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Jinabhadra Gaại’s.
| The first
D. C.-When a negation is predicated in the case of any object, this negation is to be understood regarding samyoga (conjunction ), samavāya ( inherence ), sãmanya ( generality ) or visesa ( speciality ), but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance Devadatta is not at home' means that the samyoga between a house and Devadatta, each of which exists, is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly 'an ass has no horns' means the negation of samavāya between an existing ass and horns. Similarly there is no other moon' implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say, we have only one moon, and that there is no parallel to it.
That 'there are no pearls equal to a ghata in bulk' conveys the idea that the distinguishing feature, viz., a measure equal to that of a ghata is denied, and not the non-existence of pearls.
Such being the case, Gautama ! you may refuse to admit only the samyoga of the existing soul with something in some way, by saying something like this, that the soul does not exist in the body, but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under:
If there exists that of which negation is predicated, then, in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore, you refuse to believe a fifth prati sedha, over and above the four well-known pratiședhas, viz., sainyoga etc. So there must be a fifth pratixedha. These arguments can be refuted as below:
We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds, 2. e., only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus you will see that only a particular