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:224: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Bhavėdapèksāto vā vijnānam vabhidhānamātran vã Dirghamiti vã hrasvamiti va na tu sattā səşadharmā vā. 166 ] ___Trans-166 By means of apeksa, either vijnana or mere acknowledgment (of an object ) as short or long would be (attained ), but not the existence of the rest of the properties. (1714)
टीका-अथवा, स्वतः सिद्धे वस्तुन्यपेक्षातो भवेत् । किम् ? इत्याहविज्ञानमभिधानमात्रं वा । केनोल्लेखेन ? इत्याह-" दीर्घम्” इति वा "इस्वम्" इति वेति । किं पुनर्न भवेत् ? इत्याह-न त्वन्यापेक्षया वस्तूनां सत्ता भवति, नाप्यपेक्षिकहूस्व-दीर्घत्वादिधर्मेभ्यः शेषा रूप-रसादयो धर्मा अन्यापेक्षया सिद्धयन्ति । उत्पद्यन्ते च वस्तुसत्ताग्राहकाणि, रूपादिधर्मग्राहकाणि च ज्ञानानि । अतोऽन्यापेक्षाभावतः कथं स्वतः सिद्धस्य वस्तुसचादेरभावः ?, तत्सद्भावे च कथं शून्यता जगतः इति ॥१६६॥ (१७१४)
D. C.--By virtue of its apèksā to another object, a selfAccomplished object would again be either vijñāna or the acknowledgment of its own self as hrasva or dirgha and nothing more. Neither existence nor qualities such as rūpa, rasa, sparśa etc., that are distinct from hrasvatva, dirghatva etc., could be established by the help of apokşā. Now, jñanas that enable us to apprehend existence along with those qualities, are produced spontaneously. So, how could existence etc., of a self-accomplished object be refuted by means of apakşā ? And when the existence etc., of an object, are not denied, how could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted at all?
इहरा हस्साभावे सव्वविणासो हवेज दीहस्स । न य सो, तम्हा सत्तादयोऽणविक्खा घडाईणं ॥१६७॥ (१७१५) Ibarā bassābiavè savvaviņāso havėjja dihassa 1 Na ya so, tamhā sattadayo'navikkhā ghadatyam. 167 (1715)
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