Shraman Bhagvana Mahavira Part 3

Author(s): Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Parimal Publication
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/008004/1

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SRAMANA BHAGAVAN MAHAVIRA HIS LIFE AND TEACHING For Private Personal Use Only

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The Universities Commission Ministry of Education Snowdon Government of India: Snowdor. Simla. 27th July 1945 My dear Sir, I thank you very much for your letter of the 21st July, and the sut of books you sent to me. I am sorry to say that I have not been able to read them with the care and attention that they deserve. But I have seen enough to know that they must be of great value to students of religious thought. With regards, Your Sincere Sd (Radhakrishanan

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SRAMANA BHAGAVAN MAHAVIRA HIS LIFE AND TEACHING BY MUNI RATNA-PRABHA VIJAYA VOLUME III GANADHARA--VADA PARIMAL DELHI PUBLICATIONS INDIA

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We would like to put on record our heart felt gratitude to Mun Shilchandra Vijaya Gani, a family member of the author, for arranging the permission to publish the present volumes Price : Rs. 2000/- for set of six volumes First Published, 1948-50 Reprint Edition, 1989 Published by K. L. Joshi For Parimal Publications 27/28 Shaku Nagar, Delhi-110007. Distributed by Radha Publications 4378/4B, Murari Lal Street, Ansari Road Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002. Phone . 261839 Printer: Delux Offset Printers Old Rohtak Road, Daya Basti Delhi-110035.

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Introduction The Text of Ganadhara-vada (a) Sources. It is now a welknown fact that Risabhadeva Swami, the first Tirthankara of the persent series, was the founder of the Jaka Canon. It was during his regime that the Sacred, Works of the Jainas came into existence. After him, the Sacred Works increased in number and quality, when the religion was exalted to a high rank, but they were reduced considerably in times of disorder and anarchy. Generally speaking, preachings of all the Tirthankaras happend to be of the same kind, and their lives were almost similar to each other in principal characteristics, Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira, the elder contemporary of Gautama Buddha, was the last, but Supreme Tirthankara in the whole dynasty. Like His predecessors, He too had got his preachings composed in books. His Ganadharas or principal disciples arranged those preachings in twelve Angas, the last one being divided into fourteen Purvas. The Absolute Knowledge of these Purvas began to fad gradually, till at las it was totally extinct. Arya Jambu Swami was the last Kevalin. After him there were half a dozen Pattadharas designated as SrutaKevalins. Then there were ten asapurvins, possessing the knowledge of ten Purvas only. Arya Vajra Swami was the last Dasapurvin, after whom the knowledge of Purvas began to fade quickly. Devardahigani Ksamasramana was the last of the type Thus, when the knowledge of the original preaching of Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira was fast disappearing. it was rightly felt by some of his successors to commit those preachings to writing. As a result of such efforts, forty-five Sacred Works

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came into existence: 11 Angas. 12 Upangas, 10 Praksynas 0 Cheda -Siilras, 2 Sutras, and 4 Meila-Sitras.* Of these, the four Mila-Sairas are considered as the Original Sitras or Commandments, because they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina Monks in their religious practices. Avasyaka, Dasavaikalka, Uttaradhyayant and Piqda Nrryukti (or Ogha Niryuktz) are the four Mula Sulras, According to Weber the order or composition of these Sutras is this: -(1) Uttaradhyayana (2) Avasyaka (3) Dasavai kaliku and (4) Pinda Niryukli. Though Avasyaka Sutra is not the oldest of the four Mula Sutras, it is the mosi important of all, as its name suggests. Samiyeka (Samaiya) Catur vimsati Stava Paoikkamana), Vandaua ka (Vandanayam). Prati kramara (Padikkamaga), Kayotsarga (Kaussagga and P, atj akhyana (Paccakkhana), are the six divisions of the Avasyaka Sitra. It should be noted that though all these Sutras were dedacted into books by Ganadhars they were originally preached by Sramana Bhagavan. Mahavira.x Bhadrabahu Swami had already written a Niryukti on the Avagyaka Sutras and number of Curnis were also composed by several authors as detailed commentaries on the Avasyaka Sutra. Still, however, Jinabhadra-Gani Ksamasramana felt the need of ellucidating the original Niryukti; hence he wrote a Bhasya or Commentary in gathas or verse on the Nirgukti. Since this was an additional Bhasya to the Niryaukti, which itself was a Commentary on the Avasyaka Sura, it was know as Visesavasyaka Bhasya. The whole work runs into 3603 gathas or verses. It could futher be divided iuto several sub-sections such as Pithika, Varavarika, Upasargas, Samacari of ten (varieties), Ganadhara x In adduion to these. some ennumerate 20 more Prakirnas, 12 Nirauktis, and several more arriving at the total number of 84 Again in order to supplement the information supplied by those 84 agamas, there are sovoral other works known as Nigames or Upanisads which, in turn, ara 36 in all and bring the total number to 110. x. Vide by sifa y Perait faire part 1 tasvAmiNA u nicchapanayassa tatto jamo'NaNaM // 3382 // (i far9434% 978 )

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vnda, Ganadharas, Nihnavas, Nehndva-vada, Sesa Upodghala. Nir. orekti and a svadhyaya Nivyukti Of these, Ganadhara vada and Nihnavavada are the most important of all, because they discuss both positively and negatively, several philosophical topis that are vitally connected with the Jaina Agamas. Commentaries. There commentaries are said to have been written on the text of Visesovaszaka Bhasya. The author hiinself is said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by Kotyacarya ( or silankacarga ) the manuscript of which dated 1135 V S. is preserved in a latterad -ondition in the Bhandarkara Research ditute, Poona. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present, is that of Maladhari Ilemaandi acarya. Maladhari Hemacangrarara is different from Kali-Kala Sarxajna Hemcandracargia, the welknowu author of Kvyas'raja. Originally, he was welknown as Pandit Suelanbaracarya Bhattaraka, But his worldly name was Pradyumna and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the advice of Sri Abhayadeva Suri he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. Seddharaja Jayasinha, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V. S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-sperad well-versedness. (c) Ganadharas--their names, lineage etc. sramana Bhagavana Makavira had eleven ganadharas in all. All except Indrabhutt Gautama and Sudharma Swimi had attained Nirvan: or Final Emancipation during the life-time of their celebraied preceptor. Indrabhath Guntama and Sudharma Swami had attained moksa at Rajagriha, after the Nirvana of Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira. All ganadharas belonged to the high-born families. Being directly under the guidance of sromana Bhagavana Mahavira they became wide-read professors and knew all the twelve Angas along with fourteen Purras, The Table attached herewith supplies all information about the eleven ganadharas.

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Serial No. Name of 1 the Canadhara Parents' Name Place of Lineage Birth (Gotra ) 17 Janmasthana) i Indrabhuti ... Gautama Vasubhuti and Prithivi The Village of Gobara in Magadha 2 | Agnibhuti ... 3. Vayabhuti ... 4 Vyakta 5 Sudharma . Dharmamitra Bharadvaja) Kollagaand Varni -Sannivesa Dhammila Agnivaisyzand Bhapdita yana Dhanadeva * Vasistha Mauryasanniand vesa Vijayadevi 6 Mapdika .. 7 Maurya-putra 8 Akampita Mithila Maurya and, Kasyapa Vijayadevi Vasu and Harita Nanda Deva and Gautama Jayanti Datta and Kaundiya Varupadevi 9 Acalabhata ... Rosala 10 Metarya The Village of Tunsika in Kosami Rajagriha Nagar Prabhasa Bala and Atibhadra * After the death of her first husband Dhandava, Vijayadevi lived with Maurya. This 'shows that widow-remarriage was in vogue in those days,

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Duration of life incognito 1 Chad masthaparyaya ) Name of Con Duration stellation at of honsethe time of hold life Birth (Orih(Naksatra) vasa) Total Duration of | life in state of Perfect Knowledge (Keva li Paryaya) age Remarks Jyestha 50 years 30 years 12 years 92 years Kritika Swati 46 years ( 12 years 16 years 74 years 42 years 10 years 18 years 70 years 50 years 12 years 18 years 80 years Sravana Uttaraphal- 50 years 42 years guni Magha ! 53 years 14 years 8 years 100 years He was the first Patgadh 16 years 83 years ara of the Jaina Church. + 16 years 95 years Rohipi 165 years 2 years Mrigasirsa | 46 years 12 years 14 years 72 years Uttarasadha 48 years 9 years 21 years 78 years Asvini 36 years | 10 years 16 years 62 years Pusya 16 years 8 years ( 16 years 40 years Cl. parantuni, format annual tarapaTTodayapaDhamo, suhammanAmeNa gaNasAmI // (Tapagacchapattavali, Ed-by Kalyanavijayaji ).

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(0) Summary of the Text. We give below a summary of the text of Ganadharavasis which is contained in Guthas running from 1549 to 2054 of the Visesavasyaka Bhasya. (i) Jiva:-Iudrabhuti Gautama, the first Ganadhara, puts forward his doubt about the existence of Soul and sramana Bhagavana Mahavira removes the doubt by means of various evidences and Illustrations. Explaining the meaning of the word. Jira' the Bhagavana remarks that liva' does not signify body-deha-but it signifies the soul-atma-which is full of cognizance, Body is only inanimate. Smpli ( remembrance), jijnasa ( desire for knowledge ), czkirsa ( desire for activity ), jigamisa ( desire for movements ) and sams'aya (doubt) etc are the properties of Soul, which being self-evident is pratyaksa or directly apprehended Since body is corporeal and physically visible, properties, like cognizance etc. cannot reside into it. These properties are contained in Soul, because it is a-murta or incorporeal and a-caksusa or beyond the range of physical sight. This shows that Soal is absolutely different from body. In reply to the argument of the Vedantists that Soul, being one and the same everywhere, can never be classified, Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira Swami contends that if the Soul were one absolute entity. prevading everywhere, it ought to have been apprehended as one all-pervading element like akasa even in case of each and every pinca. or body. But that is not so. The Soul varies with the shape and size of pinda or body. Besides, if we deny the existence of Soul, there would be nothing like sukha-duhkha and Bandha-Moksa in this world. The Soul is accepted as vrjnanaghana or an assemblage of many vijnanas (cognitions), firstly because it is identical with vijnana which is upayoga (attention) either of the type of jnana (knowledge) or that of dartara (perception) and

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secondly because the soul has its each and every pralesa ( the minutest portion ) formed from the assemblage of infinite modifications of vijnana. According to the Naiyayika School, the Soul is devoid of vijnana and hence inanimate. The Jaina Preceptor refutes this theory by arguing that the soul is said to have been produced and destroyed only with regard to upayoga or attention, but it is indestructible so far as vijnana is concerned, on account of its vijnana-santali or the perpetual continuance of cognition. (ii) Karma : Solving the doubt of Agnibhuti, the second Gapadhara, sramana Bhagavana Mahavira Swami establishes the existence and significance of Karma as follows : Just as a sprout has seed as its hetu or cause, pleasure and pain experienced by the people of this world must also have some sort of hetu, This hetu is nothing but deeds or Karma of the living beings in their past life. Just as the body in youth has the body in childhood to precede it, the body in childhood has also some sort of body to precede it. The body formed of Karmas of the past life and hence known as Karmana Sarira, precedes the body in childhood, Just as, each and every act performed by a living being in this world yields a fruit, as is seen in case of tilling the ground and many other acts, so also, the acts of charity etc. undertaken by a living being undoubtedly yield fruit which is nothing but Karma. Since a majority of living beings, is found unhappy and only a few of them are found happy, we can easily infer that there are only a few who perform good actions and there are many who perform evil actions. It should be noted that Karma here, is different from Kriya or action, as Karma becomes Karya, and Kriya the Karaga. Since pleasure and pain etc. are the properties of soul,

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the soul would become their samavayi-karana or the intimate cause, and Karma, a nimutta or the external cause, is corporeal Karma Since Karmana Sarira is closely connected with jiva, it is beyond the power of sense to perceive it. But there is no doubt that it is a sort of suksma (subtle) sarira of an interior natnre. Cosequently, like the variegated transformations found in cloud, vicitrata or varieations should be accepted in case of Karmana Sarira as well The Soul is connected with Karma as intimately as a murta ghata is connected with a-murta akasa or a mitra finger is connected with the a-mutra actions of expansion and contraction. So like seed and sprout, body and Karma are mutually related as hetu and hetumat rendering theory the Karmasantana anadi or beginningless. Finally, by the help of Veda-padas, the Bhagavana establishes Karma as the intervening agent which helps the soul in the production of body. He further explains that punya is produced by hoty deeds and papa by unholy deeds. (ii) Relation Between Soul and body: According to Vayubhuti, the third Ganadhara, soul and body are indentical. But the Great Preceptor explains to him the relation between soul and body in details and removes his illusion According to him, cetana or consciousness is not the property of each one of the five bhutas or principal elements which constitute the body, but cetana is the intrinsic quality of soul residing into a group of bhutas. For, if cetana were the quality of all bhutas taken together, it ought to exist in a dead body as well. But it does not happen so. Just as Devadatta, who recollects an object perceived through the five windows of a palace in the past, is different

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from the five windows, as well as, the palace, so also person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses. When Devadalta recalls an objects seen through a number of windows, even the windows are closed, it is almin of soul that recollects the objects perceived through senseorgans even when toe sense-organs have Ctased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that alman is different from indriyas. Or, suy, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits vikuras or perversion by distilling saliva etc. by means of tongue, is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, ulman is different from mdi ijas, because having seen an object by means of eyes, atman holds j! by means of hands. In reply to the Buddhistic theory that like all objects, jiva is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experierce of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life, Bauddhas advocate the destructibility of jnana (knowledge) by means of statenients such as "Yat sat tat sai vam ksanikan" and "Ekavijnanasautatayah sattrah" etc. But if the destrutibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of smarana. Inana of the pramala or the perceiver) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. Jrana being a quality, could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body. Futher, according to Bauddhas, ksaqihata or impermanence i recognized neither by maans of self-perception for by the help of perception through sense-organs, but hy means of Tapanana or inference only. They further believe that the

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14 earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by virtue of that desire, even a ksamika vijnaua having only one support, is able to apprehend other jnanas and their visayas. This theory of Bauddhas seems fallacious. For, vasana or desire mentioned above, could be applied only when it is related to vasaka or vasauiya and could never be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Lastly, if atman were taken to be ksnika, faults such as production of many objects at a of vijnana, and violation of the law of cause would crop up. These faults could only be were taken as susceptible to utpada or production, vyaya or destruction, and dhrauvya or retention. a number of time, retention and effect etc., avoided if soul In addition to all these arguments, the sentence of Vedas also leads to establish that alman is different from body. (iv) Existence of Elements: In coures of discussion with the fourth Ganadhara named Vyakta, the Bhagavana explains the validity of the view that elements do exist. Since jiva etc are contained in bhulas or elements, doubt about bhuitas gives rise to doubts about the existence of all leading to the idea of all-pervading negation. Consequently, we will be compelled to take the whole Universe as nothing but illusion or dream. And according to this notion of all pervading negatiou, there will be no distinction between svamata or one's own opinion and papa mata or another's opinion, hrasva or small, and dirgha or long, and so on. Some objects are self-accomplished like a cloud produced as a result of collision, with the element as a case without he help of any Karta or agent. Some objects are accomplished like ghata by means of an outside agent, while some other objects, are produced by means of their virtues, as well as, the Outside agents as in the case of a child produced by means

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of its parents, as well as its, own Karmas. Lastly, there also exist some objects like sky which are permanently accomplished. Whatever is accepted and apprehended by us as being produced by means of samgari or a group of materials, is nothing but a collection of atoms. This naturally leads us to believe in the existence of atoms. Out of the five main bhutas or elements, the first four viz Prithvi ( earth!, ap (water), tejas (fire) and vaya are sa-cetana or animate, because the symptoms of celana are found in all of them. But the fifth element vis, akasa ( sky ) being a murla or incorporeal, acts only as a support and has no life. * Though distinct from the variations of clouds etc, bodies made- of the first four elements are sa-eetaxa only so long as they are unstruck by any implerpent. These bodies turn lifeless immediately if and when they are struck by some implement. At this point, the Bhag avana explains the important doctrine of Ahimsa or non-violence. He dictates that according to the specific laws of morality, that which results in evil consequences, is called himsa and that which results in good fruition is called a-himsa One does not commit himsi in spite of his striking a jiva If his motive in doing so is beneficial at the end; 01 the other hand, a person is said to have committed himsa on account of his evil motive, inspite of his abstention from strikirg a living being. All these facts lead to prove that bhutas do exist, and that out of the five main bhutas, the first four are sa-cetana. (u) Identity of Existence: Sudharman, the fifth Ganadhara. asksd a question as to whatever a living being in * Vegetables being only a varity of Prlhvet should be included under Prthui.

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this world lived a similar life in the other world. Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira Swami removes his illusion by the following explantion: Attainment of re-birth or existence in the other world depends upon the Karmas of an individual. The Kurmabandha -which binds the soul to the body is caused by muthyatva ( wrong belief ), a-virati ( non-renunciation ) pramada ( carelessness ), aud yoga ( vibrations set up in the soul through mind, body, and speech ! Para-bhava, being dependent upon Karma, happens to be vicitra like Karma. So, if the life in two existences were one and the the same, there would be no scope for an increase or decrase in it. In such a case, one who is rich in this life would become rich in the next life also, and a poor man in this life, would remain poor in the next life also Thus, there would be nothing like progress or retardation, if this and the otner life were to be the same or identical. Consequently, there would be no justification for the praetice of religious duties and pious deeds in this world. This shows clearly that similarity or identity between the two bi avas or existences would never be possible, and the belief is refuted by means of Veda-padas like " Srugalo vai esa jayate yvh sa-puriso dahyate " etc. also. (vi) Randha and Moksa: Since body and soul are connected with each other as helu and hetumat, they must havn perdetual continuance. The tendency of body is such that it becomes the cause of the future body and effect of the past Karmas In case of an anadi sanlana also, that which is the cause of future body and effect of the past one, becomes decidedly a perpetual continuance of body and Karma. This proves the existence of Karma-bandha The mutual relation between Jiya ane Karma is endless and beginningless (anadi ananta) like sky, and at the same time beginningless, but limited (anadi santa, like that between

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gold and stone. The anadi-aranta relation exists with regard to a-bhavya or mean jivas, and the anadi santa relation exists with regard to bhavya or higher souls Bhavya means that which is fit Siddhi. The group of such bhavyas, and hence it could never be destroyed. for the attainment of is endless like akasa, Mokst means separation or shedding off of the Karmapudgalas from soul. Moksa is neither ktitaka or artifical, nor a-nitya or impermanent. It can be said to be a-nitya only to the extent that everything is nitya or everlasting as dravya (substance) and a-nity's or impermanent as paryayt or modification. Like consciousness, movement is also an important property of soul. Free souls possess movements. But these free souls cannot go beyond Silllhaksetra in absence of dhirmastikaya. Dharmasiikaya and Adharmastikaya are the two factors which distinguish loka from a-loka. Like Kala, Mukatma is also anadi That is, just as nobody knows which was a first day or a first night, since the stream of Kala flows on from times immemorial, in the same way, nobody knows when the first free soul came into existence. Innumerable siddhas or mukla beings could be contained in one siddka-ksetra by virtue of their a-murtatva or form lessness as the Siddha-ksetra has only limited dimensions. Bandha and Moksa are, therefore, laid down as positive factors existing by virtue of Karmas, as shown above. (vii-vii) Existence of Devas and Narakas; i xistence of devas or gods and Nirakas or hellish denizens could be proved in various ways. At the time of a Tirthankara's birth, many gods and goddesses come to this world to pay their homages.

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Like luminary gods such as Moon etc, other gods are also perceptible. Here if it is said that Moon etc., are not luminary gods but they are mere places of habitation, there ought to exist inhabitants of these places also. And these inhabitants are none but gods. It is impossible to find people in this world who are cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. For, in this world, a happiest man is undoubtedly affected by some sort of disease, or old age, and an extremely miserable man will experience the happy breeze of cool wind, and the brightness of light. From this point of view, luman beings could never be called cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. It is the Narakas or bellish denizens only, who are destined to the cent per cent misery and it is the devas or divine beings who enjoy cent per cent happiness. It is true that sometimes a human being is allegorically called a 'god but we should not forget that unless and until the principal meaning of a world is attained, the secondary meaning could never be and narakas are acaksusa z. e., beyond the perception of senses, they do exist. (ix) Papa Punya:There are five the existence of papa-punya: different theories about (1) Thero exists punya alone which increases or decreases causiog pleasure or pain. (2) There exists papa alone which increases or decroases causing pain or pleasure. (3) Punya and papa exist in a combided stase like mecakamani (4) Panya and papa are independent or each othpr. (5) There is nothing like Karma, and bence there is nothing like punya and papa also. S'ramapa Bhagavana Mahavira Srini refutes all the above-mentioned theories and establishes his own in this way: Just as a potter accompained by earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be tne cause of ghata, there do exist punya md

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papa which are but respectively good and evil forms of Karma that works as the hetu or cause in the production of body. Though there exist visible hetus like father and mother in the production of body, there do exist invisible hetres like punyas and papas also, which determine the form proportionate or im-proportionate, beautiful or ugly, according as it is due to punya or papa. In other words, subha sarira is the product of priya karma, and a-subha sarira is the product of papa karma. Like the murta ghata which becomes the cause of a-murta jrana, the murta karma is also the cause of a-miirta sukha. duhkha or pleasure and pain etc. The experience of exquisite happiness is caused by the abundance of punya and the experience of utmost miseries is due to the abundance of sins. Prnia and papa which thus act as the causes of happiness and misery are independent of each other. Since, there is no reason for the Karma-bandha of punya and papa taken together, they can never exist in a combined state like mecakamani As seen before, mithyotva, a-virati, kasaya, pramada and yoga are the main causes of Karma-bandha. None of these causes happens to operate in case of the production of a combined state of mecakamani. Fruition of jiva subha or asubha turns the Karma subha or asubha-at the time of apprehension. Food of the same kind produces blood, flesh and saliva etc. in the body on one hand. results in useless refuge of faeces and urine also on the other hand. In the same way, Karma though apprehended in similar ways, results as subha of a-subha by virtue of parinama and asraya. Thus, according to Jainism, there do exist punya and papa as separate entities, (x) Para-bhava or the Other World: Since Atman is Strisceptible to production, destruction, and retention as seen before, it must have an access to the next world. When jiva first apprehended ghata and then apprehendeds pata the

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20 apprehension of ghatam-known as ghata--cetana--is destroyed, that about pata-or pata-cetanamis produced and the retana is retained in a continuous range of corsciousness existing from times immemorial. The same is the case with jivas which are staying in this world, or which have already passed to the other world. For, since they are succeptible to upada, vpapa, and dhranvya, they have a natural access to the next world, Moreover, if there were absolute negation of para-loka the commandments. of performing agnihotra etc. for one desirous of Salvation, and the prescription of the rewards of righteous deeds such as charity etc. would be of no avail. (xi) Nirvana or Final Emanicipation : Buddhistic theory of Nirvana is this:-A lamp, when extinguished, does never fade into any sort of earth, ether or space, but it only pacifies itself; so also, the Soul, when finally liberatecd ( from body ) does never fade into earth or sky, nor does it pass to any of the directions, but it only attains pacification at the removal of worldly bondages of sukha-duhkha. There is another theory also, which asserts that moksa or nirvana is a peculiar positve condition of the soul, at the attainment of Absolute Knowledge and Perception, when all sorts of miseries such as affection, enmity, pride, avarice, infatuation birth, death, old age, and diseases etc. have been removed. Refuting both the above-stated theories, Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira asserts that moksa means the entire separation of Karma from the region of soul. Since the mundane world has its production due to Karma, it vanishes with Karma. But jivatva happens to exist from times immemorial, and is not produced by Karma. So, jivatva, naturally, can never vanish with Karma. It is not prorer, therefore, to believe that at the tfme of Nirrana, jiva vanishes like a lamp.

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Really speaking, the flanie of a lamp does not vanish entirely but it only changes its form, Just as inilk changes its fo'm into curds, the flame of a lamp changes iuto darkness. The minute particles of the flam of a lamp transform themselves into still more minute particles of darkness which are not perceptible. But that does not mean that they have ceased to exist entirely. As a matter of fact, the light-particles of the flame which were perceptible to the eye, would become perceptible to nose when turned into darkness. So, the lamp does not entirely dic away, but it only changes from light into darkness which is perceptible Like lamp, jiva is also said to have attained N:rvana or Final Emancipation, when that jiva passes into a new form which is a-murta, free from Karma-bandhas and which is unobstructible. This, therefore, shows that the pure, enternal, positive condition of jiva at the removal of obstructions like sukha-dulkha is called the state of Nirvana or Final Emancipation to the jiva Like a sage, engrossed in the highest bliss of Absolute Knowledge, a Muklatma liberated from the bondages of all sorts of worldly miseris, like birth, death, and old age etc enjoys a blissful state of Perfect Knowledge, Finally, explaining the real interpretation of the sentences of Vedos such as " Na ha vai sas'arirasys priya'prij ayorapahutirasti " as well as " Asariram va vasantam priya'priye na sprasatah" etc., sramana Bhagavan Mahavira Swami convinces the Ganadhara of the validity of the theory of Nirvana, and removes all his doubts. (For further explanation see discusssion with the last Ganadhara ). Ganadharavada and Nihnuvavada, Although both the Vadas ultimately point to the coinion goal of the realistion of truth, there is a great contrast between Ganadhara-vada and Nihnavavada. In so far as their subjects, method of discussion, debators, and the consequences of debate are concerned. These points of contrast could be explained briefly as follows:

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Ganadharavada deals with a positive type of discussion while Nihnavavada deals with negative type of discussion. Ganadhar avada strengthens the hands of Jaina Agamas by asserting certain cardinal virtues of the Jaina Religion Nihnavavida tries to repudiate the principle of Jainism in one way or the other weakening thereby its influence over the people. Discusaions in O. V. are based on the interpretations of certain Vedavacanas; those in N. V. are based on the interpretations of the Jaina Agamas, Ganadharas enjey the proud privilege of entering into debate with sramana Bhagavana Mahavira Himself; Nihnavas enter into controversy with Precept or of one Gaccha or the other Ganadharas entertain honest doubts in their minds from the begining and hence accept the principlas of Tirthankara as soon as they are convinced; Nihnavas, in most cases, do not leave their rigid beliefs in spite of any number of solid arguments advanced by their opponents. Debates of Ganadharars, therefore, seem to have generated for the realisation of trutli, while those of Nihnavas, are caused out of jealousy, anger. vanity, or infatuation in many cases. Thus, love of truth is at the root of N. V. All the Ganadharas argue with their Celebrated Preceptor frankly with true desire for knowledge, and hence they do not hesitate in accepting the Diksa ultimately, when all their doubts are dis pelled; Nihnavas on the other hand, deliberately try to hide the truth in order to refute the theory amongst the monks and create disruption in the Gaccha. Faith in Agamas is the guiding spirit of Ganadharas scepticism fs the inain charactesistic of Nihnavas. In G V., the debators are non-Jaina persons who are initiated into Jainism at the end; in N. V. the debators not only Jainas but the learned Jaina monks themselves who abandon the Jaina church and try to establish their own School. Logic, pure and simple, brings the debators to the right path in G. V.; physical punishment brings the debators to the right path in many cases in N. V. a In G. V., the discussions are held on a very high level as they treat philosophical subjects from beginning to end; while

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23 in N. V , the discussions sometimes fall to the level of mere lo. gical tricks employed for refuting a small argument related to a certain statement of agama. Ganadharas never went against the Jaina Canon; on the contrary they sponsored the movement of establishing its influence over the masses by dedacting the principles of preachings of sraman, Bhagavana Mahavira into books. It was not so with Nzhnwas. Since they were prominent monks holding strong influence over the public, the Nihnavas actully propagated their wrongly-based theories among the dull -witted monks and defiled certain portions of the Gaccha, by dragging some of its members on their sides. Rohagupta and Sivabhiiti are the glaring instances of this type. In short, the tendency of being at perfect agreement with the preachidgs of Sramina Bhagavana Mahavira signifies the character of Garrdha. ras; while that of being at disagreement with the same, either in part or in toto, reflects the character of Nihnavas, The Author-His Life, Works, and Date Life Jinabhadaragani Ksamasramana is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet, there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his aget He was the first Jaina writer and preacher who had consistently attemped to interprete and explain the principles of the Jaina Canon in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people That is to say, he did not instruct his puplis or followers only in a tradional way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the Jaina Canon, he interpreted and i Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:(i) fa afir Fatih ATHARI ___ ya dhUtAjjItamuddadhe zauriH sindhoH sudhAmiva // 1 // * Tilakacarya in his Avasayaka Vritli.

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2A explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age, and hence was awarded the title of "yugapradhana " * His knowledge was not confined to the religious fore, but he was well-versed in the sciences of mathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also. I Still, however, Acarya Jinabhadra Cami was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional Jaina Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge anc intelligence, were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticitv and validity of the Jaina Agamas. He is therefore taken as one of the pioneer agama-pradhana or orthodox Acaryas* He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view-point (ii) vAkyavizeSAtizayavidhasandehahArimiH / jinamudaM jinabhadaM ki kSamAzramaNa stuve / -Muni-Candra Suri in Amara Caritra (A) jinavacananataM viSamaM bhAvArtha yo vivijya ziSyebhyaH / inthamupAdizadamalaM paropakAraikakRcetAH // taM namata bodhajalarSi gudamaMdiramakhilavAgminAM zreSTham / caraNazriyopagaDaM jinamadramaNizagAzramaNam // - Malayagiri Suri in his Commentary on Britha Ksetra Samasa. + Vide namaha ya aNuoga-ghara jugappahANaM pahAganANAyamaya / savva-sui-satNa -kulaM dasaNa-kANAvaogamagAmmaThiyaM // --Siddhasena Suri in his Curni on Jitaklpasutra. + Vide sa-samaya para-samayAgama-livi-gaNiya-chanda sahanimmAo / dasasa vi dizAsu jasma ya aNuo (anuvA) bhaNajJa jayapaDaho / ( Ibid)

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25 of the traditional Jaina Agamas, and were rejected if they want against the tradional preachings. The example of his predecessor Siddhasena Divakara is welknown. Siddhasena was a freeminded, but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent, ideas, irrespective of their being diffrent from or similar to the traditional Jaiua Agamas. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneously but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations. Siddhasena thus went against the traditional view of the Jaina Agamas according to which the Kevala-Jrana and the Kevala-Darsana took place simultaneously. Jinabhadra Gani Ksrmasramana repudiates the theory of Siddhasena Divakara in his Visesavasyaka Bhasya and re-establishes the original theory of the Jaina Agamas that Kevala Darsana and Kevala Jnana take place simultaneously.* Jinabhadra Gani is, thus, well-renowned as the up-holder of the Jaina traditions. That Jinabhadra Gani Ksamaframana was an orator of established repuation is known from several seurces. The commentator Hemcandracarya Maladhari refers to Jinabhadragani as " Upa Jinabhadra Ksamasramanah Vyakhyatarah ". Another commentator named Kotyacarya, who has written a commentary on the Visesavasyaka Bhasya, pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says I mASyaM sAmAyikasya sphuTavikaTapadArthopagUDhaM bRhadyaDrImatpUjyairakAri kSatakaluSadhiyAM bhUrisaMskAradhAri / + Vide qrAgA-fazni gufa--ATEITITTATI jiNabhaddakhamAsamaNaM khamAsamaNANa nihANamiva eka // (Ibid ) Also vide Jitakalpasutra Editor's Preface, p. 7 * Vide 790-aastor ( ATAFTA) Frei + Vide " Short History of Jaina Literature" Ed, by M. D. Desai, p, 152, foot-note.

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26 tasya vyAkhyAnamAtraM kimapi vidadhatA yanmayA puNyamAsaMpretyAhaM drAg krabheyaM paramaparimitAM prItimatraiva tena // No more information is available about the life of this great Acarya. Works Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana is said to have composed the following works: (i) Visesavasyaka Bhasya. This welknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of Jainism. The author himself wrote a commentary on this Bhasya, in Sanskrit. Jinabhadragani has earned the repulation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as Bhasyakara. the refences have been quoted from Visesavasyaka Bhasya. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the Jita Kalpa Sutra* it is not improbable if Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana had composed other bhasyas as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the Visesavasayaka Bhasya poggala - modaya-dante pharasamabaDasAlamaMjane caiva / zrINAdiyassa e e dihaMtA hoti nAyamvA // 235 // In this verse, the examples of poggala ( flesh ), modaya, (sweet-balls), danta (teeth), pharusaga (a potter) and vadasala (the branch of a tree) have not been explained in details by the commentators. Acarya Hemacandra Maladhari suggestively remarks that 'etAnyudAharaNAni vizeSato nisIyAdraksevAni (These examples should be understood in details from Niseetha). "6 "" Kotyacaryat also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying ":" (We shall explain in this Niscetha) * Vide Jita Kalpa Sutra, Preface, Page 9. Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

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The question arises as to who is the author of Niseeth. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to Hemacandracarya Maladhari or to Koyacarya. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by Jinabhadra Gani and the sentence "Apfe a" found in the commentary of Kotyacarya, might have orginally belonged to the commentary written by Sri Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana himself. (ii) Brihat Samgrahani--This work runs in almost 500 verses. Acarya Malayagiri Suri has written a commentary on this work in Sanskrit. The work along with the Commentary has already been published. (iii) Brihat Ksetra-Samasa-This is also a similar work. Acarya Sri Malayagiri Siri and others, have written commentaries and the work along with the cominentaries is published, (iv) Jita Kalap Sitra--This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the Jaina Monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstration. The subject of remonstration has already been treated in the Cheda-satra and other works, Jinabhadra Gani seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner. The oldest conimentary available on this work at present is the cirsi of Siddhasena in Prakrit. In his Carni, Siddhasena remarks at one place, that there existed some other curni* also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present On this Curni of Siddhasena, Sri Candra Sari has written expianatory notes in Sanskrit. Besides the cur i of Siddhasena, there is one more curni availaole in Prakrit verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same carni that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of composition * 3171 Filargiu-faranga ata pa gitu a ofen

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either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end. (v) Visesanavah : This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 Prakrit verscs and is not publiched as yet. In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider Dhyana-sataka which has been incorporated by Acarya Maharaja Haribhadra Suri in his commentary on the Avasyaka Sutra, also to be the composition of Jinabhadra Gani Ksama-sramama. But there are not sufficient evidences to convine us of his authorship of Dhayana-Sataka. Date There are no definte means that help us to fix the exact date of Jinabhadra Gani Ksama-sramana. Still, however, the tradition of various Pattavalis throws considerable light on the problem. I he tradition of the Pattavalis written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that Jinabhabra Gani Ksamasramana flourished 1115 years after the Nirvana of sramana Bhagavana Mahavira. This tixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S. There is another theory which assigns to Jinabnhadragani 500 years earlier than his commentator Maladhari Hemacandracarya who is said to have flourishec in 1175 V. S. According to this theery also, Jinabhadragani Ksama-sramana must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S. The author of Tapagaccha Patlavali places Jinabhadragani ksama-sramana as the contemporary of Acarya Sriman Haribhadra Suri who is said to have written a commentaary on Dhyana Sataka. According to this view, Jinabhadra Gani had lived a long life of 104 years, and though Acarya Haribhadra Suri was senior to him by 60 years, both of thern * At the end of teis bhasya the only reference is this: sa. 1720 varSe mAgazIrSa zudi / zukravAsare adyahe zrIpattaja li. zrI mada jJAtinA kAzIdAsAtmejana aMbAdattena / zubhaM bhavatu / zivamastu / (Jita Kalpa Sutra, Perface P. 17 )

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29 happend to be contemporaries on occount ef the long life of Jinabhadra Gani.* This view is not sound, because Haribhadra Suri did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 550 V. S but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as has been suggested. by Muni jinavijayaji Secondly, Sriman Haribhadra Suri has frequrently quoted Jinabhadragani's sutras in his Avasyaka vitti It is, therefore, clear that Jinabhadragani did not in any case flourish after Haribhadra Suri. According to other Pattavalis, all of Jinabhadra Gani, Haribhadra Suri, Devarddhigaai Ksamasramana, Silankacarya and Kalaka carya, happened to be contemporaries. But the historp of the development of Jainism shows that this theory is wrongly based. The date of Sriman Haribhadra Siri hus been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S. Jinabhadra Gani has been placed in the lattr hali. of the 7thi and the first half of the 8th century V. S. Devarddhigapi Ksamasramana und Kalak8carya are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S. Leaving others aside, let us consider if Jinabhadra Gani and Silankacarya happened to flourishi at the same time. The tradition says that SilaNGkacarya was the priest of Tanaraja, the king of Anahillapura Pasana. If this is true, the date of Silaikacarya falls somewhere near 800 V. S. This places Silankacarya undoubtedly as the contemporary of Acarya Sree Haribhadra Sariji. Now some of the Pattavalis refer to silankacarya as the pupil of Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana. If this Silankacarya is the same as the commentator Kotyacarya, several references about Jinabhadragani found in his commentary on the Visesavasyrka Bhasya, do not in any way lead us to believe that Silaikacarya was the pupil of Jinabhadragani, Unfortunately, the last and last portions of this commentary are torn out, + but in course of * Vide Ari Tapagachcha Pattavali, Vol I. page 98 + Vide Jitakalpa Saetra, Preface, pp. 14-15.

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his cominentary, the conimentator refers to Jinabhadragani Ksa misramana at several place. e. g. (i) farauguft9978744749ers at thy! (ii) sta ga gina: FratATU ANITTHET DIT! (iii) 9974792747 744 (iv) $997990etatat97 (v) xitam *TCFY41919114f97at ota: Although these references show how much respect the commentator had for Jinabhadra Gapi ksamasramana, they do not in any way lead us to believe that Jinabhadra Gaoi was his preceptor On the contray, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of Jinabhadra Gani and Silankacarya The reference is this : bhASyAnanuyAyi pAThagantaramidaM agratA, evamanenaiva vRddhikrameNetyAderA, na cedaM bhUyasISu pratiSa dRzyate // " This reference shows that there were various readings of Vibesavasyaka Bhasya in the time of Silankacarya, which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the Visesavasyaka Bhasya. This, therefore, pervents us from accepting the visw that Jinabhadra Gani Ksamasramana was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of Silankacarya Thus, there are many difficulties in according Jinabhadra Capi as the contemporary of Sijankacary or even that of Haribhadra sur. iji and others. It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the better of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the daie of Jinabhadra Gani Ksama.

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sramana as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V. S, Ethics: PHILOSOPHY. According to Jaiuism, the main purpose of every living being on this earth, viz nirvana or final emancipation is attained in the simultaneous observance of these three main doctrines: (1) Right Belief (Faith in the teachings of Jinas) (2) Right knowledge (knowledge of his doctrine) that leads to Salvation and (3) Right Conduct (Perfect Conduct). According to the Jain Philosophy, belief in real existence of tattvas is Right Faith. Knowledge of. real nahire without doubt or error is Right Knowledge attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of exiernal world, is Right Conduct Virtue consists of the five-fold conduct of one who has knowledge and faith:-- 1. Innocence-or a-himsa which is not mere negative abstention but positive kindness to all creation. 2. Charity and Truth-speaking. 3. Honorable conduct-such as not stealing. 4. Chastity in word, thought, and deed. Renunciation of all worldly interests. 5 Jaina Ethics lay stress on both faith and works. All those actions which lead to peace of mined are praya Himsa or infliction of suffering is the great sin or papa. Untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit etc are other sources of sin Sin is no offence against God, but only against man according to Jaina ethics. The ethical system of the Jainas is more rigorous than that of the Buddhists. It looks upon patience as the bighest good, and pleasure of senses as a source of sin.

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The chief feature of Jainism is ahimsa respect for all and abstention from injuring everything that has life. ) The Jainas repudiate the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing or as a series of accidents. According to them, there can neither be destruction of things that do exist nor there be creation of things out of nothing. So, according to this view, there is no God necessary for creation or destruction. Jainism looks upon God, Nature, and Soul, as aspects of the same. According to Jaina ethics there is no God; except the soul in its ideal integrity. Jaina Philosophy tells us that the life of agood in heaven is one of the forms that a soul might assume by the accumulation of punya (merit). According to them, gods are only embodied souls like men and animals different from them in degree but not in kind. The liberated souls are above gods. They are never born again, and they have no connection with the world. Meditation or adoration of the Jenas sanctifies the soul. Theory of Soul: Pluralita os spirits According to the Jaina philosophy, the universe is filled with jivas. Jiva means whatever is living and not whatever is meachanical. So, it correspond to the life-elemant of Berogson. And since it is subjects of esperience it also corresponds to the monad of Leibniz. Jainism does nohtseem to have made exact distinctions between jiva and Atman, a gira and matter. A jiva is a particular kind of existent being. The liberrted jiva freed from matter, is called the Atmax. Atman means pure consciousness untinted by matter. It excludes all space and externality. It is the jiva purified and raised to the highest spiritual status, which is mere formless consciousness,

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33 On the other hand, pudzala is not pure matter untouched by consciousness. It alrealy bears the impress of spirit. Ataman is the spirit of being and matter is the negative principle of non-living. The latter corresponds to the space of Bergson, or the materia prima of Leibniz. The bare materiality of pudgala is the direct opposite of spirit. A jiva is the combination of the two. It is material-spiritual. A soul loaded with matter is evolved in bondage. All jivas in amsara are assoniated with this negative element, Jainism believes that Atman or the pure spirit, or pure matter, and jiva which is a combination of the two, are existent, though the first two are imperceptible to us. The pudgalu skandka which we see, has also an element of consciousuess, and is as much a jiva as others, so far as the essence is concerned. The jiva and the a-jiva of the Jain as are not empirical abstractions of Atman, or consciousness, and Matter or non-consciousness but the products of an interaction between the two. Strictly speaking, Atman and non-alman are the primary elements. Jiva possesses more of self, a-jiva more of non-self. They represent two orders of arrangement in the whole univers. Jainim believes in plurality of spirits. The jiva are many, but are alike eternal. Their characteristic essence is never destroyed, however much it is obscured by external causes. They are regarded as possessing size which is varying in different cases. They contract and expand according to the dimensions of the body with which they are incorporated for the time being. Truly speaking, the essence of all jivas is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of sivas. It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth. Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in t'ie sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. Por, the Jaina Canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one

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34 another, nor could they experience different lots; there would not be Brahmins, Ksa!riyas, l'ais yas and Sndras; insects, birds and snakes. All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life, and those who, in this world, practise right conduct. Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, Jainism asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism. x Theory of Knowledgemma Like the thuory of soul, that of Knowledge is also distinctive of Jainis>>. The Jainas admit five kinds of knowledge viz., Mati sruta, Avadha Mananparaya and Kevala. 1. Nari is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions. We always have sense-perceptions or darsana prior to the rise of mati-jnana. 2. Sruta or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words. while mati-jnana gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description. 3. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of time or space. It is knowledge by clairvoyance. 4. Mananparyaya is direct knowledge of the thoughts ef others as in telepathic knowledge of other minds. 5. Kevala or Perfect Knowledge, comprehends all substan ces and their various modifications. It is omniscience unlimited by time, space, or object. This knowledge, which is independent of the senses, which can only be felt and not described, is possible only for purified souls which are perfectly free from bondage. * Vide Sutrakritanga, ii 7.48 and 51. X Cf Bosanquet-" It is freely admitted that in cognition, the sell is universal. It goos out into a world which is beyond its om given being and what it meets there it holds in common with othor selyes, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit." (Gifford Lectures, Second Sorios, Chap. II }

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The first three kinds of knowledge, are liable to error, while the last two cannot be wrong. Knowledge is pratyaksa or direct when it is immediate, and paroksa or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge, mati and fruti are faroksa and the rest pratyaksa. Cetana or consciousness is the essence of jiva and the two manifestations of celana are perception darsana) and intelligence (inan:'. In darsana, the details are not perceived while in jnana they are The former is simple apprehension, the latter conceptual knowledge. The relation between knowledge and its object, is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness The consciousness of jiva is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature, as well as, that, of the object. Ineya or object of knowledge includes silf and non-self. Like light, jnana reveals itself and other o'jects. The Nyaya - Vaisesika theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself, is rejected by the Jainas. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self, according to them, and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object, is dismissed by them as absurd, since it is the nature of knowledge that it reveals objects. With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between jnana and jneya is very intimate, Jaanin and jnana are also inseparable, though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself, become different aspects of a single concrete entity. There are jidas without jnana, since that would take away the cetana or conscious character of the jivas and reduce them to the level of a=jiva dravyas and there can be no frana without selves; for that would make jnana foundationless

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in its perfect condition, the soul is pure, Jrona and darsana ( knowledge and intuition ) arise simultaneously or are together. In the mundane jivas, jnana is perceded by darsanan Perfect knowledge is free from doubt ( samsaya ) perversity ( vimuha ) and indefiniteness ( vibhrama ) Karmas which obscure the different varieties of darsana are larsanavaroniyu Karmas and those which obscure the different kinds of jnina are jnanavarrniya karmas, These impedimeuts are passions and emotions All knowledge resides in the soul though it manifests itself when the disturbing media are removed Theory oj Karma : Karma is another important topic of the Jaina Philosophy. Karma, according to Jaruas, is of material nature (pudagalika ). The kind of matter fit to manifest Karma fills all cosmic space. It has the pecr:"iar property of developing the effect of merit and demerit. The soul by its commerce with the other world, becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle matter. These become Karma and build up a special body called "Karmaya Sarira. " which does not leave the soul till its Final Emancipation. Jivas which are found on this world in infinite number, are of three kinds ( 1 ) Nitya siddha or the ever perfect (2) Mukta or the liberated and (3) the Buddha or the bound. The second variety of jivas, does not become embodid They have achieved their purity and dwell in a state of supermundane perfection unconcerned with worldy affairs. The mundane jivas are a prey to illusion, and are condemned to the yoke of matter through an infinite succession of lines. The freed souls are absolutely pure and free from any tint of matter. They are the nirupauhi jivas leading a life of pure existence and infinite consciousness and possess infinite knowledge, infinite perception, 'infinite power, and infinite bliss.

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37 Thus, by touching the main distinctive features of the Jaime Phliosophy, we can easily remark like Sir Radhakrishanan that Jainism offers us an empirical classification of things in the Universe and so argues for a plurality of spirits. It is hoped that transliteration, translation and the digest of sanskrit commenary attached so cach verse will prove help ful to the students of Jaina Philosophy. Qujarat College Ahmedabad 20th February 1950 D. P. Thakr

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Contents Introduction 1-36 1 1. Chapter I Discussion with the First Cacadhara. 2. Chapter II Discussion with the Second Ganadhara, 78 3. Chapter III Discussion with the Third Capadhara. 138 4. Chapter IV Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara. 189 5. Chapter V Discussion with the Fifth Canadhara. 278 6. Chapter VI Discussion with the 7. Chapter VII Discussion with the Seventh Sixth Canadhara. 308 Ganadhara. 366 Canadhara. 388 Eight Ninth Canadhara. 407 8. Chapter VIII Discussion with the 9. Chapter IX Discussion with the 10. Chapter X Discussion with the Tenth 12. Chapter XI Discussion with the Eleventh Canadhara. 479 Gagadhara. 458 For Private Personal Use Only

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kSamAzramaNazrIjinabhadragaNisanhabdhaH ||gnndhrvaadH|| shriimldhaarihemcndrsuurikRtttiikaasmlkRtH| Ksamasramana Jinabhadra Gani's GANADHARAVADA Along with Maladharin H@macandra Suri's Commentary Chapter I prathamagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the First Canadlara. jIve tuha sandeho paJcakanvaM jana dhippaDa ghaDo vy| acantApaJcakkhaM ca nasthi loe khapuSpaM v||1|| (1549) Jive tuba sandeho paccakkham jam na ghippai ghaco vva 1 Accantapaccakkham ca natthi lod khapuppham va, 1 (1549) [ jIve tava sandehaH pratyakSaM yad na gRhyate ghaTa iva / atyantApratyakSaM ca nAsti loke khapuSpamiva // 1 // (1549) Jive tava sanddhah pratyaksain yad na grhyate ghata iva i Atyantapratyaksam ca nasti lokd khapuspam iva. 1 (1549)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Translation-1. (O Indrabhuti of Gautama race!) You have a doubt about (the existence of jiva (the soul) since it is not directly perceived (by senses) as in the case of ghata (a water-jar). Whatever is absolutely imperceptible, does not exist in the world, e. g., a flower in the sky. (1549) : 2: zrImaladhArihemacandrAcAryakRtA TIkA --- signa gegna ! aau: greg:-fananemisfea, aufta at, ubhayahetusadbhAvAt / tatra nAstittrahetavo'mI - nAstyAtmA, pratyakSeNAtyantamagRhyamANatvAt, iha yadatyantApratyakSaM talloke nAstyeva, yathA khapuSpam / yaccAsti tat pratyakSeNa gRhyata eva yathA ghaTaH, ityasau vyatirekadRSTAntaH / aNavospi pratyakSAH kintu ghaTAdikAryatayA pariNatAste pratyakSamupayAnti na punareva - mAtmA kadAcidapi bhAvapratyakSamupagucchati, ato'trAtyantavizeSaNamiti // 1 (1549) // Digest of the Commentary-O Long-lived Indrabhuti! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the soul. For, you come across reasons, some of which lead you to believe that the soul exists, whereas, others make you surmise that the soul does not exist. The latter are as under : The soul does not exist; for, it is, in no way, perceptible by pratyaksa pramana ( direct and valid proof) produced by a sense-orgen, as is the case with a ghata. Whatever is atyantapratyaksa (absolutely imperceptible) is certainly nonexistent in this world, e. g, a flower in the sky. Whatever exists, is certainly perceived-realized by pratyaksa pramana, 8. g., a pitcher. This is a vyatireka drstanta (a negative example ). SO Some one may here argue, that though anus (eleotrons) are not within the range of pratyaksa pramana, they are, to say, invisible; yet they do exist. So, what about them? The answer is, that no doubt they are imperceptible. to us as apas, but when they are transformed so as to perform the

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Valu] Ganacharavada functions of a pitcher, a cloth, etc., they no longer remain co. Such is not, however, the case with the Soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived. The adjeotite atyanta is here used on that account. na ya so'NumANagammo jamhA paJcakkhapuvvayaM taM pi / puvvovaladdhasambandhasaraNao liGga-liGgINaM / 2 / / (1550) Nu ya so`numanagamno jumha paccakkhapuvvayam tam pis Puvvovulaldhasambandhusaranai linga--linginam. 2 (1550) [na ca so'numAnagamyo yasmAt pratyakSapUrvakaM tadapi / __pUrvopalabdhasambandhasmaraNato liGga-liGginoH // 2 // (1550) [Na ca so'numanagainyu yasmat pratyaksapurvakam tadapi , Parvopalabdhasambandhusmaranato linga-liiginoh. 2 (1550)] Trans.--2. It (the soul) is not an object of anumana (inference); for, this (anumana), too, is preceded by pratyaksa and is the outcome of the recollection of the inseparable) connection previously observed in the case of a linga (a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a lingin (one having such a liiga) . (1550) TIkA-na cAsAvAtmA'numAnagamyaH yasmAt tadapyanumAnaM pratyakSapUrvaka pravartate / kutaH ? ityAha-"puvovaladdhe" tyAdi liGgayate-gamyate'tIndriyArtho'neneti liGgam ; athavA lInaM-tirohitamathaM gamayatIti liGgam , dhUnakRtakatvAdikam , tadasyAstIti liGgI vahatha-'nityatvAdiH, tayoli - liGginoryaH pUrva mahAnasAdau pratyakSAdinopalabdhaH kArya-kAraNabhAvAdika sambandhastasya yat smaraNaM tasmAditi / idamuktaM bhavati-pUrva mahAnasAdAvanidhUmoliGgi-liGgayoranvayavyatirekavantamavinAbhAvamadhyakSato gRhItvA tata uttarakAlaM kvacit kAntAra-parvatanitambAdau gaganAvalambinIM dhUmalekhAmavalokya prAg gRhItaM sambandhamanusarati, tad yathA-'yatra yatra dhUmastatra tatra prAgaI vahimadrAkSam , yathA mahAnasAdau, dhUmazcAtra dRzyate, tasmAd vahinApIha mbhavitavya', ityevaM liGgagrahaNa-sambandhasmaraNAbhyAM tatra pramAtA huvAjamA

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Jinabhailra Gani's [The first gacchati / na caivamAtmanA liginA sAdha kasyApi liGgasya pratyakSeNa sambandhaH siddho'sti, yatastansambandhamanusmarataH punastalliGgadarzanAjIve sampratyayaH syAt / yadi punarjIva-liGgayoH pratyakSataH sambandhasiddhiH syAt tadA jIvasyApi pratyakSatvApacyA'numAnavaiyarthya syAt / tata eva tatsiddheriti // 2 (1550) // D. C.The existence of the soul, cannot be proved by arumana (inference); for, after all, this anumana is preceded by pratyaksa pramana as is suggested by the second hemistich of this verse. Whatever reveals an object which is imperceptible to the senses, is called a linga or whatever throws light on a concealed object is a linga, and one that has a linga is called a lingin. For instance, smoke is the linga, and fire the lingin. To give another example krtakatva ( performance of an action ) is the linga, and anityatva ( impermanence ) the lingin. an inseparable connection between smoke and fire, in the form of effect and cause-the connection which is directly perceived in a kitchen, etc, can be established in two ways, viz, by anyaya (positively) and by yyatireka (negatively). Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, is an example of anvaya; and wherever there is non-existence of fire, there is non-existence of smoke, is an example of vyatireka. The recollection of the inseparable connection existing between smoke and fire, helps a man to infer the presence of fire, when he sees clouds of smoke rising to the sky, either in a forest or on the top of a mountain or the like. For, he is then reminded of having seen fire when smoke was found homing out of the kitchen or the like. Thereupon, he works up & syllogism, as under. Wherever there was smoke, I previously saw fire there, as. in the kitchen and elsewhere. I see smoke here; so, here, thoro must be fire. Thus, he rightly insers fire in view of his haying previously noticed the inseparable connection between

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 5: smoke the linga, and fire the lingin, and on his recollecting this connection, while drawing the inference. But in the case of the soul, a lingin, no connection of it, whatsoever is directly perceived with any one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, there is no room left for the recollection of an inseparable connection between the soul and its linga and hence there is no chance left for establishing the existence of the soul by anumana. Moreover, if the inseparable connection were to be observed in the case of the soul and its linga, the soul would be directly perceived, and in that ease, there would be no necessity to infer its existence. It is said: na ya jIvaliGgasambandhadarisaNamabhU jao puNo sarao / taliGgadarisaNAo jIve sampaccao hojjA / / 3 / / (1551) Na ya jivalingasambandhadarisanamabhu jao puNGo sarao | Tallingadarisanao jive sampaccao hojja. 3 (1551) [ na ca jIvaliGgasambandhadarzanamabhUd yataH punaH smarataH / taliGgadarzanAjIve sampratyayo bhavet // 3 // (1551) Na ca jivalingasambandhadarsanamabhud yatah punah smaratah | Tallingadarsanajjive sampratyayo bhavet. 3 (1551)] Trans.-3. There has not been (previously) seen (any) connection between the soul and its linga, the recollection of which, along with the sight of its linga, can lead (us) to a conviction about the (existence of) the soul. (1551). TIkA- gatArthA / na ca vaktavyaM sAmAnyatodRSTAnumAnAdAdityAdigativajIvaH sidhyati, yathA- gatimAnAdityaH dezAntaraprApteH devadattavaditi, to hanta ! devadatte dRSTAntadharmiNi sAmAnyena dezAntaraprAptiM gatipUrvikA

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The first pratyakSeNaiva nizcitya, sUrye'pi tAM tathaiva pramAtA sAdhayatIti yuktam / na caivamatra kacidapi dRSTAnte jIvasatvenAvinAbhUtaH ko'pi heturadhyakSeNopalakSyata iti / ato na sAmAnyatodRSTAdapyanumAnAta tagatiriti // 3 (1551) // D. C.-It is no use arguing that the existence of the soul can be established by an anumana which is ordinarily met with, as in the case of the motion of the Sun. To put it explicitly, the Sun is in motion; for, it reaches another region, as is the case with Davadatta. As regards the Sun, this inference is valid, since we distinctly see that Devadatta, who is here a drstantadharmin i. e., serving as an illustration, goes like the Sun, to another country after he has resorted to motion. But as far as the soul is concerned, no linga (also known as hetu ) which is inseparably connected with the soul, is directly perceived in any drstanta, (example) whatsoever. Thus, the samanyatodrsta anumana is of no avail here. The existence of the Soul cannot be proved by -agama. (seriptural authority): nAgamagammo vi tao bhijai jaM naagmo'nnumaannaao| na ya kAsai paJcakkho jIvo jassAgamo vayaNaM // 4 // (1552) Nagamgammo vi tao bhijjai jam nagamo'numanaol Na ya kasai paccakkho jivo jassagamo vayanam, 4 (1552) [nAgamagamyo'pi sako bhidyate yad nAgamo'numAnAt / na ca kasyacit pratyakSo jIvo yasyAgamo vacanam // 4 // (1552) Nagamagamyo'pi sako bhidyate yad nagamo'numanati Na ca kasyacit pratyakso jivo yasyagamo Vacanam. 4 (1552)] Tratis.-4. It (the soul) is not even within the range of agama ( scriptural authority ); for, agama is not (quite) distinct from anumana. Moreover, the soul is not pratyaksa (directly perceptible) to any one whose word is igama. (1552)

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Vada] Ganadharavada TIkA-na cAgamagamyo'pi sakA-asau jIvaH yat-yasmAdAgamo'pi nAnumAnAd bhidyate, paramArthatastasyAnumAnatvAt ; tathAhi-zAbdaM pramANAgama ucyate, zabdazca dvividhaH-dRSTArthaviSayaH adRSTArthaviSayazca / tatra dRSTArthaviSayA zabdAd yA pratItiH, sA vastuto'numAnasamutthaivam , yataH kvacit prathamaM pRthubudhnodarordhvakuNDa-loSTAyata vRttagrIvAdimati ghaTapadArthe ghaTazabdaM prayujyamAnaM dRSTA taduttarakAlaM kApi 'ghaTamAnaya' ityAdi zabdaM zrutvA pRthubudhnodarAdimadartha eva ghaTa ucyate, tathAbhUtapadArtha eva ghaTazabdaprayogapravRttaH, yathA pUrva kumbhakArApaNAdau, ghaTazabdazcAyamidAnImapi zrUyate, tasmAt tathAbhUtasyaiva pRthubudhnodarAdimataH padArthasya mayA''nayanAdikriyA kartavyA ityanumAnaM vidhAya pramAtA ghaTAnayanAdikriyAM karoti, ityevaM dRSTArthaviSayaM zAbdaM pramANa vastuto nAnumAnAd bhidyate / na caivamasAvAtmazabdaH zarIrAdRte'nyatra prayujyamAnaH kvacidpalabdhaH, yatra khalvAtmazaHzravaNAt AtmA iti pratyayo bhavediti / yadapi svarganarakAdyadRSTArthaviSayaM zAbdaM pramANaM, tadapi tacato'numAnaM nAtivartate, tathAhi-"pramANaM svarga-narakAdyadRSTArthaviSayaM vacanam , avisaMvAdivacanAptapraNItatvAt , candrArkoparAgAdivacanavat" ityevamanumAnAdeva tatra pramANatA / na caivambhUtamAptaM kamapi pazyAmaH, yasyAtmA pratyakSa iti tadvacanamAgama iti 'pratipadyemahi ' iti zeSaH // 4 (1552) // D. C.-The existence of the soul cannot be cstablished by agama; for, after all, agama cannot be separated from anumana, as, really speaking, agama is (a kind of) antimana. Agama is defined as sabda pramana, and sabda (word) is tro-fold, viz., (i) drstartha--visaya (nertaining to an object which is seen) and (ii) adrstartha-visaya (pertaining to an object which is not seen ). The conviction which is arrived at, by means of a sabda and which is associated with an object that is seen, is really an outcome of anumana. For instance, Srst of all, one notices that the word ghata is used for an object whose belly is round and extensive, whose basin is raised up and hollower out, whose neck is round, and which is made up of earth.

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Thereafter, when he hears" bring a ghata" he begins to reflect: None else but an object whose belly is round and extensive, etc., is styled as ghata; for, the word ghata is reserved for this object only-a laot noticed in the shop of & potter. I hear the word ghata; so, I should bring an object of that very kind, viz., one which is round, extensive eto. Having 80 inforred, he brings a 'ghata'. Hence, it will be seen that the sabda pramana which is associated with an object that is seen, is not separate from anumana. To think of the soul, the word 'goul' is not used for any other object but the body. Had it been, however, so used, one would have been convinced about the existence of the soul The sabda pramana associated with unseen objects like heaven, hell etc., is also, really speaking, not separate from anumana. For, the knowledge connected with unseen objects such as heaven, hell, and the like is pramana, as it comes from an apta,-a reliable personage whose word is true--& fact notioed when he predicted a lunar eclipse, a solar eclipse, and so on. Thus, here, too, the validity or truth rests upon inferenoe. There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as agama, and on the basis of this agama, the existence of the soul would have been admitted. Besides, jaM cAgamA viruddhA paropparamao vi saMsao jutto| sacappamANavisayAIo jIvo tti to buddhI // 5 // (1553) Jam cagama viruddha paropparamad vi samsao jutto 1 Savvappamanavisayaio jivo tti to buddhi. 5 (1558) [ yaccAgamA viruddhAH parasparamato'pi saMzayo yuktH| sarvapramANaviSayAtIto jIvo'sti tato buddhiH||5|| (1553)

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Vada) Ganadharavada Yaccagama viruddhah paraspara'natopi samsayn-yuktak ! Sarvapramanarisayatito jivo'sti tato buddhih. 5 (1553) ] ___ Trans.-5. Furthermore, the agamas are mutually contra. dictory. Consequently, on that account, too, (your) doubt is justifiable. You, (therefore), believe that (the existence of ) the soul cannot be established by any of the pramanas. (1553) TIkA-yatazca tIthikAnAM sambandhinaH sarve'pyAgamAH parasparavirodhinaH khalu, ato'pi saMzaya evAtmano yuktaH, na tu nizcayaH,. tathAhikecidAgamA Atmano nAstitvameva pratipAdayanti, yadAhu stikAH "etAvAneva loko'yaM yaavaanindriygocrH| bhadre ! vRkapadaM pazya yad vadanti bahuzrutAH // 1 // " ityaadi| bhaTTo'pyAha-"vijJAnadhana evaitebhyo bhUtebhyaH samutthAya tAnyevAnuvinazyati, na ca pretyasajJA'sti / " sugatastvAha-" na rUpaM bhikSavaH ! pudgalaH" ityAdi / AtmA'stitvavacanAnyapyAgameSu zrUyante, tathA ca vedaH-"na hi vai sazarIrasya priyA-'priyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA'priye na spRzataH" iti; tathA, "agnihotraM juhUyAt svargakArmaH" ityAdi / kApilAgame tu pratipAdyate--" asti puruSo'kartA nirguNo bhoktA cidrUpaH" ityAdi / tasmAdAgamAnAM parasparaviruddhatvAd naagmprmaannaadpyaatmskhsiddhiH| idaM ca vaizeSikamatena pratyakSA-'numAnA-''gamalakSaNaM pramANatrayamupanyastam / etacca svayaM draSTavyam-upamApramANagamyo'pi jIvo na bhavati / tatra hi "yathA gaustathA gavayaH / ityAdAveva sAdRzyamasanikRSTe'rthe buddhimutpAdayati / na ghehAnyaH kazcit tribhuvane'pyAtmasadRzaH padArtho'sti, yaddarzanAdAtmAnamavagacchAmaH / kAlA-''kAza-digAdayo jIvatulyA vidyanta iti cet / na, teSAmapi vivAdAspadIbhUtatvena tadaMhibaddhatvAt / apattisAdhyo'pi jIvo na bhavati /

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: 10: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first na hi dRSTaH zruto nA ko'pyartha AtmanamantareNa nopapadyate, yabalAt taM saadhyaamH| tasmAt sarvapramANaviSayAtIto jIva iti taba buddhiH, bhAvopalambha. kapramANapaJcakaviSayAtItatvAt pratiSedhasAdhakA'bhAvAkhyaSaSThapramANaviSaya eva jISa ityarthaH / iti pUrvapakSaH // 5 (1553) // D. C-The fact that the 'agamas of the various expounders of religion, are opposed to one another, justifies one to doubt the existence of the soul, rather than to admit it. For instance, some of the agamas propound the non-existence of the soul. To cite an example, the Nastikas-the atheists--hedonists Bay: << Etavan dva loko'yam yavan-indriyagocarah 1 Bhadre ! vrkapadam paja yad vadanti bahusrutan." This means :- This world is only as much as is within the range of the senses. My good lady I see the foot-prints of the wolf. Highly-learned individuals also say so. Bhatta, too, says. " Vijfanaghana dvaitabhyo bhotd bhya, samutthaya tanydvapuvinasyati, na oa protyasanjna'sti." This means :--This material body which is nothing else but consciousness, after having been generated from the five elements, is dissolved into them, and there is no clear conception for future life. Sugata says: " Na rupam bhiksavah | pudgalah" This means :-0 saints I rupa (form) is not a soul. In the agamas, we come acro88 passages which admit the existence of the soul. For instance, in the Veda, we hear - " Na hi vai sa-sartrasya priyapriyayorapabatirasti, &dari ruum ra vasantam priyapriye na sprisatah."

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :11: This means :--There is no destruction of priya (attachment) and apriya (aversion) in connection with the embodied soul. Attachment and aversion do not affect a disembodied soul. Also, " Agnihotram juhayat svargakamah " This means --An individual desirous of acquiring heaven, should perform agnihotra (a sacrifice to the god Agni). The agama of the Kapilas says:" Asti puruso akarta nirguno bhokta oidrupah." This means :--There exists a purusa ( a personal animate entity ) which is not the doer of actions, which is devoid of qualities, which is the enjoyer (of pleasure and pain ), and which is the embodiment of consciousness. Thus, since the various agamas are mutually antagonistic, the existence of the soul cannot be established even by upamana pramana ( the proof of analogy ). Yatha gau-statha gavayah, means that a cow resembles a gavaya (bos gavaeus), a species of ox. Here, the resemblance helps one to realize a distant objeot. But, in the entire universe, there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Such being the case, there is no possibility of establishing the existence of the soul, on comparing it with an object resembling it. It is no use advancing an argument that kala (time ), Akasa (space), dis (direction) etc., resemble the soul; for, there is no uniformity regarding the exposition of their nature, 80 far as the different systems of philosophy are conoerned. And hence the same trouble Even arthapatti (presumption or implication ) does not help us. There does not exist any such objeot soen or heard whose justification depending upon the soul, ora ba mtabilubad.

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212: Jinabhadra (Fani's [The first Thus, when the existence of the soul cannot be proved by any one of these five pramanas, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of abhava (uon-existence), the sixth pramana whose function is to prove non-existence. Thus, the soul does not exist. This finishes the purvapaksa ( the view of the opponent ). Now follows the refutation of the argument --- goyama ! paJcakkhu ciya jIvo jaM saMsayAivinnANaM / pacakvaM ca na sajjhaM jaha suha-dukravA sadehammi // 6 // (1554) Qoyama 1 paccakkhu cciya jivo jam sumsayaivimanam i Pacoakkham ca nu sajjham jala suha-dukkha sade hammi, 6 (1951) [gotama ! pratyakSa eva jIvo yat saMzayAdivijJAnam / pratyakSaM ca na sAdhyaM yathA sukha-duHkhe svadehe // 6 // (1554) Gautania i pratyaksa eva jivo yut samsayailivijnanam | Pratyaksam oh na sadhyaw yatha sukha dubkhe svadohd. 6 (1554)] Refutation Trans.-6. O Gautamal The soul is indeed pratyaksa to you also; for, ( your ) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the soul.-What is pratyaksa, should not be proved, e. g., weal and woe in one's body. (1554) TIkA-gautama ! bhavato'pi pratyakSa evA'yaM jIvaH, kimanyena pramANAntaropanyAsena ? / ko'yaM jIvo mama pratyakSaH ? iti cet / ucyate-yadetat tavaiva saMzayAdivijJAnaM svasaMvedanasiddhaM hRdi sphurati sa eva jIvaH, saMzayAdijJAnasyaiva tadananyatvena jIvatvAt / yacca pratyakSaM tad na pramANAntareNa sAdhyam , tathA khazarIra evAtmasaMvedanasiddhAH sukh-duHkhaadyH| pratyakSasiddhamapi sagrAma-nagaraM vizvaM zUnyavAdinaM prati sAdhyata eveti cet / naivam , "nirAlambanAH sarve pratyayAH, pratyayatvAt, khamaprattyayava" ityAdestadu

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 13: prAvitaSAdhakapramANasyaiva tatra nirAkaraNAt , atra svAtmagrAhake pratyakSe pAdhakapramANAbhAvAditi // 6 (1554) // D. C.- Gautama! the soul is directly cognizable even to you; so what is the use of resorting to other pramanas? If you ask a question as to how the soul is pratyaksa (directly cognizable ) to you, the answer is this :-- This knowledge of yours, of which the existence is proved by your own experience of it, and which you entertain in your heart, is the soul itself; for, this knowledge is identical with the soul. What could be deoided by pratyaksa should not be established by any other pramana. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery eto., which one experiences in the body. It is futile to advance an argument that though the existence of the universe consisting of villages and cities, is self-evident, yet it is to be proved so far as a nihilist is concerned. For the argument such as " Niralambana sarye pratyayah, pratyayatvat svapnapratyayavat" that is to say, all convictions are devoid of any substratum, since they are convictions, like the conviction of a dream-an argunient which can be advanced by a nibilist, and which is a badhaka pramana (prejudicing evidence ), has already been refuted. And here, there is no badhaka pramana in the case of pratyaksa which reveals the soul. The existenoe of the soul is established by pratyaksa pramana for the following reason : kayavaM karemi kAhaM vAhamahaM pacayA imAu ya / appA sa paJcakkho tikaalkbovesaao||7|| (1555) Kayavam kardmi kabam va hamaham pacoaya imau yal Appa sa ppaocakkho tikalakajjovadsao. 7 (1555)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ kRtavAn karomi kariSyAmi vAhamahampratyayAdasmAcca / AtmA sa pratyakSastraikAlikakAryopadezAt // 7 // (1555) : 14: Kritavan karomi karisyami vahamahampratyayadasmacca | Atma sa pratyaksastraikalikakaryopadesat. 7 (1555)] [ The fiast Trans. - 7. Or, this soul is pratyaksa owing to this ahampratyaya (realization as "I" in 'I did, I do, and I shall do' -the pratyaya which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses (1555) 66 TIkA - vetyathavA 'kRtavAnaham, karomyaham kariSyAmyaham '; 'uktavAnaham bravImyaham, vakSyAmyaham '; 'jJAtavAnaham, jAne'ham, jJAsyAmyaham', ityAdi prakAreNa yo'yaM traikAlikaH kAryavyapadezaH, tadviSayaprayujyamAnatayA tatsamuttho yo'yamahampratyayaH, etasmAdapi pratyakSa evA'yamAtmA iti prapadyakha / ayaM hyahampratyayo nAnumAnikaH, alaiGgikatvAt / nApyAgamAdipramANa tadanabhijJAnAM bAla-gopAlAdInAmapyantarmukhatayA''tmagrAhakatvena svasaMviditasya tasyotpAdAt, ghaTAdau cAnutpAdAditi / / 7 (1555) / / sambhavaH D. C.-In the expressions such as " krtavan aham (I did ), karomyaham ( I do ) and karisyamyaham ( I shall do ) uktavan aham ( I spoke ), bravimyaham ( I speak ) and vaksyamyaham (I shall speak), jnatavan aham (I know), janeham (I know) and jnasyamyaham (I shall know), etc.-the expressions which are associated with acts governed by all the three tenses, viz., past, present, and future, there is aham-pratyaya (the realization as "I"). This aham-pratyaya, too, establishes that the soul is pratyaksa. It should be borne in mind that this aham-pratyaya is not based on anumana; for, it has no linga. Moreover, it is not even proved by agama eto., for, even children, cowherds, and others have the conviction of this aham-pratyaya based on self-experience, though they are not conversant with pramanas such as agama etc, and that they have no such conviction regarding a ghata, a piece of cloth etc. Besides, For Private Personal Use Only ""

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 16: kaha paDivaNNamahaM ti ya kimasthi natthi tti saMsao kaha gu| sai saMsayammi vAyaM kassAhaMpaJcao jutto? // 8 // (1556) Kaba padivaNGNGamahan ti ya kim atthi natthi tti sarisao kaba nu ? | Sai samsayanimi vayan kassahan paccao jutto ? 8 (1556) [kathaM pratipanamahamiti ca kimasmi nAsmIti saMzayaH kathaM nu ? / sati saMzaye cAyaM kasyAhampratyayo yuktaH // 8 // (1556) Katham pratipannamahan iti ca kinasmi nasmiti sambayah katham nu? I Sati sansay oayam kasyahampratyayo yuktah ? 8. (1556) ]. Trans.-8. When there is no soul, how do you admit aham (the realization as I')? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this aham-pratyaya justifiable ? (1556) TIkA-hanta ! kathamasati jIve " aham" iti pratipanaM tvayA, viSayAbhAve viSayiNo'nundhAnaprasaGgAt ? / deha evAsya pratyayasya viSaya iti cet / na, jIvaviSamukte'pi dehe tadutpattiprasaGgAt / sati ca jIvaviSaye'mitrahampratyaye 'kimahamami nAsmi' iti bhavataH saMzayaH kathaM kena prakAreNopa jAyate ? ahampratyayagrAhyasya jIvasya sadbhAvAt "asmyaham" iti nizcaya eva yujyata iti bhAvaH / santi vAsinnAtmAstitvasaMzaye kasyAyamahampratyayo yujyate, nirmUlatvena tadanutthAnaprasaGgAt ? iti // 8 (1556) // ____D. C.--Hallot when the soul is non-existent, how is it that you admit "aham'? For, it is a settled fact that in the absence of a visaya (an object), there is no scope for a visayin (one having an object ). If your reply is that this ahan-pratyaya has the body alone, for, visaya is confined simply to the body, this aham-pratyaya should be possible even in the case of the body which has been given up by the soul. Moreover, if this aham-pratyaya associated with the soul arises, how can you have a doubt as to kim aham asmi (am I)

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: 16: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first or nasmi (am I nist)? For, on the contrary, in such a case, you ought to be in a position to decide that I am' owing to the sadbhava ( presence ) of the soul realized by the ahampratyaya. When there is this doubt about the existence of the soul, is there no scope for such a pratyaya owing to its being baseless ? If the non-existence of the soul is admitted, there is no possibility of a doubt regarding its existence, jai natthi saMsai ciya kimathi natthi tti saMsao kassa? / saMsahae va sarUve goyama ! kimasaMsayaM honA ? // 9 // (1557) Jai natthi samsai cciya kim atthi natthi tti samsao kassa ? I Samsaid va saruve Goyama! kimasarisayam hojja ? 9. (1557) [yadi nAsti saMzayI eva kimasmi nAsmIti saMzayaH kasya ? / saMzayite vA svarUpe gautama ! kimasaMzayaM bhavet 1 // 9 // (1557) Yadi nasti samsayi dva kim asmi nasmiti samsayah kasya ?. Samsayite va svarupd Gautamal kimasamsayam bhavdt ? 9. (1557)] Trans.-.-9. If the object about which one has doubt, is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to "kim asmi nasmi" ( whether I do exist or I do not exist)? Or, Gautama ! when you (yourself) are doubtful (about yourself), what can be free from doubt ? (1557) TIkA-yadi saMzayI jIva evAdau nAsti tahiM " asminAsmi" iti saMzayaH kasya bhavatu / saMzayo hi vijJAnAkhyo guNa eva; na ca guNinamantareNa guNaH saMbhavati / deho'tra guNIti cet, na, dehasya mUrtatvAaDatvAca, jJAnasya cAmUrtatvAt bodharUpatvAca / na cAtanurUpANAM guNaguNibhAvo yujyate, AkAza-rUpAdInAmapi tdbhaavaapcyaa'tiprsnggaapraapH| "saMsaie vetyAdi" vetyathavA saMzayite svarUpe gautama ! kimasaMzayaM zeSaM bhavet / idamuktaM bhavati -'kimami nAsmyaham ' ityevaM yaH svarUpe'pi saMzete--Atmanizcayo'pi yasya nAstItyarthaH tasya zeSaM karmavandha-mokSAdikaM ghaTa-paTAdikaM ca kimasaM.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :11. zayam-asandigdhaM syAt ? na kazcit , sarvasaMzaya eva tasya syAdityarthaH, AtmAstitvanizcayamUlo hi zepavastunizcaya iti bhaavH| ahampratyayagrAhyaM ca pratyakSamAtmAnaM niDhuvAnasya "azrAvaNaH zabdaH" ityAdivat pratyakSaviruddho nAma pakSAbhAsaH, tathA vakSyamANAnmAstitvAnumAnasadbhAvAd "nityaH zabdaH" ityAdivadanumAnaviruddho'pi / tathA "ahamasmi saMzayI" iti prAgabhyupagamyoratra "nAmi" iti pratijAnanasya sAGkhyasyAnityaH kartA, acetana AtmetyAdivadabhyupagamavirodhaH / bAlagopAlAGganAdiprasiddhaM cAtmAnaM nirAkurvataH "acandraH zazI" ityaadivllokvirodhH| "ahaM nAhaM vA" iti gadato "mAtA me vandhyA " ityAdivat svvcnvyaahtiH| evaM ca pratyakSAdibAdhite'smin pakSe'pakSadharmatayA heturpysiddhH| himavatpalaparimANAdau pizAcAdau ca pramANapazcakAbhAvasya pravRtteranaikAntiko'pi, vakSyamANAnumAnapramANasiddhe cAtmani vipakSa eva vRtteviruddhazceti / / 9 (1557) // D. C.--If, after all, there is no one like a soul to entertain a doubt, who can have a doubt as to whether I cxist or I do not exist? Doubt is a guna. ( an attribute ) known as vijnana ( knowledge ), and the guna has no separate existence from its gunin (one having an attribute). The body cannot become the gunin of doubt; for it is murta (corporeal) and jada (inanimate), whereas, knowledge is amurta (in-corporeal) and bodha-rupa (an embodiment of consciousness ). The guna and its gunin cannot have an unlike nature; otherwise, akasa (space) will become a gunin of rupa (colour etc). Furthermore, Gautama ! how can he, who is not sure about his own existence,-who has no self-confidence-say anything definitely about the rest, such as karma-bandha ( bondage and amalgamation of karmans and moksa ( liberation ), etc, and also about a ghata (a pitcher ), pata (a piece of cloth), and the like ? The answer is obvious that he cannot. For, the decision regarding all things depends upon the decision arrived at, in the case of the soul. 3

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The first soul, which boat as same Moreover, one who ignores the self-evident can be relized by aham-pratyaya, sails in the the one who says that sound is always inaudible. He is, then, resorting to a paksabhasa (a mock-assertion) which is contrary to direct evidence: His stand is further opposed to valid inference, like one, who may say Nityah sabdah,' (sound is eternal)--the valid inference which will be dealt with hereafter. "I do not : 13: * Further, one who comes forward to say that exist" after previously admitting that I an one having a doubt, is contradicting himself like a Samkhya (a follower of the Samkhya system of philosophy), who may say Anityab karta" (the doer is impermanent). "Acetanah atma" (the soul is inanimate) etc. " "" Moreover, one, who denies the existence of the soul, which is well-known to children, cow-herds, and women, entertains a belief inconsistent with the popular one and can be compared with the one who says Acandrah sasi" (the moon is devoid of the moon). One, who says "whether I am or I am not" is contradicting oneself like one (my mother is sterile ). who says: "Mata me vandhya" This view being thus opposed to pratyaksa etc., tu hetu (the cause) is a-siddha (not established) owing to its nonexistence in the paksa (subject of inference ). Besides, this hetu is also anaikantika (inconclusive), since none of the five pramanas has any scope so far as the measure of a pala of Mount Himavat and the existence of a pisaca (an evil spirit), are concerned. Moreover, since the existence of the soul can be proved by inference-a topic to be just discussed, the hetu is viruddha (contrary) too, as it is associated with the vipaksa (dissimilar instance). The existence of the soul by direct cognizance, is proved in another way also: For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada] Gamudharavada :19: guNapaJcakvattaNao guNI vi jIvo ghaDo vva pnyckkho| ghaDao vi gheppai guNI guNamettaggahaNao jamhA // 10 // (1558). Gun..paccakkhattanao guni vi jivo ghado vva peocakkbo: Ghadao vi ghdppai guni gumauettugghanao jamha. 10 (1558) [guNapratyakSatvato guNyapi jIvo ghaTa iva prtykssH| ghaTako'pi gRhyate guNI guNamAtragrahaNato yasmAt // 10 // (1558) Trans.--10. The soul which is gupin, is self-evident owing to its gunas being so (self evident), as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the gunas only, the gunin e. g., the pitclier, too, is realized. (1558) TIkA-pratyakSa eva guNI jIvaH, smRti-jijJAsA-cikIrSA-jigamipAsaMzItyAdijJAnavizeSANAM tadguNAnAM svasaMvedanapratyakSasiddhatvAt , ida yasya guNAH pratyakSAH sa pratyakSo dRSTaH, yathA ghaTA, pratyakSaguNazca jIvaH, tasmAt pratyakSaH, yathA ghaTo'pi guNI rUpAdiguNapratyakSatvAdeva pratyakSaH, tad vijJAnAdiguNapratyakSatvAdAtmApIti / Aha-anaikAntiko'yam, yasmAdAkAzaguNaH zabdaH pratyakSo'sti, na punraakaashmiti| tadayuktam , yato nAkAzaguNaH zabdaH, kintu pudgalaguNaH, aindriyakatvAt , rUpAdivaditi // 10 (1558) // D.C.-The gunin, viz., the soul is certainly pratyaksa, because its gunas such as smrti (remenibrance), jijnasa (desire for knowledge ), cikirsa (desire for action), jigamisa (desire for movements ), and doubt, etc., which are different kinds of knowledge are self evident, as they are experienced by onesell. One whose gunas are pratyaksa, is noticed to be pratyaksa; for instance, a pitcher. The gunas of the soul are pratyaksa. Therefore, the soul is pratyaksa. Just as, since rupa ( colour ) etc, the gunas of a pitcher, are pratyaksa, the pitoher, too, is pratyaksa. Such is the case with the soul, as its gupas, viz. vijnana, (knowledge Jetc., are pratyaksa.

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: 20: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Some one may say that this argument is anaihantiha ( vicious ); for, the sabda (sound ) which is the guna of akasa (space) is pratyaksa yet akasa is not pratyaksa. But this is not correct; for, sabda is not the guna of akasa, but Sabda ( sound ) is rather the guna of pudgala (matter ) as it is aindriyaka (cognizable by the sense-organs ) as is the case with colour, etc. When the gunas are pratyahsa, how is it that the gunin is also of this type ? The answer is :anno'Nano va guNI hoja guNehi, jai nAma so'nnno| nanu guNamettaggahaNe gheppai jIvo guNI sakkhaM // 11 // (1559) Anno'nanno va guni hojja gundhim jai nama so'nannot Nanu gunamdttaggahand ghdppai jivo guni sakkham. 11 (1559) [anyo'nanyo vA guNI bhaved guNaiH, yadi nAma so'nanyaH / nanu guNamAtragrahaNe gRhyate jIvo guNI sAkSAt // 11 // (1559) Anyo'nanyo va guni bhavdd gunaih, yadi nama so'nanyah Nanu gunamatragraband grhyate jivo guni saksat. (1559) ) aha anno tI evaM guNino na ghaDAdao vi pckkhaa| guNamettaggahaNAo jIvammi kau vicAro'yaM ? // 12 // (1560) Aha anno to dvam gunino na ghadadao vi paccakkha i Gupamottaggahanao jivammi kaii vicaro'yam ? 12 (1560) [athAnyastata evaM guNino na ghaTAdayo'pi pratyakSAH / guNamAtragrahaNAjIve kuto vicAro'yam // 12 / / (1560) Athangastata dvam gunino na gbatadayo'pi pratyaksah | Gunanatragrahanajjivd kuto vicaro'yam ? 12 (1560)] Trans.-11-12. The guyin may be either distinct from or identical with gunas. If it is really identical (with the gunas),

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Vada ] Ganadharavada * 21: the gunin, the soul, is surely directly realized, on the realization of (its) gunas only. If however, it (gurin) is distinct, then the gunins such as a pitcher, etc., are not pratyaksa owing to the realization of mere gunas. (Such being the case ), whence is (the scope for ) this thought of non-existence as regards the soul ? (1559- 1560) TIkA-nanu bhavatA guNebhyo guNI kimarthAntarabhUto'bhyupagamyate, anarthAntarabhUto vA ? / yadi nAma so'nanyastebhyo'narthAntarabhUtaH tahiM jJAnAdiguNagrahaNamAtrAdeva guNI jIvaH pratyakSeNa gRhyata iti siddhameva / prayogaH-yo yasmAdanantaraM sa tadgrahaNe gRhyate eva, yathA vAsasi raagH| guNebhyo'narthAntaraM va guNI tasmAd guNagrAhakapratyakSeNa so'pi gRhyata eveti / atha guNebhyo'nyo'rthAntarabhUta eva guNI / tata evaM sati ghaTAdayo'pi guNino na pratyakSAH, tadarthAntarabhUtasya rUpAdiguNamAtrasyaiva grahaNAt / iha yad yasmAdAntarabhUtaM tadgrahaNe'pi netarasya grahaNam , yathA ghaTe gRhIte paTasya, arthAntarabhUtAzca guNino guNA iSyante, ato guNagrahaNe'pi na guNigrahaNam / ato ghaTAdInAmapi samAne'grahaNadoSa ko'yaM nAma bhavataH kevala jIve vicAro nAstitvavivakSA yenocyate-" paccakkhaM jaM naM ghippai ghaDovva " ityAdi ? | atha dravyavirahitA ke'pi na santyeva guNAH, ityatastadgrahaNadvAreNa gRhyanta eva ghaTAdayaH / nanvetadAtmanyapi samAnameva / kizca guNino guNAnAmarthAntaratve'bhyupagamyamAne guNI bhavatu, mA bhUd vA pratyakSaH, tathApi jJAnAdiguNebhyaH pRthagAtmA guNI tvadabhyupagamenApi sidhyatyeveti / / (1559-1560) / D. C.-The gunin may be either separate or non-separate from its gunas. If it is non-separate, i. e, identical, then, on realizing knowledge, etc., which are the gunas of the soul, the gunin, the soul, is directly realized. The underlying argument is as follows :-- That which is not separate from another is realized on that another being realized, e. 9., colour in a garment. To be explicit, a garment and its colour are not separate; 80, when the colour is realized, the garment, too, is realized.

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:22: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first The gunin is non-separate from the gunas. Consequently when the gunas are directly perceived, the gunin, too, is certainly realized. If the gunin is really distinct from the gunas, then, such being the case, the gunins such as a pitcher and the like, are not. pratyaksa when only their gunas like colour, which are separate from the gusin, are realized. That which is distinct from another, is not realized even when another, which is separate from it, is realized. As for example, a pitcher is distinct from a piece of cloth. So, when one is realized, the other is not realized. If it is desired that gunas are to be looked upon as separate from the gunin, then, even when the gunas are realized, the gunin renains uprealized. Hence, when the fault of non-realization is applicable even in the case of pitchers etc., why should the question of nonexistence arise only in the case of the soul, to the effect that "paccakkham jam na ghippai ghado wa" eto ? There is really no existence of the gunas apart from the substance of which they are the gunas; so, when the gunas of a pitcher are realized, the pitcher, too, is certainly realized. And the case of the soul is parallel. Furthermore, even though while assuming that the gunas are separate from the gunin, the gunin becomes or does not become pratyaksa (wben the gunas become prutyaksa ), yet the gunin, the soul which is distinct from its gunas such as knowledge, has its existence proved even by your own admission. Anticipating the opinion of the disputant, the author says: aha mantrasi atthi guNI na ya dehatthaMtaraM tao kiNtu| dehe nANAiguNA so ciya tesiM guNI jutto|| 13 // (1561) Aba mannasi atthi guni na ya dehatthantaram tao kintu i Dahe nanaiguna so cciya tesim guni jutto. 13 (1561) ( 374 Arrastia gutt 7 g i ai yra: fainali dehe bAnAdiguNA: sa eva teSAM guNI yuktaH // 13 // (1561)

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Vada] Ganadharavada :28: Atha manyase'sti guni na ca ddharthantaram sakah kintu ! Dehe jinanadigunan sa dva tesam guni yuktah 13 (1561)]. Trans.-13. You may believe that there is the gunin, but that it is not distinct from a body. The glinas like knowledge etc., are observed in a boly; so that (body) alone is fit to be their gunin. ( 1561) TIkA-atha manyase astyeva jJAnAdiguNAnAM guNI, naiva taM pratyAcakSmahe, etat tu nAbhyupagacchAmo yat-"dehAdarthAntaraM tako'mau" iti, kintu deha eva jJAnAdayo guNAH samupalabhyante, ataH sa eva teSAM guNI yuktaH, yathA rUpAdInAM ghttH| prayogaH-dehaguNA eva jJAnAdayaH, tatraivopalabhyamAnatvAt , gaura-kRza-sthUlatAdivaditi // 13 (1561) // D. C-It may be that you admit that there is a gunin for the gunas like knowledge, etc., but you may refuse to believe that this gunin is something else than a body. That is to say, you look upon the body itself as the gunin in question, since the gunas such as knowledge etc., are found in the body only. For example, colour is seen in a pitcher, and hence its gunin is a pitcher. The underlying argument is this: Knowledge etc, are the gunas of a borly, because they are observed, there and there only, like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, emaciation, fatness etc. The answer is : nANAdao na dehassa muttimattAio ghaDasseva / tamhA nANAiguNA jassa sa dehAio jIvo // 14 // (1562) Nanadao na dabassa muttimattajo ghadasseva ! Tamha nanaiguna jassa sa dehaio jivo. 14 (1562) [ jJAnAdayo na dehasya mUrtimattvAdito ghaTasyeva / tasmAjjJAnAdiguNA yasya sa dehAdhiko jIvo // 14 // (1562)

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:24: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Jnanadayo na dehasya murtimattvadito ghatasyeva 1 Tasmajjsanadiguna yasya sa dehadhiko jivo. 14 (1562) ] Trans.--- 14. Knowledge etc., are not the gunas of a body, as it is murta (corporeal) etc, like a ghata. Therefore, that (object ) which has knowledge etc., as its gunas, is the soul which is separate from the body. (1562) TIkA-prayogaH-dehasya sambandhino guNAdayo guNA na bhavantyeva, tasyamUrtimacAt cAkSuSatvAd vA ghaTavat / na ca dravyarahito guNaH samasti / tato yo jJAnAdiguNAnAmanurUpo'mUrtaH, acAkSuSazca guNI, sa dehAtirikto jIvo jJAtavyaH / Aha-jJAnAdayo na dehasyeti pratyakSabAdhitamidama, deha eva jJAnAdiguNAnAM pratyakSeNaiva grahaNAt / tadayuktam , anumAnabAdhitatvAdasya pratyakSasya / tathAhi-ihendriyAtirikto vijJAtA, taduparame'pi tadupalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt , yo hi yaduparame'pi yadupalabdhamarthamanusmarati, sa tasmAdarthAntaraM dRSTaH, yathA-paJcavAtAyanopalabdhArthAnusmartA devadatta ityAdi vAyubhUtiprazne vakSyAma iti // 14 (1562) / __D.C.--The gunas such as knowledge, cannot belong to the body; for, the body is murta (corporeal) and caksusa ( visible) as is the case with a ghata. Moreover, a guna cannot exist without a substance. Now, knowledge etc.,.are amurta gunas. Therefore, their giznin, too, must be amurta etc., and hence it cannot be the body which is murta. Thus that very gunin is the soul. It may be argued that we see with our own eyes that knowledge etc., belong to the body. But this is a wrong argument, as it is not consistent with the following inference : The knower is distinct from senses; for, even when the senses cease to function, the object realized by means of them is remembered. One who remembers an object realized by means of another, even when that another ceases, is distinct from it, e. g., Dovadatta who remembers the object realized by means of the five windows. This we shall expound while answering the question of Vayubbuti.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Desirous of arriving at a conclusion, the author says:-- iya tuha deseNAyaM paJcakkho savvahA mahaM jIvo / avizyamANattaNao tuha viSNANaM va paDivajA || 15|| (1563) Iya tuha desenayam paccakkho savvaha maham jivot Avihayananattana tuha vinnanam va padivajja. 15 (1563) [ iti taca dezenAyaM pratyakSaH sarvathA mama jIvaH / avitajJAnatvatastava vijJAnamiva pratipadyasva // 15 // (1563) Iti tava desenayam pratyaksah sarvatha mama jivahl Avihatajnanatvatastava vinanamiva pratipadyasva. 15. (1563)] :25: Trans.-15. Thus this (soul) is partially pratyaksa to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to (my ) knowledge being unobstructed (infinite ). ( So) accept (the existence of the soul). ( 1563). TIkA - ityevam uktaprakAreNa svazarIre tavApi dezataH pratyakSo'yamAtmA, chasthatvena bhavataH sarvasyApi vastuno dezaviSayatvAt, ghaTavat, tathAhisarvamapi sva- paraparyAyato'nantaparyAyaM vastu, chadmasthazca pratyakSeNa sAkSAt taddeza miva gRhNAti / pratyakSeNa ca pradIpAdiprakAzeneva dezataH prakAzitAM api ghaTAdayo vyavahArataH pratyakSA ucyanta eva / sarvAtmanA ca kevalipratyakSameva vastu prakAzayati / ato mamApratihatAnantajJAnatvena sarvAtmanA'pi pratyakSo'yaM jIvaH, yathAstIndriyamapi tvatsaMzayavijJAnamiti pratipadyasveti // 15 (1563) // D. C.-In this way, the soul in your body is partially cognizable even to you; for, since you are a chadmastha (one under the evil influence of the mohaniya karman), every object is known to you only partially. Every object has an infinite number of paryayas ( modifications ), in case it is examined from the stand-point of its own paryayas and that of the paryayas belonging to the rest. A chadmastha, therefore, directly grasps only a portion of it. It is a convention that ghata etc., when partially revealed by light, etc., are said to be 4

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:26: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first pratyaksa. Only an Omniscient Being has a direct perception of any and every object in toto. I am an Omniscient Being; for, my knowledge is neither limited by time nor by space. So, I directly realize this soul in its entirelty, just as I fully realize your knowledge, viz., your doubt about the existence of the soul, consequently, admit that the soul exists. Then, what about another's body ?evaM ciya paradehe'NumANao giNha jIvamasthi tti| aNuvitti-nivittIo vinnANamayaM sarUve vva // 16 // (1564) Evam ciya paraddhd'numanao ginha jivam atthi tti 1 Anuvitti-pivittio vinnanamayam saruvd vva. 16 (1564) [evameva paradehe'numAnato gRhANa jIvamastIti / __ anuvRtti-nivRttibhyAM vijJAnamayaM svarUpa iva // 16 // (1564) Evam dva paraddha'numanato grhana jivam astiti, Anuvritti-nivrittibhyam vijaanamayan svarupa iva. 16 (1564) ]. Trans.--16 Thus, do verily accept, by means of inference, that the soul which is an enbodiment of knowledge, exists in another's body (too), owing to (his) indulgence in and cess. ation from activities, as is the case with one's own soul. (1564) TIkA-yathA khadehe evaM paradehe'pi gRhANa jiivmnumaantH| katham ? ityAha-asti-vidyata iti / kathaMbhUtaM jIvam ? ityAha-vijJAnamayaM-vijJAnAsmakam / anumAnameva sUcayannAha-"aNuvitti-nivittIo sarUve va ti" idamuktaM bhavati-parazarIre'pyasti jIvaH, iSTAniSTayoH pravRtti-nivRttidarzanAt , yathA svarUpe-khAtmani, iha yatreSTA 'niSTayoHpravRtti-nivRttI dRzyete, tatsAtmakaM dRSTam , yathA khazarIram , tathA ca pravRtti-nivRttI dRzyete parazarIre, atastadapi sAtmakam ; AtmAbhAve ceSTA-'niSTapravRtti-nivRttI na bhavataH, yathA ghaTe, ityanumAnAt parazarIre'pi jIvasiddhiH // 16 (1564) // D. C.-The soul exists in another's body, too; for, he, too, like your self, performs desirable activities and refrains from

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :08 the undesirable ones, and you, who aot accordingly, have esoul. To put it explicitly, one in whom are seen indulgence in deniz, able acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds, has a spy), as is the case with one's (your) body. The body of another is seen as associated with desirable activities and dissociated from undesirable ones. Hence, that body, too, has a soul. If the soul were non-existent, there was no scope for this association and dissociation, as can be seen in the case of a ghata. This is followed by inference that there is . soul in another's body, too. ___Anticipating doubt in another's mind, the author says:jaM ca na liMgehi samaM manasi liMgI jo purA ghiyo| saMgaM saseNa va samaM na liMgao to'Numeo so||17 / / (1565) so'NegaMto jamhA liMgehiM samaM na dipuvo vi| gahaliMgadarisaNAo gaho'Numeo sarIrammi // 18 // (1566) Jam ca na lingebim samam mannasi lingi jao pura gahisi Sangam sasena 'va saman na lingao to'qumeo so. 17 (1565) So'neganto jamba lingehim samam na ditthapuryo vil Gahalifiga-darisanai gaho'numdi sarirammi. 18 (1566) [yaJca na liGgaH samaM manyase liGgI yataH purA gRhItaH / zRgaM zazena vA samaM na liGgatastato'numeyaH saH // 17 // (1565) so'nekAnto yasmAliH samaM na dRSTapUrvo'pi / grahaliGgadazanAd graho'numeyaH zarIre // 18 // (1566) Yacca na lingain samam manyasd lingi yatah pura grbitah 1 Srigam sasdna va samam na lingatas tato'nuindyah sah. 17 (1565) So'nekanto yasmallingaih samam na drstapurvo'pi , Grahalingadarsanad grabo'numbyan sarire. 18 (1566).]

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first Trans --17-18. Moreover, that you believe that since the lingin (viz., the soul ) has not been realized formerly (up till now) along with the lingas, as is the case with the hare and the horn, so it (the soul) cannot be inferred by means of a linga, is untenable; for, a planet, that is not formerly seen along with its lingas, is inferred in a body, on perceiving its linga or lingas. (1565-1566). : 28: TIkA - yacca " na ya jIvaliMga saMbaMdhadarisaNamabhU" ityAdi pUrvoktapUrvapakSAnusAreNa manyase tvam / kim ? ityAha- tato na liGgataH - - liGgAdanumeyo'sau jIvaH / yataH kim ? ityAha-yato na khalu liGgaiH kaizcidapi samaM liGgI - jIvaH kApi kenApi purA- pUrva gRhItaH / kiMvadityAha - zRGgamiva zazakena samam / tato liGga - liGginoH pUrvaM sambandhAgrahaNAd na liGgAjIvo'numIyate / iti yad manyase tvaM tatra pratividhIyate - so'nekAntaH, yasmAliGgaiH samamadRSTapUrvo'pi grahaH- devayonivizeSaH zarIre hasana- gAna - rodana kara-caraNa- bhrUvikSepAdivikRtagrahaliGgadarzanAdanumIyata iti bAlAnAmapi pratItameveti / / 17-18 ( 1565-1566 ) // - D. C.-Just as none has ever seen a horn on the head of a hare, so none has ever seen the lingin, viz., the soul as associated with one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, one cannot infer the existence of the soul. This belief of yours is not right. For, though a graha is not previously seen along with its lingas, even children are convinced about its existence in a body, when they see that body associated with perverse acts such as, laughing, singing, weeping, movements of hands, feet, and eye-brows, etc., the acts which the lingas of the graha. are dehassatthi vihAyA painiyayAgArao ghaDasseva | 'akkhANaM ca karaNao daNDAINaM kulAlo vva // 19 // (1567) Dehassatthi vihaya painiyayagarao ghadasseva | Akkhapam ca karanas dandainam kulalo vva. 19 ( 1567)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada [ dehasyAsti vidhAtA pratiniyatAkArato ghaTasyeva / akSANAM ca karaNato daNDAdInAM kulAla iva / / 19 / / (1567) Dehasyasti vidhats pratiniyatakarato ghatasyeva i Aksanam oa karanato dandadinam kulala iva. 19 ( 1567 ) ] : 29: Trans.- 19. There is a creator of the body, owing to its shape being definite and (its having a beginning) as is the case with a ghata. (There is an adhisthatr of the organs of sense owing to their being a karana (a medium) as is the case with the adhisthatr of a stick etc. ( 1567 ) " TIkA - dehasyAsti vidhAtA - karteti pratijJA, AdimatpratiniyatAkarasvaccha, ghaTavat punarakartRkaM tadAdimaramatiniyatAkAramapi na bhavati, trisavikAraH, yazca dehasya kartA sa jIvaH / pratiniyatAkAratvaM mervAdInAmapyasti na ca teSAM kazcid vidhAtA, iti tairanaikAntiko hetuH syAt, ato'nuktamapyAdimattva vizeSaNaM draSTavyamiti / tathA akSANAmindriyANAmasti " adhiSThAtA " ityadhyAhAraH karaNatvAt yathA cakra - cIvara mRt-sUtradaNDAdInAM kulAlaH, yacca niradhiSThAtRkaM tat karaNamapi na bhavati, yathA''kAzam, yathendriyANAmadhiSThAtA sa jIva iti // 19 (1567) // " D. C.-That there is 8 creator of the body, is the pratijna ( premise ); for, it (body ) has a beginning and has definite shape a3 well; as is the case with a ghata. Whatever has no creator whastsoever, has neither & beginning nor 8 definite shape. The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example. Meru etc, have a fixed form, and even then they have no creator. So, to avoid such 8 case wherein the hotu (cause) becomes anaikantika, the adjective adimat. ( having a beginning ), though not expressed, is to be taken as understood, of sense are karana, there 8 the organs The word adhisthair is also understood. Since must be an adhisthatr for them.

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The first A paralled example is furnished by a potter, who is an< adhisthatr of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, stick, etc., which are karanas. Whatever has no adhisthatr, has no karana, e. g, akasa. Hence, it follows that the adhisthatr of the organs of sense is the soul, Moreover, asthiMdiya-visayANaM AyANAdeyabhAvao'vassaM / kammAra ivAdAyA loe saNDAsa-lohANaM / / 20 / / (1568) : 30: Atthindiya-visayanam ayanadeyabhavao'vassam | Kammara ivadaya loe sandasa-lohanam. 20 (1568) [ astIndriya-viSayANAmAdAnAdaya bhAvato'vazyam / karmAra ivAdAtA loke sandezaka- lohAnAm // 20 // (1568) Astindriya-visyanamadanadeyabhavato'vasyam i Karmara ivadata loke sandamsaka-lohanam. 20 (1553) ] Trans.-20. Just as, in this world a blacksmith is the adatr (grasper) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so, there is certainly an adatr (viz., the soul) in the case of organs of sense and their objects, since they are related as adana (means of grasping) and adeya (graspables). (1568) TIkA - iha yatrAdAnAdeyabhAvastatrAvazyamAdAtA samasti, yathA loke sandezaka- lohAnAM karmAro'yaskAraH, vidyate cendriyavipayANAmAdAnAdeyabhAvaH, atasteSAmapyastyAdAtA, sa ca jIvaH, yatra tvAdAtA nAsti, tatrAdAnAdeyabhAvo'pi na vidyate, yathA''kAza iti // 20 (1568 ) // D. C.-If there is a relation of the type of adana and adeya, then there needs be an adatr. A blacksmith is found as the ad atr; for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for adana and adeya. There is a relation of the kind of adana and adeya, in the case of the organs of sense and sense-objects. Therefore, there must be their

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Ganadharavada : 31: Vada ] added that may be adatr. He is none else but the soul. It there is no scope for the relation of the sort of adana and addya, in case the adatr is non-existent, e. g., akasa. Also, bhottA dehAINaM bhojattaNao naro vva bhattassa / saGghAyAittaNao asthi ya atthI gharasseva // 21 // (1569) Bhotta dehainam bhojjattanao naro vva bhattassa I Sanghayaittana atthi ya atthi gharasseva. 21 (1569) [ bhoktA dehAdInAM bhogyatvato nara iva bhaktasya / saGghAtAditvatossti cArthI gRhasyeva // 21 // (1569) Bhokta dehadinam bhogyatvato nara iva bhaktasya | Sanghataditvato 'sti carthi grhasyeva. 21 (1569) ] Trans.-21. Just as a man is an enjoyer of bhakta (food), so, there is an enjoyer of body etc., owing to their being objects of enjoyment. Just as, there is an owner of a house, .owing to its being a saighata (collection) etc., so, there is an owner of body etc., on account of its being a sanghata. ( 1569) yathA TIkA - iha dehAdInAM bhoktA samasti, bhogyatvAt, yathA zAlayAdibhaktavastrAdInAM naraH, yasya ca bhoktA nAsti tad bhogyamapi na bhavati, kharaviSANam, bhogyaM ca zarIrAdikama, tato vidyamAnabhoktRkamiti / tathA, arthI - svAmI / tatazca dehAdInAM vidyate khAmI, saGghAtarUpatvAt, AdizabdAd mUrtimavAt, aindriyakatvAt, cAkSuSatvAdityAdayo'pyanaikAntikatvaparihArArthaM sambhavadvihitavizeSaNA hetavo yojanIyAH, yathA gRhAdInAM sUtradhArAdaya iti dRSTAntaH / yat punarasvAmikaM tat saGghAtAdirUpamapi na bhavati; yathA gaganakusumam, saGghAtAdirUpaM ca dehAdikam tasmAd vidyamAnasvAmikamiti / 21 (1569) || D. C.-Just as we find that there is 2 person to enjoy food etc., so, there is an enjoyer of body etc. The underlying Pensoning is as follows: For Private Personal Use Only

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: 82: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first An object of enjoyment for which there is no enjoyer, does not exist, e. g. a horn of an ass. Body etc., exist as objects of enjoyment. So, it follows that there is their enjoyer, Just as a carpenter and others are svamins of a house, etc., go there is a svamin of body eto. Since this body and the like, are in the form of a collection, have a beginning, are murta, are objects of sense and are visible etc., a number of similar hetus as may be helpful in making this syllogism perfectly logical, may be mentioned : One that has no svamin, is not in the form of a collection etc. For instance, a flower in the sky which has no svamin is not in the form of a collection etc. A body eto., are, on the contrary, in the form of a collection etc. So they have a syamin viz , the soul. Really, by saying that the body has a creator, one proves that there is a creator etc., for the body. But that is not the soul, jo kattAi sa jIvo sajjhaviruddho tti te maI honaa| TIETRITTST A 7 FAIT ETET I12211 (84000) Jo kattai ga jivo sajjhaviruddho tti to mai hojja i Muttaipasangao tam na samsarino doso. 22 (1570) [yaH kAdi sa jIvaH sAdhyaviruddha iti tava matirmavet / gaifaqera ne 7 HAFTGIT : 112201 (8400) Yab kartradi sa jivah sadhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet i Murtadiprasangat tad na samsarino dosah. 22 (1570) Trans.--22. You may be thinking that, that soul which is a doer etc., is opposed to what is to be established, owing to its having a chance of being proved murta etc. But this is not a fault in the case of the mundane soul. (1570). *7-9979477ai erostetai kai, segra, 3GTNT, bhoktA, arthI coktaH sa sarvo'pi jIva eva, anyamyezvarAderyuktyakSamatvena karva

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Vada] Ganadharavada : 38: tvAdhasambhavAditi / atha sAdhyaviruddhasAdhakatvAd viruddhA ete hetava iti tava matirbhavet , tathAhi-ghaTAdInAM katrAdirUpAH kulAlAdayo mUrtimantaH, saghAtarUpAH, anityAdisvabhAvAzca dRSTAH, ityato jIvo'pyevaMvidha eva sidhyati, etadviparItazca kilAsmAkaMsAdhayitumiSTaH, ityevaM sAdhyavirUddhasAdhakatvaM hetUnAmiti / tadetadayuktatvAd na, yataH khalu saMsAriNo jIvasA sAdhayitumiSTasyA'doSo'yam / sa hyaSTakarmapudgalasaMghAtopagUDhatvAt sazarIratvAca kathaMcinmUrtatvAdidharmayukta eveti // 22 (1570) // D. C.-Up till. now, it has, no doubt, been proved that it is the soul and the soul alone which is a doer, adhisthatr, adatr, an enjoyer and the svamin of the body, organs of sensc, etc. For God or the like cannot be admitted as a doer etc., of the body, since such a statement will be opposed to reason But it must be admitted that the hetus put forward to prove that the soul is a doer etc , are viruddha (contrary) as they establish such a type of the soul which is just the contrary to what is desired. To be explicit, a potter who is a doer of a pitcher has a body, and he is in the form of a collection, and is of an impermanent nature. The same must be the case with the soul. But this type of soul is just opposed to what we are aiming at to establish. And hence, these hetus lead us to the conclusions we are opposed to. This is not so; for, we are at present establishing the existence of a mundane soul and not that of a liberated one; and that a mundane soul is somehow murta; for, it is certainly embraced by a collection of eight karmans, a kind of matter, and it has a body. There is another anumana for establishing the existence of the soul. atthi ciya te jIvo saMsayao somma ! thANupuriso vva / jaM saMdiddhaM goyama ! ta tatthannattha vatthi dhuvaM // 23 // (1571) Atthi cciya te jivo sarsayo somma 1 thanupuriso vva i Jam sandiddham Goyama! te tatthannattha vatthi dhuvain. 23 (1571)

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:14: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first [ astyeva tapa jIvaH saMzayataH saumya ! sthANu-puruSAviva / yat sandigdhaM gautama ! tat tatrAnyatra vAsti dhruvam // 23 // (1571) Astyeva tava jivah samsayatah saumya / sthanu-purusaviva 1 Yat sandigdham Gautama 1 tat tatranyatra vasti dhruvam. 23 (1571)] Trans.---23.0 lovely Gautamal Indeed you have a soul since you have a doubt (about your existence), as is the case with a branch-less trunk of a tree and a man. Whatever is doubted, certainly exists either there or elsewhere. (1571) TIkA-he saumya ! gautama ! astyeva tava jIvaH, saMzayataH saMzayasadbhAvAt , yatra yatra saMzayastat tadasti, yathA sthANu-puruSo, saMzayazva tava jIve, tasAdastyevAyam, tathAhi-sthANu-puruSayorutvAroha-pariNAhAdyubhayasAdhAraNadharmapratyakSatAyAM calana-ziraH kaNDrayanavayonilayana-vallyArohaNAyubhayagatavizeSadhamaprityakSatAyAM cobhayagataitaddharmAnusmaraNe ca satyakataravizeSanizcayacikIrSoH " kimidam 1 iti vimarzarUpaH saMzayaH prAdurasti / evaMbhUte ca sthANu-puruSAdigatasaMzaye tat sthANu-puruSAdikaM vastvastyeva, avastuni saMzayAyogAt / evamAtmazarIrayorapi prAgupalabdhasAmAnya--vizeSadharmasya pramAtustayoH sAmAnyadharmapratyakSatAyAM vizeSadharmApratyakSatve'pi ca tadvipayAnusmRtau satyAmekataravizeSopalipsoH, "kimayamAtmA kiM vA zarIramAtramidam ? iti vimarzarUpaH saMzayo jAyate / ayaM cAtma-zarIrayoH satva evopapadyate, naikatarasyA'pyabhAve, ato'sti jIvaH / athaivaM brUSe-araNyAdiSu sthANupuruSasaMzaye tatra vivakSita pradeze'nayorekatara eva bhavati, na punarubhayamapi, tatkathamucyate-'vidyamAna eva vastuni saMzayo bhavati' iti / tadayuktam abhiprAyAparijJAnAt, na hi vayamevaM bama:-" tatraiva pradeze tadubhayamapyasti" iti, kintu yadgatasaMdehastad vastu tatrA'nyatra vA pradeze dhruvamastyeva, anyathA SaSThabhUta viSayo'pi saMzayaH syAt / etadevAha-'jaM saMdiddhamityAdi' tasmAt sNshyvissytvaadstye| jIva iti sthitam / / 23 (1571) / D. C.-A 'branch-less trunk of a trce is seen from a distance, as if it wero a man. For, certain attributes such as

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : : loftiness etc., which are common to this trunk and a man, are observed, while their distinguishing characteristics, viz., a morement, scratching, dwelling of birds, ascending of creepers etor, are not noticeable. Such being the case, there arises a doubt as to whether this is a trunk of a tree or a person; for, both of these objects exist (though not in the same place ). This proves that the doubt can arise only in the case of objeots that do exist. You have a doubt as to whether this is & soul or a body, as you realize their common features, but fail to notice their distinguishing characteristics. Such a doubt propea that there is a soul; for, it cannot arise unless there existad two entities viz, a soul and a body. It may be here noted that in order that a doubt may arise, it is not absolutely necessary that the objects about which a doubt arises, must be in one and the same place. evaM nAma visANaM kharassa pattaM na taM khare ceva / annattha tadatthi cciya evaM vivarIyagAhe vi // 24 // (1572) Evam nama visanam kharassa pattam na tani khard odva ! Annattba tad atthi cciya evam vivariyagahd vi, 24 (1572) [evaM nAma viSANaM kharasya prAptaM na tat khara eva / anyatra tadastyeva evaM viparItagrahe'pi // 24 // (1572) Evam nama visanam kharasya praptam na tat khara dva i Anyatra tadastydva evam viparitagruhd pi. 24 (1572)] Trans.--24. Such being the case, an ass will indeed have & horn but certainly lie has not. It surely exlsts somewhere else. So is the case even when the perverse view is taken. (1572) ____TIkA-hanta ! yadi yatra saMzayastenAvazyameva bhavitavyam , evaM tataH kharaviSANamapyastIti prAptam , tatrApi kasyacit saMzayasadbhAvAt / ucyatenanvabhihitamatra yaduta-tatrAnyatra vA vidyamAna eva vastuni saMzayo mavati, nAvidyamAne / kharasya viSANaM kharaviSANaM nAstItyatra ca ko'rthaH / ityAha

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236: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first "na taM khare ceva ti" khara eva tadviSANaM nAsti, anyatra gavAdAvastyeveti na kazcid vybhicaarH| evaM vivarIyagAhe vitti' idamuktaM bhavati-yadA viparyastaH kazcit sthANI 'puruSa evAyam' ityAdiviparItagrahaM karoti tadApyayameva nyAyo vAcyaH-so'pi viparItagraho viparIte puruSAdike vastuni satyevopapadyate, nAvidyamAna ityarthaH / evaM bhavadabhiprAyeNa yo'sAdRzAM zarIraM AtmAstitvAbhimAnaH, nAyamAtmanaH sarvathA nAstitve yujyata iti // 24 (1572) // D. C.--If it is that the object which is doubted, must be existing in the very place where the doubt arises, then even an ass will have a horn; for, somebody may doubt its existence so far as the ass is concerned. No, this is not true. What we want to imply is that the doubted object exists either in the very place where the doubt arises, or even somewhere else. That an ass bas no horus, means that horns are not associated with the ass; but they are found elsewhere, e. g., on the head of a cow. Similar is the case when one object is definitely mistaken for the other. For instance, a man may take a branch-less trunk to be a man. Such a perverse view proves the existence of the object mistaken. Hence Gantama you may think that we are in the wrong when we admit the existence of a soul in our body. This is our perverse notion according to you. If so, even then, it establishes the existence of the soul. The soul exists, for the following reason, viz:-- asthi ajIvavivakkho paDisehAo ghaDoghaDasseva / masthi ghaDo tti va jIvatthittaparo natthisaho'yaM / 25 // (1573) Atthi ajivazivakkho padisdhao ghaco'ghadassdva / Nathi ghaco tti va jivatthittaparo natthi saddo'yam. 25 (1573) [astyajIvavipakSaH pratiSedhAd ghaTo'ghaTasyeva / jAsti ghaTa itIya jIvAstitvaparo nAstizabdo'yam // 25 / / (1572)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :37: Astya jiva vipaksah pratisddhat ghato'ghatasyeval Nasti ghata itiva jiastitvaparo nasti sabdo'yam. 25 (1572)] Trans.-25 Just as there is a ghata as opposed to aghata, so, there is an object, viz , the soul, a vipaksa (the op. posite) of an inanimate object, owing to denial. This sentence, viz., ' it does not exist' establishes the existence of the soul, as does the sentence, viz., ' there is no ghata' (establish its existence) (1573) TIkA-atra prayogaH-pratipakSavAnayamajIvaH, atra vyutpattimacchuddhapadapratiSedhAt, yatra vyutpattimataH zuddhapadasya pratiSedho dRzyate sa pratipakSavAn dRSTaH, yathA'ghaTo ghaTapratipakSavAn , atra hyaghaTaprayoge zuddhasya vyutpattimatazca padasya pratiSedhaH, ato'vazyaM ghaTalakSaNena pratipakSeNa bhavitavyam / yastu na pratipakSavAn na tatra zuddhasya vyutpattimatazca padasya pratiSedhaH, yathA'kharaviSANam ,aDittha iti| akharaviSANamityatra kharaviSANalakSaNasyAzuddhasya sAmAsikapadasya pratiSedha iti, atotra kharasya viSANaM kharaviSANamityAdivyutpattimatve satyapi kharaviSANalakSaNo vipakSo nAsti / aDittha ityatra tu vyutpattirahitasya Ditthapadasya pratiSedhaH, iti samAsarahitatvena zuddhatve satyapi nAvazyamavasthito DitthalakSaNaH ko'pi padArtho jIvavad vipakSabhUto'stIti / "natthi ghaDo ttiva" ityAdi pazcArdham / "nAsyAtmA" iti ca yo'yamAtmaniSedhadhvaniH sa jIvAstitvanAntarIyaka eva, yathA " nAstyatra ghaTaH" iti zabdo'nyatra ghaTAstitvAvinAbhAvyeva / prayogaH-yasya niSedhaH kriyamANo dRzyate tat kvacidastyeva, yathA ghaTAdikam ; niSidhyate ca bhavatA "nAsti jIvaH" iti vacanAnIvaH, tasmAdastyevAsau, yacca sarvathA nAsti tasya niSedho na dRzyata eva, yathA kharaviSANakalpAnAM paJcabhUtAtiriktabhUtAnAm niSedhyate ca tvayA jIvaH, tasmAd niSedha evAyaM tatsattvasAdhaka iti // 25 // 1573 // D. C.-The underlying argument is this, that since ajiva is a word of which an etymology exists and is furthermore a Suddha pada (a pure syllable), it has a pratipaksa (a rival ), viz., tva. A pratipaksa exists in the case of the negation of

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: 38: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a suddha pada. As for example, & pratipaksa, viz., ghata exists in the case of a-ghata which is a negation of ghata; for, there is an etymology of ghata, and that it is a suddha pada too. One which bas no pratipaksa, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a suddha pada baving an etymology is concerned. For instance, akharavisana is wanting in a pratipaksa, viz., kharavisana since kharavisana is not a suddha pada but is a samasika one-is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a vyutpatti. We may now examine the case of adittha. Dittha is its pratipaksa; but, since this dittha is wanting in a vyutpatti, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied : (i) It should be a suddha pada. (ii) At the same time, it must have a vyutpatti. In the case of kharavisana the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of dittha, the second is violated. So, there exists neither kharavisana, a pratipaksa of akharavisana nor practically qittha, a pratipaksa of aaitthha. Now the second hemistitch. Just as when one says that here there is no ghata' establishes the existence of a ghata elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under : One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e. g., & ghaca. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So, it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non-existent has no negative predication Khara-visana may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibility for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :39; This hetu is anaikantika. asao natthi niseho saMjogAipaDisehao siddhaM / saMjogAicaukaM pi siddhamatthantare niyayaM // 26 // (1574) Asao natthi niso ho sanjogaipaaise hao siddhami Sanjogaicaukkam pi siddhamatthantare niy ajam. 26 (1574) [asato nAsti niSedhaH saMyogAdipratiSedhataH siddham / saMyogAdicatuSkamapi siddhamarthAntare niyatam // 26 // (1574) Agato nasti niddhah samyogadipratisadhatab siddbami Samyogadicatuskamapi siddhamarthantard niyatam. 26 (1514)] Trans.-26. It is proved that there is no negation in the case of a non-existent object owing to the pratisdha of samyoga (connection) etc. Even the quarter union consisting of samyoga, etc., is certainly proved (torbe existing ) elsewhere. (1574) __TIkA-asato'vidyamAnasya nAsti na sammavatyeva niSedha iti siddham / kutaH? ityAha-saMyogAdipratiSedhAt , Adi zabdAt , samavAya-sAmAnya-vizeSaparigrahaH / etaduktaM bhavati-iha yatkizcit kvacid devadattAdikaM niSidhyate tasyAnyatra sata eva vivakSitasthAne kasmiMzcit saMyoga-samavAya-sAmAnyavizeSalakSaNaM catuSThayameva niSidhyate, na tu sarvathaiva devadattAderabhAva prtipaadyte| tatra " nAsti gRhe devadattaH" ityAdiSu gRha-devadattAdInAM satAmeva saMyoga mAtraM niSidhyate, na tu, teSAM sarvathaivAstitvamapAkriyate / tathA, "nAsti kharaviSANam" ityAdiSu khara-viSANAdInAM satAmeva samavAyamAnaM nirAkriyate / tathA "nAstyanyazcaMdramAH" ityAdiSu vidyamAnasyaiva candramaso'nyatracandraniSedhA. candrasAmAnyamAnaM niSidhyate, na tu sarvathA candrAbhAvaH pratipAdyate / tathA "na santi ghaTapramANA muktAH" ityAdiSu ghaTapramANanAmamAtrarUpovizeSo muktAnAM niSidhyate, na tu muktA'bhAvaH khyApyata iti / evaM ca sati "nAstyAtmA" ityatra vidyamAnasyaivAtmano yatra vacana yena kenAcit saha saMyogamAtreNa tvayA niSeddhavyam; yathA " nAstyAtmA vapusi" ityAdi na tu sarvathA''tmanaH sttvmiti|

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: 40: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first atrAha kazcit-nanu yadi yad niSidhyate tadasti, tahiM matrilokezvaranA'pyasti, yuSmadAdibhiniSidhyamAnatvAta ; tathA caturNA samavAyAdipratiSe. dhAnAM paJcamo'pi pratiSedhaprakAro'sti, tvayaira niSidhyamAnatvAt / tadayuktam , trilokezvaratAvizeSamAtraM bhavato niSidhyate. yathA ghaTapramANatvaM muktAnAm, na tu savathaivezvaratA, sva ziSyAdIzvaratAyAstavApi vidyamAnatvAt / tathA, pratiSedhasyApi pazcasaGkhayAviziSTatvamapAkriyate, na tu sarvathA pratiSedhasyAbhAvaH, catu:saGkhyA viziSTassya tasya sadbhAvAt / nanu sarvamapyasambaddhamidam , tathAhi-- matrilokezvaratvaM tAvadasadeva niSidhyate, pratiSedhasyApi pazcasaGgyAviniSTatvamavidyamAnameva nivAryate, tathA, saMyoga-samavAya-sAmAnya-vizeSANAmapi gRhadevadatta-kharaviSANAdiSvasatAmeva pratiSedhaH, ityato "yaniSidhyate tadastyeva" ityetat kathaM na plavate ? ityAzaGkayAha-"saMjogAicaukkaM piityaadi| idamuktaM bhavati--devadattAdIcA saMyogAdayo gRhAdiSvevAsanto niSidhyante, arthAntare tu teSAM te vidyanta eva; tathAhi-gRheNaiva saha devadattasya saMyogo na vidyate, athAntareNa tu kSetra-haTTa-grAmAdinA saha tasyAsau samastyeva, gRhasyApi devadattena saha saMyogo nAsti, khaTvAdinA tu saha tasyAsau vidyata eva, evaM viSANasyApi khara eva samavAyo nAsti, gavAdAvastyeva sAmAnyamapi dvitIyacandrAbhAvAcandra eva nAsti, arthAntare tu ghaTagavAdAvastyeva; ghaTapramA. Natvamapi muktAsu nAsti, arthAntare tu kUSmANDAdAvastyeva / trilokezvaratA'pi bhavapa eva nAsti, tIrthakarAdAvastyeva, paJcasaGkhyAviziSTatvamapi pratiSedhe nAsti, arthAntare tvanuttaravimAnAdAvastyeva / ityanayA vivakSayA brUma:-- "yad niSidhyate tat sAmAnyenAstyeva, na tvevaM pratijAnImahe" - "yad yatra niSidhyate tat tatraivAsti" iti yena vyabhicAra: syAt / / vayamapi zarIre jIvaM niSedhayAmaH, nAnyatrati cet / sAdhUktam, asman samIhitasya siddhatvAt , jIvasiddhayarthameva hi yatAmahe vayam , sa cet siddhaH, tahiM tatsiddhayanyathAnupapattareva tadAzrayaH setsyati, kiM tayA cintayA ? / na ca zarIramantrareNa jIvasyAzrayAntaramupapadyate, tatraiva tdvsthaanlinggoplbdheH| na ca vaktavyam-zarIrameva jIvaH, "jIvati", "mRtaH", "mUcchitaH" ityAdi vyavasthA'nupapatteH ityAderabhidhAsyamAnatvAditi // 26 // 1574 / /

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Vada] Ganadhara rada :41: D. C.-When a negation is predicated in the case of any object, this negation is to be understood regarding samyoga (conjuction ). samavaya ( inherence ), samanya (generality ) or visasa ( speciality ), but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance * Devadatta is not at home' means that the samvoga between a house and Devadatta, each of which exists. is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly an ass has no horns' means the negation of samavaya between an existing ass and horns. Similarly, there is no other moon implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say, we have only one moon, and that there is no parallel to it. That there are no pearls equal to a ghata in bulk' con veys the idea that the distinguishing feature, viz., & measure equal to that of a ghata is denied, and not the non-existence of pearls. Such being the oase, Gautama ! you may refuse to admit only the samyoga of the existing soul with something in some way, by saying something like this, that the soul does not exist in the body, but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under: If there exists that of which negation is predicated, then, in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore, you refuse to believe a fifth pratisedha, over and above the four well-known pratisedhas, viz samyoga etc. So, there must be a fifth pratisedha. These arguments can be refuted as below: We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds, i. e, only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus, you will see that only a particular

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first type of sovereignty is not admitted but not all types of it. Similarly, when we refuse to admit the fifth pratisddha, it is the number five' associated with it that is denied, and not a pratisedha in all its aspects. Regarding this refutation, it may be argued that this is all moonshine For, you refuse to admit in me the sovereignty of the three worlds-a thing that does exist in my case. The numher five' not admitted in the case of pratisedha, is also non-existent. Moreover, samyoga in the case of a house and Devadation, which is not admitted, is also non-existent. Same is the case with samavaya, samanya and visesa. Such being the case, how can you say that what is negatived does exist? The answer to this sort of argument may be given as follows: That the saryoga between the house and Devadatta is not simitted, does not mean refusal to admit the sainyoga of Dovadatta with a field, a market, a village, or the like. More over, the house has no saryoga with Devadatta only; but it has & samyoga, no doubt, with a bed-stead or the like. Similarly, the samavaya in the case of an A88 and horns is not admitad; but the samavaya in the case of a cow and its horns and the like, is certainly admitted. Likewise, samanya is not admitted in the case of the moon but it is surely admitted in the case of ghatas, cows, eto. that are more than one in number. Similarly, the measure equal to a ghata is refused so far as the pearls are concerned but it no doubt exists as regards a melon etc. The sovereignty of the three worlds is not admitted, Gautama I in your case; but it does exist as far as Orthankaras are concerned. Slimmibarly, the number five is not admitted regarding the peatadkas; but it is surely admitted when the question of anuttaras is being disoussed.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 43: From this, you will see that, what we wish to suggest is this: That which is denied, exists ordinarily. By no means we want to convey : 'that about which negation is predicated, exists there and nowhere else'. Thus, there is no vyaohicara (inconsistency ) in what we say. Gautama ! If you wish to retort that you (Gautamia ) do not admit the existence of the soul in the body only bad smit it elsewhere, that is good; for, it establishes what is desired by us. We have been all this while trying simply to establish the existence of the soul. And, if it is thus established, then the asraya (substratum ) of the soul will be proved as it is not possible to justify its existence in any other way. It is not justifiable to admit any other asraya of the soul except the body; for, the lingas of the soul are seen there. It may be borne in mind that it will not do to say that the body itself is the soul; for, in that case, we cannot have a vyavastha (fixity ) of the types, viz., he lives, he is dead, he has fainted, and the like. Of couise, this vyavastha will be exponnded horeafter, For the proof of the existence of the soul, another sty. mology can be given : jIvo tti satthayamiNaM suddhattaNao ghaDAbhihANaM va / for RENT HOU stat TE H 1 2011 (8494) atyo deho ciya se taM no pjaayvynnmeaao| ATTEOTTI FT forent sitate For H2611 (8908) Jito tti satthayaminam suddhattanad ghadabhibanam ra Jenatthdna sadattham so jivo aha mai hojja. 27 (1578) Attho daho ociya se tam no pajjayavayanabheao i Nagaiguno ya jao bhanio jivo na doho tti. 28 (1576)

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:44: Jinabhadra Gani's The first [jIva iti sArthakamidaM zuddhatvato ghaTAbhidhAnamiva / yemArthena sadathaM sa jIvo'tha matirbhavet // 27 // (1575) artho deha eca tasya tad no paryAyavacanabhedAt / jJAnAdiguNazca yato bhaNito jIvo na deha iti // 28 // (1576) Jiva iti sarthakam idam suddhatrato ghatabhidhanam iva i Yenarthena sadartham sa jivo'tha matir bhavat. x7 (1575) Artho doha eva tasya tad no paryayavacanabhedat Jihinadigunas ca yato bhanito jivo na ddha iti. 28 (1576)] Trans --27-28. This word "jiva" is significant owing to its being suddha, as is the word ghata. That arthu (meaning) by means of which it is pregnant with a meaning is jiva. If you, however, think that the artha is only the body, that is not so, on account of a difference in synonymous words; for, jiva is said to have gunas such as knowledge, etc., and not that the body ( is so said ). (1575-1576). TIkA-jIva ityed vacanaM sArthakamiti pratijJA vyutpattimattve sati zuddhapadatvAt , iha yad vyutpattimattve sati zuddhapadaM tadarthavad dRSTam , yathA ghaTAdikam / tathA ca jIvapadam , tasmAt sArthakam , yattu sArthakaM na mavati tat vyutpattimat zuddhapadaM ca na bhavati, yathA DitthAdikaM kharaviSANAdikaM ca, na ca tathA jIvapadam , tasmAt sArthakam / yad vyutpattimad na bhavati tacchuddhapadamapi sad na sArthakaM, yathA DityAdipadam, iti hetoranakAntikatAparihArArtha vyutpattimatva vizeSaNaM draSTavyam / yadapi zuddhapadaM na bhavati kintu sAmAsikam , tadapi vyutpattimatve satyapi sArthakaM na bhavati, yathA kharakipANAdikam , iti zuddhatvavizeSaNam / atha manyase--deha evAsya jIvapadasyA'rthaH, na punararthAntaram; urpha ca--" deha evA'yamanuprayujyamAno dRSTaH, yathaiSa jIvaH, enaM na hinasti" iti, ato deha evAsyArtho yukta iti / tadetad n| kutaH? ityAha--dehajIvayoH paryAyavacanabhedAt, yatra hi paryAyavacanabhedastatrAnyatvaM dRSTam , yathA paTA-kAnayoH / tatra ghaTa-phaTa-kamma-kalazAdayo ghaTasya paryAyAH, namo

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Vada] Ganadharavada : 45: vyomaa'ntrikssaa-''kaashaadystvaakaashpryaayaaH| prastute ca jIvo janturasumAn prANI satvo bhUta ityAdayo jIvaparyAyAH, zarIraM vapuH kAyo dehaH kalevaramityAdayastu shriirpryaayaaH| paryAyavacanabhede'pi ca vastvekatve sarvaikatvaprasaGgo'tra bAdhakam / yat punaridamuktam-" deha evAyamanuprayujyamAno dRSTA" ityAdi, taccharIrasahacaraNA-'vasthAnAditaH zarIre jIvopacAraH kriyate / kica, itthamapi zrUyata eva --'gataH sa jIva:' 'dahyatAmidaM zarIram' iti / kina "nANAItyAdi " yamAca jJAnAdiguNayuto jantuH, jaDazca dehA, tat kathaM deha eva jIvaH / prAgihaiva coktam--'na jJAnAdiguNo dehaH, mUrtimatvAt , ghaTavata; tathA, dehendriyAtirikta AtmA, taduparame'pi tadupalabdhAthAnAmanusmaraNAt, vAtAyanapuruSavaditi' / / 27-28 // 1575-1576 / / D. C.-Here the pratijna is : The word jiva is significant. For, over and above this, it has a vyutpatti and it is a suddha pada. Whatever is & suddha pada and has a vyutpatti is here seen to be one having an artha (meaning ). Ghata, etc., may be mentioned as instances; so is the word jiya. Therefore, it too, is significant. What is not significant is wanting in vyutpatti, and besides, it is not a suddha pada. Dittha, kharavisana, etc, are words of this type; for, the former has no vyutpatti, whereas the latter is not a suddha pada. Such is not the case with the word jiva. Therefore, it is sigpificant. The condition that it should have a vyutpatti is stated here to avoid dittha, etc., which are suddha padas, but which are not significant; for, they fail to satisfy both the conditions. Same is the case with khara-visana; for, though it has a vyutpatti it is not a suddha pada. And ther fore, it is not significant. If you believe that simply the body is the artha of jiva, because we come across the following line, it is not correct, since there is a difference in the synonyms of the body and jiva : " Daha evayam anuprayujyamano drstah yathaina jivah, enam na hinasti." The words of which the synonyms differ, are seen to be non-identical. For instance, ghata is not the same as akasa,

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: 46: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first as the synonyms of the former, viz., ghata, kuta, kumbha, and kalasa differ from those of the latter, viz., nabhas, yyorman, antariksa, akasa, and the like. In the pertinent case, the synonyms of jiva are jantu, asumat, pranin, sattva, bhuta, etc., and these are by no means the same as sarira, vapus, kaya, kalevara, etc., the synonyms of deha. If this difference in synonyms is neglected, anything will be identical with anything else, and this is certainly undesirable. Now "dona dvayam anuprayujyamano drstan". Herein, there is an upacara (metaphorical application) of jiva to the body, as it is with the help of the body that the soul walks eto. Moreover, we do hear. "gatah sa jivah; dahyatam idam sariram", i e., the soul bas departed, and let this body be burnt. Furthermore, the soul has an attribute like knowledge, whoreas the body is jada and has no knowledge. So, how can we equate the body with the soul ? The reasons why the body is not the same as the soul, have been already mentioned while concluding the commentary on verse 1562. jIvo sthi vao saccaM mavvayaNAo'vasesavayaNaM v| savaNNuvayaNao vA aNumayasavvaNNuvayaNaM va // 29 // (1577) Sivo tthi vao saccam mavvayanao'vasesavayanam va I Savvannuvayanao va anumayasavvayanam va. 29 (1577) [jIvo'sti vacaH satyaM madvacanAdavazeSavacanamiva / sarvajJavacanato vA'numatasarvajJavacanamiva / / 29 // (1577) Jivo'sti vacah satyam madvacanadavasesayacanam iva i Sarvajnavacanato va'numatasarvajsavacanam iva. 29 (1577) ] Trans.-29. Like my other statement, (e. g., one pertaining to your doubt ), the statement (of mine) that the soul

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :47: exists, is true, as it is my statement. Or, it is correct owing to its being a statement of an Omniscient Being, as is the case with the statement of one whom you look upon as Omniscient. (1577). TIkA-"jIvo'sti" ityetad vacaH satyam , madvacanatvAt , mavatsaMzayaviSayAdyavazeSavacanavat , yacca satyaM na bhavati tad madIyavacanamapi na bhavati, yathA kUTasAkSivacanam / athavA satyaM "jIvo'sti" iti vacanam , savajJavacanatvAt , bhavadanumatasarvajJavacanavaditi // 29 (1577) // D. C.-Just as my statement about your doubt is correct 80 this statement of mine that the soul exists is correct; for, it is my statement. The statement which is not correct, is not mine, e. g., the scatement of a false witness. Or, the correct. ness of this statement can be also established as under : The statement that the soul exists is correct, because it is the statement of an Omniscient Being, as is the case with & statement of one whom you look upon as sarvajna. | maya-rAga-dosa-mohAbhAvAo sacamaNaivAiM ca / savvaM ciya me vayaNaM jANaya majjhatthavayaNaM va // 30 // (1578) Bhayg-rage-dosar-mohibhavas saccamayairaim car Savvam ciya me vayanam jaraya majjhatthavayanam va. 30 (1578) [bhaya-rAga-dveSa-mohAbhAvAt satyamanatipAti ca / satyameva me vacanaM jJAyakamadhyasthavacanamiva // 30 // (1578) Bhaya-raga-dvesa-mohabhavat satyam anatipati ca ! Satyam dva md vacanam jdayakamadhyasthavacanam iva. 30 (1578)] Trans.-30. Everything that I say, is certainly true and free from any fault, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation (in me) as is the case with the words of an intelligent and impartial person. (1578) TIkA-sarvamapi madvacanaM satyamanatipAti ca bodhavyam , bhaya-samadeSA-jJAnarahitatvAta , iha yad bhayAdirahitasya vacanaM vata satyaM sya, pathA

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: 48: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first mArgajhasya bhayarahitasya praSTari rAga-dveSarahitasya mArgopadezavacanam , tathA ca madacA, tasmAt satyamanatipAti ceti // 30 (1578) // ___D. C.-Whatever I say, should be taken to be true and flawless, as I am ( entirely ) free from fear, attachment, aversion, and ignorance. In this world, it is a matter of common experience that whatever is said by one devoid of fear, etc., is true. For instance, the words spoken to one who has lost his way, by one who knows it, who is fearless, and who is devoid of attachment and aversion, are true. My statement belongs to the same category. So, it is true and flawless. The doubt of Gautama svamin is being answered. kaha savNNu tti maI jeNAhaM savvasaMsayaccheI / punchasu va jaM na jANasi jeNa va te paJcAo hojA // 31 // (1571) Kaba savvannu tti mai jenaham savvasamsayacchdii Pucchasu va jam na jasasi jena va te paocao hojja. 31. (1579) [kathaM sarvajJa iti matiyenAhaM srvsNshycchedii| pRccha vA yad na jAnAsi yena vA te pratyayo bhavet // 31 // (1579) Katham sarvajsa iti matir yenaham sarvasamsayacchedi/ Priccha va yad na janasi yena va te pratyayo bhavet. 31 (1579)] Trans.-31. You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient. This is so; for, I can remove all doubts. Or, you may ask.(me) what you do not know, so that you may be con. vinced (about my omniscience ). ( 1579 ). TIkA-kathaM nAma 'tvaM sarvajJaH' iti te matiH ? evaM tvaM manyase, tathA bhaya-rAga-dveSa-mohAbhAvazcAsiddha iti manyase / tadayuktam , yenAhaM sarvasaMzayacchedI, yazca sarvasaMzayacchettA sa sarvajJa eva / dRSTAntAbhAvenAnvayAsiddhesnaikAntiko'yaM heturiti cet / na, sarvasaMzayacchetRtvAnupapavattireveha viparyaye

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Vida] Ganadharavada : 49. bAdhakaM pramANam, kimihAnvayAnveSaNena ? | yadi vA, pRcchayatAM yat trailokyAntargataM vastu tvaM na jAnAsi yena sarvajJatvapratyayastava jAyate / mayAdyabhAvo'pi taliGgAdarzanAd mayi siddha eveti svayameva draSTavyam / kadAcidapi liGgArdazane liGgino'stitvazaGkAyAmatiprasaGga iti // 31 (1579 ) // D. C.-You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient and you may be believing that I am not entirely free from fear, attachment, aversion, and infatuation. In that case, I reply as under. ; I can remove all doubts. Whoever can do so, is certainly omniscient. So I, too, am omniscient. If you were to argue that this hetu is anaikantika (inconclusive) owing to want of an illustration, and impossibility of establishing anvaya, it is not so; for, in this viparyaya the anutpatti (inapplicability) itself of state of removing doubts is a proof that goes against it. What is the use of searching for anvaya? Or, you may ask me anything that you do not know so that you may become convinced about my omniscience. That I am free from fear, etc., is proved in my case, owing to their characteristics being not seen in me. To suspect the existence of a lingin even when there is a total absence of a linga, is too much. Concluding, the author says:-- evamuva ogaliMgaM goyama ! savvapyamANasaMsiddhaM / saMsArI - yara- thAvara- tasAibheyaM muNe jIvaM // 32 // (1580) Evam uvaogalingam Goyama! sayvappamanasamsiddham | Samsari-yara-thavara-tasaibheyam mune jivam. 32 (1580) [ evamupayogaliGga gautama ! sarvapramANasaMsiddham / saMsArI tara sthAvara - trasamedaM muNa jIvam // 32 // (1580) Evam upayogalingam Gautama! sarvapramanasamsiddham | Samsari-tara-sthavara-trasabhedam muna jivam. 82 (1580)] 7

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:50: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Trans.-32. Thus Gautama ! know the soul as one having upayoga (attention) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs and also ) as one having classifications like samsarin (mundane ) and itara (not mundane) and the mundane having two sub-classifications, viz., sthavara (immobile ) and trasa (mobile ). (1580) TIkA-evamuktena prakAreNa jIvamAtmAnaM gautama ! muNa-pratipadyasveti sambandhaH / kathambhUtam ? upayoga eva liGgaM yasya sa tathA, sarvaiH pratyakSA'numAnA-''gamapramANaiH saMsiddhaM-pratiSThitam , tathA saMsArI-tara-sthAvara-trasAdibhedam / saMsAriNazcetare siddhAH / AdizadbhAca sUkSma-bAdara-payAptA-'paryAptAdibhedaparigraha iti // 32 // 1580 // atra vedAntavAdI prAha-nanu bahubhedatvamAtmano'siddham , tasya sarvatraikatvAt , taduktam-- " eka eva hi bhUtAtmA bhUte bhUte pratiSThitaH / ekadhA bahudhA caiva dRzyate jalacandravat // 1 // yathA vizuddhamAkAzaM timiropapluto jnH| saGkIrNamiva mAtrAbhibhinnAbhirabhimanyate // 2 // tathedamamalaM brahma nirvikalpamavidyayA / / kaluSatvamivApannaM bhedarUpaM prakAzate // 3 // UrdhvamUlamadhaHzAkhamazvatthaM prAhuravyayam / chandAMsi yasya parNAni yastaM veda sa vedavit // 4 // " tathA 'puruSa evedaM ni sarva, yad bhUtaM yacca bhAvyam , utAmRtatvasyezAnaH, yadannenAtirohati, yadejati, yad naijati, yad dUre, yadu antike, yadantarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyAsya bAhyataH' ityaadi| ityetadeva pUrvArdhanAkSipyocarArdhana pariharamAha-- D. C.-In this way, Gantama! admit that there is a soul which has upayoga as its linga, of which the existence is proved by all the three pramanas., viz., pratyaksa,

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Vida ] Ganad hatavada :51: arumana and agama, and which can be variously classified. some of these classifications are :-samsarin (mundane ) and mukta (liberated ), suksma (subtle ) and badara (gross ), mrvapta (developed ) and a-paryapta (non-developed ), etc. Furthermore, the mundane beings are sub-divided as sthavara (immobile ), and trasa ( mobile ). Here a Vedantin may say that, many varieties of the soul are unwarranted; for, the soul is everywhere the same. This is oorroborated by the following verses :a. Eka dva hi bhutatma bhute bhute pratisthitah 1 Ekadha bahudha caiva droyatd jalacandravat 11111 Yatha visuddham akasam timiro papluto janah 1 Sankirnam iva matrabhir bhinnabhir abhimanyate il 2 # Tathadamamalam Brahma nirvikalpamavidyaya | Kalusatvamivapannam bh@darupam prakasato il 3 11 Urdhvamulam adhahsakhamasvattham prahuravyayam. Chandamsi yasya parnani yastam veda sa vedavit 11 4 11 And, Purusa dvedam gni sarvam, yad bhutam, yacca bhavyam utamrtatvasyesanah, yadannonatirohati, yad ejati, yad naijati, yad dure, yadu antike, yad antarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyasya bahyatah. This view of the Vedantin is now being refuted.jaha puNa so ego ciya haveja vomaM va savvapiMDesu / oten interessi e Telavitatsi 113311 (8468) Jai puna so ego cciya havejja vomam va savvapindesu / Goyama I tadegalingam pindesu taba na jivo'yam. 33 (1581) [yadi punaH sa eka eva bhaved vyomeva sarvapiNDeSu / an ! agafem fqueg qan a faisag!! 23 11 (8468)

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: 52: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Yadi punah sa oka dva bhaved vyomeva sarvapinddsu i Gautama ! tad dkalingam pinddsu tatha nu jivo'yam. 33 (1581)] Trans.-33. 0 Gautama ! if that soul were really one in all the pindas (bodies) as is the case with the sky, then, that (sky) is (only) of one form in different corporeal pidnas but such is not the soul. (1581). TIkA--paraH prAha-yadi punardarzitanyAyena sa AtmA sarveSvapi nArakatiryaG-narA-'marapiNDeSu vyomavadeka eva bhaved na tu saMsArItarAdibhedabhinnaH, tarhi kiM nAma dUSaNaM syAt / / evamukte bhagavAnAha--gautama ! tad vyoma sarveSvapi piNDeSu mUrtivizeSeSu sthitamekaliGgaM vaisadRzyAbhAvAdekarUpameva, iti yuktaM tasyaikatvam , jIvastvayaM vicAryatvena prastuto na tathA-naikaliGgaH sarvatra dRzyate, pratipiNDaM tasya vilakSaNatvAt , lakSaNabhede ca lakSyabhedAt , iti na tasyaikatvamiti // 33 // (1581) // D. C.-Some one niay ask a question: What harm is there, if, on the basis of the verses, etc, just quoted, the soul is, on the analogy of the sky, looked upon as one i.e. having no such classifications, as mundane and non-mundane and the like, so far as all the pindas, viz., the bodies of a denizen of hell, tiryac, a human being, and a celestial being, are concerned ? The answer is this: As regards the sky, it is alright to say that it is only one; for, the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal pizdas, is seen to be uniform-free from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform; for, it differs from pinqa to pinda. Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes, the difference in those having these characteristios, Hence, 'the soul is not one in number. Here is the illustration in

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:53: Vada ] Ganadharavada nANAjIvA kuMbhAvau vva bhuvi lkkhnnaaibheyaao| suha-dukkha-baMdha-mokkhAbhAvo ya jao tadegatte // 34 // (1582) Nanajiva kumbhadau vya bhuvi lakkhanaibheyaol Suba-dukkha-bandha-mokkbabbavo ya jao tadegaitd. 34 (1982) [nAnAjIvAH kumbhAdaya iva bhuvi lkssnnaadibhedaat| sukha-duHkha-vandha-mokSAbhAvazca yatastadekatve // 34 // (1582) Nanajivah kumbhadaya iva bbuvi laksanadibhedati Sukha-dubkha- bandha-moksabhavasca yatastade katve. 34 (1582)] Trans. 34. In the world, there are different souis like (different) water-pots, etc., on account of the difference in their characteristics, etc. For, if they were (only) one, there will be non-existence of sukha (happiness), dubkha (misery), bandha (bondage) and moksa (emancipation) (1582). TIkA-nAnArUpA bhuvi jIvAH parasparaM bhedabhAja ityrthH| lakSaNAdimedAditi hetuH, kumbhAdaya iveti dRSTAntaH, yacca na bhinnaM na tasya lakSaNabhedaH, yathA nabhasa iti / sukha-duHkha-bandha-mokSAbhAvazca yasmAt tadekatve, tasmAt mimA eva sarve'pi jIvA iti // 34 (1582) / ___D.C.-'The living beings in this world, differ from one another; for, there is a difference in their characteristics eto. As a parallel example may be mentioned water-pots eto, Whatever is not different from another object, does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same (since ghatakasa does not differ from mathakasa). Moreover, if there were only one soul, then, there will be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage and emancipation, But these do exist. Therefore, all the souls are different, and their number is not one but many. How do the characteristics differ in each body?

