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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. 171 : all such jnanas, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of all objects. But simultaneous production of jnana as regards all objects is never possible and hence the apprehension of sarvaksaniktāvijñāna is also impossible.
Again, if vijñāna of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend sarvakşanikatā. For, in that case, vijñāna being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that “every thing except us and those of our class is kşanika. " But that is not possible. For, according to Buddhistic theory, knowledge being exclusively kşaņika, cannot last for a long time and hence it is not possible to apprehend kşanikată in case of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as a-kșanika. This being a guna, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz., ātman, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body. जं सविसयनिययं चिय जम्माणंतरहयं च तं किह णु। नाहिति सुबहयविण्णाणविसयखयभंगयाईणि ॥१२७॥ (१६७५) Jam savisayaniyayam ciya jammānantarahayam ca tam kiha nu i Nāhiti subahuyavisnāņavisayakhayabhangayāiņi ? « 127 11 (1675) [ यद् स्वविषयनियतमेव जन्मान्तरहतं च तत् कथं नु ।
ज्ञास्यति सुबहुकविज्ञानविषयक्षयभङ्गकादीनि ? ॥१२७॥ (१६७५) Yad svavişayaniyatameva janmāntarahatam ca tat katham nu i Jnāsyati suba hukavijñānavişayakşayabhangakādîni ? 1112711 (1675)]
Trans.--127 How could that ( knowledge ) which is restricted to its own self and scope and which vanishes soon after its birth understand qualities such as indurability etc., pertaining to the scope of vijñāna ? ( 1675 ).