Shraman Bhagvana Mahavira Part 3

Author(s): Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Parimal Publication
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/008004/1

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ŚRAMAŅA BHAGAVĀN

MAHÄVIRA
HIS LIFE AND TEACHING
For Private Personal Use Only

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The Universities Commission Ministry of Education Snowdon Government of India:
Snowdor.
Simla. 27th July 1945
My dear Sir,
I thank you very much for your letter of the 21st July, and the sut of books you sent to me.
I am sorry to say that I have not been able to read them with the care and attention that they deserve. But I have seen enough to know that they must be of great value to students of religious thought.
With regards,
Your Sincere Sd (Radhakrishanan

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ŚRAMAŅA BHAGAVĀN
MAHĀVİRA HIS LIFE AND TEACHING
BY MUNI RATNA-PRABHA VIJAYA
VOLUME III GANADHARA--VADA
PARIMAL DELHI
PUBLICATIONS
INDIA

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We would like to put on record our heart felt gratitude to Mun Shilchandra Vijaya Gani, a family member of the author, for arranging the permission to publish the present volumes
Price : Rs. 2000/- for set of six volumes
First Published, 1948-50 Reprint Edition, 1989 Published by K. L. Joshi For Parimal Publications 27/28 Shaku Nagar, Delhi-110007. Distributed by Radha Publications 4378/4B, Murarı Lal Street, Ansari Road Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002. Phone . 261839 Printer: Delux Offset Printers Old Rohtak Road, Daya Basti Delhi-110035.

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Introduction
The Text of Gaṇadhara-väda
(a) Sources.
It is now a welknown fact that Riṣabhadeva Swāmi, the first Tirthankara of the persent series, was the founder of the Jaka Canon. It was during his regime that the Sacred, Works of the Jainas came into existence. After him, the Sacred Works increased in number and quality, when the religion was exalted to a high rank, but they were reduced considerably in times of disorder and anarchy. Generally speaking, preachings of all the Tirthankaras happend to be of the same kind, and their lives were almost similar to each other in principal characteristics,
Śramana Bhagavāna Mahāvīra, the elder contemporary of Gautama Buddha, was the last, but Supreme Tirthankara in the whole dynasty. Like His predecessors, He too had got his preachings composed in books. His Ganadharas or principal disciples arranged those preachings in twelve Angas, the last one being divided into fourteen Purvas. The Absolute Knowledge of these Purvas began to fad gradually, till at las it was totally extinct. Ārya Jambu Swāmi was the last Kévalin. After him there were half a dozen Pattadharas designated as ŚrutaKévalins. Then there were ten aśapūrvins, possessing the knowledge of ten Purvas only. Arya Vajra Swami was the last Daśapūrvin, after whom the knowledge of Purvas began to fade quickly. Dévardahigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa was the last of the type
Thus, when the knowledge of the original preaching of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahavira was fast disappearing. it was rightly felt by some of his successors to commit those preachings to writing. As a result of such efforts, forty-five Sacred Works

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came into existence: 11 Angas. 12 Upangas, 10 Praksynas 0 Chéda -Siilras, 2 Sūtras, and 4 Meila-Sitras.* Of these, the four Mila-Sairas are considered as the Original Sitras or Commandments, because they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina Monks in their religious practices. Āvaśyaka, Dašavaikālka, Uttarādhyayant and Pıqda Nrryukti (or Ogha Niryuktz) are the four Müla Sülras, According to Weber the order or composition of these Sūtras is this: -(1) Uttaradhyayana (2) Āvašyaka (3) Dasavai kālıku and (4) Pinda Niryukli.
Though Avaśyaka Sūtra is not the oldest of the four Müla Sütras, it is the mosi important of all, as its name suggests. Samiyeka (Sämāiya) Catur vimsati Stava Paờikkamaņa), Vandaua ka (Vandanayam). Prati kramara (Padikkamaga), Kayotsarga (Kaussagga and P, atj ākhyāna (Paccakkhăna), are the six divisions of the Avašyaka Sitra. It should be noted that though all these Sūtras were dedacted into books by Ganadhars they were originally preached by Sramana Bhagavān. Mahavira.x
Bhadrabāhu Swāmi had already written a Niryuktı on the Avagyaka Sūtras and number of Cūrnis were also composed by several authors as detailed commentaries on the Āvaśyaka Sütra. Still, however, Jinabhadra-Gani Kşamāśramana felt the need of ellucidating the original Niryukti; hence he wrote a Bhāşya or Commentary in gåthâs or verse on the Nirgukti. Since this was an additional Bhasya to the Niryaukti, which itself was a Commentary on the Avaśyaka Sura, it was know as Visesavasyaka Bhāsya. The whole work runs into 3603 gãthās or verses. It could futher be divided iuto several sub-sections such as Pithikā, Varavarikā, Upasargas, Sāmācāri of ten (varieties), Ganadhara
x In addüion to these. some ennumerate 20 more Prakırnas, 12 Nirauktis, and several more arriving at the total number of 84 Again in order to supplement the information supplied by those 84 agamas, there are sovoral other works known as Nigames or Upanisads which, in turn, ara 36 in all and bring the total number to 110. x. Vide by sifa y Perait faire part 1 तस्वामिणा उ निच्छपनयस्स तत्तो जमोऽणणं ॥ ३३८२ ॥
(i far9434% 978 )

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vñda, Ganadharas, Nihnavas, Nehndva-vada, Sésa Upodghāla. Nir. orekti and a svādhyāya Nivyukti Of these, Ganadhara vāda and Nihnavavāda are the most important of all, because they discuss both positively and negatively, several philosophical topis that are vitally connected with the Jaina Āgamas. Commentaries.
There commentaries are said to have been written on the text of Viseşõvaszaka Bhāsya. The author hiinself is said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by Kotyācārya ( or silankacarga ) the manuscript of which dated 1135 V S. is preserved in a latterad -ondition in the Bhāņdārkara Research ditute, Poona. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present, is that of Maladhāri Ilemaandı ācārya.
Maladhāri Hemacangrārāra is different from Kali-Kala Sarxajna Hémcandrācārgia, the welknowu author of Kvyâs'raja. Originally, he was welknown as Pandit Suelānbarācārya Bhattāraka, But his worldly name was Pradyumna and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the advice of Sri Abhayadeva Śūri he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. Seddharāja Jayasinha, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V. S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-sperad well-versedness. (c) Ganadharas--their names, lineage etc.
śramana Bhagavāna Makāvîra had eleven gañadharas in all. All except Indrabhūtt Gautama and Sudharma Swimî had attained Nirvāṇ: or Final Emancipation during the life-time of their celebraied preceptor. Indrabhath Guntama and Sudharmā Şwāmî had attained moksa at Rājagrihā, after the Nirvāṇa of Sramaņa Bhagavāna Mahävira.
All ganadharas belonged to the high-born families. Being directly under the guidance of śromaņa Bhagavāna Mahavira they became wide-read professors and knew all the twelve Angas along with fourteen Pūrras,
The Table attached herewith supplies all information about the eleven ganadharas.

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Serial No.
Name of 1 the Canadhara
Parents' Name
Place of Lineage
Birth (Gotra ) 17 Janmasthāna)
į
Indrabhūti ...
Gautama
Vasubhūti and Prithivi
The Village of Gobara in
Magadha
2 | Agnibhuti ... 3. Vayabhuti ... 4 Vyakta
5
Sudharmā
.
Dharmamitra Bhāradvāja) Kollāgaand Värni
-Sânnivesa Dhammila Agnivaišyzand Bhapdita yana Dhanadeva * Vásistha Mauryasanniand
vesa Vijayādevi
6 Mapdika
..
7 Maurya-putra
8
Akampita
Mithila
Maurya and, Käsyapa
Vijayādevi Vasu and Harita
Nandã Deva and Gautama
Jayanti Datta and Kaundiya Varupadevi
9
Acalabhätā ...
Rosala
10 Métārya
The Village of Tunsika in
Kośämi Rājagriha Nagar
Prabhāsa
Bala and Atibhadra
* After the death of her first husband Dhandava, Vijayadevi lived with Maurya. This 'shows that widow-remarriage was in vogue in those days,

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Duration
of life incognito 1 Chad
masthaparyāya )
Name of Con Duration stellation at of honsethe time of hold life
Birth (Orih(Nakşatra) vasa)
Total
Duration of | life in state of
Perfect Knowledge (Keva
li Paryāya)
age
Remarks
Jyestha
50 years
30 years
12 years
92 years
Kritika
Swati
46 years ( 12 years 16 years 74 years 42 years 10 years 18 years 70 years 50 years 12 years 18 years 80 years
Sravaņa
Uttarāphâl-
50 years 42 years
guni
Magha
! 53 years
14 years
8 years 100 years He was
the first
Patgadh 16 years 83 years ara of the
Jaina
Church. † 16 years 95 years
Rohipi
165 years
2 years
Mrigasirşa | 46 years 12 years
14 years 72 years
Uttaraşādha
48 years
9 years
21 years 78 years
Ašvini
36 years | 10 years
16 years 62 years
Puşya
16 years
8 years ( 16 years
40 years
Cl. parantuni, format annual तरपट्टोदयपढमो, सुहम्मनामेण गणसामी ॥
(Tapāgacchapattávali, Ed-by Kalyāņavijayaji ).

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(0) Summary of the Text.
We give below a summary of the text of Ganadharavasis which is contained in Güthās running from 1549 to 2054 of the Viseşāvašyaka Bhasya.
(i) Jiva:-Iudrabhūti Gautama, the first Ganadhara, puts forward his doubt about the existence of Soul and śramana Bhagavāna Mahavira removes the doubt by means of various evidences and Illustrations. Explaining the meaning of the word. Jira' the Bhagavāna remarks that liva' does not signify body-déha-but it signifies the soul-atma-which is full of cognizance, Body is only inanimate.
Smpli ( remembrance), jijñāsā ( desire for knowledge ), czkirşa ( desire for activity ), jigamişā ( desire for movements ) and sams'aya (doubt) etc are the properties of Soul, which being self-evident is pratyakşa or directly apprehended Since body is corporeal and physically visible, properties, like cognizance etc. cannot reside into it. These properties are contained in Soul, because it is a-mūrta or incorporeal and a-cākşuşa or beyond the range of physical sight. This shows that Soal is absolutely different from body.
In reply to the argument of the Vedāntists that Soul, being one and the same everywhere, can never be classified, Sramana Bhagavāna Mahavira Swami contends that if the Soul were one absolute entity. prevading everywhere, it ought to have been apprehended as one all-pervading element like akāśa even in case of each and every pinça. or body. But that is not so. The Soul varies with the shape and size of pinda or body. Besides, if we deny the existence of Soul, there would be nothing like sukha-duhkha and Bandha-Moksa in this world.
The Soul is accepted as vrjñānaghana or an assemblage of many vijñānas (cognitions), firstly because it is identical with vijñāna which is upayoga (attention) either of the type of jñāna (knowledge) or that of dartara (perception) and

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secondly because the soul has its each and every pralesa ( the minutest portion ) formed from the assemblage of infinite modifications of vijñāna.
According to the Naiyāyika School, the Soul is devoid of vijnana and hence inanimate. The Jaina Preceptor refutes this theory by arguing that the soul is said to have been produced and destroyed only with regard to upayoga or attention, but it is indestructible so far as vijñāna is concerned, on account of its vijñāna-santali or the perpetual continuance of cognition.
(ii) Karma : Solving the doubt of Agnibhūti, the second Gapadhara, śramaņa Bhagavāna Mahavira Swami establishes the existence and significance of Karma as follows :
Just as a sprout has seed as its hétu or cause, pleasure and pain experienced by the people of this world must also have some sort of hetu, This hetu is nothing but deeds or Karma of the living beings in their past life. Just as the body in youth has the body in childhood to precede it, the body in childhood has also some sort of body to precede it. The body formed of Karmas of the past life and hence known as Kārmana Sarira, precedes the body in childhood,
Just as, each and every act performed by a living being in this world yields a fruit, as is seen in case of tilling the ground and many other acts, so also, the acts of charity etc. undertaken by a living being undoubtedly yield fruit which is nothing but Karma.
Since a majority of living beings, is found unhappy and only a few of them are found happy, we can easily infer that there are only a few who perform good actions and there are many who perform evil actions. It should be noted that Karma here, is different from Kriya or action, as Karma becomes Karya, and Kriya the Käraga.
Since pleasure and pain etc. are the properties of soul,

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the soul would become their samaväyı-kāraṇa or the intimate cause, and Karma, a nimutta or the external cause, is corporeal
Karma
Since Karmana Sarira is closely connected with jiva, it is beyond the power of sense to perceive it. But there is no doubt that it is a sort of sūkṣma (subtle) śarira of an interior natnre. Cosequently, like the variegated transformations found in cloud, vicitrata or varieations should be accepted in case of Karmaṇa Śarira as well
The Soul is connected with Karma as intimately as a murta ghata is connected with a-murta ākāśa or a mitra finger is connected with the a-mutra actions of expansion and contraction.
So like seed and sprout, body and Karma are mutually related as hétu and hétumat rendering theory the Karmasantāna anadi or beginningless.
Finally, by the help of Veda-padas, the Bhagavāna establishes Karma as the intervening agent which helps the soul in the production of body. He further explains that punya is produced by hoty deeds and papa by unholy deeds.
(ii) Relation Between Soul and body: According to Vayubhuti, the third Ganadhara, soul and body are indentical. But the Great Preceptor explains to him the relation between soul and body in details and removes his illusion According to him, cétanā or consciousness is not the property of each one of the five bhutas or principal elements which constitute the body, but cétana is the intrinsic quality of soul residing into a group of bhūtas. For, if cétana were the quality of all bhūtas taken together, it ought to exist in a dead body as well. But it does not happen so.
Just as Dévadatta, who
recollects an object perceived through the five windows of a palace in the past, is different

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from the five windows, as well as, the palace, so also person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses.
When Dévadalta recalls an objects seen through a number of windows, even the windows are closed, it is almin of soul that recollects the objects perceived through senseorgans even when toe sense-organs have Ctased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that alman is different from indriyas. Or, súy, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits vikūras or perversion by distilling saliva etc. by means of tongue, is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, ülman is different from mdı ijas, because having seen an object by means of eyes, ātman holds j! by means of hands.
In reply to the Buddhistic theory that like all objects, jiva is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like Dêvadatta who is able to recollect his experierce of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life,
Bauddhas advocate the destructibility of jñāna (knowledge) by means of statenients such as “Yat sat tat sai vam kşanikan" and "Ekavijñānasautatayaḥ sattrah" etc. But if the destrutibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of smarana. Inana of the pramālā or the perceiver) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. Jrāna being å quality, could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body.
Futher, according to Bauddhas, kşaqihatā or impermanence i recognized neither by maans of self-perception for by the help of perception through sense-organs, but hy means of Tapanāna or inference only. They further believe that the

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earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by virtue of that desire, even a kṣamika vijñāua having only one support, is able to apprehend other jnanas and their visayas. This theory of Bauddhas seems fallacious. For, vāsanā or desire mentioned above, could be applied only when it is related to vāsaka or vāsauîya and could never be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth.
Lastly, if atman were taken to be kṣnika, faults such as production of many objects at a of vijñāna, and violation of the law of cause would crop up. These faults could only be were taken as susceptible to utpada or production, vyaya or destruction, and dhrauvya or retention.
a number of time, retention and effect etc., avoided if soul
In addition to all these arguments, the sentence of Védas also leads to establish that alman is different from body.
(iv) Existence of Elements: In coures of discussion with the fourth Ganadhara named Vyakta, the Bhagavāna explains the validity of the view that elements do exist.
Since jiva etc are contained in bhulas or elements, doubt about bhuitas gives rise to doubts about the existence of all leading to the idea of all-pervading negation. Consequently,
we will be compelled to take the whole Universe as nothing but illusion or dream. And according to this notion of all pervading negatiou, there will be no distinction between svamata or one's own opinion and papa mata or another's opinion, hrasva or small, and dirgha or long, and so on.
Some objects are self-accomplished like a cloud produced as a result of collision, with the element as a case without he help of any Karta or agent. Some objects are accomplished like ghata by means of an outside agent, while some other objects, are produced by means of their virtues, as well as, the Outside agents as in the case of a child produced by means

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of its parents, as well as its, own Karmas. Lastly, there also exist some objects like sky which are permanently accomplished.
Whatever is accepted and apprehended by us as being produced by means of samgarî or a group of materials, is nothing but a collection of atoms. This naturally leads us to believe in the existence of atoms.
Out of the five main bhūtas or elements, the first four viz Prithvi ( earth!, ap (water), téjas (fire) and vāya are sa-cetana or animate, because the symptoms of célană are found in all of them. But the fifth element vis, akāsa ( sky ) being a mūrla or incorporeal, acts only as a support and has no life. *
Though distinct from the variations of clouds etc, bodies made- of the first four elements are sa-eétaxa only so long as they are unstruck by any implerpent. These bodies turn lifeless immediately if and when they are struck by some implement.
At this point, the Bhag avāna explains the important doctrine of Ahimsā or non-violence. He dictates that according to the specific laws of morality, that which results in evil consequences, is called himsä and that which results in good fruition is called a-himsā
One does not commit himsi in spite of his striking a jiva If his motive in doing so is beneficial at the end; 01 the other hand, a person is said to have committed himsä on account of his evil motive, inspite of his abstention from strikirg a living being.
All these facts lead to prove that bhūtas do exist, and that out of the five main bhūtas, the first four are sa-cétana.
(u) Identity of Existence: Sudharman, the fifth Ganadhara. asksd a question as to whatever a living being in
* Vegetables being only a varity of Prlhvet should be included under Prthui.

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this world lived a similar life in the other world. Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira Swami removes his illusion by the following explantion:
Attainment of re-birth or existence in the other world depends upon the Karmas of an individual. The Kurmabandha -which binds the soul to the body is caused by muthyātva ( wrong belief ), a-virati ( non-renunciation ) pramāda ( carelessness ), aud yoga ( vibrations set up in the soul through mind, body, and speech ! Para-bhava, being dependent upon Karma, happens to be vicitra like Karma. So, if the life in two existences were one and the the same, there would be no scope for an increase or decrase in it. In such a case, one who is rich in this life would become rich in the next life also, and a poor man in this life, would remain poor in the next life also Thus, there would be nothing like progress or retardation, if this and the otner life were to be the same or identical. Consequently, there would be no justification for the praetice of religious duties and pious deeds in this world.
This shows clearly that similarity or identity between the two bi avas or existences would never be possible, and the belief is refuted by means of Véda-padas like “ Śrugālo vai esa jayate yvḥ sa-puriso dahyaté " etc. also.
(vi) Randha and Mokşa: Since body and soul are connected with each other as hèlu and hétumat, they must havn perdetual continuance. The tendency of body is such that it becomes the cause of the future body and effect of the past Karmas In case of an anādi sanlāna also, that which is the cause of future body and effect of the past one, becomes decidedly a perpetual continuance of body and Karma. This proves the existence of Karma-bandha
The mutual relation between Jiya ane Karma is endless and beginningless (anādi ananta) like sky, and at the same time beginningless, but limited (anādi sānta, like that between

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gold and stone. The anādi-aranta relation exists with regard to a-bhavya or mean jivas, and the anadi santa relation exists with regard to bhavya or higher souls
Bhavya means that which is fit Siddhi. The group of such bhavyas, and hence it could never be destroyed.
for the attainment of is endless like akāśa,
Mokst means separation or shedding off of the Karmapudgalas from soul. Moksa is neither kțitaka or artifical, nor a-nitya or impermanent. It can be said to be a-nitya only to the extent that everything is nitya or everlasting as dravya (substance) and a-nity's or impermanent as paryayt or modification. Like consciousness, movement is also an important property of soul.
Free souls possess movements. But these free souls cannot go beyond Silllhakşetra in absence of dhırmāstikāya. Dharmāsiïkāya and Adharmästikāya are the two factors which distinguish loka from a-loka.
Like Kala, Mukātmā is also anādi That is, just as nobody knows which was a first day or a first night, since the stream of Kāla flows on from times immemorial, in the same way, nobody knows when the first free soul came into existence. Innumerable siddhas or mukla beings could be contained in one siddka-ksétra by virtue of their a-murtatva or form lessness as the Siddha-kşetra has only limited dimensions.
Bandha and Mokşa are, therefore, laid down as positive factors existing by virtue of Karmas, as shown above.
(vii-vii) Existence of Devas and Närakas; i xistence of dévas or gods and Nīrakas or hellish denizens could be proved in various ways.
At the time of a Tirthankara's birth, many gods and goddesses come to this world to pay their homages.

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Like luminary gods such as Moon etc, other gods are also perceptible. Here if it is said that Moon etc., are not luminary gods but they are mere places of habitation, there ought to exist inhabitants of these places also. And these inhabitants are none but gods.
It is impossible to find people in this world who are cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. For, in this world, a happiest man is undoubtedly affected by some sort of disease, or old age, and an extremely miserable man will experience the happy breeze of cool wind, and the brightness of light. From this point of view, luman beings could never be called cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. It is the Narakas or bellish denizens only, who are destined to the cent per cent misery and it is the dévas or divine beings who enjoy cent per cent happiness. It is true that sometimes a human being is allegorically called a 'god but we should not forget that unless and until the principal meaning of a world is attained, the secondary meaning could never be and närakas are acākşuşa z. e., beyond the perception of senses, they do exist.
(ix) Pápa Punya:There are five the existence of pāpa-punya:
different theories
about
(1) Thero exists punya alone which increases or decreases causiog pleasure or pain. (2) There exists papa alone which increases or decroases causing pain or pleasure. (3) Punya and papa exist in a combided stase like mecakamani (4) Panya and papa are independent or each othpr. (5) There is nothing like Karma, and bence there is nothing like punya and papa also.
S'ramapa Bhagavāna Mahavira Srini refutes all the above-mentioned theories and establishes his own in this way:
Just as a potter accompained by earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be tne cause of ghata, there do exist punya md

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papa which are but respectively good and evil forms of Karma that works as the hetu or cause in the production of body. Though there exist visible hétus like father and mother in the production of body, there do exist invisible hétres like punyas and papas also, which determine the form proportionate or im-proportionate, beautiful or ugly, according as it is due to punya or papa. In other words, śubha sarira is the product of priya karma, and a-subha sarira is the product of pāpa karma.
Like the mūrta ghata which becomes the cause of a-mürta jrāna, the murta karma is also the cause of a-miirta sukha. duhkha or pleasure and pain etc. The experience of exquisite happiness is caused by the abundance of punya and the experience of utmost miseries is due to the abundance of sins.
Prņia and papa which thus act as the causes of happiness and misery are independent of each other. Since, there is no reason for the Karma-bandha of punya and pāpa taken together, they can never exist in a combined state like mecākamani As seen before, mithyötva, a-virati, kaşāya, pramada and yoga are the main causes of Karma-bandha. None of these causes happens to operate in case of the production of a combined state of mecakamaņi.
Fruition of jîva śubha or aśubha turns the Karma subha or asubha-at the time of apprehension.
Food of the same kind produces blood, flesh and saliva etc. in the body on one hand. results in useless refuge of fæces and urine also on the other hand. In the same way, Karma though apprehended in similar ways, results as śubha of a-subha by virtue of pariņāma and asraya. Thus, according to Jainism, there do exist punya and papa as separate entities,
(x) Para-bhava or the Other World: Since Atman is Strisceptible to production, destruction, and retention as seen before, it must have an access to the next world. When jiva first apprehended ghata and then apprehendeds pata the

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apprehension of ghatam-known as ghata--cétana--is destroyed, that about pața-or pața-cétanāmis produced and the rétana is retained in a continuous range of corsciousness existing from times immemorial.
The same is the case with jîvas which are staying in this world, or which have already passed to the other world. For, since they are succeptible to upāda, vpapa, and dhranvya, they have a natural access to the next world,
Moreover, if there were absolute negation of para-loka the commandments. of performing agnihotra etc. for one desirous of Salvation, and the prescription of the rewards of righteous deeds such as charity etc. would be of no avail.
(xi) Nirvāņa or Final Emanicipation : Buddhistic theory of Nirvana is this:-A lamp, when extinguished, does never fade into any sort of earth, ether or space, but it only pacifies itself; so also, the Soul, when finally liberatecd ( from body ) does never fade into earth or sky, nor does it pass to any of the directions, but it only attains pacification at the removal of worldly bondages of sukha-duḥkha.
There is another theory also, which asserts that moksa or nirvāṇa is a peculiar positve condition of the soul, at the attainment of Absolute Knowledge and Perception, when all sorts of miseries such as affection, enmity, pride, avarice, infatuation birth, death, old age, and diseases etc. have been removed.
Refuting both the above-stated theories, Sramaņa Bhagavāna Mahavira asserts that mokşa means the entire separation of Karma from the region of soul. Since the mundane world has its production due to Karma, it vanishes with Karma. But jivatva happens to exist from times immemorial, and is not produced by Karma. So, jivatva, naturally, can never vanish with Karma. It is not prorer, therefore, to believe that at the tfme of Nirrāna, jiva vanishes like a lamp.

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Really speaking, the flanie of a lamp does not vanish entirely but it only changes its form, Just as inilk changes its fo‘m into curds, the flame of a lamp changes iuto darkness. The minute particles of the flam of a lamp transform themselves into still more minute particles of darkness which are not perceptible. But that does not mean that they have ceased to exist entirely. As a matter of fact, the light-particles of the flame which were perceptible to the eye, would become perceptible to nose when turned into darkness. So, the lamp does not entirely dic away, but it only changes from light into darkness which is perceptible Like lamp, jiva is also said to have attained N:rvāņa or Final Emancipation, when that jiva passes into a new form which is a-mūrta, free from Karma-bandhas and which is unobstructible. This, therefore, shows that the pure, enternal, positive condition of jiva at the removal of obstructions like sukha-dulkha is called the state of Nirvāņa or Final Emancipation to the jiva
Like a sage, engrossed in the highest bliss of Absolute Knowledge, a Muklātmā liberated from the bondages of all sorts of worldly miseris, like birth, death, and old age etc enjoys a blissful state of Perfect Knowledge,
Finally, explaining the real interpretation of the sentences of Védos such as “ Na ha vai sas'arirasys priya'prij ayorapahutirasti ” as well as “ Asariram vā vasantam priya'priye na sprasataḥ” etc., śramana Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swami convinces the Ganadhara of the validity of the theory of Nirvana, and removes all his doubts. (For further explanation see discusssion with the last Ganadhara ).
Ganadharavāda and Nihnuvavāda,
Although both the Vădas ultimately point to the coinion goal of the realistion of truth, there is a great contrast between Ganadhara-vāda and Nihnavavada. In so far as their subjects, method of discussion, debators, and the consequences of debate are concerned. These points of contrast could be explained briefly as follows:

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Ganadharavada deals with a positive type of discussion while Nihnavavada deals with negative type of discussion. Ganadhar avāda strengthens the hands of Jaina Āgamas by asserting certain cardinal virtues of the Jaina Religion Nihnavavidā tries to repudiate the principle of Jainism in one way or the other weakening thereby its influence over the people. Discusaions in O. V. are based on the interpretations of certain Védavacanas; those in N. V. are based on the interpretations of the Jaina Agamas, Gañadharas enjey the proud privilege of entering into debate with śramaņa Bhagavāna Mahāvira Himself; Nihnavas enter into controversy with Precept or of one Gaccha or the other Ganadharas entertain honest doubts in their minds from the begining and hence accept the principlas of Tirthankara as soon as they are convinced; Nihnavas, in most cases, do not leave their rigid beliefs in spite of any number of solid arguments advanced by their opponents. Debates of Ganadharars, therefore, seem to have generated for the realisation of trutlı, while those of Nihnavas, are caused out of jealousy, anger. vanity, or infatuation in many cases. Thus, love of truth is at the root of N. V. All the Ganadharas argue with their Celebrated Preceptor frankly with true desire for knowledge, and hence they do not hesitate in accepting the Dikşă ultimately, when all their doubts are dis pelled; Nihnavas on the other hand, deliberately try to hide the truth in order to refute the theory amongst the monks and create disruption in the Gaccha.
Faith in Āgamas is the guiding spirit of Ganadharas scepticism fs the inain charactesistic of Nihnavas. In G V., the debators are non-Jaina persons who are initiated into Jainism at the end; in N. V. the debators not only Jainas but the learned Jaina monks themselves who abandon the Jaina church and try to establish their own School. Logic, pure and simple, brings the debators to the right path in G. V.; physical punishment brings the debators to the right path in many cases in N. V. a
In G. V., the discussions are held on a very high level as they treat philosophical subjects from beginning to end; while

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in N. V , the discussions sometimes fall to the level of mere lo. gical tricks employed for refuting a small argument related to a certain statement of agama. Ganadharas never went against the Jaina Canon; on the contrary they sponsored the movement of establishing its influence over the masses by dedacting the principles of preachings of śraman, Bhagavāna Mahavira into books. It was not so with Nzhnwas. Since they were prominent monks holding strong influence over the public, the Nihnavas actully propagated their wrongly-based theories among the dull -witted monks and defiled certain portions of the Gaccha, by dragging some of its members on their sides. Rohagupta and Sivabhiīti are the glaring instances of this type. In short, the tendency of being at perfect agreement with the preachidgs of Śramıņa Bhagavāna Mahāvīra signifies the character of Garrdha. ras; while that of being at disagreement with the same, either in part or in toto, reflects the character of Nihnavas,
The Author-His Life, Works, and Date
Life
Jinabhadaragaņı Ksamaśramana is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet, there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his aget
He was the first Jaina writer and preacher who had consistently attemped to interprete and explain the principles of the Jaina Canon in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people That is to say, he did not instruct his puplis or followers only in a tradional way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the Jaina Canon, he interpreted and
i Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:(i) fa afir Fatih ATHARI
___ य धूताज्जीतमुद्दधे शौरिः सिन्धोः सुधामिव ॥१॥
• Tilakācārya in his Āvasayaka Vritli.

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2A
explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age, and hence was awarded the title of "yugapradhāna " *
His knowledge was not confined to the religious fore, but he was well-versed in the sciences of mathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also. I
Still, however, Ācārya Jinabhadra Cami was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional Jaina Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge anc intelligence, were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticitv and validity of the Jaina Āgamas. He is therefore taken as one of the pioneer āgama-pradhāna or orthodox Ācāryas*
He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view-point (ii) वाक्यविशेषातिशयविधसन्देहहारिमिः । जिनमुदं जिनभदं कि क्षमाश्रमण स्तुवे ।
-Muni-Candra Suri in Amara Caritra (A) जिनवचननतं विषमं भावार्थ यो विविज्य शिष्येभ्यः ।
इन्थमुपादिशदमलं परोपकारैककृचेताः ॥ तं नमत बोधजलर्षि गुदमंदिरमखिलवाग्मिनां श्रेष्ठम् ।
चरणश्रियोपगडं जिनमद्रमणिशगाश्रमणम् ॥ - Malayagiri Sūri in his Commentary on Britha Kşetra Samāsa. + Vide नमह य अणुओग-घर जुगप्पहाणं पहागनाणायमय ।
सव्व-सुइ-सत्ण -कुलं दसण-काणावओगमगाम्मठियं ॥
--Siddhaséna Sūri in his Cūrni on Jitaklpasūtra. + Vide स-समय पर-समयागम-लिवि-गणिय-छन्द सहनिम्माओ । दसस वि दिशासु जस्म य अणुओ (अनुवा) भणज्ञ जयपडहो ।
( Ibid)

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of the traditional Jaina Agamas, and were rejected if they want against the tradional preachings. The example of his predecessor Siddhaséna Divakara is welknown. Siddhaséna was a freeminded, but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent, ideas, irrespective of their being diffrent from or similar to the traditional Jaiua Āgamas. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneously but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations. Siddhaséna thus went against the traditional view of the Jaina Āgamas according to which the Kévala-Jrāna and the Kévala-Darsana took place simultaneously. Jinabhadra Gaņi Kșrmāśramaņa repudiates the theory of Siddhaséna Diväkara in his Viséşāvasyaka Bhāśya and re-establishes the original theory of the Jaina Āgamas that Kévala Darsana and Kévala Jņāna take place simultaneously.* Jinabhadra Gani is, thus, well-renowned as the up-holder of the Jaina traditions.
That Jinabhadra Gani Kşamāframana was an orator of established repuation is known from several seurces. The commentator Hémcandrācārya Maladhäri refers to Jinabhadragani as “ Upa Jinabhadra Kşamāsramanah Vyākhyātāraḥ ". Another commentator named Kotyācārya, who has written a commentary on the Viseşăvaśyaka Bhāsya, pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says I
माष्यं सामायिकस्य स्फुटविकटपदार्थोपगूढं बृहद्यड्रीमत्पूज्यैरकारि क्षतकलुषधियां भूरिसंस्कारधारि ।
† Vide qrAgA-fazni gufa--ATEITITTATI जिणभद्दखमासमणं खमासमणाण निहाणमिव एक ॥
(Ibid ) Also vide Jitakalpasūtra Editor's Preface, p. 7 * Vide 790-aastor ( ATAFTA) Frei † Vide “ Short History of Jaina Literature" Ed, by M. D.
Desai, p, 152, foot-note.

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तस्य व्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विदधता यन्मया पुण्यमासंप्रेत्याहं द्राग् क्रभेयं परमपरिमितां प्रीतिमत्रैव तेन ॥
No more information is available about the life of this great Acarya.
Works
Jinabhadra Gani Kṣamāśramaņa is said to have composed the following works:
(i) Viseṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. This welknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of Jainism. The author himself wrote a commentary on this Bhasya, in Sanskrit. Jinabhadragani has earned the repulation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as Bhasyakāra. the refences have been quoted from Viseṣāvasyaka Bhāṣya. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the Jita Kalpa Sutra* it is not improbable if Jinabhadra Gani Kṣamasramaṇa had composed other bhāṣyas as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the Viseṣavaśayaka Bhāṣya
पोग्गल - मोदय-दन्ते फरसमबडसालमंजने चैव ।
श्रीणादियस्स ए ए दिहंता होति नायम्वा ॥ २३५ ॥
In this verse, the examples of poggala ( flesh ), modaya, (sweet-balls), danta (teeth), pharusaga (a potter) and vaḍasāla (the branch of a tree) have not been explained in details by the commentators. Acarya Hémacandra Maladhāri suggestively remarks that 'एतान्युदाहरणानि विशेषतो निसीयाद्रक्सेवानि (These examples should be understood in details from Niseetha).

"6
""
Kotyācāryat also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying ":" (We shall explain in this Niścetha)
* Vide Jita Kalpa Sūtra, Preface, Page 9.
Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

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The question arises as to who is the author of Niseeth. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to Hémacandrācārya Maladhari or to Koyācārya. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by Jinabhadra Gani and the sentence "Apfe a" found in the commentary of Kotyācārya, might have orginally belonged to the commentary written by Sri Jinabhadra Gani Kşamaśramaņa himself.
(ii) Brihat Samgrahāņi--This work runs in almost 500 verses. Ācārya Malayagiri Sūri has written a commentary on this work in Sanskrit. The work along with the Commentary has already been published.
(iii) Brihat Ksétra-Samāsa–This is also a similar work. Ācārya Sri Malayagiri Siri and others, have written commentaries and the work along with the cominentaries is published,
(iv) Jita Kalap Sitra--This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the Jaina Monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstration. The subject of remonstration has already been treated in the Chéda-sätra and other works, Jinabhadra Gani seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner.
The oldest conimentary available on this work at present is the cîrşi of Siddhaséna in Prakrit. In his Cârņi, Siddhaséna remarks at one place, that there existed some other cûrni* also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present On this Cûrņi of Siddhasena, Śrî Candra Sari has written expianatory notes in Sanskrit.
Besides the cûr i of Siddhaséna, there is one more cûrni availaole in Prakrit verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same cârni that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of composition
* 3171 Filargiu-faranga ata pa gitu a ofen

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either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.
(v) Visesaņavah : This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 Prakrit verscs and is not publiched as yet.
In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider Dhyāna-śataka which has been incorporated by Acarya Maharāja Haribhadra Sūri in his commentary on the Avaśyaka Sūtra, also to be the composition of Jinabhadra Gani Kşamā-śramama. But there are not sufficient evidences to convine us of his authorship of Dhayāna-Sataka. Date
There are no definte means that help us to fix the exact date of Jinabhadra Gani Kşamă-śramaņa. Still, however, the tradition of various Pattāvalis throws considerable light on the problem. I he tradition of the Pațțăvalis written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that Jinabhabra Gani Ksamasramaņa flourished 1115 years after the Nirvāṇa of śramana Bhagavāna Mahāvîra. This tixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S.
There is another theory which assigns to Jinabnhadragani 500 years earlier than his commentator Maladhāri Hémacandracārya who is said to have flourishec in 1175 V. S. According to this theery also, Jinabhadragani Ksama-sramaņa must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S.
The author of Tapāgaccha Patļāvali places Jinabhadragani ksamā-śramana as the contemporary of Acārya Sriman Haribhadra Suri who is said to have written a commentaary on Dhyāna Sataka. According to this view, Jinabhadra Gani had lived a long life of 104 years, and though Ācārya Haribhadra Súri was senior to him by 60 years, both of thern
* At the end of teis bhāşya the only reference is this:
स. १७२० वर्षे मागशीर्ष शुदि । शुक्रवासरे अद्यहे श्रीपत्तज लि. श्री मद ज्ञातिना काशीदासात्मेजन अंबादत्तेन । शुभं भवतु । शिवमस्तु ।
(Jita Kalpa Sutra, Perface P. 17 )

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happend to be contemporaries on occount ef the long life of Jinabhadra Gani.* This view is not sound, because Haribhadra Sùri did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 550 V. S but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as has been suggested. by Muni jinavijayaji Secondly, Sriman Haribhadra Sûri has frequrently quoted Jinabhadragani's sûtras in his Āvaśyaka vitti It is, therefore, clear that Jinabhadragani did not in any case flourish after Haribhadra Sûri.
According to other Pattāvalis, all of Jinabhadra Gani, Haribhadra Sûri, Dévarddhigaại Ksamāśramana, Śilānkācārya and Kālakā cārya, happened to be contemporaries. But the historp of the development of Jainism shows that this theory is wrongly based. The date of Śriman Haribhadra Siri hus been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S. Jinabhadra Gani has been placed in the lattr hali. of the 7thi and the first half of the 8th century V. S. Dévarddhigapi Kşamásramaņa und Kālak8cārya are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S.
Leaving others aside, let us consider if Jinabhadra Gani and Silankācārya happened to flourishi at the same time. The tradition says that Silaŋkācārya was the priest of Tanarāja, the king of Anahillapura Pāšana. If this is true, the date of Šilaikācārya falls somewhere near 800 V. S. This places Silānkācārya undoubtedly as the contemporary of Acārya Śree Haribhadra Sariji. Now some of the Pațțāvalis refer to silankācārya as the pupil of Jinabhadra Gani Ksamāśramana. If this Silankācārya is the same as the commentator Kotyācārya, several references about Jinabhadragani found in his commentary on the Višeşāvašyrka Bhāsya, do not in any way lead us to believe that Silaikācārya was the pupil of Jinabhadragani, Unfortunately, the last and last portions of this commentary are torn out, † but in course of
* Vide Āri Tapāgachcha Pattāvali, Vol I. page 98 † Vide Jitakalpa Sætra, Preface, pp. 14-15.

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his cominentary, the conimentator refers to Jinabhadragani Kşa misramaņa at several place. e. g.
(i) farauguft9978744749ers at thy! (ii) sta ga gina: FratATU ANITTHET DIT! (iii) 9974792747 744 (iv) $997990etatat97 (v) xitam *TÇFY41919114f97at ota:
Although these references show how much respect the commentator had for Jinabhadra Gapi kşamāšramana, they do not in any way lead us to believe that Jinabhadra Gaội was his preceptor On the contray, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of Jinabhadra Gaņi and Silankācārya The reference is this :
भाष्याननुयायि पाठगन्तरमिदं अग्रता, एवमनेनैव वृद्धिक्रमेणेत्यादेरा, न चेदं भूयसीषु प्रतिष दृश्यते ॥"
This reference shows that there were various readings of Vibesāvaśyaka Bhāsya in the time of Silankācārya, which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the Visesăvašyaka Bhāsya. This, therefore, pervents us from accepting the visw that Jinabhadra Gani Kşamāsramaņa was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of Silankācārya Thus, there are many difficulties in according Jinabhadra Capi as the contemporary of Sījānkācāry or even that of Haribhadra sūr. iji and others. It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the better of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the daie of Jinabhadra Gani Kşama.

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śramana as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V. S,
Ethics:
PHILOSOPHY.
According to Jaiuism, the main purpose of every living being on this earth, viz nirvàņa or final emancipation is attained in the simultaneous observance of these three main doctrines: (1) Right Belief (Faith in the teachings of Jinas) (2) Right knowledge (knowledge of his doctrine) that leads to Salvation and (3) Right Conduct (Perfect Conduct). According to the Jain Philosophy, belief in real existence of tattvas is Right Faith. Knowledge of. real nahire without doubt or error is Right Knowledge attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of exiernal world, is Right Conduct
Virtue consists of the five-fold conduct of one who has knowledge and faith:--
1. Innocence-or a-himsa which is not mere negative abstention but positive kindness to all creation.
2. Charity and Truth-speaking.
3. Honorable conduct-such as not stealing.
4. Chastity in word, thought, and deed. Renunciation of all worldly interests.
5
Jaina Ethics lay stress on both faith and works. All those actions which lead to peace of mined are praya Himsă or infliction of suffering is the great sin or papa.
Untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit etc are other sources of sin Sin is no offence against God, but only against man according to Jaina ethics.
The ethical system of the Jainas is more rigorous than that of the Buddhists. It looks upon patience as the bighest good, and pleasure of senses as a source of sin.

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The chief feature of Jainism is ahimsa respect for all and abstention from injuring everything that has life. )
The Jainas repudiate the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing or as a series of accidents. According to them, there can neither be destruction of things that do exist nor there be creation of things out of nothing. So, according to this view, there is no God necessary for creation or destruction.
Jainism looks upon God, Nature, and Soul, as aspects of the same. According to Jaina ethics there is no God; except the soul in its ideal integrity.
Jaina Philosophy tells us that the life of agood in heaven is one of the forms that a soul might assume by the accumulation of punya (merit). According to them, gods are only embodied souls like men and animals different from them in degree but not in kind.
The liberated souls are above gods. They are never born again, and they have no connection with the world. Meditation or adoration of the Jenas sanctifies the soul. Theory of Soul: Pluralita os spirits
According to the Jaina philosophy, the universe is filled with jivas. Jiva means whatever is living and not whatever is meachanical. So, it correspond to the life-elemant of Berogson. And since it is subjects of esperience it also corresponds to the monad of Leibniz.
Jainism does nohtseem to have made exact distinctions between jiva and Atman, a gira and matter. A jiva is a particular kind of existent being. The liberrted jiva freed from matter, is called the Ātmax. Ātman means pure consciousness untinted by matter. It excludes all space and externality. It is the jiva purified and raised to the highest spiritual status, which is mere formless consciousness,

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33 On the other hand, pudzala is not pure matter untouched by consciousness. It alrealy bears the impress of spirit. Ātaman is the spirit of being and matter is the negative principle of non-living. The latter corresponds to the space of Bergson, or the materia prima of Leibniz. The bare materiality of pudgala is the direct opposite of spirit. A jiva is the combination of the two. It is material-spiritual. A soul loaded with matter is evolved in bondage. All jivas in amsāra are assoniated with this negative element,
Jainism believes that Ātman or the pure spirit, or pure matter, and jiva which is a combination of the two, are existent, though the first two are imperceptible to us. The pudgalų skandka which we see, has also an element of consciousuess, and is as much a jiva as others, so far as the essence is concerned. The jiva and the a-jiva of the Jain as are not empirical abstractions of Atman, or consciousness, and Matter or non-consciousness but the products of an interaction between the two. Strictly speaking, Ātman and non-älman are the primary elements. Jiva possesses more of self, a-jiva more of non-self. They represent two orders of arrangement in the whole univers.
Jainim believes in plurality of spirits. The jiva are many, but are alike eternal. Their characteristic essence is never destroyed, however much it is obscured by external causes. They are regarded as possessing size which is varying in different cases. They contract and expand according to the dimensions of the body with which they are incorporated for the time being. Truly speaking, the essence of all jivas is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of sivas. It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth. Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in t'ie sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, Brāhmaṇas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sūdras, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. Por, the Jaina Canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one

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another, nor could they experience different lots; there would not be Brahmins, Kșa!riyas, l'ais yas and Śndras; insects, birds and snakes. All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life, and those who, in this world, practise right conduct.
Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, Jainism asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism. x
Theory of Knowledgemma
Like the thuory of soul, that of Knowledge is also distinctive of Jainis». The Jainas admit five kinds of knowledge viz., Mati śruta, Avadha Mananparāya and Kevala.
1. Nari is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions. We always have sense-perceptions or darśana prior to the rise of mati-jñāna.
2. Śruta or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words. while mati-jñāna gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description.
3. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of time or space. It is knowledge by clairvoyance.
4. Mananparyāya is direct knowledge of the thoughts ef others as in telepathic knowledge of other minds.
5. Kévala or Perfect Knowledge, comprehends all substan ces and their various modifications. It is omniscience unlimited by time, space, or object. This knowledge, which is independent of the senses, which can only be felt and not described, is possible only for purified souls which are perfectly free from bondage.
* Vide Sutrakritanga, ii 7.48 and 51.
X Cf Bosanquet-" It is freely admitted that in cognition, the sell is universal. It goos out into a world which is beyond its om given being and what it meets there it holds in common with othor selyes, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit."
(Gifford Lectures, Second Sorios, Chap. II }

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The first three kinds of knowledge, are liable to error, while the last two cannot be wrong.
Knowledge is pratyaksa or direct when it is immediate, and paroksa or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge, mati and fruti are farokşa and the rest pratyakşa.
Cétana or consciousness is the essence of jiva and the two manifestations of celana are perception darśana) and intelligence (iñan:'. In darśana, the details are not perceived while in jñana they are The former is simple apprehension, the latter conceptual knowledge.
The relation between knowledge and its object, is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness The consciousness of jiva is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature, as well as, that, of the object. Iñéya or object of knowledge includes silf and non-self. Like light, jñāna reveals itself and other o'jects. The Nyāya - Vaiseșika theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself, is rejected by the Jainas. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self, according to them, and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object, is dismissed by them as absurd, since it is the nature of knowledge that it reveals objects.
With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between jñāna and jñéya is very intimate, Jäānin and jñana are also inseparable, though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself, become different aspects of a single concrete entity.
There are jidas without jñāna, since that would take away the cétanā or conscious character of the jivas and reduce them to the level of a=jiva dravyas and there can be no frana without selves; for that would make jnana foundationless

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in its perfect condition, the soul is pure, Jřõna and darsana ( knowledge and intuition ) arise simultaneously or are together. In the mundane jivas, jnana is perceded by darśanan
Perfect knowledge is free from doubt ( samsaya ) perversity ( vimuha ) and indefiniteness ( vibhrama ) Karmas which obscure the different varieties of darśana are larsanăvaroņiyu Karmas and those which obscure the different kinds of jnina are jñānāvarrniya karmas,
These impedimeuts are passions and emotions All knowledge resides in the soul though it manifests itself when the disturbing media are removed
Theory oj Karma :
Karma is another important topic of the Jaina Philosophy. Karma, according to Jaruas, is of material nature (pudagalika ). The kind of matter fit to manifest Karma fills all cosmic space. It has the pecr:"iar property of developing the effect of merit and demerit. The soul by its commerce with the other world, becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle matter. These become Karma and build up a special body called “Kārmaya Śarira. " which does not leave the soul till its Final Emancipation.
Jivas which are found on this world in infinite number, are of three kinds ( 1 ) Nitya siddha or the ever perfect (2) Mukta or the liberated and (3) the Buddha or the bound.
The second variety of jîvas, does not become embodid They have achieved their purity and dwell in a state of supermundane perfection unconcerned with worldy affairs. The mundane jîvas are a prey to illusion, and are condemned to the yoke of matter through an infinite succession of lines. The freed souls are absolutely pure and free from any tint of matter. They are the nirupauhi jivas leading a life of pure existence and infinite consciousness and possess infinite knowledge, infinite perception, 'infinite power, and infinite bliss.

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37
Thus, by touching the main distinctive features of the Jaime Phliosophy, we can easily remark like Sir Radhakrishanan that Jainism offers us an empirical classification of things in the Universe and so argues for a plurality of spirits.
It is hoped that transliteration, translation and the digest of sanskrit commenary attached so cach verse will prove help ful to the students of Jaina Philosophy.
Qujarat College Ahmedabad 20th February 1950
D. P. Thakr

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Contents
Introduction
1-36
1
1. Chapter I Discussion with the First Caçadhara. 2. Chapter II Discussion with the Second Gaṇadhara, 78 3. Chapter III Discussion with the Third Capadhara. 138 4. Chapter IV Discussion with the Fourth Gaṇadhara. 189 5. Chapter V Discussion with the Fifth Canadhara. 278 6. Chapter VI Discussion with the 7. Chapter VII Discussion with the Seventh
Sixth
Canadhara. 308
Ganadhara. 366
Canadhara. 388
Eight Ninth
Canadhara. 407
8. Chapter VIII Discussion with the 9. Chapter IX Discussion with the 10. Chapter X Discussion with the Tenth 12. Chapter XI Discussion with the Eleventh Canadhara. 479
Gagadhara. 458

For Private Personal Use Only

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क्षमाश्रमणश्रीजिनभद्रगणिसन्हब्धः
॥गणधरवादः॥ श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्रसूरिकृतटीकासमलकृतः।
Ksamāśramana Jinabhadra Gani's GANADHARAVADA
Along with Maladhārin Həmacandra Sūri's Commentary
Chapter I
प्रथमगणधरवक्तव्यता Discussion with the First Canadlara. जीवे तुह सन्देहो पञ्चकन्वं जन धिप्पड घडो व्य। अचन्तापञ्चक्खं च नस्थि लोए खपुष्पं व॥१॥ (१५४९) Jive tuba sandėho paccakkham jam na ghippai ghaço vva 1 Accantāpaccakkham ca natthi lod khapuppham va, 1 (1549)
[ जीवे तव सन्देहः प्रत्यक्षं यद् न गृह्यते घट इव ।
अत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं च नास्ति लोके खपुष्पमिव ॥१॥ (१५४९) Jive tava sanddhaḥ pratyakşaın yad na grhyatè ghata iva i Atyantapratyaksam ca nasti lokd khapuspam iva. 1 (1549)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first Translation-1. (O Indrabhuti of Gautama race!) You have a doubt about (the existence of jiva (the soul) since it is not directly perceived (by senses) as in the case of ghata (a water-jar). Whatever is absolutely imperceptible, does not exist in the world, e. g., a flower in the sky. (1549)
: 2:
श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्राचार्यकृता टीका ---
signa gegnà ! aâu: grèg:-fananemisfèa, aufta at, उभयहेतुसद्भावात् । तत्र नास्तित्त्रहेतवोऽमी - नास्त्यात्मा, प्रत्यक्षेणात्यन्तमगृह्यमाणत्वात्, इह यदत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं तल्लोके नास्त्येव, यथा खपुष्पम् । यच्चास्ति तत् प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत एव यथा घटः, इत्यसौ व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । अणवोsपि प्रत्यक्षाः किन्तु घटादिकार्यतया परिणतास्ते प्रत्यक्षमुपयान्ति न पुनरेव - मात्मा कदाचिदपि भावप्रत्यक्षमुपगुच्छति, अतोऽत्रात्यन्तविशेषणमिति ॥ १ (१५४९) ॥
Digest of the Commentary-O Long-lived Indrabhūti! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the soul. For, you come across reasons, some of which lead you to believe that the soul exists, whereas, others make you surmise that the soul does not exist. The latter are as under :
The soul does not exist; for, it is, in no way, perceptible by pratyakṣa pramāņa ( direct and valid proof) produced by a sense-orgen, as is the case with a ghata. Whatever is atyantāpratyakṣa (absolutely imperceptible) is certainly nonexistent in this world, e. g, a flower in the sky. Whatever exists, is certainly perceived-realized by pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 8. g., a pitcher. This is a vyatirèka drstanta (a negative example ).
SO
Some one may here argue, that though aņus (eleotrons) are not within the range of pratyakṣa pramāņa, they are, to say, invisible; yet they do exist. So, what about them? The answer is, that no doubt they are imperceptible. to us as apas, but when they are transformed so as to perform the

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Valu]
Ganacharavāda functions of a pitcher, a cloth, etc., they no longer remain co. Such is not, however, the case with the Soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived. The adjeotite atyanta is here used on that account. न य सोऽणुमाणगम्मो जम्हा पञ्चक्खपुव्वयं तं पि । पुव्वोवलद्धसम्बन्धसरणओ लिङ्ग-लिङ्गीणं । २ ।। (१५५०) Nu ya soʻņumāņagamno jumhā paccakkhapuvvayam tam pis
Puvvovulaldhasambandhusaranai linga--linginam. 2 (1550) [न च सोऽनुमानगम्यो यस्मात् प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं तदपि । __पूर्वोपलब्धसम्बन्धस्मरणतो लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिनोः ॥२॥ (१५५०) [Na ca so'numānagainyu yasmāt pratyakşapūrvakam tadapi , Parvopalabdhasambandhusmaranato linga-liiginoh. 2 (1550)]
Trans.--2. It (the soul) is not an object of anumāna (inference); for, this (anumāna), too, is preceded by pratyaksa and is the outcome of the recollection of the inseparable) connection previously observed in the case of a linga (a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a lingin (one having such a liiga) . (1550)
टीका-न चासावात्माऽनुमानगम्यः यस्मात् तदप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वक प्रवर्तते । कुतः ? इत्याह-"पुवोवलद्धे" त्यादि लिङ्गयते-गम्यतेऽतीन्द्रियार्थोऽनेनेति लिङ्गम् ; अथवा लीनं-तिरोहितमथं गमयतीति लिङ्गम् , धूनकृतकत्वादिकम् , तदस्यास्तीति लिङ्गी वहथ-ऽनित्यत्वादिः, तयोलि - लिङ्गिनोर्यः पूर्व महानसादौ प्रत्यक्षादिनोपलब्धः कार्य-कारणभावादिक सम्बन्धस्तस्य यत् स्मरणं तस्मादिति । इदमुक्तं भवति-पूर्व महानसादावनिधूमोलिङ्गि-लिङ्गयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकवन्तमविनाभावमध्यक्षतो गृहीत्वा तत उत्तरकालं क्वचित् कान्तार-पर्वतनितम्बादौ गगनावलम्बिनीं धूमलेखामवलोक्य प्राग् गृहीतं सम्बन्धमनुसरति, तद् यथा-'यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र प्रागई वहिमद्राक्षम् , यथा महानसादौ, धूमश्चात्र दृश्यते, तस्माद् वहिनापीह म्भवितव्य', इत्येवं लिङ्गग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणाभ्यां तत्र प्रमाता हुवाजमा

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Jinabhailra Gaņi's
[The first गच्छति । न चैवमात्मना लिगिना साध कस्यापि लिङ्गस्य प्रत्यक्षेण सम्बन्धः सिद्धोऽस्ति, यतस्तन्सम्बन्धमनुस्मरतः पुनस्तल्लिङ्गदर्शनाजीवे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात् । यदि पुनर्जीव-लिङ्गयोः प्रत्यक्षतः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः स्यात् तदा जीवस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वापच्याऽनुमानवैयर्थ्य स्यात् । तत एव तत्सिद्धेरिति ॥ २ (१५५०)॥
D. C.The existence of the soul, cannot be proved by arumāna (inference); for, after all, this anumāna is preceded by pratyaksa pramāṇa as is suggested by the second hemistich of this verse.
Whatever reveals an object which is imperceptible to the senses, is called a linga or whatever throws light on a concealed object is a linga, and one that has a linga is called a lingin. For instance, smoke is the linga, and fire the lingin. To give another example krtakatva ( performance of an action ) is the linga, and anityatva ( impermanence ) the lingin.
an inseparable connection between smoke and fire, in the form of effect and cause-the connection which is directly perceived in a kitchen, etc, can be established in two ways, viz, by anyaya (positively) and by yyatirèka (negatively). Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, is an example of anvaya; and wherever there is non-existence of fire, there is non-existence of smoke, is an example of vyatirèka.
The recollection of the inseparable connection existing between smoke and fire, helps a man to infer the presence of fire, when he sees clouds of smoke rising to the sky, either in a forest or on the top of a mountain or the like. For, he is then reminded of having seen fire when smoke was found homing out of the kitchen or the like. Thereupon, he works up & syllogism, as under.
Wherever there was smoke, I previously saw fire there, as. in the kitchen and elsewhere. I see smoke here; so, here, thoro must be fire. Thus, he rightly insers fire in view of his haying previously noticed the inseparable connection between

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Vāda ]
Ganadharavāda
: 5:
smoke the linga, and fire the lingin, and on his recollecting this connection, while drawing the inference.
But in the case of the soul, a lingin, no connection of it, whatsoever is directly perceived with any one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, there is no room left for the recollection of an inseparable connection between the soul and its linga and hence there is no chance left for establishing the existence of the soul by anumāna.
Moreover, if the inseparable connection were to be observed in the case of the soul and its linga, the soul would be directly perceived, and in that ease, there would be no necessity to
infer its existence.
It is said:
न य जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदरिसणमभू जओ पुणो सरओ । तलिङ्गदरिसणाओ जीवे सम्पच्चओ होज्जा ।। ३ ।। (१५५१)
Na ya jivalingasambandhadarisaṇamabhū jaö puŋo saraö | Tallingadarisaṇāö jîvè sampaccaö hojjā. 3 (1551)
[ न च जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदर्शनमभूद् यतः पुनः स्मरतः । तलिङ्गदर्शनाजीवे सम्प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥ (१५५१)
Na ca jivalingasambandhadarśanamabhūd yataḥ punaḥ smarataḥ | Tallingadarśanājjivè sampratyayo bhavèt. 3 (1551)]
Trans.-3. There has not been (previously) seen (any) connection between the soul and its linga, the recollection of which, along with the sight of its linga, can lead (us) to a conviction about the (existence of) the soul. (1551).
टीका- गतार्था । न च वक्तव्यं सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानादादित्यादिगतिवजीवः सिध्यति, यथा- गतिमानादित्यः देशान्तरप्राप्तेः देवदत्तवदिति, तो हन्त ! देवदत्ते दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि सामान्येन देशान्तरप्राप्तिं गतिपूर्विका

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first प्रत्यक्षेणैव निश्चित्य, सूर्येऽपि तां तथैव प्रमाता साधयतीति युक्तम् । न चैवमत्र कचिदपि दृष्टान्ते जीवसत्वेनाविनाभूतः कोऽपि हेतुरध्यक्षेणोपलक्ष्यत इति । अतो न सामान्यतोदृष्टादप्यनुमानात तगतिरिति ॥ ३ (१५५१) ॥
D. C.-It is no use arguing that the existence of the soul can be established by an anumāna which is ordinarily met with, as in the case of the motion of the Sun. To put it explicitly, the Sun is in motion; for, it reaches another region, as is the case with Davadatta. As regards the Sun, this inference is valid, since we distinctly see that Devadatta, who is here a drştāntadharmin i. e., serving as an illustration, goes like the Sun, to another country after he has resorted to motion. But as far as the soul is concerned, no linga (also known as hètu ) which is inseparably connected with the soul, is directly perceived in any drstanta, (example) whatsoever. Thus, the sāmanyatodrsta anumāna is of no avail here.
The existence of the Soul cannot be proved by -āgama. (seriptural authority):
नागमगम्मो वि तओ भिजइ जं नागमोऽणुमाणाओ। न य कासइ पञ्चक्खो जीवो जस्सागमो वयणं ॥४॥ (१५५२)
Nāgamgammo vi taö bhijjai jam nāgamo’ņumāņāöl Na ya kāsai paccakkho jivo jassāgamo vayaṇam, 4 (1552)
[नागमगम्योऽपि सको भिद्यते यद् नागमोऽनुमानात् । न च कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षो जीवो यस्यागमो वचनम् ॥४॥ (१५५२)
Nāgamagamyo'pi sako bhidyate yad nāgamo'numānāti Na ca kasyacit pratyakso jivo yasyāgamo Vacanam. 4 (1552)]
Tratis.-4. It (the soul) is not even within the range of āgama ( scriptural authority ); for, āgama is not (quite) distinct from anumāna. Moreover, the soul is not pratyaksa (directly perceptible) to any one whose word is igama. (1552)

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Vada]
Gañadharavāda टीका-न चागमगम्योऽपि सका-असौ जीवः यत्-यस्मादागमोऽपि नानुमानाद् भिद्यते, परमार्थतस्तस्यानुमानत्वात् ; तथाहि-शाब्दं प्रमाणागम उच्यते, शब्दश्च द्विविधः-दृष्टार्थविषयः अदृष्टार्थविषयश्च । तत्र दृष्टार्थविषया शब्दाद् या प्रतीतिः, सा वस्तुतोऽनुमानसमुत्थैवम् , यतः क्वचित् प्रथमं पृथुबुध्नोदरोर्ध्वकुण्ड-लोष्टायत वृत्तग्रीवादिमति घटपदार्थे घटशब्दं प्रयुज्यमानं दृष्टा तदुत्तरकालं कापि 'घटमानय' इत्यादि शब्दं श्रुत्वा पृथुबुध्नोदरादिमदर्थ एव घट उच्यते, तथाभूतपदार्थ एव घटशब्दप्रयोगप्रवृत्तः, यथा पूर्व कुम्भकारापणादौ, घटशब्दश्चायमिदानीमपि श्रूयते, तस्मात् तथाभूतस्यैव पृथुबुध्नोदरादिमतः पदार्थस्य मयाऽऽनयनादिक्रिया कर्तव्या इत्यनुमानं विधाय प्रमाता घटानयनादिक्रियां करोति, इत्येवं दृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाण वस्तुतो नानुमानाद् भिद्यते । न चैवमसावात्मशब्दः शरीरादृतेऽन्यत्र प्रयुज्यमानः क्वचिद्पलब्धः, यत्र खल्वात्मशःश्रवणात् आत्मा इति प्रत्ययो भवेदिति । यदपि स्वर्गनरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाणं, तदपि तचतोऽनुमानं नातिवर्तते, तथाहि-"प्रमाणं स्वर्ग-नरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं वचनम् , अविसंवादिवचनाप्तप्रणीतत्वात् , चन्द्रार्कोपरागादिवचनवत्" इत्येवमनुमानादेव तत्र प्रमाणता । न
चैवम्भूतमाप्तं कमपि पश्यामः, यस्यात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति तद्वचनमागम इति 'प्रतिपद्येमहि ' इति शेषः ॥ ४ (१५५२)॥
D. C.-The existence of the soul cannot be cstablished by ăgama; for, after all, āgāma cannot be separated from anumāna, as, really speaking, āgama is (a kind of) antimāna.
Agama is defined as sabda pramāņa, and sabda (word) is tro-fold, viz., (i) drstartha--visaya (nertaining to an object which is seen) and (ii) adrstartha-visaya (pertaining to an object which is not seen ).
The conviction which is arrived at, by means of a sabda and which is associated with an object that is seen, is really an outcome of anumāna. For instance, Srst of all, one notices that the word ghata is used for an object whose belly is round and extensive, whose basin is raised up and hollower out, whose neck is round, and which is made up of earth.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first Thereafter, when he hears" bring a ghata" he begins to reflect: None else but an object whose belly is round and extensive, etc., is styled as ghata; for, the word ghata is reserved for this object only-a laot noticed in the shop of & potter. I hear the word ghata; so, I should bring an object of that very kind, viz., one which is round, extensive eto. Having 80 inforred, he brings a 'ghata'. Hence, it will be seen that the sābda pramāņa which is associated with an object that is seen, is not separate from anumāna.
To think of the soul, the word 'goul' is not used for any other object but the body. Had it been, however, so used, one would have been convinced about the existence of the soul
The sābda pramāņa associated with unseen objects like heaven, hell etc., is also, really speaking, not separate from anumāna. For, the knowledge connected with unseen objects such as heaven, hell, and the like is pramăņa, as it comes from an āpta,-a reliable personage whose word is true—& fact notioed when he predicted a lunar eclipse, a solar eclipse, and so on. Thus, here, too, the validity or truth rests upon inferenoe.
There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as agama, and on the basis of this āgama, the existence of the soul would have been admitted.
Besides,
जं चागमा विरुद्धा परोप्परमओ वि संसओ जुत्तो। सचप्पमाणविसयाईओ जीवो त्ति तो बुद्धी ॥५॥ (१५५३) Jam cāgamā viruddhā paropparamað vi samsaö jutto 1 Savvappamāņavisayāiö jivo tti to buddhi. 5 (1558) [ यच्चागमा विरुद्धाः परस्परमतोऽपि संशयो युक्तः।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीवोऽस्ति ततो बुद्धिः॥५॥ (१५५३)

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Våda)
Ganadharavada Yaccagamā viruddhāḥ paraspara'natopi samsayn-yuktak ! Sarvapramānarisayatito jivo'sti tato buddhih. 5 (1553) ]
___ Trans.-5. Furthermore, the agamas are mutually contra. dictory. Consequently, on that account, too, (your) doubt is justifiable. You, (therefore), believe that (the existence of ) the soul cannot be established by any of the pramānas. (1553)
टीका-यतश्च तीथिकानां सम्बन्धिनः सर्वेऽप्यागमाः परस्परविरोधिनः खलु, अतोऽपि संशय एवात्मनो युक्तः, न तु निश्चयः,. तथाहिकेचिदागमा आत्मनो नास्तित्वमेव प्रतिपादयन्ति, यदाहु स्तिकाः
"एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावानिन्द्रियगोचरः। भद्रे ! वृकपदं पश्य यद् वदन्ति बहुश्रुताः ॥१॥” इत्यादि।
भट्टोऽप्याह-"विज्ञानधन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति, न च प्रेत्यसज्ञाऽस्ति ।"
सुगतस्त्वाह-" न रूपं भिक्षवः ! पुद्गलः" इत्यादि ।
आत्माऽस्तित्ववचनान्यप्यागमेषु श्रूयन्ते, तथा च वेदः-"न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रियाऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इति; तथा, “अग्निहोत्रं जुहूयात् स्वर्गकार्मः” इत्यादि ।
कापिलागमे तु प्रतिपाद्यते--" अस्ति पुरुषोऽकर्ता निर्गुणो भोक्ता चिद्रूपः" इत्यादि ।
तस्मादागमानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वाद् नागमप्रमाणादप्यात्मसखसिद्धिः। इदं च वैशेषिकमतेन प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमलक्षणं प्रमाणत्रयमुपन्यस्तम् । एतच्च स्वयं द्रष्टव्यम्-उपमाप्रमाणगम्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । तत्र हि "यथा गौस्तथा गवयः । इत्यादावेव सादृश्यमसनिकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिमुत्पादयति । न घेहान्यः कश्चित् त्रिभुवनेऽप्यात्मसदृशः पदार्थोऽस्ति, यद्दर्शनादात्मानमवगच्छामः । काला-ऽऽकाश-दिगादयो जीवतुल्या विद्यन्त इति चेत् । न, तेषामपि विवादास्पदीभूतत्वेन तदंहिबद्धत्वात् । अपत्तिसाध्योऽपि जीवो न भवति ।

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: 10: Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first न हि दृष्टः श्रुतो ना कोऽप्यर्थ आत्मनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते, यबलात् तं साधयामः। तस्मात् सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीव इति तब बुद्धिः, भावोपलम्भ. कप्रमाणपञ्चकविषयातीतत्वात् प्रतिषेधसाधकाऽभावाख्यषष्ठप्रमाणविषय एव जीष इत्यर्थः । इति पूर्वपक्षः ॥५ (१५५३) ॥
D. C-The fact that the 'āgamas of the various expounders of religion, are opposed to one another, justifies one to doubt the existence of the soul, rather than to admit it. For instance, some of the āgamas propound the non-existence of the soul.
To cite an example, the Nāstikas-the atheists--hedonists
Bay:
« Etāvān dva loko'yam yāvān-indriyagocaraḥ 1 Bhadrè ! vrkapadam paja yad vadanti bahuśrutān."
This means :- This world is only as much as is within the range of the senses. My good lady I see the foot-prints of the wolf. Highly-learned individuals also say so.
Bhatta, too, says.
" Vijfānaghana dvaitabhyo bhotd bhya, samutthāya tanydväpuvinaśyati, na oa prótyasañjnā'sti."
This means :--This material body which is nothing else but consciousness, after having been generated from the five elements, is dissolved into them, and there is no clear conception for future life.
Sugata says: “ Na rupam bhikṣavaḥ | pudgalah" This means :-0 saints I rüpa (form) is not a soul.
In the āgamas, we come acro88 passages which admit the existence of the soul. For instance, in the Veda, we hear -
“ Na hi vai sa-sartrasya priyapriyayorapabatirasti, &dari ruum rā vasantam priyāpriyè na sprišatah."

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:11: This means :--There is no destruction of priya (attachment) and apriya (aversion) in connection with the embodied soul. Attachment and aversion do not affect a disembodied soul.
Also, “ Agnihotram juhāyāt svargakāmah ”
This means --An individual desirous of acquiring heaven, should perform agnihotra (a sacrifice to the god Agni).
The āgama of the Kāpilas says:" Asti puruṣo akartā nirguņo bhokta oidrůpah."
This means :--There exists a purusa ( a personal animate entity ) which is not the doer of actions, which iş devoid of qualities, which is the enjoyer (of pleasure and pain ), and which is the embodiment of consciousness.
Thus, since the various āgamas are mutually antagonistic, the existence of the soul cannot be established even by upamāna pramāna ( the proof of analogy ). Yathā gau-statha gavayaḥ, means that a cow resembles a gavaya (bos gavaeus), a species of ox.
Here, the resemblance helps one to realize a distant objeot. But, in the entire universe, there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Such being the case, there is no possibility of establishing the existence of the soul, on comparing it with an object resembling it.
It is no use advancing an argument that kāla (time ), Akasa (space), diś (direction) etc., resemble the soul; for, there is no uniformity regarding the exposition of their nature, 80 far as the different systems of philosophy are conoerned. And hence the same trouble
Even arthāpatti (presumption or implication ) does not help us. There does not exist any such objeot soen or heard whose justification depending upon the soul, ora ba mtabilubad.

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212: Jinabhadra (Fani's
[The first Thus, when the existence of the soul cannot be proved by any one of these five pramānas, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of abhāva (uon-existence), the sixth pramāņa whose function is to prove non-existence.
Thus, the soul does not exist. This finishes the purvapakşa ( the view of the opponent ).
Now follows the refutation of the argument --- गोयम ! पञ्चक्खु चिय जीवो जं संसयाइविन्नाणं । पचक्वं च न सज्झं जह सुह-दुक्रवा सदेहम्मि ॥६॥ (१५५४) Qoyama 1 paccakkhu cciya jīvo jam sumsayāivimāņam i Pacoakkham ca nu sajjham jala suha-dukkhā sadè hammi, 6 (1951) [गोतम ! प्रत्यक्ष एव जीवो यत् संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च न साध्यं यथा सुख-दुःखे स्वदेहे ॥६॥ (१५५४)
Gautania i pratyaksa eva jīvo yut samśayāılivijñānam | Pratyakşam oh na sādhyaw yathā sukha dubkhè svadohd. 6 (1554)]
Refutation
Trans.-6. O Gautamal The soul is indeed pratyakşa to you also; for, ( your ) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the soul.-What is pratyaksa, should not be proved, e. g., weal and woe in one's body. (1554)
टीका-गौतम ! भवतोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽयं जीवः, किमन्येन प्रमाणान्तरोपन्यासेन ? । कोऽयं जीवो मम प्रत्यक्षः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-यदेतत् तवैव संशयादिविज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनसिद्धं हृदि स्फुरति स एव जीवः, संशयादिज्ञानस्यैव तदनन्यत्वेन जीवत्वात् । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं तद् न प्रमाणान्तरेण साध्यम् , तथा खशरीर एवात्मसंवेदनसिद्धाः सुख-दुःखादयः। प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमपि सग्राम-नगरं विश्वं शून्यवादिनं प्रति साध्यत एवेति चेत् । नैवम् , "निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्, खमप्रत्त्ययव" इत्यादेस्तदु

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
: 13: प्रावितषाधकप्रमाणस्यैव तत्र निराकरणात् , अत्र स्वात्मग्राहके प्रत्यक्षे पाधकप्रमाणाभावादिति ॥ ६ (१५५४)॥
D. C.- Gautama! the soul is directly cognizable even to you; so what is the use of resorting to other pramánas? If you ask a question as to how the soul is pratyakşa (directly cognizable ) to you, the answer is this :--
This knowledge of yours, of which the existence is proved by your own experience of it, and which you entertain in your heart, is the soul itself; for, this knowledge is identical with the soul.
What could be deoided by pratyaksa should not be established by any other pramāņa. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery eto., which one experiences in the body. It is futile to advance an argument that though the existence of the universe consisting of villages and cities, is self-evident, yet it is to be proved so far as a nihilist is concerned. For the argument such as “ Niralambanā saryè pratyayāḥ, pratyayatvāt svapnapratyayavat" that is to say, all convictions are devoid of any substratum, since they are convictions, like the conviction of a dream-an argunient which can be advanced by a nibilist, and which is a badhaka prámaņa (prejudicing evidence ), has already been refuted. And here, there is no bādhaka pramāņa in the case of pratyaksa which reveals the soul.
The existenoe of the soul is established by pratyakşa pramaņa for the following reason :
कयवं करेमि काहं वाहमहं पचया इमाउ य । अप्पा स पञ्चक्खो तिकालकबोवएसाओ॥७॥ (१५५५) Kayavam kardmi kābam va hamaham pacoayā imau yal Appā sa ppaocakkho tikālakajjovadsão. 7 (1555)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ कृतवान् करोमि करिष्यामि वाहमहम्प्रत्ययादस्माच्च । आत्मा स प्रत्यक्षस्त्रैकालिककार्योपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥ (१५५५)
: 14:
Kritavan karomi kariṣyāmi vahamahampratyayādasmācca | Atmā sa pratyakṣastraikālikakāryopadèśāt. 7 (1555)]
[ The fiast
Trans. - 7. Or, this soul is pratyaksa owing to this ahampratyaya (realization as "I" in 'I did, I do, and I shall do' -the pratyaya which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses (1555)
66
टीका - वेत्यथवा 'कृतवानहम्, करोम्यहम् करिष्याम्यहम् '; 'उक्तवानहम् ब्रवीम्यहम्, वक्ष्याम्यहम् '; 'ज्ञातवानहम्, जानेऽहम्, ज्ञास्याम्यहम्', इत्यादि प्रकारेण योऽयं त्रैकालिकः कार्यव्यपदेशः, तद्विषयप्रयुज्यमानतया तत्समुत्थो योऽयमहम्प्रत्ययः, एतस्मादपि प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽयमात्मा इति प्रपद्यख । अयं ह्यहम्प्रत्ययो नानुमानिकः, अलैङ्गिकत्वात् । नाप्यागमादिप्रमाण तदनभिज्ञानां बाल-गोपालादीनामप्यन्तर्मुखतयाऽऽत्मग्राहकत्वेन स्वसंविदितस्य तस्योत्पादात्, घटादौ चानुत्पादादिति ।। ७ (१५५५) ।।
सम्भवः

D. C.-In the expressions such as " krtavān aham (I did ), karomyaham ( I do ) and karisyāmyaham ( I shall do ) uktavān aham ( I spoke ), bravimyaham ( I speak ) and vaksyamyaham (I shall speak), jñātavān aham (I know), janèham (I know) and jñāsyāmyaham (I shall know), etc.-the expressions which are associated with acts governed by all the three tenses, viz., past, present, and future, there is aham-pratyaya (the realization as "I"). This aham-pratyaya, too, establishes that the soul is pratyakṣa. It should be borne in mind that this aham-pratyaya is not based on anumāna; for, it has no linga. Moreover, it is not even proved by āgama eto., for, even children, cowherds, and others have the conviction of this aham-pratyaya based on self-experience, though they are not conversant with pramāņas such as agama etc, and that they have no such conviction regarding a ghata, a piece of cloth etc.
Besides,
For Private Personal Use Only
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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 16: कह पडिवण्णमहं ति य किमस्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ कह गु। सइ संसयम्मि वायं कस्साहंपञ्चओ जुत्तो? ॥ ८॥ (१५५६) Kaba padivaŋŋamahan ti ya kim atthi natthi tti sarisao kaba nu ? | Sai samsayanımi vayan kassāhan paccaö jutto ? 8 (1556)
[कथं प्रतिपनमहमिति च किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कथं नु ?।
सति संशये चायं कस्याहम्प्रत्ययो युक्तः ॥ ८॥ (१५५६) Katham pratipannamahan iti ca kinasmi
nāsmīti sambayah katham nu? I Sati sansay oayam kasyāhampratyayo yuktah ? 8. (1556) ].
Trans.-8. When there is no soul, how do you admit aham (the realization as I')? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this aham-pratyaya justifiable ? (1556)
टीका-हन्त ! कथमसति जीवे " अहम्” इति प्रतिपनं त्वया, विषयाभावे विषयिणोऽनुन्धानप्रसङ्गात् ? । देह एवास्य प्रत्ययस्य विषय इति चेत् । न, जीवविषमुक्तेऽपि देहे तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । सति च जीवविषयेऽमित्रहम्प्रत्यये 'किमहममि नास्मि' इति भवतः संशयः कथं केन प्रकारेणोप जायते ? अहम्प्रत्ययग्राह्यस्य जीवस्य सद्भावात् "अस्म्यहम्" इति निश्चय एव युज्यत इति भावः । सन्ति वासिन्नात्मास्तित्वसंशये कस्यायमहम्प्रत्ययो युज्यते, निर्मूलत्वेन तदनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् ? इति ॥ ८ (१५५६)॥ ____D. C.--Hallot when the soul is non-existent, how is it that you admit "aham'? For, it is a settled fact that in the absence of a visaya (an object), there is no scope for a vişayin (one having an object ). If your reply is that this ahan-pratyaya has the body alone, for, visaya is confined simply to the body, this aham-pratyaya should be possible even in the case of the body which has been given up by the soul.
Moreover, if this aham-pratyaya associated with the soul arises, how can you have a doubt as to kim aham asmi (am I)

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: 16: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first or nāsmi (am I nist)? For, on the contrary, in such a case, you ought to be in a position to decide that I am' owing to the sadbhāva ( presence ) of the soul realized by the ahampratyaya. When there is this doubt about the existence of the soul, is there no scope for such a pratyaya owing to its being baseless ?
If the non-existence of the soul is admitted, there is no possibility of a doubt regarding its existence,
जइ नत्थि संसइ चिय किमथि नत्थि त्ति संसओ कस्स? । संसहए व सरूवे गोयम ! किमसंसयं होना ? ॥९॥ (१५५७) Jai natthi samsai cciya kim atthi natthi tti samsaö kassa ? I Samsaid va sarūve Goyama! kimasarisayam hojjā ? 9. (1557) [यदि नास्ति संशयी एव किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कस्य ? ।
संशयिते वा स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं भवेत् १ ॥९॥ (१५५७) Yadi năsti samśayi dva kim asmi nāsmiti samsayaḥ kasya ?. Samsayite vā svarupd Gautamal kimasamsayam bhavdt ? 9. (1557)]
Trans.-.-9. If the object about which one has doubt, is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to “kim asmi nāsmi" ( whether I do exist or I do not exist)? Or, Gautama ! when you (yourself) are doubtful (about yourself), what can be free from doubt ? (1557)
टीका-यदि संशयी जीव एवादौ नास्ति तहिं " अस्मिनास्मि" इति संशयः कस्य भवतु । संशयो हि विज्ञानाख्यो गुण एव; न च गुणिनमन्तरेण गुणः संभवति । देहोऽत्र गुणीति चेत्, न, देहस्य मूर्तत्वाअडत्वाच, ज्ञानस्य चामूर्तत्वात् बोधरूपत्वाच । न चातनुरूपाणां गुणगुणिभावो युज्यते, आकाश-रूपादीनामपि तद्भावापचयाऽतिप्रसङ्गाप्राप्ः। “संसइए वेत्यादि" वेत्यथवा संशयिते स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं शेषं भवेत् । इदमुक्तं भवति
-'किममि नास्म्यहम् ' इत्येवं यः स्वरूपेऽपि संशेते--आत्मनिश्चयोऽपि यस्य नास्तीत्यर्थः तस्य शेषं कर्मवन्ध-मोक्षादिकं घट-पटादिकं च किमसं.

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:11. शयम्-असन्दिग्धं स्यात् ? न कश्चित् , सर्वसंशय एव तस्य स्यादित्यर्थः, आत्मास्तित्वनिश्चयमूलो हि शेपवस्तुनिश्चय इति भावः। अहम्प्रत्ययग्राह्यं च प्रत्यक्षमात्मानं निढुवानस्य "अश्रावणः शब्दः" इत्यादिवत् प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो नाम पक्षाभासः, तथा वक्ष्यमाणान्मास्तित्वानुमानसद्भावाद् “नित्यः शब्दः” इत्यादिवदनुमानविरुद्धोऽपि । तथा “अहमस्मि संशयी" इति प्रागभ्युपगम्योरत्र "नामि" इति प्रतिजाननस्य साङ्ख्यस्यानित्यः कर्ता, अचेतन आत्मेत्यादिवदभ्युपगमविरोधः । बालगोपालाङ्गनादिप्रसिद्धं चात्मानं निराकुर्वतः "अचन्द्रः शशी" इत्यादिवल्लोकविरोधः। “अहं नाहं वा" इति गदतो "माता मे वन्ध्या " इत्यादिवत् स्ववचनव्याहतिः। एवं च प्रत्यक्षादिबाधितेऽस्मिन् पक्षेऽपक्षधर्मतया हेतुरप्यसिद्धः। हिमवत्पलपरिमाणादौ पिशाचादौ च प्रमाणपश्चकाभावस्य प्रवृत्तेरनैकान्तिकोऽपि, वक्ष्यमाणानुमानप्रमाणसिद्धे चात्मनि विपक्ष एव वृत्तेविरुद्धश्चेति ।। ९ (१५५७) ॥
D. C.--If, after all, there is no one like a soul to entertain a doubt, who can have a doubt as to whether I cxist or I do not exist? Doubt is a guna. ( an attribute ) known as vijnana ( knowledge ), and the guna has no separate existence from its gunin (one having an attribute).
The body cannot become the gunin of doubt; for it is murta (corporeal) and jada (inanimate), whereas, knowledge is amūrta (in-corporeal) and bodha-rūpa (an embodiment of consciousness ).
The guna and its gunin cannot have an unlike nature; otherwise, akasa (space) will become a gunin of rupa (colour etc).
Furthermore, Gautama ! how can he, who is not sure about his own existence,-who has no self-confidence-say anything definitely about the rest, such as karma-bandha ( bondage and amalgamation of karmans and moksa ( liberation ), etc, and also about a ghata (a pitcher ), pata (a piece of cloth), and the like ? The answer is obvious that he cannot. For, the decision regarding all things depends upon the decision arrived at, in the case of the soul.
3

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first
soul, which boat as
same
Moreover, one who ignores the self-evident can be relized by aham-pratyaya, sails in the the one who says that sound is always inaudible. He is, then, resorting to a pakṣābhāṣa (a mock-assertion) which is contrary to direct evidence: His stand is further opposed to valid inference, like one, who may say Nityah sabdah,' (sound is eternal)--the valid inference which will be dealt with hereafter. "I do not
: 13:
•
Further, one who comes forward to say that exist" after previously admitting that I an one having a doubt, is contradicting himself like a Samkhya (a follower of the Samkhya system of philosophy), who may say Anityab karta" (the doer is impermanent). "Acètanaḥ ātmā" (the soul is inanimate) etc.
"
""
Moreover, one, who denies the existence of the soul, which is well-known to children, cow-herds, and women, entertains a belief inconsistent with the popular one and can be compared with the one who says Acandrah śasi" (the moon is devoid of the moon). One, who says "whether I am or I am not" is contradicting oneself like one (my mother is sterile ).
who says: "Matā mè vandhyā"
This view being thus opposed to pratyaksa etc., tu hètu (the cause) is a-siddha (not established) owing to its nonexistence in the pakṣa (subject of inference ).
Besides, this hètu is also anaikāntika (inconclusive), since none of the five pramāņas has any scope so far as the measure of a pala of Mount Himavat and the existence of a piśăca (an evil spirit), are concerned.
Moreover, since the existence of the soul can be proved by inference-a topic to be just discussed, the hètu is viruddha (contrary) too, as it is associated with the vipaksa (dissimilar instance).
The existence of the soul by direct cognizance, is proved in another way also:

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Page #57

Vada] Gamudharavāda
:19: गुणपञ्चक्वत्तणओ गुणी वि जीवो घडो व्व पञ्चक्खो। घडओ वि घेप्पइ गुणी गुणमेत्तग्गहणओ जम्हा ॥ १० ॥ (१५५८). Gun..paccakkhattanaö guņi vi jīvo ghado vva peocakkbo: Ghadao vi ghdppai guni gumauettugghanao jamhā. 10 (1558) [गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वतो गुण्यपि जीवो घट इव प्रत्यक्षः।
घटकोऽपि गृह्यते गुणी गुणमात्रग्रहणतो यस्मात् ॥ १०॥ (१५५८)
Trans.--10. The soul which is gupin, is self-evident owing to its gunas being so (self evident), as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the gunas only, the gunin e. g., the pitclier, too, is realized. (1558)
टीका-प्रत्यक्ष एव गुणी जीवः, स्मृति-जिज्ञासा-चिकीर्षा-जिगमिपासंशीत्यादिज्ञानविशेषाणां तद्गुणानां स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् , इद यस्य गुणाः प्रत्यक्षाः स प्रत्यक्षो दृष्टः, यथा घटा, प्रत्यक्षगुणश्च जीवः, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षः, यथा घटोऽपि गुणी रूपादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादेव प्रत्यक्षः, तद् विज्ञानादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्मापीति । आह-अनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, यस्मादाकाशगुणः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षोऽस्ति, न पुनराकाशमिति। तदयुक्तम् , यतो नाकाशगुणः शब्दः, किन्तु पुद्गलगुणः, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् , रूपादिवदिति ॥१० (१५५८)॥
D.C.-The gunin, viz., the soul is certainly pratyaksa, because its guņas such as smrti (remenıbrance), jijñāsā (desire for knowledge ), cikirsa (desire for action), jigamisa (desire for movements ), and doubt, etc., which are different kinds of knowledge are self evident, as they are experienced by onesell. One whose guņas are pratyakşa, is noticed to be pratyakşa; for instance, a pitcher.
The guņas of the soul are pratyakşa. Therefore, the soul is pratyakşa. Just as, since rūpa ( colour ) etc, the gunas of a pitcher, are pratyaksa, the pitoher, too, is pratyaksa.
Such is the case with the soul, as its gupas, viz. vijnana, (knowledge Jetc., are pratyakşa.

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: 20:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first Some one may say that this argument is anaihāntiha ( vicious ); for, the śabda (sound ) which is the guņa of ākāša (space) is pratyaksa yet akasa is not pratyaksa. But this is not correct; for, sabda is not the guņa of ākāśa, but Sabda ( sound ) is rather the guna of pudgala (matter ) as it is aindriyaka (cognizable by the sense-organs ) as is the case with colour, etc.
When the guņas are pratyahşa, how is it that the gunin is also of this type ?
The answer is :अन्नोऽणनो व गुणी होज गुणेहि, जइ नाम सोऽणनो। ननु गुणमेत्तग्गहणे घेप्पइ जीवो गुणी सक्खं ॥११॥ (१५५९) Anno'nanno va guni hojja gundhim jai nāma so'nannot Nanu gunamdttaggahand ghdppai jivo guni sakkham. 11 (1559) [अन्योऽनन्यो वा गुणी भवेद् गुणैः, यदि नाम सोऽनन्यः ।
ननु गुणमात्रग्रहणे गृह्यते जीवो गुणी साक्षात् ॥ ११॥ (१५५९) Anyo'nanyo vā guņi bhavdd guņaiḥ, yadi näma so'nanyah Nanu guņamātragraband grhyatè jīvo guņi saksāt. (1559) )
अह अन्नो ती एवं गुणिनो न घडादओ वि पचक्खा। गुणमेत्तग्गहणाओ जीवम्मि कउ विचारोऽयं ? ॥१२॥ (१५६०) Aha anno to dvam gunino na ghadādaö vi paccakkhā i Gupamottaggahanao jivammi kaii vicāro'yam ? 12 (1560) [अथान्यस्तत एवं गुणिनो न घटादयोऽपि प्रत्यक्षाः ।
गुणमात्रग्रहणाजीवे कुतो विचारोऽयम् ॥ १२ ।। (१५६०) Athāngastata dvam gunino na gbaţādayo'pi pratyakşāḥ | Gunanatragrahanajjivd kuto vicāro'yam ? 12 (1560)]
Trans.-11-12. The guyin may be either distinct from or identical with gunas. If it is really identical (with the gunas),

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Ganadharavāda
• 21:
the guņin, the soul, is surely directly realized, on the realization of (its) gunas only. If however, it (gurin) is distinct, then the guņins such as a pitcher, etc., are not pratyakşa owing to the realization of mere guņas. (Such being the case ), whence is (the scope for ) this thought of non-existence as regards the soul ? (1559- 1560)
टीका-ननु भवता गुणेभ्यो गुणी किमर्थान्तरभूतोऽभ्युपगम्यते, अनर्थान्तरभूतो वा ?। यदि नाम सोऽनन्यस्तेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतः तहिं ज्ञानादिगुणग्रहणमात्रादेव गुणी जीवः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति सिद्धमेव । प्रयोगः-यो यस्मादनन्तरं स तद्ग्रहणे गृह्यते एव, यथा वाससि रागः। गुणेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरं व गुणी तस्माद् गुणग्राहकप्रत्यक्षेण सोऽपि गृह्यत एवेति । अथ गुणेभ्योऽन्योऽर्थान्तरभूत एव गुणी । तत एवं सति घटादयोऽपि गुणिनो न प्रत्यक्षाः, तदर्थान्तरभूतस्य रूपादिगुणमात्रस्यैव ग्रहणात् । इह यद् यस्मादान्तरभूतं तद्ग्रहणेऽपि नेतरस्य ग्रहणम् , यथा घटे गृहीते पटस्य, अर्थान्तरभूताश्च गुणिनो गुणा इष्यन्ते, अतो गुणग्रहणेऽपि न गुणिग्रहणम् । अतो घटादीनामपि समानेऽग्रहणदोष कोऽयं नाम भवतः केवल जीवे विचारो नास्तित्वविवक्षा येनोच्यते-" पच्चक्खं जं नं घिप्पइ घडोव्व " इत्यादि ? | अथ द्रव्यविरहिता केऽपि न सन्त्येव गुणाः, इत्यतस्तद्ग्रहणद्वारेण गृह्यन्त एव घटादयः । नन्वेतदात्मन्यपि समानमेव । किश्च गुणिनो गुणानामर्थान्तरत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने गुणी भवतु, मा भूद् वा प्रत्यक्षः, तथापि ज्ञानादिगुणेभ्यः पृथगात्मा गुणी त्वदभ्युपगमेनापि सिध्यत्येवेति ।। (१५५९-१५६०)।
D. C.-The gunin may be either separate or non-separate from its guņas. If it is non-separate, i. e, identical, then, on realizing knowledge, etc., which are the gunas of the soul, the gunin, the soul, is directly realized. The underlying argument is as follows :--
That which is not separate from another is realized on that another being realized, e. 9., colour in a garment. To be explicit, a garment and its colour are not separate; 80, when the colour is realized, the garment, too, is realized.

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:22: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first The guņin is non-separate from the guņas. Consequently when the guņas are directly perceived, the guņin, too, is certainly realized. If the guņin is really distinct from the gunas, then, such being the case, the guņins such as a pitcher and the like, are not. pratyaksa when only their gunas like colour, which are separate from the guşin, are realized. That which is distinct from another, is not realized even when another, which is separate from it, is realized. As for example, ä pitcher is distinct from a piece of cloth. So, when one is realized, the other is not realized. If it is desired that gunas are to be looked upon as separate from the gunin, then, even when the guņas are realized, the gunin renains uprealized. Hence, when the fault of non-realization is applicable even in the case of pitchers etc., why should the question of nonexistence arise only in the case of the soul, to the effect that “paccakkham jam na ghippai ghado wa” eto ?
There is really no existence of the guņas apart from the substance of which they are the gunas; so, when the gunas of a pitcher are realized, the pitcher, too, is certainly realized. And the case of the soul is parallel.
Furthermore, even though while assuming that the gunas are separate from the gunin, the gunin becomes or does not become pratyakşa (wben the gunas become prutyakşa ), yet the gunin, the soul which is distinct from its guņas such as knowledge, has its existence proved even by your own admission. Anticipating the opinion of the disputant, the author says:
अह मन्त्रसि अत्थि गुणी न य देहत्थंतरं तओ किंतु। देहे नाणाइगुणा सो चिय तेसिं गुणी जुत्तो॥ १३ ॥ (१५६१) Aba mannasi atthi guņi na ya dehatthantaram taö kintu i Dahè nāņāigunā so cciya tèsim guni jutto. 13 (1561)
( 374 Arrastia gutt 7 g i ai yra: fainali
देहे बानादिगुणा: स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः ॥१३॥ (१५६१)

Page #61

Vada] Gañadharavada
:28: Atha manyasè'sti guņi na ca ddhārthāntaram sakah kintu ! Dehe jinānādigunān sa dva tesam guni yuktah 13 (1561)].
Trans.-13. You may believe that there is the gunin, but that it is not distinct from a body. The gliņas like knowledge etc., are observed in a boly; so that (body) alone is fit to be their gunin. ( 1561)
टीका-अथ मन्यसे अस्त्येव ज्ञानादिगुणानां गुणी, नैव तं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे, एतत् तु नाभ्युपगच्छामो यत्-"देहादर्थान्तरं तकोऽमौ" इति, किन्तु देह एव ज्ञानादयो गुणाः समुपलभ्यन्ते, अतः स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः, यथा रूपादीनां घटः। प्रयोगः-देहगुणा एव ज्ञानादयः, तत्रैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् , गौर-कृश-स्थूलतादिवदिति ॥ १३ (१५६१)॥
D. C-It may be that you admit that there is a guņin for the guņas like knowledge, etc., but you may refuse to believe that this guņin is something else than a body. That is to say, you look upon the body itself as the gunin in question, since the guņas such as knowledge etc., are found in the body only. For example, colour is seen in a pitcher, and hence its guņin is a pitcher. The underlying argument is this:
Knowledge etc, are the guņas of a borly, because they are observed, there and there only, like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, emaciation, fatness etc.
The answer is : नाणादओ न देहस्स मुत्तिमत्ताइओ घडस्सेव । तम्हा नाणाइगुणा जस्स स देहाइओ जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)
Naņadaö na dabassa muttimattājö ghadassèva ! Tamha nāņāiguņā jassa sa dèhāiö jivo. 14 (1562)
[ ज्ञानादयो न देहस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वादितो घटस्येव ।
तस्माज्ज्ञानादिगुणा यस्य स देहाधिको जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)

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:24: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first Jñānādayo na dehasya mürtimattvādito ghatasyeva 1 Tasmājjšānādiguņā yasya sa dehādhiko jivo. 14 (1562) ]
Trans.--- 14. Knowledge etc., are not the guņas of a body, as it is mūrta (corporeal) etc, like a ghata. Therefore, that (object ) which has knowledge etc., as its gunas, is the soul which is separate from the body. (1562)
टीका-प्रयोगः-देहस्य सम्बन्धिनो गुणादयो गुणा न भवन्त्येव, तस्यमूर्तिमचात् चाक्षुषत्वाद् वा घटवत् । न च द्रव्यरहितो गुणः समस्ति । ततो यो ज्ञानादिगुणानामनुरूपोऽमूर्तः, अचाक्षुषश्च गुणी, स देहातिरिक्तो जीवो ज्ञातव्यः । आह-ज्ञानादयो न देहस्येति प्रत्यक्षबाधितमिदम, देह एव ज्ञानादिगुणानां प्रत्यक्षेणैव ग्रहणात् । तदयुक्तम् , अनुमानबाधितत्वादस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य । तथाहि-इहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो विज्ञाता, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात् , यो हि यदुपरमेऽपि यदुपलब्धमर्थमनुस्मरति, स तस्मादर्थान्तरं दृष्टः, यथा-पञ्चवातायनोपलब्धार्थानुस्मर्ता देवदत्त इत्यादि वायुभूतिप्रश्ने वक्ष्याम इति ॥ १४ (१५६२)।
__D.C.--The gunas such as knowledge, cannot belong to the body; for, the body is murta (corporeal) and caksusa ( visible) as is the case with a ghata. Moreover, a guna cannot exist without a substance. Now, knowledge etc.,.are amurta gunas. Therefore, their giznin, too, must be amūrta etc., and hence it cannot be the body which is mūrta. Thus that very gunin is the soul.
It may be argued that we see with our own eyes that knowledge etc., belong to the body. But this is a wrong argument, as it is not consistent with the following inference :
The knower is distinct from senses; for, even when the senses cease to function, the object realized by means of them is remembered. One who remembers an object realized by means of another, even when that another ceases, is distinct from it, e. g., Dovadatta who remembers the object realized by means of the five windows. This we shall expound while answering the question of Vāyubbūti.

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Ganadharavāda
Desirous of arriving at a conclusion, the author says:—
इय तुह देसेणायं पञ्चक्खो सव्वहा महं जीवो । अविश्यमाणत्तणओ तुह विष्णाणं व पडिवजा || १५|| (१५६३)
Iya tuha dèsèṇāyam paccakkho savvahā maham jīvot Avihayanānattana tuha vinnānam va padivajjā. 15 (1563)
[ इति तच देशेनायं प्रत्यक्षः सर्वथा मम जीवः ।
अवितज्ञानत्वतस्तव विज्ञानमिव प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥ १५ ॥ (१५६३) Iti tava dèsènāyam pratyakṣaḥ sarvathā mama jīvaḥl Avihatajñanatvatastava viñanamiva pratipadyasva. 15. (1563)]
:25:
Trans.-15. Thus this (soul) is partially pratyaksa to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to (my ) knowledge being unobstructed (infinite ). ( So) accept (the existence of the soul). ( 1563).
टीका - इत्येवम् उक्तप्रकारेण स्वशरीरे तवापि देशतः प्रत्यक्षोऽयमात्मा, छस्थत्वेन भवतः सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो देशविषयत्वात्, घटवत्, तथाहिसर्वमपि स्व- परपर्यायतोऽनन्तपर्यायं वस्तु, छद्मस्थश्च प्रत्यक्षेण साक्षात् तद्देश मिव गृह्णाति । प्रत्यक्षेण च प्रदीपादिप्रकाशेनेव देशतः प्रकाशितां अपि घटादयो व्यवहारतः प्रत्यक्षा उच्यन्त एव । सर्वात्मना च केवलिप्रत्यक्षमेव वस्तु प्रकाशयति । अतो ममाप्रतिहतानन्तज्ञानत्वेन सर्वात्मनाऽपि प्रत्यक्षोऽयं जीवः, यथाsतीन्द्रियमपि त्वत्संशयविज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १५ (१५६३) ॥
D. C.-In this way, the soul in your body is partially cognizable even to you; for, since you are a chadmastha (one under the evil influence of the mohaniya karman), every object is known to you only partially. Every object has an infinite number of paryāyas ( modifications ), in case it is examined from the stand-point of its own paryāyas and that of the paryāyas belonging to the rest. A chadmastha, therefore, directly grasps only a portion of it. It is a convention that ghata etc., when partially revealed by light, etc., are said to be
4

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:26: Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first pratyaksa. Only an Omniscient Being has a direct perception of any and every object in toto. I am an Omniscient Being; for, my knowledge is neither limited by time nor by space. So, I directly realize this soul in its entirelty, just as I fully realize your knowledge, viz., your doubt about the existence of the soul, consequently, admit that the soul exists.
Then, what about another's body ?एवं चिय परदेहेऽणुमाणओ गिण्ह जीवमस्थि त्ति। अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ विन्नाणमयं सरूवे व्व ॥१६॥ (१५६४) Evam ciya paraddhd’ņumāņaö giņha jívam atthi tti 1 Anuvitti-pivittiö vinnāņamayam sarūvd vva. 16 (1564)
[एवमेव परदेहेऽनुमानतो गृहाण जीवमस्तीति ।
__ अनुवृत्ति-निवृत्तिभ्यां विज्ञानमयं स्वरूप इव ॥ १६ ॥ (१५६४) Evam dva paraddha'numānato grhāņa jívam astīti, Anuvritti-nivrittibhyām vijáānamayan svarūpa iva. 16 (1564) ].
Trans.--16 Thus, do verily accept, by means of inference, that the soul which is an enbodiment of knowledge, exists in another's body (too), owing to (his) indulgence in and cess. ation from activities, as is the case with one's own soul. (1564)
टीका-यथा खदेहे एवं परदेहेऽपि गृहाण जीवमनुमानतः। कथम् ? इत्याह-अस्ति-विद्यत इति । कथंभूतं जीवम् ? इत्याह-विज्ञानमयं-विज्ञानास्मकम् । अनुमानमेव सूचयन्नाह-"अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ सरूवे व ति" इदमुक्तं भवति-परशरीरेऽप्यस्ति जीवः, इष्टानिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिदर्शनात् , यथा स्वरूपे-खात्मनि, इह यत्रेष्टा ऽनिष्टयोःप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती दृश्येते, तत्सात्मकं दृष्टम् , यथा खशरीरम् , तथा च प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती दृश्येते परशरीरे, अतस्तदपि सात्मकम् ; आत्माभावे चेष्टा-ऽनिष्टप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती न भवतः, यथा घटे, इत्यनुमानात् परशरीरेऽपि जीवसिद्धिः ॥१६ (१५६४)॥
D. C.-The soul exists in another's body, too; for, he, too, like your self, performs desirable activities and refrains from

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:08 the undesirable ones, and you, who aot accordingly, have esoul. To put it explicitly, one in whom are seen indulgence in deniz, able acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds, has a spy), as is the case with one's (your) body.
The body of another is seen as associated with desirable activities and dissociated from undesirable ones. Hence, that body, too, has a soul. If the soul were non-existent, there was no scope for this association and dissociation, as can be seen in the case of a ghata. This is followed by inference that there is . soul in another's body, too. ___Anticipating doubt in another's mind, the author says:जं च न लिंगेहि समं मनसि लिंगी जो पुरा गहियो। संगं ससेण व समं न लिंगओ तोऽणुमेओ सो॥१७ ।। (१५६५) सोऽणेगंतो जम्हा लिंगेहिं समं न दिपुवो वि। गहलिंगदरिसणाओ गहोऽणुमेओ सरीरम्मि ॥१८॥ (१५६६) Jam ca na lingèbim samam mannasi lingi jaó purā gahisi Sangam sasēņa 'va saman na lingaö to'qumèö so. 17 (1565) So'nèganto jambā lingehim samam na ditthapuryo vil Gahalifiga-darisanai gaho'numdi sarirammi. 18 (1566) [यञ्च न लिङ्गः समं मन्यसे लिङ्गी यतः पुरा गृहीतः ।
शृगं शशेन वा समं न लिङ्गतस्ततोऽनुमेयः सः ॥ १७॥ (१५६५) सोऽनेकान्तो यस्मालिः समं न दृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ।
ग्रहलिङ्गदशनाद् ग्रहोऽनुमेयः शरीरे ॥ १८॥ (१५६६) Yacca na lingain samam manyasd lingi yatah purā grbitah 1 Srigam śaśdna vā samam na lingatas tato'nuindyah sah. 17 (1565) So'nekānto yasmallingaiḥ samam na drstapūrvo'pi , Grahalingadarsanad grabo'numbyan sarire. 18 (1566).]

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[ The first
Trans --17-18. Moreover, that you believe that since the lingin (viz., the soul ) has not been realized formerly (up till now) along with the lingas, as is the case with the hare and the horn, so it (the soul) cannot be inferred by means of a linga, is untenable; for, a planet, that is not formerly seen along with its lingas, is inferred in a body, on perceiving its linga or lingas. (1565-1566).
: 28:
टीका - यच्च " न य जीवलिंग संबंधदरिसणमभू" इत्यादि पूर्वोक्तपूर्वपक्षानुसारेण मन्यसे त्वम् । किम् ? इत्याह- ततो न लिङ्गतः - - लिङ्गादनुमेयोऽसौ जीवः । यतः किम् ? इत्याह-यतो न खलु लिङ्गैः कैश्चिदपि समं लिङ्गी - जीवः कापि केनापि पुरा- पूर्व गृहीतः । किंवदित्याह - शृङ्गमिव शशकेन समम् । ततो लिङ्ग - लिङ्गिनोः पूर्वं सम्बन्धाग्रहणाद् न लिङ्गाजीवोऽनुमीयते । इति यद् मन्यसे त्वं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते - सोऽनेकान्तः, यस्मालिङ्गैः सममदृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ग्रहः- देवयोनिविशेषः शरीरे हसन- गान - रोदन कर-चरण- भ्रूविक्षेपादिविकृतग्रहलिङ्गदर्शनादनुमीयत इति बालानामपि प्रतीतमेवेति ।। १७-१८ ( १५६५–१५६६ ) ॥
-
D. C.-Just as none has ever seen a horn on the head of a hare, so none has ever seen the lingin, viz., the soul as associated with one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, one cannot infer the existence of the soul. This belief of yours is not right. For, though a graha is not previously seen along with its lingas, even children are convinced about its existence in a body, when they see that body associated with perverse acts such as, laughing, singing, weeping, movements of hands, feet, and eye-brows, etc., the acts which the lingas of the graha.
are
देहस्सत्थि विहाया पइनिययागारओ घडस्सेव |
'अक्खाणं च करणओ दण्डाईणं कुलालो व्व ॥१९॥ (१५६७)
Dèhassatthi vihāya painiyayāgaraö ghaḍassèva |
Akkhāpam ca karanas dandainam kulālo vva. 19 ( 1567)

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Gaṇadharavada
[ देहस्यास्ति विधाता प्रतिनियताकारतो घटस्येव । अक्षाणां च करणतो दण्डादीनां कुलाल इव ।। १९ ।। (१५६७)
Dèhasyästi vidhāts pratiniyatākārato ghaṭasyèva i Aksānām oa karanato dandadinām kulāla iva. 19 ( 1567 ) ]
: 29:
Trans.- 19. There is a creator of the body, owing to its shape being definite and (its having a beginning) as is the case with a ghata. (There is an adhisṭhātr of the organs of sense owing to their being a karana (a medium) as is the case with the adhisthatr of a stick etc. ( 1567 )
"
टीका - देहस्यास्ति विधाता - कर्तेति प्रतिज्ञा, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकरस्वच्छ, घटवत् पुनरकर्तृकं तदादिमरमतिनियताकारमपि न भवति, trisaविकारः, यश्च देहस्य कर्ता स जीवः । प्रतिनियताकारत्वं मेर्वादीनामप्यस्ति न च तेषां कश्चिद् विधाता, इति तैरनैकान्तिको हेतुः स्यात्, अतोऽनुक्तमप्यादिमत्त्व विशेषणं द्रष्टव्यमिति । तथा अक्षाणामिन्द्रियाणामस्ति " अधिष्ठाता " इत्यध्याहारः करणत्वात् यथा चक्र - चीवर मृत्-सूत्रदण्डादीनां कुलालः, यच्च निरधिष्ठातृकं तत् करणमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम्, यथेन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठाता स जीव इति ॥ १९ (१५६७) ॥
"
D. C.-That there is 8 creator of the body, is the pratijna ( premise ); for, it (body ) has a beginning and has definite shape a3 well; as is the case with a ghata. Whatever has no creator whastsoever, has neither & beginning nor 8 definite shape. The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example. Mèru etc, have a fixed form, and even then they have no creator. So, to avoid such 8 case wherein the hotu (cause) becomes anaikantika, the adjective adimat. ( having a beginning ), though not expressed, is to be taken as understood,
of sense are karana, there

8
the organs
The word adhisthair is also understood. Since must be an adhisthätr for them.

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[The first
A paralled example is furnished by a potter, who is an◄ adhisthātr of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, stick, etc., which are karaņas. Whatever has no adhisthātr, has no karaṇa, e. g, ākāśa. Hence, it follows that the adhiṣṭhātr of the organs of sense is the soul,
Moreover,
अस्थिंदिय-विसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्सं । कम्मार इवादाया लोए सण्डास-लोहाणं ।। २० ।। (१५६८)
: 30:
Atthindiya-visayāṇam āyāṇādèyabhavaö'vassam | Kammara ivādāyā loè saṇḍāsa-lohāṇam. 20 (1568) [ अस्तीन्द्रिय-विषयाणामादानादय भावतोऽवश्यम् । कर्मार इवादाता लोके सन्देशक- लोहानाम् ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८)
Astindriya-visyāṇāmādānādèyabhāvato’vaśyam i Karmara ivādātā lokè sandaṁśaka-lohānām. 20 (1553) ]
Trans.-20. Just as, in this world a blacksmith is the ādātr (grasper) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so, there is certainly an ādātr (viz., the soul) in the case of organs of sense and their objects, since they are related as adana (means of grasping) and adèya (graspables). (1568)
टीका - इह यत्रादानादेयभावस्तत्रावश्यमादाता समस्ति, यथा लोके सन्देशक- लोहानां कर्मारोऽयस्कारः, विद्यते चेन्द्रियविपयाणामादानादेयभावः, अतस्तेषामप्यस्त्यादाता, स च जीवः, यत्र त्वादाता नास्ति, तत्रादानादेयभावोऽपि न विद्यते, यथाऽऽकाश इति ॥ २० (१५६८ ) ॥
D. C.-If there is a relation of the type of ādāna and adeya, then there needs be an ādātr. A blacksmith is found as the ad ātr; for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for ādāna and adèya. There is a relation of the kind of ādāna and ādèya, in the case of the organs of sense and sense-objects. Therefore, there must be their

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: 31:
Vada ]
added that
may be adatr. He is none else but the soul. It there is no scope for the relation of the sort of ādāna and addya, in case the ādātr is non-existent, e. g.,
ǎkāśa.
Also,
भोत्ता देहाईणं भोजत्तणओ नरो व्व भत्तस्स । सङ्घायाइत्तणओ अस्थि य अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥ २१ ॥ (१५६९)
Bhotta dèhaiņam bhojjattaṇaö naro vva bhattassa I Sanghāyāittana atthi ya atthi gharassèva. 21 (1569)
[ भोक्ता देहादीनां भोग्यत्वतो नर इव भक्तस्य ।
सङ्घातादित्वतोsस्ति चार्थी गृहस्येव ॥ २१ ॥ (१५६९)
Bhoktā dèhādīnām bhogyatvato nara iva bhaktasya | Sanghātāditvato 'sti cārthi grhasyeva. 21 (1569) ]
Trans.-21. Just as a man is an enjoyer of bhakta (food), so, there is an enjoyer of body etc., owing to their being objects of enjoyment. Just as, there is an owner of a house, .owing to its being a saighāta (collection) etc., so, there is an owner of body etc., on account of its being a sanghāta. ( 1569)
यथा
टीका - इह देहादीनां भोक्ता समस्ति, भोग्यत्वात्, यथा शालयादिभक्तवस्त्रादीनां नरः, यस्य च भोक्ता नास्ति तद् भोग्यमपि न भवति, खरविषाणम्, भोग्यं च शरीरादिकम, ततो विद्यमानभोक्तृकमिति । तथा, अर्थी - स्वामी । ततश्च देहादीनां विद्यते खामी, सङ्घातरूपत्वात्, आदिशब्दाद् मूर्तिमवात्, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्, चाक्षुषत्वादित्यादयोऽप्यनैकान्तिकत्वपरिहारार्थं सम्भवद्विहितविशेषणा हेतवो योजनीयाः, यथा गृहादीनां सूत्रधारादय इति दृष्टान्तः । यत् पुनरस्वामिकं तत् सङ्घातादिरूपमपि न भवति; यथा गगनकुसुमम्, सङ्घातादिरूपं च देहादिकम् तस्माद् विद्यमानस्वामिकमिति । २१ (१५६९) ||
D. C.-Just as we find that there is 2 person to enjoy food etc., so, there is an enjoyer of body etc. The underlying Pensoning is as follows:

For Private Personal Use Only

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: 82:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first An object of enjoyment for which there is no enjoyer, does not exist, e. g. a horn of an ass. Body etc., exist as objects of enjoyment. So, it follows that there is their enjoyer,
Just as a carpenter and others are svāmins of a house, etc., go there is a svāmin of body eto. Since this body and the like, are in the form of a collection, have a beginning, are múrta, are objects of sense and are visible etc., a number of similar hètus as may be helpful in making this syllogism perfectly logical, may be mentioned :
One that has no svāmin, is not in the form of a collection etc. For instance, a flower in the sky which has no svāmin is not in the form of a collection etc. A body eto., are, on the contrary, in the form of a collection etc. So they have a syāmin viz , the soul.
Really, by saying that the body has a creator, one proves that there is a creator etc., for the body. But that is not the soul,
जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होना। TIETRITTST À 7 FAIT ETET I12211 (84000)
Jo kattāi ga jīvo sajjhaviruddho tti tò mai hojjā i Muttăipasangāö tam na saṁsāriņo doso. 22 (1570) [यः कादि स जीवः साध्यविरुद्ध इति तव मतिर्मवेत् ।
gaifaqera ne 7 HAFTGIT : 112201 (8400) Yab kartradi sa jīvaḥ sādhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet i Mūrtādiprasangāt tad na samsāriņo doṣaḥ. 22 (1570)
Trans.--22. You may be thinking that, that soul which is a doer etc., is opposed to what is to be established, owing to its having a chance of being proved mūrta etc. But this is not a fault in the case of the mundane soul. (1570).
*7-9979477ai erostetai käi, segra, 3GTNT, भोक्ता, अर्थी चोक्तः स सर्वोऽपि जीव एव, अन्यम्येश्वरादेर्युक्त्यक्षमत्वेन कर्व

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Vada] Ganadharavada
: 38: त्वाधसम्भवादिति । अथ साध्यविरुद्धसाधकत्वाद् विरुद्धा एते हेतव इति तव मतिर्भवेत् , तथाहि-घटादीनां कत्रादिरूपाः कुलालादयो मूर्तिमन्तः, सघातरूपाः, अनित्यादिस्वभावाश्च दृष्टाः, इत्यतो जीवोऽप्येवंविध एव सिध्यति, एतद्विपरीतश्च किलास्माकंसाधयितुमिष्टः, इत्येवं साध्यविरूद्धसाधकत्वं हेतूनामिति । तदेतदयुक्तत्वाद् न, यतः खलु संसारिणो जीवसा साधयितुमिष्टस्याऽदोषोऽयम् । स ह्यष्टकर्मपुद्गलसंघातोपगूढत्वात् सशरीरत्वाच कथंचिन्मूर्तत्वादिधर्मयुक्त एवेति ॥ २२ (१५७०) ॥
D. C.-Up till. now, it has, no doubt, been proved that it is the soul and the soul alone which is a doer, adhisthātr, ādātr, an enjoyer and the svāmin of the body, organs of sensc, etc. For God or the like cannot be admitted as a doer etc., of the body, since such a statement will be opposed to reason But it must be admitted that the hetus put forward to prove that the soul is a doer etc , are viruddha (contrary) as they establish such a type of the soul which is just the contrary to what is desired. To be explicit, a potter who is a doer of a pitcher has a body, and he is in the form of a collection, and is of an impermanent nature. The same must be the case with the soul. But this type of soul is just opposed to what we are aiming at to establish. And hence, these hetus lead us to the conclusions we are opposed to. This is not so; for, we are at present establishing the existence of a mundane soul and not that of a liberated one; and that a mundane soul is somehow murta; for, it is certainly embraced by a collection of eight karmans, a kind of matter, and it has a body.
There is another anumāna for establishing the existence of the soul.
अत्थि चिय ते जीवो संसयओ सोम्म ! थाणुपुरिसो व्व । जं संदिद्धं गोयम ! त तत्थन्नत्थ वत्थि धुवं ॥ २३ ॥ (१५७१) Atthi cciya te jivo sarsayö somma 1 thāņupuriso vva i Jam sandiddham Goyama! tè tatthannattha vatthi dhuvain. 23 (1571)

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:14:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first [ अस्त्येव तप जीवः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु-पुरुषाविव । यत् सन्दिग्धं गौतम ! तत् तत्रान्यत्र वास्ति ध्रुवम् ॥ २३ ॥ (१५७१)
Astyèva tava jīvaḥ samsayataḥ saumya / sthāņu-puruşāviva 1 Yat sandigdham Gautama 1 tat tatrānyatra vāsti dhruvam. 23 (1571)]
Trans.---23.0 lovely Gautamal Indeed you have a soul since you have a doubt (about your existence), as is the case with a branch-less trunk of a tree and a man. Whatever is doubted, certainly exists either there or elsewhere. (1571)
टीका-हे सौम्य ! गौतम ! अस्त्येव तव जीवः, संशयतः संशयसद्भावात् , यत्र यत्र संशयस्तत् तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषो, संशयश्व तव जीवे, तसादस्त्येवायम्, तथाहि-स्थाणु-पुरुषयोरुत्वारोह-परिणाहाद्युभयसाधारणधर्मप्रत्यक्षतायां चलन-शिरः कण्ड्रयनवयोनिलयन-वल्ल्यारोहणायुभयगतविशेषधमप्रित्यक्षतायां चोभयगतैतद्धर्मानुस्मरणे च सत्यकतरविशेषनिश्चयचिकीर्षोः " किमिदम् १ इति विमर्शरूपः संशयः प्रादुरस्ति । एवंभूते च स्थाणु-पुरुषादिगतसंशये तत् स्थाणु-पुरुषादिकं वस्त्वस्त्येव, अवस्तुनि संशयायोगात् । एवमात्मशरीरयोरपि प्रागुपलब्धसामान्य--विशेषधर्मस्य प्रमातुस्तयोः सामान्यधर्मप्रत्यक्षतायां विशेषधर्माप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि च तद्विपयानुस्मृतौ सत्यामेकतरविशेषोपलिप्सोः, “किमयमात्मा किं वा शरीरमात्रमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयो जायते । अयं चात्म-शरीरयोः सत्व एवोपपद्यते, नैकतरस्याऽप्यभावे, अतोऽस्ति जीवः । अथैवं ब्रूषे-अरण्यादिषु स्थाणुपुरुषसंशये तत्र विवक्षित प्रदेशेऽनयोरेकतर एव भवति, न पुनरुभयमपि, तत्कथमुच्यते-'विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति' इति । तदयुक्तम् अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न हि वयमेवं बम:-" तत्रैव प्रदेशे तदुभयमप्यस्ति" इति, किन्तु यद्गतसंदेहस्तद् वस्तु तत्राऽन्यत्र वा प्रदेशे ध्रुवमस्त्येव, अन्यथा षष्ठभूत विषयोऽपि संशयः स्यात् । एतदेवाह-'जं संदिद्धमित्यादि' तस्मात् संशयविषयत्वादस्त्ये। जीव इति स्थितम् ।। २३ (१५७१) ।
D. C.-A 'branch-less trunk of a trce is seen from a distance, as if it wero a man. For, certain attributes such as

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: : loftiness etc., which are common to this trunk and a man, are observed, while their distinguishing characteristics, viz., a morement, scratching, dwelling of birds, ascending of creepers etor, are not noticeable. Such being the case, there arises a doubt as to whether this is a trunk of a tree or a person; for, both of these objects exist (though not in the same place ). This proves that the doubt can arise only in the case of objeots that do exist. You have a doubt as to whether this is & soul or a body, as you realize their common features, but fail to notice their distinguishing characteristics. Such a doubt propea that there is a soul; for, it cannot arise unless there existad two entities viz, a soul and a body. It may be here noted that in order that a doubt may arise, it is not absolutely necessary that the objects about which a doubt arises, must be in one and the same place. एवं नाम विसाणं खरस्स पत्तं न तं खरे चेव ।
अन्नत्थ तदत्थि च्चिय एवं विवरीयगाहे वि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२) Evam nāma visāņam kharassa pattam na tani khard odva ! Annattba tad atthi cciya evam vivariyagahd vi, 24 (1572) [एवं नाम विषाणं खरस्य प्राप्तं न तत् खर एव ।
अन्यत्र तदस्त्येव एवं विपरीतग्रहेऽपि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२) Evam nāma vişāņam kharasya prāptam na tat khara dva i Anyatra tadastydva evam viparitagruhd pi. 24 (1572)]
Trans.--24. Such being the case, an ass will indeed have & horn but certainly lie has not. It surely exlsts somewhere else. So is the case even when the perverse view is taken. (1572)
____टीका-हन्त ! यदि यत्र संशयस्तेनावश्यमेव भवितव्यम् , एवं ततः खरविषाणमप्यस्तीति प्राप्तम् , तत्रापि कस्यचित् संशयसद्भावात् । उच्यतेनन्वभिहितमत्र यदुत-तत्रान्यत्र वा विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो मवति, नाविद्यमाने । खरस्य विषाणं खरविषाणं नास्तीत्यत्र च कोऽर्थः । इत्याह

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236: Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The first “न तं खरे चेव ति" खर एव तद्विषाणं नास्ति, अन्यत्र गवादावस्त्येवेति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः। एवं विवरीयगाहे वित्ति' इदमुक्तं भवति-यदा विपर्यस्तः कश्चित् स्थाणी 'पुरुष एवायम्' इत्यादिविपरीतग्रहं करोति तदाप्ययमेव न्यायो वाच्यः-सोऽपि विपरीतग्रहो विपरीते पुरुषादिके वस्तुनि सत्येवोपपद्यते, नाविद्यमान इत्यर्थः । एवं भवदभिप्रायेण योऽसादृशां शरीरं आत्मास्तित्वाभिमानः, नायमात्मनः सर्वथा नास्तित्वे युज्यत इति ॥ २४ (१५७२)॥
D. C.--If it is that the object which is doubted, must be existing in the very place where the doubt arises, then even an ass will have a horn; for, somebody may doubt its existence so far as the ass is concerned. No, this is not true. What we want to imply is that the doubted object exists either in the very place where the doubt arises, or even somewhere else. That an ass bas no horus, means that horns are not associated with the ass; but they are found elsewhere, e. g., on the head of a cow. Similar is the case when one object is definitely mistaken for the other. For instance, a man may take a branch-less trunk to be a man. Such a perverse view proves the existence of the object mistaken. Hence Gantama you may think that we are in the wrong when we admit the existence of a soul in our body. This is our perverse notion according to you. If so, even then, it establishes the existence of the soul.
The soul exists, for the following reason, viz:-- अस्थि अजीवविवक्खो पडिसेहाओ घडोघडस्सेव । मस्थि घडो त्ति व जीवत्थित्तपरो नत्थिसहोऽयं । २५॥ (१५७३) Atthi ajivaživakkho padisdhãö ghaço’ghadassdva / Nathi ghaço tti va jivatthittaparo natthi saddo'yam. 25 (1573) [अस्त्यजीवविपक्षः प्रतिषेधाद् घटोऽघटस्येव ।
जास्ति घट इतीय जीवास्तित्वपरो नास्तिशब्दोऽयम् ॥२५।। (१५७२)

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:37: Astya jīva vipaksah pratişddhāt ghato'ghatasyèval Nasti ghata itiva jiastitvaparo nāsti sabdo'yam. 25 (1572)]
Trans.-25 Just as there is a ghata as opposed to aghata, so, there is an object, viz , the soul, a vipaksa (the op. posite) of an inanimate object, owing to denial. This sentence, viz., ' it does not exist' establishes the existence of the soul, as does the sentence, viz., ' there is no ghata' (establish its existence) (1573)
टीका-अत्र प्रयोगः-प्रतिपक्षवानयमजीवः, अत्र व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदप्रतिषेधात्, यत्र व्युत्पत्तिमतः शुद्धपदस्य प्रतिषेधो दृश्यते स प्रतिपक्षवान् दृष्टः, यथाऽघटो घटप्रतिपक्षवान् , अत्र ह्यघटप्रयोगे शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, अतोऽवश्यं घटलक्षणेन प्रतिपक्षेण भवितव्यम् । यस्तु न प्रतिपक्षवान् न तत्र शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, यथाऽखरविषाणम् ,अडित्थ इति। अखरविषाणमित्यत्र खरविषाणलक्षणस्याशुद्धस्य सामासिकपदस्य प्रतिषेध इति, अतोत्र खरस्य विषाणं खरविषाणमित्यादिव्युत्पत्तिमत्वे सत्यपि खरविषाणलक्षणो विपक्षो नास्ति । अडित्थ इत्यत्र तु व्युत्पत्तिरहितस्य डित्थपदस्य प्रतिषेधः, इति समासरहितत्वेन शुद्धत्वे सत्यपि नावश्यमवस्थितो डित्थलक्षणः कोऽपि पदार्थो जीववद् विपक्षभूतोऽस्तीति ।
"नत्थि घडो त्तिव" इत्यादि पश्चार्धम् । “नास्यात्मा” इति च योऽयमात्मनिषेधध्वनिः स जीवास्तित्वनान्तरीयक एव, यथा “ नास्त्यत्र घटः" इति शब्दोऽन्यत्र घटास्तित्वाविनाभाव्येव । प्रयोगः-यस्य निषेधः क्रियमाणो दृश्यते तत् क्वचिदस्त्येव, यथा घटादिकम् ; निषिध्यते च भवता "नास्ति जीवः" इति वचनानीवः, तस्मादस्त्येवासौ, यच्च सर्वथा नास्ति तस्य निषेधो न दृश्यत एव, यथा खरविषाणकल्पानां पञ्चभूतातिरिक्तभूतानाम् निषेध्यते च त्वया जीवः, तस्माद् निषेध एवायं तत्सत्त्वसाधक इति ॥२५॥ १५७३॥
D. C.-The underlying argument is this, that since ajiva is a word of which an etymology exists and is furthermore a Suddha pada (a pure syllable), it has a pratipaksa (a rival ), viz., tva. A pratipaksa exists in the case of the negation of

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: 38:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a śuddha pada. As for example, & pratipaksa, viz., ghata exists in the case of a-ghata which is a negation of ghata; for, there is an etymology of ghata, and that it is a suddha pada too. One which bas no pratipaksa, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a suddha pada baving an etymology is concerned. For instance, akharavisāna is wanting in a pratipakşa, viz., kharavişāņa since kharavişāna is not a suddha pada but is a sāmāsika one-is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a vyutpatti.
We may now examine the case of adittha. Dittha is its pratipakşa; but, since this dittha is wanting in a vyutpatti, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied :
(i) It should be a suddha pada. (ii) At the same time, it must have a vyutpatti.
In the case of kharavişāņa the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of dittha, the second is violated. So, there exists neither kharavişāņa, a pratipaksa of akharavişāņa nor practically qittha, a pratipaksa of aạitthha.
Now the second hemistitch. Just as when one says that here there is no ghata' establishes the existence of a ghata elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under :
One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e. g., & ghaça. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So, it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non-existent has no negative predication Khara-vişāņa may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibility for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
:39; This hètu is anaikantika. असओ नत्थि निसेहो संजोगाइपडिसेहओ सिद्धं । संजोगाइचउकं पि सिद्धमत्थन्तरे निययं ॥२६॥ (१५७४) Asaö natthi niso ho sanjogãipaạisè haö siddhami Sanjogāicaukkam pi siddhamatthantarè niy ajam. 26 (1574) [असतो नास्ति निषेधः संयोगादिप्रतिषेधतः सिद्धम् ।
संयोगादिचतुष्कमपि सिद्धमर्थान्तरे नियतम् ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४) Agato nāsti niddhaḥ samyogādipratişàdhatab siddbami Samyogādicatuskamapi siddhamarthāntard niyatam. 26 (1514)]
Trans.-26. It is proved that there is no negation in the case of a non-existent object owing to the pratisdha of samyoga (connection) etc. Even the quarter union consisting of saṁyoga, etc., is certainly proved (torbe existing ) elsewhere. (1574)
__टीका-असतोऽविद्यमानस्य नास्ति न सम्मवत्येव निषेध इति सिद्धम् । कुतः? इत्याह-संयोगादिप्रतिषेधात् , आदि शब्दात् , समवाय-सामान्य-विशेषपरिग्रहः । एतदुक्तं भवति-इह यत्किश्चित् क्वचिद् देवदत्तादिकं निषिध्यते तस्यान्यत्र सत एव विवक्षितस्थाने कस्मिंश्चित् संयोग-समवाय-सामान्यविशेषलक्षणं चतुष्ठयमेव निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथैव देवदत्तादेरभाव प्रतिपाद्यते। तत्र “ नास्ति गृहे देवदत्तः" इत्यादिषु गृह-देवदत्तादीनां सतामेव संयोग मात्रं निषिध्यते, न तु, तेषां सर्वथैवास्तित्वमपाक्रियते । तथा, "नास्ति खरविषाणम्" इत्यादिषु खर-विषाणादीनां सतामेव समवायमानं निराक्रियते । तथा "नास्त्यन्यश्चंद्रमाः" इत्यादिषु विद्यमानस्यैव चन्द्रमसोऽन्यत्रचन्द्रनिषेधा. चन्द्रसामान्यमानं निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथा चन्द्राभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । तथा "न सन्ति घटप्रमाणा मुक्ताः" इत्यादिषु घटप्रमाणनाममात्ररूपोविशेषो मुक्तानां निषिध्यते, न तु मुक्ताऽभावः ख्याप्यत इति । एवं च सति "नास्त्यात्मा" इत्यत्र विद्यमानस्यैवात्मनो यत्र वचन येन केनाचित् सह संयोगमात्रेण त्वया निषेद्धव्यम्; यथा " नास्त्यात्मा वपुसि" इत्यादि न तु सर्वथाऽऽत्मनः सत्त्वमिति।

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: 40: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first अत्राह कश्चित्-ननु यदि यद् निषिध्यते तदस्ति, तहिं मत्रिलोकेश्वरनाऽप्यस्ति, युष्मदादिभिनिषिध्यमानत्वात ; तथा चतुर्णा समवायादिप्रतिषे. धानां पञ्चमोऽपि प्रतिषेधप्रकारोऽस्ति, त्वयैर निषिध्यमानत्वात् । तदयुक्तम् , त्रिलोकेश्वरताविशेषमात्रं भवतो निषिध्यते. यथा घटप्रमाणत्वं मुक्तानाम्, न तु सवथैवेश्वरता, स्व शिष्यादीश्वरतायास्तवापि विद्यमानत्वात् । तथा, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पश्चसङ्खयाविशिष्टत्वमपाक्रियते, न तु सर्वथा प्रतिषेधस्याभावः, चतु:सङ्ख्या विशिष्टस्स्य तस्य सद्भावात् । ननु सर्वमप्यसम्बद्धमिदम् , तथाहि-- मत्रिलोकेश्वरत्वं तावदसदेव निषिध्यते, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पश्चसङ्ग्याविनिष्टत्वमविद्यमानमेव निवार्यते, तथा, संयोग-समवाय-सामान्य-विशेषाणामपि गृहदेवदत्त-खरविषाणादिष्वसतामेव प्रतिषेधः, इत्यतो "यनिषिध्यते तदस्त्येव" इत्येतत् कथं न प्लवते ? इत्याशङ्कयाह-"संजोगाइचउक्कं पीत्यादि। इदमुक्तं भवति--देवदत्तादीचा संयोगादयो गृहादिष्वेवासन्तो निषिध्यन्ते, अर्थान्तरे तु तेषां ते विद्यन्त एव; तथाहि-गृहेणैव सह देवदत्तस्य संयोगो न विद्यते, अथान्तरेण तु क्षेत्र-हट्ट-ग्रामादिना सह तस्यासौ समस्त्येव, गृहस्यापि देवदत्तेन सह संयोगो नास्ति, खट्वादिना तु सह तस्यासौ विद्यत एव, एवं विषाणस्यापि खर एव समवायो नास्ति, गवादावस्त्येव सामान्यमपि द्वितीयचन्द्राभावाचन्द्र एव नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु घटगवादावस्त्येव; घटप्रमा. णत्वमपि मुक्तासु नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु कूष्माण्डादावस्त्येव । त्रिलोकेश्वरताऽपि भवप एव नास्ति, तीर्थकरादावस्त्येव, पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपि प्रतिषेधे नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे त्वनुत्तरविमानादावस्त्येव । इत्यनया विवक्षया ब्रूम:-- "यद् निषिध्यते तत् सामान्येनास्त्येव, न त्वेवं प्रतिजानीमहे" - "यद् यत्र निषिध्यते तत् तत्रैवास्ति" इति येन व्यभिचार: स्यात् ।।
वयमपि शरीरे जीवं निषेधयामः, नान्यत्रति चेत् । साधूक्तम्, अस्मन् समीहितस्य सिद्धत्वात् , जीवसिद्धयर्थमेव हि यतामहे वयम् , स चेत् सिद्धः, तहिं तत्सिद्धयन्यथानुपपत्तरेव तदाश्रयः सेत्स्यति, किं तया चिन्तया ?। न च शरीरमन्त्ररेण जीवस्याश्रयान्तरमुपपद्यते, तत्रैव तदवस्थानलिङ्गोपलब्धेः। न च वक्तव्यम्-शरीरमेव जीवः, "जीवति", "मृतः", "मूच्छितः" इत्यादि व्यवस्थाऽनुपपत्तेः इत्यादेरभिधास्यमानत्वादिति ॥ २६॥ १५७४।।

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Vāda] Ganadhara rāda
:41: D. C.-When a negation is predicated in the case of any object, this negation is to be understood regarding saṁyoga (conjuction ). samavāya ( inherence ), sāmānya (generality ) or višaşa ( speciality ), but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance · Dévadatta is not at home' means that the samvoga between a house and Devadatta, each of which exists. is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly an ass has no horns' means the negation of samavāya between an existing ass and horns. Similarly, there is no other moon implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say, we have only one moon, and that there is no parallel to it.
That there are no pearls equal to a ghata in bulk' con veys the idea that the distinguishing feature, viz., & measure equal to that of a ghata is denied, and not the non-existence of pearls.
Such being the oase, Gautama ! you may refuse to admit only the samyoga of the existing soul with something in some way, by saying something like this, that the soul does not exist in the body, but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under:
If there exists that of which negation is predicated, then, in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore, you refuse to believe a fifth pratişèdha, over and above the four well-known pratişèdhas, viz samyoga etc. So, there must be a fifth pratişèdha. These arguments can be refuted as below:
We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds, i. e, only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus, you will see that only a particular

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first type of sovereignty is not admitted but not all types of it. Similarly, when we refuse to admit the fifth pratişddha, it is the number five' associated with it that is denied, and not a pratisedha in all its aspects.
Regarding this refutation, it may be argued that this is all moonshine For, you refuse to admit in me the sovereignty of the three worlds-a thing that does exist in my case. The numher five' not admitted in the case of pratişèdha, is also non-existent. Moreover, samyoga in the case of a house and Devadation, which is not admitted, is also non-existent. Same is the case with samavāya, sāmānya and višeşa. Such being the case, how can you say that what is negatived does exist? The answer to this sort of argument may be given as follows:
That the saryoga between the house and Devadatta is not simittéd, does not mean refusal to admit the sainyoga of Dövadatta with a field, a market, a village, or the like. More over, the house has no saryoga with Devadatta only; but it has & samyoga, no doubt, with a bed-stead or the like.
Similarly, the samavāya in the case of an A88 and horns is not admitad; but the samavāya in the case of a cow and its horns and the like, is certainly admitted.
Likewise, samanya is not admitted in the case of the moon but it is surely admitted in the case of ghatas, cows, eto. that are more than one in number.
Similarly, the measure equal to a ghata is refused so far as the pearls are concerned but it no doubt exists as regards a melon etc. The sovereignty of the three worlds is not admitted, Gautama I in your case; but it does exist as far as Orthankaras are concerned.
Slimmibarly, the number five is not admitted regarding the peatadkas; but it is surely admitted when the question of anuttaras is being disoussed.