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: 54: Jinabhadra Gani's ( The first jeNovaogaliMgo jIvo bhinno ya so paisarIraM / uvaogo ukkarisA-vagarisao teNa te'NaMtA // 35 // (1583) Jenu vaogalingo jivo bhinno ya so paisariran ! Uvaogo ukkarisa-vagarisai tdna tdnanta. 35 (1583) [ yenopayogaliGgo jIvo bhinnazca sa pratizarIram / upayoga utkarSA-'pakarSatastena te'nantAH // 35 // (1583) Yenopayogalingo jivo bhinnasca sa pratisariram 1 Upayoga utkarsa-pakarsatastena tdnantah. 35 (1583)] Trans.----35. That upayoga (attention) by means of whiclh the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body. The upayoga has maximum and minimum scales. Therefore they (souls) are infinite in number. (1583) TIkA-yena jJAna-darzanopayogalakSaNo'sau jIvaH, sa copayogaH pratizarIramutkarSA-'pakarSabhedAnantabhedaH, tena jIvAstadbhedAdanantamedA eveti / tadevaM bhAvitaM " nANAjIvA" ityAdipUrvArdham // 35 (1583) // ___D. C.-This soul has as its characteristic, upayoga ( attention) consisting of two kinds of knowledge, vix., differentiated and undifferentiated. This upayoga has infinite varieties; for, it differs from body to body, some having the maximum upayoga, some having the minimum upayoga, and some having upayoga between these two extremes. Therefore, the souls are of infinite kinds owing to the infinite varieties of upayoga. This has been already alluded to, in the first hemistich of verse. 1582. Now, with regards to happiness, misery, etc., i. e., exposition of the second hemistich of verse 1582, the author says: egatte savvagayattao na mokkhAdao nabhasseva / kattA bhottA maMtA na ya saMsArI jahAgAsaM // 36 // (1584)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Egatte savvagayattao na mokkhadao nabhasseva | Katta bhotta manta na ya samsari jahsgasam 36 ( 1584 ) [ ekatve sarvagatatvato na mokSAdayo nabhasa iva / kartA bhoktA mantA na ca saMsArI yathAsskAzam ||36|| (1584) Ekatve sarvagatavato na moksadayo nabhasa iva I Karta bhokta manta na ca samsari yathaka"sam. 36 (1584)] : 55: Trans.-36. On oneness (being accepted in the case of souls ) there will not be liberation. etc., owing to (the soul) being all-pervading, as is the case with the space. Moreover, like space, the soul will not be a kartr (a doer) a bhoktr (an enjoyer ), a mantr (thinker) and a sarisarin (a mundane being ). ( 1584 ) ? TIkA -- ekatve jIvAnAM sukha-duHkha-bandha - mokSAdayo nopapadyante, sarvagatatvAt, nabhasa iSa / yatra tu sukhAdayo na tat sarvagataM yathA devadatta iti / kiJca na katI, na bhoktA, na mantA, na saMsArI jIvaH, ekatvAt sarvajIvAnAm, yaccaikaM na tasya kartRtvAdayaH, yathA nabhasa iti || 36 (1584) / / D. C.-If there is only one soul, then there is no scope for happiness and misery, bondage, and liberation and the like, since one soul will be all-pervading. Space may be here cited as a pertinent case. One wherein there are happiness, misery etc, is not allpervading, e. g., Devadatta. Furthermore, since the number of the souls is only one, and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker, and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer etc..a fact which is corroborated by the example of space. Besides, egatte natthi suhI bahUvaghAu tti desaniruu vva / bahutarabaddhattaNao na ya muko desamukko vva // 37 // (1585) For Private Personal Use Only

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:56: Jinabhadra Gani's [These Egatte natthi suhi bahuvaghau tti desaniruu vya Bahuttarabaddhattanao na ya mukko desemukko vva 37 (1583) . [ekatve nAsti sukhI bahUpaghAta iti dezaniraja iva / bahutarabaddhatvato na ca mukto dezamukta iva // 37 // (1585) Ekatvo nasti sukhi bahupaghata iti dasaniruja iva 1 Bahutarabaddhtvato na ca mukto desamukta iva. 37 (1585)] __Trans -~-37. When there is oneness (of the souls), none is (completely) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease. Furthoremore, none is (entirely ) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free. (1585) TIkA-idamatra hRdayam-nAraka-tiryagAdayo'nantA jIvA nAnAvidhazarIra-mAnasopaghAtasaMpAtaduHkhitA eva, tadanantabhAgavatinastu sukhinaH, evamanantA baddhAH, tadanantabhAgavartinastu muktAH, teSAM ca sarveSAmekatve ne ko'pi sukhI prAmoti, bahutaropaghAtAnvitatvAt , yathA sarvAGgarogagrastor3agulyekadezena nIrogo yajJadattaH, evaM na ko'pi muktastatsukhabhAk ca na ko'pi ghaTate, bahutarabaddhatvAt , yathA srvaanggkiilito'nggulyekdeshmuktH| talAdekarale sukhAdyanupapattenanAnAtvaM jIvAnAmiti sthitam // 37 (1585) / D. C.--There are infinite living beings viz., denizens of hell, tiryacs, and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy. Similarly, infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of karmans, and only an infinitesimal part of them, is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as differost entities, but are considered as only one, then, none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the onse with Yajnadatta who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger. Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruirg from liberation, since thero &

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Vada] Canadharavada : 57: great deal of bondages. One who has fetters all alony his body except a finger may be mentioned as an illustration, Thus, owing to oneness there is no possiblity for happiness, etc. So, it follows that there are many souls, and not only one. Refutation of the view-point of the Naiyayikas, who admit ( the existence of) many souls, but take them to be allpervading :-- jIvo taNumettattho jaha kuMbho tggunnovlNbhaao| ahavA'NuvalaMbhAo bhinnammi ghaDe paDasseva // 38 // (1586) Jivo tanumettattho jaha kunubho taggunovalambhao i Ahava'nuvalambhao bhinnammi ghade padassdva 38 (1586) [ jIvastanumAtrastho yathA kummastadguNopalambhAt / athavA'nupalambhAd bhinne ghaTe phTasyeva // 38 // (1586) Jivastanumatrastho yatha kumbhastadgunopalambhati Athava'nupalambhad bhinnd ghate patasydva. 38 (1586) ] Trans.-38. The soul permeates the body only, since its attributes are found there, as is the case with a pitcher. Or, because it is not found (elsewhere ), as is the case with a piece of cloth (which does not permeate), a pitcher is different from it. ( 1586) TIkA-tanumAtrastho jIva iti pratijJA, tatraiva tadguNopalabdheH, yathA ghaTaH, 'svAtmamAtre' iti zeSaH / "ahavetyAdi" athavA, yo yatra pramANai? palabhyate tasya tatrAbhAva eva, yathA bhinne ghaTe paTasya, nopalabhyate ca zarIrAd bahirjIvaH, tasmAt tasya tatrAbhAva eveti / / 38 (1586) / D. C.--The measure of the soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies. For, its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher, and not outside it.

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: 58 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first As an alternative argument it may be said :--That is nonexistent there, where it cannot be realized by any of the pramanas. As for example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher' which is separate from it. The soul is not seen outside the body. Consequently, it should be taken to be non-existent there. While concluding, the author says :tamhA kattA bhottA baMdho mokkho suhaM ca dukkhaM ca / saMsaraNaM ca bahuttA-'savvagayatte sujuttAI // 39 // (1587) Tamha katta bbotta bandho 'mokkho suham ca dukkham ca i Samsaranam ca bahutta'savvagayatte sujuttaim. 39 (1587) [ tasmAt kartA bhottA bandho mokSaH sukhaM ca duHkhaM ca / teau Tabar-samarit: Falfa 11 38 11 (8964) Tasmat karta bhotta bandho moksah sukham ca duhkham cal Sarisaranam ca bahutva'sarvagatatvayoh suyuktani. 39. (1587)] Trans.--39. Therefore, a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liber. ation, happiness, misery, mundane existence, and metamorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all-pervading. (1587) TIkA-tasmAd bahutvA-sarvagatatvayoreva satoH kartutvAdayo dharmA jIvasya yujyante, nAnyathA, ityevaMvighaM pramANasiddhaM jIvaM pratipadyasveti // 39(1587) / D. C. Therefore, it is only when it is admitted that souls are many and that none of them is all-pervading; action etc., which are the attributes of the soul, can have any place. If not, these attributes will be meaningless. So, please admit the soul which is thus established by pramanas. Now the meaning of the sentences of the Voda which may be troubling you,

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: 59: Pada ) Ganadharavada goyama ! dheyapayANaM imANa atthaM ca taM na yANAsi / jaM vinANaghaNo ciya bhUyehiMto samutthAya // 40 // (1588) maNNasi majjagesu va mayabhAvo bhuuysmudumbhuuo| vitrANamettamAyA bhUe'NuviNassai sa bhUo // 41 // (1589) atthi na ya pecasaNNA jaM puvvabhave'bhihANamamugo tti / bhaNiyaM na bhavAo bhavaMtaMraM jAi jIvo tti // 42 // (1590) Goyama ! Vayapayanam imani attham ca tam na yanasi , Jam vinnanaghano cciya bhuydhinto 'samutthaya. 40 (1588) Manpasi wajjangdsu va mayabhavo bhuyasamudaubbuo 1 Vinnanamettamaya bbud'nu-vinassai sa bhuo. 41 (1589) Atthi na ya poccasanna jam puvvabhave'bhibaNGamamugo tti Jam bhaniyam na bhavao bhavantaram jai jivo tti. 42 (1590) [gautama ! vedapadAnAmeSAmartha ca tvaM na jAnAsi / yad vijJAnadhana eva bhUtebhyaH samutthAya // 40 // (1588) manyase madyAGgeSviva madabhAvo bhUtasamudayodbhUtaH / vijJAnamAtramAtmA bhUte'nuvinazyati sa bhUyaH // 41 // (1589) asti na ca pretyasaMjJA yat pUvabhave'bhidhAnamamuka iti / yad bhaNitaM na bhavAd bhavAntaraM yAti jIva iti // 42 // (1590) Gautama ! Voda padanamesamartham oa tvam na janasi i Yad vijnadaghana dva bhut@bhyah samutthaya. 40 (1588) Manyasd madyangdsviva madabhavo bhutasamudayodbhutah 1 Vijfhanamatramatma bhutenuvinasyati sa bhuyah, 4L (1589) Asti na ca protyasanjna yat purvabhavabhidhanamamuka iti i Yad bhagitam na bhavad bhavantaram yati jiva iti. 42 (1590)]

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: 60: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Trans.-40-41-42. Gautama! You do not know the (real) meaning of these sentences of the Veda. For, you believe that none but the assemblage of (the particles of) knowledge, after having arisen from elements, in the way in which intoxication arises, from the sources of spirituous liquors, is a soul consisting of knowledge only-the soul which has sprung up from the collection of elements. It again- perishes after the elements (have perished ), and that there is no designation in the previous birth to the effect that it was named as such and such in the former birth (existence), and hence, it is said that the soul does not go from one bhava, to another existence. (1588-1589-1590) TIkA-gautama! ityAmantraNam , vedapadAnAM zrutivAkyAnAmamISAM "vijJAnadhana evetebhyaH" ityAdInAM cetasi vartamAnAnAmartha yathAvasthitaM vaM na jAnAsi nAvabudhyase / kimiti ? ata Aha--yad yasmAt tvamAtmAbhiprAyeNaivaMbhUtamihArthaM manyase vikalpayasIti saMbandhaH / kathaM bhUtam ? ityAha"viNNANaghaNo ciya ti" pRthivyAdibhUtAnAM vijJAnalavasamudAyo vijJAnadhana: pRthivyAdivijJAnAMzAnAM piNDa ityarthaH, avadhAraNaM tvAtmavAdiparikalpitasya bhUtasamudAyAtiriktasya jJAna-darzanAdiguNAzrayasyAtmano nirAsArtham / bhUtebhyaH pRthivyAdibhyaH samuMditebhyo na tu vyastebhyaH, jJAnasya tatsamudAyapariNAmAGgIkArAditi bhAvaH, madyAGgeSu madyakAraNeSu dhAtakyAdiSu madabhAva iva; kathaMbhUto vijJAnadhanaH ? ityAha-"bhUyasamudaubbhUo vinANamettamAya ti" bhUtasamudayAdudbhUtastadaiva jAto na tu parabhavAt kazcidAyAto vijJAnamAtrarUpa AtmetyarthaH, samutthAyotpadya tatastAnyeva pRthivyAdIni bhUtAni vinAzamaznu vAnAnyanulakSIkRtya bhUyaH punarapi sa vijJAnaghano vijJAnamAtrarUpa AtmA vinazyati, na tvAtmavAdinAmivAnyabhavaM yAti / ata eva na pretyabhave parabhave saMjJAsti, yat pUrvabhave nArakAdijanmanyabhidhAnamAsIt tat parabhave nAsti, yaduta-amuko nArako devo vA bhUtvedAnI manuSyaH saMvRta ityAdi, nArakAdeH prAgeva sarvanAzaM naSTatvAditi bhAvaH / kimiha vAkye tAtparyavRttyA proktaM bhavati? ityAha-"jaM bhaNiyamityAdi " sarvathAtmanaH samutpadya vinaSTatvAd na bhavAdU

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Vada 1 Ganadharavada : 61: bhavAntaraM ko'pi yAtItyuktaM bhavati // 40-41-42 (1588-1589 8490) 11 D. C.-By these sentences of the Veda are meant those which Gautama had in his mind. The assemblage of knowledge consists of the united particles of knowledge arising from elements such as earth etc., oowbined together. The restriction, viz., 'none else but', is here mentioned with a view to exclude a soul according to the Atmavadins (believers in universal soul) is distinct from the collection of elements and which is an abode or substratum of attributes like joana (knowledge ) etc. The sources of spirituous liquors are dhataki etc. Gautama believes that the soul has not come from any previous birth, but it has been generated by the elements it has been evolved out of them. So, when these elements perish, the soul, too, perishes; and it is not born once more as the Atmavadins believe. In short, it bas neither any incarnation nor any transmigration. Such being the case, it is not possible to say that such and such a one who was previously a denizen of bell, or a celestial being, is now born as a human being. For, on the termination of a stage as that of a denizen of hell or the like, everything was over-Dothing. was left, not even the soul. Thus, when the soul altogether arises from-gets evolved out of a collection of elements and completely perishes as soon as these elements perish, there is none who proceeds from one birth to another. I understand the meaning of these sentences as follows : goyama! payatyamevaM manaMto natthi mannase jiivN| bakaMtaresu ya puNo bhaNio jIvo jamathi tti // 4 // (1591)

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68 Jinabhadra Gani's [The first aggihavaNAikiriyAphalaM ca to saMsayaM kuNasi jiive| mA kuru na payattho'yaM imaM payatthaM nisAmehi // 44 // (1592) Goyana ! payatthamdvam mannanto natthi pannase jivan i Vakkantardsu ya puno bhanio jivo jamatthi tti. 43 (1591) Aggihavanaikiriyaphalam ca to samsayam kunasi jive, Ma kuru na payattho'yam imam payattham nisamdhi. 44 (1592) [gautama ! padArtha evaM manyamAno nAsti manyase jIvam / vAkyAntareSu ca punarbhaNito jIvo yadastIti // 43 // (1591) amihavanAdikriyAphalaM ca tataH saMzayaM karoSi jIve / mA kuru na padArtho'yamimaM padArthaM nizamaya // 44 // (1592) Gautama i padartha evam manyamano nasti manyasd jivam Vakyantardsu on punar-bhanito jivo yadastiti. 43 (1591) Agni-havanadi kriyaphalam oa tatah samsayam karosi jive i Ma kuru na padartho'yamimam padartham nisamaya. (1592)] Trans.-43-44. Gautama ! While construing the sentences in this way, you believe that there is no soul. And, in other sentences, it is said that there is a soul, and, moreover, there is a fructification of an oblation to fire etc. Consequently, you entertain a doubt about (the existence of ) the soul; but do not do it. This is not the meaning of the sentences. But hear : this is the meaning of the sentences. (1591-1592) TIkA-gautama / asya vAkyasya darzitarUpameva padArtha manyamAnastvaM 'nAsti' ityevaM jIvaM manyase / yasmAca punaH " na ha vai sazarIrasya priyA'priyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA-'priye na spRzataH" ityAdiSu vedavAkyAntareSu " asti" ityevaM jIvo bhaNitaH prtipaaditH| tathA " amihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH" ityAdivacanAdamihavanAdikriyAyAH phalaM pAramavikaM zrUyate / na vedaM mavAntarayApinamAtmAnamantareNopapadyate / ava:

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 68: " kiM jIvo'sti nAsti vA ? " ityevaM saMzayaM jIve karoSi tvam / tadamuM mA kRthAH, yasmAd " vijJAnadhana eva0" ityAdivAkyasya nAyamartho yaM bhavAnadhyavasyati, kintvasuM vakSyamANaM padArthamiha nizamayA''karNayeti // 43-44 ( 1591 - 1592 ) // D. C.-O Gautama! You interpret this sentence in the way just shown. And hence, you conclude that the soul does not exist. At the same time, you notice that the following sentences of the veda establishing the existence of the soul: "Na ha vai sasarirasya priya' priyayorapahatirasti, asarirasya va vasantam priya'priye na sprsatah. " Moreover from the sentences such as, Agnihotrm juhuyat svargakamah " It follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering, oblation to fire, etc.,-a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, and this fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul goes in, for another existence or birth. "" - These various statements lead you to doubt the existence of the soul. But, there is n no need of entertaining such a doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence, viz., vijnanaghana eva" etc. "2 The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows : please hear it-- viSNANA osNapaNo viNNANaghaNNo tti savvaovAvi / sa bhavai bhUehiMto ghaDaviNNANAi bhAveNa // 45 // (1593) nAI ciya bhUyAI so'NuviNassaha viNassamANAiM / asthaMtarobaoge kamaso viNNeya bhAveNaM // 46 // (1594)

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:64 Jinabhadra Gari's [The first Vinnanao'nanno vinnanaghanno tti sa xvadvavir Sa bhavai bhudhinto ghalavinnanai-bhavena. 45 (1593) Taim ciya bhuyaim so'nuvinassai vinagsamanaimi Atthantarovaoge kamaso vinndya-bhavenam. 46 (1594) [vijJAnAdananyo vijJAnaghana iti srvtovyaapii| sa bhavati bhUtebhyo ghaTavijJAnAdibhAvena // 45 // (1593) tAnyeva bhUtAni so'nu vinazyati vinazyamAnAni / arthAntaropayoge kramazo vijJeyabhAvena // 46 // (1594) Vijnanadananyo' vijnanaghana iti sarvatovyapil Sa bhavati bhutebhyo ghatavijanadibhavena. 45 (153) Tanyeva bhutani so'nu vinasyati vinasyamanani, Arthantaropayoge kramaso vijadyabhavena. 46 (1594)] Trans.-45-46. The soul (itself) is the assemblage of vijnanas owing to its being non-separate from vijnana, or it is so, on account of its pervasive nature all round. It arises from elements in the form of the vijnana of a pitcher, etc. When those very elements perish as vijfeya-bhavas (objects coming within the range of vijnana) on the attention being gradually directed to another object, it (the soul) subsequently perishes. (1593-1594) TIkA-iha vijJAnaghano jIva ucyate / katham ? iti cet / ucyateviziSTaM jJAnaM vijJAnaM jJAna-darzanopayoga ityarthaH, tena vijJAnena sahAnanyabhUtatvAdekatayA ghanatvaM niviDatvamApanno vijJAnaghano jIvaH, yadi vA "sabbaovA vi ti" sarvataH pratipradezamanantAnantavijJAnaparyAyasaGghAtaghaTitatvAd vijJAnaghano jiivH| evakAreNa tu vijJAnadhana evAsau, na tu naiyAyikAdInAmiva "svarUpeNa nirvijJAnatvAnaDo'sau, buddhistu tatra samavetaiva " iti niymyte| sa bhavati-udyata iti kriyaa| kebhyaH ? ityAha-" bhUehito ti" bhUtAnIha SaTa-paTAdizeyavasturUpANyabhipretAni, tebhyo jJeyabhAvena prinntebhyH| kena bhavati? ityAha-"ghaTo'yam" "paTo'yama" ityAdivijJAnabhAvena ghaTAdijJAna

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :08: paryAyeNa / tataH kim ? ityAzaGkaya "tAnyevAnu vinazyati" ityasyArthamAha" tAI ciyetyAdi" tAnyeva jJAnAlambanabhUtAni ghaTAdibhUtAni kramaza: kAlakrameNa vyavadhAna sthaganA-'nyamanaskatvAdinA'thAntaropayoge sati viTeyabhAvena jJAnaviSayamAvena vinAzamaznuvAnAni, anu-pazcAt tadbodhaparyAyeNa, sa vijJAnaghano vinazyatIti sNbndhH| jJAnaparyAyeNa ghaTAdibhyo zeyabhUtebhyo jIvaH samutthAya kAlakramAd vyavadhAnAdinArthAntaropayoge sati jJeyabhAvena tAnyeva vinAzamaznuvAnAnyanu vinazyatIti tAtparyArthaH // 45-46 (1593) (1594) // D. C.-Here the soul is said to be vijnanaghana-an assemblage of vijnana for either of the two reasons viz , (1) the soul is non-separate from-is identical with vijnana which is upayoga either of the type of jnana or that of darsana, and (2) the soul has each and every pradesa (the minutest portion) of it, formed from a collection of infinite modifications of vijnana. The word dva used in connection with vijnanaghana shows that the belief of the Naiyayikas and others conveyed by the following sentence is untenable : "Svarupena nirvijnanatvaj jado'sau, buddhistu tatra samavetaiva." This soul is evolved out of the elements which are objeots fit to be known-the objects like a pitcher, a piece of oloth etc. That is to say, it gets transformed as the knowledge of a pitcher etc., on realizing that this is a pitcher, this is a piece of cloth, etc. These very elements such as pitcher etc, which hed once served as substratum for knowledge, perish; that is to say, they cease to be objects fit to be known when the attention of the soul is directed towards another object, when these objects are hidden or concealed from sight or when the mind is working in some other channel. Such being the case, the soul cases 9

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:08: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first to know them i. O., ceases to exist as knowledge of these objeots. This is here looked upon as its destruction. The sum and substance is this:-- When the soul comes to know any object, it is said to have been produced from that object; but, when it ceases to think of it and directs its attention somewhere else, it is said to bave perished; for, the object with which it once identified itsell, has perished. Does the soul perish entirely in this way? The answer is in the negative as suggested in the following verse - puSvAvaraviNNANovaogao vigm-sNbhvshaavo| viNNANasaMtaIe viNNANaghaNo'yamaviNAsI // 47 // (1595) Puvvavaravingagovaogao vigama-sahbhavasahavo I Vinnapasantald vionanaghano'yamavinasi. 47 (1595) [ pUrvA-'paravijJAnopayogato vigama-saMbhavasvabhAvaH / vijJAnasaMtatyA vijJAnaghano'yamavinAzI // 47 // (1595) Porva'para-vijnanopayogato vigama-sambhava svabhavah | Vijfanasantatya vijnanaghano'yamavinasi, 47 (1595) ] Trans.--47. This vijfanaghana (the soul) has the nature of destruction and that of origination, on account of the (corresponding ) upayogas being associated with the previous vijfana and the subsequent one. It is immortal owing to the continuity of vijnana. (1595) TIkA-eka evAyamAtmA trisvabhAvaH / katham ? ityucyate-arthAntaropayogakAle pUrvavijJAnopayogena tAvadayaM vigamasvabhAvo vinazvararUpaH, aparavijJAnopayogastu saMbhavasvabhAva utpAdasvarUpaH, anAdikAlapravRttasAmAnyavijJAnamAtrasaMtatyA punarayaM vijJAnaghano jIvo'vinaSTa evAvatiSThate / evamanyadapi sarva vastUtpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvamevAvagantavyam, na punaH kimapi sarvadhotpadyate, vinazyati ceti // 47 (1595) //

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Vadik ] Ganadha avada : 67: D. C.-This very soul, though one, has a three-fold nature. When it is attentive to another object, it has died; for, at that time, its attention to the former object is gone, but it has originated so far as the attention to this new object is concerned. Side by side with its twofold nature pertaining to destruction and origination, it has permanence owing to the continuity of the general vijnana existing from the beginning-less time. Similarly, every object has a three-fold nature consisting of utpada (origination ), vyaya ( destruction ) and dhrauvya (permanence), and that there is nothing which is created in all respects, and that there is nothing which entirely perishes. na va pecanANasaNNAvatiTThae saMpaovaogAo / viSNANaghaNAbhikkho jIvo'yaM veyapayAbhihio // 48 // (1596) Na ca peccananasannavatitthae sampaovaogao | Vignanaghanabhikkho jivo 'yam Vayapayabhihi8 48 ( 1596) [ na ca pretyajJAnasaMjJA'vatiSThate sAMpratopayogAt / vijJAnaghanAbhikhyo jISo'yaM vedapadAbhihitaH / / 48 / / (1596 ) Na ca pretyajnana sanjna'vatisthate sampratopayogat Vijnans-ghanabhikhyo jivo 'yam Vedapadabhihitah. 48 (1596) ] Trans.-48. The designation pertaining to former knowledge does not exist owing to the upayoga being directed to (a) present object. This soul is named vijnanaghana as said in the sentences of the Veda. (1596) TIkA-naca pretyeti na cAnyavastUpayogakAle prAktanI jJAnasaMjJAsti / kutaH 1 sAMpratavastuviSayopayogAt / idamuktaM bhavati yadA ghaTopayoganivRttau paTopayoga utpadyate, tadA ghaTopayogasaMjJA nAsti, tadupayogasya nivRttatvAt; kintu paTopaeNyogasaMjJaivAsti tadupayogasyaiva tadAnImutpannatvAt / tasmAd vijJAnadhanAbhikhyo vedapadeSvabhihito'yaM jIvaH / tato gautama ! pratipadyasvainamiti // 48 (1596) / / For Private Personal Use Only

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: 68: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first D. C.-When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, e.g., from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as ghatopayoga (attention to & pitoher ), but acquires a new designation viz., patopayoga (attention to a piece of cloth). Such being the case, this soul is named as vijnanaghana in the Voda. Therefore, Gautama ! admit that the soul exists. evaM pi bhUyadhammo nANaM tabbhAvabhAvao buddhii| taM no tadabhAvammi vi jaM nANaM veyasamayammi / / 49 / / (1597) atthamie Aice caMde saMtAsu aggi-vaayaasu| kiMjoharayaM puriso appanoi tti nihiho // 50 // (1598) Evam pi bhuyadhammo nanam tabbhavabhavao buddhi i Tam no tadabhavammi vi jam nanam Vayasamayammi. 49 (1597) Atthamie aicce cande santasu aggi-vayasu | Kimjoirayam puriso appajjoi tti niddittho, 50 (1598) [ evamapi bhUtadharmo jJAnaM tadbhAvabhAvato buddhiH| tad na tadabhAve'pi yajjJAnaM vedasamaye // 49 // (1597) astamita Aditya candre shaantyorgni-vaacoH| kiMjyotirayaM puruSa Atmajyotiriti nirdiSTaH // 50 // (1598) Evamapi bhutadharmo jnanam tadbhavabbavato buddhih, Tad na tadabhavd'pi yajjnanam Vedasamaye. 49 (1597) Astamita aditye candre santayor-agni-vavoh Kimjyotirayam purusa atmajyotiriti nirdistah. 50 (1598)] Trans.--49-50. You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the dharma of elements owing to its existing when they exist, (and that it does not exist when there is their non-existence ). This is not proper; for, even

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Vida] Gahadharavada :69: when they are non-existent, knowledge is said to exist as in the following doctrine of the Veda :-- ___ What jyotis ( light) has this man when the Sun has set, the Moon has set, and when (even) fire and speech are quiet? It is said : that is the light of the soul. ( 1597-1598) ___TIkA-" buddhI" ti syAd buddhiH prerakasya-evamapi-" sa bhavai bhaehiMto" ityAdinA yuSmadvayAkhyAnaprakAreNApItyarthaH, pRthivyAdibhUtadharma eva jJAna-bhUtasvabhAvAtmakameva jJAnamiti bhAvaH / kutaH ? ityAha-" tanmAvabhAvau ti" " etebhyo bhUtebhyaH samutthAya tAnyevAnu vinazyati"-iti vacanAd bhUtasadbhAve jJAnasya bhAvAt , tadabhAve cAbhAvAdityarthaH, yasya va bhAva eva yad bhavati, abhAve ca na bhavati tat tasyaiva dharmaH, yathA candramasathandrikA, tathA ca jJAnamanuvidadhAti bhUtAnvaya-vyatireko, tasmAt tat bhRtadharma eva / tadayuktam , viziSTameva hi nIla-pItAdibhUtagrAhakaM jJAnaM tadanvaya-vyatirekAvanuvidadhAti na tu sAmAnya jJAnamAtram , yasmAd bhUtAbhAve'pi vedalakSaNe samaye siddhAnte " sAmAnyajJAnaM bhaNitameva " iti zeSaH / kena vAkyena? ityAha-"atthamie ityAdi" astamite Aditye, yAjJavalkayA, candramasyastamite, zAnte'nau, zAntAyAM vAci, kiMjyotirevAyaM puruSaH, AtmajyotiH samrADiti hovAca, jyotiriti jJAnamAha / AdityAstamayAdau ki jyotiH ? ityAha-"ayaM puruSa iti", puruSa aatmetyrthH| arya ca kathaMbhUtaH 1 ityAha-"appajjoi ti" Atmaiva jyotirasya so'yamAtmajyotirdhAnAtmaka iti hRdayam , nirdiSTo vedavidbhiH kathitaH, tato na jJAnaM bhUtadharma iti sthitam // 49-50 (1597-1598) // D. C.-Gautama may think as under : Even in this way the way in which is interpreted the second hemistich of verse 1599 beginning with "sa bhavai bhuehinto", it gets proved that knowledge is the dharma of elements such as earth etc. For, knowledge exists when the elements exist. This is what follows from "dtebhyo bhut@bhyah samutthaya tanyevanu vinasyati." Furthermore, in the absence of the elements, knowledge does not exist.

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:70: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first That which exists only when another exists and which is nou-existent when that another is non-existent, is the dharma of that another e. g., the noon-light of the moon. Knowledge is associated with elements both by anyaya and vyatireka. Con. sequently it is the dharma of elements. This thought is unjustifiable; for, only a particular type of knowledge which hus for its object, the elements, blue, yellow etc, is associated with these elements by anvaya and vyatireka and not the entire knowledge in general. For, even when the elements are absent, the Voda declares that ordinary knowledge exists. This is what we learn from Yajnavalkya who says " Astamita aditye, condramasyastamite, sante'gnau, santayam vaci, kim Jyotir avayam purusa atmajyotih samrac iti novaca." Herein the soul having a flade in the form of knowledge, is alluded to. Hence, it follows that knowledge is not the dharma of elements. The reason is as under : tadabhAve bhAvAo bhAve cAbhAvao na taddhammo / jaha ghaDabhAvAbhAve vivajayAo paDo bhinno // 51 // (1599) Tadabhave bhavao blava cabhavao na taddhammo I Jaha ghadabhavabhave vivajjayad paco bhinno. 51 (1599) [ tadabhAve bhAvAd bhAve cAbhAvato na taddharmaH / yathA ghaTabhAvAbhAve viparyayAt paTo bhinnaH // 51 // (1599) Tadabhave bhavad bhave cabhavato na taddharmah | Yatha ghatabhavabhave viparyayat pato bhinnah. 51 (1599) ] Trans.--51. One that exists when another does not exist and does not exist when that anolher exists, is not its dharma.

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:11: Vada ] Gagadharavada For instance, a piece of cloth is different (from a pitcher) owing to its viparyaya regarding the existence and non-existence of the pitcher. (1599) TIkA-na bhUtadharmo jJAnam , muktyavasthAyAM bhUtAbhAve'pi bhAvAt , mRtazarIrAdau tadbhAve'pi cAbhAvAt , yathA ghaTasya dharmaH paTo na bhavati, kintu tasmAt bhinna eva / kutaH ? ityAha-ghaTabhAvAbhAve viparyayAt-ghaTabhAve'pyabhAvAt tadabhAve'pi ca bhAvAdityarthaH // 51 (1599) // D. C.--Just as a piece of cloth is not the dharma of a pitcher, but is different from it, for even when a pitcher exists, a piece of cloth does not exist, and that even when that pitcher is non-existent, the piece of cloth exists, so, knowledge is not the dharma of elements; for, in the liberated state, it exists, even though the elements are present in a dead body etc. Having explained the meaning of some of the sentences of the Veda, the author while concluding the subject, explains briefly the meaning of the remaining sentences of the Voda. esi gheyapayANaM na tamatthaM viyasi ahava smvsi| atyo kiM hoja suI viNNANaM vatthumeo vA // 52 // (1600) jAI davvaM kiriyA guNo'havA saMsao tvaajutto| ayameveti na vAyaM na vatthudhammo jo jutto // 53 // .(1601) savvaM ciya savvamayaM sa-parapajjAyao jao niyayaM / savvamasavvamayaM pi ya vivittarUpaM vivkkhaao||54|| (1602) sAmaNNa-disesamao teNa payatyo vivakkhayA jutto| vatthussa vissarUvo pajAyAvekkhayA savvo // 55 // (1603)

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:78: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first Esim Veyapayanam ng tamattham viyasi ahava savvesimi Attho kim hojja sui vinnanam vatthubheo va. 52 (1600) Jai davvam kiriya guno'hava samsao tavajutto 1 Ayameveti na vayam na vatthudhammo jao jutto. 53 (1601) Savvam ciya savvamayam sa-parapajjayad jad niyayam Savvamasavvamayanm pi ya vivittarapam vivakkhas. 54 (1602) Samanna-visesamao tena payattho vivakkhayi jutto Vatthussa vissaruvo pajjayavekkbaya savv, 55 (1603) [ eSAM vadapadAnAM na tvamartha verisa, athavA sarveSAm / arthaH kiM bhavet zrutirvijJAnaM vastubhedo vA // 52 // (1600) jAtivyaM kriyA guNo'thavA saMzayastavAyuktaH / ayameveti na vAyaM na vastudharmo yato yuktaH // 53 // (1601) sarvameva sarvamayaM sva-paraparyAyato yato niyatam / sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarUpaM vivakSayA // 54 // (1602) sAmAnya-vizeSamayastena padArtho vivakSayA yuktH| vastuno vizvarUpaH paryAyApekSayA sarvaH // 55 // (1603) Esam Vadapadanaw na tyamarthan vetsi athava sarvesam Arthah kim bhavet brutir-vijnanam vastubhedo va. 52 (1600) Jatir-dravyam kriya guno'thava samsayas tavayuktah 1 Ayameveti navayam na vastud harmo yato yuktah. 53 (1601) Sarvamdva sarvamayam sva-para paryayato yato niyatam | Sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarupam vivaksaya. (1602) Samanya-visdsamayastena padartho vivaksaya yuktah | Vastuno visvarupah paryayapeksaya sarvah. 55 (1603)] Trans.--52-55. You do not know the (meaning) of these sentences of the Veda or that of all. (Hence you have a doubt.) What is the meaning after all ? Is it sruti, knowledge,

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Vide] Ganadheravada difference in (i.e., speciality of) an object, a genus, a subs. tance, an action, or an attribute ? Your doubt is ill-based; for, it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the dharma of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For, each and every thing ( sarva) is certainly all things ( sarvamaya ) from the stand-point of its own modifications and those of the rest, and that sarva is a-sarvamaya too, from the stand-point of separateness. Therefore, it is proper (to believe ) that a substance has a generality and speciality, according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varied from the view-point of its modifications. (1600-1603) TIkA-tammAdeSAM pUrvoktAnAM vedapadAnAM yathA mayA vyAkhyAto'thastathA tvaM na vetsi, tena jIve saMzayaM karoSi / athavA, sarveSAmapyazeSavedapadAnAmathaM tvaM na jAnAsi, yasmAt sarveSvapi vedapadeSu viSaye tavaivaMbhUtaH saMzayo'stIti saMbandhaH / kathaMbhUta ? ityAha-" attho kiM hoja suItyAdi," kimeteSAM vedapadAnAmarthaH zrutiH zabdo bhavet , yathA merI-paTaha-DhakAdInAM bhandasya zabda evArthaH ?; athavA yad ghaTAdizabde samuccArite tadabhidheyArthaviSayaM vijJAnaM bhavad dRzyate, tat teSAmarthaH ?; kiMvA gharTazabde samutkIrtite "pRthubudhnodarAdyAkAravAn ghaTalakSaNo'rtho'nenoktaH, na tu paTAdiH" ityevaM yo vastubhedaH pratIyate sa eSAmartha ?; yadivA, kiM jAtiramIlAmarthaH, yathA gozabde samuccArite gojAtiravasIyate ?; yadivA, kiM dravyameSAmarthaH, yathA daNDItyAdiSu daNDAdimad dravyam ?; kiMvA dhAvatItyAdInAmiva dhAvanAdikriyA'mISAmarthaH; athavA kiM zuklAdInAmiva zuklAdiguNa eteSAmarthaH ? iti / ayaM ca saMzayastavAyuktaH, yasmAt " ayameva, naiva vA'yam" ityevaM kasyApi vastuno dharmo'vadhArayituM na yuktH| zabdo'pi vastuvizeSa eva, tataH "evaMbhUtasyaivArthasyAyamabhidhAyakaH, naiva vetthaMbhUtasyArthasyAyaM pratipAdakaH" ityevametaddharmasyApyavadhAraNamayuktameva / kutaH 1 ityAha-" savvaM ciyetyAdi" yasmAt sarvamapi vAcyavAcakAdikaM vastu niyataM nizcitaM sva-paraparyAyaH sarvAtmakameva sAmAnyavivakSayetyarthaH / tathA, sarvamasarvamayamapyasti viviktarUpaM sarvato vyAvRttam / kayA? ityAha-vivakSayA, kaivalasvaparyAyApekSayetyarthaH, 10

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74: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first vizeSaviSayayeti tAtparyArthaH / tasmAt sarveSAmapi padAnAM vivakSAvazataH sAmAnyamayo vizeSamayazca padArthoM yuktaH, na punarekAntenetthaMbhUta eva, anitthaMbhUta eva veti / kutaH ? ityAha-"vatthussetyAdi" yasmAt sarvo'pi vAcyasya vAcakasya vA vastunaH svabhAvaH paryAyApekSayA vizvarUpo nAnAvidho vartate / tatazca sAmAnyavivakSayA ghaTazabdaH sarvAtmakatvAt sarveSAmapi dravya-guNakriyAdyarthAnAM vAcakaH, vizeSavivakSayA tu praticiyatarUpatvAd ya evAsyeha pRthubunodarAdyAkAravAnartho vAcyatayA rUDhastasyaiva vaackH| evamanyo'pi zabdo vizeSavivakSayA yA yatra dezAdau yasyArthasya vAcakatayA rUDhaH sa tasya vAcako drssttvyH| sAmAnyavivakSayA tu "sarvaH sarvasya vAcakaH, sarva ca sarvasya vAcyam" ityanayA dizA sakalaM svadhiyA bhAvaniyamiti / tadevaM tena trijagatsvarUpavedinA bhagavatA zrImanmahAvIreNa niHzeSaparaprabodhanopAyakuzalatayA tIkSNaparazuneva nipuNayuktiprabandhena gupilavallIvitAna iva mUlAcchinaH samasto'pi tasya tatsamAsamaparamakalyANasyendrabhUteH saMzayaH // 52-55 (1600-1601-1602-1603) // D. C.-Gautama l you have not followed my exposition of these padas ( sentences). of the Veda. Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul. Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, of the replaining sentences of the Veda. Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the Veda 1. Just as sabda is the meaning of the sabda (sound) of a kettle-drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc , 80, is the meaning of these sentences sruti, i e., sabda ? 2. Is it vijnana-the vijana which arises and which is asso ciated with the object connoted by it when the word like ghata is pronounced ? 8. Do the padas of the Veda mean vastu-bheda of the type noticed when the word ghata is pronounced; the type, viz., that this connotes en object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, eto , and not a piece of cloth ?

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :75 : Is their meaning jati-the jati (genus) of the kind one realizes when the word go (wow) w uttered ? Just as when the word dandin is pronounced we take it to be a dravya having a danca, etc., similarly, does the meaning of the sentences of the Veda connote such a dravya ? In the words dhavati (rung ), etc., we take them to mean the kriya (act) of running, eto, 80 do these sentences mean any such kriya ? 7. Just as the word. sukla (white ) means the guna (attribute) of being white, so do these sentences convey & meaning of the type of this guna ? These seven queries of yours are out of place--are useless. For, it is not possible to say regarding any vastu ( substance or material) that this is only this and nothing else. Sabda, too, is certainly a kind of vastu, so it is not proper to say that it connotes only this meaning and none else. The reasons are : Every vastu whether in the form of a vacya ( direct expression) or a vacaka (indicatory word) is sarvamaya (represent ing all objects ) from the stand-point of samanya (generality) when all the paryayas ( modifications ) including its own paryayas and those of the rest are taken into account. Whereas, every vastu is a-sarvamaya when examined from the stand-point of its own paryayas which lays stress upon visesa. Cansequently, all the sentences either convey a general sense or a particular one, according to the stand-point we take. Hence, it is no use saying that they mean only this and nothing else, for, the nature of every vastu whether it is a vacya or vacaka varies according to the stand-points from which they are viewed. Thus, from ihe general stand point, the word gnata is the vacaka of dravya, supa, kriya, eto., since it is then sarvamaya.

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: 76: Jinabhadra Gaai's ( The first But, when examined from a special stand-point, it is a vacaka, of only the conventional meaning, viz., that it has an expansive bottom, a wide belly, eto., for, this stand-point makes it definite. Similarly, any other word is a vacaka of only that artha which is rudha in that country, etc., when we examine it from the special stand-point. But from the general stand-point, each and every word is a vacaka of one and all, and each and every word is a vacya of one and all. "This is the line one should sensibly follow. Thus, sramana Bhagavan Mahavira wha knew the nature of all the three worlds, completely removed the doubts of Indrabhuti who was about to acquire the most excellent merit by advancing clever arguments capable of fully instructing others as is the case with a sharp hatchet which eradicates a cluster of creepers. chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukkeNaM / so samaNo pavvaio paMcahiM saha khaMDiyasaehiM // 56 // (1604) Chinnammi sasayammi Jinena jara-marana vippamukkenami So samano pavvaid papoahim saha khandiyasadhim. 56 (1604) [ Poet hih fotata Fri-penanganat sa zramaNaH prabajitaH paJcabhiH saha khaNDikazataiH / / 56 / / (1604) Chinnd samsaye Jindna jara-marana vipramuktena Sa srananah prayrajitah pancabhih saha khantikasatain. 56 (1604)] Trans.-56. When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Indra. bhuti took #Diksa along with his five hundred pupils. TIkA-suvodhA, navaraM zrAmyatIti zramaNaH sabasau pApAd brajitaH pravanito bhAgavatIM dIkSAM pratipakSa ityrthH| 'saMyataH saMyato bhavati naaykH|

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Vada ] iti nizcayanayamatAzrayaNAccetthamuktamitIha bhAvArthaH / khaNDikAstacchAtrA iti // 56 (1604) // Ganadharavada D. C.-That one who is a samyata becomes one who is not so, is a statement here made from cendental point of view. The rest is easy. SO and not the trans evaM kammAIsu vi jaM sAmaNNaM tayaM samAujjaM / jo puNa jattha viseso samAsao taM pavakkhAmi ||27|| (1605) Evam kammalsu vi jam samannam tayam samaujjam i Jo puna jattha viseso samasao tam pavakkhami. 57 (1605) : 77: [ evaM karmAdiSvapi yat sAmAnyaM tat samAyojyam / yaH punaryatra vizeSaH samAsatastaM pravakSyAmi // 57 // (1605) Evam karmadisvapi yat samanyam tat sanayojyam | Yah punar-yatra visesaa samasatastam pravaksyami 57 (1605) ] Trans.-- 57. Thus, what is applicable to karman, etc., (the Vadas of the remaining Ganadharas) should be applied ( there ). And I shall briefly expound there, that which is a speciality (of it ) ( 1605 ). TIkA - evaM yadihAtmavAdaprakrame pratyakSA- anumAnA -''gamapramANavaktavyatAdikaM vakSyamANakarmAdivAdasthAnakaiH kimapi tulyaM tat svadhiyA tatra tatrAyojanIyam / yastu yatra vAdasthAnake vizeSastaM tatra saMkSepataH svayameva vakSyAmi || itei saptapaJcAzadbhAthArthaH // 57 (1605) / / D. C.--Here, while establishing the existence of the soul, several points have been discussed. Out of them, those that are applicable to the other discussions which are to follow, may be applied there by the reader himself. So, I shall, now, briefly discuss in the remaining vadas (discussions) only such points as happen to be their specialities. End of the Discussion with the First Ganadhara.

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Chapter II dvitIyagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the Second Ganadhara. taM pavvai souM bIo Agacchai amariseNaM / vacAmi mANemI parAjiNittA Na taM samaNaM // 58 // (1606) Tam pavvaiam soum bio agacchai amarisdnam | Vaccami namanemi parajinitta na tam samanam, 58 (1606) [taM prabaMjitaM zrutvA dvitIya AgacchatyamarSeNa / vrajAmyAnayAmi parAjitya taM zramaNam // 58 // (1606) Tam pravrajitam srutva dvitiya agacchatyamarsdna i Vrajaniyanayani parajitya tam sramanam. 58 (1606)] Trans.-58. Having heard that he ( Indrabhuti) had renounced the world, the second ( Ganadhara ) comes exaspe. rated. (He thinks ):-I may go and having vanquished that saint, I may being ( Indrabhuti ) back. ( 1606 ) TIkA-tamindrabhUti prabajitaM zrutvA dvitIyo'gnibhUtinAmA tatsodaryabandhuratrAntare'marSeNAkulitacetAH samAgacchati bhagavatsamIpam / kenAbhiprAyeNa ? ityaah-vrjaami| "Na" iti vaakyaalngkkaare| AnayAmi nijabhrAvaramindrabhUti " tataH" iti gamyate / 'Na' ityayamapi vAkyA. lahAre / taM zramaNamindrajAlikaM kamapi parAjityeti // 58 (1606) //

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Vida ) Ganadharavada :79 D.C.-On having heard that Indrabhati had taken dtksa, Agnibhuti, his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira with the object of defeating him and taking Indrabhuti back. Agnibhuti thoughtchalio chalAiNA so maNNe mAiMdajAlio vA vi| ko jANai kaha vattaM ettAhe vaTTamANI se / / 59 / / (1607) Chalio chalaina so mannd maindajalio va vi i Ko janai kaha vattam dttaha vattamant sd. 59 (1607) [chalitazchalAdinA sa manye mAyendrajAliko vApi / ko jAnAti kathaM vRttametasmAd vartamAnA tasya // 59 // (1607) Chalitaschaladina sa manye mayendrajaliko vapi 1 Ko janati katham vrittamdtasmad vartamana tasya. 59 (1607)] Trans.-59. I think, he has been cheated by artful fraud, etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit. Who knows as to what happened there ? Consequently, (the world will see ) what will happen in his case. (1607) TIkA-durjayastribhuvanasyApi madmAtendrabhUtiH, kevalamahamidaM manye - chalAdinA chalito'sau tena dhUrtena-cchala-jAti-nigrahasthAna-grahaNanipuNena nena kenApi duSTena bhramito mdvndhurityrthH| athavA, mAyendrajAlika: ko'pi nizcitamasau, yena tasyApi jagadgurormabhrAtubhramitaM cetH| tasmAt kiM bahunA? ko jAnAti tadvAdasthAnakaM tayostatra kathamapi vRttam , matparokSatvAt / ita UdhvaM punarmayi tatra gate tasya tadindrajAlavyatikarabhramitamAnasakhacara-narA-'maravAtavandanamAtrabRMhicetasaH, zramaNakasya " vaTTamANI tti" yA kAcid vArtA vartanI vA bhaviSyati to drakSyatyayaM samagro'piloka iti // 59 (1607) / D. C.-My brother Indrabhuti cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds, 80, I think he has been deceived by

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:80: Jinabhadra Gant's [The second the rogue Mahavira, who must be an expert in using chala (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning) fati (an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker) and nigraha sthana (fallacy) etc. Or this Mahavira must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his (Indrabhuti's) mind. So what more? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and Mahavira there? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint Mahavira is concerned--Mahavira who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of khccaras (demi-gods), human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery. While going there, Agnibhuti said, so pakkhaMtaramegaM pi jAi jai me tao mi tasseva / sIsattaM hojja gao vottaM patto jiNasagAse // 60 // (1608) So pakkhantaramegam pi jai jai me tao mi tasseva | Sisattam hojja gao vottum patto Jinasagase. 60 (1608) [ sa pakSAntaramekamapi yAti yadi me tatastasyaiva / ziSyatvaM bhaveyaM gata uktvA prApto jinasakAze // 60 // (1608) Sa paksantaramekamapi yati yadi me tatastasyaiva | Sisyatvam bhaveyam gata uktva prapto Jinasakasd. 60. (1608)] Trans. 60. If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of paksas (premises), I shall become a pupil of his Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of Tirthankara Mahavira. (1608) TIkA- ko jAnAti tAvadindrabhUtistena kathamapi tatra nirjitaH 1 / mama punarapyekamapi pakSAntaraM prakSavizeSaM sa yadi yAtyavabudhyate - madvihitasya

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Vada] Ganadheravada :11 sahetU-dAharaNasya pakSavizeSasya sa yadusaramadAnena kathamapi pAraM gacchatIti hRdayam , tato "mi' iti vAkyAlaGkakAre, tasyaiva zramaNasya ziSyatvena gato'haM bhaveyam iti nishcyH| tata ityAdi vAggajiM kRtvA jinasya zrImanmahAvIrasyAntikaM prApta iti // 60 (1608) // D. C.-Who knows how Indrabhuti was defeated by him ? If however, be gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my paksas (premises ) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so, he went to sramana Bhagavan Mahavira. AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNa / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNNU savvadarisI NaM // 61 // (1609) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana vippamukkdna Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam. 61 (1609) [AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 61 // (1609) Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-rnarana-vipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina. 61 (1609)] ___ Trans.-61. He was addressed by his name and gotra ( lineage) by the Tirihankara who was free from birth, old age, and death; who was all-knowing, and who had complete darsana (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1609) TIkA-AbhASitazca saMlaptazca jAti-jarA--maraNadipramuktena sarvajJena sarvadarzinA ca jinena / katham ?-nAmnA ca-he agnibhUte ! gotreNa ca-he gautamasagotra ! iti / itthaM ca nAma-gotrAbhyAM saMlaptasya tasya cintA'bhUtaho ! nAmApi mama vijAnAti, athavA, jagatprasiddho'ham, kaH kila mAM na vetti ? / yadi hi me hRdtaM saMzayaM jJAsyati, apaneSyati vA, tadA bhaved mama vismyH|| 61 (1609) // D. C.-The omniscient Tirthankara addressed the second Oanadhara by name as Agnibhuti and as one having Gautams, 11

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: 82: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second as lineage. When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under: I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that Mahavira should be knowing my name and lineage. It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if Mahavira comes to know about my doubt or removes it. When he was thinking so, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira said, kiM mane asthi kammaM uyAhu natthi tti saMsayo tujhaM / verpayANa ya atthaM na yANasi tesimo attho ||62|| (1610) Kim manne atthi kammam uyahu natthi tti samsayo tujjham | Vayapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho. 62 ( 1610) [ kiM manyase'sti karma utAho nAstIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArthaM na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 62 // (1610) Kim manuase'sti karma utaho nastiti samsayastava | Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tosamayamarthah. 62 ( 1610 ) ] Trans. - 62. You think whether a Karman exists or not. This is your doubt. You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Veda. Their meaning is this. ( 1610) TIkA - he abhibhUte ! gautama ! tvametad manyase cintayasi yadutakriyate mithyAtvAdihetusamanvitena jIveneti karma jJAnAvaraNAdikam tat kimasti nAsti vA ? iti / nanvayamanucitastava saMzayaH / ayaM hi bhavato viruddhavedapadanibandhano vartate, teSAM ca vedapadAnAM tvamartha na jAnAsi tena saMzayaM karoSi / teSAM ca vedapadAnAmayaM vakSyamANalakSaNo'rthaH iti / / 62 (1610) / * " D. C. 0 Agnibhuti of Ligutama lineage. You have a doubt as to whether the Karman which is being done by the soul under the influence of Mithyatva (False Belief), etc., and which is of the type of Jnanavarana (knowledge-obscuring ), etc., exists or not. This doubt of yours is based on your_unrealization of the exact significance of the sentences of the Veda. This significance is what will be just expounded. 9

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :88: kamme tuha saMdeho mannasi taM nANagoyarAIyaM / tuha tamaNumANasAhaNamaNubhUimayaM phalaM jassa // 63 // (1611) Kammd tuha sanddho mannasi tam nanagoyaralyam 1 Tuba tamanumana sahanamanubhuimayam phalam jassa. 63 (1611) [karmaNi tava saMdeho manyase tajjJAnagocarAtItam / tava tadanumAnasAdhanamanubhUtimayaM phalaM yasya // 63 // (1611) Karmani tava sandeho manyasd tajjoanagocaratitam | Tava tadanumana-sadhanamanubhutimayam phalam tasya. 63 (1611)] __ Trans.---63. You have a doubt about (the existence of ) the Karman. You think it to be heyond the range of khowledge. That (Karman) of which experience is the fruit, is provable (to you) by means of anuinana. (1611) TIkA-he AyuSmananibhUte ! jJAnAvaraNAdiparamANusaMghAtarUpe karmaNi tava saMdehaH, yataH pratyakSA-'numAnAdisamastapramANAtmakajJAnagocarA tItameva tat tvaM manyase, tathA hi-na tAvat pratyakSaM karma, atIndriyatvAt , kharaviSANavat , ityAdi pramANaviSayAtItatvaM prAgvajIvasyeva karmaNo'pi samAnaprAyatvAd bhaavniiymiti| tadetat saumya ! mA manthAstvam, yato mama tAvat pratyakSameva karma, tavApyanumAnaM sAdhanaM yasya , tadanumAnasAdhanaM vartate tat karma, na punaH sarvapramANagocarAtItam / yasya, kim ? ityAha-"aNubhUimayaM phalaM jassa tti" sukha-duHkhAnAmanubhUtiranubhavanaM tanmayaM tadAtmakaM phalaM yasya zubhA-'zubhakarmaNa iti / anena cedanumAnaM sUcitam-asti sukha-duHkhAnubhavasya hetuH, kAryatvAt , aGkurasyaiveti / atha yadi bhavataH pratyakSaM karma, tarhi mayApi tatpratyakSaM kasmAd na bhavati ? iti cet / tadayuktam / na hi yadekasya kasyacit pratyakSaM tenAparasyApi pratyakSeNa bhavitavyam / na hi siMha-sarabha-haMsAdayaH sarvasyApi lokasya pratyakSAH, na ca te na santi bAlAdInAmapi tatsarvasya prasiddhatvAt / tasmAdasti karma, sarvajJatvena mayA pratyakSIkatatvAt , bhvrsNshyvijnyaanvditi|

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The second aq:atq4-aft TAFAIERITE "Te gagy Aral jeNAha savvaMsaMsapaccheI, pucchasu va jaM na yANAsi" ityAdinA prAgeva prativihitatvAt / kAryapratyakSatayA bhavato'pi ca pratyakSameva karma, yathA ghaTAdikAryapratyakSatayA paramANava iti // 63 (1611) // D. C.-0 long-lived Agnibhuti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the Karman, which is a multitude of paramanus, in the form of joanavarana, etc.; for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the pramanas such as pratyaksa, anumana, ete, the pramanas which are knowledge. To be explioit, you argue as unler : Karman is not directly perceived, because it is supersensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass. Other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother in the case of the soul. But these lines of arguments are faulty. For, this Karman is certainly pratyaksa to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramana can establish its existence. The Karman is either good or bad. The good Karman makes us experience happiness, whereas, the bad Karmar bringa misery. This loads to an inference as under : There is a cause for experieroing happiness and misery since it is a Karya ( an aot) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the Karman is pratyaksa to mo ( i. e. Mahavira) it should be so to you. For, there is np. sheb rule that what is pratyaksa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, a sarabha ( a fabulous eightlegged animal-a match for lions and elephants ), a swan, etc., are not pratyaksa to one and all the beings. But, on that Account, it is not that they do not exist, for even children know them. Therefore, there doos exist the Karman, sings

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Vida] Ganadharavada :85: it is pratyaksa to me, an omniscient being, just as, your doubt is pratyaksa to me. If you doubt my omniscience, I may repeat what I said to your elder brother, viz., " Kuha savvannu tti mat jenaham savva-samsayacchet, pucchasu va jam na yanasi" (verse 1579). Moreover, this Karman is pratyaksa to you too, since you realize its Karya (effect), as is the case with paramanus, which though not directly realizable to you, are pratyaksa to you, since their Karyas like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived by you. asthi suha-dukkhaheU kajAo bIyamaMkurasseva / so viTTho ceva maI vabhicArAo na taM juttaM / 64 // (1612) jo tulasAhaNANaM phale viseso na so viNA he| kajjattaNao goyama ! ghaDo vva, heU ya so kammaM // 65 / / (1613) Atthi suba-dukkhahdu kajjao biyamankurssseva 1 So dittho ceva mai vabhicarao na tam juttam. 64 (1612) Jo tullasabananam phald viseso na so vina heum Kajjattanai Goyamal ghado vva, he ya so kammans. 65 (1613) [ asti sukhaduHkhahetuH kAryatvAt vIjamaGkarasyeva / sa dRSTa eva bhativyabhicArAd na tad yuktam // 64 // (1612) yastulyasAdhanayoH phale vizeSo na sa vinA hetum / kAryatvato gautama ! ghaTa iva, hetuzca sa karma // 65 // (1613) Asti sukhduhkkhahetuh karyatvat, bijamankurasyeva Sa drista dva matir-vyabhicarad na tad yuktam. 64 (1612) Yastulyasadhanayoh phald viseso na sa vina betum Karyatvato Gautamal ghata iva, hdtusca. sa karma. 65 (1613)] Trans-64-65 Just as,a sprout has a seed for its hetu, (because it is a karya) so, there is a hetu for happiness and misery owing to their being a karya ( an action ).

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:86: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second ___You may think :--That (hetu) is certainly seen. This (thought) is not proper owing to irrelevancy. O Gautama! That difference which exists in the fructifi. cation in the case of those who have equal means is not without a hetu, since it is a karya, as is the case with a pitcher. That hetu is Karman. 64-65 (1612-1613) TIkA-pratiprANiprasiddhayoH sukha-duHkhayorheturasti, kAryatvAt , aGkurasyeva bIjamiti / yazveha sukha-duHkhayorhetustat karmaiva, ityasti taditi / sthAd matiH-strak-candanA--'GganAdayaH sukhasya hetavaH, duHkhasya tvahi-viSakaNTakAdayaH, iti dRSTa eva mukha-duHkhayoheturasti, kimadRSTasya karmaNastaretutvakalpanena ? / na hi dRSTaparihAreNAdRSTakalpanA saMgatatvamAvahati, ati prasaGgAt / tadayuktam , vyabhicArAt, tathAhi-'jo tulletyAdi' iha yastulyasAdhanayoriSTazabdAdiviSayasukhasAdhanasametayoraniSTArthasAdhanasaMyuktayozca dvayobahunAM vA phale sukha-duHkhAnubhavanalakSaNe vizeSastAratamyarUpo dRzyate, nAsAvadRSTaM kamapi hetumantareNopapadyate, kAryatvAt , ghaTavat / yazca tatra vizeSAdhAyako'dRSTahetustad gautama! karmeti pratipadyasveti // 64-65 / / (1612-1613) D. C.-Just as, a sprout which is a Karya, has a seed for its hotu, so, happiness and misery, which are well-known to every individual, have a cause, because they are karyas. And this cause is nothing else but Karman, and so it exists. It may be that you may here raise a question as under : A garland, sandal, a woman, and the like are the hotus of happiness, whereas a serpent, a poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these hetus of happiness and misery, as well, are seen-are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe Karman to be their hetu-the Karman which is not seen? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen, is not justificable, as it out-shoots the mark. This question is out of placa owing to the vyabhicara (irrelevandy ). It is a matter of common experience that we

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Vida ) GaNGadharavada :87: find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness. Same is the case with those who have the same means to suffer misery. This difference in each case, cannot be without any hetu which is not seen. This very unseen hetu is Karman. pAlasarIraM dehatarapuvvaM iNdiyaaimttaao| jaha pAladehapuvo juvadeho puvvamiha kammaM // 66 // (1614) Balasartram debantarapuvvam indiyaimattso Jaha baladehapuvvo juvaddho purvamiha kammam. 66 (1614) [bAlazarIraM dehAntarapUrvakamindriyAdimatvAt / yathA bAladehapUrvo yuvadehaH pUrvamiha karma // 66 // (1614) Balasariram dehantarapurvakamindriyadimattvat i Yaths baladdhapurvo yuvaddhah purvamiha karma. 66 (1614) ] Trans.-66 Just as, the body in youth.is preceded by a body in child-hood, so, is the body in child-hood preceded by another body, since it has organs of sense etc Here-in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is Karman. (1614) TIkAH-zarIrAntarapUrvakamAyaM bAlazarIram , indriyAdimattvAt , yuva. zarIravaditi, AdizabdAt sukha-duHkhitva-prANA'pAna-nimeSo-nmeSa-jIvanAdimattvAdayo'pi hetavo graahyaaH| na ca janmAntarAtItazarIrapUrvakamevedamiti zakyate vaktum , tasyApAntarAlagatAvasattvena ttpuurvktvaanupptteH| na cAzarIriNo niyatagarma-deza-sthAnaprAptipUrvakA zarIragraho yujyate, niyAmakakAraNAbhAvAt / nApi svabhAvo niyAmakaH, tasya nirAkariSyamANatvAt / yaha bAlazarIrasya pUrva zarIrAntaraM tat "karma" iti mantavyam-phArmaNaM zarIramityarthaH, "jo eNa kammaenaM AhAreI aNaMtaraM jIvo" ityAdi vacanAditi // 66 (1614) //

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:88 Jinabhadra Chani's (The second D. C.--The body in childhood must have some body ta precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, prana (sign of vitality ), apana (the vital' air which goes downwards and out at the anus ), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc., as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth; for it does not exist in the apantarala gati ( state previous to the interval stage ) and so, it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for cne having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, oountry, place, eto., as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So, the body which precedes one in child-hood is Karmana--one which is known as a Karmana body, as suggested by "jo dna katnmadnam ahardt anantaram jivo." There is another inference also, kiriyAphalabhAvAo dANAINaM phalaM kisIe vya / taM ciya dANAiphalaM maNappasAyAI jai. buddhi // 6 // (1615) kiriyAsAmaNNAo jaM phalamassAvi taM mayaM kammaM / tassa pariNAmarUvaM suha-dukkhakalaM jao bhujo // 68 // (1616) Kiriya-phala-bhavao danatnam phalam kisie vva i Tam oiga dagaiphalam manappasayat jai buddht. 67 (1615) Kiriyasamannao jam phalamassavi tam mayam kammam , Tassa parinamaruvam suha-dukkhaphalam jad bhujjo. 68 (1616) [kriyAphalabhAvAd dAnAdInAM phalaM kariva / tadeva dAnAdiphalaM manAmasAdAdi yadi buddhiH // 7 // (1615) kriyAsAmAnyAd yaMtphalamasyApi tad mataM krm| tasya pariNAmarUpaM sukha-duHkhaphalaM yato bhUyaH // 68 // (1611)

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Vada] Ganadharavada :89: Kriyaphalabhavad danadinam phalam krisdriva | Tadeva danadiphalam manahprasadadi yadi buddhih. 67 (1615) Kriya-samangad yatphalamasyapi tad matam karma 1 Tasya parinamarupam sukha-duhkha phalam yato bhuyah. 68 (1616)} Trans.--67-68 Just as, there is a fruit of agriculture, so, there is a fruit of charity, etc, owing to the fructification of an act. If you think that, the fruit of charity, etc., is serenity of mind, etc., then (we say that) that which is its fruit, is looked upon as Karman owing to the commonness of kriya-the Karman from which arises, again and again, the fructification in the form of happiness and misery which are the results of Karman. (1615-1616) TIkA-" dANAINaM phalaM ti" iha dAnAdikriyANAM phalamasti "kiriyAphalabhAvAo ti" sacetanArabdhakriyANAM phalabhAvAt phalabhAvadarzanAdityarthaH, yathA kRssikriyaayaaH| iha yA cetanArabdhakriyA tasyA phalaM dRSTam, yathA kRSyAdikriyAyAH, cetanArabdhAzca dAnAdikriyAH, tasmAt phalavatyA, yacca tAsAM phalaM tat krm| yA tu niSphalA kriyA sA sacetanArabdhApi na bhavati, yathA paramANvAdikriyA, sacetanArabdhAzva. dAnAdikriyA:, tasmAt phlvtyH| syAdetat , anaikAntiko'yaM hetuH, cetanArabdhAnAmapi kAsAMcit kRSyAdikriyANAM niSphalatvadarzanAt / tadayuktam , phalavattvAbhiprAyeNaiva tadArambhAt / yacca kacid niSphalatvamapi dRzyate tatsamyagjJAnAdyabhAvena sAmagrIvaikalyAd draSTavyam , manaHzuddhayAdisAmagrIvikalatayA dAnAdikriyA api niSphalA iSyanta evetyadoSaH / ___ yadi cAtra parasyaivaMbhUtA buddhiH syAt / kathaMbhUtA? ityAha-"taM ciyetyAdi" tadeva dAnAdikriyANAM phalaM yadasmAdRzAmapi pratyakSaM manaH prasAdAdiH / idamuktaM bhavati-kRSyAdikriyA dRSTadhAnyAdyavAptiphalA dRSTAH, ato dAnAdikriyANAmapi dRSTameva manaHprasAdAdikaM phalaM bhaviSyati, kimadRSTakarmalakSaNaphalasAdhanena ? / tata iSTaviruddhasAdhanAd viruddho'yaM hetuH| tatra vayaM bama:-" kiriyAsAmaNNAo ityAdi" asyApi manaHprasAdasya yat 12

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:00: Jinabhadra Gaai's [The second phalaM tad mama karma saMmatam / nanu manaH prasAdasyApi kathaM phalamabhidhIyate ! ityAha-"kiriyAsAmaNNAo ti" idamuktaM bhavati -manaH prasAdo'pi kriyArUpa eca, tatazca yathA dAna-kRSyAdikAH kriyAH phalavatyaH, tathA kriyAsAmyAd manaH prasAdasyApi phalena bhavitavyameva, yacca tasya phalaM tat kamaiva, iti na kazcid vybhicaarH| __ yataH karmaNaH sakAzAt , kim ? ityAha-" suha-dukkhaphalaM jau ti" sukha-duHkharUpaM phalaM sukha-duHkhaphalaM yato yasmAt karmaNaH sakAzAAyate / katham ? bhUyaH punaH punarapi / kathaM bhUtaM yat sukha-duHkhaphalam 1 ityAhatasyaiva karmaNastajanakatvena yat pariNamanaM pariNAmastadrUpamiti / etaduktaM bhavati-yataH karmaNaH sakAzAt pratikSaNaM tatpariNatirUpaM sukha-duHkhaphalaM prANinAM samupajAyate, tat karma manaH prasAdAdikriyAyA api phlmbhimtm| Aha-nanvanantaragAthAyAM "dAnAdikriyAphalaM karma" iti vadatA dAnAdikriyaiva karmaNaH kAraNamuktA, atra tu manaHprasAdAdikriyA tatkAraNamucyate, iti kathaM na pUrvAparavirodhaH ? iti / satyam, kintu manaH prasAdAdikriyaivAnantaryeNa karmaNaH kAraNam , kevalaM tasyA api manaH prasAdAdikriyAyA dAnAdikriyaiva kAraNam, ataH kAraNakAraNe kAraNopacArAdadoSa iti // 67-68 (1615-1616) / D. C.-In this world, we find that each and every act performed by a living being, yields a fruit, 'as is seen in the case of tilling of ground, etc. The acts of charity are undertaken by a living being, so, they too, must bear a fruit, and that fruit is nothing else but Karman. That act which is fruitless, is not commenced by a living being, e g., the act of electrons ete; but the acts of charity, etc., are commenced by living beings; so, they are fruitful. It may here be argued that this hetu is anaikantika; for, the aot, like tilling the ground, commenced by living beings, is at times seen to yield no fruit. But, this argument is not justifiable since such an act is commenced with the hope that it will be fruitful Moreover, the failure which occurs sometimes

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 91: is due to something wanting in materials-a defect arising from want of real knowledge. We may add that we are glad to admit that the act 8.8 that of charity, if done without the serenity of mind, is fruitless; for, it is an istapatti (a desirable acquisition) to us. Some one may here argue as under : The act, like tilling the ground, is seen to yield a visible fruit, viz., acquisition of crop. So, the act, like charity, must yield a visible fruit like the serenity of mind. Such being the case, why should we think of a fruit like Karman which is invisible? Hence, this hetu is viruddha (inconsistent); for, it establishes inst the contrary to what is desired. This argument may be refuted as below :-- Even the serenity of mind is certainly a kriya. So, just as acts like charity yield a fruit, so this serenity of mind, too, must yield a fruit. And that fruit is Karman, and nothing else. So, there is no vyabhicara (irrelevancy). It may be here noted that, that Karman whence living beings experience happiness and misery which are its parinati (consequences), is certainly the fruit of the act, viz., serenity of mind. It may be argued that in the preceding verse (v. 1615) while saying that danadikriyaphalam Karma" only the act like charity was mentioned as the cause of Karman and here the act like serenity of mind is stated as the cause of Karman. So, are not these statements contradictory? Yes, they are. But, it should be borne in mind that since the act like the serenity of mind is the intermediate cause of Karman and that the act like charity is the cause of the act like the serenity of mind, there arises no flaw, because, here, we have an upacara (compliment) of Karana in KaraNGa.... ""

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: 92: Jinabhadra Gani's karana, that is to say, the cause of the cause to be cause. [ The second is here taken hojja maNovittIe dANAikie va jai phalaM buddhI / taM na nimittatAo piMDo vva ghaDassa vinneo // 69 // (1617) Hojja manovittie danaikie va jai phalam buddhi | Tam na nimittata pindo vva ghadassa vinnes 69 (1617) [ bhaved manovRtterdAnAdikriyaiva yadi phalaM buddhiH / tad na nimittatvAt piNDa iva ghaTasya vijJeyaH / / 69 / / (1617) Bhaved manovriter-danadikriyaiva yadi phalam buddhih | Tad na nimittatvat pinda iva ghatasya vijneyah 69 (1617 ) ] Trans.- 69. If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not (so ) owing to there being a nimitta (instrumental cause). For instance, a lump (of clay ) should be realized as a (a nimitta) of a pitcher. ( 1617) TIkA - atra parasya yadyevaMbhUtA buddhiH syAt / kathaMbhUtA ? ityAha- nanu manovRttermanaH prasanyAdikriyAyA dRSTarUpA dAnAdikriyaiva phalam, na tvadRSTa karmeti bhAvaH / ayamabhiprAyaH - dAnAdikriyAto manaHprasAdAdayo jAyante, tebhyazca pravardhamAnaprasatyAdipariNAmaH punarapi dAnAdikriyAM karoti, evaM punaH punarapi dAnakriyApravRtteH saiva manaH prasAdAdeH phalamastu, na tu karmeti bhAvaH, dRSTaphala mAtreNaiva caritArthatvAt kimadRSTaphalakalpanena ? iti hRdayam / tadetad na / kutaH ? nimittatvAd - manaH prasAdAdikriyAM prati dAnAdikriyAyA nimittakAraNatvAdityarthaH, yathA mRtpiNDo ghaTasya nimittaM vijJeyastathA dAnAdikriyApi manaH prasatteH / dRzyante hi pAtradAnAdibhyazcittAhAdAdayo jAyamAnAH / na ca yad yasya nimittaM taMt tasyaiva phalaM vaktumucitam, duraviruddhatvAditi // 69 // (1617) For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :99: D. C.-Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this incination, one goes in for charity. Thus, the fruit of the serenity of mind, is nothing else but the act of charity and not a Karman, which is invisible. But such a belief is untenable; for, just as, a lump of olay is the nimitta (instrumental cause ) of a pitcher, so, the act of charity is the nimitta of the serenity of mind. We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual. Such being the case, it won't do to look upon that which is a nimitta of something, as its fruit, as it is highly objectionable, Besides, asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen, as is the case with the tilling of ground, the debator says :evaM pi diTThaphalayA kiriyA na kammaphalA pasattA te| sA tammettaphala ciya jaha maMsaphalo pasuviNAso // 70 // (1618) Evam pi ditthaphalaya kiriya, na kammaphala pasatta td , Sa tammdttaphala cciya jaho mangaphalo pasuvinaso. 70 (1618) [ evamapi dRSTaphalA kriyA na karmaphalA prasaktA te / sA tanmAtraphalaiva yathA mAMsaphalaH pazuvinAzaH // 70 // (1618) Evamapi dristaphala kriya na karmaphala prasakta tai Sa tannatrapbalaiva yatha mansaphalah pasuvinasah. 70 (1618) 1 Trans.--70 In this way, too, an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen, and not a Karman by way of its fruit. That (act) certainly has a fruit only to that extent, as is the case with (the act of) killing of a beast-the killing which has flesh as its fruit. (1618)

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194 Jinabhadra Gani's [The second TIkA nanvemapi yuSmadupanyastakRSyAdikriyAnidarzanenApItyarthaH, sarvA dAnAdikApi liyA dRSTaphaladeva prasakkA na karmaphalA / idamuktaM bhavati-yathA kRpyAdikriyA dRSTaphalamAtreNaivAvasitaprayojanA bhavati, tathA dAnAdikriyAyA api zlAghAdikaM kizcid dRSTaphalamastu, kimadRSTaphalakalpanena! kiMbahunA ? sA kriyA sarvApi tanmAtraphalaiva yujyate, nAdRSTaphalA, yathA dRSTamAMsamAtraphalA pazuvinAzakriyA; na hi pazuvinAzanakriyAmadRSTAdharmaphalArtha, ko'pyArabhate, kintu mAMsabhakSaNArtham ; atastanmAtraphalaiva sA, tAvataivAvasitaprayojanatvAt / evaM dAnAdikriyAyA api dRSTamAtrameva zlAghAdikaM kizcit phalam , nAnyaditi / / 70 / / (1618) D, C.-Just as, the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen. What nuore? All these acts are such as have only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast. For, the act of killing & beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh. None kills & beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible. Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be mothing else but some sort of praise which is seen. Here, another argument is advanced as follows:pAyaM va jIvalogo vaddA diTThaphalAsu kiriyAsu / aviTThaphalAsu puNa vaddai nAsaMkhabhAgo vi // 71 // (1619) Payam va jivalogo vattai ditthaphalasu kiriyasu i Aditthapbalasu puna vattei nassinkhabhago vi. 71 (1619) [prAyo vA jIvaloMko vartate dRSTaphalAsu kriyaasu| aSTaphalAsa punarvatate nAsaMkhyabhAgo'pi // 71 // (1619)

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:951 Vada ] Ganadharavada Prayo va jivaloko vartate dristaphalasu kriyasu / Adristaphalasu puna-r-vartate nagamkhyabhago'pi. 71 (1619) ] Trans.-71 Moreover, the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen; and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619) TIkA-loko'pi ca prAyeNa dRSTamAtraphalAsveva kRSi-vANijyAdi kriyAsu pravartate, adRSTaphalAsu punardAnAdikriyAsu tadasaMkhyeyabhAgo'pi na vartate-katipayamAtra eva lokastAsu pravartate, na bhurityrthH| tatazca hiMsAdInAmazubhakriyANAmadRSTaphalAbhAvAcchubhakriyANAmapi dAnAdInAmadRSTaphalAmAvo bhaviSyati / iti parAbhiprAya iti // 71 // (1619) D.C.-People mostly do such acts as agriculture, business, eto, of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen. Consequently, just as evil acts such as killing have not got. such fruits as are not seen, so, must be the case with good acts like charity. That is to say, they too, cannot have such fruits as are not seen. This is what may be advanced as an argument by Agnibhuti. sramana Bhagavan Mahayira refutes it as under :somma! jau ciya jIvA pAyaM viTThapphalAsu vahati / adiTTaphalAo vi ya tAo paDivaja teNeva // 72 / / (1620) Somma I jau ociya jiva payam ditthaphalasu vastanti | Adittha phalao vi ya tao padivajja teneva. 72 (1620) saumya ! yata eva jIvAH prAyo dRSTaphalAsu vartante / adRSTaphalA api ca tAH pratipadyasva tenaiva // 72 // (1620) Saumya! Yata dva jtvah prayo dristaphalasu vartante i Adristaphala api ca tah pratipadyasva tenaiva. 72 (1620)]

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:08: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Trans.--72 O gentle one! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in (doing) deeds, the fruits of which are visible ( in this very life ), learn (from me) that by that very ( reason ) those are also ( deeds) the fruits of which are invisible, i. e. to be had in a subsequent birth. (1620) TIkA-saumya ! ityanibhUterAmantraNam , yata eva prANinaH prAyeNa kRSi-vANijya-hiMsAdikAsveva dRSTaphalAsvazubhakriyAsu pravartante, adRSTaphalAsu punadAnAdikAsu zubhakriyAsu svalpA eva pravartante, tenaiva tasmAdeva kAraNAt tA api kRSi-hiMsAdikA dRSTaphalA kriyA adRSTaphalA api pratipadyasvAmyapagaccha / idamuktaM bhavati-yadyapi kRSi-hiMsAdikriyAkAro dRSTaphalamAtrArthameva tAH samArabhante nAdharmArtham, tathApi te'dharmalakSaNaM pAparUpamadRSTaphalamaznuvata eva, anntsNsaarijiivaanythaanupptteH| te hi kRSi-hiMsAdikriyAnimittamanabhilaSitamapyadRSTaM pApalakSaNaM phalaM baddhA'nantaM saMsAraM paribhramanto'nantA iha tiSTanti, dAnAdikriyAnuSThAtArastu svalpA adRSTaM dharmarUpaM phalamAsAba krameNa mucyanta iti / nanu dAnAdikriyAnuSThAtRbhiryadadRSTaM dharmalakSaNaM phalamAzaMsitaM tat teSAM bhavatu, yaistu kRSi-hiMsAdikriyAkartRbhiradRSTamadharmarUpaM phalaM nAzaMsitaM tat teSAM kathaM bhavati ? iti cet / tadayuktam , na hyavikalaM kAraNaM svakArya janayada kasyApyAzaMsAmapekSate, kintvavikalakAraNatayA svakArya anayatyeva / vapturajJAtamapi hi kodravAdibIja kacid bhUpradeze patitaM jalAdisAmagrIsadAvevikalakAraNatAM prAptaM vatrAzaMsAmAve'pi svakArya janayatyeva avikalakAraNabhUtAzca kRSi-hiMsAdayo'dharmajanane / atastatkagatAzaMsA tatra kopayujyate / / na ca dAnAdikriyAyAmapi vivekinaH phalAzaMsAM kurvate, tathApyavikalakAraNatayA viziSTatarameva tA dharmaphalaM janayanti / tasmAt zumAyA azumAyAtha sarvasyA api kriyAyA adRSTaM zubhAzubha phalamastyeveti pratipacavyam , anantasaMsArajIvasatcAnyathAnupapatteriti sthitam // 72 // (1620) D. C.-O gentle one ! Thus Agnibhuii is addressed. By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing )

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Vada ] Ghanadharavida : 97: evil deeds only, viz., oultivation of land, trading, doing injury to life, etc, the fruits of which are visible; but only & few become active in (doing) good deeds, giving & gift, eto., the fruits of which are invisible-by that same fact, i. e, by that very reason, admit that also those very activities-cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are also activities, the fruits of which are invisible. The substance of what is said is this: Though the people who do the deeds, cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., only for the sake of the reward which is visible (i, e., attained in this very birth) and not for the sin (involved in their performance ), yet they do get an invisible fruit of the nature of religious demerit (adharma), viz.,--the sin (papa )-because, if it were otherwise, there will be no explanation (upapatli) of there being in this world innumerable transmigrating souls. Becauso, they having earned (baddhva, lit.-having bound) an invisible fruit of the natura of sin (papa) though not sought by them, acorues to them, due to the activities, viz., cultivation of land, injury to life, etc., exist in this world in an indefinite number (anantah tisthanti) revolving in the endless cycle of births (samsara ). But those persons, few in number, who perform the deeds of giving & gift ( dana), eto., attain an invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (dharma), and then they are liberated. Such is the sense. An opponent may argue : Let those ( persons ) who do the deeds of giving a gift (dana), eto., have that invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (dharma ) which they expect. But how do those people who do the deeds of oultivation of land, injury to living beings, eto., get that invisible fruit of the nature of sin ( adharma ) which they never wish to get ? To this doubt, the reply is as follows:--That (argument) is improper. For, a cause complete in itself (avikala ) does not stand in need of a wish or expectation on the part of 13

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:48: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second anybody (including even the doer of a deed) when it is (in the process of) producing its effect; it rather, never, fails to produce (janayanti dva ) its effect, because it is a self-complete cause. For, even though not known to the sower, the seed of codrava, etc., fallen in some tract of land and reaching the state of a self-complete cause by the presence of the materials, viz,, the water, etc., does produce its effect even in the absence of a desire ( for that effect) on the part of the sower. And deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are of the nature (bhuta) of self-complete causes in so for as the production of sin ( a-dharma) is concerned. Hence in such ouuses, where does the desire (if) present in the performer of those deeds, become useful ? On the other hand the wise (i. e., those who do their duties disinterestedlyvivekinah) have no desire for the fruits even in doing such deeds as giving a gift, etc., instead of this, such deeds being of the nature of "self-complete causes" produce the fruit in the form of religious merit (dharma ), which is only of a superior quality. Therefore, it must be admitted that there is always an invisible fruit good or bad of any action whatsoever, whether it be good or bad; because, otherwise, there will be no propriety ( anupapatti) of the existence of innumerable transmigrating souls. To demonstrate the same, the author says : iharA aviharahiyA sabve mucceja te apayatteNaM / thavidvAraMbho, ceva kesabahulo bhavibAhi / / 73 // (1621) Ihara adittharahiya savvd mucoejja te apayattenam Adittharambho ceva kesabahulo bhavijjahi. 73 (1621) [ Sekar: i goresquenta adhyAramba eka klekhabahulo bhavet // 73 // (1621)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Itaratha'drstarahitah sarve mucy eranste'paayatnena | Adrstarambha dva klesabahulo bhavet. 73 (1621 ) ] :90: unseen Trans. - 73 Otherwise, they being without an (fruit of their actions viz. cultivation, etc.), will be all of them freed (from transmigration) without any effort (to be free) on their part. And the performance (arambha) of (the good deeds. like a gift to a worthy recepient dana, etc., which give the) unseen (good rewards ) will be itself (dva) the cause of much trouble (lit. that in which there is much trouble). (1621) TIkA - itarathA yadi kRSi - hiMsAdyazubhakriyANAmadRSTaM phalaM nAbhyupagamyeta, tadA te tatkartAro'dRSTaphalAbhAvAd maraNAnantarameva sarve'pyayatnena mucyeran saMsArakAraNAbhAvAd mukti gaccheyuH, tatazca prAyaH zUnya eva saMsAraH syAdityarthaH / yazcAdRSTArambho'dRSTaphalAnAM dAnAdikriyANAM samArambhaH sa eva klezabahulaH saMsAraparibhramaNakAraNatayA durantaH syAt ; tathAhi te dAnAdikriyAnuSThAtArastadanuSThAnenAdRSTaphalAnubandhaM vidadhyuH, tato janmAntare i pAkamanubhavantastatpreritAH punarapi dAnAdikriyAsveva pravarteran tato bhUyastatphalasaMcayAt tadvipAkAnubhUtiH punarapi dAnAdikriyArambhaH ityevamanantasaMtatimayaH saMsArasteSAM bhavet / , tatraitat syAt, itthamapyastu, kAtra kilAsmAkaM bAdhA ? / atrocyateiyamatra garIyasI bhavatAM bAdhA, yat kRSi - hiMsAdya zubhakriyAnuSTAtRRNAmadRSTasaMcayAbhAve sarveSAM muktigamana eko'pi tatkriyAnuSTAtA saMsAre kApi nopalabhyeta, azubha tatphalavipAkAnubhavitA caikau'pi na dRzyeta, dAnAdizubhakriyAnuSThAtAraH zubha tatphalavipAkAnubhavitAraM eva ca kevalAH sarvatropalabhyeran, na caivaM dRzyate // 73 ( 1621 ) // D. C.-Otherwise-If no unseen (evil) reward of evil deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings etc., be assumed (to accrue to the agent along with their visible rewerd in the shape of corn ) unseen evil deeds, would be, all " They 'those who do those of them, freed without any For Private Personal Use Only

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: 100: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second effort of their own, immediately afier death, there being no invisible evil fruit (of their evil deeds like cultivation of land ), i e., they will attain Liberation, because there would be no reason for their transmigration. And, then, the author means, the world of transmigration would be mostly empty. [Now, the latter half of the verse ] Adrstarambha the per. formance of meritorious deeds like * dana' 'a gift to a worthy recopiont, etc., the fruits of which are invisible (or the unseen principle ). This performance itself would be klesabahulah i. e., its result will be bad as it will be the cause of wandering in the mundane world. To explain the same-Those who perform the deeds of 'dana' a gift to a worthy recepient' etc., would by performing them, aim at ('anubandham vidadhyuh) the invisible fruit; then, in a suoceeding birth while experiencing the maturity of that fruit (i. e., the object of enjoyment resulting from it), thoy being propelled by it would be once again active in doing the same deeds of dana, eto., then again by earning their fruit, the experience of its maturity ( will result), and once again, the performance of the deeds of daua etc. In this way, they will have transmigratory existence consisting of an endless series.* * Here we beg to differ from the commentator, who seems to us, to have missed the force of klasa in the original verse. The author seems to mean that if we do not assume the evil unseen fruit of the evil deeds of krsi eto., then we have one out of two possibilities viz., all souls will be liberated immedia taly aftor their death, and (2) if we do not assume the conclusion, then, we shall have to take performance of the good deeds of dana eto., as partly giving their good rewards and also partly but unfailingly giving the bad rewards leading to misery in a succeeding birth in this world. In this latter case, the performance of good deeds alone (dva in the verse) will be cause of much misery (klasa ). We have to explain the great deal of misery in this world. We take it as an

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Vida] Ganadharavada : 101: To the above view of the Siddhantin, an opponent may raise an objection as follows:-Let the case may be as you suggest, i. e., let the good deeds alone be assumed to give an unending series of births and deaths. What inconsistency (badha) will there be in our system (if the good deeds alone be the cause of transmigration)? To this objection, we reply the following will be the greatest inconsistency for you:--All souls will attain Liberation there being no collection of (bad) invisible. fruit by those who perform the bad deeds viz., cultivation of the land, injury to living beings, etc., and in that case, not a single person performing those (bad) deeds (of cultivation of land etc.) will be found anywhere in the world, and not a single person experiencing the maturity of their rewards which are evil will be seen anywhere; and only persons who perform the good deeds of dana etc., and experience the maturity of their rewards which are good, will be found every where. And such is not the world which we see.t invisible result of either bad deeds like krsi or of good deeds like dana alone. If we do not make either of these two assumptions, then, we should have no misery in the world and every soul should be freed from the world immediately on departure from this world. Thus, the latter half of the verse is meant to lead to the contingency of assuming the good deeds alone as the cause of the misery of the soul, and thus the cause of the samsara of the soul The commentator, however, does not seem to us to emphasise the contigency of this assumption, that he takes the good deeds as cause of the worldly existence which may be in the form of repeated enjoyment in a series of successive births of only the good rewards of good deeds, there being no bad rewards of good deeds-Translator. + In our opinion, this objection and its reply show the weakness of the commentary. The opponent, will reosive

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: 102: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second An opportent may ask "What, therefore." So, the author replies :jamaNibhogabhAjo bahutaragA jaM ca neha maipuvvaM / aviThThANihaphalaM koi vi kiriyaM samArabhai // 74 // (1622) teNa paDivaja kiriyA adikhegaMtiyapphalA savvA / dihANegaMtaphalA sAvi adiTTANubhAveNa // 75 // (1623) Jamanitghabhogabhajo bahutaraga jam ca neha maipuvvam Aditthanitthaphalam koi vi kiriyam samarabhai. 74 (1622) Tona padivajja kiriya aditthegantiyapphala savva | Ditthandgantaphala savi aditthanubhavena. 75 (1628) [ yadAniSTabhogabhAjo bahutarakA yacca neha matipUrvAm / / adRSTAniSTaphalAM kazcidapi kriyAM samArabhate // 74 // (1622) tena pratipadyasva kriyA'TTaiSTakAntikaphalA sarvA / dRSTAnaikAntikaphalA sApyadRSTAnubhAvena // 75 / / (1623) Yadanistabhogabhajo bahutaraka gacca neha matipurvam i Adrstanistaphalam kascidapi kriyam samarabhate. 74 (1622) Tena pratipadyasva kriya'drstaikantikaphala sarva i Drstanaikantikaphala sapyadrstanubhavena. 75 (1623)] Trans.--74-75 Since a great majority of souls experience undesired objects, and since none whatsoever in this world, the reply as *a welcome conclusion (istspatti) and say that sven though we do not at present find the world as ocoupied only by those who do the good deeds and get the good rewards, let it be so in future according to our assumption, since the Assumption leads to a welcome result. Even though no body would get Liberation, the world in any case would be better than it is now. "Na caivam drsyate" is in any case not justified by any word in the original verse.--Translator.

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Vida ) Ganadharavada : 108: intentionally performs a deed givirig an invisible and undesired reward, therefore, do conclude that all actions (good and bad): invariably give an unseen fruit and that action (which produces a drsta fruit ) does not invariably produce a visible fruit hecause of the power of the adrsta (the evil) unseen of the doer.t TAkA-yasAdaniSTabhogabhAjo bahutarA bhUyAMsa:-azubhakarmavipAka janitaduHkhamAja eva prANinaH pracurA ihopalabhyante, zubhakarmavipAkanivandhanasukhAnubhavitArastu svalpA eveti bhAvaH / tena tasmAt kAraNAt saumya ! pratipadyasva zubhA'zubhA vA sarvA'pi kriyA, adRSTaM zubhAzubhaM karmarupamaikAntika phalaM yasyAH sA'dRSTaikAntikaMphaletyuttaragAthAyAM saMbandhaH / idamuktaM bhavati-yena duHkhino'tra bahavaH prANino dazyante sukhinastu svalpAH, tena jJAyate kRSivANijya-hiMsAdikriyAnibandhanAzubhakarmarUpAdRSTaphalavipAko duHkhinAm, itareSAM tu dAnAdikriyAhetukazubhakarmarUpAdRSTaphalavipAka iti| vyatyayaH kasmAt na bhavati iti cet / ucyate-azubhakriyArambhiNAmeva bahutvAt , zubhakriyAnuSTAtRNAmeva ca svalpatvAditi / atrAha-nanvazubhakriyArammaphalAmapi yadyadRSTaphakaM bhavati, tat kimiti dAnAdikriyArammaka iva tadArambhako'pi kazcit tadAzaMsAM kurvANo na dRzyate / ityAha-"jaM ca nehetyAdi" yamAca nehAdRSTamaniSTamazubha phalaM yasyAHsA'dRSTAniSTaphalA tAmitthaMbhUtAM kriyAM matipUrvAmAzaMsAbuddhipUrvikAM ko'pi samArabhate, ityato na ko'pi tadAzaMsAM kurvANo dRzyate / tasmAt sarvApi kriyA'dRSTaikAntikaphaleti pratipadyasveti / punarapi kathaMbhUtAH ? ityAha-"divAyegaMtaphala ti" dRSTaM dhAnyadraviNalAbhAdikamanaikAntikamanavazyaMbhAvi phalaM yasyaH kRSivANijyAdikriyAyAH sA dRSTAnaikAntikaphalA sarvApi kriyA / idamuktaM bhavati-sarvasyA api kriyAyA adRSTaM phalaM tAvadekAntenaiva bhavati, yatu dRSphalaM tadanakAntira kameva-kasyAzcit tad bhavati kasyAcid netyarthaH / etaca dRSTaphalamyAnaikAntikatvamadRSTAnubhAvenaiveti pratipattavyam / na hi samAnasAdhanArabdhatulayakri + Vide our note at the end of the commentary on Verse 1624

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: 104 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The second pANAM dvayorSahUnAM vaikasya dRSTaphalavighAtaH, anyasya tu na, ityetadadRSTahetumantareNopapadyata iti bhaavH| etaccehaiva prAguktameveti // 74-75 (1622-1623) / D. C.-_"Since.........objects" means "because in this world innumerable beings are found to be only unhappy due (janita ) to the maturity. of evil actions;" it also means " Only few are those who enjoy happiness which depends upon (nibandhana ) the maturity of good actions." Tona-because of that season, O gentle student I know that (i. e. conclude that ) each and every action good or bad, is adrstaikantika phala i, e., suoh as gives a reward which is invariably of the form of a (new) action which is unseen and both good and bad Thus, "anistabhogabhajo bahutarakah " is to be connected with " tena......... sarva" the first half of the succeeding verse (1/1628 ). The sense of the sentence is as follows:--Because in this world we find a great majority of beings to be suffering and only a few to be enjoying, we should infer that in the case of the suffering, the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta ). in the form of "evil karma't based upon (nibandhana) activities like cultivation of land, trade, injury to living beings etc., has repened, but in the case of the rest (the enjoying the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta ) in the form of good karma produced by (hetuka ) the activities of giving a gift to a worthy recipient has ripened. An opponent may ask " Why not the reverse of what you say? The reply is as follows :-Just because in the world only those who do evil activities are in a majority and only those who perform good deeds are in a minority, Here the opponent argues :-If even those who do evil deods, get a fruit in the form of an adrsta ( in addition to the drsta or visible fruit e. g., the crops by means of cultivation of the land ), then, why is it that, just like one who does + The word "karma" is here used in the sense of samcita karmu whigh is also called adrsta-Tr.

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Vada] Ganadharavada :105: the deed of dana, that man also who does the evil deed is never found to hold an expectation for that adrsta? To this the reply is And since etc.. And because none in this world does intentionally i, e.. with a previous expectation (asamsa buddhi purvikam) such deed BS would give a fruit unseen and evil. It is due to this reason that no body is found to hold an expectation for the evil unseen (adrsta) [ while he does the deeds of krsi etc.] Therefore, conclude that all actions (good like dana and bad like krsi) whatever invariably give a result which is adrsta ( unseen ). What other qualifications do actions possess? To this the reply is:" ditthaneganta phala tti" (beginning of the latter half of v. 1623). All actions-cultivation of land, trade, etc., bear a visible fruit viz., the acquision of corn, money etc., which is not absolute e., which is not invariably accruing ( anavasyambhavi). It means that every action invariably produces an invisible fruit; but the visible fruit which is to be produced is not absolute or invariably happening i. e., some action produces it and some action does not produce it. And this uncertainty of the visible fruit must be accepted as effect of the power of an adrsta (a destiny of the man who does the deed of krti eto,) because when one out of two or many persons who do the same action (e. g., cultivation of land) with the same means, suffers the loss of his visible fruit (crops) while another does not, it never happens without a cause in the form of adrsta, the evil unseen. Moreover, this has been already explained in this very book t the When the crops of a cultivator fails, the failure is due to his adrsta and not to his action of cultivation which is a drsta or visible deed. The commentator is anxious to explain " savva kiriye' as all actions good (like dana) and bad (like krsi); but it is very difficult to explain how the good actions (like dana) 14

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[The second Karma' is a foregone :-- : 106: Jinabhadra Gani's Or, of what avail is this trouble? conclusion. By what argument? He replies ahavA phalAu kammaM kajjAttaNao pasAhiyaM puvvaM / paramANavI ghaDassa va kiriyANa tayaM phala minnaM // 76 // (1624) Ahava phalau kammam kajjattanao pasahiyam puvvam Paramanavo ghadassa va kiriyana tayam phalam bhinnam. 76 (1624) can bear a visible fruit (ditthanoganta phala), So, even the commentator has somehow to explain it as referring only to the bad actions like krsi etc. We hold that by savva kiriya we should take only the bad actions like oultivation of land, trade, etc. The purpose of the verse is to explain how all bad actions bear invariably a bad fruit which is invisible (adittha) and how even the visible fruits which these bad actions bear and which the agent intentionally aims at, are uncertain and therefore the result of the man's adrsta, the invisible karma. The visible action which a man does e. g., krsi bears two kinds of fruits invisible and visible, both of which are dependent upon the man's adrsta (aditthanubhavena). Since we find most people suffering and since we find that none does any bad action even e. g. krsi with the intention that the result be bad and invisible i, e. that he may be unhappy in his next life as a result of krsi, we must conclude that all bad actions like krsi give invariably an invisible bad result. Thus, in our opinion the proper conclusion (padivajja) from the whole of v. 1622 is the first half of v. 1623. The latter half of v. 1623 is only an additional remark. The commentator connects the first half of v. 1623 with first half of v. 1622 and the latter half of the former, with the latter half of the latter. As the latter half of v. 1622 refers only to adrsta anista, it cannot be connected with the latter half of v. 1623 which refers only to the drsta phala and traces it to adrsta karmas--Tr.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada [ athavA phalAt karma kAryatvayaH prasAdhitaM pUrvam / paramANavo ghaTasyeva kriyANAM tat phalaM bhinnam // 76 // (1624) Trans. - 76 Or rather, Athava phalt karma karyatvatah prasadhitam puruam | Paramanavo ghatasyeva kriyanam tat phalam bhinnam. 76 (1624)] ? 'karman is already proved from the fruit (i. e., the special fruit) i. e., from (the fact that, that special fruit is) an effect. Just as the atoms of a pot (are different from a pot) the effect of actions is different from those actions. (1624) jo tulasAhaNANaM phale viseso na so viNA heu / kajjataNao goyama ! ghaDo vtra, heu ya so kammaM // Jo tullasahananam phale viseso na so vina houm | Kajjattanao Goyama 1 ghado vva, hdu ya so kammam. (verse 1618) : 107: TIkA - ityasyAM gAthAyAM prAgasmAbhiH karma prasAdhitameva / kutaH ? ityAha- phalAt tulyasAdhanAnAM yaH phale vizeSastasmAdityarthaH / tato'pi phalavizeSAt kasmAt prasAdhitaM karma ? ityAha- kAryatvAt tasya phalavizeSasya, yacca kArya tasya kAraNaM bhavatyeva, yathA ghaTasya paramANavaH, yacceha kAraNaM tat karma / " kiriyANa vayaM phalaM bhinna ti" tadeva ca karma sarvAsAmapi kriyANAmadRSTaM phalamityevamihApi sAdhyate / kathaM bhUtam 1 tAbhyaH kriyAbhyo bhinnam, karmaNaH kAryatvAt, kriyANAM ca kAraNatvAt, kAryakAraNayoza parasparaM medAditi bhAvaH // 76 ( 1624 ) / / D. C.-Or, there is a difference as to the fruit achieved, hough those who try to achieve it, use the same and equal neans. That difference cannot take place without & cause. O Tautama ! like the pot, that cause is " karma" on account of the fact that. that (difference) is an effect. While explaining this verse we have already proved

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: 108 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second "karma." Whence ? He replies-- From the fruit i. e., from that differenoe in the fruit (achieved by different people with equal moans )." How is karma' proved on the strength of that difference of fruit ? He replies : * From its being an offeot, " i. R., because that difference of fruit is an effect. There is inyeriably a cause corresponding to what is an effect, just as atoms of earth are the cause of * pot. " and in this case the cause is an action. " The effect of notions is different from those actions" and it can be proved here that, that very karman' is the unseen fruit of all actions What kind of action is it? It is different from those actions. Sidoe this karman' is an effect und since actions are the cause, and sinou an effect and a cause must be mutually different, the * karman' is different from those actions. 1624 The author states an objection to this and its reply :mAha naNu muttamevaM muttaM ciya knmuttimttaao| JOITUST. TEFT FTATUTEN JETT Hull (8874) Asa sanu muttamdvam muttam ciya kajjamuttimattao Iba jaha muttattanao gbadassa parmanavo mutta 77 (1625) [ 73 gata rufaalia il 21 ocaat of Rurat gai: il 99 (7874)11 Aha panu murtamevam murtamdva karyamurtimattvati Iha yatha murtatvato gbatasya parmanavo murtah. (1625) ] Trans.--77 ( The opponent will say, ) " Then the action (karman ) has a physical form (murta )." We (the Siddhantin) would reply, " The action has indeed a physical form because its effect (viz., the body ) has a physical form. In this world the atoms (paramanus ) the cause of the pot, the effect which has a physical form, will have also a physical form." (1625) dIkA-bAha prerakA nanu yadi kAryANAM gharIrAdInAM darzanAt vatkA

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Vida] Ganadharavada : 109: raNabhUtaM karma sAdhyate, tarhi kAryasya mUrtatvAt karmApi mUrta prAmoti / AcArya uttaramAha-" muttaM ciyetyAdi" yadasmAmi prayatnena sAdhayitavyam , tadbhavatApi parasiddhAntAnabhijJabAlabuddhitayA'niSTApAdanAbhiprAyeNa sAdhitameva, tathAhi-vayamapi brUmaH-mUrtameva karma, tatkAryasya zarIrAdermUrtatvAt , iha yasya yasya kArya mUrta tasya tatya kAraNamapi mUrtam , yathA ghaTasya paramANavaH, yathAmUrta kArya na tasya kAraNaM mUrta, yathA jnyaansyaatmeti| samavAyikAraNaM cehAdhikriyate, na nimittakAraNabhUtA rUpA''lokAdaya *iti / Aha-nanu sukha-duHkhAdayo'pi karmaNaH kAryam , atasteSAmamUrtatvAt karmaNo'mUrtatvamapi praamoti| na hi mUrtAdamUrtaprasavo yujyte| na caikasya mUrtatvamamUrtatvaM ca yuktam, viruddhatvAt / atrocyate-nanvata evAtra samavAyikAraNamadhikriyate, na nimittakAraNam , sukha-duHkhAdInAM cAtmadharmatvAdAtmaiva samavAyikAraNam , karma punasteSAmanna-pAnA'hi-viSAdivad nimittakAraNamevetyadoSa iti / 77 (1625) // D. C.-The opponent asks " If on the ground that we can see ( physically) the body, etc., which are the effects, the, karman is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the karman also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form." The Acarya replies :-" Karman has indeed a physical form..." What we intend to prove with great effort, you also have already proved with an intention to lead us to an unacceptable position, because your intelligence is like that of & child (or a fool), who does not know the doctrine of others. To explain the same-We also say " A. karman is nothing but possessed of a physical form, because its effect, the body, etc., bas a physical form. In this world, the causes of the various effects having a physical form are also possessed of a physicalform e.g., the atoms which are the cause of a pot. And it an effect is without a physical form, its cause is not possessed of a physical form e. g., Atman which is the cause of, knowledge (jnana). And in this discussion, the essential cause (samaviyi

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: 110: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second karana) is the topic of consideration, and not the objects which are only the instrumental causes, such as the form (rupa), the light (aloka) etc. The opponent will argue-" The pleasure, the pain, etc., are also of the nature of effects (like the body, etc.). Hence, since they have no physical form, we would argue that the karman is also devoid of a physical form, because the rise of something devoid of a physical form, is not possible as taking place from something which has a physical form. Nor is it possible that one and the same thing be both murta (possessed of a physical form) and a-murta (devoid of a physical form) since that would be self-contradictory." To this objection, we reply :-Indeed, for this very reason, the intimate or essential cause only is taken as the topic of our consideration and we have excluded the discussion of the instrumental cause. As the pleasure, the pain, etc., are the properties of the soul (Atman), the soul alone is their essential cause, while karman is only the instrumental cause of the pleasure, the pain, etc., just as are the food, the drink, the poison of a snake, etc. Thus there is no flaw in our doctrine. 1625. --- The Acarya mentions also other arguments proving the physical nature muriatva) of an action (karman) :taha suhasaMvittIo saMbaMdhe veyaNugbhavAo ya / bajjhavalAhANAo pariNAmAo ya viSNeyaM // 78 // (1626) AhAra ivAnala iva ghaDa vva nehAikayabalAhANo / khIramivodAharaNAI kammarUvittagamagAI / 79 / / (1627) Taha suhasamvittio sambandhe veyanubbhavao ya Bajjhabalahanao parinamao ya vinndyam. 71 (1626) Ahara ivala iva ghadu vva nehai kaya balahano | Khtramivodaharanaim kammaruvittagamagaim. 79 (1627)

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1111 Vada ] Ganadbaravada [ tathA sukhasaMvitteH saMbandhe vedanodbhavAca / bAyabalAdhAnAt pariNAmAca vijJeyam // 78 / (1626) AhAra ivAnala iva ghaTa iva snehAdikRtabalAdhAnaH / kSIramivodAharaNAni karmarUpitvagamakAni // 79 // (1627) Tatha sukhasamvittah sambandhe vadanodbavacca i Babyabaladhanat parinamacca. vijidyam. 78 (1626) Abara ivanala iva ghata iva snehadikrtabaladhanah 1 Ksiramivodaharonani karmarupitvaganakani. 79 (1627) ] Trans.-78-79 Also, the fact that the karman has a physical form should be admitted, because in the association (with the karman) the consciousness of pleasure, etc, (becomes possible ) and because of the rise of experience of heat (vedana ) when one is in association (with the karman )s because it is possible to add to the strength of the karman' By external means and because of the fact that karman undergoes change. The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that karman has a physical form (and are to be taken respectively with each of the four argumenis statee in the above verse-(1) Like food, (2) like fire, (3) like the addition of strength made by means of oil, etc., to a pot of earth, (and) (4) like the (change of) milk. ( 1626-1627) TIkA-iha prathamagAthopanyastahetucatuSTayasya dvitIyagAthAyAM yathAsaMkhyaM catvAro dRSTAntA draSTavyAH / tatra mUtaM karma tatsaMbandhe sukhAdisaMvitte, iha yatsaMbandhe sukhAdi saMvedyate tad mUtaM dRSTam , yathA'zanAdyAhAraH, yacAmUrta na tatsaMbandhe sukhAdisaMvidasti, yathA''kAzasaMbandhe, saMvedyate ca tatsaMbandhe sukhAdi, tasmAt mUrta karmeti / tathA, yatsaMvandhe vedanodbhavo bhavati tad mUrta dRSTam , yathA'nalomiH, bhavati ca karmasaMbandhe vedanodbhavaH tasmAt tad mUrta Thus * Sambandhe' is to be construed with both suka. sumvitti and veyanubbhava.

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: 112 Jinabhadra Gapi's [The second miti / tathA, mUtaM karma, Atmano jJAnAdInAM ca taddharmANAM vyatiriktatve sati bAdhena -candanA-'GganAdinA balasyopacayasyAdhIyamAnatvAt , yathA snehAghAhitabalo ghaTaH, iha yasyAnAtma-vijJAnAdeH sato bAna vastunA balamAdhIyate tad mUtaM dRSTam , yathA snehAdinA''dhIyamAnavalo ghaTaH, AdhIyate ca bAyaimithyAtvAdihetubhUtairvastubhiH karmaNa upacayalakSaNaM balam , tasmAt tad mUrtamiti / tathA, mUrta karma, AtmAdivyatiriktatve sati pariNAmitvAt , kSIramiveti / evamAdIni hetUdAharaNAni karmaNo rUpitvagamakAnIti // 78-79 // (1626-27) D. C.--The four illustrations stated in the second verse, should be respectively taken as those of the four arguments presented in the first verse viz.:-The karman has a physical form (murtam), because of the experience of pleasure etc. when one is united with that karman; in this world that in association with which the pleasure etc. are experienced, is found to be something having a physical form, just as the food one eats etc; and there is no experience of pleasure etc. in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether. But in association with that i. e., karman we do experience pleasure etc., therefore, the karman has a physical form. Similarly, that in association with which, a 'burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with the fire, and the rise of a burning sensation, pain occurs when one is in association with the karman; therefore, it has a form. Here the author states an objection and its reply : aha mayamasiddhameyaM pariNAmAu ti so vi kjaao| siddho pariNAmo se dahipariNAmAviva payassa // 80 // (1628) Aha mayamasiddbameyam parinamau tti so vi kajjao ! Siddho pariyamo se dahiparinamadiva payassa, 80 (1628)

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11 Gunadharavida [atha matamasiddhametat pariNAmAditi so'pi kAryAt / siddhaHpariNAmastasya dadhipariNAmAdiva payasaH / / 80 // (1628) Atha matamasiddhametat parinam aditt so'pi karyat i Siddbah parinamastasya dadhiparinamadiva payasah. 80 (1628) ] Trans.-80. Again, (the opponent will say ) this ( i. e. Karmarupatva) could not be accomplished by (virtue of) the hetu that it undergoes change. ( But) even that is due to Karya. Just as the mutability of milk is established by the mutability of curds, its mutability could (also ) be established (by that of Karya). (1628) TIkA-atha 'pariNAmitvAt ' ityaMsiddho'yaM heturiti mataM bhavataH / ekhadapyayuktam, yataH so'pi pariNAmaH siddhaH karmaNaH, 'kajAuM ti.' karmakAryasya zarIrAdeH prinnaamitvdrshnaadityrthH| iha yasya kArya pariNAmyupalabhyate tasyAtmano'pi pariNAmitvaM nizcIyate, yathA dadhnastakAdimAvena pariNAmAt payaso'pi pariNAmitvaM vijJAyata eveti / / 80 // (1628). D. C.--Again, you would believe that Karman is asiddha by reason of its parinama. But that is not proper. The pari. namitva of Karman is apprehended from the parinamitva of its Karyas like Sarira etc. For, when the effect is mutable, mutability of the action is automatically recognized, just as the mutability of milk is recognized from the parinama of its Karya viz., curds, in the form of butter-milk. Agnibhuti asks :abhAdivigArANaM jaha vecittaM viNA vi kammeNa / taha jai saMsArINaM haveja ko nAma to doso ? // 81 // (1629) Abbhadivigaranam jaha vdcittam vina vi kammena / Taha jai sarmsariyam havdjja ko nama to doso ? 81. (1629) [anAdivikArANAM yathA vaicitryaM vinApi karmaNA / tathA yadi saMsAriNAM bhavet ko nAma tatto doSaH 1 // 81 // (1629) 15

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:11: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Abhradivikaranam yatha vaicitryam vinapi karmana i Tatha yadi samsarinam bhavet ko nama tato dosah. 81 (1529)] ___Trans-81 Just as, a variety of visible changes in the clouds etc. is apprehended even without (the help of) Karman in the same way, what harm is there if it is so in the case of mundane souls also ? (1629) TIkA-Aha-nanu yathA'bhrAdivikArANAmantareNApi karmavaicitryaM dRzyate, tathA teneva prakAreNa saMsArijIvaskandhAnAmapi sukha-duHkhAdibhAvena vaicitryaM yadi karmavinApi syAt, tataH ko nAma doSo bhavet ?--na ko'pItyarthaH / / 81 // (1629) D. C.-A variety of visible changes in the clouds is apprehended even in the absence of Karman. In the same way, in the case of mundane souls also, there would be no harm if we believe that a variety of vikaras like sukha, dubkha etc. exists without the help of Karman. The Acarya replies :-- kammammi va ko bheo jaha bajjhakkhaMdhacittayA siddhA / taha kammapoggalANa vi vicittayA jIvasahiyANaM // 82 // (1630) Kammammi va ko bhdo jaha bajjhakkhandhacitraya siddha i Taba kammapoggalana vi vioittaya jiyasabiyanam. 82 (1630) [karmaNi vA ko medo yathA bAhyaskandhacitratA siddhaa| tathA karmapudgalAnAmapi vicitratA jIvasahitAnAm // 82 // (1630) Karmani va ko bhedo yatha babyaskandhacitrata siddha! Tatha karmapudgalanamapi vicitrata jivasahitanam. 82 (1630) ] Trans. 82 (Then) what difierence (would it make) even in the case of Karman ? Just as, the variegation of eternal objects is proved, variegation of the Karmapudgalas could also be proved. (1630)

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Vada ] Ganadhuravada :116: TIkA-yadyavikArANAM gandharvanagarendradhanurAdInAM gRha-devakula-prA. kAra-taru-kRSNa-nIla-raktAdibhAvena vaicitryamiSyate saumya / / vAzabdasyApizabdArthatvAta, tarhi karmaNyapi ko medaH ko vizeSaH, yena tatra vaicitryaM nAmyupagamyate ? / nanu hanta ! yathA sakalalokapratyakSANAmamISAM gandharvapura-zakrakodaNDAdInAM bAhyaskandhAnAM vicitratA bhavato'pi siddhA, tathA tenaiva prakAreNAntarANAmapi karmaskandhAnAM pudgalamayatve samAne'pi jIvasahitatvasya vizeSavato vaicitryakAraNasadbhAve'pi sukha-duHkhAdijanakarUpatayA vicitratA kimiti neSyate / yadi hyabhrAdayo bAhyapudgalA nAnArUpatayA pariNamanti, tarhi jIvaiH parigRhItAH sutarI te tathA pariNasyantIti bhAvaH // 82 // (1630) D. C.-O Saumya ! Il forms such as a house, a temple, a wall, black, green, red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a gandharva city or a rain-bow in the sky, what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of Karman also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you. Now, the internal Karmaskandhas consist of the same substance as the bahya skandhas; and on the top of that, they are alive. Moreover, as they produce sukha, duhkha etc. as their vikaras there is all the more reason to admit vaicitrya of the Karma-pudgalas. Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless bahya pudgalas are admitted, they are all the more acceptable in the case of Karma-pudgalas which are surrounded by the cetana jivas. bajjhANa cittayA jai paDivanA kammaNo viseseNa / jIvANugayassa mayA bhattINa va sippinatthANaM // 83 // (1631' Bajjhana cittaya jai padivanna kammano visesega 1 Jivanugayassa maya bhattina va sippinatthanam. 88 (1631) [bAhyAnAM citratA yadi pratipannA karmaNo vizeSeNa / jIvAnugatasya matA bhaktInAmivi zilpinyastAnAm / / 83 // (1631) Bahyanam citrata yadi pratipanna karmano visdsdna 1 Jivanugatasya mata bhaktinamiva silpinyastanam. 88 (1631)]

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:116: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Trans.--83 If variety (in the case) of external (objects) is established, variety (in the case) of Karman which is surrounded by soul should (all the more) be accepted (as positive) like the variety of forms laid down in a piece of art. (1631) TIkA-yadi hi jIvAparigRhItAnAmapi bAhyAnAmabhrAdipudgalAnAM nAnAkArapariNatirUpA citratA tvayA pratipannA, tarhi jIvAnugatAnAM karmapudgalAnAM vizeSata evAsmAkaM bhavatazca sA sammatA bhaviSyati, bhaktayo vicchittayastAsAmiva citrAdiSu zilpinyastAnAm / ayamabhiprAya:citrakarAdizilpijIvaparigRhItAnAM citra-lepya--kASThakarmAnugatapudgalAnAM yA pariNAmacitratA sA visrasApariNatendradhanurAdipudgalapariNAmacitratAyAH sakAzAd viziSTaiveti pratyakSataH eva dRzyate / ato jIvaparigRhItatvena karmapudgalAnAmapi sukhaduHkhAdivaicitryajananarUpA viziSTatarA pariNAmacitratA kathaM na syAt ? iti // 83 // (1631) D. C.-Now that you have accepted citrata in the form of manifold transformations in the case of bahya-pudgalas like abhra etc. which are not surrounded by jiva, you shall bave to accept the sanie in the case of Karma-pudgala also as they lieve already been surrounded by Jivas. Again, the citrata of forms drawn by an artist in painting, sculpturing, carpentry etc. is peculiarly distinct from the citrata of the manifold vikaras of bahya-pudgalas like rain-bow etc, while in the case of Karma- pudgalas also, the parinamacitrata is peculiarly distinct from the other two varieties, firstly, because it gives rise to alterations like sukha, duhkha etc., and secondly, because it is aided by jiva. Again, the opponent asks :-- to jai taNumettaM ciya haveja kA kammakappaNA nAma ? / kammaM pi naNu taNu ciya saNhayarabbhatarA navaraM / / 84 // (1632) To jai tanumottam ciya havejja ka kammakappana nama ? | Kammam pi nanu tanucciya sanhayarabbhantara navaram.84(1632)

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Vada ] Ganadharavapa [ tato yadi tanumAtrameva bhavet kA karmakalpanA nAma 1 / karmApi nanu tanureva sUkSmatarAbhyantarA navaram ||84|| (1632) : 117: Tato yadi tanumatrameva bhavet ka karma-kalpana nama ? Karmapi nanu tanureva suksmatarabhyantara navaram 84 (1632)] Trans. -- 84 Now, if Karman is itself the body, why should Karman be assumed at all? That is not proper. In fact Karman is also a body though subtle and interior to a great extent. (1632) TIkA - evaM manyate paraH- yadya bhrAdivikArANAmiva karmapudgalAnAM vicitrapariNatirabhyupagamyate / tato vAyaM sakalajanapratyakSaM tanumAtramevedaM surUpakurUpa - sukha - duHkhAdibhAvaiH svabhAvata eva / mrAdivikAravad vicitrarUpatA pariNamati, ityetadevAstu kA nAma punastadvaicitrya hetu bhUtasyAntargaDukalpasya karmaNaH parikalpanA, svabhAvAdeva sarvasyApi pudgalapariNAmavaicitryasya siddhatvAt ? iti / bhagavAnAha - " kammaM pItyAdi " / ayamabhiprAyaH - yadya bhrAdivikArANAmiva tanorvaicitryamabhyupagamyate, tarhi nanu karmApi tanureva, kArmaNazarIramevetyarthaH, kevalaM zlakSNatarA, atindriyatvAt; abhyantarA ca, jIvena saddAtisaMzliSTatvAt / tatazca yathA'zrAdivikAravad bAhyasthUratanorvaicitryamabhyupaganyate, tathA karmatanorapi tatkiM nAbhyupagamyate / iti bhAvaH ||84|| (1632) D. C.--The opponent -- Now that Karma-pudgalas have been accepted as having variegated transformations like various visible changes in clouds etc, this body also, which is pratyaksa to all, can undergo a number of alterations by virtue of its svabhava in the form of surupa, kurupa, sukha, dubhka etc. And hence, it is not at all necessary to assume an intervening agent like Karman for the production of sarira etc. For, a variety of visible changes in the case of all pudgalas is accomplished by its very svabhava. The Acarya--Because we take the vaicitrya of tanu 83 being similar to that of various vikaras in abhra etc., the Karman should also be taken as tanu. This Karmana body

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: 118: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature, because it is so closely connected with jiva. So, vicitrata in the case of a Karmana sarira should be recognized, just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of vikaras of the clouds etc. Again, the author states an objection and its reply: ko tI viNA doso thUlAe savvahA vipyamukkassa / dehaggahaNAbhAvo tau ya saMsAravocchittI // 85 // (1633) Ko tie vina doso thulae savvaha vippamukkassa | Dehaggahanabhavo tau ya bamsaravocchitti. 85 (1633 ) [ kastayA vinA doSaH sthUlayA sarvathA vipramuktasya / dehagrahaNAbhAvastatazca saMsAravyavacchittiH // 85 // (1633) Kastaya vina dosah sthulaya sarvatha vipramuktasya I Ddhagrahanabhavastatasca samsaravya vacchittih. 85 (1633) ] Trans. - 85 ( The opponent will say - ) What harmis there in ( believing ) its absence ? ( The reply is-- ) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a ( new ) body in that case; and ultimately a (complete) break-off of the mundane world ( will follow ). ( 1633) TIkA-prerakaH prAha - nanu bAhyAyA: sthUratanvA vaicitryaM pratyakSadRSTatvAdevAzrAdivikAravadabhyupagacchAmaH / antaraGgAyAstu karmarUpAyAH sUkSmatanI vaicitryaM kathamicchAmaH, tasyAH sarvathA'pratyakSatvAt / / atha tadanabhyupagame doSaH ko' pyApatati, tato'rthApattareva tadvicitratA'bhyupagantavyA, tarhi nivedyatAM kastayA vinA doSo'nuSajyate ? / AcAryaH prAha maraNakAle sthUlayA dRzyamAnatanvA sarvathA vipramuktasya jantorbhavAntaragata sthUlatanugrahaNanibandhanabhUtAM sUkSmakarmatanumantareNAgretana dehagrahaNAbhAvalatraNo doSaH samApadyate na hi niSkAraNameva zarIrAntaragrahaNaM yujyate / tatazca dehAntaragrahaNAnupapattermaraNAnantaraM sarvasyApyazarIratvAdayatnenaiva saMsAravyavacchittiH syAt // 85 // (1633) #

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :119: D.C.-The opponent-We recognize the variety of sthalasartra by virtue of its being prntyaksa. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a suksma sarira as it is absolutely a-pratyaksa ( imperceptible ). Hence, if we do not accept the suksma-sarira at all, will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise ? Acarya-If the suksma Karmana sarira is not accepted, in its absence, the soul when liberated from the sthula-sartra after death, will not be able to enter the new body at the next birth For, this Karmana sarira is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth. So, in case this suksma karmana sarira is not accepted, jiva will not enter a new body after death, and ultimately the whole of the mundane world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of jivas. And even if it were so, what would happen? savvavimokkhAvattI nikAraNau vva svvsNsaaro| bhavamukkANaM va puNo saMsAraNamao aNAsAo // 86 // (1634) Savvavimokkhavatti nikkaranau ya savvasamsaro i Bhavamukkanam va puno samsaranamao anasao. 86 (1634) [ sarvavimokSApattiniSkAraNako vA sarvasaMsAraH / bhavamuktAnAM vA punaH saMsaraNamato'nAzvAsaH // 86 // (1634) Sarvavimoksapattir-niskaranako va sarvasamsarah 1 Bhavamuktanam va punah samsaranamato'nasvasah. 86 (1634) ] Trans.-86 (In that case) all will attain Moksa; the whole of mundane world would become useless; those who are exempted from existence, will have birth, and re-birth; and there will be no consolation for Moksa even. (1634) TIkA-tataH saMsAravyavacchedAnantaraM sarvasyApi jIvarAzermokSApAttamavet / athAzarIrANAmapi saMsAraparyaTanam , tarhi niSkAraNa eva sarvasyApi saMsAraH syAt, bhavamuktAnAM ca siddhAnAmitthaM punarapyakasmAd niSkAraNa evaM

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: 120: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second saMsArapAtaH syAt / tathaiva ca tatra saMsaraNam / tatazca mokSe'pyanAzvAsa iti // 86 / / (1634) D. C.-In that case there is disjunction of the entire mundane world; all the living beings will attain moksa. Again those that are bodiless will also wander in the world along with others that have bodies; the mundane world will become niskarana or good-for-nothing Moreover, Siddhas that are exempted from existence will also have to fall back into samsara and hence into the cycle of birth and re-birth. Ultimately there will be no consolation even in moksa. Thus, along with disjunction of the entire mundane world, all the above-stated difficulties will arise, if Karman is not admitted as the cause of variety. Again the opponent asks :-- muttassAmuttimayA jIveNa kahaM haveja saMbadho ? / somma ! ghaDassa vva nabhasA jaha vA davvassa kiriyAe // 87 // (1636) Muttassamuttimaya jivena kaham havejja sambandho ? | Sommai ghadassa vva nabhasa jaha va davvassa kiriyae. 87(1635) [ mUrtasyAmUrtimatA jIvena kathaM bhavat saMbandhaH ? | saumya ! ghaTasyeva namasA yathA vA dravyasya kriyayA // 87 // (1635) Murtasyamurtimata jivena katham bhavet sambandhah ? | Saumya! ghatasyeva nabhasa yatha va dravyasya kriyaya. 87(1635)] Trans.-87 "How can the corporeal (Karman) be related to the incorporeal Jiva ?" (The Acarya replies :-) O Saumya ! (Their relation is) like the relation of ghata with sky or like that of substance (dravya) with action (kriva). (1635) TIkA - nanu mUrta karmeti prAg bhavadbhiH samarthitam / tasya ca mUrtasya karmaNo'martena jIvena saha kathaM saMyogalakSaH samavAyalakSaNo vA saMbandhaH

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Vada ] Gapadharavada : 121: syAt ? | ataH karmasiddhAvapyetadaparameva randhraM pazyAmaH / bhagavAnAha - saumya ! yathA mUrtasya ghaTasyAmUrtena nabhasA saMyogalakSaNaH saMbandhastathAjJApi jIvakarmaNoH : / yathA vA dravyAsyAGgulayAdeH kriyayA''kuJcanAdikayA saha samavAyalakSaNaH saMbandhaH, tathA'trApi jIva-karmaNorayamiti / / 87 / / (1635) D. C. --Agnibhuti-You have already asserted that Karman is murta. Now, how could this murta Karman be connected with the amurta jiva either by means of the samavaya relation or even by Samyoga? This is one more difficulty in the way of the accomplishment of Karman. The Acarya- O blessed one ! just as, a murta ghata is connected with the amurta akasa by means of samyoga, and an object like finger is connected with kriya like contraction by means of the samavaya relation, so, here also, Karman is connected with jiva. The relation of jiva with Karman is proved in another way :-- ahavA paJcakakhaM ciya jIvovanibaMdhaNaM jaha sarIraM / ciTThai kammayamevaM bhavaMtare jIvasaMjuttaM // 88 // (1636) Ahava paccakkham ciya jivovanibandhanam jaha sariram | Citthai kammayamevam bhavantare jivasanjuttam. ( 1636 ) [ athavA pratyakSameva jIvopanibandhanaM yathA zarIram tiSThati kArmaNamevaM bhavAntare jIvasaMyuktam // 88 // (1636) Athava pratyaksameva jivopanibandhanam yatha sarfram | Tisthati karmanamevam bhavantare jivasamyuktam. 88 (1636) ] Trans.-88 Or, just as the (coarse) body, being percepti ble (to the senses ), is connected with the soul ( in this world), the Karmana body is connected with the soul in the next world. (1636) . 16 For Private Personal Use Only

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122: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second TIkA-athavA, yathedaM bAhyaM sthUlazarIraM jIvopanibandhanaM jIvena saha saMbaddhaM pratyakSopalabhyamAnameva tiSThati sarvatra ceSTate, evaM bhavAntaraM gacchatA jIvena saha saMyukta kArmaNazarIraM pratipadyasva / atha brUSe-dharmA'dharmanimitta jIvasaMbaddhaM bAhyaM zarIraM pravartate, tarhi pRcchAmo bhavantam-tAvapi dharmA-'dharmI bhUtau vA bhavetAm , amUrtI vA / yadi mUrtI, tarhi tayorapyamUrtenAtmanA saha kathaM saMbandhaH 1 / atha tayostena sahAsau kathamapi bhavati, tarhi karmaNo'pi tena sArdhamayaM kasmAd na syAt / athAmRtau dharmA'dharmoM, tarhi bAhyamaMtasthUlazarIreNa saha tayoH saMbandhaH kathaM syAt , mUrtA'mUrtayorbhavadabhiprAyeNa saMbandhAyogAt / na cAsaMbaddhayostayorbAhyazarIraceSTAnimittatvamupapadyate, atimasaGgAt / atha mUrtayorapi tayorvAhyazarIreNa mUrteNa saheSyate saMbandhaH, tarhi jIva-karmaNostatsadbhAve kaH pradveSaH ? iti // 88 // (1636) ____D. C. This sthula tarnra, as it is pratyaksa and connected with jiva, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the Karmana sarira is connected with jiva in the next world. ____Here again, if you think that it is the sthila sarira-with dharma and adharma as its nimittas--that exhibits all movements when conneced with jtva, I would ask you to consider whether dharma and adhurma are murta or amurta. In the first case, if you take dharmu and adharma to be murta, how could they be related to atman which is amurta ? : But, if their relation to atman is, anyhow, approved by you, why should you not approve of their relation to Karman also ? Secondly, if you believe that dharma and adharma are amurta they could not have any relation with the bahya 'and sthula body which is murta. For, according to you, connection between murta and amurta is improper. Thus, if dharma and adharma become the nimitta karanas of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of atiprsanga would arise. Moreover, if these amurta dharma and adharma have been believed as being connected with the external murta sarira, what objection would there be to assume & similar relation between jiva and Karman ?

