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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The fourth यत्संबन्धिभूतो भागो गृह्यते तत् समस्ति, यथा नभसः पूर्वभागे गृहीते तत्संबन्ध्यपरभागः, गृह्यते च घटादेराराद्भागः, अतस्तत्संन्धिभूतः परभागोऽcafea I 79174—“ STIGTITEITSC771 IGIT: pagastai, तस्याप्यन्य इत्यादि तावत् , यावत् सर्वारतीयभागः" इति । अत्रापि परभागस्यासत्त्वे सर्वारातीयभागपरिकल्पनमुपपन्नमेव स्यात् । तस्मादस्ति परभाग şfa 11 888 11 ( 898 ) !!
D. C.-What anumāna do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For, how could you deny the existence of front part which is pratyaksa to you like the heat of fire ?
It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the apeksā of the rear one, jñāna about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of anumāna. But from this it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen.
Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one e. g. A. visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front portion which is connected with the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like ghata, pata etc., must contain rear portions since their front ones åre easily apprehended.
Again, the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portion's will not fit your anumāna. As the rear part is a-vidyamāna, the inference of foremost part being so is absolutely improper. Really speaking, the front part is perceptible in this case, and the inference of rear portion being vidyamāna is correct.
Again,