Gandharwad

Author(s): Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Jain Granth Prakashak Sabha
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/011044/1

Page #1
THE FREE INDOLOGICAL COLLECTION WWW.SANSKRITDOCUMENTS.ORG/TFIC FAIR USE DECLARATION This book is sourced from another online repository and provided to you at this site under the TFIC collection. It is provided under commonly held Fair Use guidelines for individual educational or research use. We believe that the book is in the public domain and public dissemination was the intent of the original repository. We applaud and support their work wholeheartedly and only provide this version of this book at this site to make it available to even more readers. We believe that cataloging plays a big part in finding valuable books and try to facilitate that, through our TFIC group efforts. In some cases, the original sources are no longer online or are very hard to access, or marked up in or provided in Indian languages, rather than the more widely used English language. TFIC tries to address these needs too. Our intent is to aid all these repositories and digitization projects and is in no way to undercut them. For more information about our mission and our fair use guidelines, please visit our website. Note that we provide this book and others because, to the best of our knowledge, they are in the public domain, in our jurisdiction. However, before downloading and using it, you must verify that it is legal for you, in your jurisdiction, to access and use this copy of the book. Please do not download this book in error. We may not be held responsible for any copyright or other legal violations. Placing this notice in the front of every book, serves to both alert you, and to relieve us of any responsibility. If you are the intellectual property owner of this or any other book in our collection, please email us, if you have any objections to how we present or provide this book here, or to our providing this book at all. We shall work with you immediately. -The TFIC Team.

Page #2
DDDD.64 80.000 Ksamasramana Jinbhadra Gani's ...etc.0.0 GANADHARAVADA .. ...... Along with Maladharin Hemacandra Siri's Commentary ..... ............. Edited by Muni Ratna-prabha Vijaya Disciple of Sasana Samrat Acarya Maharaj Vijaya Nemisurisvaraji. . 0000000000000000000000000000 ...... with Translation, Digest of Commentary and Introduction by Prof. Dhirubhai P. Thaker M. A. Gujarat College, Ahmedabad. .Oooo..opoboo...lovece.. Sri Jaina Grantha Prakasaka Sabha Panjrapole Ahmedabad. ..... Price Rupees Four. Foreign"9-s/ Three Dollars (U. S. A.) ....... Vira Samvat 2468 Vikrama Samvat 1998 1942 S ....THSH.419... *.... SUTR..24 pav.04*.4H.. .... .......

Page #3
Printed by Gulabchand Lallubhai Shah, at Mahodaya Printing Press-Bhavnagar.

Page #4

Page #5
"DEDICATED INTO THE LOTUS-LIKE HANDS MY MOST REVERED GURU SARVA-TANTRA SVATANTRA, JAGAD-GURU SASANA SAMRAT, SURICAKRA CAKRAVARTI TAPAGACCHADHIPATI. TIRTHODDHARAKA BHATTARAKA HIS HOLINESS ACARYA MAHARAJA SRI VIJAYA NEMISURISVARAJI By His most grateful and obedient Pupil RATNAPRABHA VIJAYA.

Page #6

Page #7
Introduction * The Text of Ganadhara-vada (a) Sources According to the Jainas, the religious principles of the present era came into existence right from the time of Bhagavan Risabhadeva Swami, the first Tirthankara. After him, the sacred works increased in number and qnality when the religion was exalted to a high rank but they subsided in times of disorder and anarchy, Generally speaking, the preachings of all the Tirthankaras happened to be of the same kind and their biographies almost resembled each other in principal characteristics. The Bhagavata Purana supports the view that Risabha-deva was the founder of the present Jaina canon. There is a reference of Risabha-deva, Ajitanatha and Aristanemi in Yajur Veda. Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira, the elder contemporary of Buddha, was not only the last but Supreme Tirthankara in the line of all Jaina Tirthankaras. Like his predecessors, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavara also had got his predchings composed in books. His Ganadharas or principal disciples arranged his 1. It is not only the Jain tradition that ascribes the origin of the religious system to Risabha-deva, but there is historical evidence also to show that so far back as the first century B. C. there were people who were worshippiug Risabha-deva the first Tartha'nkara.

Page #8
preachings in twelve Angas, the twelfth Anga being divided into fourteen Purvas. These Purvas have been accepted by the "Svetambaras and the Digambams as probably the oldest Sacred Works of the Jaina canon. The tradition of the Svetambaras about the fourteen Purvas is this :-The fourteen Purvas had been incorporated in the twelth Anga (the Dristivada ) which was lost before 1000 A.V. But a detailed table of its contents and consequently of the Purvas has survived in the fourth Anga, the Samavayanga, and in the Nandi Sutra. We are told by the tradition that Arya Jambu Swame was the last Kevali. After him, the under-mentioned six Heads of the Church, viz. Prabhava Swami, S'ayyambhava Suri, Yas'obhadra Suri, s'ambhuti-vijaya Suri, Bhadrabahu Swami and Sthulabhadra were S'ruta-Kevales. Out of these, Bhadrabahu Swami was the last Pattadhara (Head of the Church ) who had all the twelve Angas along with the fourteen Purvas, along with their meanings and explanations of intricate subjects in his memory. Arya Sthulabhadra had a thorough knowledge of the meanings and explanations of the ten Purvas, and a knowledge of the remaining four Purvas (11, 12, 13, 14 ) but not their meanings and explanations. Besides, he was instructed not to impart the knowledge of the four Purvas (11, , 13, 14) to anyone. Thus, the knowledge of the Purvas decreased gradually. After him, there was a line of ten successors who had a thorough knowledge of ten Purvas. They were known as Das'apurvis. The last Das'apurve was Vajra Swami, after whom the knowledge of Purvas went on vanishing. The last who had a knowledge of one Purva was Devarddhi Gani ksamas'ramana. 2. Vide Weber, Indische Studien, XVI p. 341.

Page #9
The Svetambaras accept the existence and validity of the Siddhantas ( Sacred Works ) but the Digambaras believe that the real s'astras or religious works have already vanished and the sacred works, which are accepted by the Jaina canon at present, have no validity. At present, the Sacred Works of the S'vetambaras are forty-five in all. Some of them are written in prose and some in verse. There are eleven Angas, twelve Upangas, ten Prakirnas, six Cheda sutras, two Sutras, and four Mula-sutras. 3 As seen before, the knowledge of the original preachings of Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira had begun to fade gradually, and hence it was rightly felt by his successors to arrange the preachings into various books. As a result of their efforts, the religious works mentioned above were composed. Out of these, the four Mula Sutras are considered as the Original Sutras or Commandments, as they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina monks in their religious practices. The four Mula Sutras are :-(1) The Avas'yaka ( 2 ) Das'avaikalika (3) Uttaradhyana and ( 4 ) Pinda Niryukti (or Ogha Niryukti). According to Weber, the order of composition of these sutras is this :-(1) Uttaradhyayana ( 2 ) Avas'yaka ( 3 ) Das'avaikalika and ( 4 ) Pinda Niryukti. Of the four Mula Sutras, the Avas'yaka as its naine suggests-is the most important of all. It is divided into six sections :-(1) Samayika ( Samaiya), (2) Caturvims'ati stava (cauvisattho ), (3) Vandanaka ( Vandanayam ), 4) Prats 3. In addition to the above-named forty-five Sacred Works, some people ennumerate twenty more Prakirnas, twelve Niryuktis and several others arriving at the total number of eighty-four. Again, in order to supplement the information supplied by these eighty-four Agamas there are several other works known as Nigamas or Upanisads which, in turn, are thirty-six in all.

Page #10
6 kramana (Padikkamana ), (5) Kayotsarga ( Kaussagga ), and ( 6 ) Pratyakhyana ( Paccakhkhana). It should be noted that though all these sutras were dedacted into books by Ganadharas, they were originally preached by S'ramana Bhagvan Mahavira Swami.* The Niryukti of the Avas'yaka Sutras had already been written by Sriman Bhadrabahu Swami and a number of curnis (detailed commentaries) were also composed by various authors as commentaries on the Avas'yaka Sutras. Still, however, Jinabhadra Gani ksamas ramana felt the need of ellucidating the original niryukti. He, therefore, composed a bhasya or commentary running in gathas or verses on the original niryukti of the Samayika Sutras. Since this was an additional bhasya to various other bhasyas prepared by different authors, it was known as Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya or an Additional Bhasya to the Avasyaka (Samayika) Sutras. The whole work runs into 3603 Gathas or verses. The Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya could further be divided into various sub-sections such ass-Pithika, Varavarika, the Upasargas, the Samacari (of ten varieties), Ganadhara-vada, the Ganadharas, the Ninhavas, S'esa Upodghata, Niryukti, and a-svadhyaya Niryukti. Of these, Ganadhara-vada is one of the most important sub-sections, as it deals with the discussion between S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavira Swami and his ganadharas (or principal disciples) on various philosophical topics such as the existence of Jiva, Karma, Papa, Punya and Moksa etc. (b) Commentaries. Three commentaries are said to have been written on the text of Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya. The author himself is 4. Vide keNa kayaMti ya vavahArao jiNideNa gaNaharehiM ca / taslAmiNA u nicchrayanayassa tatto jao'NaNaM / / 3382 / ( vizeSAvazyakabhASya )

Page #11
said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by Kotyacarya (or S'i. lankacarya ) the manuscript of which dated 1136 V. S. is preserved in a tattered condition in the Bhandarkara Research Institute, Poona. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present, is that of Maladhari Hemacandracarya. Maladhari Hemacandracarya is different from Kali-Kala Sarvajna Hemcandracarya, the welknown author of Dvyas'raya. Originally, he was welknown as Pandit Svetambaracarya Bhattaraka. But his worldly name was Pradyumna and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the . advice of Sri Abhaya-deva * Suri he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. Siddharaja, Jayasinha, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V.S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-spread well-versedness. (c) Ganadharas-their names, lineage etc. Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira had eleven ganadharas in all. .All except Indrabhuti Gautama and Sudharma Swami. had attained Nirvana or Final Emancipation during the lifetime of their celebrated preceptor. Indrabhuti Gautama and Sudharma Swami had attained moksa at Rajagriha, after the Nirvana of S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavara. All ganadharas belonged to the high-born families. Being directly under the guidance of Sramana Bhagavan* Mahavara, they became wide-read professors and knew all the twelve Angas along with fourteen Purvas. The Table attached herewith supplies all information about the eleven ganadharas.

Page #12
co Serial No. * Name of the Ganadhara Parents' Name Te Lineage (Gotra ) Place of Birth (Janmasthana) Indrabhuti ... Vasubhuti. Gautama and Prithivi The Village of Gobara in Magadha Agnibhuti Vayubhuti Vyakta Sudharma Dharmamitra Bharadvaja | Kollagaand Varuni Sannivesa Dbammila Agnivaisyaand Bhadditayana Dhanadeva + Vasistha | Mauryasanniand vesa Vijayadevi Maurya and Kasyapa Vijayadevi Mandika 7 Maurya A kampita Harita Mithila Vasu and Nanda Acalabhrata Gautama Kosala Deva and Jayanti 10 Metarya Datta and Kaundiya | The Village Varunadevi of Tunsika in Kosambi 11 Prabhasa ... Bala and Rajagpiha nagar Atibhadra + After the death of her first husband Dhandeva, Vijayadevi lived with Maurya. This shows that widow-remarriage was in vogue in those days.

Page #13
Duration Name of Con- Duration of life stellation at of housethe time of hold life | incognito (ChadBirth (Griha(Naksatra) masthaVasa paryaya ) Duration of life in state of Perfect Kno wledge (Kevali Paryaya) Total age Remarks Jyestha 50 years 30 years 12 years 92 years Kritika 46 years Swati 42 years 10 years 16 years 74 years 18 years 70 years 18 years | 80 years Sravana | 50 years 12 years Uttaraphal- 50 years 42 years guni Magba 53 years 14 years 8 years 100 years He was the first * Pattadh16 years | 83 years ara of the Jaina Church. $ 16 years 95 years Robini | 65 years 2 years Msigasirsa 46 years 12 years 14 years 72 years Uttarasadha 48 years 9 years 21 years 78 years Agvini 36 years 10 years 16 years 62 years Pusya 16 years 8 years 16 years 40 years $ Cf. Teftaistas, fazerot TGAUTI I tatpaTTodayapaDhamo, suhammanAmeNa gaNasAmI / / ( Tapagacchapatlavali, Ed-by Kalyanavijayaji ).

Page #14
10 (d) Summary of the Text. We give below a summary of the text of Ganadharavada which is contained in Gathas running from 1549 to 2024 of the Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya. (i) Jiva:-Indrabhuti Gautama, the first Ganadhara, puts forward his doubt about the existence of Soul and S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavara removes the doubt by means of various evidences and illustrations. Explaining the meaning of the word ' Jiva' the Bhagavan remarks that Jiva' does not signify body-deha-but it signifies the soul-atma-which is full of cognizance. Body is only inanimate.. Smrti (remembrance ), jzjnasa (desire for knowledge ), cikersa ( desire for activity ), jigamisa ( desire for movements ) and sams'aya (doubt) etc. are the properties of Soul, which being self-evident is pratyaksa or directly apprehended. Since body is corporeal and physically visible, properties like cognizance etc. cannot reside into it. These properties are contained in Soul, because it is a-murta or incorporeal and a-caksusa or beyond the range of physical sight. This shows that Soul is absolutely different from body. In reply to the argument of the Vedantists that Soul, being one and the same everywhere, can never be classified, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira Swami contends that if the Soul were one absolute entity pervading everywhere, it ought to have been apprehended as one all-pervading element like akas'a even in case of each and every pinda or body. But that is not so. The Soul varies with the shape and size of pinda or body. Besides, if we deny the existence of Soul, there would be nothing like sukha-duhkha and Bandha-Moksa in this world. The Soul is accepted as vijnanaghana or an assemblage of many vijnanas ( cognitions ), firstly because it is identical with vijnana which is upayoga ( attention ) either of the type of jnana ( knowledge.) or that of dars'ana (perception ) and

Page #15
secondlybecause the soul has its each and every prades'a (the minutest portion ) formed from the assemblage of infinite modifications of vijnana.. According to the Naiyayika School, the Soul is devoid of vijnana and hence inanimate. The Jaina Preceptor refutes. this theory by arguing that the soul is said to have been produced and destroyed only with regard to upayoga or attention but it is indestructible so far as vijnana is concerned on account of its vijnana-santati or the perpetual continuance of cognition. (ii) Karma: Solving the doubt of Agnibhuti, the second Ganadhara, S'raman, Bhagavan Mahavira Swami establishes the existence and significance of Karma as follows: Just as a sprout has seed as its hetu or cause, the pleasure. and pain experienced by the people of this world must also have some sort of hetu. This hetu is nothing but deeds or Karmas of the living beings in their past life. Just as the body in youth has the body in childhood to precede it, the body in childhood has also some sort of body to precede it. The body formed of Karmas of the past life and hence known as Karmana Sarira, precedes the body in childhood. Just as each and every act performed by a living being in this world yields a fruit, as is seen in case of tilling the ground and many other acts, so also the acts of charity etc. undertaken by a living being undoubtedly yield fruit which is nothing but Karma, Since a majority of living beings is found unhappy and only a few of them are found happy, we can easily infer that there are only a few who perform good actions and there are many who perform evil actions. It should be noted that Karma here is different from Kriya or action, as Karma becomes Karya, and Kriya the Karana. Since pleasure and pain etc. are the properties of soul,

Page #16
s. 1:2 the soul would become their samavaya-karana or the intimate cause, and Karma a nimitta or the external cause. Karma is corporeal. Since Karmana S'arira is closely connected with jiva, it is beyond the power of senses to percive it. But there is no doubt that it is a sort of suksma (subtle ) s'arira of an interior nature. Consequently, like the variegated transformations found in clouds, vicitrata or variegations should be accepted in case of Karmana Sarira as well. The Soul is connected with Karma as intimately as a murta ghata is connected with a-murta akas'a or a murta finger is connected with the a-murta actions of expansion and contraction. So, like seed and sprout, body and Karma are mutually related as hetu and hetumat rendering thereby the Karmasamtana 'anadi or beginningless. Finally, by the help of Veda-padas, the Bhagavan establishes Karma as the intervening agent which helps the soul in the production of body. He further explains that punya is produced by holy deeds and papa by unholy deeds. (iii) Relation Between Soul and Body: According to Vayuthuti, the third Ganadhara, soul and body are identical. But the Great Preceptor explains him the relation between soul and body in details and removes his illusion. According to him, cetana or consciousness is not the property of each one of the five bhatas or principal elements which constitute the body, but cetana is the intrinsic quality of soul residing into a group of bhutas. For, if cetana were the quality of all bhutas taken together, it ought to exist in a dead body as well. But it does not happen so. Just as Devadatta, who recollects an object perceived through the five windows of a palace in the past, is different

Page #17
from the five windows as well as the palace, so also a person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses. When Devadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows, even when the windows are closed, it is atman or soul that recollects the object perceived through senseorgans even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that atman is different from indriyas. Or, say, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits vikaras or perversion by distilling saliva etc. by means of tongue is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, atman is different from indriyas, because having seen an object by means of eyes, atman holds it by means of hands. In reply to the Buddhistic theory that like all objects, jiva is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experience of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life. Bauddhns advocate the destructibility of jnaana ( knowledge ) by means of statements such as " Yat sat tat sarvam ksanikam". and " Ekavijnanasantatayah sattvah" etc. But if the destructibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of smarana. Jnana of the pramata (or the perceiver ) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. Jnana being a quality could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body. . Further, according to Bauddhas, ksanikata or impermanence is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception through sense-organs, but by means of anumana or inference only. They further believe that the

Page #18
. 14 earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by virtue of that desire, even a ksanika vijnana having only one support is able to apprehend other jnanas and their visayas. But the theory advanced by Bauddhas is fallacious. For, vasana or desire mentioned above, could be applied only when it is related to vasaka or vasanaya and could never be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Lastly, if atman were taken to be ksanika, a number of faults such as production of many objects at a time, retention of vijnana, and violation of the law of cause and effect etc., would crop up. These faults could only be avoided if soul were taken as susceptible to utpada or production, vyaya or destruction, and dhrauvya or retention. In addition to all these arguments, the sentences of Vedas also lead to establish that atman is different from body. (iv) Existence of Elements : In course of discussion with the fourth Ganadhara named Vyakta, the Bhagavan explains the validity of the view that elements do exist. Since jiva etc. are contained in bhutas or elements, doubt about bhutas gives rise to doubt about the existence of all .. leading to the idea of all-pervading negation. Consequently, we will be compelled to take the whole Universe as nothing but illusion or dream. And according to this notion of allpervading negation, there will be no distinction between svamata or one's own opinion and para-mata or another's opinion, hrasva or small, and dirgha or long and so on. Some objects are self-accomplished like a cloud produced as a result of collision, with the element as a cause without the help of any Karta or agent. Some objects are accomplished like ghata by means of an outside agent, while some other objects are produced by means of their virtues as well as the outside agents as in the case of a child produced by means

Page #19
15 of its parents as * well as its own Karmas. Lastly, there also exist some objects which are permanently accomplished like sky. Whatever is accepted and apprehended by us as being produced by means of samagri or a group of materials, is nothing but a collection of atoms. This naturally leads us to believe in the existence of atomis. Out of the five main bhutas or elements, the first four viz. Prithvi ( earth ), ap ( water ), tejas ( fire ) and vayu are sa-cetana or animate because the symptoms of cetana are found in all of them. But the fifth element viz, akas'a (sky) being a-murta or incorporeal, acts only as a support and has no life." Though distinct from the variations of clouds etc., bodies made of the first four elements are sa-cetana only so long as they are unstruck by any implement. These bodies turn lifeless immediately if and when they are struck by some implement. At this point, the Bhagavan explains the important doctrine of Ahimsa or non-violence. He distates that according to the specific laws of morality, that which results in evil consequences is called himsa and that which results in good fruition is called a-himsa. One does not commit himsa in spite of his striking a java. if his motive in doing so is beneficial at the end; on the other hand, a person is said to have committed himsa on account of his evil motive. Inspite of his abstention from striking a living being. All these facts lead to prove that the bhutas do exist, and that out of the five main bhutas, the first four are sa-cetuna. (v) Identity of Existence: Sudharman, the fifth. Ganadhara, asksd a question as to whether a living being in 5. Vegetables being only a variety of Psthvi should be included under Prthvi.

Page #20
. 16 . this world lived a similar life in the other world. S'ramana Bhayavan Mahavara Swami removes his illusion by the following explanation. Attainment of re-birth or existence in the other world depends upon the Karmas of an individual. The Karmabandhamwhich binds the soul to the body--is caused by mithyatva ( wrong belief ), a-virati (non-renunciation ) pramada (carelessness ), and yoga ( vibrations set up in the soul through mind, body, and speech ). Para-bhava, being dependent upon Karma, happens to be vicitra like Karma. So, if the life in two existences were one and the same, there would be no scope for an increase or decrease in it. In such a case, one who is rich in this life would become rich in the next life also, and a poor man in this life would remain poor in the next life as well. Thus, there would be nothing like progress or retardation, if this and the other life were to be the same or identical. And consequently, there would be no justification for the practice of religious duties and pious deeds in this world. This shows clearly that similarity or identity between the two bhavas or existences would never be possible, and the belief is refuted by means of Veda-padas like "S'rugalo vai esa jayate yah sa-puriso dahyate" etc. also. vi) Bandha and Moksa: Since body and soul are connected with each other as hetu and hetumat, they must have perpetual continuance. The tendency of body is such that it becomes the cause of the future body and effect of the past Karmas. In case of an anadi santina also, that which is the cause of future body and effect of the past one, becomes decidedly a perpetual continuance of body and Karma. This proves the existence of Karma-bandha. The mutual relation between Jiva and Karma is endless and beginningless (anadi ananta ) like sky, and at the same time beginningless but limited (anadi santu ) like that between

Page #21
17 gold and stone. The anadi ananta relation exists with regard to a-bhavya or mean jivas, and the anadi santa relation exists with regard to bhavya or higher souls. Bhavya means that which is fit for the attainment of Siddhi. The group of such bhavyas is endless like akas'a, and bence it cvuld never be destroyed. Moksa means separation or shedding off of the karmapudgalas from soul. Moksa is neither krita ka or artificial, nor a-nitya or impermanent. It can be said to be a-nitya only, to the extent that everything is nitya or everlasting as dravya ( substance ) and a-nitya or impermanent as paryaya or modification. Like consciousness movement is also an important property of soul. Free souls possess movements. But these free souls cannot go beyond Siddhaksetra in absence of dharmastikaya. Dharmastikaya and Adharmastikaya are the only two factors which distinguish loka from a-loka. Like Kala, Muktatma is also anadi. That is, just as nobody knows which was a first day or a first night, since the stream of Kala flows on from times immemorial, in the same way no body knows when the first free soul came into existence. Innumerable siddhas or mukta beings could be contained in one. siddha-ksetra by virtue of their a-murtatva or formlessness as the Siddha-ksetra has only limited dimensions. Bandha and Moksa are, therefore, laid down as positive factors existing by virtue of Karmas as shown above. ( vii-viii ) Existence of Devas and Narakas: Existence of devas or gods and Narakas or hellish denizens could be proved in various ways. At the time of a Tirthankara's birth, many gods and goddesses come to this world to pay their homages.

Page #22
18 Like luminary gods such as Moon ,eto, other gods are also perceptible. Here if it is said that. Moon etc., are not luninary gods but they are mere places of habitation, there ought to exist inhabitants of these places also. And these inhabitants are none but gods. It is impossible to find people in this world who are cent percent happy or cent percent unhappy. For, in this world, a happiest man is undoubtedly affected by some sort of disease, or old age, and an extremely miserable man will experience 'the happy breeze of cool wind, and the brightness of light. From this point of view, human beings could never be called cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. It is the Narakas or bellish denizens only who are destined to the cent per cent misery and it is the devas or divine beings who enjoy cent per cent happiness. It is true that sometimes a human being is allegorically called a 'god' but we should not forget that unless and until the principal meaning of a word is attained, the secondary meaning could never be attributed to it. All these arguments show that although gods and narakas are acalcsusa 1. e., beyond the perception of senses, they do exist. (ix ) Papa-Punya: There are five different theories about : . the existence of papa-punya : (1) There exists punya alone which increases or decreases causing pleasure or pain. (2) There exists papa alone which increases or decreases causing pain or pleasure. (3) Punya and papa exist in a combined state like mecakamani. ( 4 ) Punya and papa are independent of each other. (5) There is nothing like Karma, and hence there is nothing like punya and papa also. S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavara Swame refutes all the above-mentioned theories and establishes his own in this way : Just as a potter accompanied by earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the cause of ghata, there do exist punya and

Page #23
19 papa which are but respectively good and evil forms of Karma, that works as the hetu or cause in the production of body. Though there exist visible hetus like father and mother in the production of body, there do exist invisible hetus like punyas and papas also, which determine the form proportionate or im-proportionate, beautiful or ugly, according as it is due to punya or papa. In other words, s'ubha s'arira is the product of punya karma, and a-s'ubha s'arira is the product of papa karma. Like the murta ghata which becomes the cause of a-murta jnana, the murta karma is also the cause of a-murta sukhaduhkha or pleasure and pain etc. The experience of exquisite happiness is caused by the abundance of punya and the experience of utmost miseries is due to the abundance of sins. Punya and papa which thus act as the causes of happiness and misery are independent of each other. Since there is no reason for the Karma-bandha of punya and papa taken together, they can never exist in a combined state like mecakamani. As seen before, mithyatva, a-virati, kasaya, pramada and yoga are the main causes of Karma-bandha. None of these causes happens to operate in case of the production of a combined state of mecakamani. Fruition of jiva s'ubha or as'ubha turns the Karma s'ubha or asubha at the time of apprehension. Food of the same kind produces blood, flesh and saliva etc. in the body on one hand, and results in useful refuge of foeces and urine also on the other hand. In the same way, Karma though apprehended in similar ways, results as subha or a-s'ubha by virtue of parinama and as'raya. Thus, according to Jainism, there do exist punya and papa as separate entities. (x) Para-bhava or the Other World: Since Atman is susceptible to production, destruction and retention as seen before, it must have an access to the next world. When jiva first apprehends ghata and then apprehends pata, the

Page #24
20 apprehension of ghata-known as ghata-cetana-is destroyed, that about pata--or pata-cetana-is produced and the cetana is retained in a continuous range of consciousness existing from times immemorial. * : The same is the case with jivas which are staying in this world, or which have already passed to the other world. For, since they are susceptible to utpada, vyaya, and dhrauvya, they have a natural access to the next world. . Moreover, if there were absolute negation of para-loka the commandments of performing agnihotra etc. for one desirous of Salvation, and the prescription of the rewards of righteous deeds such as charity etc. would be of no avail. (xi) Nirvana or Final Emancipation : Buddhistic theory of Nirvana is this :-A lamp, when extinguished, does never fade into any sort of earth, ether or space, but it only pacifies itself; so' also, the Soul, when finally liberateod ( from body) does never fade into earth or sky, nor does it pass to any of the directions, but it only attains pacification at the removal of worldly bondages of sukha-duhkha. There is another theory also, which asserts that moksa or nirvana is a peculiar positive condition of the soul, at the attainment of Absolute Knowledge and Perception, when all sorts of miseries such as affection, enmity, pride, avarice, infatuation, birth, death, old age, and diseases etc. have been removed. Refuting both the above-stated theories, S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavara asserts that moksa means the entire separation of Karma from the region of soul. Since the mundane world has its production due to Karma, it vanishes with Karma. But javatva happens to exist from times immemorial, and is not produced by Karma. So, jivatva, naturally, can never vanish with Karma. It is not proper, therefore, to believe that at the time of Nirvana, jiva vanishes like a lamp.

Page #25
21 Really speaking, the flame of lamp does not vanish entirely but it only changes its form. Just as milk changes its form into curds, the Hame of lamp changes into darkness. The minute particles of the flame of a lamp transform them. selves into still more minute particles of darkness which are not perceptible. But that does not mean that they have ceased to exist entirely. As a matter of fact, the light-particles of the flame which were perceptible to the eye would become perceptible to pose when turned into darkness. So, the lamp does not entirely die away, but it only changes from light into darkness which is perceptible. Like a lamp, a java is also said to have attained Nirvana or Final Emancipation, * when that jiva passes into a new form which is a-murta, free from Karma-bandhas and which is unobstructible. This, therefore, shows that the pure, eternal, positive condition of jiva at the removal of obstructions like sukha-duhkha is called the state of Nirvuna or Final Emancipation to the java. Like a sage, engrossed in the highest bliss of Absolute Knowledge, a Muktatma liberated from the bondages of all sorts of worldly miseries like birth, death, and old age etc. enjoys a blissful state of Perfect Knowledge. . Finally, explaining the real interpretation of the sentences of Vedas such as " Na ha vai sas'ararasya priya'priyayopahatirasti" as well as " As'ariram va vasantam priya'priye na spris'atah" etc., S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavara Swani convinces the Ganadhara of the validity of the theory of Nirvana and removes all his doubts. (For further explanation see discusssion with the last Ganadhara ). II The Author-His Life, Works and Dates, (a) Life. Jinabhudru Gani Ksamas'ramana is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet,

Page #26
22 there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his age. He was the first Jaina writer and preacher who had consistently attempted to interprete and explain the principles of the Jaina Canon (or the religious principles preached by the great Jinus ) in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people. That is to say, he did not instruct his pupils or followers only in a traditional artificial way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the Jaina Canon, he interpreted and explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age and hence was awarded the title of yugapradhAna "yugapradhana".? His knowledge was not confined to the religious lore, but 6. Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:(i) jinabhadragaNiM staumi kSamAzramaNamuttamam / ___ yaH zrutAjItamuddabhre zauriH sindhoH sudhAmiva // 1 // -Tilakacarya in his Avas'ayaka Vritti. (ii) vaakyairvishessaatishyvishvsndehhaaribhiH| jinamudaM jinabhadraM kiM kSamAzramaNaM stuve // -- Muni Candra Suri in Amara Caritra. (iii) jinavacananataM viSamaM bhAvArtha yo vivicya ziSyebhyaH // ___ * itthamupAdizadamalaM paropakAraikakRtacetAH // taM namata bodhajaladhi guNamaMdiramakhilavAgminAM zreSTham // caraNazriyopagUDhaM jinabhadragaNikSamAzramaNam // - Malayagiri Suri in his Commentary on Brihat Ksetra Samasa. 7. Vide namaha ya aNuoga-dharaM jugappahANaM pahANa nANAyamayaM / - sava-sui-sattha-kusalaM daMsaNa-nANovaogamaggammiThiyaM / / --Siddhasena Suri in his Curni on Jitakalpasutra.

Page #27
28 . he was well-versed in the sciences of inathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also.8 Still, hower, Acarya Jinabhadra Gani was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional Jaina Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge and intelligence were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticity and validity of the Jaina Ayamas. He is therefore, taken as one of the pioneer agama-pradhana or orthodox Acaryas. 9 He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view- * point of the traditional Jaina Agamis, and were rejected if they went against the traditional preachings The example of his predecessor Siddhasena Divakara is welknown. Siddhasena. was a free-minded but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent ideas irrespective of their being different from or similar to the traditional Jaina Agamas. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneouly but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations, Siddhasea thus went against the traditional view of the Jaina Agamas according to which the Kevala-Jnana and the Kevala-Dars'ana took place simultaneously. Jinabhandra Gani Ksamas'ramana repudiates the theory 8. Vide E-ART 4-HATIA-fera-17fo17-35-ACA FAITT! dasasu vi disAsu jassa ya aNuogo (aNuvamo) bhaNai jasapaDaho // (Ibid) 9. Vide TTFARITA-fasu TAT-TAH-AAITAITOTAS I jiNabhaddakhamAsamaNaM khamAsamaNANaM nihANamiva ekaM // (Ibid) Also vide Jitakalpasutra (Ed-by Muni Jinavijayaji ), Editor's Preface, p. 7.

Page #28
of Siddhasena Divakara in his Vis'esavasyaka Bhas'ya and re-establishes the original theory of the Jaina Agamas that Kevala Dars'ana and Krvala Jnana take place simultaneously.10 Jinabhadra Gani is, thus, well-renowned as the preserver of the Jaina traditions. That Jinabhadra Gani Ksuma S'ramana was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator Hemcandracarya Maladhari refers to Jinabhadra Gani as " Upa Jinabhadra Ksama S'ramanah Vyakhyatarah". Another commentator named Kotyacarya who has written a commentary on the Visesavas'yaka Bhasya pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says 11 bhASyaM sAmAyikasya sphuTavikaTapadArthopagUDhaM vRhadyachImatpUjyairakAri kSatakaluSadhiyAM bhUrisaMskAradhAri / tasya vyAkhyAnamAtraM kimapi vidadhatA yanmayA puNyamApta pretyAhaM dAga labheyaM paramaparimitAM prItimatraiva tena / No more information is available about the life of this great Acarya. (b) Works. Jinabhadra Gani Ksama S'ramana is said to have composed the following works : (i) Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya : This welknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of Jainisan. The author himself wrote a commentary on this Bhasya in Sanskrit. Jinabhadra Gani has earned 10. Vide -IUTTET3TTT ( HTCTTH) foci i 11. Vide "Short History of Jaina Literature" Ed. by M, D. Desai, p. 152, foot-uote.

Page #29
25 the reputation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as Bhasyakara, the references have been quoted from this'esavas'yaka Bhasya. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the Jita Kalpa Sutrala it is not improbable if Jinabhadra Gani Ksama S'ramana had composed other bhasyas as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the Vis'esavas'ayaka Bhasya poggala-modaya-dante pharusagavaDasAlabhaMjane ceva / thINAddhiyassa e e diTuMtA hoMti nAyabA // 235 // In this verse, the examples of poggala ( flesh ) modaya ( sweet-balls ) danta (teeth ) pharusaga (a potter ) and vadasala ( the branch of a tree ) have not been explained in. details by the commentators. Acarya Hemacandra Maladhari suggestively remarks that" Tai Tai Tufa lagtaat faftegaat " (These examples should be understood in details from Nis'eetha) Kotyacaryals also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying " faaste getIn:" (We shall explain this in Nis'eetha) The question arises as to who is the author of Nis'eetha. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to Hemacandracarya Maladhari or to Kotyacarya. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by Jinabhadra Gani and the sentence" foarte a la:" found in the commentary of Kotyacarya might have orginally belonged to the. commentary written by S'ri Jinabhadra Gani ksama s'ramana himself.14 12. Vide Jita Kalpa Sutra Preface Page 9. 13. Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the Bhandarkara Research Institute, Poona. . 14. Jinavijayaji gives another evidence for this belief. In & miscellancous collection of several stray Commentaries (which he possesses ) the compiler gives three verses of Nis'eetha Bhasya and makes the following remark at the end ;gfa fHEHAT a fariteTH167FTIGAT-E27: ( Preface to Jita Kalpa Sutra pp. 9-10)

Page #30
26 Unfortunately these commentaries are not available at present, and we have to depend mostly on conjectures. The commentary of Kotyacarya is preserved in a tattered condition in the Bhandarkara Research Institute, Poona. The only available commentary is that of S'ri Maladhari Hemacandracarya, (ii) Brihat Samgrahani--This work runs in almost 500 verses. Acarya Malayagiri Suri has written a commentary on this work in Sanskrit. The work along with the Commentary has already been published. (iii) Brihat Kthetra-Samasa-This is also a similar work. Acarya S'ri Malayagiri Suri and others have written commentaries and the work along with the commentaries is published. (iv) Jita Kalpa Sutra-This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the Jaina monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstration. The subject of remonstration has already been treated in the Cheda-sutras and other works. Jinabhadra Gani seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner. The oldest commentary available on this work at present. . is the curni of Siddhasena in Prakrit. In. his Curni, Siddha sena remarks at one place that there existed some other curni5 also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present. On this Curni of Siddhasena, S're Candra Suri has written explanatry notes in Sanskrit. Besides the curni of Siddhasena, there is one more curni available in Prakrit verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same curni that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of 15. ahavA bitiyacunikarA-bhiSpAraNa catvAri vi sutteNa va ghiyaa|

Page #31
27 composition either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.16 (v) Visesanavah:-This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 Prakrit verses and is not publishdd as yet. In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider Dhyana-s'ataka which has been incorporated by Acarya Maharaja Haribhadra Suri in his commentary on the Avas'yaka Sutras, also to be the composition of Jinabhadra Gani Ksama-s'ramana. But there are not sufficient evidences to convince us of his authorship of Dhayana-S'ataka. (c) Date: - There are no definite means that help us to fix the exact date of Jinabhadra Gani ksama-s'ramana. Still, however, the tradition of various Pattavalis throws considerable light on the problem. The tradition of the Pattavalis written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that Jinabhadra Gani ksamas ramana flourished 1115 years after the Nirvana of S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavira. This fixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S. There is another theory which assigns to Jinabhadra Gani 500 years earlier than his commentator Maladhari Hemacandracarya who is said to have flourished in 1175 V. S. According to this theory also, Jinabhadra Gani ksama-s'ramana must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S. The author of Tapagaccha Pattavali places Jinabhadra Gani ksama-s'ramana as the contemporary of Acarya S'riman Haribhadra Suri who is said to have written a commentary 16. At the end of this bhasya the only reference is this:-- saM. 1720 varSe mArgazIrSa zudi 1 zukravAsare adyahe zrIpattane li0 zrI moDha jJAtinA kAzIdAsAtmajena aMbAdattena / zubhaM bhavatu | zivamastu | (Jita Kalpa Sutra Preface P. 17) *

Page #32
. 28 .. on Dhyana S'ataka. According to this view, Jinabhadra Gani had, lived a long life of 104 years and though Acarya Haribhadra Suri was senior to him by 60 or 65 years, both of them happened to be contemporaries on account of the long life.of Jinabhadra Gani.17 This view is not sound because Haribhadra Suri did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 580 V. S. but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as Muni Jinavijayaji has suggested. Secondly, Sriman Haribhadra Suri has frequently quoted Jinabhadra Gani's sutras in his Avas'yaka Vritti. It is, therefore, clear that Jinabhadra Gani did not in any case flourish after Haribhadra Suri. According to other Pattavalis, all of Jinabhadra Gani Haribhadra Suri, Devarddhi Gani ksamas'ramana, S'ilankacarya and Kalukacarya happened to be contemporaries. But the history of the development of Jainism shows that the theory is wrongly based. The date of S'riman Haribhadra Suri has been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S., Jinubhadra Gani has been placed in the latter half of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century V. S. Devarddhi Gani ksama s'ramana and Kalakacarya are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S. Leaving others aside, let us consider if Jinabhadra Gani and S'ilankacarya happened to flourish at the same time. The tradition says that S'ilankacarya was the priest of Vanaraja, the king of Anahillnpur Patana. If this is true the date of Silankacarya falls somewhere near 800 V. S. since Vanaraja established his kingdom in 802 V. S. This places S'ilankacarya undoubtedly as the contemporary of Acarya Sree Haribhadra Suriji. Now some of the Patlavalis refer to 17. Vide Sr Tapagachchha Pattavali ( Edited by) Sra Kalyana Vijayaji Vol. I. page 98.

Page #33
29 S'ilarikacarya as the pupil of Jinabhadra Gani ksama s'ramana. If this S'ilankacarya is the same as the commentator Kotyacarya several references about Jinabhadra Gani found in his commentary on the Vis'esavas' yaka Bhasya do not in any way lead us to believe that S'ilankacarya was the pupil of Jinabhadra Gani. Unfortunately, the first and last portions of this commentary are torn out, 18 but in course of his commentary the commentator refers to Jinabhadra Gani ksama s'ramana at several places. e. g. (i) frangafoxTATEAUTYSTUEET ATHI (ii) ata eva pUjyapAdaiH svaTIkAyAM prAyopagrahaNaM kRtam / (iii) HITAUETAT catch! (iv) FATHETETUTTE! (v) zrImatkSamAzramaNapUjyapAdAnAmabhiprAyo lakSaNIyaH Although these references show how much respect the commentatar had for Jinabhadra Gani ksamiis'ramana, they do not in any way lead us to believe that Jinabhadra Gani was his preceptor. On the contrary, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of Jinabhadra Gani and S'ilankacarya. The reference is this: bhASyAnanuyAyi pAThAntaramidaM agrataH, evamanenaiva vRddhikrameNetyAdervAka, na cedaM bhUyasISu pratiSu dRzyate // 19 This reference shows that there were various readings of Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya in the time of S'ilankacarya which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the Vis'esavas'yaka Bhasya. This, therefore, prevents us from accepting the view that Jinabhadra Gani ksamas'ramana was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of S'ilankacarya. 18. Vide Jitakalpa Sutra Preface pp. 14-15. 19. Ibid p. 15.

Page #34
80 Thus there are many difficulties in accepting Jinabhadra Gani as the contemporary of S'ilankacarya or even Haribhadra Suriji and others as mentioned before. It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the belief of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the date of Jinabhadra ksamas'ramana as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V. S. III Philosophy. (a) Ethics: According to Jainism, the main purpose of every living being on this earth. viz nirvana or final emancipation is attained in the simultaneous observance of these three main doctrines: (1) Right Belief (Faith in the teachings of Jinas ) (2) Right knowledge ( knowledge of his doctrine ) that leads to Salvation and (3) Right Conduct ( Perfect Conduct ). According to the Jaina Philosophy, belief in real existence of tattvas is right faith. Knowledge of real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world, is right conduct. Virtue consists of the five-fold conduct of one who has knowledge and faith : 1. Innocence-or a-himsa which is not mere negative abstention but positive kindness to all creation. 2. Charity and truth-speaking. 3. Honorable conduct-such as not stealing. 4. Chastity in word, thought and deed. 5. Renunciation of all worldly interests. Jaina ethics lay stress on both faith and works. All those actions which lead to peace of mind are punya. Himsa or infliction of suffering is the great sin or papa.

Page #35
. 81 Untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit etc. are other sources of sin. Sin is no offence against God, but only againt man according to Jaina ethics. The ethical system of the Jainas is more rigorous than that of the Buddhists. It looks upon patience as the highest good and pleasure of senses as a source of sin. The chief feature of Jainism is ahimsa (respect for all and abstention from injuring everything that has life.) The Jainas repudiate the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing or as a series of accidents. According to them, there can neither be destruction of things that do * exist nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. So, according to this view, there is no God necessary for creation or destruction. Jainism looks upon God, nature, and soul, as aspects of the same. According to Jaina ethics there is no God except the soul in its ideal integrity. The Jaina philosophy tells us that the life of God in heaven is one of the forms that a soul might assume by the accumulation of punya ( merit ). According to them, Gods are only embodied souls like men and animals different from them in degree but not in kind. The liberated souls are above gods. They are never born again, and they have no connection with the world. Meditation or adoration of the Jinas sanctifies the soul. (b) Theory of Soul: Plurality of spirits... According to the Jaina philosopby, the universe is filled with javas. Jiva means whatever is living and not whatever is mechanical. So, it corresponds to the life-elemant of Bergson. And since it is a subject of experience it also corresponds to the monad of Leibniz.

Page #36
32 Jainism does not seem to have made exact distinctions between jiva and Atinan, a-java and matter. A jiva is a particular kind of existent being. The liberated java freed from matter, is called the Atman, Ainun means pure consciousness untinted by matter. It excludes all space and externality. It is the jiva purified and raised to the highest spiritual status, which is mere formless consciousness. On the other hand, pudgala is not pure matter untouched by consciousness. It already bears the impress of spirit. Atman is the spirit of being and matter is the negative principle of non-living. The latter corresponds to the space of Bergson, or the materia prima of Leibniz. The bare materiality of pudgalu is the direct opposite of spirit. A java is the combination of the two. It is material-spiritual. A soul * loaded with matter is involved in bondage. All jivas in samsara are associated with this negative element. Jainism believes that Atran or the pure spirit, pure matter, and java which is a conibination of the two, are existent, though the first two are imperceptible to us. The pudgala skandha which we see, has also an element of consciousness, and is as much a java as others, so far as the essence is concerned. The jiva and the a-jiva of the Jainas are not empirical abstractions of Atman, or consciousness, and matter or non-consciousness but the products of an interaction between the two. Strictly speaking, Atman and non-atman are the primary elements. Jiva possesses more of self, -jiva more of not-self. They represent two orders of arrangement in the whole. Jainim believes in plurality of spirits. The jivas are many, but are alike eternal. Their characteristic ossence is never destroyed, however much it is obscured by external causes. They are regarded as possessing size which is varying in different cases. They contract and expand according to the dimensions of the body with which they are incorporated for

Page #37
33 the time being. Truly speaking, the essence of all jtvas is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of jivas. It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth. Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in the sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and S'udras, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. For, the Jaina canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one another, nor could they experience different lots; there would not be Brahmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras; insects, birds and snakes. All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life and those who, in this world, practise right conduct. 2 0 Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, Jainism asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism.3 1 (c) The theory of Knowledge Like the theory of Soul, that of knowledge is also distinctive of Jainism. The Jainas admit five kinds of knowledge viz., Mati, S'ruti, Avadhi, Manahparaya, and Kevala. 1. Mati is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions. We always have sense-perceptions or dars'ana prior to the rise of mati-jnana. 2. S'ruti or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words. While mati-jnana gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description. 20. Vide Sutrakritanga. ii, 7-48 and 51. 21. Of Bosanquet-"It is freely admitted that in cognition, the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit." (Gifford Lectures, Second Series, Chap. II)

Page #38
34 3. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of time or space. It is knowledge by clairvoyance. 4. Manahparyaya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others as in telepathic knowledge of other minds. 5. Kevala or Perfect knowledge, comprehends all substances and their various modifications. It is omniscience unlimited by time, space, or object. This knowledge which is independent of the senses, which can only be felt and not described is possible only for purified souls which are perfectly free from bondage. The first three kinds of knowledge are liable to error, while the last two cannot be wrong. Knowledge is pratyaksa or direct when it is immediate, and paroksa or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge, mati and s'ruti are paroksa and the rest pratyaksa. Cetana or consciousness is the essence of jiva and the two manifestations of cctana are perception (durs'ana ) and intelligence (jnana ). In dars'na the details are not perceived while in jnana they are. The former is simple apprehension, the latter conceptual knowledge. The relation between knowledge and its object is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness. The consciousness of the jiva is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature as well as that of the object. Jneya or object of knowledge includes self and non-self. Like light, jnana reveals itself and other objects. The Nyaya-Vais'esika theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself is rejected by the Jainas. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self, according to them, and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object is dismissed by them as absurd, since it is the nature of knowledge that reveals objects.

Page #39
35 With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between jnana and jneya is very intimate. Jhanin and jnana are also inseparable though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the object of knowledge and knowledge itself become different aspects of a single concrete entity.. There are no javas without jnana since that would take away the cetana or conscious character of the jivas and reduce them to the level of a-java dravyas and there can be no jnana without selyes; for that would make jnana foundationless. In its perfect condition, the soul is pure. Jrana and dars'ana ( knowlege and intuition ) arise simultaneously or are together. In the mundane jivas, jnana is preceded by dars'ana. Perfect knowledge is free from doubt ( sanas'aya ) perversity ( vimoha ) and indefiniteness ( vibhrama ) The Karmas which obscure the different varieties of dars'ana are dars'anavaraniya karmas and those which obscure the different kinds of jnana are jnanavaraniya karmas. These impediments are passions and emotions. All knowledge resides in the soul though it manifests itself when the disturbing media are removed. (d) Karma : Karma is another important topic of the Jaina philosophy. Karma, according to the Jainas, is of material nature (pudgalika), The kind of matter fit to manifest Karma fills all cosmic space. It has the peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. The soul by its commerce with the other world becomes literally penetrated with the particles of subtle matter. These become Karma and build up a special body called " Karmana S'arira," which does not leave the soul till its Final Emancipation. Jivas which are found on this world in infinite number, are of three kinds (1) Nitya siddha or the ever perfect *( 2 ) Mukta or the liberated and (3) the Baddha or the bound.

Page #40
36 The second variety of javas does not become embodied. They have achieved their purity and dwell in a state of supermundane perfection unconcerned - with worldly affairs. The mundane jivas are a prey to illusion, and are condemned to the yoke of matter through an infinite succession of lines. The freed souls are absolutely pure and free from any tint of matter. They are the nirupadhi jivas leading a life of pure existence and infinite consciousness and possess infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite power, and infinite bliss. Thus, by touching the main distinctive features of the Jaina philosophy, we can easily remark like Sir Radhakrishanan that " Jainism offers us an empirical classification of things in the universe and so argues for a plurality of spirits. 2 a " Gujarat College Ahmedabad 10 : 12 : '42 D. P. Thaker 22. Vide " Indian Philosophy" by Sir S. Radhakrishanan.

Page #41
Contents 1. Chapter I Discussion with the First Ganadhara. 1 2. Chapter II Discussion with the Second Ganadhara. 79 3. Chapter III Discussion with the Third Ganadhara. 137 4. Chapter IV Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara 190 5. Chapter V Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara. 279 6. Chapter VI Discussion with the Sixth Ganadhara. 309 7. Chapter VII Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara. 367 8. Chapter VIII Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara. 389 9. Chapter IX Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara. 408 10. Chapter X Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara. 459 11. * Chapter XI Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara. 480

Page #42
Ksamasramana Jinbhadra Gani's GANADHARAVADA

Page #43

Page #44
kSamAzramaNazrIjinabhadragaNisanhabdhaH // gnndhrvaadH|| zrImaladhArihemacandrasUrikRtaTIkAsamalakRtaH / HaryKsamasramana Jinabhadra Gani's GANADHARAVADA Along with Maladharin Hemacandra Suri's Commentary Chapter I prathamagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the First Ganadhara. jIve tuha sandeho paJcakkhaM jaM na ghippai ghaDo ch| aJcantApaJcakkhaM ca natthi loe khapuSpaM va // 1 // . (1549) Jive tuha sandeho paccakkham jam na ghippai ghado vva i Accantapaccakkham ca natthi loe khapuppham val 1 ( 1549 ) [ jIve tava sandehaH pratyakSa yad na gRhyate ghaTa iv| .. atyantApratyakSaM ca nAsti loke khapuSpamiva // 1 // (1549) Jive tava sandehah pratyksam yad na glhyate ghata iva | Atyantapratyaksam ca nasti loke khapuspam iva // 1 (1549 )

Page #45
*: 2:. . Jinabhadra Gani's . [The first ___Translation-1 (O Indrabhuti of Gautama gotra !) You have a doubt about ( the existence of ) jiva ( the soul ) since it is not directly perceived ( by senses ) as is the case with a ghata ( a water-jar ). Whatever is absolutely imperceptible, does not exist in the world, e. g., a flower in the sky. ( 1549 ) zrImaladhArihemacandrAcAryakRtA TIkA AyuSman indrabhUte ! tavaiSaH sandehaH-kimayamAtmA'sti, nAsti vA, ubhayahetusadbhAvAt / tatra nAstitvahetavo'mI-nAstyAtmA, pratyakSeNAtyantamagRhyamANatvAt , iha yadatyantApratyakSaM talloke nAstyeva, yathA khapuSpam / yaccAsti tat pratyakSeNa gRhyata eva, yathA ghaTaH, ityasau vyatirekadRSTAntaH / aNavo'pi hyapratyakSAH kintu ghaTAdikAryatayA pariNatAste pratyakSamupayAnti; na punarevamAtmA kadAcidapi bhAvapratyakSamupagacchati, ato'trAtyantavizeSaNamiti // 1 (1549) // Digest of the Commentary--O long-lived Indrabhuti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the soul. For, you come across reasons, some of which lead you to believe that the soul exists, whereas, others make you surmise that the soul does not exist. The latter are as under: The soul does not exist; for, it is in no way perceptible by pratyaksa pramana ( direct and valid proof ) produced by a sense-organ, as is the case with a ghata. Whatever is atyantapratyaksa (absolutely imperceptible ) is certainly nonexistent in this world, e. g., a flower in the sky. Whatever exists, is certainly perceived - realized by pratyaksa pramana, e. g., a pitcher. This is a vyatireka drstanta (a negative example ). Some one may here argue, that though anus ( electrons ) are not within the range of pratyaksa pramana they are, so to say, invisible; yet they do exist. So, what about them? The answer is, that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as anus, but when they are transformed so as to perform the

Page #46
Vada ] ... Ganadharavada functions of a pitcher, a cloth, etc., they no longer remain so, Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived. The adjective atyanta, is here used on that account. - Notes - pramANam Pramanam pramIyate anena iti pramANam-pramayate anena iti pramanam. That by which a correct notion is arrived at, is called a pramana. Stefagfasea: TAT-arthopalabdhi hetuh pramanam. Pramana is the means to knowledge. Pramana is the doctrine of Frier-syadvada which lays bare the whole truth, which is the synthesis of extremes and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths. TETH pratyaksam fegurstafa ri ya 897-. Indriyartha sannikarsa-janyam jnanam pratyaksam-knowledge derived directly from the peripheral contact of the senseorgans with their corresponding objects. TETTATH pratyaksa pramanam-Altaica afa saca FOTETTATUTOETUT-Jnanakaranakatve sati jnanatvam pratyaksapramanalaksanam. Sense-perception means direct knowledge. na ya so'NumANagammo jamhA paccakkhapuvayaM taM pi / pubovaladdhasambandhasaraNao liGga-liGgINaM // 2 // (1550) Na ya so'numanagammo jamha paccakkhapuvvayam tam pil Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranao linga-linginam 11 2 ( 1550 ) [na ca so'numAnagamyo yasmAt pratyakSapUrvakaM tadapi / getrof frorat foss-festsai: 112 11 ( 8440) Na ca so'numanagamyo yasmat pratyaksapurvakam tadapi | Purvopalabdhasambandhasmaranato linga-linginoh || 2 (1550) ] Trans.--2 It (the soul) is not an object of anumana (inference); for, this (anumana), too, is preceded by pratyaksa and is the outcome of the recollection of the (inseparable) connection

Page #47
. Jinabhadra Gani's . [The first previously observed in the case of a linga ( a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a lingin (one having such a linga). (1550) TIkA-na cAsAvAtmA'numAnagamyaH yasmAt tadapyanumAnaM pratyakSapUrvaka pravartate / kutaH ? ityAha-" pubovaladdhe "tyAdi liGganyate-gamyate'tIndriyArtho'neneti liGgam ; athavA lInaM-tirohitamarthaM gamayatIti liGgam , dhUmakRtakatvAdikam , tadasyAstIti liGgI vahvatha-'nityatvAdiH, tayoliGgaliGginoryaH pUrvaM mahAnasAdau pratyakSAdinopalabdhaH kArya-kAraNabhAvAdikaH sambandhastasya yat smaraNaM tasmAditi / idamuktaM bhavati-pUrva mahAnasAdAvagnidhUmoliGgi-liGgayoranvayavyatirekavantamavinAbhAvamadhyakSato gRhItvA tata uttarakAlaM kvacit kAntAra-parvatanitambAdau gaganAvalambinI dhUmalekhAmavalokya prAg gRhItaM sambandhamanusarati, tad yathA-' yatra yatra dhUmastatra tatra prAgahaM vahnimadrAkSam , yathA mahAnasAdau, dhUmazcAtra dRzyate, tasmAd vahninApIha bhavitavyam', ityevaM liGgagrahaNa-sambandhasmaraNAbhyAM tatra pramAtA hutabhujamavagacchati / na caivamAtmanA liGginA sAdhu kasyApi liGgasya pratyakSeNa sambandhaH siddho'sti, yatastatsambandhamanusmarataH punastalliGgadarzanAjIve sampratyayaH syAt / yadi punarjIva-liGgayoH pratyakSataH sambandhasiddhiH syAt tadA jIvasyApi pratyakSatvApatyA'numAnavaiyayaM syAt / tata eva tatsiddheriti // 2 (1550) / ____D. C.-The existence of the soul, cannot be proved by anumana ( inference); for, after all, this anumana is preceded by pratyaksa pramana as is suggested by the second hemistich of this verse. Whatever reveals an object which is imperceptible to the senses, is called a linga or whatever throws light on a concealed object is a linga, and one that has a linga is called a lingin. For instance, smoke is the linga, and fire the lingin. To give another example krtakatva ( performance of an action ) is the linga, and anityatva (impermanence ) the lingin. An inseparable connection between smoke and fire, in the form of effect and cause -- the connection which is directly perceived in a kitchen, etc., can be established in two ways, viz., the lingin.

Page #48
Vada ] . Ganadharavada . by anvaya (positively) and by vyatireka (negatively). Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, is an example of anvaya; and wherever there is non-existence of fire, there is non-existence of smoke, is an example of vyatireka. The recollection of the inseparable connection existing between smoke and fire, helps a man to infer the presence of fire, when he sees clouds of smoke rising to the sky, either in a forest or on the top of a mountain or the like. For, he is then reminded of having seen fire when moke was found coming out of the kitchen or the like. Thereupon, he works up a syllogism, as under: Wherever there was smoke, I previously saw fire there, as in the kitchen and elsewhere. I see smoke here; so, here, there must be fire. Thus, he rightly infers fire in view of his. having previously noticed the inseparable connection between smoke the linga, and fire the lingin, and on his recollecting this connection while drawing the inference. But in the case of the soul, a lingin, no connection of it, whatsoever is directly perceived with any one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, there is no room left for the recollection of an inseparable connection between the soul and its linga and hence there is no chance left for establishing the existence of the soul by anumana. Moreover, if the inseparable connection were to be observed in the case of the soul and its linga, the soul would be directly perceived, and in that case, there would be no necessity to infer its existence. - Notes - 39Tara anumana (from a anu, after, and Ar ma, to measure and hence to know ) is so called because by means of this particular kind of knowledge, a thing though remote in time, space and nature, is measured out to the mind, after one has recollected the relation of invariable sarfa vyapti, concomitance,

Page #49
..: 6 : * Jinabhadra Gani's . . [ The first between liGga linga, also known as hetu hetu, e. g. dhUma dhuma, smoke and first lingin also known as arey sadhya, e., 9., afa vahni, fire. It is said: na ya jIvaliGgasambandhadarisaNamabhU jao puNo sro| talliGgadarisaNAo jIve sampaccao hojjA // 3 // (1551) Na ya jivalingasambandhadarisanamabhu jao puno sarad 1 Tallirigadarisanao jive sampaccao hojja ll 3 ( 1551 ) [na ca jIvaliGgasambandhadarzanamabhUd yataH punaH smrtH| ___ talliGgadarzanAjIve sampratyayo bhavet // 3 // (1551) Na ca jivalingasambandhadarsanam abhu yatah punah smaratah - Tallingadarsanajjive sampratyayo bhavet // 3 ( 1551 )] Trans.-3 There has not been ( previously ) seen (any) connection between the soul and its linga, the recollection of which, along with the sight of its linga, can lead ( us ) to a conviction about the ( existence of ) the soul. ( 1551 ) ___TIkA-gatArthA / na ca vaktavyaM sAmAnyatodRSTAnumAnAdAdityAdigativajIvaH sidhyati, yathA-gatimAnAdityaH dezAntaraprApteH devadattavaditi, yato hanta ! devadatte dRSTAntadharmiNi sAmAnyena dezAntaraprAptiM gatipUrvikAM pratyakSeNaiva nizcitya, sUrye'pi tAM tathaiva pramAtA sAdhayatIti yuktam / na caivamatra kvacidapi dRSTAnte jIvasattvenAvinAbhUtaH ko'pi heturadhyakSeNopalakSyata iti / ato na sAmAnyatodRSTAdapyanumAnAt tadgatiriti // 3 (1551) / ___D. C:-It is no use arguing that the existence of the soul can be established by an anumana which is ordinarily met with, as in the case of the motion of the Sun. To put it explicitly, the Sun is in motion; for, it reaches another region, as is the case with Devadatta. As regards the Sun, this inference is valid, since we distinctly see that Devadatta, who is here a drstantadhurmin i. e., serving as an illustration, goes like the Sun, to another country after he has resorted to motion. But as

Page #50
Vada ] . . Ganadharavida . far as the soul is concerned, no linga ( also known as hetu) which is inseparably connected with the soul, is directly perceived in any drstanta, (example ) whatsoever. Thus, the samanyatodrsta anumana is of no avail here. The existence of the soul cannot be proved by agama ( scriptural authority ). nAgamagammo vi tao bhijai jaM naagmo'nnumaannaao| na ya kAsai paJcakkho jIvo jassAgamo vayaNaM // 4 // (1552) Nagamgammo vi tao bhijjai jam nagamo'numanao 1 Na ya kasai paccakkho jivo jassagamo vayanam 11 4 ( 1552 ) . [nAgamagamyo'pi sako bhidyate yad nAgamo'numAnAt / na ca kasyacit pratyakSo jIvo yasyAgamo vacanam // 4 // (1552). Nagamagamyo'pi sako bhidyate yad nagamo'numanati Na ca kasyacit pratyakso jivo yasyagamo vacanam 11 4 (1552) ] Trans.-4 It ( the soul ) is not even within the range of agama ( scriptural authority ); for, agama is not ( quite ) distinct from anumana. Moreover, the soul is not pratyaksa ( directly perceptible ) to any one whose word is agama. (1552 ) * TIkA-na cAgamagamyo'pi takaH-asau jIvaH yat-yasmAdAgamo'pi nAnumAnAd bhidyate, paramArthatastasyAnumAnatvAt ; tathAhi-zAbdaM pramANAgama ucyate, zabdazca dvividhaH-dRSTArthaviSayaH adRSTArthaviSayazca / tatra dRSTArthaviSayA zabdAd yA pratItiH, sA vastuto'numAnasamutthaivam , yataH kvacit prathamaM pRthubudhnodarordhvakuNDa-loSTAyata-vRttagrIvAdimati ghaTapadArthe ghaTazabdaM prayujyamAnaM dRSTvA taduttarakAlaM kvApi "ghaTamAnaya" ityAdi zabdaM zrutvA pRthubudhnodarAdimadartha eva ghaTa ucyate, tathAbhUtapadArtha eva ghaTazabdaprayogapravRtteH, yathA pUrva kumbhakArApaNAdau, ghaTazabdazcAyamidAnImapi zrUyate, tasmAt tathAbhUtasyaiva pRthubudhno. darAdimataH padArthasya mayA''nayanAdikriyA kartavyA ityanumAnaM vidhAya pramAtA ghaTAnayanAdikriyAM karoti, ityevaM dRSTArthaviSayaM zAbdaM pramANaM vastuto nAnu

Page #51
* 8: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first mAnAd bhidyate / na caivamasAvAtmazabdaH zarIrAdRte'nyatra prayujyamAnaH kvacidupalabdhaH, yatra khalvAtmazabdazravaNAt AtmA iti pratyayo bhavediti / yadapi svarga narakAdyadRSTArthaviSayaM zAbdaM pramANaM tadapi tattvato'numAnaM nAtivarttate, tathAhi - " pramANaM svarga-narakAdyadRSTArthaviSayaM vacanam, avisaMvAdivacanAptapraNItatvAt, candrArkoparAgAdivacanavat" ityevamanumAnAdeva tatra pramANatA / na caivambhUtamAsaM kamapi pazyAmaH, yasyAtmA pratyakSa iti tadvacanamAgama iti ' pratipadyemahi ' iti zeSaH // 4 ( 1552 ) // D. C-The existence of the soul cannot be established by agama; for, after all, agama cannot be separated from anumana, as, really speaking, agama is (a kind of) anumana. Agama is defined as subda pramanu, and sabda (word) is two-fold, viz., (i) drstartha-visaya (pertaining to an object which is seen) and (ii) a-drstartha-visaya ( pertaining to an object which is not seen). 66 The conviction which is arrived at, by means of a sabda and which is associated with an object that is seen, is really an outcome of anumana. For instance, first of all, one notices that the word ghata is used for an object whose belly is round and extensive, whose basin is raised up and hollowed out, whose neck is round and which is made up of earth. Thereafter, when he hears bring a ghata" he begins to reflect: None else but an object whose belly is round and extensive, etc., is styled as ghata; for, the word ghata is reserved for this object only a fact noticed in the shop of a potter. I hear the word ghata; so I should bring an object of that very kind, viz., one which is round, extensive etc. Having so inferred, he brings a 'ghata'. Hence, it will be seen that the sabda pramana which is associated with an object that is seen, is not separate from anumana. : To think of the soul, the word 'soul' is not used for any other object but the body. Had it been, however, so used, one would have been convinced about the existence of the soul.

Page #52
Vada ) . . Ganadharavada . The sabda pramana associated with unseen objects like heaven, hell etc., is also, really speaking, not separate from anumana. For, the knowledge connected with unseen objects such as heaven, hell and the like is pramana, as it comes from an apta, a reliable personage whose word is true-a fact noticed when he predicted a lunar eclipse, a solar eclipse and so on. Thus, here, too, the validity or truth rests upon inference.' There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as agama, and on the basis of this agama, the existence of the soul would have been admitted. Besides jaM cAgamA viruddhA paropparamao vi saMsao jutto| savappamANavisayAIo jIvo tti to buddhI // 5 // (1553) Jam cagama viruddha paropparamao vi samsao jutto i Savvappamanavisayajo jivo tti to buddhi li 5 ( 1553 ) [ yaccAgamA viruddhAH parasparamato'pi saMzayo yuktaH / sarvapramANaviSayAtIto jIvo'sti tato buddhiH // 5 // (1553) Yaccagama viruddhah parasparamato'pi sausayo yuktah 1. Sarvapramanavisayatito jivo'sti tato buddhih // 5 ( 1553 ) ] Tvans.--5 Furthermore, the agamas are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, ( your ) doubt is justifiable. You ( therefore ) believe that ( the existence of ) the soul cannot be established by any of the prananas. (1553) TIkA-yatazca tIthikAnAM sambandhinaH sarve'pyAgamAH parasparavirodhinaH khalu, ato'pi saMzaya evAtmano yuktaH, na tu nizcayaH, tathAhikecidAgamA Atmano nAstitvameva pratipAdayanti, yadAhu stikAH

Page #53
*: 10:. .. Jinabhadra Gami's . . [ The first ___ "etAvAneva loko'yaM yAvAnindriyagocaraH / * bhadra ! vRkapadaM pazya yad vadanti bahuzrutAH // 1 // " ityAdi / bhaTTo'pyAha-" vijJAnadhana evaitebhyo bhUtebhyaH samutthAya tAnyevAnuvinazyati, na ca pretyasaJjJA'sti / " sugatastvAha-" na rUpaM bhikSavaH ! pudgalaH" ityAdi / AtmA'stitvavacanAnyapyAgameSu zrUyante tathA ca vedaH-" na hi vai sazarIrasya priyA-'priyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA priye na spRzataH" iti; tathA, " agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH" ityaadi| ___ kApilAgame tu pratipAdyate--" asti puruSo'kartA nirguNo bhoktA cidrUpaH" ityaadi| tasmAdAgamAnAM parasparaviruddhavAd naagmprmaannaadpyaatmsttvsiddhiH| idaM ca vaizeSikamatena pratyakSA-'numAnA-''gamalakSaNaM pramANatrayamupanyastam / etaca svayaM draSTavyam-upamApramANagamyo'pi jIvo na bhavati / tatra hi "yathA gaustathA gvyH| ityAdAveva sAdRzyamasanikRSTe'rthe buddhimutpAdayati / na cehAnyaH kazcit tribhuvane'pyAtmasadRzaH padArtho'sti, yaddarzanAdAtmAnamavagacchAmaH / kAlA-''kAza-digAdayo jIvatulyA vidyanta iti cet / na, teSAmapi vivAdAspadIbhUtatvena tadaMhibaddhatvAt / arthApattisAdhyo'pi jIvo na bhavati / na hi dRSTaH zruto vA ko'pyartha AtmanamantareNa nopapadyate, yadalAt taM saadhyaamH| tasAt sarvapramANaviSayAtIto jIva iti tava buddhiH, bhAvopalambhakapramANapaJcakaviSayAtItatvAt pratiSedhasAdhakA'bhAvAkhyaSaSThapramANaviSaya eva jIva ityarthaH / iti puurvpkssH|| 5 (1553 ) // D. C.--The fact that the agamas of the various expounders of religion, are opposed to one another, justifies one to doubt the existence of the soul, rather than to admit it. For instance, some of the agamas propound the non-existence of the soul. To cite an example, the Nastikas---the atheists-hedonists say :

Page #54
Vada ] .. Ganadharavada . 11 : " Etavan eva loko'yam yavan indriyagocarah | Bhadre ! vrkapadam pasya yad vadanti bahusrutah ir" This means :- This world is only as much as is within the range of the senses. My good lady! see the foot-prints of the wolf. Highly learned individuals also say so. Bhatta, too, says : " Vijnanaghana evaitebhyo bhutebhyah samutthaya tanyevanuvinasyati, na ca pretyasanjna'sti. " This means :--This material body which is nothing else but consciousness, after having been generated from the five elements, is dissolved into them, and there is no clear conception for future life. Sugata says :"Na rupam bhiksavah ! pudgalah " This means :-0 saints ! rupa ( form ) is not a soul. In the agamas, we come across passages which admit the existence of the soul. For instance, in the Veda, we hear : " Na hi vai ser sararasya priyapriyayor: apahatircsti, a sarirom va vasantam priyapriye na sprasatah." This means:--There is no destruction of priya (attachment) and apriya (aversion) in connection with the embodied soul. Attachment and aversion do not affect a disembodied soul. Also " Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah " . This means : An individual desirous of acquiring heaven, should perform agnihotra ( a sacrifice to the god Agni). The agama of the Kapilas says :" Asti puruso akarta nirguno bhokta cidrupah. " . This means :-There exists a purusa ( a personal animate

Page #55
.: 12 :: Jinabhadra Gani's ... [The first entity ) which is not the doer of actions, which is devoid of qualities, which is the enjoyer' ( of pleasure and pain ), and which is the embodiment of consciousness. Thus, since the various agumas are mutually antagonistic, the existence of the soul cannot be established even by upamana pramana ( the proof of analogy ). Yatha gau statha gavayah, means that a cow resembles a bos gavaeus, a species of ox. Here the resemblance helps one to realize a distant object. But, in the entire universe, there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Such being the case, there is no possibility of establishing the existence of the soul, on - comparing it with an object resembling it. It is no use advancing an argument that kala ( time ), akasa (space), dis (direction) etc., resemble the soul; for, there is no uniformity regarding the exposition of their nature so far as the different systems of philophy are concerned. And hence the same trouble. Even arthapatti (presumption or implication ) does not help us. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose justification depending upon the soul, cannot be established. Thus, when the existence of the soul cannot be proved by any one of these five pramanas, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of abhava ( non-existence ), the sixth pramana whose function is to prove non-existence. Thus the soul does not exist. This finishes the purvapaksa ( the view of the opponent). Now follows the refutation of the argument:

Page #56
Vada ] . Ganadharavada : 13:. goyama ! paJcakkhu ciya jIvo jaM saMsayAivinnANaM / paJcakkhaM ca na sajjhaM jaha suha-dukkhA sadehammi // 6 // (1554) Goyama ! paccakkhu cciya jivo jam samsayaivinnanam 1 Paccakkham ca na sajjham jaha suha-dukkha sadehammi 116 (1954) [ gautama ! pratyakSa eva jIvo yat saMzayAdivijJAnam / pratyakSaM ca na sAdhyaM yathA sukha-duHkhe svadehe // 6 // (1554) Gautama ! pratyakna eva jivo yat samsayadivijnanam 1 Pratyaksam ca na sadhyam yatha sukha-duhkhe svade he || 6 (1554)] Refutation Trans.-6. O Gautama ! the soul is indeed pratyaksa to you also; for, ( your ) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the soul. What is pratyaksa should not be proved, e. g., weal and woe in one's body. ( 1554 ) TIkA-gautama ! bhavato'pi pratyakSa evA'yaM jIvaH, kimanyena pramANAntaropanyAsena ? / ko'yaM jIvo mama pratyakSaH ? iti cet / ucyate-yadetat tavaiva saMzayAdivijJAnaM svasaMvedanasiddhaM hRdi sphurati sa eva jIvaH, saMzayAdijJAnasyaiva tadananyatvena jIvatvAt / yacca pratyakSaM tad na pramANAntareNa sAdhyam , tathA svazarIra evAtmasaMvedanasiddhAH sukh-duHkhaadyH| pratyakSasiddhamapi sagrAma-nagaraM vizvaM zUnyavAdinaM prati sAdhyata eveti cet| naivam , "nirAlambanAH sarve pratyayAH, pratyayatvAt , svamapratyayavat " ityAdestadudbhAvitabAdhakapramANasyaiva tatra nirAkaraNAt , atra tvAtmagrAhake pratyakSe bAdhakapramANAbhAvAditi // 6 (1554) / D. C.-0 Gautama ! the soul is directly cognizable even to you; so what is the use of resorting to other pramanas ? If you ask a question as to how the soul is pratyaksa (directly cognizable ) to you, the answer is this : This knowledge of yours, of which the existence is proved by your own experience of it, and which you entertain

Page #57
14: Jinabhadra Gani's. [The first in your heart, is the soul itself; for, this knowledge is identical with the soul. What could be decided by pratyaksa should not be established by any other pramana. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery etc., which one experiences in the body. It is futile to advance an argument that though the existence of the universe consisting of villages and cities, is self-evident, yet it is to be proved so far as a nihilist is concerned. For the argument such as "Niralambana sarve pratyayah, pratyayatvat svapnapratyayavat that is to say all convictions are devoid of any substratum, since they are convictions, like the conviction of a dream-an argument which can be advanced by a nihilist and which is a badhaka pramana (prejudicing evidence), has already been refuted. And, here there is no badhaka pramana in the pratyaksa which reveals the soul. case of "" The existence of the soul is established by pratyaksa pramana for the following reason : kayavaM karemi kAhaM vAhamahaM paccayA imAu ya / 37091 cqzprai famgamiagarei || 011 (8444). i Kayavam karemi kaham va'hamaham paccaya imau ya Appa sa ppaccakkho tikalakajjovaesao. 7 ( 1555) [ kRtavAn karomi kariSyAmi vAhamahampratyayAdasmAcca / AtmA sa pratyakSastraikAlikAryopadezAt || 7 || ( 1555 ) Kritavan karomi karisyami vahamahampratyayadasmacca | Atma sa pratyaksastraikalikakaryopadesat | 7 (1555)] > Trans.-7 Or, this soul is pratyksa owing to this ahampratyaya (realization as "I") in I did, I do, and I shall do -the pratyaya which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses. (1555)

Page #58
Vada } " 66 TIkA - vetyathavA ' kRtavAnaham, karomyaham kariSyAmyaham '; 'uktavAnaham bravImyaham, vakSyAmyaham '; 'jJAtavAnaham, jAne'ham, jJAsyAmyaham', ityAdi prakAreNa yo'yaM traikAlikaH kAryavyapadezaH, tadviSayaprayujyamAnatayA tatsamuttho yo'yamahampratyayaH, etasmAdapi pratyakSa evAyamAtmA " iti prapadyakha / ayaM hyahampratyayo nAnumAnikaH, alaiGgikatvAt / nApyAgamAdipramANa sambhavaH tadanabhijJAnAM bAla-gopAlAdInAmapyantarmukhatayA''tmagrAhakatvena svasaMviditasya tasyotpAdAt ghaTAdau cAnutpAdAditi // 7 (1555 ) | " Ganadharavada " *:15:. 66 D. C. --In the expressions such as krtavan aham ( I did ), karomyaham ( I do ) and karisyamyaham ( I shall do ) uktavan aham (I spoke ), bravimyaham (I speak ) and vaksyamyaham ( I shall speak ), jnatuvan aham ( I know ), jane ham ( I know ) and jnasyamyahuum ( I shall know ), etc.--the expressions which are associated with acts governed by all the three tenses, viz., past, present and future, there is aham-pratyaya (the realization as "I"). This aham-pratyaya, too, establishes that the soul is pratyaksa. It should be borne in mind that this aham-pratyaya is not based on anumana; for, it has no linga. Moreover, it not even proved by agama etc., for, even children, cowherds and others have the conviction of this aham-pratyya based on self-experience, though they are not conversant with pramanas such as agama etc, and that they have no such conviction regarding a ghata, a piece of cloth etc. Besides kaha paDivaNNamahaM ti yakimatthi natthi ttisaMsao kaha Nu / saMsamma vAyaM kassAhaMpaccao jutto ? // 8 // (1556) sai Kaha padivannamaham ti ya kim atthi natthi tti samsao kaha nu? | Sai samsayammi vayam kassahampaccao jutto? 8 (1556) [ kathaM pratipannamahamiti ca kimasmi nAsmIti saMzayaH kathaM nu ? | sati saMzaye cAyaM kasyAhampratyayo yuktaH 1 // / 8 / / ( 1556 )

Page #59
* 16: Jinabhadra Gani's. Katham pratipannamaham iti ca kimasmi nasmiti samsayah katham nu ? | Sati samsaye cayam kasyaham pratyayo. yuktah? || 8. (1556) [The first 99 Trans.-8 When there is no soul, how do you admit aham (the realization as 'I'))? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this aham-pratyaya justifiable? (1556) TIkA - hanta ! kathamasati jIve " aham iti pratipannaM tvayA, viSayAbhAve viSayiNo'nutthAnaprasaGgAtH 1 / deha evAsya pratyayasya viSaya iti cet / na, jIvavipramukte'pi dehe tadutpattiprasaGgAt / sati ca jIvaviSaye'sminnahampratyaye ' kimahamasmi nAsmi' iti bhavataH saMzayaH kathaM kena prakAreNopa jAyate ? ahampratyayagrAhyasya jIvasya sadbhAvAt " asmyaham " iti nizcaya eva yujyata iti bhAvaH / santi vA'sminnAtmAstitvasaMzaye kasyAya mahampratyayo yujyate, nirmUlatvena tadanutthAnaprasaGgAt ? iti / / 8 (1556) / / D. C.-Hallo! when the soul is non-existent, how is it that you admitaham'? For, it is a settled fact that in the absence of a visaya (an object), there is no scope for a visayin (one having an object). If your reply is that this aham-pratyaya has the body alone, for, visaya is confined simply to the body, this aham-pratyaya should be possible even in the case of the body which has been given up by the soul. Moreover, if this aham-pratyaya associated with the soul arises, how can you have a doubt as to kim aham asmi (am I) or nasmi (am I not)? For, on the contrary, in such a case, you ought to be in a position to decide that I am ' owing to the sadbhava ( presence) of the soul realized by the ahampratyaya. When there is this doubt about the existence of the soul, is there no scope for such a pratyaya owing to its being baseless ? If the non-existence of the soul is admitted, there is no possibility of a doubt regarding its existence.

Page #60
Vada ] .. Ganadharavada . . .: 17 :. jai natthi saMsai cciya kimathi natthi tti saMsao kassa ? / saMsaie va sarUve goyama! kimasaMsayaM hojjA ? // 9 // (1557) Jai natthi samsar cciya kim atthi natthi tti samsao kassa ? I Samsaie va saruve Goyama! kim asamsayam hojja ? 11 9 ( 1557 ) [yadi nAsti saMzayI eva kimasmi nAsmIti saMzayaH kasya / saMzayite vA svarUpe gautama ! kimasaMzayaM bhavet ? // 9 // (1557) Yadi nasti samsayi eva kim asmi nasmiti samsayah kasya ? | Samsayite va svarupe Gautama ! kim asamsayam bhavet ?119 (1557)] Trans.-9 If the object about which one has doubt, is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to "kim asmi nasmi" ( whether I do exist or I do not exist ) ? Or, CGautama ! when you ( yourself ) are doubtful (about yourself ), what can be free from doubt ? ( 1557 ) TIkA-yadi saMzayI jIva evAdau nAsti tarhi " asminAsmi" iti saMzayaH kasya bhavatu ? / saMzayo hi vijJAnAkhyo guNa eva; na ca guNinamantareNa guNaH saMbhavati / deho'tra guNIti cet, na, dehasya mUrtatvAjaDatvAca, jJAnasya cAmUrtatvAt bodharUpatvAcca / na cAtanurUpANAM guNaguNibhAvo yujyate, AkAza-rUpAdInAmapi tdbhaavaaptyaatiprsnggpraaptH| "saMsaie vetyAdi " vetyathavA saMzayite svarUpe gautama ! kimasaMzayaM zeSaM bhavet ? / idamuktaM bhavati -'kimasmi nAsmyaham ' ityevaM yaH svarUpe'pi saMzete-Atmanizcayo'pi yasya nAstItyarthaH tasya zeSaM karmabandha-mokSAdikaM ghaTa-paTAdikaM ca kimasaM. zayam-asandigdhaM syAt ? na kazcit , sarvasaMzaya eva tasya syAdityarthaH, AtmAstitvanizcayamUlo hi zeSavastunizcaya iti bhaavH| ahampratyayagrAhayaM ca pratyakSamAtmAnaM niDhuvAnasya "azrAvaNaH zabdaH" ityAdivat pratyakSaviruddho nAma pakSAbhAsaH, tathA vakSyamANAtmAstitvAnumAnasadbhAvAd "nityaH zabdaH" ityAdivadanumAnaviruddho'pi / tathA " ahamasmi saMzayI " iti prAgabhyupagamyoratra "nAsmi" iti pratijAnanasya sAGkhyasyAnityaH kartA,

Page #61
*: 18 : . * Jinabhadra Gani's. [The first acetana aatmetyaadivdbhyupgmvirodhH| bAlagopAlAGganAdiprasiddhaM cAtmAnaM fatursda: "31975: gait" STTIGTEN laita: 1 "reare ar" iti gadato "mAtA me vandhyA " ityAdivat svvcnvyaahtiH| evaM ca pratyakSAdibAdhite'smin pakSe'pakSadharmatayA heturpysiddhH| himavatpalaparimANAdau pizAcAdau ca pramANapaJcakAbhAvasya pravRtteranaikAntiko'pi, vakSyamANAMnumAnapramANasiddhe cAtmani vipakSa eva vRtteviruddhazceti // 9 (1557) // D. C.-If, after all, there is no one like a soul to entertain a doubt, who can have a doubt as to whether I exist or I do not exist ? Doubt is a guna ( an attribute ) known as vijnana ( knowledge ), and the guna has no separate existence from its gunin ( one having an attribute ). The body cannot become the gunin of doubt; for it is murta ( corporeal ) and jada ( inanimate ), whereas, knowledge is amurta ( in-corporeal ) and bodha-rupa ( an embodiment of consciousness ). The guna and its gunin cannot have an unlike nature; otherwise, akasa (space) will become a gunin of rupa (colour etc). Furthermore, Gautama ! how can he, who is not sure about his own existence,--who has no self-confidencesay anything definitely about the rest, such as karma-bandha ( bondage and amalgamation of karmans and moksa ( liberation ), etc.; and also about a ghata ( a pitcher ), pata ( a piece of cloth ) and the like? The answer is obvious that he cannot. For, the decision regarding all things depends upon the decision arrived at, in the case of the soul. Moreover, one who ignores the self-evident soul, which can be realized by aham-pratyaya, sails in the same boat as one who says that sound is always inaudible. He is, then, resorting to a paksabhasa ( a mock-assertion ) which is contrary to direct evidence. His stand is further opposed to valid inference, like one, who may say ' Nityah sabdah,' ( sound is eternal )--the valid inference which will be dealt with hereafter.

Page #62
Vada ] . Ganadharavada .: 19: Further, one who comes forward to say that "I do not exist " after previously admitting that I am one having. a doubt, is contradicting himself like a Sankhya (a follower of the Sankhya system of philosophy ) who may say " Anityah karta" (the doer is impermanent ), " Acetanah atma" (.the soul is inanimate ) etc. Moreover, one, who denies the existence of the soul, which is well-known to children, cow-herds, and women, entertains a belief inconsistent with the popular one and can be compared. with the one who says " Acandrah sase" (the moon is devoid of the moon ). One, who says " whether I am or I am not " is contradicting oneself like one who says: " Mata me vandhya" (my mother is sterile ). This view being thus opposed to pratyaksa etc., the hetu * ( the cause ) is a-siddha ( not established ) owing to its nonexistence in the paksa ( subject of inference ). Besides, this hetu is also anaikantika (inconclusive ), since none of the five pramanas has any scope so far as the measure of a pala of Mount Hinavat and the existence of a pisaca ( an evil spirit ) are concerned. Moreover, since the existence of the soul can be proved by inference--a topic to be just discussed, the hetu is viruddha (contrary ) too, as it is associated with the vipaksa (dissimilar instance ). The existence of the soul by direct cognizance, is proved in another way :guNapaJcakkhattaNao guNI vi jIvo ghaDo va pcckkho| ghaDao vi gheppai guNI guNamettaggahaNao jmhaa||10|| (1558) Gunapaccakkhattanao guni vi jivo ghado vva paccakkhoi Ghadao vi gheppai guni gunamettagghanao jamha 11 10 (1558)

Page #63
:: 20 :- . ..Jinabhadra Gani's . . [ The first [ guNapratyakSatvato guNyapi jIvo ghaTa iva pratyakSaH / ghaTako'pi gRhyate guNI guNamAtragrahaNato yasmAt // 10 // (1558) Gunapratyaksatvato gunyapi jivo ghata iva pratyaksah Ghatako'pigrihyate guni gunamatragrahanato yasmat n10 (1551)] Trns.-- 10 The soul which is gunin, is self-evident owing to its gunas being so ( self-evident ), as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the gunas only, the gunin e. g., the pitcher, too, is realized. (1558) TIkA--pratyakSa evaM guNI jIvaH, smRti-jijJAsA-cikIrSA-jigamiSAsaMzItyAdijJAnavizeSANAM tadguNAnAM svasaMvedanapratyakSasiddhatvAt , iha yasya guNAH pratyakSAH sa pratyakSo dRSTaH, yathA ghaTaH, pratyakSaguNazca jIvaH, tasmAt pratyakSaH, yathA ghaTo'pi guNI rUpAdiguNapratyakSatvAdeva pratyakSaH, tadvad vijJAnAdiguNapratyakSatvAdAtmApIti / Aha-anaikAntiko'yam , yasmAdAkAzaguNaH zabdaH pratyakSo'sti, na punarAkAzamiti / tadayuktam , yato nAkAzaguNaH zabdaH, kintu pudgalaguNaH, aindriyakatvAt , rUpAdivaditi // 10 (1558) // D. C.--The gunin, viz., the soul is certainly pratyaksa, because its gunas such as smrti (remembrance ) jijnasa ( desire for knowledge ), cikarsa (desire for action ), jigamisa ( desire for movements ) and doubt, etc., which are kinds of knowledge . are self-evident, as they are experienced by oneself.' One whose gunas are pratyaksa, is noticed to be pratyaksa ; for instance, a pitcher. The gunas of the soul are pratyaksa. Therefore the soul is pratyaksa. Just as, since rupa ( colour ) etc., the gunas of of a pitcher, are pratyaksa, the pitcher, too, is pratyaksa. Such is the case with the soul, as its gunas, viz. vijnana, ( knowledge ) etc., are pratyaksa. Some one may say that this argument is anaikantika ( vicious ); for, the sabda (sound ) which is the guna of aka'sa ( space ) is pratyaksa yet ukasa is not pratyaksa. But this

Page #64
Vada ] .Ganadharavada . . .: 21 :. is not correct; for, sabda is not the guna of akass, but sabda (sound ) is rather the gunal of pudgala ( matter ) as it is aindriyaka ( cognizable by the sense-organs ) as is the case with colour, etc. When the gunas are pratyaksa, how is it that the gunin is also of this type ? The answer is :anno'Nanno va guNI hoja guNahiM, jai nAma so'nnnno| . nanu guNamettaggahaNe gheppai jIvo guNI sakkhaM // 11 // (1559) Anno'NGanno va guni hojja gunehim jas nama so'nanno 1 Nanu gunamettaggahane gheppai jivo guni sakkham // 11 (1559) [ anyo'nanyo vA guNI bhaved guNaiH, yadi nAma so'nanyaH / nanu guNamAtragrahaNe gRhyate jIvo guNI sAkSAt // 11 / / (1559) Anyo'nanyo Va guni bhaved gunaih, yadi nama so'nanyah | Nanu gunamatragrahane glhyate jivo guni saksat II 11 (1559) ] aha anno to evaM guNino na ghaDAdao vi paJcakkhA / guNamettaggahaNAo jIvammi kau vicAro'yaM? // 12 // (1560) Aha anno to evam gunino na ghadadao vi paccakkha 1. Gunamettaggahanao jivammi kati vicaro'yam ? // 12 (1560 ) [athAnyastata evaM guNino na ghaTAdayo'pi pratyakSAH / guNamAtragrahaNAjIve kuto vicAro'yam ? // 12 // (1560 ) Athanyastata evam gunino na ghatadayo'pi pratyaksah i Gunamatragrahanajjive kuto vicaro' yam ? Il 12 ( 1560 ) ] Trans.-11-12 The gunin may be either distinct from or identical with gunas. If it is really identical ( with the gunas ), the gunin, the soul, is surely directly realized, on the realization of ( its ) gunas only. If, however, it ( gurin ) is distinct, then

Page #65
.: 22:- . . Jinabhadra Gani's . .. [ The first the gunins such as a pitcher, etc., are not pratyaksa owing to the realization of merely gunas. ( Such being the case ), whence is ( the scope for ) this thought of non-existence as regards the soul ? ( 1559-1560 ) . . TIkA-nanu bhavatA guNebhyo guNI kimarthAntarabhUto'bhyupagamyate, anarthAntarabhUto vA ? / yadi nAma so'nanyastebhyo'narthAntarabhUtaH tarhi jJAnAdiguNagrahaNamAtrAdeva guNI jIvaH pratyakSeNa gRhyata iti siddhameva / prayogaH-yo yasmAdanantaraM sa tadgrahaNe gRhyate eva, yathA vAsasi raagH| guNebhyo'nantaraM ca guNI tasmAd guNagrAhakapratyakSeNa so'pi gRhyata eveti / atha guNebhyo'nyo'rthAntarabhUta eva guNI / tata evaM sati ghaTAdayo'pi guNino na pratyakSAH, tadarthAntarabhUtasya rUpAdiguNamAtrasyaiva grahaNAt / iha yad yasmAdarthAntarabhUtaM tadgrahaNe'pi netarasya grahaNam, yathA ghaTe gRhIte paTasya, arthAntarabhUtAzca guNino guNA iSyante, ato guNagrahaNe'pi na guNigrahaNam / ato ghaTAdInAmapi samAne'grahaNadoSe ko'yaM nAma bhavataH kevala jIve vicAro nAstitvavivakSA yenocyate-" paccakkhaM janaM dhippai ghaDo va" ityAdi / atha dravyavirahitAH ke'pi na santyeva guNAH, ityatastadgrahaNadvAreNa gRhyanta eva ghaTAdayaH / nanvetadAtmanyapi samAnameva / kiJca guNino guNAnAmAntaratve'bhyupagamyamAne guNI bhavatu, mA bhUd vA pratyakSaH, tathApi jJAnAdiguNebhyaH pRthagAtmA guNI tvadabhyupagamenApi sidhyatyeveti // (1559-1560) / / 'D. C.--The gunin may be either separate or non-separate from its gunas. If it is non-separate, i. e., identical, then, on realizing knowledge, etc., which are the gunas of the soul, the gunin, the soul, is directly realized. The underlying argument is as follows: That which is not separate from another is realized on that another being realized, e.g., colour in a garment. To be explicit, a garment and its colour are not separate; so, when the colour is realized, the garment, too, is realized. The gunin is non-separate from the gunas. Consequently when the gunas are directiy perceived, the gunin, too, is

Page #66
Vada ] .. Ganadharavada 23 certainly realized. If the gunin is really distinct from the gunas, then, such being the case, the gunins such as a pitcher and the like, are not pratyaksa when only their gunas like colour, which are separate from the gunin, are realized. That which is distinct from another, is not realized even when another, which is separate from it, is realized. As for example, a pitcher is distinct from a piece of cloth. So, when one is realized, the other is not realized. If it is desired that gunas are to be looked upon as separate from the gunin, then, even when the gunas are realized, the gunin remains unrealized. Hence, when the fault of non-realization is applicable even in the case of pitchers etc., why should the question of nonexistence arise only in the case of the soul, to the effect that "paccakkham jam na ghippai ghado vua" etc. ? There is really no existence of the gunas apart from the substance of which they are the gunas; so, when the gunas of a pitcher are realized, the pitcher, too, is certainly realized. And the case of the soul is parallel. Furthermore, even though while assuming that the gunas are separate from the gunin, the gunin becomes or does not become pratyaksa ( when the gunas become pratyaksa ), yet . the gurin, the soul which is distinct from its gunas such as knowledge, has its existence proved even by your own admission. Anticipating the opinion of the disputant, the author says :aha mannasi asthi guNI na ya dehatthaMtaraM tao kiMtu / dehe nANAiguNA so ciya tesiM guNI jutto|| 13 // . (1561) Aha mannasi atthi guni na ya dehatthantaram tao kintu i Dehe nanaiguna so cciya tesim guni jutto il 13 ( 1561 ) [379 Arthstea voit aa Gerefai 1*: fefore I E STATTTTT: 7 per agi gost gas ll 83 11 ( 8488) Atha manyase'sti guni na ca deharthantaram sakah kintu i Dehe jnanadigunah sa eva tesam guni yuktah || 13 ( 1561 ) ]

Page #67
.: 24 : Jinabhadra Gani's ... [The first ___Trans.-13 You may believe that there is the gunin, but that it is not distinct from a body. The gunas like knowledge etc., are observed in a body; so that ( body ) alone is fit to be their gunin. ( 1561 ) __TIkA-atha manyase-astyeva jJAnAdiguNAnAM guNI, naiva taM pratyAcakSmahe, etat tu nAbhyupacchAmo yat-" dehAdarthAntaraM tako'sau" iti, kintu deha eva jJAnAdayo guNAH samupalabhyante, ataH sa eva teSAM guNI yuktaH, yathA rUpAdInAM ghaTaH / prayogaH-dehaguNA eva jJAnAdayaH, tatraivopalabhyamAnatvAt , gaura-kuza-sthUlatAdivaditi // 13 (1561) // ____D. C.-It may be that you admit that there is a gunin for the gunas like knowledge, etc., but you may refuse to believe that this gunin is something else than a body. That is to say, you look upon the body itself as the gunin in question, since the gunas such as knowledge etc., are found in the body only. For example, colour is seen in a pitcher and hence its gunin is a pitcher. The underlying argument is this : Knowledge etc., are the gunas of a body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, emaciation, fatness etc. The answer is :nANAdao na dehassa muttimattAio ghaDasseva / tamhA nANAiguNA jassa sa dehAio jIvo // 14 // (1562) Nanadao na dehassa muttimattajo ghadasseva i Tamha nanaiguna jassa sa dehaio jivo il 14 ( 1562 ) [jJAnAdayo na dehasya mUrtimatvAdito ghaTasyeva / tasmAjjJAnAdiguNA yasya sa dehAdhiko jIvo // 14 // (1562) Jnanadayo na dehasya murtimattvadito ghatasyeva 1 Tasmajjnanadiguna yasya sa dehadhiko jivo || 14 ( 1562 ) ]

Page #68
Vada ] . . Ganadharavada __Trans.--14 Knowledge etc., are not the gunas of a body, as it is mutra ( corporeal ) etc, like a ghata. Therefore that ( object ) which has knowledge etc., as its gunas, is the soul which is separate from the body. ( 1562 ) TIkA-prayogaH-dehasya sambandhino guNAdayo guNA na bhavantyeva, tasyamRtimattvAt cAkSuSatvAd vA ghaTavat / na ca dravyarahito guNaH samasti / tato yo jJAnAdiguNAnAmanurUpo'mUrtaH, acAkSuSazca guNI, sa dehAtirikto jIvo jJAtavyaH / Aha-jJAnAdayo na dehasyeti pratyakSabAdhitamidam , deha evajJAnAdiguNAnAM pratyakSeNaiva grahaNAt / tadayuktam , anumAnabAdhitatvAdasya pratyakSasya / tathAhi-ihendriyAtirikto vijJAtA, taduparame'pi tadupalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt , yo hi yaduparame'pi yadupalabdhamarthamanusmarati, sa tasmAdarthAntaraM dRSTaH, yathA-paJcavAtAyanopalabdhArthAnusmartA devadatta ityAdi vAyubhUtiprazne . vakSyAma iti // 14 (1562) // ___D. C.-The gunas such as knowledge, cannot belong to the body; for, the body is murta and caksusa ( visible ) as is the case with a ghata. Moreover, a guna cannot exist without a substance. Now knowledge etc., are a murta gunas. Therefore their gunin, too, must be amurta etc., and hence it cannot be the body which is murta. Thus that very gurin is the soul. It may be argued that we see with our own eyes that knowledge etc., belong to the body. But this is a wrong argument as it is not consistent with the following inference : The knower is distinct from senses; for, even when the senses cease ( to function ), the object realized by means of them is remembered. One who remembers an object realized by means of another, even when that another ceases, is distinct from it, e. g., Devadatta. who remembers the object realized by means of the five windows. This we shall expound while answering the question of Vayubhuti. Desirous of arriving at a conclusion, the author says:--

Page #69
: 46:. . . Jinabhadra Gani's. . [The first iya tuha deseNAyaM paJcakkho savvahA mahaM jiivo| avihayanANattaNao tuha viSaNANaM va paDivajA // 15 // (1563) Iya tuha desenayam paccakkho savvaha maham jivo i Avihayananattanai tuha vinnanam va padivajja // 15 ( 1563 ) [ iti tava dezenAyaM pratyakSaH sarvathA mama jiivH| avihatajJAnatvatastava vijJAnamiva pratipadyasva // 15 // (1563) "Iti tava desenayam pratyaksah sarvatha mama jivah Avihatajnanatvatas taava vijnanam iva pratipadyasva // 15 (1563)] Trans.-15 Thus this ( soul ) is partially pratyaksa to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to ( my ) knowledge being unobstructed ( infinite ). (So) accept ( the existence of the soul ). ( 1563 ). TIkA-ityevam-uktaprakAreNa svazarIre tavApi dezataH pratyakSo'yamAtmA, chadmasthatvena bhavataH sarvasyApi vastuno dezaviSayatvAt , ghaTavat , tathAhisarvamapi sva-paraparyAyato'nantaparyAyaM vastu, chamasthazca pratyakSeNa sAkSAt taddezamiva gRhNAti / pratyakSeNa ca pradIpAdiprakAzeneva dezataH prakAzitA api ghaTAdayo vyavahArataH pratyakSA ucyanta eva / sarvAtmanA ca kevalipratyakSameva vastu prakAzayati / ato mamApratihatAnantajJAnatvena sarvAtmanA'pi pratyakSo'yaM jIvaH, yathA'tIndriyamapi tvatsaMzayavijJAnamiti pratipadyasveti // 15 (1563) // D. C.-In this way, the soul in your body is partially cognizable even to you; for, since you are a chadmastha ( one under the evil influence of the mohanaya karman), every object is known to you only partially. Every object has an infinite number of paryayas ( modifications ), in case it is examined from the stand-point of its own paryayas and that of the paryayas belonging to the rest. A chadmastha, therefore, directly grasps only a portion of it. It is a convention that a ghata etc., partially revealed by light, etc., are said to be pratyaksa. Only an omniscient being has a direct perception

Page #70
Vada ] Ganadharavada . . .: 27 : of any and every object in toto. I am an omniscient being; for, my knowledge is neither limited by time nor by space. So I directly realize this soul in its entirety, just as I fully realize your knowledge, viz., your doubt about the existence of the soul. Consequently admit that the soul exists. _ Then, what about another's body ? - evaM ciya paradehe'NumANao giha jIvamatthi tti / aNuvitti-nivittIo vinnANamayaM sarUve vva // 16 // (1594) Evam ciya paradehe'numanao ginha jivam atthi tti Anuvitti-nivittii vinnanamayam sarive vva // 16 ( 1564 ) [evameva paradehe'numAnato gRhANa jIvamastIti / anuvRtti-nivRttibhyAM vijJAnamayaM svarUpa iva // 16 // (1564) Evam eva paradehe'numanato glhana jivan astiti Anuvritti-nivrittibhyam vijnanamayam svarupa iva || 16 ( 1564)] Trans.--16 Thus do verily accept by means of inference that the soul which is an embodiment of knowledge, exists in another's body (too), owing to ( his) indulgence in and cessation from activities, as is the case with one's own soul. ( 1564 ) * TIkA-yathA svadehe evaM paradehe'pi gRhANa jIvamanumAnataH / katham ? ityAha-asti-vidyata iti / kathaMbhUtaM jIvam ? ityAha-vijJAnamayaM-vijJAnAtmakam / anumAnameva sUcayannAha-" aNuvitti-nivittIo saruve va ti" idamuktaM bhavati-parazarIre'pyasti jIvaH, iSTAniSTayoH pravRtti-nivRttidarzanAt , yathA svarUpe-svAtmani, iha yatreSTA-'niSTayoH pravRtti-nivRttI.dRzyete, tatsAtmakaM dRSTam, yathA svazarIram , tathA ca pravRtti-nivRttI dRzyete parazarIre, atastadapi sAtmakam ; AtmAbhAve ceSTA-'niSTapravRtti-nivRttI na bhavataH, yathA ghaTe, ityanumAnAt parazarIre'pi jiivsiddhiH|| 16 (1564) // ____D. C.-The soul exists in another's body, too; for, he, too, like yourself performs desirable activities and refrains from

Page #71
.: 28:. Jinabhadra Gani's . [The first the undesirable ones, and you who act accordingly have a soul. To put it explicitly, one in whom are seen indulgence in desirable acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds, has a soul, as is the case with one's ( your ) body. The body of another is seen as associated with desirable activities and dissociated from undesirable ones. Hence that body, too, has a soul. If the soul were non-existent, there was no scope for this association and dissociation, as can be seen in the case of a ghata. This is followed by inference that there is a soul in another's body, too. ___Anticipating doubt in another's mind, the author says :--- jaM ca na liMgahi samaM mannasi liMgI jao purA ghio| saMgaM saseNa va samaM na liMgao to'Numeo so||17|| (1565) so'NegaMto jamhA liMgehi samaM na diTThapuvo vi / gahaliMgadarisaNAo gaho'Numeo sarIrammi // 18 // (1566) Jam ca na lingehim samam mannasi lingi jao pura gahio || Sangam sasena va samam na lingao to'numed so // 17 ( 1565 ) So'neganto jamha lingehim samam na ditthapuvvo vi | (Jahalinga darisanai gaho'nume sarirammi // 18 ( 1566 ) [ yacca na liGgaiH samaM manyase liGgI yataH purA gRhiitH| zRgaM zazena vA samaM na liGgatastato'numeyaH saH // 17 // (1565) so'nekAnto yasmAlliGgaH samaM na dRSTapUrvo'pi / grahaliGgadarzanAd graho'numeyaH zarIre // 18 // (1566 ) Yacca na lingaih samam mangase lingi yatah pura glhitah | Srigam sasena Vii samam na lingatas tato'numeyah sah // 17 (1565) So'nekanto yasmallingaih samam na drstaparvo'pi | Grahalingadarsanad graho'numeyah sarire // 18 ( 1566 ).]

Page #72
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 29:. Trans.-17-18 Moreover, that you believe that since the lingin ( viz., the soul ) has not been realized formerly (up till now) along with the lingas, as is the case with the hare and the horn, so it (the soul) cannot be inferred by means of a linga, is untenable; for, agrahat, that is not formerly seen along with (his) lingas, is inferred in a body,, on perceiving his linga or lingas. (1565-1566). TIkA - yacca " na ya jIvaliMgasaMbaMdhadarisaNamabhR" ityAdi pUrvoktapUrvapakSAnusAreNa manyase tvam / kim ? ityAha- tato na liGgataH - liGgAdanu- * meyosat jIvaH / yataH kim ? ityAha-yato na khalu liGgaiH kaizcidapi samaM liGgI - jIvaH kvApi kenApi purA - pUrva gRhItaH / kiMvadityAha - zRGgamiva zazakena samam / tato liGga - liGginoH pUrvaM sambandhAgrahaNAd na liGgAjIvo'numIyate / iti yad manyase tvaM tatra pratividhIyate - so'nekAntaH, yasmAliGgaiH samamadRSTapUrvo'pi grahaH - devayonivizeSaH zarIre hasana-gAna - rodana-kara-caraNa-bhrUvikSepAdivikRtagrahaliGgadarzanAdanumIyata iti bAlAnAmapi pratItameveti / / 17-18 ( 1565 - 1566 )|| D. C.-Just as none has ever seen a horn on the head of a hare, so none has ever seen the lingin, viz., the soul as associated with one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, one cannot infer the existence of the soul. This belief of yours is not right. For, though a graha is not previously seen along with his lingas, even children are convinced about his existence in a body, when they see that body associated with perverse acts such as, laughing, singing, weeping, movements of hands, feet and eye-brows, etc., -- the acts which are the lingas of the graha. dehassatthi vihAyA painiyayAgArao ghaDasseva / akkhANaM ca karaNao daNDAINaM kulAlo vva // 19 // (1567) Dehassatthi vihaya painiyayagarao ghadasseva | Akkhanam ca karanao dandainam kulalo vva || 19 (1567) 1 A kind of celestial being. An evil-spirit

Page #73
: 30 :. . . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first [ dehasyAsti vidhAtA pratiniyatAkArato ghaTasyeva / akSANAM ca karaNato daNDAdInAM kulAla iva // 19 // (1567) Dehasyasti vidhata pratiniyatakarato ghatasyeva / Aksanam ca karanato dandadinam kulala iva || 19 ( 1567 ) ] - Trans.-19 There is a creator of the body, owing to its shape being definite and ( its having a beginning ) as is the case with a ghata. ( There is an adhisthatr of the organs of sense owing to their being a karana ( a medium ) as is the case with the adhisthatr of a stick etc. ( 1567) TIkA-dehasyAsti vidhAtA-karteti pratijJA, AdimatpratiniyatAkAratvAt , ghaTavat , punarakartRkaM tadAdimatpratiniyatAkAramapi na bhavati, yathA'bhravikAraH, yazca dehasya kartA sa jIvaH / pratiniyatAkAratvaM mervAdinAmapyasti, na ca teSAM kazcid vidhAtA, iti tairanaikAntiko hetuH syAt , ato'nuktamapyAdimatvavizeSaNaM draSTavyamiti / tathA akSANAmindriyANAmasti " adhiSThAtA" ityadhyAhAraH karaNatvAt , yathA cakra-cIvara-mRt-sUtradaNDAdInAM kulAlaH, yacca niradhiSThAtRkaM tat karaNamapi na bhavati, yathA''kAzam , yazcendriyANAmadhiSThAtA sa jIva iti // 19 (1567) // __D. C.-That there is a creator of the body, is the pratijna (premise ); for, it ( body) has a beginning and has a definite shape as well, as is the care with a ghata. Whatever has no creator whatsoever, has neither a beginning nor a definite shape. The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example. Meru etc., have a fixed form, and even then they have no creator. So, to avoid such a case wherein the hetu ( cause ) becomes anaikantika, the adjective adimat ( having a beginning ), though not expressed, is to be taken as understood. The word adhisthatr is also understood. Since the organs of sense are karana, there must be an adhisthatr for them.

Page #74
Vida ] ... Ganadharavada . . 31 : A parallel example is furnished by a potter, who is an adhisthat? of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, a stick, etc., which are karanas. Whatever has no adhisthatr, has no karana, e. g., akasa. Hence it follows that the adhisthatr of the organs of sense is the soul. Moreover, athidiya-visayANaM aayaannaadeybhaavo'vss| kammAra ivAdAyA loe saNDAsa-lohANaM // 20 // (1568) Atthindiya-visayanam ayanadeyabhavao'vassam 1 Kammara ivadaya loe sandasa-lohanam il 20 ( 1568 ) [ astIndriya-viSayANAmAdAnAdeyabhAvato'vazyam / kAra ivAdAtA loke sandaMzaka-lohAnAm // 20 // (1568) / Astindriya-visayanam adanadeyabhavato' vasyam | Karmara ivadata loke sandainsaka-lohanam // 20 (1568)] Trans.--20 Just as in this world a blacksmith is the adatr ( grasper ) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so there is certainly an adatr ( viz., the soul ) in the case of organs of . sense and their objects, since they are related as adana ( means of grasping ) and adeya ( graspables ). ( 1568) TIkA-iha yatrAdAnAdeyabhAvastavAvazyamAdAtA samasti, yathA loke sandaMzaka-lohAnAM karmAro'yaskAraH, vidyate cendriyaviSayANAmAdAnAdeyabhAvaH, atasteSAmapyastyAdAtA, sa ca jIvaH, yatra tvAdAtA nAsti, tatrAdAnadeyabhAvo'pi na vidyate, yathA''kAza iti // 20 (1568) // D. C.-If there is a relation of the type of adana and adeya, then there needs be an adatr. A blacksmith is found as the adatr; for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for adana and adeya. There is a relation of the kind of adana and adeya, in the case of the organs of sense and sense-objects. Therefore, there must be their

Page #75
*: 3% :. . . Jinabhadra Gani's ( The first adatr. He is none else but the soul. It may be added that there is no scope for the relation of the sort of adana and adeya, in case the adatr is non-existent, e. g., akasa. Also, bhottA dehAINaM bhojjattaNao naro va bhattassa / saGkAyAittaNao asthi ya atthI gharasseva // 21 // (1569) Bhotta dehainam bhojjattanao naro vva bhattassa Sanghayaittanao atthi ya atthi gharasseva ll 21 ( 1569 ) [bhoktA dehAdInAM bhogyatvato nara iva bhaktasya / saGghAtAditvato'sti cArthI gRhasyeva // 21 // (1569) Bhokta dehadinam bhogyatvato nara iya bhaktasya / Saighataditvato'sti carthi grhasyeva // 21 (1559) ] Trans.-21 Just as a man is an enjoyer of bhakta (food), so there is an enjoyer of body etc., owing to their being objects of enjoyment. Just as there is an owner of a house, owing to its being a saighata ( collection ) etc., so there is an owner of body etc., on account of its being a sanghata. (1569) TIkA-iha dehAdInAM bhoktA samasti, bhogyatvAt , yathA zAlayAdibhaktavastrAdInAM naraH, yasya ca bhoktA nAsti tad bhogyamapi na bhavati, yathA kharaMviSANam, bhogyaM ca zarIrAdikam , tato vidyamAnabhoktakamiti / tathA, arthii-svaamii| tatazca dehAdInAM vidyate svAmI, saGghAtarUpatvAt , AdizabdAd mUrtimattvAt, aindriyakatvAt , cAkSuSatvAdityAdayo'pyanaikAntikatvaparihArArtha sambhavadvihitavizeSaNA hetavo yojanIyAH, yathA gRhAdInAM sUtradhArAdaya iti dRSTAntaH / yat punarasvAmikaM tat saGghAtAdirUpamapi na bhavati; yathA gaganakusumam, saGghAtAdirUpaM ca dehAdikam , tassAd vidyAmAnasvAmikamiti // 21 (1569) // ___D. C.-Just as we find that there is a person to enjoy food etc., so there is an enjoyer of body etc. The underlying reasoning is as follows:

Page #76
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 33 :An object of enjoyment for which there is no enjoyer, does not exist, e. g. a horn of an ass. Body etc., exist as objects of enjoyment. So it follows that there is their enjoyer. Just as a carpenter and others are svamins of a house, etc., so there is a svamin of body etc, since this body and the like are in the form of a collection, have a beginning, are murta, are objects of sense and are visible etc., A number of similar hetus as may be helpful in making this syllogism perfectly logical, may be mentioned: One that has no svamin, is not in the form of a collection etc. For instance, a flower in the sky which has no svamin is not in the form of a collection etc. A body etc., are, on the contrary, in the form of a collection etc. So they have a svamin viz., the soul. Really, by saying that the body has a creator, one proves that there is a creator etc., for the body. But that is not the soul. jo kattAi sa jIvo sajjhaviruddho tti te maI hojjA / muttAipasaMgAo taM na saMsAriNo doso // 22 // (1570) Jo kattai sa jivo sajjhaviruddho tti te mai hojja | Muttaipasangao tam na sassarino doso 11 22 ( 1570 ) [.yaH kAdi sa jIvaH sAdhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet / mUrtAdiprasaGgAt tad na saMsAriNo doSaH // 22 // (1570) Yah kartradi sa jivah sadhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet | Martadiprasangat tad na sansarino dosah || 22 ( 1570 )] Trans.--22 You may be thinking that, that soul which is a doer etc., is opposed to what is to be established, owing to its having a chance of being proved murta etc. But this is not a fault in the case of the mundane soul. ( 1570 ) TIkA-yazcAyamanantaraM dehe-ndriyAdInAM kartA, adhiSTAtA, AdAtA, bhoktA, arthI coktaH sa sarvo'pi jIva eva, anyasyezvarAderyuktyakSamatvena karI

Page #77
*: 34 :- . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first tvaadysmbhvaaditi| atha sAdhyaviruddhasAdhakatvAd viruddhA ete hetava iti taSa matibhavet , tathAhi-ghaTAdInAM kAdirUpAH kulAlAdayo mUrtimantaH, saMghAtarUpAH, anityAdisvabhAvAzca dRSTAH, ityato jIvo'pyevaMvidha eva sidhyati, etadviparItazca kilAsmAkaMsAdhayitumiSTaH, ityevaM sAdhyavirUddhasAdhakatvaM hetUnAmiti / tadetadayuktatvAd na, yataH khalu saMsAriNo jIvasya sAdhayitumiSTasyA'doSo'yam / sa hyaSTakarmapudgalasaMghAtopagUDhatvAt sazarIratvAca kathaMcinmUrtatvAdidharmayukta eveti bhAvaH // 22 (1570 ) / D. C.--Up till now, it has no doubt been proved that it is the soul and the soul alone which is a doer, adhisthatr., adatr, an enjoyer and the svamin of the body, organs of sense, etc. For God or the like cannot be admitted as a doer etc., of the body, since such a statement will be opposed to reason. But it must be admitted that the hctus put forward to prove that the soul is a doer etc., are 'viruddha ( contrary ) as they establish such a type of the soul which is just the contrary to what is desired. To be explicit, a potter who is a doer of a pitcher has a body, and he is in the form of a collection, and is of an impermanent nature. The same must be the case with the soul. But this type of soul is just opposed to what we are aiming at to establish. And hence these hetus lead us to the conclusions we are opposed to. This is not so; for, we are at present establishing the existence of a mundane soul and not that of a liberated one; and that a mundane soul is somehow marta; for, it is certainly embraced by a collection of eight karmans, a kind of matter, and it has a body. There is another anumana for establishing the existence of the soul. asthi cciya te jIvo saMsayao sAmma ! thANupuriso cha / jaM saMdiddhaM goyama! taM tatthannattha vatthi dhuvaM // 23 // (1571) Atthi cciya te jivo samsayo somma! thanupuriso vval Jam sandiddham Goyamalle tatthannattha vatthi dhuvam 11 23 (157

Page #78
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 35. [ astyeva tava jIvaH saMzayataH saumya ! sthANu-puruSAviva / yat sandigdhaM gautama ! tat tatrAnyatra vAsti dhruvam // 23 / / (1571) Astyeva tava jivah samsayatah saumya ! sthanu-purusa.vivar Yat sandigdham Gautama ! tat tatranyatra vasti dhruvam ||23 (1571)] ____Trans.-23 0 lovely Gautama! Indeed you have a soul since you have a doubt ( about your existence ) as is the case with a branch-less trunk of a tree and a man. Whatever is doubted, certainly exists either there or elsewhere. (1571) TIkA-he saumya ! gautama! astyeva tava jIvaH, saMzayataH saMzayasadbhAvAt , . yatra yatra saMzayastat tadasti, yathA sthANu-puruSau, saMzayazca tava jIve, tasAdastyevAyam , tathAhi-sthANu-puruSayorUlatvAroha-pariNAhAdyubhayasAdhAraNadharmapratyakSatAyAM calana-ziraH kaNDUyanavayonilayana-vallyArohaNAdhubhayagatavizeSadhaprityakSatAyAM cobhayagataitaddharmAnusaraNe ca satyekataravizeSanizcayacikIrSoH " kimidam ? iti vimarzarUpaH saMzayaH prAdurasti / evaMbhUte ca sthANu-puruSAdigatasaMzaye tat sthANu-puruSAdikaM vastvastyeva, avastuni saMzayAyogAt / evamAtmazarIrayorapi prAgupalabdhasAmAnya-vizeSadharmasya pramAtustayoH sAmAnyadharmapratyakSatAyAM vizeSadharmApratyakSatve'pi ca tadviSayAnusmRtau satyAmekataravizeSopalipsoH, "kimayamAtmA kiM vA zarIramAtramidam ? iti vimarzarUpaH saMzayoM jAyate / ayaM cAtma-zarIrayoH satva evopapadyate, naikatarasyA'pyabhAve, ato'sti jIvaH / athaivaM brUSe--araNyAdiSu sthANupuruSasaMzaye tatra vivakSita pradeze'nayorekatara eva bhavati, na punarubhayamapi, tatkathamucyate-'vidyamAna eva vastuni saMzayo bhavati' iti ? / tadayuktam abhiprAyAparijJAnAt, na hi vayamevaM brUma:-" tatraiva pradeze tadubhayamapyasti" iti, kintu yadgatasaMdehastad vastu tatrA'nyatra vA pradeze dhruvamastyeva, anyathA SaSThabhUtaviSayo'pi saMzayaH syAt / etadevAha-'jaM saMdiddhamityAdi' tasmAt saMzayaviSayatvAdastyeva jIva iti sthitam // 23 (1571 ) // ___D. C.-A branch-less trunk of a tree is seen from a distance, as if it were a man. For, certain attributes such as

Page #79
*: 36 * . Jinabhadra Gani's. [The first loftiness etc., which are common to this trunk and a man, are observed, while their distinguishing characteristics, viz., a movement, scratching, dwelling of birds, ascending of creepers etc., are not noticeable. Such being the case, there arises a doubt as to whether this is a trunk of a tree or a person ; for, both of these objects exist (though not in the same place ). This proves that the doubt can arise only in the case of objects that do exist. You have a doubt as to whether this is a soul , or a body, as you realize their common features, but fail to notice their distinguishing characteristics. Such a doubt proves that there is a soul; for, it cannot arise unless there existed two entities viz., a soul and a body. It may be here noted that in order that a doubt may arise, it is not absolutely necessary that the objects about which a doubt arises, must be in one and the same place. evaM nAma visANaM kharassa pattaM na taM khare ceva / annattha tadatthi cciya evaM vivarIyagAhe vi // 24 // (1572) Evam nama visanam kharassa pattam na tam khare ceva | Annattha tad atthi cciya evam vivariyagahe vill 24 ( 1572 ) [ evaM nAma viSANaM kharasya prAptaM na tat khara eva / / . anyatra tadastyeva evaM viparItagrahe'pi // 24 // (1572) Evam nama visanam kharasya praptam na tat khara eva i Anyatra tadastyeva evam viparitagrahe' pi // 24 (1572)] Trans.--24 Such being the case, an ass will indeed have a horn but certainly he has not. It surely exists somewhere else. So is the case even when the perverse view is taken. (1572) ____TIkA-hanta ! yadi yatra saMzayastenAvazyameva bhavitavyam , evaM tataH kharaviSANamapyastIti prAptam , tatrApi kasyacit saMzayasadbhAvAt / ucyatenanvabhihitamatra yaduta-tatrAnyatra vA vidyamAna eva vastuni saMzayo bhavati, nAvidyamAne / kharasya viSANaM kharaviSANaM nAstItyatra ca ko'rthaH 1 / ityAha

Page #80
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 37: " na taM khare caiva tti " khara eva tadviSANaM nAsti, anyatra gavAdAvastyeveti na kazcid vyabhicAraH / ' evaM vivarIyagAhe vitti' idamuktaM bhavati - yadA viparyastaH kazcit sthANau ' puruSa evAyam' ityAdiviparItagrahaM karoti tadApyayameva nyAyo vAcyaH so'pi viparIta graho viparIte puruSAdike vastuni satyevopapadyate, nAvidyamAna ityarthaH / evaM bhavadabhiprAyeNa yo'smAdRzAM zarIra AtmAstitvAbhimAnaH, nAyamAtmanaH sarvathA nAstitve yujyata iti / / 24 (1572 ) / / D. C.--If it is that the object which is doubted, must be. existing in the very place where the doubt arises, then even an ass will have a horn; for, somebody may doubt its existence so far as the ass is concerned. No, this is not true. What we want to imply is that the doubted object exists either in the very place where the doubt arises, or even somewhere else. That an ass has no horns, means that horns are not associated with the ass; but they are found elsewhere, e. g., on the head of a cow. Similar is the case when one object is definitely mistaken for the other. For instance, a man may take a branch-less trunk to be a man. Such a perverse view proves the existence of the object mistaken. Hence Gautama! you may think that we are in the wrong when we admit the existence of a soul in our body. This is our perverse notion according to you. If so, even then it establishes the existence of the soul. The soul exists, for the following reason to :--- asthi ajIvavivakkho paDisehAo ghaDoghaDasseva / natthi ghaDo tti va jIvatthittaparo natthisaddo'yaM // 25 // (1573) . Atthi ajivavivakkho padisehao ghado' ghadasseva | Nathi ghado tti va jivatthittaparo natthi saddo 'yam || 25 (1573) [ astyajIva vipakSaH pratiSedhAd ghaTo'ghaTasyeva / nAsti ghaTa itIva jIvAstitvaparo nAstizabdo'yam / / 25 / / ( 1572)

Page #81
<< Grani's. :: 38 : Jinabhadra Gani's . [ The first Astya jiva vipaksah pratisedhat ghato' ghatasyeva i Nasti ghata itiva jiastitvaparo nasti sabdo'yam // 25 ( 1573)] Trans.-25 Just as there is a ghata as opposed to aghata, so there is an object, viz., the soul, a vipaksa ( the opposite) of an inanimate object ! owing to denial. This sentence, viz., it does not exist' establishes the existence of the soul, as does the sentence, viz., ' there is no ghata' ( establish its existence ). ( 1573) TIkA-atra prayogaH-pratipakSavAnayamajIvaH, atra vyutpattimacchuddhapadapratiSedhAt , yatra vyutpattimataH zuddhapadasya pratiSedho dRzyate sa pratipakSavAn dRSTaH, yathA'ghaTo ghaTapratipakSavAn , atra hyaghaTaprayoge zuddhasya vyutpattimatazca padasya pratiSedhaH, ato'vazyaM ghaTalakSaNena pratipakSaNa bhavitavyam / yastu na pratipakSavAn na tatra zuddhasya vyutpattimatazca padasya pratiSedhaH, yathA'kharaviSANam, aDittha iti / akharaviSANamityatra kharaviSANalakSaNasyAzuddhasya sAmAsikapadasya pratiSedha iti, atotra kharasya viSANaM kharaviSANamityAdivyutpattimattve satyapi kharaviSANalakSaNo vipakSo nAsti / aDittha ityatra tu vyutpattirahitasya Ditthapadasya pratiSedhaH, iti samAsarahitatvena zuddhatve satyapi nAvazyamavasthito DitthalakSaNaH ko'pi padArtho jIvavad vipakSabhUto'stIti / "natthi ghaDo tiva" ityAdi pazcArdham / "nAsyAtmA" iti ca yo'yamAtma niSedhadhvaniH sa jIvAstitvanAntarIyaka eva, yathA " nAstyatra ghaTaH" iti zabdo'nyatra ghaTAstitvAvinAbhAvyeva / prayogaH-yasya niSedhaH kriyamANo dRzyate tat kvacidastyeva, yathA ghaTAdikam ; niSidhyate ca bhavatA " nAsti jIvaH" iti vacanAjIvaH, tasmAdastyevAsau, yacca sarvathA nAsti tasya niSedho na dRzyata eva, yathA kharaviSANakalpAnAM paJcabhUtAtiriktabhUtAnAm , niSidhyate ca tvayA jIvaH, tasmAd niSedha evAyaM tatsatvasAdhaka iti // 25 // 1573 // D. C.-The underlying argument is this that since ajtva is a *word of which an etymology exists and is furthermore a suddha pada ( a pure syllable ), it has a pratipaksa ( a rival), viz., jiva. A pratipaksa exists in the case of the negation of

Page #82
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 39 : . one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a suddha pada. As for example, a pratipaksa, viz., ghata exists in the case of aghata which is a negation of ghata; for, there is an etymology of ghata, and that it is a suddha pada too. One which has no pratipaksa, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a suddha pada having an etymology is concerned. For instance, akharavisana is wanting in a pratipaksa, viz., kharavisana since kharavisana is not a suddha pada but is a samusika one-is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a vyutpatti.. We may now examine the case of adittha. Dittha is its pratipaksa; but, since this dittha is wanting in a vyutpatti, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied : (i) It should be a suddha pada. (ii) At the same time, it must have a vyutpatti. In the case of kharuvisana the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of dittha, the second is violated. So there exists neither kharavisana, a pratipaksa of akharavisana nor practically dittha, a pratipaksa of aditthha. Now the second henistitch. Just as when one says that here there is no ghata' establishes the existence of a ghata elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under : One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e. g., a ghata. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non existent has no negative predication. Khara-visana may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibilty for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.

Page #83
*: 40 :: . Jinabhadra Gani's [The first This hetu is anaikantika. asao natthi niseho saMjogAipaDisehao siddhaM / saMjogAicaukaM pi siddhamatthantare niyayaM // 26 // (1574) Asao natthi niseho sanjogaipadisehao siddham Sanjogaicaukkam pi siddham atthantare niyajam // 26 ( 1574) [ asato nAsti niSedhaH saMyogAdipratiSedhataH siddham / saMyogAdicatuSkamapi siddhamarthAntare niyatam // 26 // (1574) Asato nasti nisedhah samyogadipratisedhatah siddham | Samyogadicatuskamapi siddham arthantare niyatam // 26 (1514)] Trans.-26. It is proved that there is no negation in the case of a non-existent object owing to the pratisedha of samyoga (connection) etc., Even the quarter union consisting of samyoga, etc., is certainly proved ( to be existing ) elsewhere. ( 1574 ) TIkA-asato'vidyamAnasya nAsti na sambhavatyeva niSedha iti siddham / kutaH ? ityAha-saMyogAdi pratiSedhAt , Adi zabdAt , samavAya-sAmAnya-vizeSaparigrahaH / etaduktaM bhavati-iha yatkizcit kvacid devadattAdikaM niSidhyate tasyAnyatra sata eva vivakSitasthAne kasmiMzcit saMyoga-samavAya-sAmAnyavizeSalakSaNaM catuSThyameva niSidhyate, na tu sarvathaiva devadattAderabhAva pratipAdyate / tatra " nAsti gRhe devadattaH" ityAdiSu gRha-devadattAdInAM satAmeva saMyoga mAtraM niSidhyate, na tu, teSAM sarvathaivAstitvamapAkriyate / tathA, "nAsti kharaviSANam" ityAdiSu khara-viSANAdInAM satAmeva samavAyamAnaM nirAkriyate / tathA "nAstyanyazcaMdramAH" ityAdiSu vidyamAnasyaiva candramaso'nyacandraniSedhAcandrasAmAnyamAnaM niSidhyate, na tu sarvathA candrAbhAvaH pratipAdyate / tathA "na santi ghaTapramANA muktAH" ityAdiSu ghaTapramANanAmamAtrarUpovizeSo muktAnAM niSidhyate, na tu muktA'bhAvaH khyApyata iti / evaM ca sati " nAstyAtmA" ityatra vidyamAnasyaivAtmano yatra vacana yena kenAcit saha saMyogamAtreNa tvayA niSeddhavyam ; yathA " nAstyAtmA vapusi" ityAdi na tu sarvathA''tmanaH sattvamiti /

Page #84
Vada ] .Ganadharavada : 41 :. atrAha kazcit-nanu yadi yad niSidhyate tadasti, tarhi matrilokezvaratA'pyasti, yuSmadAdibhirniSidhyamAnatvAt / tathA caturNAM samavAyAdipratiSedhAnAM paJcamo'pi pratiSedhaprakAro'sti, tvayaiva niSidhyamAnatvAt / tadayuktam , trilokezvaratAvizeSamAtraM bhavato niSidhyate, yathA ghaTapramANatvaM muktAnAm , na tu sarvathaivezvaratA, svaziSyAdIzvaratAyAstavApi vidyamAnatvAt / tathA, pratiSedhasyApi paJcasaGkhyAviziSTatvamapAkriyate, na tu sarvathA pratiSedhasyAbhAvaH, catu:saGkhayAviziSTasya tasya sadbhAvAt / nanu sarvamapyasambaddhamidam , tathAhimatrilokezvaratvaM tAvadasadeva niSidhyate, pratiSedhasyApi paJcasaGkhyAviniSTatvama-. vidyamAnameva nivAryate, tathA, saMyoga-samavAya-sAmAnya-vizeSANAmapi gRhadevadatta-kharaviSANAdiSvasatAmeva pratiSedhaH, ityato "yaniSidhyate tadastyeva" . ityetat kathaM na plavate ? ityA zaGkayAha-" saMjogAicaukaM pItyAdi " / idamuktaM bhavati-devadattAdInAM saMyogAdayo gRhAdiSvevAsanto niSidhyante, arthAntare tu teSAM te vidyanta eva; tathAhi-gRheNaiva saha devadattasya saMyogo na vidyate, arthAntareNa tu kSetra-haTTa-grAmAdinA saha tasyAsau samastyeva, gRhasyApi devadattena saha saMyogo nAsti, khaTvAdinA tu saha tasyAsau vidyata eva, evaM viSANasyApi khara eva samavAyo nAsti, gavAdAvastyeva; sAmAnyamapi dvitIyacandrAbhAvAcandra eva nAsti, arthAntare tu ghaTagavAdAvastyeva; ghaTapramANatvamapi muktAsu nAsti, arthAntare tu kUSmANDAdAvastyeva / trilokezvaratA'pi bhavata eva nAsti, tIrthakarAdAvastyeva, paJcasaGkhyAviziSTatvamapi pratiSedhe nAsti, arthAntare tvanuttaravimAnAdAvastyeva / ityanayA vivakSayA brUmaH-- " yad niSidhyate tat sAmAnyenAstyeva, na tvevaM pratijAnImahe "-"yad yatra niSidhyate tat tatraivAsti " iti yena vyabhicAraH syAt // vayamapi zarIre jIvaM niSedhayAmaH, nAnyatreti cet / sAdhUktam , asmat samIhitasya siddhatvAt , jIvasiddhyarthameva hi yatAmahe vayam , sa cet siddhaH, tahi tatsiddhyanyathAnupapattereva tadAzrayaH setsyati, kiM tayA cintayA ? / na ca zarIramantareNa jIvasyAzrayAntaramupapadyate, tatraiva tdvsthaanlinggoplbdheH| na ca vaktavyam-zarIrameva jIvaH, "jIvati", " mRtaH", "mUrcchitaH" ityAdi vyavasthA'nupapatteH ityAderabhidhAsyamAnatvAditi // 26 // 1574 //

Page #85
**: 42 : . Jinabhadra Gaai's. | The first D. C.-When a negation is predicated in the case of any object, this negation is to be understood regarding samyoga (conjunction ), samavaya ( inherence ), samanya ( generality ) or visesa ( speciality ), but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance Devadatta is not at home' means that the samyoga between a house and Devadatta, each of which exists, is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly 'an ass has no horns' means the negation of samavaya between an existing ass and horns. Similarly there is no other moon' implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say, we have only one moon, and that there is no parallel to it. That 'there are no pearls equal to a ghata in bulk' conveys the idea that the distinguishing feature, viz., a measure equal to that of a ghata is denied, and not the non-existence of pearls. Such being the case, Gautama ! you may refuse to admit only the samyoga of the existing soul with something in some way, by saying something like this, that the soul does not exist in the body, but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under: If there exists that of which negation is predicated, then, in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore, you refuse to believe a fifth prati sedha, over and above the four well-known pratisedhas, viz., sainyoga etc. So there must be a fifth pratixedha. These arguments can be refuted as below: We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds, 2. e., only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus you will see that only a particular

Page #86
Vada ] . Ganadharavada .: 43 : type of sovereignty is not admitted but not all types of it. Similarly, when we refuse to admit the fifth pratisedha, it is the number 'five'associated with it that is denied, and not a pratisedha in all its aspects. Regarding this refutation, it may be argued that this is all moonshine. For, you refuse to admit in me the sovereignty of the three worlds - a thing that does exist in my case. The number 'five' not admitted in the case of pratisedha is also non-existent. Moreover, samyoga in the case of a house and Devadatta, which is not admitted, is also non-existent. Same is the case with samavaya, samanya and vis'esa. Such being the case, how can you say that what is negatived does exist? The answer to this sort of argument may be given as follows: That the samyoga between the house and Devadatta is not admitted, does not mean refusal to admit the sanyoga of Devadatta with a field, a market, a village or the like. Moreover, the house has no samyoga with Devadatta only; but it has a samyoga no doubt with a bed-stead or the like. Similarly the samavaya in the case of an ass and horns is not admited; but the samavaya in the case of a cow and its horns and the like, is certainly admitted. Likewise samanya is not admitted in the case of the moon but it is surely admitted in the case of ghatas, cows, etc. that are more than one in number. Similarly the measure equal to a ghata is refused so far as the pearls are concerned but it no doubt exists as regards a melton etc. The sovereignty of the three worlds is not admitted, Gautama ! in your case; but it does exist as far as Tirtharkaras are concerned. Similarly the number five is not admitted regarding the pratisedhas; but it is surely admitted when the question of anuttaras is being discussed.