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Here, there is an objection and its refutationmutteNAmuttimao uvaghAyA 'NuggahA kahaM hojjA ? | jaha viNNANAINaM maharApANosahAIhiM // / 89 / / (1637) Muttenamuttimao uvaghaya-'nuggaha kaham hojja? Jaha vinanatnam mairapanosahathini. 89 (1637 ) : 123: [ mUrtaNAmUrtimata upaghAtA - 'nugrahau kathaM bhavetAm ? yathA vijJAnAdInAM madirApAnau - SadhAdibhiH / / 89 / / (1637) Murtenamurtimata upaghata'nugrahau katham bhavetam? | Yatha vijnanadinan madirapanau sadhadibhib. 89 (1637 ) ] Trans.--89 " How could the amurta ( soul ) be supported or damaged by the murta (Karman)?" (The answer is-) In the way as vijtana etc. are ( damaged or supported ) by a drink of wine, medicine etc. (1637 ) TIkA - nanu mUrtena karmaNA'mUrtimato jIvasya kathamAhlAdaparitApAdyanugraho - paghAtau syAtAm / na hyamUrtasya nabhaso mUrtermalayajajvalanajvAlAdibhistau yujyete iti bhAvaH / atrottaramAha - 'jaha viSNANAINamityAdi ' yathA'mUrtAnAmapi vijJAna - vividiSA- dhRti - smRtyAdijIvadharmANAM mUrterapi madirApAna- hRtpUra- viSa-pipIlikAdibhirbhakSitairupaghAtaH kriyate, payaH-zarkarAghRtapUrNa bheSajAdibhistvanugraha ityevamihApIti / etacca jIvasyAmUrtatvamabhyupagamyoktam / / 89 / / (1637) D. C.--Agnibhuti -- In fact, the amurta atman cannot feel joy or sorrow as an anugraha ( favour ) or upaghata ( offense ) by virtue of a murta Karman, just as the amurta akasa is neither supported nor damaged by the murta sandalwood or fire-flame. Acarya-- Desire for discussion of vijnana, moral courage, remembrance etc., are the amurta qualities of soul. These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison, aats, white thornapple etc. f and, are nourished by taking the murta drugs which contain + Popularly known as dhatura in Western India,

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:124 Nirubharira Gani's [The second milis, ghee, sugar-canriy etc. So, the amurta jiva is also nourished or weakened by the murta Karman. ahavA negaMto'yaM saMsArI savvahA amutto tti| jamaNAIkammasaMtaipariNAmavannarUvo so / 90 // (1638) Ahava neganto'yam samsari savvaha amuuttitti Jamanaikawmazantaiparinamavannaruvo so. 90 (1638) [ athavA naikAnto'yaM saMsArI sarvathA'mUrta iti / yadanAdikarmasantatipariNAmApannarUpaH saH // 90 // (1638) Athava naikanto'yam samsari sarvatha'niurta iti i Yadanadikarmasantatiparinamapann>>tipah sab. 90 (1638)] ___Trans.-90 Or, this mundane soul is not entirely amurtu in the extreme. For, it has attained an alteration in the coutinuous range of Kurman, which thas no beginning. (1638) TIkA -athavA, nAyamekAnto yaduta-saMsArI jIvaH sarvathA bhUte iti / kutaH ? / yad yassAdanAdikarmasantatipariNAmApanaM vahnayaH piNDanyAyenAnAdikarmasaMtAnapariNatisvarUpatAM prAptaM rUpaM yasya sa tathA / tatazca mUrtakarmaNaH kathaJcidananyatvAd mUrto'pi kathaJcijIvaH / iti mUna karmaNA bhavata eca tasyAnugraho-paghAtau, nabhasastvamUrtatvAt , acetanatvAca to na bhavata eveti // 90 / / (1638) D.C.-Or, this sariSiri jiva is also not wholly amir:: because it is assumed as an alteration distinct from the expense of Karman. Atman is attached to Karman as agni is attached to an iron-rod. Now, since Karman is murta and atman is similar to Karman to a certain extent, the atman is also murta to a certain extent even though it is amurta by its nature. Consequently, the amurta and lustrong giva feels anugraha or upaghata by virtue of a murta Karman while akasa being amuria and acetana feels neither anugraha nor upaghata.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 125 : Then, how is the Karma-santana born ? The reply is :-- saMtANo'NAI u paropparaM heuheubhaavaao| dehassa ya kammassa ya goyama ! bIyaM-kurANaM va // 91 // (1639) Santano'nat u paropparam heuheubhavao i Dahassa ya kammassa ya Goyama i biyam-kuranam va. 91 (1639) [santAno'nAdistu parasparaM hetuhetubhAvAt / dehasya ca karmaNazca gautama ! bIjA-karayoriva // 91 // (1639) Santano'nadistu parasparam hdtubetubhavati Dahasya ca karmanasca Gautamal bijankurayoriva. 91 (1639)] Trans.-91. And, O Gautama ! as Karman and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. (1639) TIkA-anAdiH karmaNaH santAna iti pratijJA / dehakarmaNoH parasparaM hetuhetumadbhAvAditi hetuH / vIjA-'Gkurayoriveti dRSTAntaH / yathA vIjenAkuro janyate, aGkurAdapi krameNa bIjamupajAyate, evaM dehena karma janyate, karmaNA tu deha ityevaM punaH punarapi prsprmnaadikaaliinhetuhetumdbhaavaadityrthH| iha yayoranyo'nyaM hetuhetumadbhAvastayoranAdiH santAnaH, yathA bIjA-karapitRputrAdInAm , tathA ca deha-karmaNoH, tato'nAdiH karmasantAna iti // 91 // (1639) D.C.-The expanse of Karman has no beginning, as deha and Karman are related to each other as hotu and hetumat. Just as, a sprout is born of seed, and the seed, in turn, is produced from the sprout; in the same way, Karman is also produced from deha, and deha, in turn, is born of Karman. Thus doha and Karman, are related as the causes of each other like bija and ankura. So, just as the continuous range of bija and ankura or pita and putra is anadi, that of deha and Karman, should also be anadi.

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:126: Jihabhadra Gani's [ The second Karman can be established by means of Veda-vacana also kamme cAsaha goyama ! jamaggihottAi saggakAmassa / veyavihiyaM vihaNNai dANAiphalaM ca loyammi // 92 // (1640) Kamme casai Goyama 1 jamaggihottai saggakamassa Vayavihiyam vihannai danajphalam ca loyammi. 92 (1640) [ karmaNi cAsati gautama ! yadagnihotrAdi vargakAmasya / vedavihitaM vihanyate dAnAdiphalaM ca loke // 92 // (1640) Karmani casati Gautama ! yadagnihotradi svargakamasya ! Veda-vihitam vihanyata danadi-phalam ca loke. 92 (1640)] Trans.--92 If, O Gautama ' the existence of Karman is denied, rites like the performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation, and the reward of munificence etc. in this world prescribed by the Veda, would, be refuted. (1640). TIkA-karmaNi cA'sati gautama ! amihotrAdinA svargakAmasya vedavihitaM yat kimapi svargAdiphalaM tad vihanyate, svargAdeH zubhakarmahetutvAt , tasya ca bhavatA'nabhyupagamAt / loke ca yad dAnAdikriyANAM phalaM svargAdikaM prasiddha tadapi vihanyeta / ayuktaM cedam , "kiriyAphalabhAvAo dANAINaM phalaM kisIe va" ityAdinA prativihitatvAditi // 92 // (1640) D. C.-If, O Gautama' the existance of Karman is denied, the commandment of Vedas that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing agnihotra etc. would be null and void. Again, the wellknown phalas like svarga etc. prescribed for actions like dana etc, would also be refuted, if you don't believe in Karman, But that is not proper, as it is opposed by " Kiriyaphala bhavao danainam phalam kisie vvat" etc. Hence you shall have to accept Karman with its anadi santana. + Vide v. 1615.

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Vida] Ganadharavada : 127: On the non-apprehension of Karman, if Isvara eto, were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world, a number of difficulties would arise, kammaNicchaMto vA suddhaM ciya jIvamIsarAI vA / maNNasi dehAINaM jaM kattAraM na so jutto // 93 // (1641) ubagaraNAbhAvAo niceTTA - 'muttayAio vA vi / IsaradehAraMbhe vi tullayA vA'NavatthA vA // 94 // (1642) Kammamanicchanto va suddham ciya jivamisaraim va | Mannasi dehatnam jam kattaram na so jutto. 93 (1641) Uvagaranabhavao niccettha'muttayaio va vi Isaradeharambhe vi tullaya va'navattha va. 94 (1642) * [ karmAnicchan vA zuddhameva jIvamIzvarAdiM vA / manyase dehAdInAM yaM kartAraM na sa yuktaH // 93 // (1641) upakaraNAbhAvAd nizceSTA- mUrtatAdito vApi / Izvara dehArambhe'pi tulyatA vA'navasthA vA // 94 // (1642) Karmanicchan va suddhameva jivamisvaradim va i Manyase dehadinam yam kartaram na sa yuktah, 93 (1641)] Upakaranabhavad niscesta-'murtatadito vapi i Isvarade harambhe'pi tulyata va'navastha vs. 94 (1642)] Trans-93-94 Or, denying (the existence of) Karman, you might presume jiva itself-pure and simple-or Isvara etc:, to be the creator of (the objects like ) deha etc. But that is not SO, since jiva is void of means (upakaraNGa), motion (cesta), and form (murtata). Even (in the case of) deha etc. being accomplished by Isvara etc, either the same difficulties would arise or there would be disorder. (1641-1642) For Private Personal Use Only

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The second TIkA - karma vAsnicchannagnibhUte gautama ! yaM karmarahitatvAt zuddhameva jIvamAtmAnamIzvarAvyaktakAla - niyati-yadRcchAdikaM vA dehAdInAM kartAraM manyase, tatrApyucyate - nAsau zuddhajIve-zvarAdiH kartA yujyata iti // 128: . , TIkA- nAyamIzvarajIvAdirakarmA zarIrAdikAryANyArabhate, upakaraNAbhAvAt daNDAdyupakaraNarahitakulAlavat / na ca karma vinA zarIrAdhAramme jIvAdInAmanyadupakaraNaM ghaTate, garbhAdyavasthAsvanyopakaraNAsaMbhavAt, zukra- zoNitAdi grahaNasyApyakarmaNo'nupapatteH / athavA, anyathA prayogaH kriyate "nicceTTetyAdi" nAkarmA zarIrAdyArabhate, nizreSTatvAt, AkAzavat, tathA'mUrtasvAt, Adi zabdAdazarIratvAt niSkriyatvAt, sarvagatatvAt, AkAzavadeva, tathA, ekatvAt, ekaparamANuvadityAdi / athocyate- zarIravAnIzvaraH, sarvANyapi dehAdikAryANyArabhate / nanvIzvaradehArambhe'pi tarhi tulyatA paryanuyogasya, tathAhiakarmA nArabhate nijazarIramIzvaraH, nirupakaraNatvAt daNDAdirahitakulAlacaditi / athAnyaH ko'pIzvara staccharIrAmbhAya pravartate / tataH so'pi zarIravAn, azarIro vA 1 / yadyazarIraH, tarhi nArabhate, nirupakaraNatvAt, ityAdi saiva vaktavyatA / atha zarIravAn, tarhi taccharIrArambhe tulyatA, so'pyakarmA nijazarIraM nArabhate, nirupakaraNatvAdityAdi / atha taccharIramanyaH zarIravAnArabhate / atastasyApyanyaH, tasyApyanya ityevamanavasthA / aniSTaM ca sarvametat / tasmAd nezvarI dehAdInAM kartA, kintu karmasadvitIyo jIva eva / viSprayojanavezvaro dehAdIn kurvannunmattakalpa eva syAt, saprayojanakartRtve punaranIzvaratvaprasaGgaH / na cAnAdizuddhasya dehAdikaraNecchA yujyate, tasyA rAgavikalparUpatvAt, ityAdyatra bahuvaktavyam, granthagahanatAmasaGgAcu nocyata iti / anenaiva vidhAnena viSNu -- brahmAdayo'pi pratyuktA draSTavyA iti // 93-94 // (1641 - 1642) D. C.-O Agnibhuti Gautama! Leaving the Karman aside, it is absolutely improper to accept any one of jiva, Isvara, kala ( Time ), avyakta (Visnu), niyati ( Destiny ), or yadriccha ( self-will) to be the karta of deha etc. It is not possible for jiva and Isvara etc., to accomplish Karvas such as sartra etc., without the help of Karman. jiva

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 129: cannot accomplish objets like sarira on account of the following reasons : (1) If jiva is presumed to be the Karta of sarira eto., it must have some means to produce them. Just 88 & potter cannot produce a ghata without the help of an upakarana like danda, so also, jiva cannot accomplish Karyas like sartra in absence of an upakarana. Now, jiva is not supposed to have any other upakarana except Karman in producing sarira eto. For, no other upakarana except Karman can exist in the state of embryo etc. (2) In the process of accomplishment of Karyas like sarira, jiva would not be able to suck up semen, blood eto., without the help of Karman. (3) Jiva cannot accomplish sarira etc., on account of its inactive, incorporeal, and all-pervading nature like akasa. Again, it is useless to believe that sariravan isvara produces each and every object such as daha etc. Because the above-mentioned difficulties are bound to arise in that case also. In absence of an upakarana, Isvara like a potter without a danda, is not supposed to create his own body. Now here, if it is assumed that a second Isvara creates the body of this Isvara, consider whether that Isvara has a body or not. If he has no body it is clear from what has already been dis cussed that he cannot create sarira in absence of an upakarana. But if it is said that a third Isvara having a body creates the body of this Isvara, a fouth Isvara shall have to be supposed to create the body of the third one, and a fifth Isvara to create that of the fourth one, and so on, until ultimately it results in an anavastha which is not at all desirable. Thus it is clear that Isvara is not the creator of sartra etc. But in spite of that if it is believed that Jsvara creates sarira etc., consider whether he doea so with or without any 17

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180: Jinxbhadra Gani's [ The second pumposo. If Isvara orvates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his Isvaratva. For a siddha and anadi atman is not expected to cherish desire for creating deha eto., as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on. A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of grantha-vistara (extension of the work ) they are zot stated here. But in line of the arguments stated above, it can also be proved that neithes Brahma nor Visnu nor any one else, can be taken as the Karta of sarira eto. Isvara therefore is not acceptable as the creator of sarira oto, from any point of view, but jiva accompanied by the upakarana Karman, should alone be ascepted as the karta of sarira eto. ahava sahAvaM mannasi vinnnnaannghnnaaiveyvuttaao| taha bahudosaM goyama! tANaM ca payANamayamaMttho // 25 // (1643) Ahava sahavam mannasi vinnana ghanai Vayavuttao 1 Faba bahudasama Goyama i tanam ca payananiayamattho. 95 (1643) [athavA svabhAvaM manyase vijJAnaghanAdivedoktAt / tathA bahudoSaM gautama! teSAM ca padAnAmayamarthaH // 95 // (1643) Athava svabhavam mangasd vijnapaghanadiv@doktati Tatha bahudosam Gautamal tasam ca padanamayapaarthah. 95(1643) Trans.-95 Again, O Gautama ! if you think svabhavam ( to be the karta of sartra etc.), from the sentences of the Vadas such as " vijfanaghana" etc. a number of difficulties will arise. But (ca) the real interpretation of those sentences is this. pomy "gra gard it axe;" soula #qanaxana svamA dehAdInAM kartAraM manyase, yataH kecidAhu :

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:191 Tada ) Ganadharavada sarvahetunirAzaMsaM bhAvAnAM janma varNyate / svabhAvavAdibhiste hi nAhuH svamapi kAraNam // 1 // rAjIvakaNTakAdInAM vacivyaM kaH karoti hi ? / mayuracandrikAdirvA vicitraH kena nirmitaH ? // 2 // kAdAcitkaM yadatrAsti niHzeSaM tadahetukam / yathA kaNTakataikSNyAdi tathA caite sukhaadyH||3|| tadetad yathA tvaM manyase gautama ! tathA'bhyupagamyamAnaM bahudoSameva; tathAhi --yo dehAdInAM kartA svabhAvo'bhyupagamyate, sa kiM vastuvizeSo vA, akAraNatA vA, vastudharmo vA, ? iti trayI gtiH| tatra na tAvad vastuvizeSaH, tadgrAhakapramANAbhAvAt / aprANakasyAbhyupagame karmApi kiM nAbhyupagamyate, tasthApi tvadabhiprayeNApramANakatvAt / / kiJca, vastuvizeSaH sa svabhAvo mUrto vA syAt amUrto vA 1 / yadi mUrtaH, tahiM svabhAva iti nAmAntareNa kamaivoktaM syAt / athAmUrtaH, tarhi nAsau kasyApi kartA, amUrtatvAt , nirupakaraNatvAca, vyomavaditi / na ca mUrtasya zarIrAdeH kAryasyAmUrta kAraNamanurUpam , AkAzavaditi / athAkAraNatA svabhAva iSyate, tatrApyabhidadhmahe-nanvevaM satyakAraNaM zarIrAdhutpadyata ityayamarthaH syAt , tathA ca sati kAraNAbhAvasya samAnatvAda yugapadevAzeSaMdehotpAdaprasaGgaH / api ca, itthaM mahetukamAkasmikaM zarIrAyutpanata ityabhyupagataM bhavet / etazcAyukta meva, yato yadahetukamAsmikaM na tadAdimatpratiniyatAkAram , yathA'bhrAdivikAraH, AdimatpratiniyatAkAraM ca shriiraadi| tasmAd nAkasmikam , kintu karmahetukameva / pratiniyatAkAratvAdeva copakaraNasahitakatRnirvartyameva zarirAdikaM ghaTAdivaditi gamyata eva / na ca garbhAdhavasthAsu karmaNo'nyadupakaraNaM ghaTata ityuktameva / atha vastuno dharmaH svabhAvo'bhyupagamyate / tathApyasau yadyAtmadharmo vijJAnAdivat , tahiM na zarIrAdikAraNamasau, amUrtatvAt , AkAzavat , ityabhihitameva / atha mUrtavastudhoMDa sau, tahiM siddhasAdhyatA, karmaNo'pi pudgalAstikAyaparyAya vizeSatvenAsmAbhirapyupagatatvAditi / api ca, " puruSa evedaM sarvam" ityAdivedavAkyazravaNA bhavakA

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3 132 Jinabhadra Gani's [The second karmAstitvasaMzayaH / eSAM hi vedapadAnAmayamarthastava cetasi viparivartate--puruSa AtmA, evakAro'vadhAraNe, sa ca puruSAtiriktasya karma-prakRtI-zvarAdeH sattAvyavacchedArthaH, idaM sarva-pratyakSaM vartamAnaM cetanAcetanasvarUpam , "miM" iti vAkyAlaGkAre, yad bhUtam-atItam , yaca bhAvyaM-bhaviSyad muktisaMsArAvapi sa evetyrthH| utAmRtatvasyezAna iti / utazabdo'pyarthe / apizabdazca smuccye| amRtatvasya ca amaraNabhAvasya mokSasyezAnaH prabhurityarthaH / ydnnenaatirohtiiti| cazabdasya luptasya darzanAd yaccAnena-AhAreNa, atirohati-atizayena vRddhimupaiti / yadejati-calati, pazvAdi / yad naiti-na calati parvatAdi / yad dUre mervAdi / yadu antike-uzabdo'vadhAraNe, yadantike samIpe tadapi puruSa evetyarthaH / yadantaH-madhye, asya-cetanAcetanasya sarvasya; yadeva sarvasyApyasya bAhyataH, tat sarva puruSa eveti / atastavyatiriktasya karmaNaH kala sattA duHzraddheyeti te matiH / tathA, "vijJAnadhana evaitebhyo bhUtebhyaH" ityAdInyapi vedapadAni karmAbhAvapratipAdakAni manyase tvam , atrApyevakArasya karmAdisattAvyavacchedaparatvAt / tadevameteSAM " puruSa evedam" ityAdInAM "vijJAnadhana"AdInAM ca vedapadAnAM nAyamartho yo bhavatazcetasi vartate, kintu teSAM padAnAmayaM bhAvArtha:--" puruSa evedaM sarvam' ityAdIni tAvat puruSastutiparANi jAtyAdimadatyAgahetoradvaitabhAvanApratipAdakAni ca vartate, na tu karmasattAvyavacchedakAni / vedavAkyAni hi kAnicid vidhivAdaparANi, kAnyapyarthavAdapradhAnAni, aparANi tvanuvAdaparANi / tatra "agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH" ityAdIni vidhivAdaparANi / arthavAdastu dvidhA-stutyarthavAdaH, nindArthavAdazca / tatra "puruSa evedaM sarvam" ityAdikA stutyarthavAdaH tathA tatra "sa sarvavid yasyaSA mahipA bhuvi divye bahmapure hyeSa vyomni AtmAsu pratiSThitastamakSaraM vedayate yastu sa sarvajJaH sarvavit sarvamevAviveza" iti; tathA, "ekayA pUrNayAhUtyA sarvAn kAmAnavAmoti" ityAdikazca sarvo'pi stutyrthvaadaa| " ekayA pUrNayA" ityAdividhinAdo'pi kasAd na bhavati? iti cet / ucyate-zeSasyAmihotrAdyAnuSThAnasya vaiyarthyaprasaGgAditi / " eSaH vaH prathamo yazo yo'miSTomA yo'nenAniSThA'nyena yajate sa gartamabhyapata" atra

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 133: pazumedhAdInAM prathamakaraNaM nindyata ityayaM nindaarthvaadH|| "dvAdazamAsAH saMvatsaraH" " aniruSNaH" " agnihimasya bheSajam" ityAdIni tu vedavAkyAnyanuvAdapradhAnAni, lokaprasiddhasyaivAthasyaiteSvanuvAdAditi / ___ tasmAt " puruSa evedaM sarvam" ityAdIni vedapadAni stutyarthavAdapradhAnAni draSTavyAni / "vijJAnadhana evaitebhyaH" ityatrApyayamarthaHvijJAnaghanAkhyaH puruSa evAyaM bhUtebhyo'rthAntaraM vartate / sa ca kartA, kArya ca zarIrAdikamiti prAk sAdhitameva / tatazca karTakAryAbhyAmarthAntaraM karaNamanumIyate; tathAhi-yatra kartR-kAryabhAvastatrAvazyaMbhAvi karaNam , yathA'yaskArA 'ya:piNDasadbhAve saMdaMzaH yaccAnAtmanaH zarIrAdikAryanivRttau karaNabhAvamApadyate tad karma iti pratipadyasva / apica, sAkSAdeva karmasattApratipAdakAni zruyanta eva vedavAkyAni, tadyathA-" puNyaH puNyena karmaNA, pApaH pApena karmaNA" ityAdi / tasmAdAgamAdapi siddha pratipadyasva karmeti // 96 // (1643) D. C.-You, too, O Agnibhuti ! like others presume svabhava und svabhava only to be the karta of deha etc. on hearing the Vadapadas such as " Vijnanaghana dvaitebhyo bhutabhyah " etc. It is therefore said by some pecple that, Sarvahetunirasamsam bhavanam janma varnyate i Svabhavavadibhiste hi nahuh svamapi karanam ||1|| Rajivakantakadinam vaicityam kah karoti hi? 1 Mayuracandrikadirva vicitrah kena nirmitah 112 11 Kadacitkam yadatrasti nihsasah tadahetukami Yatha kantakataiksnyadi tatha caitd sukhadayah || 3 // So, Gautama ! If you also hold the same view., viz., that syabhava is the karta of deha etc., a number of dosas will crop up. In the first instance, consider whether svabhava is (1) a vastuvisesa ( an object in particular) or (2) a-karanata ( causelessness ) itself or (3) vastudharma ( quality of an an object ). (1) Svabhaya can never be recognized as a vastuvisesa as there exists no pramana (ground of assurance ) to prove

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134: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second that it is a vastu. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an a-pramanaka ( unauthorized ) vastu as the pasta itself, you should also accept Karman as a vastu; for according to you, Karman is also a-pramanaka. Secondly, if that svabhava is vastuvisesa, is it murta or amurta? If it is murta, it is nothing but Karman with a synonym of svabhava. If it is amurta it is not supposed to have any sort of upakarana and hence like akasa it can never be a karta of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an amurta svabhava to be the karana of a murta karya such as deha etc. So, it is clear that svabhava is not a vastuvisdsa in any case. 2. If svabhava were supposed to be a-karanata, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause, and Karana will be absent uniformly at all places; consequently, all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidently all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For, one that is produeed spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the vikaras of abhra etc., a beginning or a definite form. Objects like sarira should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of Karman, they are adiman and they possess a definite form as that of a ghata. This shows that such objects are produced by a karta by means of an upakarana, and Karman is the only possible upakarana in the state of embryo. So, Karman ought to be accepted as its real hetu and not the syabhava. 3. Now, consider if svabhava can be taken as a vastudharma, If svabhava is supposed to be the quality of a vastu like atman it would be amurta like akasa and hence it would not become the cause of sarira eto. But there would be no objection if svabhava were taken to be the quality of a murta object. For, in that case, Karman will become a paryaya of the svabhava of a murta object. So, we have no objection in accepting syabhava as a dharma of the murta object,

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Vada] Gapadharavada 66 Moreover, O Agnibhuti! you entertain Karman by hearing sentences such of the Vedas. According to you, sentences is as follows: " 135: doubt as regards as purusa evedam sarvam the interpretation of those Everything that is animate and inanimate, past and future, movable and immovable, distant and near, interior and exterior everything that is nourished by food, and one who is the lord of moksa-all this is purusa and purusa alone. No other object as Karman exists as distinct from this purusa. Similarly, according to you, sentences such as vijnana.. ghana" also establish the non-existance of Karman. Because, in both the above-mentioned padas you interpret " eva " as referring to tha non-existence of Karman 99 Your interpretation of the Veda-padas is not correct. Sentences like "purusa evedam" etc. are meant to praise the atman and to establish the advaita-bhava in order to avoid the arrogance of jati etc. but they are not the non-existence of Karman. meant to establish "" Sentences are generally divided into three kinds :-(1) Vidhivadapara i. e., sentences that are laid down as rules. (2) Arthavadapara i. e., sentences that are laid down as the explanatory remarks and (3) Anuvadapara i e., sentences that are laid down as explanatory repetitions-" Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah" is an example of vidhivada. Arthavada is of two kinds :-(1) Stuti-arthavada and (2) Ninda arthavada. Sentences such as "purnsa evedam sarvam 19 etc., well as those "Sa sarvavid yasyaisa mahima bhuvi vivyd brahmapure hyesa vyomni atmasu pratisthitamaksarnm vedyate yastu sa sarvajna sarvavit sarvamevavivesa and " kaya purnayahutya sarvan kamanavapnoti" etc., are also the examples of stuti-arthavada. as 39 Again you may raise a question as to why the sentences like " 'dkaya parnaya" etc. be not taken as the illustrations

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: 186 : Jinabhadra Gani's of Vidhivada. But if it illustrates Vidhivada, the anusthanas like agnihotra would be of no avail. [The second rest of the In the sentence "asa vaha prathamo yajno yo`gnistomah, yo'nenanistavanyena yujate sa gartamabhyapatat" the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the nindarthavada. Lastly Veda-vakyas such as " dvadasamasah samvat sarah" " agnirusnah " " agni rhimasya bhosajam" etc, are anuvada pradhana as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts. It is, therefore, clear that Vedapadas like "purusa dvddam sarvam" are meant to illustrate the stuti-arthavada. " Vijnana ghana dvaite bhah" etc., can be interpreted in this way-Atman, as an assemblage, of knowledge is distinot from bhutas and it itself is the karta of the karyas such as sarira etc. Now that, it bas become the karta it must have a karmana (instrument ) to accomplish the Karyas. For, wherever there are karta and karya, there ought to be a karana also. Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, Karman is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of Karyas like sarira by Atman. So, you shall have to accept the existence of Karman. Moreover, Karman can be established by the help of Voda-vacanas like " punyah punyena karmana, papah papena karmana" also, Thus Karman is proved by means of agama also. Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that Karman does exist and Karman is the only instrument to accomplish Karyas like sarira etc. chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNa jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / so samaNo pavvahao paMcahiM saha khaMDiyasaehiM // 16 // (1644) Chinnammi samsayammi Jindna jara-maranavippamukkenam i So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiya-sadhim. 96 (1644)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 137 : [fea te forta A-ATOTengrai sa zramaNaH pravajitaH paJcabhiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 96 / / (1644) Chinna samsayd Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitah pancabhih saha khandikasataih. 96 (1644) ] Trans.-96 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Agnibhuti accepted Diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1644 ). End of the Discussion with the Second Ganadhara, 18

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Chapter III tRtIyagaNadharavaktavyatA Discassion with the Third Ganadhara. te pavvaie souM taio Agacchaha jiMNasagAsaM / pakSAmi vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 97 // (1645) To pavvaid soum taio agacchai Jinasagasam : Vaccami vandamt vanditta pajjuvasami // 97 // (1645) [to pravrajitau zrutvA ratIya Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 97 // (1645) Tau pravrajitau srutva tritiya agacchati Jinasakasam 1 Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase li 97 || ( 1645 ) ] Trans:-97 Having heard that both of them ( Indrabhati. and Agnibhuti) had renounced the world, the third (Ganadhara) comes before the Tirthankara.(He thinks):-I may go, pay my homage, and worship hirn (1645). TIkA-tAvindrabhUtya-'gnibhUtI pravrajitau zrutvA tRtIyo vAyubhUtirnAmA dvijopAdhyAyo jinasakAzamAgacchati sAtizayanijavandhudvayaniSkramaNAkarNanAjAgiti vigalitAmimAno bhagavati saMjAtasarvajJapratyayaH sannavamavadhAryAgataHvrajAmi tatrAhamaSi, vande bhagavantaM zrImanmahAvIram , vanditvA ca paryupAseparyupAsti karomi tasya bhagavata iti // 17 // (1645) D. C.-On having heard that Indrabhuti and Agnibhuti had aocepted the Diksa (and were defeated,) the third ganadhara named Vayubhuti approached Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira with an humble and obedient motive of bowing down to him and worshipping him.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :139: And, what more did he think when he approached ? sIsatteNovagayA saMpayarmida-ggibhUiNo jss| tihUyaNakayappaNAmo sa mahAbhAgo'bhigamaNijjo // 18 // (1646) tadabhigamaNa-vaMdaNo-vAsaNAiNA hojna pUyapAvo'haM / vocchiNNasaMsao vA vottuM patto jiNasagAse // 99 // (1647) Sisattenovagaya sampayaminda-ggibhuino jassai Tihuyanakayappanamo sa mahabhago'bhigamanijjo 98. (1646) Tadabhigamana-vandano-vasanaina hojja puyapavo'hame Vocchinna samsao va vottum patto Jinasagase. 99. (1647) [ ziSyatvenopagatI sAMpratamindrA-nibhUtI yasya / tribhuvanakRtapraNAmaH sa mahAbhAgo'bhigamanIyaH // 18 // (1646) tadabhigamana-vandano-pAsanAdinA bhaveyaM pUtapApo'ham / vyavacchinnasaMzayo voktA prApto jinasakAze / / 99 // (1647) Sisyatvenopagatau, sampratamindra'gnibhati yasya | Tribhuvanakritaprayamah sa mahabhago'bhigamaniyah. 98. (1646)] Tadabhigamana-vandano-pasanadina bhaveyam putapapoham, Vyavacchinnasamsoyo vokta prapto Jinasakase. 99 (1647)] Trans. --98-99 "I should approach the revered Bhagavan Mahavira whom Indrabhuti and Agnibhuti have recently *accepted as their preceptor, and to whom (people of) the three worlds pay their obeisances. Having approached him, I shall get myself purged of sins by bowing down to him and worshipping him, and I shall get my doubts cleared." Having said so, he came to sramana Bhagavan Mahavira. (1646-1647) Then what next : AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNNa savvadarisINaM // 10 // (1648)

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: 140: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third Abhattho ya Jindnam jai-jara-paranavippapukkonam , Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarist nam. 100 (1648) ( 37aan farata Fifa-ati-hati agama i nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 100 / / (1648) Abhasitasca Jindna jati-jara-maranavipramuktona i Nanna ca gotrona ca sarvajndna sarvadarsina. 100 (1648)] Trans.--100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darsana (undifferentiated knowledge ). (1648). D. C:--Alhough thus respectfully and directly addressed by the Lord and seeing the beauty and splendour of his emigence extending over the three worlds, and being unable to disclose the doubt remaining in his mind, out of agitation Vayubhuti remained silent with amazement. But we was again addressed thus :tajjIva tassarIraM ti saMsao na vi ya pucchase kiNci| veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho / / 101 // (1649) Tajjiva tassariram ti samsao na vi ya pucchase kimci Vayapayana ya attham na yanabi tesimo attho. 101 (1649) [ tajjIvastaccharIramiti saMzayo nApi ca pRcchasi kiJcit ? / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 101 // (1649) Tajjtvastochartramiti samsayo napi ca priochasi kimcit ? | Vadapadanam sartham na jangsi t@samayamarthah. 101 (1649) ] Trans. 101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is jiva is sarira itself and yet you do not ask me (about it ). But (ca) you do not know the real meaning of Vada-padas. Here is their real interpretation. (1649),

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Vada ) Ganadharavada : 141: TIkA-he AyuSman vAyubhUte ! "tadeva vastu jIvastadeva ca zarIram , na punaranyat" ityevaMbhUtastava saMzayo vatete, nApi ca tadapanodArtha kizcid mA pRcchasi / nanu yajJapATAd nirgacchatA tvayA'bhihitamAsIt-" vocchiNNasaMsao vA" iti, tat kimiti na kizcit pRcchasi / ayaM ca saMzayastava viruddhavedapadazravaNanivandhano vartate / teSAM ca vedapadAnAmartha tvaM na jAnAsi, tena saMzayaM kuruSe / teSAM cAyaM vakSyamANalakSaNortha iti // 1.1 // (1649) D. C.--You entertain the doubt in your mind as to whether that which is jiva be called sarira also. But you do not put any question about it to remove that doubt. This doubt of yours is based upon hearing the Veda-padas of contradictory senses. But that is not the correct interpretation, Here is the real interpsetation. Moreover, vasuhAibhUyasamudayasaMbhUyA ceyaNa tti te sNkaa| patteyamadihA vi hu majjaMgamau vva samudAye / / 102 // (1650) jaha majjaMgesu mao vIsumadiTTho vi samudae houM / kAlaMtare viNassai taha bhUyagaNammi ceyaNNam // 103 // (1651) Vasuhai-hhuya-samudaya-sambhuya cdyana tti te sanka ! Pattdyamadittha vi hu majjangamau vva samudayd. 102 (1650) Jaha majjangdsu mao visumadittho vi samudae boum ! Kalantard vinassai taha bhaya gayammi cdyannam. 103 (1651) [vasudhAdibhUtasamudayasaMbhUtA cetaneti tava zaGkA / pratyekamadRSTA'pi khalu madyAGgamada iva samudAye // 102 // (1650) yathA madyAneSu mado vizvagadRSTo'pi samudaye bhUtvA / kAlAntare vinazyati tathA bhUtagaNe'pi caitanyam // 10 // (1651)

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: 142: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third Vasudhadi-bhuta-samudaya sambhuta cetaneti tava sanka | Pratyekamadrists'pi khalu madyangamada iva samudayd. 102 (1651) Yatha madyangesu mado visvagadristo'pi samudaye bhutva | Kalantare vinasyati tatha bhutagane 'pi caitanyam. 103 (1651 ) ] Trans.- 102-103. Your presumption is that consciousness ( cetana ) is produced from the collection ( samudaya ) of bhutas like prithivi etc., because like intoxication ( mada ) though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection ( of those constituents ). Just as intoxication, though not present in each separate constituent of wine (madya ), is produced in the collection of these constituents, and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness (caitanya) is also produced in the collection of bhutas and perishes as time passes. ( 1650-1651) TIkA -- vasudhA pRthvI, AdizabdAdap-tejo - vAyu-parigrahaH, vasudhAdaya eva bhavantIti kRtvA bhUtAni vasudhAdibhUtAni teSAM samudayaH parasparamilanapariNativasudhAdibhUtasabhUdayaH, tasmAt prAgasatI saMbhUtA saMjAtA, cetanetyevaMbhUtA tava zaGkAM / sA ca cetanA pRthivyAdibhUteSu pratyekAvasthAyAmadRSTApi dhAtakIkusuma - guDo- dakAdiSu madyAGgeSu mada iva tatsamudAye saMbhUteti pratyakSata eva dRzyate / tadevamanvayadvAreNa cetanAyA bhUtasamudAyadharmatA darzitA / atha vyatirekadvAreNa tasyAstAM darzayitumAha - "jaha maaMgesu ityAdi " yathA madyAGgeSu madabhAvaH pratyekAvasthAyAmudRSTo'pi tatsamudAye bhUtvA tatraH kiyantamapi kAlaM sthitvA kAlAntare tathAvidhasAmagrIvazAt kutazcid vinazyati, tathA bhUtagaNe'pi pratyeka samacaitanyaM bhUtvA tataH kAlAntare vinazyati / tato'nvayavyatirekAbhyAM nizcIyate bhUtadharma eSa caitanyam / idamatra hRdayam - yat samudAyiSu pratyekaM nopalabhyate tatsamudAye copalabhyate, tatastatsamudAyamAtradharma eva, yathA madyAGgasamudAyadharmo madaH / sa hi madyAGgeSu vizvaznopalabhyate, tatsamudAye copalabhyate, atastaddharmaH / evaM cetanApi bhUtasamudAye bhavati, pRthag na bhavati, atastaddharmaH /

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Vida] Ganadharavada : 148: dharma - dharmiNozrAmeda eva, bhede ghaTa - paTayoriva dharmi- dharmabhAvAprasaGgAt / tasmAt sa eva jIvastadeva ca zarIram / vAkyAntareSu punaH zarIrAd bhinnaH zrUyate jIvaH, tadyathA " na hi vai sa zarIrasya priyA'priyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyApriye na spRzataH " ityAdi / tatastava saMzaya iti // 102-103 / / (1650 - 1651) / / D. C.-According to your presumption cetana is produced from the samudaya of bhutas such as prithvi, ap, tejas, vayu eto. Just as mada cannot be seen in each separate constituent e. g., dhataki flower, jaggery etc., of the wine, but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined to-gether. In the same way, cetana is recognized in the samudaya of bhutas only and not in a separate constituent like prithvi. So, cetana becomes the quality of the samudaya of bhutas. Again, this cetana, after being produced in the samudaya of bhutas perishes after naving stayed for some time, just as the quality of mada after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine, vanishes as time passes. Thus, it is proved by means of anvaya as well as vyatireka in the above two cases that caitanya is a dharma of the samudaya of bhutas. Again, that which is not present in a constitution of samudaya but in the samudaya itself becomes the quality of samudaya only, and not of a constituent. So, caitanya being found only in samudaya and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a dharma of the samudaya of bhutas, as mada becomes a dharma of the samudaya of madyangas. Now, there can be no distinction between dharma and dharmin. For, if they were distinct, they could not be related as dharma and dharmin. Sarira is nothing but the samudaya of bhitas and jiva is formed of cetana. Hence, jiva and sarira are nothing but dharma and dharmin and as such they should be considered as one and the same. Now, on the other hand, there which establish jiva to be distinct from several Veda-padas sarira e. g. "Na hi are

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:144: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third vai sa-sarisya priyaprivayo-r-apahatirasti, a-sariram va vasantam privapriya na sprsatah." And that is the reason why you have raised this doubt. The doubt is refuted as follows :patteyamabhAvAo na reNutellaM va samudaye ceyaa| majaGgesu tu mao vIsuM pi na savvaso natthi // 104 // (1652) bhami-dhaNi-vitaNhayAI patteyaM pi hu jahA mayaMgesu / taha jai bhUesu bhave ceyA to samudaye hojA // 105 / / (1653) Patteyamabhavao na renutellam va samudaye caya i Majjangdsu tu nao visum pi na savvaso natthi. 104 (1652) Bhami-dhani-vitanhayat patteyam pi bu jaba mayangesu Taha jai bbudsu bhave caya to samudaye hojja. 105 (1653) [pratyekamabhAvAd na reNutailamiva samudaye cetnaa| madyAGgeSu tu mado viSvagapi na sarvazo nAsti // 104 // (1652) bhrami-dhrANi-vitRSNatAdayaH pratyekamapi khalu yathA madAGgeSu / tathA yadi bhUteSu bhavecetanA tataH samudaye bhavet // 105 // (1653) Pratyekamabhavad na ronutailamiva samudaya cotana, Madyangesu tu mado visvagapi na sarvaso nasti. 104 (1652) Bhrani-dhrani-vitrisnatadayah pratyokamapi khalu yatha madangesul Tatha yadi bbutesu bhaveccetana tatah samudaye bbavet. 105 (1653) Trans.--104-105 Consciousness (cetana) can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sands if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication (mada) is not absolutely absent even in an individual constiluent of wine. (For), every constituent (of wine) possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing

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:145: Vada] Ganadharavada insanity, producing satiety and quenching thirst etc. in its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the) bhutas ( separately ), it could be (found) in the collection (also) (1652-1653). TIkA-"na samudaye ceya ti" na bhUtasamudayamAtraprabhavA cetanA, "patteyamabhAvAu ti" bhUtapratyekAvasthAyAM tasyA aMzato'pi sarvathA'nupalabdherityarthaH / kiM yathA kiMprabhavaM na bhavati ? ityAha--" na reNunellaM va ti" yathA pratyekaM savarthA'nupalambhAd reNukaNasamudAyaprabhavaM tailaM na bhavatItyarthaH / prayogaH-yad yeSu pRthagavasthAyAM sarvathA nopalabhyate tat teSAM samudAye'pi na bhavati, yathA sikatAkaNasamudAye tailam , yatu teSAM samudAye bhavati na tasya pRthag vyavasthiteSu teSu sarvathA'nupalambhaH, yathaikaikatilAvasthAyAM tailasya, sarvathA nopalabhyate ca bhUteSu pratyekAvasthAyAM cetanA, tasmAd nAsau tatsamudAyamAtraprabhavA, kinvarthApattarevAnyat kimapi jIvalakSaNaM kAraNAntaraM bhUtasamudAyAtiriktaM tatra saMghaTTitaM, yata iyaM prabhavatIti pratipattavyam / Aha"pratyekAvasthAyAM sarvathA'nupalambhAt" ityanaikAntiko'yaM hetuH, / pratyekA vasthAyAM sarvathA'nupalabdhasyApi madasya madyAGgasamudAye darzanAt , ityAzaDkyAha-" majjaMgesu ityAdi" dhAtakIkusumAdiSu madyAGgeSu punarviSvak pRthag na sarvathA mado nAsti, api tu yA ca yAvatI ca madamAtrA pRthagapi teSvastyevetyarthaH / tato nAnaikAntikatA hetoriti / ___TIkA-yathA pratyekAvasthAyAM dhAtakIkusumeSu yA ca yAvatI ca zramizcitabhramApAdanazaktirasti, guDa-drAkSe-kSurasAdiSu punarghANiratRptijananazaktirasti, udake tu vitRSNatAkaraNazaktirasti, AdizabdAdanyeppaSi madyAGgeSvanyApi yathAsaMbhavaM zaktirvAcyA, tathA tenaiva prakAreNa vyasteSvapi pRthivyAdibhUteSu yadi kAcicaitanyazaktiraaviSyat , tadA tatsamudAye saMpUrNA spaSTA cetanA syAt, na caitadasti, tasmAd na bhUtasamudAyamAtraprabhaveyamiti // 104-105 (1652-53) // D. C.-Since cetana is not present in the individual state of a bhuta, even to a limited extent, it can never be found in 19

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: 146 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The third the combination of the bhutas also, just as oil cannot be found in a samudaya of Bands when it is not present in each individual praticle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the colleative state also, "and whatever is present incollection should be present in the individual also, e. g., oil when present its prithak avastha of sesamum is found in its collective state also. In the present case, cetana is not found in the prithak avastha of bhutas, and hence, it is improper to accept that cetana is produced in the samudaya of bhutas. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from bhutasamudaya. That cause is nothing else but jiva which is amurta on account of the amurta cetana. Here again, the opponent may argue that the abovementioned rule is wrong. For, mada is not found in the individual state of a constituent like dhatakt puspa of the madya; and get the quality of intoxication does exist in its samudaya. But it is not proper to say that mada-bhava is altogether absent from dhatakt puspa etc. For, mada does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A dhatakt puspa can induce insanity in its individual capacity; the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word "adi" other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if caitanya-Sakti were present in the individual bhutas like prithart eto. even to a limitted extent, caitanya would certainly bave been manifested in their combination also. But when cetana is absent in the very prithak state, it can never be produced in the combined state. Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

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Vada ] Gapadheravada :147: jai vA savvAbhAvo vIsuM to kiM tadaMganiyamo'yaM / tassamudayaniyamo vA annesu vi to habejAhi // 106 // (1654) Jai va savvabhavo visum to kim tadanganiyamo'yami Tassanudayaniyamo va annesu vi to havejjabi. 106 (1654) [yadi vA sarvAbhAvo viSvak tataH kiM tadaGganiyamo'yaM / tassamudayaniyamo vA'nyeSvapi tato bhavet // 106 // (1654) Yadi va sarvabhavo visvak tatah kim tadanganiyamo'yami Tassamudayaniyamo vanydsvapi tato bhavdt. 106 (1654)] Trans.-106 Or, if the power of intoxication were altogether absent from all ( the constituents of wine ) individually, how could they be called its divisions at all ? and why should there be any rule regarding its collection also? (For), in that case, it must be produced by means of (the collection of) other objects also. (1654) TIkA-yadi ca madhAGgeSu pRthagavasthAyAM sarvathaiva madazakyabhAvaH, tarhi ko'yaM tadaGganiyamaH ko'yaM dhAtakIkusumAdInAM madyAGgatAniyamaH, tatsamudAyaniyamo vA-kimiti madyArthI dhAtakIkusumAdInyevAnveSayati, tatsamudAya kimapi niyamena mIlayati ? ityarthaH, nanvanyeSvapi ca bhazmA-ima-gomayAdiSu samuditeSu madyaM bhavediti // 106 / / (1654) D. C.-If the power of inoxication is denied to exist in the prithak avastha of the constituents like dhataki puspa eto., they cannot be called the constituents of wine at all. Again, if dhataki puspa eto., has no power of intoxication at all, why should people desirous of wine, collect all the constituents like dhataki puspa in order to prepare wine and why do they not prepare wine by combining other objects like ashes. stones, cowdung, etc.? This clearly indicates that the Power of intoxication does exist in the individual state of constituents like dhataki puspa eto., and as a result of that, it appears in wine which is the combined state of all swh constituents,

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:148: Jinabhadra Gani's _[The third At this point, an opponent may advance the following argument : bhUyANaM patteyaM pi ceyaNA samudae drisnnaao| jaha majaMgesu mao maha tti heU na siddho'yaM // 107 // (1655) Bhuyanam patteyam pi coyana samudad darisanao i Jaha najjangdsu mao mai tti heu na siddho'yam. 107 (1655) [ bhUtAnAM pratyekamapi cetanA samudaye darzanAt / . yathA madyAGgeSu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam / / 107 // (1655) Bhutanam pratyokampi catana samudaye darsanati Yatha madyangdsu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam. 107 (1655)] Trans.-107 Since consciousness is found in the collection of bhutas, if an argument is advanced that consciousness is present in each individual bhuta also, as intoxication is present in various constituents of wine, it can never be approved of. ( 1655). TIkA-syAt parasya matiH--sAdhUktaM yat-pRthagapi madyAGgeSu kizcid madasAmarthyamastIti / etadeva hi mamaM bhUteSu vyastAvasthAyAM caitanyAstitvasiddhAvudAharaNaM bhaviSyati, tathAhi-vyasteSvapi bhUteSu caitanyamasti, tatsamudAye tadarzanAt , madyAGgeSu madavaditi / yathA madyAGgeSu madaH pRthagalpatvAd nAtispaSTaH, tatsamudAye tvabhivyaktimeti, tathA bhUteSvapi pRthagavasthAyAmaNIyasI cetanA, tatsamudAye tu bhUyasIyamiti / atrottaramAha-"heU na siddho'yamiti" "cetanAyA bhUtasamudAye darzanAt" ityasiddho'yaM heturityarthaH, Atmano bhUtasamudAyAntargatatvena cetanAyAstaddharmatvAt , AtmAbhAve ca tatsamudAye'pi vadasiddharasiddho'yaM heturiti bhaavH| yadi hi bhUtasamudAyamAtradharmazcetanA bhavet tadA mRtazarIre'pyupalabhyeta / vAyostadAnIM tatrAbhAvAt tadanupalambha iti vet / naivam, nalikAdiprayogatastatprakSepe'pi tdnuplbdheH| tejastadAnIM. vatra nAstIti cet / na, tatprakSepe'pi tadanupalambhAt / viziSTatejo-vAyava

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Vada ] Ganadbaravada : 149: bhAvAdanupalambha iti cet / kiM nAmAtmasattvaM vihAyA'nyat tadvaiziSTyam ? nanu saMjJAntareNAtmasattvameva tvayApi pratipAditaM syAditi // 107 // (1655) D. C.-An opponent may advance the following line of argument:-- As mada is present in each separate constituent of wine, it is found in the samudaya of those bhutas also. In the same way, it can be said that since cetana is completely manifested in the collection of bhutas it should be present in each independent bhuta at least to a certain extent. Just as mada is not clearly perceptible in its individual state, but distinct in the samudaya, so also, cotana is not clearly peroeptible in the individual state on account of its minute form, but it is more distinct in the collective state. But it is not in the fitness of things to state that, because cetana is found in the bhuta-samudaya it should be present in each individual bhuta also, as cetana is the quality of Soul and the Soul is contained within (antargata ) the bhutasamudaya. So, it atman is absent from the bhuta-samudaya, catana cannot exist in the samudaya. Thus, your argument that cetana is found in the collection of bhutas is not valid. For, if celana were taken to be a quality of mere bhuta-samudaya it ought to be found in a dead body also. Here again, it is improper to advance an excuse that cdtana is absent in a dead body on account of the absence of vayu. For, cetana could never be found in a dead body, even if vayu were made to enter the body by means of a pipe etc. Similarly, if it is argued that cetana does not exist in a dead body due to the absence of tejas, tejas also could be made to enter the dead body by the same sort of means and proved that cetand is absent in that case also. Lastly, if it is said that on account of the nonexistence of a peculiar type of vayu and tejas, cetana is absent from a dead body, the peculiarity in the case would be due to nothing else but the excellence of atman which would automatically mean that you admit the existence of atman.

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[ The third : 150. Jinabhadra Gani's naNu paJcakkhaviroho goyama ! taM naannumaannbhaavaao| tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyaM bhUyaceyaM tti // 108 / / (1656) Nanu paccakkhaviroho Goyama ! tam nanumanabhavao i Tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyan bhayacdyam tti. 108 (1656) [ nanu pratyakSavirodho gautama ! tad nAnumAnabhAvAt / tava pratyakSavirodhaH pratyekaM bhUtacetaneti // 108 // (1656) Nanu pratyaksavirodhu Gautama ! tad nanumana bhavat i Tava pratyaksavirodhah pratydkam bhatacdtuneti. 108 (1656) ] Trans.-108 Certainly OGautama that is not an evident contradiction (as you think ) on account of the existence of anumana. (On the contrary ), your assumption that cetana exists in each and every bhuta constituent is an evident contradiction. ( 1656) TIkA-nanu pratyakSaviruddhamevedaM yat--bhUtasamudAye satyupalabhyamAnApi cetanA na tatsamudAyasyetyabhidhIyate / na hi ghaTe rUpAdaya upalabhyamAnA na ghaTasyeti vaktumucitam / tadayuktam , yato na bhU-jalasamudAyamAtre upalabhyamAnA api haritAdayastanmAtraprabhavA iti zakyate vaktum / tadIjasAdhakAnumAnena bAdhyate'sAvupalambha iti cet / tadetadihApi samAnam / etadevAha-- " goyametyAdi" vAyubhUterapIndrabhUtisodaryabhrAtRtvena samAnagotratvAd gautama ! ityevamAmantraNam , yatvaM brUSe-tadetad na, bhUtasamudAyAtiriktAtmasAdhakAnumAnasadbhAvAt , tatastenaiva tvatpratyakSasya bAdhitatvAditi bhAvaH / pratyuta tavaiva pratyakSavirodhaH / kiM kurvataH ? ityAha " patteyaM bhUyaceya tti" 'bruvataH' iti shessH| pratyekAvasthAyAM pRthivyAdibhUteSu caitanyAbhAvasyaiva darzanAt tadastitvaM pratyakSeNaiva bAdhyata iti " pratyekaM bhUteSu cetanA" iti bruvatastavaiva pratyakSavirodha ityarthaH // 108 // (1656) D. C.-Vayubhuti-That cetana though perceived in a collection of bhutas, does not belong to the bhuta-samudaya seems to be incongruent. For, just as it is improper to assert

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Vada] Ganadharavada : 131 that qualities like rupa etc., seen in a ghata, do not belong to the ghata, so here also, it is not proper to state that cetana though apprehended in a collection of bhutas. does not belong to the bhuta-samudaya. Acarya-The argument advanced by you, O Gautama? is absolutely invalid. Just as vegetables etc., found in a collection of earth and water can never be considered to have been produced from the collection of earth and water, sinte they are produced from their seeds; in the same way, cotana also, should never be taken to have been produced from the collection of bhutas though it is found in a body made of bhutas such as prithvi etc. For, that cetans is produced from atman which is altogether distinct from the bhuta-samudaya. Thus, there is no contradiction in my argument. But the contradiction lies in your assertion that cetana is produced in each and every individual bhuta. bhUiMdiyovaladdhANusaraNao tehiM bhinnarUvussa / ceyA paMcagavakkhovaladvapurisassa vA sarao / / 109 / / (1656) Bhuindiyovaladdhanusaranao tehim bhinnaruvassa I Ceya pancagavakkhovaladdhapurisassa va sarao 109 (1657) [ bhUtendriyopalabdhAnusmaraNatastebhyo bhinnarUpasya / cetanA paJcagavAkSopalabdhapuruSasyeva smarataH // 109 // (1657) Bhutendriyopaladdhanusmaranatastebhyo bhinnarupasya | Cetana pancagavaksopalabdha purusasy e va smaratah. 109 (1657)} Trans. 109 Like a man who perceives (an object) from five windows and recalls (it) to his mind, cetans being itself (the quality) of an object different from them (i e., bhutas) perceives (an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form) of bhutas and recalls (the object) to his mind. (1657) TIkA - tebhyo bhUtendriyabhyo bhinnarUpasya kasyApi dharmazretaneti prtijnyaa|

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:102 Jinabhadra Gani's [The third bhUtendriyopalabdhArthAnusmaraNAditi hetuH| yathA pazcabhirgavAkSarupalabdhAnarthAnanusmaratastadatiriktasya kasyApi devadattAdeH puruSasya caitaneti dRSTAntaH / ayamatra tAtparyArtha:---iha ya eko yairanekairupalabdhAnarthAnanusmarati sa tebhyo medavAn dRSTaH, yathA paJcabhirgavAkSarupalabdhAnarthAnanusmaran devadattaH,* yazca yasmAd bhUtendriyAtmakasamudAyAd bhinno na bhavati, kiM tahiM ? ananyaH, nAyameko'nekopalabdhAnAmarthAnAmanusmartA, yathA zabdAdigrAhakamanovijJAnavizeSaH, tairupalabhyAnummarato'pi ca tadanatiriktatve devadattasyApi gavAkSamAtraprasaGgo bAdhakaM pramANam / indriyANyavopalabhante, na punastairanya upalamata iti cet / na, "taduparame'pi tadupalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt , tadvayApAre ca kadAcidanupalambhAt" ityanantarameva vakSyamANatvAditi / / 109 / / (1657) D. C.-The point is that cetana who remembers an object perceived by its sense-organs in the form of bhutas, becomes the quality of something which is different from those bhutendriyas, just as Devadatta who remembers an object perceived through five windows by means of five indriyas, is distinct from those windows. So, that which is not bhinna from the samudaya of bhutendriyas, can never remember an ohject apprehended by more than one means. For, after having perceived an object through a number of means, if cetana were abhinna from those means, then, Devadatta who recognizes an object through a number of windows, would become the window itself. Again, in recognizing an object, it is improper to say that mere indriyas apprchend the object and nothing else. For, even when the indriyas have ceased workiog. the object perceived by them is recalled; and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended. taduvarame vi saraNao tabvAvAre vinovlNbhaao| iMdiyabhinnassa maI paMcagavakkhANubhaviNo vdha // 110 // (1658)

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Gajadharavida :163 Taduvaramd vi saranao tavvavaro vi novalambha8 1 Indiyabhinnassa mat. pancagavakkhanubhaviyo vva. 110 (1658) [taduparame'pi smaraNatastavyApAre'pi nopalambhAt / indriyabhinnasya matiH paJcagavAkSAnumavina iva // 110 / / (1658) Taduparame'pi smaranatastadvyapard'pi nopalambhati Indriyabhinnasya matih pancagavakSanubhavina iva. 110 (1658)] Trans.---110. As, in the case of a person perceiving (an object) from five windows, cognition (in the form of knowledge) is distinct from sense-organs; because an object apprehended by the sense-organs, is remembered even when the indriyas have ceased working and (sometimes) in spite of their work. ing, the object is not perceived. (1658) TIkA-indriyebhyo bhinnasyaiva kasyApIyaM ghaTAdijJAnalakSaNA matiriti prtijnyaa| taduparame'pi-andhatva-bAdhiryAdyavasthAyAmindriyavyApArAmAve'pi, tadvAreNopalabdhAnAmarthAnAmanusmaraNAditi hetuH / athavA, asyAmeva pratijJAyAM tayApAre'pi-indriyavyApRtAvapi kadAcidanupayuktAvasthAyAm , vastvanulammAdityaparo hetuH| yadi hIndriyANyeva draSTuNi mayeyuH, tahiM kimiti visphAritAkSasyApi praguNazrotrAdIndriyavargasyApi yogyadezasthitAnAmapi rUpa-zabdAdivastUnAmanupayuktasya anyamanaskasya zUnyacittasyopalammo na bhavati / tato jJAyate-indriyagrAmavyatiriktasyaiva kasyacidayamupalammaH, yathA pazcamirgavAyopidAdivastUnyanubhaviturdarzakasyeti dRssttaantH| atrApi prayogAmyAM tArpayamupadaryate, tadyathA-iha yo yaduparame'pi yairupalabdhAnAmAnAmanumA sa temyo vyatirikto dRSTaH, yathA gavAkSarupalabdhAnAmarthAnAM gavAhoparame'pi devadattaH, anusmarati cAyamAtmA'ndhabadhiratvAdikAle'pIndriyopalabdhAnarthAna , ataH sa tebhyo'rthaantrmiti| tathA, indriyemyo vyatirikta jAtmA, tandyApAre'pyanupalambhAva, iha yo yavdyApAre'pi yarupalamyAnarthAn nopalabhate sa temyo mino dRSTaH, yathA'sthagitagavAzo'pyanyamanaskatayA'nupayukto'pazyaMstebhyo devadata iti // 110 // (1658)

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: 154: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third D. C.-Cognition (mati) which constitutes the knowledge of ghata eto, belongs to something which is distinct from sense-organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness eto, the object perceived by the indriyas is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognized. Now, if the sense-organ itself were to apprehend an object, how is it that an absent-minded man is not able to apprehend an object even with open eyes, and efficient ears, substances of rupa and sabda placed at proper places ? It follows, therefore, that some one, who like a person looking at an object like a woman from five windows, is different from the sense-organs, is able to apprehend it. A rule can be deduced from this, that one who remembers an object even after its indriyas have ceased working, is distinct from those indriyas. When Davadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows even after the windows are closed, it is atman, who remembers the object perceived by sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in the state of blindness, deafness etc. This provos that atman is different from indriyas. Again, that which does not recognize an object even while the indriyas are working, is different from the senseorgans like an absent-minded Devadatta looking through the open windows. uvalabbhanneNa vigAragahaNao tadahio dhuvaM atthi / puvvAvaravAtAyaNagahaNavigArAipuriso vva // 111 // (1659) Uvalabbhannena vigaragabanao tadahio dhuvam atthi Puvvavaravatayanagahanavigaraipuriso vva. 111 (165:)) [upalabhyAnyena vikAragrahaNatastadadhiko dhruvamasti / pUrvAparavAtAyanagrahaNavikArAdipuruSa iva // 111 // (1659) Upalabhyanydna vikaragrahanatastadadhiko dhruvanasti 1 Purvaparavatayanagrahanavikaradipurusa iva. 111 (1659) ]

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Vada] Ganadharavada : 155: ___ Trans.-111 Just as a person apprehending (an object) from an eastward window and perverting himself (due to its sight) at the opposite window, is different from those windows, so also, the soul who apprehends (an object ) by means of one (sense-organ) and exhibits perversion by means of another, is decidedly different from those sense-organs. (1629) TIkA-iha dhruvaM nizcitaM tadadhikastebhya indriyebhyaH samadhiko bhinnaH samasti jIvaH, anyenopalabhyAnyena vikAragrahaNAt , iha yo'nyenopalabhyAnyena vikAraM pratipadyate sa tasmAd bhinno dRSTaH, yathA pravaraprAsAdoparItastataH padaparipATIM kurvANaH pUrvavAtAyanena ramaNImavalokyAparavAtAyanena samAgatAyAstasyAH karAdinA kucasparzAdivikAramupadarzayan devadattaH, tathA cAyamAtmA cakSuSA'mlIkAmanantaM dRSTvA rasanena hRllAsa-lAlAsAvAdivikAraM pratipadyate, tasmAt tayobhinna iti| athavA, grahaNazabdamihA''dAnaparyAyaM kRtvA'nyathAnumAnaM vidhIyate-indriyebhyo vyatirikta AtmA, anyenopalabhyAnyena grahaNAt, iha ya AdeyaM ghaTAdikamarthamanyanopalabhyAnyena gRhNAti sa tAbhyAM bhedavAn dRSTaH, yathA pUrvavAtAyanena ghaTAdikamupalabhyAparavAtAyanena gRhNAnastAbhyAM devadattaH, gRhNAti ca cakSuSopalabdhaM ghaTAdikamartha hastAdinA jIvA, tatastAbhyAM bhinna iti // 111 / / (1659) D. C.-Jiva who apprehends an object by means of one indriya and exhibits vikaras by means of another, is bhinna from both the indriyas. Just as Dovadatta who looks at a woman from an eastward window and exhibits his perversion of the sight of stanasparsa etc., by her hands at the other is really speaking different from both the windows; in the stame way, the Soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes and exhibits vikaras in the form of distilling saliva etc., by means of tongue, is decidedly different from both, Or, atman is different from indriyas because having seen an object by means of eyes, atman holds it by means of hands, Another inference,

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: 156: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third savveMdiuvaladdhANusaraNao tdhio'nnumNtbbo| jaha paMcabhinnavinnANapurisavinnANasaMpanno // 112 // (1660) Savvendiuvaladdhanusaranao tadahio'numantavvo I Jaha pancabhinnavinnanapurisavinnanasampanno. 112. (1660) [ srvendriyoplbdhaanusrnntstddhiko'numntvyH| yathA paJcaminnavijJAnapuruSavijJAnasaMpannaH // 112 // (1660) Sarvendriyopalabdhanusnaranatastadadhiko'numantavyah 1 Yatha pancabbinnavijnana purusavijnanasampannah, 112 (1660)] ___ Trans.--112 Just as, from five different persons having five different vijnanas, a sixth person possessing all the five vijfanas is different, so also, the soul who remembers an object cognized by all the sense-organs, should be inferred as being distinct from them. (1660) TIkA-sarvendriyopalabdhArthAnusaraNataH kAraNAt badadhiko'sti jIvaH / dRSTAntamAha-yathA paJca ca te bhinnavijJAnAzca paJcabhinna vijJAnA icchAvazAt pratyeka sparza-rasa-gandha-rUpa-zabdopayogavanta ityarthaH, paJcabhinna vijJAnAzca te puruSAzca paJcabhinna vijJAnapuruSAsteSAM yAni sparzAdiviSayANi vijJAnAni taiH saMpannastadvettA yaH SaSThaH puruSastebhyaH paJcabhyo bhinnaH / idamatra tAtparyamya iha yairupalabdhAnAmarthAnAmeko'nusmA sa tebhyo bhinno dRSTaH, yathecchAnuvidhAyizabdAdibhinnajAtIyavijJAnapuruSapaJcakAt tadazeSavijJAnAbhijJaH pumAn , icchAnuvidhAyizabdAdibhinnajAtIyavijJAnendriyapazcakAzeSavijJAnavettA cAyameka AtmA, tasmAdindriyapaJcakAd bhinna eveti| zabdAdibhinnavijJAnapuruSapazvasyeva pRthagindriyANAmupalabdhiprasaGgato'niSTApAdanAd viruddho'yaM heturiti cet / na, icchAnuvidhAyivizeSaNAt, icchAyAzcendriyANAmasaMbhavAt , sahakArikAraNatayopalabdhikAraNamAtratAyA indriyeSvapi sadbhAvAt , upcaartstessaampyuplbdhervirodhaaddossH| kiJca, pratipattyupAyamAtramevaitat, na hyatIndriyevartheSvekAntenaiva yuktyanveSaNaparairbhAvyam / uktaM ca

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Vada ] Ga&dharavada : 157 : Agamazcopapattizca saMpUrNa dRSTikAraNam / atIndriyANAmarthAnAM sadbhAvapratipattaye / / 1 / / iti // 112 / / (1660) D. C.-Since jiva remembers an object perceived by all the sense-organs, jiva should be distinguished from indriyas. From five different persons possessing five different vijnanas such as sparsa, rasa etc., according to their will, a sixth purusa having all the five vijnanas together, is distinguished. In the same way, the Soul that possesses the cognizance of all the five sense-organs, should be distinguished from each of the five sense-organe, In short, one who is the only anusmarta of the objects cognized, is distinguished from those by means of which the objects are perceived. An objection may be raised at this point, that like five different purusas having five different vijnanas such as sabda, rasa, etc., the five indriyas should also possess the power of cognizance. For, if they have no cognizance, the argument stated above would be a-siddha. But the contention is not valid. For, there would be no difficulty in this case by reason of the adjective " icchavasat." Indriyas are not supposed to have any sort of desire. Or, by way of the co-operative cause the reason of perception lies in indriyas, and bence, there is no harm, if indriyas were metaphorically believed to be jssana itself. Or, say, this illustration is nothing but a means to an end, Consequently, for the recognition of objects which are atindriya ( beyond perception ), agama and yukti are the only resorts. For, it is said, Agamasco'papattisca sampurnam dristikaranam; Atindriyanamarthanam sadbhavapratipattayd. A few more inferences are laid down in support of the distinction of Soul, viNNANaMtarapuvvaM bAlaNNANamiha naannbhaavaao| E raamigoe gaavi erfeuill 383 11 (688)

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:158: Jinabhadra Gani's [ the third Vinnanantarapuvvam balannanamiha nanabhavaol Jaha balananapuvvam juvananam tam ca dehahiam. 113 (1661) [vijJAnAntarapUrva bAlajJAnamiha jJAnabhAvAt / yathA bAlajJAnapUrva yuvajJAnaM tacca dehAdhikam // 113 // (1661) Vijnanantarapurvam balajnanamiha jnanabhavati Yatha balajnanapurvan yuvajnanam tacca ddhadhikam. 113 (1661)] Trans.--113 Just as, cognizance in youth is siinilar to cognizance in chiidhood, the latter is similar to other cognizances because of its being cognizance. And that (cognizance) is distinguished from de ha (1661) TIkA--anyavijJAnapUrvakamidaM bAlavijJAnam , vijJAnatvAt , iha yad vijJAnaM tadanyavijJAnapUrvakam dRSTam , yathA bAlavijJAnapUrvakaM yuvavijJAnam , yadvijJAnapUrvakaM cedaM bAlavijJAnaM, taccharIrAdanyadeva, pUrvazarIratyAge'pIhatyavijJAnakAraNatvAt , tasya ca vijJAnasya guNatvena guNinamAtmAnamantareNAsaMbhavAt , taccharIravyatiriktamAtmAnaM vyavasthAmaH, na tu zarIramevAtmeti / vijJAnatvAditi pratijJArthaMkadezavAdasiddho heturiti cet / na, vizeSasya pakSIkRtatvAt / bhavati ca vizeSe pakSIkRte sAmAnyaM hetuH, yathA'nityo varNAtmakaH zabdaH, zabdatvAt , meghazabdavat / evamihApi bAlavijJAnamanyavijJAnapUrvakamiti vizeSaH pakSIkRtaH, na tu sAmAnyavijJAnamanyavijJAnapUrvakamiti pakSIkRtaM, yena vijJAnatvAditi pratijJArthaMkadezaH syAt, yathA'nityaH zabdaH, zabdatvAditi // 113 / / (1661) D. C.-Here the balajnana is similar to other vijnanas on account of its vijnanatva. Just as, yuvajnana resembles balajnana, the vijnana to which the balajaana resembles is distinguished from deha because it continues to be the cause of vijnana even after it has left the former body. Now, since vijnana is a quality, it cannot remain without a gunin viz., atman; consequently, we recognize atman to be distinct from body, and not the body itselt.

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Vids] Ganadharavada : 159: "Vayubhuti-The hetn vijhanatvat" stated by you, becomes nothing but a portion of the proposition to be proved in that case. Acarya--It is not so. The particular is pointed out in this case; and when particular is emphasized, the hetu stated there-in, is common e. g., the varnatmaka sabda is anitya because of its sabdatva as in the case of a meghasabda. Similarly, in the proposition that balavijnana is similar to other vijnanas, only a particular 'case of vijnana is emphasized and vijnana in general is not emphasized, consequently this does not form a part of the proposition as, it forms in the case of " anityah sabdah sabdatvat." paDhamo thaNAhilAso aNNAhArAhilAsapuvo'yaM / jaha saMpayAhilAso'NubhUio so ya dehahio // 114 // (1662) Padhamo thanihilaso annaharahilasapuvvo'yam | Jaha sampayahilaso'nubhuis so ya dehahio. 114 (1662)] [prathamaH stanAbhilASo'nyAhArAbhilASapUrvo'yam / yathA sAMpratAbhilASo'nubhUtitaH sa ca dehAdhikaH 114 // (1662) Prathaidah stanabhilaso'nyaharabhilasapurvo'yam 1 Yatha sampratabhilaso'nubhutitah sa ca dehadhikah. 114 (1662) ] Trans -114 The first desire (of the child ) to suck the breasts ( of mother ), is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same ) experience. And that desire is distinct from body. (1662) TIkA-gautama! AdyaH stanAbhilASo bAlasyAyamanyAbhilApapUrvakaH, anubhUne:-anubhavAtmakatvAta , sAMpratAbhilASavaditi / athavA, " abhilASatvAt" ityayamanuno'pi heturdraSTavyaH, iha yo'bhilApaH so'nyAbhilASapUrvako dRSTaH, yathA sAMpratAbhilASaH, yadabhilASapUrvakazcAyamAdyaH stanAbhilASaH sa zarIrAdanya eva, pUrvazarIraparityAge'SIhatyAbhilASakAraNatvAt / jJAnaguNavA

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: 160: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third milApo na guNinamantareNa sNbhvni| ato yastasyAzrayabhUto guNI sa zarIrAtirikta Atmeti / Aha--nanvanaikAntiko'yam, srvsyaa'pybhilaasspuurvktvaanupptteH| na hi mokSAbhilApo mokSAbhilASapUrvako ghaTate / tadayuktam , abhiprAyAparizAnAt , yo hi stanAbhilASaH sa sAmAnyenaivAmilApapUrvaka ityetadevAsmAmirucyate, na punarvizeSeNa brUmaH--" stanAbhilASo'nyastanAbhilASapUrvakaH" iti / evaM ca sAmAnyoktI mokSAbhilASapakSe'pi ghaTata eva, mokSAbhilASasyApi sAmAnyenA'nyAbhilASapUrvakatvAditi // 114 // (1662) D. C.-The first desire of the child to suck the breasts of the mother, is just similar to the other abhilasas on account of its being an abhilasa. Now, the desire to which the child's stanabhilasa resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of this abhilasa even after it has left the body. Abhilasa is the quality of knowledge which cannot exist without a support, which is nothing but the soul, independent of deha. Vayubhuti:-The hetu stated in the above-named anumana, involves the fault of uncertainty as all abhilasas are not the game. e. g., an abhilasa for moksa does not resemble another abhilasa for moksz. So, why not to believe the same in the ouse of this abhilasa algo ? The Acarya.-You have not understood the point, 0 Gautama ! The point is that we have conipared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly, in the case of moksabhilasa also, the noksabhilasa should not be compared with other moksabhilasas but only with other abhilasas in general. (1662) Anothor inference,

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Vikda ] Gagadharavada bAlasarIraM dehaMtarapuSyaM indiyAhabhattAo / juvadeho bAlAdiva sa jassa deho sa dehi ti ||115|| (1663) Balasartram dehantarapuvvam indiyaimattao | Juvadeho baladiva sa jassa deho sa dehi tti. 115 (1668) [ bAlazarIraM dehAntarapUrvamindriyAdimatrAt / yuvadeho bAlAdiva sa yasya dehaH sa dehIti // 115 // (1663) Balasariram dehantarapurvamindriyadimattvat | Yuvaddho baladiva sa yasya dahal sa dehiti. 115 (1663) ] Trans. 115 As the body in youth resembles the body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because it possesses the sense-organs. One to whom that body belongs, is the owner of body (and not the body itself). (1663). TIkA - bAlazarIraM zarIrAntarapUrvakam, indriyAdimatvAt, iha yadindriyAdimat, tadanyadehapUrvakaM dRSTam, yathA yuvazarIraM bAladehapUrvakam, yatpUrvakaM cedaM bAlazarIraM tadasmAt zarIrAdarthAntaram, tadatyaye'pIha tyazarIrIpAdAnAt, yasya ca tacchazarIraM sa bhavAntarayAyIzarIdAdarthAntarabhRto dehavAnastyAtmA, na punaH zarIramevAtmeti siddhamiti // 115 // (1663) : 161: 8 D. C.-Just as a body in youth resembles body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because of its possessing the indriyas. Now, the body to which this balasartra resembles, is distinct from the latter, for this body rises up even if the former body has perished. Again, that to whom this body belongs, is nothing but Soul, who travels from life to life, and who, being not the body itself, is distinct from this body. Another inference, aNNasuha- dukkhapuSyaM suhAi bAlassa saMpaisahaM va / aNumUhamayattaNao aNubhUhamao ya jIvo ti // 116 // (1664) 21 For Private Personal Use Only

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third Annasuha-dukkhapuvvam suhai balassa sampaisuham va Anubhuimayattanao anubhuimao ya jivo tti. 116 (1664) [ anyasukha-duHkhapUrvaM sukhAdi bAlasya sAMpratasukhamiva / anubhUtimayatvato'nubhUtimayazca jIva iti / / 116 / / (1664) Anyasukha-duhkhapurvam sukhadi balasya sampratasukhamiva | Anubhutimayatvato'nubhutimayasca jiva iti. 116 (1664) ] : 162: Trans-116 Happiness in the state of childhood like the present-day happiness resembles happiness, misery etc., in other states. And the Soul is possessed of the faculty of perception, because of its being capable of perceptivity. (1664). TIkA - anyasukhapUrvaka midamAdyaM bAlasukham, anubhavAtmakatvAt, sAMpra tasukhavat, yatsukhapUrvakaM cedamAdyaM sukham, taccharIrAdanyadeva, tadatyaye'pIha - tyasukhakAraNatvAt / guNazrAyam, sa ca guNinamantareNa na saMbhavati, ato yastasyAzrayabhUto guNI sa dehAdarthAntaram iti sukhAnubhUtimayo jIva iti siddham / evaM duHkha-rAga-dveSa-bhaya- zokAdayo'pyAyojanIyA iti // 116 // (1664 ) // , D. C.-Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present-day happiness, because of its anubhutimayatva. Now, the happiness to which this balusukha resembles, is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished. Moreover, sukha is a guna which cannot exist without the support of gunin which, too, is distinct from body. This proves that the Soul is possessed of anubhuti of happiness. According to the same argument, we can prove that atman possesses the anubhuti of duhkha, raga, dvesa, bhaya, soka, etc. Now, the anumanas that have already been laid down to establish the existence of Ava and karman are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory. saMtANo'NAI u paropparaM heu heu bhAvAo / dehassa ya kammassa ya goyama ! bIyaM- kurANaM va // 117 // (1665) + Vide verse 1689. For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :16: Santano'nal u paropparam hou-hdubhavan Dabassa ya kammassa ya Goyama i biyam-kuranam va. 117 (1665) [santAno'nAdistu parasparaM hetu-hetubhAvAt / dehasya ca karmaNazca gautama / bIjA-'Gkharayoriva // 117 // (1665) Santano'nadistu parasparam h@tu-hetubhavat i Dahasya ca karmanasca Gautama ! bija'nkurayoriva. 117 (1665)] Trans.- 117 And O Gautama ! as Karman and body are naturally related as the causes of each other like seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. (1665). If the relation of Karman with body is eternal, how can the existence of jiva be established ? to kamma-sarIrANaM kattAraM krnn-kjbhaavaao| paDivaja tadanbhahiaM daMDa-ghaDANaM kulAlaM va // 118 // (1666) atthi sarIravihAyA painiyayAgArao ghaDasseva / akkhANaM ca karaNao daMDAINaM kulAlo vva // 119 // (1667) athiMdiyavisayANaM aayaannaadeybhaavo'vssN|| kammAra ivAdAyA loe saMDAsa-lohANaM // 120 // (1668) bhottA dehAINaM bhojjattaNao naro vva bhattassa / saMghAyAittaNao asthi ya atthI gharasseva // 121 // (1669) jo kattAi sa jIvo sajjhaviruddho tti te maI honaa| muttAipasagAo taM no saMsAriNI doso // 122 // (1670) To kamma-sartranam kattaram karana-kajjabhavan Padivajja tadabbhahiam danda-ghadanam kulalam va. 118 (1666)

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: 164 : Jinabhadra Gaai's [The third [aa: -Atat: sale aru-parrarara i pratipadyakha tadabhyadhikaM daNDa-ghaTayoH kulAlamiva // 118 // (1666). Tatah karma-sarirayoh kartaram karana-karyabhavati Pratipadyasva tadabbyadhikam danda-ghetayoh kulalamiva. (118)] Trans.-118 So, like a potter (to be distinct) from danda and ghata, know the creator of Karman and sarira to be distinct from both on account of the existence of cause and effect. ( 1666) 119. (1667) Vide verse 1567. 120. ( 1668 ) Vide verse 1568. 121. (1669) Vide verse 1569. 122. (1670) Vide verse 1570. Since all objects are ksanika according to Buddhistic theory, an opponent may argue here that jiva vanishes with body and hence it is no use trying to prove that Soul is different from body. The Acarya refutes this argument as follows:jAissaro na vigao saraNAo bAlajAisaraNo vva / jaha vA sadesavataM naro saraMto videsammi // 123 // (1671) Jaissaro na vigao saranao balajaisarano vyal Jaha va saddsavattam nero saranto videsammi, 129 (1671) [jAtisaro na vigataH smaraNAd bAlajAtisaraNa iva / yathA vA khadezavRttaM naraH smaran videze // 123 // (1671) Jatismaro na vigatah smaranad bala-jati-smarana iva i Yatha va svadesavritam narah smaran videse. 129 (1671)) Trans.--123 Like a person recollecting (his) childhood in old age) or recolleciing in a foreign country the incident, ( that happened ) in his own country, the Soul who recollects the former existence, does not perish by virtue of its power of ) recollection. (1671)

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Vada] Ganadharavada 165: TIkA-iha yo jAtasaro jIvaH sa prAgbhavikazarIravigame'pi sati na vigata iti pratijJA / 'saraNAu tti' maraNAditi hetuH| yathA bAlajAtI bAlajanmani vRttaM smaratIti bAlajAtisaraNo vRddha iti dRssttaantH| yathA vA, khadeze mAlavakamadhyadezAdau vRttaM videze'pi gato naraH saran na vigtH| idamuktaM bhavati-yo'nyadeza-kAlAdhanubhUtamarthaM sarati so'vinaSTo dRSTaH, yathA bAlakAlAnubhUtAnAmarthAnAmanusaH vRddhAdyavasthAyAM devdttH| yastu vinaSTo nAsau kizcidanusmarati, yathA janmAnantaramevoparataH / na ca pUrvapUrvakSaNAnubhUtamAhitasaMskArA uttarottarakSaNAH sarantIti vaktavyam, pUrva-pUrvakSaNAnAM sarvaniranvayavinAzena sarvathA vinaSTatvAt , uttarottarakSaNAnAM sarvathA'nyatvAt / na cAnyAnubhUtamanyo'nusmarati, devadattAnubhUtasya yajJadattAnusaraNaprasaGgAditi // 123 // (1671) D. C.--Here, the proposition is that tho Soul that remembers former existence, cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body, by virtue of its smaragasakti. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recolleots in & foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country, does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing, 80, also, the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place, is vidyamana (existing) like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But, if he be only the anusmarta nothing can be recolted in the next life, as he himself is not alive in that existence. Again, it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments, as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later 'ones disappear.

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: 166: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third Lastly, one can never remember the cxperience of another. If it were so Yajnadatta would be able to remember the experience of Devadatta. aha mannasi khaNio vi hu sumarai vinnaannsNtigunnaao| tahavi sarIrAdaNNo siddho viNNANasaMtANo // 124 // (1672) Aha mannasi khanio vi hu sumarai vinnanasantaigunao i Tabavi suriradanno siddho vinnanasantano. 124 (1672) [ atha manyase kSaNiko'pi khalu sarati vijJAnasaMtatiguNAt / tathApi zarIrAdanyaH siddho vijnyaansNtaanH|| 124 // (1672) Atha mangasd ksaniko'pi khalu smarati vijaanasantatigunati Tatbapi sarfradanyah siddho vijnanasantanah. 124 (1672) ___ Trans.-124 Again, if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers (the former existence ) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body. ( 1672 ) TIkA-athaivaM manyase tvam-kSaNiko'pi kSaNabhaGguro'pi jIvaH pUrvavRttAntaM saratyeva / kutaH ? ityAha-vijJAnAnAM vijJAnakSaNAnAM saMtatiH saMtAnastasyA guNastatsAmarthyarUpastamAditi, kSaNasaMtAnasyAvasthitatvAt kSaNanazvaro'pi maratItyarthaH / atrottaramAha-nanu tathApyevamapi sati jJAnalakSaNasantAnasyAvetanazarIrasaMkrAnterbhavAntarasadbhAvaH sidhyati, sarvazarIrebhyazca vijJAnasaMtAnasyesthamarthAntaratA sAdhitA bhavati, avicchinnavijJAnasantAnAtmakazcaivaM zarIrAdarthAntarabhUta AtmA siddho bhavatIti / tadevaM parabhavamaGgIkRtyAvinaSTasmaraNamAveditam // 124 // (1672) D. C."-Vayubhuti.-Even though the Soul is ksayika, it is able to remember the incidents of former life, because of the continuous range of the moments of vijnana. The Acerya:-Even in that oase, the continuous range of

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Vida ] Ganadbararada :167: knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life. Thus, vijnanasantana is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently, the Soul that contains this vijnanasantana would also be distin guished from body. In this way, indestructibility of Soul, is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also. na ya savvaheva khaNi nANaM puyovlddhsrnnaao| khaNio na saraha bhUyaM jaha jammANaMtaravinaTTho // 125 // (1673) Na ya savvaheve khaniyam nanam purvovaladd hasaranad i Khanis na sarai bhayam jaha jammanantaravinattho. 125 (1673) [ na ca sarvathaiva kSaNikaM jJAnaM pUrvopalabdhasaraNAt / kSaNiko na sarati bhUtaM yathA jnmaanntrvinssttH|| 125 // (1673) Na ca sarvathaiva ksanikam jnanam purvopalabdhagmaranat i Ksaniko na smarati bhatam yatha janmanantaravinastah. (1673)] Trans.--125 Or (ca), knowledge is not absolutely indurable (ksanika) by (virtue of the power of ) recollecting an object apprehended in the past. (For), one that is ksanika is, like an object, perished after its very birth, not able to remember the past. (1673) TIkA-na ca sarvathaiva kSaNikaM jJAnaM vaktuM yujyate / kathazcittu kSaNikatAM bhagavAnapIcchatyeva, iti "sarvathaiva" ityuktam / kasmAt punarjJAnaM na kSaNikam ? ityAha--pUrvopalabdhasya bAlakAlAdhanubhUtasyArthasya vRddhatvAdyavasthAyAmapi smaraNadarzanAt / na caitadekAntakSaNikatve styuppdyte| kutaH ? ityAha"khaNioi tyAdi" yaH kSaNiko nAyaM bhUtamatItaM smarati, yathA janmAnantaravinaSTaH, ekAntakSaNikaM ceSyate jJAnam , ata; saraNAbhAvaprasaGga iti // 125 // (1673)

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Jinabhadra Grani's [ The third entirely ksanika knowledge were no recognition D. C.-Jnana sbould never be said to be It may be ksanika to a certain extent. For, if taken to be absolutely transient, there would be in old age of objects perceived in childhood, as in the case of one who is perished after its birth. Ultimately smarana will not exist at all even if jnana were taken to be ksanika in every way. : 168: And there is another difficulty also, jassegame gabaMdhaNamegaMteNa khaNiyaM ya viSNANaM / savvakhaNiyaviNNANaM tassAjuttaM kadAcidavi // 126 // (1674) Jassegamegaband hanamegantena khaniyam ya vinnanam | Savvakhaniyavinnanam tassajuttam kadacidavi. 156 ( 1674) [yasyaikamekavannamekAntena kSaNikaM ca vijJAnam / sarvakSaNikavijJAnaM tasyAyuktaM kadAcidapi // 126 // (1674) Yasyaikamekabandhanamekantena ksanikam ca vijnanam | Sarvaksanikavijnanam tasyayuktam kadacidapi. 126 ( 1674 ) ] Trans. -- 126. It is never reasonable to accept vijnana (of an object) as vijnana having all-pervading ksanikata, as it is -one independant vijnana exclusively connected with one moment (1674). 66 TIkA -yasya vAdino baudhasya ' ekavijJAnasaMtatayaH saccAH' iti vacanAdekamevAsahAyaM jJAnaM tasya ' sarvamapi vastu kSaNikam' ityevaMbhUtaM vijJAnaM kadAcidapi na yuktamiti saMbandhaH / iSyate ca sarvakSaNikatAvijJAnaM saugataiH, " yat sat tat sarva kSaNikam " tathA kSaNikAH sarvasaMskArAH " ityAdivacanAt / etaca kSaNikatAgrAhakajJAnasyaikatve na saMbhavatyeva / yadi hi trilokItalagataiH sarvairapi kSaNikeH padArthaiH puraH sthitvA tadekaM vijJAnaM janyetaM, tadA tadevajAnIyAd yaduta - " kSaNikAH sarve'pyamI padArthAH" iti / na caivaM sarvairapi vaistajanyate / kutaH ? ityAha - ' egabaMdhaNaM ti' yasmAdekameva

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Vada ] Ganadharavada ..169 pratiniyataM bandhanaM nivandhanamAlambanaM yasya tadekavandhanaM jJAnam , ataH kathamazeSavastustomavyApinI kSaNikatAmavabudhyeta ? / api ca, ekAlambanatve'pi yadyazeSapadArthaviSayANAmapi jJAnAnAM yugapadutpattiriSyate, AtmA ca tadarthAnusmartA, tadA syAdazeSapadArthakSaNikatAparijJAnam / na cAzeSArthagrAhakAnekajJAnAnAM yugapadutpattiriSyate / kiJca, tadekamapyekArthaviSayamapi ca vijJAnaM sarvapadArthagatAM kSaNikatAmajJAsyadeva yadyutpattyanantaradhvaMsi nAbhaviSyat / avinAzitve hi tadavasthitatayopaviSTaM sadanmamanyaM cArthamutpattyanantaramuparamantaM dRSTvA " sarvamevAsmadvarjamasmatsajAtIyavarja ca vastukSaNikameva" ityavabudhyeta, na caitadasti / kutaH ? ityAha-" egaMteNa khaNiyaM ceti" yasya ca bauddhasyaikAntena kSaNika kSaNadhvaMsyeva vijJAnaM, na punazcirAvasthAyi, tasya kathaM sarvavastugatakSaNikatAparijJAnaM syAt / tasmAdakSaNikameva pramAjJAnameSTavyam / tacca guNatvAdanurUpaM guNinamAtmAnamantareNa na sNbhvti| ataH siddhaH zarIrAd vyatirikta Atmeti // 126 / / (1674) D. C.-According to the theory that there is one and only one continuous range of vijnana to all living beings, the Bauddhas believe that vijnana is oka (one ) and asahaya ( independent), and hence, it can never recognize all objects, as all objects would become ksanika according to that theory. Saugatas (Bauddhas), however, try to establish sarvaksanikatavijnana by the help of statements such as "all that exists is ksanika" and " all samskaras, are ksamika" etc. Now, jhana having all-pervading ksanikta is not possible at all. For, if one were able to produce such jfana in presence of all objects in the universe, then only it could be apprehended that all these objects are ksanika. But joana oould never be produced by means of all those objects in that manner. For, how could ksanikata extended to all objects, be recognized when jnana resorts to one and only one alambana? In such cases, if all jnanas of all objects were taken to have been produced at the same time, and if atman were accepted as the anusmarta of 22

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: 170: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third all such jnanas, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of ali objects. But simultaneous production of jnana as regards all objects, is never possible, and hence, the apprehension of sarvaksaniktavijnana is also impossible. Again, if vijnana of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend sarvaksanikata. For, in that case, vijnana being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that 'every thing except us and those of our class, is ksanika. "But that is not possible. For, according to Buddhistic theory, knowledge being exclusively ksanika, cannot last for a long time, and hence it is not possible to apprehend ksanikta in save of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as a-ksanika. This being a guna, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz., atman, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body. 66 L jaM savisayaniyayaM ciya jammANaMtarahayaM ca taM kiha Nu / mAhiti subahupaviSNANavisa yastvayabhaMgayAINi // 127 // (1675) Jam savisayaniyayam ciya jammanantarahayam ca tam kiha nu Nahiti subahuyavinnanavisayakhayabhangayatni? 127 (1675) [ yad svaviSayaniyatameva janmAntarahataM ca tat kathaM nu / jJAsyati subahukavijJAnaviSayakSayabhaGgakAdIni ? // 127 // (1675) Yad svavisayaniyatameva janmantarahatam ca tat katham nu | Jasyati subahukavijnanavisayaksaya bhangakadtni? 127 (1675)] Trans.-127 How could that (knowledge) which is restricted to its own self and scope, and which vanishes soon after its birth, understand qualities such as indurability etc., pertaining to the scope of vijnana ? (1675).

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Thica ] Ganadharavacta : 171 TIkA-yat svaviSayamAnaniyataM janmAnantarahataM ca pramoda vijJAnaM tamanaM apahavijJAnaviSayagatAn kSaNabhaMga-nirAtmakatva-sukhi-duHkhitAdIn dhAna zAsyati na kathazcidityarthaH / / 127 / / (1675) ___D. C.-Pramatri jnana (authentic knowledge) is restricted to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after its own production. So, it could never understand a number of attributes e.g., transitoriness, subjectivity, and sense al happiness, misery etc., related to the subject of vijnana, gihijja savvabhaMgaM jai ya maI svissyaannumaannaao| taM pi na jao'NumANaM juttaM sattAisiddhIo // 128 // (1676) Ginbijja savvabhangam jai pa mat sevisayanumanao Tam pi na jao'pumapam juttam sattuisiddhi8. 128 (1676) [gRhNIyAt sarvabhaGgaM yadi ca matiH svaviSayAnumAnAt / tadapi na yato'numAnaM yuktaM sattAdisiddhau // 128 // (1676) Grihniyat sarvabhangam yadi a matik svavisayanumanat i. Tadapi na yato'numanam yuktam sattadisiddhau, 123 (1674)] Trans.--128 Again, it is not even proper to believe that vijnana apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of inference from its own self and scope. Because, anumang is proper only with regard to the establishment of existence etc. (1676). . TIkA-yadi ca parasyaivaMbhUtA matiH syAd yaduta ekamapi-ekAlambanamapi kSaNikamapi ca pramAna vijJAnaM sarvavastu gatakSaNabhaGgaM gRhNIyAt / kutaH / ityAha-svaviSayAnumAnAt / patadukkaM bhavati-yasmAvayamasmadinamaH kSaNikaH, ahaM ca kSaNanazvararUpam, tato vijJAnasAmyAdanyAnyapi vizAlmaki kSaNikAni, viSayasAmyAcAnye'pi viSayAH sarve'pi kSaNikA, ityevaM saMca viSayAzca skhaviSayAstadanumAnAt sarvasyApi vastustomasya vaNikatvAdi gRkhte| atra dUSaNamAha-"taM pItyAdi" tadapi na yuktaM na ghaTamAnakam / kataH vyAha

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: 112: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third yatastat svaviSayAnumAnamanyeSAM vijJAnAnAmanyaviSayANAM ca pakSIkRtAnAM sattAdi prasiddhAveva yujyate / nahi satvenApyaprasiddhezarmiNi kSaNikatAdidharmaH sAdhyamAno vibhraajte| ko hi nAma zabdAdiSvAdAveva satvenApratIteSu kRtakatvAdinAnityatvAdidharmAna sAdhayati, "tatra pakSaH prasiddhodharmI" ityaadivcnaat| na cedamekamekAlambanaM kSaNikaM ca jJAnametad voDhuM zaknoti yaduta-anyajJAnAni santi, tadviSayAzca vidyante, teSAM ca viSayANAM svaviSayajJAnajananasvabhAvAdaya evaM bhUtA dharmAHsantIti / etadaparijJAne ca kathameteSAM kSaNikatAM sAdhayiSyati, dharmiNa evAprasiddheH / ___ syAdetat, svaviSayAnumAnAdevAnyavijJAnAdisattApi setsyatyeva, tathAhi-yathA'hamasmi tathAnyAnyapi jJAnAni santi, yathA ca madviSayo vidyate, evamanye'pi jJAnaviSayA vidyanta eva; yathA cAhaM madviSayazca kSaNikaH, evamanyajJAnAni tadviSayAzca kSaNikA eveti, evaM sarveSAM satvaM kSaNikatA ca svaviSayAnumAnAdeva setsyatIti / etadapyayuktam, yataH sarvakSaNikatAgrAhaka jJAnaM kSaNanazvaratvAvanmAntaraM "mRta ivAhamasmi, kSaNikaM ca" ityevamAtmAnamapi nAvabudhyate, anyaparijJAnaM tu tasya dUrotsAritameva / kiJca, tat svaviSayamAtrasyApi kSaNikatAM nAvagacchati, samAnakAlameva dvayorapi vinaSTatvAt / yadi hi svaviSayaM vinazyantaM dRSTvA tatadgatakSaNikatA nizcitya svayaM pazcAt kAlAntare tad vinazyet , tadA syAt tasya svaviSayakSaNikatApratipattiH, na caitadasti, jJAnasya viSayasya ca nijanijakSaNaM janayitvA samAnakAlameva vinAzAbhyupagamAt / na ca svasaMvedanapratyakSeNa vA kSaNikatA gRhyata iti saugatairiSyate, anumAnagamyatvena tasyAstairabhyupagamAditi // 128 // (1676) D. C.-An opponent may advance the following objection in this case Pramatrivijnana though ksanika and resorting to only one alambana, is able to recognize ksaaikata of its own self as well as sphere. For, just as the knowledge that we are ksanika as our visaya is ksanika, is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as ksanika,

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 173: The argument stated above is not correct. Svavisaya. numana can be appied only in case of establishing the the existence eto. of other vijnanas and visayas, and not otherwise. Just as in case of sabda etc., which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like anityata by reason of their pere constructive utility; so, in this case also, properties like ksanikata, could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all. Moreover, vijnana which is said to be ksanika and skalam-- bana, is not able to understand whether there are other jnanas and visayas, and whether those jnanas and visayas possess the property of producing jnana of its own self and sphere. So, if such 'jnana could not be produced and if the objects in which ksanikata is to be established, are not known, how could ksanikta be proved to exist at all ? At this point, the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other vijnanas could be established by the help of sva visayanumana. One would say in this case that " Just as I exist and my visaya exists, other jnanas and their visayas also exist, and just as I and my visaya are ksanika, other jnanas and their visayas are also ksanika." Thus, existence, as well as, ksanikata of all the objects could easily be established. The above objection is entirely fallacious. Jiana which apprebends sarvaksapikata is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on nocount of its being ksanika-as good as dead. Thus, when it is not able to recognise its own self, how can it perceive that there are other jnanas and their visayas also ? Such indurable jnana does not recognize ksanikata of its own visaya, because, according to them, that jnana and visaya vanish within equally short time. If that jnana ascertains the ksanikata of its own visaya from its disappearance within a short time before the jnana itself dies away, then and then only would the ksanikata of its

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:174: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third visaya be recognized by it. But this argument is not accepted by Bauddlias. They believe that jnana and its visaya disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment. Moreover, according to Saugatas, ksanikata is recognized neither by means of self-perception, nor by the help of percep. tion by sense-organs, but by means of anumana only. jANejja vAsaNA u sA vi hu vAsitta-vAsaNijvANaM / juttA sameca doNhaM na u jammANaMtarahayassa // 129 // (1677) Janejja yasana u sa vi hu vasitta-vasanijjanam I Jutta sambcca donham na u jammayantarabayassa. 129 (1677) [jAnIyAt vAsanA tu sApi khalu vAsi-vAsanIyayoH / yuktA sametya dvayona tu janmAnantarahatasya // 129 / / (1677) Janiyat vasana tu sapi khalu vasi-vasaniyayoh I Yukta samatya dva yorna tu janmanantarahatsya. 129 (1677)] Trans.-129 Again, (the opponent might argue that) desire could understand sarvaksanikata;, but that also is in fact proper (only) because it is related to both-one that desires and the desired (object), and not in case of that which vanishes soon after (its birth ). (1677). TIkA-syAdetat pUrvapUrvavijJAnakSaNairuttarovijJAnakSaNAMnAmevabhUtA vAsanA janyate, yayA'nyavijJAna-tadviSayANAM sattva-kSaNikatAdIm dharmAnekamekAlambanaM kSaNikamapi ca vijJAnaM jAnAti, ataH sarvakSaNikatAjJAnaM saugatAnA na vidhyate / tadapyayuktam, yataH sApi vAsanA vAsaka-vAsanIyayoddhayorapi sametya saMyujya vidyamAnayoreva yuktA, na tu janmAntarameva itasya vinaSTasya / vAsya-vAsakayozca saMyogenAvasthAne kssnniktaahaaniprsaaH| kizva, sApi vAsanA kSaNikA, akSaNikA vaa| kSaNikatve kathaM tadvazAt sarvakSaNikatAparijJAnam ? / akSaNikatve tu pratijJAhAniriti // 129 / / (1677) D. C.--Here again, the opponents may argue that the

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ada ] Gangadharavada : 175: earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire, even a ksanika vijnana having only one support is able to apprehend other jnanas and their visayas having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no barm in believing that all objects are ksanika. But even that is not correct. For vasana in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to vasaka and vasaniya; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the avasthana (retention ) of vasya and vasaka connected together, ksanikata itself would not exist. And, is that yasana ksanika or a-ksanika ? If it were ksanika, it would not be able to apprebend sarvaksanikata; and if it were a-ksanika, the very proposition that everything is ksanika would be violated. So, the theory of Bauddhas that everything is ksanika does not fit in, in any way. Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the Acarya now illustrates his own. bahuviNNANappabhavo jugvmnnegtthyaa'hvegss| Pepperrotaret at yufanitari ar 1183011 (866) viNNANavaNaviNAse dosA icAdayo pasajvati / na u ThiyasaMbhUyaccuyaviNNANamayammi jIvammi // 131 // (1679) tassa vicittAvaraNakhaovasamajAI cittruuvaaii| khaNiyANi ya kAlaMtaravittINi ya mahavihANAI // 132 // (1680) Bahuvinnanappabhavo jugavamapogatthaya'havegassa i Vipnanavattha va paquccavittivighao va. 130 (1678) Vimpanakbanavinaad dosa icaadayo pasajjanti . . . Na on thiyambhuyaccuyavinpanamayammi jivammi. 191 (1679)

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Jinabhadra Gani's Tassa vicittavaranakhaovasamajaim cittaruvaim | Khaniyani ya kalantaravittini ya maivihanaim 132 (1680) : 176: [ The third [ bahuvijJAnaprabhavo yugapadanekArthatA'thavaikasya / vijJAnAvasthA vA pratItyavRttivighAto vA // 130 // (1678) vijJAnakSaNavinAze doSA ityAdayaH prasajanti / na tu sthita saMbhUtacyutavijJAnamaye jIve / / 131 / / (1679) tasya vicitrAvaraNakSayopazamajAni citrarUpANi / kSaNikAni ca kAlAntaravRttIni ca matividhAnAni // 132 // (1680) Bahuvijnans prabhavo yugapadanekarthata'thavaikasya | Vijnanavastha va pratityavrittivighato va. 130 ( 1678) Vijnanaksanavinase dosa ityadayah prasajanti | Na_tu_sthitasambhutacyutavijnnanamaye jtve. 181 ( 1679) Tasya vicitravaranaksayoposamajani citrarupani | Ksanikani ca kalantaravrittini ca matividhanani. 132 (1680) ] Trans. -- 130-131-132 If vijnana were taken to be ksana vinasi a number of faults such as production of many vijnanas, yielding more than one meaning at a time, or, one yielding more than one meaning at a time, retention ( avastha) of vijtana, violation of the law of cause and effect etc. would arise. This would not happen only in case of jiva, having vijtana which is sthita ( settled ), sambhuta (born ), and cyuta ( dropped), being accepted. (For), it manifests various (types of) intellectual forms that are born of various types of diminutions and relaxations that are ksanika, as well as, permanent. (1678-1679-1680). TIkA - tadevaM vijJAnasya pratikSaNaM vinAze'bhyupagamyamAne ityAdayo doSAH prasajanti / ke punaste doSAH 1 ityAha- " bahuviSNANetyAdi " ityevaM saMbandhaH / kSaNanaHzvaravijJAnavAdinA bhuvanatrayAntarvartisarvArthagrahaNArthaM yugapadeva bahUnAM jJAnAnAM prabhava utpAdo'bhyupagantavyaH, tadAzrayabhUtatra taduSTAnAma

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Vida ] Ganadharavada :17: thAnAmanusmA'vasthita AtmA'bhyupagantavyaH, anyathA " yat sat tat sarva kSaNikam" "kSaNikAH sarve saMskArAH" nirAtmAnaH sarve bhAvAH" ityAdi sarvakSaNikatAdivijJAnaM nopapadyeta, tadabhyupagame ca svmttyaagprsktiH| athavA, kSaNikaM vijJAnamicchataikassapi vijJAnasya yugapadanekArthatA-sarvabhavanAntargatArthagrAhitA'bhyupagantavyA, yena sarvakSaNikatAdivijJAnamupapadyate, na caitadiSyate, dRzyate vaa| "viNNANAvasthA va tti" yadivA, avasthAnamavasthA, vijJAnasyAvasthA vijJAnAvasthA'bhyupagantavyA bhavati / idamuktaM bhavati-vijJAnasyAnalpakalpAgrazo'vasthAnameSTavyam , yena tat sarvadA samAsInamaMnyAnyavastuvinazvaratAM vIkSamANaM sarvakSaNikatAmavagacchediti sarva prAgevoktameva / evaM cAbhyupagame vijJAnasaMjJAmAtraviziSTaAtmaivAbhyupagato bhavati / ___ athaitad bahuvijJAnaprabhavAdikaM neSyate, tarhi pratItyavRttivighAta: prAmoti / idamatra hRdayam-kAraNaM pratItyAzritya kAryasya vRttiHpravRttirutpattiriti yAvat, na punaH kAraNa kAryAvasthAyAM kathaJcidapyanveti, ityevaM sauga. tairbhyupgmyte| itthaM caabhyupgmymaane'tiitsmrnnaadismstvyvhaarocchedprsnggH| evaM hi vyavahArapravRttiH syAd yadyatItAnekasaMketAdijJAnAzrayastattadvijJAnarUpeNa pariNAmAdanvayI AtmA'bhyupagamyate / tathAbhyupagame ca sati pratItyavRttyabhyupamavidhAtaH syAditi / nanu yadi vijJAnasya kSaNavinAza ete doSAH prasajanti, tahiM kAmI doSA na bhavanti? ityAha-"na u ThiyetyAdi" na tvamadabhyupagate jIve'bhyupagamyamAna ete-doSAH prasajanti / kathaMbhUte jIve? sthitasaMbhUtacyutavijJAnamaye--kathaJcid dravyarUpatayA sthitam , kathaJcittuttaraparyAyeNa saMbhUtam , kathaJcitpunaH pUrvaparyAyeNa cyutaM vinaSTaM yad vijJAnaM tanmaya ityrthH| tasmAdamumevotpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktaM zarIrAdarthAntarabhUtamasadabhyupagatamAtmAnaM samastavyavahArasiddhaye pratipadyasveti // 130-131 // (1678 -1679) TIkA-matermatijJAnasya vidhAnAni nAnAbhedarUpANi tasya yathoktarUpasyAtmanaH pravartante / kathaMbhUtAni ? ityAha-vicitro yo'sau matijJAnAvaraNakSayopazamastato jAtAni, ata eva khakAraNabhUtakSayopazamavaicitryAd vicitrarUpANi / tathA, paryAyarUpatayA kSaNikAni, dravyarUpatayA tu nityatvAt

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: 178 : Jinabhadra Gapis (The third kAlAntaravRttIni / upalakSaNaM ca matividhAnAni, zrutA-'vadhi-mana:paryAyavidhAnAnyapi yathAsaMkhyaM zrutA-'vadhimanaHparyAyajJAnAvaraNakSayopazamavaicitryAda vicitrarUpANi yathAsaMbhavaM tasya drssttvyaani| kevalajJAnaM tvekamevAvikalpa kevalajJAnAvaraNakSayAdeva draSTavyamiti // 132 // (1680) D. C.-If jnana were taken to be ksanika as stated before, a number of dosas would get in, in the following manner : 1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three worlds should be recognized, a ksaaikata-vadin ought to admit that all sorts of banas are produced at the same time, and the Soul that remembers the objects in which those franas are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Other wise, statements such as "Whatever exists is all ksamika" "Al bhavas are ksanika" eto., that establisbied sarvaksanikata would be futile. Moreover, when more than one jkana are accepted, the original theory of skavijnana santati has also been violated. 2. Again, if ksana vijnana were accepted, another fault would also crop up. In this case, one and the same vijkana would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the three worlds. But this could never happen, nor be believed. 8. In order to recognize 8 number of objects, vijana must be taken to last for a long time. As & , result of this, vijnana would be able to recognize the ksanikata of all, as they are ksanika also. But by believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but vijfana would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition. 4. Again, if the production of many vijnanas were not accepted, there would be. violation of pratityavrtti: When karana is not anyhow apprehended in the etate of 'karya, Bauddhas oall it the violation of pratityavrtti. As the production of a karya depends , upon a karana, this would give rise to dose. If 'Bauddhas were to accept this, o processes suon me that of

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 179: remembering the past incident-etc., would be abolished. Again, if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions etc, were believed to have been related to the parinama in the form of vijnana, then also, the law of pratityavritti would be violated. For, by believing so, the Soul is taken as related to the parinama. Thus, in case vijnana is accepted as ksanika, all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing vijnana which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form, and which has already ceased' to exist as vijnana, the faults ennumerated above would never arise. This proves that atman that has utility, stability, and productivity for the sake of all vyavahara is undoubtedly distinct from body. For, such an atman possesses various matijnana-bhedas produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the matijnana itself. These bhedas are ksanika on account of their wavering nature, and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality. Again, by means of implication, the soul manifests various types of jnana e. g. sruta (ascertained by intellect), avadhi ( applied by intellect), and manahparyaya (mental perception ) etc., are respectively produced from the knowledge ascertained, applied, and perceived by mind. 130-131-132 (1678-1679-1680) The Kavala jnana or Absolute Knowledge is attained only when all its interruptions are warded off. nico saMtANo siM savvAvaraNaparisaMkhae jaM ca / kevalamudiyaM kevala bhAveNANaMtamavigappaM // 133 // (1681) Nicco santaao sim savvavaranaparisamkhad jam ca i Kovalamudiyam kovalabhavenaNGantamavigappam, 133" (1681) [lact: Trana: gat gelateritud tai ogled nararanfeng Il 823 11 (8668)

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: 180: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third Nityah santana dsam sarvavarana parisamksaye yacca i Kevalamuditam kevalabhavananantamavikalpam. 133 (1681)] Trans.---133 They (matijinanadi vidhanas) have a perpet. ual continuance (nitya santana)-in the form of samanyajnanawhich being free from all interruptions, is said to be ananta (endless) and avikalpa (illusionless). Kevala (Absolute) exists "by (virtue of ) its Kevalabhava (absoluteness) (1681). TIkA-"siM ti" eteSAM ca matijJAnAdividhAnAnAmavizeSitajJAnamAtrarUpasaMtAno nityo'vyvcchinnruupH| kevalajJAnaM tvavikalpaM bhedarahitamuditamAkhyAtaM bhagavadbhiH yataH sarvasyApi nijAvaraNasya kSaya eva tdupjaayte| ato'vikalpaM kevalabhAvenAnantakAlAvasthAyitvAt , anantArthaviSayatvAcAnantamiti // 133 / / (1681) D. C.-The avisasitajnana or samanyajnana of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc. But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be ananta and avikalpa by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all avaranas. Thus Kovalajnana is avikalpa (i. e. positive and illusionless ) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object ( anan. tartha). 1681. Here again Vayubhuti raises a doubt, and the 7Irthankura removes it... so jai dehAdanno to pavisaMto va nissaraMto vA / kIsa na dIsaha, goyama! duvihA'Nuvaladdhi u sA ya // 134 // (1682) So jai debadanno to pavisanto va nissaranto vai Kisa na disai, Goyama duviba'nuvaladdhi u sa ya. 134 (1682) [sa yadi devAdanyastataH pravizan vA niHsaran vaa| kasmAd na dRzyate, gautama ! dvividhA'nupalabdhistu sA ca // 134 // (1682) Sa yadi dehadanyastatah pravisan va nihsaran vai Kasmad nadrsyate Gautamalavividhanupalabdhistusa ca, 134/1683)

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Vida] Ganadharavada :181 asao kharasaMgassa va sao vi dUrAibhAvao'bhihiyA! muhumA-'muttattaNao kammANugayassa jIvassa // 135 // (1683) Asao kharagangassa va sao vi duraibhavao bhihiya i Suhuma'mattattapas kammanugayassa jivassa. 135 (1683) [asataH kharazRGgasyeva sato'pi duuraadibhaavto'bhihitaa| sUkSmA'mUrtatvataH karmAnugatasya jIvasya // 135 / / (1683) Asatah kharasrngasydva sato'pi duradibhavato'bhihita i Sukona'murtatvatah karmanugatsya jivasya. 135 (1683) ] Trans.- 134-135 If the Soul is different from body, how is it that it is not perceived while entering ( the body ). or issuing forth (from it)? But again, O. Gautama ! non-perception (anupalabdhi) is of two types :-1. Non-perception of a non-existent object like a kharasrnga and 2. Non-perception of an existent object by reason of its distance etc. Non-perception of the Soul which is karmanugata is due to its exquisite formlessness (saksma'murtatva) (1682-1683). TIkA-yadi nAma zarIrAdanyo'sau jIvastato ghaTe caTaka iva zarIre pravizan niHsaran vA kimiti nopalabhyate ? / bhagavAnAha-"goyametyAdi" yato dvividhA'nupalabdhirasti, atastasyAnupalabdheH kAraNAd gautama ! jIvo na dRzyate / kathaM punaH sA'nupalabdhidikSiA ? ityAha-sA cAnupalandherekA'sato bhavati, yathA kharazRGgasya / dvitIyA tu sato'pyarthasya bhavati / kutaH ? ityAha-dUrAdibhAvAditi, dUrAt sannapyartho na dRzyate, yathA svargAdiH, AdizandAt-atisaMnikarSAt , ati saukSmyAt, mano'navasthAnAva, indriyApATavAt , matimAndyAta, azakyatvAt , AvaraNAt , abhibhavAt , sAmAnyAt , anupayogAt, anupAyAt, vismRteH, durAgamAt, mohAt , vidarzanAt , vikArAt, akriyAtaH, anadhigamAt , kAlavibhakarSAva, svabhAvaviprakarSAceti / tatrAtisaMnikarSAva sambhapyartho nopalabhyate, yathA netr-dkssikaa-pkssmaadiH|

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The third atisaukSmyAt paramANvAdiH / mano'navasthAnAt, sato'pyanupalabdhiryathA naSTacetasAm / indriyApATavAt kiJcidvadhirAdInAm / matimAndyAdanupalabdhiH satAmapi sUkSmazAstrArthavizeSANAm / azakyatvAt svakarNa-kRkATikA mastakapRSThAdInAm / AvaraNAd hastAdisthagitalocanAnAM kaTakuvyAdyAvRttAnAM vA / abhibhavAt prasRtasUratejasi divase tArakANAm sAmAnyAt sUpalakSitasyApi mASAdeH samAnajAtIyamASAdirAzipatitasyApratyabhijJAnAt sato'pyanupalabdhiH / anupayogAd rUpopayuktasya zeSaviSayANAm / anupAyAt zRGgAdibhyo gomahiSyAdipayaHpariNAmajijJAsoH / vismRteH pUrvopalabdhasya / durAgamAd durupaMdezAt tatpratirUpakarItikAdivipralambhitamateH kanakAdInAM satAmapyanupalabdhiH / mohAt satAmapi jIvAditaccAnAm / vidarzanAt sarvathA'ndhAdInAm vArdhakyAdivikArAd bahuzaHpUrvopalabdhasya sato'pyanupalabdhiH / akriyAto bhUkhananAdikriyA'bhAvAd vRkSamUlAdInAmanupalabdhiH / anadhigamAt zAstrAzravaNAt tadarthasya sato'pyanupalabdhiH / kAlaviprakarSAd bhUtabhaviSyadRSabhadevapadmanAmatIrthakarAdInAmanupalabdhiH / svabhAvaviprakarSAd nabhaH pizAdInAmanupa lmbhH| tadevaM satAmapyarthAnAmekaviMzatividhA'nupalabdhiH pravartate / ato'sya karmAnugatasya saMsAriNo jIvasyA'mUrtatvAd nabhasa iva, kArmaNasya tu saukSmyAt paramANovi sato'nupalabdhiH, nAsataH / kathaM punaretajjhAyate - nAsata Atmano SnupalabdhiH, kintu sataH 1 iti cet / ucyate-- anumAnaistatsattvasya sAdhitatvAditi // 134 -135 / / (1682-1683) I : 182: D. C. -Vayubhuti-- If this soul is different from body, how is it that it is not seen entering or issuing forth from the body like a cataka (sparrow ) from a ghata ( vessel ) ? Bhagavan-Because of the two-fold anupalabdhi, O Gautama! the Soul is not perceived. These two types are - ( 1 ) Anupalabdhi of a non-existent object e. g. a kharasrnga (horn of an ass) and (2) Anupalabdhi of an existent object. Now, for the non-perception of an existent object, there are twenty-one reasons. i. Atiduratva (Extreme remoteness )-Places like svarga,

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det: But as they are extremely remote, they are not Vada ] Ganadharavada : 188 : do exist. But as they are extremely remote, they are not perceivable. i. Atisannikarsa (Close vicinity )-Certain objects like eye lashes and secretion of eyes, though existent, cannot be seen on account of their close vicinity. ji. Atisauksmya (Exquisite fineness )-Paramanus are im perceptible, because they are exquisitely fine. These paramanus are so minute in form, that they are not perceptible even to the naked eye, even though they are considered to be existent. Mandnavasthana (Instability of mind )-Sometimes even & murta object is not apprehended by reason of mano navasthana or the instability of mind, as in the case of an insane man. v. Indriyapatatva (Dullness of senses ) -Non-perception arises also when a sense or senses are benumbed e. g. a deaf man. vi. Matimandya (Dullness of intellect )-Certain subtleties of the sastras are always anupalabhya to a dull-witted . man, due to his manimandya. vii. Asakyatva ( Impossibility )-One can never see his own ear, head, or back, as it is utterly impossible to do so. riji. Avarana (Obstruction |-When eyes are covered with hands or when hands are obscured by means of a mat or a wall, it is avarana that causes non-perception. iz, Abhibhava (Predominance )-Predominance of Sun in the sky, makes the stars anupalabhya on a sun-bright day. Samanya-( Commonness ) When beans are niixed with beans of the same quality, there is non-aprehension of beans owing to the samanyatva present in both.

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: 184: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third xi. Anupayoga i Lack of Attention - When an object is touched by a particular indriya, say, Rupa (the sense of eye ), it is not perceived by the rest of senses because of of their anupayoga to the object. xii. Anupaya ( Want of Means - If a person wants to take an estimate of milk (contained ) in a cow or a buffalo by means of srnga eto., he can never do so, because there is no such means available. idi. Vismrti ( Forgetfulness -An object perceived before, becomes anupalabhya afterwards by reason of vismrti. . Duragama--( Wrong Instruction -When an object like gold is presented in the style of a forged edict, it is not recognized in its true form, because there is durupadesa or wrong instruction as regards its form. XV. Moha ( Delusion )-Objects like Jiva do exist, but they are not perceived due to moha ( on the part of those who try to perceive them ). Ivi. Vidarsana ( Absence of Sight is the absolute cause of anupalabdhi in the case of blind persons. cvii. Vikara (Loss of Health Mostly, it 80 happens that things that are once perceived are not apprehended in later life on account of vikaras like vardhakya (old age ) eto. sviii. Akriya (Want' of Action There is non-perception of roots of trees because of the scarcity of actions like bhukhanana eto. xix. Anadhigama (Non-soquisition Owing to the anadhi gama of sastrasravana, the meaning of Sastras becomes incomprehensible. XX. Kala viprakarsa (Remoteness of Time )-Rsabhadeya and other Tirthankaras of the past, and Padma Nabha of future anngot be recognized due to the remoteness of time.

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Vida ] Gapadharavada : 185 : i. Syabhavaviprakarsa (Natural Remoteness )--Things like nabhas and pisat ure non-cognizible by reason of their svabhavaviprakarsch In this way, anupalabdhi of an existent object takes place in twenty-one different ways. So, Jiva is insperceptible like nabhas due to its amurtata; and sartra being an assemblage of the Karman paramanus is anupalabhya because of sauksmya of & paramanu. Thus, non-perception of the Soul and body, is positively the non-perception of an existent object and not of a nonezistent one. An argument may here be advanced that "If you take Atman to be existent, how do you apprehend its existence ?" The reply is : The existence of Atman is established by means of anumana. And hence, its anupalabdhi is not the anupalabdhi of a non-existent object like a kharabriga, but it is the anupalabdhi of an existent object like nabhas and paramapu. Then, the distinction of Soul from body is established by the help of Vadavacana. dehANaNNe va jie jamaggihottAI saggakAmassa / veyavihiyaM vihaNNai dANAiphalaM ca loyammi // 136 // (1684) Dahanaane va jie jamaggihottaim saggakamassa * V@yavihiyam vibannai danaiphalam ca oa loyammi. 196 (1684) | The word Pisa=ruru, a kind of deer according to Sayanacarya. The deer is called Pisa probably because it is Pisa (reddish) in colour. The anupalabdhi of the Pisa deer may be taken to be due to its nature of being always far away from human habitations. The word, however, seems rather improper when placed with nabhas, If we road pisaca instead of Pisa, it would suit our purpose better.--Tr.

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: 186: Jinabhadra Gayl's [The thira [dehAnanye vA jIve yadamihotrAdi svargakAmasya / vedavihitaM vihanyate dAnAdiphalaM ca loke // 136 // (1684) Dahananye va jtvd yadagnihotradi gvargakamasya i Vedavihitam vihanyata danadiphalam on loke. 136 (1684)] ___ Trans.--136 Or, if ytva is (believed to be) identical with deha (the body), then, (obstruction of the) rites like agnihotra (the worship of sacred-fire) for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. (danadiphala) in the world prescribed by the Vedas, would be refuted. (1684). TIkA-zarIramAtre jIve sati gautama! yat svargakAmasya vedavihitamagrihotrAdyanuSThAnaM tad vihanyate, dehasya vatinA'traiva bhasmIkaraNAt , jIvAbhAve kasyAsau vargoM bhavet ? iti bhaavH| dAnAdiphalaM cAnubhaviturabhAvAt kasya bhavet ? iti // 136 // (1684) ___D. C.-0 Gautama! If each and every sarira is believed to be identical with jiva, the commandment of the Vedas that a person who desires to attain Salvation, should perform the rites of Agnihotra, would be null and void. Because, when body is reduced to ashes by fire in this world, the Riva being taken to be identical with body is also supposed to have vanished with the body. And then, who would attain Salvation when Jiva itself does not exist ? Similarly, who would be there to enjoy the fruits of good deeds like dana when there would be none to receive them at all! Vayubhuti entertains doubt as regards the distinction of Soul from body by bearing the various Voda-padas bearing contradictory arguments. Bhagavan Mahavira interprets these Veda-padas correctly and olears his doubt.. viNNANaghaNAINaM veyapayANaM tmtthmvidNto| dehANaNNaM manasi tANaM ca payANamayamattho // 130 // (1685)

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Veda] Ganadhararada : 187: Vinnanaghanatnam Vayapayanam tamatthamavidanto Dahanangam mannasi tanam ca payayamayamattho. 187 (1685) [vijJAnadhanAdInAM vedapadAnAM tvamarthamavidan / dehAnanyaM manyase teSAM ca padAnAmayamarthaH // 137 / / (1685) Vijnanaghanadinam Vada-padanam tvamarthamavidan Dahananyam manyasd tesam ca padanamayamarthah. 137 (1686)] Trans.--137 You, not knowing the (real) meaning of sentences like " Vijnanaghana" etc., of the Vedas, think that the Soul is identical with body. But (ca) their real interpre. tation is this.t (1685). TIkA-vijJAnaghanAkhyaH puruSa evAyaM bhUtebhyo'rthAntaramityAdivyAkhyA pUrvavadeva / ata eva prAguktam-" zarIratayA pariNato bhUtasaMghAto'yaM vidyamAnakartRkaH, AdimatpratiniyatAkAratvAt , ghaTavad, yazca tatkartA sa tadatirikto jIvaH" iti / bhUtAriktAtmamatipAdakAni ca vedavAkyAni tavApi pratItAnyeva / tadyathA-"satyena labhyastapasA hyeSa brahmacaryeNa nityaM jyotirmayo vizuddho yaM pazyanti dhIrA yatayaH saMyatAtmAnaH" ityaadi| tadevaM sarveSAmapi vedavAkyAnAM bhUtAtiriktasya jIvasya pratipAdakatvAd bhUtebhyo'tiriktaM jIvaM pratipadyakheti // 137 // (1685) D. C.--That the Soul itself is "vijnanaghana" and that it is distinct from other bhutas has already been discussed. It has already been said that .Sartrataya parinato bhutasamghato'yam vidyamanakartrikah, Adimatpratiniyatakaratvat ghatavat, yasca tatkarta sa tadatirikto jivah iti Moreover, sentences of the Vedas that prove Atman to be atirikta from bhutas, have not been beyond your comprehenBion. e.g. + The real interpretation of sentences like " vijnanaghana" eto , has already been stated and discussed in the First Vada. vide Vs. 1588-1595.

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: 188: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third "Satyena labhyastapasa hydsa brahmacaryena nityam jyotirmayo visuddhoyam pakyanti dhtra vatayah samyatatmlnah II" In the same way, all Veda-padas have proved that Jiva is atirikta from bhutas. Hence, you too, shall have to admit that, the Soul is distinot from bhutas. chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNaM jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / Fun To9537t af HeifcheSE 1183611 (8668) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinanam jara-maranavippamukkenam i So samano pavvalo pancahim saha khandiyasa dhim. 138 (1686) [chinne saMzaye jinena jarA-maraNavipramuktena / sa zramaNaH prabajitaH paJcabhiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 138 // (1686) Chinna samsayo jnona jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Sa sramanak pravrajitah pancabhih saha khankikasataih.,138 (1686)] Trans.--138 When the doubt was removed by the Nrthankara, who was entirely free from jara (old age ), and marana (death), the saint Vayubhuti accepted the Diksa along with his five hundred followers. (1686). End of the Discussion with the Third Ganadhara.

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Chapter IV cturthgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara. te pavvaie souM viyattu Agacchaha jinnsgaasN| vacAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 139 // (1687) Td pavvaie soum Viyattu agacohai jinasagasam i Vaccami na vandamt vanditta pajjuvasami. 139 (1687) [tAna pravrajitAn zrutvA vyakta Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 139 // (1687) Tan pravrajitan srutva Vyakta agacchati jinasakasam i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase. 139 (1687)] Trans.-139 Having heard that they (i. e. Vayubhuti and his fellow-mendicants) had renounced the world, Vykta comes before the Tirthankara. (He thinks...) "I may go, pay my homage (to the Tirthankara), and serve him." (1687) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukaNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNNU savvadarisINaM // 140 // (1688) Abhattho yajinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukk dnam Namdna ya gottona ya savvappu savvadarisinam. 140 (1688) [AmASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadacinA // 140 // (1688)

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:190: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Abhasitasca jinena jati-jara-maranavipraniuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina. 140 (1681)] Trans.--140 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had (attained) complete darsana. (1628) Bhagavan said :kiM maNNe asthi bhUyA udAhu natthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho // 141 // (1689) Kim naand atthi bhuya udahu natthi tti sansao tujjha 1 Vdyapayana ya attham na yanast tesimo attho. 141 (1689) [kiM manyase santi bhUtAnyutAho na santIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi tepAmayamarthaH // 141 // (1689) Kim manyasd santi bhutanyutabo na santiti samsayastava 1 Vedapadanam cartham na janasi t@samayamarthah. 141 (1699)] Trans. -141 O Vyakta ! What are you thinking nf? You entertain the doubt as to whether Bhutas exist or not. But (ca) you have not understood the (real) interpretation of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1689) TIkA-pRthivya-'p-tejo-vAyvA-''kAzalakSaNAni paJcabhUtAni, tAni ca kiM santi na vA ? iti tvaM manyase / saMzayazca tavAyaM viruddhavedapadazravaNanibandhano vartate / tAni cAmUni vedapadAni-"khamopamaM vai sakalamityeSa brahmavidhiraJjasA vijJeyaH" ityAdi, tathA, " dyAvA-pRthivI" ityAdi, tathA, "pRthivI devatA, Apo devatAH" ityAdi / eteSAM cAyamarthastava pratibhAsate-"khamopamam-svamasadRzam , nipAto'vadhAraNe, sakalam-azeSa jagat, ityeSa brahmavidhiH-paramArthaprakAraH, aJjasA-praguNena nyAyena, vijJeya:jJAtavyaH" iti / tadevamAdIni vedapadAni kila bhUtanihavaparANi, "dyAvA

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 191: pRthivI" ityAdIni tu sattApratipAdakAni, atastava saMzayaH / tadeteSAM vedapadAnAM tvamartha na jAnAsi, cazabdAd yuktihRdayaM ca na verisa / tena saMzayaM kuruSe / teSAM cAyamartho vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 141 // (1689) D. C.-This is your querry-"Do the pancabhitas viz. Prthvi (earth) ap (water), tejas (fire), vayu (air) and akasa (ether) exist or not? This querry is based upon your misapprehension of certain sentences of the Vedas, that are mutually contradictory. The sentences are(1) "Svapnopamam vai sakalamitydsa brahmavidhiranjasa vijndyah" etc. (2) "Dyava-prithvt" etc. and (8) " Prithvi-dovata, apo devatah " etc. Your interpretation of these sentences runs thus : All this world is nothing but a dream or illusion. So, one should honestly endeavour to know the Brahma, which is the the only paramarthaprakasa worth attaining. Such sentences refute the existence of the five elements while others like Dyava prithivi and << Prithivi devata, apo dovatan" establish the existence of those very elements. These contradicting sentences of the Vedas have given rise to your doubt. Really speaking, you have not understood the real purport of the above sentences. Here I give their correct interpretation. Listen to it. bhUesu tujjha saMkA suviNaya-mAovamAI hoja tti| na viyArijaMtAI bhayaMti jaM savvahA jutti // 142 // (1690) Bbuesu tujjha sanka guvinaya-maovamaim hojja tti i Na viyarijjantaim bhayanti jam savvaha juttim. 142 (1690) [bhUteSu tava zaGkA svamaka-mAyopamAni bhaveyuriti / na vicAryamANAni bhajanti yat sarvathA yuktim // 142 // (1690)

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.193 Jinabhadra Gaul's [The fourth Bhat@su tava tanka svapnaka-mayopamani bhaveyuriti i Na rioaryamanani bhajanti yat sarvatha yuktim. 142 (1690)] bhUyAisaMsayAo jIvAisu kA kaha tti te buddhii| taM savvasuNNasaMkI manasi mAyovamaM loyaM // 143 // (1691) Bhuyaisamsayao jivaisu ka kaha tti to buddht i Tam savvasuppasankt mannasi mayovamam loyam. 143 (1691) [bhUtAdisaMzayAt jIvAdiSu kA katheti te buddhiH| tvaM sarvazUnyazakI manyase mAyopamaM lokaM // 143 // (1691) Bhutadisamsayat jivadinu ka kathori te buddhih i Tvam saryasunyasaikt manyasd mayopamam lokam. 148 (1691) Trans.--142-143 You entertain the doubt about the elements that they are (unreal) like dreams and illusions. - And when you question the (existence of) elements (them. selves), what to talk of objects like jiva etc.? You, being dubious about the existence of everything, believe the whole. world to be (as unreal as) maya. (1690-1691). . TIkA-AyuSman vyakta ! bhUteSu bhavataH sandehaH, yataH svapnopamAnAni mAyopamAnAni caitAni bhaveyuriti tvaM mnyse| yathA hi svame kila kavid nimkho'pi nijagRhAGgaNe gajaghaTA-turaMganivaha-maNi-kanakarAzyAdikamabhUtamapi pazyati, mAyAyAM cendrajAlavilasitarUpAyAmavidyamAnamapi kanaka-maNi-mauktika-rajatabhAjanA-''rAma-puSpa-phalAdikaM dRzyate, tathaitAnyapi bhUtAnyevaMvidhAnyeveti manyase, yad yamAd vicAryamANAnyetAni sarvathaiva na kAzcid yukti bhajante shnte| bhUteSu ca saMzaye jIva-puNya-pApAdiSu kila kA vAtoM bhUtavikArAdhiSThAnatvAt teSAm / iti tava buddhiH| tasAt sarvasyApi bhUta-jIvAdivastunastvadabhiprAyeNAbhAvAt sarvazUnyatAzahI tvaM niravazeSamapi lokaM mAyopamaM khamendrajAlatulyaM manyasa iti // 142-143 // (1990-1691.)

