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.: 176
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The third
earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire even a kşanikrı vijñāna having only one support is 'able to apprehend other jñānas and their visayas having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no harm in believing that all objects are ksanika.
But even that is not correct. For vāsanā in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to vāsaka and vāsaniya; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the avasthāna ( retention ) of vāsya and vāsaka connected together, kșanikatā itself would not exist. And is that vāsanā ksanika or a-kşanika ? If it were kşanika, it would not be able to apprehend sarvaksanikatā; and if it were a-lcşanika the very proposition that everything is ksaniku would be violated.
So, the theory of Bauddhas that everything is ksaņika does not fit in, in any way.
Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the Ācārya now illustrates bis own. बहुविण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्थयाऽहवेगस्त । विण्णाणावत्था वा पडुचवित्तीविघाओ वा ॥१३०॥ (१६७८) विण्णाणखणविणासे दोसा इच्चादयो पसज्जति । न उ ठियसंभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि॥१३१॥(१६७९) तस्स विचित्तावरणखओवसमजाइं चित्तरूवाइं। खणियाणि य कालंतरवित्तीणि य मइविहाणाइं॥१३२॥(१६८०) Baliuvinnaņappabhavo jugavamanegatthayā’havegassa i Vinnāņāvatthā vā paduccavittīvighão vā || 130 11 ( 1678 ) Vinnāņakhaṇāviņāse dosā iccādayo pasajjanti i Na u țhiyasambhūyaccuyaviņņāṇamayammi jīvammi 1113111 (1679)