Gandharwad

Author(s): Ratnaprabhvijay, D P Thaker
Publisher: Jain Granth Prakashak Sabha
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/011044/1

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DDDD.64
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GANADHARAVĀDA
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Along with Maladhārin Hemacandra Sīri's Commentary
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Edited by Muni Ratna-prabha Vijaya
Disciple of Sāsana Sāmrāt Ācārya Mahārāj Vijaya Nemisūrīśvaraji.
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with Translation, Digest of Commentary
and Introduction
by Prof. Dhirubhai P. Thaker M. A.
Gujarat College, Ahmedabad.
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Printed by Gulabchand Lallubhai Shah, at Mahodaya Printing Press-Bhavnagar.

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"DEDICATED
INTO
THE LOTUS-LIKE HANDS
MY MOST REVERED GURU SARVA-TANTRA SVATANTRA, JAGAD-GURU ŠĀSANA SAMRĀT, SŪRICAKRA CAKRAVARTI TAPĀGACCHÁDHIPATI. TIRTHODDHARAKA
BHATTARAKA HIS HOLINESS ACARYA MAHĀRĀJA
SRI VIJAYA NEMISŪRISVARAJI
By
His most grateful and obedient
Pupil RATNAPRABHA VIJAYA.

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Introduction
· The Text of Ganadhara-vāda
(a) Sources
According to the Jainas, the religious principles of the present era came into existence right from the time of Bhagavān Risabhadeva Swāmi, the first Tîrthankara.
After him, the sacred works increased in number and qnality when the religion was exalted to a high rank but they subsided in times of disorder and anarchy, Generally speaking, the preachings of all the Tîrthankaras happened to be of the same kind and their biographies almost resembled each other in principal characteristics.
The Bhagavata Purāna supports the view that Risabha-deva was the founder of the present Jaina canon. There is a reference of Rişabha-deva, Ajîtanātha and Aristanemî in Yajur Veda.
Šramana Bhagavān Mahāvira, the elder contemporary of Buddha, was not only the last but Supreme Tirthankara in the line of all Jaina Tirthankaras. Like his predecessors, Sramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvara also had got his predchings composed in books. His Ganadharas or principal disciples arranged his
1. It is not only the Jain tradition that ascribes the origin of the religious system to Risabha-deva, but there is historical evidence also to show that so far back as the first century B. C. there were people who were worshippiug Risabha-deva the first Tartha'nkara.

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preachings in twelve Angas, the twelfth Anga being divided into fourteen Pūrvas. These Pūrvas have been accepted by the "Svetāmbaras and the Digambams as probably the oldest Sacred Works of the Jaina canon. The tradition of the Svetāmbaras about the fourteen Pūrvas is this :-The fourteen Pūrvas had been incorporated in the twelth Anga (the Dristivada ) which was lost before 1000 A.V. But a detailed table of its contents and consequently of the Pūrvas has survived in the fourth Anga, the Samavāyānga, and in the Nandi Sūtra.
We are told by the tradition that Ārya Jambū Swāmê was the last Kevalî. After him, the under-mentioned six Heads of the Church, viz. Prabhava Swāmi, S'ayyambhava Sūri, Yas'obhadra Sūri, s'ambhūti-vijaya Sūri, Bhadrabāhu Swami and Sthūlabhadra were S'ruta-Kevalês. Out of these, Bhadrabāhu Swāmî was the last Pattadhara (Head of the Church ) who had all the twelve Angas along with the fourteen Purvas, along with their meanings and explanations of intricate subjects in his memory. Arya Sthūlabhadra had a thorough knowledge of the meanings and explanations of the ten Pūrvas, and a knowledge of the remaining four Pūrvas (11, 12, 13, 14 ) but not their meanings and explanations. Besides, he was instructed not to impart the knowledge of the four Purvas (11, , 13, 14) to anyone. Thus, the knowledge of the Pūrvas decreased gradually.
After him, there was a line of ten successors who had a thorough knowledge of ten Pūrvas. They were known as Das'apūrvis. The last Das'apūrvê was Vajra Swamî, after whom the knowledge of Purvas went on vanishing. The last who had a knowledge of one Pūrva was Devarddhi Gani kşamās'ramana.
2. Vide Weber, Indische Studien, XVI p. 341.

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The Svetāmbaras accept the existence and validity of the Siddhāntas ( Sacred Works ) but the Digambaras believe that the real s'āstras or religious works have already vanished and the sacred works, which are accepted by the Jaina canon at present, have no validity.
At present, the Sacred Works of the S'vetāmbaras are forty-five in all. Some of them are written in prose and some in verse. There are eleven Angas, twelve Upāngas, ten Prakirnas, six Cheda sūtras, two Sūtras, and four Mūla-sūtras. 3
As seen before, the knowledge of the original preachings of Šramana Bhagavān Mahavira had begun to fade gradually, and hence it was rightly felt by his successors to arrange the preachings into various books. As a result of their efforts, the religious works mentioned above were composed.
Out of these, the four Müla Sūtras are considered as the Original Sūtras or Commandments, as they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina monks in their religious practices. The four Múla Sutras are :-(1) The Avas'yaka ( 2 ) Das'avaikālika (3) Uttarādhyana and ( 4 ) Pinda Niryukti (or Ogha Niryukti). According to Weber, the order of composition of these sūtras is this :-(1) Uttarādhyayana ( 2 ) Āvas'yaka ( 3 ) Das'avaikālika and ( 4 ) Pinda Niryukti.
Of the four Müla Sūtras, the Āvas'yaka as its naine suggests-is the most important of all. It is divided into six sections :-(1) Sāmāyika ( Sāmaiya), (2) Caturvims'ati stava (cauvisattho ), (3) Vandanaka ( Vandanayam ), 4) Prats
3. In addition to the above-named forty-five Sacred Works, some people ennumerate twenty more Prakirnas, twelve Niryuktis and several others arriving at the total number of eighty-four. Again, in order to supplement the information supplied by these eighty-four Agamas there are several other works known as Nigamas or Upanisads which, in turn, are thirty-six in all.

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6
kramana (Padikkamana ), (5) Kayotsarga ( Kāussagga ), and ( 6 ) Pratyakhyāna ( Paccakhkhāṇa). It should be noted that though all these sutras were dedacted into books by Ganadharas, they were originally preached by S'ramana Bhagvan Mahāvîra Swāmi.*
The Niryukti of the Avas'yaka Sutras had already been written by Sriman Bhadrabāhu Swami and a number of curnis (detailed commentaries) were also composed by various authors as commentaries on the Avas'yaka Sutras. Still, however, Jinabhadra Gani kṣamās ramana felt the need of ellucidating the original niryukti. He, therefore, composed a bhasya or commentary running in gathās or verses on the original niryukti of the Sāmāyika Sutras. Since this was an additional bhasya to various other bhasyas prepared by different authors, it was known as Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhasya or an Additional Bhāṣya to the Avasyaka (Sāmāyika) Sutras.
The whole work runs into 3603 Gathas or verses. The Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhāṣya could further be divided into various sub-sections such ass-Pithika, Varavarika, the Upasargas, the Sāmācāri (of ten varieties), Ganadhara-vada, the Ganadharas, the Ninhavas, S'eṣa Upodghata, Niryukti, and a-svādhyāya Niryukti. Of these, Ganadhara-vada is one of the most important sub-sections, as it deals with the discussion between S'ramana Bhagavan Mahavira Swami and his ganadharas (or principal disciples) on various philosophical topics such as the existence of Jiva, Karma, Pāpa, Punya and Mokṣa etc.
(b) Commentaries.
Three commentaries are said to have been written on the text of Vis'eṣāvas'yaka Bhasya. The author himself is
4. Vide केण कयंति य ववहारओ जिणिदेण गणहरेहिं च । तस्लामिणा उ निच्छ्रयनयस्स तत्तो जओऽणणं ।। ३३८२ । ( विशेषावश्यकभाष्य )

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said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by Kotyācārya (or S'i. lankācārya ) the manuscript of which dated 1136 V. S. is preserved in a tattered condition in the Bhāņdārkara Research Institute, Poona. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present, is that of Maladhari Hemacandrācārya.
Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya is different from Kali-Kāla Sarvajna Hemcandrācārya, the welknown author of Dvyās'raya. Originally, he was welknown as Pandit Svetāmbarācārya Bhattaraka. But his worldly name was Pradyumna and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the . advice of Sri Abhaya-deva · Suri he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. Siddharāja, Jayasinha, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V.S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-spread well-versedness. (c) Ganadharas-their names, lineage etc.
Šramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvīra had eleven ganadharas in all. .All except Indrabhūti Gautama and Sudharma Swami. had attained Nirvana or Final Emancipation during the lifetime of their celebrated preceptor. Indrabhuti Gautama and Sudharmā Swāmî had attained mokşa at Rājagriha, after the Nirvāṇa of Š'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvara.
All ganadharas belonged to the high-born families. Being directly under the guidance of Sramaņa Bhagavān* Mahāvara, they became wide-read professors and knew all the twelve Angas along with fourteen Purvas.
The Table attached herewith supplies all information about the eleven ganadharas.

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co
Serial No.
* Name of the Gañadhara
Parents' Name
Te Lineage
(Gotra )
Place of
Birth (Janmasthāna)
Indrabhūti
...
Vasubhūti. Gautama and Prithiví
The Village of Gobara in Magadha
Agnibhūti Vāyubhūti Vyakta
Sudharma
Dharmamitra Bhāradvāja | Kollágaand Varuni
Sannivesa Dbammila Agnivaiśyāand Bhadditāyana Dhanadeva + Vasistha | Mauryasanniand
veśa Vijayādevi Maurya and Kāśyapa Vijayadevi
Maņdika
7 Maurya
A kampita
Harita
Mithila
Vasu and Nanda
Acalabhrata
Gautama
Košala
Deva and Jayanti
10 Metārya
Datta and Kaundiya | The Village Varuņadevī
of Tunsika in
Kośămbī 11 Prabhasa ... Bala and
Rājagpiha nagar Atibhadra † After the death of her first husband Dhandeva, Vijayādevi lived with Maurya. This shows that widow-remarriage was in vogue in those days.

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Duration Name of Con- Duration
of life stellation at of housethe time of hold life
| incognito
(ChadBirth (Griha(Naksatra)
masthaVása
paryāya )
Duration of life in state of Perfect Kno wledge (Kevali Paryāya)
Total age
Remarks
Jyeșthā
50 years
30 years
12 years
92 years
Kritika
46 years
Swati
42 years
10 years
16 years 74 years 18 years 70 years 18 years | 80 years
Śravaņa
| 50 years
12 years
Uttarāphal-
50 years 42 years
guni
Magbā
53 years
14 years
8 years 100 years He was
the first
• Pattadh16 years | 83 years ara of the
Jaina
Church. $ 16 years 95 years
Robiņi
| 65 years
2 years
Msigasirşa
46 years
12 years
14 years 72 years
Uttarasādha
48 years
9 years
21 years
78 years
Agvini
36 years
10 years
16 years 62 years
Pusya
16 years
8 years
16 years 40 years
$ Cf. Teftaistas, fazerot TGAUTI I तत्पट्टोदयपढमो, सुहम्मनामेण गणसामी ।।
( Tapagacchapatļāvali, Ed-by Kalyāņavijayaji ).

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(d) Summary of the Text.
We give below a summary of the text of Gañadharavāda which is contained in Gathās running from 1549 to 2024 of the Vis'eşāvas'yaka Bhāşya.
(i) Jiva:-Indrabhūti Gautama, the first Ganadhara, puts forward his doubt about the existence of Soul and S'ramaņa Bhagavān Mahāvara removes the doubt by means of various evidences and illustrations. Explaining the meaning of the word ' Jiva' the Bhagavān remarks that Jiva' does not signify body-deha-but it signifies the soul-ātmā-which is full of cognizance. Body is only inanimate..
Smrti (remembrance ), jzjñāsā (desire for knowledge ), cikêrsā ( desire for activity ), jigamişā ( desire for movements ) and sams'aya (doubt) etc. are the properties of Soul, which being self-evident is pratyaksa or directly apprehended. Since body is corporeal and physically visible, properties like cognizance etc. cannot reside into it. These properties are contained in Soul, because it is a-mūrta or incorporeal and a-cākṣuşa or beyond the range of physical sight. This shows that Soul is absolutely different from body.
In reply to the argument of the Vedāntists that Soul, being one and the same everywhere, can never be classified, Sramana Bhagåvān Mahāvîra Swamî contends that if the Soul were one absolute entity pervading everywhere, it ought to have been apprehended as one all-pervading element like ākās'a even in case of each and every pinda or body. But that is not so. The Soul varies with the shape and size of pinda or body. Besides, if we deny the existence of Soul, there would be nothing like sukha-duhkha and Bandha-Moksa in this world.
The Soul is accepted as vijnānaghana or an assemblage of many vijñānas ( cognitions ), firstly because it is identical with vijñāna which is upayoga ( attention ) either of the type of jñāna ( knowledge.) or that of dars'ana (perception ) and

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secondlybecause the soul has its each and every prades'a (the minutest portion ) formed from the assemblage of infiņite modifications of vijñāna..
According to the Naiyāyika School, the Soul is devoid of vijñāna and hence inanimate. The Jaina Preceptor refutes. this theory by arguing that the soul is said to have been produced and destroyed only with regard to upayoga or attention but it is indestructible so far as vijñāna is concerned on account of its vijnāna-santati or the perpetual continuance of cognition.
(ii) Karma: Solving the doubt of Agnibhūti, the second Gañadhara, S'raman, Bhagavān Mahāvîra Swāmî establishes the existence and significance of Karma as follows:
Just as a sprout has seed as its hetu or cause, the pleasure. and pain experienced by the people of this world must also have some sort of hetu. This hetu is nothing but deeds or Karmas of the living beings in their past life. Just as the body in youth has the body in childhood to precede it, the body in childhood has also some sort of body to precede it. The body formed of Karmas of the past life and hence known as Kārmana Sarira, precedes the body in childhood.
Just as each and every act performed by a living being in this world yields a fruit, as is seen in case of tilling the ground and many other acts, so also the acts of charity etc. undertaken by a living being undoubtedly yield fruit which is nothing but Karma,
Since a majority of living beings is found unhappy and only a few of them are found happy, we can easily infer that there are only a few who perform good actions and there are many who perform evil actions. It should be noted that Karma here is different from Kriyā or action, as Karma becomes Kārya, and Kriya the Kāraņa.
Since pleasure and pain etc. are the properties of soul,

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s.
1:2
the soul would become their samavāya-karana or the intimate cause, and Karma a nimitta or the external cause. Karma is córporeal.
Since Kārmana S'arîra is closely connected with jîva, it is beyond the power of senses to percive it. But there is no doubt that it is a sort of sūksma (subtle ) s'arira of an interior natúre. Consequently, like the variegated transformations found in clouds, vicitratā or variegations should be accepted in case of Kārmana Sarîra as well.
The Soul is connected with Karma as intimately as a mūrta ghata is connected with a-mūrta ākās'a or a murta finger is connected with the a-mūrta actions of expansion and contraction.
So, like seed and sprout, body and Karma are mutually related as hetu and hetumat rendering thereby the Karmasamtāna 'anādi or beginningless.
Finally, by the help of Veda-padas, the Bhagavān establishes Karma as the intervening agent which helps the soul in the production of body. He further explains that punya is produced by holy deeds and pāpa by unholy deeds.
(iii) Relation Between Soul and Body: According to Vāyuthūti, the third Ganadhara, soul and body are identical. But the Great Preceptor explains him the relation between soul and body in details and removes his illusion. According to him, cetanā or consciousness is not the property of each one of the five bhātas or principal elements which constitute the body, but cetanā is the intrinsic quality of soul residing into a group of bhūtas. For, if cetană were the quality of all bhūtas taken together, it ought to exist in a dead body as well. But it does not happen so.
Just as Devadatta, who recollects an object perceived through the five windows of a palace in the past, is different

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from the five windows as well as the palace, so also a person recollecting an object apprehended by the five senses of a body, is different from the body and its five senses.
When Devadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows, even when the windows are closed, it is atman or soul that recollects the object perceived through senseorgans even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in case of benumbed state of blindness, deafness etc. This shows evidently that ātman is different from indriyas. Or, say, for example, a soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes, and exhibits vikāras or perversion by distilling saliva etc. by means of tongue is decidedly different from eyes as well as tongue. Or, ātman is different from indriyas, because having seen an object by means of eyes, ātman holds it by means of hands.
In reply to the Buddhistic theory that like all objects, jiva is destructible, it is argued that one who remembers the incidents that happened in former time and place, is existing like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experience of childhood. So, the soul also can never vanish on account of its being able to recollect the past life.
Bauddhns advocate the destructibility of jñāana ( knowledge ) by means of statements such as “ Yat sat tat sarvam ksanikam". and " Ekavijñānasantatayaḥ sattvāh” etc. But if the destructibility of knowledge were accepted, there would be absolute negation of smaraņa. Jnāna of the pramātā (or the perceiver ) should, therefore, be taken as indestructible. Jnāna being a quality could never exist without a substance. This shows distinctly that soul is distinguished from body. .
Further, according to Bauddhas, kşaņikatā or impermanence is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception through sense-organs, but by means of anumāna or inference only. They further believe that the

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14
earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension that by virtue of that desire, even a kşanika vijñāna having only one support is able to apprehend other jñānas and their visayas. But the theory advanced by Bauddhas is fallacious. For, vāsanā or desire mentioned above, could be applied only when it is related to vāsaka or vāsanaya and could never be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth.
Lastly, if ātman were taken to be kşaņika, a number of faults such as production of many objects at a time, retention of vijñāna, and violation of the law of cause and effect etc., would crop up. These faults could only be avoided if soul were taken as susceptible to utpada or production, vyaya or destruction, and dhrauvya or retention.
In addition to all these arguments, the sentences of Vedas also lead to establish that ātman is different from body.
(iv) Existence of Elements : In course of discussion with the fourth Gañadhara named Vyakta, the Bhagavān explains the validity of the view that elements do exist.
Since jîva etc. are contained in bhūtas or elements, doubt about bhūtas gives rise to doubt about the existence of all .. leading to the idea of all-pervading negation. Consequently, we will be compelled to take the whole Universe as nothing but illusion or dream. And according to this notion of allpervading negation, there will be no distinction between svamata or one's own opinion and para-mata or another's opinion, hrasva or small, and dirgha or long and so on.
Some objects are self-accomplished like a cloud produced as a result of collision, with the element as a cause without the help of any Kartā or agent. Some objects are accomplished like ghata by means of an outside agent, while some other objects are produced by means of their virtues as well as the outside agents as in the case of a child produced by means

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of its parents as • well as its own Karmas. Lastly, there also exist some objects which are permanently accomplished like sky.
Whatever is accepted and apprehended by us as being produced by means of sāmagrî or a group of materials, is nothing but a collection of atoms. This naturally leads us to believe in the existence of atomis.
Out of the five main bhūtas or elements, the first four viz. Prithvi ( earth ), ap ( water ), tejas ( fire ) and vāyu are sa-cetana or animate because the symptoms of cetană are found in all of them. But the fifth element viz, ākās'a (sky) being a-murta or incorporeal, acts only as a support and has no life.”
Though distinct from the variations of clouds etc., bodies made of the first four elements are sa-cetana only so long as they are unstruck by any implement. These bodies turn lifeless immediately if and when they are struck by some implement.
At this point, the Bhagavān explains the important doctrine of Ahimsā or non-violence. He distates that according to the specific laws of morality, that which results in evil consequences is called himsā and that which results in good fruition is called a-himsā.
One does not commit himsā in spite of his striking a java. if his motive in doing so is beneficial at the end; on the other hand, a person is said to have committed himsā on account of his evil motive. Inspite of his abstention from striking a living being.
All these facts lead to prove that the bhutas do exist, and that out of the five main bhūtas, the first four are sa-cetuna.
(v) Identity of Existence: Sudharman, the fifth. Ganadhara, asksd a question as to whether a living being in
5. Vegetables being only a variety of Pșthvī should be included under Prthvī.

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. 16 . this world lived a similar life in the other world. S'ramana Bhayavān Mahāvara Swamî removes his illusion by the following explanation.
Attainment of re-birth or existence in the other world depends upon the Karmas of an individual. The Karmabandhamwhich binds the soul to the body—is caused by mithyātva ( wrong belief ), a-virati (non-renunciation ) pramada (carelessness ), and yoga ( vibrations set up in the soul through mind, body, and speech ). Para-bhava, being dependent upon Karma, happens to be vicitra like Karma. So, if the life in two existences were one and the same, there would be no scope for an increase or decrease in it. In such a case, one who is rich in this life would become rich in the next life also, and a poor man in this life would remain poor in the next life as well. Thus, there would be nothing like progress or retardation, if this and the other life were to be the same or identical. And consequently, there would be no justification for the practice of religious duties and pious deeds in this world.
This shows clearly that similarity or identity between the two bhavas or existences would never be possible, and the belief is refuted by means of Veda-padas like “S'rugālo vai esa jāyate yah sa-puriso dahyate” etc. also.
vi) Bandha and Moksa: Since body and soul are connected with each other as hetu and hetumat, they must have perpetual continuance. The tendency of body is such that it becomes the cause of the future body and effect of the past Karmas. In case of an anādi santīna also, that which is the cause of future body and effect of the past one, becomes decidedly a perpetual continuance of body and Karma. This proves the existence of Karma-bandha.
The mutual relation between Jiva and Karma is endless and beginningless (anādi ananta ) like sky, and at the same time beginningless but limited (anādi sāntu ) like that between

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gold and stone. The anadi ananta relation exists with regard to a-bhavya or mean jîvas, and the anādi sānta relation exists with regard to bhavya or higher souls.
Bhavya means that which is fit for the attainment of Siddhi. The group of such bhavyas is endless like ākąs'a, and bence it cvuld never be destroyed.
Moksa means separation or shedding off of the karmapudgalas from soul. Moksa is neither krita ka or artificial, nor a-nitya or impermanent. It can be said to be a-nitya only, to the extent that everything is nitya or everlasting as dravya ( substance ) and a-nitya or impermanent as paryāya or modification. Like consciousness movement is also an important property of soul.
Free souls possess movements. But these free souls cannot go beyond Siddhakşetra in absence of dharmastikāya. Dharmāstikāya and Adharmāstikāya are the only two factors which distinguish loka from a-loka.
Like Kāla, Muktātmā is also anādi. That is, just as nobody knows which was a first day or a first night, since the stream of Kāla flows on from times immemorial, in the same way no body knows when the first free soul came into existence. Innumerable siddhas or mukta beings could be contained in one. siddha-ksetra by virtue of their a-mūrtatva or formlessness as the Siddha-kşetra has only limited dimensions.
Bandha and Moksa are, therefore, laid down as positive factors existing by virtue of Karmas as shown above.
( vii-viii ) Existence of Devas and Nārakas: Existence of devas or gods and Nārakas or hellish denizens could be proved in various ways.
At the time of a Tirthankara's birth, many gods and goddesses come to this world to pay their homages.

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Like luminary gods such as Moon ,eto, other gods are also perceptible. Here if it is said that. Moon etc., are not luninary gods but they are mere places of habitation, there ought to exist inhabitants of these places also. And these inhabitants are none but gods.
It is impossible to find people in this world who are cent percent happy or cent percent unhappy. For, in this world, a happiest man is undoubtedly affected by some sort of disease, or old age, and an extremely miserable man will experience 'the happy breeze of cool wind, and the brightness of light. From this point of view, human beings could never be called cent per cent happy or cent per cent unhappy. It is the Nārakas or bellish denizens only who are destined to the cent per cent misery and it is the devas or divine beings who enjoy cent per cent happiness. It is true that sometimes a human being is allegorically called a 'god' but we should not forget that unless and until the principal meaning of a word is attained, the secondary meaning could never be attributed to it. All these arguments show that although gods and nārakas are acālcșușa 1. e., beyond the perception of senses, they do exist.
(ix ) Pāpa-Punya: There are five different theories about : . the existence of pāpa-punya :
(1) There exists punya alone which increases or decreases causing pleasure or pain. (2) There exists papa alone which increases or decreases causing pain or pleasure. (3) Punya and pāpa exist in a combined state like mecakamani. ( 4 ) Punya and pāpa are independent of each other. (5) There is nothing like Karma, and hence there is nothing like punya and pāpa also.
S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvara Swāmê refutes all the above-mentioned theories and establishes his own in this way :
Just as a potter accompanied by earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the cause of ghata, there do exist punya and

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papa which are but respectively good and evil forms of Karma, that works as the hetu or cause in the production of body. Though there exist visible hetus like father and mother in the production of body, there do exist invisible hetus like punyas and papas also, which determine the form proportionate or im-proportionate, beautiful or ugly, according as it is due to punya or papa. In other words, s'ubha s'arira is the product of punya karma, and a-s'ubha s'arira is the product of papa karma.
Like the murta ghata which becomes the cause of a-murta jnana, the murta karma is also the cause of a-murta sukhaduḥkha or pleasure and pain etc. The experience of exquisite happiness is caused by the abundance of punya and the experience of utmost miseries is due to the abundance of sins.
Punya and papa which thus act as the causes of happiness and misery are independent of each other. Since there is no reason for the Karma-bandha of punya and papa taken together, they can never exist in a combined state like mecakamani. As seen before, mithyatva, a-virati, kaṣāya, pramāda and yoga are the main causes of Karma-bandha. None of these causes happens to operate in case of the production of a combined state of mecakamani.
Fruition of jiva s'ubha or as'ubha turns the Karma s'ubha or asubha at the time of apprehension.
Food of the same kind produces blood, flesh and saliva etc. in the body on one hand, and results in useful refuge of foeces and urine also on the other hand. In the same way, Karma though apprehended in similar ways, results as subha or a-s'ubha by virtue of parināma and as'raya. Thus, according to Jainism, there do exist punya and papa as separate entities.
(x) Para-bhava or the Other World: Since Atman is susceptible to production, destruction and retention as seen before, it must have an access to the next world. When jiva first apprehends ghata and then apprehends pata, the

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apprehension of ghata-known as ghata-çetanā-is destroyed, that about pața--or pata-cetanā-is produced and the cetanā is retained in a continuous range of consciousness existing from times immemorial. • : The same is the case with jîvas which are staying in this world, or which have already passed to the other world. For, since they are susceptible to utpada, vyaya, and dhrauvya, they have a natural access to the next world. . Moreover, if there were absolute negation of para-loka the commandments of performing agnihotra etc. for one desirous of Salvation, and the prescription of the rewards of righteous deeds such as charity etc. would be of no avail.
(xi) Nirvāņa or Final Emancipation : Buddhistic theory of Nirvana is this :-A lamp, when extinguished, does never fade into any sort of earth, ether or space, but it only pacifies itself; so' also, the Soul, when finally liberateod ( from body) does never fade into earth or sky, nor does it pass to any of the directions, but it only attains pacification at the removal of worldly bondages of sukha-duhkha.
There is another theory also, which asserts that mokṣa or nirvāṇa is a peculiar positive condition of the soul, at the attainment of Absolute Knowledge and Perception, when all sorts of miseries such as affection, enmity, pride, avarice, infatuation, birth, death, old age, and diseases etc. have been removed.
Refuting both the above-stated theories, S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvâra asserts that mokṣa means the entire separation of Karma from the region of soul. Since the mundane world has its production due to Karma, it vanishes with Karma. But javatva happens to exist from times immemorial, and is not produced by Karma. So, jîvatva, naturally, can never vanish with Karma. It is not proper, therefore, to believe that at the time of Nirvana, jîva vanishes like a lamp.

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Really speaking, the flame of lamp does not vanish entirely but it only changes its form. Just as milk changes its form into curds, the Hame of lamp changes into darkness. The minute particles of the flame of a lamp transform them. selves into still more minute particles of darkness which are not perceptible. But that does not mean that they have ceased to exist entirely. As a matter of fact, the light-particles of the flame which were perceptible to the eye would become perceptible to pose when turned into darkness. So, the lamp does not entirely die away, but it only changes from light into darkness which is perceptible. Like a lamp, a java is also said to have attained Nirvāņa or Final Emancipation, · when that jîva passes into a new form which is a-mūrta, free from Karma-bandhas and which is unobstructible. This, therefore, shows that the pure, eternal, positive condition of jîva at the removal of obstructions like sukha-duhkha is called the state of Nirvūņa or Final Emancipation to the java.
Like a sage, engrossed in the highest bliss of Absolute Knowledge, a Muktātmā liberated from the bondages of all sorts of worldly miseries like birth, death, and old age etc. enjoys a blissful state of Perfect Knowledge.
. Finally, explaining the real interpretation of the sentences of Vedas such as “ Na ha vai sas'arârasya priyā’priyayopahatirasti" as well as " As'ariram vā vasantam priyā'priye na spris'atah" etc., S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvara Swānî convinces the Ganadhara of the validity of the theory of Nirvāna and removes all his doubts. (For further explanation see discusssion with the last Ganadhara ).
II The Author-His Life, Works and Dates, (a) Life.
Jinabhudru Gani Kşamās'ramana is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet,

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there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his age.
He was the first Jaina writer and preacher who had consistently attempted to interprete and explain the principles of the Jaina Canon (or the religious principles preached by the great Jinus ) in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people. That is to say, he did not instruct his pupils or followers only in a traditional artificial way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the Jaina Canon, he interpreted and explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age and hence was awarded the title of युगप्रधान “yugapradhāna”.?
His knowledge was not confined to the religious lore, but
6. Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:(i) जिनभद्रगणिं स्तौमि क्षमाश्रमणमुत्तमम् । ___ यः श्रुताजीतमुद्दभ्रे शौरिः सिन्धोः सुधामिव ॥१॥
-Tilakācārya in his Avas'ayaka Vritti. (ii) वाक्यैर्विशेषातिशयविश्वसन्देहहारिभिः। जिनमुदं जिनभद्रं किं क्षमाश्रमणं स्तुवे ॥
-- Muni Candra Suri in Amara Caritra. (iii) जिनवचननतं विषमं भावार्थ यो विविच्य शिष्येभ्यः ॥ ___ • इत्थमुपादिशदमलं परोपकारैककृतचेताः ॥
तं नमत बोधजलधि गुणमंदिरमखिलवाग्मिनां श्रेष्ठम् ॥
चरणश्रियोपगूढं जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणम् ॥ - Malayagiri Sūri in his Commentary on Brihat Ksetra Samāsa. 7. Vide नमह य अणुओग-धरं जुगप्पहाणं पहाण नाणायमयं । - सव-सुइ-सत्थ-कुसलं दंसण-नाणोवओगमग्गम्मिठियं ।।
--Siddhasena Sūri in his Cūrni on Jītakalpasūtra.

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he was well-versed in the sciences of inathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also.8
Still, hower, Ācārya Jinabhadra Gani was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional Jaina Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge and intelligence were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticity and validity of the Jaina Ayamas. He is therefore, taken as one of the pioneer āgama-pradhāna or orthodox Acāryas. 9
He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view- · point of the traditional Jaina Āgamıs, and were rejected if they went against the traditional preachings The example of his predecessor Siddhasena Divākara is welknown. Siddhasena. was a free-minded but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent ideas irrespective of their being different from or similar to the traditional Jaina Āgamas. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneouly but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations, Siddhasea thus went against the traditional view of the Jaina Agamas according to which the Keväla-Jņāna and the Kevala-Dars'ana took place simultaneously. Jinabhandra Gani Ksamās'ramana repudiates the theory
8. Vide E-ART 4-HATIA-fera-17fo17-35-AÇA FAITT! दससु वि दिसासु जस्स य अणुओगो (अणुवमो) भणइ जसपडहो ॥
(Ibid) 9. Vide TTFÄRITA-fasu TAT-TAĦ-AAITAITOTAS I जिणभद्दखमासमणं खमासमणाणं निहाणमिव एकं ॥
(Ibid) Also vide Jitakalpasūtra (Ed-by Muni Jinavijayaji ), Editor's Preface, p. 7.

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of Siddhasena Divākara in his Vis'eşāvasyaka Bhās'ya and re-establishes the original theory of the Jaina Agamas that Kevala Dars'ana and Krvala Jñāna take place simultaneously.10
Jinabhadra Gani is, thus, well-renowned as the preserver of the Jaina traditions.
That Jinabhadra Gani Ksumā S'ramana was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator Hemcandrācärya Maladhāri refers to Jinabhadra Gani as “ Upa Jinabhadra Kşamā S'ramanāḥ Vyākhyātāraḥ”. Another commentator named Kotyācārya who has written a commentary on the Višeşāvas'yaka Bhāsya pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says 11
भाष्यं सामायिकस्य स्फुटविकटपदार्थोपगूढं वृहद्यछीमत्पूज्यैरकारि क्षतकलुषधियां भूरिसंस्कारधारि । तस्य व्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विदधता यन्मया पुण्यमाप्त
प्रेत्याहं दाग लभेयं परमपरिमितां प्रीतिमत्रैव तेन । No more information is available about the life of this great Acārya. (b) Works.
Jinabhadra Gani Ksama S'ramana is said to have composed the following works :
(i) Vis'eşāvas'yaka Bhāsya : This welknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of Jainisan. The author himself wrote a commentary on this Bhāsya in Sanskrit. Jinabhadra Gani has earned
10. Vide -IUTTET3TTT ( HTCTTH) foci i
11. Vide “Short History of Jaina Literature" Ed. by M, D. Desai, p. 152, foot-uote.

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the reputation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as Bhāsyakāra, the references have been quoted from this'eşāvas'yaka Bhāşya. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the Jita Kalpa Sūtrala it is not improbable if Jinabhadra Gani Ksamă S'ramana had composed other bhāsyas as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the Vis'eşāvas'ayaka Bhāsya
पोग्गल-मोदय-दन्ते फरुसगवडसालभंजने चेव ।
थीणाद्धियस्स ए ए दिटुंता होंति नायबा ॥ २३५॥ In this verse, the examples of poggala ( flesh ) modaya ( sweet-balls ) danta (teeth ) pharusaga (a potter ) and vadasāla ( the branch of a tree ) have not been explained in. details by the commentators. Ācārya Hemacandra Maladhāri suggestively remarks that“ Tai Tai Tufa lagtaat faftegaat " (These examples should be understood in details from Nis'eetha)
Kotyācāryals also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying " faaste getIn:" (We shall explain this in Nis'eetha)
The question arises as to who is the author of Nis'eetha. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to Hemacandrācārya Maladhāri or to Kotyācārya. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by Jinabhadra Gāni and the sentence" foarte a la:" found in the commentary of Kotyācārya might have orginally belonged to the. commentary written by S'rî Jinabhadra Gani kşamā s'ramana himself.14
12. Vide Jita Kalpa Sūtra Preface Page 9.
13. Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the Bhandārkara Research Institute, Poona. .
14. Jinavijayaji gives another evidence for this belief. In & miscellancous collection of several stray Commentaries (which he possesses ) the compiler gives three verses of Nis'eetha Bhāşya and makes the following remark at the end ;gfa fHEHAT a fariteTH167FTIGAT-E27:
( Preface to Jita Kalpa Sūtra pp. 9-10)

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Unfortunately these commentaries are not available at present, and we have to depend mostly on conjectures. The commentary of Kotyācārya is preserved in a tattered condition in the Bhāndārkara Research Institute, Poona. The only available commentary is that of S'ri Maladhāri Hemacandrācārya,
(ii) Brihat Samgrahaņi—This work runs in almost 500 verses. Acārya Malayagiri Suri has written a commentary on this work in Sanskrit. The work along with the Commentary has already been published.
(iii) Brihat Kþetra-Samāsa-This is also a similar work. Acārya S'ri Malayagiri Sūri and others have written commentaries and the work along with the commentaries is published.
(iv) Jita Kalpa Sūtra-This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the Jaina monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstration. The subject of remonstration has already been treated in the Cheda-sūtras and other works. Jinabhadra Gani seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner.
The oldest commentary available on this work at present. . is the cūrni of Siddhasena in Prakrit. In. his Cūrni, Siddha
sena remarks at one place that there existed some other curni5 also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present. On this Cūrni of Siddhasena, S're Candra Suri has written explanatry notes in Sanskrit.
Besides the cūrni of Siddhasena, there is one more cūrņi available in Prākrit verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same cūrni that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of
15. अहवा बितियचुनिकरा-भिष्पारण चत्वारि वि सुत्तेण व गहिया।

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composition either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.16
(v) Viseṣaṇavah:-This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 Prakrit verses and is not publishdd as yet.
In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider Dhyana-s'ataka which has been incorporated by Acarya Maharaja Haribhadra Suri in his commentary on the Āvas'yaka Sūtras, also to be the composition of Jinabhadra Gani Ksama-s'ramana. But there are not sufficient evidences to convince us of his authorship of Dhayana-S'ataka. (c) Date:
-
There are no definite means that help us to fix the exact date of Jinabhadra Gani kṣama-s'ramana. Still, however, the tradition of various Pattavalis throws considerable light on the problem. The tradition of the Patṭāvalis written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that Jinabhadra Gani kṣamās ramana flourished 1115 years after the Nirvana of S'ramana Bhagavān Mahāvîra. This fixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S.
There is another theory which assigns to Jinabhadra Gani 500 years earlier than his commentator Maladhari Hemacandracārya who is said to have flourished in 1175 V. S. According to this theory also, Jinabhadra Gani kṣama-s'ramana must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S.
The author of Tapagaccha Paṭṭavali places Jinabhadra Gani kṣama-s'ramana as the contemporary of Acarya S'rîmān Haribhadra Suri who is said to have written a commentary
16. At the end of this bhasya the only reference is this:-- सं. १७२० वर्षे मार्गशीर्ष शुदि १ शुक्रवासरे अद्यहे श्रीपत्तने लि० श्री मोढ ज्ञातिना काशीदासात्मजेन अंबादत्तेन । शुभं भवतु | शिवमस्तु |
(Jita Kalpa Sutra Preface P. 17)
•

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on Dhyāna S'ataka. According to this view, Jinabhadra Gani had, lived a long life of 104 years and though Acārya Haribhadra Suri was senior to him by 60 or 65 years, both of them happened to be contemporaries on account of the long life.of Jinabhadra Gani.17 This view is not sound because Haribhadra Sūri did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 580 V. S. but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as Muni Jinavijayaji has suggested. Secondly, Sriman Haribhadra Sūri has frequently quoted Jinabhadra Gani's sūtras in his Āvas'yaka Vritti. It is, therefore, clear that Jinabhadra Gani did not in any case flourish after Haribhadra Suri.
According to other Pattāvalis, all of Jinabhadra Gani Haribhadra Sūri, Devarddhi Gani ksamās'ramaņa, S'ilānkācārya and Kālukācārya happened to be contemporaries. But the history of the development of Jainism shows that the theory is wrongly based. The date of S'rîmān Haribhadra Sūri has been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S., Jinubhadra Gani has been placed in the latter half of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century V. S. Devarddhi Gani kşamā s'ramana and Kālakācārya are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S.
Leaving others aside, let us consider if Jinabhadra Gani and S'ilankācārya happened to flourish at the same time. The tradition says that S'ilankācārya was the priest of Vanarāja, the king of Anahillnpur Pātana. If this is true the date of Silankācārya falls somewhere near 800 V. S. since Vanarāja established his kingdom in 802 V. S. This places S'ilānkācārya undoubtedly as the contemporary of Acārya Sree Haribhadra Sūriji. Now some of the Patļāvalis refer to
17. Vide Sr Tapāgachchha Pattāvali ( Edited by) Srā Kalyāna Vijayaji Vol. I. page 98.

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S'ilarikācārya as the pupil of Jinabhadra Gani kşamā s'ramana. If this S'ilānkācārya is the same as the commentator Kotyācārya several references about Jinabhadra Gani found in his commentary on the Vis'eşāvas' yaka Bhāsya do not in any way lead us to believe that S'îlankācārya was the pupil of Jinabhadra Gaņi. Unfortunately, the first and last portions of this commentary are torn out, 18 but in course of his commentary the commentator refers to Jinabhadra Gani kşamā s'ramana at several places. e. g.
(i) frangafoxTATEAUTYSTUEET ATHI (ii) अत एव पूज्यपादैः स्वटीकायां प्रायोपग्रहणं कृतम् । (iii) HITAUETAT catch! (iv) FATHETETUTTE! (v) श्रीमत्क्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादानामभिप्रायो लक्षणीयः
Although these references show how much respect the commentatar had for Jinabhadra Gani kşamiis'ramana, they do not in any way lead us to believe that Jinabhadra Gani was his preceptor. On the contrary, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of Jinabhadra Gani and S'ilankācārya. The reference is this:
भाष्याननुयायि पाठान्तरमिदं अग्रतः, एवमनेनैव वृद्धिक्रमेणेत्यादेर्वाक,
न चेदं भूयसीषु प्रतिषु दृश्यते ॥19 This reference shows that there were various readings of Vis'esăvas'yaka Bhāsya in the time of S'ilaňkācārya which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the Vis'eşāvas'yaka Bhāsya. This, therefore, prevents us from accepting the view that Jinabhadra Gani ksamās'ramana was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of S'îlankācārya.
18. Vide Jitakalpa Sūtra Preface pp. 14-15. 19. Ibid p. 15.

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Thus there are many difficulties in accepting Jinabhadra Gani as the contemporary of S'ilankācārya or even Haribhadra Sūriji and others as mentioned before.
It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the belief of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the date of Jinabhadra kşamās'ramana as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V. S.
III Philosophy. (a) Ethics:
According to Jainism, the main purpose of every living being on this earth. viz nirvāṇa or final emancipation is attained in the simultaneous observance of these three main doctrines: (1) Right Belief (Faith in the teachings of Jinas ) (2) Right knowledge ( knowledge of his doctrine ) that leads to Salvation and (3) Right Conduct ( Perfect Conduct ). According to the Jaina Philosophy, belief in real existence of tattvas is right faith. Knowledge of real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world, is right conduct.
Virtue consists of the five-fold conduct of one who has knowledge and faith :
1. Innocence-or a-himsā which is not mere negative abstention but positive kindness to all creation.
2. Charity and truth-speaking. 3. Honorable conduct-such as not stealing. 4. Chastity in word, thought and deed. 5. Renunciation of all worldly interests.
Jaina ethics lay stress on both faith and works. All those actions which lead to peace of mind are punya. Himsā or infliction of suffering is the great sin or papa.

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Untruthfulness, dishonesty, unchastity, covetousness, anger, conceit etc. are other sources of sin. Sin is no offence against God, but only againt man according to Jaina ethics.
The ethical system of the Jainas is more rigorous than that of the Buddhists. It looks upon patience as the highest good and pleasure of senses as a source of sin.
The chief feature of Jainism is ahimsā (respect for all and abstention from injuring everything that has life.)
The Jainas repudiate the theory of the creation of the world out of nothing or as a series of accidents. According to them, there can neither be destruction of things that do · exist nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. So, according to this view, there is no God necessary for creation or destruction.
Jainism looks upon God, nature, and soul, as aspects of the same. According to Jaina ethics there is no God except the soul in its ideal integrity.
The Jaina philosophy tells us that the life of God in heaven is one of the forms that a soul might assume by the accumulation of punya ( merit ). According to them, Gods are only embodied souls like men and animals different from them in degree but not in kind.
The liberated souls are above gods. They are never born again, and they have no connection with the world. Meditation or adoration of the Jinas sanctifies the soul. (b) Theory of Soul: Plurality of spirits...
According to the Jaina philosopby, the universe is filled with javas. Jiva means whatever is living and not whatever is mechanical. So, it corresponds to the life-elemant of Bergson. And since it is a subject of experience it also corresponds to the monad of Leibniz.

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Jainism does not seem to have made exact distinctions between jîva and Atinan, a-java and matter. A jîva is a particular kind of existent being. The liberated java freed from matter, is called the Atman, Ainun means pure consciousness untinted by matter. It excludes all space and externality. It is the jîva purified and raised to the highest spiritual status, which is mere formless consciousness.
On the other hand, pudgala is not pure matter untouched by consciousness. It already bears the impress of spirit. Atman is the spirit of being and matter is the negative principle of non-living. The latter corresponds to the space of Bergson, or the materia prima of Leibniz. The bare materiality of pudgalu is the direct opposite of spirit. A java
is the combination of the two. It is material-spiritual. A soul • loaded with matter is involved in bondage. All jîvas in samsāra are associated with this negative element.
Jainism believes that Ātran or the pure spirit, pure matter, and java which is a conibination of the two, are existent, though the first two are imperceptible to us. The pudgala skandha which we see, has also an element of consciousness, and is as much a java as others, so far as the essence is concerned. The jîva and the a-jîva of the Jainas are not empirical abstractions of Atman, or consciousness, and matter or non-consciousness but the products of an interaction between the two. Strictly speaking, Atman and non-ātman are the primary elements. Jîva possesses more of self, -jîva more of not-self. They represent two orders of arrangement in the whole.
Jainim believes in plurality of spirits. The jîvas are many, but are alike eternal. Their characteristic ossence is never destroyed, however much it is obscured by external causes. They are regarded as possessing size which is varying in different cases. They contract and expand according to the dimensions of the body with which they are incorporated for

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the time being. Truly speaking, the essence of all jtvas is consciousness and it is only superficial to advance the theory of plurality of jîvas. It is only a relative conception and cannot be taken as an ultimate truth. Still, however, this distinction of spirits is justified in the sense that it distinguishes good from the bad, Brāhmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, and S'üdras, from each other, insects, birds, snakes and so on. For, the Jaina canon dictates that if there were but one soul common to all beings, they could not be distinguished from one another, nor could they experience different lots; there would not be Brāhmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas and Sūdras; insects, birds and snakes. All would be men and gods. We make equal both those who lead a blameable life and those who, in this world, practise right conduct. 2 0
Thus unlike other systems of philosophy, Jainism asserts the doctrine of pluralistic realism.3 1 (c) The theory of Knowledge
Like the theory of Soul, that of knowledge is also distinctive of Jainism. The Jainas admit five kinds of knowledge viz., Mati, S'ruti, Avadhi, Manahparāya, and Kevala.
1. Mati is ordinary cognition obtained by normal means of sense-perceptions. We always have sense-perceptions or dars'ana prior to the rise of mati-jñāna.
2. S'ruti or testimony is knowledge derived through signs, symbols, or words. While mati-jñāna gives us knowledge by acquaintance, this gives us knowledge by description.
20. Vide Sūtrakritānga. ii, 7-48 and 51.
21. Of Bosanquet-“It is freely admitted that in cognition, the self is universal. It goes out into a world which is beyond its own given being and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding, it ceases to be a self-contained and repellant unit."
(Gifford Lectures, Second Series, Chap. II)

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3. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of time or space. It is knowledge by clairvoyance.
4. Manāhparyāya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others as in telepathic knowledge of other minds.
5. Kevala or Perfect knowledge, comprehends all substances and their various modifications. It is omniscience unlimited by time, space, or object. This knowledge which is independent of the senses, which can only be felt and not described is possible only for purified souls which are perfectly free from bondage.
The first three kinds of knowledge are liable to error, while the last two cannot be wrong.
Knowledge is pratyakṣa or direct when it is immediate, and paroksa or indirect when it is mediated by some other kind of knowledge. Of the five kinds of knowledge, mati and s'ruti are parokșa and the rest pratyakşa.
Cetanā or consciousness is the essence of jîva and the two manifestations of cctana are perception (durs'ana ) and intelligence (jñāna ). In dars'na the details are not perceived while in jñāna they are. The former is simple apprehension, the latter conceptual knowledge.
The relation between knowledge and its object is an external one with regard to physical objects, though it is not so with regard to self-consciousness. The consciousness of the jîva is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature as well as that of the object. Jneya or object of knowledge includes self and non-self. Like light, jñāna reveals itself and other objects. The Nyāya-Vais'esika theory that knowledge reveals only external relations but not itself is rejected by the Jainas. In knowing any object, the self knows itself simultaneously. Knowledge is always apportioned by the self, according to them, and the question as to how consciousness can reveal the unconscious object is dismissed by them as absurd, since it is the nature of knowledge that reveals objects.

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With regard to self-consciousness, the relation between jñāna and jñeya is very intimate. Jhānin and jnāna are also inseparable though distinguishable. In self-consciousness, the subject of knowledge, the object of knowledge and knowledge itself become different aspects of a single concrete entity..
There are no javas without jñāna since that would take away the cetanā or conscious character of the jîvas and reduce them to the level of a-java dravyas and there can be no jñāna without selyes; for that would make jñāna foundationless.
In its perfect condition, the soul is pure. Jřāna and dars'ana ( knowlege and intuition ) arise simultaneously or are together. In the mundane jîvas, jñāna is preceded by dars'ana.
Perfect knowledge is free from doubt ( sanas'aya ) perversity ( vimoha ) and indefiniteness ( vibhrama )
The Karmas which obscure the different varieties of dars'ana are dars'anāvaranîya karmas and those which obscure the different kinds of jñāna are jñānāvaranîya karmas.
These impediments are passions and emotions. All knowledge resides in the soul though it manifests itself when the disturbing media are removed. (d) Karma :
Karma is another important topic of the Jaina philosophy. Karma, according to the Jainas, is of material nature (pudgałika), The kind of matter fit to manifest Karma fills all cosmic space. It has the peculiar property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. The soul by its commerce with the other world becomes literally penetrated with the pårticles of subtle matter. These become Karma and build up a special body called “ Kārmaņa S'arira," which does not leave the soul till its Final Emancipation.
Jivas which are found on this world in infinite number, are of three kinds (1) Nitya siddha or the ever perfect *( 2 ) Mukta or the liberated and (3) the Baddha or the bound.

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The second variety of javas does not become embodied. They have achieved their purity and dwell in a state of supermundane perfection unconcerned - with worldly affairs. The mundane jîvas are a prey to illusion, and are condemned to the yoke of matter through an infinite succession of lines. The freed souls are absolutely pure and free from any tint of matter. They are the nirupādhi jîvas leading a life of pure existence and infinite consciousness and possess infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite power, and infinite bliss.
Thus, by touching the main distinctive features of the Jaina philosophy, we can easily remark like Sir Radhakrishanan that " Jainism offers us an empirical classification of things in the universe and so argues for a plurality of spirits. 2 a "
Gujarat College
Ahmedabad 10 : 12 : '42
D. P. Thaker
22. Vide " Indian Philosophy" by Sir S. Radhākrishanan.

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Contents
1. Chapter I Discussion with the First Gañadhara. 1 2. Chapter II Discussion with the Second Gañadhara. 79 3. Chapter III Discussion with the Third Gañadhara. 137 4. Chapter IV Discussion with the Fourth Gañadhara 190 5. Chapter V Discussion with the Fifth Gañadhara. 279 6. Chapter VI Discussion with the Sixth Gañadhara. 309 7. Chapter VII Discussion with the Seventh Gañadhara. 367 8. Chapter VIII Discussion with the Eighth Gañadhara. 389 9. Chapter IX Discussion with the Ninth Gañadhara. 408 10. Chapter X Discussion with the Tenth Gañadhara. 459 11. · Chapter XI Discussion with the Eleventh Gañadhara. 480

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Ksamāśramana Jinbhadra Gani's
GANADHARAVĀDA

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क्षमाश्रमणश्रीजिनभद्रगणिसन्हब्धः
॥ गणधरवादः॥ श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्रसूरिकृतटीकासमलकृतः ।
HaryKșamāśramaņa Jinabhadra Gaņi's GANADHARAVĀDA
Along with Maladhārin Hemacandra Sūri's Commentary
Chapter I
प्रथमगणधरवक्तव्यता Discussion with the First Gañadhara. जीवे तुह सन्देहो पञ्चक्खं जं न घिप्पइ घडो छ।
अञ्चन्तापञ्चक्खं च नत्थि लोए खपुष्पं व ॥१॥. (१५४९) Jive tuha sandeho paccakkham jam na ghippai ghado vva i Accantāpaccakkham ca natthi loe khapuppham val 1 ( 1549 )
[ जीवे तव सन्देहः प्रत्यक्ष यद् न गृह्यते घट इव। ..
अत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं च नास्ति लोके खपुष्पमिव ॥१॥ (१५४९) Jive tava sandehaḥ pratykşam yad na gļhyate ghata iva | Atyantapratyaksam ca nāsti loke khapuspam iva ॥ 1 (1549 )

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•: 2:. . Jinabhadra Gani's .
[The first ___Translation-1 (O Indrabhuti of Gautama gotra !) You have a doubt about ( the existence of ) jiva ( the soul ) since it is not directly perceived ( by senses ) as is the case with a ghata ( a water-jar ). Whatever is absolutely imperceptible, does not exist in the world, e. g., a flower in the sky. ( 1549 ) श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्राचार्यकृता टीका
आयुष्मन् इन्द्रभूते ! तवैषः सन्देहः-किमयमात्माऽस्ति, नास्ति वा, उभयहेतुसद्भावात् । तत्र नास्तित्वहेतवोऽमी-नास्त्यात्मा, प्रत्यक्षेणात्यन्तमगृह्यमाणत्वात् , इह यदत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षं तल्लोके नास्त्येव, यथा खपुष्पम् । यच्चास्ति तत् प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत एव, यथा घटः, इत्यसौ व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । अणवोऽपि ह्यप्रत्यक्षाः किन्तु घटादिकार्यतया परिणतास्ते प्रत्यक्षमुपयान्ति; न पुनरेवमात्मा कदाचिदपि भावप्रत्यक्षमुपगच्छति, अतोऽत्रात्यन्तविशेषणमिति ॥ १ (१५४९)॥
Digest of the Commentary--O long-lived Indrabhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the soul. For, you come across reasons, some of which lead you to believe that the soul exists, whereas, others make you surmise that the soul does not exist. The latter are as under:
The soul does not exist; for, it is in no way perceptible by pratyaksa pramāna ( direct and valid proof ) produced by a sense-organ, as is the case with a ghata. Whatever is atyantāpratyaksa (absolutely imperceptible ) is certainly nonexistent in this world, e. g., a flower in the sky. Whatever exists, is certainly perceived - realized by pratyakşa pramāna, e. g., a pitcher. This is a vyatireka drstānta (a negative example ).
Some one may here argue, that though anus ( electrons ) are not within the range of pratyakșa pramāna they are, so to say, invisible; yet they do exist. So, what about them? The answer is, that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as anus, but when they are transformed so as to perform the

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Vada ]
... Gañadharavāda
functions of a pitcher, a cloth, etc., they no longer remain so, Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived. The adjective atyanta, is here used on that account.
- Notes - प्रमाणम् Pramānam प्रमीयते अनेन इति प्रमाणम्-pramayate anena iti pramānam. That by which a correct notion is arrived at, is called a pramāna. Stefagfasea: TAT-arthopalabdhi hetuh pramāņam. Pramāņa is the means to knowledge.
Pramāņa is the doctrine of Frier-syādvāda which lays bare the whole truth, which is the synthesis of extremes and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths.
TETH pratyakşam fegurstafa ri ya 897-. Indriyārtha sannikarşa-janyam jñānam pratyakşam-knowledge derived directly from the peripheral contact of the senseorgans with their corresponding objects.
TETTATH pratyaksa pramāņam-Altaicà afa saca FOTETTATUTOETUT-Jñānākaranakatve sati jñānatvam pratyakşapramānalaksanam. Sense-perception means direct knowledge. न य सोऽणुमाणगम्मो जम्हा पच्चक्खपुवयं तं पि । पुबोवलद्धसम्बन्धसरणओ लिङ्ग-लिङ्गीणं ॥२॥ (१५५०)
Na ya so’numāņagammo jamhā paccakkhapuvvayam tam pil Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranaö linga-lingīnam 11 2 ( 1550 ) [न च सोऽनुमानगम्यो यस्मात् प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं तदपि ।
getrof frorat foss-festsai: 112 11 ( 8440) Na ca so'numānagamyo yasmāt pratyakşapūrvakam tadapi | Pūrvopalabdhasambandhasmaraṇato linga-linginoh || 2 (1550) ]
Trans.—2 It (the soul) is not an object of anumāna (inference); for, this (anumāna), too, is preceded by pratyakṣa and is the outcome of the recollection of the (inseparable) connection

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. Jinabhadra Gani's . [The first previously observed in the case of a linga ( a characteristic or an indicatory mark) and a lingin (one having such a linga). (1550)
टीका-न चासावात्माऽनुमानगम्यः यस्मात् तदप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वक प्रवर्तते । कुतः ? इत्याह-" पुबोवलद्धे "त्यादि लिङ्गन्यते-गम्यतेऽतीन्द्रियार्थोऽनेनेति लिङ्गम् ; अथवा लीनं-तिरोहितमर्थं गमयतीति लिङ्गम् , धूमकृतकत्वादिकम् , तदस्यास्तीति लिङ्गी वह्वथ-ऽनित्यत्वादिः, तयोलिङ्गलिङ्गिनोर्यः पूर्वं महानसादौ प्रत्यक्षादिनोपलब्धः कार्य-कारणभावादिकः सम्बन्धस्तस्य यत् स्मरणं तस्मादिति । इदमुक्तं भवति-पूर्व महानसादावग्निधूमोलिङ्गि-लिङ्गयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकवन्तमविनाभावमध्यक्षतो गृहीत्वा तत उत्तरकालं क्वचित् कान्तार-पर्वतनितम्बादौ गगनावलम्बिनी धूमलेखामवलोक्य प्राग् गृहीतं सम्बन्धमनुसरति, तद् यथा-' यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र प्रागहं वह्निमद्राक्षम् , यथा महानसादौ, धूमश्चात्र दृश्यते, तस्माद् वह्निनापीह भवितव्यम्', इत्येवं लिङ्गग्रहण-सम्बन्धस्मरणाभ्यां तत्र प्रमाता हुतभुजमवगच्छति । न चैवमात्मना लिङ्गिना साधु कस्यापि लिङ्गस्य प्रत्यक्षेण सम्बन्धः सिद्धोऽस्ति, यतस्तत्सम्बन्धमनुस्मरतः पुनस्तल्लिङ्गदर्शनाजीवे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात् । यदि पुनर्जीव-लिङ्गयोः प्रत्यक्षतः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः स्यात् तदा जीवस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्याऽनुमानवैययं स्यात् । तत एव तत्सिद्धेरिति ॥ २ (१५५०)।
____D. C.-The existence of the soul, cannot be proved by anumāna ( inference); for, after all, this anumāna is preceded by pratyakşa pramana as is suggested by the second hemistich of this verse.
Whatever reveals an object which is imperceptible to the senses, is called a linga or whatever throws light on a concealed object is a linga, and one that has a linga is called a lingin. For instance, smoke is the linga, and fire the lingin. To give another example krtakatva ( performance of an action ) is the linga, and anityatva (impermanence ) the lingin.
An inseparable connection between smoke and fire, in the form of effect and cause -- the connection which is directly perceived in a kitchen, etc., can be established in two ways, viz.,
the lingin.

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Vada ]
. Gañadharavada . by anvaya (positively) and by vyatireka (negatively). Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, is an example of anvaya; and wherever there is non-existence of fire, there is non-existence of smoke, is an example of vyatireka.
The recollection of the inseparable connection existing between smoke and fire, helps a man to infer the presence of fire, when he sees clouds of smoke rising to the sky, either in a forest or on the top of a mountain or the like. For, he is then reminded of having seen fire when moke was found coming out of the kitchen or the like. Thereupon, he works up a syllogism, as under:
Wherever there was smoke, I previously saw fire there, as in the kitchen and elsewhere. I see smoke here; so, here, there must be fire. Thus, he rightly infers fire in view of his. having previously noticed the inseparable connection between smoke the linga, and fire the lingin, and on his recollecting this connection while drawing the inference.
But in the case of the soul, a lingin, no connection of it, whatsoever is directly perceived with any one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, there is no room left for the recollection of an inseparable connection between the soul and its linga and hence there is no chance left for establishing the existence of the soul by anumāna.
Moreover, if the inseparable connection were to be observed in the case of the soul and its linga, the soul would be directly perceived, and in that case, there would be no necessity to infer its existence.
- Notes -
39Tara anumāna (from a anu, after, and Ar mā, to measure and hence to know ) is so called because by means of this particular kind of knowledge, a thing though remote in time, space and nature, is measured out to the mind, after one has recollected the relation of invariable sarfa vyāpti, concomitance,

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..: 6 :
• Jinabhadra Gani's . . [ The first between लिङ्ग linga, also known as हेतु hetu, e. g. धूम dhuma, smoke and first lingin also known as arey sādhya, e., 9., afa vahni, fire.
It is said: न य जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदरिसणमभू जओ पुणो सरओ। तल्लिङ्गदरिसणाओ जीवे सम्पच्चओ होज्जा ॥३॥ (१५५१) Na ya jivalingasambandhadarisanamabhū jaö puno sarað 1 Tallirigadarisanāö jive sampaccaö hojjā ll 3 ( 1551 )
[न च जीवलिङ्गसम्बन्धदर्शनमभूद् यतः पुनः स्मरतः। ___ तल्लिङ्गदर्शनाजीवे सम्प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥३॥ (१५५१) Na ca jivalingasambandhadarśanam abhū yataḥ punaḥ smarataḥ - Tallingadarsanajjive sampratyayo bhavet ॥ 3 ( 1551 )]
Trans.-3 There has not been ( previously ) seen (any) connection between the soul and its linga, the recollection of which, along with the sight of its linga, can lead ( us ) to a conviction about the ( existence of ) the soul. ( 1551 )
___टीका-गतार्था । न च वक्तव्यं सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानादादित्यादिगतिवजीवः सिध्यति, यथा-गतिमानादित्यः देशान्तरप्राप्तेः देवदत्तवदिति, यतो हन्त ! देवदत्ते दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि सामान्येन देशान्तरप्राप्तिं गतिपूर्विकां प्रत्यक्षेणैव निश्चित्य, सूर्येऽपि तां तथैव प्रमाता साधयतीति युक्तम् । न चैवमत्र क्वचिदपि दृष्टान्ते जीवसत्त्वेनाविनाभूतः कोऽपि हेतुरध्यक्षेणोपलक्ष्यत इति । अतो न सामान्यतोदृष्टादप्यनुमानात् तद्गतिरिति ॥ ३ (१५५१) । ___D. C:-It is no use arguing that the existence of the soul can be established by an anumāna which is ordinarily met with, as in the case of the motion of the Sun. To put it explicitly, the Sun is in motion; for, it reaches another region, as is the case with Devadatta. As regards the Sun, this inference is valid, since we distinctly see that Devadatta, who is here å drstāntadhurmin i. e., serving as an illustration, goes like the Sun, to another country after he has resorted to motion. But as

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. . Ganadharavida . far as the soul is concerned, no linga ( also known as hetu) which is inseparably connected with the soul, is directly perceived in any drstānta, (example ) whatsoever. Thus, the samanyatodrsta anumāna is of no avail here.
The existence of the soul cannot be proved by agama ( scriptural authority ). नागमगम्मो वि तओ भिजइ जं नागमोऽणुमाणाओ। न य कासइ पञ्चक्खो जीवो जस्सागमो वयणं ॥४॥(१५५२) Nāgamgammo vi taö bhijjaï jam nāgamo'ņumāņāö 1 Na ya kāsaï paccakkho jivo jassāgamo vayanam 11 4 ( 1552 ) .
[नागमगम्योऽपि सको भिद्यते यद् नागमोऽनुमानात् ।
न च कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षो जीवो यस्यागमो वचनम् ॥ ४ ॥ (१५५२). Nāgamagamyo’pi sako bhidyate yad nāgamo’numānāti Na ca kasyacit pratyakso jivo yasyāgamo vacanam 11 4 (1552) ]
Trans.-4 It ( the soul ) is not even within the range of āgama ( scriptural authority ); for, āgama is not ( quite ) distinct from anumāna. Moreover, the soul is not pratyaksa ( directly perceptible ) to any one whose word is āgama. (1552 )
· टीका-न चागमगम्योऽपि तकः-असौ जीवः यत्-यस्मादागमोऽपि नानुमानाद् भिद्यते, परमार्थतस्तस्यानुमानत्वात् ; तथाहि-शाब्दं प्रमाणागम उच्यते, शब्दश्च द्विविधः-दृष्टार्थविषयः अदृष्टार्थविषयश्च । तत्र दृष्टार्थविषया शब्दाद् या प्रतीतिः, सा वस्तुतोऽनुमानसमुत्थैवम् , यतः क्वचित् प्रथमं पृथुबुध्नोदरोर्ध्वकुण्ड-लोष्टायत-वृत्तग्रीवादिमति घटपदार्थे घटशब्दं प्रयुज्यमानं दृष्ट्वा तदुत्तरकालं क्वापि “घटमानय" इत्यादि शब्दं श्रुत्वा पृथुबुध्नोदरादिमदर्थ एव घट उच्यते, तथाभूतपदार्थ एव घटशब्दप्रयोगप्रवृत्तेः, यथा पूर्व कुम्भकारापणादौ, घटशब्दश्चायमिदानीमपि श्रूयते, तस्मात् तथाभूतस्यैव पृथुबुध्नो. दरादिमतः पदार्थस्य मयाऽऽनयनादिक्रिया कर्तव्या इत्यनुमानं विधाय प्रमाता घटानयनादिक्रियां करोति, इत्येवं दृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाणं वस्तुतो नानु

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first
मानाद् भिद्यते । न चैवमसावात्मशब्दः शरीरादृतेऽन्यत्र प्रयुज्यमानः क्वचिदुपलब्धः, यत्र खल्वात्मशब्दश्रवणात् आत्मा इति प्रत्ययो भवेदिति । यदपि स्वर्ग नरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं शाब्दं प्रमाणं तदपि तत्त्वतोऽनुमानं नातिवर्त्तते, तथाहि - " प्रमाणं स्वर्ग-नरकाद्यदृष्टार्थविषयं वचनम्, अविसंवादिवचनाप्तप्रणीतत्वात्, चन्द्रार्कोपरागादिवचनवत्" इत्येवमनुमानादेव तत्र प्रमाणता । न चैवम्भूतमासं कमपि पश्यामः, यस्यात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति तद्वचनमागम इति ' प्रतिपद्येमहि ' इति शेषः ॥ ४ ( १५५२ ) ॥
D. C-The existence of the soul cannot be established by agama; for, after all, agama cannot be separated from anumana, as, really speaking, agama is (a kind of) anumāna.
Agama is defined as subda pramanu, and sabda (word) is two-fold, viz., (i) drstartha-visaya (pertaining to an object which is seen) and (ii) a-drstartha-visaya ( pertaining to an object which is not seen).
66
The conviction which is arrived at, by means of a sabda and which is associated with an object that is seen, is really an outcome of anumana. For instance, first of all, one notices that the word ghata is used for an object whose belly is round and extensive, whose basin is raised up and hollowed out, whose neck is round and which is made up of earth. Thereafter, when he hears bring a ghata" he begins to reflect: None else but an object whose belly is round and extensive, etc., is styled as ghata; for, the word ghata is reserved for this object only a fact noticed in the shop of a potter. I hear the word ghata; so I should bring an object of that very kind, viz., one which is round, extensive etc. Having so inferred, he brings a 'ghata'. Hence, it will be seen that the sabda pramana which is associated with an object that is seen, is not separate from anumana.
:
To think of the soul, the word 'soul' is not used for any other object but the body. Had it been, however, so used, one would have been convinced about the existence of the soul.

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Vada )
. . Ganadharavada . The sabda pramāņa associated with unseen objects like heaven, hell etc., is also, really speaking, not separate from anumāna. For, the knowledge connected with unseen objects such as heaven, hell and the like is pramāna, as it comes from an apta, a reliable personage whose word is true-a fact noticed when he predicted a lunar eclipse, a solar eclipse and so on. Thus, here, too, the validity or truth rests upon inference.'
There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as āgama, and on the basis of this agama, the existence of the soul would have been admitted.
Besides जं चागमा विरुद्धा परोप्परमओ वि संसओ जुत्तो। सवप्पमाणविसयाईओ जीवो त्ति तो बुद्धी ॥ ५॥ (१५५३) Jam cāgamā viruddhā paropparamaö vi samsaö jutto i Savvappamāņavisayājö jīvo tti to buddhi li 5 ( 1553 )
[ यच्चागमा विरुद्धाः परस्परमतोऽपि संशयो युक्तः ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीवोऽस्ति ततो बुद्धिः ॥ ५ ॥ (१५५३) Yaccāgamā viruddhāh parasparamato'pi sausayo yuktaḥ 1. Sarvapramānavisayatito jivo'sti tato buddhih ॥ 5 ( 1553 ) ]
Tvans.—5 Furthermore, the agamas are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, ( your ) doubt is justifiable. You ( therefore ) believe that ( the existence of ) the soul cannot be established by any of the pranānas. (1553)
टीका-यतश्च तीथिकानां सम्बन्धिनः सर्वेऽप्यागमाः परस्परविरोधिनः खलु, अतोऽपि संशय एवात्मनो युक्तः, न तु निश्चयः, तथाहिकेचिदागमा आत्मनो नास्तित्वमेव प्रतिपादयन्ति, यदाहु स्तिकाः

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•: 10:. .. Jinabhadra Gami's . . [ The first
___ "एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावानिन्द्रियगोचरः । · भद्र ! वृकपदं पश्य यद् वदन्ति बहुश्रुताः ॥ १॥" इत्यादि ।
भट्टोऽप्याह-" विज्ञानधन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति, न च प्रेत्यसञ्ज्ञाऽस्ति ।"
सुगतस्त्वाह-" न रूपं भिक्षवः ! पुद्गलः" इत्यादि ।
आत्माऽस्तित्ववचनान्यप्यागमेषु श्रूयन्ते तथा च वेदः-" न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया प्रिये न स्पृशतः" इति; तथा, “ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादि।
___ कापिलागमे तु प्रतिपाद्यते--" अस्ति पुरुषोऽकर्ता निर्गुणो भोक्ता चिद्रूपः" इत्यादि। तस्मादागमानां परस्परविरुद्धवाद् नागमप्रमाणादप्यात्मसत्त्वसिद्धिः। इदं च वैशेषिकमतेन प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमलक्षणं प्रमाणत्रयमुपन्यस्तम् । एतच स्वयं द्रष्टव्यम्-उपमाप्रमाणगम्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । तत्र हि “यथा गौस्तथा गवयः। इत्यादावेव सादृश्यमसनिकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिमुत्पादयति । न चेहान्यः कश्चित् त्रिभुवनेऽप्यात्मसदृशः पदार्थोऽस्ति, यद्दर्शनादात्मानमवगच्छामः । काला-ऽऽकाश-दिगादयो जीवतुल्या विद्यन्त इति चेत् । न, तेषामपि विवादास्पदीभूतत्वेन तदंहिबद्धत्वात् । अर्थापत्तिसाध्योऽपि जीवो न भवति । न हि दृष्टः श्रुतो वा कोऽप्यर्थ आत्मनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते, यदलात् तं साधयामः। तसात् सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतो जीव इति तव बुद्धिः, भावोपलम्भकप्रमाणपञ्चकविषयातीतत्वात् प्रतिषेधसाधकाऽभावाख्यषष्ठप्रमाणविषय एव जीव इत्यर्थः । इति पूर्वपक्षः॥ ५ (१५५३ )॥
D. C.—The fact that the āgamas of the various expounders of religion, are opposed to one another, justifies one to doubt the existence of the soul, rather than to admit it. For instance, some of the agamas propound the non-existence of the soul.
To cite an example, the Nastikas---the atheists-hedonists say :

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Vada ] .. Gañadharavāda .
11 : “ Etāvān eva loko’yam yāvān indriyagocaraḥ |
Bhadre ! vrkapadam paśya yad vadanti bahušrutāḥ ir”
This means :- This world is only as much as is within the range of the senses. My good lady! see the foot-prints of the wolf. Highly learned individuals also say so.
Bhatta, too, says :
“ Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānuvinasyati, na ca pretyasañjnā'sti. ”
This means :--This material body which is nothing else but consciousness, after having been generated from the five elements, is dissolved into them, and there is no clear conception for future life.
Sugata says :“Na rūpam bhikṣavaḥ ! pudgalah " This means :-0 saints ! rūpa ( form ) is not a soul.
In the āgamas, we come across passages which admit the existence of the soul. For instance, in the Veda, we hear :
“ Na hi vai ser sararasya priyāpriyayor: apahatircsti, a sarîrøm vā vasantam priyapriye na sprašatah.”
This means:--There is no destruction of priya (attachment) and apriya (aversion) in connection with the embodied soul. Attachment and aversion do not affect a disembodied soul.
Also “ Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah ” .
This means : An individual desirous of acquiring heaven, should perform agnihotra ( a sacrifice to the god Agni).
The agama of the Kāpilas says :“ Asti puruso akartā nirguno bhoktā cidrūpah. ” . This means :-There exists a puruşa ( a personal animate

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's ...
[The first
entity ) which is not the doer of actions, which is devoid of qualities, which is the enjoyer' ( of pleasure and pain ), and which is the embodiment of consciousness.
Thus, since the various āgumas are mutually antagonistic, the existence of the soul cannot be established even by upamāna pramāna ( the proof of analogy ). Yathā gau statha gavayah, means that a cow resembles a bos gavaeus, a species of ox.
Here the resemblance helps one to realize a distant object. But, in the entire universe, there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul. Such being the case, there is no
possibility of establishing the existence of the soul, on - comparing it with an object resembling it.
It is no use advancing an argument that kāla ( time ), ākāsa (space), dis (direction) etc., resemble the soul; for, there is no uniformity regarding the exposition of their nature so far as the different systems of philophy are concerned. And hence the same trouble.
Even arthāpatti (presumption or implication ) does not help us. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose justification depending upon the soul, cannot be established.
Thus, when the existence of the soul cannot be proved by any one of these five pramāṇas, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of abháva ( non-existence ), the sixth pramana whose function is to prove non-existence.
Thus the soul does not exist. This finishes the pūrvapaksa ( the view of the opponent).
Now follows the refutation of the argument:

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Vada ] . Ganadharavada
: 13:. गोयम ! पञ्चक्खु चिय जीवो जं संसयाइविन्नाणं ।
पञ्चक्खं च न सज्झं जह सुह-दुक्खा सदेहम्मि ॥६॥ (१५५४) Goyama ! paccakkhu cciya jivo jam samsayāivinnāņam 1 Paccakkham ca na sajjham jaha suha-dukkhā sadehammi 116 (1954) [ गौतम ! प्रत्यक्ष एव जीवो यत् संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च न साध्यं यथा सुख-दुःखे स्वदेहे ॥ ६ ॥ (१५५४) Gautama ! pratyakņa eva jīvo yat samśayādivijñānam 1 Pratyakşam ca na sādhyam yatha sukha-duḥkhe svade he || 6 (1554)]
Refutation
Trans.-6. O Gautama ! the soul is indeed pratyaksa to you also; for, ( your ) knowledge about it which consists of doubts etc., is itself the soul. What is pratyaksa should not be proved, e. g., weal and woe in one's body. ( 1554 )
टीका-गौतम ! भवतोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽयं जीवः, किमन्येन प्रमाणान्तरोपन्यासेन ? । कोऽयं जीवो मम प्रत्यक्षः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-यदेतत् तवैव संशयादिविज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनसिद्धं हृदि स्फुरति स एव जीवः, संशयादिज्ञानस्यैव तदनन्यत्वेन जीवत्वात् । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं तद् न प्रमाणान्तरेण साध्यम् , तथा स्वशरीर एवात्मसंवेदनसिद्धाः सुख-दुःखादयः। प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमपि सग्राम-नगरं विश्वं शून्यवादिनं प्रति साध्यत एवेति चेत्। नैवम् , “निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः, प्रत्ययत्वात् , स्वमप्रत्ययवत् " इत्यादेस्तदुद्भावितबाधकप्रमाणस्यैव तत्र निराकरणात् , अत्र त्वात्मग्राहके प्रत्यक्षे बाधकप्रमाणाभावादिति ॥ ६ (१५५४) ।
D. C.-0 Gautama ! the soul is directly cognizable even to you; so what is the use of resorting to other pramānas ? If you ask a question as to how the soul is pratyaksa (directly cognizable ) to you, the answer is this :
This knowledge of yours, of which the existence is proved by your own experience of it, and which you entertain

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Jinabhadra Gani's.
[The first
in your heart, is the soul itself; for, this knowledge is identical with the soul.
What could be decided by pratyakṣa should not be established by any other pramāna. No proof is required to prove the existence of happiness, misery etc., which one experiences in the body. It is futile to advance an argument that though the existence of the universe consisting of villages and cities, is self-evident, yet it is to be proved so far as a nihilist is concerned. For the argument such as "Niralambanā sarve pratyayaḥ, pratyayatvat svapnapratyayavat that is to say all convictions are devoid of any substratum, since they are convictions, like the conviction of a dream-an argument which can be advanced by a nihilist and which is a badhaka pramāna (prejudicing evidence), has already been refuted. And, here there is no badhaka pramana in the pratyakṣa which reveals the soul.
case of
""
The existence of the soul is established by pratyakṣa pramana for the following reason :
कयवं करेमि काहं वाहमहं पच्चया इमाउ य ।
37091 ♬ cqzpraì famgamıagareì || 011 (8444).
î
Kayavam karemi kāham vā'hamaham paccaya imāü ya Appa sa ppaccakkho tikālakajjovaesão. 7 ( 1555)
[ कृतवान् करोमि करिष्यामि वाहमहम्प्रत्ययादस्माच्च ।
आत्मा स प्रत्यक्षस्त्रैकालिकार्योपदेशात् || ७ || ( १५५५ ) Kritavan karomi kariṣyāmi vahamahampratyayadasmacca | Atma sa pratyakṣastraikālikakaryopadeśat | 7 (1555)]
>
Trans.-7 Or, this soul is pratykṣa owing to this ahampratyaya (realization as "I") in I did, I do, and I shall do -the pratyaya which is associated with functions pertaining to (all) the three tenses. (1555)

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Vada }
"
66
टीका - वेत्यथवा ' कृतवानहम्, करोम्यहम् करिष्याम्यहम् '; 'उक्तवानहम् ब्रवीम्यहम्, वक्ष्याम्यहम् '; 'ज्ञातवानहम्, जानेऽहम्, ज्ञास्याम्यहम्', इत्यादि प्रकारेण योऽयं त्रैकालिकः कार्यव्यपदेशः, तद्विषयप्रयुज्यमानतया तत्समुत्थो योऽयमहम्प्रत्ययः, एतस्मादपि प्रत्यक्ष एवायमात्मा " इति प्रपद्यख । अयं ह्यहम्प्रत्ययो नानुमानिकः, अलैङ्गिकत्वात् । नाप्यागमादिप्रमाण सम्भवः तदनभिज्ञानां बाल-गोपालादीनामप्यन्तर्मुखतयाऽऽत्मग्राहकत्वेन स्वसंविदितस्य तस्योत्पादात् घटादौ चानुत्पादादिति ॥ ७ (१५५५ ) |
"
Gaṇadharavada
"
•:15:.
66
D. C. —In the expressions such as krtavān aham ( I did ), karomyaham ( I do ) and karisyāmyaham ( I shall do ) uktavān aham (I spoke ), bravimyaham (I speak ) and vakṣyāmyaham ( I shall speak ), jñātuvān aham ( I know ), jane ham ( I know ) and jñasyāmyahuum ( I shall know ), etc.—the expressions which are associated with acts governed by all the three tenses, viz., past, present and future, there is aham-pratyaya (the realization as "I"). This aham-pratyaya, too, establishes that the soul is pratyakṣa. It should be borne in mind that this aham-pratyaya is not based on anumāna; for, it has no linga. Moreover, it not even proved by āgama etc., for, even children, cowherds and others have the conviction of this aham-pratyya based on self-experience, though they are not conversant with pramanas such as agama etc, and that they have no such conviction regarding a ghata, a piece of cloth etc.
Besides
कह पडिवण्णमहं ति यकिमत्थि नत्थि त्तिसंसओ कह णु । संसम्म वायं कस्साहंपच्चओ जुत्तो ? ॥ ८ ॥ (१५५६)
सइ
Kaha padivannamaham ti ya kim atthi natthi tti samsao kaha nu? | Sai samsayammi vāyam kassāhampaccao jutto? 8 (1556)
[ कथं प्रतिपन्नमहमिति च किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कथं नु ? | सति संशये चायं कस्याहम्प्रत्ययो युक्तः १ ॥। ८ ।। ( १५५६ )

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* 16:
Jinabhadra Gani's.
Katham pratipannamaham iti ca kimasmi
nasmīti samsayaḥ katham nu ? | Sati samśaye cayam kasyaham pratyayo. yuktaḥ? || 8. (1556)
[The first
99
Trans.-8 When there is no soul, how do you admit aham (the realization as 'I'))? How can there be a doubt as to whether it (the soul) is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this aham-pratyaya justifiable? (1556) टीका - हन्त ! कथमसति जीवे “ अहम् इति प्रतिपन्नं त्वया, विषयाभावे विषयिणोऽनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात्ः १ । देह एवास्य प्रत्ययस्य विषय इति चेत् । न, जीवविप्रमुक्तेऽपि देहे तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । सति च जीवविषयेऽस्मिन्नहम्प्रत्यये ' किमहमस्मि नास्मि' इति भवतः संशयः कथं केन प्रकारेणोप जायते ? अहम्प्रत्ययग्राह्यस्य जीवस्य सद्भावात् " अस्म्यहम् " इति निश्चय एव युज्यत इति भावः । सन्ति वाऽस्मिन्नात्मास्तित्वसंशये कस्याय महम्प्रत्ययो युज्यते, निर्मूलत्वेन तदनुत्थानप्रसङ्गात् ? इति ।। ८ (१५५६) ।।
D. C.-Hallo! when the soul is non-existent, how is it that you admitaham'? For, it is a settled fact that in the absence of a visaya (an object), there is no scope for a visayin (one having an object). If your reply is that this aham-pratyaya has the body alone, for, visaya is confined simply to the body, this aham-pratyaya should be possible even in the case of the body which has been given up by the soul.
Moreover, if this aham-pratyaya associated with the soul arises, how can you have a doubt as to kim aham asmi (am I) or nasmi (am I not)? For, on the contrary, in such a case, you ought to be in a position to decide that I am ' owing to the sadbhava ( presence) of the soul realized by the ahampratyaya. When there is this doubt about the existence of the soul, is there no scope for such a pratyaya owing to its being baseless ?
If the non-existence of the soul is admitted, there is no possibility of a doubt regarding its existence.

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.. Ganadharavada . . .: 17 :. जइ नत्थि संसइ च्चिय किमथि नत्थि त्ति संसओ कस्स ? । संसइए व सरूवे गोयम! किमसंसयं होज्जा ? ॥९॥(१५५७) Jaï natthi samsař cciya kim atthi natthi tti saṁsaö kassa ? I Samsaïe va sarūve Goyama! kim asamsayam hojjā ? 11 9 ( 1557 ) [यदि नास्ति संशयी एव किमस्मि नास्मीति संशयः कस्य ।
संशयिते वा स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं भवेत् ? ॥९॥ (१५५७) Yadi násti samśayi eva kim asmi násmîti samśayaḥ kasya ? | Samśayite vā svarūpe Gautama ! kim asamsayam bhavet ?119 (1557)]
Trans.-9 If the object about which one has doubt, is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to “kim asmi nāsmi” ( whether I do exist or I do not exist ) ? Or, CGautama ! when you ( yourself ) are doubtful (about yourself ), what can be free from doubt ? ( 1557 )
टीका-यदि संशयी जीव एवादौ नास्ति तर्हि " अस्मिनास्मि" इति संशयः कस्य भवतु ? । संशयो हि विज्ञानाख्यो गुण एव; न च गुणिनमन्तरेण गुणः संभवति । देहोऽत्र गुणीति चेत्, न, देहस्य मूर्तत्वाजडत्वाच, ज्ञानस्य चामूर्तत्वात् बोधरूपत्वाच्च । न चातनुरूपाणां गुणगुणिभावो युज्यते, आकाश-रूपादीनामपि तद्भावापत्यातिप्रसङ्गप्राप्तः। “संसइए वेत्यादि " वेत्यथवा संशयिते स्वरूपे गौतम ! किमसंशयं शेषं भवेत् ? । इदमुक्तं भवति
-'किमस्मि नास्म्यहम् ' इत्येवं यः स्वरूपेऽपि संशेते-आत्मनिश्चयोऽपि यस्य नास्तीत्यर्थः तस्य शेषं कर्मबन्ध-मोक्षादिकं घट-पटादिकं च किमसं. शयम्-असन्दिग्धं स्यात् ? न कश्चित् , सर्वसंशय एव तस्य स्यादित्यर्थः, आत्मास्तित्वनिश्चयमूलो हि शेषवस्तुनिश्चय इति भावः। अहम्प्रत्ययग्राहयं च प्रत्यक्षमात्मानं निढुवानस्य "अश्रावणः शब्दः" इत्यादिवत् प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो नाम पक्षाभासः, तथा वक्ष्यमाणात्मास्तित्वानुमानसद्भावाद् “नित्यः शब्दः" इत्यादिवदनुमानविरुद्धोऽपि । तथा “ अहमस्मि संशयी " इति प्रागभ्युपगम्योरत्र "नास्मि" इति प्रतिजाननस्य साङ्ख्यस्यानित्यः कर्ता,

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•: 18 : . • Jinabhadra Gaņi's. [The first
अचेतन आत्मेत्यादिवदभ्युपगमविरोधः। बालगोपालाङ्गनादिप्रसिद्धं चात्मानं fatursda: “31975: gait” STTIGTEN laita: 1 "reare ar” इति गदतो “माता मे वन्ध्या " इत्यादिवत् स्ववचनव्याहतिः। एवं च प्रत्यक्षादिबाधितेऽस्मिन् पक्षेऽपक्षधर्मतया हेतुरप्यसिद्धः। हिमवत्पलपरिमाणादौ पिशाचादौ च प्रमाणपञ्चकाभावस्य प्रवृत्तेरनैकान्तिकोऽपि, वक्ष्यमाणांनुमानप्रमाणसिद्धे चात्मनि विपक्ष एव वृत्तेविरुद्धश्चेति ॥ ९ (१५५७)॥
D. C.-If, after all, there is no one like a soul to entertain a doubt, who can have a doubt as to whether I exist or I do not exist ? Doubt is a guna ( an attribute ) known as vijñāna ( knowledge ), and the guna has no separate existence from its gunin ( one having an attribute ).
The body cannot become the gunin of doubt; for it is mūrta ( corporeal ) and jada ( inanimate ), whereas, knowledge is amūrta ( in-corporeal ) and bodha-rūpa ( an embodiment of consciousness ).
The guna and its gunin cannot have an unlike nature; otherwise, ākasa (space) will become a gunin of rūpa (colour etc).
Furthermore, Gautama ! how can he, who is not sure about his own existence,--who has no self-confidencesay anything definitely about the rest, such as karma-bandha ( bondage and amalgamation of karmans and moksa ( liberation ), etc.; and also about a ghata ( a pitcher ), pata ( a piece of cloth ) and the like? The answer is obvious that he cannot. For, the decision regarding all things depends upon the decision arrived at, in the case of the soul.
Moreover, one who ignores the self-evident soul, which can be realized by aham-pratyaya, sails in the same boat as one who says that sound is always inaudible. He is, then, resorting to a pakşābhāsa ( a mock-assertion ) which is contrary to direct evidence. His stand is further opposed to valid inference, like one, who may say ' Nityah sabdah,' ( sound is eternal )--the valid inference which will be dealt with hereafter.

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Vada ]
. Gañadharavada
.: 19:
Further, one who comes forward to say that “I do not exist " after previously admitting that I am one having. a doubt, is contradicting himself like a Sankhya (a follower of the Sankhya system of philosophy ) who may say “ Anityah kartā” (the doer is impermanent ), “ Acetanah ātmā” (.the soul is inanimate ) etc.
Moreover, one, who denies the existence of the soul, which is well-known to children, cow-herds, and women, entertains a belief inconsistent with the popular one and can be compared. with the one who says “ Acandrah sašê" (the moon is devoid of the moon ). One, who says “ whether I am or I am not " is contradicting oneself like one who says: “ Mātā me vandhyā” (my mother is sterile ).
This view being thus opposed to pratyaksa etc., the hetu • ( the cause ) is a-siddha ( not established ) owing to its nonexistence in the paksa ( subject of inference ).
Besides, this hetu is also anaikāntika (inconclusive ), since none of the five pramānas has any scope so far as the measure of a pala of Mount Hinavat and the existence of a pišāca ( an evil spirit ) are concerned.
Moreover, since the existence of the soul can be proved by inference—a topic to be just discussed, the hetu is viruddha (contrary ) too, as it is associated with the vipaksa (dissimilar instance ).
The existence of the soul by direct cognizance, is proved in another way :गुणपञ्चक्खत्तणओ गुणी वि जीवो घडो व पच्चक्खो। घडओ वि घेप्पइ गुणी गुणमेत्तग्गहणओ जम्हा॥१०॥ (१५५८) Gunapaccakkhattaņaö guni vi jīvo ghado vva paccakkhoi Ghadaö vi gheppaï guņi guņamettagghaņaö jamhā 11 10 (1558)

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:: 20 :- . ..Jinabhadra Gani's . . [ The first [ गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वतो गुण्यपि जीवो घट इव प्रत्यक्षः ।
घटकोऽपि गृह्यते गुणी गुणमात्रग्रहणतो यस्मात् ॥ १०॥ (१५५८) Guņapratyakşatvato guṇyapi jivo ghata iva pratyakṣaḥ Ghatako'pigrihyate guni gunamatragrahanato yasmat n10 (1551)]
Trns.-- 10 The soul which is gunin, is self-evident owing to its gunas being so ( self-evident ), as is the case with a pitcher. For, on realizing the gunas only, the gunin e. g., the pitcher, too, is realized. (1558)
टीका--प्रत्यक्ष एवं गुणी जीवः, स्मृति-जिज्ञासा-चिकीर्षा-जिगमिषासंशीत्यादिज्ञानविशेषाणां तद्गुणानां स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् , इह यस्य गुणाः प्रत्यक्षाः स प्रत्यक्षो दृष्टः, यथा घटः, प्रत्यक्षगुणश्च जीवः, तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षः, यथा घटोऽपि गुणी रूपादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादेव प्रत्यक्षः, तद्वद् विज्ञानादिगुणप्रत्यक्षत्वादात्मापीति । आह-अनैकान्तिकोऽयम् , यस्मादाकाशगुणः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षोऽस्ति, न पुनराकाशमिति । तदयुक्तम् , यतो नाकाशगुणः शब्दः, किन्तु पुद्गलगुणः, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् , रूपादिवदिति ॥ १० (१५५८)॥
D. C.--The gunin, viz., the soul is certainly pratyaksa, because its gunas such as smrti (remembrance ) jijñāsā ( desire for knowledge ), cikarşā (desire for action ), jigamisā ( desire for movements ) and doubt, etc., which are kinds of knowledge . are self-evident, as they are experienced by oneself.' One whose gunas are pratyakşa, is noticed to be pratyakşa ; for instance, a pitcher.
The gunas of the soul are pratyaksa. Therefore the soul is pratyaksa. Just as, since rūpa ( colour ) etc., the gunas of of a pitcher, are pratyaksa, the pitcher, too, is pratyaksa.
Such is the case with the soul, as its gunas, viz. vijnana, ( knowledge ) etc., are pratyaksa.
Some one may say that this argument is anaikantika ( vicious ); for, the sabda (sound ) which is the guna of ākā'sa ( space ) is pratyaksa yet ūkašā is not pratyakşa. But this

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Vada ]
.Ganadharavada . . .: 21 :. is not correct; for, sabda is not the guna of akass, but sabda (sound ) is rather the gunal of pudgala ( matter ) as it is aindriyaka ( cognizable by the sense-organs ) as is the case with colour, etc.
When the gunas are pratyakşa, how is it that the gunin is also of this type ?
The answer is :अन्नोऽणन्नो व गुणी होज गुणहिं, जइ नाम सोऽणन्नो। . ननु गुणमेत्तग्गहणे घेप्पइ जीवो गुणी सक्खं ॥११॥ (१५५९) Anno'ŋanno va guņi hojja gunehim jas nāma so’nanno 1 Nanu gunamettaggahane gheppai jivo guni sakkham ॥ 11 (1559)
[ अन्योऽनन्यो वा गुणी भवेद् गुणैः, यदि नाम सोऽनन्यः ।
ननु गुणमात्रग्रहणे गृह्यते जीवो गुणी साक्षात् ॥ ११ ।। (१५५९) Anyo'nanyo Va guni bhaved gunaih, yadi nāma so'nanyah | Nanu guņamātragrahaņe gļhyate jīvo guņi sākṣāt II 11 (1559) ] अह अन्नो तो एवं गुणिनो न घडादओ वि पञ्चक्खा । गुणमेत्तग्गहणाओ जीवम्मि कउ विचारोऽयं? ॥१२॥ (१५६०) Aha anno to evam guņino na ghadādaö vi paccakkhā 1. Gunamettaggahanao jivammi kati vicaro'yam ? ॥ 12 (1560 )
[अथान्यस्तत एवं गुणिनो न घटादयोऽपि प्रत्यक्षाः ।
गुणमात्रग्रहणाजीवे कुतो विचारोऽयम् ? ॥ १२ ॥ (१५६० ) Athânyastata evam guņino na ghatādayo'pi pratyaksāh i Guņamátragrahaņājjīve kuto vicāro' yam ? Il 12 ( 1560 ) ]
Trans.-11-12 The gunin may be either distinct from or identical with gunas. If it is really identical ( with the gunas ), the gunin, the soul, is surely directly realized, on the realization of ( its ) gunas only. If, however, it ( gurin ) is distinct, then

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.: 22:- . . Jinabhadra Gani's . .. [ The first the guņins such as a pitcher, etc., are not pratyaksa owing to the realization of merely gunas. ( Such being the case ), whence is ( the scope for ) this thought of non-existence as regards the soul ? ( 1559-1560 ) . . टीका-ननु भवता गुणेभ्यो गुणी किमर्थान्तरभूतोऽभ्युपगम्यते,
अनर्थान्तरभूतो वा ? । यदि नाम सोऽनन्यस्तेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतः तर्हि ज्ञानादिगुणग्रहणमात्रादेव गुणी जीवः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति सिद्धमेव । प्रयोगः-यो यस्मादनन्तरं स तद्ग्रहणे गृह्यते एव, यथा वाससि रागः। गुणेभ्योऽनन्तरं च गुणी तस्माद् गुणग्राहकप्रत्यक्षेण सोऽपि गृह्यत एवेति । अथ गुणेभ्योऽन्योऽर्थान्तरभूत एव गुणी । तत एवं सति घटादयोऽपि गुणिनो न प्रत्यक्षाः, तदर्थान्तरभूतस्य रूपादिगुणमात्रस्यैव ग्रहणात् । इह यद् यस्मादर्थान्तरभूतं तद्ग्रहणेऽपि नेतरस्य ग्रहणम्, यथा घटे गृहीते पटस्य, अर्थान्तरभूताश्च गुणिनो गुणा इष्यन्ते, अतो गुणग्रहणेऽपि न गुणिग्रहणम् । अतो घटादीनामपि समानेऽग्रहणदोषे कोऽयं नाम भवतः केवल जीवे विचारो नास्तित्वविवक्षा येनोच्यते-" पच्चक्खं जनं धिप्पइ घडो व" इत्यादि । अथ द्रव्यविरहिताः केऽपि न सन्त्येव गुणाः, इत्यतस्तद्ग्रहणद्वारेण गृह्यन्त एव घटादयः । नन्वेतदात्मन्यपि समानमेव । किञ्च गुणिनो गुणानामान्तरत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने गुणी भवतु, मा भूद् वा प्रत्यक्षः, तथापि ज्ञानादिगुणेभ्यः पृथगात्मा गुणी त्वदभ्युपगमेनापि सिध्यत्येवेति ॥(१५५९-१५६०)। ।
'D. C.—The gunin may be either separate or non-separate from its gunas. If it is non-separate, i. e., identical, then, on realizing knowledge, etc., which are the gunas of the soul, the gunin, the soul, is directly realized. The underlying argument is as follows:
That which is not separate from another is realized on that another being realized, e.g., colour in a garment. To be explicit, a garment and its colour are not separate; so, when the colour is realized, the garment, too, is realized.
The gunin is non-separate from the gunas. Consequently when the gunas are directiy perceived, the gunin, too, is

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Vada ]
.. Gañadharavada
23
certainly realized. If the gunin is really distinct from the gunas, then, such being the case, the gunins such as a pitcher and the like, are not pratyaksa when only their gunas like colour, which are separate from the gunin, are realized. That which is distinct from another, is not realized even when another, which is separate from it, is realized. As for example, a pitcher is distinct from a piece of cloth. So, when one is realized, the other is not realized. If it is desired that gunas are to be looked upon as separate from the gunin, then, even when the gunas are realized, the gunin remains unrealized. Hence, when the fault of non-realization is applicable even in the case of pitchers etc., why should the question of nonexistence arise only in the case of the soul, to the effect that “paccakkham jam na ghippaï ghado vua" etc. ?
There is really no existence of the gunas apart from the substance of which they are the gunas; so, when the gunas of a pitcher are realized, the pitcher, too, is certainly realized. And the case of the soul is parallel.
Furthermore, even though while assuming that the guņas are separate from the gunin, the gunin becomes or does not become pratyakşa ( when the gunas become pratyaksa ), yet . the gurin, the soul which is distinct from its gunas such as knowledge, has its existence proved even by your own admission. Anticipating the opinion of the disputant, the author says :अह मन्नसि अस्थि गुणी न य देहत्थंतरं तओ किंतु । देहे नाणाइगुणा सो चिय तेसिं गुणी जुत्तो॥ १३ ॥. (१५६१) Aha mannasi atthi guni na ya dehatthantaram taö kintu į Dehe nāņāiguņā so cciya tesim guņi jutto il 13 ( 1561 )
[379 Arthstea voit aa Gerefai 1*: fefore I
E STATTTTT: 7 per agi gost gas ll 83 11 ( 8488) Atha manyase’sti guņi na ca dehárthāntaram sakaḥ kintu i Dehe jñānādiguņāh sa eva teşām guņi yuktah || 13 ( 1561 ) ]

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.: 24 :
Jinabhadra Gani's ... [The first ___Trans.-13 You may believe that there is the gunin, but that it is not distinct from a body. The gunas like knowledge etc., are observed in a body; so that ( body ) alone is fit to be their gunin. ( 1561 )
__टीका-अथ मन्यसे-अस्त्येव ज्ञानादिगुणानां गुणी, नैव तं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे, एतत् तु नाभ्युपच्छामो यत्-" देहादर्थान्तरं तकोऽसौ" इति, किन्तु देह एव ज्ञानादयो गुणाः समुपलभ्यन्ते, अतः स एव तेषां गुणी युक्तः, यथा रूपादीनां घटः । प्रयोगः-देहगुणा एव ज्ञानादयः, तत्रैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् , गौर-कुश-स्थूलतादिवदिति ॥ १३ (१५६१)॥ ____D. C.-It may be that you admit that there is a gunin for the gunas like knowledge, etc., but you may refuse to believe that this gunin is something else than a body. That is to say, you look upon the body itself as the gunin in question, since the gunas such as knowledge etc., are found in the body only. For example, colour is seen in a pitcher and hence its gunin is a pitcher. The underlying argument is this :
Knowledge etc., are the gunas of a body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, emaciation, fatness etc.
The answer is :नाणादओ न देहस्स मुत्तिमत्ताइओ घडस्सेव । तम्हा नाणाइगुणा जस्स स देहाइओ जीवो ॥ १४ ॥ (१५६२)
Nānadao na dehassa muttimattājö ghadasseva i
Tamhā nāņāïguņā jassa sa dehāïö jīvo il 14 ( 1562 ) [ज्ञानादयो न देहस्य मूर्तिमत्वादितो घटस्येव । तस्माज्ज्ञानादिगुणा यस्य स देहाधिको जीवो ॥१४॥ (१५६२) Jnánādayo na dehasya mūrtimattvadito ghațasyeva 1 Tasmājjnānādiguņā yasya sa dehādhiko jīvo || 14 ( 1562 ) ]

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Vada ]
. . Ganadharavada
__Trans.--14 Knowledge etc., are not the gunas of a body, as it is mūtra ( corporeal ) etc, like a ghata. Therefore that ( object ) which has knowledge etc., as its gunas, is the soul which is separate from the body. ( 1562 )
टीका-प्रयोगः-देहस्य सम्बन्धिनो गुणादयो गुणा न भवन्त्येव, तस्यमृतिमत्त्वात् चाक्षुषत्वाद् वा घटवत् । न च द्रव्यरहितो गुणः समस्ति । ततो यो ज्ञानादिगुणानामनुरूपोऽमूर्तः, अचाक्षुषश्च गुणी, स देहातिरिक्तो जीवो ज्ञातव्यः । आह-ज्ञानादयो न देहस्येति प्रत्यक्षबाधितमिदम् , देह एवज्ञानादिगुणानां प्रत्यक्षेणैव ग्रहणात् । तदयुक्तम् , अनुमानबाधितत्वादस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य । तथाहि-इहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो विज्ञाता, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात् , यो हि यदुपरमेऽपि यदुपलब्धमर्थमनुस्मरति, स तस्मादर्थान्तरं दृष्टः, यथा-पञ्चवातायनोपलब्धार्थानुस्मर्ता देवदत्त इत्यादि वायुभूतिप्रश्ने . वक्ष्याम इति ॥ १४ (१५६२)॥
___D. C.-The gunas such as knowledge, cannot belong to the body; for, the body is mūrta and cāksusa ( visible ) as is the case with a ghata. Moreover, a guna cannot exist without a substance. Now knowledge etc., are a mūrta gunas. Therefore their gunin, too, must be amūrta etc., and hence it cannot be the body which is mūrta. Thus that very gurin is the soul.
It may be argued that we see with our own eyes that knowledge etc., belong to the body. But this is a wrong argument as it is not consistent with the following inference :
The knower is distinct from senses; for, even when the senses cease ( to function ), the object realized by means of them is remembered. One who remembers an object realized by means of another, even when that another ceases, is distinct from it, e. g., Devadatta. who remembers the object realized by means of the five windows. This we shall expound while answering the question of Vayubhūti.
Desirous of arriving at a conclusion, the author says:--

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: 46:. . . Jinabhadra Gani's. . [The first इय तुह देसेणायं पञ्चक्खो सव्वहा महं जीवो। अविहयनाणत्तणओ तुह विषणाणं व पडिवजा ॥१५॥ (१५६३) Iya tuha desenāyam paccakkho savvahā maham jīvo i Avihayananattanai tuha vinnānam va padivajja ॥ 15 ( 1563 ) [ इति तव देशेनायं प्रत्यक्षः सर्वथा मम जीवः।
अविहतज्ञानत्वतस्तव विज्ञानमिव प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥ १५ ॥ (१५६३) "Iti tava desenayam pratyakşaḥ sarvatha mama jīvaḥ Avihatajnanatvatas taava vijnanam iva pratipadyasva ॥ 15 (1563)]
Trans.-15 Thus this ( soul ) is partially pratyaksa to you and entirely to me, as is the case with your knowledge, owing to ( my ) knowledge being unobstructed ( infinite ). (So) accept ( the existence of the soul ). ( 1563 ).
टीका-इत्येवम्-उक्तप्रकारेण स्वशरीरे तवापि देशतः प्रत्यक्षोऽयमात्मा, छद्मस्थत्वेन भवतः सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो देशविषयत्वात् , घटवत् , तथाहिसर्वमपि स्व-परपर्यायतोऽनन्तपर्यायं वस्तु, छमस्थश्च प्रत्यक्षेण साक्षात् तद्देशमिव गृह्णाति । प्रत्यक्षेण च प्रदीपादिप्रकाशेनेव देशतः प्रकाशिता अपि घटादयो व्यवहारतः प्रत्यक्षा उच्यन्त एव । सर्वात्मना च केवलिप्रत्यक्षमेव वस्तु प्रकाशयति । अतो ममाप्रतिहतानन्तज्ञानत्वेन सर्वात्मनाऽपि प्रत्यक्षोऽयं जीवः, यथाऽतीन्द्रियमपि त्वत्संशयविज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १५ (१५६३) ॥
D. C.-In this way, the soul in your body is partially cognizable even to you; for, since you are a chadmastha ( one under the evil influence of the mohanaya karman), every object is known to you only partially. Every object has an infinite number of paryāyas ( modifications ), in case it is examined from the stand-point of its own paryāyas and that of the paryāyas belonging to the rest. A chadmastha, therefore, directly grasps only a portion of it. It is a convention that a ghata etc., partially revealed by light, etc., are said to be pratyaksa. Only an omniscient being has a direct perception

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Vada ]
Ganadharavada . . .: 27 : of any and every object in toto. I am an omniscient being; for, my knowledge is neither limited by time nor by space. So I directly realize this soul in its entirety, just as I fully realize your knowledge, viz., your doubt about the existence of the soul. Consequently admit that the soul exists. _ Then, what about another's body ? - एवं चिय परदेहेऽणुमाणओ गिह जीवमत्थि त्ति । अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ विन्नाणमयं सरूवे व्व ॥ १६ ॥ (१५९४) Evam ciya paradehe’ņumāņaö ginha jīvam atthi tti Anuvitti-nivittii vinnānamayam sarive vva ॥ 16 ( 1564 ) [एवमेव परदेहेऽनुमानतो गृहाण जीवमस्तीति ।
अनुवृत्ति-निवृत्तिभ्यां विज्ञानमयं स्वरूप इव ॥ १६ ॥ (१५६४) Evam eva paradehe’numānato gļhāņa jīvan astīti Anuvritti-nivrittibhyam vijñanamayam svarūpa iva || 16 ( 1564)]
Trans.—16 Thus do verily accept by means of inference that the soul which is an embodiment of knowledge, exists in another's body (too), owing to ( his) indulgence in and cessation from activities, as is the case with one's own soul. ( 1564 )
· टीका-यथा स्वदेहे एवं परदेहेऽपि गृहाण जीवमनुमानतः । कथम् ? इत्याह-अस्ति-विद्यत इति । कथंभूतं जीवम् ? इत्याह-विज्ञानमयं-विज्ञानात्मकम् । अनुमानमेव सूचयन्नाह-" अणुवित्ति-निवित्तीओ सरुवे व ति" इदमुक्तं भवति-परशरीरेऽप्यस्ति जीवः, इष्टानिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिदर्शनात् , यथा स्वरूपे-स्वात्मनि, इह यत्रेष्टा-ऽनिष्टयोः प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती.दृश्येते, तत्सात्मकं दृष्टम्, यथा स्वशरीरम् , तथा च प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती दृश्येते परशरीरे, अतस्तदपि सात्मकम् ; आत्माभावे चेष्टा-ऽनिष्टप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ती न भवतः, यथा घटे, इत्यनुमानात् परशरीरेऽपि जीवसिद्धिः॥ १६ (१५६४)॥ ____D. C.-The soul exists in another's body, too; for, he, too, like yourself performs desirable activities and refrains from

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.: 28:.
Jinabhadra Gani's .
[The first
the undesirable ones, and you who act accordingly have a soul. To put it explicitly, one in whom are seen indulgence in desirable acts and non-indulgence in undesirable deeds, has a soul, as is the case with one's ( your ) body.
The body of another is seen as associated with desirable activities and dissociated from undesirable ones. Hence that body, too, has a soul. If the soul were non-existent, there was no scope for this association and dissociation, as can be seen in the case of a ghata. This is followed by inference that there is a soul in another's body, too. ___Anticipating doubt in another's mind, the author says :--- जं च न लिंगहि समं मन्नसि लिंगी जओ पुरा गहिओ। संगं ससेण व समं न लिंगओ तोऽणुमेओ सो॥१७॥ (१५६५) सोऽणेगंतो जम्हा लिंगेहि समं न दिट्ठपुवो वि । गहलिंगदरिसणाओ गहोऽणुमेओ सरीरम्मि ॥१८॥ (१५६६) Jam ca na lingehim samam mannasi lingi jaö purā gahiö || Sangam sasena va samam na lingao to'numed so ॥ 17 ( 1565 ) So'neganto jamhā lingehim samam na ditthapuvvo vi | (Jahalinga darisanai gaho'nume sarirammi ॥ 18 ( 1566 ) [ यच्च न लिङ्गैः समं मन्यसे लिङ्गी यतः पुरा गृहीतः।
शृगं शशेन वा समं न लिङ्गतस्ततोऽनुमेयः सः ॥ १७ ॥ (१५६५) सोऽनेकान्तो यस्माल्लिङ्गः समं न दृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ।
ग्रहलिङ्गदर्शनाद् ग्रहोऽनुमेयः शरीरे ॥ १८ ॥ (१५६६ ) Yacca na lingaih samam mangase lingi yataḥ purā gļhitaḥ | Srigam sasena Vii samam na lingatas tato'numeyah sah ॥ 17 (1565) So'nekanto yasmallingaih samam na drstapārvo'pi | Grahalingadarsanad graho'numeyah sarire ॥ 18 ( 1566 ).]

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
⚫: 29:.
Trans.-17-18 Moreover, that you believe that since the lingin ( viz., the soul ) has not been realized formerly (up till now) along with the lingas, as is the case with the hare and the horn, so it (the soul) cannot be inferred by means of a linga, is untenable; for, agrahat, that is not formerly seen along with (his) lingas, is inferred in a body,, on perceiving his linga or lingas. (1565-1566).
टीका - यच्च " न य जीवलिंगसंबंधदरिसणमभृ" इत्यादि पूर्वोक्तपूर्वपक्षानुसारेण मन्यसे त्वम् । किम् ? इत्याह- ततो न लिङ्गतः - लिङ्गादनु- • मेयोsat जीवः । यतः किम् ? इत्याह-यतो न खलु लिङ्गैः कैश्चिदपि समं लिङ्गी - जीवः क्वापि केनापि पुरा - पूर्व गृहीतः । किंवदित्याह - शृङ्गमिव शशकेन समम् । ततो लिङ्ग - लिङ्गिनोः पूर्वं सम्बन्धाग्रहणाद् न लिङ्गाजीवोऽनुमीयते । इति यद् मन्यसे त्वं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते - सोऽनेकान्तः, यस्मालिङ्गैः सममदृष्टपूर्वोऽपि ग्रहः - देवयोनिविशेषः शरीरे हसन-गान - रोदन-कर-चरण-भ्रूविक्षेपादिविकृतग्रहलिङ्गदर्शनादनुमीयत इति बालानामपि प्रतीतमेवेति ।। १७-१८ ( १५६५ - १५६६ )||
D. C.-Just as none has ever seen a horn on the head of a hare, so none has ever seen the lingin, viz., the soul as associated with one or more of its lingas. Such being the case, one cannot infer the existence of the soul. This belief of yours is not right. For, though a graha is not previously seen along with his lingas, even children are convinced about his existence in a body, when they see that body associated with perverse acts such as, laughing, singing, weeping, movements of hands, feet and eye-brows, etc., — the acts which are the lingas of the graha.
देहस्सत्थि विहाया पइनिययागारओ घडस्सेव ।
अक्खाणं च करणओ दण्डाईणं कुलालो व्व ॥ १९ ॥ (१५६७)
Dehassatthi vihāyā païniyayāgāraö ghaḍasseva |
Akkhānam ca karanaö dandāīnam kulālo vva || 19 (1567)
1 A kind of celestial being. An evil-spirit

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: 30 :. . . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first [ देहस्यास्ति विधाता प्रतिनियताकारतो घटस्येव ।
अक्षाणां च करणतो दण्डादीनां कुलाल इव ॥ १९॥ (१५६७) Dehasyāsti vidhātā pratiniyatakārato ghatasyeva / Aksāņām ca karaṇato daņdādinām kulāla iva || 19 ( 1567 ) ]
- Trans.-19 There is a creator of the body, owing to its shape being definite and ( its having a beginning ) as is the case with a ghāța. ( There is an adhisthātr of the organs of sense owing to their being a karaṇa ( a medium ) as is the case with the adhisthātr of a stick etc. ( 1567)
टीका-देहस्यास्ति विधाता-कर्तेति प्रतिज्ञा, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात् , घटवत् , पुनरकर्तृकं तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारमपि न भवति, यथाऽभ्रविकारः, यश्च देहस्य कर्ता स जीवः । प्रतिनियताकारत्वं मेर्वादिनामप्यस्ति, न च तेषां कश्चिद् विधाता, इति तैरनैकान्तिको हेतुः स्यात् , अतोऽनुक्तमप्यादिमत्वविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यमिति । तथा अक्षाणामिन्द्रियाणामस्ति “ अधिष्ठाता" इत्यध्याहारः करणत्वात् , यथा चक्र-चीवर-मृत्-सूत्रदण्डादीनां कुलालः, यच्च निरधिष्ठातृकं तत् करणमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम् , यश्चेन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठाता स जीव इति ॥ १९ (१५६७)॥
__D. C.-That there is a creator of the body, is the pratijñā (premise ); for, it ( body) has a beginning and has a definite shape as well, as is the care with a ghata. Whatever has no creator whatsoever, has neither a beginning nor a definite shape. The transformation of clouds may be pointed out as a pertinent example. Meru etc., have a fixed form, and even then they have no creator. So, to avoid such a case wherein the hetu ( cause ) becomes anaikāntika, the adjective ādimat ( having a beginning ), though not expressed, is to be taken as understood.
The word adhisthātr is also understood. Since the organs of sense are karana, there must be an adhisthātr for them.

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... Ganadharavāda . . 31 : A parallel example is furnished by a potter, who is an adhisthāt? of a wheel, a piece of cloth, clay, thread, a stick, etc., which are karanas. Whatever has no adhisthātr, has no karana, e. g., ākāsa. Hence it follows that the adhisthātr of the organs of sense is the soul.
Moreover, अथिदिय-विसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्स। कम्मार इवादाया लोए सण्डास-लोहाणं ॥२०॥ (१५६८)
Atthindiya-visayānam āyāņādeyabhavaö’vassam 1 Kammāra ivādāyā loe sandāsa-lohāņam il 20 ( 1568 ) [ अस्तीन्द्रिय-विषयाणामादानादेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
कार इवादाता लोके सन्दंशक-लोहानाम् ॥ २० ॥ (१५६८) । Astindriya-visayāņām ādānādeyabhāvato' vaśyam | Karmara ivadatā loke sandainsaka-lohānam ॥ 20 (1568)]
Trans.--20 Just as in this world a blacksmith is the ādātr ( grasper ) in the case of a pair of tongs and iron, so there is certainly an ādātr ( viz., the soul ) in the case of organs of . sense and their objects, since they are related as ādāna ( means of grasping ) and adeya ( graspables ). ( 1568)
टीका-इह यत्रादानादेयभावस्तवावश्यमादाता समस्ति, यथा लोके सन्दंशक-लोहानां कर्मारोऽयस्कारः, विद्यते चेन्द्रियविषयाणामादानादेयभावः, अतस्तेषामप्यस्त्यादाता, स च जीवः, यत्र त्वादाता नास्ति, तत्रादानदेयभावोऽपि न विद्यते, यथाऽऽकाश इति ॥ २० (१५६८)॥
D. C.-If there is a relation of the type of adāna and adeya, then there needs be an adatr. A blacksmith is found as the ādātr; for, we come across a pair of tongs and iron which respectively stand for ādāna and ādeya. There is a relation of the kind of adāna and ädeya, in the case of the organs of sense and sense-objects. Therefore, there must be their

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•: 3% :. . . Jinabhadra Gani's
( The first ādātr. He is none else but the soul. It may be added that there is no scope for the relation of the sort of ādāna and ādeya, in case the ādātr is non-existent, e. g., ākasa.
Also, भोत्ता देहाईणं भोज्जत्तणओ नरो व भत्तस्स । सङ्कायाइत्तणओ अस्थि य अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥२१॥ (१५६९)
Bhottā dehāīņam bhojjattanaö naro vva bhattassa Sanghāyāïttanaö atthi ya atthi gharasseva ll 21 ( 1569 ) [भोक्ता देहादीनां भोग्यत्वतो नर इव भक्तस्य ।
सङ्घातादित्वतोऽस्ति चार्थी गृहस्येव ॥ २१॥ (१५६९) Bhoktă dehādīnām bhogyatvato nara iya bhaktasya / Saighataditvato'sti carthi grhasyeva ॥ 21 (1559) ]
Trans.-21 Just as a man is an enjoyer of bhakta (food), so there is an enjoyer of body etc., owing to their being objects of enjoyment. Just as there is an owner of a house, owing to its being a saighata ( collection ) etc., so there is an owner of body etc., on account of its being a sanghāta. (1569)
टीका-इह देहादीनां भोक्ता समस्ति, भोग्यत्वात् , यथा शालयादिभक्तवस्त्रादीनां नरः, यस्य च भोक्ता नास्ति तद् भोग्यमपि न भवति, यथा खरंविषाणम्, भोग्यं च शरीरादिकम् , ततो विद्यमानभोक्तकमिति । तथा, अर्थी-स्वामी। ततश्च देहादीनां विद्यते स्वामी, सङ्घातरूपत्वात् , आदिशब्दाद् मूर्तिमत्त्वात्, ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् , चाक्षुषत्वादित्यादयोऽप्यनैकान्तिकत्वपरिहारार्थ सम्भवद्विहितविशेषणा हेतवो योजनीयाः, यथा गृहादीनां सूत्रधारादय इति दृष्टान्तः । यत् पुनरस्वामिकं तत् सङ्घातादिरूपमपि न भवति; यथा गगनकुसुमम्, सङ्घातादिरूपं च देहादिकम् , तस्साद् विद्यामानस्वामिकमिति ॥ २१ (१५६९)॥
___D. C.-Just as we find that there is a person to enjoy food etc., so there is an enjoyer of body etc. The underlying reasoning is as follows:

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 33 :An object of enjoyment for which there is no enjoyer, does not exist, e. g. a horn of an ass. Body etc., exist as objects of enjoyment. So it follows that there is their enjoyer.
Just as a carpenter and others are svāmins of a house, etc., so there is a svāmin of body etc, since this body and the like are in the form of a collection, have a beginning, are mūrta, are objects of sense and are visible etc., A number of similar hetus as may be helpful in making this syllogism perfectly logical, may be mentioned:
One that has no svāmin, is not in the form of a collection etc. For instance, a flower in the sky which has no svāmin is not in the form of a collection etc. A body etc., are, on the contrary, in the form of a collection etc. So they have a svāmin viz., the soul.
Really, by saying that the body has a creator, one proves that there is a creator etc., for the body. But that is not the soul.
जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होज्जा । मुत्ताइपसंगाओ तं न संसारिणो दोसो ॥ २२ ॥ (१५७०) Jo kattāi sa jīvo sajjhaviruddho tti te mai hojjā | Muttāipasangāö tam na sassārino doso 11 22 ( 1570 ) [.यः कादि स जीवः साध्यविरुद्ध इति तव मतिर्भवेत् ।
मूर्तादिप्रसङ्गात् तद् न संसारिणो दोषः ॥ २२ ॥ (१५७०) Yaḥ kartrādi sa jīvaḥ sadhyaviruddha iti tava matirbhavet | Mārtādiprasangāt tad na sansáriņo doṣaḥ || 22 ( 1570 )]
Trans.—22 You may be thinking that, that soul which is a doer etc., is opposed to what is to be established, owing to its having a chance of being proved mūrta etc. But this is not a fault in the case of the mundane soul. ( 1570 )
टीका-यश्चायमनन्तरं देहे-न्द्रियादीनां कर्ता, अधिष्टाता, आदाता, भोक्ता, अर्थी चोक्तः स सर्वोऽपि जीव एव, अन्यस्येश्वरादेर्युक्त्यक्षमत्वेन करी

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*: 34 :- . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first त्वाद्यसम्भवादिति। अथ साध्यविरुद्धसाधकत्वाद् विरुद्धा एते हेतव इति तष मतिभवेत् , तथाहि-घटादीनां कादिरूपाः कुलालादयो मूर्तिमन्तः, संघातरूपाः, अनित्यादिस्वभावाश्च दृष्टाः, इत्यतो जीवोऽप्येवंविध एव सिध्यति, एतद्विपरीतश्च किलास्माकंसाधयितुमिष्टः, इत्येवं साध्यविरूद्धसाधकत्वं हेतूनामिति । तदेतदयुक्तत्वाद् न, यतः खलु संसारिणो जीवस्य साधयितुमिष्टस्याऽदोषोऽयम् । स ह्यष्टकर्मपुद्गलसंघातोपगूढत्वात् सशरीरत्वाच कथंचिन्मूर्तत्वादिधर्मयुक्त एवेति भावः ॥ २२ (१५७० )।
D. C.--Up till now, it has no doubt been proved that it is the soul and the soul alone which is a doer, adhisthātr., adātr, an enjoyer and the svāmin of the body, organs of sense, etc. For God or the like cannot be admitted as a doer etc., of the body, since such a statement will be opposed to reason. But it must be admitted that the hctus put forward to prove that the soul is a doer etc., are 'viruddha ( contrary ) as they establish such a type of the soul which is just the contrary to what is desired. To be explicit, a potter who is a doer of a pitcher has a body, and he is in the form of a collection, and is of an impermanent nature. The same must be the case with the soul. But this type of soul is just opposed to what we are aiming at to establish. And hence these hetus lead us to the conclusions we are opposed to. This is not so; for, we are at present establishing the existence of a mundane soul and not that of a liberated one; and that a mundane soul is somehow mārta; for, it is certainly embraced by a collection of eight karmans, a kind of matter, and it has a body.
There is another anumāna for establishing the existence of the soul. अस्थि च्चिय ते जीवो संसयओ साम्म ! थाणुपुरिसो छ । जं संदिद्धं गोयम! तं तत्थन्नत्थ वत्थि धुवं ॥ २३॥ (१५७१) Atthi cciya te jīvo samsayö somma! thāņupuriso vval Jam sandiddham Goyamalle tatthannattha vatthi dhuvam 11 23 (157

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 35. [ अस्त्येव तव जीवः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु-पुरुषाविव ।
यत् सन्दिग्धं गौतम ! तत् तत्रान्यत्र वास्ति ध्रुवम् ॥२३।। (१५७१) Astyeva tava jivah samsayatah saumya ! sthanu-purusa.vivar Yat sandigdham Gautama ! tat tatrānyatra vāsti dhruvam ||23 (1571)] ____Trans.-23 0 lovely Gautama! Indeed you have a soul since you have a doubt ( about your existence ) as is the case with a branch-less trunk of a tree and a man. Whatever is doubted, certainly exists either there or elsewhere. (1571)
टीका-हे सौम्य ! गौतम! अस्त्येव तव जीवः, संशयतः संशयसद्भावात् , . यत्र यत्र संशयस्तत् तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषौ, संशयश्च तव जीवे, तसादस्त्येवायम् , तथाहि-स्थाणु-पुरुषयोरूलत्वारोह-परिणाहाद्युभयसाधारणधर्मप्रत्यक्षतायां चलन-शिरः कण्डूयनवयोनिलयन-वल्ल्यारोहणाधुभयगतविशेषधप्रित्यक्षतायां चोभयगतैतद्धर्मानुसरणे च सत्येकतरविशेषनिश्चयचिकीर्षोः " किमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयः प्रादुरस्ति । एवंभूते च स्थाणु-पुरुषादिगतसंशये तत् स्थाणु-पुरुषादिकं वस्त्वस्त्येव, अवस्तुनि संशयायोगात् । एवमात्मशरीरयोरपि प्रागुपलब्धसामान्य-विशेषधर्मस्य प्रमातुस्तयोः सामान्यधर्मप्रत्यक्षतायां विशेषधर्माप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि च तद्विषयानुस्मृतौ सत्यामेकतरविशेषोपलिप्सोः, “किमयमात्मा किं वा शरीरमात्रमिदम् ? इति विमर्शरूपः संशयों जायते । अयं चात्म-शरीरयोः सत्व एवोपपद्यते, नैकतरस्याऽप्यभावे, अतोऽस्ति जीवः । अथैवं ब्रूषे--अरण्यादिषु स्थाणुपुरुषसंशये तत्र विवक्षित प्रदेशेऽनयोरेकतर एव भवति, न पुनरुभयमपि, तत्कथमुच्यते-'विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति' इति ? । तदयुक्तम् अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न हि वयमेवं ब्रूम:-" तत्रैव प्रदेशे तदुभयमप्यस्ति" इति, किन्तु यद्गतसंदेहस्तद् वस्तु तत्राऽन्यत्र वा प्रदेशे ध्रुवमस्त्येव, अन्यथा षष्ठभूतविषयोऽपि संशयः स्यात् । एतदेवाह-'जं संदिद्धमित्यादि' तस्मात् संशयविषयत्वादस्त्येव जीव इति स्थितम् ॥ २३ (१५७१ ) ॥ ___D. C.-A branch-less trunk of a tree is seen from a
distance, as if it were a man. For, certain attributes such as

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•: 36 •
.
Jinabhadra Gaņi's.
[The first
loftiness etc., which are common to this trunk and a man, are observed, while their distinguishing characteristics, viz., a movement, scratching, dwelling of birds, ascending of creepers etc., are not noticeable. Such being the case, there arises a doubt as to whether this is a trunk of a tree or a person ; for, both of these objects exist (though not in the same place ). This proves that the doubt can arise only in the case of objects that do exist. You have a doubt as to whether this is a soul , or a body, as you realize their common features, but fail to notice their distinguishing characteristics. Such a doubt proves that there is a soul; for, it cannot arise unless there existed two entities viz., a soul and a body. It may be here noted that in order that a doubt may arise, it is not absolutely necessary that the objects about which a doubt arises, must be in one and the same place. एवं नाम विसाणं खरस्स पत्तं न तं खरे चेव । अन्नत्थ तदत्थि च्चिय एवं विवरीयगाहे वि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२) Evam nāma visānam kharassa pattam na tam khare ceva | Annattha tad atthi cciya evam vivariyagāhe vill 24 ( 1572 )
[ एवं नाम विषाणं खरस्य प्राप्तं न तत् खर एव ।। . अन्यत्र तदस्त्येव एवं विपरीतग्रहेऽपि ॥ २४ ॥ (१५७२) Evam nāma vişāņam kharasya prāptam na tat khara eva i Anyatra tadastyeva evam viparitagrahe' pi ॥ 24 (1572)]
Trans.--24 Such being the case, an ass will indeed have a horn but certainly he has not. It surely exists somewhere else. So is the case even when the perverse view is taken. (1572) ____टीका-हन्त ! यदि यत्र संशयस्तेनावश्यमेव भवितव्यम् , एवं ततः खरविषाणमप्यस्तीति प्राप्तम् , तत्रापि कस्यचित् संशयसद्भावात् । उच्यतेनन्वभिहितमत्र यदुत-तत्रान्यत्र वा विद्यमान एव वस्तुनि संशयो भवति, नाविद्यमाने । खरस्य विषाणं खरविषाणं नास्तीत्यत्र च कोऽर्थः १ । इत्याह

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Vāda ]
Gaṇadharavada
•: 37:
" न तं खरे चैव त्ति " खर एव तद्विषाणं नास्ति, अन्यत्र गवादावस्त्येवेति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः । ' एवं विवरीयगाहे वित्ति' इदमुक्तं भवति - यदा विपर्यस्तः कश्चित् स्थाणौ ' पुरुष एवायम्' इत्यादिविपरीतग्रहं करोति तदाप्ययमेव न्यायो वाच्यः सोऽपि विपरीत ग्रहो विपरीते पुरुषादिके वस्तुनि सत्येवोपपद्यते, नाविद्यमान इत्यर्थः । एवं भवदभिप्रायेण योऽस्मादृशां शरीर आत्मास्तित्वाभिमानः, नायमात्मनः सर्वथा नास्तित्वे युज्यत इति ।। २४ (१५७२ ) ।।
D. C.—If it is that the object which is doubted, must be. existing in the very place where the doubt arises, then even an ass will have a horn; for, somebody may doubt its existence so far as the ass is concerned. No, this is not true. What we want to imply is that the doubted object exists either in the very place where the doubt arises, or even somewhere else. That an ass has no horns, means that horns are not associated with the ass; but they are found elsewhere, e. g., on the head of a cow. Similar is the case when one object is definitely mistaken for the other. For instance, a man may take a branch-less trunk to be a man. Such a perverse view proves the existence of the object mistaken. Hence Gautama! you may think that we are in the wrong when we admit the existence of a soul in our body. This is our perverse notion according to you. If so, even then it establishes the existence of the soul.
The soul exists, for the following reason to :---
अस्थि अजीवविवक्खो पडिसेहाओ घडोघडस्सेव ।
नत्थि घडो त्ति व जीवत्थित्तपरो नत्थिसद्दोऽयं ॥ २५॥ (१५७३)
.
Atthi ajivavivakkho padisehão ghado' ghaḍasseva | Nathi ghado tti va jīvatthittaparo natthi saddo 'yam || 25 (1573)
[ अस्त्यजीव विपक्षः प्रतिषेधाद् घटोऽघटस्येव ।
नास्ति घट इतीव जीवास्तित्वपरो नास्तिशब्दोऽयम् ।। २५ ।। ( १५७२)

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« Graņi's.
:: 38 :
Jinabhadra Gani's . [ The first Astya jīva vipaksaḥ pratişedhất ghato' ghatasyeva i Nasti ghata itiva jiastitvaparo nāsti sabdo'yam ॥ 25 ( 1573)]
Trans.-25 Just as there is a ghata as opposed to aghata, so there is an object, viz., the soul, a vipaksa ( the opposite) of an inanimate object ! owing to denial. This sentence, viz., it does not exist' establishes the existence of the soul, as does the sentence, viz., ' there is no ghata' ( establish its existence ). ( 1573)
टीका-अत्र प्रयोगः-प्रतिपक्षवानयमजीवः, अत्र व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदप्रतिषेधात् , यत्र व्युत्पत्तिमतः शुद्धपदस्य प्रतिषेधो दृश्यते स प्रतिपक्षवान् दृष्टः, यथाऽघटो घटप्रतिपक्षवान् , अत्र ह्यघटप्रयोगे शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, अतोऽवश्यं घटलक्षणेन प्रतिपक्षण भवितव्यम् । यस्तु न प्रतिपक्षवान् न तत्र शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य प्रतिषेधः, यथाऽखरविषाणम्, अडित्थ इति । अखरविषाणमित्यत्र खरविषाणलक्षणस्याशुद्धस्य सामासिकपदस्य प्रतिषेध इति, अतोत्र खरस्य विषाणं खरविषाणमित्यादिव्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्यपि खरविषाणलक्षणो विपक्षो नास्ति । अडित्थ इत्यत्र तु व्युत्पत्तिरहितस्य डित्थपदस्य प्रतिषेधः, इति समासरहितत्वेन शुद्धत्वे सत्यपि नावश्यमवस्थितो डित्थलक्षणः कोऽपि पदार्थो जीववद् विपक्षभूतोऽस्तीति ।
"नत्थि घडो तिव" इत्यादि पश्चार्धम् । "नास्यात्मा" इति च योऽयमात्म निषेधध्वनिः स जीवास्तित्वनान्तरीयक एव, यथा “ नास्त्यत्र घटः" इति शब्दोऽन्यत्र घटास्तित्वाविनाभाव्येव । प्रयोगः-यस्य निषेधः क्रियमाणो दृश्यते तत् क्वचिदस्त्येव, यथा घटादिकम् ; निषिध्यते च भवता " नास्ति जीवः" इति वचनाजीवः, तस्मादस्त्येवासौ, यच्च सर्वथा नास्ति तस्य निषेधो न दृश्यत एव, यथा खरविषाणकल्पानां पञ्चभूतातिरिक्तभूतानाम् , निषिध्यते च त्वया जीवः, तस्माद् निषेध एवायं तत्सत्वसाधक इति ॥२५॥ १५७३॥
D. C.-The underlying argument is this that since ajtva is a •word of which an etymology exists and is furthermore a suddha pada ( a pure syllable ), it has a pratipaksa ( a rival), viz., jîva. A pratipaksa exists in the case of the negation of

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.: 39 :
.
one which has an etymology or a dissolution, over and above its being a suddha pada. As for example, a pratîpakşa, viz., ghata exists in the case of aghata which is a negation of ghata; for, there is an etymology of ghata, and that it is a suddha pada too. One which has no pratipakşa, has no negation possible as existing, so far as a suddha pada having an etymology is concerned. For instance, akharavişāna is wanting in a pratipakşa, viz., kharavisāna since kharavişāna is not a suddha pada but is a sāmūsika one-is a compound, though, no doubt, there is a dissolution of this compound, and as such it has a vyutpatti..
We may now examine the case of adittha. Dittha is its pratipakşa; but, since this dittha is wanting in a vyutpatti, it is out of consideration here. For, two conditions must be satisfied :
(i) It should be a suddha pada. (ii) At the same time, it must have a vyutpatti.
In the case of kharuvisana the first condition is not satisfied, whereas in the case of dittha, the second is violated. So there exists neither kharavisāna, a pratipaksa of akharavişāņa nor practically dittha, a pratipakṣa of aditthha.
Now the second henistitch. Just as when one says that here there is no ghata' establishes the existence of a ghata elsewhere, so the statement that there is no soul, proves its existence at least somewhere. The reasoning in this case is as under :
One of which a negation is being predicated surely exists somewhere, e. g., a ghața. You are predicating the negation of a soul etc. So it does exist somewhere. For, what is absolutely non existent has no negative predication. Khara-vişāna may be cited as an instance. It is non-existent; so, there is no possibilty for affirming the existence of its negation. The very fact that you predicate negation in the case of the soul, establishes its existence.