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Vida] Ganadharavida : 198: D. C.-Long-lived Vyakta! You question the existence of Bhutas. Just as, in a dream, a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants, and horses, or treasures of jewellery and gold, but actually he does not possess them, and just as, under the illusion of the Indrajala, precious things, e. g., dishes (made) of gold, silver, jewels etc., or beautiful objects e. g., parks, flowers, fruits etc., are perceived, but really speaking, they are not existing; in the same way, according your belief, bhutas like prithivi are perceived by us; but a8 a matter of fact, they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an Indrajala. But this belief of yours, is absolutely unfounded. Again, as you have a doubt in the existence of elements, the doubt is bound to arise in the case of jiva, papa and punya also. Because, these objects are contained in the various vikaras of the bhutas themselves. It follows, therefore, that, according to you, all bhutas like Prthivt and all padarthas (objects) like jiva are a-vidyamana (non-existent). This indicates that you are sarvasunyatasanki and according to you, the whole Universe is just like svapna, maya or Indrajala. Now, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira gives a number of arguments for doubts which Vyakta entertained in his mind:jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao nAvi annao siddhI / bhAvANamavekkhAo viyatta ! jaha dIha-hassANaM // 144 // (1692 ) Jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao navi annad siddht Bhavanamavekkhao Viyatta! jaha diha-hassanam. 144 (1692) [ yathA kila na svataH parato nobhayato nApyanyataH siddhiH / bhAvAnAmapekSAto vyakta ! yathA dIrgha-hakhayoH // 144 // (1692) Yatha kila na svatah parato nobhayato napyanyatah siddhih | Bhavanamapeksato Vyakta yatha dirgha-brasvayoh. 144 (1692) Trans.-144 Accomplishment of objects, O Vyakta! like (the accomplishment of) hrasva (short) and dirgha (long) 25 For Private Personal Use Only

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, 194 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth can never be attained by means of itself, through another, by means of both, or through any other object. (1692). TIkA-vyakta ! bhavato'yamabhiprAya:-yathA kila na svataH, na parataH, na cobhayataH, nApyanyato bhAvAnAM siddhiH sNbhaavyte| kutaH 1 ityAhaapekSAtaH-kAryakAraNAdibhAvasyApekSikatvAdityarthaH, isva-dIrghavyapadezavat / tathAhi-yat kimapi bhAvajAtamasti tena sarveNApi kAryeNa vA bhavitavyam , kAraNena vaa| tatra kArya kAraNena kriyata iti kAraNAyatta eva tasya kAryatvavyapadezaH, na tu kAryasya kAryatvaM svataH siddhaM kimapyasti / evaM kAraNamapi kArya karotIti kAryAyatta eva tasya kAraNatvavyapadezaH, na tu tasya kAraNatvaM svataH siddhaM kiJcidasti / tadevaM kAryAdibhAvaH svato na sidhyati / yacca svato na siddhaM tasya parato'pi siddhirnAsti, yathA kharaviSANasya / tatazca na khataH kAryAdibhAvaH, nApi parataH / sva-parobhayatastarhi tasya siddhiriti cet / tadayuktam , yastAdubhayatastatsiddherabhAvAt tatsamudAye'pi tadayogAt / na hi sikatAkaNeSu pratyekamasat tailaM tatsamudAye prAdurbhavati / api ca, ubhayataH siddhipakSa itaretarAzrayadoSaH prAmoti / yAvaddhi kArya na sidhyati na tAvatkAraNasiddhirasti / yAvacca kAraNaM na sidhyati na tAvat kArya siddhimAsAdayati / ata itretraashrydossH| tasmAd nobhayato'pi kaaryaadibhaavsiddhiH| nApyanyata:-anubhayata ityarthaH, sva-paro-bhayavyatirekeNAnyasya vastuno'sattvena nirhetukatvaprasaGgAt / evaM hasva-dIrghalakSaNe dRSTAnte'pi "apekSAtaH" ityasya hrasva-dIrghatvAsiddhilakSaNena sAdhyenAnvayo bhAvanIyaH / tathAhi--pradezinyA aGguSThamapekSya dIrghatvaM prtiiyte| madhyamA tvapekSya isvatvam , paramArthena tviyaM svato na isvA, nApi dIrghA / tadevaM na svato hrasva-dIrghatvayoH siddhiH| tataH parataH, ubhayataH, anubhayatazca tatsiddhayabhAvo yathoktavad bhAvanIyaH, taduktam na dIrghastIha dIrghatvaM na isve nApi ca dvye|| tasAdasiddhaM zUnyatvAt sadityAkhyAyate ka hi ? // 1 // " isvaM pratItya siddhaM dIrgha dIrgha pratItya hrasvamapi / __ na kiJcidasti siddhaM vyavahAravazAd vadantyevam // 1 // (1692)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 195 : D. C.- Vyakta ! Your argument is this --Complete attainment of the existence of) objects is not possible either svatah or paratah or ubhayatah or anyatah as in the case of (the accomplishment of the existence of) the hrasva and dirgha, on account of there being apeksikatva (expectation) of the Karya Karanadibhavas (i. e., relations like that of cause and effect ) of the padarthas. Hence, each and every object is expected to be either karya or karana. As every karya is done by karana, its karyatva is subjugated by karanatva. But the karyatva of a karya is not svabhava-siddha (self-accomplished ). Similarly, karana accomplishes karya. So that, karanatva of karanas is subjugated by the karyatva of karya. But karanatva also is not svatah siddha. Now, one which is not Svatahsiddha by virtue of its own self cannot be accomplished by means of another also, as in the case of the horn of an ass. So, karyadibhava is accomplished neither by itself nor by another. Again, it is improper to consider the possibility of karyadibhavas even by sva and para taken together. Because, since siddhi is not found in either of them separately, how could it be attained in the samudaya of the two? Take the example of oil and sand. When oil is not present in every single particle of sand, it is not found in the collection of sand algo. Thus, the accomplishment of an object by means of ubhaya (both ), is also impossible. In case of accomplishment by means of ubhaya, there is another difficulty also. During the process of siddhi, so long as karya is not accomplished, there is karanasiddhi and so long as karana is not accomplished, there is karyasiddhi. Consequently, karya and karana depend upon each other, and hence, there is itaretarasrayadosa, or the fault of affecting each other, Thus, it is clear that the siddhi of karyadibhava is not possible even if sva and para are taken together.

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: 196 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Nor even by any other means-anubhayatah-the siddhi is possible. For, there is no vastu (object) available except sva, para and ubhaya in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of bhavas anyatah or anubhayatah (i. e., by means of any object excepting sva, para and ubhaya ), the siddhi would be nir-hetuka (void of quse ). To take an example, the pradesint finger (next to thumb) looks dirgha when compared with the thumb and hrasva when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself, is neither short nor long. Since it is not hrasva or dirgha by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said " Na dirghd'steeba dirghatvam na brasvd napi ca dvaye i Tasmadasiddham sunyatvat sadityakhyayatd kva hi ? It " Hrasvam pratitya siddham dirgham, dirgham pratitya brasvamapii Na kincidasti siddbam, vyavabaravasad vadantysvam 11" (1692) In support of the prima faci assertion that there is sarvasunyata, a number of examples are given. atthitta-ghaDegANegayA va svvegyaaidosaao| savve'NabhilappA vA suNNA vA savvahA bhAvA // 145 // (1693) Atthitta-ghadaganegaya va savvogayaidosaol Savve'nabhilappa va sunna va savvaha bhava, 145 (1693) [astitva-ghaTekAnekatA vA sarvaikatAdidoSAt / sarve'nabhilApyA vA zunyA vA sarvathA bhAvAH // 145 // (1693) Astitva-ghataikanokata va sarvaikatadidosati Sarvd'nabhilapya va sunya va sarvatha bhavah. 145 (1693) ] Trans.--145 Unity or distinction of astitva and ghata would either give rise to faults like sarvaikata (i. e. universal

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 197: oneness ) or all the objects would become inexpressible (by word or speech ) or non-existent in all respects. (1693). TIkA-nanvastitva-ghaTayorekatvam , anekatvaM vaa| yadyekatvam , tarhi sarvaikatA prApnoti-yo yo'sti sa sa ghaTa ityastitve ghaTasya pravezAt sarvasya ghaTatvaprasaGgaH syAt, na paTAdi padArthAntaram / ghaTo vA sarvasattvAnyatirekAt sarvAtmakaH syAt / athavA, yo ghaTaH sa evAstIti ghaTamAtre'stitvaM praviSTam , tato'nyatra sattvAbhAvAdaghaTasya sarvasyApyabhAvaprasaGgato ghaTa evaika: syAt / so'pi vA na bhavet , aghaTavyAvRtto hi ghaTo bhavati, yadA ca tatpratipakSabhUto'ghaTa eva jAsti, tadA kimapekSo'sau ghaTaH syAt / / iti sarvazUnyatvamiti / atha ghaTa-sattvayoranyatvamiti dvitIyo viklpH| tahiM sattvarahitatvAdasan ghaTaH, khrvissaannvditi| apica, sato bhAvaH sattvamucyate, tasya ca svAdhArabhUtebhyo ghaTAdibhyaH sadbhayo'nyatve'sattvameva syAt, AdhArAdanyatve aadheysyaapynupptteH| tadevamastitvena saha ghaTAdInAmekatvA'nyatvavikalpAbhyAmuktanyAyena sarvaikatAdidoSaprasaGgAt sarve'pi bhAvA anabhilapyA vA maveyuH, sarvathA zUnyA vA syuH, sarvathaiva teSAmabhAvo vA bhavedityarthaH / apica, yad notpadyate tattAvad nirvivAdaM kharaviSANavadasadeva, iti nivRttA tatkathA / yadapyutpattimalloke'bhyupagamyate, tasyApi jAtA-jAtAdivikalpayuktibhirutpAdo na ghaTate, iti zUnyataiva yukteti // 145 // (1693) __D. C.-(1) If ghata and astitva are taken to be one, all objec' will have to be taken as one. For, when ghata is said to be abhinna from astitva, all objects that have existence will be called ghata, and there will be no distinction of objects like pata eto. Thus, there will arise the difficulty of sarvaikata or Universal one-ness. Moreover, ghata will become a sarvatmaka or all-pervading object, since it is taken as inseparable from the astitva of all objects. Again, if ghata is believed to be astitva itself, existence will be restricted to ghata only. All other objects that are not ghata will, in that case, have no existence. Consequently ghata alone will exist.

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: 198 : Jinabhadra Gaai's [The fourth Or, say, ghata, too, will not exist according to this argument. Whatever is different fron, a-ghata. is called ghata. Now, since ghata and astitva go together, a-ghata which is opposite to ghata will also have no existence. Thus, a-ghata does not exist. So, also, ghata will not exist. For, in comparision with what, will the object be ghata if a-ghata is absent ? Hence it is better to resort to sarvasunyata. (2) Now, the second alternative that-ghata is distinct from astitva-may be considered. If ghata is bhinna from astitva, it is devoid of astitva also. . For, astitva being the quality of existence, is the adheya, and ghata which contains the quality is adhara. Adheya is not supposed to exist, when adhara is away from it. So, ghata is devoid of existence, and hence it is said to be a-vidyamana like the horn of an ass. Thus, the above discussion of unity or distinction of astitva and ghata leads either to the difficulty of sarvaikata or to the anabhilapyatva and sunyatva as regards each and every object. Again, that which is not produced is undoubtedly a-vidyamana, like the born of an ass, and it has already been discussed before. With regard to objects that have been produced in this world, it can also be proved that their production is not in the fitness of things, if properly thought of. jAyAjjAyo-bhayo na jAyamANaM ca jAyae jmhaa| aNavatthA-'bhAvo-bhayadosAo suNNayA tamhA // 146 // (1694) Jaya'jayo-bhayao na jayamanam ca jagad jamhai Anavattha'bhavo-bhayadoslo sunnaya tamha. 146 (1694) [ arat-sonalitat 7 ET4HR 7 F Tara i anavasthA-'bhAvo-bhayadoSAt zUnyatA tasAt // 146 // (1694) Jata jato bhayato na jayamanam ca jayatd yasmati Anavasthabhavo-bhayadosat sunyata tasmat. 146 (1694) ]

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 199: Trans.-146 (An object) which has (already ) been produced, or which is in both the conditions, or which is (in the state of being produced, can never be produced on account of faults like disorder, non-entity or both So, it is non-existent. TIkA-iha tAvad na jAtaM jAyate, jAtatvAdeva, niSpannaghaTavat / atha jAtamapi jAyate, tAnavasthA, jAtatvAvizeSeNa punaH punarjanmaprasaGgAt / athAjAtaM jAyate / tatrottaramAha-" abhAva ti" sUcakatvAt sUtrasya, taryabhAvo'pi kharaviSANalakSaNo jAyatAm , ajAtatvAvizeSAt / atha jAtAjAtarUpaM jAyate / tadapyayuktam / kutaH 1 ityAha-ubhayadoSAt prtyekomypkssoktdossaaptterityrthH| kiJca, etajjAnAjAtalakSaNamubhayamasti vA, na vaa| yadyasti, tahiM jAtameva tat , na punarubhayam, tatra cokto dossH| atha nAsti tathApi nobhayaM tat, kintvajAtameva, tatrApi cAbhihitameva dUSaNam / nApi jAyamAnaM jAyate, pUrvoktavikalpadvayAnativRtteH, tathAhi-tadapi jAyamAnamasti na vA / yadyasti, tahiM jAtameva tat / nAsti cet, tabajAtameva / pakSadvaye'pi cAsminnabhihita eva dossH| DaktaM ca gataM na gamyate tAvadagataM naiva gmyte| gatAgatavinirmuktaM gamyamAnaM na gamyate // 1 // ityaadi| yasmAdevam , tasAdanavasthAdidoSaprasaGgena vastUnAmutpAdAyogAjagataH zUnyataiva yukteti // 146 // (1694) ___D. C.-(1) An object which is once produced has not to undergo the process of production again, just as a ghata which has already been jata has not to be produced again. Even then if it is said that objects that have once been produced can be produced again and again, there would be anavastha. Hence production of an already jata object, is absolutely impossible. (2) Again, if an a-jaia object is believed to be capable of being produced, objects like kharavisana-that have never

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: 200 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth been produced so far-should also be taken as capable of being produced. Because, ajatatva is present in kharavisana also. But this is absurd. So, production of an ajata object, is never possible. (3) In the case of an object which is both' jata and a-jata, the utpatti is not possible. Because dosas that are found in each one of the above two cases separately, are certainly found in the combination of the two also. Moreover, if an object which is ubhayarupa is taken to be vidyamana it becomes jata and loses its jatajata ubhayarupa. Similarly, if it is a-vidyamana, it cannot be called ubhayarupa, but anutpanna only. Now, when it is utpanna or anutpanna, dosas like anavastha and abhava do arise. (4) In the case of a jayamana object .also, the above argument may be applied, and the dosas like anavastha and abhava arise in that case also, according as it becomes jata or a-jata due to its being vidyamana or a-vidyamana. So, production in this case is also impossible. So, it is said, " Gatam na gamyate tavadagatam naiva gamyate i Gatagatavinirmuktam gamyamanam na gamyotd 11" Thus, in all the above-mentioned four avasthas of an object, it has been clearly pointed out that its utpatti is impossible. Henoe, it is proper to believe in the Universal non-entity. heU-pacayasAmaggi vIsu bhAvesu no va jaMkalaM / dIsaha sAmaggimayaM savvAbhAve na sAmaggI // 147 // (1695) Hou-paocayasamaggi visu bhavesu no va jam kajjam 1 Disai samaggimayam savvabhave na samaggi. 147 (1695) [hetu-pratyayasAmagrI viSvam bhAveSu no vA yat kAryam / dRzyate sAmagrImayaM sarvAbhAve na sAmagrI // 147 // (1695)

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Vada ] Ganadharavida :201: Hatu-pratyayasamagri visvag bhavesu no va yat karyami Drisyate samagrimayam sarvabhavd na samagri. 147 (1695) ] Trans 147 An object is accomplished by means of a group of causes taken together, and not by hetu or pratyaya in its individual capacity. (This) collection of causes cannot be (found) in the ( midst of) all-pervading negation. TIkA-hetavaH-upAdAnakAraNAni, pratyayAstu nimittakAraNAni, teSAM hetu-pratyayAnAM yA sAmagrI tasyA viSvam bhAveSu pRthagavasthAsu yat kArya na dRzyate, dRzyate ca sAmagrImayam-saMpUrNasAmaDayavasthAyAM punadRzyata ityarthaH / evaM ca sati kAryasya sarvAbhAva eva yukta iti zeSaH / sarvAbhAve ca na sAmagrI naiva sAmagrIsadbhAvaH praamotiityrthH| tataH sarvazUnyataiveti bhAvaH / idamatra hRdayam-hetavazva pratyayAzca svajanyamartha kimekaikazaH kurvanti, saMbhUya vaa?| na tAvadekaikazaH, tthaa'nuplbdheH| tata ekaikasmAt kAryasyAbhAvAt sAmauyAmapi tadabhAva eva syAt , sikatAkaNatailavaditi / itthaM ca sarvasyApi kAryasyotparayabhAve sAmagrIsadbhAvo na prAmoti, anutpannAyAH sAmagryA apyyogaat| tatazca sarvazUnyataiva jagataH / uktaM ca hetu-pratyayasAmagrI pRthag bhAveSvadarzanAt / / tena te nAbhilapyA hi bhAvAH sarve svabhAvataH // 1 // loke yAvat saMjJA sAmaThyAmeva dRzyate yasAt / tasAd na santi bhAvA bhAve sati nAsti sAmagrI // 2 // ityaadi| asa ca vyAkhyA-pRthag. bhAveSvadarzanAta "kAryasya" iti zeSaH / tena te ghaTAdayoM bhAvA sarve'pi khabhAvataH svarUpato nAmilApyA:, pRthagekaikAvasthAyI kAryasyAnutpAdAda , utpasimansareNa ca ghaTAdisaMjJA'pravRtteH, saMjJA'mAvai cAmilaptumazakyatvAditi / kutaH punaH pRthagavasthAyAM saMjJApravRttiH ? ityAha-" loke yAkadityAdi" loke yAvat saMjJA "ghaTo'yam" ityAdisaMjJApravRttiH, tAvat saMpUrNa kArya saMpUrNasAmadhyAmeva yasmAt dRzyate, pRthagabhAve ca sAmaNyAmapyabhAvAt sikatAtailavad na santyeva bhAvAH, bhAvAsakhe kutaH sAmagrIsadbhAva: / iti // 947 / / (1695) 26

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: 202 : Jinabhadra Gari's [The fourth D. C.-An objeot is said to have been accomplished only when all upsdana and nimitta causes, are assembled together. But when each one of these causes operates separately, the | karya could never be accomplished. In other words, there is abhaya of the karya, and ultimately there will be sarvabhava. Again, in the midst of sarvabhava, samagri cannot exist. Consequently, there will be sarvasunyata. Moreover, just as oil cannot be found in the collection of sands when it is not present in each individual particle, so also karya cannot be found in the combination of many karanas, when it is absent in each individual karana separately. Thus, when the existence and production of all karyas are denied, the existeroe and production of samagri are also denied. So here also, sarvasunyata is the only resort of belief. Again, it is said that, "Hatu-pratyayasamagri prthag bhavdsvadarsanati T@na te nabhilapya hi bhavah sarve svabhavatah 1 " << Loke yavat samjaa samagryameva dris yate yasmati Tasmad na santi bhava, bhave sati nasti samagri. 147 (1695)" parabhAgAdarisaNao savvArAbhAgasuhamayAo ya / ubhayANuvalaMbhAo savvANuladdhio suNNaM // 148 // (1696) Parabhagadarisanao savvarabhagasuhamaya8 ya 1 Ubhayanuval mbhao savvanuladdhio gunnam. 148 (1696) [ parabhAgAdarzanataH sarvArAdvAgasaukSamyAca / ubhayAnupalambhAt sarvAnupalabdhitA zUnyam // 148 // (1696) Parabhagadarsanatah sarvaradbhagasauksmyacca ! Ubhayanupalambbat sarvanupalabdhitah sunyam. 148 (1696) ] Trans.-148 The rear portion (of an object ) is not perceptible; and its front-most part is very minute. So, on

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Vida] Ganadharavada : 208: account of the non-perception of these two, there is nonperception of all, which results in complete negation. TIkA-iha yat tAvadadRzyaM tadasadeva, anupalambhAva , kharaviSANavaditi nivRttA tadvArtA dRzyasyApi ca stambha-kumbha-kuDyAdeH para madhya-bhAgayorasatvameva, arvAgbhAgAntaritatvena tayorapyadarzanAt, ArAdbhAgasyApi ca sAvayavatvAt punaranyaH khalvArAdbhAgaH tasyApyanyaH punastasyApyanya ityevaM tAvat , yAvat sArAtIyabhAgasya, paramANuprataramAtratvenAtisaukSmyAt , pUrveSAM caaraadaagaanaamnysyaanyenaantrittvenaanuplbdheH| tatazcokanyAyena parabhAgasarAtIyabhAgalakSaNobhayabhAgAnupalambhAt sarvasyApi vastujAtasyAnupalabdheH zUnyaM jagaditi / uktaM ca " yAvad dRzyaM parastAvad bhAgaH sa ca na dRzyate / tena te nAbhilApyA hi bhAvAH sarve svabhAvataH // 1 // " tadevamuktayuktyA sarvasyApi bhUtAderabhAvaH prAmoti, zrUyate ca zrutI bhUtAdisadbhAvo'pIti saMzayaH / iti pUrvapakSaH // 148 // (1696) D. C.-It has already been discussed that objects like kharavisapa do not exist, because they are non-perceptible, In case of perceptible objects like pillar, jar, wall etc., the rear and middle portions are not perceived, because they are screened by the front portion coming in their way. So, they are said to be a-vidyamana. Again, the front portion consists of a number of divisions. Out of all these divisions, every one is screened by the other coming in its immediate front, which again is screened by a third one in its immediate vicinity, and so on. Ultimately, the front-most particle is left unscrcened. But it is extremely emall in size, and hence .. becomes non-cognizible. Now, since the rear and front-most parts are non-perceptible, it can be said that objects-and ultimately all the objects in the Universe--are non-cognizible or sunya. Moreover, it is said that,

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[ The fourth : 204 : Jinabhadra Gani's "Yavad drisyam parastavad bhagah sa ca na drisyate | Tana to nabhilapya hi bhavah sarve svabhavatah || " So, you have a doubt in the existence of Bhuta etc., and according to your belief, they are non-existent. This finishes the purvapaksa (the argument of the opponent). Now follows the refutation of the argumentmA kuru viyatta ! saMsayamasaha na saMsayasamunbhavo jutto / svakusuma - kharasiMgesu va, jutto so thANu- purisenuM // 149 // (1697) Ma kuru Viyatta ! samsayamasai na samsayasamubbhavo jutto Khakusuma-kharasingesu va jutto so thanu-purisesu. 149 (1697) [ mA kuru vyakta ! saMzayamasati na saMzayasamudbhavo yuktaH / khakusuma - kharazRGgayoriva yuktaH sa sthANu-puruSayoH // 149 // (1697) Ma kuru Vyakta samsayamasati na samsayasamudbhavo yuktah | Khakusuma-kharasrigayoriva yuktab sa sthanu purusayob. 149 ] Trans.-1490 Vyakta! Do not entertain doubt. The doubt about non-existent (objects) is improper as in the case of kha-kusuma (flower of the sky) and kharasrnga (horn of an ass). It is proper (only ) with regard to ( existent objects like) sthanu and purusd (1697) TIkA - AyuSman vyakta ! mA kRthAH saMzayaM mA bhUtAbhAvaM budhyasva, gato'sati bhUtakadambake maMzayaH khakusuma- kharaviSANayoriva na yuktaH, api svabhAvanizcaya eva syAt / satsveva ca bhUteSu sthANu- puruSAdiSviva saMzayo yuktaH / yadi punarasatyapi vastuni saMdehaH syAt tadA'vizeSeNa kharaviSANAdiSvapi syAditi bhAvaH / / 149 / / (1697) D. C. - 0 long-lived Vyakta / Don't be dubious about the existence of bhutas. Because the doubt about non-existent objects is totally unjustifible as in the case of kha-kusuma and kharasriga, where abhava is already fixed up. It can be For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :205: justified only in the case of existent objects like sthanu and purusa. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, the doubt will be raised in the case of kharavisana also, which, too is non-existent in general. ko vA visesahe. savvAbhAve vi thaannu-purisesu| saMkA na khapupphAisu vivajao vA kahaM na bhave ? // 150 // (1698) Ko va visdsahdu savvabhava vi thanu-purisdsu i Sanka da khapupfaisu vivajjad ya kaham na bhavd ? 150 (1698) [ko vA vizeSahetuH sarvAbhAve'pi sthANu-puruSayoH / zaGkA na khapuSpAdiSu viparyayo vA kathaM na bhavet 1 // 150 // (1698) Ko va visdsahdtuh sarvabhave'pi sthanu-purusayoh i Sanka na khapuspadisu viparyayo va katham na bhavat ? 150] Trans.-150 Or, what special reason can there be in (entertaining ) doubt about sthanu and purusa and not about kha-puspa (flower of the sky) etc., even in (the midst of) allpervading non-entity? Or, why should not the reverse take place ? (1698) TIkA-ko vA'tra vizeSaheturucyatAM yat-sarvAbhAve sarvazUnyatAyAmaviziSTAyAmapi sthANvAdiSu saMzayo bhvti| na khapuSpAdiSu / nanu. vizeSahetvabhAvAdavizeSeNa sarvatra saMzayo'stu, niyAmakAbhAvAd / viparyayo vA bhavet khapuSpAdiSu saMzayaH syAd na sthAvAdiSviti bhAvaH // 150 // (1698) D. C.-Even when there was all-pervading negation, on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like sthanu eto., and not about non-existent objeots like kha-puspa eto.? If there is no visesaheta on which your beliet is based, the samsaya, in general, may rise at all places. Or, in absence of clear explanation, reverse may be the case in e. The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like kha-puspa eto., and not about existent objects like sthanu etc.

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:206: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Moreover, paccakkhaoSNumANAdAgamao vA pasiddhiratthANaM / sabappamANavisayAbhAve kiha saMsao jutto ? // 151 // (1699) Paccakkhao'numanadagamao va pasiddhiratthanam i Savvappamanavisayabhavd kiha samsao jutto ? 151 (1699) [pratyakSato'numAnAdAgamato vA prasiddhirarthAnAm / sarvapramANaviSayAbhAve kathaM saMzayo yuktaH 1 // 151 // (1699) Pratyaksato'numanadagamato va prasiddhirarthanami Sarvapramanavisayabhavd katham samsayo yuktah ? 151 (1899)] Trans.-151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by ( means of ) visible evidence (pratyaksa), or by inference (anumana), or by documentary evidence (agama). (But) in ahsence of all (such) evidences and topics, how could the doubt be justified ? (1699) TIkA-yadA hi pramANairarthAnAM prasiddhirjAtA bhavet tadA kathaJcit kacid vastuni saMzayo yujyate / yadA ca sarveSAM pramANAnAM sarveSAM ca tadviSayANAmabhAvastadA kathaM saMzayo'stu, saMzayasya jJAta-jJeyAdyarthasAmagrIjanyatvAt ? / sarvazUnyatve ca tadabhAvAd na saMzayodbhUtiH, nirmUlatvAditi bhAvaH // 151 // (1699) D. C.-When the object is accomplished by means of pramanas (evidences ), a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent. But when all such pramanas and visayas are absent, how can the doubt exist ? The doubt springs up from materials like jnata and joeya. But when everything is believed as sunya, materials like jnata and joeya are not supposed to exist, and hence, the samsaya has also no reason to rise. jaM saMsayAdau nANapajjayA taM ca neyasaMbaddhaM / savvayAbhAve na saMsao teNa te jutto // 152 // (1700)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 207: Jam samsayadau nanapajjaya tam ca neyasambarldhami Savvanndyabhave na samsao tena te jutto. 152 (1700) [yat saMzayAdayo jJAnaparyayAstacca jJeyasaMbaddham / sarvajJeyAbhAve na saMzayastena te yuktaH // 152 / (1700) Yat samsayadayo joanaparyayastacca jo@yasambadham i Sarvajneyabhavd na samsayastena te yuktah 152 (1700) ] Trans.-152 Since doubt etc. are the synonyms of jnana, they are related to the jaeya (cognizable object) also. So, in absence of all jneyas, your doubt has also no place (to exist). (1700) TIkA-yasmAt saMzaya-viparyayA-'nadhyavasAya-nirNayA vijJAnaparyayAH, taca jJeyanibandhanameva, sarvazUnyatAyAM na jJeyamasti, tasmAd na tava saMzayo yuktH| sati ca saMzaye'numAnasiddhA eva bhAvAH // 152 // (1700) D. C.-Since doubt, inversion (viparyaya), non-apprehen. sion ( anadhyavasaya ), and affirmation ( nirnaya ) are the ( various ) synonyms of knowledge, they are automatically connected with the cognizible also. Now, since everything is sunya, nothing can be apprehended when there is nothing jodya, there can be no jnana and no samsaya also, as samsaya is nothing but a paryaya of the knowledge. Still, however, if you insist upon entertaining doubt, siddhi of objects will have to be apprehended only by means of anumana and not by virtue of perception, as there can be do perception on account of the absolute abhava of everything. saMti ciya te bhAvA saMsayao somma ! thANu-purisa vya / aha dilutamasiddhaM maNNasi naNu saMsayAbhAvo // 153 // (1701) Santi coiya te bhava samsayao Somma 1 thanu-purisa vya Aha ditthantamasiddham mannasi ranu samsayabhavo. 153 [santyeva te mAvA saMzayataH saumya ! sthANu-puruSAviva / .. atha dRSTAntamasiddhaM manyase nanu saMzayAbhAvaH // 153 // (1701)

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: 208: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Santydva to bhavah sansayatab Saumya ! sthanu-purusaviva 1 Atha drstantamasiddham mangase nanu samsayabhavah. 153(1701)] Trans.-153 O Saumya ! Because of ( your ) doubt (about them ), those objects do exist as sthanu and purusa. But, again, if you believe the example (of sthanu and purusa) to be unaccomplished, existence of the doubt will be denied. ( 1701 ) TIkA-saumya ! santi bhavato'pi bhAvAH, saMzayasamutthAnAt , iha yat saMzayyate tadasti, yathA sthANu-puruSo; yaccAsad na tava saMzayyate, yathA khapuSpa-kharaviSANe / atha sthANu-puruSalakSaNaM dRSTAntamasiddhaM manyase tvam , sarveSAmapi sthANu-puruSAdibhAvAnAmavizeSeNaivAsacAbhyupagamAt / tadayuktam , yato nanu sarvabhAvAsace saMzayAbhAva eva syAt , ityuktameveti // 153 // (1701) ____D. C.-0 Saumya ! The very doubt that you have raised against the objects, proves that the objects are vidyamana as sthanu and purusa. For, there cannot exist any doubt about non-existent objects like akasapuspa and kharavisana. Again, if you think that the above example of (the existent objects like ) sthanu and purusa is wrong, you are not justified. For, in that case, all objects whether vidyamana as sthanu etc, or a-vidyamana as khapuspa etc, will have to be considered as a-vidyamana according to your belief. So, when the existence of each and every object will be denied, naturally the existence of doubt will also be denied. savvAbhAve vi maI saMdeho simiNae vva, no taM ca / jaM saraNAinimitto simiNo na u savvahAbhAvo // 154 // (1702) Savvabhava vi mat samleho siminae vva, no tam cal Jam saranainimitto simino na u savvababhavo. 154. (1702) [ sarvAbhAve'pi matiH saMdehaH svamaka iva, no tacca / yat saraNAdinimittaH svamo ne tu sarvathA'bhAvaH // 154 // (1702)

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Vida 1 Ganadharavada :209: Sarvabhavd'pi mataih samidhah svapnaka iva, no tacca | Yat smaranadinimittah svapno na tu sarvatha'bhavah. 154 (1702)] 'Trans.-154 It is improper to believe that inspite of allpervading negation, doubt does spring up in a dream. For, a dream consists of (a number of) nimittas like remembrance etc., and it is not absolutely non-existent. (1702) TIkA-syAnmatiH parasya-sarvAbhAve'pi svapne dRSTaH saMzayaH, yathA kila kazcit pAmaro nijagRhAGgaNe "kimayaM dvipendo mahIdhro vA ? iti saMzete, na ca tat tatra kizcidapyasti, evamanyatra sarvabhAvAbhAve'pi saMzayo bhvissyti| taca na, yad yasmAt svapne'pi pUrvadRSTAnubhUtasaraNAdinimittaH saMdehaH, na tu sarvathA bhAvAbhAve'sau kApi pravartate / anyathA hi yat SaSThabhUtAdikaM kacidapi nAsti tatrApi saMzayaH syAt, vizeSAbhAvAditi / nanu kiM khapno'pi nimittamantareNa na pravartate / evametat // (1702) D. C.-In support of the belief that doubt springs up even in Sarvabhava, an opponent may advance an argument as follows : Just as in a dream, a poor pauper raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or & mountain before his house, though, in fact, nothing exists like that; so, also, at other places, doubt can be raised in spite of the absolute abhava of things. Thus, we can say that even though there is sarvabhava, samsaya does exist in a dream. But the above argument is totally groundless. In a dream, doubt arises on account of various reasops. Say, for instance, when an object is seen or experienced, the remenibrance of that experience etc., gives rise to the doubt. So, for the rise of doubt in the dream, there is some sort of reason which brings the dream-and hence the doubt-into existence. Thus, doubt arises from an existent object and not from the absolute abhava of it. But, suppose, even then, if you believe that the samd dha springs up from the absolute abhava also, the doubt should 27

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:210 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth also have to arise from objects like sixth element which have never been existent so far. Because, abhava is present in them also. annuy-vitttth-ciNtiy-suth-pyiviyaar-devyaa'nnuuyaa| simiNassa nimittAI puNNaM pAvaM ca nAbhAvo // 155 // (1703) Anuhuya-dittha-cintiya-suya-payaiviyara-devaya'naya i Siminassa nimittaim punnam pavam ca nabhavo. 155 (1703) [anubhUta-dRSTa-cintita-zruta-prakRtivikAra-devatA'nUpAH / khapnasa nimicAni puNyaM pApaM ca nAbhAvaH // 155 / / (1703) Anubhuta-drsta-cintita-sruta-prakrti-vikara-devata'nupah | Svapnasya nimittani punyam papam ca nabhavah 155 (1703)] Trans.-155 (Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing (of an object), ill-health (prakrtivikara), a deity, watery place, meritorious act, and sin-these are the prominent causes (nimittas) of dream. So it is not non-existent. (1703) TIkA-snAna-bhojana-vilepanAdikamanyadA'nubhUtaM svapne dRzyate, ityanubhUto'rthaH khapnasya nimittam / athavA, kri-turgaadiko'nydaadRsstto'rthstnimittm| vicintitazca priytmaalaabhaadiH| zrutazca svrg-nrkaadiH| tathA, vAta-pitAdijanitaH prakRtivikAraH khapnasya nimittam / tathA, anukUlA pratikUlA vA devatA tanimittam / tathA, anUpaH sjlprdeshH| tathA puNya miSTakhapnasya nimittam / pApaM cAniSTasya tasya nimittam , na punarvastvabhAvaH / kizva, khapno'pi tAvad : mAva eva / tatastasyApi sattve kathaM "zUnyaM jagat" iti bhavatA pratijJAyate // 155 / / (1703) D. C.--The nimittas that bring dream into existence are treated as follows:--- 1. Previous experience-Certain acts like snana, bhojana,

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 211: vilepana etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dream due to this reason. 2. Observation-When objects like elephants, horses eto., are perceived in dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the drstartha reason. 3. Attentive Consideration-A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc., is called the dream of cintitartha. 4. Hearing-When places like svarga, and naraka, which are only heard of, and not seen-are perceived in dream, the nimitta is srtartha. 5. Distrubance of Health--IU .health caused by diseases like vata and pitta, is also one of the nimittas of dream. 6. A deity-When one beholds a deity-adverse or favourable-in dreann, the dream can be called dova-nimitta. 7. Watery place - This is ulso one of the nimittas when one dreams in the midst of watery region. 8.-9. Punya and papa-A dream is said to be good or bad according as there is punya or papa as its nimitta. Thus, it is clear that a svapna is brought about by one of the above-mentioned nimittas. And hence, svapna is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of one or more nimittas. In this way, when the drearn itself is existent, how can you call the world to be non-existent like svapna ? viNNANamayattaNao ghaDaviNNANaM va sumiNao bhaavo| ahavA vihiyanimitto ghaDo vva nemittiyttaao||156|| (1704) VinnaNGamayattanao ghadavinnanam va sumisao bhavol Abava vihiyanimitto ghaco vvao nemittiyattao. 156 (1704) [vijJAnamayatvato ghaTavijJAnamiva svamako bhAvaH / athavA vihitanimitto ghaTa iva naimittikatvAt // 156 // (1704)

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:212 Jinabhadra Gaai's [The fourth Vijnanamayatvato gbatavijaanamiva svapnako bhavah 1 Athava vihitanimitto ghata iva naimittikatvat. 156 (1704)] ___ Trans.-156 The existence of dream is (apprehended) either because dream is vijnanamaya (i. e. full of knowledge) like the knowledge of ghata, or because it is naimittika (i. e. caused by nimitta) like ghata as mentioned before. (1704) TIkA-bhAvaH khama iti prtijnyaa| vijJAnamayatvAditi hetuH| ghaTavijJAnavaditi dRssttaantH| athavA, bhAvaH svapnaH, naimittikatvAt niminiSpayo naimittikastadbhAvastattvaM tasmAdityarthaH, ghttvditi| kathaM punaH svapno naimittikaH ? ityAha-yato vihitanimittaH, vihitAni--"aNuhUya-diTThaciMtiya " ityAdinA pratipAditAni nimittAni yasyAsau vihitanimitta iti // 156 // (1704) D. C.-Existence of dream can be proved in either of these two ways: ___1. Dream is full of cognizance as ghata is. So, like ghata, dream can also be perceived on account of its being existent. 2. As ghata is caused by various nimittas, dream is also caused by nimittas, like anubhava, smarana, cintana etc., that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a murta karya, and hence existent like ghata. savvAbhAve ca kao sumiNo'sumiNo tti sacamaliyaM ti / gaMdhavapuraM pADaliputtaM tattho kyAro tti ? // 157: / (1705) kalaM ti kAraNaM ti ya sajjhamiNaM sAhaNaM ti katta tti / pattA vayaNaM vacaM parapakkho'yaM saMpakkho'yaM ? // 158 // (1706) kiM veha thira-davo-siNa-calayA-'rUvittaNAI niyayAI / sahArao ya gajmA sottAiyAI gahUNAI ? // 159 // (1707)

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Vada] Ganadharavada :213: samayA vivajao vA savvAgahaNaM va kiM na sunnnnmmi| kiM suNNayA va sammaM saggaho kiM va micchattaM? // 160 // (1708) kiha sa-paro-bhayabuddhI kahaM ca tersi propprmsiddhii| aha paramaIe bhaNNai sa-paramaivisesaNaM katto? // 161 // (1701) Savvabhava ca kao sumino'sumino tti saccamaliyam til Gandhavvapuram Padaliputtam tattho vayaro tti? 151 (1705) Kajjam ti karanam ti ya sajjbaminam sahanam ti katta ttit Vatta vayanam vaccam parapakkho'yam s2-pakkho'yam? 158 (1706) Kim vdha -thira-davo-sina-calaya-ravittanaim niyayaim | Saddadao ya gajjba sottaiyaim gabanaim ? 159 (1707) Sanaya vivajjao va savvagahanam va kim na sunnammil Kim sunnaya va sammam saggaho kim va micchattam? 160 (1708) Kiha sa-paro-bhaya buddht kaham ca tasim paropparamasiddhti Aha paramata bhanpai sa-paramaivisbsanam katto ? 161 (1709) [ sarvAbhAve ca kutaH svapno'svapna iti satyamalIkamiti / gandharvapuraM pATaliputraM tathya upacAra iti // 157 / / (1705) kAryamiti kAraNamiti ca sAdhyamidaM sAdhanamiti krteti| vaktA vacanaM vAcyaM parapakSo'yaM svapakSo'yam 1 // 158 // (1706) kiM veha sthira dravo-SNa-calanA-'rUpitvAni niyatAni / zabdAdayazca grAhyAH zrotAdikAni grAhyANi ? // 159 // (1707) samatA viparyayo vA sarvAgrahaNaM vA kiM na zUnye / kiM zUnyatA vA samyak sadgrahaH kiM vA mithyAtvam 1 // 160 // (1708) kathaM sva-paro-bhayabuddhiH kathaM ca teSAM prsprmsiddhiH| atha paramatyA bhaNyate sva-paramativizeSaNaM kutaH ? // 16 // (1709) Sarvabbava ca kutah svapno'svapna iti satyamaltkamiti Gandharvapuram Pataliputram tathya upacara iti ? 157 (1705)

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: 214: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Karyamiti karanamiti ca sadhyamidam sadhanamiti karteti | Vakta vacanam vacyam para pakso'yam svapakso'yam? 158 (1706) Kim veha sthira-dravo-sna-calata-rupitvani niyatani | Sabdadayasca grahyah srotradikani grahyani? 159 (1707) Samata viparyayo va sarvagrahanam va kim na sunye Kim sunyata va sanyak sadgrahah kim va mithyatvam, 160 (1701) Katham sva-paro-bhaya buddhih katham ca tesam paraspara siddhih Atha para-matya bhanyate sva-para-mativisesanam kutah? 161] Trans. 157-161 Again, in case of all-pervading negation, how could there be distinction between dream and otherwise, between truth and false-hood, between (an imaginary) Gandharva city and (a real) Pataliputra +, between a fact and fancy, between cause and effect, between end, means, and (their) agent, between speaker, speech, and (that which is ) to be spoken, between one's own party, and the opposite party? Or, in such a case, how could (properties like) stability, fluidity, heat, activeness etc., as well as, (the rule) that sound etc., are grahya (to be received) and the ear etc., are grahakas (receivers)-be ascertained at all? Or, why should (faults like) uniformity, contraiety or non-acceptibility of all, not arise in (the state of all-pervading) negation? And, is this ( apprehension of) sunyata really substantial or worthless ? Moreover, how could sva, para, and ubhaya be distinguished and how would their mutual accomplishment be possible (in case of all-pervading negation)? And, if it is said to be due to another's intellect, how could the intellect of sva and para be distinguished? (1705-1709). TIkA - sarvAbhAve ca sarvazUnyatAyAM cAbhyupagamyamAnAyAM "svapno'yam " " asvapno'yam " iti kutaH - kiMkRto'yaM vizeSaH ? ityarthaH / tathA, satyamidam, alIkaM vA; tathA, gandharvapurametat, pATalIputrAdi cedam ; tathA, " tattho bayAro tti " ayaM tathyo nirupacarito mukhyazcatuSpadavizeSaH siMhaH, + Known as Patna at the present time.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 215: ayaM tvaupacAriko manuSyavizeSo mANavakaH, tathA, kAryamidaM ghaTAdi, kAraNaM cedaM mRtpiNDAdi; tathA, sAdhyamidamanityatvAdi, sAdhanaM kRtakatvAdi, kartA ghaTAdeH kulAlAdiH; tathA ayaM vaktA, vAdI, vacanaM cedaM vyavayavaM pazcAvayavaM vA; idaM ca vAcyamabhidheyamasya zabdasaMdarbhasya tathA, ayaM svapakSaH, ayaM ca parapakSa iti sarvazUnyatve kuto'sau vizeSo gamyate ? / " kiM veha thiretyAdi " pRthvyiAH sthiratvam, apAM dravatvam, varuSNatvam vAyozcalatvam, AkAzasyArUpitvamityAdayo niyatAH sarvadevaikasvabhAvAH vizeSAH sarvazUnyatAyAM kuto gamyante ? / tathA, zabdAdayo grAhmA eva indriyANi ca zrotAdIni grAhakANyeveti kuto niyamasiddhiH 1 / - " samayetyAdi " nanu sarvazUnyatAyAM svapnA svapna satyA'lIkAdInAM vizeSanibandhanAbhAvAt samataiva kasmAd na bhavati - yAdRzaH svapnaH, asvapno'pi tAdRza eva; yAdRzazvAsvapna svapno'pi tAdRza evetyAdi ? | athavA, viparyayaH kuto na bhavati - yaH svapnaH so'svapnaH yastvasvamaH sa svapna ityAdi / yadivA, sarveSAmapi svapnA'svapnAdInAM sarvathAzUnyatve'grahaNameva kasmAd na bhavati ? / bhrAntivazAdeva svapnA svapnAdigrahaNamiti cet / tadayuktam - deza - kAla-svabhAvAdinaiyanyena tadgrAhakajJAnotpatteH / kiJca, iyaM bhrAntiH kiM vidyate, na vA 1 / yadi vidyate, tarhyabhyupagamavirodhaH / atha na vidyate, tarhi bhrAnterasazvAbhAvagrAhakajJAnasya nirbhrAntatvAt santyeva sarve bhAvAH, na punaH zUnyateti / athavA, anyat pRcchAmo bhavantam - nanu sarvazUnyatve zUnyataiva samyaktvaM satAM bhAvAnAM grahaNaM sadgrahaH, bhAvasattvagrahaNaM punarmithyAtvamityatra kaste vizeSahetuH ? | 46 " " * yaduktam- na svato bhAvAnAM siddhiH ityAdi; tatpratividhAnArthamAha - "kiha sa-paro bhayetyAdi " nanu kathaM hrasva-dIrgho bhayaviSaye " idaM isvam " " idaM dIrgham " " etacu tadubhayam" ityevaMbhUto sva-paro bhaya buddhiryuga padAzrIyate bhavatA ? kathaM ca teSAM hrasva-dIrghA -bhayAnAM parasparamasiddhirudhuSyate 1 - pUrvAparaviruddhatvAd naitad vaktuM yujyata ityarthaH / ayamatra bhAvArtha:na svalpApekSikameva vastUnAM sattvam, kintu svaviSayajJAnajananAdyarthakriyAkAritvamapi / tatazca hastra - - dIrghA-bhayAnyAtmaviSayaM cejjJAnaM janayanti, tadA - "

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:216: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth santyeva tAni, kathaM teSAmasiddhiH 1 / yadapyuktam-" padhyamAGgalimapekSya pradezinyAM isvatvamasadevocyate" ityAdiH tadapyayuktam , yato yadi madhyamAmapekSya pradezinyAM svataH sarvathA'satyAmapi isvatvaM bhavati, tadA vizeSAbhAvAt kharaviSANe'pi tad bhavet , atidIrghavindriyaSTayAdivapi ca tat syAt / athavA, pradezinyAH svApekSayA svAtmanyapi isvatvaM syAt, sarvatrAsaccAvizepAt / na caivam / tasAt svataH satyAmeva pradezinyA vastuto'nantadharmAtmakatvAt tattatsahakArisaMnidhau tattadrUpAbhivyaktastattajjJAnamutpadyate, na punarasatyAmeva tatyAmapekSAmAtrata eva isvajJAnamupajAyate / evaM dIrgho-bhayAdiSvapi vAcyam / atha "idaM isvam" " idaM dIrgham" "etacobhayam" ityAdi svaparo-bhayabuddhiH paramatyA-parAbhyupagamenocyate, na punaH svataH siddhaM svaviSayajJAnajanakaM hrasvAdikaM kiJcidasti, ato na kazcit pUrvAparavirodha ityatrAhananu sarvazunyatve " idaM svamatam ," "etacca paramatam" ityetadapi svaparamAvena vizeSaNaM kutaH1-na kutazcidityarthaH, sva-parabhAve'pi "samayA vivajao kA" ityAghevAvartana bhAvaH / sva-parabhAvAdyabhyupagame ca zUnyatvAbhyupagamahAniriti // 157-158-159-160-161 // (17051706-1707-1708-1709) // D. C.--If the idea of all-pervading negation were taken As true, there would not exist any distinction between dream and reality; truth and falsehood; between an imaginary Gandharvapura and a real Pataliputra; between a natural four-legged lion and an artificial man-lion Manavaka; between karyas like ghata, etc., and karanas like lump of earth eto., Again, there would be no distinction between sadhya (say, e.g. anityatva) sadhana ( say, e. g. the artificial instrument-by means of which anityatva is brought about) und karta (e. g. a: potter ) who is the doer of the sadhya. There would be no distinotion between a speaker, his speech (composed of three or five parts ), and a number of words that are to be uttered, and there would be no distinction between svapaksa and ,paranaksa. also.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 217: Moreover, properties such as stability of earth, fluidity of water, activeness of wind, formlessness of sky etc., as well as, the rule that sabda, rupa, gandha etc., are grahya and ears, eyes, nose etc., are grahaka, could not be established in the midst of sarvasunyata. Again, in the midst of all-pervading negation, there being no possibility of distinction between satya and asatya either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of svapna as well as asvapna, or (2) there would be inverse apprehension of svapna as asvapna and asvapna as svapna, or (3) there would be absolute non-apprehension of svapna, asvapna and many other things. Here, O Vyakta! It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprenhension of svapna, asvapna etc., is due to bhranti (delusion). For, cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time, place, and properties. And is that bhranti, which, according to you, apprehends svapna, asvapna, etc., vidyamina or a-vidyamana? If it is vidyamana, then naturally sarvasunyata does not exist. If it is a-vidyamana, the jnana that apprehends an object being devoid of bhranti, all objects would automatically be taken as vidya mana and there would be nothing like sarvasunyata at all. And, how is it O Vyakta ! that the apprehension of existent objects as sunya, is according to you, a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as vidyamana is worthless? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this sarvasunyata ? According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves, you apprehend objects that are short, long, or either, distinctly as short, long, or either. Thus on one side, you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects; while on the other side, you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very 28 For Private Personal Use Only

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:88: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth objects. This involvas self-contradiction in your own argument, which, o Vyakta ! is not at all worthy of you. The point is that in case of establishing the existenoe of objects, mere apeksa would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object whigh produces jiana about its own self, is also an active cause. And that is the reason why hrasva, dirga, and abhaya-each one of which would be producing jbana about its own self-should be taken as existing. Again, o Vyakta ! you believe that compared to the middle finger, the prad@sint finger is considered as hrasva even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger, ir prad@sint were taken as hrasva even though it is avidyamana by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also a-vidyamana should be taken as hrasva and a very long substance like indradhvaja should also be taken as hrasva, as the quality of a-vidyamanata is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really spoaking, pradesint finger being vidyamana by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along 'with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So, it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of hrasva, dirgha eto., is produced in the absolutely non-existent anguli only by means of apo ksa. You might argne at this point that in such CASOS also, dirgha, hrasva, ubhaya eto., are apprehended, and the intellects as regards sva, para, and ubhaya are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion, and further that according to you, hrasva, dirgha etc, that are svatahsiddha and that produce jnana with regard to their own selves, are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, o Vyakta ! how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally, there would be no distinction between sva and para at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinotion, there would be bothing like sunyata at al. (1705-1709)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada :219: jugavaM kameNa vA te viNNANaM hona diih-hssesu| jai jugavaM kAvekkhA kameNa puvammi kAgveklA ? // 162 // (1510) AimaviNNANaM vA jaM bAlasseha tassa kaa'vekkhaa| tullesu va kA'vekkhA paropparaM loyaNaduge vva ? // 163 // (1711) Jugavam kamena va ta vinnanam hojja diha-hassegu | Jai jugavam kavekkha kamona puvvammi ka'vekkha ? 162 (1710) Aimavinnanam va jam balassdha tassa ka'vekkha | Tullesu va ka'vekkha paropparam loyanaduge vva ? 163 (1711) [ yugapat krameNa vA te vijJAnaM bhaved dIrgha-isvayoH / yadi yugapat kA'pekSA krameNa pUrvamin kA'pekSA? // 162 // (1710) AdimavijJAnaM vA yad vAlasyeha tasya kA'pekSA / tulyayorvA kA'pekSA parasparaM locanadvika iva // 163 // (1711) Yugapat kramena va te vijnanam bhaved dirgha-hrasvayoh ! Yadi yugapat ko'peksa kramona purvasmin ka paksa ? 162 (1710) Adima vijnanam va yad balasydha tasya ka'peksa Tulyayorva ka'pdksa parasparam locanadvika iva ? 163 (1711).1 Trans.-162-163-1s that vijnana of yours as regards dirgha and hrasva (produced ) all at once, or in regular course ? If (it is produced) all at once, what apsksa (is there )? (And) if (it is produced) in regular course, to what apaksa is the first produced ? Or, to what apaksa has the first and foremost cognizance of a child been produced ? Or, what mutual apeksa (could there be ) in the case of two similar (objects ) like a pair of eyes ? (1710-1711) TIkA-nanu madhyamA-pradezinyAdidIrgha-hasvayostavAmiprAyeNa khAkArapratibhAsi jJAnaM kiM yugapadeva bhavet , krameNa vA ? yadi yugapat vahi parAnapekSaM dvayorapi yugapadeva khapratibhAsini jJAne pratibhAsAt kasya kila

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:220 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth kA'pekSA ? / atha krameNa, tadApi pUrvameva svapratibhAsinA jJAnena parAnapekSa meva isvasya pradezinyAdehItatvAduttarasin madhyamAdike dIrghe kaa'pekssaa| tasAcakSurAdisAmagrIsadbhAve parAnapekSameva svakIyaviviktarUpeNa sarvabhAvAnAM khajJAne pratibhAsAt svata eva siddhiH / athavA, bAlasya tatkSaNameva jAtasya zizoryadiha nayanonmeSAnantaramevAdau vijJAnam , tat kimapekSya praadursti| yadi vA, ye na isve nApi dIpe, kintu parasparaM tulye eva vastunI, tayoryugapadeva svapratibhAsinA jJAnena gRhyamANayoH kA'nyonyApekSA ?-na kAcit, yathA tulyasya locanayugmasya / tasmAdagulyAdipadArthAnAM nAnyApekSameva rUpam , kintu svapratibhAsavatA jJAnenAnyanirapekSA eva te svarUpato'pi gRhynte| uttarakAlaM tu tattadrUpajijJAsAyAM tattatpratipakSasaraNAdisahakArikAraNAntaravazAna, dIrgha-isvAdivyapadezAH pravartante, iti svataHsiddhA eva santi mAvA iti / / (1710-1711) D. C.-Consider whether jnana in case of objects that are hrasva and dirgha is produced at the same time or in regular course. If both the jfanas are produced simultaneously, there would be no scopo for apeksa, both being recognized in their own form at the same time. On the other hand, if jnanas of the two, were produced one after another, the hrasva object would be apprehended by virtue of its own jnana; but later on, to whose ape ks& would the dirgha ohject be apprehended ? This leads us to conclude that, in spite of the existence of mediums like eyes etc., in absence of apeksa, all objects are apprehended in various forms only by virtue of their individual jnanas. This proves that the existence of all objects, is very natural. Again, to whose apoksa is the jitana attained by a child immediately after its birth, produced? And, what mutual apaksa could there exist in reflecting a similar cognizance in two similar objects which are neither hrasva nor dirgha but exactly identical to each other } This shows that various forms of objects like fingers eto., are not apprehended by

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Vada] Ganadharavada :221: virtue of their apeksa to others but by means of their corresponding cognizances which are independent of apaksa. Later on, in the curiosity of observing the forms in details, the objeots are recognized as hrasva, dirgha etc., on account of certain co-operative causes such as recalling the opposite faction etc. Each and every object would, therefore, be taken as existent by virtue of no other factor but its own svabhava. Moreover, kiM hassAo dIhe dIhAo ceva kiM na dIhammi / kIsa va na khapupphAu kiM na khapupphe khapupphAo? // 164 // Kim hassao dihe dihao cova kim no dihammil Kisa va na khapupphau kim na khapuppho khapupphao ? 164 (1712) [kiM isvAd dIrSe dIrghAdeva kiM na dIrthe / karasAd vA na khapuSpAt kiM na khapuSpe khapuSpAt 1 // 164 // (1712) Kim hrasvad dirghe dirghadeva kim na dirghe Kasmad va na khapuspat kim na khapuspa khapuspat ? 164 (1712)] Trans.-164 Why ( is the knowledge) about dirgha (acquired) from hrasva and not from dirgha ( itself )? Or, why not from khapuspa? Or, why not ( the knowledge ) about khapuspa, (acquired) from khapuspa ( itself) ? (1712) TIkA-hanta ! yadi sarvazUnyatA, tataH kimiti isvAdeva pradezinIpramRtidravyAd dIrgha madhyamAdidravye dIrghajJAnAbhidhAnavyavahAraH pravartatedIrghApekSa eva dIrdhana jJAnAbhidhAnena vyavahAraH kiM na pravartate, asattvAvizeSAt ? iti bhAvaH / evaM "kiM dIhAo hasse hassAu ceva kiM na hassammi" ityetadapi draSTavyam / tathA, kimiti vA na khapuSpAd dIrSe hrasve vA tajjJAnAbhidhAnavyavahatirvidhIyate ? / tathA, asattvAvizeSata eva kimiti khapuSpAva khapuSpa eva isva-dIrghajJAnAdivyavahAro na pravartate ? / na caivam, tasAda sattyeva bhAvAH, na tu zUnyatA jagata iti // 164 // (1712)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth D. C.-If everything is sunya, according to the theory of sarva-sunyata, how is it that the cognizance of dirgha is acquired only from its apeksa to hrasva, as seen in the case of prad esint and madhyama fingers, and not from its apeksa to the dirgha itself ? Similarly, why is the practice of appre hending dirghatva from dirgha, and hrasvatva from hrasva not followed? Moreover, the practice of acquiring knowledge of khapuspa, as well as, the knowledge of hrasvatva and dirghatva in khapuspa from the khapuspa itself, is not followed even though sunyata is common to all of them. This shows that there is nothing like sarvasunyata in this world. : 222: fi asharare ciya hoya maI va sabhAva evAyaM / so bhAvo tti sabhAvo vaMjhAputte na so jutto // 165 // (1713) Kim va'vikkha e ciya hojja mai va sabhava dvayam So bhavo tti sabhavo vanjhaputte na so jutto. 165 (1713) [ kiMvApekSayaiva bhaved matirvA svabhAva evAyam / svo bhAva iti svabhAvo vandhyAputre na sa yuktaH / / 165 / / (1713) Kim vapeksayaiva bhaved matirva svabhava evayam | Svo bhava iti svabhavo vandhyaputre na sa yuktah. 165 (1713)] 66 Trans. - 165 Or of what avail is the apoksa at all ? (The opponent may argue here that) Apprehension by means of apeksa is natural. " ( But ) the existence of one's own self means svabhava; (and) that does not apply to the son of a barren woman. ( 1713 ) TIkA - athavA, sarvasyApyesattve husvAderdIrghAdyapekSayApi kiM kartavyam, zUnyatApratikUlatvAt tasyAH ghaTAdyarthasaccavat 1 / atha parasya matirbhavetsvabhAvAdevApekSayaiva hUsva-dIrghAdivyavahAraH pravartate / na ca svabhAvaH paryanuyogamarhati; tathA coktam - " agnirdahati nAkAzaM ko'tra payanuryujyatAm ? " iti / inta 1 itthamapi hato'si, yata svo bhAvaH svabhAvastataH sva- parabhAvA

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Vida ] Canadharavada :223: syupagamAt zUnyatAbhyupagamahAniH / na ca vandhyAputrakalpAnAmarthAnAM svabhAvaparikalpanA yukteti / bhavatu vA'pekSA, tathApi zUnyatA'siddhiH // 165 // (1713) D. C.-If there is absolute negation in the world, what is the use of apeksa in apprehending hrasva etc., to the apeksa of dirgha etc. ? For, the very conception of apo ksa, is contrary to the absolute negation. Vyakta :- Apprehending hrasva, dirgha eto., hy means of apdksa, is very natural. Acarya - That is not so, o Vyakta ! Syabhava is the root-cause in cases like "fire burns" "the sky does not burn" eto. But, that is not applicable to the above-named example of the apprehension of hrasva, dirgha etc. . Hence, svabhava should not be blamed in such cases. It is absurd to assumo svabhava in the apprehension of non-existent objects like vandhyaputra. Svabhava means existence of one's own self. The rest can be distinguished as parabhava--the existence of everything else. Apart from your belief in apdksa, the principle of sarva. gunyata would be violated even from this point of view. How ? hojAvekkhAo vA viNNANaM vAbhihANamettaM vaa| dIhaM ti va hassaM ti va na u sattA sesadhammA vA // 166 // (1714) Hojjavekkbfo va vinpanam vabhihaNGam ettam va i Diham ti va hassam ti va na u satta sesadhamma va. 166 (1714) [ bhavedapekSAto vA vijJAnaM vAbhidhAnamAtraM vaa| dIrghamiti vA isvamiti vA na tu sattA zeSadharmA vA // 166 // (1714)

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:224: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Bhavedapeksato va vijnanam vabhidhanamatran va Dirghamiti va hrasvamiti va na tu satta s@sadharma va. 166 ] ___Trans-166 By means of apeksa, either vijnana or mere acknowledgment (of an object ) as short or long would be (attained ), but not the existence of the rest of the properties. (1714) TIkA-athavA, svataH siddhe vastunyapekSAto bhavet / kim ? ityAhavijJAnamabhidhAnamAtraM vA / kenollekhena ? ityAha-" dIrgham" iti vA "isvam" iti veti / kiM punarna bhavet ? ityAha-na tvanyApekSayA vastUnAM sattA bhavati, nApyapekSikahUsva-dIrghatvAdidharmebhyaH zeSA rUpa-rasAdayo dharmA anyApekSayA siddhayanti / utpadyante ca vastusattAgrAhakANi, rUpAdidharmagrAhakANi ca jJAnAni / ato'nyApekSAbhAvataH kathaM svataH siddhasya vastusacAderabhAvaH ?, tatsadbhAve ca kathaM zUnyatA jagataH iti // 166 // (1714) D. C.--By virtue of its apeksa to another object, a selfAccomplished object would again be either vijnana or the acknowledgment of its own self as hrasva or dirgha and nothing more. Neither existence nor qualities such as rupa, rasa, sparsa etc., that are distinct from hrasvatva, dirghatva etc., could be established by the help of apoksa. Now, jnanas that enable us to apprehend existence along with those qualities, are produced spontaneously. So, how could existence etc., of a self-accomplished object be refuted by means of apaksa ? And when the existence etc., of an object, are not denied, how could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted at all? iharA hassAbhAve savvaviNAso haveja dIhassa / na ya so, tamhA sattAdayo'NavikkhA ghaDAINaM // 167 // (1715) Ibara bassabiave savvavinaso havejja dihassa 1 Na ya so, tamha sattadayo'navikkha ghadatyam. 167 (1715)

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Vada ) Ganadharavada :225 [ itarathA hkhAbhAve sarvavinAzo bhaved dIrghasya / na ca saH, tasAt sattAdayo'napekSA ghaTAdInAm // 167 // (1715) Itaratba brasvabhavd sarvavinaso bhaved dirghasya i Na ca sah, tasmat sattadayo'napdksa ghatadinam. 167 (1715)] Trans.-167 Otherwise, in the absence of hrasva, there should have been an absolute negation of dirgha also. But that is not so. Hence, the existence etc., of ghata etc., are (established as ) independant of (their) apoksa (to other objects). ( 1715) TIkA-itarathA-yadi ghaTAdInAM sattAdayo'pyanyApekSayA bhaveyuH, tadA ikhAbhAve ikhasya sarvavinAze dIrghasyApi vastunaH sarvavinAzaH syAt, ikhasattApekSitvAd dIrghasattAdInAm / na caivamasau dIrghasya sarvavinAzo dRzyate / tamAt nizcIyate-santyanyAnapekSA eva ghaTAdInAM sattA-rUpAdayo dharmAH, tatsatve cApAstA zUnyateti // 167 // (1715) D. C.-If the qualities like existence etc., of the objects such as ghata etc, were dependant upon their comparision with other objects, destruction of a hrasva object would have effected the destruction of a dirgha object also. But really speaking, existence etc, of a dirgha object, are not denied when a hrasva object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like ghata eto., have their properties such as existence, rupa, eto., totally independant of their apeksa to other objects, and hence, the idea of allpervading negation is automatically refuted. jAvi avikkhA'vikkhaNamavikkhago'vikkhaNijamaNavikkha / sA na mayA savvesu vi saMtesu na sunnayA nAma // 168 // (1716) kiMci sao taha parao tadubhayao kiMci nizcasiddhaM pi / jalao ghaDao puriso tahaM vavahArao neyaM // 169 // (1717) 29

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:226 Jinabhadra Garis [ The fourth nicchayao puNa bAhiranimittamettovaogao savvaM / hoi sao jamabhAvo na sijjhai nimittabhAve vi // 170 // Javi avikkha'vikkhanamavikkhago'vikkhanijjamanavikkha i Sa na maya savvesu vi santesu na sunnaya nama. 168 (1716) Kim ci sad taha parad tadubhayao kim ci niccasiddham pi 1 Jalad ghacao puriso taham vavaharad neyam. 169 (1717) Niochayao puna bahiranimittamattovao gad savvam Hoi sao jamabhavo na sijjhai nimittabhave vi. 170 (1718) [ yA'pyapekSApekSaNamapekSako' pekSaNIyamanapekSya / sA na matA sarveSvapi satsu na zUnyatA nAma // 168 // (1716) kiJcit khatastathA paratastadubhayataH kiJcid nityasiddhimapi / jalado ghaTakaH puruSastathA vyavahArato jJeyam // 169 // (1717) nizcayataH punarbahinimittamAtropayogataH sarvam / bhavati khato yadabhAvo na sidhyati nimittabhAve'pi // 170 // (1718) Ya'pyapdksa'pdksanamapdksako'pdksaniyamanapeksya | Sa na mata sarvesvapi satsu na sunyata nama. 168 (1716) Kimcit svatastatha paratastadubhayatah kimcid nityasiddhamapii Jalado ghatakah purusastatha vyavaharato jneyam. 169 (1717) Niscayatah punar-bahir-nimittamatropayogatah sarvami Bhavati svato yadabhavo na sidhyati nimittabhavapi. 170 (1718)] Trans.---168-169-170 Even apdksa-being identical to (the nature of) action (apeksanam), agent (apdksaka), and object (apeksantyam)-could not be accepted. When all are existing, there could not be sunyata at all. some are spontaneous e. g., a cloud; some ( are produced ) by means of others as in the case of ghata; and Some ( are produced ) in both the ways. e. g. a man; while some are produced even for ever. Again, it is certain that each one ( of them), becomes existent by its own self, only by usresorting to the external Jain Education international For Privad & Persal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 227: causes. ( But ) that which is non-existent is not produced even in the presence of external causes. (1716-1717-1718) TIkA-yA'pIyaM isvAderdIrghAdyapekSA sA'pyapekSaNaM kriyArUpam ; tathA, apekSakaM kartAram , apekSaNIyaM ca karma, anapekSya na matA-na viduSAM sammatA / tataH kim ? ityAha-eteSu cApekSaNA-'pekSakA-'pekSaNIyeSu sarveSu vastuSu satsu na kAcit zUnyatA nAma / ato'pekSakAdisavalakSaNe vipakSa evApekSAlakSaNasya hetovRttatvAd viruddhatvamiti // 168 // (1716) TIkA-iha kizcit svata eva siddhathati, yathA kardanirapekSastatkAraNadravyasaMghAtaviziSTapariNAmarUpo jaladaH / kizcinu parataH, yathA kulAlakanuko ghaTaH / kizcidubhayataH, yathA mAtA-pitRbhyAM svakRtakarmatazca purussH| kizcid nityasiddhameva, yathA''kAzam / etacca vyavahAranayApekSayA draSTavyam / nizcayatastu bAhyaM nimittamAtramevAzritya sarva vastu svata eva sidhyati, yad yasmAd bAhyanimittasadbhAve'pi kharaviSANAdirUpo'bhAvaH kadAcidapi na sidhyti| ubhayanayamataM ca samyaktvamiti // 169-170 // (1717-1718) D. C. Consideration of dirgha etc., in comparision with hrasva etc., is itself nothing but karta, karma, and kriya. Now, when all objects are accomplished as existent by virtue of their being either karta, karma or krija, where could the sunyata exist at all ? The existence of all objects is either svatah, paratah, or ubhayatah. There are several objects such as cloud etc, which come into being only by coming into contact with some substance as their karana; some, like ghata are produced by the help of karta, some, like purusa are produced by both (as purusa comes into existence on acoount of his parents as well as, his deeds in the past life). Some objects like akasa are ever-accomplished. Thus, it is seen that various objects come into existence in various ways, according to their usage. But, really speaking, all objects are existing by their very svabhava merely by resorting to their external causos. In case of objects that are non-existent, existence could not be brought

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:228: Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth about even if the external causes were present, because nonexistence is innate in them by their very svabhava. In reply to the question whether astitva and ghata are one or different, the Acarya argues thus - atthitta-ghaDegANegayA ya pajjAyametaciMteyaM / asthi ghaDe paDivanne, iharA sA kiM na kharasiMge? // 171 // (1719) Atthitta-ghadeganegaya ya pajjayanottacinteyam 1 Atthi ghada padivannd, ihara sa kim na kharasingd ? 171 (1719) [ astitva-ghaTekAnekatA vA paryAyamAtracinteyam / asti ghaTe pratipane, itarathA sA kiM na kharazRGge ? // 171 // (1719) Astitva-ghataikanekata va paryayanatracinteyam I Asti ghate pratipannd, itaratha sa kim na kharasrige. 171] Trans.--171 (The question) whether ghata and astitva are one or different, is (nothing but the question) of synonym when ghata is existent. (For,) otherwise, why should it not arise in case of kharasriga (also)? (1719) TIkA-iha "asti ghaTo na tu nAsti" ityeva patipane sati tadanantaramevAstitva-ghaTayoH "kimekatA, anekatA vA?" ityAdinA ghaTAstitvayorekatvA-'nekatvalakSaNaparyAyamAtracintaiva bhavatA kRtA bhavati, na tu tayorabhAvaH sidhyati / anyathA hyabhAvarUpAvizeSAd yathA ghaTA-'stitvayoH, evaM kharaviSANa-vandhyAputrayorapyekatvA-'nekatvacintA bhavataH kiM na pravartate ? iti // 171 // (1719) D. C.-After having asserted that "ghata exists" the question whether ghata and astitva are identical or not, is reduoed to the consideration of both as being mere synonyms of each other. Moreover, this question should arice only in case of the existent ghata. For, if it were not so, the question of skats-andkata would arise in case of non-existent objects like kharasrnga and vandhyaputra also.

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Vada] Ganadharavada :229: Following the example of ghata and astitva, there would be & probability of ekata-ano kata hetween ghata and sunyata also ghaDa-sunnayannayAe vi sunnayA kA ghaDAhiyA somma ! / egatte ghaDao ciya na suNNayA nAma ghaDadhammo ! // 172 // (1720) Ghada-sunnayunayad vi sundaya ka ghadahiya somma ! | Egattd ghadai cciya na sunnaya nama ghadadhanimo 1 172 (1720) [ghaTa-zunyatAnyatAyAmapi zUnyatA kA ghaTAdhikA saumya / ekatve ghaTaka eva na zanyatA nAma ghaTadharmaH ! // 172 // (1720) Ghata-sunyatanyatayau'api sunyata ka ghatadhika saumya il Ekatve ghataka dva na sunyata pawa ghatadharmah | 172] Trans.-- 172 Even in case of ghata and sunyata being different (from each other ), what sunyata, exceeding ghata could be (found), O Saumya? In case of similarity also, it is the ghata itself (which exists) Sunyata does never become the property of ghata. (1720) ____TIkA-nanu ghaTa-zUnyatayorapyanyatA, ananyatA vaa?| yadyanyatA, tahiM "sunnayA kA ghaDAhiyA somma ! tti" saumya vyakta ! zUnyatA kA ghaTAdhikA nAma ?-nanu ghaTamAtrameva pazyAmaH, na punaH kvacit zUnyatA ghaTAdadhikA samIkSyate / athAnanyatA, tathApi sati ghaTazUnyatvayorekatve ghaTa evAsau yujyate, pratyakSata evopalabhyamAnatvAt , na tu zUnyatvaM nAma kazcit taddharmaH, sarvapramANairanupalabdheriti // 1712 // (1720) D. C.-If ghata and sunyata are bhinna from each other, exceeding ghata, what more sunyata ! is required, O saumyat In case of both being sinuilar to each other, sunyata would be nothing but hata on account of its being perceived by pratyaksa pramana. But sunyata would never become a property of ghata as it could never be accomplished by any possible means whatsoever. Moreover,

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: 230: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth viNNANa-vayaNa-vAINamegayA to tadatthiyA siddhaa| aNNatte aNNANI nivvayaNo vA kahaM vAI? // 173 // (1721) Vinnana-vayana-vainamegays to tadatthiya siddhar Annattd annant nivvayano va kaham vai ? 173 (1721) [vijJAna-vacana-vAdinorekatA tatastadastitA siddhA / anyatve'jJAnI nirvacano kA kathaM vAdI 1 // 173 // (1721) Vijnana-vacana-vadinordkata tatastadastita siddha i Anyatve'jnani nirvacano va katham vadt ? 173 (1721)] Trans.-173 (if) knowledge and speech are idnntical, then, its existence is proved. ( But) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no knowledge or speech ? (1721). TIkA-"zUnyaM sarvameva vizvatrayam" ityevaMbhUtaM yad vijJAnaM vacanaM ca, tena-saMha zUnyavAdino bhavata ekatvam , anekatvaM vA ? yokatvam , tatastadastitA vastvastitA siddheti kutaH zUnyatA, vRkSatva-ziMzapAtvayorivaikatvasya vastutvAt / anyatve tu vijJAna-vacanayorajJAnI nirvacanazca vAdI kathaM zUnyatAM sAdhayet , zilAsaMghAtavat 1 iti // 173 / (1721) D. C.-When the knowledge, as well as, the statement that all the three worlds are sunya, are indentical to each other, the existence-and not the sunyata-of an object is establi. shed. For, their identity is similar to the identity of vriksatva and sinsapatva, But when vijnana and vacana are dissimilar, the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock, and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of sunyata. ghaDasattA ghaDadhammo tatto'NaNNo paDAio bhinnnno| atthi tti teNa bhaNie ko ghaDa eveti niyamo'yaM // 174 // (1722) Ghadasatta ghaqadhammo tatto'nanno palaio bhinno Atthi tti tena bhanid ko ghaca eveti niyamo'yam ? 174 (1722)

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:281 Vada ] Ganadharavada [ ghaTasattA ghaTadharmastato'nanyaH paTAdito bhinnH| astIti tena bhaNite ko ghaTa eveti niyamo'yam ? // 174 // (1722) Gbatasatta ghatadharmastato'nanyah patadito bhinnah | Astiti tena bhanitd ko ghata ardti niyamo'yam ? 174 (1722)] Trans.--174 Existence of ghata is a property of ghata. So, (it is) non-separable (from ghata), (and) distinct from pata etc. By saying, therefore, that " It exists ", how could you frame a rule that there exists ghata alone ? (1722) TIkA-ghaTAstitvalakSaNA ghaTasattA ghaTasya dharmaH, sa ca tato ghaTAdananyo'bhinnaH, paTAdibhyastu sarvebhyo'pi bhinnH| tena tato "ghaTo'sti" iti bhaNite 'ghaTa eva' iti "ghaTa evAsti" iti ko'yaM niyama?nijanijasattAyAH paTAdiSvapi bhAvAt te'pi santyeveti bhAvaH // 174 // (1722) ___D. C.-Astitva is the property of ghata, and hence, it is non-separable from ghata but distinct from objects like pata etc. So, when it is said that "ghata exists ", you cannot assert that ghata alone exists. For, the property of astitva is present in objects like pata also, and hence they too are existing. jaM vA jadatthi taM taM ghaDo tti savvaghaDayApasaMgo ko| bhaNie ghaDotthi va kahaM savvatthittAvaroho tti // 175 // (1723) Jam va jadatthi tam tam ghado tti savvaghadayapasango kol Bhanie ghadotthi va kaham savvatthittavaroho tti ? 175 (1728) [yadA yadasti tattad ghaTa iti sarvaghaTatAprasaGgaH kH| bhaNite ghaTo'sti vA kathaM sarvAstitvAvarodha iti ? // 175 / / (1723) Yadva yadasti tattad ghata iti sarvaghatataprasangah kah 1 Bhanite gbato'sti va katham sarvastitvavarodha iti? 175 (1723)] Trans.-175 Or, by saying that whatever exists is ghata, how would the occasion of all being ghata arise ? Or, by

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:282 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth asserting that ghata exists, how would the existence of all be obstructed ? (1723). TIkA-" yad vA proktam-yad yadasti tattat sarva ghaTaH" iti, tatra ko'yaM sarvaghaTatAprasaGgaH ? / tathA, " yo ghaTaH sa evAsti" ityapyukte kathaM sarvAstitvAvarodhaH-kathaM ghaTasya sarvAtmakatvam ? ityarthaH / yadA hi ghaTasattA ghaTa evAsti nAnyatra, tadA " yatra yatra ghaTAstitva tatra tatra ghaTaH" iti na kazcit sarveSAM ghaTatAprasaGgaH, tathA, "ghaTasatvena ghaTa evAsti" ityetasimapyukte na kizcid ghaTasya sarvAtmakatvaM pratIyata iti bhAvaH // 175 // (1723) D. C. Since the astitva of ghata is restricted to ghata alone, and since ghata exists only when ghatastitva is present, there would be no fear of all objects being considered as ghata when we say that "yad yad asti, tat tat sarvam ghatah " Again, astitva of other objects would not be injured by the assertion that ghata exists. For, the all-pervading nature of ghata is not approhended when we say "ghatasattvena ghata ava asti." 175 (1723). After refuting the opponent's view in this way, the Acarya is now asserting his own atthi tti teNa bhaNie ghaDoghaDo vA ghaDo u attheva / cUo'cUo va dumo cUo u jahA dumo niyamA // 176 // (1724) Atthi tti tena bhaaid ghado'ghado va ghaco u attheva Cao'cud va .dumo cuo u jaha dumo niyama. 176 (1724) [astIti tena bhaNite ghaTo'ghaTo vA ghaTastvastyeva / cUto'cUto vA drumazcUtastu yathA drumo niyamAt // 176 // (1724) Astiti tena bhanito ghato'ghato va ghatastvastydva i Cuto'cuto va drumascutastu yatha drumo niyamat. 176 (1724)]

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 238: "" " "" Trans-176 Just as from the assertion of "tree" (we understand) a mango tree or any other tree, but from mango tree (nothing else but) tree is understood, in the same way, by saying that " it exists ", ghata or (objects) other than ghata ( are appreheded ), but from 'ghata, astitva alone is understood. ( 1724 ) " TIkA - yena kAraNena ghaTasattA ghaTadharmatvAt ghaTa evAsti paTAdibhyastu bhinnA, tena tasmAta 64 asti 75 ityukte ghaTaH, aghaTo vA - paTAdirgamyate, nijanijasacvasya sarveSu paTAdiSvapi bhAvAt / " ghaDo u attheva tti " ghaTa iti tu prokte'styeveti gamyate, nijasattvasya niyamena ghaTe sadbhAvAt / atra yathAsaMkhya mudAharaNadvayam / yathA " drumaH " ityukte cUtaH, acUto vA nimbAdirgamyate, drumatvasya sarvatra bhAvAt ! cUtaH iti tu nigadite druma eva gamyate, adrumasya cUtatvAyogAditi // 176 // (1724) "" " " D. C. - As the quality of vriksatva is present in all the trees, when we Fay 39 "tree all the trees-whether 8 mango tree or any other tree-are understood. But when the word mango tree" is spoken, vriksatva alone is understood. For, the mango tree cannot exist without being a vriksa. Similarly, here also, existence of ghata being the quality of ghata, is present in ghata only and nowhere else, while the common property of astitva is present in all objects. So, when we say 'asti', all objects whether ghata or pata-are recognized, as each one of them has its own property of existence. But when we say " ghata" astitva alone is apprehended because ghata has its own satta. " Now, the Acarya replies to the argument that what has already been produced, could not be produced, and so on-- kiM taM jAyaM ti maI jAyA jAo - bhayaM pi jadajAyaM / aha jAyaM pi na jAyaM kiM na khapuSphe viyAro'yaM // 177 // (1725) Kim tam jayam ti mai jaya'jao-bhayam pi jadajayam | Aha jayam pi na jayam kim na khapuppha viyaro 'yam. 177 (1725) 30

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284: Jinabhadra Gani's [ kiM tatamiti matijItA-jAto - bhayamapi yadyajAtam / atha jAtamapi na jAtaM kiM na khapuSpe vicAro'yam // 177 // (1725) [The fourth Kim tajjatamiti matir-jata'jato-bhayamapi yadyajatam | Atha jatamapi na jatam kim na khapuspe vicaro 'yam 177 (1725) ] Trans.-177 If it is believed that neither jsta nor a-jata nor jatajata could be produced, what could be produced then ? Again, if jata is not jata (according to you ), why not think the same about kha-puspa (also ) ? ( 1725 ) 66 TIkA - praSTavyo'tra devAnAMpriyaH, kathaya kiM tad vastu jAtamiti pratipadyate tatra matiH, yajAtA-jAto - bhayAdiprakArairajAtaM sAdhyate -- yasya jAtAjAtAdiprakArairjanma tvayA niSidhyata ityarthaH / yadi hi jAtaM kimapi vastu tava siddhaM, tarhi tatsaccainaiva pratihatA zUnyatA, ataH kiM taJjAtaM jAyate ? kiM tadajAtaM jAyate kiM tajAvAjAtaM jAyate 1 " ityAdayaH zUnyatAsiddhayarthasupanyasyamAnA nirarthakA eva vikalpA iti pracchakAbhigrAyaH / atha tadapi jAtaM jAtAjAtAdivikalpAzrayabhUtaM jAtatvena bhavato na siddham, kintvajAtameva tad, nanu svavacanaviruddhamidaM jAtamapyajAtamiti / kiJca, jAtasyAsacce nirAzrayatvA jAtAjAtA divikalpA nirarthakA eva / athaitadAzrayabhUte jAtAkhye vastunyasiddhe'pi " na jAtaM jAyate " ityAdivikalpa vicAraH pravartate, tarhi khapuSpesuraau kiM na vidhIyate, asattvAvizeSeNa " samayA vivajjao vA " ityAdi - vyaktadoSaprasaGgAt 1 / na ca vaktavyaM -- pareSAM siddhaM jAtamurarIkRtya vikalpA vidhIyante, sva- parabhAvAbhyupagame zUnyatAhAniprApteriti / 177 // (1725) D. C. - Tell me O Vyakta ! what object, according to you, could be proved as jata when it has already been denied production as jata, a-jata or both ? If anything that has been produced, is accepted by you, sunyata would be denied on account of its very existence, and hence alternative questions whether jata, aiala, or jatajata could be produced or not, would become useless. Again, if a jata object which gives rise to a number of alternatives like jata, a-jata etc, is not admissible to you as

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 235: jata and if you take it as a-jata, there would be self-contradiction in your argument. Moreover, when existence of a jata object is denied, alternatives like jata, a-jata etc., would become useless in absence of their asrayas. Now, if you admit the above-mentioned alternatives in case of non-existent objects also, you shall have to apply those alternatives to the kha - puspa, which is also non-existent. Here, it could not be said that all those alternatives were applied by accepting things which were believed as jata by others. Because, it would bring in a distinction between sva and para which violates the principle of sunyata. Moreover, jai saJcahA na jAyaM kiM jammANaMtaraM taduvalambho / putrvaM vA'NuvalaMbho puNo vi kAlaMtarahayassa ? || 178 || (1726) Jai savvaha na jayam kim jammanantaram taduvalambho Puvvam va'nuvalambho puno vi kalantarabayassa ? 178 (1726) [ yadi sarvathA na jAtaM kiM janmAnantaraM tadupalambhaH / pUrva vA'nupalambhaH punarapi kAlAntarahatasya ? // / 178 / / (1726) Yadi sarvatha na jatam kim janmanantaram tadupalambhah | Purvam va'nupalambhah punarapi kalantarahatasya ? 178 (1726) ] Trans.-178 If ( according to you ) it is not produced in all respects, why its apprehension after production? And why not before, or in future, after one has been destroyed ? ( 1726 ). TIkA - yadi sarvairapi prakArairghaTAdikAryaM na jAtamiti zUnyavAdinA pratipAdyate, tarhi mRtpiNDAdyavasthAyAmanupalabdhaM kulAlAdisAmagrInirvartitajanmAnantaraM kimiti tasmAt tadupalabhyate / pUrva vA janmata kimiti tasyAnupalambhaH ? | punarapi ca kAlAntare laguDAdinA hatasya kimiti tasyAnupalambhaH ? | ajAtasya gagananalinasyeva sarvadaiva ghaTAderanupalambha eva

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: 296: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth syAt, yastu kadAcidupalambhaH, kadAcittu nopalambhaH, asau jAtasyaivopapadyata iti bhAvaH // 178 // (1726) D. C.-If according to your sunyata-vada, objects like ghata are not altogether produced, how is it that ghata which is not apprehended in the state of a lump of earth, is appre hended when produced by nimittas like potter etc.? And why is the ghata not apprehended before its production or after it being broken by the hit of a stick etc.? If objects like ghata were altogether a-jata, like khapuspa, they would never be apprehended at all. And, the quality of being apprehensible at one time and non-apprehensible at the other, is possible only in case of a jata object. 178 (1726) Besides, jaha savvahA na jAyaM jAyaM suNNavayaNaM tahA bhAvA / aha jAyaM pi na jAyaM payAsiyA suNNayA keNa ? // 179 // (1727) Jaha savvaha na jayam jayam sunnavayanam taha bhava | Aha jayam pi na jayam payasiya sunnaya kena ? 179 ( 1727) [ yathA sarvathA na jAtaM jAtaM zUnyavacanaM tathA bhAvAH / atha jAtamapi na jAtaM prakAzitA zUnyatA kena 1 // 179 // (1727) Yatha sarvatha na jatam jatam sunyavacanam tatha bhavah | Atha jatamapi na jatam prakasita sunyata kena? 179 (1727)] Trans.- 179 Just as the assertion about sunyata is jata, even though not produced altogether, so also, other objects ( should be taken as jata ). Again, if jsta were denied have been produced, by what means would the sunyata be manifested? ( 1727 ). to TIkA- " zUnyaM sarva jagat " ityevaMbhUtaM yactAviSayaM vijJAnaM vacanaM ca tad yathA jAtA-jAtAdiprakAraiH sarvathA jAtamapyajAtamapi sat kenApi prakAreNa tAvajjAtam, tathA bhAvA api ghaTa- paTAdayo jAtA eSTavyA

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Vada ] Ganadharavada ityato na zUnyaM jagat / atha zUnyatAvijJAna-vacanadvayaM jAtamapyajAtamiSyate, tarhi tadvijJAna-vacanAbhyAM vinA kenAsau zUnyatA prakAzitA ? -na kenaciditi zUnyatAnupapattiriti // 179 // (1727) // : 237: D. C.-Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is sunya are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever, in the same way, other objects such as ghata, pata etc., should also be taken as jeta. And, if you accept vijnana and vacana about sunyata to be a-jata, how would you be able to express sunyata without the help of vijnana or vacana, about it? Hence, sunyata is not acceptible in any way. 1.9 (1727). Also, jAyai jAyamajAyaM jAyAjAyamaha jAyamANaM ca / kajjamiha vivakkhAe na jAyae savvahA kiMci // 180 // (1728) rUvi tti jAi jAo kuMbho saMThANao puNarajAo / jAyAjAo dohi vi tassamayaM jAyamANo ti // 181 // (1729) puvvakao u ghaDatayA parapajjA ehiM tadubhaehiM ca / jAyaMto ya paDatayA na jAyae savvahA kuMbho // 182 // (1730) bomAi niccajAyaM na jAyae teNa savvahA somma ! | iya davvatayA savvaM bhavaNijjaM pajjavagaIe || 183 // (1731) Jayai jayamajayam jayajayamaha jayamanam ca Kajjamiha vivakkhad na jayad savvaha kimci. 180 ( 1728 ) Ruvi tti jai jao kumbho samthanao punarajao | Jayajao dohi vi tassamayam jayamano tti. 181 ( 1729) Puvvakao u ghadataya para pajjaehim tadubhad him ca Jayanto ya padataya na jayad savvaha kumbho. 182 (1730 )

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: 238: Jirabhadra Gani's [The fourth Vomai niccajayam na jayae tena savvaha somma ! I Iya davvataya savvam bhayanijjam pajjavagaie. 183 (1731) [ jAyate jAtamajAtaM jAtAjAtamatha jAyamAnaM ca / kAryamiha vivakSayA na jAyate sarvathA kizcit // 180 // (1728) rUpIti jAyate jAtaH kumbhaH saMsthAnataH punarajAtaH / jAtAjAto dvAbhyAmapi tatsamayaM jAyamAna iti // 181 // (1729) pUrvakRtastu ghaTatayA paraparyAyaistadubhayaizca / jAyamAnazca paTatayA na jAyate sarvathA kumbhaH // 182 // (1730) !! vyomAdi nityajAtaM na jAyate tena sarvathA saumya ! iti dravyatayA sarva bhajanIyaM paryavagatyA // 183 // (1731) Jayate jatamajatam jatajatamatha jayamanam ca | Karyamiha vivaksaya na jayate sarvatha kimcit. 180 (1728) Rupiti jayate jatan kumbhah sansthanatah punarajatah | Jatajato dvabhvamapi tatsamayam jayamana iti. 181 (1729) Purvakritastu ghatataya paraparyayaistadubhayaisca | Jayamanasca patataya na jayate sarvatha kumbhah. 182 (1730) Vyomadi nityajatam na jayate tena sarvatha saumya ! | Iti dravyataya sarvam bhajaniyam paryavagatya. 183 (1731)] Trans.-180-183 Jata, a-jata, jetajata, as well as the jayamana objects are produced in this world on account of various causes, (but) nothing is produced in perfection. The jata (kumbha) is produced, since it has form; the a-jata kumbha is produced because of shape; the jatajata (is produced) even by both, and the jayamana (is also produced) because the process of production takes place in the present tense. But a kumbha which has been produced before, could never be produced on account of ghatata or (by means of) the characteristics of other (objects) or by means of both; and the jayamana kumbha could also never be produced on For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada] Ganadbaravada :239: account of patata. Again sky etc., could also never be pro. duced on account of their nityata. Hence, O Saumya ! nothing could be produced as a substance (but) everything should be taken according to the surrounding characteristics. (1728-1731) TIkA-iha kArya ghaTAdikaM vivakSayA kimapi jAtaM jAyate, kizcidajAtam , kiJcijAtAjAtam , kizcijAyamAnam , kiJcitu sarvathA na jAyata iti / atha yathAkramamudAharaNa:ni--" svItyAdi " rUpitayA ghaTo jAto jAyate, mRdUpatAyAH prAgapi bhAvAt , tadrUpatayA jAta eva ghaTo jAyate ityarthaH / saMsthAnatayA''kAravizeSeNa punaH sa evAjAto jAyate, mRtpiNDAdyavasthAyAmAkArasyAsaMbhavAt / mRdrUpatayA, AkAravizeSeNa ceti dvAbhyAmapi prakArAbhyAM jAtAjAto jAyate, tadanantarabhUtatvAd ghaTasya / tathA, atItA-'nAgata kAlayorvinaSTAnutpannatvAt kriyAnupapattervartamAnasamaya eva kriyAsadbhAvAt natsamayaM vartamAnasamayaM jAyamAno jAyate / kizcittu sarvathA jAtA'jAtadiprakArairna jAyate / kiM punastat ? ityAha-"punvakao u ityAdi" pUrvakRtastu pUrvaniSpanno ghaTo ghaTatayA jAtA-jAtAdivikalpAnAM madhyAdekenApi prakAreNa na jAyate, pUrvameva jAtatvAt / kiM ghaTatayaiva na jAyate ? / na, ityAha-"parapajAehiM ti" tathA, paTAdigataiH paraparyAyaizca ghaTo na jAyate, svaparyAyANAM pUrvameva jAtatvAt , paraparyAyaizca kadAcit kasyApyabhavanAt / sva-paraparyAyaiH pUrvakRtaghaTo na jAyate, jAtA-jAtapaTa-kharaviSANavaditi bhaavH| tathA, jAyamAno'pi vartamAnakriyAkSaNasamaye paTatayA ghaTo na jAyate, pararUpatayA kasyApyabhavanAt / kiM pUrvakRto ghaTa evetthaM na jAyate, Ahosvidanyadapi kizcid na jAyate ? ityAha-"vomAItyAdi" na kevalaM pUrvakRto ghaTo ghaTatayA na jAyate, tathA vyomAdi ca tena kAraNena saumya ! sarvathA jAtAdibhiH sarvairapi prakArairna jAyate, yena kim ? ityAha-yena nityajAtaM sarvadA'vasthitam , hetudvAreNa vizeSaNamidam , nityajAtatvAd na jAyata ityrthH| uktasyaivArthasyopasaMhAravyAjena tAtparyamupadarzayannAha-'iyetyAdi" ityuktaprakAreNa sarvamapi ghaTa-paTa-vyomAdikaM vastu dravyarUpeNa " na jAyate"

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: 240: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth itIhApi saMvadhyate, tadrUpatayA sadAvasthitatvAditi bhaavH| paryAyagatyA paryAyacintayA punaH sarva bhajanIyaM vikalpanIyam-pUrvajAtaM ghaTAdikaM rUpAdibhiH svaparyAyairapi na jAyate, pUrvajAtatvAdeva, ajAtaM tu tava khaparyAyairjAyate, paraparyAyastu kizcidapi na jAyate, ityevaM paryAyacintAyAM bhjnaa| etacca prAyo errouata il 860-808-862-8C311(8492608978-8430-8938)11 D. C-Several objects like ghata which have once been jata in this world, could be produced by reason of their rupatva. Before the rupa of ghata is produced, the rupa of earth is already there, and hence the ghata which is jata to the apeksa of rupitva is produced in this way. Thereafter, ghata is a-jata as far as shape is considered When it takes the shape in course of production, the a-jata ghata comes into existence. The jatajata ghata is produced in both the ways-rupitva as well as akara. Moreove, ghata which is jayamana is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced, takes place only during the present tense. There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories 2. g. A ghata which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as & ghata again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, ghata could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like pata etc. As ghata has its own process of production and characteristics. it could not be produced like an existent pata or a non-existent kharafriga. Thirdly, ghata which is being produced during the present tine, could never be produced as pata etc. For, karya which is being produced as ghata etc., could never be produced as an absolutely different object like pata. So, all objects e. g., ghata, pata, akasa eto., could not be produced in the form of substanoo, as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as paryaya is concerned, all are said to have been produced,

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Vada ] Gapadharavida :2411 In reply to the question viz., "Since everything is made up of some sort of materials, how could those materials exist in the midst of all-pervading negation ?" the Acarya states dIsaha sAmaggimayaM savvamiha tthi na ya sA, naNu viruddhaM / gheppaDa va na pacakkhaM kiM kacchaparomasAmaggI ? // 184 // (1732) Disai samaggimayam savvamiha tthi na ya sa, nanu virudd bam 1 Gheppai va na paccakkham kim kaccoparoma samaggi ? 184 (1732) [dRzyate sAmagrImayaM sarvamihAsti na ca sA, nanu viruddham / gRhyate vA na pratyakSaM kiM kacchaparomasAmagrI 1 // 184 // (1732) Drsyate samagrimayam sarvamibasti na ca sa. nanu viruddhami Grihyata va na pratyaksam kim kacchaparomasamagrt ? 184] . Trans.--184 All (objects) in this world appear as consisting of (some sort of) materials; but, in fact, reverse is the case, (as) those materials do not exist. Or, if it is accepted, why is the ingredient of the hair of a tortoise, not perceptible to the senses ? (1732) TIkA-iha yaduktam- "sarvamapi kArya sAmathyAtmakaM dRzyate, sarvAmAve ca nAsti sAmagrI" iti| tadetad viruddhameva, prastutArthapratipAdakatvAt , vacojanakakaNThau-STha-tAlvAdisAmayAH pratyakSata evoplbdheH|| atha brUSeavidyopaplavAdavidyamAnamapi dRzyate, yata uktam kAma-khama-bhayo-nmAdairavidyopaplavAt tthaa| pazyantyasantamapyartha nanaH kezendukAdivat // 1 // iti / yadyevam, tabasattve sAmAnye'pi kacchaparomajanakasAmagrI kimiti pratyakSata eva nopalabhyate ?, samatA viparyayo vA kathaM na syAditi vAcyam ? iti // 184 // (1732) / D. C.-Vyakta :--All objects are composed of some sort of samagni in this world. But in the midst of sarvasunyata, 81

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: 242: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Samagri, too, does not exist, because everything becomes sunya at the end. Bhagavan :-This belief of yours, O Vyakta! is totally wrong. For, constituents like kantha, ostha, talu etc., which form samagri as well as vacana are directly perceptible. Hence, how could the existence of samagri be denied? Vyakta :-One could perceive even an a-vidyamana object, on account of kama, svapna, bhaya, unmada, or a-vidya, but in fact that does not exist. Bhagavan -If it is so, O Vyakta! why is the samagri that produces the hair of a tortoise, not produced? A-vidyamanata is common in both the cases.. So, either this samagri should be apprehended like the samagrt that produces vacana, or both should not be apprehended. Or, why should not the fault of viparyaya (contrariety) take place when the samagr| that produces the hair of a tortoise is apprehended and the one that produces vacana is not? But, sAmaggimao vattA vayaNaM catthi jaha to kao suNNaM / aha natthi keNa bhaNiaM vayaNAbhAve suyaM keNa ? || 185|| (1733) Samaggimao vatta vayanam catthi jai to kao sunnam Aha natthi kena bhaniam vayanabhave suyam kena? 185 (1733) [ sAmagrImayo vaktA vacanaM cAsti yadi tataH kutaH zUnyam / atha nAsti kena bhaNitaM vacanAbhAve zrutaM kena 1 // 185 // (1733) Samagrimayo vakta vacanam casti yadi tatah kutah sunyam | Atha nasti kena bhanitam vacanabhave srutam kena? 185 (1733)] Trans.-185 And, the speaker-accompanied by a group of constituent part-as well as the speech exist, whence is the sunyata (produced)? On the other hand, if they do not exist, in absence of (speaker as well as) words, by whom is the sunyata pronounced (and) by whom is (it) heard? (1733) For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 243: TIkA-sAmagrI-uraH-ziraH-kaNThau-8-tAlu-jihvAdisamudAyAtmikA tanmayaH sAmagyAtmako vaktA, tadvavanaM cAsti na vA / yadyasti, tahiM kuto jagacchUnyatvam , tadvakta-vacanasattvenaiva vyabhicArAt ? / atha tadvaktavacane na staH, tarhi vakta-vacanAbhAve kena bhaNitaM zUnyaM jagat ?-na kenacit / sarvazUnyatve ca pratipAdyasyApyabhAvAt kena tacchUnyavacaH zrutam ? iti // 185 // (1733) D.C.-Are the speaker-possessed of a group of constituents like heart, head, throat, lips, palate, tongue eto., and the speech, existing or not? If they are, sunynta will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not, in absence of the speaker and speech, there will be none to announce that the world is sunya. Moreover, in the midst of all being non-existent, neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that sunya vacana. Also, . jeNaM ceva na vattA vayaNaM vA to na saMti vynnijjaa| bhAvA to suNNamidaM vayaNamidaM sacamaliyaM vA 1 // 186 // (1734) jai sacaM.nAbhAvo ahAliyaM na pamANameyaM ti| abbhuvagayaM ti va maI nAbhAve juttameyaM ti // 187 // (1735) Jenam ceva na vatta vayanam va to na santi vayanijja i Bhava to sunyamidam vayunamidam saccamaliyam va ? 186 (1734) Jai saccam nabhavo ahaliyam na ppamanamdyam til Abbhuvagayam ti va mat nabhavd juttamdyam ti. 187 (1735) [ yeva na vaktA vacanaM vA tato na santi vcniiyaaH| bhAvAstataH zUnyamidaM vacanamidaM satyamalIkaM vA 1 // 186 // (1734) yadi satyaM nAbhAvo'thAlIkaM na pramANametaditi / abhyupagatamiti vA matirnAbhAve yukkametaditi // 187 // (1735)

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:244: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Yanaiva na vakta vaoanam va tato na santi vacaniyah I Bhavastatah supyamidam vacanawidam satyamalikam va. 186 Yadi satyam nabbavo'thalfkam na pramanametaditi Abhyupagatamiti va mati-r-nabhavid yuktametaditi. 187 (1735)] Trans.-186-187 ( An opponenent may argue that ) "Just as a speaker or speech does not exist, the objects (that are) to be expressed, will be non-existent, (and hence) this (world) is also non-existent " Is this stateinent true or false ? If it is true, there will be no negation, and if it is false, that will no longer be a ground of assurance. Or, if you believed that sunyata is anyhow arrived at, it is not proper (1o do so) in (the midst of all-pervading) negation. (1734-1735) TIkA-yenaiva na vaktA, nApi ca vacanam , tatastenaiva na santi vacanIyA bhAvA iti, ataH zUnyamidaM jagaditi / atrocyate-yadetad vaktavacana-vacanIyAnAM bhAvAnAmabhAvapratipAdakaM vacanaM tat satyamalIkaM vA / yadi satyam , tamusyaiva satyavacanasya sadbhAvAd nAmAvaH sarvabhAvAnAm / athAlIkamidaM vacanam , tarbApramANametat , ato naatHshuunytaasiddhiH| atha yathA tathA vAbhyupagatamasmAbhiH zUnyatApratipAdakaM vacanam , ato'sadvacanaprAmANyAt zUnyatAsiddhiriti tava matiH / naivam , yataH "satyam , alIkaM vA tvayedamabhyupagatam ?" ityAdi punastadevAvartate / kiJca, abhyupagantA,. abhyupagamaH, abhyupagamanIyaM cetyetatrayasya sadbhAve'bhyupagamo'pyeSa bhavato yujyate, na ca sarvabhAvAnAmabhAve etatrayaM yuktamiti // 186-187 // (17341735) D. C.-Vyakta-Now that vakta and vacana have been established as sunya, the vacaniya bhavas will also be sunya on account of the same reason So, ultimately, the whole world is non-existent in all respects. Bhagavan :--If it is so, O Vyakta ! I ask you a question : Is that statement which proves the non-existence of vakta,

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: 245: Vada] Ganadharavada vacana, and the vacaniya bhavas true or false? If it is true, the abhava of the above-mentioned objects, could not be attained on account of its own existence. And if is is false, the statement will cease to be a pramana to establish sunyata. Thus, it is not possible to establish sunyata in either of the two ways. Vyakta :-But the statement which establishes sunyata has anyhow been accepted by us. Our vacana is, therefore, authentic, and sunyata has undoubtedly been established. Bhagavan :-That is not true, O Vyakta! For, in accepting the above-mentioned statement, the same fault will arise when you ask the question as to whether that vacana is true or false and so on. Moreover, you cannot accept the vacana, unless the person who accepts the vacana to be accepted and the acceptance itself are existent. The theory of sarvasunyata seems unfounded from this point of view also. Moreover, famug fa - ag arawis faeg fa fanfeu ? I kiM va na savvaM sijjhai sAmaggIu khapuSphANaM 9 // 188 // (1736) Sikayasu kim na taillam samaggtu tilesu vi kimatthi ? Kim va na savvam sijjhai samaggiu khapupphanam 188 (1736) [ fumaig fa a ad arutaftadsaft faufta ? 1 kiM vA na sarva sidhyati sAmagrItaH khapuSpAnAm 1 || 188 || (1736) Sikatasu kim na tailan samagritastilesvapi kimasti? I Kim va na sarvam siddhyati samagritah khapuspanam. 188 (1736)] Trans. 188 Why is the oil not (manufactured) from the materials like sands and why from sesamum seeds only? Or, why not everything be attained from the materials of khapuspas (only)? (1736). For Private Personal Use Only

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: 246: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth TIkA-sarvabhAvAnAmasace sarvo'pi pratiniyato lokavyavahAraH samucchidyate, tathAhi-bhAvAbhAvasya sarvatrAviziSTatvAt kimiti sikatAkaNasAmagrItastailaM na bhavati, tilAdisAmarayAM vA tat kimasti ? / kiM vA khapuSpasAmagrItaH sarvamapi kAryajAtaM na sidhyati ? / na caivam , tasmAt pratiniyatakAryakAraNabhAvadarzanAd nAmAvasAmagrItaH kimapyutpadyate, kintu yathA khabhAvasAmagrItaH, tathA ca sati na zUnyaM jagaditi // 188 // (1736) D. C.-In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of loka-vyavahara will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type--viz., that of absolute negation-how is it that oil is manufactured only from the samagri of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc. ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the samagri of khapuspas alone ? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not sunya, And, savvaM sAmaggimayaM negato'yaM jo'nnurpeso| aha so vi sappaeso jatthAvatthA sa paramANU // 189 // (1737) Savvam samaggimayam neganto'yam jao'nurapaeso I Aha so vi sappadso jatthavattha sa paramana. 189 (1737) [ sarva sAmagrImayaM naikAnto'yaM yto'nnurprdeshH| atha so'pi sapradezo yatrAvasthA sa paramANuH // 189 // (1737) Sarvam samagrimayam naikanto'yam yato'nurapradesah | Atha so'pi sa-pradeso yatravastha sa paramanuh. 189 (1737)] Trans.-189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials, is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space. But ( if even that occupies space according to you ), wherever it resides, there is a molecule. (1737)

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Vada] Ganadharavada : 247: TIkA-sarva sAmagrImayaM sAmagrIjanyaM vastvityayamapi naikAntikaH, yato dvayaNukAdayaH skandhAH sapradezatvAd dvayAdiparamANujanyatvAd bhavantu sAmagrIjanyA:, paramANuH punarapradeza iti na kenacijanyate iti kathamasau sAmagrIjanyaH syAt ? / asti cAsau, kAryaliGgagamyatvAt ; uktaM ca muu||rnnurprdeshH kAraNamantyaM bhavet tathA nityH| ekarasa-varNa-gandho-dvisparzaH kAryaliGgazca // 1 // athAyamapi sapradezaH, tarkhetpradezo'NubhaviSyati, tasyApi sapradezatve tatpradezo'NurityevaM tAvat , yAvad yatra kvacid niSpredazatayA bhavabuddheravasthAna bhaviSyati, sa eva paramANuH, tenApi ca sAmagrIjanyatvasya vyabhicAra iti // 189 // (1737) D. C.-There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from Samagrt. For, objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the samagrt of those atoms, but a paramanu by itself, does never occupy space, and hence could never be produced from any samagri. This paramanu is produced only from karya-linga, as it is said Murtair-anuraprade sah karanamantyam bhavet tatha nityah i Ekarasa-varna-gandho-dvisparsah karyalingasca II But if you believe this paramanu to occupy space, wherever you apprehend parai...nu, there would be anu till ultimately it would be absoluta y vacant, where nothing but parmanu not produced from any samagri would be found. dIsai sAmagginayaM na yANayo sati naNu viruddhamidaM / kiM vANUNamabhAve nipphaNNamiNaM khapupphehiM // 190 // (1738) Disai samaggimayam na yanavu santi nanu viruddhamidam Kim vanupamabhavd nippharnaminam khapupphdhim. 190 (1788)

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: 248 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ dRzyate sAmagrImayaM na coNavaH santi nanu viruddhamidam / kiM vANUnAmabhAve niSpannamidaM khapuSpaiH ? // 190 // (1738) Drisyate samagrimayam na canavah santi nanu viruddhamidam ! Kim vanunamabhave nispannamidam khapuspaih. 190 ( 1738 ) ] Trans. - 190 It is really contradictory ( to believe ) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist. Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, (all) this is produced by means of ( mere ) khapuspa ? (1738 ) [ The fourth " TIkA- "sAmagrImayaM sarva dRzyate" iti bhavataiva prAguktam, 66 aNavazva na santi " ityadhunA brUSe, nanu viruddhamidam, yathA ' sarvamapyanRtaM vacanam iti bruvataH svavacanavirodhaH, tathA'trApItyarthaH / yadeva hi sAmagrImayaM kimapi dRzyate bhavatA, tadevANusaMghAtAtmakam, ataH svavacanenaiva pratipAditatvAt kathamaNavo na santi ? iti bhAvaH / kiJca, aNUnAmabhAva idaM sarvamapi ghaTAdikAryajAtaM kiM khapuSpairniSpannam, paramANvabhAve tajjanakamRtpiNDAdisAmagrayabhAvAt ? iti bhAvaH / tasmAd yasmAt sAmagrImayaM dRzyata iti pratipadyate bhavatA, tadradeva paramANava iti // 190 // (1738) D. C - If you are to state that those that are not samagrtjanya are not paramanus at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself. It has already been said that everything which is samagrimaya is apprehensible. Again, all that you have accepted as samagrimaya or samagrijanya in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms. Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case. And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like ghata, pata.ete, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like khapuspa eto. ? Because if paramanu is absent, a samagri like mritpinda would also be absent. So, when you assert that samagrimaya is apprehended, the paramanus that form this samagri, are automatically established as existent. Now, in reply to the argument prima facie that since

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Vada ] Ganadharavida :249: rear portion is not perceptble and since front portion is very minute, everything is sunya,t the author indicates, desassArAbhAgo gheppar3a na ya so tti naNu viruddhamiNaM / savvAbhAve vi na so gheppai kiM kharavisANassa // 191 // (1739) Desassarabhago gheppai na ya so tti nazu viruddhamiran i Savvabhavd vi na so gheppai kim kharavisanassa. 191 (1739) [ dezasyArAbhAgo gRhyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidam / sarvAbhAve'pi na sa gRhyate kiM kharaviSANasya ? // 191 // (1739) Dasasyaradbhago grihyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidami Sarvabhave'pi na sa grihyate kim kharavisanasya ? 191 ( 1739) Trans.-191 To say that the foremost portion of a visible objeet is perceptible but it dose not exist, is really contradictory. (Por) even in the midst of all-pervading negation, why is the front part of the horn of an ass not perceived ? (1739) TIkA-yaduktam-"dRzyasyApi vastunaH parabhAgastAvad na dRzyate, ArAdbhAgastu gRhyate, paraM so'pyanyAnyaparabhAgakalpanayA prAguktayuktito nAsti" iti / nanu viruddhamidam-" gRhyate'sau, na ca samasti" iti / sarvAbhAvAd bhrAntyA'sau gRhyata iti cet / tadayuktam, yataH sarvAbhAve tulye'pi kimiti kharaviSANasya saMbandhI ArAdbhAgo na gRhyate / samatA viparyayo vA kathaM na bhavati ? iti // 191 // (1739) ___D.C.-It has been said before that only a front part of a visible object is perceived and not the rear part. This front part, is, in comparision with other parts in the rear, is very suksma and hence that too becomes non-existent. This statement is self-contradicting. For, to say that it is perceptible but it does not exist, is absurd. Here, if it is said, that in the midst of sarvabhava, it is t vide verse 1696. 32

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:250: Jinabhadra Gani's ( The fourth perceptible because of bhranti, that is also not proper. For since abhava is common everywhere, why is the front part o non-existent objects like the horn of an ass etc., not apprehended ? Or, how does it not happen that the front part of objects like kharavisana etc. be apprehended andt bat of objeots like ghata, pata etc. not apprehended ? Moreover, parabhAgAdarisaNao nArAbhAgo vi kimaNumANaM ti| ArAbhAgaggahaNe kiM va na parabhAgasaMsiddhI ? // 192 // (1740) Parabhagadarisanad narabhago vi kimanumanam til Arabhagaggahand kim va na parabhagasamsiddht ? 192 (1740) [parabhAgAdarzanato nArAdbhAgo'pi kimanumAnamiti / ArAdbhAgagrahaNe kiM vA na parabhAgasaMsiddhiH ? // 192 / / (1740) Parabhagadarsanato naradbhago'pi kimanumanamiti i Aradbhagagrahane kim va na parabhagasamsiddhih ? 192 (1740) Trans...-192 On account of the rear part being imperceptible, what inference ( is held ) in case of even the front part ( being imperceptible )? Or, is it that the rear part is not apprehended when the front part is apprehended ? ( 1740) TIkA-"parabhAgamAtrAdarzanAdArAdbhAgo'pi nAsti' ityatra kimanumAnaM bhavataH ? / etaduktaM bhavati-yat pratyakSega sakalalokaprasiddhaM tadagnerauSNyamiva kathamanumAnena bAdhyate ? / ArAdbhAgasya hyApekSikatvAt tadanyathAnupapatteH parabhAgAnumAnaM tApadadyApi yujyate / yastu parabhAgAdarzanamAtreNaiva tamihavaH, so'saMvaddha eva, satsvapi dazAdiviprakRSTeSu meru-pizAcAdiSvadarzanasaMbhavAt / tasmAd na prbhaagaadrshnmaatrennaaraadbhaago'phmotvyH| kiJca, ArAdbhAgagrahaNe. paramAgAnumAnaM - yujyetApiti bhASyakAro'pyAha-" ArAmAgetyAdi " ArAdbhAgrahaNe kathaM na parabhAgasaMsiddhiH 1 api tu tatsaMsiddhireva, nacAhidRzyavastunaH parabhAgo'sti, tatsabaMndhibhUtasyArAgAgasya grahaNAt , iha

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 281 : yatsaMbandhibhUto bhAgo gRhyate tat samasti, yathA nabhasaH pUrvamAge gRhIte tatsaMbandhyaparabhAgaH, gRhyate ca ghaTAderArAdbhAgaH, atastatsaMndhibhUtaH parabhAgo'pyasti / yaccoktam--" ArAdbhAgasyA'pyanya ArAdbhAgaH kalpanIyA, tasyApyanya ityAdi tAvat , yAvat sarvArAtIyabhAgaH" iti / atrApi parabhAgasyAsatve sarvArAtIyabhAgaparikalpanamupapannameva syAt / tasmAdasti parabhAga sia il 888 11 (1980) D. C.-What anumana do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For, how could you deny the existence of front part which is pratyaksa to you like the heat of fire ! It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the apeksa of the rear one, jnana about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of anumana. But from this, it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen. Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one e. g. A visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front poriion which is connected whith the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this, that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like ghata, pata etc, must contain rear portions since their front ones are easily apprehended. Again, the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portions will not fit your anumana. As the rear part is a-vidyamana, the inference of furemost part being so, is absolutely improper. Really speaking, the front part is perceptible in this case, and the inference of rear portion being vidyamana, is correct. Again,

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:252 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth savvAbhAve vikao ArA-para-majjhabhAganANattaM / aha paramaIe bhaNNai sa-paramaivisesaNaM katto ? // 1932 // (1741) Ara-para-majjhabhAgA paDivaNNA jai na suNNayA nAma / appaDivaNNesu vi kA vigappaNA kharavisANassa? // 194 // (1742) savvAbhAve vArAbhAgo kiM dIsae na prbhaago| savvAgahaNaM va na kiM kiM vA na vivajAo hoi ? // 195 // (1743) Savyabhave vi kao ara-para-majjhabhagananattam | Aha paramte bhannai sa-paramaivisdsanam katto? 193 (1741) Ara-para-majjhabhaga padivanna jai na sunnaya namas Appadivannesu vi ka vigappana khara visanassa ? 194 (1742) Savvabhave varabhago kim disad na parabhago i Savvagahanam va na kim kim va na vivajjao boi ? 195 (1743) [sarvAbhAve'pi kuta ArAt-para-madhyabhAganAnAtvam / atha paramatyA bhaNyate sva-paramativizeSaNaM kutaH ? // 193 / / (1741) ArAt-para-madhyabhAgAH pratipannA yadi na zUnyatA nAma / apratipanneSvapi kA vikalpanA kharaviSANasya ? // 194 // (1742) sarvAbhAve vArAdbhAgaH kiM dRzyate na parabhAgaH / sarvAgrahaNaM ca na kiM kiM vA na viparyayo bhavati // 195 // (1743) Sarvabtave'pi kuta arat-para-madhyabhagananatvami Atha paramatya bhanyatd sva-paramativisesayam kutah ? 193 Arat-para-madhyabhagah pratipanna gadi na sonyata nama i Apratipanndsvapi ka vikalpana kharavisanasya ? 194 ( 1742) Sarvabhavd varadbhagah kim drisyate na parabhagah 1 Sarvagrahanam ca na kim kim va na viparyayo bhavati ? 195 ] Trans.--193-194-195 Even in the midst of all-pervading negation, how could the distinction beineen front, rear, ard

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 253: middle portions exist? And, if it is said so in the opinion of others, whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear, and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no sunyata at all. And, if they are not proved (to be existing), why alternatives about (non-existent objects like ) kharavisana ? Or, in the midst of the negation of all objects, why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one? Or, why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or, why not the reverse ( apprehension ) also ? ( 1741-1743 ). Also, parabhAgadarisaNaM vA phalihAINaM ti te dhuvaM saMti / jai vA te vina saMtA parabhAgAdarisaNamaheU 1 // 196 // (1744) savvAdariNau ciya na bhaNNai kIsa, bhAI tannAma / puvvanbhuvagayahANI paccakkhavirohao ceva // 197 // ( 1745) Parabhagadarisanam va phalihainam ti te dhuyam santi | Jai va te vi na santa parbbagadarisanamaheu ? 196 ( 1744 ) Savvadarisanau cciya na bhannai kisa bhanai tannama | Puvvabbhuvagayahant paccakkhavirohao cdva_197 (1745 ) [ parabhAgadarzanaM vA sphaTikAdInAmiti te dhruvaM santi / yadi vA te'pi na santaH parabhAgAdarzanamahetuH / / 196 / / (1744) sarvAdarzanata eva na bhavyate kasmAt, bhaNati tannAma | pUrvAbhyupagatahAniH pratyakSavirodhatazcaiva // 197 // (1745) Parabhagadarsanam va sphatikadinamiti te dhruvam santi | Yadi va te 'pi na santah parabhagadarsanamahdtuh 196 ( 1744 ) Sarvadarsanata eva na bhanyate kasmat, bhanati tannama | Parvabhyugatahanib pratyaksavirodhatascaiva 197 (1745) ] Trans.-196-197 Or, since the rear portions of (objects

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: 254: Jinabhadra Gani's The fourth like ) crystal. etc. are seen, they exist without doubt. And, if they, too, do not exist ( according to you ), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen Why is the reasonthat nothing could be seen-not stated ? If it ts stated, the proposition (which is) accepted before, will (constitute)direct contradiction. (1744-1745) TIkA-nanu yeSAM sphaTikA-'bhrapaTalAdInAM bhAvAnAM parabhAgadarzanamasti te tAvad dhruvaM santyeva, iti " parabhAgAdarzanAt " ityanena hetunA sarvabhAvAnAmasacaM na sidhyati / atha sphaTikAdayo'pi na santi tarhi " parabhAgAdarza nAt" ityayamahetuH, tvadabhipretasya sarvabhAvAsattvasyAsAdhakatvAt / ato'vyApakamamuM hetuM parityajya "sarvAdarzanAd na santi bhAvAH" ityayameva vyApako hetuH kasmAd na bhaNyate / ' bhaNai tannAma tti' atra para uttaraM bhaNati / kim ? ityAha-tannAmAstu " sarvAdarzanAt" iti-ayaM hetustarhi bhavatvityarthaH, yathA tathA zUnyataivAsmAbhiH sAdhayitavyA, sA ca "sarvAdarzanAt" ityanenApi hetunA sidhyatu, kimanenA''graheNAsmAkam ? iti bhaavH| atha sUrirAha-" punvetyAdi " nanvidAnI " sarvAdarzanAt" iti avato bhavataH " parabhAgAdarisaNao" iti pUrvAbhyupagatasya hAniH prApnoti / kiJca, grAma-nagara-sarita-samudra-ghaTa-paTAdInAM pratyakSeNaiva darzanAt sarvAdarzanalakSaNasya hetoH prtykssvirodhH| tataH pratyakSavirodhatazca "sarvAdarzanAt " ityetdyuktmiti| atra kazcidAha-nanu sapakSasya sarvasyAvyApako'pi vipakSAt sarvathA nivRtto heturiSyata eva, yathA " anityaH zabdaH prayatnAnantarIyakatvAt iti, na ghanityo'rthaH sarvo'pi prayatnAnantarIyakaH vidyud-ghana-kusumAdibhirvyabhicArAt / tadvadihApi yadyapi sarveSvapi bhAveSu parabhAgAdarzanaM nAsti, yathApi bahuSu tAvadasti, atasteSu zUnyatAM sAdhayannasau samyag heturbhaviSyati / tadayuktam , yatastatra " yadanityaM na bhavati tat prayatnAnantarIyakamapi na bhavati, yathA''kAzam " ityevaM vyatirekaH sidhyati; iha tu yatra zUnyatA nAsti, kiM tarhi ? vastunaH sacam , parabhAgAdarzanamapi tatra nAsti

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Vada ] Ganadharavada : 256: kintu parabhAgadarzanam , yathA kka ? iti bhavataH sarvAsadvAdino vyatirekA afaela a fersofa, eratsegtarefala 11899-884911 (8088-81984) D. C.--Non-existence of each and every object could not be proved by virtue of the non-apprehension of rear parts. The rear portions of transparent objects like crystal and mica are apprehended. Existence of those objects has therefore undoubtedly been established. Consequently, non-apprehension of all objects can never be proved by means of the hetu that rear portions are not seen, Here, again, if you contend that sphatika etc. also do not exist, your argument that rear portion is not seen, will fail and hence be invalid, as the rear portions of those objects are clearly apprehended. In spite of this faulty argument, if you attempt to establish sunyata by means of a widely applicable statement that " Nothing could be proved to exist as nothing is perceived" then also, the previous hetu that rear part could not be seen, would be violated. Secondly, since village, town, river, sea, ghata, pata etc, are directly apprehensible, the hetu will be evidently invalid in that way also. The opponent may contena again, that a reason which is not applicable to all the instances on the same side, can be called a logical reason if it is absolutely inapplicable to the opposite side, e. 9., sabda is a-nitya, because it is not produced without effort. But this does not mean that all a-nitya objects like lightning, cloud eto, though produced without effort, are a-nitya. Similarly, here also, rear parts of all the objects are not non-apprehensible, but as the rear parts of several objects are not apprehensible, this hetu leads us to prove $unyata in them, and that is why it is called & correot or logical reason ! But, that is not proper. O Vyakta 1 In the hetu mentioned above, perversion of difference is found. Take, for example, the

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:256: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth proposition that "That which is a-nitya, is like akas'a, produced without effort. " If vyatirekavyapti is applied in this case, nothing else but vidyamanata of an object is inferred when sunyata is not found at all. Moreover, rear part is also apprehended in this case. So, O sarvasunyatavadin ! you shall never be able to obtain the vyatirekavyapti. Your hetu will, therefore, not remain as a hetu at all. nasthi para-majjhabhAgA apaJcakkhattao maI hojaa| naNu akkha-sthAvattI apaJcakkhattahANI vA // 198 // (1746) Natthi para-majjhabhaga apaccakkhattao mai hojja 1 Nanu akkha-tthavatti apaocakkhattabani va 198 ( 1746 ) [na staH para-madhyabhAgAvapratyakSatvato matirbhavet / nanvakSA-'rthApattirapratyakSatvahAnirvA // 198 // (1746) Na star para-madhyabhagavapratyaksatvato mati-r-bhavet / Nanvaksa'rthapattirapratyaksatvahanirva 198 ( 1746 ) ] ___Trans.-198 If the rear, as well as, middle portions (of an object) are accepted as non-exintent, on account of their imperceptibility, then either there will be perception of senseorgans as well as objects, or imperceptibility (itself ) will be violated. (1756) TIkA- atha syAnmatiH--para-madhyabhAgau na staH, apratyakSatvAt kharaviSANavat / tadasattve ca tadapekSayA nirdizyamAna ArAdbhAgo'pi nAsti ataH srvshuunytetybhipraayH| tadayuktam , yataH-"akSamakSamindriyamindriyaM prati varvata iti pratyakSo'rthaH, na pratyakSo'pratyakSaH. tadbhAvo'pratyakSatvam , tasAdapratyakSatvAt" ityucyamAne nanvakSANAmarthasya cA''pattiH satA prAmoti, tadApatau ca zUnyatAbhyupagamahAniH / zUnyatAyAM vA'pratyakSatvalakSaNasya hetoreniH, akSA-rthAnAmabhAve pratyakSA-pratyakSavyapadezAnupapateriti bhAvaH // 198 // (1746)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 257 D.C,--Vyakta:- The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like kharavisana. The front parts will also not exist in that case, because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of sarvas inyata. Bhagavana :-The argument is not valid. Pratyaksa means existing at each of the sense-organs. So, when the hetu of apratyaksalva is advanced, there would be apprehension of senseorgans, as well as, the objects to be apprehended, and in their apprehension, Sunyata would never be accepted. For, if sunyata is taken along with the hetu of a-pratyaksalva, the hetu itself will prove invalid. Or, say in absence of indriya and artha, the practical usage or pratyaksa and a-pratyaksa would never be possible. Moreover, atthi apacakkhaM pi hujaha bhavao saMsayAivinnANaM / aha nathi suNNayA kA kAsa va keNovaladdhA vA ? // 199 // (1747) Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavao saisayaivinnanam Aha natthi sunnaya ka kasa va kenovaladdha va ? 199 (1747) [astyapratyakSamapi khalu yathA bhavataH saMzayAdivijJAnam / atha nAsti zUnyatA kA kasya vA kenopalabdhA vA ? // 199 // (1747) Astyapratyaksanipi khalu yatha bhavatah samsayadivijnanam Atha nasti sunyata ka kasya va kenopalabdhi va? 199 (1747)] Trans.--199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is imperceptible (to others). And if that (doubt) does not exist, what is that sinyata? Whose szinyala (is that) ? And who has apprehended it ? (1747) TIkA-nanvapratyakSamapyasti kizcid vastu, yathA bhavataH saMzayAdivijJAnamanyeSAmapratyakSamapyasti, tato yathaitan, tathA para-madhyamAgAvamatyakSoM 33

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258 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth afaora ityanaikAntiko hetuH / atha bhavatsaMzayAdivijJAnamapi nAsti, tarhi kA nAma zUnyatA ? kasya vA'sau ? kena vopalabdhA ? bhavata eveha tatra kila saMzayaH, sa ced nAsti, tarhi kasyAnyasya grAma-nagarAdisattve vipratipattiH ? iti bhAvaH || 199|| (1747) // D. C.-Just as, your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is not perceptible to others, in the same way, there are some objects which exist, in spite of their imperceptibility. Middle and rear portions of such objects do exist, in spite of their a-pratyksalva Your hetu will, therefore involve the fault of anaikantikalva, since it has been applicable to more than one object. Again, if your apprehension of doubt etc., does not exist, where would be sunyata then? To whom does that sunyata belong? And, who has apprehended that s'unyata? The doubt therefore, must exist. Otherwise, who else will raise the doubt about the existence of vidyamana objects like village, town, etc. ? After refuting the idea of sunyala, the Bhagavana now tries to establish the existence of elements like prithvi etc in the following way : paJcakhesu na juto tuha bhUmi-jalA --'nalesa saMdeho / analAssure bhave so'vi na jutto'NumANAo // 200 // Paccakkhesu na jutto tuha bhumi jala'-nalesu samdeho Anila'gasesu bhave so'vi na jutto'numanao || 200 ( 1748) [ pratyakSeSu na yuktastava bhUmi-jalA - 'naleSu saMdehaH / anilA - sskAzayorbhavet so'pi na yukto'numAnAt // 200 // ( 1748 ) Pratyaksesu na yuktastava bhumi-jala-'nalesu samdehah Anila-"kasayor-bhavet so'pi na yukto'numanat 200 (1748)] Trans. - 200 Your doubt about the objects like earth water, and fire, is not proper, because they are ( directly) per.

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Vadal Gasadharavada 259 ceptible (to the senses). That (doubt) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also, by virtue of anumana. (1748) TIkA-tasmAd bhUmi-jala-vamiSu pratyakSeSu tava saumya ! saMzayo naM yuktaH yathA svsvruupe| tathA, anilo'pi pratyakSa eva, guNapratyakSatvAt, ghaTavat, tatastatrApi na saMzayo yuktaH / bhavatu vA, anila-''kAzayoramatyasatvena saMzayaH, tathA'pyasau na yuktaH. anumAnasiddhatvAt tayoriti // 20 // (1748) // D. C.-Just as, in the case of your own body, you cannot raise doubt, so in the case of pratyaksa objects such as bhumi (earth), jaia (water), and anala (fire) also, you should not raise doubt. Moreover, you cannot entertain doubt about vayu (wind) and akasa space), also because, they are established by ineans anumara. Here is the anumana about wind, asthi adissApAiyapharisaNAINaM guNI gunntnno| ruvassa ghaDo vva guNI jo tesiM so'nilo nAma // 201 // 1749 // Atthi adissapaiyapharisanainam guni gunattanao i Rivassa ghado vva gupi jo tesim so'nilo nama 201 (1949) [ astyadRzyApAditasparzanAdInAM guNI guNatvataH / rUpasya ghaTa iva guNI yasteSAM so'nige nAma / / 201 // (1749) Astyadrisyapaditasparsanadinam guni gupatvatah Rupasya ghata iva gupi yastesam so'nilo nama 120111 (1749)] Trans.--201. Just as ghata is the object possessing the property of rupa, 'wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties, like a sense of touch, etc. produced by some invisible (force.) (1749) TIkA-ya ete'dRzyena kenApyApAditA janitAH pAdayaste vidyamAnaguNinaH, guNatvAt, Adi zabdAcchanda-svAsthya-kampA guDante, ete'pi

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260 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth hi vAyumabhavAd vAyuguNA eva, iha ye guNAste vidyamAnaguNino dRSTAH, yathA ghaTa-rUpAdayaH, yazcaiSAM sparza - zabda-svAsthya-kampAnAM guNI sa vAyuH tasmAdastyasAviti // 201 // (1749) // D. C.---Properties like sparsa, sabda, svasthya, and kampa are produced by means of some invisible force. Now, since these properties appear as existing in voya (wind), vayu is said to possess those properties, just as ghata possesses the property of ripa. The anumana to establish akas is this : asthi vasuhAhabhANaM toyassa ghaDo vva muttimttaao| jaM bhUyANaM bhANaM taM vomaM vatta! suvvattaM // 202 / / (1750) Atthi vasuhaibhanam toyassa ghaco vya muttimattao Jam bhuyanam bhapam tam vomam Vattal suvvattam 1120211 [bhasti vasudhAdibhAjanaM toyasya ghaTa iva mRtimattvAt / yad bhUtAnAM bhAjanaM tad vyoma vyakta ! suvyaktam // 203 // (1750) Asti vasudhadibhajanam toyasya ghata iva murtimattvat Yad bhutanam bliajanam tad vyoma Vyakta ! suvyaktam 12021 Trans -~-202 Just as ghata becomes the receptacle of water, so there is a receptacle for earth etc. also. The receptacle of (those) elements is nothing but akasa. (1750, TIkA asti vasudhA-jalA-'nala-vAyanAM bhAjanamAdhAraH, mUrtimatyAta, toyasya ghaTavat, yacca teSAM bhAjanaM, tadAyuSman vyakta ! muvyakta vyometi / yadi ca sAdhyaikadezatAM dRSTAntasya kazcit prerayavi, tadetya prayogaH-vidhamAnamAjanA pRthivI, mUrtatvAt, toyavat, tathA, ApaH, tejovat tejazca nAyuvat, vAyuzca pRthivIvaditi // 202 / / (1750) ____D. C-Eartil, water, fire, and wind have their adharas of the type of the ghata full of water on account of their being corporeal. This adhara, O Vyakta! is well known as akasa. Since prithvi

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 261 has its bhajana vidyamona on account of its mirtatva like water, water has also the bhajana same as that of fire, and the fire in turn, has the one similar to that of wind, which ultimately will have the same one as prithvi. Having established the existence of all the five elements the Acarya now concludes: ----- evaM paJcarakhAipamANasiddhAI somma ! paDivaja / jIva- sarIrAhArovaogadhammAI bhUyAI / / 203 / / (1751 ) Evam paccakkhaipamanasiddhaim somma! padivajja Jiva-sariraharavaogadhammaim bhuyaim. 203 (1751) [ evaM pratyakSAdipramANasiddhAni saumya : pratipadyasva / jIva- zarIrAdhAropayogadharmANi bhUtAni // 203 // (1751) Evam pratyaksadipramanasiddhani saumya! pratipadyasva Jiva-sariradharopayogadharmani bhutani 203 (1751)] Trans. - 203 So, O Saumya ! Accept those bhiitas that have iva and sarira as their adharas along with the property of common usage to have been established by means of evidences such as those perceptible by senses etc. Now, the bhutas are established as animate in this way:-- kiha sajIvAI maI taliGgAo nilAvasANAI | vomaM vimuttibhAvAdAdhAro veva na sajIvaM // 204 // (1752) Kiha sajivaim mai tallingao'nilavasanaim Vomam vimuttibhavadadharo ceva na sa-jivam 204 (1752) [ kathaM sajIvAni matistaliGgAdanilAvasAnAni / vyoma vimUrtibhAvAdAdhAra eva na sajIvam // 204 // (1752) Katham sa-jivani matistallingadanilavasanani Vyoma vimurtibhavadadhara eva na sa-jivam 204 (1752)]

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262 Jinabhadra Ganis [The fourth Trans:-204 (The opponent may ask How are they animate? (The answer is,-Bhibas ending at vityu are animate on account of (their possessing) that characteristic. The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support, (and hence) it is not animate TIkA-kathaM punaH saha jIvena vartanta iti sajIvAni bhUtAni ? iti parasya matiH syAt / atrocyate-tasya jIvasya liGga talliGgaM tasmAt tadupalabberityarthaH, sacetanAnyaniLAvasAnAni catvAri bhUtAni / vyoma-AkAzaM punarvigatamUrtibhAvamAdhAraNa eva, na tu sajIvamiti // 204 // (1752) D. C. Vyakta :-How are the bhaitas sajiva as they exist along with jiva? The Acarya. ---Prihvi jalu, agne and vayu are sajiva because they possess the characteristics of siva. But the sky is not sajiva since it is a-miirta and hence it acts merely as an adhara. The living characteristic of prithvi can be laid down as follows: jmm-jraa-jiivnn-mrnn-rohnnaa-haar-dohlaa-myo| rAga-tigicchAIhi ya nAri vva saceyaNA taravo // 205 // (1753) Janma-jara-jivana-marapa-rohana-hara-dohala-mayaon Roga-tigicchaihi ya nari va sa-ceyana taravo 11201511 (1753) [janma-jarA-jIvana-maraNa-rohaNA-''hAra-dauhadA-''mayataH / roga-cikitsAdibhizca nArIva sacetanAstaravaH // 205 // (1753) Janma-jara-jivana-marana-rohana-"hara-dauhruda-"mayatah Roga-cikitsadibhisca narivva sa-cetanastaravah 120511 (1753)] Trans:--205 Trees, like woman, are living (beings) by reason of (their having) birth, old age life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease, and its diagnosis etc.