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 43: From this, you will see that, what we wish to suggest is this:
That which is denied, exists ordinarily. By no means we want to convey : 'that about which negation is predicated, exists there and nowhere else'. Thus, there is no vyaõhicāra (inconsistency ) in what we say.
Gautama ! If you wish to retort that you (Gautamia ) do not admit the existence of the soul in the body only bad smit it elsewhere, that is good; for, it establishes what is desired by us. We have been all this while trying simply to establish the existence of the soul. And, if it is thus established, then the āšraya (substratum ) of the soul will be proved as it is not possible to justify its existence in any other way.
It is not justifiable to admit any other āśraya of the soul except the body; for, the lingas of the soul are seen there. It may be borne in mind that it will not do to say that the body itself is the soul; for, in that case, we cannot have a vyavasthā (fixity ) of the types, viz., he lives, he is dead, he has fainted, and the like. Of couise, this vyavastha will be exponnded horeafter,
For the proof of the existence of the soul, another sty. mology can be given : जीवो त्ति सत्थयमिणं सुद्धत्तणओ घडाभिहाणं व । for RENT HOU stat TE H 1 2011 (8494) अत्यो देहो चिय से तं नो पजायवयणमेआओ। ATTEOTTI FT forent sitate For H2611 (8908) Jito tti satthayaminam suddhattaņað ghadābhibāņam ra Jeņatthdna sadattham so jivo aha mai hojja. 27 (1578) Attho daho ociya sè tam no pajjāyavayanabhèão i Nāgāiguno ya jao bhaņio jīvo na doho tti. 28 (1576)

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:44: Jinabhadra Gani's
The first [जीव इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।
येमार्थेन सदथं स जीवोऽथ मतिर्भवेत् ॥२७॥ (१५७५) अर्थो देह एच तस्य तद् नो पर्यायवचनभेदात् ।
ज्ञानादिगुणश्च यतो भणितो जीवो न देह इति ॥२८॥ (१५७६) Jiva iti sarthakam idam suddhatrato ghatābhidhānam iva i Yenarthena sadartham sa jivo'tha matir bhavat. x7 (1575) Artho doha eva tasya tad no paryāyavacanabhedāt Jihinadigunas ca yato bhanito jivo na ddha iti. 28 (1576)]
Trans --27-28. This word “jīva” is significant owing to its being suddha, as is the word ghata. That arthu (meaning) by means of which it is pregnant with a meaning is jiva. If you, however, think that the artha is only the body, that is not so, on account of a difference in synonymous words; for, jiva is said to have gunas such as knowledge, etc., and not that the body ( is so said ). (1575-1576).
टीका-जीव इत्येद् वचनं सार्थकमिति प्रतिज्ञा व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदत्वात् , इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदं तदर्थवद् दृष्टम् , यथा घटादिकम् । तथा च जीवपदम् , तस्मात् सार्थकम् , यत्तु सार्थकं न मवति तत् व्युत्पत्तिमत् शुद्धपदं च न भवति, यथा डित्थादिकं खरविषाणादिकं च, न च तथा जीवपदम् , तस्मात् सार्थकम् । यद् व्युत्पत्तिमद् न भवति तच्छुद्धपदमपि सद् न सार्थकं, यथा डित्यादिपदम्, इति हेतोरनकान्तिकतापरिहारार्थ व्युत्पत्तिमत्व विशेषणं द्रष्टव्यम् । यदपि शुद्धपदं न भवति किन्तु सामासिकम् , तदपि व्युत्पत्तिमत्वे सत्यपि सार्थकं न भवति, यथा खरकिपाणादिकम् , इति शुद्धत्वविशेषणम् ।
अथ मन्यसे--देह एवास्य जीवपदस्याऽर्थः, न पुनरर्थान्तरम्; उर्फ च--" देह एवाऽयमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टः, यथैष जीवः, एनं न हिनस्ति" इति, अतो देह एवास्यार्थो युक्त इति । तदेतद् न। कुतः? इत्याह--देहजीवयोः पर्यायवचनभेदात्, यत्र हि पर्यायवचनभेदस्तत्रान्यत्वं दृष्टम् , यथा पटा-कानयोः । तत्र घट-फट-कम्म-कलशादयो घटस्य पर्यायाः, नमो

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Vada] Ganadharavada
: 45: व्योमाऽन्तरिक्षा-ऽऽकाशादयस्त्वाकाशपर्यायाः। प्रस्तुते च जीवो जन्तुरसुमान् प्राणी सत्वो भूत इत्यादयो जीवपर्यायाः, शरीरं वपुः कायो देहः कलेवरमित्यादयस्तु शरीरपर्यायाः। पर्यायवचनभेदेऽपि च वस्त्वेकत्वे सर्वैकत्वप्रसङ्गोऽत्र बाधकम् । यत् पुनरिदमुक्तम्-" देह एवायमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टा" इत्यादि, तच्छरीरसहचरणा-ऽवस्थानादितः शरीरे जीवोपचारः क्रियते । किच, इत्थमपि श्रूयत एव --'गतः स जीव:' 'दह्यतामिदं शरीरम्' इति । किन “नाणाईत्यादि " यमाच ज्ञानादिगुणयुतो जन्तुः, जडश्च देहा, तत् कथं देह एव जीवः । प्रागिहैव चोक्तम्--'न ज्ञानादिगुणो देहः, मूर्तिमत्वात् , घटवत; तथा, देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्त आत्मा, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धाथानामनुस्मरणात्, वातायनपुरुषवदिति' ।। २७-२८॥ १५७५-१५७६ ।।
D. C.-Here the pratijna is : The word jiva is significant. For, over and above this, it has a vyutpatti and it is a suddha pada. Whatever is & śuddha pada and has a vyutpatti is here seen to be one having an artha (meaning ). Ghata, etc., may be mentioned as instances; so is the word jiya. Therefore, it too, is significant. What is not significant is wanting in vyutpatti, and besides, it is not a suddha pada. Dittha, kharavisana, etc, are words of this type; for, the former has no vyutpatti, whereas the latter is not a suddha pada. Such is not the case with the word jiva. Therefore, it is sigpificant. The condition that it should have a vyutpatti is stated here to avoid dittha, etc., which are suddha padas, but which are not significant; for, they fail to satisfy both the conditions. Same is the case with khara-vişāna; for, though it has a vyutpatti it is not a suddha pada. And ther fore, it is not significant.
If you believe that simply the body is the artha of jiva, because we come across the following line, it is not correct, since there is a difference in the synonyms of the body and jiva :
“ Daha evāyam anuprayujyamāno drstah yathaiņa jivaḥ, enam na hinasti."
The words of which the synonyms differ, are seen to be non-identical. For instance, ghata is not the same as ākāśa,

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: 46: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first as the synonyms of the former, viz., ghata, kuța, kumbha, and kalaśa differ from those of the latter, viz., nabhas, yyorman, antariksa, ākāśa, and the like. In the pertinent case, the synonyms of jiva are jantu, asumat, prāņin, sattva, bhūta, etc., and these are by no means the same as śarira, vapus, kāya, kalèvara, etc., the synonyms of deha. If this difference in synonyms is neglected, anything will be identical with anything else, and this is certainly undesirable.
Now "dona dvayam anuprayujyamāno drstan". Herein, there is an upacara (metaphorical application) of jiva to the body, as it is with the help of the body that the soul walks eto.
Moreover, we do hear. “gataḥ sa jivah; dahyatām idam sariram", i e., the soul bas departed, and let this body be burnt.
Furthermore, the soul has an attribute like knowledge, whoreas the body is jada and has no knowledge. So, how can we equate the body with the soul ?
The reasons why the body is not the same as the soul, have been already mentioned while concluding the commentary on verse 1562.
जीवो स्थि वओ सच्चं मव्वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व। सवण्णुवयणओ वा अणुमयसव्वण्णुवयणं व ॥२९॥ (१५७७) Sivo tthi vaö saccam mavvayaņāö'vasèsavayaņam va I Savvannuvayaņaö vă anumayasavvayaņam va. 29 (1577)
[जीवोऽस्ति वचः सत्यं मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
सर्वज्ञवचनतो वाऽनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनमिव ।। २९ ॥ (१५७७) Jivo'sti vacaḥ satyam madvacanādavasèşayacanam iva i Sarvajñavacanato va’numatasarvajšavacanam iva. 29 (1577) ]
Trans.-29. Like my other statement, (e. g., one pertaining to your doubt ), the statement (of mine) that the soul

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:47: exists, is true, as it is my statement. Or, it is correct owing to its being a statement of an Omniscient Being, as is the case with the statement of one whom you look upon as Omniscient. (1577).
टीका-"जीवोऽस्ति" इत्येतद् वचः सत्यम् , मद्वचनत्वात् , मवत्संशयविषयाद्यवशेषवचनवत् , यच्च सत्यं न भवति तद् मदीयवचनमपि न भवति, यथा कूटसाक्षिवचनम् । अथवा सत्यं “जीवोऽस्ति" इति वचनम् , सवज्ञवचनत्वात् , भवदनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥ २९ (१५७७)॥
D. C.-Just as my statement about your doubt is correct 80 this statement of mine that the soul exists is correct; for, it is my statement. The statement which is not correct, is not mine, e. g., the scatement of a false witness. Or, the correct. ness of this statement can be also established as under :
The statement that the soul exists is correct, because it is the statement of an Omniscient Being, as is the case with & statement of one whom you look upon as sarvajña. | मय-राग-दोस-मोहाभावाओ सचमणइवाइं च ।
सव्वं चिय मे वयणं जाणय मज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३०॥ (१५७८) Bhayg-rage-dosar-mohibhavas saccamayairaim car Savvam ciya me vayaņam jāraya majjhatthavayaņam va. 30 (1578) [भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।
सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३०॥ (१५७८) Bhaya-rāga-dvèşa-mohābhāvāt satyam anatipāti ca ! Satyam dva md vacanam jdāyakamadhyasthavacanam iva. 30 (1578)]
Trans.-30. Everything that I say, is certainly true and free from any fault, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation (in me) as is the case with the words of an intelligent and impartial person. (1578)
टीका-सर्वमपि मद्वचनं सत्यमनतिपाति च बोधव्यम् , भय-समदेषा-ज्ञानरहितत्वात , इह यद् भयादिरहितस्य वचनं वत सत्यं स्य, पथा

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: 48: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first मार्गझस्य भयरहितस्य प्रष्टरि राग-द्वेषरहितस्य मार्गोपदेशवचनम् , तथा च मदचा, तस्मात् सत्यमनतिपाति चेति ॥ ३० (१५७८)॥
___D. C.-Whatever I say, should be taken to be true and flawless, as I am ( entirely ) free from fear, attachment, aversion, and ignorance. In this world, it is a matter of common experience that whatever is said by one devoid of fear, etc., is true. For instance, the words spoken to one who has lost his way, by one who knows it, who is fearless, and who is devoid of attachment and aversion, are true. My statement belongs to the same category. So, it is true and flawless.
The doubt of Gautama svāmin is being answered. कह सव्ण्णु त्ति मई जेणाहं सव्वसंसयच्छेई । पुन्छसु व जं न जाणसि जेण व ते पञ्चाओ होजा ॥३१॥ (१५७१) Kaba savvaņņu tti mai jèņāham savvasamsayacchdii Pucchasu va jam na jāsasi jèņa va tè paocaö hojjā. 31. (1579) [कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतियेनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी।
पृच्छ वा यद् न जानासि येन वा ते प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥३१॥ (१५७९) Katham sarvajša iti matir yènāham sarvasamsayacchèdi/ Priccha vā yad na jānāsi yena vā tè pratyayo bhavet. 31 (1579)]
Trans.-31. You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient. This is so; for, I can remove all doubts. Or, you may ask.(me) what you do not know, so that you may be con. vinced (about my omniscience ). ( 1579 ).
टीका-कथं नाम 'त्वं सर्वज्ञः' इति ते मतिः ? एवं त्वं मन्यसे, तथा भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावश्चासिद्ध इति मन्यसे । तदयुक्तम् , येनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी, यश्च सर्वसंशयच्छेत्ता स सर्वज्ञ एव । दृष्टान्ताभावेनान्वयासिद्धेस्नैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, सर्वसंशयच्छेतृत्वानुपपवत्तिरेवेह विपर्यये

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Vida]
Gaṇadharavāda
: 49.
बाधकं प्रमाणम्, किमिहान्वयान्वेषणेन ? | यदि वा, पृच्छयतां यत् त्रैलोक्यान्तर्गतं वस्तु त्वं न जानासि येन सर्वज्ञत्वप्रत्ययस्तव जायते । मयाद्यभावोऽपि तलिङ्गादर्शनाद् मयि सिद्ध एवेति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । कदाचिदपि लिङ्गार्दशने लिङ्गिनोऽस्तित्वशङ्कायामतिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ ३१ (१५७९ ) ॥
D. C.-You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient and you may be believing that I am not entirely free from fear, attachment, aversion, and infatuation. In that case, I reply
as under.
;
I can remove all doubts. Whoever can do so, is certainly omniscient. So I, too, am omniscient. If you were to argue that this hètu is anaikāntika (inconclusive) owing to want of an illustration, and impossibility of establishing anvaya, it is not so; for, in this viparyaya the anutpatti (inapplicability) itself of state of removing doubts is a proof that goes against it. What is the use of searching for anvaya? Or, you may ask me anything that you do not know so that you may become convinced about my omniscience.
That I am free from fear, etc., is proved in my case, owing to their characteristics being not seen in me. To suspect the existence of a lingin even when there is a total absence of a linga, is too much.
Concluding, the author says:--
एवमुव ओगलिंगं गोयम ! सव्वप्यमाणसंसिद्धं । संसारी - यर- थावर- तसाइभेयं मुणे जीवं ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८०)
Evam uvaögalingam Goyama! sayvappamāṇasaṁsiddham | Samsari-yara-thāvara-tasaibhèyam muņè jivam. 32 (1580)
[ एवमुपयोगलिङ्ग गौतम ! सर्वप्रमाणसंसिद्धम् ।
संसारी तर स्थावर - त्रसमेदं मुण जीवम् ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८०)
Evam upayogalingam Gautama! sarvapramāņasaṁsiddham | Samsari-tara-sthāvara-trasabhedam muna jīvam. 82 (1580)]
7

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:50: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first Trans.-32. Thus Gautama ! know the soul as one having upayoga (attention) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs and also ) as one having classifications like saṁsārin (mundane ) and itara (not mundane) and the mundane having two sub-classifications, viz., sthāvara (immobile ) and trasa (mobile ). (1580)
टीका-एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण जीवमात्मानं गौतम ! मुण-प्रतिपद्यस्वेति सम्बन्धः । कथम्भूतम् ? उपयोग एव लिङ्गं यस्य स तथा, सर्वैः प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणैः संसिद्धं-प्रतिष्ठितम् , तथा संसारी-तर-स्थावर-त्रसादिभेदम् । संसारिणश्चेतरे सिद्धाः । आदिशद्भाच सूक्ष्म-बादर-पयाप्ता-ऽपर्याप्तादिभेदपरिग्रह इति ॥ ३२ ॥ १५८०॥
अत्र वेदान्तवादी प्राह-ननु बहुभेदत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम् , तस्य सर्वत्रैकत्वात् , तदुक्तम्--
" एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते प्रतिष्ठितः । एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १॥ यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः। सङ्कीर्णमिव मात्राभिभिन्नाभिरभिमन्यते ॥ २ ॥ तथेदममलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पमविद्यया ।। कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥३॥ ऊर्ध्वमूलमधःशाखमश्वत्थं प्राहुरव्ययम् ।
छन्दांसि यस्य पर्णानि यस्तं वेद स वेदवित् ॥४॥"
तथा 'पुरुष एवेदं नि सर्व, यद् भूतं यच्च भाव्यम् , उतामृतत्वस्येशानः, यदन्नेनातिरोहति, यदेजति, यद् नैजति, यद् दूरे, यदु अन्तिके, यदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य, यत् सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः' इत्यादि। इत्येतदेव पूर्वार्धनाक्षिप्योचरार्धन परिहरमाह--
D. C.-In this way, Gantama! admit that there is a soul which has upayoga as its linga, of which the existence is proved by all the three pramānas., viz., pratyaksa,

Page #89

Vida ] Ganad hatavada
:51: arumāna and āgama, and which can be variously classified. some of these classifications are :-samsărin (mundane ) and mukta (liberated ), sūkşma (subtle ) and bådara (gross ), mrvāpta (developed ) and a-paryāpta (non-developed ), etc. Furthermore, the mundane beings are sub-divided as sthāvara (immobile ), and trasa ( mobile ).
Here a Vedāntin may say that, many varieties of the soul are unwarranted; for, the soul is everywhere the same. This is oorroborated by the following verses :a. Eka dva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte pratisthitaḥ 1
Ekadhã bahudhā caiva droyatd jalacandravat 11111 Yathā visuddham ākāśam timiro papluto janah 1 Sankirņam iva mātrābhir bhinnābhir abhimanyatè il 2 # Tathadamamalam Brahma nirvikalpamavidyayā | Kaluşatvamivāpannam bhədarūpam prakāśato il 3 11 Urdhvamulam adhaḥśākhamaśvattham prāhuravyayam.
Chandāmsi yasya parņāni yastam véda sa vėdavit 11 4 11 And,
Puruşa dvedam gni sarvam, yad bhūtam, yacca bhāvyam utāmrtatvasyèśanah, yadannonātirohati, yad ejati, yad naijati, yad dūrė, yadu antike, yad antarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyāsya bāhyataḥ.
This vịew of the Vedāntin is now being refuted.जह पुण सो एगो चिय हवेज वोमं व सव्वपिंडेसु । oten interessi e Telavitatsi 113311 (8468) Jai puņa so ego cciya havėjja vomam va savvapiņdesu / Goyama I tadègalingam piņdesu tabā na jīvo'yam. 33 (1581) [यदि पुनः स एक एव भवेद् व्योमेव सर्वपिण्डेषु ।
an ! agafem fquèg qan a faisag!! 23 11 (8468)

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: 52: Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The first Yadi punaḥ sa oka dva bhaved vyomèva sarvapiņddşu i Gautama ! tad dkalingam pinddsu tathā nu jivo'yam. 33 (1581)]
Trans.-33. 0 Gautama ! if that soul were really one in all the pindas (bodies) as is the case with the sky, then, that (sky) is (only) of one form in different corporeal pidņas but such is not the soul. (1581).
टीका--परः प्राह-यदि पुनर्दर्शितन्यायेन स आत्मा सर्वेष्वपि नारकतिर्यङ्-नरा-ऽमरपिण्डेषु व्योमवदेक एव भवेद् न तु संसारीतरादिभेदभिन्नः, तर्हि किं नाम दूषणं स्यात् ।। एवमुक्ते भगवानाह--गौतम ! तद् व्योम सर्वेष्वपि पिण्डेषु मूर्तिविशेषेषु स्थितमेकलिङ्गं वैसदृश्याभावादेकरूपमेव, इति युक्तं तस्यैकत्वम् , जीवस्त्वयं विचार्यत्वेन प्रस्तुतो न तथा-नैकलिङ्गः सर्वत्र दृश्यते, प्रतिपिण्डं तस्य विलक्षणत्वात् , लक्षणभेदे च लक्ष्यभेदात् , इति न तस्यैकत्वमिति ॥ ३३ ॥ (१५८१) ॥
D. C.-Some one niay ask a question: What harm is there, if, on the basis of the verses, etc, just quoted, the soul is, on the analogy of the sky, looked upon as one i.e. having no such classifications, as mundane and non-mundane and the like, so far as all the pindas, viz., the bodies of a denizen of hell, tiryac, a human being, and a celestial being, are concerned ?
The answer is this: As regards the sky, it is alright to say that it is only one; for, the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal pizdas, is seen to be uniform-free from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform; for, it differs from piņqa to pinda. Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes, the difference in those having these characteristios, Hence, 'the soul is not one in number.
Here is the illustration in

Page #91

:53:
Vada ]
Ganadharavāda नाणाजीवा कुंभावउ व्व भुवि लक्खणाइभेयाओ। सुह-दुक्ख-बंध-मोक्खाभावो य जओ तदेगत्ते ॥३४॥ (१५८२)
Nánājīvā kumbhādaü vya bhuvi lakkhaņaibhèyāöl Suba-dukkha-bandha-mokkbābbāvo ya jaö tadègaitd. 34 (1982)
[नानाजीवाः कुम्भादय इव भुवि लक्षणादिभेदात्। सुख-दुःख-वन्ध-मोक्षाभावश्च यतस्तदेकत्वे ॥३४॥ (१५८२)
Nánājīvāh kumbhādaya iva bbuvi lakşaņādibhèdāti Sukha-dubkha- bandha-moksābhāvasca yatastade katvè. 34 (1582)]
Trans. 34. In the world, there are different souis like (different) water-pots, etc., on account of the difference in their characteristics, etc. For, if they were (only) one, there will be non-existence of sukha (happiness), dubkha (misery), bandha (bondage) and moksa (emancipation) (1582).
टीका-नानारूपा भुवि जीवाः परस्परं भेदभाज इत्यर्थः। लक्षणादिमेदादिति हेतुः, कुम्भादय इवेति दृष्टान्तः, यच्च न भिन्नं न तस्य लक्षणभेदः, यथा नभस इति । सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षाभावश्च यस्मात् तदेकत्वे, तस्मात् मिमा एव सर्वेऽपि जीवा इति ॥ ३४ (१५८२) ।
___D.C.-'The living beings in this world, differ from one another; for, there is a difference in their characteristics eto. As a parallel example may be mentioned water-pots eto, Whatever is not different from another object, does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same (since ghatākāśa does not differ from mathākaša). Moreover, if there were only one soul, then, there will be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage and emancipation, But these do exist. Therefore, all the souls are different, and their number is not one but many.
How do the characteristics differ in each body?

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: 54: Jinabhadra Gani's
( The first जेणोवओगलिंगो जीवो भिन्नो य सो पइसरीरं । उवओगो उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ तेण तेऽणंता ॥३५॥ (१५८३) Jeņu vaögalingö jīvo bhinno ya so paisarīran ! Uvaogo ukkarisa-vagarisai tdna tdnantā. 35 (1583) [ येनोपयोगलिङ्गो जीवो भिन्नश्च स प्रतिशरीरम् ।
उपयोग उत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षतस्तेन तेऽनन्ताः ॥३५॥ (१५८३) Yenopayogalingo jīvo bhinnaśca sa pratiśariram 1 Upayoga utkarsa-pakarsatastena tdnantāh. 35 (1583)]
Trans.----35. That upayoga (attention) by means of whiclh the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body. The upayoga has maximum and minimum scales. Therefore they (souls) are infinite in number. (1583)
टीका-येन ज्ञान-दर्शनोपयोगलक्षणोऽसौ जीवः, स चोपयोगः प्रतिशरीरमुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षभेदानन्तभेदः, तेन जीवास्तद्भेदादनन्तमेदा एवेति । तदेवं भावितं " नाणाजीवा" इत्यादिपूर्वार्धम् ॥ ३५ (१५८३) ॥
___D. C.-This soul has as its characteristic, upayoga ( attention) consisting of two kinds of knowledge, vix., differentiated and undifferentiated. This upayoga has infinite varieties; for, it differs from body to body, some having the maximum upayoga, some having the minimum upayoga, and some having upayoga between these two extremes. Therefore, the souls are of infinite kinds owing to the infinite varieties of upayoga. This has been already alluded to, in the first hemistich of verse. 1582.
Now, with regards to happiness, misery, etc., i. e., exposition of the second hemistich of verse 1582, the author says: एगत्ते सव्वगयत्तओ न मोक्खादओ नभस्सेव । कत्ता भोत्ता मंता न य संसारी जहागासं ॥३६॥ (१५८४)

Page #93

Vada ]
Ganadharavada
Egattè savvagayattaö na mokkhādaö nabhassèva | Kattā bhottā mantā na ya samsārī jahsgāsam 36 ( 1584 )
[ एकत्वे सर्वगतत्वतो न मोक्षादयो नभस इव ।
कर्ता भोक्ता मन्ता न च संसारी यथाssकाशम् ||३६|| (१५८४)
Ekatvè sarvagatavato na mokṣādayo nabhasa iva I Kartā bhoktā mantā na ca saṁsārī yathākā"śam. 36 (1584)]
: 55:
Trans.-36. On oneness (being accepted in the case of souls ) there will not be liberation. etc., owing to (the soul) being all-pervading, as is the case with the space. Moreover, like space, the soul will not be a kartr (a doer) a bhoktr (an enjoyer ), a mantr (thinker) and a sarisārin (a mundane being ). ( 1584 )
?
टीका -- एकत्वे जीवानां सुख-दुःख-बन्ध - मोक्षादयो नोपपद्यन्ते, सर्वगतत्वात्, नभस इष । यत्र तु सुखादयो न तत् सर्वगतं यथा देवदत्त इति । किञ्च न कती, न भोक्ता, न मन्ता, न संसारी जीवः, एकत्वात् सर्वजीवानाम्, यच्चैकं न तस्य कर्तृत्वादयः, यथा नभस इति || ३६ (१५८४) ।।
D. C.-If there is only one soul, then there is no scope for happiness and misery, bondage, and liberation and the like, since one soul will be all-pervading. Space may be here cited as a pertinent case.
One wherein there are happiness, misery etc, is not allpervading, e. g., Devadatta.
Furthermore, since the number of the souls is only one, and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker, and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer etc..a fact which is corroborated by the example of
space.
Besides,
एगत्ते नत्थि सुही बहूवघाउ त्ति देसनिरुउ व्व । बहुतरबद्धत्तणओ न य मुको देसमुक्को व्व ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)
For Private Personal Use Only

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:56: Jinabhadra Gani's
[These Egattè natthi suhi bahûvaghãu tti dèsaniruu vya Bahuttarabaddhattanao na ya mukko desemukko vva 37 (1583) . [एकत्वे नास्ति सुखी बहूपघात इति देशनिरज इव ।
बहुतरबद्धत्वतो न च मुक्तो देशमुक्त इव ॥३७॥ (१५८५) Ekatvò nāsti sukhi bahūpaghāta iti daśaniruja iva 1 Bahutarabaddhtvato na ca mukto desamukta iva. 37 (1585)]
__Trans -~-37. When there is oneness (of the souls), none is (completely) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease. Furthoremore, none is (entirely ) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free. (1585)
टीका-इदमत्र हृदयम्-नारक-तिर्यगादयोऽनन्ता जीवा नानाविधशरीर-मानसोपघातसंपातदुःखिता एव, तदनन्तभागवतिनस्तु सुखिनः, एवमनन्ता बद्धाः, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु मुक्ताः, तेषां च सर्वेषामेकत्वे ने कोऽपि सुखी प्रामोति, बहुतरोपघातान्वितत्वात् , यथा सर्वाङ्गरोगग्रस्तोड़गुल्येकदेशेन नीरोगो यज्ञदत्तः, एवं न कोऽपि मुक्तस्तत्सुखभाक् च न कोऽपि घटते, बहुतरबद्धत्वात् , यथा सर्वाङ्गकीलितोऽङ्गुल्येकदेशमुक्तः। तलादेकरले सुखाद्यनुपपत्तेननानात्वं जीवानामिति स्थितम् ॥ ३७ (१५८५)।
D. C.--There are infinite living beings viz., denizens of hell, tiryacs, and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy. Similarly, infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of karmans, and only an infinitesimal part of them, is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as differost entities, but are considered as only one, then, none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the onse with Yajñadatta who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger. Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruirg from liberation, since thero &

Page #95

Vada] Canadharavăda
: 57: great deal of bondages. One who has fetters all alony his body except a finger may be mentioned as an illustration,
Thus, owing to oneness there is no possiblity for happiness, etc. So, it follows that there are many souls, and not only one.
Refutation of the view-point of the Naiyāyikas, who admit ( the existence of) many souls, but take them to be allpervading :-- जीवो तणुमेत्तत्थो जह कुंभो तग्गुणोवलंभाओ। अहवाऽणुवलंभाओ भिन्नम्मि घडे पडस्सेव ॥३८॥ (१५८६) Jivo taņumėttattho jaha kunubho tagguņovalambhāö i Ahavā’ņuvalambhãö bhinnammi ghade padassdva 38 (1586) [ जीवस्तनुमात्रस्थो यथा कुम्मस्तद्गुणोपलम्भात् ।
अथवाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्ने घटे फ्टस्येव ॥३८॥ (१५८६) Jivastanumătrastho yathā kumbhastadguṇopalambhāti Athava'nupalambhād bhinnd ghate patasydva. 38 (1586) ]
Trans.-38. The soul permeates the body only, since its attributes are found there, as is the case with a pitcher. Or, because it is not found (elsewhere ), as is the case with a piece of cloth (which does not permeate), a pitcher is different from it. ( 1586)
टीका-तनुमात्रस्थो जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेः, यथा घटः, 'स्वात्ममात्रे' इति शेषः । “अहवेत्यादि" अथवा, यो यत्र प्रमाणै? पलभ्यते तस्य तत्राभाव एव, यथा भिन्ने घटे पटस्य, नोपलभ्यते च शरीराद् बहिर्जीवः, तस्मात् तस्य तत्राभाव एवेति ।। ३८ (१५८६) ।
D. C.--The measure of the soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies. For, its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher, and not outside it.

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: 58 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first As an alternative argument it may be said :--That is nonexistent there, where it cannot be realized by any of the pramāṇas. As for example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher' which is separate from it.
The soul is not seen outside the body. Consequently, it should be taken to be non-existent there.
While concluding, the author says :तम्हा कत्ता भोत्ता बंधो मोक्खो सुहं च दुक्खं च । संसरणं च बहुत्ता-ऽसव्वगयत्ते सुजुत्ताई ॥३९ ॥ (१५८७) Tamhā kattä bbottā bandho 'mokkho suham ca dukkham ca i Samsaranam ca bahuttā’savvagayattè sujuttaim. 39 (1587) [ तस्मात् कर्ता भोत्ता बन्धो मोक्षः सुखं च दुःखं च ।
teau Tabar-samarit: Falfa 11 38 11 (8964) Tasmāt kartā bhottā bandho mokşah sukham ca duhkham cal Sarisaranam ca bahūtvā'sarvagatatvayoḥ suyuktāni. 39. (1587)]
Trans.--39. Therefore, a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liber. ation, happiness, misery, mundane existence, and metamorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all-pervading. (1587)
टीका-तस्माद् बहुत्वा-सर्वगतत्वयोरेव सतोः कर्तुत्वादयो धर्मा जीवस्य युज्यन्ते, नान्यथा, इत्येवंविघं प्रमाणसिद्धं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥३९(१५८७)।
D. C. Therefore, it is only when it is admitted that souls are many and that none of them is all-pervading; action etc., which are the attributes of the soul, can have any place. If not, these attributes will be meaningless. So, please admit the soul which is thus established by pramānas.
Now the meaning of the sentences of the Voda which may be troubling you,

Page #97

: 59:
Pada )
Gañadharavada गोयम ! धेयपयाणं इमाण अत्थं च तं न याणासि । जं विनाणघणो चिय भूयेहिंतो समुत्थाय ॥४०॥ (१५८८) मण्णसि मज्जगेसु व मयभावो भूयसमुदउम्भूओ। वित्राणमेत्तमाया भूएऽणुविणस्सइ स भूओ ॥४१ ॥ (१५८९) अत्थि न य पेचसण्णा जं पुव्वभवेऽभिहाणममुगो त्ति ।
भणियं न भवाओ भवंतंरं जाइ जीवो त्ति ॥४२॥ (१५९०)
Goyama ! Vàyapayāņam imāņı attham ca tam na yaņāsi , Jam vinnāņaghaño cciya bhūydhinto 'samutthāya. 40 (1588) Manpasi wajjangdsu va mayabhāvo bhūyasamudaubbūö 1 Vinnāņamèttamayā bbūd’ņu-viņassai sa bhūö. 41 (1589) Atthi na ya pòccasaņņā jam puvvabhavè'bhibāŋamamugo tti Jam bhaniyam na bhavao bhavantaram jai jivo tti. 42 (1590)
[गौतम ! वेदपदानामेषामर्थ च त्वं न जानासि । यद् विज्ञानधन एव भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय ॥४०॥ (१५८८) मन्यसे मद्याङ्गेष्विव मदभावो भूतसमुदयोद्भूतः । विज्ञानमात्रमात्मा भूतेऽनुविनश्यति स भूयः ॥४१॥ (१५८९) अस्ति न च प्रेत्यसंज्ञा यत् पूवभवेऽभिधानममुक इति । यद् भणितं न भवाद् भवान्तरं याति जीव इति ॥४२॥ (१५९०)
Gautama ! Voda padānāmèşāmartham oa tvam na jānāsi i Yad vijñādaghana dva bhūtəbhyaḥ samutthāya. 40 (1588) Manyasd madyangdşviva madabhāvo bhūtasamudayodbhūtaḥ 1 Vijfhānamātramātmā bhūtènuvinaśyati sa bhūyaḥ, 4L (1589) Asti na ca pròtyasanjñā yat pūrvabhavabhidhānamamuka itį i Yad bhagitam na bhavād bhavāntaram yāti jiva iti. 42 (1590)]

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: 60:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first
Trans.-40-41-42. Gautama! You do not know the (real) meaning of these sentences of the Veda. For, you believe that none but the assemblage of (the particles of) knowledge, after having arisen from elements, in the way in which intoxication arises, from the sources of spirituous liquors, is a soul consisting of knowledge only-the soul which has sprung up from the collection of elements. It again- perishes after the elements (have perished ), and that there is no designation in the previous birth to the effect that it was named as such and such in the former birth (existence), and hence, it is said that the soul does not go from one bhava, to another existence. (1588-1589-1590)
टीका-गौतम! इत्यामन्त्रणम् , वेदपदानां श्रुतिवाक्यानाममीषां "विज्ञानधन एवेतेभ्यः" इत्यादीनां चेतसि वर्तमानानामर्थ यथावस्थितं वं न जानासि नावबुध्यसे । किमिति ? अत आह--यद् यस्मात् त्वमात्माभिप्रायेणैवंभूतमिहार्थं मन्यसे विकल्पयसीति संबन्धः । कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह"विण्णाणघणो चिय ति" पृथिव्यादिभूतानां विज्ञानलवसमुदायो विज्ञानधन: पृथिव्यादिविज्ञानांशानां पिण्ड इत्यर्थः, अवधारणं त्वात्मवादिपरिकल्पितस्य भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तस्य ज्ञान-दर्शनादिगुणाश्रयस्यात्मनो निरासार्थम् । भूतेभ्यः पृथिव्यादिभ्यः समुंदितेभ्यो न तु व्यस्तेभ्यः, ज्ञानस्य तत्समुदायपरिणामाङ्गीकारादिति भावः, मद्याङ्गेषु मद्यकारणेषु धातक्यादिषु मदभाव इव; कथंभूतो विज्ञानधनः ? इत्याह-"भूयसमुदउब्भूओ विनाणमेत्तमाय ति" भूतसमुदयादुद्भूतस्तदैव जातो न तु परभवात् कश्चिदायातो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मेत्यर्थः, समुत्थायोत्पद्य ततस्तान्येव पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि विनाशमश्नु वानान्यनुलक्षीकृत्य भूयः पुनरपि स विज्ञानघनो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मा विनश्यति, न त्वात्मवादिनामिवान्यभवं याति । अत एव न प्रेत्यभवे परभवे संज्ञास्ति, यत् पूर्वभवे नारकादिजन्मन्यभिधानमासीत् तत् परभवे नास्ति, यदुत-अमुको नारको देवो वा भूत्वेदानी मनुष्यः संवृत इत्यादि, नारकादेः प्रागेव सर्वनाशं नष्टत्वादिति भावः । किमिह वाक्ये तात्पर्यवृत्त्या प्रोक्तं भवति? इत्याह-"जं भणियमित्यादि " सर्वथात्मनः समुत्पद्य विनष्टत्वाद् न भवादू

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Vada 1 Gañadharavāda
: 61: भवान्तरं कोऽपि यातीत्युक्तं भवति ॥ ४०-४१-४२ (१५८८-१५८९ 8490) 11
D. C.-By these sentences of the Veda are meant those which Gautama had in his mind.
The assemblage of knowledge consists of the united particles of knowledge arising from elements such as earth etc., oowbined together.
The restriction, viz., 'none else but', is here mentioned with a view to exclude a soul according to the Atmavādins (believers in universal soul) is distinct from the collection of elements and which is an abode or substratum of attributes like jõāna (knowledge ) etc.
The sources of spirituous liquors are dhātaki etc.
Gautama believes that the soul has not come from any previous birth, but it has been generated by the elements it has been evolved out of them. So, when these elements perish, the soul, too, perishes; and it is not born once more as the Atmavādins believe. In short, it bas neither any incarnation nor any transmigration. Such being the case, it is not possible to say that such and such a one who was previously a denizen of bell, or a celestial being, is now born as a human being. For, on the termination of a stage as that of a denizen of hell or the like, everything was over-Dothing. was left, not even the soul.
Thus, when the soul altogether arises from-gets evolved out of a collection of elements and completely perishes as soon as these elements perish, there is none who proceeds from one birth to another.
I understand the meaning of these sentences as follows :
गोयम! पयत्यमेवं मनंतो नत्थि मन्नसे जीवं। बकंतरेसु य पुणो भणिओ जीवो जमथि त्ति ॥४॥ (१५९१)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first अग्गिहवणाइकिरियाफलं च तो संसयं कुणसि जीवे। मा कुरु न पयत्थोऽयं इमं पयत्थं निसामेहि ॥४४॥ (१५९२) Goyana ! payatthamdvam mannanto natthi pannase jivan i Vakkantardsu ya puno bhanio jivo jamatthi tti. 43 (1591) Aggihavaņāikiriyāphalam ca to samsayam kuņasi jive, Mã kuru na payattho'yam imam payattham nisāmdhi. 44 (1592) [गौतम ! पदार्थ एवं मन्यमानो नास्ति मन्यसे जीवम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु च पुनर्भणितो जीवो यदस्तीति ॥४३॥ (१५९१) अमिहवनादिक्रियाफलं च ततः संशयं करोषि जीवे ।
मा कुरु न पदार्थोऽयमिमं पदार्थं निशमय ॥४४॥ (१५९२) Gautama i padārtha èvam manyamāno násti manyasd jīvam Vakyantardsu on punar-bhanito jivo yadastiti. 43 (1591) Agni-havanādi kriyāphalam oa tataḥ samśayam karosi jive i Ma kuru na padartho'yamimam padartham nisamaya. (1592)]
Trans.-43-44. Gautama ! While construing the sentences in this way, you believe that there is no soul. And, in other sentences, it is said that there is a soul, and, moreover, there is a fructification of an oblation to fire etc. Consequently, you entertain a doubt about (the existence of ) the soul; but do not do it. This is not the meaning of the sentences. But hear : this is the meaning of the sentences. (1591-1592)
टीका-गौतम । अस्य वाक्यस्य दर्शितरूपमेव पदार्थ मन्यमानस्त्वं 'नास्ति' इत्येवं जीवं मन्यसे । यस्माच पुनः " न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रियाऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यादिषु वेदवाक्यान्तरेषु " अस्ति" इत्येवं जीवो भणितः प्रतिपादितः। तथा " अमिहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादिवचनादमिहवनादिक्रियायाः फलं
पारमविकं श्रूयते । न वेदं मवान्तरयापिनमात्मानमन्तरेणोपपद्यते । अव:

Page #101

Vada ]
Ganadharavada
: 68:
" किं जीवोऽस्ति नास्ति वा ? " इत्येवं संशयं जीवे करोषि त्वम् । तदमुं मा कृथाः, यस्माद् " विज्ञानधन एव०" इत्यादिवाक्यस्य नायमर्थो यं भवानध्यवस्यति, किन्त्वसुं वक्ष्यमाणं पदार्थमिह निशमयाऽऽकर्णयेति ॥ ४३-४४ ( १५९१ - १५९२ ) ॥
D. C.-O Gautama! You interpret this sentence in the way just shown. And hence, you conclude that the soul does not exist. At the same time, you notice that the following sentences of the vèda establishing the existence of the soul:
"Na ha vai saśarìrasya priyā' priyayorapahatirasti, asarirasya vā vasantam priya'priyè na sprśataḥ. "
Moreover from the sentences such as,
Agnihotrm juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ "
It follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering, oblation to fire, etc.,-a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, and this fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul goes in, for another existence or birth.
""
-
These various statements lead you to doubt the existence of the soul. But, there is n no need of entertaining such a doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence, viz., vijñānaghana èva" etc.
"2
The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows : please hear it—
विष्णाणा ओsणपणो विण्णाणघण्णो त्ति सव्वओवावि । स भवइ भूएहिंतो घडविण्णाणाइ भावेण ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३) नाई चिय भूयाई सोऽणुविणस्सह विणस्समाणाइं । अस्थंतरोबओगे कमसो विण्णेय भावेणं ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४)

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:64 Jinabhadra Gari's
[The first Viņņāņāo'nanno viņnanaghanno tti sa xvaðvåvir Sa bhavai bhūdhinto ghaļaviņņāņāi-bhāvèņa. 45 (1593) Tāim ciya bhūyāim so'ņuvinassai viņagsamāņāimi Atthantarovaögè kamaso viņndya-bhāvèņam. 46 (1594) [विज्ञानादनन्यो विज्ञानघन इति सर्वतोव्यापी।
स भवति भूतेभ्यो घटविज्ञानादिभावेन ॥४५॥ (१५९३) तान्येव भूतानि सोऽनु विनश्यति विनश्यमानानि ।
अर्थान्तरोपयोगे क्रमशो विज्ञेयभावेन ॥४६॥ (१५९४) Vijñānādananyo' vijñānaghana iti sarvatovyāpil Sa bhavati bhutebhyo ghatavijānādibhavena. 45 (153) Tānyèva bhūtāni so'nu vinaśyati vinaśyamānāni, Arthāntaropayoge kramaso vijadyabhāvena. 46 (1594)]
Trans.-45-46. The soul (itself) is the assemblage of vijñānas owing to its being non-separate from vijñana, or it is so, on account of its pervasive nature all round. It arises from elements in the form of the vijñāna of a pitcher, etc. When those very elements perish as vijfèya-bhāvas (objects coming within the range of vijñāna) on the attention being gradually directed to another object, it (the soul) subsequently perishes. (1593-1594)
टीका-इह विज्ञानघनो जीव उच्यते । कथम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यतेविशिष्टं ज्ञानं विज्ञानं ज्ञान-दर्शनोपयोग इत्यर्थः, तेन विज्ञानेन सहानन्यभूतत्वादेकतया घनत्वं निविडत्वमापन्नो विज्ञानघनो जीवः, यदि वा “सब्बओवा वि ति" सर्वतः प्रतिप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तविज्ञानपर्यायसङ्घातघटितत्वाद् विज्ञानघनो जीवः। एवकारेण तु विज्ञानधन एवासौ, न तु नैयायिकादीनामिव "स्वरूपेण निर्विज्ञानत्वानडोऽसौ, बुद्धिस्तु तत्र समवेतैव " इति नियम्यते। स भवति-उद्यत इति क्रिया। केभ्यः ? इत्याह-" भूएहितो ति" भूतानीह षट-पटादिशेयवस्तुरूपाण्यभिप्रेतानि, तेभ्यो ज्ञेयभावेन परिणतेभ्यः। केन भवति? इत्याह-"घटोऽयम्" "पटोऽयम" इत्यादिविज्ञानभावेन घटादिज्ञान

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
:08: पर्यायेण । ततः किम् ? इत्याशङ्कय "तान्येवानु विनश्यति" इत्यस्यार्थमाह" ताई चियेत्यादि" तान्येव ज्ञानालम्बनभूतानि घटादिभूतानि क्रमश: कालक्रमेण व्यवधान स्थगना-ऽन्यमनस्कत्वादिनाऽथान्तरोपयोगे सति विटेयभावेन ज्ञानविषयमावेन विनाशमश्नुवानानि, अनु-पश्चात् तद्बोधपर्यायेण, स विज्ञानघनो विनश्यतीति संबन्धः। ज्ञानपर्यायेण घटादिभ्यो शेयभूतेभ्यो जीवः समुत्थाय कालक्रमाद् व्यवधानादिनार्थान्तरोपयोगे सति ज्ञेयभावेन तान्येव विनाशमश्नुवानान्यनु विनश्यतीति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥४५-४६ (१५९३) (१५९४)॥
D. C.-Here the soul is said to be vijñānaghana-an assemblage of vijñāna for either of the two reasons viz , (1) the soul is non-separate from-is identical with vijñāna which is upayoga either of the type of jñāna or that of darsana, and (2) the soul has each and every pradesa (the minutest portion) of it, formed from a collection of infinite modifications of vijñāna.
The word dva used in connection with vijñānaghana shows that the belief of the Naiyāyikas and others conveyed by the following sentence is untenable :
“Svarūpēņa nirvijñānatvaj jado'sau, buddhistu tatra samavetaiva."
This soul is evolved out of the elements which are objeóts fit to be known-the objects like a pitcher, a piece of oloth etc. That is to say, it gets transformed as the knowledge of a pitcher etc., on realizing that this is a pitcher, this is a piece of cloth, etc.
These very elements such as pitcher etc, which hed once served as substratum for knowledge, perish; that is to say, they cease to be objects fit to be known when the attention of the soul is directed towards another object, when these objects are hidden or concealed from sight or when the mind is working in some other channel. Such being the case, the soul cases
9

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:08: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first to know them i. O., ceases to exist as knowledge of these objeots. This is here looked upon as its destruction. The sum and substance is this:--
When the soul comes to know any object, it is said to have been produced from that object; but, when it ceases to think of it and directs its attention somewhere else, it is said to bave perished; for, the object with which it once identified itsell, has perished.
Does the soul perish entirely in this way? The answer is in the negative as suggested in the following verse -
पुष्वावरविण्णाणोवओगओ विगम-संभवसहावो। विण्णाणसंतईए विण्णाणघणोऽयमविणासी ॥४७॥ (१५९५) Puvvăvaravingāgovaögaö vigama-saħbhavasahāvo I Vinnāpasantald vionānaghano'yamavināsi. 47 (1595) [ पूर्वा-ऽपरविज्ञानोपयोगतो विगम-संभवस्वभावः ।
विज्ञानसंतत्या विज्ञानघनोऽयमविनाशी ॥४७॥ (१५९५) Porvā'para-vijñānopayogato vigama-sambhava svabhāvah | Vijfānasantatýā vijñānaghano'yamavinašī, 47 (1595) ]
Trans.--47. This vijfānaghana (the soul) has the nature of destruction and that of origination, on account of the (corresponding ) upayogas being associated with the previous vijfāna and the subsequent one. It is immortal owing to the continuity of vijñāna. (1595)
टीका-एक एवायमात्मा त्रिस्वभावः । कथम् ? इत्युच्यते-अर्थान्तरोपयोगकाले पूर्वविज्ञानोपयोगेन तावदयं विगमस्वभावो विनश्वररूपः, अपरविज्ञानोपयोगस्तु संभवस्वभाव उत्पादस्वरूपः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तसामान्यविज्ञानमात्रसंतत्या पुनरयं विज्ञानघनो जीवोऽविनष्ट एवावतिष्ठते । एवमन्यदपि सर्व वस्तूत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावमेवावगन्तव्यम्, न पुनः किमपि सर्वधोत्पद्यते, विनश्यति चेति ॥ ४७ (१५९५)॥

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Vadik ]
Gaṇadha avada
: 67:
D. C.-This very soul, though one, has a three-fold nature. When it is attentive to another object, it has died; for, at that time, its attention to the former object is gone, but it has originated so far as the attention to this new object is concerned. Side by side with its twofold nature pertaining to destruction and origination, it has permanence owing to the continuity of the general vijñāna existing from the beginning-less time. Similarly, every object has a three-fold nature consisting of utpāda (origination ), vyaya ( destruction ) and dhrauvya (permanence), and that there is nothing which is created in all respects, and that there is nothing which entirely perishes.
न व पेचनाणसण्णावतिट्ठए संपओवओगाओ । विष्णाणघणाभिक्खो जीवोऽयं वेयपयाभिहिओ ॥४८॥ (१५९६)
Na ca peccanāṇasaņṇāvatiṭṭhaè sampaövaogāö | Vigņānaghanābhikkho jivo 'yam Vayapayābhihi8 48 ( 1596)
[ न च प्रेत्यज्ञानसंज्ञाऽवतिष्ठते सांप्रतोपयोगात् ।
विज्ञानघनाभिख्यो जीषोऽयं वेदपदाभिहितः ।। ४८ ।। (१५९६ ) Na ca prètyajnāna sanjnā'vatiṣṭhate sampratopayogāt Vijnāns-ghanābhikhyo jivo 'yam Vedapadābhihitah. 48 (1596) ]
Trans.-48. The designation pertaining to former knowledge does not exist owing to the upayoga being directed to (a) present object. This soul is named vijñānaghana as said in the sentences of the Vèda. (1596)
टीका-नच प्रेत्येति न चान्यवस्तूपयोगकाले प्राक्तनी ज्ञानसंज्ञास्ति । कुतः १ सांप्रतवस्तुविषयोपयोगात् । इदमुक्तं भवति यदा घटोपयोगनिवृत्तौ पटोपयोग उत्पद्यते, तदा घटोपयोगसंज्ञा नास्ति, तदुपयोगस्य निवृत्तत्वात्; किन्तु पटोपॅयोगसंज्ञैवास्ति तदुपयोगस्यैव तदानीमुत्पन्नत्वात् । तस्माद् विज्ञानधनाभिख्यो वेदपदेष्वभिहितोऽयं जीवः । ततो गौतम ! प्रतिपद्यस्वैनमिति ॥ ४८ (१५९६) ।।

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: 68:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first D. C.-When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, e.g., from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as ghatopayoga (attention to & pitoher ), but acquires a new designation viz., patopayoga (attention to a piece of cloth). Such being the case, this soul is named as vijñānaghana in the Voda. Therefore, Gautama ! admit that the soul exists.
एवं पि भूयधम्मो नाणं तब्भावभावओ बुद्धी। तं नो तदभावम्मि वि जं नाणं वेयसमयम्मि ।।४९।। (१५९७) अत्थमिए आइचे चंदे संतासु अग्गि-वायासु। किंजोहरयं पुरिसो अप्पनोइ त्ति निहिहो ॥५०॥ (१५९८) Evam pi bhūyadhammo nāņam tabbhāvabhavaö buddhi i Tam no tadabhavammi vi jam nānam Vayasamayammi. 49 (1597) Atthamie āicce candè santāsu aggi-vāyāsu | Kimjoirayam puriso appajjoi tti niddittho, 50 (1598)
[ एवमपि भूतधर्मो ज्ञानं तद्भावभावतो बुद्धिः।
तद् न तदभावेऽपि यज्ज्ञानं वेदसमये ॥४९॥ (१५९७) अस्तमित आदित्य चन्द्रे शान्तयोरग्नि-वाचोः। किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष आत्मज्योतिरिति निर्दिष्टः ॥५०॥ (१५९८) Evamapi bhūtadharmo jnānam tadbhāvabbāvato buddhiḥ, Tad na tadabhavd'pi yajjnānam Vedasamaye. 49 (1597) Astamita ādityè candrè śāntayor-agni-vāvoh Kimjyotirayam purusa atmajyotiriti nirdistah. 50 (1598)]
Tránş.--49-50. You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the dharma of elements owing to its existing when they exist, (and that it does not exist when there is their non-existence ). This is not proper; for, even

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Vida] Gahadharavada
:69: when they are non-existent, knowledge is said to exist as in the following doctrine of the Veda :--
___ What jyotis ( light) has this man when the Sun has set, the Moon has set, and when (even) fire and speech are quiet? It is said : that is the light of the soul. ( 1597-1598)
___टीका-" बुद्धी" ति स्याद् बुद्धिः प्रेरकस्य-एवमपि-" स भवइ भएहिंतो" इत्यादिना युष्मद्वयाख्यानप्रकारेणापीत्यर्थः, पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्म एव ज्ञान-भूतस्वभावात्मकमेव ज्ञानमिति भावः । कुतः ? इत्याह-" तन्मावभावउ ति" " एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति"-इति वचनाद् भूतसद्भावे ज्ञानस्य भावात् , तदभावे चाभावादित्यर्थः, यस्य व भाव एव यद् भवति, अभावे च न भवति तत् तस्यैव धर्मः, यथा चन्द्रमसथन्द्रिका, तथा च ज्ञानमनुविदधाति भूतान्वय-व्यतिरेको, तस्मात् तत् भृतधर्म एव । तदयुक्तम् , विशिष्टमेव हि नील-पीतादिभूतग्राहकं ज्ञानं तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकावनुविदधाति न तु सामान्य ज्ञानमात्रम् , यस्माद् भूताभावेऽपि वेदलक्षणे समये सिद्धान्ते " सामान्यज्ञानं भणितमेव " इति शेषः । केन वाक्येन? इत्याह-"अत्थमिए इत्यादि" अस्तमिते आदित्ये, याज्ञवल्कया, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽनौ, शान्तायां वाचि, किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुषः, आत्मज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच, ज्योतिरिति ज्ञानमाह । आदित्यास्तमयादौ कि ज्योतिः ? इत्याह-"अयं पुरुष इति", पुरुष आत्मेत्यर्थः। अर्य च कथंभूतः १ इत्याह-"अप्पज्जोइ ति" आत्मैव ज्योतिरस्य सोऽयमात्मज्योतिर्धानात्मक इति हृदयम् , निर्दिष्टो वेदविद्भिः कथितः, ततो न ज्ञानं भूतधर्म इति स्थितम् ॥ ४९-५० (१५९७-१५९८)॥
D. C.-Gautama may think as under :
Even in this way the way in which is interpreted the second hemistich of verse 1599 beginning with “sa bhavai bhūèhinto", it gets proved that knowledge is the dharma of elements such as earth etc. For, knowledge exists when the elements exist. This is what follows from “dtebhyo bhūtəbhyah samutthāya tanyèvānu vinaśyati.” Furthermore, in the absence of the elements, knowledge does not exist.

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:70: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first That which exists only when another exists and which is nou-existent when that another is non-existent, is the dharma of that another e. g., the noon-light of the moon. Knowledge is associated with elements both by anyaya and vyatireka. Con. sequently it is the dharma of elements. This thought is unjustifiable; for, only a particular type of knowledge which hus for its object, the elements, blue, yellow etc, is associated with these elements by anvaya and vyatirèka and not the entire knowledge in general. For, even when the elements are absent, the Voda declares that ordinary knowledge exists. This is what we learn from Yājnavalkya who says " Astamita adityè, condramasyastamitè, śānte'gnau, śantāyām vāci, kim Jyotir avāyam puruşa ātmajyotiḥ samraç iti novāca." Herein the soul having a flade in the form of knowledge, is alluded to. Hence, it follows that knowledge is not the dharma of elements.
The reason is as under :
तदभावे भावाओ भावे चाभावओ न तद्धम्मो । जह घडभावाभावे विवजयाओ पडो भिन्नो ॥५१॥ (१५९९) Tadabhāvè bhāvāö blāvà cābhāvao na taddhammo I Jaha ghadabhāvābhāvè vivajjayāð paço bhinno. 51 (1599) [ तदभावे भावाद् भावे चाभावतो न तद्धर्मः । यथा घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात् पटो भिन्नः ॥५१॥ (१५९९)
Tadabhāvè bhāvād bhavè cābhāvato na taddharmaḥ | Yathā ghatabhāvābhāvè viparyayat pato bhinnaḥ. 51 (1599) ]
Trans.--51. One that exists when another does not exist and does not exist when that anolher exists, is not its dharma.

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:11:
Vada ]
Gagadharavāda For instance, a piece of cloth is different (from a pitcher) owing to its viparyaya regarding the existence and non-existence of the pitcher. (1599)
टीका-न भूतधर्मो ज्ञानम् , मुक्त्यवस्थायां भूताभावेऽपि भावात् , मृतशरीरादौ तद्भावेऽपि चाभावात् , यथा घटस्य धर्मः पटो न भवति, किन्तु तस्मात् भिन्न एव । कुतः ? इत्याह-घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात्-घटभावेऽप्यभावात् तदभावेऽपि च भावादित्यर्थः ॥५१ (१५९९) ॥
D. C.--Just as a piece of cloth is not the dharma of a pitcher, but is different from it, for even when a pitcher exists, a piece of cloth does not exist, and that even when that pitcher is non-existent, the piece of cloth exists, so, knowledge is not the dharma of elements; for, in the liberated state, it exists, even though the elements are present in a dead body etc.
Having explained the meaning of some of the sentences of the Veda, the author while concluding the subject, explains briefly the meaning of the remaining sentences of the Voda. एसि घेयपयाणं न तमत्थं वियसि अहव सम्वसि। अत्यो किं होज सुई विण्णाणं वत्थुमेओ वा ॥५२॥ (१६००) जाई दव्वं किरिया गुणोऽहवा संसओ तवाजुत्तो। अयमेवेति न वायं न वत्थुधम्मो जो जुत्तो ॥५३॥.(१६०१) सव्वं चिय सव्वमयं स-परपज्जायओ जओ निययं । सव्वमसव्वमयं पि य विवित्तरूपं विवक्खाओ॥५४॥ (१६०२) सामण्ण-दिसेसमओ तेण पयत्यो विवक्खया जुत्तो। वत्थुस्स विस्सरूवो पजायावेक्खया सव्वो ॥५५॥ (१६०३)

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:78: Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The first Esim Vèyapayāņam ng tamattham viyasi ahava savvësimi Attho kim hojja sui viņņāņam vatthubhèö vå. 52 (1600) Jāi davvam kiriyā guņo'havā samsaö tavājutto 1 Ayamèvèti na vāyam na vatthudhammo jaö jutto. 53 (1601) Savvam ciya savvamayam sa-parapajjāyað jað niyayam Savvamasavvamayanm pi ya vivittarāpam vivakkhas. 54 (1602)
Sāmaņņa-visèsamaö tèna payattho vivakkhayi jutto Vatthussa vissarūvo pajjāyāvèkkbaya savv, 55 (1603) [ एषां वदपदानां न त्वमर्थ वेरिस, अथवा सर्वेषाम् ।
अर्थः किं भवेत् श्रुतिर्विज्ञानं वस्तुभेदो वा ॥५२॥ (१६००) जातिव्यं क्रिया गुणोऽथवा संशयस्तवायुक्तः । अयमेवेति न वायं न वस्तुधर्मो यतो युक्तः ॥५३॥ (१६०१) सर्वमेव सर्वमयं स्व-परपर्यायतो यतो नियतम् । सर्वमसर्वमयमपि च विविक्तरूपं विवक्षया ॥५४॥ (१६०२) सामान्य-विशेषमयस्तेन पदार्थो विवक्षया युक्तः।
वस्तुनो विश्वरूपः पर्यायापेक्षया सर्वः ॥५५॥ (१६०३) Eşām Vadapadánāw na tyamarthan vetsi athavā sarvèşām Arthah kim bhavet brutir-vijnanam vastubhedo vā. 52 (1600) Jātir-dravyam kriya guno'thavă samsayas tavāyuktaḥ 1 Ayamèvèti navāyam na vastud harmo yato yuktah. 53 (1601) Sarvamdva sarvamayam sva-para paryāyato yato niyatam | Sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarūpam vivakṣayā. (1602) Sāmānya-viśdşamayastèna padārtho vivakşayā yuktah | Vastuno visvarupah paryayapeksayā sarvah. 55 (1603)]
Trans.--52-55. You do not know the (meaning) of these sentences of the Veda or that of all. (Hence you have a doubt.) What is the meaning after all ? Is it śruti, knowledge,

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Vide]
Ganadheravada difference in (i.e., speciality of) an object, a genus, a subs. tance, an action, or an attribute ? Your doubt is ill-based; for, it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the dharma of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For, each and every thing ( sarva) is certainly all things ( sarvamaya ) from the stand-point of its own modifications and those of the rest, and that sarva is a-sarvamaya too, from the stand-point of separateness. Therefore, it is proper (to believe ) that a substance has a generality and speciality, according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varied from the view-point of its modifications. (1600-1603)
टीका-तम्मादेषां पूर्वोक्तानां वेदपदानां यथा मया व्याख्यातोऽथस्तथा त्वं न वेत्सि, तेन जीवे संशयं करोषि । अथवा, सर्वेषामप्यशेषवेदपदानामथं त्वं न जानासि, यस्मात् सर्वेष्वपि वेदपदेषु विषये तवैवंभूतः संशयोऽस्तीति संबन्धः । कथंभूत ? इत्याह-" अत्थो किं होज सुईत्यादि," किमेतेषां वेदपदानामर्थः श्रुतिः शब्दो भवेत् , यथा मेरी-पटह-ढकादीनां भन्दस्य शब्द एवार्थः ?; अथवा यद् घटादिशब्दे समुच्चारिते तदभिधेयार्थविषयं विज्ञानं भवद् दृश्यते, तत् तेषामर्थः ?; किंवा घर्टशब्दे समुत्कीर्तिते "पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवान् घटलक्षणोऽर्थोऽनेनोक्तः, न तु पटादिः" इत्येवं यो वस्तुभेदः प्रतीयते स एषामर्थ ?; यदिवा, किं जातिरमीलामर्थः, यथा गोशब्दे समुच्चारिते गोजातिरवसीयते ?; यदिवा, किं द्रव्यमेषामर्थः, यथा दण्डीत्यादिषु दण्डादिमद् द्रव्यम् ?; किंवा धावतीत्यादीनामिव धावनादिक्रियाऽमीषामर्थः; अथवा किं शुक्लादीनामिव शुक्लादिगुण एतेषामर्थः ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तवायुक्तः, यस्मात् " अयमेव, नैव वाऽयम्" इत्येवं कस्यापि वस्तुनो धर्मोऽवधारयितुं न युक्तः। शब्दोऽपि वस्तुविशेष एव, ततः "एवंभूतस्यैवार्थस्यायमभिधायकः, नैव वेत्थंभूतस्यार्थस्यायं प्रतिपादकः" इत्येवमेतद्धर्मस्याप्यवधारणमयुक्तमेव । कुतः १ इत्याह-" सव्वं चियेत्यादि" यस्मात् सर्वमपि वाच्यवाचकादिकं वस्तु नियतं निश्चितं स्व-परपर्यायः सर्वात्मकमेव सामान्यविवक्षयेत्यर्थः । तथा, सर्वमसर्वमयमप्यस्ति विविक्तरूपं सर्वतो व्यावृत्तम् । कया? इत्याह-विवक्षया, कैवलस्वपर्यायापेक्षयेत्यर्थः, 10

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74: Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first विशेषविषययेति तात्पर्यार्थः । तस्मात् सर्वेषामपि पदानां विवक्षावशतः सामान्यमयो विशेषमयश्च पदार्थों युक्तः, न पुनरेकान्तेनेत्थंभूत एव, अनित्थंभूत एव वेति । कुतः ? इत्याह-"वत्थुस्सेत्यादि" यस्मात् सर्वोऽपि वाच्यस्य वाचकस्य वा वस्तुनः स्वभावः पर्यायापेक्षया विश्वरूपो नानाविधो वर्तते । ततश्च सामान्यविवक्षया घटशब्दः सर्वात्मकत्वात् सर्वेषामपि द्रव्य-गुणक्रियाद्यर्थानां वाचकः, विशेषविवक्षया तु प्रतिचियतरूपत्वाद् य एवास्येह पृथुबुनोदराद्याकारवानर्थो वाच्यतया रूढस्तस्यैव वाचकः। एवमन्योऽपि शब्दो विशेषविवक्षया या यत्र देशादौ यस्यार्थस्य वाचकतया रूढः स तस्य वाचको द्रष्टव्यः। सामान्यविवक्षया तु "सर्वः सर्वस्य वाचकः, सर्व च सर्वस्य वाच्यम्” इत्यनया दिशा सकलं स्वधिया भावनियमिति ।
तदेवं तेन त्रिजगत्स्वरूपवेदिना भगवता श्रीमन्महावीरेण निःशेषपरप्रबोधनोपायकुशलतया तीक्ष्णपरशुनेव निपुणयुक्तिप्रबन्धेन गुपिलवल्लीवितान इव मूलाच्छिनः समस्तोऽपि तस्य तत्समासमपरमकल्याणस्येन्द्रभूतेः संशयः ॥ ५२-५५ (१६००-१६०१-१६०२-१६०३)॥
D. C.-Gautama l you have not followed my exposition of these padas ( sentences). of the Veda. Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul. Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, of the replaining sentences of the Veda.
Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the Veda 1. Just as sabda is the meaning of the sabda (sound) of a
kettle-drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc , 80, is the meaning
of these sentences śruti, i e., śabda ? 2. Is it vijñāna-the vijana which arises and which is asso
ciated with the object connoted by it when the word like
ghata is pronounced ? 8. Do the padas of the Veda mean vastu-bheda of the type
noticed when the word ghata is pronounced; the type, viz., that this connotes en object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, eto , and not a piece of cloth ?

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:75 : Is their meaning jäti-the jāti (genus) of the kind one realizes when the word go (wow) w uttered ? Just as when the word daņdin is pronounced we take it to be a dravya having a dança, etc., similarly, does the meaning of the sentences of the Veda connote such a dravya ? In the words dhāvati (rung ), etc., we take them to mean the kriyā (act) of running, eto, 80 do these sentences mean
any such kriyā ? 7. Just as the word. sukla (white ) means the guna (attribute)
of being white, so do these sentences convey & meaning of the type of this guna ?
These seven queries of yours are out of place--are useless. For, it is not possible to say regarding any vastu ( substance or material) that this is only this and nothing else. Sabda, too, is certainly a kind of vastu, so it is not proper to say that it connotes only this meaning and none else. The reasons are :
Every vastu whether in the form of a vācya ( direct expression) or a vācaka (indicatory word) is sarvamaya (represent ing all objects ) from the stand-point of sāmānya (generality) when all the paryāyas ( modifications ) including its own paryāyas and those of the rest are taken into account. Whereas, every vastu is a-sarvamaya when examined from the stand-point of its own paryayas which lays stress upon višeşa.
Cansequently, all the sentences either convey a general sense or a particular one, according to the stand-point we take. Hence, it is no use saying that they mean only this and nothing else, for, the nature of every vastu whether it is a vācya or väcaka varies according to the stand-points from which they are viewed.
Thus, from ihe general stand point, the word gnata is the vācaka of dravya, supa, kriyā, eto., since it is then sarvamaya.

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: 76: Jinabhadra Gaại's
( The first But, when examined from a special stand-point, it is a vācaka, of only the conventional meaning, viz., that it has an expansive bottom, a wide belly, eto., for, this stand-point makes it definite.
Similarly, any other word is a vacaka of only that artha which is rudha in that country, etc., when we examine it from the special stand-point.
But from the general stand-point, each and every word is a vācaka of one and all, and each and every word is a vācya of one and all. “This is the line one should sensibly follow.
Thus, śramana Bhagavān Mahavira wha knew the nature of all the three worlds, completely removed the doubts of Indrabhūti who was about to acquire the most excellent merit by advancing clever arguments capable of fully instructing others as is the case with a sharp hatchet which eradicates a cluster of creepers. छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥५६॥ (१६०४) Chinnammi sasayammi Jiņèņa jara-maraṇa vippamukkėņami So samaņo pavvaið papoahim saha khandiyasadhim. 56 (1604)
[ Poet hih fotata Fri-penanganat
स श्रमणः प्रबजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ।।५६।। (१६०४) Chinnd samsayè Jindnå jarā-maraņa vipramuktèna Sa śranaṇaḥ prayrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khanţikaśataiņ. 56 (1604)]
Trans.-56. When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Indra. bhūti took #Diksā along with his five hundred pupils.
टीका-सुवोधा, नवरं श्राम्यतीति श्रमणः सबसौ पापाद् ब्रजितः प्रवनितो भागवतीं दीक्षां प्रतिपक्ष इत्यर्थः। 'संयतः संयतो भवति नायकः।

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Vada ]
इति निश्चयनयमताश्रयणाच्चेत्थमुक्तमितीह भावार्थः । खण्डिकास्तच्छात्रा इति ॥ ५६ (१६०४) ॥
Gaṇadharavāda
D. C.-That one who is a samyata becomes one who is not so, is a statement here made from cendental point of view. The rest is easy.
SO
and not
the trans
एवं कम्माईसु वि जं सामण्णं तयं समाउज्जं ।
जो पुण जत्थ विसेसो समासओ तं पवक्खामि ||२७|| (१६०५)
Evam kammalsu vi jam sāmaṇņam tayam samāujjam i Jo puna jattha visèso samāsaö tam pavakkhāmi. 57 (1605)
: 77:
[ एवं कर्मादिष्वपि यत् सामान्यं तत् समायोज्यम् ।
यः पुनर्यत्र विशेषः समासतस्तं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥ ५७ ॥ (१६०५) Evam karmadiṣvapi yat sāmanyam tat sanāyojyam | Yah punar-yatra viśesaa samāsatastam pravaksyāmi 57 (1605) ]

Trans.-- 57. Thus, what is applicable to karman, etc., (the Vādas of the remaining Gaṇadharas) should be applied ( there ). And I shall briefly expound there, that which is a speciality (of it ) ( 1605 ).
टीका - एवं यदिहात्मवादप्रक्रमे प्रत्यक्षा- अनुमाना -ऽऽगमप्रमाणवक्तव्यतादिकं वक्ष्यमाणकर्मादिवादस्थानकैः किमपि तुल्यं तत् स्वधिया तत्र तत्रायोजनीयम् । यस्तु यत्र वादस्थानके विशेषस्तं तत्र संक्षेपतः स्वयमेव वक्ष्यामि || इतेि सप्तपञ्चाशद्भाथार्थः ॥ ५७ (१६०५) ।।

D. C.—Here, while establishing the existence of the soul, several points have been discussed. Out of them, those that are applicable to the other discussions which are to follow, may be applied there by the reader himself. So, I shall, now, briefly discuss in the remaining vādas (discussions) only such points as happen to be their specialities.
End of the Discussion with the First Gaṇadhara.

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Chapter II
द्वितीयगणधरवक्तव्यता Discussion with the Second Gañadhara.
तं पव्वइ सोउं बीओ आगच्छइ अमरिसेणं । वचामि माणेमी पराजिणित्ता ण तं समणं ॥५८॥ (१६०६) Tam pavvaiam söum bío āgacchai amarisdņam | Vaccāmi namāņemi parājiņittā na tam samaņam, 58 (1606)
[तं प्रबंजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीय आगच्छत्यमर्षेण ।
व्रजाम्यानयामि पराजित्य तं श्रमणम् ॥५८॥ (१६०६) Tam pravrajitam śrutvā dvitiya āgacchatyamarsdņa i Vrajānıyanayāni parajitya tam śramanam. 58 (1606)]
Trans.-58. Having heard that he ( Indrabhuti) had renounced the world, the second ( Gañadhara ) comes exaspe. rated. (He thinks ):-I may go and having vanquished that saint, I may being ( Indrabhūti ) back. ( 1606 )
टीका-तमिन्द्रभूति प्रबजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीयोऽग्निभूतिनामा तत्सोदर्यबन्धुरत्रान्तरेऽमर्षेणाकुलितचेताः समागच्छति भगवत्समीपम् । केनाभिप्रायेण ? इत्याह-व्रजामि। "ण" इति वाक्यालङ्ककारे। आनयामि निजभ्रावरमिन्द्रभूति " ततः" इति गम्यते । 'ण' इत्ययमपि वाक्या. लहारे । तं श्रमणमिन्द्रजालिकं कमपि पराजित्येति ॥ ५८ (१६०६)॥

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Vida ) Ganadharavada
:79 D.C.-On having heard that Indrabhati had taken dtksa, Agnibhūti, his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to Śramana Bhagavān Mahāvira with the object of defeating him and taking Indrabhūti back.
Agnibhūti thoughtछलिओ छलाइणा सो मण्णे माइंदजालिओ वा वि। को जाणइ कह वत्तं एत्ताहे वट्टमाणी से ।। ५९ ।। (१६०७) Chalio chalāiņā so maņņd māindajālio vā vi i Ko janai kaha vattam dttāha vattamānt sd. 59 (1607)
[छलितश्छलादिना स मन्ये मायेन्द्रजालिको वापि ।
को जानाति कथं वृत्तमेतस्माद् वर्तमाना तस्य ॥ ५९॥ (१६०७) Chalitaśchalādinā sa manye māyèndrajāliko vāpi 1 Ko janati katham vrittamdtasmād vartamānā tasya. 59 (1607)]
Trans.-59. I think, he has been cheated by artful fraud, etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit. Who knows as to what happened there ? Consequently, (the world will see ) what will happen in his case. (1607)
टीका-दुर्जयस्त्रिभुवनस्यापि मद्मातेन्द्रभूतिः, केवलमहमिदं मन्ये - छलादिना छलितोऽसौ तेन धूर्तेन-च्छल-जाति-निग्रहस्थान-ग्रहणनिपुणेन नेन केनापि दुष्टेन भ्रमितो मद्वन्धुरित्यर्थः। अथवा, मायेन्द्रजालिक: कोऽपि निश्चितमसौ, येन तस्यापि जगद्गुरोर्मभ्रातुभ्रमितं चेतः। तस्मात् किं बहुना? को जानाति तद्वादस्थानकं तयोस्तत्र कथमपि वृत्तम् , मत्परोक्षत्वात् । इत ऊध्वं पुनर्मयि तत्र गते तस्य तदिन्द्रजालव्यतिकरभ्रमितमानसखचर-नरा-ऽमरवातवन्दनमात्रबृंहिचेतसः, श्रमणकस्य " वट्टमाणी त्ति” या काचिद् वार्ता वर्तनी वा भविष्यति तो द्रक्ष्यत्ययं समग्रोऽपिलोक इति ॥५९ (१६०७)।
D. C.-My brother Indrabhūti cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds, 80, I think he has been deceived by

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:80:
Jinabhadra Gant's
[The second
the rogue Mahavira, who must be an expert in using chala (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning) fāti (an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker) and nigraha sthāna (fallacy) etc. Or this Mahavira must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his (Indrabhūti's) mind. So what more? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and Mahavira there? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint Mahavira is concerned--Mahāvira who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of khccaras (demi-gods), human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery.
While going there, Agnibhuti said,
सो पक्खंतरमेगं पि जाइ जइ मे तओ मि तस्सेव । सीसत्तं होज्ज गओ वोत्तं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८)
So pakkhantaramègam pi jāi jai mè taö mi tassèva | Sisattam hojja gaö vottum patto Jiņasagasè. 60 (1608)
[ स पक्षान्तरमेकमपि याति यदि मे ततस्तस्यैव ।
शिष्यत्वं भवेयं गत उक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८) Sa pakṣāntaramèkamapi yāti yadi mè tatastasyaiva | Sisyatvam bhavèyam gata uktvā prāpto Jinasakāśd. 60. (1608)]
Trans. 60. If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of pakṣas (premises), I shall become a pupil of his Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of Tirthankara Mahavira. (1608)
टीका- को जानाति तावदिन्द्रभूतिस्तेन कथमपि तत्र निर्जितः १ । मम पुनरप्येकमपि पक्षान्तरं प्रक्षविशेषं स यदि यात्यवबुध्यते – मद्विहितस्य

Page #119

Vada] Ganadheravada
:11 सहेतू-दाहरणस्य पक्षविशेषस्य स यदुसरमदानेन कथमपि पारं गच्छतीति हृदयम् , ततो "मि' इति वाक्यालङ्ककारे, तस्यैव श्रमणस्य शिष्यत्वेन गतोऽहं भवेयम् इति निश्चयः। तत इत्यादि वाग्गजिं कृत्वा जिनस्य श्रीमन्महावीरस्यान्तिकं प्राप्त इति ॥६० (१६०८)॥
D. C.-Who knows how Indrabhūti was defeated by him ? If however, be gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my paksas (premises ) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so, he went to śramana Bhagavān Mahavira.
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केण । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥६१ ॥ (१६०९) Abhattho ya Jiņèņam jāi-jarā-maraṇa vippamukkdņa Nāmèņa ya gottèņa ya savvaņņū savvadarisī ņam. 61 (1609) [आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९) Abhāsitasca Jinena jati-jara-rnarana-vipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina. 61 (1609)]
___ Trans.-61. He was addressed by his name and gotra ( lineage) by the Tirihankara who was free from birth, old age, and death; who was all-knowing, and who had complete darsana (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1609)
टीका-आभाषितश्च संलप्तश्च जाति-जरा--मरणदिप्रमुक्तेन सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना च जिनेन । कथम् ?-नाम्ना च-हे अग्निभूते ! गोत्रेण च-हे गौतमसगोत्र ! इति । इत्थं च नाम-गोत्राभ्यां संलप्तस्य तस्य चिन्ताऽभूत्अहो ! नामापि मम विजानाति, अथवा, जगत्प्रसिद्धोऽहम्, कः किल मां न वेत्ति ? । यदि हि मे हृद्तं संशयं ज्ञास्यति, अपनेष्यति वा, तदा भवेद् मम विस्मयः॥ ६१ (१६०९)॥
D. C.-The omniscient Tirthankara addressed the second Oanadhara by name as Agnibhūti and as one having Gautams,
11

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: 82:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
as lineage. When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under:
I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that Mahavira should be knowing my name and lineage. It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if Mahavira comes to know about my doubt or removes it.
When he was thinking so, Śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvira said, किं मने अस्थि कम्मं उयाहु नत्थि त्ति संसयो तुझं । वेrपयाण य अत्थं न याणसि तेसिमो अत्थो ||६२|| (१६१०)
Kim mannè atthi kammam uyāhu natthi tti samsayo tujjham | Vayapayāna ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho. 62 ( 1610) [ किं मन्यसेऽस्ति कर्म उताहो नास्तीति संशयस्तव । वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ६२ ॥ (१६१०)
Kim manуase'sti karma utaho nāstīti saṁśayastava | Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi tosāmayamarthah. 62 ( 1610 ) ]
Trans. – 62. You think whether a Karman exists or not. This is your doubt. You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Veda. Their meaning is this. ( 1610) टीका - हे अभिभूते ! गौतम ! त्वमेतद् मन्यसे चिन्तयसि यदुतक्रियते मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुसमन्वितेन जीवेनेति कर्म ज्ञानावरणादिकम् तत् किमस्ति नास्ति वा ? इति । नन्वयमनुचितस्तव संशयः । अयं हि भवतो विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो वर्तते, तेषां च वेदपदानां त्वमर्थ न जानासि तेन संशयं करोषि । तेषां च वेदपदानामयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थः इति ।। ६२ (१६१०)।
•
"
D. C. 0 Agnibhuti of Ligutama lineage. You have a doubt as to whether the Karman which is being done by the soul under the influence of Mithyatva (False Belief), etc., and which is of the type of Jñānāvaraņa (knowledge-obscuring ), etc., exists or not. This doubt of yours is based on your_unrealization of the exact significance of the sentences of the Veda. This significance is what will be just expounded.

9

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:88: कम्मे तुह संदेहो मन्नसि तं नाणगोयराईयं । तुह तमणुमाणसाहणमणुभूइमयं फलं जस्स ॥६३॥ (१६११) Kammd tuha sanddho mannasi tam nāņagoyarălyam 1 Tuba tamaņumāņa sahaņamaņubhūimayam phalam jassa. 63 (1611) [कर्मणि तव संदेहो मन्यसे तज्ज्ञानगोचरातीतम् ।
तव तदनुमानसाधनमनुभूतिमयं फलं यस्य ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११) Karmaņi tava sandėho manyasd tajjõānagocarātītam | Tava tadanumāna-sādhanamanubhūtimayam phalam tasya. 63 (1611)]
__ Trans.---63. You have a doubt about (the existence of ) the Karman. You think it to be heyond the range of khowledge. That (Karman) of which experience is the fruit, is provable (to you) by means of anuinana. (1611)
टीका-हे आयुष्मननिभूते ! ज्ञानावरणादिपरमाणुसंघातरूपे कर्मणि तव संदेहः, यतः प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमानादिसमस्तप्रमाणात्मकज्ञानगोचरा तीतमेव तत् त्वं मन्यसे, तथा हि-न तावत् प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् , खरविषाणवत् , इत्यादि प्रमाणविषयातीतत्वं प्राग्वजीवस्येव कर्मणोऽपि समानप्रायत्वाद् भावनीयमिति। तदेतत् सौम्य ! मा मन्थास्त्वम्, यतो मम तावत् प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, तवाप्यनुमानं साधनं यस्य , तदनुमानसाधनं वर्तते तत् कर्म, न पुनः सर्वप्रमाणगोचरातीतम् । यस्य, किम् ? इत्याह-"अणुभूइमयं फलं जस्स त्ति" सुख-दुःखानामनुभूतिरनुभवनं तन्मयं तदात्मकं फलं यस्य शुभा-ऽशुभकर्मण इति । अनेन चेदनुमानं सूचितम्-अस्ति सुख-दुःखानुभवस्य हेतुः, कार्यत्वात् , अङ्कुरस्यैवेति ।
अथ यदि भवतः प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, तर्हि मयापि तत्प्रत्यक्षं कस्माद् न भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । न हि यदेकस्य कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षं तेनापरस्यापि प्रत्यक्षेण भवितव्यम् । न हि सिंह-सरभ-हंसादयः सर्वस्यापि लोकस्य प्रत्यक्षाः, न च ते न सन्ति बालादीनामपि तत्सर्वस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति कर्म, सर्वज्ञत्वेन मया प्रत्यक्षीकतत्वात् , भवरसंशयविज्ञानवदिति।

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second aq:atq4-aft TAFAIERITE "Te gagy Aral जेणाह सव्वंसंसपच्छेई, पुच्छसु व जं न याणासि" इत्यादिना प्रागेव प्रतिविहितत्वात् । कार्यप्रत्यक्षतया भवतोऽपि च प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, यथा घटादिकार्यप्रत्यक्षतया परमाणव इति ॥६३ (१६११)॥
D. C.-0 long-lived Agnibhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the Karman, which is a multitude of paramāņus, in the form of jõānāvaraña, etc.; for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the pramānas such as pratyakşa, anumāna, ete, the pramāņas which are knowledge. To be explioit, you argue as unler :
Karman is not directly perceived, because it is supersensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass.
Other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother in the case of the soul.
But these lines of arguments are faulty. For, this Karman is certainly pratyaksa to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramāņa can establish its existence. The Karman is either good or bad. The good Karman makes us experience happiness, whereas, the bad Karmar bringa misery.
This loads to an inference as under :
There is a cause for experieroing happiness and misery since it is a Kārya ( an aot) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the Karman is pratyaksa to mo ( i. e. Mahāvira) it should be so to you. For, there is np. sheb rule that what is pratyakşa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, a śarabha ( a fabulous eightlegged animal-a match for lions and elephants ), a swan, etc., are not pratyakşa to one and all the beings. But, on that Account, it is not that they do not exist, for even children know them. Therefore, there doos exist the Karman, sings

Page #123

Vida] Gaņadharavāda
:85: it is pratyaksa to me, an omniscient being, just as, your doubt is pratyakşa to me. If you doubt my omniscience, I may repeat what I said to your elder brother, viz.,
“ Kuha savvaņņu tti mat jèņāham savva-samsayacchet, pucchasu va jam na yanasi" (verse 1579).
Moreover, this Karman is pratyakşa to you too, since you realize its Karya (effect), as is the case with paramāņus, which though not directly realizable to you, are pratyakşa to you, since their Karyas like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived by you. अस्थि सुह-दुक्खहेऊ कजाओ बीयमंकुरस्सेव । सो विट्ठो चेव मई वभिचाराओ न तं जुत्तं । ६४ ॥ (१६१२) जो तुलसाहणाणं फले विसेसो न सो विणा हे। कज्जत्तणओ गोयम ! घडो व्व, हेऊ य सो कम्मं ॥६५।। (१६१३) Atthi suba-dukkhahdū kajjāö bīyamankursssèva 1 So dittho ceva mai vabhicārăö na tam juttam. 64 (1612) Jo tullasābananam phald visèso na so viņā hèum Kajjattanai Goyamal ghado vva, he ya so kammans. 65 (1613) [ अस्ति सुखदुःखहेतुः कार्यत्वात् वीजमङ्करस्येव ।
स दृष्ट एव भतिव्यभिचाराद् न तद् युक्तम् ॥ ६४॥ (१६१२) यस्तुल्यसाधनयोः फले विशेषो न स विना हेतुम् ।
कार्यत्वतो गौतम ! घट इव, हेतुश्च स कर्म ॥ ६५ ॥ (१६१३) Asti sukhduḥkkhahetuḥ kāryatvāt, bijamankurasyeva Sa drista dva matir-vyabhicarād na tad yuktam. 64 (1612) Yastulyasādhanayoḥ phald višeşo na sa vină bètum Karyatvato Gautamal ghata iva, hdtusca. sa karma. 65 (1613)]
Trans-64-65 Just as,a sprout has a seed for its hetu, (because it is a kārya) so, there is a hetu for happiness and misery owing to their being a karya ( an action ).

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:86: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second ___You may think :--That (hetu) is certainly seen. This (thought) is not proper owing to irrelevancy.
O Gautama! That difference which exists in the fructifi. cation in the case of those who have equal means is not without a hètu, since it is a kārya, as is the case with a pitcher. That hetu is Karman. 64-65 (1612-1613)
टीका-प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धयोः सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, कार्यत्वात् , अङ्कुरस्येव बीजमिति । यश्वेह सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुस्तत् कर्मैव, इत्यस्ति तदिति । स्थाद् मतिः-स्त्रक्-चन्दना--ऽङ्गनादयः सुखस्य हेतवः, दुःखस्य त्वहि-विषकण्टकादयः, इति दृष्ट एव मुख-दुःखयोहेतुरस्ति, किमदृष्टस्य कर्मणस्तरेतुत्वकल्पनेन ? । न हि दृष्टपरिहारेणादृष्टकल्पना संगतत्वमावहति, अति प्रसङ्गात् । तदयुक्तम् , व्यभिचारात्, तथाहि-'जो तुल्लेत्यादि' इह यस्तुल्यसाधनयोरिष्टशब्दादिविषयसुखसाधनसमेतयोरनिष्टार्थसाधनसंयुक्तयोश्च द्वयोबहुनां वा फले सुख-दुःखानुभवनलक्षणे विशेषस्तारतम्यरूपो दृश्यते, नासावदृष्टं कमपि हेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यते, कार्यत्वात् , घटवत् । यश्च तत्र विशेषाधायकोऽदृष्टहेतुस्तद् गौतम! कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥६४-६५।। (१६१२-१६१३)
D. C.-Just as, a sprout which is a Karya, has a seed for its hotu, so, happiness and misery, which are well-known to every individual, have a cause, because they are kāryas. And this cause is nothing else but Karman, and so it exists. It may be that you may here raise a question as under :
A garland, sandal, a woman, and the like are the hotus of happiness, whereas a serpent, a poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these hètus of happiness and misery, as well, are seen-are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe Karman to be their hètu-the Karman which is not seen? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen, is not justificable, as it out-shoots the mark.
This question is out of placa owing to the vyabhicāra (irrelevandy ). It is a matter of common experience that we

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Vida ) Gaŋadharavāda
:87: find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness.
Same is the case with those who have the same means to suffer misery.
This difference in each case, cannot be without any hètu which is not seen.
This very unseen hètu is Karman. पालसरीरं देहतरपुव्वं इंदियाइमत्ताओ। जह पालदेहपुवो जुवदेहो पुव्वमिह कम्मं ॥६६॥ (१६१४) Balasartram dèbantarapuvvam indiyāimattso Jaha baladehapuvvo juvaddho purvamiha kammam. 66 (1614) [बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वकमिन्द्रियादिमत्वात् ।
यथा बालदेहपूर्वो युवदेहः पूर्वमिह कर्म ॥६६॥ (१६१४) Balasariram dehāntarapūrvakamindriyadimattvat i Yaths bāladdhapūrvo yuvaddhaḥ pūrvamiha karma. 66 (1614) ]
Trans.-66 Just as, the body in youth.is preceded by a body in child-hood, so, is the body in child-hood preceded by another body, since it has organs of sense etc Here-in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is Karman. (1614)
टीकाः-शरीरान्तरपूर्वकमायं बालशरीरम् , इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् , युव. शरीरवदिति, आदिशब्दात् सुख-दुःखित्व-प्राणाऽपान-निमेषो-न्मेष-जीवनादिमत्त्वादयोऽपि हेतवो ग्राह्याः। न च जन्मान्तरातीतशरीरपूर्वकमेवेदमिति शक्यते वक्तुम् , तस्यापान्तरालगतावसत्त्वेन तत्पूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः। न चाशरीरिणो नियतगर्म-देश-स्थानप्राप्तिपूर्वका शरीरग्रहो युज्यते, नियामककारणाभावात् । नापि स्वभावो नियामकः, तस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । यह बालशरीरस्य पूर्व शरीरान्तरं तत् "कर्म" इति मन्तव्यम्-फार्मणं शरीरमित्यर्थः, "जो एण कम्मएनं आहारेई अणंतरं जीवो" इत्यादि वचनादिति ॥ ६६ (१६१४)॥

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:88
Jinabhadra Chani's (The second D. C.--The body in childhood must have some body ta precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, prāņa (sign of vitality ), apāna (the vital' air which goes downwards and out at the anus ), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc., as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes oné in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth; for it does not exist in the apāntarāla gati ( state previous to the interval stage ) and so, it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for cne having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, oountry, place, eto., as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So, the body which precedes one in child-hood is Kārmana--one which is known as a Kārmana body, as suggested by "jo dna katnmadnam āhārdt anantaram jivo."
There is another inference also, किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व्य । तं चिय दाणाइफलं मणप्पसायाई जइ. बुद्धि ॥६॥ (१६१५) किरियासामण्णाओ जं फलमस्सावि तं मयं कम्मं । तस्स परिणामरूवं सुह-दुक्खकलं जओ भुजो ॥६८॥ (१६१६) Kiriyā-phala-bhāvāö daņātņam phalam kisiè vva i Tam oiga dāgāiphalam manappasāyāt jai buddht. 67 (1615) Kiriyāsamaņņāö jam phalamassāvi tam mayam kammam , Tassa pariņāmarūvam suha-dukkhaphalam jað bhujjo. 68 (1616) [क्रियाफलभावाद् दानादीनां फलं करिव ।
तदेव दानादिफलं मनामसादादि यदि बुद्धिः ॥७॥ (१६१५) क्रियासामान्याद् यंत्फलमस्यापि तद् मतं कर्म। तस्य परिणामरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो भूयः ॥६८॥ (१६११)

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Vada] Ganadharavāda
:89: Kriyāphalabhāvād dānādinām phalam krisdriva | Tadeva dānādiphalam manahprasādadi yadi buddhih. 67 (1615) Kriya-sāmāngād yatphalamasyāpi tad matam karma 1 Tasya pariņāmarūpam sukha-duhkha phalam yato bhūyaḥ. 68 (1616)}
Trans.--67-68 Just as, there is a fruit of agriculture, so, there is a fruit of charity, etc, owing to the fructification of an act. If you think that, the fruit of charity, etc., is serenity of mind, etc., then (we say that) that which is its fruit, is looked upon as Karman owing to the commonness of kriyā-the Karman from which arises, again and again, the fructification in the form of happiness and misery which are the results of Karman. (1615-1616)
टीका-" दाणाईणं फलं ति" इह दानादिक्रियाणां फलमस्ति "किरियाफलभावाओ ति" सचेतनारब्धक्रियाणां फलभावात् फलभावदर्शनादित्यर्थः, यथा कृषिक्रियायाः। इह या चेतनारब्धक्रिया तस्या फलं दृष्टम्, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियायाः, चेतनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्या, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म। या तु निष्फला क्रिया सा सचेतनारब्धापि न भवति, यथा परमाण्वादिक्रिया, सचेतनारब्धाश्व. दानादिक्रिया:, तस्मात् फलवत्यः। स्यादेतत् , अनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, चेतनारब्धानामपि कासांचित् कृष्यादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वदर्शनात् । तदयुक्तम् , फलवत्त्वाभिप्रायेणैव तदारम्भात् । यच्च कचिद् निष्फलत्वमपि दृश्यते तत्सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्यभावेन सामग्रीवैकल्याद् द्रष्टव्यम् , मनःशुद्धयादिसामग्रीविकलतया दानादिक्रिया अपि निष्फला इष्यन्त एवेत्यदोषः । ___ यदि चात्र परस्यैवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता? इत्याह-"तं चियेत्यादि" तदेव दानादिक्रियाणां फलं यदस्मादृशामपि प्रत्यक्षं मनः प्रसादादिः । इदमुक्तं भवति-कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टधान्याद्यवाप्तिफला दृष्टाः, अतो दानादिक्रियाणामपि दृष्टमेव मनःप्रसादादिकं फलं भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकर्मलक्षणफलसाधनेन ?। तत इष्टविरुद्धसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः। तत्र वयं बम:-" किरियासामण्णाओ इत्यादि" अस्यापि मनःप्रसादस्य यत्
12

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Jinabhadra Gaại's [The second फलं तद् मम कर्म संमतम् । ननु मनः प्रसादस्यापि कथं फलमभिधीयते ! इत्याह-"किरियासामण्णाओ ति" इदमुक्तं भवति -मनः प्रसादोऽपि क्रियारूप एच, ततश्च यथा दान-कृष्यादिकाः क्रियाः फलवत्यः, तथा क्रियासाम्याद् मनः प्रसादस्यापि फलेन भवितव्यमेव, यच्च तस्य फलं तत् कमैव, इति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः। __ यतः कर्मणः सकाशात् , किम् ? इत्याह-" सुह-दुक्खफलं जउ ति" सुख-दुःखरूपं फलं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो यस्मात् कर्मणः सकाशाआयते । कथम् ? भूयः पुनः पुनरपि । कथं भूतं यत् सुख-दुःखफलम् १ इत्याहतस्यैव कर्मणस्तजनकत्वेन यत् परिणमनं परिणामस्तद्रूपमिति । एतदुक्तं भवति-यतः कर्मणः सकाशात् प्रतिक्षणं तत्परिणतिरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं प्राणिनां समुपजायते, तत् कर्म मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया अपि फलमभिमतम्। आह-नन्वनन्तरगाथायां "दानादिक्रियाफलं कर्म” इति वदता दानादिक्रियैव कर्मणः कारणमुक्ता, अत्र तु मनःप्रसादादिक्रिया तत्कारणमुच्यते, इति कथं न पूर्वापरविरोधः ? इति । सत्यम्, किन्तु मनः प्रसादादिक्रियैवानन्तर्येण कर्मणः कारणम् , केवलं तस्या अपि मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया दानादिक्रियैव कारणम्, अतः कारणकारणे कारणोपचाराददोष इति ॥६७-६८ (१६१५-१६१६) ।
D. C.-In this world, we find that each and every act performed by a living being, yields a fruit, 'as is seen in the case of tilling of ground, etc. The acts of charity are undertaken by a living being, so, they too, must bear a fruit, and that fruit is nothing else but Karman. That act which is fruitless, is not commenced by a living being, e g., the act of electrons ete; but the acts of charity, etc., are commenced by living beings; so, they are fruitful.
It may here be argued that this hètu is anaikāntika; for, the aot, like tilling the ground, commenced by living beings, is at times seen to yield no fruit. But, this argument is not justifiable since such an act is commenced with the hope that it will be fruitful Moreover, the failure which occurs sometimes

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Vāda ]
Ganadharavada
: 91:
is due to something wanting in materials-a defect arising from want of real knowledge.
We may add that we are glad to admit that the act 8.8 that of charity, if done without the serenity of mind, is fruitless; for, it is an iṣṭāpatti (a desirable acquisition) to us.
Some one may here argue as under :
The act, like tilling the ground, is seen to yield a visible fruit, viz., acquisition of crop. So, the act, like charity, must yield a visible fruit like the serenity of mind. Such being the case, why should we think of a fruit like Karman which is invisible? Hence, this hètu is viruddha (inconsistent); for, it establishes inst the contrary to what is desired.
This argument may be refuted as below :—
Even the serenity of mind is certainly a kriyā. So, just as acts like charity yield a fruit, so this serenity of mind, too, must yield a fruit. And that fruit is Karman, and nothing else. So, there is no vyabhicāra (irrelevancy).
It may be here noted that, that Karman whence living beings experience happiness and misery which are its parinati (consequences), is certainly the fruit of the act, viz., serenity
of mind.
It may be argued that in the preceding verse (v. 1615) while saying that dānādikriyāphalam Karma" only the act like charity was mentioned as the cause of Karman and here the act like serenity of mind is stated as the cause of Karman. So, are not these statements contradictory? Yes, they are. But, it should be borne in mind that since the act like the serenity of mind is the intermediate cause of Karman and that the act like charity is the cause of the act like the serenity of mind, there arises no flaw, because, here, we have an upacara (compliment) of Karaṇa in Karaŋa....

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Jinabhadra Gani's
kāraṇa, that is to say, the cause of the cause to be cause.
[ The second
is here taken
होज्ज मणोवित्तीए दाणाइकिए व जइ फलं बुद्धी ।
तं न निमित्तताओ पिंडो व्व घडस्स विन्नेओ ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)
Hojja manovittiè dāņäikiè va jai phalam buddhî | Tam na nimittatā pindo vva ghadassa vinnes 69 (1617)
[ भवेद् मनोवृत्तेर्दानादिक्रियैव यदि फलं बुद्धिः ।
तद् न निमित्तत्वात् पिण्ड इव घटस्य विज्ञेयः ।। ६९ ।। (१६१७) Bhaved manovriter-dānādikriyaiva yadi phalam buddhiḥ | Tad na nimittatvāt pinda iva ghatasya vijñeyah 69 (1617 ) ]
Trans.- 69. If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not (so ) owing to there being a nimitta (instrumental cause). For instance, a lump (of clay ) should be realized as a (a nimitta) of a pitcher. ( 1617)
टीका - अत्र परस्य यद्येवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह- ननु मनोवृत्तेर्मनः प्रसन्यादिक्रियाया दृष्टरूपा दानादिक्रियैव फलम्, न त्वदृष्ट कर्मेति भावः । अयमभिप्रायः - दानादिक्रियातो मनःप्रसादादयो जायन्ते, तेभ्यश्च प्रवर्धमानप्रसत्यादिपरिणामः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियां करोति, एवं पुनः पुनरपि दानक्रियाप्रवृत्तेः सैव मनः प्रसादादेः फलमस्तु, न तु कर्मेति भावः, दृष्टफल मात्रेणैव चरितार्थत्वात् किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? इति हृदयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? निमित्तत्वाद् - मनः प्रसादादिक्रियां प्रति दानादिक्रियाया निमित्तकारणत्वादित्यर्थः, यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटस्य निमित्तं विज्ञेयस्तथा दानादिक्रियापि मनः प्रसत्तेः । दृश्यन्ते हि पात्रदानादिभ्यश्चित्ताहादादयो जायमानाः । न च यद् यस्य निमित्तं तंत् तस्यैव फलं वक्तुमुचितम्, दुरविरुद्धत्वादिति ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७)

For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
:99: D. C.-Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this incination, one goes in for charity.
Thus, the fruit of the serenity of mind, is nothing else but the act of charity and not a Karman, which is invisible.
But such a belief is untenable; for, just as, a lump of olay is the nimitta (instrumental cause ) of a pitcher, so, the act of charity is the nimitta of the serenity of mind.
We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual.
Such being the case, it won't do to look upon that which is a nimitta of something, as its fruit, as it is highly objectionable,
Besides, asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen, as is the case with the tilling of ground, the debator says :एवं पि दिट्ठफलया किरिया न कम्मफला पसत्ता ते।
सा तम्मेत्तफल चिय जह मंसफलो पसुविणासो ॥७०॥ (१६१८) Evam pi ditthaphalayā kiriyā, na kammaphalā pasattā td , Sā tammdttaphala cciya jaho mangaphalo pasuviņāso. 70 (1618) [ एवमपि दृष्टफला क्रिया न कर्मफला प्रसक्ता ते ।
सा तन्मात्रफलैव यथा मांसफलः पशुविनाशः ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८) Evamapi dristaphalā kriya na karmaphalā prasaktā tài Sa tannātrapbalaiva yathā mānsaphalah paśuvināśaḥ. 70 (1618) 1
Trans.—70 In this way, too, an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen, and not a Karman by way of its fruit. That (act) certainly has a fruit only to that extent, as is the case with (the act of) killing of a beast-the killing which has flesh as its fruit. (1618)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The second टीका नन्वेमपि युष्मदुपन्यस्तकृष्यादिक्रियानिदर्शनेनापीत्यर्थः, सर्वा दानादिकापि लिया दृष्टफलदेव प्रसक्का न कर्मफला । इदमुक्तं भवति-यथा कृप्यादिक्रिया दृष्टफलमात्रेणैवावसितप्रयोजना भवति, तथा दानादिक्रियाया अपि श्लाघादिकं किश्चिद् दृष्टफलमस्तु, किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन! किंबहुना ? सा क्रिया सर्वापि तन्मात्रफलैव युज्यते, नादृष्टफला, यथा दृष्टमांसमात्रफला पशुविनाशक्रिया; न हि पशुविनाशनक्रियामदृष्टाधर्मफलार्थ, कोऽप्यारभते, किन्तु मांसभक्षणार्थम् ; अतस्तन्मात्रफलैव सा, तावतैवावसितप्रयोजनत्वात् । एवं दानादिक्रियाया अपि दृष्टमात्रमेव श्लाघादिकं किश्चित् फलम् , नान्यदिति ।। ७० ।। (१६१८)
D, C.-Just as, the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen.
What nuore? All these acts are such as have only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast. For, the act of killing & beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh. None kills & beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible.
Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be mothing else but some sort of praise which is seen.
Here, another argument is advanced as follows:पायं व जीवलोगो वद्दा दिट्ठफलासु किरियासु ।
अविट्ठफलासु पुण वद्दइ नासंखभागो वि ॥७१॥ (१६१९) Payam va jivalogo vaţtai ditthaphalāsu kiriyasu i Aditthapbalasu puna vattei nāssinkhabhago vi. 71 (1619) [प्रायो वा जीवलोंको वर्तते दृष्टफलासु क्रियासु।
अष्टफलास पुनर्वतते नासंख्यभागोऽपि ॥७१ ॥ (१६१९)

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada Prāyo vā jivaloko vartatè dristaphalāsu kriyāsu / Adristaphalāsu puna-r-vartatè nāgamkhyabhāgo'pi. 71 (1619) ]
Trans.-71 Moreover, the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen; and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619)
टीका-लोकोऽपि च प्रायेण दृष्टमात्रफलास्वेव कृषि-वाणिज्यादि क्रियासु प्रवर्तते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिक्रियासु तदसंख्येयभागोऽपि न वर्तते-कतिपयमात्र एव लोकस्तासु प्रवर्तते, न बहुरित्यर्थः। ततश्च हिंसादीनामशुभक्रियाणामदृष्टफलाभावाच्छुभक्रियाणामपि दानादीनामदृष्टफलामावो भविष्यति । इति पराभिप्राय इति ॥७१ ॥ (१६१९)
D.C.-People mostly do such acts as agriculture, business, eto, of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen.
Consequently, just as evil acts such as killing have not got. such fruits as are not seen, so, must be the case with good acts like charity. That is to say, they too, cannot have such fruits as are not seen.
This is what may be advanced as an argument by Agnibhūti.
śramaņa Bhagavān Mahāyira refutes it as under :सोम्म! जउ चिय जीवा पायं विट्ठप्फलासु वहति । अदिट्टफलाओ वि य ताओ पडिवज तेणेव ॥ ७२ ।। (१६२०) Somma I jau ociya jivā påyam ditthaphalāsu vastanti | Adittha phalāö vi ya tāö padivajja tènèva. 72 (1620)
सौम्य ! यत एव जीवाः प्रायो दृष्टफलासु वर्तन्ते ।
अदृष्टफला अपि च ताः प्रतिपद्यस्व तेनैव ॥ ७२ ॥ (१६२०) Saumya! Yata dva jtvāḥ prāyo dristaphalasu vartante i Adristaphala api ca tah pratipadyasva tenaiva. 72 (1620)]

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:08: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second Trans.—72 O gentle one! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in (doing) deeds, the fruits of which are visible ( in this very life ), learn (from me) that by that very ( reason ) those are also ( deeds) the fruits of which are invisible, i. e. to be had in a subsequent birth. (1620)
टीका-सौम्य ! इत्यनिभूतेरामन्त्रणम् , यत एव प्राणिनः प्रायेण कृषि-वाणिज्य-हिंसादिकास्वेव दृष्टफलास्वशुभक्रियासु प्रवर्तन्ते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनदानादिकासु शुभक्रियासु स्वल्पा एव प्रवर्तन्ते, तेनैव तस्मादेव कारणात् ता अपि कृषि-हिंसादिका दृष्टफला क्रिया अदृष्टफला अपि प्रतिपद्यस्वाम्यपगच्छ । इदमुक्तं भवति-यद्यपि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकारो दृष्टफलमात्रार्थमेव ताः समारभन्ते नाधर्मार्थम्, तथापि तेऽधर्मलक्षणं पापरूपमदृष्टफलमश्नुवत एव, अनन्तसंसारिजीवान्यथानुपपत्तेः। ते हि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियानिमित्तमनभिलषितमप्यदृष्टं पापलक्षणं फलं बद्धाऽनन्तं संसारं परिभ्रमन्तोऽनन्ता इह तिष्टन्ति, दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तु स्वल्पा अदृष्टं धर्मरूपं फलमासाब क्रमेण मुच्यन्त इति ।
ननु दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातृभिर्यददृष्टं धर्मलक्षणं फलमाशंसितं तत् तेषां भवतु, यैस्तु कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तृभिरदृष्टमधर्मरूपं फलं नाशंसितं तत् तेषां कथं भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , न ह्यविकलं कारणं स्वकार्य जनयद कस्याप्याशंसामपेक्षते, किन्त्वविकलकारणतया स्वकार्य अनयत्येव । वप्तुरज्ञातमपि हि कोद्रवादिबीज कचिद् भूप्रदेशे पतितं जलादिसामग्रीसदावेविकलकारणतां प्राप्तं वत्राशंसामावेऽपि स्वकार्य जनयत्येव अविकलकारणभूताश्च कृषि-हिंसादयोऽधर्मजनने । अतस्तत्कगताशंसा तत्र कोपयुज्यते ।। न च दानादिक्रियायामपि विवेकिनः फलाशंसां कुर्वते, तथाप्यविकलकारणतया विशिष्टतरमेव ता धर्मफलं जनयन्ति । तस्मात् शुमाया अशुमायाथ सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं शुभाशुभ फलमस्त्येवेति प्रतिपचव्यम् , अनन्तसंसारजीवसत्चान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति स्थितम् ॥ ७२ ॥ (१६२०)
D. C.-O gentle one ! Thus Agnibhūii is addressed. By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing )

Page #135

Vada ] Ghanadharavida
: 97: evil deeds only, viz., oultivation of land, trading, doing injury to life, etc, the fruits of which are visible; but only & few become active in (doing) good deeds, giving & gift, eto., the fruits of which are invisible-by that same fact, i. e, by that very reason, admit that also those very activities-cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are also activities, the fruits of which are invisible. The substance of what is said is this: Though the people who do the deeds, cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., only for the sake of the reward which is visible (i, e., attained in this very birth) and not for the sin (involved in their performance ), yet they do get an invisible fruit of the nature of religious demerit (adharma), viz.,—the sin (pāpa )-because, if it were otherwise, there will be no explanation (upapatli) of there being in this world innumerable transmigrating souls. Becauso, they having earned (baddhvā, lit.-having bound) an invisible fruit of the natura of sin (pāpa) though not sought by them, acorues to them, due to the activities, viz., cultivation of land, injury to life, etc., exist in this world in an indefinite number (anantāḥ tisthanti) revolving in the endless cycle of births (samsāra ). But those persons, few in number, who perform the deeds of giving & gift ( dāna), eto., attain an invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (dharma), and then they are liberated. Such is the sense.
An opponent may argue : Let those ( persons ) who do the deeds of giving a gift (dāna), eto., have that invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (dharma ) which they expect. But how do those people who do the deeds of oultivation of land, injury to living beings, eto., get that invisible fruit of the nature of sin ( adharma ) which they never wish to get ?
To this doubt, the reply is as follows:--That (argument) is improper. For, a cause complete in itself (avikala ) does not stand in need of a wish or expectation on the part of
13

Page #136

:48: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second anybody (including even the doer of a deed) when it is (in the process of) producing its effect; it rather, never, fails to produce (janayanti dva ) its effect, because it is a self-complete cause. For, even though not known to the sower, the seed of codrava, etc., fallen in some tract of land and reaching the state of a self-complete cause by the presence of the materials, viz,, the water, etc., does produce its effect even in the absence of a desire ( for that effect) on the part of the sower. And deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are of the nature (bhūta) of self-complete causes in so for as the production of sin ( a-dharma) is concerned. Hence in such ouuses, where does the desire (if) present in the performer of those deeds, become useful ? On the other hand the wise (i. e., those who do their duties disinterestedlyvivekinah) have no desire for the fruits even in doing such deeds as giving a gift, etc., instead of this, such deeds being of the nature of “self-complete causes" produce the fruit in the form of religious merit (dharma ), which is only of a superior quality.
Therefore, it must be admitted that there is always an invisible fruit good or bad of any action whatsoever, whether it be good or bad; because, otherwise, there will be no propriety ( anupapatti) of the existence of innumerable transmigrating souls.
To demonstrate the same, the author says :
इहरा अविहरहिया सब्वे मुच्चेज ते अपयत्तेणं ।
थविद्वारंभो, चेव केसबहुलो भविबाहि ।।७३ ॥ (१६२१) Iharā adittharahiya savvd mucoèjja tè apayattèņam Aditthārambho ceva kesabahulo bhavijjähi. 73 (1621) [ Sekar: i goresquenta
अध्यारम्ब एक क्लेखबहुलो भवेत् ॥७३॥ (१६२१)

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
Itarathā'drṣṭarahitāḥ sarvè mucy èranstè'paayatnèna | Adrstārambha dva kleśabahulo bhavet. 73 (1621 ) ]
:90:
unseen
Trans. - 73 Otherwise, they being without an (fruit of their actions viz. cultivation, etc.), will be all of them freed (from transmigration) without any effort (to be free) on their part. And the performance (arambha) of (the good deeds. like a gift to a worthy recepient dāna, etc., which give the) unseen (good rewards ) will be itself (dva) the cause of much trouble (lit. that in which there is much trouble). (1621)
टीका - इतरथा यदि कृषि - हिंसाद्यशुभक्रियाणामदृष्टं फलं नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा ते तत्कर्तारोऽदृष्टफलाभावाद् मरणानन्तरमेव सर्वेऽप्ययत्नेन मुच्येरन् संसारकारणाभावाद् मुक्ति गच्छेयुः, ततश्च प्रायः शून्य एव संसारः स्यादित्यर्थः । यश्चादृष्टारम्भोऽदृष्टफलानां दानादिक्रियाणां समारम्भः स एव क्लेशबहुलः संसारपरिभ्रमणकारणतया दुरन्तः स्यात् ; तथाहि ते दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तदनुष्ठानेनादृष्टफलानुबन्धं विदध्युः, ततो जन्मान्तरे ि पाकमनुभवन्तस्तत्प्रेरिताः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियास्वेव प्रवर्तेरन् ततो भूयस्तत्फलसंचयात् तद्विपाकानुभूतिः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियारम्भः इत्येवमनन्तसंततिमयः संसारस्तेषां भवेत् ।
,
तत्रैतत् स्यात्, इत्थमप्यस्तु, कात्र किलास्माकं बाधा ? । अत्रोच्यतेइयमत्र गरीयसी भवतां बाधा, यत् कृषि - हिंसाद्य शुभक्रियानुष्टातॄणामदृष्टसंचयाभावे सर्वेषां मुक्तिगमन एकोऽपि तत्क्रियानुष्टाता संसारे कापि नोपलभ्येत, अशुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभविता चैकौऽपि न दृश्येत, दानादिशुभक्रियानुष्ठातारः शुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभवितारं एव च केवलाः सर्वत्रोपलभ्येरन्, न चैवं दृश्यते ॥ ७३ ( १६२१ ) ॥
D. C.-Otherwise-If no unseen (evil) reward of evil deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings etc., be assumed (to accrue to the agent along with their visible rewerd in the shape of corn ) unseen evil deeds, would be, all
"
They 'those who do those of them, freed without any

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Page #138

: 100: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second effort of their own, immediately afier death, there being no invisible evil fruit (of their evil deeds like cultivation of land ), i e., they will attain Liberation, because there would be no reason for their transmigration. And, then, the author means, the world of transmigration would be mostly empty.
[Now, the latter half of the verse ] Adrstārambha the per. formance of meritorious deeds like • dāna' 'a gift to a worthy recopiont, etc., the fruits of which are invisible (or the unseen principle ). This performance itself would be klèśabahulah i. e., its result will be bad as it will be the cause of wandering in the mundane world. To explain the same–Those who perform the deeds of 'dāna' a gift to a worthy recepient' etc., would by performing them, aim at ('anubandham vidadhyuh) the invisible fruit; then, in a suoceeding birth while experiencing the maturity of that fruit (i. e., the object of enjoyment resulting from it), thoy being propelled by it would be once again active in doing the same deeds of dana, eto., then again by earning their fruit, the experience of its maturity ( will result), and once again, the performance of the deeds of dāua etc. In this way, they will have transmigratory existence consisting of an endless series.*
* Here we beg to differ from the commentator, who seems to us, to have missed the force of klasa in the original verse. The author seems to mean that if we do not assume the evil unseen fruit of the evil deeds of krsi eto., then we have one out of two possibilities viz., all souls will be liberated immedia taly aftor their death, and (2) if we do not assume the conclusion, then, we shall have to take performance of the good deeds of dāna eto., as partly giving their good rewards and also partly but unfailingly giving the bad rewards leading to misery in a succeeding birth in this world. In this latter case, the performance of good deeds alone (dva in the verse) will be cause of much misery (klasa ). We have to explain the great deal of misery in this world. We take it as an

Page #139

Vida]
Ganadharavāda
: 101:
To the above view of the Siddhantin, an opponent may raise an objection as follows:-Let the case may be as you suggest, i. e., let the good deeds alone be assumed to give an unending series of births and deaths. What inconsistency (bādhā) will there be in our system (if the good deeds alone be the cause of transmigration)?
To this objection, we reply the following will be the greatest inconsistency for you:--All souls will attain Liberation there being no collection of (bad) invisible. fruit by those who perform the bad deeds viz., cultivation of the land, injury to living beings, etc., and in that case, not a single person performing those (bad) deeds (of cultivation of land etc.) will be found anywhere in the world, and not a single person experiencing the maturity of their rewards which are evil will be seen anywhere; and only persons who perform the good deeds of dana etc., and experience the maturity of their rewards which are good, will be found every where. And such is not the world which we see.t
invisible result of either bad deeds like krṣi or of good deeds like dana alone. If we do not make either of these two assumptions, then, we should have no misery in the world and every soul should be freed from the world immediately on departure from this world. Thus, the latter half of the verse is meant to lead to the contingency of assuming the good deeds alone as the cause of the misery of the soul, and thus the cause of the samsara of the soul The commentator, however, does not seem to us to emphasise the contigency of this assumption, that he takes the good deeds as cause of the worldly existence which may be in the form of repeated enjoyment in a series of successive births of only the good rewards of good deeds, there being no bad rewards of good deeds-Translator.
† In our opinion, this objection and its reply show the weakness of the commentary. The opponent, will reosive

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: 102: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second An opportent may ask "What, therefore." So, the author replies :जमणिभोगभाजो बहुतरगा जं च नेह मइपुव्वं ।
अविठ्ठाणिहफलं कोइ वि किरियं समारभइ ॥ ७४ ॥ (१६२२) तेण पडिवज किरिया अदिखेगंतियप्फला सव्वा । दिहाणेगंतफला सावि अदिट्टाणुभावेण ॥७५॥ (१६२३) Jamaniţghabhogabhājo bahutaragă jam ca neha maipuvvam Aditthānitthaphalam koi vi kiriyam samārabhai. 74 (1622) Toņa padivajja kiriyā aditthégantiyapphalā savvā | Ditthāndgantaphalā savi aditthānubhavena. 75 (1628) [ यदानिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरका यच्च नेह मतिपूर्वाम् ।।
अदृष्टानिष्टफलां कश्चिदपि क्रियां समारभते ॥७४ ॥ (१६२२) तेन प्रतिपद्यस्व क्रियाऽट्टैष्टकान्तिकफला सर्वा ।
दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला साप्यदृष्टानुभावेन ॥७५ ।। (१६२३) Yadanistabhogabhājo bahutarakā gacca nèha matipūrvām i Adrstanistaphalām kascidapi kriyām samārabhate. 74 (1622) Tena pratipadyasva kriyā'drșțaikāntikaphalā sarvā i Drstanaikāntikaphalā sāpyadrstanubhavena. 75 (1623)]
Trans.--74-75 Since a great majority of souls experience undesired objects, and since none whatsoever in this world, the reply as •a welcome conclusion (istspatti) and say that sven though we do not at present find the world as ocoupied only by those who do the good deeds and get the good rewards, let it be so in future according to our assumption, since the Assumption leads to a welcome result. Even though no body would get Liberation, the world in any case would be better than it is now. "Na caivam drsyate" is in any case not justified by any word in the original verse.--Translator.

Page #141

Vida ) Ganadharavada
: 108: intentionally performs a deed givirig an invisible and undesired reward, therefore, do conclude that all actions (good and bad): invariably give an unseen fruit and that action (which produces a drsta fruit ) does not invariably produce a visible fruit hecause of the power of the adrsta (the evil) unseen of the doer.t
टाका-यसादनिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरा भूयांस:-अशुभकर्मविपाक जनितदुःखमाज एव प्राणिनः प्रचुरा इहोपलभ्यन्ते, शुभकर्मविपाकनिवन्धनसुखानुभवितारस्तु स्वल्पा एवेति भावः । तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व शुभाऽशुभा वा सर्वाऽपि क्रिया, अदृष्टं शुभाशुभं कर्मरुपमैकान्तिक फलं यस्याः साऽदृष्टैकान्तिकंफलेत्युत्तरगाथायां संबन्धः । इदमुक्तं भवति-येन दुःखिनोऽत्र बहवः प्राणिनो दश्यन्ते सुखिनस्तु स्वल्पाः, तेन ज्ञायते कृषिवाणिज्य-हिंसादिक्रियानिबन्धनाशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाको दुःखिनाम्, इतरेषां तु दानादिक्रियाहेतुकशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाक इति। व्यत्ययः कस्मात् न भवति इति चेत् । उच्यते-अशुभक्रियारम्भिणामेव बहुत्वात् , शुभक्रियानुष्टातृणामेव च स्वल्पत्वादिति ।
अत्राह-नन्वशुभक्रियारम्मफलामपि यद्यदृष्टफकं भवति, तत् किमिति दानादिक्रियारम्मक इव तदारम्भकोऽपि कश्चित् तदाशंसां कुर्वाणो न दृश्यते । इत्याह-"जं च नेहेत्यादि" यमाच नेहादृष्टमनिष्टमशुभ फलं यस्याःसाऽदृष्टानिष्टफला तामित्थंभूतां क्रियां मतिपूर्वामाशंसाबुद्धिपूर्विकां कोऽपि समारभते, इत्यतो न कोऽपि तदाशंसां कुर्वाणो दृश्यते । तस्मात् सर्वापि क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफलेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ।
पुनरपि कथंभूताः ? इत्याह-"दिवायेगंतफल ति" दृष्टं धान्यद्रविणलाभादिकमनैकान्तिकमनवश्यंभावि फलं यस्यः कृषिवाणिज्यादिक्रियायाः सा दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला सर्वापि क्रिया । इदमुक्तं भवति-सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं फलं तावदेकान्तेनैव भवति, यतु दृष्फलं तदनकान्तिर कमेव-कस्याश्चित् तद् भवति कस्याचिद् नेत्यर्थः । एतच दृष्टफलम्यानैकान्तिकत्वमदृष्टानुभावेनैवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । न हि समानसाधनारब्धतुलयक्रि + Vide our note at the end of the commentary on Verse 1624

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: 104 : Jinabhadra Gani's
(The second पाणां द्वयोर्षहूनां वैकस्य दृष्टफलविघातः, अन्यस्य तु न, इत्येतददृष्टहेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यत इति भावः। एतच्चेहैव प्रागुक्तमेवेति ॥७४-७५ (१६२२-१६२३)।
D. C.-_“Since.........objects” means "because in this world innumerable beings are found to be only unhappy due (janita ) to the maturity. of evil actions;” it also means “ Only few are those who enjoy happiness which depends upon (nibandhana ) the maturity of good actions." Tona-because of that season, O gentle student I know that (i. e. conclude that ) each and every action good or bad, is adrstaikāntika phala i, e., suoh as gives a reward which is invariably of the form of a (new) action which is unseen and both good and bad Thus, "anistabhogabhājo bahutarakāḥ " is to be connected with " tena......... sarva" the first half of the succeeding verse (1/1628 ). The sense of the sentence is as follows:--Because in this world we find a great majority of beings to be suffering and only a few to be enjoying, we should infer that in the case of the suffering, the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta ). in the form of "evil karma't based upon (nibandhana) activities like cultivation of land, trade, injury to living beings etc., has repened, but in the case of the rest (the enjoying the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta ) in the form of good karma produced by (hètuka ) the activities of giving a gift to a worthy recipient has ripened. An opponent may ask “ Why not the reverse of what you say? The reply is as follows :-Just because in the world only those who do evil activities are in a majority and only those who perform good deeds are in a minority,
Here the opponent argues :-If even those who do evil deods, get a fruit in the form of an adrsta ( in addition to the drsta or visible fruit e. g., the crops by means of cultivation of the land ), then, why is it that, just like one who does
† The word "karma” is here used in the sense of saṁcita karmu whigh is also called adrsta-Tr.

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Vada]
Ganadharavada
:105:
the deed of dana, that man also who does the evil deed is never found to hold an expectation for that adrṣṭa?
To this the reply is And since etc.. And because none in this world does intentionally i, e.. with a previous expectation (āśaṁśa buddhi pūrvikām) such deed BS would give a fruit unseen and evil. It is due to this reason that no body is found to hold an expectation for the evil unseen (adrṣṭa) [ while he does the deeds of krsi etc.] Therefore, conclude that all actions (good like dana and bad like krsi) whatever invariably give a result which is adrṣṭa ( unseen ).
What other qualifications do actions possess? To this the reply is:" diṭṭhāṇeganta phala tti" (beginning of the latter half of v. 1623). All actions-cultivation of land, trade, etc., bear a visible fruit viz., the acquision of corn, money etc., which is not absolute e., which is not invariably accruing ( anavaśyambhāvi). It means that every action invariably produces an invisible fruit; but the visible fruit which is to be produced is not absolute or invariably happening i. e., some action produces it and some action does not produce it. And this uncertainty of the visible fruit must be accepted as effect of the power of an adrsta (a destiny of the man who does the deed of krti eto,) because when one out of two or many persons who do the same action (e. g., cultivation of land) with the same means, suffers the loss of his visible fruit (crops) while another does not, it never happens without a cause in the form of adrṣṭa, the evil unseen. Moreover, this has been already explained in this very book t
the
When the crops of a cultivator fails, the failure is due to his adrṣṭa and not to his action of cultivation which is a drṣţa or visible deed.
The commentator is anxious to explain " savva kiriye' as all actions good (like dana) and bad (like krṣi); but it is very difficult to explain how the good actions (like dana)
14

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[The second Karma' is a foregone
:--
: 106:
Jinabhadra Gani's
Or, of what avail is this trouble? conclusion. By what argument? He replies
अहवा फलाउ कम्मं कज्जात्तणओ पसाहियं पुव्वं । परमाणवी घडस्स व किरियाण तयं फल मिन्नं ॥ ७६ ॥ (१६२४) Ahava phalau kammam kajjattanao pasāhiyam puvvam Paramāņavo ghaḍassa va kiriyaṇa tayam phalam bhinnam. 76 (1624)
can bear a visible fruit (ditṭhāņoganta phala), So, even the commentator has somehow to explain it as referring only to the bad actions like krşi etc.
We hold that by savva kiriya we should take only the bad actions like oultivation of land, trade, etc. The purpose of the verse is to explain how all bad actions bear invariably a bad fruit which is invisible (adiṭṭha) and how even the visible fruits which these bad actions bear and which the agent intentionally aims at, are uncertain and therefore the result of the man's adrṣţa, the invisible karma. The visible action which a man does e. g., krsi bears two kinds of fruits invisible and visible, both of which are dependent upon the man's adrṣṭa (adiṭṭhānubhāvēņa). Since we find most people
suffering and since we find that none does any bad action even e. g. krsi with the intention that the result be bad and invisible i, e. that he may be unhappy in his next life as a result of krṣi, we must conclude that all bad actions like krsi give invariably an invisible bad result.
Thus, in our opinion the proper conclusion (paḍivajja) from the whole of v. 1622 is the first half of v. 1623. The latter half of v. 1623 is only an additional remark. The commentator connects the first half of v. 1623 with first half of v. 1622 and the latter half of the former, with the latter half of the latter. As the latter half of v. 1622 refers only to adrṣṭa aniṣṭa, it cannot be connected with the latter half of v. 1623 which refers only to the drṣṭa phala and traces it to adrṣṭa karmas—Tr.

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavāda
[ अथवा फलात् कर्म कार्यत्वयः प्रसाधितं पूर्वम् ।
परमाणवो घटस्येव क्रियाणां तत् फलं भिन्नम् ॥ ७६ ॥ (१६२४)
Trans. - 76 Or rather,
Athava phalt karma karyatvataḥ prasadhitam pūruam | Paramānavo ghatasyeva kriyānām tat phalam bhinnam. 76 (1624)] ? 'karman is already proved from the fruit (i. e., the special fruit) i. e., from (the fact that, that special fruit is) an effect. Just as the atoms of a pot (are different from a pot) the effect of actions is different from those actions. (1624)
जो तुलसाहणाणं फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेउ । कज्जतणओ गोयम ! घडो व्त्र, हेउ य सो कम्मं ॥
Jo tullasāhaṇāņam phalè visèso na so viņā hồūm | Kajjattanao Goyama 1 ghado vva, hdū ya so kammam. (verse 1618)
: 107:
टीका - इत्यस्यां गाथायां प्रागस्माभिः कर्म प्रसाधितमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह- फलात् तुल्यसाधनानां यः फले विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः । ततोऽपि फलविशेषात् कस्मात् प्रसाधितं कर्म ? इत्याह- कार्यत्वात् तस्य फलविशेषस्य, यच्च कार्य तस्य कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, यच्चेह कारणं तत् कर्म । " किरियाण वयं फलं भिन्न ति" तदेव च कर्म सर्वासामपि क्रियाणामदृष्टं फलमित्येवमिहापि साध्यते । कथं भूतम् १ ताभ्यः क्रियाभ्यो भिन्नम्, कर्मणः कार्यत्वात्, क्रियाणां च कारणत्वात्, कार्यकारणयोश परस्परं मेदादिति भावः ॥ ७६ ( १६२४ ) ।।
D. C.-Or, there is a difference as to the fruit achieved, hough those who try to achieve it, use the same and equal neans. That difference cannot take place without & cause. O Tautama ! like the pot, that cause is " karma" on account of the fact that. that (difference) is an effect.
While explaining this

verse
we

have already proved

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: 108 : Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The second "karma." Whence ? He replies-- From the fruit i. e., from that differenoe in the fruit (achieved by different people with equal moans )." How is karma' proved on the strength of that difference of fruit ? He replies :
• From its being an offeot, " i. R., because that difference of fruit is an effect. There is inyeriably a cause corresponding to what is an effect, just as atoms of earth are the cause of * pot. ” and in this case the cause is an action. “ The effect of notions is different from those actions" and it can be proved here that, that very karman' is the unseen fruit of all actions What kind of action is it? It is different from those actions. Sidoe this karman' is an effect und since actions are the cause, and sinou an effect and a cause must be mutually different, the • karman' is different from those actions. 1624
The author states an objection to this and its reply :माह नणु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कनमुत्तिमत्ताओ।
JOITUST. TEFT FTATUTEN JETT Hull (8874) Aşa saņu muttamdvam muttam ciya kajjamuttimattão Iba jaha muttattaņao gbadassa parmāņavo mūttā 77 (1625)
[ 73 gata rufaalia il
21 ocaat of Rurat gai: il 99 (7874)11 Aha panu mûrtamevam mürtamdva kāryamurtimattvāti Iha yathā mürtatvato gbatasya parmāņavo mūrtāḥ. (1625) ]
Trans.--77 ( The opponent will say, ) " Then the action (karman ) has a physical form (mūrta ).” We (the Siddhāntin) would reply, “ The action has indeed a physical form because its effect (viz., the body ) has a physical form. In this world the atoms (paramánus ) the cause of the pot, the effect which has a physical form, will have also a physical form." (1625)
दीका-बाह प्रेरका ननु यदि कार्याणां घरीरादीनां दर्शनात् वत्का

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Vida] Ganadharavada
: 109: रणभूतं कर्म साध्यते, तर्हि कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात् कर्मापि मूर्त प्रामोति । आचार्य उत्तरमाह-" मुत्तं चियेत्यादि" यदस्मामि प्रयत्नेन साधयितव्यम् , तद्भवतापि परसिद्धान्तानभिज्ञबालबुद्धितयाऽनिष्टापादनाभिप्रायेण साधितमेव, तथाहि-वयमपि ब्रूमः-मूर्तमेव कर्म, तत्कार्यस्य शरीरादेर्मूर्तत्वात् , इह यस्य यस्य कार्य मूर्त तस्य तत्य कारणमपि मूर्तम् , यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, यथामूर्त कार्य न तस्य कारणं मूर्त, यथा ज्ञानस्यात्मेति। समवायिकारणं चेहाधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणभूता रूपाऽऽलोकादय •इति । आह-ननु सुख-दुःखादयोऽपि कर्मणः कार्यम् , अतस्तेषाममूर्तत्वात् कर्मणोऽमूर्तत्वमपि प्रामोति। न हि मूर्तादमूर्तप्रसवो युज्यते। न चैकस्य मूर्तत्वममूर्तत्वं च युक्तम्, विरुद्धत्वात् । अत्रोच्यते-नन्वत एवात्र समवायिकारणमधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणम् , सुख-दुःखादीनां चात्मधर्मत्वादात्मैव समवायिकारणम् , कर्म पुनस्तेषामन्न-पानाऽहि-विषादिवद् निमित्तकारणमेवेत्यदोष इति । ७७ (१६२५)॥
D. C.-The opponent asks “ If on the ground that we can see ( physically) the body, etc., which are the effects, the, karman is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the karman also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form."
The Acārya replies :-" Karman has indeed a physical form..." What we intend to prove with great effort, you also have already proved with an intention to lead us to an unacceptable position, because your intelligence is like that of & child (or a fool), who does not know the doctrine of others. To explain the same-We also say “ A. karman is nothing but possessed of a physical form, because its effect, the body, etc., bas a physical form. In this world, the causes of the various effects having a physical form are also possessed of a physicalform e.g., the atoms which are the cause of a pot. And it an effect is without a physical form, its cause is not possessed of a physical form e. g., Atman which is the cause of, knowledge (jnana). And in this discussion, the essential cause (samaviyi

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: 110:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
kāraṇa) is the topic of consideration, and not the objects which are only the instrumental causes, such as the form (rupa), the light (āloka) etc.
The opponent will argue-" The pleasure, the pain, etc., are also of the nature of effects (like the body, etc.). Hence, since they have no physical form, we would argue that the karman is also devoid of a physical form, because the rise of something devoid of a physical form, is not possible as taking place from something which has a physical form. Nor is it possible that one and the same thing be both murta (possessed of a physical form) and a-mürta (devoid of a physical form) since that would be self-contradictory."
To this objection, we reply :-Indeed, for this very reason, the intimate or essential cause only is taken as the topic of our consideration and we have excluded the discussion of the instrumental cause. As the pleasure, the pain, etc., are the properties of the soul (Atman), the soul alone is their essential cause, while karman is only the instrumental cause of the pleasure, the pain, etc., just as are the food, the drink, the poison of a snake, etc. Thus there is no flaw in our doctrine. 1625.
---
The Acarya mentions also other arguments proving the physical nature mūriatva) of an action (karman) :तह सुहसंवित्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुग्भवाओ य । बज्झवलाहाणाओ परिणामाओ य विष्णेयं ॥ ७८ ॥ (१६२६) आहार इवानल इव घड व्व नेहाइकयबलाहाणो । खीरमिवोदाहरणाई कम्मरूवित्तगमगाई । ७९ ।। (१६२७)
Taha suhasamvittio sambandhè vèyaṇubbhavão ya Bajjhabalāhāṇāo pariņāmāo ya viņṇdyam. 71 (1626) Ahara ivāla iva ghaḍu vva nèhäi kaya balāhāņo | Khtramivodaharaṇāim kammarûvittagamagāim. 79 (1627)

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1111
Vada ]
Gañadbaravāda [ तथा सुखसंवित्तेः संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवाच । बायबलाधानात् परिणामाच विज्ञेयम् ॥ ७८ । (१६२६) आहार इवानल इव घट इव स्नेहादिकृतबलाधानः ।
क्षीरमिवोदाहरणानि कर्मरूपित्वगमकानि ॥ ७९ ॥ (१६२७) Tatha sukhasamvittàḥ sambandhè vàdanodbavācca i Babyabaladhānāt parinamācca. vijidyam. 78 (1626) Abāra ivānala iva ghata iva snehādikrtabalādhānaḥ 1 Kșiramivodāharoņāni karmarūpitvaganakāni. 79 (1627) ]
Trans.-78-79 Also, the fact that the karman has a physical form should be admitted, because in the association (with the karman) the consciousness of pleasure, etc, (becomes possible ) and because of the rise of experience of heat (vedana ) when one is in association (with the karman )s because it is possible to add to the strength of the karman' By external means and because of the fact that karman undergoes change.
The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that karman has a physical form (and are to be taken respectively with each of the four argumenis statee in the above verse-(1) Like food, (2) like fire, (3) like the addition of strength made by means of oil, etc., to a pot of earth, (and) (4) like the (change of) milk. ( 1626-1627)
टीका-इह प्रथमगाथोपन्यस्तहेतुचतुष्टयस्य द्वितीयगाथायां यथासंख्यं चत्वारो दृष्टान्ता द्रष्टव्याः । तत्र मूतं कर्म तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंवित्ते, इह यत्संबन्धे सुखादि संवेद्यते तद् मूतं दृष्टम् , यथाऽशनाद्याहारः, यचामूर्त न तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंविदस्ति, यथाऽऽकाशसंबन्धे, संवेद्यते च तत्संबन्धे सुखादि, तस्मात् मूर्त कर्मेति । तथा, यत्संवन्धे वेदनोद्भवो भवति तद् मूर्त दृष्टम् , यथाऽनलोमिः, भवति च कर्मसंबन्धे वेदनोद्भवः तस्मात् तद् मूर्त
Thus • Sambandhe' is to be construed with both suka. sumvitti and vèyanubbhavā.

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: 112
Jinabhadra Gapi's [The second मिति । तथा, मूतं कर्म, आत्मनो ज्ञानादीनां च तद्धर्माणां व्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति बाधेन -चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादिना बलस्योपचयस्याधीयमानत्वात् , यथा स्नेहाघाहितबलो घटः, इह यस्यानात्म-विज्ञानादेः सतो बान वस्तुना बलमाधीयते तद् मूतं दृष्टम् , यथा स्नेहादिनाऽऽधीयमानवलो घटः, आधीयते च बायैमिथ्यात्वादिहेतुभूतैर्वस्तुभिः कर्मण उपचयलक्षणं बलम् , तस्मात् तद् मूर्तमिति । तथा, मूर्त कर्म, आत्मादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति परिणामित्वात् , क्षीरमिवेति । एवमादीनि हेतूदाहरणानि कर्मणो रूपित्वगमकानीति ॥७८-७९ ॥ (१६२६-२७)
D. C.--The four illustrations stated in the second verse, should be respectively taken as those of the four arguments presented in the first verse viz.:-The karman has a physical form (mūrtam), because of the experience of pleasure etc. when one is united with that karman; in this world that in association with which the pleasure etc. are experienced, is found to be something having a physical form, just as the food one eats etc; and there is no experience of pleasure etc. in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether.
But in association with that i. e., karman we do experience pleasure etc., therefore, the karman has a physical form. Similarly, that in association with which, a 'burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with the fire, and the rise of a burning sensation, pain occurs when one is in association with the karman; therefore, it has a form. Here the author states an objection and its reply :
अह मयमसिद्धमेयं परिणामाउ ति सो वि कजाओ। सिद्धो परिणामो से दहिपरिणामाविव पयस्स ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८) Aha mayamasiddbameyam pariņāmāu tti so vi kajjāő ! Siddho pariyāmo se dahiparinamadiva payassa, 80 (1628)

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11
Gunadharavida [अथ मतमसिद्धमेतत् परिणामादिति सोऽपि कार्यात् ।
सिद्धःपरिणामस्तस्य दधिपरिणामादिव पयसः ।।८० ॥ (१६२८) Atha matamasiddhametat pariņām āditt so'pi kāryāt i Siddbaḥ pariņāmastasya dadhipariņāmādiva payasaḥ. 80 (1628) ]
Trans.-80. Again, (the opponent will say ) this ( i. e. Karmarüpatva) could not be accomplished by (virtue of) the hètu that it undergoes change. ( But) even that is due to Karya. Just as the mutability of milk is established by the mutability of curds, its mutability could (also ) be established (by that of Karya). (1628)
टीका-अथ 'परिणामित्वात् ' इत्यंसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति मतं भवतः । एखदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सोऽपि परिणामः सिद्धः कर्मणः, 'कजाउं ति.' कर्मकार्यस्य शरीरादेः परिणामित्वदर्शनादित्यर्थः। इह यस्य कार्य परिणाम्युपलभ्यते तस्यात्मनोऽपि परिणामित्वं निश्चीयते, यथा दध्नस्तकादिमावेन परिणामात् पयसोऽपि परिणामित्वं विज्ञायत एवेति ।। ८०॥ (१६२८).
D. C.--Again, you would believe that Karman is asiddha by reason of its parinama. But that is not proper. The pari. ņāmitva of Karman is apprehended from the pariņāmitva of its Kāryas like Sarira etc. For, when the effect is mutable, mutability of the action is automatically recognized, just as the mutability of milk is recognized from the pariņāma of its Kārya viz., curds, in the form of butter-milk.
Agnibhūti asks :अभादिविगाराणं जह वेचित्तं विणा वि कम्मेण । तह जइ संसारीणं हवेज को नाम तो दोसो ? ॥८१॥ (१६२९) Abbhādivigārāņam jaha vdcittam viņā vi kammeņa / Taha jai sarmsariyam havdjja ko nāma to doso ? 81. (1629) [अनादिविकाराणां यथा वैचित्र्यं विनापि कर्मणा ।
तथा यदि संसारिणां भवेत् को नाम तत्तो दोषः १ ॥८१॥ (१६२९) 15

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:11:
Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Abhrādivikārāņām yathā vaicitryam vināpi karmanā i Tatha yadi samsarinam bhavet ko nāma tato dosah. 81 (1529)]
___Trans-81 Just as, a variety of visible changes in the clouds etc. is apprehended even without (the help of) Karman in the same way, what harm is there if it is so in the case of mundane souls also ? (1629)
टीका-आह-ननु यथाऽभ्रादिविकाराणामन्तरेणापि कर्मवैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, तथा तेनेव प्रकारेण संसारिजीवस्कन्धानामपि सुख-दुःखादिभावेन वैचित्र्यं यदि कर्मविनापि स्यात्, ततः को नाम दोषो भवेत् ?--न कोऽपीत्यर्थः ।। ८१॥ (१६२९)
D. C.-A variety of visible changes in the clouds is apprehended even in the absence of Karman. In the same way, in the case of mundane souls also, there would be no harm if we believe that a variety of vikāras like sukha, dubkha etc. exists without the help of Karman.
The Acārya replies :-- कम्मम्मि व को भेओ जह बज्झक्खंधचित्तया सिद्धा । तह कम्मपोग्गलाण वि विचित्तया जीवसहियाणं ॥८२॥ (१६३०) Kammammi va ko bhdö jaha bajjhakkhandhacitrayā siddhā i Taba kammapoggalāna vi vioittayā jiyasabiyānam. 82 (1630) [कर्मणि वा को मेदो यथा बाह्यस्कन्धचित्रता सिद्धा।
तथा कर्मपुद्गलानामपि विचित्रता जीवसहितानाम् ॥ ८२ ॥ (१६३०) Karmaņi vā ko bhedo yathā bābýaskandhacitratā siddhā! Tathā karmapudgalānāmapi vicitratā jīvasahitānām. 82 (1630) ]
Trans. 82 (Then) what difierence (would it make) even in the case of Karman ? Just as, the variegation of eternal objects is proved, variegation of the Karmapudgalas could also be proved. (1630)

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Vada ] Gañadhuravāda
:116: टीका-यद्यविकाराणां गन्धर्वनगरेन्द्रधनुरादीनां गृह-देवकुल-प्रा. कार-तरु-कृष्ण-नील-रक्तादिभावेन वैचित्र्यमिष्यते सौम्य ।। वाशब्दस्यापिशब्दार्थत्वात, तर्हि कर्मण्यपि को मेदः को विशेषः, येन तत्र वैचित्र्यं नाम्युपगम्यते ?। ननु हन्त ! यथा सकललोकप्रत्यक्षाणाममीषां गन्धर्वपुर-शक्रकोदण्डादीनां बाह्यस्कन्धानां विचित्रता भवतोऽपि सिद्धा, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेणान्तराणामपि कर्मस्कन्धानां पुद्गलमयत्वे समानेऽपि जीवसहितत्वस्य विशेषवतो वैचित्र्यकारणसद्भावेऽपि सुख-दुःखादिजनकरूपतया विचित्रता किमिति नेष्यते । यदि ह्यभ्रादयो बाह्यपुद्गला नानारूपतया परिणमन्ति, तर्हि जीवैः परिगृहीताः सुतरी ते तथा परिणस्यन्तीति भावः ॥८२॥ (१६३०)
D. C.-O Saumya ! Il forms such as a house, a temple, a wall, black, green, red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a gandharva city or a rain-bow in the sky, what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of Karman also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you. Now, the internal Karmaskandhas consist of the same substance as the bāhya skandhas; and on the top of that, they are alive. Moreover, as they produce sukha, duḥkha etc. as their vikāras there is all the more reason to admit vaicitrya of the Karma-pudgalas. Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless bāhya pudgalas are admitted, they are all the more acceptable in the case of Karma-pudgalas which are surrounded by the cètana jivas. बज्झाण चित्तया जइ पडिवना कम्मणो विसेसेण । जीवाणुगयस्स मया भत्तीण व सिप्पिनत्थाणं ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१' Bajjhāņa cittayā jai padivannā kammaṇo visesega 1 Jivanugayassa maya bhattina va sippinatthānam. 88 (1631) [बाह्यानां चित्रता यदि प्रतिपन्ना कर्मणो विशेषेण ।
जीवानुगतस्य मता भक्तीनामिवि शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् ।।८३॥ (१६३१) Bāhyānām citratā yadi pratipannā karmaṇo visdşdna 1 Jivanugatasya mata bhaktinamiva silpinyastānām. 88 (1631)]

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:116:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second Trans.--83 If variety (in the case) of external (objects) is established, variety (in the case) of Karman which is surrounded by soul should (all the more) be accepted (as positive) like the variety of forms laid down in a piece of art. (1631)
टीका-यदि हि जीवापरिगृहीतानामपि बाह्यानामभ्रादिपुद्गलानां नानाकारपरिणतिरूपा चित्रता त्वया प्रतिपन्ना, तर्हि जीवानुगतानां कर्मपुद्गलानां विशेषत एवास्माकं भवतश्च सा सम्मता भविष्यति, भक्तयो विच्छित्तयस्तासामिव चित्रादिषु शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् । अयमभिप्राय:चित्रकरादिशिल्पिजीवपरिगृहीतानां चित्र-लेप्य--काष्ठकर्मानुगतपुद्गलानां या परिणामचित्रता सा विस्रसापरिणतेन्द्रधनुरादिपुद्गलपरिणामचित्रतायाः सकाशाद् विशिष्टैवेति प्रत्यक्षतः एव दृश्यते । अतो जीवपरिगृहीतत्वेन कर्मपुद्गलानामपि सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यजननरूपा विशिष्टतरा परिणामचित्रता कथं न स्यात् ? इति ॥ ८३ ॥ (१६३१)
D. C.-Now that you have accepted citrata in the form of manifold transformations in the case of bāhya-pudgalas like abhra etc. which are not surrounded by jiva, you shall bave to accept the sanie in the case of Karma-pudgala also as they lieve already been surrounded by Jivas.
Again, the citratā of forms drawn by an artist in painting, sculpturing, carpentry etc. is peculiarly distinct from the citrată of the manifold vikāras of bāhya-pudgalas like rain-bow etc, while in the case of Karma- pudgalas also, the pariņāmacitratā is peculiarly distinct from the other two varieties, firstly, because it gives rise to alterations like sukha, duḥkha etc., and secondly, because it is aided by jiva.
Again, the opponent asks :-- तो जइ तणुमेत्तं चिय हवेज का कम्मकप्पणा नाम ?। कम्मं पि नणु तणु चिय सण्हयरब्भतरा नवरं ।।८४॥ (१६३२) To jai taņumottam ciya havèjja kā kammakappaņā nama ? | Kammam pi nanu tanucciya sanhayarabbhantara navaram.84(1632)

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavāpa
[ ततो यदि तनुमात्रमेव भवेत् का कर्मकल्पना नाम १ ।
कर्मापि ननु तनुरेव सूक्ष्मतराभ्यन्तरा नवरम् ||८४|| (१६३२)
: 117:
Tato yadi tanumātramèva bhavèt kā karma-kalpanā nāma ? Karmāpi nanu tanurèva sūkśmatarābhyantarā navaram 84 (1632)]
Trans. -- 84 Now, if Karman is itself the body, why should Karman be assumed at all? That is not proper. In fact Karman is also a body though subtle and interior to a great extent. (1632)
टीका - एवं मन्यते परः- यद्य भ्रादिविकाराणामिव कर्मपुद्गलानां विचित्रपरिणतिरभ्युपगम्यते । ततो वायं सकलजनप्रत्यक्षं तनुमात्रमेवेदं सुरूपकुरूप - सुख - दुःखादिभावैः स्वभावत एव । म्रादिविकारवद् विचित्ररूपता परिणमति, इत्येतदेवास्तु का नाम पुनस्तद्वैचित्र्य हेतु भूतस्यान्तर्गडुकल्पस्य कर्मणः परिकल्पना, स्वभावादेव सर्वस्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामवैचित्र्यस्य सिद्धत्वात् ? इति । भगवानाह - " कम्मं पीत्यादि ” । अयमभिप्रायः - यद्य भ्रादिविकाराणामिव तनोर्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि ननु कर्मापि तनुरेव, कार्मणशरीरमेवेत्यर्थः, केवलं श्लक्ष्णतरा, अतिन्द्रियत्वात्; अभ्यन्तरा च, जीवेन सद्दातिसंश्लिष्टत्वात् । ततश्च यथाऽश्रादिविकारवद् बाह्यस्थूरतनोर्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगन्यते, तथा कर्मतनोरपि तत्किं नाभ्युपगम्यते । इति भावः ||८४|| (१६३२)
D. C.--The opponent -- Now that Karma-pudgalas have been accepted as having variegated transformations like various visible changes in clouds etc, this body also, which is pratyakśa to all, can undergo a number of alterations by virtue of its svabhāva in the form of surūpa, kurūpa, sukha, dubhka etc. And hence, it is not at all necessary to assume an intervening agent like Karman for the production of sarira etc. For, a variety of visible changes in the case of all pudgalas is accomplished by its very svabhāva.
The Acarya--Because we take the vaicitrya of tanu 83 being similar to that of various vikāras in abhra etc., the Karman should also be taken as tanu. This Kārmaṇa body

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: 118:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature, because it is so closely connected with jiva. So, vicitratâ in the case of a Karmaṇa śarira should be recognized, just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of vikāras of the clouds etc.
Again, the author states an objection and its reply: को ती विणा दोसो थूलाए सव्वहा विप्यमुक्कस्स । देहग्गहणाभावो तउ य संसारवोच्छित्ती ॥८५॥ (१६३३) Ko tiè viņā doso thūlāè savvahā vippamukkassa | Dèhaggahanābhāvo tau ya bamsāravocchitti. 85 (1633 ) [ कस्तया विना दोषः स्थूलया सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य ।
देहग्रहणाभावस्ततश्च संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३) Kastaya vina doṣaḥ sthulaya sarvatha vipramuktasya I Ddhagrahanābhāvastataśca samsaravya vacchittih. 85 (1633) ]
Trans. – 85 ( The opponent will say – ) What harmis there in ( believing ) its absence ? ( The reply is— ) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a ( new ) body in that case; and ultimately a (complete) break-off of the mundane world ( will follow ). ( 1633)
टीका-प्रेरकः प्राह - ननु बाह्याया: स्थूरतन्वा वैचित्र्यं प्रत्यक्षदृष्टत्वादेवाश्रादिविकारवदभ्युपगच्छामः । अन्तरङ्गायास्तु कर्मरूपायाः सूक्ष्मतनी वैचित्र्यं कथमिच्छामः, तस्याः सर्वथाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । । अथ तदनभ्युपगमे दोषः कोऽ प्यापतति, ततोऽर्थापत्तरेव तद्विचित्रताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, तर्हि निवेद्यतां कस्तया विना दोषोऽनुषज्यते ? । आचार्यः प्राह मरणकाले स्थूलया दृश्यमानतन्वा सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य जन्तोर्भवान्तरगत स्थूलतनुग्रहणनिबन्धनभूतां सूक्ष्मकर्मतनुमन्तरेणाग्रेतन देहग्रहणाभावलत्रणो दोषः समापद्यते न हि निष्कारणमेव शरीरान्तरग्रहणं युज्यते । ततश्च देहान्तरग्रहणानुपपत्तेर्मरणानन्तरं सर्वस्याप्यशरीरत्वादयत्नेनैव संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः स्यात् ॥ ८५ ॥ (१६३३)

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:119: D.C.-The opponent-We recognize the variety of sthalasartra by virtue of its being prntyaksa. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a sūksma sarira as it is absolutely a-pratyaksa ( imperceptible ). Hence, if we do not accept the sūkśma-sarira at all, will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise ?
Acārya-If the sukśma Kārmaņa sarira is not accepted, in its absence, the soul when liberated from the sthūla-sartra after death, will not be able to enter the new body at the next birth For, this Karmana sarira is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth. So, in case this sūkśma kārmaņa sarira is not accepted, jiva will not enter a new body after death, and ultimately the whole of the mundane world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of jivas.
And even if it were so, what would happen? सव्वविमोक्खावत्ती निकारणउ व्व सव्वसंसारो। भवमुक्काणं व पुणो संसारणमओ अणासाओ ॥८६॥ (१६३४) Savvavimokkhāvatti nikkāraṇau ya savvasamsāro i Bhavamukkāņam va puno samsaranamao anāsão. 86 (1634) [ सर्वविमोक्षापत्तिनिष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः ।
भवमुक्तानां वा पुनः संसरणमतोऽनाश्वासः ॥८६॥ (१६३४) Sarvavimoksāpattir-nişkāranako vă sarvasaṁsāraḥ 1 Bhavamuktānam vā punaḥ samsaraṇamato'nāśvāsaḥ. 86 (1634) ]
Trans.-86 (In that case) all will attain Moksa; the whole of mundane world would become useless; those who are exempted from existence, will have birth, and re-birth; and there will be no consolation for Moksa even. (1634)
टीका-ततः संसारव्यवच्छेदानन्तरं सर्वस्यापि जीवराशेर्मोक्षापात्तमवेत् । अथाशरीराणामपि संसारपर्यटनम् , तर्हि निष्कारण एव सर्वस्यापि संसारः स्यात्, भवमुक्तानां च सिद्धानामित्थं पुनरप्यकस्माद् निष्कारण एवं

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: 120:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
संसारपातः स्यात् । तथैव च तत्र संसरणम् । ततश्च मोक्षेऽप्यनाश्वास इति ॥८६ ।। (१६३४)
D. C.-In that case there is disjunction of the entire mundane world; all the living beings will attain mokṣa. Again those that are bodiless will also wander in the world along with others that have bodies; the mundane world will become niskāraṇa or good-for-nothing Moreover, Siddhas that are exempted from existence will also have to fall back into saṁsāra and hence into the cycle of birth and re-birth. Ultimately there will be no consolation even in mokṣa. Thus, along with disjunction of the entire mundane world, all the above-stated difficulties will arise, if Karman is not admitted as the cause of variety.
Again the opponent asks :--
मुत्तस्सामुत्तिमया जीवेण कहं हवेज संबधो ? । सोम्म ! घडस्स व्व नभसा जह वा दव्वस्स किरियाए ॥ ८७॥ (१६३६)
Muttassāmuttimayā jîvēņa kaham havèjja sambandho ? | Sommai ghaḍassa vva nabhasā jaha vā davvassa kiriyāè. 87(1635)
[ मूर्तस्यामूर्तिमता जीवेन कथं भवत् संबन्धः ? |
सौम्य ! घटस्येव नमसा यथा वा द्रव्यस्य क्रियया ॥८७॥ (१६३५) Murtasyamurtimatā jîvèna katham bhavèt sambandhaḥ ? | Saumya! ghaṭasyèva nabhasa yathā vā dravyasya kriyayā. 87(1635)]
Trans.-87 "How can the corporeal (Karman) be related to the incorporeal Jiva ?" (The Acarya replies :-) O Saumya ! (Their relation is) like the relation of ghata with sky or like that of substance (dravya) with action (krivā). (1635)
टीका - ननु मूर्त कर्मेति प्राग् भवद्भिः समर्थितम् । तस्य च मूर्तस्य कर्मणोऽमर्तेन जीवेन सह कथं संयोगलक्षः समवायलक्षणो वा संबन्धः

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Gapadharavada
: 121:
स्यात्
? | अतः कर्मसिद्धावप्येतदपरमेव रन्ध्रं पश्यामः । भगवानाह - सौम्य ! यथा मूर्तस्य घटस्यामूर्तेन नभसा संयोगलक्षणः संबन्धस्तथाज्ञापि जीवकर्मणोः : । यथा वा द्रव्यास्याङ्गुलयादेः क्रिययाऽऽकुञ्चनादिकया सह समवायलक्षणः संबन्धः, तथाऽत्रापि जीव-कर्मणोरयमिति ।। ८७ ।। (१६३५)
D. C. --Agnibhūti-You have already asserted that Karman is mūrta. Now, how could this murta Karman be connected with the amurta jiva either by means of the samavāya relation or even by Samyoga? This is one more difficulty in the way of the accomplishment of Karman.
The Acārya- O blessed one ! just as, a murta ghata is connected with the amurta ākāśa by means of samyoga, and an object like finger is connected with kriyā like contraction by means of the samavaya relation, so, here also, Karman is connected with jiva.
The relation of jiva with Karman is proved in another
way :--
अहवा पञ्चकखं चिय जीवोवनिबंधणं जह सरीरं । चिट्ठइ कम्मयमेवं भवंतरे जीवसंजुत्तं ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६)
Ahava paccakkham ciya jivovanibandhaṇam jaha sariram | Citthai kammayamèvam bhavantare jivasanjuttam. ( 1636 )
[ अथवा प्रत्यक्षमेव जीवोपनिबन्धनं यथा शरीरम्
तिष्ठति कार्मणमेवं भवान्तरे जीवसंयुक्तम् ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६)
Athavā pratyakśamèva jivopanibandhanam yatha śarfram | Tisthati kārmanamevam bhavāntare jivasamyuktam. 88 (1636) ]
Trans.-88 Or, just as the (coarse) body, being percepti ble (to the senses ), is connected with the soul ( in this world), the Kārmaṇa body is connected with the soul in the next world. (1636) .
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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second टीका-अथवा, यथेदं बाह्यं स्थूलशरीरं जीवोपनिबन्धनं जीवेन सह संबद्धं प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमानमेव तिष्ठति सर्वत्र चेष्टते, एवं भवान्तरं गच्छता जीवेन सह संयुक्त कार्मणशरीरं प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ ब्रूषे-धर्माऽधर्मनिमित्त जीवसंबद्धं बाह्यं शरीरं प्रवर्तते, तर्हि पृच्छामो भवन्तम्-तावपि धर्मा-ऽधर्मी भूतौ वा भवेताम् , अमूर्ती वा । यदि मूर्ती, तर्हि तयोरप्यमूर्तेनात्मना सह कथं संबन्धः १ । अथ तयोस्तेन सहासौ कथमपि भवति, तर्हि कर्मणोऽपि तेन सार्धमयं कस्माद् न स्यात् । अथामृतौ धर्माऽधर्मों, तर्हि बाह्यमंतस्थूलशरीरेण सह तयोः संबन्धः कथं स्यात् , मूर्ताऽमूर्तयोर्भवदभिप्रायेण संबन्धायोगात् । न चासंबद्धयोस्तयोर्बाह्यशरीरचेष्टानिमित्तत्वमुपपद्यते, अतिमसङ्गात् । अथ मूर्तयोरपि तयोर्वाह्यशरीरेण मूर्तेण सहेष्यते संबन्धः, तर्हि जीव-कर्मणोस्तत्सद्भावे कः प्रद्वेषः ? इति ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६) ____D. C. This sthula tarnra, as it is pratyaksa and connected with jiva, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the Kārmaņa sarira is connected with jiva in the next world.
____Here again, if you think that it is the sthila sarira-with dharma and adharma as its nimittas--that exhibits all movements when conneced with jtva, I would ask you to consider whether dharma and adhurma are mürta or amūrta.
In the first case, if you take dharmu and adharma to be mūrta, how could they be related to atman which is amurta ? :
But, if their relation to atman is, anyhow, approved by you, why should you not approve of their relation to Karman also ? Secondly, if you believe that dharma and adharma are amūrta they could not have any relation with the bāhya 'and sthūla body which is mūrta. For, according to you, connection between mürta and amurta is improper. Thus, if dharma and adharma become the nimitta kāraṇas of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of atiprsanga would arise. Moreover, if these amūrta dharma and adharma have been believed as being connected with the external murta sarira, what objection would there be to assume & similar relation between jiva and Karman ?