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•: 40 :: . Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The first This hetu is anaikāntika. असओ नत्थि निसेहो संजोगाइपडिसेहओ सिद्धं । संजोगाइचउकं पि सिद्धमत्थन्तरे निययं ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४) Asaö natthi niseho sańjogāïpadisehaö siddham Sanjogaicaukkam pi siddham atthantare niyajam ॥ 26 ( 1574) [ असतो नास्ति निषेधः संयोगादिप्रतिषेधतः सिद्धम् ।
संयोगादिचतुष्कमपि सिद्धमर्थान्तरे नियतम् ॥ २६ ॥ (१५७४) Asato nāsti nişedhaḥ samyogādipratişedhatah siddham | Samyogadicatuskamapi siddham arthantare niyatam ॥ 26 (1514)]
Trans.-26. It is proved that there is no negation in the case of a non-existent object owing to the pratişedha of samyoga (connection) etc., Even the quarter union consisting of samyoga, etc., is certainly proved ( to be existing ) elsewhere. ( 1574 )
टीका-असतोऽविद्यमानस्य नास्ति न सम्भवत्येव निषेध इति सिद्धम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-संयोगादि प्रतिषेधात् , आदि शब्दात् , समवाय-सामान्य-विशेषपरिग्रहः । एतदुक्तं भवति-इह यत्किश्चित् क्वचिद् देवदत्तादिकं निषिध्यते तस्यान्यत्र सत एव विवक्षितस्थाने कस्मिंश्चित् संयोग-समवाय-सामान्यविशेषलक्षणं चतुष्ठ्यमेव निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथैव देवदत्तादेरभाव प्रतिपाद्यते । तत्र " नास्ति गृहे देवदत्तः" इत्यादिषु गृह-देवदत्तादीनां सतामेव संयोग मात्रं निषिध्यते, न तु, तेषां सर्वथैवास्तित्वमपाक्रियते । तथा, "नास्ति खरविषाणम्" इत्यादिषु खर-विषाणादीनां सतामेव समवायमानं निराक्रियते । तथा "नास्त्यन्यश्चंद्रमाः" इत्यादिषु विद्यमानस्यैव चन्द्रमसोऽन्यचन्द्रनिषेधाचन्द्रसामान्यमानं निषिध्यते, न तु सर्वथा चन्द्राभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । तथा "न सन्ति घटप्रमाणा मुक्ताः" इत्यादिषु घटप्रमाणनाममात्ररूपोविशेषो मुक्तानां निषिध्यते, न तु मुक्ताऽभावः ख्याप्यत इति । एवं च सति " नास्त्यात्मा" इत्यत्र विद्यमानस्यैवात्मनो यत्र वचन येन केनाचित् सह संयोगमात्रेण त्वया निषेद्धव्यम् ; यथा “ नास्त्यात्मा वपुसि" इत्यादि न तु सर्वथाऽऽत्मनः सत्त्वमिति ।

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Vada ] .Ganadharavada
: 41 :. अत्राह कश्चित्-ननु यदि यद् निषिध्यते तदस्ति, तर्हि मत्रिलोकेश्वरताऽप्यस्ति, युष्मदादिभिर्निषिध्यमानत्वात् । तथा चतुर्णां समवायादिप्रतिषेधानां पञ्चमोऽपि प्रतिषेधप्रकारोऽस्ति, त्वयैव निषिध्यमानत्वात् । तदयुक्तम् , त्रिलोकेश्वरताविशेषमात्रं भवतो निषिध्यते, यथा घटप्रमाणत्वं मुक्तानाम् , न तु सर्वथैवेश्वरता, स्वशिष्यादीश्वरतायास्तवापि विद्यमानत्वात् । तथा, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपाक्रियते, न तु सर्वथा प्रतिषेधस्याभावः, चतु:सङ्खयाविशिष्टस्य तस्य सद्भावात् । ननु सर्वमप्यसम्बद्धमिदम् , तथाहिमत्रिलोकेश्वरत्वं तावदसदेव निषिध्यते, प्रतिषेधस्यापि पञ्चसङ्ख्याविनिष्टत्वम-. विद्यमानमेव निवार्यते, तथा, संयोग-समवाय-सामान्य-विशेषाणामपि गृहदेवदत्त-खरविषाणादिष्वसतामेव प्रतिषेधः, इत्यतो “यनिषिध्यते तदस्त्येव" . इत्येतत् कथं न प्लवते ? इत्या शङ्कयाह-" संजोगाइचउकं पीत्यादि "। इदमुक्तं भवति-देवदत्तादीनां संयोगादयो गृहादिष्वेवासन्तो निषिध्यन्ते, अर्थान्तरे तु तेषां ते विद्यन्त एव; तथाहि-गृहेणैव सह देवदत्तस्य संयोगो न विद्यते, अर्थान्तरेण तु क्षेत्र-हट्ट-ग्रामादिना सह तस्यासौ समस्त्येव, गृहस्यापि देवदत्तेन सह संयोगो नास्ति, खट्वादिना तु सह तस्यासौ विद्यत एव, एवं विषाणस्यापि खर एव समवायो नास्ति, गवादावस्त्येव; सामान्यमपि द्वितीयचन्द्राभावाचन्द्र एव नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु घटगवादावस्त्येव; घटप्रमाणत्वमपि मुक्तासु नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे तु कूष्माण्डादावस्त्येव । त्रिलोकेश्वरताऽपि भवत एव नास्ति, तीर्थकरादावस्त्येव, पञ्चसङ्ख्याविशिष्टत्वमपि प्रतिषेधे नास्ति, अर्थान्तरे त्वनुत्तरविमानादावस्त्येव । इत्यनया विवक्षया ब्रूमः-- " यद् निषिध्यते तत् सामान्येनास्त्येव, न त्वेवं प्रतिजानीमहे "-"यद् यत्र निषिध्यते तत् तत्रैवास्ति " इति येन व्यभिचारः स्यात् ॥
वयमपि शरीरे जीवं निषेधयामः, नान्यत्रेति चेत् । साधूक्तम् , अस्मत् समीहितस्य सिद्धत्वात् , जीवसिद्ध्यर्थमेव हि यतामहे वयम् , स चेत् सिद्धः, तहि तत्सिद्ध्यन्यथानुपपत्तेरेव तदाश्रयः सेत्स्यति, किं तया चिन्तया ? । न च शरीरमन्तरेण जीवस्याश्रयान्तरमुपपद्यते, तत्रैव तदवस्थानलिङ्गोपलब्धेः। न च वक्तव्यम्-शरीरमेव जीवः, “जीवति", " मृतः", "मूर्च्छितः” इत्यादि व्यवस्थाऽनुपपत्तेः इत्यादेरभिधास्यमानत्वादिति ॥ २६ ॥ १५७४ ॥

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**: 42 :
.
Jinabhadra Gaại’s.
| The first
D. C.-When a negation is predicated in the case of any object, this negation is to be understood regarding samyoga (conjunction ), samavāya ( inherence ), sãmanya ( generality ) or visesa ( speciality ), but, not in one and all the aspects. For instance Devadatta is not at home' means that the samyoga between a house and Devadatta, each of which exists, is not admitted. This does not mean that the existence of either of them is denied in toto. Similarly 'an ass has no horns' means the negation of samavāya between an existing ass and horns. Similarly there is no other moon' implies that there is a negation of commonness. That is to say, we have only one moon, and that there is no parallel to it.
That 'there are no pearls equal to a ghata in bulk' conveys the idea that the distinguishing feature, viz., a measure equal to that of a ghata is denied, and not the non-existence of pearls.
Such being the case, Gautama ! you may refuse to admit only the samyoga of the existing soul with something in some way, by saying something like this, that the soul does not exist in the body, but you cannot refuse to admit its existence from all other stand-points. Some one may come forward to argue as under:
If there exists that of which negation is predicated, then, in my case there must be the sovereignty of the three worlds as it is not admitted by you in my case. Furthermore, you refuse to believe a fifth prati sedha, over and above the four well-known pratiședhas, viz., sainyoga etc. So there must be a fifth pratixedha. These arguments can be refuted as below:
We do not admit in your case the sovereignty of the three worlds, 2. e., only a particular aspect of sovereignty but not your sovereignty which exists owing to your being a master of several pupils of yours. Thus you will see that only a particular

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Vada ] . Gañadharavada
.: 43 : type of sovereignty is not admitted but not all types of it. Similarly, when we refuse to admit the fifth pratisedha, it is the number 'five'associated with it that is denied, and not a pratişedha in all its aspects.
Regarding this refutation, it may be argued that this is all moonshine. For, you refuse to admit in me the sovereignty of the three worlds – a thing that does exist in my case. The number 'five' not admitted in the case of pratisedha is also non-existent. Moreover, samyoga in the case of a house and Devadatta, which is not admitted, is also non-existent. Same is the case with samavāya, sāmānya and vis'eşa. Such being the case, how can you say that what is negatived does exist? The answer to this sort of argument may be given as follows:
That the samyoga between the house and Devadatta is not admitted, does not mean refusal to admit the sanyoga of Devadatta with a field, a market, a village or the like. Moreover, the house has no samyoga with Devadatta only; but it has a samyoga no doubt with a bed-stead or the like.
Similarly the samavāya in the case of an ass and horns is not admited; but the samavāya in the case of a cow and its horns and the like, is certainly admitted.
Likewise sāmānya is not admitted in the case of the moon but it is surely admitted in the case of ghatas, cows, etc. that are more than one in number.
Similarly the measure equal to a ghata is refused so far as the pearls are concerned but it no doubt exists as regards a melton etc. The sovereignty of the three worlds is not admitted, Gautama ! in your case; but it does exist as far as Tirthařkaras are concerned.
Similarly the number five is not admitted regarding the pratişedhas; but it is surely admitted when the question of anuttaras is being discussed.

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•: 44 :: . Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The first From this, you will see that, what we wish to suggest is this :
That which is denied, exists ordinarily. By no means we want to convey : 'that about which negation is predicated, exists there and nowhere else'. Thus, there is no vyabhicāra ( inconsistency ) in what we say.
Gautama ! If you wish to retort that you ( Gautama ) do not admit the existence of the soul in the body only and admit it elsewhere, that is good; for, it establishes what is desired by us. We have been all this while trying simply to establish the existence of the soul. And, if it is thus established, then the asraya (substratum ) of the soul will be proved as it is not possible to justify its existence in any other way.
It is not justifiable to admit any other asraya of the soul except the body; for, the lingas of the soul are seen there. It may be borne in mind that it will not do to say that the body itself is the soul; for, in that case we cannot have a vyavasthā (fixity ) of the types, viz., he lives, he is dead, he has fainted and the like. Of course, this vyavcısthã will be expounded hereafter.
For the proof of the existence of the soul, another etymology can be given :जीवो त्ति सत्थयमिणं सुद्धत्तणओ घडाभिहाणं व । जेण त्थेण सदत्थं सो जीवो अह मई होज ॥२७॥ (१५७५)
अत्थो देहो च्चिय से तं नो पज्जायवयणभेआओ। FLUTEGUTT T FSTT HOTETT FET a CET 112611 (849€) Jivo tti satthayaminam suddhattanaö ghadābhihāņam va 1 Jenatthena sadattham so jīvo aha mai hojja 11 27 ( 1575 ) Attho deho cciya se tam no pajjāyavayanabheão Nāņāïguno ya jaö bhaniö jīvo na deho tti || 28 ( 1576 )

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Vada ]
Gañadharavāda . • 45 :: [ जीव इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।
येनार्थेन सदर्थं स जीवोऽथ मतिर्भवेत् ॥ २७ ॥ (१५७५) अर्थो देह एव तस्य तद् नो पर्यायवचनभेदात् ।
ज्ञानादिगुणश्च यतो भणितो जीवो न देह इति ॥२८॥ (१५७६) Jīva iti sārthakam idanı śudd hatvato ghaçabhidhanam iva i . Yenarthena sadartham sa jivo’tha matir bhavet || 27 ( 1575 ) Artho deha eva tasya tad no paryāyavacanabhedati JNanadigunas ca yato bhanito jivo na deha iti ॥ 28 ( 1576)]
___Trans.-27-28 This word “ jiva” is significant owing to its being suddha, as is the word ghata. That artha ( meaning) by means of which it is pregnant with a meaning is jiva. If you, however, think that that artha is only the body, . that is not so, on account of a difference in synonymous words; for, jiva is said to have gunas such as knowledge, etc., and not that the body ( is so said ). ( 1575-1576 )
टीका-जीव इत्येतद् वचनं सार्थकमिति प्रतिज्ञा व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति शुद्धपदत्वात् , इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्वे सति शुद्धपदं तदर्थवद् दृष्टम् , यथा घटादिकम् , तथा च जीवपदम् , तस्मात् सार्थकम् , यत्तु सार्थकं न भवति तद् व्युत्पत्तिमत् शुद्धपदं च न भवति, यथा डित्थादिकं खरविषाणादिकं च, न च तथा जीवपदम् , तस्मात् सार्थकम् । यद् व्युत्पत्तिमद् न भवति तच्छुद्धपदमपि सद् न सार्थकं, यथा डित्थादिपदम् , इति हेतोरनैकान्तिकवापरिहारार्थं व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यम् । यदपि शुद्धपदं न भवति किन्तु सामासिकम् , तदपि व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सत्यपि सार्थकं न भवति, यथा खरविषाणादिकम् , इति शुद्धत्वविशेषणम् ।
अथ मन्यसे-देह एवास्य जीवपदस्याऽर्थः, न पुनरर्थान्तरम् ; उक्तं च-" देह एवाऽयमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टः, यथेष जीवः, एनं न हिनस्ति" इति, अतो देह एवास्यार्थो युक्त इति । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह-देहजीवयोः पर्यायवचनभेदात् , यत्र हि पर्यायवचनभेदस्तत्रान्यत्वं दृष्टम् , यथा घटा-ऽऽकाशयोः । तत्र घट-कुट-कुम्भ-कलशादयो घटस्थ पर्यायाः, नभो

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•: 46 .: . Jinabhadra Gani's.. [ The first व्योमाऽन्तरिक्षा-ऽऽकाशादयस्त्वाकाशपर्यायाः। प्रस्तुते च जीवोजन्तुरसुमान् प्राणी सत्वो भूत इत्यादयो जीवपर्यायाः, शरीरं वपुः कायो देहः कलेवरमित्यादयस्तु शरीरपर्यायाः। पर्यायवचनभेदेऽपि च वस्त्वेकत्वे सर्वैकत्वप्रसङ्गोऽत्र बाधकम् । यत् पुनरिदमुक्तम्-“देह एवायमनुप्रयुज्यमानो दृष्टः" इत्यादि, तच्छरीरसहचरणा-ऽवस्थानादितः शरीरे जीवोपचारः क्रियते । किञ्च, इत्थमपि श्रूयत एव--'गतः स जीवः' 'दह्यतामिदं शरीरम्' इति । किञ्च “ नाणाईत्यादि " यसाच ज्ञानादिगुणयुतो जन्तुः, जडश्च देहः, तत् कथं देह एव जीवः । प्रागिहैव चोक्तम्--' न ज्ञानादिगुणो देहः, मूर्तिमत्त्वात् , घटवत् ; तथा, देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्त आत्मा, तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानामनुस्मरणात् , वातायनपुरुषवदिति ' ॥ २७-२८ ॥१५७५-१५७७ ॥
D. C. Here the pratijna is : The word jîva is significant. For, over and above this, it has a vyutpatti and it is a suddha pada. Whatever is a suddha pada and has a vyutpatti is here seen to be one having an artha ( meaning). Ghata, etc., may be mentioned as instances; so is the word jîvne. Therefore it too, is significant. What is not significant is wanting in vyutpatti, and besides, it is not a suddha pada. Dittha, kharavisana, etc., are words of this type; for, the former has no vyutpatti, whereas the latter is not a suddha pada. Such is not the case with the word jîva. Therefore it is significant. The condition that it should have a vyutpatti is stated here to avoid dittha, etc., which are suddha padas, but which are not significant; for, they fail to satisfy both the conditions. Same is the case with khara-visānc; for, though it has a vyutpatti it is not a suddha pada. And therefore it is not significant.
If you believe that simply the body is the artha of java, because we come across the following line, it is not correct, since there is a difference in the synonyms of the body and java :
“ Deha evāyam anuprayujyamūno drstah yathaisc jîvaḥ, enam na hinasti. "
The words of which the synonyms differ, are seen to be non-identical. For instance, ghata is not the same as ākā'sa

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as the synonyms of the former, viz., ghata, kuṭa, kumbha and kalasa differ from those of the latter, viz., nabhas, vyoman, antarikṣa, ākāsu and the like. In the pertinent case, the synonyms of jiva are jantu, asumat, pranin, sattva, bhūta, etc., and these are by no means the same as sarira, vapus, kaya, kalevara, etc., the synonyms of deha. If this difference in synonyms is neglected, anything will be identical with anything else, and this is certainly undesirable.
•: 47.
Now "deha evayam anupruyujyamano drstah ". Herein, there is an upacara (metaphorical application) of jîva to the body, as it is with the help of the body that the soul walks etc.
66
Moreover, we do hear; yataḥ sa jivah, dahyatam idam sariram", i. e, the soul has departed and let this body be burnt.
Furthermore, the soul has an attribute like knowledge, whereas the body is jada and has no knowledge. So, how can we equate the body with the soul?
The reasons why the body is not the same as the soul, have been already mentioned while concluding the commentary on verse 1562.
जीवोत्थि वओ सच्चं मवयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व । Azoganašì an Ag4qazogayoi a 112311 ( 3400)
Jivo tthi vao saccam mavvayaṇāö'vasesavayaṇam va Savvannuvayaṇao va anumayasavvannuvayanam va || 29 ( 1577)
[ जीवोsस्ति वचः सत्यं मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव । सर्वज्ञवचनतो वाऽनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनमिव ॥ २९ ॥ ( १५७७ ) Jivo'sti vacaḥ satyam madvacanadavaśeṣavaca nam iva | Sarvajñavacanato va'numatasarvajñavacanam iva || 29 (1577)]
Trans.-29 Like my other statement, (e. g., one pertaining to your doubt), the statement (of mine) that the soul exists,

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| The first
is true, as it is my statement. Or, it is correct owing to its being a statement of an omniscient being, as is the case with the statement of one whom you look upon as omniscient. (1577)
टीका-"जीवोऽस्ति" इत्येतद् वचः सत्यम् , मद्वचनत्वात् , भवत्संशयविषयाद्यवशेषवचनवत् , यच्च सत्यं न भवति तद् मदीयवचनमपि न भवति, यथा कूटसाक्षिवचनम् । अथवा सत्यं “ जीवोऽस्ति" इति वचनम् , सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात् , भवदनुमतसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥ २९ (१५७७ )॥
___D. C.-Just as my statement about your doubt is correct so this statement of mine that the soul exists is correct; for, it is my statement. The statement which is not correct, is not mine, e.g., the statement of a false witness. Or, the correctness of this statement can be also established as under:
The statement that the soul exists is correct, because it is the statement of an omniscient being, as is the case with a statement of one whom you look upon as sarvajía. भय-राग-दोस-मोहाभावाओ सच्चमणइवाइं च । सवं चिय मे वयणं जाणय मज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३०॥ (१५७८) Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvāö saccamanaïvāim ca i Savvam ciya me vayanam janaya majjhatthavayanam va 30 (1578) [भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।
सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३० ॥ (१५७८) Bhaya-rāga-dvesa-mohābhāvāt satyam anatipāti ca i Satyam éva me vacanamjnāyakamadhyasthavacanam iva |130 (1578)]
Trans.--30 Everything that I say, is certainly true and free from any fault, on account of the ( complete ) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation ( in me ) as is the case with the words of an intelligent and impartial person. (1578)
टीका-सर्वमपि मद्वचनं सत्यमनतिपाति च बोधव्यम् , भय-रागद्वेषा-ऽज्ञानरहितत्वात् , इह यद् भयादिरहितस्य वचनं तत् सत्यं दृष्टम् , यथा

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-:49 :.
Vada]
.Ganadharavada मार्गज्ञस्य भयरहितस्य प्रष्टरि राग-द्वेषरहितस्य मार्गोपदेशवचनम् , तथा च मद्वचा, तस्मात् सत्यमनतिपाति चेति ॥ ३० (१५७८) ॥ .
D. C.-Whatever I say, should be taken to be true and flawless, as I am ( entirely ) free from fear, attachment, aversion and ignorance. In this world, it is a matter of common experience that whatever is said by one devoid of fear, etc., is true. For instance, the words spoken to one who has lost his way, by one who knows it, who is fearless and who is devoid of attachment and aversion, are true. My statement belongs to the same category. So it is true and flawless.
The doubt of Gautama svāmin is being answered. कह सवण्णु त्ति मई जेणाहं सवसंसयच्छेई। पुच्छसु व जं न जाणसि जेणं व ते पच्चओ होजा ॥३१॥ (१५७९) Kaha savvannu tti mai jenāham savvasamsayacchei | Pucchasu va jam na janasi jena va te paccao hojja ॥ 31 (1579) [ कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतियेनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी।
पृच्छ वा यद् न जानासि येन वा ते प्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥ ३१ ॥ (१५७९) Katham sarvajña iti matir yenāham sarvasamsayacchedi | Psiccha vā yad na jānāsi yena vā te pratyayo bhavet 11 31 (1579)]
Trans.-31 You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient. This is so; for, I can remove all doubts. Or you may ask ( me ) what you do not know so that you may be convinced ( about my omniscience ). ( 1579 ) .
टीका-कथं नाम ' त्वं सर्वज्ञः' इति ते मतिः ? एवं त्वं मन्यसे, तथा भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावश्चासिद्ध इति मन्यसे । तदयुक्तम् , येनाहं सर्वसंशयच्छेदी, यश्च सर्वसंशयच्छेत्ता स सर्वज्ञ एव । दृष्टान्ताभावेनान्वयासिद्धेस्नैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरेवेह विपर्यये

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[The first
बाधकं प्रमाणम्, किमिहान्वयान्वेषणेन १ । यदि वा, पृच्छथतां यत् त्रैलोक्यान्तर्गतं वस्तु त्वं न जानासि येन सर्वज्ञत्वप्रत्ययस्तव जायते । भयाद्यभावोऽपि तल्लिङ्गादर्शनाद् मयि सिद्ध एवेति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । कदाचिदपि लिङ्गादर्शने लिङ्गिनोsस्तित्वशङ्कायामतिप्रसङ्ग इति ।। ३१ (१५७९ ) ।।
D. C.-You may be thinking as to how I am omniscient and you may be believing that I am not entirely free from fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation. In that case I reply as under :――
I can remove all doubts. Whoever can do so, is certainly omniscient. So I, too, am omniscient. If you were to argue that this hetu is anaikantika (inconclusive) owing to want of an illustration, and impossibility of establishing anvaya, it is not so; for, in this viparyaya the anutpatti (inapplicability) itself of state of removing doubts is a proof that goes against it. What is the use of searching for anvaya? Or you may ask me anything that you do not know so that you may become convinced about my omniscience.
That I am free from fear, etc., is proved in my case, owing to their characteristics being not seen in me. To suspect the existence of a lingin even when there is a total absence of a linga, is too much.
• Concluding the author says :
एवमुवओगलिंगं गोयम ! सवप्पमाणसंसिद्धं ।
संसारी पर थावर - तसाइभेयं मुणे जीवं ॥ ३२ ॥ (१५८० )
Evam uvaögalingam Goyama! savvappamāṇasaṁsiddham | Sainsārī-yara-thāvara-tasāibheyam mune jivam ॥ 32 (1580) [ एवमुपयोगलिङ्गं गौतम ! सर्वप्रमाणसंसिद्धम् ।
संसारी - तर स्थावर-त्रसभेदं मुण जीवम् ॥ ३२ ॥ ( १५८० ) Evam upayogalingam Gautama! sarvapramanasamsiddham Samsări-tara-sthāvara trasabhedam muna jīvam || 32 ( 1580 ) ]

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
. .:51:. Trans.-32 Thus Gautama! know the soul as one having upayoga ( attention ) as the characteristic mark, as one proved by all the valid proofs and ( also ) as one having classifications like samsārin ( mundane ) and itara ( not mundane ) and the mundane having two sub-classifications, viz., sthāvara ( immobile ) and trasa ( mobile ). ( 1580 )
टीका-एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण जीवमात्मानं गौतम! मुण-प्रतिपद्यस्वेति सम्बन्धः । कथम्भूतम् ? उपयोग एव लिङ्गं यस्य स तथा, सर्वैः प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणैः संसिद्धं-प्रतिष्ठितम् , तथा संसारी-तर-स्थावर-त्रसादिभेदम् । संसारिणश्चेतरे सिद्धाः। आदिशद्धाच्च सूक्ष्म-बादर-पर्याप्ता-ऽपर्याप्तादिभेदपरिग्रह इति ॥ ३२ ॥ १५८० ॥
अत्र वेदान्तवादी पाह-ननु बहुभेदत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम् , तस्य सर्वत्रैकत्वात् , तदुक्तम्
" एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते प्रतिष्ठितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥१॥ यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः । सङ्कीर्णमिव मात्राभिभिन्नाभिरभिमन्यते ॥ २ ॥ तथेदममलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पमविद्यया । कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं प्रकाशते ॥३॥ ऊर्ध्वमूलमधःशाखमश्वत्थं प्राहुरव्ययम् ।
छन्दांसि यस्य पर्णानि यस्तं वेद स वेदवित् ॥ ४॥"
तथा 'पुरुष एवेदं ग्नि सर्वं, यद् भूतं यच्च भाव्यम् , उतामृतत्वस्येशानः, यदन्नेनातिरोहति, यदेजति, यद् नैजति, यद् दूरे, यदु अन्तिके, यदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य, यत् सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः' इत्यादि । इत्येतदेव पूर्वार्धनाक्षिप्योत्तरार्धन परिहरन्नाह
D. C.-In this way, Gautama ! admit that there is a soul which has upāyoga as its linga, of which the existence is proved by all the three pramānas., viz., pratyaksa,

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• 52:.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first
anumāna and agama, and which can be variously classified. Some of these classifications are :-samsarin (mundane) and mukta (liberated), sūkṣma (subtle) and badara (gross), paryāpta (developed) and aparyāpta (non-developed), etc. Furthermore, the mundane beings are sub-divided as sthavara (immobile) and trusa (mobile).
Here a Vedantin may say that, many varieties of the soul are unwarranted; for, the soul is everywhere the same. This is corroborated by the following verses :
،،
Eka eva hi bhutatma bhute bhute pratisthitaḥ Ekadha bahudha caiva drṣyate jalcandravat 1 ||
Yatha visuddham akasam timiropapluto janaḥ Sankirnam iva mātrābhir bhinnābhir abhimanyate || 2 ||| Tathedam amalam brahma nirvikalpamavidyayā | Kaluṣatvam ivapannam bhedarupam prakasate 3 n Urdhvamulam adhaḥsakham asvattham prahur avyayamı Chandamsi yasya parṇāni yas tam veda sa vedavit || 4 ||"
And
Puruşa evedam gni sarvam, yad bhūtam, yacca bhavyam utāmrtatvasyesānaḥ, yadannenatirohati, yad ejati, yad naijati, yad. dure, yadu antike, yad antarasya sarvasya, yat sarvasyasya bahyataḥ.
This view of the Vedantin is now being refuted :--
जइ पुण सो एगो चिय हवेज्ज वोमं व सङ्घपिंडेसु । गोयम ! तदेगलिंगं पिंडेसु तहा न जीवोऽयं ॥ ३३॥ (१५८१)
Jai puna so ego cciya havejja vomam va savvapindesu Goyama! tad egalingam pinḍesu tahā na jīvo'yam || 33 (1581)
[ यदि पुनः स एक एव भवेद् व्योमेव सर्वपिण्डेषु ।
nitaĦ ! aè̟nfoś fqvèg aer a flåtsag || 33 || ( 2468 )

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Vada ] ___ . Ganadharavada
.:53 :Yadi punaḥ sa eka eva bhaved vyomeva sarvapiņdeșu | Gautama ! tad ekalingam pindesu tatha na jivo'yam ॥ 33 (1581) ] ____ Trans.-33 0 Gautama ! if that soul were really one in all the piņdas ( bodies ) as is the case with the sky, then that ( sky ) is ( only ) of one form in different corporeal pindas but such is not the soul. ( 1581 )
टीका-परः प्राह-यदि पुनर्दर्शितन्यायेन स आत्मा सर्वेष्वपि नारकतिर्यङ्-नरा-ऽमरपिण्डेषु व्योमवदेक एव भवेद् न तु संसारीतरादिभेदभिन्नः, तर्हि किं नाम दूषणं स्यात् । एवमुक्ते भगवानाह-गौतम ! तद् व्योम सर्वेष्वपि पिण्डेषु मूर्तिविशेषेषु स्थितमेकलिङ्गं वैसदृश्याभावादेकरूपमेव, इति युक्तं तस्यैकत्वम् , जीवस्त्वयं विचार्यत्वेन प्रस्तुतो न तथा-नैकलिङ्गः सर्वत्र दृश्यते, प्रतिपिण्डं तस्य विलक्षणत्वात् , लक्षणभेदे च लक्ष्यभेदात्, इति न तस्यैकत्वमिति ॥ ३३ (१५८१ ) ॥
D. C.-Some one may ask a question : What harm is there, if, on the basis of the verses, etc., just quoted, the soul is, on the analogy of the sky, looked upon as one i.e. having no such • classifications, as mundane and non-mundane and the like, so far as all the pindas, viz., the bodies of a denizen of hell, tiryac, a human being and a celestial being, are concerned ?
The answer is this: As regards the sky, it is alright to say that it is only one; for, the sky, even while permeating all the corporeal pindas, is seen to be uniform-free from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform; for, it differs from pinda to pinda. Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes, the difference in those having these characteristics. Hence, the soul is not one in number.
Here is the illustration :

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•: 54:. .. Jinabhadra Gani's [The first नाणाजीवा कुंभादउ व भुवि लक्खणाइभेयाओ। सुह-दुक्ख-बंध-मोक्खाभावो य जओ तदेगत्ते ॥३४॥ (१५८२) Nāņājivā kumbhādaü vya bhuvi lakkhaṇāibheyāö 1 Suha-dukkha-bandha-mokkhābhāvo ya jaö tadegatte 1134 (1582) [नानाजीवाः कुम्भादय इव भुवि लक्षणादिभेदात् ।
सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षाभावश्च यतस्तदेकत्वे ॥ ३४ ॥ (१५८२) Nānājīvāḥ kumbhadaya iva bhuvi lakṣaṇadibhedāt i Sukha-duhkha-bandha-moksabhavas ca yatas tadekatve ॥34(1582)]
Trans.-34 In this world, there are different souls like ( different) water-pots, etc., on account of the difference in their characteristics, etc. For, if they were ( only ) one, there will be non-existence of sukha ( happiness ), duhkha ( misery ), bandha ( bondage ) and moksa ( emancipation ). ( 1582)
टीका-नानारूपा भुवि जीवाः परस्परं भेदभाज इत्यर्थः । लक्षणादिभेदादिति हेतुः, कुम्भादय इवेति दृष्टान्तः, यच्च न भिन्नं न तस्य लक्षणभेदः, यथा नभस इति । सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षाभावश्च यस्मात् तदेकत्वे, तस्मात् भिन्ना एव सर्वेऽपि जीवा इति ॥ ३४ (१५८२)॥
___D. C.-The living beings in this world, differ from one another; for, there is a difference in their characteristics etc. As a parallel example may be mentioned water-pots etc. Whatever is not different from another object, does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same ( since ghatākāsa does not differ from mathākās a). Moreover, if there were only one soul, then, there will be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage and emancipation. But these do exist. Therefore all the souls are different, and their number is not one but many.
How do the characteristics differ in each body?

Page #98

Vada ] . Ganadharavada
:55. जेणोवओगलिंगो जीवो भिन्नो य सो पइसरीरं। उवओगो उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ तेण तेऽणंता ॥३५॥ (१५८३)
Jenovaögalingö jīvo bhinno ya so paisarīram i Uvaögo ukkarisā-vagarisað tena te’nantā || 35 ( 1513 ) [येनोपयोगलिङ्गो जीवो भिन्नश्च स प्रतिशरीरम् ।
उपयोग उत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षतस्तेन तेऽनन्ताः ॥ ३५ ॥ (१५८३) Yenopayogalingo jīvo bhinnaś ca sa pratiśarīram i Upayoga utkarsa-pakarsatas tena te'nantah ॥ 35 ( 1583 )]
Trans.-35 That upayoga ( attention) by means of which the soul has attention as the characteristic mark, is different in every body. The upayoga has maximum and minimum. scales. Therefore they (souls ) are infinite in number. (1583)
टीका-येन ज्ञान-दर्शनोपयोगलक्षणोऽसौ जीवः, स चोपयोगः प्रतिशरीरमुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षभेदानन्तभेदः, तेन जीवास्त दादनन्तभेदा एवेति । तदेवं भावितं " नाणाजीवा" इत्यादि पूर्वार्धम् ॥ ३५ (१५८३)॥
D. C.-This soul has as its characteristic, upayoga ( attention) consisting of two kinds of knowledge, viz., differentiated and undifferentiated. This upayoga has infinite varieties; for, it differs from body to body, some having the utkarsa ( maximum ) upayoga, some having the apakarşa (minimum) upayoga and some having upayoga between these two extremes. Therefore the souls are of infinite kinds owing to the infinite varieties of upayoga. This has been already alluded to, in the first hemistich of verse 1582.
Now, with regards to happiness, misery, etc., s. e., exposition of the second hemistich of verse 1582, the author says: एगत्ते सवगयत्तओ न मोक्खादओ नभस्सेव । कत्ता भोता मंता न य संसारी जहागासं ॥३६॥ (१५८४)

Page #99

•: 56:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first
Egatte savvagayattaö na mokkhadaö nabhasseva | Kättā bhottā mantā na ya samsārī jahāgāsam ॥ 36 ( 1584 )
[ एकत्वे सर्वगतत्वतो न मोक्षादयो नभस इव ।
कर्ता भोक्ता मन्ता न च संसारी यथाऽऽकाशम् || ३६ || ( १५८४ )
Ekatve sarvagatatvato na mokṣadayo nabhasa iva | Karta bhokta_manta na ca samsarī yathāka” Śam || 36 ( 1584 ) ]
Trans. – 36 On oneness ( being accepted in the case of souls ) there will not be liberation, etc., owing to ( the soul ) being all-pervading, as is the case with the space. Moreover, like space, the soul will not be a kartr ( a doer ) a bhoktr ( an enjoyer ), a mantr ( thinker) and a sarsārin ( a mundane being ). ( 1584 )
7
टीका - एकत्वे जीवानां सुख-दुःख-बन्ध - मोक्षादयो नोपपद्यन्ते, सर्वगतत्वात् नभस इव । यत्र तु सुखादयो न तत् सर्वगतं यथा देवदत्त इति । किञ्च न कर्ता, न भोक्ता, न मन्ता, न संसारी जीवः, एकत्वात् सर्वजीवानाम्, यच्चैकं न तस्य कर्तृत्वादयः, यथा नभस इति ।। ३६ (१५८४) ।
D. C.—If there is only one soul, then there is no scope for happiness and misery, bondage and liberation and the like since one soul will be all-pervading. Space may be here cited as a pertinent case.
One where in there are happiness, misery etc., is not all-pervading. e. g., Devadatta.
Further more, since the number of the souls is only one, and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer etc., a fact which is corroborated by the example of space.
Besides
एगत्ते नत्थि सुही बहूवघाउ त्ति देसनिरुउ व । बहुतरबद्धत्तणओ न य मुक्का देसमुको व्व ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५)

Page #100

Vada ] Ganadhara vada
:57 . Egatte natthi suhĩ bahūvaghāu tti desaniruu vya / Bahuttara baddhattanao na ya mukko desamukko vva ॥ 37 (1585) [एकत्वे नास्ति सुखी बहूपघात इति देशनिरुज इव ।
बहुतरबद्धत्वतो न च मुक्तो देशमुक्त इव ॥ ३७ ॥ (१५८५) .. Ekatve násti sukhi babūpaghāta iti deśaniruja iva | . Bahutarabaddhtrato na ca mukto desamukta iva ॥ 37 ( 1585 )] ___Trans.-37 When there is oneness ( of the souls ), none is ( completely ) happy on account of many diseases, as is the case with one who is partially free from disease. Furtheremore, none is ( entirely ) liberated owing to many bondages, as is the case with one who is partially free. ( 1585)
टीका-इदमत्र हृदयम् -नारक-तिर्यगादयोऽनन्ता जीवा नानाविधशरीर--मानसोपघातसंपातैर्दुःखिता एव, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु सुखिनः, एवमनन्ता बद्धाः, तदनन्तभागवर्तिनस्तु मुक्ताः, तेषां च सर्वेषामेकत्वे न कोऽपि सुखी प्राप्नोति, बहुतरोपघातान्वितत्वात् , यथा सर्वाङ्गरोगग्रस्तोऽमुल्येकदेशेन नीरोगो यज्ञदत्तः, एवं न कोऽपि मुक्तस्तत्सुखभाक् च न कोऽपि घटते, बहुतरबद्धत्वात् , यथा सर्वाङ्गकीलितोगुल्येकदेशमुक्तः। तस्मादेकत्वे सुखाद्यनुपपत्तेर्नानात्वं जीवानामिति स्थितम् ॥ ३७ (१५८५) ॥ ___D. C.- There are infinite living beings viz., denizens of hell, tiryacs and others, who are certainly unhappy on account of their suffering from various types of physical and mental diseases, and only an infinitesimal portion of them is happy. Similarly infinite beings are tied down by the bondages of karmans, and only an infinitesimal part of them is liberated. If all these living beings are not looked upon as differənt entities, but are considered as only one, then none can be seen happy owing to a great many diseases, as is the case with Yajñadatta who has a disease in all parts of the body except in a finger. Similarly none is liberated, and hence none can enjoy the bliss accruing from liberation, since there is a

Page #101

*:58 : . Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first great deal of bondages. One who has fetters all along his body: except a finger may be mentioned as an illustration.
Thus, owing to oneness there is no possiblity for happiness, etc. So it follows that there are many souls and not only one.
Refutation of the view-point of the Naiyāyikas, who admit (the existence of) many souls, but take them to be all-pervading:जीवो तणुमेत्तत्थो जह कुंभो तग्गुणोवलंभाओ। अहवाऽणुवलंभाओ भिन्नम्मि घडे पडस्सेव ॥३८॥ (१५८६) Jivo tanumettattho jaha kumbho taggumovalambhāö 1 Ahavā’nuvalambhāö bhinnammi ghade padasseva ll 38 ( 1586 ) [ जीवस्तनुमात्रस्थो यथा कुम्भस्तद्गुणोपलम्भात् ।।
अथवाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्ने घटे पटस्येव ॥ ३८ ॥ (१५८६) Jīvastanumatrastho yathā kumbhastadguṇopalambhāti Athavā’nupalambhād bhinne ghate patasyeva II 38 ( 1586 ) ]
Transe.-38 The soul permeates the body only, since its attributes are found there, as is the case with a pitcher. Or because it is not found ( elsewhere ), as is the case with a piece of cloth ( which does not permeate ), a pitcher is different from it. ( 1586)
टीका-तनुमात्रस्थो जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेः, यथा घटः, 'स्वात्ममात्रे' इति शेषः। “अहवेत्यादि" अथवा, यो यत्र प्रमाणैनोंपलभ्यते तस्य तत्राभाव एव, यथा भिन्ने घटे पटस्य, नोपलभ्यते च शरीराद् बहिर्जीवः, तस्मात् तस्य तत्राभाव एवेति ॥ ३८ (१५८६ ) ॥ ____D. C.-The measure of the soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies. For, its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher and not outside it.

Page #102

Vada ] Gañadhara vāda
. : 59:As an alternative argument it may be said :-That is nonexistent there, where it cannot be realized by any of the pramānas. As for example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher which is separate from it.
The soul is not seen outside the body. Consequently it should be taken to be non-existent there.
While concluding the author says :तम्हा कत्ता भोत्ता बंधो मोक्खो सुहं च दुक्खं च । FATUI TEAT-SATTET ETTE 11 3811 ( 464 ) Tamhā kattā bhottā bandho mokkho suham ca dukkham ca i Samsaranam ca bahutāt'savvagayatte sujuttāim || 39 ( 1587 ) [ तस्मात् कर्ता भोक्ता बन्धो मोक्षः सुखं च दुःखं च ।
FATOT 2 ET1--Suaract: TTFIT II 3S 11 ( 9460) Tasmāt karta bhoktă bandho mokşah sukham ca duhkham ca Samsaraṇam ca bahūtva’sarvagatatvayoh suyuktani 11 39 (1587) ]
Trans.- 39 Therefore a doer, an enjoyer, bondage, liberation, happiness, misery, mundane existence and metamorphosis are thoroughly justifiable when the souls are admitted as many and non-all-pervading. ( 1587 )
टीका-तस्माद् बहुत्वा-सर्वगतत्वयोरेव सतोः कर्तृत्वादयो धर्मा जीवस्य युज्यन्ते, नान्यथा, इत्येवंविधं प्रमाणसिद्धं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥३९(१५८७)।।
D. C.-Therefore it is only when it is admitted that souls are many and that none of them is all-pervading, action etc, which are the attributes of the soul, can have any place. If not, these attributes will be meaningless. So please admit the soul which is thus established by pramānas.
Now the meaning of the sentences of the Veda which may be troubling you.

Page #103

.: 60 :Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first गोयम ! वेयपयाणं इमाण अत्थं च तं न याणासि । जं विन्नाणघणो च्चिय भूयहिंतो समुत्थाय ॥४०॥ (१५८८) मपणसि मज्जंगेसु व मयभावो भूयसमुदउब्भूओ। विन्नाणमेत्तमाया भूएऽणु विणस्सइ स भूओ ॥४१॥ (१५८९) अस्थि न य पेचसण्णा जं पुत्वभवेऽभिहाणममुगो त्ति । जं भणियं न भवाओ भवंतरं जाइ जीवोत्ति ॥४२॥ (१५९०) Goyama ! Veyapayānam imāņa attham ca tam na yāņāsi Jam vinnānaghano cciya bhuyehinto samutthāya ॥ 40 ( 1588 ) Mannasi majjangesu va mayabhāvo bhūyasamudaübbhūö 1 Vinnānamettamāyā bhūe'ņu viņassai sa bhūö il 41 ( 1589 ) Atthi na ya peccasannā jam puvvabhave'bhihāṇamamugo tti 1 Jam bhaniyam na bhavāö bhavantaram jāi jīvo tti 11 42 (1590) [गौतम ! वेदपदानामेषामर्थं च त्वं न जानासि ।
यद् विज्ञानधन एव भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय ॥ ४० ॥ (१५८८ )
मन्यसे मद्याङ्गेष्विव मदभावो भूतसमुदयोद्भूतः। • विज्ञानमात्रमात्मा भूतेऽनु विनश्यति स भूयः ॥ ४१ ॥ (१५८९)
अस्ति न च प्रेत्यसंज्ञा यत् पूर्वभवेऽभिधानममुक इति ।
यद् भणितं न भवाद् भवान्तरं याति जीव इति ॥ ४२ ॥ (१५९०) Gautama ! Veda padānāmeşāmartham ca tvam na jänāsi / Yad vijnānaghana eva bhūtebhyāḥ samutthāya || 40 ( 1588 ) Manyase madyangesviva madabhāvo bhūtasamudayodbhūtaḥ 1 Vijñānamātramātmā bhūte’nu vinaśyati sa bhūyaḥ || 41 (1589) Asti na ca pretyasanjñā yat pūrvabhave'bhidhānamamuka iti i Yad bhanitam na bhavad bhavantaram yati jiva iti ॥ 42 (1590)]

Page #104

Vada] .. Ganadharavada
। : 61 : Trans.-40-41-42 Gautama! You do not know the (real) meaning of these sentences of the Veda. For, you believe that none but the assemblage of ( the particles of) knowledge, after having arisen from elements, in the way in which intoxication arises, from the sources of spirituous liquors; is a soul consisting of knowledge only-the soul which has sprung up from the collection of elements. It again perishes after the elements ( have perished ), and that there is no designation in the previous birth to the effect that it was named as such and such in the former birth (existence ) and hence it is said that the soul does not go from one bhava, to another existence. ( 1588-1589-1590)
टीका-गौतम ! इत्यामन्त्रणम् , वेदपदानां श्रुतिवाक्यानाममीषां "विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यः" इत्यादीनां चेतसि वर्तमानानामर्थं यथावस्थितं त्वं न जानासि नावबुध्यसे । किमिति ? अत आह-यद् यस्मात् त्वमात्माभिप्रायेणैवंभूतमिहार्थं मन्यसे विकल्पयसीति संबन्धः । कथं भूतम् ? इत्याह"विण्णाणघणो चियत्ति" पृथिव्यादिभूतानां विज्ञानलवसमुदायो विज्ञानधनः पृथिव्यादिविज्ञानांशानां पिण्ड इत्यर्थः, अवधारणं त्वात्मवादिपरिकल्पितस्य
भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तस्य ज्ञान-दर्शनादिगुणाश्रयस्यात्मनो निरासार्थम् । भूते• भ्यः पृथिव्यादिभ्यः समुदितेभ्यो न तु व्यस्तेभ्यः, ज्ञानस्य तत्समुदायपरिणामाङ्गीकारादिति भावः, मद्याङ्गेषु मद्यकारणेषु धातक्यादिषु मदभाव.इव; कथंभूतो विज्ञानधनः ? इत्याह--" भूयसमुदउन्भूओ विन्नाणमेत्तमाय ति" भूतसमुदयादुद्भूतस्तदैव जातो न तु परभवात् कश्चिदायातो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मेत्यर्थः, समुत्थायोत्पद्य ततस्तान्येव पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि विनाशमश्नु वानान्यनु लक्षीकृत्य भूयः पुनरपि स विज्ञानघनो विज्ञानमात्ररूप आत्मा विनश्यति, न त्वात्मवादिनामिवान्यभवं याति । अत एव न प्रेत्यभवे परभवे संज्ञास्ति, यत् पूर्वभवे नारकादिजन्मन्यभिधानमासीत् तत् परभवे नास्ति, यदुत-अमुको नारको देवो वा भूत्वेदानी मनुष्यः संवृत इत्यादि, नारकादेः प्रागेव सर्वनाशं नष्टत्वादिति भावः। किमिह वाक्ये तात्पर्यवृत्त्या प्रोक्तं भवति ? इत्याह-" जं भणियमित्यादि " सर्वथात्मनः समुत्पद्य विनष्टत्वाद् न भवाद्

Page #105

.: 62:.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first
भवान्तरं कोऽपि यातीत्युक्तं भवति ।। ४०-४१-४२ ( १५८८-१५८९ १५९० ) ॥
D. C.-By these sentences of the Veda are meant those which Gautama had in his mind.
The assemblage of knowledge consists of the united particles of knowledge arising from elements such as earth etc., combined together.
•
here mentioned with
The restriction, viz., 'none else but', a view to exclude a soul according to the Ātmāvādins (believers in universal soul) is distinct from the collection of elements and which is an abode or substratum of attributes like jñāna (knowledge) etc.
The sources of spirituous liquors are dhatakî etc.
Gautama believes that the soul has not come from any previous birth but it has been generated by the elements-it has been evolved out of them. So, when these elements perish, the soul, too, perishes; and it is not born once more as the Atmavadins believe. In short, it has neither any incarnation nor any transmigration. Such being the case, it is not possible to say that such and such a one who was previously a denizen of hell or a celestial being, is now born as a human being. For, on the termination of a stage as that of a denizen of hell or the like, everything was over-nothing was left, not even the soul.
Thus, when the soul altogether arises from-gets evolved out of a collection of elements and completely perishes as soon as these elements perish, there is none who proceeds from one birth to another.
I understand the meaning of these sentences as follows:
गोयम ! पयत्थमेवं मन्नतो नत्थि मन्नसे जीवं । वक्तरेसु य पुणो भणिओ जीवो जमस्थि ति ॥ ४३ ॥ ( १५९१)

Page #106

Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 63 : अग्गिहवणाइकिरियाफलं च तो संसयं कुणसि जीवे । मा कुरु न पयत्थोऽयं इमं पयत्थं निसामेहि ॥४४॥ (१५९२) Goyama ! payatthamevam mannanto natthi mannase jīvam ! Vakkantaresu ya puno bhanio jivo jamatthi ttin 43 ( 1591) Aggihavanāikiriyāphalam ca to samsayam kunasi jive | Mā kuru na payattho'yam imam payattham nisāmehi 11 44 (1592)
[ गौतम ! पदार्थ एवं मन्यमानो नास्ति मन्यसे जीवम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु च पुनर्भणितो जीवो यदस्तीति ॥ ४३ ।। (१५९१) अग्निहवनादिक्रियाफलं च ततः संशयं करोषि जीवे ।
मा कुरु न पदार्थोऽयमिमं पदार्थं निशमय ॥ ४४ ॥ (१५९२) Gautama ! padārtha evam manyanāno nāsti manyase jīvam 1 Vakyantaresu ca punar-bhanito jivo yadastiti ॥ 43 ( 1591) Agni havanādi kriyāphalam ca tataḥ saniśayam karosi jīve / Ma kuru na padartho'yanimam padartham nisamaya ॥ ( 1592)] ___Trans.-43-44 CGautama ! While construing the sentences in this way, you believe that there is no soul. And, in other sentences it is said that there is a soul, and, moreover there is a fructification of an oblation to fire etc. Consequently, you entertain a doubt about ( the existence of ) the soul; but do not do it. This is not the meaning of the sentences. But hear : this is the meaning of the sentences. ( 1591-1592)
टीका--गौतम । अस्य वाक्यस्य दर्शितरूपमेव पदार्थ मन्यमानस्त्वं 'नास्ति' इत्येवं जीवं मन्यसे । यस्माच पुनः “ न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-- ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-अप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यादिषु वेदवाक्यान्तरेषु “ अस्ति” इत्येवं जीवो भणितः प्रतिपादितः। तथा "अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादिवचनादग्निहवनादिक्रियायाः फलं च पारभविकं श्रूयते । न चेदं भवान्तरयायिनमात्मानमन्तरेणोपपद्यते । अतः

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• 64. :Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The first " किं जीवोऽस्ति नास्ति वा ? " इत्येवं संशयं जीवे करोषि त्वम् । तदमुं मा कृथाः, यस्माद् “ विज्ञानघन एव०" इत्यादिवाक्यस्य नायमों यं भवानध्यवस्यति, किन्त्वमुं वक्ष्यमाणं पदार्थमिह निशमयाऽऽकर्णयेति ॥ ४३--४४ (१५९१-१५९२)॥
· D. C.-0 Gautama ! You interpret this sentence in the way just shown. And hence, you conclude that the soul does not . exist. At the same time, you notice that the following sentences of the veda establishlng the existence of the soul :
“Na ha vai sasararasya priya'priyayor apahatir asti, asarîrasya vā vasantam priya'priye na sprsatah.”
Moreover from the sentences such as " Agnihotrm juhuyat svargakamah "
it follows that there accrues a fruit of an offering, oblation to fire, etc.,-a fruit to be enjoyed during the next birth, and this fruit can have no meaning unless it is admitted that the soul goes in, for another existence or birth.
These various statements lead you to doubt the existence of the soul. But, there is no need of entertaining such a doubt as this doubt is due to your misinterpreting the sentence, viz., " vijñānaghana eva” etc.
The real interpretation of this sentence is as follows: please hear it.
विण्णाणाओऽणपणो विण्णाणघण्णो त्ति सवओवावि । स भवइ भूएहिंतो घडविण्णाणाइभावेण ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३) ताइंचिय भूयाइं सोऽणु विणस्सइ विणस्समाणाई। अत्यंतरोवओगे कमसो विण्णेयभावेणं ॥४६॥ (१५९४)

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Vada ]
. Gañadharavāda : .:: 65 :: Vinnāņāo'nanno vinnāņaghanno tti savvaövāvil Sa bhavai bhuehinto ghadavinnānāi bhavena ॥ 45 ( 1593 ) Tāim ciya bhūyāim so'nu viņassai viņassamāṇāim / Atthantarovaige kamaso vinneya bhave nam ॥ 46 ( 1594 )
[ विज्ञानादनन्यो विज्ञानधन इति सर्वतोव्यापी ।
स भवति भूतेभ्यो घटविज्ञानादिभावेन ॥ ४५ ॥ (१५९३) तान्येव भूतानि सोऽनु विनश्यति विनश्यमानानि ।
अर्थान्तरोपयोगे क्रमशो विज्ञेयभावेन ॥ ४६ ॥ (१५९४) Vijñānādananyo vijñānaghana iti sarvatovyāpī| Sa bhavati bhūtebhyo ghatavijñānādibhāvena ll 45 ( 1593 ) Tanyeva bhūtāni so’nu vinaśyati vinaśyamanānil Arthántaropayoge kramaśo vijñeyabhāvena || 46 ( 1594 )]
_Trans.-45-46 The soul ( itself ) is the assemblage of vijñānas owing to its being non-separate from vijnana, or it is so, on account of its pervasive all around. It arises from elements in the form of the vijñāna of a pitcher, etc. When those very elements perish as vijñeya-bhāvas ( objects coming within the range of vijñāna ) on the attention being gradually directed to another object, it (the soul) subsequently perishes. (1593–1594)
__टीका-इह विज्ञानघनो जीव उच्यते । कथम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-- विशिष्टं ज्ञानं विज्ञानं ज्ञान-दर्शनोपयोग इत्यर्थः, तेन विज्ञानेन सहानन्यभूतस्वादेकतया घनत्वं निविडत्वमापन्नो विज्ञानधनो जीवः, यदिवा "सबओवा वि ति" सर्वतः प्रतिप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तविज्ञानपर्यायसङ्घातघटितत्वाद् विज्ञानघनो जीवः। एवकारेण तु विज्ञानघन एवासौ, न तु नैयायिकादीनामिव " स्वरूपेण निर्विज्ञानत्वाजडोऽसौ, बुद्धिस्तु तत्र समवेतैव" इति नियम्यते । स भवति-उद्यत इति क्रिया । केभ्यः ? इत्याह-" भूएहितो ति" भूतानीह घट-पटादिज्ञेयवस्तुरूपाण्यभिप्रेतानि, तेभ्यो ज्ञेयभावेन परिणतेभ्यः । केन भवति ? इत्याह--"घटोऽयम्" "पटोऽयम्" इत्यादिविज्ञानभावेन घटादिज्ञान

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.: 66 :
Jinabhadra Gani's . [ The first पर्यायेण । ततः किम् ? इत्याशङ्कय 'तान्येवानु विनश्यति" इत्यस्यार्थमाह" ताई चियेत्यादि " तान्येव ज्ञानालम्बनभूतानि घटादिभूतानि क्रमशः कालक्रमेण व्यवधान स्थगना-ऽन्यमनस्कत्वादिनार्थान्तरोपयोगे सति विशेयभावेन ज्ञानविषयभावेन विनाशमश्नुवानानि, अनु-पश्चात् तद्बोधपर्यायेण, स विज्ञानधनो विनश्यतीति संबन्धः । ज्ञानपर्यायेण घटादिभ्यो ज्ञेयभूतेभ्यो जीवः समुत्थाय कालक्रमाद् व्यवधानादिनार्थान्तरोपयोगे सति ज्ञेयभावेन तान्येव विनाशमश्नुवानान्यनु विनश्यतीति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥ ४५-४६ (१५९३) (१५९४)॥
___D. C.--Here the soul is said to be vijrianaghana-an assemblage of vijñāna for either of the two reasons viz., (1) the soul is non-separate from-is identical with vijñāna which is upayoga either of the type of jñāna or that of dars'ana, and (2) the soul has each and every pradesa (the minutest portion ) of it, formed from a collection of infinite modifications of vijñāna.
The word eva used in connection with vijñānaghana shows that the belief of the Naiyāyikas and others conveyed by the following sentence is untenable :
“ Svarūpeṇa nirvijñānatvaj jado'sau, buddhis tu tatra samavetaiva."
This soul is evolved out of the elements which are objects fit to be known-the objects like a pitcher, a piece of cloth etc. That is to say, it gets transformed as the knowledge of a pitcher etc., on realizing that this is a pitcher, this is a piece of cloth, etc. .
These very elements such a pitcher etc, which had once served as substratum for knowledge, perish; that is to say, they cease to be objects fit to be known when the attention of the soul is directed towards another object when these objects are hidden or concealed from sight or when the mind is working in some other channel. Such being the case, the soul ceases

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
67 :
to know them i. e., ceases to exist as knowledge of these objects. This is here looked upon as its destruction. The sum and substance is this :
When a soul comes to know any object, it is said to have been produced from that object; but, when it ceases to think of it and directs its attention somewhere else, it is said to have perished; for, the object with which it once identified itself, has perished.
Does the soul perish entirely in this way ? The answer is in the negative as suggested in the following verse :पुवावरविण्णाणोवओगओ विगम-संभवसहावो। विण्णाणसंतईए विण्णाणघणोऽयमविणासी ॥४७॥ (१५९५) Puvyāvaraviņņānovaögaö vigama-sambhavasahāvo i Vinnānasantaie vinnānaghano' yamavinasi ॥ 47 ( 1595 ) [ पूर्वा-ऽपरविज्ञानोपयोगतो विगम-संभवस्वभावः ।
विज्ञानसंतत्या विज्ञानघनोऽयमविनाशी ॥ ४७ ॥ (१५९५) Pūrvā para vijñānopayogato vigama-sambhava svabhāvah Vijñānasantatyā vijñānaghano'yamavināśi il 47 ( 1595 ) ] - Trans.-47 This vijnanaghana ( the soul ) has the nature of destruction and that of origination on account of the (corresponding ) upayogas being associated with the previous vijñāna and the subsequent one. It is immortal owing to the continuity of vijñāna.. ( 1595 )
टीका--एक एवायमात्मा त्रिस्वभावः । कथम् ? इत्युच्यते-अर्थान्तरोपयोगकाले पूर्वविज्ञानोपयोगेन तावदयं विगमस्वभावो विनश्वररूपः, अपरविज्ञानोपयोगस्तु संभवस्वभाव उत्पादस्वरूपः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तसामान्यविज्ञानमात्रसंतत्या पुनरयं विज्ञानघनो जीवोऽविनष्ट एवावतिष्ठते । एवमन्यदपि सर्व वस्तूत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावमेवावगन्तव्यम् , न पुनः किमपि सर्वथोत्पद्यते, विनश्यति चेति ॥ ४७ (१५९५) ॥

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:: 68 : Jinabhadra Gani's
[The first D. C.-This very soul, though one, has a three-fold nature. When it is attentive to another object, it has died; for, at that time, its attention to the former object is gone, but it has originated so far as the attention to this new object is concerned. Side by side with its twofold nature pertaining to destruction and origination, it has permanence owing to the continuity of the general vijāna existing from the beginning-less time. Similarly every object has a three-fold nature consisting of utpada (origination ), vyaya (destruction ) and dhrauvya (permanence ), and that there is nothing which is created in all respects, and that there is nothing which entirely perishes. न च पेचनाणसण्णावतिट्टए संपओवओगाओ। विण्णाणघणाभिक्खो जीवोऽयं वेयपयभिहिओ ॥४८॥(१५९६) Na ca peccanāṇasannāvatitthae sampaövaogāö 1 Vinnānaghanābhikkho jīvo'yam Veyapayabhihiö 11 48 ( 1596 ) [ न च प्रेत्यज्ञानसंज्ञाऽवतिष्ठते सांप्रतोपयोगात् ।
विज्ञानघनाभिख्यो जीवोऽयं वेदपदाभिहितः ॥ ४८ ॥ (१५९६ ) Na ca pretyajnāna sanjna'vatişthate sampratayogāt / Vijnāna ghanabhikhyo jīvo'yam Vedapadabhihitaḥ || 48 (1596).]
Trans.-48 The designation pertaining to former knowledge does not exist owing to the upayoga being directed to (a) present object. This soul is named vijjāņaghaņa as said in the sentences of the Veda. ( 1596 ) - टीका--न च प्रेत्येति-न चान्यवस्तूपयोगकाले प्राक्तनी ज्ञानसंज्ञास्ति । कुतः ? सांप्रतवस्तुविषयोपयोगात् । इदमुक्तं भवति-यदा घटोपयोगनिवृत्ती पटोपयोग उत्पद्यते, तदा घटोपयोगसंज्ञा नास्ति, तदुपयोगस्य निवृत्तत्वात् । किन्तु पटोपयोगसंहवास्ति, तदुपयोगस्यैव तदानीमुत्पन्नत्वात् । तस्माद् विज्ञानघनाभिख्यो वेदपदेष्वभिहितोऽयं जीवः । ततो गौतम ! प्रतिपद्यस्वैनमिति ॥ ४८ (१५९६)॥ , ..

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 69 :. ___D. C.-When the attention of the soul is diverted from one object to another, e. g., from a pitcher to a piece of cloth, then it ceases to be styled as ghatopayoga (attention to a pitcher ) but acquires a new designation viz., patopayogaa ( attention to a piece of cloth ). Such being the case, this soul is named as vijñānaghana in the Veda. Therefore, Gautama ! admit that the soul exists.
एवं पि भूयधम्मो नाणं तब्भावभावओ बुद्धी। तं नो तदभावम्मि वि जं नाणं वेयसमयम्मि ॥४९॥ (१५९ अथमिए आइच्चे चंदे संतासु अग्गि-वायासु । किंजोइरयं पुरिसो अप्पज्जोइ त्ति निविट्ठो ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८) Evam pi bhūyadhammo nāņam tabbhāvabhāvao buddhi | Tam no tadabhavammi vi jam nānam Veyasamayamm ॥ 49 (1597 Atthamie āicce cande santāsu aggi-vāyāsu / Kimjoirayam puriso appajjoi tti niddittho ॥ 50 ( 1598 ) [ एवमपि भूतधर्मो ज्ञानं तद्भावभावतो बुद्धिः। . तद् न तदभावेऽपि यज्ज्ञानं वेदसमये ॥ ४९ ।। ( १५९७ )
अस्तंमित आदित्ये चन्द्रे शान्तयोरग्नि-वाचोः । किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष आत्मज्योतिरिति निर्दिष्टः ॥ ५० ॥ (१५९८) Evamapi bhūtadharmo jnanam tadbhāvabhayato buddbih 1 Tad na tadabhāve’pi yajjñānam Vedasamaye || 49 ( 1597 ) Astamita aditye candre Santayor-agni-vacoh। . Kimjyotirayam puruşa ātmajyotiriti nirdistaḥ || 50 ( 1598 )]
Trans.-49-50 You may think that even in this way, knowledge is the dharma of elements owing to its existing when they exist (and that it does not exist when there is their non-existence ). This is not proper; for, even

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: 70 :. . Jinabhadra Gani's.
[ The first when they are non-existent, knowledge is said to exist in the following doctrine of the Veda :
What jyotis ( light ) has this man when the Sun has set, the Moon has set and when ( even ) fire and speech are quiet? It is said : that is the light of the soul. ( 1597-1598)
___टीका-" बुद्धी" ति स्याद् बुद्धिः प्रेरकस्य-एवमपि-" स भवइ भूएहितो" इत्यादिना युष्मद्वयाख्यानप्रकारेणापीत्यर्थः, पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्म एव ज्ञानं-भूतस्वभावात्मकमेव ज्ञानमिति भावः। कुतः ? इत्याह-" तब्भावभावउ ति" " एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति "-इति वचनाद् भूतसद्भावे ज्ञानस्य भावात् , तदभावे चाभावादित्यर्थः, यस्य च भाव एव यद् भवति, अभावे च न भवति तत् तस्यैव धर्मः, यथा चन्द्रमसश्वन्द्रिका, तथा च ज्ञानमनुविदधाति भूतान्वय-व्यतिरेको, तस्मात् तद् भूतधर्म एव । तदयुक्तम् , विशिष्टमेव हि नील-पीतादिभूतग्राहकं ज्ञानं तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकावनुविदधाति न तु सामान्य ज्ञानमात्रम्, यस्माद् भूताभावेऽपि वेदलक्षणे समये सिद्धान्ते “ सामान्यज्ञानं भणितमेव" इति शेषः । केन वाक्येन ? इत्याह-"अत्थमिए इत्यादि" अस्तमिते आदित्ये, याज्ञवल्कया, चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते, शान्तेऽनौ, शान्तायां वाचि, किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुषः, आत्मज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच, ज्योतिरिति ज्ञानमाह । आदित्यास्तमयादौ किं न्योतिः १ इत्याह-" अयं पुरुष इति", पुरुष आत्मेत्यर्थः। अयं च कथंभूतः ? इत्याह-"अप्पजोइ ति" आत्मैव ज्योतिरस्य सोऽयमात्मज्योतिर्ज्ञानात्मक इति हृदयम् , निर्दिष्टो वेदविद्भिः कथितः, ततो न ज्ञानं भूतधर्म इति स्थितम् ॥ ४९-५० (१५९७-१५९८)॥
D. C.-Gautama may think as under:
Even in this way—the way in which is interpreted the second hemistich of verse 1593 beginning with “sa bhavai bhãehinto", it gets proved that knowledge is the dharma of elements such as earth etc. For, knowledge exists when the elements exist. This is what follows from “ etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānu vinas'yati.” Furthermore, in the absence of the elenients, knowledge does not exist.

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 71 : That which exists only when another exists and which is non-existent when that another is non-existent, is the dharma of that another e. g., the moon-light of the moon. Knowledge is associated with elements both anvaya and vyatireka. Consequently it is the dharma of elements. This thought is unjustifiable; for, only a particular type of knowledge which has for its object, the elements, blue, yellow etc, is associated with these elements by anvaya and vyatireka and not the entire knowledge in general. For, even when the elements are absent, the Veda declares that ordinary knowledge exists. This is what we learn from yājňavalkya who says "Astamite āditye, candramasyastanite, santegnau, śāntāyām vāci, kim jyotir evūyam puruşa ātnujyotiḥ samrīd iti hovāca." Herein the soul having a flame in the form of knowledge is alluded to. Hence it follows that knowledge is not the dharma of elements.
The reason !s as under:तदभावे भावाओ भावे चाभावओ न तद्धम्मो । जह घडभावाभावे विवजयाओ पडो भिन्नो ॥ ५१ ॥ (१५९९)
Tadabhāve bhāvāö bhāve cābhāvao na taddhammol Jaha ghadabhāvābhāve vivajjayāö pado bhinno 11 51 ( 1599)
[ तदभावे भावाद् भावे चाभावतो न तद्धर्मः।
T91 FTHANHÀ fanatura qat ha: 1148 11 (8488) Tadabhāve bhāvād bhāve cābhāvato na taddharmaḥ 1 Yathā ghatabhāvābhāve viparyayāt pato bhinnaḥ 11 51 ( 1599 ) ]
Trans.-51 One that exists when another does not exist and does not exist when that another exists, is not its dharma.

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•: 7:
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The first For instance, a piece of cloth is different ( from a pitcher ) owing to its viparyaya regarding the existence and non-existence of the pitcher. ( 1599 )
... टीका-न भूतधर्मो ज्ञानम् , मुक्त्यवस्थायां भूताभावेऽपि भावात् , मृतशरीरादौ तद्भावेऽपि चाभावात् , यथा घटस्य धर्मः पटो न भवति, किन्तु तस्माद् भिन्न एव । कुतः ? इत्याह-घटभावाभावे विपर्ययात्-घटभावेऽप्यभावात् तदभावेऽपि च भावादित्यर्थः ॥ ५१ ( १५९९)॥
D. C.-Just as a piece of cloth is not the dharma of a pitcher, but is different from it, for, even when a pitcher exists, a piece of cloth does not exist, and that even when that pitcher
is non-existent, the piece of cloth exists, so knowledge is not . the dharma of elements; for, in the liberated state, it exists,
even though the elements do not, and that it does not exist even when the elements are present in a dead body etc.
Having explained the meaning of some of the sentences of the Veda, the author weile concluding the subject, explains briefly the meaning of the remaining sentences of the Veda.
एसि वेयपयाणं न तमत्थं वियसि अहव सबेसि । अत्थो किं होज्ज सुई विण्णाणं वत्थुभेओ वा ॥५२॥ (१६००) जाई दत्वं किरिया गुणोऽहवा संसओ तवाजुत्तो। अयमेवेति नवायं न वत्थुधम्मो जओ जुत्तो ॥ ५३ ॥ (१६०१) सव्वं चिय सवमयं स-परपजायओ जओ निययं । सबमसवमयं पि य विवित्तरूपं विवक्खाओ ।। ५४ ॥ (१६०२) सामण्ण-विसेसमओ तेण पयत्थो विवक्खया जुत्तो।। वस्थुस्स विस्सरूवो पजायावेक्खया सबो ॥ ५५ ॥ ( १६०३)

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Vada ] Gayadharavada
6:18. Esim Veyapayānam na tamattham viyasi ahava savvesim! Attho kim hojja sui viņņāņam vatthubheö vā 11 52 ( 1600 ) Jāi davvam kiriyā guņo'havā samsaö tavājutto i Ayameveti na vāyam na vatthu dhammo jaö jutto 11 53 ( 160,1) Savvam ciya savvamayam sa-parapajjāyaö jaö niyayam Savvamasavvamayam pi ya vivittarūpam vivakkhāö ul 54 (1602) Sāmaņņa-visesamaö teņa payattho vivakkhayā jutto 1 Vatthussa vissarūvo pajjāyāvekkhayā savvo 11 55 ( 1603 ) [एषां वेदपदानां न त्वमर्थं वेत्सि, अथवा सर्वेषाम् ।
अर्थः किं भवेत् श्रुतिर्विज्ञानं वस्तुभेदो वा ॥ ५२ ॥ (१६००) जातिव्यं क्रिया गुणोऽथवा संशयस्तवायुक्तः। अयमेवेति न वायं न वस्तुधर्मो यतो युक्तः ॥ ५३ ।। ( १६०१ ) सर्वमेव सर्वमयं स्व-परपर्यायतो यतो नियतम् । सर्वमसर्वमयमपि च विविक्तरूपं विवक्षया ॥५४ ॥ (१६०२) सामान्य-विशेषमयस्तेन पदार्थो विवक्षया युक्तः।
वस्तुनो विश्वरूपः पर्यायापेक्षया सर्वः ॥ ५५ ॥ (१६०३) Eşam Vedapadánām na tvamartham vetsi athavā sarveşām i Arthah kim bhavet śrutir-vijñānam vastubhedo vā (1 52 (16Q0) Jatir-dravyam kriya guno'thava samsayas tavayuktah | Ayameveti navāyam na vastudharmo yato yuktaḥ 11 53 (1601) Sarvameva sarvamayam sva-para paryayato yato niyatam / Sarvamasarvamayamapi ca viviktarāpam vivaksays ॥ ( 1602) Sāmānya-višeşamayastena padārtho vivakşayā yuktaḥ, Vastuno visvarāpah paryayapeksuya sarvah || 55 ( 1603 )]
Trans.-52-55 You do not know the artha ( meaning ) of these sentences of the Veda or that of all. (Hence you have a doubt. ) What can artha be ? Is it śruti, knowledge,
10.

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•: 74 :
.
Jinabhadra Gani's
The first
difference in ( i. e., speciality of ) an object, a genus, a substance, an action, or an attribute ? Your doubt is ill-based; for, it is not proper to draw a sweeping conclusion regarding the dharma of an object that it is only this or that it is certainly not this. For, each and every thing ( sarva) is certainly all things ( sarvamaya) from the stand-point of
its own modifications and those of the rest, and that sarva is a-sarvamaya too, from the stand-point of separateness. . Therefore, it is proper ( to believe ) that a substance has a
generality and speciality, according to the stand-point taken and that its nature is varried from the view-point of its paryāyas. ( 1600-1603 )
टीका-तस्मादेषां पूर्वोक्तानां वेदपदानां यथा मया व्याख्यातोऽथस्तथा त्वं न वेत्सि, तेन जीवे संशयं करोषि । अथवा, सर्वेषामप्यशेषवेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, यस्मात् सर्वेष्वपि वेदपदेषु विषये तवैवंभ्रतः संशयोऽस्तीति संबन्धः । कथंभूत ? इत्याह-" अत्थो कि होञ्ज सुईत्यादि," किमेतेषां वेदपदानामर्थः श्रुतिः शब्दो भवेत् , यथा भेरी-पटह-ढक्कादीनां शब्दस्य शब्द एवार्थः १; अथवा यद् घटादिशब्दे समुच्चारिते तदभिधेयार्थविषयं विज्ञानं भवद् दृश्यते, तत् तेषामर्थः ?; किंवा घटशब्दे समुत्कीर्तिते " पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवान् घटलक्षणोऽर्थोऽनेनोक्तः, न तु पटादिः" इत्येवं यो वस्तुभेदः प्रतीयते स एषामर्थ ?; यदिवा, किं जातिरमीषामर्थः, यथा गोंशब्दे समुच्चारिते गोजातिरवसीयते ?; यदिवा, किं द्रव्यमेषामर्थः, यथा दण्डीत्यादिषु दण्डादिमद् द्रव्यम् ?; किंवा धावतीत्यादीनामिव धावनादिक्रियाऽमीषामर्थः; अथवा, किं शुक्लादीनामिव शुक्लादिगुण एतेषामर्थः ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तवायुक्तः; यस्मात् " अयमेव, नैव वाऽयम्" इत्येवं कस्यापि वस्तुनो धर्मोऽवधारयितुं न युक्तः । शब्दोऽपि वस्तुविशेष एव, ततः " एवंभूतस्यैवार्थस्यायमभिधायकः, नैव वेत्थंभूतस्यार्थस्यायं प्रतिपादकः" इत्येवमेतद्धर्मस्याप्यवधारणमयुक्तमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह-" सवं चियेत्यादि" यस्मात् सर्वमपि वाच्यवाचकादिक वस्तु नियतं निश्चितं स्व-परपर्यायः सर्वात्मकमेव सामान्यविवक्षयेत्यर्थः। तथा, सर्वमसर्वमयमप्यस्ति विविक्तरूपं सर्वतो व्यावृत्तम् । कया ? इत्याह-विवक्षया, केवलस्वपर्यायापेक्षयेत्यर्थः,

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
विशेषविषययेति तात्पर्यार्थः । तस्मात् सर्वेषामपि पदानां विवक्षावशतः सामान्यमयो विशेषमय पदार्थों युक्तः, न पुनरेकान्तेनेत्थंभूत एव, अनित्थंभूत एव वेति । कुतः १ इत्याह- " वत्थुस्सेत्यादि" यस्मात् सर्वोऽपि वाच्यस्य वाचकस्य वा वस्तुनः स्वभावः पर्यायापेक्षया विश्वरूपो नानाविधो वर्तते । ततश्च सामान्यविवक्षया घटशब्दः सर्वात्मकत्वात् सर्वेषामपि द्रव्य-गुणक्रियाद्यर्थानां वाचकः, विशेषविवक्षया तु प्रतिनियतरूपत्वाद् य एवास्येह पृथुबुनोदराद्याकारवानर्थो वाच्यतया रूढस्तस्यैव वाचकः । एवमन्योऽपि शब्दो विशेषविवक्षया या यत्र देशादौ यस्यार्थस्य वाचकतया रूढः स तस्य वाचको द्रष्टव्यः । सामान्यविवक्षया तु " सर्वः सर्वस्य वाचकः, सर्वे च सर्वस्य वाच्यम् " इत्यनया दिशा सकलं स्वधिया भावनियमिति ।
• 75:
तदेवं तेन त्रिजगत्स्वरूपवेदिना भगवता श्रीमन्महावीरेण निःशेषपरप्रबोधनोपायकुशलतया तीक्ष्णपरशुनेव निपुणयुक्तिप्रबन्धेन गुपिलवल्लीवितान इव मूलाच्छिन्नः समस्तोऽपि तस्य तत्समासन्नपरम कल्याणस्येन्द्र भूतेः संशयः ।। ५२-५५ ( १६०० - १६०१ - १६०२-१६०३ ) ।।
D. C.-Gautama! you have not followed my exposition of these padas ( sentences ) of the Veda. Hence, you have a doubt regarding the soul. Or, you do not know the meaning of these, as well as, the remaining sentences of the Veda.
Consequently, you raise the following queries in connection with all the sentences of the Veda:
1. Just as sabda is the meaning of the subdu ( sound ) of a kettle-drum, a tabor, a double drum, etc., so, is the meaning of these sentences sruti, i. e., sabda ?
2. Is it vijñana-the vijñana which arises and which is associated with the object connoted by it when the word like ghata is pronounced?
3. Do the padas of the Veda mean vastu-bhed of the type noticed when the word ghata is pronounced; the type, viz., that this connotes an object which has a wide bottom, an expansive belly, etc., and not a piece of cloth ?

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•: 76 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The first 4. Is their meaning jāti-the jati (genus) of the kind one
· realizes when the word go (cow ) is uttered. 5. Just as when the word dandin is pronounced we take it
to be a dravya having a danda, etc., similarly, does the - meaning of the sentences of the Vedu connote such a
dravya ? 6. In the words dhāvati (runs ), etc., we take them to mean
the kriya (act) of running, etc., so do these sentences mean
any such kriyā. 7. Just as the word sukla ( white ) means the guna (attribute )
of being white, so do these sentences convey a meaning of the type of this guna ?
These seven queries of yours are out of place-are useless. For, it is not possible to say regarding any vastu ( substance or material ) this is only this and nothing else. Sabda, too, is certainly a kind of vastu, so it is not proper to say that it connotes only this meaning and none else. The reasons are :
Every vastu whether in the form of a vācya ( direct expression) or a vācaka (indicatory word) is sarvamaya ( representing all objects ) from the stand-point of samānya (generality) when all the paryāyas ( modifications ) including its own paryāyas and those of the rest are taken into account. Whereas, every vastu is a-sarvamaya when examined from the stand-point of its own paryāyas which lays stress upon višeşa,
Consequently, all the sentences either convey a general sense or a particular one, according to the stand-point we take. Hence, it is no use saying that they mean only this and nothing else, for, the nature of every vastu whether it is a vācya or vacaka varies according to the stand-points from which they are viewed.
Thus from the general stand-point, the word ghata is the vācaka of dravya, guna, kriyā, etc., since it is then sarvamaya,

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
• 77 : But, when examined from a special stand-point, it is a vācaka, of only the rudha (conventional) meaning, viz., that it has an expansive bottom, a wide belly, etc., for, this stand-point makes it definite.
Similarly, any other word is a vācaka of only that artha which is rudha in that country, etc., when we examine it from the special stand-point.
But from the general stand-point, each and every word is a vacaka of one and all, and each and every word is a vācya of one and all. This is the line one should sensibly follow.
Thus, Šramana, Bhagvān Mahāvīru who knew the nature of all the three worlds, completely removed the doubts of Indrabhūti who was about to acquire the most excellent merit by advancing clever arguments capable of fully instructing others as is the case with a sharp hatchet which eradicates a cluster of creepers. छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुकेणं । सो समणो पवइओ पंचहि सह खंडियसएहिं ॥५६॥ (१६०४) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-marana vippamukkenami So samano pavvaiö pancahim saha khandiyasaehim 11 56 (1604)
[ lga HTÀ ÊT GTI-ATTRATTATI
4 4WUt: Hana: Nam: Hã : Ik6l (84-8) Chinne samśaye Jinena jara-maraņa vipramuktena l. Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khandikašataiḥ 1156 (1604)]
Trans.-56 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Indrabhūti took aan Dikśā along with his five hundred pupils.
टीका-सुबोधा, नवरं श्राम्यतीति श्रमणः सन्नसौ पापाद् व्रजितः प्रवजितो भागवतीं दीक्षां प्रतिपन्न इत्यर्थः। 'संयतः संयतो भवति नासंयतः'

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.: 78 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's . [The first इति निश्चयनयमताश्रयणाचेत्थमुक्तमितीह भावार्थः। खण्डिकास्तच्छात्रा इति ॥ ५६ (१६०४)॥
C. C.-That one who is a saṁyata becomes so and not one.who is not so, is a statement here made from the transcendental point of view. The rest is easy. एवं कम्माईसु वि जं सामण्णं तयं समाउजं । जो पुण जत्थ विसेसो समासओ तं पवक्खामि ॥५७॥(१६०५) Evam kammāísu vi jam sāmannam tayam samāujjami Jo puna jattha viseso samāsaö tam pavakkhāmi l 57 ( 1605 )
[ एवं कर्मादिष्वपि यत् सामान्यं तत् समायोज्यम् ।
यः पुनयंत्र विशेषः समासतस्तं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥ ५७ ॥ (१६०५) Evam karmādişvapi yat sāmānyam tat samāyojyam 1 Yah punar-yatra visesah samasatastam pravaksyāmi ॥ 57(1605)]
Trans.-57 Thus, what is applicable to karman, etc., ( the Vadas of the remaining Ganadharas ) should be applied ( there). And I shall briefly expound there, that which is a speciality ( of it ) ( 1605)
टीका-एवं यदिहात्मवादप्रक्रमे प्रत्यक्षा-ऽनुमाना-ऽऽगमप्रमाणवक्तव्यतादिकं वक्ष्यमाणकर्मादिवादस्थानकैः किमपि तुल्यं तत् स्वधियां तत्र तत्रायोजनीयम् । यस्तु यत्र वादस्थानके विशेषस्तं तत्र संक्षेपतः स्वयमेव वक्ष्यामि ॥ इति सप्तपञ्चाशदाथार्थः ॥ ५७ (१६०५) ॥ ___D. G. Here, while establishing the existence of the soul, several points bave been discussed. Out of them, those that are applicable to the other discussions which are to follow, may be applied there by the reader himself. So, I shall, now, briefly discuss in the remaining vādas ( discussions ) only such points as happen to be their specialities.
End of the Discussion with the First Gañadhara.

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Chapter 11
द्वितीयगणधरवक्तव्यता Discussion with the Second Canadhara. [ Arguments advanced to prove the non-existence of
Karman and their refutation तं पवइअं सोउं बीओ आगच्छइ अमरिसेणं ।
वञ्चामि णमाणेमी पराजिणित्ता ण तं समणं ॥ ५८॥ (१६०६) Tam pavvaiam söum bîo āgacchai amarisenam | Vaccami nanānemii parājinittā na tam samanam ॥ 58 ( 1606 ) [तं प्रव्रजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीय आगच्छत्यमर्षेण ।
व्रजाम्यानयामि पराजित्य तं श्रमणम् ॥ ५८ ॥ (१६०६) Tam pravrajitam śrutvă dvitiya agacchatya marşeņa i Vrajāmyanayami parajitya tam śramaņam || 58 ( 1606 ") ]
Trans.--58 Having heard that he ( Indrabhūti ) had renounced the world, the second (Ganadhara) comes exasperated. ( He thinks ):-- I may go and having vanquished that.asint, I may bring (Indrabhūti) back. (1606)
टीका-तमिन्द्रभूति प्रत्रजितं श्रुत्वा द्वितीयोऽग्निभूतिनामा तत्सोदर्यबन्धुरत्रान्तरेऽमर्षेणाकुलितचेताः समागच्छति भगवत्समीपम् । केनाभिप्रायेण? इत्याह-व्रजामि । “ण” इति वाक्यालङ्ककारे । आनयामि निजभ्रातरमिन्द्रभूतिं " ततः" इति गम्यते । 'ण' इत्ययमपि वाक्यालङ्कारे । तं श्रमणमिन्द्रजालिकं कमपि पराजित्येति ।। ५८ (१६०६) ॥ ..

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The second
D. C.-On having heard that Indrabhuti had taken dîkṣā, Agnibhuti, his younger brother is exasperated. He comes to Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira with the object of defeating him and taking Indrabhūti back.
Agnibhuti thought
छलिओ छलाइणा सो मण्णे माइंदजालिओ वा वि । .को जाइ कह वत्तं एत्ताहे वहमाणी से ॥ ५९ ॥ (१६०७)
•: 80:.
59 (1607)
Chalio chalaiņā so manne mãindajāliö vā vi Ko jāṇai kaha vattam ettāhe vattamāṇî se ll [ छलितश्छलादिना स मन्ये मायेन्द्रजालिको वापि । को जानाति कथं वृत्तमेतस्माद् वर्तमाना तस्य Chalitaśchaladina sa manye mayendrajaliko vapi Ko jānati katham vrittametasmād vartamānā tasya || 59 (1607) ]
५९ ।। (१६०७)
Trans. – 59 I think, he has been cheated by chala ( artful fraud), etc., or he is a clever juggler practising deceit. Who knows as to what happened there? Consequently, (the world will see ) what will happen in his case. ( 1607 )
टीका - दुर्जयत्रिभुवनस्यापि मद्भ्रातेन्द्रभूतिः, केवलमहमिदं मन्येछलादिना छलितोऽसौ तेन धूर्तेन - च्छल - जाति - निग्रहस्थान- ग्रहणनिपुणेन तेन केनापि दुष्टेन भ्रमितो मद्बन्धुरित्यर्थः । अथवा, मायेन्द्रजालिकः कोऽपि निश्चितमसौ, येन तस्यापि जगद्गुरोर्मद्भ्रातुर्भ्रमितं चेतः । तस्मात् किं बहुना ? को जानाति तद्वादस्थानकं तयोस्तत्र कथमपि वृत्तम्, मत्परोक्षत्वात् ? । इत ऊर्ध्वं पुनर्मयि तत्र गते तस्य तदिन्द्रजालव्यतिकरभ्रमितमानसखचर - नरा - sमरत्रात वन्दनमात्रबृंहिचेतसः, श्रमणकस्य माण त्ति या काचिद् वार्ता वर्तनी वा भविष्यति तां द्रक्ष्यत्ययं समग्रोऽपि लोक इति ।। ५९ (१६०७ ) ॥
66
"
D. C.-My brother Indrabhuti cannot be defeated by any one in the three worlds, so, I think he has been deceived by

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Vada ].
Gañadharavada
.
81 :
the rogue Mahāvêra, who must be an expert in using chala (a trick resulting in the destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning ) Játi ( an argument based on the same ground as put forth by the first speaker and nigraha sthāna (fallacy ) etc. Or this Mahāvīra must certainly be a deceitful juggler. That is why he could change his ( Indrabhūti's ) mind. So what more? I was not present there, so who knows as to what discussion took place between my brother and Mahāvîra there? So let me, first of all, go there and let the world see as to what happens, so far as this saint Mahāvīra is concerned-Mahāvíra who has been puffed up with pride owing to his being saluted by a collection of khacaras ( deni-gods ) human beings and celestial beings whose minds have been perplexed by jugglery.
While going there, Agnibhūti said, सो पक्खंतरमेगं पि जाइ जइ मे तओ मि तस्सेव । FIAT CIS T211 azi ya FUTATIÊT 11 80 ll (p&•C) So pakkhantaramegam pi jāi jai me taö mi tasseva Sisattam hojja gað vottum patto Jiņasagāse il 60 ( 1698 )
[स.पक्षान्तरमेकमपि याति यदि मे ततस्तस्यैव ।
शिष्यत्वं भवेयं गत उक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ६० ॥ (१६०८) Sa paksāntaramekamapi yati yadi ne tatastasyaiva i Sisyatvam bhaveyam gata uktvá prāpto Jinasa kāśe 11 60 ( 1608)]
Trans.-60 If he clearly understands the weak point of any one of paksas ( premises ), I shall become a pupil of his. Having said so, he went and came up into the presence of Tirthankara Mahāvīra. ( 1608 )
टीका-को जानाति तावदिन्द्रभूतिस्तेन कथमपि तत्र निर्जितः ? । मम पुनरप्येकमपि पक्षान्तरं प्रक्षविशेषं स यदि यात्यवबुध्यते-मद्विहितस्य
11

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82
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
सहेतू -दाहरणस्य पक्षविशेषस्य स यदुत्तरप्रदानेन कथमपि पारं गच्छतीति हृदयम्, ततो 'मि' इति वाक्यालङ्ककारे, तस्यैव श्रमणस्य शिष्यत्वेन गतोऽहं भवेयम् इति निश्चयः । तत इत्यादि वाग्गजिं कृत्वा जिनस्य श्रीममहावीरस्यान्तिकं प्राप्त इति ॥ ६० ( १६०८ ) ॥
D. C.—Who knows how Indrabhuti was defeated by him ! If however, he gives a satisfactory answer to any one of my paksas (premises) I shall become a pupil of that saint. He made a firm resolution. Having said so, he went to Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira.
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ - जरा-मरणविषयमुक्केण ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सङ्घण्णू सवदरिसी णं ॥ ६१ ॥ (१६०९)
Abhattho ya Jineņam jāi-jara-maraṇa vippamukkeṇa | Nāmena ya gottena ya savvannū savvadarisī nam ॥ 61 (1609 )
[ आभाषितश्व जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। ६१ ।। ( १६०९ ) Abhasitaśca Jinena jati-jarā–marana vipramuktena | Nanna ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina || 61 ( 1609 ) ]
Trans.-61. He was addressed by his name and gotra ( lineage ) by the Tirtharikara who was free from birth, .old age and death, who was all-knowing and who had complete darśana (undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1609 )
टीका- आभाषितश्च संलप्तच जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना च जिनेन । कथम् ? - नाम्ना च-हे अग्निभूते ! गोत्रेण च-हे गौतमगोत्र ! इति । इत्थं च नाम -- गोत्राभ्यां संलप्तस्य तस्य चिन्ताऽभूत्अहो ! नामापि मम विजानाति, अथवा, जगत्प्रसिद्धोऽहम् कः किल मां वेति ? | यदि हि मे हृतं संशयं ज्ञास्यति, अपनेष्यति वा, तदा भवेद् मम विस्मयः ॥ ६१ ( १६०९ ) ॥
,
D. C.-The omniscient Tirthankara addressed the second Ganadhara by name as Agnibhuti and as one having Gautama,

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Vada ]:
Gaṇadharavada
.: 83:.
as apineage. When he was so spoken of, he was taken aback. But an after-thought came to him as under :
I am famous in the world, so it is but natural that Mahavira should be knowing my name and lineage. It will be, however, a matter of surprise to me if Mahavira comes to know about my doubt or removes it.
When he was thinking so, Śramana Bhagavan Mahāvîra said, किं मन्ने अस्थि कम्मं उयाहु न त्थि त्ति संसयो तुझं । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसि तेसिमो अत्थो ॥६२॥ ( १६१० ) Kim manne atthi kammam uyāhu na tthi tti saṁsayo tujjham Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho || 62 ( 1610 ) [ किं मन्यसेऽस्ति कर्म उताहो नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ।। ६२ ।। ( १६१० ) Kim manyase'sti karma utaho nāstīti samśayastava | Vedapadānām_cäartham na jānāsi teşamayamarthah || 62 (1610) ]
Trans. – 62 You think whether a Karman exists or not. This is your doubt. You do not know the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Veda. Their meaning is this. ( 1610 ) टीका - हे अग्निभूते ! गौतम । त्वमेतद् मन्यसे चिन्तयसि यदुतक्रियते मिध्यात्वादिहेतुसमन्वितेन जीवेनेति कर्म ज्ञानावरणादिकम् तत् किमस्ति नास्ति वा ? इति । नन्वयमनुचितस्तव संशयः । अयं हि भवतो विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धो वर्तते, तेषां च वेदपदानां त्वमर्थं न जानासि तेन संशयं करोषि । तेषां च वेदपदानामयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थः इति ।। ६२ (१६१०) ।।
9
,
D. C. —' 0 Agnibhuti ! of Gautama lineage. You have a doubt as to whether the Karman which is being done by the soul under the influence of Mithyatva (False Belief), etc., and which is of the type of Jnanavarana (knowledge-obscuring), etc., exists or not. This doubt of yours is based on your unrealization of the exact significance of the sentences of the Veda. This significance is what will be just expounded.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
कम्मे तुह संदेहो मन्नसि तं नाणगोयराईयं ।
तुह तमणुमाणसाहणमणुभूइमयं फलं जस्स ॥ ६३ ॥ (१६११)
.: 84:
[ The second
Kamme tuha sandeho mannasi tam nāṇagoyarāîyam | Tuha tamanumāna sāhanamanubhūimayam phalam jassa || 63 (1611)
[ कर्मणि तब संदेहो मन्यसे तज्ज्ञानगोचरातीतम् ।
तव तदनुमान साधनमनुभूतिमयं फलं यस्य ॥ ६३ ॥ ( १६११ ) Karmani tava sandeho manyase tajjnanagocarātītam | Tava tadanumāna sādhanamanubhūtimayam phalam tasya||63(1611)]
Trans. - 63 You have a doubt about ( the existence of ) the Karman. You think it to be beyond the range of knowledge. That (Karman) of which experience is the fruit, is provable ( to you ) by means of anumāna. (1611 )
तव
टीका - हे आयुष्मन्नग्निभूते ! ज्ञानावरणादिपरमाणुसंघातरूपे कर्मणि संदेहः, यतः प्रत्यक्षा-नुमानादिसमस्त प्रमाणात्मकज्ञानगोचरा तीतमेव तत् त्वं मन्यसे, तथा हि-न तावत् प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, अतीन्द्रियत्वात्, खरविषाणवत्, इत्यादि प्रमाण विषयातीतत्वं प्राग्वज्जीवस्येव कर्मणोऽपि समानप्रायत्वाद् भावनीयमिति । तदेतत् सौम्य ! मा मन्थास्त्वम्, यतो मम तावत् प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, तवाप्यनुमानं साधनं यस्य तदनुमानसाधनं वर्तते तत् कर्म, न पुनः सर्वप्रमाणगोचरातीतम् । यस्य किम् ? इत्याह- " अणुभूइमयं फलं जस्स त्ति " सुख-दुःखानामनुभूतिरनुभवनं तन्मयं तदात्मकं फलं यस्य शुभा - शुभकमर्ण इति । अनेन चेदनुमानं सूचितम् - अस्ति सुख-दुःखानुभवस्य हेतुः, कार्यत्वात्, अङ्करस्यैवेति ।
अथ यदि भवतः प्रत्यक्षं कर्म, तर्हि मयापि तत्प्रत्यक्षं कस्माद् न भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, न हि यदेकस्य कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षं तेनापरस्यापि प्रत्यक्षेण भवितव्यम् । न हि सिंह - सरभ - हंसादयः सर्वस्यापि लोकस्य प्रत्यक्षाः, न च ते न सन्ति बालादीनामपि तत्सर्वस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति कर्म, सर्वज्ञत्वेन मया प्रत्यक्षीकृतत्वात् भवत्संशय विज्ञानवदिति ।
"

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Vada ]
· Gañadharavada
•: 85 :
न च वक्तव्यम्-त्वयि सर्वज्ञत्वमस्मान् प्रत्यसिद्धम् " कह सवणु ति मई जेणाहं सबसंसयच्छेई, पुच्छसु व जं न याणामि" इत्यादिना प्रागेव प्रतिविहितत्वात् । कार्यप्रत्यक्षतया भवतोऽपि च प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, यथा घटादिकार्यप्रत्यक्षतया परमाणव इति ॥ ६३ (१६११)॥
D. C.-O long-lived Agnibhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the Karman, which is a multitude of paramānus, in the form of jñānāvarana, etc., for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the pramānas such as pratyakşa, anumāna, etc., the pramanas which are knowledge. To be explicit, you argue as under :
Karman is not directly perceived, because it is supersensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass.
Other arguments that you advance are the same as men. tioned by your brother in the case of the soul.
But these lines of arguments are faulty. For, this Karman is certainly pratyaksa to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramana can establish its existence. The Karman is either good or bad. The good Karman makes us experience happiness, where as, the bad Karman misery.
This leads to an inference as under :
There is # cause for experiencing happiness and misery since it is a Karya ( an act) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the Karman is pratyaksa to me (1. e. Mahāvara ) it should be so to you. For, there is no such rule that what is pratyakşa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, a sarbha ( a fabulous eightlegged animal a match for lions and elephants ), a swan, etc. are not pratyaksa to one and all the beings. But, on that account, it is not that they do not exist, for, even children know them. Therefore, there does exist the Karman since

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.:86:.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
it is pratyaksa to me, an omniscient being just as, your doubt is pratyaksa to me. If you doubt my omniscience, I may repeat what I said to your elder brother, viz.,
“ Kaha savvannu tti mai jenāham savva samsayacchei, pucchasu va jam na yānasi” (verse 1579 ).
Moreover, this Karman is pratyaksa to you too, since you realize its Kārya (effect), as is the case with paramanus, which though not directly realizable to you, are pratyaksa to you, since their Kāryas like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived by you., अस्थि सुह-दुक्खहेऊ कज्जाओ बीयमंकुरस्सेव । सो दिट्ठो चेव मई वभिचाराओ न तं जुत्तं ॥ ६४ ॥ (१६१२) जो तुल्लसाहणाणं फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेउं । कन्जत्तणओ गोयम ! घडो व्व, हेऊ य सो कम्म॥६५॥(१६१३) Atthi suha-dukkhaheū kajjāö biyamarikurssseva | So dittho ceva maî vabhicārāö na tam juttam 11 64 11 (1612) Jo tullasāhanānam phale viseso na so viņā heum 1 Kajjattaņaö Goyama! ghado vva, heū ya so kamniam 116511 (1613) [ अस्ति सुखदुःखहेतुः कार्यत्वात् बीजमकरस्येव ।
स दृष्ट एव मतियभिचाराद् न तद् युक्तम् ।। ६४ ॥ (१६१२) यस्तुल्यसाधनयोः फले विशेषो न स विना हेतुम् ।
कार्यत्वतो गौतम ! घट इव, हेतुश्च स कर्म ॥ ६५ ॥ (१६१३) Asti sukhduhkkhhetuh kāryatvāt, bījamankurasyeva 1 Sa drista eva matir-vyabhicārad na tad yuktam | 64 (1612 ) Yastulyasadhanayoḥ phale višeşo na sa vina hetum 1 Karyatvato Gautamaa ! ghata iva, hetusca sa karma ॥ 65 ( 1613)] ____ Trans.-64-65 Just as a sprout has a seed for its hetu, ( because it is a kārya ) so, there is a hetu for happiness and misery owing to their being a kārya ( an action )

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Vada J 4:
Gaṇadharavada
•: 87 :.
You may think : - That ( hetu ) is certainly seen. This ( thought ) is not proper owing to vyabhicāra ( irrelevancy ).
O Gautama! That difference which exists in the fructification in the case of those who have equal means is not without a hetu, since it is a karya, as is the case with a pitcher. That hetu is Karman. 64-65 ( 1612-1613 )
3
टीका - प्रतिप्राणि प्रसिद्ध्योः सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, कार्यत्वात्, अङ्करस्येव वीजमिति । यह सुख - दुःखयोर्हेतुस्तत् कर्मैव इत्यस्ति तदिति । स्याद् मतिः- स्रक् - चन्दना - ऽङ्गनादयः सुखस्य हेतवः, दुःखस्य त्वहि - विषकण्टकादयः, इति दृष्ट एव सुख-दुःखयोर्हेतुरस्ति, किमदृष्टस्य कर्मणस्तद्धेतुत्वकलपनेन ? । न हि दृष्टपरिहारेणादृष्टकल्पना संगतत्वमावहति, अति प्रसङ्गात् । तदयुक्तम्, व्यभिचारात्, तथाहि - ' जो तुल्लेत्यादि ' इह यस्तुल्यसाधनयोरिष्टशब्दादिविषयसुखसाधनसमेतयोरनिष्टार्थसाधनसंयुक्तयोश्च द्वयोबहूनां वा फले सुख - दुःखानुभवनलक्षणे विशेषस्तारतम्यरूपो दृश्यते, नासावदृष्टं कमपि हेतुमन्तरेणोपपद्यते, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत् । यश्च तत्र विशेषाधातद् गौतम ! कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ||६४-६५॥ (१६१२-१६१३)
D. C.-Just as a sprout which is a Karya, has a seed for its hetu, so happiness and misery, which are well-known to every individual, have a cause, because they are kāryas. And this cause is nothing else but Karman and so it exists. It may be that you may here raise a question as under :
A garland, sandal, a woman and the like are the hetus of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these hetus of happiness and misery as well, are seen-are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe Karman to be their hetu-the Karman which is not seen? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justificable, as it out-shoots the mark.
This question is out of place owing to the vyabhicara (irrelevancy). It is a matter of common experience that we

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.: 88 :: . Jinabhadra. Cani's [The second find that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness.
Same is the case with those who have the same means to suffer misery.
This difference in each case, cannot be without any hetu which is not seen.
This very unseen hetu is Karman. बालसरीरं देहतरपुवं इंदियाइमत्ताओ। जह बालदेहपुट्टो जुवदेहो पुवमिह कम्मं ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४) Bālasariram dehantarapuvvam indiyāimattão 1 Jaha baladehapuvvo juvadeho puvvamiha kammar ॥ 66 ॥ (1614)
[बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वकमिन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् । __ यथा बालदेहपूर्वो युवदेहः पूर्वमिह कम ॥ ६६ ॥ (१६१४) Balasarīram dehāntarapūrvakamindriyādimattvāti Yathā bālade hapūrvo yuvadehah pūrvamiha karma ll 66 (1614)]
___Trans.-66 Just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in child-hood so is the body in child-hood preceded by another body, since it has organs of sense etc. Here-in this very body which is prior to that in child-hood is Karman. (1614)
टीका:-शरीरान्तरपूर्वकमाद्यं बालशरीरम् , इन्द्रियादिमत्वात् , युवशरीरवदिति, आदिशब्दात् सुख-हुःखित्व-प्राणाऽपान-निमेषो-न्मेष जीवनादिमत्त्वादयोऽपि हेतवो ग्राह्याः । न च जन्मान्तरातीतशरीरपूर्वकमेवेदमिति शक्यते वक्तुम् , नस्यापान्तरालगतावसत्त्वेन तत्पूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न चाशरीरिणो नियतगर्भ-देश-स्थानप्राप्तिपूर्वकः शरीरग्रहो युज्यते, नियामककारणाभावात् । नापि स्वभावो नियामकः, तस्य निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । यञ्चेह बालशरीरस्य पूर्व शरीरान्तरं तत् “ कर्म " इति मन्तव्यम्-कार्मणं शरीरमित्यर्थः, “जोएण कम्मएणं आहारेई अणंतरं जीवो" इत्यादि वचनादिति ।। ६६ (१६१४) ।

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Vada ] • Ganadharavada
. 89. D. C.-The body in childhood must have some body to precede it, since it has organs of sense, happiness, misery, prāna ( sign of vitality ) apāna (the vital air which goes downwards and out at the anus ), winking of the eyes, opening of the eyes, life, etc., as is the case with the body in youth. This body which precedes one in child-hood, cannot be the body belonging to the previous birth; for it does not exist in the apāntarāla gati ( state previous to the interval stage ) and so it has no scope here. Moreover, it is not possible for one having no body, to have a body in a particular womb, country, place, etc., as there is none to so direct it. Even nature cannot so direct it as we shall soon prove. So the body which precedes one in child-hood is Kārmana-one which is known as a Karmana body, as suggested by "jeena kaammaenam sharet anantaram jivo."
There is another inference also, किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व । तं चिय दाणाइफलं मणप्पसायाई जइ बुद्धी ॥६७॥ (१६१५) किरियासामण्णाओ जं फलमस्सावि तं मयं कम्मं । तस्स परिणामरूवं सुह-दुक्खफलं जओ भुजो ॥६८॥ (१६१६) Kiriyā phala bhāvāö dānāîņam phalam kisîe vval Tam ciya dāņāiphalam manappasāyāî jai buddhî ll 67 (1615 ) Kiriyāsāmannāö jam phalamassāvi tam mayam kammam Tassa parināmarūvam suha-dukkhaphalam jaö bhujjo 11 68 (1616) [क्रियाफलभावाद् दानादीनां फलं कृषेरिव ।
तदेव दानादिफलं मनःप्रसादादि यदि बुद्धिः ॥ ६७ ॥ (१६१५) क्रियासामान्याद् यत्फलमस्यापि तद् मतं कर्म । तस्य परिणामरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो भूयः ॥ ६८ ॥ (१६१६)
12

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The second
Kriyaphalabhāvād danadînām phalam krişeriva Tadeva dānādiphalam manaḥprasādādi yadi buddhiḥ || 67 (1615) Kriya sāmānyad yatphalanasyāpi tad matam karma i Tasya pariņāmarūpam sukha-duḥkha phalam yato bhūyaḥu[68(1616)] ____Trans.-67-68 Just as there is a fruit of agriculture, so there is a fruit of charity, etc., owing to the fructification of an act. If you think that, the fruit of charity, etc., is serenity of mind, etc., then ( we say that ) that which is its fruit is looked upon as Karman owing to the commonness of kriya-the Karman from which arises again and again the fructification in the form of happiness and misery which are the results of Karman. ( 1615-1616 )
टीका-" दाणाईणं फलं त्ति " इह दानादिक्रियाणां फलमस्ति "किरियाफलभावाओ त्ति" सचेतनारब्धक्रियाणां फलभावात् फलभावदर्शनादित्यर्थः, यथा कृषिक्रियायाः। इह या चेतनारब्धक्रिया तस्या फलं दृष्टम् , यथा कृष्यादिक्रियायाः, चेतनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्यः, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । या तु निष्फला क्रिया सा सचेतनारब्धापि न भवति, यथा परमाण्वादिक्रिया, सचेतनारब्धाश्च दानादिक्रियाः, तस्मात् फलवत्यः। स्यादेतत् , अनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, चेतनारब्धानामपि कासांचित् कृष्यादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वदर्शनात् । तदयुक्तम् , फलवत्वाभिप्रायेणैव तदारम्भात् । यच्च क्वचिद् निष्फलत्वमपि दृश्यते तत्सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्यभावेन सामग्रीवैकल्याद् द्रष्टव्यम् , मनःशुद्ध्यादिसामग्रीविकलतया दानादिक्रिया अपि निष्फला इष्यन्त एवेत्यदोषः ।
यदि चात्र परस्यैवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह-"तं चियेत्यादि " तदेव दानादिक्रियाणां फलं यदस्मादृशामपि प्रत्यक्षं मनः प्रसादादि । इदमुक्तं भवति-कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टधान्याद्यवाप्तिफला दृष्टाः, अतो दानादिक्रियाणामपि दृष्टमेव मनःप्रसादादिकं फलं भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकर्मलक्षणफलसाधनेन ?। तत इष्टविरुद्धसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः। तत्रि वयं ब्रूमः-" किरियासामण्णाओ इत्यादि" अस्यापि मनःप्रसादस्य यत्

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 91 :फलं तद् मम कर्म संमतम् । ननु मनः प्रसादस्यापि कथं फलमभिधीयते ? इत्याह-"किरियासामण्णाओ ति" इदमुक्तं भवति-मनः प्रसादोऽपि क्रियारूप एव, ततश्च यथा दान-कृष्यादिकाः क्रियाः फलवत्यः, तथा क्रियासाम्याद् मनः प्रसादस्यापि फलेन भवितव्यमेव, यच्च तस्य फलं तत् कर्मैव, इति न कश्चिद् व्यभिचारः।
यतः कर्मणः सकाशात् , किम् ? इत्याह-" सुह-दुक्खफलं जउ त्ति " सुख-दुःखरूपं फलं सुख-दुःखफलं यतो यस्मात् कर्मणः सकाशाजायते । कथम् ? भूयः पुनः पुनरपि । कथं भूतं यत् सुख-दुःखफलम् ? इत्याहतस्यैव कर्मणस्तजनकत्वेन यत् परिणमनं परिणामस्तद्रूपमिति । एतदुक्तं भवति-यतः कर्मणः सकाशात् प्रतिक्षणं तत्परिणतिरूपं सुख-दुःखफलं प्राणिनां समुपजायते, तत् कर्म मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया अपि फलमभिमतम् । आह-नन्वनन्तरगाथायां " दानादिक्रियाफलं कर्म " इति वदता दानादिक्रियैव कर्मणः कारणमुक्ता, अत्र तु मनःप्रसादादिक्रिया तत्कारणमुच्यते, इति कथं न पूर्वापरविरोधः ? इति । सत्यम् , किन्तु मनः प्रसादादि क्रियैवानन्तर्येण कर्मणः कारणम् , केवलं तस्या अपि मनः प्रसादादिक्रियाया दानादिक्रियैव कारणम्, अतः कारणकारणे कारणोपचाराददोष इति ॥ ६७-६८ ( १६१५-१६१६ ) ॥ . D. C.-In this world, we find that each and every act perfornied by a living being, yields a fruit, as is seen in the case of tilling of ground, etc. The acts of charity are undertaken by a living being, so they too, must bear a fruit, and that fruit is nothing else but Karman. That act which is fruitless, is not commenced by a living being, e. g., the act of electrons etc; but the acts of charity, etc., are commenced by living beings; so they are fruitful.
It may here be argued that this hetu is anaikāntika; for, the act like tilling the ground commenced by living beings, is at times seen to yield no fruit. But, this argument is not justifiable since such an act is commenced with the hope that it will be fruitful. Moreover, the failure which occurs sometimes

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.: 92 :: . Jinabhadra Gaại's
(The second is due to something wanting in materials--a defect arising from want of real knowledge.
We may add that we are glad to admit that the act as that of charity, if done without the serenity of mind, is fruitless; for, it is an iştāpatti ( a desirable acquisition ) to us.
Some one may here argue as under :
The act, like tilling the ground, is seen to yield a visible fruit, viz., acquisition of crop. So, the act like charity must yield a visible fruit like the serenity of mind. Such being the case, why should we think of a fruit like Karman which is invisible? Hence this hetu is viruddha ( inconsistent ); for, it establishes just the contrary to what is desired.
This argument may be refuted as below:
Even the serenity of mind is certainly a kriya. So, just as acts like charity yield a fruit, so this serenity of mind, too, must yield a fruit. And that fruit is Karman and nothing else. So, there is no vyabhicara ( irrelevancy ).
It may be here noted that, that Karman whence living beings experience happiness and misery which are its parinati ( consequences ) is certainly the fruit of the act, viz., serenity of mind.
It may be argued that in the preceding verse (v. 1615 ) while saying that “ dānādi kriyaphalam Karma ” only the act like charity was mentioned as the cause of Kurman and here the act like serenity of mind is stated as the cause of Karman. So, are not these statements contradictory? Yes, they are. But, it should be borne in mind that since the act like the serenity of mind is the intermediate cause of Karman and that the act like charity is the cause of the act like the serenity of mind, there arises no flaw, because, here, we have an upacara (compliment ) of Kārana in Kāraņa

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. .: 93 : kārana, that is to say, the cause of the cause is here taken to be cause. होज मणोवित्तीए दाणाइकिए व जइ फलं बुद्धी । तं न निमित्तताओ पिंडो व घडस्स विन्नेओ ॥६९ ॥ (१६१७) Hojja mañovittîe dāņāikie va jai phalam buddhî Tam na nimittatāo pindo vva ghadassa vinneo 11 69 ( 1617). [ भवेद् मनोवृत्तेर्दानादिक्रियैव यदि फलं बुद्धिः।
तद् न निमित्तत्वात् पिण्ड इव घटस्य विज्ञेयः ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७) Bhaved manovriter-danādikriyaiva yadi pbalam buddhiḥ Tad na nimittatvat pinda iva ghatasya vijneyah | 69 ( 1617 )]
Trans.-69 If you think that only the acts like charity, etc., are the fruits of the mental inclination, it is not ( so ) owing to there being a nimitta (instrumental cause ). For instance, a lump ( of clay ) should be realized as ( a nimitta ) of a pitcher. ( 1617) . टीका-अत्र परस्य यद्येवंभूता बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता ? इत्याह-ननु मनोवृत्तेर्मनःप्रसत्यादिक्रियाया दृष्टरूपा दानादिक्रियैव फलम्, न त्वदृष्टं कर्मेति भावः। अयमभिप्राय:-दानादिक्रियातो मनःप्रसादादयो जायन्ते, तेभ्यश्च प्रवर्धमानदित्सादिपरिणामः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियां करोति, एवं पुनः पुनरपि दानक्रियाप्रवृत्तेः सैव मनः प्रसादादेः फलमस्तु, न तु कर्मेति भावः, दृष्टफलमात्रेणैव चरितार्थत्वात् किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन? इति हृदयम्। तदेतद् न। कुतः ? निमित्तत्वाद्-मनःप्रसादादिक्रियां प्रति दानादिक्रियाया निमित्तकारणत्वादित्यर्थः, यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटस्य निमित्तं विज्ञेयस्तथा दानादिक्रियापि मनः प्रसत्तेः । दृश्यन्ते हि पात्रदानादिभ्यश्चित्ताहादादयो जायमानाः। न च यद् यस्य निमित्तं तत् तस्यैव फलं वक्तुमुचितम् , दुरविरुद्धत्वादिति ॥ ६९ ॥ (१६१७॥

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.: 94 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's. [The second
D. C.-Serenity of mind arises from the act of charity and this serenity gives an impetus to give donations and in virtue of this inclination, one goes in for charity.
Thus, the fruit of the serenity of mind is nothing else but the act of charity and not a Karman, which is invisible.
But such a belief is untenable; for, just as a lump of clay is the nimitta (instrumental cause ) of a pitcher, so, the act of charity is the nimitta of the serenity of mind.
We see that one gets pleased when a donation is given to a deserving individual.
Such being the case, it won't do to look upon that which is a nimitta of something, as its fruit, as it is highly objectionable.
Besides, asserting that all actions are attended by fruits which are seen, as is the case with the tilling of ground, the debator says :एवं पि दिट्ठफलया किरिया न कम्मफला पसत्ता ते । सा तम्मेत्तफल च्चिय जह मंसफलो पसुविणासो ॥७०॥(१६१८) Evam pi ditthaphalayā kiriyā, na kammaphalā pasattā te i . Sā tammettaphala cciya jaha mansaphalo pasuviņāso il 70 (1618) [ एवमपि दृष्टफला क्रिया न कर्मफला प्रसक्ता ते ।
सा तन्मात्रफलैव यथा मांसफलः पशुविनाशः ।। ७० ॥ (१६१८) Evamapi dristaphalā kriya na karmaphalā prasaktā te i Så tanmätraphalaiva yathā mānsaphalaḥ paśuvināśaḥ ( 70 ( 1618 )]
Trans.—70 In this way, too, an act is proved to have a fruit which is seen, and not a Karman by way of its fruit. That ( act ) certainly has a fruit only to that extent, as is the case with ( the act of ) killing of a beast-the killing which has flesh as its fruit. ( 1618 )

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.
:.
टीका-नन्वेमपि युष्मदुपन्यस्तकृष्यादिक्रियानिदर्शनेनापीत्यर्थः, सर्वा दानादिकापि क्रिया दृष्टफलदैव प्रसक्ता न कर्मफला । इदमुक्तं भवति-यथा कृष्यादिक्रिया दृष्टफलमात्रेणैवावसितप्रयोजना भवति, तथा दानादिक्रियाया अपि श्लाघादिकं किञ्चिद् दृष्टफलमस्तु, किमदृष्टफलकल्पनेन ? किं बहुना ? सा क्रिया सर्वापि तन्मात्रफलैव युज्यते, नादृष्टफला, यथा दृष्टमांसमात्रफला पशुविनाशक्रिया; न हि पशुविनाशनक्रियामदृष्टाधर्मफलाथै, कोऽप्यारभते, किन्तु मांसभक्षणार्थम् । अतस्तन्मात्रफलैव सा, तावतैवावसितप्रयोजनत्वात् । . एवं दानादिक्रियाया अपि दृष्टमात्रमेव श्लाघादिकं किश्चित् फलम् , नान्यदिति ॥ ७० ॥ (१६१८)
__D. C.-Just as the act of tilling the ground has no other fruit than what is seen, so, the act of charity may have a fruit like some sort of praise which can be seen.
What more? All these acts are such as only visible fruits, and not any invisible one, as is seen in the act of killing a beast. For, the act of killing a beast has no other purpose underlying it except the acquisition of flesh. None kills a beast for some other motive, such as committing a sin which is invisible.
Similarly, the fruit of the act of charity, must be nothing else but some sort of praise which is seen.
Here, another argument is advanced as follows :'पायं व जीवलोगो वट्टइ दिट्ठफलासु किरियासु। .
अदिट्टफलासु पुण वदृइ नासंखभागो वि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)
Pāyam va jivalogo vattai ditthaphalāsu kiriyāsu / Aditthaphalasu runa vattai nasamkhabhago vi ॥ 71 ( 1619)
[प्रायो वा जीवलोको वर्तते दृष्टफलासु क्रियासु । अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्वर्तते नासंख्यभागोऽपि ॥ ७१ ॥ (१६१९)

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Prāyo vā jīvaloko vartate dristaphalāsu kriyasu / Adristaphalasu punar-vartate nasamkhyabhāgo'pi ॥ 71 ( 1619 )]
Trans.-71 Moreover, the people indulge mostly in such acts of which the fruits are seen; and not even an infinitesimal part of them, in acts of which the fruits are not visible. (1619)
टीका-लोकोऽपि च प्रायेण दृष्टमात्रफलास्वेव कृषि-वाणिज्यादि क्रियासु प्रवर्तते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिक्रियासु तदसंख्येयभागोऽपि न वर्तते-कतिपयमात्र एव लोकस्तासु प्रवर्तते, न बहुरित्यर्थः। ततश्च हिंसादीनामशुभक्रियाणामदृष्टफलाभावाच्छुभक्रियाणामपि दानादीनामदृष्टफलाभावो भविष्यति । इति पराभिप्राय इति ॥७१ (१६१९)॥
D. C.-People mostly do such acts as agriculture, business, etc., of which the fruits are certainly seen. And only a very negligible number of them, indulges in acts like charity of which the fruits are not seen.
Consequently, just as evil acts such as killing have not got such fruits as are not seen, so must be the case with good acts like charity. That is to say, they too, cannot have such fruits as are not seen.
This is what may be advanced as an argument by Agnibhūti.
• Šramana Bhagavān Mahāvīru refutes it as under :- . सोम्म ! जउ च्चिय जीवा पायं दिटुप्फलासु वहति । अदिट्ठफलाओ वि य ताओ पडिवज तेणेव ॥ ७२ ॥ १६२० ॥ Somma ! jau cciya jîvā pāyam dițthaphalāsu vattanti i Adittha phalao vi ya tai padivajja teneva ॥ 72 ॥ ( 1620 ) [ सौम्य ! यत एव जीवाः प्रायो दृष्टफलासु वर्तन्ते ।
अदृष्टफला अपि च ताः प्रतिपद्यस्व तेनैव ।। ७२ ।। (१६२० ) Saumya ! Yata eva jîvāḥ prāyo driştaphalāsu vartante 1 Adristaphala api ca tah pratipadyasva tenaiva ॥ 72 ॥ ( 1620)]

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Gañadharavada Trans.-72 0 gentle one ! By the very fact that the souls are active mostly in ( doing ) deeds, the fruits of which are visible ( in this very life ) learn ( from me ) that by that very ( reason ) those are also ( deeds ) the fruits of which are invisible, i. e., to be had in a subsequent birth. ( 1620 )
टीका-सौम्य ! इत्यग्निभूतेरामन्त्रणम् , यत एव प्राणिनः प्रायेण कृषि-वाणिज्य-हिंसादिकास्वेव दृष्टफलास्वशुभक्रियासु प्रवर्तन्ते, अदृष्टफलासु पुनर्दानादिकासु शुभक्रियासु स्वल्पा एव प्रवर्तन्ते, तेनैव तस्मादेव कारणात् . ता अपि कृषि-हिंसादिका दृष्टफलाः क्रिया अदृष्टफला अपि प्रतिपद्यस्वाभ्युपगच्छ । इदमुक्तं भवति-यद्यपि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तारो दृष्टफलमात्रार्थमेव ताः समारभन्ते नाधर्मार्थम् , तथापि तेऽधर्मलक्षणं पापरूपमदृष्टफलमश्नुवत एव, अनन्तसंसारिजीवान्यथानुपपत्तेः । ते हि कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियानिमित्तमनभिलषितमप्यदृष्टं पापलक्षणं फलं बद्धवाऽनन्तं संसारं परिभ्रमन्तोऽनन्ता इह तिष्टन्ति, दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तु स्वल्पा अदृष्टं धर्मरूपं फलमासाद्य क्रमेण मुच्यन्त इति ।
ननु दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातृभिर्यददृष्टं धर्मलक्षणं फलमाशंसितं तत् तेषां भवतु, यैस्तु कृषि-हिंसादिक्रियाकर्तृभिरदृष्टमधर्मरूपं फलं नाशंसितं तत् तेषां कथं भवति ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , न ह्यविकलं कारणं स्वकार्य जनयत् कस्याप्याशंसामपेक्षते, किन्त्वविकल कारणतया स्वकार्य जनयत्येव । वप्तुरज्ञातमपि हि कोद्रवादिबीजं क्वचिद् भूप्रदेशे पतितं जलादिसामग्रीसद्भावेऽविकलकारणतां प्राप्तं वत्राशंसाभावेऽपि स्वकार्य जनयत्येव अविकलकारणभूताश्च कृषि-हिंसादयोऽधर्मजनने । अतस्तत्कर्तृगताशंसा तत्र क्वोपयुज्यते । न च दानादिक्रियायामपि विवेकिनः फलाशंसां कुर्वते, तथाप्यविकलकारणतया विशिष्टतरमेव ता धर्मफलं जनयन्ति । तस्मात् शुभाया अशुभायाश्च सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं शुभाऽशुभं फलमस्त्येवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् , अनन्तसंसारजीवसत्तान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति स्थितम् ॥ ७२ (१६२० ) ॥
____D. C.-0 gentle one ! Thus Agnibhati is addressed. By the very fact that creatures generally become active in (doing )
13

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evil deeds only, viz., cultivation of land, trading, doing injury to life, etc., the fruits of which are visible; but only a few become active in (doing ) good deeds, giving a gift, etc., the fruits of which are invisible—by that same fact, i. e., by that very reason, admit that also those very activities-cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are also activities, the fruits of which are invisible. The substance of what is said is this:Though the people who do the deeds, cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., only for the sake of the reward which is visible (. C., attained in this very birth) and not for the sin ( involved in their performance ), yet they do get an invisible fruit of the nature of religious demerit ( udharma ), viz.,—the sin ( papa )-because, if it were otherwise, there will be no explanation ( upapatti ) of there being in this world innumerable transmigrating souls. Because, they having earned ( baddhvā, lit.-having bound ) an invisible fruit of the nature of sin (pāpa ) though not sought by them, accrues to them, due to the activities, viz., cultivation of land, injury to life, etc., exist in this world in an indefinite number (anantūh tisthanti ) revolving in the endless cycle of births ( samsāra ). But those persons, few in number, who perform the deeds of giving a gift ( dana ), etc., attain an invisible reward of the nature of religious merit (dharma) and then they are liberated. Such is the sense.
An opponent may argue : Let those ( persons ) who do the deeds of giving a gift (dana ), etc., have that invisible reward of the nature of religious merit ( dharma ) which they expect. But how do those people who do the deeds of cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., get that invisible fruit of the nature of sin (adharma ) which they never wish to get ?
To this doubt the reply is as follows :--That ( argument ) is improper. For, a cause complete in itself ( uvikala ) does not stand in need of a wish or expectation on the part of

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Gañadharavāda . •: 99:anybody ( including even the doer of a deed ) when it is (in the process of) producing its effect, it rather, never fails to produce ( janayanti eva ) its effect because it is a self-complete cause. For, even though not known to the sower, the seed of codrava, etc., fallen in some tract of land and reaching the state of a self-complete cause by the presence of the materials, viz, the water, etc., does produce its effect even in the absence of a desire ( for that effect ) on the part of the sower. And deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings, etc., are. of the nature ( bhūta ) of self-complete causes in so for as the production of sin (a-dharma ) is concerned. Hence in such causes, where does the desire (if) present in the performer of those deeds become useful ? On the other hand, ( meaning of ca ) the wise ( i. e., those who do their duties disinterestedly-vivekinah ) have no desire for the fruits even in doing such deeds as giving a gift, etc., instead of this, such deeds being of the nature of " self-complete causes " produce the fruit in the form of religious merit (dharma ) which is only of a superior quality.
Therefore, it must be admitted that there is always an invisible fruit good or bad of any action whatsoever, whether it be good or bad, because otherwise there will be no propriety ( anupapatti ) of the existence of innumerable transmigrating souls.
To demonstrate the same the author says :इहरा अदिद्वरहिया सव्वे मुच्चेज ते अपयत्तेणं। . GEITH
ETT ll 03 11 (8898) Iharā adittharahiyā savve muccejja te apayattenam Aditthārambho ceva kesabahulo bhavijjāhi ( 73 11 ( 1621 ) [ इतरथाऽदृष्टरहिताः सर्वे मुच्येरंस्तेऽप्रयत्नेन ।
TERITFH TE TOTTEST waa 11 13 11 (???)