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Vadal Canadharavada 263 TIkA-"sacetanAstarava " iti pratijJA / "janma-jarA-jIvanamaraNa-kSatasarohaNA-''hAra-dohRdA-''maya-tacikitsAdisadbhAvAt " iti hetuH / " nArIvat" iti dRssttaantH| Aha-nanvanaikAntiko'yam, acetanedhapi jnmaadivypdeshdrshnaat| tathAhi-' jAtaM tad dadhi" iti vyapadizyate, na caitat scetnm| tathA, "jIvitaM viSam" "mRtaM kumumbhakam" ityAdi / atrocyate-vanaspatI sarvANyapi sacetanaliGgAni janmAdInyupala. bhya te, ato manuSyeSviva tAni teSu nirupacaritAni, dadhyAdau tu pratiniyata eva kazciJjAtAdivyapadezo dazyate, sa caupacArika eva-jAtamiva jAtaM dadhi, mRtamiva mRtaM kusummakamityAdi // 205 / / (1753) D. C.--Trees are sa-cetana like woman Because, like woman, they possess the living characteristics such as janna-jara jivanamarana etc. Some one might argue that this rule could be applied to the lifeless objects also. Because, several characteristics like life, death, etc. are very well applied to the lifeless objects as well, when it is said that "curds is produced" or "(effect of) that poison is still alive" or (intoxication of) safflowert is dead" and so on, even though the objects mentioned there in, are lifeless. The argument mentioned above is not justified, since all the characteristics of celana are residing in the animate objects as their innate qualities. But in the case of life!ess objects, those characteristics are rarely applied, and that too, in a particular sense, and not as a rule. chikkaparoiyA chikkamettasaMkoyao kuliMgo vya / AsayasaMcArAo viyatta ! vallIviyANAiM // 206 // (1754) sammAdao ya sAva-ppaboha-saMkAyagAio'bhimayA / baulAdao ya sahAivisayakAlovalaMbhAo // 217 // (1755) + Popularly known as Kasumba in Kathiawar.

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264 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourti. Chikkaparoiya chikkamettasankoyao kulingo vva Asayasancarao Viyatta I valliviyanaim 1t 206 (1754) Sammadao ya sava-ppaboha-sankoyanaio'bhimaya / Bauladao ya saddaivisayakalovalambhao | 207 11 (1755) [ spRSTaparodikAH spRSTamAtrasaMkocataH kuliGga iva / AzrayasaMcArAd vyakta ! vallIvitAnAni // 206 / (1754) zamyAdayazca svApa-prabodha- saMkocanAdito'mimatAH / bakulAdayazca zabdAdiviSayakAlopalambhAt // 207 // (1755) Spristprarodikah spristamatrasankocanatah kulinga iva i Afrayasancarad Vyakta ! vallivitanani 11 206) (1754) ] Samyadayasca svapa-prabodha-sankocanadito'bhimatah Bankuladayasca sabdadivisaya kalopalambhat | 2071 (1755 )] Trans.-206-207 For, sensitive plants, O Vyakta ! contract themselves like worm at the touch (of others); clusters of creepers spread themselves for support; sami etc. are supposed to contain the properties of sleeping, waking, contraction etc. and bakula etc. contain the properties like tabda etc. and (the other of) time also. (1754-1755) TIkA--sacetanAH spRSTabharodikAdayo vanaspatayaH, spRSTamAtrasaMkocAt, kuliGgaH koTAdistadvat / tathA, sacetanA vallyAdayaH, svarakSArtha vRtti-vRkSavaraNDakAdhAzrayaM prati saMcaraNAt / tathA, zamyAdayazcetanatvenAmimatAH, svApaprabodha-saMkocAdimattvAt , devadattavat / tathA sacetanA bakalA-'zoka-kuruvakavirahaka-campaka-tilakAdayaH, zandAdiviSaya kAlopalambhAt-zabda-rUpa-gandha rasa-sparzaviSayANAM kAle prastAva upabhogasya yathAsaMkhyamupalambhAdityarthaH, yjnydttvditi| evaM pUrvamapi dauhRdAdiliGgeSu kUSmANDI-bIna pUrakAdayo vanaspativizeSAH pakSIkartavyA iti // 206--207 // (1754. 1755) // D, C.-Plants like spaei s'aprarodika contract themselves like worm at a slight touch, and hence they are sa-cetana.

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Vada ] Canadharavada 265 So are the creepers spreading over a wall, tree or fence, for self-protection. Sami etc. are also sa-cetana, since they have the tendency to sleep, wake, or feel shy like Devadatta. Trees like bakula, asoka, kurabaka, viharaka, campaka, tilaka etc., are res. pectively able to feel the sensations of sabda, rupa, rasa, gandha sparsa etc. Plants like kusmandi and bijapuraka feel the longing of a pregnant woman. It is clear, therefore, that vanaspati is sa-cetana, Moreover, maMsaMkuro vva saamaannjaairuuvNkurovlNbhaao| tarugaNa-vihuma-lavaNo-balAdao sAsayAvatthA // 208 // (1756) Maisankuro wa samanajai-ruvankurovalambhao 1 TarugaNGa-vidduma-lavano-valadao-sasayavattha. 1208 # (1756) [mAMsAGkara iva samAnajAvirUpAkSuropalambhAt / tarugaNa-vidruma--lavaNopalAdayaH svAzrayAvasthAH // 208 // (1756) Mansankura iva samanajatirupankuropalambhati Tarugapa-vidruma-lavano-paladayah svasrayavasthah u 208 // (1756)] Trans.-208 Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. (are alive! at their own places of production by reason of their having a sprout in the form of common generality, similar to the sprout of flesh. (1756) TIkA-tarugaNaH tathA vidruma--lavaNo--palAdayazca svAzrayAvasthA svajanmasthAnagatAH santazcetanAH, chimAnAmapyamISAM punastatsthAna eva samAnajA. tIyAGkurotthAnAt, ardhAmAMsAGkuravat / Ai--nanu pRthivyAdibhUtAnAmiha sacetanatvaM sAdhayitumArabdham, tataH pRthivyA evAdau vada sAdhayitu yuktam, tasyA evAdAvupanyAsAt, tatkimiti "jamma--jarA- jIvaNa" ityAdinA tarUNAmevAdau tat sAdhitam, pazcAttu vidruma--lavaNo--palAdInAmiti ? / satyam, kintu pRthvIvikAratayA pRthvIbhUta eva tarUNAmantarbhAvo lokaprasiddhaH 34

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- 266 Jinabhadra Gani's The fourth muvyaktacaitanyaliGgAzca yayA taravo na tathA lavaNo-pala-jalAdaya iti harat dari Alfafafa 1120611 (8199EUR) 11 D. C.-Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. are sa-cetana at their own places of production Because, the sprouts of these objects spring up, again and again, like the sprout of flesh springing up in the case of disease of piles etc. Vyakta :-Really speaking, you had started to establish sacetanatva in the elements like prithvi etc Then, what is the idea in proving sa-cetanatva first in the case of vanaspati and then in the case of prithvi ? Bhagavana :- Vanaspati is nothing but a form of prithvi. Hence, out of the five bhitas, vanaspati resides only in prithvi. Moreover, the spirit of life is not so clearly manifested in stones etc. as it has been in case of vanaspati. For this reason, o Vyakta ! Caitanya is established first in vanaspati and then in prithvi. Now, the sa-cetanatva of water is established - bhUmikkhayasAbhAviyasaMbhavao dadduro vva jalamuttaM / mahavA maccho va sbhaavvomsNbhuuypaayaao|| 209 / / (1757) Bhumikkhayasabhaviyasambhavao dadduro wa jalamuttam i Ahaya maccho va sabhavavomasambhuyapayao 120911 (1757) [xford Tufanaat T FT HETI athavA matyasya iva svabhAvavyomasaMbhUtapAtAt // 209 // (1757) Bhumiksatasvabhavikasambhavato dardura iva jalamuktami Athava matsya iva svabhavavyomasambhutapatat 11 209 11 (1757)] Trans.-209 Water springing up naturally by digging the earth, is said to be living like a frog; or, by reason of its falling naturally from the sky, water is living like a fish. (1757)

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267 Vida] Ganadharavada TIkA-bhaumamambhaH sacetanamuktam, kSatabhUmisajAtIyasvAbhAvikasya tasya saMbhavAt, daduravat / athavA, sacetanamantarikSamambhaH, anAdivikArasvabhAvasabhUtapAtAta, matsyavaditi // 209 // (1757) // D. C.- Water springing from earth when dug out of it, is sa-cetana like a frog; or, that which falls from the sky as natural rains, is also called sa-cetana, since it comes from vikaras like clouds etc. Fire, as well as wind, can also be taken as sa-cetana in this way : aparapperitiriyAniyamiyadiggamaNo'nilo go vva / analo AhArAo viddhi-vigaarovlmbhaao|| 21 // (1758) Aparapperiyaniyamiya diggamanao'nilo go wa i Analo aharao viddhi-vigarovalambhao 11 210 11 (1758) [aparaperivatiyaMganiyamitadiggamanato'nilo gauriva / anala AhArAd ddhi--vikAropalambhAt / / 210 // (1758) Aparapreritatiryganiyamitadiggamanato'nilo gauriva | Anala aharad vriddhi-vikaropalambhat 1 21011 (1758)] Trans.-210 Wind is (alive) like a cow on account of its moving to and fro in various directions without being impelled by others. Fire is sa-cetanu because it has attained growth as well as a variety of forms by means of food. (1758) TIkA--sAtmako vAyuH, aparapreritatiryaganiyamitadiggamanAt, govat / yathA, sAtmakaM tejaH, AhAropAdAnAt, tadvRddhau vikAravizeSopaLammAva, naravat / gAthAbandhAnulomyAcca, naravat / gAthAbandhAnulomyAca vyatyayenopanyAsa iti // 210 // (1758) D. C.-Wind has life as it moves in all directions without the help of any external agency. Fire is also sa-jira as it is able to grow and manifest various forms by the help of ahara. -

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268 Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth tnnvo'nnnbhaaivigaarmuttjaaitto'nnilNtaaii| sasthAsatthahayAo nijIva--sajIvaruvAo / / 211 / / (1759) Tapavo'nabbhaivigaramuttajaittao'nilantaims Satthasatthahayao nijjiva-sa-jivaruvao 1121111. (1759) [tanavo'nabhrAdivikAramUrtajAtitvato'nilAntAni / zastrA--'zakhahatA nirjIva--sajIvarUpAH // 211 // (1759) Tanavo'nabhradivikaramurtajatitvato'nilantani / Sastra-sastrahata nirjiva-sa-jiva rupah 11 211 (1759) ] Trans.-211 Bodies ( made of the four bhutas ) ending at vayu though different from forins like clouds etc. become lifeless when smashed by weapons and alive when free from weapons on account of their corporeal form. (1759) ___TIkA--pRthivyAdhanilAntAni catvAri bhUtAni jIvanirvatitAstadAdhArabhUtAstanava iti pratijJA, abhrAdivikArAdanyatve sati mUrtajAtitvAt, gavAdizarIravat / abhrAvivikArastu vistrasApariNatapudalasaMghAtarUpatvenAcetanatvAd varjitaH / tAzca pRthivyAditanavaH zasropahatA nirjIvAH azasropahatAstu sajIvA varNa-gandha-rasAdilakSaNataH samavaseyA iti // 211 // (1759) D. C.-Objects made of bhutas like prithvi, jaia, tejas, and vayu are distinguished from objects like clouds etc. on account of their definite corporeal forms. Hence, these bodies are alive when free from the attack of any weapon, but they at once become lifeless when smashed by weapons. Bhutas like prithvi etc. can be proved as living in another way also :-- sijhaMti somma ! bahusA jIvA navasattasaMbhavo naviya / parimiyadeso logo na saMti cegiMdiyA jesi // 212 // (1760) te siM bhavavicchittI pAvai nehA ya sA jao teNa / siddhamaNaMtA jIvA bhUyAhArA ya te'vassaM // 213 // (1761)

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269 Vada ] Ganadharavada Sijjhanti Sommal bahuso jiva navasattasambhavo navi ya 1 Parimiyadeso logo na santi cegindiya jesim 11 212 (1760) Te sim bhavavicchitti pavai nettha ya sa jao tema l Siddhamaganta jiva bhuyahara ya te'vassam 21311 (1761, [sidhyanti saumya ! bahuzo jIvA navasattvasaMbhavo nApi ca / parimitadezo loko na santi caikendriyAM yeSAm / / 212 // 1760) teSAM bhavavicchittiH pAmoti neSTA ca sA yatastena / siddhamananantA jIvA bhUtAdhArAzca te'vazyam // 213 // (1761) Sidhyanti Saumya / bahuso jiva navasttvasambhavo napi ca Parimitadeso loko na santi caikenkriyam yesam |212 // 1760] Tesam bhavavicchittih prapnotinesta ca sa yatastena i Siddhamananta jiva bhutadharasca tevasyam 1121311 (1761)] i Trans.--212-213 Many a jiva, o Saumya! attains moksa and there is no possibility of new jivas (to be born). The world is limited. So, those according to whom, plants, etc. do not exist, will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (ca) that is not desirable. Hence, it is definitely proved that they (i.e. plants etc.) are the endless jivas with bhutas as their supports ( 17601761) TIkA--sidhyanti mukti yAnti tAvadajasaM bahuzo jIvA, na ca navasavotpAdaH kenApISyate, parimitadezazca lokaH, tatastadAdhArAH sthUlAH stokA eva jIvA ghaTante / evaM ca sati yeSAM matena vanaspatyAdaya ekendriyA jIvA na santi, teSAM bhavasya saMsArasya vyavacchittiH mAmoti / na cAsau kasyApi tIrthAntarIyasyeSTA yataH, tena tasmAt kAraNAt siddhaM satcAnAMmAnamtyam / te ca saMsAritvAdavazyaM bhUtAdhArAH zarIriNa evetyarthaH / na ca banaspatyAdInantareNAnyat teSAM zarIramupapadyate / nivedyantAM vA yaccharIrAste, abhyupagamyatAM vA vanaspatyAdInAM sAtmakatvamiti bhAvaH // 212--213 // (1760--1761) // D. C. Since many jivas attain moksa there is no possibility

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270 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth of new sattvas to be born. Moreover, this world is limited in space. It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of jivos depending upon it Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc. are not sa-cetana, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time. But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted. Now, since all these jivas are the mundane zivas, they must have bhutas as their sastras (weapons) and since plants etc. are based on bkutus they should also be undoubtedly taken as sanjiva. Now, the opponent's objection and its refutation-- evamahiMsAbhAvo jIvaghaNaM ti na ya taM jo'bhihi| satthovayamajIvaM na ya jIvaghaNaM ti to hiMsA // 214 // (1762) Evamahimsabhavo jivaghanam ti na ya tam jao'bhihiami Satthovahayamajivam na ya jivaghanam ti to himso 1121411 (1762) [ evamahiMsA'bhAvo jIvaghanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam / zastropahatamajIvaM na ca jIvadhanamiti tato hiMsA / / 214 // (1762) Evamahimsa'bhavo,jivaghanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam i Sastropahatamajivain na ca jivaghanamiti tato himsa 121411 (1762)] Trans.--214 ( The opponent inay ask that ) There is no Xossibility of ahimsa in that case on account of the statement that "(the world) is compact with jivas." (The reply is-) That is not so. It has already been said that, one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons. So, himsa could never be derived merely from the statement that "( the world ) is compact with jivas." (1762) TIkA-nanvevaM sati lokasyAtIvapRthivyAdijIvaghanatvAdahiMsA'bhAvaH, saMyatairapyahiMsAvatapityaM nirvAhayitumazakyamiti bhaavH| tadetad na, yato'nantaramevAbhihitamasmAbhiH--" zastropahataM pRthivyAdikamajIvaM" bhavati /

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271 Vada ] Ganadharavada tadajIvatve cAkRtA-'kAritAdiparibhogena nirvahatyeva yatInAM sNymH| na ca "jIvadhano lokaH" ityetAvanmAtreNaiva hiMsA saMbhavatIti // 214 // (1762) / / D.C.-Vyahta:-If the world is packed with Jivas such as prithvi etc. even an ascetic will not be able to follow the vow of ahinsa, etc. as they will least require food etc. which they would not obtain without himsa. Bhagavata :-For this, it has already been said O Vyakta) that prithvi etc. become lifeless when beaten by weapons. Thus, when they become a-jiva there is no objection for yatis to get their food from them. So, it is not proper to deduce himsa merely from the statement that the world is full of jivas. Moreover, na ya ghAyau tti hiMso nAghAyaMno tti nicchiymhiso| na viralajIvamahiso na ya jIvaghaNaM ti to hiMsA // 215 / / (1763) ahaNaMto vihu hiMso duhRtsaNao mao ahimaro ch| bAhiMto na vi hiMso suddhattaNao jahA vijo // 216 // (1765) Na ya ghayau tti himso naghayanto tti nicchiyamahieso I Na viralajivamahiriso na ya jivaghanam ti to hiriso 1215 11 (1763) Ahananto vi hu himso dutthattapao mao ahimaro va i Bahinto na vi himso suddhattanao jaha vijjo 11 216 I (1764) na ca ghAtaka iti hiMsro nAnamiti nishcitimhiNsrH| na viralajIvamahistro na ca jIvadhanamiti tatohivaH // 215 / / (1763) annanapi khalu hiMsro duSTatvato mato'bhimara iva / bAdhamAno nApi hiMsraH zuddhatvato yathA vaidyaH // 216 // (1764) Na ca ghataka iti himsro naghnanniti niscitamahimsrah 1 Na viralajivamhimsro na ca jivaghanamiti tato himsrah // 215 / /

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272 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Aghnannapi khalu himsro dustatvato mato'bhimara iva i Badhamano napi himsrah suddhatvato yatha vaidyah 11 216 11 ] Trans.-215-216 One who is destructive, is not (necessarily) murderous, and one who is not destructive, is not certainly non. violent Nor is one having little givi a-himsaka and one that is packed with jivas accepted as himsaka. Por, one is murderous, like a hunter, on accouut of his wicked motive even without killing; while another afflicting others with a good purpose, like a physician, is not murderous. (1J63-1764 . TIkA-na hi "ghAtakaH" ityetAvatA hiMsaH na cAnamapi nizcayanayamatenAhisaH, nApi "virala jIvam" ityetA mAtreNAhiMsraH, na cApi "jIvadhanam" ityetAvatA ca hiMsra iti| kiM tarhi ? amimaro gajAdighAtakA sa itra duSTAdhyavasAyo'nanapi hiMsro mtH| bAdhamAno'pi ca zuddhapariNAmo na hiMsro yathA vaidyaH, iti ghanapyahiMstraH, ananapi ca hiMsra uktaH // 215216 // (1763-1764) / D). C- The point is that one committing actual hinasu is not hinsaka, because of his good motive as in the case of a physician, while another, not actually committing himsi but having wicked purpose, is himsaka like a hunter, Also, paMcasamio tigutto nANI avihiMsao na vivriio| hou va saMpattI se mA vA jIvovaroheNaM // 217 // (1765) Pancasamio tigutto pani avihimsao na vivario 1 Hiu va sampatti se ma jivovarohenam || 217 // (1765) [paJcasamitastrigupto jJAnyavihiMsako na viparItaH / bhavatu vA saMpattistasya mA vA jIvoparodhena // 217 // (1765)

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Vada] Clavadharavada 273 Pancasamitastrigupto jnanyavihimsako na viparital i Bhavatu va sampattistasya ma jivoparodhena 121711 (1765)] Trans.--217 A wise person, conversant with the five samitist and guarded in three ways ( i e., by mind, speech and body ) is a-himsaka, but not the one (having ) contrary (characteristics). He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of) himsa on account of obstruction to jivas. (1765) TIkA-paJcabhiH samitimiH samitaH, timRmirguptibhizca gupto jJAnI jIvasvarUpa-tadrazAkriyAbhitraH sarvathA jIvarakSApariNAmapariNataH tatmayataya kathamapi hiMsamapyavihiMsako mataH / etadviparItalakSaNastu nAhiMsakA; kintu hiMsra evAyam, azubhapariNAmatvAt / bAhyajIvahiMsAyAstu jIvoparodhena jIvasya kITAderuparodhenopaghAtena saMpattirbhavatu, mA bhUd vA 'sa' tasya sAdhvAdeH, hiMsakatve tasyA anekAntikatvAditi // 217 // (1765) // D. C.-A person conversant with all the five samitis and restraining himself in three ways--manasa (by mind ) vacasa ( by speech ) and karamana ( by bodily actions -is the jnata of actual jivasvarilpa aud its protection. Such a person should be taken as a-himsaka even if he commits himsa. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned jnani purust, is himsaka as he brings about an a-s'ubha parinama. Pulfilment of himsa may or may not be attained by him due to givoparodha or the (natural) obstruction to jivas, but his himsakatva is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below :atubho jo pariNAmo sA hiMsA so u baahirnimittN| ko vi avekkheja na vA jamhA'NegaMtiyaM bajjhaM // 218 // (1766) Asubho jo parinamo sa himsa so u bahiranimittam Ko vi avekkehjja na va jamha'pegantiyam bajjham // 218 (1766) + Five Jaina rules of life. 35

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274 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth [azumo yaH pariNAmaH sA hiMsA sa tu bAhyanimittam / ko'pyapekSeta na vA yasmAdanaikAntikaM bAhyam // 218 // (1766) A$ubho yah parinamah sa himsa sa tu bahyanimittam i Ko'pyapekseta na va yasmadanaikantikam bahyamn 121811 (1766)] Trans.--218 What is (known as) inauspicious consequence is (itself) himsa. But that is an external cause. Some may or may not require ( this cause ), because the external (cause ) is variable. (1766) TIkA- yasmAdiha nizcayanayato yo'zumapariNAmaH sa eva "hiMsA" ityAkhyAyate / sa ca bAhyasattvAtipAtakriyAlakSaNaM nimittaM ko'pyapekSate, ko'pi punastabhirapekSo'pi bhavet. yathA tandulamatsyAdInAm tasmAdanakAntikameva bAhyanimittam, tatsadbhAve'pyahiMsakatvAt, tadabhAve'pi ca hiMsakatvAditi // 218 / / (1766) / D. C.-An action having inauspicious consequence is called himsa. This sort of himsa results from the niinitla of zivahinsa while sometimes himsa results without the apekisu of those nimittas as in the case of tandulamatsya. As the bahya nimitta is anxikantika, an action is himsaka sometimes even in absence of bah, a nimitta and a-hiinsaka sometimes even in its own absence. asubhapariNAmaheMU jIvAbAho tti to mayaM hiMsA / jassa u na so nimittaM saMto vi na tasma mA hiMsA // 219 // (1967) Asubhaparinamaheu jivabaho tti to mayam himsi: Jassa u na so nimittam santo vi na tassa sa hinsa 121911 (1767) [ azumapariNAmahetu vAbAdha iti tato mataM himA / yasya tu na sa nimittaM samapi na tasya sA hiMsA // 211 // (1567) Asubhaparinamahetu-r-jivabadha iti tato matam himsa ! Yasya tu na sa nimittam sannapi na tasya sa hinsa 112 1911 ]

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Vada ] Gianadharavada 275 Trans. -- 219 Affliction of jivas as a cause for an evil end is called himsa. That which has no such ( end ), has nothing like himsa even if the cause is there. (1767) TIkA - tatastasmAd yo jIvAbAdho'zubha pariNAmasya hetu:, athavA, azubha pariNAmo hetuH kAraNaM yasyAsAvazubhapariNAma heturjIvAbAdho jIvaghAtaH, sa eva " hiMsA " iti mataM tIrthakara - gaNadharANAm / yasya tu jIvAbAdhasya sosthumapariNAmo na nimittaM sa jIvAbAdhaM sannapi tasya sAdhorna hiMseti // 219 // (1767) // D. C. - One who inflicts pain upon jivas with an evil purpose is said to commit hemsa; but one who, has no such purpose, does uot commit himsa even if he inflicts pain upon jivas. saddAdao rahaphalA na vIyamohassa bhAvasuddhIo / jaha, taha jIvAbAho na suddhamaNaso vi hiMsAe // 220 // (1768) Saddadao raiphala na viyamohassa bhavasuddhto Jaha, taha jivabaho na suddamanaso vi himsae ||220 (1768). [ zabdAdayo ratiphaLA na vItamohasya bhAvazuddheH / yathA, tathA jIvAbAdho na zuddhamanaso'pi hiMsAye // 220 // (1768) Sabdadayo ratiphala na vitamohasya bhavasuddheh Yatha, tatha jivabadho na suddhamanaso 'pi himsayai 2201 ] Trans. -- 220 Just as sabda etc do not become the objects of pleasure to a dispassionate saint on account of the purity of (his) mind, affliction of vas too does not become the cause of himsa to a person having pure intention (768) TIkA- yatheha vItarAga-dveSa - mohasya bhagavata iSTAH zabda-rUpAdayo bhAvavizuddhito na kadAcid ratiphaLA ratijanakAH saMpadyante, yathA beha zuddhAtmano rUpavatyAmapi mAtari na viSayAbhilASaH saMjAyate, tathA zuddhapariNAmasya yatnavataH sAdhoH sacvopaghAto'pi na hiMsAyai saMpadyate / tato'

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276 Jinabhadra Gamis [The fourth zubhapariNAmajanakatve vAhya nimittamanaikAntikameveti / tasmAd vyakta ! santi paJcabhUtAni, cetanAni cAyAni catvAri, ityetat .pratIhIti sthitam / yazca " svamomayaM vai sakalam" ityAdi / tatrApi yastava cetasi vartate nAsAvarthaH, kintu bhavabhayodvignAnAM bhavyasatcAnAM dhana-phanaka-putra-phalatrAdhasAratAmAtra. pratipAinaM tena vidhIyate, yena te tadAsthA parityajya muktaye pravartante, na punastatra bhUtAbhAvaH pratipAdyate / iti muzca saMzayam, patipayasva bhUtAstitvamiti // 220 // (1768) D. C.-To a dispassionate saint, s'abda, rupa, rasa etc. . do not become the attractive objects of pleasure, because his mind is pure. A pure-minded inan does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering muni does never commit himsa even if he inflicts pain upon jivas on account of his s'uddha bhavas. It is clear, trierefore, that bahya nimitta is anaikantika so far as himsa is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple. Hence O Bhadra ! accept the existence of the five bhutus and know it for certain that the first four of them viz, prithvi, jala, agni, and vayu are sa-cetana. Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the Veda-dadas like "Svapno pamas var sakalam" etc. The main object of those sentences, is to assert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc. before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the bhavabhaya, so that they might abandon their attachment to the wordly visayas and strive for the attainment of moksa. Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, o Saumya 1 and admit the existence of bhtitas. chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNa jarA-maraNaviSpamukkeNa / so samaNo pavvaio paMcahiM saha khaMDiyasarahiM // 221 // (1769) Chinnammi samsaymmi Jipena jara-maranayippamukkenam i So samano pavvalo pancahim saha khandiyasaenim 1122 111 (1769)

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Vada ) Ganadharavada 277 [fare front fortat 77-4fcorfanget i # $40: qafera: qafa: h afica: 1138? 11 (P1988) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maraqavipramuktena i Sa sramanah pravrajitah pancabhih saha khannikasalaih 1122111] Trans.--221 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age, and death, the saint Vyakli accepted diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1769) End of the Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara

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Chapter V pshcmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Fifth Canadhara. te pavvahae souM suhama Agacchai jiNasagAsaM / baccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 222 / / (1770) Te pavvaie soum Suhuma agacchai Jinasagasam i Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami 222|1 (1770) [vAn prajitAn zrutvA sudharma Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 222 // (1770) Tan pravrajitan srutva Sudharma agacchati Jinsakasam | Vrajami vande vanditva paryupasc ||222 // (1770) ! Trans.--222 Having heard that they (Vyakta and others) had renounced the world, Sudharman comes before the Tirthankara. He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1770) AbhaTTho yaM jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNNu savvadarisI NaM / / 223 // (1771). Abhattho ya Jinenam jail-jara-imaranavippamukkenam | Namena ya gottena ya savuannu savvadarisi nam // 223 // (1771) [ AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena ! nAnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 223 // (1771)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina | 2231: (1771) ] Trans.-223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra (lineage), by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darkana (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1771) 279 kiM manne jArisa ihabhavammi so tArisI parabhave vi / veyapayAga ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho || 224 // (1772) Kim manne jariso ihabhavammi so tariso parabhave vit Veya-payana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho 12241 (1772) [ kiM manyase yAdRza ihabhave sa tAdRzaH parabhave'pi / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 224 // (1772) Kim manyase yadrisa ihabhave sa tadrisan parabhave'pi | Veda-padanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 224 (1772)) Trans. - 224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world? But (ca) you do nor know the (real) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation (1772) TIkA - tvamevaM manyase - yo manuSyAdiryAdRza ihabhave sa tAdRzaH pararaspi / nanvayamanucitaste saMzayaH, yato'sau viruddhavedapadazrunigibandhano vartate / tAni cAmUni vedapadAni " puruSo vai puruSatvamaznute, pazatraH pazutvam" ityAdi, tathA " zrRgAlo vai eSa jayate yaH sapurISo dahyate " ityAdi / eSAM ca vedapadAnAmamumarthaM manyase tvam - " puruSo mRtaH san parabhave puruSatvamevetyAdi, amUni kila bhavAntaragatajantusAdRzyapratipAdakAni tathA, " zrRgAlo vai " ityAdIni tu vaisadRzyakhyApakAni " iti / iti / atastava saMzayaH / ayaM cAyukta eva yato'mISAM vedapadAnAM nAyamarthaH, kintu vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 224 / (1772) / / 7 D. C. -- O Sutharaman ! Do you entertain the belief that

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280 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth human life in the next world is the same as it is here? Sentences of Vedas having contradictory interpretations have given rise to this illusion of yours. The sentences are as follows: (1) "Puruso vai purusatvamas'nute, pas'avah pasatvam" etc. and (2) "Srugalo vai esa jayate yah sa-puriso dahyate" etc According to you, interpretations of these two sentences are respectively as follows:-- (1) A man obtains nothing but manhood even after death in the next world; and animals such as a cow etc. become animals after death. Thus, sentences like this suggest that the next life is the same as this. (2) But the sentences like "Srugalo vai etc." mean to assert that the next life is totally different from the present one. Such contradicting interpretations have given rise to the misguided belief of yours. Here is their real interpretation. Listen carefully. kAraNasarisaM kAM vIyasevaGkuro pti maNNaMto / ihabhavasarisaM savvaM jamavesi pare vi tamantaM // 225 // (1773) Karanasarisam kajjam biyassevankuro tti mannanto | Ihabhavasarisam savvam jamavesi pare vi tamajuttam 225| (1773) [ kAraNasadRzaM kArya bIjasyevAGkura iti manyamAnaH | ihabhavasadRzaM sarva zadavaiSi parasminnapi tadayuktam // 225 // (1773, Karanasadrisam karyam bijasyevankura iti manyamanah | Ihabhavasadrisam sarvam yadavaisi parasminnapi tadayuktum 1225 ] Trans.-225 Just as sprout is similar to seed, the effect is also similar to cause according to you. ( And hence ), you

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 281 believe everything in the next world to be siinilar to everything in this world. (But) that is not correct. (1773) TIkA-sudharmANaM pati bhagavAnuvAca-" iha kAraNAnurUpamevakAryabhavati, yathA yavabIjAnurUpo yavAGkaraH, ihabhavakAraNaM cAnyajanma, tatastenA pIhabhavasadRzena bhavitavyam" ityevaM manyamAnastvaM yadihamavasadRzaM sarva puruSAdikaM parabhave'pyavaiSi, tadayuktamevati // 225 // (1773) D. C... Since karana is the same as karya according to you, the past life, being the karana of the present life, becomes the same as the present life. This is why you are led to believe that everything in this life is similar to everything in the next one. But this apprehension of yours is not correct. Because jAi saro siMgAo bhUtaNaA saasvaannulittaao| saMjAyai golomAvilomasaMjAgao duvvA // 226 // (1774) iti rukkhAyuvede joNivihANe ya visrisehito| dIsai jamhA jammaM suhamma ! to nAyamegaMto // 227 / / (1775) Jai saro signao bhutanao sasavanulittao ! Sajnayai goloma'vilomasanjogao duvva 1122611 (1774) Iti rukkhayuvvede jonivihane ya visarisehinto I Disai jamha jammam Suhammal to nayameganto 1122711 (1775) [ jAyate zaraH zRGgAd bhUtaNakaH sarSapAnuliptAt / saMjAyate golomAvilomasaMyogato durvA // 226 // (1774) iti vRkSAyurvede yonividhAne ca visadRzebhyaH / dRzyate yasmAjanma sudharman ! tato nAyamekAntaH // 227 // (1772) Jayate sarah sringad bhutripakah sarsapanuliptati Sanjayate goloma'vilomasamyogato durva 1122611 (1774) ) 36

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282 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth Iti vsiksaurvede yonividhane ca visadsisebhyah Dsisyate yasmajjanina Sudharman ! tato nayamekantah 1122711] Trans.-226-227 The sara plant is produced from horn; earth-grass' is produced by the anointing of mustard and durvas is produced by the combination of goloma" and aviloma plants. Similarly, in the treatise on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of a number of) dissimilar objects. The rule is therefore, not exclusive, O Sudharaman! (1774-1775) TIkA-tataH " kAraNAnurUpaM kAryam" iti sudharman ! nAyamekAntaH, at Trafo at nta, a ga paaralang TOTA: 767ghAto jAyate; tathA, golomA-'vilomAbhyAM dUrvA prabhavati, ityevaM vRkSAyurvede vilakSaNAnekadravyasaMyogajanmAno vanaspatayo dRzyante / tathA, yonividhAne c| yonipAbhRte visadRzAnekadravyasaMyogayonayaH sarpa-siMhAdiprANino qurut $41974 qaraf 777TETT: HITEVI 377: TAET TUTTOETUT ? sfat 11 276-226 11 (plug-Plou)! D. C.-The rule that karya is similar to karana is not ekantika. Because, the s'ara is produced even by means of s'raga, by the unction of mustard-seeds, the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of goloma and aviloma grasses, the durva grass is produced. Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is shown 1. Bhutrinaka (earth-grass) A kind of fragrant grass, the plant Androhogon Schoenanthus. 2. Sarsapa-Mustard-seed; popularly known as sarasava in Western India; Sinapis Dichotoma. 3. Durva=Name of a bent grass; panic grass, Panicum Dactylon ; Goloma, Aviloma=Two different kinds of bent grass. 5. Vraksayu=Name of a short treatise by Surpain on the planting and cultivation of trees.

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Vada ] Canadharavada 283 as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between karya and karana, is therefore, inapplicable in this case. Or, say, the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world, on account of similarity between karyand kirana in this way:-- ahavA jau ciya bIyANurUvajammaM mayaM tao ceva / jIva giNha bhavAo bhavaMtare cittapariNAmaM // 228 // (1776) jeNa bhavaMkurabIyaM kammaM cittaM ca taMjao'bhihiyaM / heuvicittattaNao bhavaMkuravicittayA teNaM // 229 // (1777) jai paDivannaM kammaM heuvicittattao vicittaM ca / to tatphalaM vi citta pavajja saMsAriNo somma ! // 230 // (1778) Ahava jau cciya biyanuruvajammam mayam tao ceva Jivam ginha bhavao bhavantare cittaparinamani 1122811 (1776) Jena bhavankurabiyam kamimam cittam ca tam jao'bhihiyami Heuvicittattayao bhavankuraviccittaya tenam 12294 (1777) Jai padivannam kaminam heuvicittattao vicittam ca i To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsarino somma ! 11230H (1778) [athavA yata eva bIjAnurUpajanma mataM tata eva / jIvaM gRhANa bhavAd bhavAntare citrapariNAmam // 228 // (1776) yena bhavAGkarabIjaM karma citraM tad yato'mihitam / hetuvicitratvato bhavAkuravicitratA tena // 229 // (1777) yadi pratipannaM karma hetuvicitratvato vicitraM ca / tatastatphalamapi citraM pratipayasva saMsAriNaH saumya ! // 230 // (1778) Athava yata eva bijanurupajanma matam tate eva Jivam grihana bhavad bhavantare cittaparinamam 1122811 (1776)

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284 Jinabhadra Gani's [Tlie fifth Yena bhavankurabijam karma citram tad yato'bhihitam Hetuvicitratvato bhavankuravicitrata tena 1122911 (1477) Yadi pratipannam karma hetuvicitratvato vicitram ca Tatastatphalamapi citram pratipadyasva samsarinah Saumya ! 11230u] Trans.--228-229-230 Or, because the production (of kurya) is siinilar to the root-cause, according to you, take j'iva in the next life to be a parinama distinct from this mundane world. For, karman (which is) the seed of the sprout of life is itself distinct. And, if the effect is established to be distinct because the cause is distinct, know it for certain O Saumyal that the Mundane Soul has also its phala distinct from it. (1776-1777-1778) TIkA-vyAkhyA-athavA, yata eva bIjAnurUpaM kAraNAnuguNaM kAryANAM janma matam, tata eveha mavAd bhavAntare jIvaM gRhANa pratipadyasva / kathaMbhUtam ? jAti-kula-balai-zvarya-rUpAdivicitrapariNAmam / yadi nAma bIjAnurUpaM janma, tathApi kathaM bhavAntare vicitratA jIvAnAm ? ityAha-"jeNa bhavaharetyAdi" yena yasmAd nAraka-tiryagAdirUpeNa bhavanaM bhava. sa evAGkara ivAGkarastasya vIjamiha karmaivAvaseyam, tacca mithyAlA-'viratyAdihetuvaiciyAd vicitraM yasmAd mayA'bhihitam, tasmAt tajjanyasya bhavAGkarasyApi jAtyAdimedena vicitratA / tato yadi tvayA karma pratipannam, hetuvaicitryAca yadi sadvaicitryamabhyupagatam, tataH saMsAriNo jIvasya tatphalamapi nArakatiryaG-manuSyA-mararUpeNa bhavanarUpaM saumya ! vicitrarUpaM pratipadyasveti // 228-229-230 (1776-1777-1778) // D. C.--The production of various karyas is similar to the corresponding karanas according to you. But the jiva in the next life, is distinguished from this world on account of jati, kula, rupa, bala, ais'varya etc. Now if Karya is taken to be similar to the karana, how will the jivas be different in the next life? The vicitrata of jiva in the next life, is to be accounted for by means of karman. For karman being the hotu of samsara, renders the whole sansura, viciira by reason of its

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 285 own self being vicitra. So, just as karman is vicitra by reason of its wrong belief and vowlessness etc, its Karya viz, bhava should also be taken as vicitra by reason of jati, kula, rupa, bala etc. So, if you admit Karman and if you believe that Karya is distinguished from karana, then O Saumya! know it for certain that the Mundane Soul has its phala in the form of vicitrata as hellish beings, lower animals, human beings, or celestial beings. cittaM saMsAritaM vicittakammaphalabhAvao heU / iha cittaM vittANaM kammANa phalaM va logammi // 231 // (1779) Cittam samsarittam vicittakammaphalabhavao heu Jha cittam cittanam kammana phalam va logammi || 231|| (1779) [ citra saMsAritvaM vicitrakarmaphaLamAvato hetoH / iha citraM citrANAM karmaNAM phalamiva loke // 231 // ( 1779 ) Citram samsaritvam vicitrakarmaphalabhavato hetohi Tha citram citranam karmanam phalamiva loke || 2311 (1779 ) ] Trans.-231 Like the variable result of variable actions ( accomplished) in this world, worldliness is variable on account of the hetu that (it is also) the result of variable actions. (1779) TIkA citra saMsArijIvAnAM nArakAdirUpeNa saMsAritvamiti pratijJA / vicitrasya karmaNaH phaLarUpatvAditi hetuH / iha yad vicitrahetukaM tad vicitrasupalabhyate, yatheha kRSi--vANijyAdikarmaNAM phalaM loka iti / tadevaM karma vaicitryAd bhavavaicitrye pramANamuktam || 231 // (1779) // -- D. C. - Just as the results of various actions like ploughing trading etc. are variable, the samsaritva of the mundane animals is also varied as seen in their hellish experience etc. on account of the fact that samsarit va is nothing but the result of their vicitra actions in the past, For Private Personal Use Only

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286 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth Now, in support of the variable nature of Karman, the author states:--- cittA kammapariNaI poggalapariNAmao jahA bjjhaa| kammANa cittayA puNa tacheuvicittabhAvAo // 232 / / (1780) Citta kammaparinai poggalaparinamao jaha bajjhai Kammana cittaya puna taddhcuvicittabhavao #232 (1780) [citrA karmapariNatiH pudalapariNAmato yathA bAhyA / karmaNAM citratA punastaddhetuvicitrabhAvAt // 232 // (1780) Citra karmaparinatih pudgalaparinamato yatha bahya Karmanam citrata punastaddhetuvicitrabhavat 1123211 (1780)] Trans.---232 Just as the outward effect of actions is variable on account of its being the parinama of earthly bodies, the variable nature of actions, is also due to their hetu being variable. (1780) TIkA-iha vicitrA karmapariNatiH, pudralapariNAmAtmakatvAt, iha yatyudalapariNAmatmakaM tad vicitrapariNatirUpaM dRzyate, yathA bAhyo'bhrAdi vikAraH, pRthivyAdivikAro vA yattu vicitrapariNatirUpaM na bhavati tat pudralapariNAmAtmakamapi na bhavati, yathA''kAzam, yA punaH pudralapariNAmasAmye'pi karmaNAmAvaraNAdibhedene vizeSato vicitratA sA taddhetubaicicyA. davagantavyA, vicitrAzca mithyAtvAdayaH-pradveSa-ninavAdayazca karmahe tava iti // 232 // 11780) / D. C.--Effect of Karman is varied in this world. Only that which is pudgalupar inimal maka is known as vicitra (as in the case of various transformations of cloud, earth etc.). While that which is not the result of earthly pudgalas, is not recognized as a vicitraparinati (as in the case of akasa). In case of Karman itself being variable, in addition to this pudgalaparinamatva, vicilrata is due to the variable nature of its motives like vanity, hostility, and wickedness etc, by means of which those actions are actually inspired. 232 (1780).

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Vada ] Ganadharavada ahavA ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao teNaM / kammala pi bhavasarisaM paDivaja paraloe || 233 || (1781) 287 kiM bhaNiyamiha maNuyA nANAgaikammakAriNo maMti / jaha se taphalabhAjo pare vi to sarisamA juttA || 234 // (1782) Ahava ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao tenam Kammaphalam pi ihabhavasarisam padivajja paraloe #1233|| 1781) Kim bhaniyamiha manuya nanagaikammakarino santi Jai te tapphalabhajo pare vi to sarisaya jutta #234p (1782) [ athavehabhatrasadRzaH paraloko'pi yadi saMmatastena / karmaphalamapI bhavasadRzaM pratipadyasva paraloke / / 233 / / (1781) kiM bhaNitamiha manujA nAnAgatikarmakAriNaH santi / yadi te tatphalabhAjaH parasminnapi tataH sadRzatA yuktA // 234 // (1782) Athavehabhavasadrisam paraloko'pi yadi sammatastena Karmaphalamapihabhavasadrisam pratipadyasva paraloke 23311 Kim bhayitamiha manuja nanagatikarmakarinah santi | Yadi te tatphalabhajah parasminnapi tatah sadrisata yukta ||234||] Trans.~~~233-234 Or, if the other life is also taken as the same as this life, (you should) accept the karma phala in the other life to be the same as (that in) this life. Has it been said that there exist people in this world doing (various) deeds according to their various tendences ? If they exist, there exist (people ) in the next (world) to enjoy their fruits also. Sameness (of both ) is, therefore, justified. 1781-1782) TIkA - vyAkhyA - athavA, yadIha bhavasadRzaH paraloko'pi saMmRto bhavataH, " teNaM ti " tataH karmaphalamapi paraloka ihamavasadRzamityavicitrazumAStgbhakriyAnurUpaM vicitraM pratipadyasveti / evaM mukulitaM pratipAdyaitadeva bhAvayati - " ki bhaNiyamityAdi " kimetAvatA pratipAditaM bhavati ? |

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288 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth iha tAvad manuSyA nAnAgatihetuvicitra kriyAnuSThAyinaH santIti pratyakSata eva lakSyante / tato yadi te paraloke tattatkriyAphalabhAja iSyante, tato yacehatyakriyANAmasadRzatA, tathA paralokagatajantUnAmapi saiva yuktA, nanu yosa yAdRzaH sa paratrApi tAdRza eva bhavati // 233-234 // (1781-1782) D. C. If, according to you, next life is the prototype of this one, the karmaphala in the next life, will depend upon (one's) various good or bad actions in this life. Nov, since various people do various deeds as a result of their various tendences in this life, it should be noted that they enjoy fruits of their actions in the next life.. So, inclination of one in the present life, depends upon his inclination in the past life also. Then, anticipating doubts in the opponent's mind, the author states :--- aha iha saphalaM kammaM na pare to savvahA na sarisaptaM / akayAgama- kayanAsA kammAbhAvo'havA patto // 235 // ( 1783) kammAbhAve ya kao bhavaMtaraM, sarisayA va tadabhAve / nikkAraNao ya bhavo jai tA nAso vi taha ceva || 236 // (1784) Aha iha saphalam kanimam na pare to savvaha na sarisattam Akayagama-kayanasa kammabhavo'hava patto ||235|| (1783) Kammabhave ya kao bhavantaram, sarisaya va tadabhave i Nikkaranao ya bhavo jai ta naso vi taha ceva 11236|| (1784) [ atheha saphalaM karma na parasmiMdatataH sarvathA na sadRzatvam / akRtAgama - kRtanAzau karmAbhAvo'thavA prAptaH // 235 // (1783) karmAbhAve ca kRto bhavAntaraM sadRzatA vA tadabhAve / niSkAraNakazca bhavo yadi tato nAzo'pi tathaiva / / 236 / / (1784 ) For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Atheha saphalam karma na parasminstatah sarvatha na sadrisatvami Akritagama-kritanasau karmabhavo'thava praptah 11235|| (1783)] Karmabhave ca kuto bhavantaram sadrisata va tadabhave | Niskaranaksca bhavo yadi tato naso 'pi tathaiva || 236 (1784) ] Trans. -- 235-236 If ( the opponent says that ) Karman is successful here (only ), (and) not in the next life, then, there will be nothing like sameness at all. The unaccomplished object will crop up, and the accomplished ore will come to an end. Or, there will be (complete) negation of Karman itself. In absence of Karman, how will the next life come into existence? And in its absence, whence (will) the sadrisata ( exist ) ? And if the (next) life is (taken to have been) produced without any cause, then (its) end will also be so. (1783-1784) TIkA - athaivaM brUSe-iha saphalaM karmeti - ihabhavasaMbandhyeva kRSyAdikrayA rUpaM karma saphalam, na tu pArabhavikadAnAdikriyArUpaM karma / tatazca tatphalAbhAbAd na paraloke jantuvaisadRzyam / atrottaramAha - " tato sabbadA na sarisattaM vi" tata evaM sati yat tatrAbhipretaM tat sarvathA parabhave jIvAnAM sadRzatvaM na syAt / taddhi karmaNA janyate tacca nAsti, pArabhavika kriyANAM tvayA niSphaLatvAbhyupagamAt, tanniSphalatve ca karmAbhAvAt / atha karmAbhAve'pi bhavet sAdRzyam tarhyakratasyaiva tasya nirhetukasyA''gamaH mAmoti kRtasya ca dAna - hiMsAdikriyAphalarUpasya karmaNo nAzaH prasajati / athavA, mUlata eva karmaNAmabhAvaH prAptaH - dAna - hiMsAdikriyANAM niSphalatvAbhyupagamAd mUlata eva karmaNo bandho'pi na syAditi bhAvaH / tataH kim ? ityAha--karmAbhAve ca kAraNAbhAvAt kuto bhavAntaram, tadabhAve ca dUrotsAritameva sAdRzyam / atha karmAbhAve'pi bhava iSyate, tarhi niSkAraNa evAsau syAt / yadi caivamayamiyeta, tato nAzo'pi tasya bhavasya niSkAraNa eva syAt, ato vyarthastaponiyamAnuSThAnaprayAsaH / niSkAraNe ca bhave'bhyupagamyamAne vaisadRzyamapi jIvAnAM niSkAraNaM kiM neSyete, vizeSAbhAvAt ? iti / / 235-236 // (1783 - 1784) / / 37 1 For Private 289 Personal Use Only

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth D. C. Sudharman:- Actions (like ploughing etc. which are connected with this life are alone fruitful, and those (like munificence etc.) that are connected with the other life, are not fruitful. This is the reason why there is no distinction between the lives of creatures in the two bhavas. 290 Bhagavana: But sadrisata can never exist without cause as sadrisata itself is produced from Karman. Now, when you take Karman (like dana etc.) connected with the other life, to be fruitless, there is no scope for saarisata to exist. Sudharman-Sadrisata of jivas could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of ghata produced from earth. Bhagavana If sadris'ya exists even in absence of Karman there will be akritagama (i. e., springing up of the un-accomplished object), as well as kritanas'a (i. e. destruction of the accomplished object). Thus, the existence of Karman itself is denied. When there is no Karman, how can the parabhava exist? And when the existence of parabhava is denied, the existence of sadrisya between two bhavas will automatically be denied. Sudharman--The existence of bhavantura could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of lifeless objects when Karya and karana are the same. Bhagavana: In that case, Sudharman' the production, as well as, the destruction of bhavatara will also be niskarana. Consequently, the practice of austerities, munificence, and vows etc. would be good-for-nothing, as bhavantara will not depend upon those actions, and all people-whether doing good or bad deeds-will have the same prototype life. Moreover, you should also take the visadris'ya or dissimilarity of various jivas from each other to be niskarasaka like bhavantara For, like bhavantara, there is karanabhava in case of vaisadris'ja also.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 291 kammAbhAve vi maI ko doso hoja sabhAvo'yaM / jaha kAraNANurUMdha ghaDAi kajaM sahAveNaM // 237 // (1785) Kammabhave vi mai ko doso hojja jai sabhavo'yami Jaha karananuruvam ghadai kajjam sahavenam 1123711 (1785) [karmAbhAve'pi mati. ko doSo bhavet yadi svabhAvo' yam / yathA kAraNAnurUpaM ghaTAdi kArya svabhAvena // 237 / / (1785) Karmabhavepi matil ko duso bhavet yadi svabliavo'yam Yatha karananurupa ghatadi karyam svabhavena 11237.1 (1785) __Tran. 237 Again, the opponent inight believe that (the karzu could be brought about even in absence of Kryman. What objection would arise if it were its very nature as in the case of karyas like ghata etc., which bear natural resemblance with their karanas ? (1785) TIkA-atha parasyaivaMbhUtA matiH syAd yaduta-karmAbhAve'pi yadi bhavasadbhAvarUpaH svabhAva evAyaM bhavet tahi ko doSaH syAt ?--vinApi karma padi svabhAvAdeva bhavaH syAt tarhi kiM dUSaNaM bhavet ? -na kizcidityarthaH / dRSTAntamAha-yathA karma vinApi mRtpiNDiAdikAraNAnurUpaM ghaTAdi kArya svasvabhAvenaivotpadyamAnaM dRzyate, tathA sAmANijanmaparamparArUpo bhavo'pi svabhAvAdena bhaviSyati / atrocyate-nanu dhaTo'pi na svabhAvataH eva jAyate, kartR-karaNAdyapekSitvAt tasya / tatazvehApi karturAtmanaH pArabhavikasya ca zarIrAdikAyastha karaNaM saMbhAvyate, tacca kartR-kAryAbhyAM bhinaM loke'pi dRzyate, kulAla-ghaTAbhyAM cakrAdivat, yaccedAtmanaH zarIrAdi kArya kurvataH karaNaM vat karmeti pratipadyasva / syAdetat, ghaTAdeH pratyakSasiddhatvAt bhavantu kulAlAdayaH kartAraH, zarIrAdi kArya tvamAdivikAravat svabhAvato'pi bhaviSyati, tato na krmsiddhiH| tadayuktam, yato na svAbhAvikaM zarIrAdi, AdimatpratiniyatAkAratvAt, ghaTavaditi / kiJca "kAraNAnurUpameva kaarym|" ityevaM yat parabhave sAdRzyaM tvayA'bhyupagamyate, tadapi svabhAvavAdinastavAbhrAdi.

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292 Jinabhadra Cani's [ The fifth vikAradRSTAnte parihIyate, abhrAdivikArasya svakAraNabhUtapudgaladravyAdatifaamuafafa 11 239 II (1964) 11 D. C.-Sudharnan:-- Just as, it is by virtue of their svabhava that .objects like ghata etc. are produced as a natural result of their respective karanas but without the help of karman, the bhavantara is also produced by virtue of its own svabhava even in absence of Karman. Bhagavana--Karyas like ghata, o Sudharmani could never be produced merely by virtue of their svabhuva, but they have to depend upon karta and karana also. So, in the production of Sarira also, karta and kurana are of primary importance. This leads us to believe that in the production of bhavantara, alman which is different from body, is the kirta, and Karman, the karaga, just as potter is tne karta, and chakra etc. act as karanas, when ghata is produced. Sudharman:-Since karyas like ghata are direcily apprehensible, potter and chakra etc. may respectively be taken as their karta and karapas. But karyas like s'arira in bhavantara are produced naturally like the multi-coloured changes in clouds etc. It is not therefore, possible to seek Karman as a karana, in the production of bhavantara. Bhagavana :-Your argument is totally unfounded. Karyas like s'arira etc. are not svabhavika because they have a beginning, as well as, a definite akara like ghata. You have taken the other life to be the same as this, because, according to you, Karya is exactly similar to karana. But this principle of sadcis'ata is not applicable in case of abhradivikaras, as they are peculiarly different from the objects having definite akara. Moreover, hoja sahAvo vatthu nikAraNayA va vatthudhammo vA ? / jaha vatthu Nasthi tao'NuvaladdhIo khapuSpaM va // 238 / / (1786)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada accatamaNuvaddho vi aha tao asthi natthi kiM kammaM / heU va tadatthite jo naNu kammassa vi sa eva // 239 // (1787) 293 kammassa vAbhihANaM hoja sahAvo tti hou ko doso / nicaM va so sabhAvo sariso etyaM ca ko heU ? / / 240 // (1788) Hojja sahavo vatthum nikkaranaya va vatthudhammo va ? Jaha vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhjo khapupyham va ||238||| Accantamanuvaladho vi aha tao atthi kim kammam Heu va tadtthitte jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva || 239 || ( 1787 ) Kammassa vabhihanam hojja sahavo tti hou ko doso i Niccam va so sabhavo sariso ettham ca ko heu? #240 (1788) [ matret svabhAvo vastu niSkAraNatA vA vastuvarmo kA ? | yadi vastu nAsti sako'nupalabdheH khapuSpamiva // 238 // (1786) atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nAsti kiM karma / hetu tadasvitve yo nanu karmaNo'pi sa eva 239 // (1787) karmaNo vAbhidhAnaM bhavet svabhAva iti bhavatu ko doSaH / nityaM vA sa svamAtraH sadRzo'tra ca ko hetuH ? / / 240 // (1788) Bhavet svabavo vastu niskaranata va vastudharmo va ? | Yadi vastu nasti sako'nupalabdheh khapuspamiva // 238|| ( 1786) Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nasti kim karma Hetu r-va tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva || 239 // ( 1787) Karmano vabhidhanam bhavet svabhava iti bhavatu ko dosah i Nityam va sa svabhavah sad! iso 'tra ca ko hetur ? 240 (1788 ) ] Trans. - 238-239-240 Is (that) svabhava, a (definite ) object, or causelessness ( itself), or property of an object ? If it is ( taken as) a ( definite) object, it is not ( so), because it is nonperceptible like a kha-pusba. In spite of its being non-preceptible if it exists, why should not Karman exist?

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294 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth The hetu that (works) in its existence, (works) in case of Karman also. (Or), what objection ( would arise ), if svabhava becomes a synonym of Karman, and what is the hetu (in believing) that svabhava is always the same? (1786-1787-1788) TIkA - etad gAthAtrayamapi prAyaH prAgeva vyAkhyAtArtham, navaraM " nizcaM " ityAdi tRtIyagAthottarArdham / idamatra hRdayam - sa svabhAvo nityaM sadRza eva tvayA'bhyupagatantavyaH, bhavAntare sahayyeva manuSyAdimavasya jananAt, tasya ca svabhAvasya nityaM sadRzatve ko hetuH ? | na kazcidityabhiprAyaH / svabhAvata evAyaM svabhAvaH sadRza iti cet / nanu bhavavisadRzatAyAmapyetad vaktuM zakyata eveti // 238-239 240 / / (1786 - 1787-1788) / / D. C.-The point is that since you have taken svabhava to be the same for ever, as the same life is repeated in various bhavas you should state the reason for its nutyasadrisata. You might say that there is no hetu as such, as nityasadris'a by virtue of its own self. For, the same argument could be advanced in case of vaisadrisya of the bhavas as well. And, so mukto'mukto vA jai mutto to na savvahA sariso / pariNAmao payaM piva na dehaheU jai amutto || 241 // (1789) unagaraNAbhAvAo na ya havai suhamma ! so amutto vi / kajjassa muttimattA suhasaMvittAdio 'ceva // 242 // (1790) So mutto'mutto va jai mutto to na savvaha sariso Parinamao payam piva na dehaheu jai amutto | 241 (1789 ) Uvagaranabhavao na ya havai Suhamma! so amutto vi Kajjassa muttimatta suhasamvittadio ceva 2420 (1790) [ sa mUrtImUrtI vA yadi mUrtasvato na sarvathA sadRzaH / pariNAmataH paya iva na deha heturyadyapUrtaH // 241 / / (1789)

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295 Vada ] Ganadharavada upakaraNAbhAvAd na ca bhavati sudharman ! so'bhUtau'pi / kAryasya mUrtimattvAt sukhasaMvicyAditazcaiva / / 242 // (1790) Sa murto murto va yadi murtastato na sarvatha sadrisahi Parinamatah paya iva na dehahetu r-yadyamittah 02410 (1789) Upak aranabhavad na ca bhavati Sudharman! so'murto'pi) Karyasya murtimattvad suk hasamvittyaditascaiva 124211 (1790)] Trans.-241-242. Is that (srabhava), miirta or a-mairta ? If murta, it is not at all sad'irsa on account of its (having a parinama as in the case of milk. And, if it is a-mirta, o Sudharman ! even that a-nurta svabhiva does not become the cause of body in ahsence of instruments, as well as, on account of the corporeal nature of Karza indicated) by the perception of happiness etc: (1789-1790) TIkA-vyAkhyA-sa svabhAvo mUrtaH, amRto vA ? / yadi mUrtaH, tarhi karmaNA saha tasya ko vizeSaH ? saMjJAntaramAtraviziSTakamaivetthamuktaM syAditi / na cAsau sarvadaiva sadRzo yujyate, pariNAmitvAt . dugdhAdivat / athavA, bhUtatvAdevAbhrAdivikAvaditi / athAmUrto'sau svabhAvaH, tarhi naiSa dehAdInAmArambhakaH, anupakaraNatvAt , daNDAdi vikalakulAlavat. amUrtatvAdeva vA, AkAzavat / 'na ya havai suhamma ! so amutto vi ti" kiJca, sudharman ! ito'pi sa svabhAvo'mUrtoM na yuktaH, zarIrAdestatkAryasya mUrtimattvAt / na hyamrtasya nabhasa iva mUrta kAryamupajAyate / tathA, sukha-saMvityAdezva naaymmuurtH| idamuktaM bhavati-karma tAvad bhavatA neSyate, svabhAvavAditvAt / tatazca zarIrAdIni, sukha-duHkhasaMvicyAdIni ca svabhAvasyaiva kAryANyeSTavyAni, tasya cAmUrtatve netaanyuppdynte| tato yathA dvitIyagaNadharavAde kAryasya mUtatvAt, mukhasaMvityAdezca karmaNo mUrtatvaM sAdhitam. tatheha svabhAvasyApi tat sAdhanIyam / tathA ca prAguktam - Aha naNu muttamevaM muttaM ciya kjjmuttimttaao| iha jaha muttattaNao ghaDassa paramANavo muttA // 1 //

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296 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth taha muhasaMvittIo saMbaMdhe veyaNubbhavAo ya / bajmavalAhANAo pariNAmAo ya viSNeyaM // 2 // iti // 241-242 // (1789-1790) / D. C.-Consider whether svabhava is mtirta or a-marta If it is murta, svabhara will be nothing but a synonym of Karman. Moreover, the property of adris'ata will never be applied if svabhava, is musta, because like milk, or like the murta clouds having a number of forms, svabkova will also possess a number of parinamas. If svab harr is - notre then also, like kars'a it does not become the hetre of sai ira because of the absence of upkarrpas. Secondly, an incorporeal karuna can neven produce a corporeal karya. So, szabkaaz--should not be called a-miirta when the karyas of svabhavu such as the percerption of saikha, duhkha etc. are mitrtai Now the second alternative viz. that svabhava is niskaranata is discussed-- ahavA'kAraNau cciya sabhAvao tovi marisayA ktto| kimakAraNao na bhave visarisayA kiM va vicchatI // 243 // 1791) Ahava'karanau cciya sabhava. tovi sarisayx katto i Kimakarana<<, na bhave visarisayi kim va vicchitti 124311 (1791) [athavA'kAraNata eva svabhAvatastato'pi sadRzatA kutH| kimakAraNato na bhaved visadRzatA kiMvA vicchittiH // 243 // (1791) Athava'karanata eva svabavatastato'pi sadriaata kutah Kimakaranato na bhaved visadrisata kim va vicchittih ? 124311 Trans.--243 Or, if (bhaviriture is produced) by virtue of svabhava (and) without any reason, whence is sadrasata + Vide verses 1625, 1626.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 297 (to be found. ? (And) why (should not dissimilarity take place without reason ? and why not destruction also ? (1791) TIkA-atha svabhAvata eva bhavotpattirityatra " akAraNata eva" ityayamoM'bhipretaH, "to vi ti" tathApi hanta ! parabhave sadRzatA kutaH ? / ko'bhiprAyaH ? / ityAha-yathA'kAraNataH sadRzatA bhavati, tathA kimityakAraNataH eva visadRzatA na syAta ? / akasmAccAkAraNato bhavavicchittiH kasmAd na syAt ? akasmAcca bhavan svaraviSANAdirapi bhavet / zarIrAdInAM cAkAraNato bhavatAmabhrAdInAmiva pratiniyatAkAratvAdirUpatA na syAt / tasmAd nAkAraNatA svabhAva iti / / 243 // (1791) // . D: C-Sadris'ata of bhavaniara cannot be established even if you believe that it is produced without reason. For, just as sadsis'ata is taken to have been produced without reason, vi-sadxis ata will also take place without reason. Similarly, destruction of bhava will also take place without any reason, and following the same procedure, a non-existent object like kharavisana will also come into existence without any reason. Moreover, objects like s'arira etc. will lose their definite shape and such other characteristics on account of their resemblance with abhra-vikara, inasinuch as they are produced without reason. Hence, it is not possible to believe svabhava as niskaranata itself. Taking the third alternative viz. that svabhava is vastudharma, the author states : ahava sahAvo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao nicha / uppAya-hii-bhaMgA cittA jaM vatthupajjAyA / / 244 / / (1792) Ahava sahayo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao niccami Uppaya-tthii-bhanga citta jam vatthupajjaya // 244 // ( 1792) [athavA svabhAvo dharmoM vastunaH, na so'pi sadRzako nityam / utpAda-sthiti-bhaGgAzcitrA yad vasnuparyAyAH // 244 / / (1792) 38

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298 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth Athava svabhavo charmo vastunah na so'pi sadrisako nityam Utpada-sthiti-bhangascitra yad vastuparyayah // 244 // ( 1792 ) ] Trans-244 Or, if svabhava is a property of an object that also will not be always the same. Because, the paryayas of production, retention and destruction of an object are distinct ( from each other ). ( 1792 ) TIkA - atha vastuno dharmaH svabhAvaH, so'pi sarvadaiva sadRzo na ghaTate, iti kathaM sarvadaiva zarIrAdInAM sadRzatAM janayet / kathaM punarasya sadaiva sadRzatA na ghaTate 2 ityAha-" uppAyetyAdi " yad yasmAdutpAda-sthiti- bhaGgAdayazcitrA vastuparyAyAH, na ca te sadaivA'vasthitasAdRzyAH, nIlAdInAM vastudharmANAM pratyakSa evAnyAnyarUpatayA prinntidrshnaat| vizva vastudharmo'sau bhavasvabhAva Atmadharmo vA syAt, puladharmo vA ? | yadyAtmadharmaH, tahiM nAsau zarIrAdInAM kAraNam, amUrtatvAt AkAzAdivat / atha puladharmaH, tahi karmaivAsau, karmaNo'pi hi pudgalAstikAyadharmatvenAsmAbhirabhyupagatatvA divi // 244 // (1592) // " D. C.-Svablava will not be the same throughout even if you believe that it is a vastudharma. Hence, it is not possible to maintain for ever the sadyisya of sarira etc. also. For, the three stages of production, existence and destruction are not always the same in case in case of a single object. Distinction of properties in case of black objects is easily perceived atman or Secondly, is this vastudharma, a dharma of the a dharma of the pudgala? If it is the property of atman it can never become the cause of s'arira etc For it will be a-murta like akas'a in that case. On the other hand, if this vastudharma is the property of a pudgain, then it will become the Karman itself, as Karman is nothing but a pudgaladharma itself. kammassa vi pariNAmo suhamma ! dhammo sa poggalamayasya / heU cino jagao hoi sahAvo tti ko doso ? || 245 / / (1793)

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Vada ] Gagadharavada 299 Kammassa vi parinamo Suhamina ! dhammo sa poggalamayassa i Heu citto jagai hoi sahavo tti ko doso ? 1124511 (1793) [karmaNo'pi pariNAmaH sudharman ! dharma sa pudgalamayasya / hetuzcitro jagato bhavati svabhAva iti ko doSaH / / 245 // (1793) Karmano'pi parinamah Sudharman | Dharma sa pudgalamayasya , Hetuscitro jagalo bhavati svabhava iti ko dosah | 245 / / ( 1793)] Trans -- 245 0 Sudharman' That (svabhava ), being the parinamz of Karnian composed of a definite body, (becomes) its dharma also. (And), vhat is wrong if svabhava is taken as the varitable cause of the (entire mundane) world ? (1793) on (195) TIkA-mudharman ! asau vastudharmoM bhavatsvabhAvI dharmoM bhavatu, ko dopaH ?- kazcit, yuktiyuktatvAt / kiM viziSTo dharma: ? ityAhapariNAmaH / kasya ? / krmnnH| karthabhUtasya ? / punalamayasya / kayaMbhUto yaH karmapariNAmaH ? / ityAha-hetuH / kasya ? / jagataH-jagadvaicitryasya / kadevaM karmalakSagasya vastunaH karmapariNAmarUgo dharmoM bhavati svabhAvaH, nAtra kAcid doSApattiH / asmAkamapi saMmato'yamarthaH, kevalaM sarvadA sahayo'sau na bhavati, kintu citro mithyAtvAdihetuvaivicyAd vicitro vividhasvabhAvaH / ato na tasmAt parabhave sAdRzyameva, kintu vicitrarUpateti // 245 // (1793) / D. C-0 Sudharmean ! Since svabhava has been taken as a vastu-dharma, it may be taken as a dharmi of the pudg alavraya Karman also. So, there is no objection in admitting svabhava as the parinama of ricra karmin, and hence as the hetu of universal vicitrata also. In other words, it is due to the nature of the vicitra Karman that this world is full of varieties. The only point to remember in this case, is that it is not always the same, but it is full of varieties on account of various hetus such as vanity, hostility etc.

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300 Jinabhadra Gani,s [The fifth ahavA savvaM vatthu paikkhaNaM ciya suhamma ! dhmmhiN|| saMbhavaha veha kehi vi kehi vi tadavasthamacaMtaM // 246 // (1794) taM appaNo vi sarisaM na punvadhammehiM pacchimilANaM / sayalassa tihuagassa ca sarisaM sAmaNNadhammehiM // 247 // (1795) Ahava savvam vatthum paikkhanam ciya Suhamma | dhammehimi Sambhavai veha kehi vi kehi vi tadavatthamaccantam ||24611 Tam appano vi sarisam na puvvadhainmehim pacchimillanam Sayalassa tihuanassa ca sarisam samanpadhammehim 1124711 (1795) [athavA sarva vastu pratikSaNameva mudharman ! dharmaiH / saMbhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam // 246 // (1794) tadAtmano'pi sadRzaM na pUrvadharmaiH pAzcAtyAnAm / sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadRzaM sAmAnyadharmaiH // 247 // (1795) Athava sarvam vastu pratiksanameva Sudharman 1 dharmaih 1 Sambhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam 124611] radatmano'pi sadrisam na purvadharmaih pascatyanam Sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadoisam samanyadharmaih 112471] Trans.-246-247. O Sudharman ! at every single moment, each and every object of the Universe) is being produced, destroyed, or retained by (virtue of) some property or the other. So, none of them) has its former properties similar to the latter omes. On the other hand, by virtue of (certain common properties, all the three worlds are similar. (1794-1795) TIkA-vyAkhyA-athavA, sudharman ! kimeka eva paramavaH ?, sarvameva hi ghaTa-paTAdikaM bhuvanAntargataM vastu kaizcit puurvpryaaye| samAnA--'samAnaparyAyaH pratikSaNamutpadyate, kaizcit punaruttaraparyAyaH samAnA-'samAnaparyAyaiyeti nyuparamati, kaizcittu tadavasthamevAste / tatazcaivaM sati tadastvAtmano'pi pUrvapUrvadhamaiM

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 301 ruttarottaradharmANAM na sadRzam, kiM punaranyavastunAm ?; sAmAnyadharmaMstu sarvasyApi tribhuvanasya samAnam, kiM punarekasyaiva nijapUrvajanmanaH ? iti / / 246- / / 247 // (1794-1795) / / D. C.-Not only the bhavrintaru, o Sudhurman ! but each and every object (like ghata and pata) in this Universe, is being produced, destroyed, or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar parya yas. But, on the other hand, all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently, a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both. ko sabaheva sarisA asariseA vA ihabhave parabhave vA ? / sarisAsarisaM savvaM niJcAnicAirUvaM ca // 248 // (1796) ko savvaheva sariso asariso va ihabhave parabhave va? Sarisasarisam savvam niccaniccairuvam ca 124811 (1796) [kaH sarvathaiva sadRzo'sadRzo vehamave parabhave vaa| sadazAsadRzaM sarva nityAnityAdirUpaM ca // 248 // (1796) Kah sarvathaiva sadsiso'sadriso vehabhave parabhave va ?, Sadrisasadrisam sarvam nityanityadirupam ca ||2481 (17961] __Trans.--248 What (object) is (taken as) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life ? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. (1796) TIkA-ko bartho'rthAntarairAtmanA vA sahehabhave'pi sarvathA sazo'dazI vA, kiM punaH parabhave ? / tasmAt sarvamapi vastu sarveNApi saha samAnA'samAnarUpamevehabhave'pi, iti kunaH parabhave sAdRzmameva patijJAyate bhavatA? iti bhAvaH / tathA, sarvamapi nityA-'nityAdhanantadharmAtmakamiti // 248 // (1796) //

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302 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth D. C.-It is not possible to find an object which is similar or dissimilar to other objects or even to itself even in this life, and much less in the other. All objects are found to be similar, as well as, dissimilar to other objects even in this life. So, it is no use holding the view that they are the same in the other life also. Similarly, all objects have permanent, as well as, transitory forms. This idea is illustrated by an example stated belowjaha niyaehiM vi. sariso na juvA bhuvi bAla-dhuDDhadhammahiM / jagao vi samA sattAiehiM taha parabhave jiivaa|| 249 // (1797) Jaha niyaehim vi sariso na juva bhuvi bala -viiddhadhammehimi Jagao vi samo sattaiehim taha parobhave jivo // 249 // ( 1797 ) [yathA nijakairapi sahazo na yuvA bhuvi baal-vRddhdhrmH| jagato'pi samaH sattAdikaistathA paramave jIvaH // 249 / / (1797) Yatha nijakairapi sadriso na yuva bhuvi bala-vriddhadharmrihi Jagato'pi samah sattadikatstatha parabhuvu jivah 112 194 (1797,1 Trans.--249 Just as a young inan does not resemble his own past and future forms of childhood and old age respectively on (this) earth, but at the same time resembles the whole of earth on account of the property of existing etc, in the same way, jiva, too, becomes similar, as well as, dissimilar in the other life. (1797) TIkA-yaha yuvA nijairapyatItA-'nAgAla-vRddhAdiparyAya-rAtmano'pi sarvathA na samAnaH, sattAdibhistu sAmAnyaparyAya gati na kenacid na samAnaH, tathAyapi jIva: paralokaM gataH sarveNApi saha samAnA-'samAna. rUpa eva, iti kutaH sarvathA sAdazyam ? iti // 249 / / (1797) D. C.-Just as a young man does not resemble his own forms of childhood and old age, but at the same time resembles

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Vada ] Canadharavada 303 all other objects in this world on account of certain common properties like the quality of existing etc., in the same way. Jit as in the other life, are not merely similar but dissimilar to other objects also. Moreover, maNuo devIbhRo sarisA saptAha ehi jagaovi / devAIhi visrise| nizcAnido vi emeva // 250 // ( 1798 ) Maquo devibhuo sariso sattalehim jagao vi Devathi visariso niccanicco vi emeva || 250 ( 1798 ) [ manujo devIbhUtaH sadRzaH sattAdikairjagato'pi / devatva dizo nityAnityo'pyevameva // 250 // ( 1798) Manujo devibhutah sadsisah sattadikair-jagato`pi | Deva(tv a)dibhir-vis adriso nityanityo'pyevameva ||250|| (1798)] Trans-250 A divine man resembles the whole of mundane world on account of (properties like) existence etc. and is distinguished (from it) as well by means of (his) state of being a deity etc. In the same way, (he) is permanent and at the same time transitory also. (1798 ) sadRza, 1 TIkA- manuSyo mRtvA devatvamApana jagattrayasyApi sattAdibhiH paryAyaiH devatvAdibhistu visadRzaH, iti naikAnteka kApi sadRzatA / tathA, dravyatayAssau nityaH, paryAyatayA tvanitya ityAdyapi vaktavyam / atrAhanavasmAbhirapi naikAntena parabhave sAdRzyamabhyupagamyate kintu samAnajAtyanvayamAtrameveSyate, puruSAdirmRtaH puruSAdireva bhavatIti / etadapyayuktam, karmajanito hi parabhava iti sAdhitam / tacca mithvAsAdivicitrahetujanyatvAd vicitrameveti, atastajjanyaH parabhavo vicitra eva yubhyate, na tu samAnajAtyanvayaH sidhyatIti / / 250 / / (1798) // D C A person who becomes deva after death, resembles all the three worlds, on account of the common characteristics

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304 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth like existence etc but at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his devalva etc. This shows that absolute sadris'ata is not acceptible but visadris'ata has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are nitya on account of their dravyatva, and, at the same time, a-nitya because of their varied transformations Sudharman:-I accept sadrsata of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, purusa turns out to be a purusa and animals remain as animals in the bhavantara. Bhagavana :-Your argument, O Sudharman is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various hetus such as mithyatua etc. Hence, bhavantara which is produced by these actions should also be taken as vicitrata on account of the vicitrata of actions, but sadris'ata can never fit in by means of their relation to the sadris'a gender etc. For, urisA - sakarisA na samANAe vi jeNa jAIe / sarisaggAhe jamhA dANAiphalaM vihA tamhA || 251 || (1799) Ukkarisa-'vakkarisa na samanae vi jena jaiel Sarisaggahe jamha danaiphalam viha tamha #251 (1799) [ utkarSA - pakarSo na samAnAyAmapi yena jAtau / sadRzagrahe yasmAd dAnAdiphalaM dRthA tasmAt / / 251 / / (1799) Utkarsa-'pakarsau na samanayampi yena jatau Sadrisagrahe yasmad danadiphalam vritha tasmat 251 (1799)] Trans.-251 In will be no scope for) case of) (absolute) sameness, there elevation or degradation even in the

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Vada] Ganadharavada 305 same genesis, (and ) the fruits of munificence etc. will become futile. (1799) TIkA-sahazagrahe samAnajAtIyatAgrahe sati samAnAyAmapi jAto yena yasmAdIzvara-daridra-kulInA-'kulInAdirUpeNotkarSA-'pakarSoM na ghttaaNpaashctH| yo hi yAdRza ihamave, sa yadi parabhave'pi tAza eva, tahiM ya ihabhave IzvaraH sa paramave'pi tAdRza eva, evaM daridrAdiSvapi vAcyam / tatazcehamavAt parabhave sarvaprakArairapyutkarSA-'pakarSoM na syAtAm . kinvekAntasahasataiva bhavet / "tamha ti" tasmAd moktavyo'yaM sAdRzyagraha iti prakramAd draSTavyam / athetyamAcakSIyA:-mA bhUtAmutkarSA-'pakarSoM, kA no hAniH ? ityAha"jamhA dANAiphalaM viha ti"cakArasya gamyamAnatvAd yasmAtthaM paratrotkarSA'pakarSayorabhAve dAnAdiphalaM vRthA saMpadyate / loko hi paratra devAdisamRdiprAptyA''tmana utkarSArtha dAnAdipatiM vidadhAti / yadi coktayuktyotkarSAcabhAvAd daridro dAna-tapa-tIrthAvagAhanAyapi kRtvA'mutra daridra eva syAt, tahiM ka tadAnAdiphalam ! ityapAdhikA dAnAdau pravRttiH, tasmAd na vidheyaH sAdRzyagraha iti // 251 // (1799) // D. C.--If you believe in absolute sameness, there will be no scope either for elevation or for degration even in the same genesis. One, who is rich in this life will remain rich in the next life also in spite of his sinful actions, and a poor man will remain poor in the next life, even if he performs benevolent duties such as dana, tapas, tirtha-snana etc. according to your belief of absolute sadois'ata. Thus, there will be no reward of either good or evil actions, but the same type of life will go on throughout all the blavas. So, if there is no utkarsi or apakarsa in the next life, there will be no utility for various benevolent actions such as munificence, austerities, ablations in holy waters etc., to be followed by people for the attainment of Vevatva etc. To believe in absolute sadcis'ata is, therefore, inot' proper. 251. (1799). And the Vedapadas will also be wrong if absolute salsis'ya is accepted 39

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306 Jinabhadra Gani's jaM ca sigAlo vaha esa jAyae veyavihiyamiccAI | saggIyaM jaM ca phalaM tamasaMbaddhaM sarisayAe // 252 // (1800) Jam ca sigalo vai esa jayae Veyavihiyamiccaaim Saggiyam jam ca phalam tamasanbaddham sarisayae || 252 // ( 1800) [ yacca zRgALo vai eSa jAyate vedavihitamityAdi / svargIyaM yacca phalaM tadasaMbaddhaM sadRzatAyAm / / 252 / / (1800) [ The sixth Yacca srigalo vai esa jayate Vedavihitamityadi i Svargiyam yacca phalam tadasambaddham sadrisatayam || 252 ] Trans. - 252 Statements of Vedas such as Srigalo vaz esa jayate" etc., as well as, the reward of heaven laid down 1 by Dedas, will prove iuconsistent in ( case of) sadrisuta (being admitted). (1800) "4 TIkA - yaha " zRgAlo vai eSa jAyate yaH sapurISo dadyate " ityAdi vedavihitaM tadapi paramatrasadRzatAgrahe'saMbaddhameva syAt, puruSAderamutra zRgAlatayAnupapatteH / tathA, yadapi " agnihotraM juhuyAt, svargakAmaH " tathA, " agniSTomena yamarAjyamamijayati" ityAdikaM svargIyaphalamucakatvAt svargIyaM phalaM tadapyasaMbaddhaM bhavet, manuSyasya tvadabhiprAyeNa devatvAnupapatteriti / "puruSo vai puruSatvamaznute, pazatraH pazutvam" ityAdInAM ca vedapadAnAmayamartha ko'pi puruSaH khalviha janmani prakRtyA bhadrako vinItaH sAnukrozo'matsaratha manuSyanAma - gotre karmaNI baddhA mRtaH san puruSatvamaznute, na tu niyamena sarva eva anyasyAnyakarmatrazagasyAnyathApyutpatteH / evaM pazavo'pi kecid mAyAdidoSavazAt pazunAmakagotre karmaNI baddhvA parabhave pazavo jAyante, na tu sarve'pi niyamena karmApekSitvAjjIvagaveriti / tadevaM tasyApi cchinnaH saMzayaH // 252 // (1800) || D. C.-If it is admitted, O blessed Suduarman! that the next life is exactiy similar to this life, the sentences of Vedas such as "" Srigalo vai esa jayate yah sa-puriso dahyate ' etc; which tell us that one who is burnt along with foeces becomes fox 33 For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Canadharavada 307 in the next life, wili turn to be inconsistent. For, according to you, a man should become a man only in the next life. Secondly, sentences like " agnihotram juhuyal svorgakamah " and "agnistomena yamarajamabhujayati" which lay down the conditions for the attainment of swarga, will also become inconsistent, because a man does never become deity according to your theory of sadrista. The real interpretation of puruso vai purusatvamasnute pas'avah pas'utvam" etc. is this :-A person who is pious, cultured, and self-less, attains the genesis of man when he dies away after having attached his actions to the human name and lineage. But that does not mean that all purusas attain purusatva as a rule, By virtue of different types of actions, people are liable to be born in an absolutely different genesis also. The same is the case with animals. On account of certain faults like illusion etc. certain animals remain as animals when they pass away in the next life, having attached their actions to the name and lineage of animals. But all pasus do not attain pasutva as a rule because their movement from one bhava to another depends upon their actions. Thus, chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNa jarA-maraNavippamukeNaM / so samaNo pavvaio paMcahiM saha khaMDiyasaehiM / / 253 // (1801) Chinnammi samsayammi Jimena jara-marapavippyamukkepam So samano pavvalo pancahim saha khandiyasathim 1125311 (1801) Trans.--253 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint (Sudharman) accepted diksa along with his five hundred pupils. ( 1801 ) End of the Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara.

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Chapter VI sssstthgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Sixth Gayadhara te pavaIe souM maMDio Agacchaha jinnsgaasN| vAmiNa vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 254 // (1802) Te pavvaie so um Mandio agacchai Jinasagasam i Vaccami ga vandami yanditta pajjuvasami 125411 (1802) [tAn manajitAn zrutvA maNDika Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande banditvA paryupAse // 254 // (1802) Tan pravrajitan srutva Manlika agacchati Jinasakasam i Vrajami vande variditva paryupase // 254n (1802)] Trans.-254 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Mandika comes belore the Tirthankara. (He thinks):I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1802) . TIkA-vyAkhyA pUrvavat navaraM maNDiko nAma paSTho dvijopAdhyAyaH zrImabinasakAzamAgacchatIti / / 254 // (1802) DC.-Now the sixth Ganadhara named Mandika, comes before the Tirthankara and starts discussion. AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukaNaM / nAmeNaM ya goteNa ya savvaNNU savvadarisI NaM // 255 // (1803)

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Vada ) Ganadharavada 309 Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenam | Namenam ya gotrena ya savvannu savvadarisi nain 11 2551L (1803) [ AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 255 / / (1803) Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-marasavipramuktena i Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina ||2551 (1803) Trans.--255 He was addressed by his name, and lineage by the T'irthaikara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete darsana (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1803) The Tirthaikara then said kiM manne baMdha-mokkhA saMti na saMti tti saMsao tujjhaM / beyapayANa ya atyaM na yANasI tesimo attho / 256 // (1804) Kim manne bandha-mokkha santi na santi tti samsao tujjhami Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho 11 256 (1804) [kiM manyase bandha-mokSau sto na sta iti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArthe na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH / / 256 // (1804) Kim manyase bandha-moksau sto na sta iti samsayastava i Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tesairayamarthah (12561 (1804) Trans.--256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether bandha (wordly bondages) and moksa (Final Liberation), exits or not. But (ca), you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of V'edas. Their (real) interpretation is this. (1804) TIkA-maNDika ! tvamityaM manyase-kiM bandha-mokSau sto na vA ? iti / ayaM cAnucitastava saMzayaH, viruddhavedapadazrutinibandhanatvAva, tathAhi-"sa phSa viguNo vibhuna badhyate saMsaravi vA, na mucyate mocayati vA, na vA eSa bAsamabhyantaraM vA veda " ityAdIni vedapadAni, tathA, "na ha vai sazarIrasya

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310 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth priyA - syiyora pahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA-priye na spRzataH ityAdIni ca / eteSAM cArtha tvaM na jAnAsi yato'yametadarthastava cetasi vartate, tadyathA - sa eSaH - adhikRto jantuH, viguNaH - sacca - rajas-tamoguNarahitaH, vibhuH - sarvagataH, na badhyate - puNya-pApAbhyAM na yujyata ityarthaH, saMsarati vA 'na' ityanuvartate, na mucyate na karmaNA viyujyate, bandhasyaivAbhAvAtH mocayati vA nAnyam, ityanenAkartRkatvamAha, na vA eSa bAhyamAtmabhinnaM mahadahaGkArAdi, abhyantaraM - nijasvarUpameva veda-vijAnAti, prakRtidharmatvAjjhAnasya, prakRtezvAcetanatvAt / tatazcAmUni kila bandha - mokSAmAvatipAdakAni / tathA, na ha vai - naivetyarthaH, sazarIrasya priyA - 'priyayorapatirastoti - bAhyAM- ''dhyAtmikAnAdizarIra saMtAnayuktatvAt sukha-duHkhayoravahatiH saMsAriNo nAstItyarthaH, azarIraM vA vasantaM - amUrtamityarthaH, priyA - 'priye na spRzataH, tatkAraNabhUtasya karmaNo'bhAvAdityarthaH / amUni ca bandha - mokSAbhidhAyakAnIti / ataH saMzayaH / tatra " sa eSa viguNo vibhuH " ityAdInAM nAyamarthaH, kintvayaM vakSyamANalakSaNa iti / / 256 || (1804) 1 77 D. C. - 0 Mandika! You doubt the existence of bandha and moksa, because you have heard various Vedapadas having contradictory meanings. "Sa esa viguno vibhu r-na badhyate samsarati va na mucyate mocayati va na va esa bahyamabhyantaram va veda" etc. as well as, Hike, "Na ha var sa-sarirasya priya-priyayorapahatir asti, as'ariram va vasantan priya-priye na sprs' atah etc. You have not grasped the real meaning of these sentences. According to you, the interpretation of the first sentence, is this:--The all-pervading Soul, which being free from attributes like sattva, rajas, and tamas, is never bound by the clutches of papa and puNGya, nor does it proceed further. Since there is absolute bandhabhava, this (Soul) can neither be detatched from karma, nor can it relieve the other from the bandhas.

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311 Vada ] Canadharavada It knows neither the external attributes like pride etc. nor does it recognize its own internal self, on account of jnana being the property of prakriti which is acetana here. So, the statements such as stated above, assert the absolute abhava of bandha and moksa between jiva and Karma. On the other hand, sentences, such as, "na ha vaz" etc., would mean quite the reverse (according to you). They assert that there is no abhava of priya, and a-priya, to one having sarira, -while the a-sariri atman is never touched by them. Since the external, as well as, internal anadi sariras are santanayukta, the samsari jivas are not deprived of the experiences of sukha and duhkha, while the a-s'ariri atman is never touched by sukha and duhkha on account of the absolute abhava of its karana Karman. Thus, these Vedapadas are inclined to assert the existence of bandha and moksa. Such sentences have given rise to your doubt, which is not at all proper. Your interpretation of the sentences is not correct. I, therefore, give you their real interpretation. Please listen carefully taM manasi jai baMdho jogo jIvassa kammuNA samayaM / yaa tos at Ph a aa 1? Il 349H (8 604) Tam mannasi jai bandho jogo jivassa kammuna samayami Fuvvam paccha jivo kammam va samam va te hojja ? 1125711 (1805) [tvaM manyase yadi bandho yogo jovasya karmaNA samakam / pUrva pazcAjIvaH karma vA samaM vA te bhavetAm ? // 257 // (1805) Tvam manyase yadi bandho yogo iivasya karmapa samakami Purvam pascajjivah karma va samam va te bhavetam ? 1125711] Trans.--257 If you believe that bandha is the union of jiva with Karma, will the jiva be produced first and then Karma, 2Karma be produced first, and then jiva, or both to gether? (1805)

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312 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth TIkA-'veyapayANa ya' ityatra cazabdAd yukti ca tvaM na jAnAsi / kutaH ? yasmAdAyuSman maNDika ! tvamevaM manyase-jIvasya bandho yadi karmaNA samakaM sAdhaM yogaH saMyogo'bhipretaH saM khalvAdimAn Adirahito vaa| yayAdimAna , tataH kiM pUrva jIvaH pramuyeta pazcAt karma, pUrva vA pharma pazcAjIvaH prasyeta, samaM vA yugapad vA tau dvAvapi prasUyeyAtAm ? iti pakSatrayamiti // 257 // (1805) // D. C.If, O long-lived Mandika, you believe that bandha means the contact of jiva with Karma, consider whether that contact is adiman or adirahit.. If it is udiman there will be three alternatives: ( 1 ) Jiva will be produced first and then Karma or (2) Karma will be produced first and then jiva or (3) both of them will be produced simultaneously. Refuting the first alternative, the author states :na hi puvvamaheUo kharasaMgaM vAyasaMbhavo jutto| nikAraNajAyassa ya nikAraNau ciya viNAso // 258 // (1806) Na hi puvvamahcao kharasangam vayasambhavo jutto Nikkaranajayassa ya nikkaranau cciya vinaso 125811 (1806) [na hi pUrvamahetoH kharazRGganivAtmasaMbhavo yuktaH / niSkAraNajAtasya ca niSkAraNaka eva vinAzaH // 258 // (1806) Na hi purvamahetoh kharassingaimvatmasambhavo yuktahi Niskaranajatasya ca niskaranaka eva vinasah | 258 // ( 1806)] Trans.-258 Like kharasringa, the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of hetu. And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also, without any cause. (1806) TIkA-"pUrva jIvaH. pazcAtkarma" ityetadayuktam , yato na karmaNaH pUrva "kharasaMgaM vAyasaMbhayo jutto" kharazRGgasyevAtmanaH saMbhavo yuktaH, ahetukatvAta,

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313 Vida] Ganadharavada iha yadahetukaM tad na jAyate, yathA kharazRGgama, yazca jAyate tad nirhetukamapi na mavati, yathA ghaTaH, niSkAraNasya ca jAtasya niSkAraNa eva vinAzaH syAditi // 258 // (1806) // D. C.--According to the first alternative stated above, jiva is born first and then Karmi. Now since Karma is the hetu of jivas, the production of jivit is totally unjustified like the production of khara-sting i on account of its a-heta ktva. Por, that which has no hetu, is never produced like khara-sringa, and that which has already been produced is never nir-hetuka, as in case of ghata. Moreover, that which is born without any cause, has even to meet its end without any end. Proceeding further the author arguesahavA'NAi ciya so nikAraNaona kammajogo se / aha nikAraNao mo, mukkassa vi hohii sa bhujjo // 259 / / (1807) Ahava'nai cciya so nikkaaranao na kammajogo se Aha nikkaranao so, mukkassa vi hohil sa bhujjo 11 259 11 (1807) [athavA'nAdireva sa niSkAraNako na karmayogastasya / atha niSkAraNaH saH, muktasyApi bhaviSyati sa bhUyaH // 259 // (1807) Athava'nadireva sa niskaranako na karmayogastasyai Atha niskaranah sah muktasyapi bhavisyati sa bhuyah 1125911 (1807) ] Trans.--259 Or, that ( soul) being anadi, may be beyond any cause, and ( hence ) have no connection with Karma. If it were beyond any cause, it might have belonged to a mukta being also * 1807) ___TIkA-atha cet karmaNaH pUrvamAtmA'nAdikAlasiddha eva, iti kiM tasya sahetuka-nirhetukacintayA ? iti / atrocyate-"nikAraNao ityAdi' yadyevam, tataH "se" tasya jIvasya karmayogaH karmabandho na pAmo akAraNakhAn, namasa iva / atha niSkAraNo'pyaso bhavati, tarhi muktara 40

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314 Jinabhadra Gagi's [ The sixth bhUyaH sa bhaviSyati, niSkAraNatvAvizeSAta, tatazca muktAvapyanAvAsa iti // 259 / / (1807) // D, C.-Mandika:----Existence of soul has already been established from times immemorial, before Karma was produced. It is, therefore, useless to consider whether its production is sa-hetuka or nir-hetuka. Bhagavana:--In that case, O Mandika ! on account of its causelessness, atman will have no bondage with Karma as it has no bondage with akasa. ___Mandika:--No, in spite of its causelessness, the soul is in contact with Karma. Bhagavana:-Then, it will be attached to a mukta (liberated) being also. Thus, one that has already been liberated from the worldly bondages, will again come into those bondages on account of the common property, viz:-niskaranata, belonging to both of them. 259 (1807). hoja sa niccamuko baMdhAbhAvammi ko va se mokkhA ? / na hi mukkavavaeso baMdhAbhAve mao nabhaso // 260 // (1808) Hojja sa niccamukko bandhabhavammi ko va se mokkho ? Na hi mukkavvavaeso bandhabhave mao nabhaso 1126011 (1808) [bhavet sa nityamukto bandhAbhAve ko vA tasya mokSaH ? / na hi muktavyapadezo bandhAbhAve mato nabhasaH // 260 / / (1808) Bhavet sa nityamukto bandhabhave ko va tasya moksah ? Na hi muktavyapadeso bandhabhave mato nabhasah 126011 (1808)] Trans.---200 If it is ever liberated in absence of bondage, how will its moksa exist? For, in absence of bondage, aitribute of liberation could never be accepted as in the case of akasa. (1808) TIkA-athavA, karmayogAbhAvAd nityamukta evAsau bhavet / yadi vA,

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Vadh' Ganadharavada 315 badhAmAtre kaH kila tasya mokSavyapadezaH ? / na babaddhasya namasaH kasyApi muktavyapadezo mataH, bandhapUrvakatvAd mokSasya / tasmAd na "pUrva jIvaH pazcAt karma" iti prathamavikalpa iti // 260 / / (1808) // D. C.-Mandika:-On account of the abhiva of Karmayoga, this atman is also nitya-mukta. Bhagavan:-If it is so, O Mandika, how will whoksa be Attributed to it? For, one that is not susceptible to bandha, is never susceptible to moksa also, as in the case of uzkasa. Moksa can be attributed only to those that undergo bandhas. The first alternative that jivu is produced first and then Karma, is, therefore, not acceptible. 260 ( 1808 ). Now, the other two alternatives-viz., that Karmu is produced first and jiva afterwards or that both of them, are produced simultaneously-are refuted as follows: na ya kammassa vi puvvaM katturabhAve samunbhavo jutto| nikAraNao so vi ya taha jugappattibhAve ya // 261 / / (1809) na hi kattA kajaM ti ya jugavuppattIe jIva-kammANaM / jutto vavaeso'yaM jaha loe govisANANaM // 262 // (1810) Na ya kammassa vi puvvam katturabhave samubbhavo jutto i Nikkaran&o so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhave ya 11 261 11 (1809) Na hi katta kajjam ti ya jugavuppattie jiva-kammanan i Jutto vavaeso'yam jaha lie govisanapam || 262 // ( 1810) [na ca karmaNo'pi pUrva karturamAve samudbhavo yuktaH / niSkAraNakaH so'pi ca tathA yugapadutpattibhAve ca // 261 // (1809) nahi kartA kAryamiti ca yugapadutpattau jIva-pharmaNoH / yukto vyapadezo'yaM yathA loke goviSANayoH // 262 // (1810)

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316 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Na ca karmano'pi purvam kartarabhave samudbhavo yuktahi Niskaranakah so'pi ca tatha yugapadutpattibhave ca 11 261 11 ( 1809 ) Na bi karta karyaniiti ca yugapadutpattau jiva-karmaqoh Yukto vyapade'so' yam yatha loke govisanayoh || 262 // ( 1810)] Trans.--261-262 It is not appropriate (to believe ) the production of Karma to be first in absence of Karta, nor is it so even if it is niskaranaka. In case of both being produced simultaneously, the same ( difficulties) will arise. Moreover, in ( case of ) simultaneous production of jiva and Karma, designation of karta and karya will not properly fit in as found in the popular example of the two horns of a cow. ( 1809-1810) TIkA--na ca jIvAt mAk karmaNo'pi samudbhavo yuktaH, karturjIvasya tadAnImabhAvAt, akriyamANasya ca karmavAyogAt, niSkAraNazcetyamasau karmasamudbhavaH syAt, tato'kAraNajAtasyAkAraNata eva vinAzo'pi syaaditi| tayA, yugapadutpattibhAve ca " pratyekapakSoktA doSAH vAcyA" iti zeSaHnirhetukatvAt pratyekavadubhayasyApi smuditsyaanutpttirityaadi| na ca yugapa. dutpabhayonIba-karmaNoH kartR-karmabhAvo yujyata ityetadevAha-na hItyAdi" nahi yugapadutpatrayorjIva--karmaNoH "ayaM jIvaH kartA" "idaM vA jJAnAvaraNAdipudgagalanikurambaM karma" iti vyapadezoM yujyate, yayA loke sanye-- saragoviSANayoriti // 261--262 // (1809--1810) // ___D. C.-- It is not appropriate to accept that Karma is produced first and jiva afterwards. Por, the production of Karma is not possible without jive, which is the Karma at the same time. And if that production of Karma is niskaranaka, its end will also be niskaranaka. It is also not proper to say that jiva and Karma are produced simultaneously. Because, in that case also, both being nirhteuka, the same difficulties will arise. Moreover, if jiva and Karma are produced together, they will no longer be taken as karta and karya but like the two

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317 Vada ] Ganadharavada horns of a cow, they will be taken as twins produced together. 261-262 ( 1809-1810 ). Now, coming to the second alternative at the root, the author proceeds:-- hojANAio vA saMbaMdho taha vina ghaDae mokyo / joDaNAI so'NaMto jIva-nahANaM va saMbaMdho // 263 / / (1811) Hejjansio va sambandho that vi na ghadae mokkho I Jo'hai sonanto jiva-nahanam va sambandho // 263 // ( 1811) [bhavedanAdiko vA saMbandhastathApi na ghaTate mokSaH / yo'nAdiH so'nanto jIva--nabhasoriva saMbandhaH / / 563 // (1811) Bhavedanadiko va sambandhastathapi na ghatate moksah, Yo'nadih ss'nanto jiva-nabhsoriva sambandhah | 263 ( 1811) Trans.--263 Or, if the contact (of jiva with Karma ) is ( taken as ) anadaka ( without any beginning ), there will be nothing like mcksa. That which is anudi like the contact of jiva and akasa, is ananta ( endless ) also. ( 1811) TIkA- syAdetava, anAdireva jIva-karmaNoH saMbandhaH sNyogH| nana tathApi mokSo na ghaTate, yasmAd yo'nAdiH saMyoga: so'nanto dRSTaH, yathA jiiv--nmsoH| na hyAkAzena saha jIvasya kadAcidapi saMyogo nivartate / evaM karmaNApi sahAsau na nivarteta, tathA ca sati muktyabhAvamasaGga iti // 263 / / (1811) // D. C.--If the contact of jiva with Karma is anadika, it should be even ananta like the contact of ziva with sky, and in that case, there will be no scope for moksa at all. iya juttIe na ghaTai suvaha ya suIsu baMdha-mokkhA tti| teNa tuha saMsao'yaM na ya kajo'yaM jahA suNasu // 264 // (1812)

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318 Jinabhadra Gani's ( The sixth ya juttie na ghatai suvvai ya suisu bandha-mokkha tti Tena tuha samsao'yam na ya kajjo'yam jaha sunasu 126411 (1812) [iti yutkayA na ghaTate zrUyate ca zrutiSu bandhamokSAcIti / tena tava saMzayo'yaM na ca kAryoM'yaM yathA zruNu // 264 // (1812) Iti yuktya na ghatate sruyate ca srutisu bandha-modsaviti Tena tava samsayo'yam na ca karyo'yam yatha ssinu 1126411 (1812)] Trans --- 264 Thus, by means of the above-mentioned argument, bandha and woksa do not fit in. Still however, it is heard in the Vedas (that they exist). This doubt of yours -which is (absolutely) improper-is due to that So, listen to me (now). (1812) TokA--ityevaM yuktayuktyA bandho mokSazca na ghaTate, zrayate ca zrutiSu vedvaakyessvsau| tatastava saMzayo'yam / yathA cAyaM na kAryastathA zrRNu saumya ! iti| uktaH pUrvapakSaH / / 264 // (1812) // D. C.-The arguments advanced by you do not lead one to prove the existence of bandha and noksu as seen above. But since it has already been found in Vedas that they exist, your doubt has come into existence, which is totally unworthy of you. Now, listen to me. 264 (1812). saMtANo'NAIo paropparaM heu-heubhaavaao| dehassa ya kammassaM ya maMDiya ! bIyaM-kurANAM va // 265 // (1813) Santano'nalo paropparam heu-heubhavao i Dehassa ya kammassa ya Mandiya ' biyam-kuranam va n265n(1813) [saMtAno'nAdikaH parasparaM hetu--hetumadbhAvAt / dehasya ca karmaNazca maNDika ! bIjA--'Gkarayoriva / / 265 // (1813) Santano'nadikah parasparam hetu-hetubhavati Dehasya ca karmanasca Mandika 1 bija nikurayoriva n2651 (1813)] Trans.--265 Since body and Karma are mutually related

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Vada ] Canadharavada like seed and sprout as helu and hetumat, their expansion, O Mandzka, is anadika. (1813) 319 TIkA - zarIra - karmaNoranAdiH saMtAna iti pratijJA, parasparaM hetuhetumadbhAvAt, bIjAGkavaditi / tatazca " kiM pUrva jIvaH pazcAt karma" ? ityAdi plavata eva, anAdilAt tatsaMtAnasyeti // 265 / / (1813) / / D. C. - The santana of sarira and Karma is anad, because both of them are related to each other as hetu and hetumat like seed and sprout. On account of this aradztva of santana, the argument that jiva is born first and Karma afterwards, will automatically be null and void. 265 (1813). asthi sa deho jo kammakAraNaM jo ya kajjamaNNassa / kammaM ca dehakAraNamatthi ya jaM kajamaNNassa / / 266 / / (1814) * Atthi sa deho jo kammakaranam jo ya kajjamannassa Kammam ca dehakaranamatthi ya jam kajjamannassa // 266 (1814) [ asti sa deho yaH karmakAraNaM yazca kAryamanyasya / karma ca dehakAraNamasti ca yat kAryamanyasya || 266 / / (1814 ) Asti sa deho yah karmakaranam yasca karyamanyasya i Karma ca dheakaranamasti ca yat karyamanyasya || 266 (1814)] Trans.--266 The body is such that it becomes the cause of (one) Karma, and effect of another, while Karma is also the cause of (one) body, and the effect of another. ( 1814) TIkA - asti sa kazcid deho yo'gretanasya karmaNaH kAraNam, yazcAnya syAtItasya karmaNaH kAryam / tathA, karmApi samasti / kiM viziSTam ? ityAhayadapretanasya dehasya kAraNam, yaccAnyAsyAtItasya dehasya kAryamiti / evamanAdau saMsAre na kvacid vizrAmyati, ato'nAdirdeha- karmasaMtAna iti / Aha-- nanu vandha-- mokSAviha sAdhayituM prastutau tataH karmasaMtAna syAnAdikhasAdhanamasaMbaddhamiva lakSyate / tadayuktam, abhimAyAparijJAnAt, na kRtaM }

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320 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth " karma saMbhavati "kriyata iti karma" iti vyutpatteH yacca tasya karaNamasAveva bandha iti kathaM na tatsiddhiH 1 // 266 // (1814) // DC-Some deha is such that it serves as the cause of some future actions, while itself has already been the effect of some past actions. The Karma, in turn also serves as the cause of some body to come, while it has itself been the effect of some other body in the past. Thus, in this anadi samsara the santana of deha and Karma is also anadi as it never stops to rest. Mandika: But it is quite irrelevant to establish the anadiva of Karma-santana. For, the point is to establish the existence of bandha and moksa. Bhagavan:-It is not so, O MNGadika | "Kriyate iti Karma" that which is accomplished, is action. So, an unaccomplished action is never possible. In the accomplishment of Karma, its karana is nothing but bandha, and hence the significance of establishing the anaditva of Kdrma-santana. Mandika: If that which has been accomplished is Karma, who is the krato of this deha? 266 (1814). - The Bhaagvan replies kaptA jIvo kammassa karaNao jaha ghaDasma ghaDakAro / evaM ci dehassa vi kammakaraNasaMbhavAu ti // 267 // (1815) Katta jivo kammassa karagao jaha ghadassa ghadakaro Evam ciya dehassa vi kammakarnasambhavau tti 11267 (1815) [ kartA jIvaH karmaNaH karaNato yathA ghaTasya ghaTakAraH / evameva dehasyApi karmakaraNa saMbhavAditi // 267 // (1815) Karta jivah karmanah karanato yatha ghatasya ghatakarah i Evameva dehasyapi karmakaranasambhavaditi 267 (1815))

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321 Vada ] Ganadharavada Trans.-267 Just as jiva happens to be the karta of karma as potter (is ) of ghata by virtue of its instrumentality, so also, (it becomes the karta ) of deha by virtue of karmi as (its) nstrument. ( 1815 ) TIkA-kartA cAtra karmaNo jIvaH, karaNasametatvAt daNDAdikaraNayuktakulAlavad ghaTasya, karaNaM ceha jIvasya karma nivartayataH zarIramavagantavyam / evaM dehasyApyAtmaiva kartA, karmarUpaM karaNaM karmakaraNaM tatsaMbhavAt ---tayuktatvAt , daNDAdikaraNasametakulAlavaditi / / 267 // (1815) / / D. C.-Just as potter is called the karta of ghata, because he is accompained by variouss karana such as danda etc., the Soul will also be called the karta of deha by reason of its being accompanied by Karma as the karana. 267 (1815). _Here, again, the opponent's view is stated and refutedkammaM karaNamasiddhaM va te maI kajao tayaM siddhaM / kiriyAphalao ya puNo paDivaja tamaggibhUi vva // 268 // (1816) Kammam karanamasiddham va te mai kajjao tayam siddhami Kiriyaphalao ya puno paoivajja tamaggibhui wa 1126811 ( 1816 ) [karma karaNamasiddhaM vA tava matiH kAryatastata siddham / kriyAphalatazca punaH pratipayasva tadagnibhUtiriva // 268 // (1816) Karma karanamasiddham va tava matih karyatastat siddhami Kriyaphalatasca punah pratipadyasva tadagnibhutiriva 1126811 (1816)7 Trans.----268 Or, (it may be ) your belief that Karma cannot be proved as karana ; but it has been proved by ( the help of) kurya. Moreover, like Agnibhuti (you should ) accept it, by reason of kriyaphala also. ( 1816) TIkA-syAdetat, atIndriyatvenAsiddhatvAt karmaNaH karaNatvamasiddham / tadayuktam, yataH kAryataH kAryadvAreNa tat siddhameva, tathAhi-vidyamAnakaraNaM zarIrAdi, katAbAra, ghaTA deva, yavAsya karagaM tara kara tasmAdastyeva 41

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322 Jinabhadra Cani,s [The sixth tat / athavA, vidyamAnakaraNamevAtmazarIralakSaNaM dvayam kartR - kAryarUpatvAt, kulAla - ghaTAdivat yacca karturAtmanaH zarIramutpAdayataH kAraNaM tat karmeti kathaM na tatsiddhi: ? / tathA, phalavatyo dAnAdikriyAH, cetanArambhakriyArUpatvAt, kRSyAdikriyAbAt yacca tAsAM phalaM tat karma / ityabhibhUtiriva tvamapi pratipadyasveti // 268 / / (1816) D. C. Mandika : -- Since karna is atindriya ( beyond the perception of sense-organs) it can never be taken as karapa. Bhagavan : -It is not so. Since sarira is susceptible to production like ghata, it must have some karana to bring its existence. This karana is Karma itself. Or say, there must be some karana between Karta like atman and Karya like s'arira as in the case of ghatakara and ghata. And, this can be nothing else but Karma. This shows that Karma can be brought about even by the help of Karyas like s'arira. Moreover, Karyas like dana etc. which are inspired by fruit, are also fruitful like Kriyas such as krisZ etc. So, like Agnibhiti, you, too, O Mandika ! shall have to admit the existence of Karma. 11268 (1816) In reply to the assertion that a bandha which is anadi is ananta also, the author states jaM saMtANo'NAI teNANato'vi NAyamegaMtA / dIsaI saMto vi jao katthaha vIrya-kurAINaM // 269 // (1817) Jam santano'nai tenananto'vi nayameganto Disai santo vi jao katthai biyam-kurainam ||269|| (1817) [ yat saMtAno'nAdistenAnanto'pi nAyamekAntaH / dRzyate sannapi yataH kutrApi bIjA - 'GkarAdInAm / / 269 / / (1817) Yat santano'nadistenanto'pi nayamekantah Drisyate sannapi yatah kutrapi bija'-m kuradinam ||269|| (1817;) Trans. - 269 An expansion which has no beginning,

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Vada] Gapadharayada 323 cannot exclusively be called endless also. Por, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning, are sometimes found (as having ends) also. (1817) TIkA-" yad yasmAnjIva-karmasaMyogasaMtAno'nAdistena tasmAdananto'pi" iti nAyamekAntaH, yato'nAdirapi saMyuktayorvastunoH saMtAnaH sAnto'pi kvacid dRzyate, yathA bIjA-'GkarAdInAM saMtAna iti // 269 // (1817) D. C. There can never be an exclusive rule that the anadi santana of jiva and Karma combined together, is ananta also. Por, in some cases, the sanatana does come to an end inspite of its anaditva e. g. the santana of seed and sprout. Also, aNNayaramaNivattiyakavaM bIya-kurANa jaM vihayaM / tattha hao saMtANo kukkuDi-aMDAiyANaM ca // 270 / / (1818) Annayaramanivvattiyakajjam biyam-kurana jam vihayam i Tattha hao santano kukkuli-andaiyanam ca 1127011 (1818) [anyataradanirvatitakArya bIjA-'Gkarayoryad vihatat / satra hataH saMtAnaH kukkuTaca-'NNAdikAnAM ca // 270 // (1818) Anyataradanirvartitakaryam bija-rkurayoryad vihatami Tatra hatah santanah kukkutya'-opadikanam ca 112701 (1818) jaha veha kaMcaNo-valasaMjogo'NAisaMtaigao vi| ghocchinnai sovAyaM taha jogo jIva-kammANaM // 271 // (1719) Jaha veka kancano-valasanjogo'paisantaigao vi! Vocchijjai sovayam taha jogo jiva-kammanam 1127111 (1819) [yathA veha kAzcano-palasaMyogo'nAdisaMtatigato'pi / vyavacchidyate sopAyaM tathA yogo jIva-karmaNoH // 271 // (1819) Yatha veha kancano--palasamyogo'nadisantatigato'pi 1 Vyavacchidyate sopayam tatha yogo jiva-karmasok 127111 (1819)]

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324 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Trans. - 270-271. When either a seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the ( desired ) effect, its santana is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial, is cut off, in the same way, the contact of jiva with Karma (is also cut off). (1818-1819 ). TIkA -- bIjA--'Gkarayormadhye'nyataradanirvartitakAryameva yad vihataM vyavacchinnaM tatrAnayorhato vyavacchinnaH saMtAnaH / evaM kukkuTaya- 'NDakayoH pitAputrayorapi ca vaktavyam / yathA vA kAJcano-- paLayoranAdikAlamavRta saMtAnabhAvagato'pi saMyogoH sopAyamagnitApAdyupAyAd vyavacchidyate, tathA jIvakarmaNorapi saMyoga'nAdisaMtAnagato'pi tapaH saMyamAdhupAyAd vyavacchidyate, iti na mokSAbhAva iti // 270 -- 271 // (1818--1819) D. C.-If either of bija and ankura vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire inspite of its anaditva, the contact between jiva and Karma could also be brought to an end by means of tapas, samyama etc., until ultimately the moksa is attained. // 270271 (1818-1819 )n Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceeds to kiM jIva-nahANa va aha jogo kaMcaNo-valANaM va ? | jIvarasa ya kammassa ya bhaNNai duviho vi na viruddho // 272 // (1820) desoari for bhavvANaM kaMcazo'valANaM va / jIvase sAmaNNe bhavvo'bhavyo tti ko bheo ? / / 273 // (1821) To kim jiva-nahana va aha jogo kancano-valanam va? Jiyassa ya kammassa ya bhagnai duviho vi na viruddho || 272 // ( 1820) For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Padhamo'bhavvanam ciya bhavvanam kancano-valaanm va i Jivatte samanne bhavuo'bhavvo tti ko bheo ? [ 273 u (1821) 325 [ tataH kiM jIva-- nabhasorivAtha yogaH kAJcano patrayoriva ? | jIvasya ca karmaNazca bhaNyate dvividho'pi na viruddha / / 72 / / (1820 ) prathamo'bhavyAnAmeva bhavyAnAM kAJcano--palayoriva / jIvatve sAmAnye bhavyo'bhavya iti ko bhedaH ? || 273 / / (1821) Tatat kim jiva- nabhasorivatah yogah kancano - palayoriva ? Jivasya ca karmanasca bhaynate dvi- vidho' pi na viruddhah272 Prathamo'bhavyanameva bhavyanam ka/cano-palayoriva Jivatve samanye bhavyo bhavyah iti ko bheda || 273 || ( 1821 }} 1) Trans.-272-273 " Then, does the union of jiva and karma resemble the union of jiva and nabhas? Or, is it similar tc that between gold and stone ? "" Union in both the ways wil not be contrary. The first belongs to the inauspicious only (contact) of the auspicious resembles (the one') between gola and stone." "What is the distinction between auspicious and inauspicious, when the state of existence is common ?" (1820-1821). TIkA - Aha-- jIvasya karmaNazca yo'yaM parasparaM yogaH so'nAdiH san kiM jIva -- nabhasorivAnantaH, atha kAzcano - paLayoriva sAnto'pi syAt ? ubhayathApi darzanAt kimatra pratipadyAmahe ? | maNyate'trottarama-- dvidhA'pyayamaviruddhaH, tatra prathamo'nAdyanantarUpo'bhavyAnAM draSTavyaH / yastu kAzcano - paLayorivAnAdiH sAnto'sau bhavyAnAM vijJeyaH / Aha- natu jIvatvasAmye'pi "ayaM cAbhavyaH" iti kikRto'yaM vizeSa: ? / na ca vaktavyamyathA jIvatve samAne'pi nAraka- tiryagAdayo vizeSAstathA bhavyA--'bhavyasvavizeSo'pi bhaviSyatIti yataH karmajanitA evaM nArakAdivizeSAH, na tu svAbhAvikA / mavyA - 'bhavyatvavizeSo'pi yadi karmajanitastadA bhavatu, ko nivArayitA ?, na caivamiti // 275 -273 // (1820 -1-21) // 39 66 " ayaM bhavyaH D. C. -- Mandika : Should the anad contact of itna with

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320 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth Karma be taken as ananta, like that between Jiva and nabhas or as santa like that between gold and stone ? Bhagavana:--It is possible in both ways It is found as anudi and ananta in case of inauspicious objects, but in cases of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as anadi and sunta. Mandzka:-- How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere ? Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other, even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is possible, because, the naraka experiences etc. are produced on account of Karma, and are not svabhavika. hou jai kammakao na viroho nAragAibheu vva / bhaNaha ya bhavcA'bhavvA sabhAvao teNa saMdeho // 274 // (1822) Hou jai kammakai na viroho naragaibheu vai Bhaqaha ya bhavva'bhavva sabhavao tena sandeho 127-11 (1822) [bhavatu yadi karmakRto na virodho nArakAdimeda iva / bhaNatha ca bhavyA-'bhavyAn svamAvatastena saMdehaH // 274 / / (1822) Bhavatu yadi karmaksito na virodho narakadibheda iva i Bhayatha ca bhavya'bhavyan svabhavatastena samdehah 11 2741 Trans.--274 If the distinction is caused by karma as in the case of hellish experience etc., there is no objection. But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their ( very) nature, the doubt does arise. ( 1822) TIkA-bhavatu vA yadi karmakRto'yaM bhavyAs-bhavyatvavizeSo jIvAnAfacut, 779 fm fatte, #1#fata, fa, tant pours

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Vida ] Ganadharavada 327 manyAH svamAvata eva jIvA na tu karmataH," iti yUyaM bhaNaya, tenAsmAkaM saMdeha iti // 274 / / (1822) // ___D. C.-Mandeka :-If you accept that the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is also karma-janita ( like that between hen and animal life ) I have nothing to say but when you take their distinction to be svabhavika, I raise the doubt. 12740 (1822) Explaining the real cause between bhavya and a-bhavya the author replies :davAite tulle jIva-nahANaM sabhAvao bheo| jIvA-jIvAgao jaha, taha bhanve-yaraviseso // 275 // (1823) Davvaitte tulle jiva-nahanam sabhavao bheo i Jivalivaigao jaha, taha bhavveyaraviseso 127511 (1823) [dravyAditve tulye jIva-nabhasoH svabhAvato bhedaH / jIvA-'jIvAdigato yathA, tathA manye-taravizeSaH // 275 // (1823) Dravyaditve tulye jiva-nabhaso svabhavato bhedah Jiva'jivadigato yatha, tatha bhavyetara-vis'esah 127311 (1823)] ____Trans.-~275 Just as in (case of) iva and nabhas the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in (the midst of) the common element of (their being) dravya etc, in the same way, the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. (1823) TIkA-yathA jIva-nabhasodraSyatva-satva--prameyatva-jJeyatvAdau turaye'pi jIvA--'jIvalva-cetanA-cetanatvAdisvabhAvato bhedaH, tathA jIvAnAmapi jIvatvasAmye'pi yadi bhavyA-'bhavyakRto vizeSaH syAt, tarhi ko doSaH ? iti // 275 // (1823) D. C.-Although jiva and akas'a possess the common properties like dravyatva, sattva ( existence ), prameyatva

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328 Jinabuadra Gani's [The sixth (destructibility) ineyatva (cognizibility) etc., distinction such as that of jiva and a-jiva etc., does exist by its very nature. Similarly, in case of jivas also, even though sivalva is common, the distinction of bhavya and abhavya remains there as a natural consequence, // 275 (1823) / / The pupil objects to this view thusevaM pi bhavvabhAvo jIvattaM piva sbhaavjaaiio| pAvai nico tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvANaM / / 276 / / (1824) Evam pi bhavyabhavo jivattam piva sabhavajaio 1 Pavai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvanam 1127611 (1824) [ evamapi bhavyabhAvo jInatvamiva svabhAvajAtIyaH / prApnoti nityastasmiMzca tavasthe nAsti nirvANam // 276 // (1824) Evampi bhavyabhavo jivatvamiva syabhavajatiyah Prapnoti nityastasminsca tadavasthe nasti nirvanam 1127611 (1824)] Trans.--276 Even in that case, the quality of (being) auspicious being natural like jivatva, will become everlasting; and if it is so, there will be no (scope for) final liberation (at all). (1824) TIkA -nanvemapi bhavyabhAvo nityo'vinAzI prAmoti, svabhAvajAtIyatvAt -svAbhAvikatvAt jIvatvavat / bhavatvevamiti cet / tadayuktam, yatastasmin mavyabhAve tadavasthe nityovasthAyini nAsti nirvANam, sido na bhavyo nApya bhavyaH" iti vacanAditi // 276 // (1824) D. C.--If the quality of bhavyatva is svabhavika as jivatva, as said above, it will become everlasting like jivata also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting bhavyabhava, there will be no scope for moksa at all 11276 (1824 11 The author refutes this argument as follows:

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Vada 1 Ganadharavada jaha ghaDapuvvAbhAvo'NAisahAvo vi sanihaNo evaM / jaI bhavvattAbhAvo bhaveja kiriyAe ko doso ? // 277 // (1825) Jaha ghadapuvvabhavo'naisahavo vi sanihano evam i Jai bhavvattabhavo bhavejja kiriyae ko doso? #277|| (1825) [ yathA ghaTapUrvA mAvo'nAdisvabhAvo'pi sanidhana evam | yadi bhavyatvAbhAvo bhavet kriyayA ko doSa: / / 277 / / (1825) Yatha ghatapurvabhavo'nadisvabhavo'pi sanidhana evam Yadi bhavyatvabhavo bhavet kriyaya ko dosab | 277 (1825) ] 329 Trans. - 277 What harm is there if the ( previous) abhava of auspiciousness is possessed of end, like the previous nonexistence of ghata inspite of its being anadi by nature ? (1825) TIkA- yathA ghaTasya prAgabhAvo'nAdisvabhAvajAtIyo'pi ghaTotpattau sanidhano vinazvaro dRSTaH, evaM yadi bhavyatvasyApi jJAna - tapaHsacitracaraNakriyopAyato'bhAvaH syAt, tarhi ko doSaH saMpadyate ? - na kazciditi / / 277 / / 1825 / / an D. C. --The previous non-existence of ghata comes to end, when ghata is actually produced. Similarly, there is no harm if we assume that the abhava of bhavyatva comes to an end, when the bhavytva is actually brought into existence by the process of perception 277 (1825) || aNudAharaNamabhAvo kharasaMgaM piva maI na taM jamhA / bhAvo ciya sa visiTTho kuMbhANuSpattimetteNaM // 278 // (1826) Anudaharanamabhavo kharasangam piva mai na tam jamha | Bhavo cciya sa visittho kumbhanuppattimettegam 278 (1826) [ anudAharaNabhAvaH kharazRGgamiva matirna tad yasmAt / mAva eva sa viziSTaH kumbhAnutpattimAtreNa || 278 || (1826) Anudaharanabhavah kharasringamiva matirna tad yasmat | Bhava eva sa visistar kumbhanutpattimatrena 278 | ( 1826) ] 42

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330 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Trans.--278 ( You may believe that ) like kharasringa, this is no (good ) example. But it is not so. That is nothing but bhava distinguished by the non-production of ghata. ( 1826 ) TIkA-syAda matiH parasya-nanvanudAharaNamaso mAgabhAvA, abhAvarUpatayevAvastutvAta, kharaviSANavat / vana, yasmAd bhAva evAsau ghaTapAgamAvA, tatkAraNabhUtAnAdikAlamavRttapuralasaMghAtarUpaH, kevalaM ghaTAnutpattimAtreNa viziSTa // 278 // (1826) D. C.---Mandika:--- Life kharasxiiga, previous non-existence cannot be taken as a right illustration, because like-kharasrsinga, it is non-existent on account of its abhavarupata. Bhagavann: It is not so. The previous abhava of ghata is itself bhavz. The only difference found in it, is that, at this stage the production of ghata has not yet been brought about from the mass of earth, which has served as its karana from times imemmorial 11 277 ( 1826 ) 11 evaM bhavaghuccheo koDAgArassa vA avcutti| taM nANaMtattaNao'NAgayakAlaM-barANaM va // 279 / / (1827) Evam bhavavuccheo kotthagarassa va avacau tti i Tam nanantattanao'nagayakalam-baranam va // 279 // ( 1827 ) [evaM bhavyocchedaH koSTAgArasyevApacaya iti / tad nAnannatvato'nAgatakAlA-Dambarayoriva / / 279 // (1827) Evan bhavyocchedah kostagarasyevapacaya iti i Tad nanantatvato'nagatakala-mbarayoriva il 279 11 ( 1827 )] Trans.-279 Similarly, it is not ( correct ) ( to believe ) the culmination of the auspicious to be similar to the diminution of granery on account of its ) endlessness, like the time to come or sky. ( 1827 ) TIkA-nanvecaM sati bhavyocchedaH bhanyajIvaH saMsAraH zUnyaH pAmoti,

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Vada ] Ganadharava 4 apacayAt / kasya yathA samucchedaH ? ityAha- stokastokAkRSyamANadhAnyasya dhAnyabhRtakoSThAgArasya / idamuktaM bhavati - kAlasyAnantyAt SaNmAsaparyante cAvazyamekasya bhavyasya jIvasya siddhigamanAt krameNApacIyamAnasya dhAnyakoSThAgArasyeva sarvasyApi bhavyarAzerucchedaH prApnotIti / atrottaramAha-tadetad na, anantatvAd bhavyarAzeH, anAgatakALA-sskAzavaditi / iha yad bRhadananta kenAnantaM, tat stoka - tayA'pacIyamAnamapi nocchidyate, yathA pratisamayaM vartamAna tApasyA'pacIyamAno'pyanAgatakAla samayarAziH, pratisamayaM buddhayA pradezApahAreNApacIyamAnaH sarvanabhApradezarAzirvA / rati na bhavyocchedaH // 275 // ( 1827 ) // D. C. -- Mandeka - If the uccheda of bhavya jivas is accepted, this world will gradually be deprived of them. Ultimately, there will be no bhavya jiva existing in the world. For, just as a granary of corn, is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn, this world will also be losing one bhavya jiva at least at the end of say, six months, when he will be attaining moksa, until ultimately the world will be void of bhavya jivas. 331 Bhagavana:--Your argument is fallacious, O Mandika. The number of bhavya jivas is as endldss as the time to come or sky, and hence its absolute viccheda should never be feared, jaM cAtItA'NAgayakAlA tullA jao ya saMsiddho / eko anaMtabhAgo bhavvANamaIyakAle // 280 // ( 1828 ) esseNaM tattiu ciya jutto jaM to vi savvabhavvANaM / junto na samuccheo hojja maI kahamiNaM siddhaM ? / / 281 / / (1829) bhavvANamaNaMta saNamaNaMtabhAgo va kiha mukkA siM / kAlAdao va maMDiya ! maha vayaNAo va paDivajja // 282 // (1830) Jam catita'nagayakala tulla jao ya samsidhho I Ekko anantabhago bhavanamaiyakalam || 280 // ( 1828 )

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332 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth Essenam tattiu cciya jutto jam to vi savvabhavvanam | Jutto na samuccheo hojja mai kahaminam siddham ? ||28||(1829) Bhavvanamanantattanantabhago va kiha mukko sim Kaladao va Mandiya ! maha vayanao va padivajja // 282 // ( 1830 ) [ vaccAtItA'nAgatakAlau tulyau yatazca saMsiddhaH / eko'nantabhAgo bhavyAnAmatIta kALena // 280 // (1828) eSyatA tAvAneva yukto yat tato'pi sarvabhavyAnAm / yukto na samucchedo bhaved matiH kathamidaM siddham / / 281 / / (1829) bhavyAnAmanantatvamanantabhAgo vA kathaM vA mukta eSAm ? kAlAdaya iva maNDika ! mama vacanAd vA pratipadyasva || 282 // (1830) Yaccatita nagatkalau tulyau yats'ca samsiddhah | Bko'nantabhago bhavyanamatitakalena / 280 // ( 1828 ) Esyata tavaneva yukte yet tato'pi sarvabhavyanam | Yukto na samucchedo bhaved matih kathamidam siddham ? ||281|| Bhavyanamanantatvamanantabhago va katham va mukta esam ? Kaladaya iva Mandika ! mama vacanad va pratipadyasva // 282 // ] Trans. - 280-281-282 Since the times-past and futureare similiar, an infinitesimal part of the auspicious, which has already been liberated in the past will meet liberation in future also It is not proper, therefore, to believe in ( complete ) destination of all auspicious ( creatures ). ( It may be asked ) "How is it proved? Or, how is the endlessness or infinitesimal part of the auspicious ( creatures ) liberated ?" "Like Kala etc. Or, O Mandika, take it ( for granted ) on my word," 1829-1830) (1828 TIkA vyAkhyA - yasmAcAtItA - 'nAgatakAlau tulyAdeva, yatazvAtItenApi kAlenaika eva nigodAnanvatamo bhAgo'dyApi bhavyAnAM siddhaH, eSyatApi bhaviSyatkAlena tAvanmAtra eva bhavyAnanvabhAgaH siddhiM gacchan yukto ghaTamAnakaH, na hInAdhikaH bhaviSyato'thi kAkasyAtIcaturayasvAt / For Private Personal Use Only -

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333 Vada ] tata evamapi sati na sarvabhavyAnAmucchedo yuktaH, sarveNApi kAlena tadanantabhAgasyaiva siddhigamanasambhavopadarzanAt / atha parasya matirbhavet tatkathamidaM siddhaM yaduta - anantA bhavyAH, tadanantabhAgazca sarveNaiva kAlena setsyatIti ? | atrocyate - kALA - ''kAzAdaya ivAnanvAstAvad bhavyAH, tadanantabhAgasya ca muktigamanAt, kALA - sskAzayoriva na sarveSAmuccheda iti pratipadya sva, madvacanAd vA maNDika ! sarvametat zraddhehIti / / 280-281-282 // (1828- 1829-1830) Ganadharavada D. C. - As the time, whether past or future is the same throughout, the infinite number of bhavya jivas, or a portion of them attains moksa during past, as well as, future times in equal proportion. The accheda of all bhavya jivas is, therefore, not acceptible Mandika:-But how is it proved that the bhavyas are ananta and their anantabhaga attains moksa at all times ? Bhagavana:--They are antanta like kala and akasa. Even if infinite number of bhavyas passes away to to moksa, they remain endless for ever, like kala and akasa. Rely upon my word, O Mandika, and accept it // 280-282 ( 1828-1830 ) // If it is asked "How could it be taken as true merely on your words?" the answer is sambhUyamigaM ginhasu maha vayaNAo'vasesa vayaNaM va / savvaNNutAio vA jANayamajjhatthavayaNaM ca // 283 // (1831) maNasi hi savaNU savvesiM savvasaMsayaccheyA / dihaMtAbhAvammi vipucchau jo saMsao jassa // 284 // (1832) Sadbhuyaminam gighasu maha vayanao'vasesavayanam va Savvanyutaio va janayamajjhatthavayanam va || 283 Mangasi kiha savvannu savvesim savvasamsayaccheya | Ditthantabhavammi vi pucchau jo samsao jassa // 284 // ( 1832 ) 1831 )

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334 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth [sadbhUtamidaM gRhANa madvacanAdavazeSavacanamiva / sarvajJatAdito vA zAyakamadhyasthavaca miva / / 283 / / (1831) manyase kathaM sarvajJaH sarveSAM sarvasaMzayacchedAt / dRSTAntAbhAve'pi pRcchatu yaH saMzayo yasya / / 284 / (1832) Sadhutamidam grihana madvacanadavas'esayacanamivai Sarvajnatadito va jnayakamadhyasthavacanamiva 12830 (1831)] Manyase katham sarvajnah sarvasamseyacchedat Dristantabhave'pi pricchatu yah samsayo yasya ||2840 (1832)] Trans.--283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience. (If) you question "How am I to be omniscient?" (The reply is that) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all. Even in absence of (proper)examples. one who entertains doubts may ask me. (1831-1832) TIkA-vyAkhyA-sadbhUtamidamanantaroktaM sarvamapIti gRhANa tvam, maracanatvAt, yathA tvatsaMzayAdiviSayamavazeSaM madvacanam, sarvazatvAdityAdibhyo vA hetubhyaH, AdizabdAt vItarAgatvAdiparigrahaH, hAyakamadhyasthabacanavadityayamatra dRSTAnta iti / athaivaM manyase-kathamiva sarvajJastvam / atrodhyate-sarveSAM sarvasaMzayacchedAt / anyasya sarvasaMzayacchettuH kasyAppadarzanAda ko'tra dRSTAntaH ?--na kshciditi| atrocyate- kimatra dRSTAntAnveSaNena ? / sadabhAve'pi hi yo yasya saMzayaH sa taM sarvamapi pRcchatu, yena svamatyayasiddha eva mayi sarvazanizcayo bhavatIti / / 283--284 // (1831.-1832) D. C:-~-Bhagavana::--Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am sarvajira and vitaraga. Mandika:--On what ground are you to be called sarvajna ? Bhagavana :--) am sarvajina, because I remove the doubts of all. Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question, so that he may be convinced of my sarrajnatua. 283-284(1831-1832)

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335 Vada ] Ganadharavada Mandika, then, puts the question as follows:bhavvA vi na sijjhissaMti kei kAleNa jai vi savveNa / naNu te vi abhavya ciya kiMvA bhavyattaNaM tesiM? // 285 / / (1833) Bhavva yi na sijjhissanti kei kalena jai vi savvena i Naru te vi abhavva cciya kimva bhavvattanam tesim ? // 2851(1833) [bhavyA bhapi na setsyanti ke'pi kAlena yadyapi sarveNa / manu te'pyabhavyA eva kiMvA bhavyatvaM teSAm ? / / 285 / / (1833) Bhavya api na setsyanti ke'pi kalena yadyapi sarvena Nanu te pyabhvya eva kimva bhavyatvam tesam ? (128511 (1833) | Trans.--285 Some (of the creatures ) though, bhavya, do not attain moksa at any time. As a matter of fact, they are also a-blhavyas. If not so, how is their bhavyatva accoun -- ted for ? (1833) TIkA-nanu bhanyA api santo yadi sarveNApi kAlena sarve'pi na setsyanti, tahiM yeSAM siddhirna bhaviSyati, amavyA eva te kiMna vyapadizyante ? kena bA vizeSeNa teSAM bhavyatvam ? iti nivedyatAmiti // 285 // (1833) D. C.---Mandika:-If all those that are bhanya do not attain moksa at any time, inspite of their bhavyatva, why should they not be called a-bhavya ? Otherwise, by what characteristics are they to be distinguished as bhavya ? // 285 // ( 1833)] The reply is - bhaNNai bhanyo jogA na ya jAggattaNa sinjhae sanyo / jaha joggamni vi dalie sabammina kIrae paDinA 286 // (1834) Bhannai bhavvo joggo na ya joggattena sijjhai savvo Jaha joggammi vi dalie savvammi na kirae palima 1128611 ( 1834 ) [ bhaNyate bhavyo yogyo na ca yogyatvena sidhyati sarvaH / yathA yogye'pi dalike sarvasmin na kriyane pratimA // 286 // (1834)

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336 Jinabhadra Gapi's ( The sixth Bhanyate bhavyo vogyo na ca yogyatvena sidhyati sarvah 1 Yatha yogye'pi dalike sarvasmin na kriyate pratima. 1128611 (1834)] Trans.--286 The bhavya is called worthy (of moksa), but all do not attain (moksa) by (virtue of) mere worthiness, just as image could not be produced merely by means of proper constituents. (1834) TIkA-maNyate'trottaram / kim ? ityAha-bhanyo'tra sidigamanayo gyo'bhimetaH na tu yaH siddhigati yAsyatyeva, na ca yogyatvamastItyetAvataiva sanaH sidhyati, kintu siddhigamanasAmagrIsaMbhave sati / dRSTAntamAha-yayA hema-maNi-pASANa-candana-kASThAdike yogye'pi pratimAhe'pi dalikena sarvasmin pratimA vidhIyate, kintu yatraiva taniSpattiyogyA sAmagrI saMbhavati tatraivAsau kriyate / na ca tadasaMbhavamAtreNa pratimAviSaye'yogyatA mavati / niyamazveha navaM vidhIyate yaduta-pratimAyogye vastuni pratimA bhavatyeveti, kintu yadA tadA vA tadyogya eva sA mavati, nAnyatreti evamihApi na "mavyaH" ityetAvanmAvegava sarvaH sidhyati, kintu sAmagrIsaMpatau, na ca tadasaMpattAvapi tasyAbhavyatA bhavati, kintu yadA tadA vA bhavyasyaiva mukti bhavyasyeti // 286 // (1834) D. C. Bhavya means worthy of attaning mokse and not exactly one who attains moksa. Worthiness for moksa does not mean the attainment itself. Even thouge substances like gold, jewels, stones, sandal wood etc are capable of producing an image the image is not produced out of all but only out of certain suitable, substances. There is no such rule that the image is produced by means of certain suitable substances but only when suitable substances unite to produce an image Similarly, in case of bhavyas also, there is no rigid rule that one who is bhavya must necessarily attain moksa nor will bhavja be called a-bhavya if he does not attain moksa Sooner or later, bhavya alone attains rokas by virtue of its necessary characteristics, but a-bhavya will never be able to attain moksa 11286 (1834)

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337 Vada ] Canadharavada jaha vA sa eva pAsANa-kaNagajogo viogajoggo vi| na vijujjai sabbo ciya sa vijubai jassa saMpattI // 287 / / (1835) kiM puNa jA saMpattI sA joggasseva na u ajoggassa / taha jo mokkho niyamA so bhavANaM na iyaresiM // 288 // (1836) Jaha va sa eva pasana-kanagajogo viogajoggo vi i Na vijujjai savvo cciya sa vijujjai jassa sampatti (128711 (1835) Kim puna ja sanpatti sa joggasseva na u ajoggassa Taha jo mokkho niyaira so bhavyanam na iyaresim 1128811 (1836 [ yathA vA sa eva pASANa-kanakayogo viyogayogyo'pi / na viyujyate sarva eva sa ciyujyate yasya saMmAptiH // 287 // (1836) kiM puryA saMpAptiH sA yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasya / tathA yA mokSo niyamAt sa bhavyAnAM netareSAm // 288 // (1836) Yatha va sa eva pasana-kanakayogo viyogayogyo'pi Na viyujyate sarvam eva sa viyujyate yasya sampraptih 1128711 (1835) Kim punarya sampraptih sa yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasyai Tatha yo mokso niyamat sa bhavyanam netaresain 28811 (1836)] Trans -- 287-288 Just as the contact between stone and gold, though susceptible to separation, is not separated, only those that have reached attainment are separated. Similarly, moksa which is laid down as a rule belongs only to bhavyas and not to others. (1835-1836) TIkA-yathA vA sa eva pUrvoktaH suvarNapASANa-kanakayoryogo viyogayogyatAnvito'pi soM na viyujyate, kintu sa eva viyujyate, yasya viyogasAmagrosaMmAptiriti / kiM punaH ? etad bhujamukSipya brUmaH-yA viyo. gasAmagrIsaMprAptiH sA viyogayogyasyaiva suvarNoMpalasya bhavati, na tu tadayogyasya, tathA tenaiva prakAreNa vaH sarvakarmakSayalakSaNo mosaH sa niyamAd 43

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338 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth mavyAnAmeva bhavati, netareSAmabhavyAnAmiti manyA-'mavyayovizeSa iti // 287-288 // (1835-1836) // D. C.--Although the contact between gold and stone is susceptible w separation, it can never be applied to all as a general rule. Because, only that which secures necessary conditions for separation, is separable. Moreover, these necessary conditions which cause the separation, act only upon those that are worthy of separation and not upon others. The same is the case with mousa. The attainment of muisa is possible for bhavyas only, and not for a-bh ruyas even if they possess necessary conditions. This is the distinctive feature between bhavya and a-bhavya 1287-288 11 (1835-1836) kayagAimattaNAo mokkho nicco na hoi kuMbho vva / no paddhasAbhAvo bhuvi tammA vi jaM nicco / / 289 / / 1837) aNudAharaNamabhAvo eso vi maI na taM jao niyo| kuMbhavigAsavisiTTho bhAvo ciya poggalamao ya // 290 // (1838) Kayagaimattanao mokkho nicco na hoi kumbho vva i No paddhamsabhavo bhuvi taddhamma vi jam nicco 128911 (1837) Anudaharanamabhivo eso vi mai na tam jao niyao 1 Kumbhavinasavisittho bhavo cciya poggalamao ya 129011 (1838) [kRtakAdimattvAd mokSo nityo na mavati kumbha iva / no pradhvaMsAbhAvo bhuvi taddharmApi yad nityaH // 289 // (1837) aNudAharaNamabhAva eSo'pi manina tad yato niyataH / kumbhavinAzaviziSTo bhAva eva pudgalamayazca // 29 // (1838) Kritahadimaltvad mokso nityo na bhavati kumbha iva 1 No pradhvamsabhavo bhuvi taddharmapi yad nityah 1128911 (1837)

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Canadharavada Vada ] Anudaharanamabhava eso'pi matirna tad yato niyatah! Kumbhavinasavisisto bhava eva pudgalamayasca || 290 | ( 1833)] 339 Trans. - 289-290 "Like kumbha, moksa is not nitya on account of its artificiality etc. " It is not so. Because, indestructiblity is everlasting on this earth inspite of its (possessing) that property. " (But ) this negation is void of example also." That is not true. Destruction of kumbha is definite and hence) (its) positiveness is distinguished by means of pudgalas. (1837-1838) / TIkA - vyAkhyA- nanu mokSo nityo na bhavati, kintvanityo vinAzI, kRtakatvAt, AdizabdAt prayatnAnantarIyakatvA''dimattvAdiparigrahaH / kumbhavaditi dRSTAntaH / atrocyate-anaikAntikatA hetUnAm, vipakSe'pi gamanAt, yasmAdiha ghaTAdipradhvaMsAbhAvaH kRtakAdisvabhAvo'pi nitya eva tadanityatve ghaTAdestadrUpatayaivonmajjana prasaGgAditi / athaivaM parasya matiH- na kevalaM pUrvoktaH prAgabhAvaH kiMntveSo'pi pradhvaMsAbhAvo'bhAvatvenAvastutvAdanuda haraNameva / tadetad na, yato yasmAd niyato nizcitaH kumbhavinAzavizeSeNa viziSTaH pudgalAtmako bhAva evAyamapi madhvaMsAbhAvaH / ato yuktametadudAharaNamiti / etaca mokSasya kRtakatvamabhyupagamyoktam // 289-290 // // (1837-1738) // D. C. - Mandika-Moksa is not nitya but it is a- nitya like ghata as it is artificial and adiman in character like ghata. Bhagavana--It is not SO The hetu advanced by you applies to the vipaksa as well, and hence it is anarkantika. The pradhvamsabhava, in case of ghata, for example, is nitya, inspite of its being kritaka. For, if it were a nitya, objects like ghata should have been born in the same form. Mandika:-But since pradhvamsabhava is negative in character, you will not be able to cite an example based on it. Bhagavana :--It is not negative, O Mandika | but positive ir character. The definite forms of pudgalas found at the For Private Personal Use Only

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth destruction of ghati is nothing but prahvamsabhavz. The example cited is, therefore, quite proper to the occassion. The same is the case with moksa also. Moksa will never be called a-nitya even if it is believed to possess the properties like kstakatva. 1289-290 (1837-18383 Or, say, Moksa is not kritaka at all on account of the following reason :ki vegateNa kayaM poggalamattavilayammi jIvassa / kiM nivvattiyamahiyaM nabhaso ghaDamettavilayammi? / / 291 // (1839) Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilaymmi jivassa Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi? // 291 // [kiMvaikAntena kRtaM pudgalamAtravilaye jIvasya / kiM nirvativamadhikaM namaso ghaTamAtravilaye ? // 291 // (1839) Kim vaikantena kritam pudgalamatravilaye jivasyai Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamatravilaye ?129111 (1839)] Trans.--291 ".At the destruction of mere pudagalas, how is jiva alone to be affected ?" "At the destruction of mere ghata, how is sky affected all the more ? (1839) TIkA-kimiha pudgalamAtravilaye sati samastakarmapudgalaparizATasamaye jIvasyAtmanaH svatattve rattimAdadhata ekAntena kRtaM vihitam, yena kRtako mokSaH syAt ? / etaduktaM bhavati-ihAtma-karmapudglaviyogo mokSo'bhimetaH / tatra tapaHsaMyamaprabhAvato jIvAt karmaNi prathara jAyamAne kimAtmanaH kriyate, yena kRtakatvAdanityatvaM mokSasya pratipAdyate / atha sa evAtma-karmaviyogaH 'kriyamANatvAt kRtakaH, tato'nitya ityAzaGkayAha-"kiM nivvattiyamityAdi" mudrAdinA ghaTamAtrasya vinAze sati kiM nAma nabhaso'bhyadhika nirvatitam ? na kishcidityrthH| evamihApi karmamAtravinAze sati kiM jIvasyAdhika kRtam , yena tadekAkitArUpasya mokSasya kRtakatvenAnityatvaM syAt ? / sa eSa karmaNo binAzo ghaTavinAzayat kriyamAnakhAt kRtakaH, tataH sarvakarmakSaya

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Vada] Ganadharavada 341 * lakSaNo mokSo'nitya iti cet / tadayuktam, yato yathA'yametra ghaTavinAzo yaH kevalAkAzasadbhAvo na punastato vibhinno'sau na cAkAzasya kimapyadhikaM kriyate, tasya sadAvasthitatvena nityatvAt evamihApyayameva karmaNo vinAzo yaH kevalAtmasadbhAvaH, na tvAtmano vibhinno'sau na cAtmanaH kiJcidadhikaM vidhIyate, tasyApi nabhovada nityatvAt / tasmAd na mokSasya kRtakatvamanityatvaM vA / kathaJciccAnityatvaM siddhasAdhyataiva dravya - paryAyobhayarUpatayA sarpasyApi vastuno nityAnityarUpatvAditi : 291 / / (1839 / * at D. C.---Bhagavana :--Since Moksa is nothing but the separation of Soul from Karma pudgaras, it cannot be artificial all. When. Karma is being separated from iv, how is Atma to be affected to render the Moks a-nitya? Mandika:-1 he separation of soul from Karma is kitaka owing to its kriyamanalva. The oksa is, therefore, kritaka and a-nitya too. Bhagavana:--When ghata is destroyed by means of hammer etc. the sky is not at all affected. In the same way, when Karma is destroyed, jiva will also remain unaffected. It is not, therefore, proper to believe that Meksa is kritaka and a nitya. Mandika :--Karma being destructible like ghata, like ghata it is kritaka also. Now, since Moksa is nothing but the destruction of all Karmas, it is also kritaka and hence a-nity also. Bhagavana:-Your argument is absolutely false. O Mandika ! Existence of sky persists even if ghat is destroyed The destru cition of ghaya is not bhinna from akasa, but at the same time akasa is not affected by it also, since it is everlasting. Similarly in case of Karma also, although the destruction of Karmas IS not different from the existence of Soul, the Soul is not affected by it, on account of its being nitya like akasa. The Moksa is, therefore. never kritaka, O Mandika, and never a-nilya also, even if it is a-nutya to the extent that all objects are a-nitya as far as their dravyatva and paryayas are concerned.

