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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
D. C.-Vyakla:—The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like kharavişāņa. The front parts will also inot exist in that case, because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of sarvas'ünyatā.
Bhagavān:-The argument is not valid. Pratyaksa means existing at each of the sense-organs. So, when the hetu of a-pratpaksatva is advanced, there would be apprehension of sense-organs as well as the objects to be apprehended, and in their apprehension, s'ünyatā would never be accepted. For, if s'ünyatā is taken along with the hetu of a-pratyakşatva, the hetu itself will prove invalid. Or, say in absence of indriya and artha, the practical usage or pratyakşa and a-pratyaksa would never be possible.
Moreover, अस्थि अपच्चक्खं पि ह जह भवओ संसयाइविन्नाणं । अह नत्थि सुण्णया का कास व केणोवलद्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७) Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavao samsayājvinnānami Aha natthi sunnayā kā kāsa va kenovaladdhā vā ? 1119911 (1747) [ अस्त्यप्रत्यक्षमपि खलु यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
अथ नास्ति शून्यता का कस्य वा केनोपलब्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७) Astyapratyakşampi khalu yatha bhavataḥ samsayādivijñānam i Atha násti sūnyatā kā kasya va kenopalabdhā vā ? ||19911 (1747)]
Trans.- 199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exist, even though it is imperceptible ( to others ). And if that (doubt) does not exist, what is that sūnyata? Whose śânyata ( is that ) ? And who has apprehended it ? ( 1747 )
टीका-नन्वप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति किश्चिद् वस्तु, यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानमन्येषामप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति, ततो यथैतत् , तथा पर-मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षौ