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Itarathadrstarahitah sarve mucyeranste'prayatnena | Adrstarambha eva klesabahulo bhavet ॥ 73 (1621)]
Trans.-73 Otherwise, they being without an unseen ( fruit of their actions viz. cultivation, etc.) will be all of them freed ( from transmigration ) without any effort (to be free) on their part. And the performance (arambha) of ( the good deeds like a gift to a worthy recepient dana, etc., which give the ) unseen ( good rewards ) will be itself (eva) the cause of much trouble ( lit. that in which there is much trouble ). (1621)
टीका-इतरथा यदि कृषि-हिंसाद्यशुभक्रियाणामदृष्टं फलं नाभ्युपगम्येत, तदा ते तत्कर्तारोऽदृष्टफलाभावाद् मरणानन्तरमेव सर्वेऽप्ययत्नेन मुच्येरन्-संसारकारणाभावाद् मुक्तिं गच्छेयुः, ततश्च प्रायः शून्य एव संसारः स्यादित्यर्थः । यश्चादृष्टारम्भोऽदृष्टफलानां दानादिक्रियाणां समारम्भः स एव क्लेशबहुलः संसारपरिभ्रमणकारणतया दुरन्तः स्यात् ; तथाहि-ते दानादिक्रियानुष्ठातारस्तदनुष्ठानेनादृष्टफलानुबन्धं विदध्युः, ततो जन्मान्तरे तद्विपाकमनुभवन्तस्तत्प्रेरिताः पुनरपि दानादिक्रियास्वेव प्रवर्तेरन् , ततो भूयस्तस्फलसंचयात् तद्विपाकानुभूतिः, पुनरपि दानादिक्रियारम्भः, इत्येवमनन्तसंततिमयः संसारस्तेषां भवेत् ।
तत्रैतत् स्यात् , इत्थमप्यस्तु, कात्र किलास्माकं बाधा ? । अत्रोच्यतेइयमंत्र गरीयसी भवतां बाधा, यत् कृषि-हिंसाद्यशुभक्रियानुष्टातॄणामदृष्टसंचयाभावे सर्वेषां मुक्तिगमन एकोऽपि तत्क्रियानुष्टाता संसारे क्वापि नोपलभ्येत, अशुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभविता चैकोऽपि न दृश्येत, दानादिशुभक्रियानुष्ठातारः शुभ तत्फलविपाकानुभवितारं एव च केवलाः सर्वत्रोपलभ्येरन् , न चैवं दृश्यते ॥ ७३ (१६२१)॥ ____D. C.-Otherwise-If no unseen ( evil ) reward of evil deeds like cultivation of land, injury to living beings etc., be assumed ( to accrue to the agent along with their visible reward in the shape of corn ) — They'-those who do those unseen evil deeds. They would be, all of them, freed without

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any effort of their own immediately after death, there being no invisible evil fruit (of their evil deeds like cultivation of land), i.e., they will attain Liberation, because there would be no reason for their transmigration. And, then, the author means, the world of transmigration would be mostly empty:
[Now, the latter half of the verse ] Adrstārambha the performance of meritorious deeds like 'dāna' 'a gift to a worthy recepient, etc., the fruits of which are invisible (or the unseen principle ). This performance itself would be kles'abahulah i. e., its result will be bad as it will be the cause of wandering in the mundane world. To explain the sameThose who perform the deeds of 'dāna''a gift to a worthy recepient'etc., would by performing them, aim at (anubandham vidadhyuh) the invisible fruit; then, in a succeeding birth while experiencing the maturity of that fruit (1. e., the object of enjoyment resulting from it ) they being propelled by it would be once again active in doing the same deeds of dāna, etc., then again by earning their fruit, the experience of its maturity ( will result ) and once again, the performance of the deeds of dāna etc. In this way, they will have transmigratory existence consisting of an endless series.
* (1) Here we beg to differ from the commentator, who seems to us, to have missed the force of klesa in the original verse. The author seems to mean that if we do not assume the evil unseen fruit of the evil deeds of krsi etc., then we have one out of two possibilities viz., all souls will be liberated immediately after their death, and (2) if we do not assume the conclusion, then, we shall have to take performance of the good deeds of dāna etc., as partly giving their good rewards and also partly but unfailingly giving the bad rewards leading to misery in a succeeding birth in this world. In this latter case, the performance of good deeds alone (eva in the verse) will be cause of much misery ( kleša ). We have to explain the great deal of misery in this world. We take it as an

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invisible result of either bad deeds like krsz or of good deeds liko dana alone. If we do not make either of these two assumptions, then, we should have no nisery in the world and every soul should be freed from the world immediately on departure from this world. Thus, the latter half of the verse is meant to lead to the contingency of assuming the good deeds ilone as the cause of the misery of the soul, and thus the cause of the samsāra of the soul. The commentator, · however, does not seem to us to emphasise the contigency of this assumption, that he takes the good deeds as cause of the worldly existence which may be in the form of repeated enjoyment in a series of successive births of only the good rewards of good deeds, there being no bad rewards of good deeds-The Translator's Note
To the above view of the Siddhāntin, an opponent may raise an objection as follows:-Let the case may be as you suggest, i. e., let the good deeds alone be assumed to give an unending series of births and deaths. What inconsistency ( badha ) will there be in our system (if the good deeds alone be the cause of transmigration ).
To this objection, we reply-the following will be the greatest inconsistency for you :-All souls will attain Liberation there being no collection of ( bad ) invisible fruit by those who perform the bad deeds viz., cultivation of the land, injury to living beings, etc., and in that case, not a single person performing those ( bad ) deeds (of cultivation of land etc.) will be found anywhere in the world, and not a single person experiencing the maturity of their rewards which are evil will be seen anywhere; and only persons who perform the good deeds of dana etc., and experience the maturity of their rewards which are good, will be found everywhere. And such is not the world which we see.
( In our opinion, this objection and its reply show the weakness of the commentary. The opponent, will receive

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.103:.
the reply as a welcome conclusion (iştāpatti ) and say that even though we do not at present find the world as occupied only by those who do the good deeds and get the good rewards, let it be so in future according to our assumption, since the assumption leads to a welcome result. Even though no body would get Liberation, the world in any case would be better than it is now. “ Na caivam drsyate” is, in any case not justified by any word in the original verse.-The Translator's Note.
___An opponent may ask “ What, therefore." So, the author replies :जमणि?भोगभाजो बहुतरगा जं च नेह मइपुत्वं । अदिवाणिट्ठफलं कोइ वि किरियं समारभइ ॥ ७४॥ (१६२२) तेण पडिवज्ज किरिया अदिद्वेगंतियप्फला सवा। दिट्ठाणेगंतफला सावि अदिट्ठाणुभावेण ॥७५ ॥ (१६२३)
Jamanitthabhogabhäjo bahutaragā jam ca neha maipuvvas i Aditthānitthaphalam koi vi kiriyam samārabhai 11 74 (1622) Tena padivajja kiriyā aditthegantiyapphalā savvā | Ditthanegantaphalā savi aditthānubhavena ॥ 75 (1623) [ यदनिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरका यच्च नेह मतिपूर्वाम् ।
अदृष्टानिष्टफलां कश्चिदपि क्रियां समारभते ।। ७४ ॥ (१६२२) तेन प्रतिपद्यस्व क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफला सर्वा ।
दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला साप्यदृष्टानुभावेन ॥ ७५ ॥ (१६२३) . Yadanistabhogabhājo bahutarakai yacca neha matipūrvām i Adrstanistaphalam kascidapi kriyām samārabhate ॥ 74 ( 1622) Tena pratipadyasva kriya’dřstaikāntikaphalā sarvā i Drstanaikāntikaphala Sapyadrstanubhavena ॥ 75 ( 1623 )] ____ Trans.-74-75 Since a great majority of souls experience undesired objects, and since none whatsoever is this world,

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*: 104 :
Jinabhadra Cani's [The second intentionally performs a deed giving an invisible and undesired reward, therefore, do conclude that all actions (good and bad) invariably give an unseen fruit and that action ( which produces a drsta fruit ) does not invariably produce a visible fruit because of the power of the adrsta ( the evil )unseen of the doer.t ___टीका-यस्मादनिष्टभोगभाजो बहुतरा भूयांसः-अशुभकर्मविपाकजनितदुःखमाज एव प्राणिनः प्रचुरा इहोपलभ्यन्ते, शुभकर्मविपाकनिबन्धनसुखानुभवितारस्तु स्वल्पा एवेति भावः। तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व शुभाऽशुभा वा सर्वाऽपि क्रिया, अदृष्टं शुभाशुभं कर्मरुपमैकान्तिकं फलं यस्याः साऽदृष्टेकान्तिकफलेत्युत्तरगाथायां संबन्धः। इदमुक्तं भवति-येन दुःखिनोऽत्र बहवः प्राणिनो दृश्यन्ते सुखिनस्तु स्वल्पाः, तेन ज्ञायते-कृषिवाणिज्य--हिंसादिक्रियानिवन्धनाशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाको दुःखिनाम्, इतरेषां तु दानादिक्रियाहेतुकशुभकर्मरूपादृष्टफलविपाक इति। व्यत्ययः कस्माद् न भवति इति चेत् । उच्यते-अशुभक्रियारम्भिणामेव बहुत्वात् , शुभक्रियानुष्टातॄणामेव च स्वलपत्वादिति ।
अत्राह-नन्वशुभक्रियारम्भफलामपि यद्यदृष्टफलं भवति, तत् किमिति दानादिक्रियारम्भक इव तदारम्भकोऽपि कश्चित् तदाशंसां कुर्वाणो न दृश्यते ? इत्याह-"जंच नेहेत्यादि" यस्माच नेहाऽदृष्टमनिष्टमशुभं फलं यस्याःसाऽदृष्टानिष्टफला तामित्थंभूतां क्रियां मतिपूर्वामाशंसाबुद्धिपूर्विकां कोऽपि समारभते, इत्यतो न कोऽपि तदाशंसां कुर्वाणो दृश्यते । तस्मात् सर्वापि क्रियाऽदृष्टैकान्तिकफलेति प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ।।
पुनरपि कथंभूताः ? इत्याह-" दिट्ठाणेगंतफल ति" दृष्टं धान्यद्रविणलाभादिकमनैकान्तिकमनवश्यंभावि फलं यस्याः कृषिवाणिज्यादिक्रियायाः सा दृष्टानैकान्तिकफला सर्वापि क्रिया । इदमुक्तं भवति-सर्वस्या अपि क्रियाया अदृष्टं फलं तावदेकान्तेनैव भवति, यत्तु दृष्टफलं तदनैकान्तिकमेव-कस्याश्चित् तद् भवति कस्याश्चिद् नेत्यर्थः। एतश्च दृष्टफलस्यानैकान्तिकत्वमदृष्टानुभावेनैवेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । न हि समानसाधनारब्धतुल्यक्रि
+ Vide our note at the end of the commentary on verse 1621.

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
•: 105 :•
ammi zûdgai ànea zenofaara:, azaza y a, grdazzeègnzaरेणोपपद्यत इति भावः । एतच्चैव प्रागुक्तमेवेति ॥ ७४-७५ (१६२२-१६२३)।।
D. C.-" Since.........objects "" means "because in this world innumerable beings are found to be only unhappy due (janita) to the maturity of evil actions; " it also means "Only few are those who enjoy happiness which depends upon (nibandhana) the maturity of good actions. Tena-because of that reason, O gentle student! know that (i. e. conclude that) each and every action good or bad, is adṛṣṭaikantika phala i. e., such as gives a reward which is invariably of the form of a ( new) action which is unseen and both good and bad. Thus, "anistabhogabhajo bahutarakaḥ" is to be connected with "tena.........sarva the first half of the succeeding verse (v/1623). The sense of the sentence is as follows:-Because in this world we find a great majority of beings to be suffering and only a few to be enjoying, we should infer that in the case of the suffering, the fruit of the unseen principle (adrsta) in the form of "evil karma "† based upon (nibandhana) activities like cultivation of land, trade, injury to living beings etc., has ripened, but in the case of the rest (the enjoying) the fruit of the unseen principle (adṛṣṭa) in the form of good karma produced by (hetuka) the activities of giving a gift to a worthy recipient has ripened. An opponent may ask Why not the reverse of what you say? The reply is as follows:-Just because in the world only those who do evil activities are in a majority and only those who perform good deeds are in a minority.
C6
33
33
Here the opponent argues:-If even those who do evil deeds get a fruit in the form of an adṛṣṭa (in addition to the drsta or visible fruit e. g., the crops by means of cultivation of the land), then why is it that, just like one who does
33
†The word "karma is here used in the sense of samcita karma which is also called adrsta-Tr.

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.: 106 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The second
the deed of dana, that man also who does the evil deed is never found to hold an expectation for that adṛṣṭa?
To this the reply is: And since etc. And because none in this world does intentionally i. e., with a previous expectation (asamsa buddhi purvikam) such deed as would give a fruit unseen and evil. It is due to this reason that no body is found to hold an expectation for the evil unseen (adrsta) [ while he does the deeds of krsi etc ]. Therefore, conclude that all actions (good like dana and bad like krṣi) whatever invariably give a result which is adṛṣṭa (unseen ).
"
""
What other qualifications do actions possess? To this the reply is" ditthaneganta phala tti (beginning of the latter half of v. 1623). All actions-cultivation of land, trade, etc., bear a visible fruit viz., the acquision of corn, money etc., which is not absolute i. e., which is not invariably accruing (anavasyam bhavi ). It means that every action invariably "produces an invisible fruit; but the visible fruit which is to be produced is not absolute or invariably happening i. c., some action produces it and some action does not produce it. And this uncertainty of the visible fruit must be accepted as the effect of the power of an adṛṣṭa (a destiny of the man who does the deed of krsi etc.,) because when one out of two or many persons who do the same action (e. g., cultivation of land) with the same means, suffers the loss of his visible fruit (crops) while another does not, it never happens without a cause in the form of adrsta, the evil unseen. Moreover, this has been already explained in this very book.t
[The commentator is anxious to explain savva kiriyā' as all actions good (like dana) and bad (like krsi); but it is very difficult to explain how the good actions (like dana)
When the crops of a cultivator fails, the failure is due to his adrsta and not to his action of cultivation which is a drsta or visible deed.

Page #150

Vada ]
Gañadharavada
• 107 :
can bear a visible fruit ( ditthāneganta phala ); so even the commentator has somehow to explain it as referring only to the bad actions like krsi etc.
We hold that by savva kiriyā we should take only the bad actions like cultivation of land, trade, etc. The purpose of the verse is to explain how all bad actions bear invariably a bad fruit which is invisible ( adittha ) and how even the visible fruits which these bad actions bear and which the agent intentionally aims at, are uncertain and therefore the result of the man's adrsta, the invisible karma. The visible action which a man does e. g., krsi bears two kinds of fruits invisible and visible, both of which are dependent upon the man's adrsta ( aditthānubhāvena ). Since we find most people suffering and since we find that none does any bad action even e. g. krsi with the intention that the result be bad and invisible i. e.. that he may be unhappy in his next life as a result of krsi, we must conclude that all bad actions like krsi give invariably an adrsta invisible bad result.
Thus, in our opinion the proper conclusion (padivajja) from the whole of v. 1622 is the first half of v. 1623. The latter half of v. 1623 is only an additional remark. The commentator .connects the first half of v. 1623 with first half of v. 1622 and the latter half of the former, with the latter half of the latter. As the latter half of v. 1622 refers only to adrsta anista, it cannot be connected with the latter half of v. 1623 'which refers only to the drsta phala and traces it to adrsta karmas. Tr. ]
Or, of what avail is this trouble? • Karma' is a.foregone conclusion. By what argument? He replies :अहवा फलाउ कम्मं कज्जत्तणओ पसाहियं पुवं । परमाणवो घडस्स व किरियाण तयं फल भिन्नं ॥७६॥ (१६२४) Ahavā phalāu kammam kajjattanao pasāhiyam puvvam i Paramāņavo ghadassa va kiriyāna tayam phalam bhinnam 1176 (1624)

Page #151

: 108:
Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The second [ अथवा फलात् कर्म कार्यत्वतः प्रसाधितं पूर्वम् ।
परमाणवो घटस्येव क्रियाणां तत् फलं भिन्नम् ॥ ७६ ॥ (१६२४) Athava phalāt karma karyatvataḥ prasādhitam pūrvami Paramāņavo ghatasyeva kriyaņām tat phalam bhinnam || 76 (1624)]
Trans.-76 Or rather, — karman' is already proved from the fruit ( i. e., the special fruit ) i. e., from ( the fact that, that special fruit is ) an effect. Just as the atoms of a pot ( are different from a pot ) the effect of actions is different from those actions. ( 1624 )
जो तुल्लसाहणाणं फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेउं । कजत्तणओ गोयम ! घडो व, हेऊ य सो कम्मं ॥
Jo tullasahaņāņam phale viseso na so viņā heūm 1 Kajjattanao Goyama! ghado vva, heā ya so kammam॥(verse 1613)
टीका-इत्यस्यां गाथायां प्रागस्माभिः कर्म प्रसाधितमेव । कुतः ? इत्याह-फलात् तुल्यसाधनानां यः फले विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः। ततोऽपि फलविशेषात् कस्मात् प्रसाधितं कर्म ? इत्याह-कार्यत्वात् तस्य फलविशेषस्य, यच्च कार्य तस्य कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, यच्चेह कारणं तत् कर्म। "किरियाण तयं फलं भिन्नं ति" तदेव च कर्म सर्वासामपि क्रियाणामदृष्टं फलमित्येवमिहापि साध्यते । कथं भूतम् ? ताभ्यः क्रियाभ्यो भिन्नम् , कर्मणः कार्यत्वात् , क्रियाणां च कारणत्वात् , कार्यकारणयोश्च परस्परं भेदादिति भावः ॥ ७६ ( १६२४ )॥
D. C.-Or, there is a difference as to the fruit achieved, though those who try to achieve it, use the same and equal means. That difference cannot take place without a cause. O Gautama ! like the pot, that cause is “ karma” on account of the fact that that ( difference ) is an effect.
While explaining this verse we have already proved

Page #152

Vada ]
Gañadharavada . •; 109 : “ karma." Whence ? He replies—" From the fruit i, e., from that difference in the fruit ( achieved by different people with equal means ).” How is 'karma? proved on the strength of that difference of fruit ? He replies:--
“ From its being an effect, " 6. e., because that difference of fruit is an effect. There is invariably a cause corresponding to what is an effect, just as atoms of earth are the cause of a pot, ” and in this case the cause is an action. “ The effect of actions is different from those actions" and it can be proved here that that very' karman'is the unseen fruit of all actions whatever. What kind of action is it? It is different from those actions. Since this "karman' is an effect and since actions are the cause, and since an effect and a cause must be mutually different, the karman’ is different from those actions. 1624
The author states an objection to this and its reply:आह नणु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कज्जमुत्तिमत्ताओ। इह जह मुत्तत्तणओ घडस्स परमाणवो मुत्ता ॥७७॥ (१६२५) Aha naņu muttamevam muttam ciya kajjamuttimaitāo i Iha jaha muttattanao ghadassa parmānavo mūttā 11 77 (1625) · [SITE 78 yawa gawa praviãamara II
इह यथा मूर्तत्वतो घटस्य परमाणवो मूर्ताः ॥ ७७ (१६२५)॥ Aha nanu mūrtamevam mūrtameva kāryamurtimattvät Iha yathā mūrtatvato ghatasya parmāņavo mūrtāḥ || ( 1625 )]
Trans.-77 (The opponent will say,) “ Then the action ( karman) has a physical form ( mūrta ).” We (the Siddhantin) would reply, “ The action has indeed a physical form because its effect ( viz., the body ) has a physical form. In this world the atoms (paramāņus ) the cause of the pot, the effect which has a physical form, will have also a physical form.” ( 1625 )
टीका-आह प्रेरक:-ननु यदि कार्याणां शरीरादीनां दर्शनात् तत्का

Page #153

: 110 :- . Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second रणभूतं कर्म साध्यते, तर्हि कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात् कर्मापि मूर्त प्रामोति ।
आचार्य उत्तरमाह-" मुत्तं चियेत्यादि " यदस्माभिः प्रयत्नेन साधयितव्यम् , तद्भवतापि परसिद्धान्तानभिज्ञबालबुद्धितयाऽनिष्टापादनाभिप्रायेण साधितमेव, तथाहि-वयमपि ब्रूमः-मूर्तमेव कर्म, तत्कार्यस्य शरीरादेमूर्तत्वात् , इह यस्य यस्य कार्य मूतं तस्य तस्य कारणमपि मूर्तम् , यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, यच्चामूर्त कार्यं न तस्य कारणं मूर्त, यथा ज्ञानस्यात्मेति । समवायिकारणं चेहाधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणभूता रूपाऽऽलोकादय इति । आह-ननु सुख-दुःखादयोऽपि कर्मणः कार्यम् , अतस्तेषाममूर्तत्वात् कर्मणोऽमूर्तत्वमपि प्राप्नोति । न हि मूर्तादमूर्तप्रसवो युज्यते । न चैकस्य मूर्तत्वममूर्तत्वं च युक्तम् , विरुद्धत्वात् । अत्रोच्यते-नन्वत एवात्र समवायिकारणमधिक्रियते, न निमित्तकारणम् , सुख-दुःखादीनां चात्मधर्मत्वादात्मैव समवायिकारणम् , कर्म पुनस्तेषामन्न-पानाऽहि-विषादिवद् निमित्तकारणमेवेत्यदोष इति ॥ ७७ (१६२५)॥
D. C.--The opponent asks “If on the ground that we can see (physically ) the body, etc., which are the effects, the karman is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the karman also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form."
The Ācārya replies :-" Karman has indeed a physical form..." What we intend to prove with great effort, you also have already proved with an intention to lead us to an unacceptable position, because your intelligence is like that of a child ( or a fool ) who does not know the doctrine of others. To explain the same-We also say " A karman is nothing but possessed of a physical form, because its effect, the body, etc., has a physical form. In this world, the causes of the various effects having a physical form are also possessed of a physical form e. g., the atoms which are the cause of a pot. And if an effect is without a physical form, its cause is not possessed of a physical form e. g., Atman which is the cause of knowledge (jñāna). And in this discussion the essential cause ( samavāyi

Page #154

Vada ]
Gañadharavada
·
111 ?
karana ) is the topic of consideration and not the objects which are only the instrumental causes, such as the form (rūpa ), the light ( aloka ) etc.
The opponent will argue—“The pleasure, the pain, etc., are also of the nature of effects (like the body, etc. ). Herice, since they have no physical form, we would argue that the karman is also devoid of a physical form, because the rise of something devoid of a physical form is not possible (or reasonable) as taking place from something which has a physical form. Nor is it possible that one and the same thing be both mūrta (possessed of a physical form ) and a-mūrta (devoid of a physical form ) since that would be self-contradictory. "
To this objection we reply :-Indeed, for this very reason, the intimate or essential cause only is taken as the topic of our consideration and we have excluded the discussion of the instrumental cause. As the pleasure, the pain, etc., are the properties of the soul ( Atman), the soul alone is their essential cause, while karman is only the instrumental cause, while karman is only the instrumental cause of the pleasure, the pain, etc., just as are the food, the drink, the poison of a snake, etc. Thus there is no flaw in our doctrine. 1625
The Ācārya mentions also other arguments proving the physical nature ( mūrtatva ) of an action ( karman ):-- तह सुहसंवित्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुब्भवाओ य । ashaIETOT137Ì TETOTTAISĪT Quoti II VCHI (-882€)
आहार इवानल इव घडु व्व नेहाइकयबलाहाणो । खीरमिवोदाहरणाई कम्मरूवित्तगमगाइं ॥ ७९ ॥ (१६२७) Taha suhasamvittîo sambandhe veyanubbhavāo ya i Bajjhabalāhāņão pariņāmāo ya vinneyam 11 71 ( 1626 ) Ahāra ivānala iva ghadu vya nehāi kaya balāhāno 1 Khîramivodāharaṇāim kammarūvittagamagāim 11 79 ( 1627 )

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.: 112
Jinabhadra Gani's [The second [ तथा सुखसंवित्तेः संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवाच । बाह्यवलाधानात् परिणामाच विज्ञेयम् ॥ ७८ (१६२६)॥ आहार इवानल इव घट इव स्नेहादिकुतबलाधानः ।
क्षीरमिवोदाहरणानि कर्मरूपित्वगमकानि ।। ७९ (१६२७)॥ Tatha sukhasamvitteh sambandhe vedanodbhavācca / Bāhyabalādhānāt pariņāmācca vijñeyam || 78 (1626 ) Ahära ivānala iva ghata iva snehädikşta balādhānah | Kșiramivodaharoņāni karmarūpitvagamakāni 11 79 (1627 ) ]
Trans.—78–79 Also the fact that the karman has a physical form should be admitted because in the association
( with the karman ) the consciousness of pleasure, etc., (becomes · possible ) and because of the rise of experience of heat
( vedana ) when one is in association (with the karman ) because it is possible to add to the strength of the 'karman' by external means and because of the fact that karman undergoes change.
The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that karman has a physical form ( and are to be taken respectively with each of the four arguments stated in the above verse—(1) Like food, (2) like fire, (3) like the addition of strengh made by means of oil, etc, to a pot of earth, (and) (4) like the ( change of ) milk. ( 1626-1627)
टीका-इह प्रथमगाथोपन्यस्तहेतुचतुष्टयस्य द्वितीयगाथायां यथासंख्यं चत्वारो दृष्टान्ता द्रष्टव्याः। तत्र मूर्त कर्म तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंवित्तेः, इह यत्संबन्धे सुखादि संवेद्यते तद् मूर्त दृष्टम् , यथाऽशनाद्याहारः, यच्चामूर्त न तत्संबन्धे सुखादिसंविदस्ति, यथाऽऽकाशसंबन्धे, संवेद्यते च तत्संबन्धे सुखादि, तस्मात् मूर्तं कर्मेति । तथा, यत्संबन्धे वेदनोद्भवो भवति तद् मूर्त दृष्टम् , यथाऽनलोग्निः, भवति च कर्मसंबन्धे वेदनोद्भवः तस्मात् तद् मूर्त
+ Thus · Sambandhe' is to be construed with both suhasamvitti and veyanubbhava.

Page #156

Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 118 : मिति । तथा, मूर्त कर्म, आत्मनो ज्ञानादीनां च तद्धर्माणां व्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति बाह्येन सक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गनादिना बलस्योपचयस्याधीयमानत्वात् , यथा स्नेहाद्याहितबलो घटः, इह यस्यानात्म-विज्ञानादेः सतो बाह्येन वस्तुना बलमाधीयते तद् मूर्त दृष्टम् , यथा स्नेहादिनाऽऽधीयमानबलो घटः, आधीयते च बार्मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुभूतैर्वस्तुभिः कर्मण उपचयलक्षणं बलम् , तस्मात् तद् मूर्तमिति । तथा, मूर्त कर्म, आत्मादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति परिणामित्वात् , क्षीरमिवेति । एवमादीनि हेतूदाहरणानि कर्मणो रूपित्व- . गमकानीति ॥ ७८-७९ (१६२६-१६२७ )॥ ____D. C.-The four illustrations stated in the second verse should be respectively taken as those of the four arguments presented in the first verse viz.:--The karman has a physical form (mūrtam ) because of the experience of pleasure etc. when one is united with that karman: in this world that in association with which the pleasure etc. are experienced is found to be something having a physical form, just as the food one eats etc; and there is no experience of pleasure etc, in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether.
But in association with that i. e., karman we do experience pleasure etc. therefore, the karman has a physical form. Similarly, that in association with which a burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with the fire, and the rise of a burning sensation, pain occurs when one is in association with the karman; therefore, it has a form. Here the author states an objection and its reply:
अह मयमसिद्धमेयं परिणामाउ त्ति सो वि कज्जाओ। सिद्धो परिणामो से दहिपरिणामादिव पयस्स ॥ ८०॥ (१६२८)
Aha mayamasiddhameyam pariņāmāu tti so vi kajjāo i Siddho pariņāmo se dahipariņāmādiva payassa u 80 ( 1628 )
16

Page #157

* 114 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The second [अथ मतमसिद्धमेतत् परिणामादिति सोऽपि कार्यात् ।
सिद्धः परिणामस्तस्य दधिपरिणामादिव पयसः ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८) Atha matamasiddhauetat pariņāmāditi so’pi kāryāt i Siddha) pariņāmastasya dadhipariņāmādiva payasaḥ || 80 (1628 ]
Trans.-80 Again ( the opponent will say ) this (i.e. Karmarūpatva) could not be accomplished by ( virtue of) the hetu that it undergoes change. ( But ) even that is due to Karya. Just as the mutability of milk is established by the mutability of curds, its mutability could ( also ) be established ( by that of Karya ). ( 1628)
टीका-अथ 'परिणामित्वात्' इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति मतं भवतः । एतदप्ययुक्तम् , यतः सोऽपि परिणामः सिद्धः कर्मणः, 'कजाउ त्ति' कर्मकार्यस्य शरीरादेः परिणामित्वदर्शनादित्यर्थः । इह यस्य कार्य परिणाम्युपलभ्यते तस्यात्मनोऽपि परिणामित्वं निश्चीयते, यथा दध्नस्तकादिभावेन परिणामात् पयसोऽपि परिणामित्वं विज्ञायत एवेति ॥ ८० ॥ (१६२८)
D. C.-Again, you would believe that Kurman is asiddha by reason of its parināma. But that is not proper. The parināmituri of Karman is apprehended from the parināmitva of its Kūryus like Sarîru etc. For, when the effect is mutable, mutability of the action is automatically recognized, just as the mutability of milk is recognized from the pariņāma of its Karya viz, curds, in the form of butter-milk.
Agnibhūti asks :अब्भादिविगाराणं जह वेचित्तं विणा वि कम्मेण । तह जइ संसारीणं हवेज को नाम तो दोसो ? ॥८१॥ (१६२९) Abbhādivigārānam jaha vecittani viņā vi kammeņa i Taha jai sainsārîņam havejja ko nāma to doso ? 11 81 ( 1629 ) [ अभ्रादिविकाराणां यथा वैचित्र्यं विनापि कर्मणा ।
तथा यदि संसारिणां भवेत् को नाम ततो दोषः ? ॥ ८१॥ (१६२९)

Page #158

Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
Abhrādivikārāṇām yatha vaicitryam vinapi karmanā i Tatha yadi samsarinam bhavet ko nāma tato dosah | 81 (1529) ]
• 115 : •
Trans.-81 Just as a variety of visible changes in the clouds etc. is apprehended even without (the help of) Karman in the same way, what harm is there if it is so in the case of mundane souls also ? (1629 )
टीका- आह- ननु यथाभ्रादिविकाराणामन्तरेणापि कर्म वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते, तथा तेनेव प्रकारेण संसारिजीवस्कन्धानामपि सुख - दुःखादिभावेन वैचित्र्यं यदि कर्मविनापि स्यात्, ततः को नाम दोषो भवेत् ? - न कोऽपीत्यर्थः ॥। ८१ ।। ( १६२९ )
D. C.-A variety of various visible changes in the clouds is apprehended even in the absence of Karman. In the same way, in the case of mundane souls also, there would be no harm if we believe that a variety of vikaras like sukha, duḥkha etc. exists without the help of Karman.
The Acarya replies:
कम्मम्मि व को भेओ जह बज्झक्खंधचित्तया सिद्धा । तह कम्पोग्गलाण व विचित्तया जीवसहियाणं ॥ ८२ ॥ (१६३०)
Kammammi va ko bheo jaha bajjhakkhandhacittaya siddhā Taha kammapoggalāna vi vicittayā jivasahiyānam || 82 (1630 )
[ कर्मणि वा को भेदो यथा बाह्यस्कन्धचित्रता सिद्धा ।
तथा कर्मपुद्गलानामपि विचित्रता जीवसहितानाम् ॥। ८२ ।। (१६३० ) Karmaņi vā ko bhedo yatha bahyaskandhacitrată siddhā | Tatha karmapudgalanamapi vicitrata jivasahitānām || 82 (1630 ) ]
Trans.—82 ( Then ) what difference ( would it make ) even in the case of Karman? Just as the variegation of external objects is proved, variegation of the Karmapudgalas could also be proved. ( 1630 )

Page #159

•: 116 : . Jinabhadra Gaại’s [The second
टीका-यद्यभ्रविकाराणां गन्धर्वनगरेन्द्रधनुरादीनां गृह-देवकुल-प्राकार-तरु-कृष्ण-नील-रक्तादिभावेन वैचित्र्यमिष्यते सौम्य! वाशब्दस्यापिशब्दार्थत्वात, तर्हि कर्मण्यपि को भेदः को विशेषः, येन तत्र वैचित्र्यं नाभ्युपगम्यते ? । ननु हन्त ! यथा सकललोकप्रत्यक्षाणाममीषां गन्धर्वपुर-शक्र. कोदण्डादीनां बाह्यस्कन्धानां विचित्रता भवतोऽपि सिद्धा, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेणान्तराणामपि कर्मस्कन्धानां पुद्गलमयत्वे समानेऽपि जीवसहितत्वस्य विशेषवतो वैचित्र्यकारणसद्भावेऽपि सुख-दुःखादिजनकरूपतया विचित्रता किमिति नेष्यते ? । यदि ह्यभ्रादयो बाह्यपुद्गला नानारूपतया परिणमन्ति, तर्हि जीवैः परिगृहीताः सुतरां ते तथा परिणंस्यन्तीति भावः ॥ ८२(१६३०)। ___D. C.-0 Saumya ! If forms such as a house, a temple, a wall, black, green, red etc. are believed as the variety of visible changes like a gandharva city or a rain-bow in the sky, what harm is there if the same kind of variety is accepted in the case of Karman also ? Variegation of objects having external forms is admissible to you. Now, the internal Karmaskandhas consist of the same substance as the bāhya skandhas; and on the top of that, they are alive. Moreover, as they produce sukha, duhkha etc. as their vikaras there is all the more reason to admit vaicitrya of the Karma-pudgalas. Thus when various transformations in the case of lifeless bāhya pudgalas are admitted, they are all the more acceptable in the case of Karma-pudgalas which are surrounded by the cetana jāvas. बज्झाण चित्तया जइ पडिवन्ना कम्मणो विसेसेण । जीवाणुगयस्स मया भत्तीण व सिप्पिनत्थाणं ॥ ८३॥ (१६३१) Bajjhāna cittayā jai padivannā kammano visesena i Jivanugayassa maya bhattina va sippinatthānam | 83 ( 1631 ) [ बाह्यानां चित्रता यदि प्रतिपन्ना कर्मणो विशेषेण ।।
जीवानुगतस्य मता भक्तीनामिवि शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् ॥८३॥ (१६३१) Bāhyānām citratá yadi pratipannā karmaṇo višeşeņa i Jivanugatasya mata bhaktinamiva silpinyastānām ॥ 83 ( 1631)]

Page #160

Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 117 : Trans.—83 If variety (in the case ) of external ( objects) is established, variety ( in the case) of Karman which is surr. ounded by soul should ( all the more ) be accepted ( as positive like the variety of forms laid down in a piece of art. ( 1631
टीका-यदि हि जीवापरिगृहीतानामपि बाह्यानामभ्रादिपुद्गलानां नानाकारपरिणतिरूपा चित्रता त्वया प्रतिपन्ना, तर्हि जीवानुगतानां कर्मपुद्गलानां विशेषत एवास्माकं भवतश्च सा सम्मता भविष्यति, भक्तयो विच्छित्तयस्तासामिव चित्रादिषु शिल्पिन्यस्तानाम् । अयमभिप्राय:चित्रकरादिशिल्पिजीवपरिगृहीतानां चित्र-लेप्य-काष्ठकर्मानुगतपुद्गलानां या परिणामचित्रता सा वित्रसापरिणतेन्द्रधनुरादिपुद्गलपरिणामचित्रतायाः सकाशाद् विशिष्टैवेति प्रत्यक्षतः एव दृश्यते । अतो जीवपरिगृहीतत्वेन कर्मपुद्गलानामपि सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यजननरूपा विशिष्टतरा परिणामचित्रता कथं न स्यात् । इति ॥ ८३ (१६३१) ॥
D. C.--Now that you have accepted citrută in the form of manifold transformations in the case of bahyu-pudgalas like abhra etc. which are not surrounded by jîva, you shall have to accept the same in the case of Karmn-pudgalas also as they have already been surrouided by jîvas. · Again, the citratā of forms drawn by an artist in painting, sculpturing, carpentry etc. is peculiarly distinct from the citratā of the manifold vikaras of bāhya-pudgalas like rain-bow etc., while in the case of Karma-pudgalas also, the pariņāmacitratā is peculiarly distinct from the other two varieties, firstly because it gives rise to alterations like sukha, duḥkha etc. and secondly because it is aided by jîva.
___Again, the opponent asks :तो जइ तणुमेत्तं चिय हवेज का कम्मकप्पणा नाम?। कम्मं पि नणु तणु च्चिय सण्हयरब्भंतरा नवरं ॥८४॥ (१६३२) To jai taņumettam ciya havejja kā kammakappaņā nāma ?! Kammam pi nanu tanu cciya sanhayarabbhantara navaram ॥ (1632)

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.: 118 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The second
[ ततो यदि तनुमात्रमेव भवेत् का कर्मकल्पना नाम ? ।
कर्मापि ननु तनुरेव सूक्ष्मतराभ्यन्तरा नवरम् ॥ ८४ ॥ ( १६३२ ) Tato yadi tanumātrameva bhavet kā karma-kalpanā nāma ? I Karmapi nanu tanureva sūksmatarābhyantarā navaram || 84(1632)]
Trans.-84 Now, if Karman is itself the body, why should Karman be assumed at all? That is not proper. In fact Karman is also a body though subtle and interior to a great extent. ( 1632)
टीका-एवं मन्यते परः-यद्यभ्रादिविकाराणामिव कर्मपुद्गलानां विचित्रपरिणतिरभ्युपगम्यते । ततो बाह्यं सकलजनप्रत्यक्षं तनुमात्रमेवेदं सुरूपकुरूप-सुख-दुःखादिभात्रैः स्वभावत एवाभ्रादिविकारवद् विचित्ररूपतया परिणमति, इत्येतदेवास्तु, का नाम पुनस्तद्वैचित्र्यहेतुभूतस्यान्तर्गडुकल्पस्य कर्मणः परिकल्पना, स्वभावादेव सर्वस्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामवैचित्र्यस्य सिद्धत्वात् ? इति । भगवानाह-"कम्मं पीत्यादि"। अयमभिप्रायः-यद्यभ्रादिविकाराणामिव तनोर्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगम्यते, तहिं ननु कर्मापि तनुरेव, कार्मणशरीरमेवेत्यर्थः, केवलं श्लक्ष्णतरा, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ; अभ्यन्तरा च, जीवेन सहातिसंश्लिष्टत्वात् । ततश्च यथाऽभ्रादिविकारवद् बाह्यस्थूरतनोवैचित्र्यमभ्युपगम्यते, तथा कर्मतनोरपि तत्कि नाभ्युपगम्यते ? इति भावः ॥८४(१६३२)।
D. C.--The opponent-Now that Karma-pudgalas have been accepted as having variegated transformations like various visible changes in clouds etc. this body also, which is pratyaksa to all, can undergo a number of alternations by virtue of its svabhāva in the form of surūpa, kurūpa, sukha, duḥkha etc, And hence, it is not at all necessary to assume an intervening agent like Karman for the production of surîra etc. For, a variety of visible changes in the case of all pudgalas is accomplished by its very svabhāvu.
The Ācārya-Because we take the vaicitrya of tanu as being similar to that of various vikaras in abhra etc. the Karman should also be taken as tanu. This Kārmana body

Page #162

Vada 1
Gañadharavāda
.
::119:.
is very subtle as it is beyond the cognizance of senses and it is of an interior nature because it is so closely connected with jîva. So, vicitrata in the case of a Kārmaņa sarira should be recognized just as variegation of an external gross object is apprehended as that of vikāras of the clouds etc. -
Again, the author states an objection and its reply :को तीए विणा दोसो थूलाए सबहा विप्पमुक्कस्स । देहग्गहणाभावो तउ य संसारवोच्छित्ती॥ ८५॥ (१६३३) Ko tîe viņā doso thūlāe savvahā vippamukkassa 1 Dehaggahaņābhāvo täu ya sarisäravocchittî u 85 ( 1633 ) [ कस्तया विना दोषः स्थूलया सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य ।
देहग्रहणाभावस्ततश्च संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः ।। ८५ ॥ (१६३३ ) Kastaya vina dosah sthūlayā sarvathā vipramuktasya ı Dehagrahaņābhāvastatasca samsāravyavacchittiḥ || 85 ( 1633 )]
Trans.-85 ( The opponent will say— ) What harm is there in ( believing ) its absence ? ( The reply is-) It is impossible for (the soul) liberated from a gross body to enter a ( new ) body in that case; and ultimately a ( complete ) break-off of the mundane world ( will follow ). ( 1633 )
टीका-प्रेरकः प्राह-ननु बाह्यायाः स्थूरतन्वा वैचित्र्यं प्रत्यक्षदृष्टत्वादेवाभ्रादिविकारवदभ्युपगच्छामः । अन्तरङ्गायास्तु कर्मरूपायाः सूक्ष्मतनोर्वैचित्र्यं कथमिच्छामः, तस्याः सर्वथाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ? । अथ तदनभ्युपगमे दोषःकोऽ प्यापतति, ततोऽर्थापत्तेरेव तद्विचित्रताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या, तर्हि निवेद्यतां कस्तया विना दोषोऽनुषज्यते ? । आचार्यः प्राह-मरण काले स्थूलया दृश्यमानतन्वा सर्वथा विप्रमुक्तस्य जन्तोभवान्तरगतस्थूलतनुग्रहणनिबन्धनभूतां सूक्ष्मकर्मतनुमन्तरेणातनदेहग्रहणाभावलक्षणो दोषः ममापद्यते । न हि निष्कारणमेव शरीरान्तरग्रहणं युज्यते । ततश्च देहान्तरग्रहणानुपपत्तेमरणानन्तरं सर्वस्याप्यशरीरत्वादयत्नेनैव संसारव्यवच्छित्तिः स्यात् ।। ८५ ( १६३३ ) ॥

Page #163

: 120 : . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second ____D. C.--The opponent--We recognize the variety of sthilasarîra by virtue of its being pratyaksa. But we cannot apprehend the variety of a sūksma sarîra as it is absolutely a-pratyaksna (imperceptible ). Hence, if we do not accept the sūksma-sarira at all, will you kindly tell me what difficulty would arise ?
Ācārya-If the suksma Kārmana sarîra is not accepted, in its absence the soul when liberated from the sthūla-sarira after death, will not be able to enter the new body at the next · birth. For, this Kārmana sarara is the only agency through which a new body could be attained in the next birth. So, in case this sūksma karmana sarîra is not accepted, jîva will not enter a new body after death and ultimately the whole of the mundane world will become disjuncted in absence of effort on the part of jîvas.
And even if it were so, what would happen ? सबविमोक्खावत्ती निकारणउ व्व सव्वसंसारो। भवमुकाणं व पुणो संसरणमओ अणासाओ॥८६॥ (१६३४) Savvavimokkhāvattî nikkāraṇau vva savvasaṁsāro i Bhavamukkānam va puno samsaranamao anāsao ॥ 86 ( 1634) [ सर्वविमोक्षापत्तिनिष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः।
भवमुक्तानां वा पुनः संसरणमतोऽनाश्वासः॥ ८६ ।। (१६३४ ) Sarvavimo kśápattir-nişkāraṇako vā sarvasamsārah | Bhavamuktānām vā punah sansaraṇamato'nāśvāsaḥ 11 86 (1734)]
Trans.-86 ( In that case ) all will attain Moksa ; the whole of mundane world would become useless; those who are exempted from existence will have birth and re-birth; and there will be no consolation for Moksa even. ( 1634 )
टीका-ततः संसारव्यवच्छेदानन्तरं सर्वस्यापि जीवराशेर्मोक्षापत्तिर्भवेत । अथाशरीराणामपि संसारपर्यटनम् , तर्हि निष्कारण एव सर्वस्यापि संसारः स्यात् , भवमुक्तानां च सिद्धानामित्थं पुनरप्यकस्माद् निष्कारण एव

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: 121 :संसारपातः स्यात् । तथैव च तत्र संसरणम् । ततश्च मोक्षेऽप्यनाश्वास इति ॥ ८६ (१६३४)॥
D. C.-In that case there is disjunction of the entire mundane world; all the living beings will attain moksa. Again those that are bodiless will also wander in the world along with others that have bodies; the mundane world will become niskarana or good-for-nothing. Moreover, Siddhas that are exempted from existence will also have to fall back into sanisära. and hence into the cycle of birth and re-birth. Ultimately there will be no consolation even in molesa. Thus, along with. disjunction of the entire mundane world, all the above-stated difficulties will arise if Karnan is not admitted as the cause of variety.
Again the opponent asks :मुत्तस्सामुत्तिमया जीवेण कहं हवेज संबंधो ? । सोम्म! घडस्स व नभसा जह वा दबस्स किरियाए॥८७॥(१६३५) Muttassāmuttimayā jîvena kaham havejja sambandho? I Somma! ghadassa vva nabhasa jaha va davvassa kiriyāe ॥ (1635) [ मूर्तस्यामूर्तिमता जीवेन कथं भवेत् संबन्धः ।
सौम्य ! घटस्येव नभसा यथा वा द्रव्यस्य क्रियया ॥ ८७॥ (१६३५) Mārtasyāmūrtimatā jîvena katham bhavet sambandhah ? | Saumya! ghatasyeva nabhasa yathā vā dravyasya kriyayā|187(1635)]
___Trans.-87 “ How can the corporeal (Karman) be related to the incorporeal Jiva ? " ( The Acarya replies :-) O Saumya ! ( Their relation is ) like the relation of ghata with sky or like that of substance ( dravya ) with action ( kriyā). ( 1635)
___टीका-ननु मूर्त कर्मेति प्राग् भवद्भिः समर्थितम् । तस्य च मूर्तस्य कर्मणोऽमूर्तेन जीवेन सह कथं संयोगलक्षणः समवायलक्षणो वा संबन्धः
16

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•: 122 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The second स्यात् । अतः कर्मसिद्धावप्येतदपरमेव रन्ध्र पश्यामः । भगवानाह-सौम्य ! यथा मूर्तस्य घटस्यामूर्तेन नभसा संयोगलक्षणः संबन्धस्तथानापि जीवकर्मणोः। यथा वा द्रव्यास्याङ्गुलयादेः क्रिययाऽऽकुञ्चनादिकया सह समवाबलक्षणः संबन्धः, तथाऽत्रापि जीव-कर्मणोरयमिति ॥ ८७ (१६३५)॥
___D. C.-Agribhuti-You have already asserted that Karmaon is mūrta. Now, how could this mūrta Karman be connected with the amūrta jîva either by means of the samavāya relation or even by Sanyoga ? This is one more difficuly in the way of the accomplishment of Karman. ___The Acarya-O blessed one ! just as a martca ghcata is connected with the amūrta ākāsa by means of samyoga and an object like finger is connected with kriyā like contraction by means of the samavaya relation, so, here also Karman is connected with jîva.
The relation of jîva with Karman is proved in another way:अहवा पञ्चक्खं चिय जीवोवनिबंधणं जह सरीरं । चिट्ठइ कम्मयमेवं भवंतरे जीवसंजुत्तं ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६) Ahavā paccakkham ciya jîvovanibandhanam jaha sarîram i Citthai kammayamevam bhavantare jivasanjuttam ॥ ( 1636 )
[अथवा प्रत्यक्षमेव जीवोपनिबन्धनं यथा शरीरम् ।
तिष्ठति कार्मणमेवं भवान्तरे जीवसंयुक्तम् ॥ ८८ ॥ (१६३६) Athavā pratyakśameva jivopanibandhanam yathā śarîram / Tisthati kārmanamevam bhavantare jivasamyuktam ॥ 88 (1636)]
__Trans.-88 Or, just as the ( coarse ) body being perceptible ( to the senses) is connected with the soul ( in this world ) the Kārmaņa body is connected with the soul in the next world. ( 1636 ).

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.
: 123 :
टीका-अथवा, यथेदं बाह्यं स्थूलशरीरं जीवोपनिवन्धनं जीवेन सह संबद्धं प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमानमेव तिष्ठति सर्वत्र चेष्टते, एवं भवान्तरं गच्छता जीवेन सह संयुक्तं कार्मणशरीरं प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ ब्रषे-धर्माऽधर्मनिमित्तं जीवसंबद्धं बाह्यं शरीरं प्रवर्तते, तर्हि पृच्छामो भवन्तम्-तावपि धर्मा-ऽधमाँ मूतौ वा भवेताम् , अमूर्ती वा ? । यदि मूतौँ, तर्हि तयोरप्यमूर्तेनात्मना सह कथं संबन्धः । अथ तयोस्तेन सहासौ कथमपि भवति, तर्हि कर्मणोऽपि तेन सार्धमयं कस्माद् न स्यात् ? । अथामूर्ती धर्माऽधौं, तर्हि बाह्यमूर्तस्थूलशरीरेण सह तयोः संबन्धः कथं स्यात् , मूर्ताऽमूर्तयोर्भवदभिप्रायेण संबन्धा. योगात् । न चासंबद्धयोस्तयोर्बाह्यशरीरचेष्टानिमित्तत्वमुपपद्यते, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ मूर्तयोरपि तयोर्बाह्यशरीरेण मूर्तेण सहेष्यते संबन्धः, तर्हि जीव-कर्मणोस्तत्सद्भावे कः प्रद्वेषः ? इति ॥ ८८ (१६३६ ) ॥
D. C.- This sthūla sarara, as it is pratyaksa and connected with jîva, moves its limbs here and there, in this world, while the Kārmaņa sarîra is connected with jîva in the next world.
Here again, if you think that it is the sthūla sarîra--with dharma and adharma as its nimittas—that exhibits all movements when conneced with jîva I would ask you to consider whether dharma and adharma are mūrta or amūrta.
In the first case, if you take dharma and adharma to be mūrta how could they be related to atman which is amūrta ? But, if their relation to ātman is, anyhow, approved of by you, why should you not approve of their relation to Karman also ? Secondly, if you believe that dharma and adharma are amūrta they could not have any relation with the bāhya and sthüla body which is murta. For, according to you, connection between mūrta and amūrta is improper. Thus, if dharma and adharma become the nimitta kāraṇas of all the gestures of body even though there is no mutual relation between them, the fault of atiprsanga would arise. Moreover, if these amūrta dharma and adharma have been believed as being connected with the external mūrta sarîra, what objection would there be to assume a similar relation between jîva and Karman ?

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•: 124 : : Jinabhadra Gaại's [The second
Here there is an objection and its refutationमुत्तेणामुत्तिमओ उवघाया-ऽणुग्गहा कहं होजा ? । जह विण्णाणाईणं मइरापाणोसहाईहि ॥ ८९॥ (१६३७) Mutteņāmuttimao uvaghāyā-'nuggahā kaham hojjā ? Jaha vinnānainam mairāpānosahaihim ॥ 89 ( 1637 ) [ मूर्तेणामूर्तिमत उपघाता-ऽनुग्रही कथं भवेताम् । ___ यथा विज्ञानादीनां मदिरापानौ-पधादिभिः ।। ८९ ॥ (१६३७) Mūrteņāmūrtinata upaghātā'nugrahau katham bhavetām? I Yatha vijñānādînām madirāpānau-şadhādibhiḥ 11 89 ( 1637)]
Trans.-89 “ How could the amūrta ( soul) be supported or damaged by the mūrta (Karman)?” ( The answer is- ) In the way as vijnana etc. are ( damaged or supported) by a drink of wine, medicine etc. ( 1637 ) ______टीका-ननु मूर्तेन कर्मणाऽमूर्तिमतो जीवस्य कथमाह्लादपरितापाद्यनुग्रहो-पघातौ स्याताम् ? । न ह्यमूर्तस्य नमसो मूर्तेर्मलयजज्वलनज्वालादिभिस्तौ युज्यते इति भावः। अत्रोत्तरमाह-'जह विण्णाणाईणमित्यादि यथाऽमूर्तानामपि विज्ञान-विविदिषा-धृति-स्मृत्यादिजीवधर्माणां मूत्रपि मदिरापान-हृत्पूर-विष-पिपीलिकादिभिर्भक्षितैरुपधातः क्रियते, पयः-शर्कराधृतपूर्ण मेषजादिभिस्त्वनुग्रह इत्येवमिहापीति । एतच्च जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ॥ ८९ १६३७ ।।
D. C.-Agnibhuti-In fact, the amerta ātman cannot feel joy or sorrow as an conugraha ( favour) or upaghāta (offence) by virtue of a mūrta Karman, just as the comūrta ākāsa is neither supported nor damaged by the mūrta sandalwood or fire-flame.
Ācārya-Desire for discussion of vijnana, moral courage, remembrance etc., are the amūrta qualities of soul. These qualities are weakened by taking wine, poison, ant, a white thornapple etc.t and, are nourished by taking the mūrta drugs which contain
+ Popularly known as dhatura in Western India.

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada . : 125 : milk, ghee, sugar-candy etc. So the amūrta java is also nourished or weakened by the mūrta Karman. अहवा नेगंतोऽयं संसारी सबहा अमुत्तो त्ति । जमणाइकम्मसंतइपरिणामवन्नरूवो सो ॥ ९०॥ (१६३८) Ahavā neganto’yam samsārî savvahā amutto tti i Jamaņāikammasantaipariņāmavannarūvo so 11 90 ( 1631 ) [अथवा नैकान्तोऽयं संसारी सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति ।
यदनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापनरूपः सः ॥ ९० ॥ (१६३८) Athavā naikānto'yam samsāri sarvatha'mūrta iti i Yadanādikarmasantatipariņāmāpannarūpah sah 11 90 (1638)]
___Trans.-90 Or, this mundane soul is not entirely amārta in the extreme. For, it has attained an alteration in the continuous range of Karman, which has no beginning. ( 1638 )
टीका-अथवा, नायमेकान्तो यदुत-संसारी जीवः सर्वथाऽमूर्त इति । कुतः १ । यद् यस्मादनादिकर्मसन्ततिपरिणामापन्नं वह्नययः पिण्डन्यायेनानादिकर्मसंतानपरिणतिस्वरूपतां प्राप्तं रूपं यस्य स तथा । ततश्च मूर्तकर्मणः कथञ्चिदनन्यत्वाद् मूर्तोऽपि कथञ्चिजीवः। इति मूर्तेन कर्मणा भवत एव तस्यानुग्रहो-पघातौ, नभसस्त्वमूर्तत्वात् , अचेतनत्वाच्च तौ न भवत एवेति ॥ ९० (१६३८)॥
D. C.-Or, this samsarî jîva is also not wholly amūrta because it has assumed an alteration distinct from the expanse of Karman. Atman is attached to Karman as agni is attached to an iron-rod. Now, since Karman is mūru and atman is similar to Karman to a certain extent, the atman is also mūrta to a certain extent even though it is amūrta by its svabhāva, Consequently, the amūrta and lustrous jîva feels anugraha or upaghāta by virtue of a mūrta Karman while ākusa being amūrta and acetana feels neither anugraha or upaghāta,

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•: 126 :- . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second
Then, how is the Karma-santāna born ? The reply is :संताणोऽणाई उ परोप्परं हेउहेउभावाओ। देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं-कुराणं व ॥९१॥(१६३९) Santāņo'nāî u paropparam heuheubhāvāo 1 Dehassa ya kammassa ya Goyama ! bîyam-kurāņam va 1191(1639) [सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतुहेतुभावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्व गौतम ! बीजा-कुरयोरिव ।।९१॥ (१६३९) Santāno'nādistu parasparam hetuhetubhāvāt i Dehasya ca karmanasca Gautama ! bijankurayoriva ॥ 91 (1639)]
Trans.-91 And, O Gautama ! as Karman and body are mutually related as the causes of each other like the seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. ( 1639)
___टीका-अनादिः कर्मणः सन्तान इति प्रतिज्ञा। देहकर्मणोः परस्परं हेतुहेतुमद्भावादिति हेतुः। बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोरिवेति दृष्टान्तः । यथा बीजेनाऽङ्कुरो अन्यते, अङ्कुरादपि क्रमेण बीजमुपजायते, एवं देहेन कर्म जन्यते, कर्मणा तु देह इत्येवं पुनः पुनरपि परस्परमनादिकालीनहेतुहेतुमद्भावादित्यर्थः । इह ययोरन्योऽन्यं हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्तयोरनादिः सन्तानः, यथा बीजा-ङ्करपितृपुत्रादीनाम्, तथा च देह-कर्मणोः, ततोऽनादिः कर्मसन्तान इति ॥ ९१ (१६३९)॥
___D. C.--The expanse of Karmcom has no beginning, as deha and Karman are related to each other as lietu and hetumat. Just as a sprout is born of seed and the seed, in turn, is produced from the sprout; in the same way, Karman is also produced from deha, and deha, in turn, is born of Karman. Thus deha and Karman, are related as the causes of each other like bâja and ankura. So, just as the continuous range of bija and ankura or pitā and putra is anādi, that of deha and Karman should also be anādi.

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127 :. Karman can be established by means of Veda-vacana alsoकम्मे चासइ गोयम ! जमग्गिहोत्ताइ सग्गकामस्स । वेयविहियं विहण्णइ दाणाइफलं च लोयम्मि ॥१२॥ (१६४०) Kamme cāsai Goyama ! jamaggihottāi saggakāmassa i Veyavihiyam vihannai dāņāiphalam ca loyammi 1 92 ( 1640 ) [कर्मणि चासति गौतम ! यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ।। ९२ ॥ (१६४०)। Karmaņi cāsati Gautama ! yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya i Veda-vihitam vihanyate danadi phalam ca loke ll 92 (1640 ) ]
Trans.-92 If, O Gautama ! the existence of Karman is denied, rites like rhe performance of Sacred-fire for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. in this world prescribed by the Veda, would be refuted. ( 1640 ).
टीका-कर्मणि चाऽसति गौतम ! अग्निहोत्रादिना स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितं यत् किमपि स्वर्गादिफलं तद् विहन्यते, स्वर्गादेः शुभकर्महेतुत्वात् , तस्य च भवताऽनभ्युपगमात् । लोके च यद् दानादिक्रियाणां फलं स्वर्गादिकं प्रसिद्ध तदपि विहन्येत । अयुक्तं चेदम् , “किरियाफलभावाओ दाणाईणं फलं किसीए व" इत्यादिना प्रतिविहितत्वादिति ॥ ९२ (१६४० ) ।
D. C.-If O Gautama ! The existance of Karman is denied the commandment of Vedas that a person desiring to attain Salvation can do so by performing agnihotra etc: would be null and void. Again, the wellknown phalas like svarga etc. prescribed for actions like dana etc. would also be refuted, if you don't believe in Karman. But that is not proper as it is opposed by "Kiriyāphala bhāvão danāînam phalam kisîe vvat” etc. Hence you shall have to accept Karman with its anādi santāna.
+ Vide v. 1615.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The second
On the non-apprehension of Karman, if Is'vara etc. were taken to be the creators of the manifold variations in the world, a number of difficulties would arise,
•: 128 :.
कम्ममणिच्छंतो वा सुद्धं चिय जीवमीसराइं वा । मण्णसि देहाईणं जं कत्तारं न सो जुत्तो ॥ ९३ ॥ ( १६४१ )
उवगरणाभावाओ निच्चेट्ठा - मुत्तयाइओ वा वि । ईसरदेहारंभे वि तुझ्या वाऽणवत्था वा ॥ ९४ ॥ ( १६४२ )
Kammamanicchanto vā śuddham ciya jîvamîsarāim vā | Mannasi dehāínam jam kattāram na so jutto ॥ 93 ( 1641 ) Uvagaraṇābhāvāo nicceṭṭhā'muttayāio vā vi Isaradehārambhe vi tullayā vā' navatthā vā ॥ 94 (1642 )
[ कर्मानिच्छन् वा शुद्धमेव जीवमीश्वरादिं वा ।
मन्यसे देहादीनां यं कर्तारं न स युक्तः ॥ ९३ ॥ ( १६४१ ) ॥
उपकरणाभावाद् निश्रेष्टा- मूर्ततादितो वापि ।
ईश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तुल्यता वाऽनवस्था वा ९४ ॥ ( १६४२ ) ॥
Karmanicchan va śūddhameva jîvamiśvaradim vā
Manyase dehādinam yam kartaram na sa yuktah || 93 (1641 ) ]
Upakaranābhāvād niśces' ta - 'mūrtatadito vāpi | īśvaradehārambhe 'pi tulyata va' navastha vā || 94 ( 1642 ) ]
Trans.-93–94 Or, denying (the existence of ) Karman, you might presume jiva itself-pure and simple-or Isvara etc, to be the creator of ( the objects like ) deha etc. But that is not since jivas is void of means (upakarana) motion ( cestā ) and form ( mūrtatā ). Even ( in the case of ) deha etc. being accomplished by Īśvara etc. either the
SO,
same difficulties would arise or there would be disorder. ( 1641-1642)

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.: 129:. ___टीका-कर्म वाऽनिच्छन्नग्निभूते गौतम ! यं कर्मरहितत्वात् शुद्धमेव जीवमात्मानमीश्वराव्यक्तकाल-नियति-यदृच्छादिकं वा देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, तत्राप्युच्यते-नासौ शुद्धजीवे-श्वरादिः कर्ता युज्यत इति ॥ ____टीका-नायमीश्वरजीवादिरकर्मा शरीरादिकार्याण्यारभते, उपकरणा भावात् , दण्डाद्युपकरणरहितकुलालवत् । न च कर्म विना शरीराधारम्भे जीवादीनामन्यदुपकरणं घटते, गर्भावस्थास्वन्योपकरणासंभवात् , शुक्र-शोणितादि ग्रहणस्याप्यकर्मणोऽनुपपत्तेः। अथवा, अन्यथा प्रयोगः क्रियते-"निचेद्वेत्यादि" नाकर्मा शरीराधारभते, निश्चेष्टत्वात् , आकाशवत् , तथाऽमूर्तत्वात् , आदि शब्दादशरीरत्वात् , निष्क्रियत्वात् , सर्वगतत्वात् , आकाशवदेव, तथा, एकत्वात् , एकपरमाणुवदित्यादि । अथोच्यते-शरीरवानीश्वरः, सर्वाण्यपि देहादिकार्याण्यारभते । नन्वीश्वरदेहारम्भेऽपि तर्हि तुल्यता पर्यनुयोगस्य, तथाहिअकर्मा नारभते निजशरीरमीश्वरः, निरुपकरणत्वात् , दण्डादिरहितकुलालवदिति । अथान्यः कोऽपीश्वर स्तच्छरीराम्भाय प्रवर्तते । ततः सोऽपि शरीरवान् , अशरीरो वा १ । यद्यशरीरः, तर्हि नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वात् , इत्यादि सैव वक्तव्यता। अथ शरीरवान्, तर्हि तच्छरीरारम्भे तुल्यता, सोऽप्यकर्मा निजशरीरं नारभते, निरुपकरणत्वादित्यादि । अथ तच्छरीरमन्यः शरीरवानारभते । अतस्तस्याप्यन्यः, तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवमनवस्था । अनिष्टं च सर्वमेतत् । तस्माद् नेश्वरो देहादीनां कर्ता, किन्तु कर्मसद्वितीयो जीव एव । निष्प्रयोजनश्चेश्वरो देहादीन् कुर्वन्नुन्मत्तकल्प एव स्यात् , सप्रयोजनकर्तृत्वे पुनरनीश्वरत्वप्रसङ्गः। न चानादिशुद्धस्य देहादिकरणेच्छा युज्यते, तस्या रागविकल्परूपत्वात् , इत्याद्यत्र बहुवक्तव्यम् , ग्रन्थगहनताप्रसङ्गात्तु नोच्यत इति। अनेनैव विधानेन विष्णु-ब्रह्मादयोऽपि प्रत्युक्ता द्रष्टव्या इति ।। ९३-९४ (१६४१-१६४२)।
D. C.-0 Agnibhūti Gautama! Leaving the Karman aside, it is absolutely improper to accept any one of jîva, Isvara, kāla ( Time ) avyakta ( Visnu ) niyati ( Destiny ) or yadriccha ( self-will) to be the kartīt of deha etc.
It is not possible for java and Išvura etc, to accomplish Káryas such as sarira etc, without the help of Karman, Jiva
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•: 130 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The second cannot accomplish objects like sarira on account of the following reasons :
(1) If jiva is presumed to be the Kartā of sarîra etc, it must have some means to produce them. Just as a potter cannot produce a ghata without the help of an upakarana like danda, so also jîva cannot accomplish Kāryas like srîra in absence of an upakarana. Now, jîva is not supposed to have any other upakarana except Karman in producing sarîra etc. For, no other upakarana except Karman can exist in the state of embryo etc.
(2) In the process of accomplishment of Kāryas like sarîra, jiva would not be able to suck up semen, blood etc. without the help of Karman.
(3) Jîva cannot accomplish surîra etc. on account of its inactive, incorporeal, and all-pervading nature like akasa.
Again, it is useless to believe that sarîravan Isvara produces each and every object such as deha etc. Because the above-mentioned difficulties are bound to arise in that case also. In absence of an upakarana, Is'vara like a potter without a danda, is not supposed to create his own body. Now here, if it is assumed that a second Is'vara creates the body of this Is'vara, consider whether that Isvara has a body or not. If he has no body it is clear from what has already been discussed that he cannot create surîra in absence of an upakarana. But if it is said that a third īs'vara having a body creates the body of this Is'vara, a fourth Is'vara shall have to be supposed to create the body of the third one, and a fifth Is'vara to create that of the fourth one, and so on until ultimately it results in an anavasthā which is not at all desirable.
Thus it is clear that Isvara is not the creator of sarîru etc. But in spite of that if it is believed that Is'vara creates šarîra etc, consider whether he does so with or without any

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purpose. If īs'vara creates body without any purpose he would be taken as frantic, and if he does so with some intention he would lose his Isvaratva. For a siddha and anādi útman is not expected to cherish desire for creating deha etc, as desire is one of the forms of illusion and so on. A number of such arguments could be advanced in this connection, but for fear of grantha-vistāra (extension of the work ) they are not stated here. But in line of the arguments stated above it can also be proved that neither Brahmā nor Vişnu nor any one else can be taken as the Kartā of sarira etc.
Is'vara therefore is not acceptable as the creator of sarira etc., from any point of view, but jîva accompanied by the upakarana Karman, should alone be accepted as the kartā of sarîra etc. अहव सहावं मन्नसि विण्णाणघणाइवेयवुत्ताओ। तह बहुदोसं गोयम ! ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥२५॥ (१६४३) Ahava sahāvam mannasi vinnaņa ghaṇāi Veyavuttão I Taha bahudosam Goyama! tānam ca payāṇamayamattho 119511(1643) [अथवा स्वभावं मन्यसे विज्ञानधनादिवेदोक्तात ।
ageri itaa ! ani a TEFATHTH: 11 84.11 ( 3883 ) Athavá svabhāvam manyase vijñanaghanādivedoktāti Tathā bahudosam Gautama ! teşām ca padanāmayamartha) 195||(1643)
Trans.-95 Again, O Gautama ! if you think svabhāvam ( to be the kartā of śarira etc ), from the sentences of the Vedas such as “ vijñāna ghana” etc, a number of difficulties will arise. But (ca) the real interpretation of those sentences is this
Etfor37% "fasraga paaralary:" uric ac79992017 स्वभावं देहादीनां कर्तारं मन्यसे, यतः केचिदाहु :

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The second
:: 132 : . Jinabhadra Gani's
सर्वहेतुनिराशंसं भावानां जन्म वर्ण्यते ।। स्वभाववादिभिस्ते हि नाहुः स्वमपि कारणम् ॥ १॥ राजीवकण्टकादीनां वैचित्र्यं कः करोति हि ? । मयुरचन्द्रिकादिर्वा विचित्रः केन निर्मितः ? ॥ २ ॥ कादाचित्कं यदत्रास्ति निःशेषं तदहेतुकम् ।
यथा कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादि तथा चैते सुखादयः ॥ ३ ॥ तदेतद् यथा त्वं नन्यसे गौतम ! तथाऽभ्युपगम्यमानं बहुदोषमेव; तथाहि -यो देहादीनां कर्ता स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते, स किं वस्तुविशेषो वा, अकारणता वा, वस्तुधर्मों वा, ? इति त्रयी गतिः। तत्र न तावद् वस्तुविशेषः, तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् । अप्रमाणकस्याभ्युपगमे कर्मापि किं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि त्वदभिप्रयेणाप्रमाणकत्वात् । किञ्च, वस्तुविशेषः स स्वभावो मूर्ती वा स्यात् अमूर्ती वा ? । यदि मूर्तः, तर्हि स्वभाव इति नामान्तरेण कमैवोक्तं स्यात् । अथामूर्तः, तर्हि नासौ कस्यापि कर्ता, अमूर्तत्वात् , निरुपकरणत्वाच्च, व्योमवदिति। न च मूर्तस्य शरीरादेः कार्यस्यामूर्त कारणमनुरूपम् , आकाशवदिति । अथाकारणता स्वभाव इष्यते, तत्राप्यभिदध्महे-नन्वेवं सत्यकारणं शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इत्ययमर्थः स्यात् , तथा च सति कारणाभावस्य समानत्वाद् युगपदेवाशेषदेहोत्पादप्रसङ्गः। अपि च, इत्थमहेतुकमाकस्मिकं शरीराद्युत्पद्यत इत्यभ्युपगतं भवेत । एतश्चायुक्तमेव, यतो यदहेतुकमास्मिकं न तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारम् , यथाऽभ्रादिविकारः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारं च शरीरादि । तस्माद् नाकस्मिकम् , किन्तु कर्महेतुकमेव । प्रतिनियताकारत्वादेव चोपकरणसहितकनिर्वर्त्यमेव शरीरादिकं घटादिवदिति गम्यत एव । न च गर्भाद्यवस्थासु कर्मणोऽन्यदुपकरणं घटत इत्युक्तमेव । अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाप्यसौ यद्यात्मधर्मो विज्ञानादिवत् , तर्हि न शरीरादिकारणमसौ, अमूर्तत्वात् , आकाशवत् , इत्यभिहितमेव । अथ मूर्तवस्तुधर्मोऽ सौ, तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, कर्मणोऽपि पुद्गलास्तिकायपर्यायविशेषत्वेनास्माभिरप्युपगतत्वादिति ।
अपि च, " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम् " इत्यादिवेदवाक्यश्रवणाद् भवतः

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कर्मास्तित्वसंशयः। एषां हि वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव चेतसि विपरिवर्तते - पुरुष आत्मा, एवकारोऽवधारणे, स च पुरुषातिरिक्तस्य कर्म-प्रकृती- श्वरादेः सत्ताव्यवच्छेदार्थः, इदं सर्व — प्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानं चेतनाचेतनस्वरूपम्, “झिं" इति वाक्यालङ्कारे, यद् भूतम् - अतीतम्, यच्च भाव्यं भविष्यद् मुक्तिसंसारावपि स एवेत्यर्थः । उतामृतत्वस्येशान इति । उतशब्दोऽप्यर्थे । अपिशब्दच समुच्चये । अमृतत्वस्य च अमरणभावस्य मोक्षस्येशानः प्रभुरित्यर्थः । यदन्नेनातिरोहतीति । चशब्दस्य लुप्तस्य दर्शनाद् यच्चान्नेन - आहारण, अतिरोहति - अतिशयेन वृद्धिमुपैति । यदेजति - चलति पश्वादि । यद् नैजति - न चलति पर्वतादि । यद् दूरे मेर्वादि । यदु अन्तिके - उशब्दोऽवधारणे, यदन्तिके समीपे तदपि पुरुष एवेत्यर्थः । यदन्तः - मध्ये, अस्य - चेतनाचेतनस्य सर्वस्य यदेव सर्वस्याप्यस्य बाह्यतः, तत् सर्व पुरुष एवेति । अतस्तव्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः किल सत्ता दुःश्रद्धेयेति ते मतिः । तथा, विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः इत्यादीन्यपि वेदपदानि कर्माभावप्रतिपादकानि मन्यसे त्वम्, अत्राप्येवकारस्य कर्मादिसत्ताव्यवच्छेदपरत्वात् ।
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"
तदेवमेतेषां " पुरुष एवेदम्" इत्यादीनां " विज्ञानघन " - आदीनां च वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यो भवतश्चेतसि वर्तते, किन्तु तेषां पदानामयं भावार्थ:- " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादीनि तावत् पुरुषस्तुतिपराणि जात्यादिमदत्यागहेतोरद्वैतभावनाप्रतिपादकानि च वर्तते, न तु कर्मसत्ताव्यवच्छेदकानि । वेदवाक्यानि हि कानिचिद् विधिवादपराणि, कान्यप्यर्थवादप्रधानानि, अपराणि त्वनुवादपराणि। तत्र “अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इत्यादीनि विधिवादपराणि । अर्थवादस्तु द्विधा स्तुत्यर्थवादः, निन्दार्थवादश्च । तत्र " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम् ” इत्यादिकः स्तुत्यर्थवादः तथा तत्र " स सर्वविद् यस्यैषा महिषा भुवि दिव्ये बह्मपुरे ह्येष व्योम्नि आत्मासु प्रतिष्ठितस्तमक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु स सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् सर्वमेवाविवेश " इति तथा, एकया पूर्णयाहृत्या सर्वान् कामानवाप्नोति " इत्यादिकश्च सर्वोऽपि स्तुत्यर्थवादः । " एकया पूर्णया " इत्यादिविधिवादोऽपि कस्माद् न भवति ? इति चेत् । उच्यते – शेषस्याग्निहोत्राद्यानुष्ठानस्य वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति । " एषः वः प्रथमो यज्ञो योऽग्निष्टोमः योऽनेनानिष्ट्वाऽन्येन यजते स गर्तमभ्यपतत् " अत्र
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.: 134 :. . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second पशुमेधादीनां प्रथमकरणं निन्द्यत इत्ययं निन्दार्थवादः ॥ " द्वादशमासाः संवत्सरः" "अग्निरुष्णः" " अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्" इत्यादीनि तु वेदवाक्यान्यनुवादप्रधानानि, लोकप्रसिद्धस्यैवार्थस्यैतेष्वनुवादादिति ।
· तस्मात् " पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम्" इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि स्तुत्यर्थवादप्रधानानि द्रष्टव्यानि । “ विज्ञानधन एवैतेभ्यः” इत्यत्राप्ययमर्थःविज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वर्तते । स च कर्ता, कार्य च • शरीरादिकमिति प्राक् साधितमेव । ततश्च कर्तृकार्याभ्यामर्थान्तरं करणमनुमीयते; तथाहि-यत्र कर्तृ-कार्यभावस्तत्रावश्यंभावि करणम् , यथाऽयस्कारा ऽयःपिण्डसद्भावे संदंशः यच्चानात्मनः शरीरादिकार्यनिवृत्तौ करणभावमापद्यते तत् कर्म इति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अपिच, साक्षादेव कर्मसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि श्रुयन्त एव वेदवाक्यानि, तद्यथा-" पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा पापः पापेन कर्मणा" इत्यादि । तस्मादागमादपि सिद्ध प्रतिपद्यस्व कर्मेति ॥ ९५ (१६४३) । ___D. C.-You, too, O Agribhiti ! like others presume svabhavat and svabhāva only to be the kartā of deha etc. on hearing the Vedapadas such as “ Vijnanaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyah " etc. It is therefore said by some people that~
Sarvahetunirāśamsam bhāvānam janna varnyate i Svabhävavadibhiste hi nahuḥ svamapi kāraṇam || 1 11 Rājî vakantakādinām vaicitryam kaḥ karoti hi?i . Mayāracandrikadirva vicitrah kena nirmitah ॥ 2 ॥ Kādācitkam yadatrasti niḥśeşaḥ tadahetukami Yathā kaạtakataikšņyādi tathā caite sukhadayaḥ || 3 |
So," Gautama ! If you also hold the same view., viz, that svabhāva is the kartā of deha etc. a number of dosas will crop up. In the first instance, consider whether svrbhāva is (1) a vastuvis'esa ( an object in particular) or ( 2 ) a-karanatā ( causelessness ) itself or (3) vastudharma ( quality of an object ).
(1) Svabhāva can never be recognized as a vastuvis'eşch as there exists no pramānıı ( ground of assurance ) to prove

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, : 135 : that it is a vastu. Now here, if you are prepared to accept an a-pramanaka ( unauthorized ) vastu as the vastu itself, you should also accept Karman as a vastu; for according to you, Karman is also a-pramāņaka. Secondly, if that svabhāva is vastuvis'esa, is it mūrta or amurta? If it is mūrta, it is nothịng but Karman with a synonym of sva'hāva. If it is amūrta it is not supposed to have any sort of upakarana and hence like akās'a it can never be a kartā of any object. Moreover, it is improper to accept an amurta svabhāva to be the karana of a mūrta kārya such as deha etc. So, it is clear that svabhāva is not a vastuvis'eşa in any case.
2. If svabhāva were supposed to be a-kāraṇatā, all objects will have to be taken as being produced without cause and Karanu will be absent uniformly at all places; consequently all objects will have to be supposed to have been produced accidently all at a time. But it would be absurd to believe like that. For one that is produced spontaneously without any reason, does never possess, like the vikāras of abhra ete, a beginning or a definite form. Objects like s'asira should never be believed to have been born without cause, because they are produced by means of Karman, they are adimān and they possess a definite form as that of a ghata. This shows that such objects are produced by a karta by means of an upakarand, and Karman is the only possible upakarana in the state of embryo. So, Karman ought to be accepted as its real hetu and not the svabhāva.
3. Now, consider if svabhāva can be taken as a vastudharma. If svabhāva is supposed to be the quality of a vastu like atman it would be amūrta like ūkas'u and hence it would not become the cause of s'arira etc. But there would be no objection if svabhāva were taken to be the quality of a mūrta object. For, in that case, Karman will become a paryaya of the svabhūva of a murta object. So, we have no objection in accepting svabhāva as a dharma of the murta object.

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.: 136 ::
.
Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The second
Moreover, O Aynibhūti ! you entertain doubt as regards Karman by hearing sentences such as "purusa evedam sarvam" of the Vedas. According to you, the interpretation of those sentences is as follows:
· "Everything that is animate and inanimate, past and future, movable and immovable, distant and near, interior and exterior everything that is nourished by food, and one who is the lord of moksci-all this is purusa and purusa alone. No other object as Kurman exists as distinct from this puruşa.
Similarly, according to you, sentences such as “ vijñānaghana” also establish the non-existance of Karman. Because, in both the above-mentioned padas you interpret “eva” as referring to the non-existence of Karman.
Your interpretation of the Veda-padas is not correct. Sentences like "purusa evedam " etc are meant to praise the atman and to establish the advaita-bhāva in order to avoid the arrogance of jati etc, but they are not meant to establish the non-existence of Karman.
Sentences are generally divided into three kinds :-(1) Vidhivadaparı, i. e., sentences that are laid down as rules. (2) Arthavāduparu i.e., sentences that are laid down as the explanatory remarks and (3) Anuvādapara 3. e., sentences that are laid down as explanatory repetitions~" Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakâmah ” is an example of vidhivada. Arthavada is of two kinds :-(1) Stuti-arthavada and (2) Ninda arthavada. Sentences such as "purusu evedam sarvam” etc, as well as those "Sa sarvavid yasyaisa mahimâ bhuvi vivye brahmapure hyeşâ vyomni âtmâsu pratisthitastamaks'aram vedyate yastu sa sarvajna sarvavit sarvamevavives'a ” and “ ekaya pārnayahutya sarvân kâ mânavâpnoti" etc, are also the examples of stuti-arthavada.
Again you may raise a question as to why the sentences like “ekuyâ parnaya ” etc. be not taken as the illustrations

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
.: 137 :.
of Vidhivada. But if it illustrates Vidhivada, the rest of the anusthānas like agnihotra would be of no avail,
In the sentence " esa vaha prathamo yajno yo'gnistomaah, yo'nenaniṣṭavanyena yajate sa gartamabhyapatat "the sacrifice of animals is censured and hence it illustrates the nindarthavada. Lastly Veda-vakyas such as dvādasamāsāḥ samvat sarah agnirusnah" agni rhimasya bhesajam. etc., are anuvada pradhana as they state mere explanatory repetitions of well-known facts.
cc
33
66
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It is, therefore, clear that Vedapadas like " sarvam are meant to illustrate the stuti-arthavada.
39
purusa evedam
Vijnana ghana evaitebhyah " etc. can be interpreted in this way-Atman, as an assemblage of knowledge is distinct from bhutas and it itself is the karta of the karyas such as sarîra etc. Now that, it has become the kartā it must have a karana (instrument) to accomplish the Karyas. For, wherever there are kartā and karya there ought to be karana also. Like a forceps in the case of a blacksmith and iron-rod, Karman is used as an instrument in the accomplishment of Karays like saira by Atman. So, you shall have to accept the existence of Karman.
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Moreover, Karman can be established by the help of Veda-vacanas like punyah punyena karmana, papah papena karmana" also. Thus Karman is proved by means of agama also. Hence, leave all the doubts aside and know it for certain that Karman does exist and Karman is the only instrument to accomplish Karyas like sarira etc.
छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
aì aqoìì qaşen qafë az dièyagië 19E11 (3888)
Chinnammi samsayammi Jiņeṇa jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam | So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiya saehim ||96||(1644)
18

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा - मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ९६ ॥ ( १६४४ )
.: 138:.
[The second
Chinne samsaye Jinena jara-maraṇavipramuk tena Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitaḥ pancabhiḥ saha khandikaśataiḥ96(1644)]
B
Trans.-96 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, the saint Agnibhuti accepted Diksä along with his five hundred pupils. (1644).
End of the Discussion with the Second Ganadhara.

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Chapter III
तृतीयगणधरवक्तव्यता
Discussion with the Third Ganadhara. ते पव्वइए सोउं तइओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं । वच्चामि वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ९७ ॥ (१६४५)
Te pavvaie söum taio āgacchai Jiņasagāsam i Vaccāmi vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi li 97 11 ( 1645 ) [ तौ प्रबजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीय आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ९७ ॥ (१६४५) Tau pravrajitau śrutvā tritîya ägacchati Jinasakāšam Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse 11 97 11 ( 1645 ) ]
Trans.-97 Having heard that both of them ( Indrabhūti and Agnibkūti) had renounced the world, the third (Ganadhara) comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks ):-I may go, pay my homage and worship him (1645).
टीका-ताविन्दभूत्य-ऽग्निभूती प्रव्रजितौ श्रुत्वा तृतीयो वायुभूतिनामा द्विजोपाध्यायो जिनसकाशमागच्छति सातिशयनिजबन्धुद्वयनिष्क्रमर्णाकर्णनाज्झगिति विगलिताभिमानो भगवति संजातसर्वज्ञप्रत्ययः सन्नेवमवधार्यागत:व्रजामि तत्राहमपि, वन्दे भगवन्तं श्रीमन्महावीरम् , वन्दित्वा च पर्युपासेपर्युपास्ति करोमि तस्य भगवत इति ॥ ९७ (१६४५)॥
D. C.-On having heard that Indrabhūti and Agnibhuti had accepted the Diks'à (and were defeated,) the third ganadhara named Vayubhūti approached Šramana Bhagavân Mahavira with an humble and obedient motive of bowing down to him and worshipping him.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The third
And, what more did he think when he approached?
सीसत्तेणोवगया संपयमिंदग्गिभूइणो जस्स । तिहूयणकयप्पणामो स महाभागोऽभिगमणिज्जो ॥९८॥ (१६४६ ) तदभिगमण - बंदणो - वासणाइणा होज्ज प्रयपावोऽहं । वोच्छिण्णसंसओ वा वोतुं पत्तो जिणसगासे ॥ ९९ ॥ (१६४७)
.: 140 :
Sîsatteṇovagaya sampayaminda-ggibhūiņo jassa | Tihūyanakayappanāmo sa mahābhāgo' bhigamanijjo ॥98 (1646 )
Tadobhigamana-vandano-vāsanāinā hojja pūyapāvo'ham Vocchinna samsao vā vottum patto Jinasagáse ॥ 99 ॥ (1647) [ शिष्यत्वेनोपगतौ सांप्रतमिन्द्राऽग्निभूती यस्य । त्रिभुवनकृतप्रणामः स महाभागोऽभिगमनीयः ॥ ९८ ॥ (१६४६) तदभिगमन-वन्दनोपासनादिना भवेयं पूतपापोऽहम् । व्यवच्छिन्नसंशयो वोक्त्वा प्राप्तो जिनसकाशे ॥ ९९ ॥ (१६४७)
Sisyatvenopagatau, sampratamindra'gnibhūti yasya । Tribhuvanakritapranamah sa mahābhāgo 'bhigamaniyah ||98 (1646) ] Tadabhigamana-vandano-pasanadina bhaveyam putapapo'ham Vyavacchinnasamsayo vokta prapto Jinasakaśe ॥ 99 ॥ ( 1647 ) ]
Trans. – 98-99 "I should approach the revered Bhagvan Mahavira whom Indrabhūti and Agnibhuti have recently accepted as their preceptor and to whom (people of) the three worlds pay their obeisances. Having approached him, I shall get myself purged of sins by bowing down to him and worshipping him, and I shall get my doubts cleared." Having said so, he came to Sramana Bhagvān Mahavira (1646–1647). Then what next ?
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्यमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ १०० ॥ (१६४८)

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Gañadharavāda
141
Ābhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkenam Nāmena ya gotteņa ya savvannū savvadarisî ņam || 100 11 (1648)
[ TATT Ferata fifa-FTT-ATTANTI
als 7 Tam a paista maafiar 11 800 11 (?&86). Ābhāşitaśca Jinena jāti-jarā-maraṇavipramuktena | Namna ca gotreņa ca sarvajñena sarvadarsinā || 10011 ( 1648 )]
Trans.-100 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge ). ( 1648 ).
D. C.-Although thus respectfully and directly addressed by the Lord and seeing the beauty and splendour of his eminence extending over the three worlds, and being unable to disclose the doubt remaining in his mind, out of agitation Vāyubhūti remained silent with amazement. But he was again addressed thus :तज्जीव तस्सरीरं ति संसओ न वि य पुच्छसे किंचि । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥१०१॥(१६४९) Tajjîva tassarîram ti samsao na vi ya pucchase kimci 1 Veyapayāņa ya attham na yāṇasî tesimo attho 11 101 11 (1649) [ तज्जीवस्तच्छरीरमिति संशयो नापि च पृच्छसि किञ्चित् ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १०१ ॥ (१६४९) Tajjîvastaccharîrawiti samsayo nāpi ca pricchasi kimcit ? | Vedapadānām cārtham na jānási teşāmayamarthaḥ 110111 (1649)]
Trans.-101 You entertain the doubt as to whether that which is jiva is sarira itself and yet you do not ask me ( about it ). But (ca) you do not know the real meaning of Veda-padas. Here is their real interpretation. (1649).

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The third टीका-हे आयुष्मन् वायुभूते ! " तदेव वस्तु जीवस्तदेव च शरीरम् , न पुनरन्यत्" इत्येवंभूतस्तव संशयो वर्तते, नापिच तदपनोदाथ किञ्चिद् मा पृच्छसि । ननु यज्ञपाटाद् निर्गच्छता त्वयाऽभिहितमासीत्-“वोच्छिण्णसंसओ वा" इति, तत् किमिति न किञ्चित् पृच्छसि ? । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तेषां च वेदपदानार्थं त्वं न जानासि, तेन संशयं कुरुषे । तेषां चायं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणोऽर्थ इति ॥१०१॥ (१६४९)
D. C.-You entertain the doubt in your mind as to whether that which is jîva be called sarîra also. But you do not put any question about it to remove that doubt. This doubt of yours is based upon hearing the Veda-padas of contradictory senses. But that is not the correct interpretation. Here is the real interpretation.
Moreover, वसुहाइभूयसमुदयसंभूया चेयण त्ति ते संका। पत्तेयमदिट्ठा वि हु मज्जंगमउ व्व समुदाये ॥१०२॥ (१६५०) जह मज्जंगेसु मओ वीसुमदिट्ठो वि समुदए होउं। कालंतरे विणस्सइ तह भूयगणम्मि चेयण्णम् ॥१०३॥(१६५१) Vasuhāi bhūya samudaya sambhūyā ceyana tti te sarkā i Patteyamadittha vi hu majjangamau vva samudaye ॥ 102 ॥ (1650) Jaha majjarigesu mao vîsumadittho vi samudae höumi Kālantare vîņassai taha bhūya ganammi ceyannam 11 1031 (1651) [ वसुधादिभूतसमुदयसंभूता चेतनेति तव शङ्का । प्रत्येकमदृष्टाऽपि खलु मद्याङ्गमद इव समुदाये ॥ १०२ ।। (१६५० ) यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदो विश्वगदृष्टोऽपि समुदये भूत्वा । कालान्तरे विनश्यति तथा भूतगणेऽपि चैतन्यम् ।। १०३ ॥ (१६५१)

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'
.: 143:.
Vasudbadi bhūta samudaya sambhūta cetaneti tava sarkā i Pratyekamadristā’pi khalu madyāngamada iva samudaye 1110211(1651) Yathā madyānigeşu mado viśvagadrişto'pi samudaye bhūtva i Kālāntare vinaśyati tathả bhūtagaņe’pi caitanyam |110311 (1651)]
Trans.-102-103 Your presumption is that consciousness ( cetana) is produced from the collection (samudaya) of bhūtas like prithivi etc. because like intoxication ( mada) though not found in each separate constituent, it is apprehended in the collection ( of those constituents). Just as intoxication, though not present in each separate constituent of wine ( madya ) is produced in the collection of these constituents and disappears after a particular period of time, similarly consciousness (caitanya ) is also produced in the collection of bhūtas and perishes as time passes ( 1650–1651 ).
टीका-वसुधा पृथ्वी, आदिशब्दादप्-तेजो-वायु-परिग्रहः, वसुधादय एव भवन्तीति कृत्वा भूतानि वसुधादिभूतानि, तेषां समुदयः परस्परमीलनपरिणतिवसुधादिभूतसभूदयः, तस्मात् प्रागसती संभूता संजाता, चेतनेत्येवंभूता तव शङ्का । सा च चेतना पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टापि धातकीकुसुम-गुडो-दकादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु मद इव तत्समुदाये संभूतेति प्रत्यक्षत एव दृश्यते । तदेवमन्वयद्वारेण चेतनाया भूतसमुदायधर्मता दर्शिता । अथ व्यतिरेकद्वारेण तस्यास्तां दर्शयितुमाह-" जह मजंगेसु इत्यादि " यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदभावः प्रत्येकावस्थायामदृष्टोऽपि तत्समुदाये भूत्वा ततः कियन्तमपि कालं स्थित्वा कालान्तरे तथाविधसामग्रीवशात् कृतश्चिद् विनश्यति,तथा भूतगणेऽपि प्रत्यकसमचैतन्यं भूत्वा ततः कालान्तरे विनश्यति। ततोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चीयते-भूतधर्म एष चैतन्यम् ।
__इदमत्र हृदयम्-यत् समुदायिषु प्रत्येकं नोपलभ्यते तत्समुदाये चोपलभयते, तत तत्समुदायमात्रधर्म एव, यथा मद्याङ्गसमुदायधर्मो मदः । स हि मद्याङ्गेषु विश्वग्नोपलभ्यते, तत्समुदाये चोपलभ्यते, अतस्तद्धर्मः । एवं चेतनापि भूतसमुदाये भवति, पृथग् न भवति, अतस्तद्धर्मः ।

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The third
धर्म-धर्मिणोश्चाभेद एव, भेदे घट-पटयोरिव धर्मि-धर्मभावाप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् स एव जीवस्तदेव च शरीरम् । वाक्यान्तरेषु पुनः शरीराद् भिन्नः श्रूयते जीवः, तद्यथा “ तहि चै स शरीरस्य प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यादि । ततस्तव संशय grat 11 802-803 ( 8840–8848) 11
D. C--According to your presumption cetană is produced from the samudaya of bhūtas such as prithvå, aptejas, vāyu etc. Just as madu cannot be seen in each separate constituent e.g, dhātakî flower, jaggery etc, of the wine, but it can be produced only when all those constituents are combined together. In the same way, cetanā is recognized in the samudāya of bhūtas only and not in a separate constituent like prithvi. So, cetana becomes the quality of the samudaya of bhūtas. Again, this cetana, after being produced in the samudâya of bhūtas perishes after naving stayed for some time, just as the quality of mada after being produced in the combination of the constituents of wine vanishes as time passes. Thus it is proved by means of anvaya as well as vyatireka in the above two cases that caitanya is a dharma of the samudaya of bhūtas.
Again, that which is not present in a constitution of samudaya but in the samudaya itself becomes the quality of samudaya only, and not of a constituent. So, caitanya being found only in samudaya and not in each of its individual constituents becomes a dharma of the samudaya of bhūtas, as mada becomes a dharma of the samudaya of madyangas. Now, there can be no distinction between dharma and dharmin. For if they were distinct they could not be related as dharma and dharmin. Sarîra is nothing but the samudaya of bhūtas and jîva is formed of cetanā. Hence jîva and s'arîra are nothing but dharma and dharmin and as such they should be considered as one and the same.
Now, on the other hand there are several Veda-padas which establish jîva to be distinct from s'arîra e. g. “Na hi

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Vada ]
vai sa-s'arîsya priyâpriyayo r-apahatirasti, a-s'arîram vâ vasantam priyâpriye na sprs'ataḥ." And that is the reason why you have raised this doubt.
The doubt is refuted as follows:
पत्तेयमभावाओ न रेणुतेल्लं व समुदये चेया ।
मज्जसु तु मओ वीसुं पि न सङ्घसो नत्थि ॥ १०४ ॥ ( १६५२ ) भमि धणि वितण्हयाई पत्तेयं पि हु जहा मयंगेसु । तह जइ भूएसु भवे चेया तो समुदये होज्जा ॥१०५॥ (१६५३)
Gaṇadharavada
.: 145:
Patteyamabhāvão na renutellam va samudaye ceyā Majjarigesu tu mao visum pi na savvaso natthi ॥ 104 ॥ ( 1652 )
Bhami-dhani-vitaṇhayaî patteyam pi hu jahā mayangesu Taha jai bhūesu bhave ceyā to samudaye hojjā || 105 | ( 1653 )
[ प्रत्येकमभावाद् न रेणुतैलमिव समुदये चेतना |
माङ्गेषु तु मदो विष्वगपि न सर्वशो नास्ति ॥ १०४ ॥ (१६५२) भ्रमि-भ्राणि - वितृष्णतादयः प्रत्येकमपि खलु यथा मदाङ्गेषु ।
तथा यदि भूतेषु भवेच्चेतना ततः समुदये भवेत् ।। १०५ ॥ (१६५३)
Pratyekamabhavad na reṇutailamiva samudaye cetana Madyāngeşu tu mado visvagapi na sarvaśo nāsti || 104 ॥ (1652) Bhrami-dhrani-vitriṣnatadayaḥ pratye kamapi khalu yatha madangeșu Tatha yadi bhūtesu bhaveccetana tatah samudaye bhavet || 105 (1653 )
Trans.-104-105 Consciousness (cetana) can never exist in a collection if it is absent in case of (its) individual constituents, just as oil cannot be found in a collection of sands if it is not present in each individual particle of the sand. Again, intoxication (mada) is not absolutely absent even in an individual constituent of wine. (For), every constituent (of wine) possesses some capacity or other like that of inducing
19

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•: 146:. . Jinabhadra Gani's [The second insanity, producing satiety and quenching thirst etc. in its individual state. If consciousness were present in (each of the) bhātas ( separately ), it could be ( found ) in the collection (also) ( 1652-1653).
टीका-" न समुदये चेय त्ति" न भूतसमुदयमात्रप्रभवा चेतना, " पत्तेयमभावाउ ति" भूतप्रत्येकावस्थायां तस्या अंशतोऽपि सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः । किं यथा किंप्रभवं न भवति ? इत्याह-" न रेणुतेल्लं व ति" यथा प्रत्येकं सवर्थाऽनुपलम्भाद् रेणुकणसमुदायप्रभवं तैलं न भवतीत्यर्थः । प्रयोगः-यद् येषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते तत् तेषां समुदायेऽपि न भवति, यथा सिकताकणसमुदाये तैलम् , यत्तु तेषां समुदाये भवति न तस्य पृथग् व्यवस्थितेषु तेषु सर्वथाऽनुपलम्भः, यथैकैकतिलावस्थायां तैलस्य, सर्वथा नोपलभ्यते च भूतेषु प्रत्येकावस्थायां चेतना, तस्माद् नासौ तत्समुदायमात्रप्रभवा, किन्त्वर्थापत्तेरेवान्यत् किमपि जीवलक्षणं कारणान्तरं भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तं तत्र संघट्टितं, यत इयं प्रभवतीति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । आह" प्रत्येकावस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलम्भात्" इत्यनैकान्तिकोऽयं हेतुः, । प्रत्येका वस्थायां सर्वथाऽनुपलब्धस्यापि मदस्य मद्याङ्गसमुदाये दर्शनात् , इत्याश
झ्याह-" मजंगेसु इत्यादि " धातकीकुसुमादिषु मद्याङ्गेषु पुनर्विष्वक पृथग् न सर्वथा मदो नास्ति, अपि तु या च यावती च मदमात्रा पृथगपि तेष्वस्त्येवेत्यर्थः । ततो नानैकान्तिकता हेतोरिति ।
टीका-यथा प्रत्येकावस्थायां धातकीकुसुमेषु या च यावती च भ्रमिश्चितभ्रमापादनशक्तिरस्ति, गुड-द्राक्षे-क्षुरसादिषु पुनधाणिरतृप्तिजननशक्तिरस्ति, उदके तु वितृष्णताकरणशक्तिरस्ति, आदिशब्दादन्येष्वपि मद्याङ्गेष्वन्यापि यथासंभवं शक्तिर्वाच्या, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण व्यस्तेष्वपि पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु यदि काचिच्चैतन्यशक्तिरभविष्यत् , तदा तत्समुदाये संपूर्णा स्पष्टा चेतना स्यात् , न चैतदस्ति, तस्माद् न भूतसमुदायमात्रप्रभवेयमिति ॥ १०४-१०५ (१६५२-५३) ॥ ____D. C.--Since cetana is not present in the individual state of a bhūta, even to a limited extent, it can never be found in

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
147 the combination of the bhūtas also, just as oil cannot be found in a samudaya of sands when it is not present in each individual particle of sand. From this, a rule can be deduced that whatever is absent in an individual state should be absent in the collective state also, and whatever is present in.collection should be present in the individual also, e. g., oil when present its prithak avasthā of sesamum is found in its collective state also.
allthili lilli luni
In the present case, cetana is not found in the prithak avastha of bhūtas and hence it is improper to accept that cetanā is produced in the samudaya of bhūtas. Really speaking, it is produced by some other cause totally different from bhūtasamudaya. That cause is nothing else but jîva which is amūrta on account of the amūrta cetanā.
Here again, the opponent may argue that the abovementioned rule is wrong. For, mada is not found in the individual state of a constituent like dhātalî puspa of the madya; and yet the quality of intoxication does exist in its samudaya. But it is not proper to say that mada-bhāva is altogether absent from dhātaki puspa etc. For, mada does exist in the individual state to a certain extent. A dhataki puspa.can induce insanity in its individual capacity; the juice of jaggery, vine, sugar-cane etc. can produce contentment and water can quench the thirst. By the word “adi ” other constituents of wine should also be included, as they too, possess some capacity or the other as far as possible. Now, if caitanya-sakti were present in the individual bhūtas like prithvi etc. even to a limitted extent, caitanya would certainly have been manifested in their combination also. But when cetana is absent in the very prithak state, it can never be produced in the combined state.
Now, what would happen if the constituents of wine had no power of intoxication at all ?

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148 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The second
जइ वा सवाभावो वसुं तो किं तद्गनियमोऽयं । तस्समुदयनियमो वा अन्नेसु वि तो हवेजाहि ॥ १०६ ॥ (१६५४)
Jai vā savvābhāvo vîsum to kim tadanganiyamo'yam Tassamudayaniyamo vā annesu vi to havejjāhi ॥ 106 ॥ ( 1654 ) [ यदि वा सर्वाभावो विष्वक् ततः किं तदङ्गनियमोऽयं ।
तस्समुदयनियमो वाऽन्येष्वपि ततो भवेत् ॥ १०६ ॥ ( १६५४ ) Yadi va sarvabhavo visvak tataḥ kim tadanganiyamo'yamı Tassamudayaniyamo va' nyesvapi tato bhavet || 106 | ( 1654 ) ]
Trans.-106 Or, if the power of intoxication were altogether absent from all (the constituents of wine) individually, how could they be called its divisions at all? and why should there be any rule regarding its collection also? (For), in that case it must be produced by means of (the collection) other objects also. ( 1654 )
टीका- यदि च मद्याङ्गेषु पृथगवस्थायां सर्वथैव मदशक्त्यभावः, तर्हि कोऽयं तदङ्गनियमः — कोऽयं धातकीकुसुमादीनां मद्याङ्गतानियमः, तत्समुदायनियमो वा किमिति मद्यार्थी धातकीकुसुमादीन्येवान्वेषयति, तत्समुदायं किमपि नियमेन मीलयति ? इत्यर्थः नन्वन्येष्वपि च भश्मा-श्म- गोमयादिषु समुदितेषु मद्यं भवेदिति ॥ १०६ ( १६५४ ) ॥
9
D. C.--If the power of inoxication is denied to exist in the prithak avastha of the constituents like dhataki puspa etc, they cannot be called the constituents of wine at all. Again, if dhataki puspa etc, had no power of intoxication at all, why should people desirous of wine, collect all the constituents like dhataki puspa in order to prepare wine? and why do they not prepare wine by combining other objects like ashes, stones, cowdung, ete ? This clearly indicates that the power of intoxication does exist in the individual state of constituents like dhataki puspa etc, and as a result of that, it appears in wine which is the combined state of all such constituents.

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 142 ... At this point, an opponent may advance the following argument :भूयाणं पत्तेयं पि चेयणा समुदए दरिसणाओ। जह मजंगेसु मओ मइ त्ति हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयं ॥१०७॥(१६५५) Bhūyāņam patteyam pi ceyaņā samudae darisanão i Jaha majjarigesu mao mai tti heū na siddho'yam || 107-11 (1655) [ भूतानां प्रत्येकमपि चेतना समुदये दर्शनात् ।
यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदो मतिरिति हेतुर्न सिद्धोऽयम् ।। १०७ ॥ (१६५५) Bhūtánām pratyekampi cetanā samudaye darśanāt Yatha madyangeșu mado matiriti heturna siddho'yam 111071(1655)]
Trans.107 Since consciousness is found in the collection of bhūtas, if an argument is advanced that consciousness is present in each individual bhūta also as intoxication is present in various constituents of wine, it can never be approved of. ( 1655 ).
टीका-स्यात् परस्य मतिः-साधूक्तं यत्-पृथगपि मद्याङ्गेषु किञ्चिद् मदसामर्थ्य मस्तीति । एतदेव हि मम भूतेषु व्यस्तावस्थायां चैतन्यास्तित्वसिद्धावुदाहरणं भविष्यति, तथाहि-व्यस्तेष्वपि भूतेषु चैतन्यमस्ति, तत्समुदाये तदर्शनात् , मद्याङ्गेषु मदवदिति । यथा मद्याङ्गेषु मदः पृथगल्पत्वाद् नातिस्पष्टः, तत्समुदाये त्वभिव्यक्तिमेति, तथा भूतेष्वपि पृथगवस्थायामणीयसी चेतना, तत्समुदाये तु भूयसीयमिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह-"हेऊ न सिद्धोऽयमिति" " चेतनाया भूतसमुदाये दर्शनात्" इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरित्यर्थः, आत्मनो भूतसमुदायान्तर्गतत्वेन चेतनायास्तद्धमत्वात् , आत्माभावे च तत्समुदायेऽपि तदसिद्धेरसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति भावः। यदि हि भूतसमुदायमात्रधर्मश्चेतना भवेत् तदा मृतशरीरेऽप्युपलभ्येत । वायोस्तदानीं तत्राभावात् तदनुपलम्भ इति चेत् । नैवम् , नलिकादिप्रयोगतस्तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलब्धेः। तेजस्तदानीं तत्र नास्तीति चेत् । न, तत्प्रक्षेपेऽपि तदनुपलम्भात् । विशिष्टतेजो-वाय्व

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•: 150 :
Jinabhadra Gaại's [ The second भावादनुपलम्भ इति चेत् । किं नामात्मसत्त्वं विहायाऽन्यत् तद्वैशिष्ट्यम् ? ननु संज्ञान्तरेणात्मसत्त्वमेव त्वयापि प्रतिपादितं स्यादिति ॥१०७(१६५५)।
D. C.-An opponent may advance the following line of argument:
As mada is present in each separate constituent of wine, it is found in the samudaya of those bhūtas also. In the same way, it can be said that since cetanā is completely manifested in the collection of bhūtas it should be present in each independent bhūta at least to a certain extent. Just as mada is not clearly perceptible in its individual state, but distinct in the samudāya, so also, cetanā is not clearly perceptible in the individual state on account of its minute form, but it is more distinct in the collective state.
But it is not in the fitness of things to state that because cetanā is found in the bhūta samudaya it should be present in each individual bhūta also, as cetanā is the quality of Soul and the Soul is contained within (antargata ) the bhūta samudaya. So, if ātman is absent from the blūta samudaya, cetana cannot exist in the samudaya. Thus, your argument that cetanā is found in the collection of bhūtas is not valid. For, if cetana were taken to be a quality of mere bhūta samudaya it ought to be found in a dead body also. Here again, it is improper to advance an excuse that cetana is absent in a dead body on account of the absence of vāyu. For, cetană could never be found in a dead body, even if vãyu were made to enter the body by means of a pipe etc. Similarly, if it is argued that cetanā does not exist in a dead body due to the absence of tejas, tejas also could be made to enter the dead body by the same sort of means and proved that cetanū is absent in that case also. Lastly, if it is said that on account of the non-existence of a peculiar type of vāyu and tejas, cetanā is absent from a dead body, the peculiarity in the case would be due to nothing else but the excellence of ātman which would automatically mean that you admit the existence of ātman.

