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The first three kinds of knowledge, are liable to error, while the last two cannot be wrong.
Knowledge is pratyaksa or direct when it is immediate, and paroksa or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge, mati and fruti are farokşa and the rest pratyakşa.
Cétana or consciousness is the essence of jiva and the two manifestations of celana are perception darśana) and intelligence (iñan:'. In darśana, the details are not perceived while in jñana they are The former is simple apprehension, the latter conceptual knowledge.
The relation between knowledge and its object, is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness The consciousness of jiva is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature, as well as, that, of the object. Iñéya or object of knowledge includes silf and non-self. Like light, jñāna reveals itself and other o'jects. The Nyāya - Vaiseșika theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself, is rejected by the Jainas. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self, according to them, and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object, is dismissed by them as absurd, since it is the nature of knowledge that it reveals objects.
With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between jñāna and jñéya is very intimate, Jäānin and jñana are also inseparable, though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself, become different aspects of a single concrete entity.
There are jidas without jñāna, since that would take away the cétanā or conscious character of the jivas and reduce them to the level of a=jiva dravyas and there can be no frana without selves; for that would make jnana foundationless
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