________________
ada ] Gangadharavada
: 175: earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire, even a kşanika vijñāna having only one support is able to apprehend other jñānas and their visayas having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no barm in believing that all objects are kşanika.
But even that is not correct. For vāsana in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to vāsaka and vāsaniya; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the avasthāna (retention ) of vāsya and vasaka connected together, kşanikatā itself would not exist. And, is that yāsanā kşaņika or a-ksaņika ? If it were kşanika, it would not be able to apprebend sarvakşaņikatā; and if it were a-kşanika, the very proposition that everything is kşaņika would be violated.
So, the theory of Bauddhas that everything is kşaņika does not fit in, in any way.
Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the Acārya now illustrates his own. बहुविण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्थयाऽहवेगस्स। Pepperrotaret at yufanitari ar 1183011 (866) विण्णाणवणविणासे दोसा इचादयो पसज्वति । न उ ठियसंभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि ॥१३१॥ (१६७९) तस्स विचित्तावरणखओवसमजाई चित्तरूवाई।
खणियाणि य कालंतरवित्तीणि य महविहाणाई ॥१३२॥ (१६८०) Bahuvinnanappabhavo jugavamapogatthayā’havegassa i Vipņāņāvatthā vā paquccavittīvighāö vā. 130 (1678) Vimpāņakbañāviņāad dosā icaādayo pasajjanti . . . Na on thiyambhūyaccuyaviņpānamayammi jivammi. 191 (1679)
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org