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 151 :नणु पञ्चक्खविरोहो गोयम ! तं नाणुमाणभावाओ। तुह पञ्चक्खविरोहो पत्तेयं भूयचेयं त्ति ॥१०८॥ (१६५६) Naņu paccakkhaviroho Goyama ! tam nāņumāṇabhāvão i Tuha paccakkhaviroho patteyam bhūyaceyam tti il 108 11 (1656) [ ननु प्रत्यक्षविरोधो गौतम ! तद् नानुमानभावात् ।
तव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः प्रत्येकं भूतचेतनेति ॥ १०८ ॥ (१६५६) Nanu pratyakśavirodho Gautama! tad nānumāna bhāvāt | Tava pratyaksa virodhaḥ pratyekam bhūtacetaneti || 108 11 (1656)]
Trans.—108 Certainly O Gautama! that is not an evident contradiction ( as you think ) on account of the existence of anumāna. ( On the contrary ), your assumption that cetana exists in each and every bhūta constituents is an evident contradiction. ( 1656 )
टीका-ननु प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमेवेदं यत्-भूतसमुदाये सत्युपलभ्यमानापि चेतना न तत्समुदायस्येत्यभिधीयते । न हि घटे रूपादय उपलभ्यमाना न घटस्येति वक्तुमुचितम् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो न भू-जलसमुदायमात्रे उपलभ्यमाना अपि हरितादयस्तन्मात्रप्रभवा इति शक्यते वक्तुम् । तद्वीजसाधकानुमानेन बाध्यतेऽसावुपलम्भ इति चेत् । तदेतदिहापि समानम् । एतदेवाह" गोयमेत्यादि " वायुभूतेरपीन्द्रभूतिसोदर्यभ्रातृत्वेन समानगोत्रत्वाद् गौतम ! इत्येवमामन्त्रणम् , यत्त्वं ब्रूषे-तदेतद् न, भूतसमुदायातिरिक्तात्मसाधकानुमानसद्भावात् , ततस्तेनैव त्वत्प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधितत्वादिति भावः । प्रत्युत तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । किं कुर्वतः ? इत्याह “ पत्तेयं भूयचेय त्ति" 'ब्रुवतः' इति शेषः। प्रत्येकावस्थायां पृथिव्यादिभूतेषु चैतन्याभावस्यैव दर्शनात् तदस्तित्वं प्रत्यक्षेणैव बाध्यत इति " प्रत्येकं भूतेषु चेतना" इति ब्रुवतस्तवैव प्रत्यक्षविरोध इत्यर्थः ॥ १०८ ( १६५६ ) ॥
D. C.-Vayubhūti --That cetanā though perceived in a collection of bhūtas, does not belong to the bhūta samudaya seems to be incongruent. For, just as it is improper to assert

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.: 152 : . Jinabhadra Gaņi's (The second that qualities like rūpa etc. seen in a ghata, do not belong to the ghata, so here also, it is not proper to state that cetana though apprehended in a collection of bhūtas, does not belong to the bhūta samudāya.
. Ācārya-The argument advanced by you, O Gautama ! is absolutely invalid. Just as vegetables etc. found in a collection of earth and water can never be considered to have been produced from the collection of earth and water, since they are produced from their seeds; in the same way, cetana also should never be taken to have been produced from the collection of bhūtas though it is found in a body made of bhūtas such as prithvi etc. For, that cetanā is produced from ātman which is altogether distinct from the bhūta samudāya. Thus, there is no contradiction in my argument. But the contradiction lies in your assertion that cetanā is produced in each and every individual bhūta. भूइंदियोवलद्धाणुसरणओ तेहिं भिन्नरूवस्स ।
चेया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धपुरिसस्स वा सरओ ॥ १०९ ॥ (१६५६) Bhūindiyovaladdhānusaranao tehim bhinnarūvassa 1 Ceyā pancagavakkhovaladdhapurisassa vā sarao 11 109 11 (1657) [भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तेभ्यो भिन्नरूपस्य ।
चेतना पश्चगवाक्षोपलब्धपुरुषस्येव स्मरतः ॥ १०९ ( १६५७ ) ॥ Bhūtendriyopalabdhānusmaraṇatastebhyo bhinnarūpasya / Cetanā pancagavaksopalabdha puruşasyeva smarataḥ ||10911 (1657)]
Trans.-109 Like a man who perceives (an object ) from five windows and recalls ( it ) to his mind, cetanā being itself ( the quality ) of an object different from them ( i. e., bhūtas ) perceives ( an object) by means of sense-organs (in the form) of bhūtas and recalls ( the object ) to his mind. ( 1657 )
टीका-तेभ्यो भूतेन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नरूपस्य कस्यापि धर्मश्चेतनेति प्रतिज्ञा।

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 15:. भूतेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणादिति हेतुः। यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरतस्तदतिरिक्तस्य कस्यापि देवदत्तादेः पुरुषस्य चेतनेति दृष्टान्तः। अयमत्र तात्पर्यार्थ:-इह य एको यैरनेकैरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरति स तेभ्यो भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षरुपलब्धानर्थाननुस्मरन् देवदत्तः, यश्च यस्माद् भूतेन्द्रियात्मकसमुदायाद् भिन्नो न भवति, किं तर्हि ? अनन्यः, नायमेकोऽनेकोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता, यथा शब्दादिग्राहकमनोविज्ञानविशेषः, तैरुपलभ्यानुस्मरतोऽपि च तदनतिरिक्तत्वे देवदत्तस्यापि गवाक्षमात्रप्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्रमाणम् । इन्द्रियाण्येवोपलभन्ते, न पुनस्तैरन्य उपलभत इति चेत् । न, " तदुपरमेऽपि तदुपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात् , तव्यापारे च कदाचिदनुपलम्भात्" इत्यनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति ॥ १०९ ( १६५७ )॥
D. C.—The point is that cetana who remembers an object perceived by its sense-organs in the form of bhūtas, becomes the quality of something which is different from those bhūten. driyas, just as Devadatta who remembers an object perceived through five windows by means of five indriyas, is distinct from those windows. So, that which is not bhinna from the samudaya of bhūtendriyas, can never remember an object apprehended by more than one means. For, after having perceived an object through a number of means, if cetana were abhinna from those means, then Devadatta who recognizes an object through a number of windows, would become the window itself.
Again, in recognizing an object it is improper to say that mere indriyas (sense-organs ) apprehend the object and nothing else. For, even when the indriyas have ceased working the object perceived by them is recalled; and sometimes, in spite of their working, the object is not apprehended. तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तबावारे वि नोवलंभाओ। इंदियभिन्नस्स मई पंचगवक्खाणुभविणो व ॥११० ॥ (१६५८)
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Page #197

• 154:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The third
Taduvarame vi saraṇao tavvāvāre vi novalambhão | Indiyabhinnassa mai pancagavakkhānubhavino vva ॥ 110 ॥ (1658)
[ तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तव्यापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियभिन्नस्य मतिः पञ्चगवाक्षानुभविन इव ॥ ११० ॥ (१६५८) Taduparame'pi smaraṇatastadvyāpāre'pi nopalambhāt | Indriyabhinnasya matiḥ pancagavākśānubhavina iva ||110|| (1658)]
Trans.-110. As in the case of a person perceiving (an object) from five windows, cognition ( in the form of knowledge ) is distinct from sense-organs; because an object apprehended by the sense-organs is remembered even when the indriyas have ceased working and (sometimes) in spite of their working, the object is not perceived. ( 1658 )
टीका - इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नस्यैव कस्यापीयं घटादिज्ञानलक्षणा मतिरिति प्रतिज्ञा । तदुपरमेऽपि - अन्धत्व - वाधिर्याद्यवस्थायामिन्द्रियव्यापाराभावेऽपि, तद्वारेणोपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मरणादिति हेतुः । अथवा, अस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां तद्व्यापारेऽपि - इन्द्रियव्यापृतावपि कदाचिदनुपयुक्तावस्थायाम्, वस्त्वनुलम्भादित्यपरो हेतुः । यदि हीन्द्रियाण्येव द्रष्टृणि भवेयुः, तर्हि किमिति विस्फारिताक्षस्यापि प्रगुणश्रोत्रादीन्द्रियवर्गस्यापि योग्यदेशस्थितानामपि रूप- शब्दादिवस्तूनामनुपयुक्तस्य अन्यमनस्कस्य शून्यचित्तस्योपलम्भो न भवति । ततो ज्ञायते - इन्द्रियग्रामव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव कस्यचिदयमुपलम्भः, यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैर्योषिदादिवस्तून्यनुभवितुर्दर्शकस्येति दृष्टान्तः ।
अत्रापि प्रयोगाभ्यां तात्पर्यमुपदर्श्यते, तद्यथा - इह यो यदुपरमेsपि यैरुपलब्धानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता स तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो दृष्टः, यथा गवाक्षैरुपलब्धानामर्थानां गवाक्षोपरमे देवदत्तः, अनुस्मरति चायमात्माऽन्धबधिरत्वादिकालेऽपीन्द्रियोपलब्धानर्थान्, अतः स तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति । तथा, इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, तव्यापारेऽप्यर्थानुपलम्भात्, इह यो यद्व्यापारेsपि यैरुपलभ्यानर्थान् नोपलभते स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथाऽस्थगितगवाक्षोऽप्यन्यमनस्कतयाऽनुपयुक्तोऽपश्यंस्तेभ्यो देवदत्त इति ।। ११० (१६५८ ) ॥

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 155 : D. C.-Cognition ( mati ) which constitutes the knowledge of ghata etc., belongs to something which is distinct from sense-organs. For, even if the senses are benumbed as in the state of deafness, blindness etc., the object perceived by the indriyas is remembered, while on the other side, even if the senses are working, the object is not recognized.
Now, if the sense-organ itself were to apprehend an object, how is it that an absent-minded man is not able to apprehend an object even with open eyes, efficient ears and · substances of rūpa and sabda placed at proper places ? It follows, therefore, that some one, who like a person looking at an object like a woman from five windows, is different from the sense-organs, is able to apprehend it. A rule can be deduced from this that one who remembers an object even after its indriyas have ceased working is distinct from those indriyas, When Devadatta recalls an object seen through a number of windows even after the windows are closed, it is ātman, who remembers the object perceived by sense-organs even when the sense-organs have ceased working as in the state of blindness, deafness etc. This proves that ātman is different from indriyas. Again, that which does not recognize an object even if the indriyas are working, is different from the senseorgans like an absent-minded Devadatta looking through the open windows. उवलब्भन्नेण विगारगहणओ तदहिओ धुवं अस्थि । galatalargurte OTTITIESÍTAT THIS?811 (8&48) Uvalabbhanneņa vigāragahaņao tadahio dhuvam.atthi i Puvvāvaravātāyanagahaņavigārāipuriso vva u 11111 ( 1659 ) [ उपलभ्यान्येन विकारग्रहणतस्तदधिको ध्रुवमस्ति ।
पूर्वापरवातायनग्रहणविकारादिपुरुष इव ॥१११ ॥ (१६५९) Upalabhyanyena vikāragrabanatastadadhiko dhruvamasti Pūrvāparavātayanagrahaņavikārādipuruşa iva || 111 || (1659 ) ]

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.: 156 :Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The third ____Trans.-111 Just as a person apprehending ( an object) from an eastward window and perverting himself ( due to its sight ) at the opposite window, is different from those windows, so also, the soul who apprehends ( an object ) by means of one (sense-organ) and exhibits perversion by means of another is decidedly different from those sense organs. ( 1659)
टीका-इह ध्रुवं निश्चितं तदधिकस्तेभ्य इन्द्रियेभ्यः समधिको भिन्न: समस्ति जीवः, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन विकारग्रहणात् , इह योऽन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन विकारं प्रतिपद्यते स तस्माद् भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथा प्रवरप्रासादोपरीतस्ततः पदपरिपाटीं कुर्वाणः पूर्ववातायनेन रमणीमवलोक्यापरवातायनेन समागतायास्तस्याः करादिना कुचस्पर्शादिविकारमुपदर्शयन् देवदत्तः, तथा चायमात्मा चक्षुषाऽम्लीकामनन्तं दृष्ट्वा रसनेन हल्लास-लालासावादिविकारं प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मात् तयोभिन्न इति। अथवा, ग्रहणशब्दमिहाऽऽदानपर्यायं कृत्वाऽन्यथानुमानं विधीयते-इन्द्रियेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा, अन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन ग्रहणात् , इह य आदेयं घटादिकमर्थमन्येनोपलभ्यान्येन गृह्णाति स ताभ्यां भेदवान् दृष्टः, यथा पूर्ववातायनेन घटादिकमुपलभ्यापरवातायनेन गृह्णानस्ताभ्यां देवदत्तः, गृह्णाति च चक्षुषोपलब्धं घटादिकमर्थं हस्तादिना जीवः, ततस्ताभ्यां भिन्न इति ॥ १११ (१६५९) ॥ ____D. C.-Jiva who apprehends an object by means of one indriya and exhibits vikaras by means of another, is blinna from both the indriyas. Just as Devadatta who looks at a woman from an eastward window and exhibits his perversion of the sight of stanasparsa etc, by her hands at the other is really speaking different from both the windows; in the same way, the Soul who observes a person eating tamarind by means of eyes and exhibits vikaras in the form of distilling saliva etc, by means of tongue, is decidedly different from both. Or, ātman is different from indriyas because having seen an object by means of eyes, ātman holds it by means of hands.
Another inference,

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 157:. सवेंदिउवलद्धाणुसरणओ तदहिओऽणुमंतवो। जह पंचभिन्नविन्नाणपुरिसविन्नाणसंपन्नो ॥ ११२॥ (१६६०) Savvendiuvaladdhāņusaranao tadahio’ņumantavvo 1 Jaha pancabhinnavinnānapurisavinnānasampanno ॥ 112 ॥ (1660) [ सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धानुस्मरणतस्तदधिकोऽनुमन्तव्यः ।
यथा पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषविज्ञानसंपन्नः ॥ ११२ ॥ (१६६०) Sarvendriyopalabdhānusmaraṇatastadadhiko’numantavyaḥ | Yathā pancabhinnavijnāna puruşavijnanasampannaḥ 1112|1 (1660)]
Trans.-112 Just as from five different persons having five different vijnānas a sixth person possessing all the five vijnanas is different, so also, the soul who remembers an object cognized by all the sense-organs should be inferred as being distinct from them. ( 1660 )
टीका-सर्वेन्द्रियोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणतः कारणात् तदधिकोऽस्ति जीवः । दृष्टान्तमाह-यथा पञ्च च ते भिन्नविज्ञानाश्च पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञाना इच्छावशात् प्रत्येकं स्पर्श-रस-गन्ध-रूप-शब्दोपयोगवन्त इत्यर्थः, पञ्चभिन्न विज्ञानाश्च ते पुरुषाश्च पञ्चभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषास्तेषां यानि स्पर्शादिविषयाणि विज्ञानानि तैः संपन्नस्तद्वेत्ता यः षष्ठः पुरुषस्तेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यो भिन्नः। इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्य इह यैरुपलब्धानामर्थानामेकोऽनुस्मर्ता स तेभ्यो भिन्नो दृष्टः, यथेच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानपुरुषपञ्चकात् तदशेषविज्ञानाभिज्ञः पुमान् , इच्छानुविधायिशब्दादिभिन्नजातीयविज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकाशेषविज्ञानवेत्ता चायमेक आत्मा, तस्मादिन्द्रियपञ्चकाद् भिन्न एवेति। शब्दादिभिन्नविज्ञानपुरुषपश्वस्येव पृथगिन्द्रियाणामुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गतोऽनिष्टापादनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत् । न, इच्छानुविधायिविशेषणात् , इच्छायाश्चेन्द्रियाणामसंभवात् , सहकारिकारणतयोपलब्धिकारणमात्रताया इन्द्रियेष्वपि सद्भावात् , उपचारतस्तेषामुप्युपलब्धेरविरोधाददोषः । किञ्च, प्रतिपत्त्युपायमात्रमेवैतत् , न ह्यतीन्द्रियेप्वर्थेष्वेकान्तेनैव युक्त्यन्वेषणपरैर्भाव्यम् ; उक्तं च

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•: 158 : Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The third आगमश्चोपपत्तिश्च संपूर्ण दृष्टिकारणम् । अतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां सद्भावप्रतिपत्तये ॥१॥ इति ॥ ११२ (१६६०)॥
D. C.--Since jîva remembers an object perceived by all the sense-organs, jîva should be distinguished from indriyas. From five different persons possessing five different vijnānas such as sparsa, rasa etc, according to their will, a sixth puruşa having all the five vijnanas together is distinguished. In the same way, the Soul that possesses the cognizance of all the five sense-organs, should be distinguished from each of the five sense-organs. In short, one who is the only anusmartā of the objects cognized, is distinguished from those by means of which the objects are perceived.
An objection may be raised at this point that like five different purusas having five different vijnānas such as sabda, rasa, etc, the five indriyas should also possess the power of cognizance. For, if they have no cognizance, the argument stated above would be a-siddha. But the contention is not valid. For, there would be no difficulty in this case by reason of the adjective "icchāvasāt.” Indriyas are not supposed to have any sort of desire. Or, by way of the co-operative cause the reason of perception lies in indriyas and hence there is no harm, if indriyas were metaphorically believed to be jnāna itself. Or, say, this illustration is nothing but a means to an end. Consequently, for the recognition of objects which are atîndriya ( beyond perception ) agama and yukti are the only resorts. For it is said,
Agamascoʻpapattiśca sampurnam dristikāranam;
Atîndriyānāmarthānām sadbhava pratipattaye. A few more inferences are laid down in support of the distinction of Soul, विण्णाणंतरपुवं बालपणाणामह नाणभावाओ । जह बालनाणपुवं जुवनाणं तं च देहहिअं ॥११३॥ (१६६१)

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Vada] . Gañadharavada
159:. Vinnānantarapuvvam bālannānamiha nānabhāvão Jaha bālanānapuvvam juvanāņam tam ca dehahiam u 11311 (1661) [विज्ञानान्तरपूर्व बालज्ञानमिह ज्ञानभावात् ।
यथा बालज्ञानपूर्व युवज्ञानं तच्च देहाधिकम् ॥११३ ॥ (१६६१) Vijnānāntarapūrvam bālajnānamiha jnānabhávat / Yathā bālajnānapūrvam yuvajnānam tacca dehādhikam 1/11311 (1661)] ____Trans.-113 Just as cognizance in youth is similar to cognizance in childhood, the latter is similar to other cognizances because of its being cognizance. And that ( cognizance ) is distinguished from deha. ( 1661 )
टीका-अन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिदं बालविज्ञानम् , विज्ञानत्वात् , इह यद् विज्ञानं तदन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकम् दृष्टम् , यथा बालविज्ञानपूर्वकं युवविज्ञानम् , यद्विज्ञानपूर्वकं चेदं बालविज्ञानं, तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, पूर्वशरीरत्यागेऽपीहत्यविज्ञानकारणत्वात् , तस्य च विज्ञानस्य गुणत्वेन गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेणासंभवात्, तच्छरीरव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं व्यवस्यामः, न तु शरीरमेवात्मेति । विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थंकदेशत्वादसिद्धो हेतुरिति चेत् । न, विशेषस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् । भवति च विशेषे पक्षीकृते सामान्यं हेतुः, यथाऽनित्यो वर्णात्मकः
शब्दः, शब्दत्वात् , मेघशन्दवत् । एवमिहापि बालविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिति विशेषः पक्षीकृतः, न तु सामान्यविज्ञानमन्यविज्ञानपूर्वकमिति पक्षीकृतं, येन विज्ञानत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञार्थंकदेशः स्यात् , यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः, शब्दत्यादित्वादि ॥ ११३ (१६६१)॥
D. C.—Here the bālajnāna is similar to other vijnanas on account of its vijnanatva. Just as yuvajnāna resembles bālajnāna, the vijnana to which the bala jnana resembles is distinguished from deha because it continues to be the cause of vijnāna even after it has left the former body. Now, since vijnana is a quality, it cannot remain without a gunin viz, atman; consequently, we recognize aiman to be distinct from body and not the body itself.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The third
Vayubhuti-The hetu vijnänatvāt" stated by you becomes nothing but a portion of the proposition to be proved in that case.
.: 160 :•
" "
Acarya-It is not so. The particular is pointed out in this case; and when particular is emphasized, the hetu stated there-in is common e. g., the varnätmaka sabda is anitya because of its sabdatva as in the case of a meghasabda. Similarly, in the proposition that bālavijnāna is similar to other · vijnānas, only a particular case of vijnana is emphasized and vijnana in general is not emphasized, consequently this does not form a part of the proposition as it forms in the case of anityah sabdah sabdatvat.”
66
पढमो थणाहिलासो अण्णाहाराहिलासपुवोऽयं ।
जह संपयाहिलासोऽणुभूइओ सोय देहहिओ ॥ ११४॥ (१६६२)
Padhamo thaṇāhilāso anṇāhārāhilāsapuvvo'yam | Jaha sampayāhilāso'nubhūio so ya dehahio ॥ 114 ॥ ( 1662 ) ] [ प्रथमः स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्याहाराभिलाषपूर्वोऽयम् ।
यथा सांप्रताभिलाषोऽनुभूतितः स च देहाधिकः ॥ ११४ ॥ (१६६२) Prathamaḥ stanābhilaṣo'nyāhārābhilaṣapūrvo'yami Yatha sampratabhilaso 'nubhūtitah sa ca dehadhika || 114 (1662) ]
Trans.—114 The first desire ( of the child ) to suck the breasts (of mother) is like the desire in the present case just similar to other desires for food on account of (the same) experience. And that desire is distinct from body. ( 1662 )
टीका- गौतम ! आद्यः स्तनाभिलाषो बालस्वायमन्याभिलाषपूर्वकः, अनुभूतेः - अनुभवात्मकत्वात्, सांप्रताभिलाषवदिति । अथवा, "अभिलाषत्वात् " इत्ययमनुक्तोऽपि हेतुद्रष्टव्यः, इह योऽभिलाषः सोऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वको दृष्टः, यथा सांप्रताभिलाषः, यदभिलाषपूर्वक श्चायमाद्यः स्तनाभिलाषः स शरीरादन्य एव, पूर्वशरीरपरित्यागेऽपीहत्याभिलापकारणत्वात् । ज्ञानगुणश्चा

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
. : 161 :भिलाषो न गुणिनमन्तरेण संभवति । अतो यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स शरीरातिरिक्त आत्मेति ।
आह-नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम् , सर्वस्याऽप्यभिलाषपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न हि मोक्षाभिलाषो मोक्षाभिलाषपूर्वको घटते । तदयुक्तम् , अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् , यो हि स्तनाभिलाषः स सामान्येनैवाभिलाषपूर्वक इत्येतदेवास्माभिरुच्यते, न पुनर्विशेषेण ब्रूमः-" स्तनाभिलाषोऽन्यस्तनाभिलाषपूर्वकः" इति । एवं च सामान्योक्ती मोक्षाभिलाषपक्षेऽपि घटत एव, मोक्षाभिलाषस्यापि सामान्येनाऽन्याभिलाषपूर्वकत्वादिति ॥ ११४ (१६६२) । ____D. C.-The first desire of the child to suck the breasts of the mother is just similar to the other abhilāsas on account of its being an abhilasa. Now, the desire to which the child's stanābhilāsa resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of this abhilāşa even after it has left the body. Abhilasa is the quality of knowledge which cannot exist without a support, which is nothing but the soul, independent of deha.
Vayubhūti :-The hetu stated in the above-named anumāna involves the fault of uncertainty as all abhilāsas are not the same. e. g., an abhilāsa for moksa does not resemble another abhilāşa for moksa. So, why not to believe the same in the case of this abhilāsa also ? ____ The Acarrya :-You have not understood the point, O Gautama ! The point is that we have compared the desire for breasts only with other desires in general. We have not stated in particular that the desire for breasts is just similar to other desires for breasts. Similarly, in the case of moksabhilasa also, the moksābhilāşa should not be compared with other moksābhitāşas but only with other abhilāşas in general. (1662)
Another inference,
21

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- 162 : .. Jinabhadra Gani's [The third बालसरीरं देहतरपुवं इन्दियाइमत्ताओ। जुवदेहो बालादिव स जस्स देहो स देहि त्ति ॥११५॥ (१६६३) Bālasariram dehantarapuvvam indiyāimattāo i Juvadeho bālādiva sa jassa deho sa dehi tti || 115 ( 1663 ) [बालशरीरं देहान्तरपूर्वमिन्द्रियादिमत्वात् ।
युवदेहो बालादिव स यस्य देहः स देहीति ॥ ११५ ॥ (१६६३) Balasarîram debāntarapūrvanindriyadimattvat i Yuvadeho baladiva. sa yasya dehah sa dehiti ॥ 115 ॥ ( 1663 )] ___Trans.-115 As the body in youth resembles the body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because it possesses the sense-organs. One to whom that body belongs is the owner of body (and not the body itself). ( 1663 ).
____टीका-बालशरीरं शरीरान्तरपूर्वकम् , इन्द्रियादिमत्त्वात् , इह यदिन्द्रियादिमत् , तदन्यदेहपूर्वकं दृष्टम् , यथा युवशरीरं बालदेहपूर्वकम् , यत्पूर्वक चेदं बालशरीरं तदस्मात शरीरादर्थान्तरम् , तदत्ययेऽपीहत्यशरीरोपादानात् , यस्य च तच्छ शरीरं स भवान्तरयायीशरीरादर्थान्तरभूतो देहवानस्त्यात्मा, न पुनः शरीरमेवात्मेति सिद्धमिति ॥ ११५ (१६६३ ) ॥ ___D. C.-Just as a body in youth resembles a body in infancy, the body in infancy is just similar to other bodies because of its possessing the indriyas. Now, the body to which this balasarîra resembles is distinct from the latter, for this body rises up even if the former body has perished. Again, that to whom this body belongs is nothing but Soul, who travels from life to life, and who, being not the body itself, is distinct from this body.
Another inference, अण्णसुह-दुक्खपुवं सुहाइ बालस्स संपइसुहं व । अणुभूइमयत्तणओ अणुभूइमओ य जीवो त्ति ॥११६॥ (१६६४)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
•: 163 :Annasuha-dukkhapuvvam suhāi bālassa sampaisuham va i Anubhūimayattanao anubhūimao ya jîvo tti. Il 116 11 ( 1664 ) [ अन्यसुख-दुःखपूर्व सुखादि बालस्य सांप्रतसुखमिव ।
अनुभूतिमयत्वतोऽनुभूतिमयश्च जीव इति ।। ११६ ॥ (१६६४) Anyasukha-duḥkhapūrvam sukhādi bālasya sāmpratasuk hamiva i Anubhutimayatvato'nubhutimayasca jiva iti ॥ 116 ॥ ( 1664 ) ]
__Trans.-116 Happiness in the state of childhood like the present-day happiness resembles happiness, misery etc., in other states. And the Soul is possessed of the faculty of perception because of its being capable of perceptivity. (1664).
टीका-अन्यसुखपूर्वकमिदमाद्यं बालसुखम् , अनुभवात्मकत्वात् , सांग्रतसुखवत् , यत्सुखपूर्वकं चेदमायं सुखम् , तच्छरीरादन्यदेव, तदत्ययेऽपीहत्यसुखकारणत्वात् । गुणश्चायम् , स च गुणिनमन्तरेण न संभवति, अतो यस्तस्याश्रयभूतो गुणी स देहादर्थान्तरम् , इति सुखानुभूतिमयो जीव इति सिद्धम् । एवं दुःख-राग-द्वेष-भय-शोकादयोऽप्यायोजनीया इति ॥ ११६ (१६६४)॥
___D. C.--Happiness in the state of childhood resembles the present-day happiness, because of its anubhūtimayatva. Now, the happiness to which this bālasukha resembles is distinct from body, because it continues to be the cause of happiness even if a former body has perished. Moreover, sukha is a guna which cannot exist without the support of gunin which, too, is distinct from body. This proves that the Soul is possessed of anubhūti of happiness. According to the same argument, we can prove that ātman possesses the anubhūti of duḥkha, raga, dvesa, bhaya, soka, etc. Now, the anumūnas that have already been laid down to establish the existence of jîva and karman are re-stated here in order to refresh the memory. संताणोऽणाई उ परोप्परं हेउ-हेउभावाओ। देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोयम ! बीयं-कुराणं व ॥११७॥(१६६५)
Vide verse 1639.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
Santāno'nāī u paropparam heu-heubhāvão । Dehassa ya kammassa ya Goyama ! biyam-kurānam va 117 (1665 )
.: 164:
[ The third
[ सन्तानोऽनादिस्तु परस्परं हेतु - हेतुभावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च गौतम । बीजा - ऽङ्कुरयोरिव ॥ ११७ ॥ ( १६६५)
Santano'nadistu parasparam hetu-hetubhāvāt | Dehasya ca karmanaśca Gautama ! bija'n kurayoriva॥117 (1665 ) ]
Trans. - 117 And O Gautama! as Karman and body are naturally related as the causes of each other like seed and sprout, the continuous range of Karman will have no beginning. ( 1665 ).
If the relation of Karman with body is eternal, how can the existence of jiva be established?
तो कम्म - सरीराणं कत्तारं करण - कजभावाओ ।
पडिवज तदब्भहिअं दंड घडाणं कुलालं व ॥ ११८ ॥ (१६६६)
अस्थि सरीरविहाया पइनिययागारओ घटस्सेव । अक्खाणं च करणओ दंडाईणं कुलालो व ॥ ११९ ॥ (१६६७)
अस्थिंदियविसयाणं आयाणादेयभावओऽवस्सं । कम्मार इवादाया लोए संडास - लोहाणं ॥ १२० ॥ (१६६८) भोत्ता देहाईणं भोज्जत्तणओ नरो व भत्तस्स । संघायाइत्तणओ अत्थिय अत्थी घरस्सेव ॥ १२१ ॥ (१६६९) जो कत्ताइ स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मई होज्जा । मुत्ताइपसंगाओ तं नो संसारिणो दोसो ॥ १२२ ॥ (१६७०)
To kamma-sarirānam kattāram karana kajjabhāvão | Padivajja tadabbhahiam danda-ghadānam kulālam va 118 (1666)

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.: 165:. [ततः कर्म-शरीरयोः कर्तारं करण-कार्यभावात् ।।
प्रतिपद्यस्व तदभ्यधिकं दण्ड-घटयोः कुलालमिव ।। ११८॥ (१९६६) Tataḥ karma-śarîrayoh kartāram karaņa-karyabhāvāti Pratipadyasva tadabhyadhikam danda-ghațayoḥ kulalamivall 11811]
Trans.-118 So, like a potter (to be distinct) from danda and ghata, know the creator of Karman and sarira to be distinct from both on account of the existence of cause and effect. ( 1666)
119. (1667 ) Vide verse 1567. 120. ( 1668 ) Vide verse 1568. 121. (1669 ) Vide verse 1569.
122. ( 1670 ) Vide verse 1570. Since all objects are kšunika according to Buddhistic theory, an opponent may argue here that java vanishes with body and hence it is no use trying to prove that Soul is different from body. The Acārya refutes this argument as follows :जाइस्सरो न विगओ सरणाओ बालजाइसरणो छ । जह वा सदेसवतं नरो सरंतो विदेसम्मि ॥१२३॥ (१६७१) Jāissaro na vigao saranão bālajāisarano vva / Jaha vā sadesavattam naro saranto videsammi 012301 (1671) [जातिस्मरो न विगतः स्मरणाद् बालजातिस्मरण इव ।
यथा वा स्वदेशवृत्तं नरः स्मरन् विदेशे ॥ १२३ ।। (१६७१.) Jātismaro na vigatah smaraņād bala jāti smaraņa iva i Yathā vā svadeśavritam naraḥ smaran videśe || 123 ! ( 1671)]
____Trans.-123 Like a person recollecting ( his ) childhood ( in old age ) or recollecting in a foreign country the incident, ( that happened ) in his own country, the Soul who recollects the former existence does not perish by virtue of ( its power of ) recollection. ( 1671 )

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.: 166 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The third टीका-इह यो जातिस्मरो जीवः स प्राग्भविकशरीरविगमेऽपि सति न विगत इति प्रतिज्ञा । 'सरणाउ त्ति' स्मरणादिति हेतुः। यथा बालजाती बालजन्मनि वृत्तं स्मरतीति बालजातिस्मरणो वृद्ध इति दृष्टान्तः । यथा वा, स्वदेशे मालवकमध्यदेशादौ वृत्तं विदेशेऽपि गतो नरः स्मरन् न विगतः । इदमुक्तं भवति-योऽन्यदेश-कालाद्यनुभूतमर्थ स्मरति सोऽविनष्टो दृष्टः, यथा बालकालानुभूतानामर्थानामनुस्मर्ता वृद्धाद्यवस्थायां देवदत्तः। यस्तु विनष्टो नासौ किञ्चिदनुस्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरमेवोपरतः। न च पूर्वपूर्वक्षणानुभूतमाहितसंस्कारा उत्तरोत्तरक्षणाः स्मरन्तीति वक्तव्यम् , पूर्व-पूर्वक्षणानां सर्वनिरन्वयविनाशेन सर्वथा विनष्टत्वात् , उत्तरोत्तरक्षणानां सर्वथाऽन्यत्वात् । न चान्यानुभूतमन्योऽनुस्मरति, देवदत्तानुभूतस्य यज्ञदत्तानुस्मरणप्रसङ्गादिति ॥ १२३ (१६७१)॥
D. C.-Here, the proposition is that the Soul that remembers former existence, cannot vanish even after the disappearance of the former body by virtue of its smaranasakti. Just as an old person who remembers his state of childhood does not himself perish even if childhood has vanished, or just as a person who recollects in a foreign country the incidents that happened in his own country, does not himself perish even if the incidents are no more existing, so also, the Soul that remembers former existence does not vanish even if the body of former existence has already vanished. In short, one who recollects incidents that happened in former time and place is vidyamāna (existing ) like Devadatta who is able to recollect his experiences of childhood in old age. But, if he be only the anusmartā nothing can be recollected in the next life as he himself is not alive in that existence.
Again, it is not correct to say that all experiences of former moments are recollected in the later moments, as former moments are absolutely separate from the later moments and they disappear as soon as their relations with the later ones disappear.

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 167 .. Lastly, one can never remember the experience of another. If it were so, Yajnadatta would be able to remember the experience of Devadatta. अह मन्नसि खणिओ वि हु सुमरइ विन्नाणसंतइगुणाओ।.. तहवि सरीरादण्णो सिद्धो विण्णाणसंताणो॥ १२४ ॥ (१६७२) Aha mannasi khanio vi hu sumarai vinnānasantaigunão I Tahavi sasiradanno siddho vinnānasantano ॥ 124n ( 1672) . [ अथ मन्यसे क्षणिकोऽपि खलु स्मरति विज्ञानसंततिगुणात् ।
तथापि शरीरादन्यः सिद्धो विज्ञानसंतानः ॥ १२४ ॥ ( १६७२) Atha manyase kşaņiko’pi khalu smarati vijnanasantatiguņāt | Tathāpi śarîradanyaḥ siddho vijnānasantānaḥ || 124 11 (1572)]
Trans.—124 Again if you believe that (the soul) though transitory, remembers ( the former existence ) by virtue of its having a continuous range of knowledge, the continuous range of knowledge in that case also, has been proved to be distinct from body. ( 1672 )
टीका-अथैवं मन्यसे त्वम्-क्षणिकोऽपि क्षणभङ्गुरोऽपि जीवः पूर्ववृत्तान्तं स्मरत्येव । कुतः ? इत्याह-विज्ञानानां विज्ञानक्षणानां संततिः संतानस्तस्या गुणस्तत्सामर्थ्यरूपस्तस्मादिति, क्षणसंतानस्यावस्थितत्वात् क्षणनश्वरोऽपि स्मरतीत्यर्थः । अत्रोत्तरमाह-ननु तथाप्येवमपि सति ज्ञानलक्षणसन्तानस्याग्रेतनशरीरसंक्रान्तेर्भवान्तरसद्भावः सिध्यति, सर्वशरीरेभ्यश्च विज्ञानसंतानस्येस्थमर्थान्तरता साधिता भवति, अविच्छिन्नविज्ञानसन्तानात्मकश्चैवं शरीरादर्थान्तरभूत आत्मा सिद्धो भवतीति । तदेवं परभवमङ्गीकृत्याविनष्टस्मरणमावेदितम् ॥ १२४ (१६७२ ) ।।
D. C.-Vāyubhūti :--Even though the Soul is ksaņila, it is able to remember the incidents of former life because of the continuous range of the moments of vijnana.
The Acārya :--Even in that case, the continuous range of

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: 168 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's [The third knowledge extends to the former life and hence its existence is also established in the former life. Thus, vijñānasantāna is proved to be distinct from all bodies. Consequently, the Soul that contains this vijñānasantāna would also be distinguished from body.
In this way, indestructibility of Soul is apprehended to the expectation of another life. And the same could be established in connection with this life also.
न य सबहेव खणिअं नाणं पुवोवलद्धसरणाओ। खणिओ न सरइ भूयं जह जम्माणंतरविनडो॥१२५॥ (१६७३) Na ya savvaheva khaniyam nāņam puvvovaladdhasaranão i Khanio na sarai bhūyam jaha jammāṇantaravinattho 1112511 (1673) [न च सर्वथैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं पूर्वोपलब्धस्मरणात् ।
क्षणिको न स्मरति भूतं यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः ॥ १२५ ॥ (१६७३) Na ca sarvathaiva kśaņikam jñānam pūrvopalabdhasmaraņāt i Ksaniko na smarati bhātam yatha janmanantaravinastah || (1673)]
Trans.-125 Or ( ca ), knowledge is not absolutely indurable ( kśanika ) by ( virtue of the power of ) recollecting an object apprehended in the past. (For ), one that is kśanika is, like an object perished after its very birth, not able to remember the past. ( 1673 )
टीका-न च सर्वथैव क्षणिकं ज्ञानं वक्तुं युज्यते । कथञ्चित्तु क्षणिकतां भगवानपीच्छत्येव, इति “सर्वथैव" इत्युक्तम् । कस्मात् पुनर्ज्ञानं न क्षणिकम् ? इत्याह-पूर्वोपलब्धस्य बालकालाद्यनुभूतस्यार्थस्य वृद्धत्वाद्यवस्थायामपि स्मरणदर्शनात् । न चैतदेकान्तक्षणिकत्वे सत्युपपद्यते । कुतः? इत्याह"खणिओइ त्यादि" यः क्षणिको नायं भूतमतीतं स्मरति, यथा जन्मानन्तरविनष्टः, एकान्तक्षणिकं चेष्यते ज्ञानम् , अतः स्मरणाभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ १२५ (१६७३ ) ॥

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D. C. - Jñāna should never be said to be entirely ksanika. It may be kṣanika to a certain extent. If knowledge were taken to be absolutely transient, there would be no recognition in old age of objects perceived in childhood, as in the case of one who is perished after its birth. Ultimately smarana will not exist at all even if jnana were taken to be kṣanika in
every way.
And there is another difficulty also.
जस्सेगमेगबंधणमेगंतेण खणियं य विष्णाणं । सवखणियविपणाणं तस्साजुत्तं कदाचिदवि ॥ १२६॥ (१६७४)
Jassegamegabandhanamegantena khaniyam ya vinṇāṇam Savvakhaniyavinnānam tassājuttam kadācidavi ॥ 156 | (1674) [ यस्यैकमेकबन्धनमेकान्तेन क्षणिकं च विज्ञानम् ।
सर्वक्षणिकविज्ञानं तस्यायुक्तं कदाचिदपि ।। १२६ ।। ( १६७४ ) Yasyaikamekabandhanamekantena kṣaṇikam ca vijñānam | Sarvaksanikavijnanam tasyāyuktam kadacidapi || 126 | ( 1674) ]
Trans. – 126 It is never reasonable to accept vijñāna ( of an object) as vijñāna having all-pervading kṣanikatā, as it is one independant vijnana exclusively connected with one moment ( 1674 ).
,
•
टीका - यस्य वादिनो बौद्धस्य ' एकविज्ञान संततयः सच्चाः इति वचनादेकमेवासहायं ज्ञानं तस्य ' सर्वमपि वस्तु क्षणिकम्' इत्येवंभूतं विज्ञानं कदाचिदपि न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । इष्यते च सर्वक्षणिकता विज्ञानं सौगतैः, " यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम् " तथा " क्षणिका : सर्वसंस्काराः " इत्यादिवचनात् । एतच्च क्षणिकता ग्राहकज्ञानस्यैकत्वे न संभवत्येव । यदि हि त्रिलोकीत लगतैः सर्वैरपि क्षणिकैः पदार्थः पुरः स्थित्वा तदेकं विज्ञानं जन्येत, तदा तदेतज्जानीयाद् यदुत - " क्षणिकाः सर्वेऽप्यमी पदार्थाः " इति । न चैवं सर्वैरपि तैस्तज्जन्यते । कुतः १ इत्याह- ' एगबंधणं ति ' यस्मादेकमेव
22

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[The third प्रतिनियतं बन्धनं निवन्धनमालम्बनं यस्य तदेकवन्धनं ज्ञानम् , अतः कथमशेषवस्तुस्तोमव्यापिनी क्षणिकतामवबुध्येत ? । अपि च, एकालम्बनत्वेऽपि यद्यशेषपदार्थविषयाणामपि ज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते, आत्मा च तदर्थानुस्मर्ता, तदा स्यादशेषपदार्थक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् । न चाशेषार्थग्राहकानेकज्ञानानां युगपदुत्पत्तिरिष्यते ।
किञ्च, तदेकमप्येकार्थविषयमपि च विज्ञानं सर्वपदार्थगतां क्षणिकतामज्ञास्यदेव यद्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरध्वंसि नाभविष्यत् । अविनाशित्वे हि तदवस्थिततयोपविष्टं सदन्यमन्यं चार्थमुत्पत्यनन्तरमुपरमन्तं दृष्ट्वा “ सर्वमेवास्मद्वर्जमस्मत्सजातीयवर्ज च वस्तुक्षणिकमेव " इत्यवबुध्येत, न चैतदस्ति । कुतः ? इत्याह-" एगतेण खणियं चेति" यस्य च बौद्धस्यैकान्तेन क्षणिक क्षणध्वस्येव विज्ञानं, न पुनश्चिरावस्थायि, तस्य कथं सर्ववस्तुगतक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानं स्यात् ।। तस्मादक्षणिकमेव प्रमात ज्ञानमेष्टव्यम् । तच्च गुणत्वादनुरूपं गुणिनमात्मानमन्तरेण न संभवति । अतः सिद्धः शरीराद् व्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति ॥ १२६ (१६७४) ।
__D. C.-According to the theory that there is one and only one continuous range of vijnana to all living beings, the Bauddhas believe that vijnana is eka (one ) and asahaya ( independent) and hence it can never recognize all objects, as all objects would become ksanika according to that theory. Saugatas (Bauddhas ) however try to establish sarvakşanikativijirāna by the help of statements such as “ all that exists is kşanika” and “all samskaras, are kșaniku " etc. Now, jñāna having.all-pervading kşanikatā is not possible at all. For, if one were able to produce such jnana in presence of all objects in the Universe, then only it could be apprehended that all these objects are ksanika. But jñāna could never be produced by means of all those objects in that manner. For, how could ksanikată extended to all objects be recognized when jnana resorts to one and only one alambana ? In such cases, if all jiānas of all objects were taken to have been produced at the same time, and if ātman were accepted as the anusmartā of

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. 171 : all such jnanas, then and then only it would be possible to recognize the transitoriness of all objects. But simultaneous production of jnana as regards all objects is never possible and hence the apprehension of sarvaksaniktāvijñāna is also impossible.
Again, if vijñāna of an object were not to vanish soon after its birth, one might get an opportunity to apprehend sarvakşanikatā. For, in that case, vijñāna being contained within indestructibility, one could naturally remark at the destruction of all other objects that “every thing except us and those of our class is kşanika. " But that is not possible. For, according to Buddhistic theory, knowledge being exclusively kşaņika, cannot last for a long time and hence it is not possible to apprehend kşanikată in case of all objects. Authentic knowledge should therefore be considered as a-kșanika. This being a guna, it can never exist without a suitable resort viz., ātman, which leads automatically to prove that soul is distinct from body. जं सविसयनिययं चिय जम्माणंतरहयं च तं किह णु। नाहिति सुबहयविण्णाणविसयखयभंगयाईणि ॥१२७॥ (१६७५) Jam savisayaniyayam ciya jammānantarahayam ca tam kiha nu i Nāhiti subahuyavisnāņavisayakhayabhangayāiņi ? « 127 11 (1675) [ यद् स्वविषयनियतमेव जन्मान्तरहतं च तत् कथं नु ।
ज्ञास्यति सुबहुकविज्ञानविषयक्षयभङ्गकादीनि ? ॥१२७॥ (१६७५) Yad svavişayaniyatameva janmāntarahatam ca tat katham nu i Jnāsyati suba hukavijñānavişayakşayabhangakādîni ? 1112711 (1675)]
Trans.--127 How could that ( knowledge ) which is restricted to its own self and scope and which vanishes soon after its birth understand qualities such as indurability etc., pertaining to the scope of vijñāna ? ( 1675 ).

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The third टीका-यत् स्वविषयमात्रनियतं जन्मानन्तरहतं च प्रमात विज्ञानं, तत्कथं सुबहुविज्ञानविषयगतान् क्षणभंग-निरात्मकत्व-सुखि-दुःखितादीन् धर्मान् ज्ञास्यति ? न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः ॥ १२७ (१६७५) ॥
· D.C.-Pramātri jñāna (authentic knowledge ) is restricted to its own self and scope. It is destroyed immediately after its own production. So, it could never understand a number of attributes e. g. transitoriness, subjectivity, and sense of happiness, misery etc., related to the visaya (subject) of vijñāna. गिव्हिज्ज सबभंगं जइ य मई सविषयाणुमाणाओ। तं पि न जओऽणुमाणं जुत्तं सत्ताइसिद्धीओ ॥१२८॥ (१६७६) Ginhijja savvabhargam jai ya maî savişayāņumāņão 1 Tam pi na jao’ņumāņam juttam sattāisiddhîo ii 128 11 (1676 ) [गृह्णीयात् सर्वभङ्गं यदि च मतिः स्वविषयानुमानात् ।
तदपि न यतोऽनुमानं युक्तं सत्तादिसिद्धौ ॥ १२८ ॥ (१६७६ ) Gșihộiyāt sarvabhangam yadi ca matiḥ svavisayanumānāt i Tadapi na yato'numānam yuktam sattadisiddhau ॥ 128 ॥ ( 1676)]
___Trans.–128 Again, it is not even proper to believe that vijñana apprehends indurability of all (objects) by means of anumāna from its own self and scope. Because, anumāna is proper only with regard to the establishment of existence etc. ( 1676).
टीका-यदि च परस्यैवंभूता मतिः स्याद् यदुत-एकमपि-एकालम्बनमपि क्षणिकमपि च प्रमात विज्ञानं सर्ववस्तु गतक्षणभङ्गं गृह्णीयात् । कुतः ? इत्याह-स्वविषयानुमानात् । एतदुक्तं भवति-यस्मादयमस्मद्विषयः क्षणिकः, अहं च क्षणनश्वररूपम् , ततो विज्ञानसाम्यादन्यान्यपि विज्ञानानि क्षणिकानि, विषयसाम्याच्चान्येऽपि विषयाः सर्वेऽपि क्षणिकाः, इत्येवं स्वं च विषयाश्च स्वविषयास्तदनुमानात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य क्षणिकत्वादि गृह्यते। अत्र दूषणमाह-"तं पीत्यादि" तदपि न युक्तं न घटमानकम्। कृतः? इत्याह

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.: 173 :. यतस्तत् स्वविषयानुमानमन्येषां विज्ञानानामन्यविषयाणां च पक्षीकृतानां सत्तादि प्रसिद्धावेव युज्यते । नहि सत्त्वेनाप्यप्रसिद्धैधर्मिणि क्षणिकतादिधर्मः साध्यमानो विभ्राजते। को हि नाम शब्दादिष्वादावेव सत्त्वेनाप्रतीतेषु कृतकत्वादिनानित्यत्वादिधर्मान् साधयति, " तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धोधर्मी" इत्यादिवचा नात् । न चेदमेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकं च ज्ञानमेतद् वोढुं शक्नोति यदुत-अन्यज्ञानानि सन्ति, तद्विषयाश्च विद्यन्ते, तेषां च विषयाणां स्वविषयज्ञानजननस्वभावादय एवं भूता धर्माःसन्तीति । एतदपरिज्ञाने च कथमेतेषां क्षणिकतां . साधयिष्यति, धर्मिण एवाप्रसिद्धेः ।
___ स्यादेतत् , स्वविषयानुमानादेवान्यविज्ञानादिसत्तापि सेत्स्यत्येव, तथाहि-यथाऽहमस्मि तथान्यान्यपि ज्ञानानि सन्ति, यथा च मद्विषयो विद्यते, एवमन्येऽपि ज्ञानविषया विद्यन्त एव; यथा चाहं मद्विषयश्च क्षणिकः, एवमन्यज्ञानानि तद्विषयाश्च क्षणिका एवेति, एवं सर्वेषां सत्त्वं क्षणिकता च स्वविषयानुमानादेव सेत्स्यतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् , यतः सर्वक्षणिकताग्राहक ज्ञानं क्षणनश्वरत्वाजन्मान्तरं "मृत इवाहमस्मि, क्षणिकं च" इत्येवमात्मानमपि नावबुध्यते, अन्यपरिज्ञानं तु तस्य दूरोत्सारितमेव । किञ्च, तत् स्वविषयमात्रस्यापि क्षणिकतां नावगच्छति, समानकालमेव द्वयोरपि विनष्टत्वात् । यदि हि स्वविषयं विनश्यन्तं दृष्ट्वा ततद्गतक्षणिकतां निश्चित्य स्वयं पश्चात् कालान्तरे तद् विनश्येत् , तदा स्यात् तस्य स्वविषयक्षणिकताप्रतिपत्तिः, न चैतदस्ति, ज्ञानस्य विषयस्य च निजनिजक्षणं जनयित्वा समानकालमेव विनाशाभ्युपगमात् । न च स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेण वा क्षणिकता गृह्यत इति सौगतैरिष्यते, अनुमानगम्यत्वेन तस्यास्तैरभ्युपगमादिति ॥ १२८ (१६७६) ॥
___D. C.-An opponent may advance the following objection in this case
Pramātrivijñāna though kşaņika and resorting to only one ālambana is able to recognize kșani katā of its own self as well as sphere. For, just as the knowledge that we are ksanika as our visaya is kşanika is common in other cases also, all other objects and their spheres should also be considered as kşaniku.

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(The third
The argument stated above is not correct. Svavisayanumāna can be applied only in case of establishing the existence etc. of other vijñānas and visayas and not otherwise. Just as in case of s'abda etc., which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like anityatā by reason of their mere constructive utility; so, in this case also, properties like ksanikatā could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all.
Moreover, vijnana which is said to be ksanika and ekalambana, is not able to understand whether there are other jnānas and visayas, and whether those jňānas and visayas possess the property of producing jñana of its own self and sphere. So, if such jnana could not be produced and if the objects in which ksanikatā is to be established are not known, how could kșanikatā be proved to exist at all ?
At this point, the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other vijnanas could be established by the help of sva visayanumana. One would say in this case that “ Just as I exist and my vişaya exists, other jnanas and their visayas also exist, and just as I and my visaya are ksanika, other jñānas and their visayas are also ksanika.” Thus, existence as well as ksanikatū of all the objects could easily be established.
The above objection is entirely fallacious. Jnana which apprehends sarvaksaņikatā is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on account of its being kșanika-as good as dead. Thus, when it is not able to recognise its own self how can it perceive that there are other jñanas and their visayas also ? Such indurable jrana does not recognize ksanikatā of its own vişaya, because, according to them, that jñāna and visaya vanish within equally short time. If that jnana ascertains the kşanikatā of its own vişnya from its disappearance within a short time before the jnana itself dies away, then and then only would the ksunikatā of its

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: 175:.
visaya be recognized by it. But this argument is not accepted by Bauddhas. They believe that jñāna and its visaya disappear at the same time after being produced for a moment.
Moreover, according to Saugatas, ksanikatā is recognized neither by means of self-perception nor by the help of perception by sense-organs, but by means of anumāna only. जाणेज वासणा उ सा. वि हु वासित्त-वासणिज्जाणं । जुत्ता समेच्च दोण्हं न उ जम्माणंतरहयस्स ॥१२९॥ (१६७७) Jāņejja vāsaņā u sā vi hu vāsitta-vāsanijjāņam 1 Juttā samecca donham na u jammāṇantarahayassa ||12911 (1677) [जानीयात् वासना तु सापि खलु वासि-वासनीययोः ।
युक्ता समेत्य द्वयोनं तु जन्मानन्तरहतस्य ॥१२९ ॥ (१६७७) Jāniyāt vásanā tu sāpi khalu vāsi-vásanîyayoḥ | Yuktā sametya dvayorna tu janmānantarahatasya ||12911 (1677)]
Trans.--129 Again, the opponent might argue that desire could understand sarvakşanikatā; but that also is in fact proper ( only ) because it is related to both-one that desires and the desired ( object ), and not in case of that which vanishes soon after (its birth ). ( 1677).
टीका-स्यादेतत् पूर्वपूर्वविज्ञानक्षणैरुत्तरोत्तरविज्ञानक्षणानामेवंभूता वासना जन्यते, ययाऽन्यविज्ञान-तद्विषयाणां सत्त्व-क्षणिकतादीन् धर्मानेकमेकालम्बनं क्षणिकमपि च विज्ञानं जानाति, अतः सर्वक्षणिकताज्ञानं सौगतानां न विरुध्यते । तदप्ययुक्तम् , यतः सापि वासना वासक-वासनीययोईयोरपि समेत्य संयुज्य विद्यमानयोरेव युक्ता, न तु जन्मान्तरमेव हतस्य विनष्टस्य । वास्य-वासकयोश्च संयोगेनावस्थाने क्षणिकताहानिप्रसङ्गः। किञ्च, सापि वासना क्षणिका, अक्षणिका वा ?! क्षणिकत्वे कथं तद्वशात् सर्वक्षणिकतापरिज्ञानम् ? । अक्षणिकत्वे तु प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति ॥ १२९ (१६७७ ) ॥
D. C.---Here, again the opponents may argue that the

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earlier moments of apprehension create such a desire during the later moments of apprehension, that by means of that desire even a kşanikrı vijñāna having only one support is 'able to apprehend other jñānas and their visayas having existence, transitoriness etc. as their qualities. Consequently, there is no harm in believing that all objects are ksanika.
But even that is not correct. For vāsanā in the above case, could be applied only when it is related to vāsaka and vāsaniya; and hence, it could not be applied to the knowledge that vanishes immediately after its birth. Again, in accepting the avasthāna ( retention ) of vāsya and vāsaka connected together, kșanikatā itself would not exist. And is that vāsanā ksanika or a-kşanika ? If it were kşanika, it would not be able to apprehend sarvaksanikatā; and if it were a-lcşanika the very proposition that everything is ksaniku would be violated.
So, the theory of Bauddhas that everything is ksaņika does not fit in, in any way.
Thus, having refuted the opponent's view, the Ācārya now illustrates bis own. बहुविण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्थयाऽहवेगस्त । विण्णाणावत्था वा पडुचवित्तीविघाओ वा ॥१३०॥ (१६७८) विण्णाणखणविणासे दोसा इच्चादयो पसज्जति । न उ ठियसंभूयच्चुयविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि॥१३१॥(१६७९) तस्स विचित्तावरणखओवसमजाइं चित्तरूवाइं। खणियाणि य कालंतरवित्तीणि य मइविहाणाइं॥१३२॥(१६८०) Baliuvinnaņappabhavo jugavamanegatthayā’havegassa i Vinnāņāvatthā vā paduccavittīvighão vā || 130 11 ( 1678 ) Vinnāņakhaṇāviņāse dosā iccādayo pasajjanti i Na u țhiyasambhūyaccuyaviņņāṇamayammi jīvammi 1113111 (1679)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 177 :. Tassa vicittávaranakhaovasamajāim cittarūvāim i Khaniyani ya kālāntaravittini ya maivihānaim ॥ 132॥ ( 1680 ) [बहुविज्ञानप्रभवो युगपदनेकार्थताऽथवैकस्य । विज्ञानावस्था वा प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघातो वा ॥ १३० ।। (१६७८). विज्ञानक्षणविनाशे दोषा इत्यादयः प्रसजन्ति । न तु स्थितसंभूतच्युतविज्ञानमये जीवे ॥ १३१ ॥ (१६७९) तस्य विचित्रावरणक्षयोपशमजानि चित्ररूपाणि ।
क्षणिकानि च कालान्तरवृत्तीनि च मतिविधानानि ॥ १३२ ॥ (१६८०) Bahuvijnanaprabhavo yugapadanekārthata’thavaikasya i Vijñānāvasthā vā pratîtyavrittivigbáto vā u 130 11 ( 1678 ) Vijnanaksaņavināśe dosa ityādayaḥ prasajanti 1 Na tu sthitasambhūtac'yutavijnanamaye jîve il 131 11 ( 1679 ) Tasya vicitrāvaraşakşayopašamajāni citrarūpāņi Kșanikāni ca kālāntaravrittîni ca matividhānani || 132 | (1680)]
Trans.--130-131-132 If vijnana were taken to be ksana vināśi a number of faults such as production of many vijnanas, yielding more than one meaning at a time, or, one yielding more than one meaning at a time, retention (avastha ) of vijñāna, violation of the law of cause and effect etc. would arise. This would not happen only in case of jiva, having vijnana which is sthita ( settled) sambhūta ( born ) and cyuta (dropped) being accepted. (For), it manifests various (types of) intellectual forms that are born of various types of diminutions and relaxations and that are kșanika as well as permanent. ( 1678-1679-1680 ).
टीका-तदेवं विज्ञानस्य प्रतिक्षणं विनाशेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने इत्यादयो दोषाः प्रसजन्ति । के पुनस्ते दोषाः ? इत्याह-" बहुविण्णाणेत्यादि " इत्येवं संबन्धः । क्षणनश्वरविज्ञानवादिना भुवनत्रयान्तर्वतिसर्वार्थग्रहणार्थं युगपदेव बहूनां ज्ञानानां प्रभव उत्पादोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तदाश्रयभूतश्च तदृष्टानाम
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र्थानामनुस्मर्ताऽवस्थित आत्माऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, अन्यथा " यत् सत् तत् सर्वं क्षणिकम् " " क्षणिकाः सर्वे संस्काराः " " निरात्मानः सर्वे भावाः" इत्यादि सर्वक्षणिकता दिविज्ञानं नोपपद्येत, तदभ्युपगमे च स्वमतत्यागप्रसक्तिः । अथवा, क्षणिकं विज्ञानमिच्छतैकस्यपि विज्ञानस्य युगपदनेकार्थता - सर्वभवनान्तर्गतार्थग्राहिताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या येन सर्वक्षणिकता दिविज्ञानमुपपद्यते, न चैतदिष्यते, दृश्यते वा । " विण्णाणावत्था व त्ति " यदिवा, अवस्थानमवस्था, विज्ञानस्यावस्था विज्ञानावस्थाऽभ्युपगन्तव्या भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति - विज्ञानस्यानल्पकल्पाग्रशोऽवस्थानमेष्टव्यम् येन तत् सर्वदा समासीनमन्यान्यवस्तुविनश्वरतां वीक्षमाणं सर्वक्षणिकतामवगच्छेदिति सर्वं प्रागेवोक्तमेव । एवं चाभ्युपगमे विज्ञानसंज्ञामात्रविशिष्ट आत्मैवाभ्युपगतो भवति ।
"
अथैतद् बहुविज्ञानप्रभवादिकं नेष्यते, तर्हि प्रतीत्यवृत्तिविघातः प्राप्नोति । इदमत्र हृदयम् — कारणं प्रतीत्याश्रित्य कार्यस्य वृत्तिः प्रवृत्तिरुत्पत्तिरिति यावत् न पुनः कारणं कार्यावस्थायां कथञ्चिदप्यन्वेति इत्येवं सौगतेरभ्युपगम्यते । इत्थं चाभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतीतस्मरणादिसमस्तव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । एवं हि व्यवहारप्रवृत्तिः स्याद् यद्यतीतानेकसंकेतादिज्ञानाश्रयस्ततद्विज्ञानरूपेण परिणामादन्वयी आत्माऽभ्युपगम्यते । तथाभ्युपगमे च सति प्रतीत्यवृच्यभ्युपमविधातः स्यादिति । ननु यदि विज्ञानस्य क्षणविनाश एते दोषाः प्रसजन्ति, तर्हि क्कामी दोषा न भवन्ति ? इत्याह-- "न उठियेत्यादि" न त्वस्मभ्युपगते जीवेऽभ्युपगम्यमान एते दोषाः प्रजन्ति । कथंभूते - जीवे स्थितसंभृतच्युतविज्ञानमये - कथञ्चिद् द्रव्यरूपतया स्थितम्, कथञ्चित्तत्तरपर्यायेण संभूतम्, कथञ्चित्पुनः पूर्वपर्यायेण च्युतं विनष्टं यद् विज्ञानं तन्मय इत्यर्थः । तस्मादमुमेवोत्पाद-व्यय- धौव्ययुक्तं शरीरादर्थान्तरभूतमस्मदभ्युपगतमात्मानं समस्तव्यवहारसिद्ध प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १३० - १३१ (१६७८१६७९) ॥
टीका - मतेर्मतिज्ञानस्य विधानानि नानाभेदरूपाणि तस्य यथोक्तरूपस्यात्मनः प्रवर्तन्ते । कथंभूतानि ? इत्याह-विचित्रो योऽसौ मतिज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमस्ततो जातानि अत एव स्वकारणभूतक्षयोपशमवैचित्र्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि । तथा, पर्यायरूपतया क्षणिकानि, द्रव्यरूपतया तु नित्यत्वात्
,

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. : 179 :
EZO) II
:
Vada ]
Gañadharavāda कालान्तरवृत्तीनि । उपलक्षणं च मतिविधानानि, श्रुता-बधि-मनःपर्यायविधानान्यपि यथासंख्यं श्रुता-ऽवधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमवैचिच्याद् विचित्ररूपाणि यथासंभवं तस्य द्रष्टव्यानि । केवलज्ञानं त्वेकमेवाविकल्पं केवलज्ञानावरणक्षयादेव द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥ १३२ (१६८०)॥
D. C.-If jnana were taken to be ksanika as stated before, & number of dosas would get in, in the following manner :. 1. In order that all the objects that pervade the three . worlds, should be recognized, a kșanikatā-vādin ought to admit that all sorts of jñanas are produced at the same time and the Soul that rememebers the objects in which those jñānas are produced should be taken to stay on permanently. Otherwise, statements such as "Whatever exists is all kşanika" “ All bhāvas are kşanika ” etc. that established sarvakşanikatā would be futile.
Moreover, when more than one jvāna are accepted, the original theory of ekavijnanasantati has also been violated.
2. Again, if ksana vijnana were accepted, another fault would also crop up. In this case, one and the same vijnana would be able to recognize all the objects that exist in all the the worlds. But this could never happen, nor be believed.
3. In order to recognize a number of objects, vijnana must be taken to last for a long time. As a result of this, vijñāna" would be able to recognize the kșanikatū of all as they are kşanika also. But believing so, the Soul which is known as nothing but vijnana. would have to be accepted, and it would go against the original proposition..
4. Again, if the production of many vijnanas were not accepted, there would be violation of pratityavrtti. When karana is not anyhow apprehended in the state of karya, Bauddhas call it the violation of pratityavrtti. As the production of a kārya depends upon a kārana this would gives rise to dosa. If Baudhas were to accept this, processes such as that of

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remembering the past incident etc. would be abolished. Again, if the soul which is the abode of knowledge such as a number of past allusions, etc. were believed to have been related to the parināma in the form of vijñāna, then also the law of pratityavritti would be violated. For, believing so the Soul is taken as related to the pariņāma.
Thus, in case vijnana is accepted as kşanika, all the above mentioned faults would arise. But if the Soul possessing vijnana which is produced anyhow in the form of substance or in any other new equivalent form and which has already ceased to exist as vijñāna, the faults ennumerated above would never arise. This proves that atman that has utility, stability and productivity for the sake of all vyavahāra is undoubtedly distinct from body. For, such an ātman possesses various matijñānabhedas produced from various types of diminutions and relaxations of the matijnana itself. These bhedas are kșanika on account of their wavering nature, and they are everlasting on account of their substantiality.
Again, by means of implication, the soul manifests various types of jñana e. g. sruta (ascertained by intellect ); avadhi ( applied by intellect ) and manahparyaya (mental perception) etc. are respectively produced from the knowledge ascertained, applied and perceived by mind. 130-131-132 (1678–1679-1680)
The Kevala jñāna or Absolute knowledge is attained only when all its interruptions are warded off. निच्चो संताणो सिं सवावरणपरिसंखए जं च । magici hauan@tei II 8381 (8808) Nicco santāņo sim savvāvaraṇaparisamkhae jam ca i Kevalamudiyam kevalabhāveņāṇantamavigappam i 133 11 (1681) [नित्यः सन्तानः एषां सर्वावरणपरिसंक्षये यच्च ।
केवलमुदितं केवलभावेनानन्तमविकल्पम् ।। १३३ ।। (१६८१)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 181 : Nityaḥ santāna eşām sarvavaraņa parisanıkşaye yacoa Kevalamuditam kevalabhāveninantamavikalpam ॥ 133 ॥ (1581)]
Trans.-133 They ( matijnānādi vidhānas ) have a perpetual continuance (nitya santāna )-in the form of sāmānyajñānawhich being free from all interruptions is said to be ananta ( endless ) and avikalpa ( illusionless ). Kevala (Absolute) exists by ( virtue of ) its Kevalabhava ( Absoluteness) (1681 ).
टीका-"सिं ति" एतेषां च मतिज्ञानादिविधानानामविशेषितज्ञान- . मात्ररूपसंतानो नित्योऽव्यवच्छिन्नरूपः । केवलज्ञानं त्वविकल्पं भेदरहितमुदितमाख्यातं भगवद्भिः यतः सर्वस्यापि निजावरणस्य क्षय एव तदुपजायते । अतोऽविकल्पं केवलभावेनानन्तकालावस्थायित्वात् , अनन्तार्थविषयत्वाश्चानन्तमिति ॥ १३३ (१६८१)॥ ____D. C.-The avisesitajmana or samanyajnana of an object is the only everlasting offspring of its various expedients like cognizance of memory etc. But the Absolute cognizance which is said to be ananta and avikalpų by revered preceptors is attained only when it is free from all avaranas. Thus Kevalajnana is avikalpa (i. e. positive and illusionless ) because it is ananta (endless ) because it lasts for ever and concerns the infinite object ( anantārtha ). 1681.
Here again Vāyubhuti raises a doubt and the Tirtharkara removes it:सो जइ देहादन्नो तो पविसंतो व निस्सरंतो वा। कीस न दीसइ, गोयम! दुविहाऽणुवलद्धि उसाय॥१३४॥(१६८२) So jai dehādanno to pavisanto va nissaranto vā! Kîsa na dîsai, Goyama ! duvihā’nuvaladdhi u să ya 11 134 11 (1682) [स यदि देवादन्यस्ततः प्रविशन् वा निःसरन् वा। .
कस्माद् न दृश्यते, गौतम ! द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु सा च ॥१३४॥(१६८२) Sa yadi dehadangastataḥ pravišan vā niħsaran val Kasmad na drśyate Gautama ! dvivid ha’nupalabdhistu sa call 134||(1682)

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The third असओ खरसंगस्स व सओ वि दूराइभावओऽभिहिया । सुहुमा-ऽमुत्तत्तणओ कम्माणुगयस्स जीवस्स ॥ १३५ ॥ (१६८३) Asao kharasangassa va sao vi dūrāibhāyao' bhihiyā | Suhuma'muttattanao kammānugayassa jivassa ॥ 135 ॥ ( 1683) [असतः खरश्रृङ्गस्येव सतोऽपि दूरादिभावतोऽभिहिता ।
सूक्ष्माऽमूर्तत्वतः कर्मानुगतस्य जीवस्य ॥ १३५ ॥ (१६८३) Asataḥ kharaśrngasyeva sato’pi dūrādibhavato’bhihita 1 Saksma murtatvatah karmanugatsya jivasya ॥ 135 ॥ (1683)]
Trans.-134-135 .If the Soul is different from body, how is it that it is not perceived while entering (the body ) or issuing forth ( from it ) ?
But again, O Gautama ! non-perception ( anupalabdhi ) is of two types :-1. Non-perception of a non-existent object like a kharasrnga and 2. Non-perception of an existent object by reason of its distance etc. Non-perception of the Soul which is karmānugata is due to its exquisite formlessness (sūkśmāmürtatva ) ( 1682–1683 ).
टीका-यदि नाम शरीरादन्योऽसौ जीवस्ततो घटे चटक इव शरीरे प्रविशन् निःसरन् वा किमिति नोपलभ्यते ? । भगवानाह-"गोयमेत्यादि" यतो द्विविधाऽनुपलब्धिरस्ति, अतस्तस्यानुपलब्धेः कारणाद् गौतमः ! जीवो न दृश्यते । कथं पुनः साऽनुपलब्धिर्द्विविधा ? इत्याह-सा चानुपलधेरेकाऽसतो भवति, यथा खरशृङ्गस्य । द्वितीया तु सतोऽप्यर्थस्य भवति । कुतः ? इत्याह-दूरादिभावादिति, दूरात् सन्नप्यर्थो न दृश्यते, यथा स्वर्गादिः, आदिशब्दात् अतिसंनिकर्षात् , अति सौक्ष्म्यात् , मनोऽनवस्थानात् , इन्द्रियापाटवात् , मतिमान्यात् , अशक्यत्वात् , आवरणात् , अभिभवात् , सामान्यात , अनुपयोगात् , अनुपायात् , विस्मृतेः, दुरागमात् , मोहात् , विदर्शनात् , विकारात् , अंक्रियातः, अनधिगमात् , कालविप्रकर्षात् , स्वभावविप्रकर्षाच्चेति। . . . . . तत्रातिसंनिकर्षात् सन्नप्यों नोपलभ्यते, यथा नेत्र दूषिका-पक्ष्मादिः।

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Gañadharavāda
. : 183 :अतिसौक्ष्म्यात् परमाण्वादिः। मनोऽनवस्थानात् , सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिर्यथा नष्टचेतसाम् । इन्द्रियापाटवात् किश्चिदधिरादीनाम् । मतिमान्धादनुपलब्धिः सतामपि सूक्ष्मशास्त्रार्थ विशेषाणाम् । अशक्यत्वात् स्वकर्ण-कृकाटिका-मस्तकपृष्ठादीनाम् । आवरणाद् हस्तादिस्थगितलोचनानां कटकुट्याद्यावृत्तानां वा । अभिभवात् प्रसृतमूरतेजसि दिवसे तारकाणाम् । सामान्यात् सूपलक्षितस्यापि माषादेः समानजातीयमाषादिराशिपतितस्याप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः। अनुपयोगाद् रूपोपयुक्तस्य शेषविषयाणाम् । अनुपायात् श्रृङ्गादिभ्यो गोमहिष्यादिपयःपरिणामजिज्ञासोः। विस्मृतेः पूर्वोपलब्धस्य। दुरागमाद् दुरुपदेशात् तत्प्रतिरूपकरीतिकादिविप्रलम्भितमतेः कनकादीनां सतामप्यनुपलब्धिः । मोहात् सतामपि जीवादितत्त्वानाम् । विदर्शनात् सर्वथाऽन्धादीनाम् वार्धक्यादिविकाराद् बहुशःपूर्वोपलब्धस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । अक्रियातो भूखननादिक्रियाऽभावाद् वृक्षमूलादीनामनुपलब्धिः। अनधिगमात् शास्त्राश्रवणात् तदर्थस्य सतोऽप्यनुपलब्धिः । कालविप्रकर्षाद् भूतभविष्यदृषभदेवपद्मनामतीर्थकरादीनामनुपलब्धिः । स्वभावविप्रकर्षाद् नभः पिशादीनामनुप लम्भः। तदेवं सतामप्यर्थानामेकविंशतिविधाऽनुपलब्धिः प्रवर्तते । अतोऽस्य कर्मानुगतस्य संसारिणो जीवस्याऽमूर्तत्वाद् नभस इव, कार्मणस्य तु सौक्ष्म्यात् परमाणोरिव सतोऽनुलपलब्धिः, नासतः। कथं पुनरेतज्झायते-नासत आत्मनो ऽनुपलब्धिः, किन्तु सतः ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-अनुमानस्तत्सत्त्वस्य साधितत्वादिति ।। १३४-१३५ (१६८२-१६८३)
D. C.-Vayubhuti-If this soul is different from body, how is it that it is not seen entering or issuing forth from the body like a cataka ( sparrow ) from a ghata ( vessel)?
Bhagawan-Because of the two-fold anupalalıdhi, O Gautuma! the Soul is not perceived. These two types are:-1) Anupalabdhi of a non-existent object e. g, a kharusriga ( born of an ass ) and (2) Anupalabdhi of an existent object.
Now, for the non-perception of an existent object there are twenty-one reasons.
i. "Atiduratva( Extreme remoteness )--Places like svarga,

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•: 184 ::
Jinabhadra Gani's [The third do exist. But as they are extremely remote they are not
perceivable. ii. Atisannikarsu (Close vicinity )-Certain objects like eye
lashes and secretion of eyes, though existent, cannot be
seen on account of their close vicinity. iii. Atisauksmya ( Exquisite fineness )-Paramānus are im
perceptible, because they are exquisitely fine. These paramānus are so minute in form that they are not perceptible even to the maked eye, even though they are considered to be existent. Manònavasthāna ( Instability of mind )-Sometimes even a mūrta object is not apprehended by reason of mano' navasthana or the instability of mind as in the case of
an insane man. v. Indriyāpātutva ( Dullness of senses )--Non-perception
arises asso when a sense or senses are benumbed e.g.
a deaf man, vi. Matimāndya ( Dullness of ntellect )-Certain subtleties
of the s'astras are always anupalabhya to a dull-witted
man due to his matimāndya. vii. Asakyatva ( Impossibility )-One can never see his own
ear, head or back as it is utterly impossible to do so. viii. Avarana (Obstruction ).When eyes are covered with
hands or when hands are obscured by means of a mat
or a wall it is avarana that causes non-perception. ix. Abhibhava (Predominance )---Predominance of Sun in
the sky, makes the stars anupalubhya on a sun-bright
day. X. Samānya-( Commonness ) When beans are mixed with
beans of the same quality there is non-aprehension of beans owing to the samānyatva present in both.

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Vada]
Gaṇadharavada
.: 185 :•
xi. Anupayoga (Lack of Attention )-When an object is touched by a particular indriya, say, Rupa (the sense of eye), it is not perceived by the rest of senses because of their anupayoga to the object.
xii. Anupaya (Want of Means)-If a person wants to take an estimate of milk (contained) in a cow or a buffalo by means of rnga etc, he can never do so because there is no such means available.
xiii. Vismrti Forgetfulness )-An object perceived before becomes anupalabhya afterwards by reason of vismṛti.
xiv. Duragama-( Wrong Instruction) When an object like gold is presented in the style of a forged edict, it is not recognized in its true form, because there is durupadesa or wrong instruction as regards its form.
XV.
Moha (Delusion )-Objects like jiva do exist, but they are not perceived due to moha (on the part of those who try to perceive them ).
xvi. Vidarsana (Absence of Sight)-is the absolute cause of anupalabdhi in the case of blind persons.
xviii. Vikara (Loss of Health )-Mostly, it so happens that things that are once perceived are not apprehended in later life on account of vikaras like vardhakya (old age) etc.
xviii. Akriya (Want of Action )-There is non-perception of roots of trees because of the scarcity of actions like bhukhanana etc.
xix. Anadhigama (Non-acquisition)-Owing to the anadhigama of sastrasravana, the meaning of S'astras becomes incomprehensible.
xx. Kala viprakarsa (Remoteness of Time)-Rsabhadeva and other Tirthankaras of the past and Padma Nabha of future cannot be recognized due to the remoteness of time.
24

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186 Jinabhadra Gaại's
[Tho third xxi. Svabhava viprakarsa (Natural Remoteness)-Things like
nabhas and pišať are non-cognizible by reason of their
svabhāva viprakarsa.
In this way, anupalabdhi of an existent object takes place in twenty-one different ways.
So, Jiva is imperceptible like nabhas due to its amūrtata; and s'arîra being an assemblage of the Kārman paramānus • is anupalabhya because of s'aukṣmya of a paramaņu.
Thus, non-perception of the Soul and body is positively the non-perception of an existent object and not of a nonexistent one.
An argument may here be advanced that “If you take Atman to be existent, how do you apprehend its existence ?" The reply is :
The existence of Ātman is established by means of anumāna. And hence, its anupalabdhi is not the anupalubdhi of a non-existent object like a kharas'rnga, but it is the anupalabdhi of an existent object like nabhas and paramāņu, Then, the distinction of Soul from body is established by the help of Vedavacana. देहाणण्णे व जिए जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स । alater fouis C1011540 T DITIH 1182811 (8&c8) Dehāṇanne va jie jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa | Veyavihiyam vihannai dāņāiphalam ca loyammi || 136 u ( 1684)
† The word Pis'a=ruru, a kind of deer according to Sayanācārya. The deer is called Pis'a probably because it is Pisa ( reddish ) in colour. The anupalabdhi of tbe Pis'a deer may be taken to be due to its nature of being always far away from human habitations. The word, however, seems rather improper when placed with nabhas. If we read pisaca instead of Pis'a it would suit our purpose better --Tr.

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Vada]
Gaṇadharavada
[ देहानन्ये वा जीवे यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
वेदविहितं विहन्यते दानादिफलं च लोके ।। १३६ ॥ ( १६८४ )
187:
Dehananye va jîve yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya i Vedavihitam vihanyate danādiphalam ca loke || 136 | ( 1684) ]
Trans.—136 Or, if Jiva is ( believed to be ) identical with deha ( the body ), then, ( obstruction of the ) rites like agnihotra (the worship of sacred-fire) for a person aspiring for Salvation and the reward of munificence etc. (danadiphala) in the world prescribed by the Vedas, would be refuted ( 1684 ).
टीका - शरीरमात्रे जीवे सति गौतम ! यत् स्वर्गकामस्य वेदविहितमग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं तद् विहन्यते, देहस्य वह्निनाऽत्रैव भस्मीकरणात्, जीवाभावे कयास स्वर्गो भवेत् । इति भावः । दानादिफलं चानुभवितुरभावात् कस्य भवेत् ? इति ॥ १३६ ( १६८४ ) ॥
D. C. - O Goutama ! If each and every s'artra is believed to be identical with jiva, the commandment of the Vedas that a person who desires to attain Salvation should perform the rite of Agnihotra, would be null and void. Because, when body is reduced to ashes by fire in this world, the Jiva being taken to be identical with body is also supposed to have vanished with the body. And then, who would attain Salvation when Jiva itself does not exist?
Similarly, who would be there to enjoy the fruits of good deeds like dana when there would be none to receive them at all?
Vayubhuti entertains doubt as regards the distinction of Soul from body by hearing the various Veda-padas bearing contradictory arguments. Bhagavan Mahavira interprets these Veda-padas correctly and clears his doubt.
विष्णाणघणाईणं वेयपयाणं तमत्थमविदंतो । देहाणपणं मन्नसिं ताणं च पयाणमयमत्थो ॥ १३७ ॥ (१६८५)

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: 188 :. .
Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The third Viņņānaghaņāînam Veyapayānam tamatthamavidanto 1 Dehānannam mannasi tānam ca payāṇamayamattho 1113711 (1685)
[विज्ञानधनादीनां वेदपदानां त्वमर्थमविदन् । . देहानन्यं मन्यसे तेषां च पदानामयमर्थः ॥ १३७ ॥ (१६८५) Vijñānaghanadînām Veda-padānām tvamarthamavidan | Dehanányan manyase teşām ca padânāmayamarthah 111371(1685)]
Trans.-137 You, not knowing the ( real) meaning of sentences like “ Vijnanaghana" etc. of the Vedas, think that the Soul is identical with body. But (ca) their real interpretation is this.t ( 1685 ).
टीका-विज्ञानघनाख्यः पुरुष एवायं भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमित्यादिव्याख्या पूर्ववदेव । अत एव प्रागुक्तम्-" शरीरतया परिणतो भूतसंघातोऽयं विद्यमानकर्तृकः, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात् , घटवद् , यश्च तत्कर्ता स तदतिरिक्तो जीवः" इति । भूतारिक्तात्मप्रतिपादकानि च वेदवाक्यानि तवापि प्रतीतान्येव । तद्यथा-"सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यं ज्योतिर्मयो विशुद्धो यं पश्यन्ति धीरा यतयः संयतात्मानः" इत्यादि । तदेवं सर्वेषा
मपि वेदवाक्यानां भूतातिरिक्तस्य जीवस्य प्रतिपादकत्वाद् भूतेभ्योऽति'रिक्तं जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ १३७ (१६८५)॥ ... D. C.-That the Soul itself is f vijnanaghana " and that it is distinct from other bhūtas has already been discussed. It has already been said that Sarîratayā pariņato bhūtasamghāto'yan vidyamānakastsikaḥ 1 Adimatpratiniyatākāratvāt ghatavat, yaśca tatkartā sa tadatirikto
_jivah iti ॥ Moreover, sentences of the Vedas that prove Atman to be atirikta from bhūtas, have not been beyond your comprehen. sion. e. g.
+ The real interpretation of sentences like " vijñānaghana " etc. has already been stated and discussed in the First Vada. vide Vs. 1588-1595.

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Vada ] Ganadharavada
189 :: " Satyena labhyastapasā hyeşa brahmacaryoņa nityam jyotirmayo i Vis'uddho’yam pas'yanti dhğrı yatayah samyatatmanah 11"
In the same way, all Veda-padas have proved that Java is atirikta from bhūtas. Hence, you too, shall have to admit that the Soul is distinct from bhūtas. . छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मि जिणेणं जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
TAHUI TEE311 IZRE HE ESTAGE 1133611 (88€8) Chinnammi samsayammi jineņam jarā-maraṇavippamukkeņam | So samaņo pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim 11 138 11 (1686) [feat Hath fhath FTT-Artagati
T: gala: q : the talosana: ll 88611(886€ ) Chinne samśaye jinena jara-maraṇavipramuktena 1 Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitah pancabhiḥ saha khaṇdikaśataih 1138||(1686)
Trans.-138 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthařkara, who was entirely free from jarā ( old age ) and maraña (death), the saint Vāyubhūti accepted the Diksā along with his five hundred followers:-( 1686 ).
End of the Discussion with the Third Ganadhara,

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Chapter IV
चतुर्थगणधरवक्तव्यता ।
Discussion with the Fourth Gaṇadhara.
ते पवइए सोउं वियन्तु आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ १३९ ॥ (१६८७ )
Te pavvaie söum Vyattu Vāgacchai jiņasagāsam Vaccāmi na vandāmī vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 139 ॥ ( 1687 )
[ तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा व्यक्त आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् । व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ १३९ ॥ ( ( १६८७ ) Tan pravrajitan śrutva Vyakta agacchati jinasakāśam | Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase || 139 ॥ ( 1687 ) ]
Trans. - 139 Having heard that they (i. e. Vāyubhūti and his fellow-mendicants) had renounced the world, Vykta comes before the Tirthankara. (He thinks...) "I may go, pay my homage ( to the Tirtharikara ) and serve him.” ( 1687 )
आभट्ठों य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोतेण य सव्वण्णू सवदरिसीणं ॥ १४० ॥ (१६८८)
Abhaṭṭho ya jineņam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam | Nāmena ya gottena ya savvannū savvadarisinam || 140 | (1688)
[ आभाषितश्व जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ १४० ॥ ( १६८८ )

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.: 191
Abhasitaśca jinena jāti-jarā-marañavipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina ॥ 140 ॥ ( 1681)]
Trans.-140 He was addressed by his name and gotra ( lineage) by the Tirthankara who was free from jati ( birth) jara ( old age) and marana ( death ), who was Sarvajna ( omniscient ) and who had (attained) complete darsana. (1628)
Bhagavāri said :किं मण्णे अस्थि भूया उदाह नस्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमोअत्थो॥१४१॥ (१६८९) Kim manne atthi bhūyā udāhu natthi tti samsao tujjha i Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasî tesimo attho Il 141 11 (1689)
[किं मन्यसे सन्ति भूतान्युताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ १४१ ॥ ( १६८९ ) Kim mangase santi bhūtānyutāho na santiti samsayastava i Vedapadānām cartham na jā nāsi teşāmayamarthah 114111 (1689)]
Trans.-141 O Vyakta ! What are you thinking of ? You entertain the doubt as to whether Bhūtas exist or not. But (ca) you have not understood the ( real) interpretation of the senterices of the Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. (1689)
टीका-पृथिव्य-ऽप्-तेजो-चायवा-ऽऽकाशलक्षणानि पञ्चभूतानि, तानि च किं सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । संशयश्च तवायं विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि-" स्वमोपमं वै सकलमित्येष ब्रह्मविधिरञ्जसा विज्ञेयः" इत्यादि, तथा, " द्यावा-पृथिवी" इत्यादि, तथा, " पृथिवी देवता, आपो देवताः" इत्यादि । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तव प्रतिभासते-"स्वप्नोपमम्-स्वप्नसदृशम् , वैनिपातोऽवधारणे, सकलम्-अशेष जगत्, इत्येष ब्रह्मविधिः-परमार्थप्रकारः, अञ्जसा-प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, विज्ञेयःज्ञातव्यः" इति । तदेवमादीनि वेदपदानि किल भूतनिवपराणि, " द्यावा

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Jinabhadra Gani's (The fourth पृथिवी" इत्यादीनि तु सत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, अतस्तव संशयः। तदेतेषां वेदपदानां त्वमर्थ न जानासि, चशब्दाद् युक्तिहृदयं च न वेसि । तेन संशयं कुरुषे । तेषां चायमों वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ।। १४१ (१६८९ )॥
D. C.--This is your querry-" Do the pancabhūtas viz. Přthvi ( earth ) ap (water) tejas (fire) vayu ( air ) and akas'a (ether) exist or not? This querry is based upon your misapprehension of certain sentences of the Vedas, that are mutually contradictory. The sentences are(1) " Svapnopamam val sakalamtyesa brahmavidhiranjasa
vijneyah” etc. (2) “ Dyava-prithvi " etc. and (3) “ Prithvî--devată, apo devatah " etc. Your interpretation of these sentences runs thus :
All this world is nothing but a dream or illusion. So, one should honestly endeavour to know the Brahma, which is the only paramarthaprakās'a worth attaining.
Such sentences refute the existence of the five elements while uthers like Dyava prithivi and “ Prithivê devatā, apo devatäh” establish the existence of those very elements. These contradicting sentences of the Vedas have given rise to your doubt.
Really speaking, you have not understood the real purport of the above sentences. Here I give their correct interpretation, Listen to it. भूएसु तुज्झ संका सुविणय-माओवमाइं होज ति । न वियारिजंताई भयंति जं सव्वहा जुत्तिं ॥ १४२ ॥ (१६९०) Bhữesu tujiha sankā suvinaya-māovaniāim hojja tti Na viyārijjantāim bhayanti jam savvahā juttim u 142 11 (1690) [ भूतेषु तव शङ्का स्वप्नक-मायोपमानि भवेयुरिति ।
न विचार्यमाणानि भजन्ति यत् सर्वथा युक्तिम् ।। १४२ ॥ ( १६९०)

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Gaṇadharavada
Bhuteṣu tava sanka svapnaka-mayopamani bhaveyuriti Na vicāryamānani bhajanti yat sarvathā yuktim || 142 || (1690) ]
.: 193 :•
भूयाइसंसयाओ जीवाइस का कह त्ति ते बुद्धी ।
तं सव्वसुणसंकी मन्नसि मायोवमं लोयं ॥ १४३ ॥ (१६९१)
Bhūyāisamsayão jîvāisu kā kaha tti te buddhî Tam savvasunnasanki mannasi māyovamam loyam ॥ 143॥ ( 1691)
[ भूतादिसंशयात् जीवादिषु का कथेति ते बुद्धिः ।
त्वं सर्वशून्यशङ्कमन्यसे मायोपमं लोकं ॥ १४३ ॥ ( १६९१ )
Bhūtādisamśayat jîvādiṣu kā katheti te buddhiḥ | Tvam sarvaśünyaśańkî manyase mayopamam lokam ||143|| (1691) ]
Trans. - 142-143 You entertain the doubt about the elements that they are (unreal) like dreams and illusions. And when you question the (existence of ) elements (themselves), what to talk of objects like jiva etc.? You being dubious about the existence of everything, believe the whole world to be ( as unreal as ) māyā. ( 1690–1691 ).
टीका- आयुष्मन् व्यक्त ! भूतेषु भवतः सन्देहः, यतः स्वप्नोपमा नानि मायोपमानानि चैतानि भवेयुरिति त्वं मन्यसे । यथा हि स्वप्ने किल कश्चिद् निःस्वोsपि निजगृहाङ्गणे गजघटा-तुरग निवह-मणि - कनकराश्यादिकमभूतमपि पश्यति, मायायां चेन्द्रजालविलसितरूपायामविद्यमानमपि कनक - मणि- मौक्तिक - रजतभाजना -ऽऽराम - पुष्प फलादिकं दृश्यते, तथैतान्यपि भूतान्येवंविधान्येवेति मन्यसे यद् यस्माद् विचार्यमाणान्येतानि सर्वथैव न काञ्चिद् युक्ति भजन्ते सहन्ते । भुतेषु च संशये जीव- पुण्य-पापादिषु किल का वार्ता भूतविकाराधिष्ठानत्वात् तेषाम् इति तव बुद्धिः । तस्मात् सर्वस्यापि भूत-जीवादिवस्तुनस्त्वदभिप्रायेणाभावात् सर्वशून्यताशङ्की त्वं निरवशेषमपि लोकं मायोपमं स्वप्ने - न्द्रजालतुल्यं मन्यस इति ।। १४२-१४३ ( १६९० - १६९१ ) ॥
25

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
D. C.-Long-lived Vyakta! You question the existence of Bhutas. Just as, in a dream, a poor man sees before his own house multitudes of elephants, and horses, or treasures of jewellery and gold, but actually he does not possess them, and just as, under the illusion of the Indrajala, precious things, c g., dishes (made) of gold, silver, jewels etc., or beautiful objects e. g., parks, flowers, fruits etc, are perceived, but really speaking, they are not existing; in the same way, according to your belief, bhutas like prithivi are perceived by us; but as a matter of fact, they are unreal and illusory like objects seen in a dream or an Indrajala. But this belief of yours absolutely unfounded.
is
• 194:
Again, as you have a doubt in the existence of elements, the doubt is bound to arise in the case of Jiva, papa and punya also. Because, these objects are contained in the various vikaras of the bhutas themselves. It follows, therefore, that, according to you, all bhutas like Prthavi and all padarthas (objects) like jiva are a-vidyamāna (non-existent). This indicates that you are sarvasunyatasanki and according to you, the whole Universe is just like svapna, māyā or Indrajala.
Now, Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira gives a number of arguments for doubts which Vyakta entertained in his mindजह किर न सओ परओ नोभयओ नावि अन्नओ सिद्धी । zia19ƒàzzersì fea! ag gîg-gemnoi||88811 (3&83)
Jaha kira na sao parao nobhayao nāvi annao siddhî Bhāvāṇamavekkhão Viyatta jaha dîha-hassāṇam ||144|| (1692) [ यथा किल न स्वतः परतो नोभयतो नाप्यन्यतः सिद्धिः । भावानामपेक्षातो व्यक्त ! यथा दीर्घ - ह्रस्वयोः ॥ १४४ ॥ (१६९२)
Yatha kila na svataḥ parato nobhayato napyanyataḥ siddhiḥ | Bhavanamapekṣato Vyakta! yatha dirgla-hrasvayoh ||144|| (1692)

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Trans.---144 Accomplishment of objects, O Vyakta ! like ( the accomplishment of ) hrasva ( short) and dirgha ( long ) can never be attained by means of itself, through another, by means of both, or through any other object (1692).
टीका-व्यक्त ! भवतोऽयमभिप्रायः-यथा किल न स्वतः, न परतः, न चोभयतः, नाप्यन्यतो भावानां सिद्धिः संभाव्यते । कुतः ? इत्याहअपेक्षातः-कार्यकारणादिभावस्यापेक्षिकत्वादित्यर्थः, इस्व-दीर्घव्यपदेशवत् । तथाहि-यत् किमपि भावजातमस्ति तेन सर्वेणापि कार्येण वा भवितव्यम् , कारणेन वा । तत्र कार्य कारणेन क्रियत इति कारणायत्त एव तस्य कार्यत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु कार्यस्य कार्यत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किमप्यस्ति । एवं कारणमपि कार्य करोतीति कार्यायत्त एव तस्य कारणत्वव्यपदेशः, न तु तस्य कारणत्वं स्वतः सिद्धं किञ्चिदस्ति । तदेवं कार्यादिभावः स्वतो न सिध्यति । यच्च स्वतो न सिद्धं तस्य परतोऽपि सिद्धिर्नास्ति, यथा खरविषाणस्य । ततश्च न स्वतः कार्यादिभावः, नापि परतः। स्व-परोभयतस्तर्हि तस्य सिद्धिरिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , व्यस्तादुभयतस्तत्सिद्धेरभावात् तत्समुदायेऽपि तदयोगात् । न हि सिकताकणेषु प्रत्येकमसत् तैलं तत्समुदाये प्रादुर्भवति ।।
अपि च, उभयतः सिद्धिपक्ष इतरेतराश्रयदोषः प्राप्नोति । यावद्धि कार्य न सिध्यति न तावत्कारणसिद्धिरस्ति । यावच्च कारणं न सिध्यति न तावत् कार्य सिद्धिमासादयति । अत इतरेतराश्रयदोषः । तस्माद् नोभयतोऽपि कार्यादिभावसिद्धिः । नाप्यन्यतः-अनुभयत इत्यर्थः, स्व-परो-भयव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वेन निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवं इस्व-दीर्घलक्षणे दृष्टान्तेऽपि “अपेक्षातः" इत्यस्य ह्रस्व-दीर्घत्वासिद्धिलक्षणेन साध्येनान्वयो भावनीयः । तथाहि-प्रदेशिन्या अङ्गुष्ठमपेक्ष्य दीर्घत्वं प्रतीयते । मध्यमां त्वपेक्ष्य इस्वत्वम् , परमार्थेन त्वियं स्वतो न ह्रस्वा, नापि दीर्घा । तदेवं न स्वतो इस्व-दीर्घत्वयोः सिद्धिः। ततः परतः, उभयतः, अनुभयतश्च तत्सिद्ध्यभावो यथोक्तवद् भावनीयः, तदुक्तम्---
न दीर्घस्तीह दीर्घत्वं न इस्वे नापि च द्वये ।
तस्माद सिद्धं शून्यत्वात् सदित्याख्यायते व हि ? ॥१॥ " इस्वं प्रतीत्य सिद्धं दीर्घ, दीर्घ प्रतीत्य इस्वमपि । न किश्चिदस्ति सिद्धं व्यवहारवशाद् बदन्त्येवम् ॥ १॥ (१६९२ )

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The fourth
D. C.-Vyakta ! your argument is this :-Complete attain. ment of (the existence of) objects is not possible either svatah or paratah or ubhayataḥ or anyataḥ as in the case of (the accomplishment of the existence of) the hrasva and dirgha, there being apeksikatva (expectation) of the Kārya Karanādibhāvas (3. e., relations like that of cause and effect) of the padārthas. Hence, each and every object is expected to be either karya or karana. As every karya is done by karana, its kāryatva is subjugated by karanatva. But the kāryatva of a kārya is not svabhāva-siddha ( self-accomplished ).
Similarly, kārana accomplishes kārya. So that, kāraṇatva of karaṇa is subjugated by the kāryatva of kārya. But kārņatva also is not svatah siddha.
Now, one which is not Svatahsiddha by virtue of its own self cannot be accomplished by means of another also, as in the case of the horn of an ass. So, kāryadibhāva is accomplished neither by itself nor by another.
Again, it is improper to consider the possibility of kāryādibhāvas even by sva and para taken together. Because, since siddhi is not found in either of them separately, how could it be attained in the samudaya of the two ? Take the example of oil and sand. When 'oil is not present in every single particle of sand, it is not found in the collection of sand also. Thus, the accomplishment of an object by means of ubhaya, (both ) is also impossible.
In case of accomplishment by means of ubhaya, there is another difficulty also. During the process of siddhi, so long as kārya is not accomplished, there is kāraṇasiddhi and so long as karana is not accomplished, there is kāryasiddhi. Consequently, kārya and karana depend upon each other, and hence there is itaretarasrayadosa, or the fault of affecting each other, Thus, it is clear that the siddhi of kāryādibhāva is not possible even if sva and para are taken together.

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Nor even by any other means-anublayuluh-the siddhi is possible. For, there is no vastu ( object ) available except sva, para and ubhhya in this world. So, even if we presume the accomplishment of bhāvas anyatah or anubhayatah (i. e., by means of any object excepting sva, paru and ubhaya ) the siddhi would be nir-hetuka (void of cause ). To take an example the pradesini finger (next to thumb ) looks dîrgha when compared with the thumb and hrasvu when compared with the middle finger. But the finger by itself is neither short nor long.
Since it is not hro.sva or dîrgha by virtue of itself, it is not so by means of another object, nor by both taken together, nor by any extra means whatsoever. So it is said“Na dîrghe'steeha dîrghatvam na hrasve näpi ca dvayei
Tasmadasiddbam sūnyatvāt saditya khyāyate kva hi ? || “ Hrasvam pratîtya siddham dîrgham, dîrgham pratîtya hrasvamapit Na kinoidasti siddham, vyavahāravašād vadantyevam " (1692)
In support of the prima facie assertion that there is sarvusunyatā, a number of examples are given. अत्थित्त-घडेगाणेगया व सवेगयाइदोसाओ। सवेऽणभिलप्पा वा सुण्णा वा सबहा भावा ॥ १४५ ॥ (१६९३) Atthitta-ghadegānegayā va savvegayāidosão i Savve’ņabhilappā vā sunnā vā savvahā bhāvā Il 145 || (.1693 )
[ feara-elamar ar passariaguaia i
posafisicat al Tatar att prat: 11 884 ll ( 8883) Astitva-ghataikānekatā vā sarvaika tādidosāti Sarve'nabhilāpyā vā śünya vă sarvatha bhāvaḥ 11 145 11 ( 1693 ) ]
Trans.--145 Unity or distinction of astitva and ghata would either give rise to faults like sarvaikatā (i. e. universal

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
oneness ) or all the objects would become inexpressible (by word or speech ) or non-existent in all respects (1693).
टीका-नन्वस्तित्व-घटयोरेकत्वम् , अनेकत्वं वां ? । यद्येकत्वम् , तर्हि सर्वैकता प्राप्नोति-यो योऽस्ति स स घट इत्यस्तित्वे घटस्य प्रवेशात् सर्वस्य घटत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, न पटादि पदार्थान्तरम् । घटो वा सर्वसत्त्वाव्यतिरेकात् सर्वात्मकः स्यात् ; अथवा, यो घटः स एवास्तीति घटमात्रेऽस्तित्वं प्रविष्टम् , ततोऽन्यत्र सत्त्वाभावादघटस्य सर्वस्याप्यभावप्रसङ्गतो घट एवैका स्यात् । सोऽपि वा न भवेत् , अघटव्यावृत्तो हि घटो भवति, यदा च तत्प्रतिपक्षभृतोऽघट एव नास्ति, तदा किमपेक्षोऽसौ घटः स्यात १। इति सर्वशून्यत्वमिति । अथ घट-सत्चयोरन्यत्वमिति द्वितीयो विकल्पः। तर्हि सत्त्वरहितत्वादसन् घटः, खरविषाणवदिति । अपिच, सतो भावः सचमुच्यते, तस्य च स्वाधारभूतेभ्यो घटादिभ्यः सद्भयोऽन्यत्वेऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात्, आधारादन्यत्वे आधेयस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । तदेवमस्तित्वेन सह घटादीनामेकत्वाऽन्यत्वविकल्पाभ्यामुक्तन्यायेन सर्वैकतादिदोषप्रसङ्गात सर्वेऽपि भावा अनभिलप्या वा भवेयुः, सर्वथा शून्या वा स्युः, सर्वथैव तेषामभावो वा भवेदित्यर्थः । अपिच, यद् नोत्पद्यते तत्तावद् निर्विवादं खरविषाणवदसदेव, इति निवृत्ता तत्कथा । यदप्युत्पत्तिमल्लोकेऽभ्युपगम्यते, तस्यापि जाता-जातादिविकल्पयुक्तिभिरुत्पादो न घटते, इति शून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥ १४५ (१६९३) ।
D. C.-( 1.) If ghata and Astitva are taken to be one, all objects will have to be taken as one. For, when ghata is said to be abhinna from astitva, all objects that have existence will be called ghata, and there will be no distinction of objects like pata etc. Thus there will arise the difficulty of scrvaikatā or Universal one-ness. Moreover, ghata will become a sarvatmaka or all-pervading object, since it is taken as inseparable from the astitva of all objects. Again, if ghata is believed to be costitva itself, existence will be restricted to ghata only. All other objects that are not ghata will, in that case, have no existence. Consequently ghata alone will exist,

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Or, say, ghata, too, will not exist according to this argument. Whatever is different from a-ghata is called ghata. Now, since ghata and astitva go together, c-ghata which is opposite to ghata will also have no existence. Thus, a-ghatu does not exist. So, also ghata will not exist. For, in comparision with what, will the object be ghata if c-ghata is absent ?
Hence it is better to resort to sarvašūnyata.
(2) Now, the second alternative that-ghata is distinct from astutva-may be considered. If ghata is bhinna from astitva, it is devoid of astitva also For, ustitva being the quality of existence, is the adheya, and ghata which contains the quality is ādhāra. Adheya is not supposed to exist, when ādhāra is away from it. So, ghata is devoid of existence and hence it is said to be c-vidyamāna like the horn of an ass.
Thus, the above discussion of unity or distinction of astitva and ghatu leads either to the difficulty of sarvaikatâ or to the anabhılāpyatvu and sūnyatva as regards each and every object.
Again, that which is not produced is undoubtedly c-vidyamâna, like the horn of an ass, and it has already been discussed before With regard to objects that have been produced in this world, it can also be proved that their production is not in the fitness of things, if properly thought of. जायाऽजायो-भयो न जायमाणं च जायए जम्हा । अणवत्था-ऽभावो-भयदोसाओ सुण्णया तम्हा ॥१४६॥(१६९४) Jāyā’ jāyo-bhayao na jāyamānam ca jāyae jamhā i Anavatthā' bhāvo-bhayadosão suņnayā tamhā 11 146 11 ( 1694 ) [ FIar-sgratinat a FTTHAT FIT TA1a1
अनवस्था ऽभावो-भयदोषात् शून्यता तस्मात् ॥ १४६ ।। (१६९४) Jatü’játobhayato, na jāyamanam ca jayate yasmāti Anavastha'bhāvo-bhayadoşāt šūnyatā tasmat || 146 # ( 1694 ) ]

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{ The fourth
Trans.-146 ( An object ) which has ( already ) been produced, or which is in both the conditions, or which is ( in the state of) being produced, can never be produced on account of faults like disorder, non-entity or both. So, it is non-existent.
टीका-इह तावद् न जातं जायते, जातत्वादेव, निष्पन्नघटवत् । अथ जातमपि जायते, तीनवस्था, जातत्वाविशेषेण पुनःपुनर्जन्मप्रसङ्गात् । अथाजातं जायते । तत्रोत्तरमाह-" अभाव त्ति” सूचकत्वात् सूत्रस्य, तह्यभावोऽपि खरविषाणलक्षणो जायताम् , अजातत्वाविशेषात् । अथ जाताजातरूपं जायते । तदप्ययुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-उभयदोषात् प्रत्येकोभयपक्षोक्तदोषापत्तेरित्यर्थः । किञ्च, एतजाताजातलक्षणमुभयमस्ति वा, न वा । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि जातमेव तत्, न पुनरुभयम् , तत्र चोक्तो दोषः । अथ नास्ति तथापि नोभयं तत् , किन्त्वजातमेव, तत्रापि चाभिहितमेव दूषणम् । नापि जायमानं जायते, पूर्वोक्त विकल्पद्वयानतिवृत्तेः, तथाहि-तदपि जायमानमस्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि जातमेव तत् । नास्ति चेत्, तबजातमेव । पक्षद्वयेऽपि चास्मिन्नभिहित एव दोषः । उक्तं च
गतं न गम्यते तावदगतं नैव गम्यते ।
गतागतविनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥ १ ॥ इत्यादि । यस्मादेवम् , तस्मादनवस्थादिदोषप्रसङ्गेन वस्तूनामुत्पादायोगाजगतः शून्यतैव युक्तेति ॥ १४६ (१६९४)।
___D. C.-(1) An object which is once produced has not to undergo the process of production again, just as a ghata which has already been jāta has not to be produced again. Even then if it is said that objects that have once been produced can be produced again and again, there would be anavasthā. Hence utpatti of an already jāta object is absolutely impossible.
(2) Again, if an a-jäta object is believed to be capable of being produced objects like kharavisāna-that have never

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• 201 : been produced so far-should also be taken as capable of being produced. Because, ajătatva is present in kharavişana also. But this is absurd. So, utpatti of an ajātu object is never possible.
(3) In the case of an object which is both jäta and arjata, the utpatti is not possible. Because dosas that are found in each one of the above two cases separately are certainly found in the combination of the two also.
Moreover, if an object which is ubhayarūpa is taken to be vidyamāna it becomes jäta and loses its jätājāta ubhayarūpa. Similarly, if it is a-vidyamāna, it cannot be called ubhayarūpa, but anutpanna only. Now, when it is utpanna or anutpanna, dosas like anavastha and abhāva do arise.
( 4 ) In the case of a jūyamāna object also, the above argument may be applied and the dosas like anavastha and abhāva arise in that case also, according as it becomes jāta or a-jāta due to its being vidyamāna or c-vidyamāna. So, utpatti in this case is also impossible.
So, it is said, " Gatam na gamyate távadagatam naiva gamyate ! Gatāgatavinirmuktam gamyamānain na ganyate 11"
Thus, in all the above-mentioned four avasthās of an object, it has been clearly pointed out that its utpatti is impossible. Hence, it is proper to believe in the Universal non-entity. 25- TATAPOT ofte Hag at a gi etori I . CIAS ALATTHİ ATHIN a FIAT 88011 (1884) Heū-paccayasāmaggi vîsu bhāvesu no va jam kajjam | Disai sāmaggimayam savvābhāve na sāmaggî u 147 11 ( 1695 )
[ हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री विष्वग् भावेषु नो वा यत् कार्यम् ।
sud naitai hatarët e rrut I1 880 II (8884) 26

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[The fourth
Hetu-pratyayasamagri visvag bhaveṣu no va yat karyam Driśyate samagrimayam sarvābhāve na sāmagri || 147 ॥ ( 1695 ) ]
•: 202 :.
Trans.-147 An object is accomplished by means of a group of causes taken together and not by hetu or pratyaya in its individual capacity. (This) collection of causes cannot be ( found ) in the ( midst of ) all-pervading negation.
टीका - हेतवः - उपादानकारणानि, प्रत्ययास्तु निमित्तकारणानि तेषां हेतु - प्रत्ययानां या सामग्री तस्या विष्वग् भावेषु पृथगवस्थासु यत् कार्यं न दृश्यते, दृश्यते च सामग्रीमयम् - संपूर्ण सामय्यवस्थायां पुनर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं च सति कार्यस्य सर्वाभाव एव युक्त इति शेषः । सर्वाभावे च न सामग्रीनैक सामग्रीसद्भावः प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः । ततः सर्वशून्यतैवेति भावः । इदमत्र हृदयम् - हेतवश्च प्रत्ययाच स्वजन्यमर्थ किमेकैकशः कुर्वन्ति, संभूय वा १ । न तावदेकैकशः, तथाऽनुपलब्धेः । तत एकैकस्मात् कार्यस्याभावात् सामव्यामपि तदभाव एव स्यात्, सिकताकणतैलवदिति । इत्थं च सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्योत्पत्त्यभावे सामग्रीसद्भावो न प्राप्नोति, अनुत्पन्नायाः सामय्या अप्ययोगात् । ततश्च सर्वशून्यतैव जगतः । उक्तं च
"
हेतु प्रत्ययसामग्री पृथग् भावेष्वदर्शनात् ।
तेन ते नाभिलप्या हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः ॥ १ ॥
लोके यावत् संज्ञा सामग्र्यामेव दृश्यते यस्मात् । तस्माद् न सन्ति भावा भावे सति नास्ति सामग्री ॥ १ ॥
इत्यादि । अस्य च व्याख्या - पृथग् भावेष्वदर्शनात् " कार्यस्य " इति शेषः । तेन ते घटादयो भावा सर्वेऽपि स्वभावतः स्वरूपतो नाभिलाप्याः, पृथगेकैकावस्थायाः कार्यस्यानुत्पादात् उत्पत्तिमन्तरेण च घटादिसंज्ञाऽप्रवृत्तेः, संज्ञाऽभावे चाभिलप्तुमशक्यत्वादिति । कुतः पुनः पृथगवस्थायां संज्ञा - प्रवृत्ति: : इत्याह- " लोके यावदित्यादि " लोके यावत् संज्ञा " घटोऽयम् " ? 'इत्यादिसंज्ञाप्रवृत्तिः तावत् संपूर्ण कार्य संपूर्ण सामग्र्यामेव यस्माद् दृश्यते, पृथगभावे च सामय्यामप्यभावात् सिकता तैलवद् न सन्त्येव भावाः, भावासवे च कुतः सामग्रीसद्भावः १ इति ।। १४७ ।। ( १६९५ ) ॥
"

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.: 203 : D. C.-An object is said to have been accomplished only when all upadana and nimitta causes are assembled together. But when each one of these causes operates separately, the karya could never be accomplished. In other words, there is abhāva of the karya and ultimately there will be sarvābhāva. Again, in the midst of sarvābhāva, sämagrî cannot exist. Consequently, there will be sarvas'unyatā.
Moreover, just as oil cannot be found in the collection of sands when it is not present in each individual particle, so also karya cannot be found in the combination of many karanas when it is absent in each individual karaạn separately.
Thus, when the existence and production of all kāryas are denied, the existence and production of samagri are also denied. So here also, sarvas'unyata is the only resort of belief. Again, it is said that
“Hetu-pratyayasamagrî přthag bhaveśvadarśanāti Tena te nābhilapyā hi bhavaḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ 11" “ Loke yāvat samjňāsanagryāmeva dřiśyate yasmāti
Tasmād na santi bhāvā, bhāve sati nāsti samagri 11147||(1695)" परभागादरिसणओं सवाराभागसुहमयाओ य। उभयाणुवलंभाओ सबाणुलद्धिओ सुण्णं ॥ १४८ ॥ (१६९६ ) Parabhāgādarisanao savvārābhāgasuhamayāo ya i Ubhayāņuvalambhão savvāņuladdhio suņnam 148 11 ( 1696 )
[ परभागादर्शनतः सर्वाराद्भागसौक्ष्म्याच्च ।
J#4145FhTa vaigroya: 77611 886 11 (8898) Parabhāgādarśanataḥ sarvarādbhāgasaukṣmyacca / Ubhayānupalambhāt sarvānupalabdhitah šūnyam (1 148 11 (1696) ]
Trans.—148 The 'rear portion ( of an object ) is not perceptible; and its front-most part is very minute. So, on

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth account of the non-perception of these two, there is nonperception of all, which results in complete negation.
2
टीका - इह यत् तावददृश्यं तदसदेव, अनुपलम्भात्, खरविषाणवदिति निवृत्ता तद्वार्ता दृश्यस्यापि च स्तम्भ - कुम्भ - कुड्यादेः पर मध्य भागयोरसत्वमेव अर्वाग्भागान्तरितत्वेन तयोरप्यदर्शनात्, आराद्भागस्यापि च सावयवत्वात् पुनरन्यः खल्वाराद्भागः तस्याप्यन्यः पुनस्तस्याप्यन्य इत्येवं तावत् यावत् सर्वारातीयभागस्य, परमाणुप्रतरमात्रत्वेनातिसौक्ष्म्यात्, पूर्वेषां चाराद्भागानामन्यस्यान्येनान्तरितत्वेनानुपलब्धेः । ततश्वोक्तन्यायेन परभागसर्वारातीयभागलक्षणोभयभागानुपलम्भात् सर्वस्यापि वस्तुजातस्यानुपलब्धेः शून्यं जगदिति । उक्तं च
यावद् दृश्यं परस्तावद् भागः स च न दृश्यते । तेन ते नाभिलाया हि भावाः सर्वे स्वभावतः ॥ १ ॥ " तदेवमुक्तयुक्तया सर्वस्यापि भूतादेरभावः प्राप्नोति श्रूयते च श्रुतौ भूतादिसद्भावोऽपीति संशयः । इति पूर्वपक्षः || १४८ ( १६९६ ) ॥
แ
D. C.-It has already been discussed that objects like kharaviṣāna do not exist, because they are non-perceptible. In case of perceptible objects like pillar, jar, wall etc, the rear and middle portions are not perceived because they are screened by the front portion coming in their way. So they are said to be a-vidyamāna.
Again, the front portion consists of a number of divisions. Out of all these divisions, every one is screened by the other coming in its immediate front which again is screened by a third one in its immediate vicinity and so on. Ultimately, the front-most particle is left unscreened. But it is extremely small in size and hence becomes non-cognizible. Now, since the rear and front-most parts are non-perceptible, it can be said that objects-and ultimately all the objects in the Universe-are non-cognizable or s'unya. Moreover, it is said that

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.: 205 :
“Yavad dpiśyam parastāvad bhāgah sa ca na dřiśyate 1
Tena te nābhilapyā hi bhavaḥ sarve svabhavataḥ ! "
So, you have a doubt in the existence of Bhuta eto, and according to your belief, they are non-existent. This finishes the pūrvapaksa ( the argument of the opponent )
Now follows the refutation of the argumentमा कुरु वियत्त! संसयमसइ न संसयसमुब्भवो जुत्तो। खकुसुम-खरसिंगेसु व, जुत्तो सो थाणु-पुरिसेसु ॥१४९॥(१६९६) Mā kuru Viyatta ! samsayamasai na samsayasamubbhavo jutto 1 Khakusuma-kharasingesu va jutto so thāņu-purisesu ||1491(1697)
[मा कुरु व्यक्त ! संशयमसति न संशयसमुद्भवो युक्तः।
खकुसुम-खरशृङ्गयोरिव युक्तः स स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः॥१४९॥(१६९७) Mā kuru Vyakta ! samsayamasati na samsayasamudbhavo yuktahi Khakusuma-kharasrigayoriva yuktah sa sthānu-purusayoh ||1491]
Trans.--149 O Vyakta! Do not entertain doubt, The doubt about non-existent (objects) is improper as in the case of kha-kusuma (flower of the sky) and kharaśrrga (horn of an ass ). It is proper (only) with regard to (existent objects like ) sthānu and purusa. ( 1697)
टीका-आयुष्मन व्यक्त ! मा कृथाः संशयं-मा भूताभावं बुध्यस्व, गतोऽसति भूतकदम्बके संशयः खकुसुम-खरविषाणयोरिव न युक्तः, अपि त्वभावनिश्चय एव स्यात् । सत्स्वेव च भूतेषु स्थाणु-पुरुषादिष्विव संशयो युक्तः । यदि पुनरसत्यपि वस्तुनि संदेहः स्यात् तदाऽविशेषेण खरविषाणादिष्वपि स्यादिति भावः ॥ १४९ ॥ (१६९७ ) ॥
D. C.-0 long-lived Vayakta ! Don't be dubious about the existence of Blütas. Because the doubt about non-existent objects is totally unjustifiable as in the case of kha-kusuma and kharas'rnga where abhāva is already fixed up. It can be

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.: 206 :
Jinabhadra :Gani's [The fourth justified only in the case of existent objects like sthanu and puruşa. But if you raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, the doubt will be raised in the case of kharavişāna also, which, too is non-existent in general. को वा विसेसहेऊ सवाभावे वि थाणु-पुरिसेसु । संका न खपुप्फाइसु विवजओ वा कहं न भवे? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८) Ko vā visesaheū savvābhāve vi thāņu-purisesu | Sankā na khapupfaisu vivajjao vā kaham na bhave ? ॥ 150 ॥ (1698)
[को वा विशेषहेतुः सर्वाभावेऽपि स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः ।
शङ्का न खपुष्पादिषु विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवेत् ? ॥१५०॥ (१६९८) Ko Va viesahetuh sarvabhave'pi sthānu-purusayoh | Sarika na khapușpădişu viparyayo vā katham na bhavet? 11150117
Trans.--150 Or, what special reason can there be in ( entertaining ) doubt about sthāņu and purusa and not about kha-puspa ( flower of the sky ) etc, even in ( the midst of ) allpervading non-entity? Or, why should not the reverse take place ? ( 1698)
टीका-को चाऽत्र विशेषहेतुरुच्यतां यत्-सर्वाभावे सर्वशून्यतायामविशिष्टायामपि स्थाण्वादिषु संशयो भवति । न खपुष्पादिषु ?। ननु विशेषहेत्वभावादविशेषेण सर्वत्र संशयोऽस्तु, नियामकाभावाद् । विपर्ययो वा भवेत्-खपुष्पादिषु संशयः स्याद् न स्थाण्वादिष्विति भावः॥१५०(१६९८)।
D. C.-Even when there was all-pervading negation on what special ground could you entertain doubt about existent objects like sthanu etc, and not about non-existent objects like kha-puspa etc ? If there is no višeşahetu on which your belief is based, the sams'aya, in general, may rise at all places. Or, in absence of clear explanation, reverse may be the case i. e. The doubt may arise about non-existent objects like kha-puspa etc, and not about existent objects like sthānu etc.

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: 207 :
Moreover, पच्चक्खओऽणुमाणादागमओ वा पसिद्धिरत्थाणं । सवप्पमाणविसयाभावे किह संसओ जुत्तो ? ॥१५१॥ (१६९९) Paccakkhao'numānādāgamao vā pasiddhiratthānām i Savvappamāņavisayābhāve kiha samsao jutto ? u 15111 ( 1699)
[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयाभावे कथं संशयो युक्तः ? ॥ १५१ ॥ ( १६९९ ) Pratyakşato’numānādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthānām i Sarvapramāņavisayābhāve katham samsayo yuktah ? 1115111 (1699)]
____Trans.-151 The accomplishment of objects is (attained) either by ( means of ) visible evidence (pratyaksa ) or by inference ( anumāna ) or by documentary evidence ( agama ). ( But ) in absence of all ( such ) Prananas ( evidences ) and visayas ( topics ) how could the samśaya be justified ? ( 1699 )
टीका-यदा हि प्रमाणैरर्थानां प्रसिद्धिर्जाता भवेत् तदा कथश्चित् क्वचिद् वस्तुनि संशयो युज्यते । यदा च सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सर्वेषां च तद्विषयाणामभावस्तदा कथं संशयोऽस्तु, संशयस्य ज्ञात-ज्ञेयाद्यर्थसामग्रीजन्यत्वात् १ । सर्वशून्यत्वे च तदभावाद् न संशयोद्भूतिः, निर्मूलत्वादिति भावः ॥१५१॥ (१६९९)॥
D. C.-When the object is accomplished by means of pramānas ( evidences ) a doubt may arise in several objects to a certain extent. But when all such pramānas and visayas are absent, how can the doubt exist? The doubt springs up from materials like znātā and jieya. But when everything is believed as s'ünya, materials like jñātā and jieyc are not supposed to exist, and hence, the sams'aya has also no reason to rise. जं संसयादउ नाणपज्जया तं च नेयसंबद्धं । सबन्नेयाभावे न संसओ तेण ते जुत्तो ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००)

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth Jam samsayādau nānapajjayā tam ca neyasambaddhami Savvanneyābhāve na samsao tena te jutto ॥ 152 ॥ ( 1700 )
[ यत् संशयादयो ज्ञानपर्ययास्तच ज्ञेयसंबद्धम् ।।
सर्वज्ञेयाभावे न संशयस्तेन ते युक्तः ॥ १५२ ॥ (१७००) Yat samśayādayo jñānaparyayastacca jnegasaībaddham | Sarvajneyabhave na samsayastena te yuktah | 152 ॥ ( 1700 )]
Trans.-152 Since doubt etc. are the synonyms of jnana, they are related to the jneya ( cognizable object ) also. So, in absence of all jneyas, your doubt has also no place ( to exist ). ( 1700 )
टीका-यस्मात् संशय-विपर्यया-ऽनध्यवसाय-निर्णया विज्ञानपर्ययाः, तच ज्ञेयनिबन्धनमेव, सर्वशून्यतायां न ज्ञेयमस्ति, तस्माद् न तव संशयो युक्तः । सति च संशयेऽनुमानसिद्धा एव भावाः ॥ १५२ ( १७००)॥ ____D. C.-Since doubt, inversion (vaparyaya ) non-apprehen. sion (anadhyavasāya ) and affirmation ( nirnaya ) are the ( various ) synonyms of knowledge, they are automatically connected with the cognizable also. Now, since everything is s’unya, nothing can be apprehended when there is nothing jneya, there can be no jnana and no sams'aya also, as sams'aya is nothing but a paryāya of the knowledge.
Still, however, if you insist upon entertaining doubt, siddhi of objects will have to be apprehended only by means of anumāna and not by virtue of perception as there can be no perception on account of the absolute abhāva of everything. संति चिय ते भावा संसयओ सोम्म ! थाणु-पुरिस छ। अह दिटुंतमसिद्धं मण्णसि नणु संसयाभावो ॥१५३॥(१७०१) Santi cciya te bhāvā samsayao Somma! thāņu-purisa vya Aha ditthantamasiddham mannasi nanu sanisayābhāvo 11 153 11
[सन्त्येव ते भावाः संशयतः सौम्य ! स्थाणु-पुरुषाविव ।
अथ दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे ननु संशयाभावः ॥१५३ ।। (१७०१)

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Santyeva te bhā vāḥ samsayatah Saumya ! sthāņu-purusāviva 1 Atha dạştäntamasiddham manyase nanu saņśayābhāvah|l15311(1701)]
____ Trans.-153 0 Saumya! Because of ( your ) doubt ( about them ), those objects do exist like sthānu and purusa, But, again, if you believe the example ( of sthānu and purusa ) to be asiddha (i. e. unaccomplished ), existence of the doubt will be denied. ( 1701 )
टीका-सौम्य ! सन्ति भवतोऽपि भावाः, संशयसमुत्थानात् , इह यत् संशय्यते तदस्ति, यथा स्थाणु-पुरुषो; यच्चासद् न तत् संशय्यते, यथा खपुष्प-खरविषाणे। अथ स्थाणु-पुरुषलक्षणं दृष्टान्तमसिद्धं मन्यसे त्वम् , सर्वेषामपि स्थाणु-पुरुषादिभावानामविशेषेणैवासत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो ननु सर्वभावासत्त्वे संशयाभाव एव स्यात् , इत्युक्तमेवेति ।।१५३॥ (१७०१)
D. C.-0 Saumya / The very doubt that you have raised against the objects proves that the objects are vidyamana like sthāru and purusa. For, there cannot exist any doubt about non-existent objects like akās'apuspa and kharavisāna.
Again, if you think that the above example of (the existent objects like ) sthānu and purusa is wrong, you are not justified. For, in that case, all objects whether vidyamana as sthanu etc, or a-vidyamann, as khapuspa etc. will have to be considered as a-vidyamāna according to your belief. So, when the existence of each and every object will be denied, naturally the existence of doubt will also be denied. सवाभावे वि मई संदेहो सिमिणए ब, नो तं च । जं सरणाइनिमित्तो सिमिणो न उ सबहाभावो ॥१५४॥(१७०२) Savvābhāve vi maî samdeho siminae vva, no tam ca 1 Jam saranāinimitto simiņo na u savvahābhāvo u 154 11 ( 1702 )
[सर्वाभावेऽपि मतिः संदेहः स्वमक इव, नो तच्च ।
यत् स्मरणादिनिमित्तः स्वमो न तु सर्वथाऽभावः॥१५४॥(१७०२)

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Sarvabhave'pi matih samde haḥ svapnaka iva, no tacca Yat smaranadinimittaḥ svapno na tu sarvatha'bhavaḥ 154|| (1702)]
Trans-154 It is improper to believe that inspite of allpervading negation, doubt does spring up in a dream. For, dream consists of (a number of) nimittas like remembrance etc. and it is not absolutely non-existent. (1702)
Â☎1-7917aÎâ: 9779-aafuràsfâ eacà _ge: ĦTI:, TAI किल कश्चित् पामरो निजगृहाङ्गणे “किमयं द्विपेन्द्रो महीधो वा ? इति संशेते, न च तत् तत्र किञ्चिदप्यस्ति, एवमन्यत्र सर्वभावाभावेऽपि संशयो भविष्यति । तच्च न, यद् यस्मात् स्वप्नेऽपि पूर्वदृष्टानुभृतस्मरणादिनिमित्तः संदेहः, न तु सर्वथा भावाभावेऽसौ क्वापि प्रवर्तते । अन्यथा हि यत् षष्ठभूतादिकं क्वचिदपि नास्ति तत्रापि संशयः स्यात्, विशेषाभावादिति । ननु किं स्वप्नोऽपि निमित्तमन्तरेण न प्रवर्तते १ । एवमेतत् ॥ ( १७०२ ) ॥
D. C-In support of the belief that doubt springs up even in sarvabhava, an opponent may advance an argument as follows Just as in a dream, a poor pauper raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or a mountain before his house, though, in fact, nothing exists like that; so, also, at other places, doubt can be raised inspite of the absolute abhava of things. Thus we can say that even though, there is sarvabhava, sams'aya does exist in dream.
But the above argument is totally groundless. In dream, doubt arises on account of various reasons. Say for instance, when an object is seen or experienced, the remembrance of that experience etc. gives rise to the doubt. So, for the rise of doubt in the dream there is some sort of reason which brings the dream-and hence the doubt-into existence. Thus doubt arises from an existent object and not from the absolute abhava of it.
But, suppose, even then, if you believe that the samdeha springs up from the absolute abhava also, the doubt should

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also have to arise from objects like sixth element which have never been existent so far. Because, abhāva is present in them also.
अणुहय-दि-चिंतिय-सुय-पयइवियार-देवयाऽणूया। सिमिणस्स निमित्ताइं पुण्णं पावं च नाभावो ॥१५५॥(१७०३) Anuhuya-dittha-cintiya-suya-payaiviyara-devaya'nuya । Simiņassa nimittāim punnam pāvam ca nābhāvo il 155 11 (1703) [ अनुभूत-दृष्ट-चिन्तित-श्रुत-प्रकृतिविकार-देवताऽनूपाः।
स्वप्नस्य निमित्तानि पुण्यं पापं च नाभावः ॥ १५५ ॥ (१७०३) Anubhūta-dřsta-cintita-śruta-prakřti-vikāra-devatā’nūpāh Svapnasya nimittani punyam papam ca nābhāvah ul55॥ (1703)]
- Trans.-155 ( Previous) experience, observation, attentive consideration, and hearing ( of an object ), ill-health (prakrti) vikāra ), a deity, watery place, meritorious act and sin-these are the prominent causes ( nimittas ) of dream. So it is not non-existent. (1703)
टीका-स्नान-भोजन-विलेपनादिकमन्यदाऽनुभूतं स्वप्ने दृश्यते, इत्यनुभूतोऽर्थः स्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । अथवा, करि-तुरगादिकोऽन्यदादृष्टोऽर्थस्तनिमित्तम् । विचिन्तितश्च प्रियतमालाभादिः । श्रुतश्च स्वर्ग-नरकादिः। तथा, वात-पितादिजनितः प्रकृतिविकारः स्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । तथा, अनुकूला प्रतिकूला वा देवता तनिमित्तम् । तथा, अनूपः सजलप्रदेशः। तथा पुण्यमिष्टस्वप्नस्य निमित्तम् । पापं चानिष्टस्य तस्य निमित्तम्, न पुनर्वस्त्वभावः । किञ्च, स्वमोऽपि तावद् भाव एव । ततस्तस्यापि सत्वे कथं " शून्यं जगत्" इति भवता प्रतिज्ञायते ॥ १५५ (१७०३)
D. C.-The nimittas that bring dream into existence are treated as follows:
1. Previous experience-Certain acts like snana, bhojana,

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[ The fourth
vilepana etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dream due to this reason.
2. Observation-When objects like elephants, horses etc. are perceived in dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the drstārtha reason.
3. Attentive Consideration---A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc. is called the dream of cintitārtha.
4, Hearing-When places like svarga, and narakawhich are only heard of, and not seen-are perceived in dream, the nimitta is sy tārtha.
5. Disturbance of Health Ill health caused by diseases like våta and pitta is also one of the nimittas of dream.
6. A deity--When one beholds a deity-adverse or favourable-in dream, the dream can be called deva-nimitta.
7. Watery place-This is also one of the nimittas when one dreams in the midst of watery region.
8-9. Punya and pāpa-A dream is said to be good or bad according as there is punya or papa, as its nimitta.
Thus, it is clear that & svapna is brought about by one of the above-mentioned nimittas. And hence, svapna is nothing but an object which can be brought into existence by means of a nimitta or nimittas. In this way, when the dream itself is existent, how can you call the world to be non-existent like svapna ? विण्णाणमयत्तणओ घडविण्णाणं व सुमिणओ भावो । अहवा विहियनिमित्तो घडो व नेमित्तियत्ताओ॥१५६॥(१७०४) Vinnānamayattanao ghadavinnānam va suminao bhāvo i Ahavā vihiyanimitto ghado vya nemittiyattāo il 156 11 ( 1704) [विज्ञानमयत्वतो घटविज्ञानमिव स्वमको भावः ।
tuar farzalamint ST ÀMÀTirana 11 848 11 (2008) :

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Vijnanamayatvato ghata vijnanawiva svapnako bhāvaḥ 1 Athava vihitanimitto ghata iva naimittikatvat | 156 ॥ ( 1704)]
Trans.—156 The existence of dream is ( apprehended) either because dream is vijnanamaya (i. e. full of knowledge ) like ghata or because it is naimittika ( i. e. caused by nimitta ) like ghata as mentioned before. ( 1704 )
टीका-भावः स्वम इति प्रतिज्ञा। विज्ञानमयत्वादिति हेतुः। घटविज्ञानवदिति दृष्टान्तः । अथवा, भावः स्वमा, नैमित्तिकत्वात् निमित्तैनिष्पन्नो नैमित्तिकस्तद्धावस्तत्वं तस्मादित्यर्थः, घटवदिति । कथं पुनः स्वप्नो नैमित्तिकः ? इत्याह-यतो विहितनिमित्तः, विहितानि-"अणुय-दिट्ठचिंतिय" इत्यादिना प्रतिपादितानि निमित्तानि यस्यासौ विहितनिमित्त इति ॥ १५६ (१७०४)॥
D. C.-Existence of dream can be proved in either of these two ways :
1. Dream is full of cognizance as ghata is. So, like ghata, dream can also be perceived on account of its being existent.
2. As ghata is caused by various nimittas, dream is also caused by nemittas, like anubhavu, smarana, cintana etc. that are mentioned before. So, it is clear that dream is a mürta kārya, and hence existent like ghata. सवाभावे च कओ सुमिणोऽसुमिणो त्ति सच्चमलियं ति। गंधवपुरं पाडलिपुत्तं तत्थो वयारो ति ? ॥ १५७ ॥ (१७०५) कजं ति कारणं ति य सज्झमिणं साहणं ति कत्तं त्ति । वत्ता वयणं वच्चं परपक्खोऽयं सपक्खोऽयं ? ॥ १५८ ॥ (१७०६) किं वेह थिर-दवो-सिण-चलया-रूवित्तणाई निययाई। सद्दादओ य गज्झा सोत्ताइयाइं गहणाई ? ॥ १५९ ॥ (१७०७)

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Jinabhadra Gaại's [The fourth समया विवजओ वा सवागहणं व किं न सुपणम्मि । किं सुण्णया व सम्मं सग्गहो किं व मिच्छत्तं? ॥१६०॥(१७०८) किह स-परो-भयबुद्धी कहं च तेसिं परोप्परमसिद्धी । अह परमईए भण्णइ स-परमइविसेसणं कत्तो ? ॥१६१॥ (१७०९) Savvābhāve ca kao sumino'sumino tti saccamaliyam til Giandhavvapuram Padaliputtam tattho vayāro tti ? 1115711(1705) Kajiam ti kāranam ti ya sajjhaminam sāhanam ti katta tti i Vattā vayaņam vaccam parapakkho'yam sa-pakkho'yam?11158||(1706) Kim veha thira-davo-sina-calayā-rūvittanaim niyayāim i Saddādao ya gajjhā sottāiyāim gahanāim ? ll 159 11 ( 1707 ) Samayā vivajjao vā savvāgahanam va kim na sunnammi 1 Kim sunnayā va sammam saggaho kim va micchattam?॥160॥(1708) Kiha sa-paro-bhaya buddhî kaham ca tesim paropparamasiddhi i Aha paramate bhannai sa-paramaivisesanam katto? ॥1610 (1709) [सर्वाभावे च कुतः स्वप्नोऽस्वप्न इति सत्यमलीकमिति ।
गन्धर्वपुरं पाटलिपुत्रं तथ्य उपचार इति ॥ १५७ ॥ (१७०५) कार्यमिति कारणमिति च साध्यमिदं साधनमिति कर्तेति । वक्ता वचनं वाच्यं परपक्षोऽयं स्वपक्षोऽयम् ? ॥ १५८ ॥ (१७०६) किं वेह स्थिर-द्रवो-ष्ण-चलना-रूपित्वानि नियतानि । शब्दादयश्च प्राधाः श्रोत्रादिकानि ग्राह्याणि ? ॥ १५९ ॥ (१७०७) समता विपर्ययो वा सर्वाग्रहणं वा किं न शून्ये । किं शून्यता वा सम्यक् सद्ग्रहः किं वा मिथ्यात्वम् ? ॥१६०॥(१७०८) कथं स्व-परो भयबुद्धिः कथं च तेषां परस्परमसिद्धिः।
अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व-परमतिविशेषणं कुतः ॥ १६१ ॥ (१७०९) Sarvabhāve ca kutaḥ svapno'svapna iti satyamalîkamiti i Gandharvapuram Pataliputram tathya upacara iti ? 1115711 (1705)

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.: 215 >> Karyamiti kāraṇapiti ca sadhyamidam sadhanamiti karteti i Vaktā vacanam vācyam para pakśo'yam svapakśo'yam ?1115811(1706) Kim veha sthira-dravo-sña-calatā-rūpitvāni niyatāni i Sabdādayaśca grāhyāḥ śrotradıkāni grāhyaņi ? | 159 I (1707) Samatā viparyayo vā sarvagrahaņam vā kim na sunye i Kim šūnyatā vā samyak sadgrahaḥ kim vā mithyatyam ||16011(1701) Katham sva-paro-bhaya buddhiḥ katham ca teşām parasparamasıddhiḥ Atha para-matya bhanyate sva-para-mativisesaņam kutah ? ||16111 ]
Trans.—157-161 Again, in case of all-pervading negation how could there be distinction between dream and otherwise? between truth and false-hood ? between ( an imaginary ) Gandharva city and ( a real ) Patliputra?t between a fact and fancy? between cause and effect? between end, means, and ( their ) agent? between speaker, speech, and ( that which is ) to be spoken ? between one's own party, and the opposite party? Or, in such a case, how could (properties like ) stability, fluidity, heat, activeness etc. as well as (the rule ) that sound etc. are grāhya (to be received) and the ear etc. are grāhakas (receivers |-be ascertained at all? Or, why should (faults like ) uniformity, contraiety or non-acceptibility of all, not arise in ( the state of all-pervading ) negation ? And, is this ( apprehension of ) śünaytā really substantial or worthless ? Moreover, how could sva, para, and ubhaya be distinguished and how would their mutual accomplishment be possible ( in case of all-pervading negation )? And, if it is said to be due to another's intellect, how could the intellect of sva and para be distinguished ? ( 1705-1709 ).
टीका-सर्वाभावे च सर्वशून्यतायां चाभ्युपगम्यमानायां " स्वप्नोऽTH" "Facasqy" ştà a:-f arsi fatt:? grau: 1 791, सत्यमिदम् , अलीकं वा; तथा, गन्धर्वपुरमेतत् , पाटलीपुत्रादि चेदम् ; तथा, " तत्थो क्यारो ति" अयं तथ्यो निरुपचरितो मुख्यश्चतुष्पदविशेषः सिंहा,
+ Known as Patrā at the preseut timo.