Page #87
*: 44 :: . Jinabhadra Gani's [The first From this, you will see that, what we wish to suggest is this : That which is denied, exists ordinarily. By no means we want to convey : 'that about which negation is predicated, exists there and nowhere else'. Thus, there is no vyabhicara ( inconsistency ) in what we say. Gautama ! If you wish to retort that you ( Gautama ) do not admit the existence of the soul in the body only and admit it elsewhere, that is good; for, it establishes what is desired by us. We have been all this while trying simply to establish the existence of the soul. And, if it is thus established, then the asraya (substratum ) of the soul will be proved as it is not possible to justify its existence in any other way. It is not justifiable to admit any other asraya of the soul except the body; for, the lingas of the soul are seen there. It may be borne in mind that it will not do to say that the body itself is the soul; for, in that case we cannot have a vyavastha (fixity ) of the types, viz., he lives, he is dead, he has fainted and the like. Of course, this vyavcistha will be expounded hereafter. For the proof of the existence of the soul, another etymology can be given :jIvo tti satthayamiNaM suddhattaNao ghaDAbhihANaM va / jeNa ttheNa sadatthaM so jIvo aha maI hoja // 27 // (1575) attho deho cciya se taM no pjjaayvynnbheaao| FLUTEGUTT T FSTT HOTETT FET a CET 112611 (849EUR) Jivo tti satthayaminam suddhattanao ghadabhihanam va 1 Jenatthena sadattham so jivo aha mai hojja 11 27 ( 1575 ) Attho deho cciya se tam no pajjayavayanabheao Nanaiguno ya jao bhanio jivo na deho tti || 28 ( 1576 )

Page #88
Vada ] Ganadharavada . * 45 :: [ jIva iti sArthakamidaM zuddhatvato ghaTAbhidhAnamiva / yenArthena sadarthaM sa jIvo'tha matirbhavet // 27 // (1575) artho deha eva tasya tad no paryAyavacanabhedAt / jJAnAdiguNazca yato bhaNito jIvo na deha iti // 28 // (1576) Jiva iti sarthakam idani sudd hatvato ghacabhidhanam iva i . Yenarthena sadartham sa jivo'tha matir bhavet || 27 ( 1575 ) Artho deha eva tasya tad no paryayavacanabhedati JNanadigunas ca yato bhanito jivo na deha iti // 28 ( 1576)] ___Trans.-27-28 This word " jiva" is significant owing to its being suddha, as is the word ghata. That artha ( meaning) by means of which it is pregnant with a meaning is jiva. If you, however, think that that artha is only the body, . that is not so, on account of a difference in synonymous words; for, jiva is said to have gunas such as knowledge, etc., and not that the body ( is so said ). ( 1575-1576 ) TIkA-jIva ityetad vacanaM sArthakamiti pratijJA vyutpattimattve sati zuddhapadatvAt , iha yad vyutpattimatve sati zuddhapadaM tadarthavad dRSTam , yathA ghaTAdikam , tathA ca jIvapadam , tasmAt sArthakam , yattu sArthakaM na bhavati tad vyutpattimat zuddhapadaM ca na bhavati, yathA DitthAdikaM kharaviSANAdikaM ca, na ca tathA jIvapadam , tasmAt sArthakam / yad vyutpattimad na bhavati tacchuddhapadamapi sad na sArthakaM, yathA DitthAdipadam , iti hetoranaikAntikavAparihArArthaM vyutpattimattvavizeSaNaM draSTavyam / yadapi zuddhapadaM na bhavati kintu sAmAsikam , tadapi vyutpattimattve satyapi sArthakaM na bhavati, yathA kharaviSANAdikam , iti zuddhatvavizeSaNam / atha manyase-deha evAsya jIvapadasyA'rthaH, na punararthAntaram ; uktaM ca-" deha evA'yamanuprayujyamAno dRSTaH, yatheSa jIvaH, enaM na hinasti" iti, ato deha evAsyArtho yukta iti / tadetad na / kutaH ? ityAha-dehajIvayoH paryAyavacanabhedAt , yatra hi paryAyavacanabhedastatrAnyatvaM dRSTam , yathA ghaTA-''kAzayoH / tatra ghaTa-kuTa-kumbha-kalazAdayo ghaTastha paryAyAH, nabho

Page #89
*: 46 .: . Jinabhadra Gani's.. [ The first vyomaa'ntrikssaa-''kaashaadystvaakaashpryaayaaH| prastute ca jIvojanturasumAn prANI satvo bhUta ityAdayo jIvaparyAyAH, zarIraM vapuH kAyo dehaH kalevaramityAdayastu shriirpryaayaaH| paryAyavacanabhede'pi ca vastvekatve sarvaikatvaprasaGgo'tra bAdhakam / yat punaridamuktam-"deha evAyamanuprayujyamAno dRSTaH" ityAdi, taccharIrasahacaraNA-'vasthAnAditaH zarIre jIvopacAraH kriyate / kiJca, itthamapi zrUyata eva--'gataH sa jIvaH' 'dahyatAmidaM zarIram' iti / kiJca " nANAItyAdi " yasAca jJAnAdiguNayuto jantuH, jaDazca dehaH, tat kathaM deha eva jIvaH / prAgihaiva coktam--' na jJAnAdiguNo dehaH, mUrtimattvAt , ghaTavat ; tathA, dehendriyAtirikta AtmA, taduparame'pi tadupalabdhArthAnAmanusmaraNAt , vAtAyanapuruSavaditi ' // 27-28 // 1575-1577 // D. C. Here the pratijna is : The word jiva is significant. For, over and above this, it has a vyutpatti and it is a suddha pada. Whatever is a suddha pada and has a vyutpatti is here seen to be one having an artha ( meaning). Ghata, etc., may be mentioned as instances; so is the word jivne. Therefore it too, is significant. What is not significant is wanting in vyutpatti, and besides, it is not a suddha pada. Dittha, kharavisana, etc., are words of this type; for, the former has no vyutpatti, whereas the latter is not a suddha pada. Such is not the case with the word jiva. Therefore it is significant. The condition that it should have a vyutpatti is stated here to avoid dittha, etc., which are suddha padas, but which are not significant; for, they fail to satisfy both the conditions. Same is the case with khara-visanc; for, though it has a vyutpatti it is not a suddha pada. And therefore it is not significant. If you believe that simply the body is the artha of java, because we come across the following line, it is not correct, since there is a difference in the synonyms of the body and java : " Deha evayam anuprayujyamuno drstah yathaisc jivah, enam na hinasti. " The words of which the synonyms differ, are seen to be non-identical. For instance, ghata is not the same as aka'sa

Page #90
Vada} Ganadharavada as the synonyms of the former, viz., ghata, kuta, kumbha and kalasa differ from those of the latter, viz., nabhas, vyoman, antariksa, akasu and the like. In the pertinent case, the synonyms of jiva are jantu, asumat, pranin, sattva, bhuta, etc., and these are by no means the same as sarira, vapus, kaya, kalevara, etc., the synonyms of deha. If this difference in synonyms is neglected, anything will be identical with anything else, and this is certainly undesirable. *: 47. Now "deha evayam anupruyujyamano drstah ". Herein, there is an upacara (metaphorical application) of jiva to the body, as it is with the help of the body that the soul walks etc. 66 Moreover, we do hear; yatah sa jivah, dahyatam idam sariram", i. e, the soul has departed and let this body be burnt. Furthermore, the soul has an attribute like knowledge, whereas the body is jada and has no knowledge. So, how can we equate the body with the soul? The reasons why the body is not the same as the soul, have been already mentioned while concluding the commentary on verse 1562. jIvotthi vao saccaM mavayaNAo'vasesavayaNaM va / Azoganasi an Ag4qazogayoi a 112311 ( 3400) Jivo tthi vao saccam mavvayanao'vasesavayanam va Savvannuvayanao va anumayasavvannuvayanam va || 29 ( 1577) [ jIvossti vacaH satyaM madvacanAdavazeSavacanamiva / sarvajJavacanato vA'numatasarvajJavacanamiva // 29 // ( 1577 ) Jivo'sti vacah satyam madvacanadavasesavaca nam iva | Sarvajnavacanato va'numatasarvajnavacanam iva || 29 (1577)] Trans.-29 Like my other statement, (e. g., one pertaining to your doubt), the statement (of mine) that the soul exists,

Page #91
6:48. Jinabhadra Gani's | The first is true, as it is my statement. Or, it is correct owing to its being a statement of an omniscient being, as is the case with the statement of one whom you look upon as omniscient. (1577) TIkA-"jIvo'sti" ityetad vacaH satyam , madvacanatvAt , bhavatsaMzayaviSayAdyavazeSavacanavat , yacca satyaM na bhavati tad madIyavacanamapi na bhavati, yathA kUTasAkSivacanam / athavA satyaM " jIvo'sti" iti vacanam , sarvajJavacanatvAt , bhavadanumatasarvajJavacanavaditi // 29 (1577 ) // ___D. C.-Just as my statement about your doubt is correct so this statement of mine that the soul exists is correct; for, it is my statement. The statement which is not correct, is not mine, e.g., the statement of a false witness. Or, the correctness of this statement can be also established as under: The statement that the soul exists is correct, because it is the statement of an omniscient being, as is the case with a statement of one whom you look upon as sarvajia. bhaya-rAga-dosa-mohAbhAvAo saccamaNaivAiM ca / savaM ciya me vayaNaM jANaya majjhatthavayaNaM va // 30 // (1578) Bhaya-raga-dosa-mohabhavao saccamanaivaim ca i Savvam ciya me vayanam janaya majjhatthavayanam va 30 (1578) [bhaya-rAga-dveSa-mohAbhAvAt satyamanatipAti ca / satyameva me vacanaM jJAyakamadhyasthavacanamiva // 30 // (1578) Bhaya-raga-dvesa-mohabhavat satyam anatipati ca i Satyam eva me vacanamjnayakamadhyasthavacanam iva |130 (1578)] Trans.--30 Everything that I say, is certainly true and free from any fault, on account of the ( complete ) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation ( in me ) as is the case with the words of an intelligent and impartial person. (1578) TIkA-sarvamapi madvacanaM satyamanatipAti ca bodhavyam , bhaya-rAgadveSA-'jJAnarahitatvAt , iha yad bhayAdirahitasya vacanaM tat satyaM dRSTam , yathA

Page #92
-:49 :. Vada] .Ganadharavada mArgajJasya bhayarahitasya praSTari rAga-dveSarahitasya mArgopadezavacanam , tathA ca madvacA, tasmAt satyamanatipAti ceti // 30 (1578) // . D. C.-Whatever I say, should be taken to be true and flawless, as I am ( entirely ) free from fear, attachment, aversion and ignorance. In this world, it is a matter of common experience that whatever is said by one devoid of fear, etc., is true. For instance, the words spoken to one who has lost his way, by one who knows it, who is fearless and who is devoid of attachment and aversion, are true. My statement belongs to the same category. So it is true and flawless. The doubt of Gautama svamin is being answered. kaha savaNNu tti maI jeNAhaM svsNsyccheii| pucchasu va jaM na jANasi jeNaM va te paccao hojA // 31 // (1579) Kaha savvannu tti mai jenaham savvasamsayacchei | Pucchasu va jam na janasi jena va te paccao hojja // 31 (1579) [ kathaM sarvajJa iti matiyenAhaM srvsNshycchedii| pRccha vA yad na jAnAsi yena vA te pratyayo bhavet // 31 // (1579) Katham sarvajna iti matir yenaham sarvasamsayacchedi | Psiccha va yad na janasi yena va te pratyayo bhavet 11 31 (1579)] Trans.-31 You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient. This is so; for, I can remove all doubts. Or you may ask ( me ) what you do not know so that you may be convinced ( about my omniscience ). ( 1579 ) . TIkA-kathaM nAma ' tvaM sarvajJaH' iti te matiH ? evaM tvaM manyase, tathA bhaya-rAga-dveSa-mohAbhAvazcAsiddha iti manyase / tadayuktam , yenAhaM sarvasaMzayacchedI, yazca sarvasaMzayacchettA sa sarvajJa eva / dRSTAntAbhAvenAnvayAsiddhesnaikAntiko'yaM heturiti cet / na, sarvasaMzayacchettRtvAnupapattireveha viparyaye

Page #93
*: 50: Jinabhadra Gani's [The first bAdhakaM pramANam, kimihAnvayAnveSaNena 1 / yadi vA, pRcchathatAM yat trailokyAntargataM vastu tvaM na jAnAsi yena sarvajJatvapratyayastava jAyate / bhayAdyabhAvo'pi talliGgAdarzanAd mayi siddha eveti svayameva draSTavyam / kadAcidapi liGgAdarzane liGginosstitvazaGkAyAmatiprasaGga iti / / 31 (1579 ) / / D. C.-You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient and you may be believing that I am not entirely free from fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation. In that case I reply as under :---- I can remove all doubts. Whoever can do so, is certainly omniscient. So I, too, am omniscient. If you were to argue that this hetu is anaikantika (inconclusive) owing to want of an illustration, and impossibility of establishing anvaya, it is not so; for, in this viparyaya the anutpatti (inapplicability) itself of state of removing doubts is a proof that goes against it. What is the use of searching for anvaya? Or you may ask me anything that you do not know so that you may become convinced about my omniscience. That I am free from fear, etc., is proved in my case, owing to their characteristics being not seen in me. To suspect the existence of a lingin even when there is a total absence of a linga, is too much. * Concluding the author says : evamuvaogaliMgaM goyama ! savappamANasaMsiddhaM / saMsArI para thAvara - tasAibheyaM muNe jIvaM // 32 // (1580 ) Evam uvaogalingam Goyama! savvappamanasamsiddham | Sainsari-yara-thavara-tasaibheyam mune jivam // 32 (1580) [ evamupayogaliGgaM gautama ! sarvapramANasaMsiddham / saMsArI - tara sthAvara-trasabhedaM muNa jIvam // 32 // ( 1580 ) Evam upayogalingam Gautama! sarvapramanasamsiddham Samsari-tara-sthavara trasabhedam muna jivam || 32 ( 1580 ) ]

Page #94
Vada ] Ganadharavada . .:51:. Trans.-32 Thus Gautama! know the soul as one having upayoga ( attention ) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs and ( also ) as one having classifications like samsarin ( mundane ) and itara ( not mundane ) and the mundane having two sub-classifications, viz., sthavara ( immobile ) and trasa ( mobile ). ( 1580 ) TIkA-evamuktena prakAreNa jIvamAtmAnaM gautama! muNa-pratipadyasveti sambandhaH / kathambhUtam ? upayoga eva liGgaM yasya sa tathA, sarvaiH pratyakSA'numAnA-''gamapramANaiH saMsiddhaM-pratiSThitam , tathA saMsArI-tara-sthAvara-trasAdibhedam / saMsAriNazcetare siddhaaH| AdizaddhAcca sUkSma-bAdara-paryAptA-'paryAptAdibhedaparigraha iti // 32 // 1580 // atra vedAntavAdI pAha-nanu bahubhedatvamAtmano'siddham , tasya sarvatraikatvAt , taduktam " eka eva hi bhUtAtmA bhUte bhUte pratiSThitaH / ekadhA bahudhA caiva dRzyate jalacandravat // 1 // yathA vizuddhamAkAzaM timiropapluto janaH / saGkIrNamiva mAtrAbhibhinnAbhirabhimanyate // 2 // tathedamamalaM brahma nirvikalpamavidyayA / kaluSatvamivApannaM bhedarUpaM prakAzate // 3 // UrdhvamUlamadhaHzAkhamazvatthaM prAhuravyayam / chandAMsi yasya parNAni yastaM veda sa vedavit // 4 // " tathA 'puruSa evedaM gni sarvaM, yad bhUtaM yacca bhAvyam , utAmRtatvasyezAnaH, yadannenAtirohati, yadejati, yad naijati, yad dUre, yadu antike, yadantarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyAsya bAhyataH' ityAdi / ityetadeva pUrvArdhanAkSipyottarArdhana pariharannAha D. C.-In this way, Gautama ! admit that there is a soul which has upayoga as its linga, of which the existence is proved by all the three pramanas., viz., pratyaksa,

Page #95
* 52:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The first anumana and agama, and which can be variously classified. Some of these classifications are :-samsarin (mundane) and mukta (liberated), suksma (subtle) and badara (gross), paryapta (developed) and aparyapta (non-developed), etc. Furthermore, the mundane beings are sub-divided as sthavara (immobile) and trusa (mobile). Here a Vedantin may say that, many varieties of the soul are unwarranted; for, the soul is everywhere the same. This is corroborated by the following verses : ,, Eka eva hi bhutatma bhute bhute pratisthitah Ekadha bahudha caiva drsyate jalcandravat 1 || Yatha visuddham akasam timiropapluto janah Sankirnam iva matrabhir bhinnabhir abhimanyate || 2 ||| Tathedam amalam brahma nirvikalpamavidyaya | Kalusatvam ivapannam bhedarupam prakasate 3 n Urdhvamulam adhahsakham asvattham prahur avyayami Chandamsi yasya parnani yas tam veda sa vedavit || 4 ||" And Purusa evedam gni sarvam, yad bhutam, yacca bhavyam utamrtatvasyesanah, yadannenatirohati, yad ejati, yad naijati, yad. dure, yadu antike, yad antarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyasya bahyatah. This view of the Vedantin is now being refuted :-- jai puNa so ego ciya havejja vomaM va saGghapiMDesu / goyama ! tadegaliMgaM piMDesu tahA na jIvo'yaM // 33 // (1581) Jai puna so ego cciya havejja vomam va savvapindesu Goyama! tad egalingam pindesu taha na jivo'yam || 33 (1581) [ yadi punaH sa eka eva bhaved vyomeva sarvapiNDeSu / nitaH ! aenfos fqveg aer a flatsag || 33 || ( 2468 )

Page #96
Vada ] ___ . Ganadharavada .:53 :Yadi punah sa eka eva bhaved vyomeva sarvapindesu | Gautama ! tad ekalingam pindesu tatha na jivo'yam // 33 (1581) ] ____ Trans.-33 0 Gautama ! if that soul were really one in all the pindas ( bodies ) as is the case with the sky, then that ( sky ) is ( only ) of one form in different corporeal pindas but such is not the soul. ( 1581 ) TIkA-paraH prAha-yadi punardarzitanyAyena sa AtmA sarveSvapi nArakatiryaG-narA-'marapiNDeSu vyomavadeka eva bhaved na tu saMsArItarAdibhedabhinnaH, tarhi kiM nAma dUSaNaM syAt / evamukte bhagavAnAha-gautama ! tad vyoma sarveSvapi piNDeSu mUrtivizeSeSu sthitamekaliGgaM vaisadRzyAbhAvAdekarUpameva, iti yuktaM tasyaikatvam , jIvastvayaM vicAryatvena prastuto na tathA-naikaliGgaH sarvatra dRzyate, pratipiNDaM tasya vilakSaNatvAt , lakSaNabhede ca lakSyabhedAt, iti na tasyaikatvamiti // 33 (1581 ) // D. C.-Some one may ask a question : What harm is there, if, on the basis of the verses, etc., just quoted, the soul is, on the analogy of the sky, looked upon as one i.e. having no such * classifications, as mundane and non-mundane and the like, so far as all the pindas, viz., the bodies of a denizen of hell, tiryac, a human being and a celestial being, are concerned ? The answer is this: As regards the sky, it is alright to say that it is only one; for, the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal pindas, is seen to be uniform-free from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform; for, it differs from pinda to pinda. Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes, the difference in those having these characteristics. Hence, the soul is not one in number. Here is the illustration :

Page #97
*: 54:. .. Jinabhadra Gani's [The first nANAjIvA kuMbhAdau va bhuvi lkkhnnaaibheyaao| suha-dukkha-baMdha-mokkhAbhAvo ya jao tadegatte // 34 // (1582) Nanajiva kumbhadau vya bhuvi lakkhanaibheyao 1 Suha-dukkha-bandha-mokkhabhavo ya jao tadegatte 1134 (1582) [nAnAjIvAH kumbhAdaya iva bhuvi lakSaNAdibhedAt / sukha-duHkha-bandha-mokSAbhAvazca yatastadekatve // 34 // (1582) Nanajivah kumbhadaya iva bhuvi laksanadibhedat i Sukha-duhkha-bandha-moksabhavas ca yatas tadekatve // 34(1582)] Trans.-34 In this world, there are different souls like ( different) water-pots, etc., on account of the difference in their characteristics, etc. For, if they were ( only ) one, there will be non-existence of sukha ( happiness ), duhkha ( misery ), bandha ( bondage ) and moksa ( emancipation ). ( 1582) TIkA-nAnArUpA bhuvi jIvAH parasparaM bhedabhAja ityarthaH / lakSaNAdibhedAditi hetuH, kumbhAdaya iveti dRSTAntaH, yacca na bhinnaM na tasya lakSaNabhedaH, yathA nabhasa iti / sukha-duHkha-bandha-mokSAbhAvazca yasmAt tadekatve, tasmAt bhinnA eva sarve'pi jIvA iti // 34 (1582) // ___D. C.-The living beings in this world, differ from one another; for, there is a difference in their characteristics etc. As a parallel example may be mentioned water-pots etc. Whatever is not different from another object, does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same ( since ghatakasa does not differ from mathakas a). Moreover, if there were only one soul, then, there will be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage and emancipation. But these do exist. Therefore all the souls are different, and their number is not one but many. How do the characteristics differ in each body?

Page #98
Vada ] . Ganadharavada :55. jeNovaogaliMgo jIvo bhinno ya so pisriirN| uvaogo ukkarisA-vagarisao teNa te'NaMtA // 35 // (1583) Jenovaogalingo jivo bhinno ya so paisariram i Uvaogo ukkarisa-vagarisad tena te'nanta || 35 ( 1513 ) [yenopayogaliGgo jIvo bhinnazca sa pratizarIram / upayoga utkarSA-'pakarSatastena te'nantAH // 35 // (1583) Yenopayogalingo jivo bhinnas ca sa pratisariram i Upayoga utkarsa-pakarsatas tena te'nantah // 35 ( 1583 )] Trans.-35 That upayoga ( attention) by means of which the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body. The upayoga has maximum and minimum. scales. Therefore they (souls ) are infinite in number. (1583) TIkA-yena jJAna-darzanopayogalakSaNo'sau jIvaH, sa copayogaH pratizarIramutkarSA-'pakarSabhedAnantabhedaH, tena jIvAsta dAdanantabhedA eveti / tadevaM bhAvitaM " nANAjIvA" ityAdi pUrvArdham // 35 (1583) // D. C.-This soul has as its characteristic, upayoga ( attention) consisting of two kinds of knowledge, viz., differentiated and undifferentiated. This upayoga has infinite varieties; for, it differs from body to body, some having the utkarsa ( maximum ) upayoga, some having the apakarsa (minimum) upayoga and some having upayoga between these two extremes. Therefore the souls are of infinite kinds owing to the infinite varieties of upayoga. This has been already alluded to, in the first hemistich of verse 1582. Now, with regards to happiness, misery, etc., s. e., exposition of the second hemistich of verse 1582, the author says: egatte savagayattao na mokkhAdao nabhasseva / kattA bhotA maMtA na ya saMsArI jahAgAsaM // 36 // (1584)

Page #99
*: 56: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first Egatte savvagayattao na mokkhadao nabhasseva | Katta bhotta manta na ya samsari jahagasam // 36 ( 1584 ) [ ekatve sarvagatatvato na mokSAdayo nabhasa iva / kartA bhoktA mantA na ca saMsArI yathA''kAzam || 36 || ( 1584 ) Ekatve sarvagatatvato na moksadayo nabhasa iva | Karta bhokta_manta na ca samsari yathaka" Sam || 36 ( 1584 ) ] Trans. - 36 On oneness ( being accepted in the case of souls ) there will not be liberation, etc., owing to ( the soul ) being all-pervading, as is the case with the space. Moreover, like space, the soul will not be a kartr ( a doer ) a bhoktr ( an enjoyer ), a mantr ( thinker) and a sarsarin ( a mundane being ). ( 1584 ) 7 TIkA - ekatve jIvAnAM sukha-duHkha-bandha - mokSAdayo nopapadyante, sarvagatatvAt nabhasa iva / yatra tu sukhAdayo na tat sarvagataM yathA devadatta iti / kiJca na kartA, na bhoktA, na mantA, na saMsArI jIvaH, ekatvAt sarvajIvAnAm, yaccaikaM na tasya kartRtvAdayaH, yathA nabhasa iti / / 36 (1584) / D. C.--If there is only one soul, then there is no scope for happiness and misery, bondage and liberation and the like since one soul will be all-pervading. Space may be here cited as a pertinent case. One where in there are happiness, misery etc., is not all-pervading. e. g., Devadatta. Further more, since the number of the souls is only one, and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer etc., a fact which is corroborated by the example of space. Besides egatte natthi suhI bahUvaghAu tti desaniruu va / bahutarabaddhattaNao na ya mukkA desamuko vva // 37 // (1585)

Page #100
Vada ] Ganadhara vada :57 . Egatte natthi suhi bahuvaghau tti desaniruu vya / Bahuttara baddhattanao na ya mukko desamukko vva // 37 (1585) [ekatve nAsti sukhI bahUpaghAta iti dezaniruja iva / bahutarabaddhatvato na ca mukto dezamukta iva // 37 // (1585) .. Ekatve nasti sukhi babupaghata iti desaniruja iva | . Bahutarabaddhtrato na ca mukto desamukta iva // 37 ( 1585 )] ___Trans.-37 When there is oneness ( of the souls ), none is ( completely ) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease. Furtheremore, none is ( entirely ) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free. ( 1585) TIkA-idamatra hRdayam -nAraka-tiryagAdayo'nantA jIvA nAnAvidhazarIra--mAnasopaghAtasaMpAtairduHkhitA eva, tadanantabhAgavartinastu sukhinaH, evamanantA baddhAH, tadanantabhAgavartinastu muktAH, teSAM ca sarveSAmekatve na ko'pi sukhI prApnoti, bahutaropaghAtAnvitatvAt , yathA sarvAGgarogagrasto'mulyekadezena nIrogo yajJadattaH, evaM na ko'pi muktastatsukhabhAk ca na ko'pi ghaTate, bahutarabaddhatvAt , yathA srvaanggkiilitogulyekdeshmuktH| tasmAdekatve sukhAdyanupapatternAnAtvaM jIvAnAmiti sthitam // 37 (1585) // ___D. C.- There are infinite living beings viz., denizens of hell, tiryacs and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy. Similarly infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of karmans, and only an infinitesimal part of them is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as differ@nt entities, but are considered as only one, then none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the case with Yajnadatta who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger. Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruing from liberation, since there is a

Page #101
*:58 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The first great deal of bondages. One who has fetters all along his body: except a finger may be mentioned as an illustration. Thus, owing to oneness there is no possiblity for happiness, etc. So it follows that there are many souls and not only one. Refutation of the view-point of the Naiyayikas, who admit (the existence of) many souls, but take them to be all-pervading:jIvo taNumettattho jaha kuMbho tggunnovlNbhaao| ahavA'NuvalaMbhAo bhinnammi ghaDe paDasseva // 38 // (1586) Jivo tanumettattho jaha kumbho taggumovalambhao 1 Ahava'nuvalambhao bhinnammi ghade padasseva ll 38 ( 1586 ) [ jIvastanumAtrastho yathA kumbhastadguNopalambhAt / / athavA'nupalambhAd bhinne ghaTe paTasyeva // 38 // (1586) Jivastanumatrastho yatha kumbhastadgunopalambhati Athava'nupalambhad bhinne ghate patasyeva II 38 ( 1586 ) ] Transe.-38 The soul permeates the body only, since its attributes are found there, as is the case with a pitcher. Or because it is not found ( elsewhere ), as is the case with a piece of cloth ( which does not permeate ), a pitcher is different from it. ( 1586) TIkA-tanumAtrastho jIva iti pratijJA, tatraiva tadguNopalabdheH, yathA ghaTaH, 'svAtmamAtre' iti shessH| "ahavetyAdi" athavA, yo yatra pramANainoMpalabhyate tasya tatrAbhAva eva, yathA bhinne ghaTe paTasya, nopalabhyate ca zarIrAd bahirjIvaH, tasmAt tasya tatrAbhAva eveti // 38 (1586 ) // ____D. C.-The measure of the soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies. For, its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher and not outside it.

Page #102
Vada ] Ganadhara vada . : 59:As an alternative argument it may be said :-That is nonexistent there, where it cannot be realized by any of the pramanas. As for example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher which is separate from it. The soul is not seen outside the body. Consequently it should be taken to be non-existent there. While concluding the author says :tamhA kattA bhottA baMdho mokkho suhaM ca dukkhaM ca / FATUI TEAT-SATTET ETTE 11 3811 ( 464 ) Tamha katta bhotta bandho mokkho suham ca dukkham ca i Samsaranam ca bahutat'savvagayatte sujuttaim || 39 ( 1587 ) [ tasmAt kartA bhoktA bandho mokSaH sukhaM ca duHkhaM ca / FATOT 2 ET1--Suaract: TTFIT II 3S 11 ( 9460) Tasmat karta bhokta bandho moksah sukham ca duhkham ca Samsaranam ca bahutva'sarvagatatvayoh suyuktani 11 39 (1587) ] Trans.- 39 Therefore a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liberation, happiness, misery, mundane existence and metamorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all-pervading. ( 1587 ) TIkA-tasmAd bahutvA-sarvagatatvayoreva satoH kartRtvAdayo dharmA jIvasya yujyante, nAnyathA, ityevaMvidhaM pramANasiddhaM jIvaM pratipadyasveti // 39(1587) / / D. C.-Therefore it is only when it is admitted that souls are many and that none of them is all-pervading, action etc, which are the attributes of the soul, can have any place. If not, these attributes will be meaningless. So please admit the soul which is thus established by pramanas. Now the meaning of the sentences of the Veda which may be troubling you.

Page #103
.: 60 :Jinabhadra Gani's [The first goyama ! veyapayANaM imANa atthaM ca taM na yANAsi / jaM vinnANaghaNo cciya bhUyahiMto samutthAya // 40 // (1588) mapaNasi majjaMgesu va mayabhAvo bhuuysmudubbhuuo| vinnANamettamAyA bhUe'Nu viNassai sa bhUo // 41 // (1589) asthi na ya pecasaNNA jaM putvabhave'bhihANamamugo tti / jaM bhaNiyaM na bhavAo bhavaMtaraM jAi jIvotti // 42 // (1590) Goyama ! Veyapayanam imana attham ca tam na yanasi Jam vinnanaghano cciya bhuyehinto samutthaya // 40 ( 1588 ) Mannasi majjangesu va mayabhavo bhuyasamudaubbhuo 1 Vinnanamettamaya bhue'nu vinassai sa bhuo il 41 ( 1589 ) Atthi na ya peccasanna jam puvvabhave'bhihanamamugo tti 1 Jam bhaniyam na bhavao bhavantaram jai jivo tti 11 42 (1590) [gautama ! vedapadAnAmeSAmarthaM ca tvaM na jAnAsi / yad vijJAnadhana eva bhUtebhyaH samutthAya // 40 // (1588 ) manyase madyAGgeSviva madabhAvo bhuutsmudyodbhuutH| * vijJAnamAtramAtmA bhUte'nu vinazyati sa bhUyaH // 41 // (1589) asti na ca pretyasaMjJA yat pUrvabhave'bhidhAnamamuka iti / yad bhaNitaM na bhavAd bhavAntaraM yAti jIva iti // 42 // (1590) Gautama ! Veda padanamesamartham ca tvam na janasi / Yad vijnanaghana eva bhutebhyah samutthaya || 40 ( 1588 ) Manyase madyangesviva madabhavo bhutasamudayodbhutah 1 Vijnanamatramatma bhute'nu vinasyati sa bhuyah || 41 (1589) Asti na ca pretyasanjna yat purvabhave'bhidhanamamuka iti i Yad bhanitam na bhavad bhavantaram yati jiva iti // 42 (1590)]

Page #104
Vada] .. Ganadharavada / : 61 : Trans.-40-41-42 Gautama! You do not know the (real) meaning of these sentences of the Veda. For, you believe that none but the assemblage of ( the particles of) knowledge, after having arisen from elements, in the way in which intoxication arises, from the sources of spirituous liquors; is a soul consisting of knowledge only-the soul which has sprung up from the collection of elements. It again perishes after the elements ( have perished ), and that there is no designation in the previous birth to the effect that it was named as such and such in the former birth (existence ) and hence it is said that the soul does not go from one bhava, to another existence. ( 1588-1589-1590) TIkA-gautama ! ityAmantraNam , vedapadAnAM zrutivAkyAnAmamISAM "vijJAnaghana evaitebhyaH" ityAdInAM cetasi vartamAnAnAmarthaM yathAvasthitaM tvaM na jAnAsi nAvabudhyase / kimiti ? ata Aha-yad yasmAt tvamAtmAbhiprAyeNaivaMbhUtamihArthaM manyase vikalpayasIti saMbandhaH / kathaM bhUtam ? ityAha"viNNANaghaNo ciyatti" pRthivyAdibhUtAnAM vijJAnalavasamudAyo vijJAnadhanaH pRthivyAdivijJAnAMzAnAM piNDa ityarthaH, avadhAraNaM tvAtmavAdiparikalpitasya bhUtasamudAyAtiriktasya jJAna-darzanAdiguNAzrayasyAtmano nirAsArtham / bhUte* bhyaH pRthivyAdibhyaH samuditebhyo na tu vyastebhyaH, jJAnasya tatsamudAyapariNAmAGgIkArAditi bhAvaH, madyAGgeSu madyakAraNeSu dhAtakyAdiSu madabhAva.iva; kathaMbhUto vijJAnadhanaH ? ityAha--" bhUyasamudaunbhUo vinnANamettamAya ti" bhUtasamudayAdudbhUtastadaiva jAto na tu parabhavAt kazcidAyAto vijJAnamAtrarUpa AtmetyarthaH, samutthAyotpadya tatastAnyeva pRthivyAdIni bhUtAni vinAzamaznu vAnAnyanu lakSIkRtya bhUyaH punarapi sa vijJAnaghano vijJAnamAtrarUpa AtmA vinazyati, na tvAtmavAdinAmivAnyabhavaM yAti / ata eva na pretyabhave parabhave saMjJAsti, yat pUrvabhave nArakAdijanmanyabhidhAnamAsIt tat parabhave nAsti, yaduta-amuko nArako devo vA bhUtvedAnI manuSyaH saMvRta ityAdi, nArakAdeH prAgeva sarvanAzaM naSTatvAditi bhaavH| kimiha vAkye tAtparyavRttyA proktaM bhavati ? ityAha-" jaM bhaNiyamityAdi " sarvathAtmanaH samutpadya vinaSTatvAd na bhavAd

Page #105
.: 62:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The first bhavAntaraM ko'pi yAtItyuktaM bhavati / / 40-41-42 ( 1588-1589 1590 ) // D. C.-By these sentences of the Veda are meant those which Gautama had in his mind. The assemblage of knowledge consists of the united particles of knowledge arising from elements such as earth etc., combined together. * here mentioned with The restriction, viz., 'none else but', a view to exclude a soul according to the Atmavadins (believers in universal soul) is distinct from the collection of elements and which is an abode or substratum of attributes like jnana (knowledge) etc. The sources of spirituous liquors are dhataki etc. Gautama believes that the soul has not come from any previous birth but it has been generated by the elements-it has been evolved out of them. So, when these elements perish, the soul, too, perishes; and it is not born once more as the Atmavadins believe. In short, it has neither any incarnation nor any transmigration. Such being the case, it is not possible to say that such and such a one who was previously a denizen of hell or a celestial being, is now born as a human being. For, on the termination of a stage as that of a denizen of hell or the like, everything was over-nothing was left, not even the soul. Thus, when the soul altogether arises from-gets evolved out of a collection of elements and completely perishes as soon as these elements perish, there is none who proceeds from one birth to another. I understand the meaning of these sentences as follows: goyama ! payatthamevaM mannato natthi mannase jIvaM / vaktaresu ya puNo bhaNio jIvo jamasthi ti // 43 // ( 1591)

Page #106
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 63 : aggihavaNAikiriyAphalaM ca to saMsayaM kuNasi jIve / mA kuru na payattho'yaM imaM payatthaM nisAmehi // 44 // (1592) Goyama ! payatthamevam mannanto natthi mannase jivam ! Vakkantaresu ya puno bhanio jivo jamatthi ttin 43 ( 1591) Aggihavanaikiriyaphalam ca to samsayam kunasi jive | Ma kuru na payattho'yam imam payattham nisamehi 11 44 (1592) [ gautama ! padArtha evaM manyamAno nAsti manyase jIvam / vAkyAntareSu ca punarbhaNito jIvo yadastIti // 43 / / (1591) agnihavanAdikriyAphalaM ca tataH saMzayaM karoSi jIve / mA kuru na padArtho'yamimaM padArthaM nizamaya // 44 // (1592) Gautama ! padartha evam manyanano nasti manyase jivam 1 Vakyantaresu ca punar-bhanito jivo yadastiti // 43 ( 1591) Agni havanadi kriyaphalam ca tatah sanisayam karosi jive / Ma kuru na padartho'yanimam padartham nisamaya // ( 1592)] ___Trans.-43-44 CGautama ! While construing the sentences in this way, you believe that there is no soul. And, in other sentences it is said that there is a soul, and, moreover there is a fructification of an oblation to fire etc. Consequently, you entertain a doubt about ( the existence of ) the soul; but do not do it. This is not the meaning of the sentences. But hear : this is the meaning of the sentences. ( 1591-1592) TIkA--gautama / asya vAkyasya darzitarUpameva padArtha manyamAnastvaM 'nAsti' ityevaM jIvaM manyase / yasmAca punaH " na ha vai sazarIrasya priyA-- 'priyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA-apriye na spRzataH" ityAdiSu vedavAkyAntareSu " asti" ityevaM jIvo bhaNitaH prtipaaditH| tathA "agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH" ityAdivacanAdagnihavanAdikriyAyAH phalaM ca pArabhavikaM zrUyate / na cedaM bhavAntarayAyinamAtmAnamantareNopapadyate / ataH

Page #107
* 64. :Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first " kiM jIvo'sti nAsti vA ? " ityevaM saMzayaM jIve karoSi tvam / tadamuM mA kRthAH, yasmAd " vijJAnaghana eva0" ityAdivAkyasya nAyamoM yaM bhavAnadhyavasyati, kintvamuM vakSyamANaM padArthamiha nizamayA''karNayeti // 43--44 (1591-1592) // * D. C.-0 Gautama ! You interpret this sentence in the way just shown. And hence, you conclude that the soul does not . exist. At the same time, you notice that the following sentences of the veda establishlng the existence of the soul : "Na ha vai sasararasya priya'priyayor apahatir asti, asarirasya va vasantam priya'priye na sprsatah." Moreover from the sentences such as " Agnihotrm juhuyat svargakamah " it follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering, oblation to fire, etc.,-a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, and this fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul goes in, for another existence or birth. These various statements lead you to doubt the existence of the soul. But, there is no need of entertaining such a doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence, viz., " vijnanaghana eva" etc. The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows: please hear it. viNNANAo'NapaNo viNNANaghaNNo tti savaovAvi / sa bhavai bhUehiMto ghaDaviNNANAibhAveNa // 45 // (1593) tAiMciya bhUyAiM so'Nu viNassai vinnssmaannaaii| atyaMtarovaoge kamaso viNNeyabhAveNaM // 46 // (1594)

Page #108
Vada ] . Ganadharavada : .:: 65 :: Vinnanao'nanno vinnanaghanno tti savvaovavil Sa bhavai bhuehinto ghadavinnanai bhavena // 45 ( 1593 ) Taim ciya bhuyaim so'nu vinassai vinassamanaim / Atthantarovaige kamaso vinneya bhave nam // 46 ( 1594 ) [ vijJAnAdananyo vijJAnadhana iti sarvatovyApI / sa bhavati bhUtebhyo ghaTavijJAnAdibhAvena // 45 // (1593) tAnyeva bhUtAni so'nu vinazyati vinazyamAnAni / arthAntaropayoge kramazo vijJeyabhAvena // 46 // (1594) Vijnanadananyo vijnanaghana iti sarvatovyapi| Sa bhavati bhutebhyo ghatavijnanadibhavena ll 45 ( 1593 ) Tanyeva bhutani so'nu vinasyati vinasyamananil Arthantaropayoge kramaso vijneyabhavena || 46 ( 1594 )] _Trans.-45-46 The soul ( itself ) is the assemblage of vijnanas owing to its being non-separate from vijnana, or it is so, on account of its pervasive all around. It arises from elements in the form of the vijnana of a pitcher, etc. When those very elements perish as vijneya-bhavas ( objects coming within the range of vijnana ) on the attention being gradually directed to another object, it (the soul) subsequently perishes. (1593-1594) __TIkA-iha vijJAnaghano jIva ucyate / katham ? iti cet / ucyate-- viziSTaM jJAnaM vijJAnaM jJAna-darzanopayoga ityarthaH, tena vijJAnena sahAnanyabhUtasvAdekatayA ghanatvaM niviDatvamApanno vijJAnadhano jIvaH, yadivA "sabaovA vi ti" sarvataH pratipradezamanantAnantavijJAnaparyAyasaGghAtaghaTitatvAd vijJAnaghano jiivH| evakAreNa tu vijJAnaghana evAsau, na tu naiyAyikAdInAmiva " svarUpeNa nirvijJAnatvAjaDo'sau, buddhistu tatra samavetaiva" iti niyamyate / sa bhavati-udyata iti kriyA / kebhyaH ? ityAha-" bhUehito ti" bhUtAnIha ghaTa-paTAdijJeyavasturUpANyabhipretAni, tebhyo jJeyabhAvena pariNatebhyaH / kena bhavati ? ityAha--"ghaTo'yam" "paTo'yam" ityAdivijJAnabhAvena ghaTAdijJAna

Page #109
.: 66 : Jinabhadra Gani's . [ The first paryAyeNa / tataH kim ? ityAzaGkaya 'tAnyevAnu vinazyati" ityasyArthamAha" tAI ciyetyAdi " tAnyeva jJAnAlambanabhUtAni ghaTAdibhUtAni kramazaH kAlakrameNa vyavadhAna sthaganA-'nyamanaskatvAdinArthAntaropayoge sati vizeyabhAvena jJAnaviSayabhAvena vinAzamaznuvAnAni, anu-pazcAt tadbodhaparyAyeNa, sa vijJAnadhano vinazyatIti saMbandhaH / jJAnaparyAyeNa ghaTAdibhyo jJeyabhUtebhyo jIvaH samutthAya kAlakramAd vyavadhAnAdinArthAntaropayoge sati jJeyabhAvena tAnyeva vinAzamaznuvAnAnyanu vinazyatIti tAtparyArthaH // 45-46 (1593) (1594) // ___D. C.--Here the soul is said to be vijrianaghana-an assemblage of vijnana for either of the two reasons viz., (1) the soul is non-separate from-is identical with vijnana which is upayoga either of the type of jnana or that of dars'ana, and (2) the soul has each and every pradesa (the minutest portion ) of it, formed from a collection of infinite modifications of vijnana. The word eva used in connection with vijnanaghana shows that the belief of the Naiyayikas and others conveyed by the following sentence is untenable : " Svarupena nirvijnanatvaj jado'sau, buddhis tu tatra samavetaiva." This soul is evolved out of the elements which are objects fit to be known-the objects like a pitcher, a piece of cloth etc. That is to say, it gets transformed as the knowledge of a pitcher etc., on realizing that this is a pitcher, this is a piece of cloth, etc. . These very elements such a pitcher etc, which had once served as substratum for knowledge, perish; that is to say, they cease to be objects fit to be known when the attention of the soul is directed towards another object when these objects are hidden or concealed from sight or when the mind is working in some other channel. Such being the case, the soul ceases

Page #110
Vada ] Ganadharavada 67 : to know them i. e., ceases to exist as knowledge of these objects. This is here looked upon as its destruction. The sum and substance is this : When a soul comes to know any object, it is said to have been produced from that object; but, when it ceases to think of it and directs its attention somewhere else, it is said to have perished; for, the object with which it once identified itself, has perished. Does the soul perish entirely in this way ? The answer is in the negative as suggested in the following verse :puvAvaraviNNANovaogao vigm-sNbhvshaavo| viNNANasaMtaIe viNNANaghaNo'yamaviNAsI // 47 // (1595) Puvyavaravinnanovaogao vigama-sambhavasahavo i Vinnanasantaie vinnanaghano' yamavinasi // 47 ( 1595 ) [ pUrvA-'paravijJAnopayogato vigama-saMbhavasvabhAvaH / vijJAnasaMtatyA vijJAnaghano'yamavinAzI // 47 // (1595) Purva para vijnanopayogato vigama-sambhava svabhavah Vijnanasantatya vijnanaghano'yamavinasi il 47 ( 1595 ) ] - Trans.-47 This vijnanaghana ( the soul ) has the nature of destruction and that of origination on account of the (corresponding ) upayogas being associated with the previous vijnana and the subsequent one. It is immortal owing to the continuity of vijnana.. ( 1595 ) TIkA--eka evAyamAtmA trisvabhAvaH / katham ? ityucyate-arthAntaropayogakAle pUrvavijJAnopayogena tAvadayaM vigamasvabhAvo vinazvararUpaH, aparavijJAnopayogastu saMbhavasvabhAva utpAdasvarUpaH, anAdikAlapravRttasAmAnyavijJAnamAtrasaMtatyA punarayaM vijJAnaghano jIvo'vinaSTa evAvatiSThate / evamanyadapi sarva vastUtpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvamevAvagantavyam , na punaH kimapi sarvathotpadyate, vinazyati ceti // 47 (1595) //

Page #111
:: 68 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The first D. C.-This very soul, though one, has a three-fold nature. When it is attentive to another object, it has died; for, at that time, its attention to the former object is gone, but it has originated so far as the attention to this new object is concerned. Side by side with its twofold nature pertaining to destruction and origination, it has permanence owing to the continuity of the general vijana existing from the beginning-less time. Similarly every object has a three-fold nature consisting of utpada (origination ), vyaya (destruction ) and dhrauvya (permanence ), and that there is nothing which is created in all respects, and that there is nothing which entirely perishes. na ca pecanANasaNNAvatiTTae sNpovogaao| viNNANaghaNAbhikkho jIvo'yaM veyapayabhihio // 48 // (1596) Na ca peccananasannavatitthae sampaovaogao 1 Vinnanaghanabhikkho jivo'yam Veyapayabhihio 11 48 ( 1596 ) [ na ca pretyajJAnasaMjJA'vatiSThate sAMpratopayogAt / vijJAnaghanAbhikhyo jIvo'yaM vedapadAbhihitaH // 48 // (1596 ) Na ca pretyajnana sanjna'vatisthate sampratayogat / Vijnana ghanabhikhyo jivo'yam Vedapadabhihitah || 48 (1596).] Trans.-48 The designation pertaining to former knowledge does not exist owing to the upayoga being directed to (a) present object. This soul is named vijjanaghana as said in the sentences of the Veda. ( 1596 ) - TIkA--na ca pretyeti-na cAnyavastUpayogakAle prAktanI jJAnasaMjJAsti / kutaH ? sAMpratavastuviSayopayogAt / idamuktaM bhavati-yadA ghaTopayoganivRttI paTopayoga utpadyate, tadA ghaTopayogasaMjJA nAsti, tadupayogasya nivRttatvAt / kintu paTopayogasaMhavAsti, tadupayogasyaiva tadAnImutpannatvAt / tasmAd vijJAnaghanAbhikhyo vedapadeSvabhihito'yaM jIvaH / tato gautama ! pratipadyasvainamiti // 48 (1596) // , ..

Page #112
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 69 :. ___D. C.-When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, e. g., from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as ghatopayoga (attention to a pitcher ) but acquires a new designation viz., patopayogaa ( attention to a piece of cloth ). Such being the case, this soul is named as vijnanaghana in the Veda. Therefore, Gautama ! admit that the soul exists. evaM pi bhUyadhammo nANaM tabbhAvabhAvao buddhii| taM no tadabhAvammi vi jaM nANaM veyasamayammi // 49 // (159 athamie Aicce caMde saMtAsu aggi-vAyAsu / kiMjoirayaM puriso appajjoi tti niviTTho // 50 // (1598) Evam pi bhuyadhammo nanam tabbhavabhavao buddhi | Tam no tadabhavammi vi jam nanam Veyasamayamm // 49 (1597 Atthamie aicce cande santasu aggi-vayasu / Kimjoirayam puriso appajjoi tti niddittho // 50 ( 1598 ) [ evamapi bhUtadharmo jJAnaM tadbhAvabhAvato buddhiH| . tad na tadabhAve'pi yajjJAnaM vedasamaye // 49 / / ( 1597 ) astaMmita Aditye candre zAntayoragni-vAcoH / kiMjyotirayaM puruSa Atmajyotiriti nirdiSTaH // 50 // (1598) Evamapi bhutadharmo jnanam tadbhavabhayato buddbih 1 Tad na tadabhave'pi yajjnanam Vedasamaye || 49 ( 1597 ) Astamita aditye candre Santayor-agni-vacoh / . Kimjyotirayam purusa atmajyotiriti nirdistah || 50 ( 1598 )] Trans.-49-50 You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the dharma of elements owing to its existing when they exist (and that it does not exist when there is their non-existence ). This is not proper; for, even

Page #113
: 70 :. . Jinabhadra Gani's. [ The first when they are non-existent, knowledge is said to exist in the following doctrine of the Veda : What jyotis ( light ) has this man when the Sun has set, the Moon has set and when ( even ) fire and speech are quiet? It is said : that is the light of the soul. ( 1597-1598) ___TIkA-" buddhI" ti syAd buddhiH prerakasya-evamapi-" sa bhavai bhUehito" ityAdinA yuSmadvayAkhyAnaprakAreNApItyarthaH, pRthivyAdibhUtadharma eva jJAnaM-bhUtasvabhAvAtmakameva jJAnamiti bhaavH| kutaH ? ityAha-" tabbhAvabhAvau ti" " etebhyo bhUtebhyaH samutthAya tAnyevAnu vinazyati "-iti vacanAd bhUtasadbhAve jJAnasya bhAvAt , tadabhAve cAbhAvAdityarthaH, yasya ca bhAva eva yad bhavati, abhAve ca na bhavati tat tasyaiva dharmaH, yathA candramasazvandrikA, tathA ca jJAnamanuvidadhAti bhUtAnvaya-vyatireko, tasmAt tad bhUtadharma eva / tadayuktam , viziSTameva hi nIla-pItAdibhUtagrAhakaM jJAnaM tadanvaya-vyatirekAvanuvidadhAti na tu sAmAnya jJAnamAtram, yasmAd bhUtAbhAve'pi vedalakSaNe samaye siddhAnte " sAmAnyajJAnaM bhaNitameva" iti zeSaH / kena vAkyena ? ityAha-"atthamie ityAdi" astamite Aditye, yAjJavalkayA, candramasyastamite, zAnte'nau, zAntAyAM vAci, kiMjyotirevAyaM puruSaH, AtmajyotiH samrADiti hovAca, jyotiriti jJAnamAha / AdityAstamayAdau kiM nyotiH 1 ityAha-" ayaM puruSa iti", puruSa aatmetyrthH| ayaM ca kathaMbhUtaH ? ityAha-"appajoi ti" Atmaiva jyotirasya so'yamAtmajyotirjJAnAtmaka iti hRdayam , nirdiSTo vedavidbhiH kathitaH, tato na jJAnaM bhUtadharma iti sthitam // 49-50 (1597-1598) // D. C.-Gautama may think as under: Even in this way--the way in which is interpreted the second hemistich of verse 1593 beginning with "sa bhavai bhaehinto", it gets proved that knowledge is the dharma of elements such as earth etc. For, knowledge exists when the elements exist. This is what follows from " etebhyo bhutebhyah samutthaya tanyevanu vinas'yati." Furthermore, in the absence of the elenients, knowledge does not exist.

Page #114
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 71 : That which exists only when another exists and which is non-existent when that another is non-existent, is the dharma of that another e. g., the moon-light of the moon. Knowledge is associated with elements both anvaya and vyatireka. Consequently it is the dharma of elements. This thought is unjustifiable; for, only a particular type of knowledge which has for its object, the elements, blue, yellow etc, is associated with these elements by anvaya and vyatireka and not the entire knowledge in general. For, even when the elements are absent, the Veda declares that ordinary knowledge exists. This is what we learn from yajnavalkya who says "Astamite aditye, candramasyastanite, santegnau, santayam vaci, kim jyotir evuyam purusa atnujyotih samrid iti hovaca." Herein the soul having a flame in the form of knowledge is alluded to. Hence it follows that knowledge is not the dharma of elements. The reason !s as under:tadabhAve bhAvAo bhAve cAbhAvao na taddhammo / jaha ghaDabhAvAbhAve vivajayAo paDo bhinno // 51 // (1599) Tadabhave bhavao bhave cabhavao na taddhammol Jaha ghadabhavabhave vivajjayao pado bhinno 11 51 ( 1599) [ tadabhAve bhAvAd bhAve cAbhAvato na tddhrmH| T91 FTHANHA fanatura qat ha: 1148 11 (8488) Tadabhave bhavad bhave cabhavato na taddharmah 1 Yatha ghatabhavabhave viparyayat pato bhinnah 11 51 ( 1599 ) ] Trans.-51 One that exists when another does not exist and does not exist when that another exists, is not its dharma.

Page #115
*: 7: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first For instance, a piece of cloth is different ( from a pitcher ) owing to its viparyaya regarding the existence and non-existence of the pitcher. ( 1599 ) ... TIkA-na bhUtadharmo jJAnam , muktyavasthAyAM bhUtAbhAve'pi bhAvAt , mRtazarIrAdau tadbhAve'pi cAbhAvAt , yathA ghaTasya dharmaH paTo na bhavati, kintu tasmAd bhinna eva / kutaH ? ityAha-ghaTabhAvAbhAve viparyayAt-ghaTabhAve'pyabhAvAt tadabhAve'pi ca bhAvAdityarthaH // 51 ( 1599) // D. C.-Just as a piece of cloth is not the dharma of a pitcher, but is different from it, for, even when a pitcher exists, a piece of cloth does not exist, and that even when that pitcher is non-existent, the piece of cloth exists, so knowledge is not . the dharma of elements; for, in the liberated state, it exists, even though the elements do not, and that it does not exist even when the elements are present in a dead body etc. Having explained the meaning of some of the sentences of the Veda, the author weile concluding the subject, explains briefly the meaning of the remaining sentences of the Veda. esi veyapayANaM na tamatthaM viyasi ahava sabesi / attho kiM hojja suI viNNANaM vatthubheo vA // 52 // (1600) jAI datvaM kiriyA guNo'havA saMsao tvaajutto| ayameveti navAyaM na vatthudhammo jao jutto // 53 // (1601) savvaM ciya savamayaM sa-parapajAyao jao niyayaM / sabamasavamayaM pi ya vivittarUpaM vivakkhAo / / 54 // (1602) sAmaNNa-visesamao teNa payattho vivakkhayA jutto|| vasthussa vissarUvo pajAyAvekkhayA sabo // 55 // ( 1603)

Page #116
Vada ] Gayadharavada 6:18. Esim Veyapayanam na tamattham viyasi ahava savvesim! Attho kim hojja sui vinnanam vatthubheo va 11 52 ( 1600 ) Jai davvam kiriya guno'hava samsao tavajutto i Ayameveti na vayam na vatthu dhammo jao jutto 11 53 ( 160,1) Savvam ciya savvamayam sa-parapajjayao jao niyayam Savvamasavvamayam pi ya vivittarupam vivakkhao ul 54 (1602) Samanna-visesamao tena payattho vivakkhaya jutto 1 Vatthussa vissaruvo pajjayavekkhaya savvo 11 55 ( 1603 ) [eSAM vedapadAnAM na tvamarthaM vetsi, athavA sarveSAm / arthaH kiM bhavet zrutirvijJAnaM vastubhedo vA // 52 // (1600) jAtivyaM kriyA guNo'thavA sNshystvaayuktH| ayameveti na vAyaM na vastudharmo yato yuktaH // 53 / / ( 1601 ) sarvameva sarvamayaM sva-paraparyAyato yato niyatam / sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarUpaM vivakSayA // 54 // (1602) sAmAnya-vizeSamayastena padArtho vivakSayA yuktH| vastuno vizvarUpaH paryAyApekSayA sarvaH // 55 // (1603) Esam Vedapadanam na tvamartham vetsi athava sarvesam i Arthah kim bhavet srutir-vijnanam vastubhedo va (1 52 (16Q0) Jatir-dravyam kriya guno'thava samsayas tavayuktah | Ayameveti navayam na vastudharmo yato yuktah 11 53 (1601) Sarvameva sarvamayam sva-para paryayato yato niyatam / Sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarapam vivaksays // ( 1602) Samanya-visesamayastena padartho vivaksaya yuktah, Vastuno visvarapah paryayapeksuya sarvah || 55 ( 1603 )] Trans.-52-55 You do not know the artha ( meaning ) of these sentences of the Veda or that of all. (Hence you have a doubt. ) What can artha be ? Is it sruti, knowledge, 10.

Page #117
*: 74 : . Jinabhadra Gani's The first difference in ( i. e., speciality of ) an object, a genus, a substance, an action, or an attribute ? Your doubt is ill-based; for, it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the dharma of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For, each and every thing ( sarva) is certainly all things ( sarvamaya) from the stand-point of its own modifications and those of the rest, and that sarva is a-sarvamaya too, from the stand-point of separateness. . Therefore, it is proper ( to believe ) that a substance has a generality and speciality, according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varried from the view-point of its paryayas. ( 1600-1603 ) TIkA-tasmAdeSAM pUrvoktAnAM vedapadAnAM yathA mayA vyAkhyAto'thastathA tvaM na vetsi, tena jIve saMzayaM karoSi / athavA, sarveSAmapyazeSavedapadAnAmarthaM tvaM na jAnAsi, yasmAt sarveSvapi vedapadeSu viSaye tavaivaMbhrataH saMzayo'stIti saMbandhaH / kathaMbhUta ? ityAha-" attho ki hoJja suItyAdi," kimeteSAM vedapadAnAmarthaH zrutiH zabdo bhavet , yathA bherI-paTaha-DhakkAdInAM zabdasya zabda evArthaH 1; athavA yad ghaTAdizabde samuccArite tadabhidheyArthaviSayaM vijJAnaM bhavad dRzyate, tat teSAmarthaH ?; kiMvA ghaTazabde samutkIrtite " pRthubudhnodarAdyAkAravAn ghaTalakSaNo'rtho'nenoktaH, na tu paTAdiH" ityevaM yo vastubhedaH pratIyate sa eSAmartha ?; yadivA, kiM jAtiramISAmarthaH, yathA goMzabde samuccArite gojAtiravasIyate ?; yadivA, kiM dravyameSAmarthaH, yathA daNDItyAdiSu daNDAdimad dravyam ?; kiMvA dhAvatItyAdInAmiva dhAvanAdikriyA'mISAmarthaH; athavA, kiM zuklAdInAmiva zuklAdiguNa eteSAmarthaH ? iti / ayaM ca saMzayastavAyuktaH; yasmAt " ayameva, naiva vA'yam" ityevaM kasyApi vastuno dharmo'vadhArayituM na yuktaH / zabdo'pi vastuvizeSa eva, tataH " evaMbhUtasyaivArthasyAyamabhidhAyakaH, naiva vetthaMbhUtasyArthasyAyaM pratipAdakaH" ityevametaddharmasyApyavadhAraNamayuktameva / kutaH ? ityAha-" savaM ciyetyAdi" yasmAt sarvamapi vAcyavAcakAdika vastu niyataM nizcitaM sva-paraparyAyaH sarvAtmakameva saamaanyvivkssyetyrthH| tathA, sarvamasarvamayamapyasti viviktarUpaM sarvato vyAvRttam / kayA ? ityAha-vivakSayA, kevalasvaparyAyApekSayetyarthaH,

Page #118
Vada ] Ganadharavada vizeSaviSayayeti tAtparyArthaH / tasmAt sarveSAmapi padAnAM vivakSAvazataH sAmAnyamayo vizeSamaya padArthoM yuktaH, na punarekAntenetthaMbhUta eva, anitthaMbhUta eva veti / kutaH 1 ityAha- " vatthussetyAdi" yasmAt sarvo'pi vAcyasya vAcakasya vA vastunaH svabhAvaH paryAyApekSayA vizvarUpo nAnAvidho vartate / tatazca sAmAnyavivakSayA ghaTazabdaH sarvAtmakatvAt sarveSAmapi dravya-guNakriyAdyarthAnAM vAcakaH, vizeSavivakSayA tu pratiniyatarUpatvAd ya evAsyeha pRthubunodarAdyAkAravAnartho vAcyatayA rUDhastasyaiva vAcakaH / evamanyo'pi zabdo vizeSavivakSayA yA yatra dezAdau yasyArthasya vAcakatayA rUDhaH sa tasya vAcako draSTavyaH / sAmAnyavivakSayA tu " sarvaH sarvasya vAcakaH, sarve ca sarvasya vAcyam " ityanayA dizA sakalaM svadhiyA bhAvaniyamiti / * 75: tadevaM tena trijagatsvarUpavedinA bhagavatA zrImanmahAvIreNa niHzeSaparaprabodhanopAyakuzalatayA tIkSNaparazuneva nipuNayuktiprabandhena gupilavallIvitAna iva mUlAcchinnaH samasto'pi tasya tatsamAsannaparama kalyANasyendra bhUteH saMzayaH / / 52-55 ( 1600 - 1601 - 1602-1603 ) / / D. C.-Gautama! you have not followed my exposition of these padas ( sentences ) of the Veda. Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul. Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, the remaining sentences of the Veda. Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the Veda: 1. Just as sabda is the meaning of the subdu ( sound ) of a kettle-drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc., so, is the meaning of these sentences sruti, i. e., sabda ? 2. Is it vijnana-the vijnana which arises and which is associated with the object connoted by it when the word like ghata is pronounced? 3. Do the padas of the Veda mean vastu-bhed of the type noticed when the word ghata is pronounced; the type, viz., that this connotes an object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, etc., and not a piece of cloth ?

Page #119
*: 76 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The first 4. Is their meaning jati-the jati (genus) of the kind one * realizes when the word go (cow ) is uttered. 5. Just as when the word dandin is pronounced we take it to be a dravya having a danda, etc., similarly, does the - meaning of the sentences of the Vedu connote such a dravya ? 6. In the words dhavati (runs ), etc., we take them to mean the kriya (act) of running, etc., so do these sentences mean any such kriya. 7. Just as the word sukla ( white ) means the guna (attribute ) of being white, so do these sentences convey a meaning of the type of this guna ? These seven queries of yours are out of place-are useless. For, it is not possible to say regarding any vastu ( substance or material ) this is only this and nothing else. Sabda, too, is certainly a kind of vastu, so it is not proper to say that it connotes only this meaning and none else. The reasons are : Every vastu whether in the form of a vacya ( direct expression) or a vacaka (indicatory word) is sarvamaya ( representing all objects ) from the stand-point of samanya (generality) when all the paryayas ( modifications ) including its own paryayas and those of the rest are taken into account. Whereas, every vastu is a-sarvamaya when examined from the stand-point of its own paryayas which lays stress upon visesa, Consequently, all the sentences either convey a general sense or a particular one, according to the stand-point we take. Hence, it is no use saying that they mean only this and nothing else, for, the nature of every vastu whether it is a vacya or vacaka varies according to the stand-points from which they are viewed. Thus from the general stand-point, the word ghata is the vacaka of dravya, guna, kriya, etc., since it is then sarvamaya,

Page #120
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 77 : But, when examined from a special stand-point, it is a vacaka, of only the rudha (conventional) meaning, viz., that it has an expansive bottom, a wide belly, etc., for, this stand-point makes it definite. Similarly, any other word is a vacaka of only that artha which is rudha in that country, etc., when we examine it from the special stand-point. But from the general stand-point, each and every word is a vacaka of one and all, and each and every word is a vacya of one and all. This is the line one should sensibly follow. Thus, Sramana, Bhagvan Mahaviru who knew the nature of all the three worlds, completely removed the doubts of Indrabhuti who was about to acquire the most excellent merit by advancing clever arguments capable of fully instructing others as is the case with a sharp hatchet which eradicates a cluster of creepers. chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukeNaM / so samaNo pavaio paMcahi saha khaMDiyasaehiM // 56 // (1604) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-marana vippamukkenami So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim 11 56 (1604) [ lga HTA ET GTI-ATTRATTATI 4 4WUt: Hana: Nam: Ha : Ik6l (84-8) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-marana vipramuktena l. Sa sramanah pravrajitah pancabhih saha khandikasataih 1156 (1604)] Trans.-56 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Indrabhuti took aan Diksa along with his five hundred pupils. TIkA-subodhA, navaraM zrAmyatIti zramaNaH sannasau pApAd vrajitaH pravajito bhAgavatIM dIkSAM pratipanna ityrthH| 'saMyataH saMyato bhavati nAsaMyataH'

Page #121
.: 78 : . Jinabhadra Gani's . [The first iti nizcayanayamatAzrayaNAcetthamuktamitIha bhaavaarthH| khaNDikAstacchAtrA iti // 56 (1604) // C. C.-That one who is a samyata becomes so and not one.who is not so, is a statement here made from the transcendental point of view. The rest is easy. evaM kammAIsu vi jaM sAmaNNaM tayaM samAujaM / jo puNa jattha viseso samAsao taM pavakkhAmi // 57 // (1605) Evam kammaisu vi jam samannam tayam samaujjami Jo puna jattha viseso samasao tam pavakkhami l 57 ( 1605 ) [ evaM karmAdiSvapi yat sAmAnyaM tat samAyojyam / yaH punayaMtra vizeSaH samAsatastaM pravakSyAmi // 57 // (1605) Evam karmadisvapi yat samanyam tat samayojyam 1 Yah punar-yatra visesah samasatastam pravaksyami // 57(1605)] Trans.-57 Thus, what is applicable to karman, etc., ( the Vadas of the remaining Ganadharas ) should be applied ( there). And I shall briefly expound there, that which is a speciality ( of it ) ( 1605) TIkA-evaM yadihAtmavAdaprakrame pratyakSA-'numAnA-''gamapramANavaktavyatAdikaM vakSyamANakarmAdivAdasthAnakaiH kimapi tulyaM tat svadhiyAM tatra tatrAyojanIyam / yastu yatra vAdasthAnake vizeSastaM tatra saMkSepataH svayameva vakSyAmi // iti saptapaJcAzadAthArthaH // 57 (1605) // ___D. G. Here, while establishing the existence of the soul, several points bave been discussed. Out of them, those that are applicable to the other discussions which are to follow, may be applied there by the reader himself. So, I shall, now, briefly discuss in the remaining vadas ( discussions ) only such points as happen to be their specialities. End of the Discussion with the First Ganadhara.

Page #122
Chapter 11 dvitIyagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the Second Canadhara. [ Arguments advanced to prove the non-existence of Karman and their refutation taM pavaiaM souM bIo Agacchai amariseNaM / vaJcAmi NamANemI parAjiNittA Na taM samaNaM // 58 // (1606) Tam pavvaiam soum bio agacchai amarisenam | Vaccami nananemii parajinitta na tam samanam // 58 ( 1606 ) [taM pravrajitaM zrutvA dvitIya AgacchatyamarSeNa / vrajAmyAnayAmi parAjitya taM zramaNam // 58 // (1606) Tam pravrajitam srutva dvitiya agacchatya marsena i Vrajamyanayami parajitya tam sramanam || 58 ( 1606 ") ] Trans.--58 Having heard that he ( Indrabhuti ) had renounced the world, the second (Ganadhara) comes exasperated. ( He thinks ):-- I may go and having vanquished that.asint, I may bring (Indrabhuti) back. (1606) TIkA-tamindrabhUti pratrajitaM zrutvA dvitIyo'gnibhUtinAmA tatsodaryabandhuratrAntare'marSeNAkulitacetAH samAgacchati bhagavatsamIpam / kenAbhiprAyeNa? ityAha-vrajAmi / "Na" iti vAkyAlaGkakAre / AnayAmi nijabhrAtaramindrabhUtiM " tataH" iti gamyate / 'Na' ityayamapi vAkyAlaGkAre / taM zramaNamindrajAlikaM kamapi parAjityeti / / 58 (1606) // ..

Page #123
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second D. C.-On having heard that Indrabhuti had taken diksa, Agnibhuti, his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira with the object of defeating him and taking Indrabhuti back. Agnibhuti thought chalio chalAiNA so maNNe mAiMdajAlio vA vi / .ko jAi kaha vattaM ettAhe vahamANI se // 59 // (1607) *: 80:. 59 (1607) Chalio chalaina so manne maindajalio va vi Ko janai kaha vattam ettahe vattamani se ll [ chalitazchalAdinA sa manye mAyendrajAliko vApi / ko jAnAti kathaM vRttametasmAd vartamAnA tasya Chalitaschaladina sa manye mayendrajaliko vapi Ko janati katham vrittametasmad vartamana tasya || 59 (1607) ] 59 / / (1607) Trans. - 59 I think, he has been cheated by chala ( artful fraud), etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit. Who knows as to what happened there? Consequently, (the world will see ) what will happen in his case. ( 1607 ) TIkA - durjayatribhuvanasyApi madbhrAtendrabhUtiH, kevalamahamidaM manyechalAdinA chalito'sau tena dhUrtena - cchala - jAti - nigrahasthAna- grahaNanipuNena tena kenApi duSTena bhramito madbandhurityarthaH / athavA, mAyendrajAlikaH ko'pi nizcitamasau, yena tasyApi jagadgurormadbhrAturbhramitaM cetaH / tasmAt kiM bahunA ? ko jAnAti tadvAdasthAnakaM tayostatra kathamapi vRttam, matparokSatvAt ? / ita UrdhvaM punarmayi tatra gate tasya tadindrajAlavyatikarabhramitamAnasakhacara - narA - smaratrAta vandanamAtrabRMhicetasaH, zramaNakasya mANa tti yA kAcid vArtA vartanI vA bhaviSyati tAM drakSyatyayaM samagro'pi loka iti / / 59 (1607 ) // 66 " D. C.-My brother Indrabhuti cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds, so, I think he has been deceived by

Page #124
Vada ]. Ganadharavada . 81 : the rogue Mahavera, who must be an expert in using chala (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning ) Jati ( an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker and nigraha sthana (fallacy ) etc. Or this Mahavira must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his ( Indrabhuti's ) mind. So what more? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and Mahavira there? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint Mahavira is concerned-Mahavira who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of khacaras ( deni-gods ) human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery. While going there, Agnibhuti said, so pakkhaMtaramegaM pi jAi jai me tao mi tasseva / FIAT CIS T211 azi ya FUTATIET 11 80 ll (p&*C) So pakkhantaramegam pi jai jai me tao mi tasseva Sisattam hojja gad vottum patto Jinasagase il 60 ( 1698 ) [sa.pakSAntaramekamapi yAti yadi me tatastasyaiva / ziSyatvaM bhaveyaM gata uktvA prApto jinasakAze // 60 // (1608) Sa paksantaramekamapi yati yadi ne tatastasyaiva i Sisyatvam bhaveyam gata uktva prapto Jinasa kase 11 60 ( 1608)] Trans.-60 If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of paksas ( premises ), I shall become a pupil of his. Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of Tirthankara Mahavira. ( 1608 ) TIkA-ko jAnAti tAvadindrabhUtistena kathamapi tatra nirjitaH ? / mama punarapyekamapi pakSAntaraM prakSavizeSaM sa yadi yAtyavabudhyate-madvihitasya 11

Page #125
82 Jinabhadra Gani's [The second sahetU -dAharaNasya pakSavizeSasya sa yaduttarapradAnena kathamapi pAraM gacchatIti hRdayam, tato 'mi' iti vAkyAlaGkakAre, tasyaiva zramaNasya ziSyatvena gato'haM bhaveyam iti nizcayaH / tata ityAdi vAggajiM kRtvA jinasya zrImamahAvIrasyAntikaM prApta iti // 60 ( 1608 ) // D. C.--Who knows how Indrabhuti was defeated by him ! If however, he gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my paksas (premises) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so, he went to Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira. AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi - jarA-maraNaviSayamukkeNa / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya saGghaNNU savadarisI NaM // 61 // (1609) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana vippamukkena | Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam // 61 (1609 ) [ AbhASitazva jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 61 / / ( 1609 ) Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-marana vipramuktena | Nanna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina || 61 ( 1609 ) ] Trans.-61. He was addressed by his name and gotra ( lineage ) by the Tirtharikara who was free from birth, .old age and death, who was all-knowing and who had complete darsana (undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1609 ) TIkA- AbhASitazca saMlaptaca jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena sarvajJena sarvadarzinA ca jinena / katham ? - nAmnA ca-he agnibhUte ! gotreNa ca-he gautamagotra ! iti / itthaM ca nAma -- gotrAbhyAM saMlaptasya tasya cintA'bhUtaho ! nAmApi mama vijAnAti, athavA, jagatprasiddho'ham kaH kila mAM veti ? | yadi hi me hRtaM saMzayaM jJAsyati, apaneSyati vA, tadA bhaved mama vismayaH // 61 ( 1609 ) // , D. C.-The omniscient Tirthankara addressed the second Ganadhara by name as Agnibhuti and as one having Gautama,

Page #126
Vada ]: Ganadharavada .: 83:. as apineage. When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under : I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that Mahavira should be knowing my name and lineage. It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if Mahavira comes to know about my doubt or removes it. When he was thinking so, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira said, kiM manne asthi kammaM uyAhu na tthi tti saMsayo tujhaM / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasi tesimo attho // 62 // ( 1610 ) Kim manne atthi kammam uyahu na tthi tti samsayo tujjham Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho || 62 ( 1610 ) [ kiM manyase'sti karma utAho nAstIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArthaM na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH / / 62 / / ( 1610 ) Kim manyase'sti karma utaho nastiti samsayastava | Vedapadanam_caartham na janasi tesamayamarthah || 62 (1610) ] Trans. - 62 You think whether a Karman exists or not. This is your doubt. You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Veda. Their meaning is this. ( 1610 ) TIkA - he agnibhUte ! gautama / tvametad manyase cintayasi yadutakriyate midhyAtvAdihetusamanvitena jIveneti karma jJAnAvaraNAdikam tat kimasti nAsti vA ? iti / nanvayamanucitastava saMzayaH / ayaM hi bhavato viruddhavedapadanibandho vartate, teSAM ca vedapadAnAM tvamarthaM na jAnAsi tena saMzayaM karoSi / teSAM ca vedapadAnAmayaM vakSyamANalakSaNo'rthaH iti / / 62 (1610) / / 9 , D. C. --' 0 Agnibhuti ! of Gautama lineage. You have a doubt as to whether the Karman which is being done by the soul under the influence of Mithyatva (False Belief), etc., and which is of the type of Jnanavarana (knowledge-obscuring), etc., exists or not. This doubt of yours is based on your unrealization of the exact significance of the sentences of the Veda. This significance is what will be just expounded.

Page #127
Jinabhadra Gani's kamme tuha saMdeho mannasi taM nANagoyarAIyaM / tuha tamaNumANasAhaNamaNubhUimayaM phalaM jassa // 63 // (1611) .: 84: [ The second Kamme tuha sandeho mannasi tam nanagoyaraiyam | Tuha tamanumana sahanamanubhuimayam phalam jassa || 63 (1611) [ karmaNi taba saMdeho manyase tajjJAnagocarAtItam / tava tadanumAna sAdhanamanubhUtimayaM phalaM yasya // 63 // ( 1611 ) Karmani tava sandeho manyase tajjnanagocaratitam | Tava tadanumana sadhanamanubhutimayam phalam tasya||63(1611)] Trans. - 63 You have a doubt about ( the existence of ) the Karman. You think it to be beyond the range of knowledge. That (Karman) of which experience is the fruit, is provable ( to you ) by means of anumana. (1611 ) tava TIkA - he AyuSmannagnibhUte ! jJAnAvaraNAdiparamANusaMghAtarUpe karmaNi saMdehaH, yataH pratyakSA-numAnAdisamasta pramANAtmakajJAnagocarA tItameva tat tvaM manyase, tathA hi-na tAvat pratyakSaM karma, atIndriyatvAt, kharaviSANavat, ityAdi pramANa viSayAtItatvaM prAgvajjIvasyeva karmaNo'pi samAnaprAyatvAd bhAvanIyamiti / tadetat saumya ! mA manthAstvam, yato mama tAvat pratyakSameva karma, tavApyanumAnaM sAdhanaM yasya tadanumAnasAdhanaM vartate tat karma, na punaH sarvapramANagocarAtItam / yasya kim ? ityAha- " aNubhUimayaM phalaM jassa tti " sukha-duHkhAnAmanubhUtiranubhavanaM tanmayaM tadAtmakaM phalaM yasya zubhA - zubhakamarNa iti / anena cedanumAnaM sUcitam - asti sukha-duHkhAnubhavasya hetuH, kAryatvAt, aGkarasyaiveti / atha yadi bhavataH pratyakSaM karma, tarhi mayApi tatpratyakSaM kasmAd na bhavati ? iti cet / tadayuktam, na hi yadekasya kasyacit pratyakSaM tenAparasyApi pratyakSeNa bhavitavyam / na hi siMha - sarabha - haMsAdayaH sarvasyApi lokasya pratyakSAH, na ca te na santi bAlAdInAmapi tatsarvasya prasiddhatvAt / tasmAdasti karma, sarvajJatvena mayA pratyakSIkRtatvAt bhavatsaMzaya vijJAnavaditi / "

Page #128
Vada ] * Ganadharavada *: 85 : na ca vaktavyam-tvayi sarvajJatvamasmAn pratyasiddham " kaha savaNu ti maI jeNAhaM sabasaMsayaccheI, pucchasu va jaM na yANAmi" ityAdinA prAgeva prativihitatvAt / kAryapratyakSatayA bhavato'pi ca pratyakSameva karma, yathA ghaTAdikAryapratyakSatayA paramANava iti // 63 (1611) // D. C.-O long-lived Agnibhuti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the Karman, which is a multitude of paramanus, in the form of jnanavarana, etc., for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the pramanas such as pratyaksa, anumana, etc., the pramanas which are knowledge. To be explicit, you argue as under : Karman is not directly perceived, because it is supersensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass. Other arguments that you advance are the same as men. tioned by your brother in the case of the soul. But these lines of arguments are faulty. For, this Karman is certainly pratyaksa to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramana can establish its existence. The Karman is either good or bad. The good Karman makes us experience happiness, where as, the bad Karman misery. This leads to an inference as under : There is # cause for experiencing happiness and misery since it is a Karya ( an act) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the Karman is pratyaksa to me (1. e. Mahavara ) it should be so to you. For, there is no such rule that what is pratyaksa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, a sarbha ( a fabulous eightlegged animal a match for lions and elephants ), a swan, etc. are not pratyaksa to one and all the beings. But, on that account, it is not that they do not exist, for, even children know them. Therefore, there does exist the Karman since

Page #129
.:86:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The second it is pratyaksa to me, an omniscient being just as, your doubt is pratyaksa to me. If you doubt my omniscience, I may repeat what I said to your elder brother, viz., " Kaha savvannu tti mai jenaham savva samsayacchei, pucchasu va jam na yanasi" (verse 1579 ). Moreover, this Karman is pratyaksa to you too, since you realize its Karya (effect), as is the case with paramanus, which though not directly realizable to you, are pratyaksa to you, since their Karyas like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived by you., asthi suha-dukkhaheU kajjAo bIyamaMkurasseva / so diTTho ceva maI vabhicArAo na taM juttaM // 64 // (1612) jo tullasAhaNANaM phale viseso na so viNA heuM / kanjattaNao goyama ! ghaDo vva, heU ya so kmm||65||(1613) Atthi suha-dukkhaheu kajjao biyamarikurssseva | So dittho ceva mai vabhicarao na tam juttam 11 64 11 (1612) Jo tullasahananam phale viseso na so vina heum 1 Kajjattanao Goyama! ghado vva, heu ya so kamniam 116511 (1613) [ asti sukhaduHkhahetuH kAryatvAt bIjamakarasyeva / sa dRSTa eva matiyabhicArAd na tad yuktam / / 64 // (1612) yastulyasAdhanayoH phale vizeSo na sa vinA hetum / kAryatvato gautama ! ghaTa iva, hetuzca sa karma // 65 // (1613) Asti sukhduhkkhhetuh karyatvat, bijamankurasyeva 1 Sa drista eva matir-vyabhicarad na tad yuktam | 64 (1612 ) Yastulyasadhanayoh phale viseso na sa vina hetum 1 Karyatvato Gautamaa ! ghata iva, hetusca sa karma // 65 ( 1613)] ____ Trans.-64-65 Just as a sprout has a seed for its hetu, ( because it is a karya ) so, there is a hetu for happiness and misery owing to their being a karya ( an action )

Page #130
Vada J 4: Ganadharavada *: 87 :. You may think : - That ( hetu ) is certainly seen. This ( thought ) is not proper owing to vyabhicara ( irrelevancy ). O Gautama! That difference which exists in the fructification in the case of those who have equal means is not without a hetu, since it is a karya, as is the case with a pitcher. That hetu is Karman. 64-65 ( 1612-1613 ) 3 TIkA - pratiprANi prasiddhyoH sukha-duHkhayorheturasti, kAryatvAt, aGkarasyeva vIjamiti / yaha sukha - duHkhayorhetustat karmaiva ityasti taditi / syAd matiH- srak - candanA - 'GganAdayaH sukhasya hetavaH, duHkhasya tvahi - viSakaNTakAdayaH, iti dRSTa eva sukha-duHkhayorheturasti, kimadRSTasya karmaNastaddhetutvakalapanena ? / na hi dRSTaparihAreNAdRSTakalpanA saMgatatvamAvahati, ati prasaGgAt / tadayuktam, vyabhicArAt, tathAhi - ' jo tulletyAdi ' iha yastulyasAdhanayoriSTazabdAdiviSayasukhasAdhanasametayoraniSTArthasAdhanasaMyuktayozca dvayobahUnAM vA phale sukha - duHkhAnubhavanalakSaNe vizeSastAratamyarUpo dRzyate, nAsAvadRSTaM kamapi hetumantareNopapadyate, kAryatvAt, ghaTavat / yazca tatra vizeSAdhAtad gautama ! karmeti pratipadyasveti ||64-65 // (1612-1613) D. C.-Just as a sprout which is a Karya, has a seed for its hetu, so happiness and misery, which are well-known to every individual, have a cause, because they are karyas. And this cause is nothing else but Karman and so it exists. It may be that you may here raise a question as under : A garland, sandal, a woman and the like are the hetus of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these hetus of happiness and misery as well, are seen-are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe Karman to be their hetu-the Karman which is not seen? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justificable, as it out-shoots the mark. This question is out of place owing to the vyabhicara (irrelevancy). It is a matter of common experience that we

Page #131
.: 88 :: . Jinabhadra. Cani's [The second find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness. Same is the case with those who have the same means to suffer misery. This difference in each case, cannot be without any hetu which is not seen. This very unseen hetu is Karman. bAlasarIraM dehatarapuvaM iNdiyaaimttaao| jaha bAladehapuTTo juvadeho puvamiha kammaM // 66 // (1614) Balasariram dehantarapuvvam indiyaimattao 1 Jaha baladehapuvvo juvadeho puvvamiha kammar // 66 // (1614) [bAlazarIraM dehAntarapUrvakamindriyAdimattvAt / __ yathA bAladehapUrvo yuvadehaH pUrvamiha kama // 66 // (1614) Balasariram dehantarapurvakamindriyadimattvati Yatha balade hapurvo yuvadehah purvamiha karma ll 66 (1614)] ___Trans.-66 Just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in child-hood so is the body in child-hood preceded by another body, since it has organs of sense etc. Here-in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is Karman. (1614) TIkA:-zarIrAntarapUrvakamAdyaM bAlazarIram , indriyAdimatvAt , yuvazarIravaditi, AdizabdAt sukha-huHkhitva-prANA'pAna-nimeSo-nmeSa jIvanAdimattvAdayo'pi hetavo grAhyAH / na ca janmAntarAtItazarIrapUrvakamevedamiti zakyate vaktum , nasyApAntarAlagatAvasattvena tatpUrvakatvAnupapatteH / na cAzarIriNo niyatagarbha-deza-sthAnaprAptipUrvakaH zarIragraho yujyate, niyAmakakAraNAbhAvAt / nApi svabhAvo niyAmakaH, tasya nirAkariSyamANatvAt / yaJceha bAlazarIrasya pUrva zarIrAntaraM tat " karma " iti mantavyam-kArmaNaM zarIramityarthaH, "joeNa kammaeNaM AhAreI aNaMtaraM jIvo" ityAdi vacanAditi / / 66 (1614) /

Page #132
Vada ] * Ganadharavada . 89. D. C.-The body in childhood must have some body to precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, prana ( sign of vitality ) apana (the vital air which goes downwards and out at the anus ), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc., as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth; for it does not exist in the apantarala gati ( state previous to the interval stage ) and so it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for one having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, country, place, etc., as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So the body which precedes one in child-hood is Karmana-one which is known as a Karmana body, as suggested by "jeena kaammaenam sharet anantaram jivo." There is another inference also, kiriyAphalabhAvAo dANAINaM phalaM kisIe va / taM ciya dANAiphalaM maNappasAyAI jai buddhI // 67 // (1615) kiriyAsAmaNNAo jaM phalamassAvi taM mayaM kammaM / tassa pariNAmarUvaM suha-dukkhaphalaM jao bhujo // 68 // (1616) Kiriya phala bhavao danainam phalam kisie vval Tam ciya danaiphalam manappasayai jai buddhi ll 67 (1615 ) Kiriyasamannao jam phalamassavi tam mayam kammam Tassa parinamaruvam suha-dukkhaphalam jao bhujjo 11 68 (1616) [kriyAphalabhAvAd dAnAdInAM phalaM kRSeriva / tadeva dAnAdiphalaM manaHprasAdAdi yadi buddhiH // 67 // (1615) kriyAsAmAnyAd yatphalamasyApi tad mataM karma / tasya pariNAmarUpaM sukha-duHkhaphalaM yato bhUyaH // 68 // (1616) 12

Page #133
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second Kriyaphalabhavad danadinam phalam kriseriva Tadeva danadiphalam manahprasadadi yadi buddhih || 67 (1615) Kriya samanyad yatphalanasyapi tad matam karma i Tasya parinamarupam sukha-duhkha phalam yato bhuyahu[68(1616)] ____Trans.-67-68 Just as there is a fruit of agriculture, so there is a fruit of charity, etc., owing to the fructification of an act. If you think that, the fruit of charity, etc., is serenity of mind, etc., then ( we say that ) that which is its fruit is looked upon as Karman owing to the commonness of kriya-the Karman from which arises again and again the fructification in the form of happiness and misery which are the results of Karman. ( 1615-1616 ) TIkA-" dANAINaM phalaM tti " iha dAnAdikriyANAM phalamasti "kiriyAphalabhAvAo tti" sacetanArabdhakriyANAM phalabhAvAt phalabhAvadarzanAdityarthaH, yathA kRssikriyaayaaH| iha yA cetanArabdhakriyA tasyA phalaM dRSTam , yathA kRSyAdikriyAyAH, cetanArabdhAzca dAnAdikriyAH, tasmAt phalavatyaH, yacca tAsAM phalaM tat karma / yA tu niSphalA kriyA sA sacetanArabdhApi na bhavati, yathA paramANvAdikriyA, sacetanArabdhAzca dAnAdikriyAH, tasmAt phlvtyH| syAdetat , anaikAntiko'yaM hetuH, cetanArabdhAnAmapi kAsAMcit kRSyAdikriyANAM niSphalatvadarzanAt / tadayuktam , phalavatvAbhiprAyeNaiva tadArambhAt / yacca kvacid niSphalatvamapi dRzyate tatsamyagjJAnAdyabhAvena sAmagrIvaikalyAd draSTavyam , manaHzuddhyAdisAmagrIvikalatayA dAnAdikriyA api niSphalA iSyanta evetyadoSaH / yadi cAtra parasyaivaMbhUtA buddhiH syAt / kathaMbhUtA ? ityAha-"taM ciyetyAdi " tadeva dAnAdikriyANAM phalaM yadasmAdRzAmapi pratyakSaM manaH prasAdAdi / idamuktaM bhavati-kRSyAdikriyA dRSTadhAnyAdyavAptiphalA dRSTAH, ato dAnAdikriyANAmapi dRSTameva manaHprasAdAdikaM phalaM bhaviSyati, kimadRSTakarmalakSaNaphalasAdhanena ? / tata iSTaviruddhasAdhanAd viruddho'yaM hetuH| tatri vayaM brUmaH-" kiriyAsAmaNNAo ityAdi" asyApi manaHprasAdasya yat

Page #134
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 91 :phalaM tad mama karma saMmatam / nanu manaH prasAdasyApi kathaM phalamabhidhIyate ? ityAha-"kiriyAsAmaNNAo ti" idamuktaM bhavati-manaH prasAdo'pi kriyArUpa eva, tatazca yathA dAna-kRSyAdikAH kriyAH phalavatyaH, tathA kriyAsAmyAd manaH prasAdasyApi phalena bhavitavyameva, yacca tasya phalaM tat karmaiva, iti na kazcid vybhicaarH| yataH karmaNaH sakAzAt , kim ? ityAha-" suha-dukkhaphalaM jau tti " sukha-duHkharUpaM phalaM sukha-duHkhaphalaM yato yasmAt karmaNaH sakAzAjAyate / katham ? bhUyaH punaH punarapi / kathaM bhUtaM yat sukha-duHkhaphalam ? ityAhatasyaiva karmaNastajanakatvena yat pariNamanaM pariNAmastadrUpamiti / etaduktaM bhavati-yataH karmaNaH sakAzAt pratikSaNaM tatpariNatirUpaM sukha-duHkhaphalaM prANinAM samupajAyate, tat karma manaH prasAdAdikriyAyA api phalamabhimatam / Aha-nanvanantaragAthAyAM " dAnAdikriyAphalaM karma " iti vadatA dAnAdikriyaiva karmaNaH kAraNamuktA, atra tu manaHprasAdAdikriyA tatkAraNamucyate, iti kathaM na pUrvAparavirodhaH ? iti / satyam , kintu manaH prasAdAdi kriyaivAnantaryeNa karmaNaH kAraNam , kevalaM tasyA api manaH prasAdAdikriyAyA dAnAdikriyaiva kAraNam, ataH kAraNakAraNe kAraNopacArAdadoSa iti // 67-68 ( 1615-1616 ) // . D. C.-In this world, we find that each and every act perfornied by a living being, yields a fruit, as is seen in the case of tilling of ground, etc. The acts of charity are undertaken by a living being, so they too, must bear a fruit, and that fruit is nothing else but Karman. That act which is fruitless, is not commenced by a living being, e. g., the act of electrons etc; but the acts of charity, etc., are commenced by living beings; so they are fruitful. It may here be argued that this hetu is anaikantika; for, the act like tilling the ground commenced by living beings, is at times seen to yield no fruit. But, this argument is not justifiable since such an act is commenced with the hope that it will be fruitful. Moreover, the failure which occurs sometimes

Page #135
.: 92 :: . Jinabhadra Gaai's (The second is due to something wanting in materials--a defect arising from want of real knowledge. We may add that we are glad to admit that the act as that of charity, if done without the serenity of mind, is fruitless; for, it is an istapatti ( a desirable acquisition ) to us. Some one may here argue as under : The act, like tilling the ground, is seen to yield a visible fruit, viz., acquisition of crop. So, the act like charity must yield a visible fruit like the serenity of mind. Such being the case, why should we think of a fruit like Karman which is invisible? Hence this hetu is viruddha ( inconsistent ); for, it establishes just the contrary to what is desired. This argument may be refuted as below: Even the serenity of mind is certainly a kriya. So, just as acts like charity yield a fruit, so this serenity of mind, too, must yield a fruit. And that fruit is Karman and nothing else. So, there is no vyabhicara ( irrelevancy ). It may be here noted that, that Karman whence living beings experience happiness and misery which are its parinati ( consequences ) is certainly the fruit of the act, viz., serenity of mind. It may be argued that in the preceding verse (v. 1615 ) while saying that " danadi kriyaphalam Karma " only the act like charity was mentioned as the cause of Kurman and here the act like serenity of mind is stated as the cause of Karman. So, are not these statements contradictory? Yes, they are. But, it should be borne in mind that since the act like the serenity of mind is the intermediate cause of Karman and that the act like charity is the cause of the act like the serenity of mind, there arises no flaw, because, here, we have an upacara (compliment ) of Karana in Karana

Page #136
Vada ] Ganadharavada . .: 93 : karana, that is to say, the cause of the cause is here taken to be cause. hoja maNovittIe dANAikie va jai phalaM buddhI / taM na nimittatAo piMDo va ghaDassa vinneo // 69 // (1617) Hojja manovittie danaikie va jai phalam buddhi Tam na nimittatao pindo vva ghadassa vinneo 11 69 ( 1617). [ bhaved manovRtterdAnAdikriyaiva yadi phalaM buddhiH| tad na nimittatvAt piNDa iva ghaTasya vijJeyaH // 69 // (1617) Bhaved manovriter-danadikriyaiva yadi pbalam buddhih Tad na nimittatvat pinda iva ghatasya vijneyah | 69 ( 1617 )] Trans.-69 If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not ( so ) owing to there being a nimitta (instrumental cause ). For instance, a lump ( of clay ) should be realized as ( a nimitta ) of a pitcher. ( 1617) . TIkA-atra parasya yadyevaMbhUtA buddhiH syAt / kathaMbhUtA ? ityAha-nanu manovRttermanaHprasatyAdikriyAyA dRSTarUpA dAnAdikriyaiva phalam, na tvadRSTaM karmeti bhaavH| ayamabhiprAya:-dAnAdikriyAto manaHprasAdAdayo jAyante, tebhyazca pravardhamAnaditsAdipariNAmaH punarapi dAnAdikriyAM karoti, evaM punaH punarapi dAnakriyApravRtteH saiva manaH prasAdAdeH phalamastu, na tu karmeti bhAvaH, dRSTaphalamAtreNaiva caritArthatvAt kimadRSTaphalakalpanena? iti hRdym| tadetad n| kutaH ? nimittatvAd-manaHprasAdAdikriyAM prati dAnAdikriyAyA nimittakAraNatvAdityarthaH, yathA mRtpiNDo ghaTasya nimittaM vijJeyastathA dAnAdikriyApi manaH prasatteH / dRzyante hi pAtradAnAdibhyazcittAhAdAdayo jaaymaanaaH| na ca yad yasya nimittaM tat tasyaiva phalaM vaktumucitam , duraviruddhatvAditi // 69 // (1617 //

Page #137
.: 94 : . Jinabhadra Gani's. [The second D. C.-Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this inclination, one goes in for charity. Thus, the fruit of the serenity of mind is nothing else but the act of charity and not a Karman, which is invisible. But such a belief is untenable; for, just as a lump of clay is the nimitta (instrumental cause ) of a pitcher, so, the act of charity is the nimitta of the serenity of mind. We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual. Such being the case, it won't do to look upon that which is a nimitta of something, as its fruit, as it is highly objectionable. Besides, asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen, as is the case with the tilling of ground, the debator says :evaM pi diTThaphalayA kiriyA na kammaphalA pasattA te / sA tammettaphala cciya jaha maMsaphalo pasuviNAso // 70 // (1618) Evam pi ditthaphalaya kiriya, na kammaphala pasatta te i . Sa tammettaphala cciya jaha mansaphalo pasuvinaso il 70 (1618) [ evamapi dRSTaphalA kriyA na karmaphalA prasaktA te / sA tanmAtraphalaiva yathA mAMsaphalaH pazuvinAzaH / / 70 // (1618) Evamapi dristaphala kriya na karmaphala prasakta te i Sa tanmatraphalaiva yatha mansaphalah pasuvinasah ( 70 ( 1618 )] Trans.--70 In this way, too, an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen, and not a Karman by way of its fruit. That ( act ) certainly has a fruit only to that extent, as is the case with ( the act of ) killing of a beast-the killing which has flesh as its fruit. ( 1618 )

Page #138
Vada ] Ganadharavada . :. TIkA-nanvemapi yuSmadupanyastakRSyAdikriyAnidarzanenApItyarthaH, sarvA dAnAdikApi kriyA dRSTaphaladaiva prasaktA na karmaphalA / idamuktaM bhavati-yathA kRSyAdikriyA dRSTaphalamAtreNaivAvasitaprayojanA bhavati, tathA dAnAdikriyAyA api zlAghAdikaM kiJcid dRSTaphalamastu, kimadRSTaphalakalpanena ? kiM bahunA ? sA kriyA sarvApi tanmAtraphalaiva yujyate, nAdRSTaphalA, yathA dRSTamAMsamAtraphalA pazuvinAzakriyA; na hi pazuvinAzanakriyAmadRSTAdharmaphalAthai, ko'pyArabhate, kintu mAMsabhakSaNArtham / atastanmAtraphalaiva sA, tAvataivAvasitaprayojanatvAt / . evaM dAnAdikriyAyA api dRSTamAtrameva zlAghAdikaM kizcit phalam , nAnyaditi // 70 // (1618) __D. C.-Just as the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen. What more? All these acts are such as only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast. For, the act of killing a beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh. None kills a beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible. Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be nothing else but some sort of praise which is seen. Here, another argument is advanced as follows :'pAyaM va jIvalogo vaTTai diTThaphalAsu kiriyaasu| . adiTTaphalAsu puNa vadRi nAsaMkhabhAgo vi // 71 // (1619) Payam va jivalogo vattai ditthaphalasu kiriyasu / Aditthaphalasu runa vattai nasamkhabhago vi // 71 ( 1619) [prAyo vA jIvaloko vartate dRSTaphalAsu kriyAsu / adRSTaphalAsu punarvartate nAsaMkhyabhAgo'pi // 71 // (1619)

Page #139
.: 96 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Prayo va jivaloko vartate dristaphalasu kriyasu / Adristaphalasu punar-vartate nasamkhyabhago'pi // 71 ( 1619 )] Trans.-71 Moreover, the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen; and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619) TIkA-loko'pi ca prAyeNa dRSTamAtraphalAsveva kRSi-vANijyAdi kriyAsu pravartate, adRSTaphalAsu punardAnAdikriyAsu tadasaMkhyeyabhAgo'pi na vartate-katipayamAtra eva lokastAsu pravartate, na bhurityrthH| tatazca hiMsAdInAmazubhakriyANAmadRSTaphalAbhAvAcchubhakriyANAmapi dAnAdInAmadRSTaphalAbhAvo bhaviSyati / iti parAbhiprAya iti // 71 (1619) // D. C.-People mostly do such acts as agriculture, business, etc., of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen. Consequently, just as evil acts such as killing have not got such fruits as are not seen, so must be the case with good acts like charity. That is to say, they too, cannot have such fruits as are not seen. This is what may be advanced as an argument by Agnibhuti. * Sramana Bhagavan Mahaviru refutes it as under :- . somma ! jau cciya jIvA pAyaM diTupphalAsu vahati / adiTThaphalAo vi ya tAo paDivaja teNeva // 72 // 1620 // Somma ! jau cciya jiva payam ditthaphalasu vattanti i Adittha phalao vi ya tai padivajja teneva // 72 // ( 1620 ) [ saumya ! yata eva jIvAH prAyo dRSTaphalAsu vartante / adRSTaphalA api ca tAH pratipadyasva tenaiva / / 72 / / (1620 ) Saumya ! Yata eva jivah prayo dristaphalasu vartante 1 Adristaphala api ca tah pratipadyasva tenaiva // 72 // ( 1620)]

Page #140
97 :. Vada ] Ganadharavada Trans.-72 0 gentle one ! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in ( doing ) deeds, the fruits of which are visible ( in this very life ) learn ( from me ) that by that very ( reason ) those are also ( deeds ) the fruits of which are invisible, i. e., to be had in a subsequent birth. ( 1620 ) TIkA-saumya ! ityagnibhUterAmantraNam , yata eva prANinaH prAyeNa kRSi-vANijya-hiMsAdikAsveva dRSTaphalAsvazubhakriyAsu pravartante, adRSTaphalAsu punardAnAdikAsu zubhakriyAsu svalpA eva pravartante, tenaiva tasmAdeva kAraNAt . tA api kRSi-hiMsAdikA dRSTaphalAH kriyA adRSTaphalA api pratipadyasvAbhyupagaccha / idamuktaM bhavati-yadyapi kRSi-hiMsAdikriyAkartAro dRSTaphalamAtrArthameva tAH samArabhante nAdharmArtham , tathApi te'dharmalakSaNaM pAparUpamadRSTaphalamaznuvata eva, anantasaMsArijIvAnyathAnupapatteH / te hi kRSi-hiMsAdikriyAnimittamanabhilaSitamapyadRSTaM pApalakSaNaM phalaM baddhavA'nantaM saMsAraM paribhramanto'nantA iha tiSTanti, dAnAdikriyAnuSThAtArastu svalpA adRSTaM dharmarUpaM phalamAsAdya krameNa mucyanta iti / nanu dAnAdikriyAnuSThAtRbhiryadadRSTaM dharmalakSaNaM phalamAzaMsitaM tat teSAM bhavatu, yaistu kRSi-hiMsAdikriyAkartRbhiradRSTamadharmarUpaM phalaM nAzaMsitaM tat teSAM kathaM bhavati ? iti cet / tadayuktam , na hyavikalaM kAraNaM svakArya janayat kasyApyAzaMsAmapekSate, kintvavikala kAraNatayA svakArya janayatyeva / vapturajJAtamapi hi kodravAdibIjaM kvacid bhUpradeze patitaM jalAdisAmagrIsadbhAve'vikalakAraNatAM prAptaM vatrAzaMsAbhAve'pi svakArya janayatyeva avikalakAraNabhUtAzca kRSi-hiMsAdayo'dharmajanane / atastatkartRgatAzaMsA tatra kvopayujyate / na ca dAnAdikriyAyAmapi vivekinaH phalAzaMsAM kurvate, tathApyavikalakAraNatayA viziSTatarameva tA dharmaphalaM janayanti / tasmAt zubhAyA azubhAyAzca sarvasyA api kriyAyA adRSTaM zubhA'zubhaM phalamastyeveti pratipattavyam , anantasaMsArajIvasattAnyathAnupapatteriti sthitam // 72 (1620 ) // ____D. C.-0 gentle one ! Thus Agnibhati is addressed. By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing ) 13

Page #141
.: 98: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second evil deeds only, viz., cultivation of land, trading, doing injury to life, etc., the fruits of which are visible; but only a few become active in (doing ) good deeds, giving a gift, etc., the fruits of which are invisible--by that same fact, i. e., by that very reason, admit that also those very activities-cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are also activities, the fruits of which are invisible. The substance of what is said is this:Though the people who do the deeds, cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., only for the sake of the reward which is visible (. C., attained in this very birth) and not for the sin ( involved in their performance ), yet they do get an invisible fruit of the nature of religious demerit ( udharma ), viz.,--the sin ( papa )-because, if it were otherwise, there will be no explanation ( upapatti ) of there being in this world innumerable transmigrating souls. Because, they having earned ( baddhva, lit.-having bound ) an invisible fruit of the nature of sin (papa ) though not sought by them, accrues to them, due to the activities, viz., cultivation of land, injury to life, etc., exist in this world in an indefinite number (anantuh tisthanti ) revolving in the endless cycle of births ( samsara ). But those persons, few in number, who perform the deeds of giving a gift ( dana ), etc., attain an invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (dharma) and then they are liberated. Such is the sense. An opponent may argue : Let those ( persons ) who do the deeds of giving a gift (dana ), etc., have that invisible reward of the nature of religious merit ( dharma ) which they expect. But how do those people who do the deeds of cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., get that invisible fruit of the nature of sin (adharma ) which they never wish to get ? To this doubt the reply is as follows :--That ( argument ) is improper. For, a cause complete in itself ( uvikala ) does not stand in need of a wish or expectation on the part of

Page #142
Vada ] Ganadharavada . *: 99:anybody ( including even the doer of a deed ) when it is (in the process of) producing its effect, it rather, never fails to produce ( janayanti eva ) its effect because it is a self-complete cause. For, even though not known to the sower, the seed of codrava, etc., fallen in some tract of land and reaching the state of a self-complete cause by the presence of the materials, viz, the water, etc., does produce its effect even in the absence of a desire ( for that effect ) on the part of the sower. And deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are. of the nature ( bhuta ) of self-complete causes in so for as the production of sin (a-dharma ) is concerned. Hence in such causes, where does the desire (if) present in the performer of those deeds become useful ? On the other hand, ( meaning of ca ) the wise ( i. e., those who do their duties disinterestedly-vivekinah ) have no desire for the fruits even in doing such deeds as giving a gift, etc., instead of this, such deeds being of the nature of " self-complete causes " produce the fruit in the form of religious merit (dharma ) which is only of a superior quality. Therefore, it must be admitted that there is always an invisible fruit good or bad of any action whatsoever, whether it be good or bad, because otherwise there will be no propriety ( anupapatti ) of the existence of innumerable transmigrating souls. To demonstrate the same the author says :iharA adidvarahiyA savve mucceja te apyttennN| . GEITH ETT ll 03 11 (8898) Ihara adittharahiya savve muccejja te apayattenam Adittharambho ceva kesabahulo bhavijjahi ( 73 11 ( 1621 ) [ itarathA'dRSTarahitAH sarve mucyeraMste'prayatnena / TERITFH TE TOTTEST waa 11 13 11 (???)

Page #143
*: 100 :: . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second Itarathadrstarahitah sarve mucyeranste'prayatnena | Adrstarambha eva klesabahulo bhavet // 73 (1621)] Trans.-73 Otherwise, they being without an unseen ( fruit of their actions viz. cultivation, etc.) will be all of them freed ( from transmigration ) without any effort (to be free) on their part. And the performance (arambha) of ( the good deeds like a gift to a worthy recepient dana, etc., which give the ) unseen ( good rewards ) will be itself (eva) the cause of much trouble ( lit. that in which there is much trouble ). (1621) TIkA-itarathA yadi kRSi-hiMsAdyazubhakriyANAmadRSTaM phalaM nAbhyupagamyeta, tadA te tatkartAro'dRSTaphalAbhAvAd maraNAnantarameva sarve'pyayatnena mucyeran-saMsArakAraNAbhAvAd muktiM gaccheyuH, tatazca prAyaH zUnya eva saMsAraH syAdityarthaH / yazcAdRSTArambho'dRSTaphalAnAM dAnAdikriyANAM samArambhaH sa eva klezabahulaH saMsAraparibhramaNakAraNatayA durantaH syAt ; tathAhi-te dAnAdikriyAnuSThAtArastadanuSThAnenAdRSTaphalAnubandhaM vidadhyuH, tato janmAntare tadvipAkamanubhavantastatpreritAH punarapi dAnAdikriyAsveva pravarteran , tato bhUyastasphalasaMcayAt tadvipAkAnubhUtiH, punarapi dAnAdikriyArambhaH, ityevamanantasaMtatimayaH saMsArasteSAM bhavet / tatraitat syAt , itthamapyastu, kAtra kilAsmAkaM bAdhA ? / atrocyateiyamaMtra garIyasI bhavatAM bAdhA, yat kRSi-hiMsAdyazubhakriyAnuSTAtRRNAmadRSTasaMcayAbhAve sarveSAM muktigamana eko'pi tatkriyAnuSTAtA saMsAre kvApi nopalabhyeta, azubha tatphalavipAkAnubhavitA caiko'pi na dRzyeta, dAnAdizubhakriyAnuSThAtAraH zubha tatphalavipAkAnubhavitAraM eva ca kevalAH sarvatropalabhyeran , na caivaM dRzyate // 73 (1621) // ____D. C.-Otherwise-If no unseen ( evil ) reward of evil deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings etc., be assumed ( to accrue to the agent along with their visible reward in the shape of corn ) -- They'-those who do those unseen evil deeds. They would be, all of them, freed without

Page #144
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 101 any effort of their own immediately after death, there being no invisible evil fruit (of their evil deeds like cultivation of land), i.e., they will attain Liberation, because there would be no reason for their transmigration. And, then, the author means, the world of transmigration would be mostly empty: [Now, the latter half of the verse ] Adrstarambha the performance of meritorious deeds like 'dana' 'a gift to a worthy recepient, etc., the fruits of which are invisible (or the unseen principle ). This performance itself would be kles'abahulah i. e., its result will be bad as it will be the cause of wandering in the mundane world. To explain the sameThose who perform the deeds of 'dana''a gift to a worthy recepient'etc., would by performing them, aim at (anubandham vidadhyuh) the invisible fruit; then, in a succeeding birth while experiencing the maturity of that fruit (1. e., the object of enjoyment resulting from it ) they being propelled by it would be once again active in doing the same deeds of dana, etc., then again by earning their fruit, the experience of its maturity ( will result ) and once again, the performance of the deeds of dana etc. In this way, they will have transmigratory existence consisting of an endless series. * (1) Here we beg to differ from the commentator, who seems to us, to have missed the force of klesa in the original verse. The author seems to mean that if we do not assume the evil unseen fruit of the evil deeds of krsi etc., then we have one out of two possibilities viz., all souls will be liberated immediately after their death, and (2) if we do not assume the conclusion, then, we shall have to take performance of the good deeds of dana etc., as partly giving their good rewards and also partly but unfailingly giving the bad rewards leading to misery in a succeeding birth in this world. In this latter case, the performance of good deeds alone (eva in the verse) will be cause of much misery ( klesa ). We have to explain the great deal of misery in this world. We take it as an

Page #145
*: 102 : : Jinabhadra Gani's [The second invisible result of either bad deeds like krsz or of good deeds liko dana alone. If we do not make either of these two assumptions, then, we should have no nisery in the world and every soul should be freed from the world immediately on departure from this world. Thus, the latter half of the verse is meant to lead to the contingency of assuming the good deeds ilone as the cause of the misery of the soul, and thus the cause of the samsara of the soul. The commentator, * however, does not seem to us to emphasise the contigency of this assumption, that he takes the good deeds as cause of the worldly existence which may be in the form of repeated enjoyment in a series of successive births of only the good rewards of good deeds, there being no bad rewards of good deeds-The Translator's Note To the above view of the Siddhantin, an opponent may raise an objection as follows:-Let the case may be as you suggest, i. e., let the good deeds alone be assumed to give an unending series of births and deaths. What inconsistency ( badha ) will there be in our system (if the good deeds alone be the cause of transmigration ). To this objection, we reply-the following will be the greatest inconsistency for you :-All souls will attain Liberation there being no collection of ( bad ) invisible fruit by those who perform the bad deeds viz., cultivation of the land, injury to living beings, etc., and in that case, not a single person performing those ( bad ) deeds (of cultivation of land etc.) will be found anywhere in the world, and not a single person experiencing the maturity of their rewards which are evil will be seen anywhere; and only persons who perform the good deeds of dana etc., and experience the maturity of their rewards which are good, will be found everywhere. And such is not the world which we see. ( In our opinion, this objection and its reply show the weakness of the commentary. The opponent, will receive

Page #146
Vada ] Ganadharavada . .103:. the reply as a welcome conclusion (istapatti ) and say that even though we do not at present find the world as occupied only by those who do the good deeds and get the good rewards, let it be so in future according to our assumption, since the assumption leads to a welcome result. Even though no body would get Liberation, the world in any case would be better than it is now. " Na caivam drsyate" is, in any case not justified by any word in the original verse.-The Translator's Note. ___An opponent may ask " What, therefore." So, the author replies :jamaNi?bhogabhAjo bahutaragA jaM ca neha maiputvaM / adivANiTThaphalaM koi vi kiriyaM samArabhai // 74 // (1622) teNa paDivajja kiriyA adidvegaMtiyapphalA svaa| diTThANegaMtaphalA sAvi adiTThANubhAveNa // 75 // (1623) Jamanitthabhogabhajo bahutaraga jam ca neha maipuvvas i Aditthanitthaphalam koi vi kiriyam samarabhai 11 74 (1622) Tena padivajja kiriya aditthegantiyapphala savva | Ditthanegantaphala savi aditthanubhavena // 75 (1623) [ yadaniSTabhogabhAjo bahutarakA yacca neha matipUrvAm / adRSTAniSTaphalAM kazcidapi kriyAM samArabhate / / 74 // (1622) tena pratipadyasva kriyA'dRSTaikAntikaphalA sarvA / dRSTAnaikAntikaphalA sApyadRSTAnubhAvena // 75 // (1623) . Yadanistabhogabhajo bahutarakai yacca neha matipurvam i Adrstanistaphalam kascidapi kriyam samarabhate // 74 ( 1622) Tena pratipadyasva kriya'drstaikantikaphala sarva i Drstanaikantikaphala Sapyadrstanubhavena // 75 ( 1623 )] ____ Trans.-74-75 Since a great majority of souls experience undesired objects, and since none whatsoever is this world,

Page #147
*: 104 : Jinabhadra Cani's [The second intentionally performs a deed giving an invisible and undesired reward, therefore, do conclude that all actions (good and bad) invariably give an unseen fruit and that action ( which produces a drsta fruit ) does not invariably produce a visible fruit because of the power of the adrsta ( the evil )unseen of the doer.t ___TIkA-yasmAdaniSTabhogabhAjo bahutarA bhUyAMsaH-azubhakarmavipAkajanitaduHkhamAja eva prANinaH pracurA ihopalabhyante, zubhakarmavipAkanibandhanasukhAnubhavitArastu svalpA eveti bhaavH| tena tasmAt kAraNAt saumya ! pratipadyasva zubhA'zubhA vA sarvA'pi kriyA, adRSTaM zubhAzubhaM karmarupamaikAntikaM phalaM yasyAH sA'dRSTekAntikaphaletyuttaragAthAyAM sNbndhH| idamuktaM bhavati-yena duHkhino'tra bahavaH prANino dRzyante sukhinastu svalpAH, tena jJAyate-kRSivANijya--hiMsAdikriyAnivandhanAzubhakarmarUpAdRSTaphalavipAko duHkhinAm, itareSAM tu dAnAdikriyAhetukazubhakarmarUpAdRSTaphalavipAka iti| vyatyayaH kasmAd na bhavati iti cet / ucyate-azubhakriyArambhiNAmeva bahutvAt , zubhakriyAnuSTAtRRNAmeva ca svalapatvAditi / atrAha-nanvazubhakriyArambhaphalAmapi yadyadRSTaphalaM bhavati, tat kimiti dAnAdikriyArambhaka iva tadArambhako'pi kazcit tadAzaMsAM kurvANo na dRzyate ? ityAha-"jaMca nehetyAdi" yasmAca nehA'dRSTamaniSTamazubhaM phalaM yasyAHsA'dRSTAniSTaphalA tAmitthaMbhUtAM kriyAM matipUrvAmAzaMsAbuddhipUrvikAM ko'pi samArabhate, ityato na ko'pi tadAzaMsAM kurvANo dRzyate / tasmAt sarvApi kriyA'dRSTaikAntikaphaleti pratipadyasveti / / punarapi kathaMbhUtAH ? ityAha-" diTThANegaMtaphala ti" dRSTaM dhAnyadraviNalAbhAdikamanaikAntikamanavazyaMbhAvi phalaM yasyAH kRSivANijyAdikriyAyAH sA dRSTAnaikAntikaphalA sarvApi kriyA / idamuktaM bhavati-sarvasyA api kriyAyA adRSTaM phalaM tAvadekAntenaiva bhavati, yattu dRSTaphalaM tadanaikAntikameva-kasyAzcit tad bhavati kasyAzcid netyrthH| etazca dRSTaphalasyAnaikAntikatvamadRSTAnubhAvenaiveti pratipattavyam / na hi samAnasAdhanArabdhatulyakri + Vide our note at the end of the commentary on verse 1621.

Page #148
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 105 :* ammi zudgai anea zenofaara:, azaza y a, grdazzeegnzareNopapadyata iti bhAvaH / etaccaiva prAguktameveti // 74-75 (1622-1623) / / D. C.-" Since.........objects "" means "because in this world innumerable beings are found to be only unhappy due (janita) to the maturity of evil actions; " it also means "Only few are those who enjoy happiness which depends upon (nibandhana) the maturity of good actions. Tena-because of that reason, O gentle student! know that (i. e. conclude that) each and every action good or bad, is adrstaikantika phala i. e., such as gives a reward which is invariably of the form of a ( new) action which is unseen and both good and bad. Thus, "anistabhogabhajo bahutarakah" is to be connected with "tena.........sarva the first half of the succeeding verse (v/1623). The sense of the sentence is as follows:-Because in this world we find a great majority of beings to be suffering and only a few to be enjoying, we should infer that in the case of the suffering, the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta) in the form of "evil karma "+ based upon (nibandhana) activities like cultivation of land, trade, injury to living beings etc., has ripened, but in the case of the rest (the enjoying) the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta) in the form of good karma produced by (hetuka) the activities of giving a gift to a worthy recipient has ripened. An opponent may ask Why not the reverse of what you say? The reply is as follows:-Just because in the world only those who do evil activities are in a majority and only those who perform good deeds are in a minority. C6 33 33 Here the opponent argues:-If even those who do evil deeds get a fruit in the form of an adrsta (in addition to the drsta or visible fruit e. g., the crops by means of cultivation of the land), then why is it that, just like one who does 33 +The word "karma is here used in the sense of samcita karma which is also called adrsta-Tr.

Page #149
.: 106 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The second the deed of dana, that man also who does the evil deed is never found to hold an expectation for that adrsta? To this the reply is: And since etc. And because none in this world does intentionally i. e., with a previous expectation (asamsa buddhi purvikam) such deed as would give a fruit unseen and evil. It is due to this reason that no body is found to hold an expectation for the evil unseen (adrsta) [ while he does the deeds of krsi etc ]. Therefore, conclude that all actions (good like dana and bad like krsi) whatever invariably give a result which is adrsta (unseen ). " "" What other qualifications do actions possess? To this the reply is" ditthaneganta phala tti (beginning of the latter half of v. 1623). All actions-cultivation of land, trade, etc., bear a visible fruit viz., the acquision of corn, money etc., which is not absolute i. e., which is not invariably accruing (anavasyam bhavi ). It means that every action invariably "produces an invisible fruit; but the visible fruit which is to be produced is not absolute or invariably happening i. c., some action produces it and some action does not produce it. And this uncertainty of the visible fruit must be accepted as the effect of the power of an adrsta (a destiny of the man who does the deed of krsi etc.,) because when one out of two or many persons who do the same action (e. g., cultivation of land) with the same means, suffers the loss of his visible fruit (crops) while another does not, it never happens without a cause in the form of adrsta, the evil unseen. Moreover, this has been already explained in this very book.t [The commentator is anxious to explain savva kiriya' as all actions good (like dana) and bad (like krsi); but it is very difficult to explain how the good actions (like dana) When the crops of a cultivator fails, the failure is due to his adrsta and not to his action of cultivation which is a drsta or visible deed.

Page #150
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 107 : can bear a visible fruit ( ditthaneganta phala ); so even the commentator has somehow to explain it as referring only to the bad actions like krsi etc. We hold that by savva kiriya we should take only the bad actions like cultivation of land, trade, etc. The purpose of the verse is to explain how all bad actions bear invariably a bad fruit which is invisible ( adittha ) and how even the visible fruits which these bad actions bear and which the agent intentionally aims at, are uncertain and therefore the result of the man's adrsta, the invisible karma. The visible action which a man does e. g., krsi bears two kinds of fruits invisible and visible, both of which are dependent upon the man's adrsta ( aditthanubhavena ). Since we find most people suffering and since we find that none does any bad action even e. g. krsi with the intention that the result be bad and invisible i. e.. that he may be unhappy in his next life as a result of krsi, we must conclude that all bad actions like krsi give invariably an adrsta invisible bad result. Thus, in our opinion the proper conclusion (padivajja) from the whole of v. 1622 is the first half of v. 1623. The latter half of v. 1623 is only an additional remark. The commentator .connects the first half of v. 1623 with first half of v. 1622 and the latter half of the former, with the latter half of the latter. As the latter half of v. 1622 refers only to adrsta anista, it cannot be connected with the latter half of v. 1623 'which refers only to the drsta phala and traces it to adrsta karmas. Tr. ] Or, of what avail is this trouble? * Karma' is a.foregone conclusion. By what argument? He replies :ahavA phalAu kammaM kajjattaNao pasAhiyaM puvaM / paramANavo ghaDassa va kiriyANa tayaM phala bhinnaM // 76 // (1624) Ahava phalau kammam kajjattanao pasahiyam puvvam i Paramanavo ghadassa va kiriyana tayam phalam bhinnam 1176 (1624)

Page #151
: 108: Jinabhadra Gani's [The second [ athavA phalAt karma kAryatvataH prasAdhitaM pUrvam / paramANavo ghaTasyeva kriyANAM tat phalaM bhinnam // 76 // (1624) Athava phalat karma karyatvatah prasadhitam purvami Paramanavo ghatasyeva kriyanam tat phalam bhinnam || 76 (1624)] Trans.-76 Or rather, -- karman' is already proved from the fruit ( i. e., the special fruit ) i. e., from ( the fact that, that special fruit is ) an effect. Just as the atoms of a pot ( are different from a pot ) the effect of actions is different from those actions. ( 1624 ) jo tullasAhaNANaM phale viseso na so viNA heuM / kajattaNao goyama ! ghaDo va, heU ya so kammaM // Jo tullasahananam phale viseso na so vina heum 1 Kajjattanao Goyama! ghado vva, hea ya so kammam // (verse 1613) TIkA-ityasyAM gAthAyAM prAgasmAbhiH karma prasAdhitameva / kutaH ? ityAha-phalAt tulyasAdhanAnAM yaH phale vishessstsmaadityrthH| tato'pi phalavizeSAt kasmAt prasAdhitaM karma ? ityAha-kAryatvAt tasya phalavizeSasya, yacca kArya tasya kAraNaM bhavatyeva, yathA ghaTasya paramANavaH, yacceha kAraNaM tat krm| "kiriyANa tayaM phalaM bhinnaM ti" tadeva ca karma sarvAsAmapi kriyANAmadRSTaM phalamityevamihApi sAdhyate / kathaM bhUtam ? tAbhyaH kriyAbhyo bhinnam , karmaNaH kAryatvAt , kriyANAM ca kAraNatvAt , kAryakAraNayozca parasparaM bhedAditi bhAvaH // 76 ( 1624 ) // D. C.-Or, there is a difference as to the fruit achieved, though those who try to achieve it, use the same and equal means. That difference cannot take place without a cause. O Gautama ! like the pot, that cause is " karma" on account of the fact that that ( difference ) is an effect. While explaining this verse we have already proved

Page #152
Vada ] Ganadharavada . *; 109 : " karma." Whence ? He replies--" From the fruit i, e., from that difference in the fruit ( achieved by different people with equal means )." How is 'karma? proved on the strength of that difference of fruit ? He replies:-- " From its being an effect, " 6. e., because that difference of fruit is an effect. There is invariably a cause corresponding to what is an effect, just as atoms of earth are the cause of a pot, " and in this case the cause is an action. " The effect of actions is different from those actions" and it can be proved here that that very' karman'is the unseen fruit of all actions whatever. What kind of action is it? It is different from those actions. Since this "karman' is an effect and since actions are the cause, and since an effect and a cause must be mutually different, the karman' is different from those actions. 1624 The author states an objection to this and its reply:Aha naNu muttamevaM muttaM ciya kjjmuttimttaao| iha jaha muttattaNao ghaDassa paramANavo muttA // 77 // (1625) Aha nanu muttamevam muttam ciya kajjamuttimaitao i Iha jaha muttattanao ghadassa parmanavo mutta 11 77 (1625) * [SITE 78 yawa gawa praviaamara II iha yathA mUrtatvato ghaTasya paramANavo mUrtAH // 77 (1625) // Aha nanu murtamevam murtameva karyamurtimattvat Iha yatha murtatvato ghatasya parmanavo murtah || ( 1625 )] Trans.-77 (The opponent will say,) " Then the action ( karman) has a physical form ( murta )." We (the Siddhantin) would reply, " The action has indeed a physical form because its effect ( viz., the body ) has a physical form. In this world the atoms (paramanus ) the cause of the pot, the effect which has a physical form, will have also a physical form." ( 1625 ) TIkA-Aha preraka:-nanu yadi kAryANAM zarIrAdInAM darzanAt tatkA

Page #153
: 110 :- . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second raNabhUtaM karma sAdhyate, tarhi kAryasya mUrtatvAt karmApi mUrta prAmoti / AcArya uttaramAha-" muttaM ciyetyAdi " yadasmAbhiH prayatnena sAdhayitavyam , tadbhavatApi parasiddhAntAnabhijJabAlabuddhitayA'niSTApAdanAbhiprAyeNa sAdhitameva, tathAhi-vayamapi brUmaH-mUrtameva karma, tatkAryasya zarIrAdemUrtatvAt , iha yasya yasya kArya mUtaM tasya tasya kAraNamapi mUrtam , yathA ghaTasya paramANavaH, yaccAmUrta kAryaM na tasya kAraNaM mUrta, yathA jJAnasyAtmeti / samavAyikAraNaM cehAdhikriyate, na nimittakAraNabhUtA rUpA''lokAdaya iti / Aha-nanu sukha-duHkhAdayo'pi karmaNaH kAryam , atasteSAmamUrtatvAt karmaNo'mUrtatvamapi prApnoti / na hi mUrtAdamUrtaprasavo yujyate / na caikasya mUrtatvamamUrtatvaM ca yuktam , viruddhatvAt / atrocyate-nanvata evAtra samavAyikAraNamadhikriyate, na nimittakAraNam , sukha-duHkhAdInAM cAtmadharmatvAdAtmaiva samavAyikAraNam , karma punasteSAmanna-pAnA'hi-viSAdivad nimittakAraNamevetyadoSa iti // 77 (1625) // D. C.--The opponent asks "If on the ground that we can see (physically ) the body, etc., which are the effects, the karman is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the karman also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form." The Acarya replies :-" Karman has indeed a physical form..." What we intend to prove with great effort, you also have already proved with an intention to lead us to an unacceptable position, because your intelligence is like that of a child ( or a fool ) who does not know the doctrine of others. To explain the same-We also say " A karman is nothing but possessed of a physical form, because its effect, the body, etc., has a physical form. In this world, the causes of the various effects having a physical form are also possessed of a physical form e. g., the atoms which are the cause of a pot. And if an effect is without a physical form, its cause is not possessed of a physical form e. g., Atman which is the cause of knowledge (jnana). And in this discussion the essential cause ( samavayi

Page #154
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 111 ? karana ) is the topic of consideration and not the objects which are only the instrumental causes, such as the form (rupa ), the light ( aloka ) etc. The opponent will argue--"The pleasure, the pain, etc., are also of the nature of effects (like the body, etc. ). Herice, since they have no physical form, we would argue that the karman is also devoid of a physical form, because the rise of something devoid of a physical form is not possible (or reasonable) as taking place from something which has a physical form. Nor is it possible that one and the same thing be both murta (possessed of a physical form ) and a-murta (devoid of a physical form ) since that would be self-contradictory. " To this objection we reply :-Indeed, for this very reason, the intimate or essential cause only is taken as the topic of our consideration and we have excluded the discussion of the instrumental cause. As the pleasure, the pain, etc., are the properties of the soul ( Atman), the soul alone is their essential cause, while karman is only the instrumental cause, while karman is only the instrumental cause of the pleasure, the pain, etc., just as are the food, the drink, the poison of a snake, etc. Thus there is no flaw in our doctrine. 1625 The Acarya mentions also other arguments proving the physical nature ( murtatva ) of an action ( karman ):-- taha suhasaMvittIo saMbaMdhe veyaNubbhavAo ya / ashaIETOT137I TETOTTAISIT Quoti II VCHI (-882EUR) AhAra ivAnala iva ghaDu vva nehAikayabalAhANo / khIramivodAharaNAI kammarUvittagamagAiM // 79 // (1627) Taha suhasamvittio sambandhe veyanubbhavao ya i Bajjhabalahanao parinamao ya vinneyam 11 71 ( 1626 ) Ahara ivanala iva ghadu vya nehai kaya balahano 1 Khiramivodaharanaim kammaruvittagamagaim 11 79 ( 1627 )

Page #155
.: 112 Jinabhadra Gani's [The second [ tathA sukhasaMvitteH saMbandhe vedanodbhavAca / bAhyavalAdhAnAt pariNAmAca vijJeyam // 78 (1626) // AhAra ivAnala iva ghaTa iva snehAdikutabalAdhAnaH / kSIramivodAharaNAni karmarUpitvagamakAni / / 79 (1627) // Tatha sukhasamvitteh sambandhe vedanodbhavacca / Bahyabaladhanat parinamacca vijneyam || 78 (1626 ) Ahara ivanala iva ghata iva snehadiksta baladhanah | Ksiramivodaharonani karmarupitvagamakani 11 79 (1627 ) ] Trans.--78-79 Also the fact that the karman has a physical form should be admitted because in the association ( with the karman ) the consciousness of pleasure, etc., (becomes * possible ) and because of the rise of experience of heat ( vedana ) when one is in association (with the karman ) because it is possible to add to the strength of the 'karman' by external means and because of the fact that karman undergoes change. The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that karman has a physical form ( and are to be taken respectively with each of the four arguments stated in the above verse--(1) Like food, (2) like fire, (3) like the addition of strengh made by means of oil, etc, to a pot of earth, (and) (4) like the ( change of ) milk. ( 1626-1627) TIkA-iha prathamagAthopanyastahetucatuSTayasya dvitIyagAthAyAM yathAsaMkhyaM catvAro dRSTAntA drssttvyaaH| tatra mUrta karma tatsaMbandhe sukhAdisaMvitteH, iha yatsaMbandhe sukhAdi saMvedyate tad mUrta dRSTam , yathA'zanAdyAhAraH, yaccAmUrta na tatsaMbandhe sukhAdisaMvidasti, yathA''kAzasaMbandhe, saMvedyate ca tatsaMbandhe sukhAdi, tasmAt mUrtaM karmeti / tathA, yatsaMbandhe vedanodbhavo bhavati tad mUrta dRSTam , yathA'nalogniH, bhavati ca karmasaMbandhe vedanodbhavaH tasmAt tad mUrta + Thus * Sambandhe' is to be construed with both suhasamvitti and veyanubbhava.