Page #161

Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
Here, there is an objection and its refutationमुत्तेणामुत्तिमओ उवघाया ऽणुग्गहा कहं होज्जा ? | जह विण्णाणाईणं महरापाणोसहाईहिं ॥। ८९ ।। (१६३७)
Muttèņāmuttimaö uvaghāyā-'ņuggahā kaham hojjā? Jaha vinānātnam mairāpānosahathini. 89 (1637 )
: 123:
[ मूर्तणामूर्तिमत उपघाता - ऽनुग्रहौ कथं भवेताम् ?
यथा विज्ञानादीनां मदिरापानौ - षधादिभिः ।। ८९ ।। (१६३७) Mürtèṇāmurtimata upaghātā'nugrahau katham bhavètām? | Yathā vijñānādinān madirāpānau sadhādibhib. 89 (1637 ) ]
Trans.—89 “ How could the amūrta ( soul ) be supported or damaged by the mūrta (Karman)?" (The answer is-) In the way as vijtana etc. are ( damaged or supported ) by a drink of wine, medicine etc. (1637 )
टीका - ननु मूर्तेन कर्मणाऽमूर्तिमतो जीवस्य कथमाह्लादपरितापाद्यनुग्रहो - पघातौ स्याताम् । न ह्यमूर्तस्य नभसो मूर्तेर्मलयजज्वलनज्वालादिभिस्तौ युज्येते इति भावः । अत्रोत्तरमाह - 'जह विष्णाणाईणमित्यादि ' यथाऽमूर्तानामपि विज्ञान - विविदिषा- धृति - स्मृत्यादिजीवधर्माणां मूर्तेरपि मदिरापान- हृत्पूर- विष-पिपीलिकादिभिर्भक्षितैरुपघातः क्रियते, पयः-शर्कराघृतपूर्ण भेषजादिभिस्त्वनुग्रह इत्येवमिहापीति । एतच्च जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ।। ८९ ।। (१६३७)
D. C.—Agnibhūti — In fact, the amūrta ātman cannot feel joy or sorrow as an anugraha ( favour ) or upaghāta ( offense ) by virtue of a mūrta Karman, just as the amūrta ākāśa is neither supported nor damaged by the murta sandalwood or fire-flame.
Acārya— Desire for discussion of vijñāna, moral courage, remembrance etc., are the amūrta qualities of soul. These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison, aats, white thornapple etc. f and, are nourished by taking the murta drugs which contain † Popularly known as dhatura in Western India,

Page #162

:124 Nirubharira Gani's
[The second milis, ghee, sugar-canriy etc. So, the amurta jiva is also nourished or weakened by the murta Karman.
अहवा नेगंतोऽयं संसारी सव्वहा अमुत्तो त्ति। जमणाईकम्मसंतइपरिणामवन्नरूवो सो । ९० ॥ (१६३८) Ahava nèganto'yam samsārî savvahā amuuttitti Jamanāikawmazantaipariņāmavannarüvo so. 90 (1638) [ अथवा नैकान्तोऽयं संसारी सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति ।
यदनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापन्नरूपः सः ॥ ९० ॥ (१६३८) Athavå naikānto’yam samsārî sarvathā’nıūrta iti i Yadanādikarmasantatipariņāmapann»tipah sab. 90 (1638)]
___Trans.-90 Or, this mundane soul is not entirely amurtu in the extreme. For, it has attained an alteration in the coutinuous range of Kurman, which thas no beginning. (1638)
टीका -अथवा, नायमेकान्तो यदुत-संसारी जीवः सर्वथा भूते इति । कुतः ? । यद् यस्सादनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापनं वह्नयः पिण्डन्यायेनानादिकर्मसंतानपरिणतिस्वरूपतां प्राप्तं रूपं यस्य स तथा । ततश्च मूर्तकर्मणः कथञ्चिदनन्यत्वाद् मूर्तोऽपि कथञ्चिजीवः । इति मून कर्मणा भवत एच तस्यानुग्रहो-पघातौ, नभसस्त्वमूर्तत्वात् , अचेतनत्वाच तो न भवत एवेति ॥ ९० ।। (१६३८)
D.C.-Or, this sariSiri jiva is also not wholly amir:: because it is assumed as an alteration distinct from the expense of Karman. Atman is attached to Karman as agni is attached to an iron-rod. Now, since Karman is mûrta and ātman is similar to Karman to a certain extent, the atman is also mūrta to a certain extent even though it is amūrta by its nature. Consequently, the amūrta and lustrong giva feels anugraha or upaghāta by virtue of a mūrta Karman while ākāśa being amūria and acetana feels neither anugraha nor upaghāta.

Page #163

Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 125 : Then, how is the Karma-santāna born ? The reply is :-- संताणोऽणाई उ परोप्परं हेउहेउभावाओ। देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं-कुराणं व ॥९१॥ (१६३९) Santāņo'ņāt u paropparam hèuhèubhāvāö i Dahassa ya kammassa ya Goyama i biyam-kurāņam va. 91 (1639) [सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतुहेतुभावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम ! बीजा-करयोरिव ॥९१ ॥ (१६३९) Santano'nādistu parasparam hdtubetubhāvāti Dahasya ca karmanasca Gautamal bijankurayoriva. 91 (1639)]
Trans.-91. And, O Gautama ! as Karman and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. (1639)
टीका-अनादिः कर्मणः सन्तान इति प्रतिज्ञा । देहकर्मणोः परस्परं हेतुहेतुमद्भावादिति हेतुः । वीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोरिवेति दृष्टान्तः । यथा वीजेनाकुरो जन्यते, अङ्कुरादपि क्रमेण बीजमुपजायते, एवं देहेन कर्म जन्यते, कर्मणा तु देह इत्येवं पुनः पुनरपि परस्परमनादिकालीनहेतुहेतुमद्भावादित्यर्थः। इह ययोरन्योऽन्यं हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्तयोरनादिः सन्तानः, यथा बीजा-करपितृपुत्रादीनाम् , तथा च देह-कर्मणोः, ततोऽनादिः कर्मसन्तान इति ॥ ९१॥ (१६३९)
D.C.-The expanse of Karman has no beginning, as deha and Karman are related to each other as hotu and hètumat. Just as, a sprout is born of seed, and the seed, in turn, is produced from the sprout; in the same way, Karman is also produced from deha, and deha, in turn, is born of Karman. Thus doha and Karman, are related as the causes of each other like bija and ankura. So, just as the continuous range of bija and ankura or pitā and putra is anādi, that of deha and Karman, should also be anadi.

Page #164

:126: Jihabhadra Gani's
[ The second Karman can be established by means of Veda-vacana also कम्मे चासह गोयम ! जमग्गिहोत्ताइ सग्गकामस्स ।
वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥९२॥ (१६४०) Kammè cāsai Goyama 1 jamaggihottāi saggakāmassa Vayavihiyam vihannai danajphalam ca loyammi. 92 (1640) [ कर्मणि चासति गौतम ! यदग्निहोत्रादि वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ९२ ॥ (१६४०) Karmaņi căsati Gautama ! yadagnihotrádi svargakāmasya ! Veda-vihitam vihanyata dānadi-phalam ca loke. 92 (1640)]
Trans.--92 If, O Gautama ' the existence of Karman is denied, rites like the performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation, and the reward of munificence etc. in this world prescribed by the Veda, would, be refuted. (1640).
टीका-कर्मणि चाऽसति गौतम ! अमिहोत्रादिना स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितं यत् किमपि स्वर्गादिफलं तद् विहन्यते, स्वर्गादेः शुभकर्महेतुत्वात् , तस्य च भवताऽनभ्युपगमात् । लोके च यद् दानादिक्रियाणां फलं स्वर्गादिकं प्रसिद्ध तदपि विहन्येत । अयुक्तं चेदम् , “किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व" इत्यादिना प्रतिविहितत्वादिति ॥ ९२ ॥ (१६४०)
D. C.-If, O Gautama' the existance of Karman is denied, the commandment of Vedas that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing agnihotra etc. would be null and void. Again, the wellknown phalas like svarga etc. prescribed for actions like dana etc, would also be refuted, if you don't believe in Karman, But that is not proper, as it is opposed by “ Kiriyāphala bhāvāo dānāîņam phalam kisiè vvat” etc. Hence you shall have to accept Karman with its anādi santāna.
+ Vide v. 1615.

Page #165

Vida]
Gaṇadharavāda
: 127:
On the non-apprehension of Karman, if Isvara eto, were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world, a number of difficulties would arise,
कम्मणिच्छंतो वा सुद्धं चिय जीवमीसराई वा ।
मण्णसि देहाईणं जं कत्तारं न सो जुत्तो ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१) उबगरणाभावाओ निचेट्टा - ऽमुत्तयाइओ वा वि । ईसरदेहारंभे वि तुल्लया वाऽणवत्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२)
Kammamanicchanto và suddham ciya jivamisarāim vā | Manņasi dèhātņam jam kattāram na so jutto. 93 (1641) Uvagaraṇābhāvão niccèṭṭhā'muttayāiö vā vi Isaradèhārambhè vi tullayā va'ṇavatthā vā. 94 (1642)
•
[ कर्मानिच्छन् वा शुद्धमेव जीवमीश्वरादिं वा ।
मन्यसे देहादीनां यं कर्तारं न स युक्तः ॥ ९३ ॥ (१६४१)
उपकरणाभावाद् निश्चेष्टा- मूर्ततादितो वापि ।
ईश्वर देहारम्भेऽपि तुल्यता वाऽनवस्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ (१६४२)
Karmanicchan vä śuddhamèva jivamiśvarādim vă i Manyasè dèhādinām yam kartāram na sa yuktaḥ, 93 (1641)]
Upakaraṇabhāvād niścèṣṭā-'mūrtatādito vapi i Isvarade harambhè'pi tulyatā va'navastha vs. 94 (1642)]
Trans-93-94 Or, denying (the existence of) Karman, you might presume jiva itself-pure and simple-or Isvara etc:, to be the creator of (the objects like ) dèha etc. But that is not SO, since jiva is void of means (upakaraŋa), motion (cèstā), and form (mūrtatā). Even (in the case of) dèha etc. being accomplished by Iśvara etc, either the same difficulties would arise or there would be disorder.
(1641-1642)

For Private Personal Use Only

Page #166

Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
टीका - कर्म वाsनिच्छन्नग्निभूते गौतम ! यं कर्मरहितत्वात् शुद्धमेव जीवमात्मानमीश्वराव्यक्तकाल - नियति-यदृच्छादिकं वा देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, तत्राप्युच्यते - नासौ शुद्धजीवे-श्वरादिः कर्ता युज्यत इति ॥
128:
.
,
टीका- नायमीश्वरजीवादिरकर्मा शरीरादिकार्याण्यारभते, उपकरणाभावात् दण्डाद्युपकरणरहितकुलालवत् । न च कर्म विना शरीराधारम्मे जीवादीनामन्यदुपकरणं घटते, गर्भाद्यवस्थास्वन्योपकरणासंभवात्, शुक्र- शोणितादि ग्रहणस्याप्यकर्मणोऽनुपपत्तेः । अथवा, अन्यथा प्रयोगः क्रियते "निच्चेट्टेत्यादि” नाकर्मा शरीराद्यारभते, निश्रेष्टत्वात्, आकाशवत्, तथाऽमूर्तस्वात्, आदि शब्दादशरीरत्वात् निष्क्रियत्वात्, सर्वगतत्वात्, आकाशवदेव, तथा, एकत्वात्, एकपरमाणुवदित्यादि । अथोच्यते- शरीरवानीश्वरः, सर्वाण्यपि देहादिकार्याण्यारभते । नन्वीश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तर्हि तुल्यता पर्यनुयोगस्य, तथाहिअकर्मा नारभते निजशरीरमीश्वरः, निरुपकरणत्वात् दण्डादिरहितकुलालचदिति । अथान्यः कोऽपीश्वर स्तच्छरीराम्भाय प्रवर्तते । ततः सोऽपि शरीरवान्, अशरीरो वा १ । यद्यशरीरः, तर्हि नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वात्, इत्यादि सैव वक्तव्यता । अथ शरीरवान्, तर्हि तच्छरीरारम्भे तुल्यता, सोऽप्यकर्मा निजशरीरं नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वादित्यादि । अथ तच्छरीरमन्यः शरीरवानारभते । अतस्तस्याप्यन्यः, तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवमनवस्था । अनिष्टं च सर्वमेतत् । तस्माद् नेश्वरी देहादीनां कर्ता, किन्तु कर्मसद्वितीयो जीव एव । विष्प्रयोजनवेश्वरो देहादीन् कुर्वन्नुन्मत्तकल्प एव स्यात्, सप्रयोजनकर्तृत्वे पुनरनीश्वरत्वप्रसङ्गः । न चानादिशुद्धस्य देहादिकरणेच्छा युज्यते, तस्या रागविकल्परूपत्वात्, इत्याद्यत्र बहुवक्तव्यम्, ग्रन्थगहनतामसङ्गाचु नोच्यत इति । अनेनैव विधानेन विष्णु -- ब्रह्मादयोऽपि प्रत्युक्ता द्रष्टव्या इति ॥ ९३-९४ ॥ (१६४१ - १६४२)
D. C.-O Agnibhūti Gautama! Leaving the Karman aside, it is absolutely improper to accept any one of jiva, Isvara, kala ( Time ), avyakta (Visnu), niyati ( Destiny ), or yadriccha ( self-will) to be the karta of deha etc.
It is not possible for jiva and Isvara etc., to accomplish Kārvas such as sartra etc., without the help of Karman. jiva

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
: 129: cannot accomplish objets like sarira on account of the following reasons :
(1) If jiva is presumed to be the Kartā of śarira eto., it must have some means to produce them. Just 88 & potter cannot produce a ghata without the help of an upakaraṇa like daņda, so also, jiva cannot accomplish Kāryas like śartra in absence of an upakarana. Now, jiva is not supposed to have any other upakarana except Karman in producing sarira eto. For, no other upakaraña except Karman can exist in the state of embryo etc.
(2) In the process of accomplishment of Kāryas like śarira, jiva would not be able to suck up semen, blood eto., without the help of Karman.
(3) Jiva cannot accomplish sarira etc., on account of its inactive, incorporeal, and all-pervading nature like ākāśa.
Again, it is useless to believe that sariravān isvara produces each and every object such as daha etc. Because the above-mentioned difficulties are bound to arise in that case also. In absence of an upakarana, Isvara like a potter without a daņda, is not supposed to create his own body. Now here, if it is assumed that a second Isvara creates the body of this Isvara, consider whether that Isvara has a body or not. If he has no body it is clear from what has already been dis cussed that he cannot create sarira in absence of an upakarana. But if it is said that a third Isvara having a body creates the body of this Isvara, a fouth Isvara shall have to be supposed to create the body of the third one, and a fifth Isvara to create that of the fourth one, and so on, until ultimately it results in an anavasthā which is not at all desirable.
Thus it is clear that Išvara is not the creator of śartra etc. But in spite of that if it is believed that Jśvara creates sarira etc., consider whether he doea so with or without any
17

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180: Jinxbhadra Gani's
[ The second pumposo. If Isvara orvates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his Isvaratva. For a siddha and anādi ātman is not expected to cherish desire for creating deha eto., as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on. A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of grantha-vistāra (extension of the work ) they are zot stated here. But in line of the arguments stated above, it can also be proved that neithes Brahmā nor Visņu nor any one else, can be taken as the Kartâ of śarira eto.
Isvara therefore is not acceptable as the creator of śarira oto, from any point of view, but jiva accompanied by the upakarana Karman, should alone be ascepted as the kartā of sarira eto.
अहव सहावं मन्नसि विण्णाणघणाइवेयवुत्ताओ। तह बहुदोसं गोयम! ताणं च पयाणमयमंत्थो ॥२५॥ (१६४३) Ahava sahāvam mannasi viņņāņa ghaņāi Vàyavuttão 1 Faba bahudasama Goyama i tanam ca payāṇaniayamattho. 95 (1643) [अथवा स्वभावं मन्यसे विज्ञानघनादिवेदोक्तात् ।
तथा बहुदोषं गौतम! तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥९५॥ (१६४३) Athavă svabhāvam mangasd vijñāpaghanādivədoktāti Tathā bahudosam Gautamal taşām ca padānāmayapaarthaḥ. 95(1643)
Trans.-95 Again, O Gautama ! if you think svabhāvam ( to be the karta of sartra etc.), from the sentences of the Vadas such as " vijfānaghana” etc. a number of difficulties will arise. But (ca) the real interpretation of those sentences is this.
pomy "gra gård it axe;" şoula #qanaxana स्वमा देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, यतः केचिदाहु :

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:191
Tāda )
Gañadharavāda सर्वहेतुनिराशंसं भावानां जन्म वर्ण्यते । स्वभाववादिभिस्ते हि नाहुः स्वमपि कारणम् ॥१॥ राजीवकण्टकादीनां वचिव्यं कः करोति हि ?। मयुरचन्द्रिकादिर्वा विचित्रः केन निर्मितः ? ॥२॥ कादाचित्कं यदत्रास्ति निःशेषं तदहेतुकम् ।
यथा कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादि तथा चैते सुखादयः॥३॥ तदेतद् यथा त्वं मन्यसे गौतम ! तथाऽभ्युपगम्यमानं बहुदोषमेव; तथाहि --यो देहादीनां कर्ता स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते, स किं वस्तुविशेषो वा, अकारणता वा, वस्तुधर्मो वा, ? इति त्रयी गतिः। तत्र न तावद् वस्तुविशेषः, तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् । अप्राणकस्याभ्युपगमे कर्मापि किं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तस्थापि त्वदभिप्रयेणाप्रमाणकत्वात् ।। किञ्च, वस्तुविशेषः स स्वभावो मूर्तो वा स्यात् अमूर्तो वा १ । यदि मूर्तः, तहिं स्वभाव इति नामान्तरेण कमैवोक्तं स्यात् । अथामूर्तः, तर्हि नासौ कस्यापि कर्ता, अमूर्तत्वात् , निरुपकरणत्वाच, व्योमवदिति । न च मूर्तस्य शरीरादेः कार्यस्यामूर्त कारणमनुरूपम् , आकाशवदिति । अथाकारणता स्वभाव इष्यते, तत्राप्यभिदध्महे-नन्वेवं सत्यकारणं शरीराधुत्पद्यत इत्ययमर्थः स्यात् , तथा च सति कारणाभावस्य समानत्वाद युगपदेवाशेषंदेहोत्पादप्रसङ्गः । अपि च, इत्थं महेतुकमाकस्मिकं शरीरायुत्पनत इत्यभ्युपगतं भवेत् । एतश्चायुक्त मेव, यतो यदहेतुकमास्मिकं न तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारम् , यथाऽभ्रादिविकारः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारं च शरीरादि। तस्माद् नाकस्मिकम् , किन्तु कर्महेतुकमेव । प्रतिनियताकारत्वादेव चोपकरणसहितकतृनिर्वर्त्यमेव शरिरादिकं घटादिवदिति गम्यत एव । न च गर्भाधवस्थासु कर्मणोऽन्यदुपकरणं घटत इत्युक्तमेव । अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाप्यसौ यद्यात्मधर्मो विज्ञानादिवत् , तहिं न शरीरादिकारणमसौ, अमूर्तत्वात् , आकाशवत् , इत्यभिहितमेव । अथ मूर्तवस्तुधोंड सौ, तहिं सिद्धसाध्यता, कर्मणोऽपि पुद्गलास्तिकायपर्याय विशेषत्वेनास्माभिरप्युपगतत्वादिति ।
अपि च, " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादिवेदवाक्यश्रवणा भवका

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3 132
Jinabhadra Gani's [The second कर्मास्तित्वसंशयः । एषां हि वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव चेतसि विपरिवर्तते--पुरुष आत्मा, एवकारोऽवधारणे, स च पुरुषातिरिक्तस्य कर्म-प्रकृती-श्वरादेः सत्ताव्यवच्छेदार्थः, इदं सर्व-प्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपम् , "मिं" इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, यद् भूतम्-अतीतम् , यच भाव्यं-भविष्यद् मुक्तिसंसारावपि स एवेत्यर्थः। उतामृतत्वस्येशान इति । उतशब्दोऽप्यर्थे । अपिशब्दश्च समुच्चये। अमृतत्वस्य च अमरणभावस्य मोक्षस्येशानः प्रभुरित्यर्थः । यदन्नेनातिरोहतीति। चशब्दस्य लुप्तस्य दर्शनाद् यच्चानेन-आहारेण, अतिरोहति-अतिशयेन वृद्धिमुपैति । यदेजति–चलति, पश्वादि । यद् नैति-न चलति पर्वतादि । यद् दूरे मेर्वादि । यदु अन्तिके-उशब्दोऽवधारणे, यदन्तिके समीपे तदपि पुरुष एवेत्यर्थः । यदन्तः-मध्ये, अस्य-चेतनाचेतनस्य सर्वस्य; यदेव सर्वस्याप्यस्य बाह्यतः, तत् सर्व पुरुष एवेति । अतस्तव्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः कल सत्ता दुःश्रद्धेयेति ते मतिः । तथा, "विज्ञानधन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः" इत्यादीन्यपि वेदपदानि कर्माभावप्रतिपादकानि मन्यसे त्वम् , अत्राप्येवकारस्य कर्मादिसत्ताव्यवच्छेदपरत्वात् ।
तदेवमेतेषां " पुरुष एवेदम्" इत्यादीनां "विज्ञानधन"आदीनां च वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यो भवतश्चेतसि वर्तते, किन्तु तेषां पदानामयं भावार्थ:--" पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्' इत्यादीनि तावत् पुरुषस्तुतिपराणि जात्यादिमदत्यागहेतोरद्वैतभावनाप्रतिपादकानि च वर्तते, न तु कर्मसत्ताव्यवच्छेदकानि । वेदवाक्यानि हि कानिचिद् विधिवादपराणि, कान्यप्यर्थवादप्रधानानि, अपराणि त्वनुवादपराणि । तत्र "अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादीनि विधिवादपराणि । अर्थवादस्तु द्विधा-स्तुत्यर्थवादः, निन्दार्थवादश्च । तत्र “पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादिका स्तुत्यर्थवादः तथा तत्र “स सर्वविद् यस्यषा महिपा भुवि दिव्ये बह्मपुरे ह्येष व्योम्नि आत्मासु प्रतिष्ठितस्तमक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु स सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् सर्वमेवाविवेश" इति; तथा, “एकया पूर्णयाहूत्या सर्वान् कामानवामोति" इत्यादिकश्च सर्वोऽपि स्तुत्यर्थवादा। " एकया पूर्णया" इत्यादिविधिनादोऽपि कसाद् न भवति? इति चेत् । उच्यते-शेषस्यामिहोत्राद्यानुष्ठानस्य वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति । " एषः वः प्रथमो यशो योऽमिष्टोमा योऽनेनानिष्ठाऽन्येन यजते स गर्तमभ्यपत" अत्र

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 133: पशुमेधादीनां प्रथमकरणं निन्द्यत इत्ययं निन्दार्थवादः॥ "द्वादशमासाः संवत्सरः" " अनिरुष्णः" " अग्निहिमस्य भेषजम्" इत्यादीनि तु वेदवाक्यान्यनुवादप्रधानानि, लोकप्रसिद्धस्यैवाथस्यैतेष्वनुवादादिति ।
___ तस्मात् " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि स्तुत्यर्थवादप्रधानानि द्रष्टव्यानि । “विज्ञानधन एवैतेभ्यः" इत्यत्राप्ययमर्थःविज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वर्तते । स च कर्ता, कार्य च शरीरादिकमिति प्राक् साधितमेव । ततश्च कर्टकार्याभ्यामर्थान्तरं करणमनुमीयते; तथाहि-यत्र कर्तृ-कार्यभावस्तत्रावश्यंभावि करणम् , यथाऽयस्कारा ऽय:पिण्डसद्भावे संदंशः यच्चानात्मनः शरीरादिकार्यनिवृत्तौ करणभावमापद्यते तद् कर्म इति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अपिच, साक्षादेव कर्मसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि श्रुयन्त एव वेदवाक्यानि, तद्यथा-" पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा, पापः पापेन कर्मणा" इत्यादि । तस्मादागमादपि सिद्ध प्रतिपद्यस्व कर्मेति ॥ ९६ ॥ (१६४३)
D. C.-You, too, O Agnibhūti ! like others presume svabhāva und svabhāva only to be the kartā of deha etc. on hearing the Vadapadas such as “ Vijñānaghana dvaitebhyo bhūtabhyaḥ " etc. It is therefore said by some pecple that,
Sarvahetunirāśamsam bhāvānām janma varnyatè i Svabhāvavādibhistè hi nāhuḥ svamapi kāraṇam ||1|| Rājivakantakādinām vaicityam kaḥ karoti hi? 1 Mayuracandrikādirvā vicitrah kèna nirmitah 112 11 Kādācitkam yadatrāsti niḥśàṣaḥ tadahetukami Yathā kantakataiksnyādi tathā caitd sukhadayah || 3॥
So, Gautama ! If you also hold the same view., viz., that syabhāva is the kartā of deha etc., a number of dosas will crop up. In the first instance, consider whether svabhava is (1) a vastuvisèsa ( an object in particular) or (2) a-karanata ( causelessness ) itself or (3) vastudharma ( quality of an an object ).
(1) Svabhāya can never be recognized as a vastuvisesa as there exists no pramāņa (ground of assurance ) to prove

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134: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second that it is a vastu. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an a-pramāņaka ( unauthorized ) vastu as the pasta itself, you should also accept Karman as a vastu; for according to you, Karman is also a-pramānaka. Secondly, if that svábhāva is vastuvišesa, is it mūrta or amūrta? If it is murta, it is nothing but Karman with a synonym of svabhāva. If it is amūrta it is not supposed to have any sort of upakarana and hence like ākāśa it can never be a kartā of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an amūrta svabhāva to be the kāraņa of a mūrta kārya such as deha etc. So, it is clear that svabhāva is not a vastuvisdşa in any case.
2. If svabhāva were supposed to be a-kāraṇatā, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause, and Kāraṇa will be absent uniformly at all places; consequently, all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidently all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For, one that is produeed spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the vikāras of abhra etc., a beginning or a definite form. Objects like sarira should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of Karman, they are adiman and they possess a definite form as that of a ghata. This shows that such objects are produced by a kartā by means of an upakarana, and Karman is the only possible upakarana in the state of embryo. So, Karman ought to be accepted as its real hètu and not the syabhāva.
3. Now, consider if svabhāva can be taken as a vastudharma, If svabhāva is supposed to be the quality of a vastu like ātman it would be amūrta like ākaśa and hence it would not become the cause of sarira eto. But there would be no objection if svabhāva were taken to be the quality of a murta object. For, in that case, Karman will become a paryāya of the svabhāva of a murta object. So, we have no objection in accepting syabhāva as a dharma of the mūrta object,

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Vada]
Gapadharavāda
66
Moreover, O Agnibhūti! you entertain Karman by hearing sentences such of the Vedas. According to you, sentences is as follows:
"
135:
doubt as regards
as purusa èvèdam sarvam the interpretation of those
Everything that is animate and inanimate, past and future, movable and immovable, distant and near, interior and exterior everything that is nourished by food, and one who is the lord of mokṣa-all this is purusa and purusa alone. No other object as Karman exists as distinct from this purusa.
Similarly, according to you, sentences such as vijñāna.. ghana" also establish the non-existance of Karman. Because, in both the above-mentioned padas you interpret " èva " as referring to tha non-existence of Karman
99
Your interpretation of the Veda-padas is not correct. Sentences like "purusa èvèdam" etc. are meant to praise the atman and to establish the advaita-bhāva in order to avoid the arrogance of jati etc. but they are not the non-existence of Karman.
meant to establish

""
Sentences are generally divided into three kinds :-(1) Vidhivadapara i. e., sentences that are laid down as rules. (2) Arthavadapara i. e., sentences that are laid down as the explanatory remarks and (3) Anuvadapara i e., sentences that are laid down as explanatory repetitions-" Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ" is an example of vidhivāda. Arthavāda is of two kinds :-(1) Stuti-arthavada and (2) Ninda arthavāda. Sentences such as "purnṣa èvèdam sarvam 19 etc., well as those "Sa sarvavid yasyaisa mahima bhuvi vivyd brahmapurè hyèṣā vyomni ātmāsu pratiṣṭhitamaksarnm vèdyatè yastu sa sarvajña sarvavit sarvamèvavivèśa and " kayā pūrṇayahūtyā sarvān kāmānavāpnoti" etc., are also the examples of stuti-arthavāda.
as
39

Again you may raise a question as to why the sentences like " 'dkayā parṇayā" etc. be not taken as the illustrations

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: 186 :
Jỉnabhadra Gani's of Vidhivāda. But if it illustrates Vidhivāda, the anusthānas like agnihotra would be of no avail.
[The second rest of the
In the sentence “aşa vaha prathamo yajño yoʻgnistomah, yo'nènāniştavānyèna yujatė sa gartamabhyapatat” the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the nindarthavāda. Lastly Veda-vākyas such as “ dvādaśamasāḥ samvat sarah" “ agnirusṇaḥ " “ agni rhimasya bhošajam" etc, are anuvāda pradhāna as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts.
It is, therefore, clear that Vèdapadas like "purusa dvddam sarvam" are meant to illustrate the stuti-arthavāda.
“ Vijñāna ghana dvaitė bhaḥ" etc., can be interpreted in this way-Atman, as an assemblage, of knowledge is distinot from bhūtas and it itself is the karta of the kāryas such as sarira etc. Now that, it bas become the kartā it must have a karmaņa (instrument ) to accomplish the Kāryas. For, wherever there are kartā and karya, there ought to be a karana also. Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, Karman is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of Karyas like sarira by Atman. So, you shall have to accept the existence of Karman.
Moreover, Karman can be established by the help of Voda-vacanas like " punyah punyèna karmaņā, pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā” also, Thus Karman is proved by means of agama also. Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that Karman does exist and Karman is the only instrument to accomplish Karyas like śarira etc. छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वहओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥१६॥ (१६४४) Chinnammi samsayammi Jiņdna jarā-maranavippamukkėņam i So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiya-sadhim. 96 (1644)

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
: 137 : [fea te forta A-ATOTêngrai
स श्रमणः प्रवजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ९६ ।। (१६४४) Chinna samsayd Jinèna jarā-maraṇavipramuktèna 1 Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khandikaśataiḥ. 96 (1644) ]
Trans.-96 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Agnibhūti accepted Diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1644 ).
End of the Discussion with the Second Gañadhara,
18

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Chapter III
तृतीयगणधरवक्तव्यता Discassion with the Third Gañadhara. ते पव्वइए सोउं तइओ आगच्छह जिंणसगासं । पक्षामि वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥९७ ॥ (१६४५)
To pavvaid söum taio āgacchai Jiņasagāsam : Vaccami vandamt vanditta pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 97 ॥ (1645) [तो प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा रतीय आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥९७॥ (१६४५) Tau pravrajitau śrutva tritiya āgacchati Jinasakāšam 1 Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāsè li 97 || ( 1645 ) ]
Trans:-97 Having heard that both of them ( Indrabhati. and Agnibhūti) had renounced the world, the third (Ganadhara) comes before the Tirthankara.(He thinks):-I may go, pay my homage, and worship hirn (1645).
टीका-ताविन्द्रभूत्य-ऽग्निभूती प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीयो वायुभूतिर्नामा द्विजोपाध्यायो जिनसकाशमागच्छति सातिशयनिजवन्धुद्वयनिष्क्रमणाकर्णनाजागिति विगलितामिमानो भगवति संजातसर्वज्ञप्रत्ययः सन्नवमवधार्यागतःव्रजामि तत्राहमषि, वन्दे भगवन्तं श्रीमन्महावीरम् , वन्दित्वा च पर्युपासेपर्युपास्ति करोमि तस्य भगवत इति ॥१७॥ (१६४५)
D. C.-On having heard that Indrabhūti and Agnibhūti had aocepted the Diksā (and were defeated,) the third gañadhara named Vayubhūti approached Sramaņa Bhagavan Mahāvira with an humble and obedient motive of bowing down to him and worshipping him.

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:139: And, what more did he think when he approached ? सीसत्तेणोवगया संपयर्मिद-ग्गिभूइणो जस्स। तिहूयणकयप्पणामो स महाभागोऽभिगमणिज्जो ॥१८॥ (१६४६) तदभिगमण-वंदणो-वासणाइणा होज्न पूयपावोऽहं । वोच्छिण्णसंसओ वा वोत्तुं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥९९॥ (१६४७) Sisattèņovagayā sampayaminda-ggibhūiņo jassai Tihūyaņakayappaņāmo sa mahābhāgo'bhigamaņijjo 98. (1646) Tadabhigamana-vandano-vasanainā hojja puyapavo'hame Vocchiņņa samsao vā vottum patto Jiņasagāsè. 99. (1647) [ शिष्यत्वेनोपगती सांप्रतमिन्द्रा-निभूती यस्य । त्रिभुवनकृतप्रणामः स महाभागोऽभिगमनीयः ॥ १८॥ (१६४६) तदभिगमन-वन्दनो-पासनादिना भवेयं पूतपापोऽहम् ।
व्यवच्छिन्नसंशयो वोक्ता प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ।। ९९ ॥ (१६४७) Sisyatvenopagatau, sampratamindra'gnibhāti yasya | Tribhuvanakritaprayāmah sa mahābhāgo'bhigamaniyah. 98. (1646)] Tadabhigamana-vandano-pāsanādinā bhavèyam pūtapāpoham, Vyavacchinnasamsoyo voktā prāpto Jinasakāśè. 99 (1647)]
Trans. --98-99 "I should approach the revered Bhagavan Mahavira whom Indrabhūti and Agnibhūti have recently •accepted as their preceptor, and to whom (people of) the three worlds pay their obeisances. Having approached him, I shall get myself purged of sins by bowing down to him and worshipping him, and I shall get my doubts cleared." Having said so, he came to śramana Bhagavān Mahāvira. (1646-1647)
Then what next : आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्ण सव्वदरिसीणं ॥१०॥ (१६४८)

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: 140: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third Abhattho ya Jindņam jāi-jarā-paraṇavippapukkòņam , Nāmèņa ya gottèņa ya savvaņņū savvadarist nam. 100 (1648)
( 37aan farata Fifa-ati-hati agama i
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १०० ।। (१६४८) Abhasitaśca Jindna jāti-jarā-maranavipramuktona i Nannā ca gotroņa ca sarvajndna sarvadarsinā. 100 (1648)]
Trans.--100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darśana (undifferentiated knowledge ). (1648).
D. C:--Alhough thus respectfully and directly addressed by the Lord and seeing the beauty and splendour of his emigence extending over the three worlds, and being unable to disclose the doubt remaining in his mind, out of agitation Vāyubhūti remained silent with amazement. But we was again addressed thus :तज्जीव तस्सरीरं ति संसओ न वि य पुच्छसे किंचि। वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ।। १०१॥ (१६४९) Tajjiva tassariram ti samsao na vi ya pucchasè kimci Vayapayāņa ya attham na yāṇabi tesimo attho. 101 (1649) [ तज्जीवस्तच्छरीरमिति संशयो नापि च पृच्छसि किञ्चित् ?।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥१०१॥ (१६४९) Tajjtvastochartramiti samsayo nãpi ca priochasi kimcit ? | Vadapadānām sārtham na jāngsi təşāmayamarthaḥ. 101 (1649) ]
Trans. 101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is jiva is sarira itself and yet you do not ask me (about it ). But (ca) you do not know the real meaning of Vada-padas. Here is their real interpretation. (1649),

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Vāda ) Ganadharavāda
: 141: टीका-हे आयुष्मन् वायुभूते ! "तदेव वस्तु जीवस्तदेव च शरीरम् , न पुनरन्यत्" इत्येवंभूतस्तव संशयो वतेते, नापि च तदपनोदार्थ किश्चिद् मा पृच्छसि । ननु यज्ञपाटाद् निर्गच्छता त्वयाऽभिहितमासीत्-" वोच्छिण्णसंसओ वा" इति, तत् किमिति न किश्चित् पृच्छसि । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिवन्धनो वर्तते । तेषां च वेदपदानामर्थ त्वं न जानासि, तेन संशयं कुरुषे । तेषां चायं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोर्थ इति ॥१.१॥ (१६४९)
D. C.--You entertain the doubt in your mind as to whether that which is jiva be called sarira also. But you do not put any question about it to remove that doubt. This doubt of yours is based upon hearing the Veda-padas of contradictory senses. But that is not the correct interpretation, Here is the real interpsetation.
Moreover, वसुहाइभूयसमुदयसंभूया चेयण त्ति ते संका। पत्तेयमदिहा वि हु मज्जंगमउ व्व समुदाये ।। १०२ ॥ (१६५०) जह मज्जंगेसु मओ वीसुमदिट्ठो वि समुदए होउं । कालंतरे विणस्सइ तह भूयगणम्मि चेयण्णम् ॥१०३॥ (१६५१)
Vasuhāi-hhūya-samudaya-sambhūyā cdyaņa tti tè sankā ! Pattdyamaditthā vi hu majjangamau vva samudāyd. 102 (1650) Jaha majjangdsu mao visumadiţtho vi samudaè böum ! Kalantard vinassai taha bhāya gayammi cdyannam. 103 (1651)
[वसुधादिभूतसमुदयसंभूता चेतनेति तव शङ्का ।
प्रत्येकमदृष्टाऽपि खलु मद्याङ्गमद इव समुदाये ॥१०२॥ (१६५०) यथा मद्यानेषु मदो विश्वगदृष्टोऽपि समुदये भूत्वा । कालान्तरे विनश्यति तथा भूतगणेऽपि चैतन्यम् ॥१०॥ (१६५१)

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: 142:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The third
Vasudhadi-bhūta-samudaya sambhūta cètanèti tava sankā | Pratyèkamadrists'pi khalu madyangamada iva samudāyd. 102 (1651) Yathā madyangèṣu mado viśvagadriṣṭo'pi samudayè bhūtvā | Kālāntarè vinasyati tathā bhūtagane 'pi caitanyam. 103 (1651 ) ]
Trans.- 102-103. Your presumption is that consciousness ( cetana ) is produced from the collection ( samudaya ) of bhūtas like prithivi etc., because like intoxication ( mada ) though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection ( of those constituents ). Just as intoxication, though not present in each separate constituent of wine (madya ), is produced in the collection of these constituents, and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness (caitanya) is also produced in the collection of bhūtas and perishes as time passes. ( 1650-1651)
टीका -- वसुधा पृथ्वी, आदिशब्दादप्-तेजो - वायु-परिग्रहः, वसुधादय एव भवन्तीति कृत्वा भूतानि वसुधादिभूतानि तेषां समुदयः परस्परमिलनपरिणतिवसुधादिभूतसभूदयः, तस्मात् प्रागसती संभूता संजाता, चेतनेत्येवंभूता तव शङ्कां । सा च चेतना पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टापि धातकीकुसुम - गुडो- दकादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु मद इव तत्समुदाये संभूतेति प्रत्यक्षत एव दृश्यते । तदेवमन्वयद्वारेण चेतनाया भूतसमुदायधर्मता दर्शिता । अथ व्यतिरेकद्वारेण तस्यास्तां दर्शयितुमाह – “जह मअंगेसु इत्यादि " यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदभावः प्रत्येकावस्थायामुदृष्टोऽपि तत्समुदाये भूत्वा तत्रः कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा कालान्तरे तथाविधसामग्रीवशात् कुतश्चिद् विनश्यति, तथा भूतगणेऽपि प्रत्येक समचैतन्यं भूत्वा ततः कालान्तरे विनश्यति । ततोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चीयते भूतधर्म एष चैतन्यम् ।
इदमत्र हृदयम् - यत् समुदायिषु प्रत्येकं नोपलभ्यते तत्समुदाये चोपलभ्यते, ततस्तत्समुदायमात्रधर्म एव, यथा मद्याङ्गसमुदायधर्मो मदः । स हि मद्याङ्गेषु विश्वश्नोपलभ्यते, तत्समुदाये चोपलभ्यते, अतस्तद्धर्मः । एवं चेतनापि भूतसमुदाये भवति, पृथग् न भवति, अतस्तद्धर्मः ।

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Vida]
Gaṇadharavāda
: 148:
धर्म - धर्मिणोश्रामेद एव, भेदे घट - पटयोरिव धर्मि- धर्मभावाप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स एव जीवस्तदेव च शरीरम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु पुनः शरीराद् भिन्नः श्रूयते जीवः, तद्यथा " न हि वै स शरीरस्य प्रियाऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादि । ततस्तव संशय इति ॥ १०२-१०३ ।। (१६५० - १६५१) ।।
D. C.-According to your presumption cètanā is produced from the samudāya of bhūtas such as prithvi, ap, tèjas, vāyu eto. Just as mada cannot be seen in each separate constituent e. g., dhataki flower, jaggery etc., of the wine, but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined to-gether. In the same way, cètanā is recognized in the samudaya of bhūtas only and not in a separate constituent like prithvi. So, cètanā becomes the quality of the samudāya of bhūtas. Again, this cètană, after being produced in the samudāya of bhūtas perishes after naving stayed for some time, just as the quality of mada after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine, vanishes as time passes. Thus, it is proved by means of anvaya as well as vyatirèka in the above two cases that caitanya is a dharma of the samudāya of bhūtas.
Again, that which is not present in a constitution of samudāya but in the samudaya itself becomes the quality of samudaya only, and not of a constituent. So, caitanya being found only in samudaya and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a dharma of the samudaya of bhūtas, as mada becomes a dharma of the samudaya of madyangas. Now, there can be no distinction between dharma and dharmin. For, if they were distinct, they could not be related as dharma and dharmin. Śarira is nothing but the samudaya of bhitas and jiva is formed of cètanā. Hence, jiva and sarira are nothing but dharma and dharmin and as such they should be considered as one and the same.
Now, on the other hand, there which establish jiva to be distinct from

several Veda-padas śarira e. g. "Na hi
are

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:144: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third vai sa-sarisya priyāprivayo-r-apahatirasti, a-sariram va vasantam privāpriya na sprśataḥ.” And that is the reason why you have raised this doubt.
The doubt is refuted as follows :पत्तेयमभावाओ न रेणुतेल्लं व समुदये चेया। मजङ्गेसु तु मओ वीसुं पि न सव्वसो नत्थि ॥१०४ ॥ (१६५२) भमि-धणि-वितण्हयाई पत्तेयं पि हु जहा मयंगेसु । तह जइ भूएसु भवे चेया तो समुदये होजा ॥१०५ ।। (१६५३) Pattèyamabhāvāo na rèņutellam va samudayè càyā i Majjangdsu tu nao visum pi na savvaso natthi. 104 (1652) Bhami-dhani-vitaṇhayāt pattèyam pi bu jabā mayangèsu Taha jai bbūdsu bhavè càyā to samudayè hojjā. 105 (1653) [प्रत्येकमभावाद् न रेणुतैलमिव समुदये चेतना। मद्याङ्गेषु तु मदो विष्वगपि न सर्वशो नास्ति ॥ १०४ ॥ (१६५२) भ्रमि-ध्राणि-वितृष्णतादयः प्रत्येकमपि खलु यथा मदाङ्गेषु ।
तथा यदि भूतेषु भवेचेतना ततः समुदये भवेत् ॥ १०५॥ (१६५३) Pratyèkamabhāvād na röņutailamiva samudayà còtanā, Madyangesu tu mado visvagapi na sarvaso nāsti. 104 (1652) Bhrani-dhrāņi-vitrişnatādayaḥ pratyökamapi khalu yathā
madángeşul Tathā yadi bbūtèşu bhavèccètanā tatah samudayè bbavèt. 105 (1653)
Trans.--104-105 Consciousness (cetanā) can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sands if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication (mada) is not absolutely absent even in an individual constiluent of wine. (For), every constituent (of wine) possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing

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:145:
Vada]
Ganadharavada insanity, producing satiety and quenching thirst etc. in its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the) bhūtas ( separately ), it could be (found) in the collection (also) (1652-1653).
टीका-"न समुदये चेय ति" न भूतसमुदयमात्रप्रभवा चेतना, "पत्तेयमभावाउ ति" भूतप्रत्येकावस्थायां तस्या अंशतोऽपि सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः । किं यथा किंप्रभवं न भवति ? इत्याह--" न रेणुनेल्लं व ति" यथा प्रत्येकं सवर्थाऽनुपलम्भाद् रेणुकणसमुदायप्रभवं तैलं न भवतीत्यर्थः । प्रयोगः-यद् येषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते तत् तेषां समुदायेऽपि न भवति, यथा सिकताकणसमुदाये तैलम् , यतु तेषां समुदाये भवति न तस्य पृथग् व्यवस्थितेषु तेषु सर्वथाऽनुपलम्भः, यथैकैकतिलावस्थायां तैलस्य, सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते च भूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायां चेतना, तस्माद् नासौ तत्समुदायमात्रप्रभवा, किन्वर्थापत्तरेवान्यत् किमपि जीवलक्षणं कारणान्तरं भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तं तत्र संघट्टितं, यत इयं प्रभवतीति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । आह"प्रत्येकावस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलम्भात्" इत्यनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, । प्रत्येका वस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धस्यापि मदस्य मद्याङ्गसमुदाये दर्शनात् , इत्याशड्क्याह-" मज्जंगेसु इत्यादि" धातकीकुसुमादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु पुनर्विष्वक् पृथग् न सर्वथा मदो नास्ति, अपि तु या च यावती च मदमात्रा पृथगपि तेष्वस्त्येवेत्यर्थः । ततो नानैकान्तिकता हेतोरिति ।
___टीका-यथा प्रत्येकावस्थायां धातकीकुसुमेषु या च यावती च श्रमिश्चितभ्रमापादनशक्तिरस्ति, गुड-द्राक्षे-क्षुरसादिषु पुनर्घाणिरतृप्तिजननशक्तिरस्ति, उदके तु वितृष्णताकरणशक्तिरस्ति, आदिशब्दादन्येप्पषि मद्याङ्गेष्वन्यापि यथासंभवं शक्तिर्वाच्या, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण व्यस्तेष्वपि पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु यदि काचिचैतन्यशक्तिरअविष्यत् , तदा तत्समुदाये संपूर्णा स्पष्टा चेतना स्यात्, न चैतदस्ति, तस्माद् न भूतसमुदायमात्रप्रभवेयमिति ॥ १०४-१०५ (१६५२-५३) ॥
D. C.-Since cètanā is not present in the individual state of a bhūta, even to a limited extent, it can never be found in
19

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: 146 : Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third the combination of the bhūtas also, just as oil cannot be found in a samudaya of Bands when it is not present in each individual praticle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the colleative state also, “and whatever is present incollection should be present in the individual also, e. g., oil when present its prithak avasthā of sesamum is found in its collective state also.
In the present case, cètanā is not found in the prithak avasthā of bhūtas, and hence, it is improper to accept that cètanā is produced in the samudāya of bhūtas. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from bhūtasamudāya. That cause is nothing else but jiva which is amurta on account of the amūrta cetanā.
Here again, the opponent may argue that the abovementioned rule is wrong. For, mada is not found in the individual state of a constituent like dhātakt puspa of the madya; and get the quality of intoxication does exist in its samudaya. But it is not proper to say that mada-bhāva is altogether absent from dhătakt puspa etc. For, mada does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A dhātakt puspa can induce insanity in its individual capacity; the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word “ādi" other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if caitanya-Śakti were present in the individual bhūtas like prithart eto. even to a limitted extent, caitanya would certainly bave been manifested in their combination also. But when cetana is absent in the very prithak state, it can never be produced in the combined state.
Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

Page #185

Vada ] Gapadheravada
:147: जइ वा सव्वाभावो वीसुं तो किं तदंगनियमोऽयं । तस्समुदयनियमो वा अन्नेसु वि तो हबेजाहि ॥१०६॥ (१६५४) Jai vă savvābhāvo visum to kim tadanganiyamo'yami Tassanudayaniyamo vā annèsu vi to havėjjābi. 106 (1654) [यदि वा सर्वाभावो विष्वक् ततः किं तदङ्गनियमोऽयं ।
तस्समुदयनियमो वाऽन्येष्वपि ततो भवेत् ॥१०६॥ (१६५४) Yadi va sarvābhāvo visvak tataḥ kim tadanganiyamo'yami Tassamudayaniyamo vanydsvapi tato bhavdt. 106 (1654)]
Trans.-106 Or, if the power of intoxication were altogether absent from all ( the constituents of wine ) individually, how could they be called its divisions at all ? and why should there be any rule regarding its collection also? (For), in that case, it must be produced by means of (the collection of) other objects also. (1654)
टीका-यदि च मधाङ्गेषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथैव मदशक्यभावः, तर्हि कोऽयं तदङ्गनियमः कोऽयं धातकीकुसुमादीनां मद्याङ्गतानियमः, तत्समुदायनियमो वा-किमिति मद्यार्थी धातकीकुसुमादीन्येवान्वेषयति, तत्समुदाय किमपि नियमेन मीलयति ? इत्यर्थः, नन्वन्येष्वपि च भश्मा-इम-गोमयादिषु समुदितेषु मद्यं भवेदिति ॥१०६ ।। (१६५४)
D. C.-If the power of inoxication is denied to exist in the prithak avasthā of the constituents like dhātaki puspa eto., they cannot be called the constituents of wine at all. Again, if dhātaki puspa eto., has no power of intoxication at all, why should people desirous of wine, collect all the constituents like dhataki puspa in order to prepare wine and why do they not prepare wine by combining other objects like ashes. stones, cowdung, etc.? This clearly indicates that the Power of intoxication does exist in the individual state of constituents like dhātaki puspa eto., and as a result of that, it appears in wine which is the combined state of all swh constituents,

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:148: Jinabhadra Gani's
_[The third At this point, an opponent may advance the following argument :
भूयाणं पत्तेयं पि चेयणा समुदए दरिसणाओ। जह मजंगेसु मओ मह त्ति हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयं ॥१०७॥ (१६५५) Bhūyāņam patteyam pi còyaņā samudad darisaņão i Jaha najjangdsu mao mai tti hèū na siddho'yam. 107 (1655) [ भूतानां प्रत्येकमपि चेतना समुदये दर्शनात् । .
यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदो मतिरिति हेतुर्न सिद्धोऽयम् ।। १०७॥ (१६५५) Bhūtānām pratyökampi càtanā samudayè darśanāti Yathā madyangdsu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam. 107 (1655)]
Trans.-107 Since consciousness is found in the collection of bhūtas, if an argument is advanced that consciousness is present in each individual bhūta also, as intoxication is present in various constituents of wine, it can never be approved of. ( 1655).
टीका-स्यात् परस्य मतिः--साधूक्तं यत्-पृथगपि मद्याङ्गेषु किश्चिद् मदसामर्थ्यमस्तीति । एतदेव हि ममं भूतेषु व्यस्तावस्थायां चैतन्यास्तित्वसिद्धावुदाहरणं भविष्यति, तथाहि-व्यस्तेष्वपि भूतेषु चैतन्यमस्ति, तत्समुदाये तदर्शनात् , मद्याङ्गेषु मदवदिति । यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदः पृथगल्पत्वाद् नातिस्पष्टः, तत्समुदाये त्वभिव्यक्तिमेति, तथा भूतेष्वपि पृथगवस्थायामणीयसी चेतना, तत्समुदाये तु भूयसीयमिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह-"हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयमिति" "चेतनाया भूतसमुदाये दर्शनात्" इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरित्यर्थः, आत्मनो भूतसमुदायान्तर्गतत्वेन चेतनायास्तद्धर्मत्वात् , आत्माभावे च तत्समुदायेऽपि वदसिद्धरसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति भावः। यदि हि भूतसमुदायमात्रधर्मश्चेतना भवेत् तदा मृतशरीरेऽप्युपलभ्येत । वायोस्तदानीं तत्राभावात् तदनुपलम्भ इति वेत् । नैवम्, नलिकादिप्रयोगतस्तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलब्धेः। तेजस्तदानीं. वत्र नास्तीति चेत् । न, तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलम्भात् । विशिष्टतेजो-वायव

Page #187

Vada ] Ganadbaravāda
: 149: भावादनुपलम्भ इति चेत् । किं नामात्मसत्त्वं विहायाऽन्यत् तद्वैशिष्ट्यम् ? ननु संज्ञान्तरेणात्मसत्त्वमेव त्वयापि प्रतिपादितं स्यादिति ॥१०७॥ (१६५५)
D. C.-An opponent may advance the following line of argument:--
As mada is present in each separate constituent of wine, it is found in the samudāya of those bhūtas also. In the same way, it can be said that since cetanā is completely manifested in the collection of bhūtas it should be present in each independent bhūta at least to a certain extent. Just as mada is not clearly perceptible in its individual state, but distinct in the samudaya, so also, cotanā is not clearly peroeptible in the individual state on account of its minute form, but it is more distinct in the collective state.
But it is not in the fitness of things to state that, because cetanā is found in the bhūta-samudaya it should be present in each individual bhūta also, as cètanā is the quality of Soul and the Soul is contained within (antargata ) the bhūtasamudaya. So, it ātman is absent from the bhūta-samudaya, catanā cannot exist in the samudaya. Thus, your argument that cètanā is found in the collection of bhūtas is not valid. For, if celana were taken to be a quality of mere bhūta-samudāya it ought to be found in a dead body also. Here again, it is improper to advance an excuse that cdtanā is absent in a dead body on account of the absence of vāyu. For, cetanā could never be found in a dead body, even if vayu were made to enter the body by means of a pipe etc. Similarly, if it is argued that cètanā does not exist in a dead body due to the absence of tėjas, tèjas also could be made to enter the dead body by the same sort of means and proved that cetand is absent in that case also. Lastly, if it is said that on account of the nonexistence of a peculiar type of vayu and tėjas, cetanā is absent from a dead body, the peculiarity in the case would be due to nothing else but the excellence of ātman which would automatically mean that you admit the existence of atman.

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[ The third
: 150.
Jinabhadra Gani's नणु पञ्चक्खविरोहो गोयम ! तं नाणुमाणभावाओ। तुह पच्चक्खविरोहो पत्तेयं भूयचेयं त्ति ॥१०८।। (१६५६) Naņu paccakkhaviroho Goyama ! tam nāņumanabhāvāo i Tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyan bhāyacdyam tti. 108 (1656) [ ननु प्रत्यक्षविरोधो गौतम ! तद् नानुमानभावात् ।
तव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः प्रत्येकं भूतचेतनेति ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६) Nanu pratyakśavirodhu Gautama ! tad nānumāna bhāvat i Tava pratyaksavirodhah pratydkam bhātacdtuneti. 108 (1656) ]
Trans.-108 Certainly OGautama that is not an evident contradiction (as you think ) on account of the existence of anumāna. (On the contrary ), your assumption that cetanā exists in each and every bhūta constituent is an evident contradiction. ( 1656)
टीका-ननु प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेवेदं यत्--भूतसमुदाये सत्युपलभ्यमानापि चेतना न तत्समुदायस्येत्यभिधीयते । न हि घटे रूपादय उपलभ्यमाना न घटस्येति वक्तुमुचितम् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो न भू-जलसमुदायमात्रे उपलभ्यमाना अपि हरितादयस्तन्मात्रप्रभवा इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । तदीजसाधकानुमानेन बाध्यतेऽसावुपलम्भ इति चेत् । तदेतदिहापि समानम् । एतदेवाह-- " गोयमेत्यादि" वायुभूतेरपीन्द्रभूतिसोदर्यभ्रातृत्वेन समानगोत्रत्वाद् गौतम ! इत्येवमामन्त्रणम् , यत्वं ब्रूषे-तदेतद् न, भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तात्मसाधकानुमानसद्भावात् , ततस्तेनैव त्वत्प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधितत्वादिति भावः । प्रत्युत तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । किं कुर्वतः ? इत्याह " पत्तेयं भूयचेय त्ति" 'ब्रुवतः' इति शेषः। प्रत्येकावस्थायां पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु चैतन्याभावस्यैव दर्शनात् तदस्तित्वं प्रत्यक्षेणैव बाध्यत इति " प्रत्येकं भूतेषु चेतना" इति ब्रुवतस्तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोध इत्यर्थः ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६)
D. C.-Vayubhuti-That cetana though perceived in a collection of bhūtas, does not belong to the bhūta-samudaya seems to be incongruent. For, just as it is improper to assert

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Vada]
Gaṇadharavada
: 131
that qualities like rupa etc., seen in a għata, do not belong to the ghata, so here also, it is not proper to state that cètană though apprehended in a collection of bhutas. does not belong to the bhūta-samudāya.
Acarya-The argument advanced by you, O Gautama? is absolutely invalid. Just as vegetables etc., found in a collection of earth and water can never be considered to have been produced from the collection of earth and water, sinte they are produced from their seeds; in the same way, còtană also, should never be taken to have been produced from the collection of bhūtas though it is found in a body made of bhūtas such as prithvi etc. For, that cètans is produced from atman which is altogether distinct from the bhūta-samudaya. Thus, there is no contradiction in my argument. But the contradiction lies in your assertion that cètană is produced in each and every individual bhūta.
भूइंदियोवलद्धाणुसरणओ तेहिं भिन्नरूवुस्स ।
चेया पंचगवक्खोवलद्वपुरिसस्स वा सरओ ।। १०९ ।। (१६५६) Bhuindiyovaladdhāņusaraṇao tèhim bhinnarūvassa I Cèyà pancagavakkhovaladdhapurisassa vā saraö 109 (1657) [ भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तेभ्यो भिन्नरूपस्य ।
चेतना पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धपुरुषस्येव स्मरतः ॥ १०९ ॥ (१६५७)
Bhütendriyopaladdhanusmaraṇatastèbhyo bhinnarūpasya |
Cètana pancagavākśopalabdha puruṣasy è va smarataḥ. 109 (1657)}
Trans. 109 Like a man who perceives (an object) from five windows and recalls (it) to his mind, cètans being itself (the quality) of an object different from them (i e., bhūtas) perceives (an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form) of bhutas and recalls (the object) to his mind. (1657)
टीका - तेभ्यो भूतेन्द्रियभ्यो भिन्नरूपस्य कस्यापि धर्मश्रेतनेति प्रतिज्ञा।

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:102
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणादिति हेतुः। यथा पश्चभिर्गवाक्षरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरतस्तदतिरिक्तस्य कस्यापि देवदत्तादेः पुरुषस्य चैतनेति दृष्टान्तः । अयमत्र तात्पर्यार्थ:---इह य एको यैरनेकैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरति स तेभ्यो मेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरन् देवदत्तः,• यश्च यस्माद् भूतेन्द्रियात्मकसमुदायाद् भिन्नो न भवति, किं तहिं ? अनन्यः, नायमेकोऽनेकोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता, यथा शब्दादिग्राहकमनोविज्ञानविशेषः, तैरुपलभ्यानुम्मरतोऽपि च तदनतिरिक्तत्वे देवदत्तस्यापि गवाक्षमात्रप्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्रमाणम् । इन्द्रियाण्यवोपलभन्ते, न पुनस्तैरन्य उपलमत इति चेत् । न, "तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात् , तद्वयापारे च कदाचिदनुपलम्भात्" इत्यनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति ।। १०९ ।। (१६५७)
D. C.-The point is that cetanā who remembers an object perceived by its sense-organs in the form of bhūtas, becomes the quality of something which is different from those bhūtendriyas, just as Devadatta who remembers an object perceived through five windows by means of five indriyas, is distinct from those windows. So, that which is not bhinna from the samudāya of bhūtèndriyas, can never remember an ohject apprehended by more than one means. For, after having perceived an object through a number of means, if cetana were abhinna from those means, then, Devadatta who recognizes an object through a number of windows, would become the window itself.
Again, in recognizing an object, it is improper to say that mere indriyas apprchend the object and nothing else. For, even when the indriyas have ceased workiog. the object perceived by them is recalled; and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended. तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तब्वावारे विनोवलंभाओ। इंदियभिन्नस्स मई पंचगवक्खाणुभविणो व्ध ॥११०॥ (१६५८)

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Gajadharavida
:163 Taduvaramd vi saranao tavvāvárò vi novalambhā8 1 Indiyabhinnassa mat. pancagavakkhanubhaviyo vva. 110 (1658) [तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तव्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियभिन्नस्य मतिः पञ्चगवाक्षानुमविन इव ॥११० ।। (१६५८) Taduparamè'pi smaraṇatastadvyāpārd'pi nopalambhāti Indriyabhinnasya matih pancagavakSanubhavina iva. 110 (1658)]
Trans.---110. As, in the case of a person perceiving (an object) from five windows, cognition (in the form of knowledge) is distinct from sense-organs; because an object apprehended by the sense-organs, is remembered even when the indriyas have ceased working and (sometimes) in spite of their work. ing, the object is not perceived. (1658)
टीका-इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नस्यैव कस्यापीयं घटादिज्ञानलक्षणा मतिरिति प्रतिज्ञा। तदुपरमेऽपि-अन्धत्व-बाधिर्याद्यवस्थायामिन्द्रियव्यापारामावेऽपि, तद्वारेणोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मरणादिति हेतुः । अथवा, अस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां तयापारेऽपि-इन्द्रियव्यापृतावपि कदाचिदनुपयुक्तावस्थायाम् , वस्त्वनुलम्मादित्यपरो हेतुः। यदि हीन्द्रियाण्येव द्रष्टुणि मयेयुः, तहिं किमिति विस्फारिताक्षस्यापि प्रगुणश्रोत्रादीन्द्रियवर्गस्यापि योग्यदेशस्थितानामपि रूप-शब्दादिवस्तूनामनुपयुक्तस्य अन्यमनस्कस्य शून्यचित्तस्योपलम्मो न भवति । ततो ज्ञायते-इन्द्रियग्रामव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव कस्यचिदयमुपलम्मः, यथा पश्चमिर्गवायोपिदादिवस्तून्यनुभवितुर्दर्शकस्येति दृष्टान्तः।
अत्रापि प्रयोगाम्यां तार्पयमुपदर्यते, तद्यथा-इह यो यदुपरमेऽपि यैरुपलब्धानामानामनुमा स तेम्यो व्यतिरिक्तो दृष्टः, यथा गवाक्षरुपलब्धानामर्थानां गवाहोपरमेऽपि देवदत्तः, अनुस्मरति चायमात्माऽन्धबधिरत्वादिकालेऽपीन्द्रियोपलब्धानर्थान , अतः स तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति। तथा, इन्द्रियेम्यो व्यतिरिक्त जात्मा, तन्द्यापारेऽप्यनुपलम्भाव, इह यो यव्द्यापारेऽपि यरुपलम्यानर्थान् नोपलभते स तेम्यो मिनो दृष्टः, यथाऽस्थगितगवाशोऽप्यन्यमनस्कतयाऽनुपयुक्तोऽपश्यंस्तेभ्यो देवदत इति ॥११०॥ (१६५८)

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: 154: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third D. C.-Cognition (mati) which constitutes the knowledge of ghata eto, belongs to something which is distinct from sense-organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness eto, the object perceived by the indriyas is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognized.
Now, if the sense-organ itself were to apprehend an object, how is it that an absent-minded man is not able to apprehend an object even with open eyes, and efficient ears, substances of rūpa and sabda placed at proper places ? It follows, therefore, that some one, who like a person looking at an object like a woman from five windows, is different from the sense-organs, is able to apprehend it. A rule can be deduced from this, that one who remembers an object even after its indriyas have ceased working, is distinct from those indriyas. When Davadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows even after the windows are closed, it is ātman, who remembers the object perceived by sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in the state of blindness, deafness etc. This provos that ātman is different from indriyas. Again, that which does not recognize an object even while the indriyas are working, is different from the senseorgans like an absent-minded Devadatta looking through the open windows. उवलब्भन्नेण विगारगहणओ तदहिओ धुवं अत्थि । पुव्वावरवातायणगहणविगाराइपुरिसो व्व ॥ १११॥ (१६५९) Uvalabbhannėņa vigāragabaņaö tadahiö dhuvam atthi Puvvāvaravātāyaṇagahaņavigārāipuriso vva. 111 (165:)) [उपलभ्यान्येन विकारग्रहणतस्तदधिको ध्रुवमस्ति ।
पूर्वापरवातायनग्रहणविकारादिपुरुष इव ॥ १११ ॥ (१६५९) Upalabhyānydna vikaragrahaņatastadadhiko dhruvanasti 1 Pūrvāparavătayanagrahaņavikārādipuruşa iva. 111 (1659) ]

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Vada] Gañadharavāda
: 155: ___ Trans.-111 Just as a person apprehending (an object) from an eastward window and perverting himself (due to its sight) at the opposite window, is different from those windows, so also, the soul who apprehends (an object ) by means of one (sense-organ) and exhibits perversion by means of another, is decidedly different from those sense-organs. (1629)
टीका-इह ध्रुवं निश्चितं तदधिकस्तेभ्य इन्द्रियेभ्यः समधिको भिन्नः समस्ति जीवः, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन विकारग्रहणात् , इह योऽन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन विकारं प्रतिपद्यते स तस्माद् भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथा प्रवरप्रासादोपरीतस्ततः पदपरिपाटीं कुर्वाणः पूर्ववातायनेन रमणीमवलोक्यापरवातायनेन समागतायास्तस्याः करादिना कुचस्पर्शादिविकारमुपदर्शयन् देवदत्तः, तथा चायमात्मा चक्षुषाऽम्लीकामनन्तं दृष्ट्वा रसनेन हृल्लास-लालासावादिविकारं प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मात् तयोभिन्न इति। अथवा, ग्रहणशब्दमिहाऽऽदानपर्यायं कृत्वाऽन्यथानुमानं विधीयते-इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन ग्रहणात्, इह य आदेयं घटादिकमर्थमन्यनोपलभ्यान्येन गृह्णाति स ताभ्यां भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पूर्ववातायनेन घटादिकमुपलभ्यापरवातायनेन गृह्णानस्ताभ्यां देवदत्तः, गृह्णाति च चक्षुषोपलब्धं घटादिकमर्थ हस्तादिना जीवा, ततस्ताभ्यां भिन्न इति ॥१११ ।। (१६५९)
D. C.-Jiva who apprehends an object by means of one indriya and exhibits vikāras by means of another, is bhinna from both the indriyas. Just as Dovadatta who looks at a woman from an eastward window and exhibits his perversion of the sight of stanasparśa etc., by her hands at the other is really speaking different from both the windows; in the stame way, the Soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes and exhibits vikāras in the form of distilling saliva etc., by means of tongue, is decidedly different from both, Or, åtman is different from indriyas because having seen an object by means of eyes, ātman holds it by means of hands,
Another inference,

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: 156: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third सव्वेंदिउवलद्धाणुसरणओ तदहिओऽणुमंतब्बो। जह पंचभिन्नविन्नाणपुरिसविन्नाणसंपन्नो ॥ ११२ ॥ (१६६०) Savvendiuvaladdhāņusarañaö tadahio’ņumantavvo I Jaha pancabhinnavinnāņapurisavinnānasampanno. 112. (1660) [ सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुसरणतस्तदधिकोऽनुमन्तव्यः।
यथा पञ्चमिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषविज्ञानसंपन्नः ॥११२॥ (१६६०) Sarvèndriyopalabdhānusnaraṇatastadadhiko'numantavyaḥ 1 Yathā pancabbinnavijñana puruşavijñānasampannaḥ, 112 (1660)]
___ Trans.--112 Just as, from five different persons having five different vijñānas, a sixth person possessing all the five vijfānas is different, so also, the soul who remembers an object cognized by all the sense-organs, should be inferred as being distinct from them. (1660)
टीका-सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुसरणतः कारणात् बदधिकोऽस्ति जीवः । दृष्टान्तमाह-यथा पञ्च च ते भिन्नविज्ञानाश्च पञ्चभिन्न विज्ञाना इच्छावशात् प्रत्येक स्पर्श-रस-गन्ध-रूप-शब्दोपयोगवन्त इत्यर्थः, पञ्चभिन्न विज्ञानाश्च ते पुरुषाश्च पञ्चभिन्न विज्ञानपुरुषास्तेषां यानि स्पर्शादिविषयाणि विज्ञानानि तैः संपन्नस्तद्वेत्ता यः षष्ठः पुरुषस्तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यो भिन्नः । इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्य इह यैरुपलब्धानामर्थानामेकोऽनुस्मा स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथेच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानपुरुषपञ्चकात् तदशेषविज्ञानाभिज्ञः पुमान् , इच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानेन्द्रियपश्चकाशेषविज्ञानवेत्ता चायमेक आत्मा, तस्मादिन्द्रियपञ्चकाद् भिन्न एवेति। शब्दादिभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषपश्वस्येव पृथगिन्द्रियाणामुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गतोऽनिष्टापादनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, इच्छानुविधायिविशेषणात्, इच्छायाश्चेन्द्रियाणामसंभवात् , सहकारिकारणतयोपलब्धिकारणमात्रताया इन्द्रियेष्वपि सद्भावात् , उपचारतस्तेषामप्युपलब्धेरविरोधाददोषः। किञ्च, प्रतिपत्त्युपायमात्रमेवैतत्, न ह्यतीन्द्रियेवर्थेष्वेकान्तेनैव युक्त्यन्वेषणपरैर्भाव्यम् । उक्तं च

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Vāda ] Gạ&dharavada
: 157 : आगमश्चोपपत्तिश्च संपूर्ण दृष्टिकारणम् । अतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां सद्भावप्रतिपत्तये ।।१।। इति ॥११२।। (१६६०)
D. C.-Since jiva remembers an object perceived by all the sense-organs, jiva should be distinguished from indriyas. From five different persons possessing five different vijñānas such as sparśa, rasa etc., according to their will, a sixth purusa having all the five vijñānas together, is distinguished. In the same way, the Soul that possesses the cognizance of all the five sense-organs, should be distinguished from each of the five sense-organe, In short, one who is the only anusmartā of the objects cognized, is distinguished from those by means of which the objects are perceived.
An objection may be raised at this point, that like five different puruşas having five different vijñānas such as sabda, rasa, etc., the five indriyas should also possess the power of cognizance. For, if they have no cognizance, the argument stated above would be a-siddha. But the contention is not valid. For, there would be no difficulty in this case by reason of the adjective " icchāvasāt.” Indriyas are not supposed to have any sort of desire. Or, by way of the co-operative cause the reason of perception lies in indriyas, and bence, there is no harm, if indriyas were metaphorically believed to be jßāna itself. Or, say, this illustration is nothing but a means to an end, Consequently, for the recognition of objects which are atîndriya ( beyond perception ), āgama and yukti are the only resorts. For, it is said,
Agamaśco'papattiśca sampūrņam dristikāraṇam;
Atindriyāņāmarthānām sadbhāvapratipattayd. A few more inferences are laid down in support of the distinction of Soul, विण्णाणंतरपुव्वं बालण्णाणमिह नाणभावाओ।
E raamigoe gaavi erfeuill 383 11 (688)

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:158:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ the third Vinnañantarapuvvam bālaņņāņamiha nāṇabhāvāöl Jaha bālanāņapuvvam juvanāņam tam ca dehahiam. 113 (1661) [विज्ञानान्तरपूर्व बालज्ञानमिह ज्ञानभावात् ।
यथा बालज्ञानपूर्व युवज्ञानं तच्च देहाधिकम् ॥११३॥ (१६६१) Vijñānāntarapūrvam bālajñānamiha jñānabhāvāti Yatha bālajñānapūrvan yuvajñānam tacca ddhadhikam. 113 (1661)]
Trans.--113 Just as, cognizance in youth is siinilar to cognizance in chiidhood, the latter is similar to other cognizances because of its being cognizance. And that (cognizance) is distinguished from de ha (1661)
टीका--अन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिदं बालविज्ञानम् , विज्ञानत्वात् , इह यद् विज्ञानं तदन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकम् दृष्टम् , यथा बालविज्ञानपूर्वकं युवविज्ञानम् , यद्विज्ञानपूर्वकं चेदं बालविज्ञानं, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, पूर्वशरीरत्यागेऽपीहत्यविज्ञानकारणत्वात् , तस्य च विज्ञानस्य गुणत्वेन गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेणासंभवात् , तच्छरीरव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं व्यवस्थामः, न तु शरीरमेवात्मेति । विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थंकदेशवादसिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत् । न, विशेषस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् । भवति च विशेषे पक्षीकृते सामान्यं हेतुः, यथाऽनित्यो वर्णात्मकः शब्दः, शब्दत्वात् , मेघशब्दवत् । एवमिहापि बालविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिति विशेषः पक्षीकृतः, न तु सामान्यविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिति पक्षीकृतं, येन विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थंकदेशः स्यात्, यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः, शब्दत्वादिति ॥ ११३ ।। (१६६१)
D. C.-Here the bālajñāna is similar to other vijñānas on account of its vijñānatva. Just as, yuvajñāna resembles bālajñāna, the vijñāna to which the bālajăána resembles is distinguished from déha because it continues to be the cause of vijñāna even after it has left the former body. Now, since vijñāna is a quality, it cannot remain without a gunin viz., ātman; consequently, we recognize ātman to be distinct from body, and not the body itselt.

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Vids] Ganadharavāda
: 159: "Vayubhuti-The hetn vijhanatvat" stated by you, becomes nothing but a portion of the proposition to be proved in that case.
Acārya—It is not so. The particular is pointed out in this case; and when particular is emphasized, the hètu stated there-in, is common e. g., the varņatmaka sabda is anitya because of its sabdatva as in the case of a meghaśabda. Similarly, in the proposition that bälavijñana is similar to other vijñānas, only a particular 'case of vijnāna is emphasized and vijnana in general is not emphasized, consequently this does not form a part of the proposition as, it forms in the case of " anityah sabdah sabdatvāt." पढमो थणाहिलासो अण्णाहाराहिलासपुवोऽयं । जह संपयाहिलासोऽणुभूइओ सो य देहहिओ ॥११४ ॥ (१६६२) Padhamo thanīhilāso aņņāhārāhilāsapuvvo'yam | Jaha sampayāhilaso'nubhuis so ya dehahio. 114 (1662)] [प्रथमः स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्याहाराभिलाषपूर्वोऽयम् ।
यथा सांप्रताभिलाषोऽनुभूतितः स च देहाधिकः ११४॥ (१६६२) Prathaidah stanābhilāso'nyāhārābhilāşapūrvo'yam 1 Yathā sāmpratābhilāşo'nubhūtitah sa ca dehādhikah. 114 (1662) ]
Trans -114 The first desire (of the child ) to suck the breasts ( of mother ), is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same ) experience. And that desire is distinct from body. (1662)
टीका-गौतम! आद्यः स्तनाभिलाषो बालस्यायमन्याभिलापपूर्वकः, अनुभूने:-अनुभवात्मकत्वात , सांप्रताभिलाषवदिति । अथवा, “ अभिलाषत्वात्" इत्ययमनुनोऽपि हेतुर्द्रष्टव्यः, इह योऽभिलापः सोऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वको दृष्टः, यथा सांप्रताभिलाषः, यदभिलाषपूर्वकश्चायमाद्यः स्तनाभिलाषः स शरीरादन्य एव, पूर्वशरीरपरित्यागेऽषीहत्याभिलाषकारणत्वात् । ज्ञानगुणवा

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: 160: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third मिलापो न गुणिनमन्तरेण संभवनि। अतो यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स शरीरातिरिक्त आत्मेति ।
आह--नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, सर्वस्याऽप्यभिलाषपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः। न हि मोक्षाभिलापो मोक्षाभिलाषपूर्वको घटते । तदयुक्तम् , अभिप्रायापरिशानात् , यो हि स्तनाभिलाषः स सामान्येनैवामिलापपूर्वक इत्येतदेवास्मामिरुच्यते, न पुनर्विशेषेण ब्रूमः--" स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्यस्तनाभिलाषपूर्वकः" इति । एवं च सामान्योक्ती मोक्षाभिलाषपक्षेऽपि घटत एव, मोक्षाभिलाषस्यापि सामान्येनाऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वकत्वादिति ॥११४ ॥ (१६६२)
D. C.-The first desire of the child to suck the breasts of the mother, is just similar to the other abhilāşas on account of its being an abhilasa. Now, the desire to which the child's stanābhilāsa resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of this abhilaşa even after it has left the body. Abhilāsa is the quality of knowledge which cannot exist without a support, which is nothing but the soul, independent of deha.
Vayubhuti:-The hetu stated in the above-named anumana, involves the fault of uncertainty as all abhilāşas are not the game. e. g., an abhilāşa for mokşa does not resemble another abhilāşa for moksz. So, why not to believe the same in the ouse of this abhilāşa algo ?
The Acārya.-You have not understood the point, 0 Gautama ! The point is that we have conipared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly, in the case of moksabhilasa also, the nokšābhilāşa should not be compared with other mokşabhilasas but only with other abhilāşas in general. (1662)
Anothor inference,

Page #199

Vikda ]
Gagadharavada
बालसरीरं देहंतरपुष्यं इन्दियाहभत्ताओ ।
जुवदेहो बालादिव स जस्स देहो स देहि ति ||११५|| (१६६३)
Balasartram dèhantarapuvvam indiyāimattāö | Juvadeho bālādiva sa jassa dèho sa dèhi tti. 115 (1668)
[ बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वमिन्द्रियादिमत्रात् ।
युवदेहो बालादिव स यस्य देहः स देहीति ॥ ११५ ॥ (१६६३)
Bālasariram dehāntarapūrvamindriyādimattvāt | Yuvaddho bālādiva sa yasya dahal sa dehiti. 115 (1663) ]
Trans. 115 As the body in youth resembles the body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because it possesses the sense-organs. One to whom that body belongs, is the owner of body (and not the body itself). (1663).
टीका - बालशरीरं शरीरान्तरपूर्वकम्, इन्द्रियादिमत्वात्, इह यदिन्द्रियादिमत्, तदन्यदेहपूर्वकं दृष्टम्, यथा युवशरीरं बालदेहपूर्वकम्, यत्पूर्वकं चेदं बालशरीरं तदस्मात् शरीरादर्थान्तरम्, तदत्ययेऽपीह त्यशरीरीपादानात्, यस्य च तच्छशरीरं स भवान्तरयायीशरीदादर्थान्तरभृतो देहवानस्त्यात्मा, न पुनः शरीरमेवात्मेति सिद्धमिति ॥ ११५ ॥ (१६६३)
: 161:
8
D. C.-Just as a body in youth resembles body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because of its possessing the indriyas. Now, the body to which this balasartra resembles, is distinct from the latter, for this body rises up even if the former body has perished. Again, that to whom this body belongs, is nothing but Soul, who travels from life to life, and who, being not the body itself, is distinct from this body.
Another inference,
अण्णसुह- दुक्खपुष्यं सुहाइ बालस्स संपइसहं व । अणुमूहमयत्तणओ अणुभूहमओ य जीवो ति ॥ ११६ ॥ (१६६४)
21

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Page #200

Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The third
Annasuha-dukkhapuvvam suhāi bālassa sampaisuham va Anubhūimayattaṇaö aṇubhūimaö ya jivo tti. 116 (1664) [ अन्यसुख-दुःखपूर्वं सुखादि बालस्य सांप्रतसुखमिव । अनुभूतिमयत्वतोऽनुभूतिमयश्च जीव इति ।। ११६ ।। (१६६४) Anyasukha-duḥkhapūrvam sukhādi balasya sampratasukhámiva | Anubhūtimayatvato'nubhūtimayaśca jiva iti. 116 (1664) ]
: 162:
Trans-116 Happiness in the state of childhood like the present-day happiness resembles happiness, misery etc., in other states. And the Soul is possessed of the faculty of perception, because of its being capable of perceptivity. (1664).
टीका - अन्यसुखपूर्वक मिदमाद्यं बालसुखम्, अनुभवात्मकत्वात्, सांप्र तसुखवत्, यत्सुखपूर्वकं चेदमाद्यं सुखम्, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, तदत्ययेऽपीह - त्यसुखकारणत्वात् । गुणश्रायम्, स च गुणिनमन्तरेण न संभवति, अतो यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स देहादर्थान्तरम् इति सुखानुभूतिमयो जीव इति सिद्धम् । एवं दुःख-राग-द्वेष-भय- शोकादयोऽप्यायोजनीया इति ॥ ११६॥ (१६६४ ) ॥
,
D. C.-Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present-day happiness, because of its anubhutimayatva. Now, the happiness to which this bālusukha resembles, is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished. Moreover, sukha is a guna which cannot exist without the support of gunin which, too, is distinct from body. This proves that the Soul is possessed of anubhuti of happiness. According to the same argument, we can prove that ätman possesses the anubhūti of duḥkha, rāga, dvesa, bhaya, soka, etc. Now, the anumānas that have already been laid down to establish the existence of Ava and karman are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory.
संताणोऽणाई उ परोप्परं हेउ हेउ भावाओ ।
देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं- कुराणं व ॥ ११७ ॥ (१६६५)
+ Vide verse 1689.

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Page #201

Vada ] Gañadharavada
:16: Santāno'nal u paropparam hou-hdubhāvan Dabassa ya kammassa ya Goyama i biyam-kurāņam va. 117 (1665) [सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतु-हेतुभावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम । बीजा-ऽङ्खरयोरिव ॥ ११७ ॥ (१६६५) Santāno'nādistu parasparam hətu-hètubhāvāt i Dahasya ca karmaṇaśca Gautama ! bijā’nkurayoriva. 117 (1665)]
Trans.- 117 And O Gautama ! as Karman and body are naturally related as the causes of each other like seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. (1665).
If the relation of Karman with body is eternal, how can the existence of jiva be established ? तो कम्म-सरीराणं कत्तारं करण-कजभावाओ। पडिवज तदन्भहिअं दंड-घडाणं कुलालं व ॥११८॥ (१६६६) अत्थि सरीरविहाया पइनिययागारओ घडस्सेव । अक्खाणं च करणओ दंडाईणं कुलालो व्व ॥ ११९ ॥ (१६६७) अथिंदियविसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्सं।। कम्मार इवादाया लोए संडास-लोहाणं ॥१२० ॥ (१६६८) भोत्ता देहाईणं भोज्जत्तणओ नरो व्व भत्तस्स । संघायाइत्तणओ अस्थि य अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥ १२१॥ (१६६९) जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होना। मुत्ताइपसगाओ तं नो संसारिणी दोसो ॥ १२२ ॥ (१६७०) To kamma-sartrānam kattāram karana-kajjabhavan Padivajja tadabbhahiam danda-ghadanam kulalam va. 118 (1666)

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: 164 : Jinabhadra Gaại's
[The third [aa: -Atat: sale aru-parrarara i
प्रतिपद्यख तदभ्यधिकं दण्ड-घटयोः कुलालमिव ॥११८॥ (१६६६). Tataḥ karma-śarirayoh kartāram karana-kāryabhāvāti Pratipadyasva tadabbyadhikam danda-ghețayoḥ kulalamiva. (118)]
Trans.-118 So, like a potter (to be distinct) from danda and ghata, know the creator of Karman and sarira to be distinct from both on account of the existence of cause and effect. ( 1666)
119. (1667) Vide verse 1567. 120. ( 1668 ) Vide verse 1568. 121. (1669) Vide verse 1569.
122. (1670) Vide verse 1570. Since all objects are kśanika according to Buddhistic theory, an opponent may argue here that jiva vanishes with body and hence it is no use trying to prove that Soul is different from body. The Acarya refutes this argument as follows:जाइस्सरो न विगओ सरणाओ बालजाइसरणो व्व । जह वा सदेसवतं नरो सरंतो विदेसम्मि ॥ १२३॥ (१६७१) Jāissaro na vigao saraņāö balajāisarano vyál Jaha vā saddsavattam nero saranto videsammi, 129 (1671)
[जातिसरो न विगतः स्मरणाद् बालजातिसरण इव ।
यथा वा खदेशवृत्तं नरः स्मरन् विदेशे ॥१२३॥ (१६७१) Jātismaro na vigatah smaraņād bāla-jāti-smaraņa iva i Yathā vā svadeśavritam narah smaran vidèse. 129 (1671))
Trans.--123 Like a person recollecting (his) childhood in old age) or recolleciing in a foreign country the incident, ( that happened ) in his own country, the Soul who recollects the former existence, does not perish by virtue of its power of ) recollection. (1671)

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Vada] Gañadharavāda
165: टीका-इह यो जातसरो जीवः स प्राग्भविकशरीरविगमेऽपि सति न विगत इति प्रतिज्ञा । 'सरणाउ त्ति' मरणादिति हेतुः। यथा बालजाती बालजन्मनि वृत्तं स्मरतीति बालजातिसरणो वृद्ध इति दृष्टान्तः। यथा वा, खदेशे मालवकमध्यदेशादौ वृत्तं विदेशेऽपि गतो नरः सरन् न विगतः। इदमुक्तं भवति-योऽन्यदेश-कालाधनुभूतमर्थं सरति सोऽविनष्टो दृष्टः, यथा बालकालानुभूतानामर्थानामनुसः वृद्धाद्यवस्थायां देवदत्तः। यस्तु विनष्टो नासौ किश्चिदनुस्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरमेवोपरतः । न च पूर्वपूर्वक्षणानुभूतमाहितसंस्कारा उत्तरोत्तरक्षणाः सरन्तीति वक्तव्यम्, पूर्व-पूर्वक्षणानां सर्वनिरन्वयविनाशेन सर्वथा विनष्टत्वात् , उत्तरोत्तरक्षणानां सर्वथाऽन्यत्वात् । न चान्यानुभूतमन्योऽनुस्मरति, देवदत्तानुभूतस्य यज्ञदत्तानुसरणप्रसङ्गादिति ॥ १२३॥ (१६७१)
D. C.--Here, the proposition is that tho Soul that remembers former existence, cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body, by virtue of its smaragasakti. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recolleots in & foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country, does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing, 80, also, the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place, is vidyamana (existing) like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But, if he be only the anusmartā nothing can be recolted in the next life, as he himself is not alive in that existence.
Again, it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments, as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later 'ones disappear.

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: 166: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third Lastly, one can never remember the cxperience of another. If it were so Yajñadatta would be able to remember the experience of Devadatta.
अह मन्नसि खणिओ वि हु सुमरइ विन्नाणसंतइगुणाओ। तहवि सरीरादण्णो सिद्धो विण्णाणसंताणो ॥१२४॥ (१६७२) Aha mannasi khaņiö vi hu sumarai vinnāṇasantaiguņāö i Tabavi surirādaņņo siddho viņņāṇasantāno. 124 (1672) [ अथ मन्यसे क्षणिकोऽपि खलु सरति विज्ञानसंततिगुणात् ।
तथापि शरीरादन्यः सिद्धो विज्ञानसंतानः॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२) Atha mangasd kşaņiko'pi khalu smarati vijäānasantatiguņāti Tatbāpi sarfrādanyaḥ siddho vijñānasantānaḥ. 124 (1672)
___ Trans.-124 Again, if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers (the former existence ) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body. ( 1672 )
टीका-अथैवं मन्यसे त्वम्-क्षणिकोऽपि क्षणभङ्गुरोऽपि जीवः पूर्ववृत्तान्तं सरत्येव । कुतः ? इत्याह-विज्ञानानां विज्ञानक्षणानां संततिः संतानस्तस्या गुणस्तत्सामर्थ्यरूपस्तमादिति, क्षणसंतानस्यावस्थितत्वात् क्षणनश्वरोऽपि मरतीत्यर्थः । अत्रोत्तरमाह-ननु तथाप्येवमपि सति ज्ञानलक्षणसन्तानस्यावेतनशरीरसंक्रान्तेर्भवान्तरसद्भावः सिध्यति, सर्वशरीरेभ्यश्च विज्ञानसंतानस्येस्थमर्थान्तरता साधिता भवति, अविच्छिन्नविज्ञानसन्तानात्मकश्चैवं शरीरादर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा सिद्धो भवतीति । तदेवं परभवमङ्गीकृत्याविनष्टस्मरणमावेदितम् ॥ १२४॥ (१६७२)
D. C."-Vayubhuti.-Even though the Soul is ksayika, it is able to remember the incidents of former life, because of the continuous range of the moments of vijñāna.
The Acerya:-Even in that oase, the continuous range of

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Vida ] Ganadbararāda
:167: knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life. Thus, vijñānasantāna is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently, the Soul that contains this vijñānasantāna would also be distin guished from body.
In this way, indestructibility of Soul, is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also.
न य सव्वहेव खणि नाणं पुयोवलद्धसरणाओ। खणिो न सरह भूयं जह जम्माणंतरविनट्ठो ॥१२५॥ (१६७३) Na ya savvahève khaniyam nāņam purvovaladd hasaraņāð i Khanis na sarai bhāyam jaha jammānantaravinattho. 125 (1673) [ न च सर्वथैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं पूर्वोपलब्धसरणात् ।
क्षणिको न सरति भूतं यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः॥ १२५॥ (१६७३) Na ca sarvathaiva kşaņikam jñānam pūrvopalabdhagmaraņāt i Ksaniko na smarati bhātam yathā janmānantaravinastah. (1673)]
Trans.—125 Or (ca), knowledge is not absolutely indurable (ksanika) by (virtue of the power of ) recollecting an object apprehended in the past. (For), one that is kşaņika is, like an object, perished after its very birth, not able to remember the past. (1673)
टीका-न च सर्वथैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं वक्तुं युज्यते । कथश्चित्तु क्षणिकतां भगवानपीच्छत्येव, इति "सर्वथैव” इत्युक्तम् । कस्मात् पुनर्ज्ञानं न क्षणिकम् ? इत्याह--पूर्वोपलब्धस्य बालकालाधनुभूतस्यार्थस्य वृद्धत्वाद्यवस्थायामपि स्मरणदर्शनात् । न चैतदेकान्तक्षणिकत्वे सत्युपपद्यते। कुतः ? इत्याह"खणिओइ त्यादि" यः क्षणिको नायं भूतमतीतं स्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः, एकान्तक्षणिकं चेष्यते ज्ञानम् , अत; सरणाभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ १२५॥ (१६७३)

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entirely kṣaṇika knowledge were no recognition
D. C.-Jñana sbould never be said to be It may be kṣaṇika to a certain extent. For, if taken to be absolutely transient, there would be in old age of objects perceived in childhood, as in the case of one who is perished after its birth. Ultimately smaraṇa will not exist at all even if jñāna were taken to be kṣanika in every way.
: 168:
And there is another difficulty also,
जस्सेगमे गबंधणमेगंतेण खणियं य विष्णाणं । सव्वखणियविण्णाणं तस्साजुत्तं कदाचिदवि ॥ १२६ ॥ (१६७४)
Jassègamegaband haṇamègantèņa khaniyam ya viņṇāṇam | Savvakhaniyavinnānam tassājuttam kadācidavi. 156 ( 1674)
[यस्यैकमेकवन्नमेकान्तेन क्षणिकं च विज्ञानम् ।
सर्वक्षणिकविज्ञानं तस्यायुक्तं कदाचिदपि ॥ १२६ ॥ (१६७४)
Yasyaikamèkabandhanamèkāntèna kṣaṇikam ca vijñānam | Sarvaksanikavijñānam tasyāyuktam kadācidapi. 126 ( 1674 ) ]
Trans. -- 126. It is never reasonable to accept vijñāna (of an object) as vijñāna having all-pervading kṣaṇikatā, as it is -one independant vijñāna exclusively connected with one moment (1674).
66
टीका -यस्य वादिनो बौधस्य ' एकविज्ञानसंततयः सच्चाः' इति वचनादेकमेवासहायं ज्ञानं तस्य ' सर्वमपि वस्तु क्षणिकम्' इत्येवंभूतं विज्ञानं कदाचिदपि न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । इष्यते च सर्वक्षणिकताविज्ञानं सौगतैः, " यत् सत् तत् सर्व क्षणिकम् " तथा क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्काराः " इत्यादिवचनात् । एतच क्षणिकताग्राहकज्ञानस्यैकत्वे न संभवत्येव । यदि हि त्रिलोकीतलगतैः सर्वैरपि क्षणिकेः पदार्थैः पुरः स्थित्वा तदेकं विज्ञानं जन्येतं, तदा तदेवजानीयाद् यदुत - " क्षणिकाः सर्वेऽप्यमी पदार्थाः” इति । न चैवं सर्वैरपि वैस्तजन्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह - ' एगबंधणं ति' यस्मादेकमेव

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
..169 प्रतिनियतं बन्धनं निवन्धनमालम्बनं यस्य तदेकवन्धनं ज्ञानम् , अतः कथमशेषवस्तुस्तोमव्यापिनी क्षणिकतामवबुध्येत ? । अपि च, एकालम्बनत्वेऽपि यद्यशेषपदार्थविषयाणामपि ज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते, आत्मा च तदर्थानुस्मर्ता, तदा स्यादशेषपदार्थक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् । न चाशेषार्थग्राहकानेकज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते ।
किञ्च, तदेकमप्येकार्थविषयमपि च विज्ञानं सर्वपदार्थगतां क्षणिकतामज्ञास्यदेव यद्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरध्वंसि नाभविष्यत् । अविनाशित्वे हि तदवस्थिततयोपविष्टं सदन्ममन्यं चार्थमुत्पत्त्यनन्तरमुपरमन्तं दृष्ट्वा “ सर्वमेवास्मद्वर्जमस्मत्सजातीयवर्ज च वस्तुक्षणिकमेव" इत्यवबुध्येत, न चैतदस्ति । कुतः ? इत्याह-" एगंतेण खणियं चेति" यस्य च बौद्धस्यैकान्तेन क्षणिक क्षणध्वंस्येव विज्ञानं, न पुनश्चिरावस्थायि, तस्य कथं सर्ववस्तुगतक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानं स्यात् । तस्मादक्षणिकमेव प्रमाज्ञानमेष्टव्यम् । तच्च गुणत्वादनुरूपं गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेण न संभवति। अतः सिद्धः शरीराद् व्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति ॥१२६ ।। (१६७४)
D. C.-According to the theory that there is one and only one continuous range of vijñāna to all living beings, the Bauddhas believe that vijñāna is oka (one ) and asahāya ( independent), and hence, it can never recognize all objects, as all objects would become kşanika according to that theory. Saugatas (Bauddhas), however, try to establish sarvaksanikatavijñāna by the help of statements such as “all that exists is ksanika" and " all samskāras, are ksamika" etc. Now, jhana having all-pervading kşaņiktā is not possible at all. For, if one were able to produce such jfāna in presence of all objects in the universe, then only it could be apprehended that all these objects are kşanika. But jõāna oould never be produced by means of all those objects in that manner. For, how could kşanikatā extended to all objects, be recognized when jñāna resorts to one and only one alambana? In such cases, if all jñānas of all objects were taken to have been produced at the same time, and if ātman were accepted as the anusmarta of
22

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[The third
all such jñānas, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of ali objects. But simultaneous production of jñāna as regards all objects, is never possible, and hence, the apprehension of sarvaksaņiktāvijñāna is also impossible.
Again, if vijñāna of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend sarvakṣanikata. For, in that case, vijñāna being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that 'every thing except us and those of our class, is kṣanika. "But that is not possible. For, according to Buddhistic theory, knowledge being exclusively kṣanika, cannot last for a long time, and hence it is not possible to apprehend ksaņiktā in саве of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as a-kṣanika. This being a guna, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz., ātman, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body.
66
L
जं सविसयनिययं चिय जम्माणंतरहयं च तं किह णु । माहिति सुबहुपविष्णाणविस यस्त्वयभंगयाईणि ॥१२७॥ (१६७५)
Jam savisayaniyayam ciya jammāṇantarahayam ca tam kiha ņu Nahiti subahuyaviņṇāņavisayakhayabhangayātņi? 127 (1675)
[ यद् स्वविषयनियतमेव जन्मान्तरहतं च तत् कथं नु ।
ज्ञास्यति सुबहुकविज्ञानविषयक्षयभङ्गकादीनि ? ॥ १२७ ॥ (१६७५)
Yad svavisayaniyatamèva janmäntarahatam ca tat katham nu | Jasyati subahukavijñānaviṣayakṣaya bhangakādtni? 127 (1675)]
Trans.-127 How could that (knowledge) which is restricted to its own self and scope, and which vanishes soon after its birth, understand qualities such as indurability etc., pertaining to the scope of vijñāna ? (1675).

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Thica ] Ganadharaväcta
: 171 टीका-यत् स्वविषयमाननियतं जन्मानन्तरहतं च प्रमोद विज्ञानं तमनं अपहविज्ञानविषयगतान् क्षणभंग-निरात्मकत्व-सुखि-दुःखितादीन् धान शास्यति न कथश्चिदित्यर्थः ।। १२७ ।। (१६७५) ___D. C.-Pramatri jnana (authentic knowledge) is restricted to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after its own production. So, it could never understand a number of attributes e.g., transitoriness, subjectivity, and sense al happiness, misery etc., related to the subject of vijnana, गिहिज्ज सव्वभंगं जइ य मई सविषयाणुमाणाओ। तं पि न जओऽणुमाणं जुत्तं सत्ताइसिद्धीओ ॥१२८॥ (१६७६) Giņbijja savvabhangam jai pa mat sevişayāņumānão Tam pi na jaö'pumāpam juttam sattuisiddhi8. 128 (1676) [गृह्णीयात् सर्वभङ्गं यदि च मतिः स्वविषयानुमानात् ।
तदपि न यतोऽनुमानं युक्तं सत्तादिसिद्धौ ॥१२८॥ (१६७६) Grihniyāt sarvabhangam yadi a matik svavisayānumanāt i. Tadapi na yato'numānam yuktam sattadisiddhau, 123 (1674)]
Trans.--128 Again, it is not even proper to believe that vijnāna apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of inference from its own self and scope. Because, anumang is proper only with regard to the establishment of existence etc. (1676).
. टीका-यदि च परस्यैवंभूता मतिः स्याद् यदुत एकमपि-एकालम्बनमपि क्षणिकमपि च प्रमान विज्ञानं सर्ववस्तु गतक्षणभङ्गं गृह्णीयात् । कुतः । इत्याह-स्वविषयानुमानात् । पतदुक्कं भवति-यस्मावयमस्मदिनमः क्षणिकः, अहं च क्षणनश्वररूपम्, ततो विज्ञानसाम्यादन्यान्यपि विशाल्मकि क्षणिकानि, विषयसाम्याचान्येऽपि विषयाः सर्वेऽपि क्षणिका, इत्येवं संच विषयाश्च स्खविषयास्तदनुमानात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य वणिकत्वादि गृखते। अत्र दूषणमाह-"तं पीत्यादि" तदपि न युक्तं न घटमानकम् । कतः व्याह

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[The third यतस्तत् स्वविषयानुमानमन्येषां विज्ञानानामन्यविषयाणां च पक्षीकृतानां सत्तादि प्रसिद्धावेव युज्यते । नहि सत्वेनाप्यप्रसिद्धेशर्मिणि क्षणिकतादिधर्मः साध्यमानो विभ्राजते। को हि नाम शब्दादिष्वादावेव सत्वेनाप्रतीतेषु कृतकत्वादिनानित्यत्वादिधर्मान साधयति, "तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धोधर्मी” इत्यादिवचनात्। न चेदमेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकं च ज्ञानमेतद् वोढुं शक्नोति यदुत-अन्यज्ञानानि सन्ति, तद्विषयाश्च विद्यन्ते, तेषां च विषयाणां स्वविषयज्ञानजननस्वभावादय एवं भूता धर्माःसन्तीति । एतदपरिज्ञाने च कथमेतेषां क्षणिकतां साधयिष्यति, धर्मिण एवाप्रसिद्धेः ।
___ स्यादेतत्, स्वविषयानुमानादेवान्यविज्ञानादिसत्तापि सेत्स्यत्येव, तथाहि-यथाऽहमस्मि तथान्यान्यपि ज्ञानानि सन्ति, यथा च मद्विषयो विद्यते, एवमन्येऽपि ज्ञानविषया विद्यन्त एव; यथा चाहं मद्विषयश्च क्षणिकः, एवमन्यज्ञानानि तद्विषयाश्च क्षणिका एवेति, एवं सर्वेषां सत्वं क्षणिकता च स्वविषयानुमानादेव सेत्स्यतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सर्वक्षणिकताग्राहक ज्ञानं क्षणनश्वरत्वावन्मान्तरं "मृत इवाहमस्मि, क्षणिकं च" इत्येवमात्मानमपि नावबुध्यते, अन्यपरिज्ञानं तु तस्य दूरोत्सारितमेव । किञ्च, तत् स्वविषयमात्रस्यापि क्षणिकतां नावगच्छति, समानकालमेव द्वयोरपि विनष्टत्वात् । यदि हि स्वविषयं विनश्यन्तं दृष्ट्वा ततद्गतक्षणिकता निश्चित्य स्वयं पश्चात् कालान्तरे तद् विनश्येत् , तदा स्यात् तस्य स्वविषयक्षणिकताप्रतिपत्तिः, न चैतदस्ति, ज्ञानस्य विषयस्य च निजनिजक्षणं जनयित्वा समानकालमेव विनाशाभ्युपगमात् । न च स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेण वा क्षणिकता गृह्यत इति सौगतैरिष्यते, अनुमानगम्यत्वेन तस्यास्तैरभ्युपगमादिति ॥१२८॥ (१६७६)
D. C.-An opponent may advance the following objection in this case
Pramātrivijñāna though ksaņika and resorting to only one alambana, is able to recognize kşaạikatā of its own self as well as sphere. For, just as the knowledge that we are kşanika as our vişaya is kşaņika, is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as ksanika,

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: 173: The argument stated above is not correct. Svavisayā. numāna can be appied only in case of establishing the the existence eto. of other vijñānas and visayas, and not otherwise. Just as in case of sabda etc., which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like anityatā by reason of their pere constructive utility; so, in this case also, properties like kşanikatā, could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all.
Moreover, vijñāna which is said to be kşanika and skālam-- bana, is not able to understand whether there are other jñānas and visayas, and whether those jñānas and vişayas possess the property of producing jñāna of its own self and sphere. So, if such 'jnāna could not be produced and if the objects in which kşanikatā is to be established, are not known, how could kşaņiktā be proved to exist at all ?
At this point, the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other vijñānas could be established by the help of sva vişayānumāna. One would say in this case that “ Just as I exist and my vişaya exists, other jnanas and their vişayas also exist, and just as I and my visaya are kşanika, other jñānas and their visayas are also kşanika." Thus, existence, as well as, kşanikatā of all the objects could easily be established.
The above objection is entirely fallacious. Jiāna which apprebends sarvakşapikatā is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on nocount of its being kşaņika-as good as dead. Thus, when it is not able to recognise its own self, how can it perceive that there are other jñānas and their visayas also ? Such indurable jñāna does not recognize kşaņikatā of its own visaya, because, according to them, that jñāna and vişaya vanish within equally short time. If that jñāna ascertains the ksaņikatā of its own vişaya from its disappearance within a short time before the jñāna itself dies away, then and then only would the kşaņikatā of its

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:174: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third vişaya be recognized by it. But this argument is not accepted by Bauddlias. They believe that jñāna and its visaya disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment.
Moreover, according to Saugatas, kşanikata is recognized neither by means of self-perception, nor by the help of percep. tion by sense-organs, but by means of anumāna only. जाणेज्ज वासणा उ सा वि हु वासित्त-वासणिज्वाणं । जुत्ता समेच दोण्हं न उ जम्माणंतरहयस्स ॥१२९॥ (१६७७) Jāņèjja yāsaņā u să vi hu vāsitta-vāsanijjāņam I Juttā sambcca donham na u jammayantarabayassa. 129 (1677) [जानीयात् वासना तु सापि खलु वासि-वासनीययोः ।
युक्ता समेत्य द्वयोन तु जन्मानन्तरहतस्य ॥१२९।। (१६७७) Jāniyāt vāsanā tu sāpi khalu väsi-vāsaniyayoh I Yuktā samatya dva yorna tu janmānantarahatsya. 129 (1677)]
Trans.-129 Again, (the opponent might argue that) desire could understand sarvaksaņikatā;, but that also is in fact proper (only) because it is related to both-one that desires and the desired (object), and not in case of that which vanishes soon after (its birth ). (1677).
टीका-स्यादेतत् पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञानक्षणैरुत्तरोविज्ञानक्षणांनामेवभूता वासना जन्यते, ययाऽन्यविज्ञान-तद्विषयाणां सत्त्व-क्षणिकतादीम् धर्मानेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकमपि च विज्ञानं जानाति, अतः सर्वक्षणिकताज्ञानं सौगताना न विध्यते । तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतः सापि वासना वासक-वासनीययोद्धयोरपि समेत्य संयुज्य विद्यमानयोरेव युक्ता, न तु जन्मान्तरमेव इतस्य विनष्टस्य । वास्य-वासकयोश्च संयोगेनावस्थाने क्षणिकताहानिप्रसाः। किश्व, सापि वासना क्षणिका, अक्षणिका वा। क्षणिकत्वे कथं तद्वशात् सर्वक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् ? । अक्षणिकत्वे तु प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति ॥१२९ ।। (१६७७)
D. C.--Here again, the opponents may argue that the

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ada ] Gangadharavada
: 175: earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire, even a kşanika vijñāna having only one support is able to apprehend other jñānas and their visayas having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no barm in believing that all objects are kşanika.
But even that is not correct. For vāsana in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to vāsaka and vāsaniya; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the avasthāna (retention ) of vāsya and vasaka connected together, kşanikatā itself would not exist. And, is that yāsanā kşaņika or a-ksaņika ? If it were kşanika, it would not be able to apprebend sarvakşaņikatā; and if it were a-kşanika, the very proposition that everything is kşaņika would be violated.
So, the theory of Bauddhas that everything is kşaņika does not fit in, in any way.
Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the Acārya now illustrates his own. बहुविण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्थयाऽहवेगस्स। Pepperrotaret at yufanitari ar 1183011 (866) विण्णाणवणविणासे दोसा इचादयो पसज्वति । न उ ठियसंभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि ॥१३१॥ (१६७९) तस्स विचित्तावरणखओवसमजाई चित्तरूवाई।
खणियाणि य कालंतरवित्तीणि य महविहाणाई ॥१३२॥ (१६८०) Bahuvinnanappabhavo jugavamapogatthayā’havegassa i Vipņāņāvatthā vā paquccavittīvighāö vā. 130 (1678) Vimpāņakbañāviņāad dosā icaādayo pasajjanti . . . Na on thiyambhūyaccuyaviņpānamayammi jivammi. 191 (1679)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
Tassa vicittävaraṇakhaovasamajāim cittarūvāim | Khaniyāni ya kālāntaravittini ya maivihānāim 132 (1680)
: 176:
[ The third
[ बहुविज्ञानप्रभवो युगपदनेकार्थताऽथवैकस्य ।
विज्ञानावस्था वा प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघातो वा ॥ १३० ॥ (१६७८)
विज्ञानक्षणविनाशे दोषा इत्यादयः प्रसजन्ति । न तु स्थित संभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये जीवे ।। १३१ ।। (१६७९)
तस्य विचित्रावरणक्षयोपशमजानि चित्ररूपाणि ।
क्षणिकानि च कालान्तरवृत्तीनि च मतिविधानानि ॥ १३२ ॥ (१६८०)
Bahuvijñāns prabhavo yugapadanèkārthata’thavaikasya | Vijnanāvasthā va pratityavrittivighāto vā. 130 ( 1678)
Vijñānakṣaṇavināśè doṣā ityādayaḥ prasajanti | Na_tu_sthitasambhūtacyutavijnñānamaye jtve. 181 ( 1679)
Tasya vicitrăvaraṇakṣayopośamajāni citrarūpāņi | Kşanikani ca kālāntaravrittini ca matividhānāni. 132 (1680) ]
Trans. -- 130-131-132 If vijñāna were taken to be ksana vināsi a number of faults such as production of many vijñānas, yielding more than one meaning at a time, or, one yielding more than one meaning at a time, retention ( avastha) of vijtana, violation of the law of cause and effect etc. would arise. This would not happen only in case of jiva, having vijtana which is sthita ( settled ), sambhūta (born ), and cyuta ( dropped), being accepted. (For), it manifests various (types of) intellectual forms that are born of various types of diminutions and relaxations that are kṣaṇika, as well as, permanent. (1678-1679-1680).
टीका - तदेवं विज्ञानस्य प्रतिक्षणं विनाशेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने इत्यादयो दोषाः प्रसजन्ति । के पुनस्ते दोषाः १ इत्याह- " बहुविष्णाणेत्यादि " इत्येवं संबन्धः । क्षणनःश्वरविज्ञानवादिना भुवनत्रयान्तर्वर्तिसर्वार्थग्रहणार्थं युगपदेव बहूनां ज्ञानानां प्रभव उत्पादोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तदाश्रयभूतत्र तदुष्टानाम

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Vida ] Ganadharavāda
:17: थानामनुस्माऽवस्थित आत्माऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, अन्यथा " यत् सत् तत् सर्व क्षणिकम्" "क्षणिकाः सर्वे संस्काराः" निरात्मानः सर्वे भावाः" इत्यादि सर्वक्षणिकतादिविज्ञानं नोपपद्येत, तदभ्युपगमे च स्वमतत्यागप्रसक्तिः। अथवा, क्षणिकं विज्ञानमिच्छतैकस्सपि विज्ञानस्य युगपदनेकार्थता-सर्वभवनान्तर्गतार्थग्राहिताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, येन सर्वक्षणिकतादिविज्ञानमुपपद्यते, न चैतदिष्यते, दृश्यते वा। "विण्णाणावस्था व त्ति" यदिवा, अवस्थानमवस्था, विज्ञानस्यावस्था विज्ञानावस्थाऽभ्युपगन्तव्या भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति-विज्ञानस्यानल्पकल्पाग्रशोऽवस्थानमेष्टव्यम् , येन तत् सर्वदा समासीनमंन्यान्यवस्तुविनश्वरतां वीक्षमाणं सर्वक्षणिकतामवगच्छेदिति सर्व प्रागेवोक्तमेव । एवं चाभ्युपगमे विज्ञानसंज्ञामात्रविशिष्टआत्मैवाभ्युपगतो भवति ।
___ अथैतद् बहुविज्ञानप्रभवादिकं नेष्यते, तर्हि प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघात: प्रामोति । इदमत्र हृदयम्-कारणं प्रतीत्याश्रित्य कार्यस्य वृत्तिःप्रवृत्तिरुत्पत्तिरिति यावत्, न पुनः कारण कार्यावस्थायां कथञ्चिदप्यन्वेति, इत्येवं सौग. तैरभ्युपगम्यते। इत्थं चाभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतीतस्मरणादिसमस्तव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः। एवं हि व्यवहारप्रवृत्तिः स्याद् यद्यतीतानेकसंकेतादिज्ञानाश्रयस्तत्तद्विज्ञानरूपेण परिणामादन्वयी आत्माऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाभ्युपगमे च सति प्रतीत्यवृत्त्यभ्युपमविधातः स्यादिति । ननु यदि विज्ञानस्य क्षणविनाश एते दोषाः प्रसजन्ति, तहिं कामी दोषा न भवन्ति? इत्याह-"न उ ठियेत्यादि" न त्वमदभ्युपगते जीवेऽभ्युपगम्यमान एते-दोषाः प्रसजन्ति । कथंभूते जीवे? स्थितसंभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये--कथञ्चिद् द्रव्यरूपतया स्थितम् , कथञ्चित्तुत्तरपर्यायेण संभूतम् , कथञ्चित्पुनः पूर्वपर्यायेण च्युतं विनष्टं यद् विज्ञानं तन्मय इत्यर्थः। तस्मादमुमेवोत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्ययुक्तं शरीरादर्थान्तरभूतमसदभ्युपगतमात्मानं समस्तव्यवहारसिद्धये प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥१३०-१३१॥ (१६७८ -१६७९)
टीका-मतेर्मतिज्ञानस्य विधानानि नानाभेदरूपाणि तस्य यथोक्तरूपस्यात्मनः प्रवर्तन्ते । कथंभूतानि ? इत्याह-विचित्रो योऽसौ मतिज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमस्ततो जातानि, अत एव खकारणभूतक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि । तथा, पर्यायरूपतया क्षणिकानि, द्रव्यरूपतया तु नित्यत्वात्

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: 178 :
Jinabhadra Gapis (The third कालान्तरवृत्तीनि । उपलक्षणं च मतिविधानानि, श्रुता-ऽवधि-मन:पर्यायविधानान्यपि यथासंख्यं श्रुता-ऽवधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद विचित्ररूपाणि यथासंभवं तस्य द्रष्टव्यानि। केवलज्ञानं त्वेकमेवाविकल्प केवलज्ञानावरणक्षयादेव द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥१३२ ॥ (१६८०)
D. C.-If jñāna were taken to be kşanika as stated before, a number of dosas would get in, in the following manner :
1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three worlds should be recognized, a kşaạikatā-vādin ought to admit that all sorts of bānas are produced at the same time, and the Soul that remembers the objects in which those frānas are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Other wise, statements such as “Whatever exists is all kşamika" "Al bhavas are kşaņika" eto., that establisbied sarvaksanikata would be futile.
Moreover, when more than one jkāna are accepted, the original theory of skavijñāna santati has also been violated.
2. Again, if ksana vijñāna were accepted, another fault would also crop up. In this case, one and the same vijkāna would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the three worlds. But this could never happen, nor be believed.
8. In order to recognize 8 number of objects, vijāna must be taken to last for a long time. As & , result of this, vijñāna would be able to recognize the kşanikatā of all, as they are ksanika also. But by believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but vijfāna would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition.
4. Again, if the production of many vijñānas were not accepted, there would be. violation of pratityavrtti: When kāraña is not anyhow apprehended in the etate of 'kärya, Bauddhäs oall it the violation of pratityavrtti. As the production of a karya depends , upon a karana, this would give rise to dose. If 'Bauddhas were to accept this, o processes suon me that of

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
: 179: remembering the past incident-etc., would be abolished. Again, if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions etc, were believed to have been related to the pariņāma in the form of vijñāna, then also, the law of pratityavritti would be violated. For, by believing so, the Soul is taken as related to the parinama.
Thus, in case vijñāna is accepted as kşanika, all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing vijñāna which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form, and which has already ceased' to exist as vijñāna, the faults ennumerated above would never arise. This proves that atman that has utility, stability, and productivity for the sake of all vyavahāra is undoubtedly distinct from body. For, such an ātman possesses various matijñāna-bhèdas produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the matijñāna itself. These bhedas are kşaņika on account of their wavering nature, and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality.
Again, by means of implication, the soul manifests various types of jñana e. g. śruta (ascertained by intellect), avadhi ( applied by intellect), and manahparyāya (mental perception ) etc., are respectively produced from the knowledge ascertained, applied, and perceived by mind. 130-131-132 (1678-1679-1680)
The Kavala jñāna or Absolute Knowledge is attained only when all its interruptions are warded off.
निचो संताणो सिं सव्वावरणपरिसंखए जं च । केवलमुदियं केवल भावेणाणंतमविगप्पं ॥१३३ ॥ (१६८१) Nicco santāạo sim savvāvaranaparisamkhad jam ca i Kovalamudiyam kòvalabhāvèņāŋantamavigappam, 133" (1681) [lact: Trana: gat gelateritud tai
ogled nararanfeng Il 823 11 (8668)

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: 180: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third Nityaḥ santāna dşām sarvavaraņa parisamkşayè yacca i Kevalamuditam kevalabhāvanānantamavikalpam. 133 (1681)]
Trans.---133 They (matijinānādi vidhānas) have a perpet. ual continuance (nitya santana)-in the form of samanyajnanawhich being free from all interruptions, is said to be ananta (endless) and avikalpa (illusionless). Kevala (Absolute) exists "by (virtue of ) its Kevalabhava (absoluteness) (1681).
टीका-"सिं ति" एतेषां च मतिज्ञानादिविधानानामविशेषितज्ञानमात्ररूपसंतानो नित्योऽव्यवच्छिन्नरूपः। केवलज्ञानं त्वविकल्पं भेदरहितमुदितमाख्यातं भगवद्भिः यतः सर्वस्यापि निजावरणस्य क्षय एव तदुपजायते। अतोऽविकल्पं केवलभावेनानन्तकालावस्थायित्वात् , अनन्तार्थविषयत्वाचानन्तमिति ॥१३३ ।। (१६८१)
D. C.-The avišasitajñāna or sâmānyajñāna of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc. But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be ananta and avikalpa by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all avaraņas. Thus Kovalajñana is avikalpa (i. e. positive and illusionless ) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object ( anan. tārtha). 1681.
Here again Vāyubhūti raises a doubt, and the 7Irthankura removes it...
सो जइ देहादन्नो तो पविसंतो व निस्सरंतो वा । कीस न दीसह, गोयम! दुविहाऽणुवलद्धि उ सा य ॥१३४॥ (१६८२) So jai dèbādanno to pavisanto va nissaranto vai Kisa na disai, Goyama duvibā’ņuvaladdhi u sā ya. 134 (1682) [स यदि देवादन्यस्ततः प्रविशन् वा निःसरन् वा।
कस्माद् न दृश्यते, गौतम ! द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु सा च ॥१३४॥ (१६८२) Sa yadi dehādanyastataḥ pravišan vā niħsaran vãi Kasmad nadrsyate Gautamalavividhanupalabdhistusa ca, 134/1683)

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Vida] Ganadharavada
:181 असओ खरसंगस्स व सओ वि दूराइभावओऽभिहिया! मुहुमा-ऽमुत्तत्तणओ कम्माणुगयस्स जीवस्स ॥१३५॥ (१६८३) Asaở kharagangassa va sao vi dūrāibhāvaö bhihiyā i Suhuma'mattattapas kammānugayassa jivassa. 135 (1683) [असतः खरशृङ्गस्येव सतोऽपि दूरादिभावतोऽभिहिता।
सूक्ष्माऽमूर्तत्वतः कर्मानुगतस्य जीवस्य ॥१३५।। (१६८३) Asataḥ kharaśrngasydva sato’pi dūrādibhavato'bhihitā i Sūkóna'mūrtatvataḥ karmānugatsya jivasya. 135 (1683) ]
Trans.- 134-135 If the Soul is different from body, how is it that it is not perceived while entering ( the body ). or issuing forth (from it)?
But again, O. Gautama ! non-perception (anupalabdhi) is of two types :-1. Non-perception of a non-existent object like a kharaśrnga and 2. Non-perception of an existent object by reason of its distance etc. Non-perception of the Soul which is karmānugata is due to its exquisite formlessness (sāksmā'murtatva) (1682-1683).
टीका-यदि नाम शरीरादन्योऽसौ जीवस्ततो घटे चटक इव शरीरे प्रविशन् निःसरन् वा किमिति नोपलभ्यते ?। भगवानाह-“गोयमेत्यादि" यतो द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिरस्ति, अतस्तस्यानुपलब्धेः कारणाद् गौतम ! जीवो न दृश्यते । कथं पुनः साऽनुपलब्धिदिक्षिा ? इत्याह-सा चानुपलन्धेरेकाऽसतो भवति, यथा खरशृङ्गस्य । द्वितीया तु सतोऽप्यर्थस्य भवति । कुतः ? इत्याह-दूरादिभावादिति, दूरात् सन्नप्यर्थो न दृश्यते, यथा स्वर्गादिः, आदिशन्दात्-अतिसंनिकर्षात् , अति सौक्ष्म्यात्, मनोऽनवस्थानाव, इन्द्रियापाटवात् , मतिमान्द्यात, अशक्यत्वात् , आवरणात् , अभिभवात् , सामान्यात् , अनुपयोगात्, अनुपायात्, विस्मृतेः, दुरागमात्, मोहात् , विदर्शनात् , विकारात्, अक्रियातः, अनधिगमात् , कालविभकर्षाव, स्वभावविप्रकर्षाचेति ।
तत्रातिसंनिकर्षाव सम्भप्यर्थो नोपलभ्यते, यथा नेत्र-दक्षिका-पक्ष्मादिः।

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third अतिसौक्ष्म्यात् परमाण्वादिः । मनोऽनवस्थानात्, सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिर्यथा नष्टचेतसाम् । इन्द्रियापाटवात् किञ्चिद्वधिरादीनाम् । मतिमान्द्यादनुपलब्धिः सतामपि सूक्ष्मशास्त्रार्थविशेषाणाम् । अशक्यत्वात् स्वकर्ण-कृकाटिका मस्तकपृष्ठादीनाम् । आवरणाद् हस्तादिस्थगितलोचनानां कटकुव्याद्यावृत्तानां वा । अभिभवात् प्रसृतसूरतेजसि दिवसे तारकाणाम् सामान्यात् सूपलक्षितस्यापि माषादेः समानजातीयमाषादिराशिपतितस्याप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । अनुपयोगाद् रूपोपयुक्तस्य शेषविषयाणाम् । अनुपायात् शृङ्गादिभ्यो गोमहिष्यादिपयःपरिणामजिज्ञासोः । विस्मृतेः पूर्वोपलब्धस्य । दुरागमाद् दुरुपंदेशात् तत्प्रतिरूपकरीतिकादिविप्रलम्भितमतेः कनकादीनां सतामप्यनुपलब्धिः । मोहात् सतामपि जीवादितच्चानाम् । विदर्शनात् सर्वथाऽन्धादीनाम् वार्धक्यादिविकाराद् बहुशःपूर्वोपलब्धस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । अक्रियातो भूखननादिक्रियाऽभावाद् वृक्षमूलादीनामनुपलब्धिः । अनधिगमात् शास्त्राश्रवणात् तदर्थस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । कालविप्रकर्षाद् भूतभविष्यदृषभदेवपद्मनामतीर्थकरादीनामनुपलब्धिः । स्वभावविप्रकर्षाद् नभः पिशादीनामनुप लम्भः। तदेवं सतामप्यर्थानामेकविंशतिविधाऽनुपलब्धिः प्रवर्तते । अतोऽस्य कर्मानुगतस्य संसारिणो जीवस्याऽमूर्तत्वाद् नभस इव, कार्मणस्य तु सौक्ष्म्यात् परमाणोवि सतोऽनुपलब्धिः, नासतः । कथं पुनरेतज्झायते - नासत आत्मनो Sनुपलब्धिः, किन्तु सतः १ इति चेत् । उच्यते-- अनुमानैस्तत्सत्त्वस्य साधितत्वादिति ॥१३४ -१३५।। (१६८२-१६८३)
I
: 182:
D. C. -Vayubhūti— If this soul is different from body, how is it that it is not seen entering or issuing forth from the body like a cataka (sparrow ) from a ghata ( vessel ) ?
Bhagavan-Because of the two-fold anupalabdhi, O Gautama! the Soul is not perceived. These two types are - ( 1 ) Anupalabdhi of a non-existent object e. g. a kharaśrňga (horn of an ass) and (2) Anupalabdhi of an existent object.
Now, for the non-perception of an existent object, there are twenty-one reasons.
i. Atiduratva (Extreme remoteness )-Places like svarga,

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det: But as they are extremely remote, they are not
Vada ] Ganadharavāda
: 188 : do exist. But as they are extremely remote, they are not
perceivable. i. Atisannikarsa (Close vicinity )-Certain objects like eye
lashes and secretion of eyes, though existent, cannot be seen on account of their close vicinity.
ji. Atisauksmya (Exquisite fineness )-Paramāņus are im
perceptible, because they are exquisitely fine. These paramāņus are so minute in form, that they are not perceptible even to the naked eye, even though they are considered to be existent.
Mandnavasthāna (Instability of mind )-Sometimes even & mūrta object is not apprehended by reason of mano navasthana or the instability of mind, as in the case of
an insane man. v. Indriyāpātatva (Dullness of senses ) -Non-perception arises
also when a sense or senses are benumbed e. g. a
deaf man. vi. Matimândya (Dullness of intellect )-Certain subtleties
of the śāstras are always anupalabhya to a dull-witted .
man, due to his manimāndya. vii. Asakyatva ( Impossibility )-One can never see his own
ear, head, or back, as it is utterly impossible to do so.
riji. Avarana (Obstruction |-When eyes are covered with hands
or when hands are obscured by means of a mat or a wall,
it is āvaraņa that causes non-perception. iz, Abhibhava (Predominance )-Predominance of Sun in the
sky, makes the stars anupalabhya on a sun-bright day. Sāmānya-( Commonness ) When beans are niixed with beans of the same quality, there is non-aprehension of beans owing to the sāmānyatva present in both.

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: 184: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third xi. Anupayoga i Lack of Attention - When an object is
touched by a particular indriya, say, Rūpa (the sense of eye ), it is not perceived by the rest of senses because of
of their anupayoga to the object. xii. Anupāya ( Want of Means - If a person wants to take
an estimate of milk (contained ) in a cow or a buffalo by means of śrnga eto., he can never do so, because there is
no such means available. idi. Vismrti ( Forgetfulness -Án object perceived before,
becomes anupalabhya afterwards by reason of vismrti. . Durāgama--( Wrong Instruction –When an object like
gold is presented in the style of a forged edict, it is not recognized in its true form, because there is durupadesa
or wrong instruction as regards its form. XV. Moha ( Delusion )-Objects like Jiva do exist, but they are
not perceived due to moha ( on the part of those who try
to perceive them ). Ivi. Vidarsana ( Absence of Sight is the absolute cause of
anupalabdhi in the case of blind persons. cvii. Vikara (Loss of Health Mostly, it 80 happens that
things that are once perceived are not apprehended in later
life on account of vikaras like vārdhakya (old age ) eto. sviii. Akriyā (Want' of Action There is non-perception of
roots of trees because of the scarcity of actions like
bhukhanana eto. xix. Anadhigama (Non-soquisition Owing to the anadhi
gama of sästraśravana, the meaning of Šāstras becomes
incomprehensible. XX. Kāla viprakarsa (Remoteness of Time )-Rşabhadeya and
other Tirthankaras of the past, and Padma Nabha of future anngot be recognized due to the remoteness of time.

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Vida ] Gapadharavada
: 185 : i. Syabhāvaviprakarsa (Natural Remoteness )--Things like
nabhas and piśať ure non-cognizible by reason of their svabhāvaviprakarsch
In this way, anupalabdhi of an existent object takes place in twenty-one different ways.
So, Jiva is insperceptible like nabhas due to its amūrtatā; and sartra being an assemblage of the Kārman paramāņus is anupalabhya because of sauksmya of & paramāņu. Thus, non-perception of the Soul and body, is positively the non-perception of an existent object and not of a nonezistent one.
An argument may here be advanced that “If you take Atman to be existent, how do you apprehend its existence ?" The reply is :
The existence of Atman is established by means of anumāna. And hence, its anupalabdhi is not the anupalabdhi of a non-existent object like a kharabriga, but it is the anupalabdhi of an existent object like nabhas and paramāpu. Then, the distinction of Soul from body is established by the help of Vadavacana. देहाणण्णे व जिए जमग्गिहोत्ताई सग्गकामस्स । वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥१३६॥ (१६८४) Dahāņaạnè va jie jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa · Vəyavihiyam vibaņņai dāņaiphalam ca oa loyammi. 196 (1684)
| The word Pisa=ruru, a kind of deer according to Sāyaṇācārya. The deer is called Piśa probably because it is Pisa (reddish) in colour. The anupalabdhi of the Piśa deer may be taken to be due to its nature of being always far away from human habitations. The word, however, seems rather improper when placed with nabhas, If we road pisāca instead of Pisa, it would suit our purpose better.--Tr.

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: 186: Jinabhadra Gayl's
[The thira [देहानन्ये वा जीवे यदमिहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ॥१३६॥ (१६८४) Dahānanyè vā jtvd yadagnihotrādi gvargakāmasya i Vedavihitam vihanyata dānadiphalam on loke. 136 (1684)]
___ Trans.--136 Or, if ytva is (believed to be) identical with deha (the body), then, (obstruction of the) rites like agnihotra (the worship of sacred-fire) for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. (dānādiphala) in the world prescribed by the Vedas, would be refuted. (1684).
टीका-शरीरमात्रे जीवे सति गौतम! यत् स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितमग्रिहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं तद् विहन्यते, देहस्य वतिनाऽत्रैव भस्मीकरणात् , जीवाभावे कस्यासौ वर्गों भवेत् ? इति भावः। दानादिफलं चानुभवितुरभावात् कस्य भवेत् ? इति ॥१३६॥ (१६८४)
___D. C.-0 Gautama! If each and every sarira is believed to be identical with jiva, the commandment of the Vedas that a person who desires to attain Salvation, should perform the rites of Agnihotra, would be null and void. Because, when body is reduced to ashes by fire in this world, the Riva being taken to be identical with body is also supposed to have vanished with the body. And then, who would attain Salvation when Jiva itself does not exist ?
Similarly, who would be there to enjoy the fruits of good deeds like dana when there would be none to receive them at all!
Vāyubhūti entertains doubt as regards the distinction of Soul from body by bearing the various Voda-padas bearing contradictory arguments. Bhagavān Mahāvira interprets these Veda-padas correctly and olears his doubt.. विण्णाणघणाईणं वेयपयाणं तमत्थमविदंतो। देहाणण्णं मनसि ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥१३०॥ (१६८५)

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Veda] Ganadhararāda
: 187: Vinnānagħaņātņam Vàyapayānam tamatthamavidanto Dahānangam mannasi tānam ca payayamayamattho. 187 (1685) [विज्ञानधनादीनां वेदपदानां त्वमर्थमविदन् ।
देहानन्यं मन्यसे तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥ १३७ ।। (१६८५) Vijñānaghanādinām Vada-padānām tvamarthamavidan Dahānanyam manyasd tesam ca padanāmayamarthah. 137 (1686)]
Trans.—137 You, not knowing the (real) meaning of sentences like " Vijnanaghana" etc., of the Vedas, think that the Soul is identical with body. But (ca) their real interpre. tation is this.t (1685).
टीका-विज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमित्यादिव्याख्या पूर्ववदेव । अत एव प्रागुक्तम्-" शरीरतया परिणतो भूतसंघातोऽयं विद्यमानकर्तृकः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात् , घटवद्, यश्च तत्कर्ता स तदतिरिक्तो जीवः” इति । भूतारिक्तात्ममतिपादकानि च वेदवाक्यानि तवापि प्रतीतान्येव । तद्यथा-"सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यं ज्योतिर्मयो विशुद्धो यं पश्यन्ति धीरा यतयः संयतात्मानः" इत्यादि। तदेवं सर्वेषामपि वेदवाक्यानां भूतातिरिक्तस्य जीवस्य प्रतिपादकत्वाद् भूतेभ्योऽतिरिक्तं जीवं प्रतिपद्यखेति ॥१३७॥ (१६८५)
D. C.—That the Soul itself is "vijñānaghana" and that it is distinct from other bhūtas has already been discussed. It has already been said that .Sartratayā pariņato bhūtasamghāto'yam vidyamānakartrikaḥ, Adimatpratiniyatākāratvāt ghatavat, yaśca tatkartā sa tadatirikto
jivaḥ iti Moreover, sentences of the Vedas that prove Atman to be atirikta from bhūtas, have not been beyond your comprehenBion. e.g.
† The real interpretation of sentences like " vijñānaghana" eto , has already been stated and discussed in the First Vada. vide Vs. 1588-1595.

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: 188: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third "Satyena labhyastapasā hydşa brahmacaryèņa nityam jyotirmayo visuddhoyam pakyanti dhtrã vatayah samyatätmlnah II”
In the same way, all Veda-padas have proved that Jiva is atirikta from bhūtas. Hence, you too, shall have to admit that, the Soul is distinot from bhūtas. छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेणं जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
Fun To9537t af HeifcheSE 1183611 (8668) Chinnammi samsayammi Jiņàņam jarā-maranavippamukkèņam i So samaņo pavvalo pancahim saha khandiyasa dhim. 138 (1686)
[छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रबजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥१३८॥ (१६८६) Chinna samsayo jñona jarā-maraṇavipramuktena 1 Sa śramaņak pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khaņķikasataiḥ.,138 (1686)]
Trans.--138 When the doubt was removed by the Nrthankara, who was entirely free from jară (old age ), and maraņa (death), the saint Vāyubhūti accepted the Dikșa along with his five hundred followers. (1686).
End of the Discussion with the Third Gañadhara.

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Chapter IV
चतुर्थगणधरवक्तव्यता। Discussion with the Fourth Gañadhara. ते पव्वइए सोउं वियत्तु आगच्छह जिणसगासं। वचामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥१३९॥ (१६८७) Td pavvaiè soum Viyattu āgacohai jiņasagasam i Vaccāmi ņa vandamt vandittā pajjuvāsāmi. 139 (1687) [तान प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा व्यक्त आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥१३९॥ (१६८७) Tan pravrajitan śrutvā Vyakta āgacchati jinasakāšam i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase. 139 (1687)]
Trans.-139 Having heard that they (i. e. Vayubhuti and his fellow-mendicants) had renounced the world, Vykta comes before the Tirthankara. (He thinks...) "I may go, pay my homage (to the Tirthankara), and serve him." (1687) आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुकणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसीणं ॥१४०॥ (१६८८) Abhattho yajiņèņam jāi-jara-maranavippamukk dņam Nămdņa ya gottòņa ya savvappũ savvadarisiņam. 140 (1688) [आम्ाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदचिना ॥ १४० ॥ (१६८८)

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:190: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Abhāşitaśca jinèna jāti-jarā-maraṇavipraniuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina. 140 (1681)]
Trans.--140 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had (attained) complete darsana. (1628)
Bhagavān said :किं मण्णे अस्थि भूया उदाहु नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥१४१॥ (१६८९) Kim naạnd atthi bhūyā udāhu natthi tti saņsao tujjha 1 Vdyapayana ya attham na yānast tesimo attho. 141 (1689) [किं मन्यसे सन्ति भूतान्युताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेपामयमर्थः ॥१४१॥ (१६८९) Kim manyasd santi bhūtānyutābo na santîti samsayastava 1 Vèdapadánām cārtham na jānāsi təşāmayamarthaḥ. 141 (1699)]
Trans. -141 O Vyakta ! What are you thinking nf? You entertain the doubt as to whether Bhūtas exist or not. But (ca) you have not understood the (real) interpretation of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1689)
टीका-पृथिव्य-ऽप्-तेजो-वाय्वा-ऽऽकाशलक्षणानि पञ्चभूतानि, तानि च किं सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । संशयश्च तवायं विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि-"खमोपमं वै सकलमित्येष ब्रह्मविधिरञ्जसा विज्ञेयः" इत्यादि, तथा, “ द्यावा-पृथिवी" इत्यादि, तथा, "पृथिवी देवता, आपो देवताः" इत्यादि । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तव प्रतिभासते-"खमोपमम्-स्वमसदृशम् , निपातोऽवधारणे, सकलम्-अशेष जगत्, इत्येष ब्रह्मविधिः-परमार्थप्रकारः, अञ्जसा-प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, विज्ञेय:ज्ञातव्यः" इति । तदेवमादीनि वेदपदानि किल भूतनिहवपराणि, "द्यावा

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Vada ] Ganadharavada
: 191: पृथिवी" इत्यादीनि तु सत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, अतस्तव संशयः । तदेतेषां वेदपदानां त्वमर्थ न जानासि, चशब्दाद् युक्तिहृदयं च न वेरिस । तेन संशयं कुरुषे । तेषां चायमर्थो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥१४१॥ (१६८९)
D. C.-This is your querry-"Do the pancabhitas viz. Prthvi (earth) ap (water), tėjas (fire), vāyu (air) and ākāśa (ether) exist or not? This querry is based upon your misapprehension of certain sentences of the Vedas, that are mutually contradictory. The sentences are(1) "Svapnopamam vai sakalamitydsa brahmavidhiranjasa
vijndyah" etc. (2) “Dyāvā-prithvt" etc. and (8) “ Prithvi-dovatā, āpo devatāḥ " etc. Your interpretation of these sentences runs thus :
All this world is nothing but a dream or illusion. So, one should honestly endeavour to know the Brahma, which is the the only paramārthaprakāśa worth attaining.
Such sentences refute the existence of the five elements while others like Dyāvā prithivi and « Prithivi devatā, āpo dòvatān” establish the existence of those very elements. These contradicting sentences of the Vedas have given rise to your doubt.
Really speaking, you have not understood the real purport of the above sentences. Here I give their correct interpretation. Listen to it.
भूएसु तुज्झ संका सुविणय-माओवमाई होज त्ति। न वियारिजंताई भयंति जं सव्वहा जुत्ति ॥१४२॥ (१६९०) Bbūèsu tujjha sankā guviņaya-māövamāim hojja tti i Na viyārijjantāim bhayanti jam savvahā juttim. 142 (1690) [भूतेषु तव शङ्का स्वमक-मायोपमानि भवेयुरिति ।
न विचार्यमाणानि भजन्ति यत् सर्वथा युक्तिम् ॥१४२॥ (१६९०)

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.193
Jinabhadra Gaul's [The fourth Bhatəşu tava tankā svapnaka-māyopamāni bhavèyuriti i Na rioaryamānāni bhajanti yat sarvathā yuktim. 142 (1690)] भूयाइसंसयाओ जीवाइसु का कह त्ति ते बुद्धी। तं सव्वसुण्णसंकी मनसि मायोवमं लोयं ॥१४३॥ (१६९१) Bhūyāisamsayão jivāisu kā kaha tti to buddht i Tam savvasuppasankt mannasi māyovamam loyam. 143 (1691) [भूतादिसंशयात् जीवादिषु का कथेति ते बुद्धिः।
त्वं सर्वशून्यशकी मन्यसे मायोपमं लोकं ॥१४३॥ (१६९१) Bhūtadisamsayāt jivādiņu kā kathori tè buddhiḥ i Tvam saryasunyasaikt manyasd mayopamam lokam. 148 (1691)
Trans.--142–143 You entertain the doubt about the elements that they are (unreal) like dreams and illusions. - And when you question the (existence of) elements (them. selves), what to talk of objects like jiva etc.? You, being dubious about the existence of everything, believe the whole. world to be (as unreal as) māyā. (1690–1691).
. टीका-आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! भूतेषु भवतः सन्देहः, यतः स्वप्नोपमानानि मायोपमानानि चैतानि भवेयुरिति त्वं मन्यसे। यथा हि स्वमे किल कविद् निम्खोऽपि निजगृहाङ्गणे गजघटा-तुरंगनिवह-मणि-कनकराश्यादिकमभूतमपि पश्यति, मायायां चेन्द्रजालविलसितरूपायामविद्यमानमपि कनक-मणि-मौक्तिक-रजतभाजना-ऽऽराम-पुष्प-फलादिकं दृश्यते, तथैतान्यपि भूतान्येवंविधान्येवेति मन्यसे, यद् यमाद् विचार्यमाणान्येतानि सर्वथैव न काश्चिद् युक्ति भजन्ते सहन्ते। भूतेषु च संशये जीव-पुण्य-पापादिषु किल का वातों भूतविकाराधिष्ठानत्वात् तेषाम् । इति तव बुद्धिः। तसात् सर्वस्यापि भूत-जीवादिवस्तुनस्त्वदभिप्रायेणाभावात् सर्वशून्यताशही त्वं निरवशेषमपि लोकं मायोपमं खमेन्द्रजालतुल्यं मन्यस इति ॥१४२-१४३॥ (१९९०-१६९१.)

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Vida]
Gaṇadharavida
: 198:
D. C.-Long-lived Vyakta! You question the existence of Bhutas. Just as, in a dream, a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants, and horses, or treasures of jewellery and gold, but actually he does not possess them, and just as, under the illusion of the Indrajāla, precious things, e. g., dishes (made) of gold, silver, jewels etc., or beautiful objects e. g., parks, flowers, fruits etc., are perceived, but really speaking, they are not existing; in the same way, according your belief, bhūtas like prithivi are perceived by us; but a8 a matter of fact, they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an Indrajāla. But this belief of yours, is absolutely unfounded.
Again, as you have a doubt in the existence of elements, the doubt is bound to arise in the case of jiva, pāpa and punya also. Because, these objects are contained in the various vikāras of the bhutas themselves. It follows, therefore, that, according to you, all bhūtas like Prthivt and all padarthas (objects) like jiva are a-vidyamāna (non-existent). This indicates that you are sarvaśūnyatāśańki and according to you, the whole Universe is just like svapna, māyā or Indrajāla.
Now, Śramana Bhagavān Mahavira gives a number of arguments for doubts which Vyakta entertained in his mind:जह किर न सओ परओ नोभयओ नावि अन्नओ सिद्धी । भावाणमवेक्खाओ वियत्त ! जह दीह-हस्साणं ॥ १४४ ॥ (१६९२ )
Jaha kira na saö paraö nobhayaö nāvi annað siddht Bhāvāṇamavèkkhāö Viyatta! jaha dîha-hassāņam. 144 (1692)
[ यथा किल न स्वतः परतो नोभयतो नाप्यन्यतः सिद्धिः ।
भावानामपेक्षातो व्यक्त ! यथा दीर्घ-हखयोः ॥ १४४ ॥ (१६९२) Yathā kila na svataḥ parato nobhayato nāpyanyataḥ siddhiḥ | Bhāvānāmapèkṣato Vyakta yatha dirgha-brasvayoḥ. 144 (1692)
Trans.-144 Accomplishment of objects, O Vyakta! like (the accomplishment of) hrasva (short) and dirgha (long)
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, 194 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth can never be attained by means of itself, through another, by means of both, or through any other object. (1692).
टीका-व्यक्त ! भवतोऽयमभिप्राय:-यथा किल न स्वतः, न परतः, न चोभयतः, नाप्यन्यतो भावानां सिद्धिः संभाव्यते। कुतः १ इत्याहअपेक्षातः-कार्यकारणादिभावस्यापेक्षिकत्वादित्यर्थः, इस्व-दीर्घव्यपदेशवत् । तथाहि-यत् किमपि भावजातमस्ति तेन सर्वेणापि कार्येण वा भवितव्यम् , कारणेन वा। तत्र कार्य कारणेन क्रियत इति कारणायत्त एव तस्य कार्यत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु कार्यस्य कार्यत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किमप्यस्ति । एवं कारणमपि कार्य करोतीति कार्यायत्त एव तस्य कारणत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु तस्य कारणत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किञ्चिदस्ति । तदेवं कार्यादिभावः स्वतो न सिध्यति । यच्च स्वतो न सिद्धं तस्य परतोऽपि सिद्धिर्नास्ति, यथा खरविषाणस्य । ततश्च न खतः कार्यादिभावः, नापि परतः । स्व-परोभयतस्तर्हि तस्य सिद्धिरिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , यस्तादुभयतस्तत्सिद्धेरभावात् तत्समुदायेऽपि तदयोगात् । न हि सिकताकणेषु प्रत्येकमसत् तैलं तत्समुदाये प्रादुर्भवति ।
अपि च, उभयतः सिद्धिपक्ष इतरेतराश्रयदोषः प्रामोति । यावद्धि कार्य न सिध्यति न तावत्कारणसिद्धिरस्ति । यावच्च कारणं न सिध्यति न तावत् कार्य सिद्धिमासादयति । अत इतरेतराश्रयदोषः। तस्माद् नोभयतोऽपि कार्यादिभावसिद्धिः। नाप्यन्यत:-अनुभयत इत्यर्थः, स्व-परो-भयव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वेन निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवं हस्व-दीर्घलक्षणे दृष्टान्तेऽपि "अपेक्षातः” इत्यस्य ह्रस्व-दीर्घत्वासिद्धिलक्षणेन साध्येनान्वयो भावनीयः । तथाहि--प्रदेशिन्या अङ्गुष्ठमपेक्ष्य दीर्घत्वं प्रतीयते। मध्यमा त्वपेक्ष्य इस्वत्वम् , परमार्थेन त्वियं स्वतो न इस्वा, नापि दीर्घा । तदेवं न स्वतो ह्रस्व-दीर्घत्वयोः सिद्धिः। ततः परतः, उभयतः, अनुभयतश्च तत्सिद्धयभावो यथोक्तवद् भावनीयः, तदुक्तम्
न दीर्घस्तीह दीर्घत्वं न इस्वे नापि च द्वये।।
तसादसिद्धं शून्यत्वात् सदित्याख्यायते क हि ? ॥१॥ " इस्वं प्रतीत्य सिद्धं दीर्घ दीर्घ प्रतीत्य ह्रस्वमपि । __ न किञ्चिदस्ति सिद्धं व्यवहारवशाद् वदन्त्येवम् ॥ १॥ (१६९२)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 195 : D. C.- Vyakta ! Your argument is this --Complete attainment of the existence of) objects is not possible either svataḥ or parataḥ or ubhayataḥ or anyataḥ as in the case of (the accomplishment of the existence of) the hrasva and dirgha, on account of there being apeksikatva (expectation) of the Kārya Kāraṇadibhāvas (i. e., relations like that of cause and effect ) of the padārthas. Hence, each and every object is expected to be either kärya or karana. As every kārya is done by kārana, its kāryatva is subjugated by kāraṇatva. But the kāryatva of a kārya is not svabhāva-siddha (self-accomplished ).
Similarly, karana accomplishes kārya. So that, kāraṇatva of karanas is subjugated by the karyatva of karya. But kāraṇatva also is not svatah siddha.
Now, one which is not Svatahsiddha by virtue of its own self cannot be accomplished by means of another also, as in the case of the horn of an ass. So, kāryādibhāva is accomplished neither by itself nor by another.
Again, it is improper to consider the possibility of kāryādibhāvas even by sva and para taken together. Because, since siddhi is not found in either of them separately, how could it be attained in the samudāya of the two? Take the example of oil and sand. When oil is not present in every single particle of sand, it is not found in the collection of sand algo. Thus, the accomplishment of an object by means of ubhaya (both ), is also impossible.
In case of accomplishment by means of ubhaya, there is another difficulty also. During the process of siddhi, so long as kārya is not accomplished, there is kāraṇasiddhi and so long as kāraṇa is not accomplished, there is karyasiddhi. Consequently, kārya and kāraṇa depend upon each other, and hence, there is itarëtarāśrayadoşa, or the fault of affecting each other, Thus, it is clear that the siddhi of kāryādibhāva is not possible even if sva and para are taken together.