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[ The fourth अयं त्वौपचारिको मनुष्यविशेषो माणवकः, तथा, कार्यमिदं घटादि, कारणं चेदं मृत्पिण्डादि; तथा साध्यमिदमनित्यत्वादि, साधनं कृतकत्वादि, कर्ता घटादेः कुलालादिः; तथा, अयं वक्ता, वादी, वचनं चेदं व्यवयवं पञ्चावयवं
इदं च वाच्यमभिधेयमस्य शब्दसंदर्भस्यः तथा, अयं स्वपक्षः, अयं च परपक्ष इति सर्वशून्यत्वे कुतोऽसौ विशेषो गम्यते । । " किं वेह थिरेत्यादि " पृथिव्याः स्थिरत्वम्, अपां द्रवत्वम् वह्नेरुष्णत्वम् वायोश्चलत्वम्, आकाशस्यारूपत्वमित्यादयो नियताः सर्वदैवैकस्वभावाः विशेषाः सर्वशून्यतायां कुतो गम्यन्ते । तथा, शब्दादयो ग्राह्या एव, इन्द्रियाणि च श्रोत्रादीनि ग्राहकाण्येवेति कुतो नियमसिद्धि: ? ।
•: 216:
" समयेत्यादि " ननु सर्वशून्यतायां स्वप्ना स्वप्न - सत्यालीका - दीनां विशेषनिबन्धनाभावात् समतैव कस्माद् न भवति - यादृशः स्वमः, अस्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एव; यादृशश्चास्वप्नः, स्वप्नोऽपि तादृश एवेत्यादि ? | अथवा, विपर्ययः कुतो न भवति - यः स्वप्नः सोऽस्वप्नः यस्त्वस्वप्नः स स्वप्न इत्यादि । यदिवा, सर्वेषामपि स्वप्नाऽस्वप्नादीनां सर्वथाशून्यत्वेऽग्रहणमेव कस्माद् न भवति ? | भ्रान्तिवशादेव स्वप्ना स्वप्नादिग्रहणमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् - देश-काल- स्वभावादिनैयत्येन तद्ग्राहकज्ञानोत्पत्तेः । किञ्च, इयं
न्तिः किं विद्यते, न वा । यदि विद्यते, तर्ह्यभ्युपगमविरोधः । अथ न विद्यते, तर्हि भ्रान्तेरसच्त्वाभावग्राहकज्ञानस्य निर्भ्रान्तत्वात् सन्त्येव सर्वे भावाः, न पुनः शून्यतेति । अथवा, अन्यत् पृच्छामो भवन्तम् - ननु सर्वशून्यत्वे शून्यतैव सम्यक्त्वं सतां भावानां ग्रहणं सद्ग्रहः, भावसच्चग्रहणं पुनर्मिथ्यात्वमित्यत्र कस्ते विशेषहेतुः ? |
44
.यदुक्तम्- न स्वतो भावानां सिद्धिः इत्यादि; तत्प्रतिविधानार्थमाह - " हि स परो भयेत्यादि " ननु कथं ह्रस्व-दीर्घो - भयविषये " इदं ह्रस्वम् " "इदं दीर्घम्" "एतत्तु तदुभयम्" इत्येवंभूतो स्व-परो भय बुद्धिर्युगपदाश्रीयते भवता ? कथं च तेषां ह्रस्व-दीर्घो -भयानां परस्परम सिद्धिरुधुध्यते ? - पूर्वापरविरुद्धत्वाद् नैतद् वक्तुं युज्यत इत्यर्थः । अयमत्र भावार्थ:न स्वल्पापेक्षिकमेव वस्तूनां सच्चम्, किन्तु स्वविषयज्ञानजननाद्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वमपि । ततश्च ह्रस्व-दीर्घो - भयान्यात्मविषयं चेज्ज्ञानं जनयन्ति, तदा' सन्त्येव तानि, कथं तेषामसिद्धि: ? । यदप्युक्तम् - " मध्यमाङ्गुलिमपेक्ष्य
A
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Gaṇadharavada
.: 217 ..
प्रदेशिन्यां ह्रस्वत्वमसदेवोच्यते " इत्यादिः तदप्ययुक्तम्, यतो यदि मध्यमामपेक्ष्य प्रदेशिन्यां स्वतः सर्वथाऽसत्यामपि ह्रस्वत्वं भवति, तदा विशेषाभावात् खरविषाणेऽपि तद् भवेत्, अतिदीर्घेष्विन्द्रियष्ट्यादिष्वपि च तत् स्यात् । अथवा, प्रदेशिन्याः स्वापेक्षया स्वात्मन्यपि ह्रस्वत्वं स्यात्, सर्वत्रासच्चाविशेपात्; न चैवम् । तस्मात् स्वतः सत्यामेव प्रदेशिन्यां वस्तुतोऽनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वात् तत्तत्सहकारिसंनिधौ तत्तद्रूपाभिव्यक्तेस्ततज्ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, न पुनरसत्यामेव तस्यामपेक्षामात्रत एव ह्रस्वज्ञानमुपजायते । एवं दीर्घो - भयादिष्वपि वाच्यम् ।
-
66
97
अथ इदं स्वम् " " इदं दीर्घम् " " एतच्चोभयम् " इत्यादि स्वपरो - भयबुद्धिः परमत्या - पराभ्युपगमेनोच्यते, न पुनः स्वतः सिद्धं स्वविषयज्ञानजनकं ह्रस्वादिकं किञ्चिदस्ति, अतो न कश्चित् पूर्वापरविरोध इत्यत्राह - ननु सर्वशून्यत्वे " इदं स्वमतम्, 66 एतच्च परमतम् " इत्येतदपि स्वपरभावेन विशेषणं कुतः १ न कुतश्चिदित्यर्थः, स्व- परभावेऽपि “ समया विवञ्जओ वा " इत्याद्येवावर्तत भावः । स्व- परभावाद्यभ्युपगमे च शून्यस्वाभ्युपगमहानिरिति ॥ १५७ - १५८- १५९-१६०-१६१ ॥ ( १७०५१७०६ - १७०७-१७०८ - १७०९ ) ।।
66
D. C.-If the idea of all-pervading negation were taken as true, there would not exist any distinction between dream and reality; truth and falsehood; between an imaginary Gandharvapura and a real Pataliputra; between a natural four-legged lion and an artificial man-lion Manavaka; between karyas like ghata, etc. and karanas like lump of earth etc. Again, there would be no distinction between sādhya ( say, e. g. anityutva) sadhana (say, e. g. the artificial instrument-by means of which anatyatva is brought about ) and kartā (e. g. a potter) who is the doer of the sadhya. There would be no distinction between a speaker, his speech (composed of three or five parts) and a number of words that are to be uttered, and there would be no distinction between svapaksa and parapaksa also.
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[The fourth
Moreover, properties such as stability of earth, fluidity of water, activeness of wind, formlessness of sky etc. as well as the rule that sabda, rūpa, gandha etc. are grahya and ears, eyes, nose etc. are grahaka, could not be established in the midst of sarvas'ünyatā.
Again, in the midst of all-pervading negation there being no possibility of distinction between satya and asatya either (1) there would be uniform apprehension of svapna as well as asvapna, or ( 2 ) there would be inverse apprehension of svapna as asvapna and asvapna as svapna, or ( 3 ) there would be absolute non-apprehension of svapna, asvapna and many other things. Here, o Vyakta ! It is absolutely incorrect to assert that the apprenhension of svapna, asvapna etc. is due to bhrāntı ( delusion). For, cognizance that apprehends an object is produced only by means of definite ascertainment of time, place and properties.
And is that bhrānts, which, according to you, apprehends svapna, asvapna, etc., vidyamana or a-vidyamāna? If it is vidyamāna, then naturally sarvas'ünyatā does not exist. If it is a-vidyamāna the jnana that apprehends an object being devoid of bhrānti, all objects would automatically be taken as vidyamāna and there would be nothing like sarvas'ünyatā at all.
And, how is it 0 Vyakťa ! that the apprehension of existent objects as sūnya, is, according to you, a right apprehension and that which apprehends them as vidyamāna is worthless? Will you tell me what particular purpose do you hold in believing this sarvašūnyatā ?
According to the rule that objects could never be accomplished merely by themselves, you apprehend objects that are short, long, or either, distinctly as short, long, or either. Thus, on one side, you are utilizing your power of discrimination in the apprehension of objects; while on the other side, you are trying to assert the mutual non-accomplishment of those very

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.: 219 : objects. This involves self-contradiction in your own argument which, o Vyakta ! is not at all worthy of you.
The point is that in case of establishing the existence of objects mere apekṣā would not do. Quality of undertaking an action in an object which produces jnana about its own self is also an active cause. And that is the reason why hrasva, dîrgha, and ubhaya-each one of which would be producing jnāna about its own self-should be taken as existing.
Again, o Vyakta ! you believe that to the apeksā of the middle finger, the pradesini finger is considered as hrasva even if it does not exist. But your argument is absolutely unfounded. For, in comparision with the middle finger if pradesinî were taken as hrasva even though it is a-vidyamana by its very nature, the horns of an ass that are also a-vidyamāna should be taken as hrasva and a very long substance like indradhvaja should also be taken as hrasva as the quality of a-vidyamanatā is common in all the three cases. But that is not so. Really speaking, pradesine finger being vidyamana by nature and being possessed of a number of properties by virtue of various co-operative causes, manifests manifold variations along with the corresponding types of cognizance also. So it is not correct to assert that the cognizance of hrasva, dîrgha etc. is produced in the absolutely non-existent anguli only by means of apekşă. You might argue at this point that in such cases also, dîrgha, hrasva, ubkaya eto. are apprehended and the intellects as regards sva para and wbhaya are discriminated only in comparision with another's opinion and further that according to you, hrasva, dîrgha etc. that are svatah, siddha and that produce jnana with regard to their own selves are nothing at all. Even if you believe like that, o Vyakta! how would you distinguish between your opinion and another's opinion in the midst of all-pervading negation ? Naturally there would be no distinction between sva and para at all. On the other hand, if you accept this distinction there would be nothing like sunyata at all. (1705-1709 )

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth जुगवं कमेण वा ते विण्णाणं होज दीह-हस्सेसु । जइ जुगवं कावेक्खा कमेण पुवम्मि काऽवेक्खा ?॥१६२॥(१७१०) आइमविण्णाणं वा जं बालस्सेह तस्स काऽवेक्खा । तुल्लेसु व काऽवेक्खा परोप्परं लोयणदुगे व ? ॥ १६३ ॥(१७११) Jugavan kamena vā te vinnānam hojja dîha-hassesu i Jai jugavam kāvekkhā kamena puvvammi kā’vekkhā ? 1116211 (1710) Āimaviņnānam vā jam bālasseha tassa kā’vekkhā , Tullesu va kā’vekkhā paropparam loyanaduge vya ? 1116311 (1711)
[ युगपत् क्रमेण वा ते विज्ञानं भवेद् दीर्घ-इस्वयोः । यदि युगपत् काऽपेक्षा क्रमेण पूर्वस्मिन् काऽपेक्षा ? ॥१६२॥(१७१०) आदिमविज्ञानं वा यद् बालस्येह तस्य काऽपेक्षा ।
तुल्ययोर्वा काऽपेक्षा परस्परं लोचनद्विक इव ॥ १६३ ॥ (१७११) Yugapat krameņa vă te vijnānam bhaved drîgha-hrasvayoh 1 Yadi yugapat ka'peksa kramena pārvasmin ka peksa ? ||1621(1710) Adimavijñānam vā yad bālasyeha tasya ka’peksa i Tulyayorvā kā’pekşā parasparam locanadvika iva ? 1116311 (1711)]
Trans.-162-163 Is that vijnana of yours as regards dirgha and hrasva (produced ) all at once or in regular course? If (it is produced ) all at once, what apeksā ( is there ) ? (And) if ( it is produced ) in regular course, to what apeksā is the first produced ? Or, to what apeksā has the first and foremost cognizance of a child been produced ? Or, what mutual apeksā ( could there be ) in the case of two similar (objects) like a pair of eyes ? ( 1710-1711)
टीका-ननु मध्यमा-प्रदेशिन्यादिदीर्घ-इस्वयोस्तवाभिप्रायेण स्वाकारप्रतिभासि ज्ञानं किं युगपदेव भवेत् , क्रमेण वा ? यदि युगपत् तहिं परानपेक्षं द्वयोरपि युगपदेव स्वप्रतिभासिनि ज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् कस्य किल

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Gaṇadharavada
.: 221 :.
काsपेक्षा ? | अथ क्रमेण तदापि पूर्वमेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन परानपेक्षमेव स्वस्य प्रदेशिन्यादेर्गृहीतत्वादुत्तरस्मिन् मध्यमादिके दीर्घे काऽपेक्षा ? | तस्माच्चक्षुरादिसामग्री सद्भावे परानपेक्षमेव स्वकीयविविक्तरूपेण सर्वभावानां स्वज्ञाने प्रतिभासात् स्वत एव सिद्धिः । अथवा, बालस्य तत्क्षणमेव जातस्य शिशोर्यदिह नयनोन्मेषानन्तरमेवादौ विज्ञानम्, तत् किमपेक्ष्य प्रादुरस्ति १ । यदि वा, ये न ह्रस्वे नापि दीर्घे, किन्तु परस्परं तुल्ये एव वस्तुनी, तयोर्यु - गपदेव स्वप्रतिभासिना ज्ञानेन गृह्यमाणयोः काऽन्योन्यापेक्षा ? - न काचित्, यथा तुल्यस्य लोचनयुग्मस्य । तस्मादङ्गुल्यादिपदार्थानां नान्यापेक्षमेव रूपम्, किन्तु स्वप्रतिभासवता ज्ञानेनान्यनिरपेक्षा एव ते स्वरूपतोऽपि गृह्यन्ते । उत्तरकालं तु तत्तद्रूपजिज्ञासायां तत्तत्प्रतिपक्षस्मरणादिसहकारिकारणान्तरबशाद् दीर्घ-हस्वादिव्यपदेशाः प्रवर्तन्ते इति स्वतः सिद्धा एव सन्ति भावा इति ।। ( १७१० - १७११ ) ।।
D. C-Consider whether jñana in case of objects that are hrasva and dirgha is produced at the same time or in regular course. If both the pñanas are produced simultaneously, there would be no scope for apeksa, both being recognized in their own form at the same time. On the other hand, if jnanas of the two were produced one after another the hrasva object would be apprehended by virtue of its own jñana; but later on, to whose apekṣa would the dirgha object be apprehended? This leads us to conclude that in spite of the existence of mediums like eyes etc., in absence of apeksā all objects are apprehended in various forms only by virtue of their individual jnanas. This proves that the existence of all objects is very natural.
Again, to whose apekṣa is the jñana attained by a child immediately after its birth produced? And, what mutual apeksa could there exist in reflecting a similar cognizance in two similar objects which are neither hrasva nor dirgha but exactly identical to each other? This shows that various forms of objects like fingers etc. are not apprehended by

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
virtue of their apekṣā to others but by means of their corresponding cognizances which are independent of apeksa. Later on, in the curiosity of observing the forms in details, the objects are recognized as hrasva, dirgha etc., on account of certain co-operative causes such as recalling the opposite faction etc. Each and every object would therefore be taken as existent by virtue of no other factor but its own svabhava.
Moreover,
किं हसाओ दी दीहाओ चैव किं न दीहम्मि |
कीस व न खपुष्फाउ किं न खपुष्फे खपुष्फाओ ? ॥ १६४ ॥
Kim hassão dîhe dîhão ceva kim no dîhammi
Kîsa va na khapupphāu kim na khapupphe khapupphão ?||164||(1712) [ किं ह्रस्वाद् दीर्घे दीर्घादेव किं न दीर्घे ।
कस्माद् वा न खपुष्पात् किं न खपुष्पे खपुष्पात् १ || १६४|| (१७१२)
Kim hrasvad dirghe dirghadeva kim na dîrghe Kasmād vā na khapuspat kim na khapuşpe khapuspat ? || 164 (1712) ]
Trans. -- 164 Why ( is the knowledge ) about dirgha ( acquired ) from hrasva and not from dirgha ( itself ) ? Or, why not from khapuspa ? Or, why not ( the knowledge ) about khapuspa ( acquired ) from khapuspa ( itself ) ? ( 1712)
"
टीका- हन्त ! यदि सर्वशून्यता, ततः किमिति इस्वादेव प्रदेशिनीप्रभृतिद्रव्याद् दीर्घे मध्यमादिद्रव्ये दीर्घज्ञानाभिधानव्यवहारः प्रवर्ततेदीर्घापेक्ष एव दीर्घेन ज्ञानाभिधानेन व्यवहारः किं न प्रवर्तते, असच्चाविशेषात् ? इति भावः । एवं " किं दीहाओ हस्से हस्साउ चेव किं न हस्सम्मि इत्येतदपि द्रष्टव्यम् । तथा, किमिति वा न खपुष्पाद् दीर्घे ह्रस्वे वा तज्झानाभिधानव्यवहृतिर्विधीयते । तथा, असच्चाविशेषत एव किमिति खपुष्पात् ? पुष्प एव ह्रस्व-दीर्घज्ञानादिव्यवहारो न प्रवर्तते १ । न चैवम्, तस्मात् सन्त्येव भावाः, न तु शून्यता जगत इति ॥ १६४ ( १७१२ ) ।।

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D. C.-If everything is s'ünya according to the theory of sarva s'ünyata, how is it that the cognizance of dirgha is acquired only from its apeksa to hrasva as seen in the case of prades'inî and madhyamā fingers, and not from its apeksā to the dargha itself ? Similarly, why is the practice of apprehending dîrghatva from dîrgha and hrasvatva from hrasva not followed ? Moreover, the practice of acquiring knowledge of khapuspa as well as the knowledge of hrasvatva and dîrghatva in khapuspa from the khapuspa itself is not followed even though s'ünyatā is common to all of them. This shows that there is nothing like sarvas'ünyata in this world.
Moreover, किं वाऽविक्खाए चिय होज मई व सभाव एवायं । सो भावो त्ति सभावो वंझापुत्ते न सो जुत्तो ॥१६५॥ (१७१३) Kim vā’vikkhāe ciya hojia maî ya sabhāva evāyam | So bhāvo tti sabhāvo vanjhāputte na so jutto # 165 11 ( 1713 ) [किंवापेक्षयैव भवेद् मतिर्वा स्वभाव एवायम् । .
स्वो भाव इति स्वभावो वन्ध्यापुत्रे न स युक्तः ॥ १६५ ॥ (१७१३) Kimvāpekşayaiva bhaved matirvā svabhāva evayam Svo bhava iti svabhavo vandhyaputre na sa yuktah ॥165॥ ( 17 13)]
____ Trans.-165 Or, of what avail is the apeksa at all ? ( The opponent may argue here that ) “ Apprehension by means of apeksā is natural.” ( But) the bhāva ( existence ) of sva ( one's own self ) means svabhāva; ( and ) that does not apply to the son of a barren woman. ( 1713) ।
टीका-अथवा, सर्वस्याप्येसत्त्वे इस्वादेर्दीर्वाद्यपेक्षयापि किं कर्तव्यम् , शून्यताप्रतिकूलत्वात् तस्याः, घटाद्यर्थसत्त्ववत् ? । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्स्वभावादेवापेक्षयैव इस्व-दीर्घादिव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोगमर्हति; तथा चोक्तम्-" अग्निर्दहति नाकाशं कोऽत्र पयनुयुज्यताम् १"

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[The fourth इति । हन्त ! इत्थमपि हतोऽसि, यत स्वो भावः स्वभावस्ततः स्व- परभावाभ्युपगमात् शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः । न च वन्ध्यापुत्र कल्पानामर्थानां स्वभाव - परिकल्पना युक्तेति । भवतु वाऽपेक्षा, तथापि शून्यताऽसिद्धिः || १६५ ॥ ( १७१३ ) ॥
D. C—If there is absolute negation in the world, what is the use of apekṣa in apprehending hrasva etc. to the apekṣā of dirgha etc.? For, the very conception of apekṣā is contrary to the absolute negation.
Vyakta :—Apprehending hrasva, dirgha etc. by means of apekṣa is very natural.
"
root cause in cases
Acarya: :-— That is not so, O Vyakta ! Svabhāva is the like fire burns " "The sky does not burn etc. But, that is not applicable to the above-named example of the apprehension of hrasva, dirgha etc. Hence, svabhava should not be blamed in such cases. It is absurd to assume svabhāva in the apprehension of non-existent objects like vandhyāputra.
Svabhava means existence of one's own self. The rest can be distinguished as parabhava-the existence of everything else. Apart from your belief in apekṣa, the principle of sarvas'unyata would be violated even from this point of view.
How ?
होज्जावेक्खाओ वा विण्णाणं वाभिहाणमेत्तं वा ।
दीहं ति व हस्संति व न उसत्ता सेसधम्मा वा ॥ १६६ ॥ (१७१४)
Hojjāvekkhāo vā vinṇānam vābhihānamettam vā
Dîham ti va hassam ti va na u sattā sesadhammā vā ||166|| (1714)
[ भवेदपेक्षातो वा विज्ञानं वाभिधानमात्रं वा ।
दीर्घमिति वा इस्वमिति वा न तु सत्ता शेषधर्मा वा || १६६ || (१७१४)

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Bhaveda pekṣāto vā vijnanam vābhidhānamatram vă i Dirghamiti vá hrasvamiti vā na tu sattă seşadharmā vā 1116611]
___Trans.-166 By means of apeksa either vijnana. or mere acknowledgment ( of an object ) as short or long would be ( attained ) but not the existence of the rest of the properties. ( 1714 )
टीका-अथवा, स्वतः सिद्धे वस्तुन्यपेक्षातो भवेत् । किम् ? इत्याहविज्ञानमभिधानमात्रं वा। केनोल्लेखेन ? इत्याह-" दीर्घम्" इति वा ." इस्वम्" इति वेति । किं पुनर्न भवेत् ? इत्याह-न त्वन्यापेक्षया वस्तूनां सत्ता भवति, नाप्यापेक्षिकहस्व-दीर्घत्वादिधर्मेभ्यः शेषा रूप-रसादयो धर्मा अन्यापेक्षया सिद्ध्यन्ति । उत्पद्यन्ते च वस्तुसत्ताग्राहकाणि, रूपादिधर्मग्राहकाणि च ज्ञानानि । अतोऽन्यापेक्षाभावतः कथं स्वतः सिद्धस्य वस्तुसत्तादेरभावः ?, तत्सद्भावे च कथं शून्यता जगतः ? इति ॥१६६(१७१४)।।
D. C.-By virtue of its apeksā to another object, a selfaccomplished object would gain either vijñāna or the acknowledgment of its own self as hrasvu or dargha and nothing more. Neither existence nor qualities such as rūpa, rasa, sparsa etc., that are distinct from hrasvatva, dirghatva etc. could be established by the help of apeksā. Now, jñanas that enable us to apprehend existence along with those qualities are produced spontaneously. So, how could existence etc. of a self-accomplished object be refuted by means of apeksā ? And when the existence etc. of an object are not denied, how could the principle of all-pervading negation be accepted
at all ?
इहरा हस्साभावे सबविणासो हवेज दीहस्स । न य सो, तम्हा सत्तादयोऽणविक्खा घडाईणं ॥१६७॥(१७१५) Iharā hassābhāve sayvaviņāso havejja dîhassa 1 Na ya so, tamhā sattādayo'navikkhā ghadāîņam 11 167 11 ( 1715)

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: 226 :.. Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth [ इतरथा ह्रस्वाभावे सर्वविनाशो भवेद् दीर्घस्य ।
न च सः, तसात् सत्तादयोऽनपेक्षा घटादीनाम् ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५) Itaratha hrasvabhāve sarvavinášo bhaved dirghasya i Na ca sah, tasmāt sattādayo'napeksă ghatādinām 1116711 (1715)]
Trans.--167 Otherwise, in the absence of hrasva, there should have been an absolute negation of dirgha also. But that is not so. Hence the existence etc. of ghata etc. are ( established as ) independant of ( their ) apeksa. ( to other objects ). ( 1715)
टीका-इतरथा-यदि घटादीनां सत्तादयोऽप्यन्यापेक्षया भवेयुः, तदा इस्वाभावे इस्वस्य सर्वविनाशे दीर्घस्यापि वस्तुनः सर्वविनाशः स्यात् , इस्वसत्तापेक्षित्वाद् दीर्घसत्तादीनाम् । न चैवमसौ दीर्घस्य सर्वविनाशो दृश्यते । तसात् निश्चीयते-सन्त्यन्यानपेक्षा एव घटादीनां सत्ता-रूपादयो धर्माः, तत्सत्वे चापास्ता शून्यतेति ॥ १६७ ॥ (१७१५) ॥
D. C.-If the qualities like existence etc. of the objects such as ghata etc., were dependant upon their comparision with other objects, destruction of a hrasva object would have effected the destruction of a dîrgha object also. But really speaking, existence etc. of a dîrgha object are not denied when a hrasva object turns into an absolute negation. This leads us to the conclusion that objects like ghata etc. have their properties such as existence, rūpa, etc., totally independant of their apeksā to other objects and hence the idea of allpervading negation is automatically refuted जावि अविक्खाऽविक्खणमविक्खगोऽविक्खणिज्जमणविक्ख । सा न मया सवेसु वि संतेसु न सुन्नया नाम ॥१६८॥ (१७१६) किंचि सओ तह परओ तदुभयओ किंचि निच्चसिद्धं पि । जलओ घडओ पुरिसो तहं ववहारओ नेयं ॥१६९॥ (१७१७)

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निच्छयओ पुण बाहिरनिमित्तमेत्तोवओगओ सवं । होइ सओ जमभावो न सिज्झइ निमित्तभावे वि ॥ १७० ॥
•: 227 :
Jāvi avikkhā'vikkhaṇamavikkhago' vikkhanijjamaṇavikkha Sā na mayā savvesu vi santesu na sunnayā nāma ॥ 168 (1716)
Kim ci sao taha parao tadubhayao kim ci niccasiddham pi Jalao ghadao puriso taham vavahārao neyam || 169 ॥ ( 1717)
Nicchayao puna bāhiranimittamettovao-gao savvam | Hoi sao jamabhāvo na sijjhai nimittabhāve vi ॥ 170 ॥ ( 1718 ) [ याऽप्यपेक्षाsपेक्षणमपेक्षको पेक्षणीयमनपेक्ष्य ।
सा न मता सर्वेष्वपि सत्सु न शून्यता नाम ॥ १६८ ॥ ( १७१६ ) किञ्चित् स्वतस्तथा परतस्तदुभयतः किञ्चिद् नित्यसिद्धिमपि । जलदो घटकः पुरुषस्तथा व्यवहारतो ज्ञेयम् ॥ १६९ ॥ ( १७१७ ) निश्चयतः पुनर्वहिर्निमित्तमात्रोपयोगतः सर्वम् ।
भवति स्वतो यदभावो न सिध्यति निमित्तभावेऽपि ॥ १७० ॥ ( १७१८)
YĀ'pyapeksa’peksanamapeksako'peksaniyamanapeksya | Sā na matd sarvesvapi satsu na śūnyatā năma | 168 || ( 1716 ) Kimcit svatastatha paratastadubhayataḥ kimcid nityasiddhamapi | Jalado ghatakah purusastathā vyavaharato jñeyam ||169॥ ( 1717)
Niścayataḥ punar-bahir-nimittamatropayogatah sarvam i Bhavati svato yadabhāvo na sidhyati nimittabhāve 'pi ||170|(1718) ]
Trans.—168–169-170 Even apeksā-being identical to ( the nature of ) action ( apeksanam ), agent ( apeksakah ), and object (apeksaniyam)-could not be accepted. When all are existing there could not be sūnyata at all. Some are spontaneous e. g. a cloud; some (are produced) by means of others as in the case of ghata; and Some (are produced) in both the ways. e. g. a man; while some are produced even for ever. Again, it is certain that each one ( of them ) becomes existent by its own self only by resorting to the external

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causes. ( But) that which is non-existent is not produced even in the presence of external causes. ( 1716-1717-1718)
___टीका-याऽपीयं इस्वादेर्दीर्घाद्यपेक्षा साऽप्यपेक्षणं क्रियारूपम् ; तथा, अपेक्षकं कर्तारम, अपेक्षणीयं च कर्म, अनपेक्ष्य न मता-न विदुषां सम्मता। ततः किम् ? इत्याह-एतेषु चापेक्षणा-ऽपेक्षका-ऽपेक्षणीयेषु सर्वेषु वस्तुषु सत्सु न काचित् शून्यता नाम । अतोऽपेक्षकादिसवलक्षणे विपक्ष एवापेक्षालक्षणस्य हेतोवृत्तत्वाद् विरुद्धत्वमिति ॥ १६८॥ (१७१६)॥
टीका-इह किञ्चित् स्वत एव सिद्ध्यति, यथा कर्तृनिरपेक्षस्तत्कारणद्रव्यसंघातविशिष्टपरिणामरूपो जलदः । किञ्चित्तु परतः, यथा कुलालकर्तृको घटः । किञ्चिदुभयतः, यथा माता-पितृभ्यां स्वकृतकर्मतश्च पुरुषः। किञ्चिद् नित्यसिद्धमेव, यथाऽऽकाशम् । एतच्च व्यवहारनयापेक्षया द्रष्टव्यम् । निश्चयतस्तु बाह्य निमित्तमात्रमेवाश्रित्य सर्वं वस्तु स्वत एव सिध्यति, यद् यस्माद् बाह्य निमित्तसद्भावेऽपि खरविषाणादिरूपोऽभावः कदाचिदपि न सिध्यति। उभयनयमतं च सम्यक्त्वमिति ॥१६९-१७० (१७१७-१७१८)। ___D. C.-Consideration of dirgha etc. in comparision with hrasva etc., is itself nothing but kartā, karma and kriyā. Now, when all objects are accomplished as existent by virtue of their being either karta, karma or kriya, where could the s'ünyata exist at all ?
The existence of all objects is either svatah, paratah, or ubhayataḥ. There are several objects such as cloud etc. which come into being only by coming into contact with some substance as their karana; some like ghata are produced by the help of kartā, some like puruşa are produced by both (as purusa comes into existence on account of his parents as well as his deeds in the past life ). Some objects like ākasa are ever accomplished. Thus, it is seen that various objects come into existence in various ways, according to their usage. But really speaking, all objects are existing by their very svabhāva merely by resorting to their external causes. In case of objects that are non-existent, existence could not be brought

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about even if the external causes were present because nonexistence is innate in them by their very svabhāva.
.: 229 :.
In reply to the question whether astitva and ghata are one or different, the Acarya argues thus:
अत्थित्त - घडेगाणेगया य पज्जायमेत्तचितेयं ।
अस्थि घडे पडिवन्ने, इहरा सा किं न खरसिंगे ? ॥ १७१ ॥ (१७१९ )
Atthitta-ghaḍegāṇegaya ya pajjāyamettacinteyam Atthi ghade padivanne, iharā sā kim na kharasinge ? ॥171॥ (1719)
[ अस्तित्व - घटैकानेकता वा पर्यायमात्रचिन्तेयम् ।
अस्ति घटे प्रतिपन्ने, इतरथा सा किं न खरशृङ्गे ।। १७१ ।। (१७१९ ) । Astitva-ghaṭaikanekatā vā paryāyamātracinteyam | Asti ghate pratipanne, itarathā sā kim na kharaśrige ॥ 171 ॥ ]
Trans. – 171 ( The question ) whether ghata and astitva are one or different is (nothing but the question) of synonym when ghata is existent. (For,) otherwise why should it not arise in case of kharaśrnga ( also ) ? ( 1719 )
टीका - इह " अस्ति घटो न तु नास्ति " इत्येवं पतिपन्ने सति तदनन्तरमेवास्तित्व- घटयोः " किमेकता, अनेकता वा ? " इत्यादिना घटास्तित्वयोरकत्वाऽनेकत्वलक्षणपर्याय मात्रचिन्तैव भवता कृता भवति, न तु तयोरभावः सिध्यति । अन्यथा ह्यभावरूपाविशेषाद् यथा घटा -ऽस्तित्वयोः, एवं खरविषाण - वन्ध्यापुत्रयोरप्येकत्वा - ऽनेकत्वचिन्ता भवतः किं न प्रवर्तते इति ।। १७१ ( १७१९ ) ॥
66
D. C.-After having asserted that ghata exists" the question whether ghata and astitva are identical or not is reduced to the consideration of both as being mere synonyms of each other. Moreover, this question should arise only in case of the existent ghata. For, if it were not so, the question of ekata-anekata would arise in case of non-existent objects like kharasṛnga and vandhyaputra also.

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Following the example of ghata and astitva there would be a probability of ekata-anekatā between ghata and sūnyatā also घड-सुन्नयनयाए वि सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म !। एगत्ते घडओ च्चिय न सुण्णया नाम घडधम्मो ! ॥१७२॥(१७२०) Ghada-sunnaynnayāe vi sunnayā kā ghadāhiyā sommall Egatte ghadao cciya na sunnaya nāma ghadadhammo! ॥1720 (1720) [घट-शून्यतान्यतायामपि शून्यता का घटाधिका सौम्य !।
एकत्वे घटक एव न शून्यता नाम घटधर्मः ! ॥ १७२ ॥ (१७२०)॥ Gbața-šūnyatanyatāyāmapi śūnyatā ka ghatadhikā saumya !! Ekatve ghataka eva na śūnyatā nāma ghatadharmaḥ ! || 172 11 ]
Trans.-172 Even in case of ghata and sūnyatā being different ( from each other ) what sūnyatā, exceeding ghata could be ( found ), O Saumya ? In case of similarity also, it is the ghata itself (which exists ). Sūnyatā does never become the property of ghata ( 1720 )
टीका-ननु घट-शून्यतयोरप्यन्यता, अनन्यता वा ?। यद्यन्यता, तर्हि " सुन्नया का घडाहिया सोम्म ! ति" सौम्य व्यक्त ! शून्यता का घटाधिका नाम ?-ननु घटमात्रमेव पश्यामः, न पुनः क्वचित् शून्यता घटादधिका समीक्ष्यते । अथानन्यता, तथापि सति घटशून्यत्वयोरेकत्वे घट एवासौ युज्यते, प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलभ्यमानत्वात् , न तु शून्यत्वं नाम कश्चित् तद्धर्मः, सर्वप्रमाणैरनुपलब्धेरिति ॥ १७१२ (१७२०)॥
D. C.-If ghata and sūnyatā are bhinna from each other, exceeding ghata what more sunyata ! is required, O saumya ? In case of both being similar to each other, sūnyatā would be nothing but ghata on account of its being perceived by pratyakışa pramāna. Byt sūnyatā would never become a property of ghata as it could never be accomplished by any possible means whatsoever.
Moreover,

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:231:. विण्णाण-वयण-वाईणमेगया तो तदत्थिया सिद्धा । अण्णत्ते अण्णाणी निव्वयणो वा कहं वाई ? ॥१७३॥ (१७२१) Vinnāna-vayana-vāînamegayā to tadatthiyā siddhā i Annatte annani nivvayano va kaham vai ? || 173 ॥ ( 1721 ) [विज्ञान-वचन-वादिनोरेकता ततस्तदस्तिता सिद्धा ।
अन्यत्वेऽज्ञानी निर्वचनो वा कथं वादी ? ॥ १७३ ॥ (१७२१ ) Vijñāna-vacana -vadinore katā tatastadastitā siddhā 1 Anyatve'jñāni nirvacano vă katham vadî ? || 173 11 ( 1721)]
Trans.--173 ( If ) knowledge and speech are identical, then its existence is proved. ( But ) in case of difference, how could there be a disputant having no khowledge or speech ? ( 1721 ).
____टीका-" शून्यं सर्वमेव विश्वत्रयम्" इत्येवंभूतं यद्विज्ञानं वचनं च, तेन सह शून्यवादिनो भवत एकत्वम्, अनेकत्वं वा ? योकत्वम् , ततस्तदस्तिता वस्त्वस्तिता सिद्धेति कुतः शून्यता, वृक्षत्व-शिंशपात्वयोरिवैकत्वस्य वस्तुत्वात् ? । अन्यत्वे तु विज्ञान-वचनयोरज्ञानी निर्वचनश्च वादी कथं शून्यतां साधयेत् , शिलासंघातवत् ? इति ॥ १७३ (१७२१)॥ ____D. C.-When the knowledge as well as the statement that all the three worlds are sunya are indentical to each other the existence-and not the sunyta-of an object is established. For, their identity is similar to the identity of vriksatva and sinsapātva. But when vijnana and vacana are dissimilar the disputant will either become ignorant or speechless like a rock and hence will be totally unfit to expound the theory of šūnyatā. घडसत्ता घडधम्मो तत्तोऽणण्णो पडाइओ भिण्णो । आत्थि त्ति तेण भणिए को घड एवेति नियमोऽयं ॥१७॥(१७२२) Ghadasattā gladadhammo tatto'ịanno padalo bhiņno i Atthi tti tena bhanie ko ghada eveti niyamo'yam ? ॥1740 (1722)

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[ घटसत्ता घटधर्मस्ततोऽनन्यः पटादितो भिन्नः ।
अस्तीति तेन भणिते को घट एवेति नियमोऽयम् ? ॥१७४॥ (१७२२)
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Ghaṭasatta ghaṭadharmastato'nanyah patadito bhinnaḥ Astiti tena bhanite ko ghata eveti niyamo 'yam ? ॥174|| (1722) ]
Trans.—174 Existence of ghata is a property of ghata. So, ( it is ) non-separable ( from ghata ) ( and ) distinct from pata etc. By saying, therefore, that “It exists how could you frame a rule that there exists ghata alone ? ( 1722 )
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टीका - घटास्तित्वलक्षणा घटसत्ता घटस्य धर्मः, स च ततो घटादनन्योऽभिन्नः, पटादिभ्यस्तु सर्वेभ्योऽपि भिन्नः । तेन ततो " घटोऽस्ति " इति भणिते 'घट एव ' इति " घट एवास्ति " इति कोऽयं नियम :निज निजसत्ताया: पटादिष्वपि भावात् तेऽपि सन्त्येवेति भावः ॥ ९७४ ॥ ( १७२२ ) ॥
D. C.-Astitva is the property of ghata and hence it is non-separable from ghata but distinct from objects like puta etc. So, when it is said that “ ghata exists " you cannot assert that ghata alone exists. For, the property of astitva is present in objects like pata also and hence they too are existing.
जं वा जदत्थि तं तं घडो त्ति सवघडयापसंगो को । भणिए घोत्थि व कहं सवत्थित्तावरोहो त्ति ? ॥१७५॥ (१७२३)
Jam va jadatthi tam tam ghado tti savvaghaḍayāpasango ko | Bhanie ghadotthi va kahams avvatthittāvaroho tti? u175u (1723)
[ यद्वा यदस्ति तत्तद् घट इति सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः कः ।
भणिते घटोsस्ति वा कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोध इति ? || १७५ || (१७२३) Yadva yadasti tattad ghata iti sarvaghatataprasangaḥ kaḥ Bhanite ghato'sti vā katham sarvāstitvāvarodha iti ? ॥175॥ ( 1728) ]
Trans.- 175 Or, by saying that whatever exists is ghata, how would the occasion of all being ghata arise? Or, by

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:233 : asserting that ghața exists, how would the existence of all be obstructed ? ( 1723 ).
____टीका-" यद् वा प्रोक्तम्-यद् यदस्ति तत्तत् सर्व घटः" इति, तत्र कोऽयं सर्वघटताप्रसङ्गः । तथा, “ यो घटः स एवास्ति" इत्यप्युक्ते कथं सर्वास्तित्वावरोधः-कथं घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वम् ? इत्यर्थः । यदा हि घटसत्ता घट एवास्ति नान्यत्र, तदा " यत्र यत्र घटास्तित्वं तत्र तत्र घटः" इति न कश्चित् सर्वेषां घटताप्रसङ्गः, तथा, “ घटसत्वेन घट एवास्ति" इत्येतस्मिनप्युक्ते न किञ्चिद् घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्वं प्रतीयत इति भावः ॥ १७५ ।। (१७२३)॥
D. C.--Since the astrtva of ghata is restricted to ghata only and since ghata exists only when ghatāstitva is present there would be no fear of all objects being considered as ghata when we say that "yad yad asti, tat-tat sarvam ghatak”. Again, astatva of other objects would not be injured by the assertion that ghata exists. For, the all-pervading nature of ghata is not apprehended when we say "ghatasattvena ghata eva asts.” 175 (1723).
After refuting the opponent's view in this way the Ācārya is now asserting his ownअस्थि त्ति तेण भणिए घडोऽघडो वा घडो उ अत्थेव । चूओऽचूओ व दुमो चूओ उ जहा दुमोनियमा॥१७६॥(१७२४) Atthi tti tena bhaạie ghado’ghado vā ghado u attheva 1 Cūo'cūo va dumo cūo u jahā dumo niyamā 11 176 11 ( 1724 ) [अस्तीति तेन भणिते घटोऽघटो वा घटस्त्वस्त्येव ।।
चूतोऽचूतो वा द्रुमश्चूतस्तु यथा दुमो नियमात् ।। १७६ ।। ( १७२४) Astîti tena bhaạite ghato'ghato vă ghatastvastyeva i Cūto'cūto vá drumaścūtastu yathā drumo niyamāt 017611 (1724) |
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Trans.-176 Just as from the assertion of "tree" (we understand ) a mango tree or any other tree, but from “ mango tree ( nothing else but ) "tree" is understood, in the same way, by saying that “ it exists", ghata or (objects) other than ghata ( are appreheded ), but from ghata, astitva alone is understood ( 1724 )
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टीका - येन कारणेन घटसत्ता घटधर्मत्वाद् घट एवास्ति पटादिभ्यस्तु भिन्ना, तेन तस्मात् अस्ति इत्युक्ते घटः, अघटो वा - पटादिर्गम्यते, निजनिजसच्चस्य सर्वेषु पटादिष्वपि भावात् । " घडो उ अत्थेव त्ति ፃ घट इति तु प्रोक्तेऽस्त्येवेति गम्यते, निजसत्त्वस्य नियमेन घटे सद्भावात् । अत्र यथासंख्यमुदाहरणद्वयम् । यथा द्रुमः इत्युक्ते चूतः, अचूतो वा निम्बादिर्गम्यते, द्रुमत्वस्य सर्वत्र भावात् 1 चूत: " इति तु निगदिते द्रुम एव गम्यते, अद्रुमस्य चूतत्वायोगादिति || १७६ ( १७२४ ) ॥
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D. C.-As the quality of vriksatva is present in all the trees, when we say tree "all the trees-whether a mango tree or any other tree-are understood. But when the word " mango tree is spoken, vriksatva alone is understood. For, the mango tree cannot exist without being a vriksa. Similarly, here also, existence of ghata being the quality of ghata, is present in ghata only and nowhere else, while the common property of astitva is present in all objects. So, when we say 'aste', all objects whether ghata or pata-are recognized as each one of them has its own property of existence. But when we say "C ghata' astitva alone is apprehended, because ghata has its own satta.
Now, the Acarya replies to the argument that what has already been.produced, could not be produced and so on
किं तं जायं ति मई जायाऽजाओ भयं पि जदजायं । अह जायं पि न जायं किं न खपुष्फे वियारोऽयं ॥ १७७॥ (१७२५)
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Kim tam jāyam ti maî jāyā'jão-bhayam pi jadajāyam |
Aha jāyam pi na jāyam kim na khapupphe viyāro 'yam || 177 (1725)

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[किं तजातमिति मतिर्जाता-जातो-भयमपि यद्यजातम् ।।
अथ जातमपि न जातं किं न खपुष्पे विचारोऽयम् ॥१७७॥ (१७२५) । Kim tajjātaniti matir-jata’jāto -bhayamapı yadyajātami Atha jātamapi na jātam kim na khapuspe vicãro'yam ||17711 (1725)]
Trans.--177 If it is believed that neither jāta nor a-jāta nor jātājāta could be produced, what could be produced then ? Again, if jata is not jata ( according to you ), why not think the saine about kha-puspa ( also )? ( 1725 )
टीका-प्रष्टव्योऽत्रं देवानांप्रियः, कथय-किं तद् वस्तु जातमिति प्रतिपद्यते तव मतिः, यजाता-जातो-भयादिप्रकारैरजातं साध्यते-यस्य जाताजातादिप्रकारैर्जन्म त्वया निषिध्यत इत्यर्थः । यदि हि जातं किमपि वस्तु तव सिद्धं, तर्हि तत्सत्वेनैव प्रतिहता शून्यता, अतः " किं तज्जातं जायते ? किं तदजातं जायते किं तज्जाताजातं जायते ?" इत्यादयः शून्यतासिद्ध्यर्थमुपन्यस्यमाना निरर्थका एव विकल्पा इति प्रच्छकाभिप्रायः। अथ तदपि जातं जाताजातादिविकल्पाश्रय भूतं जातत्वेन भवतो न सिद्धम् , किन्त्वजातमेव तत् , ननु स्ववचनविरुद्धमिद-जातमप्यजातमिति । किञ्च, जातस्यासत्त्वे निराश्रयत्वाजाताजातादिविकल्पा निरर्थका एव । अथैतदाश्रयभूते जाताख्ये वस्तुन्यसिद्धेऽपि “न जातं जायते" इत्यादिविकल्पविचारः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि खपुष्पेऽप्यसौ किं न विधीयते, असत्वाविशेषेण “ समया विवजओ वा” इत्यादिव्यक्तदोष प्रसङ्गात् । न च वक्तव्यं-परेषां सिद्धं जातमुररीकृत्य विकल्पा विधीयन्ते, स्व-परभावाभ्युपगमे शून्यताहानिप्राप्तेरिति ।।१७७॥ (१७२५) ।।
___D. C.--'Tell me O Vyaktta ! what object, according to you, could be proved as gāta when it has already been denied production as jāta, a-jäta or both ? If anything that has been produced, is accepted by you s'ünyutā would be denied on account of its very existence and hence alternative questions whether jata a-gāta or gātajata could be produced or not, would become useless.
Again, if a jäta object which gives rise to a number of alternatives like gata, a-jata etc. is not, admissible to you as

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jata and if you take it as a-jata there would be self-contradiction in your argument. Moreover, when existence of a jāta object is denied, alternatives like jāta, a-jata etc. would become useless in absence of their as'rayas.
Now, if you admit the above-mentioned alternatives in case of non-existent objects also, you shall have to apply those alternatives to the kha-puspa, which is also non-existent, Here, it could not be said that all those alternatives were applied by accepting things which were believed as jäta by others. Because, it would bring in distinction between svo and para which violates the principle of s'ūnyata.
Moreover,
जइ सबहा न जायं किं जम्माणंतरं तदुवलम्भो । पुवं वाऽणुवलंभो पुणो वि कालंतरहयस्स? ॥१७८॥ (१७२६) Jai sayvahā na jāyam kim jammānantaram taduvalambho Puyvam vā'nuvalambho puno vi kālantarahayassa ? 11178N (1726) [ यदि सर्वथा न जातं किं जन्मानन्तरं तदुपलम्भः ।
पूर्व वाऽनुपलम्भः पुनरपि कालान्तरहतस्य ? ॥१७८ ।। (१७२६) Yadi sarvathā na jātam kim janmānantaram tadupalambhah | Pūrvam va’nupalambhaḥ punarapi kālāntarahatasya ? 117811 (1726)]
Trans.-178 If ( according to you ) it is not produced in all respects, why its apprehension after production ? And why not before, or after one has been destroyed in future ? (1726).
. टीका-यदि सर्वैरपि प्रकारघंटादिकार्य न जातमिति शून्यवादिना प्रतिपाद्यते, तर्हि मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामनुपलब्धं कुलालादिसामग्रीनिवर्तितजन्मानन्तरं किमिति तस्मात् तदुपलभ्यते । पूर्व वा जन्मतः किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः १ । पुनरपि च कालान्तरे लगुडादिना हतस्य किमिति तस्यानुपलम्भः ?। अजातस्य गगननलिनस्येव सर्वदैव घटादेरनुपलम्भ एव

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___:237 : स्यात् , यस्तु कदाचिदुपलम्भः, कदाचित्तु नोपलम्भः, असौ जातस्यैवोपपद्यत इति भावः ॥ १७८ ॥ (१७२६)॥ ____D. C.-If according to your sunyata-vada, objects like ghata are not altogether produced, how is it that ghata which is not apprehended in the state of a lump of earth, is apprehended when produced by nomittas like potter etc? And why is the ghata not apprehended before its production or after its being broken by the hit of a stick etc ? If objects like ghata were altogether a-jāta, like khapuspa they would never be apprehended at all. And, the quality of being apprehensible at one time and non-apprehensible at the other, is possible only in case of a jata object. 178 ( 1726).
Besides, जह सबहा न जायं जायं सुण्णवयणं तहा भावा । अह जायं पिन जायं पयासिया सुण्णया केण? ॥१७९॥(१७२७) Jaha savvahā na jāyam jāyam sunnavayaņam tahā bhāvā i Aha jayam pi na jāyam payāsiyā sunnayā kena ? 1117911 ( 1727) [ यथा सर्वथा न जातं जातं शून्यवचनं तथा भावाः ।
अथ जातमपि न जातं प्रकाशिता शून्यता केन ? ॥ १७९ ।। (१७२७) Yathā sarvathā na jātam jātam sūnyavacanam tathā bhāvāḥi Atha jatamapi na jatam prakasita sānyata kena ? ॥ 179 ॥ ( 1727 )]
Trans.—179 Just as the assertion about śãnyata is jāta, even though not produced altogether, so also, other objects ( should be taken as jāta ). Again, if jāta were denied to have been produced, by what means would the sünyatā be manifested ? ( 1727).
___टीका-" शून्यं सर्वं जगत् " इत्येवंभूतं यच्छून्यताविषय विज्ञानं वचनं च तद् यथा जाता-जातादिप्रकारैः सर्वथा जातमप्यजातमपि सत् केनापि प्रकारेण तावजातम् , तथा भावा अपि घट-पटादयो जाता एष्टव्या

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
इत्यतो न शून्यं जगत् । अथ शून्यताविज्ञान - वचनद्वयं जातमप्यजातमिष्यते, तर्हि तद्विज्ञान-वचनाभ्यां विना केनासौ शून्यता प्रकाशिता ? -न केनचिदिति शून्यतानुपपत्तिरिति ।। १७९ ।। (१७२७ ) ॥
D. C.-Just as the statement as well as knowledge that everything is s'unya are accepted as having been produced in any way whatsoever, in the same way, other objects such as ghata, pata etc. should also be taken as jāta. And, if you accept vijnana and vacana about s'unyata to be a-jata, how would you be able to express s'unyata without the help of vijñāna or vacana, about it ? Hence, s'ūnyatā is not acceptible in any way. 179 ( 1727 ).
Also,
जाय जायमजायं जायाजायमह जायमाणं च । कमिह विवक्खाए न जायए सहा किंचि ॥१८०॥ ( १७२८) रूवि त्ति जाइ जाओ कुंभो संठाणओ पुणरजाओ । जायाजाओ दोहि वि तस्समयं जायमाणो ति ॥ १८१ ॥ (१७२९)
पुवकओ उघडतया परपजाएहिं तदुभएहिं च ।
जायं तो य पडतया न जायए सव्वहा कुंभो ॥ १८२ ॥ (१७३०) वोमाइ निच्चजायं न जायए तेण सङ्घहा सोम्म ! | इय दवतया सवं भणिज्जं पज्जवगईए ॥ ९८३ ॥ ( १७३१ )
Jāyai jāyamajāyam jayājāyamaha jāyamāṇam cal Kajjamiha vivakkhāe na jāyae savvahā kimci || 180 ॥ ( 1728 ) Rūvi tti jai jāo kumbho samṭhāṇao punarajão Jayājão dohi vi tassamayam jāyamāno tti ॥ 181 ( 1729 ) Puvvakao u ghaḍatayā para pajjāehim tadubhaehim ca Jāyanto ya padatayā na jāyae savvahā kumbho || 182 ॥ ( 1730 )

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
-:239 .. Vomāi niccajāyam na jāyae tena savvahā somma!! Iya davvataya savvam bhayanijjam pajjavagaie ॥ 183 ॥ ( 1731 ) [ जायते जातमजातं जाताजातमथ जायमानं च ।
कार्यमिह विवक्षया न जायते सर्वथा किञ्चित् ॥ १८० ॥ (१७२८) रूपीति जायते जातःकुम्भः संस्थानतः पुनरजातः । जाताजातो द्वाभ्यामपि तत्समयं जायमान इति ॥ १८१॥ (१७२९) पूर्वकृतस्तु घटतया परपर्यायैस्तदुभयैश्च । जायमानश्च पटतया न जायते सर्वथा कुम्भः ॥ १८२ ॥ (१७३०) व्योमादि नित्यजातं न जायते तेन सर्वथा सौम्य ! । '
इति द्रव्यतया सर्व भजनीयं पर्यवगत्या ॥ १८३ ॥ (१७३१ ) Jayate jātamajātam jātājátamatha jāyamānam ca i Kāryamıha vivaksaya na jayate sarvathā kimcit !! 180 II (1728)] Rūpîtı jayate jātaḥ kumbhaḥ samsthānataḥ punarajātaḥ i Jātājāto dvabhyamapi tatsamayam jayamāna iti I 181 || ( 1729 )] Pūrvaksitastu ghatataya paraparyāyaistadubhayaiśca 1 Jayamānaśca patata ya na jāyate sarvatha kumbhaḥ (1182|1 (1730)] Vyomādi nityajátam na jāyate tena sarvathā saumya! i Iti dravyataya sarvam bhajaniyam paryavagatya || 183 ॥ (1731)]
Trans.-180-183 Jata, a-jata, jatajata, as well as the jāyamāna objects are produced in this world on account of various causes, ( but ) nothing is produced in perfection. The jata (kumbha) is produced, since it has form; the a-jata kumbha is produced because of shape; the jātājāta ( is produced ) even by both, and the jāyamāna ( is also produced because the process of production takes place in the present tense. But a kumbha which has been produced before, could never be produced on account of ghatata or ( by means of ) the characteristics of other ( objects) or by means of both; and the jāyamāna kumbha could also never be produced on occouut

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1.M
• 240 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The fourth of patata. Again sky etc. could also never be produced as they are nityajāta. Hence, O Saumya! nothing could be produced as a substance (but) everything should be taken according to the surrounding characteristics. ( 1728–1731 ).
9
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टीका - इह कार्यं घटादिकं विवक्षया किमपि जातं जायते किञ्चिदजातम्, किञ्चिजाताजातम्, किश्चिञ्जायमानम् किञ्चित्तु सर्वथा न जायत इति । अथ यथाक्रममुदाहरणानि - " रूवीत्यादि " रूपितया घटो जातो जायते, मृदूपताया: प्रागपि भावात्, तद्रूपतया जात एव घटो जायते इत्यर्थः । संस्थानतयाऽऽकारविशेषेण पुनः स एवाजातो जायते, मृत्पिण्डाद्यवस्थायामाकारस्यासंभवात् । मृद्रूपतया, आकारविशेषेण चेति द्वाभ्यामपि प्रकाराभ्यां जाताजातो जायते, तदनर्थान्तरभूतत्वाद् घटस्य । तथा, अतीता-ऽनागतकालयोर्विनष्टानुत्पन्नत्वात् क्रियानुपपत्तेर्वर्तमानसमय एव क्रियासद्भावात् तत्समयं वर्तमानसमयं जायमानो जायते । किञ्चित्तु सर्वथा जाता - Sजातादिप्रकारैर्न जायते । किं पुनस्तत् ? इत्याह – “ पुवकओ उ इत्यादि " पूर्वकृतस्तु पूर्वनिष्पन्नो घटो घटतया जाता-जातादिविकल्पानां मध्यादेकेनापि प्रकारेण न जायते, पूर्वमेव जातत्वात् । किं घटतयैव न जायते ? | न, इत्याह - " परपजाएहिं ति तथा, पटादिगतैः परपर्यायैश्च घटो न जायते, स्वपर्यायाणां पूर्वमेव जातत्वात् परपर्यायैश्च कदाचित् कस्याप्यभवनात् । स्व-परपर्यायैः पूर्वकृतघटो न जायते, जाता-जातपट - खरविषाणवदिति भावः ।
-
99
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तथा, जायमानोऽपि वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणसमये पटतया घटो न जायते, पररूपत्तया कस्याप्यभवनात् । किं पूर्वकृतो घट एवेत्थं न जायते, आहोस्विदन्यदपि किञ्चिद् न जायते १ इत्याह-- " वोमाईत्यादि " न केवलं पूर्वकृतो घटो घटतया न जायते, तथा व्योमादि च तेन कारणेन सौम्य ! सर्वथा जातादिभिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्न जायते, येन किम् ? इत्याह--येन नित्यजातं सर्वदाऽवस्थितम्, हेतुद्वारेण विशेषणमिदम्, नित्यजातत्वाद् न जायत इत्यर्थः । उक्तस्यैवार्थस्योपसंहारव्याजेन तात्पर्यमुपदर्शयन्नाह ' इयेत्यादि ' इत्युक्तप्रकारेण सर्वमपि घट-पट - व्योमादिकं वस्तु द्रव्यरूपेण 46 न जायते "

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 241 इतीहापि संबध्यते, तद्रूपतया सदावस्थितत्वादिति भावः। पर्यायगत्या पर्यायचिन्तया पुनः सर्व भजनीयविकल्पनीयम्-पूर्वजातं घटादिकं रूपादिभिः स्वपर्यायैरपि न जायते, पूर्वजातत्वादेव, अजातं तु तत् स्वपर्यायैर्जायते, परपर्यायैस्तु किञ्चिदपि न जायते, इत्येवं पर्यायचिन्तायां भजना। एतच्च प्रायो gripahala 11 860-868-862-86311 (8026-8028-81930.81938)||
D. C.--Several objects like ghata which have once been jāta in this world, could be produced by reason of their rūpatva. Before the rupa of ghata is produced, the rūpa of earth is already there and hence the ghata which is jāta to the apeksā of rūpitva is produced in this way. Thereafter, ghata is a-jata as far as shape is considered. When it takes the shape in course of production, the a-jāta ghata comes into existence. The jātājāta ghata is produced in both the ways-rūpitva as well as the akora. Moreover, ghata which is jāyamāna is produced only during the present tense. The past having already vanished and future having not yet come, the process of being produced takes place only during the present tense.
There are several objects of peculiar types which do not go under any of the above-mentioned categories. e. g. A ghata which has already been produced in the past, could never be produced as a ghata again in any of the above-stated ways. Secondly, ghata could not be produced on account of the characteristics of other objects like pata etc. As ghata has its own process of production and characteristics, it could not be produced like an existent pata or a non-existent kharasanga, Thirdly, ghata which is being produced during the present time, could never be produced as pata etc. For, kūrya which is being produced as ghata etc. could never be produced as an absolutely different object like pata. So, all objects e.g, ghata, pata, ākas'a etc., could not be produced in the form of substance as they are primarily made in that state. But, as far as paryāya is concerned, all are said to have been produced.
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:242:.
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The fourth In reply to the question viz. “Since everything is made up of some sort of materials, how could those materials exist in the midst of all-pervading negation ?" the Acarya statesदीसइ सामग्गिमयं सबमिह त्थि न य सा, नणु विरुद्धं । घेप्पड व न पञ्चक्खं किं कच्छपरोमसामग्गी? ॥१८४॥ (१७३२) Disai sāmaggimayam savvamiha tthi na ya sā, nanu viruddham 1 Gheppai va na paccakkham kim kaccaparoma sāmaggî ?111841(1732) [दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं सर्वमिहास्ति न च सा, ननु विरुद्धम् ।
गृह्यते वा न प्रत्यक्षं किं कच्छपरोमसामग्री ? ॥१८४ ॥ (१७३२) Dşśyate Sāmagrîmayam sarvamibāsti na ca sā, nanu viruddham Grihyate vá na pratyaksam kim kacchaparomasāmagrî ? ||184 11 ] ___Trans.-184 All ( objects ) in this world appear as consisting of ( some sort of ) materials ; but, in fact, reverse is the case, ( as ) those materials do not exist. Or, if it is accepted, why is the ingredient of the hair of a tortoise not perceptible to the senses ? ( 1732 )
टीका-इह यदुक्तम्-~-"सर्वमपि कार्य सामग्र्यात्मकं दृश्यते, सर्वाभावे च नास्ति सामग्री" इति । तदेतद् विरुद्धमेव, प्रस्तुतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात् , वचोजनककण्ठौ-ठ-ताल्वादिसामग्र्याः प्रत्यक्षत एवोपलब्धेः॥ अथ ब्रूषे-- अविद्योपप्लवादविद्यमानमपि दृश्यते, यत उक्तम् . काम-स्वम-भयो-न्मादैरविद्योपप्लवात् तथा ।
पश्यन्त्यसन्तमप्यर्थं जनः केशेन्दुकादिवेत् ॥ १॥ इति ।
यद्येवम्, तीसत्त्वे सामान्येऽपि कच्छपरोमजनकसामग्री किमिति प्रत्यक्षत एव नोपलभ्यते ?, समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ? इति ।। १८४ ॥ (१७३२)॥
__D C.-Vyakta :-All objects are composed of some sort of sāmagrî in this world. But in the midst of sarvas'ünyatā,

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 243 :: sāmagri, too, does not exist, because everything becomes s'ūnya at the end.
Bhagavan :-This belief of yours O Vyakta ! is totally wrong. For, constituents like kantha, ostha, talu etc, which form sāmagrî as well as vacana are directly perceptible. Hence, how could the existence of samagrî be denied ?
Vyakta :-One could perceive even an a-vidyamäna object on account of kāma, svapna, bhaya, unmāda, or a-vidya, but in fact that does not exist.
Bhagavān :-If it is so, O Vyakta ! why is the sāmagrî that produces the hair of a tortoise not produced ? A-vidyamānatā is common in both the cases. So, either this sämagrî should be apprehended like the sāmagrî that produces vacana or both should not be apprehended. Or, why should not the fault of viparyaya ( contrariety ) take place when the sāmagri that produces the hair of a tortoise is apprehended and the one that produces vacana is not ?
But, सामग्गिमओ वत्ता वयणं चत्थि जइ तो कओ सुण्णं । अह नत्थि केण भणि वयणाभावे सुयं केण ?॥१८५।।(१७३३) Sāmaggimao vattā vayaņam catthi jai to kao sunnam i Aha natthi kena bhaniam vayaņābhāve suyam kena ? u1850(1733) [सामग्रीमयो वक्ता वचनं चास्ति यदि ततः कुतः शून्यम् ।
अथ नास्ति केन भणितं वचनाभावे श्रुतं केन ? ॥१८५॥ (१७३३) Sāmagrîmayo vaktā vacanam cāsti yadi tatah kutaḥ śūnyam| Atha năsti kena bhaạitam vacanabhāve śrutam kena ? 111851(1733)]
Trans.—185 And, if the speaker-accompanied by a group of constituent parts-as well as the speech exist, whence is the sūnyatā ( produced ) ? On the other hand, if they do not exist, in absence of ( speaker as well as ) words, by whom is the sūnyata pronounced (and) by whom is (it) heard ? (1733)

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.: 244
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
. टीका-सामग्री-उरः-शिरः-कण्ठौ-ठ-तालु-जिह्वादिसमुदायात्मिका तन्मयः सामग्र्यात्मको वक्ता, तद्ववनं चास्ति न वा ? । यद्यस्ति, तर्हि कुतो जगच्छून्यत्वम् , तद्वक्त-वचनसत्त्वेनैव व्यभिचारात् ।। अथ तद्वक्तृवचने न स्तः, तर्हि वक्त-वचनाभावे केन भणितं शून्यं जगत् ?--न केनचित् । सर्वशून्यत्वे च प्रतिपाद्यस्याप्यभावात् केन तच्छून्यवचः श्रुतम् ? इति ॥१८५॥ (१७३३)॥
D. C.--Are the speaker-possessed of a group of constituents like heart, head, throat, lips, palate, tongue etc, and the speech, existing or not? If they are, sūnyatā will no more be existing on account of the very fact that they exist. If they are not in absence of the speaker and speech there will be none to announce that the world is s'unya. Moreover, in the midst of all being non-existent, neither the object to be proved will exist nor will there be anyone to hear that s'ünya vacana.
Also, जेणं चेव न वत्ता वयणं वा तो न संति वयणिज्जा । भावा तो सुण्णमिदं वयणमिदं सच्चमलियं वा ? ॥ १८६ ॥ जइ सच्चं नाभावो अहालियं न पमाणमेयं ति। अब्भुवयं ति व मई नाभावे जुत्तमेयं ति ॥१८७॥ (१७३५) Jenam ceva na vattā vayanam vā to na santi vayanijjā ! Bhāvā to sunnamidam vayanamidam saccamaliyam vā ?11186|1(1734) Jai saccam nābhāvo ahāliyam na ppamāṇameyam til Abbhuvagayam ti va mai nabhave juttameyam ti ॥ 187॥ (1735) [ येनैव न वक्ता वचनं वा ततो न सन्ति वचनीयाः।
भावास्ततः शून्यमिदं वचनमिदं सत्यमलीकं वा ? ॥१८६ ॥ (१७३४) यदि सत्यं नाभावोऽथालीकं न प्रमाणमेतदिति । अभ्युपगतमिति वा मतिर्नाभावे युक्तमेतदिति ॥ १८७॥ (१७३५)

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Yenaiva na vakta vacanam va tato na santi vacanîyah Bhavastatah śūnyamidam vacanamidam satyamalikam va ||186॥ ] Yadi satyam nābhāvo'thalikam na pramaṇametaditi Abhyupagatamiti va mati r-nabhave yuktametaditi ||187 || ( 1735 ) ]
Trans.—186-187 ( An opponenent may argue that ) Just as a speaker or speech does not exist, the objects ( that are ) to be expressed will be non-existent ( and hence ) this ( world ) is also non-existent. Is this statement true or false? If it is true, there will be no negation and if it is false, that will no longer be a ground of assurance.
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"
Or, if you believed that sānyata is anyhow arrived at, it is not proper ( to do so ) in ( the midst of all-pervading ) negation. ( 1734-1735 )
टीका- येनैव न वक्ता, नापि च वचनम्, ततस्तेनैव न सन्ति वचनीया भावा इति, अतः शून्यमिदं जगदिति । अत्रोच्यते - यदेतद् वक्तृ - वचन-वचनीयानां भावानामभावप्रतिप्रादकं वचनं तत् सत्यमलीकं वा १ । यदि सत्यम्, तर्ह्यस्यैव सत्यवचनस्य सद्भावाद् नाभावः सर्वभावानाम् । अथालीकमिदं वचनम्, तर्ह्यप्रमाणमेतत्, अतो नातः शून्यतासिद्धिः । अथ यथा तथा वाभ्युपगतमस्माभिः शून्यताप्रतिपादकं वचनम्, अतोऽस्मद्वचनप्रामाण्यात् शून्यतासिद्धिरिति तव मतिः । नैवम्, यतः सत्यम्, अलीकं वा त्वयेदमभ्युपगतम् ? " इत्यादि पुनस्तदेवावर्तते । किञ्च, अभ्युपगन्ता, अभ्युपगमः, अभ्युपगमनीयं चेत्येतत्रयस्य सद्भावेऽभ्युपगमोऽप्येष भवतो युज्यते, न च सर्वभावानामभावे एतत्रयं युक्तमिति ॥ १८६-१८७।। (१७३४१७३५) ॥
44
D. C. — Vyakta— Now that vaktā and vacana have been established as s'unya, the vacanîya bhavas will also be s'unya on account of the same reason. So, ultimately, the whole world is non-existent in all respects.
Bhagavān:--If it is so, O Vyakta / I ask you a question : Is that statement which proves the non-existence of vakta,

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vacana, and the vacanîya bhāvas true or false? If it is true, the abhāva of the above-mentioned objects could not be attained on account of its own existence. And if it is false, the statement will cease to be a pramāna to establish s'ünyatā. Thus, it is not possible to establish sunyatā in either of the two ways.
Vyakta :-But the statement which establishes s'ünyatā has anyhow been accepted by us. Our vacana is therefore authentic and s'ünyātā has undoubtedly been established.
Bhagavān :--That is not true, o Vyakta! For, in accepting the above-mentioned statement, the same fault will arise when you ask the question as to whether that vacana is true or false and so on. Moreover, you cannot accept the vacana, unless the person who accepts the vacana to be accepted and the acceptance itself are existent.
The theory of sarvas'ünyatā seems unfounded from this point of view also.
Moreover, सिकयासु किं न तेल्लं सामग्गीउ तिलेसु वि किमत्थि ? । fa a a HR SEHE AHÍ: age roi ? 118CC11P13€) Sikayāsu kim na taillam sāmaggîu tilesu vi kimatthî ? 1 kim va na savvan sijjhai sāmaggîu khapupphāņam ? 1118811(1736)
[सिकतासु किं न तैलं सामग्रीतस्तिलेष्वपि किमस्ति ? ।
किंवा न सर्व सिध्यति सामग्रीतः खपुष्पानाम् ? ॥१८८॥ (१७३६)॥ Sikatāsu kimona tailam samagrîtastileşvapi kimasti ? I Kim va na sarvam siddhyati samagrîtaḥ khapuspānam ||188H (1736)]
Trans.-188 Why is the oil not ( manufactured from the materials like sands and why from sesamum seeds only ? Or, why not everything be attained from the materials of khapuspas ( only) ? ( 1736 ).

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टीका - सर्वभावानामसरचे सर्वोऽपि प्रतिनियतो लोकव्यवहारः समुच्छिद्यते, तथाहि - भावाभावस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् किमि तिसिकता कणसामग्रीतस्तैलं न भवति, तिलादिसामग्र्यां वा तत् किमस्ति ? । किं वा खपुष्पसामग्रीतः सर्वमपि कार्यजातं न सिध्यति । न चैवम् तस्मात् प्रतिनियतकार्य कारणभावदर्शनाद् नाभावसामग्रीतः किमप्युत्पद्यते, किन्तु यथा स्वभावसामग्रीतः, तथा च सति न शून्यं जगदिति ॥ ९८८ ॥ (१७३६) ।।
"
D. C. — In case of all objects being taken as non-existent, the entire course of loka-vyavahara will be violated. If all the objects are of the same type-viz., that of absolute negation-how is it that oil is manufactured only from the samagrî of sesamum seeds and not from the materials like sand-particles etc. ? Or, if there is all-pervading negation, why not all the objects be attained from the samagra of khapuspas alone? The fact that it never happens like this in the world, leads us to believe that the world is not s'unya.
And,
सवं सामग्गिमयं नेगतोऽयं जओऽणुरपएसो ।
अह सो वि सप्पएसो जत्थावत्था स परमाणू ॥ १८९॥ (१७३७)
Savvam samaggimayam neganto'yam jao'nurapaeso Aha so vi sappaeso jatthāvatthā sa paramānū ॥ 189 ॥ ( 1737 )
[ सर्व सामग्रीमयं नैकान्तोऽयं यतोऽणुरप्रदेशः ।
अथ सोऽपि सप्रदेशो यत्रावस्था स परमाणुः ॥ १८९ ॥ ( १७३७ ) Sarvam samagrîmayam naikanto'yam yato'nurapradeśaḥ Atha sopisa-pradeśo yatravastha sa paramanu 11189 || ( 1737) ]
Trans.-189 That everything should be produced from a group of materials is not the one inevitable (rule) because atom does not occupy space. But if even that occupies space according to you) wherever it resides there is a molecule. ( (1737)

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The fourth टीका-सर्व सामग्रीमयं सामग्रीजन्यं वस्त्वित्ययमपि नैवगन्तः, यतो व्यणुकादयः स्कन्धाः सप्रदेशत्वाद् व्यादिपरमाणुजन्यत्वाद् भवन्तु सामग्रीजन्याः, परमाणुः पुनरप्रदेश इति न केनचिजन्यते इति कथमसौ सामग्रीजन्यः स्यात् । अस्ति चासौ, कार्यलिङ्गगम्यत्वात् ; उक्तं च
मू॥रणुरप्रदेशः कारणमन्त्यं तथा नित्यः ।
एकरस-वर्ण-गन्धो द्विस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च ॥ १ ॥
अथायमपि सप्रेदशः, तबै प्रदेशोऽणुर्भविष्यति, तस्यापि सप्रदेशत्वे तत्प्रदेशोऽणुरित्येवं तावत् , यावद् यत्र कचिद् निष्प्रेदशतया भवबुद्धेवस्थानं भविष्यति, स एव परमाणुः, तेनापि च सामग्रीजन्यत्वस्य व्यभिचार इति ॥ १८९ ॥ (१७३६ ) ॥
D. C.-There cannot be a general rule that each and every object should be produced from sāmagrî. For, objects composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the sāmagrî of those atoms, but a paramānu by itself does never occupy space, and hence could never be produced from any sāmagrî. This paramānu is produced only from kärya-linga, as it is said Mūrtair-aņurapradeśaḥ kāraṇamantyam bhavet tathā nityaḥ | Ekarasa-varņa-gandho dvisparśah kāryalingaśca II
But if you believe this paramānu to occupy space, wherever you apprehend paramānu there would be anu till ultimately it would be absolutely vacant, where nothing but parmānu not produced from any sāmagrî would be found. दीसइ सामग्गिमयं न याणवो संति नणु विरुद्धमिदं । किं वाणूणमभावे निप्फण्णमिणं खपुप्फेहिं ॥१९०॥ (१७३८) Disai sāmaggimayam na yānavo santi naņu viruddhamidam II Kim vānūņamabhāve nipphannamiņam khapupphehim 1119011 (1738) [ दृश्यते सामग्रीमयं न चाणवः सन्ति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
किं वाऽणूनामभावे निष्पन्नमिदं खपुष्पैः ? ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)

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Driśyate Sāmagrimayam na cāņavaḥ santi nanu viruddhamidam i Kim vāņūnāmabhāve nişpannamidam khapuspaiḥ 1119011 (1738) ]
Trans.--190 It is really contradictory to believe ) that what is produced by materials is seen and that atoms do not exist. Or, is it that, in absence of atoms, ( all ) this is produced by means of ( mere ) khapuspa ? ( 1738 )
टीका-"सामग्रीमयं सर्व दृश्यते" इति भवतैव प्रागुक्तम् , "अणवश्च न सन्ति" इत्यधुना ब्रूषे, ननु विरुद्धमिदम् , यथा ' सर्वमप्यनृतं वचनम् । इति ब्रुवतः स्ववचनविरोधः, तथाऽत्रापीत्यर्थः । यदेव हि सामग्रीमयं किमपि दृश्यते भवता, तदेवाणुसंघातात्मकम् , अतः स्ववचनेनैव प्रतिपादितत्वात् कथमणवो न सन्ति ? इति भावः। किञ्च, अणूनामभाव इदं सर्वमपि घटादिकार्यजातं किं खपुष्पैनिष्पन्नम् , परमाण्वभावे तजनकमृत्पिण्डादिसामग्र्यभावात् ? इति भावः। तस्माद् यस्मात् सामग्रीमयं दृश्यत इति प्रतिपद्यते भवता,तद्वदेव परमाणव इति ॥ १९० ॥ (१७३८)॥
D. C.-If you are to state that those that are not sāmagrîjanya are not paramānus at all, your own statement will be contradicting itself. It has already been said that everything which is samagrîmaya is apprehensible. Again, all that you have accepted as sāmagrîmaya or sāmagrîjanya in this world, is nothing but a collection of atoms. Thus, when you establish the existence of atoms by your own words, you cannot call them non-existent, in any case. And, if you call those atoms non-existent, should the objects like ghata, pata etc, be taken to have been produced from the non-existent objects like khapuspa etc. ? Because if paramānu is absent, a sāmagrî like mritpinda would also be absent. So, when you assert that samagrîmaya is apprehended, the paramānus that form this sāmagrî are automatically established as existent.
Now, in reply to the argument prima facie that since
32

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rear portion is not perceptible and since front portion is very minute, everything is s'unya,† the author indicates
देस साराभागो घेप्पड़ न य सो ति नणु विरुद्धमिणं । सवाभावे विन सो घेप्पड़ किं खरविसाणस्स ॥१९१॥ (१७३९)
Desassarabhago gheppai na ya so tti nanu viruddhamīnam Savvābhāve vi na so gheppar kim kharavisānassa 191 (1739) [ देशस्थाराद्भागो गृह्यते न च स इति ननु विरुद्धमिदम् ।
सर्वाभावेऽपि न स गृह्यते किं खरविषाणस्य १ । १९१ ।। ( १७३९ ) Deśasyarādbhago grihyate na ca sa iti nanu viruddhamidam Sarvābhāve’pi na sa grihyate kim kharavisanasya ? ॥1910 (1739) ]
Trans.-191 To say that the foremost portion of a visible object is perceptible but it does not exist, is really contradictory. (For) even in the midst of all-pervading negation, why is the front part of the horn of an ass not perceived ? ( 1739 )
99
टीका - यदुक्तम् - " दृश्यस्यापि वस्तुनः परभागस्तावद् न दृश्यते, आराद्भागस्तु गृह्यते, परं सोऽप्यन्यान्यपरभागकल्पनया प्रागुक्तयुक्तितो नास्ति इति । ननु विरुद्धमिदम् - " गृह्यतेऽसौ न च समस्ति " इति । सर्वाभावाद् भ्रान्त्याऽसौ गृह्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतः सर्वाभावे तुल्येऽपि किमिति खरविषाणस्य संबन्धी आराद्भागो न गृह्यते १ । समता विपर्ययो वा कथं न भवति । इति ॥ १९९ ॥ ( १७३९ ) ।।
9
D. C.-It has been said before that only a front part of a visible object is perceived and not the rear part. This front part is, in comparision with other parts in the rear, very suksma and hence that too becomes non-existent This statement is self-contradicting. For, to say that it is perceptible but it does not exist, is absurd.
Here, if it is said, that in the midst of sarvabhava it is
+ Vide verse 1696.

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.: 251 : perceptible because of bhrānti, that is also not proper. For, since abhāva is common everywhere, why is the front part of non-existent objects like the horn of an ass etc., not appre. hended ? Or, how does it not happen that the front part of objects like kharavisāna etc. be apprehended and that of objects like ghata, pata etc. not apprehended ?
Moreover, परभागादरिसणओ नाराभागो वि किमणुमाणं ति । आराभागग्गहणे किं व न परभागसंसिद्धी ? ॥१९२॥ (१७४०) Parabhāgādarisanao nārābhāgo vi kimaņumānam til Arabhagaggahane kim va na parabhāgasamsiddhi ? ॥1920 (1740) [परमागादर्शनतो नाराद्भागोऽपि किमनुमानमिति ।
आराद्भागग्रहणे किं वा न परभागसंसिद्धिः ? ॥ १९२ ॥ (१७४०) Parabhāgādarśanato náradbhago’pi kimanumānamiti 1 Arādbhāgagrahaņe kim vă na parabhāgasamsiddhiḥ ? ||192|( 1740)]
Trans.-192 On account of the rear part being imperceptible, what anumāna ( is held ) in case of even the front part ( being imperceptible )? Or, is it that the rear part is not apprehended when the front part is apprehended ? (1740)
टीका-"परभागमात्रादर्शनादाराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति' इत्यत्र किमनुमान भवतः ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-यत् प्रत्यक्षेण सकललोकप्रसिद्धं तदग्नेरौष्ण्यमिव कथमनुमानेन बाध्यते । आराद्भागस्य ह्यापेक्षिकत्वात् तदन्यथानुपपत्तेः परभागानुमानं तावदद्यापि युज्यते । यस्तु परभागादर्शनमात्रेणैव तनिहवः, सोऽसंबद्ध एव, सत्स्वपि देशादिविप्रकृष्टेषु मेरु-पिशाचादिष्वदर्शनसंभवात् । तस्माद् न परभागादर्शनमात्रेणाराद्भागोऽपलोतव्यः। किञ्च, आराद्भागग्रहणे परभागानुमानं युज्येतापीति भाष्यकारोऽप्याह-" आराभागेत्यादि " आरागाग्रहणे कथं न परभागसंसिद्धिः १ अपि तु तत्संसिद्धिरेव, तथाहिदृश्यवस्तुनः परभागोऽस्ति, तत्संबन्धिभूतस्याराद्भागस्य ग्रहणात्, इह

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The fourth यत्संबन्धिभूतो भागो गृह्यते तत् समस्ति, यथा नभसः पूर्वभागे गृहीते तत्संबन्ध्यपरभागः, गृह्यते च घटादेराराद्भागः, अतस्तत्संन्धिभूतः परभागोऽcafea I 79174—“ STIGTITEITSC771 IGIT: pagastai, तस्याप्यन्य इत्यादि तावत् , यावत् सर्वारतीयभागः" इति । अत्रापि परभागस्यासत्त्वे सर्वारातीयभागपरिकल्पनमुपपन्नमेव स्यात् । तस्मादस्ति परभाग şfa 11 888 11 ( 898 ) !!
D. C.-What anumāna do you hold when you assert that front part is also unapprehensible because of the rear part being so ? For, how could you deny the existence of front part which is pratyaksa to you like the heat of fire ?
It is proper to believe that front portion could exist only if the rear portion be existing and not otherwise. Since the front portion is existent to the apeksā of the rear one, jñāna about the rear portion will have to be derived from the front portion by means of anumāna. But from this it is absolutely inconsistent to conclude that front portion is not perceived because the rear one is not seen.
Even the commentator asserts in this connection that when the front portion is seen we can infer the rear one e. g. A. visible object has its rear portion apprehended because its front portion which is connected with the rear one is apprehended. It follows from this that an object which has one portion perceptible contains another portion also. Objects like ghata, pata etc., must contain rear portions since their front ones åre easily apprehended.
Again, the idea of the foremost part from the successive front portion's will not fit your anumāna. As the rear part is a-vidyamāna, the inference of foremost part being so is absolutely improper. Really speaking, the front part is perceptible in this case, and the inference of rear portion being vidyamāna is correct.
Again,

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सवाभावे वि कओ आरा - पर- मज्झभागनाणत्तं । अह परमईए भण्णइ स परमइविसेसणं कत्तो ? ॥१९३॥ (१७४१) आर-पर- मज्झभागा पडिवण्णा जइ न सुण्णया नाम । अप्पडवणेसु वि का विगप्पणा खरविसाणस्स १ ॥ १९४॥ ( १७४२) सवाभावे वाराभागो किं दीसए न परभागो । सवागणं व न किं किं वा न विवज्जओ होइ ? ॥ १९५॥ (१७४३)
• 253:
Savvābhāve vi kao ārā-para-majjhabhāganānattam | Aha paramaíe bhannai sa paramaivisesanam katto ? ॥193॥ ( 1741) Āra-para-majjhabhāgā padivanṇā jai na suṇṇayā nāma | Appaḍivannesu vi kā vigappanā kharavisāṇassa? || 194|| (1742) Savvābhāve vārābhāgo kim dîsae na parabhāgo Savvāgahanam va na kim kim vā na vivajjao hoi ? ॥195m (1743)
[ सर्वाभावेऽपि कुत आरात् - पर - मध्यभागनानात्वम् ।
अथ परमत्या भण्यते स्व - परमतिविशेषणं कुतः १ ॥ १९३॥ (१७४१) आरात् - पर - मध्यभागाः प्रतिपन्ना यदि न शून्यता नाम । प्रतिपन्नेष्वपि का विकल्पना खरविषाणस्य ? ।। १९४ ।। (१७४२) सर्वाभावे वाराद्भागः किं दृश्यते न परभागः ९ ।
सर्वाग्रहणं च न किं किं वा न विपर्ययो भवति १ ॥ १९५॥ (१७४३) Sarvābhāve'pi kuta ārat - para-madhyabhaganānātvam | Atha paramatyā bhanyate sva-paramati viśesanam kutah ||193 || ] Arat-para-madhyabhagaḥ pratipannā yadi na śūnyatā nāma | Apratipannesvapi ka vikalpana kharavisanasya ? ॥194 (1742) ] Sarvabhāve vārādbhāgaḥ kim driśyate na parabhāgaḥ | Sarvagrahanam ca na kim kim va na viparyayo bhavati ? ||195॥ ]
Trans.-193-194-195 Even in the midst of all-pervading negation, how could the distinction between front, rear and

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___Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth middle portions exist ? And if it is said so in the opinion of others, whence is the distinction between one's own opinion and another's opinion ? If the front, rear, and the middle portions are accepted as existing, there would be no sūnyata at all. And, if they are not proved ( to be existing ) why alternatives about (non-existent objects like) kharavisāņa ? Or, in the midst of the negation of all objects, why is the front portion apprehended and why not the rear one? Or, why not absolute non-apprehension of both ? Or, why not the reverse ( apprehension ) also ? ( 1741-1743 ).
Also, परभागदरिसणं वा फलिहाईणं ति ते धुवं संति । जइ वा ते वि न संता परभागादरिसणमहेऊ ? ॥१९६॥(१७४४) सवादरिसणउ चिय न भण्णइ कीस, भणई तन्नाम । पुत्वब्भुवगयहाणी पञ्चक्खविरोहओ चेव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५) Parabhāgadarisanam vā phalıhāînam ti te dhuvam santi Jai vā te vi na santā parbhāgadarisana maheū ? 196 11 ( 1744) Savvādarisanäu cciya na bhannaikîsa bhanai tannāma l Puvvabbhuvagayahāņi paccakkhavirohao ceva il 197 11 ( 1745 ) [परभागदर्शनं वा स्फटिकादीनामिति ते ध्रुवं सन्ति ।
यदि वा तेऽपि न सन्तः परभागादर्शनमहेतुः ।। १९६ ॥ (१७४४) ‘सर्वादर्शनत एव न भण्यते कस्मात् , भणति तन्नाम ।
पूर्वाभ्युपगतहानिः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्चैव ॥ १९७ ॥ (१७४५) Parabhāgadarśanam vā sphatikādināmiti te dhruvam santi / Yadi vă te’pi na santaḥ parabhāgadarśanamahetuḥ 1119611 (1744)] Sarvadarśanata eva na bhaṇyate kasmät, bhaņati tannámai Pūrvabhyugatabāņih pratyaksavirodhataścaiva il 197 11 ( 1745 ) ]
Trans.-196-197 Or, since the rear portions of ( objects

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like ) crystal etc. are seen, they exist without doubt. And, if they, too, do not exist ( according to you ), the proposition will fail, as the rear portion will not be seen. Why is the reasonthat nothing could be seen-not stated? If it is stated, the proposition ( which is ) accepted before, will (constitute) direct contradiction. ( 17441745 )
"
6
,
टीका - ननु येषां स्फटिका भ्रपटलादीनां भावानां परभागदर्शनमस्ति ते तावद् ध्रुवं सन्त्येव, इति " परभागादर्शनात् " इत्यनेन हेतुना सर्वभावानामसत्वं न सिध्यति । अथ स्फटिकादयोऽपि न सन्ति तर्हि " परभागादर्श - नात् " इत्ययमहेतुः, त्वदभिप्रेतस्य सर्वभावासत्त्वस्यासाधकत्वात् । अतोऽव्यापकममुं हेतुं परित्यज्य “ सर्वादर्शनाद् न सन्ति भावाः इत्ययमेव व्यापको हेतुः कस्माद् न भण्यते ? । भइ तन्नाम ति अत्र पर उत्तरं भणति । किम् ? इत्याह- तन्नामास्तु " सर्वादर्शनात् " इति - अयं हेतुस्तर्हि भवत्वित्यर्थः, यथा तथा शून्यतैवास्माभिः साधयितव्या, सा च "सर्वादर्शनात्" इत्यनेनापि हेतुना सिध्यतु, किमनेनाऽऽग्रहेणास्माकम् ? इति भावः । अथ सूरिराह - " पुब्वेत्यादि " नन्विदानीं “ सर्वादर्शनात् " इति ब्रुवतो भवतः " परभागादरिसणओ" इति पूर्वाभ्युपगतस्य हानिः प्राप्नोति । किञ्च, ग्राम - नगर - सरित् - समुद्र- घट- पटादीनां प्रत्यक्षेणैव दर्शनात् सर्वादर्शनलक्षणस्य हेतोः प्रत्यक्षविरोधः । ततः प्रत्यक्षविरोधतश्च " सर्वादर्शनात् " इत्येतदयुक्तमिति ।
अत्र कश्चिदाह - ननु सपक्षस्य सर्वस्याव्यापकोऽपि विपक्षात सर्वथा निवृत्तो हेतुरिष्यत एव यथा “ अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वात् इति, ननित्योऽर्थः सर्वोऽपि प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः विद्युद्-धन- कुसुमादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् तद्वदिहापि यद्यपि सर्वेष्वपि भावेषु परभार्गादर्शनं नास्ति, यथापि बहुषु तावदस्ति, अतस्तेषु शून्यतां साधयन्नसौ सम्यग् हेतुर्भवि - ष्यति । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तत्र यदनित्यं न भवति तत् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकमपि न भवति, यथाssकाशम् " इत्येवं व्यतिरेकः सिध्यति, इह तु यत्र शून्यता नास्ति, किं तर्हि ? वस्तुनः सच्वम्, परभागादर्शनमपि तत्र नास्ति,
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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [ The fourth किन्तु परभागदर्शनम् , यथा क ? इति भवतः सर्वासद्वादिनो व्यतिरेकः क्वचिदपि न सिध्यति, अतोऽहेतुरेवायमिति ॥१९६-१९७ (१७४४-१७४५)।।
D. C.-Non-existence of each and every object could not be proved by virtue of the non-apprehension of rear parts. The rear portions of transparent objects like crystal and mica are apprehended. Existence of those objects has therefore undoubtedly been established. Consequently, non-apprehension of all objects can never be proved by means of the hetu that rear portions are not seen.
Here, again, if you contend that sphatika etc. also do not exist, your argument that rear portion is not seen will fail and hence be invalid, as the rear portions of those objects are clearly apprehended. In spite of this faulty argument, if you attempt to establish s'ünyatā by means of a widely applicable statement that “Nothing could be proved to exist as nothing is perceived” then also, the previous hetu that rear part could not be seen, would be violated. Secondly, since village, town, river, sea, ghata, pata etc. are directly apprehensible, and hence the hetu will be evidently invalid in that way also.
The opponent may contend again, that a reason which is not applicable to all the instances on the same side can be called a logical reason if it is absolutely inapplicable to the opposite side. e. g., s'abda is a-nitya because it is not produced without effort. But this does not mean that all a-nitya objects could not be produced without effort. Because objects like lightning, cloud etc. though. produced without effort are a-nitya. Similarly, here also, rear parts of all the objects are not non-apprehensible but as the rear parts of several objects are not apprehensible, this hetu leads us to prove s'ünyata in them and that is why it is called a corrector logical reason!
But, that is not proper. O Vyakta ! In the hetu mentioned above, pervasion of difference is found Take, for example, the

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proposition that "That which is a-nitya, is like akas'a, produced without effort. " If vyatireka vyapti is applied in this case, nothing else but vidyamanata of an object is inferred when s'unyata is not found at all. Moreover, rear part is also apprehended in this case. So, O sarvas'unyatavādin ' you shall never be able to obtain the vyatireka vyapti. Your hetu will, therefore, not remain as a hetu at all.
नत्थि पर - मज्झभागा अपच्चक्खत्तओ मई होजा । नणु अक्ख-त्थावत्ती अपच्चक्खत्तहाणी वा ॥ १९८ ॥ (१७४६ )
Natthi para-majjhabhāgā apaccakkhattao maî hojjā I Nanu akkha—tthāvatti apaccakkhattahāni vā ॥ 198 ॥ ( 1746 )
[ न स्तः पर - मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षत्वतो मतिर्भवेत् । नन्वक्षा - sर्थापत्तिरप्रत्यक्षत्वहानिर्वा ॥ १९८ ।। ( १७४६ ) Na staḥ para-madhyabhagavapratyakṣatvato mati r-bhavet i Nanvakså'rthāpattirapratyaksatvahanirvā || 198 ॥ ( 1746 ) ]
Trans.—198 If the rear, as well as, middle portions ( of an object) are accepted as non-existent on account of their imperceptibility, then either there will be perception of senseorgans, as well as, the objects or imperceptibility ( itself ) will be violated. ( 1746 )
टीका - अथ स्यान्मतिः - पर - मध्यभागौ न स्तः, अप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, खरविषाणवत् । तदसच्चे च तदपेक्षया निर्दिश्यमान आराद्भागोऽपि नास्ति, अतः सर्वशून्यतेत्यभिप्रायः । तदयुक्तम्, यतः - "अक्षमक्षमिन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रत्यक्षोऽर्थः, न प्रत्यक्षोऽप्रत्यक्षः तद्भावोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वम्, तस्मादप्रत्यक्षत्वात्" इत्युच्यमाने नन्वक्षाणामर्थस्य चाssपत्तिः सता प्राप्नोति, तदापत्तौ च शून्यताभ्युपगमहानिः । शून्यतायां वाऽप्रत्यक्षत्वलक्षणस्य हेतोर्हानि:, अक्षाsर्थानामभावे प्रत्यक्षा- प्रत्यक्षव्यपदेशानुपपतेरिति भावः ॥ १९८ ॥ ( १७४६ ) ॥
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[The fourth
D. C.-Vyakla:—The rear as well as the middle portions of an object do not exist, because they are imperceptible like kharavişāņa. The front parts will also inot exist in that case, because their existence depends upon the existence of the rear ones. This will ultimately lead to the idea of sarvas'ünyatā.
Bhagavān:-The argument is not valid. Pratyaksa means existing at each of the sense-organs. So, when the hetu of a-pratpaksatva is advanced, there would be apprehension of sense-organs as well as the objects to be apprehended, and in their apprehension, s'ünyatā would never be accepted. For, if s'ünyatā is taken along with the hetu of a-pratyakşatva, the hetu itself will prove invalid. Or, say in absence of indriya and artha, the practical usage or pratyakşa and a-pratyaksa would never be possible.
Moreover, अस्थि अपच्चक्खं पि ह जह भवओ संसयाइविन्नाणं । अह नत्थि सुण्णया का कास व केणोवलद्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७) Atthi apaccakkham pi hu jaha bhavao samsayājvinnānami Aha natthi sunnayā kā kāsa va kenovaladdhā vā ? 1119911 (1747) [ अस्त्यप्रत्यक्षमपि खलु यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानम् ।
अथ नास्ति शून्यता का कस्य वा केनोपलब्धा वा ? ॥१९९॥(१७४७) Astyapratyakşampi khalu yatha bhavataḥ samsayādivijñānam i Atha násti sūnyatā kā kasya va kenopalabdhā vā ? ||19911 (1747)]
Trans.- 199 Some object does exist in spite of its being imperceptible, just as your apprehension of doubt etc. exist, even though it is imperceptible ( to others ). And if that (doubt) does not exist, what is that sūnyata? Whose śânyata ( is that ) ? And who has apprehended it ? ( 1747 )
टीका-नन्वप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति किश्चिद् वस्तु, यथा भवतः संशयादिविज्ञानमन्येषामप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्ति, ततो यथैतत् , तथा पर-मध्यभागावप्रत्यक्षौ

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• 259 :भविष्यत इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः। अथ भवत्संशयादिविज्ञानमपि नास्ति, तर्हि का नाम शून्यता ? कस्य वाऽसौ ? केन वोपलब्धा ? भवत एवेह तत्र किल संशयः, स चेद् नास्ति, तर्हि कस्यान्यस्य ग्राम-नगरादिसच्चे विप्रतिपत्तिः ? इति भावः ॥ १९९ ॥ (१७४७)॥
D. C.--Just as, your apprehension of doubt etc. exists, even though it is not perceptible to others, in the same way, there are some objects which exist, in spite of their imperceptibility. Middle and rear portions of such objects do exist in spite of their a-pratylesatva. Your hetu will, therefore, involve the fault of anaikāntikatva, since it has been applicable to more than one object.
Again, if your apprehension of doubt etc., does not exist, what would be s'ünyatā then? To whom does that s'ünyata belong? And, who has apprehended that s'unyatā ? The doubt, therefore, must exist. Otherwise, who else will raise the doubt about the existence of vidyamāna objects like village, town, etc.?
After refuting the idea of s'ünyatā, the Bhagavan now tries to establish the existence of elements like prithvi etc. in the following way :पञ्चक्खेसु न जुत्तो तुह भूमि-जला-ऽनलेसु संदेहो ।
अनिलाऽऽगासेसु भवे सोऽवि न जुत्तोऽणुमाणाओ ॥ २०० ॥ Paccakkhesu na jutto tuha bhūmi-jalā’-nalesu samdeho 1 Anilā="gāsesu bhave so’vi na jutto’numāņāo 11 200 11 ( 1748 )
[प्रत्यक्षेषु न युक्तस्तव भूमि-जला-ऽनलेषु संदेहः । __ अनिला-ऽऽकाशयोर्भवेत् सोऽपि न युक्तोऽनुमानात् ॥२०० ॥ (१७४८) Pratyaksesu na yuktasta va bhūmi-jala-'naleșu samadehaḥ, Anila-"kāśayor-bhavet so’pi na yukto’numānāt 11 200 11 (1748)]
Trans.-200 Your doubt about the objects like earth, water, and fire, is not proper, because they are (directly) per

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[ The fourth
ceptible ( to the senses ). That ( doubt ) is out of place in the case of wind as well as sky also by virtue of anumāna. ( 1748)
टीका - तस्माद् भूमि - जल - वह्मिषु प्रत्यक्षेषु तव सौम्य ! संशयो न युक्तः, यथा स्वस्वरूपे । तथा, अनिलोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष एव, गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, घटवत्, ततस्तत्रापि न संशयो युक्तः । भवतु वा, अनिल - ssकाशयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेन संशयः, तथाऽप्यसौ न युक्तः, अनुमानसिद्धत्वात् तयोरिति ॥ २००॥ ( १७४८ ) ॥
D. C-Just as, in the case of your own body, you cannot raise doubt, so in the case of pratyakṣa objects such as bhumi ( earth ), Jala ( water ), and anala ( fire ) also you should not raise doubt. Moreover, you cannot entertain doubt about vayu ( wind ), and ākas'a (space), also because they are established by means of anumāna.
Here is the anumana about wind,
अस्थि अदिस्सापाइयफरिसणाईणं गुणी गुणत्तणओ । रुवस्स घडो व गुणी जो तेसिं सोऽनिलो नाम ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७४९)
Atthi adisāpaiyapharisaṇāînam gunî gunattanao Rūvassa ghado vva guni jo tesim so'nilo nāma ॥ 201 ॥ ( 1749)
[ अस्त्यश्यापादितस्पर्शनादीनां गुणी गुणत्वतः ।
रूपस्य घट इव गुणी यस्तेषां सोऽनिलो नाम ॥ २०१ ॥ ( १७४९ )
Astyadriśyapadita sparśanadinam guņi gunatvataḥ| Rūpasya ghata iva guni yastesām so 'nilo nāma || 201॥ ( 1749) ]
Trans-201 Just as ghata is the object possessing the the property of rūpa, wind is said to be (an element) consisting of properties, like a sense of touch, etc. produced by some invisible ( force ). ( 1749 )
टीका - य एतेऽदृश्येन केनाप्यापादिता जनिताः स्पर्शादयस्ते विद्यमानगुणिनः, गुणत्वात्, आदि शब्दाच्छन्द - स्वास्थ्य -कम्पा गृह्यन्ते, एतेऽपि

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हि वायुप्रभवाद् वायुगुणा एव, इह ये गुणास्ते विद्यमान गुणिनो दृष्टाः, यथा घट - रूपादयः, यश्चैषां स्पर्श - शब्द - स्वास्थ्य - कम्पानां गुणी स वायुः तस्मादस्त्यसाविति । २०१ ॥ ( १७४९ ) ॥
D. C.—Properties like spars'a, sabda, svāsthya and kampa are produced by means of some invisible force. Now, since these properties appear as existing in vayu (wind), vayu is said to possess those properties, just as ghata, possesses the property of rupa.
The anumana to establish akas'a is this:
अस्थि वसुहाइभाणं तोयस्स घडो व मुत्तिमत्ताओ ।
जं भूयाणं भाणं तं वोमं वत्त ! सुबत्तं ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५०)
Atthi vasuhāibhāṇam toyassa ghado vva muttimattão Jam bhūyānam bhānam tam vomam Vatta! suvvattam || 202 ॥
[ अस्ति वसुधादिभाजनं तोयस्य घट इव मूर्तिमत्त्वात् ।
यद् भूतानां भाजनं तद् व्योम व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तम् ॥ २०२ ॥ (१७५० ) Asti vasudhadibhajanam toyasya ghața iva murtimattvāt Yad bhūtānām bhajanam tad vyoma Vyakta ! suvyaktam || 202 || ]
Trans.-202 Just as ghata becomes the receptacle of of water, so there is a receptacle for earth etc. also. The receptacle of ( those ) elements is nothing but ākāśa. ( 1750 ) टीका - अस्ति वसुधा - जला - नल - वायूनां भाजनमाधारः, मूर्तिमच्वात्, तोयस्य घटवत् यच्च तेषां भाजनं तदायुष्मन् व्यक्त ! सुव्यक्तं व्योमेति । यदि च साध्यैकदेशतां दृष्टान्तस्य कचित् प्रेरयति, तदेत्थं प्रयोगः - विद्यमानभाजना पृथिवी, मूर्तत्वात्, तोयवत् तथा, आपः, तेजोवत् ; तेजश्च वायुवत्, वायुश्च पृथिवीवदिति ।। २०२ ।। ( १७५० )
"
9
D. C. ——– Earth, water, fire, and wind have their ādhāras of the type of the ghata full of water on account of their being corporeal. This ādhāra, O Vyakta / is well known as ākās'a. Since prithvi

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: 262 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The fourth has its bhājana vidyamāna on account of its mūrtatva like water, water has also the bhajana same as that of fire, and the fire in turn has the one similar to that of wind, which ultimately will have the same one as prithvê.
Having established the existence of all the five elements the Acarya now concludes :एवं पञ्चक्खाइपमाणसिद्धाई सोम्म ! पडिवज । जीव-सरीराहारोवओगधम्माइं भूयाइं ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१) Evam paccakkhāipamānasiddhāim somma ! padivajja i Jiva-sarīrāhāravaogadhammāim bhūyāim 11 203 11 ( 1757 ) [ एवं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धानि सौम्य ! प्रतिपद्यस्व ।
जीव-शरीराधारोपयोगधर्माणि भूतानि ॥ २०३ ॥ (१७५१) Evam pratyaksadipramāṇasiddhāni saumya ! pratipadyasva | Jiva-sarîradhāropayogadharmāņi bhūtāni 11 203 11 ( 1751 ) ]
Trans.-203 So, O Saumya! accept those bhatas that have jîva and sarira as their ādhāras along with the property of common usage to have been established by means of evidences such as those perceptible by senses etc.
Now, the bhūtas are established as animate in this way:किह सजीवाइं मई तल्लिङ्गाओऽनिलावसाणाइं। वोमं विमुत्तिभावादाघारो चेव न सजीवं ॥ २०४॥ (१७५२) Kiha sajsvāim maî tallirigão’nilāvasāņāim / Vomam vimuttibhavadadharo ceva na sa-jivam ॥ 204 ॥ (1752) [कथं सजीवानि मतिस्तल्लिङ्गादनिलावसानानि ।
व्योम विमूर्तिभावादाधार एव न सजीवम् ।। २०४ ।। (१७५२) Katham sa-jivani matistallingădanilāvasānāni Vyoma vimurtibhavadadhāra eva na sa-jivam || 204॥ ( 1752)

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.:263 : Trans.--204 ( The opponent may ask ) How are they animate ? ( The answer is )—Bhūtas ending at vāyu are animate on account of ( their possessing ) that characteristic. The sky being incorporeal by itself is merely a support (and hence ) it is not animate.
टीका-कथं पुनः सह जीवेन वर्तन्त इति सजीवानि भूतानि ? इति परस्य मतिः स्यात् । अत्रोच्यते-तस्य जीवस्य लिङ्गं तल्लिङ्गं तस्मात् तदुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः, सचेतनान्यनिलावसानानि चत्वारि भूतानि । व्योम-आकाशं पुनर्विगतमूर्तिभावमाधार एव, न तु सजीवमिति ॥२०४॥ (१७५२)
D. C.-Vyakta :-How are the bhūtas sajîva as they exist along with jîva ?
The Acārya :-Prithvi, jala, agni, and vāyu are sa-java because they possess the characteristics of jîva. But the sky is not sa-jîva since it is a-mūrta and hence it acts merely as an adhāra.
The living characteristic of prithvî can be laid down as follows:जम्म-जरा-जीवण-मरण-रोहणा-हार-दोहला-मयओ। रोग-तिगिच्छाईहि य नारि व सचेयणा तरवो ॥२०५॥(१७५३) Jamma-jara-jivana-marana-rohana-hara-dohala-mayaon Roga-tigicchaihi ya nari vva sa-ceyanā taravo ॥ 205 ॥ ( 1753 ) [जन्म-जरा-जीवन-मरण-रोहणा-ऽऽहार-दौहृदा-ऽऽमयतः। '
रोग-चिकित्सादिभिश्च नारीव सचेतनास्तरवः ।। २०५ ॥ (१७५३) Janma-jara-jivana-marana-rohana-"hāra-dauhruda-''mayatah | Roga-cikitsadibhisca nāriva sa-cetanastaravah || 205 ॥ (1753)]
Trans.--205 Trees like woman are living ( beings ) by reason of ( their having ) birth, old age, life, death, growth, hunger, desire, disease and its diagnosis etc.

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Jinabhadra Gani's
(The fourth
टीका-" सचेतनास्तरवः" इति प्रतिज्ञा । " जन्म-जरा-जीवनमरण-क्षतसंरोहणा-ऽऽहार-दौहृदा-ऽऽमय-तचिकित्सादिसद्भावात् " इति हेतुः । “नारीवत्" इति दृष्टान्तः । आह-नन्वनैकान्तिकोऽयम् , अचेतनेध्वपि जन्मादिव्यपदेशदर्शनात् ; तथाहि-"जातं तद् दधि" इति व्यपदिश्यते, न चैतत् सचेतनम् ; तथा, "जीवितं विषम्" "मृतं कुसुम्भकम्" इत्यादि । अत्रोच्यते-वनस्पती सर्वाण्यपि सचेतनलिङ्गानि जन्मादीन्युपलभ्यन्ते, अतो मनुष्येष्विव तानि तेषु निरुपचरितानि, दध्यादौ तु प्रतिनियत एव कश्चिजातादिव्यपदेशो दृश्यते, स चौपचारिक एव-जातमिव जातं दधि, मृतमिव मृतं कुसुम्भकमित्यादि ॥ २०५ ।। (१७५३) ।
D. C.-Trees are sa-cetana like woman. Because, like woman, they possess the living characteristics such as janmagara-jivana-marana etc. Some one might argue that this rule could be applied to the lifeless objects also. Because, several characteristics like life, death, etc. are very well applied to the lifeless objects as well, when it is said that "curds is produced” or “ ( effect of) that poison is still alive" or (intoxication of ) safflowert is dead ” and so on even though the objects mentioned there-in, are lifeless,
The argument mentioned above is not justified since all the characteristics of cetana are residing in the animate objects as their innate qualities. But in the case of lifeless objects, those characteristics are rarely applied and that too in a particular sense and not as a rule. छिकपरोइया छिक्कमेत्तसंकोयओ कुलिंगो छ। आसयसंचाराओ वियत्त ! वल्लीवियाणाई ॥२०६॥ (१७५४) सम्मादओ य साव-प्पबोह-संकायणाइओऽभिमया। बउलादओ य सदाइविसयकालोवलंभाओ ॥२०७॥ (१७५५)
+ Popularly known as Kusumbā in Käthrawar.

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Vada ] Gañadhuravada
.: 265 Chikkaparoiyā chikkamettasankoyao kulingo vya : Asayasancārao Viyatta ! valliviyanaim ॥ 206 ॥ ( 1754 ) Sammādao ya sava-ppaboha-sankoyanaio bhimaya । Baulādao ya saddāivisayakālovalambhāo 11 207 11 ( 1755 ) [ स्पृष्टप्ररोदिकाः स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचतः कुलिङ्ग इव ।
आश्रयसंचाराद् व्यक्त ! वल्लीवितानानि ॥ २०६ ॥ ( १७५४ ) शम्यादयश्च स्वाप-प्रबोध-संकोचनादितोऽभिमताः ।
बकुलादयश्च शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात् ॥ २०७॥ (१७५५) Spristprarodikāḥ spriştamātrasankocanataḥ kulinga iva i Aśrayasancárād Vyakta ! vallīvitānāni II 206 11 ( 1754 ) ] Samyadayaśca svāpa-prabodha-sankocanădito'bhimatāḥ Bakuladayasca sabdidivisaya kalopalambhat | 207 ॥ ( 1755 )]
Trans.--206–207 For, sensitive plants 0 Vyakta ! contract themselves like worin at the touch ( of others ); clusters of creepers spread themselves for support; sami etc. are supposed to contain the properties of sleeping, waking, contraction, etc and bakula etc. contain the properties like sabda etc. and ( the order of ) time also. ( 1754-1755 )
टीका-सचेतनाः स्पृष्टप्ररोदिकादयो वनस्पतयः, स्पृष्टमात्रसंकोचात् , -कुलिङ्गः कीटादिस्तद्वत् । तथा, सचेतना वल्ल्यादयः, स्वरक्षार्थ वृत्ति-वृक्षवरण्डकाद्याश्रयं प्रति संचरणात् । तथा, शम्यादयश्चेतनत्वेनाभिमताः, स्वापप्रबोध-संकोचादिमत्त्वात् , देवदत्तवत् । तथा, सचेतना बकुला-ऽशोक-कुरुबकविरहक-चम्पक-तिलकादयः, शब्दादिविषयकालोपलम्भात्-शब्द-रूप-गन्धरस-स्पर्शविषयाणां काले प्रस्ताव उपभोगस्य यथासंख्यमुपलम्भादित्यर्थः, यज्ञदत्तवदिति । एवं पूर्वमपि दौहृदादिलिङ्गेषु कूष्माण्डी-बीजपूरकादयो वनस्पतिविशेषाः पक्षीकर्तव्या इति ॥ २०६-२०७ ॥ (१७५४-१७५५)।
D. C.--Plants like spars'aprarodikā contract themselves like worn at a slight touch, and hence they are sa-cetana.

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.: 266 :
Jinabhadra Gaņi's (The fourth So are the creepers spreading over a wall, tree or fence, for self-protection. Sami etc. are also sa-cetana, since they have the tendency to sleep, wake, or feel shy like Devadatta. Trees like bakula, as'oka, kurabaka, viharaka, campaka, tilaka eto., are respectively able to feel the sensations of s'abda, rūpa, rasa, gandha, spars'a etc. Plants like kusmāndî and bijapuraka feel the longing of a pregnant woman. It is clear, therefore, that vanaspati is sa-cetana.
Moreover, मंसंकुरो व सामाणजाइरूवंकुरोवलंभाओ। तरुगण-विदम-लवणो-वलादओ सासयावत्था ॥२०८॥(१७५६) Mansankuro vya sāmānajāi-rūvamkurovalambhão 1 Tarugana-vidduma-lavaņo-valădao sāsayāvatthā. ll 208 11 (1756) [मांसाङ्कर इव समानजातिरूपाङ्कुरोपलम्भात् ।
तरुगण-विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादयः स्वाश्रयावस्थाः ॥२०८॥ (१७५६) Mansankura iva samānajātirūpānkuropalambhāt i Tarugaņa-vidruma-lavaņo-paladayah svāśrayavasthāh||20811(1756)]
Trans.--208 Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc. ( are alive ) at their own places of production by reason of their having a sprout in the form of common generality, similar to the sprout of flesh ( 1756)
• टीका-तरुगणः, तथा विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादयश्च स्वाश्रयावस्था स्वजन्मस्थानगताः सन्तश्चेतनाः, छिन्नानामप्यमीषां पुनस्तत्स्थान एव समानजातीयाङ्कुरोत्थानात् , अर्शोमांसाङ्करवत । आह-ननु पृथिव्यादिभूतानामिह सचेतनत्वं साधयितुमारब्धम् , ततः पृथिव्या एवादौ तत् साधयितुं युक्तम् , तस्या एवादावुपन्यासात् , तत्किमिति " जम्म-जरा-जीवण" इत्यादिना तरूणामेवादौ तत् साधितम् , पश्चात्तु विद्रुम-लवणो-पलादीनामिति । सत्यम् , किन्तु पृथ्वीविकारतया पृथ्वीभूत एव तरूणामन्तर्भावो लोकप्रसिद्धः,

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Vada]
Gaṇadharavada
.: 267 ..
सुव्यक्तचैतन्यलिङ्गाश्च यथा तवो न तथा लवणो - पल - जलादय इति तेषामेवादा चैतन्यं साधितमिति ।। २०८ ।। ( १७५६ ) ॥
D. C.-Trees, corals, salts, and stones etc, are sa-cetana at their own places of production. Because, the sprouts of these objects spring up again and again like the sprout of flesh springing up in the case of disease of piles etc.
Vyakta-Really speaking, you had started to establish sa-cetanatva in the elements like prithvi etc. Then, what is the idea in proving sa-cetanate a first in the case of vanaspati and then in the case of prithvi?
Bhagavana :-Vanaspati is nothing but a form of prithvi. Hence, out of the five bhutas, vanaspati resides only in prithvi. Moreover, the spirit of life is not so clearly manifested in stones etc. as it has been in case of vanaspati. For this reason O Vyakta! Caitanya is established first in vanaspati and then in prithvi.
Now, the sa-cetanatva of water is established
भूमि क्खयसाभाविय संभवओ ददुरो व जलमुत्तं । अहवा मच्छो व सभाववोमसंभूयपायाओ ॥ २०९ ।। (१७५७)
Bhumikkhayasabhāviyasambhavao dadduro vva jalamuttam Ahava maccho va sabhāvavomasambhūyapāyāo 1209 | (1757)
[ भूमिक्षतस्वाभाविक संभवतो दर्दुर इव जलमुक्तम् ।
अथवा मत्स्य इव स्वभावव्योमसंभूतपातात् ॥ २०९ ॥ ( १७५७ ) Bhumikṣatasvabhävikasambhavato dardura iva jalamuktam Athava matsya iva svabhavavyomasambhūtapātāt II 209 || (1757)]
Trans-209 Water springing up naturally by digging the earth is said to be living like a frog; or, by reason of its falling naturally from the sky, water is living like a fish. (1757)

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: 268 :Jinabhadra
[ The fourth ____टीका--भौममम्भः सचेतनमुक्तम् , क्षतभूमिसजातीयस्वाभाविकस्य तस्य संभवात् , दर्दुरवत् । अथवा, सचेतनमन्तरिक्षमम्भः, अभ्रादिविकारस्वभावसंभूतपातात् , मत्स्यवदिति ॥ २०९ ॥ (१७५७)॥
___D. C.-Water springing from earth when dug out of it, is sa-cetana lıke a frog; or, that which falls from the sky as natural rains, is also called sa-cetana since it comes from vikāras like cloud etc.
Fire, as well as, wind can also be taken as sa-cetona in this way :अपरप्पेरियतिरियानियमियदिग्गमणोऽणिलो गो व्व। अनलो आहाराओ विद्धि-विगारोवलम्भाओ ॥२१०॥ (१७५८) Apprapperiyatiriyāniyamiya deggamaņao’nilo go vya i Analo āhārāo viddhi-vigārova-lambhão 11 210 11 ( 1758 ) [अपरप्रेरिततिर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनतोऽनिलो गौरिख ।
अनल आहाराद् वृद्धि-विकारोपलम्भात् ॥ २१० ॥ (१७५८) Aparapreritatiryganiyamitadiggamanato’nilo gauriva i Anala ahārād vriddhi-vikāropalambhāt 11 210 11 ( 1758 )]
Trans.--210 Wind is ( alive ) like a cow on account of its moving to and fro in various directions without being impelled by others. Fire ( is sa-cetana ) because it has attained growth as well as variety of forms by means of food. ( 1758)
टीका-सात्मको वायुः, अपरप्रेरिततिर्यगनियमितदिग्गमनात्, गोवत् । यथा, सात्मकं तेजः, आहारोपादानात् , तवृद्धौ विकारविशेषोपलम्भाच्च, नरवत् । गाथाबन्धानुलोम्याच, नरवत् । गाथाबन्धानुलोम्याच्च व्यत्ययेनोपन्यास इति ॥ २१० ॥ (१७५८)
____D. C.-Wind has life as it moves in all directions without the help of any external agency. Fire is also sa-java as it is alle to grow and manifest various forms by the help of āhāra,

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•: 269 : तणवोऽणब्भाइविगारमुत्तजाइत्तओऽणिलंताई। सत्थासत्थहयाओ निज्जीव-सजीवरूवाओ ॥ २११॥ (१७५९) Tanavo'nabbhāivigaramuttajāittao'ạilantāim | Satthāsatthahayāo nijjîva-sa-jîvarūvão 211 ll ( 1759 ) [ तनवोऽनभ्रादिविकारमूर्तजातित्वतोऽनिलान्तानि ।
शस्त्रा-ऽशस्त्रहता निर्जीव-सजीवरूपाः ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९) Tanavo'nabhrādivikáramūrtajātitvato’nilántani i Sastra-Sastrahatā nirjiva-sa-jiva rāpah ॥ 211 ।। ( 1759 )] ___Trans.-211 Bodies ( made of the four bhutas ) ending at vāyu though different from forms like clouds etc. become lifeless when smashed by weapons and alive when free from weapons on account of their corporeal form. ( 1759 )
टीका-पृथिव्याधनिलान्तानि चत्वारि भूतानि जीवनिर्वतितास्तदाधारभूतास्तनव इति प्रतिज्ञा, अभ्रादिविकारादन्यत्वे सति मृतजातित्वात् , गवादिशरीरवत् । अभ्रादिविकारस्तु विस्रसापरिणतपुद्गलसंघातरूपत्वेनाचेतनत्वाद् वर्जितः। ताश्च पृथिव्यादितनवः शस्त्रोपहता निर्जीवाः, अशस्त्रोपहतास्तु सजीवा वर्ण-गन्ध-रसादिलक्षणतः समवसेया इति ॥ २११ ॥ (१७५९)
D. C.-Objects made of bhutas like prithvi jala, tejas, and vāyu are distinguished from objects like clouds etc. on account of their definite corporeal forms. Hence, these bodies are alive when free from the attack of any weapon, but they at once become lifeless when smashed by weapons.
Bhūtas like prithvî etc. can be proved as living in another way also :-- सिज्झति सोम्म! बहुसो जीवा नवसत्तसंभवो नवि य । परिमियदेसो लोगो न संति चेगिदिया जेसिं ॥२१२॥(१७६०) ते सिं भवविच्छित्ती पावइ नेवा य सा जओ तेण । सिद्धमणंता जीवा भूयाहारा य तेऽवस्सं ॥ २१३॥ (१७६१)

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.: 270 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
The fourth
Sijjhanti Somma ! bahuso jîvā navasattasambhavo navi ya i Parimiyadeso logo na santi cegindiyā jesim 11 212 11 ( 1760 ) Te sim bhavavicchittî pāvai netthā ya sā jao tena Siddhamanantā jīvā bhūyāhārā ya te’vassam II 213 ( 1761 ) [सिध्यन्ति सौम्य ! बहुशो जीवा नवसत्संभवो नापि च ।
परिमितदेशो लोको न सन्ति चैकेन्द्रियां येषाम् ॥ २१२ ॥ (१७६०) तेषां भवविच्छित्तिः प्राप्नोति नेष्टा च सा यतस्तेन ।
सिद्धमननन्ता जीवा भूताधाराश्च तेऽवश्यम् ॥ २१३ ॥ (१७६१) Sidhyanti Saumya ! bahušo jívá navasttvasambhavo napi ca i Parimitadeso loko na santi caikendriyam yesam 1121211 (1760) ] Teşām bhavavicchittih prāpnoti ca sa yatastena 1 Siddhamananta jiva bhātādhārasca te'vasyam ॥ 213 ॥ ( 1761)]
Trans.--212-213 Many a jīvā, O Saumya ! attains moksa and there is no possibility of new jivas ( to be born ). The world is limited. So, those according to whom, plants etc. do not exist, will have the whole mundane world destroyed. But (ca) that is not desirable. Hence it is definitely proved that they (i, e. plants etc ) are the endless jivas with bhūtas as their supports ( 1760-1761 )
टीका-सिध्यन्ति मुक्तिं यान्ति तावदजसं बहुशो जीवा, न च नवसवोत्पादः केनापीष्यते, परिमितदेशश्च लोकः, ततस्तदाधाराः स्थूलाः स्तोका एव जीवा घटन्ते । एवं च सति येषां मतेन वनस्पत्यादय एकेन्द्रिया जीवा न सन्ति, तेषां भवस्य संसारस्य व्यवच्छित्तिः प्राप्नोति । न चासौ कस्यापि तीर्थान्तरीयस्येष्टा यतः, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् सिद्धं सत्त्वानामानन्त्यम् । ते च संसारित्वादवश्यं भूताधाराः शरीरिण एवेत्यर्थः । न च वनस्पत्यादीनन्तरेणान्यत् तेषां शरीरमुपपद्यते । निवेद्यन्तां वा यच्छरीरास्ते, अभ्युपगम्यतां वा वनस्पत्यादीनां सात्मकत्वमिति भावः ॥ २१२-२१३ ॥ ( १७६०-१७६१)॥ ___D.C:-Since many jivas attain moksa there is no possibi

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lity of new sattvas to be born. Moreover, this world is limited in space. It is natural, therefore, that there will be a small number of jivas depending upon it. Under these circumstances, if one believes that plants etc. are not sa-cetana, the whole of the mundane world will have to cease existing in no time. But that is not desirable in any way. Hence, in order to account for the continuity of the mundane world, the continuity of the living beings is accepted. Now since all these jivas are the mundane jivas, they must have bhutas as their s'astras (weapons) and since plants etc. are based on bhutas they should also be undoubtedly taken as sa-jiva.
Ganadharavada
•: 271 :.
Now, the opponent's objection and its refutationएवमहिंसाभावो जीवघणं ति न य तं जओऽभिहिअं । सत्थोवहयमजीवं न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसो ॥ २१४॥ (१७६२)
Evamahimsabhāvo jîvaghaṇam ti na ya tam jao'bhihiam Satthovahayamajîvam na ya jîvaghanam ti to himso 214(1762) [ एवमहिंसाभावो जीवधनमिति न च तद् यतोऽभिहितम् ।
शस्त्रोपहतमजीवं न च जीवधनमिति ततो हिंसा ।। २१४ ।। (१७६२) Evamahimsa'bhavo jîvaghanamiti na ca tad yato'bhihitam | Sastropahatamajivam na ca jîvaghanamiti tato himsā ||214|| (1762)]
Trans. 214 (The opponent may ask that) There is no possibility of ahimsa in that case on account of the statement that " (the world) is compact with jivas. (The reply is) That is not so. It has already been said that one is rendered lifeless (only) when beaten by weapons. So, himsā could never be derived merely from the statement that "( the world) is compact with jivas." (1762)
19
टीका - नन्वेवं सति लोकस्यातीवपृथिव्या दिजीवधनत्वादहिंसाऽभावः, dqàccafgaızafazý faaf gfag+aqzfafa_ma: | aŝag a, aðऽनन्तरमेवाभिहितमस्माभिः - " शस्त्रोपहतं पृथिव्यादिकमजीवं " भवति ।

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.: 272
Jinabhadra Gaņi's (The fourth तदजीवत्वे चाकृता-कारितादिपरिभोगेन निर्वहत्येव यतीनां संयमः । न च "जीवधनो लोकः" इत्येतावन्मात्रेणैव हिंसा संभवतीति ॥२१४॥(१७६२)॥
___D. C.-Vyakta :-If the world is packed with jitvas such as prithvî etc. even an ascetic will not be able to follow the vow of ahumsā, as they will least require food etc. which they would not obtain without himsā.
____Bhagavāna :-For this, it has already been said O Vyakta ! that prithvi etc. become lifeless when beaten by weapons. Thus, when they become a-jiva there is no objection for yatis to get their food from them. So, it is not proper to deduce hingsā merely from the statement that the world is full of jîvas.
Moreover, न य घायउ त्ति हिंसो नाघायंतो त्ति निच्छियमहिंसो। न विरलजीवमाहिंसो न य जीवघणं ति तो हिंसा ॥२१५॥(१७६३) अहणतो वि हु हिंसो दुट्टत्तणओ मओ अहिमरो छ । बाहिंतो न वि हिंसो सुद्धत्तणओ जहा विज्जो ॥२१६॥ (१७६४) Na ya ghāyau tti hiņso nāghāyanto tti nicchiyamahimso Na viralajîvamahimso na ya jîvaghaṇam ti to himso 121511 (1763) Ahananto vi hu himso dutthattanao mao ahimaro vva i Bahinto na vi himso suddhattanao jaha vijjo ॥ 216 ॥ ( 1764 ) [ न च घातक इति हिंस्रो नाननिति निश्चितमहिंस्रः। न विरलजीवमहिंस्रो न च जीवघनमिति ततोहिंस्रः ॥२१५॥ (१७६३) अनन्नपि खलु हिंस्रो दुष्टत्वतो मतोऽभिमर इव ।
बाधमानो नापि हिंस्रः शुद्धत्वतो यथा वैद्यः ॥ २१६ ॥ (१७६४ ) Na ca ghātaka iti himsro nāghnanniti niścitamahimsrah | Na viralajivamhimsro na ca jivaghanamiti tato hinusrah ॥ 215॥]

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Gañadharavada
3273
Aghnannapi khalu hiņsro dustatvato mato’bhimara iva i Badhamāno nāpi himsraḥ śuddhatvato yathā vaidyaḥ 1121611 ]
Trans.--215-216 One who is destructive, is not ( necessarily ) murderous, and one who is not destructive, is not certainly non-violent. Nor is one having little jiva, a-himsaka and one that is packed with jivas accepted as himsaka. For, one is murderous, like a hunter, on account of his wicked motive even without killing; while another afflicting others with a good purpose, like a physician, is not murderous. ( 1763-1764 ).
टीका-न हि " घातकः" इत्येतावता हिंस्रः, न चानन्नपि निश्चयनयमतेनाहिंस्रः, नापि “विरलजीवम्" इत्येतावन्मात्रेणाहिंस्रः, न चापि “जीवधनम्" इत्येतावता च हिंस्र इति । किं तहिं ? अभिमरो गजादिघातकः स इव दुष्टाध्यवसायोऽनन्नपि हिंस्रो मतः। बाधमानोऽपि च शुद्धपरिणामो न हिंस्रो यथा वैद्यः, इति नन्नप्यहिंस्त्रः, अनन्नपि च हिंस्र उक्तः ॥ २१५२१६ ॥ (१७६३-१७६४)॥
___D. C.-The point is that one committing actual himstl is not himsaka because of his good motive as in the case of a physician, while another, not actually committing himsā but having wicked purpose, is himsaka like a hunter.
Also,
पंचसमिओ तिगुत्तो नाणी अविहिंसओ न विवरीओ। होउ व संपत्ती से मा वा जीवोवरोहेणं ॥ २१७ ॥ (१७६५) Pancasamio tigutto nāņî avihimsao na vivario 1 Hou va sampatti se mā vā jîvovarohenam u 217 11 ( 1765 ) [ पञ्चसमितस्त्रिगुप्तो ज्ञान्यविहिंसको न विपरीतः।
भवतु वा संपत्तिस्तस्य मा वा जीवोपरोधेन ॥ २१७ ॥ ( १७६५ )
38

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Jinabhadra Gani's
Pancasamitastrigupto jnanyavihimsako na viparitaḥ Bhavatu vā sampattistasya mā vā jivoparodhena ||217 | ( 1765 ) ]
.: 274:
[ The fourth
Trans-217 A wise person, conversant with the five samitis† and guarded in three ways (ie, by mind, speech and body) is a-himsaka, but not the one (having) contrary ( characteristics ). He may or may not attain the fulfilment (of ) himsā on account of obstruction to jtvas. ( 1765 )
,
टीका - पञ्चभिः समितिभिः समितः तिस्रभिर्गुप्तिभिश्च गुप्तो ज्ञानी जीवस्वरूप - तद्रक्षाक्रियाभिज्ञः सर्वथा जीवरक्षापरिणामपरिणतः तत्प्रयतश्च कथमपि हिंसन्नप्यविहिंसको मतः । एतद्विपरीतलक्षणस्तु नाहिंसकः, किन्तु हिंस्र एवायम्, अशुभपरिणामत्वात् । बाह्यजीवहिंसायास्तु जीवोपरोधेन जीवस्य कीटादेरुपरोधेनोपघातेन संपत्तिर्भवतु मा भूद् वा 6 स तस्य साध्वादेः, हिंसकत्वे तस्या अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति ॥। २१७ ।। ( १७६५ ) ।
D. C.-A person conversant with all the five samitis and restraining himself in three ways-manasa ( by mind) vacasă ( by speech ) and karmanā ( by bodily actions ) – is the jñātā of actual jivasvarupa and its protection. Such a person should be taken as a-himsaka even if he commits himsă. But one who is opposed to the nature of the above-mentioned jnanî purusa, is himsakca as he brings about an a- subha parināma. Fulfilment of himsä may or may not be attained by him due to jrvoparodha or the ( natural ) obstruction to jivas, but his himsakatva is undoubtedly established on account of his bad intention and its inauspicious consequence as laid down below:
असुभो जो परिणामोसा हिंसा सो उ बाहिरनिमित्तं । को वि अवेक्खेज्ज न वा जम्हाऽणेगंतियं बज्झं ॥ २९८ ॥ (१७६६
Asubho jo pariņāmo sa himsā so u bahiranimittam | Ko vi avekkhejja na vā jamhā'negantiyam bajjham 218 (1766)
+ Five Jarne 1ules of life,

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Vada] Gañadharavada
.: 275 [ अशुभो यः परिणामः सा हिंसा स तु बाह्यनिमित्तम् ।
कोऽप्यपेक्षेत न वा यसादनैकान्तिकं बाह्यम् ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६ ) Aśubho yaḥ pariņāmaḥ sā himsā sa tu bāhyanimittam i Ko'pyape kşeta na va yasmādanaikāntikam bāhyam ||2181|(1766)]
Trans.—218 What is ( known as ) inauspicious consequence is ( itself ) himsā. But that is an external cause. Some may or may not require ( this cause ), because the external ( cause ) is variable. ( 1766 )
टीका-यसादिह निश्चयनयतो योऽशुभपरिणामः स एव " हिंसा" इत्याख्यायते । स च बाह्यसत्त्वातिपातक्रियालक्षणं निमित्तं कोऽप्यपेक्षते, कोऽपि पुनस्तन्निरपेक्षोऽपि भवेत् , यथा तन्दुलमत्स्यादीनाम् ; तस्मादनैकान्तिकमेव बाह्यनिमित्तम् , तत्सद्भावेऽप्यहिंसकत्वात् , तदभावेऽपि च हिंसकत्वादिति ॥ २१८ ॥ (१७६६ )॥
D. C.-An action having inanspicious consequence is called himsā. This sort of himsā results from the nimitta of jîvahimsā while sometimes himsā results without the apeksā of those nimittas as in the case of tandulamatsya. As the bahya nimitta is anaikāntika, an action is himsaka sometimes even in absence of bāhya nimitta and a-hinsaka sometimes even in its own absence. असुभपरिणामहेऊ जीवाबाहो त्ति तो मयं हिंसा। जस्स उन सो निमित्तं संतो विन तस्स साहिंसा ॥२१९॥(१७६७) Asubhaparināmaheū jīvābāho tti to mayam himsā i Jassa u na so nimittam santo vi na tassa sā himsā 1121911 (1767) [अशुभपरिणामहेतुर्जीवावाध इति ततो मतं हिंसा ।
यस्य तु न स निमित्तं सन्नपि न तस्य सा हिंसा ॥ २१९ ।। (१७६७) Asubhapariņāmahetu r-jivābādha iti tato matam himsa i Yasya tu na sa nimittam sannapi na tasya sa himsā ||21911 ]

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fourth
Trans.--219 Affliction of sivas as a cause for an evil end is called himsā. That which has no such (end), has nothing like himsā even if cause is there. ( 1767)
टीका-ततस्तस्माद् यो जीवाबाधोऽशुभपरिणामस्य हेतुः, अथवा, अशुभपरिणामो हेतुः कारणं यस्यासावशुभपरिणामहेतुर्जीवाबाधो जीवधाता, स एव " हिंसा" इति मतं तीर्थकर-गणधराणाम् । यस्य तु जीवाबाधस्य सोऽशुभपरिणामो न निमित्तं स जीवाबाधं सन्नपि तस्य साधोर्न हिंसेति ॥ २१९ ॥ (१७६७)॥
D. C.-One who inflicts pain upon javas with an evil purpose is said to commit himsā; but one who has no such purpose does not commit himsă even if he inflicts pain upon jîvas. सद्दादओ रइफला न वीयमोहस्स भावसुद्धीओ। जह, तह जीवाबाहो न सुद्धमणसो वि हिंसाए ॥२२०॥(१७६८) Saddādao raiphalā na vîyamohassa bhāvasuddhio i Jaha, taha jivabāho na suddhamanaso vi himsāe || 220 ॥ (1768) [शब्दादयो रतिफला न वीतमोहस्य मावशुद्धः। .
यथा, तथा जीवावाधो न शुद्धमनसोऽपि हिंसायै ॥२२०॥ (१७६८) Sabdadayo ratiphalá na vitamohasya bhavasuddheh | Yathi, tathā jivabadho na suddhamanaso'pi himsāyai ॥ 220 ॥ ]
Trans.--220 Just as sabda etc do not become the objects of pleasure to a dispassionate saint on account of the purity. of ( his ) mind, affliction of jivas too does not become the cause of himsā to a person having pure intention ( 1768 )
टीका-यथेह वीतराग-द्वेष-मोहस्य भगवत इष्टाः शब्द-रूपादयो भावविशुद्धितो न कदाचिद् रतिफला रतिजनकाः संपद्यन्ते, यथा वेह शुद्धात्मनो रूपवत्यामपि मातरि न विषयाभिलाषः संजायते; तथा शुद्धपरिणामस्य यत्नवतः साधोः सत्त्वोपघातोऽपि न हिंसाय संपद्यते । ततोऽ

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शुभ परिणामजनकत्वे बाह्यं निमित्तमनैकान्तिकमेवेति । तस्माद् व्यक्त ! सन्ति पञ्चभूतानि चेतनानि चाद्यानि चत्वारि, इत्येतत् प्रतीहीति स्थितम् । यच्च "स्वमोमयं वै सकलम्" इत्यादि । तत्रापि यस्तव चेतसि वर्तते नासावर्थः, किन्तु भवभैोद्विग्नानां भव्यसखानां धन- कनक - पुत्र - कलत्राद्य सारतामात्रप्रतिपादनं तेन विधीयते, येन ते तदास्थां परित्यज्य मुक्तये प्रवर्तन्ते, न पुनस्तत्र भूताभावः प्रतिपाद्यते । इति मुञ्च संशयम्, प्रतिपद्यस्व भूतास्तित्वमिति ॥ २२० ॥ ( १७६८ )
D. C. — To a dispassionate saint, s'abda, rupa, rasa etc. do not become the attractive objects of pleasure because his mind is pure. A pure-minded man does never cherish desire for sensuous pleasure from a beautiful mother. In the same way, a self-restrained and persevering muni does never commit himsa even if he inflicts pain upon jivas on account of his s'uddha bhavas. It is clear, therefore, that bahya nimitta is anaikantika so far as himsa is concerned, and what is required is the intention pure and simple.
Hence O Bhadra! accept the existence of the five bhutas and know it for certain that the first four of them viz, prithvi, jala, agni, and vayu are sa-cetana. Moreover, you have not understood the real meaning of the Veda-padas like "Svanopamam var sakalam" etc. The main object of those sentences is to assert the fragility of wealth, wife, progeny etc. before the high-minded people who have been distressed by the bhavabhaya, so that they might abandon their attachment to the worldly visayas and strive for the attainment of moksa. Leave, therefore, all your doubts aside, O Saumya! and admit the existence of bhutas.
छिन्नम्म संसम्म जिणेण जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । सो समणो पओ पंचहिं सह खंडिसएहिं ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७६९)
Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jară-maranavippamukkeṇam So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim ||221 ( 1769)

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स श्रमणः प्रबजितः पञ्चभिः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ २२१ ॥ (१७६९) Chinne samsaye Jinena jarā-maraṇavipramuktena 1 Sa śramaņah pravrajitah pancabhiḥ saha khaņdikašataiḥ ||22111 ]
Trans.-221 When the doubt was removed by the Tîrthankara, who was entirely free from old age, and death, the saint Vyakta accepted diksā along with his five hundred pupils. (1769)
End of the Discussion with the Fourth Ganadhara.