Page #156
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 118 : miti / tathA, mUrta karma, Atmano jJAnAdInAM ca taddharmANAM vyatiriktatve sati bAhyena sak-candanA-'GganAdinA balasyopacayasyAdhIyamAnatvAt , yathA snehAdyAhitabalo ghaTaH, iha yasyAnAtma-vijJAnAdeH sato bAhyena vastunA balamAdhIyate tad mUrta dRSTam , yathA snehAdinA''dhIyamAnabalo ghaTaH, AdhIyate ca bArmithyAtvAdihetubhUtairvastubhiH karmaNa upacayalakSaNaM balam , tasmAt tad mUrtamiti / tathA, mUrta karma, AtmAdivyatiriktatve sati pariNAmitvAt , kSIramiveti / evamAdIni hetUdAharaNAni karmaNo rUpitva- . gamakAnIti // 78-79 (1626-1627 ) // ____D. C.-The four illustrations stated in the second verse should be respectively taken as those of the four arguments presented in the first verse viz.:--The karman has a physical form (murtam ) because of the experience of pleasure etc. when one is united with that karman: in this world that in association with which the pleasure etc. are experienced is found to be something having a physical form, just as the food one eats etc; and there is no experience of pleasure etc, in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether. But in association with that i. e., karman we do experience pleasure etc. therefore, the karman has a physical form. Similarly, that in association with which a burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with the fire, and the rise of a burning sensation, pain occurs when one is in association with the karman; therefore, it has a form. Here the author states an objection and its reply: aha mayamasiddhameyaM pariNAmAu tti so vi kjjaao| siddho pariNAmo se dahipariNAmAdiva payassa // 80 // (1628) Aha mayamasiddhameyam parinamau tti so vi kajjao i Siddho parinamo se dahiparinamadiva payassa u 80 ( 1628 ) 16

Page #157
* 114 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second [atha matamasiddhametat pariNAmAditi so'pi kAryAt / siddhaH pariNAmastasya dadhipariNAmAdiva payasaH // 80 // (1628) Atha matamasiddhauetat parinamaditi so'pi karyat i Siddha) parinamastasya dadhiparinamadiva payasah || 80 (1628 ] Trans.-80 Again ( the opponent will say ) this (i.e. Karmarupatva) could not be accomplished by ( virtue of) the hetu that it undergoes change. ( But ) even that is due to Karya. Just as the mutability of milk is established by the mutability of curds, its mutability could ( also ) be established ( by that of Karya ). ( 1628) TIkA-atha 'pariNAmitvAt' ityasiddho'yaM heturiti mataM bhavataH / etadapyayuktam , yataH so'pi pariNAmaH siddhaH karmaNaH, 'kajAu tti' karmakAryasya zarIrAdeH pariNAmitvadarzanAdityarthaH / iha yasya kArya pariNAmyupalabhyate tasyAtmano'pi pariNAmitvaM nizcIyate, yathA dadhnastakAdibhAvena pariNAmAt payaso'pi pariNAmitvaM vijJAyata eveti // 80 // (1628) D. C.-Again, you would believe that Kurman is asiddha by reason of its parinama. But that is not proper. The parinamituri of Karman is apprehended from the parinamitva of its Kuryus like Sariru etc. For, when the effect is mutable, mutability of the action is automatically recognized, just as the mutability of milk is recognized from the parinama of its Karya viz, curds, in the form of butter-milk. Agnibhuti asks :abbhAdivigArANaM jaha vecittaM viNA vi kammeNa / taha jai saMsArINaM haveja ko nAma to doso ? // 81 // (1629) Abbhadivigaranam jaha vecittani vina vi kammena i Taha jai sainsarinam havejja ko nama to doso ? 11 81 ( 1629 ) [ abhrAdivikArANAM yathA vaicitryaM vinApi karmaNA / tathA yadi saMsAriNAM bhavet ko nAma tato doSaH ? // 81 // (1629)

Page #158
Vada ] Ganadharavada Abhradivikaranam yatha vaicitryam vinapi karmana i Tatha yadi samsarinam bhavet ko nama tato dosah | 81 (1529) ] * 115 : * Trans.-81 Just as a variety of visible changes in the clouds etc. is apprehended even without (the help of) Karman in the same way, what harm is there if it is so in the case of mundane souls also ? (1629 ) TIkA- Aha- nanu yathAbhrAdivikArANAmantareNApi karma vaicitryaM dRzyate, tathA teneva prakAreNa saMsArijIvaskandhAnAmapi sukha - duHkhAdibhAvena vaicitryaM yadi karmavinApi syAt, tataH ko nAma doSo bhavet ? - na ko'pItyarthaH // / 81 / / ( 1629 ) D. C.-A variety of various visible changes in the clouds is apprehended even in the absence of Karman. In the same way, in the case of mundane souls also, there would be no harm if we believe that a variety of vikaras like sukha, duhkha etc. exists without the help of Karman. The Acarya replies: kammammi va ko bheo jaha bajjhakkhaMdhacittayA siddhA / taha kampoggalANa va vicittayA jIvasahiyANaM // 82 // (1630) Kammammi va ko bheo jaha bajjhakkhandhacittaya siddha Taha kammapoggalana vi vicittaya jivasahiyanam || 82 (1630 ) [ karmaNi vA ko bhedo yathA bAhyaskandhacitratA siddhA / tathA karmapudgalAnAmapi vicitratA jIvasahitAnAm // / 82 / / (1630 ) Karmani va ko bhedo yatha bahyaskandhacitrata siddha | Tatha karmapudgalanamapi vicitrata jivasahitanam || 82 (1630 ) ] Trans.--82 ( Then ) what difference ( would it make ) even in the case of Karman? Just as the variegation of external objects is proved, variegation of the Karmapudgalas could also be proved. ( 1630 )

Page #159
*: 116 : . Jinabhadra Gaai's [The second TIkA-yadyabhravikArANAM gandharvanagarendradhanurAdInAM gRha-devakula-prAkAra-taru-kRSNa-nIla-raktAdibhAvena vaicitryamiSyate saumya! vAzabdasyApizabdArthatvAta, tarhi karmaNyapi ko bhedaH ko vizeSaH, yena tatra vaicitryaM nAbhyupagamyate ? / nanu hanta ! yathA sakalalokapratyakSANAmamISAM gandharvapura-zakra. kodaNDAdInAM bAhyaskandhAnAM vicitratA bhavato'pi siddhA, tathA tenaiva prakAreNAntarANAmapi karmaskandhAnAM pudgalamayatve samAne'pi jIvasahitatvasya vizeSavato vaicitryakAraNasadbhAve'pi sukha-duHkhAdijanakarUpatayA vicitratA kimiti neSyate ? / yadi hyabhrAdayo bAhyapudgalA nAnArUpatayA pariNamanti, tarhi jIvaiH parigRhItAH sutarAM te tathA pariNaMsyantIti bhAvaH // 82(1630) / ___D. C.-0 Saumya ! If forms such as a house, a temple, a wall, black, green, red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a gandharva city or a rain-bow in the sky, what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of Karman also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you. Now, the internal Karmaskandhas consist of the same substance as the bahya skandhas; and on the top of that, they are alive. Moreover, as they produce sukha, duhkha etc. as their vikaras there is all the more reason to admit vaicitrya of the Karma-pudgalas. Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless bahya pudgalas are admitted, they are all the more acceptable in the case of Karma-pudgalas which are surrounded by the cetana javas. bajjhANa cittayA jai paDivannA kammaNo viseseNa / jIvANugayassa mayA bhattINa va sippinatthANaM // 83 // (1631) Bajjhana cittaya jai padivanna kammano visesena i Jivanugayassa maya bhattina va sippinatthanam | 83 ( 1631 ) [ bAhyAnAM citratA yadi pratipannA karmaNo vizeSeNa / / jIvAnugatasya matA bhaktInAmivi zilpinyastAnAm // 83 // (1631) Bahyanam citrata yadi pratipanna karmano visesena i Jivanugatasya mata bhaktinamiva silpinyastanam // 83 ( 1631)]

Page #160
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 117 : Trans.--83 If variety (in the case ) of external ( objects) is established, variety ( in the case) of Karman which is surr. ounded by soul should ( all the more ) be accepted ( as positive like the variety of forms laid down in a piece of art. ( 1631 TIkA-yadi hi jIvAparigRhItAnAmapi bAhyAnAmabhrAdipudgalAnAM nAnAkArapariNatirUpA citratA tvayA pratipannA, tarhi jIvAnugatAnAM karmapudgalAnAM vizeSata evAsmAkaM bhavatazca sA sammatA bhaviSyati, bhaktayo vicchittayastAsAmiva citrAdiSu zilpinyastAnAm / ayamabhiprAya:citrakarAdizilpijIvaparigRhItAnAM citra-lepya-kASThakarmAnugatapudgalAnAM yA pariNAmacitratA sA vitrasApariNatendradhanurAdipudgalapariNAmacitratAyAH sakAzAd viziSTaiveti pratyakSataH eva dRzyate / ato jIvaparigRhItatvena karmapudgalAnAmapi sukhaduHkhAdivaicitryajananarUpA viziSTatarA pariNAmacitratA kathaM na syAt / iti // 83 (1631) // D. C.--Now that you have accepted citruta in the form of manifold transformations in the case of bahyu-pudgalas like abhra etc. which are not surrounded by jiva, you shall have to accept the same in the case of Karmn-pudgalas also as they have already been surrouided by jivas. * Again, the citrata of forms drawn by an artist in painting, sculpturing, carpentry etc. is peculiarly distinct from the citrata of the manifold vikaras of bahya-pudgalas like rain-bow etc., while in the case of Karma-pudgalas also, the parinamacitrata is peculiarly distinct from the other two varieties, firstly because it gives rise to alterations like sukha, duhkha etc. and secondly because it is aided by jiva. ___Again, the opponent asks :to jai taNumettaM ciya haveja kA kammakappaNA naam?| kammaM pi naNu taNu cciya saNhayarabbhaMtarA navaraM // 84 // (1632) To jai tanumettam ciya havejja ka kammakappana nama ?! Kammam pi nanu tanu cciya sanhayarabbhantara navaram // (1632)

Page #161
.: 118 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second [ tato yadi tanumAtrameva bhavet kA karmakalpanA nAma ? / karmApi nanu tanureva sUkSmatarAbhyantarA navaram // 84 // ( 1632 ) Tato yadi tanumatrameva bhavet ka karma-kalpana nama ? I Karmapi nanu tanureva suksmatarabhyantara navaram || 84(1632)] Trans.-84 Now, if Karman is itself the body, why should Karman be assumed at all? That is not proper. In fact Karman is also a body though subtle and interior to a great extent. ( 1632) TIkA-evaM manyate paraH-yadyabhrAdivikArANAmiva karmapudgalAnAM vicitrapariNatirabhyupagamyate / tato bAhyaM sakalajanapratyakSaM tanumAtramevedaM surUpakurUpa-sukha-duHkhAdibhAtraiH svabhAvata evAbhrAdivikAravad vicitrarUpatayA pariNamati, ityetadevAstu, kA nAma punastadvaicitryahetubhUtasyAntargaDukalpasya karmaNaH parikalpanA, svabhAvAdeva sarvasyApi pudgalapariNAmavaicitryasya siddhatvAt ? iti / bhagavAnAha-"kammaM piityaadi"| ayamabhiprAyaH-yadyabhrAdivikArANAmiva tanorvaicitryamabhyupagamyate, tahiM nanu karmApi tanureva, kArmaNazarIramevetyarthaH, kevalaM zlakSNatarA, atIndriyatvAt ; abhyantarA ca, jIvena sahAtisaMzliSTatvAt / tatazca yathA'bhrAdivikAravad bAhyasthUratanovaicitryamabhyupagamyate, tathA karmatanorapi tatki nAbhyupagamyate ? iti bhAvaH // 84(1632) / D. C.--The opponent-Now that Karma-pudgalas have been accepted as having variegated transformations like various visible changes in clouds etc. this body also, which is pratyaksa to all, can undergo a number of alternations by virtue of its svabhava in the form of surupa, kurupa, sukha, duhkha etc, And hence, it is not at all necessary to assume an intervening agent like Karman for the production of surira etc. For, a variety of visible changes in the case of all pudgalas is accomplished by its very svabhavu. The Acarya-Because we take the vaicitrya of tanu as being similar to that of various vikaras in abhra etc. the Karman should also be taken as tanu. This Karmana body

Page #162
Vada 1 Ganadharavada . ::119:. is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature because it is so closely connected with jiva. So, vicitrata in the case of a Karmana sarira should be recognized just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of vikaras of the clouds etc. - Again, the author states an objection and its reply :ko tIe viNA doso thUlAe sabahA vippamukkassa / dehaggahaNAbhAvo tau ya sNsaarvocchittii|| 85 // (1633) Ko tie vina doso thulae savvaha vippamukkassa 1 Dehaggahanabhavo tau ya sarisaravocchitti u 85 ( 1633 ) [ kastayA vinA doSaH sthUlayA sarvathA vipramuktasya / dehagrahaNAbhAvastatazca saMsAravyavacchittiH / / 85 // (1633 ) Kastaya vina dosah sthulaya sarvatha vipramuktasya i Dehagrahanabhavastatasca samsaravyavacchittih || 85 ( 1633 )] Trans.-85 ( The opponent will say-- ) What harm is there in ( believing ) its absence ? ( The reply is-) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a ( new ) body in that case; and ultimately a ( complete ) break-off of the mundane world ( will follow ). ( 1633 ) TIkA-prerakaH prAha-nanu bAhyAyAH sthUratanvA vaicitryaM pratyakSadRSTatvAdevAbhrAdivikAravadabhyupagacchAmaH / antaraGgAyAstu karmarUpAyAH sUkSmatanorvaicitryaM kathamicchAmaH, tasyAH sarvathA'pratyakSatvAt ? / atha tadanabhyupagame doSaHko' pyApatati, tato'rthApattereva tadvicitratA'bhyupagantavyA, tarhi nivedyatAM kastayA vinA doSo'nuSajyate ? / AcAryaH prAha-maraNa kAle sthUlayA dRzyamAnatanvA sarvathA vipramuktasya jantobhavAntaragatasthUlatanugrahaNanibandhanabhUtAM sUkSmakarmatanumantareNAtanadehagrahaNAbhAvalakSaNo doSaH mamApadyate / na hi niSkAraNameva zarIrAntaragrahaNaM yujyate / tatazca dehAntaragrahaNAnupapattemaraNAnantaraM sarvasyApyazarIratvAdayatnenaiva saMsAravyavacchittiH syAt / / 85 ( 1633 ) //

Page #163
: 120 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second ____D. C.--The opponent--We recognize the variety of sthilasarira by virtue of its being pratyaksa. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a suksma sarira as it is absolutely a-pratyaksna (imperceptible ). Hence, if we do not accept the suksma-sarira at all, will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise ? Acarya-If the suksma Karmana sarira is not accepted, in its absence the soul when liberated from the sthula-sarira after death, will not be able to enter the new body at the next * birth. For, this Karmana sarara is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth. So, in case this suksma karmana sarira is not accepted, jiva will not enter a new body after death and ultimately the whole of the mundane world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of jivas. And even if it were so, what would happen ? sabavimokkhAvattI nikAraNau vva svvsNsaaro| bhavamukANaM va puNo saMsaraNamao annaasaao||86|| (1634) Savvavimokkhavatti nikkaranau vva savvasamsaro i Bhavamukkanam va puno samsaranamao anasao // 86 ( 1634) [ sarvavimokSApattiniSkAraNako vA srvsNsaarH| bhavamuktAnAM vA punaH sNsrnnmto'naashvaasH|| 86 / / (1634 ) Sarvavimo ksapattir-niskaranako va sarvasamsarah | Bhavamuktanam va punah sansaranamato'nasvasah 11 86 (1734)] Trans.-86 ( In that case ) all will attain Moksa ; the whole of mundane world would become useless; those who are exempted from existence will have birth and re-birth; and there will be no consolation for Moksa even. ( 1634 ) TIkA-tataH saMsAravyavacchedAnantaraM sarvasyApi jIvarAzermokSApattirbhaveta / athAzarIrANAmapi saMsAraparyaTanam , tarhi niSkAraNa eva sarvasyApi saMsAraH syAt , bhavamuktAnAM ca siddhAnAmitthaM punarapyakasmAd niSkAraNa eva

Page #164
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 121 :saMsArapAtaH syAt / tathaiva ca tatra saMsaraNam / tatazca mokSe'pyanAzvAsa iti // 86 (1634) // D. C.-In that case there is disjunction of the entire mundane world; all the living beings will attain moksa. Again those that are bodiless will also wander in the world along with others that have bodies; the mundane world will become niskarana or good-for-nothing. Moreover, Siddhas that are exempted from existence will also have to fall back into sanisara. and hence into the cycle of birth and re-birth. Ultimately there will be no consolation even in molesa. Thus, along with. disjunction of the entire mundane world, all the above-stated difficulties will arise if Karnan is not admitted as the cause of variety. Again the opponent asks :muttassAmuttimayA jIveNa kahaM haveja saMbaMdho ? / somma! ghaDassa va nabhasA jaha vA dabassa kiriyaae||87||(1635) Muttassamuttimaya jivena kaham havejja sambandho? I Somma! ghadassa vva nabhasa jaha va davvassa kiriyae // (1635) [ mUrtasyAmUrtimatA jIvena kathaM bhavet saMbandhaH / saumya ! ghaTasyeva nabhasA yathA vA dravyasya kriyayA // 87 // (1635) Martasyamurtimata jivena katham bhavet sambandhah ? | Saumya! ghatasyeva nabhasa yatha va dravyasya kriyaya|187(1635)] ___Trans.-87 " How can the corporeal (Karman) be related to the incorporeal Jiva ? " ( The Acarya replies :-) O Saumya ! ( Their relation is ) like the relation of ghata with sky or like that of substance ( dravya ) with action ( kriya). ( 1635) ___TIkA-nanu mUrta karmeti prAg bhavadbhiH samarthitam / tasya ca mUrtasya karmaNo'mUrtena jIvena saha kathaM saMyogalakSaNaH samavAyalakSaNo vA saMbandhaH 16

Page #165
*: 122 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second syAt / ataH karmasiddhAvapyetadaparameva randhra pazyAmaH / bhagavAnAha-saumya ! yathA mUrtasya ghaTasyAmUrtena nabhasA saMyogalakSaNaH saMbandhastathAnApi jiivkrmnnoH| yathA vA dravyAsyAGgulayAdeH kriyayA''kuJcanAdikayA saha samavAbalakSaNaH saMbandhaH, tathA'trApi jIva-karmaNorayamiti // 87 (1635) // ___D. C.-Agribhuti-You have already asserted that Karmaon is murta. Now, how could this murta Karman be connected with the amurta jiva either by means of the samavaya relation or even by Sanyoga ? This is one more difficuly in the way of the accomplishment of Karman. ___The Acarya-O blessed one ! just as a martca ghcata is connected with the amurta akasa by means of samyoga and an object like finger is connected with kriya like contraction by means of the samavaya relation, so, here also Karman is connected with jiva. The relation of jiva with Karman is proved in another way:ahavA paJcakkhaM ciya jIvovanibaMdhaNaM jaha sarIraM / ciTThai kammayamevaM bhavaMtare jIvasaMjuttaM // 88 // (1636) Ahava paccakkham ciya jivovanibandhanam jaha sariram i Citthai kammayamevam bhavantare jivasanjuttam // ( 1636 ) [athavA pratyakSameva jIvopanibandhanaM yathA zarIram / tiSThati kArmaNamevaM bhavAntare jIvasaMyuktam // 88 // (1636) Athava pratyaksameva jivopanibandhanam yatha sariram / Tisthati karmanamevam bhavantare jivasamyuktam // 88 (1636)] __Trans.-88 Or, just as the ( coarse ) body being perceptible ( to the senses) is connected with the soul ( in this world ) the Karmana body is connected with the soul in the next world. ( 1636 ).

Page #166
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 123 : TIkA-athavA, yathedaM bAhyaM sthUlazarIraM jIvopanivandhanaM jIvena saha saMbaddhaM pratyakSopalabhyamAnameva tiSThati sarvatra ceSTate, evaM bhavAntaraM gacchatA jIvena saha saMyuktaM kArmaNazarIraM pratipadyasva / atha braSe-dharmA'dharmanimittaM jIvasaMbaddhaM bAhyaM zarIraM pravartate, tarhi pRcchAmo bhavantam-tAvapi dharmA-'dhamA~ mUtau vA bhavetAm , amUrtI vA ? / yadi mUtau~, tarhi tayorapyamUrtenAtmanA saha kathaM saMbandhaH / atha tayostena sahAsau kathamapi bhavati, tarhi karmaNo'pi tena sArdhamayaM kasmAd na syAt ? / athAmUrtI dharmA'dhauM, tarhi bAhyamUrtasthUlazarIreNa saha tayoH saMbandhaH kathaM syAt , mUrtA'mUrtayorbhavadabhiprAyeNa saMbandhA. yogAt / na cAsaMbaddhayostayorbAhyazarIraceSTAnimittatvamupapadyate, atiprasaGgAt / atha mUrtayorapi tayorbAhyazarIreNa mUrteNa saheSyate saMbandhaH, tarhi jIva-karmaNostatsadbhAve kaH pradveSaH ? iti // 88 (1636 ) // D. C.- This sthula sarara, as it is pratyaksa and connected with jiva, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the Karmana sarira is connected with jiva in the next world. Here again, if you think that it is the sthula sarira--with dharma and adharma as its nimittas--that exhibits all movements when conneced with jiva I would ask you to consider whether dharma and adharma are murta or amurta. In the first case, if you take dharma and adharma to be murta how could they be related to atman which is amurta ? But, if their relation to atman is, anyhow, approved of by you, why should you not approve of their relation to Karman also ? Secondly, if you believe that dharma and adharma are amurta they could not have any relation with the bahya and sthula body which is murta. For, according to you, connection between murta and amurta is improper. Thus, if dharma and adharma become the nimitta karanas of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of atiprsanga would arise. Moreover, if these amurta dharma and adharma have been believed as being connected with the external murta sarira, what objection would there be to assume a similar relation between jiva and Karman ?

Page #167
*: 124 : : Jinabhadra Gaai's [The second Here there is an objection and its refutationmutteNAmuttimao uvaghAyA-'NuggahA kahaM hojA ? / jaha viNNANAINaM mairApANosahAIhi // 89 // (1637) Muttenamuttimao uvaghaya-'nuggaha kaham hojja ? Jaha vinnanainam mairapanosahaihim // 89 ( 1637 ) [ mUrteNAmUrtimata upaghAtA-'nugrahI kathaM bhavetAm / ___ yathA vijJAnAdInAM madirApAnau-padhAdibhiH / / 89 // (1637) Murtenamurtinata upaghata'nugrahau katham bhavetam? I Yatha vijnanadinam madirapanau-sadhadibhih 11 89 ( 1637)] Trans.-89 " How could the amurta ( soul) be supported or damaged by the murta (Karman)?" ( The answer is- ) In the way as vijnana etc. are ( damaged or supported) by a drink of wine, medicine etc. ( 1637 ) ______TIkA-nanu mUrtena karmaNA'mUrtimato jIvasya kathamAhlAdaparitApAdyanugraho-paghAtau syAtAm ? / na hyamUrtasya namaso mUrtermalayajajvalanajvAlAdibhistau yujyate iti bhaavH| atrottaramAha-'jaha viNNANAINamityAdi yathA'mUrtAnAmapi vijJAna-vividiSA-dhRti-smRtyAdijIvadharmANAM mUtrapi madirApAna-hRtpUra-viSa-pipIlikAdibhirbhakSitairupadhAtaH kriyate, payaH-zarkarAdhRtapUrNa meSajAdibhistvanugraha ityevamihApIti / etacca jIvasyAmUrtatvamabhyupagamyoktam // 89 1637 / / D. C.-Agnibhuti-In fact, the amerta atman cannot feel joy or sorrow as an conugraha ( favour) or upaghata (offence) by virtue of a murta Karman, just as the comurta akasa is neither supported nor damaged by the murta sandalwood or fire-flame. Acarya-Desire for discussion of vijnana, moral courage, remembrance etc., are the amurta qualities of soul. These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison, ant, a white thornapple etc.t and, are nourished by taking the murta drugs which contain + Popularly known as dhatura in Western India.

Page #168
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 125 : milk, ghee, sugar-candy etc. So the amurta java is also nourished or weakened by the murta Karman. ahavA negaMto'yaM saMsArI sabahA amutto tti / jamaNAikammasaMtaipariNAmavannarUvo so // 90 // (1638) Ahava neganto'yam samsari savvaha amutto tti i Jamanaikammasantaiparinamavannaruvo so 11 90 ( 1631 ) [athavA naikAnto'yaM saMsArI sarvathA'mUrta iti / yadanAdikarmasantatipariNAmApanarUpaH saH // 90 // (1638) Athava naikanto'yam samsari sarvatha'murta iti i Yadanadikarmasantatiparinamapannarupah sah 11 90 (1638)] ___Trans.-90 Or, this mundane soul is not entirely amarta in the extreme. For, it has attained an alteration in the continuous range of Karman, which has no beginning. ( 1638 ) TIkA-athavA, nAyamekAnto yaduta-saMsArI jIvaH sarvathA'mUrta iti / kutaH 1 / yad yasmAdanAdikarmasantatipariNAmApannaM vahnayayaH piNDanyAyenAnAdikarmasaMtAnapariNatisvarUpatAM prAptaM rUpaM yasya sa tathA / tatazca mUrtakarmaNaH kathaJcidananyatvAd mUrto'pi kthnycijiivH| iti mUrtena karmaNA bhavata eva tasyAnugraho-paghAtau, nabhasastvamUrtatvAt , acetanatvAcca tau na bhavata eveti // 90 (1638) // D. C.-Or, this samsari jiva is also not wholly amurta because it has assumed an alteration distinct from the expanse of Karman. Atman is attached to Karman as agni is attached to an iron-rod. Now, since Karman is muru and atman is similar to Karman to a certain extent, the atman is also murta to a certain extent even though it is amurta by its svabhava, Consequently, the amurta and lustrous jiva feels anugraha or upaghata by virtue of a murta Karman while akusa being amurta and acetana feels neither anugraha or upaghata,

Page #169
*: 126 :- . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Then, how is the Karma-santana born ? The reply is :saMtANo'NAI u paropparaM heuheubhaavaao| dehassa ya kammassa ya goyama ! bIyaM-kurANaM va // 91 // (1639) Santano'nai u paropparam heuheubhavao 1 Dehassa ya kammassa ya Goyama ! biyam-kuranam va 1191(1639) [santAno'nAdistu parasparaM hetuhetubhAvAt / dehasya ca karmaNazva gautama ! bIjA-kurayoriva / / 91 // (1639) Santano'nadistu parasparam hetuhetubhavat i Dehasya ca karmanasca Gautama ! bijankurayoriva // 91 (1639)] Trans.-91 And, O Gautama ! as Karman and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. ( 1639) ___TIkA-anAdiH karmaNaH santAna iti prtijnyaa| dehakarmaNoH parasparaM hetuhetumadbhAvAditi hetuH| bIjA-'Gkurayoriveti dRSTAntaH / yathA bIjenA'Gkuro anyate, aGkurAdapi krameNa bIjamupajAyate, evaM dehena karma janyate, karmaNA tu deha ityevaM punaH punarapi parasparamanAdikAlInahetuhetumadbhAvAdityarthaH / iha yayoranyo'nyaM hetuhetumadbhAvastayoranAdiH santAnaH, yathA bIjA-GkarapitRputrAdInAm, tathA ca deha-karmaNoH, tato'nAdiH karmasantAna iti // 91 (1639) // ___D. C.--The expanse of Karmcom has no beginning, as deha and Karman are related to each other as lietu and hetumat. Just as a sprout is born of seed and the seed, in turn, is produced from the sprout; in the same way, Karman is also produced from deha, and deha, in turn, is born of Karman. Thus deha and Karman, are related as the causes of each other like baja and ankura. So, just as the continuous range of bija and ankura or pita and putra is anadi, that of deha and Karman should also be anadi.

Page #170
Vada ] Ganadharavada 127 :. Karman can be established by means of Veda-vacana alsokamme cAsai goyama ! jamaggihottAi saggakAmassa / veyavihiyaM vihaNNai dANAiphalaM ca loyammi // 12 // (1640) Kamme casai Goyama ! jamaggihottai saggakamassa i Veyavihiyam vihannai danaiphalam ca loyammi 1 92 ( 1640 ) [karmaNi cAsati gautama ! yadagnihotrAdi svargakAmasya / vedavihitaM vihanyate dAnAdiphalaM ca loke / / 92 // (1640) / Karmani casati Gautama ! yadagnihotradi svargakamasya i Veda-vihitam vihanyate danadi phalam ca loke ll 92 (1640 ) ] Trans.-92 If, O Gautama ! the existence of Karman is denied, rites like rhe performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. in this world prescribed by the Veda, would be refuted. ( 1640 ). TIkA-karmaNi cA'sati gautama ! agnihotrAdinA svargakAmasya vedavihitaM yat kimapi svargAdiphalaM tad vihanyate, svargAdeH zubhakarmahetutvAt , tasya ca bhavatA'nabhyupagamAt / loke ca yad dAnAdikriyANAM phalaM svargAdikaM prasiddha tadapi vihanyeta / ayuktaM cedam , "kiriyAphalabhAvAo dANAINaM phalaM kisIe va" ityAdinA prativihitatvAditi // 92 (1640 ) / D. C.-If O Gautama ! The existance of Karman is denied the commandment of Vedas that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing agnihotra etc: would be null and void. Again, the wellknown phalas like svarga etc. prescribed for actions like dana etc. would also be refuted, if you don't believe in Karman. But that is not proper as it is opposed by "Kiriyaphala bhavao danainam phalam kisie vvat" etc. Hence you shall have to accept Karman with its anadi santana. + Vide v. 1615.

Page #171
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second On the non-apprehension of Karman, if Is'vara etc. were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world, a number of difficulties would arise, *: 128 :. kammamaNicchaMto vA suddhaM ciya jIvamIsarAiM vA / maNNasi dehAINaM jaM kattAraM na so jutto // 93 // ( 1641 ) uvagaraNAbhAvAo nicceTThA - muttayAio vA vi / IsaradehAraMbhe vi tujhyA vA'NavatthA vA // 94 // ( 1642 ) Kammamanicchanto va suddham ciya jivamisaraim va | Mannasi dehainam jam kattaram na so jutto // 93 ( 1641 ) Uvagaranabhavao niccettha'muttayaio va vi Isaradeharambhe vi tullaya va' navattha va // 94 (1642 ) [ karmAnicchan vA zuddhameva jIvamIzvarAdiM vA / manyase dehAdInAM yaM kartAraM na sa yuktaH // 93 // ( 1641 ) // upakaraNAbhAvAd nizreSTA- mUrtatAdito vApi / IzvaradehArambhe'pi tulyatA vA'navasthA vA 94 // ( 1642 ) // Karmanicchan va suddhameva jivamisvaradim va Manyase dehadinam yam kartaram na sa yuktah || 93 (1641 ) ] Upakaranabhavad nisces' ta - 'murtatadito vapi | isvaradeharambhe 'pi tulyata va' navastha va || 94 ( 1642 ) ] Trans.-93-94 Or, denying (the existence of ) Karman, you might presume jiva itself-pure and simple-or Isvara etc, to be the creator of ( the objects like ) deha etc. But that is not since jivas is void of means (upakarana) motion ( cesta ) and form ( murtata ). Even ( in the case of ) deha etc. being accomplished by Isvara etc. either the SO, same difficulties would arise or there would be disorder. ( 1641-1642)

Page #172
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 129:. ___TIkA-karma vA'nicchannagnibhUte gautama ! yaM karmarahitatvAt zuddhameva jIvamAtmAnamIzvarAvyaktakAla-niyati-yadRcchAdikaM vA dehAdInAM kartAraM manyase, tatrApyucyate-nAsau zuddhajIve-zvarAdiH kartA yujyata iti // ____TIkA-nAyamIzvarajIvAdirakarmA zarIrAdikAryANyArabhate, upakaraNA bhAvAt , daNDAdyupakaraNarahitakulAlavat / na ca karma vinA zarIrAdhArambhe jIvAdInAmanyadupakaraNaM ghaTate, garbhAvasthAsvanyopakaraNAsaMbhavAt , zukra-zoNitAdi grhnnsyaapykrmnno'nupptteH| athavA, anyathA prayogaH kriyate-"nicedvetyAdi" nAkarmA zarIrAdhArabhate, nizceSTatvAt , AkAzavat , tathA'mUrtatvAt , Adi zabdAdazarIratvAt , niSkriyatvAt , sarvagatatvAt , AkAzavadeva, tathA, ekatvAt , ekaparamANuvadityAdi / athocyate-zarIravAnIzvaraH, sarvANyapi dehAdikAryANyArabhate / nanvIzvaradehArambhe'pi tarhi tulyatA paryanuyogasya, tathAhiakarmA nArabhate nijazarIramIzvaraH, nirupakaraNatvAt , daNDAdirahitakulAlavaditi / athAnyaH ko'pIzvara staccharIrAmbhAya pravartate / tataH so'pi zarIravAn , azarIro vA 1 / yadyazarIraH, tarhi nArabhate, nirupakaraNatvAt , ityAdi saiva vktvytaa| atha zarIravAn, tarhi taccharIrArambhe tulyatA, so'pyakarmA nijazarIraM nArabhate, nirupakaraNatvAdityAdi / atha taccharIramanyaH zarIravAnArabhate / atastasyApyanyaH, tasyApyanya ityevamanavasthA / aniSTaM ca sarvametat / tasmAd nezvaro dehAdInAM kartA, kintu karmasadvitIyo jIva eva / niSprayojanazcezvaro dehAdIn kurvannunmattakalpa eva syAt , saprayojanakartRtve punrniishvrtvprsnggH| na cAnAdizuddhasya dehAdikaraNecchA yujyate, tasyA rAgavikalparUpatvAt , ityAdyatra bahuvaktavyam , granthagahanatAprasaGgAttu nocyata iti| anenaiva vidhAnena viSNu-brahmAdayo'pi pratyuktA draSTavyA iti / / 93-94 (1641-1642) / D. C.-0 Agnibhuti Gautama! Leaving the Karman aside, it is absolutely improper to accept any one of jiva, Isvara, kala ( Time ) avyakta ( Visnu ) niyati ( Destiny ) or yadriccha ( self-will) to be the kartit of deha etc. It is not possible for java and Isvura etc, to accomplish Karyas such as sarira etc, without the help of Karman, Jiva 17

Page #173
*: 130 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second cannot accomplish objects like sarira on account of the following reasons : (1) If jiva is presumed to be the Karta of sarira etc, it must have some means to produce them. Just as a potter cannot produce a ghata without the help of an upakarana like danda, so also jiva cannot accomplish Karyas like srira in absence of an upakarana. Now, jiva is not supposed to have any other upakarana except Karman in producing sarira etc. For, no other upakarana except Karman can exist in the state of embryo etc. (2) In the process of accomplishment of Karyas like sarira, jiva would not be able to suck up semen, blood etc. without the help of Karman. (3) Jiva cannot accomplish surira etc. on account of its inactive, incorporeal, and all-pervading nature like akasa. Again, it is useless to believe that sariravan Isvara produces each and every object such as deha etc. Because the above-mentioned difficulties are bound to arise in that case also. In absence of an upakarana, Is'vara like a potter without a danda, is not supposed to create his own body. Now here, if it is assumed that a second Is'vara creates the body of this Is'vara, consider whether that Isvara has a body or not. If he has no body it is clear from what has already been discussed that he cannot create surira in absence of an upakarana. But if it is said that a third is'vara having a body creates the body of this Is'vara, a fourth Is'vara shall have to be supposed to create the body of the third one, and a fifth Is'vara to create that of the fourth one, and so on until ultimately it results in an anavastha which is not at all desirable. Thus it is clear that Isvara is not the creator of sariru etc. But in spite of that if it is believed that Is'vara creates sarira etc, consider whether he does so with or without any

Page #174
Vada ] Ganadharavada 131 :: purpose. If is'vara creates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his Isvaratva. For a siddha and anadi utman is not expected to cherish desire for creating deha etc, as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on. A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of grantha-vistara (extension of the work ) they are not stated here. But in line of the arguments stated above it can also be proved that neither Brahma nor Visnu nor any one else can be taken as the Karta of sarira etc. Is'vara therefore is not acceptable as the creator of sarira etc., from any point of view, but jiva accompanied by the upakarana Karman, should alone be accepted as the karta of sarira etc. ahava sahAvaM mannasi vinnnnaannghnnaaiveyvuttaao| taha bahudosaM goyama ! tANaM ca payANamayamattho // 25 // (1643) Ahava sahavam mannasi vinnana ghanai Veyavuttao I Taha bahudosam Goyama! tanam ca payanamayamattho 119511(1643) [athavA svabhAvaM manyase vijJAnadhanAdivedoktAta / ageri itaa ! ani a TEFATHTH: 11 84.11 ( 3883 ) Athava svabhavam manyase vijnanaghanadivedoktati Tatha bahudosam Gautama ! tesam ca padanamayamartha) 195||(1643) Trans.-95 Again, O Gautama ! if you think svabhavam ( to be the karta of sarira etc ), from the sentences of the Vedas such as " vijnana ghana" etc, a number of difficulties will arise. But (ca) the real interpretation of those sentences is this Etfor37% "fasraga paaralary:" uric ac79992017 svabhAvaM dehAdInAM kartAraM manyase, yataH kecidAhu :

Page #175
The second :: 132 : . Jinabhadra Gani's sarvahetunirAzaMsaM bhAvAnAM janma varNyate / / svabhAvavAdibhiste hi nAhuH svamapi kAraNam // 1 // rAjIvakaNTakAdInAM vaicitryaM kaH karoti hi ? / mayuracandrikAdirvA vicitraH kena nirmitaH ? // 2 // kAdAcitkaM yadatrAsti niHzeSaM tadahetukam / yathA kaNTakataikSNyAdi tathA caite sukhAdayaH // 3 // tadetad yathA tvaM nanyase gautama ! tathA'bhyupagamyamAnaM bahudoSameva; tathAhi -yo dehAdInAM kartA svabhAvo'bhyupagamyate, sa kiM vastuvizeSo vA, akAraNatA vA, vastudharmoM vA, ? iti trayI gtiH| tatra na tAvad vastuvizeSaH, tadgrAhakapramANAbhAvAt / apramANakasyAbhyupagame karmApi kiM nAbhyupagamyate, tasyApi tvadabhiprayeNApramANakatvAt / kiJca, vastuvizeSaH sa svabhAvo mUrtI vA syAt amUrtI vA ? / yadi mUrtaH, tarhi svabhAva iti nAmAntareNa kamaivoktaM syAt / athAmUrtaH, tarhi nAsau kasyApi kartA, amUrtatvAt , nirupakaraNatvAcca, vyomvditi| na ca mUrtasya zarIrAdeH kAryasyAmUrta kAraNamanurUpam , AkAzavaditi / athAkAraNatA svabhAva iSyate, tatrApyabhidadhmahe-nanvevaM satyakAraNaM zarIrAdyutpadyata ityayamarthaH syAt , tathA ca sati kAraNAbhAvasya samAnatvAd yugpdevaashessdehotpaadprsnggH| api ca, itthamahetukamAkasmikaM zarIrAdyutpadyata ityabhyupagataM bhaveta / etazcAyuktameva, yato yadahetukamAsmikaM na tadAdimatpratiniyatAkAram , yathA'bhrAdivikAraH, AdimatpratiniyatAkAraM ca zarIrAdi / tasmAd nAkasmikam , kintu karmahetukameva / pratiniyatAkAratvAdeva copakaraNasahitakanirvartyameva zarIrAdikaM ghaTAdivaditi gamyata eva / na ca garbhAdyavasthAsu karmaNo'nyadupakaraNaM ghaTata ityuktameva / atha vastuno dharmaH svabhAvo'bhyupagamyate / tathApyasau yadyAtmadharmo vijJAnAdivat , tarhi na zarIrAdikAraNamasau, amUrtatvAt , AkAzavat , ityabhihitameva / atha mUrtavastudharmo' sau, tarhi siddhasAdhyatA, karmaNo'pi pudgalAstikAyaparyAyavizeSatvenAsmAbhirapyupagatatvAditi / api ca, " puruSa evedaM sarvam " ityAdivedavAkyazravaNAd bhavataH

Page #176
Vada ] Gandadharavada * 133 : * 66 krmaastitvsNshyH| eSAM hi vedapadAnAmayamarthastava cetasi viparivartate - puruSa AtmA, evakAro'vadhAraNe, sa ca puruSAtiriktasya karma-prakRtI- zvarAdeH sattAvyavacchedArthaH, idaM sarva -- pratyakSaM vartamAnaM cetanAcetanasvarUpam, "jhiM" iti vAkyAlaGkAre, yad bhUtam - atItam, yacca bhAvyaM bhaviSyad muktisaMsArAvapi sa evetyarthaH / utAmRtatvasyezAna iti / utazabdo'pyarthe / apizabdaca samuccaye / amRtatvasya ca amaraNabhAvasya mokSasyezAnaH prabhurityarthaH / yadannenAtirohatIti / cazabdasya luptasya darzanAd yaccAnnena - AhAraNa, atirohati - atizayena vRddhimupaiti / yadejati - calati pazvAdi / yad naijati - na calati parvatAdi / yad dUre mervAdi / yadu antike - uzabdo'vadhAraNe, yadantike samIpe tadapi puruSa evetyarthaH / yadantaH - madhye, asya - cetanAcetanasya sarvasya yadeva sarvasyApyasya bAhyataH, tat sarva puruSa eveti / atastavyatiriktasya karmaNaH kila sattA duHzraddheyeti te matiH / tathA, vijJAnaghana evaitebhyo bhUtebhyaH ityAdInyapi vedapadAni karmAbhAvapratipAdakAni manyase tvam, atrApyevakArasya karmAdisattAvyavacchedaparatvAt / 66 " tadevameteSAM " puruSa evedam" ityAdInAM " vijJAnaghana " - AdInAM ca vedapadAnAM nAyamartho yo bhavatazcetasi vartate, kintu teSAM padAnAmayaM bhAvArtha:- " puruSa evedaM sarvam" ityAdIni tAvat puruSastutiparANi jAtyAdimadatyAgahetoradvaitabhAvanApratipAdakAni ca vartate, na tu karmasattAvyavacchedakAni / vedavAkyAni hi kAnicid vidhivAdaparANi, kAnyapyarthavAdapradhAnAni, aparANi tvnuvaadpraanni| tatra "agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH" ityAdIni vidhivAdaparANi / arthavAdastu dvidhA stutyarthavAdaH, nindArthavAdazca / tatra " puruSa evedaM sarvam " ityAdikaH stutyarthavAdaH tathA tatra " sa sarvavid yasyaiSA mahiSA bhuvi divye bahmapure hyeSa vyomni AtmAsu pratiSThitastamakSaraM vedayate yastu sa sarvajJaH sarvavit sarvamevAviveza " iti tathA, ekayA pUrNayAhRtyA sarvAn kAmAnavApnoti " ityAdikazca sarvo'pi stutyarthavAdaH / " ekayA pUrNayA " ityAdividhivAdo'pi kasmAd na bhavati ? iti cet / ucyate - zeSasyAgnihotrAdyAnuSThAnasya vaiyarthyaprasaGgAditi / " eSaH vaH prathamo yajJo yo'gniSTomaH yo'nenAniSTvA'nyena yajate sa gartamabhyapatat " atra 46

Page #177
.: 134 :. . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second pazumedhAdInAM prathamakaraNaM nindyata ityayaM nindArthavAdaH // " dvAdazamAsAH saMvatsaraH" "agniruSNaH" " agnirhimasya bheSajam" ityAdIni tu vedavAkyAnyanuvAdapradhAnAni, lokaprasiddhasyaivArthasyaiteSvanuvAdAditi / * tasmAt " puruSa evedaM sarvam" ityAdIni vedapadAni stutyarthavAdapradhAnAni draSTavyAni / " vijJAnadhana evaitebhyaH" ityatrApyayamarthaHvijJAnaghanAkhyaH puruSa evAyaM bhUtebhyo'rthAntaraM vartate / sa ca kartA, kArya ca * zarIrAdikamiti prAk sAdhitameva / tatazca kartRkAryAbhyAmarthAntaraM karaNamanumIyate; tathAhi-yatra kartR-kAryabhAvastatrAvazyaMbhAvi karaNam , yathA'yaskArA 'yaHpiNDasadbhAve saMdaMzaH yaccAnAtmanaH zarIrAdikAryanivRttau karaNabhAvamApadyate tat karma iti pratipadyasva / apica, sAkSAdeva karmasattApratipAdakAni zruyanta eva vedavAkyAni, tadyathA-" puNyaH puNyena karmaNA pApaH pApena karmaNA" ityAdi / tasmAdAgamAdapi siddha pratipadyasva karmeti // 95 (1643) / ___D. C.-You, too, O Agribhiti ! like others presume svabhavat and svabhava only to be the karta of deha etc. on hearing the Vedapadas such as " Vijnanaghana evaitebhyo bhutebhyah " etc. It is therefore said by some people that~ Sarvahetunirasamsam bhavanam janna varnyate i Svabhavavadibhiste hi nahuh svamapi karanam || 1 11 Raji vakantakadinam vaicitryam kah karoti hi?i . Mayaracandrikadirva vicitrah kena nirmitah // 2 // Kadacitkam yadatrasti nihsesah tadahetukami Yatha kaatakataiksnyadi tatha caite sukhadayah || 3 | So," Gautama ! If you also hold the same view., viz, that svabhava is the karta of deha etc. a number of dosas will crop up. In the first instance, consider whether svrbhava is (1) a vastuvis'esa ( an object in particular) or ( 2 ) a-karanata ( causelessness ) itself or (3) vastudharma ( quality of an object ). (1) Svabhava can never be recognized as a vastuvis'esch as there exists no pramanii ( ground of assurance ) to prove

Page #178
Vada ] Ganadharavada , : 135 : that it is a vastu. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an a-pramanaka ( unauthorized ) vastu as the vastu itself, you should also accept Karman as a vastu; for according to you, Karman is also a-pramanaka. Secondly, if that svabhava is vastuvis'esa, is it murta or amurta? If it is murta, it is nothing but Karman with a synonym of sva'hava. If it is amurta it is not supposed to have any sort of upakarana and hence like akas'a it can never be a karta of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an amurta svabhava to be the karana of a murta karya such as deha etc. So, it is clear that svabhava is not a vastuvis'esa in any case. 2. If svabhava were supposed to be a-karanata, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause and Karanu will be absent uniformly at all places; consequently all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidently all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For one that is produced spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the vikaras of abhra ete, a beginning or a definite form. Objects like s'asira should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of Karman, they are adiman and they possess a definite form as that of a ghata. This shows that such objects are produced by a karta by means of an upakarand, and Karman is the only possible upakarana in the state of embryo. So, Karman ought to be accepted as its real hetu and not the svabhava. 3. Now, consider if svabhava can be taken as a vastudharma. If svabhava is supposed to be the quality of a vastu like atman it would be amurta like ukas'u and hence it would not become the cause of s'arira etc. But there would be no objection if svabhava were taken to be the quality of a murta object. For, in that case, Karman will become a paryaya of the svabhuva of a murta object. So, we have no objection in accepting svabhava as a dharma of the murta object.

Page #179
.: 136 :: . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second Moreover, O Aynibhuti ! you entertain doubt as regards Karman by hearing sentences such as "purusa evedam sarvam" of the Vedas. According to you, the interpretation of those sentences is as follows: * "Everything that is animate and inanimate, past and future, movable and immovable, distant and near, interior and exterior everything that is nourished by food, and one who is the lord of moksci-all this is purusa and purusa alone. No other object as Kurman exists as distinct from this purusa. Similarly, according to you, sentences such as " vijnanaghana" also establish the non-existance of Karman. Because, in both the above-mentioned padas you interpret "eva" as referring to the non-existence of Karman. Your interpretation of the Veda-padas is not correct. Sentences like "purusa evedam " etc are meant to praise the atman and to establish the advaita-bhava in order to avoid the arrogance of jati etc, but they are not meant to establish the non-existence of Karman. Sentences are generally divided into three kinds :-(1) Vidhivadapari, i. e., sentences that are laid down as rules. (2) Arthavaduparu i.e., sentences that are laid down as the explanatory remarks and (3) Anuvadapara 3. e., sentences that are laid down as explanatory repetitions~" Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah " is an example of vidhivada. Arthavada is of two kinds :-(1) Stuti-arthavada and (2) Ninda arthavada. Sentences such as "purusu evedam sarvam" etc, as well as those "Sa sarvavid yasyaisa mahima bhuvi vivye brahmapure hyesa vyomni atmasu pratisthitastamaks'aram vedyate yastu sa sarvajna sarvavit sarvamevavives'a " and " ekaya parnayahutya sarvan ka manavapnoti" etc, are also the examples of stuti-arthavada. Again you may raise a question as to why the sentences like "ekuya parnaya " etc. be not taken as the illustrations

Page #180
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 137 :. of Vidhivada. But if it illustrates Vidhivada, the rest of the anusthanas like agnihotra would be of no avail, In the sentence " esa vaha prathamo yajno yo'gnistomaah, yo'nenanistavanyena yajate sa gartamabhyapatat "the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the nindarthavada. Lastly Veda-vakyas such as dvadasamasah samvat sarah agnirusnah" agni rhimasya bhesajam. etc., are anuvada pradhana as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts. cc 33 66 << 66 "1 It is, therefore, clear that Vedapadas like " sarvam are meant to illustrate the stuti-arthavada. 39 purusa evedam Vijnana ghana evaitebhyah " etc. can be interpreted in this way-Atman, as an assemblage of knowledge is distinct from bhutas and it itself is the karta of the karyas such as sarira etc. Now that, it has become the karta it must have a karana (instrument) to accomplish the Karyas. For, wherever there are karta and karya there ought to be karana also. Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, Karman is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of Karays like saira by Atman. So, you shall have to accept the existence of Karman. << Moreover, Karman can be established by the help of Veda-vacanas like punyah punyena karmana, papah papena karmana" also. Thus Karman is proved by means of agama also. Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that Karman does exist and Karman is the only instrument to accomplish Karyas like sarira etc. chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNa jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / ai aqoii qasen qafe az dieyagie 19E11 (3888) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam | So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiya saehim ||96||(1644) 18

Page #181
Jinabhadra Gani's [ chinne saMzaye jinena jarA - maraNavipramuktena / sa zramaNaH pravrajitaH paJcabhiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 96 // ( 1644 ) .: 138:. [The second Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuk tena Sa sramanah pravrajitah pancabhih saha khandikasataih96(1644)] B Trans.-96 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Agnibhuti accepted Diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1644). End of the Discussion with the Second Ganadhara.

Page #182
Chapter III tRtIyagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the Third Ganadhara. te pavvaie souM taio Agacchai jiNasagAsaM / vaccAmi vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 97 // (1645) Te pavvaie soum taio agacchai Jinasagasam i Vaccami vandami vanditta pajjuvasami li 97 11 ( 1645 ) [ tau prabajitau zrutvA tRtIya Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 97 // (1645) Tau pravrajitau srutva tritiya agacchati Jinasakasam Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase 11 97 11 ( 1645 ) ] Trans.-97 Having heard that both of them ( Indrabhuti and Agnibkuti) had renounced the world, the third (Ganadhara) comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks ):-I may go, pay my homage and worship him (1645). TIkA-tAvindabhUtya-'gnibhUtI pravrajitau zrutvA tRtIyo vAyubhUtinAmA dvijopAdhyAyo jinasakAzamAgacchati sAtizayanijabandhudvayaniSkramarNAkarNanAjjhagiti vigalitAbhimAno bhagavati saMjAtasarvajJapratyayaH sannevamavadhAryAgata:vrajAmi tatrAhamapi, vande bhagavantaM zrImanmahAvIram , vanditvA ca paryupAseparyupAsti karomi tasya bhagavata iti // 97 (1645) // D. C.-On having heard that Indrabhuti and Agnibhuti had accepted the Diks'a (and were defeated,) the third ganadhara named Vayubhuti approached Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira with an humble and obedient motive of bowing down to him and worshipping him.

Page #183
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third And, what more did he think when he approached? sIsatteNovagayA saMpayamiMdaggibhUiNo jassa / tihUyaNakayappaNAmo sa mahAbhAgo'bhigamaNijjo // 98 // (1646 ) tadabhigamaNa - baMdaNo - vAsaNAiNA hojja prayapAvo'haM / vocchiNNasaMsao vA votuM patto jiNasagAse // 99 // (1647) .: 140 : Sisattenovagaya sampayaminda-ggibhuino jassa | Tihuyanakayappanamo sa mahabhago' bhigamanijjo // 98 (1646 ) Tadobhigamana-vandano-vasanaina hojja puyapavo'ham Vocchinna samsao va vottum patto Jinasagase // 99 // (1647) [ ziSyatvenopagatau sAMpratamindrA'gnibhUtI yasya / tribhuvanakRtapraNAmaH sa mahAbhAgo'bhigamanIyaH // 98 // (1646) tadabhigamana-vandanopAsanAdinA bhaveyaM pUtapApo'ham / vyavacchinnasaMzayo voktvA prApto jinasakAze // 99 // (1647) Sisyatvenopagatau, sampratamindra'gnibhuti yasya / Tribhuvanakritapranamah sa mahabhago 'bhigamaniyah ||98 (1646) ] Tadabhigamana-vandano-pasanadina bhaveyam putapapo'ham Vyavacchinnasamsayo vokta prapto Jinasakase // 99 // ( 1647 ) ] Trans. - 98-99 "I should approach the revered Bhagvan Mahavira whom Indrabhuti and Agnibhuti have recently accepted as their preceptor and to whom (people of) the three worlds pay their obeisances. Having approached him, I shall get myself purged of sins by bowing down to him and worshipping him, and I shall get my doubts cleared." Having said so, he came to Sramana Bhagvan Mahavira (1646-1647). Then what next ? AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavipyamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savvaNNU savvadarisI NaM // 100 // (1648)

Page #184
Vada ] Ganadharavada 141 Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenam Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam || 100 11 (1648) [ TATT Ferata fifa-FTT-ATTANTI als 7 Tam a paista maafiar 11 800 11 (?&86). Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina || 10011 ( 1648 )] Trans.-100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge ). ( 1648 ). D. C.-Although thus respectfully and directly addressed by the Lord and seeing the beauty and splendour of his eminence extending over the three worlds, and being unable to disclose the doubt remaining in his mind, out of agitation Vayubhuti remained silent with amazement. But he was again addressed thus :tajjIva tassarIraM ti saMsao na vi ya pucchase kiMci / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho // 101 // (1649) Tajjiva tassariram ti samsao na vi ya pucchase kimci 1 Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho 11 101 11 (1649) [ tajjIvastaccharIramiti saMzayo nApi ca pRcchasi kiJcit / vedapadAnAM cArthaM na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 101 // (1649) Tajjivastaccharirawiti samsayo napi ca pricchasi kimcit ? | Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 110111 (1649)] Trans.-101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is jiva is sarira itself and yet you do not ask me ( about it ). But (ca) you do not know the real meaning of Veda-padas. Here is their real interpretation. (1649).

Page #185
.: 142 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third TIkA-he AyuSman vAyubhUte ! " tadeva vastu jIvastadeva ca zarIram , na punaranyat" ityevaMbhUtastava saMzayo vartate, nApica tadapanodAtha kiJcid mA pRcchasi / nanu yajJapATAd nirgacchatA tvayA'bhihitamAsIt-"vocchiNNasaMsao vA" iti, tat kimiti na kiJcit pRcchasi ? / ayaM ca saMzayastava viruddhavedapadazravaNanibandhano vartate / teSAM ca vedapadAnArthaM tvaM na jAnAsi, tena saMzayaM kuruSe / teSAM cAyaM vakSyamANalakSaNo'rtha iti // 101 // (1649) D. C.-You entertain the doubt in your mind as to whether that which is jiva be called sarira also. But you do not put any question about it to remove that doubt. This doubt of yours is based upon hearing the Veda-padas of contradictory senses. But that is not the correct interpretation. Here is the real interpretation. Moreover, vasuhAibhUyasamudayasaMbhUyA ceyaNa tti te sNkaa| patteyamadiTThA vi hu majjaMgamau vva samudAye // 102 // (1650) jaha majjaMgesu mao vIsumadiTTho vi samudae houN| kAlaMtare viNassai taha bhUyagaNammi ceyaNNam // 103 // (1651) Vasuhai bhuya samudaya sambhuya ceyana tti te sarka i Patteyamadittha vi hu majjangamau vva samudaye // 102 // (1650) Jaha majjarigesu mao visumadittho vi samudae houmi Kalantare vinassai taha bhuya ganammi ceyannam 11 1031 (1651) [ vasudhAdibhUtasamudayasaMbhUtA cetaneti tava zaGkA / pratyekamadRSTA'pi khalu madyAGgamada iva samudAye // 102 / / (1650 ) yathA madyAGgeSu mado vizvagadRSTo'pi samudaye bhUtvA / kAlAntare vinazyati tathA bhUtagaNe'pi caitanyam / / 103 // (1651)

Page #186
Vada] Ganadharavida ' .: 143:. Vasudbadi bhuta samudaya sambhuta cetaneti tava sarka i Pratyekamadrista'pi khalu madyangamada iva samudaye 1110211(1651) Yatha madyanigesu mado visvagadristo'pi samudaye bhutva i Kalantare vinasyati tatha bhutagane'pi caitanyam |110311 (1651)] Trans.-102-103 Your presumption is that consciousness ( cetana) is produced from the collection (samudaya) of bhutas like prithivi etc. because like intoxication ( mada) though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection ( of those constituents). Just as intoxication, though not present in each separate constituent of wine ( madya ) is produced in the collection of these constituents and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness (caitanya ) is also produced in the collection of bhutas and perishes as time passes ( 1650-1651 ). TIkA-vasudhA pRthvI, AdizabdAdap-tejo-vAyu-parigrahaH, vasudhAdaya eva bhavantIti kRtvA bhUtAni vasudhAdibhUtAni, teSAM samudayaH parasparamIlanapariNativasudhAdibhUtasabhUdayaH, tasmAt prAgasatI saMbhUtA saMjAtA, cetanetyevaMbhUtA tava zaGkA / sA ca cetanA pRthivyAdibhUteSu pratyekAvasthAyAmadRSTApi dhAtakIkusuma-guDo-dakAdiSu madyAGgeSu mada iva tatsamudAye saMbhUteti pratyakSata eva dRzyate / tadevamanvayadvAreNa cetanAyA bhUtasamudAyadharmatA darzitA / atha vyatirekadvAreNa tasyAstAM darzayitumAha-" jaha majaMgesu ityAdi " yathA madyAGgeSu madabhAvaH pratyekAvasthAyAmadRSTo'pi tatsamudAye bhUtvA tataH kiyantamapi kAlaM sthitvA kAlAntare tathAvidhasAmagrIvazAt kRtazcid vinazyati,tathA bhUtagaNe'pi pratyakasamacaitanyaM bhUtvA tataH kAlAntare vinshyti| tato'nvayavyatirekAbhyAM nizcIyate-bhUtadharma eSa caitanyam / __idamatra hRdayam-yat samudAyiSu pratyekaM nopalabhyate tatsamudAye copalabhayate, tata tatsamudAyamAtradharma eva, yathA madyAGgasamudAyadharmo madaH / sa hi madyAGgeSu vizvagnopalabhyate, tatsamudAye copalabhyate, atastaddharmaH / evaM cetanApi bhUtasamudAye bhavati, pRthag na bhavati, atastaddharmaH /

Page #187
* 144 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The third dharma-dharmiNozcAbheda eva, bhede ghaTa-paTayoriva dharmi-dharmabhAvAprasaGgAt / tasmAt sa eva jIvastadeva ca zarIram / vAkyAntareSu punaH zarIrAd bhinnaH zrUyate jIvaH, tadyathA " tahi cai sa zarIrasya priyApriyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyApriye na spRzataH" ityAdi / tatastava saMzaya grat 11 802-803 ( 8840-8848) 11 D. C--According to your presumption cetana is produced from the samudaya of bhutas such as prithva, aptejas, vayu etc. Just as madu cannot be seen in each separate constituent e.g, dhataki flower, jaggery etc, of the wine, but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined together. In the same way, cetana is recognized in the samudaya of bhutas only and not in a separate constituent like prithvi. So, cetana becomes the quality of the samudaya of bhutas. Again, this cetana, after being produced in the samudaya of bhutas perishes after naving stayed for some time, just as the quality of mada after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine vanishes as time passes. Thus it is proved by means of anvaya as well as vyatireka in the above two cases that caitanya is a dharma of the samudaya of bhutas. Again, that which is not present in a constitution of samudaya but in the samudaya itself becomes the quality of samudaya only, and not of a constituent. So, caitanya being found only in samudaya and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a dharma of the samudaya of bhutas, as mada becomes a dharma of the samudaya of madyangas. Now, there can be no distinction between dharma and dharmin. For if they were distinct they could not be related as dharma and dharmin. Sarira is nothing but the samudaya of bhutas and jiva is formed of cetana. Hence jiva and s'arira are nothing but dharma and dharmin and as such they should be considered as one and the same. Now, on the other hand there are several Veda-padas which establish jiva to be distinct from s'arira e. g. "Na hi

Page #188
Vada ] vai sa-s'arisya priyapriyayo r-apahatirasti, a-s'ariram va vasantam priyapriye na sprs'atah." And that is the reason why you have raised this doubt. The doubt is refuted as follows: patteyamabhAvAo na reNutellaM va samudaye ceyA / majjasu tu mao vIsuM pi na saGghaso natthi // 104 // ( 1652 ) bhami dhaNi vitaNhayAI patteyaM pi hu jahA mayaMgesu / taha jai bhUesu bhave ceyA to samudaye hojjA // 105 // (1653) Ganadharavada .: 145: Patteyamabhavao na renutellam va samudaye ceya Majjarigesu tu mao visum pi na savvaso natthi // 104 // ( 1652 ) Bhami-dhani-vitanhayai patteyam pi hu jaha mayangesu Taha jai bhuesu bhave ceya to samudaye hojja || 105 | ( 1653 ) [ pratyekamabhAvAd na reNutailamiva samudaye cetanA | mAGgeSu tu mado viSvagapi na sarvazo nAsti // 104 // (1652) bhrami-bhrANi - vitRSNatAdayaH pratyekamapi khalu yathA madAGgeSu / tathA yadi bhUteSu bhaveccetanA tataH samudaye bhavet / / 105 // (1653) Pratyekamabhavad na renutailamiva samudaye cetana Madyangesu tu mado visvagapi na sarvaso nasti || 104 // (1652) Bhrami-dhrani-vitrisnatadayah pratye kamapi khalu yatha madangesu Tatha yadi bhutesu bhaveccetana tatah samudaye bhavet || 105 (1653 ) Trans.-104-105 Consciousness (cetana) can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sands if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication (mada) is not absolutely absent even in an individual constituent of wine. (For), every constituent (of wine) possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing 19

Page #189
*: 146:. . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second insanity, producing satiety and quenching thirst etc. in its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the) bhatas ( separately ), it could be ( found ) in the collection (also) ( 1652-1653). TIkA-" na samudaye ceya tti" na bhUtasamudayamAtraprabhavA cetanA, " patteyamabhAvAu ti" bhUtapratyekAvasthAyAM tasyA aMzato'pi sarvathA'nupalabdherityarthaH / kiM yathA kiMprabhavaM na bhavati ? ityAha-" na reNutellaM va ti" yathA pratyekaM savarthA'nupalambhAd reNukaNasamudAyaprabhavaM tailaM na bhavatItyarthaH / prayogaH-yad yeSu pRthagavasthAyAM sarvathA nopalabhyate tat teSAM samudAye'pi na bhavati, yathA sikatAkaNasamudAye tailam , yattu teSAM samudAye bhavati na tasya pRthag vyavasthiteSu teSu sarvathA'nupalambhaH, yathaikaikatilAvasthAyAM tailasya, sarvathA nopalabhyate ca bhUteSu pratyekAvasthAyAM cetanA, tasmAd nAsau tatsamudAyamAtraprabhavA, kintvarthApatterevAnyat kimapi jIvalakSaNaM kAraNAntaraM bhUtasamudAyAtiriktaM tatra saMghaTTitaM, yata iyaM prabhavatIti pratipattavyam / Aha" pratyekAvasthAyAM sarvathA'nupalambhAt" ityanaikAntiko'yaM hetuH, / pratyekA vasthAyAM sarvathA'nupalabdhasyApi madasya madyAGgasamudAye darzanAt , ityAza jhyAha-" majaMgesu ityAdi " dhAtakIkusumAdiSu madyAGgeSu punarviSvaka pRthag na sarvathA mado nAsti, api tu yA ca yAvatI ca madamAtrA pRthagapi teSvastyevetyarthaH / tato nAnaikAntikatA hetoriti / TIkA-yathA pratyekAvasthAyAM dhAtakIkusumeSu yA ca yAvatI ca bhramizcitabhramApAdanazaktirasti, guDa-drAkSe-kSurasAdiSu punadhANiratRptijananazaktirasti, udake tu vitRSNatAkaraNazaktirasti, AdizabdAdanyeSvapi madyAGgeSvanyApi yathAsaMbhavaM zaktirvAcyA, tathA tenaiva prakAreNa vyasteSvapi pRthivyAdibhUteSu yadi kAciccaitanyazaktirabhaviSyat , tadA tatsamudAye saMpUrNA spaSTA cetanA syAt , na caitadasti, tasmAd na bhUtasamudAyamAtraprabhaveyamiti // 104-105 (1652-53) // ____D. C.--Since cetana is not present in the individual state of a bhuta, even to a limited extent, it can never be found in

Page #190
Vada ] Ganadharavada 147 the combination of the bhutas also, just as oil cannot be found in a samudaya of sands when it is not present in each individual particle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the collective state also, and whatever is present in.collection should be present in the individual also, e. g., oil when present its prithak avastha of sesamum is found in its collective state also. allthili lilli luni In the present case, cetana is not found in the prithak avastha of bhutas and hence it is improper to accept that cetana is produced in the samudaya of bhutas. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from bhutasamudaya. That cause is nothing else but jiva which is amurta on account of the amurta cetana. Here again, the opponent may argue that the abovementioned rule is wrong. For, mada is not found in the individual state of a constituent like dhatali puspa of the madya; and yet the quality of intoxication does exist in its samudaya. But it is not proper to say that mada-bhava is altogether absent from dhataki puspa etc. For, mada does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A dhataki puspa.can induce insanity in its individual capacity; the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc. can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word "adi " other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if caitanya-sakti were present in the individual bhutas like prithvi etc. even to a limitted extent, caitanya would certainly have been manifested in their combination also. But when cetana is absent in the very prithak state, it can never be produced in the combined state. Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

Page #191
148 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second jai vA savAbhAvo vasuM to kiM tadganiyamo'yaM / tassamudayaniyamo vA annesu vi to havejAhi // 106 // (1654) Jai va savvabhavo visum to kim tadanganiyamo'yam Tassamudayaniyamo va annesu vi to havejjahi // 106 // ( 1654 ) [ yadi vA sarvAbhAvo viSvak tataH kiM tadaGganiyamo'yaM / tassamudayaniyamo vA'nyeSvapi tato bhavet // 106 // ( 1654 ) Yadi va sarvabhavo visvak tatah kim tadanganiyamo'yami Tassamudayaniyamo va' nyesvapi tato bhavet || 106 | ( 1654 ) ] Trans.-106 Or, if the power of intoxication were altogether absent from all (the constituents of wine) individually, how could they be called its divisions at all? and why should there be any rule regarding its collection also? (For), in that case it must be produced by means of (the collection) other objects also. ( 1654 ) TIkA- yadi ca madyAGgeSu pRthagavasthAyAM sarvathaiva madazaktyabhAvaH, tarhi ko'yaM tadaGganiyamaH -- ko'yaM dhAtakIkusumAdInAM madyAGgatAniyamaH, tatsamudAyaniyamo vA kimiti madyArthI dhAtakIkusumAdInyevAnveSayati, tatsamudAyaM kimapi niyamena mIlayati ? ityarthaH nanvanyeSvapi ca bhazmA-zma- gomayAdiSu samuditeSu madyaM bhavediti // 106 ( 1654 ) // 9 D. C.--If the power of inoxication is denied to exist in the prithak avastha of the constituents like dhataki puspa etc, they cannot be called the constituents of wine at all. Again, if dhataki puspa etc, had no power of intoxication at all, why should people desirous of wine, collect all the constituents like dhataki puspa in order to prepare wine? and why do they not prepare wine by combining other objects like ashes, stones, cowdung, ete ? This clearly indicates that the power of intoxication does exist in the individual state of constituents like dhataki puspa etc, and as a result of that, it appears in wine which is the combined state of all such constituents.

Page #192
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 142 ... At this point, an opponent may advance the following argument :bhUyANaM patteyaM pi ceyaNA samudae drisnnaao| jaha majaMgesu mao mai tti heU na siddho'yaM // 107 // (1655) Bhuyanam patteyam pi ceyana samudae darisanao i Jaha majjarigesu mao mai tti heu na siddho'yam || 107-11 (1655) [ bhUtAnAM pratyekamapi cetanA samudaye darzanAt / yathA madyAGgeSu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam / / 107 // (1655) Bhutanam pratyekampi cetana samudaye darsanat Yatha madyangesu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam 111071(1655)] Trans.107 Since consciousness is found in the collection of bhutas, if an argument is advanced that consciousness is present in each individual bhuta also as intoxication is present in various constituents of wine, it can never be approved of. ( 1655 ). TIkA-syAt parasya matiH-sAdhUktaM yat-pRthagapi madyAGgeSu kiJcid madasAmarthya mastIti / etadeva hi mama bhUteSu vyastAvasthAyAM caitanyAstitvasiddhAvudAharaNaM bhaviSyati, tathAhi-vyasteSvapi bhUteSu caitanyamasti, tatsamudAye tadarzanAt , madyAGgeSu madavaditi / yathA madyAGgeSu madaH pRthagalpatvAd nAtispaSTaH, tatsamudAye tvabhivyaktimeti, tathA bhUteSvapi pRthagavasthAyAmaNIyasI cetanA, tatsamudAye tu bhUyasIyamiti / atrottaramAha-"heU na siddho'yamiti" " cetanAyA bhUtasamudAye darzanAt" ityasiddho'yaM heturityarthaH, Atmano bhUtasamudAyAntargatatvena cetanAyAstaddhamatvAt , AtmAbhAve ca tatsamudAye'pi tadasiddherasiddho'yaM heturiti bhaavH| yadi hi bhUtasamudAyamAtradharmazcetanA bhavet tadA mRtazarIre'pyupalabhyeta / vAyostadAnIM tatrAbhAvAt tadanupalambha iti cet / naivam , nalikAdiprayogatastatprakSepe'pi tdnuplbdheH| tejastadAnIM tatra nAstIti cet / na, tatprakSepe'pi tadanupalambhAt / viziSTatejo-vAyva

Page #193
*: 150 : Jinabhadra Gaai's [ The second bhAvAdanupalambha iti cet / kiM nAmAtmasattvaM vihAyA'nyat tadvaiziSTyam ? nanu saMjJAntareNAtmasattvameva tvayApi pratipAditaM syAditi // 107(1655) / D. C.-An opponent may advance the following line of argument: As mada is present in each separate constituent of wine, it is found in the samudaya of those bhutas also. In the same way, it can be said that since cetana is completely manifested in the collection of bhutas it should be present in each independent bhuta at least to a certain extent. Just as mada is not clearly perceptible in its individual state, but distinct in the samudaya, so also, cetana is not clearly perceptible in the individual state on account of its minute form, but it is more distinct in the collective state. But it is not in the fitness of things to state that because cetana is found in the bhuta samudaya it should be present in each individual bhuta also, as cetana is the quality of Soul and the Soul is contained within (antargata ) the bhuta samudaya. So, if atman is absent from the bluta samudaya, cetana cannot exist in the samudaya. Thus, your argument that cetana is found in the collection of bhutas is not valid. For, if cetana were taken to be a quality of mere bhuta samudaya it ought to be found in a dead body also. Here again, it is improper to advance an excuse that cetana is absent in a dead body on account of the absence of vayu. For, cetana could never be found in a dead body, even if vayu were made to enter the body by means of a pipe etc. Similarly, if it is argued that cetana does not exist in a dead body due to the absence of tejas, tejas also could be made to enter the dead body by the same sort of means and proved that cetanu is absent in that case also. Lastly, if it is said that on account of the non-existence of a peculiar type of vayu and tejas, cetana is absent from a dead body, the peculiarity in the case would be due to nothing else but the excellence of atman which would automatically mean that you admit the existence of atman.

Page #194
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 151 :naNu paJcakkhaviroho goyama ! taM naannumaannbhaavaao| tuha paJcakkhaviroho patteyaM bhUyaceyaM tti // 108 // (1656) Nanu paccakkhaviroho Goyama ! tam nanumanabhavao i Tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyam bhuyaceyam tti il 108 11 (1656) [ nanu pratyakSavirodho gautama ! tad nAnumAnabhAvAt / tava pratyakSavirodhaH pratyekaM bhUtacetaneti // 108 // (1656) Nanu pratyaksavirodho Gautama! tad nanumana bhavat | Tava pratyaksa virodhah pratyekam bhutacetaneti || 108 11 (1656)] Trans.--108 Certainly O Gautama! that is not an evident contradiction ( as you think ) on account of the existence of anumana. ( On the contrary ), your assumption that cetana exists in each and every bhuta constituents is an evident contradiction. ( 1656 ) TIkA-nanu pratyakSaviruddhamevedaM yat-bhUtasamudAye satyupalabhyamAnApi cetanA na tatsamudAyasyetyabhidhIyate / na hi ghaTe rUpAdaya upalabhyamAnA na ghaTasyeti vaktumucitam / tadayuktam , yato na bhU-jalasamudAyamAtre upalabhyamAnA api haritAdayastanmAtraprabhavA iti zakyate vaktum / tadvIjasAdhakAnumAnena bAdhyate'sAvupalambha iti cet / tadetadihApi samAnam / etadevAha" goyametyAdi " vAyubhUterapIndrabhUtisodaryabhrAtRtvena samAnagotratvAd gautama ! ityevamAmantraNam , yattvaM brUSe-tadetad na, bhUtasamudAyAtiriktAtmasAdhakAnumAnasadbhAvAt , tatastenaiva tvatpratyakSasya bAdhitatvAditi bhAvaH / pratyuta tavaiva pratyakSavirodhaH / kiM kurvataH ? ityAha " patteyaM bhUyaceya tti" 'bruvataH' iti shessH| pratyekAvasthAyAM pRthivyAdibhUteSu caitanyAbhAvasyaiva darzanAt tadastitvaM pratyakSeNaiva bAdhyata iti " pratyekaM bhUteSu cetanA" iti bruvatastavaiva pratyakSavirodha ityarthaH // 108 ( 1656 ) // D. C.-Vayubhuti --That cetana though perceived in a collection of bhutas, does not belong to the bhuta samudaya seems to be incongruent. For, just as it is improper to assert

Page #195
.: 152 : . Jinabhadra Gani's (The second that qualities like rupa etc. seen in a ghata, do not belong to the ghata, so here also, it is not proper to state that cetana though apprehended in a collection of bhutas, does not belong to the bhuta samudaya. . Acarya-The argument advanced by you, O Gautama ! is absolutely invalid. Just as vegetables etc. found in a collection of earth and water can never be considered to have been produced from the collection of earth and water, since they are produced from their seeds; in the same way, cetana also should never be taken to have been produced from the collection of bhutas though it is found in a body made of bhutas such as prithvi etc. For, that cetana is produced from atman which is altogether distinct from the bhuta samudaya. Thus, there is no contradiction in my argument. But the contradiction lies in your assertion that cetana is produced in each and every individual bhuta. bhUiMdiyovaladdhANusaraNao tehiM bhinnarUvassa / ceyA paMcagavakkhovaladdhapurisassa vA sarao // 109 // (1656) Bhuindiyovaladdhanusaranao tehim bhinnaruvassa 1 Ceya pancagavakkhovaladdhapurisassa va sarao 11 109 11 (1657) [bhUtendriyopalabdhAnusmaraNatastebhyo bhinnarUpasya / cetanA pazcagavAkSopalabdhapuruSasyeva smarataH // 109 ( 1657 ) // Bhutendriyopalabdhanusmaranatastebhyo bhinnarupasya / Cetana pancagavaksopalabdha purusasyeva smaratah ||10911 (1657)] Trans.-109 Like a man who perceives (an object ) from five windows and recalls ( it ) to his mind, cetana being itself ( the quality ) of an object different from them ( i. e., bhutas ) perceives ( an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form) of bhutas and recalls ( the object ) to his mind. ( 1657 ) TIkA-tebhyo bhUtendriyebhyo bhinnarUpasya kasyApi dharmazcetaneti prtijnyaa|

Page #196
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 15:. bhUtendriyopalabdhArthAnusmaraNAditi hetuH| yathA paJcabhirgavAkSarupalabdhAnarthAnanusmaratastadatiriktasya kasyApi devadattAdeH puruSasya cetaneti dRssttaantH| ayamatra tAtparyArtha:-iha ya eko yairanekairupalabdhAnarthAnanusmarati sa tebhyo bhedavAn dRSTaH, yathA paJcabhirgavAkSarupalabdhAnarthAnanusmaran devadattaH, yazca yasmAd bhUtendriyAtmakasamudAyAd bhinno na bhavati, kiM tarhi ? ananyaH, nAyameko'nekopalabdhAnAmarthAnAmanusmartA, yathA zabdAdigrAhakamanovijJAnavizeSaH, tairupalabhyAnusmarato'pi ca tadanatiriktatve devadattasyApi gavAkSamAtraprasaGgo bAdhakaM pramANam / indriyANyevopalabhante, na punastairanya upalabhata iti cet / na, " taduparame'pi tadupalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt , tavyApAre ca kadAcidanupalambhAt" ityanantarameva vakSyamANatvAditi // 109 ( 1657 ) // D. C.--The point is that cetana who remembers an object perceived by its sense-organs in the form of bhutas, becomes the quality of something which is different from those bhuten. driyas, just as Devadatta who remembers an object perceived through five windows by means of five indriyas, is distinct from those windows. So, that which is not bhinna from the samudaya of bhutendriyas, can never remember an object apprehended by more than one means. For, after having perceived an object through a number of means, if cetana were abhinna from those means, then Devadatta who recognizes an object through a number of windows, would become the window itself. Again, in recognizing an object it is improper to say that mere indriyas (sense-organs ) apprehend the object and nothing else. For, even when the indriyas have ceased working the object perceived by them is recalled; and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended. taduvarame vi saraNao tabAvAre vi novlNbhaao| iMdiyabhinnassa maI paMcagavakkhANubhaviNo va // 110 // (1658) 20 .

Page #197
* 154: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third Taduvarame vi saranao tavvavare vi novalambhao | Indiyabhinnassa mai pancagavakkhanubhavino vva // 110 // (1658) [ taduparame'pi smaraNatastavyApAre'pi nopalambhAt / indriyabhinnasya matiH paJcagavAkSAnubhavina iva // 110 // (1658) Taduparame'pi smaranatastadvyapare'pi nopalambhat | Indriyabhinnasya matih pancagavaksanubhavina iva ||110|| (1658)] Trans.-110. As in the case of a person perceiving (an object) from five windows, cognition ( in the form of knowledge ) is distinct from sense-organs; because an object apprehended by the sense-organs is remembered even when the indriyas have ceased working and (sometimes) in spite of their working, the object is not perceived. ( 1658 ) TIkA - indriyebhyo bhinnasyaiva kasyApIyaM ghaTAdijJAnalakSaNA matiriti pratijJA / taduparame'pi - andhatva - vAdhiryAdyavasthAyAmindriyavyApArAbhAve'pi, tadvAreNopalabdhAnAmarthAnAmanusmaraNAditi hetuH / athavA, asyAmeva pratijJAyAM tadvyApAre'pi - indriyavyApRtAvapi kadAcidanupayuktAvasthAyAm, vastvanulambhAdityaparo hetuH / yadi hIndriyANyeva draSTRNi bhaveyuH, tarhi kimiti visphAritAkSasyApi praguNazrotrAdIndriyavargasyApi yogyadezasthitAnAmapi rUpa- zabdAdivastUnAmanupayuktasya anyamanaskasya zUnyacittasyopalambho na bhavati / tato jJAyate - indriyagrAmavyatiriktasyaiva kasyacidayamupalambhaH, yathA paJcabhirgavAkSairyoSidAdivastUnyanubhaviturdarzakasyeti dRSTAntaH / atrApi prayogAbhyAM tAtparyamupadarzyate, tadyathA - iha yo yaduparamespi yairupalabdhAnAmarthAnAmanusmartA sa tebhyo vyatirikto dRSTaH, yathA gavAkSairupalabdhAnAmarthAnAM gavAkSoparame devadattaH, anusmarati cAyamAtmA'ndhabadhiratvAdikAle'pIndriyopalabdhAnarthAn, ataH sa tebhyo'rthAntaramiti / tathA, indriyebhyo vyatirikta AtmA, tavyApAre'pyarthAnupalambhAt, iha yo yadvyApArespi yairupalabhyAnarthAn nopalabhate sa tebhyo bhinno dRSTaH, yathA'sthagitagavAkSo'pyanyamanaskatayA'nupayukto'pazyaMstebhyo devadatta iti / / 110 (1658 ) //

Page #198
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 155 : D. C.-Cognition ( mati ) which constitutes the knowledge of ghata etc., belongs to something which is distinct from sense-organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness etc., the object perceived by the indriyas is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognized. Now, if the sense-organ itself were to apprehend an object, how is it that an absent-minded man is not able to apprehend an object even with open eyes, efficient ears and * substances of rupa and sabda placed at proper places ? It follows, therefore, that some one, who like a person looking at an object like a woman from five windows, is different from the sense-organs, is able to apprehend it. A rule can be deduced from this that one who remembers an object even after its indriyas have ceased working is distinct from those indriyas, When Devadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows even after the windows are closed, it is atman, who remembers the object perceived by sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in the state of blindness, deafness etc. This proves that atman is different from indriyas. Again, that which does not recognize an object even if the indriyas are working, is different from the senseorgans like an absent-minded Devadatta looking through the open windows. uvalabbhanneNa vigAragahaNao tadahio dhuvaM asthi / galatalargurte OTTITIESITAT THIS?811 (8&48) Uvalabbhannena vigaragahanao tadahio dhuvam.atthi i Puvvavaravatayanagahanavigaraipuriso vva u 11111 ( 1659 ) [ upalabhyAnyena vikAragrahaNatastadadhiko dhruvamasti / pUrvAparavAtAyanagrahaNavikArAdipuruSa iva // 111 // (1659) Upalabhyanyena vikaragrabanatastadadhiko dhruvamasti Purvaparavatayanagrahanavikaradipurusa iva || 111 || (1659 ) ]

Page #199
.: 156 :Jinabhadra Gani's [The third ____Trans.-111 Just as a person apprehending ( an object) from an eastward window and perverting himself ( due to its sight ) at the opposite window, is different from those windows, so also, the soul who apprehends ( an object ) by means of one (sense-organ) and exhibits perversion by means of another is decidedly different from those sense organs. ( 1659) TIkA-iha dhruvaM nizcitaM tadadhikastebhya indriyebhyaH samadhiko bhinna: samasti jIvaH, anyenopalabhyAnyena vikAragrahaNAt , iha yo'nyenopalabhyAnyena vikAraM pratipadyate sa tasmAd bhinno dRSTaH, yathA pravaraprAsAdoparItastataH padaparipATIM kurvANaH pUrvavAtAyanena ramaNImavalokyAparavAtAyanena samAgatAyAstasyAH karAdinA kucasparzAdivikAramupadarzayan devadattaH, tathA cAyamAtmA cakSuSA'mlIkAmanantaM dRSTvA rasanena hallAsa-lAlAsAvAdivikAraM pratipadyate, tasmAt tayobhinna iti| athavA, grahaNazabdamihA''dAnaparyAyaM kRtvA'nyathAnumAnaM vidhIyate-indriyebhyo vyatirikta AtmA, anyenopalabhyAnyena grahaNAt , iha ya AdeyaM ghaTAdikamarthamanyenopalabhyAnyena gRhNAti sa tAbhyAM bhedavAn dRSTaH, yathA pUrvavAtAyanena ghaTAdikamupalabhyAparavAtAyanena gRhNAnastAbhyAM devadattaH, gRhNAti ca cakSuSopalabdhaM ghaTAdikamarthaM hastAdinA jIvaH, tatastAbhyAM bhinna iti // 111 (1659) // ____D. C.-Jiva who apprehends an object by means of one indriya and exhibits vikaras by means of another, is blinna from both the indriyas. Just as Devadatta who looks at a woman from an eastward window and exhibits his perversion of the sight of stanasparsa etc, by her hands at the other is really speaking different from both the windows; in the same way, the Soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes and exhibits vikaras in the form of distilling saliva etc, by means of tongue, is decidedly different from both. Or, atman is different from indriyas because having seen an object by means of eyes, atman holds it by means of hands. Another inference,

Page #200
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 157:. saveMdiuvaladdhANusaraNao tdhio'nnumNtvo| jaha paMcabhinnavinnANapurisavinnANasaMpanno // 112 // (1660) Savvendiuvaladdhanusaranao tadahio'numantavvo 1 Jaha pancabhinnavinnanapurisavinnanasampanno // 112 // (1660) [ sarvendriyopalabdhAnusmaraNatastadadhiko'numantavyaH / yathA paJcabhinnavijJAnapuruSavijJAnasaMpannaH // 112 // (1660) Sarvendriyopalabdhanusmaranatastadadhiko'numantavyah | Yatha pancabhinnavijnana purusavijnanasampannah 1112|1 (1660)] Trans.-112 Just as from five different persons having five different vijnanas a sixth person possessing all the five vijnanas is different, so also, the soul who remembers an object cognized by all the sense-organs should be inferred as being distinct from them. ( 1660 ) TIkA-sarvendriyopalabdhArthAnusmaraNataH kAraNAt tadadhiko'sti jIvaH / dRSTAntamAha-yathA paJca ca te bhinnavijJAnAzca paJcabhinnavijJAnA icchAvazAt pratyekaM sparza-rasa-gandha-rUpa-zabdopayogavanta ityarthaH, paJcabhinna vijJAnAzca te puruSAzca paJcabhinnavijJAnapuruSAsteSAM yAni sparzAdiviSayANi vijJAnAni taiH saMpannastadvettA yaH SaSThaH puruSastebhyaH paJcabhyo bhinnH| idamatra tAtparyamya iha yairupalabdhAnAmarthAnAmeko'nusmartA sa tebhyo bhinno dRSTaH, yathecchAnuvidhAyizabdAdibhinnajAtIyavijJAnapuruSapaJcakAt tadazeSavijJAnAbhijJaH pumAn , icchAnuvidhAyizabdAdibhinnajAtIyavijJAnendriyapaJcakAzeSavijJAnavettA cAyameka AtmA, tasmAdindriyapaJcakAd bhinna eveti| zabdAdibhinnavijJAnapuruSapazvasyeva pRthagindriyANAmupalabdhiprasaGgato'niSTApAdanAd viruddho'yaM heturiti cet / na, icchAnuvidhAyivizeSaNAt , icchAyAzcendriyANAmasaMbhavAt , sahakArikAraNatayopalabdhikAraNamAtratAyA indriyeSvapi sadbhAvAt , upacAratasteSAmupyupalabdheravirodhAdadoSaH / kiJca, pratipattyupAyamAtramevaitat , na hyatIndriyepvartheSvekAntenaiva yuktyanveSaNaparairbhAvyam ; uktaM ca

Page #201
*: 158 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The third Agamazcopapattizca saMpUrNa dRSTikAraNam / atIndriyANAmarthAnAM sadbhAvapratipattaye // 1 // iti // 112 (1660) // D. C.--Since jiva remembers an object perceived by all the sense-organs, jiva should be distinguished from indriyas. From five different persons possessing five different vijnanas such as sparsa, rasa etc, according to their will, a sixth purusa having all the five vijnanas together is distinguished. In the same way, the Soul that possesses the cognizance of all the five sense-organs, should be distinguished from each of the five sense-organs. In short, one who is the only anusmarta of the objects cognized, is distinguished from those by means of which the objects are perceived. An objection may be raised at this point that like five different purusas having five different vijnanas such as sabda, rasa, etc, the five indriyas should also possess the power of cognizance. For, if they have no cognizance, the argument stated above would be a-siddha. But the contention is not valid. For, there would be no difficulty in this case by reason of the adjective "icchavasat." Indriyas are not supposed to have any sort of desire. Or, by way of the co-operative cause the reason of perception lies in indriyas and hence there is no harm, if indriyas were metaphorically believed to be jnana itself. Or, say, this illustration is nothing but a means to an end. Consequently, for the recognition of objects which are atindriya ( beyond perception ) agama and yukti are the only resorts. For it is said, Agamasco`papattisca sampurnam dristikaranam; Atindriyanamarthanam sadbhava pratipattaye. A few more inferences are laid down in support of the distinction of Soul, viNNANaMtarapuvaM bAlapaNANAmaha nANabhAvAo / jaha bAlanANapuvaM juvanANaM taM ca dehahiaM // 113 // (1661)

Page #202
Vada] . Ganadharavada 159:. Vinnanantarapuvvam balannanamiha nanabhavao Jaha balananapuvvam juvananam tam ca dehahiam u 11311 (1661) [vijJAnAntarapUrva bAlajJAnamiha jJAnabhAvAt / yathA bAlajJAnapUrva yuvajJAnaM tacca dehAdhikam // 113 // (1661) Vijnanantarapurvam balajnanamiha jnanabhavat / Yatha balajnanapurvam yuvajnanam tacca dehadhikam 1/11311 (1661)] ____Trans.-113 Just as cognizance in youth is similar to cognizance in childhood, the latter is similar to other cognizances because of its being cognizance. And that ( cognizance ) is distinguished from deha. ( 1661 ) TIkA-anyavijJAnapUrvakamidaM bAlavijJAnam , vijJAnatvAt , iha yad vijJAnaM tadanyavijJAnapUrvakam dRSTam , yathA bAlavijJAnapUrvakaM yuvavijJAnam , yadvijJAnapUrvakaM cedaM bAlavijJAnaM, taccharIrAdanyadeva, pUrvazarIratyAge'pIhatyavijJAnakAraNatvAt , tasya ca vijJAnasya guNatvena guNinamAtmAnamantareNAsaMbhavAt, taccharIravyatiriktamAtmAnaM vyavasyAmaH, na tu zarIramevAtmeti / vijJAnatvAditi pratijJArthaMkadezatvAdasiddho heturiti cet / na, vizeSasya pakSIkRtatvAt / bhavati ca vizeSe pakSIkRte sAmAnyaM hetuH, yathA'nityo varNAtmakaH zabdaH, zabdatvAt , meghazandavat / evamihApi bAlavijJAnamanyavijJAnapUrvakamiti vizeSaH pakSIkRtaH, na tu sAmAnyavijJAnamanyavijJAnapUrvakamiti pakSIkRtaM, yena vijJAnatvAditi pratijJArthaMkadezaH syAt , yathA'nityaH zabdaH, zabdatyAditvAdi // 113 (1661) // D. C.--Here the balajnana is similar to other vijnanas on account of its vijnanatva. Just as yuvajnana resembles balajnana, the vijnana to which the bala jnana resembles is distinguished from deha because it continues to be the cause of vijnana even after it has left the former body. Now, since vijnana is a quality, it cannot remain without a gunin viz, atman; consequently, we recognize aiman to be distinct from body and not the body itself.

Page #203
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third Vayubhuti-The hetu vijnanatvat" stated by you becomes nothing but a portion of the proposition to be proved in that case. .: 160 :* " " Acarya-It is not so. The particular is pointed out in this case; and when particular is emphasized, the hetu stated there-in is common e. g., the varnatmaka sabda is anitya because of its sabdatva as in the case of a meghasabda. Similarly, in the proposition that balavijnana is similar to other * vijnanas, only a particular case of vijnana is emphasized and vijnana in general is not emphasized, consequently this does not form a part of the proposition as it forms in the case of anityah sabdah sabdatvat." 66 paDhamo thaNAhilAso aNNAhArAhilAsapuvo'yaM / jaha saMpayAhilAso'NubhUio soya dehahio // 114 // (1662) Padhamo thanahilaso annaharahilasapuvvo'yam | Jaha sampayahilaso'nubhuio so ya dehahio // 114 // ( 1662 ) ] [ prathamaH stanAbhilASo'nyAhArAbhilASapUrvo'yam / yathA sAMpratAbhilASo'nubhUtitaH sa ca dehAdhikaH // 114 // (1662) Prathamah stanabhilaso'nyaharabhilasapurvo'yami Yatha sampratabhilaso 'nubhutitah sa ca dehadhika || 114 (1662) ] Trans.--114 The first desire ( of the child ) to suck the breasts (of mother) is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same) experience. And that desire is distinct from body. ( 1662 ) TIkA- gautama ! AdyaH stanAbhilASo bAlasvAyamanyAbhilASapUrvakaH, anubhUteH - anubhavAtmakatvAt, sAMpratAbhilASavaditi / athavA, "abhilASatvAt " ityayamanukto'pi hetudraSTavyaH, iha yo'bhilASaH so'nyAbhilASapUrvako dRSTaH, yathA sAMpratAbhilASaH, yadabhilASapUrvaka zcAyamAdyaH stanAbhilASaH sa zarIrAdanya eva, pUrvazarIraparityAge'pIhatyAbhilApakAraNatvAt / jJAnaguNazcA

Page #204
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 161 :bhilASo na guNinamantareNa saMbhavati / ato yastasyAzrayabhUto guNI sa zarIrAtirikta Atmeti / Aha-nanvanaikAntiko'yam , sarvasyA'pyabhilASapUrvakatvAnupapatteH / na hi mokSAbhilASo mokSAbhilASapUrvako ghaTate / tadayuktam , abhiprAyAparijJAnAt , yo hi stanAbhilASaH sa sAmAnyenaivAbhilASapUrvaka ityetadevAsmAbhirucyate, na punarvizeSeNa brUmaH-" stanAbhilASo'nyastanAbhilASapUrvakaH" iti / evaM ca sAmAnyoktI mokSAbhilASapakSe'pi ghaTata eva, mokSAbhilASasyApi sAmAnyenA'nyAbhilASapUrvakatvAditi // 114 (1662) / ____D. C.-The first desire of the child to suck the breasts of the mother is just similar to the other abhilasas on account of its being an abhilasa. Now, the desire to which the child's stanabhilasa resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of this abhilasa even after it has left the body. Abhilasa is the quality of knowledge which cannot exist without a support, which is nothing but the soul, independent of deha. Vayubhuti :-The hetu stated in the above-named anumana involves the fault of uncertainty as all abhilasas are not the same. e. g., an abhilasa for moksa does not resemble another abhilasa for moksa. So, why not to believe the same in the case of this abhilasa also ? ____ The Acarrya :-You have not understood the point, O Gautama ! The point is that we have compared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly, in the case of moksabhilasa also, the moksabhilasa should not be compared with other moksabhitasas but only with other abhilasas in general. (1662) Another inference, 21

Page #205
- 162 : .. Jinabhadra Gani's [The third bAlasarIraM dehatarapuvaM indiyaaimttaao| juvadeho bAlAdiva sa jassa deho sa dehi tti // 115 // (1663) Balasariram dehantarapuvvam indiyaimattao i Juvadeho baladiva sa jassa deho sa dehi tti || 115 ( 1663 ) [bAlazarIraM dehAntarapUrvamindriyAdimatvAt / yuvadeho bAlAdiva sa yasya dehaH sa dehIti // 115 // (1663) Balasariram debantarapurvanindriyadimattvat i Yuvadeho baladiva. sa yasya dehah sa dehiti // 115 // ( 1663 )] ___Trans.-115 As the body in youth resembles the body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because it possesses the sense-organs. One to whom that body belongs is the owner of body (and not the body itself). ( 1663 ). ____TIkA-bAlazarIraM zarIrAntarapUrvakam , indriyAdimattvAt , iha yadindriyAdimat , tadanyadehapUrvakaM dRSTam , yathA yuvazarIraM bAladehapUrvakam , yatpUrvaka cedaM bAlazarIraM tadasmAta zarIrAdarthAntaram , tadatyaye'pIhatyazarIropAdAnAt , yasya ca taccha zarIraM sa bhavAntarayAyIzarIrAdarthAntarabhUto dehavAnastyAtmA, na punaH zarIramevAtmeti siddhamiti // 115 (1663 ) // ___D. C.-Just as a body in youth resembles a body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because of its possessing the indriyas. Now, the body to which this balasarira resembles is distinct from the latter, for this body rises up even if the former body has perished. Again, that to whom this body belongs is nothing but Soul, who travels from life to life, and who, being not the body itself, is distinct from this body. Another inference, aNNasuha-dukkhapuvaM suhAi bAlassa saMpaisuhaM va / aNubhUimayattaNao aNubhUimao ya jIvo tti // 116 // (1664)

Page #206
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 163 :Annasuha-dukkhapuvvam suhai balassa sampaisuham va i Anubhuimayattanao anubhuimao ya jivo tti. Il 116 11 ( 1664 ) [ anyasukha-duHkhapUrva sukhAdi bAlasya sAMpratasukhamiva / anubhUtimayatvato'nubhUtimayazca jIva iti / / 116 // (1664) Anyasukha-duhkhapurvam sukhadi balasya sampratasuk hamiva i Anubhutimayatvato'nubhutimayasca jiva iti // 116 // ( 1664 ) ] __Trans.-116 Happiness in the state of childhood like the present-day happiness resembles happiness, misery etc., in other states. And the Soul is possessed of the faculty of perception because of its being capable of perceptivity. (1664). TIkA-anyasukhapUrvakamidamAdyaM bAlasukham , anubhavAtmakatvAt , sAMgratasukhavat , yatsukhapUrvakaM cedamAyaM sukham , taccharIrAdanyadeva, tadatyaye'pIhatyasukhakAraNatvAt / guNazcAyam , sa ca guNinamantareNa na saMbhavati, ato yastasyAzrayabhUto guNI sa dehAdarthAntaram , iti sukhAnubhUtimayo jIva iti siddham / evaM duHkha-rAga-dveSa-bhaya-zokAdayo'pyAyojanIyA iti // 116 (1664) // ___D. C.--Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present-day happiness, because of its anubhutimayatva. Now, the happiness to which this balasukha resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished. Moreover, sukha is a guna which cannot exist without the support of gunin which, too, is distinct from body. This proves that the Soul is possessed of anubhuti of happiness. According to the same argument, we can prove that atman possesses the anubhuti of duhkha, raga, dvesa, bhaya, soka, etc. Now, the anumunas that have already been laid down to establish the existence of jiva and karman are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory. saMtANo'NAI u paropparaM heu-heubhaavaao| dehassa ya kammassa ya goyama ! bIyaM-kurANaM va // 117 // (1665) Vide verse 1639.

Page #207
Jinabhadra Gani's Santano'nai u paropparam heu-heubhavao / Dehassa ya kammassa ya Goyama ! biyam-kuranam va 117 (1665 ) .: 164: [ The third [ santAno'nAdistu parasparaM hetu - hetubhAvAt / dehasya ca karmaNazca gautama / bIjA - 'Gkurayoriva // 117 // ( 1665) Santano'nadistu parasparam hetu-hetubhavat | Dehasya ca karmanasca Gautama ! bija'n kurayoriva // 117 (1665 ) ] Trans. - 117 And O Gautama! as Karman and body are naturally related as the causes of each other like seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. ( 1665 ). If the relation of Karman with body is eternal, how can the existence of jiva be established? to kamma - sarIrANaM kattAraM karaNa - kajabhAvAo / paDivaja tadabbhahiaM daMDa ghaDANaM kulAlaM va // 118 // (1666) asthi sarIravihAyA painiyayAgArao ghaTasseva / akkhANaM ca karaNao daMDAINaM kulAlo va // 119 // (1667) asthiMdiyavisayANaM AyANAdeyabhAvao'vassaM / kammAra ivAdAyA loe saMDAsa - lohANaM // 120 // (1668) bhottA dehAINaM bhojjattaNao naro va bhattassa / saMghAyAittaNao atthiya atthI gharasseva // 121 // (1669) jo kattAi sa jIvo sajjhaviruddho tti te maI hojjA / muttAipasaMgAo taM no saMsAriNo doso // 122 // (1670) To kamma-sariranam kattaram karana kajjabhavao | Padivajja tadabbhahiam danda-ghadanam kulalam va 118 (1666)

Page #208
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 165:. [tataH karma-zarIrayoH kartAraM karaNa-kAryabhAvAt / / pratipadyasva tadabhyadhikaM daNDa-ghaTayoH kulAlamiva / / 118 // (1966) Tatah karma-sarirayoh kartaram karana-karyabhavati Pratipadyasva tadabhyadhikam danda-ghatayoh kulalamivall 11811] Trans.-118 So, like a potter (to be distinct) from danda and ghata, know the creator of Karman and sarira to be distinct from both on account of the existence of cause and effect. ( 1666) 119. (1667 ) Vide verse 1567. 120. ( 1668 ) Vide verse 1568. 121. (1669 ) Vide verse 1569. 122. ( 1670 ) Vide verse 1570. Since all objects are ksunika according to Buddhistic theory, an opponent may argue here that java vanishes with body and hence it is no use trying to prove that Soul is different from body. The Acarya refutes this argument as follows :jAissaro na vigao saraNAo bAlajAisaraNo cha / jaha vA sadesavataM naro saraMto videsammi // 123 // (1671) Jaissaro na vigao saranao balajaisarano vva / Jaha va sadesavattam naro saranto videsammi 012301 (1671) [jAtismaro na vigataH smaraNAd bAlajAtismaraNa iva / yathA vA svadezavRttaM naraH smaran videze // 123 / / (1671.) Jatismaro na vigatah smaranad bala jati smarana iva i Yatha va svadesavritam narah smaran videse || 123 ! ( 1671)] ____Trans.-123 Like a person recollecting ( his ) childhood ( in old age ) or recollecting in a foreign country the incident, ( that happened ) in his own country, the Soul who recollects the former existence does not perish by virtue of ( its power of ) recollection. ( 1671 )

Page #209
.: 166 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The third TIkA-iha yo jAtismaro jIvaH sa prAgbhavikazarIravigame'pi sati na vigata iti pratijJA / 'saraNAu tti' smaraNAditi hetuH| yathA bAlajAtI bAlajanmani vRttaM smaratIti bAlajAtismaraNo vRddha iti dRSTAntaH / yathA vA, svadeze mAlavakamadhyadezAdau vRttaM videze'pi gato naraH smaran na vigataH / idamuktaM bhavati-yo'nyadeza-kAlAdyanubhUtamartha smarati so'vinaSTo dRSTaH, yathA bAlakAlAnubhUtAnAmarthAnAmanusmartA vRddhAdyavasthAyAM devdttH| yastu vinaSTo nAsau kiJcidanusmarati, yathA jnmaanntrmevoprtH| na ca pUrvapUrvakSaNAnubhUtamAhitasaMskArA uttarottarakSaNAH smarantIti vaktavyam , pUrva-pUrvakSaNAnAM sarvaniranvayavinAzena sarvathA vinaSTatvAt , uttarottarakSaNAnAM sarvathA'nyatvAt / na cAnyAnubhUtamanyo'nusmarati, devadattAnubhUtasya yajJadattAnusmaraNaprasaGgAditi // 123 (1671) // D. C.-Here, the proposition is that the Soul that remembers former existence, cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body by virtue of its smaranasakti. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recollects in a foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country, does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing, so also, the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place is vidyamana (existing ) like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But, if he be only the anusmarta nothing can be recollected in the next life as he himself is not alive in that existence. Again, it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments, as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later ones disappear.

Page #210
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 167 .. Lastly, one can never remember the experience of another. If it were so, Yajnadatta would be able to remember the experience of Devadatta. aha mannasi khaNio vi hu sumarai vinnaannsNtigunnaao|.. tahavi sarIrAdaNNo siddho vinnnnaannsNtaanno|| 124 // (1672) Aha mannasi khanio vi hu sumarai vinnanasantaigunao I Tahavi sasiradanno siddho vinnanasantano // 124n ( 1672) . [ atha manyase kSaNiko'pi khalu smarati vijJAnasaMtatiguNAt / tathApi zarIrAdanyaH siddho vijJAnasaMtAnaH // 124 // ( 1672) Atha manyase ksaniko'pi khalu smarati vijnanasantatigunat | Tathapi sariradanyah siddho vijnanasantanah || 124 11 (1572)] Trans.--124 Again if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers ( the former existence ) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body. ( 1672 ) TIkA-athaivaM manyase tvam-kSaNiko'pi kSaNabhaGguro'pi jIvaH pUrvavRttAntaM smaratyeva / kutaH ? ityAha-vijJAnAnAM vijJAnakSaNAnAM saMtatiH saMtAnastasyA guNastatsAmarthyarUpastasmAditi, kSaNasaMtAnasyAvasthitatvAt kSaNanazvaro'pi smaratItyarthaH / atrottaramAha-nanu tathApyevamapi sati jJAnalakSaNasantAnasyAgretanazarIrasaMkrAnterbhavAntarasadbhAvaH sidhyati, sarvazarIrebhyazca vijJAnasaMtAnasyesthamarthAntaratA sAdhitA bhavati, avicchinnavijJAnasantAnAtmakazcaivaM zarIrAdarthAntarabhUta AtmA siddho bhavatIti / tadevaM parabhavamaGgIkRtyAvinaSTasmaraNamAveditam // 124 (1672 ) / / D. C.-Vayubhuti :--Even though the Soul is ksanila, it is able to remember the incidents of former life because of the continuous range of the moments of vijnana. The Acarya :--Even in that case, the continuous range of

Page #211
: 168 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The third knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life. Thus, vijnanasantana is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently, the Soul that contains this vijnanasantana would also be distinguished from body. In this way, indestructibility of Soul is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also. na ya sabaheva khaNiaM nANaM puvovlddhsrnnaao| khaNio na sarai bhUyaM jaha jmmaannNtrvinddo||125|| (1673) Na ya savvaheva khaniyam nanam puvvovaladdhasaranao i Khanio na sarai bhuyam jaha jammanantaravinattho 1112511 (1673) [na ca sarvathaiva kSaNikaM jJAnaM pUrvopalabdhasmaraNAt / kSaNiko na smarati bhUtaM yathA janmAnantaravinaSTaH // 125 // (1673) Na ca sarvathaiva ksanikam jnanam purvopalabdhasmaranat i Ksaniko na smarati bhatam yatha janmanantaravinastah || (1673)] Trans.-125 Or ( ca ), knowledge is not absolutely indurable ( ksanika ) by ( virtue of the power of ) recollecting an object apprehended in the past. (For ), one that is ksanika is, like an object perished after its very birth, not able to remember the past. ( 1673 ) TIkA-na ca sarvathaiva kSaNikaM jJAnaM vaktuM yujyate / kathaJcittu kSaNikatAM bhagavAnapIcchatyeva, iti "sarvathaiva" ityuktam / kasmAt punarjJAnaM na kSaNikam ? ityAha-pUrvopalabdhasya bAlakAlAdyanubhUtasyArthasya vRddhatvAdyavasthAyAmapi smaraNadarzanAt / na caitadekAntakSaNikatve satyupapadyate / kutaH? ityAha"khaNioi tyAdi" yaH kSaNiko nAyaM bhUtamatItaM smarati, yathA janmAnantaravinaSTaH, ekAntakSaNikaM ceSyate jJAnam , ataH smaraNAbhAvaprasaGga iti // 125 (1673 ) //

Page #212
.: 169 .. Vada ] Ganadharavada D. C. - Jnana should never be said to be entirely ksanika. It may be ksanika to a certain extent. If knowledge were taken to be absolutely transient, there would be no recognition in old age of objects perceived in childhood, as in the case of one who is perished after its birth. Ultimately smarana will not exist at all even if jnana were taken to be ksanika in every way. And there is another difficulty also. jassegamegabaMdhaNamegaMteNa khaNiyaM ya viSNANaM / savakhaNiyavipaNANaM tassAjuttaM kadAcidavi // 126 // (1674) Jassegamegabandhanamegantena khaniyam ya vinnanam Savvakhaniyavinnanam tassajuttam kadacidavi // 156 | (1674) [ yasyaikamekabandhanamekAntena kSaNikaM ca vijJAnam / sarvakSaNikavijJAnaM tasyAyuktaM kadAcidapi / / 126 / / ( 1674 ) Yasyaikamekabandhanamekantena ksanikam ca vijnanam | Sarvaksanikavijnanam tasyayuktam kadacidapi || 126 | ( 1674) ] Trans. - 126 It is never reasonable to accept vijnana ( of an object) as vijnana having all-pervading ksanikata, as it is one independant vijnana exclusively connected with one moment ( 1674 ). , * TIkA - yasya vAdino bauddhasya ' ekavijJAna saMtatayaH saccAH iti vacanAdekamevAsahAyaM jJAnaM tasya ' sarvamapi vastu kSaNikam' ityevaMbhUtaM vijJAnaM kadAcidapi na yuktamiti saMbandhaH / iSyate ca sarvakSaNikatA vijJAnaM saugataiH, " yat sat tat sarvaM kSaNikam " tathA " kSaNikA : sarvasaMskArAH " ityAdivacanAt / etacca kSaNikatA grAhakajJAnasyaikatve na saMbhavatyeva / yadi hi trilokIta lagataiH sarvairapi kSaNikaiH padArthaH puraH sthitvA tadekaM vijJAnaM janyeta, tadA tadetajjAnIyAd yaduta - " kSaNikAH sarve'pyamI padArthAH " iti / na caivaM sarvairapi taistajjanyate / kutaH 1 ityAha- ' egabaMdhaNaM ti ' yasmAdekameva 22

Page #213
*: 170 : Jinabhadra Gani's abhadra Gani's [The third pratiniyataM bandhanaM nivandhanamAlambanaM yasya tadekavandhanaM jJAnam , ataH kathamazeSavastustomavyApinI kSaNikatAmavabudhyeta ? / api ca, ekAlambanatve'pi yadyazeSapadArthaviSayANAmapi jJAnAnAM yugapadutpattiriSyate, AtmA ca tadarthAnusmartA, tadA syAdazeSapadArthakSaNikatAparijJAnam / na cAzeSArthagrAhakAnekajJAnAnAM yugapadutpattiriSyate / kiJca, tadekamapyekArthaviSayamapi ca vijJAnaM sarvapadArthagatAM kSaNikatAmajJAsyadeva yadyutpattyanantaradhvaMsi nAbhaviSyat / avinAzitve hi tadavasthitatayopaviSTaM sadanyamanyaM cArthamutpatyanantaramuparamantaM dRSTvA " sarvamevAsmadvarjamasmatsajAtIyavarja ca vastukSaNikameva " ityavabudhyeta, na caitadasti / kutaH ? ityAha-" egateNa khaNiyaM ceti" yasya ca bauddhasyaikAntena kSaNika kSaNadhvasyeva vijJAnaM, na punazcirAvasthAyi, tasya kathaM sarvavastugatakSaNikatAparijJAnaM syAt / / tasmAdakSaNikameva pramAta jJAnameSTavyam / tacca guNatvAdanurUpaM guNinamAtmAnamantareNa na saMbhavati / ataH siddhaH zarIrAd vyatirikta Atmeti // 126 (1674) / __D. C.-According to the theory that there is one and only one continuous range of vijnana to all living beings, the Bauddhas believe that vijnana is eka (one ) and asahaya ( independent) and hence it can never recognize all objects, as all objects would become ksanika according to that theory. Saugatas (Bauddhas ) however try to establish sarvaksanikativijirana by the help of statements such as " all that exists is ksanika" and "all samskaras, are ksaniku " etc. Now, jnana having.all-pervading ksanikata is not possible at all. For, if one were able to produce such jnana in presence of all objects in the Universe, then only it could be apprehended that all these objects are ksanika. But jnana could never be produced by means of all those objects in that manner. For, how could ksanikata extended to all objects be recognized when jnana resorts to one and only one alambana ? In such cases, if all jianas of all objects were taken to have been produced at the same time, and if atman were accepted as the anusmarta of

Page #214
Vada ] Ganadharavada . 171 : all such jnanas, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of all objects. But simultaneous production of jnana as regards all objects is never possible and hence the apprehension of sarvaksaniktavijnana is also impossible. Again, if vijnana of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend sarvaksanikata. For, in that case, vijnana being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that "every thing except us and those of our class is ksanika. " But that is not possible. For, according to Buddhistic theory, knowledge being exclusively ksanika, cannot last for a long time and hence it is not possible to apprehend ksanikata in case of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as a-ksanika. This being a guna, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz., atman, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body. jaM savisayaniyayaM ciya jammANaMtarahayaM ca taM kiha nnu| nAhiti subahayaviNNANavisayakhayabhaMgayAINi // 127 // (1675) Jam savisayaniyayam ciya jammanantarahayam ca tam kiha nu i Nahiti subahuyavisnanavisayakhayabhangayaini ? << 127 11 (1675) [ yad svaviSayaniyatameva janmAntarahataM ca tat kathaM nu / jJAsyati subahukavijJAnaviSayakSayabhaGgakAdIni ? // 127 // (1675) Yad svavisayaniyatameva janmantarahatam ca tat katham nu i Jnasyati suba hukavijnanavisayaksayabhangakadini ? 1112711 (1675)] Trans.--127 How could that ( knowledge ) which is restricted to its own self and scope and which vanishes soon after its birth understand qualities such as indurability etc., pertaining to the scope of vijnana ? ( 1675 ).

Page #215
* 172 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The third TIkA-yat svaviSayamAtraniyataM janmAnantarahataM ca pramAta vijJAnaM, tatkathaM subahuvijJAnaviSayagatAn kSaNabhaMga-nirAtmakatva-sukhi-duHkhitAdIn dharmAn jJAsyati ? na kathaJcidityarthaH // 127 (1675) // * D.C.-Pramatri jnana (authentic knowledge ) is restricted to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after its own production. So, it could never understand a number of attributes e. g. transitoriness, subjectivity, and sense of happiness, misery etc., related to the visaya (subject) of vijnana. givhijja sababhaMgaM jai ya maI svissyaannumaannaao| taM pi na jao'NumANaM juttaM sattAisiddhIo // 128 // (1676) Ginhijja savvabhargam jai ya mai savisayanumanao 1 Tam pi na jao'numanam juttam sattaisiddhio ii 128 11 (1676 ) [gRhNIyAt sarvabhaGgaM yadi ca matiH svaviSayAnumAnAt / tadapi na yato'numAnaM yuktaM sattAdisiddhau // 128 // (1676 ) Gsihoiyat sarvabhangam yadi ca matih svavisayanumanat i Tadapi na yato'numanam yuktam sattadisiddhau // 128 // ( 1676)] ___Trans.-128 Again, it is not even proper to believe that vijnana apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of anumana from its own self and scope. Because, anumana is proper only with regard to the establishment of existence etc. ( 1676). TIkA-yadi ca parasyaivaMbhUtA matiH syAd yaduta-ekamapi-ekAlambanamapi kSaNikamapi ca pramAta vijJAnaM sarvavastu gatakSaNabhaGgaM gRhNIyAt / kutaH ? ityAha-svaviSayAnumAnAt / etaduktaM bhavati-yasmAdayamasmadviSayaH kSaNikaH, ahaM ca kSaNanazvararUpam , tato vijJAnasAmyAdanyAnyapi vijJAnAni kSaNikAni, viSayasAmyAccAnye'pi viSayAH sarve'pi kSaNikAH, ityevaM svaM ca viSayAzca svaviSayAstadanumAnAt sarvasyApi vastustomasya kSaNikatvAdi gRhyte| atra dUSaNamAha-"taM pItyAdi" tadapi na yuktaM na ghttmaankm| kRtaH? ityAha

Page #216
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 173 :. yatastat svaviSayAnumAnamanyeSAM vijJAnAnAmanyaviSayANAM ca pakSIkRtAnAM sattAdi prasiddhAveva yujyate / nahi sattvenApyaprasiddhaidharmiNi kSaNikatAdidharmaH sAdhyamAno vibhraajte| ko hi nAma zabdAdiSvAdAveva sattvenApratIteSu kRtakatvAdinAnityatvAdidharmAn sAdhayati, " tatra pakSaH prasiddhodharmI" ityAdivacA nAt / na cedamekamekAlambanaM kSaNikaM ca jJAnametad voDhuM zaknoti yaduta-anyajJAnAni santi, tadviSayAzca vidyante, teSAM ca viSayANAM svaviSayajJAnajananasvabhAvAdaya evaM bhUtA dharmAHsantIti / etadaparijJAne ca kathameteSAM kSaNikatAM . sAdhayiSyati, dharmiNa evAprasiddheH / ___ syAdetat , svaviSayAnumAnAdevAnyavijJAnAdisattApi setsyatyeva, tathAhi-yathA'hamasmi tathAnyAnyapi jJAnAni santi, yathA ca madviSayo vidyate, evamanye'pi jJAnaviSayA vidyanta eva; yathA cAhaM madviSayazca kSaNikaH, evamanyajJAnAni tadviSayAzca kSaNikA eveti, evaM sarveSAM sattvaM kSaNikatA ca svaviSayAnumAnAdeva setsyatIti / etadapyayuktam , yataH sarvakSaNikatAgrAhaka jJAnaM kSaNanazvaratvAjanmAntaraM "mRta ivAhamasmi, kSaNikaM ca" ityevamAtmAnamapi nAvabudhyate, anyaparijJAnaM tu tasya dUrotsAritameva / kiJca, tat svaviSayamAtrasyApi kSaNikatAM nAvagacchati, samAnakAlameva dvayorapi vinaSTatvAt / yadi hi svaviSayaM vinazyantaM dRSTvA tatadgatakSaNikatAM nizcitya svayaM pazcAt kAlAntare tad vinazyet , tadA syAt tasya svaviSayakSaNikatApratipattiH, na caitadasti, jJAnasya viSayasya ca nijanijakSaNaM janayitvA samAnakAlameva vinAzAbhyupagamAt / na ca svasaMvedanapratyakSeNa vA kSaNikatA gRhyata iti saugatairiSyate, anumAnagamyatvena tasyAstairabhyupagamAditi // 128 (1676) // ___D. C.-An opponent may advance the following objection in this case Pramatrivijnana though ksanika and resorting to only one alambana is able to recognize ksani kata of its own self as well as sphere. For, just as the knowledge that we are ksanika as our visaya is ksanika is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as ksaniku.

Page #217
.: 174 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The third The argument stated above is not correct. Svavisayanumana can be applied only in case of establishing the existence etc. of other vijnanas and visayas and not otherwise. Just as in case of s'abda etc., which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like anityata by reason of their mere constructive utility; so, in this case also, properties like ksanikata could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all. Moreover, vijnana which is said to be ksanika and ekalambana, is not able to understand whether there are other jnanas and visayas, and whether those jnanas and visayas possess the property of producing jnana of its own self and sphere. So, if such jnana could not be produced and if the objects in which ksanikata is to be established are not known, how could ksanikata be proved to exist at all ? At this point, the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other vijnanas could be established by the help of sva visayanumana. One would say in this case that " Just as I exist and my visaya exists, other jnanas and their visayas also exist, and just as I and my visaya are ksanika, other jnanas and their visayas are also ksanika." Thus, existence as well as ksanikatu of all the objects could easily be established. The above objection is entirely fallacious. Jnana which apprehends sarvaksanikata is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on account of its being ksanika-as good as dead. Thus, when it is not able to recognise its own self how can it perceive that there are other jnanas and their visayas also ? Such indurable jrana does not recognize ksanikata of its own visaya, because, according to them, that jnana and visaya vanish within equally short time. If that jnana ascertains the ksanikata of its own visnya from its disappearance within a short time before the jnana itself dies away, then and then only would the ksunikata of its

Page #218
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 175:. visaya be recognized by it. But this argument is not accepted by Bauddhas. They believe that jnana and its visaya disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment. Moreover, according to Saugatas, ksanikata is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception by sense-organs, but by means of anumana only. jANeja vAsaNA u sA. vi hu vAsitta-vAsaNijjANaM / juttA samecca doNhaM na u jammANaMtarahayassa // 129 // (1677) Janejja vasana u sa vi hu vasitta-vasanijjanam 1 Jutta samecca donham na u jammanantarahayassa ||12911 (1677) [jAnIyAt vAsanA tu sApi khalu vAsi-vAsanIyayoH / yuktA sametya dvayonaM tu janmAnantarahatasya // 129 // (1677) Janiyat vasana tu sapi khalu vasi-vasaniyayoh | Yukta sametya dvayorna tu janmanantarahatasya ||12911 (1677)] Trans.--129 Again, the opponent might argue that desire could understand sarvaksanikata; but that also is in fact proper ( only ) because it is related to both-one that desires and the desired ( object ), and not in case of that which vanishes soon after (its birth ). ( 1677). TIkA-syAdetat pUrvapUrvavijJAnakSaNairuttarottaravijJAnakSaNAnAmevaMbhUtA vAsanA janyate, yayA'nyavijJAna-tadviSayANAM sattva-kSaNikatAdIn dharmAnekamekAlambanaM kSaNikamapi ca vijJAnaM jAnAti, ataH sarvakSaNikatAjJAnaM saugatAnAM na virudhyate / tadapyayuktam , yataH sApi vAsanA vAsaka-vAsanIyayoIyorapi sametya saMyujya vidyamAnayoreva yuktA, na tu janmAntarameva hatasya vinaSTasya / vAsya-vAsakayozca saMyogenAvasthAne kssnniktaahaaniprsnggH| kiJca, sApi vAsanA kSaNikA, akSaNikA vA ?! kSaNikatve kathaM tadvazAt sarvakSaNikatAparijJAnam ? / akSaNikatve tu pratijJAhAniriti // 129 (1677 ) // D. C.---Here, again the opponents may argue that the

Page #219
.: 176 Jinabhadra Gani's [The third earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire even a ksanikri vijnana having only one support is 'able to apprehend other jnanas and their visayas having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no harm in believing that all objects are ksanika. But even that is not correct. For vasana in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to vasaka and vasaniya; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the avasthana ( retention ) of vasya and vasaka connected together, ksanikata itself would not exist. And is that vasana ksanika or a-ksanika ? If it were ksanika, it would not be able to apprehend sarvaksanikata; and if it were a-lcsanika the very proposition that everything is ksaniku would be violated. So, the theory of Bauddhas that everything is ksanika does not fit in, in any way. Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the Acarya now illustrates bis own. bahuviNNANappabhavo jugavamaNegatthayA'havegasta / viNNANAvatthA vA paDucavittIvighAo vA // 130 // (1678) viNNANakhaNaviNAse dosA iccAdayo pasajjati / na u ThiyasaMbhUyaccuyaviNNANamayammi jiivmmi||131||(1679) tassa vicittAvaraNakhaovasamajAiM cittruuvaaiN| khaNiyANi ya kAlaMtaravittINi ya mivihaannaaiN||132||(1680) Baliuvinnanappabhavo jugavamanegatthaya'havegassa i Vinnanavattha va paduccavittivighao va || 130 11 ( 1678 ) Vinnanakhanavinase dosa iccadayo pasajjanti i Na u thiyasambhuyaccuyavinnanamayammi jivammi 1113111 (1679)

Page #220
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 177 :. Tassa vicittavaranakhaovasamajaim cittaruvaim i Khaniyani ya kalantaravittini ya maivihanaim // 132 // ( 1680 ) [bahuvijJAnaprabhavo yugapadanekArthatA'thavaikasya / vijJAnAvasthA vA pratItyavRttivighAto vA // 130 / / (1678). vijJAnakSaNavinAze doSA ityAdayaH prasajanti / na tu sthitasaMbhUtacyutavijJAnamaye jIve // 131 // (1679) tasya vicitrAvaraNakSayopazamajAni citrarUpANi / kSaNikAni ca kAlAntaravRttIni ca matividhAnAni // 132 // (1680) Bahuvijnanaprabhavo yugapadanekarthata'thavaikasya i Vijnanavastha va pratityavrittivigbato va u 130 11 ( 1678 ) Vijnanaksanavinase dosa ityadayah prasajanti 1 Na tu sthitasambhutac'yutavijnanamaye jive il 131 11 ( 1679 ) Tasya vicitravarasaksayopasamajani citrarupani Ksanikani ca kalantaravrittini ca matividhanani || 132 | (1680)] Trans.--130-131-132 If vijnana were taken to be ksana vinasi a number of faults such as production of many vijnanas, yielding more than one meaning at a time, or, one yielding more than one meaning at a time, retention (avastha ) of vijnana, violation of the law of cause and effect etc. would arise. This would not happen only in case of jiva, having vijnana which is sthita ( settled) sambhuta ( born ) and cyuta (dropped) being accepted. (For), it manifests various (types of) intellectual forms that are born of various types of diminutions and relaxations and that are ksanika as well as permanent. ( 1678-1679-1680 ). TIkA-tadevaM vijJAnasya pratikSaNaM vinAze'bhyupagamyamAne ityAdayo doSAH prasajanti / ke punaste doSAH ? ityAha-" bahuviNNANetyAdi " ityevaM saMbandhaH / kSaNanazvaravijJAnavAdinA bhuvanatrayAntarvatisarvArthagrahaNArthaM yugapadeva bahUnAM jJAnAnAM prabhava utpAdo'bhyupagantavyaH, tadAzrayabhUtazca tadRSTAnAma 23

Page #221
:-178 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third rthAnAmanusmartA'vasthita AtmA'bhyupagantavyaH, anyathA " yat sat tat sarvaM kSaNikam " " kSaNikAH sarve saMskArAH " " nirAtmAnaH sarve bhAvAH" ityAdi sarvakSaNikatA divijJAnaM nopapadyeta, tadabhyupagame ca svamatatyAgaprasaktiH / athavA, kSaNikaM vijJAnamicchataikasyapi vijJAnasya yugapadanekArthatA - sarvabhavanAntargatArthagrAhitA'bhyupagantavyA yena sarvakSaNikatA divijJAnamupapadyate, na caitadiSyate, dRzyate vA / " viNNANAvatthA va tti " yadivA, avasthAnamavasthA, vijJAnasyAvasthA vijJAnAvasthA'bhyupagantavyA bhavati / idamuktaM bhavati - vijJAnasyAnalpakalpAgrazo'vasthAnameSTavyam yena tat sarvadA samAsInamanyAnyavastuvinazvaratAM vIkSamANaM sarvakSaNikatAmavagacchediti sarvaM prAgevoktameva / evaM cAbhyupagame vijJAnasaMjJAmAtraviziSTa AtmaivAbhyupagato bhavati / " athaitad bahuvijJAnaprabhavAdikaM neSyate, tarhi pratItyavRttivighAtaH prApnoti / idamatra hRdayam -- kAraNaM pratItyAzritya kAryasya vRttiH pravRttirutpattiriti yAvat na punaH kAraNaM kAryAvasthAyAM kathaJcidapyanveti ityevaM saugaterabhyupagamyate / itthaM cAbhyupagamyamAne'tItasmaraNAdisamastavyavahArocchedaprasaGgaH / evaM hi vyavahArapravRttiH syAd yadyatItAnekasaMketAdijJAnAzrayastatadvijJAnarUpeNa pariNAmAdanvayI AtmA'bhyupagamyate / tathAbhyupagame ca sati pratItyavRcyabhyupamavidhAtaH syAditi / nanu yadi vijJAnasya kSaNavinAza ete doSAH prasajanti, tarhi kkAmI doSA na bhavanti ? ityAha-- "na uThiyetyAdi" na tvasmabhyupagate jIve'bhyupagamyamAna ete doSAH prajanti / kathaMbhUte - jIve sthitasaMbhRtacyutavijJAnamaye - kathaJcid dravyarUpatayA sthitam, kathaJcittattaraparyAyeNa saMbhUtam, kathaJcitpunaH pUrvaparyAyeNa cyutaM vinaSTaM yad vijJAnaM tanmaya ityarthaH / tasmAdamumevotpAda-vyaya- dhauvyayuktaM zarIrAdarthAntarabhUtamasmadabhyupagatamAtmAnaM samastavyavahArasiddha pratipadyasveti // 130 - 131 (16781679) // TIkA - matermatijJAnasya vidhAnAni nAnAbhedarUpANi tasya yathoktarUpasyAtmanaH pravartante / kathaMbhUtAni ? ityAha-vicitro yo'sau matijJAnAvaraNakSayopazamastato jAtAni ata eva svakAraNabhUtakSayopazamavaicitryAd vicitrarUpANi / tathA, paryAyarUpatayA kSaNikAni, dravyarUpatayA tu nityatvAt ,

Page #222
. : 179 : EZO) II : Vada ] Ganadharavada kAlAntaravRttIni / upalakSaNaM ca matividhAnAni, zrutA-badhi-manaHparyAyavidhAnAnyapi yathAsaMkhyaM zrutA-'vadhimanaHparyAyajJAnAvaraNakSayopazamavaicicyAd vicitrarUpANi yathAsaMbhavaM tasya draSTavyAni / kevalajJAnaM tvekamevAvikalpaM kevalajJAnAvaraNakSayAdeva draSTavyamiti // 132 (1680) // D. C.-If jnana were taken to be ksanika as stated before, & number of dosas would get in, in the following manner :. 1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three . worlds, should be recognized, a ksanikata-vadin ought to admit that all sorts of jnanas are produced at the same time and the Soul that rememebers the objects in which those jnanas are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Otherwise, statements such as "Whatever exists is all ksanika" " All bhavas are ksanika " etc. that established sarvaksanikata would be futile. Moreover, when more than one jvana are accepted, the original theory of ekavijnanasantati has also been violated. 2. Again, if ksana vijnana were accepted, another fault would also crop up. In this case, one and the same vijnana would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the the worlds. But this could never happen, nor be believed. 3. In order to recognize a number of objects, vijnana must be taken to last for a long time. As a result of this, vijnana" would be able to recognize the ksanikatu of all as they are ksanika also. But believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but vijnana. would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition.. 4. Again, if the production of many vijnanas were not accepted, there would be violation of pratityavrtti. When karana is not anyhow apprehended in the state of karya, Bauddhas call it the violation of pratityavrtti. As the production of a karya depends upon a karana this would gives rise to dosa. If Baudhas were to accept this, processes such as that of

Page #223
: 180 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The third remembering the past incident etc. would be abolished. Again, if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions, etc. were believed to have been related to the parinama in the form of vijnana, then also the law of pratityavritti would be violated. For, believing so the Soul is taken as related to the parinama. Thus, in case vijnana is accepted as ksanika, all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing vijnana which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form and which has already ceased to exist as vijnana, the faults ennumerated above would never arise. This proves that atman that has utility, stability and productivity for the sake of all vyavahara is undoubtedly distinct from body. For, such an atman possesses various matijnanabhedas produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the matijnana itself. These bhedas are ksanika on account of their wavering nature, and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality. Again, by means of implication, the soul manifests various types of jnana e. g. sruta (ascertained by intellect ); avadhi ( applied by intellect ) and manahparyaya (mental perception) etc. are respectively produced from the knowledge ascertained, applied and perceived by mind. 130-131-132 (1678-1679-1680) The Kevala jnana or Absolute knowledge is attained only when all its interruptions are warded off. nicco saMtANo siM savAvaraNaparisaMkhae jaM ca / magici hauan@tei II 8381 (8808) Nicco santano sim savvavaranaparisamkhae jam ca i Kevalamudiyam kevalabhavenanantamavigappam i 133 11 (1681) [nityaH santAnaH eSAM sarvAvaraNaparisaMkSaye yacca / kevalamuditaM kevalabhAvenAnantamavikalpam / / 133 / / (1681)

Page #224
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 181 : Nityah santana esam sarvavarana parisaniksaye yacoa Kevalamuditam kevalabhaveninantamavikalpam // 133 // (1581)] Trans.-133 They ( matijnanadi vidhanas ) have a perpetual continuance (nitya santana )-in the form of samanyajnanawhich being free from all interruptions is said to be ananta ( endless ) and avikalpa ( illusionless ). Kevala (Absolute) exists by ( virtue of ) its Kevalabhava ( Absoluteness) (1681 ). TIkA-"siM ti" eteSAM ca matijJAnAdividhAnAnAmavizeSitajJAna- . mAtrarUpasaMtAno nityo'vyavacchinnarUpaH / kevalajJAnaM tvavikalpaM bhedarahitamuditamAkhyAtaM bhagavadbhiH yataH sarvasyApi nijAvaraNasya kSaya eva tadupajAyate / ato'vikalpaM kevalabhAvenAnantakAlAvasthAyitvAt , anantArthaviSayatvAzcAnantamiti // 133 (1681) // ____D. C.-The avisesitajmana or samanyajnana of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc. But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be ananta and avikalpu by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all avaranas. Thus Kevalajnana is avikalpa (i. e. positive and illusionless ) because it is ananta (endless ) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object ( anantartha ). 1681. Here again Vayubhuti raises a doubt and the Tirtharkara removes it:so jai dehAdanno to pavisaMto va nissaraMto vaa| kIsa na dIsai, goyama! duvihA'Nuvaladdhi usaay||134||(1682) So jai dehadanno to pavisanto va nissaranto va! Kisa na disai, Goyama ! duviha'nuvaladdhi u sa ya 11 134 11 (1682) [sa yadi devAdanyastataH pravizan vA niHsaran vaa| . kasmAd na dRzyate, gautama ! dvividhA'nupalabdhistu sA ca // 134 // (1682) Sa yadi dehadangastatah pravisan va nihsaran val Kasmad na drsyate Gautama ! dvivid ha'nupalabdhistu sa call 134||(1682)

Page #225
*: 182 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The third asao kharasaMgassa va sao vi dUrAibhAvao'bhihiyA / suhumA-'muttattaNao kammANugayassa jIvassa // 135 // (1683) Asao kharasangassa va sao vi duraibhayao' bhihiya | Suhuma'muttattanao kammanugayassa jivassa // 135 // ( 1683) [asataH kharazrRGgasyeva sato'pi dUrAdibhAvato'bhihitA / sUkSmA'mUrtatvataH karmAnugatasya jIvasya // 135 // (1683) Asatah kharasrngasyeva sato'pi duradibhavato'bhihita 1 Saksma murtatvatah karmanugatsya jivasya // 135 // (1683)] Trans.-134-135 .If the Soul is different from body, how is it that it is not perceived while entering (the body ) or issuing forth ( from it ) ? But again, O Gautama ! non-perception ( anupalabdhi ) is of two types :-1. Non-perception of a non-existent object like a kharasrnga and 2. Non-perception of an existent object by reason of its distance etc. Non-perception of the Soul which is karmanugata is due to its exquisite formlessness (suksmamurtatva ) ( 1682-1683 ). TIkA-yadi nAma zarIrAdanyo'sau jIvastato ghaTe caTaka iva zarIre pravizan niHsaran vA kimiti nopalabhyate ? / bhagavAnAha-"goyametyAdi" yato dvividhA'nupalabdhirasti, atastasyAnupalabdheH kAraNAd gautamaH ! jIvo na dRzyate / kathaM punaH sA'nupalabdhirdvividhA ? ityAha-sA cAnupaladherekA'sato bhavati, yathA kharazRGgasya / dvitIyA tu sato'pyarthasya bhavati / kutaH ? ityAha-dUrAdibhAvAditi, dUrAt sannapyartho na dRzyate, yathA svargAdiH, AdizabdAt atisaMnikarSAt , ati saukSmyAt , mano'navasthAnAt , indriyApATavAt , matimAnyAt , azakyatvAt , AvaraNAt , abhibhavAt , sAmAnyAta , anupayogAt , anupAyAt , vismRteH, durAgamAt , mohAt , vidarzanAt , vikArAt , aMkriyAtaH, anadhigamAt , kAlaviprakarSAt , svbhaavviprkrssaacceti| . . . . . tatrAtisaMnikarSAt sannapyoM nopalabhyate, yathA netra duussikaa-pkssmaadiH|

Page #226
Vada ] Ganadharavada . : 183 :atisaukSmyAt prmaannvaadiH| mano'navasthAnAt , sato'pyanupalabdhiryathA naSTacetasAm / indriyApATavAt kizcidadhirAdInAm / matimAndhAdanupalabdhiH satAmapi sUkSmazAstrArtha vizeSANAm / azakyatvAt svakarNa-kRkATikA-mastakapRSThAdInAm / AvaraNAd hastAdisthagitalocanAnAM kaTakuTyAdyAvRttAnAM vA / abhibhavAt prasRtamUratejasi divase tArakANAm / sAmAnyAt sUpalakSitasyApi mASAdeH samAnajAtIyamASAdirAzipatitasyApratyabhijJAnAt sto'pynuplbdhiH| anupayogAd rUpopayuktasya zeSaviSayANAm / anupAyAt zrRGgAdibhyo gomhissyaadipyHprinnaamjijnyaasoH| vismRteH puurvoplbdhsy| durAgamAd durupadezAt tatpratirUpakarItikAdivipralambhitamateH kanakAdInAM satAmapyanupalabdhiH / mohAt satAmapi jIvAditattvAnAm / vidarzanAt sarvathA'ndhAdInAm vArdhakyAdivikArAd bahuzaHpUrvopalabdhasya sato'pyanupalabdhiH / akriyAto bhUkhananAdikriyA'bhAvAd vRkssmuulaadiinaamnuplbdhiH| anadhigamAt zAstrAzravaNAt tadarthasya sato'pyanupalabdhiH / kAlaviprakarSAd bhUtabhaviSyadRSabhadevapadmanAmatIrthakarAdInAmanupalabdhiH / svabhAvaviprakarSAd nabhaH pizAdInAmanupa lmbhH| tadevaM satAmapyarthAnAmekaviMzatividhA'nupalabdhiH pravartate / ato'sya karmAnugatasya saMsAriNo jIvasyA'mUrtatvAd nabhasa iva, kArmaNasya tu saukSmyAt paramANoriva sato'nulapalabdhiH, naastH| kathaM punaretajjhAyate-nAsata Atmano 'nupalabdhiH, kintu sataH ? iti cet / ucyate-anumAnastatsattvasya sAdhitatvAditi / / 134-135 (1682-1683) D. C.-Vayubhuti-If this soul is different from body, how is it that it is not seen entering or issuing forth from the body like a cataka ( sparrow ) from a ghata ( vessel)? Bhagawan-Because of the two-fold anupalalidhi, O Gautuma! the Soul is not perceived. These two types are:-1) Anupalabdhi of a non-existent object e. g, a kharusriga ( born of an ass ) and (2) Anupalabdhi of an existent object. Now, for the non-perception of an existent object there are twenty-one reasons. i. "Atiduratva( Extreme remoteness )--Places like svarga,

Page #227
*: 184 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [The third do exist. But as they are extremely remote they are not perceivable. ii. Atisannikarsu (Close vicinity )-Certain objects like eye lashes and secretion of eyes, though existent, cannot be seen on account of their close vicinity. iii. Atisauksmya ( Exquisite fineness )-Paramanus are im perceptible, because they are exquisitely fine. These paramanus are so minute in form that they are not perceptible even to the maked eye, even though they are considered to be existent. Manonavasthana ( Instability of mind )-Sometimes even a murta object is not apprehended by reason of mano' navasthana or the instability of mind as in the case of an insane man. v. Indriyapatutva ( Dullness of senses )--Non-perception arises asso when a sense or senses are benumbed e.g. a deaf man, vi. Matimandya ( Dullness of ntellect )-Certain subtleties of the s'astras are always anupalabhya to a dull-witted man due to his matimandya. vii. Asakyatva ( Impossibility )-One can never see his own ear, head or back as it is utterly impossible to do so. viii. Avarana (Obstruction ).When eyes are covered with hands or when hands are obscured by means of a mat or a wall it is avarana that causes non-perception. ix. Abhibhava (Predominance )---Predominance of Sun in the sky, makes the stars anupalubhya on a sun-bright day. X. Samanya-( Commonness ) When beans are mixed with beans of the same quality there is non-aprehension of beans owing to the samanyatva present in both.

