Shraman Bhagvana Mahavira Part 3

SR No.: 008004
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Parimal Publication
Publication Year: 1989
Total Pages: 586
Language: English, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_English, Biography, History, & Religion
File Size: 14 MB

Page 256

:88: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth objects. This involvas self-contradiction in your own argument, which, o Vyakta ! is not at all worthy of you.
The point is that in case of establishing the existenoe of objects, mere apekşā would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object whigh produces jiāna about its own self, is also an active cause. And that is the reason why hrasva, dirga, and abhaya-each one of which would be producing jbāna about its own self-should be taken as existing.
Again, o Vyakta ! you believe that compared to the middle finger, the pradəsint finger is considered as hrasva even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger, ir pradəsint were taken as hrasva even though it is avidyamāna by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also a-vidyamāna should be taken as hrasva and a very long substance like indradhvaja should also be taken as hrasva, as the quality of a-vidyamănatā is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really spoaking, pradesint finger being vidyamāna by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along 'with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So, it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of hrasva, dirgha eto., is produced in the absolutely non-existent anguli only by means of apo kşa. You might argne at this point that in such CASOS also, dirgha, hrasva, ubhaya eto., are apprehended, and the intellects as regards sva, para, and ubhaya are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion, and further that according to you, hrasva, dirgha etc, that are svataḥsiddha and that produce jñāna with regard to their own selves, are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, o Vyakta ! how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally, there would be no distinction between sva and para at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinotion, there would be bothing like sünyatā at al. (1705-1709)