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: 196 : Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Nor even by any other means-anubhayataḥ-the siddhi is possible. For, there is no vastu (object) available except sva, para and ubhaya in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of bhāvas anyataḥ or anubhayataḥ (i. e., by means of any object excepting sva, para and ubhaya ), the siddhi would be nir-hetuka (void of quse ). To take an example, the pradėsint finger (next to thumb) looks dirgha when compared with the thumb and hrasva when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself, is neither short nor long.
Since it is not hrasva or dirgha by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said “ Na dirghd'steeba dirghatvam na brasvd nāpi ca dvayè i
Tasmādasiddham sūnyatvāt sadityākhyāyatd kva hi ? It “ Hrasvam pratîtya siddham dirgham, dirgham pratîtya
brasvamapii Na kincidasti siddbam, vyavabāravasād vadantysvam 11" (1692)
In support of the prima faci assertion that there is sarvasunyatā, a number of examples are given. अत्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया व सव्वेगयाइदोसाओ। सव्वेऽणभिलप्पा वा सुण्णा वा सव्वहा भावा ॥१४५॥ (१६९३) Atthitta-ghadagāņègayā va savvogayāidosāöl Savvè'nabhilappă vă suņņa vā savvahā bhavā, 145 (1693) [अस्तित्व-घटेकानेकता वा सर्वैकतादिदोषात् ।
सर्वेऽनभिलाप्या वा शुन्या वा सर्वथा भावाः ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३) Astitva-ghataikanòkatā vā sarvaikatādidoşāti Sarvd'nabhilāpyā và sūnyā vā sarvathā bhāvāḥ. 145 (1693) ]
Trans.—145 Unity or distinction of astitva and ghata would either give rise to faults like sarvaikatā (i. e. universal

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Vada ] Ganadharavada
: 197: oneness ) or all the objects would become inexpressible (by word or speech ) or non-existent in all respects. (1693).
टीका-नन्वस्तित्व-घटयोरेकत्वम् , अनेकत्वं वा। यद्येकत्वम् , तर्हि सर्वैकता प्राप्नोति-यो योऽस्ति स स घट इत्यस्तित्वे घटस्य प्रवेशात् सर्वस्य घटत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, न पटादि पदार्थान्तरम् । घटो वा सर्वसत्त्वान्यतिरेकात् सर्वात्मकः स्यात् । अथवा, यो घटः स एवास्तीति घटमात्रेऽस्तित्वं प्रविष्टम् , ततोऽन्यत्र सत्त्वाभावादघटस्य सर्वस्याप्यभावप्रसङ्गतो घट एवैक: स्यात् । सोऽपि वा न भवेत् , अघटव्यावृत्तो हि घटो भवति, यदा च तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतोऽघट एव जास्ति, तदा किमपेक्षोऽसौ घटः स्यात् ।। इति सर्वशून्यत्वमिति । अथ घट-सत्त्वयोरन्यत्वमिति द्वितीयो विकल्पः। तहिं सत्त्वरहितत्वादसन् घटः, खरविषाणवदिति। अपिच, सतो भावः सत्त्वमुच्यते, तस्य च स्वाधारभूतेभ्यो घटादिभ्यः सद्भयोऽन्यत्वेऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात्, आधारादन्यत्वे आधेयस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः। तदेवमस्तित्वेन सह घटादीनामेकत्वाऽन्यत्वविकल्पाभ्यामुक्तन्यायेन सर्वैकतादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् सर्वेऽपि भावा अनभिलप्या वा मवेयुः, सर्वथा शून्या वा स्युः, सर्वथैव तेषामभावो वा भवेदित्यर्थः । अपिच, यद् नोत्पद्यते तत्तावद् निर्विवादं खरविषाणवदसदेव, इति निवृत्ता तत्कथा । यदप्युत्पत्तिमल्लोकेऽभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि जाता-जातादिविकल्पयुक्तिभिरुत्पादो न घटते, इति शून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥१४५॥ (१६९३)
__D. C.-(1) If ghata and astitva are taken to be one, all objec' will have to be taken as one. For, when ghata is said to be abhinna from astitva, all objects that have existence will be called ghata, and there will be no distinction of objects like pata eto. Thus, there will arise the difficulty of sarvaikatā or Universal one-ness. Moreover, ghata will become a sarvatmaka or all-pervading object, since it is taken as inseparable from the astitva of all objects. Again, if ghata is believed to be astitva itself, existence will be restricted to ghata only. All other objects that are not ghata will, in that case, have no existence. Consequently ghata alone will exist.

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: 198 : Jinabhadra Gaại's
[The fourth Or, say, ghata, too, will not exist according to this argument. Whatever is different fron, a-ghata. is called ghata. Now, since ghata and astitva go together, a-ghata which is opposite to ghata will also have no existence. Thus, a-ghata does not exist. So, also, ghata will not exist. For, in comparision with what, will the object be ghata if a-ghata is absent ?
Hence it is better to resort to sarvaśūnyata.
(2) Now, the second alternative that-ghata is distinct from astitva-may be considered. If ghata is bhinna from astitva, it is devoid of astitva also. . For, astitva being the quality of existence, is the adhèya, and ghata which contains the quality is ādhāra. Adhèya is not supposed to exist, when ādhāra is away from it. So, ghata is devoid of existence, and hence it is said to be a-vidyamāna like the horn of an ass.
Thus, the above discussion of unity or distinction of astitva and ghata leads either to the difficulty of sarvaikatā or to the anabhilāpyatva and śunyatva as regards each and every object.
Again, that which is not produced is undoubtedly a-vidyamāna, like the born of an ass, and it has already been discussed before. With regard to objects that have been produced in this world, it can also be proved that their production is not in the fitness of things, if properly thought of. जायाज्जायो-भयो न जायमाणं च जायए जम्हा। अणवत्था-ऽभावो-भयदोसाओ सुण्णया तम्हा ॥१४६॥ (१६९४) Jāyā'jāyo-bhayao na jāyamāṇam ca jāgad jamhái Anavatthā'bhāvo-bhayadosłö suņņayā tamhā. 146 (1694)
[ arat-sonalitat 7 ET4HR 7 F Tara i
अनवस्था-ऽभावो-भयदोषात् शून्यता तसात् ॥१४६॥ (१६९४) Jātā jato bhayato na jāyamānam ca jāyatd yasmāti Anavasthabhāvo-bhayadoşat śünyata tasmát. 146 (1694) ]

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
199: Trans.-146 (An object) which has (already ) been produced, or which is in both the conditions, or which is (in the state of being produced, can never be produced on account of faults like disorder, non-entity or both So, it is non-existent.
टीका-इह तावद् न जातं जायते, जातत्वादेव, निष्पन्नघटवत् । अथ जातमपि जायते, तानवस्था, जातत्वाविशेषेण पुनः पुनर्जन्मप्रसङ्गात् । अथाजातं जायते । तत्रोत्तरमाह-" अभाव ति" सूचकत्वात् सूत्रस्य, तर्यभावोऽपि खरविषाणलक्षणो जायताम् , अजातत्वाविशेषात् । अथ जाताजातरूपं जायते । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कुतः १ इत्याह-उभयदोषात् प्रत्येकोमयपक्षोक्तदोषापत्तेरित्यर्थः। किञ्च, एतज्जानाजातलक्षणमुभयमस्ति वा, न वा। यद्यस्ति, तहिं जातमेव तत् , न पुनरुभयम्, तत्र चोक्तो दोषः। अथ नास्ति तथापि नोभयं तत्, किन्त्वजातमेव, तत्रापि चाभिहितमेव दूषणम् । नापि जायमानं जायते, पूर्वोक्तविकल्पद्वयानतिवृत्तेः, तथाहि-तदपि जायमानमस्ति न वा । यद्यस्ति, तहिं जातमेव तत् । नास्ति चेत्, तबजातमेव । पक्षद्वयेऽपि चास्मिन्नभिहित एव दोषः। डक्तं च
गतं न गम्यते तावदगतं नैव गम्यते।
गतागतविनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥१॥ इत्यादि। यस्मादेवम् , तसादनवस्थादिदोषप्रसङ्गेन वस्तूनामुत्पादायोगाजगतः शून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥ १४६ ॥ (१६९४) ___D. C.-(1) An object which is once produced has not to undergo the process of production again, just as a ghata which has already been jata has not to be produced again. Even then if it is said that objects that have once been produced can be produced again and again, there would be anavasthā. Hence production of an already jāta object, is absolutely impossible.
(2) Again, if an a-jaia object is believed to be capable of being produced, objects like kharavişāņa-that have never

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: 200 : Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth been produced so far-should also be taken as capable of being produced. Because, ajătatva is present in kharavişāna also. But this is absurd. So, production of an ajāta object, is never possible.
(3) In the case of an object which is both' jāta and a-jāta, the utpatti is not possible. Because dosas that are found in each one of the above two cases separately, are certainly found in the combination of the two also.
Moreover, if an object which is ubhayarüpa is taken to be vidyamāna it becomes jāta and loses its jātājāta ubhayarūpa. Similarly, if it is a-vidyamāna, it cannot be called ubhayarūpa, but anutpanna only. Now, when it is utpanna or anutpanna, doşas like anavasthā and abhava do arise.
(4) In the case of a jāyamāna object .also, the above argument may be applied, and the dosas like anavasthā and abhāva arise in that case also, according as it becomes jāta or a-jāta due to its being vidyamāna or a-vidyamāna. So, production in this case is also impossible.
So, it is said, “ Gatam na gamyatè tävadagatam naiva gamyate i Gatāgatavinirmuktam gamyamānam na gamyotd 11"
Thus, in all the above-mentioned four avasthās of an object, it has been clearly pointed out that its utpatti is impossible. Henoe, it is proper to believe in the Universal non-entity. हेऊ-पचयसामग्गि वीसु भावेसु नो व जंकलं । दीसह सामग्गिमयं सव्वाभावे न सामग्गी ॥१४७॥ (१६९५) Hou-paocayasamaggi visu bhāvesu no va jam kajjam 1 Disai sāmaggimayam savvābhāvé na sāmaggi. 147 (1695) [हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री विष्वम् भावेषु नो वा यत् कार्यम् ।
दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं सर्वाभावे न सामग्री ॥१४७॥ (१६९५)

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Vada ] Ganadharavida
:201: Hatu-pratyayasamagri visvag bhāvèşu no vā yat käryami Driśyatè sāmagrimayam sarvābhāvd na sāmagri. 147 (1695) ]
Trans 147 An object is accomplished by means of a group of causes taken together, and not by hétu or pratyaya in its individual capacity. (This) collection of causes cannot be (found) in the ( midst of) all-pervading negation.
टीका-हेतवः-उपादानकारणानि, प्रत्ययास्तु निमित्तकारणानि, तेषां हेतु-प्रत्ययानां या सामग्री तस्या विष्वम् भावेषु पृथगवस्थासु यत् कार्य न दृश्यते, दृश्यते च सामग्रीमयम्-संपूर्णसामडयवस्थायां पुनदृश्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं च सति कार्यस्य सर्वाभाव एव युक्त इति शेषः । सर्वाभावे च न सामग्री नैव सामग्रीसद्भावः प्रामोतीत्यर्थः। ततः सर्वशून्यतैवेति भावः । इदमत्र हृदयम्-हेतवश्व प्रत्ययाश्च स्वजन्यमर्थ किमेकैकशः कुर्वन्ति, संभूय वा?। न तावदेकैकशः, तथाऽनुपलब्धेः। तत एकैकस्मात् कार्यस्याभावात् सामउयामपि तदभाव एव स्यात् , सिकताकणतैलवदिति । इत्थं च सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्योत्परयभावे सामग्रीसद्भावो न प्रामोति, अनुत्पन्नायाः सामग्र्या अप्ययोगात्। ततश्च सर्वशून्यतैव जगतः । उक्तं च
हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री पृथग् भावेष्वदर्शनात् ।। तेन ते नाभिलप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः ॥१॥ लोके यावत् संज्ञा सामठ्यामेव दृश्यते यसात् । तसाद् न सन्ति भावा भावे सति नास्ति सामग्री ॥२॥
इत्यादि। अस च व्याख्या-पृथग्. भावेष्वदर्शनात “कार्यस्य" इति शेषः । तेन ते घटादयों भावा सर्वेऽपि खभावतः स्वरूपतो नामिलाप्या:, पृथगेकैकावस्थायी कार्यस्यानुत्पादाद , उत्पसिमन्सरेण च घटादिसंज्ञाऽप्रवृत्तेः, संज्ञाऽमावै चामिलप्तुमशक्यत्वादिति । कुतः पुनः पृथगवस्थायां संज्ञाप्रवृत्तिः ? इत्याह-" लोके याकदित्यादि" लोके यावत् संज्ञा “घटोऽयम्" इत्यादिसंज्ञाप्रवृत्तिः, तावत् संपूर्ण कार्य संपूर्णसामध्यामेव यस्मात् दृश्यते, पृथगभावे च सामण्यामप्यभावात् सिकतातैलवद् न सन्त्येव भावाः, भावासखे
कुतः सामग्रीसद्भाव: । इति ॥९४७ ।। (१६९५)
26

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: 202 : Jinabhadra Gari's
[The fourth D. C.-An objeot is said to have been accomplished only when all upsdāna and nimitta causes, are assembled together.
But when each one of these causes operates separately, the | kārya could never be accomplished. In other words, there is abhāya of the karya, and ultimately there will be sarvābhāva. Again, in the midst of sarvābhāva, sāmagri cannot exist. Consequently, there will be sarvaśūnyatā.
Moreover, just as oil cannot be found in the collection of sands when it is not present in each individual particle, so also karya cannot be found in the combination of many kāranas, when it is absent in each individual kāraṇa separately.
Thus, when the existence and production of all kāryas are denied, the existeroe and production of samagri are also denied. So here also, sarvasunyatā is the only resort of belief. Again, it is said that, “Hatu-pratyayasāmagri prthag bhāvdşvadarśanāti Təna tè nābhilapyā hi bhavāḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ 1 " « Loke yavat sāmjãā samagryāmèva dris yatè yasmāti Tasmād na santi bhāvā, bhāvè sati nāsti sāmagri. 147 (1695)" परभागादरिसणओ सव्वाराभागसुहमयाओ य । उभयाणुवलंभाओ सव्वाणुलद्धिओ सुण्णं ॥ १४८ ॥ (१६९६) Parabhāgadarisaņaö savvārābhāgasuhamayā8 ya 1 Ubhayāņuval mbhāö savvāṇuladdhiö guņņam. 148 (1696)
[ परभागादर्शनतः सर्वाराद्वागसौक्षम्याच ।
उभयानुपलम्भात् सर्वानुपलब्धिता शून्यम् ॥१४८॥ (१६९६) Parabhāgādarśanataḥ sarvaradbhāgasauksmyācca ! Ubhayānupalambbat sarvānupalabdhitaḥ sūnyam. 148 (1696) ]
Trans.-148 The rear portion (of an object ) is not perceptible; and its front-most part is very minute. So, on

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Vida] Ganadharavada
: 208: account of the non-perception of these two, there is nonperception of all, which results in complete negation.
टीका-इह यत् तावददृश्यं तदसदेव, अनुपलम्भाव , खरविषाणवदिति निवृत्ता तद्वार्ता दृश्यस्यापि च स्तम्भ-कुम्भ-कुड्यादेः पर मध्य-भागयोरसत्वमेव, अर्वाग्भागान्तरितत्वेन तयोरप्यदर्शनात्, आराद्भागस्यापि च सावयवत्वात् पुनरन्यः खल्वाराद्भागः तस्याप्यन्यः पुनस्तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवं तावत् , यावत् सारातीयभागस्य, परमाणुप्रतरमात्रत्वेनातिसौक्ष्म्यात् , पूर्वेषां चारादागानामन्यस्यान्येनान्तरितत्वेनानुपलब्धेः। ततश्चोकन्यायेन परभागसरातीयभागलक्षणोभयभागानुपलम्भात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुजातस्यानुपलब्धेः शून्यं जगदिति । उक्तं च
" यावद् दृश्यं परस्तावद् भागः स च न दृश्यते ।
तेन ते नाभिलाप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः ॥१॥" तदेवमुक्तयुक्त्या सर्वस्यापि भूतादेरभावः प्रामोति, श्रूयते च श्रुती भूतादिसद्भावोऽपीति संशयः । इति पूर्वपक्षः ॥१४८॥ (१६९६)
D. C.-It has already been discussed that objects like kharavişāpa do not exist, because they are non-perceptible, In case of perceptible objects like pillar, jar, wall etc., the rear and middle portions are not perceived, because they are screened by the front portion coming in their way. So, they are said to be a-vidyamāna.
Again, the front portion consists of a number of divisions. Out of all these divisions, every one is screened by the other coming in its immediate front, which again is screened by a third one in its immediate vicinity, and so on. Ultimately, the front-most particle is left unscrcened. But it is extremely emall in size, and hence .. becomes non-cognizible. Now, since the rear and front-most parts are non-perceptible, it can be said that objects-and ultimately all the objects in the Universe--are non-cognizible or sūnya. Moreover, it is said that,

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[ The fourth
: 204 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
"Yavad driśyam parastāvad bhāgaḥ sa ca na driśyatè | Tana to nabhilapyā hi bhāvāḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ ||
"
So, you have a doubt in the existence of Bhūta etc., and according to your belief, they are non-existent. This finishes the purvapakṣa (the argument of the opponent).
Now follows the refutation of the argumentमा कुरु वियत्त ! संसयमसह न संसयसमुन्भवो जुत्तो । स्वकुसुम - खरसिंगेसु व, जुत्तो सो थाणु- पुरिसेनुं ॥ १४९ ॥ (१६९७) Mā kuru Viyatta ! samsayamasai na samsayasamubbhavo jutto Khakusuma-kharasingèsu va jutto so thāņu-purisèsu. 149 (1697)
[ मा कुरु व्यक्त ! संशयमसति न संशयसमुद्भवो युक्तः ।
खकुसुम - खरशृङ्गयोरिव युक्तः स स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ॥ १४९ ॥ (१६९७)
Ma kuru Vyakta samsayamasati na samśayasamudbhavo yuktaḥ | Khakusuma-kharaśrigayoriva yuktab sa sthānu purusayob. 149 ]
Trans.-1490 Vyakta! Do not entertain doubt. The doubt about non-existent (objects) is improper as in the case of kha-kusuma (flower of the sky) and kharaśrňga (horn of an ass). It is proper (only ) with regard to ( existent objects like) sthanu and purusd (1697)
टीका - आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! मा कृथाः संशयं मा भूताभावं बुध्यस्व, गतोऽसति भूतकदम्बके मंशयः खकुसुम- खरविषाणयोरिव न युक्तः, अपि स्वभावनिश्चय एव स्यात् । सत्स्वेव च भूतेषु स्थाणु- पुरुषादिष्विव संशयो युक्तः । यदि पुनरसत्यपि वस्तुनि संदेहः स्यात् तदाऽविशेषेण खरविषाणादिष्वपि स्यादिति भावः ।। १४९ ।। (१६९७)
D. C. - 0 long-lived Vyakta / Don't be dubious about the existence of bhūtas. Because the doubt about non-existent objects is totally unjustifible as in the case of kha-kusuma and kharaśriga, where abhāva is already fixed up. It can be

For Private Personal Use Only

Page #243

Vada ] Ganadharavāda
:205: justified only in the case of existent objects like sthāņu and puruşa. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, the doubt will be raised in the case of kharavişāna also, which, too is non-existent in general.
को वा विसेसहे. सव्वाभावे वि थाणु-पुरिसेसु। संका न खपुप्फाइसु विवजओ वा कहं न भवे ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८) Ko vā visdsahdū savvābhāvà vi thāņu-purisdsu i Sankā da khapupfāisu vivajjað yâ kaham na bhavd ? 150 (1698) [को वा विशेषहेतुः सर्वाभावेऽपि स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ।
शङ्का न खपुष्पादिषु विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवेत् १ ॥१५०॥ (१६९८) Ko vā visdşahdtuḥ sarvābhāvè'pi sthāņu-puruşayoḥ i Sankā na khapuspadisu viparyayo va katham na bhavat ? 150]
Trans.-150 Or, what special reason can there be in (entertaining ) doubt about sthāņu and purusa and not about kha-puspa (flower of the sky) etc., even in (the midst of) allpervading non-entity? Or, why should not the reverse take place ? (1698)
टीका-को वाऽत्र विशेषहेतुरुच्यतां यत्-सर्वाभावे सर्वशून्यतायामविशिष्टायामपि स्थाण्वादिषु संशयो भवति। न खपुष्पादिषु । ननु. विशेषहेत्वभावादविशेषेण सर्वत्र संशयोऽस्तु, नियामकाभावाद् । विपर्ययो वा भवेत् खपुष्पादिषु संशयः स्याद् न स्थावादिष्विति भावः ॥१५०॥ (१६९८)
D. C.-Even when there was all-pervading negation, on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like sthāņu eto., and not about non-existent objeots like kha-puspa eto.? If there is no visesaheta on which your beliet is based, the samsaya, in general, may rise at all places. Or, in absence of clear explanation, reverse may be the case in e. The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like kha-puspa eto., and not about existent objects like sthānu etc.

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:206: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Moreover, पच्चक्खओष्णुमाणादागमओ वा पसिद्धिरत्थाणं । सबप्पमाणविसयाभावे किह संसओ जुत्तो ? ॥१५१॥ (१६९९) Paccakkhaö’ņumāņādāgamaö vă pasiddhiratthāņām i Savvappamānavisayābhāvd kiha samsao jutto ? 151 (1699)
[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयाभावे कथं संशयो युक्तः १ ॥१५१॥ (१६९९) Pratyakşato'numānādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthānāmi Sarvapramānavisayabhāvd katham samsayo yuktah ? 151 (1899)]
Trans.-151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by ( means of ) visible evidence (pratyaksa), or by inference (anumāna), or by documentary evidence (agama). (But) in ahsence of all (such) evidences and topics, how could the doubt be justified ? (1699)
टीका-यदा हि प्रमाणैरर्थानां प्रसिद्धिर्जाता भवेत् तदा कथञ्चित् कचिद् वस्तुनि संशयो युज्यते । यदा च सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सर्वेषां च तद्विषयाणामभावस्तदा कथं संशयोऽस्तु, संशयस्य ज्ञात-ज्ञेयाद्यर्थसामग्रीजन्यत्वात् ? । सर्वशून्यत्वे च तदभावाद् न संशयोद्भूतिः, निर्मूलत्वादिति भावः ॥१५१ ॥ (१६९९)
D. C.-When the object is accomplished by means of pramāṇas (evidences ), a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent. But when all such pramāṇas and visayas are absent, how can the doubt exist ? The doubt springs up from materials like jñātā and jõèya. But when everything is believed as sūnya, materials like jñātā and jõèya are not supposed to exist, and hence, the samsaya has also no reason to rise. जं संसयादउ नाणपज्जया तं च नेयसंबद्धं । सव्वयाभावे न संसओ तेण ते जुत्तो ॥१५२॥ (१७००)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada
: 207: Jam samsayādau nāņapajjayā tam ca nèyasambarldhami Savvanndyābhăvè na samsaö tèna tè jutto. 152 (1700) [यत् संशयादयो ज्ञानपर्ययास्तच्च ज्ञेयसंबद्धम् ।
सर्वज्ञेयाभावे न संशयस्तेन ते युक्तः ॥१५२ । (१७००) Yat samśayādayo jõānaparyayāstacca jóəyasambadham i Sarvajñèyābhāvd na samsayastèna tè yuktaḥ 152 (1700) ]
Trans.-152 Since doubt etc. are the synonyms of jñāna, they are related to the jäeya (cognizable object) also. So, in absence of all jñèyas, your doubt has also no place (to exist). (1700)
टीका-यस्मात् संशय-विपर्यया-ऽनध्यवसाय-निर्णया विज्ञानपर्ययाः, तच ज्ञेयनिबन्धनमेव, सर्वशून्यतायां न ज्ञेयमस्ति, तस्माद् न तव संशयो युक्तः। सति च संशयेऽनुमानसिद्धा एव भावाः ॥१५२ ॥ (१७००)
D. C.-Since doubt, inversion (viparyaya), non-apprehen. sion ( anadhyavasāya ), and affirmation ( nirnaya ) are the ( various ) synonyms of knowledge, they are automatically connected with the cognizible also. Now, since everything is śūnya, nothing can be apprehended when there is nothing jodya, there can be no jñāna and no samsaya also, as samsaya is nothing but a paryāya of the knowledge.
Still, however, if you insist upon entertaining doubt, siddhi of objects will have to be apprehended only by means of anumāna and not by virtue of perception, as there can be do perception on account of the absolute abhāva of everything. संति चिय ते भावा संसयओ सोम्म ! थाणु-पुरिस व्य । अह दिलुतमसिद्धं मण्णसि नणु संसयाभावो ॥१५३॥ (१७०१) Santi coiya tè bhāvā samsayaö Somma 1 thāņu-purisa vya Aha ditthantamasiddhåm maņņasi ranu samsayābhāvo. 153
[सन्त्येव ते मावा संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु-पुरुषाविव । .. अथ दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे ननु संशयाभावः ॥१५३॥ (१७०१)

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[The fourth Santydva to bhāvāh saņśayatab Saumya ! sthāņu-puruşāviva 1 Atha drştāntamasiddham mangase nanu samśayābhāvaḥ. 153(1701)]
Trans.-153 O Saumya ! Because of ( your ) doubt (about them ), those objects do exist as sthānu and purusa. But, again, if you believe the example (of sthānu and purusa) to be unaccomplished, existence of the doubt will be denied. ( 1701 )
टीका-सौम्य ! सन्ति भवतोऽपि भावाः, संशयसमुत्थानात् , इह यत् संशय्यते तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषो; यच्चासद् न तव संशय्यते, यथा खपुष्प-खरविषाणे । अथ स्थाणु-पुरुषलक्षणं दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे त्वम् , सर्वेषामपि स्थाणु-पुरुषादिभावानामविशेषेणैवासचाभ्युपगमात् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो ननु सर्वभावासचे संशयाभाव एव स्यात् , इत्युक्तमेवेति ॥१५३॥ (१७०१)
____D. C.-0 Saumya ! The very doubt that you have raised against the objects, proves that the objects are vidyamāna as sthāņu and puruşa. For, there cannot exist any doubt about non-existent objects like ākāśapuspa and kharavisāna.
Again, if you think that the above example of (the existent objects like ) sthāņu and purusa is wrong, you are not justified. For, in that case, all objects whether vidyamāna as sthaņu etc, or a-vidyamāna as khapuspa etc, will have to be considered as a-vidyamāna according to your belief. So, when the existence of each and every object will be denied, naturally the existence of doubt will also be denied. सव्वाभावे वि मई संदेहो सिमिणए व्व, नो तं च । जं सरणाइनिमित्तो सिमिणो न उ सव्वहाभावो ॥१५४॥ (१७०२) Savvābhāva vi mat samleho simiņaè vva, no tam cal Jam saranainimitto simiņo na u savvabābhāvo. 154. (1702) [ सर्वाभावेऽपि मतिः संदेहः स्वमक इव, नो तच्च ।
यत् सरणादिनिमित्तः स्वमो ने तु सर्वथाऽभावः ॥१५४॥ (१७०२)

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:209: Sarvābhāvd'pi mataih samidhaḥ svapnaka iva, no tacca | Yat smaranadinimittah svapno na tu sarvatha'bhavah. 154 (1702)]
'Trans.-154 It is improper to believe that inspite of allpervading negation, doubt does spring up in a dream. For, a dream consists of (a number of) nimittas like remembrance etc., and it is not absolutely non-existent. (1702)
टीका-स्यान्मतिः परस्य-सर्वाभावेऽपि स्वप्ने दृष्टः संशयः, यथा किल कश्चित् पामरो निजगृहाङ्गणे “किमयं द्विपेन्दो महीध्रो वा ? इति संशेते, न च तत् तत्र किश्चिदप्यस्ति, एवमन्यत्र सर्वभावाभावेऽपि संशयो भविष्यति। तच न, यद् यस्मात् स्वप्नेऽपि पूर्वदृष्टानुभूतसरणादिनिमित्तः संदेहः, न तु सर्वथा भावाभावेऽसौ कापि प्रवर्तते । अन्यथा हि यत् षष्ठभूतादिकं कचिदपि नास्ति तत्रापि संशयः स्यात्, विशेषाभावादिति । ननु किं खप्नोऽपि निमित्तमन्तरेण न प्रवर्तते । एवमेतत् ॥ (१७०२)
D. C.-In support of the belief that doubt springs up even in Sarvabhāva, an opponent may advance an argument as follows : Just as in a dream, a poor pauper raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or & mountain before his house, though, in fact, nothing exists like that; so, also, at other places, doubt can be raised in spite of the absolute abhāva of things. Thus, we can say that even though there is sarvābhāva, samsaya does exist in a dream.
But the above argument is totally groundless. In a dream, doubt arises on account of various reasops. Say, for instance, when an object is seen or experienced, the remenibrance of that experience etc., gives rise to the doubt. So, for the rise of doubt in the dream, there is some sort of reason which brings the dream-and hence the doubt-into existence. Thus, doubt arises from an existent object and not from the absolute abháva of it.
But, suppose, even then, if you believe that the samd dha springs up from the absolute abhāva also, the doubt should
27

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:210 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth also have to arise from objects like sixth element which have never been existent so far. Because, abhāva is present in them also.
अणुय-विट्ठ-चिंतिय-सुथ-पयइवियार-देवयाऽणूया। सिमिणस्स निमित्ताई पुण्णं पावं च नाभावो ॥१५५॥ (१७०३) Anuhủya-dittha-cintiya-suya-payaiviyāra-devayā’ņāyā i Simiņassa nimittāim puņņam pāvam ca nābhāvo. 155 (1703) [अनुभूत-दृष्ट-चिन्तित-श्रुत-प्रकृतिविकार-देवताऽनूपाः ।
खप्नस निमिचानि पुण्यं पापं च नाभावः ॥१५५ ।। (१७०३) Anubhuta-drsta-cintita-sruta-prakrti-vikāra-devata'nupāh | Svapnasya nimittani punyam papam ca nābhāvah 155 (1703)]
Trans.-155 (Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing (of an object), ill-health (prakrtivikāra), a deity, watery place, meritorious act, and sin-these are the prominent causes (nimittas) of dream. So it is not non-existent. (1703)
टीका-स्नान-भोजन-विलेपनादिकमन्यदाऽनुभूतं स्वप्ने दृश्यते, इत्यनुभूतोऽर्थः खप्नस्य निमित्तम् । अथवा, करि-तुरगादिकोऽन्यदादृष्टोऽर्थस्तनिमित्तम्। विचिन्तितश्च प्रियतमालाभादिः। श्रुतश्च स्वर्ग-नरकादिः। तथा, वात-पितादिजनितः प्रकृतिविकारः खप्नस्य निमित्तम् । तथा, अनुकूला प्रतिकूला वा देवता तनिमित्तम् । तथा, अनूपः सजलप्रदेशः। तथा पुण्य मिष्टखप्नस्य निमित्तम् । पापं चानिष्टस्य तस्य निमित्तम् , न पुनर्वस्त्वभावः । किश्व, खप्नोऽपि तावद् : माव एव । ततस्तस्यापि सत्त्वे कथं "शून्यं जगत्" इति भवता प्रतिज्ञायते ॥१५५।। (१७०३)
D. C.—The nimittas that bring dream into existence are treated as follows:---
1. Previous experience-Certain acts like snāna, bħojana,

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 211: vilèpana etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dream due to this reason.
2. Observation-When objects like elephants, horses eto., are perceived in dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the drştartha reason.
3. Attentive Consideration-A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc., is called the dream of cintitārtha.
4. Hearing-When places like svarga, and naraka, which are only heard of, and not seen-are perceived in dream, the nimitta is śrtārtha.
5. Distrubance of Health—IU .health caused by diseases like vāta and pitta, is also one of the nimittas of dream.
6. A deity-When one beholds a deity-adverse or favourable-in dreann, the dream can be called dova-nimitta.
7. Watery place - This is ulso one of the nimittas when one dreams in the midst of watery region.
8.-9. Punya and pāpa-A dream is said to be good or bad according as there is punya or pāpa as its nimitta.
Thus, it is clear that a svapna is brought about by one of the above-mentioned nimittas. And hence, svapna is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of one or more nimittas. In this way, when the drearn itself is existent, how can you call the world to be non-existent like svapna ? विण्णाणमयत्तणओ घडविण्णाणं व सुमिणओ भावो।
अहवा विहियनिमित्तो घडो व्व नेमित्तियत्ताओ॥१५६।। (१७०४) Viņņāŋamayattanao ghadaviņņāņam va sumisao bhāvol Abavā vihiyanimitto ghaço vvao nemittiyattāö. 156 (1704) [विज्ञानमयत्वतो घटविज्ञानमिव स्वमको भावः ।
अथवा विहितनिमित्तो घट इव नैमित्तिकत्वात् ॥१५६॥ (१७०४)

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:212 Jinabhadra Gaại's
[The fourth Vijñānamayatvato gbațavijäānamiva svapnako bhāvaḥ 1 Athava vihitanimitto ghata iva naimittikatvat. 156 (1704)]
___ Trans.-156 The existence of dream is (apprehended) either because dream is vijñānamaya (i. e. full of knowledge) like the knowledge of ghata, or because it is naimittika (i. e. caused by nimitta) like ghata as mentioned before. (1704)
टीका-भावः खम इति प्रतिज्ञा। विज्ञानमयत्वादिति हेतुः। घटविज्ञानवदिति दृष्टान्तः। अथवा, भावः स्वप्नः, नैमित्तिकत्वात् निमिनिष्पयो नैमित्तिकस्तद्भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मादित्यर्थः, घटवदिति। कथं पुनः स्वप्नो नैमित्तिकः ? इत्याह-यतो विहितनिमित्तः, विहितानि—“अणुहूय-दिट्ठचिंतिय " इत्यादिना प्रतिपादितानि निमित्तानि यस्यासौ विहितनिमित्त इति ॥१५६॥ (१७०४)
D. C.-Existence of dream can be proved in either of these two ways:
___1. Dream is full of cognizance as ghata is. So, like ghata, dream can also be perceived on account of its being existent.
2. As ghata is caused by various nimittas, dream is also caused by nimittas, like anubhava, smarana, cintana etc., that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a mūrta kārya, and hence existent like ghata. सव्वाभावे च कओ सुमिणोऽसुमिणो त्ति सचमलियं ति । गंधवपुरं पाडलिपुत्तं तत्थो क्यारो त्ति ? ॥१५७:। (१७०५) कलं ति कारणं ति य सज्झमिणं साहणं ति कत्त त्ति । पत्ता वयणं वचं परपक्खोऽयं संपक्खोऽयं ? ॥१५८॥ (१७०६) किं वेह थिर-दवो-सिण-चलया-ऽरूवित्तणाई निययाई । सहारओ य गज्मा सोत्ताइयाई गहूणाई ? ॥१५९॥ (१७०७)

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Vada] Ganadharavada
:213: समया विवजओ वा सव्वागहणं व किं न सुण्णम्मि। किं सुण्णया व सम्मं सग्गहो किं व मिच्छत्तं? ॥१६०॥ (१७०८) किह स-परो-भयबुद्धी कहं च तेर्सि परोप्परमसिद्धी।
अह परमईए भण्णइ स-परमइविसेसणं कत्तो? ॥१६१॥ (१७०१) Savvabhāvà ca kao sumino'sumiņo tti saccamaliyam til Gandhavvapuram Pādalıputtam tattho vayāro tti? 151 (1705) Kajjam ti kāraṇam ti ya sajjbamiņam sāhaņam ti katta ttit Vattā vayaņam vaccam parapakkho'yam s2-pakkho'yam? 158 (1706) Kim vdha -thira-davo-sina-calaya-rāvittanaim niyayaim | Saddadaö ya gajjbā sottāiyāim gabañaim ? 159 (1707) Sanayā vivajjaö vā savvāgahaņam va kim na suņņammil Kim suņņayā va sammam saggaho kim va micchattam? 160 (1708) Kiha sa-paro-bhaya buddht kaham ca tasim paropparamasiddhti Aha paramata bhanpai sa-paramaivisbsanam katto ? 161 (1709) [ सर्वाभावे च कुतः स्वप्नोऽस्वप्न इति सत्यमलीकमिति । गन्धर्वपुरं पाटलिपुत्रं तथ्य उपचार इति ॥१५७।। (१७०५) कार्यमिति कारणमिति च साध्यमिदं साधनमिति कर्तेति। वक्ता वचनं वाच्यं परपक्षोऽयं स्वपक्षोऽयम् १ ॥१५८॥ (१७०६) किं वेह स्थिर द्रवो-ष्ण-चलना-ऽरूपित्वानि नियतानि । शब्दादयश्च ग्राह्याः श्रोतादिकानि ग्राह्याणि ? ॥१५९ ॥ (१७०७) समता विपर्ययो वा सर्वाग्रहणं वा किं न शून्ये । किं शून्यता वा सम्यक् सद्ग्रहः किं वा मिथ्यात्वम् १ ॥१६०॥ (१७०८) कथं स्व-परो-भयबुद्धिः कथं च तेषां परस्परमसिद्धिः।
अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व-परमतिविशेषणं कुतः ? ॥१६॥ (१७०९) Sarvābbávà ca kutaḥ svapno'svapna iti satyamaltkamiti Gandharvapuram Pataliputram tathya upacara iti ? 157 (1705)

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: 214:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
Kāryamiti karaṇamiti ca sadhyamidam sādhanamiti kartèti | Vaktā vacanam vācyam para pakśo'yam svapakso'yam? 158 (1706)
Kim vèha sthira-dravo-ṣṇa-calata-rūpitvāni niyatāni | Sabdadayaśca grāhyāḥ śrotrādikāni grāhyāņi? 159 (1707)
Samatā viparyayo và sarvāgrahaņam vā kim na śunyè Kim śūnyatā và sanyak sadgrahah kim và mithyātvam, 160 (1701) Katham sva-paro-bhaya buddhiḥ katham ca tèṣām paraspara siddhiḥ Atha para-matyā bhaṇyatè sva-para-mativiśèṣaṇam kutaḥ? 161]
Trans. 157-161 Again, in case of all-pervading negation, how could there be distinction between dream and otherwise, between truth and false-hood, between (an imaginary) Gandharva city and (a real) Pățaliputra †, between a fact and fancy, between cause and effect, between end, means, and (their) agent, between speaker, speech, and (that which is ) to be spoken, between one's own party, and the opposite party? Or, in such a case, how could (properties like) stability, fluidity, heat, activeness etc., as well as, (the rule) that sound etc., are grahya (to be received) and the ear etc., are grahakas (receivers)-be ascertained at all? Or, why should (faults like) uniformity, contraiety or non-acceptibility of all, not arise in (the state of all-pervading) negation? And, is this ( apprehension of) sunyata really substantial or worthless ? Moreover, how could sva, para, and ubhaya be distinguished and how would their mutual accomplishment be possible (in case of all-pervading negation)? And, if it is said to be due to another's intellect, how could the intellect of sva and para be distinguished? (1705-1709).
टीका - सर्वाभावे च सर्वशून्यतायां चाभ्युपगम्यमानायां "स्वप्नोऽयम् ” “ अस्वप्नोऽयम् " इति कुतः - किंकृतोऽयं विशेषः ? इत्यर्थः । तथा, सत्यमिदम्, अलीकं वा; तथा, गन्धर्वपुरमेतत्, पाटलीपुत्रादि चेदम् ; तथा, " तत्थो बयारो त्ति " अयं तथ्यो निरुपचरितो मुख्यश्चतुष्पदविशेषः सिंहः,
† Known as Patna at the present time.

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Gaṇadharavada
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अयं त्वौपचारिको मनुष्यविशेषो माणवकः, तथा, कार्यमिदं घटादि, कारणं चेदं मृत्पिण्डादि; तथा, साध्यमिदमनित्यत्वादि, साधनं कृतकत्वादि, कर्ता घटादेः कुलालादिः; तथा अयं वक्ता, वादी, वचनं चेदं व्यवयवं पश्चावयवं वा; इदं च वाच्यमभिधेयमस्य शब्दसंदर्भस्य तथा, अयं स्वपक्षः, अयं च परपक्ष इति सर्वशून्यत्वे कुतोऽसौ विशेषो गम्यते ? । " किं वेह थिरेत्यादि " पृथ्व्यिाः स्थिरत्वम्, अपां द्रवत्वम्, वरुष्णत्वम् वायोश्चलत्वम्, आकाशस्यारूपित्वमित्यादयो नियताः सर्वदेवैकस्वभावाः विशेषाः सर्वशून्यतायां कुतो गम्यन्ते ? । तथा, शब्दादयो ग्राह्मा एव इन्द्रियाणि च श्रोतादीनि ग्राहकाण्येवेति कुतो नियमसिद्धिः १ ।
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" समयेत्यादि " ननु सर्वशून्यतायां स्वप्ना स्वप्न सत्याऽलीकादीनां विशेषनिबन्धनाभावात् समतैव कस्माद् न भवति - यादृशः स्वप्नः, अस्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एव; यादृशश्वास्वप्न स्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एवेत्यादि ? | अथवा, विपर्ययः कुतो न भवति - यः स्वप्नः सोऽस्वप्नः यस्त्वस्वमः स स्वप्न इत्यादि । यदिवा, सर्वेषामपि स्वप्नाऽस्वप्नादीनां सर्वथाशून्यत्वेऽग्रहणमेव कस्माद् न भवति ? । भ्रान्तिवशादेव स्वप्ना स्वप्नादिग्रहणमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् - देश - काल-स्वभावादिनैयन्येन तद्ग्राहकज्ञानोत्पत्तेः । किञ्च, इयं भ्रान्तिः किं विद्यते, न वा १ । यदि विद्यते, तर्ह्यभ्युपगमविरोधः । अथ न विद्यते, तर्हि भ्रान्तेरसश्वाभावग्राहकज्ञानस्य निर्भ्रान्तत्वात् सन्त्येव सर्वे भावाः, न पुनः शून्यतेति । अथवा, अन्यत् पृच्छामो भवन्तम् - ननु सर्वशून्यत्वे शून्यतैव सम्यक्त्वं सतां भावानां ग्रहणं सद्ग्रहः, भावसत्त्वग्रहणं पुनर्मिथ्यात्वमित्यत्र कस्ते विशेषहेतुः ? |
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यदुक्तम्- न स्वतो भावानां सिद्धिः इत्यादि; तत्प्रतिविधानार्थमाह - "किह स-परो भयेत्यादि " ननु कथं ह्रस्व-दीर्घो भयविषये " इदं इस्वम् ” “ इदं दीर्घम् ” “ एतचु तदुभयम्" इत्येवंभूतो स्व-परो भय बुद्धिर्युग पदाश्रीयते भवता ? कथं च तेषां ह्रस्व-दीर्घा -भयानां परस्परमसिद्धिरुधुष्यते १ – पूर्वापरविरुद्धत्वाद् नैतद् वक्तुं युज्यत इत्यर्थः । अयमत्र भावार्थ:न स्वल्पापेक्षिकमेव वस्तूनां सत्त्वम्, किन्तु स्वविषयज्ञानजननाद्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वमपि । ततश्च हस्त्र - - दीर्घा-भयान्यात्मविषयं चेज्ज्ञानं जनयन्ति, तदा
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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth सन्त्येव तानि, कथं तेषामसिद्धिः १ । यदप्युक्तम्-" पध्यमाङ्गलिमपेक्ष्य प्रदेशिन्यां इस्वत्वमसदेवोच्यते" इत्यादिः तदप्ययुक्तम् , यतो यदि मध्यमामपेक्ष्य प्रदेशिन्यां स्वतः सर्वथाऽसत्यामपि इस्वत्वं भवति, तदा विशेषाभावात् खरविषाणेऽपि तद् भवेत् , अतिदीर्घविन्द्रियष्टयादिवपि च तत् स्यात् । अथवा, प्रदेशिन्याः स्वापेक्षया स्वात्मन्यपि इस्वत्वं स्यात्, सर्वत्रासच्चाविशेपात् । न चैवम् । तसात् स्वतः सत्यामेव प्रदेशिन्या वस्तुतोऽनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वात् तत्तत्सहकारिसंनिधौ तत्तद्रूपाभिव्यक्तस्तत्तज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, न पुनरसत्यामेव तत्यामपेक्षामात्रत एव इस्वज्ञानमुपजायते । एवं दीर्घो-भयादिष्वपि वाच्यम् ।
अथ "इदं इस्वम्" " इदं दीर्घम्" "एतचोभयम्" इत्यादि स्वपरो-भयबुद्धिः परमत्या-पराभ्युपगमेनोच्यते, न पुनः स्वतः सिद्धं स्वविषयज्ञानजनकं ह्रस्वादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति, अतो न कश्चित् पूर्वापरविरोध इत्यत्राहननु सर्वशुन्यत्वे " इदं स्वमतम् ," "एतच्च परमतम्" इत्येतदपि स्वपरमावेन विशेषणं कुतः१-न कुतश्चिदित्यर्थः, स्व-परभावेऽपि "समया विवजओ का" इत्याघेवावर्तन भावः । स्व-परभावाद्यभ्युपगमे च शून्यत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरिति ॥ १५७-१५८-१५९-१६०-१६१ ॥ (१७०५१७०६-१७०७-१७०८-१७०९)॥
D. C.--If the idea of all-pervading negation were taken As true, there would not exist any distinction between dream and reality; truth and falsehood; between an imaginary Gandharvapura and a real Pătaliputra; between a natural four-legged lion and an artificial man-lion Manavaka; between kāryas like ghata, etc., and karanas like lump of earth eto., Again, there would be no distinction between sādhya (say, e.g. anityatva) sadhana ( say, e. g. the artificial instrument-by means of which anityatva is brought about) und kartā (e. g. a: potter ) who is the doer of the sādhya. There would be no distinotion between a speaker, his speech (composed of three or five parts ), and a number of words that are to be uttered, and there would be no distinction between svapakşa and ,paranaksa. also.

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Gaṇadharavāda
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Moreover, properties such as stability of earth, fluidity of water, activeness of wind, formlessness of sky etc., as well as, the rule that sabda, rūpa, gandha etc., are grahya and ears, eyes, nose etc., are grāhaka, could not be established in the midst of sarvaśūnyatā.
Again, in the midst of all-pervading negation, there being no possibility of distinction between satya and asatya either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of svapna as well as asvapna, or (2) there would be inverse apprehension of svapna as asvapna and asvapna as svapna, or (3) there would be absolute non-apprehension of svapna, asvapna and many other things. Here, O Vyakta! It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprenhension of svapna, asvapna etc., is due to bhrānti (delusion). For, cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time, place, and properties.
And is that bhrānti, which, according to you, apprehends svapna, asvapna, etc., vidyamına or a-vidyamana? If it is vidyamāna, then naturally sarvaśūnyatā does not exist. If it is a-vidyamāna, the jñāna that apprehends an object being devoid of bhrānti, all objects would automatically be taken as vidya māna and there would be nothing like sarvaśūnyatā at all.
And, how is it O Vyaktā ! that the apprehension of existent objects as sunya, is according to you, a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as vidyamāna is worthless? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this sarvaśūnyatā ?
According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves, you apprehend objects that are short, long, or either, distinctly as short, long, or either. Thus on one side, you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects; while on the other side, you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very
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:88: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth objects. This involvas self-contradiction in your own argument, which, o Vyakta ! is not at all worthy of you.
The point is that in case of establishing the existenoe of objects, mere apekşā would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object whigh produces jiāna about its own self, is also an active cause. And that is the reason why hrasva, dirga, and abhaya-each one of which would be producing jbāna about its own self-should be taken as existing.
Again, o Vyakta ! you believe that compared to the middle finger, the pradəsint finger is considered as hrasva even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger, ir pradəsint were taken as hrasva even though it is avidyamāna by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also a-vidyamāna should be taken as hrasva and a very long substance like indradhvaja should also be taken as hrasva, as the quality of a-vidyamănatā is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really spoaking, pradesint finger being vidyamāna by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along 'with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So, it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of hrasva, dirgha eto., is produced in the absolutely non-existent anguli only by means of apo kşa. You might argne at this point that in such CASOS also, dirgha, hrasva, ubhaya eto., are apprehended, and the intellects as regards sva, para, and ubhaya are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion, and further that according to you, hrasva, dirgha etc, that are svataḥsiddha and that produce jñāna with regard to their own selves, are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, o Vyakta ! how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally, there would be no distinction between sva and para at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinotion, there would be bothing like sünyatā at al. (1705-1709)

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Vada ] Ganadharavada
:219: जुगवं कमेण वा ते विण्णाणं होन दीह-हस्सेसु। जइ जुगवं कावेक्खा कमेण पुवम्मि काग्वेक्ला ?॥१६२॥ (१५१०) आइमविण्णाणं वा जं बालस्सेह तस्स काऽवेक्खा। तुल्लेसु व काऽवेक्खा परोप्परं लोयणदुगे व्व ? ॥१६३॥ (१७११) Jugavam kamèņa vā tà viņņaņam hojja diha-hassègu | Jai jugavam kāvekkhā kamòņa puvvammi kā'vèkkhā ? 162 (1710) Aimaviņņāņam và jam bālassdha tassa kā'vèkkhā | Tullesu va kā'vèkkhā paropparam loyanadugè vva ? 163 (1711) [ युगपत् क्रमेण वा ते विज्ञानं भवेद् दीर्घ-इस्वयोः ।
यदि युगपत् काऽपेक्षा क्रमेण पूर्वमिन् काऽपेक्षा? ॥१६२॥ (१७१०) आदिमविज्ञानं वा यद् वालस्येह तस्य काऽपेक्षा ।
तुल्ययोर्वा काऽपेक्षा परस्परं लोचनद्विक इव ॥१६३॥ (१७११) Yugapat kramèņa vā tè vijñānam bhaved dirgha-hrasvayoh ! Yadi yugapat ko'pèkşā kramòņa pūrvasmin kā pakşā ? 162 (1710) Adima vijñānam va yad bālasydha tasya ka'pèksā Tulyayorvā kā'pdksa parasparam locanadvika iva ? 163 (1711).1
Trans.-162-163-1s that vijnana of yours as regards dirgha and hrasva (produced ) all at once, or in regular course ? If (it is produced) all at once, what apsksa (is there )? (And) if (it is produced) in regular course, to what apakşā is the first produced ? Or, to what apakşã has the first and foremost cognizance of a child been produced ? Or, what mutual apèksā (could there be ) in the case of two similar (objects ) like a pair of eyes ? (1710-1711)
टीका-ननु मध्यमा-प्रदेशिन्यादिदीर्घ-हस्वयोस्तवामिप्रायेण खाकारप्रतिभासि ज्ञानं किं युगपदेव भवेत् , क्रमेण वा ? यदि युगपत् वहि परानपेक्षं द्वयोरपि युगपदेव खप्रतिभासिनि ज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् कस्य किल

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth काऽपेक्षा ? । अथ क्रमेण, तदापि पूर्वमेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन परानपेक्ष मेव इस्वस्य प्रदेशिन्यादेहीतत्वादुत्तरसिन् मध्यमादिके दीर्घे काऽपेक्षा। तसाचक्षुरादिसामग्रीसद्भावे परानपेक्षमेव स्वकीयविविक्तरूपेण सर्वभावानां खज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् स्वत एव सिद्धिः । अथवा, बालस्य तत्क्षणमेव जातस्य शिशोर्यदिह नयनोन्मेषानन्तरमेवादौ विज्ञानम् , तत् किमपेक्ष्य प्रादुरस्ति। यदि वा, ये न इस्वे नापि दीपे, किन्तु परस्परं तुल्ये एव वस्तुनी, तयोर्युगपदेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन गृह्यमाणयोः काऽन्योन्यापेक्षा ?-न काचित्, यथा तुल्यस्य लोचनयुग्मस्य । तस्मादगुल्यादिपदार्थानां नान्यापेक्षमेव रूपम् , किन्तु स्वप्रतिभासवता ज्ञानेनान्यनिरपेक्षा एव ते स्वरूपतोऽपि गृह्यन्ते। उत्तरकालं तु तत्तद्रूपजिज्ञासायां तत्तत्प्रतिपक्षसरणादिसहकारिकारणान्तरवशान, दीर्घ-इस्वादिव्यपदेशाः प्रवर्तन्ते, इति स्वतःसिद्धा एव सन्ति मावा इति ।। (१७१०-१७११)
D. C.-Consider whether jñāna in case of objects that are hrasva and dirgha is produced at the same time or in regular course. If both the jfānas are produced simultaneously, there would be no scopo for apeksa, both being recognized in their own form at the same time. On the other hand, if jñānas of the two, were produced one after another, the hrasva object would be apprehended by virtue of its own jñāna; but later on, to whose ape kş& would the dirgha ohject be apprehended ? This leads us to conclude that, in spite of the existence of mediums like eyes etc., in absence of apekṣā, all objects are apprehended in various forms only by virtue of their individual jñānas. This proves that the existence of all objects, is very natural.
Again, to whose apokşā is the jitāna attained by a child immediately after its birth, produced? And, what mutual apakşā could there exist in reflecting a similar cognizance in two similar objects which are neither hrasva nor dirgha but exactly identical to each other } This shows that various forms of objects like fingers eto., are not apprehended by

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Vada] Ganadharavāda
:221: virtue of their apeksā to others but by means of their corresponding cognizances which are independent of apakşā. Later on, in the curiosity of observing the forms in details, the objeots are recognized as hrasva, dirgha etc., on account of certain co-operative causes such as recalling the opposite faction etc. Each and every object would, therefore, be taken as existent by virtue of no other factor but its own svabhāva.
Moreover, किं हस्साओ दीहे दीहाओ चेव किं न दीहम्मि । कीस व न खपुप्फाउ किं न खपुप्फे खपुप्फाओ? ॥१६४॥ Kim hassão dihè dihāö cova kim no dîhammil Kisa va na khapupphāu kim na khapupphò khapupphāö ? 164 (1712) [किं इस्वाद् दीर्षे दीर्घादेव किं न दीर्थे ।
करसाद् वा न खपुष्पात् किं न खपुष्पे खपुष्पात् १ ॥१६४॥ (१७१२) Kim hrasvād dirghè dirghādeva kim na dirghè Kasmād vā na khapuspat kim na khapuspa khapuspat ? 164 (1712)]
Trans.-164 Why ( is the knowledge) about dirgha (acquired) from hrasva and not from dirgha ( itself )? Or, why not from khapuspa? Or, why not ( the knowledge ) about khapuspa, (acquired) from khapuspa ( itself) ? (1712)
टीका-हन्त ! यदि सर्वशून्यता, ततः किमिति इस्वादेव प्रदेशिनीप्रमृतिद्रव्याद् दीर्घ मध्यमादिद्रव्ये दीर्घज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहारः प्रवर्ततेदीर्घापेक्ष एव दीर्धन ज्ञानाभिधानेन व्यवहारः किं न प्रवर्तते, असत्त्वाविशेषात् ? इति भावः । एवं “किं दीहाओ हस्से हस्साउ चेव किं न हस्सम्मि" इत्येतदपि द्रष्टव्यम् । तथा, किमिति वा न खपुष्पाद् दीर्षे ह्रस्वे वा तज्ज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहतिर्विधीयते ? । तथा, असत्त्वाविशेषत एव किमिति खपुष्पाव खपुष्प एव इस्व-दीर्घज्ञानादिव्यवहारो न प्रवर्तते ?। न चैवम्, तसाद सत्त्येव भावाः, न तु शून्यता जगत इति ॥१६४॥ (१७१२)

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[ The fourth
D. C.-If everything is sūnya, according to the theory of sarva-śūnyatā, how is it that the cognizance of dirgha is acquired only from its apèkṣā to hrasva, as seen in the case of prad esint and madhyamā fingers, and not from its apèkṣa to the dirgha itself ? Similarly, why is the practice of appre hending dirghatva from dirgha, and hrasvatva from hrasva not followed? Moreover, the practice of acquiring knowledge of khapuspa, as well as, the knowledge of hrasvatva and dirghatva in khapuspa from the khapuspa itself, is not followed even though sunyatā is common to all of them. This shows that there is nothing like sarvaśūnyatā in this world.
: 222:
fi ashararए चिय होय मई व सभाव एवायं ।
सो भावो त्ति सभावो वंझापुत्ते न सो जुत्तो ॥ १६५॥ (१७१३)
Kim va'vikkha è ciya hojja mai va sabhava dvāyam So bhavo tti sabhāvo vanjhāputte na so jutto. 165 (1713)
[ किंवापेक्षयैव भवेद् मतिर्वा स्वभाव एवायम् ।
स्वो भाव इति स्वभावो वन्ध्यापुत्रे न स युक्तः ।। १६५ ।। (१७१३)
Kim vapèkṣayaiva bhavèd matirvā svabhāva èvāyam | Svo bhāva iti svabhāvo vandhyāputre na sa yuktah. 165 (1713)]
66
Trans. - 165 Or of what avail is the apòksā at all ? (The opponent may argue here that) Apprehension by means of apèksā is natural. " ( But ) the existence of one's own self means svabhāva; (and) that does not apply to the son of a barren woman. ( 1713 )
टीका - अथवा, सर्वस्याप्येसत्त्वे हुस्वादेर्दीर्घाद्यपेक्षयापि किं कर्तव्यम्, शून्यताप्रतिकूलत्वात् तस्याः घटाद्यर्थसच्चवत् १ । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्स्वभावादेवापेक्षयैव हूस्व-दीर्घादिव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोगमर्हति; तथा चोक्तम् - " अग्निर्दहति नाकाशं कोऽत्र पयनुर्युज्यताम् ? " इति । इन्त 1 इत्थमपि हतोऽसि, यत स्वो भावः स्वभावस्ततः स्व- परभावा

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Vida ] Canadharavada
:223: स्युपगमात् शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः । न च वन्ध्यापुत्रकल्पानामर्थानां स्वभावपरिकल्पना युक्तेति । भवतु वाऽपेक्षा, तथापि शून्यताऽसिद्धिः ॥१६५॥ (१७१३)
D. C.-If there is absolute negation in the world, what is the use of apèkşā in apprehending hrasva etc., to the apeksā of dirgha etc. ? For, the very conception of apo kşā, is contrary to the absolute negation.
Vyakta :- Apprehending hrasva, dirgha eto., hy means of apdksa, is very natural.
Acārya - That is not so, o Vyakta ! Syabhāva is the root-cause in cases like "fire burns" "the sky does not burn” eto. But, that is not applicable to the above-named example of the apprehension of hrasva, dirgha etc. . Hence, svabhāva should not be blamed in such cases. It is absurd to assumo svabhāva in the apprehension of non-existent objects like vandhyāputra.
Svabhava means existence of one's own self. The rest can be distinguished as parabhāva--the existence of everything else. Apart from your belief in apdksa, the principle of sarva. günyatā would be violated even from this point of view.
How ?
होजावेक्खाओ वा विण्णाणं वाभिहाणमेत्तं वा। दीहं ति व हस्सं ति व न उ सत्ता सेसधम्मा वा ॥१६६॥ (१७१४) Hojjavèkkbfö vā viņpāņam vābhihāŋam èttam vā i Diham ti va hassam ti va na u sattā sèsadhamma vā. 166 (1714) [ भवेदपेक्षातो वा विज्ञानं वाभिधानमात्रं वा।
दीर्घमिति वा इस्वमिति वा न तु सत्ता शेषधर्मा वा ॥१६६॥ (१७१४)

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:224: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Bhavėdapèksāto vā vijnānam vabhidhānamātran vã Dirghamiti vã hrasvamiti va na tu sattā səşadharmā vā. 166 ] ___Trans-166 By means of apeksa, either vijnana or mere acknowledgment (of an object ) as short or long would be (attained ), but not the existence of the rest of the properties. (1714)
टीका-अथवा, स्वतः सिद्धे वस्तुन्यपेक्षातो भवेत् । किम् ? इत्याहविज्ञानमभिधानमात्रं वा । केनोल्लेखेन ? इत्याह-" दीर्घम्” इति वा "इस्वम्" इति वेति । किं पुनर्न भवेत् ? इत्याह-न त्वन्यापेक्षया वस्तूनां सत्ता भवति, नाप्यपेक्षिकहूस्व-दीर्घत्वादिधर्मेभ्यः शेषा रूप-रसादयो धर्मा अन्यापेक्षया सिद्धयन्ति । उत्पद्यन्ते च वस्तुसत्ताग्राहकाणि, रूपादिधर्मग्राहकाणि च ज्ञानानि । अतोऽन्यापेक्षाभावतः कथं स्वतः सिद्धस्य वस्तुसचादेरभावः ?, तत्सद्भावे च कथं शून्यता जगतः इति ॥१६६॥ (१७१४)
D. C.--By virtue of its apèksā to another object, a selfAccomplished object would again be either vijñāna or the acknowledgment of its own self as hrasva or dirgha and nothing more. Neither existence nor qualities such as rūpa, rasa, sparśa etc., that are distinct from hrasvatva, dirghatva etc., could be established by the help of apokşā. Now, jñanas that enable us to apprehend existence along with those qualities, are produced spontaneously. So, how could existence etc., of a self-accomplished object be refuted by means of apakşā ? And when the existence etc., of an object, are not denied, how could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted at all?
इहरा हस्साभावे सव्वविणासो हवेज दीहस्स । न य सो, तम्हा सत्तादयोऽणविक्खा घडाईणं ॥१६७॥ (१७१५) Ibarā bassābiavè savvaviņāso havėjja dihassa 1 Na ya so, tamhā sattadayo'navikkhā ghadatyam. 167 (1715)

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Vada ) Ganadharavada
:225 [ इतरथा ह्खाभावे सर्वविनाशो भवेद् दीर्घस्य ।
न च सः, तसात् सत्तादयोऽनपेक्षा घटादीनाम् ॥ १६७॥ (१७१५) Itaratbā brasvābhāvd sarvavināšo bhaved dirghasya i Na ca sah, tasmāt sattadayo'napdksa ghatadinām. 167 (1715)]
Trans.-167 Otherwise, in the absence of hrāsva, there should have been an absolute negation of dirgha also. But that is not so. Hence, the existence etc., of ghata etc., are (established as ) independant of (their) apòkşā (to other objects). ( 1715)
टीका-इतरथा-यदि घटादीनां सत्तादयोऽप्यन्यापेक्षया भवेयुः, तदा इखाभावे इखस्य सर्वविनाशे दीर्घस्यापि वस्तुनः सर्वविनाशः स्यात्, इखसत्तापेक्षित्वाद् दीर्घसत्तादीनाम् । न चैवमसौ दीर्घस्य सर्वविनाशो दृश्यते । तमात् निश्चीयते-सन्त्यन्यानपेक्षा एव घटादीनां सत्ता-रूपादयो धर्माः, तत्सत्वे चापास्ता शून्यतेति ॥१६७॥ (१७१५)
D. C.-If the qualities like existence etc., of the objects such as ghata etc, were dependant upon their comparision with other objects, destruction of a hrasva object would have effected the destruction of a dirgha object also. But really speaking, existence etc, of a dirgha object, are not denied when a hrasva object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like ghata eto., have their properties such as existence, rupa, eto., totally independant of their apèkşā to other objects, and hence, the idea of allpervading negation is automatically refuted. जावि अविक्खाऽविक्खणमविक्खगोऽविक्खणिजमणविक्ख । सा न मया सव्वेसु वि संतेसु न सुन्नया नाम ॥१६८॥ (१७१६) किंचि सओ तह परओ तदुभयओ किंचि निश्चसिद्धं पि । जलओ घडओ पुरिसो तहं ववहारओ नेयं ॥१६९॥ (१७१७)
29

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:226
Jinabhadra Garis [ The fourth निच्छयओ पुण बाहिरनिमित्तमेत्तोवओगओ सव्वं । होइ सओ जमभावो न सिज्झइ निमित्तभावे वि ॥ १७०॥ Javi avikkhā'vikkhaṇamavikkhago'vikkhanijjamaņavikkha i Să na mayā savvèsu vi santèsu na sunnaya nāma. 168 (1716) Kim ci sað taha parað tadubhayaö kim ci niccasiddham pi 1 Jalað ghaçaö puriso taham vavahārað nèyam. 169 (1717) Niochayaổ puņa bāhiranimittamattovao gað savvam Hoi saö jamabhāvo na sijjhai nimittabhāvè vi. 170 (1718) [ याऽप्यपेक्षापेक्षणमपेक्षकोऽ पेक्षणीयमनपेक्ष्य ।
सा न मता सर्वेष्वपि सत्सु न शून्यता नाम ॥१६८॥ (१७१६) किञ्चित् खतस्तथा परतस्तदुभयतः किञ्चिद् नित्यसिद्धिमपि । जलदो घटकः पुरुषस्तथा व्यवहारतो ज्ञेयम् ॥१६९॥ (१७१७) निश्चयतः पुनर्बहिनिमित्तमात्रोपयोगतः सर्वम् ।
भवति खतो यदभावो न सिध्यति निमित्तभावेऽपि ॥१७०॥ (१७१८) Ya'pyapdksa'pdksanamapdksako'pdksaniyamanapeksya | Sā na matā sarvesvapi satsu na sunyatā nāma. 168 (1716) Kimcit svatastathā paratastadubhayataḥ kimcid nityasiddhamapii Jalado ghatakah purusastathā vyavahārato jneyam. 169 (1717) Niścayataḥ punar-bahir-nimittamātropayogataḥ sarvami Bhavati svato yadabhavo na sidhyati nimittabhāvapi. 170 (1718)]
Trans.---168-169-170 Even apdksa-being identical to (the nature of) action (apeksanam), agent (apdksaka), and object (apeksantyam)-could not be accepted. When all are existing, there could not be śūnyatā at all. some are spontaneous e. g., a cloud; some ( are produced ) by means of others as in the case of ghata; and Some ( are produced ) in both the ways. e. g. a man; while some are produced even for ever. Again, it is certain that each one ( of them), becomes existent by its own self, only by usresorting to the external
For Privad & Persal Use Only

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Vāda ]
Ganadharavāda
: 227: causes. ( But ) that which is non-existent is not produced even in the presence of external causes. (1716-1717-1718)
टीका-याऽपीयं इस्वादेर्दीर्घाद्यपेक्षा साऽप्यपेक्षणं क्रियारूपम् ; तथा, अपेक्षकं कर्तारम् , अपेक्षणीयं च कर्म, अनपेक्ष्य न मता-न विदुषां सम्मता । ततः किम् ? इत्याह-एतेषु चापेक्षणा-ऽपेक्षका-ऽपेक्षणीयेषु सर्वेषु वस्तुषु सत्सु न काचित् शून्यता नाम । अतोऽपेक्षकादिसवलक्षणे विपक्ष एवापेक्षालक्षणस्य हेतोवृत्तत्वाद् विरुद्धत्वमिति ॥१६८॥ (१७१६)
टीका-इह किश्चित् स्वत एव सिद्धथति, यथा कर्दनिरपेक्षस्तत्कारणद्रव्यसंघातविशिष्टपरिणामरूपो जलदः । किश्चिनु परतः, यथा कुलालकनुको घटः । किश्चिदुभयतः, यथा माता-पितृभ्यां स्वकृतकर्मतश्च पुरुषः। किश्चिद् नित्यसिद्धमेव, यथाऽऽकाशम् । एतच्च व्यवहारनयापेक्षया द्रष्टव्यम् । निश्चयतस्तु बाह्यं निमित्तमात्रमेवाश्रित्य सर्व वस्तु स्वत एव सिध्यति, यद् यस्माद् बाह्यनिमित्तसद्भावेऽपि खरविषाणादिरूपोऽभावः कदाचिदपि न सिध्यति। उभयनयमतं च सम्यक्त्वमिति ॥१६९-१७०॥ (१७१७-१७१८)
D. C. Consideration of dirgha etc., in comparision with hrasva etc., is itself nothing but kartā, karma, and kriya. Now, when all objects are accomplished as existent by virtue of their being either kartā, karma or krijā, where could the sunyata exist at all ?
The existence of all objects is either svatah, paratah, or ubhayataḥ. There are several objects such as cloud etc, which come into being only by coming into contact with some substance as their kāraña; some, like ghata are produced by the help of kārtā, some, like purusa are produced by both (as puruşa comes into existence on acoount of his parents as well as, his deeds in the past life). Some objects like akasa are ever-accomplished. Thus, it is seen that various objects come into existence in various ways, according to their usage. But, really speaking, all objects are existing by their very svabhāva merely by resorting to their external cấusos. In case of objects that are non-existent, existence could not be brought

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:228: Jinabhadra Gani's
(The fourth about even if the external causes were present, because nonexistence is innate in them by their very svabhāva.
In reply to the question whether astitva and ghata are one or different, the Acārya argues thus – अत्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया य पज्जायमेतचिंतेयं ।
अस्थि घडे पडिवन्ने, इहरा सा किं न खरसिंगे? ॥१७१॥ (१७१९) Atthitta-ghadègāņègayā ya pajjāyanòttacintèyam 1 Atthi ghada padivannd, ihara sa kim na kharasingd ? 171 (1719) [ अस्तित्व-घटेकानेकता वा पर्यायमात्रचिन्तेयम् ।
अस्ति घटे प्रतिपने, इतरथा सा किं न खरशृङ्गे ? ॥१७१॥ (१७१९) Astitva-ghataikānekatā vā paryāyanātracintèyam I Asti ghate pratipannd, itaratha sa kim na kharasrige. 171]
Trans.--171 (The question) whether għata and astitva are one or different, is (nothing but the question) of synonym when ghata is existent. (For,) otherwise, why should it not arise in case of kharasriga (also)? (1719)
टीका-इह “अस्ति घटो न तु नास्ति" इत्येव पतिपने सति तदनन्तरमेवास्तित्व-घटयोः “किमेकता, अनेकता वा?" इत्यादिना घटास्तित्वयोरेकत्वा-ऽनेकत्वलक्षणपर्यायमात्रचिन्तैव भवता कृता भवति, न तु तयोरभावः सिध्यति । अन्यथा ह्यभावरूपाविशेषाद् यथा घटा-ऽस्तित्वयोः, एवं खरविषाण-वन्ध्यापुत्रयोरप्येकत्वा-ऽनेकत्वचिन्ता भवतः किं न प्रवर्तते ? इति ॥ १७१॥ (१७१९)
D. C.-After having asserted that "ghata exists" the question whether ghata and astitva are identical or not, is reduoed to the consideration of both as being mere synonyms of each other. Moreover, this question should arice only in case of the existent ghata. For, if it were not so, the question of skats-andkatā would arise in case of non-existent objects like kharasrnga and vandhyāputra also.

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Vada] Gañadharavada
:229: Following the example of ghata and astitva, there would be & probability of ekatā-ano katā hetween ghata and śünyatā also घड-सुन्नयन्नयाए वि सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म !। एगत्ते घडओ चिय न सुण्णया नाम घडधम्मो ! ॥१७२॥ (१७२०) Ghada-sunnayunayād vi sundayā kā ghadāhiyā somma ! | Egattd ghadai cciya na sunnaya nāma ghadadhanimo 1 172 (1720) [घट-शुन्यतान्यतायामपि शून्यता का घटाधिका सौम्य ।
एकत्वे घटक एव न शन्यता नाम घटधर्मः ! ॥१७२॥ (१७२०) Ghaţa-śūnyatanyatāyāu'api sūnyatā kā ghatādhikā saumya il Ekatvė ghataka dva na śünyatā pāwa ghatadharmaḥ | 172]
Trans.-- 172 Even in case of ghata and sūnyatā being different (from each other ), what sūnyatā, exceeding ghata could be (found), O Saumya? In case of similarity also, it is the ghata itself (which exists) Sūnyatā does never become the property of ghata. (1720)
____टीका-ननु घट-शून्यतयोरप्यन्यता, अनन्यता वा?। यद्यन्यता, तहिं “सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म ! त्ति" सौम्य व्यक्त ! शून्यता का घटाधिका नाम ?-ननु घटमात्रमेव पश्यामः, न पुनः क्वचित् शून्यता घटादधिका समीक्ष्यते । अथानन्यता, तथापि सति घटशून्यत्वयोरेकत्वे घट एवासौ युज्यते, प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् , न तु शून्यत्वं नाम कश्चित् तद्धर्मः, सर्वप्रमाणैरनुपलब्धेरिति ॥१७१२॥ (१७२०)
D. C.-If ghata and sünyatā are bhinna from each other, exceeding ghata, what more sunyata ! is required, O saumyat In case of both being sinuilar to each other, sūnyatā would be nothing but hața on account of its being perceived by pratyaksa pramāņa. But śūnyatā would never become a property of ghața as it could never be accomplished by any possible means whatsoever.
Moreover,

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[The fourth विण्णाण-वयण-वाईणमेगया तो तदत्थिया सिद्धा।
अण्णत्ते अण्णाणी निव्वयणो वा कहं वाई? ॥१७३॥ (१७२१) Vinnāna-vayana-vainamegays to tadatthiya siddhar Annattd annant nivvayano vā kaham vai ? 173 (1721) [विज्ञान-वचन-वादिनोरेकता ततस्तदस्तिता सिद्धा ।
अन्यत्वेऽज्ञानी निर्वचनो का कथं वादी १ ॥१७३॥ (१७२१) Vijñāna-vacana-vādinordkatā tatastadastitā siddhā i Anyatvè'jñāni nirvacano vā katham vādt ? 173 (1721)]
Trans.-173 (if) knowledge and speech are idnntical, then, its existence is proved. ( But) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no knowledge or speech ? (1721).
टीका-"शून्यं सर्वमेव विश्वत्रयम्" इत्येवंभूतं यद् विज्ञानं वचनं च, तेन-संह शून्यवादिनो भवत एकत्वम् , अनेकत्वं वा ? योकत्वम् , ततस्तदस्तिता वस्त्वस्तिता सिद्धेति कुतः शून्यता, वृक्षत्व-शिंशपात्वयोरिवैकत्वस्य वस्तुत्वात् । अन्यत्वे तु विज्ञान-वचनयोरज्ञानी निर्वचनश्च वादी कथं शून्यतां साधयेत् , शिलासंघातवत् १ इति ॥१७३। (१७२१)
D. C.-When the knowledge, as well as, the statement that all the three worlds are śūnya, are indentical to each other, the existence-and not the śūnyatā-of an object is establi. shed. For, their identity is similar to the identity of vriksatva and sinsapātva, But when vijñāna and vacana are dissimilar, the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock, and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of śūnyatā. घडसत्ता घडधम्मो तत्तोऽणण्णो पडाइओ भिण्णो।
अत्थि त्ति तेण भणिए को घड एवेति नियमोऽयं ॥१७४॥ (१७२२) Ghadasatta ghaqadhammo tatto’ņaņņo paļāiö bhiņņo Atthi tti tèņa bhanid ko ghaça èvèti niyamo'yam ? 174 (1722)

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अस्तीति तेन भणिते को घट एवेति नियमोऽयम् ? ॥१७४॥ (१७२२) Gbatasattā ghatadharmastato'nanyaḥ pațādito bhinnaḥ | Astiti tena bhanitd ko ghata ardti niyamo'yam ? 174 (1722)]
Trans.--174 Existence of ghata is a property of ghata. So, (it is) non-separable (from ghata), (and) distinct from pata etc. By saying, therefore, that “ It exists ", how could you frame a rule that there exists ghata alone ? (1722)
टीका-घटास्तित्वलक्षणा घटसत्ता घटस्य धर्मः, स च ततो घटादनन्योऽभिन्नः, पटादिभ्यस्तु सर्वेभ्योऽपि भिन्नः। तेन ततो “घटोऽस्ति" इति भणिते 'घट एव' इति “घट एवास्ति" इति कोऽयं नियम?निजनिजसत्तायाः पटादिष्वपि भावात् तेऽपि सन्त्येवेति भावः ॥१७४॥ (१७२२)
___D. C.-Astitva is the property of ghata, and hence, it is non-separable from ghata but distinct from objects like pata etc. So, when it is said that "ghata exists ", you cannot assert that ghata alone exists. For, the property of astitva is present in objects like pața also, and hence they too are existing. जं वा जदत्थि तं तं घडो त्ति सव्वघडयापसंगो को। भणिए घडोत्थि व कहं सव्वत्थित्तावरोहो त्ति ॥१७५॥ (१७२३) Jam va jadatthi tam tam ghado tti savvaghadayāpasango kol Bhanie ghadotthi va kaham savvatthittavaroho tti ? 175 (1728) [यदा यदस्ति तत्तद् घट इति सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः कः।
भणिते घटोऽस्ति वा कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोध इति ? ॥१७५।। (१७२३) Yadvā yadasti tattad ghata iti sarvaghatatāprasangah kaḥ 1 Bhanite gbato'sti va katham sarvāstitvavarodha iti? 175 (1723)]
Trans.-175 Or, by saying that whatever exists is ghata, how would the occasion of all being ghata arise ? Or, by

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[The fourth asserting that ghata exists, how would the existence of all be obstructed ? (1723).
टीका-" यद् वा प्रोक्तम्-यद् यदस्ति तत्तत् सर्व घटः" इति, तत्र कोऽयं सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः ? । तथा, " यो घटः स एवास्ति" इत्यप्युक्ते कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोधः-कथं घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वम् ? इत्यर्थः । यदा हि घटसत्ता घट एवास्ति नान्यत्र, तदा " यत्र यत्र घटास्तित्व तत्र तत्र घटः” इति न कश्चित् सर्वेषां घटताप्रसङ्गः, तथा, “घटसत्वेन घट एवास्ति" इत्येतसिमप्युक्ते न किश्चिद् घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वं प्रतीयत इति भावः ॥१७५ ॥ (१७२३)
D. C. Since the astitva of ghata is restricted to ghata alone, and since ghaţa exists only when ghatāstitva is present, there would be no fear of all objects being considered as ghata when we say that “yad yad asti, tat tat sarvam ghataḥ " Again, astitva of other objects would not be injured by the assertion that ghata exists. For, the all-pervading nature of ghata is not approhended when we say “ghatasattvèna ghata ava asti." 175 (1723).
After refuting the opponent's view in this way, the Acārya is now asserting his own
अत्थि त्ति तेण भणिए घडोघडो वा घडो उ अत्थेव । चूओऽचूओ व दुमो चूओ उ जहा दुमो नियमा ॥१७६॥ (१७२४) Atthi tti tèņa bhaạid ghado'ghado vā ghaço u attheva Cão'cūð va .dumo cūö u jahā dumo niyamā. 176 (1724)
[अस्तीति तेन भणिते घटोऽघटो वा घटस्त्वस्त्येव ।
चूतोऽचूतो वा द्रुमश्चूतस्तु यथा द्रुमो नियमात् ॥ १७६॥ (१७२४) Astiti tèna bhanito ghato'ghato vā ghatastvastydva i Cüto'cūto vă drumaścūtastu yathā drumo niyamāt. 176 (1724)]

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Trans-176 Just as from the assertion of "tree" (we understand) a mango tree or any other tree, but from mango tree (nothing else but) tree is understood, in the same way, by saying that “ it exists ", ghata or (objects) other than ghata ( are appreheded ), but from 'ghata, astitva alone is understood. ( 1724 )
"
टीका - येन कारणेन घटसत्ता घटधर्मत्वात् घट एवास्ति पटादिभ्यस्तु भिन्ना, तेन तस्मात 64 अस्ति 75 इत्युक्ते घटः, अघटो वा - पटादिर्गम्यते, निजनिजसच्वस्य सर्वेषु पटादिष्वपि भावात् । " घडो उ अत्थेव त्ति " घट इति तु प्रोक्तेऽस्त्येवेति गम्यते, निजसत्त्वस्य नियमेन घटे सद्भावात् । अत्र यथासंख्य मुदाहरणद्वयम् । यथा " द्रुमः " इत्युक्ते चूतः, अचूतो वा निम्बादिर्गम्यते, द्रुमत्वस्य सर्वत्र भावात् ! चूतः इति तु निगदिते द्रुम एव गम्यते, अद्रुमस्य चूतत्वायोगादिति ॥ १७६ ॥ (१७२४)
""
"
"
D. C. - As the quality of vriksatva is present in all the trees, when we Fay 39 "tree all the trees-whether 8 mango tree or any other tree-are understood. But when the word mango tree" is spoken, vriksatva alone is understood. For, the mango tree cannot exist without being a vrikṣa. Similarly, here also, existence of ghata being the quality of ghata, is present in ghata only and nowhere else, while the common property of astitva is present in all objects. So, when we say 'asti', all objects whether ghaṭa or pata-are recognized, as each one of them has its own property of existence. But when we say " ghata” astitva alone is apprehended because ghata
has its own satta.
"
Now, the Acarya replies to the argument that what has already been produced, could not be produced, and so on—
किं तं जायं ति मई जाया जाओ - भयं पि जदजायं । अह जायं पि न जायं किं न खपुष्फे वियारोऽयं ॥ १७७॥(१७२५)
Kim tam jāyam ti mai jāyā'jāö-bhayam pi jadajayam |
Aha jāyam pi na jayam kim na khapuppha viyaro 'yam. 177 (1725)
30

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[ किं ततमिति मतिजीता-जातो - भयमपि यद्यजातम् ।
अथ जातमपि न जातं किं न खपुष्पे विचारोऽयम् ॥ १७७॥ (१७२५)
[The fourth
Kim tajjātamiti matir-jātā'jāto-bhayamapi yadyajātam | Atha jātamapi na jātam kim na khapuspè vicāro 'yam 177 (1725) ]
Trans.-177 If it is believed that neither jsta nor a-jāta nor jātājāta could be produced, what could be produced then ? Again, if jāta is not jāta (according to you ), why not think the same about kha-puspa (also ) ? ( 1725 )
66
टीका - प्रष्टव्योऽत्र देवानांप्रियः, कथय किं तद् वस्तु जातमिति प्रतिपद्यते तत्र मतिः, यजाता-जातो - भयादिप्रकारैरजातं साध्यते — यस्य जाताजातादिप्रकारैर्जन्म त्वया निषिध्यत इत्यर्थः । यदि हि जातं किमपि वस्तु तव सिद्धं, तर्हि तत्सच्चैनैव प्रतिहता शून्यता, अतः किं तञ्जातं जायते ? किं तदजातं जायते किं तजावाजातं जायते १ " इत्यादयः शून्यतासिद्धयर्थसुपन्यस्यमाना निरर्थका एव विकल्पा इति प्रच्छकाभिग्रायः । अथ तदपि जातं जाताजातादिविकल्पाश्रयभूतं जातत्वेन भवतो न सिद्धम्, किन्त्वजातमेव तद्, ननु स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदं जातमप्यजातमिति । किञ्च, जातस्यासच्चे निराश्रयत्वा जाताजाता दिविकल्पा निरर्थका एव । अथैतदाश्रयभूते जाताख्ये वस्तुन्यसिद्धेऽपि " न जातं जायते " इत्यादिविकल्प विचारः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि खपुष्पेsuraौ किं न विधीयते, असत्त्वाविशेषेण " समया विवज्जओ वा " इत्यादि - व्यक्तदोषप्रसङ्गात् १ । न च वक्तव्यं -- परेषां सिद्धं जातमुररीकृत्य विकल्पा विधीयन्ते, स्व- परभावाभ्युपगमे शून्यताहानिप्राप्तेरिति । १७७ ॥ (१७२५)
D. C. - Tell me O Vyakta ! what object, according to you, could be proved as jāta when it has already been denied production as jāta, a-jata or both ? If anything that has been produced, is accepted by you, śûnyata would be denied on account of its very existence, and hence alternative questions whether jāta, aiāla, or jātājata could be produced or not, would become useless.
Again, if a jata object which gives rise to a number of alternatives like jäta, a-jāta etc, is not admissible to you as

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jāta and if you take it as a-jāta, there would be self-contradiction in your argument. Moreover, when existence of a jata object is denied, alternatives like jāta, a-jata etc., would become useless in absence of their āśrayas.
Now, if you admit the above-mentioned alternatives in case of non-existent objects also, you shall have to apply those alternatives to the kha - puspa, which is also non-existent. Here, it could not be said that all those alternatives were applied by accepting things which were believed as jāta by others. Because, it would bring in a distinction between sva and para which violates the principle of śūnyatā.
Moreover,
जइ सञ्चहा न जायं किं जम्माणंतरं तदुवलम्भो ।
पुत्र्वं वाऽणुवलंभो पुणो वि कालंतरहयस्स ? || १७८ || (१७२६)
Jai savvaha na jāyam kim jammāṇantaram taduvalambho Puvvam vā'nuvalambho puno vi kālantarabayassa ? 178 (1726)
[ यदि सर्वथा न जातं किं जन्मानन्तरं तदुपलम्भः ।
पूर्व वाऽनुपलम्भः पुनरपि कालान्तरहतस्य ? ॥। १७८ ।। (१७२६) Yadi sarvathā na jātam kim janmänantaram tadupalambhaḥ | Pūrvam vā'nupalambhah punarapi kālantarahatasya ? 178 (1726) ]
Trans.-178 If ( according to you ) it is not produced in all respects, why its apprehension after production? And why not before, or in future, after one has been destroyed ? ( 1726 ).
टीका - यदि सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्घटादिकार्यं न जातमिति शून्यवादिना प्रतिपाद्यते, तर्हि मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामनुपलब्धं कुलालादिसामग्रीनिर्वर्तितजन्मानन्तरं किमिति तस्मात् तदुपलभ्यते । पूर्व वा जन्मत किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ? | पुनरपि च कालान्तरे लगुडादिना हतस्य किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ? | अजातस्य गगननलिनस्येव सर्वदैव घटादेरनुपलम्भ एव

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स्यात्, यस्तु कदाचिदुपलम्भः, कदाचित्तु नोपलम्भः, असौ जातस्यैवोपपद्यत इति भावः ॥ १७८ ॥ (१७२६)
D. C.-If according to your sunyata-vāda, objects like ghata are not altogether produced, how is it that ghata which is not apprehended in the state of a lump of earth, is appre hended when produced by nimittas like potter etc.? And why is the ghata not apprehended before its production or after it being broken by the hit of a stick etc.? If objects like ghata were altogether a-jāta, like khapuspa, they would never be apprehended at all. And, the quality of being apprehensible at one time and non-apprehensible at the other, is possible only in case of a jāta object. 178 (1726)
Besides,
जह सव्वहा न जायं जायं सुण्णवयणं तहा भावा ।
अह जायं पि न जायं पयासिया सुण्णया केण ? ॥ १७९॥ (१७२७)
Jaha savvahā na jāyam jāyam suņṇavayaṇam tahā bhāvā | Aha jayam pi na jayam payāsiyā sunnayā kena ? 179 ( 1727)
[ यथा सर्वथा न जातं जातं शून्यवचनं तथा भावाः ।
अथ जातमपि न जातं प्रकाशिता शून्यता केन १ ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७)
Yathā sarvathā na jātam jātam sūnyavacanam tathā bhāvāḥ | Atha jātamapi na jātam prakāśitā sūnyatā kèna? 179 (1727)]
Trans.- 179 Just as the assertion about śūnyata is jāta, even though not produced altogether, so also, other objects ( should be taken as jāta ). Again, if jsta were denied have been produced, by what means would the sunyata be manifested? ( 1727 ).
to
टीका- “ शून्यं सर्व जगत् ” इत्येवंभूतं यच्ताविषयं विज्ञानं वचनं च तद् यथा जाता-जातादिप्रकारैः सर्वथा जातमप्यजातमपि सत् केनापि प्रकारेण तावज्जातम्, तथा भावा अपि घट- पटादयो जाता एष्टव्या

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
इत्यतो न शून्यं जगत् । अथ शून्यताविज्ञान-वचनद्वयं जातमप्यजातमिष्यते, तर्हि तद्विज्ञान-वचनाभ्यां विना केनासौ शून्यता प्रकाशिता ? -न केनचिदिति शून्यतानुपपत्तिरिति ॥ १७९ ॥ (१७२७) ॥
: 237:
D. C.-Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is sūnya are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever, in the same way, other objects such as ghata, pata etc., should also be taken as jeta. And, if you accept vijñāna and vacana about śūnyatā to be a-jāta, how would you be able to express sunyatā without the help of vijñāna or vacana, about it? Hence, śünyata is not acceptible in any way. 1.9 (1727).
Also,
जायइ जायमजायं जायाजायमह जायमाणं च ।
कज्जमिह विवक्खाए न जायए सव्वहा किंचि ॥ १८० ॥ (१७२८) रूवि त्ति जाइ जाओ कुंभो संठाणओ पुणरजाओ । जायाजाओ दोहि वि तस्समयं जायमाणो ति ॥ १८१ ॥ (१७२९)
पुव्वकओ उ घडतया परपज्जा एहिं तदुभएहिं च । जायंतो य पडतया न जायए सव्वहा कुंभो ॥१८२॥ (१७३०) बोमाइ निच्चजायं न जायए तेण सव्वहा सोम्म ! | इय दव्वतया सव्वं भवणिज्जं पज्जवगईए || १८३॥ (१७३१)
Jayai jāyamajāyam jāyājāyamaha jayamāṇam ca Kajjamiha vivakkhad na jāyad savvahā kimci. 180 ( 1728 )
Rūvi tti jai jāö kumbho samṭhāṇaö puṇarajāö | Jāyājāö dohi vi tassamayam jāyamāno tti. 181 ( 1729) Puvvakaö u ghaḍataya para pajjāèhim tadubhad him ca Jāyanto ya padatayā na jāyad savvahā kumbho. 182 (1730 )

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Jirabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
Vomai niccajayam na jāyaè tèņa savvahā somma ! I Iya davvatayā savvam bhayaṇijjam pajjavagaiè. 183 (1731)
[ जायते जातमजातं जाताजातमथ जायमानं च ।
कार्यमिह विवक्षया न जायते सर्वथा किश्चित् ॥ १८० ॥ (१७२८)
रूपीति जायते जातः कुम्भः संस्थानतः पुनरजातः । जाताजातो द्वाभ्यामपि तत्समयं जायमान इति ॥ १८१ ॥ (१७२९)
पूर्वकृतस्तु घटतया परपर्यायैस्तदुभयैश्च ।
जायमानश्च पटतया न जायते सर्वथा कुम्भः ॥१८२॥ (१७३०)
!!
व्योमादि नित्यजातं न जायते तेन सर्वथा सौम्य ! इति द्रव्यतया सर्व भजनीयं पर्यवगत्या ॥ १८३॥ (१७३१)
Jāyatè jätamajātam jātājātamatha jāyamānam ca | Kāryamiha vivakṣayā na jāyatè sarvathā kimcit. 180 (1728)
Rūpîti jāyatè jatan kumbhah sansthānataḥ punarajātah | Jātājāto dvābhvāmapi tatsamayam jāyamāna iti. 181 (1729)
Purvakritastu ghaṭatayā paraparyāyaistadubhayaiśca | Jayamanaśca paṭatayā na jāyatè sarvathā kumbhaḥ. 182 (1730) Vyomadi nityajātam na jayatè tèna sarvatha saumya ! | Iti dravyataya sarvam bhajaniyam paryavagatyā. 183 (1731)]
Trans.-180-183 Jāta, a-jāta, jētājāta, as well as the jāyamāna objects are produced in this world on account of various causes, (but) nothing is produced in perfection. The jata (kumbha) is produced, since it has form; the a-jāta kumbha is produced because of shape; the jātājāta (is produced) even by both, and the jāyamāna (is also produced) because the process of production takes place in the present tense. But a kumbha which has been produced before, could never be produced on account of ghatată or (by means of) the characteristics of other (objects) or by means of both; and the jāyamāna kumbha could also never be produced on

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Vada] Gañadbaravāda
:239: account of patata. Again sky etc., could also never be pro. duced on account of their nityata. Hence, O Saumya ! nothing could be produced as a substance (but) everything should be taken according to the surrounding characteristics. (1728-1731)
टीका-इह कार्य घटादिकं विवक्षया किमपि जातं जायते, किश्चिदजातम् , किञ्चिजाताजातम् , किश्चिजायमानम् , किञ्चितु सर्वथा न जायत इति । अथ यथाक्रममुदाहरण:नि--" स्वीत्यादि " रूपितया घटो जातो जायते, मृदूपतायाः प्रागपि भावात् , तद्रूपतया जात एव घटो जायते इत्यर्थः । संस्थानतयाऽऽकारविशेषेण पुनः स एवाजातो जायते, मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामाकारस्यासंभवात् । मृद्रूपतया, आकारविशेषेण चेति द्वाभ्यामपि प्रकाराभ्यां जाताजातो जायते, तदनन्तरभूतत्वाद् घटस्य । तथा, अतीता-ऽनागत कालयोर्विनष्टानुत्पन्नत्वात् क्रियानुपपत्तेर्वर्तमानसमय एव क्रियासद्भावात् नत्समयं वर्तमानसमयं जायमानो जायते । किश्चित्तु सर्वथा जाताऽजातदिप्रकारैर्न जायते । किं पुनस्तत् ? इत्याह-“पुन्वकओ उ इत्यादि" पूर्वकृतस्तु पूर्वनिष्पन्नो घटो घटतया जाता-जातादिविकल्पानां मध्यादेकेनापि प्रकारेण न जायते, पूर्वमेव जातत्वात् । किं घटतयैव न जायते ? । न, इत्याह-"परपजाएहिं ति" तथा, पटादिगतैः परपर्यायैश्च घटो न जायते, स्वपर्यायाणां पूर्वमेव जातत्वात् , परपर्यायैश्च कदाचित् कस्याप्यभवनात् । स्व-परपर्यायैः पूर्वकृतघटो न जायते, जाता-जातपट-खरविषाणवदिति भावः।
तथा, जायमानोऽपि वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणसमये पटतया घटो न जायते, पररूपतया कस्याप्यभवनात् । किं पूर्वकृतो घट एवेत्थं न जायते, आहोस्विदन्यदपि किश्चिद् न जायते ? इत्याह-"वोमाईत्यादि" न केवलं पूर्वकृतो घटो घटतया न जायते, तथा व्योमादि च तेन कारणेन सौम्य ! सर्वथा जातादिभिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्न जायते, येन किम् ? इत्याह-येन नित्यजातं सर्वदाऽवस्थितम् , हेतुद्वारेण विशेषणमिदम् , नित्यजातत्वाद् न जायत इत्यर्थः। उक्तस्यैवार्थस्योपसंहारव्याजेन तात्पर्यमुपदर्शयन्नाह-'इयेत्यादि" इत्युक्तप्रकारेण सर्वमपि घट-पट-व्योमादिकं वस्तु द्रव्यरूपेण " न जायते"

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth इतीहापि संवध्यते, तद्रूपतया सदावस्थितत्वादिति भावः। पर्यायगत्या पर्यायचिन्तया पुनः सर्व भजनीयं विकल्पनीयम्-पूर्वजातं घटादिकं रूपादिभिः स्वपर्यायैरपि न जायते, पूर्वजातत्वादेव, अजातं तु तव खपर्यायैर्जायते, परपर्यायस्तु किश्चिदपि न जायते, इत्येवं पर्यायचिन्तायां भजना। एतच्च प्रायो errouata il 860-808-862-8C311(8492608978-8430-8938)11
D. C-Several objects like ghata which have once been jāta in this world, could be produced by reason of their rūpatva. Before the rūpa of ghata is produced, the rupa of earth is already there, and hence the ghata which is jata to the apèksā of rūpitva is produced in this way. Thereafter, ghata is a-jāta as far as shape is considered When it takes the shape in course of production, the a-jäta ghata comes into existence. The jātajāta ghata is produced in both the ways-rūpitva as well as äkāra. Moreove, ghata which is jāyamāna is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced, takes place only during the present tense.
There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories 2. g. A ghata which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as & ghata again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, ghata could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like pata etc. As ghata has its own process of production and characteristics. it could not be produced like an existent pata or a non-existent kharafriga. Thirdly, ghata which is being produced during the present tine, could never be produced as pata etc. For, kārya which is being produced as ghata etc., could never be produced as an absolutely different object like pața. So, all objects e. g., ghata, pata, ākāśa eto., could not be produced in the form of substanoo, as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as paryāya is concerned, all are said to have been produced,

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Vada ] Gapadharavida
:2411 In reply to the question viz., “Since everything is made up of some sort of materials, how could those materials exist in the midst of all-pervading negation ?” the Ācārya states
दीसह सामग्गिमयं सव्वमिह त्थि न य सा, नणु विरुद्धं ।
घेप्पड व न पचक्खं किं कच्छपरोमसामग्गी ? ॥१८४॥ (१७३२) Disai sāmaggimayam savvamiha tthi na ya sā, naņu virudd bam 1 Gheppai va na paccakkham kim kaccoparoma sāmaggi ? 184 (1732) [दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं सर्वमिहास्ति न च सा, ननु विरुद्धम् ।
गृह्यते वा न प्रत्यक्षं किं कच्छपरोमसामग्री १ ॥१८४॥ (१७३२) Drśyatè sāmagrimayam sarvamibāsti na ca sā. nanu viruddhamı Grihyata va na pratyaksam kim kacchaparomasamagrt ? 184]
. Trans.--184 All (objects) in this world appear as consisting of (some sort of) materials; but, in fact, reverse is the case, (as) those materials do not exist. Or, if it is accepted, why is the ingredient of the hair of a tortoise, not perceptible to the senses ? (1732)
टीका-इह यदुक्तम्- "सर्वमपि कार्य सामथ्यात्मकं दृश्यते, सर्वामावे च नास्ति सामग्री” इति। तदेतद् विरुद्धमेव, प्रस्तुतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात् , वचोजनककण्ठौ-ष्ठ-ताल्वादिसामयाः प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलब्धेः॥ अथ ब्रूषेअविद्योपप्लवादविद्यमानमपि दृश्यते, यत उक्तम्
काम-खम-भयो-न्मादैरविद्योपप्लवात् तथा।
पश्यन्त्यसन्तमप्यर्थ ननः केशेन्दुकादिवत् ॥१॥ इति । यद्येवम्, तबसत्त्वे सामान्येऽपि कच्छपरोमजनकसामग्री किमिति प्रत्यक्षत एव नोपलभ्यते ?, समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ? इति ॥१८४॥ (१७३२) ।
D. C.-Vyakta :--All objects are composed of some sort of sāmagni in this world. But in the midst of sarvaśūnyatā,
81

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Samagri, too, does not exist, because everything becomes sūnya at the end.
Bhagavan :-This belief of yours, O Vyakta! is totally wrong. For, constituents like kantha, oṣṭha, tālu etc., which form samagri as well as vacana are directly perceptible. Hence, how could the existence of samagri be denied?
Vyakta :-One could perceive even an a-vidyamāna object, on account of kāma, svapna, bhaya, unmăda, or a-vidyā, but in fact that does not exist.
Bhagavan -If it is so, O Vyakta! why is the samagri that produces the hair of a tortoise, not produced? A-vidyamanata is common in both the cases.. So, either this samagri should be apprehended like the samagrt that produces vacana, or both should not be apprehended. Or, why should not the fault of viparyāya (contrariety) take place when the samagr↑ that produces the hair of a tortoise is apprehended and the one that produces vacana is not?
But,
सामग्गिमओ वत्ता वयणं चत्थि जह तो कओ सुण्णं ।
अह नत्थि केण भणिअं वयणाभावे सुयं केण ? || १८५|| (१७३३)
Samaggimaö vattā vayaṇam catthi jai to kao suņņam Aha natthi kèņa bhaṇiam vayaṇābhāvè suyam kèņa? 185 (1733)
[ सामग्रीमयो वक्ता वचनं चास्ति यदि ततः कुतः शून्यम् ।
अथ नास्ति केन भणितं वचनाभावे श्रुतं केन १ ॥१८५॥ (१७३३) Samagrimayo vaktā vacanam cāsti yadi tataḥ kutaḥ śūnyam | Atha nästi kena bhaņitam vacanābhāvè śrutam kèna? 185 (1733)]
Trans.-185 And, the speaker-accompanied by a group of constituent part-as well as the speech exist, whence is the sunyata (produced)? On the other hand, if they do not exist, in absence of (speaker as well as) words, by whom is the sunyata pronounced (and) by whom is (it) heard? (1733)

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 243: टीका-सामग्री-उरः-शिरः-कण्ठौ-8-तालु-जिह्वादिसमुदायात्मिका तन्मयः सामग्यात्मको वक्ता, तद्ववनं चास्ति न वा । यद्यस्ति, तहिं कुतो जगच्छून्यत्वम् , तद्वक्त-वचनसत्त्वेनैव व्यभिचारात् ?। अथ तद्वक्तवचने न स्तः, तर्हि वक्त-वचनाभावे केन भणितं शून्यं जगत् ?-न केनचित् । सर्वशून्यत्वे च प्रतिपाद्यस्याप्यभावात् केन तच्छून्यवचः श्रुतम् ? इति ॥१८५॥ (१७३३)
D.C.-Are the speaker-possessed of a group of constituents like heart, head, throat, lips, palate, tongue eto., and the speech, existing or not? If they are, sünyntā will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not, in absence of the speaker and speech, there will be none to announce that the world is sūnya. Moreover, in the midst of all being non-existent, neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that sünya vacana.
Also,
.
जेणं चेव न वत्ता वयणं वा तो न संति वयणिज्जा। भावा तो सुण्णमिदं वयणमिदं सचमलियं वा १ ॥१८६॥ (१७३४) जइ सचं.नाभावो अहालियं न पमाणमेयं ति। अब्भुवगयं ति व मई नाभावे जुत्तमेयं ति ॥१८७॥ (१७३५) Jèņam ceva na vattā vayaņam vā to na santi vayanijjā i Bhāvā to sunyamidam vayunamidam saccamaliyam vā ? 186 (1734) Jai saccam nābhāvo ahāliyam na ppamāṇamdyam til Abbhuvagayam ti va mat nābhavd juttamdyam ti. 187 (1735) [ येव न वक्ता वचनं वा ततो न सन्ति वचनीयाः।
भावास्ततः शून्यमिदं वचनमिदं सत्यमलीकं वा १ ॥१८६॥ (१७३४) यदि सत्यं नाभावोऽथालीकं न प्रमाणमेतदिति । अभ्युपगतमिति वा मतिर्नाभावे युक्कमेतदिति ॥१८७॥ (१७३५)

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:244: Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth Yanaiva na vaktà vaoanam vā tato na santi vacaniyāḥ I Bhāvāstataḥ śūpyamidam vacanawidam satyamalikam vå. 186 Yadi satyam nābbāvo'thälfkam na pramāṇamètaditi Abhyupagatamiti va mati-r-nabhavid yuktametaditi. 187 (1735)]
Trans.-186-187 ( An opponenent may argue that ) “Just as a speaker or speech does not exist, the objects (that are) to be expressed, will be non-existent, (and hence) this (world) is also non-existent ” Is this stateinent true or false ? If it is true, there will be no negation, and if it is false, that will no longer be a ground of assurance.
Or, if you believed that sūnyata is anyhow arrived at, it is not proper (1o do so) in (the midst of all-pervading) negation. (1734-1735)
टीका-येनैव न वक्ता, नापि च वचनम् , ततस्तेनैव न सन्ति वचनीया भावा इति, अतः शून्यमिदं जगदिति । अत्रोच्यते-यदेतद् वक्तवचन-वचनीयानां भावानामभावप्रतिपादकं वचनं तत् सत्यमलीकं वा । यदि सत्यम् , तमुस्यैव सत्यवचनस्य सद्भावाद् नामावः सर्वभावानाम् । अथालीकमिदं वचनम् , तर्बाप्रमाणमेतत् , अतो नातःशून्यतासिद्धिः। अथ यथा तथा वाभ्युपगतमस्माभिः शून्यताप्रतिपादकं वचनम् , अतोऽसद्वचनप्रामाण्यात् शून्यतासिद्धिरिति तव मतिः । नैवम् , यतः "सत्यम् , अलीकं वा त्वयेदमभ्युपगतम् ?" इत्यादि पुनस्तदेवावर्तते । किञ्च, अभ्युपगन्ता,. अभ्युपगमः, अभ्युपगमनीयं चेत्येतत्रयस्य सद्भावेऽभ्युपगमोऽप्येष भवतो युज्यते, न च सर्वभावानामभावे एतत्रयं युक्तमिति ॥१८६-१८७॥ (१७३४१७३५)
D. C.-Vyakta-Now that vakta and vacana have been established as sünya, the vacaniya bhāvas will also be śünya on account of the same reason So, ultimately, the whole world is non-existent in all respects.
Bhagavān :--If it is so, O Vyakta ! I ask you a question : Is that statement which proves the non-existence of vaktā,

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vacana, and the vacaniya bhāvas true or false? If it is true, the abhāva of the above-mentioned objects, could not be attained on account of its own existence. And if is is false, the statement will cease to be a pramaņa to establish sunyatā. Thus, it is not possible to establish sunyata in either of the two ways.
Vyakta :-But the statement which establishes sūnyatā has anyhow been accepted by us. Our vacana is, therefore, authentic, and sūnyata has undoubtedly been established.
Bhagavān :-That is not true, O Vyakta! For, in accepting the above-mentioned statement, the same fault will arise when you ask the question as to whether that vacana is true or false and so on. Moreover, you cannot accept the vacana, unless the person who accepts the vacana to be accepted and the acceptance itself are existent.
The theory of sarvaśūnyatā seems unfounded from this point of view also.
Moreover,
famug få - àg arawis faèg fa fanfeu ? I किं व न सव्वं सिज्झइ सामग्गीउ खपुष्फाणं ९ ॥१८८॥ (१७३६)
Sikayāsu kim na taillam sāmaggtu tilèsu vi kimatthi ? Kim va na savvam sijjhai samaggiu khapupphāņam 188 (1736)
[ fùmaig fá a åð arutaftadsaft faufta ? 1
किं वा न सर्व सिध्यति सामग्रीतः खपुष्पानाम् १ || १८८ || (१७३६)
Sikatāsu kim na tailan samagritastilèṣvapi kimasti? Į Kim vā na sarvam siddhyati samagritaḥ khapuṣpānām. 188 (1736)]
Trans. 188 Why is the oil not (manufactured) from the materials like sands and why from sesamum seeds only? Or, why not everything be attained from the materials of khapuspas (only)? (1736).

For Private Personal Use Only

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[The fourth टीका-सर्वभावानामसचे सर्वोऽपि प्रतिनियतो लोकव्यवहारः समुच्छिद्यते, तथाहि-भावाभावस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् किमिति सिकताकणसामग्रीतस्तैलं न भवति, तिलादिसामरयां वा तत् किमस्ति ? । किं वा खपुष्पसामग्रीतः सर्वमपि कार्यजातं न सिध्यति ? । न चैवम् , तस्मात् प्रतिनियतकार्यकारणभावदर्शनाद् नामावसामग्रीतः किमप्युत्पद्यते, किन्तु यथा खभावसामग्रीतः, तथा च सति न शून्यं जगदिति ॥१८८॥ (१७३६)
D. C.-In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of loka-vyavahāra will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type--viz., that of absolute negation-how is it that oil is manufactured only from the sāmagri of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc. ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the samagri of khapuspas alone ? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not sūnya,
And, सव्वं सामग्गिमयं नेगतोऽयं जओऽणुरपएसो।
अह सो वि सप्पएसो जत्थावत्था स परमाणू ॥१८९॥ (१७३७) Savvam sāmaggimayam neganto'yam jaö'ņurapaèso I Aha so vi sappadso jatthāvatthā sa paramaņā. 189 (1737) [ सर्व सामग्रीमयं नैकान्तोऽयं यतोऽणुरप्रदेशः।
अथ सोऽपि सप्रदेशो यत्रावस्था स परमाणुः ॥१८९॥ (१७३७) Sarvam sāmagrimayam naikānto'yam yato’ņurapradeśaḥ | Atha so'pi sa-pradeso yatravasthā sa paramanuh. 189 (1737)]
Trans.-189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials, is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space. But ( if even that occupies space according to you ), wherever it resides, there is a molecule. (1737)

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Vada] Ganadharavada
: 247: टीका-सर्व सामग्रीमयं सामग्रीजन्यं वस्त्वित्ययमपि नैकान्तिकः, यतो द्वयणुकादयः स्कन्धाः सप्रदेशत्वाद् द्वयादिपरमाणुजन्यत्वाद् भवन्तु सामग्रीजन्या:, परमाणुः पुनरप्रदेश इति न केनचिजन्यते इति कथमसौ सामग्रीजन्यः स्यात् ? । अस्ति चासौ, कार्यलिङ्गगम्यत्वात् ; उक्तं च
मू॥रणुरप्रदेशः कारणमन्त्यं भवेत् तथा नित्यः। एकरस-वर्ण-गन्धो-द्विस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च ॥१॥
अथायमपि सप्रदेशः, तर्खेत्प्रदेशोऽणुभविष्यति, तस्यापि सप्रदेशत्वे तत्प्रदेशोऽणुरित्येवं तावत् , यावद् यत्र क्वचिद् निष्प्रेदशतया भवबुद्धेरवस्थान भविष्यति, स एव परमाणुः, तेनापि च सामग्रीजन्यत्वस्य व्यभिचार इति ॥१८९॥ (१७३७)
D. C.-There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from Samagrt. For, objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the samagrt of those atoms, but a paramāņu by itself, does never occupy space, and hence could never be produced from any samagri. This paramānu is produced only from karya-linga, as it is said
Mūrtair-anurapradè śaḥ kāraṇamantyam bhavèt tathā nityaḥ i Ekarasa-varṇa-gandho-dvisparśaḥ kāryalingaśca II
But if you believe this paramāņu to occupy space, wherever you apprehend parai...ņu, there would be aņu till ultimately it would be absoluta y vacant, where nothing but parmāņu not produced from any sāmagri would be found. दीसइ सामग्गिनयं न याणयो सति नणु विरुद्धमिदं । किं वाणूणमभावे निप्फण्णमिणं खपुप्फेहिं ॥ १९०॥ (१७३८) Disai sāmaggimayam na yāņavu santi nanu viruddhamidam Kim vānupamabhāvd nippharnaminam khapupphdhim. 190 (1788)

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[ दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं न चोणवः सन्ति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
किं वाणूनामभावे निष्पन्नमिदं खपुष्पैः ? ॥ १९०॥ (१७३८) Drisyatè samagrimayam na cāṇavaḥ santi nanu viruddhamidam ! Kim vānūnāmabhāve nispannamidam khapuspaih. 190 ( 1738 ) ]
Trans. – 190 It is really contradictory ( to believe ) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist. Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, (all) this is produced by means of ( mere ) khapuspa ? (1738 )
[ The fourth
"
टीका- “सामग्रीमयं सर्व दृश्यते" इति भवतैव प्रागुक्तम्, 66 अणवश्व न सन्ति " इत्यधुना ब्रूषे, ननु विरुद्धमिदम्, यथा ' सर्वमप्यनृतं वचनम् इति ब्रुवतः स्ववचनविरोधः, तथाऽत्रापीत्यर्थः । यदेव हि सामग्रीमयं किमपि दृश्यते भवता, तदेवाणुसंघातात्मकम्, अतः स्ववचनेनैव प्रतिपादितत्वात् कथमणवो न सन्ति ? इति भावः । किञ्च, अणूनामभाव इदं सर्वमपि घटादिकार्यजातं किं खपुष्पैर्निष्पन्नम्, परमाण्वभावे तज्जनकमृत्पिण्डादिसामग्रयभावात् ? इति भावः । तस्माद् यस्मात् सामग्रीमयं दृश्यत इति प्रतिपद्यते भवता, तद्रदेव परमाणव इति ॥ १९०॥ (१७३८)
D. C - If you are to state that those that are not sāmagrtjanya are not paramāņus at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself. It has already been said that everything which is sāmagrimaya is apprehensible. Again, all that you have accepted as sāmagrimaya or sāmagrijanya in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms. Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case. And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like ghata, pata.ete, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like khapuspa eto. ? Because if paramānu is absent, a samagri like mritpinḍa would also be absent. So, when you assert that sămagrîmaya is apprehended, the paramāņus that form this sāmagri, are automatically established as existent.
Now, in reply to the

argument prima facie that since

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Vada ] Gañadharavida
:249: rear portion is not perceptble and since front portion is very minute, everything is sūnya,t the author indicates, देसस्साराभागो घेप्पड़ न य सो त्ति नणु विरुद्धमिणं ।
सव्वाभावे वि न सो घेप्पइ किं खरविसाणस्स ॥१९१॥ (१७३९) Desassārābhāgo ghèppai na ya so tti nažu viruddhamiran i Savvābhāvd vi na so gheppai kim kharavisanassa. 191 (1739) [ देशस्याराभागो गृह्यते न च स इति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
सर्वाभावेऽपि न स गृह्यते किं खरविषाणस्य ? ॥ १९१ ॥ (१७३९) Daśasyārādbhāgo grihyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidamı Sarvābhāvè'pi na sa grihyatè kim kharavişānasya ? 191 ( 1739)
Trans.-191 To say that the foremost portion of a visible objeet is perceptible but it dose not exist, is really contradictory. (Por) even in the midst of all-pervading negation, why is the front part of the horn of an ass not perceived ? (1739)
टीका-यदुक्तम्-"दृश्यस्यापि वस्तुनः परभागस्तावद् न दृश्यते, आराद्भागस्तु गृह्यते, परं सोऽप्यन्यान्यपरभागकल्पनया प्रागुक्तयुक्तितो नास्ति" इति । ननु विरुद्धमिदम्-" गृह्यतेऽसौ, न च समस्ति" इति । सर्वाभावाद् भ्रान्त्याऽसौ गृह्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतः सर्वाभावे तुल्येऽपि किमिति खरविषाणस्य संबन्धी आराद्भागो न गृह्यते । समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवति ? इति ॥ १९१ ॥ (१७३९)
___D.C.-It has been said before that only a front part of a visible object is perceived and not the rear part. This front part, is, in comparision with other parts in the rear, is very sūksma and hence that too becomes non-existent. This statement is self-contradicting. For, to say that it is perceptible but it does not exist, is absurd.
Here, if it is said, that in the midst of sarvābhāva, it is t vide verse 1696.
32

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( The fourth perceptible because of bhrānti, that is also not proper. For since abhāva is common everywhere, why is the front part o non-existent objects like the horn of an ass etc., not apprehended ? Or, how does it not happen that the front part of objects like kharavişāna etc. be apprehended andt bat of objeots like ghata, pata etc. not apprehended ?
Moreover, परभागादरिसणओ नाराभागो वि किमणुमाणं ति।
आराभागग्गहणे किं व न परभागसंसिद्धी ? ॥१९२॥ (१७४०) Parabhāgādarisaņað nārābhāgo vi kimaņumāņam til Arabhagaggahand kim va na parabhāgasamsiddht ? 192 (1740)
[परभागादर्शनतो नाराद्भागोऽपि किमनुमानमिति ।
आराद्भागग्रहणे किं वा न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? ॥ १९२ ।। (१७४०) Parabhāgādarśanato nārādbhāgo'pi kimanumānamiti i Arādbhagagrahaņe kim vā na parabhāgasamsiddhiḥ ? 192 (1740)
Trans...-192 On account of the rear part being imperceptible, what inference ( is held ) in case of even the front part ( being imperceptible )? Or, is it that the rear part is not apprehended when the front part is apprehended ? ( 1740)
टीका-"परभागमात्रादर्शनादाराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति' इत्यत्र किमनुमानं भवतः ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-यत् प्रत्यक्षेग सकललोकप्रसिद्धं तदग्नेरौष्ण्यमिव कथमनुमानेन बाध्यते ?। आराद्भागस्य ह्यापेक्षिकत्वात् तदन्यथानुपपत्तेः परभागानुमानं तापदद्यापि युज्यते । यस्तु परभागादर्शनमात्रेणैव तमिहवः, सोऽसंवद्ध एव, सत्स्वपि दशादिविप्रकृष्टेषु मेरु-पिशाचादिष्वदर्शनसंभवात् । तस्माद् न परभागादर्शनमात्रेणाराद्भागोऽपह्मोतव्यः। किञ्च, आराद्भागग्रहणे. परमागानुमानं - युज्येतापिति भाष्यकारोऽप्याह-" आरामागेत्यादि " आराद्भाग्रहणे कथं न परभागसंसिद्धिः १ अपि तु तत्संसिद्धिरेव, नचाहिदृश्यवस्तुनः परभागोऽस्ति, तत्सबंन्धिभूतस्यारागागस्य ग्रहणात् , इह

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281 : यत्संबन्धिभूतो भागो गृह्यते तत् समस्ति, यथा नभसः पूर्वमागे गृहीते तत्संबन्ध्यपरभागः, गृह्यते च घटादेराराद्भागः, अतस्तत्संन्धिभूतः परभागोऽप्यस्ति । यच्चोक्तम्--" आराद्भागस्याऽप्यन्य आराद्भागः कल्पनीया, तस्याप्यन्य इत्यादि तावत् , यावत् सर्वारातीयभागः" इति । अत्रापि परभागस्यासत्वे सर्वारातीयभागपरिकल्पनमुपपन्नमेव स्यात् । तस्मादस्ति परभाग sia il 888 11 (1980)
D. C.-What anumāna do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For, how could you deny the existence of front part which is pratyakşa to you like the heat of fire !
It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the apekšā of the rear one, jñāna about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of anumāna. But from this, it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen.
Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one e. g. A visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front poriion which is connected whith the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this, that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like ghata, pața etc, must contain rear portions since their front ones are easily apprehended.
Again, the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portions will not fit your anumāna. As the rear part is a-vidyamāna, the inference of furemost part being so, is absolutely improper. Really speaking, the front part is perceptible in this case, and the inference of rear portion being vidyamāna, is correct.
Again,

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth सव्वाभावे विकओ आरा-पर-मज्झभागनाणत्तं । अह परमईए भण्णइ स-परमइविसेसणं कत्तो ?॥१९३२॥ (१७४१) आर-पर-मज्झभागा पडिवण्णा जइ न सुण्णया नाम । अप्पडिवण्णेसु वि का विगप्पणा खरविसाणस्स? ॥१९४॥ (१७४२) सव्वाभावे वाराभागो किं दीसए न परभागो। सव्वागहणं व न किं किं वा न विवजाओ होइ ? ॥१९५॥ (१७४३) Savyābhāvè vi kaö ārā-para-majjhabhāganāņattam | Aha paramte bhannai sa-paramaivisdsanam katto? 193 (1741) Ara-para-majjhabhāgā padivannā jai na sunnaya namas Appadivaņņēsu vi kā vigappaņā khara visānassa ? 194 (1742) Savvābhāvě vārābhāgo kim dîsad na parabhago i Savvāgahaņam va na kim kim vā na vivajjaö böi ? 195 (1743) [सर्वाभावेऽपि कुत आरात्-पर-मध्यभागनानात्वम् । अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व-परमतिविशेषणं कुतः ? ॥१९३।। (१७४१) आरात्-पर-मध्यभागाः प्रतिपन्ना यदि न शून्यता नाम । अप्रतिपन्नेष्वपि का विकल्पना खरविषाणस्य ? ॥ १९४॥ (१७४२) सर्वाभावे वाराद्भागः किं दृश्यते न परभागः । सर्वाग्रहणं च न किं किं वा न विपर्ययो भवति ॥१९५॥ (१७४३)
Sarvābtāvè'pi kuta ārāt-para-madhyabhaganānātvami Atha paramatya bhanyatd sva-paramativisesayam kutah ? 193 Arāt-para-madhyabhāgāḥ pratipannā gadi na śonyata nāma i Apratipanndşvapi kā vikalpanã kharavişāṇasya ? 194 ( 1742) Sarvābhāvd värādbhāgaḥ kim driśyatė na parabhāgaḥ 1 Sarvāgrahaņam ca na kim kim vā na viparyayo bhavati ? 195 ]
Trans.—193-194-195 Even in the midst of all-pervading negation, how could the distinction beineen front, rear, ard

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middle portions exist? And, if it is said so in the opinion of others, whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear, and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no sūnyatā at all. And, if they are not proved (to be existing), why alternatives about (non-existent objects like ) kharavisāna ? Or, in the midst of the negation of all objects, why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one? Or, why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or, why not the reverse ( apprehension ) also ? ( 1741-1743 ).
Also,
परभागदरिसणं वा फलिहाईणं ति ते धुवं संति । जइ वा ते विन संता परभागादरिसणमहेऊ १ ॥ १९६ ॥ (१७४४) सव्वादरिणउ चिय न भण्णइ कीस, भाई तन्नाम । पुव्वन्भुवगयहाणी पच्चक्खविरोहओ चेव ॥ १९७ ॥ ( १७४५)
Parabhagadarisaņam va phalihaiņam ti te dhuyam santi | Jai va te vi na santa parbbāgadarisanamahèū ? 196 ( 1744 ) Savvadarisaṇau cciya na bhaņņai kîsa bhaņai tannāma | Puvvabbhuvagayahāņt paccakkhavirohaö cdva_197 (1745 )
[ परभागदर्शनं वा स्फटिकादीनामिति ते ध्रुवं सन्ति ।
यदि वा तेऽपि न सन्तः परभागादर्शनमहेतुः ।। १९६ ।। (१७४४)
सर्वादर्शनत एव न भव्यते कस्मात्, भणति तन्नाम | पूर्वाभ्युपगतहानिः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्चैव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५)
Parabhāgadarśanam va sphatikādināmiti te dhruvam santi | Yadi vā te 'pi na santah parabhāgādarśanamahdtuh 196 ( 1744 ) Sarvādarśanatā eva na bhaṇyate kasmāt, bhanati tannāma | Parvābhyugatahānib pratyaksavirodhataścaiva 197 (1745) ] Trans.-196-197 Or, since the rear portions of (objects

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The fourth like ) crystal. etc. are seen, they exist without doubt. And, if they, too, do not exist ( according to you ), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen Why is the reasonthat nothing could be seen-not stated ? If it ts stated, the proposition (which is) accepted before, will (constitute)direct contradiction. (1744-1745)
टीका-ननु येषां स्फटिका-ऽभ्रपटलादीनां भावानां परभागदर्शनमस्ति ते तावद् ध्रुवं सन्त्येव, इति " परभागादर्शनात् ” इत्यनेन हेतुना सर्वभावानामसचं न सिध्यति । अथ स्फटिकादयोऽपि न सन्ति तर्हि " परभागादर्श नात्" इत्ययमहेतुः, त्वदभिप्रेतस्य सर्वभावासत्त्वस्यासाधकत्वात् । अतोऽव्यापकममुं हेतुं परित्यज्य “सर्वादर्शनाद् न सन्ति भावाः" इत्ययमेव व्यापको हेतुः कस्माद् न भण्यते । ' भणइ तन्नाम त्ति' अत्र पर उत्तरं भणति । किम् ? इत्याह-तन्नामास्तु " सर्वादर्शनात्" इति-अयं हेतुस्तर्हि भवत्वित्यर्थः, यथा तथा शून्यतैवास्माभिः साधयितव्या, सा च "सर्वादर्शनात्" इत्यनेनापि हेतुना सिध्यतु, किमनेनाऽऽग्रहेणास्माकम् ? इति भावः। अथ सूरिराह-" पुन्वेत्यादि " नन्विदानी " सर्वादर्शनात्" इति अवतो भवतः " परभागादरिसणओ" इति पूर्वाभ्युपगतस्य हानिः प्राप्नोति । किञ्च, ग्राम-नगर-सरित-समुद्र-घट-पटादीनां प्रत्यक्षेणैव दर्शनात् सर्वादर्शनलक्षणस्य हेतोः प्रत्यक्षविरोधः। ततः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्च "सर्वादर्शनात् " इत्येतदयुक्तमिति।
अत्र कश्चिदाह-ननु सपक्षस्य सर्वस्याव्यापकोऽपि विपक्षात् सर्वथा निवृत्तो हेतुरिष्यत एव, यथा “ अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् इति, न घनित्योऽर्थः सर्वोऽपि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः विद्युद्-घन-कुसुमादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् । तद्वदिहापि यद्यपि सर्वेष्वपि भावेषु परभागादर्शनं नास्ति, यथापि बहुषु तावदस्ति, अतस्तेषु शून्यतां साधयन्नसौ सम्यग् हेतुर्भविष्यति । तदयुक्तम् , यतस्तत्र " यदनित्यं न भवति तत् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम् " इत्येवं व्यतिरेकः सिध्यति; इह तु यत्र शून्यता नास्ति, किं तर्हि ? वस्तुनः सचम् , परभागादर्शनमपि तत्र नास्ति

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: 256: किन्तु परभागदर्शनम् , यथा क्क ? इति भवतः सर्वासद्वादिनो व्यतिरेका afaela a fersofà, eratsegtarefalà 11899-884911 (8088-81984)
D. C.—Non-existence of each and every object could not be proved by virtue of the non-apprehension of rear parts. The rear portions of transparent objects like crystal and mica are apprehended. Existence of those objects has therefore undoubtedly been established. Consequently, non-apprehension of all objects can never be proved by means of the hetu that rear portions are not seen,
Here, again, if you contend that sphatika etc. also do not exist, your argument that rear portion is not seen, will fail and hence be invalid, as the rear portions of those objects are clearly apprehended. In spite of this faulty argument, if you attempt to establish śūnyatā by means of a widely applicable statement that “ Nothing could be proved to exist as nothing is perceived" then also, the previous hetu that rear part could not be seen, would be violated. Secondly, since village, town, river, sea, ghata, pața etc, are directly apprehensible, the hetu will be evidently invalid in that way also.
The opponent may contena again, that a reason which is not applicable to all the instances on the same side, can be called a logical reason if it is absolutely inapplicable to the opposite side, e. 9., sabda is a-nitya, because it is not produced without effort. But this does not mean that all a-nitya objects like lightning, cloud eto, though produced without effort, are a-nitya. Similarly, here also, rear parts of all the objects are not non-apprehensible, but as the rear parts of several objects are not apprehensible, this hetu leads us to prove $ūnyatā in them, and that is why it is called & correot or logical reason !
But, that is not proper. O Vyakta 1 In the hetu mentioned above, perversion of difference is found. Take, for example, the

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[The fourth proposition that “That which is a-nitya, is like ākās'a, produced without effort. ” If vyatirèkavyapti is applied in this case, nothing else but vidyamānatā of an object is inferred when sunyatā is not found at all. Moreover, rear part is also apprehended in this case. So, O sarvasunyatavadin ! you shall never be able to obtain the vyatirèkavyāpti. Your hètu will, therefore, not remain as a hetu at all.
नस्थि पर-मज्झभागा अपञ्चक्खत्तओ मई होजा। नणु अक्ख-स्थावत्ती अपञ्चक्खत्तहाणी वा ॥१९८॥ (१७४६) Natthi para-majjhabhāgā apaccakkhattao mai hojjā 1 Naņu akkha-tthāvatti apaocakkhattabāņi vā 198 ( 1746 )
[न स्तः पर-मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षत्वतो मतिर्भवेत् ।
नन्वक्षा-ऽर्थापत्तिरप्रत्यक्षत्वहानिर्वा ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६) Na star para-madhyabhagavapratyaksatvato mati-r-bhavet । Nanvakşa'rthāpattirapratyakşatvahānirvā 198 ( 1746 ) ] ___Trans.-198 If the rear, as well as, middle portions (of an object) are accepted as non-exintent, on account of their imperceptibility, then either there will be perception of senseorgans as well as objects, or imperceptibility (itself ) will be violated. (1756)
टीका- अथ स्यान्मतिः--पर-मध्यभागौ न स्तः, अप्रत्यक्षत्वात् खरविषाणवत् । तदसत्त्वे च तदपेक्षया निर्दिश्यमान आराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति अतः सर्वशून्यतेत्यभिप्रायः। तदयुक्तम् , यतः-"अक्षमक्षमिन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं प्रति वर्वत इति प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थः, न प्रत्यक्षोऽप्रत्यक्षः. तद्भावोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वम् , तसादप्रत्यक्षत्वात्" इत्युच्यमाने नन्वक्षाणामर्थस्य चाऽऽपत्तिः सता प्रामोति, तदापतौ च शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः । शून्यतायां वाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वलक्षणस्य हेतोरेनिः, अक्षा-र्थानामभावे प्रत्यक्षा-प्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशानुपपतेरिति भावः ॥ १९८॥ (१७४६)

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257 D.C,--Vyakta:- The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like kharavişāņa. The front parts will also not exist in that case, because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of sarvaś inyatā.
Bhagavāna :-The argument is not valid. Pratyaksa means existing at each of the sense-organs. So, when the hetu of apratyakşalva is advanced, there would be apprehension of senseorgans, as well as, the objects to be apprehended, and in their apprehension, Śūnyatā would never be accepted. For, if śünyatā is taken along with the hetu of a-pratyakşalva, the hetu itself will prove invalid. Or, say in absence of indriya and artha, the practical usage or pratyaksa and a-pratyaksa would never be possible.
Moreover, अत्थि अपचक्खं पि हुजह भवओ संसयाइविन्नाणं । अह नथि सुण्णया का कास व केणोवलद्धा वा ? ॥ १९९ ॥(१७४७) Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavaö saisayāivinnāņam Aha natthi suņnayā kā kāsa va kéņovaladdhā vā ? 199 (1747) [अस्त्यप्रत्यक्षमपि खलु यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
अथ नास्ति शून्यता का कस्य वा केनोपलब्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७) Astyapratyaksanipi khalu yathā bhavatah samśayādivijnānam Atha nāsti sūnyatā kā kasya vā kénopalabdhi vā? 199 (1747)]
Trans.—199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is imperceptible (to others). And if that (doubt) does not exist, what is that sinyata? Whose śžinyalā (is that) ? And who has apprehended it ? (1747)
टीका-नन्वप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति किश्चिद् वस्तु, यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानमन्येषामप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति, ततो यथैतन्, तथा पर-मध्यमागावमत्यक्षों
33

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[The fourth
afaora इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः । अथ भवत्संशयादिविज्ञानमपि नास्ति, तर्हि का नाम शून्यता ? कस्य वाऽसौ ? केन वोपलब्धा ? भवत एवेह तत्र किल संशयः, स चेद् नास्ति, तर्हि कस्यान्यस्य ग्राम-नगरादिसत्त्वे विप्रतिपत्तिः ? इति भावः || १९९|| (१७४७) ॥
D. C.-Just as, your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is not perceptible to others, in the same way, there are some objects which exist, in spite of their imperceptibility. Middle and rear portions of such objects do exist, in spite of their a-pratykṣalva Your hetu will, therefore involve the fault of anaikāntikalva, since it has been applicable to more than one object.
Again, if your apprehension of doubt etc., does not exist, where would be sunyata then? To whom does that śūnyatā belong? And, who has apprehended that s'unyata? The doubt therefore, must exist. Otherwise, who else will raise the doubt about the existence of vidyamāna objects like village, town, etc. ?
After refuting the idea of sunyala, the Bhagavana now tries to establish the existence of elements like prithvi etc in the following way :
पञ्चखेसु न जुतो तुह भूमि–जला --ऽनलेस संदेहो । अनलाssure भवे सोऽवि न जुत्तोऽणुमाणाओ ॥ २०० ॥
Paccakkhesu na jutto tuha bhūmi jala'-nalesu samdeho Anilā'gāsésu bhave so'vi na jutto'numānão || 200 ( 1748)
[ प्रत्यक्षेषु न युक्तस्तव भूमि-जला - ऽनलेषु संदेहः ।
अनिला - ssकाशयोर्भवेत् सोऽपि न युक्तोऽनुमानात् ॥ २०० ॥ ( १७४८ ) Pratyakşeṣu na yuktastava bhūmi-jalā-'nalėṣu samdéhah Anilā-”kāśayor-bhavét so'pi na yukto'numānāt 200 (1748)]
Trans. - 200
Your doubt about the objects like earth water, and fire, is not proper, because they are ( directly) per.

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259 ceptible (to the senses). That (doubt) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also, by virtue of anumāna. (1748)
टीका-तस्माद् भूमि-जल-वमिषु प्रत्यक्षेषु तव सौम्य ! संशयो नं युक्तः यथा स्वस्वरूपे। तथा, अनिलोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एव, गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, घटवत्, ततस्तत्रापि न संशयो युक्तः । भवतु वा, अनिल-ऽऽकाशयोरमत्यसत्वेन संशयः, तथाऽप्यसौ न युक्तः. अनुमानसिद्धत्वात् तयोरिति ॥२०॥ (१७४८)॥
D. C.-Just as, in the case of your own body, you cannot raise doubt, so in the case of pratyaksa objects such as bhumi (earth), jaia (water), and anala (fire) also, you should not raise doubt. Moreover, you cannot entertain doubt about vayu (wind) and akāśa space), also because, they are established by ineans anumăra.
Here is the anumāna about wind, अस्थि अदिस्सापाइयफरिसणाईणं गुणी गुणतणओ। रुवस्स घडो व्व गुणी जो तेसिं सोऽनिलो नाम ॥ २०१॥ १७४९॥
Atthi adissāpäiyapharisaņāîņam guņi guņattaņao i Rivassa ghado vva gupi jo tésim so'nilo nāma 201 (1949) [ अस्त्यदृश्यापादितस्पर्शनादीनां गुणी गुणत्वतः ।
रूपस्य घट इव गुणी यस्तेषां सोऽनिगे नाम ।। २०१॥ (१७४९) Astyadriśyāpaditasparsanādinām guņi gupatvataḥ Rūpasya ghata iva gupi yasteşām so'nilo nāma 120111 (1749)]
Trans.--201. Just as ghata is the object possessing the property of rūpa, 'wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties, like a sense of touch, etc. produced by some invisible (force.) (1749)
टीका-य एतेऽदृश्येन केनाप्यापादिता जनिताः पादयस्ते विद्यमानगुणिनः, गुणत्वात्, आदि शब्दाच्छन्द-स्वास्थ्य-कम्पा गुडन्ते, एतेऽपि

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth हि वायुमभवाद् वायुगुणा एव, इह ये गुणास्ते विद्यमानगुणिनो दृष्टाः, यथा घट-रूपादयः, यश्चैषां स्पर्श - शब्द-स्वास्थ्य-कम्पानां गुणी स वायुः तस्मादस्त्यसाविति ॥२०१॥ (१७४९) ॥
D. C.---Properties like sparsa, sabda, svästhya, and kampă are produced by means of some invisible force. Now, since these properties appear as existing in võya (wind), vāyu is said to possess those properties, just as ghata possesses the property of ripa.
The anumāna to establish ākās is this : अस्थि वसुहाहभाणं तोयस्स घडो व्व मुत्तिमत्ताओ। जं भूयाणं भाणं तं वोमं वत्त! सुव्वत्तं ॥ २०२ ।। (१७५०)
Atthi vasuhāibhāṇam toyassa ghaço vya muttimattao Jam bhūyāņam bhāpam tam vomam Vattal suvvattam 1120211
[भस्ति वसुधादिभाजनं तोयस्य घट इव मृतिमत्त्वात् ।
यद् भूतानां भाजनं तद् व्योम व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तम् ॥२०३॥ (१७५०) Asti vasudhādibhājanam toyasya ghata iva mūrtimattvāt Yad bhūtānām bliājanam tad vyoma Vyakta ! suvyaktam 12021
Trans -~-202 Just as ghata becomes the receptacle of water, so there is a receptacle for earth etc. also. The receptacle of (those) elements is nothing but ākāśa. (1750,
टीका अस्ति वसुधा-जला-ऽनल-वायनां भाजनमाधारः, मूर्तिमत्यात, तोयस्य घटवत्, यच्च तेषां भाजनं, तदायुष्मन् व्यक्त ! मुव्यक्त व्योमेति । यदि च साध्यैकदेशतां दृष्टान्तस्य कश्चित् प्रेरयवि, तदेत्य प्रयोगः-विधमानमाजना पृथिवी, मूर्तत्वात्, तोयवत्, तथा, आपः, तेजोवत् तेजश्च नायुवत्, वायुश्च पृथिवीवदिति ॥२०२।। (१७५०)
____D. C-Eartil, water, fire, and wind have their adhāras of the type of the ghata full of water on account of their being corporeal. This ādhāra, O Vyakta! is well known as åkāśa. Since prithvi

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Gaṇadharavāda
261
has its bhajana vidyamōna on account of its mirtatva like water, water has also the bhajana same as that of fire, and the fire in turn, has the one similar to that of wind, which ultimately will have the same one as prithvi.
Having established the existence of all the five elements the Acarya now concludes:
एवं पञ्चरखाइपमाणसिद्धाई सोम्म ! पडिवज ।
जीव- सरीराहारोवओगधम्माई भूयाई ।। २०३ ।। (१७५१ ) Evam paccakkhāipamāṇasiddhāim somma! paḍivajja Jiva-sarirāhāravaogadhammaim bhūyāim. 203 (1751) [ एवं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धानि सौम्य : प्रतिपद्यस्व । जीव- शरीराधारोपयोगधर्माणि भूतानि ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१)
Evam pratyakṣadipramāņasiddhāni saumya! pratipadyasva Jiva-sarirādharöpayogadharmāņi bhūtāni 203 (1751)]
Trans. – 203 So, O Saumya ! Accept those bhiitas that have iva and sarira as their adhāras along with the property of common usage to have been established by means of evidences such as those perceptible by senses etc.
Now, the bhūtās are established as animate in this way:-- किह सजीवाई मई तलिङ्गाओ निलावसाणाई |
वोमं विमुत्तिभावादाधारो वेव न सजीवं ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)
Kiha sajîvāim maî tallingão'nilāvasāṇāim Vomam vimuttibhāvādādharo céva na sa-jîvam 204 (1752)
[ कथं सजीवानि मतिस्तलिङ्गादनिलावसानानि ।
व्योम विमूर्तिभावादाधार एव न सजीवम् ॥ २०४ ॥ (१७५२)
Katham sa-jivāni matistallingādanilāvasānāni
Vyoma vimurtibhāvādādhāra éva na sa-jîvam 204 (1752)]

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[The fourth Trans:-204 (The opponent may ask How are they animate? (The answer is,-Bhibas ending at vityu are animate on account of (their possessing) that characteristic. The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support, (and hence) it is not animate
टीका-कथं पुनः सह जीवेन वर्तन्त इति सजीवानि भूतानि ? इति परस्य मतिः स्यात् । अत्रोच्यते-तस्य जीवस्य लिङ्ग तल्लिङ्गं तस्मात् तदुपलब्बेरित्यर्थः, सचेतनान्यनिळावसानानि चत्वारि भूतानि । व्योम-आकाशं पुनर्विगतमूर्तिभावमाधारण एव, न तु सजीवमिति ॥२०४॥ (१७५२)
D. C. Vyakta :-How are the bhaitas sajiva as they exist along with jiva?
The Ācārya. ---Prihvî jalu, agne and vāyu are sajiva because they possess the characteristics of siva. But the sky is not sajiva since it is a-miirta and hence it acts merely as an adhāra.
The living characteristic of prithvî can be laid down as
follows:
जम्म-जरा-जीवण-मरण-रोहणा-हार-दोहला-मयओ। राग-तिगिच्छाईहि य नारि व्व सचेयणा तरवो ॥ २०५ ॥ (१७५३)
Janma-jara-jivana-marapa-rohana-hāra-dohala-mayaon Roga-tigicchāîhi ya nāri va sa-ceyaņā taravo 11201511 (1753) [जन्म-जरा-जीवन-मरण-रोहणा-ऽऽहार-दौहदा-ऽऽमयतः ।
रोग-चिकित्सादिभिश्च नारीव सचेतनास्तरवः ॥२०५॥ (१७५३) Janma-jara-jivana-marana-rohana-"hara-dauhruda-"mayatah Roga-cikitsādibhisca nārivva sa-cetanastaravah 120511 (1753)]
Trans:—205 Trees, like woman, are living (beings) by reason of (their having) birth, old age life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease, and its diagnosis etc.

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263 टीका-"सचेतनास्तरव " इति प्रतिज्ञा । “जन्म-जरा-जीवनमरण-क्षतसरोहणा-ऽऽहार-दोहृदा-ऽऽमय-तचिकित्सादिसद्भावात् " इति हेतुः । " नारीवत्" इति दृष्टान्तः। आह-नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम्, अचेतनेधपि जन्मादिव्यपदेशदर्शनात्। तथाहि-' जातं तद् दधि" इति व्यपदिश्यते, न चैतत् सचेतनम्। तथा, “जीवितं विषम्” “मृतं कुमुम्भकम्" इत्यादि । अत्रोच्यते-वनस्पती सर्वाण्यपि सचेतनलिङ्गानि जन्मादीन्युपल. भ्य ते, अतो मनुष्येष्विव तानि तेषु निरुपचरितानि, दध्यादौ तु प्रतिनियत एव कश्चिञ्जातादिव्यपदेशो दश्यते, स चौपचारिक एव-जातमिव जातं दधि, मृतमिव मृतं कुसुम्मकमित्यादि ॥२०५।। (१७५३)
D. C.--Trees are sa-cétana like woman Because, like woman, they possess the living characteristics such as janna-jarā jivanamarana etc. Some one might argue that this rule could be applied to the lifeless objects also. Because, several characteristics like life, death, etc. are very well applied to the lifeless objects as well, when it is said that "curds is produced" or "(effect of) that poison is still alive" or (intoxication of) safflowert is dead" and so on, even though the objects mentioned there in, are lifeless.
The argument mentioned above is not justified, since all the characteristics of celana are residing in the animate objects as their innate qualities. But in the case of life!ess objects, those characteristics are rarely applied, and that too, in a particular sense, and not as a rule. छिक्कपरोइया छिक्कमेत्तसंकोयओ कुलिंगो व्य । आसयसंचाराओ वियत्त ! वल्लीवियाणाइं ॥ २०६ ॥ (१७५४) सम्मादओ य साव-प्पबोह-संकायगाइओऽभिमया । बउलादओ य सहाइविसयकालोवलंभाओ ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७५५)
† Popularly known as Kasumbā in Käthiāwār.

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourti. Chikkaparoiyā chikkamettasankoyao kulingo vva Āsayasancārão Viyatta I valliviyāņāim 1t 206 (1754)
Śammādao ya sāva-ppaboha-sankoyaņāio'bhimayā / Baulādao ya saddāivisayakálovalambhão | 207 11 (1755)
[ स्पृष्टपरोदिकाः स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचतः कुलिङ्ग इव ।
आश्रयसंचाराद् व्यक्त ! वल्लीवितानानि ॥२०६। (१७५४) शम्यादयश्च स्वाप-प्रबोध- संकोचनादितोऽमिमताः ।
बकुलादयश्च शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात् ॥२०७॥ (१७५५) Spristprarodikâh spristamatrasankocanatah kulinga iva i Āfrayasancărād Vyakta ! vallivitanāni 11 206) (1754) ] Samyādayaśca svāpa-prabodha-sankocanādito'bhimataḥ Bankuladayasca sabdadivisaya kalopalambhat | 2071 (1755 )]
Trans.-206-207 For, sensitive plants, O Vyakta ! contract themselves like worm at the touch (of others); clusters of creepers spread themselves for support; sami etc. are supposed to contain the properties of sleeping, waking, contraction etc. and bakula etc. contain the properties like tabda etc. and (the other of) time also. (1754-1755)
टीका--सचेतनाः स्पृष्टभरोदिकादयो वनस्पतयः, स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचात्, कुलिङ्गः कोटादिस्तद्वत् । तथा, सचेतना वल्ल्यादयः, स्वरक्षार्थ वृत्ति-वृक्षवरण्डकाधाश्रयं प्रति संचरणात् । तथा, शम्यादयश्चेतनत्वेनामिमताः, स्वापप्रबोध-संकोचादिमत्त्वात् , देवदत्तवत् । तथा सचेतना बकला-ऽशोक-कुरुवकविरहक-चम्पक-तिलकादयः, शन्दादिविषय कालोपलम्भात्-शब्द-रूप-गन्ध रस-स्पर्शविषयाणां काले प्रस्ताव उपभोगस्य यथासंख्यमुपलम्भादित्यर्थः, यज्ञदत्तवदिति। एवं पूर्वमपि दौहृदादिलिङ्गेषु कूष्माण्डी-बीन पूरकादयो वनस्पतिविशेषाः पक्षीकर्तव्या इति ॥२०६--२०७॥ (१७५४. १७५५)॥
D, C.-Plants like spæi s'aprarodikā contract themselves like worm at a slight touch, and hence they are sa-cetana.