Page #228
Vada] Ganadharavada .: 185 :* xi. Anupayoga (Lack of Attention )-When an object is touched by a particular indriya, say, Rupa (the sense of eye), it is not perceived by the rest of senses because of their anupayoga to the object. xii. Anupaya (Want of Means)-If a person wants to take an estimate of milk (contained) in a cow or a buffalo by means of rnga etc, he can never do so because there is no such means available. xiii. Vismrti Forgetfulness )-An object perceived before becomes anupalabhya afterwards by reason of vismrti. xiv. Duragama-( Wrong Instruction) When an object like gold is presented in the style of a forged edict, it is not recognized in its true form, because there is durupadesa or wrong instruction as regards its form. XV. Moha (Delusion )-Objects like jiva do exist, but they are not perceived due to moha (on the part of those who try to perceive them ). xvi. Vidarsana (Absence of Sight)-is the absolute cause of anupalabdhi in the case of blind persons. xviii. Vikara (Loss of Health )-Mostly, it so happens that things that are once perceived are not apprehended in later life on account of vikaras like vardhakya (old age) etc. xviii. Akriya (Want of Action )-There is non-perception of roots of trees because of the scarcity of actions like bhukhanana etc. xix. Anadhigama (Non-acquisition)-Owing to the anadhigama of sastrasravana, the meaning of S'astras becomes incomprehensible. xx. Kala viprakarsa (Remoteness of Time)-Rsabhadeva and other Tirthankaras of the past and Padma Nabha of future cannot be recognized due to the remoteness of time. 24

Page #229
186 Jinabhadra Gaai's [Tho third xxi. Svabhava viprakarsa (Natural Remoteness)-Things like nabhas and pisat are non-cognizible by reason of their svabhava viprakarsa. In this way, anupalabdhi of an existent object takes place in twenty-one different ways. So, Jiva is imperceptible like nabhas due to its amurtata; and s'arira being an assemblage of the Karman paramanus * is anupalabhya because of s'auksmya of a paramanu. Thus, non-perception of the Soul and body is positively the non-perception of an existent object and not of a nonexistent one. An argument may here be advanced that "If you take Atman to be existent, how do you apprehend its existence ?" The reply is : The existence of Atman is established by means of anumana. And hence, its anupalabdhi is not the anupalubdhi of a non-existent object like a kharas'rnga, but it is the anupalabdhi of an existent object like nabhas and paramanu, Then, the distinction of Soul from body is established by the help of Vedavacana. dehANaNNe va jie jamaggihottAiM saggakAmassa / alater fouis C1011540 T DITIH 1182811 (8&c8) Dehananne va jie jamaggihottaim saggakamassa | Veyavihiyam vihannai danaiphalam ca loyammi || 136 u ( 1684) + The word Pis'a=ruru, a kind of deer according to Sayanacarya. The deer is called Pis'a probably because it is Pisa ( reddish ) in colour. The anupalabdhi of tbe Pis'a deer may be taken to be due to its nature of being always far away from human habitations. The word, however, seems rather improper when placed with nabhas. If we read pisaca instead of Pis'a it would suit our purpose better --Tr.

Page #230
Vada] Ganadharavada [ dehAnanye vA jIve yadagnihotrAdi svargakAmasya / vedavihitaM vihanyate dAnAdiphalaM ca loke / / 136 // ( 1684 ) 187: Dehananye va jive yadagnihotradi svargakamasya i Vedavihitam vihanyate danadiphalam ca loke || 136 | ( 1684) ] Trans.--136 Or, if Jiva is ( believed to be ) identical with deha ( the body ), then, ( obstruction of the ) rites like agnihotra (the worship of sacred-fire) for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. (danadiphala) in the world prescribed by the Vedas, would be refuted ( 1684 ). TIkA - zarIramAtre jIve sati gautama ! yat svargakAmasya vedavihitamagnihotrAdyanuSThAnaM tad vihanyate, dehasya vahninA'traiva bhasmIkaraNAt, jIvAbhAve kayAsa svargo bhavet / iti bhAvaH / dAnAdiphalaM cAnubhaviturabhAvAt kasya bhavet ? iti // 136 ( 1684 ) // D. C. - O Goutama ! If each and every s'artra is believed to be identical with jiva, the commandment of the Vedas that a person who desires to attain Salvation should perform the rite of Agnihotra, would be null and void. Because, when body is reduced to ashes by fire in this world, the Jiva being taken to be identical with body is also supposed to have vanished with the body. And then, who would attain Salvation when Jiva itself does not exist? Similarly, who would be there to enjoy the fruits of good deeds like dana when there would be none to receive them at all? Vayubhuti entertains doubt as regards the distinction of Soul from body by hearing the various Veda-padas bearing contradictory arguments. Bhagavan Mahavira interprets these Veda-padas correctly and clears his doubt. viSNANaghaNAINaM veyapayANaM tamatthamavidaMto / dehANapaNaM mannasiM tANaM ca payANamayamattho // 137 // (1685)

Page #231
: 188 :. . Jinabhadra Gani's [The third Vinnanaghanainam Veyapayanam tamatthamavidanto 1 Dehanannam mannasi tanam ca payanamayamattho 1113711 (1685) [vijJAnadhanAdInAM vedapadAnAM tvamarthamavidan / . dehAnanyaM manyase teSAM ca padAnAmayamarthaH // 137 // (1685) Vijnanaghanadinam Veda-padanam tvamarthamavidan | Dehananyan manyase tesam ca padanamayamarthah 111371(1685)] Trans.-137 You, not knowing the ( real) meaning of sentences like " Vijnanaghana" etc. of the Vedas, think that the Soul is identical with body. But (ca) their real interpretation is this.t ( 1685 ). TIkA-vijJAnaghanAkhyaH puruSa evAyaM bhUtebhyo'rthAntaramityAdivyAkhyA pUrvavadeva / ata eva prAguktam-" zarIratayA pariNato bhUtasaMghAto'yaM vidyamAnakartRkaH, AdimatpratiniyatAkAratvAt , ghaTavad , yazca tatkartA sa tadatirikto jIvaH" iti / bhUtAriktAtmapratipAdakAni ca vedavAkyAni tavApi pratItAnyeva / tadyathA-"satyena labhyastapasA hyeSa brahmacaryeNa nityaM jyotirmayo vizuddho yaM pazyanti dhIrA yatayaH saMyatAtmAnaH" ityAdi / tadevaM sarveSA mapi vedavAkyAnAM bhUtAtiriktasya jIvasya pratipAdakatvAd bhUtebhyo'ti'riktaM jIvaM pratipadyasveti // 137 (1685) // ... D. C.-That the Soul itself is f vijnanaghana " and that it is distinct from other bhutas has already been discussed. It has already been said that Sarirataya parinato bhutasamghato'yan vidyamanakastsikah 1 Adimatpratiniyatakaratvat ghatavat, yasca tatkarta sa tadatirikto _jivah iti // Moreover, sentences of the Vedas that prove Atman to be atirikta from bhutas, have not been beyond your comprehen. sion. e. g. + The real interpretation of sentences like " vijnanaghana " etc. has already been stated and discussed in the First Vada. vide Vs. 1588-1595.

Page #232
Vada ] Ganadharavada 189 :: " Satyena labhyastapasa hyesa brahmacaryona nityam jyotirmayo i Vis'uddho'yam pas'yanti dhgri yatayah samyatatmanah 11" In the same way, all Veda-padas have proved that Java is atirikta from bhutas. Hence, you too, shall have to admit that the Soul is distinct from bhutas. . chinnammi saMsayammi jiNeNaM jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / TAHUI TEE311 IZRE HE ESTAGE 1133611 (88EUR8) Chinnammi samsayammi jinenam jara-maranavippamukkenam | So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim 11 138 11 (1686) [feat Hath fhath FTT-Artagati T: gala: q : the talosana: ll 88611(886EUR ) Chinne samsaye jinena jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitah pancabhih saha khandikasataih 1138||(1686) Trans.-138 When the doubt was removed by the Tirtharkara, who was entirely free from jara ( old age ) and marana (death), the saint Vayubhuti accepted the Diksa along with his five hundred followers:-( 1686 ). End of the Discussion with the Third Ganadhara,

Page #233
Chapter IV caturthagaNadharavaktavyatA / Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara. te pavaie souM viyantu Agacchai jiNasagAsaM / vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 139 // (1687 ) Te pavvaie soum Vyattu Vagacchai jinasagasam Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami // 139 // ( 1687 ) [ tAn pravrajitAn zrutvA vyakta Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 139 // ( ( 1687 ) Tan pravrajitan srutva Vyakta agacchati jinasakasam | Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase || 139 // ( 1687 ) ] Trans. - 139 Having heard that they (i. e. Vayubhuti and his fellow-mendicants) had renounced the world, Vykta comes before the Tirthankara. (He thinks...) "I may go, pay my homage ( to the Tirtharikara ) and serve him." ( 1687 ) AbhaTThoM ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya goteNa ya savvaNNU savadarisINaM // 140 // (1688) Abhattho ya jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenam | Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisinam || 140 | (1688) [ AbhASitazva jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 140 // ( 1688 )

Page #234
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 191 Abhasitasca jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina // 140 // ( 1681)] Trans.-140 He was addressed by his name and gotra ( lineage) by the Tirthankara who was free from jati ( birth) jara ( old age) and marana ( death ), who was Sarvajna ( omniscient ) and who had (attained) complete darsana. (1628) Bhagavari said :kiM maNNe asthi bhUyA udAha nasthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimoattho||141|| (1689) Kim manne atthi bhuya udahu natthi tti samsao tujjha i Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho Il 141 11 (1689) [kiM manyase santi bhUtAnyutAho na santIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArthaM na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 141 // ( 1689 ) Kim mangase santi bhutanyutaho na santiti samsayastava i Vedapadanam cartham na ja nasi tesamayamarthah 114111 (1689)] Trans.-141 O Vyakta ! What are you thinking of ? You entertain the doubt as to whether Bhutas exist or not. But (ca) you have not understood the ( real) interpretation of the senterices of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1689) TIkA-pRthivya-'p-tejo-cAyavA-''kAzalakSaNAni paJcabhUtAni, tAni ca kiM santi na vA ? iti tvaM manyase / saMzayazca tavAyaM viruddhavedapadazravaNanibandhano vartate / tAni cAmUni vedapadAni-" svamopamaM vai sakalamityeSa brahmavidhiraJjasA vijJeyaH" ityAdi, tathA, " dyAvA-pRthivI" ityAdi, tathA, " pRthivI devatA, Apo devatAH" ityAdi / eteSAM cAyamarthastava pratibhAsate-"svapnopamam-svapnasadRzam , vainipAto'vadhAraNe, sakalam-azeSa jagat, ityeSa brahmavidhiH-paramArthaprakAraH, aJjasA-praguNena nyAyena, vijJeyaHjJAtavyaH" iti / tadevamAdIni vedapadAni kila bhUtanivaparANi, " dyAvA

Page #235
*: 192 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth pRthivI" ityAdIni tu sattApratipAdakAni, atastava sNshyH| tadeteSAM vedapadAnAM tvamartha na jAnAsi, cazabdAd yuktihRdayaM ca na vesi / tena saMzayaM kuruSe / teSAM cAyamoM vakSyamANalakSaNa iti / / 141 (1689 ) // D. C.--This is your querry-" Do the pancabhutas viz. Prthvi ( earth ) ap (water) tejas (fire) vayu ( air ) and akas'a (ether) exist or not? This querry is based upon your misapprehension of certain sentences of the Vedas, that are mutually contradictory. The sentences are(1) " Svapnopamam val sakalamtyesa brahmavidhiranjasa vijneyah" etc. (2) " Dyava-prithvi " etc. and (3) " Prithvi--devata, apo devatah " etc. Your interpretation of these sentences runs thus : All this world is nothing but a dream or illusion. So, one should honestly endeavour to know the Brahma, which is the only paramarthaprakas'a worth attaining. Such sentences refute the existence of the five elements while uthers like Dyava prithivi and " Prithive devata, apo devatah" establish the existence of those very elements. These contradicting sentences of the Vedas have given rise to your doubt. Really speaking, you have not understood the real purport of the above sentences. Here I give their correct interpretation, Listen to it. bhUesu tujjha saMkA suviNaya-mAovamAiM hoja ti / na viyArijaMtAI bhayaMti jaM savvahA juttiM // 142 // (1690) Bhuesu tujiha sanka suvinaya-maovaniaim hojja tti Na viyarijjantaim bhayanti jam savvaha juttim u 142 11 (1690) [ bhUteSu tava zaGkA svapnaka-mAyopamAni bhaveyuriti / na vicAryamANAni bhajanti yat sarvathA yuktim / / 142 // ( 1690)

Page #236
Vada ] Ganadharavada Bhutesu tava sanka svapnaka-mayopamani bhaveyuriti Na vicaryamanani bhajanti yat sarvatha yuktim || 142 || (1690) ] .: 193 :* bhUyAisaMsayAo jIvAisa kA kaha tti te buddhI / taM savvasuNasaMkI mannasi mAyovamaM loyaM // 143 // (1691) Bhuyaisamsayao jivaisu ka kaha tti te buddhi Tam savvasunnasanki mannasi mayovamam loyam // 143 // ( 1691) [ bhUtAdisaMzayAt jIvAdiSu kA katheti te buddhiH / tvaM sarvazUnyazaGkamanyase mAyopamaM lokaM // 143 // ( 1691 ) Bhutadisamsayat jivadisu ka katheti te buddhih | Tvam sarvasunyasanki manyase mayopamam lokam ||143|| (1691) ] Trans. - 142-143 You entertain the doubt about the elements that they are (unreal) like dreams and illusions. And when you question the (existence of ) elements (themselves), what to talk of objects like jiva etc.? You being dubious about the existence of everything, believe the whole world to be ( as unreal as ) maya. ( 1690-1691 ). TIkA- AyuSman vyakta ! bhUteSu bhavataH sandehaH, yataH svapnopamA nAni mAyopamAnAni caitAni bhaveyuriti tvaM manyase / yathA hi svapne kila kazcid niHsvospi nijagRhAGgaNe gajaghaTA-turaga nivaha-maNi - kanakarAzyAdikamabhUtamapi pazyati, mAyAyAM cendrajAlavilasitarUpAyAmavidyamAnamapi kanaka - maNi- mauktika - rajatabhAjanA -''rAma - puSpa phalAdikaM dRzyate, tathaitAnyapi bhUtAnyevaMvidhAnyeveti manyase yad yasmAd vicAryamANAnyetAni sarvathaiva na kAJcid yukti bhajante sahante / bhuteSu ca saMzaye jIva- puNya-pApAdiSu kila kA vArtA bhUtavikArAdhiSThAnatvAt teSAm iti tava buddhiH / tasmAt sarvasyApi bhUta-jIvAdivastunastvadabhiprAyeNAbhAvAt sarvazUnyatAzaGkI tvaM niravazeSamapi lokaM mAyopamaM svapne - ndrajAlatulyaM manyasa iti / / 142-143 ( 1690 - 1691 ) // 25

Page #237
: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth D. C.-Long-lived Vyakta! You question the existence of Bhutas. Just as, in a dream, a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants, and horses, or treasures of jewellery and gold, but actually he does not possess them, and just as, under the illusion of the Indrajala, precious things, c g., dishes (made) of gold, silver, jewels etc., or beautiful objects e. g., parks, flowers, fruits etc, are perceived, but really speaking, they are not existing; in the same way, according to your belief, bhutas like prithivi are perceived by us; but as a matter of fact, they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an Indrajala. But this belief of yours absolutely unfounded. is * 194: Again, as you have a doubt in the existence of elements, the doubt is bound to arise in the case of Jiva, papa and punya also. Because, these objects are contained in the various vikaras of the bhutas themselves. It follows, therefore, that, according to you, all bhutas like Prthavi and all padarthas (objects) like jiva are a-vidyamana (non-existent). This indicates that you are sarvasunyatasanki and according to you, the whole Universe is just like svapna, maya or Indrajala. Now, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira gives a number of arguments for doubts which Vyakta entertained in his mindjaha kira na sao parao nobhayao nAvi annao siddhI / zia19fazzersi fea! ag gig-gemnoi||88811 (3&83) Jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao navi annao siddhi Bhavanamavekkhao Viyatta jaha diha-hassanam ||144|| (1692) [ yathA kila na svataH parato nobhayato nApyanyataH siddhiH / bhAvAnAmapekSAto vyakta ! yathA dIrgha - hrasvayoH // 144 // (1692) Yatha kila na svatah parato nobhayato napyanyatah siddhih | Bhavanamapeksato Vyakta! yatha dirgla-hrasvayoh ||144|| (1692)

Page #238
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 195:. Trans.---144 Accomplishment of objects, O Vyakta ! like ( the accomplishment of ) hrasva ( short) and dirgha ( long ) can never be attained by means of itself, through another, by means of both, or through any other object (1692). TIkA-vyakta ! bhavato'yamabhiprAyaH-yathA kila na svataH, na parataH, na cobhayataH, nApyanyato bhAvAnAM siddhiH saMbhAvyate / kutaH ? ityAhaapekSAtaH-kAryakAraNAdibhAvasyApekSikatvAdityarthaH, isva-dIrghavyapadezavat / tathAhi-yat kimapi bhAvajAtamasti tena sarveNApi kAryeNa vA bhavitavyam , kAraNena vA / tatra kArya kAraNena kriyata iti kAraNAyatta eva tasya kAryatvavyapadezaH, na tu kAryasya kAryatvaM svataH siddhaM kimapyasti / evaM kAraNamapi kArya karotIti kAryAyatta eva tasya kAraNatvavyapadezaH, na tu tasya kAraNatvaM svataH siddhaM kiJcidasti / tadevaM kAryAdibhAvaH svato na sidhyati / yacca svato na siddhaM tasya parato'pi siddhirnAsti, yathA kharaviSANasya / tatazca na svataH kAryAdibhAvaH, nApi prtH| sva-parobhayatastarhi tasya siddhiriti cet / tadayuktam , vyastAdubhayatastatsiddherabhAvAt tatsamudAye'pi tadayogAt / na hi sikatAkaNeSu pratyekamasat tailaM tatsamudAye prAdurbhavati / / api ca, ubhayataH siddhipakSa itaretarAzrayadoSaH prApnoti / yAvaddhi kArya na sidhyati na tAvatkAraNasiddhirasti / yAvacca kAraNaM na sidhyati na tAvat kArya siddhimAsAdayati / ata itaretarAzrayadoSaH / tasmAd nobhayato'pi kAryAdibhAvasiddhiH / nApyanyataH-anubhayata ityarthaH, sva-paro-bhayavyatirekeNAnyasya vastuno'sattvena nirhetukatvaprasaGgAt / evaM isva-dIrghalakSaNe dRSTAnte'pi "apekSAtaH" ityasya hrasva-dIrghatvAsiddhilakSaNena sAdhyenAnvayo bhAvanIyaH / tathAhi-pradezinyA aGguSThamapekSya dIrghatvaM pratIyate / madhyamAM tvapekSya isvatvam , paramArthena tviyaM svato na hrasvA, nApi dIrghA / tadevaM na svato isva-dIrghatvayoH siddhiH| tataH parataH, ubhayataH, anubhayatazca tatsiddhyabhAvo yathoktavad bhAvanIyaH, taduktam--- na dIrghastIha dIrghatvaM na isve nApi ca dvaye / tasmAda siddhaM zUnyatvAt sadityAkhyAyate va hi ? // 1 // " isvaM pratItya siddhaM dIrgha, dIrgha pratItya isvamapi / na kizcidasti siddhaM vyavahAravazAd badantyevam // 1 // (1692 )

Page #239
* 196 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth D. C.-Vyakta ! your argument is this :-Complete attain. ment of (the existence of) objects is not possible either svatah or paratah or ubhayatah or anyatah as in the case of (the accomplishment of the existence of) the hrasva and dirgha, there being apeksikatva (expectation) of the Karya Karanadibhavas (3. e., relations like that of cause and effect) of the padarthas. Hence, each and every object is expected to be either karya or karana. As every karya is done by karana, its karyatva is subjugated by karanatva. But the karyatva of a karya is not svabhava-siddha ( self-accomplished ). Similarly, karana accomplishes karya. So that, karanatva of karana is subjugated by the karyatva of karya. But karnatva also is not svatah siddha. Now, one which is not Svatahsiddha by virtue of its own self cannot be accomplished by means of another also, as in the case of the horn of an ass. So, karyadibhava is accomplished neither by itself nor by another. Again, it is improper to consider the possibility of karyadibhavas even by sva and para taken together. Because, since siddhi is not found in either of them separately, how could it be attained in the samudaya of the two ? Take the example of oil and sand. When 'oil is not present in every single particle of sand, it is not found in the collection of sand also. Thus, the accomplishment of an object by means of ubhaya, (both ) is also impossible. In case of accomplishment by means of ubhaya, there is another difficulty also. During the process of siddhi, so long as karya is not accomplished, there is karanasiddhi and so long as karana is not accomplished, there is karyasiddhi. Consequently, karya and karana depend upon each other, and hence there is itaretarasrayadosa, or the fault of affecting each other, Thus, it is clear that the siddhi of karyadibhava is not possible even if sva and para are taken together.

Page #240
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 197 :: Nor even by any other means-anublayuluh-the siddhi is possible. For, there is no vastu ( object ) available except sva, para and ubhhya in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of bhavas anyatah or anubhayatah (i. e., by means of any object excepting sva, paru and ubhaya ) the siddhi would be nir-hetuka (void of cause ). To take an example the pradesini finger (next to thumb ) looks dirgha when compared with the thumb and hrasvu when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself is neither short nor long. Since it is not hro.sva or dirgha by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said"Na dirghe'steeha dirghatvam na hrasve napi ca dvayei Tasmadasiddbam sunyatvat saditya khyayate kva hi ? || " Hrasvam pratitya siddham dirgham, dirgham pratitya hrasvamapit Na kinoidasti siddham, vyavaharavasad vadantyevam " (1692) In support of the prima facie assertion that there is sarvusunyata, a number of examples are given. atthitta-ghaDegANegayA va svegyaaidosaao| save'NabhilappA vA suNNA vA sabahA bhAvA // 145 // (1693) Atthitta-ghadeganegaya va savvegayaidosao i Savve'nabhilappa va sunna va savvaha bhava Il 145 || (.1693 ) [ feara-elamar ar passariaguaia i posafisicat al Tatar att prat: 11 884 ll ( 8883) Astitva-ghataikanekata va sarvaika tadidosati Sarve'nabhilapya va sunya va sarvatha bhavah 11 145 11 ( 1693 ) ] Trans.--145 Unity or distinction of astitva and ghata would either give rise to faults like sarvaikata (i. e. universal

Page #241
*: 198 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth oneness ) or all the objects would become inexpressible (by word or speech ) or non-existent in all respects (1693). TIkA-nanvastitva-ghaTayorekatvam , anekatvaM vAM ? / yadyekatvam , tarhi sarvaikatA prApnoti-yo yo'sti sa sa ghaTa ityastitve ghaTasya pravezAt sarvasya ghaTatvaprasaGgaH syAt, na paTAdi padArthAntaram / ghaTo vA sarvasattvAvyatirekAt sarvAtmakaH syAt ; athavA, yo ghaTaH sa evAstIti ghaTamAtre'stitvaM praviSTam , tato'nyatra sattvAbhAvAdaghaTasya sarvasyApyabhAvaprasaGgato ghaTa evaikA syAt / so'pi vA na bhavet , aghaTavyAvRtto hi ghaTo bhavati, yadA ca tatpratipakSabhRto'ghaTa eva nAsti, tadA kimapekSo'sau ghaTaH syAta 1 / iti sarvazUnyatvamiti / atha ghaTa-satcayoranyatvamiti dvitIyo viklpH| tarhi sattvarahitatvAdasan ghaTaH, kharaviSANavaditi / apica, sato bhAvaH sacamucyate, tasya ca svAdhArabhUtebhyo ghaTAdibhyaH sadbhayo'nyatve'sattvameva syAt, AdhArAdanyatve AdheyasyApyanupapatteH / tadevamastitvena saha ghaTAdInAmekatvA'nyatvavikalpAbhyAmuktanyAyena sarvaikatAdidoSaprasaGgAta sarve'pi bhAvA anabhilapyA vA bhaveyuH, sarvathA zUnyA vA syuH, sarvathaiva teSAmabhAvo vA bhavedityarthaH / apica, yad notpadyate tattAvad nirvivAdaM kharaviSANavadasadeva, iti nivRttA tatkathA / yadapyutpattimalloke'bhyupagamyate, tasyApi jAtA-jAtAdivikalpayuktibhirutpAdo na ghaTate, iti zUnyataiva yukteti // 145 (1693) / D. C.-( 1.) If ghata and Astitva are taken to be one, all objects will have to be taken as one. For, when ghata is said to be abhinna from astitva, all objects that have existence will be called ghata, and there will be no distinction of objects like pata etc. Thus there will arise the difficulty of scrvaikata or Universal one-ness. Moreover, ghata will become a sarvatmaka or all-pervading object, since it is taken as inseparable from the astitva of all objects. Again, if ghata is believed to be costitva itself, existence will be restricted to ghata only. All other objects that are not ghata will, in that case, have no existence. Consequently ghata alone will exist,

Page #242
Vada ] Ganadharavida : 199: Or, say, ghata, too, will not exist according to this argument. Whatever is different from a-ghata is called ghata. Now, since ghata and astitva go together, c-ghata which is opposite to ghata will also have no existence. Thus, a-ghatu does not exist. So, also ghata will not exist. For, in comparision with what, will the object be ghata if c-ghata is absent ? Hence it is better to resort to sarvasunyata. (2) Now, the second alternative that-ghata is distinct from astutva-may be considered. If ghata is bhinna from astitva, it is devoid of astitva also For, ustitva being the quality of existence, is the adheya, and ghata which contains the quality is adhara. Adheya is not supposed to exist, when adhara is away from it. So, ghata is devoid of existence and hence it is said to be c-vidyamana like the horn of an ass. Thus, the above discussion of unity or distinction of astitva and ghatu leads either to the difficulty of sarvaikata or to the anabhilapyatvu and sunyatva as regards each and every object. Again, that which is not produced is undoubtedly c-vidyamana, like the horn of an ass, and it has already been discussed before With regard to objects that have been produced in this world, it can also be proved that their production is not in the fitness of things, if properly thought of. jAyA'jAyo-bhayo na jAyamANaM ca jAyae jamhA / aNavatthA-'bhAvo-bhayadosAo suNNayA tamhA // 146 // (1694) Jaya' jayo-bhayao na jayamanam ca jayae jamha i Anavattha' bhavo-bhayadosao sunnaya tamha 11 146 11 ( 1694 ) [ FIar-sgratinat a FTTHAT FIT TA1a1 anavasthA 'bhAvo-bhayadoSAt zUnyatA tasmAt // 146 / / (1694) Jatu'jatobhayato, na jayamanam ca jayate yasmati Anavastha'bhavo-bhayadosat sunyata tasmat || 146 # ( 1694 ) ]

Page #243
.: 200. Jinabhadra Gani's { The fourth Trans.-146 ( An object ) which has ( already ) been produced, or which is in both the conditions, or which is ( in the state of) being produced, can never be produced on account of faults like disorder, non-entity or both. So, it is non-existent. TIkA-iha tAvad na jAtaM jAyate, jAtatvAdeva, niSpannaghaTavat / atha jAtamapi jAyate, tInavasthA, jAtatvAvizeSeNa punaHpunarjanmaprasaGgAt / athAjAtaM jAyate / tatrottaramAha-" abhAva tti" sUcakatvAt sUtrasya, tahyabhAvo'pi kharaviSANalakSaNo jAyatAm , ajAtatvAvizeSAt / atha jAtAjAtarUpaM jAyate / tadapyayuktam / kutaH ? ityAha-ubhayadoSAt pratyekobhayapakSoktadoSApatterityarthaH / kiJca, etajAtAjAtalakSaNamubhayamasti vA, na vA / yadyasti, tarhi jAtameva tat, na punarubhayam , tatra cokto doSaH / atha nAsti tathApi nobhayaM tat , kintvajAtameva, tatrApi cAbhihitameva dUSaNam / nApi jAyamAnaM jAyate, pUrvokta vikalpadvayAnativRtteH, tathAhi-tadapi jAyamAnamasti na vA ? / yadyasti, tarhi jAtameva tat / nAsti cet, tabajAtameva / pakSadvaye'pi cAsminnabhihita eva doSaH / uktaM ca gataM na gamyate tAvadagataM naiva gamyate / gatAgatavinirmuktaM gamyamAnaM na gamyate // 1 // ityAdi / yasmAdevam , tasmAdanavasthAdidoSaprasaGgena vastUnAmutpAdAyogAjagataH zUnyataiva yukteti // 146 (1694) / ___D. C.-(1) An object which is once produced has not to undergo the process of production again, just as a ghata which has already been jata has not to be produced again. Even then if it is said that objects that have once been produced can be produced again and again, there would be anavastha. Hence utpatti of an already jata object is absolutely impossible. (2) Again, if an a-jata object is believed to be capable of being produced objects like kharavisana-that have never

Page #244
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 201 : been produced so far-should also be taken as capable of being produced. Because, ajatatva is present in kharavisana also. But this is absurd. So, utpatti of an ajatu object is never possible. (3) In the case of an object which is both jata and arjata, the utpatti is not possible. Because dosas that are found in each one of the above two cases separately are certainly found in the combination of the two also. Moreover, if an object which is ubhayarupa is taken to be vidyamana it becomes jata and loses its jatajata ubhayarupa. Similarly, if it is a-vidyamana, it cannot be called ubhayarupa, but anutpanna only. Now, when it is utpanna or anutpanna, dosas like anavastha and abhava do arise. ( 4 ) In the case of a juyamana object also, the above argument may be applied and the dosas like anavastha and abhava arise in that case also, according as it becomes jata or a-jata due to its being vidyamana or c-vidyamana. So, utpatti in this case is also impossible. So, it is said, " Gatam na gamyate tavadagatam naiva gamyate ! Gatagatavinirmuktam gamyamanain na ganyate 11" Thus, in all the above-mentioned four avasthas of an object, it has been clearly pointed out that its utpatti is impossible. Hence, it is proper to believe in the Universal non-entity. 25- TATAPOT ofte Hag at a gi etori I . CIAS ALATTHI ATHIN a FIAT 88011 (1884) Heu-paccayasamaggi visu bhavesu no va jam kajjam | Disai samaggimayam savvabhave na samaggi u 147 11 ( 1695 ) [ hetu-pratyayasAmagrI viSvag bhAveSu no vA yat kAryam / sud naitai hataret e rrut I1 880 II (8884) 26

Page #245
Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Hetu-pratyayasamagri visvag bhavesu no va yat karyam Drisyate samagrimayam sarvabhave na samagri || 147 // ( 1695 ) ] *: 202 :. Trans.-147 An object is accomplished by means of a group of causes taken together and not by hetu or pratyaya in its individual capacity. (This) collection of causes cannot be ( found ) in the ( midst of ) all-pervading negation. TIkA - hetavaH - upAdAnakAraNAni, pratyayAstu nimittakAraNAni teSAM hetu - pratyayAnAM yA sAmagrI tasyA viSvag bhAveSu pRthagavasthAsu yat kAryaM na dRzyate, dRzyate ca sAmagrImayam - saMpUrNa sAmayyavasthAyAM punardRzyata ityarthaH / evaM ca sati kAryasya sarvAbhAva eva yukta iti zeSaH / sarvAbhAve ca na sAmagrInaika sAmagrIsadbhAvaH prApnotItyarthaH / tataH sarvazUnyataiveti bhAvaH / idamatra hRdayam - hetavazca pratyayAca svajanyamartha kimekaikazaH kurvanti, saMbhUya vA 1 / na tAvadekaikazaH, tathA'nupalabdheH / tata ekaikasmAt kAryasyAbhAvAt sAmavyAmapi tadabhAva eva syAt, sikatAkaNatailavaditi / itthaM ca sarvasyApi kAryasyotpattyabhAve sAmagrIsadbhAvo na prApnoti, anutpannAyAH sAmayyA apyayogAt / tatazca sarvazUnyataiva jagataH / uktaM ca " hetu pratyayasAmagrI pRthag bhAveSvadarzanAt / tena te nAbhilapyA hi bhAvAH sarve svabhAvataH // 1 // loke yAvat saMjJA sAmagryAmeva dRzyate yasmAt / tasmAd na santi bhAvA bhAve sati nAsti sAmagrI // 1 // ityAdi / asya ca vyAkhyA - pRthag bhAveSvadarzanAt " kAryasya " iti zeSaH / tena te ghaTAdayo bhAvA sarve'pi svabhAvataH svarUpato nAbhilApyAH, pRthagekaikAvasthAyAH kAryasyAnutpAdAt utpattimantareNa ca ghaTAdisaMjJA'pravRtteH, saMjJA'bhAve cAbhilaptumazakyatvAditi / kutaH punaH pRthagavasthAyAM saMjJA - pravRtti: : ityAha- " loke yAvadityAdi " loke yAvat saMjJA " ghaTo'yam " ? 'ityAdisaMjJApravRttiH tAvat saMpUrNa kArya saMpUrNa sAmagryAmeva yasmAd dRzyate, pRthagabhAve ca sAmayyAmapyabhAvAt sikatA tailavad na santyeva bhAvAH, bhAvAsave ca kutaH sAmagrIsadbhAvaH 1 iti / / 147 / / ( 1695 ) // "

Page #246
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 203 : D. C.-An object is said to have been accomplished only when all upadana and nimitta causes are assembled together. But when each one of these causes operates separately, the karya could never be accomplished. In other words, there is abhava of the karya and ultimately there will be sarvabhava. Again, in the midst of sarvabhava, samagri cannot exist. Consequently, there will be sarvas'unyata. Moreover, just as oil cannot be found in the collection of sands when it is not present in each individual particle, so also karya cannot be found in the combination of many karanas when it is absent in each individual karaan separately. Thus, when the existence and production of all karyas are denied, the existence and production of samagri are also denied. So here also, sarvas'unyata is the only resort of belief. Again, it is said that "Hetu-pratyayasamagri prthag bhavesvadarsanati Tena te nabhilapya hi bhavah sarve svabhavatah 11" " Loke yavat samjnasanagryameva drisyate yasmati Tasmad na santi bhava, bhave sati nasti samagri 11147||(1695)" parabhAgAdarisaNaoM savArAbhAgasuhamayAo y| ubhayANuvalaMbhAo sabANuladdhio suNNaM // 148 // (1696 ) Parabhagadarisanao savvarabhagasuhamayao ya i Ubhayanuvalambhao savvanuladdhio sunnam 148 11 ( 1696 ) [ parabhAgAdarzanataH sarvArAdbhAgasaukSmyAcca / J#4145FhTa vaigroya: 77611 886 11 (8898) Parabhagadarsanatah sarvaradbhagasauksmyacca / Ubhayanupalambhat sarvanupalabdhitah sunyam (1 148 11 (1696) ] Trans.--148 The 'rear portion ( of an object ) is not perceptible; and its front-most part is very minute. So, on

Page #247
.:;204: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth account of the non-perception of these two, there is nonperception of all, which results in complete negation. 2 TIkA - iha yat tAvadadRzyaM tadasadeva, anupalambhAt, kharaviSANavaditi nivRttA tadvArtA dRzyasyApi ca stambha - kumbha - kuDyAdeH para madhya bhAgayorasatvameva arvAgbhAgAntaritatvena tayorapyadarzanAt, ArAdbhAgasyApi ca sAvayavatvAt punaranyaH khalvArAdbhAgaH tasyApyanyaH punastasyApyanya ityevaM tAvat yAvat sarvArAtIyabhAgasya, paramANuprataramAtratvenAtisaukSmyAt, pUrveSAM cArAdbhAgAnAmanyasyAnyenAntaritatvenAnupalabdheH / tatazvoktanyAyena parabhAgasarvArAtIyabhAgalakSaNobhayabhAgAnupalambhAt sarvasyApi vastujAtasyAnupalabdheH zUnyaM jagaditi / uktaM ca yAvad dRzyaM parastAvad bhAgaH sa ca na dRzyate / tena te nAbhilAyA hi bhAvAH sarve svabhAvataH // 1 // " tadevamuktayuktayA sarvasyApi bhUtAderabhAvaH prApnoti zrUyate ca zrutau bhUtAdisadbhAvo'pIti saMzayaH / iti pUrvapakSaH || 148 ( 1696 ) // ae D. C.-It has already been discussed that objects like kharavisana do not exist, because they are non-perceptible. In case of perceptible objects like pillar, jar, wall etc, the rear and middle portions are not perceived because they are screened by the front portion coming in their way. So they are said to be a-vidyamana. Again, the front portion consists of a number of divisions. Out of all these divisions, every one is screened by the other coming in its immediate front which again is screened by a third one in its immediate vicinity and so on. Ultimately, the front-most particle is left unscreened. But it is extremely small in size and hence becomes non-cognizible. Now, since the rear and front-most parts are non-perceptible, it can be said that objects-and ultimately all the objects in the Universe-are non-cognizable or s'unya. Moreover, it is said that

Page #248
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 205 : "Yavad dpisyam parastavad bhagah sa ca na drisyate 1 Tena te nabhilapya hi bhavah sarve svabhavatah ! " So, you have a doubt in the existence of Bhuta eto, and according to your belief, they are non-existent. This finishes the purvapaksa ( the argument of the opponent ) Now follows the refutation of the argumentmA kuru viyatta! saMsayamasai na saMsayasamubbhavo jutto| khakusuma-kharasiMgesu va, jutto so thANu-purisesu // 149 // (1696) Ma kuru Viyatta ! samsayamasai na samsayasamubbhavo jutto 1 Khakusuma-kharasingesu va jutto so thanu-purisesu ||1491(1697) [mA kuru vyakta ! saMzayamasati na saMzayasamudbhavo yuktH| khakusuma-kharazRGgayoriva yuktaH sa sthaannu-purussyoH||149||(1697) Ma kuru Vyakta ! samsayamasati na samsayasamudbhavo yuktahi Khakusuma-kharasrigayoriva yuktah sa sthanu-purusayoh ||1491] Trans.--149 O Vyakta! Do not entertain doubt, The doubt about non-existent (objects) is improper as in the case of kha-kusuma (flower of the sky) and kharasrrga (horn of an ass ). It is proper (only) with regard to (existent objects like ) sthanu and purusa. ( 1697) TIkA-AyuSmana vyakta ! mA kRthAH saMzayaM-mA bhUtAbhAvaM budhyasva, gato'sati bhUtakadambake saMzayaH khakusuma-kharaviSANayoriva na yuktaH, api tvabhAvanizcaya eva syAt / satsveva ca bhUteSu sthANu-puruSAdiSviva saMzayo yuktaH / yadi punarasatyapi vastuni saMdehaH syAt tadA'vizeSeNa kharaviSANAdiSvapi syAditi bhAvaH // 149 // (1697 ) // D. C.-0 long-lived Vayakta ! Don't be dubious about the existence of Blutas. Because the doubt about non-existent objects is totally unjustifiable as in the case of kha-kusuma and kharas'rnga where abhava is already fixed up. It can be

Page #249
.: 206 : Jinabhadra :Gani's [The fourth justified only in the case of existent objects like sthanu and purusa. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, the doubt will be raised in the case of kharavisana also, which, too is non-existent in general. ko vA visesaheU savAbhAve vi thANu-purisesu / saMkA na khapupphAisu vivajao vA kahaM na bhave? // 150 // (1698) Ko va visesaheu savvabhave vi thanu-purisesu | Sanka na khapupfaisu vivajjao va kaham na bhave ? // 150 // (1698) [ko vA vizeSahetuH sarvAbhAve'pi sthANu-puruSayoH / zaGkA na khapuSpAdiSu viparyayo vA kathaM na bhavet ? // 150 // (1698) Ko Va viesahetuh sarvabhave'pi sthanu-purusayoh | Sarika na khapuspadisu viparyayo va katham na bhavet? 11150117 Trans.--150 Or, what special reason can there be in ( entertaining ) doubt about sthanu and purusa and not about kha-puspa ( flower of the sky ) etc, even in ( the midst of ) allpervading non-entity? Or, why should not the reverse take place ? ( 1698) TIkA-ko cA'tra vizeSaheturucyatAM yat-sarvAbhAve sarvazUnyatAyAmaviziSTAyAmapi sthANvAdiSu saMzayo bhavati / na khapuSpAdiSu ? / nanu vizeSahetvabhAvAdavizeSeNa sarvatra saMzayo'stu, niyAmakAbhAvAd / viparyayo vA bhavet-khapuSpAdiSu saMzayaH syAd na sthANvAdiSviti bhaavH||150(1698)| D. C.-Even when there was all-pervading negation on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like sthanu etc, and not about non-existent objects like kha-puspa etc ? If there is no visesahetu on which your belief is based, the sams'aya, in general, may rise at all places. Or, in absence of clear explanation, reverse may be the case i. e. The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like kha-puspa etc, and not about existent objects like sthanu etc.

Page #250
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 207 : Moreover, paccakkhao'NumANAdAgamao vA pasiddhiratthANaM / savappamANavisayAbhAve kiha saMsao jutto ? // 151 // (1699) Paccakkhao'numanadagamao va pasiddhiratthanam i Savvappamanavisayabhave kiha samsao jutto ? u 15111 ( 1699) [pratyakSato'numAnAdAgamato vA prasiddhirarthAnAm / sarvapramANaviSayAbhAve kathaM saMzayo yuktaH ? // 151 // ( 1699 ) Pratyaksato'numanadagamato va prasiddhirarthanam i Sarvapramanavisayabhave katham samsayo yuktah ? 1115111 (1699)] ____Trans.-151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by ( means of ) visible evidence (pratyaksa ) or by inference ( anumana ) or by documentary evidence ( agama ). ( But ) in absence of all ( such ) Prananas ( evidences ) and visayas ( topics ) how could the samsaya be justified ? ( 1699 ) TIkA-yadA hi pramANairarthAnAM prasiddhirjAtA bhavet tadA kathazcit kvacid vastuni saMzayo yujyate / yadA ca sarveSAM pramANAnAM sarveSAM ca tadviSayANAmabhAvastadA kathaM saMzayo'stu, saMzayasya jJAta-jJeyAdyarthasAmagrIjanyatvAt 1 / sarvazUnyatve ca tadabhAvAd na saMzayodbhUtiH, nirmUlatvAditi bhAvaH // 151 // (1699) // D. C.-When the object is accomplished by means of pramanas ( evidences ) a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent. But when all such pramanas and visayas are absent, how can the doubt exist? The doubt springs up from materials like znata and jieya. But when everything is believed as s'unya, materials like jnata and jieyc are not supposed to exist, and hence, the sams'aya has also no reason to rise. jaM saMsayAdau nANapajjayA taM ca neyasaMbaddhaM / sabanneyAbhAve na saMsao teNa te jutto // 152 // (1700)

Page #251
.: 208:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Jam samsayadau nanapajjaya tam ca neyasambaddhami Savvanneyabhave na samsao tena te jutto // 152 // ( 1700 ) [ yat saMzayAdayo jJAnaparyayAstaca jJeyasaMbaddham / / sarvajJeyAbhAve na saMzayastena te yuktaH // 152 // (1700) Yat samsayadayo jnanaparyayastacca jnegasaibaddham | Sarvajneyabhave na samsayastena te yuktah | 152 // ( 1700 )] Trans.-152 Since doubt etc. are the synonyms of jnana, they are related to the jneya ( cognizable object ) also. So, in absence of all jneyas, your doubt has also no place ( to exist ). ( 1700 ) TIkA-yasmAt saMzaya-viparyayA-'nadhyavasAya-nirNayA vijJAnaparyayAH, taca jJeyanibandhanameva, sarvazUnyatAyAM na jJeyamasti, tasmAd na tava saMzayo yuktaH / sati ca saMzaye'numAnasiddhA eva bhAvAH // 152 ( 1700) // ____D. C.-Since doubt, inversion (vaparyaya ) non-apprehen. sion (anadhyavasaya ) and affirmation ( nirnaya ) are the ( various ) synonyms of knowledge, they are automatically connected with the cognizable also. Now, since everything is s'unya, nothing can be apprehended when there is nothing jneya, there can be no jnana and no sams'aya also, as sams'aya is nothing but a paryaya of the knowledge. Still, however, if you insist upon entertaining doubt, siddhi of objects will have to be apprehended only by means of anumana and not by virtue of perception as there can be no perception on account of the absolute abhava of everything. saMti ciya te bhAvA saMsayao somma ! thANu-purisa ch| aha diTuMtamasiddhaM maNNasi naNu saMsayAbhAvo // 153 // (1701) Santi cciya te bhava samsayao Somma! thanu-purisa vya Aha ditthantamasiddham mannasi nanu sanisayabhavo 11 153 11 [santyeva te bhAvAH saMzayataH saumya ! sthANu-puruSAviva / atha dRSTAntamasiddhaM manyase nanu saMzayAbhAvaH // 153 / / (1701)

Page #252
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 209 :. Santyeva te bha vah samsayatah Saumya ! sthanu-purusaviva 1 Atha dastantamasiddham manyase nanu sansayabhavah|l15311(1701)] ____ Trans.-153 0 Saumya! Because of ( your ) doubt ( about them ), those objects do exist like sthanu and purusa, But, again, if you believe the example ( of sthanu and purusa ) to be asiddha (i. e. unaccomplished ), existence of the doubt will be denied. ( 1701 ) TIkA-saumya ! santi bhavato'pi bhAvAH, saMzayasamutthAnAt , iha yat saMzayyate tadasti, yathA sthANu-puruSo; yaccAsad na tat saMzayyate, yathA khpussp-khrvissaanne| atha sthANu-puruSalakSaNaM dRSTAntamasiddhaM manyase tvam , sarveSAmapi sthANu-puruSAdibhAvAnAmavizeSeNaivAsattvAbhyupagamAt / tadayuktam , yato nanu sarvabhAvAsattve saMzayAbhAva eva syAt , ityuktameveti / / 153 // (1701) D. C.-0 Saumya / The very doubt that you have raised against the objects proves that the objects are vidyamana like stharu and purusa. For, there cannot exist any doubt about non-existent objects like akas'apuspa and kharavisana. Again, if you think that the above example of (the existent objects like ) sthanu and purusa is wrong, you are not justified. For, in that case, all objects whether vidyamana as sthanu etc, or a-vidyamann, as khapuspa etc. will have to be considered as a-vidyamana according to your belief. So, when the existence of each and every object will be denied, naturally the existence of doubt will also be denied. savAbhAve vi maI saMdeho simiNae ba, no taM ca / jaM saraNAinimitto simiNo na u sabahAbhAvo // 154 // (1702) Savvabhave vi mai samdeho siminae vva, no tam ca 1 Jam saranainimitto simino na u savvahabhavo u 154 11 ( 1702 ) [sarvAbhAve'pi matiH saMdehaH svamaka iva, no tacca / yat smaraNAdinimittaH svamo na tu srvthaa'bhaavH||154||(1702)

Page #253
.: 210: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Sarvabhave'pi matih samde hah svapnaka iva, no tacca Yat smaranadinimittah svapno na tu sarvatha'bhavah 154|| (1702)] Trans-154 It is improper to believe that inspite of allpervading negation, doubt does spring up in a dream. For, dream consists of (a number of) nimittas like remembrance etc. and it is not absolutely non-existent. (1702) A1-7917aIa: 9779-aafurasfa eaca _ge: HTI:, TAI kila kazcit pAmaro nijagRhAGgaNe "kimayaM dvipendro mahIdho vA ? iti saMzete, na ca tat tatra kiJcidapyasti, evamanyatra sarvabhAvAbhAve'pi saMzayo bhaviSyati / tacca na, yad yasmAt svapne'pi pUrvadRSTAnubhRtasmaraNAdinimittaH saMdehaH, na tu sarvathA bhAvAbhAve'sau kvApi pravartate / anyathA hi yat SaSThabhUtAdikaM kvacidapi nAsti tatrApi saMzayaH syAt, vizeSAbhAvAditi / nanu kiM svapno'pi nimittamantareNa na pravartate 1 / evametat // ( 1702 ) // D. C-In support of the belief that doubt springs up even in sarvabhava, an opponent may advance an argument as follows Just as in a dream, a poor pauper raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or a mountain before his house, though, in fact, nothing exists like that; so, also, at other places, doubt can be raised inspite of the absolute abhava of things. Thus we can say that even though, there is sarvabhava, sams'aya does exist in dream. But the above argument is totally groundless. In dream, doubt arises on account of various reasons. Say for instance, when an object is seen or experienced, the remembrance of that experience etc. gives rise to the doubt. So, for the rise of doubt in the dream there is some sort of reason which brings the dream-and hence the doubt-into existence. Thus doubt arises from an existent object and not from the absolute abhava of it. But, suppose, even then, if you believe that the samdeha springs up from the absolute abhava also, the doubt should

Page #254
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 211: also have to arise from objects like sixth element which have never been existent so far. Because, abhava is present in them also. annuhy-di-ciNtiy-suy-pyiviyaar-devyaa'nnuuyaa| simiNassa nimittAiM puNNaM pAvaM ca nAbhAvo // 155 // (1703) Anuhuya-dittha-cintiya-suya-payaiviyara-devaya'nuya / Siminassa nimittaim punnam pavam ca nabhavo il 155 11 (1703) [ anubhuut-dRsstt-cintit-shrut-prkRtivikaar-devtaa'nuupaaH| svapnasya nimittAni puNyaM pApaM ca nAbhAvaH // 155 // (1703) Anubhuta-drsta-cintita-sruta-prakrti-vikara-devata'nupah Svapnasya nimittani punyam papam ca nabhavah ul55 // (1703)] - Trans.-155 ( Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing ( of an object ), ill-health (prakrti) vikara ), a deity, watery place, meritorious act and sin-these are the prominent causes ( nimittas ) of dream. So it is not non-existent. (1703) TIkA-snAna-bhojana-vilepanAdikamanyadA'nubhUtaM svapne dRzyate, ityanubhUto'rthaH svapnasya nimittam / athavA, kari-turagAdiko'nyadAdRSTo'rthastanimittam / vicintitazca priyatamAlAbhAdiH / zrutazca svrg-nrkaadiH| tathA, vAta-pitAdijanitaH prakRtivikAraH svapnasya nimittam / tathA, anukUlA pratikUlA vA devatA tanimittam / tathA, anUpaH sjlprdeshH| tathA puNyamiSTasvapnasya nimittam / pApaM cAniSTasya tasya nimittam, na punarvastvabhAvaH / kiJca, svamo'pi tAvad bhAva eva / tatastasyApi satve kathaM " zUnyaM jagat" iti bhavatA pratijJAyate // 155 (1703) D. C.-The nimittas that bring dream into existence are treated as follows: 1. Previous experience-Certain acts like snana, bhojana,

Page #255
. 212 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth vilepana etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dream due to this reason. 2. Observation-When objects like elephants, horses etc. are perceived in dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the drstartha reason. 3. Attentive Consideration---A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc. is called the dream of cintitartha. 4, Hearing-When places like svarga, and narakawhich are only heard of, and not seen-are perceived in dream, the nimitta is sy tartha. 5. Disturbance of Health Ill health caused by diseases like vata and pitta is also one of the nimittas of dream. 6. A deity--When one beholds a deity-adverse or favourable-in dream, the dream can be called deva-nimitta. 7. Watery place-This is also one of the nimittas when one dreams in the midst of watery region. 8-9. Punya and papa-A dream is said to be good or bad according as there is punya or papa, as its nimitta. Thus, it is clear that & svapna is brought about by one of the above-mentioned nimittas. And hence, svapna is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of a nimitta or nimittas. In this way, when the dream itself is existent, how can you call the world to be non-existent like svapna ? viNNANamayattaNao ghaDaviNNANaM va sumiNao bhAvo / ahavA vihiyanimitto ghaDo va nemittiyttaao||156||(1704) Vinnanamayattanao ghadavinnanam va suminao bhavo i Ahava vihiyanimitto ghado vya nemittiyattao il 156 11 ( 1704) [vijJAnamayatvato ghaTavijJAnamiva svamako bhAvaH / tuar farzalamint ST AMATirana 11 848 11 (2008) :

Page #256
Vada ] Ganadharavada 6:218 : Vijnanamayatvato ghata vijnanawiva svapnako bhavah 1 Athava vihitanimitto ghata iva naimittikatvat | 156 // ( 1704)] Trans.--156 The existence of dream is ( apprehended) either because dream is vijnanamaya (i. e. full of knowledge ) like ghata or because it is naimittika ( i. e. caused by nimitta ) like ghata as mentioned before. ( 1704 ) TIkA-bhAvaH svama iti prtijnyaa| vijJAnamayatvAditi hetuH| ghaTavijJAnavaditi dRSTAntaH / athavA, bhAvaH svamA, naimittikatvAt nimittainiSpanno naimittikastaddhAvastatvaM tasmAdityarthaH, ghaTavaditi / kathaM punaH svapno naimittikaH ? ityAha-yato vihitanimittaH, vihitAni-"aNuya-diTThaciMtiya" ityAdinA pratipAditAni nimittAni yasyAsau vihitanimitta iti // 156 (1704) // D. C.-Existence of dream can be proved in either of these two ways : 1. Dream is full of cognizance as ghata is. So, like ghata, dream can also be perceived on account of its being existent. 2. As ghata is caused by various nimittas, dream is also caused by nemittas, like anubhavu, smarana, cintana etc. that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a murta karya, and hence existent like ghata. savAbhAve ca kao sumiNo'sumiNo tti saccamaliyaM ti| gaMdhavapuraM pADaliputtaM tattho vayAro ti ? // 157 // (1705) kajaM ti kAraNaM ti ya sajjhamiNaM sAhaNaM ti kattaM tti / vattA vayaNaM vaccaM parapakkho'yaM sapakkho'yaM ? // 158 // (1706) kiM veha thira-davo-siNa-calayA-rUvittaNAI niyyaaii| saddAdao ya gajjhA sottAiyAiM gahaNAI ? // 159 // (1707)

Page #257
.: 214 : Jinabhadra Gaai's [The fourth samayA vivajao vA savAgahaNaM va kiM na supaNammi / kiM suNNayA va sammaM saggaho kiM va micchattaM? // 160 // (1708) kiha sa-paro-bhayabuddhI kahaM ca tesiM paropparamasiddhI / aha paramaIe bhaNNai sa-paramaivisesaNaM katto ? // 161 // (1709) Savvabhave ca kao sumino'sumino tti saccamaliyam til Giandhavvapuram Padaliputtam tattho vayaro tti ? 1115711(1705) Kajiam ti karanam ti ya sajjhaminam sahanam ti katta tti i Vatta vayanam vaccam parapakkho'yam sa-pakkho'yam?11158||(1706) Kim veha thira-davo-sina-calaya-ruvittanaim niyayaim i Saddadao ya gajjha sottaiyaim gahanaim ? ll 159 11 ( 1707 ) Samaya vivajjao va savvagahanam va kim na sunnammi 1 Kim sunnaya va sammam saggaho kim va micchattam? // 160 // (1708) Kiha sa-paro-bhaya buddhi kaham ca tesim paropparamasiddhi i Aha paramate bhannai sa-paramaivisesanam katto? // 1610 (1709) [sarvAbhAve ca kutaH svapno'svapna iti satyamalIkamiti / gandharvapuraM pATaliputraM tathya upacAra iti // 157 // (1705) kAryamiti kAraNamiti ca sAdhyamidaM sAdhanamiti karteti / vaktA vacanaM vAcyaM parapakSo'yaM svapakSo'yam ? // 158 // (1706) kiM veha sthira-dravo-SNa-calanA-rUpitvAni niyatAni / zabdAdayazca prAdhAH zrotrAdikAni grAhyANi ? // 159 // (1707) samatA viparyayo vA sarvAgrahaNaM vA kiM na zUnye / kiM zUnyatA vA samyak sadgrahaH kiM vA mithyAtvam ? // 160 // (1708) kathaM sva-paro bhayabuddhiH kathaM ca teSAM prsprmsiddhiH| atha paramatyA bhaNyate sva-paramativizeSaNaM kutaH // 161 // (1709) Sarvabhave ca kutah svapno'svapna iti satyamalikamiti i Gandharvapuram Pataliputram tathya upacara iti ? 1115711 (1705)

Page #258
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 215 >> Karyamiti karanapiti ca sadhyamidam sadhanamiti karteti i Vakta vacanam vacyam para pakso'yam svapakso'yam ?1115811(1706) Kim veha sthira-dravo-sna-calata-rupitvani niyatani i Sabdadayasca grahyah srotradikani grahyani ? | 159 I (1707) Samata viparyayo va sarvagrahanam va kim na sunye i Kim sunyata va samyak sadgrahah kim va mithyatyam ||16011(1701) Katham sva-paro-bhaya buddhih katham ca tesam parasparamasiddhih Atha para-matya bhanyate sva-para-mativisesanam kutah ? ||16111 ] Trans.--157-161 Again, in case of all-pervading negation how could there be distinction between dream and otherwise? between truth and false-hood ? between ( an imaginary ) Gandharva city and ( a real ) Patliputra?t between a fact and fancy? between cause and effect? between end, means, and ( their ) agent? between speaker, speech, and ( that which is ) to be spoken ? between one's own party, and the opposite party? Or, in such a case, how could (properties like ) stability, fluidity, heat, activeness etc. as well as (the rule ) that sound etc. are grahya (to be received) and the ear etc. are grahakas (receivers |-be ascertained at all? Or, why should (faults like ) uniformity, contraiety or non-acceptibility of all, not arise in ( the state of all-pervading ) negation ? And, is this ( apprehension of ) sunayta really substantial or worthless ? Moreover, how could sva, para, and ubhaya be distinguished and how would their mutual accomplishment be possible ( in case of all-pervading negation )? And, if it is said to be due to another's intellect, how could the intellect of sva and para be distinguished ? ( 1705-1709 ). TIkA-sarvAbhAve ca sarvazUnyatAyAM cAbhyupagamyamAnAyAM " svapno'TH" "Facasqy" sta a:-f arsi fatt:? grau: 1 791, satyamidam , alIkaM vA; tathA, gandharvapurametat , pATalIputrAdi cedam ; tathA, " tattho kyAro ti" ayaM tathyo nirupacarito mukhyazcatuSpadavizeSaH siMhA, + Known as Patra at the preseut timo.

Page #259
Jinabhadra Ganni's [ The fourth ayaM tvaupacAriko manuSyavizeSo mANavakaH, tathA, kAryamidaM ghaTAdi, kAraNaM cedaM mRtpiNDAdi; tathA sAdhyamidamanityatvAdi, sAdhanaM kRtakatvAdi, kartA ghaTAdeH kulAlAdiH; tathA, ayaM vaktA, vAdI, vacanaM cedaM vyavayavaM paJcAvayavaM idaM ca vAcyamabhidheyamasya zabdasaMdarbhasyaH tathA, ayaM svapakSaH, ayaM ca parapakSa iti sarvazUnyatve kuto'sau vizeSo gamyate / / " kiM veha thiretyAdi " pRthivyAH sthiratvam, apAM dravatvam vahneruSNatvam vAyozcalatvam, AkAzasyArUpatvamityAdayo niyatAH sarvadaivaikasvabhAvAH vizeSAH sarvazUnyatAyAM kuto gamyante / tathA, zabdAdayo grAhyA eva, indriyANi ca zrotrAdIni grAhakANyeveti kuto niyamasiddhi: ? / *: 216: " samayetyAdi " nanu sarvazUnyatAyAM svapnA svapna - satyAlIkA - dInAM vizeSanibandhanAbhAvAt samataiva kasmAd na bhavati - yAdRzaH svamaH, asvapno'pi tAdRza eva; yAdRzazcAsvapnaH, svapno'pi tAdRza evetyAdi ? | athavA, viparyayaH kuto na bhavati - yaH svapnaH so'svapnaH yastvasvapnaH sa svapna ityAdi / yadivA, sarveSAmapi svapnA'svapnAdInAM sarvathAzUnyatve'grahaNameva kasmAd na bhavati ? | bhrAntivazAdeva svapnA svapnAdigrahaNamiti cet / tadayuktam - deza-kAla- svabhAvAdinaiyatyena tadgrAhakajJAnotpatteH / kiJca, iyaM ntiH kiM vidyate, na vA / yadi vidyate, tarhyabhyupagamavirodhaH / atha na vidyate, tarhi bhrAnterasactvAbhAvagrAhakajJAnasya nirbhrAntatvAt santyeva sarve bhAvAH, na punaH zUnyateti / athavA, anyat pRcchAmo bhavantam - nanu sarvazUnyatve zUnyataiva samyaktvaM satAM bhAvAnAM grahaNaM sadgrahaH, bhAvasaccagrahaNaM punarmithyAtvamityatra kaste vizeSahetuH ? | 44 .yaduktam- na svato bhAvAnAM siddhiH ityAdi; tatpratividhAnArthamAha - " hi sa paro bhayetyAdi " nanu kathaM hrasva-dIrgho - bhayaviSaye " idaM hrasvam " "idaM dIrgham" "etattu tadubhayam" ityevaMbhUto sva-paro bhaya buddhiryugapadAzrIyate bhavatA ? kathaM ca teSAM hrasva-dIrgho -bhayAnAM parasparama siddhirudhudhyate ? - pUrvAparaviruddhatvAd naitad vaktuM yujyata ityarthaH / ayamatra bhAvArtha:na svalpApekSikameva vastUnAM saccam, kintu svaviSayajJAnajananAdyarthakriyAkAritvamapi / tatazca hrasva-dIrgho - bhayAnyAtmaviSayaM cejjJAnaM janayanti, tadA' santyeva tAni, kathaM teSAmasiddhi: ? / yadapyuktam - " madhyamAGgulimapekSya A "

Page #260
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 217 .. pradezinyAM hrasvatvamasadevocyate " ityAdiH tadapyayuktam, yato yadi madhyamAmapekSya pradezinyAM svataH sarvathA'satyAmapi hrasvatvaM bhavati, tadA vizeSAbhAvAt kharaviSANe'pi tad bhavet, atidIrgheSvindriyaSTyAdiSvapi ca tat syAt / athavA, pradezinyAH svApekSayA svAtmanyapi hrasvatvaM syAt, sarvatrAsaccAvizepAt; na caivam / tasmAt svataH satyAmeva pradezinyAM vastuto'nantadharmAtmakatvAt tattatsahakArisaMnidhau tattadrUpAbhivyaktestatajjJAnamutpadyate, na punarasatyAmeva tasyAmapekSAmAtrata eva hrasvajJAnamupajAyate / evaM dIrgho - bhayAdiSvapi vAcyam / - 66 97 atha idaM svam " " idaM dIrgham " " etaccobhayam " ityAdi svaparo - bhayabuddhiH paramatyA - parAbhyupagamenocyate, na punaH svataH siddhaM svaviSayajJAnajanakaM hrasvAdikaM kiJcidasti, ato na kazcit pUrvAparavirodha ityatrAha - nanu sarvazUnyatve " idaM svamatam, 66 etacca paramatam " ityetadapi svaparabhAvena vizeSaNaM kutaH 1 na kutazcidityarthaH, sva- parabhAve'pi " samayA vivaJjao vA " ityAdyevAvartata bhAvaH / sva- parabhAvAdyabhyupagame ca zUnyasvAbhyupagamahAniriti // 157 - 158- 159-160-161 // ( 17051706 - 1707-1708 - 1709 ) / / 66 D. C.-If the idea of all-pervading negation were taken as true, there would not exist any distinction between dream and reality; truth and falsehood; between an imaginary Gandharvapura and a real Pataliputra; between a natural four-legged lion and an artificial man-lion Manavaka; between karyas like ghata, etc. and karanas like lump of earth etc. Again, there would be no distinction between sadhya ( say, e. g. anityutva) sadhana (say, e. g. the artificial instrument-by means of which anatyatva is brought about ) and karta (e. g. a potter) who is the doer of the sadhya. There would be no distinction between a speaker, his speech (composed of three or five parts) and a number of words that are to be uttered, and there would be no distinction between svapaksa and parapaksa also. 28

Page #261
* 218 :: Jinabhadra Gari's [The fourth Moreover, properties such as stability of earth, fluidity of water, activeness of wind, formlessness of sky etc. as well as the rule that sabda, rupa, gandha etc. are grahya and ears, eyes, nose etc. are grahaka, could not be established in the midst of sarvas'unyata. Again, in the midst of all-pervading negation there being no possibility of distinction between satya and asatya either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of svapna as well as asvapna, or ( 2 ) there would be inverse apprehension of svapna as asvapna and asvapna as svapna, or ( 3 ) there would be absolute non-apprehension of svapna, asvapna and many other things. Here, o Vyakta ! It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprenhension of svapna, asvapna etc. is due to bhranti ( delusion). For, cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time, place and properties. And is that bhrants, which, according to you, apprehends svapna, asvapna, etc., vidyamana or a-vidyamana? If it is vidyamana, then naturally sarvas'unyata does not exist. If it is a-vidyamana the jnana that apprehends an object being devoid of bhranti, all objects would automatically be taken as vidyamana and there would be nothing like sarvas'unyata at all. And, how is it 0 Vyakta ! that the apprehension of existent objects as sunya, is, according to you, a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as vidyamana is worthless? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this sarvasunyata ? According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves, you apprehend objects that are short, long, or either, distinctly as short, long, or either. Thus, on one side, you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects; while on the other side, you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very

Page #262
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 219 : objects. This involves self-contradiction in your own argument which, o Vyakta ! is not at all worthy of you. The point is that in case of establishing the existence of objects mere apeksa would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object which produces jnana about its own self is also an active cause. And that is the reason why hrasva, dirgha, and ubhaya-each one of which would be producing jnana about its own self-should be taken as existing. Again, o Vyakta ! you believe that to the apeksa of the middle finger, the pradesini finger is considered as hrasva even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger if pradesini were taken as hrasva even though it is a-vidyamana by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also a-vidyamana should be taken as hrasva and a very long substance like indradhvaja should also be taken as hrasva as the quality of a-vidyamanata is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really speaking, pradesine finger being vidyamana by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of hrasva, dirgha etc. is produced in the absolutely non-existent anguli only by means of apeksa. You might argue at this point that in such cases also, dirgha, hrasva, ubkaya eto. are apprehended and the intellects as regards sva para and wbhaya are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion and further that according to you, hrasva, dirgha etc. that are svatah, siddha and that produce jnana with regard to their own selves are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, o Vyakta! how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally there would be no distinction between sva and para at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinction there would be nothing like sunyata at all. (1705-1709 )

Page #263
*: 220 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth jugavaM kameNa vA te viNNANaM hoja dIha-hassesu / jai jugavaM kAvekkhA kameNa puvammi kA'vekkhA ? // 162 // (1710) AimaviNNANaM vA jaM bAlasseha tassa kA'vekkhA / tullesu va kA'vekkhA paropparaM loyaNaduge va ? // 163 // (1711) Jugavan kamena va te vinnanam hojja diha-hassesu i Jai jugavam kavekkha kamena puvvammi ka'vekkha ? 1116211 (1710) Aimavinnanam va jam balasseha tassa ka'vekkha , Tullesu va ka'vekkha paropparam loyanaduge vya ? 1116311 (1711) [ yugapat krameNa vA te vijJAnaM bhaved dIrgha-isvayoH / yadi yugapat kA'pekSA krameNa pUrvasmin kA'pekSA ? // 162 // (1710) AdimavijJAnaM vA yad bAlasyeha tasya kA'pekSA / tulyayorvA kA'pekSA parasparaM locanadvika iva // 163 // (1711) Yugapat kramena va te vijnanam bhaved drigha-hrasvayoh 1 Yadi yugapat ka'peksa kramena parvasmin ka peksa ? ||1621(1710) Adimavijnanam va yad balasyeha tasya ka'peksa i Tulyayorva ka'peksa parasparam locanadvika iva ? 1116311 (1711)] Trans.-162-163 Is that vijnana of yours as regards dirgha and hrasva (produced ) all at once or in regular course? If (it is produced ) all at once, what apeksa ( is there ) ? (And) if ( it is produced ) in regular course, to what apeksa is the first produced ? Or, to what apeksa has the first and foremost cognizance of a child been produced ? Or, what mutual apeksa ( could there be ) in the case of two similar (objects) like a pair of eyes ? ( 1710-1711) TIkA-nanu madhyamA-pradezinyAdidIrgha-isvayostavAbhiprAyeNa svAkArapratibhAsi jJAnaM kiM yugapadeva bhavet , krameNa vA ? yadi yugapat tahiM parAnapekSaM dvayorapi yugapadeva svapratibhAsini jJAne pratibhAsAt kasya kila

Page #264
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 221 :. kAspekSA ? | atha krameNa tadApi pUrvameva svapratibhAsinA jJAnena parAnapekSameva svasya pradezinyAdergRhItatvAduttarasmin madhyamAdike dIrghe kA'pekSA ? | tasmAccakSurAdisAmagrI sadbhAve parAnapekSameva svakIyaviviktarUpeNa sarvabhAvAnAM svajJAne pratibhAsAt svata eva siddhiH / athavA, bAlasya tatkSaNameva jAtasya zizoryadiha nayanonmeSAnantaramevAdau vijJAnam, tat kimapekSya prAdurasti 1 / yadi vA, ye na hrasve nApi dIrghe, kintu parasparaM tulye eva vastunI, tayoryu - gapadeva svapratibhAsinA jJAnena gRhyamANayoH kA'nyonyApekSA ? - na kAcit, yathA tulyasya locanayugmasya / tasmAdaGgulyAdipadArthAnAM nAnyApekSameva rUpam, kintu svapratibhAsavatA jJAnenAnyanirapekSA eva te svarUpato'pi gRhyante / uttarakAlaM tu tattadrUpajijJAsAyAM tattatpratipakSasmaraNAdisahakArikAraNAntarabazAd dIrgha-hasvAdivyapadezAH pravartante iti svataH siddhA eva santi bhAvA iti / / ( 1710 - 1711 ) / / D. C-Consider whether jnana in case of objects that are hrasva and dirgha is produced at the same time or in regular course. If both the pnanas are produced simultaneously, there would be no scope for apeksa, both being recognized in their own form at the same time. On the other hand, if jnanas of the two were produced one after another the hrasva object would be apprehended by virtue of its own jnana; but later on, to whose apeksa would the dirgha object be apprehended? This leads us to conclude that in spite of the existence of mediums like eyes etc., in absence of apeksa all objects are apprehended in various forms only by virtue of their individual jnanas. This proves that the existence of all objects is very natural. Again, to whose apeksa is the jnana attained by a child immediately after its birth produced? And, what mutual apeksa could there exist in reflecting a similar cognizance in two similar objects which are neither hrasva nor dirgha but exactly identical to each other? This shows that various forms of objects like fingers etc. are not apprehended by

Page #265
.: 222 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth virtue of their apeksa to others but by means of their corresponding cognizances which are independent of apeksa. Later on, in the curiosity of observing the forms in details, the objects are recognized as hrasva, dirgha etc., on account of certain co-operative causes such as recalling the opposite faction etc. Each and every object would therefore be taken as existent by virtue of no other factor but its own svabhava. Moreover, kiM hasAo dI dIhAo caiva kiM na dIhammi | kIsa va na khapuSphAu kiM na khapuSphe khapuSphAo ? // 164 // Kim hassao dihe dihao ceva kim no dihammi Kisa va na khapupphau kim na khapupphe khapupphao ?||164||(1712) [ kiM hrasvAd dIrghe dIrghAdeva kiM na dIrghe / kasmAd vA na khapuSpAt kiM na khapuSpe khapuSpAt 1 || 164|| (1712) Kim hrasvad dirghe dirghadeva kim na dirghe Kasmad va na khapuspat kim na khapuspe khapuspat ? || 164 (1712) ] Trans. -- 164 Why ( is the knowledge ) about dirgha ( acquired ) from hrasva and not from dirgha ( itself ) ? Or, why not from khapuspa ? Or, why not ( the knowledge ) about khapuspa ( acquired ) from khapuspa ( itself ) ? ( 1712) " TIkA- hanta ! yadi sarvazUnyatA, tataH kimiti isvAdeva pradezinIprabhRtidravyAd dIrghe madhyamAdidravye dIrghajJAnAbhidhAnavyavahAraH pravartatedIrghApekSa eva dIrghena jJAnAbhidhAnena vyavahAraH kiM na pravartate, asaccAvizeSAt ? iti bhAvaH / evaM " kiM dIhAo hasse hassAu ceva kiM na hassammi ityetadapi draSTavyam / tathA, kimiti vA na khapuSpAd dIrghe hrasve vA tajjhAnAbhidhAnavyavahRtirvidhIyate / tathA, asaccAvizeSata eva kimiti khapuSpAt ? puSpa eva hrasva-dIrghajJAnAdivyavahAro na pravartate 1 / na caivam, tasmAt santyeva bhAvAH, na tu zUnyatA jagata iti // 164 ( 1712 ) / /

Page #266
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 223 :. D. C.-If everything is s'unya according to the theory of sarva s'unyata, how is it that the cognizance of dirgha is acquired only from its apeksa to hrasva as seen in the case of prades'ini and madhyama fingers, and not from its apeksa to the dargha itself ? Similarly, why is the practice of apprehending dirghatva from dirgha and hrasvatva from hrasva not followed ? Moreover, the practice of acquiring knowledge of khapuspa as well as the knowledge of hrasvatva and dirghatva in khapuspa from the khapuspa itself is not followed even though s'unyata is common to all of them. This shows that there is nothing like sarvas'unyata in this world. Moreover, kiM vA'vikkhAe ciya hoja maI va sabhAva evAyaM / so bhAvo tti sabhAvo vaMjhAputte na so jutto // 165 // (1713) Kim va'vikkhae ciya hojia mai ya sabhava evayam | So bhavo tti sabhavo vanjhaputte na so jutto # 165 11 ( 1713 ) [kiMvApekSayaiva bhaved matirvA svabhAva evAyam / . svo bhAva iti svabhAvo vandhyAputre na sa yuktaH // 165 // (1713) Kimvapeksayaiva bhaved matirva svabhava evayam Svo bhava iti svabhavo vandhyaputre na sa yuktah // 165 // ( 17 13)] ____ Trans.-165 Or, of what avail is the apeksa at all ? ( The opponent may argue here that ) " Apprehension by means of apeksa is natural." ( But) the bhava ( existence ) of sva ( one's own self ) means svabhava; ( and ) that does not apply to the son of a barren woman. ( 1713) / TIkA-athavA, sarvasyApyesattve isvAderdIrvAdyapekSayApi kiM kartavyam , zUnyatApratikUlatvAt tasyAH, ghaTAdyarthasattvavat ? / atha parasya matirbhavetsvabhAvAdevApekSayaiva isva-dIrghAdivyavahAraH pravartate / na ca svabhAvaH paryanuyogamarhati; tathA coktam-" agnirdahati nAkAzaM ko'tra payanuyujyatAm 1"

Page #267
.: 224 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth iti / hanta ! itthamapi hato'si, yata svo bhAvaH svabhAvastataH sva- parabhAvAbhyupagamAt zUnyatAbhyupagamahAniH / na ca vandhyAputra kalpAnAmarthAnAM svabhAva - parikalpanA yukteti / bhavatu vA'pekSA, tathApi zUnyatA'siddhiH || 165 // ( 1713 ) // D. C--If there is absolute negation in the world, what is the use of apeksa in apprehending hrasva etc. to the apeksa of dirgha etc.? For, the very conception of apeksa is contrary to the absolute negation. Vyakta :--Apprehending hrasva, dirgha etc. by means of apeksa is very natural. " root cause in cases Acarya: :--- That is not so, O Vyakta ! Svabhava is the like fire burns " "The sky does not burn etc. But, that is not applicable to the above-named example of the apprehension of hrasva, dirgha etc. Hence, svabhava should not be blamed in such cases. It is absurd to assume svabhava in the apprehension of non-existent objects like vandhyaputra. Svabhava means existence of one's own self. The rest can be distinguished as parabhava-the existence of everything else. Apart from your belief in apeksa, the principle of sarvas'unyata would be violated even from this point of view. How ? hojjAvekkhAo vA viNNANaM vAbhihANamettaM vA / dIhaM ti va hassaMti va na usattA sesadhammA vA // 166 // (1714) Hojjavekkhao va vinnanam vabhihanamettam va Diham ti va hassam ti va na u satta sesadhamma va ||166|| (1714) [ bhavedapekSAto vA vijJAnaM vAbhidhAnamAtraM vA / dIrghamiti vA isvamiti vA na tu sattA zeSadharmA vA || 166 || (1714)

Page #268
Vada] Ganadharavada : 225: Bhaveda peksato va vijnanam vabhidhanamatram va i Dirghamiti va hrasvamiti va na tu satta sesadharma va 1116611] ___Trans.-166 By means of apeksa either vijnana. or mere acknowledgment ( of an object ) as short or long would be ( attained ) but not the existence of the rest of the properties. ( 1714 ) TIkA-athavA, svataH siddhe vastunyapekSAto bhavet / kim ? ityAhavijJAnamabhidhAnamAtraM vaa| kenollekhena ? ityAha-" dIrgham" iti vA ." isvam" iti veti / kiM punarna bhavet ? ityAha-na tvanyApekSayA vastUnAM sattA bhavati, nApyApekSikahasva-dIrghatvAdidharmebhyaH zeSA rUpa-rasAdayo dharmA anyApekSayA siddhyanti / utpadyante ca vastusattAgrAhakANi, rUpAdidharmagrAhakANi ca jJAnAni / ato'nyApekSAbhAvataH kathaM svataH siddhasya vastusattAderabhAvaH ?, tatsadbhAve ca kathaM zUnyatA jagataH ? iti // 166(1714) / / D. C.-By virtue of its apeksa to another object, a selfaccomplished object would gain either vijnana or the acknowledgment of its own self as hrasvu or dargha and nothing more. Neither existence nor qualities such as rupa, rasa, sparsa etc., that are distinct from hrasvatva, dirghatva etc. could be established by the help of apeksa. Now, jnanas that enable us to apprehend existence along with those qualities are produced spontaneously. So, how could existence etc. of a self-accomplished object be refuted by means of apeksa ? And when the existence etc. of an object are not denied, how could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted at all ? iharA hassAbhAve sabaviNAso haveja dIhassa / na ya so, tamhA sattAdayo'NavikkhA ghaDAINaM // 167 // (1715) Ihara hassabhave sayvavinaso havejja dihassa 1 Na ya so, tamha sattadayo'navikkha ghadainam 11 167 11 ( 1715)

Page #269
: 226 :.. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth [ itarathA hrasvAbhAve sarvavinAzo bhaved dIrghasya / na ca saH, tasAt sattAdayo'napekSA ghaTAdInAm // 167 // (1715) Itaratha hrasvabhave sarvavinaso bhaved dirghasya i Na ca sah, tasmat sattadayo'napeksa ghatadinam 1116711 (1715)] Trans.--167 Otherwise, in the absence of hrasva, there should have been an absolute negation of dirgha also. But that is not so. Hence the existence etc. of ghata etc. are ( established as ) independant of ( their ) apeksa. ( to other objects ). ( 1715) TIkA-itarathA-yadi ghaTAdInAM sattAdayo'pyanyApekSayA bhaveyuH, tadA isvAbhAve isvasya sarvavinAze dIrghasyApi vastunaH sarvavinAzaH syAt , isvasattApekSitvAd dIrghasattAdInAm / na caivamasau dIrghasya sarvavinAzo dRzyate / tasAt nizcIyate-santyanyAnapekSA eva ghaTAdInAM sattA-rUpAdayo dharmAH, tatsatve cApAstA zUnyateti // 167 // (1715) // D. C.-If the qualities like existence etc. of the objects such as ghata etc., were dependant upon their comparision with other objects, destruction of a hrasva object would have effected the destruction of a dirgha object also. But really speaking, existence etc. of a dirgha object are not denied when a hrasva object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like ghata etc. have their properties such as existence, rupa, etc., totally independant of their apeksa to other objects and hence the idea of allpervading negation is automatically refuted jAvi avikkhA'vikkhaNamavikkhago'vikkhaNijjamaNavikkha / sA na mayA savesu vi saMtesu na sunnayA nAma // 168 // (1716) kiMci sao taha parao tadubhayao kiMci niccasiddhaM pi / jalao ghaDao puriso tahaM vavahArao neyaM // 169 // (1717)

Page #270
Vada ] Ganadharavada nicchayao puNa bAhiranimittamettovaogao savaM / hoi sao jamabhAvo na sijjhai nimittabhAve vi // 170 // *: 227 : Javi avikkha'vikkhanamavikkhago' vikkhanijjamanavikkha Sa na maya savvesu vi santesu na sunnaya nama // 168 (1716) Kim ci sao taha parao tadubhayao kim ci niccasiddham pi Jalao ghadao puriso taham vavaharao neyam || 169 // ( 1717) Nicchayao puna bahiranimittamettovao-gao savvam | Hoi sao jamabhavo na sijjhai nimittabhave vi // 170 // ( 1718 ) [ yA'pyapekSAspekSaNamapekSako pekSaNIyamanapekSya / sA na matA sarveSvapi satsu na zUnyatA nAma // 168 // ( 1716 ) kiJcit svatastathA paratastadubhayataH kiJcid nityasiddhimapi / jalado ghaTakaH puruSastathA vyavahArato jJeyam // 169 // ( 1717 ) nizcayataH punarvahirnimittamAtropayogataH sarvam / bhavati svato yadabhAvo na sidhyati nimittabhAve'pi // 170 // ( 1718) YA'pyapeksa'peksanamapeksako'peksaniyamanapeksya | Sa na matd sarvesvapi satsu na sunyata nama | 168 || ( 1716 ) Kimcit svatastatha paratastadubhayatah kimcid nityasiddhamapi | Jalado ghatakah purusastatha vyavaharato jneyam ||169 // ( 1717) Niscayatah punar-bahir-nimittamatropayogatah sarvam i Bhavati svato yadabhavo na sidhyati nimittabhave 'pi ||170|(1718) ] Trans.--168-169-170 Even apeksa-being identical to ( the nature of ) action ( apeksanam ), agent ( apeksakah ), and object (apeksaniyam)-could not be accepted. When all are existing there could not be sunyata at all. Some are spontaneous e. g. a cloud; some (are produced) by means of others as in the case of ghata; and Some (are produced) in both the ways. e. g. a man; while some are produced even for ever. Again, it is certain that each one ( of them ) becomes existent by its own self only by resorting to the external

Page #271
*: 228 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth causes. ( But) that which is non-existent is not produced even in the presence of external causes. ( 1716-1717-1718) ___TIkA-yA'pIyaM isvAderdIrghAdyapekSA sA'pyapekSaNaM kriyArUpam ; tathA, apekSakaM kartArama, apekSaNIyaM ca karma, anapekSya na matA-na viduSAM smmtaa| tataH kim ? ityAha-eteSu cApekSaNA-'pekSakA-'pekSaNIyeSu sarveSu vastuSu satsu na kAcit zUnyatA nAma / ato'pekSakAdisavalakSaNe vipakSa evApekSAlakSaNasya hetovRttatvAd viruddhatvamiti // 168 // (1716) // TIkA-iha kiJcit svata eva siddhyati, yathA kartRnirapekSastatkAraNadravyasaMghAtaviziSTapariNAmarUpo jaladaH / kiJcittu parataH, yathA kulAlakartRko ghaTaH / kiJcidubhayataH, yathA mAtA-pitRbhyAM svakRtakarmatazca purussH| kiJcid nityasiddhameva, yathA''kAzam / etacca vyavahAranayApekSayA draSTavyam / nizcayatastu bAhya nimittamAtramevAzritya sarvaM vastu svata eva sidhyati, yad yasmAd bAhya nimittasadbhAve'pi kharaviSANAdirUpo'bhAvaH kadAcidapi na sidhyti| ubhayanayamataM ca samyaktvamiti // 169-170 (1717-1718) / ___D. C.-Consideration of dirgha etc. in comparision with hrasva etc., is itself nothing but karta, karma and kriya. Now, when all objects are accomplished as existent by virtue of their being either karta, karma or kriya, where could the s'unyata exist at all ? The existence of all objects is either svatah, paratah, or ubhayatah. There are several objects such as cloud etc. which come into being only by coming into contact with some substance as their karana; some like ghata are produced by the help of karta, some like purusa are produced by both (as purusa comes into existence on account of his parents as well as his deeds in the past life ). Some objects like akasa are ever accomplished. Thus, it is seen that various objects come into existence in various ways, according to their usage. But really speaking, all objects are existing by their very svabhava merely by resorting to their external causes. In case of objects that are non-existent, existence could not be brought

Page #272
Vada ] Ganadharavada about even if the external causes were present because nonexistence is innate in them by their very svabhava. .: 229 :. In reply to the question whether astitva and ghata are one or different, the Acarya argues thus: atthitta - ghaDegANegayA ya pajjAyamettaciteyaM / asthi ghaDe paDivanne, iharA sA kiM na kharasiMge ? // 171 // (1719 ) Atthitta-ghadeganegaya ya pajjayamettacinteyam Atthi ghade padivanne, ihara sa kim na kharasinge ? // 171 // (1719) [ astitva - ghaTaikAnekatA vA paryAyamAtracinteyam / asti ghaTe pratipanne, itarathA sA kiM na kharazRGge / / 171 / / (1719 ) / Astitva-ghataikanekata va paryayamatracinteyam | Asti ghate pratipanne, itaratha sa kim na kharasrige // 171 // ] Trans. - 171 ( The question ) whether ghata and astitva are one or different is (nothing but the question) of synonym when ghata is existent. (For,) otherwise why should it not arise in case of kharasrnga ( also ) ? ( 1719 ) TIkA - iha " asti ghaTo na tu nAsti " ityevaM patipanne sati tadanantaramevAstitva- ghaTayoH " kimekatA, anekatA vA ? " ityAdinA ghaTAstitvayorakatvA'nekatvalakSaNaparyAya mAtracintaiva bhavatA kRtA bhavati, na tu tayorabhAvaH sidhyati / anyathA hyabhAvarUpAvizeSAd yathA ghaTA -'stitvayoH, evaM kharaviSANa - vandhyAputrayorapyekatvA - 'nekatvacintA bhavataH kiM na pravartate iti / / 171 ( 1719 ) // 66 D. C.-After having asserted that ghata exists" the question whether ghata and astitva are identical or not is reduced to the consideration of both as being mere synonyms of each other. Moreover, this question should arise only in case of the existent ghata. For, if it were not so, the question of ekata-anekata would arise in case of non-existent objects like kharasrnga and vandhyaputra also.

Page #273
.: 230 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Following the example of ghata and astitva there would be a probability of ekata-anekata between ghata and sunyata also ghaDa-sunnayanayAe vi sunnayA kA ghaDAhiyA somma ! / egatte ghaDao cciya na suNNayA nAma ghaDadhammo ! // 172 // (1720) Ghada-sunnaynnayae vi sunnaya ka ghadahiya sommall Egatte ghadao cciya na sunnaya nama ghadadhammo! // 1720 (1720) [ghaTa-zUnyatAnyatAyAmapi zUnyatA kA ghaTAdhikA saumya ! / ekatve ghaTaka eva na zUnyatA nAma ghaTadharmaH ! // 172 // (1720) // Gbata-sunyatanyatayamapi sunyata ka ghatadhika saumya !! Ekatve ghataka eva na sunyata nama ghatadharmah ! || 172 11 ] Trans.-172 Even in case of ghata and sunyata being different ( from each other ) what sunyata, exceeding ghata could be ( found ), O Saumya ? In case of similarity also, it is the ghata itself (which exists ). Sunyata does never become the property of ghata ( 1720 ) TIkA-nanu ghaTa-zUnyatayorapyanyatA, ananyatA vA ? / yadyanyatA, tarhi " sunnayA kA ghaDAhiyA somma ! ti" saumya vyakta ! zUnyatA kA ghaTAdhikA nAma ?-nanu ghaTamAtrameva pazyAmaH, na punaH kvacit zUnyatA ghaTAdadhikA samIkSyate / athAnanyatA, tathApi sati ghaTazUnyatvayorekatve ghaTa evAsau yujyate, pratyakSata evopalabhyamAnatvAt , na tu zUnyatvaM nAma kazcit taddharmaH, sarvapramANairanupalabdheriti // 1712 (1720) // D. C.-If ghata and sunyata are bhinna from each other, exceeding ghata what more sunyata ! is required, O saumya ? In case of both being similar to each other, sunyata would be nothing but ghata on account of its being perceived by pratyakisa pramana. Byt sunyata would never become a property of ghata as it could never be accomplished by any possible means whatsoever. Moreover,

Page #274
Vada] Ganadharavada :231:. viNNANa-vayaNa-vAINamegayA to tadatthiyA siddhA / aNNatte aNNANI nivvayaNo vA kahaM vAI ? // 173 // (1721) Vinnana-vayana-vainamegaya to tadatthiya siddha i Annatte annani nivvayano va kaham vai ? || 173 // ( 1721 ) [vijJAna-vacana-vAdinorekatA tatastadastitA siddhA / anyatve'jJAnI nirvacano vA kathaM vAdI ? // 173 // (1721 ) Vijnana-vacana -vadinore kata tatastadastita siddha 1 Anyatve'jnani nirvacano va katham vadi ? || 173 11 ( 1721)] Trans.--173 ( If ) knowledge and speech are identical, then its existence is proved. ( But ) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no khowledge or speech ? ( 1721 ). ____TIkA-" zUnyaM sarvameva vizvatrayam" ityevaMbhUtaM yadvijJAnaM vacanaM ca, tena saha zUnyavAdino bhavata ekatvam, anekatvaM vA ? yokatvam , tatastadastitA vastvastitA siddheti kutaH zUnyatA, vRkSatva-ziMzapAtvayorivaikatvasya vastutvAt ? / anyatve tu vijJAna-vacanayorajJAnI nirvacanazca vAdI kathaM zUnyatAM sAdhayet , zilAsaMghAtavat ? iti // 173 (1721) // ____D. C.-When the knowledge as well as the statement that all the three worlds are sunya are indentical to each other the existence-and not the sunyta-of an object is established. For, their identity is similar to the identity of vriksatva and sinsapatva. But when vijnana and vacana are dissimilar the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of sunyata. ghaDasattA ghaDadhammo tatto'NaNNo paDAio bhiNNo / Atthi tti teNa bhaNie ko ghaDa eveti niyamo'yaM // 17 // (1722) Ghadasatta gladadhammo tatto'ianno padalo bhinno i Atthi tti tena bhanie ko ghada eveti niyamo'yam ? // 1740 (1722)

Page #275
Jinabhadra Gani's [ ghaTasattA ghaTadharmastato'nanyaH paTAdito bhinnaH / astIti tena bhaNite ko ghaTa eveti niyamo'yam ? // 174 // (1722) -: 282 : [ The fourth Ghatasatta ghatadharmastato'nanyah patadito bhinnah Astiti tena bhanite ko ghata eveti niyamo 'yam ? // 174|| (1722) ] Trans.--174 Existence of ghata is a property of ghata. So, ( it is ) non-separable ( from ghata ) ( and ) distinct from pata etc. By saying, therefore, that "It exists how could you frame a rule that there exists ghata alone ? ( 1722 ) "" TIkA - ghaTAstitvalakSaNA ghaTasattA ghaTasya dharmaH, sa ca tato ghaTAdananyo'bhinnaH, paTAdibhyastu sarvebhyo'pi bhinnaH / tena tato " ghaTo'sti " iti bhaNite 'ghaTa eva ' iti " ghaTa evAsti " iti ko'yaM niyama :nija nijasattAyA: paTAdiSvapi bhAvAt te'pi santyeveti bhAvaH // 974 // ( 1722 ) // D. C.-Astitva is the property of ghata and hence it is non-separable from ghata but distinct from objects like puta etc. So, when it is said that " ghata exists " you cannot assert that ghata alone exists. For, the property of astitva is present in objects like pata also and hence they too are existing. jaM vA jadatthi taM taM ghaDo tti savaghaDayApasaMgo ko / bhaNie ghotthi va kahaM savatthittAvaroho tti ? // 175 // (1723) Jam va jadatthi tam tam ghado tti savvaghadayapasango ko | Bhanie ghadotthi va kahams avvatthittavaroho tti? u175u (1723) [ yadvA yadasti tattad ghaTa iti sarvaghaTatAprasaGgaH kaH / bhaNite ghaTossti vA kathaM sarvAstitvAvarodha iti ? || 175 || (1723) Yadva yadasti tattad ghata iti sarvaghatataprasangah kah Bhanite ghato'sti va katham sarvastitvavarodha iti ? // 175 // ( 1728) ] Trans.- 175 Or, by saying that whatever exists is ghata, how would the occasion of all being ghata arise? Or, by

Page #276
Vada] Ganadharavada :233 : asserting that ghata exists, how would the existence of all be obstructed ? ( 1723 ). ____TIkA-" yad vA proktam-yad yadasti tattat sarva ghaTaH" iti, tatra ko'yaM sarvaghaTatAprasaGgaH / tathA, " yo ghaTaH sa evAsti" ityapyukte kathaM sarvAstitvAvarodhaH-kathaM ghaTasya sarvAtmakatvam ? ityarthaH / yadA hi ghaTasattA ghaTa evAsti nAnyatra, tadA " yatra yatra ghaTAstitvaM tatra tatra ghaTaH" iti na kazcit sarveSAM ghaTatAprasaGgaH, tathA, " ghaTasatvena ghaTa evAsti" ityetasminapyukte na kiJcid ghaTasya sarvAtmakatvaM pratIyata iti bhAvaH // 175 / / (1723) // D. C.--Since the astrtva of ghata is restricted to ghata only and since ghata exists only when ghatastitva is present there would be no fear of all objects being considered as ghata when we say that "yad yad asti, tat-tat sarvam ghatak". Again, astatva of other objects would not be injured by the assertion that ghata exists. For, the all-pervading nature of ghata is not apprehended when we say "ghatasattvena ghata eva asts." 175 (1723). After refuting the opponent's view in this way the Acarya is now asserting his ownasthi tti teNa bhaNie ghaDo'ghaDo vA ghaDo u attheva / cUo'cUo va dumo cUo u jahA dumoniymaa||176||(1724) Atthi tti tena bhaaie ghado'ghado va ghado u attheva 1 Cuo'cuo va dumo cuo u jaha dumo niyama 11 176 11 ( 1724 ) [astIti tena bhaNite ghaTo'ghaTo vA ghaTastvastyeva / / cUto'cUto vA drumazcUtastu yathA dumo niyamAt / / 176 / / ( 1724) Astiti tena bhaaite ghato'ghato va ghatastvastyeva i Cuto'cuto va drumascutastu yatha drumo niyamat 017611 (1724) | 30

Page #277
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth " Trans.-176 Just as from the assertion of "tree" (we understand ) a mango tree or any other tree, but from " mango tree ( nothing else but ) "tree" is understood, in the same way, by saying that " it exists", ghata or (objects) other than ghata ( are appreheded ), but from ghata, astitva alone is understood ( 1724 ) ( .: 234 :* 66 " TIkA - yena kAraNena ghaTasattA ghaTadharmatvAd ghaTa evAsti paTAdibhyastu bhinnA, tena tasmAt asti ityukte ghaTaH, aghaTo vA - paTAdirgamyate, nijanijasaccasya sarveSu paTAdiSvapi bhAvAt / " ghaDo u attheva tti tzaa ghaTa iti tu prokte'styeveti gamyate, nijasattvasya niyamena ghaTe sadbhAvAt / atra yathAsaMkhyamudAharaNadvayam / yathA drumaH ityukte cUtaH, acUto vA nimbAdirgamyate, drumatvasya sarvatra bhAvAt 1 cUta: " iti tu nigadite druma eva gamyate, adrumasya cUtatvAyogAditi || 176 ( 1724 ) // 66 44 "6 D. C.-As the quality of vriksatva is present in all the trees, when we say tree "all the trees-whether a mango tree or any other tree-are understood. But when the word " mango tree is spoken, vriksatva alone is understood. For, the mango tree cannot exist without being a vriksa. Similarly, here also, existence of ghata being the quality of ghata, is present in ghata only and nowhere else, while the common property of astitva is present in all objects. So, when we say 'aste', all objects whether ghata or pata-are recognized as each one of them has its own property of existence. But when we say "C ghata' astitva alone is apprehended, because ghata has its own satta. Now, the Acarya replies to the argument that what has already been.produced, could not be produced and so on kiM taM jAyaM ti maI jAyA'jAo bhayaM pi jadajAyaM / aha jAyaM pi na jAyaM kiM na khapuSphe viyAro'yaM // 177 // (1725) 66 " "" Kim tam jayam ti mai jaya'jao-bhayam pi jadajayam | Aha jayam pi na jayam kim na khapupphe viyaro 'yam || 177 (1725)

Page #278
Vada ] Ganadharavada .:235 : [kiM tajAtamiti matirjAtA-jAto-bhayamapi yadyajAtam / / atha jAtamapi na jAtaM kiM na khapuSpe vicAro'yam // 177 // (1725) / Kim tajjataniti matir-jata'jato -bhayamapi yadyajatami Atha jatamapi na jatam kim na khapuspe vicaro'yam ||17711 (1725)] Trans.--177 If it is believed that neither jata nor a-jata nor jatajata could be produced, what could be produced then ? Again, if jata is not jata ( according to you ), why not think the saine about kha-puspa ( also )? ( 1725 ) TIkA-praSTavyo'traM devAnAMpriyaH, kathaya-kiM tad vastu jAtamiti pratipadyate tava matiH, yajAtA-jAto-bhayAdiprakArairajAtaM sAdhyate-yasya jAtAjAtAdiprakArairjanma tvayA niSidhyata ityarthaH / yadi hi jAtaM kimapi vastu tava siddhaM, tarhi tatsatvenaiva pratihatA zUnyatA, ataH " kiM tajjAtaM jAyate ? kiM tadajAtaM jAyate kiM tajjAtAjAtaM jAyate ?" ityAdayaH zUnyatAsiddhyarthamupanyasyamAnA nirarthakA eva vikalpA iti prcchkaabhipraayH| atha tadapi jAtaM jAtAjAtAdivikalpAzraya bhUtaM jAtatvena bhavato na siddham , kintvajAtameva tat , nanu svavacanaviruddhamida-jAtamapyajAtamiti / kiJca, jAtasyAsattve nirAzrayatvAjAtAjAtAdivikalpA nirarthakA eva / athaitadAzrayabhUte jAtAkhye vastunyasiddhe'pi "na jAtaM jAyate" ityAdivikalpavicAraH pravartate, tarhi khapuSpe'pyasau kiM na vidhIyate, asatvAvizeSeNa " samayA vivajao vA" ityAdivyaktadoSa prasaGgAt / na ca vaktavyaM-pareSAM siddhaM jAtamurarIkRtya vikalpA vidhIyante, sva-parabhAvAbhyupagame zUnyatAhAniprApteriti / / 177 // (1725) / / ___D. C.--'Tell me O Vyaktta ! what object, according to you, could be proved as gata when it has already been denied production as jata, a-jata or both ? If anything that has been produced, is accepted by you s'unyuta would be denied on account of its very existence and hence alternative questions whether jata a-gata or gatajata could be produced or not, would become useless. Again, if a jata object which gives rise to a number of alternatives like gata, a-jata etc. is not, admissible to you as

Page #279
.: 236 : Jinabhadra Gani's The fourth jata and if you take it as a-jata there would be self-contradiction in your argument. Moreover, when existence of a jata object is denied, alternatives like jata, a-jata etc. would become useless in absence of their as'rayas. Now, if you admit the above-mentioned alternatives in case of non-existent objects also, you shall have to apply those alternatives to the kha-puspa, which is also non-existent, Here, it could not be said that all those alternatives were applied by accepting things which were believed as jata by others. Because, it would bring in distinction between svo and para which violates the principle of s'unyata. Moreover, jai sabahA na jAyaM kiM jammANaMtaraM taduvalambho / puvaM vA'NuvalaMbho puNo vi kAlaMtarahayassa? // 178 // (1726) Jai sayvaha na jayam kim jammanantaram taduvalambho Puyvam va'nuvalambho puno vi kalantarahayassa ? 11178N (1726) [ yadi sarvathA na jAtaM kiM janmAnantaraM tadupalambhaH / pUrva vA'nupalambhaH punarapi kAlAntarahatasya ? // 178 / / (1726) Yadi sarvatha na jatam kim janmanantaram tadupalambhah | Purvam va'nupalambhah punarapi kalantarahatasya ? 117811 (1726)] Trans.-178 If ( according to you ) it is not produced in all respects, why its apprehension after production ? And why not before, or after one has been destroyed in future ? (1726). . TIkA-yadi sarvairapi prakAraghaMTAdikArya na jAtamiti zUnyavAdinA pratipAdyate, tarhi mRtpiNDAdyavasthAyAmanupalabdhaM kulAlAdisAmagrInivartitajanmAnantaraM kimiti tasmAt tadupalabhyate / pUrva vA janmataH kimiti tasyAnupalambhaH 1 / punarapi ca kAlAntare laguDAdinA hatasya kimiti tasyAnupalambhaH ? / ajAtasya gagananalinasyeva sarvadaiva ghaTAderanupalambha eva

Page #280
Vada ] Ganadharavada ___:237 : syAt , yastu kadAcidupalambhaH, kadAcittu nopalambhaH, asau jAtasyaivopapadyata iti bhAvaH // 178 // (1726) // ____D. C.-If according to your sunyata-vada, objects like ghata are not altogether produced, how is it that ghata which is not apprehended in the state of a lump of earth, is apprehended when produced by nomittas like potter etc? And why is the ghata not apprehended before its production or after its being broken by the hit of a stick etc ? If objects like ghata were altogether a-jata, like khapuspa they would never be apprehended at all. And, the quality of being apprehensible at one time and non-apprehensible at the other, is possible only in case of a jata object. 178 ( 1726). Besides, jaha sabahA na jAyaM jAyaM suNNavayaNaM tahA bhAvA / aha jAyaM pina jAyaM payAsiyA suNNayA keNa? // 179 // (1727) Jaha savvaha na jayam jayam sunnavayanam taha bhava i Aha jayam pi na jayam payasiya sunnaya kena ? 1117911 ( 1727) [ yathA sarvathA na jAtaM jAtaM zUnyavacanaM tathA bhAvAH / atha jAtamapi na jAtaM prakAzitA zUnyatA kena ? // 179 / / (1727) Yatha sarvatha na jatam jatam sunyavacanam tatha bhavahi Atha jatamapi na jatam prakasita sanyata kena ? // 179 // ( 1727 )] Trans.--179 Just as the assertion about sanyata is jata, even though not produced altogether, so also, other objects ( should be taken as jata ). Again, if jata were denied to have been produced, by what means would the sunyata be manifested ? ( 1727). ___TIkA-" zUnyaM sarvaM jagat " ityevaMbhUtaM yacchUnyatAviSaya vijJAnaM vacanaM ca tad yathA jAtA-jAtAdiprakAraiH sarvathA jAtamapyajAtamapi sat kenApi prakAreNa tAvajAtam , tathA bhAvA api ghaTa-paTAdayo jAtA eSTavyA

Page #281
*: 238 : * Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth ityato na zUnyaM jagat / atha zUnyatAvijJAna - vacanadvayaM jAtamapyajAtamiSyate, tarhi tadvijJAna-vacanAbhyAM vinA kenAsau zUnyatA prakAzitA ? -na kenaciditi zUnyatAnupapattiriti / / 179 / / (1727 ) // D. C.-Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is s'unya are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever, in the same way, other objects such as ghata, pata etc. should also be taken as jata. And, if you accept vijnana and vacana about s'unyata to be a-jata, how would you be able to express s'unyata without the help of vijnana or vacana, about it ? Hence, s'unyata is not acceptible in any way. 179 ( 1727 ). Also, jAya jAyamajAyaM jAyAjAyamaha jAyamANaM ca / kamiha vivakkhAe na jAyae sahA kiMci // 180 // ( 1728) rUvi tti jAi jAo kuMbho saMThANao puNarajAo / jAyAjAo dohi vi tassamayaM jAyamANo ti // 181 // (1729) puvakao ughaDatayA parapajAehiM tadubhaehiM ca / jAyaM to ya paDatayA na jAyae savvahA kuMbho // 182 // (1730) vomAi niccajAyaM na jAyae teNa saGghahA somma ! | iya davatayA savaM bhaNijjaM pajjavagaIe // 983 // ( 1731 ) Jayai jayamajayam jayajayamaha jayamanam cal Kajjamiha vivakkhae na jayae savvaha kimci || 180 // ( 1728 ) Ruvi tti jai jao kumbho samthanao punarajao Jayajao dohi vi tassamayam jayamano tti // 181 ( 1729 ) Puvvakao u ghadataya para pajjaehim tadubhaehim ca Jayanto ya padataya na jayae savvaha kumbho || 182 // ( 1730 )

Page #282
Vada ] Ganadharavada -:239 .. Vomai niccajayam na jayae tena savvaha somma!! Iya davvataya savvam bhayanijjam pajjavagaie // 183 // ( 1731 ) [ jAyate jAtamajAtaM jAtAjAtamatha jAyamAnaM ca / kAryamiha vivakSayA na jAyate sarvathA kiJcit // 180 // (1728) rUpIti jAyate jAtaHkumbhaH saMsthAnataH punarajAtaH / jAtAjAto dvAbhyAmapi tatsamayaM jAyamAna iti // 181 // (1729) pUrvakRtastu ghaTatayA paraparyAyaistadubhayaizca / jAyamAnazca paTatayA na jAyate sarvathA kumbhaH // 182 // (1730) vyomAdi nityajAtaM na jAyate tena sarvathA saumya ! / ' iti dravyatayA sarva bhajanIyaM paryavagatyA // 183 // (1731 ) Jayate jatamajatam jatajatamatha jayamanam ca i Karyamiha vivaksaya na jayate sarvatha kimcit !! 180 II (1728)] Rupiti jayate jatah kumbhah samsthanatah punarajatah i Jatajato dvabhyamapi tatsamayam jayamana iti I 181 || ( 1729 )] Purvaksitastu ghatataya paraparyayaistadubhayaisca 1 Jayamanasca patata ya na jayate sarvatha kumbhah (1182|1 (1730)] Vyomadi nityajatam na jayate tena sarvatha saumya! i Iti dravyataya sarvam bhajaniyam paryavagatya || 183 // (1731)] Trans.-180-183 Jata, a-jata, jatajata, as well as the jayamana objects are produced in this world on account of various causes, ( but ) nothing is produced in perfection. The jata (kumbha) is produced, since it has form; the a-jata kumbha is produced because of shape; the jatajata ( is produced ) even by both, and the jayamana ( is also produced because the process of production takes place in the present tense. But a kumbha which has been produced before, could never be produced on account of ghatata or ( by means of ) the characteristics of other ( objects) or by means of both; and the jayamana kumbha could also never be produced on occouut

Page #283
1.M * 240 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth of patata. Again sky etc. could also never be produced as they are nityajata. Hence, O Saumya! nothing could be produced as a substance (but) everything should be taken according to the surrounding characteristics. ( 1728-1731 ). 9 " TIkA - iha kAryaM ghaTAdikaM vivakSayA kimapi jAtaM jAyate kiJcidajAtam, kiJcijAtAjAtam, kizciJjAyamAnam kiJcittu sarvathA na jAyata iti / atha yathAkramamudAharaNAni - " rUvItyAdi " rUpitayA ghaTo jAto jAyate, mRdUpatAyA: prAgapi bhAvAt, tadrUpatayA jAta eva ghaTo jAyate ityarthaH / saMsthAnatayA''kAravizeSeNa punaH sa evAjAto jAyate, mRtpiNDAdyavasthAyAmAkArasyAsaMbhavAt / mRdrUpatayA, AkAravizeSeNa ceti dvAbhyAmapi prakArAbhyAM jAtAjAto jAyate, tadanarthAntarabhUtatvAd ghaTasya / tathA, atItA-'nAgatakAlayorvinaSTAnutpannatvAt kriyAnupapattervartamAnasamaya eva kriyAsadbhAvAt tatsamayaM vartamAnasamayaM jAyamAno jAyate / kiJcittu sarvathA jAtA - SjAtAdiprakArairna jAyate / kiM punastat ? ityAha - " puvakao u ityAdi " pUrvakRtastu pUrvaniSpanno ghaTo ghaTatayA jAtA-jAtAdivikalpAnAM madhyAdekenApi prakAreNa na jAyate, pUrvameva jAtatvAt / kiM ghaTatayaiva na jAyate ? | na, ityAha - " parapajAehiM ti tathA, paTAdigataiH paraparyAyaizca ghaTo na jAyate, svaparyAyANAM pUrvameva jAtatvAt paraparyAyaizca kadAcit kasyApyabhavanAt / sva-paraparyAyaiH pUrvakRtaghaTo na jAyate, jAtA-jAtapaTa - kharaviSANavaditi bhAvaH / - 99 " tathA, jAyamAno'pi vartamAnakriyAkSaNasamaye paTatayA ghaTo na jAyate, pararUpattayA kasyApyabhavanAt / kiM pUrvakRto ghaTa evetthaM na jAyate, Ahosvidanyadapi kiJcid na jAyate 1 ityAha-- " vomAItyAdi " na kevalaM pUrvakRto ghaTo ghaTatayA na jAyate, tathA vyomAdi ca tena kAraNena saumya ! sarvathA jAtAdibhiH sarvairapi prakArairna jAyate, yena kim ? ityAha--yena nityajAtaM sarvadA'vasthitam, hetudvAreNa vizeSaNamidam, nityajAtatvAd na jAyata ityarthaH / uktasyaivArthasyopasaMhAravyAjena tAtparyamupadarzayannAha ' iyetyAdi ' ityuktaprakAreNa sarvamapi ghaTa-paTa - vyomAdikaM vastu dravyarUpeNa 46 na jAyate "

Page #284
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 241 itIhApi saMbadhyate, tadrUpatayA sadAvasthitatvAditi bhaavH| paryAyagatyA paryAyacintayA punaH sarva bhajanIyavikalpanIyam-pUrvajAtaM ghaTAdikaM rUpAdibhiH svaparyAyairapi na jAyate, pUrvajAtatvAdeva, ajAtaM tu tat svaparyAyairjAyate, paraparyAyaistu kiJcidapi na jAyate, ityevaM paryAyacintAyAM bhjnaa| etacca prAyo gripahala 11 860-868-862-86311 (8026-8028-81930.81938)|| D. C.--Several objects like ghata which have once been jata in this world, could be produced by reason of their rupatva. Before the rupa of ghata is produced, the rupa of earth is already there and hence the ghata which is jata to the apeksa of rupitva is produced in this way. Thereafter, ghata is a-jata as far as shape is considered. When it takes the shape in course of production, the a-jata ghata comes into existence. The jatajata ghata is produced in both the ways-rupitva as well as the akora. Moreover, ghata which is jayamana is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced takes place only during the present tense. There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories. e. g. A ghata which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as a ghata again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, ghata could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like pata etc. As ghata has its own process of production and characteristics, it could not be produced like an existent pata or a non-existent kharasanga, Thirdly, ghata which is being produced during the present time, could never be produced as pata etc. For, kurya which is being produced as ghata etc. could never be produced as an absolutely different object like pata. So, all objects e.g, ghata, pata, akas'a etc., could not be produced in the form of substance as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as paryaya is concerned, all are said to have been produced. 32

Page #285
:242:. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth In reply to the question viz. "Since everything is made up of some sort of materials, how could those materials exist in the midst of all-pervading negation ?" the Acarya statesdIsai sAmaggimayaM sabamiha tthi na ya sA, naNu viruddhaM / gheppaDa va na paJcakkhaM kiM kacchaparomasAmaggI? // 184 // (1732) Disai samaggimayam savvamiha tthi na ya sa, nanu viruddham 1 Gheppai va na paccakkham kim kaccaparoma samaggi ?111841(1732) [dRzyate sAmagrImayaM sarvamihAsti na ca sA, nanu viruddham / gRhyate vA na pratyakSaM kiM kacchaparomasAmagrI ? // 184 // (1732) Dssyate Samagrimayam sarvamibasti na ca sa, nanu viruddham Grihyate va na pratyaksam kim kacchaparomasamagri ? ||184 11 ] ___Trans.-184 All ( objects ) in this world appear as consisting of ( some sort of ) materials ; but, in fact, reverse is the case, ( as ) those materials do not exist. Or, if it is accepted, why is the ingredient of the hair of a tortoise not perceptible to the senses ? ( 1732 ) TIkA-iha yaduktam-~-"sarvamapi kArya sAmagryAtmakaM dRzyate, sarvAbhAve ca nAsti sAmagrI" iti / tadetad viruddhameva, prastutArthapratipAdakatvAt , vacojanakakaNThau-Tha-tAlvAdisAmagryAH pratyakSata evoplbdheH|| atha brUSe-- avidyopaplavAdavidyamAnamapi dRzyate, yata uktam . kAma-svama-bhayo-nmAdairavidyopaplavAt tathA / pazyantyasantamapyarthaM janaH kezendukAdivet // 1 // iti / yadyevam, tIsattve sAmAnye'pi kacchaparomajanakasAmagrI kimiti pratyakSata eva nopalabhyate ?, samatA viparyayo vA kathaM na syAditi vAcyam ? iti / / 184 // (1732) // __D C.-Vyakta :-All objects are composed of some sort of samagri in this world. But in the midst of sarvas'unyata,

Page #286
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 243 :: samagri, too, does not exist, because everything becomes s'unya at the end. Bhagavan :-This belief of yours O Vyakta ! is totally wrong. For, constituents like kantha, ostha, talu etc, which form samagri as well as vacana are directly perceptible. Hence, how could the existence of samagri be denied ? Vyakta :-One could perceive even an a-vidyamana object on account of kama, svapna, bhaya, unmada, or a-vidya, but in fact that does not exist. Bhagavan :-If it is so, O Vyakta ! why is the samagri that produces the hair of a tortoise not produced ? A-vidyamanata is common in both the cases. So, either this samagri should be apprehended like the samagri that produces vacana or both should not be apprehended. Or, why should not the fault of viparyaya ( contrariety ) take place when the samagri that produces the hair of a tortoise is apprehended and the one that produces vacana is not ? But, sAmaggimao vattA vayaNaM catthi jai to kao suNNaM / aha natthi keNa bhaNi vayaNAbhAve suyaM keNa ? // 185 / / (1733) Samaggimao vatta vayanam catthi jai to kao sunnam i Aha natthi kena bhaniam vayanabhave suyam kena ? u1850(1733) [sAmagrImayo vaktA vacanaM cAsti yadi tataH kutaH zUnyam / atha nAsti kena bhaNitaM vacanAbhAve zrutaM kena ? // 185 // (1733) Samagrimayo vakta vacanam casti yadi tatah kutah sunyam| Atha nasti kena bhaaitam vacanabhave srutam kena ? 111851(1733)] Trans.--185 And, if the speaker-accompanied by a group of constituent parts-as well as the speech exist, whence is the sunyata ( produced ) ? On the other hand, if they do not exist, in absence of ( speaker as well as ) words, by whom is the sunyata pronounced (and) by whom is (it) heard ? (1733)

Page #287
.: 244 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth . TIkA-sAmagrI-uraH-ziraH-kaNThau-Tha-tAlu-jihvAdisamudAyAtmikA tanmayaH sAmagryAtmako vaktA, tadvavanaM cAsti na vA ? / yadyasti, tarhi kuto jagacchUnyatvam , tadvakta-vacanasattvenaiva vyabhicArAt / / atha tadvaktRvacane na staH, tarhi vakta-vacanAbhAve kena bhaNitaM zUnyaM jagat ?--na kenacit / sarvazUnyatve ca pratipAdyasyApyabhAvAt kena tacchUnyavacaH zrutam ? iti // 185 // (1733) // D. C.--Are the speaker-possessed of a group of constituents like heart, head, throat, lips, palate, tongue etc, and the speech, existing or not? If they are, sunyata will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not in absence of the speaker and speech there will be none to announce that the world is s'unya. Moreover, in the midst of all being non-existent, neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that s'unya vacana. Also, jeNaM ceva na vattA vayaNaM vA to na saMti vayaNijjA / bhAvA to suNNamidaM vayaNamidaM saccamaliyaM vA ? // 186 // jai saccaM nAbhAvo ahAliyaM na pamANameyaM ti| abbhuvayaM ti va maI nAbhAve juttameyaM ti // 187 // (1735) Jenam ceva na vatta vayanam va to na santi vayanijja ! Bhava to sunnamidam vayanamidam saccamaliyam va ?11186|1(1734) Jai saccam nabhavo ahaliyam na ppamanameyam til Abbhuvagayam ti va mai nabhave juttameyam ti // 187 // (1735) [ yenaiva na vaktA vacanaM vA tato na santi vcniiyaaH| bhAvAstataH zUnyamidaM vacanamidaM satyamalIkaM vA ? // 186 // (1734) yadi satyaM nAbhAvo'thAlIkaM na pramANametaditi / abhyupagatamiti vA matirnAbhAve yuktametaditi // 187 // (1735)

Page #288
Vada ] Ganadharavada Yenaiva na vakta vacanam va tato na santi vacaniyah Bhavastatah sunyamidam vacanamidam satyamalikam va ||186 // ] Yadi satyam nabhavo'thalikam na pramanametaditi Abhyupagatamiti va mati r-nabhave yuktametaditi ||187 || ( 1735 ) ] Trans.--186-187 ( An opponenent may argue that ) Just as a speaker or speech does not exist, the objects ( that are ) to be expressed will be non-existent ( and hence ) this ( world ) is also non-existent. Is this statement true or false? If it is true, there will be no negation and if it is false, that will no longer be a ground of assurance. 66 .: 245: " Or, if you believed that sanyata is anyhow arrived at, it is not proper ( to do so ) in ( the midst of all-pervading ) negation. ( 1734-1735 ) TIkA- yenaiva na vaktA, nApi ca vacanam, tatastenaiva na santi vacanIyA bhAvA iti, ataH zUnyamidaM jagaditi / atrocyate - yadetad vaktR - vacana-vacanIyAnAM bhAvAnAmabhAvapratiprAdakaM vacanaM tat satyamalIkaM vA 1 / yadi satyam, tarhyasyaiva satyavacanasya sadbhAvAd nAbhAvaH sarvabhAvAnAm / athAlIkamidaM vacanam, tarhyapramANametat, ato nAtaH zUnyatAsiddhiH / atha yathA tathA vAbhyupagatamasmAbhiH zUnyatApratipAdakaM vacanam, ato'smadvacanaprAmANyAt zUnyatAsiddhiriti tava matiH / naivam, yataH satyam, alIkaM vA tvayedamabhyupagatam ? " ityAdi punastadevAvartate / kiJca, abhyupagantA, abhyupagamaH, abhyupagamanIyaM cetyetatrayasya sadbhAve'bhyupagamo'pyeSa bhavato yujyate, na ca sarvabhAvAnAmabhAve etatrayaM yuktamiti // 186-187 / / (17341735) // 44 D. C. -- Vyakta-- Now that vakta and vacana have been established as s'unya, the vacaniya bhavas will also be s'unya on account of the same reason. So, ultimately, the whole world is non-existent in all respects. Bhagavan:--If it is so, O Vyakta / I ask you a question : Is that statement which proves the non-existence of vakta,

Page #289
.: 246 :: Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth vacana, and the vacaniya bhavas true or false? If it is true, the abhava of the above-mentioned objects could not be attained on account of its own existence. And if it is false, the statement will cease to be a pramana to establish s'unyata. Thus, it is not possible to establish sunyata in either of the two ways. Vyakta :-But the statement which establishes s'unyata has anyhow been accepted by us. Our vacana is therefore authentic and s'unyata has undoubtedly been established. Bhagavan :--That is not true, o Vyakta! For, in accepting the above-mentioned statement, the same fault will arise when you ask the question as to whether that vacana is true or false and so on. Moreover, you cannot accept the vacana, unless the person who accepts the vacana to be accepted and the acceptance itself are existent. The theory of sarvas'unyata seems unfounded from this point of view also. Moreover, sikayAsu kiM na tellaM sAmaggIu tilesu vi kimatthi ? / fa a a HR SEHE AHI: age roi ? 118CC11P13EUR) Sikayasu kim na taillam samaggiu tilesu vi kimatthi ? 1 kim va na savvan sijjhai samaggiu khapupphanam ? 1118811(1736) [sikatAsu kiM na tailaM sAmagrItastileSvapi kimasti ? / kiMvA na sarva sidhyati sAmagrItaH khapuSpAnAm ? // 188 // (1736) // Sikatasu kimona tailam samagritastilesvapi kimasti ? I Kim va na sarvam siddhyati samagritah khapuspanam ||188H (1736)] Trans.-188 Why is the oil not ( manufactured from the materials like sands and why from sesamum seeds only ? Or, why not everything be attained from the materials of khapuspas ( only) ? ( 1736 ).

Page #290
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 247 : TIkA - sarvabhAvAnAmasarace sarvo'pi pratiniyato lokavyavahAraH samucchidyate, tathAhi - bhAvAbhAvasya sarvatrAviziSTatvAt kimi tisikatA kaNasAmagrItastailaM na bhavati, tilAdisAmagryAM vA tat kimasti ? / kiM vA khapuSpasAmagrItaH sarvamapi kAryajAtaM na sidhyati / na caivam tasmAt pratiniyatakArya kAraNabhAvadarzanAd nAbhAvasAmagrItaH kimapyutpadyate, kintu yathA svabhAvasAmagrItaH, tathA ca sati na zUnyaM jagaditi // 988 // (1736) / / " D. C. -- In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of loka-vyavahara will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type-viz., that of absolute negation-how is it that oil is manufactured only from the samagri of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc. ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the samagra of khapuspas alone? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not s'unya. And, savaM sAmaggimayaM negato'yaM jao'Nurapaeso / aha so vi sappaeso jatthAvatthA sa paramANU // 189 // (1737) Savvam samaggimayam neganto'yam jao'nurapaeso Aha so vi sappaeso jatthavattha sa paramanu // 189 // ( 1737 ) [ sarva sAmagrImayaM naikAnto'yaM yato'NurapradezaH / atha so'pi sapradezo yatrAvasthA sa paramANuH // 189 // ( 1737 ) Sarvam samagrimayam naikanto'yam yato'nurapradesah Atha sopisa-pradeso yatravastha sa paramanu 11189 || ( 1737) ] Trans.-189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space. But if even that occupies space according to you) wherever it resides there is a molecule. ( (1737)

Page #291
*: 248:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth TIkA-sarva sAmagrImayaM sAmagrIjanyaM vastvityayamapi naivagantaH, yato vyaNukAdayaH skandhAH sapradezatvAd vyAdiparamANujanyatvAd bhavantu sAmagrIjanyAH, paramANuH punarapradeza iti na kenacijanyate iti kathamasau sAmagrIjanyaH syAt / asti cAsau, kAryaliGgagamyatvAt ; uktaM ca muu||rnnurprdeshH kAraNamantyaM tathA nityaH / ekarasa-varNa-gandho dvisparzaH kAryaliGgazca // 1 // athAyamapi sapredazaH, tabai pradezo'NurbhaviSyati, tasyApi sapradezatve tatpradezo'NurityevaM tAvat , yAvad yatra kacid niSpredazatayA bhavabuddhevasthAnaM bhaviSyati, sa eva paramANuH, tenApi ca sAmagrIjanyatvasya vyabhicAra iti // 189 // (1736 ) // D. C.-There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from samagri. For, objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the samagri of those atoms, but a paramanu by itself does never occupy space, and hence could never be produced from any samagri. This paramanu is produced only from karya-linga, as it is said Murtair-anurapradesah karanamantyam bhavet tatha nityah | Ekarasa-varna-gandho dvisparsah karyalingasca II But if you believe this paramanu to occupy space, wherever you apprehend paramanu there would be anu till ultimately it would be absolutely vacant, where nothing but parmanu not produced from any samagri would be found. dIsai sAmaggimayaM na yANavo saMti naNu viruddhamidaM / kiM vANUNamabhAve nipphaNNamiNaM khapupphehiM // 190 // (1738) Disai samaggimayam na yanavo santi nanu viruddhamidam II Kim vanunamabhave nipphannaminam khapupphehim 1119011 (1738) [ dRzyate sAmagrImayaM na cANavaH santi nanu viruddhamidam / kiM vA'NUnAmabhAve niSpannamidaM khapuSpaiH ? // 190 // (1738)

Page #292
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 249 : Drisyate Samagrimayam na canavah santi nanu viruddhamidam i Kim vanunamabhave nispannamidam khapuspaih 1119011 (1738) ] Trans.--190 It is really contradictory to believe ) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist. Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, ( all ) this is produced by means of ( mere ) khapuspa ? ( 1738 ) TIkA-"sAmagrImayaM sarva dRzyate" iti bhavataiva prAguktam , "aNavazca na santi" ityadhunA brUSe, nanu viruddhamidam , yathA ' sarvamapyanRtaM vacanam / iti bruvataH svavacanavirodhaH, tathA'trApItyarthaH / yadeva hi sAmagrImayaM kimapi dRzyate bhavatA, tadevANusaMghAtAtmakam , ataH svavacanenaiva pratipAditatvAt kathamaNavo na santi ? iti bhaavH| kiJca, aNUnAmabhAva idaM sarvamapi ghaTAdikAryajAtaM kiM khapuSpainiSpannam , paramANvabhAve tajanakamRtpiNDAdisAmagryabhAvAt ? iti bhaavH| tasmAd yasmAt sAmagrImayaM dRzyata iti pratipadyate bhavatA,tadvadeva paramANava iti // 190 // (1738) // D. C.-If you are to state that those that are not samagrijanya are not paramanus at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself. It has already been said that everything which is samagrimaya is apprehensible. Again, all that you have accepted as samagrimaya or samagrijanya in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms. Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case. And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like ghata, pata etc, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like khapuspa etc. ? Because if paramanu is absent, a samagri like mritpinda would also be absent. So, when you assert that samagrimaya is apprehended, the paramanus that form this samagri are automatically established as existent. Now, in reply to the argument prima facie that since 32

Page #293
.: 250 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth rear portion is not perceptible and since front portion is very minute, everything is s'unya,+ the author indicates desa sArAbhAgo gheppar3a na ya so ti naNu viruddhamiNaM / savAbhAve vina so gheppar3a kiM kharavisANassa // 191 // (1739) Desassarabhago gheppai na ya so tti nanu viruddhaminam Savvabhave vi na so gheppar kim kharavisanassa 191 (1739) [ dezasthArAdbhAgo gRhyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidam / sarvAbhAve'pi na sa gRhyate kiM kharaviSANasya 1 / 191 / / ( 1739 ) Desasyaradbhago grihyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidam Sarvabhave'pi na sa grihyate kim kharavisanasya ? // 1910 (1739) ] Trans.-191 To say that the foremost portion of a visible object is perceptible but it does not exist, is really contradictory. (For) even in the midst of all-pervading negation, why is the front part of the horn of an ass not perceived ? ( 1739 ) 99 TIkA - yaduktam - " dRzyasyApi vastunaH parabhAgastAvad na dRzyate, ArAdbhAgastu gRhyate, paraM so'pyanyAnyaparabhAgakalpanayA prAguktayuktito nAsti iti / nanu viruddhamidam - " gRhyate'sau na ca samasti " iti / sarvAbhAvAd bhrAntyA'sau gRhyata iti cet / tadayuktam, yataH sarvAbhAve tulye'pi kimiti kharaviSANasya saMbandhI ArAdbhAgo na gRhyate 1 / samatA viparyayo vA kathaM na bhavati / iti // 199 // ( 1739 ) / / 9 D. C.-It has been said before that only a front part of a visible object is perceived and not the rear part. This front part is, in comparision with other parts in the rear, very suksma and hence that too becomes non-existent This statement is self-contradicting. For, to say that it is perceptible but it does not exist, is absurd. Here, if it is said, that in the midst of sarvabhava it is + Vide verse 1696.