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Chapter V
पञ्चमगणधरवक्तव्यता। Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara.
ते पवइए सोउं सुहम आगच्छइ जिणसगासं । वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २२२॥ (१७७०) Te pavvale söum Suhuma āgacchai Jiņasagāsam 1 Vaccāmi na vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi 11 222 ( 1770 ) [ तान् प्रवजितान् श्रुत्वा सुधर्म आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २२२ ॥ (१७७०) Tan pravrajitan śrutva Sudharma agacchati Jinsakāśam 1 Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse 11 222 || ( 1770 )
Trans.—222 Having heard that they (Vyakta and others) had renounced the world, Sudharman comes before the Tirtharkara. (He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. ( 1770 ) आभट्ठो ये जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुकेणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवण्णु सवदरिसी णं ॥२२३॥ (१७७१) Ābhattho ya Jiņeņam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkenami Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam ॥ 223 ॥ (1771)
आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरामरणविप्रमुक्तेन । नाना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ २२३ ॥ (१७७१)

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Abhisitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena | Namnā ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsina ॥ 223 ॥ ( 1771)]
Trans.-223 He was addressed by his name, and gotra ( lineage ), by the Tirthankara who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was all-knowing, and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1771 ) किं मन्ने जारिसो इहभवम्मि सो तारिसो परभवे वि । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥२२४॥ (१७७२) Kim manne jāriso ihabhavammi so tāriso parabhave vi i Veya-payāna ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 224 ॥ ( 1772 ) [किं मन्यसे यादृश इहभवे स तादृशः परभवेऽपि ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२) Kim manyase yādšiša ihabhave sa tādriśaḥ parabhave’pi 1 Veda-padanām cârtham na jānási tesāmayamarthaḥ 1122411(1772)]
Trans.-224 Is it your belief that human life even in the next world is the same as it is in this world ? But ( ca ) you do not know the ( real ) ireaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their ( real ) interpretation ( 1772 )
टीका-त्वमेवं मन्यसे-यो मनुष्यादिर्यादृश इहभवे स तादृशः परभवेऽपि । नन्वयमनुचितस्ते संशयः, यतोऽसौ विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि-“ पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशवः पशुत्वम् " इत्यादि, तथा, “ श्रृगालो वै एष जायते यः सपुरीषो दह्यते" इत्यादि । एषां च वेदपदानाममुमर्थ मन्यसे त्वम्-"पुरुषो मृतः सन् परभवे पुरुषत्वमेवेत्यादि, अमूनि किल भवान्तरगतजन्तुसादृश्यप्रतिपादकानि तथा, " श्रृगालो वै" इत्यादीनि तु वैसदृश्यख्यापकानि” इति । अतस्तव संशयः । अयं चायुक्त एव, यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानां नायमर्थः, किन्तु वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २२४ ॥ (१७७२)॥
D. C-0 Sudharman ! Do you entertain the belief that

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human life in the next world is the same as it is here ? Sentences of Vedas having contradictory interpretations have given rise to this illusion of yours. The sentences are as follows :(1)“ Puruso vai puruşatvamas'nute, pas'avah pašutvam"
etc. and ( 2 ) " Śrugālo vai eșa jāyate yah sa-puriso dahyate” etc.
According to you, interpretations of these two sentences are respectively as follows :
(1) A man obtains nothing but manhood even after death, in the next world; and animals such as cow etc. become animals after death. Thus, sentences like this suggest that the next life is the same as this.
(2) But the sentences like " Śrugālo vai eto." mean to assert that the next life is totally different from the present one.
Such contradicting interpretations have given rise to the misguided belief of yours. Here is their real interpretation. Listen carefully. कारणसरिसं कजं बीयस्सेवकुरो त्ति मण्णंतो। इहभवसरिसं सत्वं जमवेसि परे वि तमजुत्तं ॥२२५॥ (१७७३) Kāranasarisam kajjam bîyassevankuro tti mannanto lhabhavasarisanı savvanı jamavesi pare vi tamajuttam 1122511 (1773) [ कारणसदृशं कार्य बीजस्येवाङ्कुर इति मन्यमानः ।
इहभवसदृशं सर्व यदवैषि परस्मिन्नपि तदयुक्तम् ।। २२५ ।। (१७७३) Kāpaņasadsiśam kāryam bijasyevārkura iti manyamāna) 1 Ihabhavasadsiśam sarvam yadavaisi parasminnapi tadayuklam||22511]
Trans.—225 Just as sprout is similar to seed, the effect is also similar to cause according to you. (And hence ), you

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believe everything in the next world to be similar to everything in this world. (But ) that is not correct. ( 1773 )
___टीका-सुधर्माणं प्रति भगवानुवाच-" इह कारणानुरूपमेव कार्य भवति, यथा यवबीजानुरूपो यवाङ्कुरः, इहभवकारणं चान्यजन्म, ततस्तेनापीहभवदृशेन भवितव्यम्" इत्येवं मन्यमानस्त्वं यदिहभवसदृशं सर्व पुरुषादिकं परभवेऽप्यवैषि, तदयुक्तमेवेति ॥ २२५ ॥ (१७७३)
D. C.-Since kāraṇa is the same as karya according to you, the past life, being the karana of the present life, becomes the same as the present life. That is why you are led to believe that everything in this life is similar to everything in the next one. But this apprehension of yours is not correct.
Because--
जाइ सरो सिंगाओ भूतणओ सासवाणुलित्ताओ। संजायइ गोलोमाऽविलोमसंजोगओ दुवा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४) इति रुक्खायुवेदे जोणिविहाणे य विसरिसेहिंतो। दीसइ जम्हा जम्मं सुहम्म! तो नायमेगंतो ॥२२७॥ (१७७५) Jāi saro singão bhūtanao sāsavāņulittão i Sanjayai goloma'vilomasanjogao duvva ॥ 226 ॥ ( 1774 ) Iti rukkhāyuvvede jonivihāne ya visarisehinto I Disai jamhā jammam Suhamma! to nāyameganto 1122711 (1775) [ जायते शरः शृङ्गाद् भूवणकः सर्षपानुलिप्तात् ।
संजायते. गोलोमाऽविलोमसंयोगतो दूर्वा ॥ २२६ ॥ (१७७४) इति वृक्षायुर्वेदे योनिविधाने च विसदृशेभ्यः।।
दृश्यते यस्माजन्म सुधर्मन् ! ततो नायमेकान्तः ।। २१७॥ (१७७५) Jayate śarah śțirigād bhūtřiņakah sarsapānuliptāt i Sanjayate goloma'vilomasamyogato dārva ॥ 226 ॥ ( 1774 )]

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:: 283 :Iti vsiksăurvede yonividhāne ca visadpisebhyaḥ, Drisyate yasmajjanma Sudharman ! tato nayamekāntah || 227 ॥]
Trans.--226-227 The śara plant is produced from horn; earth-grass? is produced by the anointing of mustard, and dūrvās is produced by the combination of goloma+ and aviloma plants. Similarly, in the treatises on (planting and cultivation of) trees, production is brought about by the combination of ( a number of ) dissimilar objects. The rule is, therefore, not exclusive, O Sudharman! ( 1774-1775)
टीका-ततः " कारणानुरूपं कार्यम् " इति सुधर्मन् ! नायमेकान्तः, यतः श्रृङ्गादपि शरो जायते, तस्मादेव च सर्षपानुलिप्ताद् भूतृणकः शष्यसंघातो जायते; तथा, गोलोमा-ऽविलोमाभ्यां दूर्वा प्रभवति, इत्येवं वृक्षायुर्वेद विलक्षणानेकद्रव्यसंयोगजन्मानो वनस्पतयो दृश्यन्ते । तथा, योनिविधाने च । योनिप्राभृते विसदृशानेकद्रव्यसंयोगयोनयः सर्प-सिंहादिप्राणिनो मणयो हेमादयश्च पदार्था नानारूपाः समुपलभ्यन्ते । अतः केयं कार्यस कारणानुरूपता ? इति ॥ २२६-२२७ ॥ (१७७४-१७७५)॥
D. C.-The rule that kaaryaa is similar to karana is not ekantika. Because, the scarra is produced even by means of s'rnga, by the unction of mustard-seeds the earth-grass is produced and by the combination of goloma and aviloma grasses, the diurva grass is produced.
Moreover, in the treatise on the planting and cultivation of trees, production of objects such as jewels, gold, etc is
___1. Bhutrinalea (earth-grass ) = A kind of fragnant grass; the plantb Androhogon Schoenanthus.
2. Sarsapa=Mustard-seed; popularly known as’ sarasava in Western India; Sinapis Dichotoma.
3. Dūrvā=Name of a bent grass; panic grass. Panicum Dactylon; 4. Goloma, Aviloma=Two different kinds of bent giass.
5. Vriksāyu = Name of a short treatise by Sürpāla on the planting and cultivation of trees.

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shown as being brought about by the combination of various dissimilar objects. The rule of similarity between karya and karana, is therefore, inapplicable in this case.
Or, say, the life of creatures in the next world is distinguished from their life in this world, on account of similarity between karya and karana in this way :
अहवा जउ च्चिय बीयाणुरूवजम्मं मयं तओ चेव ।
जीवं गिण्ह भवाओ भवंतरे चित्तपरिणामं ॥२२८॥ (१७७६) जेण भवंकुरबीयं कम्मं चित्तं च तं जओऽभिहियं । उविचित्तत्तणओ भवंकुरविचित्तया तेणं ॥ २२९ ॥ (१७७७) जइ पडिवन्नं कम्मं हेउविचित्तत्तओ विचित्तं च । तो तत्फलं वि चित्तं पवज्ज संसारिणो सोम्म ! ॥ २३०॥ (१७७८)
Ahava jau cciya bîyānurūvajammam mayam tao ceva Į Jivam ginha bhavão bhavantare cittaparināmam ॥ 228 (1776 ) Jena bhavankurabiyam kammam cittam ca tam jao'bhihiyam Heuvicittattanao bhavankuraviccittayā tenam ॥ 229 ॥ ( 1777 ) Jai paḍivannam kammam heuvicittattao vicittam ca To tatphalam vi cittam pavajja samsāriņo somma ! 1230|| (1778)
[ अथवा यत एव बीजानुरूपजन्म मतं तत एव ।
जीवं गृहाण भवाद् भवान्तरे चित्रपरिणामम् || २२८ ॥ ( १७७६ ) येन भवाकरबीजं कर्म चित्रं तद् यतोऽभिहितम् । हेतुविचित्रत्वतो भवाङ्करविचित्रता तेन ॥ २२९ ॥ ( १७७७ ) यदि प्रतिपन्नं कर्म हेतुविचित्रत्वतो विचित्रं च ।
ततस्तत्फलमपि चित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्व संसारिणः सौम्य ! ||२३०|| (१७७८)
Athava yata eva bijānurūpajanma matam tata eva i Jivam grihana bhavād bhavantare cittaparinamam ॥ 228 (1776)

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.: 285 Yena bhavankurabijam karma citram tad yato’bhihitam i Hetuvicitratvato bhavankuravicitratā tena ॥ 229 ॥ ( 1777 ) Yadi pratipannam karma hetuvicitratvato vicitram ca ! Tatastatphalamapi citram pratipadyasva samsāriņah Saumya ! 1123011]
Trans.-228-229-230 Or, because the production (of karya) is similar to the root-cause, according to you, take jiva in the next life to be a pariņāma distinct from this mundane world. For, karman ( which is ) the seed of the sprout of life is itself distinct. And, if the effect is established to be distinct because the cause is distinct, know it for certain O Saumya ! that the mundane Soul has also its phala distinct from it. ( 1776-1777-1778)
टीका-व्याख्या-अथवा, यत एव बीजानुरूपं कारणानुगुणं कार्याणां जन्म मतम् , तत एवेह भवाद् भवान्तरे जीवं गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व । कथंभूतम् ? जाति-कुल-बलैश्वर्य-रूपादिविचित्रपरिणामम् । यदि नाम बीजानुरूपं जन्म, तथापि कथं भवान्तरे विचित्रता जीवानाम् ? इत्याह-" जेण भवंकुरेत्यादि " येन यस्माद् नारक-तिर्यगादिरूपेण भवनं भवः स एवाङ्कर इवाङ्करस्तस्य बीजमिह कर्मैवावसेयम् , तच्च मिथ्यात्वा-ऽचिरत्यादिहेतुवैचिव्याद् विचित्रं यस्माद् मयाऽभिहितम् , तस्मात् तजन्यस्य भवाङ्कुरस्यापि जात्यादिभेदेन विचित्रता । ततो यदि त्वया कर्म प्रतिपन्नम् , हेतुवैचिच्याच यदि तद्वैचित्र्यमभ्युपगतम्, ततः संसारिणो जीवस्य तत्फलमपि नारकतिर्यंङ्-मनुष्या-ऽमररूपेण भवनरूपं सौम्य ! विचित्ररूपं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २२८-२२९-२३० (१७७६-१७७७-१७७८)॥
D. C.-The production of various karyas is similar to the corresponding karanas according to you. But the jîva in the next life is distinguished from this world on account of jati, kula, rupa, bala, ars'varya etc. Now if Karya is taken to be similar to the kārana, how will the jîvas be different in the next life? The vicitratã of gîva in the next life is to be accounted for by means of karman. For karman being the hetu of samsāra, renders the whole samsāra, vicitra by reason

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of its own self being vicitra. So, just as karman is vicitra by reason of its wrong belief and vowlessness etc, its Karya viz, bhava should also be taken as vicitra by reason of jati, kula, rūpa, bala ete. So, if you admit Karman and if you believe that Karya is distinguished from karana, then O Saumya! know it for certain that the mundane Soul has its phala in the form of victrata as hellish beings, lower animals, human beings, or celestial beings.
चित्तं संसारितं विचित्तकम्मफलभावओ हेऊ ।
इह चित्तं चित्ताणं कम्माण फलं व लोगम्मि ॥२३१॥ (१७७९)
Cittam samsärittam vicittakammaphalabhavao heu | Iha cittam cittānam kammāna phalam va logammi || 231 (1779) [ चित्र संसारित्वं विचित्रकर्मफलभावतो हेतोः ।
इह चित्रं चित्राणां कर्मणां फलमिव लोके ॥ २३१ ॥ (१७७९ ) Citram samsaritvam vicitrakarmaphalabhavato hetoh Iha citram citrānām karmanām phalamiva loke || 231 ॥ ( 1779 ) ]
Trans.-231 Like the variable result of variable actions (accomplished) in this world, worldliness is variable on account of the hetu that (it is also) the result of variable actions. ( 1779 )
टीका - चित्र संसारिजीवानां नारकादिरूपेण संसारित्वमिति प्रतिज्ञा । विचित्रस्य कर्मणः फलरूपत्वादिति हेतुः । इह यद् विचित्रहेतुकं तद् विचित्रमुपलभ्यते, यथेह कृषि-वाणिज्यादिकर्मणां फलं लोक इति । तदेवं कर्म वैचित्र्याद् भववैचित्र्ये प्रमाणमुक्तम् || २३१ || (१७७९ ) ॥
D. C.-Just as the results of various actions like ploughing trading etc. are variable, the samsaritva of the mundane animals is also varied as seen in their hellish experience etc. on account of the fact that samsaritva is nothing but the result of their vicitra actions in the past,

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Gañadharavada Now, in support of the variable nature of Karman, the author states :चित्ता कम्मपरिणई पोग्गलपरिणामओ जहा बज्झा । कम्माण चित्तया पुण त उविचित्तभावाओ॥२३२॥ (१७८०) Cittā kammapariņaî poggalapariņāmao jahā bajjhā | Kammāņa cittayā puna taddheuvicittabhāvāo 11 232 11 ( 1780 ) [चित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः पुलपरिणामतो यथा बाह्या ।
कर्मणां चित्रता पुनस्तद्धेतुविचित्रभावात् ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०) Citrā karmapariņatiḥ pudgalapariņamiato yathā bāhya | Karmanam citrata punastaddhetuvicitrabhavat 0 232 ॥ (1780)] ____Trans.-232 Just as the outward effect of actions is variable on account of its being the pariņāma of earthly bodies, the variable nature of actions is also due to their hetu being variable. ( 1780 )
टीका-इह विचित्रा कर्मपरिणतिः, पुद्रलपरिणामात्मकत्वात् , इह यत्पुद्रलपरिणामत्मकं तद् विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं दृश्यते, यथा बाह्योऽभ्रादिविकारः, पृथिव्यादिविकारो वा, यत्तु विचित्रपरिणतिरूपं न भवति तत् पुद्रलपरिणामात्मकमपि न भवति, यथाऽऽकाशम् , या पुनः पुद्रलपरिणामसाम्येऽपि कर्मणामावरणादिभेदेन विशेषतो विचित्रता सा तद्धेतुवैचिच्यादवगन्तव्या, विचित्राश्च मिथ्यात्वादयः-प्रद्वेष-निमवादयश्च कर्महेतव इति ॥ २३२ ॥ (१७८०)॥
D. C.-Effect of Karman is varied in this world., Only that which is pudgalaparıņāmātmaka is known as vicitra (as in the case of various transformations of cloud, earth etc.). While that which is not the result of earthly půdgalas, is not recognized as a vicitraparinati ( as in the case of ākās'a ). In case of Karman itself being variable, in addition to this pudgalapariņāmatva, vicitrată is due to the variable nature of its motives like vanity, hostility, and wickedness etc. by means of which those actions are actually inspired. 232 ( 1780 ).

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[The fifth अहवा इहभवसरिसो परलोगो वि जइ सम्मओ तेणं । कम्मफलं पि इहभवसरिसं पडिवज परलोए ॥२३३॥ (१७८१) किं भणियमिह मणुया नाणागइकम्मकारिणो संति । जइ ते तप्फलभाजो परे वि तो सरिसया जुत्ता ॥२३४॥(१७८२) Ahavā ihabhavasariso paralogo vi jai sammao tenam i Kammaphalam pi ihabhavasarisam pațivajja paralöe 112331 (1781) Kim bhaniyamiha manuyā nāņāgaikammakārino santi , Jai te tapphalabhājo pare vi to sarisayā juttā || 234 i ( 1782 ) [ अथवेहभवसदृशः परलोकोऽपि यदि संमतस्तेन ।
कर्मफलमपीहभवसदृशं प्रतिपद्यस्व परलोके ॥ २३३ ॥ (१७८१) किं भणितमिह मनुजा नानागतिकर्मकारिणः सन्ति ।
यदि ते तत्फलभाजः परस्मिन्नपि ततः सदृशता युक्ता ॥२३४॥(१७८२) Athavehabhavasadțiśam paraloko’pi yadi sammatastena 1 Karmaphalamapthabhavasadrisam pratipadyasva paraloke || 233 ॥ Kim bhaạitamiha manujā nānāgatikarmakariņaḥ santi 1 Yadi te tatphalabhajah parasminnapi tatah sadrisata yukta 02340]
Trans.-233-234 Or, if the other life is also taken as the same as this life, (you should ) accept the karma phala in the other life to be the same as ( that in ) this life. Has it been said that there exist people in this world doing (various ) deeds according to their various tendences ? If they exist, there exist ( people ) in the next ( world ) to enjoy their fruits also. Sameness (of both ) is, therefore, justified. ( 1781-1782 )
टीका-व्याख्या-अथवा, यदीहभवसदृशः परलोकोऽपि संमतो भवतः, " तेणं ति" ततः कर्मफलमपि परलोक इहभवसदृशमिहत्यविचित्रशुभाऽशुभक्रियानुरूपं विचित्रं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति । एवं मुकुलितं प्रतिपाद्यैतदेव भावयति-" किं भणियमित्यादि" किमेतावता प्रतिपादितं भवति ? ।

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Vada ]
Gañadharavida इह तावद् मनुष्या नानागतिहेतुविचित्रक्रियानुष्ठायिनः सन्तीति प्रत्यक्षत एव लक्ष्यन्ते । ततो यदि ते परलोके तत्तत्क्रियाफलभाज इष्यन्ते, ततो यथेहत्यक्रियाणामसदृशता, तथा परलोकगतजन्तूनामपि सैव युक्ता, ननु योऽत्र यादृशः स परत्रापि तादृश एव भवति ॥२३३-२३४॥(१७८१-१७८२) ___D. C.--If, according to you, next life is the prototype of this one, the karmaphala in the next life will depend upon (one's ) various good or bad actions in this life. Now, since various people do various deeds as a result of their various tendences in this life, it should be noted that they enjoy fruits of their actions in the next life. So, inclination of one in the present life, depends upon his inclination in the past life also.
Then, anticipating doubts in the opponent's mind, the author states :अह इह सफलं कम्मं न परे तो सबहा न सरिसत्तं । अकयागम-कयनासा कम्माभावोऽहवा पत्तो ॥२३५॥ (१७८३) कम्माभावे य कओ भवंतरं, सरिसया व तदभावे । निकारणओ य भवो जइ ता नासो वि तह चेव ॥२३६॥(१७८४) Aha iha saphalam kammam na pare to savvahā na sarisattami Akayāgama-kayanāsā kammābhāvo'havā patto 11 235 0 ( 1783 ) Kammābhāve ya kao bhavantaram, sarisayā va tadabliāve i Nikkāraṇao ya bhavo jai tā nāso vi taha ceva 11 236 11 ( 1784) [ अथेह सफलं कर्म न परस्मिस्ततः सर्वथा न सदृशत्वम् ।
अकृतागम-कृतनाशौ कर्माभावोऽथवा प्राप्तः ॥ २३५ ॥ (१७८३) कर्माभावे च कुतो भवान्तरं, सदृशता वा तदभावे । निष्कारणकश्च भवो यदि ततो नाशोऽपि तथैव ॥ २३६ ॥ (१७८४)
31

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[The fifth
Atheha saphalam karma na parasminstataḥ sarvathā na sadrisatvam Akritagama-kritanasau karmabhāvo'thava prāptah 0235॥ (1783)] Karmabhāve ca kuto bhavāntaram sadfißatā vá tadabhāve i Niskāranakasca bhavo yadi tato naso'pi tathaiva ॥ 236॥ (1784)]
Trans.--235-236 If (the opponent says that ) Karman is successful here ( only ), ( and ) not in the next life, then there will be nothing like sameness at all. The unaccomplished object will crop up and the accomplished one will come to an end Or, there will be ( complete ) negation of Karman itself. In absence of Karman, how will the next life come into existence ? And in its absence, whence ( will ) the sadrisata ( exist ) ? And if the ( next ) life is ( taken to have been) produced without any cause, then (its ) end will also be so. ( 1783-1784)
टीका-अथैवं ब्रूषे-इह सफलं कर्मेति-इहभवसंबन्ध्येव कृष्यादिक्रियारूपं कर्म सफलम् , न तु पारभविकदानादिक्रियारूपं कर्म । ततश्च तत्फलाभावाद् न परलोके जन्तुवैसदृश्यम् । अत्रोत्तरमाह-" ततो सबहा न सरिसत्तं ति" तत एवं सति यत् तवाभिप्रेतं तत् सर्वथा परभवे जीवानां सदृशत्वं न स्यात् । तद्धि कर्मणा जन्यते, तच नास्ति, पारभविकक्रियाणां त्वया निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमात् , तन्निष्फलत्वे च कर्माभावात् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भवेत् सादृश्यम् , तबकृतस्यैव तस्य निर्हेतुकस्याऽऽगमः प्राप्नोति, कृतस्य च दान-हिंसादिक्रियाफलरूपस्य कर्मणो नाशः प्रसजति । अथवा, मूलत एव कर्मणामभावः प्राप्तः-दान-हिंसादिक्रियाणां निष्फलत्वाभ्युपगमाद् मूलत एव कर्मणो बन्धोऽपि न स्यादिति भावः । ततः किम् ? इत्याह-कर्माभावे च कारणाभावात् कुतो भवान्तरम् , तदभावे च दूरोत्सारितमेव सादृश्यम् । अथ कर्माभावेऽपि भव इष्यते, तर्हि निष्कारण एवासौ स्यात् । यदि चैवमयमियेत, ततो नाशोऽपि तस्य भवस्य निष्कारण एव स्यात् , अतो व्यर्थस्तपोनियमाद्यनुष्ठानप्रयासः। निष्कारणे च भवेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने वैसदृश्यमपि जीवानां निष्कारणं किं नेष्यते, विशेषाभावात् ? इति ॥ २३५-२३६ ॥ (१७८३-१७८४)॥

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Vada]
Gaṇadharavada
D. C.-Sudharman :-Actions (like ploughing etc.) which are connected with this life are alone fruitful, and those (like munificence etc.) that are connected with the other life, are not fruitful. This is the reason why there is no distinction between the lives of creatures in the two bhavas.
•: 291:•
Bhagavan :-But sadris'ata can never exist without cause as sadris'ata itself is produced from Karman. Now, when you take Karman (like dana etc.) connected with the other life, to be fruitless, there is no scope for sadris'ata to exist.
Sudharman-Sadris'ata of jivas could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of ghata produced from earth.
Bhagavan :-If sadris'ya exists even in absence of Karman there will be akritagama (i. e., springing up of the unaccomplished object), as well as kritanas'a (i. e. destruction of the accomplished object ). Thus the existence of Karman itself is denied. When there is no Karman, how can the parabhava exist? And when the existence of parabhava is denied, the existence of sadris'ya between two bhavas will automatically be denied.
Sudharman:-The existence of bhavantara could be brought about even in absence of Karman as in the case of lifeless objects when Karya and karana are the same.
Bhagavan :-In that case, O Sudharman! the production as well as the destruction of bhavantara will also be niskarana. Consequently, the practice of austerities, munificence, and vows etc. would be good-for-nothing, as bhavantara will not depend upon those actions, and all people-whether doing good or bad deeds will have the same prototype life. Moreover, you should also take the vaisadris'ya or dissimilarity of various jivas from each other to be nis'karanaka like bhavantara. For, like bhavantara, there is karaṇābhāva in case of varsadris'ya also,

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[ The fifth
कम्माभावे व मई को दोसो होज्ज जइ सभावोऽयं । जह कारणाणुरूवं घडाइ कज्जं सहावेणं ॥ २३७ ॥ (१७८५)
Kammābhāve vi maî ko doso hojja jai sabhāvo'yam | Jaha kāranānurūvam ghadai kajjam sahāvenam ॥ 237 ॥ ( 1785) [ कर्माभावेऽपि मतिः को दोषो भवेत् यदि स्वभावोऽयम् ।
यथा कारणानुरूपं घटादि कार्य स्वभावेन || २३७ ॥ ( १७८५ ) Karmabhave'pi matiḥ ko doso bhavet yadi svabhavo'yam | Yathā kāranānurūpam ghatadi karyam svabhāvena ॥ 237 1785) ]
Trans. – 237 Again, the opponent might believe that ( the karya could be brought about even in absence of Karman. What objection would arise if it were its very nature as in the case of karyas like ghata etc., which bear natural resemblence with their kāranas ? ( 1785 )
टीका - अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिः स्याद् यदुतकर्माभावेऽपि यदि भवसद्भावरूपः स्वभाव एवायं भवेत् तर्हि को दोषः स्यात् ? -- विनापि कर्म यदि स्वभावादेव भवः स्यात् तर्हि किं दूषणं भवेत् ? --- न किञ्चिदित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तमाह-यथा कर्म विनापि मृत्पिण्डादिकारणानुरूपं घटादि कार्य स्वस्वभावेनैवोत्पद्यमानं दृश्यते, तथा सदृशप्राणिजन्मपरम्परारूपो भवोऽपि स्वभावादेव भविष्यति । अत्रोच्यते ननु घटोऽपि न स्वभावतः एव जायते, कर्तृ-करणाद्यपेक्षित्वात् तस्य । ततश्चेहापि कर्तुरात्मनः पारभविकस्य च शरीरांदिकार्यस्य करणं संभाव्यते तच्च कर्तृ- कार्याभ्यां भिन्नं लोकेऽपि दृश्यते, कुलाल-घटाभ्यां चक्रादिवत् यच्चेहात्मनः शरीरादि कार्यं कुर्वतः करणं तत् कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यस्व । स्यादेतत् घटादेः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् भवन्तु कुलालादयः कर्तारः, शरीरादि कार्यं त्वादिविकारवत् स्वभावतोऽपि भवि ष्यति, ततो न कर्मसिद्धिः । तदयुक्तम्, यतो न स्वाभाविकं शरीरादि, आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात् घटवदिति । किञ्च "कारणानुरूपमेव कार्यम्" इत्येवं यत् परभवे सादृश्यं त्वयाऽभ्युपगम्यते, तदपि स्वभाववादिनस्तवाआदि
"

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
293 : विकारदृष्टान्ते परिहीयते, अभ्रादिविकारस्य स्वकारणभूतपुद्गलद्रव्यादतिfagyuncanfefà 11 23011 (2964) 11
D. C.-Sudharman :-Just as, it is by virtue of their svabhāva that objects like ghata etc. are produced as a natural result of their respective karanas but without the help of karman, the bhavāntara is also produced by virtue of its own svabhāva even in absence of Karman.
Bhagavan-Karyas like ghata, o Sudharman ! could never be produced merely by virtue of their svabhāva, but they have to depend upon karta and kārana also. So, in the production of Sarara also, kartū and karana are of primary importance. This leads us to believe that in the production of bhavantara, ātman which is different from body, is the kartā, and Karman, the karana, just as potter is the kartā and chakra etc. act as kāraņas, when ghata is produced.
Sudharman :-Since küryas like ghata are directly apprehensible, potter and chakra, etc. may respectively be taken as their kartu aud karaņas. But kāryas like s'arîra in bhavāntara are produced naturally like the multi-coloured changes in clouds etc. It is not, therefore, possible to seek Kurman as a kāraṇa, in the production of bhavāntara.
Bhagavān :--Your argument is totally unfounded. Karyas like s'arira etc. are not svābhāvika because they have a beginning, as well as, a definite ākāra like ghata. You have taken the other life to be the same as this, because, according to you, Karya is exactly similar to karana. But this principle of sadris'atā is not applicable in case of abhrādivikāras, as they are peculiarly different from the objects having definite akära.
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[The fifth अञ्चंतमणुवलद्धो वि अह तओ अस्थि नस्थि किं कम्मं । हेऊ व तदत्थित्ते जो नणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥२३९॥(१७८७) कम्मस्स वाभिहाणं होज सहावो त्ति होउ को दोसो। निचं व सो सभावो सरिसो एत्थं च को हेऊ ? ॥२४०॥ (१७८८) Hojja sahāvo vatthum nikkāranayā va vatthudhammo vā ? Jaha vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhio khapuppham va ॥ 238॥ Accantamanuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammami Heu va tadtthitte jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 239 ॥ (1787) Kammassa vābhihānam hojja sahāvo tti hou ko doso i Niccam va so sabhāvo sariso ettham ca ko heū ? 1124011 (1788) [ भवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मों वा ।
यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ २३८ ॥ (१७८६) अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म । हेतुर्वा तदस्तित्वे यो ननु कमणोऽपि स एव ॥ २३९ ॥ (१७८७) कर्मणो वाभिधानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः ।
नित्यं वा स स्वभावः सदृशोऽत्र च को हेतुः ? ॥२४०॥ (१७८८) Bhavet svabhávo vastu nişkaraṇatā vā vastud harmo vā ? ! Yadi vastu nasti sako'nupalabdheh khapuspamiva ॥ 238 ॥(1786) Atyantamanupalabdho'pyatha sako'sti nasti kim karma | Hetu 'r-vā tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva ll 239 II (1787) Karmano vābhidhūnam bhavet svabhāva iti bhavatu ko dosah Nityam vā sa "svabhāyaḥ sady iśo'tra ca ko hetuh? || 240 11 ( 1788 )]
Trans.-238-239-240 Is ( that ) svabhava a ( definite ) object, or causelessness ( itself ), or property of an object ? If it is ( taken as ) a ( definite ) object, it is not ( so ) because it is non-perceptible like a kha-puspa. In spite of its being non-perceptible, if it exists, why should not Karman exist ?

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:295:.
The hetu that ( works ) in its existence, ( works ) in case of Karman also. (Or ) what objection ( would arise ), if svabhāva becomes a synonym of Karman, and what is the hetu (in believing ) that svabhava is always the same? ( 1786-1787-1788)
टीका-एतद् गाथात्रयमपि प्रायः प्रागेव व्याख्यातार्थम् , नवरं "निचं " इत्यादि तृतीयगाथोत्तरार्धम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्-स स्वभावो नित्यं सदृश एव त्वयाऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, भवान्तरे सदृश्यैव मनुष्यादिभवस्य जननात् , तस्य च स्वभावस्य नित्यं सदृशत्वे को हेतुः १ । न कश्चिदित्यभिप्रायः। स्वभावत एवायं स्वभावः सदृश इति चेत् । ननु भवविसदृशतायामप्येतद् वक्तुं शक्यत एवेति ॥ २३८-२३९-२४०॥ (१७८६-१७८७-१७८८)॥ ___D. C.-The point is that since you have taken svabhava to be the same for ever as the same life is repeated in various bhavas you should state the reason for its nityasadrıs'atā. You might say that there is no hetu as such, as nityasadrisa by virtue of its own self. For, the same argument could be advanced in case of vaisadris'ya of the bhavas as well.
And, सो मुत्तोऽमुत्तो वा जइ मुत्तो तो न सबहा सरिसो। परिणामओ पयं पिव न देहहेऊ जइ अमुत्तो ॥२४१॥ (१७८९) उवगरणाभावाओ न य हवइ सुहम्म! सो अमुत्तो वि। कज्जस्स मुत्तिमत्ता सुहसंवित्तादिओ चेव ॥२४२॥ (१७९०)
So mutto’mutto vā jai mutto to na savvahā sarisol Parināmao payam piva na dehaheū jai amutto 11,241 11 ( 1789) Uvagaranābhāvāo na ya havai Suhamma! so amutto vi i Kajjassa muttimattā suhasamvittādio ceva 11 242 11 ( 1790 ) [स मूर्तोऽमूर्ती वा यदि मूर्तस्ततो न सर्वथा सदृशः ।
परिणामतः पय इव न देहहेतुर्यद्यमूर्तः ।। २४१ ॥ (१७८९)

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उपकरणाभावाद् न च भवति सुधर्मन् ! सोऽमूर्खोऽपि । कार्यस्य मूर्तिमस्वात् सुखसंविच्यादितश्चैव ॥ २४२ ॥ ( १७९० )
.: 296 :•
[The fifth
Sa mürto'murto va yadi murtastato na sarvatha sadṛiśaḥ Parināmatah paya iva na dehahetu r- yadyamūrtah | 241 ॥ ( 1789 )
Upakaranābhāvād na ca bhavati Sudharman ! so'mūrto'pi Karyasya mūrtimattvad sukhasamvittyaditaścaiva | 242 (1790) ]
Trans. – 241-242. Is that ( svabhāva), mūrta or a-mūrta ? If murta, it is not at all sadrisa on account of its (having a) parināma as in the case of milk. And, if it is a-mūrta, 0 Sudharman! even that a-murta svabhava does not become the cause of body in absence of instruments, as well as on account of the corporeal nature of Karya (indicated) by the perception of happiness etc. ( 1789-1790 )
"
46
टीका - व्याख्या - स स्वभावो मूर्तः, अमूर्ती वा १ । यदि मूर्तः तर्हि कर्मणा सह तस्य को विशेषः ? संज्ञान्तरमात्र विशिष्टकर्मैवेत्थमुक्तं स्यादिति । न चासौ सर्वदेव सदृशो युज्यते, परिणामित्वात्, दुग्धादिवत् । अथवा, मूर्तत्वादेवादिविकारवदिति । अथामूर्तोऽसौ स्वभावः तर्हि नैष देहादीनामारम्भकः, अनुपकरणत्वात्, दण्डादिविकलकुलालवत्, अमूर्तत्वादेव वा आकाशवत् । न य हवइ सुहम्म ! सो अमुत्तो वि त्ति " किञ्च, सुधर्मन् ! इतोऽपि स स्वभावोऽमूर्ती न युक्तः, शरीरादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तिमयात् । न ह्यमूर्तस्य नभस इव मूर्त कार्यमुपजायते । तथा, सुख-संवित्यादेश्व नायममूर्तः । इदमुक्तं भवति — कर्म तावद् भवता नेष्यते, स्वभाववादित्वात् । ततश्च शरीरादीनि, सुख-दुःखसंविच्यादीनि च स्वभावस्यैव कार्याण्येष्टव्यानि तस्य चामूर्तत्वे नैतान्युपपद्यन्ते । ततो यथा द्वितीयगणधरवादे कार्यस्य मूर्तत्वात्, सुखसंवित्यादेश्व कर्मणो मूर्तत्वं साधितम्, तथेह स्वभावस्यापि तत् साधनीयम् । तथा च प्रागुक्तम् -
आह नणु मुत्तमेवं मुत्तं चिय कजमुत्तिमत्ताओ । इह जह मुत्तत्तणओ घडस्स परमाणवो मुत्ता ॥ १ ॥

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तह सुहसंवित्तीओ संबंधे वेयणुब्भवाओ य । qgaqsız1913 qftararen a fqodá || 2 ||
इति ॥ २४१ - २४२ ।। ( १७८९ - १७९० ) ॥
•: 297 :.
D. C.-Consider whether svabhava is murta or a-murta. If it is murta, svabhava will be nothing but a synonym of Karman. Moreover, the property of sadris'ata will never be applied if svabhava is murta, because like milk, or like the murta clouds having a number of forms, svabhava will also possess a number of parinamas.
If svabhava is a-murta, then also, like akas'a it does not become the hetu of s'arira because of the absence of upakaranas. Secondly, an incorporeal karana can never produce a corporeal karya. So, svabhāva should not be called a-murta when the karyas of svabhava such as the perception of sukha, duhkha etc. are murta.t
Now the second alternative viz. that svabhava is niskāranatā is discussed
अहवाsकारणउचिय सभावओ तोवि सरिया को । किमकारणओ न भवे विसरिसया किं व विच्छित्ती॥२४३॥ (१७९१)
Ahavā kāraṇau cciya sabhavao tovi sarisayā katto | Kimakāraṇao na bhave visarisaya kim va vicchittî 1243 (1791) [ अथवाsकारणत एव स्वभावतस्ततोऽपि सदृशता कुतः ।
किमकारणतो न भवेद् विसदृशता किंवा विच्छित्तिः ॥२४३॥ (१७९१) Athava'karaṇata eva svabavatastato'pi sadrisata kutaḥ Kimakaraṇato na bhaved visadriśata kim va vicchittiḥ ? 2431]
Trans.-243 Or, if (bhavantara is produced) by virtue of svabhava (and) without any reason, whence is sadriśată
† Vide verses 1625, 1626.
38

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.: 298 : Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The fifth (to be found) ? (And) why (should) not dissimilarity take place without reason ? and why not destruction also ? ( 1791 )
टीका-अथ स्वभावत एव भवोत्पत्तिरित्यत्र " अकारणत एव" इत्ययमर्थोऽभिप्रेतः, " तो वित्ति" तथापि हन्त ! परभवे सदशता कुतः । कोऽभिप्रायः ? इत्याह-यथाऽकारणतः सदृशता भवति, तथा किमित्यकारणतः एव विसदृशता न स्यात् । अकस्माच्चाकारणतो भवविच्छित्तिः कस्माद् न स्यात् ? । अकस्माच भवन् खरविषाणादिरपि भवेत् । शरीरादीनां चाकारणतो भवतामभ्रादीनामिव प्रतिनियताकारत्वादिरूपता न स्यात् । तस्माद् नाकारणता स्वभाव इति ॥ २४३ ॥ (१७९१)॥
D. C.-Sadris'atā of bhavantara cannot be established even if you believe that it is produced without reason. For, just as sadris'ata is taken to have been produced without reason, vi-sadrrisata will also take place without reason. Similarly, destruction of bhava will also take place without any reason, and following the same procedure, a non-existent object like kharavisand will also come into existence without any reason. Moreover, objects like s'arira etc. will lose their definite shape and such other characteristics, on account of their resemblance with abhra-vikara in as much as they are produced without reason. Hence, it is not possible to believe svabhava as niskaranátā itself.
Taking the third alternative viz. that svabhāva is vastudharma, the author states:अहवं सहावो धम्मो वत्थुस्स, न सो वि सरिसओ निच्चं । उप्पाय-ट्ठिइ-भंगा चित्ता जं वत्थुपज्जाया ॥२४४॥ (१७९२). Ahava sahāvo dhammo vatthussa, na so vi sarisao niccam i Uppāya-tthii-bhanga citta jam vatthupajjaya ॥ 244 ॥ ( 1792) [ अथवा स्वभावो धर्मो वस्तुनः, न सोऽपि सदृशको नित्यम् ।
उत्पाद-स्थिति-भङ्गाश्चित्रा यद् वस्तुपर्यायाः ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२)

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Athavā syabhāvo dharmo vastunah na so'pi sadpisako nityam | Utpada-sthiti-bhangāscitra yad vastuparyāyah || 244 | ( 1792 )!
Trans.—244 Or, if svabhāva is a property of an object that also will not be always the same. Because, the paryāyās of production, retention and destruction of an object are distinct (from each other ). ( 1792 )
टीका-अथ वस्तुनो धर्मः स्वभावः, सोऽपि सर्वदैव सदृशो न घटते, इति कथं सर्वदैव शरीरादीनां सदृशतां जनयेत् । कथं पुनरस्य सदैव सदृशता न घटते ? इत्याह-" उप्पायेत्यादि" यद् यस्मादुत्पाद-स्थिति-भङ्गादयश्चित्रा वस्तुपर्यायाः, न च ते सदैवाऽवस्थितसादृश्याः, नीलादीनां वस्तुधर्माणां प्रत्यक्षत एवान्यान्यरूपतया परिणतिदर्शनात् । किञ्च, वस्तुधर्मोऽसौ भव
स्वभाव आत्मधर्मो वा स्यात् , पुलधर्मो वा ? । यद्यात्मधर्मः, तर्हि नासौ शरीरादीनां कारणम् , अमूर्तत्वात् , आकाशादिवत् । अथ पुद्गलधर्मः, तर्हि कर्मैवासी, कर्मणोऽपि हि पुद्गलास्तिकायधर्मत्वेनास्माभिरभ्युपगतत्वादिति ॥ २४४ ॥ (१७९२)॥
D. C.-Svabhāva will not be the same throughout even if you believe that it is a vastudharma. Hence, it is not possible to maintain for over the sadrıs'ya of sarîra etc. also. For, the three stages of production, existence and destruction are not always the same in case of a single object. Distinction of properties in case of black objects is easily perceived.
Secondly, is this vastudharma, a dharma of the atman or a dharma of the pudgala ? If it is the property of atman it can never become the cause of s'arîra etc. For, it will be a-mūrta like ākās'a in that case. On the other hand, if this vastudharma is the property of a pudgala, then it will become the Karman itself, as Karman is nothing but a pudgaladharma itself. कम्मस्स वि परिणामो सुहम्म ! धम्मो स पोग्गलमयस्स। हेऊ चित्तोजगओ होइ सहावोत्ति को दोसो ? ॥२४५॥ (१७९३)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fifth
Kammassa vi parināmo Suhamma! dhammo sa poggalamayassa i Hei citto jagao hoi sahavo tti ko doso? ॥ 245 ॥ ( 1793 ) [कर्मणोऽपि परिणामः सुधर्मन् ! धर्म स पुद्गलमयस्य ।
हेतुश्चित्रो जगतो भवति स्वभाव इति को दोषः ॥२४५॥ (१७९३) Karmaņo'pi pariņāmaḥ Sudharman! Dharma sa pudgalamayasya | Hetuscitro jagato bhavati svabhava iti ko dosah ॥ 245 ॥ (1793)]
Trans.--245 0 Sudharman! That (svabhāva ) being the pariņāma of Karman composed of a definite body, (becomes ) its dharma also. ( And ), what is wrong if svabhāva is taken as the variable cause of the ( entire mundane ) world ? ( 1793 )
टीका-सुधर्मन् ! असौ वस्तुधर्मो भवत्स्वभावो धर्मो भवतु, को दोषः ?—न कश्चित् , युक्तियुक्तत्वात् । किं विशिष्टो धर्मः ? इत्याह-- परिणामः । कस्य । कर्मणः । कथंभूतस्य ?। पुद्गलमयस्य । कथंभूतो यः कर्मपरिणामः । इत्याह-हेतुः । कस्य ?। जगत:-जगद्वैचित्र्यस्य । तदेवं कर्मलक्षणस्य वस्तुनः कर्मपरिणामरूपो धर्मो भवति स्वभावः, नात्र काचिद् दोषापत्तिः । अस्माकमपि संमतोऽयमर्थः, केवलं सर्वदा सदृशोऽसौ न भवति, किन्तु चित्रो मिथ्यात्वादिहेतुवैचिच्याद् विचित्रो विविधस्वभावः। अतो न तस्मात् परभवे सादृश्यमेव, किन्तु विचित्ररूपतेति ।। २४५ ।। (१७९३)॥
D. C.-0 Sudharman! Since svabhava has been taken as a vastu-dharma, it may be taken as a dharma of the pudgalamaya Karman also. So, there is no objection in admitting svabhāva as the parināma of vicitra karman, and hence as thọ hetu of universal vicitrată also.
In other words, it is due to the nature of the vicitra Karman that this world is full of varieties. The only point to remember in this case is that it is not always the same, but it is full of varieties on account of various hetus such as vanity, hostility etc.

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*: 301 :अहवा सवं वत्थु पइक्खणं चिय सुहम्म ! धम्महि । संभवइ वेह केहि वि केहि वि तदवत्थमचंतं ॥२४६॥ (१७९४) तं अप्पणो वि सरिसं न पुवधम्महि पच्छिमिल्लाणं । सयलस्स तिहुअणस्स च सरिसं सामण्णधम्महि ॥२४७॥(१७९५) Ahavā savvam vatthum paikkhaṇam ciya Suhamma! dhammehim i Sambhavai veha kehi vi kehi vi tadavatthamaccantam ॥ 247 ॥ Tam appano vi sarisam na puvvadhammehim pacchimillānam i Sayalassa tihuanassa ca sarisam samannadhammehim 12470(1795) [ अथवा सर्व वस्तु प्रतिक्षणमेव सुधर्मन् ! धर्मैः।
संभवति व्येति कैरपि कैरपि तदवस्थमत्यन्तम् ॥ २४६ ॥ (१७९४) तदात्मनोऽपि सदृशं न पूर्वधर्मैः पाश्चात्यानाम् ।
सकलस्य त्रिभुवनस्य च सदृशं सामान्यधर्मैः ॥ २४७ ॥ ( १७९५) Athava sarvam vastu pratikṣaṇameva Sudharman ! dharmaihi Sambhavati vyeti kairapi kairapi tadavasthamatyantam || 246 11 ] Tadātmano’pi sadsisam na pūrvadharmaiḥ pāścātyanam i Sakalasya tribhuvanasya ca sadrisam samanyadharmaih ॥ 247 ॥]
____ Trans.-246-247. O Sudharman! at every single moment, each and every object ( of the Universe ) is being produced, destroyed or retained by ( virtue of) some property or the other. So, none ( of them ) has its former properties similar to the latter ones. On the other hand, by virtue of (certain ) common properties, all the three worlds are similar. (1794-1795)
टीका-व्याख्या-अथवा, सुधर्मन्! किमेक एव परभवः ?, सर्वमेव हि घट-पटादिकं भुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु कैश्चित् पूर्वपर्यायेः समाना-ऽसमानपर्यायः प्रतिक्षणमुत्पद्यते, कैश्चित् पुनरुत्तरपर्यायैः समाना-ऽसमानपर्यायव्येति व्युपरमति, कैश्चित्तु तदवस्थमेवास्ते । ततश्चैवं सति तद्वस्त्वात्मनोऽपि पूर्वपूर्वधर्में

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[The fifth
रुत्तरोत्तरधर्माणां न सदृशम्, किं पुनरन्यवस्तूनाम् ?; सामान्यधर्मेस्तु सर्वस्यापि त्रिभुवनस्य समानम् , किं पुनरेकस्यैव निजपूर्वजन्मनः ? इति ॥ २४६-२४७॥ (१७९४-१७९५)॥
D. C.-Not only the bhavantara, O Sudharman' but each and every object (like ghata and pata ) in this Universe, is being produced, destroyed, or retained in its present state at every moment by virtue of a number of similar and dissimilar paryayas. But on the other hand, all the three worlds resemble each other also on account of certain common properties. Consequently, a past life may also resemble the present life on account of some common properties contained in both. को सबहेव सरिसो असरिसो वा इहभवे परभवे वा ? । सरिसासरिसं सवं निच्चानिच्चाइरूवं च ॥ २४८॥ (१७९६) Ko savvaheva sariso asariso vā ihablave parabhave vā ? ! Sarisāsarisam savvam niccāniccāirūvam ca 1 248 11 ( 1796 ) [ कः सर्वथैव सदृशोऽसदृशो वेहभवे परभवे वा ।
सदृशासदृशं सर्व नित्यानित्यादिरूपं च ॥ २४८ ॥ (१७९६ ) Kaḥ sarvathaiva sadrißo'sadrišo vehabhave parabhave vā ? | Sadrisasadrisam sarvam nityanitydirupam ca ॥ 248 ॥ ( 1796 )]
Trans.--248 What (object) is ( taken as ) completely similar or dissimilar either in this life or in the next life? Everything is similar as well as dissimilar having permanent as well as transitory forms. ( 1796 )
टीका-की ह्यर्थोऽर्थान्तरात्मना वा सहेहमवेऽपि सर्वथा सदृशोऽदशो वा, किं पुनः परभवे । तस्मात् सर्वमपि वस्तु सर्वेणापि सह समानाऽसमानरूपमेवेहमवेऽपि, इति कुतः परभवे सादृश्यमेव प्रतिज्ञायते भवता ? इति भावः । तथा, सर्वमपि नित्या-ऽनित्याद्यनन्तधर्मात्मकमिति ॥२४८॥ ( १७९६ ॥

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.: 803 :__D. C.-It is not possible to find an object which is similar or dissimilar to other objects or even to itself even in this life, and much less in the other.
All objects are found to be similar as well as dissimilar to other objects even in this life. So, it is no use holding the view that they are the same in the other life also. Similarly, all objects have permanent as well as transitory forms.
This idea is illustrated by an example stated below जह नियएहिं वि सरिसो न जुवा भुवि बाल-बुड्ढधम्महिं। जगओ वि समो सत्ताइएहिं तह परभवे जीवो॥२४९॥ (१७९७) Jaha niyaehim vi sariso na juyā bhuvi bāla-vuddhadhammehim i Jagao vi samo sattāiehim taha parabhave jîvo u 249 11 ( 1797) [ यथा निजकैरपि सदृशो न युवा भुवि बाल-वृद्धधर्मैः ।
जगतोऽपि समः सत्तादिकैस्तथा परभवे जीवः ।। २४९ ॥ (१७९७) Yathā nijakairapi sadrišo na yuva bhuvi bāla-vriddhadharmaiḥ Jagato'pi samah sattadikaistatha parabhave jivah 0249॥ (1797)]
Trans.—249 Just as a young man does not resemble his own past and future forms of childhood and old age respectively on ( this ) earth, but at the same tiine resembles the whole of earth on account of the property of existing etc., in the same way, jīva, too, becomes similar as well as dissimilar in the other life. ( 1797 )
__टीका-यथेह युवा निजैरप्यतीता-ऽनागतैर्षाल-वृद्धादिपर्यायै-रात्मनोऽपि सर्वथा न समानः, सत्तादिभिस्तु सामान्यपर्यायैर्जगति न केनचिद् न समानः, तथायमपि जीवः परलोकं गतः सर्वेणापि सह समाना-ऽसमानरूप एव, इति कुतः सर्वथा सादृश्यम् ? इति ॥ २४९ ॥ (१७९७)
D. C.-Just as a young man does not resemble his own forms of childhood and old age, but at the same time resembles

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[The fifth all other objects in this world on account of certain common properties like the quality of existing etc., in the same way. Jivas in the other life are not merely similar but dissimilar to other objects also.
Moreover, मणुओ देवीभूओ सरिसो सत्ताइएहिं जगओ वि। देवाईहि विसरिसो निच्चानिच्चो वि एमेव ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८) Manuo devîbhūo sariso sattāiehim jagao vil Devaihi visariso niccanicco vi emeva ॥ 250 ॥ ( 1798) [ मनुजो देवीभूतः सदृशः सत्तादिकैर्जगतोऽपि ।
देव(त्वादिभिर्विसदृशो नित्यानित्योऽप्येवमेव ॥ २५० ।। (१७९८) Manujo devîbhūtah sadțiśaḥ sattādıkair-jagato’pi 1 Deva(tva)dibhir-visadriso nityanityo'pyevameva ॥ 250॥ (1793)]
Trans.-250 A divine man resembles the whole of mundane world on account of ( properties like ) existence etc. and is distinguished ( from it ) as well by means of ( his ) state of being a deity etc. In the same way, ( he ) is permanent and at the same time transitory also. ( 1798 )
टीका-मनुष्यो मृत्वा देवत्वमापन्नो जगत्त्रयस्यापि सत्तादिभिः पर्यायः सदृशः, देवत्वादिभिस्तु विसदृशः, इति नैकान्तेन क्वापि सदृशता । तथा, द्रव्यतयाऽसौ नित्यः, पर्यायतया त्वनित्य इत्याद्यपि वक्तव्यम् । अत्राहनन्वस्माभिरपि नैकान्तेन परभवे सादृश्यमभ्युपगम्यते, किन्तु समानजात्यन्वयमात्रमेवेष्यते, पुरुषादिम॒तः पुरुषादिरेव भवतीति । एतदप्ययुक्तम् , कर्मजनितो हि परभव इति साधितम् । तच्च मिथ्यात्वादिविचित्रहेतुजन्यत्वाद् विचित्रमेवेति, अतस्तजन्यः परभवो विचित्र एव युज्यते, न तु समानजात्यन्वयः सिध्यतीति ॥ २५० ॥ (१७९८)॥
D. C.A person who becomes deva after death, resembles all the three worlds, on account of the common characteristics

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Ganadharavada
•: 305 :*
like existence etc., but, at the same time, he is distinguished from the three worlds on account of his devatva etc. This shows that absolute sadris'ata is not acceptible but visadris'atā has also equal scope with it. Similarly, all objects are nitya on account of their dravyatva, and, at the same time, a-natya because of their varied transformations.
Sudharman:-I accept sadrisata of objects on account of nothing but their relation to the same gender. That is, according to me, purusa turns out to be a purusa and animals remain as animals in the bhavantara.
Bhagavan :-Your argument, O Sudharman! is fallacious. The next life is attained by virtue of actions accomplished in this life. These actions come into existence on account of various hetus such as mithyatva etc. Hence, bhavantara which is produced by these actions should also be taken as vicitrata on account of the vicitrata of actions, but sadris'ata can never fit in by means of their relation to the sadris'a gender etc.
For,
उक्करिसा - saक्करिसा न समाणाए वि जेण जाईए ।
सरिसग्गाहे जम्हा दाणाइफलं विहा तम्हा ॥ २५९ ॥ (१७९९ )
11
Ukkarisa-'vakkarisā na samāṇāe vi jeņa jāîe Sarisaggāhe jamhā dāṇāiphalam vihā tamhā 251 u (1799) [ उत्कर्षा - sपकर्षो न समानायामपि येन जातौ ।
सदृशग्रहे यस्माद् दानादिफलं वृथा तस्मात् ।। २५१ ॥ ( १७९९ ) Utkarṣa-'pakarṣau na samānāyāmpi yena jātau Sadrisagrahe yasmad dānādiphalam vṛitha tasmat ||251|| (1799)]
Trans.-251 In (case of) (absolute) sameness, there will be no (scope for) elevation or degradation even in the
39

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[The fifth same genesis, ( and) the fruits of munificence etc. will become futile. ( 1799 )
टीका-सदृशग्रहे समानजातीयताग्रहे सति समानायामपि जातो येन यस्मादीश्वर-दरिद्र-कुलीना-अकुलीनादिरूपेणोत्कर्षा-ऽपको न घटां प्राञ्चतः। यो हि यादृश इहमवे, स यदि परभवेऽपि तादृश एव, तर्हि य इहमवे ईश्वरः स परभवेऽपि तादृश एव, एवं दरिद्रादिष्वपि वाच्यम् । ततश्चेहभवात् परभवे सर्वप्रकारैरप्युत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षों न स्याताम् , किन्त्वेकान्तसदृशतैव भवेत् । " तम्ह ति" तस्माद् मोक्तव्योऽयं सादृश्यग्रह इति प्रक्रमाद् द्रष्टव्यम् । अथेत्थमाचक्षीथाः-मा भूतामुत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षों, का नो हानिः ? इत्याह"जम्हा दाणाइफलं विह त्ति" चकारस्य गम्यमानत्वाद् यसाचेत्थं परत्रोत्कर्षाऽपकर्षयोरभावे दानादिफलं वृथा संपद्यते । लोको हि परत्र देवादिसमृद्धिप्राप्त्याऽऽत्मन उत्कर्षार्थ दानादिप्रवृत्तिं विदधाति । यदि चोक्तयुक्त्योत्कर्षाद्यभावाद् दरिद्रो दान-तपस्-तीर्थावगाहनाद्यपि कृत्वाऽमुत्र दरिद्र एव स्यात्, तर्हि क तद्दानादिफलम् ? इत्यपार्थिका दानादौ प्रवृत्तिः, तस्माद् न विधेयः सादृश्यग्रह इति ॥ २५१ ॥ (१७९९)॥
D. C.-If you believe in absolute sameness, there will be no scope either for elevation or for degradation even in the same genesis. One who is rich in this life will remain rich in the next life also in spite of his sinful actions, and a poor man will remain poor in the next life even if he performs benevolent duties such as dāna, tapas, tirtha-snāna etc., according to your belief of absolute sadrıs'atā. Thus, there will be no reward of either good or evil actions, but the same type of life will go on throughout all the bhavas. So, if there is no utkarsa or apakarsa in the next life, there will be no utility for various benevolent actions such as munificence, austerities, ablations in holy waters etc., to be followed by people for the attainment of Vevatva etc. To believe in absolute sadris'atā is, therefore, not proper. 251 ( 1799 ).
And the Vedapadas will also be wrong if absolute sädris'ya is accepted

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.: 307:. जं च सिगालो वइ एस जायए वेयविहियमिच्चाई। सग्गीयं जं च फलं तमसंबद्धं सरिसयाए ॥२५२॥ (१८००) Jam ca sigālo vai esa jāyae Veyavihiyamiccāim i Saggîyam jam ca phalam tamasanbaddham sarisayāe 125211 (1800) [ यच्च शृगालो वै एष जायते वेदविहितमित्यादि ।
स्वर्गीयं यच्च फलं तदसंबद्धं सदृशतायाम् ॥ २५२ ॥ (१८००) Yacca śrigālo vai esa jayate Vedavihitamityādi Svargiyam yacca phalam tadasambaddham sadrisatayam ॥ 252॥]
____Trans.-252 Statements of Vedas such as “ Srigalo vai esa jāyate” etc., as well as the reward of heaven laid down by Vedas, will prove inconsistent in ( case of ) sadrisata ( being admitted ). ( 1800)
टीका-यच्च "शृगालो वै एष जायते यः सपुरीषो दह्यते " इत्यादि वेदविहितं तदपि परभवसदृशताग्रहेऽसंबद्धमेव स्यात् , पुरुषादेरमुत्र शृगालतयानुपपत्तेः। तथा, यदपि “ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" तथा, "अग्निष्टोमेन यमराज्यममिजयति" इत्यादिकं स्वर्गीयफलसूचकत्वात् स्वर्गीय फलं तदप्यसंबद्धं भवेत् , मनुष्यस्य त्वदभिप्रायेण देवत्वानुपपत्तेरिति । "पुरुषो वै पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, पशवः पशुत्वम्" इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानामयमर्थः कोऽपि पुरुषः खल्विह जन्मनि प्रकृत्या भद्रको विनीतः सानुक्रोशोऽमत्सरश्च मनुष्य नाम-गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्धा मृतः सन् पुरुषत्वमश्नुते, न तु नियमेन सर्व एव, अन्यस्यान्यकर्मवशगस्यान्यथाप्युत्पत्तेः । एवं पशवोऽपि केचिद् मायादिदोषवशात् पशुनाम-गोत्रे कर्मणी बद्ध्वा परभवे पशवो जायन्ते, न तु सर्वेऽपि, नियमेन कर्मापेक्षित्वाजीवगतेरिति । तदेवं तस्यापि च्छिन्न: संशयः ॥२५२ ॥ (१८००)॥ ____D. C.-If it is admitted, O blessed Sudharman ! that the next life is exactly similar to this life, the sentences of Vedas such as “ Srigālo vai esa jāyate yah sa-purîşi dahyate” etc., which tell us that, one who is burnt along with foeces becomes fox

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.: 808 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The fifth
in the next life, will turn to be inconsistent. For, according to you, man should become man only in the next life. Secondly, sentences like "agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ" and "agniṣṭomena yamarajamabhijayati" which lay down the conditions for the attainment of svarga, will also become inconsistent because man does never become deity according to your theory of sadris'ta.
The real interpretation of puruso var puruşatvamas'nute pas'avaḥ pas'utvam " etc. is this:-A person who is pious, cultured, and self-less, attains the genesis of man when he dies away after having attached his actions to the human name and lineage. But that does not mean that all purusas attain purusatva as a rule. By virtue of different types of actions, people are liable to be born in an absolutely different genesis also. The same is the case with animals. On account of certain faults like illusion etc. certain animals remain as animals when they pass away in the next life, having attached their actions to the name and lineage of animals. But all pas'us do not attain pas'utva as a rule because their movement from one bhava to another depends upon their actions.
Thus,
छिन्नम्म संसयम्मि जिणेण जरा-मरणविष्यमुक्केणं । सो समणो पवइओ पंचहिं सह खंडियस एहिं ॥ २५३॥ (१८०१)
Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maranavippamukkeṇam So samano pavvaio pancahim saha khandiyasaehim 253 (1801)
Trans.-253 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that Saint (Sudharman) accepted diksa along with his five hundred pupils. (1801)
End of the Discussion with the Fifth Ganadhara,

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Chapter VI
षष्ठगणधरवक्तव्यता ।
Discussion with the Sixth Gaṇadhara
ते पचइए सोउं मंडिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं ।
वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ २५४ ॥ ( १८०२ )
Te pavvaie so um Mandio agacchai Jiņasagāsam Vaccāmi na vandāmī vandittā pajjuvāsāmi || 254॥ ( 1802 )
[ तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा मण्डिक आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् । जामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ २५४ ॥ ( १८०२ )
Tan pravrajitan śrutva Mandika agacchati Jinasakāśam | Vrajāmi vande vanditva paryupase ॥ 254 | ( ( 1802 ) ]
Trans.-254 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Mandika comes before the Tirtharikara ( He thinks ) :I may go, pay my homage, and worship him. ( 1802 )
टीका - व्याख्या पूर्ववत् नवरं मण्डिको नाम षष्ठो द्विजोपाध्यायः श्रीमजिनसकाशमागच्छतीति ॥ २५४ ॥ ( १८०२ )
D. C.—Now the sixth Ganadhara named Mandika, comes before the Tirthankara and starts discussion.
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ - जरा - मरणविषयमुक्केणं । नामेणं य गोत्रेण य सङ्घण्णू सवदरिसी णं ॥ २५५॥ ( १८०२ )

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Abhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-maraṇavippamukkeṇam Nāmenam ya gotrena ya savvannū savvadarisi nam ॥255 (1803) [ आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। २५५ ॥ ( १८०३ ) ābhāşitaśca Jinena jāti- jara-maranavipramuktena। Nāmnå ca gotrena ca sarvajñiena sarvadarśina ॥ 255॥ ( 1803 ) ]
Trans. – 255 He was addressed by his name, and lineage by the Tirthankara, who was free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge ). ( 1803 )
The Tirthankara then said
310.
[ The sixth
किं मन्ने बंध - मोक्खा संति न संति त्ति संसओ तुज्झं । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४ )
Kim manne bandha-mokkhā santi na santi tti samsao tujjham | Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasí tesimo attho ॥ 256 ॥ ( 1804 ) [ किं मन्यसे बन्ध - मोक्षौ स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः || २५६ ।। ( १८०४ ) Kim manyase bandha-mokṣau sto na sta iti samsayastava Vedapadānām_crtham na jānāsi tesamayamarthah ||256(1804) ]
Trans. – 256 What do you think about ? You entertain doubt as to whether bandha ( worldly bondages) and moksa ( Final Liberation ), exist or not. But ( ca), you do not know the ( real ) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Their ( real ) interpretation is this. ( 1804 )
टीका- मण्डिक ! त्वमित्थं मन्यसे - किं बन्ध-मोक्षौ स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितस्तव संशयः, विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनत्वात् तथाहि - " स एष विगुणो विभुर्न बध्यते संसरति वा, न मुच्यते मोचयति वा, न वा एष
,
"
बाह्यमभ्यन्तरं वा वेद ” इत्यादीनि वेदपदानि, तथा, " न ह वै सशरीरस्य

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19
प्रिया - ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृशतः इत्यादीनि च । एतेषां चार्थं त्वं न जानासि यतोऽयमेतदर्थस्तव चेतसि वर्तते, तद्यथा - स एषः - अधिकृतो जन्तुः, विगुणः - सच्च- रजस्-तमोगुणरहितः, विभुः सर्वगतः, न बध्यते - पुण्य-पापाभ्यां न युज्यत इत्यर्थः, संसरति वा 'न' इत्यनुवर्तते, न मुच्यते-न कर्मणा वियुज्यते, बन्धस्यैवाभावात् ; मोचयति वा नान्यम्, इत्यनेनाकर्तृकत्वमाह; न वा एष बाह्यम्आत्मभिन्नं महदहङ्कारादि, अभ्यन्तरं निजस्वरूपमेव, वेद-विजानाति, प्रकृतिधर्मत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य, प्रकृतेश्वाचेतनत्वात् । ततश्चामूनि किल बन्ध-मोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि । तथा, न ह वै नैवेत्यर्थः सशरीरस्य प्रिया-प्रिययोरहतिरस्तीति- बाह्याऽऽध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानयुक्तत्वात् सुख-दुःखयोरपहतिः संसारिणो नास्तीत्यर्थः, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं - अमूर्तमित्यर्थः, प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृशतः, तत्कारणभूतस्य कर्मणोऽभावादित्यर्थः । अमूनि चबन्ध - मोक्षाभिधायकानीति । अतः संशयः । तत्र " स एष विगुणो विभुः" इत्यादीनां नायमर्थः, किन्त्वयं वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ २५६ ॥ (१८०४ )
"
D. C. - O Mandika! You doubt the existence of bandha and moksa, because you have heard various Vedapadas having contradictory meanings.
66
Sa esa vigunvo vibhu r-na badhyate samsarati vā na mucyate mocayati vā no vā eṣa bāhyamabhyantaram vā veda " etc. as well as like,
"'
Na ha vai sa-s'arîrasya priyā-priyayorapahatir asti, as'ariram vā vasantam priya-priye na spri's'atal
"
etc.
You have not grasped the real meaning of these sentences. According to you, the interpretation of the first sentence is this-The all-pervading Soul, which being free from attributes like sattva, rajas, and tamas, is never bound by the clutches of papa and punya, nor does it proceed further. Since there is absolute bandhabhava, this (Soul) can neither be detatched from karma, nor can it relieve the other from the bandhas.

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It knows neither the external attributes like pride etc. nor does it recognize its own internal self, on account of jnana being the property of prakriti which is acetana here. So, the statements such as stated above, assert the absolute abhava of bandha and mokṣa between jiva and Karma.
*312:
(4
39
On the other hand, sentences such as, na ha vai etc., would mean quite the reverse (according to you). They assert that there is no abhava of priya, and a-priya, to one having sartra, while the a-sarîri atman is never touched by them. Since the external, as well as, internal anadi sariras are samtanayukta, the samsarî jivas are not deprived of the experiences of sukha and duḥkha, while the a-s'ariri atman is never touched by sukha and duḥkha on account of the absolute abhava of its Karana, the Karman. Thus, these Vedapadas are inclined to assert the existence of bandha and moksa.
Such sentences have given rise to your doubt, which is not at all proper. Your interpretation of the sentences is not correct. I, therefore, give you their real interpretation. Please listen carefully
तं मन्नसि जड़ बंधो जोगो जीवस्स कम्मुणा समयं ।
पुवं पच्छा जीवो कम्मं व समं व ते होजा ? ॥ २५७॥ (१८०५)
Tam mannasi jai bandho jogo jîvassa kammuņā samayam Puvvam paccha jîvo kammam va samam va te hojjā? 257u (1805)
[स्वं मन्यसे यदि बन्धो योगो जीवस्य कर्मणा समकम् ।
gå qaneta: zå ar aú ar à xàag ? || 240 || (3604) Tvam manyase yadi bandho yogo jivasya karmaṇā samakam Purvam paścajjivaḥ karma va samam va te bhave tam? 257 ]
Trans-257 If you believe that bandha is the union of jiva with Karma, will the jiva be produced first and then Karma, or Karma be produced first and then jiva, or both together? (1805)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 313 :. टीका-'वेयपयाण य' इत्यत्र चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च त्वं न जानासि । कुतः ? यस्मादायुष्मन् मण्डिक ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-जीवस्य बन्धो यदि कर्मणा समकं साधं योगः संयोगोऽभिप्रेतः स खल्वादिमान् आदिरहितो वा ? । यद्यादिमान् , ततः किं पूर्व जीवः प्रसूयेत पश्चात् कर्म, पूर्व वा कर्म पश्चाजीवः प्रसूयेत, समं वा युगपद् वा तौ द्वावपि प्रसूयेयाताम् ? इति पक्षत्रयमिति ॥ २५७ ।। (१८०५)॥
D. C.--If, O long-lived Mandrka, you believe that bandha means the contact of jîva with Karma, consider whether that contact is adimān or adirahita. If it is ādomān there will be three alternatives: (1) Java will be produced first and then Karma or ( 2 ) Karma will be produced first and then giva or ( 3 ) both of them will be produced simultaneously.
Refuting the first alternative, the author states :न हि पुवमहेऊओ खरसंगं वायसंभवो जुत्तो। निकारणजायस्स य निकारणउ च्चिय विणासो ॥२५८॥(१८०६) Na hi puvvamaheño kharasargam vāyasambhavo jutto I Nikkāranajayassa ya nikkāranau cciya vināso n 258 ॥ (1806 ) [न हि पूर्वमहेतोः खरशृङ्गमिवात्मसंभवो युक्तः।
निष्कारणजातस्य च निष्कारणक एव विनाशः ॥ २५८ ॥ (१८०६) Na hi pūrvamahetoh kharasțingamivātmasambhavo yuktaḥ Nişkāraṇajätasya ca niskāraņaka eva vinaśaḥ || 258 || ( 1806 ) ]
Trans.---258 Like kharaśringa, the production of Soul is not justified on account of the absence of hetu. And that which is born without any cause, has its end (also ) without any cause. ( 1806)
___टीका-" पूर्व जीवः पश्चात्कर्म" इत्येतदयुक्तम् , यतो न कर्मणः पूर्व "खरसंगंवायसंभवो जुत्तो" खरशृङ्गस्येवात्मनः संभवो युक्तः, अहेतुकत्वात् ,
40

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इह यदहेतुकं तद् न जायते, यथा खरशृङ्गम्, यच्च जायते तद् निर्हेतुकमपि न भवति, यथा घटः, निष्कारणस्य च जातस्य निष्कारण एव विनाशः स्यादिति ॥ २५८ ॥ ( १८०६ ) ॥
D. C. - According to the first alternative stated above, jiva is born first and then Karma. Now since Karma is the hetu of jivas, the production of jiva is totally unjustified like the production of khara-s'ringa on account of its a-hetuktva. For, that which has no hetu, is never produced like khara-sringa, and that which has already been produced is never nir-hetuka as in case of ghata. Moreover, that which is born without any cause, has even to meet its end without any end.
Proceeding further the author argues
अहवाsure चिसो निक्कारणओ न कम्मजोगो से । अह निक्कारणओ सो, मुक्कस्स वि होहिइ स भुजो ॥ २५९ ॥
Ahava'nai cciya so nikkaraṇao na kammajogo se Aha nikkāranao so, mukkassa vi hohii sa bhujjo || 259 ॥ ( 1807) [ अथवाऽनादिरेव स निष्कारणको न कर्मयोगस्तस्य ।
अथ निष्कारणः सः, मुक्तस्यापि भविष्यति स भूयः ॥ २५९ ॥ (१८०७) Athava nadireva sa niskāraṇako na karmayogastasya I Atha niskaranah sah muktasyāpi bhavisyati sa bhūyah ||259 (1807 ) ]
Trans. – 259 Or, that ( soul) being anādi, may be beyond any cause, and ( hence ) have no connection with Karma. If it were beyond any cause, it might have belonged to a mukta being also. ( 1807 )
टीका - अथ चेत् कर्मणः पूर्वमात्माऽनादिकालसिद्ध एव इति किं तस्य सहेतुक - निर्हेतुकचिन्तया ? इति । अत्रोच्यते - " निक्कारणओ इत्यादि " यद्येवम्, ततः से" तस्य जीवस्य कर्मयोगः कर्मबन्धो न प्राप्नोति, अकारणत्वात्, नभस इव । अथ निष्कारणोऽप्यसौ भवति, तर्हि मुक्तस्यापि
46

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"
भूयः स भविष्यति, निष्कारणत्वाविशेषात् ततश्च मुक्तावप्यनाश्वास इति ।। २५९ ।। ( १८०७ ) ॥
• 315:
D. C.-Mandika:-Existence of soul has already been established from times immemorial before Karma was produced. It is, therefore, useless to consider whether its production is sa-hetuka or nir-hetuka.
Bhagavan :-In that case, O Mandika! on account of its causelessness, atman will have no bondage with Karma as it has no bondage with ākās'a.
Mandika:-No, in spite of its causelessness, the soul is in contact with Karma.
Bhagavan:-Then, it will be attached to a mukta (liberated) being also. Thus, one that has already been liberated from the worldly bondages, will again come into those bondages on account of the common property, viz:-niskāraṇatā belonging to both of them. 259 (1807).
हो स निच्चमुको बंधाभावम्मि को व से मोक्खो ? |
a fè ymaayaì áurmà A37 a×aì || 280 II (?coc)
Hojja sa niccamukko bandhābhāvammi ko va se mokkho ? Na hi mukkavvavaeso bandhābhāve mao nabhaso 260 (1808)
[ भवेत् स नित्यमुक्तो बन्धाभावे को वा तस्य मोक्षः १ ।
न हि मुक्त व्यपदेशो बन्धाभावे मतो नभसः || २६० ॥ ( १८९८ ) Bhavet sa nityamuk to bandhābhāve ko va tasya mokṣaḥ ? | Na hi muktavyapadeśo bandhābhāve mato nabhasaḥ 1260|| (1808)]
Trans.-260 If it is ever liberated in absence of bondage, how will its moksa exist? For, in absence of bondage, attribute of liberation could never be accepted as in the case of ākāśa. (1808)
टीका - अथवा, कर्मयोगाभावाद् नित्यमुक्त एवासौ भवेत् । यदिवा,

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[The sixth बन्धाभावे कः किल तस्य मोक्षव्यपदेशः । न ह्यबद्धस्य नभसः कस्यापि मुक्तव्यपदेशो मतः, बन्धपूर्वकत्वाद् 'मोक्षस्य । तस्माद् न " पूर्व जीवः पश्चात् कर्म" इति प्रथमविकल्प इति ॥ २६० ॥ (१८०८)॥
D. C.-Mandika :-On account of the abhāva of Karmayoga, this ūtman is also nitya-mukta.
Bhagavān :-If it is so, O Mandika, how will mokṣa be attributed to it? For, one that is not susceptible to bandha, is never susceptible to mokșa also, as in the case of ākās'a. Mokșa can be attributed only to those that undergo bandhas. The first alternative that jîva is produced first and then Karma, is, therefore, not acceptible. 260 ( 1808 ).
Now, the other two alternatives-viz., that Karma is produced first and jîva afterwards or that both of them are produced simultaneously-are refuted as follows :---- न य कम्मस्स वि पुवं कत्तुरभावे समुब्भवो जुत्तो। निकारणओ सो वि य तह जुगवुप्पत्तिभावे य ॥२६१॥ (१८०९) न हि कत्ता कज्जं ति य जुगवुप्पत्तीए जीव-कम्माणं । जुत्तो ववएसोऽयं जह लोए गोविसाणाणं ॥ २६२ ॥ (१८१०) Na ya kammassa vi puvvam katturabhāve samubbhavo jutto Nikkāranao so vi ya taha jugavuppattibhāve ya 11 2610 (1809) Na hi kattā kajjam ti ya jugavuppattîe jîva-kammānam Jutto vavaeso'yam jaha loe govisānānam ॥ 262 ॥ ( 1810 ) [न च कमणोऽपि पूर्व कर्तुरभावे समुद्भवो युक्तः। निष्कारणकः सोऽपि च तथा युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च ॥२६१॥ (१८०९) न हि कर्ता कार्यमिति च युगपदुत्पत्तौ जीव-कमणोः । युक्तो व्यपदेशोऽयं यथा लोके गोविषाणयोः ॥२६२॥ (१८१०)

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Na ca karmano'pi pūrvam karturabhave samudbhavo yuktah Niskaranakah so 'pi ca tatha yugapadūtpattibhave ca || 261 (1809) Na hi karta karyamiti ca yugapadutpattau jîva-karmaṇoḥ | Yukto vyapadeśo 'yam yathā loke govisanayoh ॥ 262 ॥ ( 1810 ) ]
Trans. – 261-262 It is not appropriate ( to believe ) the production of Karma to be first in absence of Kartā, nor is it so even it it is niskāraṇaka. In case of both being produced simultaneously, the same ( difficulties ) will arise. Moreover, in (case of) simultaneous production of jiva and Karma, designation of kartā and kārya will not properly fit in as found in the propular example of the two horns of a cow. (1809-1810)
टीका- न च जीवात् प्राक् कर्मणोऽपि समुद्भवो युक्तः, कर्तुर्जीवस्य तदानीमभावात्, अक्रियमाणस्य च कर्मत्वायोगात्, निष्कारणचेत्थमसौ कर्मसमुद्भवः स्यात्, ततोऽकारणजातस्याकारणत एव विनाशोऽपि स्यादिति । तथा, युगपदुत्पत्तिभावे च " प्रत्येकपक्षोक्ता दोषाः वाच्याः" इति शेषःनिर्हेतुकत्वात् प्रत्येकवदुभयस्यापि समुदितस्यानुत्पत्तिरित्यादि । न च युगपदुत्पन्नयोर्जीव - कर्मणोः कर्तृ - कर्मभावो युज्यत इत्येतदेवाह - " न हीत्यादि " न हि युगपदुत्पन्नयोर्जीव - कर्मणोः " अयं जीवः कर्ता " " इदं वा ज्ञानावरणादिपुद्गलनिकुरम्बं कर्म " इति व्यपदेशो युज्यते, यथा लोके सव्येतरगोविषाणयोरिति ।। २६१-२६२ ।। ( १८०९ - १८१० ) ।।
D. C.-It is not appropriate to accept that Karma is produced first and jiva afterwards. For, the production of Karma is not possible without jiva, which is the Karta at the same time. And if that production of Karma is niṣkāraṇaka, its end will also be niskaranaka.
It is also not proper to say that jiva and Karma are produced simultaneously. Because, in that case also, both being nir-hetuka, the same difficulties will arise.
Moreover, if Jiva and Karma are produced together, they will no longer be taken as kartā and karya but like the two

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.:318:
Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth horns of a cow, they will be taken as twins produced together. 261-262 (1809-1810). ___ Now, coming to the second alternative at the root, the author proceeds :होजाणाईओ वा संबंधो तह वि न घडए मोक्खो । जोऽणाई सोऽणंतो जीव-नहाणं व संबंधो ॥२६३॥ (१८११) Hojjāņāío vā sambandho taha vi na ghadae mokkho Jo'nai so'nanto jiva-nahānam va sambandho ॥ 263 ॥ ( 1811) [ भवेदनादिको वा संबन्धस्तथापि न घटते मोक्षः।
योऽनादिः सोऽनन्तो जीव-नभसोरिव संबन्धः ॥ २६३ ॥ (१८११) Bhavedanadiko vă sambandhastathapi na ghațate moksaḥ, Yo'nadih so'nanto jiva-nabhasoriva sambandhah ||263॥ (1811)]
__Trans.-263 Or, if the contact ( of jiva with Karma ! ( taken as ) anadika (without any beginning ), there will nothing like mokşa. That which is anādi like the contact jiva and akasa, is ananta ( endless ) also. ( 1811 )
टीका-स्यादेतत् , अनादिरेव जीव-कर्मणोः संबन्धः संयोगः । ननु तथापि मोक्षो न घटते, यस्माद् योऽनादिः संयोगः सोऽनन्तो दृष्टः, यथा जीव-नभसोः। न ह्याकाशेन सह जीवस्य कदाचिदपि संयोगो निवतेते । एवं कर्मणापि सहासौ न निवर्तेत, तथा च सति मुक्त्यभावप्रसङ्ग इति ॥ २६३॥ (१८११)॥
D. C.-If the contact of jîva with Karma is anādika, it should be even ananta like the contact of jîva with sky, and in that case there will be no scope for mokṣa at all. इय जुत्तीए न घटइ सुबइ य सुईसु बंध-मोक्खा त्ति । तेण तुह.संसओऽयं न य कजोऽयं जहा सुणसु ॥ २६४ ॥

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.: 919:. Iya juttîe na ghatai suvvai ya sussu bandha-mokkhă tti Teņa tuha samsao'yam na ya kajjo'yam jahā suņasu 1126411 (1812) [इति युक्त्या न घटते श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु बन्धमोक्षाविति ।
तेन तव संशयोऽयं न च कार्योऽयं यथा श्रुणु ॥२६४ ॥ (१८१२) Iti yuktya na ghatate śrūyate ca śrutisu bandha-mokşaviti Tena tava samsayo'yam na ca kāryo'yam yatha. srinu 0264॥ (1812)]
Trans.—264 Thus by means of the above-mentioned argument, bandha and moksa do not fit in. Still however, it is heard in the Vedas ( that they exist ). This doubt of yours -which is ( absolutely ) improper-is due to that. So, listen to me ( now ). ( 1812 )
___टीका-इत्येवं युक्तयुक्त्या बन्धो मोक्षश्च न घटते, श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु वेदवाक्येष्वसौ। ततस्तव संशयोऽयम् । यथा चायं न कार्यस्तथा श्रृणु सौम्य ! इति । उक्तः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ २६४ ॥ ( १८१२ ) ।।
___D. C.-The arguments advanced by you do not lead one to prove the existence of bandhu and mokşcas seen above, But, since it has already been found in Vedas that they exist, your doubt has come into existence, which is totally unworthy of you. Now, listen to me. 264 ( 1812 ). संताणोऽणाईओ परोप्परं हेउ-हेउभावाओ। देहस्स य कम्मस्स य मंडिय! बीयं-कुराणां व ॥२६५॥(१८१३) Santano'naio paropparam- heu-heubhavao | Dehassa ya kammassa ya Mandiya! biyam-kurānām van2651(1813) [ संतानोऽनादिकः परस्परं हेतु-हेतुमद्भावात् ।
देहस्य च कर्मणश्च मण्डिक ! बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोरिव ॥२६५॥ (१८१३), Santano'nādikaḥ parasparam hetu-hetubhāvāt i Dehasya ca karmaņaśca Maņdika ! bija’n kurayoriva ||26511 (1813)]
Trans.--265 Since body and Karma are mutually related

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like seed and sprout as hetu and hetumat, their expansion, O Mandika, is anādika. ( 1813 )
टीक-शरीर-कर्मणोरनादिः संतान इति प्रतिज्ञा, परस्परं हेतु-हेतुमद्भावात् , बीजाकुरवदिति । ततश्च " किं पूर्व जीवः पश्चात् कर्म" ? इत्यादि प्लवत एव, अनादित्वात् तत्संतानस्येति ॥ २६५ ॥ (१८१३ )॥
D. C.--The santäna of s'arîra and Karma is anādo because both of them are related to each other as hetu and hetumat like seed and sprout. On account of this anăditva of santāna, the argument that jîva is born first and Karma afterwards, will automatically be null and void. 265 ( 1813 ).
अस्थि स देहो जो कम्मकारणं जो य कज्जमण्णस्स। कम्मं च देहकारणमत्थि य जं कज्जमण्णस्स ॥२६६॥ (१८१४) Atthi sa deho jo kammakāraṇam jo ya kajjamannassa Kammam ca dehakāranamatthi ya jam kajjamannassa 1126611 (1814) [अस्ति स देहो यः कर्मकारणं यश्च कार्यमन्यस्य ।
कर्म च देहकारणमस्ति च यत् कार्यमन्यस्य ।। २६६ ॥ (१८१४) Asti sa deho yaḥ karmakāraṇam yaśca kāryamanyasya | Karma ca dehakāranamasti ca yat kāryamanyasya || 266 ॥ (1814)] - -
___ Trans.-266 The body is such that it becomes the cause of (one) Karma, and effect of another, while Karma is also the cause of (one ) body, and the effect. of another. (1814)
टीका-अस्ति स कश्चिद् देहो योऽग्रेतनस्य कर्मणः कारणम् , यश्चान्यस्या तीतस्य कर्मणः कार्यम् । तथा, कर्मापि समस्ति । किं विशिष्टम् ? इत्याहयदग्रेतनस्य देहस्य कारणम् , यच्चान्यास्यातीतस्य देहस्य कार्यमिति । एवमनादौ संसारे न क्वचिद् विश्राम्यति, अतोऽनादिदेह-कर्मसंतान इति । आह-ननु बन्ध-मोक्षाविह साधयितुं प्रस्तुतौ, ततः कर्मसंतानस्थानादित्वसाधनमसंबद्धमिव लक्ष्यते । तदयुक्तम् , अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्, न यकृतं

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D. C.-Some deha is such that it serves as the cause of some future actions, while it itself has already been the effect of some past actions. The Karma in turn also serves as the cause of some body to come, while it has itself been the effect of some other body in the past. Thus, in this anādi samsāra the santūna of deha and Karma is also anādi as it never stops to rest.
Mandika :-But it is quite irrelevant to establish the anāditva of Karma-santāna, For, the point is to establish the existence of bandha and moksa
Bhagavān :- It is not so, O Manduka ! "Kriyate iti Karma" that which is accomplished is action. So, an unaccomplished action is never possible. In the accomplishment of Karma, its kārana is nothing but bandha, and hence the significance of establishing the anāditva of Karma-santāna.
Mandika :-If that which has been accomplished is Karma, who is the kartā of this deha? 266 ( 1814 ).
The Bhagavān replies कत्ता जीवो कम्मस्स करणओ जह घडस्स घडकारो । एवं चिय देहस्स वि कम्मकरणसंभवाउ त्ति ॥२६७॥(१८१५) Kattā jîvo kammassa karanao jaha ghadassa ghadakāro 1 Evam ciya dehassa vi kammakaranasambhavāu tti 11 267 11(1815) [कर्ता जीवः कर्मणः करणतो यथा घटस्य घटकारः।
एवमेव देहस्यापि कर्मकरणसंभवादिति ॥ २६७ ॥ ( १८१५) Karta jîvaḥ karmaṇah karaṇato yathá ghatasya ghatakaraḥ | Evameva dehasyāpi karmakaranasambhavaditi u 267 || ( 1815 )]
42

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The sixth Trans.—267 Just as jiva happens to be the kartā of karma as potter (is) of ghata by virtue of its instrumentality, so also, ( it becomes the kartā) of deha by virtue of karma as ( its ) instrument. ( 1815 )
टीका-कर्ता चात्र कर्मणो जीवः, करणसमेतत्वात् , दण्डादिकरणयुक्तकुलालवद् घटस्य, करणं चेह जीवस्य कर्म निर्वर्तयतः शरीरमवगन्तव्यम् । एवं देहस्याप्यात्मैव कर्ता, कर्मरूपं करणं कर्मकरणं तत्संभवात्-तद्युक्तत्वात् , दण्डादिकरणसमेतकुलालवदिति ।। २६७ ॥ ( १८१५)॥ ____D. C.-Just as potter is called the karta of ghatar because he is accompanied by various karanas such as danda etc, the Soul will also be called the kartā of deha by reason of its being accompanied by Karma as the karana. 267 ( 1815).
Here, again, the opponent's view is stated and refutedकम्मं करणमसिद्धं व ते मई कजओ तयं सिद्धं । किरियाफलओ य पुणो पडिवज्ज तमग्गिभूइ व ॥२६८॥(१८१६) Kammam karaṇamasiddham va te maî kajjao tayam siddham | Kiriyāphalao ya puno paờivajja tamaggibhūi vva 1268u (1816) [कर्म करणमसिद्धं वा तव मतिः कार्यतस्तत् सिद्धम् ।
क्रियाफलतश्च पुनः प्रतिपद्यस्व तदग्निभूतिरिव ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६) Karna karaṇamasidd ham vă tava matıḥ kāryatastat siddham Kriyāphalatasca punaḥ pratipadyasva tadagnibhūtirivall26811(1816)]
Trans.-268 Or, ( it may be ) your belief that Karma cannot be proved as karana; but it has been proved by ( the help of ) kārya. Moreover, like Agnibhati (you should ) accept it by reason of kriyāphala also.. ( 1816 )
टीका-स्यादेतत् , अतीन्द्रियत्वेनासिद्धत्वात् कर्मणः करणत्वमसिद्धम् । तदयुक्तम् , यतः कार्यतः कार्यद्वारेण तत् सिद्धमेव, तथाहि-विद्यमानकरणं शरीरादि, कृतकत्वात् , घटादिवत् , यच्चास्य करणं तत् कर्मैव, तस्मादस्त्येव

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.: 323 :. तत् । अथवा, विद्यमानकरणमेवात्मशरीरलक्षणं द्वयम् , कर्तृ-कार्यरूपत्वात् , कुलाल-घटादिवत् यच्च कर्तुरात्मनः शरीरमुत्पादयतः करणं तत् कर्मेति कथं न तत्सिद्धिः १ । तथा, फलवत्यो दानादिक्रियाः, चेतनारब्धक्रियारूपत्वात् , कृष्यादिक्रियावत्, यच्च तासां फलं तत् कर्म । इत्यग्निभूतिरिव त्वमपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ २६८ ॥ (१८१६ )
D. C.- Mandıka :-Since karma is atîndriya ( beyond the perception of sense-organs ) it can never be taken as karana.
Bhagavān:-It is not so. Since saritra is susceptible to production like ghata, it must have some karana to bring its existence This karana is Karma itself Or, say, there must be some karana between Kartā like ātman and Kārya like s'arira as in the case of ghatakāra and ghata. And this can be nothing else but Karma. This shows that Karma can be brought about even by the help of Käryas like s'arêra. Moreover, Kāryas like dāna etc which are inspired by fruit are also fruitful like Kryās such as krisi etc. So, like Agnibhūti, you, too, O Mandaka ! shall have to admit the existence of Karms. 268 ॥ ( 1816 ) ॥
In reply to the assertion that a bandha which is anādi is ananta also the author statesजं संताणोऽणाई तेणाणतोऽवि णायमेगंतो। दीसई संतो वि जओ कत्थइ बीयं-कुराईणं ॥२६९॥ (१८१७) Jam santāno'nāî tenānanto’vi nāyameganto i Disai santo vi jao katthai biyam-kurainam ॥ 269 ॥ ( 1817) [यत् संतानोऽनादिस्तेनानन्तोऽपि नायमेकान्तः। '
दृश्यते सन्नपि यतः कुत्रापि बीजा-ऽङ्खरादीनाम् ॥२६९।। ( १८१७) Yat santano'nadisteninanto’pi nāyamekantah | Drisyate sannapi yatah kutripi bija'-iikuradinām ॥ 269 ॥ ( 1817 )]
Trans.-269 An expansion which has no beginning,

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cannot exclusively be called endless also. For, the expansions such as that of seed and sprout etc. though void of beginning are sometimes found (as having ends ) also. ( 1817)
टीका-" यद् यस्माजीव-कर्मसंयोगसंतानोऽनादिस्तेन तस्मादनन्तोऽपि" इति नायमेकान्तः, यतोऽनादिरपि संयुक्तयोर्वस्तुनोः संतानः सान्तोऽपि क्वचिद् दृश्यते, यथा बीजा-ऽङ्कुरादीनां संतान इति ॥ २६९ ।। (१८१७)
D. C.--There can never be an exclusive rule that the anādi santāna of jîva and Karma combined together is anantos also. For, in some cases, the santāna does come to an end inspite of its anādilva e. y. the santāna of seed and sprout.
Also, अण्णयरमणिवत्तियकज्जं बीयं-कुराण जं विहयं । तत्थ हओ संताणो कुक्कुडि-अंडाइयाणं च ॥२७०॥ (१८१८) Annayaramanivvattiyakajjam bîyam-kurāņa jam vihayam / Tattha hao santano kukkudi-andaiyanam ca ॥ 270 ॥ ( 1818) [अन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकार्य बीजा-ऽङ्कुरयोर्यद् विहतम् ।
तत्र हतः संतानः कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डादिकानां च ॥ २७० ॥ (१८१८) Anyataradanirvartitakāryam bija-rikurayoryad vihatam Tatra hataḥ santanaḥ kukkutya’-ndadikānām ca 1 270 II (1818)] जह वेह कंचणो-वलसंजोगोऽणाइसंतइगओ वि। वोच्छिजइ सोवायं तह जोगो जीव-कम्माणं ॥२७॥ (१८१९) Jaha veha kancano-valasanjogo’ņāisantaigao vi > Vocchijjai sovayam taha jogo jiva-kammānam ॥ 271 ॥ ( 1819 ) [ यथा वेह काञ्चनो-पलसंयोगोऽनादिसंततिगतोऽपि ।
व्यवच्छिद्यते सोपायं तथा योगो जीव-कर्मणोः ॥२७१॥ (१८१९) Yathā veha kancano-palasamyogo'nadisantatigato’pi | Vyavacchidyate sopayam tatha yogo jiva-karmanoh n2710 (1819)]

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Trans.-270-271. When either of seed and sprout is destroyed without having accomplished the ( desired ) effect, its santāna is also destroyed. The same is the case with a hen and its eggs also. Or, just as the contact of gold with stone though continued in succession through times immemorial, is cut off, in the same way, the contact of jiva with Karma ( is also cut off ). ( 1818-1819 ).
टीका-बीजा-ऽङ्कुरोमध्येऽन्यतरदनिर्वर्तितकायमेव यद् विहतं व्यव· च्छिन्नं तत्रानयोर्हतो व्यवच्छिन्नः संतानः । एवं कुक्कुट्य-ऽण्डकयोः पिता
पुत्रयोरपि च वक्तव्यम् । यथा वा काञ्चनो-पलयोरनादिकालप्रवृतसंतानभावगतोऽपि संयोगोः सोपायमग्नितापाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, तथा जीवकर्मणोरपि संयोगऽनादिसंतानगतोऽपि तपःसंयमाद्युपायाद् व्यवच्छिद्यते, इति न मोक्षाभाव इति ॥ २७०-२७१ ॥ (१८१८-१८१९)
D. C.-If either of bêja and ankura vanishes without accomplishing the desired effect, the same will be true in case of hen and its eggs as well as father and son also. Or, just as the contact between gold and stone could be removed by means of the heat of fire inspite of its anāditva, the contact between jîva and Karma could also be brought to an end by means of tapas, samyama etc., until ultimately the moksa is attained. ॥ 270-271 (1818-1819 )॥
Anticipating the opponent's objection at this juncture, the author proceedsतो किं जीव-नहाण व अह जोगो कंचणो-वलाणं व ? । जीवस्स य कम्मस्स य भण्णइ दुविहो विन विरुद्धो॥२७२(१८२०) पढमोऽभवाणं चिय भवाणं कंचणोऽवलाणं व । जीवत्ते सामण्णे भवोऽभवो त्ति को भेओ ? ॥२७३॥ (१८२१) To kim jiva-nahana va aha jogo karicano-valānam va ?। Jivassa ya kammassa ya bhannai duviho vi na viruddhon3720(1820)

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Padhamo'bhavvāṇam ciya bhavvānam karcaṇo-valāņam va Jivatte sāmanne bhavvo 'bhavvo tti ko bheo ? ॥ 273 ॥ ( 1821 )
.
[ ततः किं जीव- नभसोरिवाथ योगः काञ्चनो - पलयोरिव ? | जीवस्य च कर्मणश्च भण्यते द्विविधोऽपि न विरुद्धः || २७२ || (१८२० )
प्रथमोऽभव्यानामेव भव्यानां काञ्चनो - पलयोरिव ।
जीवत्वे सामान्ये भव्योऽभव्य इति को भेदः १ ॥ २७३ ॥ (१८२१ )
Tatah kim jiva-nabhasorivatha yogah kañcano - palayoriva ? Jivasya ca karmanas 'ca bhanyate dvi- vidho'pi na viruddhah | 272 ॥
Prathamo’bhavyānameva bhavyānam kāñcano-palayoriva | Jivatve samanye bhavyo'bhavya iti ko bhedaḥ || 273 || (1821)]
Trans.-272-273 "Then, does the union of jiva and karma resemble the union of jiva and nabhas? Or, is it similar to that between gold and stone?" "Union in both the ways will not be contrary. The first belongs to the inauspicious only; ( contact ) of the auspicious resembles (the one ) between gold and stone." "What is the distinction between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is common ?” (1820-1821).
टीका - आह - जीवस्य कर्मणश्च योऽयं परस्परं योगः सोऽनादिः सन् किं जीव - नभसोरिवानन्तः, अथ काञ्चनो - पलयोरिव सान्तोऽपि स्यात् ? उभयथापि दर्शनात् किमत्र प्रतिपद्यामहे १ । भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम-द्विधाऽप्ययमविरुद्धः, तत्र प्रथमोऽनाद्यनन्तरूपोऽभव्यानां द्रष्टव्यः । यस्तु काञ्चनोपलयोरिवानादिः सान्तोऽसौ भव्यानां विज्ञेयः । आह - ननु जीवत्वसाम्येऽपि “अयं भव्यः” “अयं चाभव्यः" इति किंकृतोऽयं विशेष: ? । न च वक्तव्यम् - यथा जीवत्वे समानेऽपि नारक - तिर्यगादयो विशेषास्तथा भव्या-भव्यत्वविशेषोऽपि भविष्यतीति, यतः कर्मजनिता एवं नारकादिविशेषाः, न तु स्वाभाविकाः । भव्या-भव्यत्वविशेषोऽपि यदि कर्मजनितस्तदा भवतु, को निवारयिता ?, न चैवमिति ॥ २७२ - २७३ ॥ ( १८२० - १८२१ ) ॥
D. C-Mandika:-Should the anad contact of jiva with

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.: 327 ::
Karma be taken as ananta like that between jîva and nabhas or as sānta like that between gold and stone ?
Bhagarān: It is possible in both ways. It is found as anādr and ananta in case of inauspicious objects, but in case of auspicious objects like gold and stone, it is found as anādi and sānta.
Mandika:-- How could you distinguish between auspicious and inauspicious when the state of existence is the same everywhere?
Moreover, it cannot be argued that just as the experiences of hen and animal life are different from each other even if the state of existence is the same in both, so, also, the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is possible, because, the näraka experiences etc. are produced on account of Karma and are not svābhāvika.
होउ जइ कम्मकओ न विरोहो नारगाइभेउ छ । भणह य भवाऽभवा सभावओ तेण संदेहो ॥२७४॥ (१८२२) Hộu jai kammakao na viroho nāragāibheu vva i Bhanaha ya bhavvā’bhavvā sabhāvao tena samdeho 1127411 (1822) [ भवतु यदि कर्मकृतो न विरोधो नारकादिभेद इव ।
भणथ च भव्या-ऽभव्यान् स्वभावतस्तेन संदेहः ॥२७४॥(१८२२) Bhavatu yadi karmakrito na virodho nārakādibheda ival Bhaņatha ca bhavya’bhavyān svabhāvatastena samdehah 11 274 11
Trans.—274 If the distinction is caused by karma as in the case of hellish experience etc., there is no objection. But when you say that they are auspicious and inauspicious by their ( very ) nature, the doubt does arise. ( 1822 )
टीका-भवतु वा यदि कर्मकृतोऽयं भव्याऽ-भव्यत्वविशेषो जीवानामिष्यते, नात्र कश्चिद् विरोधः, नारकादिभेदवत् , न चैतदस्ति, यतो "भव्याऽ

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[The sixth भेव्याः स्वभावत एव जीवा न तु कर्मतः, " इति यूयं भणथ, तेनास्माकं संदेह इति ॥ २७४ ॥ (१८२२)॥ ____D. C.-Mandika :-If you accept that the distinction between bhavya and a-bhavya is also karma-janita ( like that between hen and animal life ) I have nothing to say, but when you take their distinction to be svabhāveka, I raise the doubt ॥ 274 ( 1822 ) ॥
Explaining the real cause between bhavya and a-bhavya the author replies:दवाइत्ते तुल्ले जीव-नहाणं सभावओ भेओ। जीवा-ऽजीवाइगओ जह, तह भवे-यरविसेसो॥२७५॥(१८२३) Davvāitte tulle jîva-nahānam sabhāvao bheo i Jîvā'jîvāigao jaha, taha bhavveyaraviseso 11 275 | ( 1823 ) [ द्रव्यादित्वे तुल्ये जीव-नभसोः स्वभावतो भेदः ।
जीवा-ऽजीवादिगतो यथा, तथा भव्ये-तरविशेषः ॥२७५॥ (१८२३) Dravyaditve tulye jiva-nabhaso svabhávato bhedah | Jivajivadigato yatha, tatha bhavyetara-visesah ॥ 273 ॥ ( 1823 )]
____ Trans.-275 Just as in ( case of ) jiva and nabhas the natural distinction of living and lifeless does exist even in ( the midst of ) the common element of ( their being ) dravya etc., in the same way, the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious is also natural. ( 1823 )
टीका-यथा जीव-नभसोर्द्रव्यत्व-सत्त्व-प्रमेयत्व-ज्ञेयत्वादौ तुल्येऽपि जीवा-ऽजीवत्व-चेतना-चेतनत्वादिस्वभावतो भेदः, तथा जीवानामपि जीवत्वसाम्येऽपि यदि भव्या-ऽभव्यकृतो विशेषः स्यात, तर्हि को दोषः ? इति ॥ २७५ ।। ( १८२३)
___D. C-Although java and ākās' as possess the common properties like dravyatva, sattva ( existence ), prameyatva

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0:329 : ( destructibility ) jneyatva ( cognizibility ) etc., distinction such as that of jîva and a-jîva etc, does exist by its very nature. Similarly, in case of jîvas also, even though jîvatva is common, the distinction of bhavya and abhavya remains there as & natural consequence. ॥ 275 ( 1823)॥
The pupil objects to this view thusएवं पि भवभावो जीवत्तं पिव सभावजाईओ। पावइ निच्चो तम्मि य तदवत्थे नत्थि निवाणं ॥२७६॥ (१८२४) Evam pi bhavyabhāvo jîvattam piva sabhāvajāio 1 . Pāvai nicco tammi ya tadavatthe natthi nivvānam 112761 (1824) [एवमपि भव्यभावो जीवत्वमिव स्वभावजातीयः ।
प्राप्नोति नित्यस्तस्मिंश्च तदवस्थे नास्ति निर्वाणम् ॥२७६॥ (१८२४) Evampi bhavyabhavo jîvatvamiva svabhāvajātîyaḥ | Prāpnoti nityastasminsca tadavasthe nästi nirvāṇam 1127611 (1824)]
Trans.—276 Even in that case, the quality of (being ) auspicious being natural like jivatva, will become everlasting; and if it is so, there will be no ( scope for ) final liberation ( at all ). ( 1824 )
टीका-नन्वेवमपि भव्यभावो नित्योऽविनाशी प्राप्नोति, स्वभावजातीयत्वात्-स्वाभाविकत्वात् जीवत्ववत् । भवत्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तस्मिन् भव्यभावे तदवस्थे नित्यावस्थायिनि नास्ति निर्वाणम् , “सिद्धो न भव्यो नाप्य भव्यः" इति वचनादिति ॥ २७६ ॥ (१८२४ )
D. C.-If the quality of bhavyatva is svābhāvika as jîvatva, as said above, it will become everlasting like jîvatva also. Consequently, in the midst of everlasting bhavyabhāva, there will be no scope for moksa at all ॥ 276 ( 1824 ) ॥
The author refutes this argument as follows:
42

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[The sixth जह घडपुत्वाभावोऽणाइसहावो वि सनिहणो एवं । जई भवत्ताभावो भवेज किरियाए को दोसो? ॥२७७॥(१८२५) Jaha ghadapuyvābhāvo'nāisahāvo vi sanihaņo evamı Jai bhavvattābhāvo bhavejja kiriyãe ko doso ? 11 277 11 ( 1825 ) [ यथा घटपूर्वाभावोऽनादिस्वभावोऽपि सनिधन एवम् ।
यदि भव्यत्वाभावो भवेत् क्रियया को दोषः ॥ २७७॥ (१८२५) Yatha ghatapārvabhavo'nadisvabhavo'pi sanidhana evam | Yadi bhavyatvabhavo bhavet kriyaya ko dosah ॥ 277 ॥ (1825)]
Trans.-277 What harm is there if the ( previous ) abhava of auspiciousness is possessed of end, like the previous nonexistence of ghata inspite of its being anādi by nature ? (1825)
टीका-यथा घटस्य प्रागभावोऽनादिस्वभावजातीयोऽपि घटोत्पत्ती सनिधनो विनश्वरो दृष्टः, एवं यदि भव्यत्वस्यापि ज्ञान-तपासचिवचरणक्रियोपायतोऽभावः स्यात् , तर्हि को दोषः संपद्यते ?-न कश्चिदिति ॥ २७७ ।। (१८२५) ____D. C.-The previous non-existence of ghataa comes to an end, when ghata is actually produced. Similarly, there is no harm if we assume that the abhāva of bhavyatva comes to an end, when the bhavytva is actualiy brought into existence by the process of perception || 277 ( 1825 ) || अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंगं पिव मई न तं जम्हा। भावो च्चिय स विसिट्ठो कुंभाणुप्पत्तिमेत्तेणं ॥२७८॥ (१८२६) Anudāharaṇamabhāvo kharasangam piva maî na tam jamhā | Bhavo cciya sa visittho kumbhānuppattimettenam ॥278॥ (1826) [अनुदाहरणभावः खरशृङ्गमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
भाव एव स विशिष्टः कुम्भानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण ।। २७८ ॥ (१८२६) Anudāharanabhāvah kharasținganiva matirna tad yasmāti Bhava eva sa visistah kumbhinutpattimātrena ॥278॥ (1826 )]

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Trans. – 278 ( You may believe that ) like kharasringa, this is no ( good ) example. But it is not so. That is nothing but bhāva distinguished by the non-production of ghata. (1826)
टीका - स्याद् मतिः परस्य - नन्वनुदाहरणमसौ प्रागभावः, अभावरूपतयैवावस्तुत्वात् खरविषाणवत् । तन्न, यस्माद् भाव एवासौ घटप्रागभावः, तत्कारणभूतानादिकालप्रवृत्तपुद्गलसंघातरूपः केवलं वटानुत्पत्तिमात्रेण विशिष्ट इति ।। २७८ ॥ ( १८२६ )
D. C-Mandika:-Like kharasringa previous non-existence cannot be taken as a right illustration, because like kharasringa it is non-existent on account of its abhavarūpatā.
Bhagavan:-It is not so. The previous abhava of ghata is itself bhava. The only difference found in it is that, at this stage the production of ghata has not yet been brought about from the mass of earth, which has served as its karana from times inmorial ॥ 277 (1826 ) ॥
एवं भव्वुच्छेओ कोट्ठागारस्स वा अवचउत्ति ।
तं नाणंतत्तणओऽणागयकालं - बराणं व ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७ )
Evam bhavvuccheo koṭṭhāgarassa vā avacau tti Tam nānantattanao'nāgayakalam-barānam va || 279 ( 1827 ) [ एवं भव्योच्छेदः कोष्टागारस्येवापचय इति ।
तद् नानन्तत्वतोऽनागतकाला - डम्बरयोखि ॥ २७९ ॥ ( १८२७ ) Evam bhavyocchedaḥ kosṭagarasyevāpacaya iti | Tad nānantatvato'nagatakalāmbarayoriva || 279 ॥ ( 1827 ) ]
Trans. – 279 Similarly, it is not ( correct ) ( to believe ) the culmination of the auspicious to be similar to the diminution of granery on account of (its) endlessness like the time to come or 'sky. ( 1827 )
टीका - नन्वेवं सति भव्योच्छेदः - भव्यजीवैः संसारः शून्यः प्राभोति,

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[The sixth
अपचयात् । कस्य यथा समुच्छेदः ? इत्याह-स्तोकस्तोकाकृष्यमाणधान्यस्य धान्यभृतकोष्ठागारस्य । इदमुक्तं भवति-कालस्यानन्त्यात षण्मासपर्यन्ते चावश्यमेकस्य भव्यस्य जीवस्य सिद्धिगमनात् क्रमेणापचीयमानस्य धान्यकोष्ठागारस्येव सर्वस्यापि भव्यराशेरुच्छेदः प्राप्नोतीति । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तदेतद् न, अनन्तत्वाद् भव्यराशेः, अनागतकाला-ऽऽकाशवदिति । इह यद् बृहदनन्तकेनानन्तं, तत् स्तोक-स्तोकतयाऽपचीयमानमपि नोच्छिद्यते, यथा प्रतिसमयं वर्तमान तापत्त्याऽपचीयमानोऽप्यनागतकालसमयराशिः, प्रतिसमयं बुद्ध्या प्रदेशापहारेणापचीयमानः सर्वनभःप्रदेशराशिर्वा । इति न भव्योच्छेदः ॥ २७९ ॥ (१८२७)॥
D. C.-Mandoka:-If the uccheda of bhavya jîvas is accepted, this world will gradually be deprived of them, Ultimately there will be no bhavya jîva existing in the world. For just as a granary of corn, is being exhausted day by day by the gradual decrease of corn, this world will also be losing one bhavyn java at least at the end of say, six months, when he will be attaining moksa, until ultimately the world will be void of bhavya jîvas. __Bhagavān :--Your argument is fallacious, O Mandika. The number of bhavya gavas is as endless as the time to come or sky, and hence its absolute viccheda should never be feared. जं चातीताऽणागयकाला तुल्ला जओ य संसिद्धो । एको अणंतभागो भवाणमईयकालेणं ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८) एस्सेणं तत्तिउ चिय जुत्तो जं तो वि सबभवाणं । जुत्तो न समुच्छेओ होज मई कहमिणं सिद्धं ? ॥२८१॥(१८२९) भवाणमणंतत्तणमणंतभागो व किह मुको सिं । कालादओव मंडिय! मह वयणाओ व पडिवज ॥२८२॥ (१८३०) Jam cātītā’ņāgayakālā tulla jao ya samsiddho I Ekko anantabhāgo bhavvanamaiyakālenam ॥ 280 ॥ ( 1828 )

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Essenam tattiu cciya jutto jam to vi sayvabhavyānami Jutto na samuccheo hojja maî kahaminam siddham ? 112810(1829) Bhavvānamanantattanantabhāgo va kiha mukko simi Kaladao va Mandiya ! maha vayanao va padivajja ॥ 282 ॥ ( 1830 ) [ यच्चातीता-ऽनागतकालौ तुल्यौ यतश्च संसिद्धः।
एकोऽनन्तभागो भव्यानामतीतकालेन ॥ २८० ॥ (१८२८) एष्यता तावानेव युक्तो यत् ततोऽपि सर्वभव्यानाम् । युक्तो न समुच्छेदो भवेद् मतिः कथमिदं सिद्धम् ॥२८१॥ (१८२९) . भव्यानामनन्तत्वमनन्तभागो वा कथं वा मुक्त एषाम् ?
कालादय इव मण्डिक ! मम वचनाद् वा प्रतिपद्यस्व ॥२८२।। (१८३०) Yaccātitā nāgatakalau tulyau yats'ca samsiddhah | Eko’nantabhāgo bhavyānāmatîtakalena 11 280 (1828) Esyatā távāneva yukto yat tato'pi sarvabhavyānām i Yukto na samucchedo bhaved matih kathamidam siddham ? ||281॥ Bhavyānānanantatvamanantabhāgo vã katham vā mukta esām ? Kāládaya iya Maņdıka ! mama vacanád vā pratipadyasva 1128211]
Trans.-280-281-282 Since the times-past and futureare similiar, an infinitesimal part of the auspicious which has already been liberated in the past will meet liberation in future also. It is not proper therefore to believe in (complete ) destination of all auspicious ( creatures ). ( It may be asked ) “ How is it proved ? Or, how is the endlessness or infinitesimal part of the auspicious ( creatures ) liberated ?" “ Like Kala etc. Or, O Mandika, take it ( for granted ) on my word." ( 1828-- 1829-1830)
टीका-व्याख्या-यस्माच्चातीता-ऽनागतकालौ तुल्यावेव, यतश्चातीतेनापि कालेनैक एव निगोदानन्ततमो भागोऽद्यापि भव्यानां सिद्धः, एष्यतापि भविष्यत्कालेन तावन्मात्र एव भव्यानन्तभागः सिद्धिं गच्छन् युक्तो घटमानकः, न हीनाधिकः भविष्यतोऽपि कालस्यातीततुल्यत्वात् ।

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( The sixth तत एवमपि सति न सर्वभव्यानामुच्छेदो युक्तः, सर्वेणापि कालेन तदनन्तभागस्यैव सिद्धिगमनसम्भवोपदर्शनात् । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्-तत्कथमिदं सिद्धं यदुत-अनन्ता भव्याः, तदनन्तभागश्च सर्वेणैव कालेन सेत्स्यतीति ? । अत्रोच्यते-काला-ऽऽकाशादय इवानन्तास्तावद् भव्याः, तदनन्तभागस्य च मुक्तिगमनात् , काला-ऽऽकाशयोरिव न सर्वेषामुच्छेद इति प्रतिपद्यस्व, मद्वचनाद् वा मण्डिक ! सर्वमेतत् श्रद्धेहीति ॥ २८०-२८१-२८२ ।। (१८२८-१८२९-१८३०)
D. C.-As the time, whether past or future is the same throughout, the infinite number of bhavya jîvas, or a portion of them attains moksa during past as well as future times in equal proportion The uccheda of all bhavya jîvas is, therefore, not acceptible.
Mandika:-But how is it proved that the bhavyas are ananta and their anantabhāga attains moksa at all times ?
Bhagavān:--They are antanta like kāla and ākās'a. Even if infinite number of bhavyas passes away to mokşa, they remain endless for ever like kāla and cikās'a. Rely upon my word, O Meandaka, and. accept it. ॥ 280-282 ( 1828-1830)॥
If it is asked “How could it be taken as true merely on your words ? " the answer isसब्भूयमिणं गिण्हसु मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व । सवण्णुताइओ वा जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ॥ २८३॥ (१८३१) मण्णसि किह सवण्णू सवेसि सवसंसयच्छेया। दिटुंताभावम्मि वि पुच्छउ जो संसओ जस्स ॥२८४॥(१८३२) Sabbhūyamiņam ginhasu maha vayaņāo'vasesavayanam va i Savvannutaio vā janayamajjhatthavayanam va ॥ 283॥ (1831) Mannasi kiha savvannā savyesim savvasamsayaccheyā i Ditthantabhāvammi vi pucchau jo samsao jassa ॥ 284॥ (1832)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 335 [सद्भूतमिदं गृहाण मद्वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
सर्वज्ञतादितो वा ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ।। २८३ ॥ ( १८३१) मन्यसे कथं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।।
दृष्टान्ताभावेऽपि पृच्छतु यः संशयो यस्य ॥ २८४ ॥ (१८३२) Sadbhūtamidam gộihāņa madvacanādavas’oşavacanamıya Sarvajnatādito vā jñāyakamadhyasthavacanamiva || 283 | ( 1831)] Manyase katham sarvajraḥ sarveşam sarvasamsayacchedāt i Dristantabhave'pi pricchatu yah samsayo yasya ॥ 284 1 ( 1832 ) ]
Trans.-283-284 Like all other statements or like the statement of an impartial observer, take it as a fact from my word, because of my omniscience. ( If ) you question “ How am I to be omniscient ? ” (The reply is that ) I am Omniscient because I remove the doubts of all. Even in absence of ( proper ) examples, one who entertains doubts may ask.me. (1831-1832)
टीका-व्याख्या-सद्भूतमिदमनन्तरोक्तं सर्वमपीति गृहाण त्वम् , मद्वचनत्वात् , यथा त्वत्संशयादिविषयमवशेष मद्वचनम् , सर्वज्ञत्वादित्यादिभ्यो वा हेतुभ्यः, आदिशब्दात् वीतरागत्वादिपरिग्रहः, ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनवदित्ययमत्र दृष्टान्त इति । अथैवं मन्यसे-कथमिव सर्वज्ञस्त्वम् । अत्रोच्यते-सर्वेषां सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् । अन्यस्य सर्वसंशयच्छेत्तुः कस्याप्यदर्शनात् कोऽत्र दृष्टान्तः ?-न कश्चिदिति । अत्रोच्यते-किमत्र दृष्टान्तान्वेषणेन ? । तदभावेऽपि हि यो यस्य संशयः स तं सर्वमपि पृच्छतु, येन स्वप्रत्ययसिद्ध एव मयि सर्वज्ञत्वनिश्चयो भवतीति ।। २८३-२८४॥ ( १८३१-१८३२ )
D. C.-Bhaguvān:-Take everything that I speak to be authentic, because I am sarvajña and vîtarūgu,
Mandıka:-On what ground are you to be called srrvajna ?
Bhagavān:-I am sarvagna because I remove the doubts of all. Even though it is not necessary to cite an example in this connection, one who entertains doubts may put a question so that he may be convinced of my scorvajinatva. 283-284(1831-1832)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
(The sixth
Also,
जह वा स एव पासाण-कणगजोगो विओगजोग्गो वि। न विजुज्जइ सबो चिय स विजुज्जइ जस्स संपत्ती॥२८७॥(१८३५) किं पुण जा संपत्ती सा जोग्गस्सेव न उ अजोग्गस्स। तह जो मोक्खो नियमा सो भवाणं न इयरेसिं ॥२८८॥(१८३६) Jaha vă sa eva pāsāna-kanagajogo viogajoggo vi i Na vijujjai savvo cciya sa vijujjai jassa sampattî ll 287 # (1835) Kim puna jā sampattî sā joggasseva na u ajoggassa i. Taha jo mokkho niyamā so bhavyāṇam na iyaresim 1128811 (1836) [ यथा वा स एव पाषाण-कनकयोगो वियोगयोग्योऽपि ।
न वियुज्यते सर्व एव स वियुज्यते यस्य संप्राप्तिः ॥२८७॥ (१८३५) किं पुनर्या संप्राप्तिः सा योग्यस्यैव न त्वयोग्यस्य ।
तथा यो मोक्षो नियमात् स भव्यानां नेतरेषाम् ॥२८८॥ (१८३६) Yathā vā sa eva pāşāņa-kanakayogo viyogayogyo’pi 1 Na vigujyate sarvam eva sa viyujyate yasya sampraptıḥ||287||(1835)] Kim punarya samprāptih sa yogyasyaiva na tvayogyasya i Tatha yo mokso niyamāt sa bhavyānām netareşām 1128811 (1836)]
___Trans.-287-288 Just as the contact between stone and gold, though susceptible to separation, is not separated, only those that have reached attainment are separated. Similarly, moksia which is laid down as a rule belongs only to bhavyas and not to others. ( 1835-1836)
टीका-यथा वा स एव पूर्वोक्तः सुवर्णपाषाण-कनकयोर्योगो वियोगयोग्यतान्वितोऽपि सर्वो न वियुज्यते, किन्तु स एव वियुज्यते, यस्य वियोगसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिरिति । किं पुनः ? एतद् भुजमुत्क्षिप्य ब्रूमः-या वियोगसामग्रीसंप्राप्तिः सा वियोगयोग्यस्यैव सुवर्णोपलस्य भवति, न तु तदयोग्यस्य, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण वः सर्वकर्मक्षयलक्षणो मोक्षः स नियमाद्

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: 339 : भव्यानामेव भवति, नेतरेषामभव्यानामिति भव्या-ऽभव्ययोर्विशेष इति ।। २८७-२८८ ॥ (१८३५-१८३६ )॥
D. C.-Although the contact between gold and stone is susceptible to separation, it can never be applied to all as a general rule. Because, only that which secures necessary conditions for separation is separable.
Moreover, these necessary conditions which cause the separation, act only upon those that are worthy of separation and not upon others. The same is the case with moksa. The attainment of noksa is possible for bhavyas only, and not for a-bhavyas even if they possess necessary conditions. This is the distinctive feature between bhavya and a-bhavya u 287–288 ( 1835-1836 )॥ कयगाइमत्तणाओं मोक्खो निच्चो न होइ कुंभो छ। नो पद्धंसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा वि जं निच्चो ॥२८९॥ (१८३७) अणुदाहरणमभावो एसो वि मई न तं जओ नियओ। कुंभविणासविसिट्ठो भावो च्चिय पोग्गलमओ य ॥२९०॥(१८३८) Kayagāimattanão mokkho nicco na höi kumbho vva i No paddhamsābhāvo bhuvi taddhammā vi jam nicco 1128911 (1837) Anudāharanamabhāvo eso vi maî na tam jao niyao 1 Kumbhavinasavisittho bhavo cciya poggalamao ya n290॥ (1838) [ कृतकादिमत्त्वाद् मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
नो प्रध्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ।। २८९ ।। ( १८३७ ) अणुदाहरणमभाव एषोऽपि मतिर्न तद् यतो नियतः।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुद्गलमयश्च ॥ २९० ॥ (१८३८ ) Kritakādimattvād mokso nityo na bhavati kumbha iva i No pradhvamsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmāpi yad nityaḥ ||289|| (1837)

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.: 340 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The sixth
Anudābaraṇamabhāva eso'pi matirna tad yato niyataḥ 1 Kumbhavinasavisisto bhava eva pudgalamayasca ॥ 290 ॥ (1838)]
Trans.-289-290 “ Like kumbha, moksa is not nitya on account of its artificiality etc.” It is not so. Because, indestructibility is everlasting on this earth inspite of its ( possessing ) that property. " ( But ) this negation is void of example also.” That is not true. Destruction of kumbha is definite and ( hence ) ( its ) positiveness is distinguished by means of pudgalas. ( 1837-1838 )
टीका-व्याख्या-ननु मोक्षो नित्यो न भवति, किन्त्वनित्यो विनाशी, कृतकत्वात् ; आदिशब्दात् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाऽऽदिमत्त्वादिपरिग्रहः। कुम्भवदिति दृष्टान्तः । अत्रोच्यते-अनैकान्तिकता हेतूनाम् , विपक्षेऽपि गमनात्, यस्मादिह घटादिप्रध्वंसाभावः कृतकादिस्वभावोऽपि नित्य एव, तदनित्यत्वे घटादेस्तद्रूपतयैवोन्मजनप्रसङ्गादिति । अथैवं परस्य मतिः-न केवलं पूर्वोक्तः प्रागभावः किन्त्वेषोऽपि प्रध्वंसाभावोऽभावत्वेनावस्तुत्वादनुदाहरणमेव । तदेतद् न, यतो यस्माद् नियतो निश्चितः कुम्भविनाशविशेषेण विशिष्टः पुद्गलात्मको भाव एवायमपि प्रध्वंसाभावः । अतो युक्तमेतदुदाहरणमिति । एतच्च मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमभ्युपगम्योक्तम् ॥ २८९-२९० ॥ ॥ (१८३७-१८३८)॥
___D.C.-Mandilia-Molesa is not natyaa but it is a-nitya like ghata as it is artificial and ādimān in character like ghata.
Bhagavān:-It is not so. The hetu advanced by you applies to the vipaksa as well, and hence it is anaikāntika. The pradhvamsābhāva, in case of ghata, for example, is notya inspite of its being kritaka. For, if it were a-natya, objects like ghata should have been born in the same form,
Mandaka :-But since pradhvamsābhāva is negative in character, you will not be able to cite an example based on it.
Bhagavān:-It is not negative, O Mandaka ! but positive in character. The definite forms of pudgalas found at the

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 341 :destruction of ghata is nothing but pradhvamsābhāva. The example cited is, therefore, quite proper to the occasion. The same is the case with moksa also. Moksa will never be called a-nitya even if it is believed to possess the properties like Meritakatvcs. || 288-290 ( 1837-1838 )॥
Or, say, Moksa is not kritaka at all on account of the following reason:किं वेगंतेण कयं पोग्गलमत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स । किं निवत्तियमहियं नभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि ? ॥२९१॥ (१४३९) Kim vegantena kayam poggalamettavilayammi jîvassa / Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi? ॥ 291 ॥ [किं चैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य ।
किं निर्वतितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ? ॥ २९१ ॥ ( १८३९ ) Kım vaikantena kțitam pudgalamātravilaye jîvasya / Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamātravilaye ?129111 (1839)]
Trans.-291 " At the destruction of mere pudagalas, how is jiva alone to be affected ?” “At the destruction of mere ghata, how is sky affected all the more?" ( 1839 )
टीका-किमिह पुद्गलमात्रविलये सति समस्तकर्मपुद्गलपरिशाटसमये जीवस्यात्मनः स्वतत्त्वे वृत्तिमादधत एकान्तेन कृतं विहितम् , येन कृतको मोक्षः स्यात् ? । एतदुक्तं भवति-इहात्म-कर्मपुद्गलवियोगो मोक्षोऽभिप्रेतः । तत्र तपःसंयमप्रभावतो जीवात् कर्मणि प्रथग् जायमाने किमात्मनः क्रियते, येन कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वं मोक्षस्य प्रतिपाद्यते ।। अथ स एवात्म-कर्मवियोगः क्रियमाणत्वात् कृतकः, ततोऽनित्य इत्याशङ्कयाह-" किं निवत्तियमित्यादि" मुद्गरादिना घटमात्रस्य विनाशे सति किं नाम नभसोऽभ्यधिकं निर्वर्तितम् ? न किञ्चिदित्यर्थः। एवमिहापि कर्ममात्रविनाशे सति किं जीवस्याधिक कृतम् , येन तदेकाकितारूपस्य मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वेनानित्यत्वं स्यात् ? । स एव कर्मणो विनाशो घटविनाशवत् क्रियमानत्वात् कृतकः, ततः सर्वकर्मक्षय

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth लक्षणो मोक्षोऽनित्य इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो यथाऽयमेव घटविनाशो
यः केवलाकाशसद्भावो न पुनस्ततो विभिन्नोऽसौ, न चाकाशस्य किमप्यधिक क्रियते, तस्य सदावस्थितत्वेन नित्यत्वात् , एवमिहाप्ययमेव कर्मणो विनाशो
यः केवलात्मसद्भावः, न त्वात्मनो विभिन्नोऽसौ, न चात्मनः किञ्चिदधिकं विधीयते, तस्यापि नभोवद् नित्यत्वात् । तस्माद् न मोक्षस्य कृतकत्वमनित्यत्वं वा । कथञ्चिच्चानित्यत्वे सिद्धसाध्यतैव, द्रव्य-पर्यायोभयरूपतया सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो नित्यानित्यरूपत्वादिति ।। २९१ ॥ (१८३९) ॥
D. C.-Bhagavān :-Since Moksa is nothing but the separation of Soul from Karma-pudgalas, it cannot be artificial at all. When Karma is being separated from java, how is Atmā to be affected to render the Moksc a-nitya ?
Mandika :-The separation of soul from Karma is kritaka owing to its kriyamānatvā. The Moksa is, therefore, kritaka and a-nitya too.
Bhagavān :-When ghata is destroyed by means of hammer etc. the sky is not at all affected. In the same way, when Karma is destroyed, hîva will also remain unaffected. It is not, therefore, proper to believe that Moksa is kritaka and a-nitya.
Mandrka :-Karma being destructible like ghata, like ghata it is krstaka also. Now since Moksa is nothing but the destruction of all Karmas, it is also kritaka and hence a-nitya also.
Bhagavān:-Your argument is absolutely false. O Mandiku' Existence of sky persists even if ghata is destroyed The destruction of ghata is not bhinna from ākās'a, but at the same time ākās'a is not affected by it also, since it is everlasting. Similarly in case of Karma also, although the destruction of Karmas is not different from the existence of Soul, the Soul is not affected by it on account of its being nitya like ākās'a. The Moksa is, therefore, never kritaka, O Mandika, and never a-nitya also, even if it is a-nitya to the extent that all objects are a-ritya as far as their dravyatva and paryāyas are concerned.