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Vada ] Canadharavāda
265 So are the creepers spreading over a wall, tree or fence, for self-protection. Sami etc. are also sa-cétana, since they have the tendency to sleep, wake, or feel shy like Dévadatta. Trees like bakula, asoka, kurabaka, viharaka, campaka, tilaka etc., are res. pectively able to feel the sensations of sabda, rupa, rasa, gandha sparsa etc. Plants like kuşmāņdi and bijapuraka feel the longing of a pregnant woman. It is clear, therefore, that vanaspati is sa-cétana,
Moreover, मंसंकुरो व्व सामाणजाइरूवंकुरोवलंभाओ। तरुगण-विहुम-लवणो-बलादओ सासयावत्था ॥ २०८ ॥ (१७५६) Maisankuro wa sâmāņajāi-rūvankurovalambhāö 1 Tarugaŋa-vidduma-lavano-valadaö-sāsayāvattha. 1208 # (1756) [मांसाङ्कर इव समानजाविरूपाक्षुरोपलम्भात् ।
तरुगण-विद्रुम--लवणोपलादयः स्वाश्रयावस्थाः ॥२०८॥ (१७५६) Mānsänkura iva samānajatirūpānkuropalambhāti Tarugapa-vidruma-lavano-paladayah svasrayavasthah u 208॥ (1756)]
Trans.-208 Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. (are alive! at their own places of production by reason of their having a sprout in the form of common generality, similar to the sprout of flesh. (1756)
टीका-तरुगणः तथा विद्रुम--लवणो--पलादयश्च स्वाश्रयावस्था स्वजन्मस्थानगताः सन्तश्चेतनाः, छिमानामप्यमीषां पुनस्तत्स्थान एव समानजा. तीयाङ्कुरोत्थानात्, अर्धामांसाङ्कुरवत् । आइ--ननु पृथिव्यादिभूतानामिह सचेतनत्वं साधयितुमारब्धम्, ततः पृथिव्या एवादौ वद साधयितु युक्तम्, तस्या एवादावुपन्यासात्, तत्किमिति “जम्म--जरा- जीवण" इत्यादिना तरूणामेवादौ तत् साधितम्, पश्चात्तु विद्रुम--लवणो--पलादीनामिति ? । सत्यम्, किन्तु पृथ्वीविकारतया पृथ्वीभूत एव तरूणामन्तर्भावो लोकप्रसिद्धः 34

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Jinabhadra Gani's
The fourth मुव्यक्तचैतन्यलिङ्गाश्च यया तरवो न तथा लवणो-पल-जलादय इति
harat dari Alfafafa 1120611 (8199€) 11
D. C.-Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. are sa-cétana at their own places of production Because, the sprouts of these objects spring up, again and again, like the sprout of flesh springing up in the case of disease of piles etc.
Vyakta :-Really speaking, you had started to establish sacétanatva in the elements like prithvî etc Then, what is the idea in proving sa-cétanatva first in the case of vanaspati and then in the case of prithvi ?
Bhagavāna :- Vanaspati is nothing but a form of prithvi. Hence, out of the five bhitas, vanaspati resides only in prithvi. Moreover, the spirit of life is not so clearly manifested in stones etc. as it has been in case of vanaspati. For this reason, o Vyakta ! Caitanya is established first in vanaspati and then in prithvi.
Now, the sa-cétanatva of water is established - भूमिक्खयसाभावियसंभवओ दद्दुरो व्व जलमुत्तं । महवा मच्छो व सभाववोमसंभूयपायाओ॥ २०९ ।। (१७५७)
Bhūmikkhayasābhāviyasambhavao dadduro wa jalamuttam i Ahayā maccho va sabhāvavomasambhūyapāyāö 120911 (1757)
[xford Tufanaat T FT HETI अथवा मत्यस्य इव स्वभावव्योमसंभूतपातात् ॥२०९॥ (१७५७)
Bhūmiksatasvābhāvikasambhavato dardura iva jalamuktami Athavă matsya iva svabhāvavyomasambhūtapātāt 11 209 11 (1757)]
Trans.-209 Water springing up naturally by digging the earth, is said to be living like a frog; or, by reason of its falling naturally from the sky, water is living like a fish. (1757)

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Vida]
Ganadharavāda टीका-भौममम्भः सचेतनमुक्तम्, क्षतभूमिसजातीयस्वाभाविकस्य तस्य संभवात्, ददुरवत् । अथवा, सचेतनमन्तरिक्षमम्भः, अनादिविकारस्वभावसभूतपातात, मत्स्यवदिति ॥२०९॥ (१७५७)॥
D. C.- Water springing from earth when dug out of it, is sa-cétana like a frog; or, that which falls from the sky as natural rains, is also called sa-cétana, since it comes from vikāras like clouds etc.
Fire, as well as wind, can also be taken as sa-cétana in this way :
अपरप्पेरितिरियानियमियदिग्गमणोऽनिलो गो व्व । अनलो आहाराओ विद्धि-विगारोवलम्भाओ॥ २१॥ (१७५८) Aparapperiyāniyamiya diggamanao’ņilo go wa i Analo ahārāö viddhi-vigārovalambhāö 11 210 11 (1758) [अपरपेरिवतियंगनियमितदिग्गमनतोऽनिलो गौरिव ।
अनल आहाराद् द्धि--विकारोपलम्भात् ।।२१०॥ (१७५८) Aparapréritatiryganiyamitadiggamanato'nilo gauriva | Anala āhārād vriddhi-vikāropalambhāt 1 21011 (1758)]
Trans.-210 Wind is (alive) like a cow on account of its moving to and fro in various directions without being impelled by others. Fire is sa-cetanu because it has attained growth as well as a variety of forms by means of food. (1758)
टीका--सात्मको वायुः, अपरप्रेरिततिर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनात्, गोवत् । यथा, सात्मकं तेजः, आहारोपादानात्, तद्वृद्धौ विकारविशेषोपळम्माव, नरवत् । गाथाबन्धानुलोम्याच्च, नरवत् । गाथाबन्धानुलोम्याच व्यत्ययेनोपन्यास इति ॥२१०॥ (१७५८)
D. C.-Wind has life as it moves in all directions without the help of any external agency. Fire is also sa-jira as it is able to grow and manifest various forms by the help of āhāra. -

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(The fourth तणवोऽणन्भाइविगारमुत्तजाइत्तोऽणिलंताई। सस्थासत्थहयाओ निजीव--सजीवरुवाओ ।। २११ ।। (१७५९)
Tapavo'nabbhaivigaramuttajaittao'nilantaims Satthăsatthahayáo nijjiva-sa-jivarūvão 1121111. (1759)
[तनवोऽनभ्रादिविकारमूर्तजातित्वतोऽनिलान्तानि ।
शस्त्रा--ऽशखहता निर्जीव--सजीवरूपाः ॥२११॥ (१७५९) Tanavo'nabhrādivikáramūrtajātitvato'nilāntāni / Śastrā-sastrahată nirjîva-sa-jiva rūpaḥ 11 211 (1759) ]
Trans.-211 Bodies ( made of the four bhūtas ) ending at vāyu though different from forins like clouds etc. become lifeless when smashed by weapons and alive when free from weapons on account of their corporeal form. (1759)
___टीका--पृथिव्याधनिलान्तानि चत्वारि भूतानि जीवनिर्वतितास्तदाधारभूतास्तनव इति प्रतिज्ञा, अभ्रादिविकारादन्यत्वे सति मूर्तजातित्वात्, गवादिशरीरवत् । अभ्राविविकारस्तु विस्त्रसापरिणतपुदलसंघातरूपत्वेनाचेतनत्वाद् वर्जितः । ताश्च पृथिव्यादितनवः शस्रोपहता निर्जीवाः अशस्रोपहतास्तु सजीवा वर्ण-गन्ध-रसादिलक्षणतः समवसेया इति ॥२११॥ (१७५९)
D. C.-Objects made of bhūtas like prithvi, jaia, tejas, and vāyu are distinguished from objects like clouds etc. on account of their definite corporeal forms. Hence, these bodies are alive when free from the attack of any weapon, but they at once become lifeless when smashed by weapons.
Bhūtas like prithvi etc. can be proved as living in another way also :-- सिझंति सोम्म ! बहुसा जीवा नवसत्तसंभवो नविय । परिमियदेसो लोगो न संति चेगिंदिया जेसि ॥२१२॥(१७६०) ते सिं भवविच्छित्ती पावइ नेहा य सा जओ तेण । सिद्धमणंता जीवा भूयाहारा य तेऽवस्सं ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१)

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Gañadharavada Sijjhanti Sommal bahuso jivā navasattasambhavo navi ya 1 Parimiyadeso logo na santi cégindiya jésim 11 212 (1760) Te sim bhavavicchitti pāvai nettha ya så jao téma l Siddhamaganta jivā bhūyāhārā ya te'vassam 21311 (1761,
[सिध्यन्ति सौम्य ! बहुशो जीवा नवसत्त्वसंभवो नापि च । परिमितदेशो लोको न सन्ति चैकेन्द्रियां येषाम् ।।२१२॥ १७६०) तेषां भवविच्छित्तिः पामोति नेष्टा च सा यतस्तेन ।
सिद्धमननन्ता जीवा भूताधाराश्च तेऽवश्यम् ॥२१३ ॥ (१७६१) Sidhyanti Saumya / bahušo jivă navasttvasambhavo nāpi ca Parimitadeso loko na santi caikénkriyām yesām |212 ॥ 1760] Téşām bhavavicchittiḥ prāpnotinéşță ca să yatastena i Siddhamanantă jivā bhūtādhārāśca tévasyam 1121311 (1761)] i Trans.--212-213 Many a jiva, o Saumya! attains moksa and there is no possibility of new jivas (to be born). The world is limited. So, those according to whom, plants, etc. do not exist, will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (ca) that is not desirable. Hence, it is definitely proved that they (i.e. plants etc.) are the endless jîvas with bhūtas as their supports ( 17601761)
टीका--सिध्यन्ति मुक्ति यान्ति तावदजसं बहुशो जीवा, न च नवसवोत्पादः केनापीष्यते, परिमितदेशश्च लोकः, ततस्तदाधाराः स्थूलाः स्तोका एव जीवा घटन्ते । एवं च सति येषां मतेन वनस्पत्यादय एकेन्द्रिया जीवा न सन्ति, तेषां भवस्य संसारस्य व्यवच्छित्तिः मामोति । न चासौ कस्यापि तीर्थान्तरीयस्येष्टा यतः, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सिद्धं सत्चानांमानम्त्यम् । ते च संसारित्वादवश्यं भूताधाराः शरीरिण एवेत्यर्थः । न च बनस्पत्यादीनन्तरेणान्यत् तेषां शरीरमुपपद्यते । निवेद्यन्तां वा यच्छरीरास्ते, अभ्युपगम्यतां वा वनस्पत्यादीनां सात्मकत्वमिति भावः ॥ २१२--२१३ ॥ (१७६०--१७६१) ॥
D. C. Since many jîvas attain mokşa there is no possibility

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[The fourth of new sattvas to be born. Moreover, this world is limited in space. It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of jivos depending upon it Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc. are not sa-cétana, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time. But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted. Now, since all these jivas are the mundane zivas, they must have bhutas as their sastras (weapons) and since plants etc. are based on bkutus they should also be undoubtedly taken as sanjiva.
Now, the opponent's objection and its refutation-- एवमहिंसाभावो जीवघणं ति न य तं जओऽभिहि। सत्थोवयमजीवं न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसा ॥ २१४॥ (१७६२)
Evamahimsābhāvo jivaghaṇam ti na ya tam jao'bhihiami Satthovahayamajivam na ya jivaghanam ti to himso 1121411 (1762) [ एवमहिंसाऽभावो जीवघनमिति न च तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
शस्त्रोपहतमजीवं न च जीवधनमिति ततो हिंसा ।। २१४ ॥ (१७६२) Evamahimsā'bhāvo,jivaghanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam i Sastropahatamajivain na ca jivaghanamiti tato himsā 121411 (1762)]
Trans.--214 ( The opponent inay ask that ) There is no Xossibility of ahimsa in that case on account of the statement that "(the world) is compact with jîvas." (The reply is-) That is not so. It has already been said that, one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons. So, himsā could never be derived merely from the statement that "( the world ) is compact with jivas." (1762)
टीका-नन्वेवं सति लोकस्यातीवपृथिव्यादिजीवघनत्वादहिंसाऽभावः, संयतैरप्यहिंसावतपित्यं निर्वाहयितुमशक्यमिति भावः। तदेतद् न, यतोऽनन्तरमेवाभिहितमस्माभिः--" शस्त्रोपहतं पृथिव्यादिकमजीवं" भवति ।

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Gañadharavāda तदजीवत्वे चाकृता-ऽकारितादिपरिभोगेन निर्वहत्येव यतीनां संयमः। न च "जीवधनो लोकः" इत्येतावन्मात्रेणैव हिंसा संभवतीति ॥२१४॥(१७६२) ।।
D.C.-Vyahta:-If the world is packed with Jivas such as prithvi etc. even an ascetic will not be able to follow the vow of ahinsa, etc. as they will least require food etc. which they would not obtain without himsā.
Bhagavata :-For this, it has already been said O Vyakta) that prithvi etc. become lifeless when beaten by weapons. Thus, when they become a-jîva there is no objection for yatis to get their food from them. So, it is not proper to deduce himsa merely from the statement that the world is full of jîvas.
Moreover, न य घायउ त्ति हिंसो नाघायंनो त्ति निच्छियमहिसो। न विरलजीवमहिसो न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसा ॥२१५।। (१७६३) अहणंतो विहु हिंसो दुहृत्सणओ मओ अहिमरो छ। बाहिंतो न वि हिंसो सुद्धत्तणओ जहा विजो ॥२१६॥ (१७६५) Na ya ghāyau tti himso nāghāyanto tti nicchiyamahiệso I Na viralajivamahiriso na ya jivaghanam ti to hiriso 1215 11 (1763) Ahananto vi hu himso dutthattapao mao ahimaro va i Bāhinto na vi himso suddhattaņao jahā vijjo 11 216 I (1764)
न च घातक इति हिंस्रो नानमिति निश्चितिमहिंस्रः। न विरलजीवमहिस्त्रो न च जीवधनमिति ततोहिवः ॥२१५।। (१७६३) अन्ननपि खलु हिंस्रो दुष्टत्वतो मतोऽभिमर इव । बाधमानो नापि हिंस्रः शुद्धत्वतो यथा वैद्यः ॥ २१६ ॥ (१७६४)
Na ca ghātaka iti himsro nāghnanniti niscitamahimsrah 1 Na viralajivamhimsro na ca jivaghanamiti tato himsrah ॥ 215।।

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[The fourth Aghnannapi khalu himsro duştatvato mato'bhimara iva i Bādhamāno nāpi himsraḥ śuddhatvato yathā vaidyaḥ 11 216 11 ]
Trans.-215-216 One who is destructive, is not (necessarily) murderous, and one who is not destructive, is not certainly non. violent Nor is one having little givı a-himsaka and one that is packed with jîvas accepted as himsaka. Por, one is murderous, like a hunter, on accouut of his wicked motive even without killing; while another afflicting others with a good purpose, like a physician, is not murderous. (1J63-1764 .
टीका-न हि "घातकः” इत्येतावता हिंसः न चानमपि निश्चयनयमतेनाहिसः, नापि “विरल जीवम्" इत्येता मात्रेणाहिंस्रः, न चापि “जीवधनम्" इत्येतावता च हिंस्र इति। किं तर्हि ? अमिमरो गजादिघातका स इत्र दुष्टाध्यवसायोऽननपि हिंस्रो मतः। बाधमानोऽपि च शुद्धपरिणामो न हिंस्रो यथा वैद्यः, इति घनप्यहिंस्त्रः, अननपि च हिंस्र उक्तः ॥ २१५२१६ ॥ (१७६३-१७६४)।
D). C- The point is that one committing actual hiņasü is not hiņsaka, because of his good motive as in the case of a physician, while another, not actually committing himsī but having wicked purpose, is himsaka like a hunter,
Also,
पंचसमिओ तिगुत्तो नाणी अविहिंसओ न विवरीओ। होउ व संपत्ती से मा वा जीवोवरोहेणं ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५) Pancasamio tigutto pāņi avihimsao na vivario 1 Hiu va sampatti se ma jivovarohenam || 217॥ (1765) [पञ्चसमितस्त्रिगुप्तो ज्ञान्यविहिंसको न विपरीतः । भवतु वा संपत्तिस्तस्य मा वा जीवोपरोधेन ॥ २१७॥ (१७६५)

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273 Pancasamitastrigupto jñānyavihimsako na viparitał i Bhavatu vā sampattistasya mā jivopārodhéna 121711 (1765)]
Trans.--217 A wise person, conversant with the five samitist and guarded in three ways ( i e., by mind, speech and body ) is a-himsaka, but not the one (having ) contrary (characteristics). He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of) himsā on account of obstruction to jivas. (1765)
टीका-पञ्चभिः समितिमिः समितः, तिमृमिर्गुप्तिभिश्च गुप्तो ज्ञानी जीवस्वरूप-तद्रशाक्रियाभित्रः सर्वथा जीवरक्षापरिणामपरिणतः तत्मयतय कथमपि हिंसमप्यविहिंसको मतः । एतद्विपरीतलक्षणस्तु नाहिंसका; किन्तु हिंस्र एवायम्, अशुभपरिणामत्वात् । बाह्यजीवहिंसायास्तु जीवोपरोधेन जीवस्य कीटादेरुपरोधेनोपघातेन संपत्तिर्भवतु, मा भूद् वा 'स' तस्य साध्वादेः, हिंसकत्वे तस्या अनेकान्तिकत्वादिति ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५) ॥
D. C.-A person conversant with all the five samitis and restraining himself in three ways--manasā (by mind ) vācasa ( by speech ) and karamanā ( by bodily actions -is the jnātā of actual jîvasvarīlpa aud its protection. Such a person should be taken as a-himsaka even if he commits himsā. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned jñāni purust, is hımsaka as he brings about an a-s'ubha pariņāma. Pulfilment of himsä may or may not be attained by him due to givoparodha or the (natural) obstruction to jîvas, but his himsakatva is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below :अतुभो जो परिणामो सा हिंसा सो उ बाहिरनिमित्तं। को वि अवेक्खेज न वा जम्हाऽणेगंतियं बज्झं ॥ २१८॥ (१७६६) Asubho jo parināmo sã himsā so u bāhiranimittam Ko vi avékkéhjja na va jamha'pégantiyam bajjham ॥218 (1766) + Five Jaina rules of life. 35

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth [अशुमो यः परिणामः सा हिंसा स तु बाह्यनिमित्तम् ।
कोऽप्यपेक्षेत न वा यस्मादनैकान्तिकं बाह्यम् ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६) A$ubho yaḥ pariņāmah sā himsā sã tu bāhyanimittam i Ko'pyapékséta na vā yasmādanaikāntikam bāhyamn 121811 (1766)]
Trans.—218 What is (known as) inauspicious consequence is (itself) himsa. But that is an external cause. Some may or
may not require ( this cause ), because the external (cause ) is variable. (1766)
टीका- यस्मादिह निश्चयनयतो योऽशुमपरिणामः स एव "हिंसा" इत्याख्यायते । स च बाह्यसत्त्वातिपातक्रियालक्षणं निमित्तं कोऽप्यपेक्षते, कोऽपि पुनस्तभिरपेक्षोऽपि भवेत्. यथा तन्दुलमत्स्यादीनाम् तस्मादनकान्तिकमेव बाह्यनिमित्तम्, तत्सद्भावेऽप्यहिंसकत्वात्, तदभावेऽपि च हिंसकत्वादिति ॥ २१८ ।। (१७६६) ।
D. C.-An action having inauspicious consequence is called himsā. This sort of himsā results from the niinitla of zivahiņsā while sometimes himsă results without the apékişū of those nimittas as in the case of tandulamatsya. As the bāhya nimitta is anxikantika, an action is himsaka sometimes even in absence of bāh, a nimitta and a-hiinsaka sometimes even in its own absence. असुभपरिणामहेंऊ जीवाबाहो त्ति तो मयं हिंसा । जस्स उ न सो निमित्तं संतो वि न तस्म मा हिंसा ॥२१९॥ (१९६७) Asubhapariņāmahéū jīvābāho tti to mayam himsi: Jassa u na so nimittam santo vi na tassa să hinsă 121911 (1767) [ अशुमपरिणामहेतु वाबाध इति ततो मतं हिमा ।
यस्य तु न स निमित्तं समपि न तस्य सा हिंसा ॥२११ ॥ (१५६७) Asubhaparinamahétu-r-jivābādha iti tato matam himsa ! Yasya tu na sa nimittam sannapi na tasya să hiņsā 112 1911 ]

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Trans. -- 219
Affliction of jivas as a cause for an evil end is called himsā. That which has no such ( end ), has nothing like himsā even if the cause is there. (1767)
टीका - ततस्तस्माद् यो जीवाबाधोऽशुभ परिणामस्य हेतु:, अथवा, अशुभ परिणामो हेतुः कारणं यस्यासावशुभपरिणाम हेतुर्जीवाबाधो जीवघातः, स एव " हिंसा " इति मतं तीर्थकर - गणधराणाम् । यस्य तु जीवाबाधस्य सोsथुमपरिणामो न निमित्तं स जीवाबाधं सन्नपि तस्य साधोर्न हिंसेति ॥ २१९ ॥ (१७६७) ॥
D. C. - One who inflicts pain upon jivas with an evil purpose is said to commit hemsa; but one who, has no such purpose, does uot commit himsā even if he inflicts pain upon jîvas.
सद्दादओ रहफला न वीयमोहस्स भावसुद्धीओ ।
जह, तह जीवाबाहो न सुद्धमणसो वि हिंसाए ॥ २२० ॥ (१७६८)
Saddadao raiphala na vîyamohassa bhāvasuddhto Jaha, taha jîvābāho na suddamaṇaso vi himsāé ||220 (1768).
[ शब्दादयो रतिफळा न वीतमोहस्य भावशुद्धेः ।
यथा, तथा जीवाबाधो न शुद्धमनसोऽपि हिंसाये ॥ २२० ॥ (१७६८) Sabdadayo ratiphalā na vitamohasya bhāvaśuddhéḥ Yathā, tathā jivābādho na śuddhamanaso 'pi himsāyai 2201 ]
Trans. -- 220 Just as sabda etc do not become the objects of pleasure to a dispassionate saint on account of the purity of (his) mind, affliction of vas too does not become the cause of himsā to a person having pure intention (768)
टीका- यथेह वीतराग-द्वेष - मोहस्य भगवत इष्टाः शब्द-रूपादयो भावविशुद्धितो न कदाचिद् रतिफळा रतिजनकाः संपद्यन्ते, यथा बेह शुद्धात्मनो रूपवत्यामपि मातरि न विषयाभिलाषः संजायते, तथा शुद्धपरिणामस्य यत्नवतः साधोः सच्वोपघातोऽपि न हिंसायै संपद्यते । ततोऽ

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276 Jinabhadra Gamis
[The fourth शुभपरिणामजनकत्वे वाह्य निमित्तमनैकान्तिकमेवेति । तस्माद् व्यक्त ! सन्ति पञ्चभूतानि, चेतनानि चायानि चत्वारि, इत्येतत् .प्रतीहीति स्थितम् । यश्च " स्वमोमयं वै सकलम्" इत्यादि । तत्रापि यस्तव चेतसि वर्तते नासावर्थः, किन्तु भवभयोद्विग्नानां भव्यसत्चानां धन-फनक-पुत्र-फलत्राधसारतामात्र. प्रतिपाइनं तेन विधीयते, येन ते तदास्था परित्यज्य मुक्तये प्रवर्तन्ते, न पुनस्तत्र भूताभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । इति मुश्च संशयम्, पतिपयस्व भूतास्तित्वमिति ॥ २२०॥ (१७६८)
D. C.-To a dispassionate saint, s'abda, rūpa, rasa etc. . do not become the attractive objects of pleasure, because his mind is pure. A pure-minded inan does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering muni does never commit himsā even if he inflicts pain upon jivas on account of his s'uddha bhāvas. It is clear, trierefore, that bāhya nimitta is anaikāntika so far as himsă is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple.
Hence O Bhadra ! accept the existence of the five bhutus and know it for certain that the first four of them viz, prithvi, jala, agni, and vāyu are sa-cétana. Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the Véda-dadas like “Svapno pamās var sakalam" etc. The main object of those sentences, is to aşsert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc. before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the bhavabhaya, so that they might abandon their attachment to the wordly visayas and strive for the attainment of moksa. Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, o Saumya 1 and admit the existence of bhtitas. छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविष्पमुक्केण ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसरहिं ॥ २२१ ॥ (१७६९) Chinnammi samsaymmi Jipena jară-maraṇayippamukkeņam i So samaņo pavvalo pancahim saha khandiyasaenim 1122 111 (1769)

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Ganadharavāda
277 [fare front fortat 77-4fcorfanget i
# $40: qafera: qafa: h afica: 1138? 11 (P1988) Chinné samsayé Jinena jarā-maraqavipramukténa i Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitah pancabhih saha khaņņikašalaih 1122111]
Trans.--221 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age, and death, the saint Vyaklı accepted dikşā along with his five hundred pupils. (1769)
End of the Discussion with the Fourth Gaņadhara

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Chapter V
पश्चमगणधरवक्तव्यता।
Discussion with the Fifth Canadhara.
ते पव्वहए सोउं सुहम आगच्छइ जिणसगासं । बच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २२२ ।। (१७७०) Te pavvaie söum Suhuma āgacchai Jiņasagāsam i Vaccāmi ņa vandāmi vandittä pajjuvāsāmi 222|1 (1770) [वान् प्रजितान् श्रुत्वा सुधर्म आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २२२ ॥ (१७७०) Tăn pravrajitān śrutvā Sudharma āgacchati Jinsakāšam | Vrajami vande vanditva paryupāsc ||222॥ (1770) !
Trans.--222 Having heard that they (Vyakta and others) had renounced the world, Sudharman comes before the Tirthankara. He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1770)
आभट्ठो यं जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवण्णु सव्वदरिसी णं ।। २२३ ॥ (१७७१). Abhattho ya Jinénam jail-jarā-imaranavippamukkénam | Namena ya gottena ya savuannu savvadarisi nam ॥ 223 ॥ (1771) [ आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ! नाना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। २२३ ॥ (१७७१)

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Gaṇadharavāda
Abhāsitaśca Jinėna jāti-jarā-maraņavipramuktėna Nāmnā ca gotréna ca sarvajnéna sarvadarsinā | 2231: (1771) ]
Trans.-223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra (lineage), by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darkana (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1771)
279
किं मन्ने जारिस इहभवम्मि सो तारिसी परभवे वि ।
वेयपयाग य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो || २२४ ॥ (१७७२)
Kim manné jariso ihabhavammi so tāriso parabhavé vit Véya-payāna ya attham na yānasi tésimo attho 12241 (1772)
[ किं मन्यसे यादृश इहभवे स तादृशः परभवेऽपि ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२)
Kim manyase yādriśa ihabhave sa tādrisan parabhave'pi | Veda-padānām cārtham na jānāsi téṣāmayamarthah 224 (1772))
Trans. - 224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world? But (ca) you do nor know the (real) meaning of the sentences of Védas. Here is their (real) interpretation (1772)
टीका - त्वमेवं मन्यसे - यो मनुष्यादिर्यादृश इहभवे स तादृशः परrasपि । नन्वयमनुचितस्ते संशयः, यतोऽसौ विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुनिगिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि " पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशत्रः पशुत्वम्" इत्यादि, तथा " श्रृगालो वै एष जयते यः सपुरीषो दह्यते " इत्यादि । एषां च वेदपदानाममुमर्थं मन्यसे त्वम् - " पुरुषो मृतः सन् परभवे पुरुषत्वमेवेत्यादि, अमूनि किल भवान्तरगतजन्तुसादृश्यप्रतिपादकानि तथा, " श्रृगालो वै " इत्यादीनि तु वैसदृश्यख्यापकानि " इति । इति । अतस्तव संशयः । अयं चायुक्त एव यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानां नायमर्थः, किन्तु वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २२४ । (१७७२) ।।
7
D. C. -- O Sutharaman !

Do you entertain the belief that

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280
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The fifth
human life in the next world is the same as it is here? Sentences of Védas having contradictory interpretations have given rise to this illusion of yours. The sentences are as follows:
(1) "Puruso vai puruṣatvamas'nutė, pas'avaḥ paśatvam” etc. and (2) "Śrugālo vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ sa-puriṣo dahyaté” etc
According to you, interpretations of these two sentences are respectively as follows:--
(1) A man obtains nothing but manhood even after death in the next world; and animals such as a cow etc. become animals after death. Thus, sentences like this suggest that the next life is the same as this.
(2) But the sentences like “Śrugālo vai etc.” mean to assert that the next life is totally different from the present one.
Such contradicting interpretations have given rise to the misguided belief of yours. Here is their real interpretation. Listen carefully.
कारणसरिसं कां वीयसेवङ्कुरो प्ति मण्णंतो ।
इहभवसरिसं सव्वं जमवेसि परे वि तमन्तं ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)
Kāraṇasarisam kajjam biyassévankuro tti maņṇanto | Ihabhavasarisam savvam jamavési paré vi tamajuttam 225❘ (1773)
[ कारणसदृशं कार्य बीजस्येवाङ्कुर इति मन्यमानः |
इहभवसदृशं सर्व शदवैषि परस्मिन्नपि तदयुक्तम् ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३, Kāṛanasadriśam kāryam bijasyevänkura iti manyamānah | Ihabhavasadṛisam sarvam yadavaisi parasminnapi tadayuktum 1225 ]
Trans.-225 Just as sprout is similar to seed, the effect is also similar to cause according to you. ( And hence ), you

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281 believe everything in the next world to be siinilar to everything in this world. (But) that is not correct. (1773)
टीका-सुधर्माणं पति भगवानुवाच-" इह कारणानुरूपमेवकार्यभवति, यथा यवबीजानुरूपो यवाङ्करः, इहभवकारणं चान्यजन्म, ततस्तेना पीहभवसदृशेन भवितव्यम्" इत्येवं मन्यमानस्त्वं यदिहमवसदृशं सर्व पुरुषादिकं परभवेऽप्यवैषि, तदयुक्तमेवति ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)
D. C... Since kārana is the same as karya according to you, the past life, being the kāraṇa of the present life, becomes the same as the present life. This is why you are led to believe that everything in this life is similar to everything in the next one. But this apprehension of yours is not correct.
Because जाइ सरो सिंगाओ भूतणआ सासवाणुलित्ताओ। संजायइ गोलोमाविलोमसंजागओ दुव्वा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४) इति रुक्खायुवेदे जोणिविहाणे य विसरिसेहितो। दीसइ जम्हा जम्मं सुहम्म ! तो नायमेगंतो ॥ २२७ ।। (१७७५) Jãi saro signão bhūtanao sāsavāņulittāö ! Sajnāyai golomā’vilomasanjogao duvvă 1122611 (1774) Iti rukkhāyuvvédé jonivihāné ya visariséhinto I Disai jamhà jammam Suhammal to nāyameganto 1122711 (1775)
[ जायते शरः शृङ्गाद् भूतणकः सर्षपानुलिप्तात् । संजायते गोलोमाविलोमसंयोगतो दुर्वा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४) इति वृक्षायुर्वेदे योनिविधाने च विसदृशेभ्यः ।
दृश्यते यस्माजन्म सुधर्मन् ! ततो नायमेकान्तः ॥ २२७ ॥ (१७७२) Jāyate sarah śringād bhūtřipakah sarsapānuliptāti Sanjayaté golomā’vilomasamyogato dūrvă 1122611 (1774) )
36

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282 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fifth Iti vșikşāurvédé yonividhāné ca visadşisebhyah Dșiśyate yasmājjanına Sudharman ! tato nāyamékāntah 1122711]
Trans.-226-227 The sara plant is produced from horn; earth-grass' is produced by the anointing of mustard and dūrvās is produced by the combination of goloma“ and aviloma plants. Similarly, in the treatise on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of a number of) dissimilar objects. The rule is therefore, not exclusive, O Sudharaman! (1774-1775)
टीका-ततः " कारणानुरूपं कार्यम्" इति सुधर्मन् ! नायमेकान्तः, at Trafo at nta, a ga paaralang TOTA: 767घातो जायते; तथा, गोलोमा-ऽविलोमाभ्यां दूर्वा प्रभवति, इत्येवं वृक्षायुर्वेदे विलक्षणानेकद्रव्यसंयोगजन्मानो वनस्पतयो दृश्यन्ते । तथा, योनिविधाने च। योनिपाभृते विसदृशानेकद्रव्यसंयोगयोनयः सर्प-सिंहादिप्राणिनो qurut $41974 qaraf 777TETT: HITEVI 377: TÅET TUTTOETUT ? sfat 11 276-226 11 (plug-Plou)!
D. C.-The rule that kārya is similar to kārana is not ékāntika. Because, the s'ara is produced even by means of s'raga, by the unction of mustard-seeds, the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of goloma and aviloma grasses, the dūrvā grass is produced.
Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is shown 1. Bhūtřiņaka (earth-grass) A kind of fragrant grass, the
plant Androhogon Schoenanthus. 2. Sarsapa-Mustard-seed; popularly known as sarasava in
Western India; Sinapis Dichotoma. 3. Dūrvā=Name of a bent grass; panic grass, Panicum
Dactylon ;
Goloma, Aviloma=Two different kinds of bent grass. 5. Vrakşayu=Name of a short treatise by Surpain on the
planting and cultivation of trees.

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283 as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between kārya and karana, is therefore, inapplicable in this case.
Or, say, the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world, on account of similarity between kāryand kirana in this way:-- अहवा जउ चिय बीयाणुरूवजम्मं मयं तओ चेव । जीव गिण्ह भवाओ भवंतरे चित्तपरिणामं ॥ २२८ ॥ (१७७६) जेण भवंकुरबीयं कम्मं चित्तं च तंजओऽभिहियं । हेउविचित्तत्तणओ भवंकुरविचित्तया तेणं ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७) जइ पडिवन्नं कम्मं हेउविचित्तत्तओ विचित्तं च । तो तत्फलं वि चित्त पवज्ज संसारिणो सोम्म ! ॥ २३० ॥ (१७७८) Ahavā jau cciya biyāņuruvajammam mayam tao ceva Jivam ginha bhavão bhavantare cittapariņāmanı 1122811 (1776) Jeņa bhavankurabîyam kamimam cittam ca tam jao'bhihiyamı Héuvicittattayao bhavaņkuraviccittayā téņam 12294 (1777) Jai padivannam kaminam héuvicittattao vicittam ca i To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsāriņo somma ! 11230H (1778) [अथवा यत एव बीजानुरूपजन्म मतं तत एव । जीवं गृहाण भवाद् भवान्तरे चित्रपरिणामम् ॥ २२८ ॥ (१७७६) येन भवाङ्करबीजं कर्म चित्रं तद् यतोऽमिहितम् । हेतुविचित्रत्वतो भवाकुरविचित्रता तेन ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७) यदि प्रतिपन्नं कर्म हेतुविचित्रत्वतो विचित्रं च ।
ततस्तत्फलमपि चित्रं प्रतिपयस्व संसारिणः सौम्य ! ॥२३०॥ (१७७८) Athavā yata éva bijānurūpajanma matam taté éva Jivam grihāņa bhavăd bhavāntare cittapariņāmam 1122811 (1776)

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[Tlie fifth Yena bhavankurabijam karma citram tad yato'bhihitam Hetuvicitratvato bhāvankuravicitrată tena 1122911 (1477) Yadi pratipannam karma hétuvicitratvato vicitram ca Tatastatphalamapi citram pratipadyasva samsāriņah Saumya ! 11230u]
Trans.--228-229-230 Or, because the production (of kūrya) is siinilar to the root-cause, according to you, take j'îva in the next life to be a pariņāma distinct from this mundane world. For, karman (which is) the seed of the sprout of life is itself distinct. And, if the effect is established to be distinct because the cause is distinct, know it for certain O Saumyal that the Mundane Soul has also its phala distinct from it. (1776-1777-1778)
टीका-व्याख्या-अथवा, यत एव बीजानुरूपं कारणानुगुणं कार्याणां जन्म मतम्, तत एवेह मवाद् भवान्तरे जीवं गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व । कथंभूतम् ? जाति-कुल-बलै-श्वर्य-रूपादिविचित्रपरिणामम् । यदि नाम बीजानुरूपं जन्म, तथापि कथं भवान्तरे विचित्रता जीवानाम् ? इत्याह-"जेण भवहरेत्यादि" येन यस्माद् नारक-तिर्यगादिरूपेण भवनं भव. स एवाङ्कर इवाङ्करस्तस्य वीजमिह कर्मैवावसेयम्, तच्च मिथ्याला-ऽविरत्यादिहेतुवैचियाद् विचित्रं यस्माद् मयाऽभिहितम्, तस्मात् तज्जन्यस्य भवाङ्करस्यापि जात्यादिमेदेन विचित्रता । ततो यदि त्वया कर्म प्रतिपन्नम्, हेतुवैचित्र्याच यदि सद्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगतम्, ततः संसारिणो जीवस्य तत्फलमपि नारकतिर्यङ्-मनुष्या-मररूपेण भवनरूपं सौम्य ! विचित्ररूपं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २२८-२२९-२३० (१७७६-१७७७-१७७८)॥
D. C.—The production of various käryas is similar to the corresponding kāraṇas according to you. But the jiva in the next life, is distinguished from this world on account of jāti, kula, rūpa, bala, ais'varya etc. Now if Kārya is taken to be similar to the karaņa, how will the jîvas be different in the next life? The vicitrată of jiva in the next life, is to be accounted for by means of karman. For karman being the hotu of samsāra, renders the whole saņsura, viciira by reason of its

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own self being vicitra. So, just as karman is vicitra by reason of its wrong belief and vowlessness etc, its Karya viz, bhava should also be taken as vicitra by reason of jāti, kula, rūpa, bala etc. So, if you admit Karman and if you believe that Kārya is distinguished from karana, then O Saumya! know it for certain that the Mundane Soul has its phala in the form of vicitrata as hellish beings, lower animals, human beings, or celestial beings.
चित्तं संसारितं विचित्तकम्मफलभावओ हेऊ ।
इह चित्तं वित्ताणं कम्माण फलं व लोगम्मि ॥ २३१ ॥ (१७७९)
Cittam samsărittam vicittakammaphalabhavao heu Jha cittam cittānam kammāna phalam va logammi || 231|| (1779)
[ चित्र संसारित्वं विचित्रकर्मफळमावतो हेतोः ।
इह चित्रं चित्राणां कर्मणां फलमिव लोके ॥ २३१ ॥ ( १७७९ ) Citram samsāritvam vicitrakarmaphalabhāvato hetohi Tha citram citrānām karmanām phalamiva loke || 2311 (1779 ) ]
Trans.-231 Like the variable result of variable actions ( accomplished) in this world, worldliness is variable on account of the hétu that (it is also) the result of variable actions. (1779)
टीका चित्र संसारिजीवानां नारकादिरूपेण संसारित्वमिति प्रतिज्ञा । विचित्रस्य कर्मणः फळरूपत्वादिति हेतुः । इह यद् विचित्रहेतुकं तद् विचित्रसुपलभ्यते, यथेह कृषि--वाणिज्यादिकर्मणां फलं लोक इति । तदेवं कर्म वैचित्र्याद् भववैचित्र्ये प्रमाणमुक्तम् || २३१ ॥ (१७७९) ॥
--
D. C. - Just as the results of various actions like ploughing trading etc. are variable, the samsaritva of the mundane animals is also varied as seen in their hellish experience etc. on account of the fact that samsärit va is nothing but the result of their vicitra actions in the past,

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[The fifth Now, in support of the variable nature of Karman, the author states:--- चित्ता कम्मपरिणई पोग्गलपरिणामओ जहा बज्झा। कम्माण चित्तया पुण तछेउविचित्तभावाओ ॥ २३२ ।। (१७८०) Cittā kammapariņai poggalapariņāmao jahā bajjhái Kammāņa cittayā puņa taddhcuvicittabhāvāo #232 (1780) [चित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः पुदलपरिणामतो यथा बाह्या ।
कर्मणां चित्रता पुनस्तद्धेतुविचित्रभावात् ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०) Citrā karmapariņatih pudgalapariņāmato yathā bāhya Karmaņām citratā punastaddhétuvicitrabhāvāt 1123211 (1780)]
Trans.---232 Just as the outward effect of actions is variable on account of its being the pariņāma of earthly bodies, the variable nature of actions, is also due to their hétu being variable. (1780)
टीका-इह विचित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः, पुद्रलपरिणामात्मकत्वात्, इह यत्युदलपरिणामत्मकं तद् विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं दृश्यते, यथा बाह्योऽभ्रादि विकारः, पृथिव्यादिविकारो वा यत्तु विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं न भवति तत् पुद्रलपरिणामात्मकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम्, या पुनः पुद्रलपरिणामसाम्येऽपि कर्मणामावरणादिभेदेने विशेषतो विचित्रता सा तद्धेतुबैचिच्या. दवगन्तव्या, विचित्राश्च मिथ्यात्वादयः-प्रद्वेष-निनवादयश्च कर्महे तव इति ॥ २३२ ॥ ११७८०)।
D. C.--Effect of Karman is varied in this world. Only that which is pudgalupar inimal maka is known as vicitra (as in the case of various transformations of cloud, earth etc.). While that which is not the result of earthly pudgalas, is not recognized as a vicitraparıņati (as in the case of ākāśa). In case of Karman itself being variable, in addition to this pudgalapariņāmatva, vicilrată is due to the variable nature of its motives like vanity, hostility, and wickedness etc, by means of which those actions are actually inspired. 232 (1780).

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अहवा इहभवसरिसो परलोगो वि जइ सम्मओ तेणं । कम्मल पि भवसरिसं पडिवज परलोए || २३३ || (१७८१)
287
किं भणियमिह मणुया नाणागइकम्मकारिणो मंति ।
जह से तफलभाजो परे वि तो सरिसमा जुत्ता || २३४ ॥ (१७८२)
Ahava ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao téņam Kammaphalam pi ihabhavasarisam paḍivajja paralöé #1233|| 1781) Kim bhaṇiyamihā maṇuya nāṇāgaikammakāriņo santi Jai té tapphalabhäjo paré vi to sarisayā juttā #234π (1782) [ अथवेहभत्रसदृशः परलोकोऽपि यदि संमतस्तेन ।
कर्मफलमपी भवसदृशं प्रतिपद्यस्व परलोके ।। २३३ ।। (१७८१) किं भणितमिह मनुजा नानागतिकर्मकारिणः सन्ति ।
यदि ते तत्फलभाजः परस्मिन्नपि ततः सदृशता युक्ता ॥ २३४ ॥ (१७८२) Athavéhabhavasadṛiśam paraloko'pi yadi sammatasténa Karmaphalamapihabhavasadṛisam pratipadyasva paraloké 23311 Kim bhayitamiha manujā nānāgatikarmakāriṇaḥ santi | Yadi té tatphalabhājah parasminnapi tatah sadriśata yukta ||234||]
Trans.~~~233-234 Or, if the other life is also taken as the same as this life, (you should) accept the karma phala in the other life to be the same as (that in) this life. Has it been said that there exist people in this world doing (various) deeds according to their various tendences ? If they exist, there exist (people ) in the next (world) to enjoy their fruits also. Sameness (of both ) is, therefore, justified. 1781-1782)
टीका - व्याख्या - अथवा, यदीह भवसदृशः परलोकोऽपि संमृतो भवतः, " तेणं ति " ततः कर्मफलमपि परलोक इहमवसदृशमित्यविचित्रशुमाStgभक्रियानुरूपं विचित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति । एवं मुकुलितं प्रतिपाद्यैतदेव भावयति - " कि भणियमित्यादि " किमेतावता प्रतिपादितं भवति ? |

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[ The fifth
इह तावद् मनुष्या नानागतिहेतुविचित्र क्रियानुष्ठायिनः सन्तीति प्रत्यक्षत एव लक्ष्यन्ते । ततो यदि ते परलोके तत्तत्क्रियाफलभाज इष्यन्ते, ततो यचेहत्यक्रियाणामसदृशता, तथा परलोकगतजन्तूनामपि सैव युक्ता, ननु योsa यादृशः स परत्रापि तादृश एव भवति ॥ २३३-२३४॥ (१७८१-१७८२)
D. C. If, according to you, next life is the prototype of this one, the karmaphala in the next life, will depend upon (one's) various good or bad actions in this life. Nov, since various people do various deeds as a result of their various tendences in this life, it should be noted that they enjoy fruits of their actions in the next life.. So, inclination of one in the present life, depends upon his inclination in the past life also.
Then, anticipating doubts in the opponent's mind, the author states :---
अह इह सफलं कम्मं न परे तो सव्वहा न सरिसप्तं । अकयागम- कयनासा कम्माभावोऽहवा पत्तो ॥ २३५ ॥ ( १७८३)
कम्माभावे य कओ भवंतरं, सरिसया व तदभावे । निक्कारणओ य भवो जइ ता नासो वि तह चेव || २३६ ॥ (१७८४)
Aha iha saphalam kanımam na paré to savvahā na sarisattam Akayagama-kayanāsā kammābhāvo'havā patto ||235|| (1783) Kammābhāvé ya kaö bhavantaram, sarisayā va tadabhāvé i Nikkaraṇao ya bhavo jai tā nāso vi taha cévá 11236|| (1784)
[ अथेह सफलं कर्म न परस्मिंदततः सर्वथा न सदृशत्वम् ।
अकृतागम - कृतनाशौ कर्माभावोऽथवा प्राप्तः ॥ २३५ ॥ (१७८३) कर्माभावे च कृतो भवान्तरं सदृशता वा तदभावे ।
निष्कारणकश्च भवो यदि ततो नाशोऽपि तथैव ।। २३६ ।। (१७८४ )
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Athéha saphalam karma na parasminstataḥ sarvathā na sadṛiśatvamı Akritāgama-kritanāśau kaṛmābhāvo'thavā prāptaḥ 11235|| (1783)] Karmābhavé ca kuto bhavāntaram sadṛiśatā vā tadabhāve | Nişkāranakśca bhavo yadi tato naso 'pi tathaiva || 236 (1784) ] Trans. -- 235-236 If ( the opponent says that ) Karman is successful here (only ), (and) not in the next life, then, there will be nothing like sameness at all. The unaccomplished object will crop up, and the accomplished ore will come to an end. Or, there will be (complete) negation of Karman itself. In absence of Karman, how will the next life come into existence? And in its absence, whence (will) the sadrisata ( exist ) ? And if the (next) life is (taken to have been) produced without any cause, then (its) end will also be so. (1783-1784)
टीका - अथैवं ब्रूषे-इह सफलं कर्मेति - इहभवसंबन्ध्येव कृष्यादिक्रया रूपं कर्म सफलम्, न तु पारभविकदानादिक्रियारूपं कर्म । ततश्च तत्फलाभाबाद् न परलोके जन्तुवैसदृश्यम् । अत्रोत्तरमाह - " ततो सब्बदा न सरिसत्तं वि" तत एवं सति यत् तत्राभिप्रेतं तत् सर्वथा परभवे जीवानां सदृशत्वं न स्यात् । तद्धि कर्मणा जन्यते तच्च नास्ति, पारभविक क्रियाणां त्वया निष्फळत्वाभ्युपगमात्, तन्निष्फलत्वे च कर्माभावात् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भवेत् सादृश्यम् तर्ह्यक्रतस्यैव तस्य निर्हेतुकस्याऽऽगमः मामोति कृतस्य च दान - हिंसादिक्रियाफलरूपस्य कर्मणो नाशः प्रसजति । अथवा, मूलत एव कर्मणामभावः प्राप्तः - दान - हिंसादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमाद् मूलत एव कर्मणो बन्धोऽपि न स्यादिति भावः । ततः किम् ? इत्याह--कर्माभावे च कारणाभावात् कुतो भवान्तरम्, तदभावे च दूरोत्सारितमेव सादृश्यम् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भव इष्यते, तर्हि निष्कारण एवासौ स्यात् । यदि चैवमयमियेत, ततो नाशोऽपि तस्य भवस्य निष्कारण एव स्यात्, अतो व्यर्थस्तपोनियमानुष्ठानप्रयासः । निष्कारणे च भवेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने वैसदृश्यमपि जीवानां निष्कारणं किं नेष्येते, विशेषाभावात् ? इति ।। २३५-२३६ ॥ (१७८३ - १७८४) ।।
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[The fifth
D. C. Sudharman:- Actions (like ploughing etc. which are connected with this life are alone fruitful, and those (like munificence etc.) that are connected with the other life, are not fruitful. This is the reason why there is no distinction between the lives of creatures in the two bhavas.
290
Bhagavana: But sadṛisata can never exist without cause as sadṛisata itself is produced from Karman. Now, when you take Karman (like dana etc.) connected with the other life, to be fruitless, there is no scope for saaṛisata to exist.
Sudharman-Sadṛisată of jivas could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of ghata produced from earth.
Bhagavana If sadris'ya exists even in absence of Karman there will be akritāgama (i. e., springing up of the un-accomplished object), as well as kritanās'a (i. e. destruction of the accomplished object). Thus, the existence of Karman itself is denied. When there is no Karman, how can the parabhava exist? And when the existence of parabhava is denied, the existence of sadrisya between two bhavas will automatically be denied.
Sudharman--The existence of bhavantura could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of lifeless objects when Kārya and kārana are the same.
Bhagavāna: In that case, Sudharman' the production, as well as, the destruction of bhavatara will also be nişkarana. Consequently, the practice of austerities, munificence, and vows etc. would be good-for-nothing, as bhaväntara will not depend upon those actions, and all people-whether doing good or bad deeds-will have the same prototype life. Moreover, you should also take the visadṛis'ya or dissimilarity of various jivas from each other to be niskāraşaka like bhavantara For, like bhavantara, there is kāraṇābhava in case of vaisadris'ja also.

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291 कम्माभावे वि मई को दोसो होज सभावोऽयं । जह कारणाणुरूंध घडाइ कजं सहावेणं ॥ २३७॥ (१७८५) Kammābhāvé vi mai ko doso hojja jai sabhāvo'yami Jaha kāraṇāņurūvam ghadāi kajjam sahāvéņam 1123711 (1785) [कर्माभावेऽपि मति. को दोषो भवेत् यदि स्वभावोऽ यम् ।
यथा कारणानुरूपं घटादि कार्य स्वभावेन ॥ २३७ ।। (१७८५) Karmābhavépi matil ko duso bhavét yadi svabliāvo'yam Yathā kāraṇānurūpa ghatādi kāryam svabhāvéna 11237.1 (1785)
__Tran. 237 Again, the opponent inight believe that (the kārzu could be brought about even in absence of Kryman. What objection would arise if it were its very nature as in the case of kāryas like ghata etc., which bear natural resemblance with their karanas ? (1785)
टीका-अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिः स्याद् यदुत-कर्माभावेऽपि यदि भवसद्भावरूपः स्वभाव एवायं भवेत् तहि को दोषः स्यात् ?--विनापि कर्म पदि स्वभावादेव भवः स्यात् तर्हि किं दूषणं भवेत् ? -न किश्चिदित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तमाह-यथा कर्म विनापि मृत्पिण्डिादिकारणानुरूपं घटादि कार्य स्वस्वभावेनैवोत्पद्यमानं दृश्यते, तथा सामाणिजन्मपरम्परारूपो भवोऽपि स्वभावादेन भविष्यति । अत्रोच्यते-ननु धटोऽपि न स्वभावतः एव जायते, कर्तृ-करणाद्यपेक्षित्वात् तस्य । ततश्वेहापि कर्तुरात्मनः पारभविकस्य च शरीरादिकायस्थ करणं संभाव्यते, तच्च कर्तृ-कार्याभ्यां भिनं लोकेऽपि दृश्यते, कुलाल-घटाभ्यां चक्रादिवत्, यच्चेदात्मनः शरीरादि कार्य कुर्वतः करणं वत् कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्व । स्यादेतत्, घटादेः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् भवन्तु कुलालादयः कर्तारः, शरीरादि कार्य त्वमादिविकारवत् स्वभावतोऽपि भविष्यति, ततो न कर्मसिद्धिः। तदयुक्तम्, यतो न स्वाभाविकं शरीरादि, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवदिति । किञ्च "कारणानुरूपमेव कार्यम्।" इत्येवं यत् परभवे सादृश्यं त्वयाऽभ्युपगम्यते, तदपि स्वभाववादिनस्तवाभ्रादि.

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[ The fifth विकारदृष्टान्ते परिहीयते, अभ्रादिविकारस्य स्वकारणभूतपुद्गलद्रव्यादतिfaamuafafa 11 239 II (1964) 11
D. C.-Sudharnan:-- Just as, it is by virtue of their svabhāva that .objects like ghata etc. are produced as a natural result of their respective karanas but without the help of karman, the bhavāntara is also produced by virtue of its own svabhāva even in absence of Karman.
Bhagavāna—Kāryas like ghata, o Sudharmani could never be produced merely by virtue of their svabhūva, but they have to depend upon karta and karana also. So, in the production of Sarira also, kartā and kūrana are of primary importance. This leads us to believe that in the production of bhavāntara, alman which is different from body, is the kırta, and Karman, the kāraga, just as potter is tne kartā, and chakra etc. act as kāranas, when ghata is produced.
Sudharman:-Since kāryas like ghata are direcily apprehensible, potter and chakra etc. may respectively be taken as their kartā and kārapas. But kāryas like s'arîra in bhavāntara are produced naturally like the multi-coloured changes in clouds etc. It is not therefore, possible to seek Karman as a käraņa, in the production of bhavantara.
Bhagavāna :-Your argument is totally unfounded. Käryas like s'arira etc. are not svābhāvika because they have a beginning, as well as, a definite akāra like ghata. You have taken the other life to be the same as this, because, according to you, Kārya is exactly similar to kārana. But this principle of sadçis'atā is not applicable in case of abhrādivikāras, as they are peculiarly different from the objects having definite ākāra.
Moreover, होज सहावो वत्थु निकारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? । जह वत्थु णस्थि तओऽणुवलद्धीओ खपुष्पं व ॥ २३८ ।। (१७८६)

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अच्चतमणुवद्धो वि अह तओ अस्थि नत्थि किं कम्मं ।
हेऊ व तदत्थिते जो नणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥ २३९ ॥ (१७८७)
293
कम्मस्स वाभिहाणं होज सहावो त्ति होउ को दोसो । निचं व सो सभावो सरिसो एत्यं च को हेऊ ? ।। २४० ॥ (१७८८)
Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāraṇaya va vatthudhammo vā ? Jaha vatthum natthi tao'ņuvaladdhĵo khapupyham vā ||238||| Accantamaņuvaladho vi aha tao atthi kim kammam Heū va tadtthitté jo nanu kammassa vi sa éva || 239 || ( 1787 )
Kammassa väbhihāṇam hojja sahāvo tti hou ko doso i Niccam va so sabhavo sariso éttham ca ko héû? #240 (1788)
[ मत्रेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुवर्मो का ? | यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ २३८ ॥ (१७८६) अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म । हेतु तदस्वित्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव २३९ ॥ (१७८७) कर्मणो वाभिधानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः । नित्यं वा स स्वमात्रः सदृशोऽत्र च को हेतुः ? ।। २४० ॥ (१७८८)
Bhavét svabavo vastu niṣkāraṇatā vā vastudharmo vā ? | Yadi vastu nāsti sako'nupalabdheh khapuspamiva ॥ 238|| ( 1786)
Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nästi kim karma Hetu r-vā tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva || 239 ॥ ( 1787) Karmaņo väbhidhānam bhavet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko doṣaḥ i Nityam vā sa svabhāvah sad! iśo 'tra ca ko hetur ? 240 (1788 ) ]
Trans. - 238-239-240 Is (that) svabhāva, a (definite ) object, or causelessness ( itself), or property of an object ? If it is ( taken as) a ( definite) object, it is not ( so), because it is nonperceptible like a kha-puşba. In spite of its being non-preceptible if it exists, why should not Karman exist?

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[The fifth
The hétu that (works) in its existence, (works) in case of Karman also. (Or), what objection ( would arise ), if svabhāva becomes a synonym of Karman, and what is the hétu (in believing) that svabhāva is always the same? (1786-1787-1788)
टीका - एतद् गाथात्रयमपि प्रायः प्रागेव व्याख्यातार्थम्, नवरं " निश्चं " इत्यादि तृतीयगाथोत्तरार्धम् । इदमत्र हृदयम् - स स्वभावो नित्यं सदृश एव त्वयाऽभ्युपगतन्तव्यः, भवान्तरे सहय्येव मनुष्यादिमवस्य जननात्, तस्य च स्वभावस्य नित्यं सदृशत्वे को हेतुः ? | न कश्चिदित्यभिप्रायः । स्वभावत एवायं स्वभावः सदृश इति चेत् । ननु भवविसदृशतायामप्येतद् वक्तुं शक्यत एवेति ॥ २३८-२३९ २४० ।। (१७८६ - १७८७-१७८८) ।।
D. C.-The point is that since you have taken svabhāva to be the same for ever, as the same life is repeated in various bhavas you should state the reason for its nutyasadrisatā. You might say that there is no hétu as such, as nityasadris'a by virtue of its own self. For, the same argument could be advanced in case of vaisadṛisya of the bhavas as well.
And,
सो मुक्तोऽमुक्तो वा जइ मुत्तो तो न सव्वहा सरिसो ।
परिणामओ पयं पिव न देहहेऊ जइ अमुत्तो || २४१ ॥ (१७८९)
उनगरणाभावाओ न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि ।
कज्जस्स मुत्तिमत्ता सुहसंवित्तादिओ 'चेव ॥ २४२ ॥ (१७९०)
So mutto'mutto va jai mutto to na savvahā sariso Parināmao payam piva na dehaheū jai amutto | 241 (1789 )
Uvagaraṇābhāvão na ya havai Suhamma! so amutto vi Kajjassa muttimatta suhasamvittādio céva 2420 (1790)
[ स मूर्तीमूर्ती वा यदि मूर्तस्वतो न सर्वथा सदृशः ।
परिणामतः पय इव न देह हेतुर्यद्यपूर्तः ॥ २४१ ।। (१७८९)

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Ganadharavāda उपकरणाभावाद् न च भवति सुधर्मन् ! सोऽभूतौऽपि ।
कार्यस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वात् सुखसंविच्यादितश्चैव ।। २४२ ॥ (१७९०) Sa mūrto mūrto va yadi mūrtastato na sarvathā sadriśaḥı Parinamatah paya iva na dehahetu r-yadyamittah 02410 (1789)
Upak araņābhāvād na ca bhavati Sudharman! so'mürto'pi) Kāryasya mūrtimattvād suk hasamvittyāditascaiva 124211 (1790)]
Trans.-241-242. Is that (srabhāva), miirta or a-mairta ? If mürta, it is not at all sad'ırsa on account of its (having a pariņāma as in the case of milk. And, if it is a-mirta, o Sudharman ! even that a-nürta svabhiva does not become the cause of body in ahsence of instruments, as well as, on account of the corporeal nature of Kārza indicated) by the perception of happiness etc: (1789-1790)
टीका-व्याख्या-स स्वभावो मूर्तः, अमृतॊ वा ?। यदि मूर्तः, तर्हि कर्मणा सह तस्य को विशेषः ? संज्ञान्तरमात्रविशिष्टकमैवेत्थमुक्तं स्यादिति । न चासौ सर्वदैव सदृशो युज्यते, परिणामित्वात् . दुग्धादिवत् । अथवा, भूतत्वादेवाभ्रादिविकावदिति । अथामूर्तोऽसौ स्वभावः, तर्हि नैष देहादीनामारम्भकः, अनुपकरणत्वात् , दण्डादि विकलकुलालवत्. अमूर्तत्वादेव वा, आकाशवत् । 'न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि ति” किञ्च, सुधर्मन् ! इतोऽपि स स्वभावोऽमूर्तों न युक्तः, शरीरादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तिमत्त्वात् । न ह्यम्र्तस्य नभस इव मूर्त कार्यमुपजायते । तथा, सुख-संवित्यादेश्व नायममूर्तः। इदमुक्तं भवति-कर्म तावद् भवता नेष्यते, स्वभाववादित्वात् । ततश्च शरीरादीनि, सुख-दुःखसंविच्यादीनि च स्वभावस्यैव कार्याण्येष्टव्यानि, तस्य चामूर्तत्वे नेतान्युपपद्यन्ते। ततो यथा द्वितीयगणधरवादे कार्यस्य मूतत्वात्, मुखसंवित्यादेश्च कर्मणो मूर्तत्वं साधितम्. तथेह स्वभावस्यापि तत् साधनीयम् । तथा च प्रागुक्तम् -
आह नणु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कज्जमुत्तिमत्ताओ। इह जह मुत्तत्तणओ घडस्स परमाणवो मुत्ता ॥१॥

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[The fifth तह मुहसंवित्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुब्भवाओ य ।
बज्मवलाहाणाओ परिणामाओ य विष्णेयं ॥ २॥ इति ॥ २४१-२४२ ॥ (१७८९-१७९०) ।
D. C.-Consider whether svabhava is mtirta or a-marta If it is mürta, svabhāra will be nothing but a synonym of Karman. Moreover, the property of adris'ata will never be applied if svabhava, is mūsta, because like milk, or like the murta clouds having a number of forms, svabkõva will also possess a number of pariņamas.
If svab härr is - notre then also, like kars'a it does not become the hétre of sai ira because of the absence of upkarrpas. Secondly, an incorporeal käruņa can neven produce a corporeal karya. So, szabkaaz--should not be called a-miirta when the kāryas of svabhāvu such as the percerption of saikha, duḥkha etc. are mitrtai
Now the second alternative viz. that svabhāva is nişkaranata is discussed--
अहवाऽकारणउ च्चिय सभावओ तोवि मरिसया कत्तो। किमकारणओ न भवे विसरिसया किं व विच्छती ॥ २४३ ॥ १७९१) Ahava’kāraṇau cciya sabhāva. tovi sarisayx katto i Kimakārana«, na bhavé visarisayı kim va vicchitti 124311 (1791)
[अथवाऽकारणत एव स्वभावतस्ततोऽपि सदृशता कुतः। किमकारणतो न भवेद् विसदृशता किंवा विच्छित्तिः ॥२४३॥ (१७९१)
Athava'kāranata eva svabāvatastato'pi sadriấata kutah Kimakāranato na bhaved visadrisata kim vā vicchittih ? 124311
Trans.--243 Or, if (bhavíriture is produced) by virtue of svabhava (and) without any reason, whence is sadrasatā
+ Vide verses 1625, 1626.

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297 (to be found. ? (And) why (should not dissimilarity take place without reason ? and why not destruction also ? (1791)
टीका-अथ स्वभावत एव भवोत्पत्तिरित्यत्र " अकारणत एव" इत्ययमोंऽभिप्रेतः, “तो वि ति" तथापि हन्त ! परभवे सदृशता कुतः ? । कोऽभिप्रायः ? । इत्याह-यथाऽकारणतः सदृशता भवति, तथा किमित्यकारणतः एव विसदृशता न स्यात ?। अकस्माच्चाकारणतो भवविच्छित्तिः कस्माद् न स्यात् ? अकस्माच्च भवन् स्वरविषाणादिरपि भवेत् । शरीरादीनां चाकारणतो भवतामभ्रादीनामिव प्रतिनियताकारत्वादिरूपता न स्यात् । तस्माद् नाकारणता स्वभाव इति ।। २४३ ॥ (१७९१)॥ .
D: C-Sadris'ată of bhavāniara cannot be established even if you believe that it is produced without reason. For, just as sadşis'atā is taken to have been produced without reason, vi-sadxis atā will also take place without reason. Similarly, destruction of bhava will also take place without any reason, and following the same procedure, a non-existent object like kharavişāna will also come into existence without any reason. Moreover, objects like s'arira etc. will lose their definite shape and such other characteristics on account of their resemblance with abhra-vikāra, inasinuch as they are produced without reason. Hence, it is not possible to believe svabhāva as nişkāraṇatā itself.
Taking the third alternative viz. that svabhāva is vastudharma, the author states :
अहव सहावो धम्मो वत्थुस्स, न सो वि सरिसओ निछ । उप्पाय-हिइ-भंगा चित्ता जं वत्थुपज्जाया ।। २४४ ।। (१७९२) Ahava sahāyo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao niccamı Uppāya-tthii-bhanga citta jam vatthupajjāya ॥ 244 ॥ ( 1792) [अथवा स्वभावो धर्मों वस्तुनः, न सोऽपि सदृशको नित्यम् ।
उत्पाद-स्थिति-भङ्गाश्चित्रा यद् वस्नुपर्यायाः ॥ २४४ ।। (१७९२) 38

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[ The fifth Athava svabhāvo charmo vastunaḥ na so'pi sadrisako nityam Utpada-sthiti-bhangāscitrā yad vastuparyāyāh ॥ 244 ॥ ( 1792 ) ]
Trans-244 Or, if svabhāva is a property of an object that also will not be always the same. Because, the paryayas of production, retention and destruction of an object are distinct ( from each other ). ( 1792 )
टीका - अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावः, सोऽपि सर्वदैव सदृशो न घटते, इति कथं सर्वदैव शरीरादीनां सदृशतां जनयेत् । कथं पुनरस्य सदैव सदृशता न घटते 2 इत्याह-" उप्पायेत्यादि " यद् यस्मादुत्पाद-स्थिति- भङ्गादयश्चित्रा वस्तुपर्यायाः, न च ते सदैवाऽवस्थितसादृश्याः, नीलादीनां वस्तुधर्माणां प्रत्यक्ष एवान्यान्यरूपतया परिणतिदर्शनात्। विश्व वस्तुधर्मोऽसौ भवस्वभाव आत्मधर्मो वा स्यात्, पुलधर्मो वा ? | यद्यात्मधर्मः, तहिं नासौ शरीरादीनां कारणम्, अमूर्तत्वात् आकाशादिवत् । अथ पुलधर्मः, तहि कर्मैवासौ, कर्मणोऽपि हि पुद्गलास्तिकायधर्मत्वेनास्माभिरभ्युपगतत्वा दिवि ॥ २४४ ॥ (१५९२) ॥
"
D. C.-Svablava will not be the same throughout even if you believe that it is a vastudharma. Hence, it is not possible to maintain for ever the sādyisya of sarira etc. also. For, the three stages of production, existence and destruction are not always the same in case in case of a single object. Distinction of properties in case of black objects is easily perceived
atman or
Secondly, is this vastudharma, a dharma of the a dharma of the pudgala? If it is the property of atman it can never become the cause of s'arira etc For it will be a-mūrta like ākās'a in that case. On the other hand, if this vastudharma is the property of a pudgain, then it will become the Karman itself, as Karman is nothing but a pudgaladharma itself.
कम्मस्स वि परिणामो सुहम्म ! धम्मो स पोग्गलमयस्य ।
हेऊ चिनो जगओ होइ सहावो त्ति को दोसो ? || २४५ ।। (१७९३)

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299 Kammassa vi parinamo Suhamına ! dhammo sa poggalamayassa i Héū citto jagai hoi sahāvo tti ko doso ? 1124511 (1793) [कर्मणोऽपि परिणामः सुधर्मन् ! धर्म स पुद्गलमयस्य ।
हेतुश्चित्रो जगतो भवति स्वभाव इति को दोषः ।। २४५ ॥ (१७९३) Karmano'pi parināmaḥ Sudharman | Dharma sa pudgalamayasya , Hetuscitro jagalo bhavati svabhāva iti ko dosah | 245 ।। ( 1793)]
Trans -- 245 0 Sudharman' That (svabhāva ), being the pariņāmz of Karnian composed of a definite body, (becomes) its dharma also. (And), vhat is wrong if svabhäva is taken as the varitable cause of the (entire mundane) world ? (1793)
on (195) टीका-मुधर्मन् ! असौ वस्तुधर्मों भवत्स्वभावी धर्मों भवतु, को दोपः ?- कश्चित्, युक्तियुक्तत्वात् । किं विशिष्टो धर्म: ? इत्याहपरिणामः । कस्य ?। कर्मणः। कर्थभूतस्य ? । पुनलमयस्य । कयंभूतो यः कर्मपरिणामः ?। इत्याह-हेतुः । कस्य ?। जगतः-जगद्वैचित्र्यस्य । कदेवं कर्मलक्षगस्य वस्तुनः कर्मपरिणामरूगो धर्मों भवति स्वभावः, नात्र काचिद् दोषापत्तिः । अस्माकमपि संमतोऽयमर्थः, केवलं सर्वदा सहयोऽसौ न भवति, किन्तु चित्रो मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुवैविच्याद् विचित्रो विविधस्वभावः । अतो न तस्मात् परभवे सादृश्यमेव, किन्तु विचित्ररूपतेति ॥ २४५ ॥ (१७९३)।
D. C-0 Sudharmean ! Since svabhava has been taken as a vastu-dharma, it may be taken as a dharmı of the pudg alavraya Karman also. So, there is no objection in admitting svabhāva as the parināma of ricra karmin, and hence as the hétu of universal vicitratā also.
In other words, it is due to the nature of the vicitra Karman that this world is full of varieties. The only point to remember in this case, is that it is not always the same, but it is full of varieties on account of various hétus such as vanity, hostility etc.

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[The fifth अहवा सव्वं वत्थु पइक्खणं चिय सुहम्म ! धम्महिं।। संभवह वेह केहि वि केहि वि तदवस्थमचंतं ॥ २४६ ॥ (१७९४) तं अप्पणो वि सरिसं न पुन्वधम्मेहिं पच्छिमिलाणं । सयलस्स तिहुअगस्स च सरिसं सामण्णधम्मेहिं ॥ २४७ ॥ (१७९५) Ahavā savvam vatthum paikkhaṇam ciya Suhamma | dhammehimi Sambhavai véha kéhi vi kéhi vi tadavatthamaccantam ||24611 Tam appaņo vi sarisam na puvvadhainmehim pacchimillānam Sayalassa tihuanassa ca sarisam sāmaņpadhamméhim 1124711 (1795) [अथवा सर्व वस्तु प्रतिक्षणमेव मुधर्मन् ! धर्मैः ।
संभवति व्येति कैरपि कैरपि तदवस्थमत्यन्तम् ॥ २४६ ॥ (१७९४) तदात्मनोऽपि सदृशं न पूर्वधर्मैः पाश्चात्यानाम् ।
सकलस्य त्रिभुवनस्य च सदृशं सामान्यधर्मैः ॥ २४७॥ (१७९५) Athavā sarvam vastu pratiksanameva Sudharman 1 dharmaiḥ 1 Sambhavati vyėti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam 124611]
radātmano'pi sadrisam na pūrvadharmaiḥ päścātyānām Sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadộisam sāmānyadharmaiḥ 112471]
Trans.-246-247. O Sudharman ! at every single moment, each and every object of the Universe) is being produced, destroyed, or retained by (virtue of) some property or the other. So, none of them) has its former properties similar to the latter omes. On the other hand, by virtue of (certain common properties, all the three worlds are similar. (1794-1795)
टीका-व्याख्या-अथवा, सुधर्मन् ! किमेक एव परमवः ?, सर्वमेव हि घट-पटादिकं भुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु कैश्चित् पूर्वपर्याये। समाना--ऽसमानपर्यायः प्रतिक्षणमुत्पद्यते, कैश्चित् पुनरुत्तरपर्यायः समाना-ऽसमानपर्यायैयेति न्युपरमति, कैश्चित्तु तदवस्थमेवास्ते । ततश्चैवं सति तदस्त्वात्मनोऽपि पूर्वपूर्वधमैं

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301 रुत्तरोत्तरधर्माणां न सदृशम्, किं पुनरन्यवस्तुनाम् ?; सामान्यधर्मंस्तु सर्वस्यापि त्रिभुवनस्य समानम्, किं पुनरेकस्यैव निजपूर्वजन्मनः ? इति ।। २४६-।। २४७॥ (१७९४-१७९५) ।।
D. C.-Not only the bhavrintaru, o Sudhurman ! but each and every object (like ghata and pata) in this Universe, is being produced, destroyed, or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar paryā yas. But, on the other hand, all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently, a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both. को सबहेव सरिसा असरिसेा वा इहभवे परभवे वा ?। सरिसासरिसं सव्वं निञ्चानिचाइरूवं च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६) ko savvaheva sariso asariso vā ihabhave parabhave vā? Sarisäsarisam savvam niccaniccāırūvam ca 124811 (1796) [कः सर्वथैव सदृशोऽसदृशो वेहमवे परभवे वा।
सदशासदृशं सर्व नित्यानित्यादिरूपं च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६) Kah sarvathaiva sadşiśo'sadrišo vehabhave parabhave vă ?, Sadrisasadrisam sarvam nityānityadirupam ca ||2481 (17961]
__Trans.--248 What (object) is (taken as) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life ? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. (1796)
टीका-को बर्थोऽर्थान्तरैरात्मना वा सहेहभवेऽपि सर्वथा सशोऽदशी वा, किं पुनः परभवे ? । तस्मात् सर्वमपि वस्तु सर्वेणापि सह समानाऽसमानरूपमेवेहभवेऽपि, इति कुनः परभवे सादृश्ममेव पतिज्ञायते भवता? इति भावः । तथा, सर्वमपि नित्या-ऽनित्याधनन्तधर्मात्मकमिति ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६)॥

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[ The fifth D. C.-It is not possible to find an object which is similar or dissimilar to other objects or even to itself even in this life, and much less in the other.
All objects are found to be similar, as well as, dissimilar to other objects even in this life. So, it is no use holding the view that they are the same in the other life also. Similarly, all objects have permanent, as well as, transitory forms.
This idea is illustrated by an example stated belowजह नियएहिं वि. सरिसो न जुवा भुवि बाल-धुड्ढधम्महिं । जगओ वि समा सत्ताइएहिं तह परभवे जीवा।। २४९ ॥ (१७९७) Jaha niyaéhim vi sariso na juvā bhuvi bāla -viiddhadhammehimi Jagao vi samo sattaiehim taha parobhave jivo ॥ 249 ॥ ( 1797 ) [यथा निजकैरपि सहशो न युवा भुवि बाल-वृद्धधर्मः।
जगतोऽपि समः सत्तादिकैस्तथा परमवे जीवः ॥ २४९ ।।(१७९७) Yathä nijakairapi sadriso na yuvā bhuvi bāla-vriddhadharmrihi Jagato'pi samah sattădikatstathā parabhuvu jivah 112 194 (1797,1
Trans.--249 Just as a young inan does not resemble his own past and future forms of childhood and old age respectively on (this) earth, but at the same time resembles the whole of earth on account of the property of existing etc, in the same way, jiva, too, becomes similar, as well as, dissimilar in the other life. (1797)
टीका-यह युवा निजैरप्यतीता-ऽनागाल-वृद्धादिपर्याय-रात्मनोऽपि सर्वथा न समानः, सत्तादिभिस्तु सामान्यपर्याय गति न केनचिद् न समानः, तथायपि जीव: परलोकं गतः सर्वेणापि सह समाना-ऽसमान. रूप एव, इति कुतः सर्वथा सादश्यम् ? इति ॥२४९।। (१७९७)
D. C.-Just as a young man does not resemble his own forms of childhood and old age, but at the same time resembles

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all other objects in this world on account of certain common properties like the quality of existing etc., in the same way. Jît as in the other life, are not merely similar but dissimilar to other objects also.
Moreover,
मणुओ देवीभृओ सरिसा सप्ताह एहि जगओवि ।
देवाईहि विसरिसे। निश्चानिदो वि एमेव ॥ २५० ॥ ( १७९८ )
Maquo dévibhuo sariso sattālehim jagaö vi
Dévathi visariso niccánicco vi émeva || 250 ( 1798 )
[ मनुजो देवीभूतः सदृशः सत्तादिकैर्जगतोऽपि ।
देवत्व दिशो नित्यानित्योऽप्येवमेव ॥ २५० ॥ ( १७९८)
Manujo devibhutaḥ sadṣiśaḥ sattādikair-jagato`pi | Déva(tv a)dibhir-vis adriśo nityānityo'pyevameva ||250|| (1798)]
Trans-250 A divine man resembles the whole of mundane world on account of (properties like) existence etc. and is distinguished (from it) as well by means of (his) state of being a deity etc. In the same way, (he) is permanent and at the same time transitory also. (1798 )
सदृश,
1
टीका- मनुष्यो मृत्वा देवत्वमापन जगत्त्रयस्यापि सत्तादिभिः पर्यायैः देवत्वादिभिस्तु विसदृशः, इति नैकान्तेक कापि सदृशता । तथा, द्रव्यतयाsसौ नित्यः, पर्यायतया त्वनित्य इत्याद्यपि वक्तव्यम् । अत्राहनवस्माभिरपि नैकान्तेन परभवे सादृश्यमभ्युपगम्यते किन्तु समानजात्यन्वयमात्रमेवेष्यते, पुरुषादिर्मृतः पुरुषादिरेव भवतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम्, कर्मजनितो हि परभव इति साधितम् । तच्च मिथ्वासादिविचित्रहेतुजन्यत्वाद् विचित्रमेवेति, अतस्तज्जन्यः परभवो विचित्र एव युभ्यते, न तु समानजात्यन्वयः सिध्यतीति ।। २५० ।। (१७९८) ॥
D C A person who becomes déva after death, resembles all the three worlds, on account of the common characteristics

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[The fifth
like existence etc but at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his dévalva etc. This shows that absolute sadris'ata is not acceptible but visadris'ata has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are nitya on account of their dravyatva, and, at the same time, a-nitya because of their varied transformations
Sudharman:-I accept sadṛśata of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, purusa turns out to be a purusa and animals remain as animals in the bhaväntara.
Bhagavana :-Your argument, O Sudharman is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various hetus such as mithyatua etc. Hence, bhavantara which is produced by these actions should also be taken as vicitrata on account of the vicitrata of actions, but sadris'ată can never fit in by means of their relation to the sadris'a gender etc.
For,
उरिसा - saकरिसा न समाणाए वि जेण जाईए ।
सरिसग्गाहे जम्हा दाणाइफलं विहा तम्हा || २५१ || (१७९९)
Ukkarisä-'vakkarisā na samanãe vi jéna jāiél Sarisäggahé jamhā dāṇāiphalam viḥā tamhā #251 (1799)
[ उत्कर्षा - पकर्षो न समानायामपि येन जातौ ।
सदृशग्रहे यस्माद् दानादिफलं दृथा तस्मात् ।। २५१ ।। (१७९९)
Utkarṣā-'pakarṣau na samānāyāmpı yena jātau
Sadrisagrahe yasmād dānādiphalam vṛithā tasmāt 251 (1799)]
Trans.-251 In will be no scope for)

case of) (absolute) sameness, there elevation or degradation even in the

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305 same genesis, (and ) the fruits of munificence etc. will become futile. (1799)
टीका-सहशग्रहे समानजातीयताग्रहे सति समानायामपि जातो येन यस्मादीश्वर-दरिद्र-कुलीना-ऽकुलीनादिरूपेणोत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षों न घटांपाश्चतः। यो हि यादृश इहमवे, स यदि परभवेऽपि ताश एव, तहिं य इहभवे ईश्वरः स परमवेऽपि तादृश एव, एवं दरिद्रादिष्वपि वाच्यम् । ततश्चेहमवात् परभवे सर्वप्रकारैरप्युत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षों न स्याताम् . किन्वेकान्तसहसतैव भवेत् । "तम्ह ति" तस्माद् मोक्तव्योऽयं सादृश्यग्रह इति प्रक्रमाद् द्रष्टव्यम् । अथेत्यमाचक्षीया:-मा भूतामुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षों, का नो हानिः ? इत्याह"जम्हा दाणाइफलं विह ति"चकारस्य गम्यमानत्वाद् यस्मात्थं परत्रोत्कर्षाऽपकर्षयोरभावे दानादिफलं वृथा संपद्यते । लोको हि परत्र देवादिसमृदिप्राप्त्याऽऽत्मन उत्कर्षार्थ दानादिपतिं विदधाति । यदि चोक्तयुक्त्योत्कर्षाचभावाद् दरिद्रो दान-तप-तीर्थावगाहनायपि कृत्वाऽमुत्र दरिद्र एव स्यात्, तहिं क तदानादिफलम् ! इत्यपाधिका दानादौ प्रवृत्तिः, तस्माद् न विधेयः सादृश्यग्रह इति ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)॥
D. C.--If you believe in absolute sameness, there will be no scope either for elevation or for degration even in the same genesis. One, who is rich in this life will remain rich in the next life also in spite of his sinful actions, and a poor man will remain poor in the next life, even if he performs benevolent duties such as dana, tapas, tirtha-snāna etc. according to your belief of absolute sadộis'atā. Thus, there will be no reward of either good or evil actions, but the same type of life will go on throughout all the blavas. So, if there is no utkarşı or apakarsa in the next life, there will be no utility for various benevolent actions such as munificence, austerities, ablations in holy waters etc., to be followed by people for the attainment of Vevatva etc. To believe in absolute sadçis'atā is, therefore, inot' proper. 251. (1799).
And the Védapadas will also be wrong if absolute sālsis'ya is accepted
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जं च सिगालो वह एस जायए वेयविहियमिच्चाई | सग्गीयं जं च फलं तमसंबद्धं सरिसयाए ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००)
Jam ca sigalo vai ésa jayae Véyavihiyamiccaăim Saggiyam jam ca phalam tamasanbaddham sarisayae || 252 ॥ ( 1800)
[ यच्च शृगाळो वै एष जायते वेदविहितमित्यादि ।
स्वर्गीयं यच्च फलं तदसंबद्धं सदृशतायाम् ।। २५२ ।। (१८००)
[ The sixth
Yacca śrigālo vai esa jāyate Vedavihitamityādi i Svargiyam yacca phalam tadasambaddham sadriśatāyam || 252 ]
Trans. - 252 Statements of Vedas such as Srigalo vaz esa jayate" etc., as well as, the reward of heaven laid down 1 by Dédas, will prove iuconsistent in ( case of) sadrisuta (being admitted). (1800)
"4
टीका - यह " शृगालो वै एष जायते यः सपुरीषो दद्यते " इत्यादि वेदविहितं तदपि परमत्रसदृशताग्रहेऽसंबद्धमेव स्यात्, पुरुषादेरमुत्र शृगालतयानुपपत्तेः । तथा, यदपि " अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्, स्वर्गकामः " तथा, " अग्निष्टोमेन यमराज्यममिजयति" इत्यादिकं स्वर्गीयफलमुचकत्वात् स्वर्गीयं फलं तदप्यसंबद्धं भवेत्, मनुष्यस्य त्वदभिप्रायेण देवत्वानुपपत्तेरिति । "पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशत्रः पशुत्वम्" इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानामयमर्थ कोऽपि पुरुषः खल्विह जन्मनि प्रकृत्या भद्रको विनीतः सानुक्रोशोऽमत्सरथ मनुष्यनाम - गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्धा मृतः सन् पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, न तु नियमेन सर्व एव अन्यस्यान्यकर्मत्रशगस्यान्यथाप्युत्पत्तेः । एवं पशवोऽपि केचिद् मायादिदोषवशात् पशुनामकगोत्रे कर्मणी बद्ध्वा परभवे पशवो जायन्ते, न तु सर्वेऽपि नियमेन कर्मापेक्षित्वाज्जीवगवेरिति । तदेवं तस्यापि च्छिन्नः संशयः ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००) ||

D. C.-If it is admitted, O blessed Suduarman! that the next life is exactiy similar to this life, the sentences of Védas such as "" Śrigalo vai esa jāyatê yaḥ sa-puriṣo dahyatė ' etc; which tell us that one who is burnt along with foeces becomes fox
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307 in the next life, wili turn to be inconsistent. For, according to you, a man should become a man only in the next life. Secondly, sentences like " agnihotram juhuyāl svõrgakāmaḥ " and "agnistoména yamarājamabhujayati” which lay down the conditions for the attainment of swarga, will also become inconsistent, because a man does never become deity according to your theory of sadristā.
The real interpretation of puruso vai puruşatvamaşnuté pas'avaḥ pas'utvam" etc. is this :-A person who is pious, cultured, and self-less, attains the genesis of man when he dies away after having attached his actions to the human name and lineage. But that does not mean that all puruşas attain puruşatva as a rule, By virtue of different types of actions, people are liable to be born in an absolutely different genesis also. The same is the case with animals. On account of certain faults like illusion etc. certain animals remain as animals when they pass away in the next life, having attached their actions to the name and lineage of animals. But all paśus do not attain pasutva as a rule because their movement from one bhava to another depends upon their actions.
Thus,
छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुकेणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ।। २५३ ॥ (१८०१) Chinnammi samsayammi Jimena jarā-marapavippyamukkepam So samaño pavvalo pancahim saha khandiyasathim 1125311 (1801)
Trans.--253 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint (Sudharman) accepted dìksā along with his five hundred pupils. ( 1801 )
End of the Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara.

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Chapter VI
षष्ठगणधरवक्तव्यता।
Discussion with the Sixth Gayadhara
ते पवईए सोउं मंडिओ आगच्छह जिणसगासं। वामिण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२)
Te pavvaie so um Mandio agacchai Jiņasagāsam i Vaccāmi ga vandāmi yanditta pajjuvāsāmi 125411 (1802) [तान् मनजितान् श्रुत्वा मण्डिक आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे बन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २५४ ॥ (१८०२) Tān pravrajitān śrutvā Manļika āgacchati Jinasakāšam i Vrajami vande variditva paryupase ॥254n (1802)]
Tráns.-254 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Mandika comes belore the Tirthankara. (He thinks):I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1802) . टीका-व्याख्या पूर्ववत् नवरं मण्डिको नाम पष्ठो द्विजोपाध्यायः श्रीमबिनसकाशमागच्छतीति ।। २५४ ॥ (१८०२)
DC.-Now the sixth Ganadhara named Mandika, comes before the Tirthankara and starts discussion.
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुकणं । नामेणं य गोतेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ २५५ ॥ (१८०३)

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309 Ābhattho ya Jinéņam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkéņam | Nāméņam ya gotréņa ya savvaņņū savvadarisi ņain 11 2551L (1803) [ आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। २५५ ।। (१८०३) Ābhāşitaśca Jinéna jāti-jarā-marasavipramukténa i Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina ||2551 (1803)
Trans.—255 He was addressed by his name, and lineage by the T'îrthaikara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete darśana (undifferentiated knowledge.) (1803)
The Tirthaikara then said
किं मन्ने बंध-मोक्खा संति न संति त्ति संसओ तुज्झं । बेयपयाण य अत्यं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो । २५६ ॥ (१८०४) Kim manne bandha-mokkhā santi na santi tti samsao tujjhami Véyapayāņa ya attham na yāṇasî tésimo attho 11 256 (1804)
[किं मन्यसे बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थे न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ।। २५६ ॥ (१८०४) Kim manyasé bandha-mokşau sto na sta iti samsayastava i Védapadānām cārtham na jānāsi téşāırayamarthah (12561 (1804)
Trans.--256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether bandha (wordly bondages) and mokşa (Final Liberation), exits or not. But (ca), you do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of V'édas. Their (real) interpretation is this. (1804)
टीका-मण्डिक ! त्वमित्यं मन्यसे-किं बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितस्तव संशयः, विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनत्वाव, तथाहि-"स फ्ष विगुणो विभुन बध्यते संसरवि वा, न मुच्यते मोचयति वा, न वा एष बासमभ्यन्तरं वा वेद " इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि, तथा, “न ह वै सशरीरस्य

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[ The sixth
प्रिया - sयियोर पहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृशतः इत्यादीनि च । एतेषां चार्थ त्वं न जानासि यतोऽयमेतदर्थस्तव चेतसि वर्तते, तद्यथा - स एषः - अधिकृतो जन्तुः, विगुणः - सच्च - रजस्-तमोगुणरहितः, विभुः - सर्वगतः, न बध्यते - पुण्य-पापाभ्यां न युज्यत इत्यर्थः, संसरति वा 'न' इत्यनुवर्तते, न मुच्यते न कर्मणा वियुज्यते, बन्धस्यैवाभावात्ः मोचयति वा नान्यम्, इत्यनेनाकर्तृकत्वमाह, न वा एष बाह्यम्आत्मभिन्नं महदहङ्कारादि, अभ्यन्तरं - निजस्वरूपमेव वेद-विजानाति, प्रकृतिधर्मत्वाज्झानस्य, प्रकृतेश्वाचेतनत्वात् । ततश्चामूनि किल बन्ध - मोक्षामावतिपादकानि । तथा, न ह वै - नैवेत्यर्थः, सशरीरस्य प्रिया - ऽप्रिययोरपतिरस्तोति - बाह्यां- ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीर संतानयुक्तत्वात् सुख-दुःखयोरवहतिः संसारिणो नास्तीत्यर्थः, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं - अमूर्तमित्यर्थः, प्रिया - ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः, तत्कारणभूतस्य कर्मणोऽभावादित्यर्थः । अमूनि च बन्ध - मोक्षाभिधायकानीति । अतः संशयः । तत्र " स एष विगुणो विभुः " इत्यादीनां नायमर्थः, किन्त्वयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ।। २५६ || (१८०४)
1
77
D. C. - 0 Mandika! You doubt the existence of bandha and mokṣa, because you have heard various Vedapadas having contradictory meanings.
"Sa éṣa viguņo vibhu r-na badhyaté samsaratı và na mucyatė mocayatı vā na vā éṣā bāhyamabhyantaram vā vēda" etc. as well as, Hike,
"Na ha var sa–śarîrasya priyā-priyayorapahatir asti, as'arîram vā vasantan priya-priye na sprs' atah etc.

You have not grasped the real meaning of these sentences. According to you, the interpretation of the first sentence, is this:—The all-pervading Soul, which being free from attributes like sattva, rajas, and tamas, is never bound by the clutches of pāpa and puŋya, nor does it proceed further. Since there is absolute bandhābhāva, this (Soul) can neither be detatched from karma, nor can it relieve the other from the bandhas.

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Canadharavada It knows neither the external attributes like pride etc. nor does it recognize its own internal self, on account of jñāna being the property of prakriti which is acetana here. So, the statements such as stated above, assert the absolute abhäva of bandha and moksa between jîva and Karma.
On the other hand, sentences, such as, "na ha vaz" etc., would mean quite the reverse (according to you). They assert that there is no abhāva of priya, and a-priya, to one having sarira, -while the a-sarîri ātman is never touched by them. Since the external, as well as, internal anādi sariras are santānayukta, the samsāri jivas are not deprived of the experiences of sukha and duḥkha, while the a-s'ariri ātman is never touched by sukha and duhkha on account of the absolute abhäva of its karana Karman. Thus, these Vedapadas are inclined to assert the existence of bandha and moksa.
Such sentences have given rise to your doubt, which is not at all proper. Your interpretation of the sentences is not correct. I, therefore, give you their real interpretation. Please listen carefully
तं मनसि जइ बंधो जोगो जीवस्स कम्मुणा समयं । yaa tos at Ph a aà 1? Il 349H (8 604) Tam mannasi jai bandho jogo jîvassa kammuṇā samayami Fuvvam paccha jivo kammam va samam va te hojjā ? 1125711 (1805)
[त्वं मन्यसे यदि बन्धो योगो जोवस्य कर्मणा समकम् ।
पूर्व पश्चाजीवः कर्म वा समं वा ते भवेताम् ? ॥ २५७ ॥ (१८०५) Tvam manyase yadi bandho yogo įîvasya karmapā samakamı Pūrvam paścājjivaḥ karma vā samam vă te bhavetām ? 1125711]
Trans.—257 If you believe that bandha is the union of jiva with Karma, will the jiva be produced first and then Karma, 2Karma be produced first, and then jiva, or both to gether? (1805)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth टीका-'वेयपयाण य' इत्यत्र चशब्दाद् युक्ति च त्वं न जानासि । कुतः ? यस्मादायुष्मन् मण्डिक ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-जीवस्य बन्धो यदि कर्मणा समकं साधं योगः संयोगोऽभिप्रेतः सं खल्वादिमान् आदिरहितो वा। ययादिमान , ततः किं पूर्व जीवः प्रमुयेत पश्चात् कर्म, पूर्व वा फर्म पश्चाजीवः प्रस्येत, समं वा युगपद् वा तौ द्वावपि प्रसूयेयाताम् ? इति पक्षत्रयमिति ॥ २५७ ॥ (१८०५)॥
D. C.If, O long-lived Mandika, you believe that bandha means the contact of jîva with Karma, consider whether that contact is ādimān or ādırahit.. If it is ūdimān there will be three alternatives: ( 1 ) Jiva will be produced first and then Karma or (2) Karma will be produced first and then jîvā or (3) both of them will be produced simultaneously.
Refuting the first alternative, the author states :न हि पुव्वमहेऊओ खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो। निकारणजायस्स य निकारणउ चिय विणासो ॥ २५८॥ (१८०६) Na hi puvvamahção kharasangam vāyasambhavo jutto Nikkāraṇajāyassa ya nikkāraṇau cciya viņāso 125811 (1806) [न हि पूर्वमहेतोः खरशृङ्गनिवात्मसंभवो युक्तः । निष्कारणजातस्य च निष्कारणक एव विनाशः ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६)
Na hi pūrvamahetoh kharassingaimvātmasambhavo yuktahi Niskaranajatasya ca niskāranaka eva vināsah | 258 ॥ ( 1806)]
Trans.-258 Like kharasringa, the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of hetu. And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also, without any cause. (1806)
टीका-"पूर्व जीवः. पश्चात्कर्म" इत्येतदयुक्तम् , यतो न कर्मणः पूर्व "खरसंगं वायसंभयो जुत्तो" खरशृङ्गस्येवात्मनः संभवो युक्तः, अहेतुकत्वात,

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Vida]
Gañadharavăda इह यदहेतुकं तद् न जायते, यथा खरशृङ्गम, यश्च जायते तद् निर्हेतुकमपि न मवति, यथा घटः, निष्कारणस्य च जातस्य निष्कारण एव विनाशः स्यादिति ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६) ॥
D. C.--According to the first alternative stated above, jiva is born first and then Karmı. Now since Karma is the hétu of jîvas, the production of jivit is totally unjustified like the production of khara-sțing i on account of its a-héta ktva. Por, that which has no hètu, is never produced like khara-sringa, and that which has already been produced is never nir-hétuka, as in case of ghata. Moreover, that which is born without any cause, has even to meet its end without any end.
Proceeding further the author arguesअहवाऽणाइ चिय सो निकारणओन कम्मजोगो से । अह निकारणओ मो, मुक्कस्स वि होहिइ स भुज्जो ॥२५९।। (१८०७) Ahavă’ņãi cciya so nikkāarañaö na kammajogo sé Aha nikkāranao so, mukkassa vi hohil sa bhujjo 11 259 11 (1807) [अथवाऽनादिरेव स निष्कारणको न कर्मयोगस्तस्य ।
अथ निष्कारणः सः, मुक्तस्यापि भविष्यति स भूयः ॥२५९॥ (१८०७)
Athava'nădireva sa nişkāraṇako na karmayogastasyai Atha niskāraṇah sah muktasyapi bhavisyati sa bhūyah 1125911 (1807) ]
Trans.--259 Or, that ( soul) being anādi, may be beyond any cause, and ( hence ) have no connection with Karma. If it were beyond any cause, it might have belonged to a mukta being also • 1807)
___टीका-अथ चेत् कर्मणः पूर्वमात्माऽनादिकालसिद्ध एव, इति किं तस्य सहेतुक-निर्हेतुकचिन्तया ? इति । अत्रोच्यते-"निकारणओ इत्यादि' यद्येवम्, ततः "से" तस्य जीवस्य कर्मयोगः कर्मबन्धो न पामो अकारणखान्, नमस इव । अथ निष्कारणोऽप्यसो भवति, तर्हि मुक्तर
40

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[ The sixth भूयः स भविष्यति, निष्कारणत्वाविशेषात, ततश्च मुक्तावप्यनावास इति ॥ २५९ ।। (१८०७)॥
D, C.-Mandika:----Existence of soul has already been established from times immemorial, before Karma was produced. It is, therefore, useless to consider whether its production is sa-hetuka or nir-hetuka.
Bhagavāna:--In that case, O Mandika ! on account of its causelessness, ātman will have no bondage with Karma as it has no bondage with ākāśa.
___Mandika:--No, in spite of its causelessness, the soul is in contact with Karma.
Bhagavāna:-Then, it will be attached to a mukta (liberated) being also. Thus, one that has already been liberated from the worldly bondages, will again come into those bondages on account of the common property, viz:-nişkāraṇatā, belonging to both of them. 259 (1807). होज स निच्चमुको बंधाभावम्मि को व से मोक्खा ?। न हि मुक्कववएसो बंधाभावे मओ नभसो ॥ २६० ॥ (१८०८)
Hojja sa niccamukko bandhābhāvammi ko va sé mokkho ? Na hi mukkavvavaéso bandhābhāvé mao nabhasö 1126011 (1808)
[भवेत् स नित्यमुक्तो बन्धाभावे को वा तस्य मोक्षः ?।
न हि मुक्तव्यपदेशो बन्धाभावे मतो नभसः ॥ २६० ।। (१८०८) Bhavet sa nityamukto bandhābhāve ko vā tasya mokşah ? Na hi muktavyapadešo bandhābhāvé mato nabhasaḥ 126011 (1808)]
Trans.---200 If it is ever liberated in absence of bondage, how will its moksa exist? For, in absence of bondage, aitribute of liberation could never be accepted as in the case of ākāśa. (1808)
टीका-अथवा, कर्मयोगाभावाद् नित्यमुक्त एवासौ भवेत् । यदि वा,

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315 बधामात्रे कः किल तस्य मोक्षव्यपदेशः ? । न बबद्धस्य नमसः कस्यापि मुक्तव्यपदेशो मतः, बन्धपूर्वकत्वाद् मोक्षस्य । तस्माद् न "पूर्व जीवः पश्चात् कर्म" इति प्रथमविकल्प इति ॥ २६० ।। (१८०८) ॥
D. C.-Mandika:-On account of the abhiva of Karmayoga, this ātman is also nitya-mukta.
Bhagavān:-If it is so, O Mandika, how will whoksa be Attributed to it? For, one that is not susceptible to bandha, is never susceptible to mokşa also, as in the case of užkāśa. Mokşa can be attributed only to those that undergo bandhas. The first alternative that jivu is produced first and then Karma, is, therefore, not acceptible. 260 ( 1808 ).
Now, the other two alternatives-viz., that Karmu is produced first and jîva afterwards or that both of them, are produced simultaneously-are refuted as follows: न य कम्मस्स वि पुव्वं कत्तुरभावे समुन्भवो जुत्तो। निकारणओ सो वि य तह जुगप्पत्तिभावे य ॥ २६१ ।। (१८०९) न हि कत्ता कजं ति य जुगवुप्पत्तीए जीव-कम्माणं । जुत्तो ववएसोऽयं जह लोए गोविसाणाणं ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०) Na ya kammassa vi puvvam katturabhāve samubbhavo jutto i Nikkaran&o so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhāve ya 11 261 11 (1809) Na hi kattā kajjam ti ya jugavuppattié jiva-kammănan i Jutto vavaeso'yam jaha lie govisanapam || 262॥ ( 1810) [न च कर्मणोऽपि पूर्व कर्तुरमावे समुद्भवो युक्तः । निष्कारणकः सोऽपि च तथा युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च ॥ २६१ ॥ (१८०९) नहि कर्ता कार्यमिति च युगपदुत्पत्तौ जीव-फर्मणोः । युक्तो व्यपदेशोऽयं यथा लोके गोविषाणयोः ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०)

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[The sixth Na ca karmano'pi pūrvam kartąrabhāve samudbhavo yuktahi Nişkāranakah so'pi ca tathā yugapadūtpattibhāvé ca 11 261 11 ( 1809 ) Na bi kartā kāryaniiti ca yugapadutpattau jiva-karmaqoh Yukto vyapade'so' yam yathā loké govisanayoh || 262 ॥ ( 1810)]
Trans.--261-262 It is not appropriate (to believe ) the production of Karma to be first in absence of Kartā, nor is it so even if it is niskāranaka. In case of both being produced simultaneously, the same ( difficulties) will arise. Moreover, in ( case of ) simultaneous production of jiva and Karma, designation of kartā and kārya will not properly fit in as found in the popular example of the two horns of a cow. ( 1809-1810)
टीका--न च जीवात् माक् कर्मणोऽपि समुद्भवो युक्तः, कर्तुर्जीवस्य तदानीमभावात्, अक्रियमाणस्य च कर्मवायोगात्, निष्कारणश्चेत्यमसौ कर्मसमुद्भवः स्यात्, ततोऽकारणजातस्याकारणत एव विनाशोऽपि स्यादिति। तया, युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च " प्रत्येकपक्षोक्ता दोषाः वाच्या" इति शेषःनिर्हेतुकत्वात् प्रत्येकवदुभयस्यापि समुदितस्यानुत्पत्तिरित्यादि। न च युगप. दुत्पभयोनीब-कर्मणोः कर्तृ-कर्मभावो युज्यत इत्येतदेवाह-न हीत्यादि" नहि युगपदुत्पत्रयोर्जीव--कर्मणोः "अयं जीवः कर्ता" "इदं वा ज्ञानावरणादिपुद्गगलनिकुरम्बं कर्म” इति व्यपदेशों युज्यते, यया लोके सन्ये-- सरगोविषाणयोरिति ॥ २६१--२६२ ॥ (१८०९--१८१०)॥
___D. C.-- It is not appropriate to accept that Karma is produced first and jîva afterwards. Por, the production of Karma is not possible without jive, which is the Karma at the same time. And if that production of Karmā is nişkāranaka, its end will also be nişkāraņaka.
It is also not proper to say that jiva and Karma are produced simultaneously. Because, in that case also, both being nirhtéuka, the same difficulties will arise.
Moreover, if jiva and Karma are produced together, they will no longer be taken as kartā and karya but like the two

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Ganadharavada horns of a cow, they will be taken as twins produced together. 261-262 ( 1809-1810 ).
Now, coming to the second alternative at the root, the author proceeds:-- होजाणाइओ वा संबंधो तह विन घडए मोक्यो । जोडणाई सोऽणंतो जीव-नहाणं व संबंधो ॥ २६३ ।। (१८११)
Hejjāņšio và sambandho that vi na ghadae mokkho I Jo'hai sonanto jiva-nahānam va sambandho ॥ 263 ॥ ( 1811)
[भवेदनादिको वा संबन्धस्तथापि न घटते मोक्षः । योऽनादिः सोऽनन्तो जीव--नभसोरिव संबन्धः ।। ५६३ ॥ (१८११)
Bhavedanādiko vā sambandhastathāpi na ghatate mokṣaḥ, Yo'nadih ss'nanto jiva-nabhsoriva sambandhah | 263 ( 1811)
Trans.--263 Or, if the contact (of jîva with Karma ) is ( taken as ) anādaka ( without any beginning ), there will be nothing like mckşa. That which is anūdi like the contact of jîva and ākāśa, is ananta ( endless ) also. ( 1811)
टीका- स्यादेतव, अनादिरेव जीव-कर्मणोः संबन्धः संयोगः। नन तथापि मोक्षो न घटते, यस्माद् योऽनादिः संयोग: सोऽनन्तो दृष्टः, यथा जीव--नमसोः। न ह्याकाशेन सह जीवस्य कदाचिदपि संयोगो निवर्तते । एवं कर्मणापि सहासौ न निवर्तेत, तथा च सति मुक्त्यभावमसङ्ग इति ॥ २६३ ।। (१८११)॥
D. C.--If the contact of jīva with Karma is anādika, it should be even ananta like the contact of ziva with sky, and in that case, there will be no scope for moksa at all. इय जुत्तीए न घटइ सुवह य सुईसु बंध-मोक्खा त्ति। तेण तुह संसओऽयं न य कजोऽयं जहा सुणसु ॥ २६४ ॥ (१८१२)

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( The sixth ya juttie na ghatai suvvai ya suisu bandha-mokkhā tti Téņa tuha samsao'yam na ya kajjo'yam jahā suņasu 126411 (1812) [इति युत्कया न घटते श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु बन्धमोक्षाचीति ।
तेन तव संशयोऽयं न च कार्योंऽयं यथा श्रुणु ॥ २६४ ॥ (१८१२) Iti yuktyā na ghațate śrūyate ca śrutişu bandha-modşăviti Téna tava samsayo'yam na ca kāryo'yam yatha śșiņu 1126411 (1812)]
Trans --- 264 Thus, by means of the above-mentioned argument, bandha and woksa do not fit in. Still however, it is heard in the Vedas (that they exist). This doubt of yours -which is (absolutely) improper-is due to that So, listen to me (now). (1812)
टोका--इत्येवं युक्तयुक्त्या बन्धो मोक्षश्च न घटते, श्रयते च श्रुतिषु वेदवाक्येष्वसौ। ततस्तव संशयोऽयम् । यथा चायं न कार्यस्तथा श्रृणु सौम्य ! इति। उक्तः पूर्वपक्षः ।। २६४ ॥ (१८१२)॥
D. C.-The arguments advanced by you do not lead one to prove the existence of bandha and nokşu as seen above. But since it has already been found in Vedas that they exist, your doubt has come into existence, which is totally unworthy of you. Now, listen to me. 264 (1812). संताणोऽणाईओ परोप्परं हेउ-हेउभावाओ। देहस्स य कम्मस्सं य मंडिय ! बीयं-कुराणां व ॥ २६५ ॥ (१८१३) Santāņo'nālo paropparam héu-héubhāvão i Dehassa ya kammassa ya Mandiya ' biyam-kurānām va n265n(1813) [संतानोऽनादिकः परस्परं हेतु--हेतुमद्भावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च मण्डिक ! बीजा--ऽङ्करयोरिव ।। २६५ ॥ (१८१३) Santano'nadikah parasparam hetu-hetubhavati Dehasya ca karmanasca Mandika 1 bija nikurayoriva n2651 (1813)]
Trans.--265 Since body and Karma are mutually related

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like seed and sprout as helu and hetumat, their expansion, O Mandzka, is anādika. (1813)
319
टीका - शरीर - कर्मणोरनादिः संतान इति प्रतिज्ञा, परस्परं हेतुहेतुमद्भावात्, बीजाङ्कवदिति । ततश्च " किं पूर्व जीवः पश्चात् कर्म" ? इत्यादि प्लवत एव, अनादिलात् तत्संतानस्येति ॥ २६५ ।। (१८१३) ।।
D. C. – The santāna of sarira and Karma is anād, because both of them are related to each other as hétu and hétumat like seed and sprout. On account of this aradztva of santāna, the argument that jiva is born first and Karma afterwards, will automatically be null and void. 265 (1813).
अस्थि स देहो जो कम्मकारणं जो य कज्जमण्णस्स ।
कम्मं च देहकारणमत्थि य जं कजमण्णस्स ।। २६६ ।। (१८१४)
•
Atthi sa dého jo kammakāraṇam jo ya kajjamaņņassa Kammam ca déhakāranamatthi ya jam kajjamannassa ॥ 266 (1814) [ अस्ति स देहो यः कर्मकारणं यश्च कार्यमन्यस्य ।
कर्म च देहकारणमस्ति च यत् कार्यमन्यस्य || २६६ ।। (१८१४ ) Asti sa dého yaḥ karmakāraṇam yaśca kāryamanyasya i̟ Karma ca dhéakāranamasti ca yat kāryamanyasya || 266 (1814)]
Trans.--266 The body is such that it becomes the cause of (one) Karma, and effect of another, while Karma is also the cause of (one) body, and the effect of another. ( 1814)
टीका - अस्ति स कश्चिद् देहो योऽग्रेतनस्य कर्मणः कारणम्, यश्चान्य स्यातीतस्य कर्मणः कार्यम् । तथा, कर्मापि समस्ति । किं विशिष्टम् ? इत्याहयदप्रेतनस्य देहस्य कारणम्, यच्चान्यास्यातीतस्य देहस्य कार्यमिति । एवमनादौ संसारे न क्वचिद् विश्राम्यति, अतोऽनादिर्देह- कर्मसंतान इति । आह-- ननु वन्ध-- मोक्षाविह साधयितुं प्रस्तुतौ ततः कर्मसंतान स्यानादिखसाधनमसंबद्धमिव लक्ष्यते । तदयुक्तम्, अभिमायापरिज्ञानात्, न कृतं
}

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"
कर्म संभवति "क्रियत इति कर्म" इति व्युत्पत्तेः यच्च तस्य करणमसावेव बन्ध इति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः १ ॥ २६६ ॥ (१८१४) ॥
DC-Some déha is such that it serves as the cause of some future actions, while itself has already been the effect of some past actions. The Karma, in turn also serves as the cause of some body to come, while it has itself been the effect of some other body in the past. Thus, in this anadi samsara the santāna of déha and Karma is also anadi as it never stops to
rest.
Mandika: But it is quite irrelevant to establish the anadiva of Karma-santana. For, the point is to establish the existence of bandha and mokṣa.
Bhagavan:-It is not so, O Mŋaḍıka | “Kriyate iti Karma" that which is accomplished, is action. So, an unaccomplished action is never possible. In the accomplishment of Karma, its kārana is nothing but bandha, and hence the significance of establishing the anaditva of Kdrma-santāna.
Mandika: If that which has been accomplished is Karma, who is the krato of this deha? 266 (1814).
-
The Bhaagvān replies
कप्ता जीवो कम्मस्स करणओ जह घडस्म घडकारो । एवं चि देहस्स वि कम्मकरणसंभवाउ ति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५)
Katta jivo kammassa karagao jaha ghaḍassa ghaḍakāro Evam ciya dehassa vi kammakarṇasambhavāu tti 11267 (1815)
[ कर्ता जीवः कर्मणः करणतो यथा घटस्य घटकारः । एवमेव देहस्यापि कर्मकरण संभवादिति ॥ २६७ ॥ (१८१५)
Kartā jîvah karmaṇah karaṇato yatha ghaṭasya ghaṭakārah i Evaméva dehasyäpi karmakaraṇasambhavaditi 267 (1815))

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Gañadharavăda Trans.-267 Just as jiva happens to be the kartā of karma as potter (is ) of ghata by virtue of its instrumentality, so also, (it becomes the karta ) of déha by virtue of karmı as (its) nstrument. ( 1815 )
टीका-कर्ता चात्र कर्मणो जीवः, करणसमेतत्वात् दण्डादिकरणयुक्तकुलालवद् घटस्य, करणं चेह जीवस्य कर्म निवर्तयतः शरीरमवगन्तव्यम् । एवं देहस्याप्यात्मैव कर्ता, कर्मरूपं करणं कर्मकरणं तत्संभवात् ---तयुक्तत्वात् , दण्डादिकरणसमेतकुलालवदिति ।। २६७ ॥ (१८१५) ।।
D. C.-Just as potter is called the karta of ghata, because he is accompained by variouss karana such as danda etc., the Soul will also be called the kartā of déha by reason of its being accompanied by Karma as the karana. 267 (1815).
_Here, again, the opponent's view is stated and refutedकम्मं करणमसिद्धं व ते मई कजओ तयं सिद्धं । किरियाफलओ य पुणो पडिवज तमग्गिभूइ व्व ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६) Kammam karanamasiddham va té mai kajjaö tayam siddhami Kiriyāphalao ya puno paờivajja tamaggibhūi wa 1126811 ( 1816 )
[कर्म करणमसिद्धं वा तव मतिः कार्यतस्तत सिद्धम् ।
क्रियाफलतश्च पुनः प्रतिपयस्व तदग्निभूतिरिव ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६) Karma karanamasiddham vă tava matih kāryatastat siddhami Kriyāphalataśca punah pratipadyasva tadagnibhūtiriva 1126811 (1816)7
Trans.----268 Or, (it may be ) your belief that Karma cannot be proved as karaņa ; but it has been proved by ( the help of) kūrya. Moreover, like Agnibhūti (you should ) accept it, by reason of kriyāphala also. ( 1816)
टीका-स्यादेतत्, अतीन्द्रियत्वेनासिद्धत्वात् कर्मणः करणत्वमसिद्धम् । तदयुक्तम्, यतः कार्यतः कार्यद्वारेण तत् सिद्धमेव, तथाहि-विद्यमानकरणं शरीरादि, कताबार, घटा देव, यवास्य करगं तर कर तस्मादस्त्येव
41

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तत् । अथवा, विद्यमानकरणमेवात्मशरीरलक्षणं द्वयम् कर्तृ - कार्यरूपत्वात्, कुलाल - घटादिवत् यच्च कर्तुरात्मनः शरीरमुत्पादयतः कारणं तत् कर्मेति कथं न तत्सिद्धि: ? । तथा, फलवत्यो दानादिक्रियाः, चेतनारम्भक्रियारूपत्वात्, कृष्यादिक्रियाबात् यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । इत्यभिभूतिरिव त्वमपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २६८ ।। (१८१६)
D. C. Mandika : -- Since karna is atindriya ( beyond the perception of sense-organs) it can never be taken as karapa.
Bhagavān : -It is not so. Since sarira is susceptible to production like ghata, it must have some karana to bring its existence. This karana is Karma itself. Or say, there must be some karana between Karta like atman and Karya like s'arira as in the case of ghatakara and ghața. And, this can be nothing else but Karma. This shows that Karma can be brought about even by the help of Karyas like s'arîra. Moreover, Karyas like dāna etc. which are inspired by fruit, are also fruitful like Kriyās such as krisŻ etc. So, like Agnibhiti, you, too, O Mandika ! shall have to admit the existence of Karma. 11268 (1816)
In reply to the assertion that a bandha which is anādi is ananta also, the author states
जं संताणोऽणाई तेणाणतोऽवि णायमेगंता ।
दीसई संतो वि जओ कत्थह वीर्य-कुराईणं ॥ २६९ ॥ (१८१७)
Jam santāņo'ņāî téṇāņanto'vi ṇāyameganto
Dîsai santo vi jao katthai bîyam-kurāîņam ||269|| (1817)
[ यत् संतानोऽनादिस्तेनानन्तोऽपि नायमेकान्तः ।
दृश्यते सन्नपि यतः कुत्रापि बीजा - ऽङ्करादीनाम् ।। २६९ ।। (१८१७)
Yat santano'nādisténānto'pi nāyamékāntaḥ
Driśyaté sannapi yataḥ kutrāpi bîjā’-ṁ kurādīnām ||269|| (1817;)
Trans. - 269 An

expansion which

has no beginning,

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323 cannot exclusively be called endless also. Por, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning, are sometimes found (as having ends) also. (1817)
टीका-" यद् यस्मान्जीव-कर्मसंयोगसंतानोऽनादिस्तेन तस्मादनन्तोऽपि" इति नायमेकान्तः, यतोऽनादिरपि संयुक्तयोर्वस्तुनोः संतानः सान्तोऽपि क्वचिद् दृश्यते, यथा बीजा-ऽङ्करादीनां संतान इति ॥ २६९ ॥ (१८१७)
D. C. There can never be an exclusive rule that the anādi santāna of jiva and Karma combined together, is ananta also. Por, in some cases, the sanatāna does come to an end inspite of its anăditva e. g. the santāna of seed and sprout.
Also,
अण्णयरमणिवत्तियकवं बीय-कुराण जं विहयं । तत्थ हओ संताणो कुक्कुडि-अंडाइयाणं च ॥ २७० ।। (१८१८) Annayaramaņivvattiyakajjam biyam-kurāņa jam vihayam i Tattha hao santāṇo kukkuļi-andaiyāṇam ca 1127011 (1818) [अन्यतरदनिर्वतितकार्य बीजा-ऽङ्करयोर्यद् विहतत् ।
सत्र हतः संतानः कुक्कुटच-ऽण्णादिकानां च ॥ २७० ॥ (१८१८) Anyataradanirvartitakāryam bijā-rkurayoryad vihatami Tatra hataḥ santānaḥ kukkutya'-opādikānām ca 112701 (1818) जह वेह कंचणो-वलसंजोगोऽणाइसंतइगओ वि। घोच्छिन्नइ सोवायं तह जोगो जीव-कम्माणं ॥ २७१ ॥ (१७१९) Jaha veka kancaņo-valasanjogo'paisantaigao vi! Vocchijjai sovāyam taha jogo jiva-kammāņam 1127111 (1819)
[यथा वेह काश्चनो-पलसंयोगोऽनादिसंततिगतोऽपि ।
व्यवच्छिद्यते सोपायं तथा योगो जीव-कर्मणोः ॥ २७१ ॥ (१८१९) Yatha véha kāncano--palasamyogo'nádisantatigato'pi 1 Vyavacchidyate sopāyam tatha yogo jiva-karmaşok 127111 (1819)]

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[The sixth Trans. - 270-271. When either a seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the ( desired ) effect, its santāna is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial, is cut off, in the same way, the contact of jiva with Karma (is also cut off). (1818-1819 ).
टीका -- बीजा--ऽङ्करयोर्मध्येऽन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्यमेव यद् विहतं व्यवच्छिन्नं तत्रानयोर्हतो व्यवच्छिन्नः संतानः । एवं कुक्कुटय- ऽण्डकयोः पितापुत्रयोरपि च वक्तव्यम् । यथा वा काञ्चनो-- पळयोरनादिकालमवृत संतानभावगतोऽपि संयोगोः सोपायमग्नितापाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, तथा जीवकर्मणोरपि संयोगऽनादिसंतानगतोऽपि तपः संयमाधुपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, इति न मोक्षाभाव इति ॥ २७० -- २७१ ॥ (१८१८--१८१९)
D. C.-If either of bija and ankura vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire inspite of its anãditva, the contact between jiva and Karma could also be brought to an end by means of tapas, samyama etc., until ultimately the moksa is attained. ॥ 270271 (1818-1819 )n
Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceeds
तो किं जीव-नहाण व अह जोगो कंचणो-वलाणं व ? | जीवरस य कम्मस्स य भण्णइ दुविहो वि न विरुद्धो ॥ २७२ ॥ (१८२०)
desoari for भव्वाणं कंचशोऽवलाणं व ।
जीवसे सामण्णे भव्वोऽभव्यो त्ति को भेओ ? ।। २७३ ॥ (१८२१)
To kim jiva-nahāna va aha jogo kancano-valānam va?
Jiyassa ya kammassa ya bhagnai duviho vi na viruddho || 272 ॥ ( 1820)

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Padhamo'bhavvāṇam ciya bhavvāņam kancano-valāaṇm va i Jivatté samanné bhavuo'bhavvo tti ko bhéo ? [ 273 u (1821)
325
[ ततः किं जीव-- नभसोरिवाथ योगः काञ्चनो पत्रयोरिव ? | जीवस्य च कर्मणश्च भण्यते द्विविधोऽपि न विरुद्ध ।। ७२ ।। (१८२० )
प्रथमोऽभव्यानामेव भव्यानां काञ्चनो--पलयोरिव ।
जीवत्वे सामान्ये भव्योऽभव्य इति को भेदः ? || २७३ ।। (१८२१) Tatat kim jiva- nabhasorivātah yogah kañcano - palayoriva ? Jivasya ca karmanaśca bhaynate dvi- vidho' pi na viruddhah272
Prathamo'bhavyānāméva bhavyānām kā÷cano-palayoriva Jivatve sāmanyé bhavyo bhavyah iti ko bhéda || 273 || ( 1821 }}
1)
Trans.-272-273 “ Then, does the union of jiva and karma resemble the union of jiva and nabhas? Or, is it similar tc that between gold and stone ? "" Union in both the ways wil not be contrary. The first belongs to the inauspicious only (contact) of the auspicious resembles (the one') between gola and stone." "What is the distinction between auspicious and inauspicious, when the state of existence is common ?” (1820-1821).
टीका - आह-- जीवस्य कर्मणश्च योऽयं परस्परं योगः सोऽनादिः सन् किं जीव -- नभसोरिवानन्तः, अथ काश्चनो - पळयोरिव सान्तोऽपि स्यात् ? उभयथापि दर्शनात् किमत्र प्रतिपद्यामहे ? | मण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम-- द्विधाऽप्ययमविरुद्धः, तत्र प्रथमोऽनाद्यनन्तरूपोऽभव्यानां द्रष्टव्यः । यस्तु काश्चनो - पळयोरिवानादिः सान्तोऽसौ भव्यानां विज्ञेयः । आह- नतु जीवत्वसाम्येऽपि "अयं चाभव्यः" इति किकृतोऽयं विशेष: ? । न च वक्तव्यम्यथा जीवत्वे समानेऽपि नारक- तिर्यगादयो विशेषास्तथा भव्या--ऽभव्यस्वविशेषोऽपि भविष्यतीति यतः कर्मजनिता एवं नारकादिविशेषाः, न तु स्वाभाविका । मव्या - ऽभव्यत्वविशेषोऽपि यदि कर्मजनितस्तदा भवतु, को निवारयिता ?, न चैवमिति ॥ २७५ -२७३ ॥ (१८२० -१-२१) ॥
39 66
" अयं भव्यः
D. C. -- Mandika : Should the anād contact of itna with

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320 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The sixth Karma be taken as ananta, like that between Jiva and nabhas or as sānta like that between gold and stone ?
Bhagavāna:--It is possible in both ways It is found as anūdı and ananta in case of inauspicious objects, but in cases of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as anādi and sünta.
Mandzka:-- How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere ?
Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other, even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is possible, because, the naraka experiences etc. are produced on account of Karma, and are not svābhāvika.
होउ जइ कम्मकओ न विरोहो नारगाइभेउ व्व । भणह य भव्चाऽभव्वा सभावओ तेण संदेहो ॥ २७४ ॥ (१८२२) Hou jai kammakai na viroho näragāibhèu vai Bhaqaha ya bhavva'bhavvā sabhāvaö teņa saņdého 127-11 (1822) [भवतु यदि कर्मकृतो न विरोधो नारकादिमेद इव । भणथ च भव्या-ऽभव्यान् स्वमावतस्तेन संदेहः ॥ २७४ ।। (१८२२)
Bhavatu yadi karmakṣito na virodho nārakādibhéda iva i Bhayatha ca bhavyā'bhavyān svabhāvatastena samdéhaḥ 11 2741
Trans.--274 If the distinction is caused by karma as in the case of hellish experience etc., there is no objection. But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their ( very) nature, the doubt does arise. ( 1822)
टीका-भवतु वा यदि कर्मकृतोऽयं भव्याs-भव्यत्वविशेषो जीवानाfacut, 779 fm fatte, #1#fata, fa, tant pours

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327 मन्याः स्वमावत एव जीवा न तु कर्मतः," इति यूयं भणय, तेनास्माकं संदेह इति ॥ २७४ ।। (१८२२)॥
___D. C.-Mandeka :-If you accept that the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is also karma-janita ( like that between hen and animal life ) I have nothing to say but when you take their distinction to be svabhāvika, I raise the doubt. 12740 (1822)
Explaining the real cause between bhavya and a-bhavya the author replies :दवाइते तुल्ले जीव-नहाणं सभावओ भेओ। जीवा-जीवागओ जह, तह भन्वे-यरविसेसो ॥ २७५ ॥ (१८२३) Davväitte tulle jiva-nahāņam sabhávao bhéo i Jivalivaigao jaha, taha bhavvéyaraviseso 127511 (1823)
[द्रव्यादित्वे तुल्ये जीव-नभसोः स्वभावतो भेदः ।
जीवा-ऽजीवादिगतो यथा, तथा मन्ये-तरविशेषः ॥ २७५ ॥ (१८२३) Dravyāditve tulye jiva-nabhaso svabhävato bhedah Jivā'jivādigato yathā, tathā bhavyetara-vis'eşaḥ 127311 (1823)]
____Trans.-~275 Just as in (case of) iva and nabhas the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in (the midst of) the common element of (their being) dravya etc, in the same way, the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. (1823)
टीका-यथा जीव-नभसोद्रष्यत्व-सत्व--प्रमेयत्व-ज्ञेयत्वादौ तुरयेऽपि जीवा--ऽजीवल्व-चेतना-चेतनत्वादिस्वभावतो भेदः, तथा जीवानामपि जीवत्वसाम्येऽपि यदि भव्या-ऽभव्यकृतो विशेषः स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः ? इति ॥ २७५ ॥ (१८२३)
D. C.-Although jiva and ākās'a possess the common properties like dravyatva, sattva ( existence ), prameyatva

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328 Jinabuadra Gani's
[The sixth (destructibility) ineyatva (cognizibility) etc., distinction such as that of jiva and a-jiva etc., does exist by its very nature. Similarly, in case of jivas also, even though sîvalva is common, the distinction of bhavya and abhavya remains there as a natural consequence, ॥275 (1823)।।
The pupil objects to this view thusएवं पि भव्वभावो जीवत्तं पिव सभावजाईओ। पावइ निचो तम्मि य तदवत्थे नत्थि निव्वाणं ।। २७६ ।। (१८२४)
Evam pi bhavyabhāvo jivattam piva sabhávajāío 1 Pāvai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvāņam 1127611 (1824)
[ एवमपि भव्यभावो जीनत्वमिव स्वभावजातीयः ।
प्राप्नोति नित्यस्तस्मिंश्च तवस्थे नास्ति निर्वाणम् ॥ २७६ ॥ (१८२४) Evampi bhavyabhāvo jivatvamiva syabhāvajātîyaḥ Prāpnoti nityastasminsca tadavasthe năsti nirvāṇam 1127611 (1824)]
Trans.--276 Even in that case, the quality of (being) auspicious being natural like jivatva, will become everlasting; and if it is so, there will be no (scope for) final liberation (at all). (1824)
टीका -नन्वेमपि भव्यभावो नित्योऽविनाशी प्रामोति, स्वभावजातीयत्वात् -स्वाभाविकत्वात् जीवत्ववत् । भवत्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तस्मिन् मव्यभावे तदवस्थे नित्योवस्थायिनि नास्ति निर्वाणम्, सिदो न भव्यो नाप्य भव्यः" इति वचनादिति ॥ २७६ ॥ (१८२४)
D. C.--If the quality of bhavyatva is svābhāvika as jîvatva, as said above, it will become everlasting like jivata also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting bhavyabhāva, there will be no scope for mokşā at all 11276 (1824 11
The author refutes this argument as follows:

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जह घडपुव्वाभावोऽणाइसहावो वि सनिहणो एवं ।
जई भव्वत्ताभावो भवेज किरियाए को दोसो ? ॥ २७७ ॥ (१८२५)
Jaha ghaḍapuvvābhāvo’ṇāisahāvo vi sanihaņo èvam i Jai bhavvattābhāvo bhavėjja kiriyāė ko doso? #277|| (1825)
[ यथा घटपूर्वा मावोऽनादिस्वभावोऽपि सनिधन एवम् |
यदि भव्यत्वाभावो भवेत् क्रियया को दोष: ।। २७७ ।। (१८२५) Yatha ghaṭapurvābhāvo'nādisvabhāvo'pi sanidhana evam Yadi bhavyatvabhāvo bhavét kriyayā ko dosab | 277 (1825) ]
329
Trans. – 277 What harm is there if the ( previous) abhava of auspiciousness is possessed of end, like the previous nonexistence of ghata inspite of its being anādi by nature ? (1825)
टीका- यथा घटस्य प्रागभावोऽनादिस्वभावजातीयोऽपि घटोत्पत्तौ सनिधनो विनश्वरो दृष्टः, एवं यदि भव्यत्वस्यापि ज्ञान - तपःसचित्रचरणक्रियोपायतोऽभावः स्यात्, तर्हि को दोषः संपद्यते ? - न कश्चिदिति ।। २७७ ।। १८२५ ।।
an
D. C. --The previous non-existence of ghata comes to end, when ghata is actually produced. Similarly, there is no harm if we assume that the abhāva of bhavyatva comes to an end, when the bhavytva is actually brought into existence by the process of perception 277 (1825) ||
अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंगं पिव मई न तं जम्हा ।
भावो चिय स विसिट्ठो कुंभाणुष्पत्तिमेत्तेणं ॥ २७८ ॥ (१८२६)
Anudāharaṇamabhāvo kharasangam piva maî na tam jamhă | Bhāvo cciya sa visittho kumbhānuppattimettegam 278 (1826)
[ अनुदाहरणभावः खरशृङ्गमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
माव एव स विशिष्टः कुम्भानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण || २७८ || (१८२६) Anudāharaṇabhavaḥ kharasṛingamiva matirna tad yasmāt | Bhāva eva sa visistar kumbhānutpattimatrena 278 | ( 1826) ]
42

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[The sixth Trans.--278 ( You may believe that ) like kharasringa, this is no (good ) example. But it is not so. That is nothing but bhāva distinguished by the non-production of ghata. ( 1826 )
टीका-स्याद मतिः परस्य-नन्वनुदाहरणमसो मागभावा, अभावरूपतयेवावस्तुत्वात, खरविषाणवत् । वन, यस्माद् भाव एवासौ घटपागमावा, तत्कारणभूतानादिकालमवृत्तपुरलसंघातरूपः, केवलं घटानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण विशिष्ट ॥ २७८ ॥ (१८२६)
D. C.---Mandika:--- Life kharasxiiga, previous non-existence cannot be taken as a right illustration, because like-kharasrșinga, it is non-existent on account of its abhāvarupată.
Bhagavānn: It is not so. The previous abhāva of ghata is itself bhāvz. The only difference found in it, is thāt, at this stage the production of ghata has not yet been brought about from the mass of earth, which has served as its karana from times imemmorial 11 277 ( 1826 ) 11 एवं भवघुच्छेओ कोडागारस्स वा अवचउत्ति। तं नाणंतत्तणओऽणागयकालं-बराणं व ॥ २७९ ।। (१८२७) Evam bhavavucchéo kotthāgārāssa vā avacau tti i Tam nānantattānao'nāgayakalam-barānam va ॥ 279 ॥ ( 1827 )
[एवं भव्योच्छेदः कोष्टागारस्येवापचय इति ।
तद् नानन्नत्वतोऽनागतकाला-डम्बरयोरिव ।। २७९ ॥ (१८२७) Evan bhavyocchédah koştāgārasyévāpacaya iti i Tad nānantatvato'nāgatakālā-mbarayoriva il 279 11 ( 1827 )]
Trans.-279 Similarly, it is not ( correct ) ( to believe ) the culmination of the auspicious to be similar to the diminution of granery on account of its ) endlessness, like the time to come or sky. ( 1827 )
टीका-नन्वेचं सति भव्योच्छेदः भन्यजीवः संसारः शून्यः पामोति,

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Ganadharavā
4
अपचयात् । कस्य यथा समुच्छेदः ? इत्याह- स्तोकस्तोकाकृष्यमाणधान्यस्य धान्यभृतकोष्ठागारस्य । इदमुक्तं भवति - कालस्यानन्त्यात् षण्मासपर्यन्ते चावश्यमेकस्य भव्यस्य जीवस्य सिद्धिगमनात् क्रमेणापचीयमानस्य धान्यकोष्ठागारस्येव सर्वस्यापि भव्यराशेरुच्छेदः प्राप्नोतीति । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तदेतद् न, अनन्तत्वाद् भव्यराशेः, अनागतकाळा-ssकाशवदिति । इह यद् बृहदनन्त केनानन्तं, तत् स्तोक - तयाऽपचीयमानमपि नोच्छिद्यते, यथा प्रतिसमयं वर्तमान तापस्याऽपचीयमानोऽप्यनागतकाल समयराशिः, प्रतिसमयं बुद्धया प्रदेशापहारेणापचीयमानः सर्वनभाप्रदेशराशिर्वा । रति न भव्योच्छेदः ॥ २७५ ॥ ( १८२७ ) ॥
D. C. -- Mandeka - If the ucchéda of bhavya jivas is accepted, this world will gradually be deprived of them. Ultimately, there will be no bhavya jiva existing in the world. For, just as a granary of corn, is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn, this world will also be losing one bhavya jîva at least at the end of say, six months, when he will be attaining moksa, until ultimately the world will be void of bhavya jivas.
331
Bhagavāna:--Your
argument is fallacious, O Mandika. The number of bhavya jivas is as endldss as the time to come or sky, and hence its absolute viccheda should never be feared,
जं चातीताऽणागयकाला तुल्ला जओ य संसिद्धो ।
एको अनंतभागो भव्वाणमईयकाले ॥ २८० ॥ ( १८२८ )
एस्सेणं तत्तिउ चिय जुत्तो जं तो वि सव्वभव्वाणं । जुन्तो न समुच्छेओ होज्ज मई कहमिणं सिद्धं ? ।। २८१ ।। (१८२९)
भव्वाणमणंत सणमणंतभागो व किह मुक्का सिं ।
कालादओ व मंडिय ! मह वयणाओ व पडिवज्ज ॥ २८२॥ (१८३०)
Jam cãtita'ṇāgayakālā tullā jaö ya samsidhho I
Ekko anantabhāgo bhavānamaiyakalam || 280 ॥ ( 1828 )

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[ The sixth
Essenam tattiu cciya jutto jam to vi savvabhavvāņam | Jutto na samucchéö hojja mai kahamiņam siddham ? ||28||(1829)
Bhavvanamaṇantattaṇantabhāgo va kiha mukko sim Kālādao va Mandiya ! maha vayanão va padivajja ॥ 282 ॥ ( 1830 ) [ वच्चातीताऽनागतकालौ तुल्यौ यतश्च संसिद्धः । एकोऽनन्तभागो भव्यानामतीत काळेन ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८)
एष्यता तावानेव युक्तो यत् ततोऽपि सर्वभव्यानाम् । युक्तो न समुच्छेदो भवेद् मतिः कथमिदं सिद्धम् ।। २८१ ।। (१८२९)
भव्यानामनन्तत्वमनन्तभागो वा कथं वा मुक्त एषाम् ?
कालादय इव मण्डिक ! मम वचनाद् वा प्रतिपद्यस्व || २८२ ॥ (१८३०) Yaccâtîta nagatkalau tulyau yats'ca samsiddhaḥ | Bko'nantabhāgo bhavyānāmatitakalena। 280 ॥ ( 1828 ) Eşyatā tāvāneva yukte yet tato'pi sarvabhavyānām | Yukto na samucchedo bhaved matih kathamidam siddham ? ||281|| Bhavyānāmanantatvamanantabhāgo vā katham vā muktā eṣām ? Kālādaya iva Mandika ! mama vacanād va pratipadyasva ॥ 282 ॥ ]
Trans. - 280-281-282 Since the times-past and futureare similiar, an infinitesimal part of the auspicious, which has already been liberated in the past will meet liberation in future also It is not proper, therefore, to believe in ( complete ) destination of all auspicious ( creatures ). ( It may be asked ) "How is it proved? Or, how is the endlessness or infinitesimal part of the auspicious ( creatures ) liberated ?" "Like Kala etc. Or, O Mandika, take it ( for granted ) on my word,” 1829-1830)
(1828
टीका व्याख्या - यस्माचातीता - ऽनागतकालौ तुल्यादेव, यतश्वातीतेनापि कालेनैक एव निगोदानन्वतमो भागोऽद्यापि भव्यानां सिद्धः, एष्यतापि भविष्यत्कालेन तावन्मात्र एव भव्यानन्वभागः सिद्धिं गच्छन् युक्तो घटमानकः, न हीनाधिकः भविष्यतोऽथि काकस्यातीचतुरयस्वात् ।

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तत एवमपि सति न सर्वभव्यानामुच्छेदो युक्तः, सर्वेणापि कालेन तदनन्तभागस्यैव सिद्धिगमनसम्भवोपदर्शनात् । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत् तत्कथमिदं सिद्धं यदुत - अनन्ता भव्याः, तदनन्तभागश्च सर्वेणैव कालेन सेत्स्यतीति ? | अत्रोच्यते - काळा - ऽऽकाशादय इवानन्वास्तावद् भव्याः, तदनन्तभागस्य च मुक्तिगमनात्, काळा - ssकाशयोरिव न सर्वेषामुच्छेद इति प्रतिपद्य स्व, मद्वचनाद् वा मण्डिक ! सर्वमेतत् श्रद्धेहीति ।। २८०-२८१-२८२ ॥ (१८२८- १८२९-१८३०)
Gaṇadharavada
D. C. - As the time, whether past or future is the same throughout, the infinite number of bhavya jivas, or a portion of them attains mokṣa during past, as well as, future times in equal proportion. The accheda of all bhavya jivas is, therefore, not acceptible
Mandika:-But how is it proved that the bhavyas are ananta and their anantabhāga attains mokṣa at all times ?
Bhagavana:--They are antanta like kala and ākāśa. Even if infinite number of bhavyas passes away to to moksa, they remain endless for ever, like kāla and ākāśa. Rely upon my word, O Mandika, and accept it ॥ 280-282 ( 1828–1830 ) ॥
If it is asked "How could it be taken as true merely on your words?" the answer is
सम्भूयमिगं गिन्हसु मह वयणाओऽवसेस वयणं व ।
सव्वण्णुताइओ वा जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं च ॥ २८३ ॥ (१८३१)
मणसि हि सवणू सव्वेसिं सव्वसंसयच्छेया । दिहंताभावम्मि विपुच्छउ जो संसओ जस्स ॥ २८४ ॥ (१८३२)
Sadbhūyamiņam gighasu maha
vayaṇão'vasesavayanam va
Savvanyutaio vā jānayamajjhatthavayanam va || 283 Mangasi kiha savvaņņu savvésim savvasamsayacchéyā | Ditthantabhāvammi vi pucchau jo samsao jassa ॥ 284 ॥ ( 1832 )

1831 )

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[ The sixth [सद्भूतमिदं गृहाण मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव । सर्वज्ञतादितो वा शायकमध्यस्थवच मिव ।। २८३ ।। (१८३१) मन्यसे कथं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।
दृष्टान्ताभावेऽपि पृच्छतु यः संशयो यस्य ।। २८४ । (१८३२) Sadhūtamidam grihāņa madvacanädavas'eşayacanamivai Sarvajnatadito va jnayakamadhyasthavacanamiva 12830 (1831)] Manyase katham sarvajnaḥ sarvasamseyacchedāt Dristāntābhāve'pi pricchatu yah samsayo yasya ||2840 (1832)]
Trans.--283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience. (If) you question "How am I to be omniscient?" (The reply is that) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all. Even in absence of (proper)examples. one who entertains doubts may ask me. (1831-1832)
टीका-व्याख्या-सद्भूतमिदमनन्तरोक्तं सर्वमपीति गृहाण त्वम्, मरचनत्वात्, यथा त्वत्संशयादिविषयमवशेषं मद्वचनम्, सर्वशत्वादित्यादिभ्यो वा हेतुभ्यः, आदिशब्दात् वीतरागत्वादिपरिग्रहः, हायकमध्यस्थबचनवदित्ययमत्र दृष्टान्त इति । अथैवं मन्यसे-कथमिव सर्वज्ञस्त्वम् । अत्रोध्यते-सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् । अन्यस्य सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तुः कस्याप्पदर्शनाद कोऽत्र दृष्टान्तः ?--न कश्चिदिति। अत्रोच्यते- किमत्र दृष्टान्तान्वेषणेन ?। सदभावेऽपि हि यो यस्य संशयः स तं सर्वमपि पृच्छतु, येन स्वमत्ययसिद्ध एव मयि सर्वशनिश्चयो भवतीति ।। २८३--२८४ ॥ (१८३१.-१८३२)
D. C:-~-Bhagavāna::--Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am sarvajira and vitarāga.
Mandika:--On what ground are you to be called sarvajna ?
Bhagavāna :--) am sarvajina, because I remove the doubts of all. Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question, so that he may be convinced of my sarrajnatua. 283-284(1831-1832)

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Gañadharavāda Mandika, then, puts the question as follows:भव्वा वि न सिज्झिस्संति केइ कालेण जइ वि सव्वेण । नणु ते वि अभव्य चिय किंवा भव्यत्तणं तेसिं? ॥ २८५ ।। (१८३३) Bhavvā yi na sijjhissanti kéi kāléņa jai vi savvéņa i Naru té vi abhavva cciya kimvā bhavvattanam tésim ? ॥2851(1833) [भव्या भपि न सेत्स्यन्ति केऽपि कालेन यद्यपि सर्वेण ।
मनु तेऽप्यभव्या एव किंवा भव्यत्वं तेषाम् ? ।। २८५ ।। (१८३३) Bhavya api na setsyanti ke'pi kāleņa yadyāpi sarvena Nanu té pyabhvyā éva kimvā bhavyatvam téşām ? (128511 (1833) |
Trans.--285 Some (of the creatures ) though, bhavya, do not attain mokşa at any time. As a matter of fact, they are also a-blhavyas. If not so, how is their bhavyatva accoun -- ted for ? (1833)
टीका-ननु भन्या अपि सन्तो यदि सर्वेणापि कालेन सर्वेऽपि न सेत्स्यन्ति, तहिं येषां सिद्धिर्न भविष्यति, अमव्या एव ते किंन व्यपदिश्यन्ते ? केन बा विशेषेण तेषां भव्यत्वम् ? इति निवेद्यतामिति ॥ २८५ ॥ (१८३३)
D. C.---Mandika:-If all those that are bhanya do not attain moksa at any time, inspite of their bhavyatva, why should they not be called a-bhavya ? Otherwise, by what characteristics are they to be distinguished as bhavya ? ॥ 285॥ ( 1833)]
The reply is - भण्णइ भन्यो जोगा न य जाग्गत्तण सिन्झए सन्यो । जह जोग्गम्नि वि दलिए सबम्मिन कीरए पडिना २८६॥ (१८३४) Bhāņņai bhavvo joggo na ya joggattéņa sijjhai savvo Jaha joggammi vi dalié savvammi na kiraé paļimā 1128611 ( 1834 ) [ भण्यते भव्यो योग्यो न च योग्यत्वेन सिध्यति सर्वः । यथा योग्येऽपि दलिके सर्वस्मिन् न क्रियने प्रतिमा ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)

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( The sixth Bhanyate bhavyo vogyo na ca yogyatvena sidhyati sarvaḥ 1 Yatha yogye’pi dalike sarvasmin na kriyate pratimā. 1128611 (1834)]
Trans.--286 The bhavya is called worthy (of moksa), but all do not attain (moksa) by (virtue of) mere worthiness, just as image could not be produced merely by means of proper constituents. (1834)
टीका-मण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम् । किम् ? इत्याह-भन्योऽत्र सिदिगमनयो ग्योऽभिमेतः न तु यः सिद्धिगति यास्यत्येव, न च योग्यत्वमस्तीत्येतावतैव सनः सिध्यति, किन्तु सिद्धिगमनसामग्रीसंभवे सति । दृष्टान्तमाह-यया हेम-मणि-पाषाण-चन्दन-काष्ठादिके योग्येऽपि प्रतिमाहेऽपि दलिकेन सर्वस्मिन् प्रतिमा विधीयते, किन्तु यत्रैव तनिष्पत्तियोग्या सामग्री संभवति तत्रैवासौ क्रियते । न च तदसंभवमात्रेण प्रतिमाविषयेऽयोग्यता मवति । नियमश्वेह नवं विधीयते यदुत-प्रतिमायोग्ये वस्तुनि प्रतिमा भवत्येवेति, किन्तु यदा तदा वा तद्योग्य एव सा मवति, नान्यत्रेति एवमिहापि न "मव्यः" इत्येतावन्मावेगव सर्वः सिध्यति, किन्तु सामग्रीसंपतौ, न च तदसंपत्तावपि तस्याभव्यता भवति, किन्तु यदा तदा वा भव्यस्यैव मुक्ति भव्यस्येति ॥२८६॥ (१८३४)
D. C. Bhavya means worthy of attaning mokşe and not exactly one who attains mokşa. Worthiness for mokṣa does not mean the attainment itself. Even thouge substances like gold, jewels, stones, sandal wood etc are capable of producing an image the image is not produced out of all but only out of certain suitable, substances. There is no such rule that the image is produced by means of certain suitable substances but only when suitable substances unite to produce an image
Similarly, in case of bhavyas also, there is no rigid rule that one who is bhavya must necessarily attain mokṣa nor will bhavja be called a-bhavya if he does not attain mokşa Sooner or later, bhavya alone attains rokas by virtue of its necessary characteristics, but a-bhavya will never be able to attain mokşa 11286 (1834)

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Canadharavāda जह वा स एव पासाण-कणगजोगो विओगजोग्गो वि। न विजुज्जइ सब्बो चिय स विजुबइ जस्स संपत्ती ॥२८७।। (१८३५) किं पुण जा संपत्ती सा जोग्गस्सेव न उ अजोग्गस्स । तह जो मोक्खो नियमा सो भवाणं न इयरेसिं ॥२८८॥ (१८३६) Jaha vă sa éva păsāņa-kaņagajogo viögajoggo vi i Na vijujjai savvo cciya sa vijujjai jassa sampatti (128711 (1835) Kim puņa jā saņpatti să joggasséva na u ajoggassa Taha jo mokkho niyairā so bhavyāṇam na iyaresim 1128811 (1836 [ यथा वा स एव पाषाण-कनकयोगो वियोगयोग्योऽपि । न वियुज्यते सर्व एव स चियुज्यते यस्य संमाप्तिः ॥२८७॥ (१८३६) किं पुर्या संपाप्तिः सा योग्यस्यैव न त्वयोग्यस्य ।
तथा या मोक्षो नियमात् स भव्यानां नेतरेषाम् ॥ २८८ ॥ (१८३६) Yatha va sa eva pāşāņa-kanakayogo viyogayogyo'pi Na viyujyate sarvam eva sa viyujyate yasya samprāptiḥ 1128711 (1835) Kim punarya samprāptiḥ să yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasyai Tathā yo mokso niyamāt sa bhavyanām nétaréşāın 28811 (1836)]
Trans -- 287–288 Just as the contact between stone and gold, though susceptible to separation, is not separated, only those that have reached attainment are separated. Similarly, mokşa which is laid down as a rule belongs only to bhavyas and not to others. (1835-1836)
टीका-यथा वा स एव पूर्वोक्तः सुवर्णपाषाण-कनकयोर्योगो वियोगयोग्यतान्वितोऽपि सों न वियुज्यते, किन्तु स एव वियुज्यते, यस्य वियोगसामग्रोसंमाप्तिरिति । किं पुनः ? एतद् भुजमुक्षिप्य ब्रूमः-या वियो. गसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिः सा वियोगयोग्यस्यैव सुवर्णोंपलस्य भवति, न तु तदयोग्यस्य, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण वः सर्वकर्मक्षयलक्षणो मोसः स नियमाद्
43

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth मव्यानामेव भवति, नेतरेषामभव्यानामिति मन्या-ऽमव्ययोविशेष इति ॥ २८७-२८८ ॥ (१८३५-१८३६) ॥
D. C.--Although the contact between gold and stone is susceptible w separation, it can never be applied to all as a general rule. Because, only that which secures necessary conditions for separation, is separable.
Moreover, these necessary conditions which cause the separation, act only upon those that are worthy of separation and not upon others. The same is the case with mouşa. The attainment of muışa is possible for bhavyas only, and not for a-bh ruyas even if they possess necessary conditions. This is the distinctive feature between bhavya and a-bhavya 1287-288 11 (1835-1836) कयगाइमत्तणाओ मोक्खो निच्चो न होइ कुंभो व्व । नो पद्धसाभावो भुवि तम्मा वि जं निच्चो ।। २८९ ।। १८३७) अणुदाहरणमभावो एसो वि मई न तं जओ नियओ। कुंभविगासविसिट्ठो भावो चिय पोग्गलमओ य ॥ २९० ॥ (१८३८) Kayagāimattaņão mokkho nicco na hồi kumbho vva i No paddhamsăbhavo bhuvi taddhammā vi jam nicco 128911 (1837)
Anudāharanamabhivo éso vi maî na tam jao niyaö 1 Kumbhaviņāsavisițțho bhāvo cciya poggalamao ya 129011 (1838) [कृतकादिमत्त्वाद् मोक्षो नित्यो न मवति कुम्भ इव ।
नो प्रध्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ २८९ ॥ (१८३७) अणुदाहरणमभाव एषोऽपि मनिन तद् यतो नियतः ।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुद्गलमयश्च ॥ २९ ॥ (१८३८) Kritahādimaltvād mokso nityo na bhavati kumbha iva 1 No pradhvamsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmāpi yad nityaḥ 1128911 (1837)

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Canadharavada
Vada ] Aṇudaharaṇamabhāva eṣo'pi matirna tad yato niyataḥ! Kumbhavināśaviśisto bhāva eva pudgalamayaśca || 290 | ( 1833)]
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Trans. – 289-290 "Like kumbha, moksa is not nitya on account of its artificiality etc. " It is not so. Because, indestructiblity is everlasting on this earth inspite of its (possessing) that property. " (But ) this negation is void of example also.” That is not true. Destruction of kumbha is definite and hence) (its) positiveness is distinguished by means of pudgalas. (1837-1838)
।
टीका - व्याख्या- ननु मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति, किन्त्वनित्यो विनाशी, कृतकत्वात्, आदिशब्दात् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाऽऽदिमत्त्वादिपरिग्रहः । कुम्भवदिति दृष्टान्तः । अत्रोच्यते-अनैकान्तिकता हेतूनाम्, विपक्षेऽपि गमनात्, यस्मादिह घटादिप्रध्वंसाभावः कृतकादिस्वभावोऽपि नित्य एव तदनित्यत्वे घटादेस्तद्रूपतयैवोन्मज्जन प्रसङ्गादिति । अथैवं परस्य मतिः- न केवलं पूर्वोक्तः प्रागभावः किंन्त्वेषोऽपि प्रध्वंसाभावोऽभावत्वेनावस्तुत्वादनुद हरणमेव । तदेतद् न, यतो यस्माद् नियतो निश्चितः कुम्भविनाशविशेषेण विशिष्टः पुद्गलात्मको भाव एवायमपि मध्वंसाभावः । अतो युक्तमेतदुदाहरणमिति । एतच मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ॥ २८९-२९० ॥ ॥ (१८३७-१७३८) ॥
D. C. - Mandika-Moksa is not nitya but it is a- nitya like ghata as it is artificial and adiman in character like ghata.
Bhagavana--It is not SO The hétu advanced by you applies to the vipaksa as well, and hence it is anarkāntika. The pradhvamsābhāva, in case of ghata, for example, is nitya, inspite of its being kritaka. For, if it were a nitya, objects like ghata should have been born in the same form.
Mandika:-But since pradhvamsābhāva is negative in character, you will not be able to cite an example based on it.
Bhagavāna :--It is not negative, O Mandika | but positive ir character. The definite forms of pudgalas found at the

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[The sixth destruction of ghati is nothing but prähvamsābhāvz. The example cited is, therefore, quite proper to the occassion. The same is the case with moksa also. Moksa will never be called a-nitya even if it is believed to possess the properties like kştakatva. 1289-290 (1837-18383
Or, say, Mokşa is not kritaka at all on account of the following reason :कि वेगतेण कयं पोग्गलमत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स । किं निव्वत्तियमहियं नभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि? ।। २९१ ॥ (१८३९) Kim végantéņa kayam pogġalamettavilaymmi jivassa Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi? ॥ 291 ॥ [किंवैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य । किं निर्वतिवमधिकं नमसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ २९१ ॥ (१८३९)
Kim vaikāntena kritam pudgalamātravilaye jivasyai Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamātravilayé ?129111 (1839)]
Trans.--291 ".At the destruction of mere pudagalas, how is jiva alone to be affected ?" "At the destruction of mere ghata, how is sky affected all the more ? (1839)
टीका-किमिह पुद्गलमात्रविलये सति समस्तकर्मपुद्गलपरिशाटसमये जीवस्यात्मनः स्वतत्त्वे रत्तिमादधत एकान्तेन कृतं विहितम्, येन कृतको मोक्षः स्यात् ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-इहात्म-कर्मपुद्ग्लवियोगो मोक्षोऽभिमेतः । तत्र तपःसंयमप्रभावतो जीवात् कर्मणि प्रथर जायमाने किमात्मनः क्रियते, येन कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वं मोक्षस्य प्रतिपाद्यते । अथ स एवात्म-कर्मवियोगः 'क्रियमाणत्वात् कृतकः, ततोऽनित्य इत्याशङ्कयाह-"किं निव्वत्तियमित्यादि" मुद्रादिना घटमात्रस्य विनाशे सति किं नाम नभसोऽभ्यधिक निर्वतितम् ? न किश्चिदित्यर्थः। एवमिहापि कर्ममात्रविनाशे सति किं जीवस्याधिक कृतम् , येन तदेकाकितारूपस्य मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वेनानित्यत्वं स्यात् ?। स एष कर्मणो बिनाशो घटविनाशयत् क्रियमानखात् कृतकः, ततः सर्वकर्मक्षय

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341
*
लक्षणो मोक्षोऽनित्य इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथाऽयमेत्र घटविनाशो यः केवलाकाशसद्भावो न पुनस्ततो विभिन्नोऽसौ न चाकाशस्य किमप्यधिकं क्रियते, तस्य सदावस्थितत्वेन नित्यत्वात् एवमिहाप्ययमेव कर्मणो विनाशो यः केवलात्मसद्भावः, न त्वात्मनो विभिन्नोऽसौ न चात्मनः किञ्चिदधिकं विधीयते, तस्यापि नभोवद नित्यत्वात् । तस्माद् न मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमनित्यत्वं वा । कथञ्चिच्चानित्यत्वं सिद्धसाध्यतैव द्रव्य - पर्यायोभयरूपतया सर्पस्यापि वस्तुनो नित्यानित्यरूपत्वादिति : २९१ ।। (१८३९ ।
•
at
D. C.---Bhagavāna :—Since Moksa is nothing but the separation of Soul from Karma pudgaras, it cannot be artificial all. When. Karma is being separated from iv, how is Atma to be affected to render the Moks a-nitya?
Mandika:-1 he separation of soul from Karma is kitaka owing to its kriyamānalvā. The oksa is, therefore, kritaka and a-nityà too.
Bhagavāna:--When ghata is destroyed by means of hammer etc. the sky is not at all affected. In the same way, when Karma is destroyed, jiva will also remain unaffected. It is not, therefore, proper to believe that Mekṣa is kritaka and a nitya.
Mandika :--Karma being destructible like ghata, like ghata it is kritaka also. Now, since Mokṣa is nothing but the destruction of all Karmas, it is also kṛitaka and hence a-nity also.
Bhagavāna:-Your argument is absolutely false. O Mandika ! Existence of sky persists even if ghat is destroyed The destru cition of ghaya is not bhinna from ākāśa, but at the same time ākāśa is not affected by it also, since it is everlasting. Similarly in case of Karma also, although the destruction of Karmas IS not different from the existence of Soul, the Soul is not affected by it, on account of its being nitya like ākāśa. The Mokṣa is, therefore. never kṛitaka, O Mandika, and never a-nilya also, even if it is a-nutya to the extent that all objects are a-nitya as far as their dravyatva and paryayas are concerned.