Page #294
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 251 : perceptible because of bhranti, that is also not proper. For, since abhava is common everywhere, why is the front part of non-existent objects like the horn of an ass etc., not appre. hended ? Or, how does it not happen that the front part of objects like kharavisana etc. be apprehended and that of objects like ghata, pata etc. not apprehended ? Moreover, parabhAgAdarisaNao nArAbhAgo vi kimaNumANaM ti / ArAbhAgaggahaNe kiM va na parabhAgasaMsiddhI ? // 192 // (1740) Parabhagadarisanao narabhago vi kimanumanam til Arabhagaggahane kim va na parabhagasamsiddhi ? // 1920 (1740) [paramAgAdarzanato nArAdbhAgo'pi kimanumAnamiti / ArAdbhAgagrahaNe kiM vA na parabhAgasaMsiddhiH ? // 192 // (1740) Parabhagadarsanato naradbhago'pi kimanumanamiti 1 Aradbhagagrahane kim va na parabhagasamsiddhih ? ||192|( 1740)] Trans.-192 On account of the rear part being imperceptible, what anumana ( is held ) in case of even the front part ( being imperceptible )? Or, is it that the rear part is not apprehended when the front part is apprehended ? (1740) TIkA-"parabhAgamAtrAdarzanAdArAdbhAgo'pi nAsti' ityatra kimanumAna bhavataH ? / etaduktaM bhavati-yat pratyakSeNa sakalalokaprasiddhaM tadagnerauSNyamiva kathamanumAnena bAdhyate / ArAdbhAgasya hyApekSikatvAt tadanyathAnupapatteH parabhAgAnumAnaM tAvadadyApi yujyate / yastu parabhAgAdarzanamAtreNaiva tanihavaH, so'saMbaddha eva, satsvapi dezAdiviprakRSTeSu meru-pizAcAdiSvadarzanasaMbhavAt / tasmAd na prbhaagaadrshnmaatrennaaraadbhaago'plotvyH| kiJca, ArAdbhAgagrahaNe parabhAgAnumAnaM yujyetApIti bhASyakAro'pyAha-" ArAbhAgetyAdi " ArAgAgrahaNe kathaM na parabhAgasaMsiddhiH 1 api tu tatsaMsiddhireva, tathAhidRzyavastunaH parabhAgo'sti, tatsaMbandhibhUtasyArAdbhAgasya grahaNAt, iha

Page #295
.: 252 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth yatsaMbandhibhUto bhAgo gRhyate tat samasti, yathA nabhasaH pUrvabhAge gRhIte tatsaMbandhyaparabhAgaH, gRhyate ca ghaTAderArAdbhAgaH, atastatsaMndhibhUtaH parabhAgo'cafea I 79174--" STIGTITEITSC771 IGIT: pagastai, tasyApyanya ityAdi tAvat , yAvat sarvAratIyabhAgaH" iti / atrApi parabhAgasyAsattve sarvArAtIyabhAgaparikalpanamupapannameva syAt / tasmAdasti parabhAga sfa 11 888 11 ( 898 ) !! D. C.-What anumana do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For, how could you deny the existence of front part which is pratyaksa to you like the heat of fire ? It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the apeksa of the rear one, jnana about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of anumana. But from this it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen. Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one e. g. A. visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front portion which is connected with the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like ghata, pata etc., must contain rear portions since their front ones are easily apprehended. Again, the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portion's will not fit your anumana. As the rear part is a-vidyamana, the inference of foremost part being so is absolutely improper. Really speaking, the front part is perceptible in this case, and the inference of rear portion being vidyamana is correct. Again,

Page #296
Vada ] Ganadharavada savAbhAve vi kao ArA - para- majjhabhAganANattaM / aha paramaIe bhaNNai sa paramaivisesaNaM katto ? // 193 // (1741) Ara-para- majjhabhAgA paDivaNNA jai na suNNayA nAma / appaDavaNesu vi kA vigappaNA kharavisANassa 1 // 194 // ( 1742) savAbhAve vArAbhAgo kiM dIsae na parabhAgo / savAgaNaM va na kiM kiM vA na vivajjao hoi ? // 195 // (1743) * 253: Savvabhave vi kao ara-para-majjhabhagananattam | Aha paramaie bhannai sa paramaivisesanam katto ? // 193 // ( 1741) Ara-para-majjhabhaga padivanna jai na sunnaya nama | Appadivannesu vi ka vigappana kharavisanassa? || 194|| (1742) Savvabhave varabhago kim disae na parabhago Savvagahanam va na kim kim va na vivajjao hoi ? // 195m (1743) [ sarvAbhAve'pi kuta ArAt - para - madhyabhAganAnAtvam / atha paramatyA bhaNyate sva - paramativizeSaNaM kutaH 1 // 193 // (1741) ArAt - para - madhyabhAgAH pratipannA yadi na zUnyatA nAma / pratipanneSvapi kA vikalpanA kharaviSANasya ? / / 194 / / (1742) sarvAbhAve vArAdbhAgaH kiM dRzyate na parabhAgaH 9 / sarvAgrahaNaM ca na kiM kiM vA na viparyayo bhavati 1 // 195 // (1743) Sarvabhave'pi kuta arat - para-madhyabhagananatvam | Atha paramatya bhanyate sva-paramati visesanam kutah ||193 || ] Arat-para-madhyabhagah pratipanna yadi na sunyata nama | Apratipannesvapi ka vikalpana kharavisanasya ? // 194 (1742) ] Sarvabhave varadbhagah kim drisyate na parabhagah | Sarvagrahanam ca na kim kim va na viparyayo bhavati ? ||195 // ] Trans.-193-194-195 Even in the midst of all-pervading negation, how could the distinction between front, rear and

Page #297
:: 254 : ___Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth middle portions exist ? And if it is said so in the opinion of others, whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear, and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no sunyata at all. And, if they are not proved ( to be existing ) why alternatives about (non-existent objects like) kharavisana ? Or, in the midst of the negation of all objects, why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one? Or, why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or, why not the reverse ( apprehension ) also ? ( 1741-1743 ). Also, parabhAgadarisaNaM vA phalihAINaM ti te dhuvaM saMti / jai vA te vi na saMtA parabhAgAdarisaNamaheU ? // 196 // (1744) savAdarisaNau ciya na bhaNNai kIsa, bhaNaI tannAma / putvabbhuvagayahANI paJcakkhavirohao ceva // 197 // (1745) Parabhagadarisanam va phalihainam ti te dhuvam santi Jai va te vi na santa parbhagadarisana maheu ? 196 11 ( 1744) Savvadarisanau cciya na bhannaikisa bhanai tannama l Puvvabbhuvagayahani paccakkhavirohao ceva il 197 11 ( 1745 ) [parabhAgadarzanaM vA sphaTikAdInAmiti te dhruvaM santi / yadi vA te'pi na santaH parabhAgAdarzanamahetuH / / 196 // (1744) 'sarvAdarzanata eva na bhaNyate kasmAt , bhaNati tannAma / pUrvAbhyupagatahAniH pratyakSavirodhatazcaiva // 197 // (1745) Parabhagadarsanam va sphatikadinamiti te dhruvam santi / Yadi va te'pi na santah parabhagadarsanamahetuh 1119611 (1744)] Sarvadarsanata eva na bhanyate kasmat, bhanati tannamai Purvabhyugatabanih pratyaksavirodhatascaiva il 197 11 ( 1745 ) ] Trans.-196-197 Or, since the rear portions of ( objects

Page #298
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 255 :* like ) crystal etc. are seen, they exist without doubt. And, if they, too, do not exist ( according to you ), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen. Why is the reasonthat nothing could be seen-not stated? If it is stated, the proposition ( which is ) accepted before, will (constitute) direct contradiction. ( 17441745 ) " 6 , TIkA - nanu yeSAM sphaTikA bhrapaTalAdInAM bhAvAnAM parabhAgadarzanamasti te tAvad dhruvaM santyeva, iti " parabhAgAdarzanAt " ityanena hetunA sarvabhAvAnAmasatvaM na sidhyati / atha sphaTikAdayo'pi na santi tarhi " parabhAgAdarza - nAt " ityayamahetuH, tvadabhipretasya sarvabhAvAsattvasyAsAdhakatvAt / ato'vyApakamamuM hetuM parityajya " sarvAdarzanAd na santi bhAvAH ityayameva vyApako hetuH kasmAd na bhaNyate ? / bhai tannAma ti atra para uttaraM bhaNati / kim ? ityAha- tannAmAstu " sarvAdarzanAt " iti - ayaM hetustarhi bhavatvityarthaH, yathA tathA zUnyataivAsmAbhiH sAdhayitavyA, sA ca "sarvAdarzanAt" ityanenApi hetunA sidhyatu, kimanenA''graheNAsmAkam ? iti bhAvaH / atha sUrirAha - " pubvetyAdi " nanvidAnIM " sarvAdarzanAt " iti bruvato bhavataH " parabhAgAdarisaNao" iti pUrvAbhyupagatasya hAniH prApnoti / kiJca, grAma - nagara - sarit - samudra- ghaTa- paTAdInAM pratyakSeNaiva darzanAt sarvAdarzanalakSaNasya hetoH pratyakSavirodhaH / tataH pratyakSavirodhatazca " sarvAdarzanAt " ityetadayuktamiti / atra kazcidAha - nanu sapakSasya sarvasyAvyApako'pi vipakSAta sarvathA nivRtto heturiSyata eva yathA " anityaH zabdaH prayatnAnantarIyakatvAt iti, nanityo'rthaH sarvo'pi prayatnAnantarIyakaH vidyud-dhana- kusumAdibhirvyabhicArAt tadvadihApi yadyapi sarveSvapi bhAveSu parabhArgAdarzanaM nAsti, yathApi bahuSu tAvadasti, atasteSu zUnyatAM sAdhayannasau samyag heturbhavi - Syati / tadayuktam, yatastatra yadanityaM na bhavati tat prayatnAnantarIyakamapi na bhavati, yathAsskAzam " ityevaM vyatirekaH sidhyati, iha tu yatra zUnyatA nAsti, kiM tarhi ? vastunaH sacvam, parabhAgAdarzanamapi tatra nAsti, 46

Page #299
.: 256 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth kintu parabhAgadarzanam , yathA ka ? iti bhavataH sarvAsadvAdino vyatirekaH kvacidapi na sidhyati, ato'heturevAyamiti // 196-197 (1744-1745) / / D. C.-Non-existence of each and every object could not be proved by virtue of the non-apprehension of rear parts. The rear portions of transparent objects like crystal and mica are apprehended. Existence of those objects has therefore undoubtedly been established. Consequently, non-apprehension of all objects can never be proved by means of the hetu that rear portions are not seen. Here, again, if you contend that sphatika etc. also do not exist, your argument that rear portion is not seen will fail and hence be invalid, as the rear portions of those objects are clearly apprehended. In spite of this faulty argument, if you attempt to establish s'unyata by means of a widely applicable statement that "Nothing could be proved to exist as nothing is perceived" then also, the previous hetu that rear part could not be seen, would be violated. Secondly, since village, town, river, sea, ghata, pata etc. are directly apprehensible, and hence the hetu will be evidently invalid in that way also. The opponent may contend again, that a reason which is not applicable to all the instances on the same side can be called a logical reason if it is absolutely inapplicable to the opposite side. e. g., s'abda is a-nitya because it is not produced without effort. But this does not mean that all a-nitya objects could not be produced without effort. Because objects like lightning, cloud etc. though. produced without effort are a-nitya. Similarly, here also, rear parts of all the objects are not non-apprehensible but as the rear parts of several objects are not apprehensible, this hetu leads us to prove s'unyata in them and that is why it is called a corrector logical reason! But, that is not proper. O Vyakta ! In the hetu mentioned above, pervasion of difference is found Take, for example, the

Page #300
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 257 : proposition that "That which is a-nitya, is like akas'a, produced without effort. " If vyatireka vyapti is applied in this case, nothing else but vidyamanata of an object is inferred when s'unyata is not found at all. Moreover, rear part is also apprehended in this case. So, O sarvas'unyatavadin ' you shall never be able to obtain the vyatireka vyapti. Your hetu will, therefore, not remain as a hetu at all. natthi para - majjhabhAgA apaccakkhattao maI hojA / naNu akkha-tthAvattI apaccakkhattahANI vA // 198 // (1746 ) Natthi para-majjhabhaga apaccakkhattao mai hojja I Nanu akkha--tthavatti apaccakkhattahani va // 198 // ( 1746 ) [ na staH para - madhyabhAgAvapratyakSatvato matirbhavet / nanvakSA - srthApattirapratyakSatvahAnirvA // 198 / / ( 1746 ) Na stah para-madhyabhagavapratyaksatvato mati r-bhavet i Nanvaksa'rthapattirapratyaksatvahanirva || 198 // ( 1746 ) ] Trans.--198 If the rear, as well as, middle portions ( of an object) are accepted as non-existent on account of their imperceptibility, then either there will be perception of senseorgans, as well as, the objects or imperceptibility ( itself ) will be violated. ( 1746 ) TIkA - atha syAnmatiH - para - madhyabhAgau na staH, apratyakSatvAt, kharaviSANavat / tadasacce ca tadapekSayA nirdizyamAna ArAdbhAgo'pi nAsti, ataH sarvazUnyatetyabhiprAyaH / tadayuktam, yataH - "akSamakSamindriyamindriyaM prati vartata iti pratyakSo'rthaH, na pratyakSo'pratyakSaH tadbhAvo'pratyakSatvam, tasmAdapratyakSatvAt" ityucyamAne nanvakSANAmarthasya cAsspattiH satA prApnoti, tadApattau ca zUnyatAbhyupagamahAniH / zUnyatAyAM vA'pratyakSatvalakSaNasya hetorhAni:, akSAsrthAnAmabhAve pratyakSA- pratyakSavyapadezAnupapateriti bhAvaH // 198 // ( 1746 ) // 33

Page #301
.: 258 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth D. C.-Vyakla:--The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like kharavisana. The front parts will also inot exist in that case, because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of sarvas'unyata. Bhagavan:-The argument is not valid. Pratyaksa means existing at each of the sense-organs. So, when the hetu of a-pratpaksatva is advanced, there would be apprehension of sense-organs as well as the objects to be apprehended, and in their apprehension, s'unyata would never be accepted. For, if s'unyata is taken along with the hetu of a-pratyaksatva, the hetu itself will prove invalid. Or, say in absence of indriya and artha, the practical usage or pratyaksa and a-pratyaksa would never be possible. Moreover, asthi apaccakkhaM pi ha jaha bhavao saMsayAivinnANaM / aha natthi suNNayA kA kAsa va keNovaladdhA vA ? // 199 // (1747) Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavao samsayajvinnanami Aha natthi sunnaya ka kasa va kenovaladdha va ? 1119911 (1747) [ astyapratyakSamapi khalu yathA bhavataH saMzayAdivijJAnam / atha nAsti zUnyatA kA kasya vA kenopalabdhA vA ? // 199 // (1747) Astyapratyaksampi khalu yatha bhavatah samsayadivijnanam i Atha nasti sunyata ka kasya va kenopalabdha va ? ||19911 (1747)] Trans.- 199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exist, even though it is imperceptible ( to others ). And if that (doubt) does not exist, what is that sunyata? Whose sanyata ( is that ) ? And who has apprehended it ? ( 1747 ) TIkA-nanvapratyakSamapyasti kizcid vastu, yathA bhavataH saMzayAdivijJAnamanyeSAmapratyakSamapyasti, tato yathaitat , tathA para-madhyabhAgAvapratyakSau

Page #302
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 259 :bhaviSyata ityanaikAntiko hetuH| atha bhavatsaMzayAdivijJAnamapi nAsti, tarhi kA nAma zUnyatA ? kasya vA'sau ? kena vopalabdhA ? bhavata eveha tatra kila saMzayaH, sa ced nAsti, tarhi kasyAnyasya grAma-nagarAdisacce vipratipattiH ? iti bhAvaH // 199 // (1747) // D. C.--Just as, your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is not perceptible to others, in the same way, there are some objects which exist, in spite of their imperceptibility. Middle and rear portions of such objects do exist in spite of their a-pratylesatva. Your hetu will, therefore, involve the fault of anaikantikatva, since it has been applicable to more than one object. Again, if your apprehension of doubt etc., does not exist, what would be s'unyata then? To whom does that s'unyata belong? And, who has apprehended that s'unyata ? The doubt, therefore, must exist. Otherwise, who else will raise the doubt about the existence of vidyamana objects like village, town, etc.? After refuting the idea of s'unyata, the Bhagavan now tries to establish the existence of elements like prithvi etc. in the following way :paJcakkhesu na jutto tuha bhUmi-jalA-'nalesu saMdeho / anilA''gAsesu bhave so'vi na jutto'NumANAo // 200 // Paccakkhesu na jutto tuha bhumi-jala'-nalesu samdeho 1 Anila="gasesu bhave so'vi na jutto'numanao 11 200 11 ( 1748 ) [pratyakSeSu na yuktastava bhUmi-jalA-'naleSu saMdehaH / __ anilA-''kAzayorbhavet so'pi na yukto'numAnAt // 200 // (1748) Pratyaksesu na yuktasta va bhumi-jala-'nalesu samadehah, Anila-"kasayor-bhavet so'pi na yukto'numanat 11 200 11 (1748)] Trans.-200 Your doubt about the objects like earth, water, and fire, is not proper, because they are (directly) per

Page #303
*: 260 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth ceptible ( to the senses ). That ( doubt ) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also by virtue of anumana. ( 1748) TIkA - tasmAd bhUmi - jala - vahmiSu pratyakSeSu tava saumya ! saMzayo na yuktaH, yathA svasvarUpe / tathA, anilo'pi pratyakSa eva, guNapratyakSatvAt, ghaTavat, tatastatrApi na saMzayo yuktaH / bhavatu vA, anila - sskAzayorapratyakSatvena saMzayaH, tathA'pyasau na yuktaH, anumAnasiddhatvAt tayoriti // 200 // ( 1748 ) // D. C-Just as, in the case of your own body, you cannot raise doubt, so in the case of pratyaksa objects such as bhumi ( earth ), Jala ( water ), and anala ( fire ) also you should not raise doubt. Moreover, you cannot entertain doubt about vayu ( wind ), and akas'a (space), also because they are established by means of anumana. Here is the anumana about wind, asthi adissApAiyapharisaNAINaM guNI guNattaNao / ruvassa ghaDo va guNI jo tesiM so'nilo nAma // 209 // (1749) Atthi adisapaiyapharisanainam guni gunattanao Ruvassa ghado vva guni jo tesim so'nilo nama // 201 // ( 1749) [ astyazyApAditasparzanAdInAM guNI guNatvataH / rUpasya ghaTa iva guNI yasteSAM so'nilo nAma // 201 // ( 1749 ) Astyadrisyapadita sparsanadinam guni gunatvatah| Rupasya ghata iva guni yastesam so 'nilo nama || 201 // ( 1749) ] Trans-201 Just as ghata is the object possessing the the property of rupa, wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties, like a sense of touch, etc. produced by some invisible ( force ). ( 1749 ) TIkA - ya ete'dRzyena kenApyApAditA janitAH sparzAdayaste vidyamAnaguNinaH, guNatvAt, Adi zabdAcchanda - svAsthya -kampA gRhyante, ete'pi

Page #304
Vada ] Gannadharavada .: 261 :. hi vAyuprabhavAd vAyuguNA eva, iha ye guNAste vidyamAna guNino dRSTAH, yathA ghaTa - rUpAdayaH, yazcaiSAM sparza - zabda - svAsthya - kampAnAM guNI sa vAyuH tasmAdastyasAviti / 201 // ( 1749 ) // D. C.--Properties like spars'a, sabda, svasthya and kampa are produced by means of some invisible force. Now, since these properties appear as existing in vayu (wind), vayu is said to possess those properties, just as ghata, possesses the property of rupa. The anumana to establish akas'a is this: asthi vasuhAibhANaM toyassa ghaDo va muttimattAo / jaM bhUyANaM bhANaM taM vomaM vatta ! subattaM // 202 // (1750) Atthi vasuhaibhanam toyassa ghado vva muttimattao Jam bhuyanam bhanam tam vomam Vatta! suvvattam || 202 // [ asti vasudhAdibhAjanaM toyasya ghaTa iva mUrtimattvAt / yad bhUtAnAM bhAjanaM tad vyoma vyakta ! suvyaktam // 202 // (1750 ) Asti vasudhadibhajanam toyasya ghata iva murtimattvat Yad bhutanam bhajanam tad vyoma Vyakta ! suvyaktam || 202 || ] Trans.-202 Just as ghata becomes the receptacle of of water, so there is a receptacle for earth etc. also. The receptacle of ( those ) elements is nothing but akasa. ( 1750 ) TIkA - asti vasudhA - jalA - nala - vAyUnAM bhAjanamAdhAraH, mUrtimacvAt, toyasya ghaTavat yacca teSAM bhAjanaM tadAyuSman vyakta ! suvyaktaM vyometi / yadi ca sAdhyaikadezatAM dRSTAntasya kacit prerayati, tadetthaM prayogaH - vidyamAnabhAjanA pRthivI, mUrtatvAt, toyavat tathA, ApaH, tejovat ; tejazca vAyuvat, vAyuzca pRthivIvaditi / / 202 / / ( 1750 ) " 9 D. C. ----- Earth, water, fire, and wind have their adharas of the type of the ghata full of water on account of their being corporeal. This adhara, O Vyakta / is well known as akas'a. Since prithvi

Page #305
: 262 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth has its bhajana vidyamana on account of its murtatva like water, water has also the bhajana same as that of fire, and the fire in turn has the one similar to that of wind, which ultimately will have the same one as prithve. Having established the existence of all the five elements the Acarya now concludes :evaM paJcakkhAipamANasiddhAI somma ! paDivaja / jIva-sarIrAhArovaogadhammAiM bhUyAiM // 203 // (1751) Evam paccakkhaipamanasiddhaim somma ! padivajja i Jiva-sariraharavaogadhammaim bhuyaim 11 203 11 ( 1757 ) [ evaM pratyakSAdipramANasiddhAni saumya ! pratipadyasva / jIva-zarIrAdhAropayogadharmANi bhUtAni // 203 // (1751) Evam pratyaksadipramanasiddhani saumya ! pratipadyasva | Jiva-sariradharopayogadharmani bhutani 11 203 11 ( 1751 ) ] Trans.-203 So, O Saumya! accept those bhatas that have jiva and sarira as their adharas along with the property of common usage to have been established by means of evidences such as those perceptible by senses etc. Now, the bhutas are established as animate in this way:kiha sajIvAiM maI tllinggaao'nilaavsaannaaiN| vomaM vimuttibhAvAdAghAro ceva na sajIvaM // 204 // (1752) Kiha sajsvaim mai tallirigao'nilavasanaim / Vomam vimuttibhavadadharo ceva na sa-jivam // 204 // (1752) [kathaM sajIvAni matistalliGgAdanilAvasAnAni / vyoma vimUrtibhAvAdAdhAra eva na sajIvam / / 204 / / (1752) Katham sa-jivani matistallingadanilavasanani Vyoma vimurtibhavadadhara eva na sa-jivam || 204 // ( 1752)

Page #306
Vada] Ganadharavada .:263 : Trans.--204 ( The opponent may ask ) How are they animate ? ( The answer is )--Bhutas ending at vayu are animate on account of ( their possessing ) that characteristic. The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support (and hence ) it is not animate. TIkA-kathaM punaH saha jIvena vartanta iti sajIvAni bhUtAni ? iti parasya matiH syAt / atrocyate-tasya jIvasya liGgaM talliGgaM tasmAt tadupalabdherityarthaH, sacetanAnyanilAvasAnAni catvAri bhUtAni / vyoma-AkAzaM punarvigatamUrtibhAvamAdhAra eva, na tu sajIvamiti // 204 // (1752) D. C.-Vyakta :-How are the bhutas sajiva as they exist along with jiva ? The Acarya :-Prithvi, jala, agni, and vayu are sa-java because they possess the characteristics of jiva. But the sky is not sa-jiva since it is a-murta and hence it acts merely as an adhara. The living characteristic of prithvi can be laid down as follows:jmm-jraa-jiivnn-mrnn-rohnnaa-haar-dohlaa-myo| roga-tigicchAIhi ya nAri va saceyaNA taravo // 205 // (1753) Jamma-jara-jivana-marana-rohana-hara-dohala-mayaon Roga-tigicchaihi ya nari vva sa-ceyana taravo // 205 // ( 1753 ) [jnm-jraa-jiivn-mrnn-rohnnaa-''haar-dauhRdaa-''mytH| ' roga-cikitsAdibhizca nArIva sacetanAstaravaH / / 205 // (1753) Janma-jara-jivana-marana-rohana-"hara-dauhruda-''mayatah | Roga-cikitsadibhisca nariva sa-cetanastaravah || 205 // (1753)] Trans.--205 Trees like woman are living ( beings ) by reason of ( their having ) birth, old age, life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease and its diagnosis etc.

Page #307
:264 Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth TIkA-" sacetanAstaravaH" iti pratijJA / " janma-jarA-jIvanamaraNa-kSatasaMrohaNA-''hAra-dauhRdA-''maya-tacikitsAdisadbhAvAt " iti hetuH / "nArIvat" iti dRSTAntaH / Aha-nanvanaikAntiko'yam , acetanedhvapi janmAdivyapadezadarzanAt ; tathAhi-"jAtaM tad dadhi" iti vyapadizyate, na caitat sacetanam ; tathA, "jIvitaM viSam" "mRtaM kusumbhakam" ityAdi / atrocyate-vanaspatI sarvANyapi sacetanaliGgAni janmAdInyupalabhyante, ato manuSyeSviva tAni teSu nirupacaritAni, dadhyAdau tu pratiniyata eva kazcijAtAdivyapadezo dRzyate, sa caupacArika eva-jAtamiva jAtaM dadhi, mRtamiva mRtaM kusumbhakamityAdi // 205 / / (1753) / D. C.-Trees are sa-cetana like woman. Because, like woman, they possess the living characteristics such as janmagara-jivana-marana etc. Some one might argue that this rule could be applied to the lifeless objects also. Because, several characteristics like life, death, etc. are very well applied to the lifeless objects as well, when it is said that "curds is produced" or " ( effect of) that poison is still alive" or (intoxication of ) safflowert is dead " and so on even though the objects mentioned there-in, are lifeless, The argument mentioned above is not justified since all the characteristics of cetana are residing in the animate objects as their innate qualities. But in the case of lifeless objects, those characteristics are rarely applied and that too in a particular sense and not as a rule. chikaparoiyA chikkamettasaMkoyao kuliMgo ch| AsayasaMcArAo viyatta ! vallIviyANAI // 206 // (1754) sammAdao ya saav-ppboh-sNkaaynnaaio'bhimyaa| baulAdao ya sadAivisayakAlovalaMbhAo // 207 // (1755) + Popularly known as Kusumba in Kathrawar.

Page #308
Vada ] Ganadhuravada .: 265 Chikkaparoiya chikkamettasankoyao kulingo vya : Asayasancarao Viyatta ! valliviyanaim // 206 // ( 1754 ) Sammadao ya sava-ppaboha-sankoyanaio bhimaya / Bauladao ya saddaivisayakalovalambhao 11 207 11 ( 1755 ) [ spRSTaprarodikAH spRSTamAtrasaMkocataH kuliGga iva / AzrayasaMcArAd vyakta ! vallIvitAnAni // 206 // ( 1754 ) zamyAdayazca svApa-prabodha-saMkocanAdito'bhimatAH / bakulAdayazca zabdAdiviSayakAlopalambhAt // 207 // (1755) Spristprarodikah spristamatrasankocanatah kulinga iva i Asrayasancarad Vyakta ! vallivitanani II 206 11 ( 1754 ) ] Samyadayasca svapa-prabodha-sankocanadito'bhimatah Bakuladayasca sabdidivisaya kalopalambhat | 207 // ( 1755 )] Trans.--206-207 For, sensitive plants 0 Vyakta ! contract themselves like worin at the touch ( of others ); clusters of creepers spread themselves for support; sami etc. are supposed to contain the properties of sleeping, waking, contraction, etc and bakula etc. contain the properties like sabda etc. and ( the order of ) time also. ( 1754-1755 ) TIkA-sacetanAH spRSTaprarodikAdayo vanaspatayaH, spRSTamAtrasaMkocAt , -kuliGgaH kITAdistadvat / tathA, sacetanA vallyAdayaH, svarakSArtha vRtti-vRkSavaraNDakAdyAzrayaM prati saMcaraNAt / tathA, zamyAdayazcetanatvenAbhimatAH, svApaprabodha-saMkocAdimattvAt , devadattavat / tathA, sacetanA bakulA-'zoka-kurubakavirahaka-campaka-tilakAdayaH, zabdAdiviSayakAlopalambhAt-zabda-rUpa-gandharasa-sparzaviSayANAM kAle prastAva upabhogasya yathAsaMkhyamupalambhAdityarthaH, yajJadattavaditi / evaM pUrvamapi dauhRdAdiliGgeSu kUSmANDI-bIjapUrakAdayo vanaspativizeSAH pakSIkartavyA iti // 206-207 // (1754-1755) / D. C.--Plants like spars'aprarodika contract themselves like worn at a slight touch, and hence they are sa-cetana.

Page #309
.: 266 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth So are the creepers spreading over a wall, tree or fence, for self-protection. Sami etc. are also sa-cetana, since they have the tendency to sleep, wake, or feel shy like Devadatta. Trees like bakula, as'oka, kurabaka, viharaka, campaka, tilaka eto., are respectively able to feel the sensations of s'abda, rupa, rasa, gandha, spars'a etc. Plants like kusmandi and bijapuraka feel the longing of a pregnant woman. It is clear, therefore, that vanaspati is sa-cetana. Moreover, maMsaMkuro va saamaannjaairuuvNkurovlNbhaao| tarugaNa-vidama-lavaNo-valAdao sAsayAvatthA // 208 // (1756) Mansankuro vya samanajai-ruvamkurovalambhao 1 Tarugana-vidduma-lavano-valadao sasayavattha. ll 208 11 (1756) [mAMsAGkara iva samAnajAtirUpAGkuropalambhAt / tarugaNa-vidruma-lavaNo-palAdayaH svAzrayAvasthAH // 208 // (1756) Mansankura iva samanajatirupankuropalambhat i Tarugana-vidruma-lavano-paladayah svasrayavasthah||20811(1756)] Trans.--208 Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. ( are alive ) at their own places of production by reason of their having a sprout in the form of common generality, similar to the sprout of flesh ( 1756) * TIkA-tarugaNaH, tathA vidruma-lavaNo-palAdayazca svAzrayAvasthA svajanmasthAnagatAH santazcetanAH, chinnAnAmapyamISAM punastatsthAna eva samAnajAtIyAGkurotthAnAt , arzomAMsAGkaravata / Aha-nanu pRthivyAdibhUtAnAmiha sacetanatvaM sAdhayitumArabdham , tataH pRthivyA evAdau tat sAdhayituM yuktam , tasyA evAdAvupanyAsAt , tatkimiti " jamma-jarA-jIvaNa" ityAdinA tarUNAmevAdau tat sAdhitam , pazcAttu vidruma-lavaNo-palAdInAmiti / satyam , kintu pRthvIvikAratayA pRthvIbhUta eva tarUNAmantarbhAvo lokaprasiddhaH,

Page #310
Vada] Ganadharavada .: 267 .. suvyaktacaitanyaliGgAzca yathA tavo na tathA lavaNo - pala - jalAdaya iti teSAmevAdA caitanyaM sAdhitamiti / / 208 / / ( 1756 ) // D. C.-Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc, are sa-cetana at their own places of production. Because, the sprouts of these objects spring up again and again like the sprout of flesh springing up in the case of disease of piles etc. Vyakta-Really speaking, you had started to establish sa-cetanatva in the elements like prithvi etc. Then, what is the idea in proving sa-cetanate a first in the case of vanaspati and then in the case of prithvi? Bhagavana :-Vanaspati is nothing but a form of prithvi. Hence, out of the five bhutas, vanaspati resides only in prithvi. Moreover, the spirit of life is not so clearly manifested in stones etc. as it has been in case of vanaspati. For this reason O Vyakta! Caitanya is established first in vanaspati and then in prithvi. Now, the sa-cetanatva of water is established bhUmi kkhayasAbhAviya saMbhavao daduro va jalamuttaM / ahavA maccho va sabhAvavomasaMbhUyapAyAo // 209 / / (1757) Bhumikkhayasabhaviyasambhavao dadduro vva jalamuttam Ahava maccho va sabhavavomasambhuyapayao 1209 | (1757) [ bhUmikSatasvAbhAvika saMbhavato dardura iva jalamuktam / athavA matsya iva svabhAvavyomasaMbhUtapAtAt // 209 // ( 1757 ) Bhumiksatasvabhavikasambhavato dardura iva jalamuktam Athava matsya iva svabhavavyomasambhutapatat II 209 || (1757)] Trans-209 Water springing up naturally by digging the earth is said to be living like a frog; or, by reason of its falling naturally from the sky, water is living like a fish. (1757)

Page #311
: 268 :Jinabhadra [ The fourth ____TIkA--bhaumamambhaH sacetanamuktam , kSatabhUmisajAtIyasvAbhAvikasya tasya saMbhavAt , darduravat / athavA, sacetanamantarikSamambhaH, abhrAdivikArasvabhAvasaMbhUtapAtAt , matsyavaditi // 209 // (1757) // ___D. C.-Water springing from earth when dug out of it, is sa-cetana like a frog; or, that which falls from the sky as natural rains, is also called sa-cetana since it comes from vikaras like cloud etc. Fire, as well as, wind can also be taken as sa-cetona in this way :aparapperiyatiriyAniyamiyadiggamaNo'Nilo go vv| analo AhArAo viddhi-vigArovalambhAo // 210 // (1758) Apprapperiyatiriyaniyamiya deggamanao'nilo go vya i Analo aharao viddhi-vigarova-lambhao 11 210 11 ( 1758 ) [aparapreritatiryaganiyamitadiggamanato'nilo gaurikha / anala AhArAd vRddhi-vikAropalambhAt // 210 // (1758) Aparapreritatiryganiyamitadiggamanato'nilo gauriva i Anala aharad vriddhi-vikaropalambhat 11 210 11 ( 1758 )] Trans.--210 Wind is ( alive ) like a cow on account of its moving to and fro in various directions without being impelled by others. Fire ( is sa-cetana ) because it has attained growth as well as variety of forms by means of food. ( 1758) TIkA-sAtmako vAyuH, aparapreritatiryaganiyamitadiggamanAt, govat / yathA, sAtmakaM tejaH, AhAropAdAnAt , tavRddhau vikAravizeSopalambhAcca, naravat / gAthAbandhAnulomyAca, naravat / gAthAbandhAnulomyAcca vyatyayenopanyAsa iti // 210 // (1758) ____D. C.-Wind has life as it moves in all directions without the help of any external agency. Fire is also sa-java as it is alle to grow and manifest various forms by the help of ahara,

Page #312
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 269 : tnnvo'nnbbhaaivigaarmuttjaaitto'nnilNtaaii| satthAsatthahayAo nijjIva-sajIvarUvAo // 211 // (1759) Tanavo'nabbhaivigaramuttajaittao'ailantaim | Satthasatthahayao nijjiva-sa-jivaruvao 211 ll ( 1759 ) [ tanavo'nabhrAdivikAramUrtajAtitvato'nilAntAni / zastrA-'zastrahatA nirjIva-sajIvarUpAH // 211 // (1759) Tanavo'nabhradivikaramurtajatitvato'nilantani i Sastra-Sastrahata nirjiva-sa-jiva rapah // 211 / / ( 1759 )] ___Trans.-211 Bodies ( made of the four bhutas ) ending at vayu though different from forms like clouds etc. become lifeless when smashed by weapons and alive when free from weapons on account of their corporeal form. ( 1759 ) TIkA-pRthivyAdhanilAntAni catvAri bhUtAni jIvanirvatitAstadAdhArabhUtAstanava iti pratijJA, abhrAdivikArAdanyatve sati mRtajAtitvAt , gavAdizarIravat / abhrAdivikArastu visrasApariNatapudgalasaMghAtarUpatvenAcetanatvAd vrjitH| tAzca pRthivyAditanavaH zastropahatA nirjIvAH, azastropahatAstu sajIvA varNa-gandha-rasAdilakSaNataH samavaseyA iti // 211 // (1759) D. C.-Objects made of bhutas like prithvi jala, tejas, and vayu are distinguished from objects like clouds etc. on account of their definite corporeal forms. Hence, these bodies are alive when free from the attack of any weapon, but they at once become lifeless when smashed by weapons. Bhutas like prithvi etc. can be proved as living in another way also :-- sijjhati somma! bahuso jIvA navasattasaMbhavo navi ya / parimiyadeso logo na saMti cegidiyA jesiM // 212 // (1760) te siM bhavavicchittI pAvai nevA ya sA jao teNa / siddhamaNaMtA jIvA bhUyAhArA ya te'vassaM // 213 // (1761)

Page #313
.: 270 : Jinabhadra Gani's The fourth Sijjhanti Somma ! bahuso jiva navasattasambhavo navi ya i Parimiyadeso logo na santi cegindiya jesim 11 212 11 ( 1760 ) Te sim bhavavicchitti pavai nettha ya sa jao tena Siddhamananta jiva bhuyahara ya te'vassam II 213 ( 1761 ) [sidhyanti saumya ! bahuzo jIvA navasatsaMbhavo nApi ca / parimitadezo loko na santi caikendriyAM yeSAm // 212 // (1760) teSAM bhavavicchittiH prApnoti neSTA ca sA yatastena / siddhamananantA jIvA bhUtAdhArAzca te'vazyam // 213 // (1761) Sidhyanti Saumya ! bahuso jiva navasttvasambhavo napi ca i Parimitadeso loko na santi caikendriyam yesam 1121211 (1760) ] Tesam bhavavicchittih prapnoti ca sa yatastena 1 Siddhamananta jiva bhatadharasca te'vasyam // 213 // ( 1761)] Trans.--212-213 Many a jiva, O Saumya ! attains moksa and there is no possibility of new jivas ( to be born ). The world is limited. So, those according to whom, plants etc. do not exist, will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (ca) that is not desirable. Hence it is definitely proved that they (i, e. plants etc ) are the endless jivas with bhutas as their supports ( 1760-1761 ) TIkA-sidhyanti muktiM yAnti tAvadajasaM bahuzo jIvA, na ca navasavotpAdaH kenApISyate, parimitadezazca lokaH, tatastadAdhArAH sthUlAH stokA eva jIvA ghaTante / evaM ca sati yeSAM matena vanaspatyAdaya ekendriyA jIvA na santi, teSAM bhavasya saMsArasya vyavacchittiH prApnoti / na cAsau kasyApi tIrthAntarIyasyeSTA yataH, tena tasmAt kAraNAt siddhaM sattvAnAmAnantyam / te ca saMsAritvAdavazyaM bhUtAdhArAH zarIriNa evetyarthaH / na ca vanaspatyAdInantareNAnyat teSAM zarIramupapadyate / nivedyantAM vA yaccharIrAste, abhyupagamyatAM vA vanaspatyAdInAM sAtmakatvamiti bhAvaH // 212-213 // ( 1760-1761) // ___D.C:-Since many jivas attain moksa there is no possibi

Page #314
Vada] lity of new sattvas to be born. Moreover, this world is limited in space. It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of jivas depending upon it. Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc. are not sa-cetana, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time. But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted. Now since all these jivas are the mundane jivas, they must have bhutas as their s'astras (weapons) and since plants etc. are based on bhutas they should also be undoubtedly taken as sa-jiva. Ganadharavada *: 271 :. Now, the opponent's objection and its refutationevamahiMsAbhAvo jIvaghaNaM ti na ya taM jao'bhihiaM / satthovahayamajIvaM na ya jIvaghaNaM ti to hiMso // 214 // (1762) Evamahimsabhavo jivaghanam ti na ya tam jao'bhihiam Satthovahayamajivam na ya jivaghanam ti to himso 214(1762) [ evamahiMsAbhAvo jIvadhanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam / zastropahatamajIvaM na ca jIvadhanamiti tato hiMsA / / 214 / / (1762) Evamahimsa'bhavo jivaghanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam | Sastropahatamajivam na ca jivaghanamiti tato himsa ||214|| (1762)] Trans. 214 (The opponent may ask that) There is no possibility of ahimsa in that case on account of the statement that " (the world) is compact with jivas. (The reply is) That is not so. It has already been said that one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons. So, himsa could never be derived merely from the statement that "( the world) is compact with jivas." (1762) 19 TIkA - nanvevaM sati lokasyAtIvapRthivyA dijIvadhanatvAdahiMsA'bhAvaH, dqaccafgaizafazy faaf gfag+aqzfafa_ma: | asag a, ad'nantaramevAbhihitamasmAbhiH - " zastropahataM pRthivyAdikamajIvaM " bhavati /

Page #315
.: 272 Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth tadajIvatve cAkRtA-kAritAdiparibhogena nirvahatyeva yatInAM saMyamaH / na ca "jIvadhano lokaH" ityetAvanmAtreNaiva hiMsA saMbhavatIti // 214 // (1762) // ___D. C.-Vyakta :-If the world is packed with jitvas such as prithvi etc. even an ascetic will not be able to follow the vow of ahumsa, as they will least require food etc. which they would not obtain without himsa. ____Bhagavana :-For this, it has already been said O Vyakta ! that prithvi etc. become lifeless when beaten by weapons. Thus, when they become a-jiva there is no objection for yatis to get their food from them. So, it is not proper to deduce hingsa merely from the statement that the world is full of jivas. Moreover, na ya ghAyau tti hiMso nAghAyaMto tti nicchiymhiNso| na viralajIvamAhiMso na ya jIvaghaNaM ti to hiMsA // 215 // (1763) ahaNato vi hu hiMso duTTattaNao mao ahimaro cha / bAhiMto na vi hiMso suddhattaNao jahA vijjo // 216 // (1764) Na ya ghayau tti hinso naghayanto tti nicchiyamahimso Na viralajivamahimso na ya jivaghanam ti to himso 121511 (1763) Ahananto vi hu himso dutthattanao mao ahimaro vva i Bahinto na vi himso suddhattanao jaha vijjo // 216 // ( 1764 ) [ na ca ghAtaka iti hiMsro nAnaniti nishcitmhiNsrH| na viralajIvamahiMsro na ca jIvaghanamiti tatohiMsraH // 215 // (1763) anannapi khalu hiMsro duSTatvato mato'bhimara iva / bAdhamAno nApi hiMsraH zuddhatvato yathA vaidyaH // 216 // (1764 ) Na ca ghataka iti himsro naghnanniti niscitamahimsrah | Na viralajivamhimsro na ca jivaghanamiti tato hinusrah // 215 // ]

Page #316
Vada] Ganadharavada 3273 Aghnannapi khalu hinsro dustatvato mato'bhimara iva i Badhamano napi himsrah suddhatvato yatha vaidyah 1121611 ] Trans.--215-216 One who is destructive, is not ( necessarily ) murderous, and one who is not destructive, is not certainly non-violent. Nor is one having little jiva, a-himsaka and one that is packed with jivas accepted as himsaka. For, one is murderous, like a hunter, on account of his wicked motive even without killing; while another afflicting others with a good purpose, like a physician, is not murderous. ( 1763-1764 ). TIkA-na hi " ghAtakaH" ityetAvatA hiMsraH, na cAnannapi nizcayanayamatenAhiMsraH, nApi "viralajIvam" ityetAvanmAtreNAhiMsraH, na cApi "jIvadhanam" ityetAvatA ca hiMsra iti / kiM tahiM ? abhimaro gajAdighAtakaH sa iva duSTAdhyavasAyo'nannapi hiMsro mtH| bAdhamAno'pi ca zuddhapariNAmo na hiMsro yathA vaidyaH, iti nannapyahiMstraH, anannapi ca hiMsra uktaH // 215216 // (1763-1764) // ___D. C.-The point is that one committing actual himstl is not himsaka because of his good motive as in the case of a physician, while another, not actually committing himsa but having wicked purpose, is himsaka like a hunter. Also, paMcasamio tigutto nANI avihiMsao na vivriio| hou va saMpattI se mA vA jIvovaroheNaM // 217 // (1765) Pancasamio tigutto nani avihimsao na vivario 1 Hou va sampatti se ma va jivovarohenam u 217 11 ( 1765 ) [ paJcasamitastrigupto jJAnyavihiMsako na vipriitH| bhavatu vA saMpattistasya mA vA jIvoparodhena // 217 // ( 1765 ) 38

Page #317
Jinabhadra Gani's Pancasamitastrigupto jnanyavihimsako na viparitah Bhavatu va sampattistasya ma va jivoparodhena ||217 | ( 1765 ) ] .: 274: [ The fourth Trans-217 A wise person, conversant with the five samitis+ and guarded in three ways (ie, by mind, speech and body) is a-himsaka, but not the one (having) contrary ( characteristics ). He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of ) himsa on account of obstruction to jtvas. ( 1765 ) , TIkA - paJcabhiH samitibhiH samitaH tisrabhirguptibhizca gupto jJAnI jIvasvarUpa - tadrakSAkriyAbhijJaH sarvathA jIvarakSApariNAmapariNataH tatprayatazca kathamapi hiMsannapyavihiMsako mataH / etadviparItalakSaNastu nAhiMsakaH, kintu hiMsra evAyam, azubhapariNAmatvAt / bAhyajIvahiMsAyAstu jIvoparodhena jIvasya kITAderuparodhenopaghAtena saMpattirbhavatu mA bhUd vA 6 sa tasya sAdhvAdeH, hiMsakatve tasyA anaikAntikatvAditi // / 217 / / ( 1765 ) / D. C.-A person conversant with all the five samitis and restraining himself in three ways-manasa ( by mind) vacasa ( by speech ) and karmana ( by bodily actions ) - is the jnata of actual jivasvarupa and its protection. Such a person should be taken as a-himsaka even if he commits himsa. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned jnani purusa, is himsakca as he brings about an a- subha parinama. Fulfilment of himsa may or may not be attained by him due to jrvoparodha or the ( natural ) obstruction to jivas, but his himsakatva is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below: asubho jo pariNAmosA hiMsA so u bAhiranimittaM / ko vi avekkhejja na vA jamhA'NegaMtiyaM bajjhaM // 298 // (1766 Asubho jo parinamo sa himsa so u bahiranimittam | Ko vi avekkhejja na va jamha'negantiyam bajjham 218 (1766) + Five Jarne 1ules of life,

Page #318
Vada] Ganadharavada .: 275 [ azubho yaH pariNAmaH sA hiMsA sa tu bAhyanimittam / ko'pyapekSeta na vA yasAdanaikAntikaM bAhyam // 218 // (1766 ) Asubho yah parinamah sa himsa sa tu bahyanimittam i Ko'pyape kseta na va yasmadanaikantikam bahyam ||2181|(1766)] Trans.--218 What is ( known as ) inauspicious consequence is ( itself ) himsa. But that is an external cause. Some may or may not require ( this cause ), because the external ( cause ) is variable. ( 1766 ) TIkA-yasAdiha nizcayanayato yo'zubhapariNAmaH sa eva " hiMsA" ityAkhyAyate / sa ca bAhyasattvAtipAtakriyAlakSaNaM nimittaM ko'pyapekSate, ko'pi punastannirapekSo'pi bhavet , yathA tandulamatsyAdInAm ; tasmAdanaikAntikameva bAhyanimittam , tatsadbhAve'pyahiMsakatvAt , tadabhAve'pi ca hiMsakatvAditi // 218 // (1766 ) // D. C.-An action having inanspicious consequence is called himsa. This sort of himsa results from the nimitta of jivahimsa while sometimes himsa results without the apeksa of those nimittas as in the case of tandulamatsya. As the bahya nimitta is anaikantika, an action is himsaka sometimes even in absence of bahya nimitta and a-hinsaka sometimes even in its own absence. asubhapariNAmaheU jIvAbAho tti to mayaM hiNsaa| jassa una so nimittaM saMto vina tassa sAhiMsA // 219 // (1767) Asubhaparinamaheu jivabaho tti to mayam himsa i Jassa u na so nimittam santo vi na tassa sa himsa 1121911 (1767) [azubhapariNAmaheturjIvAvAdha iti tato mataM hiMsA / yasya tu na sa nimittaM sannapi na tasya sA hiMsA // 219 / / (1767) Asubhaparinamahetu r-jivabadha iti tato matam himsa i Yasya tu na sa nimittam sannapi na tasya sa himsa ||21911 ]

Page #319
*:276 Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Trans.--219 Affliction of sivas as a cause for an evil end is called himsa. That which has no such (end), has nothing like himsa even if cause is there. ( 1767) TIkA-tatastasmAd yo jIvAbAdho'zubhapariNAmasya hetuH, athavA, azubhapariNAmo hetuH kAraNaM yasyAsAvazubhapariNAmaheturjIvAbAdho jIvadhAtA, sa eva " hiMsA" iti mataM tIrthakara-gaNadharANAm / yasya tu jIvAbAdhasya so'zubhapariNAmo na nimittaM sa jIvAbAdhaM sannapi tasya sAdhorna hiMseti // 219 // (1767) // D. C.-One who inflicts pain upon javas with an evil purpose is said to commit himsa; but one who has no such purpose does not commit himsa even if he inflicts pain upon jivas. saddAdao raiphalA na vIyamohassa bhaavsuddhiio| jaha, taha jIvAbAho na suddhamaNaso vi hiMsAe // 220 // (1768) Saddadao raiphala na viyamohassa bhavasuddhio i Jaha, taha jivabaho na suddhamanaso vi himsae || 220 // (1768) [zabdAdayo ratiphalA na vItamohasya maavshuddhH| . yathA, tathA jIvAvAdho na zuddhamanaso'pi hiMsAyai // 220 // (1768) Sabdadayo ratiphala na vitamohasya bhavasuddheh | Yathi, tatha jivabadho na suddhamanaso'pi himsayai // 220 // ] Trans.--220 Just as sabda etc do not become the objects of pleasure to a dispassionate saint on account of the purity. of ( his ) mind, affliction of jivas too does not become the cause of himsa to a person having pure intention ( 1768 ) TIkA-yatheha vItarAga-dveSa-mohasya bhagavata iSTAH zabda-rUpAdayo bhAvavizuddhito na kadAcid ratiphalA ratijanakAH saMpadyante, yathA veha zuddhAtmano rUpavatyAmapi mAtari na viSayAbhilASaH saMjAyate; tathA zuddhapariNAmasya yatnavataH sAdhoH sattvopaghAto'pi na hiMsAya saMpadyate / tato'

Page #320
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 277 :. zubha pariNAmajanakatve bAhyaM nimittamanaikAntikameveti / tasmAd vyakta ! santi paJcabhUtAni cetanAni cAdyAni catvAri, ityetat pratIhIti sthitam / yacca "svamomayaM vai sakalam" ityAdi / tatrApi yastava cetasi vartate nAsAvarthaH, kintu bhavabhaiodvignAnAM bhavyasakhAnAM dhana- kanaka - putra - kalatrAdya sAratAmAtrapratipAdanaM tena vidhIyate, yena te tadAsthAM parityajya muktaye pravartante, na punastatra bhUtAbhAvaH pratipAdyate / iti muJca saMzayam, pratipadyasva bhUtAstitvamiti // 220 // ( 1768 ) D. C. -- To a dispassionate saint, s'abda, rupa, rasa etc. do not become the attractive objects of pleasure because his mind is pure. A pure-minded man does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering muni does never commit himsa even if he inflicts pain upon jivas on account of his s'uddha bhavas. It is clear, therefore, that bahya nimitta is anaikantika so far as himsa is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple. Hence O Bhadra! accept the existence of the five bhutas and know it for certain that the first four of them viz, prithvi, jala, agni, and vayu are sa-cetana. Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the Veda-padas like "Svanopamam var sakalam" etc. The main object of those sentences is to assert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc. before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the bhavabhaya, so that they might abandon their attachment to the worldly visayas and strive for the attainment of moksa. Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, O Saumya! and admit the existence of bhutas. chinnamma saMsamma jiNeNa jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / so samaNo pao paMcahiM saha khaMDisaehiM // 229 // (1769) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim ||221 ( 1769)

Page #321
.: 278 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth [fon si fa FTT-Hota yarati sa zramaNaH prabajitaH paJcabhiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 221 // (1769) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitah pancabhih saha khandikasataih ||22111 ] Trans.-221 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age, and death, the saint Vyakta accepted diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1769) End of the Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara.

Page #322
Chapter V pnycmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara. te pavaie souM suhama Agacchai jiNasagAsaM / vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 222 // (1770) Te pavvale soum Suhuma agacchai Jinasagasam 1 Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami 11 222 ( 1770 ) [ tAn pravajitAn zrutvA sudharma Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 222 // (1770) Tan pravrajitan srutva Sudharma agacchati Jinsakasam 1 Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase 11 222 || ( 1770 ) Trans.--222 Having heard that they (Vyakta and others) had renounced the world, Sudharman comes before the Tirtharkara. (He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. ( 1770 ) AbhaTTho ye jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNNu savadarisI NaM // 223 // (1771) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenami Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam // 223 // (1771) AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarAmaraNavipramuktena / nAnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 223 // (1771)

Page #323
: 280 Jinabhudra Gani's [ The fifth Abhisitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina // 223 // ( 1771)] Trans.-223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra ( lineage ), by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1771 ) kiM manne jAriso ihabhavammi so tAriso parabhave vi / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho // 224 // (1772) Kim manne jariso ihabhavammi so tariso parabhave vi i Veya-payana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 224 // ( 1772 ) [kiM manyase yAdRza ihabhave sa tAdRzaH parabhave'pi / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 224 // (1772) Kim manyase yadsisa ihabhave sa tadrisah parabhave'pi 1 Veda-padanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1122411(1772)] Trans.-224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world ? But ( ca ) you do not know the ( real ) ireaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their ( real ) interpretation ( 1772 ) TIkA-tvamevaM manyase-yo manuSyAdiryAdRza ihabhave sa tAdRzaH parabhave'pi / nanvayamanucitaste saMzayaH, yato'sau viruddhavedapadazrutinibandhano vartate / tAni cAmUni vedapadAni-" puruSo vai puruSatvamaznute, pazavaH pazutvam " ityAdi, tathA, " zrRgAlo vai eSa jAyate yaH sapurISo dahyate" ityAdi / eSAM ca vedapadAnAmamumartha manyase tvam-"puruSo mRtaH san parabhave puruSatvamevetyAdi, amUni kila bhavAntaragatajantusAdRzyapratipAdakAni tathA, " zrRgAlo vai" ityAdIni tu vaisadRzyakhyApakAni" iti / atastava saMzayaH / ayaM cAyukta eva, yato'mISAM vedapadAnAM nAyamarthaH, kintu vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 224 // (1772) // D. C-0 Sudharman ! Do you entertain the belief that

Page #324
Vada ] Ganadharavada 4: 281 : human life in the next world is the same as it is here ? Sentences of Vedas having contradictory interpretations have given rise to this illusion of yours. The sentences are as follows :(1)" Puruso vai purusatvamas'nute, pas'avah pasutvam" etc. and ( 2 ) " Srugalo vai esa jayate yah sa-puriso dahyate" etc. According to you, interpretations of these two sentences are respectively as follows : (1) A man obtains nothing but manhood even after death, in the next world; and animals such as cow etc. become animals after death. Thus, sentences like this suggest that the next life is the same as this. (2) But the sentences like " Srugalo vai eto." mean to assert that the next life is totally different from the present one. Such contradicting interpretations have given rise to the misguided belief of yours. Here is their real interpretation. Listen carefully. kAraNasarisaM kajaM bIyassevakuro tti mnnnnNto| ihabhavasarisaM satvaM jamavesi pare vi tamajuttaM // 225 // (1773) Karanasarisam kajjam biyassevankuro tti mannanto lhabhavasarisani savvani jamavesi pare vi tamajuttam 1122511 (1773) [ kAraNasadRzaM kArya bIjasyevAGkura iti manyamAnaH / ihabhavasadRzaM sarva yadavaiSi parasminnapi tadayuktam / / 225 / / (1773) Kapanasadsisam karyam bijasyevarkura iti manyamana) 1 Ihabhavasadsisam sarvam yadavaisi parasminnapi tadayuklam||22511] Trans.--225 Just as sprout is similar to seed, the effect is also similar to cause according to you. (And hence ), you

Page #325
282 :. Jinabhadra Gaai's [ The fifth believe everything in the next world to be similar to everything in this world. (But ) that is not correct. ( 1773 ) ___TIkA-sudharmANaM prati bhagavAnuvAca-" iha kAraNAnurUpameva kArya bhavati, yathA yavabIjAnurUpo yavAGkuraH, ihabhavakAraNaM cAnyajanma, tatastenApIhabhavadRzena bhavitavyam" ityevaM manyamAnastvaM yadihabhavasadRzaM sarva puruSAdikaM parabhave'pyavaiSi, tadayuktameveti // 225 // (1773) D. C.-Since karana is the same as karya according to you, the past life, being the karana of the present life, becomes the same as the present life. That is why you are led to believe that everything in this life is similar to everything in the next one. But this apprehension of yours is not correct. Because-- jAi saro siMgAo bhUtaNao saasvaannulittaao| saMjAyai golomA'vilomasaMjogao duvA // 226 // (1774) iti rukkhAyuvede joNivihANe ya visrisehiNto| dIsai jamhA jammaM suhamma! to nAyamegaMto // 227 // (1775) Jai saro singao bhutanao sasavanulittao i Sanjayai goloma'vilomasanjogao duvva // 226 // ( 1774 ) Iti rukkhayuvvede jonivihane ya visarisehinto I Disai jamha jammam Suhamma! to nayameganto 1122711 (1775) [ jAyate zaraH zRGgAd bhUvaNakaH sarSapAnuliptAt / saMjAyate. golomA'vilomasaMyogato dUrvA // 226 // (1774) iti vRkSAyurvede yonividhAne ca visdRshebhyH|| dRzyate yasmAjanma sudharman ! tato nAyamekAntaH / / 217 // (1775) Jayate sarah stirigad bhutrinakah sarsapanuliptat i Sanjayate goloma'vilomasamyogato darva // 226 // ( 1774 )]

Page #326
Vada ] Ganadharavada :: 283 :Iti vsiksaurvede yonividhane ca visadpisebhyah, Drisyate yasmajjanma Sudharman ! tato nayamekantah || 227 // ] Trans.--226-227 The sara plant is produced from horn; earth-grass? is produced by the anointing of mustard, and durvas is produced by the combination of goloma+ and aviloma plants. Similarly, in the treatises on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of ( a number of ) dissimilar objects. The rule is, therefore, not exclusive, O Sudharman! ( 1774-1775) TIkA-tataH " kAraNAnurUpaM kAryam " iti sudharman ! nAyamekAntaH, yataH zrRGgAdapi zaro jAyate, tasmAdeva ca sarSapAnuliptAd bhUtRNakaH zaSyasaMghAto jAyate; tathA, golomA-'vilomAbhyAM dUrvA prabhavati, ityevaM vRkSAyurveda vilakSaNAnekadravyasaMyogajanmAno vanaspatayo dRzyante / tathA, yonividhAne ca / yoniprAbhRte visadRzAnekadravyasaMyogayonayaH sarpa-siMhAdiprANino maNayo hemAdayazca padArthA nAnArUpAH samupalabhyante / ataH keyaM kAryasa kAraNAnurUpatA ? iti // 226-227 // (1774-1775) // D. C.-The rule that kaaryaa is similar to karana is not ekantika. Because, the scarra is produced even by means of s'rnga, by the unction of mustard-seeds the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of goloma and aviloma grasses, the diurva grass is produced. Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is ___1. Bhutrinalea (earth-grass ) = A kind of fragnant grass; the plantb Androhogon Schoenanthus. 2. Sarsapa=Mustard-seed; popularly known as' sarasava in Western India; Sinapis Dichotoma. 3. Durva=Name of a bent grass; panic grass. Panicum Dactylon; 4. Goloma, Aviloma=Two different kinds of bent giass. 5. Vriksayu = Name of a short treatise by Surpala on the planting and cultivation of trees.

Page #327
.: 284 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth shown as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between karya and karana, is therefore, inapplicable in this case. Or, say, the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world, on account of similarity between karya and karana in this way : ahavA jau cciya bIyANurUvajammaM mayaM tao ceva / jIvaM giNha bhavAo bhavaMtare cittapariNAmaM // 228 // (1776) jeNa bhavaMkurabIyaM kammaM cittaM ca taM jao'bhihiyaM / uvicittattaNao bhavaMkuravicittayA teNaM // 229 // (1777) jai paDivannaM kammaM heuvicittattao vicittaM ca / to tatphalaM vi cittaM pavajja saMsAriNo somma ! // 230 // (1778) Ahava jau cciya biyanuruvajammam mayam tao ceva I Jivam ginha bhavao bhavantare cittaparinamam // 228 (1776 ) Jena bhavankurabiyam kammam cittam ca tam jao'bhihiyam Heuvicittattanao bhavankuraviccittaya tenam // 229 // ( 1777 ) Jai padivannam kammam heuvicittattao vicittam ca To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsarino somma ! 1230|| (1778) [ athavA yata eva bIjAnurUpajanma mataM tata eva / jIvaM gRhANa bhavAd bhavAntare citrapariNAmam || 228 // ( 1776 ) yena bhavAkarabIjaM karma citraM tad yato'bhihitam / hetuvicitratvato bhavAGkaravicitratA tena // 229 // ( 1777 ) yadi pratipannaM karma hetuvicitratvato vicitraM ca / tatastatphalamapi citraM pratipadyasva saMsAriNaH saumya ! ||230|| (1778) Athava yata eva bijanurupajanma matam tata eva i Jivam grihana bhavad bhavantare cittaparinamam // 228 (1776)

Page #328
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 285 Yena bhavankurabijam karma citram tad yato'bhihitam i Hetuvicitratvato bhavankuravicitrata tena // 229 // ( 1777 ) Yadi pratipannam karma hetuvicitratvato vicitram ca ! Tatastatphalamapi citram pratipadyasva samsarinah Saumya ! 1123011] Trans.-228-229-230 Or, because the production (of karya) is similar to the root-cause, according to you, take jiva in the next life to be a parinama distinct from this mundane world. For, karman ( which is ) the seed of the sprout of life is itself distinct. And, if the effect is established to be distinct because the cause is distinct, know it for certain O Saumya ! that the mundane Soul has also its phala distinct from it. ( 1776-1777-1778) TIkA-vyAkhyA-athavA, yata eva bIjAnurUpaM kAraNAnuguNaM kAryANAM janma matam , tata eveha bhavAd bhavAntare jIvaM gRhANa pratipadyasva / kathaMbhUtam ? jAti-kula-balaizvarya-rUpAdivicitrapariNAmam / yadi nAma bIjAnurUpaM janma, tathApi kathaM bhavAntare vicitratA jIvAnAm ? ityAha-" jeNa bhavaMkuretyAdi " yena yasmAd nAraka-tiryagAdirUpeNa bhavanaM bhavaH sa evAGkara ivAGkarastasya bIjamiha karmaivAvaseyam , tacca mithyAtvA-'ciratyAdihetuvaicivyAd vicitraM yasmAd mayA'bhihitam , tasmAt tajanyasya bhavAGkurasyApi jAtyAdibhedena vicitratA / tato yadi tvayA karma pratipannam , hetuvaicicyAca yadi tadvaicitryamabhyupagatam, tataH saMsAriNo jIvasya tatphalamapi nArakatiryaMG-manuSyA-'mararUpeNa bhavanarUpaM saumya ! vicitrarUpaM pratipadyasveti // 228-229-230 (1776-1777-1778) // D. C.-The production of various karyas is similar to the corresponding karanas according to you. But the jiva in the next life is distinguished from this world on account of jati, kula, rupa, bala, ars'varya etc. Now if Karya is taken to be similar to the karana, how will the jivas be different in the next life? The vicitrata of giva in the next life is to be accounted for by means of karman. For karman being the hetu of samsara, renders the whole samsara, vicitra by reason

Page #329
.: 286 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth of its own self being vicitra. So, just as karman is vicitra by reason of its wrong belief and vowlessness etc, its Karya viz, bhava should also be taken as vicitra by reason of jati, kula, rupa, bala ete. So, if you admit Karman and if you believe that Karya is distinguished from karana, then O Saumya! know it for certain that the mundane Soul has its phala in the form of victrata as hellish beings, lower animals, human beings, or celestial beings. cittaM saMsAritaM vicittakammaphalabhAvao heU / iha cittaM cittANaM kammANa phalaM va logammi // 231 // (1779) Cittam samsarittam vicittakammaphalabhavao heu | Iha cittam cittanam kammana phalam va logammi || 231 (1779) [ citra saMsAritvaM vicitrakarmaphalabhAvato hetoH / iha citraM citrANAM karmaNAM phalamiva loke // 231 // (1779 ) Citram samsaritvam vicitrakarmaphalabhavato hetoh Iha citram citranam karmanam phalamiva loke || 231 // ( 1779 ) ] Trans.-231 Like the variable result of variable actions (accomplished) in this world, worldliness is variable on account of the hetu that (it is also) the result of variable actions. ( 1779 ) TIkA - citra saMsArijIvAnAM nArakAdirUpeNa saMsAritvamiti pratijJA / vicitrasya karmaNaH phalarUpatvAditi hetuH / iha yad vicitrahetukaM tad vicitramupalabhyate, yatheha kRSi-vANijyAdikarmaNAM phalaM loka iti / tadevaM karma vaicitryAd bhavavaicitrye pramANamuktam || 231 || (1779 ) // D. C.-Just as the results of various actions like ploughing trading etc. are variable, the samsaritva of the mundane animals is also varied as seen in their hellish experience etc. on account of the fact that samsaritva is nothing but the result of their vicitra actions in the past,

Page #330
.: 287. Veda ] Ganadharavada Now, in support of the variable nature of Karman, the author states :cittA kammapariNaI poggalapariNAmao jahA bajjhA / kammANa cittayA puNa ta uvicittbhaavaao||232|| (1780) Citta kammaparinai poggalaparinamao jaha bajjha | Kammana cittaya puna taddheuvicittabhavao 11 232 11 ( 1780 ) [citrA karmapariNatiH pulapariNAmato yathA bAhyA / karmaNAM citratA punastaddhetuvicitrabhAvAt // 232 // (1780) Citra karmaparinatih pudgalaparinamiato yatha bahya | Karmanam citrata punastaddhetuvicitrabhavat 0 232 // (1780)] ____Trans.-232 Just as the outward effect of actions is variable on account of its being the parinama of earthly bodies, the variable nature of actions is also due to their hetu being variable. ( 1780 ) TIkA-iha vicitrA karmapariNatiH, pudralapariNAmAtmakatvAt , iha yatpudralapariNAmatmakaM tad vicitrapariNatirUpaM dRzyate, yathA bAhyo'bhrAdivikAraH, pRthivyAdivikAro vA, yattu vicitrapariNatirUpaM na bhavati tat pudralapariNAmAtmakamapi na bhavati, yathA''kAzam , yA punaH pudralapariNAmasAmye'pi karmaNAmAvaraNAdibhedena vizeSato vicitratA sA taddhetuvaicicyAdavagantavyA, vicitrAzca mithyAtvAdayaH-pradveSa-nimavAdayazca karmahetava iti // 232 // (1780) // D. C.-Effect of Karman is varied in this world., Only that which is pudgalaparinamatmaka is known as vicitra (as in the case of various transformations of cloud, earth etc.). While that which is not the result of earthly pudgalas, is not recognized as a vicitraparinati ( as in the case of akas'a ). In case of Karman itself being variable, in addition to this pudgalaparinamatva, vicitrata is due to the variable nature of its motives like vanity, hostility, and wickedness etc. by means of which those actions are actually inspired. 232 ( 1780 ).

Page #331
*:288 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth ahavA ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao teNaM / kammaphalaM pi ihabhavasarisaM paDivaja paraloe // 233 // (1781) kiM bhaNiyamiha maNuyA nANAgaikammakAriNo saMti / jai te tapphalabhAjo pare vi to sarisayA juttA // 234 // (1782) Ahava ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao tenam i Kammaphalam pi ihabhavasarisam pativajja paraloe 112331 (1781) Kim bhaniyamiha manuya nanagaikammakarino santi , Jai te tapphalabhajo pare vi to sarisaya jutta || 234 i ( 1782 ) [ athavehabhavasadRzaH paraloko'pi yadi saMmatastena / karmaphalamapIhabhavasadRzaM pratipadyasva paraloke // 233 // (1781) kiM bhaNitamiha manujA nAnAgatikarmakAriNaH santi / yadi te tatphalabhAjaH parasminnapi tataH sadRzatA yuktA // 234 // (1782) Athavehabhavasadtisam paraloko'pi yadi sammatastena 1 Karmaphalamapthabhavasadrisam pratipadyasva paraloke || 233 // Kim bhaaitamiha manuja nanagatikarmakarinah santi 1 Yadi te tatphalabhajah parasminnapi tatah sadrisata yukta 02340] Trans.-233-234 Or, if the other life is also taken as the same as this life, (you should ) accept the karma phala in the other life to be the same as ( that in ) this life. Has it been said that there exist people in this world doing (various ) deeds according to their various tendences ? If they exist, there exist ( people ) in the next ( world ) to enjoy their fruits also. Sameness (of both ) is, therefore, justified. ( 1781-1782 ) TIkA-vyAkhyA-athavA, yadIhabhavasadRzaH paraloko'pi saMmato bhavataH, " teNaM ti" tataH karmaphalamapi paraloka ihabhavasadRzamihatyavicitrazubhA'zubhakriyAnurUpaM vicitraM pratipadyasveti / evaM mukulitaM pratipAdyaitadeva bhAvayati-" kiM bhaNiyamityAdi" kimetAvatA pratipAditaM bhavati ? /

Page #332
.: 289 : Vada ] Ganadharavida iha tAvad manuSyA nAnAgatihetuvicitrakriyAnuSThAyinaH santIti pratyakSata eva lakSyante / tato yadi te paraloke tattatkriyAphalabhAja iSyante, tato yathehatyakriyANAmasadRzatA, tathA paralokagatajantUnAmapi saiva yuktA, nanu yo'tra yAdRzaH sa paratrApi tAdRza eva bhavati // 233-234 // (1781-1782) ___D. C.--If, according to you, next life is the prototype of this one, the karmaphala in the next life will depend upon (one's ) various good or bad actions in this life. Now, since various people do various deeds as a result of their various tendences in this life, it should be noted that they enjoy fruits of their actions in the next life. So, inclination of one in the present life, depends upon his inclination in the past life also. Then, anticipating doubts in the opponent's mind, the author states :aha iha saphalaM kammaM na pare to sabahA na sarisattaM / akayAgama-kayanAsA kammAbhAvo'havA patto // 235 // (1783) kammAbhAve ya kao bhavaMtaraM, sarisayA va tadabhAve / nikAraNao ya bhavo jai tA nAso vi taha ceva // 236 // (1784) Aha iha saphalam kammam na pare to savvaha na sarisattami Akayagama-kayanasa kammabhavo'hava patto 11 235 0 ( 1783 ) Kammabhave ya kao bhavantaram, sarisaya va tadabliave i Nikkaranao ya bhavo jai ta naso vi taha ceva 11 236 11 ( 1784) [ atheha saphalaM karma na parasmistataH sarvathA na sadRzatvam / akRtAgama-kRtanAzau karmAbhAvo'thavA prAptaH // 235 // (1783) karmAbhAve ca kuto bhavAntaraM, sadRzatA vA tadabhAve / niSkAraNakazca bhavo yadi tato nAzo'pi tathaiva // 236 // (1784) 31

Page #333
* 290 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth Atheha saphalam karma na parasminstatah sarvatha na sadrisatvam Akritagama-kritanasau karmabhavo'thava praptah 0235 // (1783)] Karmabhave ca kuto bhavantaram sadfissata va tadabhave i Niskaranakasca bhavo yadi tato naso'pi tathaiva // 236 // (1784)] Trans.--235-236 If (the opponent says that ) Karman is successful here ( only ), ( and ) not in the next life, then there will be nothing like sameness at all. The unaccomplished object will crop up and the accomplished one will come to an end Or, there will be ( complete ) negation of Karman itself. In absence of Karman, how will the next life come into existence ? And in its absence, whence ( will ) the sadrisata ( exist ) ? And if the ( next ) life is ( taken to have been) produced without any cause, then (its ) end will also be so. ( 1783-1784) TIkA-athaivaM brUSe-iha saphalaM karmeti-ihabhavasaMbandhyeva kRSyAdikriyArUpaM karma saphalam , na tu pArabhavikadAnAdikriyArUpaM karma / tatazca tatphalAbhAvAd na paraloke jantuvaisadRzyam / atrottaramAha-" tato sabahA na sarisattaM ti" tata evaM sati yat tavAbhipretaM tat sarvathA parabhave jIvAnAM sadRzatvaM na syAt / taddhi karmaNA janyate, taca nAsti, pArabhavikakriyANAM tvayA niSphalatvAbhyupagamAt , tanniSphalatve ca karmAbhAvAt / atha karmAbhAve'pi bhavet sAdRzyam , tabakRtasyaiva tasya nirhetukasyA''gamaH prApnoti, kRtasya ca dAna-hiMsAdikriyAphalarUpasya karmaNo nAzaH prasajati / athavA, mUlata eva karmaNAmabhAvaH prAptaH-dAna-hiMsAdikriyANAM niSphalatvAbhyupagamAd mUlata eva karmaNo bandho'pi na syAditi bhAvaH / tataH kim ? ityAha-karmAbhAve ca kAraNAbhAvAt kuto bhavAntaram , tadabhAve ca dUrotsAritameva sAdRzyam / atha karmAbhAve'pi bhava iSyate, tarhi niSkAraNa evAsau syAt / yadi caivamayamiyeta, tato nAzo'pi tasya bhavasya niSkAraNa eva syAt , ato vyrthstponiymaadynusstthaanpryaasH| niSkAraNe ca bhave'bhyupagamyamAne vaisadRzyamapi jIvAnAM niSkAraNaM kiM neSyate, vizeSAbhAvAt ? iti // 235-236 // (1783-1784) //

Page #334
Vada] Ganadharavada D. C.-Sudharman :-Actions (like ploughing etc.) which are connected with this life are alone fruitful, and those (like munificence etc.) that are connected with the other life, are not fruitful. This is the reason why there is no distinction between the lives of creatures in the two bhavas. *: 291:* Bhagavan :-But sadris'ata can never exist without cause as sadris'ata itself is produced from Karman. Now, when you take Karman (like dana etc.) connected with the other life, to be fruitless, there is no scope for sadris'ata to exist. Sudharman-Sadris'ata of jivas could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of ghata produced from earth. Bhagavan :-If sadris'ya exists even in absence of Karman there will be akritagama (i. e., springing up of the unaccomplished object), as well as kritanas'a (i. e. destruction of the accomplished object ). Thus the existence of Karman itself is denied. When there is no Karman, how can the parabhava exist? And when the existence of parabhava is denied, the existence of sadris'ya between two bhavas will automatically be denied. Sudharman:-The existence of bhavantara could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of lifeless objects when Karya and karana are the same. Bhagavan :-In that case, O Sudharman! the production as well as the destruction of bhavantara will also be niskarana. Consequently, the practice of austerities, munificence, and vows etc. would be good-for-nothing, as bhavantara will not depend upon those actions, and all people-whether doing good or bad deeds will have the same prototype life. Moreover, you should also take the vaisadris'ya or dissimilarity of various jivas from each other to be nis'karanaka like bhavantara. For, like bhavantara, there is karanabhava in case of varsadris'ya also,

Page #335
.: 292:. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fifth kammAbhAve va maI ko doso hojja jai sabhAvo'yaM / jaha kAraNANurUvaM ghaDAi kajjaM sahAveNaM // 237 // (1785) Kammabhave vi mai ko doso hojja jai sabhavo'yam | Jaha karananuruvam ghadai kajjam sahavenam // 237 // ( 1785) [ karmAbhAve'pi matiH ko doSo bhavet yadi svabhAvo'yam / yathA kAraNAnurUpaM ghaTAdi kArya svabhAvena || 237 // ( 1785 ) Karmabhave'pi matih ko doso bhavet yadi svabhavo'yam | Yatha karananurupam ghatadi karyam svabhavena // 237 1785) ] Trans. - 237 Again, the opponent might believe that ( the karya could be brought about even in absence of Karman. What objection would arise if it were its very nature as in the case of karyas like ghata etc., which bear natural resemblence with their karanas ? ( 1785 ) TIkA - atha parasyaivaMbhUtA matiH syAd yadutakarmAbhAve'pi yadi bhavasadbhAvarUpaH svabhAva evAyaM bhavet tarhi ko doSaH syAt ? -- vinApi karma yadi svabhAvAdeva bhavaH syAt tarhi kiM dUSaNaM bhavet ? --- na kiJcidityarthaH / dRSTAntamAha-yathA karma vinApi mRtpiNDAdikAraNAnurUpaM ghaTAdi kArya svasvabhAvenaivotpadyamAnaM dRzyate, tathA sadRzaprANijanmaparamparArUpo bhavo'pi svabhAvAdeva bhaviSyati / atrocyate nanu ghaTo'pi na svabhAvataH eva jAyate, kartR-karaNAdyapekSitvAt tasya / tatazcehApi karturAtmanaH pArabhavikasya ca zarIrAMdikAryasya karaNaM saMbhAvyate tacca kartR- kAryAbhyAM bhinnaM loke'pi dRzyate, kulAla-ghaTAbhyAM cakrAdivat yaccehAtmanaH zarIrAdi kAryaM kurvataH karaNaM tat karmeti pratipadyasva / syAdetat ghaTAdeH pratyakSasiddhatvAt bhavantu kulAlAdayaH kartAraH, zarIrAdi kAryaM tvAdivikAravat svabhAvato'pi bhavi Syati, tato na karmasiddhiH / tadayuktam, yato na svAbhAvikaM zarIrAdi, AdimatpratiniyatAkAratvAt ghaTavaditi / kiJca "kAraNAnurUpameva kAryam" ityevaM yat parabhave sAdRzyaM tvayA'bhyupagamyate, tadapi svabhAvavAdinastavAAdi "

Page #336
Vada ] Ganadharavada 293 : vikAradRSTAnte parihIyate, abhrAdivikArasya svakAraNabhUtapudgaladravyAdatifagyuncanfefa 11 23011 (2964) 11 D. C.-Sudharman :-Just as, it is by virtue of their svabhava that objects like ghata etc. are produced as a natural result of their respective karanas but without the help of karman, the bhavantara is also produced by virtue of its own svabhava even in absence of Karman. Bhagavan-Karyas like ghata, o Sudharman ! could never be produced merely by virtue of their svabhava, but they have to depend upon karta and karana also. So, in the production of Sarara also, kartu and karana are of primary importance. This leads us to believe that in the production of bhavantara, atman which is different from body, is the karta, and Karman, the karana, just as potter is the karta and chakra etc. act as karanas, when ghata is produced. Sudharman :-Since kuryas like ghata are directly apprehensible, potter and chakra, etc. may respectively be taken as their kartu aud karanas. But karyas like s'arira in bhavantara are produced naturally like the multi-coloured changes in clouds etc. It is not, therefore, possible to seek Kurman as a karana, in the production of bhavantara. Bhagavan :--Your argument is totally unfounded. Karyas like s'arira etc. are not svabhavika because they have a beginning, as well as, a definite akara like ghata. You have taken the other life to be the same as this, because, according to you, Karya is exactly similar to karana. But this principle of sadris'ata is not applicable in case of abhradivikaras, as they are peculiarly different from the objects having definite akara. Moreover, hoja sahAvo vatthaM nikAraNayA va vatthudhammo vA ? / FE acej o 31 sua sisi agis at 1123EUR11(PUC&

Page #337
.: 294 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth aJcaMtamaNuvaladdho vi aha tao asthi nasthi kiM kammaM / heU va tadatthitte jo naNu kammassa vi sa eva // 239 // (1787) kammassa vAbhihANaM hoja sahAvo tti hou ko doso| nicaM va so sabhAvo sariso etthaM ca ko heU ? // 240 // (1788) Hojja sahavo vatthum nikkaranaya va vatthudhammo va ? Jaha vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhio khapuppham va // 238 // Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammami Heu va tadtthitte jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva // 239 // (1787) Kammassa vabhihanam hojja sahavo tti hou ko doso i Niccam va so sabhavo sariso ettham ca ko heu ? 1124011 (1788) [ bhavet svabhAvo vastu niSkAraNatA vA vastudharmoM vA / yadi vastu nAsti sako'nupalabdheH khapuSpamiva // 238 // (1786) atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nAsti kiM karma / heturvA tadastitve yo nanu kamaNo'pi sa eva // 239 // (1787) karmaNo vAbhidhAnaM bhavet svabhAva iti bhavatu ko doSaH / nityaM vA sa svabhAvaH sadRzo'tra ca ko hetuH ? // 240 // (1788) Bhavet svabhavo vastu niskaranata va vastud harmo va ? ! Yadi vastu nasti sako'nupalabdheh khapuspamiva // 238 // (1786) Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nasti kim karma | Hetu 'r-va tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva ll 239 II (1787) Karmano vabhidhunam bhavet svabhava iti bhavatu ko dosah Nityam va sa "svabhayah sady iso'tra ca ko hetuh? || 240 11 ( 1788 )] Trans.-238-239-240 Is ( that ) svabhava a ( definite ) object, or causelessness ( itself ), or property of an object ? If it is ( taken as ) a ( definite ) object, it is not ( so ) because it is non-perceptible like a kha-puspa. In spite of its being non-perceptible, if it exists, why should not Karman exist ?

Page #338
* Vadal Ganadharavada :295:. The hetu that ( works ) in its existence, ( works ) in case of Karman also. (Or ) what objection ( would arise ), if svabhava becomes a synonym of Karman, and what is the hetu (in believing ) that svabhava is always the same? ( 1786-1787-1788) TIkA-etad gAthAtrayamapi prAyaH prAgeva vyAkhyAtArtham , navaraM "nicaM " ityAdi tRtIyagAthottarArdham / idamatra hRdayam-sa svabhAvo nityaM sadRza eva tvayA'bhyupagantavyaH, bhavAntare sadRzyaiva manuSyAdibhavasya jananAt , tasya ca svabhAvasya nityaM sadRzatve ko hetuH 1 / na kshciditybhipraayH| svabhAvata evAyaM svabhAvaH sadRza iti cet / nanu bhavavisadRzatAyAmapyetad vaktuM zakyata eveti // 238-239-240 // (1786-1787-1788) // ___D. C.-The point is that since you have taken svabhava to be the same for ever as the same life is repeated in various bhavas you should state the reason for its nityasadris'ata. You might say that there is no hetu as such, as nityasadrisa by virtue of its own self. For, the same argument could be advanced in case of vaisadris'ya of the bhavas as well. And, so mutto'mutto vA jai mutto to na sabahA sriso| pariNAmao payaM piva na dehaheU jai amutto // 241 // (1789) uvagaraNAbhAvAo na ya havai suhamma! so amutto vi| kajjassa muttimattA suhasaMvittAdio ceva // 242 // (1790) So mutto'mutto va jai mutto to na savvaha sarisol Parinamao payam piva na dehaheu jai amutto 11,241 11 ( 1789) Uvagaranabhavao na ya havai Suhamma! so amutto vi i Kajjassa muttimatta suhasamvittadio ceva 11 242 11 ( 1790 ) [sa mUrto'mUrtI vA yadi mUrtastato na sarvathA sadRzaH / pariNAmataH paya iva na dehaheturyadyamUrtaH / / 241 // (1789)

Page #339
Jinabhadra Gani's upakaraNAbhAvAd na ca bhavati sudharman ! so'mUrkho'pi / kAryasya mUrtimasvAt sukhasaMvicyAditazcaiva // 242 // ( 1790 ) .: 296 :* [The fifth Sa murto'murto va yadi murtastato na sarvatha sadrisah Parinamatah paya iva na dehahetu r- yadyamurtah | 241 // ( 1789 ) Upakaranabhavad na ca bhavati Sudharman ! so'murto'pi Karyasya murtimattvad sukhasamvittyaditascaiva | 242 (1790) ] Trans. - 241-242. Is that ( svabhava), murta or a-murta ? If murta, it is not at all sadrisa on account of its (having a) parinama as in the case of milk. And, if it is a-murta, 0 Sudharman! even that a-murta svabhava does not become the cause of body in absence of instruments, as well as on account of the corporeal nature of Karya (indicated) by the perception of happiness etc. ( 1789-1790 ) " 46 TIkA - vyAkhyA - sa svabhAvo mUrtaH, amUrtI vA 1 / yadi mUrtaH tarhi karmaNA saha tasya ko vizeSaH ? saMjJAntaramAtra viziSTakarmaivetthamuktaM syAditi / na cAsau sarvadeva sadRzo yujyate, pariNAmitvAt, dugdhAdivat / athavA, mUrtatvAdevAdivikAravaditi / athAmUrto'sau svabhAvaH tarhi naiSa dehAdInAmArambhakaH, anupakaraNatvAt, daNDAdivikalakulAlavat, amUrtatvAdeva vA AkAzavat / na ya havai suhamma ! so amutto vi tti " kiJca, sudharman ! ito'pi sa svabhAvo'mUrtI na yuktaH, zarIrAdestatkAryasya mUrtimayAt / na hyamUrtasya nabhasa iva mUrta kAryamupajAyate / tathA, sukha-saMvityAdezva nAyamamUrtaH / idamuktaM bhavati -- karma tAvad bhavatA neSyate, svabhAvavAditvAt / tatazca zarIrAdIni, sukha-duHkhasaMvicyAdIni ca svabhAvasyaiva kAryANyeSTavyAni tasya cAmUrtatve naitAnyupapadyante / tato yathA dvitIyagaNadharavAde kAryasya mUrtatvAt, sukhasaMvityAdezva karmaNo mUrtatvaM sAdhitam, tatheha svabhAvasyApi tat sAdhanIyam / tathA ca prAguktam - Aha naNu muttamevaM muttaM ciya kajamuttimattAo / iha jaha muttattaNao ghaDassa paramANavo muttA // 1 //

Page #340
Vida ] Ganadharavada taha suhasaMvittIo saMbaMdhe veyaNubbhavAo ya / qgaqsiz1913 qftararen a fqoda || 2 || iti // 241 - 242 / / ( 1789 - 1790 ) // *: 297 :. D. C.-Consider whether svabhava is murta or a-murta. If it is murta, svabhava will be nothing but a synonym of Karman. Moreover, the property of sadris'ata will never be applied if svabhava is murta, because like milk, or like the murta clouds having a number of forms, svabhava will also possess a number of parinamas. If svabhava is a-murta, then also, like akas'a it does not become the hetu of s'arira because of the absence of upakaranas. Secondly, an incorporeal karana can never produce a corporeal karya. So, svabhava should not be called a-murta when the karyas of svabhava such as the perception of sukha, duhkha etc. are murta.t Now the second alternative viz. that svabhava is niskaranata is discussed ahavAskAraNauciya sabhAvao tovi sariyA ko / kimakAraNao na bhave visarisayA kiM va vicchittii||243|| (1791) Ahava karanau cciya sabhavao tovi sarisaya katto | Kimakaranao na bhave visarisaya kim va vicchitti 1243 (1791) [ athavAskAraNata eva svabhAvatastato'pi sadRzatA kutaH / kimakAraNato na bhaved visadRzatA kiMvA vicchittiH // 243 // (1791) Athava'karanata eva svabavatastato'pi sadrisata kutah Kimakaranato na bhaved visadrisata kim va vicchittih ? 2431] Trans.-243 Or, if (bhavantara is produced) by virtue of svabhava (and) without any reason, whence is sadrisata + Vide verses 1625, 1626. 38

Page #341
.: 298 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth (to be found) ? (And) why (should) not dissimilarity take place without reason ? and why not destruction also ? ( 1791 ) TIkA-atha svabhAvata eva bhavotpattirityatra " akAraNata eva" ityayamartho'bhipretaH, " to vitti" tathApi hanta ! parabhave sadazatA kutaH / ko'bhiprAyaH ? ityAha-yathA'kAraNataH sadRzatA bhavati, tathA kimityakAraNataH eva visadRzatA na syAt / akasmAccAkAraNato bhavavicchittiH kasmAd na syAt ? / akasmAca bhavan kharaviSANAdirapi bhavet / zarIrAdInAM cAkAraNato bhavatAmabhrAdInAmiva pratiniyatAkAratvAdirUpatA na syAt / tasmAd nAkAraNatA svabhAva iti // 243 // (1791) // D. C.-Sadris'ata of bhavantara cannot be established even if you believe that it is produced without reason. For, just as sadris'ata is taken to have been produced without reason, vi-sadrrisata will also take place without reason. Similarly, destruction of bhava will also take place without any reason, and following the same procedure, a non-existent object like kharavisand will also come into existence without any reason. Moreover, objects like s'arira etc. will lose their definite shape and such other characteristics, on account of their resemblance with abhra-vikara in as much as they are produced without reason. Hence, it is not possible to believe svabhava as niskaranata itself. Taking the third alternative viz. that svabhava is vastudharma, the author states:ahavaM sahAvo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao niccaM / uppAya-TThii-bhaMgA cittA jaM vatthupajjAyA // 244 // (1792). Ahava sahavo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao niccam i Uppaya-tthii-bhanga citta jam vatthupajjaya // 244 // ( 1792) [ athavA svabhAvo dharmo vastunaH, na so'pi sadRzako nityam / utpAda-sthiti-bhaGgAzcitrA yad vastuparyAyAH // 244 // (1792)

Page #342
Vsda] Ganadharavada :: 299 : Athava syabhavo dharmo vastunah na so'pi sadpisako nityam | Utpada-sthiti-bhangascitra yad vastuparyayah || 244 | ( 1792 )! Trans.--244 Or, if svabhava is a property of an object that also will not be always the same. Because, the paryayas of production, retention and destruction of an object are distinct (from each other ). ( 1792 ) TIkA-atha vastuno dharmaH svabhAvaH, so'pi sarvadaiva sadRzo na ghaTate, iti kathaM sarvadaiva zarIrAdInAM sadRzatAM janayet / kathaM punarasya sadaiva sadRzatA na ghaTate ? ityAha-" uppAyetyAdi" yad yasmAdutpAda-sthiti-bhaGgAdayazcitrA vastuparyAyAH, na ca te sadaivA'vasthitasAdRzyAH, nIlAdInAM vastudharmANAM pratyakSata evAnyAnyarUpatayA pariNatidarzanAt / kiJca, vastudharmo'sau bhava svabhAva Atmadharmo vA syAt , puladharmo vA ? / yadyAtmadharmaH, tarhi nAsau zarIrAdInAM kAraNam , amUrtatvAt , AkAzAdivat / atha pudgaladharmaH, tarhi karmaivAsI, karmaNo'pi hi pudgalAstikAyadharmatvenAsmAbhirabhyupagatatvAditi // 244 // (1792) // D. C.-Svabhava will not be the same throughout even if you believe that it is a vastudharma. Hence, it is not possible to maintain for over the sadris'ya of sarira etc. also. For, the three stages of production, existence and destruction are not always the same in case of a single object. Distinction of properties in case of black objects is easily perceived. Secondly, is this vastudharma, a dharma of the atman or a dharma of the pudgala ? If it is the property of atman it can never become the cause of s'arira etc. For, it will be a-murta like akas'a in that case. On the other hand, if this vastudharma is the property of a pudgala, then it will become the Karman itself, as Karman is nothing but a pudgaladharma itself. kammassa vi pariNAmo suhamma ! dhammo sa pogglmyss| heU cittojagao hoi sahAvotti ko doso ? // 245 // (1793)

Page #343
.: 300:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth Kammassa vi parinamo Suhamma! dhammo sa poggalamayassa i Hei citto jagao hoi sahavo tti ko doso? // 245 // ( 1793 ) [karmaNo'pi pariNAmaH sudharman ! dharma sa pudgalamayasya / hetuzcitro jagato bhavati svabhAva iti ko doSaH // 245 // (1793) Karmano'pi parinamah Sudharman! Dharma sa pudgalamayasya | Hetuscitro jagato bhavati svabhava iti ko dosah // 245 // (1793)] Trans.--245 0 Sudharman! That (svabhava ) being the parinama of Karman composed of a definite body, (becomes ) its dharma also. ( And ), what is wrong if svabhava is taken as the variable cause of the ( entire mundane ) world ? ( 1793 ) TIkA-sudharman ! asau vastudharmo bhavatsvabhAvo dharmo bhavatu, ko doSaH ?--na kazcit , yuktiyuktatvAt / kiM viziSTo dharmaH ? ityAha-- pariNAmaH / kasya / karmaNaH / kathaMbhUtasya ? / pudgalamayasya / kathaMbhUto yaH karmapariNAmaH / ityAha-hetuH / kasya ? / jagata:-jagadvaicitryasya / tadevaM karmalakSaNasya vastunaH karmapariNAmarUpo dharmo bhavati svabhAvaH, nAtra kAcid doSApattiH / asmAkamapi saMmato'yamarthaH, kevalaM sarvadA sadRzo'sau na bhavati, kintu citro mithyAtvAdihetuvaicicyAd vicitro vividhsvbhaavH| ato na tasmAt parabhave sAdRzyameva, kintu vicitrarUpateti / / 245 / / (1793) // D. C.-0 Sudharman! Since svabhava has been taken as a vastu-dharma, it may be taken as a dharma of the pudgalamaya Karman also. So, there is no objection in admitting svabhava as the parinama of vicitra karman, and hence as tho hetu of universal vicitrata also. In other words, it is due to the nature of the vicitra Karman that this world is full of varieties. The only point to remember in this case is that it is not always the same, but it is full of varieties on account of various hetus such as vanity, hostility etc.

Page #344
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 301 :ahavA savaM vatthu paikkhaNaM ciya suhamma ! dhammahi / saMbhavai veha kehi vi kehi vi tadavatthamacaMtaM // 246 // (1794) taM appaNo vi sarisaM na puvadhammahi pacchimillANaM / sayalassa tihuaNassa ca sarisaM sAmaNNadhammahi // 247 // (1795) Ahava savvam vatthum paikkhanam ciya Suhamma! dhammehim i Sambhavai veha kehi vi kehi vi tadavatthamaccantam // 247 // Tam appano vi sarisam na puvvadhammehim pacchimillanam i Sayalassa tihuanassa ca sarisam samannadhammehim 12470(1795) [ athavA sarva vastu pratikSaNameva sudharman ! dhrmaiH| saMbhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam // 246 // (1794) tadAtmano'pi sadRzaM na pUrvadharmaiH pAzcAtyAnAm / sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadRzaM sAmAnyadharmaiH // 247 // ( 1795) Athava sarvam vastu pratiksanameva Sudharman ! dharmaihi Sambhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam || 246 11 ] Tadatmano'pi sadsisam na purvadharmaih pascatyanam i Sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadrisam samanyadharmaih // 247 // ] ____ Trans.-246-247. O Sudharman! at every single moment, each and every object ( of the Universe ) is being produced, destroyed or retained by ( virtue of) some property or the other. So, none ( of them ) has its former properties similar to the latter ones. On the other hand, by virtue of (certain ) common properties, all the three worlds are similar. (1794-1795) TIkA-vyAkhyA-athavA, sudharman! kimeka eva parabhavaH ?, sarvameva hi ghaTa-paTAdikaM bhuvanAntargataM vastu kaizcit pUrvaparyAyeH samAnA-'samAnaparyAyaH pratikSaNamutpadyate, kaizcit punaruttaraparyAyaiH samAnA-'samAnaparyAyavyeti vyuparamati, kaizcittu tadavasthamevAste / tatazcaivaM sati tadvastvAtmano'pi pUrvapUrvadharmeM

Page #345
*: 302 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth ruttarottaradharmANAM na sadRzam, kiM punaranyavastUnAm ?; sAmAnyadharmestu sarvasyApi tribhuvanasya samAnam , kiM punarekasyaiva nijapUrvajanmanaH ? iti // 246-247 // (1794-1795) // D. C.-Not only the bhavantara, O Sudharman' but each and every object (like ghata and pata ) in this Universe, is being produced, destroyed, or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar paryayas. But on the other hand, all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently, a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both. ko sabaheva sariso asariso vA ihabhave parabhave vA ? / sarisAsarisaM savaM niccAniccAirUvaM ca // 248 // (1796) Ko savvaheva sariso asariso va ihablave parabhave va ? ! Sarisasarisam savvam niccaniccairuvam ca 1 248 11 ( 1796 ) [ kaH sarvathaiva sadRzo'sadRzo vehabhave parabhave vA / sadRzAsadRzaM sarva nityAnityAdirUpaM ca // 248 // (1796 ) Kah sarvathaiva sadrisso'sadriso vehabhave parabhave va ? | Sadrisasadrisam sarvam nityanitydirupam ca // 248 // ( 1796 )] Trans.--248 What (object) is ( taken as ) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. ( 1796 ) TIkA-kI hyartho'rthAntarAtmanA vA sahehamave'pi sarvathA sadRzo'dazo vA, kiM punaH parabhave / tasmAt sarvamapi vastu sarveNApi saha samAnA'samAnarUpamevehamave'pi, iti kutaH parabhave sAdRzyameva pratijJAyate bhavatA ? iti bhAvaH / tathA, sarvamapi nityA-'nityAdyanantadharmAtmakamiti // 248 // ( 1796 //

Page #346
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 803 :__D. C.-It is not possible to find an object which is similar or dissimilar to other objects or even to itself even in this life, and much less in the other. All objects are found to be similar as well as dissimilar to other objects even in this life. So, it is no use holding the view that they are the same in the other life also. Similarly, all objects have permanent as well as transitory forms. This idea is illustrated by an example stated below jaha niyaehiM vi sariso na juvA bhuvi baal-buddddhdhmmhiN| jagao vi samo sattAiehiM taha parabhave jiivo||249|| (1797) Jaha niyaehim vi sariso na juya bhuvi bala-vuddhadhammehim i Jagao vi samo sattaiehim taha parabhave jivo u 249 11 ( 1797) [ yathA nijakairapi sadRzo na yuvA bhuvi bAla-vRddhadharmaiH / jagato'pi samaH sattAdikaistathA parabhave jIvaH / / 249 // (1797) Yatha nijakairapi sadriso na yuva bhuvi bala-vriddhadharmaih Jagato'pi samah sattadikaistatha parabhave jivah 0249 // (1797)] Trans.--249 Just as a young man does not resemble his own past and future forms of childhood and old age respectively on ( this ) earth, but at the same tiine resembles the whole of earth on account of the property of existing etc., in the same way, jiva, too, becomes similar as well as dissimilar in the other life. ( 1797 ) __TIkA-yatheha yuvA nijairapyatItA-'nAgatairSAla-vRddhAdiparyAyai-rAtmano'pi sarvathA na samAnaH, sattAdibhistu sAmAnyaparyAyairjagati na kenacid na samAnaH, tathAyamapi jIvaH paralokaM gataH sarveNApi saha samAnA-'samAnarUpa eva, iti kutaH sarvathA sAdRzyam ? iti // 249 // (1797) D. C.-Just as a young man does not resemble his own forms of childhood and old age, but at the same time resembles

Page #347
2:304 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth all other objects in this world on account of certain common properties like the quality of existing etc., in the same way. Jivas in the other life are not merely similar but dissimilar to other objects also. Moreover, maNuo devIbhUo sariso sattAiehiM jagao vi| devAIhi visariso niccAnicco vi emeva // 250 // (1798) Manuo devibhuo sariso sattaiehim jagao vil Devaihi visariso niccanicco vi emeva // 250 // ( 1798) [ manujo devIbhUtaH sadRzaH sattAdikairjagato'pi / deva(tvAdibhirvisadRzo nityAnityo'pyevameva // 250 / / (1798) Manujo devibhutah sadtisah sattadikair-jagato'pi 1 Deva(tva)dibhir-visadriso nityanityo'pyevameva // 250 // (1793)] Trans.-250 A divine man resembles the whole of mundane world on account of ( properties like ) existence etc. and is distinguished ( from it ) as well by means of ( his ) state of being a deity etc. In the same way, ( he ) is permanent and at the same time transitory also. ( 1798 ) TIkA-manuSyo mRtvA devatvamApanno jagattrayasyApi sattAdibhiH paryAyaH sadRzaH, devatvAdibhistu visadRzaH, iti naikAntena kvApi sadRzatA / tathA, dravyatayA'sau nityaH, paryAyatayA tvanitya ityAdyapi vaktavyam / atrAhananvasmAbhirapi naikAntena parabhave sAdRzyamabhyupagamyate, kintu samAnajAtyanvayamAtrameveSyate, puruSAdima'taH puruSAdireva bhavatIti / etadapyayuktam , karmajanito hi parabhava iti sAdhitam / tacca mithyAtvAdivicitrahetujanyatvAd vicitrameveti, atastajanyaH parabhavo vicitra eva yujyate, na tu samAnajAtyanvayaH sidhyatIti // 250 // (1798) // D. C.A person who becomes deva after death, resembles all the three worlds, on account of the common characteristics

Page #348
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 305 :* like existence etc., but, at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his devatva etc. This shows that absolute sadris'ata is not acceptible but visadris'ata has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are nitya on account of their dravyatva, and, at the same time, a-natya because of their varied transformations. Sudharman:-I accept sadrisata of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, purusa turns out to be a purusa and animals remain as animals in the bhavantara. Bhagavan :-Your argument, O Sudharman! is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various hetus such as mithyatva etc. Hence, bhavantara which is produced by these actions should also be taken as vicitrata on account of the vicitrata of actions, but sadris'ata can never fit in by means of their relation to the sadris'a gender etc. For, ukkarisA - sakkarisA na samANAe vi jeNa jAIe / sarisaggAhe jamhA dANAiphalaM vihA tamhA // 259 // (1799 ) 11 Ukkarisa-'vakkarisa na samanae vi jena jaie Sarisaggahe jamha danaiphalam viha tamha 251 u (1799) [ utkarSA - spakarSo na samAnAyAmapi yena jAtau / sadRzagrahe yasmAd dAnAdiphalaM vRthA tasmAt / / 251 // ( 1799 ) Utkarsa-'pakarsau na samanayampi yena jatau Sadrisagrahe yasmad danadiphalam vritha tasmat ||251|| (1799)] Trans.-251 In (case of) (absolute) sameness, there will be no (scope for) elevation or degradation even in the 39

Page #349
*:306. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth same genesis, ( and) the fruits of munificence etc. will become futile. ( 1799 ) TIkA-sadRzagrahe samAnajAtIyatAgrahe sati samAnAyAmapi jAto yena yasmAdIzvara-daridra-kulInA-akulInAdirUpeNotkarSA-'pako na ghaTAM praanyctH| yo hi yAdRza ihamave, sa yadi parabhave'pi tAdRza eva, tarhi ya ihamave IzvaraH sa parabhave'pi tAdRza eva, evaM daridrAdiSvapi vAcyam / tatazcehabhavAt parabhave sarvaprakArairapyutkarSA-'pakarSoM na syAtAm , kintvekAntasadRzataiva bhavet / " tamha ti" tasmAd moktavyo'yaM sAdRzyagraha iti prakramAd draSTavyam / athetthamAcakSIthAH-mA bhUtAmutkarSA-'pakarSoM, kA no hAniH ? ityAha"jamhA dANAiphalaM viha tti" cakArasya gamyamAnatvAd yasAcetthaM paratrotkarSA'pakarSayorabhAve dAnAdiphalaM vRthA saMpadyate / loko hi paratra devAdisamRddhiprAptyA''tmana utkarSArtha dAnAdipravRttiM vidadhAti / yadi coktayuktyotkarSAdyabhAvAd daridro dAna-tapas-tIrthAvagAhanAdyapi kRtvA'mutra daridra eva syAt, tarhi ka taddAnAdiphalam ? ityapArthikA dAnAdau pravRttiH, tasmAd na vidheyaH sAdRzyagraha iti // 251 // (1799) // D. C.-If you believe in absolute sameness, there will be no scope either for elevation or for degradation even in the same genesis. One who is rich in this life will remain rich in the next life also in spite of his sinful actions, and a poor man will remain poor in the next life even if he performs benevolent duties such as dana, tapas, tirtha-snana etc., according to your belief of absolute sadris'ata. Thus, there will be no reward of either good or evil actions, but the same type of life will go on throughout all the bhavas. So, if there is no utkarsa or apakarsa in the next life, there will be no utility for various benevolent actions such as munificence, austerities, ablations in holy waters etc., to be followed by people for the attainment of Vevatva etc. To believe in absolute sadris'ata is, therefore, not proper. 251 ( 1799 ). And the Vedapadas will also be wrong if absolute sadris'ya is accepted

Page #350
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 307:. jaM ca sigAlo vai esa jAyae veyvihiymiccaaii| saggIyaM jaM ca phalaM tamasaMbaddhaM sarisayAe // 252 // (1800) Jam ca sigalo vai esa jayae Veyavihiyamiccaim i Saggiyam jam ca phalam tamasanbaddham sarisayae 125211 (1800) [ yacca zRgAlo vai eSa jAyate vedavihitamityAdi / svargIyaM yacca phalaM tadasaMbaddhaM sadRzatAyAm // 252 // (1800) Yacca srigalo vai esa jayate Vedavihitamityadi Svargiyam yacca phalam tadasambaddham sadrisatayam // 252 // ] ____Trans.-252 Statements of Vedas such as " Srigalo vai esa jayate" etc., as well as the reward of heaven laid down by Vedas, will prove inconsistent in ( case of ) sadrisata ( being admitted ). ( 1800) TIkA-yacca "zRgAlo vai eSa jAyate yaH sapurISo dahyate " ityAdi vedavihitaM tadapi parabhavasadRzatAgrahe'saMbaddhameva syAt , puruSAderamutra shRgaaltyaanupptteH| tathA, yadapi " agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH" tathA, "agniSTomena yamarAjyamamijayati" ityAdikaM svargIyaphalasUcakatvAt svargIya phalaM tadapyasaMbaddhaM bhavet , manuSyasya tvadabhiprAyeNa devatvAnupapatteriti / "puruSo vai puruSatvamaznute, pazavaH pazutvam" ityAdInAM ca vedapadAnAmayamarthaH ko'pi puruSaH khalviha janmani prakRtyA bhadrako vinItaH sAnukrozo'matsarazca manuSya nAma-gotre karmaNI baddhA mRtaH san puruSatvamaznute, na tu niyamena sarva eva, anyasyAnyakarmavazagasyAnyathApyutpatteH / evaM pazavo'pi kecid mAyAdidoSavazAt pazunAma-gotre karmaNI baddhvA parabhave pazavo jAyante, na tu sarve'pi, niyamena karmApekSitvAjIvagateriti / tadevaM tasyApi cchinna: saMzayaH // 252 // (1800) // ____D. C.-If it is admitted, O blessed Sudharman ! that the next life is exactly similar to this life, the sentences of Vedas such as " Srigalo vai esa jayate yah sa-purisi dahyate" etc., which tell us that, one who is burnt along with foeces becomes fox

Page #351
.: 808 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fifth in the next life, will turn to be inconsistent. For, according to you, man should become man only in the next life. Secondly, sentences like "agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah" and "agnistomena yamarajamabhijayati" which lay down the conditions for the attainment of svarga, will also become inconsistent because man does never become deity according to your theory of sadris'ta. The real interpretation of puruso var purusatvamas'nute pas'avah pas'utvam " etc. is this:-A person who is pious, cultured, and self-less, attains the genesis of man when he dies away after having attached his actions to the human name and lineage. But that does not mean that all purusas attain purusatva as a rule. By virtue of different types of actions, people are liable to be born in an absolutely different genesis also. The same is the case with animals. On account of certain faults like illusion etc. certain animals remain as animals when they pass away in the next life, having attached their actions to the name and lineage of animals. But all pas'us do not attain pas'utva as a rule because their movement from one bhava to another depends upon their actions. Thus, chinnamma saMsayammi jiNeNa jarA-maraNaviSyamukkeNaM / so samaNo pavaio paMcahiM saha khaMDiyasa ehiM // 253 // (1801) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim 253 (1801) Trans.-253 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that Saint (Sudharman) accepted diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1801) End of the Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara,

Page #352
Chapter VI SaSThagaNadharavaktavyatA / Discussion with the Sixth Ganadhara te pacaie souM maMDio Agacchai jiNasagAsaM / vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 254 // ( 1802 ) Te pavvaie so um Mandio agacchai Jinasagasam Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami || 254 // ( 1802 ) [ tAn pravrajitAn zrutvA maNDika Agacchati jinasakAzam / jAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 254 // ( 1802 ) Tan pravrajitan srutva Mandika agacchati Jinasakasam | Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase // 254 | ( ( 1802 ) ] Trans.-254 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Mandika comes before the Tirtharikara ( He thinks ) :I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. ( 1802 ) TIkA - vyAkhyA pUrvavat navaraM maNDiko nAma SaSTho dvijopAdhyAyaH zrImajinasakAzamAgacchatIti // 254 // ( 1802 ) D. C.--Now the sixth Ganadhara named Mandika, comes before the Tirthankara and starts discussion. AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi - jarA - maraNaviSayamukkeNaM / nAmeNaM ya gotreNa ya saGghaNNU savadarisI NaM // 255 // ( 1802 )

Page #353
Jinabhadra Gani's Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenam Namenam ya gotrena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam // 255 (1803) [ AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 255 // ( 1803 ) abhasitasca Jinena jati- jara-maranavipramuktena / Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajniena sarvadarsina // 255 // ( 1803 ) ] Trans. - 255 He was addressed by his name, and lineage by the Tirthankara, who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge ). ( 1803 ) The Tirthankara then said 310. [ The sixth kiM manne baMdha - mokkhA saMti na saMti tti saMsao tujjhaM / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho // 256 // (1804 ) Kim manne bandha-mokkha santi na santi tti samsao tujjham | Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 256 // ( 1804 ) [ kiM manyase bandha - mokSau sto na sta iti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH || 256 / / ( 1804 ) Kim manyase bandha-moksau sto na sta iti samsayastava Vedapadanam_crtham na janasi tesamayamarthah ||256(1804) ] Trans. - 256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether bandha ( worldly bondages) and moksa ( Final Liberation ), exist or not. But ( ca), you do not know the ( real ) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Their ( real ) interpretation is this. ( 1804 ) TIkA- maNDika ! tvamitthaM manyase - kiM bandha-mokSau sto na vA ? iti / ayaM cAnucitastava saMzayaH, viruddhavedapadazrutinibandhanatvAt tathAhi - " sa eSa viguNo vibhurna badhyate saMsarati vA, na mucyate mocayati vA, na vA eSa , " bAhyamabhyantaraM vA veda " ityAdIni vedapadAni, tathA, " na ha vai sazarIrasya

Page #354
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 811 : 19 priyA - 'priyayorapahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA-priye na spRzataH ityAdIni ca / eteSAM cArthaM tvaM na jAnAsi yato'yametadarthastava cetasi vartate, tadyathA - sa eSaH - adhikRto jantuH, viguNaH - sacca- rajas-tamoguNarahitaH, vibhuH sarvagataH, na badhyate - puNya-pApAbhyAM na yujyata ityarthaH, saMsarati vA 'na' ityanuvartate, na mucyate-na karmaNA viyujyate, bandhasyaivAbhAvAt ; mocayati vA nAnyam, ityanenAkartRkatvamAha; na vA eSa bAhyamAtmabhinnaM mahadahaGkArAdi, abhyantaraM nijasvarUpameva, veda-vijAnAti, prakRtidharmatvAjjJAnasya, prakRtezvAcetanatvAt / tatazcAmUni kila bandha-mokSAbhAvapratipAdakAni / tathA, na ha vai naivetyarthaH sazarIrasya priyA-priyayorahatirastIti- bAhyA''dhyAtmikAnAdizarIrasaMtAnayuktatvAt sukha-duHkhayorapahatiH saMsAriNo nAstItyarthaH, azarIraM vA vasantaM - amUrtamityarthaH, priyA-priye na spRzataH, tatkAraNabhUtasya karmaNo'bhAvAdityarthaH / amUni cabandha - mokSAbhidhAyakAnIti / ataH saMzayaH / tatra " sa eSa viguNo vibhuH" ityAdInAM nAyamarthaH, kintvayaM vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 256 // (1804 ) " D. C. - O Mandika! You doubt the existence of bandha and moksa, because you have heard various Vedapadas having contradictory meanings. 66 Sa esa vigunvo vibhu r-na badhyate samsarati va na mucyate mocayati va no va esa bahyamabhyantaram va veda " etc. as well as like, "' Na ha vai sa-s'arirasya priya-priyayorapahatir asti, as'ariram va vasantam priya-priye na spri's'atal " etc. You have not grasped the real meaning of these sentences. According to you, the interpretation of the first sentence is this-The all-pervading Soul, which being free from attributes like sattva, rajas, and tamas, is never bound by the clutches of papa and punya, nor does it proceed further. Since there is absolute bandhabhava, this (Soul) can neither be detatched from karma, nor can it relieve the other from the bandhas.

Page #355
Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth It knows neither the external attributes like pride etc. nor does it recognize its own internal self, on account of jnana being the property of prakriti which is acetana here. So, the statements such as stated above, assert the absolute abhava of bandha and moksa between jiva and Karma. *312: (4 39 On the other hand, sentences such as, na ha vai etc., would mean quite the reverse (according to you). They assert that there is no abhava of priya, and a-priya, to one having sartra, while the a-sariri atman is never touched by them. Since the external, as well as, internal anadi sariras are samtanayukta, the samsari jivas are not deprived of the experiences of sukha and duhkha, while the a-s'ariri atman is never touched by sukha and duhkha on account of the absolute abhava of its Karana, the Karman. Thus, these Vedapadas are inclined to assert the existence of bandha and moksa. Such sentences have given rise to your doubt, which is not at all proper. Your interpretation of the sentences is not correct. I, therefore, give you their real interpretation. Please listen carefully taM mannasi jar3a baMdho jogo jIvassa kammuNA samayaM / puvaM pacchA jIvo kammaM va samaM va te hojA ? // 257 // (1805) Tam mannasi jai bandho jogo jivassa kammuna samayam Puvvam paccha jivo kammam va samam va te hojja? 257u (1805) [svaM manyase yadi bandho yogo jIvasya karmaNA samakam / ga qaneta: za ar au ar a xaag ? || 240 || (3604) Tvam manyase yadi bandho yogo jivasya karmana samakam Purvam pascajjivah karma va samam va te bhave tam? 257 ] Trans-257 If you believe that bandha is the union of jiva with Karma, will the jiva be produced first and then Karma, or Karma be produced first and then jiva, or both together? (1805)

Page #356
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 313 :. TIkA-'veyapayANa ya' ityatra cazabdAd yuktiM ca tvaM na jAnAsi / kutaH ? yasmAdAyuSman maNDika ! tvamevaM manyase-jIvasya bandho yadi karmaNA samakaM sAdhaM yogaH saMyogo'bhipretaH sa khalvAdimAn Adirahito vA ? / yadyAdimAn , tataH kiM pUrva jIvaH prasUyeta pazcAt karma, pUrva vA karma pazcAjIvaH prasUyeta, samaM vA yugapad vA tau dvAvapi prasUyeyAtAm ? iti pakSatrayamiti // 257 / / (1805) // D. C.--If, O long-lived Mandrka, you believe that bandha means the contact of jiva with Karma, consider whether that contact is adiman or adirahita. If it is adoman there will be three alternatives: (1) Java will be produced first and then Karma or ( 2 ) Karma will be produced first and then giva or ( 3 ) both of them will be produced simultaneously. Refuting the first alternative, the author states :na hi puvamaheUo kharasaMgaM vAyasaMbhavo jutto| nikAraNajAyassa ya nikAraNau cciya viNAso // 258 // (1806) Na hi puvvamaheno kharasargam vayasambhavo jutto I Nikkaranajayassa ya nikkaranau cciya vinaso n 258 // (1806 ) [na hi pUrvamahetoH kharazRGgamivAtmasaMbhavo yuktH| niSkAraNajAtasya ca niSkAraNaka eva vinAzaH // 258 // (1806) Na hi purvamahetoh kharastingamivatmasambhavo yuktah Niskaranajatasya ca niskaranaka eva vinasah || 258 || ( 1806 ) ] Trans.---258 Like kharasringa, the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of hetu. And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also ) without any cause. ( 1806) ___TIkA-" pUrva jIvaH pazcAtkarma" ityetadayuktam , yato na karmaNaH pUrva "kharasaMgaMvAyasaMbhavo jutto" kharazRGgasyevAtmanaH saMbhavo yuktaH, ahetukatvAt , 40

Page #357
:- 814 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth iha yadahetukaM tad na jAyate, yathA kharazRGgam, yacca jAyate tad nirhetukamapi na bhavati, yathA ghaTaH, niSkAraNasya ca jAtasya niSkAraNa eva vinAzaH syAditi // 258 // ( 1806 ) // D. C. - According to the first alternative stated above, jiva is born first and then Karma. Now since Karma is the hetu of jivas, the production of jiva is totally unjustified like the production of khara-s'ringa on account of its a-hetuktva. For, that which has no hetu, is never produced like khara-sringa, and that which has already been produced is never nir-hetuka as in case of ghata. Moreover, that which is born without any cause, has even to meet its end without any end. Proceeding further the author argues ahavAsure ciso nikkAraNao na kammajogo se / aha nikkAraNao so, mukkassa vi hohii sa bhujo // 259 // Ahava'nai cciya so nikkaranao na kammajogo se Aha nikkaranao so, mukkassa vi hohii sa bhujjo || 259 // ( 1807) [ athavA'nAdireva sa niSkAraNako na karmayogastasya / atha niSkAraNaH saH, muktasyApi bhaviSyati sa bhUyaH // 259 // (1807) Athava nadireva sa niskaranako na karmayogastasya I Atha niskaranah sah muktasyapi bhavisyati sa bhuyah ||259 (1807 ) ] Trans. - 259 Or, that ( soul) being anadi, may be beyond any cause, and ( hence ) have no connection with Karma. If it were beyond any cause, it might have belonged to a mukta being also. ( 1807 ) TIkA - atha cet karmaNaH pUrvamAtmA'nAdikAlasiddha eva iti kiM tasya sahetuka - nirhetukacintayA ? iti / atrocyate - " nikkAraNao ityAdi " yadyevam, tataH se" tasya jIvasya karmayogaH karmabandho na prApnoti, akAraNatvAt, nabhasa iva / atha niSkAraNo'pyasau bhavati, tarhi muktasyApi 46

Page #358
Vada] Ganadharavada " bhUyaH sa bhaviSyati, niSkAraNatvAvizeSAt tatazca muktAvapyanAzvAsa iti / / 259 / / ( 1807 ) // * 315: D. C.-Mandika:-Existence of soul has already been established from times immemorial before Karma was produced. It is, therefore, useless to consider whether its production is sa-hetuka or nir-hetuka. Bhagavan :-In that case, O Mandika! on account of its causelessness, atman will have no bondage with Karma as it has no bondage with akas'a. Mandika:-No, in spite of its causelessness, the soul is in contact with Karma. Bhagavan:-Then, it will be attached to a mukta (liberated) being also. Thus, one that has already been liberated from the worldly bondages, will again come into those bondages on account of the common property, viz:-niskaranata belonging to both of them. 259 (1807). ho sa niccamuko baMdhAbhAvammi ko va se mokkho ? | a fe ymaayai aurma A37 axai || 280 II (?coc) Hojja sa niccamukko bandhabhavammi ko va se mokkho ? Na hi mukkavvavaeso bandhabhave mao nabhaso 260 (1808) [ bhavet sa nityamukto bandhAbhAve ko vA tasya mokSaH 1 / na hi mukta vyapadezo bandhAbhAve mato nabhasaH || 260 // ( 1898 ) Bhavet sa nityamuk to bandhabhave ko va tasya moksah ? | Na hi muktavyapadeso bandhabhave mato nabhasah 1260|| (1808)] Trans.-260 If it is ever liberated in absence of bondage, how will its moksa exist? For, in absence of bondage, attribute of liberation could never be accepted as in the case of akasa. (1808) TIkA - athavA, karmayogAbhAvAd nityamukta evAsau bhavet / yadivA,

Page #359
.: 316:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth bandhAbhAve kaH kila tasya mokSavyapadezaH / na hyabaddhasya nabhasaH kasyApi muktavyapadezo mataH, bandhapUrvakatvAd 'mokSasya / tasmAd na " pUrva jIvaH pazcAt karma" iti prathamavikalpa iti // 260 // (1808) // D. C.-Mandika :-On account of the abhava of Karmayoga, this utman is also nitya-mukta. Bhagavan :-If it is so, O Mandika, how will moksa be attributed to it? For, one that is not susceptible to bandha, is never susceptible to moksa also, as in the case of akas'a. Moksa can be attributed only to those that undergo bandhas. The first alternative that jiva is produced first and then Karma, is, therefore, not acceptible. 260 ( 1808 ). Now, the other two alternatives-viz., that Karma is produced first and jiva afterwards or that both of them are produced simultaneously-are refuted as follows :---- na ya kammassa vi puvaM katturabhAve samubbhavo jutto| nikAraNao so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhAve ya // 261 // (1809) na hi kattA kajjaM ti ya jugavuppattIe jIva-kammANaM / jutto vavaeso'yaM jaha loe govisANANaM // 262 // (1810) Na ya kammassa vi puvvam katturabhave samubbhavo jutto Nikkaranao so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhave ya 11 2610 (1809) Na hi katta kajjam ti ya jugavuppattie jiva-kammanam Jutto vavaeso'yam jaha loe govisananam // 262 // ( 1810 ) [na ca kamaNo'pi pUrva karturabhAve samudbhavo yuktH| niSkAraNakaH so'pi ca tathA yugapadutpattibhAve ca // 261 // (1809) na hi kartA kAryamiti ca yugapadutpattau jIva-kamaNoH / yukto vyapadezo'yaM yathA loke goviSANayoH // 262 // (1810)

Page #360
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 317 : Na ca karmano'pi purvam karturabhave samudbhavo yuktah Niskaranakah so 'pi ca tatha yugapadutpattibhave ca || 261 (1809) Na hi karta karyamiti ca yugapadutpattau jiva-karmanoh | Yukto vyapadeso 'yam yatha loke govisanayoh // 262 // ( 1810 ) ] Trans. - 261-262 It is not appropriate ( to believe ) the production of Karma to be first in absence of Karta, nor is it so even it it is niskaranaka. In case of both being produced simultaneously, the same ( difficulties ) will arise. Moreover, in (case of) simultaneous production of jiva and Karma, designation of karta and karya will not properly fit in as found in the propular example of the two horns of a cow. (1809-1810) TIkA- na ca jIvAt prAk karmaNo'pi samudbhavo yuktaH, karturjIvasya tadAnImabhAvAt, akriyamANasya ca karmatvAyogAt, niSkAraNacetthamasau karmasamudbhavaH syAt, tato'kAraNajAtasyAkAraNata eva vinAzo'pi syAditi / tathA, yugapadutpattibhAve ca " pratyekapakSoktA doSAH vAcyAH" iti zeSaHnirhetukatvAt pratyekavadubhayasyApi samuditasyAnutpattirityAdi / na ca yugapadutpannayorjIva - karmaNoH kartR - karmabhAvo yujyata ityetadevAha - " na hItyAdi " na hi yugapadutpannayorjIva - karmaNoH " ayaM jIvaH kartA " " idaM vA jJAnAvaraNAdipudgalanikurambaM karma " iti vyapadezo yujyate, yathA loke savyetaragoviSANayoriti / / 261-262 / / ( 1809 - 1810 ) / / D. C.-It is not appropriate to accept that Karma is produced first and jiva afterwards. For, the production of Karma is not possible without jiva, which is the Karta at the same time. And if that production of Karma is niskaranaka, its end will also be niskaranaka. It is also not proper to say that jiva and Karma are produced simultaneously. Because, in that case also, both being nir-hetuka, the same difficulties will arise. Moreover, if Jiva and Karma are produced together, they will no longer be taken as karta and karya but like the two

Page #361
.:318: Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth horns of a cow, they will be taken as twins produced together. 261-262 (1809-1810). ___ Now, coming to the second alternative at the root, the author proceeds :hojANAIo vA saMbaMdho taha vi na ghaDae mokkho / jo'NAI so'NaMto jIva-nahANaM va saMbaMdho // 263 // (1811) Hojjanaio va sambandho taha vi na ghadae mokkho Jo'nai so'nanto jiva-nahanam va sambandho // 263 // ( 1811) [ bhavedanAdiko vA saMbandhastathApi na ghaTate mokssH| yo'nAdiH so'nanto jIva-nabhasoriva saMbandhaH // 263 // (1811) Bhavedanadiko va sambandhastathapi na ghatate moksah, Yo'nadih so'nanto jiva-nabhasoriva sambandhah ||263 // (1811)] __Trans.-263 Or, if the contact ( of jiva with Karma ! ( taken as ) anadika (without any beginning ), there will nothing like moksa. That which is anadi like the contact jiva and akasa, is ananta ( endless ) also. ( 1811 ) TIkA-syAdetat , anAdireva jIva-karmaNoH saMbandhaH saMyogaH / nanu tathApi mokSo na ghaTate, yasmAd yo'nAdiH saMyogaH so'nanto dRSTaH, yathA jiiv-nbhsoH| na hyAkAzena saha jIvasya kadAcidapi saMyogo nivatete / evaM karmaNApi sahAsau na nivarteta, tathA ca sati muktyabhAvaprasaGga iti // 263 // (1811) // D. C.-If the contact of jiva with Karma is anadika, it should be even ananta like the contact of jiva with sky, and in that case there will be no scope for moksa at all. iya juttIe na ghaTai subai ya suIsu baMdha-mokkhA tti / teNa tuha.saMsao'yaM na ya kajo'yaM jahA suNasu // 264 //

Page #362
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 919:. Iya juttie na ghatai suvvai ya sussu bandha-mokkha tti Tena tuha samsao'yam na ya kajjo'yam jaha sunasu 1126411 (1812) [iti yuktyA na ghaTate zrUyate ca zrutiSu bandhamokSAviti / tena tava saMzayo'yaM na ca kAryo'yaM yathA zruNu // 264 // (1812) Iti yuktya na ghatate sruyate ca srutisu bandha-moksaviti Tena tava samsayo'yam na ca karyo'yam yatha. srinu 0264 // (1812)] Trans.--264 Thus by means of the above-mentioned argument, bandha and moksa do not fit in. Still however, it is heard in the Vedas ( that they exist ). This doubt of yours -which is ( absolutely ) improper-is due to that. So, listen to me ( now ). ( 1812 ) ___TIkA-ityevaM yuktayuktyA bandho mokSazca na ghaTate, zrUyate ca zrutiSu vedvaakyessvsau| tatastava saMzayo'yam / yathA cAyaM na kAryastathA zrRNu saumya ! iti / uktaH pUrvapakSaH // 264 // ( 1812 ) / / ___D. C.-The arguments advanced by you do not lead one to prove the existence of bandhu and mokscas seen above, But, since it has already been found in Vedas that they exist, your doubt has come into existence, which is totally unworthy of you. Now, listen to me. 264 ( 1812 ). saMtANo'NAIo paropparaM heu-heubhaavaao| dehassa ya kammassa ya maMDiya! bIyaM-kurANAM va // 265 // (1813) Santano'naio paropparam- heu-heubhavao | Dehassa ya kammassa ya Mandiya! biyam-kuranam van2651(1813) [ saMtAno'nAdikaH parasparaM hetu-hetumadbhAvAt / dehasya ca karmaNazca maNDika ! bIjA-'Gkurayoriva // 265 // (1813), Santano'nadikah parasparam hetu-hetubhavat i Dehasya ca karmanasca Mandika ! bija'n kurayoriva ||26511 (1813)] Trans.--265 Since body and Karma are mutually related

Page #363
-: 320: Jinabhadra Gani's The sixth like seed and sprout as hetu and hetumat, their expansion, O Mandika, is anadika. ( 1813 ) TIka-zarIra-karmaNoranAdiH saMtAna iti pratijJA, parasparaM hetu-hetumadbhAvAt , bIjAkuravaditi / tatazca " kiM pUrva jIvaH pazcAt karma" ? ityAdi plavata eva, anAditvAt tatsaMtAnasyeti // 265 // (1813 ) // D. C.--The santana of s'arira and Karma is anado because both of them are related to each other as hetu and hetumat like seed and sprout. On account of this anaditva of santana, the argument that jiva is born first and Karma afterwards, will automatically be null and void. 265 ( 1813 ). asthi sa deho jo kammakAraNaM jo ya kjjmnnnnss| kammaM ca dehakAraNamatthi ya jaM kajjamaNNassa // 266 // (1814) Atthi sa deho jo kammakaranam jo ya kajjamannassa Kammam ca dehakaranamatthi ya jam kajjamannassa 1126611 (1814) [asti sa deho yaH karmakAraNaM yazca kAryamanyasya / karma ca dehakAraNamasti ca yat kAryamanyasya / / 266 // (1814) Asti sa deho yah karmakaranam yasca karyamanyasya | Karma ca dehakaranamasti ca yat karyamanyasya || 266 // (1814)] - - ___ Trans.-266 The body is such that it becomes the cause of (one) Karma, and effect of another, while Karma is also the cause of (one ) body, and the effect. of another. (1814) TIkA-asti sa kazcid deho yo'gretanasya karmaNaH kAraNam , yazcAnyasyA tItasya karmaNaH kAryam / tathA, karmApi samasti / kiM viziSTam ? ityAhayadagretanasya dehasya kAraNam , yaccAnyAsyAtItasya dehasya kAryamiti / evamanAdau saMsAre na kvacid vizrAmyati, ato'nAdideha-karmasaMtAna iti / Aha-nanu bandha-mokSAviha sAdhayituM prastutau, tataH karmasaMtAnasthAnAditvasAdhanamasaMbaddhamiva lakSyate / tadayuktam , abhiprAyAparijJAnAt, na yakRtaM

Page #364
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 321 : karma saMbhavati "kriyata iti karma" iti vyutpatteH, yacca tasya karaNamasAveva FT gia T Alcate: ? 117 EUR 11 (3688) 11 D. C.-Some deha is such that it serves as the cause of some future actions, while it itself has already been the effect of some past actions. The Karma in turn also serves as the cause of some body to come, while it has itself been the effect of some other body in the past. Thus, in this anadi samsara the santuna of deha and Karma is also anadi as it never stops to rest. Mandika :-But it is quite irrelevant to establish the anaditva of Karma-santana, For, the point is to establish the existence of bandha and moksa Bhagavan :- It is not so, O Manduka ! "Kriyate iti Karma" that which is accomplished is action. So, an unaccomplished action is never possible. In the accomplishment of Karma, its karana is nothing but bandha, and hence the significance of establishing the anaditva of Karma-santana. Mandika :-If that which has been accomplished is Karma, who is the karta of this deha? 266 ( 1814 ). The Bhagavan replies kattA jIvo kammassa karaNao jaha ghaDassa ghaDakAro / evaM ciya dehassa vi kammakaraNasaMbhavAu tti // 267 // (1815) Katta jivo kammassa karanao jaha ghadassa ghadakaro 1 Evam ciya dehassa vi kammakaranasambhavau tti 11 267 11(1815) [kartA jIvaH karmaNaH karaNato yathA ghaTasya ghttkaarH| evameva dehasyApi karmakaraNasaMbhavAditi // 267 // ( 1815) Karta jivah karmanah karanato yatha ghatasya ghatakarah | Evameva dehasyapi karmakaranasambhavaditi u 267 || ( 1815 )] 42

Page #365
*: 322: Jinabhadra Gani's The sixth Trans.--267 Just as jiva happens to be the karta of karma as potter (is) of ghata by virtue of its instrumentality, so also, ( it becomes the karta) of deha by virtue of karma as ( its ) instrument. ( 1815 ) TIkA-kartA cAtra karmaNo jIvaH, karaNasametatvAt , daNDAdikaraNayuktakulAlavad ghaTasya, karaNaM ceha jIvasya karma nirvartayataH zarIramavagantavyam / evaM dehasyApyAtmaiva kartA, karmarUpaM karaNaM karmakaraNaM tatsaMbhavAt-tadyuktatvAt , daNDAdikaraNasametakulAlavaditi / / 267 // ( 1815) // ____D. C.-Just as potter is called the karta of ghatar because he is accompanied by various karanas such as danda etc, the Soul will also be called the karta of deha by reason of its being accompanied by Karma as the karana. 267 ( 1815). Here, again, the opponent's view is stated and refutedkammaM karaNamasiddhaM va te maI kajao tayaM siddhaM / kiriyAphalao ya puNo paDivajja tamaggibhUi va // 268 // (1816) Kammam karanamasiddham va te mai kajjao tayam siddham | Kiriyaphalao ya puno paoivajja tamaggibhui vva 1268u (1816) [karma karaNamasiddhaM vA tava matiH kAryatastat siddham / kriyAphalatazca punaH pratipadyasva tadagnibhUtiriva // 268 // (1816) Karna karanamasidd ham va tava matih karyatastat siddham Kriyaphalatasca punah pratipadyasva tadagnibhutirivall26811(1816)] Trans.-268 Or, ( it may be ) your belief that Karma cannot be proved as karana; but it has been proved by ( the help of ) karya. Moreover, like Agnibhati (you should ) accept it by reason of kriyaphala also.. ( 1816 ) TIkA-syAdetat , atIndriyatvenAsiddhatvAt karmaNaH karaNatvamasiddham / tadayuktam , yataH kAryataH kAryadvAreNa tat siddhameva, tathAhi-vidyamAnakaraNaM zarIrAdi, kRtakatvAt , ghaTAdivat , yaccAsya karaNaM tat karmaiva, tasmAdastyeva

Page #366
Vada] Ganadharavada .: 323 :. tat / athavA, vidyamAnakaraNamevAtmazarIralakSaNaM dvayam , kartR-kAryarUpatvAt , kulAla-ghaTAdivat yacca karturAtmanaH zarIramutpAdayataH karaNaM tat karmeti kathaM na tatsiddhiH 1 / tathA, phalavatyo dAnAdikriyAH, cetanArabdhakriyArUpatvAt , kRSyAdikriyAvat, yacca tAsAM phalaM tat karma / ityagnibhUtiriva tvamapi pratipadyasveti // 268 // (1816 ) D. C.- Mandika :-Since karma is atindriya ( beyond the perception of sense-organs ) it can never be taken as karana. Bhagavan:-It is not so. Since saritra is susceptible to production like ghata, it must have some karana to bring its existence This karana is Karma itself Or, say, there must be some karana between Karta like atman and Karya like s'arira as in the case of ghatakara and ghata. And this can be nothing else but Karma. This shows that Karma can be brought about even by the help of Karyas like s'arera. Moreover, Karyas like dana etc which are inspired by fruit are also fruitful like Kryas such as krisi etc. So, like Agnibhuti, you, too, O Mandaka ! shall have to admit the existence of Karms. 268 // ( 1816 ) // In reply to the assertion that a bandha which is anadi is ananta also the author statesjaM saMtANo'NAI teNANato'vi nnaaymegNto| dIsaI saMto vi jao katthai bIyaM-kurAINaM // 269 // (1817) Jam santano'nai tenananto'vi nayameganto i Disai santo vi jao katthai biyam-kurainam // 269 // ( 1817) [yat saMtAno'nAdistenAnanto'pi naaymekaantH| ' dRzyate sannapi yataH kutrApi bIjA-'GkharAdInAm // 269 / / ( 1817) Yat santano'nadisteninanto'pi nayamekantah | Drisyate sannapi yatah kutripi bija'-iikuradinam // 269 // ( 1817 )] Trans.-269 An expansion which has no beginning,

Page #367
.: 324 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth cannot exclusively be called endless also. For, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning are sometimes found (as having ends ) also. ( 1817) TIkA-" yad yasmAjIva-karmasaMyogasaMtAno'nAdistena tasmAdananto'pi" iti nAyamekAntaH, yato'nAdirapi saMyuktayorvastunoH saMtAnaH sAnto'pi kvacid dRzyate, yathA bIjA-'GkurAdInAM saMtAna iti // 269 / / (1817) D. C.--There can never be an exclusive rule that the anadi santana of jiva and Karma combined together is anantos also. For, in some cases, the santana does come to an end inspite of its anadilva e. y. the santana of seed and sprout. Also, aNNayaramaNivattiyakajjaM bIyaM-kurANa jaM vihayaM / tattha hao saMtANo kukkuDi-aMDAiyANaM ca // 270 // (1818) Annayaramanivvattiyakajjam biyam-kurana jam vihayam / Tattha hao santano kukkudi-andaiyanam ca // 270 // ( 1818) [anyataradanirvartitakArya bIjA-'Gkurayoryad vihatam / tatra hataH saMtAnaH kukkuTya-'NDAdikAnAM ca // 270 // (1818) Anyataradanirvartitakaryam bija-rikurayoryad vihatam Tatra hatah santanah kukkutya'-ndadikanam ca 1 270 II (1818)] jaha veha kaMcaNo-valasaMjogo'NAisaMtaigao vi| vocchijai sovAyaM taha jogo jIva-kammANaM // 27 // (1819) Jaha veha kancano-valasanjogo'naisantaigao vi > Vocchijjai sovayam taha jogo jiva-kammanam // 271 // ( 1819 ) [ yathA veha kAJcano-palasaMyogo'nAdisaMtatigato'pi / vyavacchidyate sopAyaM tathA yogo jIva-karmaNoH // 271 // (1819) Yatha veha kancano-palasamyogo'nadisantatigato'pi | Vyavacchidyate sopayam tatha yogo jiva-karmanoh n2710 (1819)]

Page #368
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 325 : Trans.-270-271. When either of seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the ( desired ) effect, its santana is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial, is cut off, in the same way, the contact of jiva with Karma ( is also cut off ). ( 1818-1819 ). TIkA-bIjA-'Gkuromadhye'nyataradanirvartitakAyameva yad vihataM vyava* cchinnaM tatrAnayorhato vyavacchinnaH saMtAnaH / evaM kukkuTya-'NDakayoH pitA putrayorapi ca vaktavyam / yathA vA kAJcano-palayoranAdikAlapravRtasaMtAnabhAvagato'pi saMyogoH sopAyamagnitApAdyupAyAd vyavacchidyate, tathA jIvakarmaNorapi saMyoga'nAdisaMtAnagato'pi tapaHsaMyamAdyupAyAd vyavacchidyate, iti na mokSAbhAva iti // 270-271 // (1818-1819) D. C.-If either of beja and ankura vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire inspite of its anaditva, the contact between jiva and Karma could also be brought to an end by means of tapas, samyama etc., until ultimately the moksa is attained. // 270-271 (1818-1819 ) // Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceedsto kiM jIva-nahANa va aha jogo kaMcaNo-valANaM va ? / jIvassa ya kammassa ya bhaNNai duviho vina viruddho||272(1820) paDhamo'bhavANaM ciya bhavANaM kaMcaNo'valANaM va / jIvatte sAmaNNe bhavo'bhavo tti ko bheo ? // 273 // (1821) To kim jiva-nahana va aha jogo karicano-valanam va ? / Jivassa ya kammassa ya bhannai duviho vi na viruddhon3720(1820)

Page #369
* 326 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth Padhamo'bhavvanam ciya bhavvanam karcano-valanam va Jivatte samanne bhavvo 'bhavvo tti ko bheo ? // 273 // ( 1821 ) . [ tataH kiM jIva- nabhasorivAtha yogaH kAJcano - palayoriva ? | jIvasya ca karmaNazca bhaNyate dvividho'pi na viruddhaH || 272 || (1820 ) prathamo'bhavyAnAmeva bhavyAnAM kAJcano - palayoriva / jIvatve sAmAnye bhavyo'bhavya iti ko bhedaH 1 // 273 // (1821 ) Tatah kim jiva-nabhasorivatha yogah kancano - palayoriva ? Jivasya ca karmanas 'ca bhanyate dvi- vidho'pi na viruddhah | 272 // Prathamo'bhavyanameva bhavyanam kancano-palayoriva | Jivatve samanye bhavyo'bhavya iti ko bhedah || 273 || (1821)] Trans.-272-273 "Then, does the union of jiva and karma resemble the union of jiva and nabhas? Or, is it similar to that between gold and stone?" "Union in both the ways will not be contrary. The first belongs to the inauspicious only; ( contact ) of the auspicious resembles (the one ) between gold and stone." "What is the distinction between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is common ?" (1820-1821). TIkA - Aha - jIvasya karmaNazca yo'yaM parasparaM yogaH so'nAdiH san kiM jIva - nabhasorivAnantaH, atha kAJcano - palayoriva sAnto'pi syAt ? ubhayathApi darzanAt kimatra pratipadyAmahe 1 / bhaNyate'trottarama-dvidhA'pyayamaviruddhaH, tatra prathamo'nAdyanantarUpo'bhavyAnAM draSTavyaH / yastu kAJcanopalayorivAnAdiH sAnto'sau bhavyAnAM vijJeyaH / Aha - nanu jIvatvasAmye'pi "ayaM bhavyaH" "ayaM cAbhavyaH" iti kiMkRto'yaM vizeSa: ? / na ca vaktavyam - yathA jIvatve samAne'pi nAraka - tiryagAdayo vizeSAstathA bhavyA-bhavyatvavizeSo'pi bhaviSyatIti, yataH karmajanitA evaM nArakAdivizeSAH, na tu svAbhAvikAH / bhavyA-bhavyatvavizeSo'pi yadi karmajanitastadA bhavatu, ko nivArayitA ?, na caivamiti // 272 - 273 // ( 1820 - 1821 ) // D. C-Mandika:-Should the anad contact of jiva with