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
•: 343 :•
Mandika:-Since Karma-pudgalas abandoned by jiva in a worn-out condition, stay on in this world ( even in that state ) why should the Soul separated from Karma, be believed to unite with the worn-out Karma, so that, it may be bound by a fresh bondage again?
Bhagavān :-Mokṣa being nitya, O Mandika, will again be bound by a fresh bondage. ॥ 291 ( 1839 ) ॥
The everlasting nature of moksa is apprehended as follows:
सोऽणवराहो व पुणो न बज्झए बंधकारणाभावा । जोगा य बंधहेऊ न य ते तस्सासरीरो ति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४० )
So'navarāho vva puno na bajjhae bandhakāraṇabhāvā | Jogā ya bandha—heū na ya te tassāsariro tti ॥ 292 ॥ ( 1840 ) [ सोsनपराध इव पुनर्न बध्यते बन्धकारणाभावात् ।
योगाश्च बन्धहेतवो न च ते तस्याशरीर इति ।। २९२ ॥ ( १८४० ) So'naparadha iva punarna badhyate bandhakaraṇābhāvāt | Yogaśca bandhahetavo na ca te tasyāśarira iti || 292 | ( 1840 ) ]
Trans. – 292 Like an innocent person, it ( i. e., Soul ) can never be bound (by bandhas) as there no cause for bondage. On account of its formlessness, it has no cause for bondages. ( 1840 )
"
टीका - स मुक्तो जीवः पुनरपि न बध्यते, बन्धकारणाभावात्, अनपराधपुरुषवत् मनो- वाक्- काययोगादयश्च बन्धहेतवोऽभिधीयन्ते ने च ते मुक्तस्य सन्ति, शरीराद्यभावात् । न च कर्मवर्गणागतपुद्गलमात्र संयोगमात्ररूपोऽत्र बन्धोऽधिक्रियते, अतिप्रसङ्गादिदोषाघातत्वात् किन्तु मिथ्यावादित निबन्धन इति ॥ २९२ ॥ (१८४० ) ॥
9
D. C.—In absence of ( any ) cause for (its ) bandha, like an innocent person, the Soul is free from bandha. Unions of mind, speech and body etc. are nothing but the causes for

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•: 344 :Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The sixth ( its ) bandha. But due to the abhāva of s'arîra etc, a free Soul is not able to contain them. So, bandha does not take place in absence of samyoga of the multiplication of karmas but it depends upon the hetus such as mothyātva etc.
Mandika :-Like bandhas, you doubt as to whether that free Soul appears in the next life or not. 11 292 ( 1840 ) ||
Bhagavān replies :न पुणो तस्स पसूई बीयाभावादिहंकुरस्सेव । बीयं च तस्स कम्मं न य तस्स तयं तओ निचो॥२९३॥ (१८४१) Na puno tassa pasūī bîyābhāvādiharikurasseva i Biyam ca tassa kammam na ya tassa tayam tao nicco 129311 (1841) [न पुनस्तस्य प्रसूतिबीजाभावादिहाङ्करस्येव ।
बीजं च तस्य कर्म न च तस्य तत ततो नित्यः ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१) Na punastasya prasūtibijābhāvadihankurasyeva 1 Bijam ca tasya karma na ca tasya tat tato nityaḥ (12931 (1841)]
Trans.—293. Like a sprout without seed, it has no birth again, since Karma is its seed. It no more belongs to that ( muktātmā ) which in that case, becomes everlasting. ( 1841 )
टीका-न तस्य मुक्तस्य पुनरपि भवप्रसूतिरुपजायते, बीजाभावात्कारणस्यासत्वात् , यथाऽङ्करस्य तदभावाद् न प्रसूतिः । बीजं चास्य कर्मैवावगन्तव्यम् , तच्च मुक्तस्य नास्त्येव, ततः पुनरावृत्त्यभावाद् नित्योऽसाविति ॥ २९३ ॥ (१८४१)॥
D. C.-Just as a sprout does not grow without seed, the muktātmā does not take any birth in absence of Karma which acts as its baja. When muktātmā is said to have no janma (birth ), it goes without saying that he is nitya also. 11293 (1841)
Also,

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.:345:. दवामुत्तत्तणओ नहं व निचो मओ स दवतया। सबगयत्तावत्ती मइ त्ति तं नाणुमाणाओ ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२) Davvāmuttattanao naham va nicco mao sa davvatayā / Savvgayattāvattî mai tti tam nāņumāņão 11 294 11 ( 1842 ) [ द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो नभ इव नित्यो मतः स द्रव्यतया ।
सर्वगतत्वापत्तिर्मतिरिति तद् नानुमानात् ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२) Dravyamūrtatvato nabha iva nityo mataḥ sa dravyataya | Sarvagatatvāpattir matiriti tad nānumānāt 1 294 11 ( 1842 ) ]
Trans.—294 By substantiality, it is considered as nitya like sky, on account of ( both ) substantiality, as well as, incorporeal nature. The belief that it is all-pervading, is not ( acceptible ) on account of anumāna. ( 1842)
टीका-स मुक्तात्मा नित्य इति प्रतिज्ञा । “ दवामुत्तत्तणउ ति" द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वादिति हेतुः । “दवतय त्ति" यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्त नभ इति दृष्टान्तः । अथैवंभृता मति परस्य स्यात-अनेन हेतुना सर्वगतत्वापत्तिरप्यात्मनः सिध्यति; तथाहि-सर्वगत आत्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात् , नभोवत् । ततश्च धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयम् । तदेतद् न । कुतः । अनुमानात्-अनुमानबाधितत्वात् सर्वगतत्वस्येत्यर्थः; तथाहिअसर्वगत आत्मा, कर्तृत्वात् , कुलालवत् । न च कर्तृत्वमसिद्धम् , भोक्तृत्वद्रष्टुत्वाद्यनुपपत्तेरिति ॥ २९४ ॥ (१८४२)॥
D. C.-Like ākās'a, ātmā is nitya on account of its dravyatva as well as a-mūrtatva. But, it is not appropriate to believe that ātmā is all-pervading like ākās'a. The soul is a-sarvagatu like potter, on account of its kartrstva. For, otherwise, it will lose several of its own characteristics like bhoktritva, a-dristatva etc. 11 294 ( 1842 ) u को वा निच्चग्गाहो सत्वं चिय वि भव-भंग-द्विइमइयं । पज्जायंतरमेत्तप्पणादनिच्चाइववएसो ॥ २९५॥ (१८४३)
44

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[ The sixth
Ko vā niccaggāho savvam ciya vi bhava-bhanga-ṭṭhiimaiyam Pajjāyantaramettappanādaniccāivavaeso ॥ 295 ॥ ( 1843 )
[ को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव - भङ्ग - स्थितिमयम् । पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ।। २९५ ।। ( १८४३ ) Ko va nityagrahaḥ sarvamevapi bhava-bhanga-sthitimayam | Paryāyāntaramātrarpanadanityadivyapadeśah || 295 ॥ ( 1843 ) ]
Trāns. - 295 Or, what ( of ) assuming nityatā ? Everything is susceptible to the state of production, destruction and existence. Only by the imposition of various methods, attributes like transitoriness etc., are designated ( 1843 )
टीका - गतार्था, नवरं पर्यायान्तरमात्रस्यार्पणं प्रधानभावेन विवक्षणं तस्मादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः, तथाहि - घटः पूर्वेण मृत्पिण्डपर्यायेण विनश्यति, घटपर्यायतया पुनरुत्पद्यते, मृद्रूपतया त्ववतिष्ठते । ततश्च यो विनष्टरूपतादिपर्यायो यदार्पितः प्रधानभूतो विवक्ष्यते, तदा तेनानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेशः । एवमसावपि मुक्तः संसारितया विनष्टः, सिद्धतयोत्पन्नः, जीवत्व - सोपयोगत्वादिभिस्त्ववतिष्ठते, तथा, प्रथमसमयसिद्धतया विनश्यति, द्विसमयसिद्धतयोस्पद्यते, द्रव्यत्व - जीवत्वादिभिस्त्ववतिष्ठते । ततोऽर्पितपर्यायेणानित्यत्वादिव्यपदेश इति ।। २९५ ॥ ( १८४३ ) ।।
D. C. - It is useless to insist that a free soul is exclusi
vely nitya Attributes like a-ntyata could be indicated by means of various methods. Before ghata comes into existence, its form as a lump of earth vanishes and comes into existence as a particular shape of earth named ghata, and continues to exist in that state after its production also.
The same is the case with muktātmā. The muktātmā also vanishes as a mundane, comes into existence as mukta and continues to be in that state by virtue of its life and utility. So, it vanishes at the first time as it is established, comes into existence by virtue of its being established at the second time,

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and continues to be in that state on account of its dravyatva, jvvatva etc.
In this way, by means of different paryāyas, the attributes like a-nityata, are imposed.
मुत्तस्स कोsवगासो सोम्म ! तिलोगसिहरं, गई किह से ? | कम्मलहुया तहागइपरिणामाईहिं भणियमिदं ॥ २९६॥ (१८४४)
"
Muttassa ko’vagāso somma ! tilogasiharam, gal kiha se ? Kammalahuyā tahāgaiparināmāíhim bhaniyamidam ॥ 296 ॥ ( 1844) [ मुक्तस्य कोऽवकाशः सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं गतिः कथं तस्य ? | कर्मलघुता तथागतिपरिणामादिभिर्भणितमिदम् ।। २९६ ।। (१८४४ ) Muktasya ko’vakāśah saumya ! trilokaśikharam, gatih katham tasya ?। Karmalaghutā tathagatiparināmādibhir bhanitamidam || 296 ( 1844 ) ]
Trans. – 296 What is the resort of the free Soul ? It is the end of three worlds. O Saumya! What is the rate of its movement? It is said that the Soul attains moksa at one time by ( virtue of) the want of a Karma, as well as, by ( virtue of) the ( natural) tendency of its movement etc. (1844)
टीका-मुक्तस्य क्षीणसमस्तकर्मणो जीवस्य कोऽवकाशः कावस्थानम् ?, इति पृष्टे सत्याह-सौम्य ! त्रिलोकशिखरं, लोकान्त इत्यर्थः । ननु कथं 'से' तस्याकर्मणो जीवस्यैतावद् दूरमितो गतिः प्रवर्तते । कर्मनिबन्धना हि जीवानां सर्वापि चेष्टा, ततो विहायोगत्यादिकर्माभावेऽपि गतिचेष्टायामतिप्रसङ्गः प्राप्नोति । अत्रोच्यते - " कम्मलहुय त्ति " कर्मापगमे सति लाघवात् समयमेकं तद्गतिप्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः तथागतिपरिणामात् कर्मक्षये सिद्धत्ववदपूर्वगतिपरिणामलाभादित्यर्थः, यथा हि समस्त कर्मक्षयादपूर्वं सिद्धत्व परिणामं जीवः समासादयति, तथोर्ध्वगतिपरिणाममपीति भावः । आदिशब्दादपरमपि तद्गतिकारणं समय भणितमिदमवगन्तव्यम्, तद्यथा - लाउ य एरंडफले अग्गी धूमो य इसु धणुविमुको । गइ पुवपओगेणं एवं सिद्धाण वि गई उ ॥ १ ॥ २९६ ॥ ( १८४४ ) ॥
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[ The sixth
D. C-Mandika:-Where do the Mukta souls reside? Bhagavan:-They reside at the end of the three worlds
O Saumya!
Mandika:-How do jivas move to such a long distance even if they are unaccompanied by Karmas? All sorts of movements of a jiva depend upon Karma, and hence, how will extensive movements such as moving in the sky etc. be possible at all?
Bhagavan:-O Blessed Mandika! just as soul attains an unprecedented achivement when karma is destroyed, in the same way, the soul proceeds with the same movement and during the same period (of time ).
Moreover, just as gourd, fruit of a castor plant, fire, smoke, arrow wafted from a bow etc. make movements by means of previous impellations, in the same way, a muktātmā is also able to make movement by means of previous impellations etc. | 296 (1844)
किं सक्तिरियमरूवं मंडिय ! भुवि चेयणं च किमरूवं ? | जह से विसेसधम्मो चेयन्नं तह मया किरिया ॥ २९७॥ (१८४५)
Kim sakkiriyamaruvam Maṇdiya! bhuvi ceyanam ca kimarūvam? Jaha se visesadhammo ceyannam taha maya kiriyā 297u (1845)
[ किं सक्रियरूपं मण्डिक ! भुवि चेतनं च किमरूपम् १ |
'यथा तस्य विशेषधर्मश्चैतन्यं तथा मता क्रिया ।। २९७ ॥ ( १८४५ ) Kim sakriyamarupam Manḍika! bhuvi cetanam ca kimarupam ? Yatha tasya viseṣadharmascaitanyam tathā matā kriya ||297||(1845)
Trans.-297 What is movable (when it is formless)? And, O Mandika, what is living (when it is formless)? Like consciousness, movement is also the distinctive characteristic of Soul. (1845)

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.: 349 :. टीका-नन्वाकाश-कालादयोऽमूर्ता निष्क्रिया एव प्रसिद्धाः, तत् किं नाम त्वयाऽरूपममूर्त सद् वस्तु सक्रियं दृष्टं, येन मुक्तात्मनः सक्रियत्वमभ्युपगम्यते ?--ननु निष्क्रिय एव मुक्तात्मा प्राप्नोति, अमूर्तत्वात् , आकाशवदिति भावः । अत्रोच्यते-मण्डिक ! त्वमप्येतत् कथय,-भुवि किमरूपं सद्वस्तु चेतनं वीक्षितम् , येन मुक्तात्मा चेतनोऽभ्युपगम्यते ?-अमूर्तत्वादचेतन एवायं प्राप्नोति, आकाशवदिति । तस्माद् यथा “ से" तस्य जीवस्यारूपेभ्य आकाशादिभ्यस्तद्रूपत्वे समानेऽन्योऽपि चैतन्यलक्षणो विशेषधर्मः समस्ति, तथा क्रियापि मता,-सक्रियत्वमपि विशेषधर्मोऽस्तु को विरोधः ? इति भावः ॥ २९७ ॥ (१८४५) ॥
D. C.--Manduka:-The a-mūrta (objects like )ākās'a and kāla are welknown as noskriya. Then, how did you apprehend a formless object like muktātmā to be sa-kriya? Since it is a-mūtra like ākās'a, it should also be niskroya like ākās'a.
Bhagavān:--What ca-mūrta object have you seen to be sacetana in this world, in order to accept muktātmā as sacetana ? Just as ākās'a is acetana on account of its amūrtatva, the muktātmā should also be acetana as a rule. Bưt it is not so. For, although ātmā resembles ākās'a in respect of a-murtatva, it possesses a distinct characteristic of cetanā, within which kriyā is also included. So, sa-kriyatva or activeness becomes a distinct peculiarity of muktātmā There is no doubt about it. 11297011845)
Or, leaving that distinction of mukta and a-mukta aside, it could also be argued that कत्ताइत्तणओ वा सकिरिओऽयं मओ कुलालो छ । देहप्पंदणओ वा पञ्चक्खं जंतपुरिसो व ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६) Kattāittaņao vā sakkirio'yam mao kulālo va i Dehapphandanao vā paccakkham jantapuriso vva 129811 (1846) [ कादित्वतो वा सक्रियोऽयं मतः कुलाल इव ।
देहस्पन्दनतो वा प्रत्यक्षं यन्त्रपुरुष इव ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६)

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Kartrāditvato va sakriyo'yam mataḥ kulala iva i Dehaspandanato vo pratyak sam yantrapurusa iva ॥ 298 ॥ (1846)]
Trans.-298 Like a potter, it is believed as active on account of its being an agent etc, or ( it is active ) like a mechanical person, on account of the directly perceptible movement of ( its ) body. (1846)
टीका-अथवा, सक्रियोऽयमात्मा, कर्तृत्वात् , कुलालवत् । आदिशब्दाद् “भोक्तृत्वात् " इति वाच्यम् । अथवा, सक्रिय आत्मा पत्यक्षत एव देहपरिस्पन्ददर्शनात् , यत्रपुरुषवदिति ॥ २९८ ॥ (१८४६ )।
D. C.-The Soul could be taken as sakriya as a potter on account of its kartritva and bhoktritva. Or, it is sakriya like a yantra-purusa on account of the pratyakşa movements of its body ॥ 298 ॥ ( 1846)] देहप्फंदणहेऊ होज्ज पयत्तो त्ति सो वि नाकिरिए। होजादिट्ठो व मई तदरूवत्ते नणु समाणं ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७) रूवित्तम्मि स देहो वच्चो तप्फंदणे पुणो हेऊ । पइनिययपरिप्फंदणमचेयणाणं न वि य जुत्तं ॥३००॥(१८४८) Dehapphandanaheñ hojja payatto tti so vi nākirie 1 Hojjādittho va maî tadarūvalte nanu samānam II 299 ( 1847) Rūvittammi sa deho vacco tapphandane puno heü I Painiyayaparipphandanamaceyaņānam na vi ya juttam 11 300 11 [ देहस्पन्दनहेतुर्भवेत् प्रयत्न इति सोऽपि नाक्रिये ।
भवेददृष्टो वा मतिस्तदरूपत्वे ननु समानम् ॥ २९९ ॥ (१८४७) रूपित्वे स देहो वाच्यस्तत्स्पन्दने पुनर्हेतुः ।
प्रतिनियतपरिस्पन्दनमचेतनानां नापि युक्तम् ।। ३०० ।। ( १८४८) Dehaspandanahetur bhavet prayatna iti so'pi nakriye 1 Bhavedadristo va matistadarāpatve nanu samānam ॥299॥ (1847)

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Rūpitve sa deho väcyastatspandane punar hetuḥ 1 Pratiniyataparispandanamacetanānām nāpi yuktam 1130011(1848) ]
Trans.-299-300 It may be ( your opinion ) that the effort (on the part of Soul ) may be the cause of bodily movements. ( But ) even that is not ( possible ) in case of motionless (Soul ). Or, ( it may be believed that ) the hetu is invisible and resembles it in fornlessness. (If it is said that ) by reason of form it is called deha, there should certainly be ( some ) reason behind ( its ) movement. But the regular movement of lifeless ( objects ) is not justified. ( 1847-1848)
टीका-अथैवं ब्रूषे-देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुरात्मनः प्रयत्नो न तु क्रिया, अतो नात्मनः सक्रियत्वसिद्धिरित्यभिप्रायः। अत्रोत्तरमाह-सोऽपि प्रयत्नो नभसीवाक्रिय आत्मनि न संभवति, अतः सक्रिय एवासौ। अमूर्तस्य च प्रयत्नस्य देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुत्वे कोऽन्यो हेतुरिति वाच्यम् ? । अन्यहेतु निरपेक्षः स्वत एवायं परिस्पन्दहेतुरिति चेत् । यद्येवम् , आत्मापि तद्धेतुर्भविष्यति, किमन्तर्गडुना प्रयत्नेन ? । अथादृष्टः कोऽपि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः, न त्वात्मा, निष्क्रियत्वात् । ननु सोऽप्यदृष्टः किं मूर्तः, अमूतों वा ? । यद्यमूर्तः, तात्मापि देहपरिस्पन्दहेतुः किं नेष्यते, अमूर्तत्वाविशेषात् ? । अथमृतिमानदृष्टः, तर्हि स कार्मणशरीरलक्षणो देह एव, नान्यः संभवति । तस्यापि च बहिश्यदेहपरिस्पन्दहेतुतया व्याप्रियमाणस्य परिस्पन्दो द्रष्टव्यः, तस्य चान्यो हेतुर्वाच्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्यः, तस्यापि चान्य इत्यनवस्था । अथ स्वभावादेवादृष्टस्य कार्मणदेहस्य परिस्पन्दः प्रवर्तते, तर्हि बहिर्दृश्यस्यापि देहस्य तत एव तत्प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति, किमदृष्टकार्मणदेहपरिकल्पनेन ? । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , अचेतनानामेवंभूतप्रतिनियतविशिष्टपरिस्पन्दनस्य स्वाभाविकत्वानुपपत्तेः, “ नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा हेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात्" इत्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् कर्मविशिष्ट आत्मैव प्रतिनियतदेहपरिस्पन्दनहेतुत्वेन व्याप्रियत इति सक्रियोऽसाविति ॥ २९९-३०० ॥ (१८४७-१८४८)॥
D. C.--Mandika :-The hetu for movements of a body is the

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[The sixth effort ( on the part ) of Soul and not the kriyā. It is, therefore, not proper to take ātmā to be sukriya.
Bhagavān:--If the ātmā is niskriya, the effort cannot exist into it, and hence it is undoubtodly sakriya. What other hetu is to be understood in accepting the a-mūrta effort as a hetu for bodily movements ? If it is said that without the apeksā of another hetu, this effort itself becomes the hetu in the deha-spanda the Soul will also be called the hetu of these bodily movements. What is the use of intervening prayatna in such a case ?
Mandikai-There is some invisible hetu in the movements of deha, but ātma being nişkriya cannot act as hetu in those movements.
Bhagavān:--Is that invisible ( hetu ) mūrta or a-mūrta ? If a-mūrta, why not take ātmā as hetu in the deha parispanda since it is also a-mūrta ? And if that a-drista is mūrta, it is nothing but kármana sarira. Now, if that kārmana sarara is used as the hetu of bāhya sarara, there must be some other hetu for the parispandana of the above-mentioned kārmana sarara This in turn, will have a third hetu for its partspanda and that a fourth one and so on until ultimately there is complete disorder. Again, if it is argued at this stage that the movement of an adrısta kārmanci sarîra is caused by no other hetu than its own svabhāva so that there may not be any sort of anavasthā, then parispanda of bāhya sareras will also be caused by stabhāva so that there may not be any sense in assuming the adrişta kārmaņa sarîra.
Mandika:—I dont mind if the parispanda is taken to have been caused by svabhāva.
Bhagavān:-But it is not reasonable to believe like that. The definite type of the parispanda like this is never possible in case of acetana objects, because that which is indipendent of any other hetu is either everlasting or absolutely transitory.

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Vada]
Gañadharavada
.: 353 :.
The only alternative to accept, therefore, is that ātmā which is distinguished by karma is the hetu of dehaparispanda and hence sakriya also. ॥ 299-300 ।। ( 1847-1848 )] होउ किरिया भवत्थस्स कम्मरहियस्स किंनिमित्ता सा ? । नणु तग्गइपरिणामा जह सिद्धत्तं तहा सा वि॥३०१॥(१८४९) Höu kiriyā bhavatthassa kammarahiyassa kimnimittā sā ? I Nanu taggaipariņāmā jaha siddhattam tahā sā vi 13010 (1849) [ भवतु क्रिया भवस्थस्य कर्मरहितस्य किंनिमित्ता सा ?
ननु तद्गतिपरिणामाद् यथा सिद्धत्वं तथा सापि ॥३०१॥ (१८४९) Bhavatu kriya bhavasthasya karmarabitasya kimnimitttā sā? Nanu tadgatipariņāmad yathā siddhatvam tathi sāpi 13011 (1849) ]
___ Trans.-301 Alright ! “ How is the action of the mundane ( Soul ) separated from Karma to be accounted for ?" “ Certainly from their pariņāma. Just as perfection is attributed to it, in the same way, activity is also attributed to it.” (1849) किं सिद्धालययरओ न गई, धम्मत्थिकायविरहाओ। सो गइउवग्गहकरो लोगम्मि जमत्थि नालोए ॥३०२॥(१८५०) Kim siddhālayaparao na gaî, dhammatthikāyavirahão So gaiuvagghakaro logammi jamatthi nālöe 11 302 11 ( 1850 ) [किं सिद्धालयपरतो न गतिः, धर्मास्तिकायविरहात् ।
स गत्युपग्रहकारो लोके यदस्ति नालोके ॥ ३०२ ॥ (१८५०) Kim siddhālayaparato na gatih, dharmastikayavirahāt i Sa gatyupagrahakāro loke yadasti naloke || 302 || (-1850 ) ]
___ Trans.--302 Why not the movement ( of Soul ) ( to extend ) beyond Siddhālaya ? Because, of the absence of the predicament of dharmāstikaya. That being the impeller of motion resides in this world, and not in the spiritual world. ( 1850 )

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.: 354:.
Jinabhadra Gaņi's [ The sixth टीका-याक्तन्यायेन मुक्तस्य गतिक्रियया सक्रियत्वमियष्ते, तर्हि सिद्धालयात् सिद्धावस्थितिक्षेत्रात् परतोऽलोकेऽपि किमिति तस्य गतिन प्रवर्तते ।। अत्रोच्यते-परतो धर्मास्तिकायविरहात् । तद्विरहोऽपि कुतः ? इत्याह-यद् यस्मादसौ धर्मास्तिकायो लोक एव समस्ति, नालोके । मा भूदसावलोके, किं तेन प्रस्तुतानुपयोगिना कर्तव्यम् , तद्विरहेऽपि भवतु मुक्तस्य तत्र गतिः, नियमाभावात् ? । तदयुक्तम् , यतो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च गतेर्गमनस्योपग्रह उपष्टम्भस्तत्कारी स एव धर्मास्तिकायो नान्यः, ततस्तस्यालोकेऽभावात् कथं लोकात् परतोऽलोकेऽपि मुक्तात्मनां गतिः प्रवर्तते ? इति॥३०२॥(१८५०)
D. C.--Mandika :-If mūktātmā were sakriya by virtue of its movement, why should it not move beyond Siddhālaya also ?
___Bhagavān :-It cannot move beyond Siddhalaya, because dharmāstekāya or the predicament of motion does not exist in the a-loka
Mandika:—What of that? Even if dharmāstıkāya does not exist in the aloka, muktamā can acceed to it without dharmāstıkāya.
Bhagavān:--That is not possible. O Mandika. It is the predicament of motion that impels muktāmā to piove. Hence, if dharmāstikaya does not exist in the aloka, muktātmā is unable to move towards it 11 302 ( 1850 ) लोगस्स स्थि विवक्खो सुद्धत्तणओ घडस्स अघडो छ। स घडाइ चिय मई न निसेहाओ तदणुरूवो ॥३०३॥ (१८५१) Logassa tthi vivakkho suddhattaņao ghadassa a-ghado vva Sa ghadāi cciya maî na nisehão tadanurūvo 11 303 # ( 1851 ) [लोकस्यास्ति विपक्षः श्रुद्धत्वतो घटस्याघट इव ।
स घटादिरेव मतिर्न निषेधात् तदनुरूपः ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१) Lokasyästi vipaksah śruddhatvato ghaťasyāghata iva 1 Sa ghatadireva matir na nisedhat tadanurāpah ॥ 303 ॥ ( 1851 )]

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 355:. ___ Trans.-303 As ghata has a-ghata ( as its opposite ) loka also has its opposite, because of its etymological distinction. The view that it is nothing but ghata etc., is (also ) not ( acceptible ). ( For ), by means of negation ( something ) of its own kind ( is understood ). ( 1851 )
टीका-अस्ति लोकस्य विपक्षः, व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदाभिधेययत्वात् , इह यद् व्युत्पत्तिमत्ता शुद्धपदेनाभिधीयते तस्य विपक्षी दृष्टः, यथा घटस्याघटः, यश्च लोकस्य विपक्षः सोऽलोकः। अथ स्यान्मति:--" न लोकोऽलोकः" इति यो लोकस्य विपक्षः स घटादिपदार्थानामन्यतम एव भविष्यति, किमिह वस्त्वन्तरपरिकल्पनया ? । तदेतद् न, पर्युदासनमा निषेधात् निषेध्यस्यैवानुरूपोऽत्र विपक्षोऽन्यवेषणीयः, “न लोकोऽलोकः" इत्यत्र लोको निषेध्यः, स चाकाशविषयः, अतोऽलोकेनाऽपि तदनुरूपेण भवितव्यम् , यथा " इहापण्डितः", इत्युक्ते विशिष्टज्ञानविकलश्चेतन एव पुरुषविशेषो गम्यते, नाचेतनो घटादिः, एवमिहापि लोकानुरूप एवालोको मन्तव्यः । उक्तं च
" नज्युक्तमिवयुक्तं वा यद्धि कार्य विधीयते ।
__ तुल्याधिकरणेऽन्यस्मिल्लोकेऽप्यर्थगतिस्तथा ॥१॥ " नब्-इवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे तथा ह्यर्थगति ।" तस्माल्लोकविपक्षत्वादस्त्यलोक इति ॥ ३०३ ॥ (१८५१)
D. C-From the point of view of etymology, just as ghata has its opposite ( word ) c-ghata, loka must also have its opposite word c-loka. It is not justifice able to assume that a-loka is also the opposite of ghata, pata etc. By means of nişedha something of its own kind is understood. Just as by the word a-pandrta a living person having no scholarship is meant but not the inanimate objects like ghata and puta, so here also, by the nisedha of loka, nothing but a-loka should be understood. And it has also been said that.
Nanyuktamiva yuktam vā yaddhi karyam vid hîyate | Tuyladhikarane' nyasminlloke'pyarthagatis tatha.

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The sixth So, a-loka alone is the vipākṣa of loka || 303 ( 1851 ) तम्हा धम्मा-ऽधम्मा लोयपरिच्छेयकारिणो जुत्ता । इहरागासे तुल्ले लोगोऽलोगो त्ति को भेओ ? ॥३०४॥ (१८५२) लोगविभागाभावे पडिघायाभावओऽणवत्थाओ। संववहाराभावो संबंधाभावओ होज्जा ॥ ३०५॥ ( १८५३) Tamhā dhammā’dhammā loyapariccheyakāriņo juttā i Iharāgāse tulle logo’logo tti ko bheo ? 11 304 11 ( 1852 ) Logavibhāgābhāve padighāyābhāvao'navatthāo i Samvavahārābhāvo sambandhābhāvao hojjā 11 305 11 ( 1853 ) [ तस्माद् धर्मा-ऽधमौ लोकपरिच्छेदकारिणौ युक्तौ। इतरथाकाशे तुल्ये लोकोऽलोक इति को भेदः ? ॥ ३०४ ॥ (१८५२) लोकाविभागाभावे प्रतिघाताभावतोऽनवस्थातः।
संव्यवहाराभावः संबन्धाभावतो भवेत् ॥ ३०५ ॥ (१८५३) Tasmad dharma-'dharmau lokapariccheda kāriņau yuktau 1 Itarathakase tulye loko'loka iti ko bhedah ? ॥ 304 ॥ (1852)] Lokavibhāgábháve pratigbātābhavato’navasthātaḥ 1 Samvyavaharārabhāvah sambandhabhāvato bhavet ॥305॥(1853)]
Trans.-304-305 Thus ( predicaments of ) motion and rest are employed as the causes of destruction of loka. Otherwise, when the sky is common (everywhere ) how are · loka' and 'a-loka,' ( to be ) distinguished? In absence of the divisions of loka, there will be no reaction and hence no ( scope tor) stability; so also there will be scope for mutual relation as there will be no connection ( between them ). ( 1852-1853 )
टीका-यस्मादुक्तप्रकारेणास्त्यलोकः, तस्मादलोकास्तित्वादेवावश्यं लोकपरिच्छेदकारिभ्यां धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायाभ्यां भवितव्यम् । अन्यथाऽऽकाशे सामान्ये सति " अयं लोकः " " अयं चालोकः" इति किंकृतोऽयं

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 357:विशेषः स्यात् ? । तस्माद् यत्र क्षेत्रे धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ वर्तेते, तल्लोकः,
शेषं त्वलोक इति लोका-ऽलोकव्यवस्थाकारिणौ धर्मा-ऽधर्मास्तिकायौ विद्यते इति । " लोगेत्यादि " यदि हि धर्मा-ऽधर्माभ्यां लोकविभागो न स्यात् , ततो लोकविभागाभावेऽविशिष्ट एव सर्वस्मिन्नप्याकाशे गतिपरिणतानां जीवानां पुद्गलानां च प्रतिघाताभावेन तद्गत्यवस्थानाभावादलोकेऽपि गमनात् , तस्य चानन्तत्वात् तेषां परस्परं संबन्धो न स्यात् । ततश्चौदारिकादिकार्मणवर्गणापर्यन्तपुद्गलकृतो जीवाना बन्ध-मोक्ष-सुखदुःख-भवसंसरणादिव्यवहारो न स्यात् । जीवस्य च जीवेन सहान्योन्यमीलनाभावात् तत्कृतोऽनुपग्रहो-पघातादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति ॥३०४-३०५॥ ( १८५२-१८५३ )॥ ___D. C.-When the existence of a-lokaa is accepted, the existence of the predicaments of motion and rest are also accepted to exist. Otherwise, ūkās'a being common everywhere loka and a-loka will not be distinguished from each other. Thus, wherever the predicaments of dharma and a-dharma exist there is loka, and the rest is called a-loka. If there were no distinction between loka and a-loka by means of dharma and a-dharma, pratighāta of various jîvas and pudgalas in this world, will not be possible. Consequently, there will be no scope for gati and avasthāna to lead them to a-loka. Jivas and pudgalas will then become ananta; there will be nothing like mutual relation between them, and the attributes of bandha and moksa will also be no longer existing between them ॥ 304-305 ॥ ( 1852-1853 ) ] निरणुग्गहत्तणाओ न गई परओ जलादिव झसस्स । जो गमणाणुग्गहिया सो धम्मो लोगपरिमाणो॥३०६॥ (१८५४) Niranuggahattanão na gai parao jalādiva jhasassai Jo gamanānuggahiya so dhammo logaparimano ॥ 306 ॥ (1854) [निरनुग्रहत्वाद् न गतिः परतो जलादिव झषस्य ।
यो गमनानुग्रहीता स धर्मो लोकपरिमाणः ।। ३०६ ॥ (१८५४)

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The sixth
Niranugrahatvad na gatih parato jaládiva jhaşasya | Yo gamanānugrahitā sa dharmo loka-parimāṇaḥ 11306|1 (1854) ]
Trans.-306 Just as the activity of fish does not extend beyond water, ( their ) movement also does not extend beyond (loka). The predicament of dharmāstikāya which is favourable to ( their ) movement, becomes the only measuring unit of loka. ( 1854 ).
टीका-ततो लोकात् परतोऽलोके जीव-पुद्गलानां न गतिः, निरनुग्रहत्वात्-तत्र गत्यनुग्रहकर्तुरभावादित्यर्थः, यथा जलात् परतो झपस्य मत्स्यस्य गतिर्न भवति, उपग्राहकाभावादिति । यश्चात्र जीव-पुद्गलगतेरनुग्रहकर्ता स लोकपरिमाणो धर्मास्तिकाय इति ॥ ३०६ ।। ( १८५४ )॥
___D. C.-Just as fish cannot move out of water as there will be no upagrāhaka of their movement, so also, jîvas and pudgalas will have no access to the a-loka, as arloka is not favourable to their movement. It is predicament of dharmāstikaya which acts as the upagrābaka of the movements of jîvas and pudgalas, that measures the worth of lokaa ॥ 306 ॥ ( 1854 ) ] अस्थि परिमाणकारी लोगस्स पमेयभावओऽवस्स। नाणं पिव नेयस्सालोगस्थित्ते य सोऽवस्सं ॥३०७ ॥ (१८५५) Atthi parimānakārî logassa pameyabhāvao’vassam Nanam piva neyassalogtthitte ya so'vassam ॥ 307 ॥ ( 1855 ) [ अस्ति परिमाणकारी लोकस्य प्रमेयभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्यालोकास्तित्वे च सोऽवश्यम् ॥ ३०७॥ (१८५५) Asti parimāņakārî lokasya praneyabhavato'paśyan Jianamiva jneyasyalokastitve ca so'vasyam ॥ 307 ॥ ( 1855 ) ] ____ Trans.-307 Just as jnana measures the jneya, similarly, in the midst of (the existence of ) a-loka, it (i. e., dharmāstikāya) also acts undoubtedly as the 'measuring unit of loka on account of its finiteness. ( 1855 )

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टीका - अस्ति लोकस्य परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात्, ज्ञानमिव ज्ञेयस्य । अथवा, जीवाः पुद्गलाच लोकोऽभिधीयते, ततोऽस्ति तत्परिमाणकारी, प्रमेयत्वात् यथा शाल्यादीनां प्रस्थः, यश्चेह परिमाता स धर्मास्तिकायः, स चावश्यमलोकस्यास्तित्व एव युज्यते, नान्यथा, आकाशस्य सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्माल्लोकाग्रे सिद्धस्यावस्थानमिति प्रस्तुतम् ॥ ३०७ ॥ (१८५५)
D. C.-Since loka is susceptible to measure, it must have some sort of measuring unit like jnana, which is the measuring unit of the jneya. The measuring unit of loka is dharmastikāya or the predicament of motion which exists only if loka exists, and not otherwise. So, in the midst of loka, the avasthana of Siddha or muktātmā must necessarily be accepted | 307 ॥ ( 1855 ) ]
पयणं पसत्तमेवं थाणाओ तं च नो जओ छट्ठी ।
इह कत्तिलक्खणेयं कत्तुरणत्यंतरं थाणं ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)
Payanam pasattamevam thanão tam ca no jao chaṭṭhî | Iha kattilakkaneyam katuranathantaram thānam ||308 | ( 1856 )
[ पतनं प्रसक्तमेवं स्थानात् तच्च नो यतः षष्ठी ।
इह कर्तृलक्षणेयं कर्तुरनर्थान्तरं स्थानम् || ३०८ || (१८५६ ) Patanam prasaktamevam sthanat tacca no yatah sasthi | Iha kartrilaksaneyam karturanarthāntaram sthanam ||308॥ ( 1856) ]
Trans.-308 (C 'Falling from ( a fixed ) position is thus attributed ( to it ). ” It is not so on account of the genitive case which is here used in the sense of Nominative. Location is not different from subject in this case. (1856)
टीका - ननु " स्थीयतेऽस्मिन्निति स्थानम् " इत्यधिकरणसाधनोऽयं शब्दः । ततश्च सिद्धस्य स्थानं सिद्धस्थानमिति समासः । ततश्चैवं सति सिद्धस्य पतनं प्रसक्तम्, स्थानात्, पर्वत - पादपाद्यग्रस्थित देवदत्तस्येव, फलस्येव वा । यस्य किल क्वापि पर्वतादाववस्थानं, तस्य कदाचित् कस्यापि पतनमपि दृश्यते; अतः सिद्धस्यापि तत् कदाचित् प्राप्नोतीति भावः । तच्च न, यतः

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Jinabhadra Gani's [ The sixth " सिद्धस्य स्थानम् " इतीयं कर्तरिषष्ठी। ततश्च " सिद्धस्य स्थानम् " इति कोऽर्थ ?--सिद्धस्तिष्ठति, न तु तदर्थान्तरभूतंस्थानमस्तीति ॥ ३०८ ॥ (१८५६)॥
D. C.--Mandika:--Sthāna means place of location. So, when the place of location of a suddha being is accepted as existing, the characteristic of falling from that place should also be attributed to it as in the case of Devadatta or a fruit falling from the summit of a mountain or tree, as the case may be. Everything is bound to fall from the place of its location and siddha is no exception to it.
Bhagavān:-It is not so. The phrase " Saddhasya sthānam " shows that the word “ Siddha" is in the Genitive case used in the Nominative sense, “ Siddhasya sthānam " means, therefore, the place where Siddha resides, but it is not different from Siddhaa || 308 ॥ ( 1856 )
Or,
नहनिच्चत्तणओ वा थाणविणासपयाणं न जुत्तं से। तह कम्माभावाओ पुणकियाभावओ वा वि ॥३०९॥ (१८५७) Nahaniccattanao vā thānavināsapayānam na juttam se i Taha kammābhāvāo punnakkiyābhāvao vā vi 11 309 11 ( 1857 ) [ नभोनित्यत्वतो वा स्थानविनाशपतनं न युक्तं तस्य ।
तथा कर्माभावात् पुनः क्रियाभावतो वापि ॥३०९ ॥ ( १८५७) Nabhonityatvato vā sthanavināśapatanam na yuktam tasya | Tathā karmābhāvāt punaḥ kriyabhāvato vāpi || 309 11 ( 1857 ) ]
Trans.--309 Neither destruction nor its falling from the place of its location is possible on account of its being nitya like ākāśa, as well as, due to the absence of krijā or even for want of Karma. ( 1857 )
टीका-अर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि स्थानस्य न पतनं सिद्धस्य, यतोऽस्यर्थान्तरं

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स्थानं नभ एव, तस्य च नित्यत्वाद् विनाशो न युक्तः, तदभावे च कुतः पतनं मुक्तस्य ? । कर्म चात्मनः पतनादिक्रियाकारणम् , मुक्तस्य च कर्माभावात कुतः पतनक्रिया । या च समयमेकमस्याप्युध्वं गतिक्रिया, तस्याः कारणं " लाउ य एरंडफले" इत्यादिना दर्शितमेव । पुनःक्रिया च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, कारणाभावात् । निजप्रयत्न-प्रेरणा-ऽऽकर्षण-विकर्षणगुरुत्वादयो हि पतनकारणम् , तत्संभवश्च मुक्तस्य नास्ति, हेतोरभावात् , इति कुतोऽस्य पतनम् ? । इति ॥ ३०९ ॥ (१८५७ ) ॥
D. C.-Even if sthāna were taken to be distinct from siddha it is not proper to believe that siddha falls from the sthāna, which itself is destructible. Since sthāna is nitya like ākās'a, it would never meet destruction. In the process of falling, Karma is the essential factor. Now, since muktātmā is free from Karma, the process of falling cannot come into existence for want of Karma Moreover, impellation by ones' own efforts, attraction, repulsion and weightiness etc. are also important causes of-the patana kroyā, but since all of them are absent in muktātmā, the patana of muktātina from its sthāna is not possible from that view point also. ॥ 309 ॥ ( 1857 ) !
__Besides, निच्चथाणाओ वा वोमाईणंपडणं पसज्जेज्जा ।
अह न मयमणेगंतो थाणाओऽवस्स पडणं ति ॥३१०॥(१८५८) Niccathānão vā vomāînampadanam pasajjejjā 1 Aha na mayamaneganto thānāo'vassa padanam tin 310॥ (1858) [नित्यस्थानाद् वा व्योमादीनां पतनं प्रसज्येत ।
अथ न मतमनेकान्तः स्थानादवश्यं पतनमिति ॥ ३१० ।। (१८५८) Nityasthānād vă vyomādînām patanam prasajyeta / Atha na matamanekāntaḥ sthānādavaśyam patanamiti 1310(1858)]
Trans.-310 Or, if the fall from permanent abode (IS admitted ) the fall of sky will also be caused. And, if that is

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not admitted, the statement that "Falling from the place of location is inevitable” becomes uncertain. ( 1858 )
टीका-ननु च “स्थानात् पतनम्" इति स्ववचनविरुद्धमिदम् , अस्थानादेव पतनस्य युज्यमानत्वात् । अथ स्थानादपि पतनमिष्यते, तर्हि नित्यमेव स्थानाद् व्योमादीनां प्रतनं प्रसज्येत । अथ न तत् तेषां मतम् , तर्हि "स्थानात् पतनम्" इत्यनैकान्तिकमेवेति ॥३१० ॥ (१८५८)
D. C.-The statement that everything has to fall from its sthāna is self-contradicting. For the action of falling takes place from the avasthāna or the abode, and not from the sthāna. If falling from sthāna were believed, the nitya objects like ākās'a will also have to meet patana, from their nitya sthānas.
On the other hand, if it is not accepted, that falling from the place of location is inevitable, will be anarkāntika 1131011 (1858)] भवओ सिद्धो त्ति मई तेणाइमसिद्धसंभवो जुत्तो। कालाणाइत्तणओ पढमसरीरं व तदजुत्तं ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९) Bhavao siddho tti mai teņāimasiddhasambhavo jutto i Kalānājttanao padhamasarîram va tadajuttam 1 311 11 ( 1859 )
[भवतः सिद्ध इति मतिस्तेनादिमसिद्धसंभवो युक्तः। ____ कालानादित्वतः प्रथमशरीरमिव तदयुक्तम् ।। ३११ ।। ( १८५९) Bhavatah siddha iti matistenādimasiddhasambhavo yuktah, Kalanaditvatah prathamasariramiva tadayuktam ॥311॥ ( 1859 )]
Trans.--311 It may be argued that the siddha (is born) froni the mundane world and hence the production of the first siddha is acceptible. But, like the first sarira, that is not possible on account of the endlessness of times.
____टीका-अथ स्याद् मतिः परस्य-यतो भवात् संसारात् सर्वोऽपि मुक्तात्मा सिद्धस्तेन ततः सर्वेषामपि सिद्धानामादिमत्त्चादवश्यमेव केनाप्यादिसिद्धेन भूवितव्यम् । तदयुक्तम् , यतो यथा सर्वाण्यपि शरीराणि, अहोरात्राणि

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प्रतीयत इति ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८५९)॥ ___D. C.--Mandikcs:-It has already been proved that all muktāmās are born of this samsāra. Hence, there ought to exist some siddha who might be called the first of all the muktātmas.
Bhagavān :-Your assumption is groundless. For like bodies, nights, and days, the muktātmā is also ādiman, but owing to the endlessness of Kāla, it is not possible to know as to who was the first siddha Il 311 II ( 1859 ) ] परिमियदेसेऽणंता किह माया मुत्तिविरहियत्ताओ। नियम्मि व नाणाई दिट्ठीओ वेगरूवम्मि ॥ ३१२ ॥ (१८६०) Parimiyadese'nantā kiha māyā muttivirahiyattāo 1 Niyammi va rānāî ditthîo vega-rūvammi 11 312 !l ( 1860 ) [परिमितदेशेऽनन्ताः कथं माता मूर्तिविरहितत्वात् ।
निजके वा ज्ञानादयो दृष्टयो वैकरूपे ।। ३१२ ॥ (१८६०) Parimitadese'nantāḥ katham mātā mūrtivirabitatvāti Nijake vā jñānādayo driştayo vaikarūpe 11 312 11 ( 1860 )]
___Trans.-312 ( Then ) how are the numerous ( siddhas) contained in limited space ?” On account of their formlessness; or like one's own apprehensions, etc, or like (numerous ) eyes on one form." ( 1860)
टीका-आह-परिमितदेशमेव सिद्धक्षेत्रम् , तत्र कथमनादिकालवर्तिनोऽनन्ताः सिद्धा मान्ति ?। अत्रोत्तरमाह-अमूर्तत्वात् सिद्धाः परिमितेऽपि क्षेत्रेऽनन्तास्तिष्ठन्ति, यथा प्रतिद्रव्यमेवानन्तानि सिद्धानां संबन्धीनि केवलज्ञान-केवलदर्शनानि संपतन्ति, दृष्टयो वा यथैकस्यामपि नर्तक्यां सहस्रशः प्रपतन्ति, परिमितेऽपि वाऽपवरकादिक्षेत्रे बहयोऽपि प्रदीपप्रभा मान्ति; एवमिहामूर्ताः सिद्धा कथं परिमितक्षेत्रेऽनन्ता न मास्यन्ति; मूर्तानामपि

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I The sixth प्रदीपप्रभादीनां बहूनामेकत्रावस्थानं दृश्यते, किमुताऽमूर्तानाम् ? इति भावः ॥ ३१२ ।। (१८६०)॥
D. C.-Mandika:-The abode of sıddhas is limited in space. How could the numberless siddhas be accomodated in it ?
Bhagāvān.-Siddhas are accomodated even in that limited space on account of their a-mūrtatva, just as a number of apprehensions are made upon one object, or just as a number of eyes fall upon one dancer, or just as light of numerous lamps is accumulated in one room of limited space, the cb-mūrta siddhas are also contained in their limited kşetra. When the accumulation of a number of murta splendours of lamps in a limited space is possible, why not the collection of a-murta siddhas be not possible in the a-murta space ? ॥ 312 ॥ ( 1860 )] न ह वइ सशरीरस्स प्पिया-ऽप्पियावहतिरेवमाईणं। वेयपयाणं च तुमं न सदत्थं मुणसि तो संका ॥३१३॥(१८६१) तुह बंधे मोक्खम्मि य, सा य न कजा जओ फुडो चेव । ससरीरे-यरभावो नणु जोसो बंध मोक्खो त्ति ॥३१४॥(१८६२) Na ha vai sa-sarîrasya ppiyā-'ppiyāvahatirevamāîņam i Veyapayānam ca tumam na sadattham munasi to sarkā il 313 11 Tuha bandhe mokkhammi ya, sā ya na kajjā jao phudo ceva i Sa-sarîre-yarabhāvo naņu jo so bandha mokkho tti 113141(1862) [न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरेवमादीनाम् ।
वेदपदानां च त्वं न सदर्थं मुणसि ततः शङ्का ॥ ३१३ ॥ (१८६१) तव बन्धे मोक्षे च, सा च न कार्या यतः स्फुट एव ।
सशरीरे-तरभावो ननु यः स बन्धो मोक्ष इति ॥ ३१४ ।। (१८६२) Na. ha vai sa-sarirasya priya-priyayorapahatirevamadinam ! Vedapadanām ca tvam na sadartham munasi tatah saiks.13130(1861)]

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Tava bandhe mokṣe ca, sa ca na karya yataḥ sphuta eva | Sa-śarire-tarabhāvo nanu yah sa bandho moksa iti ॥314॥(1862)]
Trans.-313–314 Really speaking, you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of the Vedas such as "Na ha vai sa-sartrasya priyyā-priyayorapahati” ete, 'and hence your doubt as regards bandha and moksa (has arisen). That doubt should no longer be entertained. For, bandha and moksa are nothing but the qualities of having a form and formlessness ( respectively ). ( 1861-1862 )
टीका - व्याख्या - " न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-प्रिय योर पहतिरस्ति, अशरीरं वा वसन्तं वा प्रिया - ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः " इत्यादीनां च वेदपदानां सदर्थं त्वं न मुणसि । ततो बन्धे मोक्षे च तव सौम्य ! शङ्का, सा च न कार्या, यतो ननु यः सशरीरे - तरभावः स्फुट एव बन्धो मोक्षचेति कथं शङ्का युज्यते ? । एतदुक्तं भवति - " स शरीरस्य " इत्यनेन बाह्या - ssध्यात्मिकानादिशरीरसंतानस्वरूपो बन्धः प्रोक्तः, तथा, "अशरीरं वा वसन्तम् " इत्यनेन त्वशेषशरीरापगमस्वभावो मोक्षः प्रतिपादितः । तथा " स एव विगुणो बियते " इत्यादीन्यपि पदानि संसारिजीवस्य बन्धमोक्षाभाव प्रतिपादकानि त्वं मन्यसे । तच्चायुक्तम्, मुक्तजीवविषयत्वात् तेषाम् । मुक्तस्य च बन्धाद्यभावेऽविप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति । तदेवं भगवता छिन्नस्तस्य संशयः ॥ ३१३ - ३१४ ॥ ( १८६१-१८६२ ) ।।
D. C.-You have not grasped the real meaning of the Vedapadas such as:-" Na ha vai sa-sarîrasya priya-'priya yorapahati," "Asarîram vā vasantam priya-priye na sprıs'ataḥ.” And that is why, O Saumya! you have raised the doubt as regards bandha and mokṣa. But, this sort of doubt should not be entertained by you. For, it is clear that bandha and mokṣa are nothing but the qualities of sa-sariratva and a-s'arîratva respectively.
By the words sas'arirasya etc. bandha which is nothing but the santana of the external, as well as, internal anādi

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[The sixch s'arira, is meant; while by means of "a-s'ariram vā etc mokṣa characterized by the removal of entire s'arira is laid down.
""
Finally, you have apprehended sentences such as sa esa viguno vibhurna bhdhyate etc. to support the abhava of bandha-mokṣa to the mundane soul But that is not correct. Those sentences are referring to the free soul. Attributes such as "It is never bound" etc. are directed to nothing but the muktātmā.
•: 366 :•
Thus, the doubts are removed from the mind of Mandika. || 313-314 || (1861-1862)]
छिन्नम्म संसयम्मी जिणेण जर मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । eùì aavi qaşen egiçie ag diisaagiê 1133411(?<&3)
Chinnammi samsayammi jinena jara marana vippamukkenam So samano pavvaio addhuṭṭhihi saha khandiya saehim ||315||(1863)
[ छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितोऽर्धचतुर्थैः सह खण्डिकशतैः || ३१५ ।। (१८५३) Chinne samśaye jinena jara-maraṇa vipramuktena | Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khanḍikaśataiḥ #315
Trans-315 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksa along with his four hundred and fifty followers. (1863)
End of the Discussion with the Sixth Gaṇadhara,

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Chapter VII
सप्तमगणधरवक्तव्यता। Discussion with the Seventh Ganadhara ते पवइए सोउं मोरिओ आगच्छई जिणसगासं। वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥३१६ ॥ (१८६४) आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ--जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवणू सवदरिसी णं ॥३१७॥ ( १८६५) Te pavvaie söum Morio āgacchai jiņasagāsam | Vaccāmi ņa vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi 11 316 11 (1864) Abhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-marana vippamukkenam | Namena ya gottena ya savvanu savvadarisi nam ॥ 317॥ (1865) [ तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्त्वा मौर्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् । व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३१६ ॥ (१८६४ ) आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। ३१७ ।। ( १८६५) Tan pravrajitān śrutva maurya agaccati jinsakāśana i Vrajāmi vande vanditva paryupāse 11 316 | ( 1864 ) ] Abhāşitasoa Jinena jāti-jara-maraņa vipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarva darsina ॥317॥ (1865)]
Trans.-316-317 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Maurya, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh thinks :-) I may go, pay my homages and worship him. He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara who was free from birth, old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ( 1864-1865 ) । किं मण्णे अस्थि देवा उयाहु नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो॥३१८॥ (१८६६) Kim manne atthi devā uyāhu natthi tti samsao tujjha i Veyapayana ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 318 ॥ ( 1866 ) [किं मन्यसे सन्ति देवा उताहो न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६) Kim manyase santi devā utaho na santîti samśayastava! Vedapadānām cārtham na jānāsi teşāmayamarthah 131811 (1866)]
Trans.—318 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether gods exist or not. But ( ca) you do not know the real interpretation of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their ( real ) interpretation. ( 1866 )
टीका-हे आयुष्मन मौर्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं देवा सन्ति नवेति, उभय. थापि वेदपदश्रवणात् । तथाहि-" स एष यज्ञायुधी यजमानोऽञ्जसा स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति" इत्यादि तथा, "अपाम सोमं अमृता अभूम अगमन् ज्योतिरविदाम देवान् , किं नूनमस्मात् तृणवदरातिः किमु मूर्तिममृतमय॑स्य" इत्यादिः तथा “को जानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र-यम-वरुण-कुबेरादीन्" इत्यादि । एतेषां च वेदपदानामयमर्थस्तव बुद्धौ प्रतिभासते, यथा-स एष यज्ञ एव दुरितवारणक्षमत्वादायुधं प्रहरणं यस्यासौ यज्ञायुधी, यजमानोऽञ्जसा प्रगुणेन न्यायेन, स्वर्गलोकं गच्छति, इति देवसत्ताप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा, अपाम-पीतवन्तः, सोमं लतारसम् , अमृताः-अमरणधर्माणः, अभूम-भूताः स्मः, अगमन्-गताः, ज्योतिः-स्वर्गम् , अविदाम देवान्-देवत्वं प्राप्ताः स्मः, किं नूनमस्मादूध्वं तृणवत् करिष्यति; कोऽसौ ? इत्याह-अरातिः-व्याधिः,

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
•: 369 :•
तथा, किमु प्रने, मूर्ति - जराम् अमृतमर्त्यस्येति - अमृतत्वं प्राप्तस्य मर्त्यस्य पुरुषस्येत्यर्थः, अमरणधर्मिणो मनुष्यस्य किं करिष्यन्ति जरा - व्याधयः ? इति भावः । अत्रापि देवसत्ताप्रतिपत्तिः । " को जानाति मायोपमान् " इत्यादीनि तु देवाभावप्रतिपादकानि । अतस्तव संशयः । अयुक्ताश्चायम्, यतोऽमीषां वेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि चशब्दाद् युक्तिं च न वेत्सि । एतेषां हि वेदपदानां नायमर्थो यस्तवाभिप्रेतः किन्त्वयम् - वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ ३१८ ॥ (१८६६ )
,
ܪ
D. C.-O long-lived Maurya! your doubt about the existence of gods is due to your hearing various sentences of Vedas.
The sentences are such as
(1) "Sa eṣa yajnayudhî yajamāno'njasa svargalokam gacchati etc.
(2) "Apama somam amṛitā abhūma agaman jyotiravidāma devan kim nūnamasmat triņavadarātiḥ kimu murtimamritamartyasya etc. As well as,
>>
""
47
"
(3) “ Ko jänati māyopamān girvānā nindra-Yama-Varuna Kuberadin?" etc.
According to you, interpretations of these sentences would be as follows:--
(1) This host armed with the weapon of sacrifice reaches the region of heaven immediately. (This leads to prove the existence of gods)
( 2 ) By drinking soma, they became gods, went to heaven, and attained the divine status. These divinities will banish maladies and mortality by virtue of their amritatava. (These sentences are also used in support of the existence of divinites.)

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.:370
Jinabhadra Gaņi's (The seventh (3) Who knows the illusive gods like Indra, Yama,
Varuna and Kubera etc ? ( Sentences like this
would deny the existence of gods on the other side ) So, your doubt has sprung up from the sentences such as mentioned above. But that is not justifiable, as you have not understood their real meaning. Here I explain the real interpretation ॥ 318 ॥ ( 1866)]
Now the author explains the whole proposition in details. तं मन्नसि नेरइया परतंता दुक्खसंपउत्ता य । न तरंतीहागंतुं सद्धया सुबमाणा वि ॥३१९ ॥ (१८६७) सच्छंदयारिणो पुण देवा दिवप्पभावजुत्ता य । जं न कयाइ वि दरिसणमुवेति तो संसओ तेसु ॥३२०॥(१८६८) Tam mannasi neraiyā paratantā dukkhasampauttā yal Na tarantîhāgantum saddheyā suvvamāṇā vi u 319 11 ( 1867) Sacchandayāriņo puņa devā divvappabhāvajuttā ya i Jam na kayãi vi darisanamuventi to samsao tesu 132011 (1868) [ त्वं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः परतन्त्रा दुःखसंप्रयुक्ताश्च ।
न शक्नुवन्तीहाऽऽगन्तुं श्रद्धेयाः श्रूयमाणा अपि ॥ ३१९ ॥ (१८६७) स्वच्छन्दचारिणः पुनर्देवा दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च ।
यन्न कदाचिदपि दर्शनमुपयन्ति ततः संशयस्तेषु ।। ३२० ॥ (१८६८) Tvani manyase nairayikah paratantrā duḥkhasamprayuktāśca Na śaknuvantîha”gantum sraddheyāḥ śrūyapānā api (13191 (1867) Svacchandacāriņaḥ punar-devā divyaprabhāvayuktāśca 1 Yanna kadācidapi darśanamupayanti tataḥ samśayaste sul182011(1868)]
Trans.-319-320 You think that the denizens of hell ( being ) subservient and miserable, are not able to come into this world. (So ), they are to be trusted (as existing ) even

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 371 : if ( they are merely ) heard ( to be so ). But the gods, on the other hand, are free to move and are invested with the celestial splendour also. Still, however, they do not come into the range of ( our ) sight, and hence, the doubt about them. ( 1867-1868 )
टीका-मौर्य! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-नारकाः स्वकृतपापनरकपालादिपरतत्राः, पराधीनवृत्तयोऽतीवदुःखसंघातविह्वलाश्च न शक्नुवन्त्यत्रागन्तुम् , अतः प्रत्यक्षीकरणोपायाभावात् श्रूयमाणा अपि श्रद्धेया भवन्तु । देवास्तु स्वच्छन्दचारिणो दिव्यप्रभावयुक्ताश्च, तथापि यस्माद् न कदाचिद् दर्शनपथमवतरन्ति, श्रूयन्ते च श्रुति-स्मृत्यादिषु, अतस्तेषु शङ्केति ।। ३१९-३२० ॥ (१८६७-१८६८) ___D. C.-0 Maurya ! according to you, the inability of the Nāraka-beings to come to this world, is due to their being subservient to their own sins, as well as, due to their miserable condition. So, they might be trusted upon as existing merely by hearing ( some thing about ) them.
But, the case with gods is different. For, even though they possess free movements and celestial splendour, they would never like to come within the range of our sight.
So, because they are heard of in the Vedas and Smritis etc. you have raised this doubt ॥ 319-320 ॥ ( 1867-1868 ) मा कुरु संसयमेए सुदूरमणुयाइभिन्नजाईए । पेच्छसु पञ्चक्खं चियं चउबिहे देवसंघाए ॥३२१॥ ( १८६९) Mā kuru samsayaméé sudūramaņuyāibhinnajāîe i Pecchasu paccakkham ciya cauvvihe devasanghāe u3211 (1869) [मा कुरु संशयमेतान् सुदूरमनुजादिभिन्नजातीयान् ।
प्रेक्षस्व प्रत्यक्षमेव चतुर्विधान् देवसङ्घातान् ।। ३२१ ।। (१८६९) Mā kuru saņģayametan sudūramanujadibhinnajatiyūn 1 Preksasva pratyaksameva caturvidhan devasanghatan ॥ 321 ॥

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh Trans.-321 Do not entertain doubt. Look at these four-fold multitudes of gods before your eyes ( which are ) extremely different from the human beings. ( 1869 )
टीका-मौर्यपुत्र ! देवेषु मा संशयं कार्षीस्त्वम् , एतानेव हि सुद्रमत्यर्थ मनुजादिभ्यो भिन्नजातीयान् दिव्याभरण-विलेपन-वसन-सुमनोमालालतान् भवनपति-व्यन्तर-ज्योतिष्क-वैमानिक लक्षणांश्चतुर्विधदेवसंघातान् मम वन्दनार्थमिहैव समवसरणागतान् प्रत्यक्ष एव पश्येति ॥ ३२१ ॥ (१८६९)
D. C.-You should not entertain any doubt about the existence. of gods, O Mauryaputra ! just look at these gods of all the four types-viz-bhavanapati, vyantara jyotiska, and vaimānika-distinguished from the human beings by virtue of (their) celestial ornaments and garlands etc. coming to this samavasarana to pay their homages to me. ll 321 I (1869 ) पुवं पि न संदेहो जुत्तो जं जोइसा सपच्चक्खं । दीसंति तकया वि य उवघाया-ऽणुग्गहा जगओ॥३२२॥१८७० Puvvam pi na samdeho jutto jam joisā sapaccakkhami Dîsanti takkayā vi ya uvaghāyā-nuggahā jagao 132211 ( 1870 ) [पूर्वमपि न संदेहो युक्तो यज् ज्योतिष्काः स्वप्रत्यक्षम् ।
दृश्यन्ते तत्कृता अपि चोपघाता-ऽनुग्रहा जगतः ॥३२२॥ (१८७०) Pūrvamapi na samdeho yukto yaj jyotişkāḥ svapratyaksami Dşiśyante tatkṣitā api copagbātā-nugrahā jagataḥ 1322|1 (1870)]
Trans.-322 The doubt is not justified even before ( their appearance ), since luminaries are self-perceptible. Moreover, injuries or betterments caused by them to the world are also apprehended. ( 1870 )
टीका-इह समवसरणागतदेवदर्शनात् पूर्वमपि तवान्येषां च संशयो न युक्तः, यद् यस्माचन्द्रा-ऽऽदित्यादिज्योतिष्कास्त्वया सर्वेणापिच लोकेन स्व. प्रत्यक्षत एव सर्वथा दृश्यन्ते । अतो देशतः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथं समस्तामरास्ति

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada त्वशता ?। किञ्च, सन्येव देवाः, लोकस्य तत्कृतानुग्रहो-पघातदर्शनात् । तथाहि-दृश्यन्ते क्वचित् केचित् त्रिदशाः, कस्यापि किञ्चिद्विभवप्रदानादिनाऽनुग्रहम् , तत्प्रहरणादिना चोपघातं कुर्वन्तः । ततो राजादिवत् कथमेते न सन्ति इति ॥ ३२२ ॥ (१८७०)
D. C.-Even before they appear at this Samavasarana, your doubt about their existence is not justified. For, luminaries like Sun, Moon etc are self-perceptible to you, as well as, to the whole world. So, it is not appriate to doubt their existence.
Moreover, anugraha and upaghāta caused by gods to this world are also evident to all. Several gods confer their favours upon some people by granting their objects of pleasure etc. while others inflict injuries, like a king, by means of weapons etc. This shows, for certain, that gods do exist Il 322 || (1870)
Besides, आलयमेत्तं च मई पुरं व तवासिणो तह वि सिद्धा । जे ते देव त्ति मया न य निलया निच्चपरिसुण्णा ॥३२३॥(१८७१) Alayamettam ca mai puram va tavvāsiņo taha vi siddhā | Je te deva tti mayā na ya nilayā niccaparisunnā u 323 u (1871) [ आलयमानं च मतिः पुरमिव तद्वासिनस्तथापि सिद्धाः ।
ये ते देवा इति मता न च निलया नित्यपरिशून्याः ॥३२३॥ (१८७१) Alayamatram ca matiḥ puramiva tadvasinastathāpi siddhāḥi Ye te deva iti mata na ca nilaya nityaparisunyah ॥323 (1871)]
Trans.-323 The view may be that ( luminaries ) are mere abodes. Still however, like a city, they, too, have their inhabitants, who are accepted as (none but) gods. For, places of residence cannot be vacant for ever. ( 1871 )
टीका-अथैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-आलया एवालयमा चन्द्रादिविमानानि, न तु देवाः, तत् कथं ज्योतिष्कदेवानां प्रत्यक्षत्वमभिधीयते ।

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.: 374 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh किं तद् यथाऽऽलयमात्रम् ? इत्याह-"पुरं ति" यथा पुरं शून्यं लोकानामालयमानं स्थानमात्रं, न तु तत्र लोकाः सन्ति, एवं चन्द्राद्रिविमानान्यप्यालयमात्रमेव, न तु तत्र देवाः केचित् तिष्ठन्ति, अतः कथं तेषां प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तथापि तद्वासिन आलयवासिनः सामर्थ्याद् ये सिद्धास्ते देवा इति मताः संमताः। यो ह्यालयः स सर्वोऽपि तन्निवासिनाधिष्ठितो दृष्टः, यथा प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमाना देवदत्ताधधिष्ठिता वसन्तपुराद्यालयाः, आलयाश्च ज्योति
कविमानानि, अत आलयत्वान्यथानुपपतेय तन्निवासिनः सिद्धास्ते देवा इति मताः । आह-ननु कथं ते देवाः सिध्यन्ति ? । यादृशा हि प्रत्यक्षेण देवदत्तादयो दृश्यन्ते तेऽपि तादृशा एव स्युरिति । तदयुक्तम् , विशिष्टा हि देवदत्ताद्यालयेभ्यश्चन्द्राद्यालया इति । अतस्तेनिवासिनोऽपि विशिष्टाः सिध्यन्ति, ते च देवदत्तादिविलक्षणा देवा इति । अपरस्त्वाह-ननु " आलयत्वात् " इत्ययं हेतुस्तन्निवासिजनसाधनेऽनैकान्तिक, शून्यालयैर्व्यभिचारात् । अत्रोत्तरमाह-" न य निलयेत्यादि " न च निलया-आलया नित्यमेव शून्या भवन्ति । अयमभिप्राय:-ये केचिदालयास्ते प्रार, इदानीं, एष्यति वा कालेऽवश्यमेव सन्निवासिभिरविष्ठिता एव भवन्ति न तु नित्यमेव परिशून्याः । ततो यदा तदा वा चन्द्राद्यालयनिवासिनो देवाः सिध्यन्तीति ॥ ३२३ ॥ (१८७१)
D. C.-Maurya:--Luminaries like Sun and Moon mentioned by you, are only the abodes and not the gods themselves. It could not be said, therefore, that the luminary deities are directly perceptible, just as in case of an empty town, the houses are mere places of residence for people but people do not actually reside into them, so also luminarie like moon etc should be taken as absolutely empty bodies and nothing like gods is expected to reside into them.
Bhagavān: It is not so. O Maurya! Existence of the place of residence proves the existence of its residents also. So, these luminaries are not mere alayas, but they have their inhabitants also. For, that which is called an alaya or a house is always occupied by its residents. Like houses in a town

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Vada]
Ganadharavada
* 375:
occupied by persons like Devadatta, these luminaries are also undoubtedly occupied by devinities.
Maurya-Like Devadatta etc residing in the houses of a city, the gods who are the residents of the luminary bodies should also be perceptible
Bhagavan:-It is not proper to advance such an argument. Because the places of residence are absolutely different from the houses in a city. So, their residents viz gods are also characteristically different from Devadatta etc. Although they are not apprehended by the indriyas, their existence is admitted without doubt.
Maurya:-You cannot assert exclusively that every place of residence is always occupied by a resident For, nobody would reside in a barren house. (It is forbidden to reside in such a house) From the existence of abode, therefore, you cannot infer the existence of the occupant.
Bhagavan:-A residing place is never sunya. It must have been occupied by some person or the other, either in the past or in future or at present. In case of luminary places of resort, gods like moon etc. must have occuplied the places at some time in the past, present, or future 323 (1871)
को जाणइ व किमेयं ति होज निस्संसयं विमाणाई । रयणमयनभोगमणादिह जइ विज्जाहराईणं ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२ )
Ko jāņai va kimeyam ti hojja missamsayam vimānāim | Rayanamayanabhogamanadiha jaha vijjāharāînam u 324 (1872)
[ को जानाति वा किमेतदिति भवेद् निस्संशयं विमानानि । रत्नमयनभोगमनादिह यथा विद्याधरादीनाम् || ३२४ ।। ( १८७२ ) Ko jānāti va kimetaditi bhaved nissamsayam vimānāni | Ratnamayanabhogamanadiha yatha vidyadharadinām 32411(1872)]
Trans-324 "Or, who knows what it is?" They are

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•:376 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh certainly palaces like those of Vidyadharas etc., as they are decked with jewels and they fly in the sky. ( 1872 )
टीका-यदिवा, एवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेद् यदुत-चन्द्राद्यालयत्वेन यद् गीयते भवद्भिस्तदिदं को जानाति किञ्चिद् भवेत् , किं सूर्योऽग्निमयो गोलः, चन्द्रस्त्वम्बुमयः स्वभावतः स्वच्छः, आहोस्विदेवंभूता एवैते भास्वररत्नमया गोलका ज्योतिष्कविमानानि ?, अतः कथमेतेषामालयत्वसिद्धिः। अत्र प्रतिविधानमाह-निःसंशयं विमानान्येतानि, रत्नमयत्वे सति नभोगमनात्, पुष्पकादिविद्याधरतपः सिद्धविमानवदिति । अभ्रविकार-पवनादिव्यवच्छेदार्थं रत्नमयत्वविशेषणमिति ॥ ३२४ ॥ (१८७२)
____D. C.-Masurrya:-Or, who knows what these luminaries like Sun and Moon, mentioned by you are like ? One that appears as Sun may be a ball of fire, and that which appears as Moon may be a transparent ball of water. Or, it may be that these luminaries be some such bright balls. So, it is not appropriate to believe that they are the abodes of luminary gods.
Bhagavān: -Since they are decked with jewels and they are moving in the sky, there is no doubt that they are actual vimānas like puspaka etc. attained by vidyādharas by means of austerites etc. So, take it for certain, that these vimānas are also the residing places of the various luminary gods. ॥ 324 ॥ ( 1872)॥
Or,
हो मई माएयं तहा वि तकारिणो सुरा जे ते । न य मायाइविगारा पुरं व निच्चोवलम्भाओ ॥३२५॥ (१८७३) Hojja mai māeyam tahā vi takkāriņo surā je te Na ya māyāivigārā puram va niccovalambhāo 11 325 | ( 1873 )
[भवेद् मतिर्मायेयं तथापि तत्कारिणः सुरा ये ते । . न च मायादिविकाराः पुरमिव नित्योपलम्भात् ॥ ३२५ ॥ (१८७३)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 377 :Bhaved matirmayeyam tathāpi tatkāriņaḥ surā ye te i Na ca māyādivikārāḥ puramiva nityopalambhāt ll 325 01 ( 1873 ) ]
___ Trans.-325 It may be argued that this is ( all ) illusion. But, its creators are gods, and not the perturbations like illusion etc. on account of their being obtained like a town for ever. ( 1873 )
टीका-अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्-नैते चन्द्रादिविमानान्यालयाः, किन्तु मायेयं मायाविना केनापि प्रयुक्ता । अत्रोच्यते-मायात्वममीषामसिद्धम् , वाङ्मात्रेणैव भवताऽभिधानात्; तथाप्यभ्युपगम्योच्यते-ये तत्कारिणस्तथाविधमायाप्रयोक्तारस्ते सुराः सिद्धा एव, मनुष्यादीनां तथाविधवैक्रियकरणादर्शनात् । अभ्युपगम्य च मायात्वममीषामभिहितम्। न चैते मायादि. विकाराः, नित्योपलम्भात्, सर्वेण सर्वदा दृश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः, प्रसिद्ध पाटलीपुत्रादिपुरवदिति । माये-न्द्रजालकृतानि हि वस्तूनि न नित्यमुपलभ्यन्त इति नित्यविशेषणोपादानमिति ॥ ३२५ ॥ ( १८७३ )
D. C.-You might argue that vimānas like candra etc are not actual alayas, but they are mere illusions created by some magician. But the illusionariness of such vimānas cannot be admitted by means of mere words. Still, however, if they are assumed as māyika, their creators are not magicians or human beings but the gods themselves. This is said only on the assumption that they are māyika vikāras. But really speaking, they are not māyrka as they are ever obtained like towns etc. So, these vimānas are nothing but the abodes of luminary gods ॥ 325 ॥ ( 1878) जइ नारगा पवना पगिट्ठपावफलभोइणो तेणं। - सुबहुगपुण्णफलभुजो पवजियवा सुरगणा वि ॥३२६॥(१८७४)
Jai nārgā pavannā pagitthapāvaphalabhóino tenami Subahugapunnaphalabhujo pavajjiyavva sura-ganā vin326॥(1874)
48

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.: 378 :
Jinabhadra Gaņi’s
[The seventh
[ यदि नारकाः प्रपन्नाः प्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्तेन ।
सुबहुकपुण्यफलभुजः प्रपत्तव्याः सुरगणा अपि ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४) Yadi nārakāḥ prapannāḥ praksistapāpaphalabhoginastena | Subahukapunyaphalabhujah prapattavyāḥ suragaņā api 1132611 ]
Trans~326 If the denizens of hell are admitted as the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, gods should be accepted as the enjoyers of the fruits of many good deeds. ( 1874 )
टीका-इह स्वकृतप्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्तावत् कचिद् नारकाः प्रतिपत्तव्यास्ते च यदि प्रपन्नाः, “तेणं ति" तर्हि तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वोपार्जितसुष्ठुबहुकपुण्यफलभुजः सुरगणा अपि प्रतिपत्तव्याः। अत्राह-नन्विहैवातिदुःखितनरास्तिर्यञ्चश्वातिदुःखिताः प्रकृष्टपापफलभुजो भविष्यन्ति, तथा, मनुष्या एवातिसुखिताः प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलभुजो भविष्यन्ति, किमदृष्टनारक-देव. परिकल्पनया ? इति । तदयुक्तम् , प्रकृष्टपापफलभुजां सर्वप्रकारेणापि दुःखेन भवितव्यम् , न चातिदुः खितानामपि नर-तिरश्चां सर्वप्रकारं दुःखं दृश्यते सुखदपवनाऽऽलोकादिसुखस्य सर्वेषामपि दर्शनात् । प्रकृष्टपुण्यफलभुजामपि सर्वप्रकारेणापि सुखेन भवितव्यम् , न चेहातिसुखितानामपि नराणां सर्वप्रकारं सुखमवलोक्यते, पूतिदेहोद्भवस्य रोग-जरादिप्रभवस्य च दुःखस्य तेषामपि सद्भावात् । तस्मात् प्रकृष्टपापनिबन्धनसर्वप्रकारदुःखवेदिनो नारकाः, प्रकृष्टपुण्यहेतुकसर्वप्रकारसुखभोगिनो देवाश्चाभ्युपगन्तव्या एवेति ॥ ३२६ ॥ (१८७४)
D. C.--Bhagavan :-When you believe that Narcoleas are the sufferers of the rewards of great sins, you should also believe that gods are the enjoyers of the fruits of exalted good deeds and thus they are existing.
Maurya :-Turyancas, who are excessively miserable, are the sufferers of the reward of great sins, and excessively happy human beings are enjoyers of the fruits of exalted.good deeds. So, it is not necessary to assume the existence of devas and Nārakas at all.

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.: 379
Bhagavān:--Existence of devas and Nārakas cannot be denied by saying so. Enjoyers of the rewards of great punyas and pāpas are exclusively happy or exclusively miserable, as the case may be. The manusyas and tiryancas cannot be called exclusively happy and exclusively miserable respectively. For, even the happiest human beings are susceptible to the affliction of diseases, old age, etc. while even extremely miserable tiryancas, experience the happy touch of cold breeze etc. So, manusyas and tiryancas can never be taken as exclusively happy or exclusively miserable beings, while Nārakas who suffer the consequences of pāpas, and devas who enjoy the fruits of punyas, can be easily admitted respectively as the exousively miserable and exclusively happy beings 132611 (1874) ___Now, in reply to the question that “ Why gods do not visit this world if at all they are existing ? " the author states:संकंतदिवपिम्मा विसयपसत्ताऽसमत्तकत्तवा । अणहीणमणुयकज्जा नरभवमसुभं न एंति सुरा॥३२७॥(१८७५) Sankantadivvapimmā visayapasattā’samattakattavvā | Anahinamanuyakajja narabhavamasubham na enti sura ॥ 327 ॥ [संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमाणो विषयप्रसक्ता असमाप्तकर्तव्याः।
अनधीनमनुजकार्या नरभवमशुभं नागच्छन्ति सुराः ॥३२७॥(१८७५) Sankrāntadivyapremāņo visayaprasaktā asamāptakartavyaḥ Anadhinamanujakāryā narabhavamaśubham nīgacchanti suraḥ||32711
Trans.-327 Invested with celestial love and attached to the objects of pleasure, with their duties un-finished, and their deeds independent of human beings, divinities do not come into this inauspicious world. ( 1875)
टीका-नागच्छन्तीह सदैव सुरगणाः, संक्रान्तदिव्यप्रेमत्वात् , विषयप्रसक्तत्वात् , प्रकृष्टरूपादिगुणकामिनीप्रसक्तरम्यदेशान्तरगतपुरुषवत् ; तथा, असमाप्तकर्तव्यत्वात् , बहुकर्तव्यताप्रसाधननियुक्तविनीतपुरुषवत् ।, तथा, ,

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.: 380 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The seventh अनधीनं मनुजानां कार्य येषां तेऽनधीनमनुजकार्याः, तद्भावस्तत्वं तस्माद् नेहागच्छन्ति सुराः, अनभिमतगेहादौ निःसङ्गयतिवदिति । तथा, अशुभत्वाद् नरभवस्य तद्न्धासहिष्णुतया नेहागच्छन्ति देवाः, स्वपरित्यक्तकडेवरवदिति ॥ ३२७ ॥ (१८७५)॥
D. C.-Divinities do not come to this world, because they are invested with celestial love and attached to the various objects of pleasure like a person attached to a beautiful woman possessing high qualities of extreme beauty etc. Secondy, like a great man entrusted with manifold work, these gods have also to perform manifold duties and hence their duties are never over. Thirdly, all their deeds are independent of human beings. So, just as a dispassionate ascetic never comes to an unholy house, these gods also usually abstain themselves from coming to the inauspicious human world as they would not stand even the smell of it. ll 327 11 ( 1875)
But this does not mean that they always keep themselves away from this world.
For, नवरि जिणजम्म-दिक्खा-केवल-निवाणमहनिओगेणं । भत्तीए सोम्म ! संसयविच्छेयत्थं व एजहण्हा ॥३२८॥(१८७६) पुवाणुरागओ वा समयनिबंधा तवोगुणाओ वा। नरगणपीडा-ऽणुग्गह-कंदप्पाईहिं वा केइ ॥३२९॥ (१८७७) Navari jinajamma-dikkhā-kevala-nivvāna maha neogenam | Bhatlîe Sommal samsayaviccheyattham va ejjahaṇhā 113281(1876) Puvyānurāgao vā samayanibandhā tavogunāo vā i Naraganapida-'nuggaha-kandappaihim va kei ॥ 329 ॥ ( 1877) [ नवरं जिनजन्म-दीक्षा-केवल-निर्वाणमहनियोगेन ।
भच्या सौम्य ! संशयविच्छेदार्थ वैयुरिहाद्वाय ।। ३२८ ।। (१८७६)

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Gaṇadharavada
• 381 :•
पूर्वानुरागतो वा समयनिबन्धात् तपोगुणाद् वा ।
नरगणपीडा - नुग्रह - कन्दर्पादिभिर्वा केचित् ॥ ३२९ ॥ (१८७७ ) Navaram jinajanma- diksa-kovala-nirvānamahaniyogena । Bhaktyä Saumya samsayavicchedartham vaiyurihāhnāya ||328|| Pūrvanuragato va samayanibandhat tapoguṇad vā | Naragaņapidānugraha-kandarpādibhirva kecit ॥ 329 ॥ ( 1877 ) ]
Trans.-328-329 Some have to visit this world merely by ( way of ) duty, at the occasion of birth, diksā, acceptance of absolute apprehension, or final emancipation of some saint, while others ( would come ) by reason of devotion, O Saumya ! or in order to remove ( their ) doubts, or on account of previous attachment. Some ( would do so ) following the conventional rule, some by virtue of austerities, some to afflict the human beings, some to favour them, or some ( would come ) out of passion etc. ( 1876-1877 )
9
टीका - नवरं जिनजन्म - दीक्षा - केवल - निर्वाणमहोत्सव नियोगेन तत्कर्तव्यतानियमेनेह देवा आगच्छेयुः । तत्र सौम्य ! केचिदिन्द्रादयो निजभक्त्या समागच्छन्ति केचित् तु तदनुवृच्या, अन्ये संशयव्यवच्छेदार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्वभविकपुत्र - मित्राद्यनुरागात् । समयनिबन्धः - प्रतिबोधादिनिमित्तः संकेतनिश्चयः, तस्माच्च केचिद् देवा इहागच्छन्ति । अन्ये तु महासत्त्व साध्वादि - तपोगुणसमाकृष्टाः केचित्तु पूर्ववैरिकनरगणपीडार्थम्, अपरे तु पूर्व सुहृत्पुत्राद्यनुग्रहार्थम् केचित्तु देवाः कन्दर्पादिभिरिहागच्छन्ति आदिशब्दात् साध्वादिपरीक्षा हेतोरिति द्रष्टव्यमिति । तदेवं निरूपितं देवानामश्रागमन कारणम्, अनागमनकारणं च ।। ३२८-३२९ ।। ( १८७६-१८७७ ).
"
D. C. - Various deities visit this world on various purposes. Some have to attend the occasions of janma, dîkṣā, kevala-jñāna prapti and nirvana of a saint. Some like Indra are drawn to this world by means of devotion, some to remove their doubts. Several others descend upon this world on account of their previous attachment to relatives like son, friend etc. or by following the previous conventions or by virtue of previous austerities also, some gods come to the human world for the

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purpose of afflicting human beings in order to take revenge upon them, while others would be attracted to this world out of passion or in order to test the saints of this world also.
Thus, there are various causes for their visit to this world, while others stated before are the causes of their staying away from this world also. || 328-329 || (1876-1877) AIŞEACHEMBÙ HIaş qszegftamnei a 1 विज्जा-मंतो--वायणसिद्धीओ गहविगाराओ ॥ ३३० ॥ (१८७८) उक्किपुण्ण संचयफलभावाओऽभिहाणसिद्धीओ । सवागमसिद्धीउ य संति देव त्तिं सद्धेयं ॥ ३११ ॥ (१८७९)
Jāissarakahanão kāsai paccakkhadarisanāo ya Vijjā-manto-vāyaṇasiddîo gahavigārāo 330 (1878)
Ukkiṭṭhapunnasamcayaphalabhāvāo'bhihāṇasiddhĵo
Savvägamasiddhîu ya santi deva tti saddheyam 331 || (1879)
[ जातिस्मरणकथनात् कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षदर्शनाच्च ।
विद्या-मत्रोपयाचन सिद्धेर्ग्रहविकारात् ।। ३३० ।। ( १८७८ )
उत्कृष्टपुण्यसंचय फलभावादभिधानसिद्धेः ।
सर्वागमसिद्वेव सन्ति देवा इति श्रद्धेयम् ।। ३३१ ।। ( १८७९ )
Jatismaraṇakathanat kasyacit pratyakṣadarśanacca | Vidya-mantropayacanasidd hergrahavikārāt || 330 || (1878)
Utkristapunyasamcayaphalabhavadabhidhanasiddheḥ
Sarvagamasiddheśca santi deva iti śraddheyam u 331 || (1879)]
Trans.-330-331 By the statement of some (who are) reminded of (the former) existence by means of direct apprehension, by virtue of) reciting the chantings, of (various) lores, by the movement of planets, due to the existence of the fruition of the accumulation of highly meritorious deeds, by (virtue of) (their) names, and by (the help of) all āgamas, it should be trusted that gods are existing. (1878-1879)

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*: 388 :___टीका-" सन्ति देवा इत्येतत् श्रद्धेयम् " इति प्रतिज्ञा, जातिस्मरणप्रत्ययितपुरुषेण कथनात् , नानादेशविचारिप्रत्ययित पुरुषावलोकितकथितविचित्रबृहद्देवकुलादिवस्तुवत् ; तथा, कस्यापि तपः प्रभृतिगुणयुक्तस्य प्रत्यक्षदर्शनप्रवृत्तेश्च-केनचित् प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणेनोपलम्भादित्यर्थः, दूरविप्रकृष्टनगरादिवत् ; तथा, विद्या-मत्रोपयाचनेभ्यः कार्यसिद्धेः, प्रसादफलानुमितराजादिवत् । तथा, 'गहविगाराउ त्ति' अत्र प्रयोगः-ग्रहाधिष्ठितपुरुषदेहों जीवव्यतिरितादृश्यवस्त्वधिष्ठातृका, पुरुषासंभाव्यविकारवत्क्रियादर्शनात् , संचरिष्णुयत्रव्यतिरिक्तमध्यप्रविष्टादृश्यमानपुरुषाधिष्ठितयत्रवत् ; तथा तपो-दानादिक्रियासमुपार्जितोत्कृष्टपुण्यसंभारफलसद्भावात्, उत्कृष्टपापप्राग्भारफलसद्भावनिश्चि तनारकवत् , एतच्च प्रागेव भावितम् । तथा, "देवाः" इति तदभिधानं ततोऽपि च देवानां सिद्धिः। एतच्चानन्तरगाथायां व्यक्तीकरिष्यते । तथा, सर्वे च त आगमाश्च सर्वागमास्तेष्वविप्रतिपच्या सिद्धत्वाच्च सन्ति देवा इति ॥ ३३०३३१ ॥ (१८७८-१८७९) ___D. C.-Existence of gods could be established in various ways :
(1) On the recollection of former existence, a person
would relate the story of the great family of gods
witnessed and believed by him as certain. (2) Some persons attain directly the dars'ana of gods by
virtue of their qualities like austerity etc. (3) Some people attain the accomplishment of their
objects by soliciting the favour of gods by means
of prayers, and chantings of prescribed mantras. (4) A person in charge of planets is absolutely different
from the jîvas, because of the kriyās that are found as a result of changes in the planets which are never
to be found in human beings. (5) Just as we have accepted the existence of Narakas
due to the fruition of great sins, the existence of

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gods should also be admitted on account of the phala of the accumulation of highly meritorious
deeds like tapas, dāna eto. (6) The existence of gods is established by their very
name viz-" devah” ( This will be explained in the
following verse.) (7) All the āgamas admit the existence of gods.
॥ 330-331 ( 1878-1879 )॥ The epithet " devāh. '' is then explained as follows:देव त्ति सत्थयमिदं सुद्धत्तणओ घडाभिहाणं व । अह व मई मणुउ च्चिय देवो गुण-रिद्धिसंपण्णो ॥३३२॥(१८८०) तं न जउ तच्चत्थे सिद्धे उवयारओ मया सिद्धी। तच्चत्थसीह सिद्धे माणवसीहोवयारो व ॥ ३३३ ॥ (१८८१) Deva tti satthayanıidam suddhattanao ghadābhihāņam vai Aha va mai manuu cciya devo guna riddhi sampanno 1332॥ (1880) Tam na jau tacca siddhe uyayārao mayā siddhî Taccatthasiha siddhe manavasihovayāro vva ॥ 333 ॥ ( 1881 ) [ देवा इति सार्थकमिदं शुद्धत्वतो घटाभिधानमिव ।
अथवा मतिर्मनुज एव देवो गुण-द्धिसंपन्नः ॥ ३३२ ॥ (१८८०) तद् न यतस्तथ्यार्थे सिद्ध उपचारतो मता सिद्धिः।
तथ्यार्थसिंहे सिद्धे माणवसिंहोपचार इव ॥ ३३३ ।। (१८८१) Deva iti sārthakawidam śuddhatvato ghatabhidhānamiva | Athava matirmanuja eva devogunar-ddhisumpannah ॥ 332॥ (1880) Tad na yatastathyarthe siddha upacarato matā siddhiḥ 1 Tathyarthasimhe siddhe manavasimhopacara iva ॥3330 (1881)]
Trans.—332–333 Since the epithet “deva " is clear like “ ghata", it is significant. Or, it might be believed that man

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•:385 :himself ( when ) accompanied by the prosperity of merits is god. ( But ) that is not ( correct ). ( Because ) the accomplishment ( of the secondary meaning ) by means• of usage could be brought about (only ) when the primary meaning is established, just as the epithet “ sinha" or lion could be attributed to Mänavaka by means of usage only, if the primary sense of the word “ siņha” is accepted ( 1889–1881 )
टीका-" देवाः" इत्येतत् पदं सार्थकं व्युत्पत्तिमच्छुद्धपदत्वात् , घटादिवत् । तत्र दीव्यन्तीति देवा इति व्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वम् , समासतद्धितरहितत्वेन च शुद्धत्वम् । भावना चात्र प्रागुक्तैव । अथ परस्य मतिर्भवेत्-ननु मनुष्य एवेह दृश्यमानो देवो भविष्यति, किमदृष्टदेवकल्पनया ?। किं सर्वोऽपि मनुष्यो देवः ? इति । न, इत्याह-गुणसंपन्नो गणधरादिः, ऋद्धिसंपन्नश्चक्रवादिः। अत्रोच्यते-तदेतद् न, यस्मात् तथ्ये मुख्ये वस्तुनि क्वचित् सिद्धे सत्यन्यत्रोपचारतस्तत्सिद्धिमता, यथा मुख्य यथार्थे सिंहेऽन्यत्र सिद्धे ततो माणवके सिंहोपचारः सिध्यति, एवमिहापि यदि मुख्या देवाः क्वचित् सिद्धा भवेयुः, तदा राजादेर्देवोपचारो युज्यते, नान्यथेति ॥ ३३२-३३३ ॥ (१८८०-१८८१)
D. C.-Since the word “ devāh" is void of compound and prefixes, and is explained as tatra divyantîti devāh ( those that shine there, are deities ), it is philologically siddha, like other padas such as ghata etc.
Maurya :-The man himself seen before our very eyes is God. Why to imagine an invisible form for that? All men are not gods. But those accompanied by high merits and religious prosperity could easily be taken as gods.
Bhagavan:-That is not correct. Unless and until the principal meaning of a word is not accomplished, it could never be attributed to any other object by means of upacara. The epithet of lion could easily be attributed to mūnavaka only if the primary sense of the word sınha is accomplished.
Similarly, here also the epithet “ devah " could be attributed

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to king etc. only if the existence of gods is accepted, and not otherwise. || 332-333 ( 1880-1881)॥
Now, in case of existence of gods being denied, the uselessness of the rites like agnihotra etc. is shown:देवाभावे विफलं जमग्गिहोत्ताइयाण किरियाणं । सग्गीयं जन्नाण य दाणाइफलं च तदजुत्तं ॥३३४ ॥ (१८८२) Devābhāve viphalam jamaggihottāiyāṇa kiriyānam | Saggîyam jannāņa ya dāņāiphalam ca tadajuttam 13341 (1882)
[ देवाभावे विफलं यदग्निहोत्रादिकानां क्रियाणाम् । ___ स्वर्गीयं यज्ञानां च दानादिफलं च तदयुक्तम् ॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२) Devabhave viphalam yadagnihotradikinam kriyanam | Svargiyam yajnānam ca dānādiphalam ca tadayuktam (1334||(1882)]
Trans.-334 In ( case of ) non-existence of gods, ( award of ) heaven laid down ( as a result ) of ( the accomplishment of ) the rites like agnihotra etc. as well as, the fruition of munificence etc. would be null and void. ( 1882 )
टीका-'वा' इत्यथवा, इदं दूषणम्-देवाभावेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने यदग्निहोत्रादिक्रियाणाम् “ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः " इत्यादिना स्वर्गीय फलमुक्तम्, तथा, यज्ञानां च यत् फलमभिहितं, दानादिफलं च यत् समस्तलोके प्रसिद्धम् , तत् सर्वमयुक्तं प्रामोति । स्वर्गो ह्येतेषां फलमुक्तम् , स्वर्गिणां चाभावे कुतः स्वर्गः? इति । “स एप यज्ञायुधी" इत्यादीनि च वेदवाक्यानि देवास्तित्वप्रतिपादनपराणि वर्तन्ते । अतः किं तान् न प्रतिपद्यसे? । यद्यपि " को जानाति मायोपमान् गीर्वाणानिन्द्र-यम-वरुण-कुबेरादीन्" इत्यादि वाक्यम् , तदपि न देवनास्तित्वाभिधायकम् , किन्तु सुराणामपि मायोपमस्वाभिधानेन शेषर्द्धिसमुदायानां सुतरामनित्यत्वप्रतिपादकं बोद्धव्यम् । अन्यथा हि देवास्तित्वप्रतिपादकवाक्यानि, श्रुतिमन्त्रपदैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वानं चानर्थकं स्यात्॥ ३३४ ॥ (१८८२)
D. C.-There will be one more difficulty in case of denying . .the existence of gods. Because in that case, the award of

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.: 387 :
heaven laid down as a result of the rites like agnihotra etc. in the sentences such as “ Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ ” etc. as well as, the fruition of sacrifices and meritorious deeds liko dana etc prescribed in deeds like dāna etc prescribed in this world, would become absolutely futile. Thus, in absence of svargin-the inhabitant of svarga-how is svarga to exist ?
Hence O Maurya! take it for certain that sentences such as " Sa esa yajñāyudhî" etc. are laid down to establish the existence of gods, while the sentence“ Ko jānāti māyopamān gîrvānānindra-Yama-Varuna-Kuberādîn ” etc. does not lead to deny the existence of gods, but it only means to assert the a-nityatā of the prosperity of gods and the rest. Otherwise, the sentences which establish the existence of gods, as well as, the invocation of gods like Indra by means of reciting the prescribed mantras, would be of no avail. ll 334 || ( 1882 )
Moreover, F#-HÌA-ET-TUF-ARHIŞIO FIUE FOUTIEI HALTIEU T šeigo fakt FÅ DR3401 (8663) Jama-Soma-Sūra-Suraguru-sārajjāîņi jayai jannehim | Mantāvāhanameya ya Indāîņam vihā savvam u 335 u ( 1883 )
[74-14-at-HUF-FTRIGUTeta gura 5: 1
HATAÐI Gigtai 91 Fay 11 334 11 (8663) Yama-Soma-Sūra-Suraguru-svārājyādini jayati yajnaiḥ ı Mantrahvānameva cendrādînám vệithā sarvam || 335 II ( 1883 )]
Trans.—335 ( The statement that ) one conquers the regions of ( the gods of ) Death, Moon, Sun, and Brihaspati etc, and the invocation of Indra etc by reciting the prescribed mantras would be absolutely null and void. ( 1883 )
टीका-" जमित्यादि " पूर्वार्धस्यायमर्थः-उक्थषोडशिप्रभृतिक्रतुभियथाश्रुति “ यम-सोम-सूर्य-सुरगुरु-स्वाराज्यानि जयति" इत्यादीनि देवास्तित्वसूचकानि वेदवाक्यानि देवाभावे वृथैव स्युः । इह चोक्थषोडशि ..

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प्रभृतयो यज्ञविशेषा मन्तव्याः । सयूपो यज्ञ एव हि क्रतुरुच्यते, यपरहितस्तु दानादिक्रियायुक्तो यज्ञ इति । स्वः- स्वर्गः, तत्र राज्यानि । जयतिउपार्जयतीत्यर्थ इति । तथा मन्त्रैरिन्द्रादीनामाह्वानं देवास्तित्व एवोपपद्यते, अन्यथा वृथैव स्यात् । इन्द्रादीनां मन्त्रपदैराह्वानमेवमवगन्तव्यम्'इन्द्र ! आगच्छ मेधातिथे मेषवृषण " इत्यादि । तस्माद् युक्तितो वेदवाक्येभ्यश्च सन्ति देवा " इति स्थितम् । तदेवं छिन्नो मौर्यपुत्रस्य भगवता संशयः ॥ ३३५ ॥ ( १८८३ )
46
44
D. C. — It has been laid down in the Sāstras that
"Uktha sodas'i prabhriti kratubhir yathās'ruti Yama-SomaSurya-Suraguru-svārājyāni jayati etc. Sentences like this, lead to prove the existence of gods. But they would prove themselves good-for-nothing, if the existence of gods is denied.
""
Similarly, the invocation of gods such as Indra etc. by means of mantras which indicate the existence of gods would also become futile if there were devabhava The sentences of the Vedas establish the existence of gods in one way or the other. 11 335 ( 1883 ).
The doubt of Mauryaputra is thus removed by the preceptor.
छिन्नम्म संसयम्मी जिणेण जर मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
सो समणो पड़ओ अहि सह खंडियस एहिं ॥ ३३६॥ (१८८४) Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maraṇavippamukkeṇam So samano pavvaio addhuṭṭhehim saha khandiyasachim 1336 [ छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा - मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रवजितोऽचतुर्थैः सह खण्डिकशतैः ॥ ३३६ ॥ (१८८४) Chinne samśaye Jinena jara-maraṇavipramukte na Sa śramanah paavrajito'rdha caturthaih saha khandikaśatain ॥36॥ Trans. - 336 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthar - kara who was entirely free from old age, and death, that saint accepted diksā along with his three hundred and fifty pupils. (1884) End of the Discussion with the Seventh Gaṇadhara,
Candraaps

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Chapter VIII -8@8
अष्टमगणधरवक्तव्यता
Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara
ते पइए सोउं अकंपिओ आगच्छइ जिणसगासं । वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ३३७ ॥ (१८८५)
Te pavvaie söum Akampio agacchi Jinasagasam | Vaccāmi na vandāmī vandittā pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 337 ॥ ( 1885 )
[ तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽकम्पित आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् । जामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३३७ ॥ ( १८८५ )
Tan pravrajitan śrutva'kampita agacchati Jinasakāśam | Vrajāmi vande vanditta paryupase ॥ 337 ॥ ( 1885 ) ]
Trans. – 337 Having heard that they (i. e. Mauryputra and others) had renounced the world, Akampita comes before the Tirthankara. (He thinks :-) I may go, pay my homage and worship him. ( 1885 )
आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ - जरा - मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवण्णू सवदरिसी णं ॥ ३३८ ॥ (१८८६ )
Abhaṭṭho ya Jineņam jāi-jara-marana vippamukkeṇam Nāmeņa ya gotteṇa ya savvannu savvadarisî ṇam 11338|| (1886) आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। ३३८ || ( १८८६ )

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:: 390 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eighth
Abhasitasca Jinena jati-jari-maranavipramuktena | Namna ca gotreña ca sarvajnena sarvadaršinā ll 338 II ( 1886 )]
Trans.--338 He was then, addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara, who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge ). ( 1886 )
_The Tirthaikara, then, saysकिं मण्णे नेरइया अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुझं । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो॥३३९॥ (१८८७) Kim manne neraiyā atthi natthi tti samsao tujihami Veyapayana ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 339 ॥ (1887) [किं मन्यसे नैरयिकाः सन्ति न सन्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७) Kim manyase nairayikāḥ santi na santîtı samsayastava! Vedapadanām cartham na jānāsi teşamayamarthaḥ 1133911 (1887)]
Trans.-339 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the denizens of hell exist or not. ( But you have not understood the real meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their ( real ) interpretation. (1887)
टीका-किं नारकाः सन्ति न वा ? इति त्वं मन्यसे । अयं च तव संशयो विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः, तथाहि-" नारको वै एष जायते यः शूद्रांनमश्नाति" इत्यादि-एष बाह्मणो नारको जायते यः शूद्रान्नमश्नातीत्यर्थः, इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि नारकसत्ताप्रतिपादकानि, “ न ह वै प्रेत्य नारकाः सन्ति " इत्यादीनि तु नारकाभावप्रतिपादकानि । तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्थ, च शब्दाद् युक्तिहृदयं च त्वं न जानासि, यत एतेषामयं वक्ष्यमाणोऽर्थ इति ॥ ३३९ ॥ (१८८७) ____D. C.-What are you thinking about ? your doubt about the existence of nārakas is based upon your hearing the

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 391 : various Veda-padas having contradictory senses. The Vedapadas are as follows:
(1) “ Nārako vai esa jāyate yah s’ūdrānnamas'nāti ” etc. (2) " Na ha vai prretya nārakah santa " etc.
According to you, the interpretation of these sentences is this
(1) “ A brāhmana who eats the food of s'udras becomes
a nāraka” (This proves the existence of hellish
denizens.) (2) “ In fact, there is nothing like nārakas in the
next world ” This refutes the existence of nārakas. But you have not grasped the real import of those Veda-padas. 11339||(1887)
Here I give their full significance-- तं मन्नसि पच्चक्खा देवा चंदादओ तहन्ने वि। विजा-मंतोवायणफलाइसिद्धीए गम्मति ॥ ३४० ॥ (१८८८) जे पुण सुइमेत्तफला नेरइय त्ति किह ते गहेयवा। सक्खमणुमाणओवाऽणुवलंभा भिन्नजाईया? ॥३४१॥ (१८८९) Tam mannasi paccakkhā devā candādao tahanne vi 1 Vijja-mantovāyanaphalaisiddhie gammanti ॥ 340 ॥ ( 1888 ), Je puna suimettaphalā neraiya tti kiha te gaheyavvā i Sakkhamanumānao va'nuvalambha bhinnajalya? ॥ 341 ॥ (1889)
[ त्वं मन्यसे प्रत्यक्षा देवाश्चन्दादयस्तथान्येऽपि । विद्या-मत्रोपायनफलादिसिद्धेर्गम्यन्ते ॥ ३४० ॥ ( १८८८ ) ये पुनः श्रुतिमात्रफला नैरयिका इति कथं ते ग्रहीतव्याः । साक्षादनुमानतो वाऽनुपलम्भाद् भिन्नजातीयाः ? ॥३४१॥ (१८८९).

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•: 392 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth Tvam mangase pratyaksā devāścandrādayastathānye’pi 1 Vidya-mantropāyanaphaladisiddher gamyante ॥ 340 ॥ ( 1888 ) Ye punaḥ śrutimātraphalā nairayikā iti katham te grahîtavyāḥ | Saksadanuminato va'nupalambhad bhinnajatiyah ? ॥3410 (1889)]
Trans.-340-341 You believe that deities like moon etc., are ( directly ) perceptible, so also are others perceptible as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are those denizens of hell that are known merely by hearing, and that belong to a distinct species, to be apprehended either directly or by inference, when they are ( absolutely ) non-perceptible ? ( 1888-1889 )
टीका-हे आयुष्मन्नकम्पित ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-देवास्तावच्चन्द्रादयः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसिद्धा एव, अन्ये त्वप्रत्यक्षा अपि विद्यामत्रोपयाचितकादिफलसिद्ध्याऽनुमानतो गम्यन्ते ये पुनः “ नारकाः" इत्यभिधानमात्ररूपा श्रुतिरेव फलं येषां, न पुनस्तदभिधायकशब्दव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः, ते साक्षात् , अनुमानतो वाऽनुपलभ्यमानत्वेन तिर्यग्-नरा-ऽमरेभ्यः सवर्था भिन्नजातीयाः कथं " सन्ति" इति ग्रहीतव्याः , खरविषाणवत् ? इति ॥ ३४०३४१ ॥ (१८८८-१८८९)
D. C.--Akampita:- Deities like moon etc. are apprehended by concrete authentities, and others which are imperceptible are apprehended by means of inference as a result of religious prayers etc. But how are nārakas that are quite different from gods, tiryancas and human beings, and whose existence is recognized only by hearing, to be accepted as existing when it is not apprehended by direct perception or even by inference ? ॥ 340-341 (1888-1889 ) ॥
The reply isमह पञ्चक्खत्तणओ जीवाई य व नारए गिण्ह । किं जं सपञ्चक्खं तं पञ्चक्खं नवरि इकं ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०) जं कासइ पच्चक्खं पच्चक्खं तं पि घेप्पड़ लोए। जह सीहाइदरिसणं सिद्धं न य सवपञ्चक्खं ॥३४॥ (१८९१)

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Gañadharavada
0:393 :
Maha paccakkhattanao jîvāî ya vya nārae ginha 1 Kim jam sapaccakkham tam paccakkham navari ikkam 11 342 11 Jam kāsai paccakkham paccakkham tam pi gheppai löe 1 Jaha sîhāidarisanam siddham na ya savvapaccakkham 11 343 11 [ मम प्रत्यक्षत्वतो जीवादींश्चैव नारकान् गृहाण ।
किं यत् स्वप्रत्यक्षं तत् प्रत्यक्षं नवरमेकम् ? ॥ ३४२ ॥ (१८९०) यत् कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि गृह्यते लोके ।
यथा सिंहादिदर्शनं सिद्धं न च सर्वप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ३४३ ॥ (१८९१) Mama pratyakşatvato jīvādînsceva nārakan grihaņa i Kım yat sva-pratyakşam tat pratyakşam navaramekam ? 11342||(1890) Yat kasyacitpratyakşam pratykşam tadapi grihyate loke | Yatha sinhadidarsanam siddham na ca sarvapratyaksan ||343॥(1891)]
Trans.-342-343 Accept the Narakas ( as existing ) like jiva etc. on account of ( their ) being pratyaksa to me. Is it that only that which is pratyaksa to one's own self ( could be known as ) pratyaksa and not anything else ? That which has been pratyaksa to any (person) in the world, is accepted as pratyaksa by the ( whole ) world. Just the appearance of sinha etc though not pratyaksa to all, is accepted ( by all as existing ). ( 1890-1891)
टीका-हे आयुष्मन्नकम्पित ! “ साक्षादनुपलभ्यमानत्वात्" इत्यसिद्धो हेतुः, यतोऽहं केवलप्रत्यक्षेण साक्षादेव पश्यामि नारकान् , ततो मत्प्रत्यक्षत्वात् “ सन्ति " इति गृहाण प्रतिपद्यस्व नारकान् , जीवा-ऽजीवादिपदार्थवत् । अथैवं मन्यसे-ममाप्रत्यक्षत्वात् कथमेतान् गृह्णामि ? । ननु दुरभिप्रायोऽयम् , यतः किं यत् स्वस्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्षं तदेवैकं नवरं प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते ? इति काका नेयम् । ननु यदपि कस्यचित् प्रत्ययितपुरुषस्यान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षं तदपि " प्रत्यक्षम्" इति गृह्यते व्यवहियते लोके; तथाहि-सिंहसरभ-हंसादिदर्शनं सिद्धं प्रसिद्धं लोके, न च सिंहादयः सर्वजनप्रत्यक्षाः,
80

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* 394 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The eighth देश-काल-ग्राम-नगर-सरित्-समुद्रादयश्च न सर्वेऽपि भवतः प्रत्यक्षाः, अथ चान्यस्यापि प्रत्यक्षास्ते प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवह्रियमाणा दृश्यन्ते। अतो मत्प्रत्यक्षा नारकाः किमिति प्रत्यक्षतया न व्यवहियन्ते ? इति ।। ३४२-३४३ ॥ (१८९०-१८९१)
__D. C.-Bhagavān:-0 long-lived Akompita ! your objection that Nārakas do not exist because they have not been apprehended by you, is unfounded. I have perceived those Nārakas personally. Accept them, therefore, as existing on account of their being pratyakşa to me, like all other objects animate and inanimate.
Secondly, it is not appropriate to hold the obstinate view that nothing can be said to be pratyaksa in this world, unless and until it has not been witnessed by you. Usually, that which has been witnessed by a trustworthy or respectable person, is accepted as existing in this world. Existence of lion, bear, and swan etc. is universally accepted by all even though those animals have not been pratyaksa to each and every person in the world. You have not witnessed all countries, rivers, towns, occans and times, still however, you do not doubt their existence, because they have already been pratyakşa to other respectable persons.
Similarly, you shall have to accept the existence of Närakas when they have already been pratyakisaa to me ॥ 342-343 ( 1890-1891 )॥ अहंवा जमिंदियाणं पच्चक्खं किं तदेव पचक्खं ? । उवयारमेत्तओ तं पञ्चक्खमणिदियं तत्थं ॥३४४॥ (१८९२) Ahavā jamindiyāṇam paccakkham kim tadeva paccakkham ?, Uvayāramettao tam paccakkhamanindiyam tattliam 1134411 (1892) [अथवा यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं किं तदेव प्रत्यक्षम् ।
उपचारमात्रतस्तत् प्रत्यक्षमनिन्द्रियं तथ्यम् ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)

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Gañadharavada
.: 395:
Athava yadindriyāņām pratyakşam kim tadeva pratyakşam ? | Upacāramātratastat pratyaksamanindriyam tathyam 1344॥ (1892)]
Trans.-344 Or, is it that what is perceptible to senses is alone pratyaksa ? It is pratyaksa by virtue of (mere) usuage. The real pratyaksa is beyond ( the perception of ) senses. ( 1892)
टीका-अथवा, कि यदिन्द्रियाणां प्रत्यक्षं तदेव प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते भवता, मदीयं तु प्रत्यक्षं नाभ्युपगम्यते, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ? । ननु महानयं विपर्यासः, यस्मादुपचारमात्रत एव तदिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षतया व्यवहियते-यथाऽनुमाने बाह्यधूमादिलिङ्गद्वारेण बाह्यमग्नादिवस्तु ज्ञायते, नवमत्र, तत उपचारात् प्रत्यक्षमिव प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । परमार्थतस्तुइदमपि परोक्षमेव, यतोऽक्षो जीवः, स चानुमानवदत्रापि वस्तु साक्षाद् न पश्यति, किन्त्विन्द्रियद्वारेणैव, ततोऽतीन्द्रियमेव तथ्यं प्रत्यक्षमवगन्तव्यम् , तत्र जीवेन साक्षादेव वस्तुन उपलम्भादिति ॥ ३४४ ॥ (१८९२)
D. C.-Since, that which is perceived, is beyond the, perception of senses, you do not admit it, as according to you only, that which is indriya pratyksa is pratyakşa. This is a great foly. Indriya-pratyaksa is recognized as pratyaksa by means of upacāra, similar to the case of anumāna, when objects like fire etc are apprehended by means of external indications of smoke etc. But the pratyaksa in my case is different from this. By means of mere upacāra, it is called pratyakşa, but really speaking, it is parroksa as the aksa (i-e gava ) does not apprehend the object directly as in the case of anumāna.
The atîndriya or that which is beyond perception by ( means of) sense-organs, should alone be accepted as pratyaksa as in that case, java directly perceives the object.
Akampita :-Athough in case of indriya-pratyaksa, java does not apprehend an object directly, indriyas are undoubtedly able to recognize the object directly. In such a case, why should we not consider indriya-pratyaksa to be the pratyaksa itself ? ॥ 344 ( 1892)॥

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.: 396 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth मुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमंतिंदियाइं कुंभो छ । उवलंभद्दाराणि ताई जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ३४५ ॥ (१८९३) Muttāibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vya Uvalambhaddārāņi tāim jîvo taduvaladdhā 11 345 11 ( 1893 ) [मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव ।
उपलम्भद्वाराणि तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ॥३४५॥ (१८९३) Mūrtādibbávato nopalabdhimantîndriyāṇi kumbha iva I Upalambhadvārāņi tāni jîvastadupalabdha | 345 l (1893 ) ]
Trans.-Sense-organs have no power of perception on account of ( their being ) marta etc, like ghata. They are mere mediums of perception. Jiva is their ( real ) agent of perception. ( 1893 )
___टीका-नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि-न वस्तुज्ञायकानीत्यर्थः, पुद्गलसंघातरूपत्वेन मूर्तत्वात् , आदिशब्दादचेतनत्वात् , कुम्भवत् । नवरमुपलम्भस्य श्रोत्रादिज्ञानस्य द्वाराणि भवन्त्यमूनि, गवाक्षवत् , तत्सापेक्षस्यैव क्षयोपशमस्य प्रबोधात् । जीव एव च तदुपलब्धा वस्तूपलब्धा ॥ ३४५॥(१८९३)
D. C-Since indriyas are mūrta and a-cetana like ghata, they are not able to apprehend objects. They are only mediums of apprehension like a window. The real agent of perception is Atmā which is altogether different from indriya in this way. ॥ 345 ( 1893 ) ॥
Besides, तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तवावारे वि नोवलंभाओ। इंदियभिन्नो नाया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४) Taduvarame vi saranao tayvāvāre vi novalambhão Indiyabhinno nāyā parcagavakkhovaladdhā vā || 346 # ( 1894 ) [ तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्वयापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् । इन्द्रियभिन्नो ज्ञाता पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ३४६ ॥ (१८९४)

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Gaṇadharavada
• 397:
Taduparame'pi smaraṇatastadvyapare'pi nopalambhat | Indriyabhinno jnata pañcagavaksopalabdheva ॥ 346 ॥ ( 1894 ) ]
Trans – 346 By virtue of recollection, even ( when the the sense-organs) are pacified, and on account of non-perception, even (when the sense-organs) are at work, the agent of perception is ( recognized ) as different from sense-organs, like an observer from the five windows. ( 1894 )
टीका - इन्द्रियेभ्यो भिन्नो " नायत्ति " ज्ञाता जीवः तदुपरमेऽपी इन्द्रियोपरमेऽपि तद् द्वारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात्, तद्वयापारेऽपीन्द्रियव्यापारे - ऽप्यन्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात् ; यथा पञ्चभिर्गवाक्षैरुपलब्धा वस्तूपलम्भकस्तेभ्यो भिन्न इति ।। ३४६ ।। ( १८९४ )
D. C. – Just as a person looking from the five windows, is different from those five windows, the Soul which is the agent of perception is different from the sense-organs. Because even when indriyas are not at work, the Soul is able to perceive an object by means of recollection, and if the Soul is absent-minded, the object is not at all perceived inspite of indrayas being at work. ॥ 346 ( 1894 ) ॥
Moreover,
जो पुण अणिदिउच्चिय जीवो सङ्घप्पिहाणविगमाओ । सो सुबहुयं वियाणइ अवणीयघरो जहा दट्ठा ॥३४७॥ (१८९५)
Jo puna anindiu cciya jîvo savvappihāna vigamão |
So subahuyam viyānai avaniyagharo jahā datthā ॥ 347 ॥ (1895) [ यः पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव जीवः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।
स सुबहुकं विजानात्यपनीतगृहो यथा द्रष्टा || ३४७ ॥ ( १८९५ ) Yaḥ punaranindriya eva jivaḥ sarvapidhanavigamat | Sa subahukam vijanatyapanitagriho yatha drasta ॥347 (1895) ] Trans.-347 The Soul, like an observer who is away from the house, being void of sense-organs, apprehends much more on account of all the obstructions ( being ) removed (1895).