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342 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Mandzka:-Since Karma-pudgalas abandoned by jiva in a worn-out condition, stay on in this world (even in that state) why should the Soul separated from Karma, be believed to unite with the worn-out Karma, so that, it may be bound by a fresh bondage again ? Bhagavana:-Moksa being nitya, O Mandeka, will again be bound by a fresh bondage. 11291 (1839) # The everlasting nature of moksa is apprehended as follows:-- sosNavarAho va puNo na bajjhae baMdhakAraNAbhAvA / jogA ya baMdhaheU na ya te tassAsarIroti // 292 // ( 1840 ) So'navaraho vva puno na bajjhae bandhakaranabhava | Joga ya bandha-heu na ya te tassasariro tti ||292" (1840) [ so'naparAdha iva punarna badhyate bandhakAraNAbhAvAt / yogAzva bandhahetavo na ca te tasyAzarIra iti // 292 // ( 1840 ) So'naparadha iva punarna badhyate bandhakaranabhavat Yogasca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyasarira iti || 292 | ( 1840 ) ] Trans. - 292 Like an innocent person, it 2. e. Soul) can never be bound (by bandhas) as there is no cause for bondage. On account of its formlessness, it has no cause for bondages. (1840) , TIkA - sa mukto jIvaH punarapi na badhyate, bandhakAraNAbhAvAt, anaparAdhapuruSavat, mano- vAk- kAyayogAdayazca bandhahetavo'bhidhoyante na ca te muktasya santi zarIrAdyabhAvAt / na ca karmavargaNAgata pudgalamAtra saMyogamAtrarUpaise bandho'dhikriyate, atiprasaGgAdidoSAghAtatvAt kintu mithyAsvAditaddhetunibandhana iti / / 292 / / ( 1840 ) // / D. C. -- In absence of (any) cause for (its ) bandha, like an innocent person, the Soul is free from bandha. Unions of mind, speech, and body etc. are nothing but the causes for

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Vada] Canadharavada 343 (its) bandha. But due to the abhava of sarira etc., a free Soul is not able to contain them. So, bandha does not take place in absence of samyoga of the multiplication of karmas but it depends upon the hetus such as mith yaiva etc. Mandika -Like bandhas, you douht as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. | 292 ( 1840 ) // Bhagavana replies :na puNo tassa pasaI bIyAbhAvAdihaMkurasseva / bIyaM ca tassa kammaM na ya nassa tayaM tao nicco // 293 // (1841) Na pugo tassa pasui biyabhavadihankurasseva i Biyam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa tayam tao nicco 11293.(1841) [ na punastasya pratibIjAbhAvAdihAGkarasyeva / bIjaM ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityaH // 293 // (1841) Na punastasya prasutibijabhavadihankurasyeva, Bijam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityah 1129311 (1841) Trans -- 293. Like a sprout without seed, it has no birth again, since Karma is its seed. It no more belongs to that muktatma) which in that case, becomes everlasting. (1841) TIkA-na tasya muktasya punarapi bhavatirupajAyate, bIjAmAvAtkAraNasyAsattvAt, yathA'Gkarasya tadabhAvAd na prasUtiH / bIjaM cAsya karmavAvagantavyam, taca muktasya nAstyeva, tataH punarAvRttya mAvAd nityo'sAviti // 293 / / (1841) // D. C.~-Just as a sprout does not grow without seed, the muktalma does not take any birth in absence of Karma which acts as its bija. Vhen multalma is said to have no janma (birth), it goes without saying that he is nitya also. 1293 (1841)11 Also,

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344 Jinabhadra Gagi's (The sixth davAmuttasagao nahaM va nico mao.sa dvvtyaa| savvagaMyatsAvattI maha ti taM nANumANAo / / 294 // (1842 ) Davvamuttattanao naham va nicco mai sa davvataya i Savvgayattavatti mai tti tam nanumanao ii 294 11 ( 1842 ) . [ dravyAmUrtatvato nabha iva nityo mataH sa dravyatayA / sarvagatatvAparmitiriti tad nAnumAnAt / / 294 // (1842) Dravyamurtatvato nabha iva nityo matah sa dravyataya Sarvagatatvapattir matiriti tad nanumanat :1 294 1 ( 1842 ) ) Trans.--294 By substantiality, it is considered as nitya like sky, on account of ( both ) substantiality, as well as, incorporeal nature. The belief that it is all-pervading, is not ( acceptible ) on account of anumana. ( 1842 ) TIkA-sa muktAtmA nitya iti pratijJA / "davyAmutattaNau ti" dravyatve satyamUrtatvAditi hetuH / "davvataya ti" yathA dravyatve satyamUrta nama iti dRSTAntaH / athaivaMbhUtA mati parasya syAt-anena hetunA sarvagatatvApattirapyAtmanaH sidhyati; tathAhi-sarvagata AtmA, dravyatve satyamUrtatvAta. namodhat / tatazca dharmavizeSaviparItasAdhanAd viruddho'yam / tadetad na / kutaH ? / anumAnAt-anumAnabAdhitatvAt sarvagatatvasyetyarthaH; tathAhiasarvagata AtmA, kartRtvAt . kulAlavat / na ca kartRtvamasiddham . bhoktRtvadraSTutvAcanupapattariti // 294 / / ( 1842) ___D. C.-- Like akas'a, and is nitya on account of its dravyatvu as well as a murtatvx. But it is not appropriate to believe that alma is all--pervading like (kas'a. The soul is a-sarvagata like potter, on account of its kartritvx. For, otherwise, it will lose serveral of its own characteristics like Bhokiratva, a-dristatva etc || 224 ( 1842 ) / ko vA nizcaggAho savvaM ciya vi bhava-bhaMga-dviimaiyaM / pajAyaMtaramettapaNAdaniccAivavaemo // 295 // ( 1843 )

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 345 Ko va niccaggaho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-tthiimaiyam Pajjayantaramettappanadaaiccaivasso 1 295 !" ! 1843 ) [ ko vA nityagrahaH sarvamevApi bhava-bhaga-sthitimayam / paryAyAntaramAtrArpaNAdanityAdivyapadezaH // 295 // (1843) Ko va nityagrahah sarvamevapi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam i Paryayantaramatrarpanadantiyadivyapadesah 11 265 11 ( 1843 ) } Trans.--295 Or, what (of) assuming nityata ? Everything is susceptible to the state of production, destruction, and existence. Only by, the imposition of various methods, attributes like transitoriness etc., are designated ( 1843 ) TIkA-gatArthA, navaraM paryAyAntaramAtrasyArpaNaM pradhAnabhAvena vivakSaNaM tasmAdanityAdivyapadezaH, tathAhi ghaTaHpUrveNa mRtpiNDaparyAyeNa vinazyati. ghaTaparyAyatayA punarutpadyate. mRdrapatayA tvavatiSThate / tatazca yo vinaSTarUpatAdiparyAyo yadArpitaH pradhAnabhUto vivakSyate, tadA tenAnityatvAdivyapadezaH / evamasAvapi muktaH saMsAritayA vinaSTaH, siddhatayotpannaH, jIvatva-sopayogatvAdibhistvavatiSThate, tathA, prathamasamayasiddhatayA vinazyati. dvisamayasiddhatayotpadyate, dravyatva-jIvatvAdibhistvavatiSThate / tato'rpitaparyAyeNAnityatvAdivyapadeza iti / / 295 / / ( 1843 ) / / D. C.-It is useless to insist that a free soul is exclusi. vely nitya. Attributes like a-nityata could be indicated by means of various methods. Before ghata comes - into existence, as a particular shape of earth it vanishes and comes into existence as a particular shape of earth named ghata, and continues to exist in that state after its production also. The same is the case with muktatma. The muktama also vanishes as a mundane, comes into existence as mukta and continues to be in that state by virtue of its life and utility. So, it vanishes at the first time as it is established, comes into existence by virtue of its being established at the second time 44

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346 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth and continues to be in that state on account of its dravyatva, jivatva etc - In this way, by means of different paryayas, the attributes like a-nityata, are imposed. muttassa ko'vagAso somma ! tilogasiharaM gaI kiha se ? / kammalahuyA nahAgaipariNAmAI hi bhaniyamidaM / / 296 / / (1844) Muttassa ko'vagaso somma ! tilogasiharam, gai kiha se? Kamimalahuya tahagaiparinamaihim bhaniyamidanm // 296 // (1844) [muktasya ko'vakAsaH saumya ! trilokazikharaM, gatiH kathaM tasya ? / karmalaghutA tathAgatipariNAmAdimibhaNitamidam // 96 / / (1844) Muktasya ko'vakasah saumya I trilokasik haram.gatih katham tasya ? 1 Karmalaghuta tathagatiparinamadibhir-bhaaitamidam 1129611 (1844)] Trans.--296 What is the resort of the free Soul ? It is the end of three worlds 0 Saumy, l What is the rate of its movement ? It is said that the Soul attains molsz at one moment by (virtue of ) the want of a Karma, as well as, by (virtue of) the (natural) tendency of its movement etc. 11844) TIkA-muktamya kSoNasamastakarmaNo jIvasya ko'vakAzaH kAvasthAnam ? iti pRSTe satyAha-saumya ! trilokazikharaM, lokAnta ityarthaH / nanu kathaM 'se' tasyAkarmaNo jIvasyaitAvad daramito gatiH pravartate ? / karmanibandhanA hi jIvAnAM sarvApi ceSTA. tato vihAyogatyAdikAbhAve'pi gaticeSTAyAmatiprasaGgaH praapnoti| atrocyate--"kammalahuya ti" karmApagame sati lAghavAt samayamekaM tadatimavRttirityarthaH, tathAgatipariNAmAt-karmakSaye siddhatvavadapUrvagatipariNAmalAbhAdityarthaH, yathA hi samastakarmakSayAdapUrva siddhatvapariNAmaM jIvaH samAsAdayati, tathordhvagatipariNAmamapIti bhaavH| AdizandAdaparamapi tadgatikAraNaM samayabhaNitamidamavagantavyam, tadyathA-lAu ya eraMDaphaLe aggI dhUmo ya isu dhnnuvimukko| gaha putvapaogeNaM evaM siddhANa vi gaI u|| 1 // 296 // (1844) /

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Va a ] Ganadharavada D. C-Mandika:-Where do the Mukta souls reside? Bhagavana:-They reside at the end of the three worlds O Saumya! 347 move to Mandika:-How do jivas such a long distance even if they are unaccompanied by Karmas? All sorts of movements of a jiva depend upon Karma, and hence, how will extensive movements such as moving in the sky etc be possible at all? an Bhagavana :-0 Blessed Mandika! Just as soul attains unprecedented achivement when karma is destroyed, in the same way, the soul proceeds with the same movement and during the same period (of time). Moreover, just as gourd, fruit of a castor plant, fire, smoke, arrow wafted from a bow etc. make movements by means of previous impellations, in the same way, a muktatma is also able to make movement by means of previous impellations etc. 11296|| (1844) ki saktiriyamarUvaM maMDiya ! bhuvi ceyaNaM na kimarUvaM ? | jaha se visesadhammo ceyannaM taha mayA kiriyA / / 297 / / (1845) Kim sakkiriyamaruvam Manddiya' bhuvi ceyanam ca kimaruvam ? Jaha se visesadhammo ceyanam taha maya kiriya 297 (1845) [ kiM sakriyarUpaM maNDika ! bhuvi cetanaM ca kimarUpam ? / yathA tasya vizeSadharmazcaitanyaM tathA matA kriyA / / 297 / / (1845) Kim sakriyamarupam Mandika! bhuvi cetanam ca kimarupam? Yatha tasya visesadharmascaitanyam tatha mata kriya #297|| (1845) Trans.-297 What is movable (when it is formless) ? And, O Mandika, what is living (when it is formless)? Like consciousness, movement is also the distinctive characteristic of Soul. (1845)

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348 Jinabhadra (tani's [ The sixth TIkA-nandAphAza-kAlAdayo'mUrtI niSkriyA eva prasiddhAH, vat kiM nAma tvayA'rUpamamUrta sad vastu sakriyaM dRSTaM, yena muktAtmanaH saniyakhamabhyupagamyate ?-nanu niSkriya eva muktAtmA pAmoti, atakhAt, AkAzavaditi mAvaH / atrocyate-maNDika ! tvamapyetat kathaya, bhuvi kimarUpaM sadvastu cetanaM vIkSitam, yena muktAtmA cetano'bhyupagamyate ?-amUrtatvAdacetana evAyaM pAmoti, aakaashvditi| tasmAd yathA "se" tasya jIvasyArUpebhya AkAzAdibhyastadrUpatve samAne'nyo'pi caitanyalakSaNo vize. SadharmaH samasti, tathA kriyApi matA, sakriyatvamapi vizeSadharmo'stu ko virodhaH ? iti bhAvaH / / 297 // (1845) // D. C.--Mannika:--The a-murta ( objects like ) akasa and kala are well known as niskriya Then, how did you apprehend * formless object like muktalma to sa-kriya ? Since it is a mutra line akasa, it should also be niskriya like akasa. Bhagavana:--What a-murta object have you seen to be sacetana in this world, in order to accept muktatma as sacetana ? Just as akasa is acetana on account of its amurtatva, the muktatma should also be acetana as a rule. But it is not so. Por, although atma resenibles akasa in respect of a murtatoo, it possesses a distinct characteristic of cetana, within which krija is also included. So, sa-kriyatva or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of muklatma. There is no doubt about it 11297||(1845) Or, leaving that distinction of mukta and a-mukta aside, it could also be argued that kattAisaNao vA sakirio'yaM mao kulAlo vca / dehapphaMdaNao vA paJcakkhaM jaMtapuriso bva / / 298 / / (1846) Kataittanaj va sakkirioyam mai kulalo vva Dehapphanda ao va paccahkham jantapuriso va 129811 ( 1846 ) [ kAditvato vA sakriyo'yaM mataH kulAla iva / haspanbanaso vA pratyakSaM yantrapuruSa iva // 298 // (1846)

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Vida ] Ganadharavada 349 Kartraditvato va sakriyo'yam matah kulala iva i Dehaspandanato va pratak sam yantrapurusa iva // 29811 (1846)] Trans.--298 Like a potter, it is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc, or (it is active: like a mechanical person, on account of the directly perceptible movement of (its) body (1846) TIkA-athavA, sakriyo'yamAtmA, kartRtvAt, kulAlavat / Adiza. bdAd "bhoktRtvAt " iti vAcyat / athavA, sakriya AtmA patyakSata eva dehaparispandadarzanAt, yantrapuruSavaditi // 298 / / (1846) // // D. C.---The Soul sould be taken as sakizya as a potter on account of its kartritva and broktritva. Or, it is sakriya, like a J'antra-purusa on account of the pratyaksa movements of its body 12980 ( 1846 ] dehapphaMdaNaheU hoja payatto tti so vi naakirie| hojAdiTTho va maI tadarUvatte naNu samANaM // 299 / / (1847) rUvittammi 'sa deho vaco tapkaMdaNe guNo heuu| painiyayaparipphaMdaNamaceyagANaM na vi ya juttaM / / 300 // (1848) D9happhandanaheu hojja payatto tti so vi nakirier Hojjadittho va mai tadaruvatte naNGu samanam 1129911 ( 1847) Ruvittammi sa deho vacco tapphandane puno heu i Painiyayaparipphandanamaceyananam na vi ya juttam || 300) [dehaspandanaheturbhavet prayatna iti so'pi nAkriye / bhavedadRSTo vA matistadarUpatve nanu samAnam // 299 // (1847) rUpitve sa deho vAcyastatspandane punarhetuH / pratiniyataparispandanamacetanAnAM nApi yuktam / / 300 / / (1848) Dehaspandanahetur bhavet prayatna iti so'pi nakriye , Bhavedadristo va matistadarupatve nanu samanam 1,29911 (1847)

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350 Jinabhadra Gani's ( The sixth Rupitve sa deho vacyastatspandane punar hetub i Pratiniyataparispandanamacetananani napi yuktam 130014 ( 1848 ; ) Trans.--299 300 It may be ( your opiniou ) that the effort ( on part of Soul; may be the cause of bodily movement. ( But ) even that is not possible ) in case of motionless ( Soul ). Or, ( it may be believed that / the hete is ir visible and resembles it in formlessness. ( If it is said that ) by reson of forin it is called dehir, there should certaiuly be ( sone, reson hehind ( its ) movement. But the regular movement of lifeless ( objects ) is not justified. ( 1847-1848 ) TIkA-athavaM bUSe-dehaparispandaheturAtmanaH prayatno na tu kriyA, ato nApmanaH sakriyatvasiddhirityamimAyaH / atrottaramA-so'pi prayatno nabhasIvAkriya Atmani na saMbhavati, ataH sakriya evaasau| amUrtasga ca prayatnasya dehaparispandahetutve ko'nyo heturiti vAcyam ? / anyahetu nirapekSaH svata evAyaM parispandaheturiti cet / yadyevam, AtmApi taddhaturbhaviSyati, kibhantargatena prayatnena / athAdRSTaH ko'pi dehaparispandahetuH, na tvAtmA, niSkriyatvAt / nanu so'pyadRSTaH kiM mUrtaH, amUrtI vA ? / yadya mUrtaH, tAtmApi dehaparispandahetuH kiM neSyate, amUrtatvAvizeSAt ? / athabhRtimAnadRSTaH, tahi sa kArmaNazarIralakSaNo deha eva nAnyaH saMbhavati / tasyApi ca bahidezyadehaparispandahetutayA vyAmiyamANasya parispandro draSTavyaH, tasya cAnyo heturvAcyaH, tasyApi cAnyaH, tasyApi cAnya , tasyApi cAnya ityanavasthA / atha svamAvAdevAdRSTasya kArmaNadehasya parispandaH pravartate, tarhi bahirdazyasyApi dedasya tata eva tatpattirbhaviSyati, vibhadRSTakArmaNadehaparikalpanena ? / astvemiti cet / tadayuktam, acetanAnAmevaMbhUtamatiniyataviziSTaparispandanasya svAbhAvikatvAnupapatteH, " nityaM satvamamattvaM vA hetoranyAnapekSaNAt" ityAdidoSamasaGgAt / tasmAt karmaviziSTa Atmaiva pratiniyatadehaparispandanahetutvena vyApiyata iti sakriyo'sAviti // 299-300 // (1847-1848 ) // D. C.--- Mandika: The hetu for movements of a body is the

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 351 effort on the part ) of Soul and not the kriya. It is therefore, not proper to take atma to be sakriya Bhagavana:- If the atma is niskriya, the effort cannot exit into it. and hence it is undoubtedly sakriya. What other hetu is to be understood in accepting the a-murta effort as a hetu for bodily movements ? If it is said that without the apeksa of another hetu, this effort itself becomes the hetu in the deha-spanda the Soul will also be called the helu of these bodily movements. Vhat is the use of intervening praya'ra in such a case Mondika:--There is some invisible hetu in the movements of deha, but atma being niskreya cannot act as hetu in those movenients, Bhagavana' ls that invisible ( hetu ) murta or a-murta ? If a-murta, why not take atina as hetu in the deha parispanda since it is also a-miirta ? And if that a-arista is murta, it is nothing but karmana sarira. How, if that karmana sarira is used as the hetu of bakya sarira there must be some other hetu for the parispandana of the above-mentioned kar mana sarira This in turn, will have a third hetu for its parispanda and that a fourth one and so on, until ultimattely there is complete disorder Again, if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an adpista karmana sarira is caused by no other hetu than its own svnbhava so that there may not be any sort of an runstla, then pirisponda of bahjat sarir as will also be caused by svabhava, so that there may not be any sense in assuming the Qurista kirman sarira. Mandzka: -- I don't mind if the parispandu is taken to have been caused by svabhava. Bhardvana: -. But it is not reasonable to helieve like that. The definite type of the prispanda like this is never possible in case of acetand objects, because tha: which is indipendent of any other ketu is either everlasting or absolutely transitory.

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352 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth The only alternative to accept, therefore, is that atma which is distinguished by karma is the hetu of dekaparispanda and hence sakriya also. #299-300 (1847-1848)] hou kiriyA bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kiMnimittA sA / naNu taggaipariNAmA jaha siddhattaM nahA sA vi // 301 // (1849) Hou kiriya bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kimnimitta sa? | Nanu taggaiparinama jaha siddhattam taha sa vi 13011 (1849) [ bhavatu kriyA bhavasthasya karmarahitasya kiMnimittA sA ? nanu tadgavipariNAmAd yathA siddhatvaM tathA sApi / 301 (1849) Bhavatu kriya bhavasthasya karmarahitasya kimnimittta sa? Nanu tadgatiparinamad yatha siddhatvam tatha sapi 301|| (1849)] Trans. - 301 Alright : "How is the action of the mundane (Soul). separated from Karma, to be accounted for?" "Certainly from their parinama. Just as perfection is attributed to it, in the same way, activity is also attributed to it. " ( 1849) fs siddhAlayaparao na gaI, dhammatthikAyavirahAo / so gaiuggahakaro logammi jamatthi nAloe // 302 // (1850 ) Kim siddhalayaparao na gai, dhammatthikayavirahao | So gaiuvagghakaro logammi jamatthi naloe | 3021 (1850) -[ kiM siddhAlayaparato na gatiH, dharmAstikAyavirahAt / sa gatyupagrahakAro loke yadasti nAloke / / 302 || (1850) Kim siddhalayaparato na gatih, dharmastikayavirahat | Sa gatyupagrahakaro loke yadasti naloke 302 (1850) ] to Trans.---302 Why not the movement (of Soul) extend; beyoud Siddhalaya ? Because of the absence of the predicament of dharmastikaya. That being the impeller of motion, resides in this world, and not in the spiritual world. (1850)

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353 Vada ] Ganadharavada TIkA-yayuktanyAyena muktasya gatikriyayA sakriyatvamiyate, tarhi siddhAbhayAt siddhAvasthitikSetrAta parato'loke'pi kimiti tasya gatirna pravartate ? / atrocyate-parato dharmAstikAyavirahAt / tadviraho'pi kutaH ? ityAha-yad yasmAdasau dharmAstikAyo loka eva samasti, naaloke| mA bhUdasAvaloke, kiM tena prastutAnupayoginA kartavyam, tadvirahe'pi bhavatu muktasya tatra gatiH, niyamAmAvAt ? / tadayuktam, yato jIvAnAM pugdalAnAM ca gategamanasyopagraha upaSTambhastatkArI sa eva dharmAstikAyo nAnyaH, tatastasyAloke'bhAvAt karya lokAt paravo'loke'pimuktAtmanAMgatiH pravartate ? iti // 302 / / (1850) D. C.--Mandika:-If muktalma were sakriya by virtue of its movement, why should it not move beyond Siddhalaya also : Bhagavana:-It cannot move beyond Siddhalaya, because dharmastikaya or the predicament of motion, does not exist in the a-loka. Mandikar-What of that? Even if dharmastikaya does not exist in the a-loka, muklama can acced to it without dharmastikaya. Bhagavana:--That is not possible. O Mandika. It is the predicament of motion that impels muktama to move. Hence, if dhar mastikaya does not exist in the aloka, muklatma is unable to move towards it 1302 (1850) logassa sthi vivakkho sudvattaNao ghaDasta aghaDo vva / sa ghaDAi ciya maI na nisehAo tadaNurUvo // 303 // 1851) Logassa tthi vivakkho suddhattapao ghadassa a-ghado vva i Sa ghadai cciya mai na nisehao tadanuruvo 1130311 (1851) [lokasyAsti vipakSaH zruddhatvato ghaTasyAghaTa iva / sa ghaTAdireva matirna niSedhAt tadanurUpaH // 303 // (1851) Lokasyasti vipaksah sruddhatvato ghatasyaghata iva Sa ghatadireva matir na nisedhat tadanurupah 1130311 ( 1851 )] N

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354 Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Trans. --- 303 As ghata has a gkata ( as its opposite) loka also has its opposite, because of its. etymological distinction. The view that it is nothing but ghata etc. is (also ) not (acceptible). (For), by means of negation (something) of its own kind ( is understood !, ' 851 i TIkA-asti lokasya vipakSaH, vyutpattimacchuddhapadAbhidheyayatvAt , iha yad vyutpattimattA zuddhapadenAbhidhIyate tasya vipakSo iSTaH, yathA ghaTasyAghaTaH, yazca lokasya vipakSaH so'lokH| atha syAnmatiH----"na loko'lokaH" iti yo lokasya vipakSaH ma ghaTAdipadArthAnAmanyatama eva bhaviSyati, kimiha vastvantaraparikalpanayA ? / tadetad na, payudAsanamA niSedhAt niSedhyasyaivAnurUpo'tra vipakSo'nyaveSaNIyaH, "na loko'lokaH" ityatra loko niSedhyaH, sacAkAzaviSayaH, ato'lokenApi tadanurUpeNa bhavitavyam, yathA " ihApaNDitaH", ityukte viziSTajJAnavikalazcetana eva puruSaSizeSo gamyate, nAcetano ghaTAdiH. evamihApi lokAnurUpa evAloko mantavyaH uktaM ca-- "nayuktamivayuktaM vA yaddhi kArya vidhIyate / tulyAdhikaraNe'nyasmilloke'pyarthagatistathA // 1 // "naz-ivayuktamanyasadRzAdhikaraNe tathA yaMgati / tasmAllokavipakSavAdastyaloka iti // 303 / / (1851) D. C.-From the point of view of etymology, just as ghata has its opposite (word) a-ghita, loka must also have its opposite word a--loka It is not justificeable to assume that a-lokus is also the opposite of ghutt. prta etc By means of nisedha something of its own kind is understood. Just as by the word e-pandila a living person having no scholarship is meant but not the inanimate objects like ghata and pata, so here also, by the nisedha of loka, nothing but a loka should be understood. And it has also been said that. Nanyuktamiva yuktam va yaddhi karyani vidhiyate! Tuyladhikarane' nyasminlloke' pyarthagatis tatha.

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Vida ] Qanadharavada 355 So, a-loka alone is the vipaksa of loka 130311 (1851) tamhA dhammA-dhammA loyapariccheyakAriNA juttaa| iharAgAse tulle logo'logo si ko bheo ? // 304 // (1852) logavibhAgAbhAve pddighaayaabhaavaa'nnvtthaao| saMvavahArAbhAvo saMbaMdhAbhAvao hojjA / / 305 // (1853) Tamha dhamma dhamma loyapariccheyakarino jutta 1 Jharagase tulle logo logo tti ko bheo ? 030411 (1852) Lagavibhagabhave padighayabhavao'NGavatthao i Samvavaharabhavo sambandhabhavao hojja 11 305 11 ( 1853 ) [tasmAd dharmA-'dhamau lokaparicchedakAriNau yuktau / itarathAkAze tulye loko'loka iti ko bhedaH ? / / 304 // (1852) lokAvibhAgAbhAve pratighAtAbhAvato'navasthAtaH / saMvyavahArAbhAvaH saMbandhAbhAvato bhavet // 305 // (1853) Tasmad dharma-'dharmau lokapariccheda kari au yuktau i Itarathakase tulye loko'loka iti ko bhedah ? 13041 ( 1852 ) ] Lokavibhagabhave pratighatabhavato'navasthatah Samvyavahararabhavah sambandhabhavato bhavet 3051 (1853)] Trans:--304-305 Thus, { predicaments of ) motion and rest are employed as the causes of destruction of loka. Otherwise, when the sky is common ( everywhere) how are ' loka' and aloka.' ( to be ) distinguished ? In absence of the divisions of loka, there will be no reaction, and hence no (scope for) stability; so also, there will be scope for mutual relation as there will be no connection (between them) (1852-1853) TIkA-yasmAduktamakAreNAstyalokaH, tasmAdalokAstitvAdevAvazya chokaparicchedakAribhyAM dharmA-'dharmAstikAyAbhyAM bhavitavyama; anyathAsskAze sAmAnye sati " ayaM lokaH" "ayaM cAlokaH" iti kiMkRto'yaM

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356 Jinabhadra Cani's [ The sixth vizeSaH syAt ? / tasmAd yatra kSetre dharmA-'dharmAstikAyau vartete, tallokaH zeSa nvalAMka iti lokA-'lokavyavasthAkAriNau dharmA-'dharmAsvikAge vidyate iti / 'logetyAdi " yadi hi dharmA-'dharmAbhyAM lokavibhAgo na syAt, tato lokavibhAgAbhAve'viziSTa evaM sarvasminapyakAze gati: pariNatAnAM jIvAnAM pudglAnAM ca pratighAtAbhAven tadgatyavasthAnAmAvAdaloke'pi gamanAta, tasya cAnantatvAt teSAM parasparaM saMbandho na syAt / tatazcaudArikAdikArmaNavargaNAparyantapudglakRto jIvAnAM pandha-mokSa-mukhaduHkha-bhavasaMsaraNAdivyavahAro na syAt / jIvasya ca jIvena sahAnyonyamI lanAmAvAt tatkRto'nupagraho-paghAtAdivyavahAro na syAditi / / 304-305 // (1852-1853) / D. C.-When the existence of a-loka is 'accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest, are also sccepted to exist. Otherwise, akasa being common everywhere, loka and a-loka will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of dharma and a-dharma exist, there is loka, and the rest is called a-loka. If there were no distinction between loka and a-loka by means of dharma and a dharma, pratighata of various sivas and pudgalas in the this world, will not be possible. *Consequently, there will be no scope for gati and avasthana to lead them to e-loka. Jivas and pudgalas wil then become ananta; there will be nothing like mutual relation between thein, and the attributes of bandha and moksa will also be no longer existing between them. #304-305H (1852-1853)] niraNuggahasaNAo na maI parao jalAdiva shsss| jo gamaNANuggahiyA so dhammo logaparimANo // 306 / / ( 1854 ) Niranuggahattanad na gai paras jaladiva jhasassa 1 Jo gamananuggahiya so dhammo logaparimano 130611 (1854) [niranugrahatvAd na gatiH parato jalAdiva apatya / yogamanAnugrahItA sa dharmoM lokaparimANaH // 306 // (1854)

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35/ Vada ] Ganadharavada Niranugrahatvad na gatih parato jaladiva jhasasyai Yo gamananugrahita sa dharmo loka-parimanah 306 I (1854)} Trans.-306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water, ( their ) movement also does not extend beyond (loka). The predicament of dharmastikaya which is favourable to ( their ) movement, becomes the only measuring unit of wka. (1854). TIkA-tato lokAt parato'loke jIva-pudgalAnAM ma gatiH, niranubrahattvAt-~~-tatra gatyanugraha katurabhAvAdityarthaH, yathA jalAt parato jhapasya matsyasya gatina bhavati, upagrAhakAbhAvAditi / yazcAtra jIva-pudglagateranuprahakartA sa lokaparimANo dharmAstikAya iti // 306 / / (1854 ) // D. C. Just as fish cannot move out of water, as there will be no upagrulaka of their movement, so also, jivas and pudgaias will have no access to the a-loka, as es-loka in not favourable to their movement. It is predicament of dharmastukaja which acts as the upagrahaka of the movements of jivas and pudgalas, the measures the worth of loka ||3061 (1854) atthi parimANakArI logassa pameyabhAvao'vassaM / nANaM piva neyassAlogasthitte ya so'vassaM // 307 // (1855 ) Atthi parimanakari logassa pameyabhavao'vassam, Nanam piva neyassalogatthitte ya so'vassam 30711 (1855) [asti parimANakArI kokasya prameyabhAvato'vazyam / jJAnamiva jJeyasyAlokAstitve ca so'vazyam // 307 // (1855) Asti parimanakari lokasya prameyabhavato'yasyam Jnanamiva jneyasyalokastitve ca so'vasyam 1/30/11 (1855)] Trans. -- 307 Just as jnara measures the jneya, similarly, in the midst of (the existence of) a-loka, it li, e., dharmastikaga) also, acts undoubtedly as the measuring unit of loki on account of its finiteness. (1855)

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358 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth TIkA-asti lokasya parimANakArI. prameyAt, jJAnAmiva jJeyasya / athavA, jIvAH pudgalAzca loko'bhidhIyate, tato'sti tatparimANakArI, prameyatvAt , yathA zAlvAdInAM prasthaH, yazceha parimAtA sa dharmAstikAyaH, sa cAvazyamalokasyAstitva eva yujyate, nAnyathA. AkAzasya sarvatrAviziSTatvAt / tasmAlI kAgre siddhasyAvasthAnamiti prastutam / / 307 // (1855) D. C - Since lola is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of ideasuring unit like jnanu, which is the measuring unit of the pne:a. The measuring unit of loka is dharmastikaya or the predicament of motion, which exists only if loka exists, and 110t ori.orwise. Su, on the top of loku, the avasihana of Siddha or multilina must necessarily be accepted 1130711 (1855)] payaNaM pasattameva thAgAbho taM ca no jao chaTThI / iha kattila zvaNethaM katturaNatyaMtaraM thANaM / / 308 // (1856 ) Payanam pasatiamevam thanao tam ca no jav chatthii lha kattilakkareyam katuranatthantaram thanam | 308 // (1856) [patanaM prasaktamevaM sthAnAt tazca no yataH sssstthii| Daha kartRlakSaNeyaM kartaranarthAntaraM sthAnam / / 308 / / ( 1856 ) Patanam prasaktamevam sthanat tacca no yatah sasthi 1 Tha kartrilaksaneyam karturanarthantaram sthanam 13081 (1856)] Trans.-308 " Falling from ( a fixed ) position is thus attributed ( to t ). " It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sence of Nominative. Location is not different iront subject in this case. " ( 1856 ) TIkA-nanu ' sthIyate'sminiti sthAnam ' ityadhikaraNasAdhano'yaM zabdaH / tatazca siddhasya sthAnaM siddhasthAnamiti samAsaH / tatazcavaM sati siddha sya patanaM prasaktam, sthAnAta, parvata-pAdapAyayasthitadevadattasyeva, phalasyeva caa| yasya kila kApi parvatAdAvavasthAnaM, tasya kadAcit kasyApi patanamapi dRzyate, ataH siddhasyApi tat kadAcit pAmotIti bhaavH| tacca na, yataH

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 359 "siddhasya sthAnam" itIyaM krtrisssstthii| tatazca " sidasya sthAnam " iti ko'rtha ?-siddhastiSThati, na tu tadarthAntarabhUtasthAnamastIti // 308 // (1856 ) // ___D C..--Mandika:--Sthana means place of location So, when the place of location of a sildha being is accepted as existing, the characteristic of falling from that place, should also be attributed to it as in the case of Devadotter or a fruit falling from the sunimit of a mountain or tree, as the case may be. Everything is bound to fall from the place of its location and suddha is no exception to it. Bhagavana: -It is not so. The phrase " Siddhasya sthanam" shows that the words Siditha " is in the Genitive case used in the Nominative sense, " Sidilhasya sthanam " means, therefore, the place where Siddhz resides, but it is not different from Sitthali 308 / / (1856) / Or, nahaniccattaNao vA thANaviNAsapayANaM na juttaM se / taha kammAbhAvAo puNAkriyAbhAvao vA vi // 309 // (1857) Nahaniccattajao va thanavinasapayanam na juttam se Taha kam mabhavao punnakkiyabhavao va vi ll 306 !! ( 1857 ) [nabhonityatvato vA sthAnavinAzapatanaM na yuktaM tasya / ___ tathA karmAbhAvAta punaH kriyAbhAvato vApi // 300 / / ( 1857 ) Nabhonityatvato va sthanavinasapatanam na yuktam tasyai Tatha karmabhavat puuan kriyabhavato vapi || 309 // ( 1857)" ___Trans. -309 Neither destruction nor its : falling from the place of its location, is possible on account of its being nilya like akasa, as well as, due to the absence of kriya or even for want of Karm.. ( 1857 ) TIkA-arthAntarale'pi sthAnasya na patanaM sidrasya, yato'styarthAntara

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360 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth * sthAnaM nama eva tasya ca nityatvAd vinAzo na yuktaH, tadabhAve ca kRtaH patanaM muktasya ? | karma cAtmanaH patanAdikriyAkAraNam, muktasyaM ca karmAbhAvAt kRtaH patanakriyA ? yA ca samayamekamasyApyUrdhvaM gatikriyA, tasyAH kAraNaM lAu ya eraMDaphaLe " ityAdinA darzitameva / punaHkriyA ca muktasya nAsti kAraNAbhAvAt / nijaprayatna- preraNA - sskarSaNa - vikarSaNazurutvAdayo hi patanakAraNam, tatsaMbhavatha mukasya nAsti, hetorabhAvAt, iti kuto'sya patanam ? | iti // 309 // (1857) // 4. } D. C - Even if sthana were taken to be distinct from siddha it is not proper to believe that siddha falls from the sthana, which itself is destructible. Since sthana is nitya like akasa, it would never meet destruction In the process of falling, Karma is the essential factor, Now since muktatma is free from Karma, the process of falling cannot come into existence for want of Karma. Moreover, impellation by ones' own elforts, attraction, repulsion and weightiness etc. are also important causes of--the patana kriya, but since all of them are absent in muktatma, the patani of muktatina from its sthana is not possible from that view point also. 1309 (1857) ] Beside nicathANAo vA vomAINaMpaDaNaM pasajjejjA / aha na mayamaNegaMto thANAo'vassa paDaNaM ti // 310 // (1858) N:ccathanao va vomainampadanam pasajjejja ! Aha na mayamaneganto thanao 'vassa padanam ti 310 (1858) [ nityasthAnAd vA vyomAdInAM patanaM prasajyeta / atha na matamanekAntaH sthAnAdavazyaM patanamiti / / 310 / (1858) Nityasthanad va vyomadinam patanam prasajyeta i Atha na matamanekanfah sthanadavasyam patanamiti 1310 (1858) Trans. - 310 Or, if the fall from permanent abode (is admitted) the fall of sky, will also be caused. And if that is For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Canadharavada 361 not admitted, the statement that "Falling from the place of location is inevitable" becomes uncertain. (1858) (6 TIkA nanu ca sthAnAt patanam " iti svavacanaviruddhamidam, asthAnAdeva patanasya yujyamAnatvAt / atha sthAnAdapi patanamiSyate, tahiM nityameva sthAnAd vyopAdInAM patanaM prasajyeta / atha na tat teSAM matam, varhi " sthAnAt patanam " inyanaikAntikameveti // 310 // (1858) D. C.-The statement that everything has to fall from its sthana is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the avasthana or the abode, and not from the sthana. If falling from sthana were believed, the nitya objects like akasa will also have to meet patana, from their nitya sthanas. On the other hand, if it is not accepted, that falling from the place of location is inevitable, will be anaikantika |1310|| (1858)] bhavao siddho si maI teNAhamasiddhasaMbhavo jutto / kAlANAhasaNao padamasarIraM va tadajutaM / / 311 / / (1859) Bhavao siddho tti mai tenaimasiddhasambhavo jutto Kalanaittana padhamasariram va tadajuttam 311 (1859) [ bhavataH siddha iti matistenAdimasiddhasaMbhavo yuktaH / kAlAnAditvataH prathamazarIramiva tadayuktam / / 311 / / (1859 ) Bhavatah siddha iti matistenadimasiddhasambhavo yuktah | Kalanaditvatah prathamasariramiva tadayuktam 131 11 ( 1859) ] Trans.--311 It may be argued that the siddha ( is born) from the mundane world, and hence the production of the first suddha is acceptible. But, like the first sarira, that is not possible, on account of the endlessness of times. TIkA - atha syAd matiH parasya yato bhavAt saMsArAt sarvo'pi muktAtmA siddhastena tata sarveSAmapi siddhAnAmAdimatvAdavazyameva kenApyAdisiddhena bhavitavyam / tadayuktam, yato yathA sarvANyapi zarIrANi, ahorAtrANi 46 For Private Personal Use Only

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362 Jinabhadra Gani's The sixth ca sarvANyAdiyuktAnyeva, atha ca kAlAsyAnAditvAd nAghazarIram , AdyA. horAtraM vA kimapi jJAyate, tathA kAlasyAnAditvAt sido'pi nAyaH pratIyata iti / / 311 / / (1859) / D C.-Mandika :- . It has already been proved that all muktamas are born of this samsara. Hence, there ought to exist some sidlo who might be called the first of all the muktatmas. Bhagvana : -Your assumption is groundless. For like bodies, nights, and days, the muktima is also adiman, but owing to the endlessness of Kala, it is not possible to know as to who was the first saditha |3111 (1859, ] parimiyadese'NatA kiha mAyA mRttivirhiyttaao| niyammi va nANAI diTThIo vegavammi / / 312 // (1860) Parimniyadese'panta kiha miya muttivirahiyattao 1 Niyammi va nanai ditthio vega-suvammi 1131 211 (1860) [parimitadeze'nantAH kathaM mAtA mUrtivirahitatvAt / nijake vA jJAnAdayo dRSTayo vaikarUpe // 312 / / (1860) Parimitadese'nantah kathani mata murtivirahitatvati Nijake va jnanadayo uristayo vaikarupe 1131211 (1860) 1 Trans.---312 Then ) how are the numerous siddhas) contained in limited space ? "On account of their formlessness ; or like one's own apprehensions, etc, or like (muerous ) eyes on one form" (1860) ___TIkA -Aha-parimitadezameva siddhakSetram , tatra kathamanAdikAlavartino'nantAH sidA mAnti ? / atrottaramAha-amartatvAt siddhAH parimite'pi kSetre'nantAstiSThanti, yathA pratidravyamevAnantAni siddhAnAM saMbandhIni kenala bhAnA-kevaladarzanAni saMpatanti, dRSTayo vA yathaikasyAmapi nartakyAM sahasrazaH prapatanti, parimite'pi vA'pavarakAdikSetre bahayo'pi pradIpaprabhA mAnti; evamihAmUrtAH siddhA kathaM parimitakSetre'nantA na mAsyanti; mUrtAnAmapi

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 363 pradIpaprabhAdInAM bahUnAmekatrAvasthAnaM dRzyate, kimurtA'mUrtAnAm ? iti bhAvaH // 312 // (1860) / D. C.- Manazka :--The abode of siddhas is limited in space. How could the numberless siddhas be accommodated in it ? Bhagavana :-Siddhas are accomodated even in that limited space on account of their a murtatva, just as a number of apprehensions are made upon one object, or just as a number of eyes fall upon one dancer, or just as light of numerous lamps is accumulated in one room of limited space, the a-murta siddhas are also contained in their limited ksetra, Vhen the accumulation of number of murla splendours of lamps in a limited space is possible, why not the collection of a-murta siddhas be not possible in the a niurta space ? 1312" 1860, ) na ha vaha sazarIramsa ppiyA-'ppiyAvahatirevamAIgaM / veyapayANaM ca tumaM na sadatyaM muNasi tA saMkA // 313 // (1861) tuha baMdhe mokkhammi ya, sA ya na kajA jao phuDo ceva / sasarIre-yarabhAvo naNu jo so baMdha mokkho si // 314 // (1862) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya ppiya-'ppiyavahatirevamalpam | Veyapayanam ca tumam na sadattham munasi to sanka 1131311 Tuha bandhe mokkhammi ya, sa ya na kajja jao phudo ceva i Sa-sarire-yarabhavo nanu jo so bandha mokkho tti 1131411, 1862) [na ha vai sazarIrasya miyA-'miyayorapahatirevamAdInAm / vedapadAnAM ca tvaM na sadartha muNasi tataH zaGkA / / 313 / / (1861) saba bandhe mokSe ca, sA ca na kAryA yataH sphuTa eva / sazarIre-tarabhAvo nanu yaH sa bandho mokSa iti // 314 // (1862) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-'priyayorapahatirevamadinam! Vedapadanam ca tvam na sadartham munasi tatah sanka 1313(1861)]

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364 Jinabhadra Capi's [The sixth Tava bandhe mokse ca, sa ca na karya yatah sphuta eva 1 Sa-sarire-tarabhavo nanu yah sa bandho moksa iti // 31411 (1862)] Trans ---313-314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas such as "Naha vai sa-sarirasya priyya -priya yorafahati" etc, and hence your doubt as regards bandha and moksa (has arisen ). That doubt should no longer be entertained. For, bandha and noksa are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness (respectively). (1861-1862). TIkA-vyAkhyA-" na hi vai sazarIsya piyA-'piyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM vA priyA-'piye na spRzataH" ityAdInAM ca vedapadAnAM sadartha tvaM na muNasi / tato bandhe mokSe ca tava saumya ! zaGkA, sA ca na kAryA, yato nanu yaH sazarIre-tarabhAvaH sphuTa evaM bandho mokSazceti kathaM bakA yujyate ? / etaduktaM bhavati-" sa zarIrasya" ityanena bAbA-''dhyAtmikAnAdijarIrasaMtAnasvarUpo bandhaH proktaH, tathA, "azarIraM vA basantam" ityanena tvazeSazarIrApagamasvabhAvo mokSaH prtipaaditH| tathA "sa eva viguNo vibhurna badhyate" ityAdInyapi padAni saMsArijIvasya bandhamokSAbhAvapatipAdakAni tvaM manyase / taccAyuktam, muktajIvaviSayatvAt teSAm / muktasva ca bandhAdhabhAve'vimatipattireveti / tadevaM bhagavatA chimastasya sNshyH|| 313-314 // (1861-1862 ) / D C.-You have not grasped the real meaning of the Vedapadas such as :-"Na ha vai sa-garirasya priya-'priya yorapahati," "Asariram va vasantam priya priye na sprzs'atah. And that is why, O Saumya ! you have raised the doubt as regards bandha and moksa. But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you. Por, it is clear that bandha and moksa are nothing but the qualities of sa-sariratva and a-s'ariratra respectively. By the words sasarirasya etc. bandha but the santana of the external, as well which is nothing as internal anddi

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Vada] Canadharavada 365 means of " s'arira, is meant; while by a-sariram va etc. moksa characterized by the removal of entire sa ira is laid down. Finally, you have apprehended sentences such as sa esa viguno vibhurna bhdhyate etc. to support the abhava of bandha moksa to the mundane soul. But that is not correct. Those sentences are referring to the free soul. Attributes such as Il 25 never bound" etc. are directed to nothing but the muktatma. * tr Thus, the doubts are removed from the mind of Mandika, || 313-314 | (1861-1862 )] forfin aaegni fadm ar-arofarqgekor | di amoi qzagen ergiaft az difenagfe 11224|| (PPage #404
Chapter VII sptmgnnghrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Seventh Canadhara te paccaie so morio AgacchaI jinnsgaas| vacAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi / / 316 / / 1864 / / Abhavo ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNaviSpamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNU savvadarisI // 317 / / (1865) Te pavvaie soum Morio agaccha ijinasagasam Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami ir 316 11 (1864) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana vippamukkenam | Naniena ya gottena ya savvanu savadarisi NGam 131711 (1865) [tAn prajitAn zruttvA maurya Agacchasi jinasakAzam / vrajAmi bande vanditvA paryupAse // 316 // (1864) AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavimamuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 317 // (1865) Tani pravrajitan srutva Maurya agacchati jinsakasam i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase // 316 // ( 1864) Abhasitasca Jinena jati -jara-marana vipramuktena Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina 113174 (186511 Trans.- 316-317 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Maurya, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He

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Vada] Ganadharavada 367 thinks :-- ) I may go, pay my homages and worship him. He was addressed by his name and lineage by the- Tirthaikara who was free from birth, old age and death, who was onni. scinnt, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated know. ledge. (1864-1865) kiM maNNe asthi devA uyAhu nAtha tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho / / 318 / / ( 1866 ) Kim manne atthi deva uyahu natthi tui samsao tujjha i Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho 1318 // (1866) [kiM manyase santi devA utAho na santIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 318 / / ( 1866) Kim manyase santi deva utaho na santiti samsayastava! Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1131811 (1866)] Trans.--318 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubts as to whether gods exist or not. But ( ca) you do not know the real interpretation of the sentences of the Vedas Here is their (real) interpretation, ( 1866 ) TokA-he AyuSmana maurya ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM devA santi nati, ubhayathApi vedapadazravaNAt ? / tathAhi-" sa eSa yajJAyudhI yajamAno'jasA svargalokaM gacchati" ityAdiH tathA, " apAma somaM amRtA abhUma agamana jyotiravidAma devAn, kiM nUnamasmAt tRNavadarAtiH kimu mUrtimamRtamaya'sya" itpAdiH tathA " ko jAnAti mAyopamAn garvANAnindra-yama-varuNa-kuverA. dIna" ityAdi / eteSAM vedapadAnAmayamarthastava buddhau pratimAsate, yathA-sa eSa yajJa eva duritavAraNakSamatvAdAyudhaM praharaNaM yasyAsau yajJAyudhI, yajamAno'JjasA praguNena nyAyena, svargalokaM gacchati, iti devsttaaptipttiH| tathA, apAma-potavantaH, somaM latArasam , amRtAH-amaraNadharmANaH, abhUma-bhUtAH sma., agaman-gatAH, yotiH - svargam , avidAma devAn devatvaM prAptAH smaH, kiM nUnamasmAddhvaM tRNavat kariSyatiH ko'sau ? ityAha-arAtiH-vyASi:,

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368 Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh tayA, kimu prazne, mUrti-jarAm , amRtamaya'syeti-amRtatvaM prAptasya martyasya purepasyetyarthaH, amaraNadharmiNo manuSyasya kiM kariSyanti jarA-vyAdhadhayaH ? iti bhaavH| atrApi devsttaamtipttiH| " ko jAnAti mAyopamAna " ityAdIni tu devAbhAvapratipAdakAni / atastava sNshyH| ayuktAzcAyam , yato'mISA bedapadAnAmartha svaM na jAnAsi, cazabdAd yuktiM ca na vetti / eteSAM hibedapadAnAM nAyamoM yastavAbhipretaH, kintvayam,-vakSyamANapakSaNa iti // 318 // (1866) D. C-0 long-lived Maurya l your doubt about the existence of gods is due to your hearing various sentences of Vedas. The sentences are such as -- (1) " Sa esa yajinayudhi yajamano'njasa svargalokam gacchati " etc. (2) " Apama somam amrita abhima agaman jyotiravidama devan kim nunamasmat trinavadaratih kimu murtimamriramartyasya " etc. As well as, (3)" Ko janati mayopaman girvana-nindra-Yama-Varuna Kuberadim ? " etc. According to you, interpretations of these sentences would be as follows: (1) This host armed with the weapon of sacrifice reaches the region of heaven immediately. ( This leads to prove the existence of gods ) (2) By drinking soma, they became gods, went to heven, and attained the divine status. These divinities will banish maladies and mortality by virtue of there ampitatava. ( These sentences are also used in support of the existence of divinities. )

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369 Vada ] Canadharavada (3; who knows the illusive gods like Indra, Yama Varuna and Kuulera etc ? (Sentences like this would deny the existence of gods on the other side ) So, your doubt has sprung up from the sentences such as mentioned above. But that is not justifiable, as you have not understood their real meaning. Here I explain the real interpretation // 318 // ( 1866 )] Now the author explains the whole proposition in details. taM manasi neraithA parataMtA dukkhasaM uttA ya / na taraMtIhAgaMtuM sar3ayA suzcamANA vi // 319 // ( 1867 ) sacchaMkyAriNo puNa devA di vappabhAvajuttA ya / jaM na kayAi vi darisaNamuveti no saMsao tesu / / 360 / / (1868) Tam mannasi Neraiya paratanta dukkhasanpautta ya i Na tarantihagantum saddheya suvvamana vi 11 319 11 ( 1867 ) Sacchandayarino puna deva divvappabhavajutta ya , Jam na kayai vi darisanamuvecti to samsao tesu 1132011 ( 1868 ) [ tvaM manyase nairayikAH paratantrA duHkhasaMpayuktAzca / na zaknuvantIhA''gantuM zraddheyAH zrUyamANA api / / 319 // (1867) svacchandacAriNaH punardevA divyaprabhAvayuktAzca / yanna.kadAcidapi darzanamupayAnti tataH saMzayasteSu // 320 // (1868) Tvam manyase Nairaikan paratantra duhkhasamprayuktasca ! Na saknuvantiha " gantum sraddheyah sruyamana api 113191(1867) Svacchandavarinali punar-deva divyayrabhavayuktasca i Yanna katacidapi darsanamupayanti tatah samsayastesu13 2011(1868) Trans.---319-320 You think that the denizens of hell ( being ) subservient and miserable, are not able to come into this world ( So ), they are to be trusted ( as existing ) even

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370 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The seventh If (they are inerely) heard (to be so). But the gods, on the other hand, are free to move, and are invested with the celestial splendour also. Still, however, they do not come into the range of (our) sight, and hence, the doubt about them. (1867-1863) TIkA-maurya! tvamevaM manyase-nArakA svakRtapApanarakapAlAdiparatantrAH, parAdhInavRttayo'tIvaduHkhasaMghAtavihalAca na zaknuvantyatrAgantum , ataH pratyakSIkaraNopAyAmAvAt zrUyamANA api zraddhayA bhavantu / devAstu svacchandacAriNo divyaprabhAvayuktAca, tathApi yasmAd na kadAcid darzanapathamavataranti, zrUyante ca zruti-smRtyAdiSu, atasteSu zaGketi // 319-320 // (1867-1868) D. C.-O Maurya ! According to you, the inability of the Naraka-beings to come to this world, is due to their being subservient to their own sins, as well as, due to their miserable condition. So, they might be trusted upon as existing merely by hearing (some thing about) them. But, the case with gods is different. For, even though they possess free movements and celestial splendour, they would never like to come within the range of our sight So, because they are heard of in the Vedas and Smritis etc. you have raised this doubt 1319-3204 (1867-1868) mA kuru saMsayamee suduurmnnuyaaibhinnjaaiie| pecchasu paJcagvaM ciya caubdhihe devasaMghAe // 321 // (1869) Ma kuru samsayamee sudurainanuyaibhinnajaie , Pecchasu paccakkham cciya cauvvihe devasanghae 1321|| (1869) [mA kuru saMzayametAn sudUramanunAdimibhajAtIyAn / prekSasva pratyakSameva caturvidhAn devasaGghAtAn // 321 // (1869) Ma kuru samsayametan suduramanujadibhinnajatiyan i Preksasva pratyaksameva caturvidhan devasanghatan | 32111

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Vada Ganadlaravada 371 Trans. ---321 Do not entertain doubt. Look at these four-fold multitudes of gods before your eyes (which are) extremely different from the human beings. (1869) TIkA-mauryaputra ! deveSu mA saMzayaM kArSIsvam, etAneva hi sudramatyartha manujAdibhyo bhinnajAtIyAn divyAbharaNa vichepana-vasana-mumanomAlAlaGkRtAn bhavanapati-vyantara-jyotiSka-vaimAnika lakSaNAMzcaturvidhadevasaMghAtAn mama vandanArthamihaiva samavasaraNAgatAn pratyakSa evaM pazyeti / / 321 / / (1869) D. C.--You should not entertain any doubt about the existence of gods, O Mauryaputra I just look at these gods of all the four types-viz-bhavanapan, wantara Ipotiska, and t'ammanika-distinguished from the human beings by virtue of (their) celestial ornaments and garlands etc. coming to this samavasaraya to pay then homages to be 11321# (1869) puncha pi na saMdeho jutto jaM joisA sapaccatragvaM / / dIsaMti lakrayA vi ya ubaghAyA-'NuggahA jagao // 322 // (1870) Puvvam pi na samdeho jutto jam qvisa sapaccakkham | Disanti takkaha vi ya uvaghaya nuggaha jagao 1132211 (1870, [pUrvamapi na saMdeho yukto yaj jyotiSkAH svapratyakSam / dRzyante tatkRtA api copaghAtA-'nugrahA jagataH // 322 // (1870) Purvamapi na samdelio yukto yaj jyotiskah svapratyaksam i Dsisyante taskiita api copaghata-nugraha jagatah 1132211 (1870) Trans.--322 rhe doubt is not justified even before (their | appearance), since luminaries are self-perceptible. Moreover, injuries or betterments caused by them to the world, are also apprehended. (1870) TIkA-iha samavasaraNAgatadevadarzanAt pUrvamapi tavAnyeSAM ca saMzayo na yuktaH, yad yasmAcandrA-''dityAdijyotiSkAstvayA sarveNApi ca lokena sva. pratyakSata eva sarvathA dRzyante / ato dezataH pratyakSatvAt kathaM samastAmarAsti

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374 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The seventh " tvazaGkA ? / kiJca santyeva devAH, lokasya tatkRtAnugraho - paghAtadarzanAt / tathAhi dRzyante kacit kecit tridazAH kasyApi kiJcidvibhavamadAnAdinASnugraham, tatpraharaNAdinA copaghAtaM kurvanta / tato rAjAdivat kathamete na santi iti / / 322 // ( 1870 ) D. C.-Even before they appear at the Samavasarana, your doubt about their existence is not justified. For, luminaries like Sun, Moon etc are self-perceptible to you, as well as to the whole world. So, it is not appropriate to doubt their existence. Moreover, anugraha and upaghata caused by gods to this world, are also evident to all. Several gods confer their favours upon some people by granting their objects of pleasure etc. while others inflict injuries, like a king, by means of weapons etc. This shows, for certain, that gods do exist 11322|| (1870) Besides, AlayametaM ca maI puraM va tabvAsiNA taha va siddhA / je te deva tti mayA na ya nilayA nicaparisuNNA // 323 // (1871) Alayamettam ca mai puram va tavvasino taha vi siddha Je te deva tti maya na ya nilaya niccaparisunna 1323 ( 1871) [ ALayamAtraM ca matiH puramitra tadvAsinastathApi siddhAH / ye te devA iti mayA na ca nilayA nityaparizUnyAH // 323 // (1871) Alayamatram ca matih puramiva tadvasinastathapi siddhah | Ye te deva iti mata na ca nilaya nityaparisunyah || 323|| (1871)} Trans.-323 The view may be that (luminaries) are mere abodes. Still however, like a city, they, too, have their inhabitants, who are accepted as ( none but ) gods. For, places of residence, cannot be vacant for ever. (1871) TIkA - athaivaMbhUtA matiH parasya bhavet - AlayA evAlayamAtraM candrAdivimAnAni na tu devAH, tat kathaM jyotiSkadevAnAM pratyakSatvamabhidhIyate ? | " For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 373 kiM tad yathA''layamAtram ? ityAha-"puraM ti" yathA puraM zUnyaM lokAnAmA. layamA sthAnamAtraM, na tu tatra lokAH santi. evaM candrAdrivimAnAnyapyAlayamAtrameva, na tu tatra devAH kecit taNanti ataH kathaM teSAM pratyakSatvam ? / atrottaramAha-tathApi tadvAsina AlayavAsinaH mAmoda ye siddhAste devA iti matAH saMmanA: / yo hyAlayaH sa sarvo'pi tannivAsinA'dhiSTito dRSTaH, yatha pratyakSopalabhyamAnA devadattAyadhiSThitA vasantapurAdyAlayAH, AlayAzca jyoti kavimAnAni, ata AlayalAnyathAnupapateya tanivAsinaH siddhAste devA iti matAH / Ai-nanu kathaM te devAH sidhyanti ? / yAdRzA hi pratyakSeNa devadattA dayo dRzyante tepi tAdRzA eva syuriti / tadayuktam , viziSTA hi devadattAdyAlayebhyazcandrAdyAlayA iti / atastanivAsino'pi viziSTAH sidhyanti, te ca devadattAdivilakSaNA devA iti| aparastvAha-nadu " AlayatvAt " ityayaM hetu tannivAsijansAdhane naikAntika, zUnyAlayairvyabhicArAt / atrottaramAha- na ya nilayetyAdi " na ca nilayA-AlayA nityameva zUnyA bhavanti / ayamabhiprAya:-ye kecidAlayAste prAg idAnoM, eSyati vA kAle 'vazyameva sanivAsimiradhiSThitA eva bhavanti na tu nityameva parizUnyAH / tato yadA vA candrAdhAlayanivAsino devAH sidhyantIti // 323 / / ( 1871 ) ___D. C. -Maurya:-Luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you, are only the abodes, and not the gods themselves. It could not be said, therefore, that the luminary deities are directly perceptible, just as in case of an empty town, the houses are mere places of roosidence for people, but people do not actually reside into them, so also luminaries like Moon etc. should be taken as absolutely empty hudies and nothing like gods is expected to reside into them. Bhagavana:--It is not so. O Mau ya! Existence of the place of residence proves the existence of its residents also. So, thesc luminaries are not mere alayas, but they have their inhabitants also. For, that which is called an ilaya or a house is always occupied by its residents Libe houses in a towni

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374 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The seventh occupied by persons like Devadatta, these luminaries are also undoubtedly occupied by devinities, Maurya -- Like Devudatta etc residing in the houses of a city, the gods who are the residents of the luminary bodies should also be perceptible. Bhigavana:- It is not proper to advarice such an argument. Because, the places of residence ure absolutely different from the houses in a city. So, their residents vis gods are also characteristically different froin Dezadatta etc. Although they are not apprehended by the indriyas, their existence is adinitted without doubl. Maurya :-You cannot assert exclusively that every place of residence, is always occupied by a resident. For, nobody would reside in a harren house. ( It is forbidden to reside in such a house ). From the existence of abode, therefore, you cannot inter the existence of the occpuant. Bhagavana :--A residing place is never suilya. It must have been occupied by some person or tlie other, either in the past or in future or at present. In case of luminary places of resort, gods like Moon etc. must have occuplied the places at some time in the past, present, or future 1:32311 (1871) ko jAgai va kimeyaM ti hoja nissaMsaya vimaannaaii| rayaNamayana bhogamaNAdiha jai vijAharAINaM // 324 / / (1872) Ko janai va kimeyam ti hojja nissamsayin vimanaim i Rayanamayanabhogamanadiha jaha vijjaharainam 1.32411 (1872) [ko jAnAti vA kimetaditi bhaved nissaMzayaM vimAnAni / ratnamayanabhogamanAdiha yathA vidyAdharAdInAm / / 324 / / (1872) Ko janati va kimetaditi bhaved nissamsayain vinanani i Ratanamayanabhogamanadiha yatha vidyadharadinam 132411 (1872)] Trans.-324 "Or, who knows what it is ?" They are

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375 Vada ] Ganadharayada certainly places like those of Vidyadharas etc., as they are decked with jewels and they fly in the sky. (1872) TIkA-yadi vA, evaMbhUtA matiH parasya maved yaduta-candrAdhAnayatvena yad gIyate bhavadbhistadidaM ko jAnAti kizcid bhavet kiM mUryo'bhimayo golaH, candrastvambumaya svabhAvataH svacchA, AhosvidevaMbhUtA evaite bhAsvara - ratnamayA golakA jyotiSkavimAnAni ?, ataH kathameteSAmAlayatvasiddhiH ? / atra pratividhAnamAha-niHsaMzayaM vimAnAnyetAni, ratnamayatva saMti namogamanAt, puSpakAdividyAdharatapaH siddhavimAnavaditi / abhravikAra-pavanAdivyavacchedArtha rattamayatvavizeSaNamiti // 324 // (1872) 1. C. -Maurya :--Or who knows what these luminaries like Sun and Moon, mentioned by you are like ? One that appears as Sun may be a ball of fire, and that which appears as Moon may be a transparent ball of water. Or, it may be that these luminaries be some such bright balls. So, it is not appropriate to believe that they are the abodes of luminary gods. Bhagavana :--Since they are decked with jewels, and they are moving in the sky, there is no doubt that they are actual vimanas like puspaka etc. attained by vidyadharas by means of of austerities etc. So, take it for certain, that these vimanas are also the residing places of the various luminary gods. | 324 / / (1872) / Or, hojja maI mAeyaM tahA vi takAriNo surA je te / na ya mAyAivigArA puraM va niccovalambhAo // 325 // (1873) Hojja mai maeyam taha vi tak karino sura je te ! Na ya mayaivigara puram va niccovalambliaci 11 325 11 ( 1873) [ maved matirmAyeyaM tathApi tatkAriNaH surA ye te / na ca mAyAdivikArAH puramiva nityopalambhAt / / 325 // (1873)

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376 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The seventh Bhaved matirmayeyam tathapi tatkarinah sura ye te l Na ca mayadivikarab puramiva nityopalambhat | 325 (1873) Trans.--325 It may be argued that this is ( all ) illusion. But, its creators are gods and not the perturbations like illusion etc. on account of their being obtained like a town for ever. (1873) TIkA - atha parasya matirbhavet - naite candrAdivimAnAnyAlayAH, kintu mAyeyaM mAyAvinA kenApi prayuktA / atrocyate mAyAtvamamISAmasiddham, vAGmAtreNaiva bhavatA'bhidhAnAt tathApyabhyupagamyocyate- ye tatkAriNastathAvidhamAyAprayoktAraste surAH siddhA eva manuSyAdInAM tathAvidhavaikriyakaraNAdarzanAt / abhyupagamya ca mAyAtvamamISAmabhihitam / na caite mAyAdivikArAH, nityopalambhAt sarveNa sarvadA dRzyamAnatvAdityarthaH, prasiddhapATalIputrAdipuravaditi / mAye-ndrajAlakRtAni hi vastUni na nityamupalabhyanta iti nityavizeSaNopAdAnamiti / / 325 || (1873) + D C.-You might argue that vimana like candra etc are not actual alayas, but they are mere illusions created by some magician. But the illusionariness of such vumanas cannot be admitted by means of mere words. Still, however, if they are assumed as majika, their creators are not magicians or human beings, but the gods themselves This is said only on the 'assumption that they are mayika vikaras But really speaking, they are not mayika as they are ever obtained like towns etc. So, these vimanas are nothing but the abodes of luminary gods. 1325" (1873) jai nAragA pavannA pagigpAvaphalabhoiNo teNaM / subahugapuNNaphalabhujo pavajjiyacA suragaNA vi / / 326 / / (1874) Jai narga pavanna pagiTthapavaphalabhoino tenam Subahugaf unnaphalabhujo pavajjiyavva sura gana vi 1:326# (1874)

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Vada ] Canadharavada 377 [yadi nArakA! prapannAH prakRSTayApaphalabhoginastena / subahukapuNyaphalabhujaH prapattavyAH suragaNA api / / 326 // (1874) Yadi nirakah prapannah praksistapapaplialabhoginastena 1 Subaliukapuayaphalabhujah prapattavyah suragana api 1132611] Trans.--326 If the denizens of hell are admitted as the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, gods should be accepted as the enjoyers of the fruits of many good deeds. (1874) TIkA-iha svakRtapakRSTapApaphalabhoginastAvat kacid nArakAH patipattavyAste va yadi prapannAH, " teNaM ti" tarhi tenaiva prakAreNa svopArjitamuSThubahukapuNyaphalabhunaH suragaNA api prtipttvyaaH| atrAha-nanvihaivAti. duHkhitanarAstiyaJcazvAtiduHkhitAH prakRSTapApaphalabhujo bhaviSyanti, tathA, manuSyA pavAtimukhitAH prakRSTapuNyaphalabhujo bhaviSyanti, kimadRSTanAraka -devaparikalpanayA ? iti / tadayuktam , prakRSTapApaphalabhujAM sarvaprakAreNApi duHkhena bhavitavyam, na cAtiduH khitAnAmapi nara-tirazcAM sarvaprakAraM duHkhaM dRzyate sukhadapavanA''lokAdisukhasya sarveSAmapi darzanAt / prakRSTapuNyaphalabhunAmapi sarvaprakAreNApi sukhena na bhavitavyam, na cehAtimukhitAnAmapi narANAM sarvaprakAraM sukhamavalokyate, pUtidehodbhavasya roga-jarAdiprabhavasya ca duHkhasya teSAmapi sadbhAvAt / tasmAt prakRSTapApanibandhanasarvapakAraduHkha vedino nArakAH, prakRSTapuNyahetukasarvadhakArasukhabhogino devAzcAbhyupagantavyA eveti // 326 // (1874) D. C-Bhagavana:--When you believe that Narakas are the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, you should also believe that gods are the enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds, and thus they are existing. Maurya :--Teryancus, who are excessively miserable, are the sufferers of the reward of great sins, and excessively happy human beings are enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds. So, it is not necessary to assume the existence of Devas and Narakas at all. 48

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378 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The seventh Bhagavana:--Existence of Devas and Narakas cannot be denied by saying so. Enjoyers of the rewards of great punyas and papas are exclusively happy or exclusively miserable, as the case may be. The manusyas and tirjancas cannot be called exclusively happy and exclusively miserable respectively. Por, even the happiest human beings are susceptidle to the affiction of diseases, old age, etc. while even extremely miserable tiryancas, experience the happy touch of cold breeze etc. So, munusyas and tiryancas, can never be taken as exclusively happy or exclusilvely miserable beings, while Narakas who suffer the consequences of papas, and Devas who enjoy the fruit of punyas, can be easily admitted respectively as the excusively miserable and exclusively happy beings 1132611 ( 1874 ) Now, in reply to the question that " Wlay gods do not visit this world if at all they are existing ?" the author states:-- saMkaMtadivvapimmA visayapasattA'samattakattavvA / aNahINamaNuyakajA narabharamasubhaM na eMti surA // 327 // ( 1875) Sankantadivvapimma visayapasatta'samattakattavva i Anahinamanuyakajja narabhavamasubham na enti sura || 327 // [saMkrAntadivyapremANo viSayaprasaktA asamAptakartavyAH / anadhInamanujakAryA narabhavamazubhaM nAgacchanti surAH // 327 // (1875) Sankrantadivyapremino visayprasakta asaniaptakrtavyahi Anadhinamanujalarya narabhavamasubham nagacchanti surah 32711 Trans.--327 Invested with celestial love, and attached to the objects of pleasure, with their duties un-finished, and their deeds independent of human beings, divinities do not come into this inauspicious world. ( 1875) TIkA- nAgacchantIha sadaiva suragaNAH, saMkrAntadivyaprematvAt, viSayaprasaktatvAt, prakRSTarUpAdiguNakAminIprasaktaramyadezAntaragatapuruSavatH vathA, asamAptakartavyatvAt , bahukartavyatAprasAdhananiyuktavinItapuruSavat / tathA,

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 379 anadhInaM manunAnAM kArya yeSAM te'nadhInamanujakAryAH, tadbhavastatvaM tasmAd nehAgacchanti surAH, anabhimatagehAdau niHsaGgayativaditi / tathA, azubhatvAd naramavasya tadandhAsahiSNutayA nehAgacchanti devAH, svaparityaktakaDevaravaditi // 327 // ( 1875) ii D. C. Divinities do not come to this world, because they are invested with celestial love and attached to the various objects of pleasure like a person attacited to a beautiful woman possessing high qualities of extreme beaulty etc. Secondy, like a great mai entrusted with manifold work, these gods have also to perform manifold duties and hence their duties are never over. Thirdly, all their deeds are independent of human beings So, just as a dispassionate ascetic, never comes to an unholy house, these gods also usually abstain themselaves from coming to the inauspicious luman world as they would not stand even the sinell of it // 327 / / ( 1875 ) But this does not mean that they always keep themselves away from this world navari jiNajamma-dikkhA-kevala-nivvANamahaniogeNaM / bhattIe somma ! saMsayaviccheyatyaM va ejahaNhA / / 328 / / (1876 ) punvANurAgao vA samayanibaMdhA tavoguNAo vaa| maragaNapIDA-'Nuggaha-kaMdappAIhiM vA kei // 329 / / ( 1877 ) For, Navari jinajamma-dikk ha -kevala-nivvana maha niogenam Bhattie Sommal sansayaviccheyaitham va ejjahanha 1132811(1876) Puvvanuragao va samayanibandha tavogunao va 1 Naraganapida-'nuggaha-kandappaihim va kei // 329 // ( 1877 ) [ navaraM jinajanma-dIkSA-kevala-nirvANamahaniyogena / bhattyA saumya ! saMzayavicchedArtha vaiyurihAhAya // 328 // (1876)

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380 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighth pUrvAnurAgato vA samayanibandhAt tapoguNAd vaa| naragaNapIDA--nugraha-kandarpAdibhirvA kecit // 329 / / ( 1877 ) Navaram jinajanma-diksa-kevala-nirnanamahaniyogena | Bhaktya Saumya ! samsayavicchiedartham vaiyurihabhaya 1: 328 #1 Purvanurigato va samayanibandhat tapogunad va i Naraganapida='nugraha-kandarradibhirva kecit 1132911 (1877, ) Trans.--328-329 Some have to visit this world merely by ( way of ) duty, at the occasion of birth, diksa, ac eptance of absolute apprehension, or final emancipation of some saint while others (would come) by reason of devotion, O Saumia ! or in order to remove (their ) doubts, or on account of previous attachament. Soine ( would do so ) following the conventional rule, some by virtue of austerities, some to afflict the the human being, some to favour therm, or some ( would come) out of passion etc. (1876-1877) TokA-navaraM jinajanma-dIkSA-kevala-nirvANamahotsavaniyogena tatkatavyatAniyameneha devA AgaccheyuH / tatra saumya ! kecidindrAdayo nijabhaktyA samAgacchanti, kecit tu tadanuvRtyA, anye saMzayavyayacchedArtham, apare tu pUrvagavikaputra-mitrAyanurAgAt / samayanibandha:-pratibodhAdinimittaH saMketanizcayaH, tasmAca kecid devA ihAgacchanti / anye tu mahAsatvasAdhvAditapoguNasamAkRSTAH, kecittupUrvavairikanaragaNapIDArtham, apare tu pUrvasuhatputrAdhanugrahArtham, kecittu devAH kandAdibhirihAgacchanti AdizabdAta sAdhvAdiparIkSAhetoriti draSTavyamiti / tadevaM nirUpitaM devAnAmatrAgamana kAraNam, anAgamanakAraNaM ca // 328-329 / / (1875-1877) D. C-Various deities visit this.world on various purposes. Some have to attend the occasions of janma diksa, kevala-jnana prapti and nirvana of a saint. Some like Indra are drawn to this world by means of devotion, some to remove their doubts. Several others descend upon this world on account of their previous attachment to relatives like son, friend etc. or by following the previous conventions or by virtue of previous austerities also, some gods come to the human world for thie purpose of

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 381 afflicting human beings in order to take revenge upou thein. while others would be attracted to this world out of passion or in order to test the saints of this world also Thus, there are various callses or their v.sit to this world, while others stated before, are the causes of their staying away from this world also || 328-329 // (1876-1877) jAissarahakahanAo kAmaha paJca khariNAo ya / vicA-maMto- AkAsiddhio mahavigArAo // 330 // ( 1878 ) ukittnnnnsNnyaaklbhaashe'bhikssnnsiddhiio| savogamasi Iu ya saMti deva tti saddheyaM / / 331 // (1879 ) Jaissarahakahanae kasai paccakkhadarisano ya Vijja-inanto-vayanasiddio gahavigata) || 3300 (1878) Ukkitfhapunnasancyaphalabhavdo'bhihanasidchio Savvagamasiddhiu ya santi deva tii saddheyam || 331 // ( 1879 ) [jAsmiraNakathanAt kasyacit pratyakSadarzanAcca / vidyA -mantropayAcanasiddhagrahavikArAta // 330 / / : 1878 ) utkRSTapuNya saMcayaphalabhAvAbhidhAnasiddheH / sarvAgamasiddhezca santi devA iti zraddheyam / / 331 // (1879) Jatismarapakathanat kasyacit pratyaksadarsanacca 1 Vidya-mantropayacanasiddhergrahavisarat ll 330 H 1878 ) Utkyistapunyasancayaphalabhavabhidhanasiddhen Sarvagamasiddhesca santi deva iti sraddheyam || 331 / / ( 1879 ) / Trans.-330-331 By the statement of some ( who are ) reminded of ( the former ) existence by ineans of direct apprehension, by (.virtue of } recting the chantings, of ( various ) lores by the movement of planets, due to the existence of the fruition of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds, by ( virtue of ) ( their ) names, and by ( the help of , all agamas, it should be trusted that gods are existing. ( 1878-1879 )

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382 Jiuabhadra Gamis The seventh ___TIkA- 'santi devA ityetat zraddheyam" iti pratijJA, jAtismaraNapratyayitapuruSeNa kathanAna, nAnAdezavicAripatyayitapuruSAvalokitakathitavicitrabRhaddevakulAdivastuvata; tathA, kasyApi tapaH prabhRtiguNayuktasya pratyakSadarzanapravRttezca-kenacit pratyakSapramANenopalammAdityarthaH, dUraviSkRSTanagarAdivat, tathA, vidyA- mantropayAcanebhyaH kAryasiddheH, prsaadphlaanumitraajaadivt| tayA, 'mahavigArAu tti' atra prayogaH-grahAdhiSThitapuruSadeho jIvavyatiriktAdRzyavaspadhiSThAtRka , puruSAsaMbhAvyavikArakriyAdarzanAt, saMcariSNuyanta. vyatiriktamadhyapraviSTAdRzyamAnapuruSAdhiSThitayantravat tathA tapo-dAnAdikriyA samupAjitotkRSTapugyasaMbhAraphalasadbhAvAt. utkRSTapApapArabhAraphalasadbhAvanizci tanArakavat, etacca pAgeva bhAvitam / tathA, "devAH" iti tadabhidhAnaM tato'pi ca devAnAM siddhiH / etaccAnantaragAthAyAM vyaktIkariSyate / tathA, sarve ca te AgamAzca sarvAgamAsteSvavimatipattyA siddhatvAca santi devA iti / / 33 -- 331 / / (1878-1879) D. C.-Existence of gods could be established in various ways .(1) On the recollection of former existence, a person would relate the story of the great family of gods witnessed and believed by him as certain. (2) Some persons attain directly the dars'una of gods by virtue of their qualities like austerity etc. (3, Some people attain the accomplishment of their objects by soliciting the favour of gods by means of prayers, and chantings of prescribed mantras. (4) A person in charge of planets is absolutely different from tie jivas, because of the kriyas that are found as a result of changes in the planets which are never to be found in human beings. (5) Just as we have accepted the existence of Narakas due to the fruition of great sins, the existence of gods should

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Vada } Ganadarravada 383 also be admitted on account of the phala of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds like tapas, dana ets. (6) The existence of gods is established by their very name viz "devah" (This will be explained in the following verse) (7) All the agamas admit the existence of gods. 330-331 // (1878-1879) The epithet "devah" is then explained as follows: - - devati satyayamidaM suddhattaNao ghaDAbhihANaM tra / aha va maI ma ciya devoM guNa - riddhisaMpaNNaNo // 332 // (1880) taM na jara naccatthe siddhe uvayArao nayA siddhI / jaccatthasIha siddhe mANava sIhovayAro vva / / 333 / / (1881 ) Deva tti satthayamidam suddhattanao ghadabhihanam vai Aha va mai manuu cciya devo guya riddhi sampanno 3321 1880) Tam na jau tacca siddhe uvayaro maya siddhi Taccatthasiha siddhe manavasihovayaro vva ||13331 (1881) [ devA iti sArthakamidaM zuddhatvato ghaTAbhidhAnamiva / athavA matirmanuja eva devo guNa - disaMpannaH // 332 // (1880) tad na yatastadhyArthe siddha upacArato matA siddhiH / tadhyArthasiMhe siddhe mANavasiMhopacAra iva / / 333 // (1881) Deva iti sarthakamidam suddhatvato ghatabhidhanamiva | Athava matirmanuja eva devo gunar-ddhisampannah ||3321 (1880) Tad na yatastathyarthe siddha upacarato mata siddhih Tathyarthasimhe siddhe manavasimhopacara iva 333 Trans - 332-333 Since the epithet deva " is clear like 'ghata", it is significant. Or, it might be believed that man '

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384 Jinabhadra Ciani's [ The Seventh himself (when) accompanied by the prosperity of merits, is god. (But) that is not (correct). (Because) the accomplishment (of the secondary meaning, by means of usage, could be brought about (only, when the primary meaning is establislied, just as the epithet "simha" or lion could be attributed to Manuvzka by means of usage only, if the primary sense of the word "semha" is accepted (1880-1981) TIkA-"devAH" ityetat padaM sArthakaM vyutpattimacchuddhapadatvAt, ghaTAdivat / tatra dIvyatIti devA iti vyutpattimattvam , sapAsataddhitarahi tatvena ca zuddhatvam / bhAvanA cAtra prAguktaiva / atha parasya matibhavet-nanu manuSya eveha dRzyamAno devo bhaviSyati, kigadRSTadevakalpanayA ? / kiM so'pi manuSyo devaH ? iti / na, ityAha-guNasaMpanno gaNadharAdiH, Rddhi saMpanazcakravAdiH / atrocyate-tadetad na, yasmAt tathye mukhye vastuni kvacit siddha satyanyatropacAratastatsiddhirmavA, yathA mukhye yathArtha siMhe'nyatra siddha tato mANavake siMhopacAraH sidhyati evamihApi yadi mukhyA devAH kvacit siddhA bhaveyuH tadA rAjAderdevopacAro yujyate, nAnyatheti // 332-333 / / (1880-1881) D. C.--Since the word "devan" is void of compound and prefixes, and is explained as tatra divyantite devali (those that shine there are deities). It is philologically siddhi, like other padas such as ghara etc. Maurya: --The man himself seen before our very eyes is a god. Why to imagine an invisible from that! All men are not gods. But Those accompained by high merits and religious prosperity could easily be taken as gods Bhagavana:-That is not correct. Unless and until, the principal meaning of a word is not accomplished, it could never be attributed to any other object by means of uparora The epithet of lion could easily be attributed to maravaka only if the primary sense of the word simha is accomplislied. Similarly, here also, the epithet "devah" could be attributed

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Vada ] Canadharavada 385 to king etc. only if the existence of gods is accepted, and not otherwise || 332-333 (1880-1881 ) Now, in case of existence of gods being denied, the uselessness of the rites like agnihotra etc. is shown: devAbhAve viphalaM jamaggihotsAhayANa kiriyANaM / saggIyaM jannANa ya dANAiphalaM ca tadajuntaM // 334 // (1882) Devabhave viphalam jamaggihottaiyana kiriyanam | Saggiyam jannapa ya danaiphalam ca tadajuttam ||3341 (1882) [ devAbhAve viphalaM yadagnihotrAdikAnAM kriyANAm / svargIyaM yajJAnAM ca dAnAdiphalaM ca tadayuktam // 334 // (1882) Devabhave viphalam yadagnihotradikanam kriyanam | Svargiyam yajnanam ca danadiphalam ca tadayuktam ||334||(1882)] Trans.-334 In (case of) non-existence of gods, (award of) heaven laid down (as a result) of (the accomplishment of) the rites like agnihotra etc. as well as, the fruition of munificence etc. would be null and void. (1882) TIkA- 'vA' ityathavA, idaM dUSaNam -- devAbhAve'bhyupagamyamAne yadagnihotrAdikriyANAm " agrihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH " ityAdinA svargIyaM phalamuktam, tathA, yajJAnAM ca yat phalamabhihitaM, dAnAdiphalaM ca yat samastachoke prasiddham, tat sarvamayuktaM prApnoti / svargo hyeteSAM phalamuktam, svargiNAM cAbhAve kutaH svargaH ? iti / " sa eSa yajJAyudho " ityAdIni ca vedavAkyAni devAstitvapratipAdanaparANi vartante / ataH kiM tAn na pratipadyase ? | yadyapi " ko jAnAti mAyopamAn gIrvANAnindra-yama- varuNa - kuberAdIn " ityAdi vAkyam, tadapi na devanAstitvAbhidhAyakam, kintu surANAmapi mAyopamatvAbhidhAnena zeSarddhisamudAyAnAM sutarAmanityatvapratipAdakaM boddhavyam H anyathA hi devAsvitvapratipAdakavAkyAni zrutimantra padairindrAdInAmAhAnaM cAnarthakaM syAt // 334 // (1882) " D. C.-There will be one more difficulty in case of denying the existence of gods. Because in that case, the award of 49 For Private Personal Use Only

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386 Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh heaven laid down as a result of the rites like agnihotra etc. in the sentences such as " Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah " etc. as well as, the fruition of sacrifices and meritorious deeds like dana etc prescribed in deeds like dana etc. prescribed in this world, would become absolutely futile. Thus, in absence of svargin-the inhabitant of svarga-how is svarga to exist ? Hence O Maurya ! take it for certain that sentences such as " Sa esa yajnayudhi " etc. are laid down to establish the existence of gods, while the sentence " Ko janati mayopaman girvunanindra-Yama-Varuna-Kuberadin etc. does not lead to deny the existence of gods, but it only means to assert the a-nilyata of the prosperity of gods and the rest. Otherwise, the sentences which establish the existence of guds, as well as, the invocation of gods like Indra by means of reciting the prescribed mantras, would be of no avail. 11 334 11 ( 1882 ) Moreover, jama-sAma-sUra-suraguru-sArajAINi jayai jaNNehiM / maMtAvAhaNameva ya iMdAINaM vihA savvaM // 335 // (1883) Jama-Soma-Sura-Suraguru--sarajjaini jayai jannehim Mantavahanameva ya Indainam viha savvam 11 335 ( 1883 ) [79-014-07-06-Fatouista pufa #1 AT&Taha Artetat para ll 334 11 (8668) Yama-Soma-Sura-Suraguru-svarajyadini jayati yajnaih 1 Mantrahyanameva cendradinam vritha sarvam 1 335 | ( 1883 )] Trans.--335 ( The statement that ) one conquers the regions of ( the gods of ) Death, Moon, Sun, and Brihaspati etc., and the invocation of Indra etc by reciting the preseribed mantras, would be absolutely null and void. ( 1883 ) 97="fa Luas gaffee94:-91efaudagfayeyAzruti "yama-soma-sUrya-suraguru-svArAjyAni jayati" ityAdIni devAstitvasUcakAni vedavAkyAni devAbhAve yaiva syuH| iha cokthapoDazi

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Vida ] Capadharavada 387 prabhRtayo yAvizeSA mantavyAH / sayUpo yA eva hi Rturucyate, yUparahivastu dAnAdikriyAyukto yaha iti / svaH-svargaH, tatra rAjyAni / jayati-- upAyatItyartha iti / tathA, mantrairindrAdInAmAhAnaM devAstitva evopapaMcate, anyathA uyaiva svAt / indrAdInAM mantrapadairAnamevamavagantavyam"indra ! Agaccha meghAtiye meSavRSaNa" ityAdi / tasmAd yuktito vedavAkyebhyaca "santi devA" iti sthitam / tadevaM chino mauryaputrasya bhagavatA saMzayaH // 335 // (1883) D. C-It has been laid down in the Sastras that---- * Uktha sodasz prabhtiti kralubhir yathasruti Yama-SomaSurya-Suragure-svarajyani jayati " etc. Sentences like this, lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove themselves good-for-nothing, if the existence of gods is denied. Similarly, the invocation of gods such as Indra etc. by means of mantrus, which indicate the existence of gods, would also become futile if there were devabhiva. The sentences of the l'edas establish the existence of gods in one way or the other. 1 335 // ( 1883 ). The doubt of Mauryaputra is thus removed by the preceptor. chinmammi saMsayammI jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukeNaM / so samaNo pancaio aduhehi saha khaMDiyasaehiM // 336 // (1884) Chinnammi samsayammi Jipena jara-maraqavippamukkepami So samano pavvaio addhutthehim saha khandiyasashim 133611 [chinne saMzaye jinena jarA-maraNavimamuktena / sa zramaNaH pravrajito'rdhacaturthaiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 336 // (1884) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena, Sa sramagah pravrajito'rdha caturthail saha khandikasataih 113361 Trons.---336 When doubt was removed by the Tisthankara who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted diksa along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884) End of the Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara,

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Chapter VIII assttmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara te pavvaie souM akaMpio AgacchaI jinnsgaasN| vacAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 337 // 1885 // Te pavvaie soum Akampio agacchi jigasagasam i Vaccami ya vandami vanditta pajjuvasami // 3371 (1885) [tAn pranitAn zruttvA'kampita Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 337 / / (1885) | Tan pravrajitan srutva'kampita agacchati jinasakasam i Vrajami vande vandittva paryupase // 337 // ( 1885 ) Trans.--337 Having heard that they ( 1.. Mauryaputra and others ) had renounced the world. A kampita comes before the Tirthaikara. ( He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. ( 1885 ) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNaviSpamukeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNU savvada risA gaM // 338 / / (1886) Abhattho ya Jinepam jai-jara-marapa vippamukkeyam | Namena ya gottena ya savvanu savadarisi nam 133811 (1886) [ AbhASitaca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNaviSamuktena / . nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajhena sarvadarzinA // 338 / (1886)

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Vada ] Canadharavada 389 Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-marayavipramuktena / Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina 433811 (1886)] Trans.--338 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1886 ) The Tirthafikara, then, sayski maNNe neraiyA asthi nathi tti saMsao tujjhaM / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho|| 339 // (1887) Kim manne Neraiya atthi natthi tti samsai tujjham i Veyapayana ya atthaim na yanasi tesimo attho 13391 (1887) [kiM manyase nairayikAH santi na santIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 339 // (1887) Kim manyase nairayikah santi na santiti samsayastava Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1133911 (1887)] Trans.--339 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. (But) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas Here is their (real) interpretation. (1887) TIkA--kinArakAH santi na vA ? iti tvaM mnyse| ayaM ca taba saMzayo viruddhavedapadazravaNanibandhanaH, tathAhi--" nArako vai eMSa jAyate yaH zaddhAmamanAti" ityAdi eSa brAhmaNo nArako jAyate yaHzUdrAnamanAtItyarthaH, ityAdIni vAkyAni nArakasattApratipAdakAni, "na ha vai pratya nArakAH santi" ityAdIni tu nArakAbhAvapratipAdakAni / tatraiSAM vedapadAnAmartha, ca zabdAd yuktihadarya ca tvaM na jAnAsi, yata eteSAmayaM vakSyamANo'rtha iti // 339 // (1887) D. C.-What are you thinking about ? Your doubt about the existence of Narakas is based upon your hearing the

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390 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighter various Deda-padas having contradictory senses. The Veda-padas are as follows : (1) "Narako var esa jayate yah sudrannamas'nate" etc (2) "Na ha vai pretya Narakah santi" etc. According to you, the interpretation of these sentences is this. (1) "A brahmana who eats the food of s'udras becomes a naraka" (This proves the existence of helish denizens.) (2) "In fact, there is nothing like narakas in the next world?)"In fac This proves the existence of narakas. But you have not grasped the real import of those V'eda-padas. 1133911 (1887) Here I give their full significancetaM manasi paJcakkhA devA caMdAdao tahanne vi / vijA-maMtovAyaNaphalAisiddhIe gammati // 340 // (1888) je puNa muimettaphalA neraiya tti kiha te gaheyavvA / sakkhamaNumANao vA'NuvalaMbhAbhinnajAIyA? // 341 // (1889) Tam mannasi paccakkha deva candadao tahanne vi i Vijja-mantovayanaphalaisiddhie gammanti 113401 ( 1888 ) Je puna suimettaphala Neraiya Hi kiha te gaheyayva Sakkhamanumano va'nuvalambha bhinnajaiya 13411 (1889, [svaM manyase pratyakSA devAzcandAdayastathAnye'pi / vidyA-mantropAyanaphalAdisiddhagamyate // 340 // (1888) ye punaH zrutimAtraphalA nairayikA itikarya te grahItavyAH / sAkSAdanumAnato vA'nupajammA bhimajAtIyAH? // 341 // (1889)

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Vada ] Qanadharavada 391 Tvam manyase pratyaksa devascandradayastathanye'pi , Vidya-mantropayaphaladisiddher gamyante 11 340 # ( 1888 Ye punah srutimatraphala nairayika iti katham te grahitavyah 1 Saksadanumanato va'nupalambhad bhinna jatiyah ? 43411. (1889)] Trans.-340-341 You believe that deities like moon etc, are (directly) perceptible, so also, are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing, and that belong to a distinct species, to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are (absolutely ) non-perceptible ? ( 1888-1889) ___TIkA-he AyuSmanakampita ! tvamevaM manyase-devAstAraccandrAdayaH pratyakSamamANasiddhA eva, anye svapratyakSA api vidhAmantropayAcitakAdiphachasiddhayA'numAnato gamyante, ye punaH "nArakAH" ityabhidhAnamArarUpA zrutireva phalaM yeSA, na punastadamidhAyakakSabdavyatirikto'rthaH, te sAkSAt : anumAnato vA'nupalabhyamAnatvena tiryagnarA-'marebhyaH savaryA mijA. tIyAH kathaM "santi" iti grahItavyAH, kharaviSANavat ? iti // 340341 // (1888-1889) ___D.C-Akampita:-Deities like Moon etc. are apprehended by concrete authentities, and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are Narakas that are quite diferent from gods, tiryancas and human beings, and whose existence is recognized only by hearing, to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference i // 340-341 (1888-1889 ) // The reply is maha paJcakSasaNao jIvAI ya vva nArae giha / kiM jaM sapaJcakkhaM taM paJcakkhaM navari ikaM ? // 342 / / (1890) jaM kAsaha paJcakkhaM paJcakkhaM taM pidheppai loe| jaha sIhAidarisaNaM miLU na ya sancapaJcakkhaM / / 343 / / (1891)

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392 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighth Maha paccakkhattanao jivai ya vva narae ginha | Kim jam sapaccakkham tam paccakkham navari ikkam 11342 Jam kasai paccakkham paccakkham tam pi gheppai loe | Jaha sthaidarisanam siddham na ya savvapaccakkham 1343|| | mama pratyakSatvato jIvAdizceva nArakAn gRhANa | kiM yat svapratyakSa tat pratyakSaM navaramekam ? / / 342 / / (1890) yat kasyacitmatyakSaM pratyakSaM tadapi gRhyate loke / yathA siMhAdidarzanaM siddhaM na ca sarvapratyakSam / / 343 / / (1891) Mama pratyaksatvato jivadinsceva narakan grihana | Kim yat sva-pratyaksam tat pratyaksam navaramekam? ||342||(1890) Yat kasyacitpratyaksam pratyksam tadapi grihyate loke t Yatha simhadidarsanam siddham na ca sarvapratyaksam #343||(1891) Trans. - 342-343 Accept the Narakas (as existing ) like jiva etc. on account of (their ) being pratyaksa to me. Is it that only that which is pratyaksa to one's own self (could be known as ) praiyaksa and not anything else? That which has been pratyaksa to any (person) in the world, is accepted as pratyaksa by the (whole) world. Just as the appearance of simha etc. though not pratyaksa to all, is accepted (by all as existing ). ( 1890-1891 ) TIkA - he AyuSmannakampita ! " sAkSAdanupalabhyamAnatvAt" ityasiddho hetu:, yato'haM kevalapratyakSeNa sAkSAdeva pazyAmi nArakAn tato matpratyakSatyAt " santi " iti gRhANa pratipadyasva nArakAn jIvA-'jIvAdipadArthavat / athaivaM manyase - mamA pratyakSatvAt kathametAn gRhNAmi ? / nanu durabhiprAyo'yam, yataH kiM yat svasyAtmanaH pratyakSaM tadevaikaM navaraM pratyakSamucyate ? iti kAkvA neyam / nanu yadapi kasyacit pratyayitapuruSasyAnyasya pratyakSaM tadapi " pratyakSam " iti gRhyate vyavahiyate loke; tathAhi--siMha-sarabhaM - haMsAdidarzanaM siddhaM prasiddhaM loke, na ca siMhAdayaH sarvajanapratyakSA: - For Private Personal Use Only

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393 Vada] Canadharavada deza-kAla-grAma-nagara-sarit-samudrAdayazca na sarve'pi bhavataH, pratyakSAH, atha cAnyasyApi pratyakSAste pratyakSatayA vyavahiyamANA dRzyante / ato matmatyakSA nArakAH kimiti pratyakSatayA na vyavahiyante ? iti // 342--343 // (1890- 1891) D. C.-Bhagavana :-o long-lived Akampital your objection that Narakas do not exist, because they have not been apprehended by you, is unfounded. I have perceived those Narakas personally. Accept them, therefore, as existing on account of their being pratyaksa to me, like all other objects, animate and inanimate. Secondly, it is not appropriate to hold the obstinate view that nothing can be said to be pratyaksi in this world, unless and until it has not been witnessed by yon. Usually, that which has been witnessed by a trustworthy or respectable person, is accepted as existing in this world. Existence of lion, bear, and swan etc is universally accepted by all, even though those animals have not been pratya ksu to each and every person in the world. You have not witnessed all countries, rivers, towns, oceans and times, still however, you do not doubt their existence, because they have already been pratyaksa to other respectable persons Similarly, you shall have to accept the existence of Narakas when they have already been pratyaksa to me. 11342-343. 1890-1891). ahavA jamidiyANaM paJcakha kiM tadeva paJcakkha ? / ukyAramesao taM paJcakkhamaNidiyaM tatthaM // 344 // (1892) Ahava jamindiyanam paccakkham kim tadeva paccakkham? Uvayaramettad tam paccakkhamanindiyam tattham 11 344 H (1892) [athavA yadindriyANAM pratyakSa kiM tadeva pratyakSam ? / upacAramAtratastat pratyakSamanindriyaM tathyam / / 344 // (1892) 50

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394 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth Athava yadindriyanam pratyaksam kim tadeva pratyaksam ? I Upacaramatratrastat pratyaksamanindriyani tathyam 134411 (1892)] Trans.--344 Or, is it that what is preceptible to senses, is alone pratya ksa ? It is pratyaksa by virtue of ( mere ) usuage. The real pratyaksa is beyond ( the peroeption of ) senses. ( 1892 ) ____TIkA -athavA, ki yadindriyANAM pratyakSaM tadeva pratyakSamiSyate bhavatA, madIyaM tu pratyakSaM nAbhyupagamyate, atIndriyatvAt / nanu mahAnayaM viparyAsaH, yasmAdupacAramAtrata eva tadindriyapratyakSaM pratyakSatayA vyavahiyate-yathA'numAne bAsadhUmAdiliGgadvAreNa . bAhyamagnAdivastu bAyate, naivamatra, tata upacArAt pratyakSamiva * pratyakSamucyate / paramArthatastuidamapi parokSameva, yato'kSo jIvaH, sa cAnumAnavadatrApi vastusAkSAd na pazyati, kinvindriyadvAreNaiva, tato'tIndriyameva tathyaM pratyakSamavagantavyam, tatra jIvena sAkSAdeva vastuna upalambhAditi // 344 // (1892) D. C --Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is indriya pratyaksa is pratyksa This is a great foly. Indriya-pratyaksa is recognized as pratyaksr by means of upacara, similar to the case of auumana, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc. But the pratyaksa in my .case, is different from this. By means of mere upacara it is called pratyksa, but really speaking, it is paroksa as the ciksa ( i-e jivo ) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of anumana. The atidriya or that which is beyond perception by (means of ) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as pratyaksa as in that case, jiva directly perceives the object. Akampita:-~-Athough in case of indriya-pratyaksa, jiva does not apprehend an object directly, indriyas are oudoudtedly able to recognize the object directly in such a case, why should we not consider indriya-pratya ksa to be the pratyaksa itself ! // 344 ( 1892 ) /

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Vada ] Ganadharavada muttAibhAvao novaladdhimaM tidiyAI kuMbho / uvalaMbhaddArANi tAiM jIvo tadubaladvA // 345 || (1893) Muttaibhavao novaladdhimantindiyaim kumbho vva Uvalambhaddarani taim jivo taduvaladdha | 345 // ( 1893 ) [mUrtAdibhAvato nopalabdhimantIndriyANi kumbha iva / upalambhadvArANi tAni jIvastadupalabdhA / / 345 / / (1893) Murtadibhavato nopalabdhimantindriyani kumbha iva Upalambhadvarani tani jivastadupalabha | 345 / / ( 1893 ) } On Traus.---Sense organs have no power of perception account of ( their being ) mirta etc., like ghata. They are mere mediums of perception. Jiva is their ( real ) agent of perception. ( 1893 ) TIkA - nopalabdhimantIndriyANi-na vastujJAyakAnItyarthaH, pugaLasaMghAta - rUpatvena mUrtatvAt, AdizabdAdacetanatvAt, kumbhavat / navaramupalambhasya zrotrAdijJAnasya dvArANi bhavantyamuni, gavAkSavat, tatsApekSasyaiva kSayopazamasya prabodhAt / jIva eva ca tadupalabdhA vastupalabdhA / / 345 / / (1893) 395 D. C.-Since indriyas are murta and a-cetana like ghata, they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is Atma which is altogether different from indriya in this 345 ( 1893 ) | way Besides, duvarame visaraNao tavAvAre vi novalaM bhAo / iMdibhinno nAyA paMcagavakkhovalA vA // 346 / / (1894) Taduvarame vi saranao tavvavare vi novalambhao Indiyabhinno naya pancagavakkhovaladdha va | 346 // ( 1894 ) [ taduparame'pi smaraNatastadvayApAre'pi nopalambhAt / indriyabhibho jJAtA pazcagavAkSopalabdheva // 346 / / (1894)

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396 Jinabhadra Gani's The eighth Taduparame'pi smaranatastadvyapare'pi nopalambhati Indriyabhinno jnata pancagavaksopalabdheva 1134611 (1894)] Trans.-346 By virtue of recollection, even (when the sense-organs) are pacified, and on account of non-perception, even (when the sense-organs) are at work, the agent of perception is (recognized) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows. (1894) TIkA-indriyebhyo bhinno "nAyA ti" jJAtA jIva taduparame'pI indriyoparame'pi tad dvAropalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt, tadvayApAre'pIndviyavyApAre 'pyanyamanaskatAyAmanupalambhAt; yathA* paJcamirgavAkSarupalabdhA vastupalambhakastebhyo bhinna iti // 346 / / (1894) ____D. C. Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the Soul which is the agent of perception, is different from the sense-organs. Because, even when indriyas are not at work, the Soul is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the Soul is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived inspite of indriyas being at work. // 346 (1894) / / Moreover, jo puNa aNidiu ciya jIvo sbcpihaannvigmaao| so subahayaM viyANai avaNIyagharo jahA dahA // 347 // (1895) Jo puna aoindiu cciya jivo savvappihanavigamao / So subahuyam viyanai avaniyagharo jaha dattha // 347 // (1895) [yaH punaranindriya eva jIvaH sarvapidhAnavigamAt / sa mubahukaM vijAnAtyapanItagRho yathA draSTA // 347 // (1895) Yah punaranindriya eva ji vah sarvapidhanavigamati Sa subahukam vijanatyapanitagriho yatha drasta 0 347 // (1895)] Trans ----347 The Soul, like an observer who is away from the louse, being void of sense-organs, apprehends much more on account of all the obstructions (being) removed (1895)

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397 Vada) Gagadharavada TIkA-ya punaranindriya eva kevalajJAnasaMpano jIvaHsa indriyajJAnavato jIvAt mubahu vijJAnAtIti pratijJA, sarvapidhAnavigamA sarvAvaraNa kSayAdityarthaH, yathA paJcagavAkSagRhasthitapuruSAt sarvathA'panItagRhaH sarvata evA''kAzIkRtamadeze sthito draSTA puruSa iti // 347 / / (1895) __D. C.--Just as a person looking from the open space, apprehends much more than a person looking from the five windows, the Soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprenends through indrijas. // 347 (1895) // And the jnana obtained by indriyas in this way, is not pratyaksam na hi paJcakkhaM dhammatareNa tddhmmmettghnnaao| kayagattao va sidrI kuMbhANiJcattamettassa // 348 // (1896) Na hi paccakkham dhammantarena taddhanmamettagahayao , Kayagattao va siddhi kumbhaniccattamettassa 1 348 11 (1896) [na hi pratyakSa dharmAntareNa taddharmamAtragrahaNAt / kRtakatvata iva siddhiH kummAnityatvamAtrasya / / 348 / / (1896) Na hi pratyaksam dharinantarena taddharmamatragrahanati Kritakatvata iva siddhih kumbhanityatvamatrasya 11348 i (1896)] Trans.---348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of ghata on account of its being factitious, the indriya-pratyaksa, is not pratg aksa (also), on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. (1896 TokA-na bhavati pratyakSam "indriyajaM jJAnam" iti makramAllabhyate / cakSurAdIndriyasya rUpAdiparicchedazaktivizeSarUpeNa dharmAntareNa hetubhUtena tasyAnantadharmAtmakasya vastuno yad rUpAdikamekaM dharmamAtraM tasya grahaNAditi hetuH| kiM tad yathA na pratyakSam ? ityAha-yathA kRtakatvAd ghaTAnityatvamAtrasiddhilakSaNamanumAnamityeSa dRssttaantH| iha ca yathA parasthAt sAdhyasidau

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398 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth nAnumAnaM pratyakSam, tapendriyajamapi vijJAnamityetAvAn bhAvArya iti // 348 // (1896) D. C.-Just as anumana capable of attaining the accomplishment of a desired object by means of another object, cannot be called pratyaksa jnana, so also, apprehension by means of indriyas, could not be called pratyaksa. Like an inference establishing the anityata of ghata by means of its kliakatva, cognizance attained by indriyas is not pratyaksa. Indriya pratyaksajana is limited to the apprehension of only rupa etc. by means of eye etc. // 348 ( 1896 ) // Besides. punvocaladdhasaMbaMdhasaraNao vAnalo vvaM dhUmAo / ahava nimitsaMtarao nimittamakkhassa. karaNAI // 349 // (1897) Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranan vanalo vva dhumao | Ahava nimittantarao nimittamakkhassa karanaim ||349n (1897) [purvolabdhasaMbandhasmaraNato vA'nala iva dhUmAt / athavA nimittAntarato nimittamakSasya karaNAni // 349 // (1897) Purvopalabdhasambandhasmaranato va'nala iva dhumati Athava nimittantarato nimittamaksasya karagani 1349N (1897, Trans.---349 Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, on account of the recollection by means of (its) relations of the past or on account of any (other) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the Soul. ( 1897) TIkA-"vA" ityathavA, na pratyakSamindriyajaM zAnamiti seva pratikSA, pUrvopasandhazcAsau saMbandhazca pUrvopalabdhasaMpandhastatsmaraNAjApamAnatvAt amAdamakamAnavatA tathAhi-"ghaTo'yaM, pUrvasaMketakAla evaMbhUta eva padArthe pratyakitAmiApuruSAd ghaTasaMketasya mayA gRhItatvAt" iti pUoNpalabdhasaMbandhasmaraNAdeva sarvasyApi ghaTAdigrAhakamindriyahAnapanAyate; anyathA tAlikerIpASA

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Vada ] Ganadharavada yAtasyApyavizeSeNaitat syAt / abhyAsa - pATavAdibhyazcAzukAritayaidrinyajJAnapravRtteH sarvatraitad na lakSyata iti / athavA, pratyakSamindriyajaM jJAnam, pUrvapratipAditamyutparayA'kSasya jIvasya svavyatiriktanimittavizeSAjjAyamAnatvAt, dhUmAdagnijJAnavat / svavyatiriktAni ca nimittAnyakSasya jIvasya karaNA nIndriyANi mantavyAni / yacca pratyakSaM na tajjIvasya nimittAnvarAjjAyate fang fazasi menda da qafa, nursafi-qa: qufa-sasjJAneSviti / / 349 / / (2897) D. C.-Like the perception of fire from smoke, the perception duc to sense-organs, is also produced from the recollection of the connections of the past. So, it is not pratyaksa. Take the example of ghata. The name ghata was given to it in the past We recognize it as ghata on the basis of its purvaka!a sanketa. Hence, the knowledge about ghata is apprehended by means of indriyas from the recollection of its past relations. If it were not so, a person coming from a distant island, who has neither heard nor seen anything about ghata, would at once be able to recognize it as ghata. This sort of indriya-jnana is produced very quickly from rellection etc. due to constant practice and cleverness, and hence, it is not marked everywhere. Moreover, just as one apprehends agni from dhuma which is absolutely different from himself, the apprehension in this case, is also attained by Soul from the indriyas, which are absolutely different from the Soul, showing thereby that the knowledge thus obtained is not pratyaksa but paroksa. 399 Pratyaksa jnana is acceptible to Soul directly like the Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala-jnanas and it is never I. The first stage of perception when the attention is concentrated, 2. The state of mer tal perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge. Absolute Perception. 3. For Private Personal Use Only

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400 linabhadra (ani's [The eighth obtained by the Soul from any external nimitta. All sorts of jnana except the above-mentioned three, are mere anumanas as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of jnanas like Avadhi etc, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called pratyaksa. phevala-maNo-hirahiyassa savvamaNumANamettayaM jamhA / nAragasambhAvammi ya tadathi je teNa te saMti // 350 // (1898) Kevala-Mano-hirahiyassa savvamanumanamettayam jamha i Naragasabbhavammi ya tadatthi jam tena te santi 11350+ (1898) [ kevaTa-mano-'vadhirahitasya sarvamanumAnamAtrakaM yasmAt / narakasadbhAve ca tadasti yat tena te santi // 350 / / (1898) Kevala-Mano-'vadhiralitasya sarvamanumanamatrakam yasmadi Naraksadbhave ca tadasti yat tena te santi || 35011 (1893)] Trans.--350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of Kevala, Manah- paryaya and Avadhi ( sorts of jnana ) is mere inference, it is (present) in case of (establishing) the exfitence of hellish denizens. By (virtue of) that ( anumana ), the Narakas are existing. (1898) ___TIkA-kevala-manaHparyAyA-'vadhijJAnarahitasya pramAtuH saMbandhi sarva. mapi jJAnaM yasmAdanumAnamAtrameva, parokSArthaviSayatvAt / kevalAdijJAnatrayaM tu vastusAkSAtkAritvAt pratyakSam / tadevamanumAnaM pratyakSAM ca yasmAd nArakasadbhAve sAdhye vidyata eva, tena te nArakA santIti pratipadyasva / tatra pratyakSaM madIyameva kevalajJAnam / / 350 // (1898) D. C.-Every sort of knowlege excepting Avadi-Manah paryaya and Kevala is mere anumant on account of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. Iranas like Kevala etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called praty&ksi. Since the anumina pertaining to Narakas,

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Vada Janadharavada 401 is pratyaksa, the existence of Narakas is established without doubt The pratyaksu jnana, in this case, is my own Kevalajnana 11350. (1898) / pAvaphalassa pagidussa bhoiNo kammao'vasesa vva / santi dhuvaM te'bhimayA neraiyA, aha maI hojjA / / 351 // (1899) acatthadukkhiyA je tiriya-narA-nAraga tti te'bhimayA / taM na jaosurasokkhappagarisasarisaM na taM dukkhaM // 352 // (1900) Pavaphalassa pagitthassa bhoino kamma'ovasesa vva i Santi dhuvam te'bhimaya neraiya, aha mai hojja 11351|| (1899) Accatthadukkhiyaje tiriya-nara-naraga tti te bhimaya | Tam na jao surasokkhappagarisasarisam na tam dukkham 1135211 [pApaphalasya prakRSTasya moginaH karmato'vazeSa iva / santi dhruvaM te'bhimatA naiMgyikAH, atha matibhavet // 351 // (1899) atyarthaduHkhitA ye tiryag-narA-nArakA iti te'bhimtaaH| tad na yataH surasaukhyaprakarSasadRzaM na tad duHkham // 352 // (1900) Papaphalasya prakristhasya bhoginan karmato'vasesa iva i Santi dhruvam te'bhimata nairayikah atha matir-bhavet 1135111 (1899) Atyarthaduhkhita ye tiryag-nara-naraka iti te bhimatahi Tad na yatan surasaukhyaprakarsasadrisam na tad duhkham|3521] ____ Trans.-351-352 Liko (the enjoyers of) the rest of Karmas, there are ( certainly ) some who ( have to suffer) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell Here, it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable tirjancas and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, (their) miseries are not, as extreme as the happiness of gods. (1899)-1900) TIkA-prakRSThasya pApaphalasya bhoginaH kecid dhruvaM santi "kammau ti" 51

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402 Jinabhadra Ciani's [ The eighth karmaphalatvAt tasyetyarthaH, avazeSavaditi -yathA jaghanyamadhyamapApaphalabhoginaH zeSAstiyaG-narA vidyanta ityartha dRSTAnta / " te'bhibhayA neraiya ti" ye prakRSTapApaphalabhoginaste 'nArakAH" ityabhimatAH / atha parasyaivaMbhUtA matibhaSet-atyartha duHkhitA ye tiryag-manuSyAsta evotkRSTapApaphalabhogitvAd kArakavyapadezabhAjo bhaviSyanti, kima dRSTanArakakalpanayA ? iti / tadetad na, yato'tiduHkhitAnAmapi tiryag-manuSyANAM yad duHkhaM tadamarasaukhyamakarSasadRzaprakarSavad na bhavati / idamuktaM bhavati-yeSAmutkRSTapApaphalabhogasteSAM saMbhavadbhiH sarvairapi prakArairduHkhena bhavitavyam, na caivamatiduHkhitAnAmapi tiryagAdInAM dRzyate, Aloka-tarucchAyA-zItapavana-sarit-saraH-kUpajalAdisukhasyAti duHkhiteSvapi teSu darzanAt-chedana-bhedana-pAcana-dahana-dambhana bajra-kaNTakazilAsphAlanAdibhizca narakapramiddhaiH prakArairduHkhasyAdarzanAt, ityAdi prAgutAnusAreNa svayamevAbhyUdya vAvyamiti / bhAgamArthacAyamavagantavya iti / satatamanubaddhamuktaM dukhaM narakeSu tIvrapariNAmam / tiyazuSNa-bhaya-kSut-tahAdiduHkhaM sukhaM cAlpam // 1 // sukha-duHkhe manujAnAM manaHzarIrAzraye bhuviklpe| mukhameva tu devAnAmalpaM duHkhaM tu manasi bhavam // 2 // iti / / 351-352 / / (1899-1000) / D. C.-Bhagavana:.--Just as, there are tiryancas and manusyas to enjoy the fruits of moderate sins, there do exist some who have to suffer the consequences of great sins. And take it for certain that they are none but Narakas. Akampita; -Since the excessively miserable tiryaneas. and manus vas have to undergo the consequences of great sins, wliy not to take them as Narakas Bhagavana:--It is not so. Sufferers of the consequences of great sins ought to be miserable in all respects, Tiryancas, and manush's cannot be said to be miserable in all respects as required in case of Neirakas. They are

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vada ] Ganadharavada 403 entitled to various means of pleasure like light. shades of a tree cool-breeze, river, and streain etc. On the oiher hand, varirous fiorrors of nell such as those of being killed, pierced, cooked, burnt, pressed, and dashed againsi stone-slabs are not experienced by tiryauca: or miinus jas Only Nuak:s are doomed to undergo such afflictions. It should be noted in the igamas also that: -- Salatamanubadhamuktam dunkhain varakesu livraparinamami Tiryaksusna-bhaya-ksut-tridadidukham sukhani calpam 111 Sukh-duhkha manujanain manah - Sarirasraye bahuvikalpe i Sukhameva tu devanamalpam dunkham tu mansi bhava n 211 [ Narakas have always to undergo the afflictions of excessive effects. Tiryanias have greater proportion of afilictions like incat, fear, hunger, and thrist etc and smaller proportion of happiness; manus yas have pleasures and pains ( almost in equal proportion) pertaining to body and mind while gods have absolute happiness and very Itttle misery ) 1 351-352 ( 1899-1900) 11 saccaM cedamakaMpiya ! maha vayaNAo'vasesavayaNaM va / savaNNuttaNao vA aNumayasavaNNuvayaNaM va // 353 // (1901) Saccam cedamakampiya ! maha vayanao'vasesavayanam vai SavvaNGNGuttanao va anumayasavvanguvayanam va 11 353 11 ( 1901 ) [satyaM cedamakampita ! mama vacanAdavazeSavacanamiva / hardt ITSE Taartaafu il 343 11 (308) Satyam cedamakampita ! mama vacanadavasesavacanamivai Sarvajnatvato vanumatasarvajnavacanamiva || 353 !( 1901 ; ) Trans.-353 This is true. O Akampita ! because it is my statement. Or, ( it is true ) like other statements. Or, by virtue of ( my ) all-knowing faculty, ( it is true ) like the statement of an authorized omniscient. ( 1901 )

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404 Jinabhadra Gani's Line eignur TIkA-" nArakAH santi" iti satyamakampita ! idam, macanAt, yathA'vazeSaM tvatsaMzayAdiviSayaM madvacanam / athavA, "sarvavacanatvAt" ityevaM heturvaktavyaH, tvadanumatamanu-jaiminyAdisarvajJavacanavaditi / / 353 // (1901) D. C.-Accept the statemynt the Narakas exist as true, 0 Akampita ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statments like those regarding your dobuts etc, or, because it is the statem:nt of an omniscient as great as your high-esteemed Manu, Jainini etc. 1 353 (1901) # bhaya-rAga-dAsa-mohAbhAvAo saJcamaNaivAiM ca / sacaM ciya me vayaNaM jANayamajjhatthavayaNaM va / / 354 // (1902 ) Bhaya-raga-dosa-mohabhavao Saccamanaivaim ca l Saccam ciya me vaynam janayamajjhattha vayanam va // 354 // [ bhaya-rAga-dveSa-mohAmAvAt satyamanatipAti ca / satyameva me vacanaM zAyakamadhyasthavacanamiva // 35 // (1902) Bhaya-raga-dvesa-mohabhavat satyamanatipati ca | Satyameva me vacanam !nayakamadhyasthavacanamiva 113541 (1902)] ___ Trans.- 354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from fautls like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion, and infatuation (in me). (1902,7 kiha savaNNu tti maI pacakkhaM savvasaMsayaccheyA ! bhaya-rAga-dosarahio taliMgAbhAvAA somma ! // 355 / / (1903) Kiha savvappu tti mai paccakkham savvasamsayaccheya | Bhaya-raga-dosarahio tallingabhavao Somma! 1 355 11 (1903) [ kayaM sarvajJamatiH pratyakSa sarvasaMzayacchedAt / maya-rAga-doSarahitastalijAbhAvataH saumya ! // 355 // (1903) IVide V. 1578.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 405 Katham saravajna iti matin pratyaksam saravasamsayacchedati Bhaya-raga-dosarahitastallings-bhavatah Sauinya // 355 // (1903)] Trans.-355 You might ask "How are you to be (accepted as) omnisicient ?" "Evidently because, I remove all doubts, and because I am free from even the symptoms of the faults such as fear, attachment etc." (1903) TIkA-iyamaSi vyAkhyAtArthA / yadapi " na ha vai pratya nArakAH santi" ityAdau nArakAbhAvaH zaGkayate bhavatA, tadapyayuktam, yato'yamaMtrAmipAyo mantavyaH-na khalu pretya paraloke mervAdivacchAzvatAH kecanApyavasthitA nArakAH santi, kintu ya ihotkRSTapApamarjayati, sa ito gatvA pretya nArako bhavati, ataH kenApi tatpApaM na vidheyaM yena metya nArakai bhuuyte| tadevaM chinnastatsaMzayo bhagavatA / / 355 / / (1903) ___D. C.- If you doubt my sarvajnatva, O Saumya! you are not justified. For, since I have removed all your doubts and am prepared to remove them at present if you entertain any, I am sarvajina. Moreover, in the sentences such as "Na ha vai prteya narakah santi" etc you have suspected the existence of Narakas. But it is not so. The import of those sentences is that there are no Narakas everlasting like Meru etc. in the other world, but those who commit great sins in this world, would, become Narakas in the next world. The sentences, therefore, mean to assert that no body should commit such sins lest they might become the denizens of hell after death, The Bhagavana thus removed his doubts 11 355 (1903) || So, chimammi saMsayammI jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukkeNa / / so samaNo pavvaio tihi o saha khaMDiyasaehi // 356 // (1904) Chinnami samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam ! So samano pavvaio tithi o saha khandiyasaehim 11 356 11 (1904)

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406 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighth [feet mt foretat pre-aufanymont II *HT: gafapafTFIT alustaa: 1 348 11 ( 8808) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maraqavipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khantikasataih 1135611 (1904)] Irans.-365 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diks along with his three hundred pupils. (1904) End of the Viscnssion with the Eight Ganadhara. M

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Chapter IX nvmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Nineth Ganadhara te pavvaie souM ayalabhAyA AgacchaI jinsgaa| vacAmi Na vaMdAmI baMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 357 // 1905 / / Te pavvaie soum Ayalabhaya agacch Jinaaisagasair. Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami #357 H (1905) [tAn matrajitAn zrutvA'calabhrAtA Agati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande banditvA paryupAse / / 357 / / (1905) Tan pravrajitan srutva'calabhrata agacchati jinasakasam i Vrajami vande vandittva paryupase (1357 11 ( 1905 ) Trans.---357 Having heard that they had renounced the world. Atalabhrata comes before the Tirthaikare. ( He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1905) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya goteNa ya savvaNNU savvadarisA NaM // 358 / / (1906) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana-vipparmulkenam | Namena ya gottena ya savvanu savvadarisi nam 135811 (1906) [AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavimamuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadasinA // 358 // (1906) Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jarz-- Taranavipramuktena i Namna ca gotrena ca sar ajnena sarvadarsina // 3581 (1906)]

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408 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninett. Trans --358 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1906) The Tirthankara, thell, saidkiM maNNe puNNa-pAce asthi natthi tti saMsao tujjhN| veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho / / 359 // (1907) Kim manne Punna-patti atthi natthi sansai tujjhami Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho 1135911 (1907) [kiM manyase puNya-pApe sto na sta iti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH / / 359 // (1907) Kim manyase Punya-pape sto na sta iti samsayastava Vedapadaram cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1135911 (1907)] Trans.-359 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. But (ca) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1907) TIkA-he AyuSmanacalabhrAtaH ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM puNya-pApe sto na vA ? iti / ayaM cAnucitaH saMzayaH, yasmAd viruddhavedapadanibandhano viruddhadarzanazrutinibandhanazca tava vartate / patra vedapadAni tAvat-"puruSa evedaM gni sarvam -ityAdi yathA dvitIyagaNadhare tathA vAcyAni / teSAM cArtha tvaM na jAnAsItyAdhapi tathaiva vyAkhyeyamiti // 359 // (1907) D. C.-Your doubt about the existence of punya and bapa is not justified. It is based on your hearing the sentence of Vedas bearing contradictory senses. The sentences are such as " Purusa evecran gnim sarvam" etc. which have already been mentioned in the Second Gandharavada. You have not grasped the real interpretation of those sentences. I therefore, give their real interpretation, as under:- // 359 ( 1907 ) //