Page #370
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 327 :: Karma be taken as ananta like that between jiva and nabhas or as santa like that between gold and stone ? Bhagaran: It is possible in both ways. It is found as anadr and ananta in case of inauspicious objects, but in case of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as anadi and santa. Mandika:-- How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere? Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is possible, because, the naraka experiences etc. are produced on account of Karma and are not svabhavika. hou jai kammakao na viroho nAragAibheu cha / bhaNaha ya bhavA'bhavA sabhAvao teNa saMdeho // 274 // (1822) Hou jai kammakao na viroho naragaibheu vva i Bhanaha ya bhavva'bhavva sabhavao tena samdeho 1127411 (1822) [ bhavatu yadi karmakRto na virodho nArakAdibheda iva / bhaNatha ca bhavyA-'bhavyAn svabhAvatastena saMdehaH // 274 // (1822) Bhavatu yadi karmakrito na virodho narakadibheda ival Bhanatha ca bhavya'bhavyan svabhavatastena samdehah 11 274 11 Trans.--274 If the distinction is caused by karma as in the case of hellish experience etc., there is no objection. But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their ( very ) nature, the doubt does arise. ( 1822 ) TIkA-bhavatu vA yadi karmakRto'yaM bhavyA'-bhavyatvavizeSo jIvAnAmiSyate, nAtra kazcid virodhaH, nArakAdibhedavat , na caitadasti, yato "bhavyA'

Page #371
*: 328 :Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth bhevyAH svabhAvata eva jIvA na tu karmataH, " iti yUyaM bhaNatha, tenAsmAkaM saMdeha iti // 274 // (1822) // ____D. C.-Mandika :-If you accept that the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is also karma-janita ( like that between hen and animal life ) I have nothing to say, but when you take their distinction to be svabhaveka, I raise the doubt // 274 ( 1822 ) // Explaining the real cause between bhavya and a-bhavya the author replies:davAitte tulle jIva-nahANaM sabhAvao bheo| jIvA-'jIvAigao jaha, taha bhve-yrviseso||275||(1823) Davvaitte tulle jiva-nahanam sabhavao bheo i Jiva'jivaigao jaha, taha bhavveyaraviseso 11 275 | ( 1823 ) [ dravyAditve tulye jIva-nabhasoH svabhAvato bhedaH / jIvA-'jIvAdigato yathA, tathA bhavye-taravizeSaH // 275 // (1823) Dravyaditve tulye jiva-nabhaso svabhavato bhedah | Jivajivadigato yatha, tatha bhavyetara-visesah // 273 // ( 1823 )] ____ Trans.-275 Just as in ( case of ) jiva and nabhas the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in ( the midst of ) the common element of ( their being ) dravya etc., in the same way, the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. ( 1823 ) TIkA-yathA jIva-nabhasordravyatva-sattva-prameyatva-jJeyatvAdau tulye'pi jIvA-'jIvatva-cetanA-cetanatvAdisvabhAvato bhedaH, tathA jIvAnAmapi jIvatvasAmye'pi yadi bhavyA-'bhavyakRto vizeSaH syAta, tarhi ko doSaH ? iti // 275 / / ( 1823) ___D. C-Although java and akas' as possess the common properties like dravyatva, sattva ( existence ), prameyatva

Page #372
Vada ] Ganadharavada 0:329 : ( destructibility ) jneyatva ( cognizibility ) etc., distinction such as that of jiva and a-jiva etc, does exist by its very nature. Similarly, in case of jivas also, even though jivatva is common, the distinction of bhavya and abhavya remains there as & natural consequence. // 275 ( 1823) // The pupil objects to this view thusevaM pi bhavabhAvo jIvattaM piva sbhaavjaaiio| pAvai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivANaM // 276 // (1824) Evam pi bhavyabhavo jivattam piva sabhavajaio 1 . Pavai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvanam 112761 (1824) [evamapi bhavyabhAvo jIvatvamiva svabhAvajAtIyaH / prApnoti nityastasmiMzca tadavasthe nAsti nirvANam // 276 // (1824) Evampi bhavyabhavo jivatvamiva svabhavajatiyah | Prapnoti nityastasminsca tadavasthe nasti nirvanam 1127611 (1824)] Trans.--276 Even in that case, the quality of (being ) auspicious being natural like jivatva, will become everlasting; and if it is so, there will be no ( scope for ) final liberation ( at all ). ( 1824 ) TIkA-nanvevamapi bhavyabhAvo nityo'vinAzI prApnoti, svabhAvajAtIyatvAt-svAbhAvikatvAt jIvatvavat / bhavatvevamiti cet / tadayuktam, yatastasmin bhavyabhAve tadavasthe nityAvasthAyini nAsti nirvANam , "siddho na bhavyo nApya bhavyaH" iti vacanAditi // 276 // (1824 ) D. C.-If the quality of bhavyatva is svabhavika as jivatva, as said above, it will become everlasting like jivatva also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting bhavyabhava, there will be no scope for moksa at all // 276 ( 1824 ) // The author refutes this argument as follows: 42

Page #373
.: 330: Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth jaha ghaDaputvAbhAvo'NAisahAvo vi sanihaNo evaM / jaI bhavattAbhAvo bhaveja kiriyAe ko doso? // 277 // (1825) Jaha ghadapuyvabhavo'naisahavo vi sanihano evami Jai bhavvattabhavo bhavejja kiriyae ko doso ? 11 277 11 ( 1825 ) [ yathA ghaTapUrvAbhAvo'nAdisvabhAvo'pi sanidhana evam / yadi bhavyatvAbhAvo bhavet kriyayA ko doSaH // 277 // (1825) Yatha ghataparvabhavo'nadisvabhavo'pi sanidhana evam | Yadi bhavyatvabhavo bhavet kriyaya ko dosah // 277 // (1825)] Trans.-277 What harm is there if the ( previous ) abhava of auspiciousness is possessed of end, like the previous nonexistence of ghata inspite of its being anadi by nature ? (1825) TIkA-yathA ghaTasya prAgabhAvo'nAdisvabhAvajAtIyo'pi ghaTotpattI sanidhano vinazvaro dRSTaH, evaM yadi bhavyatvasyApi jJAna-tapAsacivacaraNakriyopAyato'bhAvaH syAt , tarhi ko doSaH saMpadyate ?-na kazciditi // 277 / / (1825) ____D. C.-The previous non-existence of ghataa comes to an end, when ghata is actually produced. Similarly, there is no harm if we assume that the abhava of bhavyatva comes to an end, when the bhavytva is actualiy brought into existence by the process of perception || 277 ( 1825 ) || aNudAharaNamabhAvo kharasaMgaM piva maI na taM jmhaa| bhAvo cciya sa visiTTho kuMbhANuppattimetteNaM // 278 // (1826) Anudaharanamabhavo kharasangam piva mai na tam jamha | Bhavo cciya sa visittho kumbhanuppattimettenam // 278 // (1826) [anudAharaNabhAvaH kharazRGgamiva matirna tad yasmAt / bhAva eva sa viziSTaH kumbhAnutpattimAtreNa / / 278 // (1826) Anudaharanabhavah kharastinganiva matirna tad yasmati Bhava eva sa visistah kumbhinutpattimatrena // 278 // (1826 )]

Page #374
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 331 : Trans. - 278 ( You may believe that ) like kharasringa, this is no ( good ) example. But it is not so. That is nothing but bhava distinguished by the non-production of ghata. (1826) TIkA - syAd matiH parasya - nanvanudAharaNamasau prAgabhAvaH, abhAvarUpatayaivAvastutvAt kharaviSANavat / tanna, yasmAd bhAva evAsau ghaTaprAgabhAvaH, tatkAraNabhUtAnAdikAlapravRttapudgalasaMghAtarUpaH kevalaM vaTAnutpattimAtreNa viziSTa iti / / 278 // ( 1826 ) D. C-Mandika:-Like kharasringa previous non-existence cannot be taken as a right illustration, because like kharasringa it is non-existent on account of its abhavarupata. Bhagavan:-It is not so. The previous abhava of ghata is itself bhava. The only difference found in it is that, at this stage the production of ghata has not yet been brought about from the mass of earth, which has served as its karana from times inmorial // 277 (1826 ) // evaM bhavvuccheo koTThAgArassa vA avacautti / taM nANaMtattaNao'NAgayakAlaM - barANaM va // 279 // (1827 ) Evam bhavvuccheo kotthagarassa va avacau tti Tam nanantattanao'nagayakalam-baranam va || 279 ( 1827 ) [ evaM bhavyocchedaH koSTAgArasyevApacaya iti / tad nAnantatvato'nAgatakAlA - Dambarayokhi // 279 // ( 1827 ) Evam bhavyocchedah kostagarasyevapacaya iti | Tad nanantatvato'nagatakalambarayoriva || 279 // ( 1827 ) ] Trans. - 279 Similarly, it is not ( correct ) ( to believe ) the culmination of the auspicious to be similar to the diminution of granery on account of (its) endlessness like the time to come or 'sky. ( 1827 ) TIkA - nanvevaM sati bhavyocchedaH - bhavyajIvaiH saMsAraH zUnyaH prAbhoti,

Page #375
.: 332: Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth apacayAt / kasya yathA samucchedaH ? ityAha-stokastokAkRSyamANadhAnyasya dhAnyabhRtakoSThAgArasya / idamuktaM bhavati-kAlasyAnantyAta SaNmAsaparyante cAvazyamekasya bhavyasya jIvasya siddhigamanAt krameNApacIyamAnasya dhAnyakoSThAgArasyeva sarvasyApi bhavyarAzerucchedaH prApnotIti / atrottaramAha-tadetad na, anantatvAd bhavyarAzeH, anAgatakAlA-''kAzavaditi / iha yad bRhadanantakenAnantaM, tat stoka-stokatayA'pacIyamAnamapi nocchidyate, yathA pratisamayaM vartamAna tApattyA'pacIyamAno'pyanAgatakAlasamayarAziH, pratisamayaM buddhyA pradezApahAreNApacIyamAnaH sarvanabhaHpradezarAzirvA / iti na bhavyocchedaH // 279 // (1827) // D. C.-Mandoka:-If the uccheda of bhavya jivas is accepted, this world will gradually be deprived of them, Ultimately there will be no bhavya jiva existing in the world. For just as a granary of corn, is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn, this world will also be losing one bhavyn java at least at the end of say, six months, when he will be attaining moksa, until ultimately the world will be void of bhavya jivas. __Bhagavan :--Your argument is fallacious, O Mandika. The number of bhavya gavas is as endless as the time to come or sky, and hence its absolute viccheda should never be feared. jaM cAtItA'NAgayakAlA tullA jao ya saMsiddho / eko aNaMtabhAgo bhavANamaIyakAleNaM // 280 // (1828) esseNaM tattiu ciya jutto jaM to vi sababhavANaM / jutto na samuccheo hoja maI kahamiNaM siddhaM ? // 281 // (1829) bhavANamaNaMtattaNamaNaMtabhAgo va kiha muko siM / kAlAdaova maMDiya! maha vayaNAo va paDivaja // 282 // (1830) Jam catita'nagayakala tulla jao ya samsiddho I Ekko anantabhago bhavvanamaiyakalenam // 280 // ( 1828 )

Page #376
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 338:. Essenam tattiu cciya jutto jam to vi sayvabhavyanami Jutto na samuccheo hojja mai kahaminam siddham ? 112810(1829) Bhavvanamanantattanantabhago va kiha mukko simi Kaladao va Mandiya ! maha vayanao va padivajja // 282 // ( 1830 ) [ yaccAtItA-'nAgatakAlau tulyau yatazca sNsiddhH| eko'nantabhAgo bhavyAnAmatItakAlena // 280 // (1828) eSyatA tAvAneva yukto yat tato'pi sarvabhavyAnAm / yukto na samucchedo bhaved matiH kathamidaM siddham // 281 // (1829) . bhavyAnAmanantatvamanantabhAgo vA kathaM vA mukta eSAm ? kAlAdaya iva maNDika ! mama vacanAd vA pratipadyasva // 282 / / (1830) Yaccatita nagatakalau tulyau yats'ca samsiddhah | Eko'nantabhago bhavyanamatitakalena 11 280 (1828) Esyata tavaneva yukto yat tato'pi sarvabhavyanam i Yukto na samucchedo bhaved matih kathamidam siddham ? ||281 // Bhavyanananantatvamanantabhago va katham va mukta esam ? Kaladaya iya Mandika ! mama vacanad va pratipadyasva 1128211] Trans.-280-281-282 Since the times-past and futureare similiar, an infinitesimal part of the auspicious which has already been liberated in the past will meet liberation in future also. It is not proper therefore to believe in (complete ) destination of all auspicious ( creatures ). ( It may be asked ) " How is it proved ? Or, how is the endlessness or infinitesimal part of the auspicious ( creatures ) liberated ?" " Like Kala etc. Or, O Mandika, take it ( for granted ) on my word." ( 1828-- 1829-1830) TIkA-vyAkhyA-yasmAccAtItA-'nAgatakAlau tulyAveva, yatazcAtItenApi kAlenaika eva nigodAnantatamo bhAgo'dyApi bhavyAnAM siddhaH, eSyatApi bhaviSyatkAlena tAvanmAtra eva bhavyAnantabhAgaH siddhiM gacchan yukto ghaTamAnakaH, na hInAdhikaH bhaviSyato'pi kAlasyAtItatulyatvAt /

Page #377
.: 334 :. Jinabhadra Gani's ( The sixth tata evamapi sati na sarvabhavyAnAmucchedo yuktaH, sarveNApi kAlena tadanantabhAgasyaiva siddhigamanasambhavopadarzanAt / atha parasya matirbhavet-tatkathamidaM siddhaM yaduta-anantA bhavyAH, tadanantabhAgazca sarveNaiva kAlena setsyatIti ? / atrocyate-kAlA-''kAzAdaya ivAnantAstAvad bhavyAH, tadanantabhAgasya ca muktigamanAt , kAlA-''kAzayoriva na sarveSAmuccheda iti pratipadyasva, madvacanAd vA maNDika ! sarvametat zraddhehIti // 280-281-282 / / (1828-1829-1830) D. C.-As the time, whether past or future is the same throughout, the infinite number of bhavya jivas, or a portion of them attains moksa during past as well as future times in equal proportion The uccheda of all bhavya jivas is, therefore, not acceptible. Mandika:-But how is it proved that the bhavyas are ananta and their anantabhaga attains moksa at all times ? Bhagavan:--They are antanta like kala and akas'a. Even if infinite number of bhavyas passes away to moksa, they remain endless for ever like kala and cikas'a. Rely upon my word, O Meandaka, and. accept it. // 280-282 ( 1828-1830) // If it is asked "How could it be taken as true merely on your words ? " the answer issabbhUyamiNaM giNhasu maha vayaNAo'vasesavayaNaM va / savaNNutAio vA jANayamajjhatthavayaNaM va // 283 // (1831) maNNasi kiha savaNNU savesi svsNsyccheyaa| diTuMtAbhAvammi vi pucchau jo saMsao jassa // 284 // (1832) Sabbhuyaminam ginhasu maha vayanao'vasesavayanam va i Savvannutaio va janayamajjhatthavayanam va // 283 // (1831) Mannasi kiha savvanna savyesim savvasamsayaccheya i Ditthantabhavammi vi pucchau jo samsao jassa // 284 // (1832)

Page #378
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 335 [sadbhUtamidaM gRhANa madvacanAdavazeSavacanamiva / sarvajJatAdito vA jJAyakamadhyasthavacanamiva / / 283 // ( 1831) manyase kathaM sarvajJaH sarveSAM sarvasaMzayacchedAt / / dRSTAntAbhAve'pi pRcchatu yaH saMzayo yasya // 284 // (1832) Sadbhutamidam goihana madvacanadavas'osavacanamiya Sarvajnatadito va jnayakamadhyasthavacanamiva || 283 | ( 1831)] Manyase katham sarvajrah sarvesam sarvasamsayacchedat i Dristantabhave'pi pricchatu yah samsayo yasya // 284 1 ( 1832 ) ] Trans.-283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience. ( If ) you question " How am I to be omniscient ? " (The reply is that ) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all. Even in absence of ( proper ) examples, one who entertains doubts may ask.me. (1831-1832) TIkA-vyAkhyA-sadbhUtamidamanantaroktaM sarvamapIti gRhANa tvam , madvacanatvAt , yathA tvatsaMzayAdiviSayamavazeSa madvacanam , sarvajJatvAdityAdibhyo vA hetubhyaH, AdizabdAt vItarAgatvAdiparigrahaH, jJAyakamadhyasthavacanavadityayamatra dRSTAnta iti / athaivaM manyase-kathamiva sarvajJastvam / atrocyate-sarveSAM sarvasaMzayacchedAt / anyasya sarvasaMzayacchettuH kasyApyadarzanAt ko'tra dRSTAntaH ?-na kazciditi / atrocyate-kimatra dRSTAntAnveSaNena ? / tadabhAve'pi hi yo yasya saMzayaH sa taM sarvamapi pRcchatu, yena svapratyayasiddha eva mayi sarvajJatvanizcayo bhavatIti / / 283-284 // ( 1831-1832 ) D. C.-Bhaguvan:-Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am sarvajna and vitarugu, Mandika:-On what ground are you to be called srrvajna ? Bhagavan:-I am sarvagna because I remove the doubts of all. Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question so that he may be convinced of my scorvajinatva. 283-284(1831-1832)

Page #379
.: 838 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The sixth Also, jaha vA sa eva pAsANa-kaNagajogo viogajoggo vi| na vijujjai sabo ciya sa vijujjai jassa sNpttii||287||(1835) kiM puNa jA saMpattI sA joggasseva na u ajoggss| taha jo mokkho niyamA so bhavANaM na iyaresiM // 288 // (1836) Jaha va sa eva pasana-kanagajogo viogajoggo vi i Na vijujjai savvo cciya sa vijujjai jassa sampatti ll 287 # (1835) Kim puna ja sampatti sa joggasseva na u ajoggassa i. Taha jo mokkho niyama so bhavyanam na iyaresim 1128811 (1836) [ yathA vA sa eva pASANa-kanakayogo viyogayogyo'pi / na viyujyate sarva eva sa viyujyate yasya saMprAptiH // 287 // (1835) kiM punaryA saMprAptiH sA yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasya / tathA yo mokSo niyamAt sa bhavyAnAM netareSAm // 288 // (1836) Yatha va sa eva pasana-kanakayogo viyogayogyo'pi 1 Na vigujyate sarvam eva sa viyujyate yasya sampraptih||287||(1835)] Kim punarya sampraptih sa yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasya i Tatha yo mokso niyamat sa bhavyanam netaresam 1128811 (1836)] ___Trans.-287-288 Just as the contact between stone and gold, though susceptible to separation, is not separated, only those that have reached attainment are separated. Similarly, moksia which is laid down as a rule belongs only to bhavyas and not to others. ( 1835-1836) TIkA-yathA vA sa eva pUrvoktaH suvarNapASANa-kanakayoryogo viyogayogyatAnvito'pi sarvo na viyujyate, kintu sa eva viyujyate, yasya viyogasAmagrIsaMprAptiriti / kiM punaH ? etad bhujamutkSipya brUmaH-yA viyogasAmagrIsaMprAptiH sA viyogayogyasyaiva suvarNopalasya bhavati, na tu tadayogyasya, tathA tenaiva prakAreNa vaH sarvakarmakSayalakSaNo mokSaH sa niyamAd

Page #380
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 339 : bhavyAnAmeva bhavati, netareSAmabhavyAnAmiti bhavyA-'bhavyayorvizeSa iti / / 287-288 // (1835-1836 ) // D. C.-Although the contact between gold and stone is susceptible to separation, it can never be applied to all as a general rule. Because, only that which secures necessary conditions for separation is separable. Moreover, these necessary conditions which cause the separation, act only upon those that are worthy of separation and not upon others. The same is the case with moksa. The attainment of noksa is possible for bhavyas only, and not for a-bhavyas even if they possess necessary conditions. This is the distinctive feature between bhavya and a-bhavya u 287-288 ( 1835-1836 ) // kayagAimattaNAoM mokkho nicco na hoi kuMbho ch| no paddhaMsAbhAvo bhuvi taddhammA vi jaM nicco // 289 // (1837) aNudAharaNamabhAvo eso vi maI na taM jao niyo| kuMbhaviNAsavisiTTho bhAvo cciya poggalamao ya // 290 // (1838) Kayagaimattanao mokkho nicco na hoi kumbho vva i No paddhamsabhavo bhuvi taddhamma vi jam nicco 1128911 (1837) Anudaharanamabhavo eso vi mai na tam jao niyao 1 Kumbhavinasavisittho bhavo cciya poggalamao ya n290 // (1838) [ kRtakAdimattvAd mokSo nityo na bhavati kumbha iva / no pradhvaMsAbhAvo bhuvi taddharmApi yad nityaH / / 289 / / ( 1837 ) aNudAharaNamabhAva eSo'pi matirna tad yato niytH| kumbhavinAzaviziSTo bhAva eva pudgalamayazca // 290 // (1838 ) Kritakadimattvad mokso nityo na bhavati kumbha iva i No pradhvamsabhavo bhuvi taddharmapi yad nityah ||289|| (1837)

Page #381
.: 340 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Anudabaranamabhava eso'pi matirna tad yato niyatah 1 Kumbhavinasavisisto bhava eva pudgalamayasca // 290 // (1838)] Trans.-289-290 " Like kumbha, moksa is not nitya on account of its artificiality etc." It is not so. Because, indestructibility is everlasting on this earth inspite of its ( possessing ) that property. " ( But ) this negation is void of example also." That is not true. Destruction of kumbha is definite and ( hence ) ( its ) positiveness is distinguished by means of pudgalas. ( 1837-1838 ) TIkA-vyAkhyA-nanu mokSo nityo na bhavati, kintvanityo vinAzI, kRtakatvAt ; AdizabdAt prytnaanntriiyktvaa''dimttvaadiprigrhH| kumbhavaditi dRSTAntaH / atrocyate-anaikAntikatA hetUnAm , vipakSe'pi gamanAt, yasmAdiha ghaTAdipradhvaMsAbhAvaH kRtakAdisvabhAvo'pi nitya eva, tadanityatve ghaTAdestadrUpatayaivonmajanaprasaGgAditi / athaivaM parasya matiH-na kevalaM pUrvoktaH prAgabhAvaH kintveSo'pi pradhvaMsAbhAvo'bhAvatvenAvastutvAdanudAharaNameva / tadetad na, yato yasmAd niyato nizcitaH kumbhavinAzavizeSeNa viziSTaH pudgalAtmako bhAva evAyamapi pradhvaMsAbhAvaH / ato yuktametadudAharaNamiti / etacca mokSasya kRtakatvamabhyupagamyoktam // 289-290 // // (1837-1838) // ___D.C.-Mandilia-Molesa is not natyaa but it is a-nitya like ghata as it is artificial and adiman in character like ghata. Bhagavan:-It is not so. The hetu advanced by you applies to the vipaksa as well, and hence it is anaikantika. The pradhvamsabhava, in case of ghata, for example, is notya inspite of its being kritaka. For, if it were a-natya, objects like ghata should have been born in the same form, Mandaka :-But since pradhvamsabhava is negative in character, you will not be able to cite an example based on it. Bhagavan:-It is not negative, O Mandaka ! but positive in character. The definite forms of pudgalas found at the

Page #382
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 341 :destruction of ghata is nothing but pradhvamsabhava. The example cited is, therefore, quite proper to the occasion. The same is the case with moksa also. Moksa will never be called a-nitya even if it is believed to possess the properties like Meritakatvcs. || 288-290 ( 1837-1838 ) // Or, say, Moksa is not kritaka at all on account of the following reason:kiM vegaMteNa kayaM poggalamattavilayammi jIvassa / kiM nivattiyamahiyaM nabhaso ghaDamettavilayammi ? // 291 // (1439) Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jivassa / Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi? // 291 // [kiM caikAntena kRtaM pudgalamAtravilaye jIvasya / kiM nirvatitamadhikaM nabhaso ghaTamAtravilaye ? // 291 // ( 1839 ) Kim vaikantena ktitam pudgalamatravilaye jivasya / Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamatravilaye ?129111 (1839)] Trans.-291 " At the destruction of mere pudagalas, how is jiva alone to be affected ?" "At the destruction of mere ghata, how is sky affected all the more?" ( 1839 ) TIkA-kimiha pudgalamAtravilaye sati samastakarmapudgalaparizATasamaye jIvasyAtmanaH svatattve vRttimAdadhata ekAntena kRtaM vihitam , yena kRtako mokSaH syAt ? / etaduktaM bhavati-ihAtma-karmapudgalaviyogo mokSo'bhipretaH / tatra tapaHsaMyamaprabhAvato jIvAt karmaNi prathag jAyamAne kimAtmanaH kriyate, yena kRtakatvAdanityatvaM mokSasya pratipAdyate / / atha sa evAtma-karmaviyogaH kriyamANatvAt kRtakaH, tato'nitya ityAzaGkayAha-" kiM nivattiyamityAdi" mudgarAdinA ghaTamAtrasya vinAze sati kiM nAma nabhaso'bhyadhikaM nirvartitam ? na kinycidityrthH| evamihApi karmamAtravinAze sati kiM jIvasyAdhika kRtam , yena tadekAkitArUpasya mokSasya kRtakatvenAnityatvaM syAt ? / sa eva karmaNo vinAzo ghaTavinAzavat kriyamAnatvAt kRtakaH, tataH sarvakarmakSaya

Page #383
:: 342 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth lakSaNo mokSo'nitya iti cet / tadayuktam , yato yathA'yameva ghaTavinAzo yaH kevalAkAzasadbhAvo na punastato vibhinno'sau, na cAkAzasya kimapyadhika kriyate, tasya sadAvasthitatvena nityatvAt , evamihApyayameva karmaNo vinAzo yaH kevalAtmasadbhAvaH, na tvAtmano vibhinno'sau, na cAtmanaH kiJcidadhikaM vidhIyate, tasyApi nabhovad nityatvAt / tasmAd na mokSasya kRtakatvamanityatvaM vA / kathaJciccAnityatve siddhasAdhyataiva, dravya-paryAyobhayarUpatayA sarvasyApi vastuno nityAnityarUpatvAditi / / 291 // (1839) // D. C.-Bhagavan :-Since Moksa is nothing but the separation of Soul from Karma-pudgalas, it cannot be artificial at all. When Karma is being separated from java, how is Atma to be affected to render the Moksc a-nitya ? Mandika :-The separation of soul from Karma is kritaka owing to its kriyamanatva. The Moksa is, therefore, kritaka and a-nitya too. Bhagavan :-When ghata is destroyed by means of hammer etc. the sky is not at all affected. In the same way, when Karma is destroyed, hiva will also remain unaffected. It is not, therefore, proper to believe that Moksa is kritaka and a-nitya. Mandrka :-Karma being destructible like ghata, like ghata it is krstaka also. Now since Moksa is nothing but the destruction of all Karmas, it is also kritaka and hence a-nitya also. Bhagavan:-Your argument is absolutely false. O Mandiku' Existence of sky persists even if ghata is destroyed The destruction of ghata is not bhinna from akas'a, but at the same time akas'a is not affected by it also, since it is everlasting. Similarly in case of Karma also, although the destruction of Karmas is not different from the existence of Soul, the Soul is not affected by it on account of its being nitya like akas'a. The Moksa is, therefore, never kritaka, O Mandika, and never a-nitya also, even if it is a-nitya to the extent that all objects are a-ritya as far as their dravyatva and paryayas are concerned.

Page #384
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 343 :* Mandika:-Since Karma-pudgalas abandoned by jiva in a worn-out condition, stay on in this world ( even in that state ) why should the Soul separated from Karma, be believed to unite with the worn-out Karma, so that, it may be bound by a fresh bondage again? Bhagavan :-Moksa being nitya, O Mandika, will again be bound by a fresh bondage. // 291 ( 1839 ) // The everlasting nature of moksa is apprehended as follows: so'NavarAho va puNo na bajjhae baMdhakAraNAbhAvA / jogA ya baMdhaheU na ya te tassAsarIro ti // 292 // (1840 ) So'navaraho vva puno na bajjhae bandhakaranabhava | Joga ya bandha--heu na ya te tassasariro tti // 292 // ( 1840 ) [ sosnaparAdha iva punarna badhyate bandhakAraNAbhAvAt / yogAzca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyAzarIra iti / / 292 // ( 1840 ) So'naparadha iva punarna badhyate bandhakaranabhavat | Yogasca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyasarira iti || 292 | ( 1840 ) ] Trans. - 292 Like an innocent person, it ( i. e., Soul ) can never be bound (by bandhas) as there no cause for bondage. On account of its formlessness, it has no cause for bondages. ( 1840 ) " TIkA - sa mukto jIvaH punarapi na badhyate, bandhakAraNAbhAvAt, anaparAdhapuruSavat mano- vAk- kAyayogAdayazca bandhahetavo'bhidhIyante ne ca te muktasya santi, zarIrAdyabhAvAt / na ca karmavargaNAgatapudgalamAtra saMyogamAtrarUpo'tra bandho'dhikriyate, atiprasaGgAdidoSAghAtatvAt kintu mithyAvAdita nibandhana iti // 292 // (1840 ) // 9 D. C.--In absence of ( any ) cause for (its ) bandha, like an innocent person, the Soul is free from bandha. Unions of mind, speech and body etc. are nothing but the causes for

Page #385
*: 344 :Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth ( its ) bandha. But due to the abhava of s'arira etc, a free Soul is not able to contain them. So, bandha does not take place in absence of samyoga of the multiplication of karmas but it depends upon the hetus such as mothyatva etc. Mandika :-Like bandhas, you doubt as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. 11 292 ( 1840 ) || Bhagavan replies :na puNo tassa pasUI bIyAbhAvAdihaMkurasseva / bIyaM ca tassa kammaM na ya tassa tayaM tao nico||293|| (1841) Na puno tassa pasui biyabhavadiharikurasseva i Biyam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa tayam tao nicco 129311 (1841) [na punastasya prasUtibIjAbhAvAdihAGkarasyeva / bIjaM ca tasya karma na ca tasya tata tato nityaH // 293 // (1841) Na punastasya prasutibijabhavadihankurasyeva 1 Bijam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityah (12931 (1841)] Trans.--293. Like a sprout without seed, it has no birth again, since Karma is its seed. It no more belongs to that ( muktatma ) which in that case, becomes everlasting. ( 1841 ) TIkA-na tasya muktasya punarapi bhavaprasUtirupajAyate, bIjAbhAvAtkAraNasyAsatvAt , yathA'Gkarasya tadabhAvAd na prasUtiH / bIjaM cAsya karmaivAvagantavyam , tacca muktasya nAstyeva, tataH punarAvRttyabhAvAd nityo'sAviti // 293 // (1841) // D. C.-Just as a sprout does not grow without seed, the muktatma does not take any birth in absence of Karma which acts as its baja. When muktatma is said to have no janma (birth ), it goes without saying that he is nitya also. 11293 (1841) Also,

Page #386
Vada ] Ganadharavada .:345:. davAmuttattaNao nahaM va nico mao sa dvtyaa| sabagayattAvattI mai tti taM nANumANAo // 294 // (1842) Davvamuttattanao naham va nicco mao sa davvataya / Savvgayattavatti mai tti tam nanumanao 11 294 11 ( 1842 ) [ dravyAmUrtatvato nabha iva nityo mataH sa dravyatayA / sarvagatatvApattirmatiriti tad nAnumAnAt // 294 // (1842) Dravyamurtatvato nabha iva nityo matah sa dravyataya | Sarvagatatvapattir matiriti tad nanumanat 1 294 11 ( 1842 ) ] Trans.--294 By substantiality, it is considered as nitya like sky, on account of ( both ) substantiality, as well as, incorporeal nature. The belief that it is all-pervading, is not ( acceptible ) on account of anumana. ( 1842) TIkA-sa muktAtmA nitya iti pratijJA / " davAmuttattaNau ti" dravyatve satyamUrtatvAditi hetuH / "davataya tti" yathA dravyatve satyamUrta nabha iti dRSTAntaH / athaivaMbhRtA mati parasya syAta-anena hetunA sarvagatatvApattirapyAtmanaH sidhyati; tathAhi-sarvagata AtmA, dravyatve satyamUrtatvAt , nabhovat / tatazca dharmavizeSaviparItasAdhanAd viruddho'yam / tadetad na / kutaH / anumAnAt-anumAnabAdhitatvAt sarvagatatvasyetyarthaH; tathAhiasarvagata AtmA, kartRtvAt , kulAlavat / na ca kartRtvamasiddham , bhoktRtvadraSTutvAdyanupapatteriti // 294 // (1842) // D. C.-Like akas'a, atma is nitya on account of its dravyatva as well as a-murtatva. But, it is not appropriate to believe that atma is all-pervading like akas'a. The soul is a-sarvagatu like potter, on account of its kartrstva. For, otherwise, it will lose several of its own characteristics like bhoktritva, a-dristatva etc. 11 294 ( 1842 ) u ko vA niccaggAho satvaM ciya vi bhava-bhaMga-dviimaiyaM / pajjAyaMtaramettappaNAdaniccAivavaeso // 295 // (1843) 44

Page #387
:- 346 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth Ko va niccaggaho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-tthiimaiyam Pajjayantaramettappanadaniccaivavaeso // 295 // ( 1843 ) [ ko vA nityagrahaH sarvamevApi bhava - bhaGga - sthitimayam / paryAyAntaramAtrArpaNAdanityAdivyapadezaH / / 295 / / ( 1843 ) Ko va nityagrahah sarvamevapi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam | Paryayantaramatrarpanadanityadivyapadesah || 295 // ( 1843 ) ] Trans. - 295 Or, what ( of ) assuming nityata ? Everything is susceptible to the state of production, destruction and existence. Only by the imposition of various methods, attributes like transitoriness etc., are designated ( 1843 ) TIkA - gatArthA, navaraM paryAyAntaramAtrasyArpaNaM pradhAnabhAvena vivakSaNaM tasmAdanityAdivyapadezaH, tathAhi - ghaTaH pUrveNa mRtpiNDaparyAyeNa vinazyati, ghaTaparyAyatayA punarutpadyate, mRdrUpatayA tvavatiSThate / tatazca yo vinaSTarUpatAdiparyAyo yadArpitaH pradhAnabhUto vivakSyate, tadA tenAnityatvAdivyapadezaH / evamasAvapi muktaH saMsAritayA vinaSTaH, siddhatayotpannaH, jIvatva - sopayogatvAdibhistvavatiSThate, tathA, prathamasamayasiddhatayA vinazyati, dvisamayasiddhatayospadyate, dravyatva - jIvatvAdibhistvavatiSThate / tato'rpitaparyAyeNAnityatvAdivyapadeza iti / / 295 // ( 1843 ) / / D. C. - It is useless to insist that a free soul is exclusi vely nitya Attributes like a-ntyata could be indicated by means of various methods. Before ghata comes into existence, its form as a lump of earth vanishes and comes into existence as a particular shape of earth named ghata, and continues to exist in that state after its production also. The same is the case with muktatma. The muktatma also vanishes as a mundane, comes into existence as mukta and continues to be in that state by virtue of its life and utility. So, it vanishes at the first time as it is established, comes into existence by virtue of its being established at the second time,

Page #388
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 347: and continues to be in that state on account of its dravyatva, jvvatva etc. In this way, by means of different paryayas, the attributes like a-nityata, are imposed. muttassa kosvagAso somma ! tilogasiharaM, gaI kiha se ? | kammalahuyA tahAgaipariNAmAIhiM bhaNiyamidaM // 296 // (1844) " Muttassa ko'vagaso somma ! tilogasiharam, gal kiha se ? Kammalahuya tahagaiparinamaihim bhaniyamidam // 296 // ( 1844) [ muktasya ko'vakAzaH saumya ! trilokazikharaM gatiH kathaM tasya ? | karmalaghutA tathAgatipariNAmAdibhirbhaNitamidam / / 296 / / (1844 ) Muktasya ko'vakasah saumya ! trilokasikharam, gatih katham tasya ? / Karmalaghuta tathagatiparinamadibhir bhanitamidam || 296 ( 1844 ) ] Trans. - 296 What is the resort of the free Soul ? It is the end of three worlds. O Saumya! What is the rate of its movement? It is said that the Soul attains moksa at one time by ( virtue of) the want of a Karma, as well as, by ( virtue of) the ( natural) tendency of its movement etc. (1844) TIkA-muktasya kSINasamastakarmaNo jIvasya ko'vakAzaH kAvasthAnam ?, iti pRSTe satyAha-saumya ! trilokazikharaM, lokAnta ityarthaH / nanu kathaM 'se' tasyAkarmaNo jIvasyaitAvad dUramito gatiH pravartate / karmanibandhanA hi jIvAnAM sarvApi ceSTA, tato vihAyogatyAdikarmAbhAve'pi gaticeSTAyAmatiprasaGgaH prApnoti / atrocyate - " kammalahuya tti " karmApagame sati lAghavAt samayamekaM tadgatipravRttirityarthaH tathAgatipariNAmAt karmakSaye siddhatvavadapUrvagatipariNAmalAbhAdityarthaH, yathA hi samasta karmakSayAdapUrvaM siddhatva pariNAmaM jIvaH samAsAdayati, tathordhvagatipariNAmamapIti bhAvaH / AdizabdAdaparamapi tadgatikAraNaM samaya bhaNitamidamavagantavyam, tadyathA - lAu ya eraMDaphale aggI dhUmo ya isu dhaNuvimuko / gai puvapaogeNaM evaM siddhANa vi gaI u // 1 // 296 // ( 1844 ) // |

Page #389
.: 348 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth D. C-Mandika:-Where do the Mukta souls reside? Bhagavan:-They reside at the end of the three worlds O Saumya! Mandika:-How do jivas move to such a long distance even if they are unaccompanied by Karmas? All sorts of movements of a jiva depend upon Karma, and hence, how will extensive movements such as moving in the sky etc. be possible at all? Bhagavan:-O Blessed Mandika! just as soul attains an unprecedented achivement when karma is destroyed, in the same way, the soul proceeds with the same movement and during the same period (of time ). Moreover, just as gourd, fruit of a castor plant, fire, smoke, arrow wafted from a bow etc. make movements by means of previous impellations, in the same way, a muktatma is also able to make movement by means of previous impellations etc. | 296 (1844) kiM saktiriyamarUvaM maMDiya ! bhuvi ceyaNaM ca kimarUvaM ? | jaha se visesadhammo ceyannaM taha mayA kiriyA // 297 // (1845) Kim sakkiriyamaruvam Mandiya! bhuvi ceyanam ca kimaruvam? Jaha se visesadhammo ceyannam taha maya kiriya 297u (1845) [ kiM sakriyarUpaM maNDika ! bhuvi cetanaM ca kimarUpam 1 | 'yathA tasya vizeSadharmazcaitanyaM tathA matA kriyA / / 297 // ( 1845 ) Kim sakriyamarupam Mandika! bhuvi cetanam ca kimarupam ? Yatha tasya visesadharmascaitanyam tatha mata kriya ||297||(1845) Trans.-297 What is movable (when it is formless)? And, O Mandika, what is living (when it is formless)? Like consciousness, movement is also the distinctive characteristic of Soul. (1845)

Page #390
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 349 :. TIkA-nanvAkAza-kAlAdayo'mUrtA niSkriyA eva prasiddhAH, tat kiM nAma tvayA'rUpamamUrta sad vastu sakriyaM dRSTaM, yena muktAtmanaH sakriyatvamabhyupagamyate ?--nanu niSkriya eva muktAtmA prApnoti, amUrtatvAt , AkAzavaditi bhAvaH / atrocyate-maNDika ! tvamapyetat kathaya,-bhuvi kimarUpaM sadvastu cetanaM vIkSitam , yena muktAtmA cetano'bhyupagamyate ?-amUrtatvAdacetana evAyaM prApnoti, AkAzavaditi / tasmAd yathA " se" tasya jIvasyArUpebhya AkAzAdibhyastadrUpatve samAne'nyo'pi caitanyalakSaNo vizeSadharmaH samasti, tathA kriyApi matA,-sakriyatvamapi vizeSadharmo'stu ko virodhaH ? iti bhAvaH // 297 // (1845) // D. C.--Manduka:-The a-murta (objects like )akas'a and kala are welknown as noskriya. Then, how did you apprehend a formless object like muktatma to be sa-kriya? Since it is a-mutra like akas'a, it should also be niskroya like akas'a. Bhagavan:--What ca-murta object have you seen to be sacetana in this world, in order to accept muktatma as sacetana ? Just as akas'a is acetana on account of its amurtatva, the muktatma should also be acetana as a rule. But it is not so. For, although atma resembles akas'a in respect of a-murtatva, it possesses a distinct characteristic of cetana, within which kriya is also included. So, sa-kriyatva or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of muktatma There is no doubt about it. 11297011845) Or, leaving that distinction of mukta and a-mukta aside, it could also be argued that kattAittaNao vA sakirio'yaM mao kulAlo cha / dehappaMdaNao vA paJcakkhaM jaMtapuriso va // 298 // (1846) Kattaittanao va sakkirio'yam mao kulalo va i Dehapphandanao va paccakkham jantapuriso vva 129811 (1846) [ kAditvato vA sakriyo'yaM mataH kulAla iva / dehaspandanato vA pratyakSaM yantrapuruSa iva // 298 // (1846)

Page #391
.: 350 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth Kartraditvato va sakriyo'yam matah kulala iva i Dehaspandanato vo pratyak sam yantrapurusa iva // 298 // (1846)] Trans.-298 Like a potter, it is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc, or ( it is active ) like a mechanical person, on account of the directly perceptible movement of ( its ) body. (1846) TIkA-athavA, sakriyo'yamAtmA, kartRtvAt , kulAlavat / AdizabdAd "bhoktRtvAt " iti vAcyam / athavA, sakriya AtmA patyakSata eva dehaparispandadarzanAt , yatrapuruSavaditi // 298 // (1846 ) / D. C.-The Soul could be taken as sakriya as a potter on account of its kartritva and bhoktritva. Or, it is sakriya like a yantra-purusa on account of the pratyaksa movements of its body // 298 // ( 1846)] dehapphaMdaNaheU hojja payatto tti so vi naakirie| hojAdiTTho va maI tadarUvatte naNu samANaM // 299 // (1847) rUvittammi sa deho vacco tapphaMdaNe puNo heU / painiyayaparipphaMdaNamaceyaNANaM na vi ya juttaM // 300 // (1848) Dehapphandanahen hojja payatto tti so vi nakirie 1 Hojjadittho va mai tadaruvalte nanu samanam II 299 ( 1847) Ruvittammi sa deho vacco tapphandane puno heu I Painiyayaparipphandanamaceyananam na vi ya juttam 11 300 11 [ dehaspandanaheturbhavet prayatna iti so'pi nAkriye / bhavedadRSTo vA matistadarUpatve nanu samAnam // 299 // (1847) rUpitve sa deho vAcyastatspandane punarhetuH / pratiniyataparispandanamacetanAnAM nApi yuktam / / 300 / / ( 1848) Dehaspandanahetur bhavet prayatna iti so'pi nakriye 1 Bhavedadristo va matistadarapatve nanu samanam // 299 // (1847)

Page #392
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 351 :. Rupitve sa deho vacyastatspandane punar hetuh 1 Pratiniyataparispandanamacetananam napi yuktam 1130011(1848) ] Trans.-299-300 It may be ( your opinion ) that the effort (on the part of Soul ) may be the cause of bodily movements. ( But ) even that is not ( possible ) in case of motionless (Soul ). Or, ( it may be believed that ) the hetu is invisible and resembles it in fornlessness. (If it is said that ) by reason of form it is called deha, there should certainly be ( some ) reason behind ( its ) movement. But the regular movement of lifeless ( objects ) is not justified. ( 1847-1848) TIkA-athaivaM brUSe-dehaparispandaheturAtmanaH prayatno na tu kriyA, ato nAtmanaH skriytvsiddhiritybhipraayH| atrottaramAha-so'pi prayatno nabhasIvAkriya Atmani na saMbhavati, ataH sakriya evaasau| amUrtasya ca prayatnasya dehaparispandahetutve ko'nyo heturiti vAcyam ? / anyahetu nirapekSaH svata evAyaM parispandaheturiti cet / yadyevam , AtmApi taddheturbhaviSyati, kimantargaDunA prayatnena ? / athAdRSTaH ko'pi dehaparispandahetuH, na tvAtmA, niSkriyatvAt / nanu so'pyadRSTaH kiM mUrtaH, amUtoM vA ? / yadyamUrtaH, tAtmApi dehaparispandahetuH kiM neSyate, amUrtatvAvizeSAt ? / athamRtimAnadRSTaH, tarhi sa kArmaNazarIralakSaNo deha eva, nAnyaH saMbhavati / tasyApi ca bahizyadehaparispandahetutayA vyApriyamANasya parispando draSTavyaH, tasya cAnyo heturvAcyaH, tasyApi cAnyaH, tasyApi cAnyaH, tasyApi cAnya ityanavasthA / atha svabhAvAdevAdRSTasya kArmaNadehasya parispandaH pravartate, tarhi bahirdRzyasyApi dehasya tata eva tatpravRttirbhaviSyati, kimadRSTakArmaNadehaparikalpanena ? / astvevamiti cet / tadayuktam , acetanAnAmevaMbhUtapratiniyataviziSTaparispandanasya svAbhAvikatvAnupapatteH, " nityaM sattvamasattvaM vA hetoranyAnapekSaNAt" ityAdidoSaprasaGgAt / tasmAt karmaviziSTa Atmaiva pratiniyatadehaparispandanahetutvena vyApriyata iti sakriyo'sAviti // 299-300 // (1847-1848) // D. C.--Mandika :-The hetu for movements of a body is the

Page #393
*; 352 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth effort ( on the part ) of Soul and not the kriya. It is, therefore, not proper to take atma to be sukriya. Bhagavan:--If the atma is niskriya, the effort cannot exist into it, and hence it is undoubtodly sakriya. What other hetu is to be understood in accepting the a-murta effort as a hetu for bodily movements ? If it is said that without the apeksa of another hetu, this effort itself becomes the hetu in the deha-spanda the Soul will also be called the hetu of these bodily movements. What is the use of intervening prayatna in such a case ? Mandikai-There is some invisible hetu in the movements of deha, but atma being niskriya cannot act as hetu in those movements. Bhagavan:--Is that invisible ( hetu ) murta or a-murta ? If a-murta, why not take atma as hetu in the deha parispanda since it is also a-murta ? And if that a-drista is murta, it is nothing but karmana sarira. Now, if that karmana sarara is used as the hetu of bahya sarara, there must be some other hetu for the parispandana of the above-mentioned karmana sarara This in turn, will have a third hetu for its partspanda and that a fourth one and so on until ultimately there is complete disorder. Again, if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an adrista karmanci sarira is caused by no other hetu than its own svabhava so that there may not be any sort of anavastha, then parispanda of bahya sareras will also be caused by stabhava so that there may not be any sense in assuming the adrista karmana sarira. Mandika:--I dont mind if the parispanda is taken to have been caused by svabhava. Bhagavan:-But it is not reasonable to believe like that. The definite type of the parispanda like this is never possible in case of acetana objects, because that which is indipendent of any other hetu is either everlasting or absolutely transitory.

Page #394
Vada] Ganadharavada .: 353 :. The only alternative to accept, therefore, is that atma which is distinguished by karma is the hetu of dehaparispanda and hence sakriya also. // 299-300 / / ( 1847-1848 )] hou kiriyA bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kiMnimittA sA ? / naNu taggaipariNAmA jaha siddhattaM tahA sA vi||301||(1849) Hou kiriya bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kimnimitta sa ? I Nanu taggaiparinama jaha siddhattam taha sa vi 13010 (1849) [ bhavatu kriyA bhavasthasya karmarahitasya kiMnimittA sA ? nanu tadgatipariNAmAd yathA siddhatvaM tathA sApi // 301 // (1849) Bhavatu kriya bhavasthasya karmarabitasya kimnimittta sa? Nanu tadgatiparinamad yatha siddhatvam tathi sapi 13011 (1849) ] ___ Trans.-301 Alright ! " How is the action of the mundane ( Soul ) separated from Karma to be accounted for ?" " Certainly from their parinama. Just as perfection is attributed to it, in the same way, activity is also attributed to it." (1849) kiM siddhAlayayarao na gaI, dhmmtthikaayvirhaao| so gaiuvaggahakaro logammi jamatthi nAloe // 302 // (1850) Kim siddhalayaparao na gai, dhammatthikayavirahao So gaiuvagghakaro logammi jamatthi naloe 11 302 11 ( 1850 ) [kiM siddhAlayaparato na gatiH, dharmAstikAyavirahAt / sa gatyupagrahakAro loke yadasti nAloke // 302 // (1850) Kim siddhalayaparato na gatih, dharmastikayavirahat i Sa gatyupagrahakaro loke yadasti naloke || 302 || (-1850 ) ] ___ Trans.--302 Why not the movement ( of Soul ) ( to extend ) beyond Siddhalaya ? Because, of the absence of the predicament of dharmastikaya. That being the impeller of motion resides in this world, and not in the spiritual world. ( 1850 )

Page #395
.: 354:. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth TIkA-yAktanyAyena muktasya gatikriyayA sakriyatvamiyaSte, tarhi siddhAlayAt siddhAvasthitikSetrAt parato'loke'pi kimiti tasya gatina pravartate / / atrocyate-parato dharmAstikAyavirahAt / tadviraho'pi kutaH ? ityAha-yad yasmAdasau dharmAstikAyo loka eva samasti, nAloke / mA bhUdasAvaloke, kiM tena prastutAnupayoginA kartavyam , tadvirahe'pi bhavatu muktasya tatra gatiH, niyamAbhAvAt ? / tadayuktam , yato jIvAnAM pudgalAnAM ca gatergamanasyopagraha upaSTambhastatkArI sa eva dharmAstikAyo nAnyaH, tatastasyAloke'bhAvAt kathaM lokAt parato'loke'pi muktAtmanAM gatiH pravartate ? iti||302||(1850) D. C.--Mandika :-If muktatma were sakriya by virtue of its movement, why should it not move beyond Siddhalaya also ? ___Bhagavan :-It cannot move beyond Siddhalaya, because dharmastekaya or the predicament of motion does not exist in the a-loka Mandika:--What of that? Even if dharmastikaya does not exist in the aloka, muktama can acceed to it without dharmastikaya. Bhagavan:--That is not possible. O Mandika. It is the predicament of motion that impels muktama to piove. Hence, if dharmastikaya does not exist in the aloka, muktatma is unable to move towards it 11 302 ( 1850 ) logassa sthi vivakkho suddhattaNao ghaDassa aghaDo ch| sa ghaDAi ciya maI na nisehAo tadaNurUvo // 303 // (1851) Logassa tthi vivakkho suddhattanao ghadassa a-ghado vva Sa ghadai cciya mai na nisehao tadanuruvo 11 303 # ( 1851 ) [lokasyAsti vipakSaH zruddhatvato ghaTasyAghaTa iva / sa ghaTAdireva matirna niSedhAt tadanurUpaH // 303 // (1851) Lokasyasti vipaksah sruddhatvato ghatasyaghata iva 1 Sa ghatadireva matir na nisedhat tadanurapah // 303 // ( 1851 )]

Page #396
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 355:. ___ Trans.-303 As ghata has a-ghata ( as its opposite ) loka also has its opposite, because of its etymological distinction. The view that it is nothing but ghata etc., is (also ) not ( acceptible ). ( For ), by means of negation ( something ) of its own kind ( is understood ). ( 1851 ) TIkA-asti lokasya vipakSaH, vyutpattimacchuddhapadAbhidheyayatvAt , iha yad vyutpattimattA zuddhapadenAbhidhIyate tasya vipakSI dRSTaH, yathA ghaTasyAghaTaH, yazca lokasya vipakSaH so'lokH| atha syAnmati:--" na loko'lokaH" iti yo lokasya vipakSaH sa ghaTAdipadArthAnAmanyatama eva bhaviSyati, kimiha vastvantaraparikalpanayA ? / tadetad na, paryudAsanamA niSedhAt niSedhyasyaivAnurUpo'tra vipakSo'nyaveSaNIyaH, "na loko'lokaH" ityatra loko niSedhyaH, sa cAkAzaviSayaH, ato'lokenA'pi tadanurUpeNa bhavitavyam , yathA " ihApaNDitaH", ityukte viziSTajJAnavikalazcetana eva puruSavizeSo gamyate, nAcetano ghaTAdiH, evamihApi lokAnurUpa evAloko mantavyaH / uktaM ca " najyuktamivayuktaM vA yaddhi kArya vidhIyate / __ tulyAdhikaraNe'nyasmilloke'pyarthagatistathA // 1 // " nab-ivayuktamanyasadRzAdhikaraNe tathA hyarthagati / " tasmAllokavipakSatvAdastyaloka iti // 303 // (1851) D. C-From the point of view of etymology, just as ghata has its opposite ( word ) c-ghata, loka must also have its opposite word c-loka. It is not justifice able to assume that a-loka is also the opposite of ghata, pata etc. By means of nisedha something of its own kind is understood. Just as by the word a-pandrta a living person having no scholarship is meant but not the inanimate objects like ghata and puta, so here also, by the nisedha of loka, nothing but a-loka should be understood. And it has also been said that. Nanyuktamiva yuktam va yaddhi karyam vid hiyate | Tuyladhikarane' nyasminlloke'pyarthagatis tatha.

Page #397
:: 356:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth So, a-loka alone is the vipaksa of loka || 303 ( 1851 ) tamhA dhammA-'dhammA loyapariccheyakAriNo juttA / iharAgAse tulle logo'logo tti ko bheo ? // 304 // (1852) logavibhAgAbhAve pddighaayaabhaavo'nnvtthaao| saMvavahArAbhAvo saMbaMdhAbhAvao hojjA // 305 // ( 1853) Tamha dhamma'dhamma loyapariccheyakarino jutta i Iharagase tulle logo'logo tti ko bheo ? 11 304 11 ( 1852 ) Logavibhagabhave padighayabhavao'navatthao i Samvavaharabhavo sambandhabhavao hojja 11 305 11 ( 1853 ) [ tasmAd dharmA-'dhamau lokaparicchedakAriNau yuktau| itarathAkAze tulye loko'loka iti ko bhedaH ? // 304 // (1852) lokAvibhAgAbhAve prtighaataabhaavto'nvsthaatH| saMvyavahArAbhAvaH saMbandhAbhAvato bhavet // 305 // (1853) Tasmad dharma-'dharmau lokapariccheda karinau yuktau 1 Itarathakase tulye loko'loka iti ko bhedah ? // 304 // (1852)] Lokavibhagabhave pratigbatabhavato'navasthatah 1 Samvyavahararabhavah sambandhabhavato bhavet // 305 // (1853)] Trans.-304-305 Thus ( predicaments of ) motion and rest are employed as the causes of destruction of loka. Otherwise, when the sky is common (everywhere ) how are * loka' and 'a-loka,' ( to be ) distinguished? In absence of the divisions of loka, there will be no reaction and hence no ( scope tor) stability; so also there will be scope for mutual relation as there will be no connection ( between them ). ( 1852-1853 ) TIkA-yasmAduktaprakAreNAstyalokaH, tasmAdalokAstitvAdevAvazyaM lokaparicchedakAribhyAM dharmA-'dharmAstikAyAbhyAM bhavitavyam / anyathA''kAze sAmAnye sati " ayaM lokaH " " ayaM cAlokaH" iti kiMkRto'yaM

Page #398
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 357:vizeSaH syAt ? / tasmAd yatra kSetre dharmA-'dharmAstikAyau vartete, tallokaH, zeSaM tvaloka iti lokA-'lokavyavasthAkAriNau dharmA-'dharmAstikAyau vidyate iti / " logetyAdi " yadi hi dharmA-'dharmAbhyAM lokavibhAgo na syAt , tato lokavibhAgAbhAve'viziSTa eva sarvasminnapyAkAze gatipariNatAnAM jIvAnAM pudgalAnAM ca pratighAtAbhAvena tadgatyavasthAnAbhAvAdaloke'pi gamanAt , tasya cAnantatvAt teSAM parasparaM saMbandho na syAt / tatazcaudArikAdikArmaNavargaNAparyantapudgalakRto jIvAnA bandha-mokSa-sukhaduHkha-bhavasaMsaraNAdivyavahAro na syAt / jIvasya ca jIvena sahAnyonyamIlanAbhAvAt tatkRto'nupagraho-paghAtAdivyavahAro na syAditi // 304-305 // ( 1852-1853 ) // ___D. C.-When the existence of a-lokaa is accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest are also accepted to exist. Otherwise, ukas'a being common everywhere loka and a-loka will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of dharma and a-dharma exist there is loka, and the rest is called a-loka. If there were no distinction between loka and a-loka by means of dharma and a-dharma, pratighata of various jivas and pudgalas in this world, will not be possible. Consequently, there will be no scope for gati and avasthana to lead them to a-loka. Jivas and pudgalas will then become ananta; there will be nothing like mutual relation between them, and the attributes of bandha and moksa will also be no longer existing between them // 304-305 // ( 1852-1853 ) ] niraNuggahattaNAo na gaI parao jalAdiva jhasassa / jo gamaNANuggahiyA so dhammo logprimaanno||306|| (1854) Niranuggahattanao na gai parao jaladiva jhasassai Jo gamananuggahiya so dhammo logaparimano // 306 // (1854) [niranugrahatvAd na gatiH parato jalAdiva jhaSasya / yo gamanAnugrahItA sa dharmo lokaparimANaH / / 306 // (1854)

Page #399
.: 358 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth Niranugrahatvad na gatih parato jaladiva jhasasya | Yo gamananugrahita sa dharmo loka-parimanah 11306|1 (1854) ] Trans.-306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water, ( their ) movement also does not extend beyond (loka). The predicament of dharmastikaya which is favourable to ( their ) movement, becomes the only measuring unit of loka. ( 1854 ). TIkA-tato lokAt parato'loke jIva-pudgalAnAM na gatiH, niranugrahatvAt-tatra gatyanugrahakarturabhAvAdityarthaH, yathA jalAt parato jhapasya matsyasya gatirna bhavati, upagrAhakAbhAvAditi / yazcAtra jIva-pudgalagateranugrahakartA sa lokaparimANo dharmAstikAya iti // 306 / / ( 1854 ) // ___D. C.-Just as fish cannot move out of water as there will be no upagrahaka of their movement, so also, jivas and pudgalas will have no access to the a-loka, as arloka is not favourable to their movement. It is predicament of dharmastikaya which acts as the upagrabaka of the movements of jivas and pudgalas, that measures the worth of lokaa // 306 // ( 1854 ) ] asthi parimANakArI logassa pmeybhaavo'vss| nANaM piva neyassAlogasthitte ya so'vassaM // 307 // (1855) Atthi parimanakari logassa pameyabhavao'vassam Nanam piva neyassalogtthitte ya so'vassam // 307 // ( 1855 ) [ asti parimANakArI lokasya prameyabhAvato'vazyam / jJAnamiva jJeyasyAlokAstitve ca so'vazyam // 307 // (1855) Asti parimanakari lokasya praneyabhavato'pasyan Jianamiva jneyasyalokastitve ca so'vasyam // 307 // ( 1855 ) ] ____ Trans.-307 Just as jnana measures the jneya, similarly, in the midst of (the existence of ) a-loka, it (i. e., dharmastikaya) also acts undoubtedly as the 'measuring unit of loka on account of its finiteness. ( 1855 )

Page #400
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 359 : TIkA - asti lokasya parimANakArI, prameyatvAt, jJAnamiva jJeyasya / athavA, jIvAH pudgalAca loko'bhidhIyate, tato'sti tatparimANakArI, prameyatvAt yathA zAlyAdInAM prasthaH, yazceha parimAtA sa dharmAstikAyaH, sa cAvazyamalokasyAstitva eva yujyate, nAnyathA, AkAzasya sarvatrAviziSTatvAt / tasmAllokAgre siddhasyAvasthAnamiti prastutam // 307 // (1855) D. C.-Since loka is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of measuring unit like jnana, which is the measuring unit of the jneya. The measuring unit of loka is dharmastikaya or the predicament of motion which exists only if loka exists, and not otherwise. So, in the midst of loka, the avasthana of Siddha or muktatma must necessarily be accepted | 307 // ( 1855 ) ] payaNaM pasattamevaM thANAo taM ca no jao chaTThI / iha kattilakkhaNeyaM katturaNatyaMtaraM thANaM // 308 // (1856) Payanam pasattamevam thanao tam ca no jao chatthi | Iha kattilakkaneyam katuranathantaram thanam ||308 | ( 1856 ) [ patanaM prasaktamevaM sthAnAt tacca no yataH SaSThI / iha kartRlakSaNeyaM karturanarthAntaraM sthAnam || 308 || (1856 ) Patanam prasaktamevam sthanat tacca no yatah sasthi | Iha kartrilaksaneyam karturanarthantaram sthanam ||308 // ( 1856) ] Trans.-308 (C 'Falling from ( a fixed ) position is thus attributed ( to it ). " It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sense of Nominative. Location is not different from subject in this case. (1856) TIkA - nanu " sthIyate'sminniti sthAnam " ityadhikaraNasAdhano'yaM zabdaH / tatazca siddhasya sthAnaM siddhasthAnamiti samAsaH / tatazcaivaM sati siddhasya patanaM prasaktam, sthAnAt, parvata - pAdapAdyagrasthita devadattasyeva, phalasyeva vA / yasya kila kvApi parvatAdAvavasthAnaM, tasya kadAcit kasyApi patanamapi dRzyate; ataH siddhasyApi tat kadAcit prApnotIti bhAvaH / tacca na, yataH

Page #401
*: 360 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth " siddhasya sthAnam " itIyaM krtrisssstthii| tatazca " siddhasya sthAnam " iti ko'rtha ?--siddhastiSThati, na tu tadarthAntarabhUtaMsthAnamastIti // 308 // (1856) // D. C.--Mandika:--Sthana means place of location. So, when the place of location of a suddha being is accepted as existing, the characteristic of falling from that place should also be attributed to it as in the case of Devadatta or a fruit falling from the summit of a mountain or tree, as the case may be. Everything is bound to fall from the place of its location and siddha is no exception to it. Bhagavan:-It is not so. The phrase " Saddhasya sthanam " shows that the word " Siddha" is in the Genitive case used in the Nominative sense, " Siddhasya sthanam " means, therefore, the place where Siddha resides, but it is not different from Siddhaa || 308 // ( 1856 ) Or, nahaniccattaNao vA thANaviNAsapayANaM na juttaM se| taha kammAbhAvAo puNakiyAbhAvao vA vi // 309 // (1857) Nahaniccattanao va thanavinasapayanam na juttam se i Taha kammabhavao punnakkiyabhavao va vi 11 309 11 ( 1857 ) [ nabhonityatvato vA sthAnavinAzapatanaM na yuktaM tasya / tathA karmAbhAvAt punaH kriyAbhAvato vApi // 309 // ( 1857) Nabhonityatvato va sthanavinasapatanam na yuktam tasya | Tatha karmabhavat punah kriyabhavato vapi || 309 11 ( 1857 ) ] Trans.--309 Neither destruction nor its falling from the place of its location is possible on account of its being nitya like akasa, as well as, due to the absence of krija or even for want of Karma. ( 1857 ) TIkA-arthAntaratve'pi sthAnasya na patanaM siddhasya, yato'syarthAntaraM

Page #402
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 361 : sthAnaM nabha eva, tasya ca nityatvAd vinAzo na yuktaH, tadabhAve ca kutaH patanaM muktasya ? / karma cAtmanaH patanAdikriyAkAraNam , muktasya ca karmAbhAvAta kutaH patanakriyA / yA ca samayamekamasyApyudhvaM gatikriyA, tasyAH kAraNaM " lAu ya eraMDaphale" ityAdinA darzitameva / punaHkriyA ca muktasya nAsti, kAraNAbhAvAt / nijaprayatna-preraNA-''karSaNa-vikarSaNagurutvAdayo hi patanakAraNam , tatsaMbhavazca muktasya nAsti, hetorabhAvAt , iti kuto'sya patanam ? / iti // 309 // (1857 ) // D. C.-Even if sthana were taken to be distinct from siddha it is not proper to believe that siddha falls from the sthana, which itself is destructible. Since sthana is nitya like akas'a, it would never meet destruction. In the process of falling, Karma is the essential factor. Now, since muktatma is free from Karma, the process of falling cannot come into existence for want of Karma Moreover, impellation by ones' own efforts, attraction, repulsion and weightiness etc. are also important causes of-the patana kroya, but since all of them are absent in muktatma, the patana of muktatina from its sthana is not possible from that view point also. // 309 // ( 1857 ) ! __Besides, niccathANAo vA vomAINaMpaDaNaM pasajjejjA / aha na mayamaNegaMto thANAo'vassa paDaNaM ti // 310 // (1858) Niccathanao va vomainampadanam pasajjejja 1 Aha na mayamaneganto thanao'vassa padanam tin 310 // (1858) [nityasthAnAd vA vyomAdInAM patanaM prasajyeta / atha na matamanekAntaH sthAnAdavazyaM patanamiti // 310 / / (1858) Nityasthanad va vyomadinam patanam prasajyeta / Atha na matamanekantah sthanadavasyam patanamiti 1310(1858)] Trans.-310 Or, if the fall from permanent abode (IS admitted ) the fall of sky will also be caused. And, if that is

Page #403
*: 362 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth not admitted, the statement that "Falling from the place of location is inevitable" becomes uncertain. ( 1858 ) TIkA-nanu ca "sthAnAt patanam" iti svavacanaviruddhamidam , asthAnAdeva patanasya yujyamAnatvAt / atha sthAnAdapi patanamiSyate, tarhi nityameva sthAnAd vyomAdInAM pratanaM prasajyeta / atha na tat teSAM matam , tarhi "sthAnAt patanam" ityanaikAntikameveti // 310 // (1858) D. C.-The statement that everything has to fall from its sthana is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the avasthana or the abode, and not from the sthana. If falling from sthana were believed, the nitya objects like akas'a will also have to meet patana, from their nitya sthanas. On the other hand, if it is not accepted, that falling from the place of location is inevitable, will be anarkantika 1131011 (1858)] bhavao siddho tti maI teNAimasiddhasaMbhavo jutto| kAlANAittaNao paDhamasarIraM va tadajuttaM // 311 // (1859) Bhavao siddho tti mai tenaimasiddhasambhavo jutto i Kalanajttanao padhamasariram va tadajuttam 1 311 11 ( 1859 ) [bhavataH siddha iti matistenAdimasiddhasaMbhavo yuktH| ____ kAlAnAditvataH prathamazarIramiva tadayuktam / / 311 / / ( 1859) Bhavatah siddha iti matistenadimasiddhasambhavo yuktah, Kalanaditvatah prathamasariramiva tadayuktam // 311 // ( 1859 )] Trans.--311 It may be argued that the siddha (is born) froni the mundane world and hence the production of the first siddha is acceptible. But, like the first sarira, that is not possible on account of the endlessness of times. ____TIkA-atha syAd matiH parasya-yato bhavAt saMsArAt sarvo'pi muktAtmA siddhastena tataH sarveSAmapi siddhAnAmAdimattcAdavazyameva kenApyAdisiddhena bhUvitavyam / tadayuktam , yato yathA sarvANyapi zarIrANi, ahorAtrANi

Page #404
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 363 : ca sarvANyAdiyuktAnyeva, atha ca kAlasyAnAditvAd nAdyazarIram , AdyAhorAtraM vA kimapi jJAyate, tathA kAlasyAnAditvAt siddho'pi nAdyaH pratIyata iti // 311 // (1859) // ___D. C.--Mandikcs:-It has already been proved that all muktamas are born of this samsara. Hence, there ought to exist some siddha who might be called the first of all the muktatmas. Bhagavan :-Your assumption is groundless. For like bodies, nights, and days, the muktatma is also adiman, but owing to the endlessness of Kala, it is not possible to know as to who was the first siddha Il 311 II ( 1859 ) ] parimiyadese'NaMtA kiha mAyA muttivirhiyttaao| niyammi va nANAI diTThIo vegarUvammi // 312 // (1860) Parimiyadese'nanta kiha maya muttivirahiyattao 1 Niyammi va ranai ditthio vega-ruvammi 11 312 !l ( 1860 ) [parimitadeze'nantAH kathaM mAtA mUrtivirahitatvAt / nijake vA jJAnAdayo dRSTayo vaikarUpe / / 312 // (1860) Parimitadese'nantah katham mata murtivirabitatvati Nijake va jnanadayo dristayo vaikarupe 11 312 11 ( 1860 )] ___Trans.-312 ( Then ) how are the numerous ( siddhas) contained in limited space ?" On account of their formlessness; or like one's own apprehensions, etc, or like (numerous ) eyes on one form." ( 1860) TIkA-Aha-parimitadezameva siddhakSetram , tatra kathamanAdikAlavartino'nantAH siddhA mAnti ? / atrottaramAha-amUrtatvAt siddhAH parimite'pi kSetre'nantAstiSThanti, yathA pratidravyamevAnantAni siddhAnAM saMbandhIni kevalajJAna-kevaladarzanAni saMpatanti, dRSTayo vA yathaikasyAmapi nartakyAM sahasrazaH prapatanti, parimite'pi vA'pavarakAdikSetre bahayo'pi pradIpaprabhA mAnti; evamihAmUrtAH siddhA kathaM parimitakSetre'nantA na mAsyanti; mUrtAnAmapi

Page #405
:: 364 : Jinabhadra Gani's I The sixth pradIpaprabhAdInAM bahUnAmekatrAvasthAnaM dRzyate, kimutA'mUrtAnAm ? iti bhAvaH // 312 / / (1860) // D. C.-Mandika:-The abode of siddhas is limited in space. How could the numberless siddhas be accomodated in it ? Bhagavan.-Siddhas are accomodated even in that limited space on account of their a-murtatva, just as a number of apprehensions are made upon one object, or just as a number of eyes fall upon one dancer, or just as light of numerous lamps is accumulated in one room of limited space, the cb-murta siddhas are also contained in their limited ksetra. When the accumulation of a number of murta splendours of lamps in a limited space is possible, why not the collection of a-murta siddhas be not possible in the a-murta space ? // 312 // ( 1860 )] na ha vai sazarIrassa ppiyaa-'ppiyaavhtirevmaaiinnN| veyapayANaM ca tumaM na sadatthaM muNasi to saMkA // 313 // (1861) tuha baMdhe mokkhammi ya, sA ya na kajA jao phuDo ceva / sasarIre-yarabhAvo naNu joso baMdha mokkho tti // 314 // (1862) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya ppiya-'ppiyavahatirevamainam i Veyapayanam ca tumam na sadattham munasi to sarka il 313 11 Tuha bandhe mokkhammi ya, sa ya na kajja jao phudo ceva i Sa-sarire-yarabhavo nanu jo so bandha mokkho tti 113141(1862) [na ha vai sazarIrasya priyA-'priyayorapahatirevamAdInAm / vedapadAnAM ca tvaM na sadarthaM muNasi tataH zaGkA // 313 // (1861) tava bandhe mokSe ca, sA ca na kAryA yataH sphuTa eva / sazarIre-tarabhAvo nanu yaH sa bandho mokSa iti // 314 / / (1862) Na. ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-priyayorapahatirevamadinam ! Vedapadanam ca tvam na sadartham munasi tatah saiks.13130(1861)]

Page #406
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 365 :* Tava bandhe mokse ca, sa ca na karya yatah sphuta eva | Sa-sarire-tarabhavo nanu yah sa bandho moksa iti // 314 // (1862)] Trans.-313-314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas such as "Na ha vai sa-sartrasya priyya-priyayorapahati" ete, 'and hence your doubt as regards bandha and moksa (has arisen). That doubt should no longer be entertained. For, bandha and moksa are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness ( respectively ). ( 1861-1862 ) TIkA - vyAkhyA - " na hi vai sazarIrasya priyA-priya yora pahatirasti, azarIraM vA vasantaM vA priyA - 'priye na spRzataH " ityAdInAM ca vedapadAnAM sadarthaM tvaM na muNasi / tato bandhe mokSe ca tava saumya ! zaGkA, sA ca na kAryA, yato nanu yaH sazarIre - tarabhAvaH sphuTa eva bandho mokSaceti kathaM zaGkA yujyate ? / etaduktaM bhavati - " sa zarIrasya " ityanena bAhyA - ssdhyAtmikAnAdizarIrasaMtAnasvarUpo bandhaH proktaH, tathA, "azarIraM vA vasantam " ityanena tvazeSazarIrApagamasvabhAvo mokSaH pratipAditaH / tathA " sa eva viguNo biyate " ityAdInyapi padAni saMsArijIvasya bandhamokSAbhAva pratipAdakAni tvaM manyase / taccAyuktam, muktajIvaviSayatvAt teSAm / muktasya ca bandhAdyabhAve'vipratipattireveti / tadevaM bhagavatA chinnastasya saMzayaH // 313 - 314 // ( 1861-1862 ) / / D. C.-You have not grasped the real meaning of the Vedapadas such as:-" Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-'priya yorapahati," "Asariram va vasantam priya-priye na spris'atah." And that is why, O Saumya! you have raised the doubt as regards bandha and moksa. But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you. For, it is clear that bandha and moksa are nothing but the qualities of sa-sariratva and a-s'ariratva respectively. By the words sas'arirasya etc. bandha which is nothing but the santana of the external, as well as, internal anadi

Page #407
Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixch s'arira, is meant; while by means of "a-s'ariram va etc moksa characterized by the removal of entire s'arira is laid down. "" Finally, you have apprehended sentences such as sa esa viguno vibhurna bhdhyate etc. to support the abhava of bandha-moksa to the mundane soul But that is not correct. Those sentences are referring to the free soul. Attributes such as "It is never bound" etc. are directed to nothing but the muktatma. *: 366 :* Thus, the doubts are removed from the mind of Mandika. || 313-314 || (1861-1862)] chinnamma saMsayammI jiNeNa jara maraNavippamukkeNaM / eui aavi qasen egicie ag diisaagie 1133411(?<&3) Chinnammi samsayammi jinena jara marana vippamukkenam So samano pavvaio addhutthihi saha khandiya saehim ||315||(1863) [ chinne saMzaye jinena jarA-maraNavipramuktena / sa zramaNaH pravrajito'rdhacaturthaiH saha khaNDikazataiH || 315 / / (1853) Chinne samsaye jinena jara-marana vipramuktena | Sa sramanah pravrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khandikasataih #315 Trans-315 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his four hundred and fifty followers. (1863) End of the Discussion with the Sixth Ganadhara,

Page #408
Chapter VII sptmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara te pavaie souM morio AgacchaI jinnsgaasN| vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 316 // (1864) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi--jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNU savadarisI NaM // 317 // ( 1865) Te pavvaie soum Morio agacchai jinasagasam | Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami 11 316 11 (1864) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana vippamukkenam | Namena ya gottena ya savvanu savvadarisi nam // 317 // (1865) [ tAn pravrajitAn zruttvA maurya Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 316 // (1864 ) AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 317 / / ( 1865) Tan pravrajitan srutva maurya agaccati jinsakasana i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase 11 316 | ( 1864 ) ] Abhasitasoa Jinena jati-jara-marana vipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarva darsina // 317 // (1865)] Trans.-316-317 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Maurya, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He

Page #409
*: 368 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh thinks :-) I may go, pay my homages and worship him. He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara who was free from birth, old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ( 1864-1865 ) / kiM maNNe asthi devA uyAhu natthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho||318|| (1866) Kim manne atthi deva uyahu natthi tti samsao tujjha i Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 318 // ( 1866 ) [kiM manyase santi devA utAho na santIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 318 // (1866) Kim manyase santi deva utaho na santiti samsayastava! Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 131811 (1866)] Trans.--318 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether gods exist or not. But ( ca) you do not know the real interpretation of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their ( real ) interpretation. ( 1866 ) TIkA-he AyuSmana maurya ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM devA santi naveti, ubhaya. thApi vedapadazravaNAt / tathAhi-" sa eSa yajJAyudhI yajamAno'JjasA svargalokaM gacchati" ityAdi tathA, "apAma somaM amRtA abhUma agaman jyotiravidAma devAn , kiM nUnamasmAt tRNavadarAtiH kimu mUrtimamRtamaya'sya" ityAdiH tathA "ko jAnAti mAyopamAn gIrvANAnindra-yama-varuNa-kuberAdIn" ityAdi / eteSAM ca vedapadAnAmayamarthastava buddhau pratibhAsate, yathA-sa eSa yajJa eva duritavAraNakSamatvAdAyudhaM praharaNaM yasyAsau yajJAyudhI, yajamAno'JjasA praguNena nyAyena, svargalokaM gacchati, iti devasattApratipattiH / tathA, apAma-pItavantaH, somaM latArasam , amRtAH-amaraNadharmANaH, abhUma-bhUtAH smaH, agaman-gatAH, jyotiH-svargam , avidAma devAn-devatvaM prAptAH smaH, kiM nUnamasmAdUdhvaM tRNavat kariSyati; ko'sau ? ityAha-arAtiH-vyAdhiH,

Page #410
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 369 :* tathA, kimu prane, mUrti - jarAm amRtamartyasyeti - amRtatvaM prAptasya martyasya puruSasyetyarthaH, amaraNadharmiNo manuSyasya kiM kariSyanti jarA - vyAdhayaH ? iti bhAvaH / atrApi devasattApratipattiH / " ko jAnAti mAyopamAn " ityAdIni tu devAbhAvapratipAdakAni / atastava saMzayaH / ayuktAzcAyam, yato'mISAM vedapadAnAmarthaM tvaM na jAnAsi cazabdAd yuktiM ca na vetsi / eteSAM hi vedapadAnAM nAyamartho yastavAbhipretaH kintvayam - vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 318 // (1866 ) , r D. C.-O long-lived Maurya! your doubt about the existence of gods is due to your hearing various sentences of Vedas. The sentences are such as (1) "Sa esa yajnayudhi yajamano'njasa svargalokam gacchati etc. (2) "Apama somam amrita abhuma agaman jyotiravidama devan kim nunamasmat trinavadaratih kimu murtimamritamartyasya etc. As well as, >> "" 47 " (3) " Ko janati mayopaman girvana nindra-Yama-Varuna Kuberadin?" etc. According to you, interpretations of these sentences would be as follows:-- (1) This host armed with the weapon of sacrifice reaches the region of heaven immediately. (This leads to prove the existence of gods) ( 2 ) By drinking soma, they became gods, went to heaven, and attained the divine status. These divinities will banish maladies and mortality by virtue of their amritatava. (These sentences are also used in support of the existence of divinites.)

Page #411
.:370 Jinabhadra Gani's (The seventh (3) Who knows the illusive gods like Indra, Yama, Varuna and Kubera etc ? ( Sentences like this would deny the existence of gods on the other side ) So, your doubt has sprung up from the sentences such as mentioned above. But that is not justifiable, as you have not understood their real meaning. Here I explain the real interpretation // 318 // ( 1866)] Now the author explains the whole proposition in details. taM mannasi neraiyA parataMtA dukkhasaMpauttA ya / na taraMtIhAgaMtuM saddhayA subamANA vi // 319 // (1867) sacchaMdayAriNo puNa devA divappabhAvajuttA ya / jaM na kayAi vi darisaNamuveti to saMsao tesu // 320 // (1868) Tam mannasi neraiya paratanta dukkhasampautta yal Na tarantihagantum saddheya suvvamana vi u 319 11 ( 1867) Sacchandayarino puna deva divvappabhavajutta ya i Jam na kayai vi darisanamuventi to samsao tesu 132011 (1868) [ tvaM manyase nairayikAH paratantrA duHkhasaMprayuktAzca / na zaknuvantIhA''gantuM zraddheyAH zrUyamANA api // 319 // (1867) svacchandacAriNaH punardevA divyaprabhAvayuktAzca / yanna kadAcidapi darzanamupayanti tataH saMzayasteSu / / 320 // (1868) Tvani manyase nairayikah paratantra duhkhasamprayuktasca Na saknuvantiha"gantum sraddheyah sruyapana api (13191 (1867) Svacchandacarinah punar-deva divyaprabhavayuktasca 1 Yanna kadacidapi darsanamupayanti tatah samsayaste sul182011(1868)] Trans.-319-320 You think that the denizens of hell ( being ) subservient and miserable, are not able to come into this world. (So ), they are to be trusted (as existing ) even

Page #412
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 371 : if ( they are merely ) heard ( to be so ). But the gods, on the other hand, are free to move and are invested with the celestial splendour also. Still, however, they do not come into the range of ( our ) sight, and hence, the doubt about them. ( 1867-1868 ) TIkA-maurya! tvamevaM manyase-nArakAH svakRtapApanarakapAlAdiparatatrAH, parAdhInavRttayo'tIvaduHkhasaMghAtavihvalAzca na zaknuvantyatrAgantum , ataH pratyakSIkaraNopAyAbhAvAt zrUyamANA api zraddheyA bhavantu / devAstu svacchandacAriNo divyaprabhAvayuktAzca, tathApi yasmAd na kadAcid darzanapathamavataranti, zrUyante ca zruti-smRtyAdiSu, atasteSu zaGketi / / 319-320 // (1867-1868) ___D. C.-0 Maurya ! according to you, the inability of the Naraka-beings to come to this world, is due to their being subservient to their own sins, as well as, due to their miserable condition. So, they might be trusted upon as existing merely by hearing ( some thing about ) them. But, the case with gods is different. For, even though they possess free movements and celestial splendour, they would never like to come within the range of our sight. So, because they are heard of in the Vedas and Smritis etc. you have raised this doubt // 319-320 // ( 1867-1868 ) mA kuru saMsayamee sudUramaNuyAibhinnajAIe / pecchasu paJcakkhaM ciyaM caubihe devasaMghAe // 321 // ( 1869) Ma kuru samsayamee suduramanuyaibhinnajaie i Pecchasu paccakkham ciya cauvvihe devasanghae u3211 (1869) [mA kuru saMzayametAn sudUramanujAdibhinnajAtIyAn / prekSasva pratyakSameva caturvidhAn devasaGghAtAn / / 321 / / (1869) Ma kuru sangayametan suduramanujadibhinnajatiyun 1 Preksasva pratyaksameva caturvidhan devasanghatan // 321 //

Page #413
:.372 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh Trans.-321 Do not entertain doubt. Look at these four-fold multitudes of gods before your eyes ( which are ) extremely different from the human beings. ( 1869 ) TIkA-mauryaputra ! deveSu mA saMzayaM kArSIstvam , etAneva hi sudramatyartha manujAdibhyo bhinnajAtIyAn divyAbharaNa-vilepana-vasana-sumanomAlAlatAn bhavanapati-vyantara-jyotiSka-vaimAnika lakSaNAMzcaturvidhadevasaMghAtAn mama vandanArthamihaiva samavasaraNAgatAn pratyakSa eva pazyeti // 321 // (1869) D. C.-You should not entertain any doubt about the existence. of gods, O Mauryaputra ! just look at these gods of all the four types-viz-bhavanapati, vyantara jyotiska, and vaimanika-distinguished from the human beings by virtue of (their) celestial ornaments and garlands etc. coming to this samavasarana to pay their homages to me. ll 321 I (1869 ) puvaM pi na saMdeho jutto jaM joisA sapaccakkhaM / dIsaMti takayA vi ya uvaghAyA-'NuggahA jgo||322||1870 Puvvam pi na samdeho jutto jam joisa sapaccakkhami Disanti takkaya vi ya uvaghaya-nuggaha jagao 132211 ( 1870 ) [pUrvamapi na saMdeho yukto yaj jyotiSkAH svapratyakSam / dRzyante tatkRtA api copaghAtA-'nugrahA jagataH // 322 // (1870) Purvamapi na samdeho yukto yaj jyotiskah svapratyaksami Dsisyante tatksita api copagbata-nugraha jagatah 1322|1 (1870)] Trans.-322 The doubt is not justified even before ( their appearance ), since luminaries are self-perceptible. Moreover, injuries or betterments caused by them to the world are also apprehended. ( 1870 ) TIkA-iha samavasaraNAgatadevadarzanAt pUrvamapi tavAnyeSAM ca saMzayo na yuktaH, yad yasmAcandrA-''dityAdijyotiSkAstvayA sarveNApica lokena sva. pratyakSata eva sarvathA dRzyante / ato dezataH pratyakSatvAt kathaM samastAmarAsti

Page #414
__*378 : Vada ] Ganadharavada tvazatA ? / kiJca, sanyeva devAH, lokasya tatkRtAnugraho-paghAtadarzanAt / tathAhi-dRzyante kvacit kecit tridazAH, kasyApi kiJcidvibhavapradAnAdinA'nugraham , tatpraharaNAdinA copaghAtaM kurvantaH / tato rAjAdivat kathamete na santi iti // 322 // (1870) D. C.-Even before they appear at this Samavasarana, your doubt about their existence is not justified. For, luminaries like Sun, Moon etc are self-perceptible to you, as well as, to the whole world. So, it is not appriate to doubt their existence. Moreover, anugraha and upaghata caused by gods to this world are also evident to all. Several gods confer their favours upon some people by granting their objects of pleasure etc. while others inflict injuries, like a king, by means of weapons etc. This shows, for certain, that gods do exist Il 322 || (1870) Besides, AlayamettaM ca maI puraM va tavAsiNo taha vi siddhA / je te deva tti mayA na ya nilayA niccaparisuNNA // 323 // (1871) Alayamettam ca mai puram va tavvasino taha vi siddha | Je te deva tti maya na ya nilaya niccaparisunna u 323 u (1871) [ AlayamAnaM ca matiH puramiva tadvAsinastathApi siddhAH / ye te devA iti matA na ca nilayA nityaparizUnyAH // 323 // (1871) Alayamatram ca matih puramiva tadvasinastathapi siddhahi Ye te deva iti mata na ca nilaya nityaparisunyah // 323 (1871)] Trans.-323 The view may be that ( luminaries ) are mere abodes. Still however, like a city, they, too, have their inhabitants, who are accepted as (none but) gods. For, places of residence cannot be vacant for ever. ( 1871 ) TIkA-athaivaMbhUtA matiH parasya bhavet-AlayA evAlayamA candrAdivimAnAni, na tu devAH, tat kathaM jyotiSkadevAnAM pratyakSatvamabhidhIyate /

Page #415
.: 374 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh kiM tad yathA''layamAtram ? ityAha-"puraM ti" yathA puraM zUnyaM lokAnAmAlayamAnaM sthAnamAtraM, na tu tatra lokAH santi, evaM candrAdrivimAnAnyapyAlayamAtrameva, na tu tatra devAH kecit tiSThanti, ataH kathaM teSAM pratyakSatvam ? / atrottaramAha-tathApi tadvAsina AlayavAsinaH sAmarthyAd ye siddhAste devA iti matAH sNmtaaH| yo hyAlayaH sa sarvo'pi tannivAsinAdhiSThito dRSTaH, yathA pratyakSopalabhyamAnA devadattAdhadhiSThitA vasantapurAdyAlayAH, AlayAzca jyoti kavimAnAni, ata AlayatvAnyathAnupapateya tannivAsinaH siddhAste devA iti matAH / Aha-nanu kathaM te devAH sidhyanti ? / yAdRzA hi pratyakSeNa devadattAdayo dRzyante te'pi tAdRzA eva syuriti / tadayuktam , viziSTA hi devadattAdyAlayebhyazcandrAdyAlayA iti / atastenivAsino'pi viziSTAH sidhyanti, te ca devadattAdivilakSaNA devA iti / aparastvAha-nanu " AlayatvAt " ityayaM hetustannivAsijanasAdhane'naikAntika, zUnyAlayairvyabhicArAt / atrottaramAha-" na ya nilayetyAdi " na ca nilayA-AlayA nityameva zUnyA bhavanti / ayamabhiprAya:-ye kecidAlayAste prAra, idAnIM, eSyati vA kAle'vazyameva sannivAsibhiraviSThitA eva bhavanti na tu nityameva parizUnyAH / tato yadA tadA vA candrAdyAlayanivAsino devAH sidhyantIti // 323 // (1871) D. C.-Maurya:--Luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you, are only the abodes and not the gods themselves. It could not be said, therefore, that the luminary deities are directly perceptible, just as in case of an empty town, the houses are mere places of residence for people but people do not actually reside into them, so also luminarie like moon etc should be taken as absolutely empty bodies and nothing like gods is expected to reside into them. Bhagavan: It is not so. O Maurya! Existence of the place of residence proves the existence of its residents also. So, these luminaries are not mere alayas, but they have their inhabitants also. For, that which is called an alaya or a house is always occupied by its residents. Like houses in a town

Page #416
Vada] Ganadharavada * 375: occupied by persons like Devadatta, these luminaries are also undoubtedly occupied by devinities. Maurya-Like Devadatta etc residing in the houses of a city, the gods who are the residents of the luminary bodies should also be perceptible Bhagavan:-It is not proper to advance such an argument. Because the places of residence are absolutely different from the houses in a city. So, their residents viz gods are also characteristically different from Devadatta etc. Although they are not apprehended by the indriyas, their existence is admitted without doubt. Maurya:-You cannot assert exclusively that every place of residence is always occupied by a resident For, nobody would reside in a barren house. (It is forbidden to reside in such a house) From the existence of abode, therefore, you cannot infer the existence of the occupant. Bhagavan:-A residing place is never sunya. It must have been occupied by some person or the other, either in the past or in future or at present. In case of luminary places of resort, gods like moon etc. must have occuplied the places at some time in the past, present, or future 323 (1871) ko jANai va kimeyaM ti hoja nissaMsayaM vimANAI / rayaNamayanabhogamaNAdiha jai vijjAharAINaM // 324 // (1872 ) Ko janai va kimeyam ti hojja missamsayam vimanaim | Rayanamayanabhogamanadiha jaha vijjaharainam u 324 (1872) [ ko jAnAti vA kimetaditi bhaved nissaMzayaM vimAnAni / ratnamayanabhogamanAdiha yathA vidyAdharAdInAm || 324 / / ( 1872 ) Ko janati va kimetaditi bhaved nissamsayam vimanani | Ratnamayanabhogamanadiha yatha vidyadharadinam 32411(1872)] Trans-324 "Or, who knows what it is?" They are

Page #417
*:376 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh certainly palaces like those of Vidyadharas etc., as they are decked with jewels and they fly in the sky. ( 1872 ) TIkA-yadivA, evaMbhUtA matiH parasya bhaved yaduta-candrAdyAlayatvena yad gIyate bhavadbhistadidaM ko jAnAti kiJcid bhavet , kiM sUryo'gnimayo golaH, candrastvambumayaH svabhAvataH svacchaH, AhosvidevaMbhUtA evaite bhAsvararatnamayA golakA jyotiSkavimAnAni ?, ataH kthmetessaamaalytvsiddhiH| atra pratividhAnamAha-niHsaMzayaM vimAnAnyetAni, ratnamayatve sati nabhogamanAt, puSpakAdividyAdharatapaH siddhavimAnavaditi / abhravikAra-pavanAdivyavacchedArthaM ratnamayatvavizeSaNamiti // 324 // (1872) ____D. C.-Masurrya:-Or, who knows what these luminaries like Sun and Moon, mentioned by you are like ? One that appears as Sun may be a ball of fire, and that which appears as Moon may be a transparent ball of water. Or, it may be that these luminaries be some such bright balls. So, it is not appropriate to believe that they are the abodes of luminary gods. Bhagavan: -Since they are decked with jewels and they are moving in the sky, there is no doubt that they are actual vimanas like puspaka etc. attained by vidyadharas by means of austerites etc. So, take it for certain, that these vimanas are also the residing places of the various luminary gods. // 324 // ( 1872) // Or, ho maI mAeyaM tahA vi takAriNo surA je te / na ya mAyAivigArA puraM va niccovalambhAo // 325 // (1873) Hojja mai maeyam taha vi takkarino sura je te Na ya mayaivigara puram va niccovalambhao 11 325 | ( 1873 ) [bhaved matirmAyeyaM tathApi tatkAriNaH surA ye te / . na ca mAyAdivikArAH puramiva nityopalambhAt // 325 // (1873)

Page #418
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 377 :Bhaved matirmayeyam tathapi tatkarinah sura ye te i Na ca mayadivikarah puramiva nityopalambhat ll 325 01 ( 1873 ) ] ___ Trans.-325 It may be argued that this is ( all ) illusion. But, its creators are gods, and not the perturbations like illusion etc. on account of their being obtained like a town for ever. ( 1873 ) TIkA-atha parasya matirbhavet-naite candrAdivimAnAnyAlayAH, kintu mAyeyaM mAyAvinA kenApi prayuktA / atrocyate-mAyAtvamamISAmasiddham , vAGmAtreNaiva bhavatA'bhidhAnAt; tathApyabhyupagamyocyate-ye tatkAriNastathAvidhamAyAprayoktAraste surAH siddhA eva, manuSyAdInAM tathAvidhavaikriyakaraNAdarzanAt / abhyupagamya ca maayaatvmmiissaambhihitm| na caite mAyAdi. vikArAH, nityopalambhAt, sarveNa sarvadA dRzyamAnatvAdityarthaH, prasiddha pATalIputrAdipuravaditi / mAye-ndrajAlakRtAni hi vastUni na nityamupalabhyanta iti nityavizeSaNopAdAnamiti // 325 // ( 1873 ) D. C.-You might argue that vimanas like candra etc are not actual alayas, but they are mere illusions created by some magician. But the illusionariness of such vimanas cannot be admitted by means of mere words. Still, however, if they are assumed as mayika, their creators are not magicians or human beings but the gods themselves. This is said only on the assumption that they are mayika vikaras. But really speaking, they are not mayrka as they are ever obtained like towns etc. So, these vimanas are nothing but the abodes of luminary gods // 325 // ( 1878) jai nAragA pavanA pagiTThapAvaphalabhoiNo tennN| - subahugapuNNaphalabhujo pavajiyavA suragaNA vi // 326 // (1874) Jai narga pavanna pagitthapavaphalabhoino tenami Subahugapunnaphalabhujo pavajjiyavva sura-gana vin326 // (1874) 48

Page #419
.: 378 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh [ yadi nArakAH prapannAH prakRSTapApaphalabhoginastena / subahukapuNyaphalabhujaH prapattavyAH suragaNA api // 326 // (1874) Yadi narakah prapannah praksistapapaphalabhoginastena | Subahukapunyaphalabhujah prapattavyah suragana api 1132611 ] Trans~326 If the denizens of hell are admitted as the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, gods should be accepted as the enjoyers of the fruits of many good deeds. ( 1874 ) TIkA-iha svakRtaprakRSTapApaphalabhoginastAvat kacid nArakAH pratipattavyAste ca yadi prapannAH, "teNaM ti" tarhi tenaiva prakAreNa svopArjitasuSThubahukapuNyaphalabhujaH suragaNA api prtipttvyaaH| atrAha-nanvihaivAtiduHkhitanarAstiryaJcazvAtiduHkhitAH prakRSTapApaphalabhujo bhaviSyanti, tathA, manuSyA evAtisukhitAH prakRSTapuNyaphalabhujo bhaviSyanti, kimadRSTanAraka-deva. parikalpanayA ? iti / tadayuktam , prakRSTapApaphalabhujAM sarvaprakAreNApi duHkhena bhavitavyam , na cAtiduH khitAnAmapi nara-tirazcAM sarvaprakAraM duHkhaM dRzyate sukhadapavanA''lokAdisukhasya sarveSAmapi darzanAt / prakRSTapuNyaphalabhujAmapi sarvaprakAreNApi sukhena bhavitavyam , na cehAtisukhitAnAmapi narANAM sarvaprakAraM sukhamavalokyate, pUtidehodbhavasya roga-jarAdiprabhavasya ca duHkhasya teSAmapi sadbhAvAt / tasmAt prakRSTapApanibandhanasarvaprakAraduHkhavedino nArakAH, prakRSTapuNyahetukasarvaprakArasukhabhogino devAzcAbhyupagantavyA eveti // 326 // (1874) D. C.--Bhagavan :-When you believe that Narcoleas are the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, you should also believe that gods are the enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds and thus they are existing. Maurya :-Turyancas, who are excessively miserable, are the sufferers of the reward of great sins, and excessively happy human beings are enjoyers of the fruits of exalted.good deeds. So, it is not necessary to assume the existence of devas and Narakas at all.

Page #420
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 379 Bhagavan:--Existence of devas and Narakas cannot be denied by saying so. Enjoyers of the rewards of great punyas and papas are exclusively happy or exclusively miserable, as the case may be. The manusyas and tiryancas cannot be called exclusively happy and exclusively miserable respectively. For, even the happiest human beings are susceptible to the affliction of diseases, old age, etc. while even extremely miserable tiryancas, experience the happy touch of cold breeze etc. So, manusyas and tiryancas can never be taken as exclusively happy or exclusively miserable beings, while Narakas who suffer the consequences of papas, and devas who enjoy the fruits of punyas, can be easily admitted respectively as the exousively miserable and exclusively happy beings 132611 (1874) ___Now, in reply to the question that " Why gods do not visit this world if at all they are existing ? " the author states:saMkaMtadivapimmA visayapasattA'samattakattavA / aNahINamaNuyakajjA narabhavamasubhaM na eMti suraa||327||(1875) Sankantadivvapimma visayapasatta'samattakattavva | Anahinamanuyakajja narabhavamasubham na enti sura // 327 // [saMkrAntadivyapremANo viSayaprasaktA asmaaptkrtvyaaH| anadhInamanujakAryA narabhavamazubhaM nAgacchanti surAH // 327 // (1875) Sankrantadivyapremano visayaprasakta asamaptakartavyah Anadhinamanujakarya narabhavamasubham nigacchanti surah||32711 Trans.-327 Invested with celestial love and attached to the objects of pleasure, with their duties un-finished, and their deeds independent of human beings, divinities do not come into this inauspicious world. ( 1875) TIkA-nAgacchantIha sadaiva suragaNAH, saMkrAntadivyaprematvAt , viSayaprasaktatvAt , prakRSTarUpAdiguNakAminIprasaktaramyadezAntaragatapuruSavat ; tathA, asamAptakartavyatvAt , bahukartavyatAprasAdhananiyuktavinItapuruSavat / , tathA, ,

Page #421
.: 380 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh anadhInaM manujAnAM kArya yeSAM te'nadhInamanujakAryAH, tadbhAvastatvaM tasmAd nehAgacchanti surAH, anabhimatagehAdau niHsaGgayativaditi / tathA, azubhatvAd narabhavasya tadndhAsahiSNutayA nehAgacchanti devAH, svaparityaktakaDevaravaditi // 327 // (1875) // D. C.-Divinities do not come to this world, because they are invested with celestial love and attached to the various objects of pleasure like a person attached to a beautiful woman possessing high qualities of extreme beauty etc. Secondy, like a great man entrusted with manifold work, these gods have also to perform manifold duties and hence their duties are never over. Thirdly, all their deeds are independent of human beings. So, just as a dispassionate ascetic never comes to an unholy house, these gods also usually abstain themselves from coming to the inauspicious human world as they would not stand even the smell of it. ll 327 11 ( 1875) But this does not mean that they always keep themselves away from this world. For, navari jiNajamma-dikkhA-kevala-nivANamahaniogeNaM / bhattIe somma ! saMsayaviccheyatthaM va ejahaNhA // 328 // (1876) puvANurAgao vA samayanibaMdhA tavoguNAo vaa| naragaNapIDA-'Nuggaha-kaMdappAIhiM vA kei // 329 // (1877) Navari jinajamma-dikkha-kevala-nivvana maha neogenam | Bhatlie Sommal samsayaviccheyattham va ejjahanha 113281(1876) Puvyanuragao va samayanibandha tavogunao va i Naraganapida-'nuggaha-kandappaihim va kei // 329 // ( 1877) [ navaraM jinajanma-dIkSA-kevala-nirvANamahaniyogena / bhacyA saumya ! saMzayavicchedArtha vaiyurihAdvAya / / 328 / / (1876)

Page #422
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 381 :* pUrvAnurAgato vA samayanibandhAt tapoguNAd vA / naragaNapIDA - nugraha - kandarpAdibhirvA kecit // 329 // (1877 ) Navaram jinajanma- diksa-kovala-nirvanamahaniyogena / Bhaktya Saumya samsayavicchedartham vaiyurihahnaya ||328|| Purvanuragato va samayanibandhat tapogunad va | Naraganapidanugraha-kandarpadibhirva kecit // 329 // ( 1877 ) ] Trans.-328-329 Some have to visit this world merely by ( way of ) duty, at the occasion of birth, diksa, acceptance of absolute apprehension, or final emancipation of some saint, while others ( would come ) by reason of devotion, O Saumya ! or in order to remove ( their ) doubts, or on account of previous attachment. Some ( would do so ) following the conventional rule, some by virtue of austerities, some to afflict the human beings, some to favour them, or some ( would come ) out of passion etc. ( 1876-1877 ) 9 TIkA - navaraM jinajanma - dIkSA - kevala - nirvANamahotsava niyogena tatkartavyatAniyameneha devA AgaccheyuH / tatra saumya ! kecidindrAdayo nijabhaktyA samAgacchanti kecit tu tadanuvRcyA, anye saMzayavyavacchedArtham, apare tu pUrvabhavikaputra - mitrAdyanurAgAt / samayanibandhaH - pratibodhAdinimittaH saMketanizcayaH, tasmAcca kecid devA ihAgacchanti / anye tu mahAsattva sAdhvAdi - tapoguNasamAkRSTAH kecittu pUrvavairikanaragaNapIDArtham, apare tu pUrva suhRtputrAdyanugrahArtham kecittu devAH kandarpAdibhirihAgacchanti AdizabdAt sAdhvAdiparIkSA hetoriti draSTavyamiti / tadevaM nirUpitaM devAnAmazrAgamana kAraNam, anAgamanakAraNaM ca / / 328-329 / / ( 1876-1877 ). " D. C. - Various deities visit this world on various purposes. Some have to attend the occasions of janma, diksa, kevala-jnana prapti and nirvana of a saint. Some like Indra are drawn to this world by means of devotion, some to remove their doubts. Several others descend upon this world on account of their previous attachment to relatives like son, friend etc. or by following the previous conventions or by virtue of previous austerities also, some gods come to the human world for the

Page #423
* 382 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh purpose of afflicting human beings in order to take revenge upon them, while others would be attracted to this world out of passion or in order to test the saints of this world also. Thus, there are various causes for their visit to this world, while others stated before are the causes of their staying away from this world also. || 328-329 || (1876-1877) AISEACHEMBU HIas qszegftamnei a 1 vijjA-maMto--vAyaNasiddhIo gahavigArAo // 330 // (1878) ukkipuNNa saMcayaphalabhAvAo'bhihANasiddhIo / savAgamasiddhIu ya saMti deva ttiM saddheyaM // 311 // (1879) Jaissarakahanao kasai paccakkhadarisanao ya Vijja-manto-vayanasiddio gahavigarao 330 (1878) Ukkitthapunnasamcayaphalabhavao'bhihanasiddhjo Savvagamasiddhiu ya santi deva tti saddheyam 331 || (1879) [ jAtismaraNakathanAt kasyacit pratyakSadarzanAcca / vidyA-matropayAcana siddhergrahavikArAt / / 330 / / ( 1878 ) utkRSTapuNyasaMcaya phalabhAvAdabhidhAnasiddheH / sarvAgamasidveva santi devA iti zraddheyam / / 331 / / ( 1879 ) Jatismaranakathanat kasyacit pratyaksadarsanacca | Vidya-mantropayacanasidd hergrahavikarat || 330 || (1878) Utkristapunyasamcayaphalabhavadabhidhanasiddheh Sarvagamasiddhesca santi deva iti sraddheyam u 331 || (1879)] Trans.-330-331 By the statement of some (who are) reminded of (the former) existence by means of direct apprehension, by virtue of) reciting the chantings, of (various) lores, by the movement of planets, due to the existence of the fruition of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds, by (virtue of) (their) names, and by (the help of) all agamas, it should be trusted that gods are existing. (1878-1879)

Page #424
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 388 :___TIkA-" santi devA ityetat zraddheyam " iti pratijJA, jAtismaraNapratyayitapuruSeNa kathanAt , nAnAdezavicAripratyayita puruSAvalokitakathitavicitrabRhaddevakulAdivastuvat ; tathA, kasyApi tapaH prabhRtiguNayuktasya pratyakSadarzanapravRttezca-kenacit pratyakSapramANenopalambhAdityarthaH, dUraviprakRSTanagarAdivat ; tathA, vidyA-matropayAcanebhyaH kAryasiddheH, prasAdaphalAnumitarAjAdivat / tathA, 'gahavigArAu tti' atra prayogaH-grahAdhiSThitapuruSadehoM jIvavyatiritAdRzyavastvadhiSThAtRkA, puruSAsaMbhAvyavikAravatkriyAdarzanAt , saMcariSNuyatravyatiriktamadhyapraviSTAdRzyamAnapuruSAdhiSThitayatravat ; tathA tapo-dAnAdikriyAsamupArjitotkRSTapuNyasaMbhAraphalasadbhAvAt, utkRSTapApaprAgbhAraphalasadbhAvanizci tanArakavat , etacca prAgeva bhAvitam / tathA, "devAH" iti tadabhidhAnaM tato'pi ca devAnAM siddhiH| etaccAnantaragAthAyAM vyaktIkariSyate / tathA, sarve ca ta AgamAzca sarvAgamAsteSvavipratipacyA siddhatvAcca santi devA iti // 330331 // (1878-1879) ___D. C.-Existence of gods could be established in various ways : (1) On the recollection of former existence, a person would relate the story of the great family of gods witnessed and believed by him as certain. (2) Some persons attain directly the dars'ana of gods by virtue of their qualities like austerity etc. (3) Some people attain the accomplishment of their objects by soliciting the favour of gods by means of prayers, and chantings of prescribed mantras. (4) A person in charge of planets is absolutely different from the jivas, because of the kriyas that are found as a result of changes in the planets which are never to be found in human beings. (5) Just as we have accepted the existence of Narakas due to the fruition of great sins, the existence of

Page #425
:384 Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh gods should also be admitted on account of the phala of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds like tapas, dana eto. (6) The existence of gods is established by their very name viz-" devah" ( This will be explained in the following verse.) (7) All the agamas admit the existence of gods. // 330-331 ( 1878-1879 ) // The epithet " devah. '' is then explained as follows:deva tti satthayamidaM suddhattaNao ghaDAbhihANaM va / aha va maI maNuu cciya devo guNa-riddhisaMpaNNo // 332 // (1880) taM na jau taccatthe siddhe uvayArao mayA siddhii| taccatthasIha siddhe mANavasIhovayAro va // 333 // (1881) Deva tti satthayaniidam suddhattanao ghadabhihanam vai Aha va mai manuu cciya devo guna riddhi sampanno 1332 // (1880) Tam na jau tacca siddhe uyayarao maya siddhi Taccatthasiha siddhe manavasihovayaro vva // 333 // ( 1881 ) [ devA iti sArthakamidaM zuddhatvato ghaTAbhidhAnamiva / athavA matirmanuja eva devo guNa-ddhisaMpannaH // 332 // (1880) tad na yatastathyArthe siddha upacArato matA siddhiH| tathyArthasiMhe siddhe mANavasiMhopacAra iva // 333 / / (1881) Deva iti sarthakawidam suddhatvato ghatabhidhanamiva | Athava matirmanuja eva devogunar-ddhisumpannah // 332 // (1880) Tad na yatastathyarthe siddha upacarato mata siddhih 1 Tathyarthasimhe siddhe manavasimhopacara iva // 3330 (1881)] Trans.--332-333 Since the epithet "deva " is clear like " ghata", it is significant. Or, it might be believed that man

Page #426
Vada ] Ganadharavada *:385 :himself ( when ) accompanied by the prosperity of merits is god. ( But ) that is not ( correct ). ( Because ) the accomplishment ( of the secondary meaning ) by means* of usage could be brought about (only ) when the primary meaning is established, just as the epithet " sinha" or lion could be attributed to Manavaka by means of usage only, if the primary sense of the word " sinha" is accepted ( 1889-1881 ) TIkA-" devAH" ityetat padaM sArthakaM vyutpattimacchuddhapadatvAt , ghaTAdivat / tatra dIvyantIti devA iti vyutpattimattvam , samAsataddhitarahitatvena ca zuddhatvam / bhAvanA cAtra prAguktaiva / atha parasya matirbhavet-nanu manuSya eveha dRzyamAno devo bhaviSyati, kimadRSTadevakalpanayA ? / kiM sarvo'pi manuSyo devaH ? iti / na, ityAha-guNasaMpanno gaNadharAdiH, RddhisNpnnshckrvaadiH| atrocyate-tadetad na, yasmAt tathye mukhye vastuni kvacit siddhe satyanyatropacAratastatsiddhimatA, yathA mukhya yathArthe siMhe'nyatra siddhe tato mANavake siMhopacAraH sidhyati, evamihApi yadi mukhyA devAH kvacit siddhA bhaveyuH, tadA rAjAderdevopacAro yujyate, nAnyatheti // 332-333 // (1880-1881) D. C.-Since the word " devah" is void of compound and prefixes, and is explained as tatra divyantiti devah ( those that shine there, are deities ), it is philologically siddha, like other padas such as ghata etc. Maurya :-The man himself seen before our very eyes is God. Why to imagine an invisible form for that? All men are not gods. But those accompanied by high merits and religious prosperity could easily be taken as gods. Bhagavan:-That is not correct. Unless and until the principal meaning of a word is not accomplished, it could never be attributed to any other object by means of upacara. The epithet of lion could easily be attributed to munavaka only if the primary sense of the word sinha is accomplished. Similarly, here also the epithet " devah " could be attributed

Page #427
*: 386 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh to king etc. only if the existence of gods is accepted, and not otherwise. || 332-333 ( 1880-1881) // Now, in case of existence of gods being denied, the uselessness of the rites like agnihotra etc. is shown:devAbhAve viphalaM jamaggihottAiyANa kiriyANaM / saggIyaM jannANa ya dANAiphalaM ca tadajuttaM // 334 // (1882) Devabhave viphalam jamaggihottaiyana kiriyanam | Saggiyam jannana ya danaiphalam ca tadajuttam 13341 (1882) [ devAbhAve viphalaM yadagnihotrAdikAnAM kriyANAm / ___ svargIyaM yajJAnAM ca dAnAdiphalaM ca tadayuktam // 334 // (1882) Devabhave viphalam yadagnihotradikinam kriyanam | Svargiyam yajnanam ca danadiphalam ca tadayuktam (1334||(1882)] Trans.-334 In ( case of ) non-existence of gods, ( award of ) heaven laid down ( as a result ) of ( the accomplishment of ) the rites like agnihotra etc. as well as, the fruition of munificence etc. would be null and void. ( 1882 ) TIkA-'vA' ityathavA, idaM dUSaNam-devAbhAve'bhyupagamyamAne yadagnihotrAdikriyANAm " agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH " ityAdinA svargIya phalamuktam, tathA, yajJAnAM ca yat phalamabhihitaM, dAnAdiphalaM ca yat samastaloke prasiddham , tat sarvamayuktaM prAmoti / svargo hyeteSAM phalamuktam , svargiNAM cAbhAve kutaH svargaH? iti / "sa epa yajJAyudhI" ityAdIni ca vedavAkyAni devAstitvapratipAdanaparANi vartante / ataH kiM tAn na pratipadyase? / yadyapi " ko jAnAti mAyopamAn gIrvANAnindra-yama-varuNa-kuberAdIn" ityAdi vAkyam , tadapi na devanAstitvAbhidhAyakam , kintu surANAmapi mAyopamasvAbhidhAnena zeSarddhisamudAyAnAM sutarAmanityatvapratipAdakaM boddhavyam / anyathA hi devAstitvapratipAdakavAkyAni, zrutimantrapadairindrAdInAmAhvAnaM cAnarthakaM syaat|| 334 // (1882) D. C.-There will be one more difficulty in case of denying . .the existence of gods. Because in that case, the award of

Page #428
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 387 : heaven laid down as a result of the rites like agnihotra etc. in the sentences such as " Agnihotram juhuyat svargakamah " etc. as well as, the fruition of sacrifices and meritorious deeds liko dana etc prescribed in deeds like dana etc prescribed in this world, would become absolutely futile. Thus, in absence of svargin-the inhabitant of svarga-how is svarga to exist ? Hence O Maurya! take it for certain that sentences such as " Sa esa yajnayudhi" etc. are laid down to establish the existence of gods, while the sentence" Ko janati mayopaman girvananindra-Yama-Varuna-Kuberadin " etc. does not lead to deny the existence of gods, but it only means to assert the a-nityata of the prosperity of gods and the rest. Otherwise, the sentences which establish the existence of gods, as well as, the invocation of gods like Indra by means of reciting the prescribed mantras, would be of no avail. ll 334 || ( 1882 ) Moreover, F#-HIA-ET-TUF-ARHISIO FIUE FOUTIEI HALTIEU T seigo fakt FA DR3401 (8663) Jama-Soma-Sura-Suraguru-sarajjaini jayai jannehim | Mantavahanameya ya Indainam viha savvam u 335 u ( 1883 ) [74-14-at-HUF-FTRIGUTeta gura 5: 1 HATADI Gigtai 91 Fay 11 334 11 (8663) Yama-Soma-Sura-Suraguru-svarajyadini jayati yajnaih i Mantrahvanameva cendradinam veitha sarvam || 335 II ( 1883 )] Trans.--335 ( The statement that ) one conquers the regions of ( the gods of ) Death, Moon, Sun, and Brihaspati etc, and the invocation of Indra etc by reciting the prescribed mantras would be absolutely null and void. ( 1883 ) TIkA-" jamityAdi " pUrvArdhasyAyamarthaH-ukthaSoDaziprabhRtikratubhiyathAzruti " yama-soma-sUrya-suraguru-svArAjyAni jayati" ityAdIni devAstitvasUcakAni vedavAkyAni devAbhAve vRthaiva syuH / iha cokthaSoDazi ..

Page #429
*: 388 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The seventh prabhRtayo yajJavizeSA mantavyAH / sayUpo yajJa eva hi kraturucyate, yaparahitastu dAnAdikriyAyukto yajJa iti / svaH- svargaH, tatra rAjyAni / jayatiupArjayatItyartha iti / tathA mantrairindrAdInAmAhvAnaM devAstitva evopapadyate, anyathA vRthaiva syAt / indrAdInAM mantrapadairAhvAnamevamavagantavyam'indra ! Agaccha medhAtithe meSavRSaNa " ityAdi / tasmAd yuktito vedavAkyebhyazca santi devA " iti sthitam / tadevaM chinno mauryaputrasya bhagavatA saMzayaH // 335 // ( 1883 ) 46 44 D. C. -- It has been laid down in the Sastras that "Uktha sodas'i prabhriti kratubhir yathas'ruti Yama-SomaSurya-Suraguru-svarajyani jayati etc. Sentences like this, lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove themselves good-for-nothing, if the existence of gods is denied. "" Similarly, the invocation of gods such as Indra etc. by means of mantras which indicate the existence of gods would also become futile if there were devabhava The sentences of the Vedas establish the existence of gods in one way or the other. 11 335 ( 1883 ). The doubt of Mauryaputra is thus removed by the preceptor. chinnamma saMsayammI jiNeNa jara maraNavippamukkeNaM / so samaNo par3ao ahi saha khaMDiyasa ehiM // 336 // (1884) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio addhutthehim saha khandiyasachim 1336 [ chinne saMzaye jinena jarA - maraNavipramuktena / sa zramaNaH pravajito'caturthaiH saha khaNDikazataiH // 336 // (1884) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramukte na Sa sramanah paavrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khandikasatain // 36 // Trans. - 336 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthar - kara who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted diksa along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884) End of the Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara, Candraaps

Page #430
Chapter VIII -8@8 aSTamagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara te paie souM akaMpio Agacchai jiNasagAsaM / vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 337 // (1885) Te pavvaie soum Akampio agacchi Jinasagasam | Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami // 337 // ( 1885 ) [ tAn pravrajitAn zrutvA'kampita Agacchati jinasakAzam / jAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 337 // ( 1885 ) Tan pravrajitan srutva'kampita agacchati Jinasakasam | Vrajami vande vanditta paryupase // 337 // ( 1885 ) ] Trans. - 337 Having heard that they (i. e. Mauryputra and others) had renounced the world, Akampita comes before the Tirthankara. (He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage and worship him. ( 1885 ) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi - jarA - maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNNU savadarisI NaM // 338 // (1886 ) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-marana vippamukkenam Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam 11338|| (1886) AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 338 || ( 1886 )

Page #431
:: 390 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jari-maranavipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina ll 338 II ( 1886 )] Trans.--338 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara, who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge ). ( 1886 ) _The Tirthaikara, then, sayskiM maNNe neraiyA atthi natthi tti saMsao tujhaM / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho||339|| (1887) Kim manne neraiya atthi natthi tti samsao tujihami Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 339 // (1887) [kiM manyase nairayikAH santi na santIti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 339 // (1887) Kim manyase nairayikah santi na santiti samsayastava! Vedapadanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 1133911 (1887)] Trans.-339 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. ( But you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their ( real ) interpretation. (1887) TIkA-kiM nArakAH santi na vA ? iti tvaM manyase / ayaM ca tava saMzayo viruddhavedapadazravaNanibandhanaH, tathAhi-" nArako vai eSa jAyate yaH zUdrAMnamaznAti" ityAdi-eSa bAhmaNo nArako jAyate yaH zUdrAnnamaznAtItyarthaH, ityAdIni vAkyAni nArakasattApratipAdakAni, " na ha vai pretya nArakAH santi " ityAdIni tu nArakAbhAvapratipAdakAni / tatraiSAM vedapadAnAmartha, ca zabdAd yuktihRdayaM ca tvaM na jAnAsi, yata eteSAmayaM vakSyamANo'rtha iti // 339 // (1887) ____D. C.-What are you thinking about ? your doubt about the existence of narakas is based upon your hearing the

Page #432
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 391 : various Veda-padas having contradictory senses. The Vedapadas are as follows: (1) " Narako vai esa jayate yah s'udrannamas'nati " etc. (2) " Na ha vai prretya narakah santa " etc. According to you, the interpretation of these sentences is this (1) " A brahmana who eats the food of s'udras becomes a naraka" (This proves the existence of hellish denizens.) (2) " In fact, there is nothing like narakas in the next world " This refutes the existence of narakas. But you have not grasped the real import of those Veda-padas. 11339||(1887) Here I give their full significance-- taM mannasi paccakkhA devA caMdAdao tahanne vi| vijA-maMtovAyaNaphalAisiddhIe gammati // 340 // (1888) je puNa suimettaphalA neraiya tti kiha te gheyvaa| sakkhamaNumANaovA'NuvalaMbhA bhinnajAIyA? // 341 // (1889) Tam mannasi paccakkha deva candadao tahanne vi 1 Vijja-mantovayanaphalaisiddhie gammanti // 340 // ( 1888 ), Je puna suimettaphala neraiya tti kiha te gaheyavva i Sakkhamanumanao va'nuvalambha bhinnajalya? // 341 // (1889) [ tvaM manyase pratyakSA devAzcandAdayastathAnye'pi / vidyA-matropAyanaphalAdisiddhergamyante // 340 // ( 1888 ) ye punaH zrutimAtraphalA nairayikA iti kathaM te grahItavyAH / sAkSAdanumAnato vA'nupalambhAd bhinnajAtIyAH ? // 341 // (1889).

Page #433
*: 392 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth Tvam mangase pratyaksa devascandradayastathanye'pi 1 Vidya-mantropayanaphaladisiddher gamyante // 340 // ( 1888 ) Ye punah srutimatraphala nairayika iti katham te grahitavyah | Saksadanuminato va'nupalambhad bhinnajatiyah ? // 3410 (1889)] Trans.-340-341 You believe that deities like moon etc., are ( directly ) perceptible, so also are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing, and that belong to a distinct species, to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are ( absolutely ) non-perceptible ? ( 1888-1889 ) TIkA-he AyuSmannakampita ! tvamevaM manyase-devAstAvaccandrAdayaH pratyakSapramANasiddhA eva, anye tvapratyakSA api vidyAmatropayAcitakAdiphalasiddhyA'numAnato gamyante ye punaH " nArakAH" ityabhidhAnamAtrarUpA zrutireva phalaM yeSAM, na punastadabhidhAyakazabdavyatirikto'rthaH, te sAkSAt , anumAnato vA'nupalabhyamAnatvena tiryag-narA-'marebhyaH savarthA bhinnajAtIyAH kathaM " santi" iti grahItavyAH , kharaviSANavat ? iti // 340341 // (1888-1889) D. C.--Akampita:- Deities like moon etc. are apprehended by concrete authentities, and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are narakas that are quite different from gods, tiryancas and human beings, and whose existence is recognized only by hearing, to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference ? // 340-341 (1888-1889 ) // The reply ismaha paJcakkhattaNao jIvAI ya va nArae giNha / kiM jaM sapaJcakkhaM taM paJcakkhaM navari ikaM ? // 342 // (1890) jaM kAsai paccakkhaM paccakkhaM taM pi gheppar3a loe| jaha sIhAidarisaNaM siddhaM na ya savapaJcakkhaM // 34 // (1891)

Page #434
Vada ] Ganadharavada 0:393 : Maha paccakkhattanao jivai ya vya narae ginha 1 Kim jam sapaccakkham tam paccakkham navari ikkam 11 342 11 Jam kasai paccakkham paccakkham tam pi gheppai loe 1 Jaha sihaidarisanam siddham na ya savvapaccakkham 11 343 11 [ mama pratyakSatvato jIvAdIMzcaiva nArakAn gRhANa / kiM yat svapratyakSaM tat pratyakSaM navaramekam ? // 342 // (1890) yat kasyacitpratyakSaM pratyakSaM tadapi gRhyate loke / yathA siMhAdidarzanaM siddhaM na ca sarvapratyakSam // 343 // (1891) Mama pratyaksatvato jivadinsceva narakan grihana i Kim yat sva-pratyaksam tat pratyaksam navaramekam ? 11342||(1890) Yat kasyacitpratyaksam pratyksam tadapi grihyate loke | Yatha sinhadidarsanam siddham na ca sarvapratyaksan ||343 // (1891)] Trans.-342-343 Accept the Narakas ( as existing ) like jiva etc. on account of ( their ) being pratyaksa to me. Is it that only that which is pratyaksa to one's own self ( could be known as ) pratyaksa and not anything else ? That which has been pratyaksa to any (person) in the world, is accepted as pratyaksa by the ( whole ) world. Just the appearance of sinha etc though not pratyaksa to all, is accepted ( by all as existing ). ( 1890-1891) TIkA-he AyuSmannakampita ! " sAkSAdanupalabhyamAnatvAt" ityasiddho hetuH, yato'haM kevalapratyakSeNa sAkSAdeva pazyAmi nArakAn , tato matpratyakSatvAt " santi " iti gRhANa pratipadyasva nArakAn , jIvA-'jIvAdipadArthavat / athaivaM manyase-mamApratyakSatvAt kathametAn gRhNAmi ? / nanu durabhiprAyo'yam , yataH kiM yat svasyAtmanaH pratyakSaM tadevaikaM navaraM pratyakSamucyate ? iti kAkA neyam / nanu yadapi kasyacit pratyayitapuruSasyAnyasya pratyakSaM tadapi " pratyakSam" iti gRhyate vyavahiyate loke; tathAhi-siMhasarabha-haMsAdidarzanaM siddhaM prasiddhaM loke, na ca siMhAdayaH sarvajanapratyakSAH, 80

Page #435
* 394 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighth deza-kAla-grAma-nagara-sarit-samudrAdayazca na sarve'pi bhavataH pratyakSAH, atha cAnyasyApi pratyakSAste pratyakSatayA vyavahriyamANA dRshynte| ato matpratyakSA nArakAH kimiti pratyakSatayA na vyavahiyante ? iti / / 342-343 // (1890-1891) __D. C.-Bhagavan:-0 long-lived Akompita ! your objection that Narakas do not exist because they have not been apprehended by you, is unfounded. I have perceived those Narakas personally. Accept them, therefore, as existing on account of their being pratyaksa to me, like all other objects animate and inanimate. Secondly, it is not appropriate to hold the obstinate view that nothing can be said to be pratyaksa in this world, unless and until it has not been witnessed by you. Usually, that which has been witnessed by a trustworthy or respectable person, is accepted as existing in this world. Existence of lion, bear, and swan etc. is universally accepted by all even though those animals have not been pratyaksa to each and every person in the world. You have not witnessed all countries, rivers, towns, occans and times, still however, you do not doubt their existence, because they have already been pratyaksa to other respectable persons. Similarly, you shall have to accept the existence of Narakas when they have already been pratyakisaa to me // 342-343 ( 1890-1891 ) // ahaMvA jamiMdiyANaM paccakkhaM kiM tadeva pacakkhaM ? / uvayAramettao taM paJcakkhamaNidiyaM tatthaM // 344 // (1892) Ahava jamindiyanam paccakkham kim tadeva paccakkham ?, Uvayaramettao tam paccakkhamanindiyam tattliam 1134411 (1892) [athavA yadindriyANAM pratyakSaM kiM tadeva pratyakSam / upacAramAtratastat pratyakSamanindriyaM tathyam // 344 // (1892)

Page #436
Vada] Ganadharavada .: 395: Athava yadindriyanam pratyaksam kim tadeva pratyaksam ? | Upacaramatratastat pratyaksamanindriyam tathyam 1344 // (1892)] Trans.-344 Or, is it that what is perceptible to senses is alone pratyaksa ? It is pratyaksa by virtue of (mere) usuage. The real pratyaksa is beyond ( the perception of ) senses. ( 1892) TIkA-athavA, ki yadindriyANAM pratyakSaM tadeva pratyakSamiSyate bhavatA, madIyaM tu pratyakSaM nAbhyupagamyate, atIndriyatvAt ? / nanu mahAnayaM viparyAsaH, yasmAdupacAramAtrata eva tadindriyapratyakSaM pratyakSatayA vyavahiyate-yathA'numAne bAhyadhUmAdiliGgadvAreNa bAhyamagnAdivastu jJAyate, navamatra, tata upacArAt pratyakSamiva pratyakSamucyate / paramArthatastuidamapi parokSameva, yato'kSo jIvaH, sa cAnumAnavadatrApi vastu sAkSAd na pazyati, kintvindriyadvAreNaiva, tato'tIndriyameva tathyaM pratyakSamavagantavyam , tatra jIvena sAkSAdeva vastuna upalambhAditi // 344 // (1892) D. C.-Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the, perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is indriya pratyksa is pratyaksa. This is a great foly. Indriya-pratyaksa is recognized as pratyaksa by means of upacara, similar to the case of anumana, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc. But the pratyaksa in my case is different from this. By means of mere upacara, it is called pratyaksa, but really speaking, it is parroksa as the aksa (i-e gava ) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of anumana. The atindriya or that which is beyond perception by ( means of) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as pratyaksa as in that case, java directly perceives the object. Akampita :-Athough in case of indriya-pratyaksa, java does not apprehend an object directly, indriyas are undoubtedly able to recognize the object directly. In such a case, why should we not consider indriya-pratyaksa to be the pratyaksa itself ? // 344 ( 1892) //

Page #437
.: 396 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth muttAibhAvao novaladdhimaMtiMdiyAiM kuMbho cha / uvalaMbhaddArANi tAI jIvo taduvaladdhA // 345 // (1893) Muttaibhavao novaladdhimantindiyaim kumbho vya Uvalambhaddarani taim jivo taduvaladdha 11 345 11 ( 1893 ) [mUrtAdibhAvato nopalabdhimantIndriyANi kumbha iva / upalambhadvArANi tAni jIvastadupalabdhA // 345 // (1893) Murtadibbavato nopalabdhimantindriyani kumbha iva I Upalambhadvarani tani jivastadupalabdha | 345 l (1893 ) ] Trans.-Sense-organs have no power of perception on account of ( their being ) marta etc, like ghata. They are mere mediums of perception. Jiva is their ( real ) agent of perception. ( 1893 ) ___TIkA-nopalabdhimantIndriyANi-na vastujJAyakAnItyarthaH, pudgalasaMghAtarUpatvena mUrtatvAt , AdizabdAdacetanatvAt , kumbhavat / navaramupalambhasya zrotrAdijJAnasya dvArANi bhavantyamUni, gavAkSavat , tatsApekSasyaiva kSayopazamasya prabodhAt / jIva eva ca tadupalabdhA vastUpalabdhA // 345 // (1893) D. C-Since indriyas are murta and a-cetana like ghata, they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is Atma which is altogether different from indriya in this way. // 345 ( 1893 ) // Besides, taduvarame vi saraNao tavAvAre vi novlNbhaao| iMdiyabhinno nAyA paMcagavakkhovaladdhA vA // 346 // (1894) Taduvarame vi saranao tayvavare vi novalambhao Indiyabhinno naya parcagavakkhovaladdha va || 346 # ( 1894 ) [ taduparame'pi smaraNatastadvayApAre'pi nopalambhAt / indriyabhinno jJAtA paJcagavAkSopalabdheva // 346 // (1894)

Page #438
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 397: Taduparame'pi smaranatastadvyapare'pi nopalambhat | Indriyabhinno jnata pancagavaksopalabdheva // 346 // ( 1894 ) ] Trans - 346 By virtue of recollection, even ( when the the sense-organs) are pacified, and on account of non-perception, even (when the sense-organs) are at work, the agent of perception is ( recognized ) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows. ( 1894 ) TIkA - indriyebhyo bhinno " nAyatti " jJAtA jIvaH taduparame'pI indriyoparame'pi tad dvAropalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt, tadvayApAre'pIndriyavyApAre - 'pyanyamanaskatAyAmanupalambhAt ; yathA paJcabhirgavAkSairupalabdhA vastUpalambhakastebhyo bhinna iti / / 346 / / ( 1894 ) D. C. - Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the Soul which is the agent of perception is different from the sense-organs. Because even when indriyas are not at work, the Soul is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the Soul is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived inspite of indrayas being at work. // 346 ( 1894 ) // Moreover, jo puNa aNidiucciya jIvo saGghappihANavigamAo / so subahuyaM viyANai avaNIyagharo jahA daTThA // 347 // (1895) Jo puna anindiu cciya jivo savvappihana vigamao | So subahuyam viyanai avaniyagharo jaha dattha // 347 // (1895) [ yaH punaranindriya eva jIvaH sarvapidhAnavigamAt / sa subahukaM vijAnAtyapanItagRho yathA draSTA || 347 // ( 1895 ) Yah punaranindriya eva jivah sarvapidhanavigamat | Sa subahukam vijanatyapanitagriho yatha drasta // 347 (1895) ] Trans.-347 The Soul, like an observer who is away from the house, being void of sense-organs, apprehends much more on account of all the obstructions ( being ) removed (1895).

Page #439
.: 398 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth TIkA-ya punaranindriya eva kevalajJAnasaMpanno jIvaHsa indriyajJAnavato jIvAt subahu vijAnAtIti pratijJA, sarvapidhAnavigamAt sarvAvaraNa kSayAdityarthaH, yathA paJcagavAkSagRhasthitapuruSAt sarvathA'panItagRhaH sarvata evA''kAzIkRtapradeze sthito draSTA puruSa iti // 347 // (1895) D. C.-Just as, a person looking froin the open space, apprehends much more than a person looking from the five windows, the soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprehends through indriyas. // 347 ( 1895 ) // And the jnana obtained by indriyas in this way, is not pratyaksam na hi paJcakkhaM dhammaMtareNa tddhmmmettghnnaao| kayagattao va siddhI kuMbhANiJcattamettassa // 348 // (1896) Na hi paccakkham dhammantarena taddhammamettagahanao i Kayagattao va siddhi kumbhaniccattamettassa // 348 // ( 1896) [na hi pratyakSaM dharmAntareNa taddharmamAtragrahaNAt / kRtakatvata iva siddhiH kumbhAnityatvamAtrasya // 348 // (1896) Na hi pratyaksam dharmantarena taddharmamatragrahanati Kritakatvata iva siddhih kumbhanityatvamatrasya // 348 // (1896)] Trans.--348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of ghata on account of its being factitious, the indriya-pratyaksa, is not pratyaksa ( also ), on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. ( 1896 ) TIkA-na bhavati pratyakSam " indriyajaM jJAnam" iti prakramAllabhyate / cakSurAdIndriyasya rUpAdiparicchedazaktivizeSarUpeNa dharmAntareNa hetubhUtena tasyAnantadharmAtmakasya vastuno yad rUpAdikamekaM dharmamAtraM tasya grahaNAditi hetuH / kiM tad yathA na pratyakSam ? ityAha-yathA kRtakatvAd ghaTAnityatvamAtrasiddhilakSaNamanumAnamityeSa dRSTAntaH / iha ca yathA parasmAt sAdhyasiddhau

Page #440
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 399:. nAnumAnaM pratyakSam , tathendriyajamapi vijJAnamityetAvAn bhAvArtha iti // 348 // (1896) D. C.-Just as anumana capable of attaining the accomplishment of a desired object by means of another object, cannot be called pratyaksa jnana, so also apprehension by means of indriyas, could not be called pratyaksa. Like an inference establishing the a-nityata of ghata by means of its kritakatva, cognizance attained by indriyas is not pratyaksa Indriya-pratyaksa-jnana is limited to the apprehension of only rupa etc. by means of eye etc. ll 348 ( 1896 ) || Besides, purovaladdhasaMbaMdhasaraNao vAnalo va dhUmAo / ahava nimittaMtarao nimittamakkhassa karaNAI // 349 // (1897) Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranao vanalo vva dhumao i Ahava nimittantarao nimittamakkhassa karanaim // 349 // (1897) [ pUrvolabdhasaMbandhasmaraNato vA'nala iva dhUmAt / athavA nimittAntarato nimittamakSasya karaNAni // 349 / / (1897) Purvopalabd basambandhasmaranato va'nala iva dhumati Athava nimittan tara to nimittamaksasya karanani // 349 // (1897)] Trans.--349 Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, on account of the recollection by means of ( its ) relations of the past or on account of any ( other ) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the Soul. ( 1897 ) TIkA-"vA" ityathavA, na pratyakSamindriyajaM jJAnamiti saiva pratijJA, pUrvopaladhdhazcAsau saMbandhazca pUrvopalabdhasaMbandhastatsmaraNAjAyamAnatvAt dhUmAdanalajJAnavat ; tathAhi-"ghaTo'yaM, pUrvasaMketakAla evaMbhUta eva padArthe pratyayitAbhijJapuruSAd ghaTasaMketasya mayA gRhItatvAt" iti pUrvopalabdhasaMbandhasmaraNAdeva sarvasyApi ghaTAdigrAhakamindriyajJAnamupajAyate; anyathA nAlikeradvIpAdyA

Page #441
Jinabhadra Gani's yAtasyApyavizeSeNaitat syAt / abhyAsa - pATavAdibhyazrAzukAritayendriyajJAnapravRtteH sarvatraitad na lakSyata iti / athavA, pratyakSamindriyajaM jJAnam, pUrvapratipAditavyutpacyAskSasya jIvasya svavyatiriktanimittavizeSAjjAyamAnatvAt, dhUmAdagnijJAnavat / svavyatiriktAni ca nimittAnyakSasya jIvasya karaNAnIndriyANi mantavyAni / yacca pratyakSaM na tajjIvasya nimittAntarAjjAyate kintu jIvastatra sAkSAdeva jJeyaM pazyati, yathA'vadhi - manaH paryAya - kevalajJAneSviti // 349 // ( 1897 ) : 400: [The eighth D. C-Like the perception of fire from smoke, the perception due to sense-organs, is also produced from the recollection of the connections of the past. So, it is not pratyaksa. Take the example of ghata. The name ghata was given to it in the past. We recognize it as ghata on the bases of its purvakala sanketa. Hence, the knowledge about ghata is apprehended by means of indriyas from the recollection of its past relations. If it were no so, a person coming from a distant island, who has neither heard nor seen anything about ghata, would at once be able to recognize it as ghata. This sort of andriya-jnana is produced very quickly from recollection etc. due to constant practice and cleverness, and hence, it is not marked everywhere. Moreover, just as one apprehends agni from dhuma, which is absolutely different from himself, the apprehension in this case is also attained by Soul from the andriyas, which are absolutely different from the Soul, showing thereby that the knowledge thus obtained is not pratyaksa but paroksa. Pratyaksa jnuna is acceptible to Soul directly like the 1Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and3 Kevala-jnanas and it is never 2 1. The first stage of perception when the attention is concentrated. 2. The state of mental perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge. 3. Absolute Perception.

