Gandharwad

SR No.: 011044
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Jain Granth Prakashak Sabha
Publication Year: 1942
Total Pages: 579
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 63 MB

Page 262

Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 219 : objects. This involves self-contradiction in your own argument which, o Vyakta ! is not at all worthy of you.
The point is that in case of establishing the existence of objects mere apekṣā would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object which produces jnana about its own self is also an active cause. And that is the reason why hrasva, dîrgha, and ubhaya-each one of which would be producing jnāna about its own self-should be taken as existing.
Again, o Vyakta ! you believe that to the apeksā of the middle finger, the pradesini finger is considered as hrasva even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger if pradesinî were taken as hrasva even though it is a-vidyamana by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also a-vidyamāna should be taken as hrasva and a very long substance like indradhvaja should also be taken as hrasva as the quality of a-vidyamanatā is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really speaking, pradesine finger being vidyamana by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of hrasva, dîrgha etc. is produced in the absolutely non-existent anguli only by means of apekşă. You might argue at this point that in such cases also, dîrgha, hrasva, ubkaya eto. are apprehended and the intellects as regards sva para and wbhaya are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion and further that according to you, hrasva, dîrgha etc. that are svatah, siddha and that produce jnana with regard to their own selves are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, o Vyakta! how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally there would be no distinction between sva and para at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinction there would be nothing like sunyata at all. (1705-1709 )