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Vad ] Ganadarravada 409 maNNasi puNNaM pAvaM sAhAraNamahava do bhinnaaii| hoja na vA kammaM ciya sabhAvao bhavapavaMco'yaM // 360 // (1908) Mannasi pungam pavam saharanamahava do vi bhinnaimi Hojja na va kammam ciya sabhaavao bhavapavanco'yam // 360 // [manyase puNyaM pApaM sAdhAraNamathavA dve api bhine / bhaved na vA karmaiva svabhAvato bhavapazco'yam // 360 // (1908) Manyase punyam papam sadharanamathava dve api bhinne i Bhaved na va karmaiva svabhavato bhavaprapanco'yam 1136011(1908) Trans.-- 360 Do you think punya alone or papa alone to exit ? Or, ( do you think them to be ) common, or even differdnt ? Or, is it that Karma itself be absent, and the expan sion of the whole of mundane world be natural ? ( 1908 ) ___TIkA-iha keSAJcit tIthikAnAmayaM pravAdaH-"puNyamevaikamasti na paapm"| anye tvAhuH-"pApamevaikamasti na tu puNyam" apare tu vadanti"ubhayamapyanyonyAnuviruddhasvarUpaM mecakamaNikalpaM saMmizrasukha-duHkhAkhyaphalahetuH sAdhAraNaM puNyapApAkhyamekaM vastu" iti ! anye tu pratipAdayanti-svatantramubhayaM viviktasukha-duHkhakAraNaM "hoja ti" bhavediti / anye punarAhuH"mUlataH kabha~va nAsti, svabhAvasiddhaH sarvo'pyayaM jgtmpshc:"| atastvamapyetAn paJcavikalpAn manyase / eteSAM ca vikalpAnAM parasparaviruddhatvAt saMzayadoLAmAruDho'si tvamiti // 360 / / (1908) D. C.---There are five different theories about the existence of punya and papa as stated below: (1) There exists punya alone, and the there is nothing Itke papa. (1) There exist papa alone, and there is nothing like pnnya. (3) Punya and papa which happen to be the causes of sukha and duhkha respectively, exist in a coinblned state like a dark-blue jewel. 52

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410 Jinabhadra Gani's (4) Punya and papa are absolutely other. [ The nineth independent of each (5) There is nothing like Karma at all. The expansion of this mundane world is not due to Karma, but it is natural. Now, since you liave listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about panya and papa. || 360 // (1908) Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows:puNNukarisse tubhayA taratamajogAvagarisao haagii| tasseva gvae moragbo patyAhArovamANAo // 361 // (1909) Punnukkarisse subhaya taratamajogavagarisao hani i Tasseva khae mokkho pattharovamanai // 361 // (1909) [puNyotkarSe zubhatA taratamayogApakarSato hAniH / tasyaiva kSaye mokSaH pathyAhAropamAnAt / / 361 // (1909) Punyotkarse subhata taratamayogapakarsato hanik Tasyaiva ksaye moksah pathyaharopamanat 11 361 11 (1909)} Trans.--361 With the (gradual, rise in punyas, welfare (is obtained). With the gradual diminution, there is destruction. Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed, there is (complete) liberation. (1909) TIkA-punAtIti puNyaM tasyotkarSalezato lezatazca vRddhau zubhatA bhavati, mukhasyApi kramazo vRddhirbhavati tAm, yAvadutkRSTaM svargamukhamityarthaH / tasyaiva puNyasya tara-tamayogApakarSato hAniH sukhasya-duHkhaM bhavati / ida muktaM bhavati-yathA yathA puNyamapavIyate tathA tathA jIvAnAM krameNa duHkhamutpadyate, yAvat sarvaprakarSAptaM narakaduHzvam / tasyaiva ca puNyasya sarvathA kSape mokSa iti| etacca sarva pathyAhAropamAnAd bhaavniiym| tathAhi-yathA

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411 Vada ] Canadharavada pathyAhArasya krameNa vRddhAvArogyavRddhistathA puNyavRddhau sukhaddhiH, yayA ca pathyAhArasya krameNa parihAre sarogatA marati, evaM puNyApacaye duHkhotpattiH, sarvathA pathyAhAraparihAre ca maraNavat puNyakSaye mokSa iti // 361 // (1909) exists and D. C.-The first case-viz, that punya alone there is nothing like papamis discussed as follows: That which purifies is called punya. With the gradual increase in punya, there is a gradual rise in happiness also, leading unltimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand, when there is a gradual decrease in punya, happiness also decreases and gradually begings to turn into misery, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally, when there is entire diminution of punya, Jiva attains complete liberation, 2. e, it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet. Just as, by the gradual increase in whosesome diet, one becomes niore and more healthy, so also, by the gradual eminence of punyas, there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand, just as, when the wholesome diet is abanonded, the disease re-enters the body, and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of punya, there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately, by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely, one dies away. In the same way, by the entire destruction of punya, jiva attains complete liberation from this world. 11 361 11 (1909) Taking the second theory of pupa, the author explains:-- pAyukarise'hamayA taratamajogAvagarisao subhayA / armata e Hire 37 t hiopsit 382 11 (9880) Pavukkarise'hamaya tratamajogavagarisao subhaya | Tasseva' khae mokkho apatthabhattovamanao | 362 11 (1910)

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412 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The nineth [ pApotkarSa'dhamatA taratamayogApakarSataH zubhatA / tasyaiva bhaye mokSo'pathyabhaktopamAnAt // 362 // ( 1910 ) Papotkarse'dhamata taratamayogapakarsatah subyata ! Tasyaiva ksaye mokso'pathyabhaktopamanat 1 362 i ( 1910), Trans.--362 In ( case of ) the increase in papa, there is vileness; with gradual diminution ( of it ); ( there is ) welfare; and as in the case of the unwholesome diet, there is ( complete ) liberation ( of the siva ) when it is absolutely destroyed. (1910) TIkA-ihApathyAhAropamAnAd vaiparItyena bhAvanA kAryA / tathAhiyathA krameNApathyavaddhau rogavRddhiH, tathA pAMzayatyAtmAnaM malinayatIti pApaM, tasya vRddhau mukhadirUpA'dhamatA mantavyA-krameNa dukhaM vardhate, yAvadutkRSTaM nArakaduHkham / yathA cApathyatyAgAt krameNArogyavRddhiH, tathA krameNa pApasyApakarSAt mukhasya vRddhiH, yAvadutkRSTaM surasaukhyam / yathA cApathyAhArasya sarvathA parityAgAt paramArogyamupajAyate, evaM sarvapApakSaye mokSa iti // 362 / / (1910) D. C.-Those, who believe that there exists papa alone, and nothing like punya, put forward the same argument, but in a reverse manner. According to them, just as disease develop.s with the increase in unwholesome diet, vileness in the from of miseries etc., also increases with the eminence of sins, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. On the other haud, when the unwholesome food is being gradually given up, there is a graduat recovery of health. Similarly, by the gradual diminution of sins, there is a gradual re-generation of happiness leading ultimately to Salvation. Lastly, just as complete health is regained at the complete abandonment of the unwholesome food, there is complete attainment of moksa, when the sins are completely removed. // 362 // ( 1910 ). Now, a third belief that punya and papa exist as sadharana, is explained:

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 413 sAhAraNavaNNAdi va aha sAhAraNamahegamattAe / ukkarisA-vagarisao tasseva ya puNNapAvakkhA // 363 // (1911) Saharanavannadi va aha saharanamahegamattae, Ukkarisa-vagarisao taseva ya punapavakkha | 363 // ( 1911 ) [ sAdhAraNavarNAdIvAtha sAdhAraNamathaikamAtrayA / utkarSA-'pakarSatastasyaiva ca puNyapApAkhyA / / 363 // (1911) Sadharanavarcadivatha sadharanamathaikamatraya Utkarsa-'pakarsatastasyaiva ca punyapaptakhya in 363 // ( 1911 ) / Trans.-363 Like joint-syllables etc, i punya and papa ) are combined with each other as one. And, by reason of eminence or diminution of it, it is known as punys or pipa ( respectively ) ( 1911 ) TIkA-" aha sAhAraNamiti " atha sAdhAraNa saMkIrNapuNyapApAkhyaM vastu bhAvyata ityarthaH / kathaMbhUtaM punaridamavagantavyam ? ityAha-" sAhAraNavaNNAdi va ti" yathA sAdhAraNaM tulyaM haritAlagulikAdInAmanyataranmIlitaM varNakadvayam AdizabdAd yathA mecakamaNi', narasiMhAdirvA, tathedamapi puNya pApAkhyaM saMkIrNamekaM vastvityarthaH / nanu yadhekaM vastvidam, tahiM puNyaM pApaM ceti parasparavirodhivastuviSayamAkhyAdvayaM kathaM labhate ? ityAha- ahegamattAe ityAdi " atha tasyaivaikasya saMkIrNapuNyapApAkhayasya vastuna ekayA puNyamAtrayA-ekena puNyAMzenetyarthaH, utkarSato vRddho satyAM puNyAkhyA pravartate; ekayA tu pApamAtrayA-ekena pApAMzenetyarthaH, utkarSato vRddhau satyA pApAkhyA mavartate / apakarSe'pi puNyAMzasya pApAkhyA pravartate, pApAMzasya tvapakarSe puNyAkhyA prati iti // 363 // ( 1911) D. C.-The theory is that papr and ponya are not separate entities, but they are infused with each other as one like the two syllables joined together as one. Like a base metal of haritalu or indigo, wherein there is always one object mixed with two colours or like, the A1 ecaka jewel or Narasimha etc,

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414 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth one rises punya bapa is also a mixed entity. Here, if some the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names-papa and punya? The answer laid down by them is this - On account of the increase in the constituent punya of the punja-pafa entity, the name punya is given, while with the diminution of the constituent punya, the entity is called papa. I Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of papa it is called papa and vice versa. So, punya japa is and only one entity and does not exist separately | 363 // (1911) one Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows:--- evaM ciya do bhinnAI hoja, hojja va sabhAvao ceva / bhavasaMbhUI, bhaNNai na sabhAvAo jao'bhimao || 364 || (1912) hojja sahAvo vatyuM nikkAraNayA va vatthudhammo vA ? | jai vatyuM Natthi tao'NuvaladvIo khapuSpaM ca / / 365 // (1913) Evam ciya do bhinnaim hojja, hojja va sabhavao ceva | Bhavasambhut, bhannai na sabhavao jao 'bhimao || 364 / / (1912) Hojja sahavo vatthum nikkaranaya va vatthudhammo va ? Jai vatthum natthitao'nuvaladdhio khapuppham va || 355 (1913) [ evameva dve bhinne bhavetAM, maved vA svabhAvata eva / mavasaMbhUtiH, bhaNyate na svabhAvad yato'bhimataH / / 364 / / (1912) mavet svabhAvo vastu niSkAraNatA vA vastudharmo vA ? | yadi vastu nAsti sako'nupalabdheH khapuSpamiva / / 365 / / (1913) Evameva dve bhinne bhavetam, bhaved va svabhavata eva Bhavasambhutih, bhanyate na svabhavad yato 'bhimatah // 364 Bhavet svabhavo vastu niskaranata va vastudharmo va? | Yadi vastu nasti sako'nupalabdhek khapuspamiva || 365 / / (1913) ]

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Vada ] Canadharavada 415 Trans.-364-365 Similarly, ( some would believe that ) both are different (from each other), or that the production of the mundane world would be due to (nothing else but its) soabhava only In reply to that, it is said that the prodution of the inundane world) by virtune of (its, svabhava, is not beilvable. And, Is that svabhava a (definite) object ? or causelessness (itself) ? or the property of an object ? If (it is taken as) an object, it is not an object, because it is non-apprehensible like a kha-puspa (1912-1913) TIkA-evameva keSAzcid matena dve api bhinne svatantra syAtAM puNyapApe, tatkAryabhUtayoH sukha-duHkhayoyauMgapardhanAnubhavAbhAvAt / ato'nenaivabhinnakAryadarzanena tatkAraNabhUtyoH puNya-pApayonitA'numIyata iti / "hojja vetyAdi" athavA svabhAvata eva vinApi puNya-pApAbhyAM bhavasaMbhUtiH-bhavavaicitryasya saMbhavaH kaizvidiSyate / tadevaM darzitAH paJcApi puNya-pApaviSayA vikalpAH / etaizva bhramitamanomiH saMzayo na kartavyaH, ekasyaiva caturthavikalpasyAdeyatvAt, zeSANAM cAnAdeyatvAt / ata eva pratyAsattinyAyamaGgIkRtya paJcamavikalpaM tAvad dUSayitumAha -" bhaNNaItyAdi" bhaNyate'trottaram-na svabhAvato bhavasaMbhUtiH, yataH svabhAvo vasturUpo vAmimato mavediti dvitIyagAthAyAM saMbandhaH, niSkAraNavA vA, vastudhoM vA svabhAvo'bhimato bhavet ? iti trayo viklpaaH| tatra yadi vasturUpo'yamiti prathamo vikalpA tarhi tako'sau svamAvo nAsti, anupalambhAt, khapuSpavaditi // 364-365 // (1912.-1913) 5. C.-According to some, punya and bapa are independent of each other, because sukha and dukkha which are their respective karyas or consequences are not experienced at one and the same time. So, when kiryas are found to be independent of each other, their respective causes should also be independent of each other by anumana. Finally, there is one more theory that the expansion of this mundane world is not due to Karmis known as papa and

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416 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth punya, but on account of its own svabhava. According to this theory, there is nothing like Karma. Your doubt has sprung up from five different opinions stated above. But that is not justifiable. For, out of those five theories, none except the fourth one is acceptible. The expansion of bhava by means of its subhava as laid down in the fifth theory, is also not acceptible. Because, in that case, srabhava should either be a definite object ( vastu ) or causelessness ( niskaranata ), or the property of a delinite object ( vastu-dharma). Since svabhava is absolutely imperceptible like a kha-puspa, it can never exist as a definite object. // 364365 // ( 1912-1913 ) Then, aJcatamaNuvaladdho vi aha to asthi natdhi ki kama ? / heU va tadatthitte jo naNu kammassa vi sa eva // 366 // (1914) kammarasa vAbhihANaM hoja sabhAyo ti hou ko doso' / pahaniSayAgArAo ma ya so kattA ghaDasseva // 367 / / (1915) mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhihANaA bhinno / kamma tti sahAvo tiM yajai vA'muso na kattA to // 368 / / (1916) dehANaM vomaM piva, juttA kajAio ya muttimyaa| aha so nikAraNayA to kharasiMgAdao hotu // 369 // (1917) aha vatthuNo sa dhammo pariNAmo to sa kamma-jIvANaM / punne-'yarAbhihANo kAraNa--kajANumeo so // 370 // (1918) kiriyANaM kAraNao dehAINaM ca kjbhaavaao| kammaM madabhihiyaM ti ya paDivaja tamaggibhUi vca // 371 // (1919)

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Vada ] taM ciya dehAINaM kiriyANaM piya subhA--'subhanttAo / paDivajja puNgapAvaM sahAvao bhinnajAIye || 372 || (1920) Canadharavada Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ? Heu va tadatthitte jo nagu kammassa vi sa eva n 366 " ( 1914 ) Kammassa vabhiharam hojja sabhavo tti hou ko doso ! Painiyayagarao na ya so katta ghadasseva || 367 // ( 1915 ) 53 Mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhihanao bhinno Kamma tti sahavo tti ya jai vemutto na katta to 1368 || ( 1916 ) Dehanam vomam piva, jutta kajjaio ya muttimaya Aha so nikkaranaya to kharasingada hontu // 369 // ( 1917 ) Aha vatthuno sa dhammo parinamo to sa kamma-jivanam | Punne-yarabhihino karana- kajjanumeo so || 370 // ( 1918 ) Kiriyanam karanao dehainam ca kajjabhavno | Kammam madabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhui vva | 371 || Tam ciya dehainam kiriyanam pi ya subha-'subhattao | Padivajja punnapavam sahava bhinnajaiyam ||372 || ( 1620 ) [ atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nAsti kiM karma / hetu tadastitve yo nanu karmaNo'pi sa eva / / 366 / / (1914) karmaNo nAbhidhAnaM bhavet svabhAva iti bhavatu ko doSa: ? / pratiniyatAkArAd na ca sa kartA ghaTasyeva // 367 / / (1915) mUrtI mUrtI vA sako yadi mRrtastato'bhighAnato bhinnaH / karmeti svabhAva iti ca yadi vA'mUrtI na kartA tataH || 368 || (1996) dehAnAM vyomeva yuktA kAryAditazca mUrtimattA / atha sa niSkAraNatA tataH kharazRGgAdayo bhavantu || 369 / / (1917) atha vastunaH sa dharmaH pariNAmastataH sa karma - jIvayoH / puNye --tarAbhidhAnaH kAraNa-kAryAnumeyaH saH // 370 // (1918) 417 For Private Personal Use Only

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418 Jinabhadra Cani's [ The ninth kriyANAM kAraNato dehAdInAM ca kAryabhAvAt / wafafafafa a afaqtet caufa ufafte il 308 II (P888) tadeva dehAdInAM kriyANAmapi ca zumA--azubhatvAt / qaqah you-ard FT4TTDI f arald RGP !!(070) Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti vasti kim karma i Hetur va tadastive yo naru karmano'pi sa eva il 366 11 ( 1914 ) Carmano vabhidhanam bhavet svabhava iti bhavatu ko dosoo ? Pratiniyatakarad sa ca sa karta ghatasyeva 11 367 11 ( 1915) Murto murto va sako yadi murtastato' bhidhanato bhinnah i Karmeti svabhava iti ca yadi va'murto na karta tatak 136811916) Dehanam vyomeva yukta karyaditasca murtimatta Atha sa niskaranata tatah kharasringadayo bhavantu 113691 (1917) Atha vastunab sa dharmah parinaniastatah sa karma jivayah Punye-tarabhidhanah karana karyanumeyan sa 11 370 i ( 1918) Kriyanam karanato dehadinam ca karyabhavati Karma madabhihitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamag nibhutiriva 13711! Tadeva dehadinam kriyanamapi ca subha'-subhatvat i Pratipadyasva punya -pape svabhavato bhinnajatiye 137211 (1920,] Trans.--366-372 If it is extremely non-perceptible, why is it called scabhava and not k'armu ? The helre that works in the existence of such huva, worius in case of Karma also. Or, what harm is there is taking svabhava as the synonym of karma ? And since it has a definite shape like ghata, it cannot be a doer, just as sky is not ( the doer of ) bodies. ( For ), the corporeal nature is justified on account of ( its ) being karya etc. Now, if that ( svabhava ) were causelessness ( itself! non-existent ( objects like ) kha'aeraga etc, would come into existence. If it is taken as the property of a ( definite ) object, then it would turn out 10 be the effect of Karma and jiva and would be inferred as punya and papa by

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419 Vida] Canadharava means of karya and karana. So, like Agnubhate, you, too, ( shall have to ) accept ( the existence of ) Rirma on account of action, as well as Karyas ( in the forin of deha etc, and since Karma itself is the cause of good or bad ( in case of deha etc. ), as well as other perforinances, adinit punya and papa as belonging to different species by their very svabhava ( 1914-1920) TIkA--etAzca gAthAH prAyo'gnibhUtigaNadharavAde vyAkhyAtA eva, sugamAzca / navaraM "kAraNa- kajANumA so ti" sa ca jIva- karmaNoH puNya--pApAbhidhAnaH pariNAmaH kAraNena kAryeNa cA'numIyate--kAraNAnumAnAtU kAryAnumAnAca gamyata ityartha / etadevAnumAnadvayamAha--"kiriyANaM kAraNo ityAdi " dAnAdikriyANAM hiMsAdikriyANAM ca kAraNatvAt kAraNarUpatvAdasti tatphalabhUtastatkAryarUpapuNya--pApAtmako jIva-karmapariNAmaH, yathA kRSyAdikriyANAM shaali-yv--godhuumaadikm| uktaM ca-- " samAsu tulyaM viSamAsu tulyaM satISvasaJcApyasatISu saca / phalaM kriyAsvityatha yanimittaM tad dehinAM so'sti nuko'pi dharmaH // 1 // " etat kAraNAnumAnam / " dehAINamityAdi, dehAdInAM kAraNamasti, kAryarUpatvAt teSAm . yathA ghaTasya mRd daNDa- cakra cIvarAdisAmagrIkalitaH kulAlaH / na ca vaktavyam-dRSTa eva mAtA-pitrAdikasteSAM hetuH, dRSTahetusAmye'pi purUpe-tarAdibhAvana dehAdInAM vacitryadarzanAt, tasya cAdRSTakarmAkhyahetumantareNAbhAvAt / ata eva puNya-pApabhedena karmaNo dvaividhyam, zubhadehAdInAM puNyakAryatvAt. itareSAM tu pApaphalatvAt; uktaM ca " iha dRSTahetvasaMbhavikAryavizeSAt kulAlayala iva / hetvantaramanumeyaM tat karma zubhA-'zubhaM kartuH // 1 // " etat kAryAnumAnam / tathA, madabhihimiti ca kRtvA'gnibhUtivat tvamapi karma pratipadyasva, sarvajJavacanamAmANyAdityarthaH / tadapi puNya-pApavibhAgena vibhakta pratipadyakha, dehAdInAM tatkAryANAM kriyANAM ca tatkAraNabhUtAnAM zubhA--'zubhatvena taddvavidhyadarzanAditi / 366--372 // (1914. 1920)

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420 Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth D. C.- These verses have already been explained in details in the Second Ganadhara-vada,f The only point to remember in this connection, is that punya and papa, the parinama of liva and Karma, could be inferred from karana and karya. These two inferences are explained as follows: (1) Rarananumana:-- Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops Karyas) at the end, punya and papa are also reaped as the varinamas of Jiva and Karma with actions like munificence etc. or violence etc. as their respective causes. It is, therefore, said that"Samasu tulyam vinamasu tulyam satisvasaccapyasatisu Sacca i Phalam kriyasvityatha yannimittam tad dehinam so'stinuko'pi dharmah " (2) Karyanumana:- Just as, a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the Karana of ghata, so also in case of Karyas like sarira etc. there is some cause or the other. The cause, in this case, is nothing but punya and papa in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of karyas like sarira etc, parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them, there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms-in spite of their drsta helu, viz, parents being the same--would never be accounted for. The karma therefore has two types:--Punya and papa. Good forms are the results of punya and ugly ones are the results of papa. Hence it is said:-- Iha drstahetvasambhavikaryavisesat kulalayatna iva i Hetvantaramanumeyam tat Karma subha'-subham kartuh "" So, like Agnibhuti, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of Karma putting faith into the words of me--the + Vide pp. 86 to 137

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 421 omnisicient. You shall also have to take it for certain that Karma is divided as punya and papa, causing a variety of forms in deha etc. 366-372 || (1914-1920) The existence of punya and papa could be established in a different way:--- suha--dukkhANaM kAraNamaNurUvaM kajjabhAvao'vassaM / paramANavo ghaDassa va kAraNamiha puNNa- pAvAI / / 373 / / (1921) Suha-dukkanam karanamanuruvam kajjabhavao'vassam Paramanavo ghadassa va karanamiha puna-pavaim // 373 || (1921) [ sukha - duHkhayoH kAraNamanurUpaM kAryabhAvato'vazyam / paramANaat ghaTasyeva kAraNamiha puNyapApe || 373 / / (1921) Sukha-duhkhayoh karanamanurupam karyabhavato'vasyam i Paramanavo ghatasyeva karanamiha punya-pape | 373 | (1921)] Trans --373 Just as molecules (which act as ) the cause of ghata resemble ghata in the same way, happiness and misery, the Karyas have also their Karana viz, punya and papa similar, to them. (1921) TIkA - astyavazyaM sukha-duHkhayoranurUpaM kAraNam, kAryatvAt tayoH, yaha kArya tasyAnurUpaM kAraNaM bhavatyeva, yathA ghaTasya paramANavaH tacca tayorihAnurUpaM kAraNaM, sukhasya puNyaM duHkhasya tu pApamiti || 373 || (1921) D. C. -- Since karana is similar to Karya, the small particles of earth which make ghata, resembles ghata, and punya and papa which are the karana of sukha and duhkha would resemble sukha aud duhkha. || 373 || (1921) The opponent may now, raise the objection as follows:-- suha- dukkhakAraNaM jai kamma kajjassa tadaNurUvaM ca / pattamarUvaM taM pihU aha rUvi nANurUvaM to // 374 // (1922)

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A22 Jinabhadra Gani's | The ninth Suha-duhkhakaranam jai kammam kajjassa tadanuruvam ca Pattamaruvam tam pi hu aha ruvim nanuruvam to 13741 (1922) [mukha-duHkhakAraNaM yadi karma kAryasya tadanurUpaM ca / prAptabharUpaM tadapi khalvatha rUpi nAnurUpaM tataH // 374 // (1922) Sukha-duhkhaharanam yadi karma karyasya tadanurupam ca Praptamrrupam tadapi khalvatha rupi nanurupam tatah 11 374 it ! Trans.--374 If karma | were known as ) the cause of happiness and misery, and if Karya ( were taken as ) simiiar to it, then, that (te karma ) also would certainly become formless, and if corporeal, it would not resemble ( the Karya, ( 1922) TIkA-nanu yadi sukha-duHgvayoH puNya -pApAtmakaM karma kAraNam, tacca yadi kAryasya sukha-duHkharUpasyAnurUpaM sadamiSyate, tarhi sukha-duHkhayorAtmapariNAmatvenArUpatvAt tadapi puNya-pApAtmakaM karma tadanurUpatayA'spaM mAmoti / atha rUpavat, tarhi nAnurUpaM tat, mUtatvena vilakSaNatvAditi // 374 // (1922) D. C.-If Karmr composed of punye and papa is accepted as the Karaniz of szekha and duhkha, and if sukha and wenkhh are taken as similar to the Karma, Karmra, ishich in fact is corporeal, would becorne formless like sukha and tirthkha. On the other hand, if it is taken as corporeal, it will not resemble its karya, vis, sukha and dunkha which are incorporeal. // 374 // ( 1922) Then, the Truhankara Bhagavia replies:-. na hi savvahANurUvaM bhinnaM vA kAraNaM, aha mayaM te / ki kajja-kAraNattaNamahavA batthusaNaM tassa ? // 375 / / (1923) Na hi savvahaguruvam bhinnam, va karanam, aha mayam te Kim kajja - karapattanamahava vatthuttapam tassa ? 11 375 >> (1923)

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423 Vida ] Ganadarravada [na hi sarvathAnurUpaM minnaM vA kAraNaM, atha mata te| kiM kArya-kAraNatvamathavA vastutvaM tasya ? // 375 / / (1923) Na hi sarvathanurupam bhinnam va karanam atha matam te Kim karya-karanatvamathava vastutvam tasya ? ! 375 1! ( 1923 )] Trans.--375 The karanu is neither similar nor dissimilar ( to the karya ) in all respects. Then, you might' contend that How is its being a karya, karana or a ( definite ) object : justified )? ( 1923 ) TIkA-na hi sarvathA kAryAnurUpaM kAraNamiSyate, yena sukha-du:khada karmaNo'pyarUpatvaM praryate / nApyekAntena sarvadharmaH kAraNaM kAryAbhinnameSTavyam / "aha mayaM te ti" atha te tavaid matam-ekAntena sarvairapi dharmaH kAraNaM kAryAnurUpameva, bhinnaM vA'nurUSameveti; tahi sarvathA'nurUpatva ekasya kAraNatve'parasyApi kAraNatvAt, ekasya ca kAryatve'nyasyApi kAryatvAt kiM tayoH kArya-kAraNavam ? na kizcit dvayorapikAraNatvAt, kAryavAd veti / athaikAntabhede'bhyupagamyamAne kAryasya vastutve kiM nAma tasya kAraNasya vastukham ? na kiJcit, dvayorapi vastutve sarvathA bhedahAnimasaGgAditi / tasmAda naikAntenAnurUpatA, ananurUpatA vA kArya-kAraNayoH // 375 / / (1923) D. C.-Karana is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the Karyas. So, Karma, cannot be called formless like its Karya viz, sukha and duhkha. Your doubt is based on your assumption that karana is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the karya. But you are not justified in your assumption. Por, if Karaca were absolutely similar to Karja, it would turn out to be the karuna, of some other Karya also. Similarly, a karya taken as similar to a harana in all respects, would also become the Karya of another karana. Consequently, there will be no distinction between Karya and karona, and both would either become kurara or karya. Since there is no difference between karya being a definite

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124 Jinabhadra Gaoi's [ The ninth objec and a karana being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also, be out of place. Hence, Karza and karana are nither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other. // 375 / ( 1923 ) The author states an objection to this and to its reply: savvaM tullAtullaM jai to kajANurUvayA keyaM ? / jaM somma ! sapanAo kajje parapajao seMso // 376 // (1924) Savvam tullatullam jai to kajjanuruvaya keyam ?, Jam Somma 1 sapasjao kajjam parapajjae seso it' 376 11 ( 1924 ) [sarva tulyA--tulyaM yadi tataH kAryAnurUpatA keyam ? / yat saumya ! svaparyAyaH kArya paraparyayaH zeSaH / / 376 // (1924) Sarvain tulya'-tulyam yadi tatah karyanurupata keyam? Yat Saumya | svaparyayah karyam paraparyayah sesah 1376111925') Trans --376 "If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way, is Karya similar ( to karana } ? " For, o Saumya ! karya is the synonym and the rest, autonym (1924) TIkA-na kevalaM kArya- kAraNe eva tulyA-'tulyarUpe, kintu sakalamapi tribhuvanAntargataM vastu parasparaM tulyA-'tulyarUpameva, na punaH kiJcit kartApyekAntena tulyamatulyaM vaa| labdhAvakAzaH paraH prAha-" jaItyAdi" yadhevam, tataH keyaM kAryAnurupatA kAraNasya vizeSato'nviSyate, yenocyate"muha-dukkhANaM kAraNamaNurUvaM" ityAdi ? / yadi kizcidekAntenAnurUpaM syAt tadetthaM vaktuM yujyate, yadA vakAntato na kizcidanurUpam, naapynnuruupm| kintu sarva sarvaNa tulyA-tulyarUpameva, tadA kimanena vizeSeNa ? / atrocyate--" jamityAdi" saumya ! tulyA -tulyatve sarvagate'pi yad yasmAd kAraNasya kArya svaparyAyaH, tasmAt kAraNaM kAryasyehA nurUpamucyate zeSasvakAryarUpaH sarvo'pi padArthaH kAraNasya paraparyAyaH, iti

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Vada ] Capadharavada taM prati vivakSitaM kAraNamasamAnarUpamabhidhIyate / Aha- nanu kathaM prastute sukhaduHkhe kAraNasya svaparyAMyaH ? / ucyate - jIva- puNyasaMyogaH sukhasya kAraNam, tasya ca sukhaM paryAya eba, duHkhasyApi jIva- pApasaMyogaH kAraNam, avastasyApi duHkhaM paryAya evaM yathA ca sukhaM zubhaM, kalyANaM, zivamityAdIn vyapadezAllabhate tathA tatkAraNabhUtaM puNyaskandhadravyAmapi yathA ca duHkhamazzubham, akalyANam azivamityAdisaMjJAH mAmoti tathA tatkAraNabhUtaM pApadravyamapi, iti vizeSato'tra puNya-pApe - sukha-duHkhayeoranurUpakAraNatveneokte iti // 376 // (1934) D. C.-Bhagavana :-Not only karya and karana, but all objects of the Universe, are relatively equal and unequal, and no objects is absolutely equal or absolutely unequal. 425 Acalabhrata:-If it is so, then, why do you try to establish particularly the similarity between karana and karya by saying that "sukha and duhkha are similar to karna etc. ? Still, however, if some object is absolutely similar to another, it may be justified to say so. But when nothing is similar or dissimilar in all respects, and everything is relatively equal or unequal according to you, then, how could it be said that Karana was semilar to Karya. Bhagavana:-In spite of all objects being relatively equal or unequal, karya resembles karaya, because it is the synonym of karana, while other objects which are the autonyms of kar. ana are dissimilar to it. Hence in the present case, sukha and duhkha are the synonyms of Karma the karana. The combination of jiva and punya is the cause of sukha, and that of jiva and papa is the cause of duhkha, just as swa, kalyana, subha etc. are the synonyms for sukha, the same are the synonyms for puNGyakarmas also. Similarly, duhkha and its cause, the papa-karmas, have the same synonyms viz, a-siva, a-kalyana and a-subha etc. 54 For Private Personal Use Only

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426 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth It is in this way, O Saumya ! that punya and papa are known as the karanas resembling their karyas vix sukha and duhkha. // 376 (1924) The opponent may here ask as follows:-- kiM jaha mutsamamuttassa kAraNaM taha suhAINaM kamma / didaM sahAikAraNamannAi jaheha taha kamma ? // 377 // (1926) Kim jaha muttamamuttassa karanam taha suhainam kammami Dittham suhaikaryamannai jaheha taha kamman? || 377 // (1925) [ki yathA mtamamUrtasya kAraNaM tathA sukhAdInAM karma / dRSThaM mukhAdikAraNamanAdi yatheha tathA karma ? / / 377 / / (1926) Kim yatka murtamamurtasya karanam tatha sukhadinam karma i Dristam sukhadikarayamannadi yatheha tatha karma ? // 377 / / Trans.-377 Is Karma the cause of sukha etc, as murta is the cause of amurta ? (And) is Karma apprehended (as the cause in the same way ss food etc, are apprehended as the cause of happiness etc ? (1925) TIkA-kiM yathA mUrta nIlAdikamamUrtasya svapratibhAsijJAnasya kAraNaM hetusthAmukha-duHkhayoH puNya-pApAtmakaM karmApi mUrtameva sat kAraNam, yathA pratyakSata eva dRSTamannAdikam : AdizabdAt saka-caMdanA-janA-hiviSa-kaNTakAdikayiha sukha-duHkhayomUrta tat kAraNaM yat karmApi tayAriti bhAvArthaH ? // 377 // (1926) ___D. C.-Just as gem, garland, sandal-paste, woman ser nant, or a poisonous sting becomes the murla cause of the hantra itikta and dirhk ra. should we aceept Karma also whether good or bad-to be the murta and prat yaksi cause like food etc. ! // 377 / / (1925) The answer is--

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Vada ] Canadharavada hou tayaM ci kiM kammaNA, na jaM tuklasAhaNAgaM pi / phalabhedao so'vassaM sakAraNo kAraNaM kammaM ||378|| (1926) 427 Hou tayam ciya kim kammana, na jam tullasahananam pi Phalabheda so 'vassam sakarano karanam kammam | 378 1 ( 1926) [bhavatu nadeva kiM karmaNA, na yat tulyasAdhanAnAmapi / phaLabhedataH sosaryaM sakAraNaH kAraNaM karma // 378 // (1926) Bhavatu tadeva kim karmana, na yat tulyasadhananamapi Phalabhedatah so'vasyam sa-karanah karanam karina 1378|| (1926)] Trans.--378 (The opponent may argue futher that ). "Let that (ie, food etc.) be the cause of happiness etc." but what (is the use) of Karma? That is proper. In spite of there being equal materials, the difference in results has certainly (some) reason which is (nothing but Karma.) (1926) TIkA nanu sadeva duSTamabhAdikaM vastu tahiM sukhAdeH kAraNamastu kimadRSTena tena karmaNA pariphalpitena, atiprasaGgAt ? / tadetad na, yad yamamAt tusyAnyannAdonI sAdhanAni yeSAM te tulyasAdhanAH puruSAsteSAmapi phaLe sukhaduHkhalakSaNe kAryabhedaH phalabhedau mahAn dRzyate, tulye'dhyannArdine sukte kasyApyADhAdaH, anyasya tu rogAdyutpattirdRzyata tatyarthaH / yazcetthaM tulyAnnAdi sAdhanAnAmapi phalabhedaH, so'vazyameva sakAraNaH, niSkAraNaNve nityaM saccA'zvamasaGgAt / yatha tatkAraNaM tadadRSTaM karma, iti na tatkarapaNAssnardhyagiti // 378 // (1926) D. C. - Acalabhrota: - Since food etc are directly apprehended, they could be taken as the causes of sukka, duhkha, but what is the purpose of assuming Karma, which is absolutely imperceptible to be the cause? Bhagavana-Persons having the same sadhanas like ana etc are found to enjoy different phalas like sukha and luhk In spite of their taking the same food, some people look glad

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428 Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth while others appear gloomy. This sort of phala bhedo is significant and is due to good or bad karma. 11 378 !! ( 1926 ) The murtata of Karma is now explained as follows:etto ciya taM muttaM muttabalAhANao jahA kuNbho| dehAikajamattAio vva bhaNie puNo bhaNaha // 379 // (1928) Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalahanao jaha kumbho Dehaikajjamuttaio vva bhanie puno bhanai || 379 . ( 1927 ) [etasmAdeva tad mUrta mUrtabalAdhAnato yathA kummaH / dehAdikAryAdita iva bhaNite punarbhaNati // 379 // (1927) Etasmadeva tad murtam murtabaladhanato yatha kumbhah Dehadikaryamurtadita iva bhaaite punarbhNGati 137911 ( 1927 )] Trans.---379 On account of that reason, it is murta like ghata, on account of its ( capacity of ) strengthening the body, or on account of the karyas like deha etc. being murla. When thus told, he speaks again. ( 1927 ) TIkA-yata eva tulyasAdhanAnAM karmanivandhanaH phalamedaH, ata evo cyate-pta karma, mUrtasya dehadilAdhAnakAritvAt, yathA nimitta mAtramAvitvena ghaTo dehAdInAM baLamAdhatte evaM karmApi, ato mUrtamityarthaH / athavA, bhUta karma, mUrtena sak-candanA-'janAdinA tasyopacayalakSaNasya pahasyAdhIyamAnatvAt, kumbhavat-yathA mUrtatvena tailAdinA balasyAdhIyamAnatvAta kumbho mUrtaH, evaM vak-candanAdinopacIyamAnatvAt karmAti mUrtamisti bhaavH| yadivA, mUrta karma, dehAdestatkAryasya mUrtatvAta, paramANuvat-yathA ghaTAde.. ssatkAryasya mUrtasya darzanAt paramANavo mUrvAH, evaM dehAdesvakAryasya mUrtasya darzanAt karmApi muurtmityrthH| evaM maNite punarbhaNati paraH // 379 // (1927) D, C.-The murtatva of Karmas is -explained in variups ways Since the difference in phaias in case of those having the same sadhanas is due to Karma, the karma, should be takert as murta,

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Vada ] Ganadharayada 429 2. Karma is murta, because like ghaga, it strengthens the kar. yas like body etc.. 3. Just as ghata is murta, because it is strengthened by the murta object like oil etc. Karma is also murta, because it is also nourished by objects like flower-garlands and sandal-paste etc. Just as the parinamas of ghata are murla, because ghata is murta, the karma is also murta, because its karyas like Sarira etc. are mairta. // 379 // ( 1927 ) When thus answered by the Tirthankara, the opponent argues again to kiM dehAINaM muttattaNao taya havaMha muttaM / aha suha-dukkhAINaM kAraNabhAvAdarUvaM ti ? // 380 / / (1928) To kim dehainam muttattanao tayam havai muttam i Alia suha-dukkhainam karanabhavadaruvam ti? 11 380 1 (1928) [tataH kiM dehAdInAM mUtatvatastad bhavati matam / atha mukha-duHkhAdInAM kAraNabhAvAdarUpamiti ? / / 380 / / (1928) Tatah kim dehadinam murtatvatastad bhavati murtami Atha sukha-duhkhadinani karanabhavadarupamiti? || 380 i 1928) Trans.- 380 Then, does it become murta because of the corporeal nature, deha etc. ? Or, is it incorporeal because of sukha-duhkha etc. ( being incorporeal ) ? ( 1928) TIkA-tataH kiM dehAdInAM karmakAryANA mUrtAnAM darzanAt tat karma mUrta bhavatu, Ahosvit sukha-duHkha-krodha-mAnAdInAM jIvapariNAmabhUtAnAM tatkAryANAmamUrtAnAM darzanAt tat kAraNamAvenAmUrtamastu karma ? ityevaM mUtatvA-'mUrtatvAbhyAmubhayathApi tatkAryadarzanAt kiM mUrtam, amUrta vA karma bhavatu ? iti nivedyatAmiti / / 380 // (1928) ___D. C.- By accepting your argument, Karma will become

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430 Jinabhadra Gani's I The ninth murta, as well as, a-murta. It will be murta because its karyas like deha etc are murta. At the same time, it will be called a-mirta also, because its karyas and the jiva-parinamas such as sukha, duhkha, krodha, mona etc are a-murta. In such a case, should we take Karina as murla or a-murla ? 1138011 (1928) Bhagavana replies:na suhAINaM heU kammaM ciya kintu tANa jIvo vi| hoi samavAikAraNamiyaraM kammaM ti ko doso ? // 381 // (1929) Na sahainam heu kammam ciya kintu tana jivo vi Hoi samayaikaranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? 113811 (1929) [na sukhAdInAM hetuH kamaiva kintu teSAM jIvo'pi / bhavati samavAyikAraNamitarat karmeti ko doSaH // 381 // (1929) Na sukhadinam hetuh karmaiva kintu tesam jivo'pi Bhavati samavayikaranamitarat karme'ti ko dosah ? 113811 (1929)] Trans.-381 Karma is not the only cause of happiness etc, but jiva is also their intimate cause, Karma is the opposite one. What difficulty will arise (in such a case)? (1929) TIkA-sukhAdInAM karmaica kevalaM kAraNaM na bhavati, kintu jIvo'pi teSAM samagayikAraNaM bhavati, karma punaritaradasamavAyikAraNaM bhavatIti ko doSaH ? / idamuktaM bhavati-sugvAderamUrttatvena samavAyikAraNasya jIvasyAmUrtasvamastyeva, asamavAyikAraNasya tu karmaNaH mukhAdyatatvenAmUrtatvaM na bhavatIsapIti na doSa iti / / 381 // (1929) D. C.-Karma is not the only cause of sukha, duhkha etc. Really speaking, Jiva is the intimate cause of sukha etc, and Karma is merely an accidental cause. Hence, on account of the a-murtatva of the karyas, vis sukh, dunkra etc, their intimate cause viz jiva does become a-murta but Karma being merely an accidantal cause, does not become a-miirta. So, there will be no difficulty as regards karma being accepted as murta. 113811 (1929)

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Vada ] Canadharavada 431 Now, refuting the first assertion that the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of pufya, the author states iya rUvitte suha-dukkhakAraNatte ya kammuNo siddhe / pugNAvagarisametteNa dukkhabahulattaNamajuttaM // 382 / / (1930) Iya ruvitte suha-dukkha karanatte ya kammuno siddhe i Purnavagarisamettana dukkhabahulattanamajuttam 138211 (1930) [iti rUpitve mukha-duHkhakAraNatve ca karmaNaH siddh| puNyApakarSamAtreNa duHkhabahulatvamayuktam // 382 // (1930) Iti rupitve sukha duhkhakaranative ca karmanah siddhe ! Punyapakarsamatrena duhkhabahulatvamayuktam 1138211 (1930)] Trans.---382 When Karma is proved to be murta and (at the same time) established as the cause of sukha-duhkha ( the theory that the abundance of miseries is due to the dimminution of virtuous actions, will fail. ( 1930 ) TIkA-ityevaM paJcavikalpopanyastasvamAvavAdanirAsena puNya-pApAtmakasya karmaNaH mukha-duHkhakAraNatve rUpitve ca siddhe puNyApakarSamAtreNa yad duHkhabahulatvaM prathamavikalpopanyAse moktaM tadayuktamiti // 382 / / (1930) . C.-Now that the thery of svabhava has been refuted and the existence of a murta karma as the cause of sukha and duhkha, has been established we can easily refute the theory that the abundance of miseries is caused by the diminution of punyas || 382 // ( 1930) kammappagarisajaNiyaM tadavassaM pgrisaannubhuuiio| sokkhappagarisabhUI jaha puNNappagarisappabhavA / / 383 // (1931) Kammapprgarisajaniyam tadavassam pagarisanubhuio Sokhhappagarisabhui jaha punnappagarisappabhava 1 383 11 (1931) [karmaprakarSajanitaM tadavazyaM prakarSAnubhUteH / saukhyamakarSabhUtiyathA puNyaprakarSaprabhavA / / 383 // (1931)

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432 Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth Karmaprakarsajanitam tadavasyam prakarsanubhuteh i Saukhyaprakarsabhutiryatha Dunyaprakarsaprabhava 11 383 il Trans.--383 Just as the experience of abundance of happiness, is caused by the abundance of virtuous actions, the experience of the abundance of miseries is also produced by the abundance of sinful actions. ( 1931 ) TIkA-tad duHkhabahulatvaM puNyApakarSajanitaM na bhavati, kintu svAnurupakarmaprakarSajanitam, prakarSAnubhUtitvAt-vedanAmakarSAnubhavarUpatvAditi hetuH, yathA saukhyaprakarSAnubhUtiH svAnurUpakarmaprakarSaprabhaveti dRSTAntaH // 383 / / (1931) D. C.--Abundance of miseries is not due to the want of virtuous actions, but it is due to the abundance of sinful actions, just as abundance of happiness is due to abundance of virtuous deeds, and not due to the diminution of sinful deeds, // 383 / / ( 1931 ) Moreover, taha pajjhasAhaNappagarisaMgabhAvAdihANahA na tayaM / vivarIyabAsAhaNavalappagarisaM aveskhejjA / / 384 // (1932) Taha bajjhasahanappagarisangabhavadihannaha na tayam Vivariyabajjhiasahanabalappagarisam avekkhejja || 384 W ( 1932) [ tathA vAhyasAdhanaprakarSAGgabhAvAdihAnyathA na vat viparItabAhyasAdhanabalaprakarSamapekSeta // 384 // (1932) Tatha bahyasadhanaprakarsangabhavadihanyatha na tat, Viparitbahyasadhanabalaprakarsamapekseta 1 348 11 ( 1.32 ) ) Trans.-384 It is so, on account of the abundance of external elements also. ( For ), otherwise, it would not require the excessive force of the external, ( as well as ), opposite elements. ( 1932 )

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___433 Vada ] Ganadharavada TIkA-' tathA' ityupapasyantarArthaH / iha dehinAM duHkhabahulatvaM kevala puNyApakarSagAjanitaM na bhvti| kutaH ? ityatra hetumAha-vAhAni yAnyaniSTAhArAdIni sAdhanAni teSAM yastadanurUpaH prakarSastasyAGgabhAvAt kAraNamArAditi / viparyaye bAdha kamAi- ihetyAdi' tad duHkhamanyathA yadi puNyApakarSamAtrajanyaM bhavet tadA puNyasaMpAceSTAhArApacayamAtrAdeva bhavet, na tu pApocayasaMpAdhAniSTAhArAdirUpaviparItabAhyasAdhanAnAM yad balaM sAmarthya tasya svAnurupo yaH prkrssstmpeksset| idamatra hRdayam-yadi puNyApakarSamAtrajanyaM duHkhaM bhavet, tadA puNyodayaprApyeSTAhArAdisAdhanApakarSamAtrAdeva bhavet, na caitadasti, iSTaviparItAniSTAhArAdisAdhanamagharSasAmadeiva tadbhAvAditi // 384 / / (9932) D. C.--Abundance of miseries to the various beings in this world, is not merely caused by the diminution of punyakarmas but by the abundant force of various external elements like forbidden food also. If it were not so, it would have been caused only by the diminution of prescribed food etc. ( to be attained by punya-karmas ) and would never have depended upon the abundant force of the external but opposite elements like forbidden food etc ( to be attained by papa-karmas ) The main purport of the above argument is this:-- If dehatva were to be generated by means of the diminution of punya-karmas only, it would have been produced only on account of the lack of external materials like istahara etc. Eut it is not so, as it is produced by the increasing force of the external but opposite materials like anistahara as well. // 384 // ( 1932 ) And, deho nAvacayakao puNNuphArise va muttimttaao| hojA basa hINatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya ? // 385 / / (1933) Deho navacyakao punnukkarise va muttimattao i Hojja va sa hinatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya ? 1138511(1933 55

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434 Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth [deho nApacayakRtaH puNyotkarSa iva timattvAt / maved vA sa hInatarakaH kathAmazubhatarA mahAzva ? // 385 // (1933) Deho napacayaksitah punyotakarsa iva murtimattvat Bhaved va sa hinatarakah kathamasubhataro mahansca ? 1138511 Trans.-385 Since body is corporeal, like the abundant punya karmas, it is not produced by (means of) diminution (of punya karmasi. Or, if it is so, it should be small. (For) how is a huge and (at the same time) splendid (body available)? (1933) TIkA-duHkhitahastyAdidehaH kebalapuNyApayamAtrakRto na bhavati, mUrtimattvAt, yathA puNyotkarSe tajjanyo'nuttarasura-cakravAdidehaH, yazca puNyApacayamAtrajanyaH sa martimAnapi na bhavati, yathA na ko'pi, yadi ca puNyApacayamAtreNa deho janyata, tadA hInataraH zuma eva ca syAt, kathaM mahAn, azubhatarazca bhavet, mahato mahApuNyopacayajanyakhAt, azubhasya cAzubhakarmanivartyatSAt ? | puNyena punaraNIyasApi zubha eva deho janyeta, na tu duHkhitH| aNoyasApi hi suvarNalavenANIyAnapi sauvarNa eva ghaTo bhavati na tu mArtikaH, tAbhrAditi // 386 / / ( 1933 ) D. C.- Since the bodies of anuttara gods including the Supreme Ruler of the World are miirta, they are not produced by the diminution of punya karmas In the same way, bodies like that of a miserable elephant, etc are also not produced by the dimimution of punya kar nas only as they are mirta. Por, that which has been produced by the dininution can never be mirta. Still however, if a body is ever produced by diminution of punyas, it must be exquisitely feeble and auspicious. Because a body which is huge and at the same time auspicious, is produced by the accumulation of punyas, while that which is huge but in-auspicious is produced by the accumulation of papas. Hence, a body produced even by a small quantity of punyas must necessarily be happy and never unhappy. Just

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Vada] Gayadharavada 435 as, from a small lump of gold, a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one, similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of punyas is always happy though small in form. 11385 1 (1933) Refuting the second and third theories, the author states evaM ciya vivarIya joenA savvapAvapakkha vi| na ya sAhAraNarUvaM kammaM takAragAbhAvA // 386 // (1934) Evam ciya vivariyam joejja savvapavapakkhe vi Na ya saharanarivain kammam takkaranabhava || 386 // (1934) [ evameva viparItaM yojayet sarvapApapakSe'pi / na ca sAdhAraNarUpaM karma tatkAraNAmAvAt // 386 // (1934) Evameva viparitam yojayet saravapapapak se'pi , Na ca sadharanaripam karma, tatkaranbhavatu 386 11 (1934) ____ Trans.---386 The same (argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive papas, (but) in a reverse manner. And, (there is nothing like a common karnia (containing punga and papa together) because of the absence of its cause. (1934) TIkA-"sarva pApamevAsti, na tu puNyam , pApApacayamAtrajanyatvAt mukhasya" ityetasminnapi pakSe evameva kevalapuNyavAdoktadUSaNAd viparIta. gatyA sarva yojayet, yadyathA-pApapakarSamAtrajanitaM mukhaM na bhavati, pApAMzasyAspIyaso'pi duHkhajanakatvAt / na hyaNIyAnapi viSalavaH svAsthyaheturbhavati / tasmAt puNyajanitamevAlpamapi sukhamityAdi svabuddhayA'bhyUhya vAcyam / iti pRthag duHkhayoHkAtaNabhUte svatatre puNya -pApe eThAnye / ata eva sAdhAraNe api saMkINe puNya-pApe naissttaassye| kutaH ? ityAha-'na yetyAdi / na ca sAdhAraNarUpaM saMkoNasvabhAvaM puNya-pApatmakamekaM karmAsti, tasyaivaMbhUtasya karmaNaH kAlaNAbhAvAt / atra prayogaH-nAsti saMkIrNobhayarUpaM karma, asaMmAvyaNAnaivaMvidhakAraNatvAt, vandhyAputravaditi // 386 // (1934)

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Jinabhadra Cani's [The ninth D, C.-In case of the theory that everything is papa and there is nothing like punya and that sukka is also produced by the diminution of papa, the same argument stated above should be applied but in a reverse manner in this way: Since even a small portion of papa produced duhkha like a small particle of poison, it could never be said that sukha is produced by the diminution of papa. Even a fraction of happiness is produced by punya and never by papa, and so on. These arguments clearly indicate that punya, and papa are absolutely separate entities producing sukha and duhkha respectively. 436 So, both could never be taken as one combined entity as laid down in the third theory. Such a combined Karma has no hetu whatsoever. And hence, like a son to a barren woman it is entirely impossible. | 386 || ( 1934 ) In support of the argument, the author contiuesufafau gal-sgat a quazafea 1 * hola na u ubhayarUvo kammaM pituo tayaNuruvaM / / 387 // (1935) Kammam joganitmittam subho'subho va sa egasamayammi Hojja na ubhayaruvo kammam pi tao tayaNGuruvam ||387|1 (1935) [ karma yoganimittaM zubho'zubho vA sa ekasamaye / bhaved na tubhayarUpaH karmA'pi tatastadanurUpam / / 387 / / (1935) Karma yoganimittam subho'subho va sa ekasamaye | Bhaved na tubhayarupah karma'pi tatastadanurupam ||387|| (1935)] Trans.-387 Karma is caused by contact which is either auspicious or inauspicious at one time, but never in both the forms. So, Karma is also similar to it. (1935) TIkA - midhyAtvA'virati - pramAda - kaSAya- yogA bandhahetava iti paryate yogAbhidhAnAt sarvatra karmabandhahetutvasya yogAvinAbhAvAd yogAnAmeva bandhahetutvamiti karma yoganimittamucyate / sa dha manovAkkAyAtmako For Private Personal Use Only

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437 Vada ] Ganadarravada yoga ekasmin samaye zubho'zubho vA bhavet, na tUbhayarUpaH, ata' kAraNA. nurUpatvAt kAryasya karmApi tadanurUpaM zubhaM puNyarUpaM badhyate, azubhaM vA pAparUSa badhyate, na tu saMkIrNasvabhAvamubhayarUpamekadaiva badhyata iti / / 387 // (1935) D. C-Perversion (mithyatva ) incontinence ( a-virati ) stupidity ( krsaya ) idleness (pramada ) and contact ( yoga ) are the various causes of Karna-bandha. Out of those, yoga or contact with the other world is the principal cause This contact is divided as 1. Bodily, contact, 2 Mental contact and 3 the Contact of Actions. It is either subha or a-subha at one time, but never in a combined state of subkasubha at the same time Now, since this yoga is the karava and kar ma, the korya, the latter should be similar to the former. Hence, there cannot exist a karmi containing punya and paya combined together. When there pervades a-subha yoga the subha Karma-in the form of virtuous deeds-is produced and when there is an-subha yoga, the a-subha karma of sinful deeds, is produced. But Karma could never exist in a combined state of subhaSubha as yoga never exists in a combined state. || 387 // (1935) Now the ruthor states an objection an its replynaNu maNa-vaha-kAogA subhAslubhA bi samayammi dIsaMti / dabvammi mIsabhAvo bhaveja na u bhAvakara gamti // 388 // (1936) Nanu mana-vai-kaoga subhasubha vi samayammi disanti Da vammi misabhavo bhavejja na u bhavakaranammi 1138811(1936 [nanu mano-vAk-kAyayogA: zubhAzubhA api samaye dRzyate / dravye mizrabhAvo bhaved na tu bhAvakaraNe // (388 // (1936) Nanu mano -vak-kayayogah subhasubha api samaye dresyante Dravye misrabhavo bhaved na tu bhavakarage # 388 11 ( 1936)

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438 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth Trans.--388 "Even subha and a-subha contacts pertaining to mind, speech, and body are perceived at ( the same ) time. " " The state of mixture would be ( possible ) in ( case of ) abstract ( ones )." ( 1936 ) TIkA-nanu mano-vAk-kAyayogA: zubhAzubhAzca mizrA ityarthaH, ekasmin samaye dRzyante, tat kathamucyate-"mumo'subho vA sa egasamayammi" iti ? tathAhi-kizcidavidhinA dAnAdivitaraNaM cintayataH zubhAzumo manoyogaH, tathA, kimadhyavidhinaiva dAnAdidharmamupadizataH zubhAzubho vAgyogA, tathA, kimapyavidhinaiva jinapUjA-vandanakAdikAyaceSTAM kurvataH zubhAzubhakAyayoga iti / tadetadayuktam / kutaH ? ityAha-"daccammItyAdi " idamuktaM bhavati-iha dvividho yogaH-dravyataH, bhAvatazca / tatra mano-vAk-kAyayogapravartakAni dravyANi, mano-vAk-kAyaparispandAtmako yogazca dravyayogaH; yastvetadubhayarUpayogaheturadhyavasAyaH sa bhaavyogH| tatra zubhAzubharUpANAM yathoktacintA-dezanA-kAyaceSTAnAM pravartake dividhe'pi dravyayoge vyavahAranayadarzanavivakSAmAtreNa bhavedapi zubhAzumatvalakSaNo mizrabhAvaH, na tu manovAk-kAyayoganibandhanAdhyavasAyarUpe bhAvakaraNe bhAvAtmake yoge| ayamabhiprAyaH-dravyayogo vyavahAranayadarzanena zubhAzubharUpo'poSyate, nizcayanayena tu so'pi zubho'zubho vA kevalaH samasti, yathoktacintA-dezanAdipavartakadravyayogANAmapi zubhAzubharUpamizrANAM tnmtenaamaavaat| mano-vAk-kAyadravyayoganibandhanAdhyavasAyarUpe tu bhAvakaraNe bhAyoge zubhAzubharUpo mizrabhAvo nAsti, nizcayanayatharzanasyaivAgame'tra vivakSitatvAt / na hi zubhAnyazubhAni vA'dhyavasAyasthAnAni muktayA zubhAzubhAdhyavasAyasthAnarUpastRtIyo rAzirAgame kacidapoSyate, yenAdhyavasAyarUpe bhAvayoge zubhAzubhatvaM syAditi bhAvaH / tasmAd bhAvayoga ekasmin samaye zubho'zubho vA bhavati na tu mishrH| tataH karmApi tatmatyayaM pRthak puNyarUpaM pAparUpaM vA badhyate, na tu mizrarUpamiti sthitam / / 388 // (1936) D. C.- Acalabhrata:--The combined state of subha and 2-subha contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not accoding to the prescribed

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Vada ] Canadharavada 439 rules. That belonging to speech takes place when the observances of deeds like munificence etc. are advised but against the proper rules. The misrabhava of the bodily contact is apprehended when a person actually performs the ceremony of worship and bowing down etc. to the Tirthankara, without following the prescribed customs. In this way, it is quite easy to apprehend the three types of yogos in a mixed state of subha and 4-subha at the same time. Bhagavana; - Your rssumption is wrongly based Yoga comes into existence in two ways--(1) By virtue of the contact with a concrete substance and ( 2 ) By means of contact with abstract i objects) The concrete substances that come into contact with mind, speech, and body and the process of arouosing mind, speech and body, form the drazya yoga; whlle the mental effort which' acts as the cause of contact on the part of both-.. substance as well as the process-is known as the bhaos - yoga. The composite state of subha and a-subha taken together is possible in case of dravya-yoga of all the three varieties belonging respectively to mind. speech, and body-from the practical point of view. But it is never possible in case of bhava-yoga. It is important to note, therefore, that from the practical point of view, the mis abhava of Subha and a-subha combined together may be admitted in case of 's avya yoga but it is never possible in case of draryanyaga of definite assertion In case of bhava yoga, the misrabhava is neither possible from the paractial point of view nor with regard to definite assertion Moreover in ag amuss also, there is no mention of the composite state of subhasubha yoga, as a third variety coming after subha and a-subha varieties of mental effort. Hence, in case of bhava-yoga, there cannot exist a mixed entity of

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440 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth subhasubha-yogu but either a subha-yoga or a-subha-yoga is possible. On account of the same reasons, Kirma is also formed of subha or a-subha deeds separately. but never of Subha and a-subha combined together. 1 388 / / (1939. And, jhANaM subhamasuma vA na u mIsaM jaM ca jhANavirame vi|| lesA subhA'subhA vA subhasubhaM vA pajho kammaM ||389 (19.37) Jhanam subhamasubham va na u misam jam ca jhanaviram vie Lesa subha'subha va subhamasubham va tao kammam 1138911 (1937) [dhyAnaM zumamazubhaM vA na tu mizraM yacca dhyAnavirame'pi / lezyA zubhA'zubhA vA zubhabhazumaM vA tataH karma. / / 389 // (1937) Dhyanam subhamasubham va na tu misram ycca dhyanavirame'pi s Lesya subha'subha va subhamasubham va tatah karma 1 389 11 Trans.--389 Meditation is either auspicious or in-auspicious but never composite (of both). For, even at the end of meditation, the conflict is either $ubha ora subha. Hence karma is also either (of) virtuous (type) or (of) evil (type (1937) ____TIkA-dhyAnaM yasmAdAgame ekadA dharma-zuklakAnAtmakaM zubham Arta raudrAtmakamazubhaM vA kirdiSTam, na tu zubhAzubharUpam, yasmAJca dhyAnoparame'pi lezyA tejasIpamUnikA zubhA, kApotIprasukhA vA'zubhakadA proktA na tu zubhAzubharUpAH : ghyAnalezyAtmakAca bhArayogA:, tatastepyekadA zubhA azubhA vA bhavanti na tu minA / tato bhAvayoganimittaM karmAdhyekadA puNyAtmakaM bhuma badhyate, pApAtmakagazuma vA badhyane, ne tu mizramiti 1389 / / (1937) D. C.---It has been laid down in the agamits that dhyana is either subha 1. . inspired by a religious or guileless rotive or a-subha i, e, inspired by vile or dreadful motive at one time, but it could never be inspired by both the motives at the

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Vida.] Ganadharavada 441 same time. Even at the end of dhyana, the conflict at work is spoken of either as subha ( i. e. dominated by lustrous and such other characterstics) or as a-subha ( i. e, dominated by illominous elements ) but it could never be known as subha'-subha. The bhave-yogas are composed of meditations, as well as, the conficts. So bhava-rogas are also either subha or a-subha separately, but never misra. Consequently, Karma should also be taken either as subha or a-subha taken separately and never as subha'subha taken together. 1 389 11 ( 1937 ) Moreover, punvagahiyaM ca kammaM pariNAmavaseNa mIsayaM nejaa| iyareyaramAvaM bA mammA-micchAI na u gahaNe // 390 // (1938) Puvvagahiyam ca kammam parinamavasena misayam nejja lyareyarabhavam va samma-micchaim na u gahane 1139011 (1938) [pUrvagRhItaM ca karma pariNAmavazena mizrA nayet / itaretarabhAvaM vA samyak -mithyAtve na tu grahaNe // 390 // (1939) Purvagrihitam ca karma parinamavasena misratam nayet i Itaretarabhavam va samyak-mithyatva na tu grahane 1139011/1938)] Trans --390 A pre-apprehended Karms may attain the composite state, on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But ( that is ) not ( so ), at the time of ( new ) apprehension .( 1938) TIkA-'vA' ityathavA, etadadyApi saMbhAvyate yat-pUrvagRhItaM pUrvabaddhaM mithyAtvalakSaNaM karma pariNAmavazAt puJjatraya kurvan mizratAM samyaga-mithyAtva yuJjarUpatAM prApayedini; itaretarabhAvaM vA nayet samyaktvaM mithyAtvaM veti / idamuktaM manati-pUrvabaddhAn mithyAvapudaglAn vizuddhapariNAmaH san zodhayitvA samyaka varUpa nayet, avizuddhapariNAmastu rasamutkarSa nItvA samyaktvapuglAn mithyAtvapuje saMkramayya mithyAtvarUpatAM nayet, iti pUrvagRhItasya 56

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442 Jinabhadra Gapi' [The ninth sattAvartinaH karmaNa idaM kuryAt / grahaNakAle punana mizraM puNyapAparUpatayA saMkIrNasvabhAvaM karma bannAti, nApotaraditararUpatA nayatoti // 390 // (1938) D. C.-The composite state of Karma could be explained in this way also:-A Karma which is apprehended previously may attain subha, a-subha or migra condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure parinamas would purify the previous evil pudgalas and turn them right, while on other hand, impure parinamas would spoil the previous virtuous pudgalas by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the parinamas which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the Karma into a composite state of virtue and vice In this way, with regard to Karma of former existence, three states-viz subha, a-subha and subhasnbha-are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of Kurma, the parinama is not able to form a composite Karma of punya and papa combined together, and hence there are only two states 11 390 11 ( 1838 ) Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vice versa referred to above, is explained as follows:-- mottaNa AuyaM khalu dasaNamohaM carittamohaM ca / sesANaM pagaINaM uttaravihisaMkamo bhajo // 391 // (1939) Mottuna auyam khalu damsanamoham carittamoham ca, Sesanam pagainam uttaravihisamkamo bhajjo II 391 ( 1939 ) muktvA''yuSkaM khalu darzanamohaM cAritramohaM ca / zeSANAM prakRtInAmuttaravidhisaMkramo bhAjyaH / / 391 / / (1939) Muktva ayuskam khalu darsanamoham caritra moham ca Sesanam prakritinamuttaravidhisamkramo bhasyah 11 391 / 1939 )|| Traus.---391 Excepting the ( constituents belonging to )

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443 Vada ] Canadharavada ayukt infatuation of darsana, ( undifferentiated knowledge ) and infatuation of caritra ( right conduct }, transformations of the latter parts of the remaining characteristics should be acccepted. ( 1939 ) TIkA-iha jJAnAvaraNAdimUlaprakRtInAmanyonyaM saMkramA kadApi na bhavatyeva, uttaramakRtInAM tu nijanijamUlamakRtyabhinnAnAM parasparaM bhavatIti / tatra cAyaM vidhiH- "mAttaNa AuyaM" iti jAtipradhAno nirdeza iti bahuvacanamatra draSTavyam--catvAryASi muktveti / ekasyA AyurlakSaNAyA nijamULaprakRterabhinnAnAmapi caturNAmAyuSAmanyonyaM saMkramo na bhavatIti tadvarjanam / tathA, darzanamohaM cAritramohaM ca muktvA; ekasyA mohanIyalakSaNAyAH svamUlaprakRterabhinnayogapi darzanamoha-cAritramohayoranyonya saMkramo na bhavatItyarthaH / uktazeSANAM tu prakRtonAma, kathaMbhUtAnAma ? ityAha--" uttaravihi ti"vidhayo bhedA., uttare ca te vidhayazcottarevidhaSa uttarabhedAstadbhUtAnAmutsarapakavirUpANAmiti tAtparyam / kim ? ityAha--saMkramo bhAjyo bhajanIyaH / bhajanA caivaM draSTavyAyAH kila jJAnAvaraNapazcaka--darzanAvaraNanavaka-- kaSAyaSoDazaka -mithyAtva-bhaya--jugupsA--taijasa kArmaNa-varNAdicatuSkA guru. laghU-paghAta-nirmANA-'ntarAyapazcakalakSaNAH saptacatvAriMzad dhruvabandhinya uttaramakRtayaH, tAsAM nikamUlapakRtyamitrAnAmanyonya saMkramaH sadaiva bhavati; yathA mAnAvaraNapaznakAntarvatini matijJAnAvaraNe zrutajJAnAvaraNAdIni, teSvapi matijJAnAvaraNaM saMkrAmatItyAdi / yAstu zeSA adhruvandhinyastAsAM nijaikamUlaprakRtyamedavartinInAmapi badhyamAnAyAmavadhyamAnA saMkrAmati, na svapadhyamAnAyAM vadhyamAnA; yathA sAte badhyamAne'sAtamabadhyamAnaM saMkrAmati, na tu badhyamAnamavadhyamAne; ityAdi vAcyamiti / eSa prakRtisaMkrame vidhiH / zeSastu pradezAdisaMkramavidhiH "mUlamakRtyabhinAsu vedyamAnAsu saMkramaH bhavati" ityAdinA sthAnantarAdavaseya ityalaM prasaGganeti // 391 // (1939) D. C.-The process of prakriti samkrama ( mutual trans formation of various characteristics ) is explained as follows: Ayuk karma

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444 (3) Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth (1) Praksiti-samkrama is not possible in case of original prakritis like jnanavarana ete. But in case of characteristics which are acquired later on, mutual transition does take place, even though they are not different from their respective original characteristics. (2) Four varieties of the characteristics of ayrh, and the infatuations of darsana and curitra (right conduc!) are exceptions to the above rule. In spite of these prakritis being a-bhinna from thelr respective original praksitis, they do not undergo mutual transition. There are 47 uttara-praksitis which undergo mutual transition. They are enumerated as follows:-5 types of jnouavaranas, 9 types of darsariavaranas, 16 types of dullness; perversion, fear, contempt, the characteristic of lustre, the karmana characteristic; A characteristics of colour etc; one that is neither too long nor too short; characteristics of destruction and construction; and 5 types of obstruction (antaraya). All these 47 uttara-praki itis of definite bandha, always undergo mutual transition e. g., out of five types of prauavaranas noted above, the sruti-jnanavarana could be transformed into mati-jnanavarana and vice versa. In case of other praksites that have not been actually bound up, one that has to proper bandha may be transformed into one having proper bandha, but the process does not work vice versa, i. e, a prakriti of proper bandha, does not change nto a prakriti without bandha This is the process of prakiitt-samkrama. The process of transition in case of other pradesas etc is understood from he sentence: "Mula praksityabhiuuasu vedyamanasu samkramah bhavati" tc. implying that when they are known to be similar to the riginal prakritis, they undergo transformation 391 11 (1939)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada The separate characteristics of punya and papa are explained- sohaNavaNNAguNaM subhANubhAvaM ca jaM tayaM puSNaM / vivarIyamao pAvaM na thAyaraM nAisumaM ca / / 392 // (1940) Sohagavannaigunam subhanubhavam ca jam tayam pugnam i Vivariyamao pavam na bayaram naisuhumam ca || 3921940). [ zomanavarNAdiguNaM zubhAnubhAvaM ca yat tat puNyam / viparItamataH pApaM na bAdaraM nAtisUkSmaM ca / / 392 // (1940) 445 now Sobhanavarnadigunam s'ubhanubhavam ca yat tat punyam Viparitamatah papam na badaram natisuksmam ca || 392 (1940 1 Trans.--392 (A karma) possessed of properties like bright colour etc. and good fruition is called punya. Pupa is (exactly) opposite to it. ( Both of them are) neither too huge nor too subtle. (1240) TIkA - zobhanAH zubhA varNAdayo varNa- gandha-rasa- sparzalakSaNA guNA yasya tacchomanavarNAdiguNam, tathA yacchubhAnubhAvaM zubhavipAkamityarthaH, tat puNyamabhidhIyate / yat punarataH puNyAd viparItalakSaNam - azubhavarNAdiguNam. azubhavipAkaM cetyarthaH, tat pApamucyate / etaccobhayamapi kathaM bhUtam ? ityAhana mervAdibhAvena pariNataskandhavadatibAdaram, sUkSmeNa karmavargaNAdravyeNa niSpamatvAt nApi paramANvAdivadatimRkSmamiti // 392 // (1940) trust tajjogaM ciya reNuM puriso jahA kayabhaMgo / egalesogADhaM jIvo D. C.--A Karma having splendid colours, odours, taste, and touch, is known as punya. Papa is opposite to punya. So, its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like Meru etc. nor too minute like paramanu, because they are produced by the multiplication of various karmas // 392 // ( 1940 ) savvapyaesehiM // 393 // (1941 )

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446 Jinabhadra Clani's [ The ninth Jinhai tajjogam ciya renum puriso jaha kayabbhango i Egakkhettogadham jiva savvappaesehim // 393 // ( 1941 ) [gRhAti tadyogyameva reNuM puruSo yathA kRtAbhyaGgaH / ekakSetrAvagADhaM jIvaH sarvapadezaH / / 393 // (1941) Orinhati tadyogyameva renum purso yatha kritabhyangah Ekakshtravagadham jivah sarva-pradesaih // 393 / / ( 1941 )] ___Trans.-393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the region, tne Soul also catches ( a substance ) which is worthy of that ( Karma ), and situated in the same region, by means of all ( its ) regoin. ( 1941 ) TokA tasya puNya-pApAtmakasya karmaNo yogyameva karmavargaNAgataM dravyaM jIvo gRhNAti, na tu paramANvAdikam, audArikAdivargaNAgataM vaa'yogymityrthH| tadapyekakSetrAvagADhameva gRhNAti, na tu svAvagADhapadezebhyo bhinnprdeshaavgaadmityrthH| tacca yathA tailAdikRtAbhyaGgaH puruSo reNuM gRhNAti tathA rAga-dveSaklinasvarupo jIvo'pi gRhNAti, na tu nirhetukamiti bhAvaH / idaM ca sarvairapi svapradezai vo gRhNAti, na tu kaizcidityarthaH / uktaM ca egapae mogADhaM sacapaesehiM kammuNo joggaM / baMdhai jahuttahe sAiyamaNaNAiyaM vAvi // 1 // upazamazreNeH pratipatito mohanIyAdikaM karme sAdi badhnAti, zeSastvanavAptopazamazreNirjIvo'nAva banAtItyartha iti // 393 // (1941) D. C.--The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of papa-karmas and punya-karnmas. So, it * does not apprehend those like daramanus and audarika etc which are absolutely unfit. Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the region as that of the Soul and none else. So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc. catches dust, the Soul also being affected by raga-dvesa etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions. .

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Vada ] Ganadha ravada 447 It has, therefore, been said that-- " Egadaesogadham sarvaapaesehim kammu no joggam 1 Bandhai jahuttaheum saiyamanaiyam vavi 11 [ Ekapradesavagadham sarvaparadesaih karmano yogyami Badhinati yathoktahetu sadikamanadikam eapi ] 1 393 11 ( 1941 ) At this stage, opponent raises an objectionavisihapoggalaghaNe loe thuunntnnukmmpvibhaago| jujjeja, gahaNakAle subhA-'subhaviveyaNaM katto? // 394 / / (1942) Avisitthapoggalaghane loe thupatapukammapavibhago Jujjejja gahanakale subha'subhaviveyasam katto ? 11 394 " (1942) [ aviziSTapudglaghane koke sthUlatanukarmapavibhAgaH / yujyeta, grahaNakAle zubhA-'zubhavivecanaM kutaH ? // 394 // (1942) Avisistrpudgalaghane toke sthulatnuvkarmapravibhagah, Yujyeta, grahanakale subha'subhavivecanam kulah ! 1139411 (1942)] Tans.--394 In ( the midst of the world which is crowde with common pudgals, divisons coarse ( sthila ) and subtle ( siksma ) karmas would be justified; ( but ) at the time of apprehension, how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. ( 1942 ) TIkA--nanvaviziSTaiH pratyAkAzapradezamanantAnantaiH zumA--'zubhAdibhedenAvyavasthitaiH pudglaino nirantaraM vyApto'yaM lokaH / tatazca grahaNakAle gRhNato jIvasya sthUla -sUkSmakarmapavibhAgo yujyetA tato " na bAyaraM nAisahumaM ca" iti vizeSaNamupapannam, etadvizeSaNaviziSTAdanyasya svabhAvata eva jIvairagrahaNAt / yattu zubhAzubhavivecanaM tat samayamAtrarUpe karmagrahaNakAle tatkSaNa eva gRhNato jIvasya kutaH saMbhAvyate ?--na kutazciditi parasyAbhimAyaH / tatazca "sauhaNavaNNAiguNaM, ityAdi vizeSaNaM na yujyata iti prerakAkUtamiti // 394 / / (1942)

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448 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth multitudes of D. C.-This world is entirely filled with commen pudgalas scattered in all etherial regoins without any distinction of subha and a-subha. When jiva approhends these pudg alas it is able to recognzie them as nither too sthila, nor too suksam, as jiva is not able to recognize sthula and suksam pudgalas. In such a case, it is possible that va is able to undesstand the distiaction of sthula and suksam. But how is the distinction of subha and a subha justified when jiva tries to apprehend the karma-pudgalas ? // 394 / / ( 1942 ) The reply is- avisiddha ciya taM so pariNAmA --''sayasa bhAvao khiSpaM / kurUte subhamabhaM vA gahaNe jIvo jahAhAraM ||395|| (1943) Avisittoam ciya tam so parinama-"sayasabhavao khippam Kurute subhamasubham va gahane jivo jahaharam ||395|| (1943) [ aviziSTameva tat sa pariNAmA -''zrayasvabhAvataH kSipam / kurute zubhamazubhaM vA grahaNe jIvo yathA''hAram / / 395 || (1943 ) Avisistameva tat sa parinama"-srayarvabhavatah ksipram! Kurute subhamnasubham v8grahane jivo yatha haram ||395 (1643) ] Trans-395 It is common no doubt. (But) at the time of apprehension, the Soul turns it into subha or a-subha immediately, by virtue of its nature of resort and fruition as in case of food. (1943) TIkA-sa jIvastatkarmagrahaNe grahaNakAle zubhA -'zumAdivizeSaNAviziSTamapi gRhNan kSipaM tatkSaNameva zubhamazumaM vA kurute zubhAzubhavibhAgena vyavasthApayatItyarthaH / kutaH ? ityAha - " pariNANAsssayasa bhAva ti" ihAzrayo dvividhakarmaNo jIva AzrayaH, karma tu zubhAzubhatvasya dvividhasyApyAzrayasya svabhAva AzrayasvabhAvaH, pariNAmAzrAzrayasvabhAvazca pariNAmA

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 449 ''zrayasvabhAvau, tAbhyAmetat kurUte jIvaH / idamuktaM bhavati-jIvasya yaH zumo'zubho vA pariNAmo'dhyavasAyastadrazAd grahaNasamaya evaM karmaNaH zubhatvamazubhatvaM vA janayati tathA jIvasyApi karmAzrayabhUtasya sa ko'pi svabhAvo 'sti yena zubhA-zubhatvena pariNamayanneva karma gRhNAti; tathA, karmaNo'pi zumA-'zubhabhAvAdyAzrayasya sa svabhAvaH-sa kazcid yogyatAvizeSo'sti, yena zubhA-'zumapariNAmAnvitajIvena gRhmapANamevaitadrUpatayA pariNamati / upalakSaNaM caitat ; prakRti-sthitya-'nubhAgavaicitryam , pradezAnAmalpabahubhAgavaicitryaM ca jIvaH karmaNo grahaNasaNaya eva sarva karotIti / uktaM ca gahaNasamayamNi jIvo upAei guNe sapaJcayo savajiyANaMtaguNe kammapaesesu savvesu // 1 // AuyamAgo thovo nAme goe samo to ahigo / AvaraNamaMtarAe sarisA ahigo ya mohe vi // 2 // sabkhuvari veyaNIe bhAgo ahigo u kAraNaM kiMtu / muha-dukkhakAraNattA ThiI viseseNa sesAsu // 3 // iti // // 395 // (1943) D. C.-Although these multitudes of Karmas are not distinguished as subha or a-subha originally at the time of apprehension, jiva immediately turns them subha or a-srbha on account of parinama as well as asraya. Jiva is the asraja of Karma which again is the asraya of subhalva and a-subhatva. By tne help of this asraya svabhava as well as the parinama, yir'a apprehends Karma. So, at the time of appre. hension, subhatva or a subhalva of Karmas depends upon subha or a subha purinama produced by jiva. Jiva apprehends karma as subha or a-subha by virtue of its asrayasvubhiva So, when Karma is apprehended by jiva accompanied by subha or a-subha parinama, it is recognized either as subha or 4-subha karma. As in the case of akara, 57

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450 Jinabhadra Cani's | The ninth the karma-pudgalas also immediately undergo changes in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of Karma-pudgalas also undergo immediate changes It has, therefore, been laid down that: "Gahanasamayammi jiva uppaei gume sa-paccayao i Sarvajiyanantagune kammapaesesu savvesu Il lol Ayuyabhago thovo name goe samo tao abigo i Avaranamantarie sariso ahigo ya mohevi 211 Savvuvari Veyanie bhago ahigo in karanam kintu ! Suha-dukkhakaranatta thii visesena sesasu ! 311 (Grahanasmaye jive utpadayati gunan svapraty ayatah Sarvajitanantagunan karma pradesesu sarvesu 111 Ayuskabhagah stoko nammi gotre samastato'dhikah ! Avaranamantaraye sadriso'dhikasca mohe'pi 11 21 Sarvopari Vedaniye bhago'dhikastu karanam kintu ! Sukha-duhkha karanatvat sthitir visesena sesasu 11384 395 (1943;] The example of ahara stated above, is explained in details as follows: pariNAmA-''sayavasao gheNUe jahA pao vismhiss| tullo vi tadAhAro taha puNNA-puNapariNAmo // 396 // (1944) Parinaina "sayavasai dhenie jaha par visamahissa i Tullo, vi tadaharo taha punna purna parinamo 396 11 (194+) [ pariNAmA ''zrayavazateo dhenvA yathA payo viSamaheH / tulyo'pi tadAhArastathA puNyA-'puNyapariNAmaH // 396 / / (1944) Parinama-"srayavasato dhenva yatha paye visamaheh Tulyo'pi tadaharastatha punya-punyapariyamah #396 (1944)] Trans.-396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

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Vada ] GaNGadharavada 451 results as milk ( in case of cow ), and as poison ( in case of serpent ', so also, the result ( in case ) of punya and papa is ( different ) ( 1944 / TokA-"tadAhAro ti" tayorahi-dhenvorAhArastadAhAraH sa tulyo'pi dugdhAdiko gRhItaH pariNAmA-''zrayavazAd yathA dhenvAH payo dugdhaM bhavati, ahestu sa eva viSa-viSarUpatayA pariNAmati. tathA tenaiva prakAreNa puNyA'puNyapariNAmaH ! izmuktaM bhavita-asti sa kazcit tasyA''hAssya pariNAmo yena tulyo'pi sannAzrakavaicitryAd vicitratayA pariNaNati; azrayasyasyApyahidhenulakSaNasyAsti tattad nijasAmarthyam , yena tulyo'pi gRhIta AhArastattadrUpatayA pariNamate, tathA puNyapApayorUpanayayojanA taiveti // 396 / / (1944) D. C.-Although the food of cow and serpent is the same that of cow result as milk while the same result as poison in case of serpent, on account of the distinction of parinama and asraya. So, in spite of aharas being the same, the result is not the same in both cases, because their asrayas-Cow and serpent-are different. Like subha-subha asraya, it also depe nds upon subha-snbha parinama u 396 ( 1944 ) Or, it can be explained in this way also: jaha vegasarIrammi vi sArA--sArapariNAmayAmei / avisiho vAhAro taha kammasubhA-'subhavibhAgo // 397 / / (1945) Jaha vegasarirammi vi sara'- saraparinamayamei 1 Avisittho vaharo taha kammasubha 'subhavibhago // 397 // ( 1945) [yathA vaikazarIre'pi sArA-'sArapariNAmatAmeti / aviziSTa ivAhArastathA karmazubhA--zubhavibhAgaH / / 397 / / (1945) Yatha vaikasarire'pi sara'sarapariga matameti, Avisista ivaharastatha karmasubha-subhavibhagah 1139711 (1945) 1 Trans.--397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body, the distinction of Karma as subha and a-subhi would also take place. ( 1945 )

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452 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth TIkA-dhenu-viSadharayobhirne zarIra AhArasya pariNAma.citryaM drshitm| 'vA' ityathavA, yathaikasminnapi purUSAdizarIre'viziSTe'pyekarUpo'pyAhArI gRhItastatkSaNa evaM sArA-sArApariNAmatAmeti--rasA-'mRga-mAMsAdirasapariNAmaM mUtra-purISarUpamalapariNAmaM ca yugapAgacchatItyarthaH, tathA karmaNo. 'pyaviziSTasya gRhItasya pariNAmA-''zraavazAm zubhA-'zubhavibhAyo draSTavya iti // 397 // (1945) D. C.-Even in case of one and the same body and the same food, the food results either in substantial forms like bile chyle, blood and flesh etc. or in worthless forms like urine, foeces. etc. immediately after it has been consumed. In the same way, subha and a-subka divisions in case of Karma, should also be recognized by reason of distinction of parinama and asraya: // 397 // ( 1945 ) The author now, illustrates the distinction of punya and papa, and establishes their existence by means of agams -- sAyaM samma hAsaM puris-rh--subhaau-naam-gotaaii| puNNaM, sesaM pAvaM neyaM savivAgamavivAgaM / / 398 / / ( 1946 ) Sayam sammam hasam purisa-rai-subhau-nama-gottaiin | Punnani, sesam pavam neyam sa-vivagamavivagam ||3981 (1946) [sAtaM samyaktvaM hAsyaM purUSa--rati-nAma--gotrANi / puNyaM, zeSaM jJeyaM saSipAkamavipAkam // 398 // (1946 ) Satam samyaktvam hasyam purusa-rati-subhayurnama-gotrani Punyain, sesam papam jneyam sa-vipakamavipakam 11398111946 1 Trans.-398 Comfort, right belief ( samyaktva ).. mirth, masculine form love, and virtuous life, name and lineage-all these are known as punya ( prakritis ). The rest should be koown as papa ( parki itis ). ( Both of them may be ) with or without fruition. ( 1946 )

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'Vada ] Ganadharavada 453 TIkA--sAtabedanIyam. zodhitamithyAtvapudgalarUpa samyaktvam , hAsyam, / puruSavedaH, ratiH, zubhAyuH, nAma- gotrANi cetyetata sarva puNyamabhidhIyate / tatra nArakAyuvaMje zeSamAyustrayaM zubham, devaddhika yazaH kIti--tIrthakara nAmAdhAH saptatriMzat prakRtayo nAmakarmaNi zubhAH, gotre punarucairgotraM zubham / etAH SaTcatvAriMzat prakRtayaH kila zumatvAt puNyam / anye tu mohanIya medAn sarvAnapi jIvasya viparyAsahetutvAt pApameva manyate / tataH samyaktvahAsya-puruSaveda -rativarjA dvicatvAriMzadeva prakRtaya. puNyam tadyathA-- sAyaM uccAgoyaM nara-tiri-devAuyAi taha nAme / devadugaM maNuyadurga parNidajAI ya taNupaNagaM / / 1 / / aMgovaMgANa tigaM paDhamaM saMghayaNameva saMThANaM / subhavaNNAicaukaM agurulahU taha ya paraghAyaM // 2 // UsAsaM AyAvaM ujjoya vihagagaI vi ya pasatthA / tasa-bAyara-pajattaM patteya thiraM subhaM subhage // 3 // mussara Aeja jasaM nimmiNa titthayarameva eyaao| bAyAlaM pagaIo puNNaM ti jiNehiM bhaNiAo // 4 // maNitazeSAstu yA dvayazItimA tyastat sarvamazubhatvAt pApaM vijJeyam / samyaktvaM kathamazubham-kathaM tat pApam ? iti cet / ucyate rucirUpameva hi samyaktvaM zubhaM taceha na vicAryate, kintu zodhitamithyAtvapudglarUpam, taca zaGkAyanarthahetutvAdazubhameva, azumatvAca pApam / samyagrucevAtizaye. nAnAvArakatvAdupacAramAtra evedaM samyaktvamucyate, paramArthatastu mithyAtvamevaitat / ityalaM prasaGgena / idaM ca puNya-pApalakSaNamumayamapi savipAkamavipAkaM ca mantavyam-yathA baddha tathaiva vipAkataH kizcid vedyate, kizcitta mandarasaM nIrasaM vA kRtvA pradezodayenAvipAka vedyata ityrthH| tadevaM puNyaM pApaM ca bhedena vyavasthApya nirastaH saMkIrNapuNya-pApapakSaH / itazcAyamayukta:-sarvasyApi sanmizrasukha-duHkhAkhyakAryaprasaGgAt na caitadasti, devAdInAM kevalamukhAdhikyadarzanAt, nArakAdInAM kevaladuHkhamAdhuryanirNayAt / na ca sarvathA sanmitraikarUpasya hetoralpa-bahutvabhede'pi

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454 * Jinabhadra (Jani's [ The ninth kAryasya pramANato'lpa-bahutvaM vihAya svarupato bhedo yujyate / na hi mecakakAraNamabhavaM kAryamanyatamavarNotkaTaM ghaTate / tasmAt mukhAtizayasyAnyad nimittam , anyacca duHkhAtizayasyeti / na ca sarvathakarupasya saMkIrNapuNyapApalakSaNasya hetoH sukhAtizayamabhAvAya puNyAMzavRddhiduHkhAtizayakAraNapApAMzahAnyA mukhAtizayaprabhAvAya kalpayituM nyAyyA, puNyAMza-pApAMzayormeda prasaGgAt / tathAhi-yad vRddhAvapi yad na vardhate tat tato bhinnam ; yathA devadattavRddhAvaNyavardhamAno yazadanaH, na vardhate puNyAzavRddhau pApAMzaH, tasmAt tato bhinno'sAviti / tasmAd na sarvathaikarUpatA guNya-pApAMyoghaMTate / karmasAmAnyarUpatayA tu yadyasau tayoriSyate tadA siddhasAdhyatA, sAta-yaza:-kIyAdeH puNyasya, asAtA-'yazaH-'kIAdestu pApasyAsmAbhirapi karmatvenakatAyA abhyupagamAt / tasmAt puNya-pAparUpatayA vivikte pava puNya--pApe sta iti / tataH sukha -duHkhavaicitryanibandhanayoH puNya--pApayoryathoktanItyA sAdhitatvAd na kartavyastatsaMzayaH / / 398 (1946) D. C-(1) There are 46 characteristics which are subhar and are hence known as penyet-prakritis, They are enumerated as follows:--- Bestowing of gift; propriety of conduct etc purged of ail impurities; mirth; masculine form; affection, the three types of ayus ( union or connection with body viz-divine, human, and tiryanct, ) thirty-seven prakrits of Nama Karma ( including birth as a Tirthankara) and the noble lineage. (2) According to others, there are 42 prskatis under the category of punya. They insist that samyaktva, purusaveda, hasya and rati are papa-praksitis when they are contrary to the nature of fiva. Excepting these four prakritis, the remaining 42 prakratis are laid down by them as nnder Sayam uccagoyam nara-tiri-devauyaim taha name / Devadugam manuyadugam paninda-jai ya tanupanagam alu Angovangana tigam padhaman sanghayanameya santhagami Subhavaqgaicaukkamagurulahu taha ya praghayam 112 11

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455 Vada] Ganadharavada Usasam ayavam ujjoya vihagagal vi ya pasattha Tasa-bayara-pajjattam patteya thiram subham subhagam 113 11 Sussara aejja jasam nimmina titthayarameva eyao i Bayalam pagaio punnam ti Jinehim bhaniao 1 4 11 Satamuccair-gotram nara-tiryage-devayuskani tatha namni i Devadvikam manujadvikam pancendriyajatis ca tanupancakam lilin Angapanaganam trikam prathamam sanhananameva sansthagam Subhayarnadi catuskamagurulaghu tathaca paraghatam 11 2 1 Ucchvasa atapa uddyoto vihayogatirapi prasasta i Trasa - badara-paryapiam pratyekam sthiram subham subhagam 11311 Susyaramadsy am yaso nirmanam tairthakaramevaitah i Dvicatvarimsat prakritayah punyamiti Jinairbhanitah 11 411] The remaining 82 prakritis are recognized by them as papa-prakritis. If someone raises a question at this point that how would samyaktva be called papa-prakriti ? The arswer would be this The virtuous samy aktva whose natural inclination is undoubtedly Subha, is not referred to in this case. The pudgalas that are classed under samyaktva, though purged out of all perversions, are a-s'ubha because of the evil elements like doubt etc. being present in them. So, they come under the category of papa. The purified pudg alas do not very much obstruct the nature of samya kiva. But they are classed under samyaktva merely by means of upacara, and really speaking they belong to the category of muthyatva. (3) Both-pun ya and papa-should either have fruition or no fruition. Hence, some Karmas are recognized in their original form on account of their vipakas, while others have either scanty juice (rasa ) or no juice at all, and hence have very little upaka, So, papa and punga are recognized by virtue of their various regions of parinama, and are distinguished from each other, on account of their mutually opposite qualities.

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456 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth ( 4 ) The view that punya and papa exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if Karma which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in. a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same linie. But it does not happen so in reality. For gods have almost everything of happiness and narakas are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other. Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of punya and papa, the theory that increase of prinya cause abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of papa, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. Yajnada!la who does not grow fat with the growth of Devadatta is different from Devadalta The uniform oneness of punya and papa is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assmption of Karma being common in both, there would be no difficulty. But so far as an individual is concerned, know it for certain that punya and papa are separate from each other, as proved above, and hence O Bhadra l it is not worthy of you to raise any doubt about it. 11 398 11 (1946) Referring to the commandments of Vedas, the auothor statesasai bahi punna--pAve jamaggihottAI saggakAmassa / tadasaMbaddhaM savvaM dANAiphalaM ca loambhi // 399 // (1947) Asai bahi punna-pave jamaggihottaiin saggakamassa Tadasambaddham savam danatphalam ca loammi 11 399 31 (1947) [asatorbahiH puNya-pApayoragnihotrAdi svargakAmasta / tadasaMbadaM sarva dAnAdiphalaM ca loke // 399 / / (1947) Astorbahih punya-papayoragnihotradi svargakamasya Tadasambaddham sarvam danadiphalam ca loke 11 399 " (1947)]

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Vada] Canadharavada 457 Trans,-399 In ( case of ) btnya and papa being absent, the commandment of the performance of the sacrifice etc. ( prescribed ) for one who aspires for Salvation, would become useless. Moreover, all sorts of fruition ( of the good turn ) like munificence etc, (welknown ) in the world would also become null and void. (1947) ___TIkA-puNya-pApayorasatve yadetad bahiragnihotrAghanuSThAnaM svargakAmasya, yaca dAna-hiMsAdiphalaM puNya-pApAtmakaM loke prasiddhaM, tat sarvamasaMbaddhaM syAt. svargasyApi puNyaphalatvAt, puNya-pApayozca bhavadabhimAyeNAsatvAt. tasmAdabhyupagantavye eva punny-paape| tadevaM vedavacanamAmANyAt, yuktitazca cchinnastasya saMzaya iti // 399 / / (1947) D. C.-If there were no prenja -vapa in this world, the commandment of the Vedas that one who aspires for Salvation should perform agnihotra etc, would be of no value. Moreover, the results of actions like dana and himsa in the forms of punya and papa respectively, which a?e welknown in this world, would all be futile. Hence, take it for gronted that punya and papa are cxisting, and leave off your doubts. 1139911 (1947) Thus, chinnammi saMsayammI jiNeza jara-maraNavimukeNaM / so samaNo patraio adbhuTTehi saha khaMDiyasaehiM // 400 // (1948) Chinnammi sansayamini Jizena jara-maraqavippamukkenam! So samano ravvaio addhuthehiin saha khandiyasaehim 1140011 [chinne saMzaye jinena jarA-maraNaviSamuktena / sa zramaNaH prabajito'rdhacaturthaiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 400 / / (1948) Chinne sainsay e Ji: ena jara-maranavipramuhtena i Sa Sramanah pravrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khandikasataih // 4001 Trans.-- 400 When doubt was removed by the T'irthankara who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted diksa along with thus three thundred and fifty pupils (1948) End of the Discussion with the Ninth Garaddara. 58

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Chapter X dshmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara te pancaie souM meajo AgacchaI jiNasagAsa / baccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 401 // 1949 // Te pavvaie soum Meajjo agacchai Jinasagasam i Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami 1 4011 (1949) [tAn prabajitAn zrutvA metArya Agacchati jinasakAzam / bajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 401 / / (1949) Tani pravrajitan srutva Metai ya agacchati Jinasakasami Vrajami vande vandittva paryupase ll 4011 ( 1949) ___Trans.-401 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Metarra comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1949) AbhaTTho ga jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa yasavaNNU savvadarisI // 402 / / (1950) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana-vippamukkenam | Namena ya gottena ya savvanu savvadarisi nam 1140211 (1950) [ AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNaviSamuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 402 // (1950)

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459 vada Ganadharavada Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktenar Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina 1140211 (1950)] Trans-402 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the * Tirthaikara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was onniscient, and who had (attained) complete darsana ( Undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1950) The Tirthankara, then, saidkiM manne paraloo asthi nathi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasi tesimo astho|| 403 // (1951) Kim manne paraloo atthi natthi tti samsao tujjham, Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho 140311 (1951) [kiM manyase paraloko'sti nAstIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH / / 403 // (1951) Kim manyase paraloko'sti nastiti samsayastava! Veda-padanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1140311 (1951) Trans.--403- What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But ( cas ) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation: (1951) ____TokA-AyuSman metArya ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM bhavAntaragamanalakSaNaH paraloko'sti, nAsti vA ? iti / ayaM ca saMzayastava viruddhavedapadazrutinibandhano vartate / tAni ca "vijJAnaghana evaitebhyo bhUtebhyaH" ityAdIni prathamagaNagharoktAni drssttvyaani| " teSAM cArtha na jAnAsi" ityAdi tathaiveti / / 403 // (1951) D. C.-0 long-lived Metarya! your doubt about the existence of para-loka has arisen from your hearing various Veda-padas bearing contradictory senses. These Vede-padas are "Vijnanaghana evaitebhyo bhutebhyo "

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460 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The tenth etc. which have already been discussed in the Pirst Ganadhara-vada // 403 1 ( 1951 ) The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows manasi jai ceyaNNaM majjaMgamau vva bhUyadhammo tti / to natthi paralogo tannAse jega tannAso // 404 / / (1952) Mannasi jai ceyaNGNGam majjangamau vva bhuyadhammo tti i To natthi paralogo tannase jina tannaso || 404 // ( 1952 ) [manyase yadi caitanyaM madyAGgamada iva bhUtadharma iti / / tato nAsti paralokastannAze yena tannAzaH // 404 / / (1952) Manyase yadi cajtanyain madyangamada iva bliutadharma iti 1 Tato nasti paralokastannase yena tannasah // 404 // ( 1952 ) ] Trans.-404 If you believe consciouseness to be the property of bhutas, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the bhitas, the other world will not exist. ( 1952) TIkA-saumya ! tvamevaM manyase-yadi tAvacaitanyaM pRthivyAdibhUtadharma:bhUtebhyo'narthAntarabhUtamityarthaH, yathA guDa-dhAtakyAdimadyAGgebhyo'nantaraM madadharmaH, tarhi nAstyavAntaragamanalakSaNaH paralokaH, yena tannAze bhUtanAze tasyApi caitanyasya nAzo dhvaMso jAyate / yo hi yadanAntarabhUto dharmaH sa tadvinAze nazyatyeva yathA paTAdidharmaH zuklatvAdiH / tato bhUtaireva saha mAgeva naSTasya caitanyasya kuto bhavAntaragamanam ? iti / / 404 / / (1952) D. C.-When you take cartanya as the property of a bhutas like prithvai, it will not be separate from bhutas, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and dhataki puspa etc are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when bhulas meet destruction, their property viz caitanya will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

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461 Vada ] Ganadharavada disappears with the cloth So, when caitanya vanishes with the bhutas, how is it to go to the other world ? 1140411 (1952) Even by taking caitanya as different from bhilas, the existence of para-loka will not be established ---- aha vi tadatyaMtarayA na ya niccattaNamao vinadavatthaM / analassa vAraNIo bhinnassa viNAsadhamnassa // 405 // (1953) Aha vi tadatthantaraya na ya niccattavamai vi tadavatthami Analassa va'ranio bhinnassa vinasadhaminassa 11 405 H ( 1953 ) [athApi tadarthAntaratA na ca nityatvamato'pi tadavastham / analasyevA'raNito bhinnasya vinAzarmaNaH // 475 / / (1953) Athapi tadarthantar ata na ca nityatvamato'pi tadavastham Analasyeva'rasito bhinnasya vinasidharmanah 11 405 II ( 1953 )] ____ Trans.----405 And even if it is different, its perpetuality is Inot ( established ). Hence, like fire, which is transitory and whi'ch ts different from arani, it is transitory ( !953 ) TIkA-athApi tadarthAntaratA bhUtebhyo'rthAntaratA caitanyasyAbhyupagamyate, nanvato'pi tadavasthaM bhavAntaragAmitvAbhAvalakSaNaM dUSaNam: ca zabdo yasmAdarthe, yato'rthAntarabhUtasyApi caitanyasya na nityatvam / kathaMbhUtasyotpattimattvena vinAzadharmakasya / kasya yathA'nityatvam ? ityAha-analasya / kathaMbhUtasya ? bhimasya / kasya ? / araNIto'raNeH / idamuktaM bhavati-bhUtebhyo'rthAntaratve'pyanityaM caitanyam, utpattidharmakatvAt, araNikASTotpannatadbhinAnalabAditi, yacAnityaM tat kimapi kAlaM sthitvA'nalavadatrApi dhvaMsate, iti na tasya bhavAntarayAyikhama, ata itthamapi na paralokasiddhiriti / atha pratipiNDa bhinnAni bhUtadharmarUpANi bahUni caitanyAni neSyante, kintveka eva samastacaitanyAzrayaH sarvatribhuvanagato niSkriyazcAtmA'bhyupagamyate; yata uktam

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402 Jinabhadra Gani's 66 'eka eva hi bhUtAtmA bhUte bhUte vyavasthitaH / ekadhA bahudhA caiva dRzyate jalacandravat // 1 // " / / 405 / / (1953) D. C.-Even if cautanya were taken to be different from bhutas it would not be able to go the other world For, like fire, which is different from arani, catanya is a-nitya, as it dies away after living for sometime. [The tenth The existence of para-lhka is not established from this point of view also. Some might not admit the existence of plenty of caitanyas related to each and every bhuta, and might admit the existence of one all-pervading wskiya soul as said below Eka eva hi bhutatma bhute bhute vyavasthith Ekadha bahudha caiva drisyate jalacandravat | - [There exists ouiy one soul pervading each and every bhuta. Like moon (reflected in) water, it appears as Onc and the same time, in many forms, ] | 405 || (1953) at But even in such a case, there is no scope for paraa -loka, aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natyi paraloo | saMsaraNAbhAvAo vomassa va saJcapiMDesu // 406 / / (1954) Aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natthi paraloo i Samsaranabhavad vyomna iva sarvapindesu 406 (1954) * [ athaikaH sarvagato niSkriyastathApi nAsti paralokaH / saMsaraNAbhAvAd vyomna iva sarvapiNDeSu // 406 // (1954) Trans,--406 If there exists one, all-pervading, inactive (soul), then also, there would be nothing like para-loka because

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 463 of the lack of movement ( on its part) to all beings ( in spite of its being all-pervading ) like akasa. ( 1954) TIkA-abaiMkaH sarvagato niSkriyazcAtmA'bhyupagamyate, nanu tathApi na paralokagamanasiddhiH, tasyAtmanaH sarveSu go-manuSyAdipiNDeSu sarvagatatvena niSkiyatvena ca saMsaraNAbhAvAt, vyomavaditi // 406 // (1954) ____D. C.-Even when the existence of one, all-pervading, inactive soul is accepted, the existence of para-loka will not be established. For, like akasa, it is niskriya in spite of its being sparead over all living beings. 11 406 11 ( 1954 ! The existence of para-loka can be doubted in this manner alsoihalogAo va paro surAilogo na so vi pnyckkho| evaM pi na paralogo suvvaha ya suIsu to saMkA // 407 // (1955) Ihalogao va paro surailogo na so vi pacckkho 1 Evam pi na paralogo suvvai ya suisu to saika 11 407 # ( 1955) [ ihalokAd vA paraH surAdiloko na so'pi prtykssH| evamapi na paralokaH zrUyate ca zrutiSu tataH zaGkA / / 407 // (1955) Ihalokad va parah suradiloko ua so'pi pratyaksah Evamapi na paralokh sruyate ca srutisu tatah sanka 114071|(1955)] Trans.--407 Or, if there is a world like that of gods etc. other than this world, that is also not directly perceived. So, para--loka does not exist even in that way. On the other hand, it has been heard (abeut pura.-loka in the sastras. Consequently, the doubt ( about para-loka) has arisen. ( 1955 ) TIkA-athavA, ihalokApekSayA sura-nArakAdibhavaH paraloka ucyate, sa ca na pratyakSo dRzyate, ata evamapi na paralokaH sidhyati, zrUyate cAsau zrutiSu zAstreSu, tatastacchaGkA kimasti nAsti vA ? / iti darzitaH pUrvapakSaH // 407 / / (1955)

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464 Jinabhadra (Jani's [The nreth D. C- If the existence of some world like that of divine beings or hellish beings, is accepted, since they, too, are not pralya ksa, their existence is also not acceptible On the other hand, the "astras refer to them and tell a lot of things about them. Your doubt about the existence of para-loka is based upon such mutually contradictory facts. 1407 // (1955) Here ends the prirva paksa The author, now, refutes the arguments of purva paksa one after another -- bhUiMdiyAirittassa ceyaNA so ya davao nicco / jAissaraNAIhiM paDivajasu vAubhUha vva // 408 // (1956) Bhuindiyairittassa ceyana so ya davvai nicco Jaissaranaihim padivajjasu Vaubhui vva // 408 // ( 1956 ) [ bhUtendriyAtiriktasya cetanA saca dravyato nityaH / jAtismaraNAdibhiH pratipadyasva vAyubhUtiriva // 408 // (1956) Bhutendriyatiriktasya cotana sa ca dravyato nityah, Jatismaranadibhih pratipadyasva Vayubhutiriva || 408 // (1956) Trans.- 418 Conciousness belongs to ( the soul ) which is distinguished from elements, as well as, sense-organs. Like Vayubhuti, know it for certain therefore, that it is more perpetual than dravya by virtue of its ( power of ) remembering the former birth ctc. ( 1956 . TIkA-iha bhUtendriyAtiriktasya pUrvAbhihitAnumAnAdipramANasiddhasyAtmana eva saMbandhinI cetanA mantavyA, na bhuutdhrmH| sa cAtmA jAtismara NAdiheturdaivyato nitya iti vAyubhUtiriva pratipayasva / ato naikAntAnityatvapakSokto doSaH, paryAyata evA'syAnityatvAditi bhAvaH // 40 // (1956) D. C.--Cetana is not the property of bhutas, but it is the property of Soul, which is different from bhattas, as well as.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 465 indriyas, and the existence of which has already been established been means of anumanas and other evidences. This soul has already by accepted by Vayubhuti as more nitya than dravya on account of its power of remembering its (previous) existence etc. You too, shall have to accept its nityatva, that the fault of exclusive nityatva lleged by you, does not arise. // 408 // ( 1956 ) SO And, na ya ego satragao nikkirio lakgvaNAibhe Ao / kuMbhAdara vva bahavo paDivajra tamidabhUi vva // 409 // (1957) Na ya ego savvagao nikkirio iakkhanaibheao Kumbhadau vva bahavo padivajja tamindabhui vva ||409 (1957) [ na caikaH sarvagato niSkriyo lakSaNAdibhedAt kumbhAdaya iva bahavaH pratipadyasva tadindrabhUtiriva / / 409 / / (1957) Na caikah sarvagato niskriyo laksanadibhedat Kumbhadaya iva bahavah pratipadyasva tadinadribhutiriva >>409||| Trans. -- 409 It is neither one, nor all-pervading, nor inactive. Like Indrabhuti, believe it as many ( in number ) like 1 ghata etc. by reason of various characteristics ( 1957 ) TIkA- na cAsmAbhireka AtmeSyate, kintu bahavaH - anantAH / kutaH ? | lakSaNabhedAt / upayogalakSaNo hi jIvaH, sa copayogo rAga-dveSa- kaSAyaviSayAdhyavasAyAdibhirbhidyamAna upAdhibhedAdAnantyaM pratipadyata ityanantA jIvAH, lakSaNabhedAt ghaTAdivaditi / tathA, na sarvagata AtmA, kintu zarIramAtravyApakaH, tatra tadguNopalabdherityAdizabdopAto hetuH sparzanavaditi dRSTAntazca / evaM na niSkriya AtmA, bhoktRtvAt, devadattavaditi / tadetadindrabhUtiprathamagaNadharavat pratipadyasveti // 409 // (1957) 3 D. C.--According to us, Soul is not one, but infinite in + Vide Chap Ill. 59 For Private Personal Use Only

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466 Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth number, by virtue of its different characteristics Like ghata pata etc, the Soul has various forms on account of various laksanas such as raga, dvesa, kasaya etc. Secondly, Soul is not all-pervading, but it pervadas the body alone. Thirdly, ber cause it is the enjoyer like Pevadatta, it is not niskriya. Thus, like Indrabhuti, + you, too, shall have jo admit 1:4091 (1957) In reply to the argument that the existence of para-loka is denied because of the divine and hellish beings being a-pratyaksa, the author states--- ihalogAo ya paro somma! surA nAragA ya prloo| paDivaja moriA-'kaMpiu vva vihiyappamAgAo / / 410 / / (1958) lhalog&o ya paro Somma ! sura naraga ya paraloo ! Padivajja Moria--'kampiu vva vihiyappamanao 141011 (1058) [ihalokAzca paraH saumya ! surA nArakAzca paralokaH / patipadyasva mauryA-'kampitAviva vihitapramANAt / / 410 // (1958) Ihalokacca parah Saumya | sura narakasca paralokah! Pratipadyasya Maurya'kampitaviva vihitapramanat 14101 (1958)] Trans.--410 Believe the world other than this, O Saumya ! to be that of gods and Narakas on account of evidences that have been advanced (in case) of Maurya and Akampita.* (1958) The opponent will argue at this poini thatjIvo viNNANamao te cANi ti to na prlogo| aha vigANAdaNNo to aNabhiNNA jahAgAsaM // 411 // (1959) itto ciya na sa kattA bhottA ya ao vi natthi prlogo| jaM ca na saMsArI so aNNANA-'musio khaM va // 412 / / (1960) + Vide Chapter I * Vide chapters VII and VIJI

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 467 Jivo vinnanamao tam ciniccam ti to na paralogo i Aha vionanadapno to anabhipno jahagasam // 411 // (1959) Itto cciya na sa katta bhotta ya ao vi natthi paralogo, Jam ca na samsari so annana'-muttio kham va 141211 (1960) [jIvo vijJAnamayastaccAnityamiti tato na prlokH| atha bijJAnAdanyastato'namijho yathA''kAsam // 411 // (1959) ita eva na sa kartA bhoktA cAto'pi nAsti paralokaH / yacca na saMsArI so'zAnA--'mUrtita khamiva // 412 / / (1960) Jivo vijnamayastaccanityamiti tato na paralokah, Atha vijnanadanyastato'nabhijino yatha-kasam # 411.11 (1959)] Ita eva na sa karta bhokta cito'pi nasti paralokah Yvcca na samsari sojnana-murtitah khamiva 1 412 // (1960)] Trans.--411-412 Jiva is ( said to be ) vijnanamaya and vijnana is a-nitya. So, there cannot be paraloka. If it is ( said to be ) different from vijnana, then also, jiva being ignorant like sky, it will neither be doer nor an enjoyer, and then also, there wili be no paraloka. ( For ), that which is ignorant and incorpoeal like akasa, cannot belong to the mundane world. ( 1959-1960 ) TokA-vyAkhyA-jIvo vijJAnamayastAvad yuSmAbhiriSyaye vijJAnAdabhitra ityarthaH / tacca vijJAnamanityaM vinazvaram , atastadabhinnasya jIvasyApi vinazvaratvAd na bhavAntaragamanalakSaNaH prlokH| atha vijJAnAdanyo jIvastato'nitye vijJAne jIvAd minne sati svayaM nityo'sAviti na prlokaabhaavH| yadyevam , tahi anabhijJo jIvaH, vijJAnAdanyatrAt, bAkAva, kASThAdibad vA / ata eva ca nityakhAdevAsI jIvo na kartA, nApi bhoktaa| nityasya kartRvAcabhyupagame hi sarvadaiva tadbhAvaprasAH, tasya sadaivaikarUpatvAt / kartRvAbhAve ca na paralokaH, akRtasya tasyAbhyupagame siddhAnAmapi tatmasaGgAt / bhoktakhAmAve'pi na paralokaH, amoktuH paralokahetubhUtakarmabhogAyogAt / ito'pi ca na paralokaH / kutaH ? ityAi-"ja cetyAdi" yasmASa nAsau

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468 Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth saMsArI, nAsya jJAnAda bhinnasya jIvasya bhavAd bhavAntaragamanalakSaNaM saMsaraNamastItyarthaH / kutaH ? ityAha svayamajJAnatvAt, kASThakhaNDanat / tathA, tedrala, 34541afafall 888-88211 (8848-8860) D. C-Metarya:--You believe jiva to be vijnanamaya. Now, since vijnana is a-nitya, jiva will also be a-nitya. Consequently, there will be no possibility of going to the other world and there will be no para-loka also. On the other hand, if you take jiva to be different from vijnana, jiva will not be a-nitya, but being different from vijnana, it will be ignorant, or dull like sky or wood. Consequently, the soul will neither be karta (doer), nor bhokta (enjoyer). In absence of kartsitva, existence of para loka will be denied. For, if para-loka is taken as existing even in absence of kartritva the Siddha beings that have already attained absolute Liberation will attain para-loka. In absence of bhoktritva also, there will be no para loka, because the soul which is nitya but not bhokta, will not be able to attain para-loka in absence of Karma, which acts as the cause of passing to the other world. This jiva, therefore,. being distinguished from jivana does not belong to the mundane world, as it has no passage to the other world on account of its ignorance like that of wood, and a-murtatva like that of akasa, 11 411 412 i ( 1959-1960) The reply ismanasi viNAsi ceo uppattimadAdio jahA kuNbho| naNu eyaM dhiya sAhaNamaviNAsittevi se somma! // 413 // (1961) Mannasi vinasi ceo uppattimadadio jaha kumbho 1 Nanu eyam ciya sahagavinasitte vi se Somma! || 413 11 ( 1961 ) [manyase vinAzi ceta utpattimadAdito yathA kumbhaH / nanvetadeva sAdhanamavinAzitve'pi tasya saumya ! // 413 // (1961) Manyase vinasi ceta utpattimadadito yatha kumbhah 1 Nanvetadeva sadhanamavinasitve'pi tasya Saumya ! 11413'1 (1961)]

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Vada] Ganadharavada 469 Trans.--413 You take consciousness to be destructible like ghata on account of its ( having ) production etc. (Because) in ( case of ) its indestructibility also, the same is the cause, 0 Saumya ! ( 1961 ) TIkA-nanu ' jIvo viSNANamao taM cANicaM" iti bruvANo nUnaM tvamevaM manyase-vinAzi vinazvaraM cetazcetanA caitanyaM vijJAnamiti yAvat / utpattimattvAditi hetuH / yathA kumbha iti dRssttaantH| AdizabdAt "paryAyatvAt" ityAdiko'pi heturvaktavyaH / yo hi paryAyaH sa sarvo'pyanityaH, yathA stambhAdInAM nava-purANAdiparyAyaH / tatazcAnityAccaitanyAdabhinnatve jIvasyApyanityatvAt paralokabhAva iti tavAbhiprAyaH / na cAyaM yuktaH, yato inta ! naikA tena vijJAnamanityam , yato'vinAzitve'pi "se" tasya vijJAnasyaitadeva saumya ! tvaduktaM sAdhanaM pramANaM vartate / tato'naikAntikastvadukto heturiti bhAvaH / idamuktaM bhavati-utpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyAtmakaM vastu / tatazca yathotpattimattvAd vinAzitvaM sidhvati tathA dhrauvyAtmakatvAd vastuna : kazcid nityatvamapi sidhyati / tatazcedamapi zakyate vaktum-nityaM vijJAnam , utpattimatvAt , ghaTavat / tatazca kazcinityAd vijJAnAdaminnasya jIvasya nityatvAd na paralokAbhAva iti / / 413 // (1961) ____D. C-Since cautanya is susceptible to production, and exists in various forms due to various specific characteristics, you have accepted it to be a-nitya. That whicli exists in various forms due to various paryayas, is a-ritya like paryayas as in the case of old and new paryayas of pillar etc Thus, the Soul which is a-bhinna from the a-urtya caitanya, is taken as a-nutya by you, who have denied the existence of para-loka. But that is not correct. Caitanya-vijnana is not exclusively a-nitya, but any how, it is nitya to a certain extent also. Every object is susceptible to three conditions--production, destruction and perpetuality. So just as a--nityata is established by you on account of utpatti, nityata could also be established by means of the condition of perpetuality. It could easily be stated, therefore, that vijnana is nitya like ghata, and on

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470 Jinabhadra Gani's [ tenth account of the nityalva of jiva, there is no a bhava of para-loka. 413 (1961) Or, ahavA vatthuttaNao viNAsi ceo na hoi kuMbho vva / utpattimadAditte kahakaviNAsI ghaDo, buddhI ? // 414 / / (1962) Ahava atthuttanao vinasi ceo na hoi kumbho vva Uppattimadaditte kahamavinasi ghado buddhi ? // 414 ( 1962 ) [ athavA vastuto vinAzi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva / utpattimadAditve kathamavinAzI ghaTo, buddhi: ? / / 414 // (1962) Athava vastutvato vinasi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva Utpattimadaditve kathamavinasi ghato, buddhih : 414 ( 1962 ) 1 Trans.---414 Or, consciousness does not become destructible like ghata. on account of its being a ( definite ) object. ( The qustion may be that ) How could ghata be indestuctible, when it is suceptible to production etc ? " ( 1962 ) sc TIkA-ekAntena vinAzi vinazvaraM ceto vijJAnaM na bhavati, vastubAt, kumbhavat / tato'sya pratyanumAnasyopasthApanAd viruddhAvyabhicAyepyutpattimavalakSaNo hetuH / yaduktam - " naNu eyaM ciya sAhaNamaviNAsitte vi " ityAdi, tatra parasyaivaM buddhiH syAt / kathaMbhUtA buddhi: ? ityAha- kathamutpatti matvAd dRSTAntatvenApanyasto ghaTo'vindAzI sidhyati ? - na kathaJcit, ghaTasya vinAzitvena supratItatvAt / tatazca dRSTAnte'vinAzitvasyAsiddherdASTantike vijJAne tad na sidhyatIti parasyAbhiprAya iti // 414 // (1962) D. C. --Consciouness is never destructible exclusively on account of its being a definite vastu like ghata. Metarya: When ghata how should it be considered as destructible by all. Thus, when indestructiblity of ghata is is suceptible to production etc, indestructible? It is recognized

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Vada ] Ganadharava da 471 not proved in the illustration stated above, inderstructibility ( in case ) of vajinana also, will not be proved. // 414 // ( 1962 ) Bhag avau replies-- rUva-rasa-gaMdha-phAsA-saMkhA-saMThANa-davva-sattIo / kuMbho tti jao tAo pahAi-vicchitti-dhuvadhammA // 415 // (1963) Tuva-rasa-gandha-phasa-samkha-santhana-dayva-sattio i Kumbho tti jao tao pasui-vicchitti-dhuvadhrmma 1: 415 i ( 1963 ) [rUpa-rasa-gandha-spIH -saMkhyA-saMsthAna-dravya-zaktayaH / kumbha iti yatastAH pramRti-vyavacchitti-dhruvadharmANaH // 415 // (1963) Rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsah-samkhya-samsthana dravya-saktayah | Kumbha iti yatastah prasuti-vyavacchitti -dbruvadharmanah 1131511 Trans.--415 Form, taste, odour, touch, number, configuration, matter, and energy, form kumbha. Por, all of them possess the characteristics of production, destructibility and perpetuality. ( 1963 ). TIkA-iha rUpa-rasa-gandha-sparzalakSaNo guNasamudAyaH, ekalakSaNA saMkhyA, pRthubunodarAdhAkAralakSaNaM saMsthAnam, mRdravyam, jalAharANAdizaktizcetyetAni samuditAni yataH kumbha ityucyate, tAzca rUpa-rasa-gandhasparza-saMkhyA-saMsthAna-dravya-zaktayaH prasUti-vicchitti-dhrauvyadharmiNya utpA. da-vyaya-dhrauvyasvarUpAH, tata utpattimattvAdavinAzyapi ghaTaH sidhyati / / 415 // (1963) D. C.- A group of properties such as form, taste, odour, and touch; the number one etc.. configuration like that of broad portion from the middle etc; matter ( in the form ) of earth; and capacity for holding water; all these properties combine together, and form ghata. Each one of these properties is again perceptible to production, destructibility, and perpetuality. Ghata is, therefore, nitya inspite of its being utpattimat // 415 / / (1963)

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472 Jinabhadra Capi's [ The tenth Explaining the same in details the author proceedsiha piNDo piNDAgAra -sattipanjAyavilasamakAlaM / uppajai kuMbhAgAra-sattipajjAyakhveNa // 416 // (1964) rUvAI davayAe na jAi na ya veha teNa so nicco / evaM uppAya-vvaya-dhuvashAvaM mayaM savvaM // 417 // (1965) * Iha pindo pindagara-sattipajjayavilayasamakalam Uppajjai kumbhagara-sattipajjayaruvena 11 416 11 (1964) Ruvaim davvayae na jai na ya vei tena so nicco 1 Evam uppaya-vvaya-dhuvassahayam mayam savvam 1141711 (1965) [iha piNDaH piNDAkAra-zaktiparyAyavilayasamakAlam / utpadyate kummAkAra-zaktiparyAyarUpeNa // 416 // (1964) rUpAdidravyatayA na jAyate na ca vyeti tena sa nityaH / evamutpAda-vyaya--dhrauvyasvamAva mataM sarvam // 417 // (1965) Iha pindah pindakara-saktiparyayavilayasamakalam Utradyate kumbhakara-sakti - paryaya-rupena 11 416 11 (116411 Rupadi dravyatava na jayate na ca vyeti tena sa nityah i Evamutpada-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhavam matam sarvam 1141711 (1965) Trans:--416-417 The lump (of earth) in this case, is produced in the specific characteristics of the shape and capacity of kambha at the same time, when it is destroyed in the specific characteristics of its (own) shape and capacity. It is produced and destroyed neither by (virtue of) its form etc nor by (virtue of) its matter. It is, therefore, (called) nitya. Everything is thus believed to possess the conditions of (being susceptible to) production, destructibility, and perpetuality. (1964-1965) TIkA-iha mRtpiNDaH kartA / yo'yaM vRttasaMsthAnarUpaH svakIyo mRtpi

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Vada ] NDAkAraH, zakti yA kAcidAtmIyA, evadubhayalakSaNo yaH paryAyastastha yo viyo vinAzastatsamakAlamevAsAvutpadyate mRtpiNDaH / kena ? ityAhapRthubudhnodarAdiko yaH kummAkAraH, tacchakti yA jalAharaNAdiviSayA, etadubhalakSaNo yaH paryAyasvenotpadyate / rUpa-rasa- gandha- sparza- rUpatayA mRddravyarUpatayA cAsau mRtpiNDo na jAyate, nApi vyeti vinazyati / tatasvadrUpatayA nityo'yamucyate, tena rUpeNa tasya sadaivAvasthitavAt / tadevaM mRtpiNDo nijAkArasvazaktirUpatayA vinazyati, ghaTAkAra - tacchaktirUpatayotpadyate, rUpAdibhAvena mRdravyarUpatayA cAvatiSThata ityutpAda--vyaya-- dhrovyasvabhAvo'yamucyate / evaM ghaTo'pi pUrvaparyAyeNa vinazyati, ghaTAkAratayA tUtpadyate rUpAditvena mRdravyatayA cAvatiSThata ityasAvapyutpAda-vyaya - dhrovyasvabhAvamevAbhimataM tIrthakratAm / tatazca yathotpattimattvAda vinAzitvaM ghaTe sidhyati tathA'vinAzitvamapi / tathA ca sati sAdhyadharmiNi caitanye'pi tatsiddhiriti / tadevaM caitanyAdavyatirikto'pi jIvaH kathAzcid nitya eva / / 416 417 // ( 1964 - 1965 ) " Canadharavada 473 D. C.-Properties like the shape and capacity of the lump of earth vanish and at the same time, ghata-having its peculiar shape and its capacity of holding water-is produced. The lump of earth is neither produced nor destroyed in the form of rupa-rasa-gandha-spars'a or dravya. It continues to exist perpetually in these forms. Thus, the lump of earth vanishes in the form of the shape and capacity of ghata, and exists for ever in the form of rapa, rasa, gandha, spars'a and dravya. Similarly, ghata also vanishes in the form of its former paryayas, and comes into existence with new paryayas of ghatakara, and lasts for ever in the form of paryayas of rupa etc. as well as dravya, Consequently, it has also the svabhava of utpatti, vyaya, and dhrauvya. Such is not the case with ghata only, but it is the nature of each and every object of the Universe. So, like destructibility, in-destructibility of ghata is also due to the hetus like utpattimativa etc. Consequently in case of caitanya and atma also, the nityata shoud be. admitted || 416417 / / ( 1964-1965 ) 60

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474 Jinabhadra Gani's [ Tue runth Indicating the existence of para-loka thereby, the author states-- ghaDaceyaNayA nAso paDaceyaNayA samunbhavo samayaM / saMtANeNAvasthA taheha-paraloa-jIvANaM // 418 // (1966) maNuehaloganAso surAiparalogasaMbhavo samayaM / jIvatayA'vatthANaM nehabhavo neya paraloo // 419 // (1967) Ghadaceyanaya naso padaceyanaya samubbhavo samayam i Santanenavattha taheha-paralba-jivanam // 418 // (1966) Manuhaloganaso suraiparaloga sambhavo samayam Jivataya vatthanam nehabhavo neya paraloo || 419 // (1967) [ghaTacetanayA nAzaH paTacetanayA samudbhavaH samakam / saMvAnenAvasthA tatheha-paraloka-jIvAnAm // 418 // (1966) manujehalokanAzaH murAdiparalokasaMmavaH samakam / jIvatayA'vasthAnaM nehabhavo naiva paralokaH // 419 // (1967) Ghatacetanaya nasah patacetanaya samabhavah samakami Santanenavastha tatheha-paraloka-jivanam # 418 || (1966) Manujehalokanasah suradiparalokasambhavah samakami Jivataya'vasthanam nelabhavo naiva paralokah 11419 11 (1967)] Trans.-418--419 Destruction of the cognizance of ghata production of the congnizance of pata, and retention of their continuous range, are (apprehended all at a time. The same is the case with this world, the other world, and the jiva Vanishing of this human world, and coming into existence of the world like that of divine beings, are simultaneous. Retention in the state of) jiva is neither this world nor the other world. (1966-1967) TIkA-ghaTaviSaya vijJAnaM ghaTacetanocyate, paTaviSayaM tu vijJAna paTacetanA /

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475 Vada ] Janadharavada yadA ca ghaTavijJAnAnantaraM paTavijJAnamupajAyate jIvasya, tadA ghaTacetanayA ghaTavijJAnarUpeNa tasya nAza ucyate, paTacetanayA tu paTavijJAnarUpeNa "samayaM" yugapadeva samudbhava utpAdaH, anAdikAlapravRttena tu cetanAsaMtAnena nirvizeSaNena jIvatvamAtreNAvasthAnamiti / evaM ca yathehamave'pi tiSThato jIvasyotpAdavyaya-dhovyasvabhAvatrayaM drshitm| tathA paralokaM gatA jIvAH paralokajIvAsteSAmapyetat svabhAvatrayaM dRSTavyama; tattathA-yadA manuSyo mRtvA muralokAdAvutpadyate tadA manuSyarUpa ihaloko manuSyehalokastasya nAzaH, tatsamakAlameva ca surAdiparalokasya saMbhava utpAdaH, jIvatayA tvavasthAnam / tasyAM ca jIvatvAvasthAyAM vivakSitAyAM nehamavo vivakSyate, nApi surAdiparaloko vivakSyate, kintu niSparyAyaM jIva-dravyamAtrameva vivakSyate / tadevamutpAdavyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvatve jIvasya na paralokAbhAva iti // 418-419 // (1966-1967) __). C.----Cognizance about ghrta is called ghata chtana, and that about pata is called pata-cetana. Whenjiva acquires the cognizance of pata after that of ghata, vanishing of ghata, production in the form of pata, and retention in the form of eternal jiva, are simultaneous Utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya are therefore, the three generic characteristics of jeva, as well as, of those who have passed to the other world. When a person is born in deza-loka aftea death, he undergoes the state of destruction as regards this world, production as regards deva-loka, and perinanent avasthana as regards jiva. When a person is said to exist in the state of jivatva, it is neither sail to exist in this world nor in the other world like that of gods etc. Jiva is called mere dravya without any sort of paryaya. Thus, since jiva has the tendency of undergoing utpada, dyaya and dhrauvya, there is no abhava of the other world. // 418-419 // ( 1966-1967 ) In reply to the question whether all objects possess all the three characteristics, the author states--

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476 Jinabhadra Gani's . [The tenth asao natthi pasaI, hoja va jai, hou kharavisANassa / na ya sacahA viNAso saJcuccheyappasaMgAo / / 420 // (1958) to'vatthiyassa keNavi vilao dhammeNa bhvnnmnnenn| sabbuccheo na mao saMvavahArovarAhAo // 421 // (1969) Asao nattei pasupi, hojja va jai, hou kharavisanassai Na ya savvaha vinaso savvuccheyappasangao i 420 ( 1968 ) To'vatthiyassa kenavi vilao dhammena bhavanamannena ! Savvuccheo na mao samvavaharovarohao 11 421 # ( 1969 ) [ asato nAsti prasUtiH, bhaved vA yadi, bhavatu kharaviSANasya / na ca sarvathA vinAzaH sarvocchedamasaGgAt / / 420 // (1968) tato'vasthitasya kenApi vilayo dharmeNa bhavanamanyena / sarvocchedo na mataH saMvyavahAroparodhAt // 421 // (1969) Asato nasti prasutih, bhaved va yadi, bhavatu khara-visanasya | Na ca sarvatha vinasah sarvocchedaprasangat | 420 // ( 1968) Tato'vasthitasya kenapi vilayo dharmena bhayanamanyena i Sarvocchedo na matan samvyavaharoparodhat il 421 11 ( 1969 )} Trans.--420-421 The non-existant has no production. If it has, there would be production of the horn of an ass ( also ). Nor, is there exclusive destruction. ( For ), it would result in destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of an object existing in a perpetual range by one means, and production ( of the same ) by other means. For fear of obstruction to the mutual usage, exclusive destruction (of everything is not acceptible. ( 1968-3969 ) TIkA-ihaikAntena sarvathA'sato bastunaH prasUtirutpatsinAsti na ghaTate / atha bhavati, tarhi kharaviSANasyApi bhavatu, asttvaavishessaat| tasmAt kenApi rUpeNa sdevotpdyte| na ca sataH sarvathA vinAzaH, kramazaH, sarvasyApi

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Vada ] Ganadharavada - 477 nAraka-tiryagAderucchedaprasaGgAt / tatastasmAt tasyAvasthitasya jIvAderasti kenApi manuSyatvAdidharmeNa vilayo vinAzaH, anyena tu murAdirUpeNa bhavanamutpAdaH, sarvocchedastu na matastIrthakRtAm , saMvyavahAroparodhAt-anyathA vyavahArocchedaprasaGgAdityarthaH, tathAhi-rAjaputryAHkrIDAhetubhUtaM sauvarNakalazakaM mantavA rAjatanayasya krIDArthameva kanduko ghaTitaH, tato rAjapucyAH zokaH, kumArasya tu harSaH, suvarNasvAminazca narapateraudAsonyam , suvarNasyobhayAvasthAyAmapyavinaSTatvAt , ityAdiko yo'sau lokavyavahArastasya sarvasyApyutpAdavyaya-nauvyAtmakavastvanabhyupagame samucchedaH syAt / tasmAt kathaJcidavasthitatve jIvasya na paralokAbhAva iti / / 420-421 / / ( 1968-1969) D. C.-An object which is absolutely a-vulyamana can never undergo production. For, if the production of an a-vidyamana object is admitted, non-existent objects like khara-visapa will also come into existence, which is utterly impossible. It is only a vidyamana object that undergoes production. Secondly, there is no exclusive destruction of a vidyamana object. If there were absolute destruction of everything, even naraki and tiryanca beings would be absolutely destroyed. Jira etc. which are always avasthita, undergo vinas'a by means of characteristics such as that of manus yat va etc. On the other hand, they undergo production by means of charactoristics like that of divine beings etc. But exclusive destruction of all, is never possible for fear of the violation of usual vyavahara. Take an example to understand it more clearly :-Having broked a golden jar belonging to a princess, a ball was made of gold for a prince. On account of that, sorrow on the part of the princess, joy on the part of the prince, and gold being retained in the same quantity' in the form of ball as well as jar, indifference on the part of king who is the owner of gold, constitute loka-vyavahara, If we do not accept utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya in case of all objects, violation of this loka-vyavahara will undoubtedly take place In case of jiva being avasthita there is no para-lokabhava. // 420-421 // ( 1968-1969)

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478 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The tenth And asai va parammi loe jabaggihottAI saggakAmassa / tadasaMbaddhaM savvaM dAgAiphalaM ca loammi / / 422 / / (1930) Asai va parammi loe jamaggihottaim saggakamassa / Tadasambandham savvam danaiphalam ca loammi 1 422 1 (1970) [asati vA vA pasmaeNikloke yadagnihotrAdi svargakAmasya / tadasaMbaddha sarva dAnAdiphala ca loke // 422 // (1970) Asati va parasminlloke yadagnihotradi svargakamasya i Tadasambaddham sarvam danadiphalam ca loke 1 4221 (1970)] ___Trans ----122 In case of the other world being absent, (the commendinent of the performance of) sacrifice etc. for a Hierson aspiring for Salvation, would be useless. Moreover, the fruition of (goon turns like) munificence etc, (welknown) in this world, would also be null and void. (1970) cinnammi saMzayammI jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukkeNaM / so samaNo pavaio tihi o saha khaNDiyasaehiM // 423 // (1971) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim 11 423 11 (1971) | chinne maMzaye jinena jarA-maraNavipramuktana / sa zramaNaH pratrajitastribhistu saha khaNDikazataiH // 423 / / ( 1971 ) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Sa Sramanah pravrajitastribhistu salha khandikasatain // 4231 (1971)] Irans:----423 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his three hundred 'pupils. (1971) End of the Discossion with the Tenth Ganadhara.