Page #442
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 401 : obtained by the Soul from any external nimitta. All sorts of jnana except the above-mentioned three, are mere anumanas as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of jnanas like Avadhi eto, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called pratyaksa. kevala-maNo-hirahiyassa sabamaNumANamettayaM jamhA / nAragasabbhAvammi ya tadatthi jaM teNa te saMti // 350 // (1898) Kevala-Mano-hirahiyassa savvamanumanamettayam jamha|| Naragasabbhavammi ya tadatthi jam tena te santi n3500 (1898) [ kevala-mano-'vadhirahitasya sarvamanumAnamAtrakaM yasmAt / narakasadbhAve ca tadasti yat tena te santi // 350 // (1898) Kevala-Mano-'vadhirahitasya sarvamanumana matrakam yasmad | Naraksadbhave ca tadasti yat tena te santi ll 350 11 ( 1898 )] Trans.-350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of Kevala, Manah-paryaya and Avadhi ( sorts of jnana) is mere inference, it is ( present ) in case of ( establishing ) the existence of hellish denizens. By ( virtue of) that ( anumana), the Narakas are existing. ( 1898 ) TIkA-kevala-manaHparyAyA-'vadhijJAnarahitasya pramAtuH saMbandhi sarvamapi jJAnaM yasmAdanumAnamAtrameva, parokSArthaviSayatvAt / kevalAdijJAnatrayaM tu vastusAkSAtkAritvAt pratyakSam / tadevamanumAnaM pratyakSaM ca yasmAd nArakasadbhAve sAdhye vidyata eva, tena te nArakA santIti pratipadyasva / tatra pratyakSa madIyameva kevalajJAnam // 350 // (1898) D. C.-Every sort of knowledge excepting Avadha-Manah paryaya and Kevala is mere anumana on account 'of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. Jranas like Kevala etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called pratyaksa. Since the anumana pertaining to Narakas, 81

Page #443
402 Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth is pratyaksa, the existence of Narakas is established without doubt. The pratyaksa znana in this case is my own Kevalajrana // 350 ( 1898 ) // pAvaphalassa pagiTThassa bhoiNo kammao'vasesa ch| santi dhuvaM te'bhimayA neraiyA, aha maI hojjA // 351 // (1899) aJcatthadukkhiyA je tiriya-narA-nAraga tti te'bhimyaa| taMna jao surasokkhappagarisasarisaM na taM dukkhaM // 352 // (1900) Pavaphalassa pagitthassa bhoino kammao'vasesa vval Santi dhuvam te'bhimaya neraiya, aha mai hojja 11 351 11 (1899) Accatthadukkhiya je tiriya-nara-naraga tti te'bhimaya | Tam na jao surasokkhappagarisasarisam na tam dukkham 11352|| [ pApaphalasya prakRSTasya bhoginaH karmato'vazeSa iva / santi dhruvaM te'bhimatA nairayikAH, atha matirbhavet // 351 / / (1899) atyarthaduHkhitA ye tiryag-narA-nArakA iti te'bhimatAH / tad na yataH surasaukhyaprakarSasadRzaM na tad duHkham // 352 / / (1900) Papaphalasya prakristhasya bhoginah karmato'vasesa iva i Santi dhruvam te'bhimata nairayikah atha matir-bhavet 11351||(1899) Atyarthaduhkhiti ye tiryag-nari-naraka iti te'bhimatah | Tad na yatah surasaukhyaprakarsasadrisam na tad duhkham // 352 // ] Trans.--351-352 Like (the enjoyers of) the rest of Karmas, there are ( certainly ) some who ( have to suffer ) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell. Here, it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable tiryancas and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, ( their ) miseries are not as extreme as the happiness of gods. ( 1899-1900) TIkA-prakRSTasya pApaphalasya bhoginaH kecid dhruvaM santi "kammau ti"

Page #444
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 403 :karmaphalatvAt tasyetyarthaH, avazeSavaditi-yathA jaghanyamadhyamapApaphalabhoginaH zeSAstirya-narA vidyanta ityarthaH dRSTAnta / " te'bhimayA neraiya ti" ye prakRSTapApaphalabhoginaste " nArakAH" itybhimtaaH| atha parasyaivaMbhUtA matibhavet-atyarthaM duHkhitA ye tiryag-manuSyAsta evotkRSTapApaphalabhogitvAd nArakavyapadezabhAjo bhaviSyanti, kimadRSTanArakakalpanayA? iti / tadetad na, yato'tiduHkhitAnAmapi tiryag-manuSyANAM yad duHkhaM tadamarasaukhyaprakarSasadRzaprakarSavad na bhavati / idamuktaM bhavati-yeSAmutkRSTapApaphalabhogasteSAM saMbhavadbhiH sarvairapi prakArairduHkhena bhavitavyam, na caivamatiduHkhitAnAmapi tiryagAdInAM dRzyate, Aloka-tarucchAyA-zItapavana-sarit-saraH-kUpajalAdisukhasyAti duHkhiteSvapi teSu darzanAt-chedana-bhedana-pAcana-dahana-dambhana-vajra-kaNTakazilAsphAlanAdibhizca narakaprasiddhaiH prakArairduHkhasyAdarzanAt , ityAdi prAguktAnusAreNa svayamevAbhyUhya vAcyamiti / AgamArthazcAyamavagantavya iti / satatamanubaddhamuktaM dukhaM narakeSu tIvrapariNAmam / tiryasUSNa-bhaya-kSut-tRDAdiduHkhaM sukhaM cAlpam // 1 // sukha-duHkhe manujAnAM manaHzarIrAzraye bahuvikalpe / sukhameva tu devAnAmalpaM duHkhaM tu manasi bhavam // 2 // iti // 351-352 // (1899-1900) // D. C.-Bhagavan:--Just as, there are tiryancas and manusyas to enjoy the fruits of moderate sins, there do exist some who have to suffer the consequences of great sins. And take it for certain that they are none but Narakas. Akampita:--Since the excessively miserable tiryancas and manusyas have to undergo the consequences of great sins, why not to take them as Narakas ? Bhagavan: It is not so. Sufferers of the consequences of great sins ought to be miserable in all respects. Tiryancas and manusyas cannot be said to be miserable in all respects as required in case of Narakas. They are

Page #445
.: 404 :* Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth entitled to various means of pleasure like light, shades of a tree, cool-breeze, river, and stream etc. On the other hand, various horrors of hell such as those of being killed, pierced, cooked, burnt, pressed, and dashed against stone-slabs are not experienced by tiryancas or manusyas. Only Narakas are doomed to undergo such afflictions. It should be noted in the agamas also that:Satatamanubadhamuktam duhkham narakesu tivraparinamami Tiryaksusna-bhaya-ksut-tridadiduhkham sukham calpam ||1|| Sukh-duhkha manujanam manah-sarira sraye bahuvikalpe I Sukhameva tu deva namalpam duhkham tu mansi bhavam 112 11 [ Narakas have always to undergo the afflictions of excessive effects. Tiryancas have greater proportion of afflictions like heat, fear, hunger, and thirst etc and smaller proportion of happiness, manusyas have pleasures and pains (almost in equal proportion ) pertaining to body and mind while gods have absolute happiness and very little misery ] 11 351-352 (1899-1900) saccaM cedamakaMpiya ! maha vayaNAo'vasesavayaNaM va / savaNNuttaNao vA aNumayasavvaNNuvayaNaM va // 353 // (1901) Saccam cedamakampiya ! maha vayanao'vasesavayanam va i Savvannuttanao va anumayasavvannuvayanam va 135311 (1901) [ satyaM cedamakampita ! mama vacanAdavazeSavacanamiva / Hasraat asghahahaafha 343 11 ( 8808) Satyam cedamakampita ! mama vacanadavasesavacanamiva i Sarvajnatvato va'nunatasarvajnavacanamiva ll 353 II ( 1901)] Trans.-353 This is true. O Akampita ! because it is my statement. Or, ( it is true ) like other statements. Or, by virtue of (my) all-knowing faculty, ( it is true) like the statement of an authorized omniscient. ( 1901 )

Page #446
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 405 : TIkA-" nArakAH santi " iti satyamakampita ! idam , madvacanAt , yathA'vazeSaM tvatsaMzayAdiviSayaM madvacanam / athavA, "sarvajJavacanatvAt" ityevaM heturvaktavyaH, tvadanumatamanu-jaiminyAdisarvajJavacanavaditi // 353 // (1901) D. C.-Accept the statement that Narakas exist as true. O Akampita ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statements like those regarding your doubts etc, or, because it is the statement of an omniscient as great as your high-esteemed Manu, Jaimini etc. ll 353 (1901) 11 bhaya-rAga-dosa-mohAbhAvAo saccamaNaivAiM ca / saJcaM ciya me vayaNaM jANayamajjhatthavayaNaM va // 354 // (1902) Bhaya-raga-dosa-mohabhavao saccamanaivaim ca i Saccam ciya me vaynan janaya majjhattha vayanam va 135411 [bhaya-rAga-dveSa-mohAbhAvAt satyamanatipAti ca / satyameva me vacanaM jJAyakamadhyasthavacanamiva // 354 // (1902) Bhaya-raga-dvesa-mohabhavat satyamanatipati ca 1 Satyameva me vacanam jnayakamadhyasthavacanainiva 13541|(1902)] Trans.--354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from faults like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the ( complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation ( in me ). ( 1902 )* kiha savaNNu tti maI paJcakkhaM sbsNsyccheyaa| bhaya-rAga-dosarahio talliMgAbhAvao somm!||355||(1903) Kiha savvannu tti mai paccakkham savvasamsayaccheya i Bhaya-raga-dosarahio tallingabhavao Somma ! // 355 // ( 1903) [kathaM sarvajJa iti matiH pratyakSaM sarvasaMzayacchedAt / bhaya-rAga-doSarahitastalliGgAbhAvataH saumya ! // 355 / / ( 1903) + Vide V. 1578.

Page #447
*: 406 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth Katham sarvajna iti matih pratyaksam sarvasam sayacchedat 1 Bhaya-raga-dosara hitastalliriga-bhavatah Saumya 11 355 II (1903)] Trans.--355 You might ask" How are you to be (accepted as ) omniscient?" "Evidently because I remove all doubts and and because I am free from even the symptoms of the faults such as fear, attachment etc." ( 1903 ) TIkA-iyamapi vyAkhyAtArthA / yadapi " na ha vai pretya nArakAH santi" ityAdau nArakAbhAvaH zaGkayate bhavatA, tadapyayuktam , yato'yamatrAbhiprAyo mantavyaH-na khalu pretya paraloke meAdivacchAzvatAH kecanApyavasthitA nArakAH santi, kintu ya ihotkRSTaM pApamarjayati, sa ito gatvA pretya nArako bhavati, ataH kenApi tatpApaM na vidheyaM yena pretya naarkairbhuuyte| tadevaM chinnastatsaMzayo bhagavatA // 355 // ( 1903 ) D. C.-If you doubt about my sorrvarjnatva, O Saumya ! you are not justified. For, since I have removed all your doubts and am prepared to remove them at present if you entertain any, I am scar vajrau. Moreover, in the sentences such as " Na ha vai pretya narakah santr" etc you have suspected the existence of Narakas. But it is not so. The import of those sentences is that there are no Narakas everlasting like Meru etc. in the other world, but those who commit great sins in this world, would become Narakas in the next world. The sentences, therefore, mean to assert that no body should commit such sins lest they might become the denizens of hell after death. The Bhagavan thus removed his doubts // 355 ( 1903 ) // So, chinnammi saMsayammI jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukkeNaM / sosamaNo pavaiotihi o saha khaMDiyasaehiM // 356 // (1904) Chinnami samsayammi Jimena jara-maranavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim // 356 // (1904)

Page #448
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 4073 [ Rea Te fata Fil-frutage 1 XH: gafafafara wa afisata: 11 348 11 (8808) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih 113561|(1904)] Trans.--356 When the doubt was removed by the Tirtharkara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his three hundred pupils. ( 1904 ) End of the Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara,

Page #449
Chapter IX nvmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara te pavaie souM ayalabhAyA AgacchaI jiNasagAsaM / vaJcAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi / / 357 // (1905) Te pavvaie soum Ayalabhaya agacchai Jinasagasam i Vaccami na vandami vanditta pajjuvasami u 357 11 ( 1905) [tAn pravrajitAn zrutvA'calabhrAtA''gacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 357 // (1905) Tan pravrajitan srutva'calabhrata"gacchati Jinasakasami Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase il 357 11 (1995)} Trans.-357 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Acalabhrata. comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks :-) 1 may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1905) AbhaTTo ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNNU savadarisI NaM // 358 // (1906) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenam i Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam // 358 // (1906) [AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 358 // (1906) Abhisitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena | Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajiena sarvadarsina // 358 // ( 1906 )]

Page #450
Vada ] Ganadharavada :: 409 : Trans.--358 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1906 ) The Tirthankara then said :kiM maNNe puNNa-pAvaM atthi natthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho // 359 // (1907) Kim manne punna-pavam atthi natthi tti samsao tujiha | Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 359 // ( 1907) [kiM manyase puNya-pApe sto na sta iti saMzayastava / vedapadAnAM cArtha na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 359 // ( 1907) Kim manyase punya-pape sto na sta iti samsayastava i Vedapadanam carthany na janasi tesamayamarthah ||359 // (1907)] Trans.--359 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether punya and papa exist or not. But, (ca) you do not understand the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their ( real. ) interpretation. ( 1907) TIkA-he AyuSmanacalabhrAtaH ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM puNya-pApe sto na vA ? iti / ayaM cAnucitaH saMzayaH, yasmAd viruddhavedapadanibandhano viruddhadarzanazrutinibandhanazca tava vartate / tatra vedapadAni tAvat-"puruSa evedaM gni sarvam "---ityAdi yathA dvitIyagaNadhare tathA vAcyAni / teSAM cArtha tvaM na jAnAsItyAdyapi tathaiva vyAkhyeyamiti // 359 // (1907) D. C.-Your doubt about the existence of punya and papa is not justified. It is based on your hearing the sentences of Vedas bearing contradictory senses. The sentences are such as "Purusa evedam gnim sarvam" etc. which have already been mentioned in the Second Ganadharavada. You have not grasped the real interpretation of those sentences. I, therefore, give their real interpretation as under :- 11 359 (1907) 11

Page #451
.: 410 :*. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth maNNasi puSNaM pAvaM sAhAraNamahava do vibhinnAI / hoja navA kammaM ciya sabhAvao bhavapavaMco'yaM // 360 // (1908) Mannasi punnam pavam saharanamahava do vi bhinnaim Hojja na va kammam ciya sabhavao bhavapavanco'yam 360 [ manyase puNyaM pApaM sAdhAraNamathavA dve api bhinne / bhaved na vA karmaiva svabhAvato bhavaprapaJco'yam || 360 || ( 1908 ) Manyase punyam papam sadharanamathava dve api bhinne Bhaved na va karmaiva svabhavato bhavaprapanco 'yam ||360|| (1908) Trans.-360 Do you think punya alone or papa alone to exist? Or, ( do you think them to be ) common, or even different? Or, is it that Karma itself be absent, and the expansion of the whole of mundane world be natural? (1908) TIkA - iha kepAJcit tIrthakAnAmayaM pravAdaH - " puNyamevaikamasti na pApam " / anye tvAhuH - " pApamevaikamasti na tu puNyam " apare tu vadanti"ubhayamapyanyonyAnuviruddhasvarUpaM mecakamaNikalpaM saMmizrasukha - duHkhAkhyaphalahetuH sAdhAraNaM puNyapApAkhyamekaM vastu " iti / anye tu pratipAdayanti - svatantramubhayaM viviktasukha-duHkhakAraNaM " hoja tti " bhavediti / anye punarAhu:mUlataH karmaiva nAsti, svabhAvasiddhaH sarvo'pyayaM jagatprapaJcaH " / atastvamapyetAn paJcavikalpAn manyase / eteSAM ca vikalpAnAM parasparaviruddhatvAt saMzayadolAmAruDho'si tvamiti // 360 // ( 1908 ) 46 D. C.-There are five different theories about the existence of punya and papa as stated below: (1) There exists punya alone and there is nothing like papa. (2) There exists papa alone and there is nothing like punya. (3) Punya and papa which happen to be the causes of sukha and duhkha respectively, exist in a combined state like a dark-blue jewel.

Page #452
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 411 : (4) Punya and papa are absolutely independent of each other. (5) There is nothing like Karma at all. The expansion of this mundane world is not due to Karma, but it is natural. Now, since you have listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about punya and papa. II 360 I ( 1908 ) Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows. puNNukarisse subhayA taratamajogAvagarisao hANI / tasseva khae mokkho patthAhArovamANAo // 361 // (1909) Punnukkarisse subhaya taratamajogavagarisao hani i Tasseva khae mokkho patthaharovamanao 11 361 11 ( 1909 ) [ puNyotkarSe zubhatA taratamayogApakarSato hAniH / tasyaiva kSaye mokSaH pathyAhAropamAnAt // 361 // (1909) Punyotkarse subhata taratamayogapakarsato hanih | Tasyaiva ksaye moksah pathyabaropamanat ll 361 11 ( 1909 ) ] Trans.--361 With the ( gradual) rise in punyas, welfare (is obtained ). With the gradual diminution, there is destruction. Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed there is ( complete ) liberation. ( 1909) TIkA-punAtIti puNyaM tasyotkarSalezato lezatazca vRddhau zubhatA bhavati, sukhasyApi kramazo vRddhirbhavati tAvat , yAvadutkRSTaM svargasukhamityarthaH / tasyaiva puNyasya tara-tamayogApakarSato hAniH sukhasya-duHkhaM bhavati / idamuktaM bhavati-yathA yathA puNyamapacIyate tathA tathA jIvAnAM krameNa duHkha. mutpadyate, yAvat sarvaprakarSaprAptaM narakaduHkham / tasyaiva ca puNyasya sarvathA kSaye mokSa iti / etacca sarva pathyAhAropamAnAd bhAvanIyam; tathAhi-yathA

Page #453
.: 412 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth pathyAhArasya krameNa vRddhAvArogyavRddhistathA puNyavRddhau sukhavRddhiH, yathA ca pathyAhArasya krameNa parihAre sarogatA bhavati, evaM puNyApacaye duHkhotpattiH, sarvathA pathyAhAraparihAre ca maraNavat puNyakSaye mokSa iti // 36 // (1909) D C.-The first case-viz, that punya alone exists and there is nothing like papamis discussed as follows: That which purifies is called punya. With the gradual increase in punya, there is a gradual rise in happiness also, leading ultimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand, when there is a gradual decrease in punya, happiness also decreases and gradually begins to turn into misery, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally, when there is entire diminution of punya, Jiva attains complete liberation, be it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet. Just as, by the gradual increase in wholesome diet, one becomes more and more healthy, so also by the gradual eminence of punyas, there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand, just as, when the wholesome diet is abandoned, the disease re-enters the body, and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of punya, there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately, by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely, one dies away. In the same way, by the entire destruction of punya, giva attains complete liberation from this world. || 361 || (1909) Taking the second theory of papa, the author explains :pAvukarise'hamayA taratamajogAvagarisao subhayA / tasseva khae mokkho apatthabhattovamANAo // 362 // (1910) Pavukkarise'hamaya taratamajogavagarisao subhaya || Tasseva khae mokkho apatthabhattopamanao u 362 # ( 1910 )

Page #454
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 413 :[pApotkarSe'dhamatA taratamayogApakarSataH zubhatA / tasyaiva kSaye mokSo'pathyabhaktopamAnAt / / 362 / / ( 1910 ) Papotkarse'dhamata taratamayogapakarsatah subhata 1 Tasyaiva. ksaye mokso'pathyabhaktopamanat // 362 // ( 1910)] Trans.-362 In ( case of ) the increase in papa, there is vileness; with gradual diminution ( of it ), ( there is ) welfare; and as in the case of the unwholesome diet, there is (complete ) liberation (of the jiva) when it is absolutely destroyed. (1910) TIkA-ihApathyAhAropamAnAd vaiparItyena bhAvanA kaaryaa| tathAhiyathA krameNApathyavRddhau rogavRddhiH, tathA pAMzayatyAtmAnaM malinayatIti pApaM, tasya vRddhau sukhavRddhirUpA'dhamatA mantavyA-krameNa duHkhaM vardhate, yAvadutkRSTaM nArakaduHkham / yathA cApathyatyAgAt krameNArogyavRddhiH, tathAkrameNa pApasyApakarSAt sukhasya vRddhiH, yAvadutkRSTaM surasaukhyam / yathA cApathyAhArasya sarvathA parityAgAt paramArogyamupajAyate, evaM sarvapApakSaye mokSa iti // 362 // (1910) D. C.-Those, who believe that there exists papa alone, and nothing like punya, put forward the same argument but in a reverse manner. According to them, just as disease develops with the increase in unwholesome diet, vileness in the form of miseries etc., also increases with the eminence of sins, leading ultimately to the agony of hell On the other hand, when the unwholesome food is being gradually given up, there is a gradual recovery of health. Similarly by the gradual diminution of sins there is a gradual re-generation of happiness leading ultimately to Salvation. Lastly, just as complete health is regained at the complete abandonment of the unwholesome food, there is complete attainment of moksa when the sins are completely removed. // 362 // ( 1910 ). Now, a third belief that punya and papa exist as sadharuna, is explained :

Page #455
: 414 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The ninth sAhAraNavaNNAdi va aha sAhAraNamahegamattAe / ukkarisA-vagarisao tasseva ya puNNapAvakkhA // 363 (1911) Saharanavannadi va aha saharanamahegamattae i Ukkarisa-vagarisao tasseva ya punnapavakkha // 363 // ( 1911 ) [ sAdhAraNavarNAdIvAtha saadhaarnnmthaikmaatryaa| utkarSA-'pakarSatastasyaiva ca puNyapApAkhyA // 363 // (1911) Sadharanavarnadivatha sadharanamathaikamatraya | Utkarsa-'pakarsatastasyaiva ca punyapapakhyi |363 // (1911)] Trans.-363 Like joint-syllables etc, (punya and papa) are combined with each other as one. And, by reason of eminence or diminution of it, it is known as punya or papa ( respectively ). ( 1911) ___TIkA-" aha sAhAraNamiti" atha sAdhAraNaM saMkIrNapuNyapApAkhyaM vastu bhAvyata ityarthaH / kathaMbhUtaM punaridamavagantavyam ? ityAha-"sAhAraNavaNNAdi va ti" yathA sAdhAraNa tulyaM haritAlagulikAdInAmanyataranmIlitaM varNakadvayam ; AdizabdAd yathAmecakamaNiH, narasiMhAdirvA, tathedamapi puNyapApAkhyaM saMkIrNamekaM vastvityarthaH / nanu yadyekaM vastvidam , tarhi puNyaM pApaM ceti parasparavirodhivastuviSayamAkhyAdvayaM kathaM labhate ? ityAha-" ahegamattAe ityAdi " atha tasyaivaikasya saMkIrNapuNyapApAkhyasya vastuna ekayA puNyamAtrayA-ekena puNyAMzenetyarthaH, utkarSato vRddhau satyAM puNyAkhyA pravartate; ekayA tu pApamAtrayA-ekena pApAMzenetyarthaH, utkarSato vRddhau satyAM pApAkhyA pravartate / apakarSe'pi puNyAMzasya pApAkhyA pravartate, pApAMzasya tvapakarSe puNyAkhyA pravartata iti // 363 // (1911) / D. C.- The theory is that papa and punya are not separate entities, but they are infused with each other as one like the two syllables joined together as one. Like a base metal of haritala or indago, wherein there is always one object mixed with two colours or like, the Mecaka jewel or Narasinha eto,

Page #456
.: 415:. Vada ] Ganadharavada punya-papa is also a mixed entity. Here, if some one raises the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names-papa and punya ? The answer laid down by them is this:--On account of the increase in the constituent punya of the punya-papa entity, the name punya is given, while with the diminution of the constituent punya, the entity is called papa. Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of papa it is called papa and vice versa. So, punya-papa is one and only one entity and does not exist separately. 11363|1 (1911) Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows:evaM ciya do bhinnAiM hojja, hoja va sabhAvao ceva / bhavasaMbhUI, bhaNNai nasabhAvAo jo'bhimo||364||(1912) hoja sahAvo vatthu nikAraNayA va vatthudhammo vA ? / jai vatthu Natthi tao'NuvaladdhIo khapuppha va // 365 // (1913) Evam ciya do bhinnaim hojja, hojja va sabhavao ceva i Bhavasambhui, bhannai na sabhavao jao'bhimao 11 364 11 (1912) Hojia sahavo vatthum nikkaranaya va vatthudhammo va ? | Jai vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhio khapuppham va 136511 (1913) [ evameva dve bhinne bhavetAM, bhaved vA svabhAvata eva / bhavasaMbhUtiH, bhaNyate na svabhAvAd yato'bhimataH / / 364 // (1912) bhavet svabhAvo vastu niSkAraNatA vA vastudharmoM vA ? | yadi vastu nAsti sako'nupalabdheH khapuSpamiva // 365 // (1913) Evameva dve bhinne bhavetam, bhaved va svabhavata eva i Bhavasambhutih, bhanyate na svabhavad yato'bhimatah || 364 11 Bhavet svabhavo vastu niskaranata va vastudharmo va ? | Yadi vastu nasti sako'nupalabdheh khapuspamiva 1136511 (1913) ]

Page #457
*: 416 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth Trans.-364-365 Similarly, ( some would believe that ) both are different ( from each other ), or that the production of the mundane world would be due to (nothing else but its ) svabhava only. (In reply to that ), it is said that ( the production of the mundane world) by virtue of ( its) svabhava, is not believable. And, Is that svabhava a ( definite ) object ? or causelessness ( itself ) ? or the property of an object ? If ( it is taken as an object, it is not an object ), because it is non-apprehensible like a kha-puspa ( 1912-1913 ) TIkA-evameva keSAzcid matena dve api bhinne svatantra syAtAM puNyapApe, tatkAryabhUtayoH sukha-duHkhayoTaigapadyenAnubhavAbhAvAt / ato'nenaiva bhinnakAryadarzanena tatkAraNabhUtayoH puNya-pApayobhinnatA'numIyata iti / " hoja vetyAdi " athavA svabhAvata eva vinApi puNya-pApAbhyAM bhavasaMbhUtiH-bhavavaicitryasya saMbhavaH kaizcidiSyate / tadevaM darzitAH paJcApi puNya-pApaviSayA viklpaaH| etaizca bhramitamanobhiH saMzayo na kartavyaH, ekasyaiva caturthavikalpasyAdeyatvAt , zeSANAM cAnAdeyatvAt / ata eva pratyAsattinyAyamaGgIkRtya paJcamavikalpaM tAvad dUSayitumAha-" bhaNNaItyAdi " bhaNyate'trottaram-na svabhAvato bhavasaMbhUtiH, yataH svabhAvo vasturUpo vAbhimato bhavediti dvitIya gAthAyAM saMbandhA, niSkAraNatA vA, vastudharmo vA svabhAvo'bhimato bhavet ? iti trayo viklpaaH| tatra yadi vasturUpo'yamiti prathamo vikalpaH tarhi tako'sau svabhAvo nAsti, anupalambhAt , khapuSpavaditi // 364-365 // (1912-1913) ' D. C.--According to some, punya and papa are independent of each other, because sukha and duhkha which are their respective karyas or consequences are not experienced at one and the same time. So, when karyas are found to be independent of each other, their respective causes should also be independent of each other by anumana. Finally, there is one wore theory that the expansion of this mundane world is not due to Karmas known as papa nad

Page #458
Vada ] Ganadharavada punya but on account of its own svabhava. According to this theory, there is nothing like Karma. .: 417: Your doubt has sprung up from five different opinions stated above. But that is not justifiable. For, out of those five theories, none except the fourth one is acceptible. The expansion of bhava by means of its svabhava as laid down in the fifth theory, is also not acceptible. Because, in that case, svabhava should either be a definite object (vastu) or causelessness (niskaranata), or the property of a definite object (vastu-dharma). Since svabhava is absolutely imperceptible like a kha-puspa, it can never exist as a definite object. || 364365 (1912-1913) Then, acaMtamaNuvaddho vi aha tao asthi natthi kiM kammaM ? | heU va tadatthitte jo naNu kammassa vi sa eva // 366 // (1994) kammassa vAbhihANaM hoja sabhAvo ti hou ko doso ? | painiyayAgArAo na ya so kattA ghaDasleva // 367 // (1915) mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhihANao bhinno / kammatti sahAvo ttiya jai vA'mutto na kattA to // 368 // (1916) dehANaM vomaM piva, juttA kajjAio ya muttimayA / aha so nikkAraNayA to kharasiMgAdao hoMtu // 369 // (1917) aha vatthUNo sa dhammo pariNAmo to sa kamma- jIvANaM / pune - rAbhihANo kAraNa - kajjANumeo so // 370 // (1918) kiriyANaM kAraNao dehAINaM ca kajjabhAvAo / kammaM madbhihiyaM tiya paDivajja tamaggibhUi va // 371 // (1919) 53

Page #459
.: 418 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth taM ciya dehAINaM kiriyANaM pi ya subhaa-'subhttaao| paDivaja puNNapAvaM sahAvao bhinnajAIyaM // 372 // (1920) Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ? i Heti va tadatthitte jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva // 366 // ( 1914) Kammassa vabhihanam hojja sabhavo tti hou ko doso I Painiyayagarao na ya so katta ghadasseva 11 367 11 ( 1915) Mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhihanao bhinno i Kamma tti sahavo tti ya jai va'mutto na katta to 136811 (1916) Dehanam vomam piva, jutta kajjaio ya muttimaya 1 Aha so nikkaranaya to kharasingadao hontu 11 369 u ( 1917) Aha vatthuno sa dhammo parinamo to sa kamma-jivanam i Punne-yarabhihano karana-kajjanumeo so 11 370 11 ( 1918 ) Kiriyanam karanao dehainam ca kajjabhavao i Kammam inadabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhui vva 11 371 il Tam ciya dehainam kiriyanam pi ya subha-'subhatto i Padivajja punnapavam sahavao bhinnajaiyam 11 372 11 ( 1920 ) [ atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nAsti kiM karma / heturvA tadastitve yo nanu karmaNo'pi sa eva // 366 // ( 1914 ) karmaNo vAbhidhAnaM bhavet svabhAva iti bhavatu ko doSaH / pratiniyatAkArAd na ca sa kartA ghaTasyeva // 367 // (1915) mRto'mRto vA sako yadi mUrtastato'bhidhAnato bhinnaH / karmeti svabhAva iti ca yadi vA'mUrtI na kartA tataH // 368 // (1916) dehAnAM vyomeva, yuktA kAryAditazca muurtimttaa| atha sa niSkAraNatA tataH kharazRGgAdayo bhavantu // 369 // (1917) atha vastunaH sa dharmaH pariNAmastataH sa karma-jIvayoH / puNye-tarAbhidhAnaH kAraNa-kAryAnumeyaH saH // 370 // (1918)

Page #460
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 419 : kriyANAM kAraNato dehAdInAM ca kAryabhAvAt / karma madabhihitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamagnibhUtiriva // 371 // (1919) tadeva dehAdInAM kriyANAmapi ca zubhA-'zubhatvAt / . pratipadyasva puNya-pApe svabhAvato bhinnajAtIye // 372 // (1920) Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nasti kim karma Hetur-va tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva ll 366 11 ( 1914 ) Karmano vabhidbanam bhavet svabhava iti bhavatu ko dosah ? | Pratiniyatakarad na ca sa karta ghatasyeva ll 367 || ( 1915 ) Murto'murto va sako yadi murtastato'bhidhanato bhinnah | Karmeti svabbaya iti ca yadi va'murto na karta tatah 1136811 (1916) Dehanam vyomeva, yukta karyaditasca murtimatta 1 Atha sa niskaranata tatah kharasringadayo bhavantu 136911 (1917) Atha vastunah sa dharmah parinamastatah sa karma-jivayoh 1 Punge-tarabhidhanah karana karyanumeyah sa 11 370 01 ( 1918) Kriyanam karanato de hadinam ca karyabhavat ! Karma madabhibitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamagnibhutiriva 11371|| Tadeva dehadinam kriyanamapi ca subha'-subhatyat i Pratipadyasva punya-pape svabhavato bhinnajatiye 1137211 (1920)] Trans.-366-372 If it is extremely non-perceptible, why is it called svabhava and not Karma? The hetu that works in the existence of svabhava, works in case of Karma also. Or, what harm is there in taking svabhava as the synonym of karma ? And since it has a definite shape like ghata, it cannot be a doer just as sky is not (the doer of ) bodies. ( For ), the corporeal nature is justified on account of (its) being karya etc. Now, if that (svabhava ) were causelessness ( itself ), non-existent (objects like ) kharasrnga etc, would come into existence. If it is ( taken as ) the property of a ( definite ) object, then it would turn out to be the effect of Karma and jiva, and would be inferred as punya and papa by

Page #461
:420. Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth means of karya and karana. So, like Agnibhati, you, too, ( shall have to ) accept (the existence of) Karma on account of actions as well as Karyas ( in the form of deha etc., ) and since Karma itself is the cause of good or bad ( in case of deha etc.), as well as other performances, admit punya and papa as belonging to different species by their very svabhava ( 1914-1920) TIkA-etAzca gAthAH prAyo'gnibhUtigaNadharavAde vyAkhyAtA eva, sugamAzca / navaraM " kAraNa-kajANumeo so tti" sa ca jIva-karmaNoH puNya-pApAbhidhAnaH pariNAmaH kAraNena kAryeNa cA'numIyate-kAraNAnumAnAt kAryAnumAnAcca gamyata ityrth| etadevAnumAnadvayamAha-"kiriyANaM kAraNao ityAdi" dAnAdikriyANAM hiMsAdikriyANAM ca kAraNatvAt kAraNarUpatvAdasti tatphalabhUtastatkAryarUpapuNya-pApAtmako jIva-karmapariNAmaH, yathA kRSyAdikriyANAM zAli-yava-godhUmAdikam / uktaM ca" samAsu tulyaM viSamAsu tulyaM satISvasaccApyasatISu sacca / phalaM kriyAsvityatha yannimittaM tad dehinAM so'sti nu ko'pi dhrmH||1||" etat kAraNAnumAnam / "dehAINamityAdi" dehAdInAM kAraNamasti, kAryarUpatvAt teSAm , yathA ghaTasya mRd-daNDa-cakra-cIvarAdisAmagrIkalitaH kulAlaH / na ca vaktavyam-dRSTa eva mAtA-pitrAdikasteSAM hetuH, dRSTahetusAmye'pi surUpe-tarAdibhAvena dehAdInAM vaicitryadarzanAt , tasya cAdRSTakarmAkhyahetumantareNAbhAvAt / ata eva puNya-pApabhedena karmaNo dvaividhyam , zubhadehAdInAM puNyakAryatvAt , itareSAM tu pApaphalatvAt / uktaM ca " iha dRSTahetvasaMbhavikAryavizeSAt kulAlayatna iva / hetvantaramanumeyaM tat karma zubhA- zubhaM krtuH||1||" etat kAryAnumAnam / tathA, madabhihitamiti ca kRtvA'gnibhUtivat tvamapi karma pratipadyasva, sarvajJavacanaprAmANyAdityarthaH / tadapi puNya-pApavibhAgena , vibhaktaM pratipadyasva, dehAdInAM tatkAryANAM kriyANAM ca tatkAraNabhUtAnAM zubhA-'zubhatvena tadvaividhyadarzanAditi // 366-372 // (1914-1920)

Page #462
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 421 : D. C--These verses have already been explained in details in the Second Ganadhara-vada.+ The only point to remember in this connection is that punya and papa, the parinama of Jiva and Karma, could be inferred from karana and karya. These two inferences are explained as follows: (1) Karananumana:--Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops ( Karyas ) at the end, punya and papa are also reaped as the parinamas of Jiva and Karma with actions like munificence etc. or violence etc. as their respective causes. It is, therefore, said that"Samasu tulyam visamasu tulyam satisvasaccipyasatinu sacca | Phalam kriyasvityatha yannimittam tad dehinam so'stinuko'pi dharmah Il " ( 2 ) Karyanumana .-Just as a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the Karana of ghata, so also in case of Karyas like s'arira etc. there is some cause or the other. The cause in this case, is nothing but punya and papa in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of karyas like s'arira etc., parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also. Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms-in spite of their dusta hetu, viz, parents being the same--would never be accounted for. The karma therefore has two types :-Punya and papa. Good forms are the results of punya and ugly ones are the results of papa. Hence it is said :" Iha dTstabetvasambhavikaryavisesat kulalayatna iva i Hetvantaramanumeyam tat Karma subha'-subham kartuh il " So, like Agnibhuti, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of Karma putting faith into the words of me--the + Vide pp. 86 to 137 -

Page #463
: 422: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth omniscient. You shall also have to take it for certain that Karma is divided as punya and papa, causing a variety of forms in deha etc. 1366-372 // ( 1914-1920 ) The existence of punya and papa could be established in a different way : suha- dukkhANaM kAraNamaNurUvaM kajjabhAvao'vassaM / paramANava ghaDassa va kAraNamiha puNNa - pAvAI // 373 // (1921) Suha-dukkhanam karanamanuruvam kajjabhavao'vassam Paramanavo ghadassa va karanamiha punna-pavaim ||373 // (1921) [sukha-duHkhayoH kAraNamanurUpaM kAryabhAvato'vazyam / paramANava ghaTasyeva kAraNamiha puNyapApe || 373 // ( 1921 ) Sukha-duhkhayoh karanamanurupam karyabhavato'vasyam | Paramanavo ghatasyeva karanamiha punya-pape // 37 // ( 1921) ] Trans. - 373 Just as molecules ( which act as ) the cause of ghata resemble ghata, in the same way, happiness and misery, the Karyas have also their karana viz, punya and papa, similar, to them. ( 1921 ) TIkA - astyavazyaM sukha-duHkhayoranurUpaM kAraNam, kAryatvAt tayoH, yaha kArya tasyAnurUpaM kAraNaM bhavatyeva, yathA ghaTasya paramANavaH, tacca tayorihAnurUpaM kAraNaM, sukhasya puNyaM duHkhasya tu pApamiti || 373 || ( 1921 ) D. C. - Since karana is similar to Karya, the small particles of earth which make ghata resemble ghata, and punya and papa which are the karana of sukha and duhkha would resemble sukha and duhkcha. // 373 // ( 1921 ) The opponent may now, raise the objection as follows: suha - dukkhakAraNaM jai kammaM kajjassa tadgurUvaM ca / pattamarUvaM taM pihU aha rUviM nANurUvaM to // 374 // (1922)

Page #464
Vada ] Ganadharavida 428. Suha-duhkhakaranam jai kammam kajjassa tadanuruvam ca ! Pattamaruvam tam pi hu aha ruvim nanuruvam to 13741 (1922) [sukha-duHkhakAraNaM yadi karma kAryasya tadanurUpaM ca / prAptamarUpaM tadapi khalvatha rUpi nAnurUpaM tataH // 374 // (1922) Sukha-duhkhakaranam yadi karma karyasya tadanurupam ca 1 Praptamarupam tadapi khalvatha rupi nanurupam tatah 1137411 ] Trans.-374 If karma ( were known as ) the cause of happiness and misery, and if Karya ( were taken as ) simiiar to it, then, that (i. e. karma) also would certainly become formless, and if corporeal, it would not resemble (the Karya ). ( 1922) TIkA-nanu yadi sukha-duHkhayoH puNya-pApAtmakaM karma kAraNam , tacca yadi kAryasya sukha-duHkharUpasyAnurUpaM sadRzamiSyate, tarhi sukha-duHkhayorAtmapariNAmatvenArUpatvAt tadapi puNya-pApAtmakaM karma tadanurUpatayA'rUpaM prAmoti / atha rUpavat , tarhi nAnurUpaM tat , mUrtatvena vilakSaNatvAditi // 374 // (1922) D. C.-If Karma composed of punya and papa is accepted as the Karana of sukha and duhkha, and if sukha and duhkha are taken as similar to the Karma, Karma, which in fact is corporeal, would become formless like sukha and duhkha. On the other hand, if it is taken as corporeal, it will not resemble its karya, viz, sukha and duhlcha which are incorporeal. // 374 // ( 1922) Then, the Tirthankara Bhagavan replios :na hi sabahANurUvaM bhinnaM vA kAraNaM, aha mayaM te| kiM kaja-kAraNattaNamahavA vatthuttaNaM tassa ? // 375 // (1923) Na hi savvahanuruvam bhinnam, va karanam, aha mayam te | Kim kajja-karanattanamahava vatthuttanam tassa ? // 375u.(1923)

Page #465
.: 424 :. Jinabhadra Gani's The ninth [na hi sarvathAnurUpaM bhinnaM vA kAraNaM, atha mataM te / kiM kArya-kAraNatvamathavA vastutvaM tasya ? // 375 // (1923) Na hi sarvatbanurupam bhinnam va karanam, atha matam te i Kim karya-karanatvamathava vastutyam tasya ? || 375 || ( 1923 )] Trans.--375 The karana is neither similar nor dissimilar ( to the karya ) in all respects. Then, you might contend that " How is its being a karya, karana or a ( definite ) object (justified )? ( 1923) TIkA-na hi sarvathA kAryAnurUpaM kAraNamiSyate, yena sukha-duHkhavat karmaNo'pyarUpatvaM preryate / nApyekAntena sarvadharmaiH kAraNaM kAryAdbhinnameSTavyam / " aha mayaM te ti" atha te tavaitad matam-ekAntena sarvairapi dharmaiH kAraNaM kAryAnurUpameva, bhinnaM vA'nurUpameveti; tarhi sarvathA'nurUpatva ekasya kAraNatve'parasyApi kAraNatvAt , ekasya ca kAryatve'nyasyApi kAryatvAt kiM tayoH kArya-kAraNatvam ? na kiJcit , dvayorapikAraNatvAt , kAryatvAd veti / athaikAntabhede'bhyupagamyamAne kAryasya vastutve kiM nAma tasya kAraNasya vastutvam ? na kiJcit , dvayorapi vastutve sarvathA bhedahAniprasaGgAditi / tasmAd naikAntenAnurUpatA, ananurUpatA vA kArya-kAraNayoH / / 375 // (1923) D. C.-Karana is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the Karyas. So, Karma cannot be called formless like its Karya viz, sukha and duhkha. Your doubt is based on your assumption that karana is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the karya. But you are not justified in your assumption. For, if Karana were absolutely similar to Karya, it would turn out to be the karana of some other Karya also. Similarly, a karya taken as similar to a kurana in all respects, would also become the Karya of another karana. Consequently, there will be no distinction between Karya and karana, and both would either become karana or karya. Since there is no difference between karya being a definite

Page #466
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 425 :object and a karana being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also be out of place. Hence, Karya and karana are neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other. // 375 // ( 1923 ) The author states in objection to this and to its reply :--- satvaM tullAtullaM jai to kajjANurUvayA keyaM ? / jaM somma ! sapajAo kajaM parapajjao seso // 376 // (1924) Savvam tullatullam jai to kajjanuruvaya keyam ? 1 Jam Somma ! sapajjao kajjam parapajjao seso // 376 // (1924 ) [ sarva tulyA-'tulyaM yadi tataH kAryAnurUpatA keyam ? / yat saumya ! svaparyAyaH kArya paraparyayaH zeSaH // 376 // ( 1924 ) Sarvam tulya'-tulyam yadi tatah karyanurupata koyam ? ' Yat Saunya! svaparyayah karyam paraparyayah sesah 11376||(1924] Trans.--376 "If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way is Karya similar ( to karana )?" For, O Saumya ! Karya is the synonym and the rest autonym. (1924) TIkA-na kevalaM kArya-kAraNe eva tulyA-'tulyarUpe, kintu sakalamapi tribhuvanAntargataM vastu parasparaM tulyA-'tulyarUpameva, na punaH kiJcit kasyApyekAntena tulyamatulyaM vA / labdhAvakAzaH paraH prAha-" jaItyAdi " yadyevam , tataH keyaM kAryAnurUpatA kAraNasya vizeSato'nviSyate, yenocyate" suha-dukkhANaM kAraNamaNurUvaM " ityAdi / yadi hi kiJcidekAntenAnurUpaM syAt tadetthaM vaktuM yujyate, yadA tvekAntato na kiJcidanurUpam , nApyananurUpam ; kintu sarva sarveNa tulyA-'tulyarUpameva, tadA kimanena vizeSeNa ? / atrocyate-" jamityAdi" saumya ! tulyA-'tulyatve sarvagate'pi yad yasmAd kAraNasya kArya svaparyAyaH, tasmAt kAraNaM kAryasyehA. nurUpamucyate, zeSastvakAryarUpaH sarvo'pi padArthaH kAraNasya paraparyAyaH, iti /

Page #467
** 426 :* Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth taM prati vivakSitaM kAraNamasamAnarUpamabhidhIyate / Aha- nanu kathaM prastute sukhaduHkhe kAraNasya svaparyAya: ? / ucyate - jIva- puNyasaMyogaH sukhasya kAraNam, tasya ca sukhaM paryAya eva, duHkhasyApi jIva- pApasaMyogaH kAraNam, atastazanfa g:a qufa ga, a41a ga ga, kea, faafhenda =77dezA~llabhate tathA tatkAraNabhUtaM puNyaskandhadravyamapi yathA ca duHkhamazubham, akalyANam, azivamityAdisaMjJAH prApnoti tathA tatkAraNabhUtaM pApadravyamapi, iti vizeSato'tra puNya-pApe - sukha-duHkhayoranurUpakAraNatvenokte iti ||376|| ( 1924 ) D. C.-Bhagavan :-Not only karya and karana, but all objects of the Universe, are relatively equal and unequal and no object is absolutely equal or absolutely unequal. Acalabhrata:-If it is so, then, why do you try to establish particularly the similarity between karana and karya by saying that "sukha and duhkha are similar to karana etc.? Still, however, if some object is absolutely similar to another, it may be justified to say so. But when nothing is similar or dissimilar in all respects, and everything is relatively equal or unequal according to you, then, how could it be said that Karana was similar to karya? Bhagavan-In spite of all objects being relatively equal or unequal, karya resembles karana because it is the synonym of karana, while other objects which are the autonyms of karana are dissimilar to it. Hence in the present case, sukha and duhkha are the synonyms of Karma the karana. The combination of jiva and punya is the cause of sukha, and that of jiva and papa is the cause of duhkha, just as siva, kalyana, s'ubha etc are the synonyms for sukha, the same are the synonyms for the punya-karmas also. Similarly, duhkha and its cause, the papa-karmas, have the same synonyms viz, a-s'iva, a-kalyana and a-s'ubha etc.

Page #468
Vada ] Ganadharavada .:427:. It is in this way, O Saumya ! that punya and papa are known as the karanas resembling their karyas viz sukha and duhkha. // 376 // (1924) The opponent may here ask as follows :kiM jaha muttamamuttassa kAraNaM taha suhAINaM kammaM / diTuM suhAikAraNamannAi jaheha taha kammaM ? // 377 // (1925) Kim jaha muttamamuttassa karanam taha suhainam kammam i Dittham suhaikaranamannai jaheha taha kammam ? 113771(1925) [kiM yathA mUrtamamUrtasya kAraNaM tathA sukhAdInAM krm| dRSTaM sukhAdikAraNamannAdi yatheha tathA karma 1 // 377 // (1925) Kim yatha murtamamurtasya karanam tatha sukhadinam karma l Dristam sukhadikaranamannadi yatheha tatha karma ? // 377 // Trans.--377 Is Karma the cause of sukha etc, as murta is the cause of amarta? ( And ) is Karma apprehended ( as the cause ) in the same way as food etc, are apprehended as the cause of happiness etc ? ( 1925 ) TIkA-kiM yathA mUrta nIlAdikamamUrtasya svapratibhAsijJAnasya kAraNaM hetustathA sukha-duHkhayoH puNya-pApAtmakaM karmApi mUrtameva sat kAraNam , yathA pratyakSata eva dRSTamannAdikam ; AdizabdAt srak-candanA-'GganA-hi-viSa-kaNTakAdikamiha sukha-duHkhayomUta tat kAraNaM tadvat karmApi tayoriti bhAvArthaH ? // 377 // (1925) ___D. C.-Just as a gem, garland, sandal-paste, woman, serpent, or a poisonous sting becomes the murta cause of the a-murta sukha and duhkha, should we accept Karma also whether good or bad-to be the murta and pratyaksa cause like food etc. ? // 377 // ( 1925 ) The answer is

Page #469
.: 428 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth hou tayaM ciya kiM kammaNA, na jaM tulasAhaNANaM pi / phalabhedao so'vassaM sakAraNo kAraNaM kammaM // 378 // (1926) Hou tayam ciya kim kammana, na jam tullasahananam pi Phalabhedao so'vassam sakarano karanam kammam // 378 // (1926) [ bhavatu tadeva kiM karmaNA, na yat tulyasAdhanAnAmapi / phalabhedataH so'vazyaM sakAraNaH kAraNaM karma || 378 || (1926 ) Bhavatu tadeva kim karmana, na yat tulyasadhananamapi | Phalabhedatah so'vasyam sa-karanah karanam karma ||378||(1926)] Trans.--378 ( The opponent may argue further that). " Let that ( i. e., food etc. ) be the cause of happiness etc." but what ( is the use ) of Karma? That is proper. In spite of there being equal materials, the difference in results has certainly ( some ) reason which is ( nothing but Karma ) ( 1926 ) TIkA - nanu tadeva dRSTamannAdikaM vastu tarhi sukhAdaiH kAraNamastu kimadRSTena tena karmaNA parikalpitena, atiprasaGgAt / tadetad na, yad yasmAt tulyAnyannAdIni sAdhanAni yeSAM te tulyasAdhanAH puruSAsteSAmapi phale sukhaduHkhalakSaNe kAryabhedaH phalabhedo mahAn dRzyate, tulye'pyannAdine bhukte kasyApyAhlAdaH, anyasya tu rogAdyutpattirdRzyata ityarthaH / yazcetthaM tulyAnnAdisAdhanAnAmapi phalabhedaH, so'vazyameva sakAraNaH, niSkAraNatve nityaM saccA'saccaprasaGgAt / yacca tatkAraNaM taddRSTaM karma, iti na tatkalpanA''narthyamiti / / 378 / / ( 1926 ) D. C. -- Acalabhrata : - Since food etc are directly apprehended, they could be taken as the causes of sukcha, duhkha, but what is the purpose of assuming Karma, which is absolutely imperceptible to be the cause? Bhagavan:-Persons having the same sadhanas like anna etc are found to enjoy different phalas like sukha and duhkha, In spite of their taking the same food, some people look glad

Page #470
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 429 :* while others appear gloomy. This sort of phala bheda is significant and is due to good or bad karma. // 378 // ( 1926 ) The murtata of Karma is now explained as follows: eto ci taM muttaM muttabalAhANao jahA kuMbho / dehAikajjamuttAio va bhaNie puNo bhai // 379 // (1927) Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalahanao jaha kumbho Dehaikajjamuttaio vva bhanie puno bhanai | 379 // ( 1927 ) [ etasmAdeva tad mUrtta mUrtabalAdhAnato yathA kumbhaH / dehAdikAryamUdita va bhaNite punarbhaNati || 379 / / ( 1927 ) Etasmadeva tad murtam murtabaladhanato yatha kumbhah Dehadikaryamurtadita iva bhanite punarbhanati n379 (1927)] Trans. - 379 On account of that reason, it is murta like ghata, on account of its ( capacity of ) strengthening the body, or on account of the karyas like deha etc. being murta. When thus told, he speaks again. ( 9127 ) ,, TIkA - yata eva tulyasAdhanAnAM karmanibandhanaH phalabhedaH, ata evo - cyate - mUrta karma, mUrtasya dehAderbalAdhAna kAritvAt, kumbhavat yathA nimitta - mAtrabhAvitvena ghaTo dehAdInAM balamAdhatte evaM karmApi, ato mUrtamityarthaH / athavA, mUrta karma, mUrtena srak - candanA - 'GganAdinA tasyopacayalakSaNasya balasyAdhIyamAnatvAt, kumbhavat yathA mUrtatvena tailAdinA balasyAdhIyamAnatvAt kumbho mUrtaH, evaM srak-candanAdinopacIyamAnatvAt karmAti mUrtamiti bhAvaH / yadivA, mRta karma, dehAdestatkAryasya mUrtasvAt paramANuvat yathA ghaTAde - statkAryasya mUrtasya darzanAt paramANavo mRtaH, evaM dehAdestatkAryasya mUrtasya darzanAt karmApi mRtamityarthaH / evaM bhaNite punarbhaNati paraH || 379 / / (1927) , D. C.-The murtatva of Karmas is explained in various ways1. Since the difference in phalus in case of those having the same sadhanas is due to Karma, the karma should be taken as murta,

Page #471
*: 430: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth 2. Karma is murta, because like ghata, it strengthens the karyas like body etc. 3. Just as ghata is murta, because it is strengthened by the murta objects like oil, etc, Karma is also murta, because it is also nourished by the objects like flower-garla nds and sandal-paste etc. 4. Just as the parinamas of ghata are murta, because ghata is murta, the karma is also murta, because its karyas like sarera etc are murta. // 379 // ( 1927 ) When thus answered by the Tirthankara, the opponent argues againto kiM dehAINaM muttattaNao tayaM havai muttaM / aha suha-dukkhAINaM kAraNabhAvAdarUvaM ti ? // 380 // (1928) To kim dehainam muttattanao tayam havai muttami Aha suha-dukkhainam karanabhavadaruvam ti ? 11 380 n ( 1928) [ tataH kiM dehAdInAM mUrtatvatastad bhavati mUrtam / atha sukha-duHkhAdInAM kAraNabhAvAdarUpamiti ? // 380 // (1928) Tatah kim debadinam murtatvatastad bhavati murtam , Atha sukba-duhkhadinam karanabhavadarupamiti ? 113801|(1928)] Trans.--380 Then does it become murta because of the corporeal nature, deha etc? Or, is it incorporeal because of sukha-duhkha etc, ( being incorporeal ) ? ( 1928 ) ____TIkA-tataH kiM dehAdInAM karmakAryANA mUrtAnAM darzanAt tat karma mRtaM bhavatu, Ahosvit sukha-duHkha-krodha-mAnAdInAM jIvapariNAmabhUtAnAM tatkAryANAmamUrtAnAM darzanAt tat kAraNabhAvanAmUrtamastu karma ? ityevaM . mUrtatvA-'mUrtatvAbhyAmubhayathApi tatkAryadarzanAt kiM mUrtam , amRtaM vA karma bhavatu ? iti nivedyatAmiti // 380 / / (1928) D. C.-By accepting your argument, Karma will become

Page #472
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 431... murta as well as a-murta. It will be murta because its karyas like deha etc are murta. At the same time, it will be called a-murta also, because its karyas and the jiva-parinamas such as sukha, duhkha, krodha, mana etc are a-murta. In such a case, should we take Karma as murta or co-murta ? 138011 (1928) Bhagavan replies:na suhAINaM heU kammaM ciya kintu tANa jIvo vi| hoi samavAikAraNamiyaraM kammati ko doso? // 381 // (1929) Na sahainam heu kammam ciya kintu tana jivo vil Hoi samavaikaranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? 1138111 (1929) [na sukhAdInAM hetuH karmaiva kintu teSAM jIvo'pi / bhavati samavAyikAraNamitarat karmeti ko doSaH 1 // 381 / / (1929) Na sukhadinam hetuh karmaiva kintu tesam jivo'pi 1 Bhavati samavayikaranamitarat karme'ti ko dosah ? |3810 (1929)] Trans.-381 Karma is not the only cause of happiness etc, but jiva is also their intimate cause Karma is the opposite one. What difficulty will arise ( in such a case ) ? ( 1929 ) TIkA-sukhAdInAM karmaiva kevalaM kAraNaM na bhavati, kintu jIvo'pi teSAM samavAyikAraNaM bhavati, karma punaritaradasamavAyikAraNaM bhavatIti ko doSaH 1 / idamuktaM bhavati-sukhAderamUrttatvena samavAyikAraNasya jIvasyAmUrtatvamastyeva, asamavAyikAraNasya tu karmaNaH sukhAdyamUrtatvenAmUrtatvaM na bhavatItyapIti na doSa iti // 381 // (1929) D. C.-Karma is not the only cause of sukha, duhkha etc. Really speaking, Jiva is the intimate cause of sukha etc and Karma is merely an accidental cause. Hence, on account of the a-murtatva of the karyas, viz sukh, duhkha ete their intimate cause viz piva does become a-murta but Karma being merely an accidantal cause does not become a-murta. So, there will be no difficulty as regards karma being accepted as murta. 1381||(1929)

Page #473
*: 482 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth Now, refuting the first assertion that the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of punya, the author statesiya rUvitte suha-dukkhakAraNatte ya kammuNo siddhe / puNNAvagarisametteNa dukkhabahulattaNamajuttaM // 382 // (1930) Iya ruvitte suha-dukkha karanatte ya kammuno siddhe i Punnavagarisamettena dukkhabahulattanamajuttam 1138211 (1930) [iti rUpitve sukha-duHkhakAraNatve ca karmaNaH siddhe / puNyApakarSamAtreNa duHkhabahulatvamayuktam / / 382 / / ( 1930) Iti rupitve sukha-duhkhakaranatve ca karmanah siddhe Punyapakarsamatrena duhkhabahulatvamayuktam ||3820 (1930)] Trans.-382 When Karma is proved to be murta and ( at the same time ) established as the cause of sukha-duhkha ( the theory that ) the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of virtuous actions, will fail. ( 1930 ) TIkA-ityevaM paJcavikalpopanyastasvabhAvavAdanirAsena puNya-pApAtmakasya karmaNaH sukha-duHkhakAraNatve rUpitve ca siddhe puNyApakarSamAtreNa yad duHkhabahulatvaM prathamavikalpopanyAse proktaM tadayuktamiti // 382 // (1930) D. C.-Now that the theory of svabhava has been refuted and the existence of a murta karma as the cause of sukha and duhkha, has been established we can easily refute the theory that the abundance of miseries is caused by the diminution of purnyas // 382 // ( 1930) kammappagarisajaNiyaM tadavassaM pgrisaannubhuuiio| sokkhappagarisabhUI jaha puNNappagarisappabhavA // 383 // (1931) Kammappagarisajaniyam tadavassam pagarisanubhuio Sokhhappagarisabhui jaha punnappagarisappabhava 1138311 (1931) [karmaprakarSajanitaM tadavazyaM prakarSAnubhUteH / saukhyaprakarSabhUtiyathA puNyaprakarSaprabhavA / / 383 // (1931 )

Page #474
Vada ] Ganadharavada :433 : Karnaprakarsajanitani tadavasyam prakarsanubhuteh 1 Saukhyaprakarsabhatiryatha punyaprakarsaprabhava // 383 // Trans.--383 Just as the experience of the abundance of happiness is caused by the abudance of virtuous actions, the experience of the abundance of miseries is also produced by the abundance of sinful actions. ( 1931 ) TIkA-tad duHkhabahulatvaM puNyApakarSajanitaM na bhavati, kintu svAnurUpakarmaprakarSajanitam , prakarSAnubhUtitvAt-vedanAprakarSAnubhavarUpatvAditi hetuH, yathA saukhyaprakarSAnubhUtiH svAnurUpakarmaprakarSaprabhaveti dRSTAntaH // 383 / / (1931) ___D. C.-Abundance of miseries is not due to the want of virtuous actions but it is due to the abundance of sinful actions, just as abundance of happiness is due to abundance of virtuous deeds, and not due to the diminution of sinful deeds. // 383 // ( 1931) Moreover, taha bajjhasAhaNappagarisaMgabhAvAdihaNNahA na tayaM / vivarIyabajjhasAhaNabalappagarisaM avekkhejjA // 384 // (1932) Taha bajjhasahanappagarisangabhavadihannaha na tayam i Vivariyabajjhasahanabalappagarisam avekkhejja // 384 // ( 1932 ) [ tathA bAhyasAdhanaprakarSAGgabhAvAdihAnyathA na tat / viparItabAhyasAdhanabalaprakarSamapekSeta / / 384 // ( 1932 ) Tatha bahyasadhanaprakarsangabhavadihangatha na tati Viparitabahyasadhanabalaprakarsamapekseta // 384 // (1932)] Trans.-384 It is so on account of the abundance of external elements also. ( For ), otherwise, it would not require the excessive force of the external ( as well as ) opposite elements. ( 1932 ) 65

Page #475
* 434 :* Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth TIkA- ' tathA ' ityupapacyantarArthaH / iha dehinAM duHkhabahulatvaM kevalapuNyApakarSamAtrajanitaM na bhavati / kutaH 1 ityatra hetumAha - bAhyAni yAnyaniSTAhArAdIni sAdhanAni teSAM yastadanurUpaH prakarSastasyAGgabhAvAt kAraNabhAvAditi / viparyaye bAdhakamAha-' ihetyAdi ' tad duHkhamanyathA yadi puNyApakarSamAtrajanyaM bhavet tadA puNyasaMpAdyeSTAhArApacayamAtrAdeva bhavet, na tu pApocayasaMpAdyAniSTAhArAdirUpaviparItabAhyasAdhanAnAM yad balaM sAmarthyaM tasya svAnurUpo yaH prakarSastamapekSeta / idamatra hRdayam - yadi puNyApakarSamAtrajanyaM duHkhaM bhavet, tadA puNyodaya prApyeSTAhArAdisAdhanApakarSamAtrAdeva bhavet, na caitadasti, iSTaviparItAniSTAhArAdisAdhanaprakarSasAmarthyAdeva tadbhAvAditi // 384 // (1932) D. C.-Abundance of miseries to the various beings in this world is not merely caused by the diminution of punyakarmas but by the abundant force of various external elements like forbidden food also. If it were not so, it would have been caused only by the diminution of prescribed food etc (to be attained by punya-karmas) and would never have depended upon the abundant force of the external but opposite elements like forbidden food etc (to be attained by papa-karmas) The main purport of the above argument is this:-If dehatva were to be generated by means of the diminution of punya-karmas only, it would have been produced only on account of the lack of external materials like istahara etc. But it is not so, as it is produced by the increasing force of the external but opposite materials like anistahara as well. | 384 || (1932) And, deho nAvacayakao puNNukkarise va muttimattAo / hoja va sahINatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya ? // 385 // (1933) Deho navacayakao punnukkarise va muttimattao Hojja va sa hinatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya? // 385 (1933)

Page #476
Vada ] Ganadharavada :435 [ deho nApacayakRtaH puNyotkarSa iva mUrtimattvAt / bhaved vA sa hInatarakaH kathamazubhataro mahAMzca ? // 385 // (1933) Deho napacayaksitah punyotkarsa iva murtimattvat i Bhaved va sa hinatarakah kathamasubhataro mabansca ? 1138511 Trans.--385 Since body is corporeal like the abundant punya karmas, it is not produced by ( means of ) diminution ( of punya karmas ). Or, if it is so, it should be small. ( For) how is a huge and (at the same time ) splendid ( body available ) ? ( 1933 ) ___TIkA-duHkhitahastyAdidehaH kevalapuNyApayamAtrakRto na bhavati, mUrtimaccAt , yathA puNyotkarSe tajanyo'nuttarasura-cakravAdidehaH, yazca puNyApacayamAtrajanyaH sa mRrtimAnapi na bhavati, yathA na ko'pi, yadi ca puNyApacayamAtreNa deho janyeta, tadA hInataraH zubha eva ca syAt , kathaM mahAn , azubhatarazca bhavet , mahato mahApuNyopacayajanyatvAt , azubhasya cAzubhakarmanirvaya'tvAt / puNyena punaraNIyasApi zubha eva deho janyeta, na tu duHkhitH| aNIyasApi hi suvarNalavenANIyAnapi sauvarNa eva ghaTo bhavati na tu mArtikaH, tAmrAditi // 385 // (1933) ____D. C.-Since the bodies of anuttarra gods including the Supreme Ruler of the World are murta, they are not produced by the diminution of punya karmas. In the same way, bodies like that of a miserable elephant etc are also not produced by the dimimution of punya karmas only as they are murta. For, that which has been produced by the diminution can never be murta. Still however, if a body is ever produced by diminution of punyas, it must be exquisitely feeble and auspicious. Because a body which is huge and at the same time auspicious, is produced by the accumulation of punyas, while that which is huge but in-auspicious is produced by the accumulation of papas. Hence, a body produced even by a small quantity of punyas must necessarily be happy and never un happy. Just

Page #477
*: 436 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth as, from a small lump of gold a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one, similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of punyas is always happy though small in form. // 385 // ( 1933 ) Refuting the second and third theories, the author statesevaM ciya vivarIyaM joejjA sabapAvapakkhe vi| na ya sAhAraNarUvaM kammaM takAraNAbhAvA // 386 // (1934) Evam ciya viyariyam joejja savvapavapakkhe vil Na ya saharanaruvam kammam takkaranabhava ll 386 ( 1934) [evameva viparItaM yojayet sarvapApapakSe'pi / na ca sAdhAraNarUpaM karma tatkAraNAbhAvAt // 386 // (1934) Evameva viparitam yojayet sarvapapapakse'pi 1 Na ca sadharanarupam karma, tatkaranabhavat ll 386 II (1934) Trans.--386 The same ( argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive papas, ( but ) in a reverse manner. And, ( there is ) nothing like a common karma ( containing punya and papa together ) because of the absence of its cause. ( 1934 ) 'TIkA-" sarva pApamevAsti, na tu puNyam, pApApacayamAtrajanyatvAt sukhasya " ityetasminnapi pakSe evameva kevalapuNyavAdoktadUSaNAd viparItagatyA sarva yojayet / yadyathA-pApApakarSamAtrajanitaM sukhaM na bhavati, pApAsyAlpIyaso'pi duHkhajanakatvAt / na hyaNIyAnapi viSalavaH svAsthyaheturbhavati / tasmAt puNyajanitamevAlpamapi sukhamityAdi svabuddhayA'bhyUhya vAcyam / iti pRthag duHkhayoHkAraNabhUte svatatre puNya-pApe eSTavye / ata eva sAdhAraNe api saMkIrNe puNya-pApe naiSTavye / kutaH ? ityAha-' na yetyAdi' na ca sAdhAraNarUpaM saMkIrNasvabhAvaM puNya-pApatmakamekaM karmAsti, tasyaivaMbhUtasya karmaNaH kAraNAbhAvAt / atra prayogaH-nAsti saMkIrNobhayarUpaM karma, asaMbhAvyamAnaivaMvidhakAraNatvAt , bandhyAputravaditi // 386 // (1934) .

Page #478
Vada ] Ganadharavada .:437:D.-C.-In case of the theory that everything is papa and there is nothing like punya and that 'sukha is also produced by the diminution of papa, the same argument stated above should be applied but in a reverse manner in this way:Since even a small portion of papa produces duhkha like a small particle of poison, it could never be said that sukha is produced by the diminution of papa. Even a fraction of happiness is produced by punya and never by papre and so on. These arguments clearly indicate that punya and papa are absolutely separate entities producing sukha and duhkha respectively. So, both could never be taken as one combined entity as laid down in the third theory. Such a combined Karma has no hetu whatsoever. And hence, like a son to a barren woman it is entirely impossible. // 386 / / ( 1934 ) In support of the argument, the author continueskammaM joganimittaM subho-'subho vA sa egasamayammi / hoja na u ubhayarUvo kammaM pi tao tayaNurUvaM // 387 // (1935) Kammam joganimittam subho'subho va sa egasamayammi i Hojja na u ubhayaruvo kammam pi tao tayanuruvam 13871(1935) [karma yoganimittaM zubho'zubho vA sa ekasamaye / bhaved na tUbhayarUpaH karmA'pi tatastadanurUpam / / 387 // (1935) Karma yoganimittam subho'subho va sa ekasamaye 1 Bhaved na tubhayarupah karma'pi tatastadanurupam (1387|1(1935)] Trans.--387 Karma is caused by contact which is either auspicious or inauspicious at one time, but never in both the forms. So, Karma is also similar to it. ( 1935 ) ___TIkA-mithyAtvA-'virati-pramAda-kaSAya-yogA bandhahetava iti paryante yogAbhidhAnAt sarvatra karmabandhahetutvasya yogAvinAbhAvAd yogAnAmeva bandhahetutvamiti karma yoganimittamucyate / sa ca mano-vAk-kAyAtmako

Page #479
: 438 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth yoga ekasmin samaye zubho'zubho vA bhavet , na tUmayarUpaH, ata: kAraNAnurUpatvAt kAryasya karmApi tadanurUpaM zubhaM puNyarUpaM badhyate, azubhaM vA pAparUpaM badhyate, na tu saMkIrNasvabhAvamubhayarUpameka daiva badhyata iti // 387 // (1935) D. C.-Perversion (mithyatva ) incontinence (a-virati ) stupidity ( kasaya ) idleness (pramada ) and contact (yoga ) are the various causes of karma-bandha. Out of these, yoga or contact with the outer world is the principal cause. This contact is divided as. 1. Bodily contact, 2 Mental contact and 3 the Contact of Actions. It is either s'ubha or a-s'ubha at one time, but never in a combined state of s'ubhas'ubha at the same time. Now, since this yoga is the karana and karma, the karya, the latter shoul be similar to the former. Hence, there cannot exist a karma containing punya and papa combined together. When there pervades a-s'ubha yoga the s'ubha Karma-in the form of virtuous deeds-is produced and when there is a-s'ubha yoga, the a-s'ubha karma of sinful deeds is produced. But Karma could never exist in a combined state of s'ubhas'ubha as yoga never exists in a combined state. 113871(1935) Now the author states an objection and its reply naNu maNa-vai-kAogA subhAsubhA vi samayammi dIsaMti / davammi mIsabhAvo bhaveja na u bhAvakaraNammi // 388 // (1936) Nanu mana-vai-kaoga subhasubha vi samayammi disanti Davvammi misabhavo bhavejja na u bhavakaranammi 113881(1936) [ nanu mano-vAk-kAyayogAH zubhAzubhA api samaye dRzyante / dravye mizrabhAvo bhaved na tu bhAvakaraNe // 388 // (1936) Nanu mano-vak-kayayogah subhasubha api samaye dresyante i Dravye misrabhavo bhaved na tu bhavakarane // 388 // (1936)]

Page #480
Vada ] Ganadharavada 0:489 Trans.--388 "Even subha and a-subha contacts pertaining to mind speech and body are perceived at (the same ) time." " The state of mixture would be ( possible ) in ( case of ) abstract ( ones )." ( 1936 ) TIkA-nanu mano-vAk-kAyayogAH zubhAzubhAzca mizrA ityarthaH, ekasmin samaye dRzyante, tat kathamucyate-"subho'subho vA sa egasamayammi" iti ? tathAhi-kiJcidavidhinA dAnAdivitaraNaM cintayataH zubhAzubho manoyogaH, tathA, kimapyavidhinaiva dAnAdidharmamupadizataH zubhAzubho vAgyogaH, tathA, kimapyavidhinaiva jinapUjA-vandanakAdikAyaceSTAM kurvataH zubhAzubhakAyayoga iti / tadetadayuktam / kutaH ? ityAha-" davammItyAdi " idamuktaM bhavati-iha dvividho yogaH-dravyataH, bhAvatazca / tatra mano-vAk-kAyayogapravartakAni dravyANi, mano-vAk-kAyaparispandAtmako yogazca dravyayogaH; yastvetadubhayarUpayogaheturadhyavasAyaH sa bhaavyogH| tatra zubhAzubharUpANAM yathoktacintA-dezanA-kAyaceSTAnAM pravartake dvividhe'pi dravyayoge vyavahAranayadarzanavivakSAmAtreNa bhavedapi zubhAzubhatvalakSaNo mizrabhAvaH, na tu manovAk-kAyayoganivandhanAdhyavasAyarUpe bhAvakaraNe bhAvAtmake yoge| ayamabhiprAyaH-dravyayogo vyavahAranayadarzanena zubhAzubharUpo'pISyate, nizcayanayena tu so'pi zubho'zubho vA kevalaH samasti, yathoktacintA-dezanAdipravartakadravyayogANAmapi zubhAzubharUpamizrANAM tanmatenAbhAvAt ; mano-vAk-kAyadravyayoganivandhanAdhyavasAyarUpe tu bhAvakaraNe bhAvayoge zubhAzubharUpo mizrabhAvo nAsti, nizcayanayadarzanasyaivAgame'tra vivakSitatvAt / na hi zubhAnyazubhAni vA'dhyavasAyasthAnAni muktvA zubhAzubhAdhyavasAyasthAnarUpastRtIyo rAzirAgame kvacidapISyate, yenAdhyavasAyarUpe bhAvayoge zubhAzubhatvaM syAditi bhaavH| tasmAd bhAvayoga ekasmin samaye zubho'zubho vA bhavati na tu mishrH| tataH karmApi tatpratyayaM pRthak puNyarUpaM pAparUpaM vA badhyate, na tu mizrarUpamiti sthitam // 388 // (1936 ) ____D. C.--Acalabhrata:-The combined state of subha and a-s'ubha contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not according to the prescribed

Page #481
.: 440 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The ninth rules. That belonging to speech takes place when the observances of deeds like munificence etc, are advised but against the proper rules. The mis'rabhava of the bodily contact is apprehended when a person actually performs the ceremony of worship and bowing down etc, to the Tirthankaras without following the prescribed customs. In this way, it is quite easy to apprehend the three types of yogas in a mixed state of s'ubha and a-s'ubha at the same time. Bhagavani.Your assumption is wrongly based. Yoga comes into existence in two ways -(1) By virtue of the contact with concrete substance and ( 2 ) by means of contact with abstract (objects). The concrete substances that come into contact with mind, speech, and body and the process of arousing mind, speech and body, form the dravya-yoga; while the mental effort which acts as the cause of contact on the part of both-s. e. substance as well the process-is known as the bhava-yoga. The composite state of s'ubla and a-s'ubha taken together is possible is case of dravya-yoga of all the three varieties belonging respectively to mind, speech, and body-from the practical point of view. But it is never possible in case of bhava-yoga. It is important to note, therefore, that from the practical point of view, the mis'rabhava of s'ubha and a-subha combined together may be admitted in case of dravya-yoga, but it is never possible in case of dravya-yoga of definite assertion. In case of bhava-yoga, the mos'rabhava is neither possible from the practical point of view nor with regard to definite assertion. Moreover in agamas also, there is no mention of the composite state of s'ubhas'ubha-yoga, as a third variety coming after s'ubha and a-s'ubha varieties of mental effort. Hence, in case of bhava-yoga, there cannot exist a mixed entity of

Page #482
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 441 : s'ubha's'ubha-yoga but either a s'ubha-yogu or a-s'ubha-yoga is possible. On account of the same reasons, Karma is also formed of s'ubha or a-s'ubha deeds separately, but never of s'ubha and a-s'ubha combined together. 1 388 ) ( 1936 ) ___And, jhANaM subhamasubhaM vA na u mIsaM jaM ca jhANavirame vi / lesA subhA'subhA vA subhamasubhaM vA tao kammaM // 389 // (1937) Jhanam subhamasubham va na u misam jam ca jhanavirame vi i Lesa subha'subhava subhamasubham va tao kammam 1389|(1937) [ dhyAnaM zubhamazubhaM vA na tu mizraM yacca dhyAnavirame'pi / lezyA zubhA'zubhA vA zubhamazubhaM vA tataH karma // 389 // (1937) Dhyanam subhamasubham va na tu misram yacca dhyanaviramo'pi | Lesya subhasubha va subhamasubham va tatah karma ll 389 11 Trans.-389 Meditation is either auspicious or in-auspicious but never composite ( of both ). For, even at the end of meditation, the conflict is either subha or a-subha. Hence, harma. is also either ( of ) virtuous (type ) or ( of ) evil ( type ). ( 1937) ____TIkA-dhyAnaM yasmAdAgame ekadA dharma-zukladhyAnAtmakaM zubham , ArtaraudrAtmakamazubhaM vA nirdiSTam , na tu zubhAzubharUpam , yasmAca dhyAnoparame'pi lezyA taijasIprabhRtikA zubhA, kApotIpramukhA vA'zubhekadA proktA, na tu zubhAzubharUpAH; dhyAnalezyAtmakAzca bhAvayogAH, tatastepyekadA zubhA azubhA vA bhavanti na tu mishraaH| tato bhAvayoganimittaM karmApyekadA puNyAtmakaM zubhaM badhyate, pApAtmakamazubhaM vA badhyate, na tu mizramiti // 389 // (1937) D. C.-It has been laid down in the agamas that dhyana is either s'ubha i. e. inspired by a religious or guileless motive or a-s'ubha 2. e. inspired by vile or dreadful motive at one time, but it could never be inspired by both the motives at the

Page #483
1442 Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth same time. Even at the end of dhyana, the conflict at work is spoken of either as s'ubha (i. e, dominated by lustrous and such other characterstics) or as a-subha (i.e. dominated by illominous elements) but it could never be known as s'ubha'-s'ubha. The bhava-yogas are composed of meditations as well as the conflicts. So, bhava-yogas are also either s'ubha or a-s'ubha separately but never mis'ra. Consequently, Kurma should also be taken either as s'ubha or a-s'ubha taken separately and never as s'ubha's'ubha taken together. 1138911 (1937) Moreover, puvagahiyaM ca kammaM pariNAmavaseNa mIsayaM nejaa| iyareyarabhAvaM vA sammA-micchAiM na u gahaNe // 390 // (1938) Puvvagahiyam ca kammam parinamavasena misayam nejja | Iyareyarabhavam va samma-micchaim na u gahane 1139011 (1938) [ pUrvagRhItaM ca karma pariNAmavazena mizratAM nayet / itaretarabhAva vA samyak-mithyAtve na tu grahaNe // 390 // (1938) Purvagrihitam ca karma parinamavasena misratam nayet i Itaretarabhavam va samyak-mithyatve na tu grabane 1139011(1938)] Trans.--390 A pre-apprehended Karma may attain the composite state, on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But ( that is ) not ( so) at the time of ( new ) apprehension. ( 1939 ) TIkA-'vA' ityathavA, etadadyApi saMbhAvyate yat-pUrva gRhItaM pUrva baddhaM mithyAtvalakSaNaM karma pariNAmavazAt puJjatrayaM kurvan mizratAM samyag-mithyAtvapuJjarUpA prApayediti itaretarabhAvaM vA nayet samyaktvaM mithyAtvaM veti / idamuktaM bhavati-pUrvabaddhAna mithyAtvapudgalAn vizuddhapariNAmaH san zodhayitvA samyaktvarUpatAM nayet, avizuddhapariNAmastu rasamutkarSa nItvA samyaktvapudgalAn mithyAtvapuJje saMkramayya mithyAtvarUpatAM nayet , iti pUrvagRhItasya

Page #484
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 443 : sattAvartinaH karmaNa iMdaM kuryAt / grahaNakAle punarna mizraM puNyapAparUpatayA saMkIrNasvabhAvaM karma banAti, nApItaraditararUpatAM nayatIti // 390 // (1938) D. C.--The composite state of Karma could be explained in this way also:--A Karma which is apprehended previously may attain s'ubha, a-s'ubha or mis'ra condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure parinamas would purify the previous evil pudgalas and turn them right, while on the other hand, impure parinamas would spoil the previous virtuous pudgalas by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the parinamas which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the Karma into a composite state of virtue and vice. In this way, with regard to Karma of former existence, three states-viz s'ubha, a-s'ubha and s'ubhas'ubha-are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of Karma, the parinama is not able to form a composite Karma of punya and papa combined together and hence there are only two states. ll 390 II ( 1938) Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vide versa referred to above, is explained as follows:mottUNa AuyaM khalu desaNamohaM carittamohaM ca / HANI 201$ui 3 af FEAT HETT 11388 11 (8878) Mottuna auyam khalu damsanamoham carittamoham ca i Sesanam pagainam uttaravihisamkamo bhajjo u 391 11 ( 1939 ) [muktvA''yuSkaM khalu darzanamohaM cAritramohaM ca / zeSANAM prakRtInAmuttaravidhisaMkramo bhAjyaH // 391 // (1939) Muktva ayuskam khalu darsanamoham caritra moham ca i Sosanam praksitinamuttaravidhisamkramo bhajyah 11 391 (1939)] Trans.-391 Excepting the ( constituents belonging to )

Page #485
.: 444 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth ayuh, infatuation of darsana, ( undifferentiated knowledge and infatuation of caritra (right conduct ), transformations of the latter parts of the remaining characteristics should be accepted. ( 1939) TIkA-iha jJAnAvaraNAdimUlaprakRtInAmanyonyaM saMkramaH kadApi na bhavatyeva, uttaraprakRtInAM tu nijanijamUlaprakRtyabhinnAnAM parasparaM bhavatIti / tatra cAyaM vidhiH-" mottUNa AuyaM " iti jAtipradhAno nirdeza iti bahuvacanamatra draSTavyam-catvAryAyUMSi muktveti / ekasyA AyurlakSaNAyA nijamUlaprakRterabhinnAnAmapi caturNAmAyuSAmanyoya saMkramo na bhavatIti tadvarjanam / tathA, darzanamohaM cAritramohaM ca muktvA; ekasyA mohanIyalakSaNAyAH svamUlaprakRterabhinnayorapi darzanamoha-cAritramohayoranyonyaM saMkramo na bhavatItyarthaH / uktazeSANAM tu prakRtInAm , kathaMbhUtAnAm ? ityAha-"uttaravihi tti" vidhayo bhedAH, uttare ca te vidhayazcottarevidhaya uttarabhedAstadbhUtAnAmuttaraprakRtirUpANAmiti tAtparyam / kim ? ityAha-saMkramo bhAjyo bhajanIyaH / ____ bhajanA caivaM draSTavyA-yAH kila jJAnAvaraNapazcaka-darzanAvaraNanavakakaSAyaSoDazaka-mithyAtva-bhaya-jugupsA-taijasa-kArmaNa-varNAdicatuSkA-gurulaghU-paghAta-nirmANA-'ntarAyapaJcakalakSaNAH saptacatvAriMzad dhruvabandhinya uttaraprakRtayaH, tAsAM nijaikamUlaprakRtyabhinnAnAmanyonyaM saMkramaH sadaiva bhavati; yathA jJAnAvaraNapaJcakAntarvartini matijJAnAvaraNe zrutajJAnAvaraNAdIni, teSvapi matijJAnAvaraNaM saMkrAmatItyAdi / yAstu zeSA adhruvabandhinyastAsAM nijaikamUlaprakRtyabhedavartinInAmapi badhyamAnAyAmabadhyamAnA saMkrAmati, na tvabadhyamAnAyAM badhyamAnA; yathA sAte badhyamAne'sAtamabadhyamAnaM saMkrAmati, na tu badhyamAnamabadhyamAne; ityAdi vAcyamiti / eSa prakRtisaMkrame vidhiH / zeSastu pradezAdisaMkramavidhiH "mUlaprakRtyabhinnAsu vedyamAnAsu saMkramaH bhavati" ityAdinA sthAnAntarAdavaseya ityalaM prasaGgeneti // 391 // 1939 // D. C-The process of prakriti samkrama ( mutual trans formation of various characteristics ) is explained as follows: + Ayuh Karma.

Page #486
Vada ] Ganadharadava .: 445.30 (1) Prakriti-sam krama is not possible in case of original prakrits like jnanavarana etc. But in case of characteristics which are acquired later on, mutual transition does take place even though they are not different from their respective original characteristics. (2) Four varieties of the characteristics of ayuh, and the infatuations of dars'ana and caritra ( right conduct ) are exceptions to the above rule. In spite of these prakritis being a-bhinna from their respective original prakritis, they do not undergo mutual transition. (3) There are 47 uttara-prakrutis, which undergo mutual transition. They are enumerated as follows:-5 types of pranavaranas, 9 types of dars'anavaranas, 16 types of dullness; perversion, fear, contempt, the characteristic of lustre, the karmana characteristic; 4 characteristics of colour etc; one that is neither too long nor too short; characteristics of destruction and construction; and 5 types of obstructio All these 47 uttara-prakritis of definite bandha, always undergo mutual transition e.g., out of five types of pranavaranas noted above, the souti-ianavarana could be transformed into mato-jnanavarana and vice versa. In case of other prakritis that have not been actually bound up, one that has no proper bandha may be transformod into one having proper bandha, but the process does not work vice versa, i. e. a prakriti of proper bundha does not change into a prakriti without bandha. This is the process of prakriti-samkrama. The process of transition in case of other prades'as ete is understood from the sentence: " Mula prakrityabhinnasu vedyamanasu sumkraniah bhavati" eto. implying that when they are known to be similar to the original prakritis they undergo transformation. Il 391 || ( 1939)

Page #487
*: 446 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth The separate characteristics of punya and papa are _explained-- now sohaNavaNNAiguNaM subhANubhAvaM ca jaM tayaM puNNaM / vivarIyamao pAvaM na bAyaraM nAisuhumaM ca // 392 // (1940) Sohanavannaigunam subhanubhavam ca jam tayam punnam Vivariyamao pavam na bayaram naisuhumam ca || 392 || (1940) [ zobhana varNAdiguNaM zubhAnubhAvaM ca yat tat puNyam / viparItamataH pApaM na bAdaraM nAtisUkSmaM ca // 392 ( 1940 ) Sobhanavarnadigunam s'ubhanubhavam ca yat tat punyam Viparitamatah papam na badaram natisuksmam ca // 392 (1940)] Trans.-392 (A karma) possessed of properties like bright colour etc and good fruition is called punya. Papa is ( exactly) opposite to it. ( Both of them are ) neither too huge nor too subtle. ( 1940 ) TIkA - zobhanAH zubhA varNAdayo varNa- gandha-rasa - sparzalakSaNA guNA yasya tacchobhanavarNAdiguNam, tathA yacchubhAnubhAvaM zubhavipAkamityarthaH, tat puNyamabhidhIyate / yat punarataH puNyAd viparItalakSaNam - azubhavarNAdiguNam, azubhavipAkaM cetyarthaH, tat pApamucyate / etaccobhayamapi kathaM bhUtam 1 ityAhana mervAdibhAvena pariNataskandhavadatibAdaram, sUkSmeNa karmavargaNAdravyeNa niSpannatvAt ; nApi paramANvAdivadatisUkSmamiti // 392 // / 1940 // D. C.-A. Karma having splendid colours, odour, taste, and touch, is known as punya. Papa is opposite to punya. So, its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like Meru etc nor too minute like paramanu, because they are produced by the multiplication of various karmas. // 392 // 1940 ) gioes tajjogaM ciya reNuM puriso jahA kayabbhaMgo / egakkhettogADhaM jIvo savappaesehiM // 393 // ( 1941 )

Page #488
Vada ] Ganadharavada Ginhai tajjogam ciya renum puriso jaha kayabbhango Egakkhettogadham jivo savvappaesehim // 393 // ( 1941 ) [ gRhAti tadyogyameva reNuM puruSo yathA kRtAbhyaGgaH / eka kSetrAvagADhaM jIvaH sarvapradezaiH // 393 // ( 1941 ) * 447: Grinhati tadyogyameva renum puruso yatha kritabhyangah | Ekaksetravagadham jivah sarva- pradesain // 393 || ( 1941 ) ] Trans.-393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the same region, the Soul also catches (a substance) which is worthy of that (Karma), and situated in the same region, by means of all ( its ) regions. ( 1941 ) " TIkA - tasya puNya-pApAtmakasya karmaNo yogyameva karmavargaNAgataM dravyaM jIvo gRhNAti, na tu paramANvAdikam audArikAdivargaNAgataM vA'yogyamityarthaH / tadapyeka kSetrAvagADhameva gRhNAti, na tu svAvagADhapradezebhyo bhinnapradezAvagADhamityarthaH / tacca yathA tailAdikRtAbhyaGgaH puruSo reNuM gRhNAti tathA rAga-dveSaklinnasvarupo jIvo'pi gRhNAti, na tu nirhetukamiti bhAvaH / idaM ca sarvairapi svapradezairjIvo gRhNAti, na tu kaizcidityarthaH / uktaM ca egapaeso gADhaM sabapaesehiM kammuNo joggaM / baMdha jahutta he sAiyamaNAiyaM vAci // 1 // upazamazreNeH pratipatito mohanIyAdikaM karma sAdi banAti, zeSastvanavAptopazamazreNirjIvo'nAdyeva banAtItyartha iti / / 393 // ( 1941 ) D. C.-The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of papa-karmas and punya-karmas. So, it does not apprehend those like paramanus and audariku etc. which. are absolutely unfit. Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the same region as that of the Soul and none else. So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc catches dust, the Soul also being affected by raga-dvesa etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions.

Page #489
*: 448 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth It has therefore been said that, * Egapaesogadham sarvapaesehim kammuno joggam 1 Bandhai jahuttaheum saiyamanaiyam vavi Il [ Ekapradesavagadham sarvapradesaih karmano yogyam | Badhnati yathoktahetu sadikamanadikam vapi ] // 393 // (1941) At this stage, the opponent raises an objectionavisiTThapoggalaghaNe loe thuunntnnukmmpvibhaago| jujjeja, gahaNakAle subhA-'subhaviveyaNaM katto ? // 394 // (1942) Avisitthapoggalaghane loe thunatanukammapavibhago i Jujjejja gahanakale subha'subhaviveyanam katto ? // 394 // (1942) [ aviziSTapudgalaghane loke sthuultnukrmprvibhaagH|| yujyeta, grahaNakAle zubhA-'zubhavivecanaM kutaH ? // 394 // (1942) Avisistapudgalaghane loke sthulatanukarmapravibhagah | Yujyeta, grahanakale subhasubhavivecanam kutah? 11394||(1942)] ___ Trans.-394 In ( the midst of ) the world which is crowded with common pudgalas, divisions of coarse ( sthila) and subtle (Suksma) karmas would be justified ; ( but ) at the time of apprehension, how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. ( 1942 ) ___TIkA-nanvaviziSTaiH pratyAkAzapradezamanantAnantaH zubhA-'zubhAdibhedenAvyavasthitaiH pudgalaighano nirantaraM vyApto'yaM lokaH / tatazca grahaNakAle gRhNato jIvasya sthUla-sUkSmakarmapravibhAgo yujyeta; tato "na bAyaraM nAisuhumaM ca" iti vizeSaNamupapannam , etadvizeSaNaviziSTAdanyasya svabhAvata eva jIvairagrahaNAt / yattu zubhAzubhavivecanaM tat samayamAtrarUpe karmagrahaNakAle tatkSaNa eva gRhNato jIvasya kutaH saMbhAvyate ?-na kutazciditi parasyAbhiprAyaH / tatazca " sohaNavaNNAiguNaM " ityAdi vizeSaNaM na yujyata iti prerakAkUtamiti // 394 // (1942)

Page #490
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 449 : D. C.--This world is entirely filled with multitudes of common pudgalas scattered in all etherial regions without any distinction of s'ubha and a-s'ubha. When hiva apprehends these pudgalas it is able to recognize them as neither too sthula, nor too suksma, as java is not able to recognize sthula and suksma pudgalas. In such a case, it is possible that jiva is able to understand the distinction of sthula and suksma. But how is the distinction of s'ubha and a-s'ubha justified when jiva tries to apprehend the Karmca-pudgalas ? // 394 // ( 1942 ) The reply is avisiTuM ciya taM so pariNAmA-''sayasabhAvao khippaM / kurute subhamasubhaM vA gahaNe jIvo jahAhAraM // 395 // (1943) Avisittham ciya tam so parinama-"sayasabhavao khippam i Kurute subhamasubham va gahane jivo jahaharam 1395|1 (1943) [ aviziSTameva tat sa pariNAmA-''zrayasvabhAvataH kSipram / kurute zubhamazubhaM vA grahaNe jIvo yathA''hAram // 395 // (1943) Avisistaneva tat sa parinama"-srayasvabhavatah ksipram 1 Kurute subhamasubham vagrahanejivoyatha"-haram 13950(1943)] Trans.-395 It is common no doubt. ( But ) at the time of apprehension, the Soul turns it into subha or a-subha immediately, by virtue of its nature of resort and fruition as in case of food. ( 1943 ) TIkA-sa jIvastatkarma grahaNe grahaNakAle zubhA-'zubhAdivizeSaNAviziSTamapi gRhNana kSipraM tatkSaNameva zubhamazubhaM vA kurute-zubhA-'zubhavibhAgena vyavasthApayatItyarthaH / kutaH ? ityAha-"pariNAmA''sayasabhAvau ti" ihAzrayo dvividhakarmaNo jIva AzrayaH, karma tu zubhAzubhatvasya tasya dvividhasyApyAzrayasya svabhAva AzrayasvabhAvaH, pariNAmAzcAzrayasvabhAvazca pariNAmA *

Page #491
*:450: Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth ''zrayasvabhAvau, tAbhyAmetat kurute jIvaH / idamuktaM bhavati-jIvasya yaH zubho'zubho vA pariNAmo'dhyavasAyastadvazAd grahaNasamaya eva karmaNaH zubhatvamazubhatvaM vA janayati; tathA jIvasyApi karmAzrayabhUtasya sa ko'pi svabhAvo 'sti yena zubhA-'zubhatvena pariNamayanneva karma gRhNAti; tathA, karmaNo'pi zubhA- zubhabhAvAdyAzrayasya sa svabhAvaH-sa kazcid yogyatAvizeSo'sti, yena zubhA-'zubhapariNAmAnvitajIvena gRhyamANamevaitadrUpatayA pariNamati / upalakSaNaM caitat ; prakRti-sthitya-'nubhAgavaicitryam , pradezAnAmalpa-bahubhAgavaicitryaM ca jIvaH karmaNo grahaNasamaya eva sarva karotIti / uktaM ca gahaNasamayammi jIvo uppAei guNe sapaccayao savajiyANaMtaguNe kammapaesesu savesu // 1 // AuyabhAgo thovo nAme goe samo tao ahigo / AvaraNamaMtarAe sariso ahigo ya mohe vi // 2 // savvuvari veyaNIe bhAgo ahigo u kAraNaM kiMtu / suha-dukkhakAraNattA ThiI viseseNa sesAsu // 3 // iti // // 395 // (1943) D. C.-Although these multitudes of Karmas are not distinguished as s'ubha or a-s'ubha originally at the time of apprehension, jiva in mediately turns them s'ubha or a-s'ubha on account of parinama as well as as'raya. Jiva is the as'raya of Karma which again is the as'raya of s'ubhatva and a-s'ubhatva. By the help of this as'raya svabhava as well as the parinama, jiva apprehends Karma. So, at the time ef apprehension, s'ubhatva or a-s'ubhatva of Karmas depends upon s'ubha or a-s'ubha parinama produced by jiva. Jiva apprehends karma as s'ubha or a-s'ubha by virtue of its as'raya-svabhava. So, when Karma is apprehended by Jiva accompanied by s'ubha or a-s'ubha parinama, it is recognized either as s'ubha or a-s'ubha karma. As in the case of ahara,

Page #492
Vada] Ganadharavada the karma-pudgalas also immediately undergo change in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of Karma-pudgalas also undergo immediate changes. It has therefore been laid down that: Gahana samayammi jiva uppaei gune sa-paccayao Sarvajiyanantagune kammapaese su savvesu || 1 || Ayuyabhago thovo name goe samo tao ahigo | Avaranamantarae sariso ahigo ya mohevi || 2 || Savvuvari Veyanie bhago ahigo in karanam kintu | Suha-dukkhakaranatta thii visesena sesasu || 3 || 66 *: 451 :. [Grahanasamaye jiva utpadayati gunan svapratyayatah | Sarvajitanantagunan karma pradesesu sarvesu | 1 || Ayuskabhagah stoko namni gotre samastato'dhikah Avarane'ntaraye sadriso'dhikasca mohe'pi | 2 | Sarvopari Vedaniye bhago'dhikastu karanam kintu | Sukha-duhkha karanatvat sthitir visesena sesasu 131395 (1943)] The example of ahara stated above is explained in details as follows: pariNAmA -''sayavasao gheNUe jahA pao visamahissa / tullo vi tadAhAro taha puNNA - puNNapariNAmo // 396 // (1944) Parinama "sayavasao dhenue jaha pao visamahissa | Tullo vi tadaharo taha punna-'punna parinamo u 396 (1944) [ pariNAmA - zrayavazato dhenvA yathA payo viSamaheH / gensfq agierezaur goa1-sgoaqfkura: || 39EUR || (2988) Parinama-"srayavasato dhenva yatha payo visamaheh Tulyo'pi tadaharastatha punya-'punyaparinamah | 396 || (1944)] Trans.-396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

Page #493
.: 452 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth results as milk ( in case of cow ) and as poison ( in case of serpent ), so also, the result ( in case ) of punya and papa is ( different ) ( 1944 ) TIkA - " tadAhAro tti" tayorahi -dhenvorAhArastadAhAraH sa tulyo'pi dugdhAdiko gRhItaH pariNAmA -''zrayavazAd yathA dhenvAH payo dugdhaM bhavati, astu sa eva viSaM viSarUpatayA pariNamati, tathA tenaiva prakAreNa puNyASpuNyapariNAmaH / idamuktaM bhavati - asti sa kazcit tasyA''hArasya pariNAmo yena tulyospi sannAzrayavaicitryAd vicitratayA pariNamati; AzrayasyApyahidhenulakSaNasyAsti tattad nijasAmarthyam, yena tulyo'pi gRhIta AhArastattadrUpatayA pariNamate; tathA puNyapApayorupanayayojanA kRtaiveti // 396 // (1944) D. C.Although the food of cow and serpent is the same, that of cow results as milk while the same results as poison in case of serpent, on account of the distinction of parinama _and_ as'raya. So, in spite of aharas being the same, the result is not the same in both cases, because their as'rayas-Cow and serpent-are different. Like s'ubha-s'ubha as'raya, it also depends upon s'ubha-s'ubha parinama || 396 || (1944) 1 Or, it can be explained in this way also:jaha vegasarIram vi sArA - 'sArapariNAmayAmei / avisiTTho vAhAro taha kammasubhA - subhAvibhAgo // 397 // (1945) Jaha vegasarirammi vi sara'-saraparinamayamei | Avisittho vaharo taha kammasubha - 'subhavibhago // 397 (1945 ) [ yathA vaikazarIre'pi sArA - 'sArapariNAmatAmeti / aviziSTa ivAhArastathA karmazubhA - zubhavibhAgaH || 397 // (1945) Yatha vaikasarire 'pi sara'saraparinamatameti / Avisista ivaharastatha karmasubha' - subhavibhagah 397 (1945 ) ] Trans.-397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body, the distinction of Karma as subha and a-subha would also take place. (1945)

Page #494
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 453 :. TIkA-dhenu-viSadharayobhinne zarIra AhArasya pariNAmavaicitryaM drshitm| 'vA' ityathavA, yathaikasminnapi puruSAdizarIre'viziSTe'pyekarUpo'pyAhAro gRhItastatkSaNa eva sArA-'sArapariNAmatAmeti-rasA-'sRg-mAMsAdirasapariNAmaM mUtra-purISarUpamalapariNAmaM ca yugapadAgacchatItyarthaH, tathA karmaNo'pyaviziSTasya gRhItasya pariNAmA-''zrayavazAt zubhA-'zubhavibhAgo draSTavya iti // 397 // (1945) D. C.-Even in case of one and the same body and the same food, the food results either in substantial forms like bile chyle, blood and flesh etc. or in worthless forms like urine, foeces etc. immediately after it has been consumed. In the same way, s'ubha and a-s'ubha divisions in case of Karma, should also be recognized by reason of distinction of parinama and as'raya. Il 397 11 ( 1945 ) The author now, illustrates the distinction of punya and papa, and establishes their existence by means of agamas-- sAyaM samma hAsaM puris-ri-subhaau-naam-gottaaii| puNNaM, sesaM pAvaM neyaM savivAgamavivAgaM // 398 // (1946) Sayam sammam hasam purisa-rai-subhau-nama-gottaim i Punnam, sesam pavam neyam sa-vivagamavivagam 1139811 (1946) [sAtaM samyaktvaM hAsyaM puruSa-rati-zubhAyu-rnAma-gotrANi / puNyaM, zeSaM pApaM jJeyaM savipAkamavipAkam // 398 // (1946) Satam samyaktvam hasyam purusa-rati-subhayurnama-gotrani Punyam, sesam pupam jmeyam sa-vipakamavipakam ||398 // (1946)] Trans.-398 Comfort, right belief ( samyaktva ), mirth, masculine form love, and virtuous life, name and lineage-all these are known as punya (prakritis ). The rest should be known as papa (prakritis). (Both of them may be) with or without fruition. ( 1940 )

Page #495
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth TIkA - sAtAvedanIyam, zodhitamidhyAtvapudgalarUpaM samyaktvam, hAsyam, puruSaveda:, ratiH, zubhAyuH, nAma - gotrANi cetyetat sarvaM puNyamabhidhIyate / tatra nArakAyurvarjaM zeSamAyustrayaM zubham devadvika - yazaH - kIrti tIrthakara nAmAdyAH saptatriMzat prakRtayo nAmakarmaNi zubhAH, gotre punarucairgotraM zubham / etAH SaTcatvAriMzat prakRtayaH kila zubhatvAt puNyam / anye tu mohanIyabhedAn sarvAnapi jIvasya viparyAsahetutvAt pApameva manyante / tataH samyaktva - hAsya - puruSaveda - rativarjA dvicatvAriMzadeva prakRtayaH puNyam ; tadyathA 454: sAyaM uccAgoyaM nara- tiri - devAuyAI taha nAme | devadugaM maNuyadugaM paNidajAI ya taNupaNagaM // 1 // aMgovaMgANa tigaM paDhamaM saMghayaNameva saMThANaM / subhavaNNAica ke agurulahU taha ya paraghAyeM // 2 // UsAsaM AyAvaM ujjIya vihagagaI vi ya pasatthA | tasa - bAyara - pattaM patteya thiraM subhaM subhagaM // 3 // sussara Aja jasaM nimmiNa titthayarameva eyAo / bAyAlaM pagaIo puSNaM ti jiNehiM bhaNiAo // 4 // " bhaNitazeSAstu yA vyazItiprakRtayastat sarvamazubhatvAt pApaM vijJeyam / samyaktvaM kathamazubham - kathaM tat pApam ? iti cet / ucyate - rucirUpameva hi samyaktvaM zubhaM tacceha na vicAryate, kintu zodhitamithyAtvapudgalarUpam, tacca zaGkAdyanarthahetutvAdazubhameva azubhatvAcca pApam / samyagrucezcAtizayenAnAvArakatvAdupacAramAtra evedaM samyaktvamucyate, paramArthatastu mithyAtvamevaitat / ityalaM prasaGgena / idaM ca puNya-pApalakSaNamubhayamapi savipAkamavipAkaM ca mantavyam - yathA baddhaM tathaiva vipAkataH kiJcid vedyate kiJcittu mandarasaM nIrasaM vA kRtvA pradezodayenAvipAkaM vedyata ityarthaH / tadevaM puNyaM pApaM ca bhedena vyavasthApya nirastaH saMkIrNapuNya-pApapakSaH / > itazcAyamayuktaH - sarvasyApi sanmitrasukha - duHkhAkhyakAryaprasaGgAt ; na caitadasti devAdInAM kevalasukhAdhikyadarzanAt, nArakAdInAM kevaladuHkhaprAcuryanirNayAt / na ca sarvathA sanmitraikarUpasya hetoralpa - bahutvabhede'pi "

Page #496
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 455 :kAryasya pramANato'lpa-bahutvaM vihAya svarUpato bhedo yujyate / na hi mecakakAraNaprabhavaM kAryamanyatamavarNotkaTaM ghaTate / tasmAt sukhAtizayasyAnyad nimittam , anyacca duHkhAtizayasyeti / na ca sarvathaikarUpasya saMkIrNapuNyapApalakSaNasya hetoH sukhAtizayanibandhanaM puNyAMzavRddhiduHkhAtizayakAraNapApAMzahAnyA sukhAtizayaprabhAvAya kalpayituM nyAyyA, puNyAMza-pApAMzayorbheda prasaGgAt / tathAhi-yad vRddhAvapi yad na vardhate tat tato bhinnam ; yathA devadattavRddhAvapyavardhamAno yajJadattaH, na vardhate ca puNyAMzavRddhau pApAMzaH, tasmAt tato bhinno'sAviti / tasmAd na sarvathaikarUpatA puNya-pApAMzayorghaTate / karmasAmAnyarUpatayA tu yadyaso tayoriSyate tadA siddhasAdhyatA, sAta-yaza:-kIrtyAdeH puNyasya, asAtA-'yaza:-'kIAdestu pApasyAsmAbhirapi karmatvenaikatAyA abhyupagamAt / tasmAt puNya-pAparUpatayA vivikte eva puNya-pApe sta iti / tataH sukha-duHkhavaicitryanibandhanayoH puNya-pApayoryathoktanItyA sAdhitatvAd na kartavyastatsaMzayaH // 398 (1946) D. C.---(1) There are 46 characteristics which are s'ubha and are hence known as punya-praakrrites. They are enumerated as follows: Bestowing of gift; propriety of conduct etc purged of all impurities; mirth; masculine form; affection; the three types of ayus ( union or connection with body viz-divine, human, and toryanca, ) thirty-seven prakritis of Nama Karma (including birth as a Tirthankara ) and the noble lineage. (2) According to others, there are 42 prakratis under the category of punya. They insist that samyaktva, purusaveda, hasya and rati are papa-prakritis when they are contrary to the nature of jiva. Excepting these four prakritis, the remaining 42 prakritis are laid down by them as underSayam uccagoyam nara-tiri-devauyaim taha nave Devaduganm manuyadugam paninda-jal ya tanupanagam // 1 // Angovarigana tigam padhamam sanghayanameva santhanam i Subhavannaicaukkamagurulabu taha ya paraghiyam 112

Page #497
.: 456 :: Jinabhadra Gani's The ninth Usasam ayavam ujjoya vihagagal vi ya pasattha | Tasa-bayara-pajjattam patteya thiram subhan subhagam 11 3 11 Sussara aejja jasam nimini titthayarameva eyao 1 Bayalam pagaso punnam ti Jinehuu bhaniao 11 4 11 [ Satamuccair-gotram nara-tiryag-devayuskani tatha nadni 1 Devadvikam manujadvikam pancendriyajatis ca tanupancakam 11111 Angopanganam trikam prathamam sanhananameva sansthanam | Subhavarnadi catuskamagurulaghu tathaca paraghatam 11 2 11 Uochvasa atapa uddyoto vibayogatirapi prasasta / Trasa-badara-paryaptam pratyekam sthiram subham subhagam11311 Susvaramadeyan yaso nirmanam tairthakaramevaitah I Dvicatvarinsat praksitayah punyamiti Jinairbhanitah 11 4 11 ] The remaining 82 prakritis are recognized by them as pupa-prakirtas. If someone raises a question at this point that how would samyaktva be called papa-prakritz ? The answer would be this-The virtuous samyaktva whose natural inclination is undoubtedly s'ubhu, is not referred to in this case. The pudgalas that are classed under samyaktva, though purged out of all perversions, are a-s'ubha because of the evil elements like doubt etc. being present in them. So, they come under the category of papa. The purified pudgalas do not very much obstruct the nature of samyaktva. But they are classed under samyaktua merely by means of upacara, and really speaking they belong to the category of mithyatva. (3) Both-punya and papa-should either have fruition or no fruition. Hence, some Karmas are recognized in their original form on account of their vipakas, while others have either scanty juice ( rasa ) or no juice at all, and hence have very little vipaka. So, papa and punyu are recognized by virtue of their various regions of parinamu, and are distinguished from each other, on account of their mutually opposite qualities.

Page #498
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 457 (4) The view that punya and papa exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if Karma which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same time. But it does not happen so in reality. For, gods have almost everything of happiness and naralas are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of punya and papa, the theory that increase of punya causes abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of papa, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. Yajnadatta who does not grow fat with the growth of Devadatta is different from Devadatta. The uniform oneness of punya and papa is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assumption of Karma being common in both, there would be no difficulty. But so far as an individual is concerned, know it for certain that punya and papa are separate from each other as proved above, and hence 0 Bhadra ! it is not worthy of you to raise any doubt about it. Il 398 H ( 1946 ) Referring to the commandments of Vedas, the author statesasai bahi punna-pAve jamaggihottAiM saggakAmassa / OCH HET GROTE GT3T1FH 11 38811 (8886 ) Asai bahi punna-pave jamaggihottaim saggakamassa i Tadasambaddham savvain danaiphalam ca loammi il 399 II (1947) [ asatorbahiH puNya-pApayoragnihotrAdi svargakAmasya / tadasaMbaddhaM sarva dAnAdiphalaM ca loke // 399 // (1947 ) Asatorbahih puaya-papayoragnihotradi svargakamasya | Tadasambaddham sarvam danadiphalam ca loke 1139911 (1947)] 58

Page #499
.: 458 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth Trans. - 399 In ( case of ) punya and papa being absent, the commandment of the performance of the sacrifice etc. (prescribed) for one who aspires for Salvation, would become useless. Moreover, all sorts of fruition ( of the good turn ) like munificence etc, (welknown) in the world would also become null and void. ( 1947 ) 9 TIkA - puNya-pApayorasacce yadetad vahiragnihotrAdyanuSThAnaM svargakAmasya, yacca dAna- hiMsAdiphalaM puNya-pApAtmakaM loke prasiddhaM tat sarvamasaMbaddhaM syAt, svargasyApi puNyaphalatvAt, puNya-pApayozca bhavadabhiprAyeNAsatvAt tasmAdabhyupagantavye eva puNya-pApe / tadevaM vedavacanaprAmANyAt, yuktitazca cchinnastasya saMzaya iti / / 399 // (1947 ) 1 D. C.--If there were no punya-papa in this world, the commandment of the Vedas that one who aspires for Salvation should perform agnihotra etc, would be of no value. Moreover, the results of actions like dana and himsa in the forms of punya and papa respectively which are welknown in this world, would all be futile. Hence, take it for granted that punya and papa are existing, and leave off all your doubts. 399 (1947) Thus, chinnamma saMsayammI jiNeNa jara maraNaviSayamukkeNaM / so samaNo pavaio tihi o sahakhaMDiyasa ehiM // 400 // (1948) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim || 400 || ( 1948 ) [ chinne saMzaye jinena jarA - maraNavipramuktena | sa zramaNaH pravrajitastribhistu saha khaNDikazataiH || 400 / / ( 1948 ) Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maranavipramuktena | Sa sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih ||400 (1948)] Trans. - 400 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his three hundred pupils. (1948) End of the Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara.

Page #500
Chapter X dshmgnndhrvktvytaa| Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara te pavaie souM meajjo AgacchaI jiNasayAsaM / vaccAmi ya vaMdAmI vaMdittA pajjuvAsAmi // 401 // (1949) Te pavvaie soum Meajjo agacchai Jinasayasam | Vaccami ya vandami vanditta pajjuvasami // 401 // ( 1949 ) [tAn prabajitAn zrutvA metArya Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse // 401 // (1949) Tan pravrajitan srutva Metarya agacchati Jinasakasam Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase // 401 // ( 1949)] Trans.--401 Having heard that they have renounced the world, Metarya, comes before the Tirtharkara. (He thinks-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. ( 1949 ) AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-maraNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNNU savadarisI NaM // 402 // (1950) Abhattho ya Jinemam jai-jara-traranavippamukkenam i Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam // 402 // (1950) [ AbhASitazca jinena jAti-jarA-maraNavipramuktena / nAnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA // 402 // (1950)

Page #501
:: 460 : Jinabhadra Gani's The tenth Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jara-niaranavipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsini 402 // (1950 ) ] Trans.-402 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara, who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had (attained ) complete darsana. ( Undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1950 ) The Tirtharikara then said, kiM manne paraloo asthi natthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasi tesimo attho||403||(1951) Kim manne paraloo atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 403 // (1951) [kiM manyase paraloko'sti nAstIti saMzayastava / / vedapadAnAM cArthaM na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH // 403 // (1951) Kim manyase paraloko'sti nastiti samsayastava | Veda-padanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah 114031(1951)] Trans.-403 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But ( ca) you have not understood the ( real ) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their (real ) interpretation. (1951) TIkA-AyuSman metArya ! tvamevaM manyase-kiM bhavAntara gamanalakSaNaH paraloko'sti, nAsti vA ? iti / ayaM ca saMzayastava viruddhavedapadazrutinibandhano vartate / tAni ca " vijJAnaghana evaitebhyo bhUtebhyaH" ityAdIni prathamagaNadharoktAni drssttvyaani| "teSAM cArthaM na jAnAsi" ityAdi tthaiveti|| 403 // (1951) D. C.-0 long-lived Metarya! your doubt about the existence of para-loka has arisen from your hearing various Veda-padas bearing contradictory senses. These Veda-padas are "Vijnanaghana evaitebhyo bhutebhyo"

Page #502
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 461 :etc. which have already been discussed in the First Ganadhara-vada ll 403 11 ( 1951 ) The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows mannasi jai ceyapaNaM majaMgamau va bhayadhammo tti / to natthi paralogo tannAse jeNa tannAso // 404 // (1952) Mannasi jai ceyannam majjargamau vya bhuyadhammo tti i To natthi paralogo tannase jena tannaso il 404 11 ( 1952 ) [ manyase yadi caitanyaM madyAGgamada iva bhUtadharma iti / tato nAsti paralokastannAze yena tannAzaH // 404 // (1952) Mangase yadi caitanyam Dadyangamada iva bhutadharma iti 1 Tato nasti paralokastannase yena tannasah // 404 / / ( 1952)] Trans.-404 If you believe consciousness to be the property of bhutas, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the bhutas, the other world will not exist. (1952) ____TIkA-saumya! tvamevaM manyase-yadi tAvacaitanyaM pRthivyAdibhUtadharma:bhUtebhyo'narthAntarabhUtamityarthaH, yathA guDa-dhAtakyAdimadyAGgebhyo'nantaraM madadharmaH, tarhi nAstyavAntaragamanalakSaNaH paralokA, yena tannAze bhUtanAze tasyApi caitanyasya nAzo dhvaMso jAyate / yo hi yadanAntarabhUto dharmaH sa tadvinAze nazyatyeva, yathA paTAdidharmaH shukltvaadiH| tato bhUtaireva saha prAgeva naSTasya caitanyasya kuto bhavAntaragamanam ? iti / / 404 // (1952) D. C.-When you take cartanya as the property of a bhuta like prithvi, it will not be separate from bhutas, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and dhataki puspa etc. are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when bhutas meet destruction, their property viz caitanya will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

Page #503
*: 462 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth disappears with the cloth. So, when caitanya vanishes with the bhutas, how is it to go to the other world ? ||40411 (1952) Even by taking cartanya as different from bhutas, the existence of para-loka will not be established aha vi tadatthaMtarayA na ya niccattaNamao vi tadavatthaM / analassa vA'raNIo bhinnassa viNAsadhammassa // 405 // (1953) Aha vi tadatthantaraya na ya niccattanamao vi tadavattham Analassa varanio bhinnassa vinasadhammassa // 405 // ( 1953) [ athApi tadarthAntaratA na ca nityatvamato'pi tadavastham / analasyevA'raNito bhinnasya vinAzadharmaNaH // 405 // (1953) Athapi tadarthantarata na ca nityatvanato'pi tadavasthami Analasyevaranito bhinnasya vinasadharimanah // 405 // ( 1953 )] Trans.-405 And even if it is different, its perpetuality is not (established). Hence, like fire which is transitory and which is different from arani, it is transitory. ( 1953 ) TIkA-athApi tadarthAntaratA bhUtebhyo'rthAntaratA caitanyasyAbhyupagamyate, nanvato'pi tadavasthaM bhavAntaragAmitvAbhAvalakSaNaM dUSaNam ; ca zabdo yasmAdarthe, yato'rthAntarabhUtasyApi caitanyasya na nityatvam / kathaMbhUtasyotpattimatvena vinAzadharmakasya / kasya yathA'nityatvam ? ityAha-analasya / kathaMbhUtasya ? bhinnasya / kasya ? / arnniito'rnneH| idamuktaM bhavati-bhUtebhyo'rthAntaratve'pyanityaM caitanyam, utpattidharmakatvAt , araNikASTotpannatadbhinnAnalavaditi, yaccAnityaM tat kimapi kAlaM sthitvA'nalavadatrApi dhvaMsate, iti na tasya bhavAntarayAyitvam , ata itthamapi na paralokasiddhiriti / ___ atha pratipiNDaM bhinnAni bhUtadharmarUpANi bahUni caitanyAni neSyante, kintveka eva samastacaitanyAzrayaH sarvatribhuvanagato niSkriyazcAtmA'bhyupagamyate yata uktam

Page #504
Vada 1 Ganadharavada .: 463 : " eka eva hi bhUtAtmA bhUte bhUte vyavasthitaH / ekadhA bahudhA caiva dRzyate jalacandravat // 1 // " // 405 / / (1953) D. C.-Even if castanya were taken to be different from bhutas, it would not be able to go to the other world. For, like fire which is different from arani, cartanya is a-nitya, as it dies away after living for sometime. The existence of para-loka is not established from this point of view also. Some might not admit the existence of plenty of castanya: related to each and every bhuta, and might admit the existence of one all-pervading niskriya soul as said belowEka eva hi bhutatma bhute bhute vyavasthitah | Ekadba bahudha saiva dsisyate jalacandravat 11 [ There exists only one soul pervading each and every bhuta. Like moon ( reflected in ) water, it appears as one, and at the same time in many forms. ] // 405 // ( 1953 ) But even in such a case, there is no scope for para-loka, aha ego sabagao nikirio tahavi natthi prloo| saMsaraNAbhAvAo vomassa va sabapiDesu // 406 // (1954) Aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natthi paraloo Samsaranabhavao vomassa va savvapindesu 11 406 II ( 1954 ) [athaikaH sarvagato niSkiyastathApi nAsti paralokaH / saMsaraNAbhAvAd vyomna iva sarvapiNDeSu // 406 // ( 1954 ) Athaikah sarvagato niskriyastathapi nasti paralokah Samsaranabhavad vyomna iva sarvapindesu // 406 // ( 1954 )] ___ Trans.-406 If there exists one, all-pervading, inactive ( soul), then also, there would be nothing like para-loka because

Page #505
*: 464 :. Jinabhadra Gani's | The tenth of the lack of movement (on its part ) to all beings ( in spite of its being all-pervading ) like akasa. ( 1954 ) TIkA-athaikaH sarvagato niSkriyazcAtmA'bhyupagamyate, nanu tathApi na paralokagamanasiddhiH, tasyAtmanaH sarveSu go-manuSyAdipiNDeSu sarvagatatvena niSkiyatvena ca saMsaraNAbhAvAt , vyomavaditi / / 406 // ( 1954 ) D. C.-Even when the existence of one, all-pervading, inactive soul is accepted, the existence of para-loka will not be established. For, like akas'a, it is niskriya in spite of its being spread over all living beings | 406 11 ( 1954 ) The existence of para-loka can be doubted in this manner alsoihalogAo va paro surAilogo na so vi pnyckkho| evaM pi na paralogo subai ya suIsu to saMkA // 407 // (1955) Ihalogao va paro surailogo na so vi paccakkho 1 Evam pi na paralogo suvvai ya sussu to sanka 11 407 11 ( 1955 ) [ ihalokAd vA paraH surAdiloko na so'pi pratyakSaH / evamapi na paralokaH zrUyate ca zrutiSu tataH zaGkA // 407 / / (1955) Ihalokad va parah suradiloko na so'pi pratyaksah , Evamapi na paralokah srayate ca Srutisu tatah saika ||4071(1955)] ____Trans.-407 Or, it there is a world like that of gods etc. other than this world, that is also not directly perceived. So, para-loka does not exist even in that way. On the other hand, it has been heard ( about para-loka) in the sastras. Consequently, the doubt ( about para-loka ) has arisen. ( 1955 ) TIkA-athavA, ihalokApekSayA sura-nArakAdibhavaH paraloka ucyate, sa ca na pratyakSo dRzyate, ata evamapi na paralokaH sidhyati, zrUyate cAsau zrutiSu zAstreSu, tatastacchaGkA-kimasti nAsti vA ? / iti darzitaH pUrvapakSaH // 407 // (1955)

Page #506
Vada ] Ganadharavada 6:465 : ___D. C.-If the existence of some world like that of divine beings or hellish beings, is accepted since they, too, are not pratyaksa, their existence is also not acceptible. On the other hand, the S'astras refer to them and tell a lot of things about them. Your doubt about the existence of para-loka is based upon such mutually contradictory facts. // 407 // ( 1955 ) Here ends the purva-paksa The author now refutes the arguments of purva-paksa one after anotherbhUiMdiyAirittassa ceyaNA so ya davao nicco|| jAissaraNAIhi paDivajasu vAubhUi va // 408 // (1956) Bhuindiyairittassa ceyana so ya davvao nicco i Jaissaranaihim padivajjasu Vaubhui vva // 408 // ( 1956) [ bhUtendriyAtiriktasya cetanA sa ca dravyato nityaH / jAtismaraNAdibhiH pratipadyasva vAyubhUtiriva / / 408 // (1956 ) Bhutendriyatiriktasya cetana sa ca dravyato nityah | Jatismaranadibhih pratipadyasva Vayubhutiriva in 408 // ( 1956)] ___ Trans.-408 Consciousness belongs to ( the soul) which is distinguished from elements, as well as, sense-organs. Like Vayubhuti, know it for certain, therefore, that it is more perpetual than dravya by virtue of its ( power of) remembering the former birth etc. ( 1956 ) TIkA-iha bhUtendriyAtiriktasya pUrvAbhihitAnumAnAdipramANasiddhasyAtmana eva saMbandhinI cetanA mantavyA, na bhuutdhrmH| sa cAtmA jAtismaraNAdiheturdravyato nitya iti vAyubhUtiriva pratipadyasva / ato naikAntAnityatvapakSokto doSaH, paryAyata evA'syAnityatvAditi bhAvaH // 408 // (1956) D. C.-Cetana is not the property of bhutas, but it is the property of Soul, which is different from bhutas, as well as,

Page #507
: 466 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth indriyas, and the existence of which has already been established by means of anumanas and other evidences. This soul has already by accepted by Vayubhuti + as more nitya than dravya on account of its power of remembering its (previous) existence etc. You too, shall have to accept its nityatva, so that the fault of exclusive nityatva alleged by you does not arise. // 408 // ( 1956) And, na ya ego savagao nikirio lkkhnnaaibheaao| kuMbhAdau va bahavo paDivajja tarmidabhUi va // 409 // (1957) Na ya ego savvagao nikkirio lakkhanaibheao i Kumbhadau vva baliavo padivajja tamindabhui vva 1140911 (1957) [na caikaH sarvagato niSkriyo lakSaNAdibhedAt / / kumbhAdaya iva bahavaH pratipadyasva tadindrabhUtiriva / / 409 // (1957) Na caikah sarvagato niskriyo laksanadibhedat | Kumbhadaya iva bahavah pratipadyasva tadinadribhutiriva 11409|| Trans.-409 It is neither one, nor all-pervading, nor inactive. Like Indrabhuti, believe it as many (in number) like ghata etc. by reason of various characteristics. ( 1957) TIkA-na cAsmAbhireka AtmeSyate, kintu bhvH-anntaaH| kutaH ? / lakSaNabhedAt / upayogalakSaNo hi jIvaH, sa copayogo rAga-dveSa-kaSAyaviSayAdhyavasAyAdibhirbhidyamAna upAdhibhedAdAnantyaM pratipadyata ityanantA jIvAH, lakSaNabhedAt , ghaTAdivaditi / tathA, na sarvagata AtmA, kintu zarIramAtravyApakaH, tatraiva tadguNopalabdherityAdizabdopAtto hetuH, sparzanavaditi dRSTAntazca / evaM na niSkriya AtmA, bhoktRtvAt , devadattavaditi / tadetadindrabhUtiprathamagaNadharavat pratipadyasveti // 409 // (1957) D. C.-According to us, Soul is not one, but infinite in + Vide Chap III

Page #508
.:467:. Vada ] Ganadharadava number, by virtue of its different characteristics. Like ghata, pata etc, the Soul has various forms on account of various laksanas such as raga, dvesa, kasaya etc. Secondly, Soul is not all-pervading, but it pervadas the body alone. Thirdly, because it is the enjoyer like Devadatta, it is not niskriya. Thus, like Indrabhute,t you, too, shall have to admit 1140911 (1957) In reply to the argument that the existence of para-lokuu is denied because of the divine and hellish beings being a-pratyaksa, the author statesihalogAo ya paro somma ! surA nAragA ya prloo| paDivaja moriA-'kaMpiu va vihiyppmaannaao||410|| (1958) Ihalogao ya paro Somma! sura naraga ya paraloo I Padivajja Moria-"kampiu vva vihiyappamanao 11 410 11 ( 1958 ) [ ihalokAca paraH saumya ! surA nArakAzca paralokaH / pratipadyasva mauryA-'kampitAviva vihitapramANAt // 410 // (1958) Ihalokacca parah Saumya ! sura narakasca paralokah | Pratipadyasva Maurya'kampitaviva vihitapramanat // 4100(1958)] Trans.-410 Believe the world other than this, O Saumya! to be that of gods and Narakas on account of evidences that have been advanced ( in case ) of Maurya and Akampita.* (1958) The opponent will argue at this point thatjIvo viNNANamao taM cANicaM ti to na prlogo| aha viNNANAdaNNo to aNabhiNNo jahAgAsaM // 411 // (1959) itto cciya na sa kattA bhottA ya ao vi natthi paralogo / jaM ca na saMsArI so aNNANA-'muttio khaM va // 412 // (1960) + Vide Chapter 1 * Vide chapters VII and VIII,

Page #509
: 468 :___Jinabhadra Gani's (The tenth Jivo vinnanamao tam caniccam ti to na paralogo Aha vinnanadanno to anabhinno jahagasam 411 // ( 1959 ) Itto cciya na sa katta bhotta ya ao vi natthi paralogo i Jam ca na samsari so annana-'muttio kham va 11 412 u ( 1960 ) [jIvo vijJAnamayastaJcAnityamiti tato na paralokaH / atha vijJAnAdanyastato'nabhijJo yathA''kAzam // 411 // (1959) ita eva na sa kartA bhoktA cAto'pi nAsti paralokaH / yacca na saMsArI so'jJAnA-'mUrtita khamiva // 412 / / (1960) Jivo vijnamayastaccanityamiti tato na paralokah, Atha, vijnanadanyastato'nabhijio yatha'-kasam u 411 || ( 1959 ) ] Ita eva na sa karta bhokta cato'pi nasti paralokahi Yacca na samsari so'jnana-murtitah khamiva || 412 || ( 1960 )] Trans.-411-412 Jiva is ( said to be ) vijnanamaya and vijnana is a-nitya. So, there cannot be paraloka. If it is ( said to be ) different from vijnana, then also, jiva being ignorant like sky, it will neither be a doer nor an enjoyer, and then also, there will be no paraloka. ( For ), that which is ignorant and incorporeal like akasa, cannot belong to the mundane world. ( 1959-1960) __TIkA-vyAkhyA-jIvo vijJAnamayastAvad yuSmAbhiriSyate vijJAnAdabhinna ityarthaH / tacca vijJAnamanityaM vinazvaram , atastada bhinnasya jIvasyApi vinazvaratvAd na bhavAntaragamanalakSaNaH prlokH| atha vijJAnAdanyo jIvastato'nitye vijJAne jIvAd bhinne sati svayaM nityo'sAviti na prlokaabhaavH| yadyevam , tarhi anabhijJo jIvaH, vijJAnAdanyatvAt , AkAzavat , kASThAdivad vA / ata eva ca nityatvAdevAsau jIvo na kartA, nApi bhoktA / nityasya kartRtvAdyabhyupagame hi sarvadaiva tadbhAvaprasaGgaH, tasya sadaivaikarUpatvAt / kartRtvAbhAve ca na paralokaH, akRtasya tasyAbhyupagame siddhAnAmapi tatprasaGgAt / bhoktRtvAbhAve'pi na paralokaH, abhoktuH paralokahetubhUtakarmabhogAyogAt / ito'pi ca na paralokaH / kutaH ? ityAha-"jaM cetyAdi " yasmAcca nAsau

Page #510
Vada ] Ganadharavada -: 469 : saMsArI, nAsya jJAnAd bhinnasya jIvasya bhavAd bhavAntaragamanalakSaNaM saMsaraNamastItyarthaH / kutaH ? ityAha-svayamajJAnatvAt , kASThakhaNDavat / tathA, amartatvAt , AkAzavaditi / / 411-412 // (1959-1960) D. C.-Metarya:--You believe jiva to be vijnanamaya, Now, since vijnana is a-natya, javal will also be u-natya. Consequently, there will be no possiblity of going to the other world and there will be no para-loka also. On the other hand, if you take jiva to be different from vijnana, java will not be a-nitya, but being different from vajnana, it will be ignorant, or dull like sky or wood. Consequently, the soul will neither be karti ( doer ) nor bhokta ( enjoyer ). In absence of kartrritva, existence of para-lokaa will be denied. For, if para-loka is taken as existing even in absence of kartaitva, the Siddha beings that have already attained absolute Liberation will attain para-loka. In absence of bhoktratva also, there will be no para-loka, because the soul which is nutya but not bhokta, will not be able to attain para-loka in absence of Karma, which acts as the cause of passing to the other world, This jiva, therefore, being distinguished from givana does not belong to the mundane world, as it has no passage to the other world on account of its ignorance like that of wood, and u-murtatvaa like that of akas' co. // 411-412 // ( 1959-1960) The reply is, mannasi viNAsi ceo uppattimadAdio jahA kuNbho| naNu eyaM ciya sAhaNamaviNAsittevi se somma! // 413 // (1961) Mannasi vinasi ceo uppattimadadio jaha kumbho 1 Nanu eyam ciya sahanavinasitte vi se Somma! // 413 // (1961) [ manyase vinAzi ceta utpattimadAdito yathA kumbhH| nanvetadeva sAdhanamavinAzitve'pi tasya saumya ! // 413 // (1961) Manyase vinasi ceta utpattimadadito yatha kumbhahi Nanvetadeva sadhanamavinasitve'pi tusya Saumya ! 11413||(1961)]

Page #511
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The tenth Trans.-413 You take consciousness to be destructible like ghata on account of its ( having ) production etc. ( Because ) in ( case of ) its indestructibility also, the same is the cause, O Saumya ! ( 1961 ) *: 470: TIkA - nanu " jIvo viNNANamao taM cANicaM " iti bruvANo nUnaM tvamevaM manyase - vinAzi vinazvaraM cetazcetanA caitanyaM vijJAnamiti yAvat / utpattimatvAditi hetuH / yathA kumbha iti dRSTAnta: / AdizabdAt " paryAyatvAt" ityAdikospi heturvaktavyaH / yo hi paryAyaH sa sarvo'pyanityaH, yathA stambhAdInAM nava-purANAdiparyAyaH / tatazcAnityAccaitanyAdabhinnatve jIvasyAcayanityatvAt paralokAbhAva iti tavAbhiprAyaH / na cAyaM yuktaH, yato hanta ! naikAntena vijJAnamanityam, yato'vinAzitve'pi " se " tasya vijJAnasyaitadeva saumya ! tvaduktaM sAdhanaM pramANaM vartate / tato'naikAntikasvadukto heturiti bhAvaH / idamuktaM bhavati - utpAda - vyaya - dhrauvyAtmakaM vastu / tatazca yathotpattimanvAd vinAzitvaM sidhyati tathA dhauvyAtmakatvAd vastunaH kathaJcid nityatvamapi sidhyati / tatazvedamapi zakyate vaktum - nityaM vijJAnam, utpattimatvAt, ghaTavat / tatazca kathaJcinnityAd vijJAnAdabhinnasya jIvasya nityatvAd na paralokAbhAva iti / / 413 || ( 1961 ) D. C. - Since cantanya is susceptible to production, and exists in various forms due to various specific characteristics, you have accepted it to be a-nitya. That which exists in various forms due to various paryayas, is a-nitya like paryayas as in the case of old and new paryayas of pillar etc. Thus, the Soul which is a-bhinna from the a-nitya caitanya, is taken as a-nitya by you, who have denied the existence of para-loka. But that is not correct. Caitanya-vijnana is not exclusively a-nitya, but any how, it is reatya to a certain extent also. Every object is susceptible to three conditions-production, destruction and perpetuality. So, just as a-nityata is established by you on account of utpatti, nityata could also be established by means of the condition of perpetuality. It could easily be stated, therefore, that vijnana is nulya like ghata, and on

Page #512
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 471 :. account of the nityatva of jiva, there is no w-bhava of para-loka. // 413 // ( 1961) Or, ahavA vatthuttaNao viNAsi ceo na hoi kuMbho cha / uppattimadAditte kahamaviNAsI ghaDo, buddhI ? // 414 // (1962) Ahava vatthuttanao vinasi ceo na hoi kumbho vva 1 Uppattimadaditte kahamavinasi ghado, buddhi ? // 414 // ( 1962 ) [athavA vastutvato vinAzi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva / utpattimadAditve kathamavinAzI ghaTo, buddhiH 1 // 414 // ( 1962 ) Athava vastutvato vinasi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva i Utpattimadaditve kathamavinasi ghato, buddhih ? 11414||(1962) ] Trans.-414 Or, consciousness does not become destructible like ghata on account of its being a ( definite) object. ( The question may be that ) " How could ghata be indestructible when it is suceptible to production etc ? " ( 1962 ) ____TIkA-ekAntena vinAzi vinazvaraM ceto vijJAnaM na bhavati, vastutvAt , kumbhavat / tato'sya pratyunumAnasyopasthApanAd viruddhAvyabhicAryapyutpattimattvalakSaNo hetuH| yaduktam-"naNu eyaM ciya sAhaNamaviNAsitte vi" ityAdi, tatra parasyevaM buddhiH syAt / kathaMbhUtA buddhiH ? ityAha-kathamutpattimatvAd dRSTAntatvenApanyasto ghaTo'vinAzI sidhyati ?-na kathaJcit , ghaTesya vinAzitvena supratItatvAt / tatazca dRSTAnte'vinAzitvasyAsiddherrAntike vijJAne tad na sidhyatIti parasyAbhiprAya iti // 414 // (1962) D. C.-Consciouness is never destructible exclusively on account of its being a definite vastu like ghata Metarya:--When ghata is susceptible to production etc, how should it be considered indestructible? It is recognized as destructible by all. Thus when indestructibilty of ghata is

Page #513
*: 472 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The tenth not proved in the illustration stated above, indestructibility ( in case ) of vijnana also, will not be proved. // 414 // (1962) Bhagavan replies - rUva-rasa-gaMdha-phAsA saMkhA sNtthaann-dr-sttiio| kuMbho tti jao tAo pasUi-vicchitti-dhuvadhammA // 415 // (1963) Ruva-rasa-gandha-phasa samkha santhana-davva-sattio 1 Kumbho tti jao tao pasui-vicchitti-dhuvadhamma // 415 // ( 1963) [rUpa-rasa-gandha-sparzAH saMkhyA sNsthaan-drvy-shktyH| kumbha iti yatastAH prsuuti-vyvcchitti-dhruvdhrmaannH||415||(1963) Rupa-rasa-gandhu-sparsah samkha samsthana-dravya-saktayah / Kumbha iti yata stah prasuti-vyavacchitti-dhruvadharmanah 1141511 ___Trans.-415 Form, taste, odour, touch, number, configuration, matter, and energy form kumbha. For, all of them possess the characteristics of production, destructibility and perpetuality. ( 1963 ). TIkA-iha rUpa-rasa-gandha-sparzalakSaNo guNasamudAyaH, ekalakSaNA saMkhyA, pRthubudhnodarAdyAkAralakSaNaM saMsthAnam , mRdravyam , jalAharANAdizaktizcetyetAni samuditAni yataH kumbha ityucyate, tAzca rUpa-rasa-gandhasparza-saMkhyA-saMsthAna-dravya-zaktayaH prasUti-vicchitti-dhrauvyadharmiNya utpAdavyaya-dhrauvyasvarUpAH, tata utpattimattvAdavinAzyapi ghaTaH sidhyati // 415 // (1963) D. C.--A group of properties such as form, taste, odour, and touch; the number one etc., configuration like that of broad portion from the middle ete; matter ( in the form ) of earth; and capacity for holding water; all these properties combine together and form ghuta. Each one of these properties is again perceptible to production, destructibility and perpetuality. Ghata is, therefore, nitya inspite of its being utpattimat. ||415|| (1963)

Page #514
Vada ] Ganadharavada *478 : Explaining the same in details the author proceeds-- iha piNDo pinnddaagaar-sttipjjaayvilysmkaalN| uppajai kuMbhAgAra-sattipajjAyasaveNa // 416 // (1964) rUvAiM davayAe na jAi na ya vei teNa so nicco| evaM uppAya-vaya-dhuvassahAvaM mayaM savaM // 417 // (1965) Iha pindo pindagara-sattipajjayavilayasamakalam i Uppajjai kumbhagara-sattipajjayaruvena 1 416 11 ( 1964 ) Ruvaim davvayae na jai na ya vei tena so nicco 1 Evam uppaya-vvaya-dhuvassahavam mayam savvam 1141711 (1965) [iha piNDaH piNDAkAra-zaktiparyAyavilayasamakAlam / utpadyate kumbhAkAra-zaktiparyAyarUpeNa // 416 // (1964 ) rUpAdidravyatayA na jAyate na ca vyeti tena sa nityaH / evamutpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvaM mataM sarvam / / 417 / / (1965) Iba pindah pindakara-saktiparyayavilayasamakalam | Utpadyate kumbhakara-sakti paryaya rupena // 416 // ( 1964)] Rupadi dravyataya na jayate na ca vyeti tena sa nityah | Evamutpada-vyaya-dbrauvgasvabhavam matam sarvam 1417||(1965)] Trans ----416-417 The lump (of earth) in this case, is produced in the specific characteristics of the shape and capacity of kambha at the same time when it is destroyed in the specific characteristics of its (own) shape and capacity. It is produced and destroyed neither by (virtue of) its form etc nor by ( virtue of ) its matter. It is, therefore, ( called ) nitya. Everything is thus believed to possess the conditions of ( being susceptible to ) production, destructibility and perpetuality. ( 1964-1965) TIkA-iha mRtpiNDaH kartA / yo'yaM vRttasaMsthAnarUpaH svakIyo mRtpi60

Page #515
*: 474 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth NDAkAraH, zaktizca yA kAcidAtmIyA, etadubhayalakSaNo yaH paryAyastasya yo vilayo vinAzastatsamakAlamevAsAvutpadyate mRtpiNDaH / kena ? ityAhapRthubudhnodarAdiko yaH kumbhAkAraH, tacchaktizca yA jalAharaNAdiviSayA, etadubhayalakSaNo yaH paryAyastenotpadyate / rUpa-rasa-gandha-sparzarUpatayA mRdravyarUpatayA cAsau mRtpiNDo na jAyate, nApi vyeti vinazyati / tatastadrUpatayA nityo'yamucyate, tena rUpeNa tasya sadaivAvasthitatvAt / tadevaM mRtpiNDo nijAkArasvazaktirUpatayA vinazyati, ghaTAkAra-tacchaktirUpatayotpadyate, rUpAdibhAvena mRdadravyarUpatayA cAvatiSThata, ityutpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvo'yamucyate / evaM ghaTo'pi pUrvaparyAyeNa vinazyati, ghaTAkAratayA tatpadyate, rUpAditvena mRdrvyatayA cAvatiSThata ityasAvapyutpAda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvamevAbhimataM tIrthakRtAm / tatazca yathotpattimattvAd vinAzitvaM ghaTe sidhyati tathA'vinAzitvamapi / tathA ca sati sAdhyadharmiNi caitanye'pi tatsiddhiriti / tadevaM caitanyAdavyatirikto'pi jIvaH kathaJcid nitya eva // 416-417 // (1964-1965) D. C.-Properties like the shape and capacity of the lump of earth, vanish and at the same time, ghata-having its peculiar shape and its capacity of holding water-is produced. The lump of earth is neither produced nor destroyed in the form of rupa-rasa-gandha-spars'a or dravya. It continues to exist perpetually in these forms. Thus, the lump of earth vanishes in the form of the shape and capacity of ghata, and exists for ever in the form of rupa, rasa, gandha, spars'a and dravya. Similarly, ghata also vanishes in the form of its former paryayas, and comes into existence with new paryayas of ghatakara, and lasts for ever in the form of paryayas of rupa etc. as well as dravya Consequently, it has also the svabhava of utpatti, vyaya and dhrauvya. Such is not the case with ghata only, but it is the nature of each and every object of the Universe. So, like destructibility, in-destructibility of ghata is also due to the hetus like utpattimattva etc. Consequently, in case of cartanya and atma also, the nityata shoud be admitted. // 416-417 // ( 1964-1965)

Page #516
Vsda ] . Ganadharavada .: 475 :. Indicating the existence of para-loka thereby, the author statesghaDaceyaNayA nAso paDaceyaNayA samubbhavo samayaM / saMtANeNAvatthA taheha-paraloa-jIvANaM // 418 // (1966) maNuehaloganAso surAiparalogasaMbhavo samayaM / jIvatayA'vatthANaM nehabhavo neya paraloo // 419 // (1967) Ghadaceyanaya naso padaceyanaya samubbhavo samayam i Santanenavattha taheha-paralia-jivanam // 418 // ( 1966) Manuehaloganaso suraiparaloga sambhavo samayam i Jivataya'vatthanam nehabhavo neya paraloo // 419 // ( 1967 ) [ ghaTacetanayA nAzaH paTacetanayA samudbhavaH samakam / saMtAnenAvasthA tatheha-paraloka-jIvAnAm // 418 / / ( 1966) manujehalokanAzaH surAdiparalokasaMbhavaH samakam / jIvatayA'vasthAnaM nehabhavo naiva paralokaH / / 419 // (1967) Ghatacetanaya nasah patacetanaya samadbhavah sama kami Santanenavastha tatheha-paraloka-jivanam // 418 // (1966) Manujehalokanasah suradiparalokasambhavah samakami Jivata ya'vasthanam nehabhavo naiva paralokah || 419 11 ( 1967 ) ] Trans.--418-419 Destruction of the cognizance of ghata, production of the cognizance of pata, and retention of their continuous range, are (apprehended ) all at a time. The same is the case with this world, the other world, and the jiva. Vanishing of this human world and coming into existence of the world like that of divine beings are simultaneous. Retention in the state of) jiva is neither this world nor the other world. ( 1966-1967 ) TIkA-ghaTaviSaya vijJAnaM ghaTacetanocyate, paTaviSayaM tu vijJAnaM pttcetnaa|

Page #517
.: 476 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth yadA ca ghaTavijJAnAnantaraM paTavijJAnamupajAyate jIvasya, tadA ghaTacetanayA ghaTavijJAnarUpeNa tasya nAza ucyate, paTacetanayA tu paTavijJAnarUpeNa "samaya" yugapadeva samudbhava utpAdaH, anAdikAlapravRttena tu cetanAsaMtAnena nirvizeSaNena jIvattvamAtreNAvasthAnamiti / evaM ca yathehabhave'pi tiSThato jIvasyotpAdavyaya-dhrovyasvabhAvatrayaM darzitam ; tathA paralokaM gatA jIvAH paralokajIvAsteSAmapyetat svabhAvatrayaM dRSTavyam / tadyathA-yadA manuSyo mRtvA suralokAdAvutpadyate tadA manuSyarUpa ihaloko manuSyehalokastasya nAzaH, tatsamakAlameva ca surAdiparalokasya saMbhava utpAdaH, jIvatayA tvavasthAnam / tasyAM ca jIvatvAvasthAyAM vivakSitAyAM nehabhavo vivakSyate, nApi surAdiparaloko vivakSyate, kintu niSparyAyaM jIva-dravyamAtrameva vivakSyate / tadevamutpAdavyaya-dhrauvyasvabhAvatve jIvasya na paralokAbhAva iti // 418-419 // ( 1966-1967) D. C.-Cognizance about ghata is called ghata-cetana, and that about pata is called pata-cetana. When jiva acquires the cognizance of pata after that of ghata, vanishing of ghata, production in the form of pata, and retention in the form of eternal java, are simultaneous. Utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya are therefore, the three generic characteristios of jiva, as well as, of those who have passed to the other world. When a person is born in deva-loka after death, he undergoes the state of destruction as regards this world, production as regards deva-loka, and permanent avasthana as regards java. When a person is said to exist in the state of jivatva, it is neither said to exist in this world nor in the other world like that of gods etc. Jiva is called mere dravya without any sort of paryaya. Thus, since jiva has the tendency of undergoing utpuda, vyaya and dhrauvya, there is no abhava of the other world. || 418-419 // ( 1966-1967 ) In reply to the question whether all objects possess all the three characteristics, the author states

Page #518
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 477 : asao natthi pasUI, hoja va jai, hou kharavisANassa / na ya sabahA viNAso savvuccheyappasaMgAo // 420 // (1968) to'vatthiyassa keNavi vilao dhammeNa bhavaNamannaNa / savvuccheo na mao saMvavahArovarohAo // 421 // (1969) Asao natthi pasui, hojja va jai, hou kharavisanassa / Na ya sarvaha vinaso savvuccheyappasangao // 420 // ( 1968 ) To'vatthiyassa kenavi vilao dhammena bhavanamannena i Savvuccheo na mao samvavaharovarohao // 421 // ( 1969 ) [asato nAsti prasUtiH, bhaved vA yadi, bhavatu kharaviSANasya / na ca sarvathA vinAzaH sarvocchedaprasaGgAt / / 420 // (1968) tato'vasthitasya kenApi vilayo dharmeNa bhavanamanyena / sarvocchedo na mataH saMvyavahAroparodhAt // 421 // (1969) Asato nasti prasutih, bhaved va yadi, bhavatu khara-visanasyai Na ca sarvatha vina.sah sarvocchedaprasangat | 420 // ( 1968) Tato'vasthitasya kenapi vilayo dharmena bhavanamanyena i Sarvocchedo na matah samvyavaharoparodhat || 42111 (1969)] Trans.--420-421 The non-existant has no production. If it has, there would be production of the horn of an ass (also ). Nor, is there exclusive destruction. (For ), it would result in destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of an object existing in a perpetual range by one means and production (of the same) by other means. For fear of obstruction to the mutual usage, exclusive destruction ( of everything ) is not acceptible. ( 1968-1969) ' TIkA-ihaikAntena sarvathA'sato vastunaH prasUtirutpattirnAsti na ghttte| atha bhavati, tarhi kharaviSANasyApi bhavatu, amaccAvizeSAt / tasmAt kenApi rUpeNa sadevotpadyate / na ca sataH sarvathA vinAzaH, kramazaH sarvasyApi

Page #519
.:.478 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth nAraka-tiryagAderucchedaprasaGgAt / tatastasmAt tasyAvasthitasya jIvAderasti kenApi manuSyatvAdidharmeNa vilayo vinAzaH, anyena tu surAdirUpeNa bhavanamutpAdaH, sarvocchedastu na matastIrthakRtAm , saMvyavahAroparodhAt-anyathA vyavahArocchedaprasaGgAdityarthaH; tathAhi-rAjapucyA krIDAhetubhUtaM sauvarNakalazakaM bhaktvA rAjatanayasya krIDArthameva kanduko ghaTitaH; tato rAjaputryAH zokaH, kumArasya tu harSaH, suvarNasvAminazca narapateraudAsInyam , suvarNasyobhayAvasthAyAmapyavinaSTatvAt , ityAdiko yo'sau lokavyavahArastasya sarvasyApyutpAdavyaya-dhrauvyAtmakavastvanabhyupagame samucchedaH syAta / tasmAta kathaJcidavasthitatve jIvasya na paralokAbhAva iti // 420-421 // (1968-1969) ____D. C.-An object which is absolutely a-vidyamanaa can never undergo production. For, if the production of an a-vidyamana object is admitted, non-existent objects like khara-visana will also come into existence, which is utterly impossible. It is only a vidyamana object that undergoes production. Secondly, there is no exclusive destruction of a vidyamana object If there were absolute destruction of everything, even naraki and tiryanca beings would be absolutely destroyed. Jiva etc. which are always avasthita, undergo vinas'a by means of characteristics such as that of manusyatva etc. On the other hand, they undergo production by means of characteristics like that of divine beings etcBut exclusive destruction of all, is never possible for fear of the violation of usual vyavahara. Take an example to understand it more clearly :-Having broken a golden jar belonging to a princess, a ball was made of gold for a prince. On account of that, sorrow on the part of the princess, joy on the part of the prince, and gold being retained in the same quantity in the form of ball as well as jar, indifference on the part of king who is the owner of gold, constitute loka-vyavahara. If we do not accept utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya in case of all objects, violation of this loka-vyavahara will undoubtedly take place. In case of jiva being avasthita, there is no para-lokabhava. // 420-421 // ( 1968-1969)

Page #520
Vada ] Ganadharavada .:479.:. And, asai va parammi loe jamagnihottAiM saggakAmassa / tadasaMbaddhaM savaM dANAiphalaM ca loAmmi // 422 // (1970) Asai va parammi loe jamaggihottaim saggakamassa i Tadasambandham savvam danaiphalam ca loammi 114220 (1970) [ asati vA parasmilloke yadagnihotrAdi svargakAmasya / tadasaMbaddha sarva dAnAdiphalaM ca loke // 422 // (1970) Asati va parasminlloke yadagnihotradi svargakamasya i Tadasambaddham sarvam danadiphalam ca loke // 422 // ( 1970)] Trans.--422 In case of the other world being absent ( the commendment of the performance of ) sacrifice etc. for a person aspiring for Salvation, would be useless. Moreover, the fruition of (goon turns like ) munificence etc. (welknown ) in this world, would also be null and void. ( 1970 ) chinnammi saMzayammI jiNeNa jr-mrnnvippmukkennN| . so samaNo pavaio tihi osaha khaNDiyasaehiM // 423 // (1971) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam i So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim // 423 // (1971) [chinne saMzaye jinena jarA-maraNavipramuktena / sa zramaNaH pravajitastribhistu saha khaNDikazataiH / / 423 // (1971) Chinne sansaye Jinena jara-marana vipramuktena | Sa Sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih // 423 // (1971)] Trans.--423 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his three hundred pupils. ( 1971 ) End of the Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara.

