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Gañadharavada
.: 39 :
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one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a suddha pada. As for example, a pratîpakşa, viz., ghata exists in the case of aghata which is a negation of ghata; for, there is an etymology of ghata, and that it is a suddha pada too. One which has no pratipakşa, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a suddha pada having an etymology is concerned. For instance, akharavişāna is wanting in a pratipakşa, viz., kharavisāna since kharavişāna is not a suddha pada but is a sāmūsika one-is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a vyutpatti..
We may now examine the case of adittha. Dittha is its pratipakşa; but, since this dittha is wanting in a vyutpatti, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied :
(i) It should be a suddha pada. (ii) At the same time, it must have a vyutpatti.
In the case of kharuvisana the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of dittha, the second is violated. So there exists neither kharavisāna, a pratipaksa of akharavişāņa nor practically dittha, a pratipakṣa of aditthha.
Now the second henistitch. Just as when one says that here there is no ghata' establishes the existence of a ghata elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under :
One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e. g., a ghața. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non existent has no negative predication. Khara-vişāna may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibilty for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.