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[The sixth
Mandzka:-Since Karma-pudgalas abandoned by jiva in a worn-out condition, stay on in this world (even in that state) why should the Soul separated from Karma, be believed to unite with the worn-out Karma, so that, it may be bound by a fresh bondage again ?
Bhagavāna:-Moksa being nitya, O Mandeka, will again be bound by a fresh bondage. 11291 (1839) #
The everlasting nature of mokṣa is apprehended as follows:—
सोsणवराहो व पुणो न बज्झए बंधकारणाभावा । जोगा य बंधहेऊ न य ते तस्सासरीरोति ॥ २९२ ॥ ( १८४० )
So'ņavarāho vva puņo na bajjhaé bandhakāraṇābhāvā | Joga ya bandha-héŭ na ya te tassasariro tti ||292" (1840)
[ सोऽनपराध इव पुनर्न बध्यते बन्धकारणाभावात् ।
योगाश्व बन्धहेतवो न च ते तस्याशरीर इति ॥ २९२ ॥ ( १८४० ) So'naparādha iva punarna badhyatè bandhakāraṇābhāvāt Yogāśca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyāśarira iti || 292 | ( 1840 ) ]
Trans. – 292 Like an innocent person, it 2. e. Soul) can never be bound (by bandhas) as there is no cause for bondage. On account of its formlessness, it has no cause for bondages. (1840)
,
टीका - स मुक्तो जीवः पुनरपि न बध्यते, बन्धकारणाभावात्, अनपराधपुरुषवत्, मनो- वाक्- काययोगादयश्च बन्धहेतवोऽभिधोयन्ते न च ते मुक्तस्य सन्ति शरीराद्यभावात् । न च कर्मवर्गणागत पुद्गलमात्र संयोगमात्ररूपise बन्धोऽधिक्रियते, अतिप्रसङ्गादिदोषाघातत्वात् किन्तु मिथ्यास्वादितद्धेतुनिबन्धन इति ।। २९२ ।। ( १८४० ) ॥
।
D. C. — In absence of (any) cause for (its ) bandha, like an innocent person, the Soul is free from bandha. Unions of mind, speech, and body etc. are nothing but the causes for

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Vada] Canadharavada
343 (its) bandha. But due to the abhāva of sarira etc., a free Soul is not able to contain them. So, bandha does not take place in absence of samyoga of the multiplication of karmas but it depends upon the hétus such as mith yáiva etc.
Mandika -Like bandhas, you douht as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. | 292 ( 1840 ) ॥
Bhagavāna replies :न पुणो तस्स पसई बीयाभावादिहंकुरस्सेव । बीयं च तस्स कम्मं न य नस्स तयं तओ निच्चो ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)
Na pugo tassa pasūi bîyabhāvādihankurasseva i Biyam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa tayam taö nicco 11293.(1841)
[ न पुनस्तस्य प्रतिबीजाभावादिहाङ्करस्येव । बीजं च तस्य कर्म न च तस्य तत् ततो नित्यः ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)
Na punastasya prasūtibijābhavadihānkurasyeva, Bijam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityaḥ 1129311 (1841)
Trans -- 293. Like a sprout without seed, it has no birth again, since Karma is its seed. It no more belongs to that muktātmā) which in that case, becomes everlasting. (1841)
टीका-न तस्य मुक्तस्य पुनरपि भवतिरुपजायते, बीजामावात्कारणस्यासत्त्वात्, यथाऽङ्करस्य तदभावाद् न प्रसूतिः । बीजं चास्य कर्मवावगन्तव्यम्, तच मुक्तस्य नास्त्येव, ततः पुनरावृत्त्य मावाद् नित्योऽसाविति ॥ २९३ ।। (१८४१)॥
D. C.~-Just as a sprout does not grow without seed, the muktālmā does not take any birth in absence of Karma which acts as its bija. Vhen multālmā is said to have no janma (birth), it goes without saying that he is nitya also. 1293 (1841)11
Also,

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344 Jinabhadra Gagi's
(The sixth दवामुत्तसगओ नहं व निचो मओ.स दव्वतया। सव्वगंयत्सावत्ती मह ति तं नाणुमाणाओ ।। २९४ ॥ (१८४२ )
Davvāmuttattaņaö naham va nicco mai sa davvatayā i Savvgayattāvatti mai tti tam nāņumāņāö ii 294 11 ( 1842 )
. [ द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो नभ इव नित्यो मतः स द्रव्यतया ।
सर्वगतत्वापर्मितिरिति तद् नानुमानात् ।। २९४ ॥ (१८४२)
Dravyāmürtatvato nabha iva nityo mataḥ sa dravyatayā Sarvagatatvāpattir matiriti tad nānumānāt :1 294 1 ( 1842 ) )
Trans.--294 By substantiality, it is considered as nitya like sky, on account of ( both ) substantiality, as well as, incorporeal nature. The belief that it is all-pervading, is not ( acceptible ) on account of anumāna. ( 1842 )
टीका-स मुक्तात्मा नित्य इति प्रतिज्ञा । “दव्यामुतत्तणउ ति" द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वादिति हेतुः । “दव्वतय ति" यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्त नम इति दृष्टान्तः । अथैवंभूता मति परस्य स्यात्-अनेन हेतुना सर्वगतत्वापत्तिरप्यात्मनः सिध्यति; तथाहि-सर्वगत आत्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात. नमोधत् । ततश्च धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? । अनुमानात्-अनुमानबाधितत्वात् सर्वगतत्वस्येत्यर्थः; तथाहिअसर्वगत आत्मा, कर्तृत्वात् . कुलालवत् । न च कर्तृत्वमसिद्धम् . भोक्तृत्वद्रष्टुत्वाचनुपपत्तरिति ॥ २९४ ।। ( १८४२)
___D. C.-- Like akas'a, and is nitya on account of its dravyatvu as well as a mūrtatvx. But it is not appropriate to believe that almā is all--pervading like (kās'a. The soul is a-sarvagata like potter, on account of its kartritvx. For, otherwise, it will lose serveral of its own characteristics like Bhokiratva, a-dristatva etc || 224 ( 1842 ) । को वा निश्चग्गाहो सव्वं चिय वि भव-भंग-द्विइमइयं । पजायंतरमेत्तपणादनिच्चाइववएमो ॥ २९५ ॥ ( १८४३ )

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
345 Ko vă niccaggāho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-ţthiimaiyam Pajjāyantaramettappaņādaaiccäivasso 1 295 !" ! 1843 )
[ को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-भग-स्थितिमयम् ।
पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ २९५ ॥ (१८४३) Ko và nityagrahah sarvamevāpi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam i Paryāyāntaramātrārpaņādantiyādivyapadeśah 11 265 11 ( 1843 ) }
Trans.—295 Or, what (of) assuming nityata ? Everything is susceptible to the state of production, destruction, and existence. Only by, the imposition of various methods, attributes like transitoriness etc., are designated ( 1843 )
टीका-गतार्था, नवरं पर्यायान्तरमात्रस्यार्पणं प्रधानभावेन विवक्षणं तस्मादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः, तथाहि घटःपूर्वेण मृत्पिण्डपर्यायेण विनश्यति. घटपर्यायतया पुनरुत्पद्यते. मृद्रपतया त्ववतिष्ठते । ततश्च यो विनष्टरूपतादिपर्यायो यदार्पितः प्रधानभूतो विवक्ष्यते, तदा तेनानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेशः । एवमसावपि मुक्तः संसारितया विनष्टः, सिद्धतयोत्पन्नः, जीवत्व-सोपयोगत्वादिभिस्त्ववतिष्ठते, तथा, प्रथमसमयसिद्धतया विनश्यति. द्विसमयसिद्धतयोत्पद्यते, द्रव्यत्व-जीवत्वादिभिस्त्ववतिष्ठते । ततोऽर्पितपर्यायेणानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेश इति ।। २९५ ।। ( १८४३ ) ।।
D. C.-It is useless to insist that a free soul is exclusi. vely nitya. Attributes like a-nityatā could be indicated by
means of various methods. Before ghata comes - into existence, as a particular shape of earth it vanishes and comes into existence as a particular shape of earth named ghata, and continues to exist in that state after its production also.
The same is the case with muktātmā. The muktāmā also vanishes as a mundane, comes into existence as mukta and continues to be in that state by virtue of its life and utility. So, it vanishes at the first time as it is established, comes into existence by virtue of its being established at the second time
44

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346 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The sixth and continues to be in that state on account of its dravyatva, jivatva etc
- In this way, by means of different paryāyas, the attributes like a-nityatā, are imposed. मुत्तस्स कोऽवगासो सोम्म ! तिलोगसिहरं गई किह से ?। कम्मलहुया नहागइपरिणामाई हि भनियमिदं ।। २९६ ।। (१८४४) Muttassa ko'vagāso somma ! tilogasiharam, gai kiha se? Kamimalahuya tahāgaiparinamaihim bhaniyamidanm ॥296॥ (1844)
[मुक्तस्य कोऽवकासः सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, गतिः कथं तस्य ?। कर्मलघुता तथागतिपरिणामादिमिभणितमिदम् ॥ ९६ ।। (१८४४)
Muktasya ko'vakāšah saumya I trilokasik haram.gatih katham tasya ? 1 Karmalaghutā tathāgatipārināmādibhir-bhaạitamidam 1129611 (1844)]
Trans.--296 What is the resort of the free Soul ? It is the end of three worlds 0 Saumy, l What is the rate of its movement ? It is said that the Soul attains molsz at one moment by (virtue of ) the want of a Karma, as well as, by (virtue of) the (natural) tendency of its movement etc. 11844)
टीका-मुक्तम्य क्षोणसमस्तकर्मणो जीवस्य कोऽवकाशः कावस्थानम् ? इति पृष्टे सत्याह-सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, लोकान्त इत्यर्थः । ननु कथं 'से' तस्याकर्मणो जीवस्यैतावद् दरमितो गतिः प्रवर्तते ? । कर्मनिबन्धना हि जीवानां सर्वापि चेष्टा. ततो विहायोगत्यादिकाभावेऽपि गतिचेष्टायामतिप्रसङ्गः प्राप्नोति। अत्रोच्यते--"कम्मलहुय ति" कर्मापगमे सति लाघवात् समयमेकं तदतिमवृत्तिरित्यर्थः, तथागतिपरिणामात्-कर्मक्षये सिद्धत्ववदपूर्वगतिपरिणामलाभादित्यर्थः, यथा हि समस्तकर्मक्षयादपूर्व सिद्धत्वपरिणामं जीवः समासादयति, तथोर्ध्वगतिपरिणाममपीति भावः। आदिशन्दादपरमपि तद्गतिकारणं समयभणितमिदमवगन्तव्यम्, तद्यथा-लाउ य एरंडफळे अग्गी धूमो य इसु धणुविमुक्को। गह पुत्वपओगेणं एवं सिद्धाण वि गई उ॥ १ ॥ २९६ ॥ (१८४४)।

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Vă a ]
Gaṇadharavāda
D. C-Mandika:-Where do the Mukta souls reside?
Bhagavana:-They reside at the end of the three worlds
O Saumya!
347
move to
Mandika:-How do jivas such a long distance even if they are unaccompanied by Karmas? All sorts of movements of a jiva depend upon Karma, and hence, how will extensive movements such as moving in the sky etc be possible at all?
an
Bhagavana :-0 Blessed Manḍika! Just as soul attains unprecedented achivement when karma is destroyed, in the same way, the soul proceeds with the same movement and during the same period (of time).
Moreover, just as gourd, fruit of a castor plant, fire, smoke, arrow wafted from a bow etc. make movements by means of previous impellations, in the same way, a muktātmā is also able to make movement by means of previous impellations etc. 11296|| (1844)
कि सक्तिरियमरूवं मंडिय ! भुवि चेयणं न किमरूवं ? |
जह से विसेसधम्मो चेयन्नं तह मया किरिया ।। २९७ ।। (१८४५)
Kim sakkiriyamaruvam Maṇḍdiya' bhuvi ceyaṇam ca kimarūvam ? Jaha sé visésadhammo céyanam taha maya kiriyā 297 (1845)
[ किं सक्रियरूपं मण्डिक ! भुवि चेतनं च किमरूपम् ? ।
यथा तस्य विशेषधर्मश्चैतन्यं तथा मता क्रिया ।। २९७ ।। (१८४५) Kim sakriyamarūpam Maṇḍika! bhuvi cétanam ca kimarupam? Yatha tasya viseṣadharmascaitanyam tathā matā kriyā #297|| (1845)
Trans.-297 What is movable (when it is formless) ? And, O Mandika, what is living (when it is formless)? Like consciousness, movement is also the distinctive characteristic of Soul. (1845)

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Jinabhadra (taņi's
[ The sixth टीका-नन्दाफाश-कालादयोऽमूर्ती निष्क्रिया एव प्रसिद्धाः, वत् किं नाम त्वयाऽरूपममूर्त सद् वस्तु सक्रियं दृष्टं, येन मुक्तात्मनः सनियखमभ्युपगम्यते ?-ननु निष्क्रिय एव मुक्तात्मा पामोति, अतखात्, आकाशवदिति मावः । अत्रोच्यते-मण्डिक ! त्वमप्येतत् कथय, भुवि किमरूपं सद्वस्तु चेतनं वीक्षितम्, येन मुक्तात्मा चेतनोऽभ्युपगम्यते ?-अमूर्तत्वादचेतन एवायं पामोति, आकाशवदिति। तस्माद् यथा "से" तस्य जीवस्यारूपेभ्य आकाशादिभ्यस्तद्रूपत्वे समानेऽन्योऽपि चैतन्यलक्षणो विशे. षधर्मः समस्ति, तथा क्रियापि मता, सक्रियत्वमपि विशेषधर्मोऽस्तु को विरोधः ? इति भावः ।। २९७ ॥ (१८४५) ॥
D. C.--Maņņika:--The a-mūrta ( objects like ) ākāśa and kala are well known as niskriya Then, how did you apprehend * formless object like muktālmā to sa-kriya ? Since it is a műtrā line ākāśa, it should also be niskriya like ākāśa.
Bhagavāna:--What a-murta object have you seen to be sacetana in this world, in order to accept muktātmā as sacetana ? Just as ākāśa is acétana on account of its amürtatva, the muktātmā should also be acetana as a rule. But it is not so. Por, although ātmā resenibles ākāśa in respect of a murtatoo, it possesses a distinct characteristic of cétanā, within which krijā is also included. So, sa-kriyatva or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of muklātmā. There is no doubt about it 11297||(1845)
Or, leaving that distinction of mukta and a-mukta aside, it could also be argued that
कत्ताइसणओ वा सकिरिओऽयं मओ कुलालो व्च । देहप्फंदणओ वा पञ्चक्खं जंतपुरिसो ब्व ।। २९८ ।। (१८४६) Kataittanaj và sakkirioyam mai kulalo vva Déhapphanda aö vă paccahkham jantapuriso va 129811 ( 1846 ) [ कादित्वतो वा सक्रियोऽयं मतः कुलाल इव ।
हस्पन्बनसो वा प्रत्यक्षं यन्त्रपुरुष इव ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

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Vida ] Gañadharavāda
349 Kartrāditvato và sakriyo'yam matah kūlāla iva i Dehaspandanato vā pratak sam yantrapurusa iva ॥29811 (1846)]
Trans.--298 Like a potter, it is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc, or (it is active: like a mechanical person, on account of the directly perceptible movement of (its) body (1846)
टीका-अथवा, सक्रियोऽयमात्मा, कर्तृत्वात्, कुलालवत् । आदिश. ब्दाद् “भोक्तृत्वात् " इति वाच्यत् । अथवा, सक्रिय आत्मा पत्यक्षत एव देहपरिस्पन्ददर्शनात्, यन्त्रपुरुषवदिति ॥ २९८ ।। (१८४६) ॥ ॥
D. C.---The Soul sould be taken as sakızya as a potter on account of its kartritva and broktritva. Or, it is sakriya, like a J'antra-purusa on account of the pratyaksa movements of its body 12980 ( 1846 ] देहप्फंदणहेऊ होज पयत्तो त्ति सो वि नाकिरिए। होजादिट्ठो व मई तदरूवत्ते नणु समाणं ॥ २९९ ।। (१८४७) रूवित्तम्मि ‘स देहो वचो तप्कंदणे गुणो हेऊ। पइनिययपरिप्फंदणमचेयगाणं न वि य जुत्तं ।। ३०० ॥ (१८४८)
D9happhandanahéū hojja payatto tti so vi nākiriér Hojjādittho va mai tadarūvatte naŋu samāṇam 1129911 ( 1847)
Rūvittammi sa dého vacco tapphandané puņo héū i Painiyayaparipphandanamaceyananam na vi ya juttam || 300) [देहस्पन्दनहेतुर्भवेत् प्रयत्न इति सोऽपि नाक्रिये । भवेददृष्टो वा मतिस्तदरूपत्वे ननु समानम् ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७) रूपित्वे स देहो वाच्यस्तत्स्पन्दने पुनर्हेतुः ।
प्रतिनियतपरिस्पन्दनमचेतनानां नापि युक्तम् ।। ३०० ।। (१८४८) Dehaspandanahétur bhavét prayatna iti so’pi nākriyè , Bhavedadrişto vá matistadarüpatve nanu samānām 1,29911 (1847)

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( The sixth Rūpitve sa deho vācyastatspandane punar hetub i Pratiniyataparispandanamacétanānāni nãpi yuktam 130014 ( 1848 ; )
Trans.--299 300 It may be ( your opiniou ) that the effort ( on part of Soul; may be the cause of bodily movement. ( But ) even that is not possible ) in case of motionless ( Soul ). Or, ( it may be believed that / the hete is ir visible and resembles it in formlessness. ( If it is said that ) by reson of forin it is called déhir, there should certaiuly be ( sone, reson hehind ( its ) movement. But the regular movement of lifeless ( objects ) is not justified. ( 1847-1848 )
टीका-अथवं बूषे-देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुरात्मनः प्रयत्नो न तु क्रिया, अतो नाप्मनः सक्रियत्वसिद्धिरित्यमिमायः । अत्रोत्तरमा-सोऽपि प्रयत्नो नभसीवाक्रिय आत्मनि न संभवति, अतः सक्रिय एवासौ। अमूर्तस्ग च प्रयत्नस्य देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुत्वे कोऽन्यो हेतुरिति वाच्यम् ? । अन्यहेतु निरपेक्षः स्वत एवायं परिस्पन्दहेतुरिति चेत् । यद्येवम्, आत्मापि तद्धतुर्भविष्यति, किभन्तर्गतेन प्रयत्नेन । अथादृष्टः कोऽपि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः, न त्वात्मा, निष्क्रियत्वात् । ननु सोऽप्यदृष्टः किं मूर्तः, अमूर्ती वा ?। यद्य मूर्तः, तात्मापि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः किं नेष्यते, अमूर्तत्वाविशेषात् ? । अथभृतिमानदृष्टः, तहि स कार्मणशरीरलक्षणो देह एव नान्यः संभवति । तस्यापि च बहिदेश्यदेहपरिस्पन्दहेतुतया व्यामियमाणस्य परिस्पन्द्रो द्रष्टव्यः, तस्य चान्यो हेतुर्वाच्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्य , तस्यापि चान्य इत्यनवस्था । अथ स्वमावादेवादृष्टस्य कार्मणदेहस्य परिस्पन्दः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि बहिर्दश्यस्यापि देदस्य तत एव तत्पत्तिर्भविष्यति, विभदृष्टकार्मणदेहपरिकल्पनेन ? । अस्त्वेमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, अचेतनानामेवंभूतमतिनियतविशिष्टपरिस्पन्दनस्य स्वाभाविकत्वानुपपत्तेः, “ नित्यं सत्वममत्त्वं वा हेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात्" इत्यादिदोषमसङ्गात् । तस्मात् कर्मविशिष्ट आत्मैव प्रतिनियतदेहपरिस्पन्दनहेतुत्वेन व्यापियत इति सक्रियोऽसाविति ॥२९९-३०० ॥ (१८४७-१८४८ ) ॥
D. C.--- Mandıka: The hétu for movements of a body is the

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
351 effort on the part ) of Soul and not the kriyā. It is therefore, not proper to take åtmā to be sakriya
Bhagavāna:- If the ātmā is niskriya, the effort cannot exit into it. and hence it is undoubtedly sakriya. What other hétu is to be understood in accepting the a-mūrta effort as a hétu for bodily movements ? If it is said that without the apéksā of another hétu, this effort itself becomes the hétu in the déha-spanda the Soul will also be called the hèlu of these bodily movements. Vhat is the use of intervening praya'ra in such a case
Mondika:--There is some invisible hétu in the movements of deha, but atmå being nışkreya cannot act as hetu in those movenients,
Bhagavāna' ls that invisible ( hétu ) mürta or a-mūrta ? If a-mūrta, why not take ātinā as hétu in the deha parispanda since it is also a-miirtą ? And if that a-arista is mūrta, it is nothing but kārmaņa sarira. How, if that kārmana sarira is used as the hétu of bākya sarira there must be some other hetu for the parispandana of the above-mentioned kār maņa sarira This in turn, will have a third hètu for its parispanda and that a fourth one and so on, until ultimattely there is complete disorder Again, if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an adpişta kārmana sarira is caused by no other hétu than its own svnbhāva so that there may not be any sort of an runstlā, then pirisponda of bahjat sarir as will also be caused by svabhāva, so that there may not be any sense in assuming the Qurista kirmaņ sarira.
Mandzka: -- I don't mind if the parispandu is taken to have been caused by svabhāva.
Bhardvāna: -. But it is not reasonable to helieve like that. The definite type of the prispanda like this is never possible in case of acétand objects, because tha: which is indipendent of any other kétu is either everlasting or absolutely transitory.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The sixth
The only alternative to accept, therefore, is that ātmā which is distinguished by karma is the hétu of dekaparispanda and hence sakriya also. #299-300 (1847-1848)]
होउ किरिया भवत्थस्स कम्मरहियस्स किंनिमित्ता सा । नणु तग्गइपरिणामा जह सिद्धत्तं नहा सा वि ॥ ३०१ ॥ (१८४९)
Höu kiriyā bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kimnimittā sā? | Nanu taggaiparināmā jaha siddhattam tahā sā vi 13011 (1849)
[ भवतु क्रिया भवस्थस्य कर्मरहितस्य किंनिमित्ता सा ? ननु तद्गविपरिणामाद् यथा सिद्धत्वं तथा सापि । ३०१ (१८४९) Bhavatu kriya bhavasthasya karmarahitasya kimnimitttā sā? Nanu tadgatiparināmād yathā siddhatvam tathā sāpi 301|| (1849)]
Trans. - 301 Alright : "How is the action of the mundane (Soul). separated from Karma, to be accounted for?" "Certainly from their pariņāma. Just as perfection is attributed to it, in the same way, activity is also attributed to it. ” ( 1849)
fs सिद्धालयपरओ न गई, धम्मत्थिकायविरहाओ ।
सो गइउग्गहकरो लोगम्मि जमत्थि नालोए ॥ ३०२ ॥ (१८५० )
Kim siddhālayaparaö na gaî, dhammatthikāyavirahão | So gaiuvagghakaro logammi jamatthi nāloé | 3021 (1850)
-[ किं सिद्धालयपरतो न गतिः, धर्मास्तिकायविरहात् ।
स गत्युपग्रहकारो लोके यदस्ति नालोके ।। ३०२ || (१८५०)
Kim siddhālayaparato na gatiḥ, dharmāstikāyavirahät | Sa gatyupagrahakāro loke yadasti nāloké 302
(1850) ]
to
Trans.---302 Why not the movement (of Soul) extend; beyoud Siddhalaya ? Because of the absence of the predicament of dharmāstikāya. That being the impeller of motion, resides in this world, and not in the spiritual world. (1850)

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Vada ]
Ganadharavāda टीका-ययुक्तन्यायेन मुक्तस्य गतिक्रियया सक्रियत्वमियते, तर्हि सिद्धाभयात् सिद्धावस्थितिक्षेत्रात परतोऽलोकेऽपि किमिति तस्य गतिर्न प्रवर्तते ? । अत्रोच्यते-परतो धर्मास्तिकायविरहात् । तद्विरहोऽपि कुतः ? इत्याह-यद् यस्मादसौ धर्मास्तिकायो लोक एव समस्ति, नालोके। मा भूदसावलोके, किं तेन प्रस्तुतानुपयोगिना कर्तव्यम्, तद्विरहेऽपि भवतु मुक्तस्य तत्र गतिः, नियमामावात् ? । तदयुक्तम्, यतो जीवानां पुग्दलानां च गतेगमनस्योपग्रह उपष्टम्भस्तत्कारी स एव धर्मास्तिकायो नान्यः, ततस्तस्यालोकेऽभावात् कर्य लोकात् परवोऽलोकेऽपिमुक्तात्मनांगतिः प्रवर्तते ? इति ॥३०२।।(१८५०)
D. C.--Mandıka:-If muktalmā were sakriya by virtue of its movement, why should it not move beyond Siddhālaya also :
Bhagavana:-It cannot move beyond Siddhalaya, because dharmastikaya or the predicament of motion, does not exist in the a-loka.
Mandikar-What of that? Even if dharmāstikaya does not exist in the a-loka, muklāmā can acced to it without dharmāstıkāya.
Bhagavana:--That is not possible. O Mandika. It is the predicament of motion that impels muktāmā to move. Hence, if dhar māstıkāya does not exist in the aloka, mukłātmā is unable to move towards it 1302 (1850) लोगस्स स्थि विवक्खो सुद्वत्तणओ घडस्त अघडो व्व । स घडाइ चिय मई न निसेहाओ तदणुरूवो ॥ ३०३ ॥ १८५१) Logassa tthi vivakkho suddhattapao ghadassa a-ghado vva i Sa ghadāi cciya mai na niséhão tadaņurūvo 1130311 (1851) [लोकस्यास्ति विपक्षः श्रुद्धत्वतो घटस्याघट इव । स घटादिरेव मतिर्न निषेधात् तदनुरूपः ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)
Lokasyästi vipakşaḥ śruddhatvato ghatasyāghata iva Sa ghațădireva matir na nişédhāt tadanūrūpaḥ 1130311 ( 1851 )]
N

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[The sixth Trans. --- 303 As ghata has a gkata ( as its opposite) loka also has its opposite, because of its. etymological distinction. The view that it is nothing but ghata etc. is (also ) not (acceptible). (For), by means of negation (something) of its own kind ( is understood !, ' 851 i
टीका-अस्ति लोकस्य विपक्षः, व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदाभिधेययत्वात् , इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्ता शुद्धपदेनाभिधीयते तस्य विपक्षो इष्टः, यथा घटस्याघटः, यश्च लोकस्य विपक्षः सोऽलोकः। अथ स्यान्मतिः----"न लोकोऽलोकः” इति यो लोकस्य विपक्षः म घटादिपदार्थानामन्यतम एव भविष्यति, किमिह वस्त्वन्तरपरिकल्पनया ?। तदेतद् न, पयुदासनमा निषेधात् निषेध्यस्यैवानुरूपोऽत्र विपक्षोऽन्यवेषणीयः, “न लोकोऽलोकः" इत्यत्र लोको निषेध्यः, सचाकाशविषयः, अतोऽलोकेनापि तदनुरूपेण भवितव्यम्, यथा " इहापण्डितः", इत्युक्ते विशिष्टज्ञानविकलश्चेतन एव पुरुषषिशेषो गम्यते, नाचेतनो घटादिः. एवमिहापि लोकानुरूप एवालोको मन्तव्यः उक्तं च--
"नयुक्तमिवयुक्तं वा यद्धि कार्य विधीयते ।
तुल्याधिकरणेऽन्यस्मिल्लोकेऽप्यर्थगतिस्तथा ॥ १॥ "नश्-इवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा यंगति । तस्माल्लोकविपक्षवादस्त्यलोक इति ॥ ३०३ ।। (१८५१)
D. C.-From the point of view of etymology, just as ghata has its opposite (word) a-ghita, loka must also have its opposite word a--loka It is not justificeable to assume that a-lokus is also the opposite of ghütt. prta etc By means of nişédhā something of its own kind is understood. Just as by the word e-paņdila a living person having no scholarship is meant but not the inanimate objects like ghata and pața, so here also, by the nışédha of loka, nothing but a loka should be understood. And it has also been said that.
Nanyuktamiva yuktam vā yaddhi kāryani vidhiyaté! Tuyladhikarané' nyasminlloke' pyarthagatis tathā.

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355 So, a-loka alone is the vipakşa of loka 130311 (1851) तम्हा धम्मा-धम्मा लोयपरिच्छेयकारिणा जुत्ता। इहरागासे तुल्ले लोगोऽलोगो सि को भेओ ? ॥ ३०४॥ (१८५२) लोगविभागाभावे पडिघायाभावआऽणवत्थाओ। संववहाराभावो संबंधाभावओ होज्जा ।। ३०५ ॥ (१८५३) Tamhã dhamma dhamma loyaparicchéyakāriņo juttă 1 Jharāgāsé tullé logo logo tti ko bhèö ? 030411 (1852) Lagavibhágábhāvé padighāyābhāvao'ŋavatthāö i Samvavahārābhāvo sambandhābhāvao hojjä 11 305 11 ( 1853 )
[तस्माद् धर्मा-ऽधमौ लोकपरिच्छेदकारिणौ युक्तौ । इतरथाकाशे तुल्ये लोकोऽलोक इति को भेदः ? ।। ३०४ ॥ (१८५२) लोकाविभागाभावे प्रतिघाताभावतोऽनवस्थातः ।
संव्यवहाराभावः संबन्धाभावतो भवेत् ॥ ३०५ ॥ (१८५३) Tasmad dharmā-'dharmau lokapariccheda kāri au yuktau i Itarathäkäse tulyé loko'loka iti ko bhédah ? 13041 ( 1852 ) ] Lokavibhāgābhāvé pratighātābhāvato'navasthātaḥ Samvyavahārārabhāvaḥ sambandhābhāvato bhavét 3051 (1853)]
Trans:--304-305 Thus, { predicaments of ) motion and rest are employed as the causes of destruction of loka. Otherwise, when the sky is common ( everywhere) how are ' loka' and aloka.' ( to be ) distinguished ? In absence of the divisions of loka, there will be no reaction, and hence no (scope for) stability; so also, there will be scope for mutual relation as there will be no connection (between them) (1852-1853)
टीका-यस्मादुक्तमकारेणास्त्यलोकः, तस्मादलोकास्तित्वादेवावश्य छोकपरिच्छेदकारिभ्यां धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायाभ्यां भवितव्यम; अन्यथाssकाशे सामान्ये सति " अयं लोकः" "अयं चालोकः" इति किंकृतोऽयं

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[ The sixth विशेषः स्यात् ? । तस्माद् यत्र क्षेत्रे धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ वर्तेते, तल्लोकः
शेष न्वलांक इति लोका-ऽलोकव्यवस्थाकारिणौ धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्विकागे विद्यते इति । 'लोगेत्यादि " यदि हि धर्मा-ऽधर्माभ्यां लोकविभागो न स्यात्, ततो लोकविभागाभावेऽविशिष्ट एवं सर्वस्मिनप्यकाशे गति: परिणतानां जीवानां पुद्ग्लानां च प्रतिघाताभावेन् तद्गत्यवस्थानामावादलोकेऽपि गमनात, तस्य चानन्तत्वात् तेषां परस्परं संबन्धो न स्यात् । ततश्चौदारिकादिकार्मणवर्गणापर्यन्तपुद्ग्लकृतो जीवानां पन्ध-मोक्ष-मुखदुःख-भवसंसरणादिव्यवहारो न स्यात् । जीवस्य च जीवेन सहान्योन्यमी लनामावात् तत्कृतोऽनुपग्रहो-पघातादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति ।।३०४-३०५॥ (१८५२-१८५३) ।
D. C.-When the existence of a-loka is 'accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest, are also sccepted to exist. Otherwise, akasa being common everywhere, loka and a-loka will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of dharma and a-dharma exist, there is loka, and the rest is called a-loka. If there were no distinction between loka and a-loka by means of dharma and a dharma, pratighāta of various sivas and pudgalas in the this world, will not be possible. •Consequently, there will be no scope for gati and avasthāna to lead them to e-loka. Jivas and pudgalas wil then become ananta; there will be nothing like mutual relation between thein, and the attributes of bandha and mokṣa will also be no longer existing between them. #304–305H (1852–1853)]
निरणुग्गहसणाओ न मई परओ जलादिव शसस्स। जो गमणाणुग्गहिया सो धम्मो लोगपरिमाणो ॥ ३०६ ।। ( १८५४ )
Niranuggahattaņāð na gai paras jalādiva jhasassa 1 Jo gamaņānuggahiyā so dhammo logaparimāņo 130611 (1854) [निरनुग्रहत्वाद् न गतिः परतो जलादिव अपत्य । योगमनानुग्रहीता स धर्मों लोकपरिमाणः ॥ ३०६॥ (१८५४)

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Ganadharavāda Niranugrahatvad na gatih parato jaladiva jhaşasyai Yo gamanánugrahitā sa dharmo loka-parimāṇaḥ 306 I (1854)}
Trans.-306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water, ( their ) movement also does not extend beyond (loka). The predicament of dharmāstikaya which is favourable to ( their ) movement, becomes the only measuring unit of wka. (1854).
टीका-ततो लोकात् परतोऽलोके जीव-पुद्गलानां म गतिः, निरनुब्रहत्त्वात्-~~-तत्र गत्यनुग्रह कतुरभावादित्यर्थः, यथा जलात् परतो झपस्य मत्स्यस्य गतिन भवति, उपग्राहकाभावादिति । यश्चात्र जीव-पुद्ग्लगतेरनुप्रहकर्ता स लोकपरिमाणो धर्मास्तिकाय इति ॥ ३०६ ।। (१८५४ ) ॥
D. C. Just as fish cannot move out of water, as there will be no upagrūlaka of their movement, so also, jivas and pudgaias
will have no access to the a-loka, as es-loka in not favourable to their movement. It is predicament of dharmästukaja which acts as the upagrāhaka of the movements of jivas and pudgalas, the measures the worth of loka ||3061 (1854)
अत्थि परिमाणकारी लोगस्स पमेयभावओऽवस्सं । नाणं पिव नेयस्सालोगस्थित्ते य सोऽवस्सं ॥ ३०७॥ (१८५५ ) Atthi parimăñakāri logassa pamėyabhāvao'vassam, Năņam piva néyassålogatthitté ya so'vassam 30711 (1855)
[अस्ति परिमाणकारी कोकस्य प्रमेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्यालोकास्तित्वे च सोऽवश्यम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५) Asti parimanakāri lokasya prameyabhāvato’yaśyam Jnanamiva jnéyasyālokāstitve ca so'vaśyam 1/30/11 (1855)]
Trans. -- 307 Just as jñāra measures the jnéya, similarly, in the midst of (the existence of) a-loka, it li, e., dharmästikaga) also, acts undoubtedly as the measuring unit of loki on account of its finiteness. (1855)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth टीका-अस्ति लोकस्य परिमाणकारी. प्रमेयात्, ज्ञानामिव ज्ञेयस्य । अथवा, जीवाः पुद्गलाश्च लोकोऽभिधीयते, ततोऽस्ति तत्परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात् , यथा शाल्वादीनां प्रस्थः, यश्चेह परिमाता स धर्मास्तिकायः, स चावश्यमलोकस्यास्तित्व एव युज्यते, नान्यथा. आकाशस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्माली काग्रे सिद्धस्यावस्थानमिति प्रस्तुतम् ।। ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)
D. C - Since lola is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of ideasuring unit like jñānu, which is the measuring unit of the pné:a. The measuring unit of loka is dharmāstıkaya or the predicament of motion, which exists only if loka exists, and 110t ori.orwise. Su, on the top of loku, the avasihāna of Siddha or multilinā must necessarily be accepted 1130711 (1855)]
पयणं पसत्तमेव थागाभो तं च नो जओ छट्ठी । इह कत्तिल श्वणेथं कत्तुरणत्यंतरं थाणं ।। ३०८ ॥ (१८५६ ) Payanam pasatiamevam thăņāo tam ca no jav chatthii lha kattilakkaréyam katuranatthantaram thānam | 308 ॥ (1856) [पतनं प्रसक्तमेवं स्थानात् तश्च नो यतः षष्ठी। डह कर्तृलक्षणेयं कर्तरनर्थान्तरं स्थानम् ।। ३०८ ।। ( १८५६ )
Patanam prasaktamevam sthānät tacca no yatah şaşthi 1 Tha kartrilaksaneyam karturanarthāntaram sthānam 13081 (1856)]
Trans.-308 " Falling from ( a fixed ) position is thus attributed ( to t ). " It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sence of Nominative. Location is not different iront subject in this case. " ( 1856 )
टीका-ननु ' स्थीयतेऽस्मिनिति स्थानम् ' इत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽयं शब्दः । ततश्च सिद्धस्य स्थानं सिद्धस्थानमिति समासः । ततश्चवं सति सिद्ध स्य पतनं प्रसक्तम्, स्थानात, पर्वत-पादपाययस्थितदेवदत्तस्येव, फलस्येव चा। यस्य किल कापि पर्वतादाववस्थानं, तस्य कदाचित् कस्यापि पतनमपि दृश्यते, अतः सिद्धस्यापि तत् कदाचित् पामोतीति भावः। तच्च न, यतः

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359 "सिद्धस्य स्थानम्" इतीयं कर्तरिषष्ठी। ततश्च “ सिदस्य स्थानम् " इति कोऽर्थ ?-सिद्धस्तिष्ठति, न तु तदर्थान्तरभूतस्थानमस्तीति ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६ ) ॥
___D C..--Mandika:--Sthana means place of location So, when the place of location of a sildha being is accepted as existing, the characteristic of falling from that place, should also be attributed to it as in the case of Dévadotter or a fruit falling from the sunimit of a mountain or tree, as the case may be. Everything is bound to fall from the place of its location and suddha is no exception to it.
Bhagavāna: -It is not so. The phrase " Siddhasya sthānam" shows that the words Siditha " is in the Genitive case used in the Nominative sense, “ Sıdılhasya sthānam " means, therefore, the place where Siddhz resides, but it is not different from Sitthali 308 ।। (1856)।
Or,
नहनिच्चत्तणओ वा थाणविणासपयाणं न जुत्तं से । तह कम्माभावाओ पुणाक्रियाभावओ वा वि ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७) Nahaniccattajao vā thāņaviņāsapayāņam na juttam se Taha kam mābhāvāö punnakkiyābhāvaö vă vi ll 306 !! ( 1857 )
[नभोनित्यत्वतो वा स्थानविनाशपतनं न युक्तं तस्य । ___ तथा कर्माभावात पुनः क्रियाभावतो वापि ॥ ३०० ।। ( १८५७ ) Nabhonityatvato vā sthānavināśapatanam na yuktam tasyai Tatha karmabhavat puuan kriyābhāvato vapi || 309 ॥ ( 1857)"
___Trans. -309 Neither destruction nor its : falling from the place of its location, is possible on account of its being nilya like ākāsa, as well as, due to the absence of kriyā or even for want of Karm.. ( 1857 )
टीका-अर्थान्तरलेऽपि स्थानस्य न पतनं सिद्रस्य, यतोऽस्त्यर्थान्तर

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[ The sixth
•
स्थानं नम एव तस्य च नित्यत्वाद् विनाशो न युक्तः, तदभावे च कृतः पतनं मुक्तस्य ? | कर्म चात्मनः पतनादिक्रियाकारणम्, मुक्तस्यं च कर्माभावात् कृतः पतनक्रिया ? या च समयमेकमस्याप्यूर्ध्वं गतिक्रिया, तस्याः कारणं लाउ य एरंडफळे " इत्यादिना दर्शितमेव । पुनःक्रिया च मुक्तस्य नास्ति कारणाभावात् । निजप्रयत्न- प्रेरणा - ssकर्षण - विकर्षणशुरुत्वादयो हि पतनकारणम्, तत्संभवथ मुकस्य नास्ति, हेतोरभावात्, इति कुतोऽस्य पतनम् ? | इति ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७) ॥
4.
}
D. C - Even if sthāna were taken to be distinct from siddha it is not proper to believe that siddha falls from the sthāna, which itself is destructible. Since sthana is nitya like ākāśa, it would never meet destruction In the process of falling, Karma is the essential factor, Now since muktātmā is free from Karma, the process of falling cannot come into existence for want of Karma. Moreover, impellation by ones' own elforts, attraction, repulsion and weightiness etc. are also important causes of--the patana kriya, but since all of them are absent in muktātmā, the patanı of muktātina from its sthāna is not possible from that view point also. 1309 (1857) ]
Beside
निचथाणाओ वा वोमाईणंपडणं पसज्जेज्जा ।
अह न मयमणेगंतो थाणाओऽवस्स पडणं ति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)
N:ccathāņão vā vomāîņampaḍaṇam pasajjéjjā !
Aha na mayamaneganto thānāo 'vassa padanam ti 310 (1858) [ नित्यस्थानाद् वा व्योमादीनां पतनं प्रसज्येत ।
अथ न मतमनेकान्तः स्थानादवश्यं पतनमिति ।। ३१० । (१८५८) Nityasthānād vā vyomādinām patanam prasajyeta i Atha na matamanekānfåh sthānādavasyam patanamiti 1310 (1858)
Trans. - 310 Or, if the fall from permanent abode (is admitted) the fall of sky, will also be caused. And if that is

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not admitted, the statement that "Falling from the place of location is inevitable” becomes uncertain. (1858)
(6
टीका ननु च स्थानात् पतनम् " इति स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदम्, अस्थानादेव पतनस्य युज्यमानत्वात् । अथ स्थानादपि पतनमिष्यते, तहिं नित्यमेव स्थानाद् व्योपादीनां पतनं प्रसज्येत । अथ न तत् तेषां मतम्, वर्हि “ स्थानात् पतनम् " इन्यनैकान्तिकमेवेति ॥ ३१० ॥ (१८५८)
D. C.-The statement that everything has to fall from its sthāna is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the avasthana or the abode, and not from the sthana. If falling from sthāna were believed, the nitya objects like ākāśa will also have to meet patana, from their nitya sthānas.
On the other hand, if it is not accepted, that falling from the place of location is inevitable, will be anaikāntika |1310|| (1858)] भवओ सिद्धो सि मई तेणाहमसिद्धसंभवो जुत्तो । कालाणाहसणओ पदमसरीरं व तदजुतं ।। ३११ ।। (१८५९)
Bhavao siddho tti mai téṇāimasiddhasambhavo jutto Kālānāittana padhamasariram va tadajuttam 311 (1859)
[ भवतः सिद्ध इति मतिस्तेनादिमसिद्धसंभवो युक्तः ।
कालानादित्वतः प्रथमशरीरमिव तदयुक्तम् ।। ३११ ।। (१८५९ ) Bhavataḥ siddha iti matisténādimasiddhasambhavo yuktaḥ | Kālānāditvatah prathamaśariramiva tadayuktam 131 11 ( 1859) ]
Trans.—311 It may be argued that the siddha ( is born) from the mundane world, and hence the production of the first suddha is acceptible. But, like the first sarira, that is not possible, on account of the endlessness of times.
टीका - अथ स्याद् मतिः परस्य यतो भवात् संसारात् सर्वोऽपि मुक्तात्मा सिद्धस्तेन तत सर्वेषामपि सिद्धानामादिमत्वादवश्यमेव केनाप्यादिसिद्धेन भवितव्यम् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथा सर्वाण्यपि शरीराणि, अहोरात्राणि
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The sixth च सर्वाण्यादियुक्तान्येव, अथ च कालास्यानादित्वाद् नाघशरीरम् , आद्या. होरात्रं वा किमपि ज्ञायते, तथा कालस्यानादित्वात् सिदोऽपि नायः प्रतीयत इति ।। ३११ ।। (१८५९) ।
D C.-Mandika :- . It has already been proved that all muktāmās are born of this samsāra. Hence, there ought to exist some sidlo who might be called the first of all the muktātmas.
Bhagvana : -Your assumption is groundless. For like bodies, nights, and days, the muktīmā is also adiman, but owing to the endlessness of Kala, it is not possible to know as to who was the first saditha |3111 (1859, ]
परिमियदेसेऽणता किह माया मृत्तिविरहियत्ताओ। नियम्मि व नाणाई दिट्ठीओ वेगवम्मि ।। ३१२ ॥ (१८६०) Parimniyadésé'pantä kiha miya muttivirahiyattāö 1 Niyammi va nåņāí ditthiö vega-sūvammi 1131 211 (1860)
[परिमितदेशेऽनन्ताः कथं माता मूर्तिविरहितत्वात् ।
निजके वा ज्ञानादयो दृष्टयो वैकरूपे ॥ ३१२ ।। (१८६०) Parimitadésé'nantāḥ kathani mātā mūrtivirahitatvāti Nijaké vā jñānādayo urisțayo vaikarūpé 1131211 (1860) 1
Trans.---312 Then ) how are the numerous siddhas) contained in limited space ? "On account of their formlessness ; or like one's own apprehensions, etc, or like (muerous ) eyes on one form" (1860)
___टीका -आह-परिमितदेशमेव सिद्धक्षेत्रम् , तत्र कथमनादिकालवर्तिनोऽनन्ताः सिदा मान्ति ?। अत्रोत्तरमाह-अमर्तत्वात् सिद्धाः परिमितेऽपि क्षेत्रेऽनन्तास्तिष्ठन्ति, यथा प्रतिद्रव्यमेवानन्तानि सिद्धानां संबन्धीनि केनल भाना-केवलदर्शनानि संपतन्ति, दृष्टयो वा यथैकस्यामपि नर्तक्यां सहस्रशः प्रपतन्ति, परिमितेऽपि वाऽपवरकादिक्षेत्रे बहयोऽपि प्रदीपप्रभा मान्ति; एवमिहामूर्ताः सिद्धा कथं परिमितक्षेत्रेऽनन्ता न मास्यन्ति; मूर्तानामपि

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363 प्रदीपप्रभादीनां बहूनामेकत्रावस्थानं दृश्यते, किमुर्ताऽमूर्तानाम् ? इति भावः ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०)।
D. C.- Manążka :--The abode of siddhas is limited in space. How could the numberless siddhas be accommodated in it ?
Bhagavāna :-Siddhas are accomodated even in that limited space on account of their a mūrtatva, just as a number of apprehensions are made upon one object, or just as a number of eyes fall upon one dancer, or just as light of numerous lamps is accumulated in one room of limited space, the a-murta siddhas are also contained in their limited ksétra, Vhen the accumulation of number of mūrla splendours of lamps in a limited space is possible, why not the collection of a-murta siddhas be not possible in the a niūrta space ? 1312" 1860, ) न ह वह सशरीरम्स प्पिया-ऽप्पियावहतिरेवमाईगं । वेयपयाणं च तुमं न सदत्यं मुणसि ता संका ॥ ३१३ ॥ (१८६१) तुह बंधे मोक्खम्मि य, सा य न कजा जओ फुडो चेव । ससरीरे-यरभावो नणु जो सो बंध मोक्खो सि ॥ ३१४ ॥ (१८६२) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya ppiya-'ppiyavahatirévamalpam | Véyapayāṇam ca tumam na sadattham munasi to sankā 1131311 Tuha bandhé mokkhammi ya, să ya na kajjā jaö phudo céva i Sa-sariré-yarabhăvo naņu jo so bandha mokkho tti 1131411, 1862) [न ह वै सशरीरस्य मिया-ऽमिययोरपहतिरेवमादीनाम् ।
वेदपदानां च त्वं न सदर्थ मुणसि ततः शङ्का ।। ३१३ ।। (१८६१) सब बन्धे मोक्षे च, सा च न कार्या यतः स्फुट एव ।
सशरीरे-तरभावो ननु यः स बन्धो मोक्ष इति ॥ ३१४ ॥ (१८६२) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-'priyayorapahatirevamadinam! Vedapadanam ca tvam na sadartham munasi tatah sanka 1313(1861)]

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364
Jinabhadra Capi's
[The sixth
Tava bandhe mokse ca, sã ca na kāryā yatah sphuţa eva 1 Sa-sarire-tarabhavo nanu yah sa bandho moksa iti ॥31411 (1862)]
Trans ---313-314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas such as “Naha vai sa-sarirasya priyyā -priya yorafahati” etc, and hence your doubt as regards bandha and mokşa (has arisen ). That doubt should no longer be entertained. For, bandha and noksa are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness (respectively). (1861-1862).
टीका-व्याख्या-" न हि वै सशरीस्य पिया-ऽपिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं वा प्रिया-ऽपिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानां सदर्थ त्वं न मुणसि । ततो बन्धे मोक्षे च तव सौम्य ! शङ्का, सा च न कार्या, यतो ननु यः सशरीरे-तरभावः स्फुट एवं बन्धो मोक्षश्चेति कथं बका युज्यते ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-" स शरीरस्य" इत्यनेन बाबा-ऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिजरीरसंतानस्वरूपो बन्धः प्रोक्तः, तथा, "अशरीरं वा बसन्तम्" इत्यनेन त्वशेषशरीरापगमस्वभावो मोक्षः प्रतिपादितः। तथा "स एव विगुणो विभुर्न बध्यते" इत्यादीन्यपि पदानि संसारिजीवस्य बन्धमोक्षाभावपतिपादकानि त्वं मन्यसे । तच्चायुक्तम्, मुक्तजीवविषयत्वात् तेषाम् । मुक्तस्व च बन्धाधभावेऽविमतिपत्तिरेवेति । तदेवं भगवता छिमस्तस्य संशयः॥ ३१३-३१४ ॥ (१८६१-१८६२ )।
D C.-You have not grasped the real meaning of the Védapadas such as :-"Na ha vai sa-garirasya priya-'priya yorapahati," "Asariram vā vasantam priya priyé na sprzs'atah. And that is why, O Saumya ! you have raised the doubt as regards bandha and mokşa. But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you. Por, it is clear that bandha and moksa are nothing but the qualities of sa-sariratva and a-s'ariratra respectively.
By the words sašarirasya etc. bandha but the santana of the external, as well
which is nothing as internal anddi

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Canadharavada
365
means of "
s'arira, is meant; while by a-sariram vā etc. mokṣa characterized by the removal of entire sa îra is laid down.
Finally, you have apprehended sentences such as sa éṣa viguņo vibhurna bhdhyate etc. to support the abhāva of bandha mokṣa to the mundane soul. But that is not correct. Those sentences are referring to the free soul. Attributes such as Il 25 never bound" etc. are directed to nothing but the muktātmā.
•
tr
Thus, the doubts are removed from the mind of Maṇḍıka, || 313-314 | (1861-1862 )]
förfin áægni faðm ar-arofarqgekor | dì amoi qzagen ergiâft az difenagfe 11224|| (P<§3)
Chinnammi samsayammi jinéŋa jara maraņa vippamukkenam | So samaņo pavvāio addhuṭṭhihi saha khandiyasaéhim ||315||(1863)
[ छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा - मरणविप्रमुक्तन ।
स श्रमणः पव्रजितोऽर्घचतुर्थः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३१५ ॥ ( १८५६ )
Chinné samśayé jinena jara-maraņa vipramuktena Į Sa śramayah pravrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khanḍikasatah 131511
Trans-315 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Dikṣā along with his four hundred and fifty followers. (1863)
End of the Discussion with the Sixth Gaŋadhara.

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Chapter VII
सप्तमगणघरवक्तव्यता। Discussion with the Seventh Canadhara ते पच्चइए सो मोरिओ आगच्छई जिणसगास। वचामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ।। ३१६ ।। १८६४ ।। आभवो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविष्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वणू सव्वदरिसी ॥ ३१७ ।। (१८६५) Te pavvaie soum Morio ágạccha ijiņasagāsam Vaccāmi na vandämî vanditta pajjuvāsāmi ir 316 11 (1864)
Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana vippamukkénam | Nānieņa ya gottéņa ya savvaņū săvadarisi ŋam 131711 (1865)
[तान् प्रजितान् श्रुत्त्वा मौर्य आगच्छसि जिनसकाशम् । व्रजामि बन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३१६ ॥ (१८६४) आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविममुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३१७ ॥ (१८६५) Táni pravrajitān śrutva Maurya ägacchati jinsakāšam i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupāsé ॥ 316 ॥ ( 1864) Ābháşitaśca Jinena jāti -jara-marana vipramuktena Namnă ca gotréna ca sarvajnéna sarvadarsina 113174 (186511
Trans.- 316-317 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Maurya, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He

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Vada] Gañadharavada
367 thinks :-- ) I may go, pay my homages and worship him. He was addressed by his name and lineage by the- Tirthaikara who was free from birth, old age and death, who was onni. scinnt, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated know. ledge. (1864-1865) किं मण्णे अस्थि देवा उयाहु नाथ त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ।। ३१८ ।। ( १८६६ ) Kim manné atthi devā uyāhu natthi tui samsaö tujjha i Veyapayana ya attham na yānasi tésimo attho 1318॥ (1866) [किं मन्यसे सन्ति देवा उताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३१८ ।। ( १८६६)
Kim manyasé santi dévă utāho na santiti samśayastava! Védapadānām cărtham na jānāsi teşāmayamarthah 1131811 (1866)]
Trans.--318 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubts as to whether gods exist or not. But ( ca) you do not know the real interpretation of the sentences of the Vedas Here is their (real) interpretation, ( 1866 )
टोका-हे आयुष्मन मौर्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं देवा सन्ति नति, उभयथापि वेदपदश्रवणात् ? । तथाहि-" स एष यज्ञायुधी यजमानोऽजसा स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति" इत्यादिः तथा, " अपाम सोमं अमृता अभूम अगमन ज्योतिरविदाम देवान्, किं नूनमस्मात् तृणवदरातिः किमु मूर्तिममृतमय॑स्य" इत्पादिः तथा " को जानाति मायोपमान् गर्वाणानिन्द्र-यम-वरुण-कुवेरा. दीन" इत्यादि । एतेषां वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव बुद्धौ प्रतिमासते, यथा-स एष यज्ञ एव दुरितवारणक्षमत्वादायुधं प्रहरणं यस्यासौ यज्ञायुधी, यजमानोऽञ्जसा प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति, इति देवसत्तापतिपत्तिः। तथा, अपाम-पोतवन्तः, सोमं लतारसम् , अमृताः-अमरणधर्माणः, अभूम-भूताः स्म., अगमन्-गताः, योतिः - स्वर्गम् , अविदाम देवान् देवत्वं प्राप्ताः स्मः, किं नूनमस्माद्ध्वं तृणवत् करिष्यतिः कोऽसौ ? इत्याह-अरातिः-व्याषि:,

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368
Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh तया, किमु प्रश्ने, मूर्ति-जराम् , अमृतमय॑स्येति-अमृतत्वं प्राप्तस्य मर्त्यस्य पुरेपस्येत्यर्थः, अमरणधर्मिणो मनुष्यस्य किं करिष्यन्ति जरा-व्याधधयः ? इति भावः। अत्रापि देवसत्तामतिपत्तिः। " को जानाति मायोपमान " इत्यादीनि तु देवाभावप्रतिपादकानि । अतस्तव संशयः। अयुक्ताश्चायम् , यतोऽमीषा बेदपदानामर्थ स्वं न जानासि, चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च न वेत्ति । एतेषां हिबेदपदानां नायमों यस्तवाभिप्रेतः, किन्त्वयम्,-वक्ष्यमाणपक्षण इति ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६)
D. C-0 long-lived Maurya l your doubt about the existence of gods is due to your hearing various sentences of Vedas.
The sentences are such as — (1) “ Sa éşa yajināyudhi yajamāno'njasă svargalokam
gacchati " etc. (2) " Apāma somam amrita abhima agaman jyotiravidama
dévān kim nūnamasmāt triņavadarātih kimu murtimamriramartyasya " etc.
As well as, (3)“ Ko jānāti māyopamān girvāṇā-nindra-Yama-Varuņa
Kuberadim ? " etc.
According to you, interpretations of these sentences would be as follows:
(1) This host armed with the weapon of sacrifice reaches
the region of heaven immediately. ( This leads to
prove the existence of gods ) (2) By drinking soma, they became gods, went to heven,
and attained the divine status. These divinities will banish maladies and mortality by virtue of there ampitatava. ( These sentences are also used in support of the existence of divinities. )

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369
Vada ]
Canadharavada (3; who knows the illusive gods like Indra, Yama
Varuna and Kuuléra etc ? (Sentences like this would
deny the existence of gods on the other side ) So, your doubt has sprung up from the sentences such as mentioned above. But that is not justifiable, as you have not understood their real meaning. Here I explain the real interpretation ॥ 318 ॥ ( 1866 )]
Now the author explains the whole proposition in details. तं मनसि नेरइथा परतंता दुक्खसं उत्ता य । न तरंतीहागंतुं सड़या सुश्चमाणा वि ॥ ३१९ ॥ ( १८६७ ) सच्छंक्यारिणो पुण देवा दि वप्पभावजुत्ता य । जं न कयाइ वि दरिसणमुवेति नो संसओ तेसु ।। ३६० ।। (१८६८) Tam mannasi Néraiyā paratantă dukkhasaņpautta ya í Na tarantihagantum saddhéyā suvvamāņā vi 11 319 11 ( 1867 ) Sacchandayāriņo puņa dévā divvappabhavajuttā ya , Jam na kayāi vi darisanamuvecti to samsao tésu 1132011 ( 1868 ) [ त्वं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः परतन्त्रा दुःखसंपयुक्ताश्च ।
न शक्नुवन्तीहाऽऽगन्तुं श्रद्धेयाः श्रूयमाणा अपि ।। ३१९ ॥ (१८६७) स्वच्छन्दचारिणः पुनर्देवा दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च ।
यन्न.कदाचिदपि दर्शनमुपयान्ति ततः संशयस्तेषु ॥ ३२० ॥ (१८६८) Tvam manyasé Nairaikān paratantră duḥkhasamprayuktāśca ! Na śaknuvantihã ” gantum śraddhéyāḥ śrūyamānā api 113191(1867) Svacchandavāriņali punar-dévā divyayrabhāvayuktāśca i Yanna katācidapi darśanamupayānti tatah samsayastéşu13 2011(1868)
Trans.---319-320 You think that the denizens of hell ( being ) subservient and miserable, are not able to come into this world ( So ), they are to be trusted ( as existing ) even

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370 Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[ The seventh If (they are inerely) heard (to be so). But the gods, on the other hand, are free to move, and are invested with the celestial splendour also. Still, however, they do not come into the range of (our) sight, and hence, the doubt about them. (1867-1863)
टीका-मौर्य! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-नारका स्वकृतपापनरकपालादिपरतन्त्राः, पराधीनवृत्तयोऽतीवदुःखसंघातविहलाच न शक्नुवन्त्यत्रागन्तुम् , अतः प्रत्यक्षीकरणोपायामावात् श्रूयमाणा अपि श्रद्धया भवन्तु । देवास्तु स्वच्छन्दचारिणो दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताच, तथापि यस्माद् न कदाचिद् दर्शनपथमवतरन्ति, श्रूयन्ते च श्रुति-स्मृत्यादिषु, अतस्तेषु शङ्केति ॥ ३१९-३२० ॥ (१८६७-१८६८)
D. C.-O Maurya ! According to you, the inability of the Nāraka-beings to come to this world, is due to their being subservient to their own sins, as well as, due to their miserable condition. So, they might be trusted upon as existing merely by hearing (some thing about) them.
But, the case with gods is different. For, even though they possess free movements and celestial splendour, they would never like to come within the range of our sight
So, because they are heard of in the Vedas and Smritis etc. you have raised this doubt 1319-3204 (1867-1868) मा कुरु संसयमेए सुदूरमणुयाइभिन्नजाईए। पेच्छसु पञ्चग्वं चिय चउब्धिहे देवसंघाए ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९) Ma kuru samsayaméé sudūrainaņuyāibhinnajāié , Pécchasu paccakkham cciya cauvvihe devasanghāe 1321|| (1869) [मा कुरु संशयमेतान् सुदूरमनुनादिमिभजातीयान् ।
प्रेक्षस्व प्रत्यक्षमेव चतुर्विधान् देवसङ्घातान् ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९) Må kuru samsayamétān sudūramanujādibhinnajätiyān i Préksasva pratyaksameva caturvidhan devasanghatan | 32111

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371 Trans. —-321 Do not entertain doubt. Look at these four-fold multitudes of gods before your eyes (which are) extremely different from the human beings. (1869)
टीका-मौर्यपुत्र ! देवेषु मा संशयं कार्षीस्वम्, एतानेव हि सुद्रमत्यर्थ मनुजादिभ्यो भिन्नजातीयान् दिव्याभरण विछेपन-वसन-मुमनोमालालङ्कृतान् भवनपति-व्यन्तर-ज्योतिष्क-वैमानिक लक्षणांश्चतुर्विधदेवसंघातान् मम वन्दनार्थमिहैव समवसरणागतान् प्रत्यक्ष एवं पश्येति ।। ३२१ ।। (१८६९)
D. C.--You should not entertain any doubt about the existence of gods, O Mauryaputra I just look at these gods of all the four types-viz-bhavanapan, wantara Ipotiska, and t'ammānika-distinguished from the human beings by virtue of (their) celestial ornaments and garlands etc. coming to this samavasaraya to pay then homages to be 11321# (1869) पुन्छ पि न संदेहो जुत्तो जं जोइसा सपच्चत्रग्वं ।। दीसंति लक्रया वि य उबघाया-ऽणुग्गहा जगओ ॥ ३२२ ॥ (१८७०) Puvvam pi na samdého jutto jam qvisā sapaccakkham | Disanti takkahā vi ya uvaghāyā nuggahā jagaö 1132211 (1870, [पूर्वमपि न संदेहो युक्तो यज् ज्योतिष्काः स्वप्रत्यक्षम् ।
दृश्यन्ते तत्कृता अपि चोपघाता-ऽनुग्रहा जगतः ॥ ३२२ ॥ (१८७०) Purvamapi na samdélio yukto yaj jyotiskāḥ svapratyakşam i Dșiśyanté taškıitā api copaghātā-nugraha jagatah 1132211 (1870)
Trans.--322 rhe doubt is not justified even before (their | appearance), since luminaries are self-perceptible. Moreover, injuries or betterments caused by them to the world, are also apprehended. (1870)
टीका-इह समवसरणागतदेवदर्शनात् पूर्वमपि तवान्येषां च संशयो न युक्तः, यद् यस्माचन्द्रा-ऽऽदित्यादिज्योतिष्कास्त्वया सर्वेणापि च लोकेन स्व. प्रत्यक्षत एव सर्वथा दृश्यन्ते । अतो देशतः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथं समस्तामरास्ति

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The seventh
"
त्वशङ्का ? । किञ्च सन्त्येव देवाः, लोकस्य तत्कृतानुग्रहो - पघातदर्शनात् । तथाहि दृश्यन्ते कचित् केचित् त्रिदशाः कस्यापि किञ्चिद्विभवमदानादिनाSनुग्रहम्, तत्प्रहरणादिना चोपघातं कुर्वन्त । ततो राजादिवत् कथमेते न सन्ति इति ।। ३२२ ॥ ( १८७० )
D. C.-Even before they appear at the Samavasaraṇa, your doubt about their existence is not justified. For, luminaries like Sun, Moon etc are self-perceptible to you, as well as to the whole world. So, it is not appropriate to doubt their existence.
Moreover, anugraha and upaghata caused by gods to this world, are also evident to all. Several gods confer their favours upon some people by granting their objects of pleasure etc. while others inflict injuries, like a king, by means of weapons etc. This shows, for certain, that gods do exist 11322|| (1870)
Besides,
आलयमेतं च मई पुरं व तब्वासिणा तह व सिद्धा ।
जे ते देव त्ति मया न य निलया निचपरिसुण्णा ॥ ३२३ ॥ (१८७१) Alayaméttam ca mai puram va tavvāsiņo taha vi siddhā Je te deva tti mayā na ya nilayā niccaparisunna 1323 ( 1871)
[ आळयमात्रं च मतिः पुरमित्र तद्वासिनस्तथापि सिद्धाः ।
ये ते देवा इति मया न च निलया नित्यपरिशून्याः ॥ ३२३ ॥ (१८७१) Alayamātram ca matiḥ puramiva tadvāsinastathāpi siddhāḥ | Yé té déva iti matā na ca nilayā nityapariśunyāḥ || 323|| (1871)}
Trans.-323 The view may be that (luminaries) are mere abodes. Still however, like a city, they, too, have their inhabitants, who are accepted as ( none but ) gods. For, places of residence, cannot be vacant for ever. (1871)
टीका - अथैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत् - आलया एवालयमात्रं चन्द्रादिविमानानि न तु देवाः, तत् कथं ज्योतिष्कदेवानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमभिधीयते ? |
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For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
373 किं तद् यथाऽऽलयमात्रम् ? इत्याह-"पुरं ति" यथा पुरं शून्यं लोकानामा. लयमा स्थानमात्रं, न तु तत्र लोकाः सन्ति. एवं चन्द्राद्रिविमानान्यप्यालयमात्रमेव, न तु तत्र देवाः केचित् तणन्ति अतः कथं तेषां प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तथापि तद्वासिन आलयवासिनः मामोद ये सिद्धास्ते देवा इति मताः संमना: । यो ह्यालयः स सर्वोऽपि तन्निवासिनाऽधिष्टितो दृष्टः, यथ प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमाना देवदत्तायधिष्ठिता वसन्तपुराद्यालयाः, आलयाश्च ज्योति कविमानानि, अत आलयलान्यथानुपपतेय तनिवासिनः सिद्धास्ते देवा इति मताः । आइ-ननु कथं ते देवाः सिध्यन्ति ? । यादृशा हि प्रत्यक्षेण देवदत्ता दयो दृश्यन्ते तेपि तादृशा एव स्युरिति । तदयुक्तम् , विशिष्टा हि देवदत्ताद्यालयेभ्यश्चन्द्राद्यालया इति । अतस्तनिवासिनोऽपि विशिष्टाः सिध्यन्ति, ते च देवदत्तादिविलक्षणा देवा इति। अपरस्त्वाह-नदु “ आलयत्वात् " इत्ययं हेतु तन्निवासिजन्साधने नैकान्तिक, शून्यालयैर्व्यभिचारात् । अत्रोत्तरमाह- न य निलयेत्यादि " न च निलया-आलया नित्यमेव शून्या भवन्ति । अयमभिप्राय:-ये केचिदालयास्ते प्राग् इदानों, एष्यति वा काले ऽवश्यमेव सनिवासिमिरधिष्ठिता एव भवन्ति न तु नित्यमेव परिशून्याः । ततो यदा वा चन्द्राधालयनिवासिनो देवाः सिध्यन्तीति ॥ ३२३ ।। ( १८७१ )
___D. C. -Maurya:-Luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you, are only the abodes, and not the gods themselves. It could not be said, therefore, that the luminary deities are directly perceptible, just as in case of an empty town, the houses are mere places of roosidence for people, but people do not actually reside into them, so also luminaries like Moon etc. should be taken as absolutely empty hudies and nothing like gods is expected to reside into them.
Bhagavāna:--It is not so. O Mau ya! Existence of the place of residence proves the existence of its residents also. So, thesc luminaries are not mere ālayas, but they have their inhabitants also. For, that which is called an ilaya or a house is always occupied by its residents Libe houses in a towni

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374 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The seventh occupied by persons like Dévadatta, these luminaries are also undoubtedly occupied by dévinities,
Maurya -- Like Dévudatta etc residing in the houses of a city, the gods who are the residents of the luminary bodies should also be perceptible.
Bhigavāna:- It is not proper to advarice such an argument. Because, the places of residence ure absolutely different from the houses in a city. So, their residents vis gods are also characteristically different froin Dézadatta etc. Although they are not apprehended by the indriyas, their existence is adınitted without doubl.
Maurya :-You cannot assert exclusively that every place of residence, is always occupied by a resident. For, nobody would reside in a harren house. ( It is forbidden to reside in such a house ). From the existence of abode, therefore, you cannot inter the existence of the occpuant.
Bhagavāna :--A residing place is never sūilya. It must have been occupied by some person or tlie other, either in the past or in future or at present. In case of luminary places of resort, gods like Moon etc. must have occuplied the places at some time in the past, present, or future 1:32311 (1871)
को जागइ व किमेयं ति होज निस्संसय विमाणाई। रयणमयन भोगमणादिह जइ विजाहराईणं ॥ ३२४ ।। (१८७२) Ko jāņai va kimeyam ti hojja nissamsayın vimāņāim i Rayanamayanabhogamanādiha jaha vijjāharāîņam 1.32411 (1872) [को जानाति वा किमेतदिति भवेद् निस्संशयं विमानानि ।
रत्नमयनभोगमनादिह यथा विद्याधरादीनाम् ।। ३२४ ।। (१८७२) Ko jānāti vă kimetaditi bhaved nissamśayain viņānāni i Ratanamayanabhogamanādiha yathā vidyādharādinām 132411 (1872)]
Trans.-324 “Or, who knows what it is ?" They are

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Vada ]
Gañadharayāda certainly places like those of Vidyadharas etc., as they are decked with jewels and they fly in the sky. (1872)
टीका-यदि वा, एवंभूता मतिः परस्य मवेद् यदुत-चन्द्राधानयत्वेन यद् गीयते भवद्भिस्तदिदं को जानाति किश्चिद् भवेत् किं मूर्योऽभिमयो गोलः, चन्द्रस्त्वम्बुमय स्वभावतः स्वच्छा, आहोस्विदेवंभूता एवैते भास्वर - रत्नमया गोलका ज्योतिष्कविमानानि ?, अतः कथमेतेषामालयत्वसिद्धिः ? । अत्र प्रतिविधानमाह-निःसंशयं विमानान्येतानि, रत्नमयत्व संति नमोगमनात्, पुष्पकादिविद्याधरतपः सिद्धविमानवदिति । अभ्रविकार-पवनादिव्यवच्छेदार्थ रत्तमयत्वविशेषणमिति ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)
1. C. -Maurya :--Or who knows what these luminaries like Sun and Moon, mentioned by you are like ? One that appears as Sun may be a ball of fire, and that which appears as Moon may be a transparent ball of water. Or, it may be that these luminaries be some such bright balls. So, it is not appropriate to believe that they are the abodes of luminary gods.
Bhagavāna :--Since they are decked with jewels, and they are moving in the sky, there is no doubt that they are actual vimānas like puspaka etc. attained by vidyādharas by means of of austerities etc. So, take it for certain, that these vimānas are also the residing places of the various luminary gods. | 324 ।। (1872) ।
Or, होज्ज मई माएयं तहा वि तकारिणो सुरा जे ते । न य मायाइविगारा पुरं व निच्चोवलम्भाओ ॥ ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)
Hojja mai māéyam tahā vi tak kāriņo surā jé té ! Na ya māyāivigāră puram va niccovalambliāci 11 325 11 ( 1873) [ मवेद् मतिर्मायेयं तथापि तत्कारिणः सुरा ये ते ।
न च मायादिविकाराः पुरमिव नित्योपलम्भात् ।। ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The seventh
Bhavéd matirmāyéyam tathāpi tatkāriṇah sura yé tè l Na cā māyādivikārāb puramiva nityopalambhāt | 325 (1873)
Trans.—325 It may be argued that this is ( all ) illusion. But, its creators are gods and not the perturbations like illusion etc. on account of their being obtained like a town for ever. (1873)
टीका - अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत् - नैते चन्द्रादिविमानान्यालयाः, किन्तु मायेयं मायाविना केनापि प्रयुक्ता । अत्रोच्यते मायात्वममीषामसिद्धम्, वाङ्मात्रेणैव भवताऽभिधानात् तथाप्यभ्युपगम्योच्यते- ये तत्कारिणस्तथाविधमायाप्रयोक्तारस्ते सुराः सिद्धा एव मनुष्यादीनां तथाविधवैक्रियकरणादर्शनात् । अभ्युपगम्य च मायात्वममीषामभिहितम् । न चैते मायादिविकाराः, नित्योपलम्भात् सर्वेण सर्वदा दृश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः, प्रसिद्धपाटलीपुत्रादिपुरवदिति । माये-न्द्रजालकृतानि हि वस्तूनि न नित्यमुपलभ्यन्त इति नित्यविशेषणोपादानमिति ।। ३२५ || (१८७३)
+
D C.-You might argue that vimana like candra etc are not actual alayas, but they are mere illusions created by some magician. But the illusionariness of such vumānas cannot be admitted by means of mere words. Still, however, if they are assumed as majika, their creators are not magicians or human beings, but the gods themselves This is said only on the 'assumption that they are mayika vikaras But really speaking, they are not mayika as they are ever obtained like towns etc. So, these vimanas are nothing but the abodes of luminary gods. 1325" (1873)
जइ नारगा पवन्ना पगिgपावफलभोइणो तेणं । सुबहुगपुण्णफलभुजो पवज्जियचा सुरगणा वि ।। ३२६ ।। (१८७४)
Jai nārgā pavannā pagiṬthapāvaphalabhoiņo téņam
Subahugaf unnaphalabhujo pavajjiyavva sura gaņā vi 1:326□ (1874)

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Vada ] Cañadharavāda
377 [यदि नारका! प्रपन्नाः प्रकृष्टयापफलभोगिनस्तेन ।
सुबहुकपुण्यफलभुजः प्रपत्तव्याः सुरगणा अपि ।। ३२६ ॥ (१८७४) Yadi nīrakāh prapannāh praksistapāpaplialabhoginastena 1 Subaliukapuạyaphalabhujah prapattavyāh suragaņā api 1132611]
Trans.--326 If the denizens of hell are admitted as the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, gods should be accepted as the enjoyers of the fruits of many good deeds. (1874)
टीका-इह स्वकृतपकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्तावत् कचिद् नारकाः पतिपत्तव्यास्ते व यदि प्रपन्नाः, " तेणं ति" तर्हि तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वोपार्जितमुष्ठुबहुकपुण्यफलभुनः सुरगणा अपि प्रतिपत्तव्याः। अत्राह-नन्विहैवाति. दुःखितनरास्तियञ्चश्वातिदुःखिताः प्रकृष्टपापफलभुजो भविष्यन्ति, तथा, मनुष्या पवातिमुखिताः प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलभुजो भविष्यन्ति, किमदृष्टनारक -देवपरिकल्पनया ? इति । तदयुक्तम् , प्रकृष्टपापफलभुजां सर्वप्रकारेणापि दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चातिदुः खितानामपि नर-तिरश्चां सर्वप्रकारं दुःखं दृश्यते सुखदपवनाऽऽलोकादिसुखस्य सर्वेषामपि दर्शनात् । प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलभुनामपि सर्वप्रकारेणापि सुखेन न भवितव्यम्, न चेहातिमुखितानामपि नराणां सर्वप्रकारं सुखमवलोक्यते, पूतिदेहोद्भवस्य रोग-जरादिप्रभवस्य च दुःखस्य तेषामपि सद्भावात् । तस्मात् प्रकृष्टपापनिबन्धनसर्वपकारदुःख वेदिनो नारकाः, प्रकृष्टपुण्यहेतुकसर्वधकारसुखभोगिनो देवाश्चाभ्युपगन्तव्या एवेति ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४)
D. C-Bhagavāna:--When you believe that Narakas are the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, you should also believe that gods are the enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds, and thus they are existing.
Maurya :--Teryancus, who are excessively miserable, are the sufferers of the reward of great sins, and excessively happy human beings are enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds. So, it is not necessary to assume the existence of Dévas and Nārakas at all.
48

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[ The seventh Bhagavāna:--Existence of Dévas and Närakas cannot be denied by saying so. Enjoyers of the rewards of great punyas and papas are exclusively happy or exclusively miserable, as the case may be. The manusyas and tirjancas cannot be called exclusively happy and exclusively miserable respectively. Por, even the happiest human beings are susceptidle to the affiction of diseases, old age, etc. while even extremely miserable tıryancas, experience the happy touch of cold breeze etc. So, munuşyas and tiryancas, can never be taken as exclusively happy or exclusilvely miserable beings, while Närakas who suffer the consequences of pāpas, and Dévas who enjoy the fruit of punyas, can be easily admitted respectively as the excusively miserable and exclusively happy beings 1132611 ( 1874 )
Now, in reply to the question that " Wlay gods do not visit this world if at all they are existing ?" the author states:-- संकंतदिव्वपिम्मा विसयपसत्ताऽसमत्तकत्तव्वा । अणहीणमणुयकजा नरभरमसुभं न एंति सुरा ॥ ३२७ ॥ ( १८७५) Sankantadivvapimmä visayapasattā'samattakattavvā i Anahinamanuyakajja narabhavamasubham na énti sura || 327 ॥ [संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमाणो विषयप्रसक्ता असमाप्तकर्तव्याः ।
अनधीनमनुजकार्या नरभवमशुभं नागच्छन्ति सुराः ॥३२७॥ (१८७५) Sankrāntadivyaprémiņo visayprasakta asanıāptakrtavyāhi Anadhinamanujalāryā narabhavamaśubham nāgacchanti surāḥ 32711
Trans.--327 Invested with celestial love, and attached to the objects of pleasure, with their duties un-finished, and their deeds independent of human beings, divinities do not come into this inauspicious world. ( 1875)
टीका- नागच्छन्तीह सदैव सुरगणाः, संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमत्वात्, विषयप्रसक्तत्वात्, प्रकृष्टरूपादिगुणकामिनीप्रसक्तरम्यदेशान्तरगतपुरुषवत्ः वथा, असमाप्तकर्तव्यत्वात् , बहुकर्तव्यताप्रसाधननियुक्तविनीतपुरुषवत् । तथा,

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379 अनधीनं मनुनानां कार्य येषां तेऽनधीनमनुजकार्याः, तद्भवस्तत्वं तस्माद् नेहागच्छन्ति सुराः, अनभिमतगेहादौ निःसङ्गयतिवदिति । तथा, अशुभत्वाद् नरमवस्य तदन्धासहिष्णुतया नेहागच्छन्ति देवाः, स्वपरित्यक्तकडेवरवदिति ॥ ३२७ ॥ ( १८७५) ii
D. C. Divinities do not come to this world, because they are invested with celestial love and attached to the various objects of pleasure like a person attacited to a beautiful woman possessing high qualities of extreme beaulty etc. Secondy, like a great mai entrusted with manifold work, these gods have also to perform manifold duties and hence their duties are never over. Thirdly, all their deeds are independent of human beings So, just as a dispassionate ascetic, never comes to an unholy house, these gods also usually abstain themselaves from coming to the inauspicious luman world as they would not stand even the sinell of it ॥ 327 ।। ( 1875 )
But this does not mean that they always keep themselves away from this world नवरि जिणजम्म-दिक्खा-केवल-निव्वाणमहनिओगेणं । भत्तीए सोम्म ! संसयविच्छेयत्यं व एजहण्हा ।। ३२८ ।। (१८७६ ) पुन्वाणुरागओ वा समयनिबंधा तवोगुणाओ वा। मरगणपीडा-ऽणुग्गह-कंदप्पाईहिं वा केइ ॥ ३२९ ।। ( १८७७ )
For,
Navari jiņajamma-dikk ha -kévala-nivvāņa maha niõgéņam Bhattié Sommal sāņsayavicchéyaitham va éjjahanha 1132811(1876) Puvvānurāgao vā samayanibandha tavoguņão vā 1 Naraganapida-'nuggaha-kandappaihim va kei ॥ 329 ॥ ( 1877 ) [ नवरं जिनजन्म-दीक्षा-केवल-निर्वाणमहनियोगेन । भत्त्या सौम्य ! संशयविच्छेदार्थ वैयुरिहाहाय ॥ ३२८ ॥ (१८७६)

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380 Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[ The eighth पूर्वानुरागतो वा समयनिबन्धात् तपोगुणाद् वा।
नरगणपीडा--नुग्रह-कन्दर्पादिभिर्वा केचित् ॥ ३२९ ।। ( १८७७ ) Navaram jinajanma-diksa-kevala-nirnānamahaniyogena | Bhaktyā Saumya ! samsayavicchiedārtham vaiyurihābhāya 1: 328 #1 Purvānurigato vã samayanibandhāt tapoguņād vă i Naragaņapidā='nugraha-kandarrādibhirvā kécit 1132911 (1877, )
Trans.--328-329 Some have to visit this world merely by ( way of ) duty, at the occasion of birth, diksa, ac eptance of absolute apprehension, or final emancipation of some saint while others (would come) by reason of devotion, O Saumia ! or in order to remove (their ) doubts, or on account of previous attachament. Soine ( would do so ) following the conventional rule, some by virtue of austerities, some to afflict the the human being, some to favour therm, or some ( would come) out of passion etc. (1876-1877)
टोका-नवरं जिनजन्म-दीक्षा-केवल-निर्वाणमहोत्सवनियोगेन तत्कतव्यतानियमेनेह देवा आगच्छेयुः । तत्र सौम्य ! केचिदिन्द्रादयो निजभक्त्या समागच्छन्ति, केचित् तु तदनुवृत्या, अन्ये संशयव्ययच्छेदार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्वगविकपुत्र-मित्रायनुरागात् । समयनिबन्ध:-प्रतिबोधादिनिमित्तः संकेतनिश्चयः, तस्माच केचिद् देवा इहागच्छन्ति । अन्ये तु महासत्वसाध्वादितपोगुणसमाकृष्टाः, केचित्तुपूर्ववैरिकनरगणपीडार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्वसुहत्पुत्राधनुग्रहार्थम्, केचित्तु देवाः कन्दादिभिरिहागच्छन्ति आदिशब्दात साध्वादिपरीक्षाहेतोरिति द्रष्टव्यमिति । तदेवं निरूपितं देवानामत्रागमन कारणम्, अनागमनकारणं च ॥ ३२८-३२९ ।। (१८७५-१८७७)
D. C-Various deities visit this.world on various purposes. Some have to attend the occasions of janma dîkşā, kevala-jñāna prāpti and nirvana of a saint. Some like Indra are drawn to this world by means of devotion, some to remove their doubts. Several others descend upon this world on account of their previous attachment to relatives like son, friend etc. or by following the previous conventions or by virtue of previous austerities also, some gods come to the human world for thie purpose of

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afflicting human beings in order to take revenge upou thein. while others would be attracted to this world out of passion or in order to test the saints of this world also
Thus, there are various callses or their v.sit to this world, while others stated before, are the causes of their staying away from this world also || 328-329 ॥ (1876-1877) जाइस्सरहकहनाओ कामह पञ्च खरिणाओ य । विचा-मंतो- आकासिद्धिओ महविगाराओ ॥ ३३० ॥ ( १८७८ ) उकिटण्णसंनयाकलभाशेऽभिक्षणसिद्धीओ। सवोगमसि ीउ य संति देव त्ति सद्धेयं ।। ३३१ ॥ (१८७९ ) Jāissarahakahaņāé kāsai paccakkhadarisano ya Vijja-inanto-vayanasiddio gahavigata) || 3300 (1878) Ukkițfhapuņnasancyaphalabhāvdo'bhihāṇasidchio Savvāgamasiddhiu ya santi déva tii saddhéyam || 331 ॥ ( 1879 )
[जास्मिरणकथनात् कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षदर्शनाच्च । विद्या -मन्त्रोपयाचनसिद्धग्रहविकारात ॥ ३३० ।। : १८७८ ) उत्कृष्टपुण्य संचयफलभावाभिधानसिद्धेः ।
सर्वागमसिद्धेश्च सन्ति देवा इति श्रद्धेयम् ।। ३३१ ॥ (१८७९) Jātismarapakathanät kasyacit pratyakşadarśanācca 1 Vidya-mantropayācānasiddhérgrahavisārāt ll 330 H 1878 ) Utkyistapunyasancayaphalabhāväbhidhănasiddhén Sarvāgamasiddhésca santi déva iti sraddheyam || 331 ।। ( 1879 )।
Trans.-330-331 By the statement of some ( who are ) reminded of ( the former ) existence by ineans of direct apprehension, by (.virtue of } recting the chantings, of ( various ) lores by the movement of planets, due to the existence of the fruition of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds, by ( virtue of ) ( their ) names, and by ( the help of , all āgamas, it should be trusted that gods are existing. ( 1878-1879 )

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382 Jiuabhadra Gamis
The seventh ___टीका- 'सन्ति देवा इत्येतत् श्रद्धेयम्” इति प्रतिज्ञा, जातिस्मरणप्रत्ययितपुरुषेण कथनान, नानादेशविचारिपत्ययितपुरुषावलोकितकथितविचित्रबृहद्देवकुलादिवस्तुवत; तथा, कस्यापि तपः प्रभृतिगुणयुक्तस्य प्रत्यक्षदर्शनप्रवृत्तेश्च-केनचित् प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणेनोपलम्मादित्यर्थः, दूरविष्कृष्टनगरादिवत्, तथा, विद्या- मन्त्रोपयाचनेभ्यः कार्यसिद्धेः, प्रसादफलानुमितराजादिवत्। तया, 'महविगाराउ त्ति' अत्र प्रयोगः-ग्रहाधिष्ठितपुरुषदेहो जीवव्यतिरिक्तादृश्यवस्पधिष्ठातृक , पुरुषासंभाव्यविकारक्रियादर्शनात्, संचरिष्णुयन्त. व्यतिरिक्तमध्यप्रविष्टादृश्यमानपुरुषाधिष्ठितयन्त्रवत् तथा तपो-दानादिक्रिया समुपाजितोत्कृष्टपुग्यसंभारफलसद्भावात्. उत्कृष्टपापपारभारफलसद्भावनिश्चि तनारकवत्, एतच्च पागेव भावितम् । तथा, "देवाः" इति तदभिधानं ततोऽपि च देवानां सिद्धिः । एतच्चानन्तरगाथायां व्यक्तीकरिष्यते । तथा, सर्वे च ते आगमाश्च सर्वागमास्तेष्वविमतिपत्त्या सिद्धत्वाच सन्ति देवा इति ।। ३३ -- ३३१ ।। (१८७८-१८७९)
D. C.-Existence of gods could be established in various ways .(1) On the recollection of former existence, a person would
relate the story of the great family of gods witnessed
and believed by him as certain. (2) Some persons attain directly the dars'una of gods by
virtue of their qualities like austerity etc. (3, Some people attain the accomplishment of their objects
by soliciting the favour of gods by means of prayers,
and chantings of prescribed mantras. (4) A person in charge of planets is absolutely different
from tie jivas, because of the kriyās that are found as a result of changes in the planets which are never to be found in human beings.
(5) Just as we have accepted the existence of Narakas due
to the fruition of great sins, the existence of gods should

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also be admitted on account of the phala of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds like tapas, dāna ets.
(6) The existence of gods is established by their very name viz "dévāh" (This will be explained in the following
verse)
(7) All the āgamas admit the existence of gods. 330-331॥ (1878-1879)
The epithet "dévaḥ" is then explained as follows: - -
देवति सत्ययमिदं सुद्धत्तणओ घडाभिहाणं त्र । अह व मई म चिय देवों गुण - रिद्धिसंपण्णणो ॥ ३३२ ॥ (१८८०)
तं न जर नच्चत्थे सिद्धे उवयारओ नया सिद्धी । जच्चत्थसीह सिद्धे माणव सीहोवयारो व्व ।। ३३३ ।। (१८८१ )
Deva tti satthayamidam suddhattaṇao ghaḍābhihāṇam vai Aha va mai manuu cciya dévo guya riddhi sampanno 3321 1880)
Tam na jau tacca siddhe uvayāro maya siddhi Taccatthasiha siddhé mānavasihovayāro vva ||13331 (1881)
[ देवा इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।
अथवा मतिर्मनुज एव देवो गुण - दिसंपन्नः ॥ ३३२ ॥ (१८८०)
तद् न यतस्तध्यार्थे सिद्ध उपचारतो मता सिद्धिः । तध्यार्थसिंहे सिद्धे माणवसिंहोपचार इव ।। ३३३ ॥ (१८८१)
Dèva iti sârthakamidam śuddhatvato ghaṭābhidhānamiva | Athavā matirmanuja eva devo gunar-ddhisampannah ||3321 (1880)
Tad na yatastathyarthe siddha upacarato matā siddhiḥ Tathyārthasimhe siddhe mānavasimhopacara iva 333
Trans - 332-333 Since the epithet déva " is clear like 'ghata", it is significant. Or, it might be believed that man

'

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384 Jinabhadra Ciani's
[ The Seventh himself (when) accompanied by the prosperity of merits, is god. (But) that is not (correct). (Because) the accomplishment (of the secondary meaning, by means of usage, could be brought about (only, when the primary meaning is establislied, just as the epithet “simha" or lion could be attributed to Māņuvzka by means of usage only, if the primary sense of the word "semha" is accepted (1880-1981)
टीका-"देवाः" इत्येतत् पदं सार्थकं व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदत्वात्, घटादिवत् । तत्र दीव्यतीति देवा इति व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वम् , सपासतद्धितरहि तत्वेन च शुद्धत्वम् । भावना चात्र प्रागुक्तैव । अथ परस्य मतिभवेत्-ननु मनुष्य एवेह दृश्यमानो देवो भविष्यति, किगदृष्टदेवकल्पनया ?। किं सोऽपि मनुष्यो देवः ? इति । न, इत्याह-गुणसंपन्नो गणधरादिः, ऋद्धि संपनश्चक्रवादिः । अत्रोच्यते-तदेतद् न, यस्मात् तथ्ये मुख्ये वस्तुनि क्वचित् सिद्ध सत्यन्यत्रोपचारतस्तत्सिद्धिर्मवा, यथा मुख्ये यथार्थ सिंहेऽन्यत्र सिद्ध ततो माणवके सिंहोपचारः सिध्यति एवमिहापि यदि मुख्या देवाः क्वचित् सिद्धा भवेयुः तदा राजादेर्देवोपचारो युज्यते, नान्यथेति ॥ ३३२-३३३ ।। (१८८०-१८८१)
D. C.--Since the word "dévan" is void of compound and prefixes, and is explained as tatra divyantite dévāli (those that shine there are deities). It is philologically siddhi, like other padas such as ghara etc.
Maurya: --The man himself seen before our very eyes is a god. Why to imagine an invisible from that! All men are not góds. But Those accompained by high merits and religious prosperity could easily be taken as gods
Bhagavāna:-That is not correct. Unless and until, the principal meaning of a word is not accomplished, it could never be attributed to any other object by means of uparöra The epithet of lion could easily be attributed to māravaka only if the primary sense of the word simha is accomplislied.
Similarly, here also, the epithet "dévāḥ" could be attributed

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to king etc. only if the existence of gods is accepted, and not otherwise || 332-333 (1880-1881 )
Now, in case of existence of gods being denied, the uselessness of the rites like agnihotra etc. is shown:
देवाभावे विफलं जमग्गिहोत्साहयाण किरियाणं ।
सग्गीयं जन्नाण य दाणाइफलं च तदजुन्तं ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)
Dévǎbhāvé viphalam jamaggihottāiyāņa kiriyāṇam | Saggiyam jannapa ya dānāiphalam ca tadajuttam ||3341 (1882)
[ देवाभावे विफलं यदग्निहोत्रादिकानां क्रियाणाम् ।
स्वर्गीयं यज्ञानां च दानादिफलं च तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)
Dévābhāvé viphalam yadagnihotrādikānām kriyāṇām | Svargiyam yajñānām ca dānādiphalam ca tadayuktam ||334||(1882)]
Trans.-334 In (case of) non-existence of gods, (award of) heaven laid down (as a result) of (the accomplishment of) the rites like agnihotra etc. as well as, the fruition of munificence etc. would be null and void. (1882)
टीका- 'वा' इत्यथवा, इदं दूषणम् -- देवाभावेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने यदग्निहोत्रादिक्रियाणाम् " अग्रिहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः " इत्यादिना स्वर्गीयं फलमुक्तम्, तथा, यज्ञानां च यत् फलमभिहितं, दानादिफलं च यत् समस्तछोके प्रसिद्धम्, तत् सर्वमयुक्तं प्राप्नोति । स्वर्गो ह्येतेषां फलमुक्तम्, स्वर्गिणां चाभावे कुतः स्वर्गः ? इति । " स एष यज्ञायुधो ” इत्यादीनि च वेदवाक्यानि देवास्तित्वप्रतिपादनपराणि वर्तन्ते । अतः किं तान् न प्रतिपद्यसे ? | यद्यपि " को जानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र-यम- वरुण - कुबेरादीन् ” इत्यादि वाक्यम्, तदपि न देवनास्तित्वाभिधायकम्, किन्तु सुराणामपि मायोपमत्वाभिधानेन शेषर्द्धिसमुदायानां सुतरामनित्यत्वप्रतिपादकं बोद्धव्यम् ः अन्यथा हि देवास्वित्वप्रतिपादकवाक्यानि श्रुतिमन्त्र पदैरिन्द्रादीनामाहानं चानर्थकं स्यात् ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)
"
D. C.-There will be one more difficulty in case of denying the existence of gods. Because in that case, the award of
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For Private Personal Use Only

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386 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The seventh heaven laid down as a result of the rites like agnihotra etc. in the sentences such as ” Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ " etc. as well as, the fruition of sacrifices and meritorious deeds like dāna etc prescribed in deeds like däna etc. prescribed in this world, would become absolutely futile. Thus, in absence of svargin-the inhabitant of svarga-how is svarga to exist ?
Hence O Maurya ! take it for certain that sentences such as “ Sa eşa yajñāyudhi ” etc. are laid down to establish the existence of gods, while the sentence “ Ko jānāti māyopaman gîrvūņånindra-Yama-Varuna-Kubérādin etc. does not lead to deny the existence of gods, but it only means to assert the a-nilyatā of the prosperity of gods and the rest. Otherwise, the sentences which establish the existence of guds, as well as, the invocation of gods like Indra by means of reciting the prescribed mantras, would be of no avail. 11 334 11 ( 1882 )
Moreover, जम-साम-सूर-सुरगुरु-सारजाईणि जयइ जण्णेहिं । मंतावाहणमेव य इंदाईणं विहा सव्वं ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३) Jama-Soma-Sura-Suraguru--sārajjāiņi jayai jannehim Mantāvāhaņaméva ya Indāîņam vihä savvam 11 335 ( 1883 ) [79-014-07-06-Fatouista pufa #1
AT&Taha Artetat para ll 334 11 (8668) Yama-Soma-Sūra-Suraguru-svārājyādini jayati yajnaiḥ 1 Mantrāhyānaméva cendrădinăm vrithā sarvam 1 335 | ( 1883 )]
Trans.--335 ( The statement that ) one conquers the regions of ( the gods of ) Death, Moon, Sun, and Brihaspati etc., and the invocation of Indra etc by reciting the preseribed mantras, would be absolutely null and void. ( 1883 )
97="fa Luas gaffee94:-91efaudagfaयेयाश्रुति "यम-सोम-सूर्य-सुरगुरु-स्वाराज्यानि जयति" इत्यादीनि देवास्तित्वसूचकानि वेदवाक्यानि देवाभावे यैव स्युः। इह चोक्थपोडशि

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387 प्रभृतयो याविशेषा मन्तव्याः । सयूपो या एव हि ऋतुरुच्यते, यूपरहिवस्तु दानादिक्रियायुक्तो यह इति । स्वः-स्वर्गः, तत्र राज्यानि । जयति-- उपायतीत्यर्थ इति । तथा, मन्त्रैरिन्द्रादीनामाहानं देवास्तित्व एवोपपंचते, अन्यथा उयैव स्वात् । इन्द्रादीनां मन्त्रपदैरानमेवमवगन्तव्यम्"इन्द्र ! आगच्छ मेघातिये मेषवृषण" इत्यादि । तस्माद् युक्तितो वेदवाक्येभ्यच “सन्ति देवा" इति स्थितम् । तदेवं छिनो मौर्यपुत्रस्य भगवता संशयः ॥ ३३५ ॥ (१८८३)
D. C-It has been laid down in the Sastras that----
• Uktha sodasz prabhțiti kralubhir yathašruti Yama-SomaSurya-Suragure-svarajyani jayati " etc. Sentences like this, lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove themselves good-for-nothing, if the existence of gods is denied.
Similarly, the invocation of gods such as Indra etc. by means of mantrus, which indicate the existence of gods, would also become futile if there were dévābhīva. The sentences of the l'édas establish the existence of gods in one way or the other. 1 335 ॥ ( 1883 ). The doubt of Mauryaputra is thus removed by the preceptor. छिन्मम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुकेणं ।
सो समणो पन्चइओ अदुहेहि सह खंडियसएहिं ॥ ३३६ ॥ (१८८४) Chinnammi samsayammi Jipeņa jara-maraqavippamukképami So samano pavvaiö addhutthéhim saha khandiyasashim 133611 [छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविममुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३३६ ॥ (१८८४) Chinné samsayé Jinèna jară-maranavipramukténa, Sa sramagaḥ pravrajito'rdha caturthail saha khandikašataiḥ 113361
Trons.---336 When doubt was removed by the Tisthankara who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted dikşā along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884) End of the Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara,

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Chapter VIII
अष्टमगणधरवक्तव्यता। Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara ते पव्वइए सोउं अकंपिओ आगच्छई जिणसगासं। वचामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३३७ ॥ १८८५ ॥ Té pavvaię söum Akampiö agacchỉ jigasagāsam i Vaccāmi ya vandami vanditta pajjuvasami ॥ 3371 (1885)
[तान् प्रनितान् श्रुत्त्वाऽकम्पित आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३३७ ।। (१८८५) | Tan pravrajitān srutvā’kampita āgacchati jinasakāšam i Vrajami vande vandittvā paryupāsé ॥ 337 ॥ ( 1885 )
Trans.--337 Having heard that they ( 1.. Mauryaputra and others ) had renounced the world. A kampita comes before the Tirthaikara. ( He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. ( 1885 )
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविष्पमुकेणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वणू सव्वद रिसा गं ॥ ३३८ ।। (१८८६)
Abhattho ya Jinepam jai-jara-marapa vippamukkeyam | Nāméņa ya gotténa ya savvaņū savadarisi ņam 133811 (1886) [ आभाषितच जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविषमुक्तेन । .
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वझेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३३८ । (१८८६)

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Vada ] Canadharavāda
389 Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-marayavipramukténa । Namnā ca gotréņa ca sarvajnéna sarvadarsină 433811 (1886)]
Trans.--338 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1886 )
The Tirthafikara, then, saysकि मण्णे नेरइया अस्थि नथि त्ति संसओ तुज्झं । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७) Kim manné Neraiyā atthi natthi tti samsai tujjham i Véyapayāna ya atthaim na yāṇasî tésimo attho 13391 (1887) [किं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः सन्ति न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७) Kim manyasé nairayikāh santi na santiti samsayastava Védapadānām cârtham na jānāsi teşāmayamarthaḥ 1133911 (1887)]
Trans.--339 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. (But) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas Here is their (real) interpretation. (1887)
टीका--किनारकाः सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे। अयं च तब संशयो विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः, तथाहि--" नारको वै एंष जायते यः शद्धाममनाति" इत्यादि एष ब्राह्मणो नारको जायते यःशूद्रानमनातीत्यर्थः, इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि नारकसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, “न ह वै प्रत्य नारकाः सन्ति" इत्यादीनि तु नारकाभावप्रतिपादकानि । तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्थ, च शब्दाद् युक्तिहदर्य च त्वं न जानासि, यत एतेषामयं वक्ष्यमाणोऽर्थ इति ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७)
D. C.-What are you thinking about ? Your doubt about the existence of Narakas is based upon your hearing the

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390
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighter various Déda-padas having contradictory senses. The Véda-padas are as follows :
(1) "Nārako var éşa jāyaté yaḥ śudrānnamas'nāte" etc (2) "Na ha vai prétya Narakah santi" etc.
According to you, the interpretation of these sentences is this. (1) "A brāhmaṇa who eats the food of s'udras becomes a
nāraka" (This proves the existence of helish denizens.) (2) "In fact, there is nothing like närakas in the next
world?)"In fac
This proves the existence of närakas. But you have not grasped the real import of those V'éda-padas. 1133911 (1887)
Here I give their full significanceतं मनसि पञ्चक्खा देवा चंदादओ तहन्ने वि । विजा-मंतोवायणफलाइसिद्धीए गम्मति ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८) जे पुण मुइमेत्तफला नेरइय त्ति किह ते गहेयव्वा । सक्खमणुमाणओ वाऽणुवलंभाभिन्नजाईया? ॥३४१॥ (१८८९) Tam mannasi paccakkhā dévă candadaö tahanné vi i Vijja-mantovayanaphalaisiddhie gammanti 113401 ( 1888 ) Je puna suimettaphală Néraiya Hi kiha té gahéyayvā Sakkhamaņumāno vă’ņuvalambhā bhinnajāiyă 13411 (1889,
[स्वं मन्यसे प्रत्यक्षा देवाश्चन्दादयस्तथान्येऽपि । विद्या-मन्त्रोपायनफलादिसिद्धगम्यते ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८) ये पुनः श्रुतिमात्रफला नैरयिका इतिकर्य ते ग्रहीतव्याः । साक्षादनुमानतो वाऽनुपजम्मा भिमजातीयाः? ॥३४१॥ (१८८९)

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Vada ] Qanadharavada
391 Tvam manyasé pratyakşā dévascandrādayastathânyé'pi , Vidya-mantropāyaphalādisiddhér gamyanté 11 340 # ( 1888 Ye punaḥ śrutimätraphalā nairayikā iti katham té grahitavyāḥ 1 Sākşādanumānato vā'nupalambhād bhinna jätiyāḥ ? 43411. (1889)]
Trans.-340–341 You believe that deities like moon etc, are (directly) perceptible, so also, are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing, and that belong to a distinct species, to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are (absolutely ) non-perceptible ? ( 1888-1889)
___टीका-हे आयुष्मनकम्पित ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-देवास्तारच्चन्द्रादयः प्रत्यक्षममाणसिद्धा एव, अन्ये स्वप्रत्यक्षा अपि विधामन्त्रोपयाचितकादिफछसिद्धयाऽनुमानतो गम्यन्ते, ये पुनः “नारकाः" इत्यभिधानमाररूपा श्रुतिरेव फलं येषा, न पुनस्तदमिधायकक्षब्दव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः, ते साक्षात् : अनुमानतो वाऽनुपलभ्यमानत्वेन तिर्यग्नरा-ऽमरेभ्यः सवर्या मिजा. तीयाः कथं "सन्ति" इति ग्रहीतव्याः, खरविषाणवत् ? इति ॥ ३४०३४१॥ (१८८८-१८८९)
___D.C-Akampita:-Deities like Moon etc. are apprehended by concrete authentities, and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are Närakas that are quite diferent from gods, tiryancas and human beings, and whose existence is recognized only by hearing, to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference i ॥ 340-341 (1888-1889 ) ॥
The reply is मह पञ्चक्षसणओ जीवाई य व्व नारए गिह । किं जं सपञ्चक्खं तं पञ्चक्खं नवरि इकं ? ॥ ३४२ ।। (१८९०) जं कासह पञ्चक्खं पञ्चक्खं तं पिधेप्पइ लोए। जह सीहाइदरिसणं मिळू न य सन्चपञ्चक्खं ।। ३४३ ।। (१८९१)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eighth
Maha paccakkhattaṇao jivāî ya vva nārae giņha | Kim jam sapaccakkham tam paccakkham navari ikkam 11342 Jam kāsai paccakkham paccakkham tam pi ghéppai löé | Jaha sthäidarisaṇam siddham na ya savvapaccakkham 1343||
| मम प्रत्यक्षत्वतो जीवादिश्चेव नारकान् गृहाण |
किं यत् स्वप्रत्यक्ष तत् प्रत्यक्षं नवरमेकम् ? ।। ३४२ ।। (१८९०)
यत् कस्यचित्मत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि गृह्यते लोके ।
यथा सिंहादिदर्शनं सिद्धं न च सर्वप्रत्यक्षम् ।। ३४३ ।। (१८९१)
Mama pratyakṣatvatö jîvādinścéva nārakān grihāņa | Kim yat sva-pratyakṣam tat pratyakṣam navaramékam? ||342||(1890)
Yat kasyacitpratyakṣam pratykṣam tadapi grihyaté loké t Yathā simhādidarśanam siddham na ca sarvapratyakṣam #343||(1891)
Trans. – 342-343 Accept the Nārakas (as existing ) like jiva etc. on account of (their ) being pratyaksa to me. Is it that only that which is pratyakṣa to one's own self (could be known as ) praiyakṣa and not anything else? That which has been pratyakṣa to any (person) in the world, is accepted as pratyakṣa by the (whole) world. Just as the appearance of simha etc. though not pratyaksa to all, is accepted (by all as existing ). ( 1890-1891 )
टीका - हे आयुष्मन्नकम्पित ! " साक्षादनुपलभ्यमानत्वात्" इत्यसिद्धो हेतु:, यतोऽहं केवलप्रत्यक्षेण साक्षादेव पश्यामि नारकान् ततो मत्प्रत्यक्षत्यात् " सन्ति " इति गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व नारकान् जीवा-ऽजीवादिपदार्थवत् । अथैवं मन्यसे - ममा प्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथमेतान् गृह्णामि ? । ननु दुरभिप्रायोऽयम्, यतः किं यत् स्वस्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्षं तदेवैकं नवरं प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते ? इति काक्वा नेयम् । ननु यदपि कस्यचित् प्रत्ययितपुरुषस्यान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षं तदपि " प्रत्यक्षम् " इति गृह्यते व्यवहियते लोके; तथाहि--सिंह-सरभं - हंसादिदर्शनं सिद्धं प्रसिद्धं लोके, न च सिंहादयः सर्वजनप्रत्यक्षा:
-

For Private
Personal Use Only

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393
Vada]
Cañadharavāda देश-काल-ग्राम-नगर-सरित्-समुद्रादयश्च न सर्वेऽपि भवतः, प्रत्यक्षाः, अथ चान्यस्यापि प्रत्यक्षास्ते प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवहियमाणा दृश्यन्ते । अतो मत्मत्यक्षा नारकाः किमिति प्रत्यक्षतया न व्यवहियन्ते ? इति ॥ ३४२--३४३ ॥ (१८९०- १८९१)
D. C.-Bhagavāna :-o long-lived Akampital your objection that Närakas do not exist, because they have not been apprehended by you, is unfounded. I have perceived those Närakas personally. Accept them, therefore, as existing on account of their being pratyaksa to me, like all other objects, animate and inanimate.
Secondly, it is not appropriate to hold the obstinate view that nothing can be said to be pratyakşı in this world, unless and until it has not been witnessed by yon. Usually, that which has been witnessed by a trustworthy or respectable person, is accepted as existing in this world. Existence of lion, bear, and swan etc is universally accepted by all, even though those animals have not been pratya kşu to each and every person in the world. You have not witnessed all countries, rivers, towns, oceans and times, still however, you do not doubt their existence, because they have already been pratyakşa to other respectable persons
Similarly, you shall have to accept the existence of Nārakas when they have already been pratyakşa to me. 11342-343. 1890-1891).
अहवा जमिदियाणं पञ्चख किं तदेव पञ्चक्ख ?। उक्यारमेसओ तं पञ्चक्खमणिदियं तत्थं ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२) Ahavā jamindiyāņam paccakkham kim tadeva paccakkham? Uvayāraméttað tam paccakkhamanındiyam tattham 11 344 H (1892) [अथवा यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्ष किं तदेव प्रत्यक्षम् ? ।
उपचारमात्रतस्तत् प्रत्यक्षमनिन्द्रियं तथ्यम् ।। ३४४ ॥ (१८९२) 50

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394 Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The eighth Athavā yadindriyaņām pratyakşam kim tadéva pratyakşam ? I Upacāramātratrastat pratyakşamanindriyanı tathyam 134411 (1892)]
Trans.—344 Or, is it that what is preceptible to senses, is alone pratya kşa ? It is pratyaksa by virtue of ( mere ) usuage. The real pratyakşa is beyond ( the peroeption of ) senses. ( 1892 )
____टीका -अथवा, कि यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं तदेव प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते भवता, मदीयं तु प्रत्यक्षं नाभ्युपगम्यते, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् । ननु महानयं विपर्यासः, यस्मादुपचारमात्रत एव तदिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवहियते-यथाऽनुमाने बासधूमादिलिङ्गद्वारेण . बाह्यमग्नादिवस्तु बायते, नैवमत्र, तत उपचारात् प्रत्यक्षमिव • प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । परमार्थतस्तुइदमपि परोक्षमेव, यतोऽक्षो जीवः, स चानुमानवदत्रापि वस्तुसाक्षाद् न पश्यति, किन्विन्द्रियद्वारेणैव, ततोऽतीन्द्रियमेव तथ्यं प्रत्यक्षमवगन्तव्यम्, तत्र जीवेन साक्षादेव वस्तुन उपलम्भादिति ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)
D. C --Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is indriya pratyakşa is pratykşa This is a great foly. Indriya-pratyaksa is recognized as pratyakşr by means of upacāra, similar to the case of auumāna, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc. But the pratyaksa in my .case, is different from this. By means of mere upacara it is called pratykşa, but really speaking, it is paroksa as the cīksa ( i-e jivo ) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of anumāna.
The atîdriya or that which is beyond perception by (means of ) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as pratyaksa as in that case, jiva directly perceives the object.
Akampita:-~-Athough in case of indriya-pratyaksa, jiva does not apprehend an object directly, indriyas are oudoudtedly able to recognize the object directly in such a case, why should we not consider indriya-pratya kşa to be the pratyakşa itself ! ॥ 344 ( 1892 ) ।

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमं तिदियाई कुंभो
।
उवलंभद्दाराणि ताइं जीवो तदुबलद्वा ॥ ३४५ || (१८९३)
Muttaibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vva Uvalambhaddarani taim jivo taduvaladdha | 345 ॥ ( 1893 )
[मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।
उपलम्भद्वाराणि तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ।। ३४५ ।। (१८९३) Mūrtādibhāvato nopalabdhimantîndriyāņi kumbha iva Upalambhadvārāni tāni jivastadupalabhā | 345 ।। ( 1893 ) }
On
Traus.—-Sense organs have no power of perception account of ( their being ) mirta etc., like ghata. They are mere mediums of perception. Jiva is their ( real ) agent of perception. ( 1893 )
टीका - नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि-न वस्तुज्ञायकानीत्यर्थः, पुगळसंघात - रूपत्वेन मूर्तत्वात्, आदिशब्दादचेतनत्वात्, कुम्भवत् । नवरमुपलम्भस्य श्रोत्रादिज्ञानस्य द्वाराणि भवन्त्यमुनि, गवाक्षवत्, तत्सापेक्षस्यैव क्षयोपशमस्य प्रबोधात् । जीव एव च तदुपलब्धा वस्तुपलब्धा ।। ३४५ ।। (१८९३)
395
D. C.-Since indriyas are murta and a-cetana like ghata, they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is Atma which is altogether different from indriya in this 345 ( 1893 ) |
way
Besides,
दुवरमे विसरणओ तवावारे वि नोवलं भाओ । इंदिभिन्नो नाया पंचगवक्खोवला वा ॥ ३४६ ।। (१८९४)
Taduvaramé vi saranaō tavvävāré vi novalambhäö Indiyabhinno nāyā pañcagavakkhovaladdhā va | 346 ॥ ( 1894 )
[ तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्वयापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् । इन्द्रियभिभो ज्ञाता पश्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ३४६ ।। (१८९४)

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396 Jinabhadra Gani's
The eighth Taduparamé'pi smaraṇatastadvyāpāré'pi nopalambhāti Indriyabhinno jñātā pancagavāksopalabdhéva 1134611 (1894)]
Trans.-346 By virtue of recollection, even (when the sense-organs) are pacified, and on account of non-perception, even (when the sense-organs) are at work, the agent of perception is (recognized) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows. (1894)
टीका-इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नो “नाया ति" ज्ञाता जीव तदुपरमेऽपी इन्द्रियोपरमेऽपि तद् द्वारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्वयापारेऽपीन्द्वियव्यापारे ऽप्यन्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात्; यथा• पञ्चमिर्गवाक्षरुपलब्धा वस्तुपलम्भकस्तेभ्यो भिन्न इति ॥ ३४६ ।। (१८९४)
____D. C. Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the Soul which is the agent of perception, is different from the sense-organs. Because, even when indriyas are not at work, the Soul is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the Soul is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived inspite of indriyas being at work. ॥346 (1894)।।
Moreover, जो पुण अणिदिउ चिय जीवो सब्चपिहाणविगमाओ।
सो सुबहयं वियाणइ अवणीयघरो जहा दहा ॥ ३४७॥ (१८९५) Jo puņa aộindiu cciya jivo savvappihāņavigamão / So subahuyam viyanai avaniyagharo jaha dattha ॥ 347 ॥ (1895) [यः पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव जीवः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।
स मुबहुकं विजानात्यपनीतगृहो यथा द्रष्टा ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५) Yah punaranindriya éva ji vaḥ sarvapidhānavigamāti Sa subahukam vijānātyapanitagriho yathā drasta 0 347 ॥ (1895)]
Trans ----347 The Soul, like an observer who is away from the louse, being void of sense-organs, apprehends much more on account of all the obstructions (being) removed (1895)

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397
Vada)
Gagadharavăda टीका-य पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव केवलज्ञानसंपनो जीवःस इन्द्रियज्ञानवतो जीवात् मुबहु विज्ञानातीति प्रतिज्ञा, सर्वपिधानविगमा सर्वावरण क्षयादित्यर्थः, यथा पञ्चगवाक्षगृहस्थितपुरुषात् सर्वथाऽपनीतगृहः सर्वत एवाऽऽकाशीकृतमदेशे स्थितो द्रष्टा पुरुष इति ॥ ३४७ ।। (१८९५)
__D. C.--Just as a person looking from the open space, apprehends much more than a person looking from the five windows, the Soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprenends through indrijas. ॥ 347 (1895)॥
And the jñāna obtained by indriyas in this way, is not pratyakşam न हि पञ्चक्खं धम्मतरेण तद्धम्ममेत्तगहणाओ। कयगत्तओ व सिद्री कुंभाणिञ्चत्तमेत्तस्स ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६) Na hi paccakkham dhammantaréņa taddhanmaméttagahayão , Kayagattao va siddhi kumbhāṇiccattaméttassa 1 348 11 (1896) [न हि प्रत्यक्ष धर्मान्तरेण तद्धर्ममात्रग्रहणात् ।
कृतकत्वत इव सिद्धिः कुम्मानित्यत्वमात्रस्य ।। ३४८ ।। (१८९६) Na hi pratyakşam dharınāntaréņa taddharmamātragrahanati Kritakatvata iva siddhiḥ kumbhānityatvamātrasya 11348 i (1896)]
Trans.---348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of ghata on account of its being factitious, the indriya-pratyakşa, is not pratg akşa (also), on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. (1896
टोका-न भवति प्रत्यक्षम् “इन्द्रियजं ज्ञानम्" इति मक्रमाल्लभ्यते । चक्षुरादीन्द्रियस्य रूपादिपरिच्छेदशक्तिविशेषरूपेण धर्मान्तरेण हेतुभूतेन तस्यानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो यद् रूपादिकमेकं धर्ममात्रं तस्य ग्रहणादिति हेतुः। किं तद् यथा न प्रत्यक्षम् ? इत्याह-यथा कृतकत्वाद् घटानित्यत्वमात्रसिद्धिलक्षणमनुमानमित्येष दृष्टान्तः। इह च यथा परस्थात् साध्यसिदौ

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth नानुमानं प्रत्यक्षम्, तपेन्द्रियजमपि विज्ञानमित्येतावान् भावार्य इति ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६)
D. C.-Just as anumāna capable of attaining the accomplishment of a desired object by means of another object, cannot be called pratyaksa jñāna, so also, apprehension by means of indriyas, could not be called pratyakşa. Like an inference establishing the anityatā of ghata by means of its kļiakatva, cognizance attained by indriyas is not pratyakşa. Indriya pratyakşajäna is limited to the apprehension of only rūpa etc. by means of eye etc. ॥ 348 ( 1896 ) ॥
Besides. पुन्वोचलद्धसंबंधसरणओ वानलो व्वं धूमाओ । अहव निमित्संतरओ निमित्तमक्खस्स. करणाई ॥ ३४९ ॥ (१८९७) Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranan vănalo vva dhūmão | Ahava nimittantarao nimittamakkhassa karanaim ||349n (1897) [पुर्वोलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणतो वाऽनल इव धूमात् ।
अथवा निमित्तान्तरतो निमित्तमक्षस्य करणानि ॥ ३४९ ॥ (१८९७)
Pūrvopalabdhasambandhasmaraṇato va'nala iva dhūmāti Athavā nimittäntārato nimittamaksasya karagāni 1349N (1897,
Trans.---349 Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, on account of the recollection by means of (its) relations of the past or on account of any (other) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the Soul. ( 1897)
टीका-"वा" इत्यथवा, न प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं शानमिति सेव प्रतिक्षा, पूर्वोपसन्धश्चासौ संबन्धश्च पूर्वोपलब्धसंपन्धस्तत्स्मरणाजापमानत्वात् अमादमकमानवता तथाहि-"घटोऽयं, पूर्वसंकेतकाल एवंभूत एव पदार्थे प्रत्यकितामिापुरुषाद् घटसंकेतस्य मया गृहीतत्वात्" इति पूॉपलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणादेव सर्वस्यापि घटादिग्राहकमिन्द्रियहानपनायते; अन्यथा तालिकेरीपाषा

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Vāda ]
Gaṇadharavada
यातस्याप्यविशेषेणैतत् स्यात् । अभ्यास - पाटवादिभ्यश्चाशुकारितयैद्रिन्यज्ञानप्रवृत्तेः सर्वत्रैतद् न लक्ष्यत इति । अथवा, प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानम्, पूर्वप्रतिपादितम्युत्परयाऽक्षस्य जीवस्य स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तविशेषाज्जायमानत्वात्, धूमादग्निज्ञानवत् । स्वव्यतिरिक्तानि च निमित्तान्यक्षस्य जीवस्य करणा नीन्द्रियाणि मन्तव्यानि । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं न तज्जीवस्य निमित्तान्वराज्जायते fang fazasi menda da qafa, nursafï-qa: qufa-ŝasज्ञानेष्विति ।। ३४९ ।। (२८९७)
D. C.-Like the perception of fire from smoke, the perception duc to sense-organs, is also produced from the recollection of the connections of the past. So, it is not pratyakṣa. Take the example of ghata. The name ghata was given to it in the past We recognize it as ghata on the basis of its purvakā!a sankéta. Hence, the knowledge about ghata is apprehended by means of indriyas from the recollection of its past relations. If it were not so, a person coming from a distant island, who has neither heard nor seen anything about ghata, would at once be able to recognize it as ghata. This sort of indriya-jñāna is produced very quickly from rellection etc. due to constant practice and cleverness, and hence, it is not marked everywhere.
Moreover, just as one apprehends agni from dhuma which is absolutely different from himself, the apprehension in this case, is also attained by Soul from the indriyas, which are absolutely different from the Soul, showing thereby that the knowledge thus obtained is not pratyakṣa but parokṣa.
399
Pratyakṣa jñāna is acceptible to Soul directly like the Avadhi, Manah-paryāya and Kevala-jñānas and it is never
I. The first stage of perception when the attention is concentrated, 2. The state of mer tal perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge.
Absolute Perception.
3.

For Private Personal Use Only

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400 linabhadra (ani's
[The eighth obtained by the Soul from any external nimitta. All sorts of jñāna except the above-mentioned three, are mere anumānas as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of jñānas like Avadhi etc, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called pratyaksa. फेवल-मणो-हिरहियस्स सव्वमणुमाणमेत्तयं जम्हा । नारगसम्भावम्मि य तदथि जे तेण ते संति ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)
Kevala-Mano-hirahiyassa savvamaņumāņaméttayam jamhā i Naragasabbhāvammi ya tadatthi jam teņa te santi 11350+ (1898)
[ केवट-मनो-ऽवधिरहितस्य सर्वमनुमानमात्रकं यस्मात् । नरकसद्भावे च तदस्ति यत् तेन ते सन्ति ॥ ३५० ।। (१८९८)
Kevala-Mano-'vadhiralıtasya sarvamanumānamätrakam yasmādi Naraksadbhave ca tadasti yat tena te santi || 35011 (1893)]
Trans.--350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of Kevala, Manaḥ- paryāya and Avadhi ( sorts of jñāna ) is mere inference, it is (present) in case of (establishing) the exfitence of hellish denizens. By (virtue of) that ( anumāna ), the Nārakas are existing. (1898)
___टीका-केवल-मनःपर्याया-ऽवधिज्ञानरहितस्य प्रमातुः संबन्धि सर्व. मपि ज्ञानं यस्मादनुमानमात्रमेव, परोक्षार्थविषयत्वात् । केवलादिज्ञानत्रयं तु वस्तुसाक्षात्कारित्वात् प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेवमनुमानं प्रत्यक्षां च यस्माद् नारकसद्भावे साध्ये विद्यत एव, तेन ते नारका सन्तीति प्रतिपद्यस्व । तत्र प्रत्यक्षं मदीयमेव केवलज्ञानम् ।। ३५० ॥ (१८९८)
D. C.-Every sort of knowlege excepting Avadi-Manah paryāya and Kévala is mere anumant on account of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. Irānas like Kévala etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called praty&kşı. Since the anumina pertaining to Nārakas,

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Vāda
Jaņadharavāda
401
is pratyaksa, the existence of Narakas is established without doubt The pratyaksu jñāna, in this case, is my own Kévalajñāna 11350. (1898)। पावफलस्स पगिदुस्स भोइणो कम्मओऽवसेस व्व । सन्ति धुवं तेऽभिमया नेरइया, अह मई होज्जा ।। ३५१ ॥ (१८९९) अचत्थदुक्खिया जे तिरिय-नरा-नारग त्ति तेऽभिमया । तं न जओसुरसोक्खप्पगरिससरिसं न तं दुक्खं ॥ ३५२ ॥ (१९००) Pavaphalassa pagitthassa bhöiņo kamma'ovasésa vva i Santi dhuvam té'bhimayā neraiya, aha mai hojjā 11351|| (1899) Accatthadukkhiyaje tiriya-nara-naraga tti te bhimaya | Tam na jaö surasokkhappagarisasarisam na tam dukkham 1135211 [पापफलस्य प्रकृष्टस्य मोगिनः कर्मतोऽवशेष इव । सन्ति ध्रुवं तेऽभिमता नैंग्यिकाः, अथ मतिभवेत् ॥ ३५१ ॥ (१८९९) अत्यर्थदुःखिता ये तिर्यग्-नरा-नारका इति तेऽभिमताः।
तद् न यतः सुरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशं न तद् दुःखम् ॥३५२॥ (१९००) Pāpaphalasya prakristhasya bhoginan karmato'vasesa iva i Santi dhruvam te'bhimata nairayikāh atha matir-bhavet 1135111 (1899)
Atyarthaduhkhita ye tiryag-nara-nāraka iti te bhimatahi Tad na yatan surasaukhyaprakarsasadrisam na tad duhkham|3521]
____ Trans.-351-352 Liko (the enjoyers of) the rest of Karmas, there are ( certainly ) some who ( have to suffer) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell Here, it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable tırjancas and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, (their) miseries are not, as extreme as the happiness of gods. (1899)-1900)
टीका-प्रकृष्ठस्य पापफलस्य भोगिनः केचिद् ध्रुवं सन्ति "कम्मउ ति" 51

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Jinabhadra Ciani's
[ The eighth कर्मफलत्वात् तस्येत्यर्थः, अवशेषवदिति -यथा जघन्यमध्यमपापफलभोगिनः शेषास्तियङ्-नरा विद्यन्त इत्यर्थ दृष्टान्त । " तेऽभिभया नेरइय ति" ये प्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्ते 'नारकाः" इत्यभिमताः । अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिभषेत्-अत्यर्थ दुःखिता ये तिर्यग्-मनुष्यास्त एवोत्कृष्टपापफलभोगित्वाद् कारकव्यपदेशभाजो भविष्यन्ति, किम दृष्टनारककल्पनया ? इति । तदेतद् न, यतोऽतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यग्-मनुष्याणां यद् दुःखं तदमरसौख्यमकर्षसदृशप्रकर्षवद् न भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति-येषामुत्कृष्टपापफलभोगस्तेषां संभवद्भिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चैवमतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यगादीनां दृश्यते, आलोक-तरुच्छाया-शीतपवन-सरित्-सरः-कूपजलादिसुखस्याति दुःखितेष्वपि तेषु दर्शनात्-छेदन-भेदन-पाचन-दहन-दम्भन बज्र-कण्टकशिलास्फालनादिभिश्च नरकप्रमिद्धैः प्रकारैर्दुःखस्यादर्शनात्, इत्यादि प्रागुतानुसारेण स्वयमेवाभ्यूद्य वाव्यमिति । भागमार्थचायमवगन्तव्य इति ।
सततमनुबद्धमुक्तं दुखं नरकेषु तीव्रपरिणामम् । तियशुष्ण-भय-क्षुत्-तहादिदुःखं सुखं चाल्पम् ॥ १ ॥ सुख-दुःखे मनुजानां मनःशरीराश्रये बहुविकल्पे।
मुखमेव तु देवानामल्पं दुःखं तु मनसि भवम् ॥ २ ॥ इति ।। ३५१-३५२ ।। (१८९९-१०००)।
D. C.-Bhagavāna:.--Just as, there are tiryancas and manusyas to enjoy the fruits of moderate sins, there do exist some who have to suffer the consequences of great sins. And take it for certain that they are none but Nārakas.
Akampita; -Since the excessively miserable tiryaneas. and manus vas have to undergo the consequences of great sins, wliy not to take them as Nārakas
Bhagavāna:--It is not so. Sufferers of the consequences of great sins ought to be miserable in all respects,
Tiryancas, and manush's cannot be said to be miserable in all respects as required in case of Neīrakas. They are

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vada ] Ganadharavada
403 entitled to various means of pleasure like light. shades of a tree cool-breeze, river, and streain etc. On the oiher hand, varirous fiorrors of nell such as those of being killed, pierced, cooked, burnt, pressed, and dashed againsi stone-slabs are not experienced by tiryauca: or miinus jas Only Nūak:s are doomed to undergo such afflictions.
It should be noted in the igamas also that: -- Salatamanubadhamuktam dunkhain varakéşu livraparināmami Tiryakşūsņa-bhaya-kşüt-tridādidukham sukhani cālpam 111 Sukh-duhkha manujánāın manah - Sarırāśraye bahuvikalpé i Sukhameva tu dévānāmalpam dunkham tu mansi bhava n 211
[ Nārakas have always to undergo the afflictions of excessive effects. Tiryanías have greater proportion of afilictions like incat, fear, hunger, and thrist etc and smaller proportion of happiness; manus yas have pleasures and pains ( almost in equal proportion) pertaining to body and mind while gods have absolute happiness and very Itttle misery ) 1 351-352 ( 1899-1900) 11
सच्चं चेदमकंपिय ! मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व । सवण्णुत्तणओ वा अणुमयसवण्णुवयणं व ॥ ३५३ ॥ (१९०१) Saccam cédamakampiya ! maha vayanăo'vasésavayanam vai Savvaŋŋuttaņao vā aṇumayasavvaņguvayaņam va 11 353 11 ( 1901 ) [सत्यं चेदमकम्पित ! मम वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
hardt ITSE Taartaafu il 343 11 (308) Satyam cédamakampita ! mama vacanādavasésavacanamivai Sarvajnatvato vănumatasarvajnavacanamiva || 353 !( 1901 ; )
Trans.-353 This is true. O Akampita ! because it is my statement. Or, ( it is true ) like other statements. Or, by virtue of ( my ) all-knowing faculty, ( it is true ) like the statement of an authorized omniscient. ( 1901 )

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404
Jinabhadra Gaņi's Line eignur टीका-" नारकाः सन्ति" इति सत्यमकम्पित ! इदम्, मचनात्, यथाऽवशेषं त्वत्संशयादिविषयं मद्वचनम् । अथवा, "सर्ववचनत्वात्" इत्येवं हेतुर्वक्तव्यः, त्वदनुमतमनु-जैमिन्यादिसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ।। ३५३ ॥ (१९०१)
D. C.-Accept the statemynt the Nārakas exist as true, 0 Akampita ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statments like those regarding your dobuts etc, or, because it is the statem:nt of an omniscient as great as your high-esteemed Manu, Jaininî etc. 1 353 (1901) # भय-राग-दास-मोहाभावाओ सञ्चमणइवाइं च । सचं चिय मे वयणं जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ।। ३५४ ॥ (१९०२ ) Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvao Saccamanaivaim ca l Saccam ciya mé vaynam janayamajjhattha vayanam va ॥ 354 ॥ [ भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहामावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।
सत्यमेव मे वचनं शायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३५ ॥ (१९०२) Bhaya-raga-dvesa-mohabhāvat satyamanatipati ca | Satyameva me vacanam ¡nāyakamadhyasthavacanamiva 113541 (1902)]
___ Trans.- 354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from fautls like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the (complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion, and infatuation (in me). (1902,7 किह सवण्णु त्ति मई पचक्खं सव्वसंसयच्छेया !
भय-राग-दोसरहिओ तलिंगाभावाआ सोम्म ! ॥३५५।। (१९०३) Kiha savvappu tti mai paccakkham savvasamsayacchéya | Bhaya-rāga-dosarahio tallingābhāvao Somma! 1 355 11 (1903) [ कयं सर्वज्ञमतिः प्रत्यक्ष सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।
मय-राग-दोषरहितस्तलिजाभावतः सौम्य ! ॥ ३५५ ॥ (१९०३) IVide V. 1578.

