________________
: 38:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a śuddha pada. As for example, & pratipaksa, viz., ghata exists in the case of a-ghata which is a negation of ghata; for, there is an etymology of ghata, and that it is a suddha pada too. One which bas no pratipaksa, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a suddha pada baving an etymology is concerned. For instance, akharavisāna is wanting in a pratipakşa, viz., kharavişāņa since kharavişāna is not a suddha pada but is a sāmāsika one-is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a vyutpatti.
We may now examine the case of adittha. Dittha is its pratipakşa; but, since this dittha is wanting in a vyutpatti, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied :
(i) It should be a suddha pada. (ii) At the same time, it must have a vyutpatti.
In the case of kharavişāņa the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of dittha, the second is violated. So, there exists neither kharavişāņa, a pratipaksa of akharavişāņa nor practically qittha, a pratipaksa of aạitthha.
Now the second hemistitch. Just as when one says that here there is no ghata' establishes the existence of a ghata elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under :
One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e. g., & ghaça. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So, it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non-existent has no negative predication Khara-vişāņa may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibility for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org