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Chapter XI ekaadshmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara te pavvaie souM pahAso AgacchaI jinnsgaasN| vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 424 // 1972 // Te pavvaie soum Pahaso agacchai Jinasagasam i Vaccami ga vandami vanditta pajjuvasami 11 424 8 (1972) [tAn pratrajitAn zrutvA prabhAsa Agacchati jimasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 424 / / (1972) Tan pravrajitan srutva Prabhasa agacchati Jinasakasam i Vrajami vande vandittva paryupase // 424 // ( 1972)] Trans.-424 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Prabhasa, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1972) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNaviSpamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNNU savvadarisI paM // 425 / / (1973) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana-vippamukkenam / Namena ya gottena ya savvanu savvadarisi nam 1142511 (1973)

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480 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh [ AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNaviSamuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 425 // (1973) Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-marayavipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena saryadarsina 1142511 (1973)] Trans --425 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the Tirthaikara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( Undifferentiated knowledge.) ( 1973 ) Having thus addressed him, the Bhagavana said kiM manne nivvANaM asthi natthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atyaM na yANasi tesimo astho / / 426 // (1974) Kim maNGNGe nivyanam atthi natthi tti samsao tujihami Veyapayana ya attham na yanais tesimo attho 11426u (1974) [kiM manyase nirvANamasti nAstIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 474 // (1974) Kim manyase nirvanamasti nastiti samsayastava i Veda-padanam partham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1142611 (1974)] Trans.-~-426 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether nirvana (final emancipation) exists or not. But ( ca ) you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1974) TIkA-he AyuSman ! prabhAsa ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM nirvANamasti na vA ? iti / ayaM ca saMzayastava viruddhvedpdshrvnnnibndhnH| tAni cAmani vedapadAni-"jarAmaya vaitat sarva ydgnihotrm"| tathA, "saiSA guhA dukhgaahaa"| tathA, " dve brahmaNI paramaparaM ca, tatra paraM satyaM jJAnamanantaraM bahma" iti / eteSAM cAyamarthastavacetasi nartate-yadetadagnihotraM tajjarAmaryameva

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 481 yAvajjIvaM kartavyamiti / amihotrakriyA ca bhuutvdhhetutvaacchblruupaa| sA ca svargaphalaiba syAd naapvrgphlaa| "yAvajjIvam" iti cokte kAlAntaraM nAsti yatrApavargahetubhUtakriyAntarArammaHsyAt / tasmAt sAdhanAmAvAd mokSAmASaH / tatazcetyAdikAni kina mokSAbhAvapratipAdakAni / zeSANi tu tadastitvasUcakAni, yato guhAtra muktirUpA, sA ca saMsArAbhinandinI duravagAhA, duSpavezAt / tathA, paraM brahma satyaM mokSaH, anantaraM tu brahma jJAnamiti / tato mokSAstitvaM nAstitvaM ca vedazdamatipAditamavagamya tava sNshyH| tatraiSAM vedapadAnAmarya tvaM na jAnAsi, yatasteSAmayamoM vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 426 / / (1974) D. C.--O long-lived Prabhasa! Your doubt about the existence of moksa is based upon your hearing various Vedapadas of contradictory senses. These V'eda padas are as follows-- (1) "Jara-maryam vaitat sarvam yadagnihotram." (2) "Saisa guka duravagaho" (3) "Dve Brahmani paramaparm ca, tatra param satyam jnanamantaram brahma" etc. These Vedda-padas are interpreted by you as follows:(1) Agnihotra should be practised as long as life persists. The performance of agnihotara constitutes the sacrifice of animals which would turn it Subha or a-subha. But that would award the attainment of svarga alone, and not mokra. Since by this commandment, performance of agnihotra is advised to be practised throughout life, there would be no other period of time during which some other performance foi the attainment of moksa could be advised. In absence of sadhana, therefore, the sadhya (viz moksa) does not exist. In this way, this sentence proves the abhava of moksa The other two padas try to establish the existence of moksa in this way 61

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482 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh (2) The cave of moksa is difficult to be entered by the samsaris. (3) There are two types of Brahama:-- 1 The Parama Branma or principal Brahma is moska and a-parama or subordtnate Brahama is jnana. Your doubt has sprung up from these Veda padas which bear contradictory senses. But you have not grasped their real interpretation. Here, I give their correct interpretation Please listen carefully. // 426 1 1974 ) Bhagavana now states the opponent's view and refutes it, manasi kiM dIvassa va nAso nivvANamassa jIvassa ? / dukkhakkhayAiruvA kiM hoja va se sao'vatthA ? ||427 // 1975) Mannasi kim divassa va naso nivvanamassa jivassa ?' Dukkhakkhayairuva kim hojja va se sao'vattha || 427 !! ( 1975 ) [ manyase ki dIpasyeva nAzo nirvANamasya jIvasya ? duHkhakSayAdirUpA kiM bhaved vA tasya satA'vasthA ? // 427 // (1976) Nanyase kim dipasyeva naso nirvanamasya jivasya ? Dunkhaksayadirupa kim bhaved va tasya sato'vastha 14271(1975)] Trans.-427 Do you think the nirvana ( extinction of life ) to be similar to the extinction of lamp ? Or, would the positive exstence of soul in the form of diminution of miseries etc. be its extinction? TIkA-AyupAn ! pramAsa ! tvamekaM manyase-ki dIpasyevAsya jIvasya nAzo dhvaMsa eva nirvANam ? yathA''huH saugatavizeSAH kecit , tadyathA--- dIpo yathA nirdetimabhyupeto naivAvani gacchati nAntarikSam / dizaM na kAzcid vidizaM na kAJcit snehakSayAna kevalameti zAntim / / 1 / /

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Vada ] Gandharavada 483 jIvastathA nirvRtimabhyupeto naivAvani gacchati nAntarikSam / dizaM na kAzcid vidizaM na kAJcit klezakSayAt kevalameti zAntim // 2 // iti / kiM vA yathA jainAH mAhustathA nirvANaM bhavet ? kiM tat ? ityAha-sato vidyamAnasya jIvasya viziSTA kAcidavasthA / kayaMbhUtA ? rAgadveSa-mada-moha-janma-jarA-rogAdiduHkhakSayarUpA / uktaM ca kevalasaMvid-darzanarUpAH sarvAtiduHkhapAramuktAH / modante muktigatA jIvAH kSINAntarArigaNAH // 1 // iti / / 427 // (1975) D. C.-- Like the Buddhists, do you believe noksa to be no. thing but the extinction of jiva, like that of a lamp ? For the Buddhists, assert that:"Dipo yatha nirvsitimabhyupeto naivavanim gacchati nantarissam 1 Disam na kancid vidisiam na kancit snehaksayat kevalameti santim in ill Jivastatha nirvsitimabhyupeto naivavanim gacchati nantariksami Disam na kancid vidisim na kancit klesaksayat kevalameti santim 121 Or, do you accept moksa, like Jainas who believe the state of nir vana ( final emancipation ) as a peculiar state of the existent jita constituting the removal of raga, dvesa, mada, moka, janma, jara, roga, and duhkha etc ! ___It has been laid down by them, thatKevalasamvid-darsanarupah sarvartiduakha-parimuktah Modante muktigata jivah: ksinantarariganah " nilit 427 ( 1975) Also, ahavA'NAittaNo khassa va kiM kamma-jIvajogassa / aviogAo na bhave saMsArAbhAva eva tti ? // 428 // (1976) Ahava'naittanao khassa va kim kamma-Jivajogassa Avlogao na bhave samsarabhava eva tti ? 11 428 11 ( 1976 )

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484 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh [athavA'nAditvataH khasyeva kiM karma-jIvayogasya / aviyogAd na bhavet saMsArAbhAva eveti ? // 428 / / (1976) Athava'naditvatah khasyeva kim karma-jivayogasya i Aviyogad na bhavet samsarabhava eveti ? 11 423 It ( 1976 ) Trans.-428 Or, is it because Karma and jiva ( which are ) united together eternally, do not undergo separation like akasa, that there is absence of mundane world ?,(1976) TokA-athavA, tvamevaM nanyase-nUnaM saMsArAbhAva eva na bhavet / kutaH ? / aviyogAt-viyogAyogAt kasya ? / karma-jIvayoH saMyogasya / ataH ? / anAditvAtaH khasyeva / iha yayoranAdiHsaMyogastayoviyogo nAsti, yathA jIvA-''kAzayoH, anAdizca jIvakarmaNoH saMyogaH, tato viyogAnupaMpattiH, tatazca na saMsAgabhAva ; tathA ca sati kuto mokSaH ? iti // 428 // (1976) D, C.-There is another grouud also, upon which your doubt is based. Objects that are united with each other from time immemorial, could never undergo separation. Just as jiva and akasa are never separable from each other on account of their anadi samyoga, jiva and karmu will also never undergo separation on account of their anadi samyoga. When Karma is not separated, sainsara will also never be separable. On account of the absence of separation from samsara, the absence of moksa will also be established. // 428 / / ( 1976) ___But, paDiyAja maNDio iva viyogamiha kamma-jIvajogassa / tamaNAiNo vi kaMcaNa-dhAUNa va NANa-kiriyAhiM // 429 / / (1977) Padivajja Mandio iva viyogamiha kamma-jivajogassa Tamanaino vi kancana-dhauna va nana kiriyahim 11 429 11 (1977) [pratipayasva maNDika iva viyogamiha karma-jIvayogasya / tvamanAderapi kAzcana-dhAtvoriva jJAna-kriyAbhyAm // 429 // (1977)

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485 Vada ] Gandharavada Pratipadyasva Mandika iva viyogamiha karma-jiva-yogasya Tvamanaderapi kancana-dhatvoriva jnana-kriyabhain 1142911 (1977) Trans.-429 In this case, you ( siiall have to ) adinit the separation of Karma and jiva, in spite of their eternal union on account of cognizance and action, as in the case of gold and metal. ( 1977) TIkA-" aNAiNo vitti" anAderapi jIva-karmasaMyogasya taM' iti tvaM pratipadyasva viyogam. vandha--mokSavAde maNDikavat / kayoriva tho viyogaH ?! kAzcana-dhAtupASANayoriva / phi nirhetuka eka jIva-karmaNoviyogaH ? / na, ityAha-jJAna-kriyAbhyAm / idamuktaM bhavati-nAyamekAnto yadanAdisaMyogo na bhidhate, yataH kAJcana dhAtupASANayoranAdirapi saMyogo'gnyAdisaMparkeNa vighaTata eva, tadvajjIva-karmasaMyogasyApi samyagajJAnakriyAbhyAM viyogaM maNDikavata tvamapIha pratipadyasvati // 429 // (1977) ___D. C.-.Even the stronnest affnity between gold and metal is broken by the help of heating etc. The same is the case with that between Karma and jiva also. Separation of Karma and jiva is accomplished by means of jnana and krija in spite of their eternal union. It is not true, therefore, to say that the separation of objects joined together by anadi samyoga, is not possible. Like Mandika you. too, shall have to admit that Karma and jiva are separable from each other in spite of their eternal union. / / 429 // ( 1977 ) jaM nAragAibhAvo saMsAro nAragAibhiNNo ya / ko jIvo taM mannasi tannAse jIvanAso tti // 430 // (1978) Jam naragaibhavo samsaro naragaibhingo ya i Ko jivo tam mannasi tannase jivanaso tti il 430 11 (1978) [yad nArakAdibhAvaH saMsAro nArakAdiminazca / ko jIvastvaM manyase tamAze jIvanAza iti // 430 // (1978)

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486 Jinabhadra Gani's Yad narakadibhavah samsaro narakadibhinnasca Ko jivastvam manyase tannase jivanasa iti | 430 [ The eleventh (1978)] Tians - 430 Since samsara includes hellish denizens etc. what jiva do you mean to be different, from hellish denizens etc ? With their destruction, ( there will be ) destruction jiva also. (1978) of TIkA- yad yasmAd nAraka - tiryag- narA-marabhAva evaM nArakAditvameva saMsAra ucyate nAnyaH, nArakAdiparyAyabhinnava ko'nyo jIvaH ? | sispItyarthaH, nArakAdibhAvAdanyatvena kadAcidapi jIvasyAnupalambhAditi bhAvaH / tatastannAze nArakAdibhAvarUpasaMsAranAze jIvasya svasvarUpanAzAt sarvathA nAza eva bhavati, tataH kasyAsau maukSaH ? / iti tvaM manyase ||43|| ( 1978 ) D. C.-Since samsara consists of saraka, tiryanca, human and divine beings, jiva cannot exist as different from any One of them. So, when samsara of narakas and others, vanishes, jiva will also vanish as it is contained in samsara. Thus, when jiva vanishes, who would attain moksa ? // 430 (1978) This belief is refuted in this way na hi nAragAipajjAyamettanAsamma savvA nAso | jIvaddavassa mao muddAnAse va hemassa || 431 / / (1979) kammakao saMsAro tannAse tassa jujjae nAso / jIvattamakammakayaM tannAse tassa ko nAso ? || 432 || (1980) Na hi naragaipajjayamettanasammi savvaha naso i Jivaddavvassa mao muddanase va hemassa // 431 (1979) Kammakao samsaro tannase tassa jujjae naso I Jivattamakammakayam tannase tasya ko naso ? // 432 // (1980) [ na hi nArakAdiparyAyamAtranAze sarvathA nAzaH / jIvadravyasya mato mudrAnAza iva hemnaH || 431 // (1979)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 487 karmakRtaH saMsArastannAze tasya yujyate nAzaH / jIvatvamakarmakRtaM tannAze tasya ko nAzaH ? // 432 // (1980) Na hi narakadiparyayamatranass sarvatha nasah Jivadravyasya mato mudranasa iva hemnah 1 431 // (1979) Karmaksitah samsarastannase tasya yujyate nasah! Jivatvamakaramaksitam tannase tasya ko nasah ? 43211 (1980) Trans.-- 431-432 Like gold. at the destruction of a ring, the substance of jivx is not believed to vanish entirely at the destruction of narakas and other. Samsara is based on Karma. Hence, its destruction with Karma is justified. ( But ) jivatva is not based on Karma. Hence, how could it vanish with Karma ? 1979-1980) TIkA-nAraka-tiryagAdirUpeNa yo bhAvaH sa jIvamya paryAya eva / na ca paryAyamAtranAze paryAyiNo jIvadravyasyApi srvth| nAzo mataH, kathaJcisu bhavatyapi / na hi mudrAparyAyamAtranAze hemnaH suvarNasya sarvathA nAzo daSTaH / tato nArakAdisaMsAraparyAyanivRttau muktiparyAyAntarotpattirjIvasya mudrAparyAyanivRttau karNapUraparyAntarotpattiriva muvarNasya, na kiJcid virudhyata iti / nanu yathA karmaNo nAze saMsAro nazyati tathA tannAze jIvatvasyApi nAzAd mokSAbhAvo bhvissyti| etadapyasAram / kutaH ? ityAha-"kammako ityAdi" karmakRtaH karmajanitaH saMsAraH, tatastannAze karmanAze tasya saMsArasya nAzo yujyata eva; kAraNAbhAce kAryAbhAvasya supratItatvAt / jIvatvaM punaranAdi kAlapravRttatvAt karmakRtaM na bhavati, atastannAze karmanAze tasya jIvasya ko nAzaH?-na kazcida; kAraNa-vyApakayoreva kArya-vyApyanivartakatvAta karma tu jIvasya na kAraNaM nApi vyApakamiti bhAvaH // 431-432 / / (1979-1980) D. C.-Existence of jiva as narakas or tiryancas is merely one of the forms of jiva So, when these paryayas of jiva vanish, the substance of jira or jivatva does not vanish entirely but only partially, just as gold as a dravya, does not

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488 Jinabhadra dani's [The eleventh entirely vanish when ring etc. are destroyed When the maraka paryayas of samsara are destroyed, jiva vanishes as a samsari and comes into existsnce as the paryaya of moksa e. & in case of gold, when one paryaya, sayaring, is destroyed, another par. yaya, say an ear-ring. is produced. Prabhasa: But like samsara, jiva will also have to vanish with Karma, and hence, there will be nothing like moksa. ____ Bhagavana:-It is not so, Samsara is generated by means of Karma, and hence it would vanish with Karma. But, jivat va being at work from times immemorial, cannot be called Karma janya. So, jiva will not vanish Karina, since Karma is neither the cause of jivatva, nor is it invariably concomitant with jivatva. // 431- 432 / / ( 1979-1980 ) na vigArANuvalaMmAdAgAsaM pivaM viNAsadhammo so| iha nAsiNo vigAro dIsai kuMbhassa vA'vayavA // 433 / / (1981) Na vigaranuvalambhadagasam piva vinasadhammo so I Iha nasino vigaro disai kumbhassa va'vayava 11 433 11 ( 1981) [na vikArAnupalambhAdAkAzamiva vinAzadharmA saH / iha nAzino vikAro dRzyate kumbhasyevAvayavAH // 433 // (1981) Na vikaranupalambhadakasamiva vinasadharma sah lha nasino vikaro drisyate kumbhasyevavayavah || 433 // ( 1981)] ___Trans.-433. It ( it. jiva ) is immortal, like sky, on account of the non-apprehension of changes. In case of a destructive ( object'), a change is visible like the (various) parts of a ghata ( 1981 TIkA-na vinAzavarmA jIva iti pratijJA / vikArAnupalammAditi hetuH| iha yo vinAMzI tasya vikAro dRzyate, yathA mudrAdidhvastasya kumbhasyaM kapALalakSaNA avayavAH; astvavinAzI na tasya vikAradarzanam , yathAss

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Vada ] Canadharavada 489 kAzasyeti / tato muktasya jIvasya nityatvAd nityo mokSa iti // 433 // (1981) D. C.-The Soul is immmortal like akasa, because it does not undergo any vikara. That which is destructible, has undoubtedly to undergo vikaraz like the differnt parts of ghata Muklatma being, thus immutable, moksa is also immutable. 11 433 11 ( 1981) Also, kAlaMtaranAsI vA ghaDA vva ghaDovva kayagAio maI honaa| no paddhasAbhAvo muvi tammA vija nico // 434 // (1982) Kalantaranas! va ghado vva kayagaio mai hojja 1 No paddhamsabhavo bhuvi taddhamma vi jam nicco 114341 (1982) [kAlAntaranAzI vA ghaTa iva kRtakAdito yatimavet / no pradhvaMsAmAvo muvi taddharmApi yad nityaH // 434 // (1982) Kalantaranasi va ghata iva kritakadito matirbhavet i No pradhvansabhavo bhuvi taddharmapi yad nityah 143411 (1982)] Trans ---434 Or, the belief may be that it is destructible at a ( certain ) period of time like ghata on account of its being factitious etc. ( But ) it is not so. Indestructibility is everlasting on thls earth in spite of ( its ) having ( destructible ) characteristics ( 1982 ) The author, then, states the opponent's view and its reply-- aNudAharaNamabhAvo kharasaMga piva maI na taM jamhA / kuMbhaviNAsavisiho bhAvo ciya poggalamao so // 435 / / (1983) Anudaharanamabhavo kharasangam piva mai na tam jamha i Kumbhavinasavisittho bhavo cciya poggalamao so 1143511 (1983) [ anudAharaNamabhAlaH svarazrRMgamiva matirna tad yasmAt / kumbhavinAzaviziSTo bhAva eva pugdalamayaH sa / / 435 // (1983) 62

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490 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh Anudaharanamabhavah kharassngamiva matir na tad yasmat, Kumbhavinasavisisto bhava eva pudgalamayah sah 14350 (1983)] Trans.-435 (The opponent might say that) "It has no illustration. Abhava is non-existent like kharasriga" (But) it is not so. The quality of pudgala characterized by the destruction of ghata, is itself (indestructibility). (1983) Or, kiM vegateNa kayaM poggalamettavilayammi jIvassa ? : kiM nivvatsiyamahiyaM nabhaso ghaDamettavilayammi ? // 436 // (1984) Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jivassa ? Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi ? 1 436 11 [kiM vaikAntena kRtaM pudglamAtravilaye jIvasya ? / kiM nirvatitamadhikaM nabhaso ghaTamAtravilaye ? // 436 // (1984) Kim vaikantena kritam pudgalamatravilaye jivasya ?, Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamatravilaye ? // 4361(1984)] Trans.--436 Or, at the destruction of mere pudgalas, how is jiva to be affected ? At the destruction of ghata, how is sky affected all the more ? + (1984) The author proves immortality of muktatma by another inference also, datvAmuttattaNao mutto nicco nabhaM va davyatayA / naNu vibhuyAipasaMgo evaM sai naannumaagaao|| 437 // (1985) Davvamuttattanao mutto nicco nabham va davvatayai Nanu vibhuyaipasango evam sai, najumanao il 437 11 (1985 [davyAmUrtatvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyatayA / nanu vibhutAdimasaGga evaM sati, nAnumAnAt / / 437 / / (1985) +Vide v. 1839.

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491 Vada ] Canadharavada Dravyamurtvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyataya , Nanu vibhutadiprasanga evam sati, nanumanat 143711 (1985)] Trans.-437 The free ( soul) is everlasting like sky, on account of the incorporeal nature of (its) substance. ( The opponent might object here that ) "In that case, there would be all-pervading characteristic etc as well." (But ) it is not so, because of (an opposite inference ). (1985) TIkA-nityo muktAtmA, dravyatve satyamUrtatvAta: "davvataya ti" yayA dravyatve satyamUrtatvAd nityaM nmH| Ai-nanvanena dRSTAntena vyApakakhAdhapi sidhyati jIvasya; tathAhi-vimuApakaH sarvagato jIvaH, dravyatve satyamUrtatvAta, yathA nmH| tadevad na / kutaH ? / sarvagavatvabAdhakAnu mAnasadbhAvAta; tathAhi-tvaparyantadehamAtravyApako jIvaH, tatraiva tadvaNopalambeH, sparzanavat, ityunumAnAd bAdhate sarvagatatvaM jIvasya / evaM " na badhyate nApi mucyate jIvaH dravyatve satyamUrtatvAta, namovat" ityApi dUSaNaM, "vadhyate puNya-pApakarmaNA jIvaH, dAna-hiMsAdi kriyANAM saphalatvAta, kuSyAdikriyAvat, tathA, vighaTate samyagupAyAt ko'pi jIva-karmasaMyogA, saMyogasvAta, kAzcana-dhAtupASANasaMyogavat" ityAdhanumAnAt parihartavya. miti / / 437 / / (1985) D. C.-Like akasa dravya, jiva dravya of a free soul is also nitya, because it is a-murla as a drapya. Prabhasa :-~-As you proved rityatva ( in case) of muktaina by the help of the example of sky, the example will lead to prove other characteristics of sky, in muktalma, say for example like sky, muktalma is all pervading due to its a-murtatva. Similarly, it can also be said that jiva dravya has neither bandha nor moksa just as akata dravya has none due to a-murtatva. . Bhagavana -- It is not proper to establish other characteristics such as vibhuti etc in mu klatma by the help of the example of sky. Because, there is another inference opposite

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492 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh to it, which contradicts the existence of those characteristics, Say, for example, jiva is pervading only upto the skin of body like the sense of touch, because the jivalva is found only in body. This anumaua refutes the all-pervading nature of jiva. Similarly, the anumanas that jivas are formed by means of punya and papa, and that the combination of jiva and Karma could, any how, be brought about like the combination of gold and stone, refute the assertion that jira has neither bandha nor moksa due to the a-murtatva of its dravya like akasa. // 4371 (1985) Or, ko vA nizcaggAho savvaM ciya vi bhava-bhaGga-ThiimaiyaM / pajAyataramettappaNAdanivAivavaeso // 438 // (1986) Ko va niccagaho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-thiimaiyam | Pajjantaramettappapadiniccaivavaeso 438 // (1986) [ko bA nityagrahaH sarvamevApi bhava-mA-sthitimayam / paryAyAntaramAtrArpaNAdanityAdivyapadezaH // 438 // (1986) Ko va nityagrahah sarvamevapi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam Paryayantaramatrarpanadanityadivyapadesah # 438 4 (1986)] Trans.-438 Or, why insist upon immutability (at all)? Everything is suceptible to the state of production-break-and retention. Only by (means of) imposition of various methods, attributes like mutability etc, are designated + (1986) TIkA-atha kathaJcidanityatve'pi mokSasya na kiJcid na kSuyata iti bhAvaH / iha "kAlaMtaranAsI vA ghaDo vva" ityAdigAyAH pAgapi SaSThagaNadhare pandha- mokSavicAre vyAkhyAtA eva / tato yadiha na vyAkhyAtaM tat tato'vagantavyamiti // 438 / / (1986) + Vide v. 1843.

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Vada ] Canadharayida 493 ___D. C.--It is no use insisting exclusively upon nityala of mu klatma. Its a-uit yatu could also be admitted to a certain extent by means of various methods. But, realy speaking, all objects are susceptible to utpada-wyaya-and ahrauvya // 43811 (1986) For a detailed discussion of bandha and moksi, see Chap. VI. Now, in reply to the assertion that the extinctien of soul resembles that of lamp etc, the author states na ya savvahA viNAso'Nalassa pariNAmao payasseva / kuMbhassa kavAlANa va tahAvigArovalaMbhAo / / 439 // (1987) Na ya savvaha vinaso'nalassa parinamao payasseva / Kumbhassa kavalana va tahavigarovalambhao 1 439 II (1987) [na ca sarvathA vinAzo'nalasya pariNAmataH payasa iva / kumbhasya kapAlAnAmiva tathAvikAropalabhmAt // 439 // (1987) Na ca sarvatha vinaso'nalasya pariamatah payasa iva i Kumbhasya kapalanamiva tathavikaropalambhat || 439 // (1987), Trans.-459 Fire being mutable like milk, does not vanish entirely, because of the apprehension of changes like those (in case) of the pieces of ghata. (1987) TIkA--na pradIpAnalasya sarvaprakAraivinAzaH, pariNAmatvAt, payaso dugdhasyeva; athavA, yathA mudgarAdhAhatasya kapAlatayA pariNatasya ghaTasya, yathA vA cUNIkRtAnAM kapAlAnAm / kuto na sarvathA vinAzaH ? / ityAha-tathA tena rUpAntaraprakAreNa vikArasya pratyakSAdipramANopalambhAditi // 439 // (1987) ___D. C.-When a lamp. is extinguished its. fire does not enirely vanish. It is only mutable like milk. So, like milk turning into curds or like ghata changing into various pieces

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494 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh by means of a stick etc, light changes into darkness, but it does hot vanish absolutely. // 439 / / ( 1987 ) Again, there is an objection, and its replyjai samvahA na nAso'Nalassa kiM dIsae na so sakakhaM ? pariNAmasuhamayAo zalayavigAraMjaNarau vva // 440 // (1988) Jai savvaha na naso'nalassa kim disae na so sakkham ? Parinamasuhumayan jalayavigaraijanarau vva || 440 // ( 1988) [ yadi sarvathA na nAzo'nalasya kiM dRzyate na sa sAkSAt ? / pariNAmamakSmatAto jaladavikAro'JjanarAja iva / / 440 // (1988) Yadi sarvatha na naso'nalasya kim drisyate na sa saksat, Parinamasiksimatato jaladavikaro'njanaraja iva // 440 // ( 1988 )] Trans.---440 " If there is no absolute extinction of light, why it is not seen before our eyes ?"" Because of the subtlety of fruition as in the case of a change in cloud or dust particle, ( 1988 ) TIkA-yadi sarvathA'nalasya na nAzaH, tarhi vidhyAtAnantaraM kimityaso sAkSAda va dRzyame ? / atrottaramAi-" pariNAmetyAdi " vidhyAte pradIpe'nantarameva tAmasapudgalarUpo vikAra samupalabhyata eba, ciraM cAsau purastAd yada nopalabhyate, tat sUkSma-sUkSmatarapariNAmabhAvAt / tathAhi-vizvIryaNANasya jaladasyApi yaH kRSNAbhrapudglavikAraH sa pariNAmasaumyAda nopalabhyate / tathA, aJjanasthApi pavanena hiyamANasya yadutkRSTaraja uDDIyate tadapi pariNAmasaukSamyAda nopalabhyate na punarasatvAditi / / 440 / / (1988) D. C.--Prabhasa:-~-If there were no absolute extinction of fire, why is it not perceived before our eyes ? Bhagavana: The vzkara of the light extinguished via darkness-is not directly perceptible, because its parinama is very subtle in form, Changes in a black cloud at the time of dissolution of a cloud, are not perceived because of their very

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 495 subtle parinama, and the pollen of a collyrium also blown away by wind, is not directly perceived, because it is very minute. But in no way, it means that it does not exist So, the vikara of darkness in case of light is also non apprehensible, not because it is non-existent but because its parinamais saksma. || 440 // ( 1988) Also, houNa iMdiyaMtaragajhA puNaridiyaMtaraggahaNaM / khaMdhA eMti na ti ya poggalapariNamayA citA // 441 // (1989) Houva indiyantaragajjha puparindiyantaraggahanam Khandha enti na enti ya poggalaparinamaya citta || 441 // (1989) [bhUtvendriyAntaramAyAH punarindriyAnsaragrahaNam / skandhA yAnti na yAnti ca pudagalapariNAmatA citrA // 441 // (1989) Bhutvendriyantaragrahyan punarindriyantargrahanam i Skandha yanti na yanti ca pudgalaparinamata citra 11441.1 (1989)] Trans.---- 441 (Some ) objects apprehensible by (one group of ) sense organs, are again, apprehended by ( another group of ) sense-organs, while others are not apprehended ( by another set of sense-organs ). Manifold is the nature of their fruitions. ( 1989) TIkA-iha suvarNapatra-lavaNa-muNThI--harItakI--citraka- guDAdayaH ska. ndhAH pUrvamindriyAntaramAsAzcakSurAdIndriyaviSayA bhUtvA punadravya-kSetra kAlAdi sAmagyantaraM prApya pudgalapariNAmavecicyAdindriyAntaragrahaNaM sparzana- rasanAdindriyagrAkhatAmAyAnti; tathAhi- suvarNa patrIkRtaM cakSuhyaM bhUtvA zodhanArthamanau prakSiptaM bhasmanA militaM sat sparzanendriyagrAkhatAmeti, puna: prayogeNa bhasmanaH pRthakkRta cakSurviSayatAmupagacchati / lavaNa-muNThI--harItakI--citrakaguDAdayo'pi prAk cakSurindriyagrAthA bhUtvA pazcAt rUpAdyante vahoSaSasamudAye ca kAtha cUrNA--'valehAdi pariNAmAntaramApanA: santo rasanendriyasaMvedhA bhavanti / karpUra- kastUrikAdinAmapi pudgalAvAyA api vAyunA

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496 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh daramupanItA ghrANasaMvedhA bhavanti / yojananavakAttu parato gatAstathAvidhaM katrita mukSmapariNAmamApanA naikasyApIndriyasya viSayatAM pravipadhanta iti / anayA dizA'nyApi pudgalapariNAmatA citrA bhAvanIyeti // 441 // (1989) D. C.-The manifold nature of pulgaia-parinamas is explained by means of the following example. Substances such as a sheet of gold, salt, ginger, haritaki ( yellow myrobalans , citra kavela, jaggery etc-are first apprehended by senseorgans like eye etc, and then they undergo apprehension by means of other sense-organs such as that of touch, taste etc, when accompained by different substances, surrounding and times etc. A sheet of gold is first apprehended by eyes, but when passed through fire and mixed with ashes fer purification, it is apprehended by the sense of touch as well. Afterwards when it is separated from it, again it becomes apprehensible by eyes. The same is the case with objects like salt, ginger, green vegetables, jaggery etc. They are also caksurgrahya at the first instance, but when mixed with ashes or or other groups of medicines or when turned into liquid, powder or paste, they are perceived by the sense of touch. Pragalas like camphor and musk although perceptible by eyes at first. undergo perception by the sense of smell, when carried by wind to a long distance. On the other hand, some pudgalas when carried to a distance longer than nine yojanst do not undergo perception by means of any sense-organ on acconnt of their subtle change. In all these cases, variegated nature of the changes of pudgalas, is the main cause. Il 441 H ( 1989 ) Beside, egegeMdiyagajjhA jaha vAyavvAdo thggeyaa| houM cakabuggajmA pANidiyagajhayAmeMti / / 442 // (1990) + one Yojana-Four Kasas or 9 mile approximately,.

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Vada] Gasadharavada 497 Egegendiyagajjha jaha vayavvadao tahaggyea i Houm cakkhuggajjha ghanindiyaggijhayamenti 11 442 11 ( 1990 ) [ ekaikendriyagrAhyA yathA vAyavyAdayastayA''gneyAH / bhUtvA cakSu hyA dhoNendriyagrAhyatAM yAnti // 442 // (1990) Ekaikerdrtyagrahya yatha vayavyadayastatha"greyah i Bhutva caksurgahya ghrargendriyagrahyatam yanti 1144211 (1990)} Trans.-442 Just as ( the particles of : wind etc, are perceptible by each single sense-organ ( one by one ), ( those ) of fire also undergo perception by means of the sense of smell, after being perceptible by eyes. ( 1990 ( TokA-vAyuH sparzanendriyasyeva grAhyA, raso rasanasyaiva, gandho dhrANasyaiva, rUpaM cakSuSa eva, zamdastu zrotrasyaiva grAhyaH / tadevaM yathA vAyAvyadayaH pugdulA ekakasya pratiniyatasyendriyasya grAkhA bhUtvA pazcAt pariNAmantaraM kimapyApanA indriyAntaragrAhyA api bhavantIti svayameva gamyate, tathA prastutA api pradIpagatA AgneyAH pudglAzcakSudhA bhUtvA pazcAd vidhyate tasmin pradIpe ta eva tAmasIbhUtAH santo dhANendriyagrAhyatAmupayAnti, tat kimucyane-" ki dIsae na so sakkhaM " iti ? / nanu ghrANendriyeNopalabhyata eva vidhyAtapadIpavikAra iti / 442 / / ( 1990 ) ___D.C-Wind is perceptible by the sense of touch, juice by that of taste alone, odour by that of smell alone, form by that of eyes alone, and sound by that of ears alone. The Farticles of vayze are thus apprehended by one particular sense only. Still however, these pudgalas are apprehended by other sense-organs also when they undergo changes. In case of light, part:cles of flame are perceptible by eyes. When light is extinguished, these particles change into darkness, and are percetved by the sense of smell. Light, therefore, does not turn into nothingness, but its change into darkness is apprehended, // 442 / / ( 1990 63

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498 Jinabhadra Gapi's (The eleventh jaha dIvo nivvANo pariNAmantaranio tahA jiivo| bhaNNai parinivvANo pattA'NAbAhapariNAme / / 443 // (1991) Jaha divo nivvapo parinamantaramio taha jivo i Bhangai parlnivvano patto'nabahaparinamam 1 433 11 (1991) [ yathA dIpo nirvANaH pariNAmAntaramitastathA jIvaH / maNyate parinirvANaH prAtpo'nAvAdhapariNAmam // 443 // (1991) Yatha dipo nirvanah parinamantaramitastatha jivah Ehanyate parinirvanah prapto'nabadhaparinamam ||443 // (1991)] Trans.- 443 Just as light changed into another from, is said to have attained nirvina (iinal extinction), the Soul also, is said to have attained nirvana (final liberation) when it has turned into a faultless form. (1991) TIkA-yayA'nantaroktasvarUpapariNAmAntaraM prAptaH pradIpo "nirvANaH" ityucyate tathA jIvo'pi karmavirahitakevalAmUrtajIvasvarUpamAvalakSaNaHNASAghaM pariNAmAntaraM prApto nirvANo niti prApta ucyate / tasmAd duHkhAdikSasyapA sato'vasthA nirvANamiti sthitam / / 443 // ( 1991 ) D. C. Just as light is said to have attained nirvana when it changes into darkness, the Soul is also said to have attained nirvana when it has changed into a form which is void of Karma, and which possesses absolutely a-Furta characterlstics of the form and nature of Soul. This shows that moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of jiva when miseries etc are exterminated. Prabhasa:--If moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of jiva, at the removal of miseries etc, then, in absence of objects of pleasure like sabda etc, the free Soul will have no happiness 11 443 . (1991) Bhagavana replies:

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Vada ] Canadharavada 499 muttassaM paraM sokkhaM jANANAbAhao jahA muNaNo / taddhammA puNa virahAdAvaraNA-''bAhahe UNaM // 444 // (1992) Muttassa param sokkham nananabahao jaha munino Taddhamma puna virahadavarna-'bahaheunam 1144411 (1992) [muktasya paraM saukhyaM jJAnAnAbAdhato yathA muneH / taddharmA punarvirahAdAvaraNA--''vAdhahetUnAm // 444 // (1992) Muktasya param sauk hyam jnananabadhato yatha muneh 1 Taddharma punarvirahadavarana -"bhadhahetunam 1444(19992)] Trans - 444 Like a sage, the free soul (enjoys) perfect happiness by virtue of) its (high) knowledge, in absence of (all) obstructions. In absence of interruptions and obstructions, it (enjoys) (all, its qualities (1992) ___TIkA-muktasya jantoHparaM prakRSTama trimamithyAbhimAnajaM svabhAvika sukhamiti / " NANANAbAhau ti" jJAnaprakarSe sati janma-jarA * vyAdhi-maraNe-TaviyogA-'rati-zoka kSut-pipAsA-zItoSNa-kAma-krodhamada-zAThaya-tRSNA-rAga-dveSa--cintaurakyAdiniH zeSAbAdhavirahitatvAditi hetuH / tathAvidhamakRSTamuneriva / yathoktAvAdharahitAni kASThAdInyapi vartante, paraM teSAM jJAnAbhAvAd na sukham : atastadvayavacchedArtha jJAnagrahaNam / kayaM punarasau prakRSTajJAnavAn , AvAdharahitazca ? ityAha--" taddharmetyAdi" tadarmAprakRSTajJAnA-'nAbAdhavAn muktAtmA / kutaH? / virahAt-amAvAt / keSAm ? / AvaraNa hetUnAm , AbAghahetUnAM ca / etaduktaM bhanati-kSoNaniHzeSAvaraNatvAt prakRSTajJAnavAnasau. vedanIyakarmAdInAM ca sarveSAmapyAbAghahetUvAM sarvathA'pagamAt sarvA''vAdharahito'yamiti / prayogaH svAbhAvikena svena prakAzena prakAzavAn muktAtmA, samastaprakAzAvaraNarahitvAtat , tuhinAMzuvat / tathA cAha sthitaH zItAMzuvajjIvaH prakRtyA bhaavshuddhyaa| candrikAva vijJAnaM tadAvaraNamabhravat // 1 // iti / tayA, anAbAghamukho muktAtgA, samastAbAghaheturahivatvAt . aparAdhapagame svacchA''turabat / tathA coktam

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500 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh sa vyAvAdhAbhAvAt sarvajJatvAcca bhavati prmsukhii| vyAbAdhAbhAvo'tra svacchasya zasya paramasukham // 1 // sfa li 888 11 (8882) D. C.-Muktatma enjoyes a perfect but natural happinees. When there is uo avarana, it attains high congnizance and when there is absolute abhava of Karma, which is nothing but a cause of un-happiness, it is free from all sorts of miseries. So, like a sage, muktalmu enjoys the delight of high cognizance. It enjoys perfect happiness as it is free from the miseries of birth, old age, disease, death, separation from the beloved, absence of love, sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire, anger, pride, passion, hatred, anguish, wickedness, and eagerness etc. Like the Sun, the free soul shines by its own lustre It has, therefore, been said that Sthitah sitansuvajjivah praksitya bhavasuddhaya , Candrikavacca vijnam tadavaranamabhravat With reference to the unobstructed liappiness, it has also been said -- Sa vyabadhabhavat sarvajnatvacca bhavati paramasukhi i Vyabadhabhavo'tra svacchasya jnasya paramasukham 11 211444, 1992)] The oppoment, then, asks and Bhagavan replies-- mutto karaNAbhAvAdaNNANI kha va, naNu viruddho'yaM / jamajIvayA vi pAvai etto ciya bhaNai tannAmaH // 445 // (1993) Mutto karanabhavadannani kham va, nanu viruhdho'yami Jamajivaya vi pavai etto cciya bhanai tannama il 4451 ( 1993) [muktaH karaNAbhAvAdanAnI khamiya, nanu virudo'yam / yadajIvatApi prAmotyetasmAdeva maNati tamAma // 445 // (1993) Muktah karanabhavadajnani khamiva, nanu viruddho'yami Yadasivatapi prapnotyetasmadava bhanti tannama 1144511 (1993)]

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vada ] Ganadharavada 501 absence of sense. that case, it would ( attain lifelessness. ) ( 1993 ) Trans.-445 A free ( soul ) is ignorant like the sky, in " This is really fallacions. Because, in attain lifelessness, as well. Let it "" " "9 "" 6" TIkA -- nanvajJAnI muktAtmA, karaNAbhAvAt, AkAzavat / atrAcAryaH mAha - nanu dharmisvarUpaviparItasAdhanAd viruddho'yaM hetuH / tathAhi--anenaMtadapi sidhyati - ajIvo muktAtmA, karaNAbhAvAt, AkAzavat / atra paraH sotkarSa maNati- 46 tannAma tti " 'nAma' ityabhyanujJAyAm - astvetat, na naH kimapi yate / na hi muktAtmanAmajIvatve'smAkaM kiJcid nazyati, yena hetorviruddhatA preryamANA zobheta / atrAha kazcit nanu muktasyAjIvatvamAItAnAmapyaniSTameva tatazcaitad dUSaNamAcAryeNApi parihartavyameva, yaccAtmano'pi dUSaNaM samApatati tat kathaM parasyevaikasyodbhAvyate ? | satyametat, kintu parazaktiparIkSArtha preryamAcAryaH kRtavAn, kadAcit kSobhAU vigalitamatibhaH paro'trApi pratividhAne skhalitastUSNIM vidadhyAt / paramArthastu jIvasyAjIvatvaM kadAcidapi na bhavatyeva // 445 // (1993) D. C - Prabhasa:--- When a muktatma is free from senseorgans, it will be called ignorant like akassa. Bhagavana:----It is not so. The argument advanced by you, proves even a contrary parayaya of soul. It will prove muktatma to be lifeless in absense of indriyas. Prabhasa:-Well, what is wrong if muktatma is taken as lifeless ? / 445 | ( 1993 ) Bhagavana replies davvA--'muptapta sahAvajAiMo tassa dUravivarIyaM / na hi jacataragamaNaM jutaM nabhaso vva jIvantaM // 446 // (1994) Davva-'muttatta sahavajaio tassa duravivariyam Na hi jaccantaragamanam juttam nabhashvva jivattam ||446 (1994)

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502 Jinabhadra Gani's 1 The eleventh [ dravyA'mUrvakhavat svabhAvajAtitasya dUraviparItam / na hi jAtyantaragamanaM yuktaM nabhasa iva jIvanam / / 446 // (1994) Dravya'murtatvavat svabhavajatitasya duraviparitam Na hi jatyantaragamanam yuktam nabhasa iva jivatvam 1144611 (1994)] Trans.--446 By virtue of its natural genesis like dravyatva and a-mirtatvn it is far the most fallacious. Like life to sky its transgression to other gensis, is not proper. (1994) TIkA-tasya muktAtmano hi yasmAt kAraNAd na yuktamiti saMbandhaH / kiM tad na yuktam ? ityAha-ekasyA jIvakhalakSaNAyA jAteyaMdajIvakhalakSaNaM jAtyantaraM tatra gamanaM jAtyantaragamanam . tanna yuktam / kathaMbhUtaM jAtyantaram ? ityAha-daramatyathai viparItaM dUraviparItam / kasyA dUraviparItam ? ityAha" sahAvajAiutti" jIvakhalakSaNA yA svAbhAvikI svabhAvabhUtA jAtiH svbhaavjaatistsyaaH| kiMvad yA svabhAvajAtiH ? ityAha-upamAnapradhAnasvAd nirdezasya, dravyA-'mUrtatvavaditi dravyatvavadamUtatvavaccetyarthaH / svabhAvajAtedaraviparItaM sat kasya yathA kiM na yuktam ? ityAha-nabhasa iva jIvatvam / idamatra hRdayam-dravyatvam, amUrtatvaM ca jIvasya tAvat svabhAvabhUtA jAtiH, tasyAzca yad daraviparItaM jAtyantaramadravyabam, amUrtatvaM ca, tatra gamanaM tasya kasyAmapyavasthAyAM na bhavati / evaM jIvakhamapi jIvasya svabhAvabhUtaiva jAtiH, tatastasyA api svabhAbajAteyad daraviparItama jIvakhalakSaNaM jAtyantaraM tatra gamanaM muktAvasthAyAmapi tasya na yujyte| na khajIvasya sato nabhasaH kadAcidapi jIvatvAmAptibhavati / tasmAd mukto| jIvo yathA'dravyaM mUrtazca na bhavati, tadvipakSasvabhAvatvAt evaM jIvakhAmAvyAda jIvo'pyasau kadAcidapi na bhavatiH anyathA nabhaH-paramANvAdInAmapi svasvabhAvatyAgena vaparItyApazyAtiprasaGgAditi / __ atrAha-yaghevam, tahi yad bhavataivoktam-" ajIvo muktAtmA, kAraNAbhAvAt, AkAzavat '' iti, tat kathaM netavyam ? / atrocyate-parasya prasakA. pAdanameva tadasmAbhiH kRtam, tatkaraNe ca kAraNamuktameva, na punaranena hetunA muktasyAjIvatvaM sidhyati, pratibandhAmAvAt ; tathAhi-yadi karaNairjIvatvaM kAditi /

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Vada] Gapadharavada 503 kRtaM bhavet, yathA dahanena dhUmaH, vyApakAni vA jIvatvasya karaNAni yadi bhaveyuH, yathA zizapAyA vRkSatvam, tadA karaNanivRttau bhavejjIvatvanivRttiH, Tensfa-quafazat qu-faqqadi:; a Gaztea, AlzetenenfapAriNAmikabhAvarUpatvenAkRtakatvAt / vyApya - vyApakabhAvo'pIndriyANAM zarIreNaiva saha yujyate, ubhayasyApi pauLikatvAt, na tu jIvatvena, joba syAmUrtatvenAtyantaM tadvilakSaNatvAt / tasmAna karaNa nivRttAvapyanivRtta meva muktasya jIvatvamiti / / 446 // (1994) // D. C. Bhagavana:-Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as drayatva and a-murtatva are the innate characteristics of a soul, and just as that genesis of jiva never exists in condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics a-dravyatva and a-murtatva, jivtva is also the innate and natural characteristic of jiva, and that genesis of jiva never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently, in the state of muktatma, jiva does never beonme a-jiva any like Just as a free soul never attains the condition of a-dravyatva and murtatva, it never reaches a life-less state leaving aside its own innate living characteristics. For, if it leaves its own svabhava, the sky and molecules will also leave their innate characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency. Prabhasa: If it is so, how do you explain your statement that muktatma is a-jiva like akasa, on account of the abhava of sense-organs. Bhag avana:--The statement was made by me only to refute the opponent's view. In doing so, the reason has alreddy been explained, but this argment does not lead to prove mu klatma to be lifeless, as there is no pratibaudha for it. For, if jivalva is established by the existence of indriyas, it goes without saying that in absense of sense-organs, jiva will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke, and Asoka and vrksatva. But it does not happen actually. The sense-organs

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504 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The elevath are connected with body by the relation of part and whole, but they are not connected with jiva because of its amurtatva. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the abhava of indriyas, rhere is abhava of jivalva in muklatma. Prabhasa: --But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that muktaima is ignorant like sky in absence of sense-organs . The reply is-- muttAibhAvao novaladvimaMtidiyAI kuMbho vva / uvalaMbhadhArANi u tAI jIvo taduvaladdhA !! 447 // 1995) taduvarame visaraNao tavyAvAre vi novlNbhaao| iMdiyabhinno AyA paMcagavakkhovaladdhA vA // 448 // (1996) Muttaibhavao novaladdhimantinaiyaim kumbho vva i Uvalambhaddarani u taim jivo taduvaladdha 11 447 11 (1995) Taduvarame vi saranad tavvavare vi novalambha oll Indiyabhinno aya pancagavakkhovaladdha va 1 448 11 (1996) [ mAdibhAvato nopalabdhimantIndriyANi kumbha iva / upalambhadvArANi tu tAni jIvastadupalabdhA // 447 / / (1995) taduparame'pi smaraNatastadvayApAre'pi nopalambhAt / indriyamina pAtmA paJcagavAkSopalavdheva // 448 // (1996) Murtidibhavato nopalabdhimanimantindriyani kumbha ira 1 Upalambhadvarani tu tani jivastdupalabdha // 447 // (1995) Taduparam'epi smaranastadvyapare'pi nopalambhati Indriyabhinna atma pancagavaksopalabdheva // 44 // (1996) ] Trans.---447-448 On account of their (qualities like) murtatva etc like ghata, sense -organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension. Their

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Vada ! Ganadharavada 505 (reall agent of amprehension is jiva. Because of its power of recollection) even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working, the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows. (1925-1996) TIkA-anokhyA pUrvavat / kevalaM prastute bhAvArtha ucyate- yadI. ndriyANyupalabdhimanti bhaveyustadA nanivRttAvapyupandhinittirbhavet, na caitadasti, anvaya-vyatirekAbhyAM jIvasyopalabdhimatvanizcayAditi // 447448 / / (1995-1996 // D. C.-If the indirigens were the real agents of apprca hension, there would have heen no perception wien they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand, when they worl.ed, perception should positively take place, but due to the absent-niindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of jiva is thus established from the positive, as well as, negative point of view.11447-44811 (1995-1996) Indicating that jnana would not vanish with indriyas, but it is the very innate nature of jiva, the author states-- nANarahiona jIvo sarUvao'Nu va muttibhAveNaM / jaM teNa viruddhamidaM asthi ya so nAgarahio ya // 449 // (1997) Nanar ahii 17 jivi, saruvao'nu vva muttibhavenam i Jain teya viruddhamidam atthi ya so nanarahiii ya 11449 / / (1997) [ jJAnarahito na jIvaH svarUpato'Nuriva mUrtibhAvena / yat tena viruddhamidamasti ca sa jJAnarahitazca // 449 // (1997) Jnanarabito na jivah Svarupato'guriva mirtibhayena i Yat tena viruddhamidamasti ca sa jnanarahita ca 144911 (1997)] Trans.---449 Like an atom, jiva as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence, the statement that it is voil of cognizance is incorrect. (1997) 64

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506 Jinabhadra Jani's [ The eleventh TIkA-yad yasmAjjJAnarahito jIva kadAcidapi na bhavati, jJAnasya tatsvarUpalAt. yathA mUrtibhAvena rahito'Nuna bhavati, tena tasmAd kAraNAd viruddhametat-" asti cAsau bhukto jIvA, atha sa jJAnarahitaH" iti / na hi svarUpasyAbhAve mvarUpavato'vasthAna yujyate, tadyatiriktasya tasyAsattvAt. tathA cAnantaramevoktam-na dvijavaMtaragamaNaM juttaM namaso vya jIvataM" iti // 449 / / (1997) // 2. C.Just as an atom cannot exist without a finite from, jiva could also never exist without cognizance, as cognizance is the very nature of jiva. Since a corporeal body cannot exist without a sinite form, your statement that mukialma is void of jnana, is absolutely incorrect. // 449 / / ( 1997 Again, there is a question and its reply.... kiha so nANasarUvo naNu paJcakravANubhUhao nithae / paradehammivi ganjho sa pavitti-nivittiliMgAo / / 450 .: (1990) Kiha so nunasaruvo nanu paccakkhanubhuio niyae Paradehammi vi gajjho sa pavitti-nivittilingao 11 450 11/ 1998 ) kathaM sa mAnasvarUpo nanu pratyakSAnubhUtito nijake / paradehe'pi grAhaH sa pravRtti-nivRttiliGgAt // 450 / / (1998) Katham sa jnanasvarupo nanu partyaksanubhutito nijake i Paradehe'pi grahyah sa pravritti-nivrittilingat | 450 // ( 1998 1 Trans.--450 " How does it is exist in the form of cognizance ?". By direct apprehension, it is cogniz ble in case of its own body, and in the capacity of engagement and retirement in case of another's body." | 1998) TIkA-janu kathamasau jIvo jJAnasvarUpa iti nizcIyate ? / atrottaramAha-'nanu' ityakSamAyAma, nanu nije dehe tAvat pratyakSAnubhavAdeva mAnasvarUpo jIva iti vijJAyate, indriyavyApAroparame'pi tadvathA. pAropaLadhArthAnumagaraNAt, tavyApAre'pi cAnyamanaskanAyAmanupalambhAt,

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507 Vada ) Canadharavada adRSTA-'zrutAnAmapi cArthAnAM tathAvidhakSayopazamapATavAt kadAcid vyAkhyAnAvasthAyAM cetasi *phuraNAt / etacca svasaMvedanasiddhamapi bhavataH praSTanyatA gatam / tathA, sa jantuH paradehe'pi jJAnasvarUpa eveti grAbaH / kutaH ? / tathAvidhapravRtti-nitiliGgAditi !! 45 . / (1598) // D. (../publasa:--With wiat authority can you say that Jiva is jnanasvarapa ? Bhagavana: - That jiza exists as cognizance in its own body is seen by means of direct apprehension Even when sense-organs cease to worb, the object perceived by senseorgans, is recollected, while sometimes the object is not apprehended Even when the censt-organs are working, because of abser.t- dednes-sometimes perception crops up in the mind due to the relaxation of their destruction at the time of explantion. In case of another's body also, jiva is known to be jnanasvaruta on account of its inclination ( to the desirable objects ) and aversion from the undesirable ones ). 114501(1998)] And, samvAvaraNAvagame mo muddhayaro bhakena yUro vva / tammayabhAvAbhAvAdaNNANitaM na juttaM se // 451 // (1999) Savvavaranavagame so suddhayaro bhavejja suro vai Tammayabhavabhavadannayittam na juttam se # 451 r. ( 1999) [ sarvAvaraNApagame sa zuddhataro bhavet mura iva / tanmayamAvAbhAvAdazAnitvaM na yuktaM tasya // 451 // (1999) Sarvavaranapagame sa suddhataro bhayet sura iva Tanmayabhavabhavadajnauitvam na yuktam tasya .45111 (1999) Trans.- 451 At the removal of all interruptions, that ( muktatma ) would be purer like the Sun. It is not, therefore, proper to attribute ignorance to it. ( 1999 )

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508 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh TIkA-sendriyo janturdezato'pyAvaraNakSaye tAvat tAratamyena jJAnayukta eva bhavati, yasya tvanindriyasya sarvamapyAvaraNaM kSINam , sa vizeSAvaraNApagame zuddhatara eva bhavati- saMpUrNa jJAnaprakAzayukta para bhavatItyarthaH / yathA samastAbhrAvaraNApagame saMpUrNaprakAzamayaH sUryaH / tatastanmayabhAvasya prakAzamayatvasya karaNAbhAvenAmAvAda hetoH "se" taraya muktasya yadAnitvaM meryate bhivatA, tad na yuktam , AvaDaNAbhAve tasyaiva prakarSavato jJAnaprakAzasya sadbhAvAditi / / 451 / / (1999) / / D. C.--Muklatma possesses the power of complete cognizance, A soul having sense-cragans is cognizant, but to more or less extent on account of its avarajas being reinoved partially, Since all tlie ovaranas are removed in case of a muktatma, st is completely cognizant. Just as Sun becomes completely resplendent with lustre when all the avaranas, like clouds etc are removed the muktalma is also completely resplendent with the lustre of cognizance when all arararaof indrijas have been removed. // 451 / / ( 1999 ) evaM pagAsamaio jIvo chiddaanbhaasyttaao| kacimmataM bhAsai chihAvaraNapaIvo vva // 452 / / ( 2000 / subahuyaraM viyAgai mutto savappihANavigamAo / aSaNIyadharo mva naro vigayAvaragavyaIvo vva // 453 // (2001) Evam pagasamaio jivo (hiddavabhasayttao i Kincimmettam bhasai chiddivarayapaivo vva // 452 // ( 2000 ) Subahuyaram viyanai mutto savvappihanavigamao i Avaniyagharo vwa naro vigayavaranappaivo vva / / 453 // (2001) [ evaM prakAzamayo jIvazchidrAvamAsakatvAt / kiMzcinmAtra bhAsate chidrAvaraNapradIpa iva // 452 // (2000)

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Vabaj Caradhiaravada 509 mubahutaraM vijAnAti muktaH sarvapidhAnavigamAt / apanItagRha iva naro vigatAvaraNamadIpa iva / / 453 / / (2001) Evam prakasamayo jivaschidravabhasakatvati Kircinatram bhasate chidravaranapradipa iva 11452 : 2000 ) 1 Subahutaram vijanati muktah sarvapidhanavigamati Apanitagriha iva naro vigatavaranapradipa iva !! 453 // (2001) | Trans ---452-453 The soul is, thus lustrous It shines only a little, like a lamp ( shining ) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. ( But ) like a person relieved from home or like a lanip shining without obstruction, the mkktatmi perceives completely, when all its interruptions have been removed. ( 2000-2001 ) TIkA-tadevaM sati sarvadA prakAzamaya : prakAzasvabhAva eva jAvaH, kevalaM saMsAryavasthAyAM chamasthaH kizcinmAtramavamAsayati kSINA'kSINAvaraNajiTTairindriyacchidraizvAvamAsanAt , sacchidrakuTa- kuDyAdhantaritapradIpavadisi / muktastu muktAvathAyAM prApto jIvaH sabahutaraM vijAnAti--yadasti tat sarva prakAzayatItyarthaH, sarvapidhAnavigamAt- sarvAvaraNakSayAdityarthaH, apanInasamastagRhaH puruSa iva, vigatasamastakuTa--kuDayAghAvaraNapradIpa iva veti ! yo hi sacchidrAvaraNAntaritaH stokaM prakAzayati sa niHzeSAvaraNApagama subaveva prakAzayati / na tu yasya sarvathA prakAzAbhAva iti bhAvaH / tasmAta muttassa paraM sokkha gANA-'NAvAhA'' ityAdi sthitamU / / 452-453 / / (2000-2001 D. (: - liva is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception in the mundane life, jiva is obstructed by various avaranas, ard hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a centain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall. But in the mukta state, the tree soul illuminen everthing perfectly with its power of cognizancu like a lamp shining

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510 Jinabhadra Gani's without any obstruction or like a man relieved hold worries. [ The eleventh of all house This proves, therefore, the assertion that a free soul enjoys perfect happiness by means of perfect perception, when all its obstructions have been removed. 11 452-453 11 ( 2000-2001) Then doubting the existence of happiness to a free soul, the opponent argues-- puSaNA-'puNNakayAI jaM suha-dukkhAI teNa tannAse / tannAsAo munno nistuha-dukkho jahAgAsaM / / 454 // (2002) ahavA nissuha-dukkho nabhaM va dehe-yaadbhaavaao| AdhAro deho ciya jaM suha-dukkhovaladvINaM // 455 / / (2003) Punna-punnakayain jam suha-dukhaim tena tannase i Tannasao mutto nissuha- dukkho jahagasam H 454 H (2002) Ahava nissuha-dukkho nabham va dehe'ndiyai bhavao 1 Adharo deho cciya jam suha-dukkhovaladdhigam // 455 // (2003) [ puNyA-puNyakRte yat mukha-duHkhe tena tanAze / tamAzAd mukto niHsukha-duHkho yathAkAzam // 454 / / (2002) athavA niHsukha-duHkho nama iva dehendriyAdhabhAvAt / AdhAro deha - eva yat sukha-duHkhopalabdhInAm / / 455 // (2003) Punya-'punpaksite yat sukha-dunkhe tena tannase Tannasad mukto ninsukha-duhkho yathakasam 11 454 1 (2002) Athava nihsukh-duhkho nabha iva dehe-ndriyadyabhavati Adharo deha eva yat sukha duhkhopalabdhinam 14550 (2003)| Trans:-- 454-455 Since happiness and misery are the products of panya and papa ( respectively ), the mukta ( soul) will be free from phoya and papa like akasa, because it vanishes with them. Or, since body (itself) is the means of

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 511 apprehension of happiness and misery, it is free from happiness and misery like the sky, in absence of body, as well as, senseorgans. (2002-2003) TIkA -puNyAt mukhamupajAyato, pApAca duHkham, iti bhavatAmapi saMmatam . tena tasmAt tayoH puNya-pApayoH kAraNabhUtayaunAze mukha-duHzvayoH kAryarUpayonAzAd niHsukha-duzva eva muktAtmA prAmoti, tatkAraNAbhAvAt AkAzavaditi / athavA, ni sukha-duHskho'sau, dehe ndriyAbhAvAt. namovat , yad yasmAd deha eva, tathendriyANi ca sukha-duHkhopalabdhInAmAdhAro dRzyate, na punadehAmAve sukha-duHkhe dRzyete, nApIndriyAbhAve jJAnaM kaapyuplbhyte| tataH sidasya kathaM tadabhAvAt tAni zraddhIyante ? iti // 454-455 / / (2002-2003) D. C-Prabhasa:--That happiness is born of punya and misery of papa, has already been accepted by you. Now, when punya and papa vanish, happiness and misery being their karyas, will naturally vanish. Hence, like the sky, muktatma will be free from sukha-duhkha, Or, it will be free from sukha-duhkka in absence of deha and indriyas. Since deha is an active means of appprehending sukhaduhkha, there will be no apprehension of sukha-duhkha in absence of deha. In absence of ina'riyas, there wil be no cognizance. Consequently, a mukta (being) can never experience sukha-duhkha, // 454-4551 (2002-2003) Bhagavana replies - puNgaphalaM dukkhaM ciya kammodayao kammodayao phalaM va pAvassa / naNu pAvakale vi samaM pacakkhavirohiA ceva // 456 / / (2004) Pungaphalam dukkham ciya kammodayao phalam va pavassa Nagu pavaphale vi samam pacckkhavirohja ceva # 45611 (2004 [puNyaphalaM duHkhameva karmodayataH phalamiva pApasya / nanu pApaphave'pi samaM pratyakSavirodhitA caiva // 456 // (2004)

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512 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh Punyaphalam dunkhameva kar nodayalah phalamiva papasyai Nanu papaphale'pi samam pratyaksavirodhita saiva. 11456!' (2004) ] Trans.- - 456 " On account of ( the rise of ) Karma, the fruitieni vf virtuous deeds is even distresslnl like the fruition of sirs. The saine is really the case with the fruition of sins alst). " And it is a nothing but ) clear contradiction ( 2004 ) TIkA -cakrarvatipadalAmAdika puNyaphala nizcayato duHkhameva, karmodayajanyatvAn, narakatvAdipApaphalavat / paraH pAha-nanu pApaphale'pi samAnamidam tathAhi-atrApi vaktuM zakyata etat--uktaM pApaphalaM du khatvenAbhimataM paramArthataH sukhameva, karmodayajanyatvAt, puNyaphalavat / evaM ca badatAM pratyakSaviroSitA, khasaMvedyamukha--duHkhayauvaiparItyena saMvittyabhAvAditi // 456 // (2004) D. C.- Bhagavana.--Like pupi phalas, the punya phalas liko that of attaining cakravarta pada ( sovereignty of the world ) etc. are also distressful on account of their being produced by Karma. Prabhasa:--The same could be said of pupa phalas as well. The papa-pha as although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by Karma. Bhagavana:--Since you have not understood the real sense of sukha-duhkha, you have said so. But it is really contradicting. / / 456 // (2004) jatto ciya paJcakagvaM somma ! suhaM nasthi dakvamevedaM / napaDiyAravibhattaM to puNyaphalaM ni dukhaM ni / / 457 / / (2005) Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma | suham natthi dukkhamevedam Tappadiyaravibhattam to punnaphalnm ti dukkh'im ti 114571 (2015) [yata eva pratyakSa saumya ! sukhaM nAsti duHkhamevedam / tatpatIkAravibhaktaM tata: puNyaphalamiti duHkhamiti // 457 / / (2005)

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Vada ] Canadharavada 513 Yata eva pratyaksam Saumya ! sukham nasti duhkhamevedami Tatpratikaravibhaktom tatah punyaphalamiti duhkhamiti 1145711 ] Trans.--457 That which is directly perceived as happiness is not happiness O Saumya / but it is only misery. It has been distinguished (from duhkha ) only as its resistanee, The fruition of virtuous deeds is, therefore, ( nothing but ) dshkha. ( 2005 ) __TIkA- saumya ! prabhAsa ! yata eva duHkhenubhUyamAne kasthApyaviparyastamateH mukhaM pratyakSaM nAsti, sukhAnubhava: svasaMvidito na vidyate, ata evAsmAbhirucyate--" dukkhamevedaM" iti, yat kimapyatra saMsAracakre strak-- candanA-'GganAsaMbhogAdisamutthamapi vidyate tat sarva duHkhamevetyayaH, kevalaM tasyAGganAsaMbhogAdiviSayautsukyajanitAratirUpasya duHkhasya pratIkAro'GganAsaMbhogAdikastatmatIkArastena tatpatIkAreNa duHkhamapi sad vimaktaM murbhadena vyavasthApitam -satpatIkArarUpaM kAminIsaMmogAdikaM pAmAkaNDUyanAdivat sukhamadhyavasitam, zUlAropaNa--zUla--zirobAdhAdivyAdhi bandha-vadhAdijanitaM tu duHkhmiti| ramaNIsaMbhoga--cakravartipadalAbhAdisukhaM svasaMviditaM "duHkham" iti vadatAM pratyakSavirodha iti cet / tadayuktam, mohamUDhapratyakSatvAt tasya, tallAbhautsukyajanitAratirUpaduHkhapratIkArarUpatvAd duHkhe'pi tatra sukhAdhyavasAyaH, pApAkaNDUyanA-'pathyAhAraparibhogAdivat yathA coktam namnaH preta ivAviSTa kaNantImupagRhya tAm / gADhAyAsitasarvAGgaH sa sukhI ramate kila // 1 // autsukyamAtramavasAdayati pratiSThA linnAti labdhaparipAlanamuttireva / nAtizramApagamanAya yathA zramAya rAjyaM . svahastagatadaNDamivAtapatram // 2 // bhuktAH zriyaH sakalakAmadudhAstataH kiM saMprINitAH praNayinaH svadhana:svataH kima ? dattaM padaM zirasi vidviSatAM tataH kiM kalpaM sthita tanubhRtAM tanubhistataH kim // 3 // itthaM na kiJcidapi sAdhana-sAdhyajAtaM svapnendrajAlasadRzaM paramArthazUnyam / atyantanitikaraM yadapetabAdhaM tad brahma vAJchata jnaaH| yadi cetanAsti // 4 // 65

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514 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh ityaadinaa| "puNyaphale ti dukkhaM ti" yata evamuktamakAreNa duHkhe'pi mukhAbhimAnaH, tasmAt puNyaphalamapi sarva tattvato duHkhameveti 11 746 11 (20) D. C.--Bhagavana:- Pleasure afforded by objects like garlands, sandal-wood, and woman etc. is in reality, nothing but misery in this world. This sukha has been distinguished from duhkha ( in the form ) of passions generated from the eagerness to enjoy sexul pleasures with woman etc. Only ignorant people call it happiness. But really speaking, such sorts of liappiness are only temporarily pleasent like the scratching of herpes. While, putting to the gallows, aching in the stomach, headache, and the fetters of imprisonment etc, are known as miseries Prabhasa: -It is evidently contradictory to say that, sukha of the enjoyment with woman etc. and of the attainment of the sovereignty etc, are duhkha. Bhagavanc:--It is not contradictory to say so. It is perceived as sukha only to those who are disillusioned by ignorance, There will be establishment of sukha similar to the scratching of herpes or enjoying the forbidden food even in misery as they act as resistance against the distress of passions produced by eagerness to attain pleasure So, it has been said-- Nagnah preta ivavjstah kyamanti mupgrihya tain Calhayasitasarvangah sa sukhi ramate kila 11 lll Autsukyamatramavasadayati pratistha klisnati labdha paripalanavrittireva 1 Natisramapagamanaya yatha sramaya rajyam svahastagata dandamivatapatram 1 2 11

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Vada ] Bhuktah sriyah sakalakamadudhastatah kim samprinitah pranayinah svadhanaistatah kim? Dattam padam sirasi vidvisatam tatah kin kalpam sthitam tanubhritam tanubhistatah kim ? // 3 11 Ganadharavada 515 Ittham na kincidapi sadhana-sadhyajatam svapnendrajalasadrisam paramarthasunyam i Atyantanirvritikaram yadapteabadham tad Brahma vanchata janah | yadi cetanasti // 4 // The punya phalas awarding the attainment of visaya sukhas are thus proved as nothing but duhkhamaya in reality. u 457 || ( 2005 ) visayahaM dukvaM citra dukkhapaDiyArao tigiccha vva / taM suharAo na uyAro kiyA tayaM // 458 // (2006) Visayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadiyarao tiggiccha vva Tam suhamuvayarao na uvayaro vina taccam | 458 || (2006) [ viSayasukhaM duHkhameva duHkhapratIkAratazcikitseva / tat sukhamucArAd nopacAro vinA tathyam // 458 // (2006) Visayasukham duhkhameva duhkhpratikaratascikitseva | Tat sukhamupacarad nopacaro vina tathyam // 458 // (2006) ] Trans. - 158 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like medicine on account of its being a resistance against distress. It is (known as ) happiness by (virtue of ) usage ( only ). And there is no usage without fact. (2006) TIkA-viSayasukhaM tattvato duHkhameva duHkhapratIkArarUpatvAt, kuSTha-. gaNDA'zaroga- kvAthapAna- cchedana- dambhanA vicikitsAvat / yazca loke tatra sukhavyapadezaH pravartate sa upacArAt / na copacArastathyaM pAramArthikaM vinA kvApi pravartate, mANavakAdau siMhAdyupacAravaditi // 458 // (2006) D. C. -- Since visaya sukha is, after all, a resistance againsi duhkha, it is nothing but duhkha. For the removal of diseases like leprosy, boil, or piles, Jnst as a dose of decoction and For Private Personal Use Only

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516 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh cutting off or burning some rotten part, are considered as pleasant inspite of their causing pain, the visaya sukhas are also sidered as duhkhamaya inspite of their affording pleasure. con The visaya sukha is known as sukha by means of upacara only. This upacara is not reality but its existence is based on real objects. Without the existence of a real lion, the attribute of lion could never be given to manavaka. || 458 || (2006) tamhA jaM muttasuhaM taM tacaM dukkhasaMkhae'vassaM / muNiNo'NAbAhassa va NippaDiyAraNasaIo || 459 // (2007) Tamha jam muttasuham tam taccam dukkhasamkhae'vassam i Munipo'gabahassa va nippadiyarappasuio // 459 // (2007) [ tasmAd yad muktasukhaM tat tathyaM dukhasaMkSaye'vazyam / suneranAbAdhasyeva niSpratIkAramasUteH // 459 // (2007) Tasmad yad muktasukham tat tathyam duhkhasamksaye'vasyam | Muneranabhadhasyeva nispratikaraprasuteh || 459 || (2007) ] Trans, --- 459 Hence, at the removal of (all) miseries, happiness of a free (soul) being produced unresisted and unobstructed like a sage, is undoubtedly a real (happiness) (2007) TIkA- tasmAd yad muktasya saMbandhi tadeva sukhaM tathyaM nirupaMcaritam / kuta: ? / svAbhAvikatvena niSpatIkArarUpasya tasya prasUterUtpatteH / katham ? | avazyam / kva sati ? / duHkhasaMkSaye / sAMsArikaM hi sarva puNyaphalamapi duHkharUpatayA samarthitam, tataH pApaphalam, itaraJca sabai duHkhamevehAsti nAnyat, taca muktasya kSINam atastatsaMkSaye'vazyaMtayA yat tasya niSpratIkAraM svAbhAvikaM nirupamaM sukhamutpadyate tadeva tathyam / kasyeva ? | viziSTajJAnavato sarbAdhasya muneriva uktaM ca " nirjitamada-padanAnAM vAkkAya- manovikAra rahitAnAm / nitaparAzAnAmiheba mokSaH suvihitAnAm // 1 // For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavada 517 iti // 459 // (2007) D. C.-Happiness enjoyed by a mukla being is real, and is not based upon upacara, because it is naturally generated without any resistance. Like that of a learned sage, having no obstacle in his way, this sukha ts free from all sorts of miseris found in the mundane world. It has been said, therefore, that, Nirjitamada-madananam vak kaya-manovikararahitanam, Vinivsittaparasanamihaiva moksah suvibitanam x 459 11 ( 2097 } } Also, jaha vA nANamao'yaM jIvo nANAvaghAi cAvaraNaM / karaNamaNuggahakAriM savAvaraNakkhae suddhI // 460 / / (2008) taha sokkhamao jIvo pAvaM tassovaghAiyaM neyaM / puNNamaNuggahakAri sokkhaM savvakkhae sayalaM / / 461 // (2009) Jaha va nanamao'yam jtvo nanovaghai cavarasam Karanamaeuggahakarim savvavaranakkhae Suddhi 14601 (2008) Taha sokkhamao jiva payam tassovaghaiyam neyam Pupgamanuggahakarim sokkham savvakkhae sayalam 1146111(2009) [ yathA vA jJAnamayo'yaM jIvo jJAnopaghAti cAvaraNam / karaNamanugrahakAri sarvAvaraNakSaye zuddhiH // 460 // (2008) tathA saukhyamayo jIvaH pApaM tasyopaghAtikaM jJeyam / puNyamanugrahakAri saukhyaM sarvakSaye sakalam // 461 // (2009) Yatha va jnanamayo'yam jiva, jnanopaghati cavaranam Karanamanugrahakari sarvavaranaksaye Suddhih || 460 // (2008 Tatha saukhyamayo stvah papam tasyopaghatikam jneyam Puoyamanugrahakari saukkhyami sarvaksaye sakalam 1146 111(2009)

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518 Jinabhadra (ani's [The eleventh Trans --- 460-461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, ( any sort of ) interrnption is an obstacle to ( the apprehension of ) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful ( to it ) (and just as), at the destructiou of all interruptions, ( there is ) pure ( cognizance ), the soul is full of happiness, Sinful deed. is ( its ) obstruction, a virtuous deed is ( the ) helpfui ( elemant ) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect ( apprehension of, happiness. ( 2008-2009) TIkA vyAkhyA-yathA vA'nantajJAnamayo'sau svarUpeNa jIvaH / tadIyamAnasya ca matyAvaraNAdikamAvaraNamupaghAtakaM mantavyam / naraNAni vindriyANi rAjyAnasya, sUryAtapasya tadAvArakameghapaTalacchidrANItropakArakANi / sarvAvaraNakSaye tu mAnazuddhinirmalA sarvathAvabhAsakatvalakSaNA bhavati / makutayojanAmAha-tathA tenaiva prakAreNa svarUpataH svAbhAvikAnantasaukhyamayo jIvaH, tasya ca mukhasyaivopaghAtakArakaM pApakarma vijJeyam / puNyaM tvanuttarasUraparyanta mukhaphalaM tasya svAbhAvika sukhasyAnugrahakArakam / tataH sarvAvaraNApagame maSTajJAnamiva samastapuNyapApakSaye sakalaM paripUrNa nirupacaritaM nirupama svAbhAvikaganantaM mukhaM bhavati viddhasyeti // 460-461 // (2008-2009) D. C...The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which Mati-;nana etc. are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun--shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance. Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which papa is the obstructive element, and punya the helping element, When all sorts of papa and pupja are removed, the muktalma attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions 1101 upararas. / / 460-461 / / (2008-2009) Or, jaha vA kammakzvayao so misAipariNaiM labhaha / taha saMsArAIyaM pAvaha taso ciya suhaM ti // 42 // (2010)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Jaha va kammakkhayao so siddhattaiparinaim labhai | Taha samsaraiyam pavati tatto cciya suham ti | 462 || (1020) [ yathA vA karmakSayataH sa siddhatvAdipariNatiM labhate tathA saMsArAtItaM prApnoti tata eva sukhamiti || 462 || (2010) Yatha va karmaksayatah sae siddhatvadiparinatim labhate I Tatha samsaratitam prapnoti tata eva sukhamiti 11 462 || (2010)] 519 Trans.-- 462 Just as it attains the form of siddhatva etc, on accouht of the destruction of Karma, it attains the celestial happiness also, due to the same reason. (2010) TIkA- yathA vA sakalakarmakSayAdasau muktAtmA siddhatvAdipariNatiM labhate, tata eva sakalakarmakSayAt saMsArAtItaM vaiSayikasukhAd vilakSaNasvarUpaM nirupamaM tathyaM sukhaM prApnoti / etena yaduktam- " kSINapuNyaM - pApatvena kAraNAbhAvAd niHsukha-duHkho muktAtmA, vyomabat " ityetadapi pratyuktaM draSTavyam, kAraNAbhAvAt ityasya hetorasiddhatvAt, sakalakarmakSayalakSaNa kAraNajanyatvena siddhasukhasya sakAraNatvAditi ||462 || (2010) 14 " it D. C.-Just as a muktatma attains siddhatva etc when is free from the bondages of Karma, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So, your arguments that since muktatina is free from papa-punya, it has no sukha-dahkha also, like sky, proves itself absolutely unfounded. 462 (2010) the only Now, in reply to the argument that "deha is agent of perceiving sukha-duhkha, the author states-sAyA--sAyaM dukkhaM tavvirahammi ya suhaM jao teNaM / dehiM die dukkhaM sokkhaM dehiM diyAbhAve || 463 // (2011) Saya'-sayam dukkham tavvirahammi ya suham jao tenam Dehin-diesu dukkham sokkham dehin-diyabhave | 463 | | (2011)

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520 Jinabhadra Gani's [ sAtA sAtaM duHkhaM tadvirahe ca sukhaM yastena / dehendriyeSu duHkhaM saukhyaM dehendriyAbhAve / / 463 // (2011) Sata-'satam duhkham tadvirahe ca sukham yatastena Dehe ndriyesu duhkham saukhyam dehe-ndriyabhave ||463||(2011)] [ The eleventh Trans. - 463 Results of sinful and virtuous deeds, are anly distressful. And since happiness is ( attained ) in their absence, ( there is ) misery ( in case of ) body and sense organs existing, ( and ) ( there is ) happiness in absence of body and sense-organs. ( 2011 ) , TIkA- natu yatU puNyaphalaM sAtaM sukhatayA lokavyavahArato rUDhaM tat sarva duHkhamevetyanantarameva samarthitam asAvaM tu pApaphalatvAd nirvivAdaM duHkhameva / evaM ca sati sarva duHkhamevAsti saMsAre, na sukham / tacca duHkhaM siddhasya sarvathA kSINam / astadvirahe yad yasmAt siddhasya svAbhAvikaM nirupamam, anantaM ca yuktisiddhametra sukham tena tasmAt kAraNAt pArizeSyanyAyAt saMsAriNAmeva jIvAnAM dehendriyeSvAdhArabhUteSu yathoktasvarUpaM duHkham sukhaM tu dehendriyAbhAva eva siddhasya kSINaniHzeSasukha-duHkhatvena tasya tatra yuktisiddhatvAditi // 463 // (2011) 9 D, C.--It has already been proved that even prunya-phatas are duhkhamaya in this mundane world. And papa-thalas are undoubtedly dubkhamaya This shows that everything in this world is full of misery. This sort of duhkha can nover affect muktatmas. Muktktma being free from such duhkhas, enjoys perfect and infinite happiness showing there-by that duhkha exists only where deha and indriyas exist; and real sukha is always found in a siddha being who is free from deha and indriyas, 11463 (2011) Or, jA vA dehi-diyajaM suhamicchaha taM paDuca domoyaM / saMsArAIyamidaM dhammaMtarameva sidvimahaM // 464 // ( 2012 )

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Vada ] Casadharavada 521 Jo va denin-diyajam suhamicchai tam paducca doso'yami Samsaraiyamidam dhammantarameva siddhisuham || 464 / / (2013) [yo vA dehe-ndriyaja mukhamicchati taM pratItya doSo'yam / saMsArAtItamidaM dharmAntarameva siddhisukham // 464 // (2012) Yo va dehe-ndriyajam sukhanicchati tam pratitya dosi'yami Sainsaratitamidam dharmantarameva siddhisukham #46411 (2012) Trans.-464 Or, according to one who relieves in the happiness (afforded) by hody and sense alone, this (may involve) a difficulty. But this celestial happiness is far above the mundane world, and has ( perfectly ) different characteristics. ( 2012 ) TIkA-yo vA kazcit saMsArAbhinandI mohamDhaH parabhArthadazI viSayAmiSamAtragaddho dehendriyajameva mukhaM manyate, na tu siddhisukham, tasya tena svame'pyadarzanAt , tasya vAdinaH saMsAravipakSe mokSe pramANataH sAdhite sati " niHsukhaH, siddhaH, dehe-ndriyAmAvAt" ityayaM doSo bhvet| na tvasmAkaM saMsArAnItaM puNya-pApaphalamukha-duHkhAbhyAM sarvathA vilakSaNaM dharmAntaramevA'nupamamakSayaM nirupacaritaM siddhimukhamicchatAmiti // 464 / / (2012) D. C. According to one who is disillusioned by the infatuation of this mundane world and its sensuous pleasures, the happiness of deha and indriyas would be the only happiness and there would be nothing like moksa-rukha in his view-point. lle would, therefore, find fault with our belief by saying that muktalma. can never experience sukha as it has no deha and indriyas. But those like us, who recognize the existeuce of muktatma aand its uncomparable infinte happiness, understand that moksa sukhz being samsara'ita, has absolutely different characteristics and hence, there is no dosa. // 464 // (2012) Here again, there is a question and its replskaha naNumeyaM ti bhaI nAgA-NAbAhau tti naNu bhaNiyaM / tadaNicaM gaM piya ceyaNadhammo tti rAgo vca // 465 // (2013) 66

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522 Jinabhadra Gani's. [ The eleventh Kaha nanu meyam ti mai nana--'nabieau tti nanu bhaniyam 1. Tadapiccam nanam pi ya ceyanadhammo tti ragoavv ||4651 (2013) [ kathaM nanu meyamiti matirjJAnA-nAbAdhata iti nanu maNitam / tadAnityaM jJAnamapi ca cetanadharma iti rAga iva || 465 || (2013) Katham nanu meyamiti matirinana--'nibadhata iti nanu bhanitam Tadanityam jnanamapi ca cetanadharma iti raga iva // 455 1 (2013)] Trans. -- 465 ( The question may be that }, " How could it really be taken like that? (The reply is)-" It has alredy been said that (it is so ) on account of the uninterrupted cognizance." Then, even cognizance being a quality of consciousness, it will be a nitya like affection. ( 2013 ) 1 TIkA - atraivaMbhUtA matiH parasya bhavet nanvicchanti bhavantaH siddhasya yathoktaM sukham, kintu necchAmAtrato vastusiddhiH, api tu pramANataH, tato yena pramANena tat sidhyati tad vaktavyam / anumAnena tadanumIyata iti cet / tarhi kenAnumAnena tadanumeyat- anumIyata ityarthaH ? ityAha-- "nANA - 'NA bAhau ti naNu bhaNiyaM ti " nanu bhaNitamatrArthe mAganumAnam - siddhasya prakRSTaM sukham, jJAnatve satyanAbAdhatvAt munivaditi / punarapi paraH prAhayadyevam, tanityaM sukhaM jJAnaM ca siddhasya cetanadharmatvAt rAgavaditi // / 465 / / ( 2013 ) D. C.-Frabhasa:-With what pramana or anumana do you establish the existence of the above-mentioned moksasukha? + Bhagavana:--The auumana has already been stated that, like a sage, a muktatma enjoys perfect happiness by virtue of its uninterrupted cognizance. Prabhasa:--In that case, as happiness and cognizance on, the part of a free soul are cetana-dharmas, they would be a-nitya like raga | 465 / / ( 2013 ) There is another inference also.

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Vada ] Gandharavada 523 kayagAibhAvao vA nAvaraNA-''dhAhakAraNAbhAva / upAya-dvii bhaGgassahAvao vA na doso'yaM // 466 / / (2014) Kayagoibhavab va navaranaobxhakaranabhava . Uppaya-tthii-bhangassahavai va na doso'yam // 466 / / (2014) [kRtakAdibhAvato vA nAvaraNA-''bAdhakAraNAbhAvAt / utpAda-sthiti-bhAsvabhAvato vA na doSo'yam // 466 // (2014) Kritakadibhavato va navarana"bhadhakaranabhavat i Utpada-sthiti-bhangasvabhavato va na dogo'yam 1146611 ( 2014 )] Trans.--. 466 " Or, is it a-nutya because of ( its ) being factitious etc ?" It is not so, as there is no cause for ( the production of ) obstacles and interruptions. Or, this fault , of a-nityata ) does not arise ( at all ), on account of its nature of being susceptible to production, retention, and destruction." (2014) TIkA- athavA, anitye siddhasya mukha-jJAne, tapaHmabhRtikaSTAnuSThAnena kriyamANanvAn, AdizabdadabhUtaprAdurbhAvAta, ghaTavaditi / atrottaramAha"nAvaraNetyAdi " na siddhasyAnitye jJAna-sukhe / kutaH ? / AvaraNaM cAyA pazcAvaraNA-''vAdhI, tayoH kAraNaM hetumtasyA'bhAvAt, AkAzavaditi / idamuktaM bhavati-siddhasya jJAnaM sukhaM ca yadyapagacchet tadA syAdanityam, apagamazca jJAnasyAvaraNodayAta, sukhasya tvAbAdhahetubhUtAdasAtavedanoyodayAdikAraNAd bhavet : yAvaraga-vedanIyAdIni ca mithyatvAdibhirbandhahetumibaMdhyante, te ca siddhasya na vidyante, tatastadabhAvAd nAvaraNA-''bAdhAkAraNasadbhAvaH, tadamAvAcca na siddhamya jJAna-mukhApagamaH, tadasatve ca tayoH tadA'vasthiti tvAt kathamanityatvam ? / na ca cetanadharmAH sarve'pyanityA bhavanti, jIvagatadravyatvA-'mUtatvAdibhirvyabhicArAt / tatazca "cetanadharmatvAt" ityanaikAntiko hetuH / tathA, kRtakatvAdirapyanakAntikaH ghaTapradhvaMsAbhAvena vyabhicArAt / asidazvAyam, siddhasya jJAnasukhayoH svAmAvikatvena katakatvA ghayogAt, AvAraNA-''bAdhakArabhAvena ca tattiromAnamAtrameva nivartate, na punaste kriyete, pttaayivt| nApyabhUte prAdurbhavataH, vidyudAdivat yena tayora

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524 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh nityatvaM syAt / na hi ghanapaTaLApagame candrajyotsnAyA. sUryamamAyA vA tirobhAvamAtranivRttau kRtakatvam, abhUtaprAdurbhAvo vA vaktuM yujyata iti / sukhe atha tenAvirbhUtena viziSThena rUpeNa kRtakatvAdanitye siddhasya jJAnapratikSaNa ca paryAyarUpatayA jJeyavinAze jJAnasya vinAzAt, sukhasyApi matisamayaM parApararUpeNa pariNAmAdetayaura nityatvamucyate / tarhi siddhasAdhyatA, iti darzayati-" upAya - dviItyAdi" itthamAtmA''kAza - ghaTAdirUpasya sarvasyApi vastustomasya sthityutpAda- pralayasvAbhAvyAbhyupagamAt / siddhasukha jJAnayorapi kathaJcidanityatvAd nAyaM tadanityatvApattilakSaNo 'smAkaM dopa iti // 466 / / (2094) D. C. Prabhasa:--Jnana and sukha of a siddha being. are a-nitya firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production, like ghata. Bhagavana:--Your argument is absolutely unfounded. Q Prabhasa! Jnana and sukha of a muktatma would be a nitya only if they vanished. By means of jnanavaranas, jnano would be obscurad and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, sukha would vanish. Both these obstructions jnanavaragas and papa-karmas are bound by the hetus of mithyatva etc, muktatma being free from such hetus, it is free from jnauavaranas and papa-karmas also. Consequently, its jnana and sukha do not meet destruction, and hence they are never called a-nitya. Secondly, all the qualities of cetana are not a-nilya Dravyatva and a-murtatva are nitya. Therefore, the argument that jnana and sukha are a-nitya because they happen to be cetana-dharmas, is anekantika Similarly, the hetu of kritakatva etc is also anekantika. Indestructiblity of ghata is a-siadha inspite of its being kitaka. This hetu is a siddha also, because jnana and sukha of a siddha being, are natural. Since there is no reason for the existence of avaranas and badhas, that which is in obscuri, becomes manifest Thus, they are not factitious

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Vada ] Gayadharavada 525 like ghata etc. nor are they produced like lightning etc. The moon-light and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced, when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way. Still however, jnana and sukha of a muktatma could easily be considered as a-mutya by virtue of their being kritaka. Because, at every time, when jheya vanishes, jnana is also vanishing and sukha also comes into existence in various forms at various times So, there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be a-nitya to a certain extent, as all objects like soul, sky, ghata, and papa etc are susceptible to upada, vyaya and dhraya after all. // 466 // (2014) Establishing the existence of moksa and moksa-sukha by the help of Veta-vacanas, the author proceeds naha vaha sasarIrasya piya-'piyAvahatirevamAdi va jaM / tamokkhe nAsamma va sokkhAbhAvammi va na juttaM ||467 // (2015) Na ha vai sasarirassa ppiya'-ppiyavahatir evamadi va jam i Tadamokkhe nasammi va sokkhabliavammi va na juttam 467 [ na ha vai sazarIsya priyA - miyApahatirevamAdi vA yat / tadamokSe nAze vA saukhyAbhAve vA na yuktam / / 467 || (2015) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-priyapahatirevamadi va yati Tadamokse nase va saukhyabhave va na yuktam 467 || (2015) 1 Trans ---467 (The sentence of Vedas that ) "One having body has no likes and dislikes ttc" would become worthless in ( case of) accepting the negation or destruction of moksa and absence of absolute) happiness. (2015) " TIkA- "na ha vai sazarIrasya priyA 'bhiyayora pahatirasti" "azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA-priye na spRzataH " iti ca yad vedoktam, tadapyamokSe mokSAbhAva - jIva-karmaNoviyoge'nabhyupagamyamAna ityarthaH tathA " matirapi na prajJAyate " iti vacanAd muktAvasthAyAM sarvathA nAze vA jIvasyAbhyupagamyamAne, saccaivAmuktAtmanaH sukhAbhAtra iSyamANena yuktaM mAjhoti- abhyupagamavirodhastavetyarthaH / anena hi vAkyena kika yathokto mokSaH, muktau ca niSkarmaNo For Private Personal Use Only -

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526 Jinabhadra Gani's [ l'he eleventh jIvasya sattvam, nirupamamukhaM ca tasya, etAni trINyapyabhyupagamyante / etacca purastAda vyaktIkariSyate / tato'sya tritayasya niSedhaM kurvatastavAbhyupagamavirodha iti bhAvaH // 467 / / (2015) ___D. C.--The sentences of Vedas such as " Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya'-priyayo-rapahatirastz" and " Asariram va vasantam priya'prive na spresatah " etc would prove themselves futile if the existence of moksa, jiva, and moksa-sukha were denied. Because, the existence of moksa -separating jiv.: and Karma from each other-existence of pure soul in the mukta state and the attainment of perfect and infinite happiness by a mukta being, have already been established by the Veda-padas. / / 467 // (2015) The opponent then asksnaTTho asarIro ciya suha-dukkhAI piya-'piyAI c| tAI na phusaMti nahuM phuDamasarIraM ti ko doso ? || 468 !! (2016) Nattho a-sariro cciya suha-dukkhaiin piya-ppiyaim cal Taim na phusanti nattham phudamasariram ti ko doso? 1146811(2016) [ naSTo'zarIra eva sukha-duHkhe miyA-'piye ca / / te na spRzato naSTaM sphuTamazarIramiti ko doSaH ? // 468 // (2015) Nasto'sarira eva sukha-duhkhe priya'priye ca / Te na sprisato sastam sphutamasariramiti ko dosah ? 1146811(2016) Trans.----458 One who is dead, is bodiless. Happiness and niisery likes and dislikes do not touch him. ( Then ) what harm is there in taking a bodiless person to have been distinctly destroyed ? ( 2016 ) ___TIkA-" na ha vai0" ityAdivedavAkyasya kika paro'mumartha manyate-- zarIrasarvanAzena naSTaH kharaviSANakalpa evocyate, samevaMbhUtam zarIraM naSTaM priyApiye sukha-duHkhe yad na spRzataH, tat sphuTameva budhyata evedam, naSTasya sukha-duHkhasparzAyogAt, azarIrazandena ca jIvanAzAbhidhAnAt / evaMbhUte * cAsya vAkyasyArthe mumukSujIvasya nirvANapadIpasyeva sarvanAzamabhyupagacchatA ko'smAkamabhyupagavirodhalakSaNo doSaH ?-na kazcidapIti parAbhiprAya iti // 468 / / (2016)

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Vada] Gandharavada D. C.-Prabhasa:-Since a bodiless person is absolutely perished, it is not-existent like khara-srnga. It is, therefore, clear that such bodiless persons are not affected by happiness or misery, and likes or dislikes. Consquently, ihere would be no harm in accepting the absolute destruction of a soul which has attained moksa. 1463 (2016) "; In reply to this, Bhagavan explains the real interpretation or the Veda-padas such as "Na ha var etc and proceeds veyavayANa ya atthaM na suSThu jANasi imANa taM suNasu / asarIraMsaavat aghaNo vya sao nihAo || 469 // (2017) nanisehao ya annammi tavvihe ceva paccao jeNa / teNAsarIraggahaNe jutto jIvo na kharasiMgaM // 470 || (2018) Veyavayana ya attham na sutthu janasi imana tam suyasu Asariravvavaeso adhano vva sao nisehao 469 ( 2017 ) Naniseha ya annammi tavvihe ceva paccao jena Tenasariraggahane jutto jivo na kharasingam 470 (2018) [ vedapadAnAM cArthe na suSThu jAnAsyeSAM taM zrRNu / azarIravyapadezosdhana itra sato niSedhAt // 469 // (2017) naniSedhatazcAnyasmiMstadvidha eva pratyayo yena / " tenAzarIragrahaNe yukto jIvo na kharazRGgam // / 470 || (2018) Veda- padanam cartham na susthu janasyesam tam srunu | Asariravyapadeso'dhana iva sato niseehat | 469 || ( 2017 ) ] Nannisedhatascanyasminstadvidha eva pratyayo yeha Teasariragrahane yukto jivo na kharasrigam 470 ( 2018 )] Trans.--469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of Vedas. It is this. Hear please. Like a-dhana, the word a-sarira is meant to denote the negation of an existent object. By means of ) negation, due to 'na,' (its) existence would be found in another of the same type. In understanding. the word 'a-sarira', it is better, therefore, to accept ( the existence of ) jiva and not ( its non-existence like) hharasriga (2017-2018 ) TIkA -- AyuSman ! prabhAsa ! na kevalaM yuktim, vedapadAnAmamISAmartha For Private Personal Use Only 527 "

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523 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh ca tvaM suSTu na jAnAsi, tatastaM zRNu " na ha vai0, ityAdi pUrvAdha sugamatvAdatra gAthAdvaye na vyAkhyAtam, tadapi sukhapratipattyarthaM vyAkhyAyate-'na' iti nipAto niSedhArthaH / 'ha' vai' ityetadapi nipAtadvayaM hizabdArthatvAd yasmAdarthe / saha zarIreNa vartata iti sazarIro jIvastasya sazarIrasyetyatraivakAro draSTavyaH / tatazcAyaparthaH-yasmAt sazarIrasya jIvasya piyA-'piyayoH sukhaduHkhayorapahatirvighAto'ntaraM nAsti, na tvazarIrasya; tasmAdazarIraM zarIrarahitaM muktyavasthAyAM vasantaM lokAntasthitaM jIvaM priyA-'piye sukha-duHkhe na spRshtH| idamuktaM bhavati-yAvadayaM jIvaH sazarIraH, tAvat sukhena duHkhena vA'nyatareNa kadAcidapi na mucyate; azarIrasttasau kSINavedanIyatvAt sukhaduHkhAbhyAM kadAcidapi na spRzyata iti / evaMbhUte cAsya vAkyasyArthe sati yo'yamazarIravyapadezaH, asau sata eva vidyamAnasyaiva jIvasya muktyavasthAyAM vidhIyate, na tu sarvathA naSTasya / kutaH ? ityAha-niSedhAt / iha yo yasya niSedhaH sa tasya sata eva vidhIyate, na tvasataH, yathA'dhana iti, atra sata eva devadattasya dhananiSedho vidhIyate, na tvasataH kharaviSANasya / __ Aha-na vidyate zarIraM yasyetyevaM niSedhAdanyapadArthe jIva eva kathaM pratIyate? ityAha-" nanisehao ya ityAdi " vyAkhyAto vizeSapratipatteH paryudAsavRttinA natrA niSedho nagniSedhastasmAd nagniSedhAt kAraNAt sazarIrAdanyasmiMstadvidha eva zarIrasadRze kasmiMzcidanyapadArthe saMpatyayo vijJeyaH, yathA "na brAhmaNo'bAhmaNaH" ityukte bAhmaNasadRzaH kSatriyAdireva gamyate, na tu tuccharUpo'bhAvaH / uktaMca-" najivayuktamanyasadRzAdhikaraNe loke tathA barthagatiH" iti / iha ca zarIrasadazo'zarIro jIva eva gamyate, dvayorapyu payogarUpatvena sadRzatvAt / na ceha zarIraM sAdRzyabAdhakam, tasya jIvena saha kSIra-noranyAyato lolIbhUtatvenaikatvAditi / tadevaM yena yasmAt kAraNAt nanniSedhAdanyasmiMstadvidha evAnyapadArthe saMpratyayo bhavati, tena tasmAt kAraNAt " azarIraM vA vasantaM " ityatrAzarIramANe jIva evAzarIro yujyate, na tu kharaviSANaM tuccharUpo'bhAva ityrthH| tadevamazarIramiti vyAkhyAtam / / 469-470 // (2017-2018) D. C.-Bhagavana:--0 Prabhasa | Really you do not understand the proper meaning of the sentences such as "Va

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Vada ] Canadharavada 521 ha vai" etc. In this sentence, the particle cra' denotes negation, and the particles 'ha' and 'vai' are used in the ablative sense." Sa -sarirasya " means to a soul having a body, and " priya-priyayorapahatirasti" denotes the destrution of happiness and misery. The whole sentence will be interpreted as follows: Jiva being possessed of a body, has abhava of sukhoduhkha. In the same way, Jiva existing in a bodiless state of moksa, never undergoes snkha-dunkha i. e. As long as soul is encompassed in a body, it has to undergo szukha-dunkha, but as the bodiless muktatma is free from Karma-good or bad-it is never affected by sukha-duhkha. In the word " a-sarira " here, there is a negation of the body and not of the soul. In the expression " Adhano Devadattah " the riches are denied to the vidyamand Devadatta and not to an a-vidhamana kharaspiga. Similarly, here also, the existence of soul is not denied, but only that of body is denied. That which is denied must belong to an existent source, and not to a non-existent source. Prabhasa:How could it be believed that which is denied at one place must be found at another Bhagavana:- Just as by the word "na-brahmana' a nonbrahinin like a ksatriya or a varsya is understood, but the absolute abhava of Brahmana as a whole, is not meant. So also, the expression "a-sarira" signifies a bodiless mukta siva of the type of mukta jiva having body, but that does not absolute'y deny the existence of soul. There is resemblance in both owing to the common property of upacara Moreover, "sarira" does not come in the way of resemblance. As body is mixed with soul like milk and water, it is one and the same, as soul. Thus, by the denial of the particle 'na', the same soul is apprehended at another place, but the existence of soul is never denied thereby. So, the word 'a--Sarira' denotes nothing but jiva which is vidya mana like Devadatta, and not a-vidyamana like kharas'rniga, 11 469-470 41 (2017-2018) 67.

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350 Jinabhadra Cani's [ The eleventh The expression "Va rasantam" is now explainedim jaM va vasaMtaM saMtaM tamAha vAsaddao sadehaM pi| na phuseja vIyarAyaM jogiNapiTe-yaravisesA // 471 // (2019) Jam va vasantam santam tamaha vasddao sadeham pi Na phusejja viyarayam joginamithe paravisesa i 171!1 (2019) [yada vA vasantaM santaM tamAha vAzabdato sadeimapi / na spRzeyurvItarAga yoginamiSTe-taravizeSAH // 471 / / (2019) Yad va vasantam santam tamaha yasabdato sadehamapi Na sprseyu-r-vitaragam yuginamiste-taravisesab // 47111 (2019)] Trans.--471 Happiness and misery do not affect him who is existing in a free state and also by the word "Va (they do not affect) a dispassionate ascetic having a body ( 2019 ) TIkA-yasmAcazarIram / kathaMbhUtam ? / vasantaM lokAne nivasantaM viSThantamiti yAvat / anena basanavizeSaNena tamazarIrazabdAvAccamartha santaM vidyamAnamAha, na tvasadbhUtam, vamanasya saddharmatvAt / tasmAt kathaM jIvanAzarUpaM nirvANaM syAt ?, na kevalamazIraM muktam, kinnu vAzabdAt sadehamapi zarIramapi vItarAgaM-kSINopazamamohayoginaM paramasamAdhimantaM bhavasthamapi na spRzeyuH / ke ? / iSTe-taravizeSA sukha-duHkhabhedA ityrthH||471|| (2019) D. C.-A bodiless mukla being is not affected by the sukha-dubkha bhedas. The word va includes dispassionate ascetics having bodies. 11 471 ! (2019) Also, vAva tti vA nivAo vAsadatyo bhavaMtamiha saMtaM / khujmA'va ti va saMtaM nANAivisiTThamavAha // 472 / / (2020) Vava tti va nivao vasaddattho bhavantmiha santam "Bujjhava tti va santana nanaivisitthamahavaha // 472 // ( 2020 ) [vAveti vA nipAto vAzabdArthoM bhavantamiha santam / budhyasvA'veti vA santaM jJAnAdiviziSTamathavA'tha ||472 / / (2020) Vaveti va uipato vasabdartho bhavantamiha santam 1 Budhyasva'veti va santam jninadivisistainathava'tha 1147211 (2020) Trans . . 472 Or, "rara" is a particle meaning "Or", and

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Vada | Ganadharavada 531 'santam' means a soul exisitng ( in the mukta statc ). Or, take ava' as a particle and 'santam' meaning ( a soul ) characterised by the qualities of, knowledge, etc. (2020) TokA-'vA' ityathavA, 'vAva' ityaya zabdo nipAtaH, sa ca vAzabdArthaH / tatazcAzaroraM santaM bhavantaM muktau vidyamAnaM jIvaM prIyA-'miye na spRzataH, vAzabdAt sazarIramapi vItarAgaM na te spRzataH / yadivA, 'vasantam ' ityanyathA vyAkhyAyate-" bujjJA'va tti vetyAdi" " vA " ityathavA'yamarthaH / " vAva saMtaM ti" rakSaNa-gati-protyAdivekonaviMzatAvartheSvavadhAtuH paThyate / gatyarthAzca dhAtavo jJAnArthA api bhavanti / tatazcAhavineya ! bamevaM budhyasva ! kiM tat ? ityAha-azarIraM muktyavasthAyAM vidyamAnaM jIvam athavA, jJAnAdibhirguNaviziSTaM santamityAha brUte, priyA'piye na spRzataH: vAzabdAt sazarIramapi vItarAgamiti tatheveti // 472 // (2020) (.-The expression " za vasantam could be dissolved as t'az'i cantan the particle vava meaning "or" and santam meaning a bodiless jiva existing in the moksa state. The word vara here, will signify that sukha-dvhkha do not touch not only a bodiless jiva existing in a moksa state, but also the dispassionate ascetics having bodies. Or, the expression could be dissolved as va ava santam also. The prefix az'a has nineteen differ@nt meanings such as to protect, to go, to love etc. Since a root signifying motion signifies knowledge also, a bodiless soul existing in the mukta state, and characterized by the qualities of cognizance etc, is not affected by sukha-duhkha Here also, the word 'va' brings in the dispassionate sa-deha ascetic. 1 472 // ( 2020 ) The opponent asks na vasaMtaM avasaMtaM ti vA maI naasriirghnnaao| phusaNAvisesaNaM pi ya jao mayaM saMtavisayaM ti // 473 // (2021) Na vasantam a-vasantam ti va mai nasariragahanao Phusaravisesapam pi ya jao mayam santavisayam ti 11473W (2021)

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532 Jinabhadra Gani's [ na vasantamavasantamiti vA matirnAzarIragrahaNAt / sparzanAvizeSaNamapi ca yato mataM sadviSayamiti // 473 // (2021) d 16 na vasantam rics Na vasantamavasadtamiti va matirnasariragrahanati Sparsanavisesanamapi ca yato matam sadvisayamiti 4731 (2021) ] Trans. - 473 Or, it may be dissolved as avasantam meaning thereby not existing ( anywhere ) ' ( But ) it is not proper. ( Since ) jiva is understood from a sarira, Moreover, the adjectivesparsana' is also accepted with regard to existent objects ( only ). ( 2021 ) 6 66 " TIkA - " azarIraM vAbasantaM " ityatra luptasyAkArasya darzanAd "na vasantamavasantaM kvApyatiSThantam " iti vyAkhyAnato nAsti muktyavasthAyAM jIvaH, kvApyavasanAt, asattvAdeva ca nAmuM priyA-priye spRzata iti parasya matirbhavet / tadetad na / kutaH ? ityAha- azarIragrahaNAt / etaduktaM bhavati'na vidyate zarIraM yasya ityatra paryudAsaniSedhAt pUrvoktayuktyA muktyavasthAyAmazarIro jIvo gamyate, ityato'trAkAramazleSavyAkhyAnaM kartuM na pAryate, azarIragrahaNAda muktau jIvasiddheH / kiJca, 'piyA - 'priye na spRzataH ' ivi yadazarIrasya sparzanAvizeSaNaM tadapi yasmAt sadviSayameva matam, tasmAd na mukta jIvasyAbhAvaH / yadi zarIrazabdasya jIvAbhAvo vAcyaH syAt tadA taM priyA - spriye na spRzcata iti vizeSaNamanarthakaM syAt / na hi vandhyAputraM priyA - 'priye na spRzataH " iti vizeSyamANaM virAjate / tasmAda muktyavastho jIva evAzarIrazabdavAcyaH, na punastadabhAvaH / tato nAkAramazleSavyAkhyAnaM yuSyata iti / tadevaM "azarIraM vA vasantaM" ityanena jIvakArmaNazarIraviyogalakSaNa:sya mokSasya muktajIvasattvasya cAbhidhAnAt taniSedhaM kurbatastavAbhyupagamavirodha eveti // 473 // (1021) 66 [The eleventh For Private Personal Use Only as D. C. - Prabhasa: - If you can dissolve the expression done above, I can also dissolve the expression at my will, and pull the meaning in my favour. This, in no way, leads to esta blish the existence of moksa. For, by dissolving a-s'ariram va vasantam as 'sa-ariram va a-vasantam' I can interpret it as a bodiless ( soul ) not existing at any place, and thus prove jea to be absent from muktavasthu, proving thereby, the the negation of moksa as well as jiva, "6 *

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Vada ] Ganadharavada Bhagavana:--Your interpretation does not fit in properly. By interpreting 'a sariri' as one having no body, vidyamanati of jiva in the muktavastha is clearly understood. It is 1101 proper, therefore, to interpret it in another way by prefixing "a". Secondly, in the sentence "Sukha-duhkhe na sprisalah" sparsana becomes the adjective of 'asarira'. If a-sarira' were meant to denote the negation of soul, the adjective would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertion like "Sukha-duhkha do not affect the vandhyaputra. The adjective, therefore, is befitting a-sara' only if it means mukta-jiva ". Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as * va a-vasantam is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper. This proves the existence of moksa, which separates jiva and karmana sariza, and that oi mukta jivu also. If the existence of jiva were denied, Veda-vaianas would prove worthless as shown above. | 473 || (2021) 86 6 , The opponent said evaM pi hoja mutto nissuha- dukkhattaNaM tu tadavatthaM / taM no piya-'ppiyAI jamhA puNe-yarakayAI ||474 || (2022) trishasaNao na phusati vIyarAga-dosassa / tassa piyamappiyaM vA muktasuhaM ko pasaMgo'ttha 1 || 475|| (2013) 533 Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattanam tu tdaavattham I Tam no piya-'ppiyaim jamha punne-yarakayaim | 474 (2022 Nana'bahattanao na phusanti viyaraya-dosassa i Tasya ppiyamppiyam va muttasuham ko pasango'ttha ? | 475 [ evamapi maved mukto niHsukha-duHkkhatvaM tu tadavastham / tad no priyA - priye yasmAt puNye - tarakRte // 474 // (2022) jJAnAsnAbAdhatvato na spRzato vItarAga dveSasya / axa fquafaa a gaga m: qaytsa ? 11804|| (2627) || For Private Personal Use Only

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534 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh Evampi bhaved mukto nibsukha-duhkhatvam tu tadavasthami Tad no priya'-priye yasmat punye-tarakxite 1 474 // ( 2022 ) ] Jrana'nabadhatvato na sprisato vitaraga-dvesasyai Tasya priyamapriyam va muktasukham kah prasango'tra? 11475.1 Trans.-474-475. Such being a mukta soul, it will have no happiness and misery. ( But ) it is not ( so ), as likes and dislikes, are produced from sinful or virtuous deeds. Moreover, likes and dislikes cannot affect a dispassionate person) owing to his ( high ) knowledge and irresistability. He enjoys natural and perfect happiness. So, what is the sense in asserting the negation of happiness ? ( 2022-2023 ) TIkA-evamuktaprakAreNa mukto jIvo bhavedityakAmairapyabhyupagatamasmAmiA, tathA ca sati jIvasya karmaviyogalakSaNo mokSaH, tatra jIvasattvaM ca siddham / yattu niHmukha-duHkhatvaM siddhasya mayA preritaM tat "miyA-'bhiye azarIraM na spRzataH" iti vacanAt tadavasthameva / atrottaramAha-tadetad na, yasmAt puNya-pApakarmajanite eva jIvAnAM piyA-'piye sAMsArikasukha-duHkhe bhavataH / te ca taM kSINani zeSapuNya-pApakarmANa sakalasaMsArArNavapAramA muktAtmAnaM na spRzata ityuttaragAthAyAM saMvandhaH / na caitAvatA tasya niHmukha'svamiti svayameva draSTavyam / kataH ? ityAha-"nANetyAdi" mAnatve satya nAvAdharUpatvAdiyaH / yaca tad muktasya mukhaM muktamukhaM svAbhAvika 'niSpatIkAraM nirupamaM ca / "muttassa paraM sokkhaM jANA-'NAbAhao jahA muNiNo" ityAdinA mAgeva sAdhitam, tat tasya vItarAga-dveSasya muktAtmano na piyaM na puNyajanitaM mukhaM bhaNyate, na cAmiyaM na pApajanitaM duHkha bhaNyatte, kintvetAbhyAM sarvathA vilakSaNam, akarmajanitatvena svAmAvikatvAt, niSpatIkArarUpatvAt, nirupamatvAt, amavipAvitvAti / / atha "ko pasaMgo'tya ti" " akSarIraM piyA-'piye na spRzataH" ityukte ko'tra muktAtmani muktasukhAmAvaprasanaH ?-na kadhidityarthaH, puNyapApajanitamiyA-'piyayoramAve tasya sutarAmeva bhAvAt / tasmAt "na ha vai sazarIrasya." ityAdivedapadairyayottanItyA jIva-kArmaNazarIravirahalakSaNo mokSaH, muktAvasthasya ca jIvasya satvam, tathA, " azarIraM miyA-'piye na spRzataH" ityato'pi vacanAt puNya-pApakSayasamutthaM svAmAvikam, amavipAti

Page #573
Vada ] GaNGadharavada 535 mukhaM cAsya, ityetatritayaM siddham / ata etadanabhyupagacchatastavAbhyupagamavirodha iti sthitam / yadapi "jarAmaya vaitat sarvaM yadamihotram" ityetasmAda vAkyAd mokSahetukriyArambhayogyakAlAbhAvAd mokSAbhAvaM zaGkase tadapyayuktam, tadarthAparijJAnAt / tasya yamarthaH-yadevadagnihotraM tad yAvajjIvaM sarvamapi kAlaM kartavyam, vAzadAda mumukSubhirmokSahetubhUtamapyanupAnaM viveyamiti / ityevaM vedapadoMktadvAreNa yuktibhizva prasAdhito mokSaH / chimazca prabhAsasya tatsaMzayaH // 474-575 // (2022-2023) D. C.--Prabhasa:-I grant the extent of muktatma, moksa. and soul as such. But according to the Veda-vacanis that siddha beings are free from happiness and misery, likes and dislike will not affect tie bediless soul; consequently, a muktatmd will have no experience of happiness. Bhagavana. -- Priya and a-priya and hence sukha and duhkha are produced by punya-papas from which mnktalma is free. But this in no way, means that muktalma has no scope for the experience of happiness. Since muktatma is highly cognizant and perfectly irresistible, owing to its being free from raga-dvesa, it enjoys the highest and most natural happiness which never vanishes. Or, it is no use discussing about the negation of happiness to a mukta being, by saying that likes and dislikes do not affect the bodiless. Muktatma will thus have no experience of the mundane sukha-duhkha, because it is always free from likes and dislikes Thus, the sentences of Vedas such as Na ha vai sa-s'arirasya etc establish, O blessed Prabhasa ! the existence of moksa, va, and the immutable happiness of muktatma at the removal of pun ya-Dapa Lastly, the sentence that "Jaramaryam vaitat arvam yadagsthotram" means that one should practise agnihotra etc, till the' end of life. Your suspiciyn about the existence of moksa generated from

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536 Jinabhadra Cani's [ The elevnth this sentence (as the time of beginning the performance has not been mentioned in it) is out of place. The sentence really means as follows : One should perform sacrifice threughout the life at all times. The word 'ra' here signifies that lie who aspires for moksa should also perform the sacrifice, which acts as the hetu of their moksa. Thus, the Tirthankara removes the doubt of Prabhasa. 474 475 #: 2022-2023 ) Then, chinnammi saMzayammI jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukkeNaM / so samaNo pavvaio tihi o saha khaNDiyasarahiM // 476 / / (2024) Chinnammi samsayainmi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam i So samano pavvalo tihi o saha khamdiyasathim 11 476 << (2024) [ FEST wat fota Taufanymi sa zramaNaH pravajitastribhistu saha khaNDikazataiH // 476 // (2024) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena i Sa sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih 1147611 (2024)] Trans:--467 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his three hundred pupils. (2024) End of the Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara.

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Abhavya 326, 338, Abhavyata 326 210, 315. Abhaya 200, 202, 209, 329, 330, 343, 470, 475, 481, 490, 500, 504, Abhava-rupata 330 Abhibhava 183 Abhara-vikara-297 Acala-bhrata 407, 425, 427, 438, Acetana 314, 348, 351, 395 Adhana 527, Adharma 97, 98, 365 Adhisthatri, 29, 30, 33, Adravyatva 503 Adrista Io3, 104, 105, 106 Index Adristatva 344 Adristarambha 100 Advaitabhava 135 Aghata 38, 354 Agni 262, 276. Agnibhuti 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 95. 96, 113, 121, 128, 137, 138, 139, 419, 420 Agnihotra I1, 63, 126, 136, 186, 307, 385, 386, 457, 481. Aham-pratyaya-14, 15. Ahetukatva 313 Ahimsa 271, 272 Ahimsaka 273 Ahimsakatva 273 Aindriyaka 20, 157 68 Ajata 199, 200, 233, 234, 237, 240. Ajiva 37, 271, 328, 503 Akalyana 42, 435 Akampita 388, E91, 394, 402, 403, 404, 466 Akriya 184 Aloka 346, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, Amukta 348 Amritatva 368, 430. Amurta. 17, 24, 110, ISI, 134, 295, 296, 298, 348; 351, 363, 426, 430, 431, 498, 502 Amurtatva 344, 348, 363, 431, 468, 491, 503, Anikantika 24, 49, 50, 90, 258, 274, 276, 339, 361. Ananta 180, 317, 326 Ananta-bhaga 333. Anavasya-bhavi 105 Anadi 322, 329, 333. Anadi samyoga 484, 485 Anaditya 320. 324 Anistakara 433. Anitya 159, 304, 340, 341. 468, 469, 522, 524 Anitya caitanya 469 Anityata 345, 346, 384, 398, 469, 523, Anityatva 41, 159, 173, 216 Antaraya 441, For Private Personal Use Only

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538 (avadharavada Antarikse 41, Anubhava 212 Anugraha 372 Anumana 3, 4, 5, 8, 33, 83, 150, 171, 185. 344, 394. 400, +15, 522, Anupalabdhi 181, 182, 185. Anupayoga 384 Anusinartit 157. 165. 1617 Anutpatti 49, 98 Anuttara devas 434 Anuyada-para 135 Anvaya 4, 49, 70 Aparyapla 51. Apana 88 Apantarala 88 Apeksa 219, 220, 221, 224, 225. 226, 274 Apratyaksa 357, 258, 466. Arani 461, 462 Artha, 44. 45, 257 Artha-padapara 135. Arthapatti il, Asakyata 183 Asarira 527 Asariratva 364 Asariri 311 Asiva 425 Asoka 265, 503 Asubha 273, 425, 437, 438, 439. 441, 448, 449, 481, Asubha Karma 449 Asubha-parinama 449 Asubha-yoga 440 Asarva gata 344 Asarvamaya 73 Asatya 217. Asiddha 18, 157 Astitva 196, 197, 228, 232, 233 Asumat 46 Asvapna 217 Ati-duratva 182 Atindriya 394 Atireka 187, 188 Atyanta. pratyaksu 2. Ayadhi 179, 399, 100 Apartha 176, 200. Avasthana 358, 381, 475. Avasthita 477 Avidyamana 193, 200, 217, 477. Avidya 242 Avirati 437 Audarika 446 Adana 30, 31, Adatri, 30, 31, 33 Adeya 30, 31. Adimau 312 Adbara 198, 260, 261 Adhaya 198, 260, Agamas 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 157 381, 452. Ahara 450, 451 Akara 240, 267. Akasa 11, 30, 31, 46, 129. 240, 260, 298, 317, 333, 344, 346, 348, 356, 359, 394, 463.467. 484, 489, 503. Akasa-dravya 491. Alaya 373, 376 Arambha 99 Asamsabuddhipur vaka 104 Asraya 449, 451, 452 Asarya-svabhaya 149 Atnau - Atma tog, 110, 122, 136, 149, 151, 154, 155, 169, 170, 185, 298, 311, 344, 348, 395, 473. Atmavadins 61 Avarana 183, 500, 524.

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Index [ 539 Bija 343 Bodha-rupa 17. Brabma 191, 482 Brithaspati 386 Buddhists 483 Bakula 265 Bala 284, 285 Bandha 309, 311, 315, 318, 320, 342, 343, 356, 364, 444, 445, 491, 492, 493. Bandhabhaya 310, 311, Badhaka Pramana 13, Badha 101, 524, Bahya-nimitta 274, 276 Bahya-pudgalas 116 Bahya sarira 161 Bala Joana 158, 159. Bala-sarira 161, Bhagavana 374, 375, 377, 378, 384, 393, 402, 423, 480, 482, 488, 48, 501, 514, 522, 527 Bhakta 31. Bhava 60, 290, 294, 307. Bhaya-bhaya 276. Bhavanapati 371 Bhavantara 290, 292, 296, 297, 301, 304 Bhavya 311, 333, 337, 338, Bhavya-bhava 328, 329, Bhavatva 329, 330 Bhajana 261, Bhava -196, 330, Bhava-yoga 439, 441 Bhokta 468 Bboktri 55 Bhoktritya 344, 349, 468. Bhranti 217, Bhumi 259 Bhuta 98, 136, 145, 146, 148, 151, 186, 187, 193, 195, 245, 261, 262, 266, 268, 269, 459, 460, 461, 462, 464 Bhutasamudaya 149 Cakra 292 Caksu-r--grahya 496 Caitanaya-146, 266, 460, 461, 462, 473, 475 Caitanya- vijnan 469 Campata 265 Candra 376 Caksusa 24 Caritra 444 Cetana 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 263, 348 Cetapa-dharma 522, 524 Chadmastha 25 Chala 30 Cintana 212 Citra ka-vela 496 Cyuta 176 Danda 75, 321 Darsana 65, 68, 81, 367, 382, 389, 408, 444, 480 Darsana varan. 444 Dana 97, 98, 100, 101, 105, 126, 186, 305, 383, 457 Doha 128, 129, 133. 158, 321, 340, 419, 421, 428, 519, 520, 521 Debatya 433 Deha-parispanda 352 Deya 303, 320, 378, 383, 384 Dova-loka 475 Dovatva 304, 305 Deyabhaya 387

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540 ) Canadharvaada 41, 44. 46, 120, 134, 154, 164, 196, 198, 212, 216, 225, 232. 233, 240, 248, 259, 260, 291 301, 321, 322, 329, 330, 339, 340, 345, 354: 389, 395, 397, 398, 399, 420, 421, 428, 429, 465, 466, 469, 470, 471, 473, 474, 475, 488, 489, 490, 493, 504, 525 Ghatakara 473 Ghatopayoga 68 Grabaka 214, 217 Grahya 214. 217 Guna 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 45, 75 Gunin 17, 20, 21, 22. 23 Devadatta 24, 45, 55, 152, 154, 155, 161, 359, 374, 456, 466 Dharma 68, 69. 70, 71, 97, 98, 298, 299, 356 Dharmastikaya 346, 352, 353, 357, 358 Dhataki 6, 61, 146, 147, Dhataki-puspa 460 Dhrauyya -67, 473, 475, 477, 493 Dhrauvyatva 304 Dhyana 441 Dis 11 Diksa 76, 137, 138, 188, 277, 307 365, 380, 387, 406, 457. Dirgha 219, 220, 221, 225 Dosa 521 Dravya 75, 120, 336, 464, 465, 473. 475. 487, 491, 492 Dravyatva 327, 344, 346, 502 Dravya-yoga 339 Drista 104, 105, 420 Dristanta 6. Dristanta-dharmin 6. Dristartha 211, Dristartha-visaya 7. Duhkba 114, 117, 161, 169, 409, 415, 431, 422, 423, 426, 427, 430, 438, 483, 513, 515, 520 Duhkbamaya 516, 520, Duragama 184 Durva 282 Dvesa 162, 466, 483 Ekantika 282 Haritaki 496 Haritala 413 Hasya 454 Hetu 18, 32, 49, 83, 89, 159, 201, 257, 294, 296. 299, 304, 312, 319, 339, 350, 351, 352, 473, 524 Hotumat 31, 274, 275. Himsaka 272 Himsakatya 273 Himsa 271, 274, 457. Hrasva 218, 274 Indigo 413 Indra 369, 386, 387 Indrabhuti 2, 26, 27, 76, 78, 79. 80, 81, 137, 138, 139, 465 Indrajala 193 Indriyas 152, 153, 154, 155, 157. 158, 161, 257, 374, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 465, 501, 503, 504, 520, 521. Ganadhara 368 Gandha 265, 483, Gautama 8, 97, 107, 150 Ghata 2, 8. 17, 24, 27, 29, 37, 38,

Page #579
Index [ 541 Indriya Jnana 399 Indriya Pratyasksa 394, 397 Ista patti 91, 102 Isvara 128, 129 Jada 17 Jaimini 404 Jaipas 483 Janma 343, 483 Jantu 96 Tara 483 ata 199, 200, 233, 234, 231 Jatajata 238, 240 Jayamada 200, 238, 240 Jiva 44, 45, 116, 119, 120, 121, 128, 140, 157, 162, 164, 186, 261, 269, 275, 302, 303, 311, 312, 313, 317, 327, 340, 347, 356, 382, 392, 384, 395, 411, 418, 430, 448, 454, 467, 468, 474, 475. 477, 484, 485, 486) 487, 488, 490, 498, 503, 504, 525, 526, 527 Jira-dravya 491 Jivatva 346, 475, 487, 488 Jnapa 61, 65, 109, 157, 168, 169, 170, 173, 213, 220, 234, 357, 358, 400, 485, 487, 524, 525. Jnanayarada 82, 444, 524 Jneya 357, 358, 525 Jnayatva 328 Jyotis 69 Jyotisk 371 Karana 29, 30, 32 I Karananumana 420 Karma, Karman 33, 77, 82, 83, 84, 89, 90, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 134, 284, 289, 290, 299, 311, 312, 313, 315, 318, 324, 341, 342, 343, 346, 347, 352, 401, 409, 410, 415, 416, 418, 430, 421, 422, 423, 425, 426, 427, 429, 435, 436, 444, 449, 451, 452, 455, 456, 468, 484, 485, 487, 488. 498, 500, 519, 526. Karma-bandha 81, 83, 437, 441, 451 Karma-janita 327, 488 Karma-pudgalas 341, 342, 417, 450 Karma-rupatva 113 Karma-santana 320 Karta 134, 136, 216, 316, 321, 468 Kartritya 344, 349, 468 Kasaya 466 Kala 11. 128, 333, 333 Kama 242 Karapa 101, 134, 178, 195, 202, 216, 281, 282, 283. 284, 291, 292, 298, 419, 42', 424, 425, 426 Karanatya 195 Karanasiddha 195 Karmara 88, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 129, 141, 351, 425 Karya 113, 121, 128, 129, 136, 178, 195, 216, 240, 281, 282, 283, 284, 290, 291, 292, 296, 316, 321, 415, 418, 419, 420, 424, 423 424 425, 426. 430 Karya-sidubi 195 Kayanuyua 420 Kalasa 46 Kalovara 46 Kalyana 425 Kapilas II

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542 ] Kaya 46 Kevala Jnana 179, 180, 399, 400, 401 Kevala Jnana-prapti 380 Kha-puspa 221, 233, 234, 245, 312. 415, 416, 246, 248. 293, 477, 490, 527 Kharastinga 181, 182, 185, 198, 199. 200, 240, 312, 313. 330, 418, 490, 527 Khara-visana 38. 45. 257 Canadharavada Khecara 80 Klesa 100 Klesa-bahula 100 Kritaktva Kriya 75, 120, 12r. 348, 351, 485 Kriya phala 321 Kriyavadin Khodha 430 Ksanika 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 176 Ksanikata-vadin 178 Kseira 363 Kubera 369 Kumbha 46, 339, 471, 472 Kurupa 117 Kula 285 Kuta 46 Kusmandi 265 Laksanas 466 Linga 4, 5, 28, 29, 49, 50 Lingin 3, 4, 5, 28. 29, 49 Loka 354, 355, 356, 357, 358 Loka-vyavhara 477 Mada 144, 483 Mandika 308, 310, 312, 314, J20, 342. 326, 327, 330, 332, 333, 339, 341, 342. 343 347, 350, 362, 363, 365, 485 Manasa 273 Manahparyaya 179, 399, 400. Maniras 382, 386. Manu 404 Manusya 378, 401, 402, 403 Mati-Jnana 179, 518 Mati-Jnanavarana 444 Mati-mandya 183 Maurya-maurya-putra 366, 308, 370, 371, 373, 377, 384, 389, 466 386, Mana 430 Manavaka 216, 384, 516 Maya 193 Mayika 376 Mecaka Mani 413 Meru 415. 445. Metarya 458, 459, 468, 470 Misrabhava 439 Mithyatva 82, 304, 343, 437, 455. Moha 483. Mohaniya Karma 25 Moksa 17. 119, 120, 160, 269, 315, 317, 318, 328, 337, 338, 340, 341, 356, 481, 483, 486, 486, 493, 498, 525, 526, 527 Moksabhilasa 160 Moksa-sukha 521, 522, 526 Mrit-pinda 248 Mukta 313, 316, 345, 348, 517, 527 Muktatma 343, 345, 346, 347 348, 362, 480, 490, 491, 500. 501, 503, 504, 518, 520, 521, 522, 524, 525. Murta 17, 24, 32, 33. 112, 121, 124, 134. 426, 428, 430 333, 331. 342, 346. 491, 491, 492, 315. 331, 108, 110, 296, 395

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495 Index [ 543 Murtata 428. Paroksa 394, 399 Murtatva 261, 344, 428, 503, Pata 17, 97, 233, 240, 248, 311, 504, 524 354, 466, 474 Nabhas 46, 325 Parinama 173, 179, 273, 299, 352, Naiyayikas 57, 65 420, 429, 449, 452, 455, 494, Narasimha 413. Nama Karma 45+ Paryapta 51. Naraka 211, 326, 870, 377, 378, Paryayas 25, 75, 240, 301, 341, 382, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 346, 469, 473, 475, 487, 501 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, Pasu 307 456, 466, 477, 486, 487 Pasutra 307 Naraka-paryayas 488 Pata-cetana 475 Nastikas ro Pataga 360, 361. Nigraba Sihana 80 Papa 17, 193, 211, 310, 378, 408, Nimitta 82, 83, 200, 210. 2II, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 274, 400 415, 419, 420, 421, 422, 434, Nindartha-vada 135 435, 436, 437, 445, 449, 451, Nirhatuka 313 452, 455, 456, 474, 578 Nirvana 380, 480, 482, 498 Papa Karmas 425, 433, 434, 445 Nisedba 354 Papa-phala 475, 520 Niskriya 351, 462, 463, 466 Papa-prakriti 452, 454, 455 Nitya 304, 339, 344, 345, 359. Papa-punya 519 360, 361, 465, 468, 472 Pataliputra 214, 216 Niskaranaka 290, 297, 314, 316, 416 Phala 428 Nityata 345, 493 Prabhasa 479, 481, 488, 491, 494, Nityatva 465, 470, 491 498, 500, 501, 503, 504, 514 Nitya-sadrisa 294 522, 524, 527, 523 Niyati 128, 342 Piadesa 65, 444 Padas 481 Paksa 80 Pradhvansabhava 339, 340 Paksabhasa 18 Prakriti 444, 454, 455 Para 214 Pramana 7, 9, 13, 50, 58, 84, 85, Para-bbava 290 137, 245, 247, 522 Para-loka 461, 462, 463, 464 Pramatri Vijnana 171, 172 466, 467, 468, 470 Pratibandha 503 Parama Brahma 482 Pratighata 356 Paramanu 247, 248, 445, 446 Pratijna 9, 45 Para paksa 216 Pratipaksa 37. 38 Parispanda 351 Pratisodha 41, 43, 84, 85

Page #582
5111 (iayadlaravada Pratyaksa 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 140, 141, 164, 296, 298, 322, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 119, 122, 343, 351, 361, 410, 479 257, 349, 592, 393, 394, 397, Sastras 463, 464 399, 400, 401, 424 Siva 425 Pratyaksa Joana 398, 399, 401 Soka 162 Pratyaksa Pramana 2, 4, 13, 229 Sraroana Bhagavana Mahavira 79, Pratyaya 14, 15, 16, 201 80, 81, 82, 95, 139, 193 Prayatna 351 Suugalo 280. 306 Prana 88 Sruta 72 Iranin 46 Sruta-Jnanavarana 444 Prithvi 191, 193, 258, 266, 271, 276 Subha 425, 439, 440, 441, 448, Pudgala 20, 298, 339, 340, 356, 449, 451, 481 357, 445, 447, 448, 455, 490, 498 Subhatya 440 Pudgala-dharma 298 Subha-paripama 444, 451 Pudgalamaya 299 Subhasubha 437. 441, 453 Padgala-parinama 496 Subhasubha asraya 451 Punya 193, 271, 310, 378, 408, Subhasubba-parinama 451 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, Subhasubha-yoga 440 415, 416, 419, 420, 421, 422, Suddha 44 430, 434, 435, 436, 437, 445, Suddha-bhavas 276 449, 451, 452, 454, 455, 456, Suddha-padas 37, 38, 44 4.57, 518 Sunya 217. 229, 243, 374 Punya-Karmas 433, 434, 445 Sunyata 212, 214, 242, 243, 244, Punya-prakriti 452, 454, 455 257, 258 Punya-papa 457, 520 Sa-cetana 263, 265, 267, 270 Purusa 11, 135, 304 Sa-drisata 2899, 290, 292, 296, 297, Purusatva 307 304, 305 Purusa-veda 452, 454 Puspaka 373 Sa-Jiva 270 Sa-kriya 349, 351 Purva- kalasanketa 399 Sa-kriyatya 348 Purva paksa 12, 464 Sa-sariratya 364 Rajas 310, Rati 454 Samavasarana 371, 372 Rasa 265, 455, 473, Roga 483 Samavaya 41, 42, 109, 121 Raga 466, 522, Raga -dvesa 446 Sanibbusa 176 Rupa 10, 1), 216, 225, 240, 259, Sandeha 209 398, 473 Samghala 31 Sabda 74, 75. 154, 157. 159, 217, Samsaya 209 26.4, 275, 498 Samsara 97, I0, 120, 294, 320, Sabda Pramana 8 360, 484, 486, 487 Sarira 113, 117, 128, 13), 134, Sanisariu 55

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Index ( 545 Samsaritva 285 415, 421, 422, 413, 425, 426, Samsarita 521 427, 430, 431, 514, 517, 520, Samudaya 146, 149, 195 521, 524 imyaktya 452, 454, 455 Syrupa 117 wrayoga 39, 41, 42, 121, 343 Suksma 447 448, 495 Santati Suksma pudgala 448 Santana 323, 324 Sva 214 Sarvajna 334 Syabbava 15, 16, 117, 133, 134, Sarvajnatya '405 193, 296, 297, 298, 299, 351, Sarvaksanikata 175, 178 415, 416, 418, 473, 503 Sarvamaya 73, 75 Sarvasunyata 202, 217, 241, 245. Svabhavaka 326, 327 Sarvablava 209 Svabhava-siddha 195 Sattva 46, 370, 310, 327 Svapaksa 216 Swapna 193, 211 Satya 217 Sadhara 427, 438 Svarga 126, 211, 307, 386, 481 Sadhana 216 Svargin 386 Svatah-siddha 195 Sadharana 412 Svabhavika 292, 328 Sadhya 216 Svadhavikata 328 Samagri 202, 241, 242, 246, 248 Syamin 32, 33 Samagrimaya 348. Samanya 41, 183, 109. Tamas 310 Samanya distanta Tandula-matsya 274 Arishara bi, Tapas 305, 383 Samanya Jaana 180 Tejas 109, 268, 279 Siddba 120, 358, 359, 360, 361, Tilaka 265 362, 368, 468, 520, 524 Tiryanca 377, 378, 391, 401, 454, Siddhatva 519 477, 486, 487 Siddhalaya 346, 352, 353 Tirthankara 76, 137, 180, 188, Siddhantins. 108 189, 190, 277, 278, 279, 307, Siddhi 195 309, 365, 366, 367, 387, 388, Simha 384, 392 389, 406, 407, 408, 422, 429, Smarana 212 439, 457 458 459, 478 Smriti 19 Unmada 242 Smritis 370 Upacata 91, 384, 394, 455, 516, Soma 368 Sparsa 365, 473 517, 518 Sthapa 360, 361 Sthula 447, 448 Upaghata 372 Stuti artha-vada 135 Upagrahaka 357 Sudharman 278, 279, 282, 290, Upakarana 129, 134, 296 298, 297, 300, 301, 303, 309. Upayoga 50, 54, 65 Sukha 75, ?14. 116, 117, 409, Utpatti 200, 469, 473

Page #584
510 Candharavada Utpattimabva 474, 475 Uepada 67, 473, 474, 475, 477, 493 Uttaraprakriti 444 Vacapa 337, 245 Vacaniya 245 Vacasa 273 Vaimanika 371 Vakta 244 Vanaspati 265 Vapus 46 Varuna 369 Vastu 75, 134, 416 Vastu-dharmaa 133. 134, 297, 298, 299, 416 Vacaka 75 Vacya 75 Vayu 149, 262, 268, 276 497 Vayubhuti 24, 140, 150, 160, 166, 168, 180, 182, 186, 188, 189, 465 Veda 59, 60, 69, 71, 72, 74. 82. 186, 187, 191, 279, 280, 306, 309, 318, 367, 368, 370, 387, 408, 457, 459, 480. Vedaciya 525 Veda-padas 186, 276, 305, 310, 364, 390, 459, 481, 482, 5*6. 527 Voda-vacana 185, 525 Yedanga in Vibbuti 491 Vicchoda 321, 331 Vicitra 284, 285, 286, 299 Vicitrata 284, 285, 286, 299 Vidarsana 184 Vidhi-vada 64, 65, 74, 136 Vidyamana 165, 100, 217, 258, 477 Vidyadharas 375 Vijaana 9, 17, 19, 156, 158, 768, 169, 170, 179, 1801 2341 2371 467, 469, 471 Vijpanag hana 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 130, 135, 187, 459 Vijaapamaya 467, 468 Vijpeya-bhavas 61 Vikara 116, 184, 193, 376, 489, 494Vimanas 375, 376 Vipaksa 18, 37, 339 Viparyaya 49, 71, 242 Vipaka 455 Viruddha 18, 33, 9! Visaya 15, 175 Visayasukha 515, 516 Visayanumana 173 Visayin 15 Visesa 41 Vi-sadrisata 297, 304 Vismriti 184 Vitaraga 334 Vyabhicara 43, 71 Vyakta 189, 190, 193, 197, *17. 234, 241, 242, 244, 246257, 264m 266, 271, 377 378 Vyantara 371 Vyatireka 2, 4, 70 Vyatireka Pramana 4 Vyai astha 43 Vyavabara 179, 477 Vyaya 67, 473, 475, 477, 493 Vyutpatti 45 Vyomn 46 Yajnadatta 56, 166, 456 Yantra-purusa 349 Yoga 437