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
405 Katham saravajna iti matin pratyakşam saravasamsayacchedāti Bhaya-rāga-dosarahitastallings-bhāvatah Sauinya ॥ 355 ॥ (1903)]
Trans.-355 You might ask "How are you to be (accepted as) omnisicient ?" “Evidently because, I remove all doubts, and because I am free from even the symptoms of the faults such as fear, attachment etc.” (1903)
टीका-इयमषि व्याख्यातार्था । यदपि " न ह वै प्रत्य नारकाः सन्ति" इत्यादौ नारकाभावः शङ्कयते भवता, तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतोऽयमंत्रामिपायो मन्तव्यः-न खलु प्रेत्य परलोके मेर्वादिवच्छाश्वताः केचनाप्यवस्थिता नारकाः सन्ति, किन्तु य इहोत्कृष्टपापमर्जयति, स इतो गत्वा प्रेत्य नारको भवति, अतः केनापि तत्पापं न विधेयं येन मेत्य नारकै भूयते। तदेवं छिन्नस्तत्संशयो भगवता ।। ३५५ ।। (१९०३)
___D. C.- If you doubt my sarvajnatva, O Saumya! you are not justified. For, since I have removed all your doubts and am prepared to remove them at present if you entertain any, I am sarvajina.
Moreover, in the sentences such as “Na ha vai prtéya närakāḥ santi” etc you have suspected the existence of Nārakas. But it is not so. The import of those sentences is that there are no Narakas everlasting like Méru etc. in the other world, but those who commit great sins in this world, would, become Narakas in the next world. The sentences, therefore, mean to assert that no body should commit such sins lest they might become the denizens of hell after death,
The Bhagavāna thus removed his doubts 11 355 (1903) ||
So, छिमम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण ।।
सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सह खंडियसएहि ॥३५६॥ (१९०४) Chinnami samsayammî Jiņéņa jara-maraṇavippamukkéņam ! So samaņo pavvaio tithi o saha khanđiyasaehim 11 356 11 (1904)

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406
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eighth [feet mt foretat pre-aufanymont II
*HT: gafapafTFIT alustaa: 1 348 11 ( 8808) Chinné samsayé Jinéna jarā-maraqavipramukténa 1 Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitastribhistu saha khanţikāšataiḥ 1135611 (1904)]
Irans.-365 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Dikş along with his three hundred pupils. (1904)
End of the Viscnssion with the Eight Ganadhara.
M

Page #445

Chapter IX
नवमगणधरवक्तव्यता।
Discussion with the Nineth Ganadhara ते पव्वइए सोउं अयलभाया आगच्छई जिनसगा। वचामि ण वंदामी बंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३५७ ॥ १९०५ ।। Té pavvaié söum Ayalabhāyā āgacch Jiņaaisagāsair. Vaccāmi ņa vandāmî vandittă pajjuvāsāmi #357 H (1905) [तान् मत्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽचलभ्राता आगति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे बन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ।। ३५७ ।। (१९०५) Tan pravrajitān śrutvā'calabhrāta ägacchati jinasakāšam i Vrajāmi vandé vandittvā paryupāsé (1357 11 ( 1905 )
Trans.---357 Having heard that they had renounced the world. Atalabhrāta comes before the Tirthaikare. ( He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1905)
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोतेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसा णं ॥ ३५८ ।। (१९०६) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana-vipparmulkenam | Nāména ya gottéņa ya savvaņū savvadarisi ņam 135811 (1906) [आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविममुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदसिना ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६) Ābhāşitaśca Jinéna jāti-jarz-- Taranavipramukténa i Namnā ca gotrena ca sar ajnéna sarvadarsina ॥3581 (1906)]

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408 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninett. Trans --358 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1906)
The Tirthankara, thell, saidकिं मण्णे पुण्ण-पाचे अस्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झं। वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ।। ३५९ ॥ (१९०७) Kim manné Puņņa-pātti atthi natthi saņsai tujjhami Véyapayāņa ya attham na yāṇasi tésimo attho 1135911 (1907) [किं मन्यसे पुण्य-पापे स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ।। ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)
Kim manyasé Punya-pāpé sto na sta iti samsayastava Védapadārām cărtham na jānāsi teşāmayamarthaḥ 1135911 (1907)]
Trans.-359 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. But (ca) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Védas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1907)
टीका-हे आयुष्मनचलभ्रातः ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं पुण्य-पापे स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितः संशयः, यस्माद् विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो विरुद्धदर्शनश्रुतिनिबन्धनश्च तव वर्तते । पत्र वेदपदानि तावत्-"पुरुष एवेदं ग्नि सर्वम् -इत्यादि यथा द्वितीयगणधरे तथा वाच्यानि । तेषां चार्थ त्वं न जानासीत्याधपि तथैव व्याख्येयमिति ॥ ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)
D. C.-Your doubt about the existence of punya and bapa is not justified. It is based on your hearing the sentence of Védas bearing contradictory senses. The sentences are such as “ Purusa évécran gnim sarvam” etc. which have already been mentioned in the Second Gandharavāda. You have not grasped the real interpretation of those sentences. I therefore, give their real interpretation, as under:- ॥ 359 ( 1907 ) ॥

Page #447

Vad ] Gaņadarravada
409 मण्णसि पुण्णं पावं साहारणमहव दो भिन्नाई। होज न वा कम्मं चिय सभावओ भवपवंचोऽयं ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८) Mannasi pungam pāvam sāhāraṇamahava do vi bhinnāimi Hojja na va kammam ciya sabhaavao bhavapavanco'yam ॥ 360 ॥ [मन्यसे पुण्यं पापं साधारणमथवा द्वे अपि भिने ।
भवेद् न वा कर्मैव स्वभावतो भवपश्चोऽयम् ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८) Manyasé punyam papam sādhāraṇamathavā dvé api bhinné i Bhavéd na vā karmaiva svabhāvato bhavaprapanco'yam 1136011(1908)
Trans.-- 360 Do you think punya alone or papa alone to exit ? Or, ( do you think them to be ) common, or even differdnt ? Or, is it that Karma itself be absent, and the expan sion of the whole of mundane world be natural ? ( 1908 )
___टीका-इह केषाञ्चित् तीथिकानामयं प्रवादः-"पुण्यमेवैकमस्ति न पापम्"। अन्ये त्वाहुः-"पापमेवैकमस्ति न तु पुण्यम्" अपरे तु वदन्ति"उभयमप्यन्योन्यानुविरुद्धस्वरूपं मेचकमणिकल्पं संमिश्रसुख-दुःखाख्यफलहेतुः साधारणं पुण्यपापाख्यमेकं वस्तु" इति ! अन्ये तु प्रतिपादयन्ति-स्वतन्त्रमुभयं विविक्तसुख-दुःखकारणं "होज ति" भवेदिति । अन्ये पुनराहुः"मूलतः कभँव नास्ति, स्वभावसिद्धः सर्वोऽप्ययं जगत्मपश्च:"। अतस्त्वमप्येतान् पञ्चविकल्पान् मन्यसे । एतेषां च विकल्पानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वात् संशयदोळामारुढोऽसि त्वमिति ॥ ३६० ।। (१९०८)
D. C.---There are five different theories about the existence of punya and papa as stated below:
(1) There exists punya alone, and the there is nothing
Itke papa. (1) There exist papa alone, and there is nothing like
pnnya. (3) Punya and papa which happen to be the causes of
sukha and duhkha respectively, exist in a coinblned
state like a dark-blue jewel. 52

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410
Jinabhadra Gani's (4) Punya and pāpa are absolutely
other.
[ The nineth independent of each
(5) There is nothing like Karma at all. The expansion of
this mundane world is not due to Karma, but it is natural.
Now, since you liave listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about panya and papa. || 360 ॥ (1908)
Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows:पुण्णुकरिस्से तुभया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ हागी। तस्सेव ग्वए मोरग्बो पत्याहारोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९) Punņukkarissé subhaya taratamajogāvagarisaö hāni ı Tasséva khaé mokkho pattharovamānai ॥ 361 ॥ (1909) [पुण्योत्कर्षे शुभता तरतमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षः पथ्याहारोपमानात् ।। ३६१॥ (१९०९) Punyotkarse subhată taratamayogapakarşato hāniķ Tasyaiva kşaye mokşah pathyāhāropamānāt 11 361 11 (1909)}
Trans.--361 With the (gradual, rise in punyas, welfare (is obtained). With the gradual diminution, there is destruction. Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed, there is (complete) liberation. (1909)
टीका-पुनातीति पुण्यं तस्योत्कर्षलेशतो लेशतश्च वृद्धौ शुभता भवति, मुखस्यापि क्रमशो वृद्धिर्भवति ताम्, यावदुत्कृष्टं स्वर्गमुखमित्यर्थः । तस्यैव पुण्यस्य तर-तमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः सुखस्य-दुःखं भवति । इद मुक्तं भवति-यथा यथा पुण्यमपवीयते तथा तथा जीवानां क्रमेण दुःखमुत्पद्यते, यावत् सर्वप्रकर्षाप्तं नरकदुःश्वम् । तस्यैव च पुण्यस्य सर्वथा क्षपे मोक्ष इति। एतच्च सर्व पथ्याहारोपमानाद् भावनीयम्। तथाहि-यथा

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411
Vada ]
Caņadharavāda पथ्याहारस्य क्रमेण वृद्धावारोग्यवृद्धिस्तथा पुण्यवृद्धौ सुखद्धिः, यया च पथ्याहारस्य क्रमेण परिहारे सरोगता मरति, एवं पुण्यापचये दुःखोत्पत्तिः, सर्वथा पथ्याहारपरिहारे च मरणवत् पुण्यक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६१॥ (१९०९)
exists
and
D. C.-The first case-viz, that punya alone there is nothing like pāpamis discussed as follows:
That which purifies is called punya. With the gradual increase in punya, there is a gradual rise in happiness also, leading unltimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand, when there is a gradual decrease in punya, happiness also decreases and gradually begings to turn into misery, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally, when there is entire diminution of punya, Jiva attains complete liberation, 2. e, it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet.
Just as, by the gradual increase in whosesome diet, one becomes niore and more healthy, so also, by the gradual eminence of punyas, there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand, just as, when the wholesome diet is abanonded, the disease re-enters the body, and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of punya, there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately, by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely, one dies away. In the same way, by the entire destruction of punya, jîva attains complete liberation from this world. 11 361 11 (1909)
Taking the second theory of pūpa, the author explains:--
पायुकरिसेऽहमया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ सुभया । armata e Hire 37 t hiopsit 382 11 (9880)
Păvukkarise'hamayā tratamajogavagarisao subhaya | Tasséva' khaé mokkho apatthabhattovamāṇāö | 362 11 (1910)

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412 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The nineth [ पापोत्कर्षऽधमता तरतमयोगापकर्षतः शुभता ।
तस्यैव भये मोक्षोऽपथ्यभक्तोपमानात् ॥ ३६२ ॥ ( १९१० ) Papotkarse'dhamatā taratāmayogāpakarsataḥ śubyatā ! Tasyaiva kşaye mokso'pathyabhaktopamānāt 1 362 i ( 1910),
Trans.--362 In ( case of ) the increase in papa, there is vileness; with gradual diminution ( of it ); ( there is ) welfare; and as in the case of the unwholesome diet, there is ( complete ) liberation ( of the siva ) when it is absolutely destroyed. (1910)
टीका-इहापथ्याहारोपमानाद् वैपरीत्येन भावना कार्या । तथाहियथा क्रमेणापथ्यवद्धौ रोगवृद्धिः, तथा पांशयत्यात्मानं मलिनयतीति पापं, तस्य वृद्धौ मुखदिरूपाऽधमता मन्तव्या-क्रमेण दुखं वर्धते, यावदुत्कृष्टं नारकदुःखम् । यथा चापथ्यत्यागात् क्रमेणारोग्यवृद्धिः, तथा क्रमेण पापस्यापकर्षात् मुखस्य वृद्धिः, यावदुत्कृष्टं सुरसौख्यम् । यथा चापथ्याहारस्य सर्वथा परित्यागात् परमारोग्यमुपजायते, एवं सर्वपापक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६२।। (१९१०)
D. C.-Those, who believe that there exists papa alone, and nothing like punya, put forward the same argument, but in a reverse manner. According to them, just as disease develop.s with the increase in unwholesome diet, vileness in the from of miseries etc., also increases with the eminence of sins, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. On the other haud, when the unwholesome food is being gradually given up, there is a graduat recovery of health.
Similarly, by the gradual diminution of sins, there is a gradual re-generation of happiness leading ultimately to Salvation. Lastly, just as complete health is regained at the complete abandonment of the unwholesome food, there is complete attainment of moksa, when the sins are completely removed. ॥ 362 ॥ ( 1910 ).
Now, a third belief that punya and papa exist as sadhārana, is explained:

Page #451

Vada ] Gañadharavāda
413 साहारणवण्णादि व अह साहारणमहेगमत्ताए । उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ तस्सेव य पुण्णपावक्खा ॥ ३६३ ॥ (१९११) Sāhāranavaņņādi va aha sāhāraṇamahégamattae, Ukkarisa-vagarisao taseva ya punapāvakkha | 363 ॥ ( 1911 ) [ साधारणवर्णादीवाथ साधारणमथैकमात्रया ।
उत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षतस्तस्यैव च पुण्यपापाख्या ।। ३६३ ॥ (१९११) Sādhāraṇavarçādivāthā sādhāraṇamathaikamātrayā Utkarsa-'pakarsatastasyaiva ca punyapāptākhyā in 363 ॥ ( 1911 )।
Trans.-363 Like joint-syllables etc, í punya and papa ) are combined with each other as one. And, by reason of eminence or diminution of it, it is known as punys or pipa ( respectively ) ( 1911 )
टीका-" अह साहारणमिति ” अथ साधारण संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यं वस्तु भाव्यत इत्यर्थः । कथंभूतं पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यम् ? इत्याह-" साहारणवण्णादि व ति" यथा साधारणं तुल्यं हरितालगुलिकादीनामन्यतरन्मीलितं वर्णकद्वयम् आदिशब्दाद् यथा मेचकमणि', नरसिंहादिर्वा, तथेदमपि पुण्य पापाख्यं संकीर्णमेकं वस्त्वित्यर्थः । ननु यधेकं वस्त्विदम्, तहिं पुण्यं पापं
चेति परस्परविरोधिवस्तुविषयमाख्याद्वयं कथं लभते ? इत्याह- अहेगमत्ताए इत्यादि " अथ तस्यैवैकस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपापाखयस्य वस्तुन एकया पुण्यमात्रया-एकेन पुण्यांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो वृद्धो सत्यां पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तते; एकया तु पापमात्रया-एकेन पापांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो वृद्धौ सत्या पापाख्या मवर्तते । अपकर्षेऽपि पुण्यांशस्य पापाख्या प्रवर्तते, पापांशस्य त्वपकर्षे पुण्याख्या प्रति इति ॥ ३६३ ॥ ( १९११)
D. C.-The theory is that papr and ponya are not separate entities, but they are infused with each other as one like the two syllables joined together as one. Like a base metal of haritalu or indigo, wherein there is always one object mixed with two colours or like, the A1 écaka jewel or Narasimha etc,

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414
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
one rises
punya bapa is also a mixed entity. Here, if some the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names-papa and punya? The answer laid down by them is this - On account of the increase in the constituent punya of the punja-pafa entity, the name punya is given, while with the diminution of the constituent punya, the entity is called pāpa.
I
Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of papa it is called papa and vice versa. So, punya jāpa is and only one entity and does not exist separately | 363 ॥ (1911)
one
Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows:---
एवं चिय दो भिन्नाई होज, होज्ज व सभावओ चेव । भवसंभूई, भण्णइ न सभावाओ जओऽभिमओ || ३६४ || (१९१२)
होज्ज सहावो वत्युं निक्कारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? | जइ वत्युं णत्थि तओऽणुवलद्वीओ खपुष्पं च ।। ३६५ ॥ (१९१३) Evam ciya do bhinnāim hojja, hojja va sabhāvao ceva | Bhavasambhūt, bhannai na sabhāvão jao 'bhimao || 364 ।। (1912) Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāraṇayā va vatthudhammo vā ? Jai vatthum natthitao'nuvaladdhio khapuppham va || 355 (1913)
[ एवमेव द्वे भिन्ने भवेतां, मवेद् वा स्वभावत एव । मवसंभूतिः, भण्यते न स्वभावद् यतोऽभिमतः ।। ३६४ ।। (१९१२)
मवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मो वा ? |
यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ।। ३६५ ।। (१९१३) Evameva dve bhinne bhavetām, bhaved vã svabhāvata eva Bhavasambhūtih, bhanyate na svabhāvād yato 'bhimatah ॥ 364
Bhavet svabhāvo vastu niṣkāraṇatā vā vastudharmo vā? | Yadi vastu nāsti sako'nupalabdhek khapuspamiva || 365 ।। (1913) ]

Page #453

Vada ] Caņadharavāda
415 Trans.-364-365 Similarly, ( some would believe that ) both are different (from each other), or that the production of the mundane world would be due to (nothing else but its) soabhāva only In reply to that, it is said that the prodution of the inundane world) by virtune of (its, svabhāva, is not beilvable. And, Is that svabhava a (definite) object ? or causelessness (itself) ? or the property of an object ? If (it is taken as) an object, it is not an object, because it is non-apprehensible like a kha-puspa (1912-1913)
टीका-एवमेव केषाश्चिद् मतेन द्वे अपि भिन्ने स्वतन्त्र स्यातां पुण्यपापे, तत्कार्यभूतयोः सुख-दुःखयोयौंगपर्धनानुभवाभावात् । अतोऽनेनैवभिन्नकार्यदर्शनेन तत्कारणभूत्योः पुण्य-पापयोनिताऽनुमीयत इति । “होज्ज वेत्यादि" अथवा स्वभावत एव विनापि पुण्य-पापाभ्यां भवसंभूतिः-भववैचित्र्यस्य संभवः कैश्विदिष्यते । तदेवं दर्शिताः पञ्चापि पुण्य-पापविषया विकल्पाः । एतैश्व भ्रमितमनोमिः संशयो न कर्तव्यः, एकस्यैव चतुर्थविकल्पस्यादेयत्वात्, शेषाणां चानादेयत्वात् । अत एव प्रत्यासत्तिन्यायमङ्गीकृत्य पञ्चमविकल्पं तावद् दूषयितुमाह -" भण्णईत्यादि" भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम्-न स्वभावतो भवसंभूतिः, यतः स्वभावो वस्तुरूपो वामिमतो मवेदिति द्वितीयगाथायां संबन्धः, निष्कारणवा वा, वस्तुधों वा स्वभावोऽभिमतो भवेत् ? इति त्रयो विकल्पाः। तत्र यदि वस्तुरूपोऽयमिति प्रथमो विकल्पा तर्हि तकोऽसौ स्वमावो नास्ति, अनुपलम्भात्, खपुष्पवदिति ॥ ३६४-३६५ ॥ (१९१२.-१९१३)
5. C.-According to some, punya and bapa are independent of each other, because sukha and dukkha which are their respective kāryas or consequences are not experienced at one and the same time. So, when kiryas are found to be independent of each other, their respective causes should also be independent of each other by anumana.
Finally, there is one more theory that the expansion of this mundane world is not due to Karmis known as pāpa and

Page #454

416 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth punya, but on account of its own svabhāva. According to this theory, there is nothing like Karma.
Your doubt has sprung up from five different opinions stated above. But that is not justifiable. For, out of those five theories, none except the fourth one is acceptible. The expansion of bhava by means of its subhāva as laid down in the fifth theory, is also not acceptible. Because, in that case, srabhāva should either be a definite object ( vastu ) or causelessness ( nişkaranata ), or the property of a delinite object ( vastu-dharma). Since svabhāva is absolutely imperceptible like a kha-puspa, it can never exist as a definite object. ॥ 364365॥ ( 1912-1913 )
Then, अञ्चतमणुवलद्धो वि अह तो अस्थि नत्धि कि कम ? । हेऊ व तदत्थित्ते जो नणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥ ३६६ ॥ (१९१४) कम्मरस वाभिहाणं होज सभायो ति होउ को दोसो' । पहनिषयागाराओ म य सो कत्ता घडस्सेव ॥ ३६७ ।। (१९१५) मुत्तो अमुत्तो व तओ जइ मुत्तो तोऽभिहाणआ भिन्नो । कम्म त्ति सहावो तिं यजइ वाऽमुसो न कत्ता तो ॥ ३६८ ।। (१९१६) देहाणं वोमं पिव, जुत्ता कजाइओ य मुत्तिमया। अह सो निकारणया तो खरसिंगादओ होतु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७) अह वत्थुणो स धम्मो परिणामो तो स कम्म-जीवाणं । पुन्ने-ऽयराभिहाणो कारण--कजाणुमेओ सो ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८) किरियाणं कारणओ देहाईणं च कजभावाओ। कम्मं मदभिहियं ति य पडिवज तमग्गिभूइ व्च ॥ ३७१ ॥ (१९१९)

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Vada ]
तं चिय देहाईणं किरियाणं पिय सुभा--ऽसुभन्त्ताओ । पडिवज्ज पुण्गपावं सहावओ भिन्नजाईये || ३७२ || (१९२०)
Canadharavada
Accantamaņuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ? Héü va tadatthitte jo nagu kammassa vi sa éva n 366 " ( 1914 ) Kammassa vābhihāram hojja sabhāvo tti höu ko doso ! Painiyayāgārão na ya so katta ghadasséva || 367 ॥ ( 1915 )
53
Mutto amutto va taö jai mutto to'bhihāṇao bhinno
Kamma tti sahāvo tti ya jai vémutto na kattā to 1368 || ( 1916 ) Déhāņam vomam piva, jutta kajjāio ya muttimaya
Aha so nikkāranaya to kharasingāda hontu ॥ 369 ॥ ( 1917 ) Aha vatthuno sa dhammo pariņāmo to sa kamma-jîvāņam | Punné-yarābhihino kārana- kajjanuméo so || 370 ॥ ( 1918 ) Kiriyāṇam kāraņao dehāîņam ca kajjabhāvņo | Kammam madabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhūi vva | 371 || Tam ciya déhāîṇam kiriyāṇam pi ya subhā-'subhattão | Padivajja punnapāvam sahāva bhinnajaiyam ||372 || ( 1620 ) [ अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म ।
हेतु तदस्तित्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव ।। ३६६ ।। (१९१४) कर्मणो नाभिधानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोष: ? । प्रतिनियताकाराद् न च स कर्ता घटस्येव ॥ ३६७ ।। (१९१५) मूर्ती मूर्ती वा सको यदि मृर्तस्ततोऽभिघानतो भिन्नः । कर्मेति स्वभाव इति च यदि वाऽमूर्ती न कर्ता ततः || ३६८ || (१९९६) देहानां व्योमेव युक्ता कार्यादितश्च मूर्तिमत्ता ।
अथ स निष्कारणता ततः खरशृङ्गादयो भवन्तु || ३६९ ।। (१९१७) अथ वस्तुनः स धर्मः परिणामस्ततः स कर्म - जीवयोः ।
पुण्ये --तराभिधानः कारण-कार्यानुमेयः सः ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)

417
For Private Personal Use Only

Page #456

418 Jinabhadra Cani's
[ The ninth क्रियाणां कारणतो देहादीनां च कार्यभावात् ।
wafafafafa a afaqtet caufa ufafte il 308 II (P888) तदेव देहादीनां क्रियाणामपि च शुमा--अशुभत्वात् ।
qaqah you-ard FT4TTDI f arald RGP !!(070) Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti västi kim karma i Hétur vã tadastive yo naru karmaņo'pi sa eva il 366 11 ( 1914 ) Carmaṇo vābhidhānam bhavet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko dosoo ? Pratiniyatākārād să ca sa kartā ghatasyeva 11 367 11 ( 1915)
Murto murto vä sako yadi murtastato' bhidhānato bhinnah i Karméti svabhāva iti ca yadi vā'murto na kartā tatak 136811916)
Dehānām vyomeva yuktā kāryāditaśca mūrtimatta Atha sa nişkārāṇată tatah kharasriņgādayo bhavantu 113691 (1917)
Atha vastunab sa dharmah pariņāniastatah sa karma jivayaḥ Punyé-tarábhidhānah kärana kāryānumeyan sa 11 370 i ( 1918) Kriyaņām káranato dehadinām ca kāryabhāvāti Karma madabhihitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamag nibhūtiriva 13711! Tadeva dehādinām kriyanămapi ca śubhā'-subhatvat i Pratipadyasva punya -pāpe svabhāvato bhinnajātîye 137211 (1920,]
Trans.--366-372 If it is extremely non-perceptible, why is it called scabhāva and not k'armu ? The hélre that works in the existence of such hüvā, worius in case of Karma also. Or, what harm is there is taking svabhāva as the synonym of karma ? And since it has a definite shape like ghata, it cannot be a doer, just as sky is not ( the doer of ) bodies. ( For ), the corporeal nature is justified on account of ( its ) being karya etc. Now, if that ( svabhäva ) were causelessness ( itself! non-existent ( objects like ) kha'aéråga etc, would come into existence. If it is taken as the property of a ( definite ) object, then it would turn out 10 be the effect of Karma and jiva and would be inferred as punya and pāpa by

Page #457

419
Vida]
Canadharavă means of karya and karana. So, like Agnubhate, you, too, ( shall have to ) accept ( the existence of ) Rirma on account of action, as well as Karyas ( in the forin of deha etc, and since Karma itself is the cause of good or bad ( in case of déha etc. ), as well as other perforinances, adınit punya and pāpa as belonging to different species by their very svabhāva ( 1914-1920)
टीका--एताश्च गाथाः प्रायोऽग्निभूतिगणधरवादे व्याख्याता एव, सुगमाश्च । नवरं "कारण- कजाणुमा सो ति" स च जीव- कर्मणोः पुण्य--पापाभिधानः परिणामः कारणेन कार्येण चाऽनुमीयते--कारणानुमानातू कार्यानुमानाच गम्यत इत्यर्थ । एतदेवानुमानद्वयमाह--"किरियाणं कारणो इत्यादि " दानादिक्रियाणां हिंसादिक्रियाणां च कारणत्वात् कारणरूपत्वादस्ति तत्फलभूतस्तत्कार्यरूपपुण्य--पापात्मको जीव-कर्मपरिणामः, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियाणां शालि-यव--गोधूमादिकम्। उक्तं च--
" समासु तुल्यं विषमासु तुल्यं सतीष्वसञ्चाप्यसतीषु सच । फलं क्रियास्वित्यथ यनिमित्तं तद् देहिनां सोऽस्ति नुकोऽपि धर्मः ॥१॥"
एतत् कारणानुमानम् । “ देहाईणमित्यादि, देहादीनां कारणमस्ति, कार्यरूपत्वात् तेषाम् . यथा घटस्य मृद् दण्ड- चक्र चीवरादिसामग्रीकलितः कुलालः । न च वक्तव्यम्-दृष्ट एव माता-पित्रादिकस्तेषां हेतुः, दृष्टहेतुसाम्येऽपि पुरूपे-तरादिभावन देहादीनां वचित्र्यदर्शनात्, तस्य चादृष्टकर्माख्यहेतुमन्तरेणाभावात् । अत एव पुण्य-पापभेदेन कर्मणो द्वैविध्यम्, शुभदेहादीनां पुण्यकार्यत्वात्. इतरेषां तु पापफलत्वात्; उक्तं च
" इह दृष्टहेत्वसंभविकार्यविशेषात् कुलालयल इव ।
हेत्वन्तरमनुमेयं तत् कर्म शुभा-ऽशुभं कर्तुः ॥ १॥" एतत् कार्यानुमानम् । तथा, मदभिहिमिति च कृत्वाऽग्निभूतिवत् त्वमपि कर्म प्रतिपद्यस्व, सर्वज्ञवचनमामाण्यादित्यर्थः । तदपि पुण्य-पापविभागेन विभक्त प्रतिपद्यख, देहादीनां तत्कार्याणां क्रियाणां च तत्कारणभूतानां शुभा--ऽशुभत्वेन तद्द्वविध्यदर्शनादिति । ३६६--३७२ ॥ (१९१४. १९२०)

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420 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The ninth D. C.- These verses have already been explained in details in the Second Ganadhara-vāda,f The only point to remember in this connection, is that punya and pāpa, the pariņāma of liva and Karma, could be inferred from kārana and kärya.
These two inferences are explained as follows:
(1) Rāraṇānumana:-- Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops Kāryas) at the end, punya and pāpa are also reaped as the variņāmas of Jiva and Karma with actions like munificence etc. or violence etc. as their respective causes.
It is, therefore, said that"Samasu tulyam viņamāsu tulyam satîşvasaccăpyasatīşu Sacca i Phalam kriyāsvityatha yannimittam tad dehinām so'stinuko'pi
dharmaḥ " (2) Kāryānumāna:- Just as, a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the Kārana of ghața, so also in case of Karyas like sarira etc. there is some cause or the other. The cause, in this case, is nothing but punya and pāpa in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of karyas like sarira etc, parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them, there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms-in spite of their dřsta helu, viz, parents being the same--would never be accounted for. The karma therefore has two types:--Punya and păpa. Good forms are the results of punya and ugly ones are the results of pāpa. Hence it is said:--
Iha dřştahétvasambhavikāryaviseşāt kulälayatna iva i Hétvantaramanumeyam tat Karma śubhā'-subham kartuḥ ""
So, like Agnibhūtı, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of Karma putting faith into the words of me--the
† Vide pp. 86 to 137

Page #459

Vada ]
Gaṇadharavāda
421
omnisicient. You shall also have to take it for certain that Karma is divided as punya and pāpa, causing a variety of forms in dèha etc. 366-372 || (1914-1920)
The existence of punya and papa could be established in a different way:---
सुह--दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं कज्जभावओऽवस्सं ।
परमाणवो घडस्स व कारणमिह पुण्ण- पावाई ।। ३७३ ।। (१९२१)
Suha-dukkāṇam kāraṇamaṇurūvam kajjabhāvao'vassam Paramānavo ghadassa va kāranamiha puna-pāvaim ॥ 373 || (1921)
[ सुख - दुःखयोः कारणमनुरूपं कार्यभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
परमाणat घटस्येव कारणमिह पुण्यपापे || ३७३ ।। (१९२१) Sukha-duḥkhayoḥ kāraṇamanurūpam kāryabhāvato’vaśyam i Paramānavo ghatasyeva kāranamiha punya-pāpe | 373 | (1921)]
Trans --373 Just as molecules (which act as ) the cause of ghata resemble ghata in the same way, happiness and misery, the Karyas have also their Karana viz, punya and pāpa similar, to them. (1921)
टीका - अस्त्यवश्यं सुख-दुःखयोरनुरूपं कारणम्, कार्यत्वात् तयोः, यह कार्य तस्यानुरूपं कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः तच्च तयोरिहानुरूपं कारणं, सुखस्य पुण्यं दुःखस्य तु पापमिति || ३७३ || (१९२१)
D. C. -- Since kārana is similar to Kārya, the small particles of earth which make ghata, resembles ghata, and punya and papa which are the kāraņa of sukha and duḥkha would resemble sukha aud duḥkha. || 373 || (1921)
The opponent may now, raise the objection as follows:--
सुह- दुक्खकारणं जइ कम्म कज्जस्स तदणुरूवं च । पत्तमरूवं तं पिहू अह रूवि नाणुरूवं तो ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

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A22 Jinabhadra Gani's
| The ninth Suha-duḥkhakaraṇam jai kammam kajjassa tadaņurūvam ca Pattamarūvam tam pi hu aha rūvim nănurūvam to 13741 (1922)
[मुख-दुःखकारणं यदि कर्म कार्यस्य तदनुरूपं च ।
प्राप्तभरूपं तदपि खल्वथ रूपि नानुरूपं ततः ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२) Sukha-duḥkhahāraṇam yadi karma kāryasya tadanurūpam ca Prāptamrrūpam tadapi khalvatha rūpi nānurūpam tatah 11 374 it !
Trans.--374 If karma | were known as ) the cause of happiness and misery, and if Karya ( were taken as ) simiiar to it, then, that (te karma ) also would certainly become formless, and if corporeal, it would not resemble ( the Karya, ( 1922)
टीका-ननु यदि सुख-दुःग्वयोः पुण्य -पापात्मकं कर्म कारणम्, तच्च यदि कार्यस्य सुख-दुःखरूपस्यानुरूपं सदमिष्यते, तर्हि सुख-दुःखयोरात्मपरिणामत्वेनारूपत्वात् तदपि पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म तदनुरूपतयाऽस्पं मामोति । अथ रूपवत्, तर्हि नानुरूपं तत्, मूतत्वेन विलक्षणत्वादिति ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)
D. C.-If Karmr composed of punye and papa is accepted as the Karaņiz of szekha and duḥkha, and if sukha and wenkhh are taken as similar to the Karma, Karmra, ishich in fact is corporeal, would becorne formless like sukha and tirthkha.
On the other hand, if it is taken as corporeal, it will not resemble its kārya, vis, sukha and dunkha which are incorporeal. ॥ 374 ॥ ( 1922)
Then, the Truhankara Bhagavía replies:-. न हि सव्वहाणुरूवं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अह मयं ते । कि कज्ज-कारणत्तणमहवा बत्थुसणं तस्स ? ॥ ३७५ ।। (१९२३) Na hi savvahāgurūvam bhinnam, vā kāraṇam, aha mayam té Kim kajja - kärapattanamahavă vatthuttapam tassa ? 11 375 » (1923)

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423
Vida ]
Ganadarravāda [न हि सर्वथानुरूपं मिन्नं वा कारणं, अथ मत ते।
किं कार्य-कारणत्वमथवा वस्तुत्वं तस्य ? ॥ ३७५ ।। (१९२३) Na hi sarvathānurūpam bhinnam vā kāraṇam atha matam té Kim kārya-kāraṇatvamathavā vastutvam tasya ? ! 375 1! ( 1923 )]
Trans.--375 The kāraņu is neither similar nor dissimilar ( to the kärya ) in all respects. Then, you might' contend that
How is its being a kārya, kāraña or a ( definite ) object : justified )? ( 1923 )
टीका-न हि सर्वथा कार्यानुरूपं कारणमिष्यते, येन सुख-दु:खद कर्मणोऽप्यरूपत्वं प्रर्यते । नाप्येकान्तेन सर्वधर्मः कारणं कार्याभिन्नमेष्टव्यम् । "अह मयं ते ति” अथ ते तवैद् मतम्-एकान्तेन सर्वैरपि धर्मः कारणं कार्यानुरूपमेव, भिन्नं वाऽनुरूषमेवेति; तहि सर्वथाऽनुरूपत्व एकस्य कारणत्वेऽपरस्यापि कारणत्वात्, एकस्य च कार्यत्वेऽन्यस्यापि कार्यत्वात् किं तयोः कार्य-कारणवम् ? न किश्चित् द्वयोरपिकारणत्वात्, कार्यवाद् वेति । अथैकान्तभेदेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वे किं नाम तस्य कारणस्य वस्तुखम् ? न किञ्चित्, द्वयोरपि वस्तुत्वे सर्वथा भेदहानिमसङ्गादिति । तस्माद नैकान्तेनानुरूपता, अननुरूपता वा कार्य-कारणयोः ॥ ३७५ ।। (१९२३)
D. C.-Käraña is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the Karyas. So, Karma, cannot be called formless like its Karya viz, sukha and duhkha.
Your doubt is based on your assumption that karana is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the karya. But you are not justified in your assumption. Por, if Karaca were absolutely similar to Karja, it would turn out to be the karuna, of some other Karya also.
Similarly, a kārya taken as similar to a hārana in all respects, would also become the Karya of another kārana. Consequently, there will be no distinction between Karya and kārona, and both would either become kūrara or kärya.
Since there is no difference between kärya being a definite

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124 Jinabhadra Gaội's
[ The ninth objec and a karana being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also, be out of place. Hence, Kārza and karana are nither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other. ॥ 375। ( 1923 )
The author states an objection to this and
to
its reply:
सव्वं तुल्लातुल्लं जइ तो कजाणुरूवया केयं ? । जं सोम्म ! सपनाओ कज्जे परपजओ सेंसो ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९२४) Savvam tullătullam jai to kajjāņurūvaya kéyam ?, Jam Somma 1 sapasjãö kajjam parapajjaé séso it' 376 11 ( 1924 ) [सर्व तुल्या--तुल्यं यदि ततः कार्यानुरूपता केयम् ? ।
यत् सौम्य ! स्वपर्यायः कार्य परपर्ययः शेषः ।। ३७६ ॥ (१९२४) Sarvain tulyā'-tulyam yadi tataḥ kāryanurūpatā keyam? Yat Saumya | svaparyāyah kāryam paraparyayaḥ séşaḥ 1376111925')
Trans --376 "If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way, is Karya similar ( to karana } ? " For, o Saumya ! kārya is the synonym and the rest, autonym (1924)
टीका-न केवलं कार्य- कारणे एव तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपे, किन्तु सकलमपि त्रिभुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु परस्परं तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपमेव, न पुनः किञ्चित् कर्ताप्येकान्तेन तुल्यमतुल्यं वा। लब्धावकाशः परः प्राह-" जईत्यादि" यधेवम्, ततः केयं कार्यानुरुपता कारणस्य विशेषतोऽन्विष्यते, येनोच्यते"मुह-दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं” इत्यादि ? । यदि किश्चिदेकान्तेनानुरूपं स्यात् तदेत्थं वक्तुं युज्यते, यदा वकान्ततो न किश्चिदनुरूपम्, नाप्यननुरूपम्। किन्तु सर्व सर्वण तुल्या-तुल्यरूपमेव, तदा किमनेन विशेषेण ?। अत्रोच्यते--" जमित्यादि" सौम्य ! तुल्या -तुल्यत्वे सर्वगतेऽपि यद् यस्माद् कारणस्य कार्य स्वपर्यायः, तस्मात् कारणं कार्यस्येहा नुरूपमुच्यते शेषस्वकार्यरूपः सर्वोऽपि पदार्थः कारणस्य परपर्यायः, इति

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Väda ]
Capadharavada
तं प्रति विवक्षितं कारणमसमानरूपमभिधीयते । आह- ननु कथं प्रस्तुते सुखदुःखे कारणस्य स्वपर्यांयः ? । उच्यते - जीव- पुण्यसंयोगः सुखस्य कारणम्, तस्य च सुखं पर्याय एब, दुःखस्यापि जीव- पापसंयोगः कारणम्, अवस्तस्यापि दुःखं पर्याय एवं यथा च सुखं शुभं, कल्याणं, शिवमित्यादीन् व्यपदेशाल्लभते तथा तत्कारणभूतं पुण्यस्कन्धद्रव्यामपि यथा च दुःखमश्शुभम्, अकल्याणम् अशिवमित्यादिसंज्ञाः मामोति तथा तत्कारणभूतं पापद्रव्यमपि, इति विशेषतोऽत्र पुण्य-पापे - सुख-दुःखयेोरनुरूपकारणत्वेनेोक्ते इति ॥ ३७६ ॥ (१९३४)
D. C.-Bhagavana :-Not only karya and karaṇa, but all objects of the Universe, are relatively equal and unequal, and no objects is absolutely equal or absolutely unequal.
425
Acalabhrata:-If it is so, then, why do you try to establish particularly the similarity between karana and karya by saying that "sukha and duḥkha are similar to kārņa etc. ? Still, however, if some object is absolutely similar to another, it may be justified to say so. But when nothing is similar or dissimilar in all respects, and everything is relatively equal or unequal according to you, then, how could it be said that Karaṇa was semilar to Kārya.
Bhagavana:-In spite of all objects being relatively equal or unequal, karya resembles karaya, because it is the synonym of kāraņa, while other objects which are the autonyms of kār. ana are dissimilar to it.
Hence in the present case, sukha and duḥkha are the synonyms of Karma the karana. The combination of jiva and punya is the cause of sukha, and that of jiva and păpa is the cause of duḥkha, just as śwa, kalyāņa, śubha etc. are the synonyms for sukha, the same are the synonyms for puŋyakarmas also.
Similarly, duḥkha and its cause, the papa-karmas, have the same synonyms viz, a-siva, a-kalyāņa and a-subha etc. 54

For Private Personal Use Only

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426
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eighth It is in this way, O Saumya ! that punya and pāpa are known as the karaņas resembling their kāryas vix sukha and duḥkha. ॥ 376 (1924)
The opponent may here ask as follows:-- किं जह मुत्सममुत्तस्स कारणं तह सुहाईणं कम्म । दिदं सहाइकारणमन्नाइ जहेह तह कम्म ? ॥३७७॥ (१९२६) Kim jaha muttamamuttassa kāraṇam taha suhāîņam kammami Dittham suhaikaryamannai jahéha taha kamman? || 377॥ (1925) [कि यथा म्तममूर्तस्य कारणं तथा सुखादीनां कर्म ।
दृष्ठं मुखादिकारणमनादि यथेह तथा कर्म ? ।। ३७७ ।। (१९२६) Kim yatkā mūrtamamūrtasya kāranam tatha sukhădinām karma i Dristam sukhadikarayamannadi yathéha tathā karma ? ॥ 377 ।।
Trans.-377 Is Karma the cause of sukha etc, as mūrta is the cause of amürta ? (And) is Karma apprehended (as the cause in the same way ss food etc, are apprehended as the cause of happiness etc ? (1925)
टीका-किं यथा मूर्त नीलादिकममूर्तस्य स्वप्रतिभासिज्ञानस्य कारणं हेतुस्थामुख-दुःखयोः पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्मापि मूर्तमेव सत् कारणम्, यथा प्रत्यक्षत एव दृष्टमन्नादिकम् : आदिशब्दात् सक-चंदना-जना-हिविष-कण्टकादिकयिह सुख-दुःखयोमूर्त तत् कारणं यत् कर्मापि तयारिति भावार्थः ? ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२६)
___D. C.-Just as gem, garland, sandal-paste, woman ser nant, or a poisonous sting becomes the mūrla cause of the hantra itikta and dirhk ra. should we aceept Karma also whether good or bad-to be the mūrta and prat yakşi cause like food etc. ! ॥ 377 ।। (1925)
The answer is--

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Vada ]
Caṇadharavada
होउ तयं चि किं कम्मणा, न जं तुक्लसाहणागं पि । फलभेदओ सोऽवस्सं सकारणो कारणं कम्मं ||३७८|| (१९२६)
427
Höu tayam ciya kim kammaņā, na jam tullasāhaṇāņam pi Phalabheda so 'vassam sakārano kāranam kammam | 378 1 ( 1926)
[भवतु नदेव किं कर्मणा, न यत् तुल्यसाधनानामपि ।
फळभेदतः सोsarयं सकारणः कारणं कर्म ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)
Bhavatu tadeva kim karmaņā, na yat tulyasādhanānāmapi Phalabhedataḥ so'vasyam sa-kāraṇaḥ kāraṇam karına 1378|| (1926)]
Trans.—378 (The opponent may argue futher that ). “Let that (ie, food etc.) be the cause of happiness etc.” but what (is the use) of Karma? That is proper. In spite of there being equal materials, the difference in results has certainly (some) reason which is (nothing but Karma.) (1926)
टीका ननु सदेव दुष्टमभादिकं वस्तु तहिं सुखादेः कारणमस्तु किमदृष्टेन तेन कर्मणा परिफल्पितेन, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ? । तदेतद् न, यद् यममात् तुस्यान्यन्नादोनी साधनानि येषां ते तुल्यसाधनाः पुरुषास्तेषामपि फळे सुखदुःखलक्षणे कार्यभेदः फलभेदौ महान् दृश्यते, तुल्येऽध्यन्नार्दिने सुक्ते कस्याप्याढादः, अन्यस्य तु रोगाद्युत्पत्तिर्दृश्यत तत्यर्थः । यश्चेत्थं तुल्यान्नादि साधनानामपि फलभेदः, सोऽवश्यमेव सकारणः, निष्कारणण्वे नित्यं सच्चाऽश्वमसङ्गात् । यथ तत्कारणं तददृष्टं कर्म, इति न तत्करपणाssनर्ध्यगिति ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)
D. C. - Acalabhrota: - Since food etc are directly apprehended, they could be taken as the causes of sukka, duhkha, but what is the purpose of assuming Karma, which is absolutely imperceptible to be the cause?
Bhagavana-Persons having the same sadhanas like ana etc are found to enjoy different phalas like sukha and luhk In spite of their taking the same food, some people look glad

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428
Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth while others appear gloomy. This sort of phala bhédo is significant and is due to good or bad karma. 11 378 !! ( 1926 )
The mūrtatā of Karma is now explained as follows:एत्तो चिय तं मुत्तं मुत्तबलाहाणओ जहा कुंभो। देहाइकजमत्ताइओ व्व भणिए पुणो भणह ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२८) Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalahānao jahā kumbho Dehaikajjamuttaio vva bhanie puno bhanai || 379 . ( 1927 ) [एतस्मादेव तद् मूर्त मूर्तबलाधानतो यथा कुम्मः ।
देहादिकार्यादित इव भणिते पुनर्भणति ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७) Etasmádéva tad mūrtam mūrtabalādhānato yathā kumbhah Déhādikäryamūrtādita iva bhaạité punarbhŋati 137911 ( 1927 )]
Trans.---379 On account of that reason, it is mūrta like ghata, on account of its ( capacity of ) strengthening the body, or on account of the kāryas like déha etc. being mūrla. When thus told, he speaks again. ( 1927 )
टीका-यत एव तुल्यसाधनानां कर्मनिवन्धनः फलमेदः, अत एवो च्यते-प्त कर्म, मूर्तस्य देहदिलाधानकारित्वात्, यथा निमित्त मात्रमावित्वेन घटो देहादीनां बळमाधत्ते एवं कर्मापि, अतो मूर्तमित्यर्थः । अथवा, भूत कर्म, मूर्तेन सक्-चन्दना-ऽजनादिना तस्योपचयलक्षणस्य पहस्याधीयमानत्वात्, कुम्भवत्-यथा मूर्तत्वेन तैलादिना बलस्याधीयमानत्वात कुम्भो मूर्तः, एवं वक्-चन्दनादिनोपचीयमानत्वात् कर्माति मूर्तमिस्ति भावः। यदिवा, मूर्त कर्म, देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात, परमाणुवत्-यथा घटादे.. स्सत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् परमाणवो मूर्वाः, एवं देहादेस्वकार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् कर्मापि मूर्तमित्यर्थः। एवं मणिते पुनर्भणति परः ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)
D, C.-The murtatva of Karmas is -explained in variups ways Since the difference in phaias in case of those having the same sadhanas is due to Karma, the karma, should be takert as mūrta,

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Vada ] Ganadharayāda
429 2. Karma is mūrta, because like ghaga, it strengthens the kār.
yas like body etc.. 3. Just as ghata is mūrta, because it is strengthened by the
mūrta object like oil etc. Karma is also mürta, because it is also nourished by objects like flower-garlands and sandal-paste etc. Just as the pariņāmas of ghata are mūrla, because ghata is mürta, the karma is also mürta, because its kāryas like Sarira etc. are mairta. ॥ 379 ॥ ( 1927 )
When thus answered by the Tirthankara, the opponent argues again तो किं देहाईणं मुत्तत्तणओ तय हवंह मुत्तं । अह सुह-दुक्खाईणं कारणभावादरूवं ति ? ॥ ३८० ।। (१९२८) To kim déhāîņam muttattaņaö tayam havai muttam i Alia suha-dukkhāiņam kāraṇabhāvādarūvam ti? 11 380 1 (1928)
[ततः किं देहादीनां मूतत्वतस्तद् भवति मतम् ।
अथ मुख-दुःखादीनां कारणभावादरूपमिति ? ।। ३८० ।। (१९२८) Tataḥ kim déhadînām mūrtatvatastad bhavati murtami Atha sukha-duḥkhädînănı kāraṇabhávādarūpamiti? || 380 i 1928)
Trans.- 380 Then, does it become mürta because of the corporeal nature, déha etc. ? Or, is it incorporeal because of sukha-duhkha etc. ( being incorporeal ) ? ( 1928)
टीका-ततः किं देहादीनां कर्मकार्याणा मूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कर्म मूर्त भवतु, आहोस्वित् सुख-दुःख-क्रोध-मानादीनां जीवपरिणामभूतानां तत्कार्याणाममूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कारणमावेनामूर्तमस्तु कर्म ? इत्येवं मूतत्वा-ऽमूर्तत्वाभ्यामुभयथापि तत्कार्यदर्शनात् किं मूर्तम्, अमूर्त वा कर्म भवतु ? इति निवेद्यतामिति ।। ३८० ॥ (१९२८) ___D. C.- By accepting your argument, Karma will become

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I The ninth mürta, as well as, a-mūrta. It will be mūrta because its kāryas like déha etc are mūrta. At the same time, it will be called a-mirta also, because its käryas and the jiva-pariņāmas such as sukha, duḥkha, krodha, mõna etc are a-mūrta. In such a case, should we take Karina as mūrla or a-mürla ? 1138011 (1928)
Bhagavāna replies:न सुहाईणं हेऊ कम्मं चिय किन्तु ताण जीवो वि। होइ समवाइकारणमियरं कम्मं ति को दोसो ? ॥ ३८१ ॥ (१९२९) Na sahāîņam héū kammam ciya kintu tāņa jivo vi Höi samayāikaranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? 113811 (1929)
[न सुखादीनां हेतुः कमैव किन्तु तेषां जीवोऽपि ।
भवति समवायिकारणमितरत् कर्मेति को दोषः ॥ ३८१ ॥ (१९२९) Na sukhādinām hetuḥ karmaiva kintu teşām jivo'pi Bhavati samavāyikāraṇamitarat karmé'ti ko doşaḥ ? 113811 (1929)]
Trans.-381 Karma is not the only cause of happiness etc, but jîva is also their intimate cause, Karma is the opposite one. What difficulty will arise (in such a case)? (1929)
टीका-सुखादीनां कर्मैच केवलं कारणं न भवति, किन्तु जीवोऽपि तेषां समगयिकारणं भवति, कर्म पुनरितरदसमवायिकारणं भवतीति को दोषः ? । इदमुक्तं भवति-सुग्वादेरमूर्त्तत्वेन समवायिकारणस्य जीवस्यामूर्तस्वमस्त्येव, असमवायिकारणस्य तु कर्मणः मुखाद्यतत्वेनामूर्तत्वं न भवतीसपीति न दोष इति ।। ३८१ ॥ (१९२९)
D. C.-Karma is not the only cause of sukha, duhkha etc. Really speaking, Jiva is the intimate cause of sukha etc, and Karma is merely an accidental cause. Hence, on account of the a-mūrtatva of the kāryas, vis sukh, dunkra etc, their intimate cause viz jiva does become a-murta but Karma being merely an accidantal cause, does not become a-miirta. So, there will be no difficulty as regards karma being accepted as mūrta. 113811 (1929)

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431 Now, refuting the first assertion that the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of pufya, the author states इय रूवित्ते सुह-दुक्खकारणत्ते य कम्मुणो सिद्धे । पुग्णावगरिसमेत्तेण दुक्खबहुलत्तणमजुत्तं ॥ ३८२ ।। (१९३०) Iya rüvitté suha-dukkha kāraṇatté ya kammuņo siddhé i Purnāvagarisaméttáņa dukkhabaḥulattanamajuttam 138211 (1930) [इति रूपित्वे मुख-दुःखकारणत्वे च कर्मणः सिद्ध।
पुण्यापकर्षमात्रेण दुःखबहुलत्वमयुक्तम् ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०) Iti rūpitve sukha duḥkhakāraṇative ca karmaṇaḥ siddhé ! Punyāpakarşamātréņa duhkhabahulatvamayuktam 1138211 (1930)]
Trans.---382 When Karma is proved to be mūrta and (at the same time) established as the cause of sukha-duhkha ( the theory that the abundance of miseries is due to the dimminution of virtuous actions, will fail. ( 1930 )
टीका-इत्येवं पञ्चविकल्पोपन्यस्तस्वमाववादनिरासेन पुण्य-पापात्मकस्य कर्मणः मुख-दुःखकारणत्वे रूपित्वे च सिद्धे पुण्यापकर्षमात्रेण यद् दुःखबहुलत्वं प्रथमविकल्पोपन्यासे मोक्तं तदयुक्तमिति ॥ ३८२ ।। (१९३०)
. C.-Now that the thery of svabhāva has been refuted and the existence of a murta karma as the cause of sukha and duhkha, has been established we can easily refute the theory that the abundance of miseries is caused by the diminution of punyas || 382 ॥ ( 1930) कम्मप्पगरिसजणियं तदवस्सं पगरिसाणुभूईओ। सोक्खप्पगरिसभूई जह पुण्णप्पगरिसप्पभवा ।। ३८३ ॥ (१९३१) Kammapprgarisajaņiyam tadavassam pagarisāņubhūio Sokhhappagarisabhūî jaha puņnappagarisappabhavā 1 383 11 (1931) [कर्मप्रकर्षजनितं तदवश्यं प्रकर्षानुभूतेः । सौख्यमकर्षभूतियथा पुण्यप्रकर्षप्रभवा ।। ३८३ ॥ (१९३१)

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[The ninth Karmaprakarsajanitam tadavasyam prakarsānubhūtéḥ i Saukhyāprakarşabhūtiryathā Dunyaprakarsaprabhavā 11 383 il
Trans.--383 Just as the experience of abundance of happiness, is caused by the abundance of virtuous actions, the experience of the abundance of miseries is also produced by the abundance of sinful actions. ( 1931 )
टीका-तद् दुःखबहुलत्वं पुण्यापकर्षजनितं न भवति, किन्तु स्वानुरुपकर्मप्रकर्षजनितम्, प्रकर्षानुभूतित्वात्-वेदनामकर्षानुभवरूपत्वादिति हेतुः, यथा सौख्यप्रकर्षानुभूतिः स्वानुरूपकर्मप्रकर्षप्रभवेति दृष्टान्तः ॥ ३८३।। (१९३१)
D. C.--Abundance of miseries is not due to the want of virtuous actions, but it is due to the abundance of sinful actions, just as abundance of happiness is due to abundance of virtuous deeds, and not due to the diminution of sinful deeds, ॥ 383 ।। ( 1931 )
Moreover, तह पज्झसाहणप्पगरिसंगभावादिहाणहा न तयं । विवरीयबासाहणवलप्पगरिसं अवेस्खेज्जा ।। ३८४ ॥ (१९३२) Taha bajjhasăhaņappagarisangabhāvādihannaha na tayam Vivariyabajjhiasāhanabalappāgarisam avékkhéjjā || 384 W ( 1932) [ तथा वाह्यसाधनप्रकर्षाङ्गभावादिहान्यथा न वत् विपरीतबाह्यसाधनबलप्रकर्षमपेक्षेत ॥ ३८४ ॥ (१९३२)
Tathā bāhyasadhanaprakarsāngabhāvādihānyatha na tat, Viparitbāhyasādhanabalaprakarşamapékséta 1 348 11 ( 1.32 ) )
Trans.-384 It is so, on account of the abundance of external elements also. ( For ), otherwise, it would not require the excessive force of the external, ( as well as ), opposite elements. ( 1932 )

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Ganadharavāda टीका-' तथा' इत्युपपस्यन्तरार्थः । इह देहिनां दुःखबहुलत्वं केवल पुण्यापकर्षगाजनितं न भवति। कुतः ? इत्यत्र हेतुमाह-वाहानि यान्यनिष्टाहारादीनि साधनानि तेषां यस्तदनुरूपः प्रकर्षस्तस्याङ्गभावात् कारणमारादिति । विपर्यये बाध कमाइ- इहेत्यादि' तद् दुःखमन्यथा यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्यं भवेत् तदा पुण्यसंपाचेष्टाहारापचयमात्रादेव भवेत्, न तु पापोचयसंपाधानिष्टाहारादिरूपविपरीतबाह्यसाधनानां यद् बलं सामर्थ्य तस्य स्वानुरुपो यः प्रकर्षस्तमपेक्षेत। इदमत्र हृदयम्-यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्यं दुःखं भवेत्, तदा पुण्योदयप्राप्येष्टाहारादिसाधनापकर्षमात्रादेव भवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, इष्टविपरीतानिष्टाहारादिसाधनमघर्षसामदेिव तद्भावादिति ॥३८४।। (९९३२)
D. C.--Abundance of miseries to the various beings in this world, is not merely caused by the diminution of punyakarmas but by the abundant force of various external elements like forbidden food also. If it were not so, it would have been caused only by the diminution of prescribed food etc. ( to be attained by punya-karmas ) and would never have depended upon the abundant force of the external but opposite elements like forbidden food etc ( to be attained by papa-karmas )
The main purport of the above argument is this:-- If dèhatva were to be generated by means of the diminution of punya-karmas only, it would have been produced only on account of the lack of external materials like istāhāra etc. Eut it is not so, as it is produced by the increasing force of the external but opposite materials like aniştāhāra as well. ॥ 384 ॥ ( 1932 )
And, देहो नावचयकओ पुण्णुफारिसे व मुत्तिमत्ताओ। होजा बस हीणतरओ कहमसुभयरो महल्लो य ? ॥३८५।। (१९३३) Dého návacyakaö puņñukkarise va muttimattāo i Hojja va sa hinatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya ? 1138511(1933
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[The ninth [देहो नापचयकृतः पुण्योत्कर्ष इव तिमत्त्वात् ।
मवेद् वा स हीनतरकः कथामशुभतरा महाश्व ? ॥३८५॥ (१९३३) Deho nāpacayakṣitaḥ punyotakarsa iva mūrtimattvät Bhaved vā sa hinatarakah kathamaśubhataro mahānsca ? 1138511
Trans.-385 Since body is corporeal, like the abundant punya karmas, it is not produced by (means of) diminution (of punya karmasi. Or, if it is so, it should be small. (For) how is a huge and (at the same time) splendid (body available)? (1933)
टीका-दुःखितहस्त्यादिदेहः केबलपुण्यापयमात्रकृतो न भवति, मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, यथा पुण्योत्कर्षे तज्जन्योऽनुत्तरसुर-चक्रवादिदेहः, यश्च पुण्यापचयमात्रजन्यः स मर्तिमानपि न भवति, यथा न कोऽपि, यदि च पुण्यापचयमात्रेण देहो जन्यत, तदा हीनतरः शुम एव च स्यात्, कथं महान्, अशुभतरश्च भवेत्, महतो महापुण्योपचयजन्यखात्, अशुभस्य चाशुभकर्मनिवर्त्यत्षात् ? | पुण्येन पुनरणीयसापि शुभ एव देहो जन्येत, न तु दुःखितः। अणोयसापि हि सुवर्णलवेनाणीयानपि सौवर्ण एव घटो भवति न तु मार्तिकः, ताभ्रादिति ॥ ३८६ ।। ( १९३३ )
D. C.- Since the bodies of anuttara gods including the Supreme Ruler of the World are miirta, they are not produced by the diminution of punya karmas In the same way, bodies like that of a miserable elephant, etc are also not produced by the dimimution of punya kar nas only as they are mirta. Por, that which has been produced by the dininution can never be mirta.
Still however, if a body is ever produced by diminution of punyas, it must be exquisitely feeble and auspicious. Because a body which is huge and at the same time auspicious, is produced by the accumulation of punyas, while that which is huge but in-auspicious is produced by the accumulation of påpas. Hence, a body produced even by a small quantity of punyas must necessarily be happy and never unhappy. Just

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as, from a small lump of gold, a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one, similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of punyas is always happy though small in form. 11385 1 (1933)
Refuting the second and third theories, the author states
एवं चिय विवरीय जोएना सव्वपावपक्ख वि। न य साहारणरूवं कम्मं तकारगाभावा ॥३८६॥ (१९३४) Evam ciya vivariyam jöéjjă savvapävapakkhé vi Na ya saharanarivain kammam takkaranābhāva || 386॥ (1934)
[ एवमेव विपरीतं योजयेत् सर्वपापपक्षेऽपि ।
न च साधारणरूपं कर्म तत्कारणामावात् ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४) Evameva viparitam yojayet saravāpāpapak şe'pi , Na ca sādhāranaripam karma, tatkāraṇbhāvātu 386 11 (1934)
____ Trans.---386 The same (argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive påpas, (but) in a reverse manner. And, (there is nothing like a common karnia (containing punga and påpa together) because of the absence of its cause. (1934)
टीका-"सर्व पापमेवास्ति, न तु पुण्यम् , पापापचयमात्रजन्यत्वात् मुखस्य" इत्येतस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एवमेव केवलपुण्यवादोक्तदूषणाद् विपरीत. गत्या सर्व योजयेत्, यद्यथा-पापपकर्षमात्रजनितं मुखं न भवति, पापांशस्यास्पीयसोऽपि दुःखजनकत्वात् । न ह्यणीयानपि विषलवः स्वास्थ्यहेतुर्भवति । तस्मात् पुण्यजनितमेवाल्पमपि सुखमित्यादि स्वबुद्धयाऽभ्यूह्य वाच्यम् । इति पृथग् दुःखयोःकातणभूते स्वतत्रे पुण्य -पापे एठान्ये । अत एव साधारणे अपि संकीणे पुण्य-पापे नैष्टाष्ये। कुतः ? इत्याह-'न येत्यादि । न च साधारणरूपं संकोणस्वभावं पुण्य-पापत्मकमेकं कर्मास्ति, तस्यैवंभूतस्य कर्मणः कालणाभावात् । अत्र प्रयोगः-नास्ति संकीर्णोभयरूपं कर्म, असंमाव्यणानैवंविधकारणत्वात्, वन्ध्यापुत्रवदिति ॥ ३८६॥ (१९३४)

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D, C.-In case of the theory that everything is papa and there is nothing like punya and that sukka is also produced by the diminution of papa, the same argument stated above should be applied but in a reverse manner in this way: Since even a small portion of papa produced duḥkha like a small particle of poison, it could never be said that sukha is produced by the diminution of papa. Even a fraction of happiness is produced by punya and never by papa, and so on. These arguments clearly indicate that punya, and papa are absolutely separate entities producing sukha and duḥkha respectively.
436
So, both could never be taken as one combined entity as laid down in the third theory. Such a combined Karma has no hétu whatsoever. And hence, like a son to a barren woman it is entirely impossible. | 386 || ( 1934 )
In support of the argument, the author contiuesufafaŭ gal-sgát a ☎ quazafèa 1
*
होल न उ उभयरूवो कम्मं पितुओ तयणुरुवं ।। ३८७ ॥ (१९३५) Kammam joganitmittam subho'subho vă sa égasamayammi Hojja na ubhayarūvo kammam pi tao tayaŋurūvam ||387|1 (1935)
[ कर्म योगनिमित्तं शुभोऽशुभो वा स एकसमये ।
भवेद् न तुभयरूपः कर्माऽपि ततस्तदनुरूपम् ।। ३८७ ।। (१९३५) Karma yoganimittam subho'subho vā sa èkasamaye | Bhavéd na tubhayarūpaḥ karmā'pi tatastadanurûpam ||387|| (1935)]
Trans.-387 Karma is caused by contact which is either auspicious or inauspicious at one time, but never in both the forms. So, Karma is also similar to it. (1935)
टीका - मिध्यात्वाऽविरति - प्रमाद - कषाय- योगा बन्धहेतव इति पर्यते योगाभिधानात् सर्वत्र कर्मबन्धहेतुत्वस्य योगाविनाभावाद् योगानामेव बन्धहेतुत्वमिति कर्म योगनिमित्तमुच्यते । स ध मनोवाक्कायात्मको
For Private Personal Use Only

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Ganadarravada योग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवेत्, न तूभयरूपः, अत' कारणा. नुरूपत्वात् कार्यस्य कर्मापि तदनुरूपं शुभं पुण्यरूपं बध्यते, अशुभं वा पापरूष बध्यते, न तु संकीर्णस्वभावमुभयरूपमेकदैव बध्यत इति ।। ३८७ ॥ (१९३५)
D. C-Perversion (mithyātva ) incontinence ( a-virati ) stupidity ( krśāya ) idleness (pramāda ) and contact ( yoga ) are the various causes of Karna-bandha. Out of those, yoga or contact with the other world is the principal cause This contact is divided as 1. Bodily, contact, 2 Mental contact and 3 the Contact of Actions. It is either śubha or a-śubha at one time, but never in a combined state of subkāśubha at the same time
Now, since this yoga is the kärava and kar ma, the kôrya, the latter should be similar to the former. Hence, there cannot exist a karmi containing punya and pāya combined together. When there pervades a-subha yoga the śubha Karma-in the form of virtuous deeds-is produced and when there is an-subha yoga, the a-subha karma of sinful deeds, is produced.
But Karma could never exist in a combined state of śubhāSubha as yoga never exists in a combined state. || 387 ॥ (1935)
Now the ruthor states an objection an its replyनणु मण-वह-काओगा सुभास्लुभा बि समयम्मि दीसंति । दब्वम्मि मीसभावो भवेज न उ भावकर गम्ति ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६) Naņu maņa-vai-kaogā subhāsubhā vi samayammi disanti Da vammi misabhāvo bhavejja na u bhāvakaraṇammi 1138811(1936
[ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगा: शुभाशुभा अपि समये दृश्यते ।
द्रव्ये मिश्रभावो भवेद् न तु भावकरणे ॥ (३८८ ॥ (१९३६) Nanu mano -vák-kāyayogāh śubhāśubha api samayé dreśyanté Dravye miśrabhāvo bhavéd na tu bhāvakarage # 388 11 ( 1936)

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438 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth Trans.--388 “Even subha and a-subha contacts pertaining to mind, speech, and body are perceived at ( the same ) time. " " The state of mixture would be ( possible ) in ( case of ) abstract ( ones )." ( 1936 )
टीका-ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगा: शुभाशुभाश्च मिश्रा इत्यर्थः, एकस्मिन् समये दृश्यन्ते, तत् कथमुच्यते-"मुमोऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्मि" इति ? तथाहि-किश्चिदविधिना दानादिवितरणं चिन्तयतः शुभाशुमो मनोयोगः, तथा, किमध्यविधिनैव दानादिधर्ममुपदिशतः शुभाशुभो वाग्योगा, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव जिनपूजा-वन्दनकादिकायचेष्टां कुर्वतः शुभाशुभकाययोग इति । तदेतदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-"दच्चम्मीत्यादि " इदमुक्तं भवति-इह द्विविधो योगः-द्रव्यतः, भावतश्च । तत्र मनो-वाक्-काययोगप्रवर्तकानि द्रव्याणि, मनो-वाक्-कायपरिस्पन्दात्मको योगश्च द्रव्ययोगः; यस्त्वेतदुभयरूपयोगहेतुरध्यवसायः स भावयोगः। तत्र शुभाशुभरूपाणां यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशना-कायचेष्टानां प्रवर्तके दिविधेऽपि द्रव्ययोगे व्यवहारनयदर्शनविवक्षामात्रेण भवेदपि शुभाशुमत्वलक्षणो मिश्रभावः, न तु मनोवाक्-काययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे भावकरणे भावात्मके योगे। अयमभिप्रायः-द्रव्ययोगो व्यवहारनयदर्शनेन शुभाशुभरूपोऽपोष्यते, निश्चयनयेन तु सोऽपि शुभोऽशुभो वा केवलः समस्ति, यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशनादिपवर्तकद्रव्ययोगाणामपि शुभाशुभरूपमिश्राणां तन्मतेनामावात्। मनो-वाक्-कायद्रव्ययोगनिबन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे तु भावकरणे भायोगे शुभाशुभरूपो मिश्रभावो नास्ति, निश्चयनयथर्शनस्यैवागमेऽत्र विवक्षितत्वात् । न हि शुभान्यशुभानि वाऽध्यवसायस्थानानि मुक्तया शुभाशुभाध्यवसायस्थानरूपस्तृतीयो राशिरागमे कचिदपोष्यते, येनाध्यवसायरूपे भावयोगे शुभाशुभत्वं स्यादिति भावः । तस्माद् भावयोग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवति न तु मिश्रः। ततः कर्मापि तत्मत्ययं पृथक् पुण्यरूपं पापरूपं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्ररूपमिति स्थितम् ।। ३८८ ॥ (१९३६)
D. C.- Acalabhrātā:--The combined state of subha and 2-subha contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not accoding to the prescribed

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Vada ] Canadharavāda
439 rules. That belonging to speech takes place when the observances of deeds like munificence etc. are advised but against the proper rules.
The misrabhāva of the bodily contact is apprehended when a person actually performs the ceremony of worship and bowing down etc. to the Tirthankara, without following the prescribed customs.
In this way, it is quite easy to apprehend the three types of yogos in a mixed state of subha and 4-subha at the same time.
Bhagavāna; - Your rssumption is wrongly based Yoga comes into existence in two ways--(1) By virtue of the contact with a concrete substance and ( 2 ) By means of contact with abstract i objects) The concrete substances that come into contact with mind, speech, and body and the process of arouosing mind, speech and body, form the drażya yoga; whlle the mental effort which' acts as the cause of contact on the part of both-.. substance as well as the process-is known as the bhãos - yoga.
The composite state of śubha and a-subha taken together is possible in case of dravya-yoga of all the three varieties belonging respectively to mind. speech, and body-from the practical point of view. But it is never possible in case of bhāva-yoga. It is important to note, therefore, that from the practical point of view, the miś abhāva of Subha and a-subha combined together may be admitted in case of 's avya yoga but it is never possible in case of draryanyaga of definite assertion
In case of bhāva yoga, the miśrabhava is neither possible from the paractial point of view nor with regard to definite assertion
Moreover in ag amuss also, there is no mention of the composite state of śubhāśubha yoga, as a third variety coming after subha and a-subha varieties of mental effort. Hence, in case of bhāva-yoga, there cannot exist a mixed entity of

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440 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth subhāśubha-yogu but either a subha-yoga or a-śubha-yoga is possible. On account of the same reasons, Kirma is also formed of śubha or a-subha deeds separately. but never of Subha and a-subha combined together. 1 388 ।। (1939.
And, झाणं सुभमसुम वा न उ मीसं जं च झाणविरमे वि॥ लेसा सुभाऽसुभा वा सुभसुभं वा पझो कम्मं ||३८९ (१९.३७) Jhāṇam subhamasubham vă na u misam jam ca jhānaviram vié Lésā subha'subhā vā subhamasubham vā taö kammam 1138911 (1937)
[ध्यानं शुममशुभं वा न तु मिश्रं यच्च ध्यानविरमेऽपि ।
लेश्या शुभाऽशुभा वा शुभभशुमं वा ततः कर्म. ।। ३८९ ॥ (१९३७) Dhyanam śubhamasubham vā na tu miśram ycca dhyānaviramé'pi s Leśyā śubhā'śubhā vă subhamaśubham vă tataḥ karma 1 389 11
Trans.--389 Meditation is either auspicious or in-auspicious but never composite (of both). For, even at the end of meditation, the conflict is either $ubha ora śubha. Hence karma is also either (of) virtuous (type) or (of) evil (type (1937)
____टीका-ध्यानं यस्मादागमे एकदा धर्म-शुक्लकानात्मकं शुभम् आर्त रौद्रात्मकमशुभं वा किर्दिष्टम्, न तु शुभाशुभरूपम्, यस्माञ्च ध्यानोपरमेऽपि लेश्या तेजसीपमूनिका शुभा, कापोतीप्रसुखा वाऽशुभकदा प्रोक्ता न तु शुभाशुभरूपाः : घ्यानलेश्यात्मकाच भारयोगा:, ततस्तेप्येकदा शुभा अशुभा वा भवन्ति न तु मिना । ततो भावयोगनिमित्तं कर्माध्येकदा पुण्यात्मकं भुम बध्यते, पापात्मकगशुम वा बध्यने, ने तु मिश्रमिति १३८९।। (१९३७)
D. C.---It has been laid down in the āgamits that dhyāna is either subha 1. . inspired by a religious or guileless rotive or a-subha i, e, inspired by vile or dreadful motive at one time, but it could never be inspired by both the motives at the

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Vida.] Ganadharavāda
441 same time. Even at the end of dhyāna, the conflict at work is spoken of either as śubha ( i. e. dominated by lustrous and such other characterstics) or as a-subha ( i. e, dominated by illominous elements ) but it could never be known as śubhā'-subha.
The bhāve-yogas are composed of meditations, as well as, the conficts. So bhāva-rogas are also either śubha or a-śubha separately, but never miśra. Consequently, Karma should also be taken either as śubha or a-subha taken separately and never as subhā'śubha taken together. 1 389 11 ( 1937 )
Moreover, पुन्वगहियं च कम्मं परिणामवसेण मीसयं नेजा। इयरेयरमावं बा मम्मा-मिच्छाई न उ गहणे ॥३९०॥ (१९३८) Puvvagahiyam ca kammam pariņāmavaséna misayam néjja lyaréyarabhāvam vă sammā-micchäim na u gahaņé 1139011 (1938)
[पूर्वगृहीतं च कर्म परिणामवशेन मिश्रा नयेत् ।
इतरेतरभावं वा सम्यक् -मिथ्यात्वे न तु ग्रहणे ॥३९०॥ (१९३९) Pūrvagrihitam ca karma pariņāmavaséna miśratām nayét i Itaretarabhāvam vā samyak-mithyātva na tu grahaņé 1139011/1938)]
Trans --390 A pre-apprehended Karms may attain the composite state, on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But ( that is ) not ( so ), at the time of ( new ) apprehension .( 1938)
टीका-'वा' इत्यथवा, एतदद्यापि संभाव्यते यत्-पूर्वगृहीतं पूर्वबद्धं मिथ्यात्वलक्षणं कर्म परिणामवशात् पुञ्जत्रय कुर्वन् मिश्रतां सम्यग-मिथ्यात्व युञ्जरूपतां प्रापयेदिनि; इतरेतरभावं वा नयेत् सम्यक्त्वं मिथ्यात्वं वेति । इदमुक्तं मनति-पूर्वबद्धान् मिथ्यावपुदग्लान् विशुद्धपरिणामः सन् शोधयित्वा सम्यक वरूप नयेत्, अविशुद्धपरिणामस्तु रसमुत्कर्ष नीत्वा सम्यक्त्वपुग्लान् मिथ्यात्वपुजे संक्रमय्य मिथ्यात्वरूपतां नयेत्, इति पूर्वगृहीतस्य
56

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442
Jinabhadra Gapi' [The ninth सत्तावर्तिनः कर्मण इदं कुर्यात् । ग्रहणकाले पुनन मिश्रं पुण्यपापरूपतया संकीर्णस्वभावं कर्म बन्नाति, नापोतरदितररूपता नयतोति ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)
D. C.-The composite state of Karma could be explained in this way also:-A Karma which is apprehended previously may attain subha, a-śubha or migra condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure parināmas would purify the previous evil pudgalas and turn them right, while on other hand, impure pariņāmas would spoil the previous virtuous pudgalas by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the parināmas which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the Karma into a composite state of virtue and vice
In this way, with regard to Karma of former existence, three states-viz śubha, a-subha and śubhāśnbha-are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of Kurma, the parināma is not able to form a composite Karma of punya and pāpa combined together, and hence there are only two states 11 390 11 ( 1838 )
Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vice versa referred to above, is explained as follows:-- मोत्तण आउयं खलु दसणमोहं चरित्तमोहं च ।
सेसाणं पगईणं उत्तरविहिसंकमो भजो ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९) Mottūņa āuyam khalu damsaņamoham carittamoham ca, Sésānam pagaiņam uttaravihisamkamo bhajjo II 391 ( 1939 )
मुक्त्वाऽऽयुष्कं खलु दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च ।
शेषाणां प्रकृतीनामुत्तरविधिसंक्रमो भाज्यः ।। ३९१ ।। (१९३९) Muktvā ayuskam khalu darśanamoham cāritra moham ca Śéşāņām prakritinamuttaravidhisamkramo bhāsyah 11 391 / 1939 )||
Traus.---391 Excepting the ( constituents belonging to )

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443
Vada ]
Canadharavāda ayukt infatuation of darśana, ( undifferentiated knowledge ) and infatuation of caritra ( right conduct }, transformations of the latter parts of the remaining characteristics should be acccepted. ( 1939 )
टीका-इह ज्ञानावरणादिमूलप्रकृतीनामन्योन्यं संक्रमा कदापि न भवत्येव, उत्तरमकृतीनां तु निजनिजमूलमकृत्यभिन्नानां परस्परं भवतीति । तत्र चायं विधिः- "मात्तण आउयं" इति जातिप्रधानो निर्देश इति बहुवचनमत्र द्रष्टव्यम्--चत्वार्याषि मुक्त्वेति । एकस्या आयुर्लक्षणाया निजमूळप्रकृतेरभिन्नानामपि चतुर्णामायुषामन्योन्यं संक्रमो न भवतीति तद्वर्जनम् । तथा, दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च मुक्त्वा; एकस्या मोहनीयलक्षणायाः स्वमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नयोगपि दर्शनमोह-चारित्रमोहयोरन्योन्य संक्रमो न भवतीत्यर्थः । उक्तशेषाणां तु प्रकृतोनाम, कथंभूतानाम ? इत्याह--" उत्तरविहि ति"विधयो भेदा., उत्तरे च ते विधयश्चोत्तरेविधष उत्तरभेदास्तद्भूतानामुत्सरपकविरूपाणामिति तात्पर्यम् । किम् ? इत्याह--संक्रमो भाज्यो भजनीयः ।
भजना चैवं द्रष्टव्यायाः किल ज्ञानावरणपश्चक--दर्शनावरणनवक-- कषायषोडशक -मिथ्यात्व-भय--जुगुप्सा--तैजस कार्मण-वर्णादिचतुष्का गुरु. लघू-पघात-निर्माणा-ऽन्तरायपश्चकलक्षणाः सप्तचत्वारिंशद् ध्रुवबन्धिन्य उत्तरमकृतयः, तासां निकमूलपकृत्यमित्रानामन्योन्य संक्रमः सदैव भवति; यथा मानावरणपश्नकान्तर्वतिनि मतिज्ञानावरणे श्रुतज्ञानावरणादीनि, तेष्वपि मतिज्ञानावरणं संक्रामतीत्यादि । यास्तु शेषा अध्रुवन्धिन्यस्तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यमेदवर्तिनीनामपि बध्यमानायामवध्यमाना संक्रामति, न स्वपध्यमानायां वध्यमाना; यथा साते बध्यमानेऽसातमबध्यमानं संक्रामति, न तु बध्यमानमवध्यमाने; इत्यादि वाच्यमिति । एष प्रकृतिसंक्रमे विधिः । शेषस्तु प्रदेशादिसंक्रमविधिः "मूलमकृत्यभिनासु वेद्यमानासु संक्रमः भवति" इत्यादिना स्थानन्तरादवसेय इत्यलं प्रसङ्गनेति ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९)
D. C.-The process of prakriti samkrama ( mutual trans formation of various characteristics ) is explained as follows:
Ayuk karma

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(3)
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The ninth (1) Prakṣiti-samkrama is not possible in case of original
prakritis like jñānāvarana ete. But in case of characteristics which are acquired later on, mutual transition does take place, even though they are not different from their
respective original characteristics. (2) Four varieties of the characteristics of ayrh, and the
infatuations of darśana and curitra (right conduc!) are exceptions to the above rule. In spite of these prakritis being a-bhinna from thelr respective original praksitis, they do not undergo mutual transition. There are 47 uttara-prakṣitis which undergo mutual transition. They are enumerated as follows:-5 types of jnõuāvaranas, 9 types of darśariāvaranas, 16 types of dullness; perversion, fear, contempt, the characteristic of lustre, the karmaņa characteristic; A characteristics of colour etc; one that is neither too long nor too short; characteristics of destruction and construction; and 5 types of obstruction (antarāya).
All these 47 uttara-prakı itis of definite bandha, always undergo mutual transition e. g., out of five types of prāuāvaranas noted above, the śruti-jñānāvarana could be transformed into mati-jñānāvarana and vice versa.
In case of other praksites that have not been actually bound up, one that has to proper bandha may be transformed into one having proper bandha, but the process does not work vice versa, i. e, a prakriti of proper bandha, does not change nto a prakriti without bandha
This is the process of prakiitt-samkrama. The process of transition in case of other pradeśas etc is understood from he sentence:
“Mula prakṣityabhiuuāsu védyamānāsu samkramah bhavati" tc. implying that when they are known to be similar to the riginal prakritis, they undergo transformation 391 11 (1939)

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
The separate characteristics of punya and păpa are explained-
सोहणवण्णागुणं सुभाणुभावं च जं तयं पुष्णं । विवरीयमओ पावं न थायरं नाइसुमं च ।। ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)
Sohagavannaiguņam subhāṇubhāvam ca jam tayam pugnam i Vivariyamao pāvam na bāyaram naisuhumam ca || 3921940). [ शोमनवर्णादिगुणं शुभानुभावं च यत् तत् पुण्यम् ।
विपरीतमतः पापं न बादरं नातिसूक्ष्मं च ।। ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)
445
now
Sobhanavarṇādiguṇam s'ubhānubhāvam ca yat tat punyam Viparitamatah pāpam na bādaram nātisuksmam ca || 392 (1940 1
Trans.--392 (A karma) possessed of properties like bright colour etc. and good fruition is called punya. Pupa is (exactly) opposite to it. ( Both of them are) neither too huge nor too subtle. (1240)
टीका - शोभनाः शुभा वर्णादयो वर्ण- गन्ध-रस- स्पर्शलक्षणा गुणा यस्य तच्छोमनवर्णादिगुणम्, तथा यच्छुभानुभावं शुभविपाकमित्यर्थः, तत् पुण्यमभिधीयते । यत् पुनरतः पुण्याद् विपरीतलक्षणम् - अशुभवर्णादिगुणम्. अशुभविपाकं चेत्यर्थः, तत् पापमुच्यते । एतच्चोभयमपि कथं भूतम् ? इत्याहन मेर्वादिभावेन परिणतस्कन्धवदतिबादरम्, सूक्ष्मेण कर्मवर्गणाद्रव्येण निष्पमत्वात् नापि परमाण्वादिवदतिमृक्ष्ममिति ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)
trust तज्जोगं चिय रेणुं पुरिसो जहा कयभंगो ।
एगलेसोगाढं जीवो
D. C.—A Karma having splendid colours, odours, taste, and touch, is known as punya. Papa is opposite to punya. So, its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like Méru etc. nor too minute like paramānu, because they are produced by the multiplication of various karmas ॥ 392 ॥ ( 1940 )

सव्वप्यएसेहिं ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१ )

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446 Jinabhadra Clani's
[ The ninth Jiņhai tajjogam ciya réņum puriso jahā kayabbhango i Egakkhettogadham jiva savvappaesehim ॥ 393 ॥ ( 1941 ) [गृहाति तद्योग्यमेव रेणुं पुरुषो यथा कृताभ्यङ्गः ।
एकक्षेत्रावगाढं जीवः सर्वपदेशः ।। ३९३ ॥ (१९४१) Oriņhati tadyogyameva renum purso yathā kritābhyangah Ekakshtravagadham jivah sarva-pradesaih ॥ 393 ।। ( 1941 )]
___Trans.-393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the region, tne Soul also catches ( a substance ) which is worthy of that ( Karma ), and situated in the same region, by means of all ( its ) regoin. ( 1941 )
टोका तस्य पुण्य-पापात्मकस्य कर्मणो योग्यमेव कर्मवर्गणागतं द्रव्यं जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु परमाण्वादिकम्, औदारिकादिवर्गणागतं वाऽयोग्यमित्यर्थः। तदप्येकक्षेत्रावगाढमेव गृह्णाति, न तु स्वावगाढपदेशेभ्यो भिन्नप्रदेशावगादमित्यर्थः। तच्च यथा तैलादिकृताभ्यङ्गः पुरुषो रेणुं गृह्णाति तथा राग-द्वेषक्लिनस्वरुपो जीवोऽपि गृह्णाति, न तु निर्हेतुकमिति भावः । इदं च सर्वैरपि स्वप्रदेशै वो गृह्णाति, न तु कैश्चिदित्यर्थः । उक्तं च
एगपए मोगाढं सचपएसेहिं कम्मुणो जोग्गं ।
बंधइ जहुत्तहे साइयमणणाइयं वावि ॥ १ ॥ उपशमश्रेणेः प्रतिपतितो मोहनीयादिकं कर्मे सादि बध्नाति, शेषस्त्वनवाप्तोपशमश्रेणिर्जीवोऽनाव बनातीत्यर्थ इति ॥ ३९३ ॥ (१९४१)
D. C.--The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of papa-karmas and punya-karnmas. So, it · does not apprehend those like daramāņus and audārika etc which are absolutely unfit. Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the region as that of the Soul and none else. So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc. catches dust, the Soul also being affected by rāga-dvéşa etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions.

.

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Vāda ] Gañadha ravāda
447 It has, therefore, been said that-- “ Egadaésogādham sarvaapaéséhim kammu no joggam 1 Bandhai jahuttahéum saiyamaņāiyam vāvi 11 [ Ekapradeśavagādham sarvaparadesaih karmano yogyami Badhinăti yathoktahetu sādikamanādikam eāpi ] 1 393 11 ( 1941 )
At this stage, opponent raises an objectionअविसिहपोग्गलघणे लोए थूणतणुकम्मपविभागो। जुज्जेज, गहणकाले सुभा-ऽसुभविवेयणं कत्तो? ॥ ३९४ ।। (१९४२) Avisitthapoggalaghaņé löe thūpatapukammapavibhāgo Jujjėjja gahāņakāle subhā’subhavivéyaşam katto ? 11 394 " (1942) [ अविशिष्टपुद्ग्लघने कोके स्थूलतनुकर्मपविभागः ।
युज्येत, ग्रहणकाले शुभा-ऽशुभविवेचनं कुतः ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२) Avisistrpudgalaghane toke sthūlatnuvkarmapravibhāgaḥ, Yujyeta, grahaņakāle subhā’śubhavivecanam kulah ! 1139411 (1942)]
Tans.--394 In ( the midst of the world which is crowde with common pudgals, divisons coarse ( sthila ) and subtle ( siksma ) karmas would be justified; ( but ) at the time of apprehension, how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. ( 1942 )
टीका--नन्वविशिष्टैः प्रत्याकाशप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तैः शुमा--ऽशुभादिभेदेनाव्यवस्थितैः पुद्ग्लैनो निरन्तरं व्याप्तोऽयं लोकः । ततश्च ग्रहणकाले गृह्णतो जीवस्य स्थूल -सूक्ष्मकर्मपविभागो युज्येता ततो " न बायरं नाइसहुमं च" इति विशेषणमुपपन्नम्, एतद्विशेषणविशिष्टादन्यस्य स्वभावत एव जीवैरग्रहणात् । यत्तु शुभाशुभविवेचनं तत् समयमात्ररूपे कर्मग्रहणकाले तत्क्षण एव गृह्णतो जीवस्य कुतः संभाव्यते ?--न कुतश्चिदिति परस्याभिमायः । ततश्च "सौहणवण्णाइगुणं, इत्यादि विशेषणं न युज्यत इति प्रेरकाकूतमिति ॥ ३९४ ।। (१९४२)

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448
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
multitudes of
D. C.-This world is entirely filled with commen pudgalas scattered in all etherial regoins without any distinction of subha and a-subha. When jiva approhends these pudg alas it is able to recognzie them as nither too sthila, nor too sūkṣam, as jiva is not able to recognize sthula and sukṣam pudgalas.
In such a case, it is possible that va is able to undesstand the distiaction of sthula and sūkṣam. But how is the distinction of subha and a subha justified when jîva tries to apprehend the karma-pudgalas ? ॥ 394 ।। ( 1942 )
The reply is-
अविसिद्ध चिय तं सो परिणामा --ऽऽसयस भावओ खिष्पं । कुरूते सुभमभं वा गहणे जीवो जहाहारं ||३९५|| (१९४३)
Avisiṭṭoam ciya tam so pariņāma-"sayasabhāvaö khippam Kurute subhamasubham vā gahaṇè jivo jahāhāram ||395|| (1943)
[ अविशिष्टमेव तत् स परिणामा -ऽऽश्रयस्वभावतः क्षिपम् ।
कुरुते शुभमशुभं वा ग्रहणे जीवो यथाऽऽहारम् ।। ३९५ || (१९४३ ) Avisiṣṭameva tat sa parināmā”-śrayarvabhāvatah ksipram! Kurute śubhamnaśubham v8grahane jivo yathā hāram ||395 (1643) ]
Trans-395 It is common no doubt. (But) at the time of apprehension, the Soul turns it into subha or a-subha immediately, by virtue of its nature of resort and fruition as in case of food. (1943)
टीका-स जीवस्तत्कर्मग्रहणे ग्रहणकाले शुभा -ऽशुमादिविशेषणाविशिष्टमपि गृह्णन् क्षिपं तत्क्षणमेव शुभमशुमं वा कुरुते शुभाशुभविभागेन व्यवस्थापयतीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह - " परिणाणाssसयस भाव ति" इहाश्रयो द्विविधकर्मणो जीव आश्रयः, कर्म तु शुभाशुभत्वस्य द्विविधस्याप्याश्रयस्य स्वभाव आश्रयस्वभावः, परिणामाश्राश्रयस्वभावश्च परिणामा

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
449 ऽऽश्रयस्वभावौ, ताभ्यामेतत् कुरूते जीवः । इदमुक्तं भवति-जीवस्य यः शुमोऽशुभो वा परिणामोऽध्यवसायस्तद्रशाद् ग्रहणसमय एवं कर्मणः शुभत्वमशुभत्वं वा जनयति तथा जीवस्यापि कर्माश्रयभूतस्य स कोऽपि स्वभावो ऽस्ति येन शुभा-शुभत्वेन परिणमयन्नेव कर्म गृह्णाति; तथा, कर्मणोऽपि शुमा-ऽशुभभावाद्याश्रयस्य स स्वभावः-स कश्चिद् योग्यताविशेषोऽस्ति, येन शुभा-ऽशुमपरिणामान्वितजीवेन गृह्मपाणमेवैतद्रूपतया परिणमति । उपलक्षणं चैतत् ; प्रकृति-स्थित्य-ऽनुभागवैचित्र्यम् , प्रदेशानामल्पबहुभागवैचित्र्यं च जीवः कर्मणो ग्रहणसणय एव सर्व करोतीति । उक्तं च
गहणसमयम्णि जीवो उपाएइ गुणे सपञ्चयो सवजियाणंतगुणे कम्मपएसेसु सव्वेसु ॥१॥ आउयमागो थोवो नामे गोए समो तो अहिगो । आवरणमंतराए सरिसा अहिगो य मोहे वि ॥२॥ सब्खुवरि वेयणीए भागो अहिगो उ कारणं किंतु । मुह-दुक्खकारणत्ता ठिई विसेसेण सेसासु ॥३॥ इति ॥
॥३९५॥ (१९४३)
D. C.-Although these multitudes of Karmas are not distinguished as śubha or a-śubha originally at the time of apprehension, jiva immediately turns them śubha or a-śrbha on account of pariņāma as well as āšraya. Jiva is the āśraja of Karma which again is the aśraya of śubhalva and a-subhatva. By tne help of this āśraya svabhāva as well as the parināma, yir'a apprehends Karma. So, at the time of appre. hension, subhatva or a śubhalva of Karmas depends upon śubha or a śubha puriņama produced by jiva.
Jiva apprehends karma as śubha or a-śubha by virtue of its āśrayasvubhiva So, when Karma is apprehended by jiva accompanied by śubha or a-subha parinama, it is recognized either as śubha or 4-śubha karma. As in the case of akāra,
57

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450
Jinabhadra Caņi's
| The ninth the karma-pudgalas also immediately undergo changes in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of Karma-pudgalas also undergo immediate changes
It has, therefore, been laid down that: "Gahaņasamayammi jiva uppäéi gume sa-paccayao i Sarvajiyāṇantaguņé kammapaésésu savvesu Il lol Ayuyabhāgo thovo námé göé samo taö abigo i Āvaraṇamantarıé sariso ahigo ya mohevi 211 Savvuvari Véyanié bhāgo ahigo in kāraṇam kintu ! Suha-dukkhakāraṇattā țhii viseseņa sesāsu ! 311 (Grahaņasmayé jîvé utpādayati gunān svapraty ayatah Sarvajitānantaguņān karma pradėśéşu sarvéşu 111 Āyuşkabhāgah stoko nāmmi gotré samastato'dhikaḥ ! Āvaraṇamantarāyé sadriśo'dhikaśca mohe'pi 11 21 Sarvopari Védanîyé bhāgo'dhikastu kāraṇam kintu ! Sukha-duḥkha kāraṇatvāt sthitir višeşeņa seşāsu 11384 395 (1943;]
The example of āhāra stated above, is explained in details as follows: परिणामा-ऽऽसयवसओ घेणूए जहा पओ विसमहिस्स।
तुल्लो वि तदाहारो तह पुण्णा-पुणपरिणामो ॥३९६॥ (१९४४) Pārināinā "sayavasai dhénie jahā par visamahissa i Tullo, vi tadāhāro taha puņņā purņa pariņāmo 396 11 (194+) [ परिणामा ऽऽश्रयवशतेो धेन्वा यथा पयो विषमहेः ।
तुल्योऽपि तदाहारस्तथा पुण्या-ऽपुण्यपरिणामः ॥३९६।। (१९४४) Pariņāmā-"śrayavasato dhènvā yatha paye vişamahéh Tulyo'pi tadāhärastathā punyā-punyapariyāmah #396 (1944)]
Trans.-396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

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Vada ] Gaŋadharavāda
451 results as milk ( in case of cow ), and as poison ( in case of serpent ', so also, the result ( in case ) of punya and papa is ( different ) ( 1944 ।
टोका-"तदाहारो ति" तयोरहि-धेन्वोराहारस्तदाहारः स तुल्योऽपि दुग्धादिको गृहीतः परिणामा-ऽऽश्रयवशाद् यथा धेन्वाः पयो दुग्धं भवति, अहेस्तु स एव विष-विषरूपतया परिणामति. तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण पुण्याऽपुण्यपरिणामः ! इश्मुक्तं भवित-अस्ति स कश्चित् तस्याऽऽहास्स्य परिणामो येन तुल्योऽपि सन्नाश्रकवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रतया परिणणति; अश्रयस्यस्याप्यहिधेनुलक्षणस्यास्ति तत्तद् निजसामर्थ्यम् , येन तुल्योऽपि गृहीत आहारस्तत्तद्रूपतया परिणमते, तथा पुण्यपापयोरूपनययोजना तैवेति ॥३९६।।(१९४४)
D. C.-Although the food of cow and serpent is the same that of cow result as milk while the same result as poison in case of serpent, on account of the distinction of pariņāma and aśraya. So, in spite of āhāras being the same, the result is not the same in both cases, because their āśrayas-Cow and serpent-are different. Like subha-śubha āśraya, it also depe nds upon subha-śnbha parināma u 396 ( 1944 )
Or, it can be explained in this way also: जह वेगसरीरम्मि वि सारा--सारपरिणामयामेइ । अविसिहो वाहारो तह कम्मसुभा-ऽसुभविभागो ॥३९७।। (१९४५) Jaha végasarirammi vi sārā'- sāraparinamayāméi 1 Avisittho vāhāro taha kammasubha 'subhavibhago ॥397॥ ( 1945) [यथा वैकशरीरेऽपि सारा-ऽसारपरिणामतामेति ।
अविशिष्ट इवाहारस्तथा कर्मशुभा--शुभविभागः ।। ३९७।। (१९४५) Yathā vaikasarire'pi sārā'sāraparigā matāmeti, Avisista ivähärastathā karmasubhā-subhavibhāgaḥ 1139711 (1945) 1
Trans.--397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body, the distinction of Karma as subha and a-subhi would also take place. ( 1945 )

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452
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth टीका-धेनु-विषधरयोभिर्ने शरीर आहारस्य परिणाम.चित्र्यं दर्शितम्। 'वा' इत्यथवा, यथैकस्मिन्नपि पुरूषादिशरीरेऽविशिष्टेऽप्येकरूपोऽप्याहारी गृहीतस्तत्क्षण एवं सारा-सारापरिणामतामेति--रसा-ऽमृग-मांसादिरसपरिणामं मूत्र-पुरीषरूपमलपरिणामं च युगपागच्छतीत्यर्थः, तथा कर्मणो. ऽप्यविशिष्टस्य गृहीतस्य परिणामा-ऽऽश्रअवशाम् शुभा-ऽशुभविभायो द्रष्टव्य इति ॥३९७॥ (१९४५)
D. C.-Even in case of one and the same body and the same food, the food results either in substantial forms like bile chyle, blood and flesh etc. or in worthless forms like urine, foeces. etc. immediately after it has been consumed.
In the same way, śubha and a-subka divisions in case of Karma, should also be recognized by reason of distinction of parināma and asraya: ॥ 397 ॥ ( 1945 )
The author now, illustrates the distinction of punya and pāpa, and establishes their existence by means of agams -- सायं सम्म हासं पुरिस-रह--सुभाउ-नाम-गोताई। पुण्णं, सेसं पावं नेयं सविवागमविवागं ।। ३९८ ।। ( १९४६ )
Sayam sammam hāsam purisa-rai-subhau-nāma-gottaiin | Punnani, sesam pāvam néyam sa-vivāgamavivāgam ||3981 (1946)
[सातं सम्यक्त्वं हास्यं पुरूष--रति-नाम--गोत्राणि ।
पुण्यं, शेषं ज्ञेयं सषिपाकमविपाकम् ॥३९८॥ (१९४६ ) Satam samyaktvam hasyam purusa-rati-subhāyurnama-gotrani Punyain, sesam papam jneyam sa-vipākamavipākam 11398111946 1
Trans.-398 Comfort, right belief ( samyaktva ).. mirth, masculine form love, and virtuous life, name and lineage-all these are known as punya ( prakritis ). The rest should be köown as pāpa ( parkı itis ). ( Both of them may be ) with or without fruition. ( 1946 )

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'Vada ] Gaṇadharavāda
453 टीका--सातबेदनीयम्. शोधितमिथ्यात्वपुद्गलरूप सम्यक्त्वम् , हास्यम्, । पुरुषवेदः, रतिः, शुभायुः, नाम- गोत्राणि चेत्येतत सर्व पुण्यमभिधीयते । तत्र नारकायुवंजे शेषमायुस्त्रयं शुभम्, देवद्धिक यशः कीति--तीर्थकर नामाधाः सप्तत्रिंशत् प्रकृतयो नामकर्मणि शुभाः, गोत्रे पुनरुचैर्गोत्रं शुभम् । एताः षट्चत्वारिंशत् प्रकृतयः किल शुमत्वात् पुण्यम् । अन्ये तु मोहनीय मेदान् सर्वानपि जीवस्य विपर्यासहेतुत्वात् पापमेव मन्यते । ततः सम्यक्त्वहास्य-पुरुषवेद -रतिवर्जा द्विचत्वारिंशदेव प्रकृतय. पुण्यम् तद्यथा--
सायं उच्चागोयं नर-तिरि-देवाउयाइ तह नामे । देवदुगं मणुयदुर्ग पर्णिदजाई य तणुपणगं ।। १ ।। अंगोवंगाण तिगं पढमं संघयणमेव संठाणं । सुभवण्णाइचउकं अगुरुलहू तह य परघायं ॥ २॥ ऊसासं आयावं उज्जोय विहगगई वि य पसत्था । तस-बायर-पजत्तं पत्तेय थिरं सुभं सुभगे ॥ ३ ॥ मुस्सर आएज जसं निम्मिण तित्थयरमेव एयाओ।
बायालं पगईओ पुण्णं ति जिणेहिं भणिआओ ॥ ४ ॥
मणितशेषास्तु या द्वयशीतिमा त्यस्तत् सर्वमशुभत्वात् पापं विज्ञेयम् । सम्यक्त्वं कथमशुभम्-कथं तत् पापम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते रुचिरूपमेव हि सम्यक्त्वं शुभं तचेह न विचार्यते, किन्तु शोधितमिथ्यात्वपुद्ग्लरूपम्, तच शङ्कायनर्थहेतुत्वादशुभमेव, अशुमत्वाच पापम् । सम्यग्रुचेवातिशये. नानावारकत्वादुपचारमात्र एवेदं सम्यक्त्वमुच्यते, परमार्थतस्तु मिथ्यात्वमेवैतत् । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन । इदं च पुण्य-पापलक्षणमुमयमपि सविपाकमविपाकं च मन्तव्यम्-यथा बद्ध तथैव विपाकतः किश्चिद् वेद्यते, किश्चित्त मन्दरसं नीरसं वा कृत्वा प्रदेशोदयेनाविपाक वेद्यत इत्यर्थः। तदेवं पुण्यं पापं च भेदेन व्यवस्थाप्य निरस्तः संकीर्णपुण्य-पापपक्षः ।
इतश्चायमयुक्त:-सर्वस्यापि सन्मिश्रसुख-दुःखाख्यकार्यप्रसङ्गात् न चैतदस्ति, देवादीनां केवलमुखाधिक्यदर्शनात्, नारकादीनां केवलदुःखमाधुर्यनिर्णयात् । न च सर्वथा सन्मित्रैकरूपस्य हेतोरल्प-बहुत्वभेदेऽपि

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454
• Jinabhadra (Jani's
[ The ninth कार्यस्य प्रमाणतोऽल्प-बहुत्वं विहाय स्वरुपतो भेदो युज्यते । न हि मेचककारणमभवं कार्यमन्यतमवर्णोत्कटं घटते । तस्मात् मुखातिशयस्यान्यद् निमित्तम् , अन्यच्च दुःखातिशयस्येति । न च सर्वथकरुपस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपापलक्षणस्य हेतोः सुखातिशयमभावाय पुण्यांशवृद्धिदुःखातिशयकारणपापांशहान्या मुखातिशयप्रभावाय कल्पयितुं न्याय्या, पुण्यांश-पापांशयोर्मेद प्रसङ्गात् । तथाहि-यद् वृद्धावपि यद् न वर्धते तत् ततो भिन्नम् ; यथा देवदत्तवृद्धावण्यवर्धमानो यशदनः, न वर्धते पुण्याशवृद्धौ पापांशः, तस्मात् ततो भिन्नोऽसाविति । तस्माद् न सर्वथैकरूपता गुण्य-पापांयोघंटते । कर्मसामान्यरूपतया तु यद्यसौ तयोरिष्यते तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, सात-यश:-कीयादेः पुण्यस्य, असाता-ऽयशः-ऽकीादेस्तु पापस्यास्माभिरपि कर्मत्वेनकताया अभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् पुण्य-पापरूपतया विविक्ते पव पुण्य--पापे स्त इति । ततः सुख -दुःखवैचित्र्यनिबन्धनयोः पुण्य--पापयोर्यथोक्तनीत्या साधितत्वाद् न कर्तव्यस्तत्संशयः ।। ३९८ (१९४६)
D. C-(1) There are 46 characteristics which are subhar and are hence known as penyet-prakritis, They are enumerated as follows:---
Bestowing of gift; propriety of conduct etc purged of ail impurities; mirth; masculine form; affection, the three types of äyus ( union or connection with body viz-divine, human, and tiryanct, ) thirty-seven prakrits of Nama Karma ( including birth as a Tirthankara) and the noble lineage.
(2) According to others, there are 42 prskatis under the category of punya. They insist that samyaktva, puruşaveda, häsya and rati are păpa-prakşıtıs when they are contrary to the nature of fiva. Excepting these four prakritis, the remaining 42 prakratis are laid down by them as nnder
Sayam uccāgoyam nara-tiri-devāuyaim taha namé । Dévadugam maņuyadugam paņinda-jāî ya taņupanagam alu Angovangāņa tigam padhaman sanghayanaméya santhāgami Subhavaqgāicaukkamagurulahü taha ya praghāyam 112 11

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455
Väda]
Ganadharavāda Ūsāsam ayāvam ujjoya vihagagal vi ya pasatthā Tasa-bāyara-pajjattam patteya thiram subham subhagam 113 11 Sussara ãėjja jasam nimmiņa titthayarameva eyao i Bāyālam pagaio puņņam ti Jiņehim bhaņião 1 4 11 Sātamuccair-gotram nara-tiryage-devāyuskaņi tathā nämni i Devadvikam manujadvikam pancéndriyajätiś ca tanupancakam lilin Angapānagănām trikam prathamam sanhananameva sansthagam Subhayarņādi catuṣkamagurulaghu tathāca parāghātam 11 2 1 Ucchvása ātāpa uddyoto vihãyogatirapi prasastā i Trasa - bådara-paryāpiam pratyekam sthiram subham subhagam 11311 Susyaramadsy am yaso nirmāņam tairthakaramevaitāh i Dvicatvārimśat prakritayah punyamiti Jinairbhanitāh 11 411]
The remaining 82 prakritis are recognized by them as papa-prakritis.
If someone raises a question at this point that how would samyaktva be called papa-prakriti ? The arswer would be this The virtuous samy aktva whose natural inclination is undoubtedly Subha, is not referred to in this case. The pudgalas that are classed under samyaktva, though purged out of all perversions, are a-s'ubha because of the evil elements like doubt etc. being present in them. So, they come under the category of papa.
The purified pudg alas do not very much obstruct the nature of samya kiva. But they are classed under samyaktva merely by means of upacara, and really speaking they belong to the category of muthyātva.
(3) Both-pun ya and papa-should either have fruition or no fruition. Hence, some Karmas are recognized in their original form on account of their vipakas, while others have either scanty juice (rasa ) or no juice at all, and hence have very little upāka, So, pāpa and punga are recognized by virtue of their various regions of pariņāma, and are distinguished from each other, on account of their mutually opposite qualities.

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456 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth ( 4 ) The view that punya and papa exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if Karma which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in. a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same linie. But it does not happen so in reality. For gods have almost everything of happiness and närakas are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other. Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of punya and papa, the theory that increase of prinya cause abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of pāpa, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. Yajnada!ła who does not grow fat with the growth of Dévadatta is different from Dévadalta The uniform oneness of punya and papa is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assmption of Karma being common in both, there would be no difficulty.
But so far as an individual is concerned, know it for certain that punya and pāpa are separate from each other, as proved above, and hence O Bhadra l it is not worthy of you to raise any doubt about it. 11 398 11 (1946)
Referring to the commandments of Védas, the auothor statesअसइ बहि पुन्न--पावे जमग्गिहोत्ताई सग्गकामस्स । तदसंबद्धं सव्वं दाणाइफलं च लोअम्भि ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७) Asai bahi punna-pāvé jamaggihottaiın saggakāmassa Tadasambaddham savam dāņātphalam ca löammi 11 399 31 (1947) [असतोर्बहिः पुण्य-पापयोरग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्त ।
तदसंबदं सर्व दानादिफलं च लोके ॥३९९ ।। (१९४७) Astorbahiḥ punya-pāpayoragnihotradi svargakāmasya Tadasambaddham sarvam dānādiphalam ca loké 11 399 ” (1947)]

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Vada] Canadharavāda
457 Trans,-399 In ( case of ) btnya and papa being absent, the commandment of the performance of the sacrifice etc. ( prescribed ) for one who aspires for Salvation, would become useless. Moreover, all sorts of fruition ( of the good turn ) like munificence etc, (welknown ) in the world would also become null and void. (1947)
___टीका-पुण्य-पापयोरसत्वे यदेतद् बहिरग्निहोत्राघनुष्ठानं स्वर्गकामस्य, यच दान-हिंसादिफलं पुण्य-पापात्मकं लोके प्रसिद्धं, तत् सर्वमसंबद्धं स्यात्. स्वर्गस्यापि पुण्यफलत्वात्, पुण्य-पापयोश्च भवदभिमायेणासत्वात्. तस्मादभ्युपगन्तव्ये एव पुण्य-पापे। तदेवं वेदवचनमामाण्यात्, युक्तितश्च च्छिन्नस्तस्य संशय इति ॥ ३९९ ।। (१९४७)
D. C.-If there were no prenja -vāpa in this world, the commandment of the Vedas that one who aspires for Salvation should perform agnihotra etc, would be of no value. Moreover, the results of actions like dana and himsa in the forms of punya and pāpa respectively, which a?e welknown in this world, would all be futile. Hence, take it for gronted that punya and papa are cxisting, and leave off your doubts. 1139911 (1947)
Thus, छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेश जर-मरणविमुकेणं ।
सो समणो पत्रइओ अद्भुट्टेहि सह खंडियसएहिं ॥ ४०० ॥ (१९४८) Chinnammi saņsayamınî Jizena jara-maraqavippamukkéņam! So samaņo ravvaiö addhuthéhiin saha khandiyasaéhim 1140011 [छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविषमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रबजितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४०० ।। (१९४८) Chinné sainsay é Ji: ena jarā-maranavipramuhténa i Sa Sramanah pravrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khandikasataih ॥4001
Trans.-- 400 When doubt was removed by the T'irthankara who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted diksa along with thus three thundred and fifty pupils (1948)
End of the Discussion with the Ninth Garaddara.
58

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Chapter X
दशमगणधरवक्तव्यता।
Discussion with the Tenth Gaņadhara
ते पन्चइए सोउं मेअजो आगच्छई जिणसगास । बच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४०१ ॥ १९४९ ॥ Té pavvaié soum Méajjo āgacchai Jiņasagăsam i Vaccāmi ņa vandāmî vanditta pajjuvāsāmi 1 4011 (1949) [तान् प्रबजितान् श्रुत्वा मेतार्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
बजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ४०१ ।। (१९४९) Táni pravrajitān śrutvā Metāı ya ägacchati Jinasakāšami Vrajāmi vandé vandittvā paryupāsé ll 4011 ( 1949) ___Trans.-401 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Metārra comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1949)
आभट्ठो ग जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण यसवण्णू सव्वदरिसी ॥४०२ ।। (१९५०)
Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana-vippamukkénam | Nāméņa ya gottéņa ya savvaņū savvadarisi ņam 1140211 (1950)
[ आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविषमुक्तेन । नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४०२ ॥ (१९५०)

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459
vada
Gañadharavāda Ābhāşitaśca Jinéna jāti-jarā-maranavipramukténar Namnă ca gotréna ca sarvajnéna sarvadarśinā 1140211 (1950)]
Trans-402 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the · Tîrthaikara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was onniscient, and who had (attained) complete darsana ( Undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1950)
The Tirthañkara, then, saidकिं मन्ने परलोओ अस्थि नथि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसि तेसिमो अस्थो।। ४०३ ॥ (१९५१) Kim manné paraloo atthi natthi tti samsao tujjham, Véyapayāņa ya attham na yānasî tésimo attho 140311 (1951)
[किं मन्यसे परलोकोऽस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ।। ४०३ ॥ (१९५१) Kim manyasé paraloko'sti năstiti samsayastava! Véda-padānām cārtham na jānāsi teşāmayamarthaḥ 1140311 (1951)
Trans.--403- What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But ( cas ) you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) intérpretation: (1951)
____टोका-आयुष्मन् मेतार्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं भवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकोऽस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि च "विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः" इत्यादीनि प्रथमगणघरोक्तानि द्रष्टव्यानि। " तेषां चार्थ न जानासि" इत्यादि तथैवेति ।। ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)
D. C.-0 long-lived Metarya! your doubt about the existence of para-loka has arisen from your hearing various Véda-padas bearing contradictory senses.
These Vede-padas are “Vijñānaghana evaitébhyo bhūtébhyo "

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460 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The tenth etc. which have already been discussed in the Pirst Ganadhara-vāda ॥ 403 1 ( 1951 )
The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows
मनसि जइ चेयण्णं मज्जंगमउ व्व भूयधम्मो त्ति । तो नत्थि परलोगो तन्नासे जेग तन्नासो ॥ ४०४ ।। (१९५२) Mannasi jai céyaŋŋam majjangamau vva bhūyadhammo tti i To natthi paralogo tannāse jina tannāso || 404 ॥ ( 1952 ) [मन्यसे यदि चैतन्यं मद्याङ्गमद इव भूतधर्म इति ।।
ततो नास्ति परलोकस्तन्नाशे येन तन्नाशः ॥ ४०४ ।। (१९५२) Manyase yadi cajtanyain madyāngamada iva bliūtadharma iti 1 Tato nāsti paralokastannase yena tannasah ॥ 404 ॥ ( 1952 ) ]
Trans.-404 If you believe consciouseness to be the property of bhūtas, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the bhitas, the other world will not exist. ( 1952)
टीका-सौम्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-यदि तावचैतन्यं पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्म:भूतेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतमित्यर्थः, यथा गुड-धातक्यादिमद्याङ्गेभ्योऽनन्तरं मदधर्मः, तर्हि नास्त्यवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः, येन तन्नाशे भूतनाशे तस्यापि चैतन्यस्य नाशो ध्वंसो जायते । यो हि यदनान्तरभूतो धर्मः स तद्विनाशे नश्यत्येव यथा पटादिधर्मः शुक्लत्वादिः । ततो भूतैरेव सह मागेव नष्टस्य चैतन्यस्य कुतो भवान्तरगमनम् ? इति ।। ४०४ ।। (१९५२)
D. C.-When you take cartanya as the property of a bhūtas like prithvai, it will not be separate from bhūtas, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and dhātaki puspa etc are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when bhūlas meet destruction, their property viz caitanya will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

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461
Vada ]
Ganadharavāda disappears with the cloth So, when caitanya vanishes with the bhūtas, how is it to go to the other world ? 1140411 (1952)
Even by taking caitanya as different from bhilas, the existence of para-loka will not be established ----
अह वि तदत्यंतरया न य निच्चत्तणमओ विनदवत्थं । अनलस्स वारणीओ भिन्नस्स विणासधम्नस्स ॥ ४०५॥ (१९५३) Aha vi tadatthantarayā na ya niccattavamai vi tadavatthami Analassa vä'ranio bhinnassa viņāsadhaminassa 11 405 H ( 1953 )
[अथापि तदर्थान्तरता न च नित्यत्वमतोऽपि तदवस्थम् । अनलस्येवाऽरणितो भिन्नस्य विनाशर्मणः ॥ ४७५ ।। (१९५३)
Athāpi tadarthäntar atā na ca nityatvamato'pi tadavastham Analasyévâ'rasito bhinnasya vināśidharmanah 11 405 II ( 1953 )]
____ Trans.----405 And even if it is different, its perpetuality is Inot ( established ). Hence, like fire, which is transitory and whi'ch ts different from arani, it is transitory ( !953 )
टीका-अथापि तदर्थान्तरता भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरता चैतन्यस्याभ्युपगम्यते, नन्वतोऽपि तदवस्थं भवान्तरगामित्वाभावलक्षणं दूषणम्: च शब्दो यस्मादर्थे, यतोऽर्थान्तरभूतस्यापि चैतन्यस्य न नित्यत्वम् । कथंभूतस्योत्पत्तिमत्त्वेन विनाशधर्मकस्य । कस्य यथाऽनित्यत्वम् ? इत्याह-अनलस्य । कथंभूतस्य ? भिमस्य । कस्य ?। अरणीतोऽरणेः । इदमुक्तं भवति-भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वेऽप्यनित्यं चैतन्यम्, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात्, अरणिकाष्टोत्पन्नतद्भिनानलबादिति, यचानित्यं तत् किमपि कालं स्थित्वाऽनलवदत्रापि ध्वंसते, इति न तस्य भवान्तरयायिखम, अत इत्थमपि न परलोकसिद्धिरिति ।
अथ प्रतिपिण्ड भिन्नानि भूतधर्मरूपाणि बहूनि चैतन्यानि नेष्यन्ते, किन्त्वेक एव समस्तचैतन्याश्रयः सर्वत्रिभुवनगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽभ्युपगम्यते; यत उक्तम्

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'एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः । एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १ ॥ "
।। ४०५ ।। (१९५३)
D. C.-Even if cautanya were taken to be different from bhūtas it would not be able to go the other world For, like fire, which is different from arani, catanya is a-nitya, as it dies away after living for sometime.
[The tenth
The existence of para-lhka is not established from this point of view also.
Some might not admit the existence of plenty of caitanyas related to each and every bhūta, and might admit the existence of one all-pervading wşkiya soul as said below
Eka éva hi bhūtātmā bhūté bhūte vyavasthith Ekadha bahudha caiva driśyaté jalacandravat |
-
[There exists ouiy one soul pervading each and every bhūta. Like moon (reflected in) water, it appears as Onc and the same time, in many forms, ] | 405 || (1953)
at
But even in such a case, there is no scope for paraā -loka,
अह एगो सव्वगओ निक्किरिओ तहवि नत्यि परलोओ | संसरणाभावाओ वोमस्स व सञ्चपिंडेसु ॥ ४०६ ।। (१९५४)
Aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natthi paraloo i Samsaraṇābhāvād vyomna iva sarvapinḍéṣu 406 (1954)
·
[ अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियस्तथापि नास्ति परलोकः ।
संसरणाभावाद् व्योम्न इव सर्वपिण्डेषु ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)
Trans,--406 If there
exists one, all-pervading, inactive (soul), then also, there would be nothing like para-loka because

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463 of the lack of movement ( on its part) to all beings ( in spite of its being all-pervading ) like ākāśa. ( 1954)
टीका-अबैंकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽभ्युपगम्यते, ननु तथापि न परलोकगमनसिद्धिः, तस्यात्मनः सर्वेषु गो-मनुष्यादिपिण्डेषु सर्वगतत्वेन निष्कियत्वेन च संसरणाभावात्, व्योमवदिति ॥ ४०६ ॥ (१९५४)
____D. C.-Even when the existence of one, all-pervading, inactive soul is accepted, the existence of para-loka will not be established. For, like akasa, it is niskriya in spite of its being sparead over all living beings. 11 406 11 ( 1954 !
The existence of para-loka can be doubted in this manner alsoइहलोगाओ व परो सुराइलोगो न सो वि पञ्चक्खो। एवं पि न परलोगो सुव्वह य सुईसु तो संका ॥ ४०७॥ (१९५५)
Ihalogao va paro surăilogo na so vi pacckkho 1 Evam pi na paralogo suvvai ya suisu to saikā 11 407 # ( 1955)
[ इहलोकाद् वा परः सुरादिलोको न सोऽपि प्रत्यक्षः। एवमपि न परलोकः श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु ततः शङ्का ।। ४०७ ॥ (१९५५)
Ihalokād vā parah surādiloko ua so'pi pratyaksah Evamapi na paralokh śrūyatè ca śrutışu tatah sankā 114071|(1955)]
Trans.--407 Or, if there is a world like that of gods etc. other than this world, that is also not directly perceived. So, para--loka does not exist even in that way. On the other hand, it has been heard (abeut pura.-loka in the sastras. Consequently, the doubt ( about para-loka) has arisen. ( 1955 )
टीका-अथवा, इहलोकापेक्षया सुर-नारकादिभवः परलोक उच्यते, स च न प्रत्यक्षो दृश्यते, अत एवमपि न परलोकः सिध्यति, श्रूयते चासौ श्रुतिषु शास्त्रेषु, ततस्तच्छङ्का किमस्ति नास्ति वा ?। इति दर्शितः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ ४०७ ।। (१९५५)

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464 Jinabhadra (Jani's
[The nreth D. C- If the existence of some world like that of divine beings or hellish beings, is accepted, since they, too, are not pralya kşa, their existence is also not acceptible
On the other hand, the “astras refer to them and tell a lot of things about them. Your doubt about the existence of para-loka is based upon such mutually contradictory facts. 1407॥ (1955)
Here ends the prirva paksa The author, now, refutes the
arguments of pūrva pakşa one after another -- भूइंदियाइरित्तस्स चेयणा सो य दवओ निच्चो । जाइस्सरणाईहिं पडिवजसु वाउभूह व्व ॥ ४०८ ॥ (१९५६) Bhūindiyāirittassa céyaņā so ya davvai nicco Jaissaranaihim padivajjasu Vaubhui vva ॥ 408 ॥ ( 1956 ) [ भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य चेतना सच द्रव्यतो नित्यः ।
जातिस्मरणादिभिः प्रतिपद्यस्व वायुभूतिरिव ॥ ४०८ ॥ (१९५६) Bhūténdriyatiriktasya cótaná sa ca dravyato nityah, Jatismaranādibhih pratipadyasva Vayubhutiriva || 408 ॥ (1956)
Trans.- 418 Conciousness belongs to ( the soul ) which is distinguished from elements, as well as, sense-organs. Like Vayubhuti, know it for certain therefore, that it is more perpetual than dravya by virtue of its ( power of ) remembering the former birth ctc. ( 1956 .
टीका-इह भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य पूर्वाभिहितानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धस्यात्मन एव संबन्धिनी चेतना मन्तव्या, न भूतधर्मः। स चात्मा जातिस्मर णादिहेतुर्दैव्यतो नित्य इति वायुभूतिरिव प्रतिपयस्व । अतो नैकान्तानित्यत्वपक्षोक्तो दोषः, पर्यायत एवाऽस्यानित्यत्वादिति भावः ॥४०॥ (१९५६)
D. C.--Cétana is not the property of bhutas, but it is the property of Soul, which is different from bhattas, as well as.

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indriyas, and the existence of which has already been established been means of anumanas and other evidences. This soul has already by accepted by Vayubhuti as more nitya than dravya on account of its power of remembering its (previous) existence etc. You too, shall have to accept its nityatva, that the fault of exclusive nityatva lleged by you, does not arise. ॥ 408 ॥ ( 1956 )
SO
And,
न य एगो सत्रगओ निक्किरिओ लक्ग्वणाइभे आओ । कुंभादर व्व बहवो पडिवज्र तमिदभूइ व्व ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)
Na ya ego savvagao nikkirio iakkhaṇāibheão Kumbhādau vva bahavo padivajja tamindabhūi vva ||409 (1957) [ न चैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियो लक्षणादिभेदात्
कुम्भादय इव बहवः प्रतिपद्यस्व तदिन्द्रभूतिरिव ।। ४०९ ।। (१९५७) Na caikah sarvagato niskriyo laksanādibhedat Kumbhādaya iva bahavah pratipadyasva tadinadribhūtiriva »409|||
Trans. -- 409 It is neither one, nor all-pervading, nor inactive. Like Indrabhūti, believe it as many ( in number ) like 1 ghata etc. by reason of various characteristics ( 1957 )
टीका- न चास्माभिरेक आत्मेष्यते, किन्तु बहवः - अनन्ताः । कुतः ? | लक्षणभेदात् । उपयोगलक्षणो हि जीवः, स चोपयोगो राग-द्वेष- कषायविषयाध्यवसायादिभिर्भिद्यमान उपाधिभेदादानन्त्यं प्रतिपद्यत इत्यनन्ता जीवाः, लक्षणभेदात् घटादिवदिति । तथा, न सर्वगत आत्मा, किन्तु शरीरमात्रव्यापकः, तत्र तद्गुणोपलब्धेरित्यादिशब्दोपातो हेतुः स्पर्शनवदिति दृष्टान्तश्च । एवं न निष्क्रिय आत्मा, भोक्तृत्वात्, देवदत्तवदिति । तदेतदिन्द्रभूतिप्रथमगणधरवत् प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)
3
D. C.—According to us, Soul is not one, but infinite in + Vide Chap Ill.
59

For Private Personal Use Only

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466 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The tenth number, by virtue of its different characteristics Like ghata pata etc, the Soul has various forms on account of various laksanas such as rāga, dvesa, kasāya etc. Secondly, Soul is not all-pervading, but it pervadas the body alone. Thirdly, ber cause it is the enjoyer like Pévadatta, it is not nişkriya. Thus, like Indrabhūti, † you, too, shall have jo admit 1:4091 (1957)
In reply to the argument that the existence of para-loka is denied because of the divine and hellish beings being a-pratyaksa, the author states---
इहलोगाओ य परो सोम्म! सुरा नारगा य परलोओ। पडिवज मोरिआ-ऽकंपिउ व्व विहियप्पमागाओ ।। ४१० ।। (१९५८) lhalog&ö ya paro Somma ! surā nāragā ya paralöö ! Padivajja Moriā—'kampiu vva vihiyappamāṇāö 141011 (1058)
[इहलोकाश्च परः सौम्य ! सुरा नारकाश्च परलोकः ।
पतिपद्यस्व मौर्या-ऽकम्पिताविव विहितप्रमाणात् ।। ४१० ॥ (१९५८) Ihalokācca paraḥ Saumya | sură nārakāsca paralokah! Pratipadyasya Maurya’kampitāviva vihitapramāṇāt 14101 (1958)]
Trans.--410 Believe the world other than this, O Saumya ! to be that of gods and Nārakas on account of evidences that have been advanced (in case) of Maurya and Akampita.* (1958)
The opponent will argue at this poini thatजीवो विण्णाणमओ ते चाणि ति तो न परलोगो। अह विगाणादण्णो तो अणभिण्णा जहागासं ॥ ४११ ॥ (१९५९) इत्तो चिय न स कत्ता भोत्ता य अओ वि नत्थि परलोगो। जं च न संसारी सो अण्णाणा-ऽमुसिओ खं व ॥ ४१२ ।। (१९६०) + Vide Chapter I * Vide chapters VII and VIJI

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467 Jivo vinnānamaö tam cīņiccam ti to na paralogo i Aha vionānādapno to anabhipno jahāgasam ॥411॥ (1959) Itto cciya na sa kattă bhottă ya aö vi natthi paralogo, Jam ca na samsāri so anņāņā’-muttio kham va 141211 (1960) [जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तच्चानित्यमिति ततो न परलोकः।
अथ बिज्ञानादन्यस्ततोऽनमिझो यथाऽऽकासम् ॥ ४११ ॥ (१९५९) इत एव न स कर्ता भोक्ता चातोऽपि नास्ति परलोकः ।
यच्च न संसारी सोऽशाना--ऽमूर्तित खमिव ॥४१२ ।। (१९६०) Jivo vijñāmayastaccanityamiti tato na paralokaḥ, Atha vijñānādanyastato'nabhijino yathā-kāśam # 411.11 (1959)] Ita éva na sa kartā bhoktā cito'pi nāsti paralokah Yvcca na samsari sojnana-murtitah khamiva 1 412॥ (1960)]
Trans.--411-412 Jiva is ( said to be ) vijnanamaya and vijnana is a-nitya. So, there cannot be paraloka. If it is ( said to be ) different from vijnana, then also, jiva being ignorant like sky, it will neither be doer nor an enjoyer, and then also, there wili be no paraloka. ( For ), that which is ignorant and incorpoeal like ākāśa, cannot belong to the mundane world. ( 1959-1960 )
टोका-व्याख्या-जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तावद् युष्माभिरिष्यये विज्ञानादभित्र इत्यर्थः । तच्च विज्ञानमनित्यं विनश्वरम् , अतस्तदभिन्नस्य जीवस्यापि विनश्वरत्वाद् न भवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः। अथ विज्ञानादन्यो जीवस्ततोऽनित्ये विज्ञाने जीवाद् मिन्ने सति स्वयं नित्योऽसाविति न परलोकाभावः। यद्येवम् , तहि अनभिज्ञो जीवः, विज्ञानादन्यत्रात्, बाकाव, काष्ठादिबद् वा । अत एव च नित्यखादेवासी जीवो न कर्ता, नापि भोक्ता। नित्यस्य कर्तृवाचभ्युपगमे हि सर्वदैव तद्भावप्रसाः, तस्य सदैवैकरूपत्वात् । कर्तृवाभावे च न परलोकः, अकृतस्य तस्याभ्युपगमे सिद्धानामपि तत्मसङ्गात् । भोक्तखामावेऽपि न परलोकः, अमोक्तुः परलोकहेतुभूतकर्मभोगायोगात् । इतोऽपि च न परलोकः । कुतः ? इत्याइ-"ज चेत्यादि" यस्माष नासौ

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth संसारी, नास्य ज्ञानाद भिन्नस्य जीवस्य भवाद् भवान्तरगमनलक्षणं संसरणमस्तीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह स्वयमज्ञानत्वात्, काष्ठखण्डनत् । तथा, tedrala, 34541afafall 888-88211 (8848-8860)
D. C-Métārya:--You believe jiva to be vijnanamaya. Now, since vijnana is a-nitya, jiva will also be a-nitya. Consequently, there will be no possibility of going to the other world and there will be no para-loka also. On the other hand, if you take jiva to be different from vijñāna, jîva will not be a-nitya, but being different from vijñāna, it will be ignorant, or dull like sky or wood. Consequently, the soul will neither be kartā (doer), nor bhoktā (enjoyer). In absence of kartșitva, existence of para loka will be denied. For, if para-loka is taken as existing even in absence of kartřitva the Siddha beings that have already attained absolute Liberation will attain para-loka. In absence of bhoktritva also, there will be no para loka, because the soul which is nitya but not bhoktā, will not be able to attain para-loka in absence of Karma, which acts as the cause of passing to the other world. This jiva, therefore,. being distinguished from jîvana does not belong to the mundane world, as it has no passage to the other world on account of its ignorance like that of wood, and a-mūrtatva like that of ākāśa, 11 411 412 i ( 1959-1960)
The reply isमनसि विणासि चेओ उप्पत्तिमदादिओ जहा कुंभो। नणु एयं धिय साहणमविणासित्तेवि से सोम्म! ॥ ४१३ ॥ (१९६१) Mannasi viņāsi céö uppattimadădio jahā kumbho 1 Naņu éyam ciya sahagaviņāsitte vi sé Somma! || 413 11 ( 1961 )
[मन्यसे विनाशि चेत उत्पत्तिमदादितो यथा कुम्भः ।
नन्वेतदेव साधनमविनाशित्वेऽपि तस्य सौम्य ! ॥ ४१३॥ (१९६१) Manyasé vināsi céta utpattimadādito yathā kumbhaḥ 1 Nanvétadeva sãdhanamavināsitvé'pi tasya Saumya ! 11413'1 (1961)]

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Vada] Gañadharavăda
469 Trans.--413 You take consciousness to be destructible like ghata on account of its ( having ) production etc. (Because) in ( case of ) its indestructibility also, the same is the cause, 0 Saumya ! ( 1961 )
टीका-ननु ' जीवो विष्णाणमओ तं चाणिचं" इति ब्रुवाणो नूनं त्वमेवं मन्यसे-विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतश्चेतना चैतन्यं विज्ञानमिति यावत् । उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यथा कुम्भ इति दृष्टान्तः। आदिशब्दात् "पर्यायत्वात्” इत्यादिकोऽपि हेतुर्वक्तव्यः । यो हि पर्यायः स सर्वोऽप्यनित्यः, यथा स्तम्भादीनां नव-पुराणादिपर्यायः । ततश्चानित्याच्चैतन्यादभिन्नत्वे जीवस्याप्यनित्यत्वात् परलोकभाव इति तवाभिप्रायः । न चायं युक्तः, यतो इन्त ! नैका तेन विज्ञानमनित्यम् , यतोऽविनाशित्वेऽपि "से" तस्य विज्ञानस्यैतदेव सौम्य ! त्वदुक्तं साधनं प्रमाणं वर्तते । ततोऽनैकान्तिकस्त्वदुक्तो हेतुरिति भावः । इदमुक्तं भवति-उत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यात्मकं वस्तु । ततश्च यथोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् विनाशित्वं सिध्वति तथा ध्रौव्यात्मकत्वाद् वस्तुन : कश्चिद् नित्यत्वमपि सिध्यति । ततश्चेदमपि शक्यते वक्तुम्-नित्यं विज्ञानम् , उत्पत्तिमत्वात् , घटवत् । ततश्च कश्चिनित्याद् विज्ञानादमिन्नस्य जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् न परलोकाभाव इति ।। ४१३ ॥ (१९६१) ____D. C-Since cautanya is susceptible to production, and exists in various forms due to various specific characteristics, you have accepted it to be a-nitya. That whicli exists in various forms due to various paryāyas, is a-ritya like paryayas as in the case of old and new paryāyas of pillar etc Thus, the Soul which is a-bhinna from the a-urtya caitanya, is taken as a-nutya by you, who have denied the existence of para-loka. But that is not correct. Caitanya-vijnana is not exclusively a-nitya, but any how, it is nitya to a certain extent also.
Every object is susceptible to three conditions--production, destruction and perpetuality. So just as a--nityatā is established by you on account of utpatti, nityatā could also be established by means of the condition of perpetuality. It could easily be stated, therefore, that vijñāna is nitya like ghata, and on

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470
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ tenth
account of the nityalva of jiva, there is no a bhāva of para-loka. 413 (1961)
Or,
अहवा वत्थुत्तणओ विणासि चेओ न होइ कुंभो व्व । उत्पत्तिमदादित्ते कहकविणासी घडो, बुद्धी ? ॥ ४१४ ।। (१९६२)
Ahava atthuttaṇao viņāsi céo na hoi kumbho vva Uppattimadaditte kahamavināsi ghado buddhi ? ॥ 414 ( 1962 )
[ अथवा वस्तुतो विनाशि चेतो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
उत्पत्तिमदादित्वे कथमविनाशी घटो, बुद्धि: ? ।। ४१४ ॥ (१९६२)
Athavă vastutvato vināsi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva Utpattimadāditvé kathamavināśi ghato, buddhih : 414 ( 1962 ) 1
Trans.---414 Or, consciousness does not become destructible like ghata. on account of its being a ( definite ) object. ( The qustion may be that ) How could ghata be indestuctible, when it is suceptible to production etc ? " ( 1962 )
sc
टीका-एकान्तेन विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतो विज्ञानं न भवति, वस्तुबात्, कुम्भवत् । ततोऽस्य प्रत्यनुमानस्योपस्थापनाद् विरुद्धाव्यभिचायेप्युत्पत्तिमवलक्षणो हेतुः । यदुक्तम् - " नणु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्ते वि " इत्यादि, तत्र परस्यैवं बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता बुद्धि: ? इत्याह- कथमुत्पत्ति मत्वाद् दृष्टान्तत्वेनापन्यस्तो घटोऽविन्दाशी सिध्यति ? - न कथञ्चित्, घटस्य विनाशित्वेन सुप्रतीतत्वात् । ततश्च दृष्टान्तेऽविनाशित्वस्यासिद्धेर्दाष्टन्तिके विज्ञाने तद् न सिध्यतीति परस्याभिप्राय इति ॥ ४१४ ॥ (१९६२)
D. C. --Consciouness is never destructible exclusively on account of its being a definite vastu like ghata.
Métarya: When ghata how should it be considered as destructible by all. Thus, when indestructiblity of ghata is
is suceptible to production etc, indestructible? It is recognized

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Vada ] Ganadharavā da
471 not proved in the illustration stated above, inderstructibility ( in case ) of vajināna also, will not be proved. ॥ 414 ॥ ( 1962 )
Bhag avāu replies-- रूव-रस-गंध-फासा-संखा-संठाण-दव्व-सत्तीओ । कुंभो त्ति जओ ताओ पहाइ-विच्छित्ति-धुवधम्मा ॥ ४१५ ॥ (१९६३) Tūva-rasa-gandha-phāsā-samkhă-santhāņa-dayva-sattio i Kumbho tti jao tão pasūi-vicchitti-dhuvadhrmmā 1: 415 i ( 1963 )
[रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पीः -संख्या-संस्थान-द्रव्य-शक्तयः । कुम्भ इति यतस्ताः प्रमृति-व्यवच्छित्ति-ध्रुवधर्माणः ॥४१५॥ (१९६३)
Rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsah-samkhya-samsthāna dravya-saktayah | Kumbha iti yatastāḥ prasūti-vyavacchitti -dbruvadharmaṇaḥ 1131511
Trans.--415 Form, taste, odour, touch, number, configuration, matter, and energy, form kumbha. Por, all of them possess the characteristics of production, destructibility and perpetuality. ( 1963 ).
टीका-इह रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शलक्षणो गुणसमुदायः, एकलक्षणा संख्या, पृथुबुनोदराधाकारलक्षणं संस्थानम्, मृद्रव्यम्, जलाहराणादिशक्तिश्चेत्येतानि समुदितानि यतः कुम्भ इत्युच्यते, ताश्च रूप-रस-गन्धस्पर्श-संख्या-संस्थान-द्रव्य-शक्तयः प्रसूति-विच्छित्ति-ध्रौव्यधर्मिण्य उत्पा. द-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वरूपाः, तत उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादविनाश्यपि घटः सिध्यति ।।४१५॥ (१९६३)
D. C.- A group of properties such as form, taste, odour, and touch; the number one etc.. configuration like that of broad portion from the middle etc; matter ( in the form ) of earth; and capacity for holding water; all these properties combine together, and form ghața. Each one of these properties is again perceptible to production, destructibility, and perpetuality. Ghata is, therefore, nitya inspite of its being utpattimat ॥ 415 ।।(1963)

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472 Jinabhadra Capi's
[ The tenth Explaining the same in details the author proceedsइह पिण्डो पिण्डागार -सत्तिपन्जायविलसमकालं । उप्पजइ कुंभागार-सत्तिपज्जायख्वेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४) रूवाई दवयाए न जाइ न य वेह तेण सो निच्चो । एवं उप्पाय-व्वय-धुवस्हावं मयं सव्वं ॥ ४१७॥ (१९६५)
· Iha piņdo piņdāgāra-sattipajjāyavilayasamakālam Uppajjai kumbhāgāra-sattipajjāyarūveņa 11 416 11 (1964) Rūvāim davvayāé na jāi na ya véi téna so nicco 1 Evam uppāya-vvaya-dhuvassahāyam mayam savvam 1141711 (1965)
[इह पिण्डः पिण्डाकार-शक्तिपर्यायविलयसमकालम् । उत्पद्यते कुम्माकार-शक्तिपर्यायरूपेण ॥४१६ ॥ (१९६४) रूपादिद्रव्यतया न जायते न च व्येति तेन स नित्यः । एवमुत्पाद-व्यय--ध्रौव्यस्वमाव मतं सर्वम् ॥ ४१७ ॥ (१९६५)
Iha piņdaḥ pindākāra-saktiparyāyavilayasamakālam Utradyaté kumbhākāra-sakti - paryāya-rūpéņa 11 416 11 (116411 Rūpādi dravyatavā na jāyate na ca vyeti tena sa nityah i Evamutpăda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhāvam matam sarvam 1141711 (1965)
Trans:--416-417 The lump (of earth) in this case, is produced in the specific characteristics of the shape and capacity of kambha at the same time, when it is destroyed in the specific characteristics of its (own) shape and capacity. It is produced and destroyed neither by (virtue of) its form etc nor by (virtue of) its matter. It is, therefore, (called) nitya. Everything is thus believed to possess the conditions of (being susceptible to) production, destructibility, and perpetuality. (1964-1965)
टीका-इह मृत्पिण्डः कर्ता । योऽयं वृत्तसंस्थानरूपः स्वकीयो मृत्पि

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ण्डाकारः, शक्ति या काचिदात्मीया, एवदुभयलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्तस्थ यो वियो विनाशस्तत्समकालमेवासावुत्पद्यते मृत्पिण्डः । केन ? इत्याहपृथुबुध्नोदरादिको यः कुम्माकारः, तच्छक्ति या जलाहरणादिविषया, एतदुभलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्वेनोत्पद्यते । रूप-रस- गन्ध- स्पर्श- रूपतया मृद्द्रव्यरूपतया चासौ मृत्पिण्डो न जायते, नापि व्येति विनश्यति । ततस्वद्रूपतया नित्योऽयमुच्यते, तेन रूपेण तस्य सदैवावस्थितवात् । तदेवं मृत्पिण्डो निजाकारस्वशक्तिरूपतया विनश्यति, घटाकार - तच्छक्तिरूपतयोत्पद्यते, रूपादिभावेन मृद्रव्यरूपतया चावतिष्ठत इत्युत्पाद--व्यय-- ध्रोव्यस्वभावोऽयमुच्यते । एवं घटोऽपि पूर्वपर्यायेण विनश्यति, घटाकारतया तूत्पद्यते रूपादित्वेन मृद्रव्यतया चावतिष्ठत इत्यसावप्युत्पाद-व्यय - ध्रोव्यस्वभावमेवाभिमतं तीर्थक्रताम् । ततश्च यथोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद विनाशित्वं घटे सिध्यति तथाऽविनाशित्वमपि । तथा च सति साध्यधर्मिणि चैतन्येऽपि तत्सिद्धिरिति । तदेवं चैतन्यादव्यतिरिक्तोऽपि जीवः कथाश्चिद् नित्य एव ।। ४१६ ४१७ ॥ ( १९६४ - १९६५ )
"
Canadharavada
473
D. C.-Properties like the shape and capacity of the lump of earth vanish and at the same time, ghata-having its peculiar shape and its capacity of holding water-is produced. The lump of earth is neither produced nor destroyed in the form of rūpa-rasa-gandha-spars'a or dravya. It continues to exist perpetually in these forms. Thus, the lump of earth vanishes in the form of the shape and capacity of ghata, and exists for ever in the form of rapa, rasa, gandha, spars'a and dravya. Similarly, ghata also vanishes in the form of its former paryāyas, and comes into existence with new paryayas of ghaṭākāra, and lasts for ever in the form of paryayas of rūpa etc. as well as dravya, Consequently, it has also the svabhāva of utpattı, vyaya, and dhrauvya. Such is not the case with ghata only, but it is the nature of each and every object of the Universe. So, like destructibility, in-destructibility of ghata is also due to the hétus like utpattimativa etc. Consequently in case of caitanya and ātmā also, the nityata shoud be. admitted || 416417 ।। ( 1964-1965 )
60

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474 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ Tue runth Indicating the existence of para-loka thereby, the author states-- घडचेयणया नासो पडचेयणया समुन्भवो समयं । संताणेणावस्था तहेह-परलोअ-जीवाणं ॥ ४१८ ॥ (१९६६) मणुएहलोगनासो सुराइपरलोगसंभवो समयं । जीवतयाऽवत्थाणं नेहभवो नेय परलोओ ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७) Ghadaceyaņayā nāso padaceyaņayā samubbhavo samayam i Santanenavatthā taheha-paralba-jivanam ॥ 418 ॥ (1966) Maņuhaloganāso surāiparaloga sambhavo samayam Jivataya vatthanam nehabhavo neya paraloo || 419 ॥ (1967) [घटचेतनया नाशः पटचेतनया समुद्भवः समकम् ।
संवानेनावस्था तथेह-परलोक-जीवानाम् ॥ ४१८॥ (१९६६) मनुजेहलोकनाशः मुरादिपरलोकसंमवः समकम् ।
जीवतयाऽवस्थानं नेहभवो नैव परलोकः ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७) Ghatacétanayā nāśaḥ pațacétanayā samabhavah samakamı Santānénāvasthā tatheha-paraloka-jivāņām # 418 || (1966) Manujehalokanāśaḥ surādiparalokasambhavah samakami Jivatayā'vasthānam nelabhavo naiva paralokah 11419 11 (1967)]
Trans.-418--419 Destruction of the cognizance of ghata production of the congnizance of pața, and retention of their continuous range, are (apprehended all at a time. The same is the case with this world, the other world, and the jiva Vanishing of this human world, and coming into existence of the world like that of divine beings, are simultaneous. Retention in the state of) jiva is neither this world nor the other world. (1966-1967)
टीका-घटविषय विज्ञानं घटचेतनोच्यते, पटविषयं तु विज्ञान पटचेतना ।

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Vada ]
Jañadharavāda यदा च घटविज्ञानानन्तरं पटविज्ञानमुपजायते जीवस्य, तदा घटचेतनया घटविज्ञानरूपेण तस्य नाश उच्यते, पटचेतनया तु पटविज्ञानरूपेण "समयं" युगपदेव समुद्भव उत्पादः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तेन तु चेतनासंतानेन निर्विशेषणेन जीवत्वमात्रेणावस्थानमिति । एवं च यथेहमवेऽपि तिष्ठतो जीवस्योत्पादव्यय-धोव्यस्वभावत्रयं दर्शितम्। तथा परलोकं गता जीवाः परलोकजीवास्तेषामप्येतत् स्वभावत्रयं दृष्टव्यम; तत्तथा-यदा मनुष्यो मृत्वा मुरलोकादावुत्पद्यते तदा मनुष्यरूप इहलोको मनुष्येहलोकस्तस्य नाशः, तत्समकालमेव च सुरादिपरलोकस्य संभव उत्पादः, जीवतया त्ववस्थानम् । तस्यां च जीवत्वावस्थायां विवक्षितायां नेहमवो विवक्ष्यते, नापि सुरादिपरलोको विवक्ष्यते, किन्तु निष्पर्यायं जीव-द्रव्यमात्रमेव विवक्ष्यते । तदेवमुत्पादव्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावत्वे जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४१८-४१९ ॥ (१९६६-१९६७)
__). C.----Cognizance about ghrta is called ghata chtana, and that about pață is called pata-cétanā. Whenjiva acquires the cognizance of pata after that of ghata, vanishing of ghata, production in the form of pata, and retention in the form of eternal jiva, are simultaneous
Utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya are therefore, the three generic characteristics of jeva, as well as, of those who have passed to the other world.
When a person is born in deza-loka aftea death, he undergoes the state of destruction as regards this world, production as regards déva-loka, and perinanent avasthāna as regards jiva. When a person is said to exist in the state of jivatva, it is neither sail to exist in this world nor in the other world like that of gods etc. Jîva is called mere dravya without any sort of paryāya. Thus, since jiva has the tendency of undergoing utpäda, dyaya and dhrauvya, there is no abhāvā of the other world. ॥ 418-419 ॥ ( 1966-1967 )
In reply to the question whether all objects possess all the three characteristics, the author states--

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Jinabhadra Gani's . [The tenth असओ नत्थि पसई, होज व जइ, होउ खरविसाणस्स । न य सचहा विणासो सञ्चुच्छेयप्पसंगाओ ।। ४२० ॥ (१९५८) तोऽवत्थियस्स केणवि विलओ धम्मेण भवणमन्नेण। सब्बुच्छेओ न मओ संववहारोवराहाओ ॥ ४२१॥ (१९६९) Asao nattei pasūpi, hojjā va jai, hõu kharavisāṇassai Na ya savvahā viņāso savvucchéyappasangao i 420 ( 1968 ) To'vatthiyassa kéņavi vilao dhammeņa bhavanamanneņa ! Savvuccheö na maö samvavahārovarohão 11 421 # ( 1969 ) [ असतो नास्ति प्रसूतिः, भवेद् वा यदि, भवतु खरविषाणस्य ।
न च सर्वथा विनाशः सर्वोच्छेदमसङ्गात् ।। ४२० ॥ (१९६८) ततोऽवस्थितस्य केनापि विलयो धर्मेण भवनमन्येन ।
सर्वोच्छेदो न मतः संव्यवहारोपरोधात् ॥ ४२१ ॥ (१९६९) Asato nāsti prasutih, bhaved va yadi, bhavatu khara-visanasya | Na ca sarvatha vināsah sarvocchedaprasangat | 420 ॥ ( 1968) Tato'vasthitasya kénăpi vilayo dharméņa bhayanamanyéna i Sarvocchédo na matan samvyavahāroparodhāt il 421 11 ( 1969 )}
Trans.--420-421 The non-existant has no production. If it has, there would be production of the horn of an ass ( also ). Nor, is there exclusive destruction. ( For ), it would result in destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of an object existing in a perpetual range by one means, and production ( of the same ) by other means. For fear of obstruction to the mutual usage, exclusive destruction (of everything is not acceptible. ( 1968-3969 )
टीका-इहैकान्तेन सर्वथाऽसतो बस्तुनः प्रसूतिरुत्पत्सिनास्ति न घटते । अथ भवति, तर्हि खरविषाणस्यापि भवतु, असत्त्वाविशेषात्। तस्मात् केनापि रूपेण सदेवोत्पद्यते। न च सतः सर्वथा विनाशः, क्रमशः, सर्वस्यापि

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
- 477 नारक-तिर्यगादेरुच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । ततस्तस्मात् तस्यावस्थितस्य जीवादेरस्ति केनापि मनुष्यत्वादिधर्मेण विलयो विनाशः, अन्येन तु मुरादिरूपेण भवनमुत्पादः, सर्वोच्छेदस्तु न मतस्तीर्थकृताम् , संव्यवहारोपरोधात्-अन्यथा व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः, तथाहि-राजपुत्र्याःक्रीडाहेतुभूतं सौवर्णकलशकं मन्तवा राजतनयस्य क्रीडार्थमेव कन्दुको घटितः, ततो राजपुच्याः शोकः, कुमारस्य तु हर्षः, सुवर्णस्वामिनश्च नरपतेरौदासोन्यम् , सुवर्णस्योभयावस्थायामप्यविनष्टत्वात् , इत्यादिको योऽसौ लोकव्यवहारस्तस्य सर्वस्याप्युत्पादव्यय-नौव्यात्मकवस्त्वनभ्युपगमे समुच्छेदः स्यात् । तस्मात् कथञ्चिदवस्थितत्वे जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ।। ४२०-४२१ ।। ( १९६८-१९६९)
D. C.-An object which is absolutely a-vulyamāna can never undergo production. For, if the production of an a-vidyamāna object is admitted, non-existent objects like khara-vişāpa will also come into existence, which is utterly impossible. It is only a vidyamāna object that undergoes production. Secondly, there is no exclusive destruction of a vidyamāna object. If there were absolute destruction of everything, even nārakî and tiryanca beings would be absolutely destroyed. Jîra etc. which are always avasthita, undergo vinās'a by means of characteristics such as that of manus yat va etc. On the other hand, they undergo production by means of charactoristics like that of divine beings etc. But exclusive destruction of all, is never possible for fear of the violation of usual vyavahāra. Take an example to understand it more clearly :-Having broked a golden jar belonging to a princess, a ball was made of gold for a prince. On account of that, sorrow on the part of the princess, joy on the part of the prince, and gold being retained in the same quantity' in the form of ball as well as jar, indifference on the part of king who is the owner of gold, constitute loka-vyavahāra, If we do not accept utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya in case of all objects, violation of this loka-vyavahāra will undoubtedly take place In case of jiva being avasthita there is no para-lokābhāva. ॥ 420-421 ॥ ( 1968-1969)

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478 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The tenth And असइ व परम्मि लोए जबग्गिहोत्ताई सग्गकामस्स । तदसंबद्धं सव्वं दागाइफलं च लोअम्मि ।। ४२२ ।। (१९३०) Asai va parammi löé jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa / Tadasambandham savvam dāņāiphalam ca löammi 1 422 1 (1970) [असति वा वा पस्मॅिक्लोके यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्ध सर्व दानादिफल च लोके ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०) Asati vā parasminlloke yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya i Tadasambaddham sarvam danadiphalam ca loké 1 4221 (1970)]
___Trans ----122 In case of the other world being absent, (the commendinent of the performance of) sacrifice etc. for a Hierson aspiring for Salvation, would be useless. Moreover, the fruition of (goon turns like) munificence etc, (welknown) in this world, would also be null and void. (1970) चिन्नम्मि संशयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पवइओ तिहि ओ सह खण्डियसएहिं ॥४२३॥(१९७१) Chinnammi samsayammi Jiņéņa jara-maraṇavippamukkénam So samaņo pavvaio tihi o saha khaņdiyasaéhim 11 423 11 (1971) | छिन्ने मंशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तन ।
स श्रमणः प्रत्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४२३ ।। ( १९७१ ) Chinné samsayé Jinéna jarā-maraṇavipramukténa 1 Sa Sramanah pravrajitastribhistu salha khandikasatain ॥4231 (1971)]
Irans:----423 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Dikşā along with his three hundred 'pupils. (1971)
End of the Discossion with the Tenth Ganadhara.