Page #521
Chapter XI ekAdazagaNadharavaktavyatA Discussion with the Eleventh Canadhara te pavaie souM pahAso AgacchaI jiNasayAsaM / vaccAmi Na vaMdAmI vaMditA pajjuvAsAmi // 424 // (1972) Te pavvaie soum Pahaso agacchai Jinasayasam i Vaccami na vandami vanditia pajjuvasami 11 424 u ( 1972 ) [ tAn pravrajitAn zrutvA prabhAsa Agacchati jinasakAzam / vrajAmi vande vanditvA paryupAse / / 424 // (1972) Tan pravrajitan srutva Prabhasa agacchati Jinasakasam i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase // // 424 // ( 1972 )] Trans.--424 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Prabhasa, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks-) I shall go, pay my homages, and worship him. ( 1972 ) Then, AbhaTTho ya jiNeNaM jAi-jarA-bharaNavippamukkeNaM / nAmeNa ya gotteNa ya savaNNU savadarisI NaM // 425 // (1973) Abhattho ya Jinenam jai-jara-maranavippamukkenam i Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam // 425 // (1973)

Page #522
Vada ] Ganadharavada [ AbhASita jinena jAti - jarA - maraNavipramuktena / nAmnA ca gotreNa ca sarvajJena sarvadarzinA / / 425 // ( 1973 ) abhasitasca Jinena jati- jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina // 425 // ( 1973 ) ] .: 481 :. Trans-425 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darsana ( undifferentiated knowledge). (1973) Having thus addressed him, the Bhagavan said-- kiM manne nivANaM asthi natthi tti saMsao tujjha / veyapayANa ya atthaM na yANasI tesimo attho ||426 // (1974) Kim manne nivvanam atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha Veyapayana ya attham na yanasi tesimo attho // 426 // ( 1974 ) [ kiM manyase nirvANamasti nAstIti saMzayastava / vedApadAnAM cArthaM na jAnAsi teSAmayamarthaH || 426 // ( 1974 ) Kim manyase nirvanamasti nastiti samsayastava | Veda-padanam cartham na janasi tesamayamarthah ||426|| (1974)] Trans.--426 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether nirvana (final emancipation) exists or not. But (ca ) you have not understood the ( real ) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. ( 1974 ) 66 TIkA - he AyuSman ! prabhAsa ! tvamevaM manyase - kiM nirvANamasti na vA ? iti / ayaM ca saMzayastava viruddhavedapadazravaNanibandhanaH / tAni cAmUni vedapadAni - " jarAma vaitat sarvaM yadagnihotram " / tathA, " saiSA guhA dukhagAhA / tathA, " dve brahmaNI paramaparaM ca tatra paraM satyaM jJAnamanantaraM bA' iti / eteSAM cAyamarthastavacetasi vartate yadetadagnihotraM tajjarAmaryameva " 17 61

Page #523
*:482. Jinabhadra Gaai's ( The eleventh yAvajIvaM kartavyamiti / agnihotrakriyA ca bhUtavadhahetutvAcchabalarUpA / sA ca svargaphalaiva syAd nApavargaphalA / " yAvajIvam" iti cokte kAlAntaraM nAsti yatrApavargahetubhUtakriyAntarArambhaH syAt / tasmAt sAdhanAbhAvAd mokSAbhAvaH / tatazcetyAdikAni kila mokSAbhAvapratipAdakAni / zeSANi tu tadastitvasUcakAni, yato guhA'tra muktirUpA, sA ca saMsArAbhinandinAM duravagAhA, duSpravezAt / tathA, paraM brahma satyaM mokSaH, anantaraM tu brahma jJAnamiti / tato mokSAstitvaM nAstitvaM ca vedapadapratipAditamavagamya tava sNshyH| tatraiSAM vedapadAnAmarthaM tvaM na jAnAsi, yatasteSAmayamoM vakSyamANalakSaNa iti // 426 // (1974) ___D. C.-0 long-lived Prabhasa ! your doubt about the existence of moksa is based upon your hearing various Vedapadas of contradictory senses. These Veda-padas are as follows:(1) " Jara-maryam vaitat sarvnm yadagnihotram." (2) " Saisa guha duravagaha " ( 3 ) " Dive bralamand paramaparam_ca, testoraa param_satyam gnanamantaram brahma " etc. These Veda-padas are interpreted by you as follows:(1) Agnihotra should be practised as long as life persists. The performance of agnihotra constitutes the sacrifice of animals which would turn it subha or a-s'ubha. But that would award the attainment of svarga alone and not moksa. Since by this commandment, performance of agnihotra is advised to be practised throughout life, there would be no other period of time during which some other performance for the attainment of moksa could be advised. In absence of sadhana, therefore, the sadhya ( viz moksa ) does not exist. In this way, this sentence proves the abhava of moksa. The other two padas try to establish the existence of moksa in this way

Page #524
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 488 : (2) The cave of moksa is difficult to be entered by the samsarts. ( 3 ) There are two types of Brahma:-- 1. The Param Brahma or principal Brahma is moksa and a-param or subordinate Brahma is jnana. Your doubt has sprung up from these Veda-padas which bear contradictory senses. But you have not grasped their real interpretation. Here, I give their correct interpretation. Please listen carefully. // 426 | (1974) Bhagavan now states the opponent's view and refutes it, manasi kiM dIvassa va nAso nivANamassa jIvassa ? | dukkhakkhayAirUvA kiM hojja va se sao'vatthA ? // 427 // (1975) Mannasi kim divassa va naso nivvanamassa jivassa ? Dukkhakkhayairuva kim hojja va se sao'vattha ? // 427 // (1975) [ manyase kiM dIpasyeva nAzo nirvANamasya jIvasya ? duHkhakSayAdirUpA kiM bhaved vA tasya satosvasthA ? ||427|| (1975) Manyase kim dipasyeva naso nirvanamasya jivasya ? Duhkhaksayadirupa kim bhaved va tasya sato 'vastha? // 427 (1975) ] Trans.-427 Do you think the nirvana (extinction of life ) to be similar to the extinction of lamp ? Or, would the positive existence of soul in the form of diminution of miseries etc. be its extinction ? ( 1975 ) TIkA - AyuSman ! prabhAsa ! tvamevaM manyase - kiM dIpasyevAsya jIvasya nAzo dhvaMsa eva nirvANam 1 yathA''huH saugatavizeSAH kecit tadyathA dIpo yathA nirvRtimabhyupeto naivAvaniM gacchati nAntarikSam / dizaM na kAzcid vidizaM na kAzcit snehakSayAt kevalameti zAntim ||1||

Page #525
Jinabhadra Gani's (The eleventh jIvastathA nirdhatimabhyupeto naivAvaniM gacchati nAntarikSam / dizaM na kAzcid vidizaM na kAJcit klezakSayAt kevalameti zAntim // 2 // iti / kiM vA yathA jainAH prAhustathA nirvANaM bhavet / kiM tat ? ityAha-sato vidyamAnasya jIvasya viziSTA kAcidavasthA / kathaMbhUtA ? rAgadveSa-mada-moha-janma-jarA-rogAdiduHkhakSayarUpA / uktaM ca kevalasaMvid-darzanarUpAH sarvAtiduHkhaparimuktAH / modante muktigatA jIvAH kSINAntarArigaNAH // 1 // iti // 427 // (1975) ____D.C.-Like the Buddhists, do you believe moksa to be nothing but the extinction of jiva, like that of a lamp ? For the Buddhists, assert that:-- "Dipo yatha nirvsitimabhyupeto naivavanim gacchati nantariksam. Disam na kancid vidisim na kancit snehaksayat kevalameti santim 11111 Jivastatha nirvritimabhyupeto naivavanim gacchati nantariksam Disam na kancid vidisim na kancit klesaksayat kevalameti santim 11211 Or, do you accept moksa, like Jarnas who believe the state of nirvana ( final emancipation ) as a peculiar state of the existent java constituting the removal of raga, dvesa, mnada, moha, janma, jara, roga, and duhkha etc ? It has been laid down by them that " Kevalasamvid-darsanarupah sarvartiduhkha parimuktah | Modante muktigati. jivah ksinantarariganah " ||1 // 427 (1975)] Also, ahavA'NAittaNao khassa va kiM kamma-jIvajogassa / aviogAo na bhave saMsArAbhAva eva tti ? // 428 // (1976) Ahava'naittanao khassa va kim kamma-jivajogassa i Aviogao na bhave samsarabhava eva tti ? || 428 // ( 1976)

Page #526
Vada ] Ganadharavada -: 485,. [athavA'nAditvataH khasyeva kiM karma-jIvayogasya / aviyogAd na bhavet saMsArAbhAva eveti ? // 428 ( 1976 ) Athava'naditvatah khasyeva kim karma-jivayogasya i Aviyogad na bhavet samsarabbava eveti ? || 428 || ( 1976 ) ] ____Trans.-428 Or, is it because Karma and jiva ( which are ) united together eternally do not undergo separation like akasa, that there is absence of mundane world ? ( 1976 ) TIkA-athavA, tvamevaM manyase-nUnaM saMsArAbhAva eva na bhavet / kutaH 1 / aviyogaat-viyogaayogaat| kasya ? / karma-jIvayoH saMyogasya / kutaH / anAditvAt ; khasyeva / iha yayoranAdiHsaMyogastayoviyogo nAsti, yathA jIvA-''kAzayoH, anAdizca jIvakarmaNoH saMyogaH, tato viyogAnupapattiH, tatazca na saMsArAbhAvaH; tathA ca sati kuto mokSaH ? iti // 428 // (1976) D. C.-There is another ground also, upon which your doubt is based. Objects that are united with each other from time immemorial, could never undergo separation. Just as jiva and akas'a are never separable from each other on account of their anadi samyoga, jiva and karma will also never undergo separation on account of their anadi samyoga. When Karma is not separated, sumsara will also never be separable. On account of the absence of separation from samsara, the absence of moksa will also be established. lll 428 11 ( 1976 ) But, paDivajja maNDio iva viyogamiha kamma-jIvajogassa / tamaNAiNovi kaMcaNa-dhAUNa va NANa-kiriyAhi // 429 // (1977) Padivajja Mandio iva viyogamiha kamma-jsvajogassa / Tamanaino vi kancana-dhauna va nana-kiriyahim 1142911 (1977) [pratipadyasva maNDika iva viyogamiha karma-jIvayogasya / tvamanAderapi kAJcana-dhAtvoriva jJAna-kriyAbhyAm // 429 // (1977)

Page #527
*: 486 : * Jinabhadra Gani's Pratipadyasva Mandika iva viyogamiha karma-jiva yogasya Tvamanaderapi kancana-dhatvoriva jnana-kriyabhyam ||429||1977)] [ The eleventh Trans. - 429 In this case, you ( shall have to ) admit the separation of Karma and jiva, in spite of their eternal union on account of cognizance and action, as in the case of gold and metal. ( 1977 ) , TIkA - " aNANa vitti " anAderapi jIva - karmasaMyogasya ' taM iti tvaM pratipadyasva viyogam, bandha-mokSavAde maNDikavat / kayoriva yo viyoga: ? / kAJcana-dhAtupASANayoriva / kiM nirhetuka eva jIva-karmaNoviyoga H 1 | na, ityAha-jJAna- kriyAbhyAm / idamuktaM bhavati - nAyamekAnto yadanAdisaMyogo na bhidyate, yataH kAJcana-dhAtupASANayoranAdirapi saMyogo'gnyAdisaMparkeNa vighaTata eva tadvaJjIva- karmasaMyogasyApi samyagjJAnakriyAbhyAM viyogaM maNDikavat tvamapIha pratipadyasveti // 429 / / ( 1977 ) D. C.-Even the strongest affinity between gold and metal is broken by the help of heating etc. The same is the case with that between Karma and jiva also. Separation of Karma and jiva is accomplished by means of jnana and kriya in spite of their eternal union. It is not true, therefore, to say that the separation of objects joined together by anadi samyoga, is not possible. Like Mandika you, too, shall have to admit that Karma and Jiva are separable from each other in spite of their eternal union. // 429 // ( 1977 ) Also, jaM nAragAibhAvo saMsAro nAragAibhiNNo ya / ko jIvo taM mannasi tannAse jIvanAso ti // 430 // (1978) Jam naragaibhavo samsaro naragaibhinno ya Ko jivo tam mannasi tannase jivanaso tti || 430 u ( 1978 ) [ yad nArakAdibhAvaH saMsAro nArakAdibhinnazca / ko jIvastvaM manyase tannAze jIvanAza iti / / 430 / / ( 1978 )

Page #528
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 487.:. Yad narakadibhavah samsaro narakadibhinnasca i Ko jivastvam manyase tannase jivanasa iti || 430 || ( 1978 ) ] Trans.-430 Since samsara includes hellish denizens etc. what jiva do you mean to be different, from hellish denizens etc ? With their destruction, ( there will be ) destruction of jiva also. ( 1978) TIkA-yad yasmAd nAraka-tiryag-narA-'marabhAva eva nArakAditvameva saMsAra ucyate nAnyaH, nArakAdiparyAyabhinnazca ko'nyo jIvaH ? / na ko'pItyarthaH, nArakAdibhAvAdanyatvena kadAcidapi jIvasyAnupalambhAditi bhaavH| tatastannAze nArakAdibhAvarUpasaMsAranAze jIvasya svasvarUpanAzAt sarvathA nAza eva bhavati tataH kasyAsau maukSaH / iti tvaM manyase // 430 // (1978) D. C.-Since sumsura consists of naraku, tiryanca, human and divine beings, java cannot exist as different from any one of them. So, when samsara of narakas and others, vanishes, jiva will also vanish as it is contained in samsara. Thus, when hiva vanishes, who would attain moksa ? 1143011 ( 1978 ) This belief is refuted in this wayna hi nAragAipajjAyamettanAsammi sabahA nAso / jIvaddavassa mao muddAnAse va hemassa // 431 // ( 1979) kammakao saMsAro tannAse tassa jujjae naaso| jIvattamakammakayaM tannAse tassa ko nAso ? // 432 // (1980) Na hi naragaipajjayamettanasammi savvaha naso i Jivaddavvassa mao muddanase va hemassa 11 431 11 ( 1979 ) Kammakao samsaro tannase tassa jujjae naso I Jivattamakammakayam tannase tasya ko naso? 11 432 11 (1980) [na hi nArakAdiparyAyamAtranAze sarvathA nAzaH / jIvadravyasya mato mudrAnAza iva hemnaH / / 431 // ( 1979 )

Page #529
*:- 488 : Jinabhadra Gani's The eleventh karmakRtaH saMsArastanAze tasya yujyate naashH| jIvatvamakarmakRtaM tannAze tasya ko nAzaH 1 // 432 // (1980) Na hi nara kadiparyayawatranase sarvatha nasah Jivadravyasya mato mudranasa ivashemnah | 431 // (1979) Karmakritah samsarastannase tasya yujyate nasah Jivatvamakaramakritam tannase tasya ko nasah ? // 4320 (1980)] Trans.-431-432 Like gold at the destruction of a ring, the substance of jiva is not believed to vanish entirely at the destruction of narakas and other. Samsara is based on Karma. Hence, its destruction with Karma is justified. ( But ) jivatva is not based on Karma. Hence, how could it vanish with Karna? ( 1979-1980) TIkA-nAraka-tiryagAdirUpeNa yo bhAvaH sa jIvasya paryAya eva / na ca paryAyamAtranAze paryAyiNo jIvadravyasyApi sarvathA nAzo mataH, kathazcittu bhavatyapi / na hi mudrAparyAyamAtranAze hemnaH suvarNasya sarvathA nAzo dRSTaH / tato nArakAdisaMsAraparyAyanivRttau muktiparyAyAntarotpattirjIvasya, mudrAparyAyanivRttau karNapUraparyAyAntarotpattiriva suvarNasya, na kiJcid virudhyata iti / nanu yathA karmaNo nAze saMsAro nazyati tathA tannAze jIvatvasyApi nAzAd mokSAbhAvo bhaviSyati / etadapyasAram / kutaH ? ityAha-"kammakao ityAdi" karmakRtaH karmajanitaH saMsAraH, tatastannAze karmanAze tasya saMsArasya nAzo yujyata eva, kAraNAbhAve kAryAbhAvasya supratItatvAt / jIvatvaM punaranAdikAlapravRttatvAt karmakRtaM na bhavati, atastannAze karmanAze tasya jIvasya ko nAzaH 1-na kazcit ; kAraNa-vyApakayoreva kArya-vyApyanivartakatvAt / karma tu jIvasya na kAraNaM nApi vyApakamiti bhAvaH // 431-432 // ( 1979-1980) D. C.-Existence of jiva as narukas or tiryancas is merely one of the forms of jiva. So, when these paryayas of jiva vanish, the substance of jiva or javatva does not vanish entirely but only partially, just as gold as a dravya does not .

Page #530
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 489 :. entirely vanish when ring etc, are destroyed. When the naraka paryayas of samsara are destroyed, jiva vanishes as a samsari and comes into existence as the paryaya of moksc e. g. in case of gold, when one paryaya, say ring, is destroyed, another paryaya, say ear-ring, is produced. Prabhasa :-But like samsara, java will also have to vanish with Karma, and hence, there will be nothing like moksa. Bhagavan:-It is not so. Samsara is generated by means of Karma, and hence it would vanish with Karma. But, javatva being at work from times immemorial, cannot be called Karmajanya. So, java will not vanish with Karma, since Karma is neither the cause of hivatva nor is it invariably concomitant with jivatva. Il 431-432 11 ( 1979-1980) na vigArANuvalaMbhAdAgAsaM piva viNAsadhammo so| iha nAsiNo vigAro dIsai kuMbhassa vA'vayavA // 43 // (1981) Na vigaranuvalambhadagasam piva vinasadhammo so i Iha nasino vigaro disai kumbhassa va'vayava 11 433 11 ( 1981) [na vikArAnupalambhAdAkAzamiva vinAzadharmA sH| iha nAzino vikAro dRzyate kumbhasyevAvayavAH // 433 // (1981) Na vikaranupalambhadakasamiva vinasadharma sah Iha nasino vikaro drisyate kumbhasyevpvayavah // 433 // (1981)] Trans.-433 It ( i. e. jiva) is immortal like sky on account of the non-apprehension of changes. In case of a destructive ( object ), a change is visible like the ( various) parts of ghata ( 1981) ___TIkA-na vinAzadharmA jIva iti prtijnyaa| vikArAnupalambhAditi hetuH / iha yo vinAzI tasya vikAro dRzyate, yathA mudgarAdidhvastasya kumbhasya kapAlalakSaNA avayavAH, yastvavinAzI na tasya vikAradarzanam , yathA'' 63

Page #531
:: 490 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eloventh kAzasyeti / tato muktasya jIvasya nityatvAd nityo mokSa iti // 433 // (1981) ____D. C.-The Soul is immortal like akasar, because it does not undergo any vikara. That which is destructible has undoubtedly to undergo vikaras like the different parts of ghata. Muktatma being, thus immutable, moksa is also immutable. I1433 // (1981) Also, kAlaMtaranAsI vA ghaDo va kayagAio maI hojaa| no paddhaMsAbhAvo bhuvi taddhammA vijaM nicco // 434 // (1982) Kalantaranasi va ghado vya kayagaio mai hojja i No paddhamsabhavo bhuvi taddhamma vi jam nicco 114340 (1982) [ kAlAntaranAzI vA ghaTa iva kRtakAdito matirbhavet / no pradhvaMsAbhAvo bhuvi taddharmApi yad nityaH // 434 // (1982) Kalantaranasi va ghata iva ktitakadito matirbhavet i No pradhvamsabhavo bhuvi taddharmapi yad nityah 1143411 (1982)] ___Trans.-434 Or, the belief may be that it is destructible at a ( certain ) period of time like ghata on account of its being factitious etc. ( But ) it is not so. Indestructibility is everlasting on this earth in spite of ( its ) having ( destructible ) characteristics. ( 1982 ) The author then states the opponent's view and its replyaNudAharaNamabhAvo kharasaMgaM piva maI na taM jamhA / kuMbhaviNAsavisiTTho bhAvo ciya poggalamao so||435||(1983) Anudaharanamabhavo kharasangam piva mai na tam jamhai. Kumbhavinasavisittho bhavo cciyya poggalamao so 114351(1983) [ anudAharaNamabhAvaH kharazRMgamiva matirna tad yasmAt / kumbhavinAzaviziSTo bhAva eva pudgalamayaH sH|| 435 // (1983)

Page #532
Vada ] Ganadharavada .:491:. Anudaharanamabhavah kharaspigamiva matir na tad yasmati Kumbhavinasavisisto bhava eva pudgalamayan sah ||435 // (1983)] ___ Trans.-435 ( The opponent might say that ) " It has no illustration. Abhava is non-existent like kharasriga." ( But ) it is not so. The quality of pudgala characterized by the destruction of ghata, is itself ( indestructibility ). (1983) Or, kiM vegateNa kayaM poggalamettavilayammi jIvassa? / kiM nibattiyamahiyaM nabhaso ghddmettvilymmi?||436|| (1984) Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jivassa ?, Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi ? // 436 // [kiM vaikAntena kRtaM pudgalamAtravilaye jIvasya ? / kiM nirvartitamadhikaM nabhaso ghaTamAtravilaye // 436 ( 1984) Kim vaikantena kritam pudgalamatravilaye jivasya ? | Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamatravilaye ? // 4361(1984)] ___Trans.-436 Or, at the destruction of mere pudgalas, how is jiva to be affected ? At the destruction of ghata, how is sky affected all the more ? + ( 1984 ) The author proves immortality of muktatma by another inference also, davAmuttattaNao mutto nicco nabhaM va davatayA / naNu vibhuyAipasaMgo evaM sai, nANumANAo // 437 // (1985) Davvamuttattanao mutto nicco nabham va davvataya i Nanu vibhuyaipasango evam sai, nanumanao 11 437 11 ( 1985 ) [ dravyAmUrtatvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyatayA / nanu vibhutAdiprasaGga evaM sati, nAnumAnAt / / 437 // (1985) + Vide v. 1839.

Page #533
*: 492 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh Dravyamurtvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyataya ! Nanu vibhutadiprasanga evam sati, nanumanat // 437 // (1985)] ___Trans.---437 The free ( soul ) is everlasting like sky on account of the incorporeal nature of ( its ) substance. (The opponent might object here that ) "in that case, there would be all-pervading characteristic etc as well. " ( But ) it is not so, because of ( an opposite inference ). ( 1985 ) TIkA-nityo muktAtmA, dravyatve satyamUrtatvAt , " davataya tti" yathA dravyatve satyamUrtatvAd nityaM namaH / Aha-nanvanena dRSTAntena vyApakasvAdyapi sidhyati jIvasya; tathAhi-vibhurvyApakaH sarvagato jIvaH, dravyatve satyamUrtatvAt , yathA nabhaH / tadetad na / kutaH 1 / sarvagatatvabAdhakAnu mAnasadbhAvAt ; tathAhi-tvaparyantadehamAtravyApako jIvaH, tatraiva tadguNopalabdheH, sparzanavat , ityunumAnAd bAdhate sarvagatatvaM jIvasya / evaM "na badhyate nApi mucyate jIvaH dravyatve satyamUrtatvAt , nabhovat" ityAdyapi dUSaNaM, " badhyate puNya-pApakarmaNA jIvaH, dAna-hiMsAdi kriyANAM saphalatvAt , kRSyAdikriyAvat , tathA, vighaTate samyagupAyAt ko'pi jIva-karmasaMyogaH, saMyogatvAt , kAzcana-dhAtupASANasaMyogavat " ityAdyanumAnAt parihartavyamiti // 437 // (1985) D. C.-Like akas'a dravya, java dravya of a free soul is also nitya, because it is a-murta as a dravya. Prabhasa:-As you proved notyatva (in case ) of muktatma by the help of the example of sky, the example will lead to prove other characteristics of sky in muktatma, say for example, like sky, muktatma is all pervading due to its a-murtatva. Similarly, it can also be said that jiva dravya has neither bandha nor moksa just as akas'a dravya has none due to a-murtatva. Bhagavan. It is not proper to establish other characteristics such as vibhuta etc in muktatma by the help of the example of sky. Because, there is another inference opposite

Page #534
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 493 :to it which contradicts the existence of those characteristics. Say, for example, jiva is pervading only upto the skin of body like the sense of touch, because the javatva is found only in body. This anumana refutes the all-pervading nature of jiva. Similarly, the anumanas that javas are formed by means of punya and papa, and that the combination of jiva and Karma could any how be brought about like the combination of gold and stone, refute the assertion that hava has neither bandha nor moksa due to the a-murtatva of its dravya like akas'a. // 437 // ( 1985.) Or, ko vA niccaggAho savaM ciya vi bhava-bhaGga-ThiimaiyaM / pajjAyaMtaramettappaNAdaniccAivavaeso // 438 // (1986) Ko va niccaggaho savvam ciya vibhava-bhanga-thiimaiyam | Pajjantaramettappanadiniccaivavaeso 11 438 11 ( 1986 ) [ko vA nityagrahaH sarvamevApi bhava-bhaGga-sthitimayam / paryAyAntaramAtrArpaNAdanityAdivyapadezaH // 438 // ( 1986 ) Ko va nityagrahah sarvamevapi bhava-bhanga-sthitinayam Paryayantaramatrarpanadanityadivyapadesah 11 438 | ( 1986 ) ] ___Trans.-438 Or, why insist upon immutability ( at all ) ? Everything is suceptible to the state of production-break-and retention. Only by ( means of ) imposition of various methods, attributes like mutability etc, are designated.t ( 1986 ) TIkA-atha kathaJcidanityatve'pi mokSasya na kiJcid naH kSayata iti bhAvaH / iha "kAlaMtaranAsI vA ghaDo va" ityAdigAthAH prAgapi SaSThagaNadhare bandha-mokSavicAre vyAkhyAtA eva / tato yadiha na vyAkhyAtaM tat tato'vagantavyamiti // 438 // (1986) + Vide v. 1843.

Page #535
* 494 : * Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh D. C.-It is no use insisting exclusively upon nityata of muktatma. Its a-nityata could also be admitted to a certain extent by means of various methods. But, realy speaking, all objects are susceptible to utpada-vyaya-and dhrauvya | 438 || (1986) For a detailed discussion of bandha and moksa, see Chap. VI. Now, in reply to the assertion that the extinction of soul resembles that of lamp etc, the author states na ya sahA viNAso'Nalassa pariNAmao payasva / kuMbhassa kavAlANa va tahAvigArovalaMbhAo || 439 // (1987) Na ya savvaha vinaso'nalassa parinamao payasseva Kumbhassa kavalana va tahavigarovalambhao || 439 // ( 1987 ) [ na ca sarvathA vinAzo'nalasya pariNAmataH payasa iva / kumbhasya kapAlAnAmiva tathAvikAropalambhAt / / 439 // ( 1987 ) Na ca sarvatha vinaso'nalasya parinamatah payasa iva Kumbhasya kapalanamiva tathavikaropalambhat ||4391 (1987) ] Trans.-439 Fire being mutable like milk does not vanish entirely, because of the apprehension of changes like those ( in case ) of the pieces of ghata. ( 1987 ) 9 TIkA - na pradIpAnalasya sarvaprakArairvinAzaH, pariNAmatvAt payaso dugdhasyeva, athavA, yathA mudgarAdyAhatasya kapAlatayA pariNatasya ghaTasya, yathA vA cUNIkRtAnAM kapAlAnAm / kuto na sarvathA vinAzaH 1 / ityAha- tathA tena rUpAntaraprakAreNa vikArasya pratyakSAdipramANopalambhAditi // 439 // ( 1987 ) D. C-When a lamp is extinguished, its fire does not enirely vanish. It is only mutable like milk. So, like milk turning into curds or like ghata changing into various pieces

Page #536
Vada ) Ganadharavada .: 495:. by means of a stick eto light changes into darkness, but it does not vanish absolutely. // 439 // ( 1987 ) Again, there is an objection and its replyjai sabahA na nAso'Nalassa kiM dIsae na so sakkhaM ? / pariNAmasuhumayAo jalayavigAraMjaNarau va // 440 // (1988) Jai savvaha na naso'nalassa kim disae na so sakkham ? | Parinamasuhumayao jalayavigaranjanarau vva 11 440 V ( 1988 ) [ yadi sarvathA na nAzo'nalasya kiM dRzyate na sa sAkSAt / pariNAmasUkSmatAto jaladavikAro'Jjanaraja iva // 440 // (1988) Yadi sarvatha na naso'nalasya ku drisyate na sa saksat 1 Parinamasuksmatato jaladavikaro'njanaraja iva || 440 11 ( 1988 )] Trans.-440 " If there is no absolute extinction of light, why it is not seen before our eyes ? " " Because of the subtlety of fruition as in the case of a change in cloud or dust particle. ( 1988) TIkA-yadi sarvathA'nalasya na nAzaH, tarhi vidhyAtAnantaraM kimityasau sAkSAd na dRzyate ? / atrottaramAha-" pariNAmetyAdi" vidhyAte pradIpe'nantarameva tAmasapudgalarUpo vikAraH samupalabhyata eva, ciraM cAsau purastAd yad nopalabhyate, tat sUkSma-sUkSmatarapariNAmabhAvAt / tathAhi-vizIryamANasya jaladasyApi yaH kRSNAbhrapudgalavikAraH sa pariNAmasaukSamyAd nopalabhyate / tathA, aJjanasyApi pavanena hriyamANasya yadutkRSTaraja uDDIyate tadapi pariNAmasaukSamyAd nopalabhyate, na punarasattvAditi // 440 // (1988) D. C.-Prabhasa:-If there were no absolute extinction of fire, why is it not perceived before our eyes? Bhagavan:-The vokara of the light extinguished viz darkness-is not directly perceptible, because its parinama is very subtle in form. Changes in a black cloud at the time of dissolution of a cloud, are not perceived because of their very

Page #537
*: 496 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh subtle parinama, and the pollen of a collyrium also blown away by wind is not directly perceived, because it is very minute. But in no way, it means that it 'does not exist. So, the vikara of darkness in case of light is also non-apprehensible, not because it is non-existent but because its parinama is sukesma. // 440 // ( 1988 ) Also, hoUNa iMdiyaMtaragajjhA puNariMdiyaMtaraggahaNaM / khaMdhA eMti na eMti ya poggalapariNAmayA cittA // 441 // (1989) Houna indiyantaragajjha punarindiyantaraggahanam | Khandha enti na enti ya poggalaparinamaya citta // 441 // (1989) [ bhUtvendriyAntaragrAhyAH punarindriyAntaragrahaNam / skandhA yAnti na yAnti ca pudgalapariNAmatA citrA // 441 || (1989) Bhutvendriyantaragrahyah punarindriyantaragrahanam | Skandha yanti na yanti ca pudgalaparinamata citra // 441 // ( 1989 ) ] Trans.-441 (Some) objects apprehensible by (one group of sense organs, are again apprehended by (another group of ) sense organs, while others are not apprehended (by another set of sense-organs). Manifold is the nature of their fruitions. ( 1989 ) * TIkA - iha suvarNapatra - lavaNa-suNThI- harItakI - citraka - guDAdayaH ekandhAH pUrvamindriyAntaragrAhmAzcakSurAdIndriyaviSayA bhUtvA punardravya-kSetra - kAlAdi sAmayantaraM prApya pulapariNAmave citryAdindriyAntaragrahaNaM sparzana - rasanAdIndriyagrAhyatAmAyAnti; tathAhi - suvarNaM patrIkRtaM cakSurgrAhyaM bhUtvA zodhanArtha manau prakSiptaM bhasmanA militaM sat sparzanendriyagrAhyatAmeti punaH prayogeNa bhasmanaH pRthakkRtaM cakSurviSayatAmupagacchati / lavaNa-suNThI- harItakI - citrakaguDAdayospi prAk cakSurindriyagrAhyA bhUtvA pazcAt rUpAdyante vauSadhasamudAye ca kvAtha - cUrNA - 'valehAdi pariNAmAntaramApannAH santo rasanendriyasaMvedyA bhavanti / karpUra- kastUrikAdInAmapi pudgalAkSugrahyA api vAyunA

Page #538
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 497 : dUramupanItA ghrANasaMvedyA bhavanti / yojananavakAttu parato gatAstathAvidhaM kazcit sUkSmapariNAmamApannA naikasyApIndriyasya viSayatAM pratipadyanta iti / anayA dizA'nyApi pudgalapariNAmatA citrA bhAvanIyeti // 44 // (1989) D. C.- The manifold nature of pudgala-parinamas is explained by means of the following example. Substances such as a sheet of gold, salt, ginger, haritaki ( yellow iuyrobalans), citrakavela, jaggery eto-are first apprehended by senseorgans like eye etc, and then they undergo apprehension by means of other sense-organs such as that of touch, taste eto, when accompained by different substances, fields, and times etc. A sheet of gold is first apprehended by eyes, but when passed through fire and mixed with ashes for purification, it is apprehended by the sense of touch as well. Afterwards when it is separated from it, again it becomes apprehensible by eyes, The same is the case with objects like salt, ginger, green vegetables, jaggery etc. They are also caksurgrahya at the first instance, but when mixed with ashes or other groups of medicines or when turned into liquid, powder or paste, they are perceived by the sense of touch. Pudgalus like camphor and musk although perceptible by eyes at first, undergo perception by the sense of smell when carried by wind to a long distance. On the other hand, some pudgalas when carried to a distance longer than nine yojanast do not undergo perception by means of any sense-organ on account of their subtle changes. In all these cases, variegated nature of the changes of pudgalas, is the main cause. ll 441 11 ( 1989) Besides, egegeMdiyagajjhA jaha vAyavAdao thggeyaa| houM cakkhuggajjhA ghANiMdiyagajjhayAmeMti // 442 // (1990) + One Yojana=Four Kos'as or 9 miles (approximately)

Page #539
: 498 : Jinabhadra Gani's (The eleventh Egegendiyagajjha jaha vayavvadao tahaggeya i Houm cakkhuggajjha ghanindiyagajjhayamenti 11 442 11 ( 1990 ) [ekaikendriyagrAhyA yathA vaayvyaadystthaa''gneyaaH| bhUtvA cakSuAdyA ghrANendriyagrAhyatAM yAnti // 442 // (1990) Ekaikendriyagrahya yatha vayavyadayastatha"greyah 1 Bhutva caksurgrahya ghranendriyagrahyatam yanti 14420 (1990)] Trans.-442 Just as ( the particles of ) wind etc, are perceptible by each single sense-organ ( one by one), (those ) of fire also undergo perception by means of the sense of smell after being perceptible by eyes. ( 1990) TIkA-vAyuH sparzanendriyasyaiva grAhyaH, raso rasanasyaiva, gandho ghrANasyaiva, rUpaM cakSuSa eva, zabdastu zrotrasyaiva grAhyaH / tadevaM yathA vAyAvyadayaH pudgalA ekaikasya pratiniyatasyendriyasya grAhyA bhUtvA pazcAt pariNAmAntaraM kimapyApannA indriyAntaragrAhyA api bhavantIti svayameva gamyate, tathA prastutA api pradIpagatA AgneyAH pudgalAzcakSuhyA bhUtvA pazcAd vidhyAte tasmin pradIpe ta eva tAmasIbhUtAH santo ghrANendriyagrAhyatAmupayAnti, tat kimucyate-" kiM dIsae na so sakkhaM " iti ? / nanu ghrANendriyeNopalabhyata eva vidhyAtapradIpavikAra iti // 442 // (1990) ____D. CWind is perceptible by the sense of touch, juice by that of taste alone, odour by that of smell alone, form by that of eyes alone, and sound by that of ears alone. The particles of vayu are thus apprehended by one particular sense only. Still however, these pudgalas are apprehended by other sense-organs also when they undergo changes. In case of light, particles of flanie are perceptible by eyes. When light is extinguished, these particles change into darkness and are perceived by the sense of smell. Light, therefore, does not turn into nothingness, but its change into darkness is apprehended. // 442 // ( 1990)

Page #540
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 499 :. jaha dIvo nivANo pariNAmantaramio tahA jiivo| bhaNNai parinivANo patto'NAbAhapariNAmaM // 443 // (1991) Jaha divo nivvano parinamantaramio taha jivo | Bhannai parinivvano patto'nabahaparinamam n 443 // ( 1991 ) [ yathA dIpo nirvANaH pariNAmAntaramitastathA jIvaH / bhaNyate parinirvANaH prApto'nAbAdhapariNAmam // 443 // ( 1991 ) Yatha dipo nirvanah parinamantaramitastatha jivah | Bhanyate parinirvanah prapto'nabad haparinanam 1144311 (1991)] Trans.--443 Just as light changed into another form, is said to have attained nirvana (final extinction) the Soul also, is said to have attained nirvana ( final liberation when it has turned into a faultless form. ( 1991) ___TIkA-yatha'nantaroktasvarUpapariNAmAntaraM prAptaH pradIpo "nirvANaH" ityucyate tathA jIvo'pi karmavirahitakevalAmUrtajIvasvarUpabhAvalakSaNamabA, pariNAmAntaraM prApto nirvANo nirvRti prApta ucyate / tasmAd duHkhAdikSayarUpA sato'vasthA nirvANamiti sthitam // 443 // (1991) ___D C.-Just as light is said to have atained nevana when it changes into darkness, the Soul is also said to have attained nirvana when it has changed into a form which is void of Karma, and which possesses absolutely a-murtu characteristics of the form and nature of the Soul. This sbows that moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of jiva when miseries etc are exterminated. Prabhasa:--If moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of giva, at the removal of miseries etc, then, in absence of objects of pleasure like s'abda etc, the free Soul will have no happiness. ll 443 11 ( 1991 ) Bhagavan replies:

Page #541
:: 500 : Jinabhadra Gaai's [The eleventh muttassa paraM sokkhaM jANANAbAhao jahA muNiNo / taddhammA puNa virahAdAvaraNA-''bAhaheUNaM // 444 // (1992) Muttassa param sokkham nananabahao jaha munino Taddhamma puna virahadavarana="bahaheunam 11 44411 (1992) [ muktasya paraM saukhyaM jJAnAnAbAdhato yathA muneH / taddharmA punarvirahAdAvaraNA-''vAdhahetUnAm // 444 // ( 1992 ) Muktasya param saukhyam jaananabadhato yatha muneh Taddharma punarvirabadavarana,"bhadhahetunam ||444|| (1992)] Trans.-444 Like a sage, the free soul ( enjoys) perfect happiness by ( virtue of ) its ( high ) knowledge, in absence of ( all) obstructions. In absence of interruptions and obstructions, it ( enjoys) ( all ) its qualities. ( 1992) TIkA-muktasya jantoHparaM prakRSTamakRtrimamamithyAbhimAnajaM svAbhAvika sukhamiti pratijJA / " NANANAbAhau ti" jJAnaprakarSe sati janma-jarAvyAdhi-maraNe-STaviyogA-'rati-zoka-kSut-pipAsA-zItoSNa-kAma-krodhamada-zAThya-tRSNA-rAga-dveSa-cintautsukyAdiniH zeSAbAdhavirahitatvAditi hetuH / tathA vidhaprakRSTamuneriva / yathoktAbAdharahitAni kASThAdInyapi vartante, paraM teSAM jJAnAbhAvAd na sukham ; atastadvayavacchedArtha jJAnagrahaNam / kathaM punarasau prakRSTajJAnavAn , AvAdharahitazca ? ityAha--" taddharmetyAdi " taddharmAprakRSTajJAnA-'nAbAdhavAn muktAtmA / kutaH / virahAt-abhAvAt / keSAm / / AvaraNahetUnAm , AvAdhahetUnAM ca / etaduktaM bhavati-kSINaniH zeSAvaraNatvAt prakRSTajJAnavAnasau, vedanIyakarmAdInAM ca sarveSAmapyA bAdhahetUnAM sarvathA'pagamAt sarvA''vAdharahito'yamiti / prayogaH-svAbhAvikena svena prakAzena prakAzavAn muktAtmA, samastaprakAzAvaraNarahitatvAt , tuhinAMzuvat / tathA cAha sthitaH zItAMzuvajIvaH prakRtyA bhaavshuddhyaa| candrikAvacca vijJAnaM tadAvaraNamabhravat // 1 // iti / tathA, anAbAdhasukho muktAtmA, samastAbAdhaheturahitatvAt , jvarAdyapagame svacchA''turavat / tathA coktam

Page #542
Ganadharavada sa vyAvAdhAbhAvAt sarvajJatvAcca bhavati paramasukhI / " vyAbAdhAbhAvo'tra svacchasya jJasya paramasukham // 1 // iti // 444 // ( 1992 ) Vada] .: 501 :. D. C.-Muktatma enjoys a perfect but natural happiness. When there is no avarana, it attains high cognizance and when there is absolute abhava of Karma, which is nothing but a cause of un-happiness, it is free from all sorts of miseries. So, like a sage, muktatma enjoys the delight of high cognizance. It enjoys perfect happiness as it is free from the miseries of birth, old age, disease, death, separation from the beloved, absence of love, sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire, anger, pride, passion, hatred, anguish, wickedness, and eagerness etc. Lik the Sun, the free soul shines by its own lustre. It has therefore been said that Sthitah sitansuvajjivah prakritya bhavasuddhaya | Candrikavacca vijnam tadavaranamabhravat | 1 || With reference to the unobstructed happiness, it has also been said Sa vyabadhabhavat sarvajnatvacca bhavati paramasukhi | Vyabadhabhavo'tra svacchasya jnasya para masuk ham ||2|444(1992)] The opponent, then, asks and Bhagavan replies mutto karaNAbhAvAdaNNANI khaM va, naNu viruddho'yaM / ancftayi fa q1ag ga fau xos aaii 1188411(1993) Mutto karanabhavadannani kham va, nanu viruddho'yam Jamajivaya vi pavar etto cciya bhanai tannama # 445 u (1993) [ muktaH karaNAbhAvAdajJAnI khamiva, nanu viruddho'yam / yadajIvatApi prAnotyetasmAdeva bhaNati tannAma || 445 // (1993) Muktah karanabhavadajuani khamiva, nanu viruddho'yam Yadajivatapi prapnotyetasmadeva bhanati tannama 445m (1993) ]

Page #543
:: 502 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh Trans.-445 "A free ( soul ) is ignorant like the sky, in absence of senses." " This is really fallacious. Because, in that case, it would attain lifelessness as well." "Let it ( attain lifelessness.)" ( 1993 ) TIkA-nanvajJAnI muktAtmA, karaNAbhAvAt , AkAzavat / atrAcAryaH prAha-nanu dharmisvarUpaviparItasAdhanAd viruddho'yaM hetuH| tathAhi-anenaitadapi sidhyati-ajIvo muktAtmA, karaNAbhAvAt , AkAzavat / atra para: sotkarSa bhaNati-" tannAma tti" 'nAma' ityabhyanujJAyAm-astvetat , na naH kimapi bhUyate / na hi muktAtmanAmajIvatve'smAkaM kiJcid nazyati, yena hetoviruddhatA preryamANA zobheta / atrAha kazcit-nanu muktasyAjIvatvamAItAnAmapyaniSTameva tatazcaitad dUSaNamAcAryeNApi parihartavyameva, yaccAtmano'pi dUSaNaM samApatati tat kathaM parasyaivaikasyodbhAvyate / satyametat, kintu parazaktiparIkSArtha preryamAcAryaH kRtavAn , kadAcit kSobhAd vigalitapratibhA paro'trApi pratividhAne skhalitastUSNIM vidadhyAt / paramArthatastu jIvasyAjIvatvaM kadAcidapi na bhavatyeva // 445 // (1993) D. C.-Prabhasa:-When a muktatma is free from senseorgans, it will be called ignorant like akas'a. Bhagavan :--It is not so. The argument advanced by you, proves even a contrary paryayu of soul. It will prove muktatma to be lifeless in absence of endriyas. Prabhasa:-Well, what is wrong if muktatma is taken as lifeless 1 // 445 // ( 1993 ) Bhagavan repliesdavA-'muttatta sahAvajAio tassa dUravivarIyaM / na hi jaccataragamaNaM juttaM nabhaso va jIvattaM // 446 // (1994) Davva-'muttatta sahavajaio tassa duravivariyam Na hijaccantaragamanam juttam nabhaso vva jivattam 11446||(1994)

Page #544
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 503:. [ dravyA'mUrtatvavat svabhAvajAtitastasya dUraviparItam / na hi jAtyantaragamanaM yuktaM nabhasa iva jIvatvam // 446 / / (1994) Dravya'murtatvavat svabhavajatitastasya duraviparstain i Na hijatyantaragamanam yuktam nabhasa ivajivatvam|446||(1994)] Trans.--446 By virtue of its natural genesis like dravyatva and a-murtatva, it is far the most fallacious. Like life to sky, its transgression to the other genesis, is not proper. ( 1994 ) TIkA-tasya muktAtmano hi yasmAt kAraNAd na yuktamiti saMbandhaH / kiM tad na yuktam ? ityAha-ekasyA jIvatvalakSaNAyA jAteyaMdajIvatvalakSaNaM jAtyantaraM tatra gamanaM jAtyantaragamanam , tanna yuktam / kathaMbhUtaM jAtyantaram ? ityAha-dUramatyartha viparItaM dUraviparItam / kasyA dUraviparItam ? ityAha - " sahAvajAiu ti" jIvatvalakSaNA yA svAbhAvikI svabhAvabhUtA jAtiH svbhaavjaatistsyaaH| kiMvad yA svabhAvajAtiH ? ityAha--upamAnapradhAnatvAd nirdezasya, dravyA-'mUrtatvavaditi dravyatvavadamUrtatvavaJcatyarthaH / svabhAvajAtedUraviparItaM sat kasya yathA kiM na yuktam ? ityAha--namasa iva jIvatvam / idamatra hRdayam-dravyatvam , amUrtatvaM ca jIvasya tAvat svabhAvabhUtA jAtiH, tasyAzca yad dUraviparItaM jAtyantaramadravyatvam , amUtatvaM ca, tatra gamanaM tasya kasyAmapyavasthAyAM na bhavati / evaM jIvatvamapi jIvasya svabhAvabhUtaiva jAtiH, tatastasyA api svabhAvajAteyad draviparItama jIvatvalakSaNaM jAtyantaraM tatra gamanaM muktAvasthAyAmapi tasya na yujyate / na hyajIvasya sato nabhasaH kadAcidapi jIvatvAprAptirbhavati / tasmAd mukto jIvo yathA'dravyaM mUrtazca na bhavati, tadvipakSasvabhAvatvAt evaM jIvasvAbhAvyAda jIvo'pyasau kadAcidapi na bhavati; anyathA nabhaH-paramANvAdInAmapi svasvabhAvatyAgena vaiparItyApacyA'tiprasaGgAditi / atrAha-yadyevam , tarhi yad bhavataivoktam-"ajIvo muktAtmA, kAraNAbhAvAt , AkAzavat" iti, tat kathaM netavyam / atrocyate--parasya prasaGgApAdanameva tadasmAbhiH kRtam, tatkaraNe ca kAraNamuktameva, na punaranena hetunA muktasyAjIvatvaM sidhyati, pratibandhAbhAvAt ; tathAhi-yadi karaNairjIvatvaM

Page #545
-: 504 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh kRtaM bhavet , yathA dahanena dhUmaH, vyApakAni vA jIvatvasya karaNAni yadi bhaveyuH, yathA ziMzapAyA vRkSatvam , tadA karaNanivRttau bhavejIvatvanivRttiH, yathA'gni-vRkSatvanivRttau dhUma-ziMzapAtvayoH; na caitadasti, jIvatvasyAnAdipAriNAmikabhAvarUpatvenAkRtakatvAt / vyApya-vyApakabhAvo'pIndriyANAM zarIreNaiva saha yujyate, ubhayasyApi paulikatvAt , na tu jIvatvena, jIvasyAmUrtatvenAtyantaM tadvilakSaNatvAt / tasmAt karaNanivRttAvapyanivRttameva muktasya jIvatvamiti // 446 (1994) // ___D. C.-Bhagawan :-Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as drayatva and a-murtatva are the innate characteristics of a soul, and just as that genesis of jiva never exists in any condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics like a-dravyatva and c-murtatva, javatva is also the innate and natural characteristic of jiva, and that genesis of jiva never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently, in the state of muktaitmii, Jiva does never become a-zivot Just as a free soul never attains the condition of a-dravyatva and murtatva, it never reaches a life-less state leaving aside its own innate living characteristics. For, if it leaves its own svabhuva, the sky and molecules will also leave their innate characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency. Prabhasa :-If it is so, how do you explain your statement that muktatma is a-java like akas'a, on account of the abhava of sense-organs. Bhagavan:-The statement was made by me only to refute the opponent's view. In doing so, the reason has already been explained, but this argument does not lead to prove muktatma to be lifeless, as there is no pratibandha for it For, if jivatva is established by the existence of indriyas, it goes without saying that in absence of sence-organs, Jiva will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke, and As'oka and vrksatva. But it does not happen actually. The sense-organs

Page #546
Vada] Ganadharavada : 505 : are connected with body by the relation of part, and whole, but they are not connected with giva because of its a-murtatva. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the abhava of indriyas, there is abhava of givatva in muktatma. Prabhasa :-But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that muktatma is ignorant like sky in absence of sense-organs ? The reply ismuttAibhAvao novaladdhimaMtiMdiyAiM kuMbho cha / uvalaMbhaddArANi u tAI jIvo taduvaladdhA // 447 // (1995) taduvarame vi saraNao tavAvAre vi novlNbhaao| iMdiyabhinno AyA paMcagavakkhovaladdhA vA // 448 // (1996) Muttaibhavao novaladdhimantindiyaim kumbho vva i Uvalambhaddarani u taim jivo taduvaladdha || 447 || ( 1995 ) Taduvarame vi saranao tayvayare vi novalambhao 1 Indiyabhinno aya pancagavakkhovaladdha va 11 448 11 ( 1996 ) [ mUrtAdibhAvato nopalabdhimantIndriyANi kumbha iva / upalambhadvArANi tu tAni jIvastadupalabdhA / / 447 // ( 1995 ) taduparame'pi smaraNatastadvayApAre'pi nopalambhAt / indriyabhinna AtmA paJcagavAkSopalabdheva // 448 // (1996) Martadibhavato nopalabdhimantindriyani kumbha iva i Upalambhadvarani tu tani jivastdupalabdha || 447 || ( 1995 ) Taduparame'pi smaranastadvyapare'pi nopalambhati Indriyabhinna atma pancagavaksopalabdheva || 448 11 ( 1996 )] Trans.-447-448 On account of their ( qualities like ) murtatva etc like ghata, sense-organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension. Their 64

Page #547
2506:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh ( real ) agent of apprehension is jiva. Because of ( its power of) recollection, even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working, the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows. ( 1995-1996) TIkA-anayoAkhyA pUrvavat / kevalaM prastute bhAvArtha ucyate-yadIndriyANyupalabdhimanti bhaveyustadA tannivRttAvapyupalabdhinivRttirbhavet , na caitadasti, anvaya-vyatirekAbhyAM jIvasyopalabdhimacanizcayAditi // 447-- 448 // (1995-1996 ) // D. C.-If the indriyas were the real agents of apprehension, there would have been no perception when they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand, when they worked, perception should positively take place, but due to the absent-mindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of jiva is thus established from the positive as well as negative point of view. [1447-44811 (1995-1996) Indicating that gnana would not vanish with indriyas, but it is the very innate nature of jiva, the author statesnANarahio na jIvo sarUvao'Nu va muttibhAveNaM / jaM teNa viruddhamidaM atthi ya so nANarahio ya // 449 // (1997) Nanarahio na jivo saruvao'nu vya muttibhavenam i Jam tena viruddhamidam atthi ya so nanarahio ya // 449 // (1997) [ jJAnarahito na jIvaH svarUpato'Nuriva mUrtibhAvena / yat tena viruddhamidamasti ca sa jJAnarahitazca / / 449 // (1997) Jnanarahito na jivah svarupato'nuriva murtibhavena / Yat tena virudd hamidamasti ca sa jnanarahitasca ||44911 (1997)] Trans.--449 Like an atom, jiva as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence, the statement that it is void of cognizance is incorrect. ( 1997 )

Page #548
Vada ] Ganadharavada .. 507 : TIkA-yad yasmAjjJAnarahito jIvaH kadAcidapi na bhavati, jJAnasya tatsvarUpatvAt , yathA mUrtibhAvena rahito'Nuna bhavati, tena tasmAd kAraNAd viruddhametat-" asti cAsau mukto jIvaH, atha ca sa jJAnarahitaH" iti / na hi svarUpasyAbhAve svarUpavato'vasthAnaM yujyate, tadvyatiriktasya tasyAsatvAt , tathA cAnantaramevoktam-" na hi jaccataragamaNaM juttaM nabhaso va jIvattaM " iti // 449 ( 1997 ) // D. C.-Just as an atom cannot exist without a finite form, Java could also never exist without cognizance, as cognizance is the very nature of jiva. Since a corporeal body cannot exist without a finite form, your statement that muktatma is void of jnana, is absolutely incorrect. Il 449 11 ( 1997) Again there is a question and its reply-- kiha so nANasarUvo naNu paJcakkhANubhUio niye| paradehammivi gajjho sa pavitti-nivittiliMgAo // 450 // (1998) Kiha so nanasaruvo nanu paccakkhanubhuio niyae 1 Paradehammi vi gajjho sa pavitti-nivittilingao 11 450 # ( 1998 ) [ kathaM sa jJAnasvarUpo nanu pratyakSAnubhUtito nijake / paradehe'pi grAhyaH sa pravRtti-nivRttiliGgAt / / 450 // (1998 ) Katham sa jnanasvarupo nanu pratyaksanubhutito nijake i Paradehe'pi grahyah sa pravritti-nivrittilingat || 450 || ( 1998 )] Trans.-450 " How does it exist in the form of cognizance ? " "By direct apprehension, it is cognizible in case of its own body, and in the capacity of engagement and retirement in case of another's body." ( 1998 ) TIkA-nanu kathamasau jIvo jJAnasvarUpa iti nizcIyate / atrottaramAha-' nanu' ityakSamAyAm , nanu nije dehe tAvat pratyakSAnubhavAdeva jJAnasvarUpo jIva iti vijJAyate, indriyavyApAroparame'pi tadvyApAropalabdhArthAnusmaraNAt , tadvyApAre'pi cAnyamanaskatAyAmanupalambhAt ,

Page #549
* 503 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh adRSTA-'zrutAnAmapi cArthAnAM tathAvidhakSayopazamapATavAt kadAcid vyAkhyAnAvasthAyAM cetasi sphuraNAt / etacca svasaMvedanasiddhamapi bhavataH praSTavyatAM gatam / tathA, sa jantuH paradehe'pi jJAnasvarUpa eveti graayH| kutaH / tathAvidhapravRtti-nivRttiliGgAditi / / 450 / / (1998 ) // ____D. C.-Prabhasa:-With what authority can you say that Jiva is jnanasvarupa ? Bhagavan:-That giva exists as cognizance in its own body is seen by means of direct apprehension. Even when sense-organs cease to work, the object perceived by senseorgans, is recollected, while sometimes the object is not apprehended even when the sense-organs are working because of absent-mindednes-sometimes perception crops up in the mind due to the relaxation of their destruction at the time of explanation. In case of another's body also, giva is known to be gnanasvarupa on account of its inclination (to the desirable objects ) and aversion ( from the undesirable ones ). 14501(1998)] And, sabAvaraNAvagame so suddhayaro bhaveja sUro ch| tammayabhAvAbhAvAdaNNANittaM na juttaM se // 151 // (1999) Savvavaranavagame so suddhayaro bhavejja suro vva Tammayabhavabhavadannanitlam na juttam se u 451 ll (1999) [ sarvAvaraNApagame sa zuddhataro bhavet sUra iva / tanmayabhAvAbhAvAdajJAnitvaM na yuktaM tasya // 451 // ( 1999 ) Sarvavaranapagame sa suddhataro bhayet sura iva i Tanmayabhavabhavadajianitvam na yuktam tasya // 451 // (1999)] Trans.-451 At the removal of all interruptions, that ( muktatma ) would be purer like the Sun. It is not, therefore, proper to attribute ignorance to it. ( 1999 )

Page #550
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 509 :* TIkA - sendriyo janturdezato'pyAvaraNakSaye tAvat tAratamyena jJAnayukta eva bhavati, yasya tvanindriyasya sarvamadhyAvaraNaM kSINam sa niHzeSAvaraNApagame zuddhatara eva bhavati - saMpUrNajJAnaprakAzayukta eva bhavatItyarthaH yathA samastAAvaraNApagame saMpUrNa prakAzamayaH sUryaH / tatastanmayabhAvasya prakAzamayatvasya karaNAbhAvenAbhAvAd hetoH " se " tasya muktasya yadajJAnitvaM preryate bhavatA, tad na yuktam, AvArakAbhAve tasyaiva prakarSavato jJAnaprakAzasya sadbhAvAditi / / 451 // ( 1999 ) // D. C. - Muktatma possesses the power of complete cognizance. A soul having sense-organs is cognizant but to a more or less extent on account of its avaranas being removed partially Since all the avaranas are removed in case of a muktatma, it is completely cognizant Just as the Sun becomes completely resplendent with lustre when all the avaranas like clouds etc are removed, the muktatma is also completely resplendent with the lustre of cognizance when all avaranas of indriyas have been removed. || 451 || (1999) evaM pagAsamaio jIvo chidAvabhAsayattAo | kiMcimmettaM bhAsai chiddAvaraNapaIvo va // 452 // ( 2000 ) subahuyaraM viyANai mutto savappANavigamAo | avaNIgharo va naro vigayAvaraNappaIvo va // 453 // (2001) Evam pagasamaio jivo chiddavabhasayattao | Kincimmettam bhasai chiddavaranapaivo vva // 452 (2000) Subahuyaram viyanai mutto savvappihanavigamao | Avaniyagharo vva naro vigayavaranappaivo vva || 453 // (2001) [ evaM prakAzamayo jIvacchidrAvabhAsakatvAt / kiMJcinmAtraM bhAsate chidrAvaraNapradIpa iva / / 452 / / ( 2000 )

Page #551
.:510:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh subahutaraM vijAnAti muktaH sarvapidhAnavigamAt / apanItagRha iva naro vigatAvaraNapradIpa iva // 453 // (2001) Evam prakasanjayo jivaschidravabhasakatvati Kincinmatram bhasate chidrayaranapradipa iva 11452|| ( 2000 ) ] Subabutaram vijanati muktah sarvapidhanavigamati Apanitagriha iva naro vigatavaranapradipa iva // 453 // (2001)] Trans.-452-453 The soul is thus lustrous. It shines only a little, like a lamp (shining ) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. ( But ) like a person relieved from home or like a lamp shining without obstructions, the muktatma perceives completely, when all its interruptions have been removed. (2000-2001 ) TIkA-tadevaM sati sarvadA prakAzamayaH prakAzasvabhAva eva jIvaH, kevalaM saMsAryavasthAyAM chadmasthaH kiJcinmAtramavabhAsayati, kSINA'kSINAvaraNacchidrairindriyacchidrezcAvabhAsanAt, sacchidrakuTa-kuDyAdyantaritapradIpavaditi / muktastu muktAvasthAyAM prApto jIvaH subahutaraM vijAnAti-yadasti tat sarva prakAzayatItyarthaH, sarvapidhAnavigamAt-sarvAvaraNakSayAdityarthaH, apanItasamastagRhaH puruSa iva, vigatasamastakuTa-kuDyAdyAvaraNapradIpa iva veti / yo hi sacchidrAvaraNAntaritaH stokaM prakAzayati sa niHzeSAvaraNApagame subahveva prakAzayati / na tu tasya sarvathA prakAzAbhAva iti bhAvaH / tasmAt "muttassa paraM sokkhaM gANA-'NAbAhao" ityAdi sthitam // 452-453 // (2000-2001) D. C.-Jival is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception. In the mundane life, jiva is obstructed by various avaranas and hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a certain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall. But in the mukta state, the free soul illumines everything perfectly with its power of cognizance like a lanp shining

Page #552
Vada ] Ganadharavada 511: without any obstruction or like a man relieved of all household worries. This proves, therefore, the assertion that a free soul enjoys perfect happiness by means of perfect perception, when all its obstructions have been removed. // 452-453 // ( 2000-2001)] Then doubting the existence of happiness to a free soul, the opponent arguespuNNA-'puNNakayAiM jaM suha-dukkhAiM teNa tannAse / tannAsAo mutto nissuha-dukkho jahAgAsaM // 454 // (2002) ahavA nissuha-dukkho nabhaM va deheN-diyaadbhaavaao| AdhAro deho cciya jaM suha-dukkhovaladdhINaM // 455 // (2003) Punna-'punnakayaim jam suha-dukkhaim tena tannase i Tannasao mutto nissuha-dukkho jahagasam 11 454 II ( 2002 ) Ahava nissuha-dukkho nabham va dehe'ndiyai bhavao 1 Adharo deho cciya jam suha-dukkhovaladdhinam 1145511 (2003) [ puNyA-'puNyakRte yat sukha-duHkhe tena tannAze / tannAzAd mukto niHsukha-duHkho yathAkAzam / / 454 // (2002) athavA niHsukha-duHkho nabha iva dehe-ndriyAdyabhAvAt / AdhAro deha eva yat sukha-duHkhopalabdhInAm / / 455 / / (2003) Punys-'punyakrite yat sukha-duhkhe tena tannase | Tanna.sad mukto nihsukha-duhik ho yathakasam // 454 // (2002) Athava nihsukh-duhkho nabha iva dehe-ndriyadyabhavati Adharo deha eva yat sukha-duhkhopalabdhinam ||455||(2003)] Trans.-454-455 Since happiness and misery are the products of punya and papa ( respectively ), the mukta ( soul ) will be free from punya and papa like akasa, because it vanishes with them. Or, since body ( itself ) is the means of

Page #553
: 512: Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh apprehension of happiness and misery, it is free from happiness and misery like the sky, in absence of body as well as senseorgans. ( 2002-2003) TIkA-puNyAt sukhamupajAyate, pApAca duHkham , iti bhavatAmapi saMmatam , tena tasmAt tayoH puNya-pApayoH kAraNabhUtayona ze sukha-duHkhayoH kAryarUpayo zAd niHsukha-duHkha eva muktAtmA prAmoti, tatkAraNAbhAvAt AkAzavaditi / athavA, niHsukha-duHkho'sau, dehe-ndriyAbhAvAt , nabhovat , yad yasmAd deha eva, tathendriyANi ca sukha-duHkhopalabdhInAmAdhAro dRzyate, na punardehAbhAve sukha-duHkhe dRzyete, nApIndriyAbhAve jJAnaM kApyupalabhyate / tataH siddhasya kathaM tadabhAvAt tAni zraddhIyante ? iti // 454-455 // (2002-2003) D. C.--Prabhasu. That happiness is born of punya and misery of papu, has already been accepted by you. Now, when punya and pipa vanish, happiness and misery being their karyas, will naturally vanish Hence, like: the sky muktatma will be free from sukha-duhkha. Or, it will be free from sukha-duhkhu in absence of deha and indriyas. Since deha is an active means of apprehending sukha duhkha there will be no apprehension of sukha-duhkha in absence of dela In absence of indriyas, there will be no cognizance. Consequently, a mukta ( being ) can never experience sukher-duhcha. // 454-455 // (2002-2003) Bhagavan replies-- puNNaphalaM dukkhaM ciya kammodayao phalaM va pAvassa / naNu pAvaphale vi samaM paccakkhavirohiA ceva // 456 // (2004) Punnaphalam dukkham ciya kammodayao phalam va pavassa | Nanu pavaphale vi samam paccakkhavirohia ceva |456 // (2004) [ puNyaphalaM duHkhameva karmodayataH phalamiva pApasya / nanu pApaphale'pi samaM pratyakSavirodhitA caiva // 456 // (2004)

Page #554
Vada J Ganadharavada Punyaphalam duhkhameva karmodayatah phalamiva' papasya Nanu papaphale'pi samam pratyaksavirodhita caiva. ||456||(2004)] Trans.-456 " On account of ( the rise of ) Karma, the fruition of virtuous deeds is even distressful like the fruition of sins. The same is really the case with the fruition of sins also. And it is ( nothing but ) clear contradiction. (2004) *: 518: "" TIkA - cakravartipadalAbhAdikaM puNyaphalaM nizcayato duHkhameva, karmodayajanyatvAt, narakatvAdipApaphalavat / paraH prAha - nanu pApaphale'pi samAnamidam, tathAhi - atrApi vaktuM zakyata etat uktaM pApaphalaM duHkhatvenAbhimataM paramArthataH sukhameva karmodayajanyatvAt, puNyaphalavat / evaM ca vadatAM pratyakSavirodhitA, svasaMvedyasukha-duHkhayorvaiparItyena saMvityabhAvAditi // 456 // ( 2004 ) , D. C--Bhagavan: - Like papa phalas, the punya phalas like that of attaining cakravarti pada ( sovereignty of the world) etc, are also distressful on account of their being produced by Karma. Prabhasa:--The same could be said of papa-phalas as well. The papa-phalas although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by Karma. Bhagavan:-Since you have not understood the real sense of sukha-dukkha, you have said so. But it is really contra. dicting. // 436 // ( 2004 ) jatto ci paJcakkhaM somma ! suhaM natthi dukkhamevedaM / tappaDiyAravibhattaM to puNNaphalaM ti dukkhaM ti // 457 // (2005) Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma! suham natthi dukkhamevedam Tappadiyaravibhattam to punnaphalam ti dukkham ti // 4571 (2005) 66 [ yata eva pratyakSaM saumya ! sukhaM nAsti duHkhamevedam / tatpratIkAravibhaktaM tataH puNyaphalamiti duHkhamiti || 457|| (2005)

Page #555
:514. Jinabhadra Gani's (The eleventh Yata eva pratyaksam Saumya ! sukham nasti duhkhamevedami Tatpratikaravibhaktam tatah punyaphalamiti duhkhamiti 1145711] ____Trans.-457 That which is directly perceived as happiness is riot happiness, O Saumya ! but it is only misery. It has been distinguished (from duhkha ) only as its resistance. The fruition of virtuous deeds is, therefore, ( nothing but ) duhkha. (2005) TIkA-saumya ! prabhAsa ! yata eva duHkhe'nubhUyamAne kasyApyaviparyastamateH sukhaM pratyakSaM nAsti, sukhAnubhavaH svasaMvidito na vidyate, ata evAsmAbhirucyate-" dukkhamevedaM " iti, yat kimapyatra saMsAracakre sakcandanA-'GganAsaMbhogAdisamutthamapi vidyate tat sarva duHkhamevetyarthaH, kevalaM tasyAGganAsaMbhogAdiviSayautsukyajanitArati rUpasya duHkhasya pratIkAro'GganAsaMbhogAdikastatpratIkArastena tatpratIkAreNa duHkhamapi sad vibhaktaM mUDhai dena vyavasthApitam-tatpratIkArarUpaM kAminIsaMbhogAdikaM pAmAkaNDUyanAdivat sukhamadhyavasitam, zUlAropaNa-zUla-zirobAdhAdivyAdhi-bandha-vadhAdijanitaM tu duHkhmiti| ramaNIsaMbhoga-cakravartipadalAbhAdisukhaM svasaMviditaM "duHkham" iti vadatAM pratyakSavirodha iti cet / tadayuktam , mohamUDhapratyakSatvAt tasya, tallAbhautsukyajanitAratirUpaduHkhapratIkArarUpatvAd duHkhe'pi tatra sukhAdhyavasAyaH, pAmAkaNDUyanA-'pathyAhAraparibhogAdivat ; tathA coktam namaH preta ivAviSTa kvaNantImupagRhya tAm / gADhAyAsitasarvAGgaH sa sukhI ramate kila // 1 // autsukyamAtramavasAdayati pratiSThA kliznAti labdhaparipAlanavRttireva / nAtizramApagamanAya yathA zramAya rAjyaM svahastagatadaNDamivAtapatram // 2 // bhuktAH zriyaH sakalakAmadudhAstataH kiM saMprINitAH praNayinaH svadhanaiHstataH kima ? dattaM padaM zirasi vidviSatAM tataH kiM kalpaM sthitaM tanubhRtAM tanubhistataH kim // 3 // itthaM na kiJcidapi sAdhana-sAdhyajAtaM svapnendrajAlasadRzaM paramArthazUnyam / atyantanirvRtikaraM yadapetabAdhaM tad brahma vAJchata janAH! yadi cetanAsti // 4 //

Page #556
*: 515 : Vada ] Ganadharavada ityAdinA / " puNyaphalaM ti dukkhaM ti" yata evamuktaMprakAreNa duHkhe'pi sukhAbhimAnaH, tasmAt puNyaphalamapi sarva tatvato duHkhameveti 11 849 11 (2004) D. C.-Bhagavan:-Pleasure afforded by objects like garlands, sandal-wood, and woman etc is, in reality, nothing but misery in this world. This sukha has been distinguished from duhkha ( in the form ) of passions generated from the eagerness to enjoy sexual pleasures with woman etc. Only ignorant people call it happiness. But really speaking, such sorts of happiness are only temporarily pleasant like the scratching of herpes. While, putting to the gallows, aching in the stoniach, headache, and the fetters of imprisonment etc, are known as miseries. Prabhasa: -It is evidently contradictory to say that, sukha of the enjoyment with woman etc. and of the attainment of the sovereignty etc. are duhkha. Bhagavan: It is not contradictory to say so. It is perceived as sukha only to those who are disillusioned by ignorance. There will be establishment of sukha similar to the scratching of herpes or enjoying the forbidden food even in misery as they act as resistance against the distress of passions produced by eagerness to attain pleasure. So, it has been said Nagnah preta ivavistah kvanantimupgrihya tam Gadhayasitasarvangah sa sukhi ramate kila alill Autsukyamatramavasadayati pratistha klisnati labdha paripalanavrittireva i Natisramapagamanaya yatha sramaya rajyam svabastagata dandamivatapatram 112 11

Page #557
: 516:. Jinabhadra Gani's I The eleventh Bhuktah sriyah sakala kamadudhastatah kim samprinitah pranayinah svadhanaistatah kim ? | Dattam padam sirasi vidvisatam tatah kim kalpam sthitam tanubhritam tanubhistatah kim? // 3 // Ittham na kincidapi sadhana-sadhyajatam svapnendrajala sadrisam paramarthagunyam Atyantanirvritikaram yadapetabad ham tad Brahma vanchata janah | ___yadi cetanasti // 4 // The punya phalas awarding the attainment of visaya sukhas are thus proved as nothing but duhkhamaya in reality. // 457 // (2005) visayasuhaM dukkhaM ciya dukkhapaDiyArao tigiccha cha / taM suhamuvayArAo na uvayAro viNA tacaM // 458 // (2006) Visayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadiyarao tigiccha vya i Tam suhamuvayarao na uvayaro vina taccam II 458 >> ( 2006 ) [ viSayasukhaM duHkhameva duHkhapratIkAratazcikitseva / tat sukhamucArAd nopacAro vinA tathyam // 458 / / (2006) Visayasukham duhkhameva duhkhpratikaratascikitseva | Tat sukhamupacarad nopacaro vina tathyam || 458 II ( 2006 ) ] Trans.--458 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like medicine on account of its being a resistance against distress. It is ( known as ) happiness by ( virtue of ) usage ( only ). And there is no usage without fact. ( 2006 ) TIkA-viSayasukhaM tatvato duHkhameva, duHkhapratIkArarUpatvAt , kuSThagaNDA'jharoga-kvAthapAna-cchedana-dambhanAdicikitsAvat / yazca loke tatra sukhavyapadezaH pravartate sa upacArAt / na copacArastathyaM pAramArthikaM vinA kvApi pravartate, mANavakAdau siMhAdyupacAravaditi // 458 // (2006) D. C.-Since visaya sukha is after all a resistance against duhkha, it is nothing but duhkha. For the removal of diseases like leprosy, boil, or piles, just as a dose of decoction and .

Page #558
Vada ] Ganadharavada *:517 :. cutting off or burning some rotten part, are considered as pleasant inspite of their causing pain, the visaya sukhas are also considered as duhkhamaya inspite of their affording pleasure. The visaya sukha is known as sukha by means of upacara only. This upacara is not reality but its existence is based on real objects. Without the existence of a real lion, the attribute of lion could never be given to manavaka. // 458 // (2006) tamhA jaM muttasuhaM taM taccaM dukkhasaMkha'vassaM / muNiNo'NAbAhassa va NippaDiyArappasUIo // 459 // (2007) Tamha jam muttasuham tam taccam dukkhasamkhae'vassam Munino'nabahassa va nippadiyarappastiio // 459 // ( 2007 ) [ tasmAd yad muktasukhaM tat tathyaM dukhasaMkSaye'vazyam / muneranAbAdhasyeva niSpratIkAra prasUteH // 459 / / ( 2007 ) Tasmad yad muktasukham tat tathyam duhkhasamksaye'vasyami Muneranabhadhasyeva nispratikaraprasuteh || 459 || (2007) ] Trans. - 459 Hence, at the removal of ( all ) miseries, happiness of a free (soul) being produced unresisted and unobstructed like a sage, is undoubtedly a real (happiness) ( 2007 ) TIkA - tasmAd yad muktasya saMbandhi tadeva sukhaM tathyaM nirupacaritam / kutaH ? | svAbhAvikatvena niSpratIkArarUpasya tasya praterutpatteH / katham ? | avazyam / kva' sati 1 / duHkhasaMkSaye / sAMsArikaM hi sarva puNyaphalamapi duHkharUpatayA samarthitam, tataH pApaphalam, itaraca sarvaM duHkhamevehAsti nAnyat, tacca muktasya kSINam ; atastatsaMkSaye'vazyaMtayA yat tasya niSpratIkAraM svAbhAvikaM nirupamaM sukhamutpadyate tadeva tathyam / kasyeva / viziSTajJAnavato SnAbAdhasya muneriva uktaM ca " nirjitamada - madanAnAM vAk- kAya - manovikArarahitAnAm / nivRttaparAzAnAmiva mokSaH suvihitAnAm // 1 //

Page #559
:: 518 :: Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh iti // 459 // (2007) D. C.-Happiness enjoyed by a mukta being is real, and is not based upon upacara because it is naturally generated without any resistance. Like that of a learned sage, having no obstacle in his way, this sukha is free from all sorts of miseries found in the mundane world. It has been said, therefore, that, Nirjitamada-madananam vak-kaya-manovikirarahitanarn | Vinivrittaparasanamihaiva moksah suvihitanam // 459 // (2007) Also, jaha vA nANamao'yaM jIvo nANovaghAi cAvaraNaM / karaNamaNuggahakAriM sabAvaraNakkhae suddhI // 460 // (2008) taha sokkhamao jIvo pAvaM tassovaghAiyaM neyaM / puNNamaNuggahakAri sokkhaM sabakkhae sayalaM // 461 // (2009) Jaha va nanamao'yam jivo nanovaghoi cavaranami Karanamanuggahakarim savvavaranakkhae suddhi 1146011 (2008) Taha sokkhamao jivo pavam tassovaghaiyam neyam | Punnamanuggahakarim sokkham savvakkhae sayalam 11461||(2009) [ yathA vA jJAnamayo'yaM jIvo jJAnopaghAti cAvaraNam / karaNamanugrahakAri sarvAvaraNakSaye zuddhiH // 460 / / ( 2008) tathA saukhyamayo jIvaH pApaM tasyopaghAtikaM jJeyam / puNyamanugrahakAri saukhyaM sarvakSaye sakalam // 461 // (2009) Yatha Va jnanamayo'yam jivo, jnanopaghati cavaranam i Karanamanugrahakari sarvavaranaksaye suddhih // 460 // (2008) Tatha saukhyamayo jivah papani tasyopaghatikam jieyam | Punyamanugrahakari saukhyam sarvaksaye 'sakalam // 4610 2009)]

Page #560
Vada ) Ganadharavada -: 519 :Trans.-460-461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, (any sort of ) interruption is an obstacle to ( the apprehension of ) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful ( to it ) ( and just as ), at the destructiou of all interruptions, (there is ) pure ( cognizance ), the soul is full of happiness. Sinful deed is ( its ) obstruction, a virtuous deed is (the) helpful ( element ) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect ( apprehension of ) happiness. ( 2008-2009) TIkA-vyAkhyA-yathA vA'nantajJAnamayo'sau svarUpeNa jIvaH / tadIyajJAnasya ca matyAvaraNAdikamAvaraNamupaghAtakaM mantavyam / karaNAni tvindriyANi tajjhAnasya, sUryAtapasya tadAvArakameghapaTalacchidrANIvopakArakANi / sarvAvaraNakSaye tu jJAnazuddhinirmalatA sarvathAvabhAsakatvalakSaNA bhavati / prakRtayojanAmAha-tathA tenaiva prakAreNa svarUpataH svAbhAvikAnantasaukhyamayo jIvaH, tasya ca sukhasyaivopaghAtakArakaM pApakarma vijJeyam / puNyaM tvanuttarasUraparyantasukhaphalaMtasya svAbhAvika sukhasyAnugrahakArakam / tataH sarvAvaraNApagame prakRSTajJAnamiva samastapuNyapApakSaye sakalaM paripUrNa nirupacaritaM nirupama svAbhAvikamanantaM sukhaM bhavati siddhasyeti // 460-461 // (2008-2009) ___D. C.-The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which Mats-jnana etc are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun--shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance. Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which papa is the obstructive element, and punya the helping element. When all sorts of papa and punya are removed, the muktatma attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions nor upacaras. // 460-461 // ( 2008-2009 ) ___Or, jaha vA kammakkhayao so siddhattAipariNaiM labhai / taha saMsArAIyaM pAvai tatto ciya suhaM ti // 462 // (2010)

Page #561
*: 520: Jinabhadra Gani's | The eleventh Jaha va kamimakkhayao so siddhattaiparinaim labhail Taha samsaraiyam pavai tatto cciya suham ti // 462 // ( 1020 ) [ yathA vA karmakSayataH sa siddhatvAdipariNatiM labhate / tathA saMsArAtItaM prAmoti tata eva sukhamiti / / 462 // (2010) Yatba va karmaksayatah sa siddhatvadiparinatim labhate i Tatha samsaratitam prapnoti tata eva sukhamiti // 462 // (2010)] Trans.-462 Just as it attains the form of siddhatva etc, on account of the destruction of Karma, it attains the celestial happiness also, due to the same reason. ( 2010 ) TIkA-yathA vA sakalakarmakSayAdasau muktAtmA siddhatvAdipariNati labhate, tata eva sakalakarmakSayAt saMsArAtItaM vaiSayikasukhAd vilakSaNasvarUpaM nirupamaM tathyaM sukhaM prAmoti / etena yaduktam-" kSINapuNya-pApatvena kAraNAbhAvAd niHsukha-duHkho muktAtmA, vyomavat " ityetadapi pratyuktaM draSTavyam , " kAraNAbhAvAt" ityasya hetorasiddhatvAt , sakalakarmakSayalakSaNakAraNajanyatvena siddhasukhasya sakAraNatvAditi // 462 / / ( 2010 ) D. C.-Just as a muktatma attains siddhatva etc when it is free from the bondages of Karma, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So, your argument that since muktatma is free from papa-punya, it has no sukha-duhkha also like sky, proves itself absolutely unfounded. // 462 // (2010) Now, in reply to the argument that ' deha is the only agent of perceiving sukha-duhkha, the author statessAyA-'sAyaM dukkhaM tavirahammi ya suhaM jao tennN| dehi-diesu dukkhaM sokkhaM dehi-diyAbhAve // 463 // (2011) Saya'-sayam dukkham tavvirahamni ya suham jao tenami Dehin-diesu dukkham sokkham dehin-diyabhave // 463 // (2011)

Page #562
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 321 : [ sAtA-'sAtaM duHkhaM tadvirahe ca sukhaM yatastena / dehe-ndriyeSu duHkhaM saukhyaM dehe-ndriyAbhAve // 463 // (2011) Sata-'satam duhkham tadvirake ca sukham yatastena i Dehe-ndriyesu duhkham saukhyam dehe-ndriyabhave 11463||(2011)] ___ Trans.-463 Results of sinful and virtuous deeds are only distressful. And since happiness is ( attained ) in their absence, ( there is ) misery ( in case of ) body and sense-organs existing, (and) (there is ) happiness in absence of body and sense-organs. (2011) TIkA-nanu yat puNyaphalaM sAtaM sukhatayA lokavyavahArato rUDhaM tat sarva duHkhamevetyanantarameva samarthitam , asAtaM tu pApaphalatvAd nirvivAdaM duHkhameva / evaM ca sati sarva duHkhamevAsti saMsAre, na sukham / tacca duHkhaM siddhasya sarvathA kSINam / atastadvirahe yad yasmAt siddhasya svAbhAvikaM nirupamam , anantaM ca yukti siddhameva sukham tena tasmAt kAraNAt pArizeSyanyAyAt saMsAriNAmeva jIvAnAM dehe-ndriyeSvAdhArabhUteSu yathoktasvarUpaM duHkham , sukhaM tu dehe-ndriyAbhAva eva, siddhasya kSINaniHzeSasukha-duHkhatvena tasya tatra yuktisiddhatvAditi / / 463 // (2011) ___D. C.-It has already been proved that even punya-phalas are duhkhamaya in this mundane world. And papa-phalas are undoubtedly duhkhamaya. This shows that everything in this world is full of misery. This sort of duhkha can never affect muktatmas. Muktatma being free from such duhkhas, enjoys perfect and infinite happiness showing there-by that duhkha exists only where deha and indriyas exist; and real sukha is always found in a siddha being who is free from deha and andrrayas. // 463 // (2011) ____Or, jo vA dehi-diyajaM suhamicchai taM pahunca doso'yaM / saMsArAIyamidaM dhammaMtarameva siddhisuhaM // 464 // (2012) 86

Page #563
- 522 Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh Jo va dehin-diyajam suhamicchai tam paducca doso'yami Samsaraiyamidam dhammantarameva siddhisuham 11 4641 (2012) [ yo vA dehe-ndriyajaM sukhamicchati taM pratItya doSo'yam / saMsArAtItamidaM dharmAntarameva siddhisukham / / 464 // (2012) Yo va dehe-ndriyajam sukhamicchati tam pratitya doso'yami Samsaratitamidam dharmantarameva siddhisukham 1146411 (2012)] Trans.--464 Or, according to one who believes in the happiness (afforded) by body and sense alone, this (may involve) a difficulty. But this celestial happiness is far above the mundane world and has ( perfectly ) different characteristics. ( 2012 ) TIkA-yo vA kazcit saMsArAbhinandI mohamUDhaH paramArthAdarzI viSayA. miSamAtragRddho dehe-ndriyajameva sukhaM manyate, na tu siddhisukham , tasya tena svame'pyadarzanAt , tasya vAdinaH saMsAravipakSe mokSe pramANataH sAdhite sati "niHsukhaH, siddhaH, dehe-ndriyAbhAvAt" ityayaM doSo bhaveta; na tvasmAkaM saMsArAtItaM puNya-pApaphalasukha-duHkhAbhyAM sarvathA vilakSaNaM dharmAntaramevA'nupamamakSayaM nirupacaritaM siddhisukhamicchatAmiti / / 464 // (2012) ___D. C-According to one who is disillusioned by the infatuation of this mundane world and its sensuous pleasures, the happiness of deha and indriyas would be the only happiness and there would be nothing like moksc-sukha in his view-point. He would, therefore, find fault with our belief by saying that muktatma can never experience sukha as it has no deha and andrreyas. But those like us who recognize the existence of muktatma and its uncomparable infinite happiness, understand that moksa-sukha being samsaratita, has absolutely different characteristics and hence, there is no dosa. || 464 || ( 2012 ) Here again, there is a question and its replykaha naNu meyaM ti maI nANA-NAbAhau ti naNu bhaNiyaM / tadaNicaM gANaM pi ya ceyaNadhammo tti rAgo va // 465 // (2013)

Page #564
:: 523 : Vada ] Ganadharavada Kaha nanu meyam ti mai nana--'nabahau tti nanu bhaniyami Tadaniccam nanam pi ya ceyanadhammo tti rago vva 114651 (2013) [kathaM nanu meyamiti matiAnA-'nAvAdhata iti nanu bhaNitam / tadAnityaM jJAnamapi ca cetanadharma iti rAga iva / / 465 // (2013) Katham nanu meyamiti matirjnana-'nabadbata iti nanu bhaaitami Tadanityani jnanamapi ca cetanadharma iti raga iva li 465 ll(2013)] Trans.--465 ( The question may be that ). " How could it really be taken like that? (The reply is)-" It has already been said that ( it is so ) on account of the uninterrupted cognizance." Then, even cognizance being a quality of consciousness, it will be a-nitya like affection. ( 2013 ) ____TIkA-atraivaMbhRtA matiH parasya bhavet-nanvicchanti bhavantaH siddhasya yathoktaM sukham , kintu necchAmAtrato vastusiddhiH, api tu pramANataH tato yena pramANena tat sidhyati tad vaktavyam / anumAnena tadanumIyata iti cet / tarhi kenAnumAnena tadanumeyam-anumIyata ityarthaH ? ityAha-" nANA-'NA. bAhau tti naNu bhaNiyaM ti" nanu bhaNitamatrArthe prAganumAnam-siddhasya prakRSTaM sukham , jJAnatve satyanAbAdhatvAt , munivaditi / punarapi paraH prAhayadyevam , tadyanityaM sukhaM jJAnaM ca siddhasya, cetanadharmatvAt , rAgavaditi / / 465 // (2013) ___D. C.-Prabhasa:--With what pramana or anumana do you establish the existence of the above-mentioned moksasukha? Bhagavan:- The anumana has already been stated that, like a sage, muktatma enjoys perfect happiness by virtue of its uninterrupted cognizance. ___Prabhass:-In that case, as happiness and cognizance on, the part of free soul are cetana-dharmas, they would be a-notya like raga. // 465 // (2013) There is another inference also

Page #565
.: 524 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh kayagAibhAvao vA nAvaraNA - ssbAhakAraNAbhAvA / uppAya - TThii-bhaGgassahAvao vA na doso'yaM // 466 // (2014) Kayagaibhavao va navarana"bahakaranabhava | Uppaya--tthii-bhangassahavao va na doso'yam // 466 // ( 2014 ) [ kRtakAdibhAvato vA nAvaraNA-ssbAdhakAraNAbhAvAt / utpAda -sthiti-bhaGgasvabhAvato vA na doSo'yam / / 466 / / (2014) Kritakadibhavato va navarana"bhadhakaranabhavat | Utpada-sthiti-bhaigasvabhavato va na doso 'yam || 466 (2014) ] Trans.--466 " Or, is it a- nitya because of (its ) being factitious etc?" It is not so, as there is no cause for ( the production of ) obstacles and interruptions. Or, this fault ( of a-nityata) does not arise ( at all ) on account of its nature of being susceptible to production, retention and destruction." (2014) " , TIkA - athavA, anitye siddhasya sukha-jJAne, tapaHprabhRtikaSTAnuSThAnena kriyamANatvAt, AdizabdAdabhUtaprAdurbhAvAt ghaTavaditi / atrottaramAha" nAvaraNetyAdi " na siddhasyAnitye jJAna - sukhe / kutaH ? | AvaraNaM cAcAghavAvaraNA-''bAdhau tayoH kAraNaM hetustasyA'bhAvAt, AkAzavaditi / idamuktaM bhavati - siddhasya jJAnaM sukhaM ca yadyapagacchet tadA syAdanityam, apagamazca jJAnasyAvaraNodayAt, sukhasya tvAbAdhahetubhUtAdasAta vedanIyodayAdikAraNAdbhavet ; AvaraNa- vedanIyAdIni ca mithyatvAdibhirbandhahetubhirbadhyante, teca siddhasya na vidyante, tatastadabhAvAd nAvaraNA-''bAdhAkAraNasadbhAvaH, tadabhAvAcca na siddhasya jJAna - sukhApagamaH, tadasatve ca tayoH sadA'vasthita - tvAt kathamanityatvam 1 / na ca cetanadharmAH sarve'pyanityA bhavanti, jIvagata? dravyatvA mUrttatvAdibhirvyabhicArAt / tatazca " cetanadharmasvAta" ityanaikAntiko hetuH / tathA, kRtakatvAdirapyanaikAntikaH, ghaTapradhvaMsAbhAvena vyabhicArAt / asiddhazcAyam, siddhasya jJAnasukhayoH svAbhAvikatvena kRtakatvA dyayogAt, AvaraNA - ssbAdhakAraNAbhAvena ca tattirobhAvamAtrameva nivartate, na punaste kriyete, ghaTAdivat ; nApyabhUte prAdurbhavataH, vidyudAdivat yena tayora *

Page #566
Vada ] Ganadharavada :: 525:. nityatvaM syAt / na hi ghanapaTalApagame candrajyotsnAyAH sUryaprabhAyA vA tirobhAvamAtranivRttau kRtakatvam , abhUtaprAdurbhAvo vA vaktuM yujyata iti / atha tenAvirbhUtena viziSThena rUpeNa kRtakatvAdanitye siddhasya jJAnasukhe pratikSaNaM ca paryAyarUpatayA jJeyavinAze jJAnasya vinAzAt , sukhasyApi pratisamayaM parApararUpeNa pariNAmAdetayoranityatvaMmucyate / tarhi siddhasAdhyatA, iti darzayati-"uppAya-TTiItyAdi" itthamAtmA''kAza-ghaTAdirUpasya sarvasyApi vastustomasya sthityu-tpAda-pralayasvAbhAvyAbhyupagamAt siddhasukha jJAnayorapi kathaJcidanityatvAd nAyaM tadanityatvApattilakSaNo 'smAkaM doSa iti // 466 / / (2914) D. C.-Prabhasa:--Jnana and sukha of a suddha being, are a-nitya firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production like ghata. Bhagavan:-Your argument is absolutely unfounded. O Prabhasa' Jnana and sukha of a muktatma would be co-nitya only if they vanished. By means of jnanavaranas, jnana would be obscured and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, sukha would vanish. Both these obstructions jnanavaranas and papa-karmas are bound by the hetus of muthyatva etc, muktatma being free from such hetus it is free from jnanavaranas and papa-karmas also. Consequently, its jnana and sukha do not meet destruction and hence they are never called a-nitya. Secondly, all the qualities of cetana are not a-nitya. Dravyatva and co-murtatva are nitya. Therefore, the argument that jnana and sukha are a-nitya because they happen to be cetana-dharmas, is anekantika Simularly, the hetu of kritakatva etc is also anekantika. Indestructiblity of ghata is a-siddha inspite of its being kritaka This hetu is a-siddha also, because jnana and sukha of a siddha being are natural. Since there is no reason for the existence of avaranas and badhas, that which is in obscurity becomes manifest, Thus, they are not factitious

Page #567
.:526:. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh like ghata etc. nor are they produced like lightning etc. The moonlight and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way. Still however, jnana and sukha of a muktatma could easily be considered as a-nitya by virtue of their being kritaka. Because, at every time when jneya vanishes, jnana is also vanishing and sukha also comes into existence in various forms at various times. So, there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be a-nitya to a certain extent as all objects like soul, sky, gheta, and pata etc are susceptible to utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya after all. 11 466 11 ( 2014 ) Establishing the existence of moksa and moksa-sukha by the help of Veda-vacanas, the author proceeds-- naha vai sasarIrassa ppiya-'ppiyAvahatirevamAdi va jaM / tadamokkhe nAsammi va sokkhAbhAvammi va na juttaM // 467 // (2015) Na ha vai sasarirassa ppiya-ppiyayahatirevamadi va jami Tadamokkhe nasammi va sokkhabhavammi va na juttam 1146711 [na ha vai sazarIsya priyA-'priyApahatirevamAdi vA yat / tadamokSe nAze vA saukhyAbhAve vA na yuktam // 467 // (2015) Na ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-'priyapahatirevamadi va yati Tadamokse nase va saukhyabhave va na yuktam // 467 // (2015)] ___ Trans.-467 (The sentence of Vedas that ) " One having body has no likes and dislikes etc " would becoine worthless in ( case of ) accepting the negation or destruction of moksa and absence of ( absolute ) happiness. ( 2015 ) TIkA-" na ha vai sazarIrasya priyA-'priyayorapahatirasti" "azarIraM vA vasantaM priyA-priye na spRzataH" iti ca yad vedoktam , tadapyamokSe mokSAbhAve-jIva-karmaNoviyoge'nabhyupagamyamAna ityarthaH, tathA, "mavirapi na

Page #568
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 527 :. prajJAyate " iti vacanAd muktAvasthAyAM sarvathA nAze vA jIvasyAbhyupagamyamAne, saccevAmuktAtmanaH sukhAbhAva iSyamANe na yuktaM prApnoti - abhyupagamavirodhastavetyarthaH / anena hi vAkyena kila yathokto mokSaH, muktau ca niSkarmaNo jIvasya sabhyam, nirupamasukhaM ca tasya, etAni trINyapyabhyupagamyante / etacca purastAd vyaktIkariSyate / tato'sya tritayasya niSedhaM kurvatastavAbhyupagamavirodha iti bhAvaH // 467 // ( 2015 ) D. C.-The sentences of Vedas such as "Na ha vari sa-sarirasya priya' priyayo-rapahatirasti " and " Asariram va vasantam priya'priye na spris'atah" etc would prove themselves futile if the existence of moksa, jiva and moksa-sukha were denied. Because, the existence of moksa-separating jiva and Karma from each other-existence of pure soul in the mukta state and the attainment of perfect and infinite happiness by a mukta being, have already been established by the Veda-padas. || 467 || ( 2015 ) The opponent then asks no asarI ci suha - dukkhAI piya-'ppiyAI ca / tAiM na phusaMti naTTaM phuDamasarIraM ti ko doso ? || 468|| (2016) Nattho a-sariro cciya suha-dukkhaim piya' - ppiyaim ca / Taim na phusanti nattham phudamasariram ti ko doso? ||468 (2016) [ naSTo'zarIra eva sukha-duHkhe priyA - 'priye ca / te na spRzato naSTaM sphuTamazarIramiti ko doSaH 1 // 468 // (2016) Nasto'sarira_eva sukha duhkha priya' priye ca| Te na sprisato nastam sphutamasariramiti ko dosah ? | 468 | (2016) Trans.-468 One who is dead, is bodiless. Happiness and misery, likes and dislikes do not touch him. ( Then ) what harm is there in taking a bodiless person to have been distinctly destroyed ? (2016) TIkA - " na ha vai 0 " ityAdivedavAkyasya kila paro'mumarthaM manyate - zarIrasarvanAzena naSTaH kharaviSANakalpa evocyate, tamevaMbhUtama zarIraM naSTaM priyA

Page #569
*: 528 : Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eleventh 'priye sukha-duHkhe yad na spRzataH, tat sphuTameva budhyata evedam , naSTasya sukha-duHkhasparzAyogAt , azarIrazabdena ca jIvanAzAbhidhAnAt / evaMbhUte cAsya vAkyasyArthe mumukSujIvasya nirvANapradIpasyeva sarvanAzamabhyupagacchatAM ko'smAkamabhyupagamavirodhalakSaNo doSaH?-na kazcidapIti parAbhiprAya iti // 468 // (2016) D. C.---Prabhasa:-Since a bodiless person is absolutely perished, it is not-existent like khara-s'rnga. It is, therefore, clear that sueh bodiless persons are not affected by happiness or misery and likes or dislikes. Consequently, there would be no harm in accepting the absolute destruction of a soul which has attained molesa. // 468 // (2016) In reply to this, Bhagavan explains the real interpretation of the Veda-padas such as " Na ha vai " etc and proceeds. veyavayANa ya atthaM na suTu jANasi imANa taM suNasu / asarIravavaeso adhaNo va sao nisahAo // 469 // (2017) nanisehao ya annammi tabihe ceva paJcao jeNa / taNAsarIraggahaNe jutto jIvo na kharasiMgaM // 470 // (2018) Veyavayana ya attham na sutthu janasi imana tam sunasu / Asariravvavaeso adhano vva sao nisehao // 469 // (2017) Nanisehao ya annammi tavvihe ceva paccao jena i Tenasariraggahane jutto jivo na kharasingam // 470 // ( 2018) [ vedapadAnAM cArthaM na suSTu jAnAsyeSAM taM zRNu / azarIravyapadezo'dhana iva sato niSedhAt // 469 // (2017) naniSedhatazcAnyasmistadvidha eva pratyayo yena / tenAzarIragrahaNe yukto jIvo na kharazRGgam / / 470 // (2018) Veda-padanam cartham na susthu janasyesam tam srunu | Asariravyapadeso'dhana iva sato nisedhat // 469 // ( 2017 )] Nannised hatascanyasminstadvidha eva pratyayo yena 1 Tenasariragrahane yukto jivo na kharasrigam // 470 // (2018)]

Page #570
Vada ] Ganadharavada : 529 :. * Trans.-469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of Vedas. It is this. Hear please. Like 'a-dhana,' the word a-sarira is meant to denote the negation of an existent object. By ( means of ) negation due to -- na', ( its ) existence would be found in another of the same type. In understanding the word 'a-sarira', it is better, therefore, to accept ( the existence of ) jiva and not ( its non-existence like ) kharabriga. ( 2017-2018 ) ___TIkA-AyuSman ! prabhAsa ! na kevalaM yuktim , vedapadAnAmamISAmartha ca tvaM suSTu na jAnAsi, tatastaM zRNu " na ha vai0" ityAdi pUrvArdhaM sugamatvAdatra gAthAdvaye na vyAkhyAtam , tadapi sukhapratipattyarthaM vyAkhyAyate-'na' iti nipAto niSedhArthaH / 'ha' 'vai' ityetadapi nipAtadvayaM hizabdArthatvAd yasmAdarthe / saha zarIreNa vartata iti sazarIro jIvastasya sazarIrasyetyatraivakAro draSTavyaH / tatazcAyamarthaH-yasmAt sazarIrasya jIvasya priyA-'priyayoH sukhaduHkhayorapahatirvighAto'ntaraM nAsti, na tvazarIrasya; tasmAdazarIraM zarIra. rahitaM muktyavasthAyAM vasantaM lokAntasthitaM jIvaM priyA-'priye sukha-duHkhe na spRzataH / idamuktaM bhavati-yAvadayaM jIvaH sazarIraH, tAvat sukhena duHkhena vA'nyatareNa kadAcidapi na mucyate; azarIrastvasau kSINavedanIyatvAt sukhaduHkhAbhyAM kadAcidapi na spRzyata iti / evaMbhUte cAsya vAkyasyAthai sati yo'yamazarIravyapadezaH, asau sata eva vidyamAnasyaiva jIvasya muktyavasthAyAM vidhIyate, na tu sarvathA naSTasya / kutaH ? ityAha-niSedhAt / iha yo yasya niSedhaH sa tasya sata eva vidhIyate, na tvasataH, yathA'dhana iti, atra sata eva devadattasya dhananiSedho vidhIyate, na tvasataH kharaviSANasya / Aha-na vidyate zarIraM yasyetyevaM niSedhAdanyapadArthe jIva eva kathaM pratIyate ? ityAha-" nanisehao ya ityAdi " vyAkhyAto vizeSapratipatteH paryudAsavRttinA natrA niSedho naniSedhastasmAd naniSedhAt kAraNAt sazarIrAdanyasmiMstadvidha eva zarIrasadRze kasmiMzcidanyapadArthe saMpratyayo vijJeyaH, yathA " na brAhmaNo'bAhmaNaH" ityukte bAhmaNasadRzaH kSatriyAdireva gamyate, na

Page #571
:530: Jinabhadra Gaai's [The eleventh tu tuccharUpo'bhAvaH / uktaM ca-" najivayuktamanyasadRzAdhikaraNe loke tathA hyarthagatiH" iti / iha ca zarIrasadRzo'zarIro jIva eva gamyate, dvayorapyupayogarUpatvena sadRzatvAt / na ceha zarIraM sAdRzyabAdhakam , tasya jIvena saha kSIra-nIranyAyato lolIbhUtatvenaikatvAditi / tadevaM yena yasmAt kAraNAta naniSedhAdanyasmiMstadvidha evAnyapadArthe saMpratyayo bhavati, tena tasmAt kAraNAt " azarIraM vA vasantaM" ityatrAzarIragrahaNe jIva evAzarIro yujyate, na tu kharaviSANaM tuccharUpo'bhAva ityarthaH / tadevamazarIramiti vyAkhyAtam / / 469-470 // (2017-2018) D. C.--Bhagavan:-0 Prabhasa ! Really you do not understand the proper meaning of the sentences such as " Na ha vai " etc. In this sentence, the particle 'na' denotes negation and the particles 'ha' and 'vai' are used in the ablative sense. " Sa-s'arirasya " means to a soul having a body and " priya-"priyayorapahatirasti " denotes the destruction of happiness and misery. The whole sentence will be interpreted as follows: Jiva being possessed of a body, has no abhava of sukhaduhkha. In the same way, Jiva existing in a bodiless state of moksc, never undergoes sukha-duhkha i, e. As long as soul is encompassed in a body, it has to undergo sukha-duhkha, but as the bodiless muktatma is free from Karma-good or bad-it is never affected by sukha-duhkha. In the word " a-s'arira " here, there is a negation of the body and not of the soul. In the expression " Adhano Devcom dattah" the riches are denied to the vidyamane Devadatta and not to an a vidhomana kharas'rriga. Similarly, here also the existence of soul is not denied, but only that of body is denied. That which is denied must belong to an existent source and not to a non-existent source. Prabhasa: How could it be believed that that which is denied at one place must be found at another ?

Page #572
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 531 : Bhagavan: --Just as by the word " na-brahmana " a nonbrahmin like a ksatriya or a vais'ya is understood, but the absolute abhava of brahmana as a whole, is not meant. So also, the expression "a-s'arira" signifies a bodiless mukta jiva of the type of mukta jiva having body, but that does not absolutely deny the existence of soul. There is resemblance in both owing to the common property of upacara. Moreover," s'arira" does not come in the way of resemblance. As body is mixed with soul like milk and water, it is one and the same as soul. Thus, by the denial of the particle 'na', the same soul is apprehended at another place but the existence of soul is never denied thereby. So, the word 'a-s'arira' denotes nothing but giva which is vidyamana like Devadatta, and not a-vidyamana like kharas'rga. 11 469-470 11 ( 2017-2018 ) The expression " Va vasantam " is now explained:jaM va vasaMtaM saMtaM tamAha vAsaddao sadehaM pi| na phuseja vIyarAyaM jogiNamiTe-yaravisesA // 471 // (2019) Jam va vasantam santam tamaha vasddao sadeham pi 1 Na phusejja viyarayam joginamitthe-yaravisesa 1 471 11 (2019) [ yad vA vasantaM santaM tamAha vAzabdato sadehamapi / na spRzeyurvItarAga yoginamiSTe-taravizeSAH // 471 // (2019) Yad va vasantan santam tamaha vasabdato sadehamapi i Na speseyur vitaragam yoginamiste-taravisesah || 471 || ( 2019 )] Trans.-471 Happiness and misery do not affect him who is existing in a free state and also by the word 'va' (they do not affect ) a dispassionate ascetic having a body. ( 2019 ) TIkA-yasmAcAzarIram / kathaMbhUtam ? / vasantaM lokAgre nivasantaM tiSThantamiti yAvat / anena vasanavizeSaNena tamazarIrazabdavAcyamartha santaM

Page #573
*: 532 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh vidyamAnamAha, na tvasadbhUtam , vasanasya saddharmatvAt / tasmAt kathaM jIvanAzarUpaM nirvANaM syAt ?, na kevalamazarIraM muktam , kintu vAzabdAt sadehamapi sazarIramapi vItarAgaM-kSINopazamamohayoginaM paramasamAdhimantaM bhavasthamapi na spRzeyuH / ke ? / iSTe-taravizeSAH sukha-duHkhabhedA ityarthaH / / 471 / / (2019) D. C-A bodiless mukta being is not affected by the sukha-duhkha bhedas. The word 'va' includes dispassionate ascetics having bodies. // 471 // ( 2019 ) Also, vAva tti vA nivAo vAsadattho bhavaMtamiha saMtaM / bujjhA'va tti va saMtaM nANAivisiTThamahavAha // 472 // (2020) Vava tti va nivao vasaddattho bhavantamiha santami . Bujjha'va tti va santam nanaivisitthamahavaha // 472 // (2020) [vAveti vA nipAto vAzabdArtho bhavantamiha santam / budhyasvA'veti vA santaM jJAnAdiviziSTamathavA'tha / / 472 // (2020) Vaveti va nipato vasabdartho bhavantamiha santam i Budhyanva'veti va santam jnanadivisistamathava'tha 11472||(2020)] _____Trans.--472 Or, " vava" is a particle meaning "Or", and -- santam' means a soul existing ( in the mukta state ). Or, take ' ava' as a particle and 'santam' meaning ( a soul ) characterised by ( the qualities of ) knowledge, etc. ( 2020 ) TIkA-'vA' ityathavA, 'vAva' ityayaM zabdo nipAtaH, sa ca vAzabdArthaH / tatazcAzarIraM santaM bhavantaM muktau vidyamAnaM jIvaM priyA-'priye na spRzataH, vAzabdAt sazarIramapi vItarAga na te spRshtH| yadivA, 'vasantam' ityanyathA vyAkhyAyate-" bujjhA'va tti vetyAdi " "vA" ityathavA'yamarthaH / "vAva saMtaM ti" rakSaNa-gati-prItyAdiSvekonaviMzatAvartheSvavadhAtuH paThyate / gatyarthAzca dhAtavo jJAnArthA api bhavanti / tatazcAhavineya ! tvamevaM budhyasva / kiM tat ? ityAha-azarIraM santaM muktyavasthAyAM

Page #574
Vada ] Ganadharavada *: 533 : vidyamAnaM jIvam / athavA, jJAnAdibhirguNairviziSTaM santamityAha brUte, priyA'priye na spRzataH; vAzabdAt sazarIramapi vItarAgamiti tathaiveti // 472 // ( 2o po ) D C.--The expression "va vasantam could be dissolved as vava santan, the particle vava meaning "or" and santan meaning a bodiless jiva existing in the moksa state. The word vava here will signify that sukha-duhkha do not touch not only a bodiless jiva existing in a moksa state, but also the dispassionate ascetics having bodies. Or, the expression could be dissolved as va ava santam also. The prefix ava has nineteen different meanings such as to protect, to go, to love etc. Since a root signifying motion signifies knowledge also, a bodiless soul existing in the mukta state and characterized by the qualities of cognizance eto, is not affected by sukha-duhkha. Here also, the word 'va' brings in the dispassionate sa-deho ascetic. ll 472 11 ( 2020 ) The opponent asksna vasaMtaM avasaMtaM ti vA maI naasriirghnnaao| phusaNAvisesaNaM pi ya jao mayaM saMtavisayaM ti // 473 // (2021) Na vasantam a-vasantam ti va mai nasariragahanao 1 Phusanavisesanam pi ya jao mayam santavisayam ti 114731 (2021) [na vasantamavasantamiti vA mati zarIragrahaNAt / sparzanAvizeSaNamapi ca yato mataM sadviSayamiti // 473 // (2021) Na vasantamavasantamiti va matirnasariragrahanat i Sparsana visesanamapi ca yato matam sadvisayamiti 114731|(2021)] Trans.----473 Or, it may be dissolved as " na vasantam iti avasantam" meaning thereby not existing ( anywhere ).' ( But ) it is not proper. ( Since ) jiva is understood from *a-sarira.' Moreover, the adjective sparsana' is also accepted with regard to existent objects ( only ). ( 2021 )

Page #575
*: 534 :. Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh TIkA-" azarIraM vAvasantaM " ityatra luptasyAkArasya darzanAd " na vasantamavasantaM kApyatiSThantam" iti vyAkhyAnato nAsti muktyavasthAyAM jIvaH, kApyavasanAt , asattvAdeva ca nAmuM priyA-'priye spRzata iti parasya matirbhavet / tadetad na / kutaH ? ityAha-azarIragrahaNAt / etaduktaM bhavati" na vidyate zarIraM yasya " ityatra paryudAsaniSedhAt pUrvoktayuktyA mukkyavasthAyAmazarIro jIvo gamyate, ityato'trAkAraprazleSavyAkhyAnaM kartuM na pAryate, azarIragrahaNAd muktau jIvasiddheH / kiJca, 'priyA-'priye na spRzataH' iti yadazarIrasya sparzanAvizeSaNaM tadapi yasmAt sadviSayameva matam , tasmAd na muktau jiivsyaabhaavH| yadi hyazarIrazabdasya jIvAbhAvo vAcyaH syAta tadA taM priyA-'priye na spRzata iti vizeSaNamanarthakaM syAt / na hi "vandhyAputraM priyA-'priye na spRzataH" iti vizeSyamANa virAjate / tasmAd muktyavastho jIva evAzarIrazabdavAcyaH, na punastadabhAvaH / tato nAkAraprazleSavyAkhyAnaM yujyata iti / tadevaM "azarIraM vA vasantaM" ityanena jIvakArmaNazarIraviyogalakSaNasya mokSasya muktajIvasattvasya cAbhidhAnAt taniSedhaM kurvatastavAbhyupagamavirodha eveti // 473 // (2021) D. C.-Prabhasa:- If you can dissolve the expression as done above, I can also dissolve the expression at my will and pull the meaning in my favour. This, in no way, leads to establish the existence of molesa. For, by dissolving "a-sararam. va vasantam' as ' a-s'ariram va a-vasantam' I can interpret it as a bodiless ( soul ) not existing at any place, and thus prove jiva to be absent from muktavastha, proving thereby the the negation of moksa as well as java Bhagavan:-Your interpretation does not fit in properly. By interpreting'a-s'ariri' as one having no body, vidyamanata of jiva in the muktavastha is clearly understood. It is not proper, therefore, to interpret it in another way by prefixing "a". Secondly, in the sentence " Sukha-duhkhe na spris'atah " spars'ana becomes the adjective of' as'arira'. If 'as'arira' were meant to denote the negation of soul, the adjective

Page #576
Vada ] Ganadharavada * 535:* would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertions like " Sukha-duhkha do not affect the vandhyaputra." The adjective, therefore, is befitting 'as'arira' only if it means "mukta-jiva". Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as 'va a-vasantam ' is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper. This proves the existence of moksa which separates jiva and karmana s'arira and that of mukta-jiva also. If the existence of jiva were denied, Veda-vacanas would prove worthless as shown above. // 473 // ( 2021 ) The opponent said evaM pi hoja mutto nissuha - dukkhattaNaM tu tadvatthaM / taM no piya-ppiyAI jamhA puNe - yarakayAI // 474 // (2022) nANAbAhattaNao na phusati vIyarAya - dosassa / tassa ppiyamappiyaM vA muttasuhaM ko pasaMgo'ttha ? // 475 // (2023) Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattanam tu tadavattham Tam no piya - 'ppiyaim jamha punneyarakayaim // 474 // ( 2022 ) Nana'bahattanai na phusanti viyaraya-dosassai Tasya ppiyamappiyam va muttasuham ko pasarigo 'ttha? // 475u [ evamapi bhaved mukto niHsukha-duHkhatvaM tu tadavastham / tad no priyA - priye yasmAt puNye - tarakRte / / 474 / / (2022) jJAnAsnAbAdhatvato na spRzato vItarAga-dveSasya / tasya priyamapriyaM vA muktasukhaM kaH prasaGgo'tra 1 / / 475 / / (2023) Evamapi bhaved mukto nihsukha-duhkhatvam tu tadavastham I Tad no priya'-priye yasmat punye-tarakrite | 474 || (2022 )] Jnana'nabadhatvato na sprisato vitaraga-dvesasya | Tasya priyamapriyam va muktasukham kah prasangotra ? // 475 // Trans.--474-475. Such being a mukta soul, it will have no happiness and misery. ( But ) it is not (so), as likes and

Page #577
:: 536 :. Jinabhadra Gani's (The eleventh dislikes are produced from sinful or virtuous deeds. Moreover, likes and dislikes cannot affect a dispassionate ( person ) owing to his ( high ) knowledge and irresistability. He enjoys natural and perfect happiness. So, what is the sense in asserting the negation of happiness ? ( 2022-2023) TIkA-evamuktaprakAreNa mukto jIvo bhavedityakAmairapyabhyupagatamasmAbhiH, tathA ca sati jIvasya karmaviyogalakSaNo mokSaH, tatra jIvasatvaM ca siddham / yattu niHsukha-duHkhatvaM siddhasya mayA preritaM tat "priyA-'priye azarIraM na spRzataH" iti vacanAt tadavasthameva / atrottaramAha-tadetad na, yasmAt puNya-pApakarmajanite eva jIvAnAM priyA-'priye sAMsArikasukha-duHkhe bhvtH| te ca taM kSINaniHzeSapuNya-pApakarmANaM sakalasaMsArArNavapAraprApta muktAtmAnaM na spRzata ityuttaragAthAyAM sNbndhH| na caitAvatA tasya niHsukhatvamiti svayameva draSTavyam / kutaH ? ityAha-" nANetyAdi" jJAnatve satya. nAbAdharUpatvAdityarthaH / yacca tad muktasya sukhaM muktasukhaM svAbhAvika niSpratIkAraM nirupamaM c| " muttassa paraM sokkhaM jANA-'NAbAhao jahA muNiNo" ityAdinA prAgeva sAdhitam , tat tasya vItarAga-dveSasya muktAtmano na priyaM na puNyajanitaM sukhaM bhaNyate, na cApriyaM na pApajanitaM duHkhaM bhaNyate, kintvetAbhyAM sarvathA vilakSaNam , akarmajanitatvena svAbhAvikatvAt , niSpratIkArarUpatvAt , nirupamatvAt , apratipAtitvAceti / atha " ko pasaMgo'ttha ti" " azarIraM priyA-'priye na spRzataH" ityukte ko'tra muktAtmani muktasukhAbhAvaprasaGgaH ?-na kazcidityarthaH, puNyapApajanitapriyA-'priyayorabhAve tasya sutarAmeva bhAvAt / tasmAt " na ha vai sazarIrasya0" ityAdivedapadairyathoktanItyA jIva-kArmaNazarIravirahalakSaNo mokSaH, muktAvasthasya ca jIvasya sattvam , tathA, " azarIraM priyA-'priye na spRzataH" ityato'pi vacanAt puNya-pApakSayasamutthaM svAbhAvikam , apratipAti sukhaM cAsya, ityetatritayaM siddham / ata etadanabhyupagacchatastavAbhyupagamavirodha iti sthitam / yadapi "jarAmayaM vaitat sarva yadagnihotram" ityetasmAd vAkyAd mokSa

Page #578
Vada ] Ganadharavada .: 537 : hetukriyArambhayogyakAlAbhAvAd mokSAbhAvaM zaGkase; tadapyayuktam, tadarthAparijJAnAt / tasya hyayamarthaH-yadetadagnihotraM tad yAvajIvaM sarvamapi kAlaM kartavyam , vAzabdAd mumukSubhirmokSahetubhUtamapyanuSThAna vidheyamiti / ityevaM vedapadoktadvAreNa yf en gargat #ta: 1 faqat q1AFT akt: |898-810411 ( 2088-2023) D. C.-Prabhasa:---I grant the existence of muktatma, moksa, and soul as such. But according to the Veda-vacanas that siddha beings are free from happiness and misery, likes and dislikes will not affect the bodiless soul; consequently, a muktatma will have no experience of happiness. Bhagavan:-Priya and a-priya and hence sukha and duhkha are produced by punya-papas from which muktatma is free. But this in no way, means that muktatma has no scope for the experience of happiness. Since muktatma is highly cognizant and perfectly irresistible owing to its being free from raga-dvesa, it enjoys the highest and most natural happiness which never vanishes. Or, it is no use discussing about the negatiou of happiness to a mukta being, by saying that likes and dislikes do not affect the bodiless. Muktatma will thus have no experience of the mundane sukha-duhkha, because it is always free from likes and dislikes. Thus, the sentences of Vedas such as Na ha vai sa-s'arirasya etc establish, O blessed Prabhasa! the existence of moksa, jiva, and the immutable happiness of muktatma at the removal of punya-papa. Lastly, the sentence that "Jaramaryam vaitat sarvam yadagnshotram " means that one should practise agnihotra etc, till the end of life. Your suspicion about the existence of moksa generated from this sentence ( as the time of beginning the performance has not been mentioned in it ) is out of place. The sentence really means as follows:

Page #579
*; 538 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh One should performi sacrifice throughout the life at all times. The word 'va'here signifies that he who aspires for moksa should also perform the sacrifice, which acts as the hetu of their moksa. Thus, the Tirthankara removes the doubt of Prabhasa, 11 474-475 11 ( 2022-2023 ) Then, chinnammi saMsayammI jiNeNa jara-maraNavippamukkeNa / so samaNo pavaiotihi o saha khaMDiyasaehi // 476 // (2024) So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim 11 476 II ( 2024 ) [chinne saMzaye jinena jarA-maraNavipramuktena / / sa zramaNaH pravrajitastribhistu saha khaNDikazataiH // 476 // (2024) Chinne samsaye Jinena jari-marana vipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih 1476||(2024) Trans.-476 When the doubt was thus removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted diksa along with his three hundred pupils. (2024) End of the Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara. & End