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Chapter XI
एकादशमगणधरवक्तव्यता।
Discussion with the Eleventh Gañadhara ते पव्वइए सोउं पहासो आगच्छई जिणसगासं। वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४२४ ॥ १९७२ ॥
Té pavvaié söum Pahāso agacchai Jiņasagăsam i Vaccāmi ga vandāmî vanditta pajjuvāsāmi 11 424 8 (1972) [तान् प्रत्रजितान् श्रुत्वा प्रभास आगच्छति जिमसकाशम् । व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ४२४ ।। (१९७२)
Tan pravrajitān śrutvā Prabhasa agacchati Jinasakāšam i Vrajami vande vandittva paryupasé ॥ 424 ॥ ( 1972)]
Trans.-424 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Prabhāša, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks:-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. (1972)
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविष्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी पं ॥ ४२५ ।। (१९७३)
Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana-vippamukkénam । Nāméņa ya gottéņa ya savvaņū savvadarisi ņam 1142511 (1973)

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480
Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh [ आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविषमुक्तेन । नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४२५ ॥ (१९७३)
Abhāsitasca Jinéna jati-jara-marayavipramukténa | Namna ca gotréna ca sarvajnéna saryadarsinā 1142511 (1973)]
Trans --425 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage, by the Tirthaikara who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( Undifferentiated knowledge.) ( 1973 )
Having thus addressed him, the Bhagavāna said
किं मन्ने निव्वाणं अस्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्यं न याणसि तेसिमो अस्थो ।। ४२६ ॥ (१९७४)
Kim maŋŋé nivyāņam atthi natthi tti samsaö tujihami Véyapayāņa ya attham na yānais tésimo attho 11426u (1974) [किं मन्यसे निर्वाणमस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४७४ ॥ (१९७४) Kim manyasé nirvāṇamasti nāstiti samsayastava i Véda-padānām pārtham na jānāsi téşāmayamarthah 1142611 (1974)]
Trans.-~-426 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether nirvana (final emancipation) exists or not. But ( ca ) you have not understood the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their (real) intérpretation. (1974)
टीका-हे आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं निर्वाणमस्ति न वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः। तानि चामनि वेदपदानि-"जरामय वैतत् सर्व यदग्निहोत्रम्"। तथा, "सैषा गुहा दुखगाहा"। तथा, “ द्वे ब्रह्मणी परमपरं च, तत्र परं सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तरं बह्म" इति । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तवचेतसि नर्तते-यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तज्जरामर्यमेव

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Vada ] Ganadharavăda
481 यावज्जीवं कर्तव्यमिति । अमिहोत्रक्रिया च भूतवधहेतुत्वाच्छबलरूपा। सा च स्वर्गफलैब स्याद् नापवर्गफला। "यावज्जीवम्" इति चोक्ते कालान्तरं नास्ति यत्रापवर्गहेतुभूतक्रियान्तरारम्मःस्यात् । तस्मात् साधनामावाद् मोक्षामाषः । ततश्चेत्यादिकानि किन मोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि । शेषाणि तु तदस्तित्वसूचकानि, यतो गुहात्र मुक्तिरूपा, सा च संसाराभिनन्दिनी दुरवगाहा, दुष्पवेशात् । तथा, परं ब्रह्म सत्यं मोक्षः, अनन्तरं तु ब्रह्म ज्ञानमिति । ततो मोक्षास्तित्वं नास्तित्वं च वेदश्दमतिपादितमवगम्य तव संशयः। तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्य त्वं न जानासि, यतस्तेषामयमों वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ ४२६ ।। (१९७४)
D. C.--O long-lived Prabhàsa! Your doubt about the existence of moksa is based upon your hearing various Védapadas of contradictory senses. These V'éda padas are as follows-- (1) "Jara-maryam vaitat sarvam yadagnihotram." (2) “Saisā gukā duravagahö" (3) "Dvé Brahmani paramaparm ca, tatra param satyam
jñānamantaram brahma" etc. These Védda-padas are interpreted by you as follows:(1) Agnihotra should be practised as long as life persists.
The performance of agnihotara constitutes the sacrifice of animals which would turn it Subha or a-subha. But that would award the attainment of svarga alone, and not mokra. Since by this commandment, performance of agnihotra is advised to be practised throughout life, there would be no other period of time during which some other performance foi the attainment of moksa could be advised. In absence of sādhana, therefore, the sādhya (viz mokşa) does not exist. In this way, this sentence proves the abhāva of mokşa
The other two padas try to establish the existence of moksa in this way
61

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482
Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh (2) The cave of moksa is difficult to be entered by the samsaris. (3) There are two types of Brahama:--
1 The Parama Branma or principal Brahma is moşka
and a-parama or subordtnate Brahama is jñāna.
Your doubt has sprung up from these Veda padas which bear contradictory senses. But you have not grasped their real interpretation. Here, I give their correct interpretation Please listen carefully. ॥ 426 1 1974 )
Bhagavāna now states the opponent's view and refutes it, मनसि किं दीवस्स व नासो निव्वाणमस्स जीवस्स ?। दुक्खक्खयाइरुवा किं होज व से सओऽवत्था ? ||४२७॥१९७५)
Mannasi kim divassa va naso nivvānamassa jîvassa ?' Dukkhakkhayāirūvā kim hojja va sé sao'vattha || 427 !! ( 1975 )
[ मन्यसे कि दीपस्येव नाशो निर्वाणमस्य जीवस्य ?
दुःखक्षयादिरूपा किं भवेद् वा तस्य सताऽवस्था ? ॥४२७॥(१९७६) Nanyase kim dipasyeva nāśo nirvāṇamasya jîvasya ? Dunkhaksayadirupa kim bhaved vā tasya sato'vastha 14271(1975)]
Trans.-427 Do you think the nirvana ( extinction of life ) to be similar to the extinction of lamp ? Or, would the positive exstence of soul in the form of diminution of miseries etc. be its extinction?
टीका-आयुपान् ! प्रमास ! त्वमेकं मन्यसे-कि दीपस्येवास्य जीवस्य नाशो ध्वंस एव निर्वाणम् ? यथाऽऽहुः सौगतविशेषाः केचित् , तद्यथा---
दीपो यथा निर्देतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनि गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् । दिशं न काश्चिद् विदिशं न काञ्चित् स्नेहक्षयान केवलमेति शान्तिम् ।।१।।

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Vada ] Gandharavāda
483 जीवस्तथा निर्वृतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनि गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् । दिशं न काश्चिद् विदिशं न काञ्चित् क्लेशक्षयात् केवलमेति शान्तिम् ॥२॥
इति । किं वा यथा जैनाः माहुस्तथा निर्वाणं भवेत् ? किं तत् ? इत्याह-सतो विद्यमानस्य जीवस्य विशिष्टा काचिदवस्था । कयंभूता ? रागद्वेष-मद-मोह-जन्म-जरा-रोगादिदुःखक्षयरूपा । उक्तं च
केवलसंविद्-दर्शनरूपाः सर्वातिदुःखपारमुक्ताः ।
मोदन्ते मुक्तिगता जीवाः क्षीणान्तरारिगणाः ॥१॥ इति ।। ४२७ ॥ (१९७५)
D. C.-- Like the Buddhists, do you believe noksa to be no. thing but the extinction of jiva, like that of a lamp ? For the Buddhists, assert that:"Dipo yathā nirvșitimabhyupéto naivāvanim gacchati nāntarisşam 1 Disam na käncid vidişiam na kāncit snéhakşayāt kevalaméti śāntim in ill
Jivastathā nirvșitimabhyupéto naivāvanim gacchati nāntariksami Disam na kāncid vidisim na kancit klešakşayāt kevalameti sāntim 121
Or, do you accept mokşa, like Jainas who believe the state of nir vāņa ( final emancipation ) as a peculiar state of the existent jita constituting the removal of rāga, dvéşa, mada, moka, janma, jarā, roga, and duḥkha etc !
___It has been laid down by them, thatKévalasamvid-darsanarūpāḥ sarvārtiduakha-parimuktah Modanté muktigată jîvāḥ: kşiņāntarăriganāḥ " nilit 427 ( 1975)
Also, अहवाऽणाइत्तणो खस्स व किं कम्म-जीवजोगस्स ।
अविओगाओ न भवे संसाराभाव एव त्ति ? ॥४२८॥ (१९७६) Ahavā’ņāittaņaö khassa va kim kamma-Jivajogassa Avlögāö na bhavé saṁsārābhāva éva tti ? 11 428 11 ( 1976 )

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484
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh [अथवाऽनादित्वतः खस्येव किं कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।
अवियोगाद् न भवेत् संसाराभाव एवेति ? ॥ ४२८ ।। (१९७६) Athavā’nāditvataḥ khasyeva kim karma-jivayogasya i Aviyogād na bhavèt samsārābhāva évéti ? 11 423 It ( 1976 )
Trans.-428 Or, is it because Karma and jiva ( which are ) united together eternally, do not undergo separation like akasa, that there is absence of mundane world ?,(1976)
टोका-अथवा, त्वमेवं नन्यसे-नूनं संसाराभाव एव न भवेत् । कुतः ? । अवियोगात्-वियोगायोगात् कस्य ?। कर्म-जीवयोः संयोगस्य । अतः ?। अनादित्वातः खस्येव । इह ययोरनादिःसंयोगस्तयोवियोगो नास्ति, यथा जीवा-ऽऽकाशयोः, अनादिश्च जीवकर्मणोः संयोगः, ततो वियोगानुपंपत्तिः, ततश्च न संसागभाव ; तथा च सति कुतो मोक्षः ? इति ॥४२८ ॥ (१९७६)
D, C.-There is another grouud also, upon which your doubt is based. Objects that are united with each other from time immemorial, could never undergo separation. Just as jiva and akasa are never separable from each other on account of their anādı samyoga, jiva and karmu will also never undergo separation on account of their anādı samyoga. When Karma is not separated, sainsara will also never be separable. On account of the absence of separation from samsāra, the absence of moksa will also be established. ॥ 428।। ( 1976)
___But, पडियाज मण्डिओ इव वियोगमिह कम्म-जीवजोगस्स । तमणाइणो वि कंचण-धाऊण व णाण-किरियाहिं ॥४२९।। (१९७७) Padivajja Mandio iva viyogamıha kamma-jîvajogassa Tamaņāiņo vi kancaņa-dhāūņa va ņāņa kiriyāhim 11 429 11 (1977) [प्रतिपयस्व मण्डिक इव वियोगमिह कर्म-जीवयोगस्य । त्वमनादेरपि काश्चन-धात्वोरिव ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्याम् ॥ ४२९ ॥ (१९७७)

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485
Vada ]
Gandharavāda Pratipadyasva Mandika iva viyogamiha karma-jiva-yogasya Tvamanādérapi kāncana-dhātvoriva jñāna-kriyābhāın 1142911 (1977)
Trans.-429 In this case, you ( siiall have to ) adınit the separation of Karma and jîva, in spite of their eternal union on account of cognizance and action, as in the case of gold and metal. ( 1977)
टीका-" अणाइणो वित्ति" अनादेरपि जीव-कर्मसंयोगस्य तं' इति त्वं प्रतिपद्यस्व वियोगम्. वन्ध--मोक्षवादे मण्डिकवत् । कयोरिव थो वियोगः ?! काश्चन-धातुपाषाणयोरिव । फि निर्हेतुक एक जीव-कर्मणोवियोगः ?। न, इत्याह-ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्याम् । इदमुक्तं भवति-नायमेकान्तो यदनादिसंयोगो न भिधते, यतः काञ्चन धातुपाषाणयोरनादिरपि संयोगोऽग्न्यादिसंपर्केण विघटत एव, तद्वज्जीव-कर्मसंयोगस्यापि सम्यगज्ञानक्रियाभ्यां वियोगं मण्डिकवत त्वमपीह प्रतिपद्यस्वति ॥४२९॥ (१९७७)
___D. C.-.Even the stronnest affnity between gold and metal is broken by the help of heating etc. The same is the case with that between Karma and jiva also. Separation of Karma and jîva is accomplished by means of jñāna and krija in spite of their eternal union. It is not true, therefore, to say that the separation of objects joined together by anādı samyoga, is not possible. Like Mandika you. too, shall have to admit that Karma and jiva are separable from each other in spite of their eternal union. ।। 429॥ ( 1977 )
जं नारगाइभावो संसारो नारगाइभिण्णो य । को जीवो तं मन्नसि तन्नासे जीवनासो त्ति ॥ ४३० ॥ (१९७८)
Jam nāragāibhāvo samsāro nãragāibhingo ya i Ko jîvo tam mannasi tannāse jivanāso tti il 430 11 (1978)
[यद् नारकादिभावः संसारो नारकादिमिनश्च ।
को जीवस्त्वं मन्यसे तमाशे जीवनाश इति ॥ ४३० ॥ (१९७८)

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486
Jinabhadra Gaņi's
Yad nārakādibhāvah samsāro nārakādibhinnasca Ko jivastvam manyasé tannāśe jivanāśa iti | 430
[ The eleventh
(1978)]
Tians - 430 Since samsāra includes hellish denizens etc. what jiva do you mean to be different, from hellish denizens etc ? With their destruction, ( there will be ) destruction jiva also. (1978)
of
टीका- यद् यस्माद् नारक - तिर्यग्- नरा-मरभाव एवं नारकादित्वमेव संसार उच्यते नान्यः, नारकादिपर्यायभिन्नव कोऽन्यो जीवः ? | sisपीत्यर्थः, नारकादिभावादन्यत्वेन कदाचिदपि जीवस्यानुपलम्भादिति भावः । ततस्तन्नाशे नारकादिभावरूपसंसारनाशे जीवस्य स्वस्वरूपनाशात् सर्वथा नाश एव भवति, ततः कस्यासौ मौक्षः ? । इति त्वं मन्यसे ||४३|| ( १९७८ )
D. C.-Since sāmsāra consists of sāraka, tiryanca, human and divine beings, jiva cannot exist as different from any One of them. So, when samsara of narakas and others, vanishes, jiva will also vanish as it is contained in samsāra. Thus, when jiva vanishes, who would attain moksa ? ॥430 (1978)
This belief is refuted in this way
न हि नारगाइपज्जायमेत्तनासम्म सव्वा नासो | जीवद्दवस्स मओ मुद्दानासे व हेमस्स || ४३१ ।। (१९७९)
कम्मकओ संसारो तन्नासे तस्स जुज्जए नासो । जीवत्तमकम्मकयं तन्नासे तस्स को नासो ? || ४३२ || (१९८०)
Na hi nāragǎipajjāyamettanāsammi savvahā nāso i Jivaddavvassa mao muddānāsé va hemassa ॥ 431 (1979)
Kammakao samsaro tannāse tassa jujjae nāso I Jivattamakammakayam tannāsé tasya ko nāso ? ॥ 432 ॥ (1980)
[ न हि नारकादिपर्यायमात्रनाशे सर्वथा नाशः ।
जीवद्रव्यस्य मतो मुद्रानाश इव हेम्नः || ४३१ ॥ (१९७९)

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
487 कर्मकृतः संसारस्तन्नाशे तस्य युज्यते नाशः ।
जीवत्वमकर्मकृतं तन्नाशे तस्य को नाशः ? ॥ ४३२ ॥ (१९८०) Na hi nārakādiparyāyamåtranāss sarvatha nāšah Jivadravyasya mato mudrānasa iva hémnah 1 431 ॥ (1979) Karmaksitah samsārastannāśe tasya yujyaté nāśah! Jîvatvamakaramakṣitam tannāśé tasya ko nāśah ? 43211 (1980)
Trans.-- 431-432 Like gold. at the destruction of a ring, the substance of jivx is not believed to vanish entirely at the destruction of närakas and other. Samsāra is based on Karma.
Hence, its destruction with Karma is justified. ( But ) jivatva is not based on Karma. Hence, how could it vanish with Karma ? 1979-1980)
टीका-नारक-तिर्यगादिरूपेण यो भावः स जीवम्य पर्याय एव । न च पर्यायमात्रनाशे पर्यायिणो जीवद्रव्यस्यापि सर्वथ। नाशो मतः, कथञ्चिसु भवत्यपि । न हि मुद्रापर्यायमात्रनाशे हेम्नः सुवर्णस्य सर्वथा नाशो दष्टः । ततो नारकादिसंसारपर्यायनिवृत्तौ मुक्तिपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिर्जीवस्य मुद्रापर्यायनिवृत्तौ कर्णपूरपर्यान्तरोत्पत्तिरिव मुवर्णस्य, न किञ्चिद् विरुध्यत इति । ननु यथा कर्मणो नाशे संसारो नश्यति तथा तन्नाशे जीवत्वस्यापि नाशाद् मोक्षाभावो भविष्यति। एतदप्यसारम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-"कम्मको इत्यादि" कर्मकृतः कर्मजनितः संसारः, ततस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य संसारस्य नाशो युज्यत एव; कारणाभाचे कार्याभावस्य सुप्रतीतत्वात् । जीवत्वं पुनरनादि कालप्रवृत्तत्वात् कर्मकृतं न भवति, अतस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य जीवस्य को नाशः?-न कश्चिद; कारण-व्यापकयोरेव कार्य-व्याप्यनिवर्तकत्वात कर्म तु जीवस्य न कारणं नापि व्यापकमिति भावः ॥ ४३१-४३२ ।। (१९७९-१९८०)
D. C.-Existence of jiva as nārakas or tiryancas is merely one of the forms of jiva So, when these paryayas of jiva vanish, the substance of jirā or jivatva does not vanish entirely but only partially, just as gold as a dravya, does not

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488 Jinabhadra dani's
[The eleventh entirely vanish when ring etc. are destroyed When the māraka paryayas of samsāra are destroyed, jîva vanishes as a samsāri and comes into existsnce as the paryāya of mokşa e. & in case of gold, when one paryaya, sayaring, is destroyed, another par. yaya, say an ear-ring. is produced.
Prabhāsa: But like samsāra, jiva will also have to vanish with Karma, and hence, there will be nothing like moksa.
____ Bhagavāna:-It is not so, Samsāra is generated by means of Karma, and hence it would vanish with Karma. But, jivat va being at work from times immemorial, cannot be called Karma janya. So, jiva will not vanish Karına, since Karma is neither the cause of jivatva, nor is it invariably concomitant with jivatva. ॥ 431- 432 ।। ( 1979-1980 )
न विगाराणुवलंमादागासं पिवं विणासधम्मो सो। इह नासिणो विगारो दीसइ कुंभस्स वाऽवयवा ॥४३३।। (१९८१) Na vigārāņuvalambhādāgāsam piva viņāsadhammo so I Iha nāsiņo vigāro disai kumbhassa vā'vayavā 11 433 11 ( 1981) [न विकारानुपलम्भादाकाशमिव विनाशधर्मा सः ।
इह नाशिनो विकारो दृश्यते कुम्भस्येवावयवाः ॥ ४३३ ॥ (१९८१) Na vikarānupalambhädakāśamiva vināšadharmā sah lha nasino vikāro drisyate kumbhasyévāvayavah || 433 ॥ ( 1981)]
___Trans.-433. It ( it. jiva ) is immortal, like sky, on account of the non-apprehension of changes. In case of a destructive ( object'), a change is visible like the (various) parts of a ghata
( 1981
टीका-न विनाशवर्मा जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा । विकारानुपलम्मादिति हेतुः। इह यो विनांशी तस्य विकारो दृश्यते, यथा मुद्रादिध्वस्तस्य कुम्भस्यं कपाळलक्षणा अवयवाः; अस्त्वविनाशी न तस्य विकारदर्शनम् , यथाss

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Vada ] Canadharavada
489 काशस्येति । ततो मुक्तस्य जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् नित्यो मोक्ष इति ॥ ४३३॥ (१९८१)
D. C.-The Soul is immmortal like akasa, because it does not undergo any vikāra. That which is destructible, has undoubtedly to undergo vikaraz like the differnt parts of ghata Muklātmā being, thus immutable, moksa is also immutable. 11 433 11 ( 1981)
Also, कालंतरनासी वा घडा व्व घडोव्व कयगाइओ मई होना। नो पद्धसाभावो मुवि तम्मा विज निचो ॥४३४ ॥ (१९८२) Kalantaranās! vă ghado vva kayagãio mai höjjā 1 No paddhamsābhāvo bhuvi taddhammā vi jam nicco 114341 (1982) [कालान्तरनाशी वा घट इव कृतकादितो यतिमवेत् ।
नो प्रध्वंसामावो मुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ ४३४ ॥ (१९८२) Kälāntaranāsi vă ghata iva kritakādito matirbhavet i No pradhvaņsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmāpi yad nityah 143411 (1982)]
Trans ---434 Or, the belief may be that it is destructible at a ( certain ) period of time like ghata on account of its being factitious etc. ( But ) it is not so. Indestructibility is everlasting on thls earth in spite of ( its ) having ( destructible ) characteristics ( 1982 )
The author, then, states the opponent's view and its reply-- अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंग पिव मई न तं जम्हा । कुंभविणासविसिहो भावो चिय पोग्गलमओ सो ॥४३५।। (१९८३) Anudāharaṇamabhāvo kharasangam piva maî na tam jamhā i Kumbhaviņāsavisittho bhāvo cciya poggalamaö so 1143511 (1983)
[ अनुदाहरणमभालः स्वरश्रृंगमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुग्दलमयः स ।। ४३५ ॥ (१९८३) 62

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490 Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eleventh Anudāharanamabhāvah kharaśšngamiva matir na tad yasmāt, Kumbhavinasavisisto bhāva éva pudgalamayah sah 14350 (1983)]
Trans.-435 (The opponent might say that) "It has no illustration. Abhāva is non-existent like kharasriga" (But) it is not so. The quality of pudgala characterized by the destruction of ghata, is itself (indestructibility). (1983)
Or, किं वेगतेण कयं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स ? : किं निव्वत्सियमहियं नभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि ? ॥ ४३६ ॥ (१९८४) Kim veganténa kayam poggalaméttavilayammi jivassa ? Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadaméttavilayammi ? 1 436 11 [किं वैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्ग्लमात्रविलये जीवस्य ?।
किं निर्वतितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ ४३६ ॥ (१९८४) Kim vaikāntena kritam pudgalamātravilaye jivasya ?, Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamātravilaye ? ॥4361(1984)]
Trans.--436 Or, at the destruction of mere pudgalas, how is jiva to be affected ? At the destruction of ghata, how is sky affected all the more ? + (1984)
The author proves immortality of muktātmā by another inference also, दत्वामुत्तत्तणओ मुत्तो निच्चो नभं व दव्यतया । नणु विभुयाइपसंगो एवं सइ नाणुमागाओ॥ ४३७ ॥ (१९८५) Davvāmuttattăņaö mutto nicco nabham va davvatayai Naņu vibhuyāipasango evam sai, nājumāņão il 437 11 (1985 [दव्यामूर्तत्वतो मुक्तो नित्यो नभ इव द्रव्यतया ।
ननु विभुतादिमसङ्ग एवं सति, नानुमानात् ।। ४३७ ।। (१९८५) +Vide v. 1839.

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491
Vada ]
Canadharavāda Dravyämūrtvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyataya , Nanu vibhutādiprasanga evam sati, nānumānāt 143711 (1985)]
Trans.-437 The free ( soul) is everlasting like sky, on account of the incorporeal nature of (its) substance. ( The opponent might object here that ) "In that case, there would be all-pervading characteristic etc as well." (But ) it is not so, because of (an opposite inference ). (1985)
टीका-नित्यो मुक्तात्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात: “दव्वतय ति" यया द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वाद् नित्यं नमः। आइ-नन्वनेन दृष्टान्तेन व्यापकखाधपि सिध्यति जीवस्य; तथाहि-विमुापकः सर्वगतो जीवः, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात, यथा नमः। तदेवद् न । कुतः ?। सर्वगवत्वबाधकानु मानसद्भावात; तथाहि-त्वपर्यन्तदेहमात्रव्यापको जीवः, तत्रैव तद्वणोपलम्बेः, स्पर्शनवत्, इत्युनुमानाद् बाधते सर्वगतत्वं जीवस्य । एवं " न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते जीवः द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात, नमोवत्" इत्यापि दूषणं, "वध्यते पुण्य-पापकर्मणा जीवः, दान-हिंसादि क्रियाणां सफलत्वात, कुष्यादिक्रियावत्, तथा, विघटते सम्यगुपायात् कोऽपि जीव-कर्मसंयोगा, संयोगस्वात, काश्चन-धातुपाषाणसंयोगवत्" इत्याधनुमानात् परिहर्तव्य. मिति ।। ४३७ ।। (१९८५)
D. C.-Like ākāśa dravya, jiva dravya of a free soul is also nitya, because it is a-mürla as a drapya.
Prabhāsa :-~-As you proved rityatva ( in case) of muktaina by the help of the example of sky, the example will lead to prove other characteristics of sky, in muktalmā, say for example like sky, muktālmā is all pervading due to its a-mürtatva. Similarly, it can also be said that jîva dravya has neither bandha nor moksa just as ākāta dravya has none due to a-murtatva. .
Bhagavāna -- It is not proper to establish other characteristics such as vibhuti etc in mu klātmā by the help of the example of sky. Because, there is another inference opposite

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492
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eleventh to it, which contradicts the existence of those characteristics, Say, for example, jiva is pervading only upto the skin of body like the sense of touch, because the jîvalva is found only in body.
This anumāua refutes the all-pervading nature of jiva. Similarly, the anumānas that jivas are formed by means of punya and papa, and that the combination of jiva and Karma could, any how, be brought about like the combination of gold and stone, refute the assertion that jira has neither bandha nor mokşa due to the a-murtatva of its dravya like ākāśa. ॥ 4371 (1985)
Or, को वा निश्चग्गाहो सव्वं चिय वि भव-भङ्ग-ठिइमइयं । पजायतरमेत्तप्पणादनिवाइववएसो ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६) Ko va niccagaho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-thiimaiyam | Pajjantaramettappapādiniccaivavaéso 438 ॥ (1986) [को बा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-मा-स्थितिमयम् ।
पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६) Ko vã nityagrahah sarvamevāpi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam Pāryāyāntaramāträrpanādanityādivyapadéśaḥ # 438 4 (1986)]
Trans.-438 Or, why insist upon immutability (at all)? Everything is suceptible to the state of production-break-and retention. Only by (means of) imposition of various methods, attributes like mutability etc, are designated † (1986)
टीका-अथ कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वेऽपि मोक्षस्य न किञ्चिद् न क्षुयत इति भावः । इह "कालंतरनासी वा घडो व्व" इत्यादिगायाः पागपि षष्ठगणधरे पन्ध- मोक्षविचारे व्याख्याता एव । ततो यदिह न व्याख्यातं तत् ततोऽवगन्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३८ ।। (१९८६) † Vide v. 1843.

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Vada ] Canadharayıda
493 ___D. C.--It is no use insisting exclusively upon nityala of mu klātmā. Its a-uit yatü could also be admitted to a certain extent by means of various methods. But, realy speaking, all objects are susceptible to utpāda-wyaya-and ahrauvya ॥ 43811 (1986)
For a detailed discussion of bandha and mokşı, see Chap. VI.
Now, in reply to the assertion that the extinctien of soul resembles that of lamp etc, the author states
न य सव्वहा विणासोऽणलस्स परिणामओ पयस्सेव । कुंभस्स कवालाण व तहाविगारोवलंभाओ ।। ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)
Na ya savvahā viņāso’ņalassa pariņāmaö payasséva / Kumbhassa kavālāņa va tahāvigārovalambhão 1 439 II (1987) [न च सर्वथा विनाशोऽनलस्य परिणामतः पयस इव ।
कुम्भस्य कपालानामिव तथाविकारोपलभ्मात् ॥ ४३९ ॥ (१९८७) Na ca sarvathā vināso'nalasya pariāmatah payasa iva i Kumbhasya kapālanāmiva tathāvikāropalambhat || 439 ॥ (1987),
Trans.-459 Fire being mutable like milk, does not vanish entirely, because of the apprehension of changes like those (in case) of the pieces of ghata. (1987)
टीका--न प्रदीपानलस्य सर्वप्रकारैविनाशः, परिणामत्वात्, पयसो दुग्धस्येव; अथवा, यथा मुद्गराधाहतस्य कपालतया परिणतस्य घटस्य, यथा वा चूणीकृतानां कपालानाम् । कुतो न सर्वथा विनाशः ? । इत्याह-तथा तेन रूपान्तरप्रकारेण विकारस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपलम्भादिति ॥ ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)
___D. C.-When a lamp. is extinguished its. fire does not enirely vanish. It is only mutable like milk. So, like milk turning into curds or like ghata changing into various pieces

Page #532

494 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh by means of a stick etc, light changes into darkness, but it does hot vanish absolutely. ॥ 439 ।। ( 1987 )
Again, there is an objection, and its replyजइ सम्वहा न नासोऽणलस्स किं दीसए न सो सकखं ? परिणामसुहमयाओ शलयविगारंजणरउ व्व ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८) Jai savvahā na nāso’ņalassa kim disaé na so sakkham ? Parinamasuhumayan jalayavigaraijanarau vva || 440 ॥ ( 1988) [ यदि सर्वथा न नाशोऽनलस्य किं दृश्यते न स साक्षात् ? ।
परिणाममक्ष्मतातो जलदविकारोऽञ्जनराज इव ।। ४४० ॥ (१९८८) Yadi sarvathâ na nāśo'nalasya kim dřiśyate na sa sāksāt, Parinamasiksimatāto jaladavikāro'njanaraja iva ॥ 440 ॥ ( 1988 )]
Trans.---440 “ If there is no absolute extinction of light, why it is not seen before our eyes ?”“ Because of the subtlety of fruition as in the case of a change in cloud or dust particle, ( 1988 )
टीका-यदि सर्वथाऽनलस्य न नाशः, तर्हि विध्यातानन्तरं किमित्यसो साक्षाद व दृश्यमे ? । अत्रोत्तरमाइ-" परिणामेत्यादि " विध्याते प्रदीपेऽनन्तरमेव तामसपुद्गलरूपो विकार समुपलभ्यत एब, चिरं चासौ पुरस्ताद् यद नोपलभ्यते, तत् सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्मतरपरिणामभावात् । तथाहि-विश्वीर्यणाणस्य जलदस्यापि यः कृष्णाभ्रपुद्ग्लविकारः स परिणामसौम्याद नोपलभ्यते । तथा, अञ्जनस्थापि पवनेन हियमाणस्य यदुत्कृष्टरज उड्डीयते तदपि परिणामसौक्षम्याद नोपलभ्यते न पुनरसत्वादिति ।। ४४० ।। (१९८८)
D. C.--Prabhāsa:-~-If there were no absolute extinction of fire, why is it not perceived before our eyes ?
Bhagavāna: The vzkára of the light extinguished via darkness-is not directly perceptible, because its parināma is very subtle in form, Changes in a black cloud at the time of dissolution of a cloud, are not perceived because of their very

Page #533

Vada ] Ganadharavada
495 subtle pariņāma, and the pollen of a collyrium also blown away by wind, is not directly perceived, because it is very minute. But in no way, it means that it does not exist So, the vikāra of darkness in case of light is also non apprehensible, not because it is non-existent but because its parıņāmais saksma. || 440 ॥ ( 1988)
Also, होउण इंदियंतरगझा पुणरिदियंतरग्गहणं । खंधा एंति न ति य पोग्गलपरिणमया चिता ॥४४१॥ (१९८९) Höūva indiyantaragajjhā puparindiyantaraggahanam Khandha énti na énti ya poggalaparinamaya citta || 441 ॥ (1989) [भूत्वेन्द्रियान्तरमायाः पुनरिन्द्रियान्सरग्रहणम् ।
स्कन्धा यान्ति न यान्ति च पुदगलपरिणामता चित्रा ॥४४१॥ (१९८९) Bhūtvendriyantaragrāhyān punarindriyantargrahaņam i Skandhā yanti na yānti ca pudgalapariņāmata citrā 11441.1 (1989)]
Trans.---- 441 (Some ) objects apprehensible by (one group of ) sense organs, are again, apprehended by ( another group of ) sense-organs, while others are not apprehended ( by another set of sense-organs ). Manifold is the nature of their fruitions. ( 1989)
टीका-इह सुवर्णपत्र-लवण-मुण्ठी--हरीतकी--चित्रक- गुडादयः स्क. न्धाः पूर्वमिन्द्रियान्तरमासाश्चक्षुरादीन्द्रियविषया भूत्वा पुनद्रव्य-क्षेत्र कालादि सामग्यन्तरं प्राप्य पुद्गलपरिणामवेचिच्यादिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणं स्पर्शन- रसनादिन्द्रियग्राखतामायान्ति; तथाहि- सुवर्ण पत्रीकृतं चक्षुह्यं भूत्वा शोधनार्थमनौ प्रक्षिप्तं भस्मना मिलितं सत् स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राखतामेति, पुन: प्रयोगेण भस्मनः पृथक्कृत चक्षुर्विषयतामुपगच्छति । लवण-मुण्ठी--हरीतकी--चित्रकगुडादयोऽपि प्राक् चक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राथा भूत्वा पश्चात् रूपाद्यन्ते वहोषषसमुदाये च काथ चूर्णा--ऽवलेहादि परिणामान्तरमापना: सन्तो रसनेन्द्रियसंवेधा भवन्ति । कर्पूर- कस्तूरिकादिनामपि पुद्गलावाया अपि वायुना

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496
Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh दरमुपनीता घ्राणसंवेधा भवन्ति । योजननवकात्तु परतो गतास्तथाविधं कत्रित मुक्ष्मपरिणाममापना नैकस्यापीन्द्रियस्य विषयतां प्रविपधन्त इति । अनया दिशाऽन्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्रा भावनीयेति ॥४४१॥(१९८९)
D. C.-The manifold nature of pulgaia-pariņāmas is explained by means of the following example. Substances such as a sheet of gold, salt, ginger, haritaki ( yellow myrobalans , citra kavela, jaggery etc-are first apprehended by senseorgans like eye etc, and then they undergo apprehension by means of other sense-organs such as that of touch, taste etc, when accompained by different substances, surrounding and times etc. A sheet of gold is first apprehended by eyes, but when passed through fire and mixed with ashes fer purification, it is apprehended by the sense of touch as well. Afterwards when it is separated from it, again it becomes apprehensible by eyes. The same is the case with objects like salt, ginger, green vegetables, jaggery etc. They are also cakşurgrāhya at the first instance, but when mixed with ashes or or other groups of medicines or when turned into liquid, powder or paşte, they are perceived by the sense of touch. Pragalas like camphor and musk although perceptible by eyes at first. undergo perception by the sense of smell, when carried by wind to a long distance.
On the other hand, some pudgalas when carried to a distance longer than nine yojanst do not undergo perception by means of any sense-organ on acconnt of their subtle change. In all these cases, variegated nature of the changes of pudgalas, is the main cause. Il 441 H ( 1989 )
Beside,
एगेगेंदियगज्झा जह वायव्वादो तहग्गेया। होउं चकबुग्गज्मा पाणिदियगझयामेंति ।। ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)
† one Yojana-Four Kašas or 9 mile approximately,.

Page #535

Vada] Gaşadharavada
497 Egégéndiyagajjhā jaha vāyavvādaö tahaggyéā i Höum cakkhuggajjhā ghāṇindiyaggįjhayāmenti 11 442 11 ( 1990 )
[ एकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्या यथा वायव्यादयस्तयाऽऽग्नेयाः ।
भूत्वा चक्षु ह्या धोणेन्द्रियग्राह्यतां यान्ति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०) Ekaikérdrtyagrahya yathā vāyavyādayastathā"greyāh i Bhūtvā cakşurgāhyā ghrārgendriyagrāhyatām yānti 1144211 (1990)}
Trans.-442 Just as ( the particles of : wind etc, are perceptible by each single sense-organ ( one by one ), ( those ) of fire also undergò perception by means of the sense of smell, after being perceptible by eyes. ( 1990 (
टोका-वायुः स्पर्शनेन्द्रियस्येव ग्राह्या, रसो रसनस्यैव, गन्धो ध्राणस्यैव, रूपं चक्षुष एव, शम्दस्तु श्रोत्रस्यैव ग्राह्यः । तदेवं यथा वायाव्यदयः पुग्दुला एककस्य प्रतिनियतस्येन्द्रियस्य ग्राखा भूत्वा पश्चात् परिणामन्तरं किमप्यापना इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्या अपि भवन्तीति स्वयमेव गम्यते, तथा प्रस्तुता अपि प्रदीपगता आग्नेयाः पुद्ग्लाश्चक्षुधा भूत्वा पश्चाद् विध्यते तस्मिन् प्रदीपे त एव तामसीभूताः सन्तो धाणेन्द्रियग्राह्यतामुपयान्ति, तत् किमुच्यने-" कि दीसए न सो सक्खं " इति ? । ननु घ्राणेन्द्रियेणोपलभ्यत एव विध्यातपदीपविकार इति । ४४२ ।। ( १९९० ) ___D.C-Wind is perceptible by the sense of touch, juice by that of taste alone, odour by that of smell alone, form by that of eyes alone, and sound by that of ears alone. The Farticles of vāyze are thus apprehended by one particular sense only. Still however, these pudgalas are apprehended by other sense-organs also when they undergo changes.
In case of light, part:cles of flame are perceptible by eyes. When light is extinguished, these particles change into darkness, and are percetved by the sense of smell. Light, therefore, does not turn into nothingness, but its change into darkness is apprehended, ॥ 442 ।। ( 1990
63

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498
Jinabhadra Gapi's (The eleventh जह दीवो निव्वाणो परिणामन्तरनिओ तहा जीवो। भण्णइ परिनिव्वाणो पत्ताऽणाबाहपरिणामे ।। ४४३ ॥ (१९९१) Jaha divo nivvāpo pariņāmantaramio tahã jivo i Bhangai parlnivvăno patto’ņabāhaparıņāmam 1 433 11 (1991)
[ यथा दीपो निर्वाणः परिणामान्तरमितस्तथा जीवः ।
मण्यते परिनिर्वाणः प्रात्पोऽनावाधपरिणामम् ॥ ४४३॥ (१९९१) Yathā dipo nirvanah pariņāmāntaramitastatha jivaḥ Ehanyate parinirvanah prāpto'nabadhaparinamam ||443॥ (1991)]
Trans.- 443 Just as light changed into another from, is said to have attained nirvina (iinal extinction), the Soul also, is said to have attained nirvana (final liberation) when it has turned into a faultless form. (1991)
टीका-ययाऽनन्तरोक्तस्वरूपपरिणामान्तरं प्राप्तः प्रदीपो “निर्वाणः" इत्युच्यते तथा जीवोऽपि कर्मविरहितकेवलामूर्तजीवस्वरूपमावलक्षणःणाषाघं परिणामान्तरं प्राप्तो निर्वाणो निति प्राप्त उच्यते । तस्माद् दुःखादिक्षस्यपा सतोऽवस्था निर्वाणमिति स्थितम् ।। ४४३ ॥ ( १९९१ )
D. C. Just as light is said to have attained nirvana when it changes into darkness, the Soul is also said to have attained nirvāṇa when it has changed into a form which is void of Karma, and which possesses absolutely a-Fürta characterlstics of the form and nature of Soul. This shows that mokşa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of jiva when miseries etc are exterminated.
Prabhasa:--If moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of jiva, at the removal of miseries etc, then, in absence of objects of pleasure like sabda etc, the free Soul will have no happiness 11 443 . (1991)
Bhagavāna replies:

Page #537

Vada ] Canadharavāda
499 मुत्तस्सं परं सोक्खं जाणाणाबाहओ जहा मुणणो । तद्धम्मा पुण विरहादावरणा-ऽऽबाहहे ऊणं ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२) Muttassa param sokkham ņāņāņābāhao jahā muniņo Taddhammā puna virahādāvarņā-'bāhaheūņam 1144411 (1992) [मुक्तस्य परं सौख्यं ज्ञानानाबाधतो यथा मुनेः ।
तद्धर्मा पुनर्विरहादावरणा--ऽऽवाधहेतूनाम् ॥४४४॥ (१९९२) Muktasya param sauk hyam jñānānābādhato yatha munéḥ 1 Taddharmã punarvirahādāvaraņā -"bhādhahetūnām 1444(19992)]
Trans - 444 Like a sage, the free soul (enjoys) perfect happiness by virtue of) its (high) knowledge, in absence of (all) obstructions. In absence of interruptions and obstructions, it (enjoys) (all, its qualities (1992)
___टीका-मुक्तस्य जन्तोःपरं प्रकृष्टम त्रिममिथ्याभिमानजं स्वभाविक सुखमिति । " णाणाणाबाहउ ति" ज्ञानप्रकर्षे सति जन्म-जरा • व्याधि-मरणे-टवियोगा-ऽरति-शोक क्षुत्-पिपासा-शीतोष्ण-काम-क्रोधमद-शाठय-तृष्णा-राग-द्वेष--चिन्तौरक्यादिनिः शेषाबाधविरहितत्वादिति हेतुः । तथाविधमकृष्टमुनेरिव । यथोक्तावाधरहितानि काष्ठादीन्यपि वर्तन्ते, परं तेषां ज्ञानाभावाद् न सुखम् : अतस्तद्वयवच्छेदार्थ ज्ञानग्रहणम् । कयं पुनरसौ प्रकृष्टज्ञानवान् , आवाधरहितश्च ? इत्याह--" तद्धर्मेत्यादि" तदर्माप्रकृष्टज्ञाना-ऽनाबाधवान् मुक्तात्मा । कुतः? । विरहात्-अमावात् । केषाम् ? । आवरण हेतूनाम् , आबाघहेतूनां च । एतदुक्तं भनति-क्षोणनिःशेषावरणत्वात् प्रकृष्टज्ञानवानसौ. वेदनीयकर्मादीनां च सर्वेषामप्याबाघहेतूवां सर्वथाऽपगमात् सर्वाऽऽवाधरहितोऽयमिति । प्रयोगः स्वाभाविकेन स्वेन प्रकाशेन प्रकाशवान् मुक्तात्मा, समस्तप्रकाशावरणरहित्वातत् , तुहिनांशुवत् । तथा चाह
स्थितः शीतांशुवज्जीवः प्रकृत्या भावशुद्धया।
चन्द्रिकाव विज्ञानं तदावरणमभ्रवत् ॥१॥
इति । तया, अनाबाघमुखो मुक्तात्गा, समस्ताबाघहेतुरहिवत्वात् . अपराधपगमे स्वच्छाऽऽतुरबत् । तथा चोक्तम्

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500 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh स व्यावाधाभावात् सर्वज्ञत्वाच्च भवति परमसुखी।
व्याबाधाभावोऽत्र स्वच्छस्य शस्य परमसुखम् ॥१॥ sfa li 888 11 (8882)
D. C.-Muktātmā enjoyes a perfect but natural happinees. When there is uo āvarana, it attains high congnizance and when there is absolute abhāva of Karma, which is nothing but a cause of un-happiness, it is free from all sorts of miseries. So, like a sage, muktālmū enjoys the delight of high cognizance. It enjoys perfect happiness as it is free from the miseries of birth, old age, disease, death, separation from the beloved, absence of love, sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire, anger, pride, passion, hatred, anguish, wickedness, and eagerness etc. Like the Sun, the free soul shines by its own lustre
It has, therefore, been said that
Sthitaḥ śitānsuvajjivaḥ praksityā bhāvasuddhaya ,
Candrikāvacca vijñām tadăvaraṇamabhravat
With reference to the unobstructed liappiness, it has also been said — Sa vyābadhābhāvāt sarvajnatvācca bhavati paramasukhi i Vyabadhābhāvo'tra svacchasya jñasya paramasukham 11 211444, 1992)]
The oppoment, then, asks and Bhagavān replies-- मुत्तो करणाभावादण्णाणी ख व, नणु विरुद्धोऽयं । जमजीवया वि पावइ एत्तो चिय भणइ तन्नामः ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३) Mutto karaņābhāvādaņņāņi kham va, naņu viruhdho'yami Jamajivaya vi pāvai étto cciya bhaņai tannāma il 4451 ( 1993) [मुक्तः करणाभावादनानी खमिय, ननु विरुदोऽयम् ।
यदजीवतापि प्रामोत्येतस्मादेव मणति तमाम ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३) Muktaḥ karaņābhāvádajnāni khamiva, nanu viruddho'yami Yadasivatāpi prāpnotyetasmādáva bhanti tannāma 1144511 (1993)]

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vāda ]
Gaṇadharavāda
501
absence of sense. that case, it would ( attain lifelessness. ) ( 1993 )
Trans.-445 A free ( soul ) is ignorant like the sky, in " This is really fallacions. Because, in attain lifelessness, as well.
Let it
""
"
"9
""
6"
टीका -- नन्वज्ञानी मुक्तात्मा, करणाभावात्, आकाशवत् । अत्राचार्यः माह - ननु धर्मिस्वरूपविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः । तथाहि--अनेनंतदपि सिध्यति - अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, करणाभावात्, आकाशवत् । अत्र परः सोत्कर्ष मणति- 46 तन्नाम त्ति " 'नाम' इत्यभ्यनुज्ञायाम् - अस्त्वेतत्, न नः किमपि यते । न हि मुक्तात्मनामजीवत्वेऽस्माकं किञ्चिद् नश्यति, येन हेतोर्विरुद्धता प्रेर्यमाणा शोभेत । अत्राह कश्चित् ननु मुक्तस्याजीवत्वमाईतानामप्यनिष्टमेव ततश्चैतद् दूषणमाचार्येणापि परिहर्तव्यमेव, यच्चात्मनोऽपि दूषणं समापतति तत् कथं परस्येवैकस्योद्भाव्यते ? | सत्यमेतत्, किन्तु परशक्तिपरीक्षार्थ प्रेर्यमाचार्यः कृतवान्, कदाचित् क्षोभाऊ विगलितमतिभः परोऽत्रापि प्रतिविधाने स्खलितस्तूष्णीं विदध्यात् । परमार्थस्तु जीवस्याजीवत्वं कदाचिदपि न भवत्येव ॥ ४४५ ॥ (१९९३)
D. C - Prabhasa:--- When a muktātmā is free from senseorgans, it will be called ignorant like ākāssa.
Bhagavāna:----It is not so. The argument advanced by you, proves even a contrary parayaya of soul. It will prove muktatmā to be lifeless in absense of indriyas.
Prabhasa:-Well, what is wrong if muktātmā is taken as lifeless ? । 445 | ( 1993 )
Bhagavana replies
दव्वा--ऽमुप्तप्त सहावजाइंओ तस्स दूरविवरीयं ।
न हि जचतरगमणं जुतं नभसो व्व जीवन्तं ॥ ४४६ ॥ (१९९४)
Davva-'muttatta sahāvajāio tassa dūravivarîyam
Na hi jaccantaragamanam juttam nabhashvva jivattam ||446 (1994)

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502
Jinabhadra Gani's 1 The eleventh [ द्रव्याऽमूर्वखवत् स्वभावजातितस्य दूरविपरीतम् । न हि जात्यन्तरगमनं युक्तं नभस इव जीवनम् ।। ४४६ ॥ (१९९४)
Dravya'mūrtatvavat svabhāvajätitasya dūraviparitam Na hi játyantaragamanam yuktam nabhasa iva jivatvam 1144611 (1994)]
Trans.--446 By virtue of its natural genesis like dravyatva and a-mirtatvn it is far the most fallacious. Like life to sky its transgression to other gensis, is not proper. (1994)
टीका-तस्य मुक्तात्मनो हि यस्मात् कारणाद् न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । किं तद् न युक्तम् ? इत्याह-एकस्या जीवखलक्षणाया जातेयंदजीवखलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं जात्यन्तरगमनम् . तन्न युक्तम् । कथंभूतं जात्यन्तरम् ? इत्याह-दरमत्यथै विपरीतं दूरविपरीतम् । कस्या दूरविपरीतम् ? इत्याह" सहावजाइउत्ति" जीवखलक्षणा या स्वाभाविकी स्वभावभूता जातिः स्वभावजातिस्तस्याः। किंवद् या स्वभावजातिः ? इत्याह-उपमानप्रधानस्वाद् निर्देशस्य, द्रव्या-ऽमूर्तत्ववदिति द्रव्यत्ववदमूतत्ववच्चेत्यर्थः । स्वभावजातेदरविपरीतं सत् कस्य यथा किं न युक्तम् ? इत्याह-नभस इव जीवत्वम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्-द्रव्यत्वम्, अमूर्तत्वं च जीवस्य तावत् स्वभावभूता जातिः, तस्याश्च यद् दरविपरीतं जात्यन्तरमद्रव्यबम्, अमूर्तत्वं च, तत्र गमनं तस्य कस्यामप्यवस्थायां न भवति । एवं जीवखमपि जीवस्य स्वभावभूतैव जातिः, ततस्तस्या अपि स्वभाबजातेयद् दरविपरीतम जीवखलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं मुक्तावस्थायामपि तस्य न युज्यते। न खजीवस्य सतो नभसः कदाचिदपि जीवत्वामाप्तिभवति । तस्माद् मुक्तो। जीवो यथाऽद्रव्यं मूर्तश्च न भवति, तद्विपक्षस्वभावत्वात् एवं जीवखामाव्याद जीवोऽप्यसौ कदाचिदपि न भवतिः अन्यथा नभः-परमाण्वादीनामपि स्वस्वभावत्यागेन वपरीत्यापश्यातिप्रसङ्गादिति ।
__ अत्राह-यघेवम्, तहि यद् भवतैवोक्तम्-" अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, कारणाभावात्, आकाशवत् '' इति, तत् कथं नेतव्यम् ? । अत्रोच्यते-परस्य प्रसका. पादनमेव तदस्माभिः कृतम्, तत्करणे च कारणमुक्तमेव, न पुनरनेन हेतुना मुक्तस्याजीवत्वं सिध्यति, प्रतिबन्धामावात् ; तथाहि-यदि करणैर्जीवत्वं
कादिति ।

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503
कृतं भवेत्, यथा दहनेन धूमः, व्यापकानि वा जीवत्वस्य करणानि यदि भवेयुः, यथा शिशपाया वृक्षत्वम्, तदा करणनिवृत्तौ भवेज्जीवत्वनिवृत्तिः, Tensfa-quafazat qu-faqqadì:; a Gaztea, Alzetenenfaपारिणामिकभावरूपत्वेनाकृतकत्वात् । व्याप्य – व्यापकभावोऽपीन्द्रियाणां शरीरेणैव सह युज्यते, उभयस्यापि पौळिकत्वात्, न तु जीवत्वेन, जोब स्यामूर्तत्वेनात्यन्तं तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मान करण निवृत्तावप्यनिवृत्त मेव मुक्तस्य जीवत्वमिति ।। ४४६ ॥ (१९९४) ॥
D. C. Bhagavāna:-Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as drayatva and a-murtatva are the innate characteristics of a soul, and just as that genesis of jiva never exists in condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics a-dravyatva and a-mūrtatva, jivtva is also the innate and natural characteristic of jiva, and that genesis of jiva never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently, in the state of muktātmā, jîva does never beonme a-jiva
any
like
Just as a free soul never attains the condition of a-dravyatva and murtatva, it never reaches a life-less state leaving aside its own innate living characteristics. For, if it leaves its own svabhāva, the sky and molecules will also leave their innate characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency.
Prabhāsa: If it is so, how do you explain your statement that muktātmā is a-jiva like ākāśa, on account of the abhāva of sense-organs.
Bhag avana:--The statement was made by me only to refute the opponent's view. In doing so, the reason has alreddy been explained, but this argment does not lead to prove mu klātmā to be lifeless, as there is no pratibaudha for it. For, if jîvalva is established by the existence of indriyas, it goes without saying that in absense of sense-organs, jiva will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke, and Asoka and vṛkṣatva. But it does not happen actually. The sense-organs

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504 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The elevath are connected with body by the relation of part and whole, but they are not connected with jiva because of its amūrtatva. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the abhāva of indriyas, rhere is abhāva of jîvalva in muklātmā.
Prabhāsa: --But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that muktāima is ignorant like sky in absence of sense-organs .
The reply is-- मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्विमंतिदियाई कुंभो व्व । उवलंभधाराणि उ ताई जीवो तदुवलद्धा !! ४४७॥ १९९५) तदुवरमे विसरणओ तव्यावारे वि नोवलंभाओ। इंदियभिन्नो आया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥४४८ ॥ (१९९६) Muttāibhāvaö novaladdhimantinaiyāim kumbho vva i Uvalambhaddārāņi u tāim jîvo taduvaladdhā 11 447 11 (1995) Taduvaramé vi saraņað tavvāvāre vi novalambhā öll Indiyabhinno āyā pancagavakkhovaladdhã và 1 448 11 (1996) [ मादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।
उपलम्भद्वाराणि तु तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥ ४४७ ।। (१९९५) तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्वयापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियमिन पात्मा पञ्चगवाक्षोपलव्धेव ॥४४८ ॥ (१९९६) Mürtidibhävato nopalabdhimanimantîndriyani kumbha ira 1 Upalambhadvārāni tu tāni jivastdupalabdha ॥ 447॥ (1995) Taduparam'épi smaraṇastadvyāpåré'pi nopalambhāti Indriyabhinna ātmā pancagavāksopalabdheva ॥ 44 ॥ (1996) ]
Trans.---447-448 On account of their (qualities like) mūrtatva etc like ghata, sense -organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension. Their

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Vada ! Ganadharavada
505 (reall agent of amprehension is jiva. Because of its power of recollection) even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working, the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows. (1925-1996)
टीका-अनोख्या पूर्ववत् । केवलं प्रस्तुते भावार्थ उच्यते- यदी. न्द्रियाण्युपलब्धिमन्ति भवेयुस्तदा ननिवृत्तावप्युपन्धिनित्तिर्भवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां जीवस्योपलब्धिमत्वनिश्चयादिति ॥ ४४७४४८ ।। (१९९५-१९९६ ॥
D. C.-If the indirigens were the real agents of apprca hension, there would have heen no perception wien they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand, when they worl.ed, perception should positively take place, but due to the absent-niindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of jiva is thus established from the positive, as well as, negative point of view.11447-44811 (1995-1996)
Indicating that jnana would not vanish with indriyas, but it is the very innate nature of jîva, the author states-- नाणरहिओन जीवो सरूवओऽणु व मुत्तिभावेणं ।
जं तेण विरुद्धमिदं अस्थि य सो नागरहिओ य ॥ ४४९ ॥ (१९९७) Nāņar ahii 17 jivi, sarūvao'ņu vva muttibhāvéņam i Jain téya viruddhamidam atthi ya so nānarahiii ya 11449।। (1997) [ ज्ञानरहितो न जीवः स्वरूपतोऽणुरिव मूर्तिभावेन ।
यत् तेन विरुद्धमिदमस्ति च स ज्ञानरहितश्च ॥ ४४९ ॥ (१९९७) Jnānarabitö na jivah Svarūpato'guriva mirtibhayena i Yat téna viruddhamidamasti ca sa jnānarahita ca 144911 (1997)]
Trans.---449 Like an atom, jiva as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence, the statement that it is voil of cognizance is incorrect. (1997)
64

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506
Jinabhadra Jani's
[ The eleventh टीका-यद् यस्माज्ज्ञानरहितो जीव कदाचिदपि न भवति, ज्ञानस्य तत्स्वरूपलात्. यथा मूर्तिभावेन रहितोऽणुन भवति, तेन तस्माद् कारणाद् विरुद्धमेतत्-" अस्ति चासौ भुक्तो जीवा, अथ स ज्ञानरहितः" इति । न हि स्वरूपस्याभावे म्वरूपवतोऽवस्थान युज्यते, तद्यतिरिक्तस्य तस्यासत्त्वात्. तथा चानन्तरमेवोक्तम्-न द्विजवंतरगमणं जुत्तं नमसो व्य जीवतं" इति ॥ ४४९ ।। (१९९७) ॥
2. C.Just as an atom cannot exist without a finite from, jiva could also never exist without cognizance, as cognizance is the very nature of jiva. Since a corporeal body cannot exist without a sinite form, your statement that mukiālmā is void of jnana, is absolutely incorrect. ॥ 449 ।। ( 1997
Again, there is a question and its reply.... किह सो नाणसरूवो नणु पञ्चक्रवाणुभूहओ निथए । परदेहम्मिवि गन्झो स पवित्ति-निवित्तिलिंगाओ ।। ४५० .: (१९९०) Kiha so nūņasarūvo naņu paccakkhăņubhūio niyaé Paradehammi vi gajjho sa pavitti-nivittilingãö 11 450 11/ 1998 )
कथं स मानस्वरूपो ननु प्रत्यक्षानुभूतितो निजके ।
परदेहेऽपि ग्राहः स प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिलिङ्गात् ॥४५० ।। (१९९८) Katham sa jnānasvarūpo nanu partyaksanubhūtito nijaké i Paradehe'pi grāhyah sa pravritti-nivrittilingat | 450 ॥ ( 1998 1
Trans.--450 " How does it is exist in the form of cognizance ?”. By direct apprehension, it is cogniz ble in case of its own body, and in the capacity of engagement and retirement in case of another's body." | 1998)
टीका-जनु कथमसौ जीवो ज्ञानस्वरूप इति निश्चीयते ?। अत्रोत्तरमाह-'ननु' इत्यक्षमायाम, ननु निजे देहे तावत् प्रत्यक्षानुभवादेव मानस्वरूपो जीव इति विज्ञायते, इन्द्रियव्यापारोपरमेऽपि तद्वथा. पारोपळधार्थानुमगरणात्, तव्यापारेऽपि चान्यमनस्कनायामनुपलम्भात्,

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507
Väda )
Canadharavada अदृष्टा-ऽश्रुतानामपि चार्थानां तथाविधक्षयोपशमपाटवात् कदाचिद् व्याख्यानावस्थायां चेतसि *फुरणात् । एतच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धमपि भवतः प्रष्टन्यता गतम् । तथा, स जन्तुः परदेहेऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूप एवेति ग्राबः । कुतः ? । तथाविधप्रवृत्ति-नितिलिङ्गादिति !! ४५ . । (१५९८)॥
D. (../publäsa:--With wiat authority can you say that Jiva is jņānasvarāpa ?
Bhagavāna: - That jiza exists as cognizance in its own body is seen by means of direct apprehension Even when sense-organs cease to worb, the object perceived by senseorgans, is recollected, while sometimes the object is not apprehended Even when the censt-organs are working, because of abser.t- dednes-sometimes perception crops up in the mind due to the relaxation of their destruction at the time of explantion.
In case of another's body also, jiva is known to be jnānasvarüta on account of its inclination ( to the desirable objects ) and aversion from the undesirable ones ). 114501(1998)]
And,
सम्वावरणावगमे मो मुद्धयरो भकेन यूरो व्व । तम्मयभावाभावादण्णाणितं न जुत्तं से ॥४५१ ॥ (१९९९) Savvăvaraṇāvagámé so suddhayaro bhavéjja sūro vai Tammayabhāvàbhāvādannāyittam na juttam sé # 451 r. ( 1999) [ सर्वावरणापगमे स शुद्धतरो भवेत् मुर इव ।
तन्मयमावाभावादशानित्वं न युक्तं तस्य ॥ ४५१ ॥ (१९९९) Sarvävaraṇāpagame sa suddhataro bhayet süra iva Tanmayabhāvābhāvādajñāuitvam na yuktam tasya .45111 (1999)
Trans.- 451 At the removal of all interruptions, that ( muktātmā ) would be purer like the Sun. It is not, therefore, proper to attribute ignorance to it. ( 1999 )

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508 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh टीका-सेन्द्रियो जन्तुर्देशतोऽप्यावरणक्षये तावत् तारतम्येन ज्ञानयुक्त एव भवति, यस्य त्वनिन्द्रियस्य सर्वमप्यावरणं क्षीणम् , स विशेषावरणापगमे शुद्धतर एव भवति- संपूर्ण ज्ञानप्रकाशयुक्त पर भवतीत्यर्थः । यथा समस्ताभ्रावरणापगमे संपूर्णप्रकाशमयः सूर्यः । ततस्तन्मयभावस्य प्रकाशमयत्वस्य करणाभावेनामावाद हेतोः "से" तरय मुक्तस्य यदानित्वं मेर्यते भिवता, तद् न युक्तम् , आवडणाभावे तस्यैव प्रकर्षवतो ज्ञानप्रकाशस्य सद्भावादिति ।। ४५१ ।। (१९९९) ।।
D. C.--Muklātmā possesses the power of complete cognizance, A soul having sense-cragans is cognizant, but to more or less extent on account of its avarajas being reinoved partially, Since all tlie õvaranas are removed in case of a muktatma, st is completely cognizant.
Just as Sun becomes completely resplendent with lustre when all the avaraņas, like clouds etc are removed the muktālmā is also completely resplendent with the lustre of cognizance when all arararaof indrijas have been removed. ॥ 451 ।। ( 1999 )
एवं पगासमइओ जीवो छिद्दानभासयत्ताओ। कचिम्मतं भासइ छिहावरणपईवो व्व ॥ ४५२ ।। ( २००० । सुबहुयरं वियागइ मुत्तो सवप्पिहाणविगमाओ । अषणीयधरो म्व नरो विगयावरगव्यईवो व्व ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१) Evam pagăsamaio jivo (hiddāvabhāsayttāö i Kincimméttam bhāsai chiddivarayapaivo vva ॥ 452 ॥ ( 2000 )
Subahuyaram viyānai mutto savvappihāņavigamão i Avaniyagharo vwa naro vigayavaranappaivo vva ।। 453 ॥ (2001) [ एवं प्रकाशमयो जीवश्छिद्रावमासकत्वात् । किंश्चिन्मात्र भासते छिद्रावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५२ ॥ (२०००)

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Vábaj Caradhiaravāda
509 मुबहुतरं विजानाति मुक्तः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।
अपनीतगृह इव नरो विगतावरणमदीप इव ।। ४५३ ।। (२००१) Evam prakāśamayo jivaśchidrāvabhāsakatvāti Kircinātram bhāsaté chidrāvaraņapradipa iva 11452 : 2000 ) 1
Subahutaram vijānāti muktah sarvapidhānavigamàti Apanitagriha iva naro vigatāvaranapradipa iva !! 453 ॥ (2001) |
Trans ---452-453 The soul is, thus lustrous It shines only a little, like a lamp ( shining ) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. ( But ) like a person relieved from home or like a lanıp shining without obstruction, the mkktatmi perceives completely, when all its interruptions have been removed. ( 2000-2001 )
टीका-तदेवं सति सर्वदा प्रकाशमय : प्रकाशस्वभाव एव जावः, केवलं संसार्यवस्थायां छमस्थः किश्चिन्मात्रमवमासयति क्षीणाऽक्षीणावरणजिट्टैरिन्द्रियच्छिद्रैश्वावमासनात् , सच्छिद्रकुट- कुड्याधन्तरितप्रदीपवदिसि । मुक्तस्तु मुक्तावथायां प्राप्तो जीवः सबहुतरं विजानाति--यदस्ति तत् सर्व प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः, सर्वपिधानविगमात्- सर्वावरणक्षयादित्यर्थः, अपनीनसमस्तगृहः पुरुष इव, विगतसमस्तकुट--कुडयाघावरणप्रदीप इव वेति ! यो हि सच्छिद्रावरणान्तरितः स्तोकं प्रकाशयति स निःशेषावरणापगम सुबवेव प्रकाशयति । न तु यस्य सर्वथा प्रकाशाभाव इति भावः । तस्मात मुत्तस्स परं सोक्ख गाणा-ऽणावाहा'' इत्यादि स्थितमू ।। ४५२-४५३ ।। (२०००-२००१
D. (: - liva is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception in the mundane life, jiva is obstructed by various āvaranas, ard hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a centain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall.
But in the mukta state, the tree soul illuminen everthing perfectly with its power of cognizancu like a lamp shining

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510
Jinabhadra Gani's without any obstruction or like a man relieved hold worries.
[ The eleventh of all house
This proves, therefore, the assertion that a free soul enjoys perfect happiness by means of perfect perception, when all its obstructions have been removed. 11 452-453 11 ( 2000–2001)
Then doubting the existence of happiness to a free soul, the opponent argues-- पुषणा-ऽपुण्णकयाई जं सुह-दुक्खाई तेण तन्नासे । तन्नासाओ मुन्नो निस्तुह-दुक्खो जहागासं ।। ४५४ ॥ (२००२) अहवा निस्सुह-दुक्खो नभं व देहे-यादभावाओ।
आधारो देहो चिय जं सुह-दुक्खोवलद्वीणं ॥ ४५५ ।। (२००३) Puņņā-puņņakayāin jam suha-dukhāim téņa tannāsé i Tannāsão mutto nissuha- dukkho jahāgāsam H 454 H (2002) Ahavă nissuha-dukkho nabham va déhé'ndiyãi bhavãö 1 Adhāro deho cciya jam suha-dukkhovaladdhigam ॥455॥ (2003)
[ पुण्या-पुण्यकृते यत् मुख-दुःखे तेन तनाशे । तमाशाद् मुक्तो निःसुख-दुःखो यथाकाशम् ॥ ४५४ ।। (२००२) अथवा निःसुख-दुःखो नम इव देहेन्द्रियाधभावात् ।
आधारो देह - एव यत् सुख-दुःखोपलब्धीनाम् ।। ४५५ ॥ (२००३) Punya-'puņpakṣité yat sukha-dunkhé téna tannāsé Tannāśād mukto ninsukha-duhkho yathākāśam 11 454 1 (2002) Athavă niḥsukh-duḥkho nabha iva dehe-ndriyādyabhāvāti Ādhāro déha éva yat sukha duḥkhopalabdhînām 14550 (2003)|
Trans:-- 454-455 Since happiness and misery are the products of panya and papa ( respectively ), the mukta ( soul) will be free from phoya and pāpa like ākāša, because it vanishes with them. Or, since body (itself) is the means of

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
511 apprehension of happiness and misery, it is free from happiness and misery like the sky, in absence of body, as well as, senseorgans. (2002-2003)
टीका -पुण्यात् मुखमुपजायतो, पापाच दुःखम्, इति भवतामपि संमतम् . तेन तस्मात् तयोः पुण्य-पापयोः कारणभूतयौनाशे मुख-दुःश्वयोः कार्यरूपयोनाशाद् निःसुख-दुश्व एव मुक्तात्मा प्रामोति, तत्कारणाभावात् आकाशवदिति । अथवा, नि सुख-दुःस्खोऽसौ, देहे न्द्रियाभावात्. नमोवत् , यद् यस्माद् देह एव, तथेन्द्रियाणि च सुख-दुःखोपलब्धीनामाधारो दृश्यते, न पुनदेहामावे सुख-दुःखे दृश्येते, नापीन्द्रियाभावे ज्ञानं काप्युपलभ्यते। ततः सिदस्य कथं तदभावात् तानि श्रद्धीयन्ते ? इति ॥ ४५४-४५५ ।। (२००२-२००३)
D. C-Prabhasa:--That happiness is born of punya and misery of papa, has already been accepted by you. Now, when punya and papa vanish, happiness and misery being their kāryas, will naturally vanish. Hence, like the sky, muktātmă will be free from sukha-duhkha, Or, it will be free from sukha-duhkka in absence of deha and indriyas.
Since déha is an active means of appprehending sukhaduhkha, there will be no apprehension of sukha-duħkha in absence of déha. In absence of ina'riyas, there wil be no cognizance. Consequently, a mukta (being) can never experience sukha-duhkha, ॥454-4551 (2002-2003)
Bhagavāna replies - पुण्गफलं दुक्खं चिय कम्मोदयओ कम्मोदयओ फलं व पावस्स । नणु पावकले वि समं पचक्खविरोहिआ चेव ॥ ४५६ ।। (२००४) Pungaphalam dukkham ciya kammodayaö phalam va păvassa Nagu păvaphale vi samam pacckkhavirohjā ceva # 45611 (2004 [पुण्यफलं दुःखमेव कर्मोदयतः फलमिव पापस्य । ननु पापफवेऽपि समं प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता चैव ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

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512 Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh Punyaphalam dunkhameva kar nodayalah phalamiva păpasyai Nanu pāpaphale’pi samam pratyakşavirodhitä сaiva. 11456!' (2004) ]
Trans.- - 456 " On account of ( the rise of ) Karma, the fruitieni vf virtuous deeds is even distressłnl like the fruition of sirs. The saine is really the case with the fruition of sins alst). " And it is a nothing but ) clear contradiction ( 2004 )
टीका -चक्रर्वतिपदलामादिक पुण्यफल निश्चयतो दुःखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वान्, नरकत्वादिपापफलवत् । परः पाह-ननु पापफलेऽपि समानमिदम् तथाहि-अत्रापि वक्तुं शक्यत एतत्--उक्तं पापफलं दु खत्वेनाभिमतं परमार्थतः सुखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, पुण्यफलवत् । एवं च बदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोषिता, खसंवेद्यमुख--दुःखयौवैपरीत्येन संवित्त्यभावादिति ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)
D. C.- Bhagavāna.--Like pūpī phalas, the punya phalas liko that of attaining cakravarta pada ( sovereignty of the world ) etc. are also distressful on account of their being produced by Karma.
Prabhāsa:--The same could be said of pupa phałas as well. The pāpa-pha as although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by Karma.
Bhagavāna:--Since you have not understood the real sense of sukha-duhkha, you have said so. But it is really contradicting. ।। 456 ॥ (2004) जत्तो चिय पञ्चकग्वं सोम्म ! सुहं नस्थि दक्वमेवेदं । नपडियारविभत्तं तो पुण्यफलं नि दुखं नि ।। ४५७ ।। (२००५)
Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma | suham natthi dukkhamévédam Tappadiyāravibhattam to puņņaphalnm ti dukkh'ım ti 114571 (2015)
[यत एव प्रत्यक्ष सौम्य ! सुखं नास्ति दुःखमेवेदम् । तत्पतीकारविभक्तं तत: पुण्यफलमिति दुःखमिति ॥ ४५७ ।। (२००५)

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Vada ] Canadharavāda
513 Yata éva pratyakşam Saumya ! sukham năsti duhkhamévėdami Tatpratikāravibhaktom tatah punyaphalamiti duḥkhamiti 1145711 ]
Trans.--457 That which is directly perceived as happiness is not happiness O Saumya / but it is only misery. It has been distinguished (from duhkha ) only as its resistanee, The fruition of virtuous deeds is, therefore, ( nothing but ) dshkha. ( 2005 )
__टीका- सौम्य ! प्रभास ! यत एव दुःखेनुभूयमाने कस्थाप्यविपर्यस्तमतेः मुखं प्रत्यक्षं नास्ति, सुखानुभव: स्वसंविदितो न विद्यते, अत एवास्माभिरुच्यते--" दुक्खमेवेदं” इति, यत् किमप्यत्र संसारचक्रे स्त्रक्-- चन्दना-ऽङ्गनासंभोगादिसमुत्थमपि विद्यते तत् सर्व दुःखमेवेत्ययः, केवलं तस्याङ्गनासंभोगादिविषयौत्सुक्यजनितारतिरूपस्य दुःखस्य प्रतीकारोऽङ्गनासंभोगादिकस्तत्मतीकारस्तेन तत्पतीकारेण दुःखमपि सद् विमक्तं मुर्भदेन व्यवस्थापितम् -सत्पतीकाररूपं कामिनीसंमोगादिकं पामाकण्डूयनादिवत् सुखमध्यवसितम्, शूलारोपण--शूल--शिरोबाधादिव्याधि बन्ध-वधादिजनितं तु दुःखमिति। रमणीसंभोग--चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिसुखं स्वसंविदितं “दुःखम्" इति वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, मोहमूढप्रत्यक्षत्वात् तस्य, तल्लाभौत्सुक्यजनितारतिरूपदुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वाद् दुःखेऽपि तत्र सुखाध्यवसायः, पापाकण्डूयना-ऽपथ्याहारपरिभोगादिवत् यथा चोक्तम्
नम्नः प्रेत इवाविष्ट कणन्तीमुपगृह्य ताम् ।
गाढायासितसर्वाङ्गः स सुखी रमते किल ॥१॥ औत्सुक्यमात्रमवसादयति प्रतिष्ठा लिन्नाति लब्धपरिपालनमुत्तिरेव । नातिश्रमापगमनाय यथा श्रमाय राज्यं . स्वहस्तगतदण्डमिवातपत्रम् ॥ २॥ भुक्ताः श्रियः सकलकामदुधास्ततः किं संप्रीणिताः प्रणयिनः स्वधन:स्वतः किम ? दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किं कल्पं स्थित तनुभृतां तनुभिस्ततः किम् ॥ ३ ॥ इत्थं न किञ्चिदपि साधन-साध्यजातं स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशं परमार्थशून्यम् । अत्यन्तनितिकरं यदपेतबाधं तद् ब्रह्म वाञ्छत जनाः। यदि चेतनास्ति ॥४॥ 65

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514
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh इत्यादिना। “पुण्यफले ति दुक्खं ति" यत एवमुक्तमकारेण दुःखेऽपि मुखाभिमानः, तस्मात् पुण्यफलमपि सर्व तत्त्वतो दुःखमेवेति 11 746 11 (20)
D. C.--Bhagavāna:- Pleasure afforded by objects like garlands, sandal-wood, and woman etc. is in reality, nothing but misery in this world. This sukha has been distinguished from duhkha ( in the form ) of passions generated from the eagerness to enjoy sexul pleasures with woman etc. Only ignorant people call it happiness.
But really speaking, such sorts of liappiness are only temporarily pleasent like the scratching of herpes.
While, putting to the gallows, aching in the stomach, headache, and the fetters of imprisonment etc, are known as miseries
Prabhāsa: -It is evidently contradictory to say that, sukha of the enjoyment with woman etc. and of the attainment of the sovereignty etc, are duḥkha.
Bhagavānc:--It is not contradictory to say so. It is perceived as sukha only to those who are disillusioned by ignorance, There will be establishment of sukha similar to the scratching of herpes or enjoying the forbidden food even in misery as they act as resistance against the distress of passions produced by eagerness to attain pleasure
So, it has been said--
Nagnaḥ préta ivāvjstaḥ kyamanti mupgrihya tāın
Cāļhāyāsitasarvāngaḥ sa sukhî ramaté kila 11 lll Autsukyamātramavasādayati pratisthā kliśnāti labdha
paripälanavrittiréva 1 Natisramāpagamanāya yathā śramāya rajyam svahastagatā
daņdamivātapatram 1 2 11

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Vada ]
Bhuktaḥ śriyah sakalakāmadudhastataḥ kim samprînitāḥ
praṇayinaḥ svadhanaistataḥ kim? Dattam padam śirasi vidviṣatām tataḥ kin kalpam sthitam tanubhritām tanubhistatah kim ? ॥
3 11
Gaṇadharavāda
515
Ittham na kincidapi sadhana-sādhyajātam svapnéndrajālasadrisam paramārthaṣūnyam i Atyantanirvritikaram yadaptéabādham tad Brahma vänchata janāḥ | yadi cetanāsti ॥4॥
The punya phalas awarding the attainment of visaya sukhas are thus proved as nothing but duḥkhamaya in reality. u 457 || ( 2005 )
विसयहं दुक्वं चित्र दुक्खपडियारओ तिगिच्छ व्व ।
तं सुहराओ न उयारो किया तयं ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६) Visayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadiyārao tiggiccha vva Tam suhamuvayarão na uvayāro viņā taccam | 458 || (2006)
[ विषयसुखं दुःखमेव दुःखप्रतीकारतश्चिकित्सेव ।
तत् सुखमुचाराद् नोपचारो विना तथ्यम् ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६) Visayasukham duḥkhaméva duḥkhpratīkārataścikitséva | Tat sukhamupacārād nopacāro vinā tathyam ॥ 458 ॥ (2006) ] Trans. - 158 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like medicine on account of its being a resistance against distress. It is (known as ) happiness by (virtue of ) usage ( only ). And there is no usage without fact. (2006)
टीका-विषयसुखं तत्त्वतो दुःखमेव दुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वात्, कुष्ठ-. गण्डाऽशरोग- क्वाथपान- च्छेदन- दम्भना विचिकित्सावत् । यश्च लोके तत्र सुखव्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते स उपचारात् । न चोपचारस्तथ्यं पारमार्थिकं विना क्वापि प्रवर्तते, माणवकादौ सिंहाद्युपचारवदिति ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)
D. C. — Since visaya sukha is, after all, a resistance againsi duḥkha, it is nothing but duḥkha. For the removal of diseases like leprosy, boil, or piles, Jnst as a dose of decoction and

For Private Personal Use Only

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516
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh
cutting off or burning some rotten part, are considered as pleasant inspite of their causing pain, the visaya sukhas are also sidered as duḥkhamaya inspite of their affording pleasure.
con
The visaya sukha is known as sukha by means of upacara only. This upacara is not reality but its existence is based on real objects. Without the existence of a real lion, the attribute of lion could never be given to maṇavaka. || 458 || (2006)
तम्हा जं मुत्तसुहं तं तचं दुक्खसंखएऽवस्सं । मुणिणोऽणाबाहस्स व णिप्पडियारणसईओ || ४५९ ॥ (२००७) Tamhā jam muttasuham tam taccam dukkhasamkhaeʼvassam i Munipo’gābāhassa va nippadiyārappasūio ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)
[ तस्माद् यद् मुक्तसुखं तत् तथ्यं दुखसंक्षयेऽवश्यम् । सुनेरनाबाधस्येव निष्प्रतीकारमसूतेः ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)
Tasmad yad muktasukham tat tathyam duḥkhasamksaye'vasyam | Muneranābhādhasyeva nispratikaraprasūteh || 459 || (2007) ]
Trans, --- 459 Hence, at the removal of (all) miseries, happiness of a free (soul) being produced unresisted and unobstructed like a sage, is undoubtedly a real (happiness) (2007)
टीका- तस्माद् यद् मुक्तस्य संबन्धि तदेव सुखं तथ्यं निरुपंचरितम् । कुत: ? । स्वाभाविकत्वेन निष्पतीकाररूपस्य तस्य प्रसूतेरूत्पत्तेः । कथम् ? | अवश्यम् । क्व सति ? । दुःखसंक्षये । सांसारिकं हि सर्व पुण्यफलमपि दुःखरूपतया समर्थितम्, ततः पापफलम्, इतरञ्च सबै दुःखमेवेहास्ति नान्यत्, तच मुक्तस्य क्षीणम् अतस्तत्संक्षयेऽवश्यंतया यत् तस्य निष्प्रतीकारं स्वाभाविकं निरुपमं सुखमुत्पद्यते तदेव तथ्यम् । कस्येव ? | विशिष्टज्ञानवतो sarबाधस्य मुनेरिव उक्तं च

" निर्जितमद-पदनानां वाक्काय- मनोविकार रहितानाम् । नितपराशानामिहेब मोक्षः सुविहितानाम् ॥ १ ॥
For Private Personal Use Only

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Vada ] Ganadharavāda
517 इति ॥ ४५९ ॥ (२००७)
D. C.-Happiness enjoyed by a mukla being is real, and is not based upon upacara, because it is naturally generated without any resistance. Like that of a learned sage, having no obstacle in his way, this sukha ts free from all sorts of miseris found in the mundane world.
It has been said, therefore, that, Nirjitamada-madanānam vāk kāya-manovikărarahitānām, Vinivșittaparāśānāmihaiva mokşah suvibitānām x 459 11 ( 2097 } }
Also, जह वा नाणमओऽयं जीवो नाणावघाइ चावरणं । करणमणुग्गहकारिं सवावरणक्खए सुद्धी ॥ ४६० ।। (२००८) तह सोक्खमओ जीवो पावं तस्सोवघाइयं नेयं । पुण्णमणुग्गहकारि सोक्खं सव्वक्खए सयलं ।। ४६१ ॥ (२००९) Jaha vă nāṇamao'yam jțvo nānovaghāi căvaraşam Karanamaéuggahakarim savvavaranakkhaé Suddhi 14601 (2008) Taha sokkhamaö jiva pāyam tassovaghāiyam néyam Pupgamanuggahakārim sokkham savvakkhae sayalam 1146111(2009) [ यथा वा ज्ञानमयोऽयं जीवो ज्ञानोपघाति चावरणम् ।
करणमनुग्रहकारि सर्वावरणक्षये शुद्धिः ॥४६० ॥ (२००८) तथा सौख्यमयो जीवः पापं तस्योपघातिकं ज्ञेयम् ।
पुण्यमनुग्रहकारि सौख्यं सर्वक्षये सकलम् ॥ ४६१ ॥ (२००९) Yathā vā jñānamayo'yam jiva, jņānopaghāti cāvaranam Karanamanugrahakari sarvavaranaksaye Suddhih || 460 ॥ (2008
Tathā saukhyamayo stvah păpam tasyopaghātikam jneyam Puộyamanugrahakări saukkhyamı sarvakşayé sakalam 1146 111(2009)

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518
Jinabhadra (ani's [The eleventh Trans --- 460-461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, ( any sort of ) interrnption is an obstacle to ( the apprehension of ) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful ( to it ) (and just as), at the destructiou of all interruptions, ( there is ) pure ( cognizance ), the soul is full of happiness, Sinful deed. is ( its ) obstruction, a virtuous deed is ( the ) helpfui ( elemant ) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect ( apprehension of, happiness. ( 2008-2009)
टीका व्याख्या-यथा वाऽनन्तज्ञानमयोऽसौ स्वरूपेण जीवः । तदीयमानस्य च मत्यावरणादिकमावरणमुपघातकं मन्तव्यम् । नरणानि विन्द्रियाणि राज्यानस्य, सूर्यातपस्य तदावारकमेघपटलच्छिद्राणीत्रोपकारकाणि । सर्वावरणक्षये तु मानशुद्धिनिर्मला सर्वथावभासकत्वलक्षणा भवति । मकुतयोजनामाह-तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वरूपतः स्वाभाविकानन्तसौख्यमयो जीवः, तस्य च मुखस्यैवोपघातकारकं पापकर्म विज्ञेयम् । पुण्यं त्वनुत्तरसूरपर्यन्त मुखफलं तस्य स्वाभाविक सुखस्यानुग्रहकारकम् । ततः सर्वावरणापगमे मष्टज्ञानमिव समस्तपुण्यपापक्षये सकलं परिपूर्ण निरुपचरितं निरुपम स्वाभाविकगनन्तं मुखं भवति विद्धस्येति ॥४६०-४६१॥ (२००८-२००९)
D. C...The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which Mati-;nāna etc. are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun--shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance.
Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which papa is the obstructive element, and punya the helping element, When all sorts of păpa and pupjā are removed, the muktālma attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions 1101 uparāras. ।। 460-461 ।। (2008-2009)
Or, जह वा कम्मक्श्वयओ सो मिसाइपरिणइं लभह । तह संसाराईयं पावह तसो चिय सुहं ति ॥४२॥ (२०१०)

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Vāda ]
Gaṇadharavāda
Jaha vā kammakkhayaö so siddhattāiparinaim labhai | Taha samsaraiyam pāvati tatto cciya suham ti | 462 || (1020)
[ यथा वा कर्मक्षयतः स सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते
तथा संसारातीतं प्राप्नोति तत एव सुखमिति || ४६२ || (२०१०)
Yathā vã karmaksayatah sæ siddhatvadiparinatim labhate I Tathā samsārātītam präpnoti tata éva sukhamiti 11 462 || (2010)]
519
Trans.-- 462 Just as it attains the form of siddhatva etc, on accouht of the destruction of Karma, it attains the celestial happiness also, due to the same reason. (2010)
टीका- यथा वा सकलकर्मक्षयादसौ मुक्तात्मा सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते, तत एव सकलकर्मक्षयात् संसारातीतं वैषयिकसुखाद् विलक्षणस्वरूपं निरुपमं तथ्यं सुखं प्राप्नोति । एतेन यदुक्तम्- " क्षीणपुण्यं - पापत्वेन कारणाभावाद् निःसुख-दुःखो मुक्तात्मा, व्योमबत् ” इत्येतदपि प्रत्युक्तं द्रष्टव्यम्, कारणाभावात् इत्यस्य हेतोरसिद्धत्वात्, सकलकर्मक्षयलक्षण कारणजन्यत्वेन सिद्धसुखस्य सकारणत्वादिति ||४६२ || (२०१०)
14
"
it
D. C.-Just as a muktātmā attains siddhatva etc when is free from the bondages of Karma, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So, your arguments that since muktātinā is free from papa-punya, it has no sukha-dahkha also, like sky, proves itself absolutely unfounded.
462 (2010)
the only
Now, in reply to the argument that "déha is agent of perceiving sukha-duhkha, the author states-साया--सायं दुक्खं तव्विरहम्मि य सुहं जओ तेणं । देहिं दिए दुक्खं सोक्खं देहिं दियाभावे || ४६३ ॥ (२०११) Sāyā'-sāyam dukkham tavvirahammi ýa suham jao teņam Dehin-diesu dukkham sokkham dehin-diyabhāve | 463 |
|

(2011)

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520
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ साता सातं दुःखं तद्विरहे च सुखं यस्तेन । देहेन्द्रियेषु दुःखं सौख्यं देहेन्द्रियाभावे ।। ४६३ ॥ (२०११) Sātā-'sātām duhkham tadvirahe ca sukham yatastena Déhé ndriyésu duḥkham saukhyam déhé-ndriyābhāvé ||463||(2011)]
[ The eleventh
Trans. - 463 Results of sinful and virtuous deeds, are anly distressful. And since happiness is ( attained ) in their absence, ( there is ) misery ( in case of ) body and sense organs existing, ( and ) ( there is ) happiness in absence of body and sense-organs. ( 2011 )
,
टीका- नतु यतू पुण्यफलं सातं सुखतया लोकव्यवहारतो रूढं तत् सर्व दुःखमेवेत्यनन्तरमेव समर्थितम् असावं तु पापफलत्वाद् निर्विवादं दुःखमेव । एवं च सति सर्व दुःखमेवास्ति संसारे, न सुखम् । तच्च दुःखं सिद्धस्य सर्वथा क्षीणम् । अस्तद्विरहे यद् यस्मात् सिद्धस्य स्वाभाविकं निरुपमम्, अनन्तं च युक्तिसिद्धमेत्र सुखम् तेन तस्मात् कारणात् पारिशेष्यन्यायात् संसारिणामेव जीवानां देहेन्द्रियेष्वाधारभूतेषु यथोक्तस्वरूपं दुःखम् सुखं तु देहेन्द्रियाभाव एव सिद्धस्य क्षीणनिःशेषसुख-दुःखत्वेन तस्य तत्र युक्तिसिद्धत्वादिति ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११)
9
D, C.—It has already been proved that even prunya-phatas are duḥkhamaya in this mundane world. And papa-thalas are undoubtedly dubkhamaya This shows that everything in this world is full of misery. This sort of duḥkha can nover
affect muktātmās.
Muktktma being free from such duḥkhas, enjoys perfect and infinite happiness showing there-by that duḥkha exists only where déha and indriyas exist; and real sukha is always found in a siddha being who is free from déha and indriyas, 11463 (2011)
Or,
जा वा देहि-दियजं सुहमिच्छह तं पडुच दोमोयं ।
संसाराईयमिदं धम्मंतरमेव सिद्विमहं ॥ ४६४ ॥ ( २०१२ )

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Vada ] Casadharavāda
521 Jo va dénin-diyajam suhamicchai tam paducca doso'yami Samsaraiyamidam dhammantarameva siddhisuham || 464 ।। (2013)
[यो वा देहे-न्द्रियज मुखमिच्छति तं प्रतीत्य दोषोऽयम् ।
संसारातीतमिदं धर्मान्तरमेव सिद्धिसुखम् ॥ ४६४॥ (२०१२) Yo vă dehe-ndriyajam sukhanicchati tam pratitya dosi'yami Sainsárătitamidam dharmāntaraméva siddhisukham #46411 (2012)
Trans.-464 Or, according to one who relieves in the happiness (afforded) by hody and sense alone, this (may involve) a difficulty. But this celestial happiness is far above the mundane world, and has ( perfectly ) different characteristics. ( 2012 )
टीका-यो वा कश्चित् संसाराभिनन्दी मोहम्ढः परभार्थदशी विषयामिषमात्रगद्धो देहेन्द्रियजमेव मुखं मन्यते, न तु सिद्धिसुखम्, तस्य तेन स्वमेऽप्यदर्शनात् , तस्य वादिनः संसारविपक्षे मोक्षे प्रमाणतः साधिते सति " निःसुखः, सिद्धः, देहे-न्द्रियामावात्" इत्ययं दोषो भवेत्। न त्वस्माकं संसारानीतं पुण्य-पापफलमुख-दुःखाभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणं धर्मान्तरमेवाऽनुपममक्षयं निरुपचरितं सिद्धिमुखमिच्छतामिति ॥४६४।। (२०१२)
D. C. According to one who is disillusioned by the infatuation of this mundane world and its sensuous pleasures, the happiness of déha and indriyas would be the only happiness and there would be nothing like mokşa-rukha in his view-point. lle would, therefore, find fault with our belief by saying that muktālmā. can never experience sukha as it has no dėha and indriyas.
But those like us, who recognize the existeuce of muktātma aand its uncomparable infinte happiness, understand that moksa sukhz being samsārā'ita, has absolutely different characteristics and hence, there is no dosa. ॥ 464 ॥ (2012)
Here again, there is a question and its replsकह नणुमेयं ति भई नागा-णाबाहउ त्ति नणु भणियं । तदणिचं गं पिय चेयणधम्मो त्ति रागो व्च ॥ ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)
66

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522
Jinabhadra Gani's.
[ The eleventh
Kaha nanu méyam ti maî naņā--'ņābīеau tti naņu bhaniyam 1. Tadapiccam nānam pi ya ceyanadhammo tti rāgoavv ||4651 (2013)
[ कथं ननु मेयमिति मतिर्ज्ञाना-नाबाधत इति ननु मणितम् । तदानित्यं ज्ञानमपि च चेतनधर्म इति राग इव || ४६५ || (२०१३) Katham nanu mèyamiti matiriṇānā—'nībādhata iti nanu bhaṇitam Tadānityam jnānamapi ca cetanadharma iti raga iva ॥ 455 1 (2013)]
Trans. -- 465 ( The question may be that }, " How could it really be taken like that? (The reply is)-" It has alredy been said that (it is so ) on account of the uninterrupted cognizance." Then, even cognizance being a quality of consciousness, it will be a nitya like affection. ( 2013 )
1
टीका - अत्रैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत् नन्विच्छन्ति भवन्तः सिद्धस्य यथोक्तं सुखम्, किन्तु नेच्छामात्रतो वस्तुसिद्धिः, अपि तु प्रमाणतः, ततो येन प्रमाणेन तत् सिध्यति तद् वक्तव्यम् । अनुमानेन तदनुमीयत इति चेत् । तर्हि केनानुमानेन तदनुमेयत्- अनुमीयत इत्यर्थः ? इत्याह-- "नाणा - ऽणा बाहउ ति नणु भणियं ति " ननु भणितमत्रार्थे मागनुमानम् - सिद्धस्य प्रकृष्टं सुखम्, ज्ञानत्वे सत्यनाबाधत्वात् मुनिवदिति । पुनरपि परः प्राहयद्येवम्, तनित्यं सुखं ज्ञानं च सिद्धस्य चेतनधर्मत्वात् रागवदिति ॥। ४६५ ।। ( २०१३ )
D. C.-Frabhasa:-With what pramāna or anumana do you establish the existence of the above-mentioned moksasukha?
+
Bhagavana:--The auumana has already been stated that, like a sage, a muktāṭmā enjoys perfect happiness by virtue of its uninterrupted cognizance.
Prabhāsa:—In that case, as happiness and cognizance on, the part of a free soul are cétana-dharmas, they would be a-nitya like rāga | 465 ।। ( 2013 )
There is another inference also.

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Vada ] Gandharavada
523 कयगाइभावओ वा नावरणा-ऽऽधाहकारणाभाव । उपाय-द्विइ भङ्गस्सहावओ वा न दोसोऽयं ॥४६६।। (२०१४) Kayagồibhavab vã năvaranaobxhakāranābhāva . Uppāya-tthii-bhangassahāvai vā na doso'yam ॥ 466।। (2014) [कृतकादिभावतो वा नावरणा-ऽऽबाधकारणाभावात् । उत्पाद-स्थिति-भास्वभावतो वा न दोषोऽयम् ॥४६६॥ (२०१४)
Kritakădibhāvato vā nāvaraņā”bhādhakāranābhāvāt i Utpada-sthiti-bhangasvabhāvato vã na dogo'yam 1146611 ( 2014 )]
Trans.--. 466 " Or, is it a-nutya because of ( its ) being factitious etc ?" It is not so, as there is no cause for ( the production of ) obstacles and interruptions. Or, this fault , of a-nityată ) does not arise ( at all ), on account of its nature of being susceptible to production, retention, and destruction." (2014)
टीका- अथवा, अनित्ये सिद्धस्य मुख-ज्ञाने, तपःमभृतिकष्टानुष्ठानेन क्रियमाणन्वान्, आदिशब्ददभूतप्रादुर्भावात, घटवदिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह"नावरणेत्यादि " न सिद्धस्यानित्ये ज्ञान-सुखे । कुतः ? । आवरणं चाया पश्चावरणा-ऽऽवाधी, तयोः कारणं हेतुम्तस्याऽभावात्, आकाशवदिति । इदमुक्तं भवति-सिद्धस्य ज्ञानं सुखं च यद्यपगच्छेत् तदा स्यादनित्यम्, अपगमश्च ज्ञानस्यावरणोदयात, सुखस्य त्वाबाधहेतुभूतादसातवेदनोयोदयादिकारणाद् भवेत् : यावरग-वेदनीयादीनि च मिथ्यत्वादिभिर्बन्धहेतुमिबंध्यन्ते, ते च सिद्धस्य न विद्यन्ते, ततस्तदभावाद् नावरणा-ऽऽबाधाकारणसद्भावः, तदमावाच्च न सिद्धम्य ज्ञान-मुखापगमः, तदसत्वे च तयोः तदाऽवस्थिति त्वात् कथमनित्यत्वम् ? । न च चेतनधर्माः सर्वेऽप्यनित्या भवन्ति, जीवगतद्रव्यत्वा-ऽमूतत्वादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् । ततश्च “चेतनधर्मत्वात्" इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः । तथा, कृतकत्वादिरप्यनकान्तिकः घटप्रध्वंसाभावेन व्यभिचारात् । असिदश्वायम्, सिद्धस्य ज्ञानसुखयोः स्वामाविकत्वेन कतकत्वा घयोगात्, आवारणा-ऽऽबाधकारभावेन च तत्तिरोमानमात्रमेव निवर्तते, न पुनस्ते क्रियेते, पटायिवत्। नाप्यभूते प्रादुर्भवतः, विद्युदादिवत् येन तयोर

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[ The eleventh
नित्यत्वं स्यात् । न हि घनपटळापगमे चन्द्रज्योत्स्नाया. सूर्यममाया वा तिरोभावमात्रनिवृत्तौ कृतकत्वम्, अभूतप्रादुर्भावो वा वक्तुं युज्यत इति ।
सुखे
अथ तेनाविर्भूतेन विशिष्ठेन रूपेण कृतकत्वादनित्ये सिद्धस्य ज्ञानप्रतिक्षण च पर्यायरूपतया ज्ञेयविनाशे ज्ञानस्य विनाशात्, सुखस्यापि मतिसमयं परापररूपेण परिणामादेतयौर नित्यत्वमुच्यते । तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, इति दर्शयति-" उपाय - द्विईत्यादि" इत्थमात्माऽऽकाश - घटादिरूपस्य सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य स्थित्युत्पाद- प्रलयस्वाभाव्याभ्युपगमात् । सिद्धसुख ज्ञानयोरपि कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वाद् नायं तदनित्यत्वापत्तिलक्षणो ऽस्माकं दोप इति ॥ ४६६ ।। (२०९४)
D. C. Prabhāsa:--Jnāna and sukha of a siddha being. are a-nitya firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production, like ghata.
Bhagavāna:--Your argument is absolutely
unfounded. Q Prabhāsa! Jnana and sukha of a muktātmā would be a nitya only if they vanished. By means of jñānāvaraņas, jñāno would be obscurad and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, sukha would vanish. Both these obstructions jñānāvaragas and papa-karmas are bound by the hétus of mithyatva etc, muktātmā being free from such hétus, it is free from jñāuāvaraṇas and papa-karmas also. Consequently, its jnana and sukha do not meet destruction, and hence they are never called a-nitya.
Secondly, all the qualities of cétana are not a-nilya Dravyatva and a-mūrtatva are nitya. Therefore, the argument that jñana and sukha are a-nitya because they happen to be cétana-dharmas, is anékāntika Similarly, the hétu of kṛitakatva etc is also anékäntika. Indestructiblity of ghaţa is a-siadha inspite of its being kitaka. This hétu is a siddha also, because jnana and sukha of a siddha being, are natural. Since there is no reason for the existence of avaranas and badhas, that which is in obscuri, becomes manifest Thus, they are not factitious

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like ghata etc. nor are they produced like lightning etc. The moon-light and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced, when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way.
Still however, jñana and sukha of a muktatma could easily be considered as a-mutya by virtue of their being kritaka. Because, at every time, when jheya vanishes, jñana is also vanishing and sukha also comes into existence in various forms at various times So, there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be a-nitya to a certain extent, as all objects like soul, sky, ghata, and papa etc are susceptible to upada, vyaya and dhraya after all. ॥ 466 ॥ (2014)
Establishing the existence of mokṣa and mokṣa-sukha by the help of Veta-vacanas, the author proceeds
नह वह ससरीरस्य पिय-ऽपियावहतिरेवमादि व जं । तमोक्खे नासम्म व सोक्खाभावम्मि व न जुत्तं ||४६७॥ (२०१५) Na ha vai sasarirassa ppiya'-ppiyāvahatir évamādi va jam ī Tadamokkhè nāsammi va sokkhābliavammi va na juttam 467 [ न ह वै सशरीस्य प्रिया - मियापहतिरेवमादि वा यत् ।
तदमोक्षे नाशे वा सौख्याभावे वा न युक्तम् ।। ४६७ || (२०१५) Na ha vai sa-sarîrasya priyā-priyāpahatirévamādi vā yatı Tadamoksē nāśē vā saukhyabhāve vā na yuktam
467 || (2015) 1 Trans ---467 (The sentence of Vedas that ) “One having body has no likes and dislikes ttc" would become worthless in ( case of) accepting the negation or destruction of mokṣa and absence of absolute) happiness. (2015)
"
टीका- "न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया ऽभिययोर पहतिरस्ति" "अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृशतः " इति च यद् वेदोक्तम्, तदप्यमोक्षे मोक्षाभाव - जीव-कर्मणोवियोगेऽनभ्युपगम्यमान इत्यर्थः तथा “ मतिरपि न प्रज्ञायते " इति वचनाद् मुक्तावस्थायां सर्वथा नाशे वा जीवस्याभ्युपगम्यमाने, सच्चैवामुक्तात्मनः सुखाभात्र इष्यमाणेन युक्तं माझोति- अभ्युपगमविरोधस्तवेत्यर्थः । अनेन हि वाक्येन किक यथोक्तो मोक्षः, मुक्तौ च निष्कर्मणो
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Jinabhadra Gani's [ l'he eleventh जीवस्य सत्त्वम्, निरुपममुखं च तस्य, एतानि त्रीण्यप्यभ्युपगम्यन्ते । एतच्च पुरस्ताद व्यक्तीकरिष्यते । ततोऽस्य त्रितयस्य निषेधं कुर्वतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति भावः ॥ ४६७ ।। (२०१५)
___D. C.--The sentences of Vedas such as " Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya'-priyayo-rapahatîrastz" and " Asariram vã vasantam priya'privé na spreśataḥ " etc would prove themselves futile if the existence of moksa, jiva, and mokşa-sukha were denied. Because, the existence of mokşa -separating jiv.: and Karma from each other-existence of pure soul in the mukta state and the attainment of perfect and infinite happiness by a mukta being, have already been established by the Véda-padas. ।। 467 ॥ (2015)
The opponent then asksनट्ठो असरीरो चिय सुह-दुक्खाई पिय-ऽपियाई च। ताई न फुसंति नहुं फुडमसरीरं ति को दोसो ? || ४६८ !! (२०१६) Nattho a-sariro cciya suha-dukkhaiin piya-ppiyaim cal Táim na phusanti nattham phudamasariram ti ko doso? 1146811(2016) [ नष्टोऽशरीर एव सुख-दुःखे मिया-ऽपिये च ।।
ते न स्पृशतो नष्टं स्फुटमशरीरमिति को दोषः ? ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१५) Nasto'sarira eva sukha-duhkhe priya'priye ca । Té na spriśato sastam sphutamaśāriramiti ko doşah ? 1146811(2016)
Trans.----458 One who is dead, is bodiless. Happiness and niisery likes and dislikes do not touch him. ( Then ) what harm is there in taking a bodiless person to have been distinctly destroyed ? ( 2016 )
___टीका-" न ह वै०" इत्यादिवेदवाक्यस्य किक परोऽमुमर्थ मन्यते-- शरीरसर्वनाशेन नष्टः खरविषाणकल्प एवोच्यते, समेवंभूतम् शरीरं नष्टं प्रियापिये सुख-दुःखे यद् न स्पृशतः, तत् स्फुटमेव बुध्यत एवेदम्, नष्टस्य सुख-दुःखस्पर्शायोगात्, अशरीरशन्देन च जीवनाशाभिधानात् । एवंभूते • चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे मुमुक्षुजीवस्य निर्वाणपदीपस्येव सर्वनाशमभ्युपगच्छता कोऽस्माकमभ्युपगविरोधलक्षणो दोषः ?-न कश्चिदपीति पराभिप्राय इति ॥ ४६८ ।। (२०१६)

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D. C.-Prabhasa:-Since a bodiless person is absolutely perished, it is not-existent like khara-sṛnga. It is, therefore, clear that such bodiless persons are not affected by happiness or misery, and likes or dislikes. Consquently, ihere would be no harm in accepting the absolute destruction of a soul which has attained mokṣa. 1463 (2016)
";
In reply to this, Bhagavan explains the real interpretation or the Véda-padas such as "Na ha var etc and proceeds वेयवयाण य अत्थं न सुष्ठु जाणसि इमाण तं सुणसु । असरीरंsaavat अघणो व्य सओ निहाओ || ४६९ ॥ (२०१७) ननिसेहओ य अन्नम्मि तव्विहे चेव पच्चओ जेण । तेणासरीरग्गहणे जुत्तो जीवो न खरसिंगं ॥ ४७० || (२०१८) Véyavayāņa ya attham na sutthu jāņasi imāņa tam suyasu Asariravvavaéso adhaņo vva sao niséhão 469 ( 2017 ) Naniséha ya annammi tavvihé céva paccao jéņa Teṇāsarîraggahane jutto jivo na kharasingam 470 (2018) [ वेदपदानां चार्थे न सुष्ठु जानास्येषां तं श्रृणु ।
अशरीरव्यपदेशोsधन इत्र सतो निषेधात् ॥ ४६९ ॥ (२०१७) ननिषेधतश्चान्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एव प्रत्ययो येन ।
"
तेनाशरीरग्रहणे युक्तो जीवो न खरशृङ्गम् ॥। ४७० || (२०१८) Veda- padānām cārtham na suṣṭhu jānāsyeṣām tam śruņu | Asariravyapadeśo'dhanā iva sato niṣeehat | 469 || ( 2017 ) ] Nanniṣédhatascanyasminstadvidha eva pratyayo yeha Téāśarîragrahanè yukto jivo na kharasṛigam 470 ( 2018 )] Trans.--469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of Védas. It is this. Hear please. Like a-dhana, the word a-sarira is meant to denote the negation of an existent object. By means of ) negation, due to 'na,' (its) existence would be found in another of the same type. In understanding. the word 'a-sarira', it is better, therefore, to accept ( the existence of ) jiva and not ( its non-existence like) hharaśṛiga (2017-2018 )
टीका -- आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! न केवलं युक्तिम्, वेदपदानाममीषामर्थ
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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh च त्वं सुष्टु न जानासि, ततस्तं शृणु “ न ह वै०, इत्यादि पूर्वाध सुगमत्वादत्र गाथाद्वये न व्याख्यातम्, तदपि सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं व्याख्यायते-'न' इति निपातो निषेधार्थः । 'ह' वै' इत्येतदपि निपातद्वयं हिशब्दार्थत्वाद् यस्मादर्थे । सह शरीरेण वर्तत इति सशरीरो जीवस्तस्य सशरीरस्येत्यत्रैवकारो द्रष्टव्यः । ततश्चायपर्थः-यस्मात् सशरीरस्य जीवस्य पिया-ऽपिययोः सुखदुःखयोरपहतिर्विघातोऽन्तरं नास्ति, न त्वशरीरस्य; तस्मादशरीरं शरीररहितं मुक्त्यवस्थायां वसन्तं लोकान्तस्थितं जीवं प्रिया-ऽपिये सुख-दुःखे न स्पृशतः। इदमुक्तं भवति-यावदयं जीवः सशरीरः, तावत् सुखेन दुःखेन वाऽन्यतरेण कदाचिदपि न मुच्यते; अशरीरस्त्तसौ क्षीणवेदनीयत्वात् सुखदुःखाभ्यां कदाचिदपि न स्पृश्यत इति । एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे सति योऽयमशरीरव्यपदेशः, असौ सत एव विद्यमानस्यैव जीवस्य मुक्त्यवस्थायां विधीयते, न तु सर्वथा नष्टस्य । कुतः ? इत्याह-निषेधात् । इह यो यस्य निषेधः स तस्य सत एव विधीयते, न त्वसतः, यथाऽधन इति, अत्र सत एव देवदत्तस्य धननिषेधो विधीयते, न त्वसतः खरविषाणस्य ।
__ आह-न विद्यते शरीरं यस्येत्येवं निषेधादन्यपदार्थे जीव एव कथं प्रतीयते? इत्याह-" ननिसेहओ य इत्यादि " व्याख्यातो विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः पर्युदासवृत्तिना नत्रा निषेधो नग्निषेधस्तस्माद् नग्निषेधात् कारणात् सशरीरादन्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एव शरीरसदृशे कस्मिंश्चिदन्यपदार्थे संपत्ययो विज्ञेयः, यथा "न ब्राह्मणोऽबाह्मणः" इत्युक्ते बाह्मणसदृशः क्षत्रियादिरेव गम्यते, न तु तुच्छरूपोऽभावः । उक्तंच-" नजिवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे लोके तथा बर्थगतिः" इति । इह च शरीरसदशोऽशरीरो जीव एव गम्यते, द्वयोरप्यु पयोगरूपत्वेन सदृशत्वात् । न चेह शरीरं सादृश्यबाधकम्, तस्य जीवेन सह क्षीर-नोरन्यायतो लोलीभूतत्वेनैकत्वादिति । तदेवं येन यस्मात् कारणात् नन्निषेधादन्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एवान्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो भवति, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् " अशरीरं वा वसन्तं " इत्यत्राशरीरमाणे जीव एवाशरीरो युज्यते, न तु खरविषाणं तुच्छरूपोऽभाव इत्यर्थः। तदेवमशरीरमिति व्याख्यातम् ।। ४६९-४७० ॥ (२०१७-२०१८)
D. C.-Bhagavāna:--0 Prabhāsa | Really you do not understand the proper meaning of the sentences such as “Va

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Vada ] Canadharavada
521 ha vai" etc. In this sentence, the particle cra' denotes negation, and the particles 'ha' and 'vai' are used in the ablative sense." Sa -sarirasya " means to a soul having a body, and " priya-priyayorapahatirasti” denotes the destrution of happiness and misery. The whole sentence will be interpreted as follows:
Jiva being possessed of a body, has abhāva of sukhoduḥkha. In the same way, Jiva existing in a bodiless state of mokşa, never undergoes snkha-dunkha i. e. As long as soul is encompassed in a body, it has to undergo szukha-dunkha, but as the bodiless muktātmā is free from Karma-good or bad-it is never affected by sukha-duhkha.
In the word “ a-śārira " here, there is a negation of the body and not of the soul. In the expression “ Adhano Dévadattah " the riches are denied to the vidyamānd Dévadatta and not to an a-vidhamāna kharaśpiga. Similarly, here also, the existence of soul is not denied, but only that of body is denied. That which is denied must belong to an existent source, and not to a non-existent source.
Prabhāsa:How could it be believed that which is denied at one place must be found at another
Bhagavāna:- Just as by the word "na-brāhmana' a nonbrahınin like a kşatriya or a varśya is understood, but the absolute abhāva of Brahmaņa as a whole, is not meant. So also, the expression "a-sarira" signifies a bodiless mukta siva of the type of mukta jîva having body, but that does not absolute'y deny the existence of soul. There is resemblance in both owing to the common property of upacara
Moreover, "sarira" does not come in the way of resemblance. As body is mixed with soul like milk and water, it is one and the same, as soul. Thus, by the denial of the particle 'na', the same soul is apprehended at another place, but the existence of soul is never denied thereby. So, the word 'a--Sarira' denotes nothing but jiva which is vidya māna like Dévadatta, and not a-vidyamāna like kharas'rniga, 11 469-470 41 (2017-2018)
67.

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[ The eleventh The expression “Va rasantam" is now explainedim जं व वसंतं संतं तमाह वासद्दओ सदेहं पि। न फुसेज वीयरायं जोगिणपिटे-यरविसेसा ॥४७१॥ (२०१९) Jam va vasantam santam tamāha vàsddaö sadeham pi Na phusėjja viyarāyam joginamithé pãravisesă į 171!1 (2019) [यद वा वसन्तं सन्तं तमाह वाशब्दतो सदेइमपि ।
न स्पृशेयुर्वीतराग योगिनमिष्टे-तरविशेषाः ॥४७१।। (२०१९) Yad vă vāsantam santam tamāha yasabdato sadéhamapi Na sprséyu-r-vitaragam yuginamisté-taravisesab ॥47111 (2019)]
Trans.--471 Happiness and misery do not affect him who is existing in a free state and also by the word "Vã (they do not affect) a dispassionate ascetic having a body ( 2019 )
टीका-यस्माचशरीरम् । कथंभूतम् ? । वसन्तं लोकाने निवसन्तं विष्ठन्तमिति यावत् । अनेन बसनविशेषणेन तमशरीरशब्दावाच्चमर्थ सन्तं विद्यमानमाह, न त्वसद्भूतम्, वमनस्य सद्धर्मत्वात् । तस्मात् कथं जीवनाशरूपं निर्वाणं स्यात् ?, न केवलमशीरं मुक्तम्, किन्नु वाशब्दात् सदेहमपि शरीरमपि वीतरागं-क्षीणोपशममोहयोगिनं परमसमाधिमन्तं भवस्थमपि न स्पृशेयुः । के ? । इष्टे-तरविशेषा सुख-दुःखभेदा इत्यर्थः।।४७१॥ (२०१९)
D. C.-A bodiless mukła being is not affected by the sukha-dubkha bhédas. The word va includes dispassionate ascetics having bodies. 11 471 ! (2019)
Also, वाव त्ति वा निवाओ वासदत्यो भवंतमिह संतं । खुज्माऽव ति व संतं नाणाइविसिट्ठमवाह ॥४७२।। (२०२०) Văva tti vā niváő vásaddattho bhavantmiha santam "Bujjhava tti va santana nānaivisitthamahavāha ॥ 472 ॥ ( 2020 )
[वावेति वा निपातो वाशब्दार्थों भवन्तमिह सन्तम् ।
बुध्यस्वाऽवेति वा सन्तं ज्ञानादिविशिष्टमथवाऽथ ||४७२।। (२०२०) Vāveti vä uipăto vāśabdártho bhavantamiha santam 1 Budhyasvā'véti vã santam jňınádivisistainathavā'tha 1147211 (2020)
Trans . . 472 Or, "rara" is a particle meaning "Or", and

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Vada | Ganadharavāda
531 'santam' means a soul exisitng ( in the mukta statc ). Or, take ava' as a particle and 'santam' meaning ( a soul ) characterised by the qualities of, knowledge, etc. (2020)
टोका-'वा' इत्यथवा, ‘वाव' इत्यय शब्दो निपातः, स च वाशब्दार्थः । ततश्चाशरोरं सन्तं भवन्तं मुक्तौ विद्यमानं जीवं प्रीया-ऽमिये न स्पृशतः, वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतरागं न ते स्पृशतः । यदिवा, 'वसन्तम् ' इत्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते-" बुज्ज्ञाऽव त्ति वेत्यादि" " वा " इत्यथवाऽयमर्थः । " वाव संतं ति" रक्षण-गति-प्रोत्यादिवेकोनविंशतावर्थेष्ववधातुः पठ्यते । गत्यर्थाश्च धातवो ज्ञानार्था अपि भवन्ति । ततश्चाहविनेय ! बमेवं बुध्यस्व ! किं तत् ? इत्याह-अशरीरं मुक्त्यवस्थायां विद्यमानं जीवम् अथवा, ज्ञानादिभिर्गुणविशिष्टं सन्तमित्याह ब्रूते, प्रियाऽपिये न स्पृशतः: वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतरागमिति तथेवेति ॥ ४७२ ॥ (२०२०)
(.-The expression “ za vasantam could be dissolved as t'az'ı cantan the particle väva meaning "or" and santam meaning a bodiless jiva existing in the moksa state. The word vāra here, will signify that sukha-dvḥkha do not touch not only a bodiless jiva existing in a moksa state, but also the dispassionate ascetics having bodies.
Or, the expression could be dissolved as vã ava santam also. The prefix az'a has nineteen differənt meanings such as to protect, to go, to love etc. Since a root signifying motion signifies knowledge also, a bodiless soul existing in the mukta state, and characterized by the qualities of cognizance etc, is not affected by sukha-duhkha Here also, the word 'va' brings in the dispassionate sa-déha ascetic. 1 472॥ ( 2020 )
The opponent asks न वसंतं अवसंतं ति वा मई नासरीरगहणाओ। फुसणाविसेसणं पि य जओ मयं संतविसयं ति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१) Na vasantam a-vasantam ti vă mai năsariragahanao Phusarāvisésapam pi ya jaö mayam santavisayam ti 11473W (2021)

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532
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ न वसन्तमवसन्तमिति वा मतिर्नाशरीरग्रहणात् । स्पर्शनाविशेषणमपि च यतो मतं सद्विषयमिति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१)
ܕ
16 na vasantam rics
Na vasantamavasadtamiti va matirnāśarîragrahaṇāti Sparśanāviśesanamapi ca yato matam sadvisayamiti 4731 (2021) ] Trans. - 473 Or, it may be dissolved as avasantam meaning thereby not existing ( anywhere ) ' ( But ) it is not proper. ( Since ) jîva is understood from a sarira, Moreover, the adjectivesparśana' is also accepted with regard to existent objects ( only ). ( 2021 )
6
66
"
टीका - " अशरीरं वाबसन्तं " इत्यत्र लुप्तस्याकारस्य दर्शनाद् “न वसन्तमवसन्तं क्वाप्यतिष्ठन्तम् ” इति व्याख्यानतो नास्ति मुक्त्यवस्थायां जीवः, क्वाप्यवसनात्, असत्त्वादेव च नामुं प्रिया-प्रिये स्पृशत इति परस्य मतिर्भवेत् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह- अशरीरग्रहणात् । एतदुक्तं भवति'न विद्यते शरीरं यस्य इत्यत्र पर्युदासनिषेधात् पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या मुक्त्यवस्थायामशरीरो जीवो गम्यते, इत्यतोऽत्राकारमश्लेषव्याख्यानं कर्तुं न पार्यते, अशरीरग्रहणाद मुक्तौ जीवसिद्धेः । किञ्च, 'पिया - ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः ' इवि यदशरीरस्य स्पर्शनाविशेषणं तदपि यस्मात् सद्विषयमेव मतम्, तस्माद् न मुक्त जीवस्याभावः । यदि शरीरशब्दस्य जीवाभावो वाच्यः स्यात् तदा तं प्रिया - sप्रिये न स्पृश्चत इति विशेषणमनर्थकं स्यात् । न हि वन्ध्यापुत्रं प्रिया - ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इति विशेष्यमाणं विराजते । तस्माद मुक्त्यवस्थो जीव एवाशरीरशब्दवाच्यः, न पुनस्तदभावः । ततो नाकारमश्लेषव्याख्यानं युष्यत इति । तदेवं "अशरीरं वा वसन्तं" इत्यनेन जीवकार्मणशरीरवियोगलक्षण:स्य मोक्षस्य मुक्तजीवसत्त्वस्य चाभिधानात् तनिषेधं कुर्बतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध एवेति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (१०२१)
66
[The eleventh
For Private Personal Use Only
as
D. C. - Prabhāsa: – If you can dissolve the expression done above, I can also dissolve the expression at my will, and pull the meaning in my favour. This, in no way, leads to esta blish the existence of mokṣa. For, by dissolving a-s'ariram va vasantam as 'sa-ariram va a-vasantam' I can interpret it as a bodiless ( soul ) not existing at any place, and thus prove jea to be absent from muktāvasthu, proving thereby, the the negation of moksa as well as jiva,

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Văda ]
Gaṇadharavāda
Bhagavana:--Your interpretation does not fit in properly. By interpreting 'a sariri' as one having no body, vidyamānatı of jiva in the muktavastha is clearly understood. It is 1101 proper, therefore, to interpret it in another way by prefixing "a".
Secondly, in the sentence "Sukha-duḥkhe na spriśalah" sparsana becomes the adjective of 'asarira'. If a-sarira' were meant to denote the negation of soul, the adjective would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertion like "Sukha-duḥkha do not affect the vandhyaputra. The adjective, therefore, is befitting a-sara' only if it
means
mukta-jiva ". Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as * và a-vasantam is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper. This proves the existence of mokṣa, which separates jiva and karmana śarîza, and that oi mukta jivu also. If the existence of jiva were denied, Vėda-vaianas would prove worthless as shown above. | 473 || (2021)
86
6
ا,
The opponent said
एवं पि होज मुत्तो निस्सुह- दुक्खत्तणं तु तदवत्थं । तं नो पिय-ऽप्पियाई जम्हा पुणे-यरकयाई ||४७४ || (२०२२) trisहसणओ न फुसति वीयराग-दोसस्स । तस्स पियमप्पियं वा मुक्तसुहं को पसंगोऽत्थ १ || ४७५|| (२०१३)

533
Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattanam tu tdaavattham I Tam no piya-'ppiyaim jamhā punné-yarakayaim | 474 (2022 Nāṇā'bāhattaṇaö na phusanti vīyarāya-dosassa i Tasya ppiyamppiyam vā muttasuham ko pasango'ttha ? | 475 [ एवमपि मवेद् मुक्तो निःसुख-दुःक्खत्वं तु तदवस्थम् ।
तद् नो प्रिया - प्रिये यस्मात् पुण्ये - तरकृते ॥ ४७४ ॥ (२०२२) ज्ञानाsनाबाधत्वतो न स्पृशतो वीतराग द्वेषस्य ।
axa fquafaá a gagå m: qaytsa ? 11804|| (2627) ||
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534
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh Evampi bhavéd mukto nibsukha-duḥkhatvam tu tadavasthami Tad no priya'-priyé yasmāt punye-tarakxite 1 474 ॥ ( 2022 ) ] Jřānā'nābādhatvato na sprišato vitarāga-dvéşasyai Tasya priyamapriyam vā muktasukham kaḥ prasango'tra? 11475.1
Trans.-474-475. Such being a mukta soul, it will have no happiness and misery. ( But ) it is not ( so ), as likes and dislikes, are produced from sinful or virtuous deeds. Moreover, likes and dislikes cannot affect a dispassionate person) owing to his ( high ) knowledge and irresistability. He enjoys natural and perfect happiness. So, what is the sense in asserting the negation of happiness ? ( 2022-2023 )
टीका-एवमुक्तप्रकारेण मुक्तो जीवो भवेदित्यकामैरप्यभ्युपगतमस्मामिा, तथा च सति जीवस्य कर्मवियोगलक्षणो मोक्षः, तत्र जीवसत्त्वं च सिद्धम् । यत्तु निःमुख-दुःखत्वं सिद्धस्य मया प्रेरितं तत् "मिया-ऽभिये अशरीरं न स्पृशतः" इति वचनात् तदवस्थमेव । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तदेतद् न, यस्मात् पुण्य-पापकर्मजनिते एव जीवानां पिया-ऽपिये सांसारिकसुख-दुःखे भवतः । ते च तं क्षीणनि शेषपुण्य-पापकर्माण सकलसंसारार्णवपारमा मुक्तात्मानं न स्पृशत इत्युत्तरगाथायां संवन्धः । न चैतावता तस्य निःमुख'स्वमिति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । कतः ? इत्याह-"नाणेत्यादि" मानत्वे सत्य
नावाधरूपत्वादियः । यच तद् मुक्तस्य मुखं मुक्तमुखं स्वाभाविक 'निष्पतीकारं निरुपमं च । “मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं जाणा-ऽणाबाहओ जहा मुणिणो" इत्यादिना मागेव साधितम्, तत् तस्य वीतराग-द्वेषस्य मुक्तात्मनो न पियं न पुण्यजनितं मुखं भण्यते, न चामियं न पापजनितं दुःख भण्यत्ते, किन्त्वेताभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणम्, अकर्मजनितत्वेन स्वामाविकत्वात्, निष्पतीकाररूपत्वात्, निरुपमत्वात्, अमविपावित्वाति ।।
अथ “को पसंगोऽत्य ति" " अक्षरीरं पिया-ऽपिये न स्पृशतः" इत्युक्ते कोऽत्र मुक्तात्मनि मुक्तसुखामावप्रसनः ?-न कधिदित्यर्थः, पुण्यपापजनितमिया-ऽपिययोरमावे तस्य सुतरामेव भावात् । तस्मात् "न ह वै सशरीरस्य." इत्यादिवेदपदैर्ययोत्तनीत्या जीव-कार्मणशरीरविरहलक्षणो मोक्षः, मुक्तावस्थस्य च जीवस्य सत्वम्, तथा, " अशरीरं मिया-ऽपिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यतोऽपि वचनात् पुण्य-पापक्षयसमुत्थं स्वामाविकम्, अमविपाति

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Vada ] Gaŋadharavada
535 मुखं चास्य, इत्येतत्रितयं सिद्धम् । अत एतदनभ्युपगच्छतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति स्थितम् ।
यदपि “जरामय वैतत् सर्वं यदमिहोत्रम्" इत्येतस्माद वाक्याद् मोक्षहेतुक्रियारम्भयोग्यकालाभावाद् मोक्षाभावं शङ्कसे तदप्ययुक्तम्, तदर्थापरिज्ञानात् । तस्य यमर्थः-यदेवदग्निहोत्रं तद् यावज्जीवं सर्वमपि कालं कर्तव्यम्, वाशदाद मुमुक्षुभिर्मोक्षहेतुभूतमप्यनुपानं विवेयमिति । इत्येवं वेदपदोंक्तद्वारेण युक्तिभिश्व प्रसाधितो मोक्षः । छिमश्च प्रभासस्य तत्संशयः ॥ ४७४-५७५ ॥ (२०२२-२०२३)
D. C.--Prabhasa:-I grant the extent of muktātma, moksa. and soul as such. But according to the Véda-vacanıs that siddha beings are free from happiness and misery, likes and dislike will not affect tie bediless soul; consequently, a muktātmd will have no experience of happiness.
Bhagavāna. -- Priya and a-priya and hence sukha änd duḥkha are produced by punya-pāpas from which mnktālmā is free. But this in no way, means that muktālmā has no scope for the experience of happiness. Since muktātmā is highly cognizant and perfectly irresistible, owing to its being free from rāga-dvéşa, it enjoys the highest and most natural happiness which never vanishes.
Or, it is no use discussing about the negation of happiness to a mukta being, by saying that likes and dislikes do not affect the bodiless. Muktātmã will thus have no experience of the mundane sukha-duhkha, because it is always free from likes and dislikes Thus, the sentences of Vedas such as Na ha vai sa-s'arirasya etc establish, O blessed Prabhasa ! the existence of moksa, va, and the immutable happiness of muktātmā at the removal of pun ya-Dāpa
Lastly, the sentence that "Jaramaryam vàitat arvam yadagsthotram" means that one should practise agnihotra etc, till the' end of life.
Your suspiciyn about the existence of mokşa generated from

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536
Jinabhadra Cani's
[ The elevnth this sentence (as the time of beginning the performance has not been mentioned in it) is out of place. The sentence really means as follows :
One should perform sacrifice threughout the life at all times. The word 'ra' here signifies that lie who aspires for mokşa should also perform the sacrifice, which acts as the hétu of their mokşa. Thus, the Tirthankara removes the doubt of Prabhāsa. 474 475 #: 2022-2023 )
Then, छिन्नम्मि संशयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पव्वइओ तिहि ओ सह खण्डियसरहिं ॥४७६।।(२०२४) Chinnammi samsayainmi Jiņéņa jara-maraņavippamukkéņam i So samaņo pavvalo tihi o saha khamdiyasathim 11 476 « (2024) [ FEST wat fota Taufanymi स श्रमणः प्रवजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ४७६ ॥ (२०२४)
Chinné samsayé Jinéna jară-maraṇavipramuktena i Sa śramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikāšataih 1147611 (2024)]
Trans:--467 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksā along with his three hundred pupils. (2024)
End of the Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara.

Page #575

Abhavya 326, 338, Abhavyata 326
210, 315.
Abhaya 200, 202, 209, 329, 330, 343, 470, 475, 481,
490, 500, 504,
Abhava-rupata 330 Abhibhava 183
Abhara-vikara-297
Acala-bhrata 407, 425, 427, 438,
Acetana 314, 348, 351, 395
Adhana 527, Adharma 97, 98, 365
Adhisthatri, 29, 30, 33,
Adravyatva 503
Adrista Io3, 104, 105, 106
Index
Adristatva 344
Adristarambha 100
Advaitabhava 135
Aghata 38, 354
Agni 262, 276.
Agnibhuti 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 95. 96, 113, 121, 128, 137, 138, 139, 419, 420 Agnihotra I1, 63, 126, 136, 186, 307, 385, 386, 457, 481.
Aham-pratyaya-14, 15. Ahetukatva 313
Ahimsa 271, 272
Ahimsaka 273
Ahimsakatva 273 Aindriyaka 20, 157
68

Ajata 199, 200, 233, 234, 237, 240. Ajiva 37, 271, 328, 503
Akalyana 42, 435
Akampita 388, E91, 394, 402, 403,
404, 466
Akriya 184
Aloka 346, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, Amukta 348
Amritatva 368, 430.
Amurta. 17, 24,
110, ISI, 134, 295, 296, 298, 348; 351, 363, 426, 430, 431, 498, 502
Amurtatva 344, 348, 363, 431, 468, 491, 503,
Anikantika 24, 49, 50, 90, 258, 274, 276, 339, 361. Ananta 180, 317, 326
Ananta-bhaga 333. Anavasya-bhavi 105 Anadi 322, 329, 333. Anadi samyoga 484, 485 Anaditya 320. 324 Anistakara 433.
Anitya 159, 304, 340, 341. 468, 469, 522, 524
Anitya caitanya 469
Anityata 345, 346, 384, 398, 469, 523,
Anityatva 41, 159, 173, 216 Antaraya 441,
For Private Personal Use Only

Page #576

538
(avadharavāda
Antarikse 41, Anubhava 212 Anugraha 372 Anumana 3, 4, 5, 8, 33, 83, 150,
171, 185. 344, 394. 400, +15, 522, Anupalabdhi 181, 182, 185. Anupayoga 384 Anusinartit 157. 165. 1617 Anutpatti 49, 98 Anuttara devas 434 Anuyada-para 135 Anvaya 4, 49, 70 Aparyapla 51. Apana 88 Apantarala 88 Apeksa 219, 220, 221, 224, 225.
226, 274 Apratyaksa 357, 258, 466. Arani 461, 462 Artha, 44. 45, 257 Artha-padapara 135. Arthapatti il, Asakyata 183 Asarira 527 Asariratva 364 Asariri 311 Asiva 425 Asoka 265, 503 Asubha 273, 425, 437, 438, 439.
441, 448, 449, 481, Asubha Karma 449 Asubha-parinama 449 Asubha-yoga 440 Asarva gata 344 Asarvamaya 73 Asatya 217. Asiddha 18, 157 Astitva 196, 197, 228, 232, 233
Asumat 46 Asvapna 217 Ati-duratva 182 Atindriya 394 Atireka 187, 188 Atyanta. pratyaksu 2. Ayadhi 179, 399, 100 Apartha 176, 200. Avasthana 358, 381, 475. Avasthita 477 Avidyamana 193, 200, 217, 477. Avidya 242 Avirati 437 Audarika 446 Adana 30, 31, Adatri, 30, 31, 33 Adeya 30, 31. Adimau 312 Adbara 198, 260, 261 Adhaya 198, 260, Agamas 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 157
381, 452. Ahara 450, 451 Akara 240, 267. Akasa 11, 30, 31, 46, 129. 240,
260, 298, 317, 333, 344, 346, 348, 356, 359, 394, 463.467.
484, 489, 503. Akasa-dravya 491. Alaya 373, 376 Arambha 99 Asamsabuddhipur vaka 104 Asraya 449, 451, 452 Asarya-svabhaya 149 Atnau - Atma tog, 110, 122, 136,
149, 151, 154, 155, 169, 170,
185, 298, 311, 344, 348, 395, 473. Atmavadins 61 Avarana 183, 500, 524.

Page #577

Index
[ 539
Bija 343 Bodha-rupa 17. Brabma 191, 482 Brithaspati 386 Buddhists 483
Bakula 265 Bala 284, 285 Bandha 309, 311, 315, 318, 320,
342, 343, 356, 364, 444, 445,
491, 492, 493. Bandhabhaya 310, 311, Badhaka Pramana 13, Badha 101, 524, Bahya-nimitta 274, 276 Bahya-pudgalas 116 Bahya sarira 161 Bala Joana 158, 159. Bala-sarira 161, Bhagavana 374, 375, 377, 378,
384, 393, 402, 423, 480, 482,
488, 48, 501, 514, 522, 527 Bhakta 31. Bhava 60, 290, 294, 307. Bhaya-bhaya 276. Bhavanapati 371 Bhavantara 290, 292, 296, 297,
301, 304 Bhavya 311, 333, 337, 338, Bhavya-bhava 328, 329, Bhavatva 329, 330 Bhajana 261, Bhava -196, 330, Bhava-yoga 439, 441 Bhokta 468 Bboktri 55 Bhoktritya 344, 349, 468. Bhranti 217, Bhumi 259 Bhuta 98, 136, 145, 146, 148, 151,
186, 187, 193, 195, 245, 261, 262, 266, 268, 269, 459, 460,
461, 462, 464 Bhutasamudaya 149
Cakra 292 Caksu-r--grahya 496 Caitanaya-146, 266, 460, 461,
462, 473, 475 Caitanya- vijnan 469 Campata 265 Candra 376 Caksusa 24 Caritra 444 Cetana 145, 146, 148, 149, 150,
151, 263, 348 Cetapa-dharma 522, 524 Chadmastha 25 Chala 30 Cintana 212 Citra ka-vela 496 Cyuta 176 Danda 75, 321 Darsana 65, 68, 81, 367, 382, 389,
408, 444, 480 Darsana varan. 444 Dana 97, 98, 100, 101, 105, 126,
186, 305, 383, 457 Doha 128, 129, 133. 158, 321, 340,
419, 421, 428, 519, 520, 521 Debatya 433 Deha-parispanda 352 Deya 303, 320, 378, 383, 384 Dova-loka 475 Dovatva 304, 305 Deyabhaya 387

Page #578

540 )
Canadharvaåda
41, 44. 46, 120, 134, 154, 164, 196, 198, 212, 216, 225, 232. 233, 240, 248, 259, 260, 291 301, 321, 322, 329, 330, 339, 340, 345, 354: 389, 395, 397, 398, 399, 420, 421, 428, 429, 465, 466, 469, 470, 471, 473, 474, 475, 488, 489, 490, 493,
504, 525 Ghatakara 473 Ghatopayoga 68 Grabaka 214, 217 Grahya 214. 217 Guna 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
45, 75 Gunin 17, 20, 21, 22. 23
Devadatta 24, 45, 55, 152, 154,
155, 161, 359, 374, 456, 466 Dharma 68, 69. 70, 71, 97, 98,
298, 299, 356 Dharmastikaya 346, 352, 353,
357, 358 Dhataki 6, 61, 146, 147, Dhataki-puspa 460 Dhrauyya -67, 473, 475, 477, 493 Dhrauvyatva 304 Dhyana 441 Dis 11 Diksa 76, 137, 138, 188, 277, 307
365, 380, 387, 406, 457. Dirgha 219, 220, 221, 225 Dosa 521 Dravya 75, 120, 336, 464, 465,
473. 475. 487, 491, 492 Dravyatva 327, 344, 346, 502 Dravya-yoga 339 Drista 104, 105, 420 Dristanta 6. Dristanta-dharmin 6. Dristartha 211, Dristartha-visaya 7. Duhkba 114, 117, 161, 169, 409,
415, 431, 422, 423, 426, 427,
430, 438, 483, 513, 515, 520 Duhkbamaya 516, 520, Duragama 184 Durva 282 Dvesa 162, 466, 483 Ekantika 282
Haritaki 496 Haritala 413 Hasya 454 Hetu 18, 32, 49, 83, 89, 159, 201,
257, 294, 296. 299, 304, 312, 319, 339, 350, 351, 352, 473, 524 Hotumat 31, 274, 275. Himsaka 272 Himsakatya 273 Himsa 271, 274, 457. Hrasva 218, 274
Indigo 413 Indra 369, 386, 387 Indrabhuti 2, 26, 27, 76, 78, 79.
80, 81, 137, 138, 139, 465 Indrajala 193 Indriyas 152, 153, 154, 155, 157.
158, 161, 257, 374, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 465, 501, 503, 504, 520, 521.
Ganadhara 368 Gandha 265, 483, Gautama 8, 97, 107, 150 Ghata 2, 8. 17, 24, 27, 29, 37, 38,

Page #579

Index
[ 541
Indriya Jnana 399 Indriya Pratyasksa 394, 397 Ista patti 91, 102 Isvara 128, 129
Jada 17 Jaimini 404 Jaipas 483 Janma 343, 483 Jantu 96 Tara 483 ata 199, 200, 233, 234, 231 Jatajata 238, 240 Jayamada 200, 238, 240 Jiva 44, 45, 116, 119, 120, 121,
128, 140, 157, 162, 164, 186, 261, 269, 275, 302, 303, 311, 312, 313, 317, 327, 340, 347, 356, 382, 392, 384, 395, 411, 418, 430, 448, 454, 467, 468, 474, 475. 477, 484, 485, 486) 487, 488, 490, 498, 503, 504,
525, 526, 527 Jira-dravya 491 Jivatva 346, 475, 487, 488 Jnapa 61, 65, 109, 157, 168, 169,
170, 173, 213, 220, 234, 357, 358, 400, 485, 487, 524, 525. Jnanayarada 82, 444, 524 Jneya 357, 358, 525 Jnayatva 328 Jyotis 69 Jyotisk 371
Karana 29, 30, 32 I Karananumana 420 Karma, Karman 33, 77, 82, 83,
84, 89, 90, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 134, 284, 289, 290, 299, 311, 312, 313, 315, 318, 324, 341, 342, 343, 346, 347, 352, 401, 409, 410, 415, 416, 418, 430, 421, 422, 423, 425, 426, 427, 429, 435, 436, 444, 449, 451, 452, 455, 456, 468, 484, 485, 487, 488. 498, 500, 519,
526. Karma-bandha 81, 83, 437, 441, 451 Karma-janita 327, 488 Karma-pudgalas 341, 342, 417, 450 Karma-rupatva 113 Karma-santana 320 Karta 134, 136, 216, 316, 321, 468 Kartritya 344, 349, 468 Kasaya 466 Kala 11. 128, 333, 333 Kama 242 Karapa 101, 134, 178, 195, 202,
216, 281, 282, 283. 284, 291, 292, 298, 419, 42', 424, 425,
426 Karanatya 195 Karanasiddha 195 Karmara 88, 117, 118, 119, 120,
121, 122, 129, 141, 351, 425 Karya 113, 121, 128, 129, 136,
178, 195, 216, 240, 281, 282, 283, 284, 290, 291, 292, 296, 316, 321, 415, 418, 419, 420,
424, 423 424 425, 426. 430 Karya-sidubi 195 Kayanuyua 420
Kalasa 46 Kalovara 46 Kalyana 425 Kapilas II

Page #580

542 ]
Kaya 46
Kevala Jnana 179, 180, 399, 400,
401
Kevala Jnana-prapti 380 Kha-puspa 221, 233, 234, 245, 312. 415, 416,
246, 248. 293, 477, 490, 527 Kharastinga 181, 182, 185, 198, 199. 200, 240, 312, 313. 330,
418, 490, 527
Khara-visana 38. 45. 257
Canadharavada
Khecara 80
Klesa 100
Klesa-bahula 100
Kritaktva
Kriya 75, 120, 12r. 348, 351, 485
Kriya phala 321
Kriyavadin
Khodha 430
Ksanika 167, 168, 169, 170, 172,
176
Ksanikata-vadin 178
Kseira 363
Kubera 369
Kumbha 46, 339, 471, 472
Kurupa 117
Kula 285
Kuta 46 Kusmandi 265
Laksanas 466
Linga 4, 5, 28, 29, 49, 50 Lingin 3, 4, 5, 28. 29, 49 Loka 354, 355, 356, 357, 358 Loka-vyavhara 477
Mada 144, 483
Mandika 308, 310, 312, 314, J20, 342. 326, 327, 330,

332, 333, 339, 341, 342. 343 347, 350, 362, 363, 365, 485 Manasa 273
Manahparyaya 179, 399, 400. Maniras 382, 386.
Manu 404
Manusya 378, 401, 402, 403 Mati-Jnana 179, 518 Mati-Jnanavarana 444 Mati-mandya 183
Maurya-maurya-putra 366, 308, 370, 371, 373, 377, 384, 389, 466
386,
Mana 430
Manavaka 216, 384, 516
Maya 193
Mayika 376
Mecaka Mani 413
Meru 415. 445.
Metarya 458, 459, 468, 470
Misrabhava 439
Mithyatva 82, 304, 343, 437, 455. Moha 483.
Mohaniya Karma 25
Moksa 17. 119, 120, 160, 269, 315, 317, 318, 328, 337, 338, 340, 341, 356, 481, 483, 486, 486, 493, 498, 525, 526, 527 Moksabhilasa 160
Moksa-sukha 521, 522, 526 Mrit-pinda 248
Mukta 313, 316, 345, 348, 517, 527 Muktatma 343, 345, 346, 347 348, 362, 480, 490, 491, 500. 501, 503, 504, 518, 520, 521, 522, 524, 525.
Murta 17, 24, 32, 33. 112, 121, 124, 134.
426, 428, 430
333,
331. 342, 346. 491, 491, 492,
315.
331,

108, 110, 296, 395

Page #581

495
Index
[ 543 Murtata 428.
Paroksa 394, 399 Murtatva 261, 344, 428, 503, Pata 17, 97, 233, 240, 248, 311, 504, 524
354, 466, 474 Nabhas 46, 325
Parinama 173, 179, 273, 299, 352, Naiyayikas 57, 65
420, 429, 449, 452, 455, 494, Narasimha 413. Nama Karma 45+
Paryapta 51. Naraka 211, 326, 870, 377, 378,
Paryayas 25, 75, 240, 301, 341, 382, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393,
346, 469, 473, 475, 487, 501 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405,
Pasu 307 456, 466, 477, 486, 487
Pasutra 307 Naraka-paryayas 488
Pata-cetana 475 Nastikas ro
Pataga 360, 361. Nigraba Sihana 80
Papa 17, 193, 211, 310, 378, 408, Nimitta 82, 83, 200, 210. 2II,
409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 274, 400
415, 419, 420, 421, 422, 434, Nindartha-vada 135
435, 436, 437, 445, 449, 451, Nirhatuka 313
452, 455, 456, 474, 578 Nirvana 380, 480, 482, 498
Papa Karmas 425, 433, 434, 445 Nisedba 354
Papa-phala 475, 520 Niskriya 351, 462, 463, 466
Papa-prakriti 452, 454, 455 Nitya 304, 339, 344, 345, 359.
Papa-punya 519 360, 361, 465, 468, 472
Pataliputra 214, 216 Niskaranaka 290, 297, 314, 316, 416 Phala 428 Nityata 345, 493
Prabhasa 479, 481, 488, 491, 494, Nityatva 465, 470, 491
498, 500, 501, 503, 504, 514 Nitya-sadrisa 294
522, 524, 527, 523 Niyati 128, 342
Piadesa 65, 444 Padas 481 Paksa 80
Pradhvansabhava 339, 340 Paksabhasa 18
Prakriti 444, 454, 455 Para 214
Pramana 7, 9, 13, 50, 58, 84, 85, Para-bbava 290
137, 245, 247, 522 Para-loka 461, 462, 463, 464
Pramatri Vijnana 171, 172 466, 467, 468, 470
Pratibandha 503 Parama Brahma 482
Pratighata 356 Paramanu 247, 248, 445, 446
Pratijna 9, 45 Para paksa 216
Pratipaksa 37. 38 Parispanda 351
Pratisodha 41, 43, 84, 85

Page #582

5111
(iayadlaravāda Pratyaksa 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 140, 141, 164, 296, 298, 322,
18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 119, 122, 343, 351, 361, 410, 479 257, 349, 592, 393, 394, 397, Sastras 463, 464 399, 400, 401, 424
Siva 425 Pratyaksa Joana 398, 399, 401 Soka 162 Pratyaksa Pramana 2, 4, 13, 229
Sraroana Bhagavana Mahavira 79, Pratyaya 14, 15, 16, 201
80, 81, 82, 95, 139, 193 Prayatna 351
Suugalo 280. 306 Prana 88
Sruta 72 Iranin 46
Sruta-Jnanavarana 444 Prithvi 191, 193, 258, 266, 271, 276
Subha 425, 439, 440, 441, 448, Pudgala 20, 298, 339, 340, 356,
449, 451, 481 357, 445, 447, 448, 455, 490, 498
Subhatya 440 Pudgala-dharma 298
Subha-paripama 444, 451 Pudgalamaya 299
Subhasubha 437. 441, 453 Padgala-parinama 496
Subhasubha asraya 451 Punya 193, 271, 310, 378, 408,
Subhasubba-parinama 451 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, Subhasubha-yoga 440 415, 416, 419, 420, 421, 422, Suddha 44 430, 434, 435, 436, 437, 445, Suddha-bhavas 276 449, 451, 452, 454, 455, 456, Suddha-padas 37, 38, 44 4.57, 518
Sunya 217. 229, 243, 374 Punya-Karmas 433, 434, 445
Sunyata 212, 214, 242, 243, 244, Punya-prakriti 452, 454, 455
257, 258 Punya-papa 457, 520
Sa-cetana 263, 265, 267, 270 Purusa 11, 135, 304
Sa-drisata 2899, 290, 292, 296, 297, Purusatva 307
304, 305 Purusa-veda 452, 454 Puspaka 373
Sa-Jiva 270
Sa-kriya 349, 351 Purva- kalasanketa 399
Sa-kriyatya 348 Purva paksa 12, 464
Sa-sariratya 364 Rajas 310, Rati 454
Samavasarana 371, 372 Rasa 265, 455, 473, Roga 483
Samavaya 41, 42, 109, 121 Raga 466, 522, Raga -dvesa 446
Sanıbbusa 176 Rupa 10, 1), 216, 225, 240, 259,
Sandeha 209 398, 473
Samghala 31 Sabda 74, 75. 154, 157. 159, 217,
Samsaya 209 26.4, 275, 498
Samsara 97, I0, 120, 294, 320, Sabda Pramana 8
360, 484, 486, 487 Sarira 113, 117, 128, 13), 134, Sanisariu 55

Page #583

Index
( 545
Samsaritva 285
415, 421, 422, 413, 425, 426, Samsarita 521
427, 430, 431, 514, 517, 520, Samudaya 146, 149, 195
521, 524 imyaktya 452, 454, 455
Syrupa 117 wrayoga 39, 41, 42, 121, 343
Suksma 447 448, 495 Santati
Suksma pudgala 448 Santana 323, 324
Sva 214 Sarvajna 334
Syabbava 15, 16, 117, 133, 134, Sarvajnatya '405
193, 296, 297, 298, 299, 351, Sarvaksanikata 175, 178
415, 416, 418, 473, 503 Sarvamaya 73, 75 Sarvasunyata 202, 217, 241, 245.
Svabhavaka 326, 327 Sarvablava 209
Svabhava-siddha 195 Sattva 46, 370, 310, 327
Svapaksa 216
Swapna 193, 211 Satya 217 Sadhara 427, 438
Svarga 126, 211, 307, 386, 481 Sadhana 216
Svargin 386
Svatah-siddha 195 Sadharana 412
Svabhavika 292, 328 Sadhya 216
Svadhavikata 328 Samagri 202, 241, 242, 246, 248
Syamin 32, 33 Samagrimaya 348. Samanya 41, 183, 109.
Tamas 310 Samanya distanta
Tandula-matsya 274 Аришара бі,
Tapas 305, 383 Samanya Jaana 180
Tejas 109, 268, 279 Siddba 120, 358, 359, 360, 361, Tilaka 265 362, 368, 468, 520, 524
Tiryanca 377, 378, 391, 401, 454, Siddhatva 519
477, 486, 487 Siddhalaya 346, 352, 353
Tirthankara 76, 137, 180, 188, Siddhantins. 108
189, 190, 277, 278, 279, 307, Siddhi 195
309, 365, 366, 367, 387, 388, Simha 384, 392
389, 406, 407, 408, 422, 429, Smarana 212
439, 457 458 459, 478 Smriti 19
Unmada 242 Smritis 370
Upacata 91, 384, 394, 455, 516, Soma 368 Sparsa 365, 473
517, 518 Sthapa 360, 361 Sthula 447, 448 Upaghata 372 Stuti artha-vada 135
Upagrahaka 357 Sudharman 278, 279, 282, 290, Upakarana 129, 134, 296 298, 297, 300, 301, 303, 309.
Upayoga 50, 54, 65 Sukha 75, ?14. 116, 117, 409, Utpatti 200, 469, 473

Page #584

510
Caņdharavāda
Utpattimabva 474, 475 Uepada 67, 473, 474, 475, 477, 493 Uttaraprakriti 444 Vacapa 337, 245 Vacaniya 245 Vacasa 273 Vaimanika 371 Vakta 244 Vanaspati 265 Vapus 46 Varuna 369 Vastu 75, 134, 416 Vastu-dharmaa 133. 134, 297, 298,
299, 416 Vacaka 75 Vacya 75 Vayu 149, 262, 268, 276 497 Vayubhuti 24, 140, 150, 160, 166,
168, 180, 182, 186, 188, 189,
465 Veda 59, 60, 69, 71, 72, 74. 82.
186, 187, 191, 279, 280, 306, 309, 318, 367, 368, 370, 387,
408, 457, 459, 480. Vedaciya 525 Veda-padas 186, 276, 305, 310,
364, 390, 459, 481, 482, 5*6.
527 Voda-vacana 185, 525 Yedanga in Vibbuti 491 Vicchoda 321, 331 Vicitra 284, 285, 286, 299 Vicitrata 284, 285, 286, 299 Vidarsana 184 Vidhi-vada 64, 65, 74, 136 Vidyamana 165, 100, 217, 258, 477 Vidyadharas 375
Vijaana 9, 17, 19, 156, 158, 768,
169, 170, 179, 1801 2341 2371
467, 469, 471 Vijpanag hana 63, 65, 66, 67, 68,
130, 135, 187, 459 Vijaapamaya 467, 468 Vijpeya-bhavas 61 Vikara 116, 184, 193, 376, 489, 494Vimanas 375, 376 Vipaksa 18, 37, 339 Viparyaya 49, 71, 242 Vipaka 455 Viruddha 18, 33, 9! Visaya 15, 175 Visayasukha 515, 516 Visayanumana 173 Visayin 15 Visesa 41 Vi-sadrisata 297, 304 Vismriti 184 Vitaraga 334 Vyabhicara 43, 71 Vyakta 189, 190, 193, 197, *17.
234, 241, 242, 244, 246257,
264m 266, 271, 377 378 Vyantara 371 Vyatireka 2, 4, 70 Vyatireka Pramana 4 Vyaı astha 43 Vyavabara 179, 477 Vyaya 67, 473, 475, 477, 493 Vyutpatti 45 Vyomn 46 Yajnadatta 56, 166, 456 Yantra-purusa 349 Yoga 437