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The eighth टीका-य पुनरनिन्द्रिय एव केवलज्ञानसंपन्नो जीवःस इन्द्रियज्ञानवतो जीवात् सुबहु विजानातीति प्रतिज्ञा, सर्वपिधानविगमात् सर्वावरण क्षयादित्यर्थः, यथा पञ्चगवाक्षगृहस्थितपुरुषात् सर्वथाऽपनीतगृहः सर्वत एवाऽऽकाशीकृतप्रदेशे स्थितो द्रष्टा पुरुष इति ॥ ३४७ ॥ (१८९५)
D. C.-Just as, a person looking froin the open space, apprehends much more than a person looking from the five windows, the soul possessing absolute knowledge apprehends much more than anything that apprehends through indriyas. ॥ 347 ( 1895 ) ॥
And the jnana obtained by indriyas in this way, is not pratyakşam न हि पञ्चक्खं धम्मंतरेण तद्धम्ममेत्तगहणाओ। कयगत्तओ व सिद्धी कुंभाणिञ्चत्तमेत्तस्स ॥ ३४८ ॥ (१८९६) Na hi paccakkham dhammantarena taddhammamettagahanão i Kayagattao va siddhi kumbhāniccattamettassa ॥ 348 ॥ ( 1896) [न हि प्रत्यक्षं धर्मान्तरेण तद्धर्ममात्रग्रहणात् ।
कृतकत्वत इव सिद्धिः कुम्भानित्यत्वमात्रस्य ॥ ३४८॥ (१८९६) Na hi pratyakşam dharmântareņa taddharmamātragrahaņāti Kritakatvata iva siddhih kumbhanityatvamatrasya ॥ 348 ॥ (1896)]
Trans.--348 Like the establishment of mere transitoriness of ghata on account of its being factitious, the indriya-pratyakşa, is not pratyaksa ( also ), on account of its characteristics being accepted by another characteristic. ( 1896 )
टीका-न भवति प्रत्यक्षम् " इन्द्रियजं ज्ञानम्" इति प्रक्रमाल्लभ्यते । चक्षुरादीन्द्रियस्य रूपादिपरिच्छेदशक्तिविशेषरूपेण धर्मान्तरेण हेतुभूतेन तस्यानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनो यद् रूपादिकमेकं धर्ममात्रं तस्य ग्रहणादिति हेतुः । किं तद् यथा न प्रत्यक्षम् ? इत्याह-यथा कृतकत्वाद् घटानित्यत्वमात्रसिद्धिलक्षणमनुमानमित्येष दृष्टान्तः । इह च यथा परस्मात् साध्यसिद्धौ

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: 399:. नानुमानं प्रत्यक्षम् , तथेन्द्रियजमपि विज्ञानमित्येतावान् भावार्थ इति ॥३४८॥ (१८९६)
D. C.-Just as anumāna capable of attaining the accomplishment of a desired object by means of another object, cannot be called pratyaksa jñāna, so also apprehension by means of indriyas, could not be called pratyakşa. Like an inference establishing the a-nityatā of ghata by means of its kritakatva, cognizance attained by indriyas is not pratyaksa Indriya-pratyaksa-jnana is limited to the apprehension of only rūpa etc. by means of eye etc. ll 348 ( 1896 ) ||
Besides, पुरोवलद्धसंबंधसरणओ वानलो व धूमाओ । अहव निमित्तंतरओ निमित्तमक्खस्स करणाई ॥३४९॥(१८९७) Puvvovaladdhasambandhasaranao vānalo vva dhūmão i Ahava nimittantarao nimittamakkhassa karanaim ॥ 349 ॥ (1897) [ पूर्वोलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणतो वाऽनल इव धूमात् ।
अथवा निमित्तान्तरतो निमित्तमक्षस्य करणानि ॥ ३४९ ।। (१८९७) Pūrvopalabd basambandhasmaraṇato vā’nala iva dhūmāti Athava nimittan tara to nimittamaksasya karanani ॥ 349 ॥ (1897)]
Trans.--349 Or, like the inference of fire from smoke, on account of the recollection by means of ( its ) relations of the past or on account of any ( other ) reason, the sense-organs serve as the instrumental cause to the Soul. ( 1897 )
टीका-"वा" इत्यथवा, न प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानमिति सैव प्रतिज्ञा, पूर्वोपलध्धश्चासौ संबन्धश्च पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्तत्स्मरणाजायमानत्वात् धूमादनलज्ञानवत् ; तथाहि-"घटोऽयं, पूर्वसंकेतकाल एवंभूत एव पदार्थे प्रत्ययिताभिज्ञपुरुषाद् घटसंकेतस्य मया गृहीतत्वात्" इति पूर्वोपलब्धसंबन्धस्मरणादेव सर्वस्यापि घटादिग्राहकमिन्द्रियज्ञानमुपजायते; अन्यथा नालिकेरद्वीपाद्या

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यातस्याप्यविशेषेणैतत् स्यात् । अभ्यास - पाटवादिभ्यश्राशुकारितयेन्द्रियज्ञानप्रवृत्तेः सर्वत्रैतद् न लक्ष्यत इति । अथवा, प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियजं ज्ञानम्, पूर्वप्रतिपादितव्युत्पच्याsक्षस्य जीवस्य स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तविशेषाज्जायमानत्वात्, धूमादग्निज्ञानवत् । स्वव्यतिरिक्तानि च निमित्तान्यक्षस्य जीवस्य करणानीन्द्रियाणि मन्तव्यानि । यच्च प्रत्यक्षं न तज्जीवस्य निमित्तान्तराज्जायते किन्तु जीवस्तत्र साक्षादेव ज्ञेयं पश्यति, यथाऽवधि - मनः पर्याय - केवलज्ञानेष्विति ॥ ३४९ ॥ ( १८९७ )
: 400:
[The eighth
D. C-Like the perception of fire from smoke, the perception due to sense-organs, is also produced from the recollection of the connections of the past. So, it is not pratyakṣa. Take the example of ghata. The name ghata was given to it in the past. We recognize it as ghata on the bases of its purvakāla sanketa. Hence, the knowledge about ghata is apprehended by means of indriyas from the recollection of its past relations. If it were no so, a person coming from a distant island, who has neither heard nor seen anything about ghata, would at once be able to recognize it as ghata. This sort of andriya-jñāna is produced very quickly from recollection etc. due to constant practice and cleverness, and hence, it is not marked everywhere.
Moreover, just as one apprehends agni from dhuma, which is absolutely different from himself, the apprehension in this case is also attained by Soul from the andriyas, which are absolutely different from the Soul, showing thereby that the knowledge thus obtained is not pratyakṣa but parokṣa.
Pratyakṣa jnuna is acceptible to Soul directly like the 1Avadhi, Manaḥ-paryāya and3 Kevala-jñānas and it is never
2
1. The first stage of perception when the attention is concentrated. 2. The state of mental perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge.
3. Absolute Perception.

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.: 401 :
obtained by the Soul from any external nimitta. All sorts of jñāna except the above-mentioned three, are mere anumānas as they apprehend objects indirectly. In case of jñānas like Avadhi eto, since the Soul apprehends the object directly, the knowledge is called pratyakşa. केवल-मणो-हिरहियस्स सबमणुमाणमेत्तयं जम्हा । नारगसब्भावम्मि य तदत्थि जं तेण ते संति ॥३५०॥ (१८९८) Kevala-Mano-hirahiyassa savvamaņumānamettayam jamhā|| Naragasabbhāvammi ya tadatthi jam tena te santi n3500 (1898) [ केवल-मनो-ऽवधिरहितस्य सर्वमनुमानमात्रकं यस्मात् ।
नरकसद्भावे च तदस्ति यत् तेन ते सन्ति ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८) Kevala-Mano-'vadhirahitasya sarvamanumāna matrakam yasmad | Naraksadbhāve ca tadasti yat tena te santi ll 350 11 ( 1898 )]
Trans.-350 Since everything pertaining to that which is void of Kevala, Manah-paryaya and Avadhi ( sorts of jnana) is mere inference, it is ( present ) in case of ( establishing ) the existence of hellish denizens. By ( virtue of) that ( anumāna), the Närakas are existing. ( 1898 )
टीका-केवल-मनःपर्याया-ऽवधिज्ञानरहितस्य प्रमातुः संबन्धि सर्वमपि ज्ञानं यस्मादनुमानमात्रमेव, परोक्षार्थविषयत्वात् । केवलादिज्ञानत्रयं तु वस्तुसाक्षात्कारित्वात् प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेवमनुमानं प्रत्यक्षं च यस्माद् नारकसद्भावे साध्ये विद्यत एव, तेन ते नारका सन्तीति प्रतिपद्यस्व । तत्र प्रत्यक्ष मदीयमेव केवलज्ञानम् ॥ ३५० ॥ (१८९८)
D. C.-Every sort of knowledge excepting Avadha-Manah paryāya and Kevala is mére anumāna on account 'of its being based on the indirect perception of an object. Jrānas like Kevala etc apprehend the object directly and hence they are called pratyakşa. Since the anumāna pertaining to Närakas,
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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The eighth is pratyakşa, the existence of Nārakas is established without doubt. The pratyaksa znana in this case is my own Kevalajrana ॥ 350 ( 1898 ) ॥ पावफलस्स पगिट्ठस्स भोइणो कम्मओऽवसेस छ। सन्ति धुवं तेऽभिमया नेरइया, अह मई होज्जा ॥३५१॥(१८९९) अञ्चत्थदुक्खिया जे तिरिय-नरा-नारग त्ति तेऽभिमया। तंन जओ सुरसोक्खप्पगरिससरिसं न तं दुक्खं ॥३५२॥ (१९००) Pāvaphalassa pagitthassa bhöino kammao'vasesa vval Santi dhuvam te’bhimayā neraiyā, aha maî hojjā 11 351 11 (1899) Accatthadukkhiyā je tiriya-nară-nāraga tti te'bhimayā | Tam na jao surasokkhappagarisasarisam na tam dukkham 11352|| [ पापफलस्य प्रकृष्टस्य भोगिनः कर्मतोऽवशेष इव । सन्ति ध्रुवं तेऽभिमता नैरयिकाः, अथ मतिर्भवेत् ॥ ३५१ ।। (१८९९)
अत्यर्थदुःखिता ये तिर्यग्-नरा-नारका इति तेऽभिमताः ।
तद् न यतः सुरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशं न तद् दुःखम् ॥३५२।। (१९००) Pápaphalasya prakristhasya bhoginaḥ karmato’vašeşa iva i Santi dhruvam te'bhimata nairayıkāḥ atha matîr-bhavet 11351||(1899) Atyarthaduhkhiti ye tiryag-nari-nāraka iti te'bhimatah | Tad na yatah surasaukhyaprakarsasadrisam na tad duhkham॥352॥]
Trans.—351-352 Like (the enjoyers of) the rest of Karmas, there are ( certainly ) some who ( have to suffer ) the result of great sins. They are really known as the denizens of hell. Here, it is not appropriate to assert that extremely miserable tiryancas and human beings are the denizens of hell. Because, ( their ) miseries are not as extreme as the happiness of gods. ( 1899-1900)
टीका-प्रकृष्टस्य पापफलस्य भोगिनः केचिद् ध्रुवं सन्ति “कम्मउ ति"

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•: 403 :कर्मफलत्वात् तस्येत्यर्थः, अवशेषवदिति-यथा जघन्यमध्यमपापफलभोगिनः शेषास्तिर्य-नरा विद्यन्त इत्यर्थः दृष्टान्त । " तेऽभिमया नेरइय ति" ये प्रकृष्टपापफलभोगिनस्ते " नारकाः" इत्यभिमताः। अथ परस्यैवंभूता मतिभवेत्-अत्यर्थं दुःखिता ये तिर्यग्-मनुष्यास्त एवोत्कृष्टपापफलभोगित्वाद् नारकव्यपदेशभाजो भविष्यन्ति, किमदृष्टनारककल्पनया? इति । तदेतद् न, यतोऽतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यग्-मनुष्याणां यद् दुःखं तदमरसौख्यप्रकर्षसदृशप्रकर्षवद् न भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति-येषामुत्कृष्टपापफलभोगस्तेषां संभवद्भिः सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्दुःखेन भवितव्यम्, न चैवमतिदुःखितानामपि तिर्यगादीनां दृश्यते, आलोक-तरुच्छाया-शीतपवन-सरित्-सरः-कूपजलादिसुखस्याति दुःखितेष्वपि तेषु दर्शनात्-छेदन-भेदन-पाचन-दहन-दम्भन-वज्र-कण्टकशिलास्फालनादिभिश्च नरकप्रसिद्धैः प्रकारैर्दुःखस्यादर्शनात् , इत्यादि प्रागुक्तानुसारेण स्वयमेवाभ्यूह्य वाच्यमिति । आगमार्थश्चायमवगन्तव्य इति ।
सततमनुबद्धमुक्तं दुखं नरकेषु तीव्रपरिणामम् । तिर्यसूष्ण-भय-क्षुत्-तृडादिदुःखं सुखं चाल्पम् ॥ १॥ सुख-दुःखे मनुजानां मनःशरीराश्रये बहुविकल्पे ।
सुखमेव तु देवानामल्पं दुःखं तु मनसि भवम् ॥ २॥ इति ॥ ३५१-३५२ ॥ (१८९९-१९००)॥
D. C.-Bhagavān:--Just as, there are tiryancas and manusyas to enjoy the fruits of moderate sins, there do exist some who have to suffer the consequences of great sins. And take it for certain that they are none but Nārakas.
Akampita:—Since the excessively miserable tiryancas and manusyas have to undergo the consequences of great sins, why not to take them as Nārakas ?
Bhagavān: It is not so. Sufferers of the consequences of great sins ought to be miserable in all respects.
Tiryancas and manusyas cannot be said to be miserable in all respects as required in case of Nārakas. They are

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The eighth entitled to various means of pleasure like light, shades of a tree, cool-breeze, river, and stream etc. On the other hand, various horrors of hell such as those of being killed, pierced, cooked, burnt, pressed, and dashed against stone-slabs are not experienced by tiryancas or manusyas. Only Nārakas are doomed to undergo such afflictions.
It should be noted in the āgamas also that:Satatamanubadhamuktam duḥkham narakeșu tîvraparināmami Tiryakşūşņa-bhaya-kşut-tridādiduhkham sukham calpam ||1|| Sukh-duḥkha manujánām manaḥ-sarîrā śraye bahuvikalpe I Sukhameva tu devā nāmalpam duhkham tu mansi bhavam 112 11
[ Närakas have always to undergo the afflictions of excessive effects. Tiryancas have greater proportion of afflictions like heat, fear, hunger, and thirst etc and smaller proportion of happiness, manusyas have pleasures and pains (almost in equal proportion ) pertaining to body and mind while gods have absolute happiness and very little misery ] 11 351-352 (1899–1900) सच्चं चेदमकंपिय ! मह वयणाओऽवसेसवयणं व । सवण्णुत्तणओ वा अणुमयसव्वण्णुवयणं व ॥३५३॥ (१९०१) Saccam cedamakampiya ! maha vayanāo’vasesavayanam va i Savvannuttanao vā anumayasavvannuvayaņam va 135311 (1901) [ सत्यं चेदमकम्पित ! मम वचनादवशेषवचनमिव ।
Hasraat asghahahaafha 343 11 ( 8808) Satyam cedamakampita ! mama vacanādavaśeşavacanamıva i Sarvajnatvato vā'nunatasarvajnavacanamiva ll 353 II ( 1901)]
Trans.-353 This is true. O Akampita ! because it is my statement. Or, ( it is true ) like other statements. Or, by virtue of (my) all-knowing faculty, ( it is true) like the statement of an authorized omniscient. ( 1901 )

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•: 405 : टीका-" नारकाः सन्ति " इति सत्यमकम्पित ! इदम् , मद्वचनात् , यथाऽवशेषं त्वत्संशयादिविषयं मद्वचनम् । अथवा, "सर्वज्ञवचनत्वात्" इत्येवं हेतुर्वक्तव्यः, त्वदनुमतमनु-जैमिन्यादिसर्वज्ञवचनवदिति ॥३५३॥ (१९०१)
D. C.-Accept the statement that Nārakas exist as true. O Akampita ! either because it is my statement, or, because it is as real as the other statements like those regarding your doubts etc, or, because it is the statement of an omniscient as great as your high-esteemed Manu, Jaimini etc. ll 353 (1901) 11 भय-राग-दोस-मोहाभावाओ सच्चमणइवाइं च । सञ्चं चिय मे वयणं जाणयमज्झत्थवयणं व ॥३५४॥ (१९०२) Bhaya-rāga-dosa-mohābhāvāo saccamanaivāim ca i Saccam ciya me vaynan jānaya majjhattha vayanam va 135411 [भय-राग-द्वेष-मोहाभावात् सत्यमनतिपाति च ।
सत्यमेव मे वचनं ज्ञायकमध्यस्थवचनमिव ॥ ३५४ ॥ (१९०२) Bhaya-rāga-dveșa-mohābhāvāt satyamanatipāti ca 1 Satyameva me vacanam jņāyakamadhyasthavacanainiva 13541|(1902)]
Trans.--354 Everything that I say is certainly true and free from faults like words of an intelligent and impartial person, on account of the ( complete) absence of fear, attachment, aversion and infatuation ( in me ). ( 1902 )* किह सवण्णु त्ति मई पञ्चक्खं सबसंसयच्छेया। भय-राग-दोसरहिओ तल्लिंगाभावओ सोम्म!॥३५५॥(१९०३) Kiha savvannu tti maî paccakkham savvasamsayaccheyā i Bhaya-rāga-dosarahio tallingābhāvao Somma ! ॥ 355 ॥ ( 1903) [कथं सर्वज्ञ इति मतिः प्रत्यक्षं सर्वसंशयच्छेदात् ।
भय-राग-दोषरहितस्तल्लिङ्गाभावतः सौम्य ! ॥३५५ ।। ( १९०३)
+ Vide V. 1578.

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•: 406 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's [The eighth Katham sarvajňa iti matiḥ pratyakşam sarvasam sayacchedat 1 Bhaya-råga-dosara hitastallırigā-bhāvatah Saumya 11 355 II (1903)]
Trans.—355 You might ask“ How are you to be (accepted as ) omniscient?” “Evidently because I remove all doubts and and because I am free from even the symptoms of the faults such as fear, attachment etc.” ( 1903 )
टीका-इयमपि व्याख्यातार्था । यदपि " न ह वै प्रेत्य नारकाः सन्ति" इत्यादौ नारकाभावः शङ्कयते भवता, तदप्ययुक्तम् , यतोऽयमत्राभिप्रायो मन्तव्यः-न खलु प्रेत्य परलोके मेादिवच्छाश्वताः केचनाप्यवस्थिता नारकाः सन्ति, किन्तु य इहोत्कृष्टं पापमर्जयति, स इतो गत्वा प्रेत्य नारको भवति, अतः केनापि तत्पापं न विधेयं येन प्रेत्य नारकैर्भूयते। तदेवं छिन्नस्तत्संशयो भगवता ॥ ३५५ ॥ ( १९०३ )
D. C.-If you doubt about my sorrvarjnatva, O Saumya ! you are not justified. For, since I have removed all your doubts and am prepared to remove them at present if you entertain any, I am scar vajrau.
Moreover, in the sentences such as “ Na ha vai pretya nārakāh santr" etc you have suspected the existence of Nārakas. But it is not so. The import of those sentences is that there are no Nārakas everlasting like Meru etc. in the other world, but those who commit great sins in this world, would become Nārakas in the next world. The sentences, therefore, mean to assert that no body should commit such sins lest they might become the denizens of hell after death.
The Bhagavān thus removed his doubts ॥ 355 ( 1903 )॥
So,
छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । सोसमणो पवइओतिहि ओ सह खंडियसएहिं ॥३५६॥(१९०४) Chinnami samsayammî Jimena jara-maraṇavippamukkenam So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim ॥ 356 ॥ (1904)

Page #448

Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 4073 [ Rea Te fata Fil-frutage 1
XH: gafafafara wa afisata: 11 348 11 (8808) Chinne samsaye Jinena jarā-maraņavipramuktena 1 Sa śramaṇaḥ pravrajitastribhistu saha khaņdikaśataiḥ 113561|(1904)]
Trans.—356 When the doubt was removed by the Tìrtharkara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksā along with his three hundred pupils. ( 1904 )
End of the Discussion with the Eighth Ganadhara,

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Chapter IX
नवमगणधरवक्तव्यता। Discussion with the Ninth Ganadhara
ते पवइए सोउं अयलभाया आगच्छई जिणसगासं । वञ्चामि ण वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ।। ३५७ ॥ (१९०५) Te pavvaie söum Ayalabhāyā āgacchaî Jinasagāsam i Vaccāmi na vandāmî vandittā pajjuvāsāmi u 357 11 ( 1905) [तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वाऽचलभ्राताऽऽगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ३५७ ॥ (१९०५) Tan pravrajitan śrutvā'calabhrāta”gacchati Jinasakāśami Vrajāmi vande vanditvā paryupāse il 357 11 (1995)}
Trans.-357 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Acalabhrāta. comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks :-) 1 may go, pay my homage, and worship him. (1905) आभट्टो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवण्णू सवदरिसी णं ॥३५८॥ (१९०६) Ābhattho ya Jinenam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkeņam i Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam ॥ 358 ॥ (1906) [आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ३५८ ॥ (१९०६) Abhisitasca Jinena jati-jara-maranavipramuktena | Namnā ca gotrena ca sarvajiena sarvadarsina ॥ 358 ॥ ( 1906 )]

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
:: 409 : Trans.—358 He was, then, addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from birth, old age, and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1906 )
The Tîrthankara then said :किं मण्णे पुण्ण-पावं अत्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥३५९॥ (१९०७) Kim manne punna-pāvam atthi natthi tti samsao tujiha | Veyapayana ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 359 ॥ ( 1907) [किं मन्यसे पुण्य-पापे स्तो न स्त इति संशयस्तव ।
वेदपदानां चार्थ न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ३५९ ॥ ( १९०७) Kim manyase puṇya-pape sto na sta iti samsayastava i Vedapadānām cārthany na janasi tesamayamarthah ||359॥(1907)]
Trans.—359 What are you thinking about? You entertain the doubt as to whether punya and pāpa exist or not. But, (ca) you do not understand the (real) meaning of the sentences of the Vedas. Here is their ( real. ) interpretation. ( 1907)
टीका-हे आयुष्मनचलभ्रातः ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं पुण्य-पापे स्तो न वा ? इति । अयं चानुचितः संशयः, यस्माद् विरुद्धवेदपदनिबन्धनो विरुद्धदर्शनश्रुतिनिबन्धनश्च तव वर्तते । तत्र वेदपदानि तावत्-"पुरुष एवेदं ग्नि सर्वम् "---इत्यादि यथा द्वितीयगणधरे तथा वाच्यानि । तेषां चार्थ त्वं न जानासीत्याद्यपि तथैव व्याख्येयमिति ॥ ३५९ ॥ (१९०७)
D. C.-Your doubt about the existence of punya and pāpa is not justified. It is based on your hearing the sentences of Vedas bearing contradictory senses. The sentences are such as “Puruşa evedam gnim sarvam” etc. which have already been mentioned in the Second Ganadharavāda. You have not grasped the real interpretation of those sentences. I, therefore, give their real interpretation as under :- 11 359 (1907) 11

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.: 410 :•.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
मण्णसि पुष्णं पावं साहारणमहव दो विभिन्नाई । होज नवा कम्मं चिय सभावओ भवपवंचोऽयं ॥ ३६० ॥ (१९०८)
Mannasi punnam pāvam sāhāraṇamahava do vi bhinnāim Hojja na vā kammam ciya sabhāvao bhavapavanco'yam 360 [ मन्यसे पुण्यं पापं साधारणमथवा द्वे अपि भिन्ने ।
भवेद् न वा कर्मैव स्वभावतो भवप्रपञ्चोऽयम् || ३६० || ( १९०८ ) Manyase punyam papam sadharaṇamathava dve api bhinne Bhaved na vā karmaiva svabhāvato bhavaprapañco 'yam ||360|| (1908)
Trans.-360 Do you think punya alone or papa alone to exist? Or, ( do you think them to be ) common, or even different? Or, is it that Karma itself be absent, and the expansion of the whole of mundane world be natural? (1908)
टीका - इह केपाञ्चित् तीर्थकानामयं प्रवादः - “ पुण्यमेवैकमस्ति न पापम् " । अन्ये त्वाहुः - " पापमेवैकमस्ति न तु पुण्यम् " अपरे तु वदन्ति"उभयमप्यन्योन्यानुविरुद्धस्वरूपं मेचकमणिकल्पं संमिश्रसुख - दुःखाख्यफलहेतुः साधारणं पुण्यपापाख्यमेकं वस्तु " इति । अन्ये तु प्रतिपादयन्ति - स्वतन्त्रमुभयं विविक्तसुख-दुःखकारणं " होज त्ति " भवेदिति । अन्ये पुनराहु:मूलतः कर्मैव नास्ति, स्वभावसिद्धः सर्वोऽप्ययं जगत्प्रपञ्चः " । अतस्त्वमप्येतान् पञ्चविकल्पान् मन्यसे । एतेषां च विकल्पानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वात् संशयदोलामारुढोऽसि त्वमिति ॥ ३६० ॥ ( १९०८ )
46
D. C.-There are five different theories about the existence of punya and papa as stated below:
(1) There exists punya alone and there is nothing like pāpa.
(2) There exists pāpa alone and there is nothing like punya.
(3) Punya and papa which happen to be the causes of sukha and duḥkha respectively, exist in a combined state like a dark-blue jewel.

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
: 411 : (4) Punya and pāpa are absolutely independent of
each other. (5) There is nothing like Karma at all. The expansion
of this mundane world is not due to Karma, but it
is natural. Now, since you have listened to all the above-mentioned five views, you are wavering between the five and raising the doubt about punya and pāpa. II 360 I ( 1908 )
Each of the above-mentioned views is explained as follows. पुण्णुकरिस्से सुभया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ हाणी । तस्सेव खए मोक्खो पत्थाहारोवमाणाओ ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९) Punnukkarisse subhayā taratamajogāvagarisao hānî i Tasseva khae mokkho patthāhārovamānão 11 361 11 ( 1909 ) [ पुण्योत्कर्षे शुभता तरतमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षः पथ्याहारोपमानात् ॥ ३६१ ॥ (१९०९) Puņyotkarse śubhata taratamayogāpakarsato haniḥ | Tasyaiva kşaye moksaḥ pathyābāropamánāt ll 361 11 ( 1909 ) ]
Trans.—361 With the ( gradual) rise in punyas, welfare (is obtained ). With the gradual diminution, there is destruction. Being similar to the wholesome diet, when it is absolutely destroyed there is ( complete ) liberation. ( 1909)
टीका-पुनातीति पुण्यं तस्योत्कर्षलेशतो लेशतश्च वृद्धौ शुभता भवति, सुखस्यापि क्रमशो वृद्धिर्भवति तावत् , यावदुत्कृष्टं स्वर्गसुखमित्यर्थः । तस्यैव पुण्यस्य तर-तमयोगापकर्षतो हानिः सुखस्य-दुःखं भवति । इदमुक्तं भवति-यथा यथा पुण्यमपचीयते तथा तथा जीवानां क्रमेण दुःख. मुत्पद्यते, यावत् सर्वप्रकर्षप्राप्तं नरकदुःखम् । तस्यैव च पुण्यस्य सर्वथा क्षये मोक्ष इति । एतच्च सर्व पथ्याहारोपमानाद् भावनीयम्; तथाहि-यथा

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.: 412 :
Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The ninth पथ्याहारस्य क्रमेण वृद्धावारोग्यवृद्धिस्तथा पुण्यवृद्धौ सुखवृद्धिः, यथा च पथ्याहारस्य क्रमेण परिहारे सरोगता भवति, एवं पुण्यापचये दुःखोत्पत्तिः, सर्वथा पथ्याहारपरिहारे च मरणवत् पुण्यक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६॥ (१९०९)
D C.-The first case-viz, that punya alone exists and there is nothing like pāpamis discussed as follows:
That which purifies is called punya. With the gradual increase in punya, there is a gradual rise in happiness also, leading ultimately to Salvation which is the highest happiness. On the other hand, when there is a gradual decrease in punya, happiness also decreases and gradually begins to turn into misery, leading ultimately to the agony of hell. Finally, when there is entire diminution of punya, Jîva attains complete liberation, be it dies. This resembles the case of wholesome diet.
Just as, by the gradual increase in wholesome diet, one becomes more and more healthy, so also by the gradual eminence of punyas, there is a gradual rise in happiness also. On the other hand, just as, when the wholesome diet is abandoned, the disease re-enters the body, and one becomes ill, so also when there is gradual diminution of punya, there is gradual diminution in happiness and re-generation of misery. Ultimately, by abandoning the wholesome diet entirely, one dies away. In the same way, by the entire destruction of punya, giva attains complete liberation from this world. || 361 || (1909)
Taking the second theory of pāpa, the author explains :पावुकरिसेऽहमया तरतमजोगावगरिसओ सुभया । तस्सेव खए मोक्खो अपत्थभत्तोवमाणाओ ॥३६२ ॥ (१९१०) Pāvukkarise'hamayā taratamajogāvagarisao subhayā || Tasseva khae mokkho apatthabhattopamāṇāo u 362 # ( 1910 )

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 413 :[पापोत्कर्षेऽधमता तरतमयोगापकर्षतः शुभता ।
तस्यैव क्षये मोक्षोऽपथ्यभक्तोपमानात् ।। ३६२ ।। ( १९१० ) Papotkarşe’dhamatā taratamayogāpakarşataḥ śubhata 1 Tasyaiva. ksaye mokso'pathyabhaktopamanat ॥ 362॥ ( 1910)]
Trans.-362 In ( case of ) the increase in papa, there is vileness; with gradual diminution ( of it ), ( there is ) welfare; and as in the case of the unwholesome diet, there is (complete ) liberation (of the jiva) when it is absolutely destroyed. (1910)
टीका-इहापथ्याहारोपमानाद् वैपरीत्येन भावना कार्या। तथाहियथा क्रमेणापथ्यवृद्धौ रोगवृद्धिः, तथा पांशयत्यात्मानं मलिनयतीति पापं, तस्य वृद्धौ सुखवृद्धिरूपाऽधमता मन्तव्या-क्रमेण दुःखं वर्धते, यावदुत्कृष्टं नारकदुःखम् । यथा चापथ्यत्यागात् क्रमेणारोग्यवृद्धिः, तथाक्रमेण पापस्यापकर्षात् सुखस्य वृद्धिः, यावदुत्कृष्टं सुरसौख्यम् । यथा चापथ्याहारस्य सर्वथा परित्यागात् परमारोग्यमुपजायते, एवं सर्वपापक्षये मोक्ष इति ॥३६२॥ (१९१०)
D. C.-Those, who believe that there exists pāpa alone, and nothing like punya, put forward the same argument but in a reverse manner. According to them, just as disease develops with the increase in unwholesome diet, vileness in the form of miseries etc., also increases with the eminence of sins, leading ultimately to the agony of hell On the other hand, when the unwholesome food is being gradually given up, there is a gradual recovery of health.
Similarly by the gradual diminution of sins there is a gradual re-generation of happiness leading ultimately to Salvation. Lastly, just as complete health is regained at the complete abandonment of the unwholesome food, there is complete attainment of moksa when the sins are completely removed. ॥ 362 ॥ ( 1910 ).
Now, a third belief that punya and papa exist as sādhāruna, is explained :

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: 414 :
Jinabhadra Gaņi's (The ninth साहारणवण्णादि व अह साहारणमहेगमत्ताए । उक्करिसा-वगरिसओ तस्सेव य पुण्णपावक्खा ॥३६३ (१९११) Sāhāraṇavannādi va aha sāhāraṇamahegamattāe i Ukkarisa-vagarisao tasseva ya punnapāvakkha ॥ 363 ॥ ( 1911 ) [ साधारणवर्णादीवाथ साधारणमथैकमात्रया।
उत्कर्षा-ऽपकर्षतस्तस्यैव च पुण्यपापाख्या ॥ ३६३ ॥ (१९११) Sadhāraṇavarṇādīvātha sādhāraṇamathaikamātraya | Utkarsa-'pakarsatastasyaiva ca punyapāpākhyi |363 ॥ (1911)]
Trans.-363 Like joint-syllables etc, (punya and papa) are combined with each other as one. And, by reason of eminence or diminution of it, it is known as punya or pāpa ( respectively ). ( 1911)
___टीका-" अह साहारणमिति" अथ साधारणं संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यं वस्तु भाव्यत इत्यर्थः । कथंभूतं पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यम् ? इत्याह-"साहारणवण्णादि व ति" यथा साधारण तुल्यं हरितालगुलिकादीनामन्यतरन्मीलितं वर्णकद्वयम् ; आदिशब्दाद् यथामेचकमणिः, नरसिंहादिर्वा, तथेदमपि पुण्यपापाख्यं संकीर्णमेकं वस्त्वित्यर्थः । ननु यद्येकं वस्त्विदम् , तर्हि पुण्यं पापं चेति परस्परविरोधिवस्तुविषयमाख्याद्वयं कथं लभते ? इत्याह-" अहेगमत्ताए इत्यादि " अथ तस्यैवैकस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपापाख्यस्य वस्तुन एकया पुण्यमात्रया-एकेन पुण्यांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो वृद्धौ सत्यां पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तते; एकया तु पापमात्रया-एकेन पापांशेनेत्यर्थः, उत्कर्षतो वृद्धौ सत्यां पापाख्या प्रवर्तते । अपकर्षेऽपि पुण्यांशस्य पापाख्या प्रवर्तते, पापांशस्य त्वपकर्षे पुण्याख्या प्रवर्तत इति ॥३६३ ॥ (१९११) ।
D. C.- The theory is that pāpa and punya are not separate entities, but they are infused with each other as one like the two syllables joined together as one. Like a base metal of haritāla or indago, wherein there is always one object mixed with two colours or like, the Mecaka jewel or Narasinha eto,

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.: 415:.
Vada ]
Gañadharavada punya-pāpa is also a mixed entity. Here, if some one raises the doubt that if it is one single entity, why is it known by two names-pāpa and punya ? The answer laid down by them is this:--On account of the increase in the constituent punya of the punya-pāpa entity, the name punya is given, while with the diminution of the constituent punya, the entity is called pāpa.
Similarly, when there is predominance of the element of pāpa it is called pāpa and vice versa. So, punya-pāpa is one and only one entity and does not exist separately. 11363|1 (1911)
Now, with regard to the remaining two theories, it has been laid down as follows:एवं चिय दो भिन्नाइं होज्ज, होज व सभावओ चेव । भवसंभूई, भण्णइ नसभावाओ जओऽभिमओ॥३६४॥(१९१२) होज सहावो वत्थु निकारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ? । जइ वत्थु णत्थि तओऽणुवलद्धीओ खपुप्फ व ॥३६५॥(१९१३) Evam ciya do bhinnāim hojja, hojja va sabhāvao ceva i Bhavasambhūî, bhannaî na sabhāvāo jao’bhimao 11 364 11 (1912) Hojia sahāvo vatthum nikkāranayā va vatthudhammo vā ? | Jai vatthum natthi tao'nuvaladdhîo khapuppham va 136511 (1913) [ एवमेव द्वे भिन्ने भवेतां, भवेद् वा स्वभावत एव । भवसंभूतिः, भण्यते न स्वभावाद् यतोऽभिमतः ।। ३६४ ॥ (१९१२) भवेत् स्वभावो वस्तु निष्कारणता वा वस्तुधर्मों वा ? |
यदि वस्तु नास्ति सकोऽनुपलब्धेः खपुष्पमिव ॥ ३६५ ॥ (१९१३) Evameva dve bhinne bhavetām, bhaved vā svabhāvata eva i Bhavasambhūtiḥ, bhanyate na svabhāvād yato'bhimataḥ || 364 11 Bhavet svabhāvo vastu niskāraṇatā vā vastudharmo vā ? | Yadi vastu nāsti sako’nupalabdheḥ khapuspamiva 1136511 (1913) ]

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•: 416 :
Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[ The ninth
Trans.-364-365 Similarly, ( some would believe that ) both are different ( from each other ), or that the production of the mundane world would be due to (nothing else but its ) svabhāva only. (In reply to that ), it is said that ( the production of the mundane world) by virtue of ( its) svabhāva, is not believable. And, Is that svabhava a ( definite ) object ? or causelessness ( itself ) ? or the property of an object ? If ( it is taken as an object, it is not an object ), because it is non-apprehensible like a kha-puspa ( 1912-1913 )
टीका-एवमेव केषाश्चिद् मतेन द्वे अपि भिन्ने स्वतन्त्र स्यातां पुण्यपापे, तत्कार्यभूतयोः सुख-दुःखयोटैगपद्येनानुभवाभावात् । अतोऽनेनैव भिन्नकार्यदर्शनेन तत्कारणभूतयोः पुण्य-पापयोभिन्नताऽनुमीयत इति । " होज वेत्यादि " अथवा स्वभावत एव विनापि पुण्य-पापाभ्यां भवसंभूतिः-भववैचित्र्यस्य संभवः कैश्चिदिष्यते । तदेवं दर्शिताः पञ्चापि पुण्य-पापविषया विकल्पाः। एतैश्च भ्रमितमनोभिः संशयो न कर्तव्यः, एकस्यैव चतुर्थविकल्पस्यादेयत्वात् , शेषाणां चानादेयत्वात् । अत एव प्रत्यासत्तिन्यायमङ्गीकृत्य पञ्चमविकल्पं तावद् दूषयितुमाह-" भण्णईत्यादि " भण्यतेऽत्रोत्तरम्-न स्वभावतो भवसंभूतिः, यतः स्वभावो वस्तुरूपो वाभिमतो भवेदिति द्वितीय गाथायां संबन्धा, निष्कारणता वा, वस्तुधर्मो वा स्वभावोऽभिमतो भवेत् ? इति त्रयो विकल्पाः। तत्र यदि वस्तुरूपोऽयमिति प्रथमो विकल्पः तर्हि तकोऽसौ स्वभावो नास्ति, अनुपलम्भात् , खपुष्पवदिति ॥ ३६४-३६५ ॥ (१९१२-१९१३) ' D. C.--According to some, punya and pāpa are independent of each other, because sukha and duhkha which are their respective kāryas or consequences are not experienced at one and the same time. So, when kāryas are found to be independent of each other, their respective causes should also be independent of each other by anumāna.
Finally, there is one wore theory that the expansion of this mundane world is not due to Karmas known as pāpa nad

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
punya but on account of its own svabhava. According to this theory, there is nothing like Karma.
.: 417:
Your doubt has sprung up from five different opinions stated above. But that is not justifiable. For, out of those five theories, none except the fourth one is acceptible. The expansion of bhava by means of its svabhava as laid down in the fifth theory, is also not acceptible. Because, in that case, svabhāva should either be a definite object (vastu) or causelessness (niskāranatā), or the property of a definite object (vastu-dharma). Since svabhāva is absolutely imperceptible like a kha-puspa, it can never exist as a definite object. || 364365 (1912-1913)
Then,
अचंतमणुवद्धो वि अह तओ अस्थि नत्थि किं कम्मं ? | हेऊ व तदत्थित्ते जो नणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥ ३६६ ॥ (१९९४) कम्मस्स वाभिहाणं होज सभावो ति होउ को दोसो ? | पइनिययागाराओ न य सो कत्ता घडस्लेव ॥ ३६७॥ (१९१५) मुत्तो अमुत्तो व तओ जइ मुत्तो तोऽभिहाणओ भिन्नो । कम्मत्ति सहावो त्तिय जइ वाऽमुत्तो न कत्ता तो ॥३६८॥ (१९१६) देहाणं वोमं पिव, जुत्ता कज्जाइओ य मुत्तिमया । अह सो निक्कारणया तो खरसिंगादओ होंतु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७)
अह वत्थूणो स धम्मो परिणामो तो स कम्म- जीवाणं । पुने - राभिहाणो कारण - कज्जाणुमेओ सो ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८) किरियाणं कारणओ देहाईणं च कज्जभावाओ । कम्मं मद्भिहियं तिय पडिवज्ज तमग्गिभूइ व ॥ ३७१॥ (१९१९)
53

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.: 418 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [ The ninth तं चिय देहाईणं किरियाणं पि य सुभा-ऽसुभत्ताओ। पडिवज पुण्णपावं सहावओ भिन्नजाईयं ॥ ३७२ ॥ (१९२०) Accantamaņuvaladdho vi aha tao atthi natthi kim kammam ? i Heti va tadatthitte jo nanu kammassa vi sa eva ॥ 366 ॥ ( 1914) Kammassa vābhihānam hojja sabhāvo tti höu ko doso I Painiyayāgārão na ya so kattā ghaďasseva 11 367 11 ( 1915) Mutto amutto va tao jai mutto to'bhihānao bhinno i Kamma tti sahāvo tti ya jai vā’mutto na kattā to 136811 (1916) Dehānam vomam piva, juttā kajjāio ya muttimayā 1 Aha so nikkāranayā to kharasingādao hontu 11 369 u ( 1917) Aha vatthuņo sa dhammo parināmo to sa kamma-jîvānam i Punne-yarābhihāno kārana-kajjānumeo so 11 370 11 ( 1918 ) Kiriyānam kāranao dehāînam ca kajjabhāvāo i Kammam inadabhihiyam ti ya padivajja tamaggibhūi vva 11 371 il Tam ciya dehāînam kiriyānam pi ya subhā-'subhatto i Padivajja punnapāvam sahāvao bhinnajāîyam 11 372 11 ( 1920 ) [ अत्यन्तमनुपलब्धोऽप्यथ सकोऽस्ति नास्ति किं कर्म । हेतुर्वा तदस्तित्वे यो ननु कर्मणोऽपि स एव ॥ ३६६ ॥ ( १९१४ ) कर्मणो वाभिधानं भवेत् स्वभाव इति भवतु को दोषः । प्रतिनियताकाराद् न च स कर्ता घटस्येव ॥ ३६७ ॥ (१९१५) मृतोऽमृतॊ वा सको यदि मूर्तस्ततोऽभिधानतो भिन्नः । कर्मेति स्वभाव इति च यदि वाऽमूर्ती न कर्ता ततः ॥३६८॥ (१९१६) देहानां व्योमेव, युक्ता कार्यादितश्च मूर्तिमत्ता। अथ स निष्कारणता ततः खरशृङ्गादयो भवन्तु ॥ ३६९ ॥ (१९१७) अथ वस्तुनः स धर्मः परिणामस्ततः स कर्म-जीवयोः । पुण्ये-तराभिधानः कारण-कार्यानुमेयः सः ॥ ३७० ॥ (१९१८)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
• 419 : क्रियाणां कारणतो देहादीनां च कार्यभावात् । कर्म मदभिहितमिति च प्रतिपद्यस्व त्वमग्निभूतिरिव ॥३७१॥ (१९१९)
तदेव देहादीनां क्रियाणामपि च शुभा-ऽशुभत्वात् । . प्रतिपद्यस्व पुण्य-पापे स्वभावतो भिन्नजातीये ॥ ३७२ ॥(१९२०) Atyantamanupalabdho’pyatha sako’sti nästi kim karma Hetur-va tadastitve yo nanu karmano'pi sa eva ll 366 11 ( 1914 ) Karmaṇo vabhidbānam bhavet svabhava iti bhavatu ko dosah ? | Pratiniyatákārād na ca sa karta ghatasyeva ll 367 || ( 1915 ) Mūrto’mūrto vā sako yadi mūrtastato’bhidhānato bhinnah | Karmeti svabbaya iti ca yadi va’mūrto na kartā tatah 1136811 (1916) Dehānām vyomeva, yuktā kāryāditaśca mūrtimaţță 1 Atha sa nişkārāṇatā tataḥ kharasringādayo bhavantu 136911 (1917) Atha vastunaḥ sa dharmaḥ pariņāmastatah sa karma-jîvayoḥ 1 Punge-tarābhidhānaḥ kāraṇa kāryānumeyaḥ sa 11 370 01 ( 1918) Kriyānām kāranato de hádînām ca kāryabhāvāt ! Karma madabhibitamiti ca pratipadyasva tvamagnibhūtiriva 11371|| Tadeva dehādînām kriyānāmapi ca śubhā’-subhatyāt i Pratipadyasva punya-pāpe svabhāvato bhinnajātiye 1137211 (1920)]
Trans.-366-372 If it is extremely non-perceptible, why is it called svabhāva and not Karma? The hetu that works in the existence of svabhāva, works in case of Karma also. Or, what harm is there in taking svabhāva as the synonym of karma ? And since it has a definite shape like ghata, it cannot be a doer just as sky is not (the doer of ) bodies. ( For ), the corporeal nature is justified on account of (its) being karya etc. Now, if that (svabhāva ) were causelessness ( itself ), non-existent (objects like ) kharaśrnga etc, would come into existence. If it is ( taken as ) the property of a ( definite ) object, then it would turn out to be the effect of Karma and jîva, and would be inferred as punya and papa by

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:420.
Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The ninth
means of karya and karana. So, like Agnibhati, you, too, ( shall have to ) accept (the existence of) Karma on account of actions as well as Karyas ( in the form of deha etc., ) and since Karma itself is the cause of good or bad ( in case of deha etc.), as well as other performances, admit punya and pāpa as belonging to different species by their very svabhāva ( 1914-1920)
टीका-एताश्च गाथाः प्रायोऽग्निभूतिगणधरवादे व्याख्याता एव, सुगमाश्च । नवरं " कारण-कजाणुमेओ सो त्ति" स च जीव-कर्मणोः पुण्य-पापाभिधानः परिणामः कारणेन कार्येण चाऽनुमीयते-कारणानुमानात् कार्यानुमानाच्च गम्यत इत्यर्थ। एतदेवानुमानद्वयमाह-"किरियाणं कारणओ इत्यादि" दानादिक्रियाणां हिंसादिक्रियाणां च कारणत्वात् कारणरूपत्वादस्ति तत्फलभूतस्तत्कार्यरूपपुण्य-पापात्मको जीव-कर्मपरिणामः, यथा कृष्यादिक्रियाणां शालि-यव-गोधूमादिकम् । उक्तं च" समासु तुल्यं विषमासु तुल्यं सतीष्वसच्चाप्यसतीषु सच्च । फलं क्रियास्वित्यथ यन्निमित्तं तद् देहिनां सोऽस्ति नु कोऽपि धर्मः॥१॥"
एतत् कारणानुमानम् । “देहाईणमित्यादि" देहादीनां कारणमस्ति, कार्यरूपत्वात् तेषाम् , यथा घटस्य मृद्-दण्ड-चक्र-चीवरादिसामग्रीकलितः कुलालः । न च वक्तव्यम्-दृष्ट एव माता-पित्रादिकस्तेषां हेतुः, दृष्टहेतुसाम्येऽपि सुरूपे-तरादिभावेन देहादीनां वैचित्र्यदर्शनात् , तस्य चादृष्टकर्माख्यहेतुमन्तरेणाभावात् । अत एव पुण्य-पापभेदेन कर्मणो द्वैविध्यम् , शुभदेहादीनां पुण्यकार्यत्वात् , इतरेषां तु पापफलत्वात् । उक्तं च
" इह दृष्टहेत्वसंभविकार्यविशेषात् कुलालयत्न इव ।
हेत्वन्तरमनुमेयं तत् कर्म शुभा- शुभं कर्तुः॥१॥" एतत् कार्यानुमानम् । तथा, मदभिहितमिति च कृत्वाऽग्निभूतिवत् त्वमपि कर्म प्रतिपद्यस्व, सर्वज्ञवचनप्रामाण्यादित्यर्थः । तदपि पुण्य-पापविभागेन , विभक्तं प्रतिपद्यस्व, देहादीनां तत्कार्याणां क्रियाणां च तत्कारणभूतानां शुभा-ऽशुभत्वेन तद्वैविध्यदर्शनादिति ॥ ३६६-३७२ ॥ (१९१४-१९२०)

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.: 421 : D. C—These verses have already been explained in details in the Second Ganadhara-vāda.† The only point to remember in this connection is that punya and pāpa, the parinama of Jiva and Karma, could be inferred from kāraña and kārya.
These two inferences are explained as follows:
(1) Kāranānumāna:--Just as in case of working of agriculture, rice, barley, and wheat etc. are reaped as crops ( Kāryas ) at the end, punya and pāpa are also reaped as the parināmas of Jiva and Karma with actions like munificence etc. or violence etc. as their respective causes.
It is, therefore, said that“Samāsu tulyam visamāsu tulyam satişvasaccípyasatiņu sacca | Phalam kriyāsvityatha yannimittam tad dehînām so'stinuko'pi
dharmaḥ Il " ( 2 ) Kāryānumāna .-Just as a potter accompanied by the materials such as earth, stick, wheel etc. happens to be the Kāraṇa of ghata, so also in case of Kāryas like s'arîra etc. there is some cause or the other. The cause in this case, is nothing but punya and pāpa in the form of good and bad deeds. In the production of karyas like s'arîra etc., parents are no doubt visible causes, but along with them there are invisible causes in the form of good or bad deeds also. Otherwise, ugliness or fairness in various forms-in spite of their dụsta hetu, viz, parents being the same--would never be accounted for. The karma therefore has two types :-Punya and pāpa. Good forms are the results of punya and ugly ones are the results of pāpa. Hence it is said :" Iha dȚstabetvasambhavikāryavišeşāt kulalayatna iva i Hetvantaramanumeyam tat Karma śubha’-śubham kartuḥ il "
So, like Agnibhūti, you, too, shall have to accept the existence of Karma putting faith into the words of me--the
+ Vide pp. 86 to 137
-

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: 422:
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
omniscient. You shall also have to take it for certain that Karma is divided as punya and papa, causing a variety of forms in deha etc. 1366-372 ॥ ( 1914-1920 )
The existence of punya and papa could be established in a different way :
सुह- दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं कज्जभावओऽवस्सं ।
परमाणव घडस्स व कारणमिह पुण्ण - पावाई ॥ ३७३ ॥ (१९२१)
Suha-dukkhāṇam kāraṇamaṇurūvam kajjabhāvao'vassam Paramānavo ghadassa va kāranamiha punna-pāvāim ||373॥ (1921) [सुख-दुःखयोः कारणमनुरूपं कार्यभावतोऽवश्यम् ।
परमाणव घटस्येव कारणमिह पुण्यपापे || ३७३ ॥ ( १९२१ ) Sukha-duḥkhayoḥ karanamanurūpam kāryabhāvato’vaśyam | Paramānavo ghatasyeva karanamiha punya-pāpe ॥37॥ ( 1921) ]
Trans. – 373 Just as molecules ( which act as ) the cause of ghata resemble ghata, in the same way, happiness and misery, the Kāryas have also their kārana viz, punya and pāpa, similar, to them. ( 1921 )
टीका - अस्त्यवश्यं सुख-दुःखयोरनुरूपं कारणम्, कार्यत्वात् तयोः, यह कार्य तस्यानुरूपं कारणं भवत्येव, यथा घटस्य परमाणवः, तच्च तयोरिहानुरूपं कारणं, सुखस्य पुण्यं दुःखस्य तु पापमिति || ३७३ || ( १९२१ )
D. C. - Since karana is similar to Kārya, the small particles of earth which make ghata resemble ghata, and punya and papa which are the karana of sukha and duḥkha would resemble sukha and duhkcha. ॥ 373 ॥ ( 1921 )
The opponent may now,
raise the objection as follows:
सुह - दुक्खकारणं जइ कम्मं कज्जस्स तद्गुरूवं च । पत्तमरूवं तं पिहू अह रूविं नाणुरूवं तो ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)

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Vada ] Ganadharavida
428. Suha-duhkhakāraṇam jai kammam kajjassa tadaņurūvam ca ! Pattamarūvam tam pi hu aha rūvim nāņurūvam to 13741 (1922) [सुख-दुःखकारणं यदि कर्म कार्यस्य तदनुरूपं च ।
प्राप्तमरूपं तदपि खल्वथ रूपि नानुरूपं ततः ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२) Sukha-duḥkhakāraṇam yadi karma karyasya tadanurūpam ca 1 Prāptamarūpam tadapi khalvatha rūpi nānurūpam tataḥ 1137411 ]
Trans.-374 If karma ( were known as ) the cause of happiness and misery, and if Karya ( were taken as ) simiiar to it, then, that (i. e. karma) also would certainly become formless, and if corporeal, it would not resemble (the Karya ). ( 1922)
टीका-ननु यदि सुख-दुःखयोः पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म कारणम् , तच्च यदि कार्यस्य सुख-दुःखरूपस्यानुरूपं सदृशमिष्यते, तर्हि सुख-दुःखयोरात्मपरिणामत्वेनारूपत्वात् तदपि पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्म तदनुरूपतयाऽरूपं प्रामोति । अथ रूपवत् , तर्हि नानुरूपं तत् , मूर्तत्वेन विलक्षणत्वादिति ॥ ३७४ ॥ (१९२२)
D. C.-If Karma composed of punya and pāpa is accepted as the Kārana of sukha and duhkha, and if sukha and duḥkha are taken as similar to the Karma, Karma, which in fact is corporeal, would become formless like sukha and duḥkha.
On the other hand, if it is taken as corporeal, it will not resemble its kārya, viz, sukha and duhlcha which are incorporeal. ॥ 374॥ ( 1922)
Then, the Tirthankara Bhagavān replios :न हि सबहाणुरूवं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अह मयं ते। किं कज-कारणत्तणमहवा वत्थुत्तणं तस्स ? ॥३७५॥ (१९२३) Na hi savvahānuruvam bhinnam, vā kāranam, aha mayam te | Kim kajja-kāranattanamahava vatthuttanam tassa ? ॥375u.(1923)

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.: 424 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's
The ninth
[न हि सर्वथानुरूपं भिन्नं वा कारणं, अथ मतं ते ।
किं कार्य-कारणत्वमथवा वस्तुत्वं तस्य ? ॥ ३७५ ॥ (१९२३) Na hi sarvatbanurūpam bhinnam vā kāraṇam, atha matam te i Kim kārya-kāraṇatvamathavā vastutyam tasya ? || 375 || ( 1923 )]
Trans.—375 The karana is neither similar nor dissimilar ( to the kārya ) in all respects. Then, you might contend that " How is its being a kārya, karana or a ( definite ) object (justified )? ( 1923)
टीका-न हि सर्वथा कार्यानुरूपं कारणमिष्यते, येन सुख-दुःखवत् कर्मणोऽप्यरूपत्वं प्रेर्यते । नाप्येकान्तेन सर्वधर्मैः कारणं कार्याद्भिन्नमेष्टव्यम् । " अह मयं ते ति" अथ ते तवैतद् मतम्-एकान्तेन सर्वैरपि धर्मैः कारणं कार्यानुरूपमेव, भिन्नं वाऽनुरूपमेवेति; तर्हि सर्वथाऽनुरूपत्व एकस्य कारणत्वेऽपरस्यापि कारणत्वात् , एकस्य च कार्यत्वेऽन्यस्यापि कार्यत्वात् किं तयोः कार्य-कारणत्वम् ? न किञ्चित् , द्वयोरपिकारणत्वात् , कार्यत्वाद् वेति । अथैकान्तभेदेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वे किं नाम तस्य कारणस्य वस्तुत्वम् ? न किञ्चित् , द्वयोरपि वस्तुत्वे सर्वथा भेदहानिप्रसङ्गादिति । तस्माद् नैकान्तेनानुरूपता, अननुरूपता वा कार्य-कारणयोः ।। ३७५ ॥ (१९२३)
D. C.-Kārana is neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to the Kāryas. So, Karma cannot be called formless like its Kārya viz, sukha and duhkha.
Your doubt is based on your assumption that kārana is exclusively similar or dissimilar to the kārya. But you are not justified in your assumption. For, if Kārana were absolutely similar to Kārya, it would turn out to be the kärana of some other Kārya also.
Similarly, a kārya taken as similar to a kūrana in all respects, would also become the Kārya of another kāraṇa. Consequently, there will be no distinction between Karya and kārana, and both would either become kārana or karya.
Since there is no difference between kārya being a definite

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
•: 425 :object and a karana being a definite object, the exclusive difference between the two would also be out of place. Hence, Kārya and kārana are neither absolutely similar nor absolutely dissimilar to each other, but comparatively equal or unequal to each other. ॥ 375 ॥ ( 1923 )
The author states in objection to this and to its reply :--- सत्वं तुल्लातुल्लं जइ तो कज्जाणुरूवया केयं ? । जं सोम्म ! सपजाओ कजं परपज्जओ सेसो ॥३७६ ॥(१९२४) Savvam tullātullam jai to kajjāņurūvayā keyam ? 1 Jam Somma ! sapajjao kajjam parapajjao seso ॥ 376॥ (1924 ) [ सर्व तुल्या-ऽतुल्यं यदि ततः कार्यानुरूपता केयम् ? ।
यत् सौम्य ! स्वपर्यायः कार्य परपर्ययः शेषः ॥ ३७६ ॥ ( १९२४ ) Sarvam tulya’-tulyam yadi tataḥ kāryānurūpatā koyam ? ' Yat Saunya! svaparyayah kāryam paraparyayaḥ śeşah 11376||(1924]
Trans.--376 “If everything is comparatively equal or unequal, then, in what way is Karya similar ( to karana )?" For, O Saumya ! Kārya is the synonym and the rest autonym. (1924)
टीका-न केवलं कार्य-कारणे एव तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपे, किन्तु सकलमपि त्रिभुवनान्तर्गतं वस्तु परस्परं तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपमेव, न पुनः किञ्चित् कस्याप्येकान्तेन तुल्यमतुल्यं वा । लब्धावकाशः परः प्राह-" जईत्यादि " यद्येवम् , ततः केयं कार्यानुरूपता कारणस्य विशेषतोऽन्विष्यते, येनोच्यते" सुह-दुक्खाणं कारणमणुरूवं " इत्यादि । यदि हि किञ्चिदेकान्तेनानुरूपं स्यात् तदेत्थं वक्तुं युज्यते, यदा त्वेकान्ततो न किञ्चिदनुरूपम् , नाप्यननुरूपम् ; किन्तु सर्व सर्वेण तुल्या-ऽतुल्यरूपमेव, तदा किमनेन विशेषेण ?। अत्रोच्यते-" जमित्यादि” सौम्य ! तुल्या-ऽतुल्यत्वे सर्वगतेऽपि यद् यस्माद् कारणस्य कार्य स्वपर्यायः, तस्मात् कारणं कार्यस्येहा. नुरूपमुच्यते, शेषस्त्वकार्यरूपः सर्वोऽपि पदार्थः कारणस्य परपर्यायः, इति ।

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•* 426 :•
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
तं प्रति विवक्षितं कारणमसमानरूपमभिधीयते । आह- ननु कथं प्रस्तुते सुखदुःखे कारणस्य स्वपर्याय: ? । उच्यते - जीव- पुण्यसंयोगः सुखस्य कारणम्, तस्य च सुखं पर्याय एव, दुःखस्यापि जीव- पापसंयोगः कारणम्, अतस्तzanfa g:ả qufa ga, a41a gå gå, kea, faafhenda =77देशाँल्लभते तथा तत्कारणभूतं पुण्यस्कन्धद्रव्यमपि यथा च दुःखमशुभम्, अकल्याणम्, अशिवमित्यादिसंज्ञाः प्राप्नोति तथा तत्कारणभूतं पापद्रव्यमपि, इति विशेषतोऽत्र पुण्य-पापे - सुख-दुःखयोरनुरूपकारणत्वेनोक्ते इति ||३७६|| ( १९२४ )
D. C.-Bhagavan :-Not only karya and kāraṇa, but all objects of the Universe, are relatively equal and unequal and no object is absolutely equal or absolutely unequal.
Acalabhrata:-If it is so, then, why do you try to establish particularly the similarity between karana and karya by saying that "sukha and duḥkha are similar to karana etc.? Still, however, if some object is absolutely similar to another, it may be justified to say so. But when nothing is similar or dissimilar in all respects, and everything is relatively equal or unequal according to you, then, how could it be said that Karana was similar to kārya?
Bhagavan-In spite of all objects being relatively equal or unequal, karya resembles karana because it is the synonym of karana, while other objects which are the autonyms of karana are dissimilar to it.
Hence in the present case, sukha and duḥkha are the synonyms of Karma the karana. The combination of jiva and punya is the cause of sukha, and that of jiva and papa is the cause of duhkha, just as siva, kalyana, s'ubha etc are the synonyms for sukha, the same are the synonyms for the punya-karmas also.
Similarly, duḥkha and its cause, the papa-karmas, have the same synonyms viz, a-s'iva, a-kalyana and a-s'ubha etc.

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.:427:.
It is in this way, O Saumya ! that punya and pāpa are known as the kāraņas resembling their kāryas viz sukha and duḥkha. ॥ 376 ॥ (1924)
The opponent may here ask as follows :किं जह मुत्तममुत्तस्स कारणं तह सुहाईणं कम्मं । दिटुं सुहाइकारणमन्नाइ जहेह तह कम्मं ? ॥३७७॥ (१९२५) Kim jaha muttamamuttassa kāranam taha suhāîņam kammam i Dittham suhāikāranamannāi jaheha taha kammam ? 113771(1925) [किं यथा मूर्तममूर्तस्य कारणं तथा सुखादीनां कर्म।
दृष्टं सुखादिकारणमन्नादि यथेह तथा कर्म १ ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२५) Kim yathā mūrtamamūrtasya karanam tathā sukhadînām karma l Dristam sukhadikāranamannadi yatheha tatha karma ? ॥ 377 ॥
Trans.—377 Is Karma the cause of sukha etc, as mūrta is the cause of amārta? ( And ) is Karma apprehended ( as the cause ) in the same way as food etc, are apprehended as the cause of happiness etc ? ( 1925 )
टीका-किं यथा मूर्त नीलादिकममूर्तस्य स्वप्रतिभासिज्ञानस्य कारणं हेतुस्तथा सुख-दुःखयोः पुण्य-पापात्मकं कर्मापि मूर्तमेव सत् कारणम् , यथा प्रत्यक्षत एव दृष्टमन्नादिकम् ; आदिशब्दात् स्रक्-चन्दना-ऽङ्गना-हि-विष-कण्टकादिकमिह सुख-दुःखयोमूत तत् कारणं तद्वत् कर्मापि तयोरिति भावार्थः ? ॥ ३७७ ॥ (१९२५)
___D. C.-Just as a gem, garland, sandal-paste, woman, serpent, or a poisonous sting becomes the mūrta cause of the a-mūrta sukha and duhkha, should we accept Karma also whether good or bad-to be the mūrta and pratyakşa cause like food etc. ? ॥ 377 ॥ ( 1925 )
The answer is

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.: 428 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
होउ तयं चिय किं कम्मणा, न जं तुलसाहणाणं पि । फलभेदओ सोऽवस्सं सकारणो कारणं कम्मं ॥ ३७८ ॥ (१९२६)
Höu tayam ciya kim kammaṇā, na jam tullasāhaṇāṇam pi Phalabhedao so'vassam sakārano kāranam kammam ॥378॥ (1926) [ भवतु तदेव किं कर्मणा, न यत् तुल्यसाधनानामपि ।
फलभेदतः सोऽवश्यं सकारणः कारणं कर्म || ३७८ || (१९२६ ) Bhavatu tadeva kim karmana, na yat tulyasadhanānāmapi | Phalabhedataḥ so'vaśyam sa-kāraṇaḥ kāraṇam karma ||378||(1926)]
Trans.—378 ( The opponent may argue further that). “ Let that ( i. e., food etc. ) be the cause of happiness etc.” but what ( is the use ) of Karma? That is proper. In spite of there being equal materials, the difference in results has certainly ( some ) reason which is ( nothing but Karma ) ( 1926 )
टीका - ननु तदेव दृष्टमन्नादिकं वस्तु तर्हि सुखादैः कारणमस्तु किमदृष्टेन तेन कर्मणा परिकल्पितेन, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तदेतद् न, यद् यस्मात् तुल्यान्यन्नादीनि साधनानि येषां ते तुल्यसाधनाः पुरुषास्तेषामपि फले सुखदुःखलक्षणे कार्यभेदः फलभेदो महान् दृश्यते, तुल्येऽप्यन्नादिने भुक्ते कस्याप्याह्लादः, अन्यस्य तु रोगाद्युत्पत्तिर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । यश्चेत्थं तुल्यान्नादिसाधनानामपि फलभेदः, सोऽवश्यमेव सकारणः, निष्कारणत्वे नित्यं सच्चाऽसच्चप्रसङ्गात् । यच्च तत्कारणं तद्दृष्टं कर्म, इति न तत्कल्पनाऽऽनर्थ्यमिति ।। ३७८ ।। ( १९२६ )
D. C. -- Acalabhrātā : - Since food etc are directly apprehended, they could be taken as the causes of sukcha, duhkha, but what is the purpose of assuming Karma, which is absolutely imperceptible to be the cause?
Bhagavan:-Persons having the same sadhanas like anna etc are found to enjoy different phalas like sukha and duḥkha, In spite of their taking the same food, some people look glad

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
.: 429 :•
while others appear gloomy. This sort of phala bheda is significant and is due to good or bad karma. ॥ 378 ॥ ( 1926 ) The murtata of Karma is now explained as follows:
एतो चि तं मुत्तं मुत्तबलाहाणओ जहा कुंभो । देहाइकज्जमुत्ताइओ व भणिए पुणो भइ ॥ ३७९ ॥ (१९२७)
Etto cciya tam muttam muttabalāhāṇao jahā kumbho Dehāikajjamuttāio vva bhanie puno bhanai | 379 ॥ ( 1927 ) [ एतस्मादेव तद् मूर्त्त मूर्तबलाधानतो यथा कुम्भः ।
देहादिकार्यमूदित व भणिते पुनर्भणति || ३७९ ।। ( १९२७ ) Etasmadeva tad murtam murtabaladhanato yatha kumbhaḥ Dehadikāryamūrtadita iva bhanite punarbhanati n379 (1927)]
Trans. – 379 On account of that reason, it is mūrta like ghata, on account of its ( capacity of ) strengthening the body, or on account of the karyas like deha etc. being murta. When thus told, he speaks again. ( 9127 )
,,
टीका - यत एव तुल्यसाधनानां कर्मनिबन्धनः फलभेदः, अत एवो - च्यते - मूर्त कर्म, मूर्तस्य देहादेर्बलाधान कारित्वात्, कुम्भवत् यथा निमित्त - मात्रभावित्वेन घटो देहादीनां बलमाधत्ते एवं कर्मापि, अतो मूर्तमित्यर्थः । अथवा, मूर्त कर्म, मूर्तेन स्रक् - चन्दना - ऽङ्गनादिना तस्योपचयलक्षणस्य बलस्याधीयमानत्वात्, कुम्भवत् यथा मूर्तत्वेन तैलादिना बलस्याधीयमानत्वात् कुम्भो मूर्तः, एवं स्रक्-चन्दनादिनोपचीयमानत्वात् कर्माति मूर्तमिति भावः । यदिवा, मृत कर्म, देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्वात् परमाणुवत् यथा घटादे - स्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् परमाणवो मृतः, एवं देहादेस्तत्कार्यस्य मूर्तस्य दर्शनात् कर्मापि मृतमित्यर्थः । एवं भणिते पुनर्भणति परः || ३७९ ।। (१९२७)
,
D. C.-The murtatva of Karmas is explained in various ways1. Since the difference in phalus in case of those having the same sadhanas is due to Karma, the karma should be taken as murta,

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[ The ninth 2. Karma is mūrta, because like ghata, it strengthens the
karyas like body etc. 3. Just as ghata is mūrta, because it is strengthened by the
mūrta objects like oil, etc, Karma is also mūrta, because it is also nourished by the objects like flower-garla nds
and sandal-paste etc. 4. Just as the parıņāmas of ghata are mūrta, because ghata
is mūrta, the karma is also mūrta, because its kāryas like sarera etc are murta. ॥ 379 ॥ ( 1927 )
When thus answered by the Tîrthankara, the opponent argues againतो किं देहाईणं मुत्तत्तणओ तयं हवइ मुत्तं । अह सुह-दुक्खाईणं कारणभावादरूवं ति ? ॥३८०॥ (१९२८) To kim dehāînam muttattanao tayam havai muttami Aha suha-dukkhāînam kāraṇabhāvādarūvam ti ? 11 380 n ( 1928) [ ततः किं देहादीनां मूर्तत्वतस्तद् भवति मूर्तम् ।
अथ सुख-दुःखादीनां कारणभावादरूपमिति ? ॥ ३८०॥ (१९२८) Tatah kim debadînām mūrtatvatastad bhavatı mūrtam , Atha sukba-duḥkhādînām kāraṇabhāvādarūpamiti ? 113801|(1928)]
Trans.—380 Then does it become mūrta because of the corporeal nature, deha etc? Or, is it incorporeal because of sukha-duhkha etc, ( being incorporeal ) ? ( 1928 )
____टीका-ततः किं देहादीनां कर्मकार्याणा मूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कर्म मृतं भवतु, आहोस्वित् सुख-दुःख-क्रोध-मानादीनां जीवपरिणामभूतानां तत्कार्याणाममूर्तानां दर्शनात् तत् कारणभावनामूर्तमस्तु कर्म ? इत्येवं . मूर्तत्वा-ऽमूर्तत्वाभ्यामुभयथापि तत्कार्यदर्शनात् किं मूर्तम् , अमृतं वा कर्म भवतु ? इति निवेद्यतामिति ॥ ३८० ।। (१९२८)
D. C.-By accepting your argument, Karma will become

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* 431... mūrta as well as a-mūrta. It will be mūrta because its kāryas like deha etc are mūrta. At the same time, it will be called a-mūrta also, because its kāryas and the jîva-parināmas such as sukha, duḥkha, krodha, māna etc are a-mūrta. In such a case, should we take Karma as mūrta or co-mūrta ? 138011 (1928)
Bhagavān replies:न सुहाईणं हेऊ कम्मं चिय किन्तु ताण जीवो वि। होइ समवाइकारणमियरं कम्मति को दोसो? ॥३८१॥(१९२९) Na sahāînam heū kammam ciya kintu tāna jîvo vil Höi samavāikāranamiyaram kammam ti ko doso ? 1138111 (1929) [न सुखादीनां हेतुः कर्मैव किन्तु तेषां जीवोऽपि ।
भवति समवायिकारणमितरत् कर्मेति को दोषः १ ॥३८१।। (१९२९) Na sukhádînám hetuh karmaiva kintu tesām jîvo'pi 1 Bhavati samavayikāranamitarat karme'ti ko dosah ? |3810 (1929)]
Trans.-381 Karma is not the only cause of happiness etc, but jiva is also their intimate cause Karma is the opposite one. What difficulty will arise ( in such a case ) ? ( 1929 )
टीका-सुखादीनां कर्मैव केवलं कारणं न भवति, किन्तु जीवोऽपि तेषां समवायिकारणं भवति, कर्म पुनरितरदसमवायिकारणं भवतीति को दोषः १ । इदमुक्तं भवति-सुखादेरमूर्त्तत्वेन समवायिकारणस्य जीवस्यामूर्तत्वमस्त्येव, असमवायिकारणस्य तु कर्मणः सुखाद्यमूर्तत्वेनामूर्तत्वं न भवतीत्यपीति न दोष इति ॥ ३८१ ॥ (१९२९)
D. C.-Karma is not the only cause of sukha, duhkha etc. Really speaking, Jiva is the intimate cause of sukha etc and Karma is merely an accidental cause. Hence, on account of the a-mūrtatva of the kāryas, viz sukh, duhkha ete their intimate cause viz piva does become a-mūrta but Kārma being merely an accidantal cause does not become a-mūrta. So, there will be no difficulty as regards karma being accepted as mūrta. 1381||(1929)

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[The ninth Now, refuting the first assertion that the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of punya, the author statesइय रूवित्ते सुह-दुक्खकारणत्ते य कम्मुणो सिद्धे । पुण्णावगरिसमेत्तेण दुक्खबहुलत्तणमजुत्तं ॥ ३८२॥ (१९३०) Iya rūvitte suha-dukkha kāranatte ya kammuņo siddhe i Punnāvagarisametteņa dukkhabahulattanamajuttam 1138211 (1930) [इति रूपित्वे सुख-दुःखकारणत्वे च कर्मणः सिद्धे ।
पुण्यापकर्षमात्रेण दुःखबहुलत्वमयुक्तम् ।। ३८२ ।। ( १९३०) Iti rūpitve sukha-duhkhakāraṇatve ca karmaṇah siddhe Punyapakarsamatrena duhkhabahulatvamayuktam ||3820 (1930)]
Trans.-382 When Karma is proved to be mūrta and ( at the same time ) established as the cause of sukha-duḥkha ( the theory that ) the abundance of miseries is due to the diminution of virtuous actions, will fail. ( 1930 )
टीका-इत्येवं पञ्चविकल्पोपन्यस्तस्वभाववादनिरासेन पुण्य-पापात्मकस्य कर्मणः सुख-दुःखकारणत्वे रूपित्वे च सिद्धे पुण्यापकर्षमात्रेण यद् दुःखबहुलत्वं प्रथमविकल्पोपन्यासे प्रोक्तं तदयुक्तमिति ॥ ३८२ ॥ (१९३०)
D. C.-Now that the theory of svabhāva has been refuted and the existence of a murta karma as the cause of sukha and duhkha, has been established we can easily refute the theory that the abundance of miseries is caused by the diminution of purnyas ॥ 382 ॥ ( 1930) कम्मप्पगरिसजणियं तदवस्सं पगरिसाणुभूईओ। सोक्खप्पगरिसभूई जह पुण्णप्पगरिसप्पभवा ॥३८३॥ (१९३१) Kammappagarisajaniyam tadavassam pagarisānubhūîo Sokhhappagarisabhūi jaha punnappagarisappabhavā 1138311 (1931) [कर्मप्रकर्षजनितं तदवश्यं प्रकर्षानुभूतेः ।
सौख्यप्रकर्षभूतियथा पुण्यप्रकर्षप्रभवा ।। ३८३ ॥ (१९३१ )

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:433 : Karnaprakarsajanitanı tadavaśyam prakarsanubhūteh 1 Saukhyaprakarsabhātiryathā punyaprakarsaprabhava ॥ 383 ॥
Trans.--383 Just as the experience of the abundance of happiness is caused by the abudance of virtuous actions, the experience of the abundance of miseries is also produced by the abundance of sinful actions. ( 1931 )
टीका-तद् दुःखबहुलत्वं पुण्यापकर्षजनितं न भवति, किन्तु स्वानुरूपकर्मप्रकर्षजनितम् , प्रकर्षानुभूतित्वात्-वेदनाप्रकर्षानुभवरूपत्वादिति हेतुः, यथा सौख्यप्रकर्षानुभूतिः स्वानुरूपकर्मप्रकर्षप्रभवेति दृष्टान्तः ॥ ३८३ ।। (१९३१)
___D. C.-Abundance of miseries is not due to the want of virtuous actions but it is due to the abundance of sinful actions, just as abundance of happiness is due to abundance of virtuous deeds, and not due to the diminution of sinful deeds. ॥ 383 ॥ ( 1931)
Moreover, तह बज्झसाहणप्पगरिसंगभावादिहण्णहा न तयं । विवरीयबज्झसाहणबलप्पगरिसं अवेक्खेज्जा ॥३८४॥ (१९३२) Taha bajjhasāhanappagarisangabhāvādıhannahā na tayam i Vivariyabajjhasāhanabalappagarisam avekkhejja ॥ 384 ॥ ( 1932 ) [ तथा बाह्यसाधनप्रकर्षाङ्गभावादिहान्यथा न तत् ।
विपरीतबाह्यसाधनबलप्रकर्षमपेक्षेत ।। ३८४ ॥ ( १९३२ ) Tathā bāhyasādhanaprakarşāngabhāvādihāngatha na tati Viparitabahyasadhanabalaprakarsamapekseta ॥ 384 ॥ (1932)]
Trans.-384 It is so on account of the abundance of external elements also. ( For ), otherwise, it would not require the excessive force of the external ( as well as ) opposite elements. ( 1932 )
65

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[ The ninth
टीका- ' तथा ' इत्युपपच्यन्तरार्थः । इह देहिनां दुःखबहुलत्वं केवलपुण्यापकर्षमात्रजनितं न भवति । कुतः १ इत्यत्र हेतुमाह - बाह्यानि यान्यनिष्टाहारादीनि साधनानि तेषां यस्तदनुरूपः प्रकर्षस्तस्याङ्गभावात् कारणभावादिति । विपर्यये बाधकमाह-' इहेत्यादि ' तद् दुःखमन्यथा यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्यं भवेत् तदा पुण्यसंपाद्येष्टाहारापचयमात्रादेव भवेत्, न तु पापोचयसंपाद्यानिष्टाहारादिरूपविपरीतबाह्यसाधनानां यद् बलं सामर्थ्यं तस्य स्वानुरूपो यः प्रकर्षस्तमपेक्षेत । इदमत्र हृदयम् - यदि पुण्यापकर्षमात्रजन्यं दुःखं भवेत्, तदा पुण्योदय प्राप्येष्टाहारादिसाधनापकर्षमात्रादेव भवेत्, न चैतदस्ति, इष्टविपरीतानिष्टाहारादिसाधनप्रकर्षसामर्थ्यादेव तद्भावादिति ॥ ३८४ ॥ (१९३२)
D. C.-Abundance of miseries to the various beings in this world is not merely caused by the diminution of punyakarmas but by the abundant force of various external elements like forbidden food also. If it were not so, it would have been caused only by the diminution of prescribed food etc (to be attained by punya-karmas) and would never have depended upon the abundant force of the external but opposite elements like forbidden food etc (to be attained by papa-karmas)
The main purport of the above argument is this:-If dehatva were to be generated by means of the diminution of punya-karmas only, it would have been produced only on account of the lack of external materials like iṣṭāhāra etc. But it is not so, as it is produced by the increasing force of the external but opposite materials like aniṣṭāhāra as well. | 384 || (1932)
And,
देहो नावचयकओ पुण्णुक्करिसे व मुत्तिमत्ताओ ।
होज व सहीणतरओ कहमसुभयरो महल्लो य ? ॥ ३८५॥ (१९३३)
Deho navacayakao punnukkarise va muttimattão
Hojja va sa hinatarao kahamasubhayaro mahallo ya? ॥385 (1933)

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:435 [ देहो नापचयकृतः पुण्योत्कर्ष इव मूर्तिमत्त्वात् ।
भवेद् वा स हीनतरकः कथमशुभतरो महांश्च ? ॥ ३८५ ॥ (१९३३) Deho nápacayaksitaḥ punyotkarşa iva mūrtimattvat i Bhaved vā sa hînatarakah kathamaśubhataro mabānsca ? 1138511
Trans.--385 Since body is corporeal like the abundant punya karmas, it is not produced by ( means of ) diminution ( of punya karmas ). Or, if it is so, it should be small. ( For) how is a huge and (at the same time ) splendid ( body available ) ? ( 1933 )
___टीका-दुःखितहस्त्यादिदेहः केवलपुण्यापयमात्रकृतो न भवति, मूर्तिमच्चात् , यथा पुण्योत्कर्षे तजन्योऽनुत्तरसुर-चक्रवादिदेहः, यश्च पुण्यापचयमात्रजन्यः स मृर्तिमानपि न भवति, यथा न कोऽपि, यदि च पुण्यापचयमात्रेण देहो जन्येत, तदा हीनतरः शुभ एव च स्यात् , कथं महान् , अशुभतरश्च भवेत् , महतो महापुण्योपचयजन्यत्वात् , अशुभस्य चाशुभकर्मनिर्वय॑त्वात् । पुण्येन पुनरणीयसापि शुभ एव देहो जन्येत, न तु दुःखितः। अणीयसापि हि सुवर्णलवेनाणीयानपि सौवर्ण एव घटो भवति न तु मार्तिकः, ताम्रादिति ॥ ३८५ ॥ (१९३३) ____D. C.-Since the bodies of anuttarra gods including the Supreme Ruler of the World are mūrta, they are not produced by the diminution of punya karmas. In the same way, bodies like that of a miserable elephant etc are also not produced by the dimimution of punya karmas only as they are mūrta. For, that which has been produced by the diminution can never be murta.
Still however, if a body is ever produced by diminution of punyas, it must be exquisitely feeble and auspicious. Because a body which is huge and at the same time auspicious, is produced by the accumulation of punyas, while that which is huge but in-auspicious is produced by the accumulation of pāpas. Hence, a body produced even by a small quantity of punyas must necessarily be happy and never un happy. Just

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[ The ninth as, from a small lump of gold a small but golden pot is made but not an earthen or a copper one, similarly, a body produced even from a small accumulation of punyas is always happy though small in form. ॥ 385 ॥ ( 1933 )
Refuting the second and third theories, the author statesएवं चिय विवरीयं जोएज्जा सबपावपक्खे वि। न य साहारणरूवं कम्मं तकारणाभावा ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४) Evam ciya viyarîyam jöejjā savvapāvapakkhe vil Na ya sāhāraṇarūvam kammam takkāraṇābhāvā ll 386 ( 1934) [एवमेव विपरीतं योजयेत् सर्वपापपक्षेऽपि ।
न च साधारणरूपं कर्म तत्कारणाभावात् ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४) Evameva viparîtam yojayet sarvapāpapakşe’pi 1 Na ca sadhārañarūpam karma, tatkāraṇābhāvāt ll 386 II (1934)
Trans.--386 The same ( argument) should also be applied to the theory of exclusive pāpas, ( but ) in a reverse manner. And, ( there is ) nothing like a common karma ( containing punya and pāpa together ) because of the absence of its cause. ( 1934 )
'टीका-" सर्व पापमेवास्ति, न तु पुण्यम्, पापापचयमात्रजन्यत्वात् सुखस्य " इत्येतस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एवमेव केवलपुण्यवादोक्तदूषणाद् विपरीतगत्या सर्व योजयेत् । यद्यथा-पापापकर्षमात्रजनितं सुखं न भवति, पापास्याल्पीयसोऽपि दुःखजनकत्वात् । न ह्यणीयानपि विषलवः स्वास्थ्यहेतुर्भवति । तस्मात् पुण्यजनितमेवाल्पमपि सुखमित्यादि स्वबुद्धयाऽभ्यूह्य वाच्यम् । इति पृथग् दुःखयोःकारणभूते स्वतत्रे पुण्य-पापे एष्टव्ये । अत एव साधारणे अपि संकीर्णे पुण्य-पापे नैष्टव्ये । कुतः ? इत्याह-' न येत्यादि' न च साधारणरूपं संकीर्णस्वभावं पुण्य-पापत्मकमेकं कर्मास्ति, तस्यैवंभूतस्य कर्मणः कारणाभावात् । अत्र प्रयोगः-नास्ति संकीर्णोभयरूपं कर्म, असंभाव्यमानैवंविधकारणत्वात् , बन्ध्यापुत्रवदिति ॥ ३८६ ॥ (१९३४) .

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.:437:D.-C.-In case of the theory that everything is päpa and there is nothing like punya and that 'sukha is also produced by the diminution of pāpa, the same argument stated above should be applied but in a reverse manner in this way:Since even a small portion of pāpa produces duhkha like a small particle of poison, it could never be said that sukha is produced by the diminution of pāpa. Even a fraction of happiness is produced by punya and never by papre and so on. These arguments clearly indicate that punya and pāpa are absolutely separate entities producing sukha and duhkha respectively.
So, both could never be taken as one combined entity as laid down in the third theory. Such a combined Karma has no hetu whatsoever. And hence, like a son to a barren woman it is entirely impossible. ॥ 386 ।। ( 1934 )
In support of the argument, the author continuesकम्मं जोगनिमित्तं सुभो-ऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्मि । होज न उ उभयरूवो कम्मं पि तओ तयणुरूवं ॥३८७॥(१९३५) Kammam joganimittam subho'subho vā sa egasamayammi i Hojja na u ubhayarūvo kammam pi tao tayaņurūvam 13871(1935) [कर्म योगनिमित्तं शुभोऽशुभो वा स एकसमये ।
भवेद् न तूभयरूपः कर्माऽपि ततस्तदनुरूपम् ।। ३८७ ॥ (१९३५) Karma yoganimittam śubho’śubho vă sa ekasamaye 1 Bhaved na tūbhayarūpaḥ karma’pi tatastadanurūpam (1387|1(1935)]
Trans.--387 Karma is caused by contact which is either auspicious or inauspicious at one time, but never in both the forms. So, Karma is also similar to it. ( 1935 )
___टीका-मिथ्यात्वा-ऽविरति-प्रमाद-कषाय-योगा बन्धहेतव इति पर्यन्ते योगाभिधानात् सर्वत्र कर्मबन्धहेतुत्वस्य योगाविनाभावाद् योगानामेव बन्धहेतुत्वमिति कर्म योगनिमित्तमुच्यते । स च मनो-वाक्-कायात्मको

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: 438 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth योग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवेत् , न तूमयरूपः, अत: कारणानुरूपत्वात् कार्यस्य कर्मापि तदनुरूपं शुभं पुण्यरूपं बध्यते, अशुभं वा पापरूपं बध्यते, न तु संकीर्णस्वभावमुभयरूपमेक दैव बध्यत इति ॥३८७॥ (१९३५)
D. C.-Perversion (mithyātva ) incontinence (a-virati ) stupidity ( kaşāya ) idleness (pramāda ) and contact (yoga ) are the various causes of karma-bandha. Out of these, yoga or contact with the outer world is the principal cause. This contact is divided as. 1. Bodily contact, 2 Mental contact and 3 the Contact of Actions. It is either s'ubha or a-s'ubha at one time, but never in a combined state of s'ubhâs'ubha at the same time.
Now, since this yoga is the kārana and karma, the kārya, the latter shoul be similar to the former. Hence, there cannot exist a karma containing punya and pāpa combined together. When there pervades a-s'ubha yoga the s'ubha Karma-in the form of virtuous deeds-is produced and when there is a-s'ubha yoga, the a-s'ubha karma of sinful deeds is produced.
But Karma could never exist in a combined state of s'ubhās'ubha as yoga never exists in a combined state. 113871(1935)
Now the author states an objection and its reply नणु मण-वइ-काओगा सुभासुभा वि समयम्मि दीसंति । दवम्मि मीसभावो भवेज न उ भावकरणम्मि ॥३८८॥(१९३६) Nanu mana-vai-kāogā subhāsubhā vi samayammi dîsanti Davvammi mîsabhāvo bhavejja na u bhāvakaraṇammi 113881(1936) [ ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगाः शुभाशुभा अपि समये दृश्यन्ते ।
द्रव्ये मिश्रभावो भवेद् न तु भावकरणे ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६) Nanu mano-vak-kāyayogāḥ śubhāśubha api samaye dřeśyante i Dravye misrabhavo bhaved na tu bhavakarane ॥ 388 ॥ (1936)]

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0:489 Trans.--388 “Even śubha and a-śubha contacts pertaining to mind speech and body are perceived at (the same ) time." " The state of mixture would be ( possible ) in ( case of ) abstract ( ones ).” ( 1936 )
टीका-ननु मनो-वाक्-काययोगाः शुभाशुभाश्च मिश्रा इत्यर्थः, एकस्मिन् समये दृश्यन्ते, तत् कथमुच्यते-"सुभोऽसुभो वा स एगसमयम्मि" इति ? तथाहि-किञ्चिदविधिना दानादिवितरणं चिन्तयतः शुभाशुभो मनोयोगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव दानादिधर्ममुपदिशतः शुभाशुभो वाग्योगः, तथा, किमप्यविधिनैव जिनपूजा-वन्दनकादिकायचेष्टां कुर्वतः शुभाशुभकाययोग इति । तदेतदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-" दवम्मीत्यादि " इदमुक्तं भवति-इह द्विविधो योगः-द्रव्यतः, भावतश्च । तत्र मनो-वाक्-काययोगप्रवर्तकानि द्रव्याणि, मनो-वाक्-कायपरिस्पन्दात्मको योगश्च द्रव्ययोगः; यस्त्वेतदुभयरूपयोगहेतुरध्यवसायः स भावयोगः। तत्र शुभाशुभरूपाणां यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशना-कायचेष्टानां प्रवर्तके द्विविधेऽपि द्रव्ययोगे व्यवहारनयदर्शनविवक्षामात्रेण भवेदपि शुभाशुभत्वलक्षणो मिश्रभावः, न तु मनोवाक्-काययोगनिवन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे भावकरणे भावात्मके योगे। अयमभिप्रायः-द्रव्ययोगो व्यवहारनयदर्शनेन शुभाशुभरूपोऽपीष्यते, निश्चयनयेन तु सोऽपि शुभोऽशुभो वा केवलः समस्ति, यथोक्तचिन्ता-देशनादिप्रवर्तकद्रव्ययोगाणामपि शुभाशुभरूपमिश्राणां तन्मतेनाभावात् ; मनो-वाक्-कायद्रव्ययोगनिवन्धनाध्यवसायरूपे तु भावकरणे भावयोगे शुभाशुभरूपो मिश्रभावो नास्ति, निश्चयनयदर्शनस्यैवागमेऽत्र विवक्षितत्वात् । न हि शुभान्यशुभानि वाऽध्यवसायस्थानानि मुक्त्वा शुभाशुभाध्यवसायस्थानरूपस्तृतीयो राशिरागमे क्वचिदपीष्यते, येनाध्यवसायरूपे भावयोगे शुभाशुभत्वं स्यादिति भावः। तस्माद् भावयोग एकस्मिन् समये शुभोऽशुभो वा भवति न तु मिश्रः। ततः कर्मापि तत्प्रत्ययं पृथक् पुण्यरूपं पापरूपं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्ररूपमिति स्थितम् ॥ ३८८ ॥ (१९३६ ) ____D. C.--Acalabhrātā:-The combined state of subha and a-s'ubha contact of mind, takes place when one thinks of offering munificence etc, but not according to the prescribed

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
(The ninth
rules. That belonging to speech takes place when the observances of deeds like munificence etc, are advised but against the proper rules.
The mis'rabhāva of the bodily contact is apprehended when a person actually performs the ceremony of worship and bowing down etc, to the Tîrthankaras without following the prescribed customs.
In this way, it is quite easy to apprehend the three types of yogas in a mixed state of s'ubha and a-s'ubha at the same time.
Bhagavāni.Your assumption is wrongly based. Yoga comes into existence in two ways -(1) By virtue of the contact with concrete substance and ( 2 ) by means of contact with abstract (objects). The concrete substances that come into contact with mind, speech, and body and the process of arousing mind, speech and body, form the dravya-yoga; while the mental effort which acts as the cause of contact on the part of both-s. e. substance as well the process-is known as the bhāva-yoga.
The composite state of s'ubla and a-s'ubha taken together is possible is case of dravya-yoga of all the three varieties belonging respectively to mind, speech, and body-from the practical point of view. But it is never possible in case of bhāva-yoga. It is important to note, therefore, that from the practical point of view, the mis'rabhäva of s'ubha and a-subha combined together may be admitted in case of dravya-yoga, but it is never possible in case of dravya-yoga of definite assertion.
In case of bhāva-yoga, the mos'rabhāva is neither possible from the practical point of view nor with regard to definite assertion.
Moreover in āgamas also, there is no mention of the composite state of s'ubhās'ubha-yoga, as a third variety coming after s'ubha and a-s'ubha varieties of mental effort. Hence, in case of bhāva-yoga, there cannot exist a mixed entity of

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: 441 : s'ubhā’s'ubha-yoga but either a s'ubha-yogu or a-s'ubha-yoga is possible. On account of the same reasons, Karma is also formed of s'ubha or a-s'ubha deeds separately, but never of s'ubha and a-s'ubha combined together. 1 388 ) ( 1936 )
___And, झाणं सुभमसुभं वा न उ मीसं जं च झाणविरमे वि । लेसा सुभाऽसुभा वा सुभमसुभं वा तओ कम्मं ॥३८९॥(१९३७) Jhānam subhamasubham vā na u mîsam jam ca jhānavirame vi i Lesā subhā'subhāvā subhamasubham vā tao kammam 1389|(1937) [ ध्यानं शुभमशुभं वा न तु मिश्रं यच्च ध्यानविरमेऽपि ।
लेश्या शुभाऽशुभा वा शुभमशुभं वा ततः कर्म ॥ ३८९ ॥ (१९३७) Dhyanam śubhamaśubham vá na tu miśram yacca dhyānaviramo'pi | Leśyā śubhāśubhā vā śubhamaśubham vā tataḥ karma ll 389 11
Trans.-389 Meditation is either auspicious or in-auspicious but never composite ( of both ). For, even at the end of meditation, the conflict is either śubha or a-śubha. Hence, harma. is also either ( of ) virtuous (type ) or ( of ) evil ( type ). ( 1937) ____टीका-ध्यानं यस्मादागमे एकदा धर्म-शुक्लध्यानात्मकं शुभम् , आर्तरौद्रात्मकमशुभं वा निर्दिष्टम् , न तु शुभाशुभरूपम् , यस्माच ध्यानोपरमेऽपि लेश्या तैजसीप्रभृतिका शुभा, कापोतीप्रमुखा वाऽशुभेकदा प्रोक्ता, न तु शुभाशुभरूपाः; ध्यानलेश्यात्मकाश्च भावयोगाः, ततस्तेप्येकदा शुभा अशुभा वा भवन्ति न तु मिश्राः। ततो भावयोगनिमित्तं कर्माप्येकदा पुण्यात्मकं शुभं बध्यते, पापात्मकमशुभं वा बध्यते, न तु मिश्रमिति ॥३८९॥ (१९३७)
D. C.-It has been laid down in the āgamas that dhyāna is either s'ubha i. e. inspired by a religious or guileless motive or a-s'ubha 2. e. inspired by vile or dreadful motive at one time, but it could never be inspired by both the motives at the

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[The ninth
same time. Even at the end of dhyāna, the conflict at work is spoken of either as s'ubha (i. e, dominated by lustrous and such other characterstics) or as a-subha (i.e. dominated by illominous elements) but it could never be known as s'ubhā'-s'ubha.
The bhāva-yogas are composed of meditations as well as the conflicts. So, bhāva-yogas are also either s'ubha or a-s'ubha separately but never mis'ra. Consequently, Kurma should also be taken either as s'ubha or a-s'ubha taken separately and never as s'ubhā's'ubha taken together. 1138911 (1937)
Moreover, पुवगहियं च कम्मं परिणामवसेण मीसयं नेजा। इयरेयरभावं वा सम्मा-मिच्छाइं न उ गहणे ॥३९०॥ (१९३८) Puvvagahiyam ca kammam parināmavasena mîsayam nejjā | Iyareyarabhāvam vā sammā-micchāim na u gahane 1139011 (1938) [ पूर्वगृहीतं च कर्म परिणामवशेन मिश्रतां नयेत् ।
इतरेतरभाव वा सम्यक्-मिथ्यात्वे न तु ग्रहणे ॥ ३९० ॥ (१९३८) Pūrvagrihîtam ca karma pariņāmavašena miśratām nayet i Itaretarabhāvam vă samyak-mithyātve na tu grabaņe 1139011(1938)]
Trans.--390 A pre-apprehended Karma may attain the composite state, on account of fruition or may alternately turn itself true or false. But ( that is ) not ( so) at the time of ( new ) apprehension. ( 1939 )
टीका-'वा' इत्यथवा, एतदद्यापि संभाव्यते यत्-पूर्व गृहीतं पूर्व बद्धं मिथ्यात्वलक्षणं कर्म परिणामवशात् पुञ्जत्रयं कुर्वन् मिश्रतां सम्यग्-मिथ्यात्वपुञ्जरूपा प्रापयेदिति इतरेतरभावं वा नयेत् सम्यक्त्वं मिथ्यात्वं वेति । इदमुक्तं भवति-पूर्वबद्धान मिथ्यात्वपुद्गलान् विशुद्धपरिणामः सन् शोधयित्वा सम्यक्त्वरूपतां नयेत्, अविशुद्धपरिणामस्तु रसमुत्कर्ष नीत्वा सम्यक्त्वपुद्गलान् मिथ्यात्वपुञ्जे संक्रमय्य मिथ्यात्वरूपतां नयेत् , इति पूर्वगृहीतस्य

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.: 443 : सत्तावर्तिनः कर्मण इंदं कुर्यात् । ग्रहणकाले पुनर्न मिश्रं पुण्यपापरूपतया संकीर्णस्वभावं कर्म बनाति, नापीतरदितररूपतां नयतीति ॥३९०॥ (१९३८)
D. C.—The composite state of Karma could be explained in this way also:--A Karma which is apprehended previously may attain s'ubha, a-s'ubha or mis'ra condition or it may also turn itself better or worse. The later pure parināmas would purify the previous evil pudgalas and turn them right, while on the other hand, impure pariņāmas would spoil the previous virtuous pudgalas by means of excessive heights of sentiments etc and turn them guile. Thirdly, the pariņāmas which are half-way between purity and impurity, would turn the Karma into a composite state of virtue and vice.
In this way, with regard to Karma of former existence, three states-viz s'ubha, a-s'ubha and s'ubhās'ubha-are possible. But, at the time of new apprehension of Karma, the parināma is not able to form a composite Karma of punya and pāpa combined together and hence there are only two states. ll 390 II ( 1938)
Now, the process of changing virtue into vice, and vide versa referred to above, is explained as follows:मोत्तूण आउयं खलु देसणमोहं चरित्तमोहं च । HANİ 201$ui 3 af FEAT HETT 11388 11 (8878) Mottuna āuyam khalu damsanamoham carittamoham ca i Sesāņam pagaîņam uttaravihisamkamo bhajjo u 391 11 ( 1939 ) [मुक्त्वाऽऽयुष्कं खलु दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च ।
शेषाणां प्रकृतीनामुत्तरविधिसंक्रमो भाज्यः ॥ ३९१ ॥ (१९३९) Muktvå ayuskam khalu darśanamoham cãritra moham ca i Soşanām praksitînāmuttaravidhisamkramo bhäjyah 11 391 (1939)]
Trans.-391 Excepting the ( constituents belonging to )

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.: 444 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The ninth āyuh, infatuation of darśana, ( undifferentiated knowledge and infatuation of caritra (right conduct ), transformations of the latter parts of the remaining characteristics should be accepted. ( 1939)
टीका-इह ज्ञानावरणादिमूलप्रकृतीनामन्योन्यं संक्रमः कदापि न भवत्येव, उत्तरप्रकृतीनां तु निजनिजमूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नानां परस्परं भवतीति । तत्र चायं विधिः-" मोत्तूण आउयं " इति जातिप्रधानो निर्देश इति बहुवचनमत्र द्रष्टव्यम्-चत्वार्यायूंषि मुक्त्वेति । एकस्या आयुर्लक्षणाया निजमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नानामपि चतुर्णामायुषामन्योय संक्रमो न भवतीति तद्वर्जनम् । तथा, दर्शनमोहं चारित्रमोहं च मुक्त्वा; एकस्या मोहनीयलक्षणायाः स्वमूलप्रकृतेरभिन्नयोरपि दर्शनमोह-चारित्रमोहयोरन्योन्यं संक्रमो न भवतीत्यर्थः । उक्तशेषाणां तु प्रकृतीनाम् , कथंभूतानाम् ? इत्याह-"उत्तरविहि त्ति" विधयो भेदाः, उत्तरे च ते विधयश्चोत्तरेविधय उत्तरभेदास्तद्भूतानामुत्तरप्रकृतिरूपाणामिति तात्पर्यम् । किम् ? इत्याह-संक्रमो भाज्यो भजनीयः । ____ भजना चैवं द्रष्टव्या-याः किल ज्ञानावरणपश्चक-दर्शनावरणनवककषायषोडशक-मिथ्यात्व-भय-जुगुप्सा-तैजस-कार्मण-वर्णादिचतुष्का-गुरुलघू-पघात-निर्माणा-ऽन्तरायपञ्चकलक्षणाः सप्तचत्वारिंशद् ध्रुवबन्धिन्य उत्तरप्रकृतयः, तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नानामन्योन्यं संक्रमः सदैव भवति; यथा ज्ञानावरणपञ्चकान्तर्वर्तिनि मतिज्ञानावरणे श्रुतज्ञानावरणादीनि, तेष्वपि मतिज्ञानावरणं संक्रामतीत्यादि । यास्तु शेषा अध्रुवबन्धिन्यस्तासां निजैकमूलप्रकृत्यभेदवर्तिनीनामपि बध्यमानायामबध्यमाना संक्रामति, न त्वबध्यमानायां बध्यमाना; यथा साते बध्यमानेऽसातमबध्यमानं संक्रामति, न तु बध्यमानमबध्यमाने; इत्यादि वाच्यमिति । एष प्रकृतिसंक्रमे विधिः । शेषस्तु प्रदेशादिसंक्रमविधिः “मूलप्रकृत्यभिन्नासु वेद्यमानासु संक्रमः भवति" इत्यादिना स्थानान्तरादवसेय इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेनेति ॥ ३९१ ॥ १९३९ ॥
D. C-The process of prakriti samkrama ( mutual trans formation of various characteristics ) is explained as follows:
+ Ayuh Karma.

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Vada ] Gañadharadavā
.: 445.30 (1) Prakriti-sam krama is not possible in case of original
prakrits like jñānāvarana etc. But in case of characteristics which are acquired later on, mutual transition does take place even though they are not different from their
respective original characteristics. (2) Four varieties of the characteristics of āyuh, and the
infatuations of dars'ana and cāritra ( right conduct ) are exceptions to the above rule. In spite of these prakritis being a-bhinna from their respective original prakritis,
they do not undergo mutual transition. (3) There are 47 uttara-prakrutis, which undergo mutual
transition. They are enumerated as follows:-5 types of prānāvaranas, 9 types of dars'anavaranas, 16 types of dullness; perversion, fear, contempt, the characteristic of lustre, the karmaņa characteristic; 4 characteristics of colour etc; one that is neither too long nor too short; characteristics of destruction and construction; and 5 types of obstructio
All these 47 uttara-prakritis of definite bandha, always undergo mutual transition e.g., out of five types of prānāvaranas noted above, the souti-iānāvarana could be transformed into mato-jñānāvarana and vice versa.
In case of other prakritis that have not been actually bound up, one that has no proper bandha may be transformod into one having proper bandha, but the process does not work vice versa, i. e. a prakriti of proper bundha does not change into a prakriti without bandha.
This is the process of prakriti-samkrama. The process of transition in case of other prades'as ete is understood from the sentence:
“ Mūla prakrityabhinnāsu vedyamānäsu sumkraniah bhavati" eto. implying that when they are known to be similar to the original prakritis they undergo transformation. Il 391 || ( 1939)

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•: 446 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
The separate characteristics of punya and papa are _explained—
now
सोहणवण्णाइगुणं सुभाणुभावं च जं तयं पुण्णं । विवरीयमओ पावं न बायरं नाइसुहुमं च ॥ ३९२ ॥ (१९४०)
Sohanavanṇaiguṇam subhānubhavam ca jam tayam punnam Vivarîyamao pāvam na bāyaram nāisuhumam ca || 392 || (1940)
[ शोभन वर्णादिगुणं शुभानुभावं च यत् तत् पुण्यम् ।
विपरीतमतः पापं न बादरं नातिसूक्ष्मं च ॥ ३९२ ( १९४० ) Sobhanavarṇadiguṇam s'ubhanubhavam ca yat tat punyam Viparitamatah pāpam na badaram natisukşmam ca ॥392 (1940)]
Trans.-392 (A karma) possessed of properties like bright colour etc and good fruition is called punya. Papa is ( exactly) opposite to it. ( Both of them are ) neither too huge nor too subtle. ( 1940 )
टीका - शोभनाः शुभा वर्णादयो वर्ण- गन्ध-रस - स्पर्शलक्षणा गुणा यस्य तच्छोभनवर्णादिगुणम्, तथा यच्छुभानुभावं शुभविपाकमित्यर्थः, तत् पुण्यमभिधीयते । यत् पुनरतः पुण्याद् विपरीतलक्षणम् - अशुभवर्णादिगुणम्, अशुभविपाकं चेत्यर्थः, तत् पापमुच्यते । एतच्चोभयमपि कथं भूतम् १ इत्याहन मेर्वादिभावेन परिणतस्कन्धवदतिबादरम्, सूक्ष्मेण कर्मवर्गणाद्रव्येण निष्पन्नत्वात् ; नापि परमाण्वादिवदतिसूक्ष्ममिति ॥ ३९२ ॥। १९४० ॥
D. C.-A. Karma having splendid colours, odour, taste, and touch, is known as punya. Papa is opposite to punya. So, its colour etc. are dull and has no good fruition. Both of them are neither too huge like Meru etc nor too minute like paramāņu, because they are produced by the multiplication of various karmas. ॥ 392 ॥ 1940 )
गिoes तज्जोगं चिय रेणुं पुरिसो जहा कयब्भंगो । एगक्खेत्तोगाढं जीवो सवप्पएसेहिं ॥ ३९३ ॥ ( १९४१ )

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Gaṇadharavada
Ginhai tajjogam ciya renum puriso jahā kayabbhango Egakkhettogādham jivo savvappaesehim ॥ 393 ॥ ( 1941 ) [ गृहाति तद्योग्यमेव रेणुं पुरुषो यथा कृताभ्यङ्गः । एक क्षेत्रावगाढं जीवः सर्वप्रदेशैः ॥ ३९३ ॥ ( १९४१ )
• 447:
Grinhati tadyogyameva renum puruso yatha kṛitabhyangaḥ | Ekaksetrāvagādham jivah sarva- pradeśain ॥ 393 || ( 1941 ) ]
Trans.-393 Just as a person besmeared with oil, catches dust from the same region, the Soul also catches (a substance) which is worthy of that (Karma), and situated in the same region, by means of all ( its ) regions. ( 1941 )
"
टीका - तस्य पुण्य-पापात्मकस्य कर्मणो योग्यमेव कर्मवर्गणागतं द्रव्यं जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु परमाण्वादिकम् औदारिकादिवर्गणागतं वाऽयोग्यमित्यर्थः । तदप्येक क्षेत्रावगाढमेव गृह्णाति, न तु स्वावगाढप्रदेशेभ्यो भिन्नप्रदेशावगाढमित्यर्थः । तच्च यथा तैलादिकृताभ्यङ्गः पुरुषो रेणुं गृह्णाति तथा राग-द्वेषक्लिन्नस्वरुपो जीवोऽपि गृह्णाति, न तु निर्हेतुकमिति भावः । इदं च सर्वैरपि स्वप्रदेशैर्जीवो गृह्णाति, न तु कैश्चिदित्यर्थः । उक्तं च
एगपएसो गाढं सबपएसेहिं कम्मुणो जोग्गं । बंध जहुत्त हे साइयमणाइयं वाचि ॥ १ ॥
उपशमश्रेणेः प्रतिपतितो मोहनीयादिकं कर्म सादि बनाति, शेषस्त्वनवाप्तोपशमश्रेणिर्जीवोऽनाद्येव बनातीत्यर्थ इति ।। ३९३ ॥ ( १९४१ )
D. C.-The Soul catches only that substance which suits multitudes of papa-karmas and punya-karmas. So, it does not apprehend those like paramāņus and audariku etc. which. are absolutely unfit. Secondly, the Soul accepts those substances only, if they are situated in the same region as that of the Soul and none else. So, just as a person besmeared with oil etc catches dust, the Soul also being affected by rāga-dveṣa etc, catches purposely a proper substance by the help of all its regions.

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•: 448 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The ninth
It has therefore been said that, * Egapaesogadham sarvapaesehim kammuño joggam 1 Bandhai jahuttaheum sāiyamaņaiyam vāvi Il [ Ekapradeśavagadham sarvapradesaiḥ karmano yogyam | Badhnati yathoktahetu sadikamanadikam vapi ] ॥ 393 ॥(1941)
At this stage, the opponent raises an objectionअविसिट्ठपोग्गलघणे लोए थूणतणुकम्मपविभागो। जुज्जेज, गहणकाले सुभा-ऽसुभविवेयणं कत्तो ?॥३९४॥ (१९४२) Avisitthapoggalaghane löe thūnatanukammapavibhāgo i Jujjejja gahanakāle subha'subhaviveyanam katto ? ॥ 394 ॥ (1942) [ अविशिष्टपुद्गलघने लोके स्थूलतनुकर्मप्रविभागः।।
युज्येत, ग्रहणकाले शुभा-ऽशुभविवेचनं कुतः ? ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२) Aviśıstapudgalaghane loke sthūlatanukarmapravibhāgaḥ | Yujyeta, grahanakale śubhāśubhavivecanam kutah? 11394||(1942)] ___ Trans.-394 In ( the midst of ) the world which is crowded with common pudgalas, divisions of coarse ( sthila) and subtle (Suksma) karmas would be justified ; ( but ) at the time of apprehension, how would the distinction of auspicious and inauspicious be justified. ( 1942 )
___टीका-नन्वविशिष्टैः प्रत्याकाशप्रदेशमनन्तानन्तः शुभा-ऽशुभादिभेदेनाव्यवस्थितैः पुद्गलैघनो निरन्तरं व्याप्तोऽयं लोकः । ततश्च ग्रहणकाले गृह्णतो जीवस्य स्थूल-सूक्ष्मकर्मप्रविभागो युज्येत; ततो "न बायरं नाइसुहुमं च" इति विशेषणमुपपन्नम् , एतद्विशेषणविशिष्टादन्यस्य स्वभावत एव जीवैरग्रहणात् । यत्तु शुभाशुभविवेचनं तत् समयमात्ररूपे कर्मग्रहणकाले तत्क्षण एव गृह्णतो जीवस्य कुतः संभाव्यते ?-न कुतश्चिदिति परस्याभिप्रायः । ततश्च “ सोहणवण्णाइगुणं " इत्यादि विशेषणं न युज्यत इति प्रेरकाकूतमिति ॥ ३९४ ॥ (१९४२)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 449 : D. C.--This world is entirely filled with multitudes of common pudgalas scattered in all etherial regions without any distinction of s'ubha and a-s'ubha. When hîva apprehends these pudgalas it is able to recognize them as neither too sthūla, nor too sūksma, as jāva is not able to recognize sthūla and sūksma pudgalas.
In such a case, it is possible that jîva is able to understand the distinction of sthūla and sūkşma. But how is the distinction of s'ubha and a-s'ubha justified when jîva tries to apprehend the Karmca-pudgalas ? ॥ 394 ॥ ( 1942 )
The reply is अविसिटुं चिय तं सो परिणामा-ऽऽसयसभावओ खिप्पं । कुरुते सुभमसुभं वा गहणे जीवो जहाहारं ॥३९५॥ (१९४३) Avisittham ciya tam so parināmā-"sayasabhāvao khippam i Kurute subhamasubham vā gahane jîvo jahāhāram 1395|1 (1943) [ अविशिष्टमेव तत् स परिणामा-ऽऽश्रयस्वभावतः क्षिप्रम् ।
कुरुते शुभमशुभं वा ग्रहणे जीवो यथाऽऽहारम् ॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३) Avisistaneva tat sa parināmā”-śrayasvabhāvataḥ ksipram 1 Kurute subhamasubham vagrahanejivoyatha"-hāram 13950(1943)]
Trans.-395 It is common no doubt. ( But ) at the time of apprehension, the Soul turns it into śubha or a-śubha immediately, by virtue of its nature of resort and fruition as in case of food. ( 1943 )
टीका-स जीवस्तत्कर्म ग्रहणे ग्रहणकाले शुभा-ऽशुभादिविशेषणाविशिष्टमपि गृह्णन क्षिप्रं तत्क्षणमेव शुभमशुभं वा कुरुते-शुभा-ऽशुभविभागेन व्यवस्थापयतीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह-"परिणामाऽऽसयसभावउ ति" इहाश्रयो द्विविधकर्मणो जीव आश्रयः, कर्म तु शुभाशुभत्वस्य तस्य द्विविधस्याप्याश्रयस्य स्वभाव आश्रयस्वभावः, परिणामाश्चाश्रयस्वभावश्च परिणामा
·

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•:450:
Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The ninth ऽऽश्रयस्वभावौ, ताभ्यामेतत् कुरुते जीवः । इदमुक्तं भवति-जीवस्य यः शुभोऽशुभो वा परिणामोऽध्यवसायस्तद्वशाद् ग्रहणसमय एव कर्मणः शुभत्वमशुभत्वं वा जनयति; तथा जीवस्यापि कर्माश्रयभूतस्य स कोऽपि स्वभावो ऽस्ति येन शुभा-ऽशुभत्वेन परिणमयन्नेव कर्म गृह्णाति; तथा, कर्मणोऽपि शुभा- शुभभावाद्याश्रयस्य स स्वभावः-स कश्चिद् योग्यताविशेषोऽस्ति, येन शुभा-ऽशुभपरिणामान्वितजीवेन गृह्यमाणमेवैतद्रूपतया परिणमति । उपलक्षणं चैतत् ; प्रकृति-स्थित्य-ऽनुभागवैचित्र्यम् , प्रदेशानामल्प-बहुभागवैचित्र्यं च जीवः कर्मणो ग्रहणसमय एव सर्व करोतीति । उक्तं च
गहणसमयम्मि जीवो उप्पाएइ गुणे सपच्चयओ सवजियाणंतगुणे कम्मपएसेसु सवेसु ॥१॥ आउयभागो थोवो नामे गोए समो तओ अहिगो । आवरणमंतराए सरिसो अहिगो य मोहे वि ॥ २ ॥ सव्वुवरि वेयणीए भागो अहिगो उ कारणं किंतु । सुह-दुक्खकारणत्ता ठिई विसेसेण सेसासु ॥ ३ ॥ इति ॥
॥ ३९५ ॥ (१९४३) D. C.-Although these multitudes of Karmas are not distinguished as s'ubha or a-s'ubha originally at the time of apprehension, jiva in mediately turns them s'ubha or a-s'ubha on account of pariņāma as well as ās'raya. Jiva is the ās'raya of Karma which again is the as'raya of s'ubhatva and a-s'ubhatva. By the help of this ās'raya svabhāva as well as the pariņāma, jîva apprehends Karma. So, at the time ef apprehension, s'ubhatva or a-s'ubhatva of Karmas depends upon s'ubha or a-s'ubha pariņama produced by jîva.
Jîva apprehends karma as s'ubha or a-s'ubha by virtue of its ās'raya-svabhāva. So, when Karma is apprehended by Jiva accompanied by s'ubha or a-s'ubha parināma, it is recognized either as s'ubha or a-s'ubha karma. As in the case of āhāra,

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Vada]
Gaṇadharavada
the karma-pudgalas also immediately undergo change in their original nature in the present condition and the future consequences. In the same way, small or big portions of various regions of Karma-pudgalas also undergo immediate changes. It has therefore been laid down that:
Gahana samayammi jîva uppãei gune sa-paccayao Sarvajiyanantagune kammapaese su savvesu || 1 || Ayuyabhago thovo name goe samo tao ahigo | Avaraṇamantarae sariso ahigo ya mohevi || 2 || Savvuvari Veyanie bhago ahigo in karaṇam kintu | Suha-dukkhakaranatta thiî visesena sesasu || 3 ||
66
•: 451 :.
[Grahanasamaye jiva utpadayati gunan svapratyayataḥ | Sarvajitanantagunan karma pradeseṣu sarveṣu | 1 || Ayuskabhagaḥ stoko namni gotre samastato'dhikaḥ Avarane'ntaraye sadriśo'dhikaśca mohe'pi | 2 | Sarvopari Vedanîye bhago'dhikastu kāraṇam kintu | Sukha-duḥkha karaṇatvat sthitir višeṣena sesasu 131395 (1943)]
The example of āhāra stated above is explained in details as follows:
परिणामा -ऽऽसयवसओ घेणूए जहा पओ विसमहिस्स । तुल्लो वि तदाहारो तह पुण्णा - पुण्णपरिणामो ॥ ३९६ ॥ (१९४४)
Parināmā "sayavasao dhenue jahā pao visamahissa | Tullo vi tadāhāro taha punna-'punna parināmo u 396 (1944) [ परिणामा - श्रयवशतो धेन्वा यथा पयो विषमहेः ।
gensfq agierezaur goa1-sgoaqfkura: || 39€ || (2988) Parinama-"srayavasato dhenva yatha payo viṣamaheḥ Tulyo'pi tadaharastatha punya-'punyapariņāmaḥ | 396 || (1944)]
Trans.-396 By virtue of fruition and (the object of) resort, just as the food of cow and serpent although same

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results as milk ( in case of cow ) and as poison ( in case of serpent ), so also, the result ( in case ) of punya and pāpa is ( different ) ( 1944 )
टीका - " तदाहारो त्ति" तयोरहि -धेन्वोराहारस्तदाहारः स तुल्योऽपि दुग्धादिको गृहीतः परिणामा -ऽऽश्रयवशाद् यथा धेन्वाः पयो दुग्धं भवति, अस्तु स एव विषं विषरूपतया परिणमति, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण पुण्याSपुण्यपरिणामः । इदमुक्तं भवति - अस्ति स कश्चित् तस्याऽऽहारस्य परिणामो येन तुल्योsपि सन्नाश्रयवैचित्र्याद् विचित्रतया परिणमति; आश्रयस्याप्यहिधेनुलक्षणस्यास्ति तत्तद् निजसामर्थ्यम्, येन तुल्योऽपि गृहीत आहारस्तत्तद्रूपतया परिणमते; तथा पुण्यपापयोरुपनययोजना कृतैवेति ॥ ३९६ ॥ (१९४४)
D. C.Although the food of cow and serpent is the same, that of cow results as milk while the same results as poison in case of serpent, on account of the distinction of parināma _and_ ās'raya. So, in spite of āhāras being the same, the result is not the same in both cases, because their as'rayas-Cow and serpent-are different. Like s'ubhā-s'ubha ās'raya, it also depends upon s'ubhā-s'ubha parināma || 396 || (1944)
1
Or, it can be explained in this way also:जह वेगसरीरम् वि सारा - ऽसारपरिणामयामेइ । अविसिट्ठो वाहारो तह कम्मसुभा - सुभाविभागो ॥ ३९७॥ (१९४५)
Jaha vegasarirammi vi sārā'-sāraparināmayāmei | Avisittho vāhāro taha kammasubhā - 'subhavibhāgo ॥ 397 (1945 )
[ यथा वैकशरीरेऽपि सारा - ऽसारपरिणामतामेति ।
अविशिष्ट इवाहारस्तथा कर्मशुभा - शुभविभागः || ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)
Yatha vaikaśarire 'pi sāra'saraparinamatāmeti।
Aviśista ivāharastatha karmaśubha' - śubhavibhagah 397 (1945 ) ]
Trans.-397 Just as the same food results in a substantial or perverted form even in the same body, the distinction of Karma as subha and a-subha would also take place. (1945)

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: 453 :. टीका-धेनु-विषधरयोभिन्ने शरीर आहारस्य परिणामवैचित्र्यं दर्शितम्। 'वा' इत्यथवा, यथैकस्मिन्नपि पुरुषादिशरीरेऽविशिष्टेऽप्येकरूपोऽप्याहारो गृहीतस्तत्क्षण एव सारा-ऽसारपरिणामतामेति-रसा-ऽसृग्-मांसादिरसपरिणामं मूत्र-पुरीषरूपमलपरिणामं च युगपदागच्छतीत्यर्थः, तथा कर्मणोऽप्यविशिष्टस्य गृहीतस्य परिणामा-ऽऽश्रयवशात् शुभा-ऽशुभविभागो द्रष्टव्य इति ॥ ३९७ ॥ (१९४५)
D. C.-Even in case of one and the same body and the same food, the food results either in substantial forms like bile chyle, blood and flesh etc. or in worthless forms like urine, foeces etc. immediately after it has been consumed.
In the same way, s'ubha and a-s'ubha divisions in case of Karma, should also be recognized by reason of distinction of pariņāma and ās'raya. Il 397 11 ( 1945 )
The author now, illustrates the distinction of punya and papa, and establishes their existence by means of āgamas--
सायं सम्म हासं पुरिस-रइ-सुभाउ-नाम-गोत्ताई। पुण्णं, सेसं पावं नेयं सविवागमविवागं ॥ ३९८ ॥ (१९४६) Sāyam sammam hāsam purisa-rai-subhāu-nāma-gottāim i Puņnam, sesam pāvam neyam sa-vivāgamavivāgam 1139811 (1946) [सातं सम्यक्त्वं हास्यं पुरुष-रति-शुभायु-र्नाम-गोत्राणि ।
पुण्यं, शेषं पापं ज्ञेयं सविपाकमविपाकम् ॥ ३९८ ॥ (१९४६) Satam samyaktvam häsyam puruşa-rati-śubhāyurnāma-gotrāni Punyam, sesam pupam jmeyam sa-vipakamavipakam ||398॥ (1946)]
Trans.-398 Comfort, right belief ( samyaktva ), mirth, masculine form love, and virtuous life, name and lineage-all these are known as punya (prakritis ). The rest should be known as pāpa (prakritis). (Both of them may be) with or without fruition. ( 1940 )

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[ The ninth
टीका - सातावेदनीयम्, शोधितमिध्यात्वपुद्गलरूपं सम्यक्त्वम्, हास्यम्, पुरुषवेद:, रतिः, शुभायुः, नाम - गोत्राणि चेत्येतत् सर्वं पुण्यमभिधीयते । तत्र नारकायुर्वर्जं शेषमायुस्त्रयं शुभम् देवद्विक - यशः - कीर्ति तीर्थकर नामाद्याः सप्तत्रिंशत् प्रकृतयो नामकर्मणि शुभाः, गोत्रे पुनरुचैर्गोत्रं शुभम् । एताः षट्चत्वारिंशत् प्रकृतयः किल शुभत्वात् पुण्यम् । अन्ये तु मोहनीयभेदान् सर्वानपि जीवस्य विपर्यासहेतुत्वात् पापमेव मन्यन्ते । ततः सम्यक्त्व - हास्य - पुरुषवेद - रतिवर्जा द्विचत्वारिंशदेव प्रकृतयः पुण्यम् ; तद्यथा
454:
सायं उच्चागोयं नर- तिरि - देवाउयाई तह नामे | देवदुगं मणुयदुगं पणिदजाई य तणुपणगं ॥ १ ॥ अंगोवंगाण तिगं पढमं संघयणमेव संठाणं । सुभवण्णाइच के अगुरुलहू तह य परघायें ॥ २ ॥ ऊसासं आयावं उज्जीय विहगगई वि य पसत्था | तस - बायर - पत्तं पत्तेय थिरं सुभं सुभगं ॥ ३ ॥ सुस्सर आज जसं निम्मिण तित्थयरमेव एयाओ । बायालं पगईओ पुष्णं ति जिणेहिं भणिआओ ॥ ४ ॥
"
भणितशेषास्तु या व्यशीतिप्रकृतयस्तत् सर्वमशुभत्वात् पापं विज्ञेयम् । सम्यक्त्वं कथमशुभम् - कथं तत् पापम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते - रुचिरूपमेव हि सम्यक्त्वं शुभं तच्चेह न विचार्यते, किन्तु शोधितमिथ्यात्वपुद्गलरूपम्, तच्च शङ्काद्यनर्थहेतुत्वादशुभमेव अशुभत्वाच्च पापम् । सम्यग्रुचेश्चातिशयेनानावारकत्वादुपचारमात्र एवेदं सम्यक्त्वमुच्यते, परमार्थतस्तु मिथ्यात्वमेवैतत् । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन । इदं च पुण्य-पापलक्षणमुभयमपि सविपाकमविपाकं च मन्तव्यम् - यथा बद्धं तथैव विपाकतः किञ्चिद् वेद्यते किञ्चित्तु मन्दरसं नीरसं वा कृत्वा प्रदेशोदयेनाविपाकं वेद्यत इत्यर्थः । तदेवं पुण्यं पापं च भेदेन व्यवस्थाप्य निरस्तः संकीर्णपुण्य-पापपक्षः ।
>
इतश्चायमयुक्तः - सर्वस्यापि सन्मित्रसुख - दुःखाख्यकार्यप्रसङ्गात् ; न चैतदस्ति देवादीनां केवलसुखाधिक्यदर्शनात्, नारकादीनां केवलदुःखप्राचुर्यनिर्णयात् । न च सर्वथा सन्मित्रैकरूपस्य हेतोरल्प - बहुत्वभेदेऽपि
"

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: 455 :कार्यस्य प्रमाणतोऽल्प-बहुत्वं विहाय स्वरूपतो भेदो युज्यते । न हि मेचककारणप्रभवं कार्यमन्यतमवर्णोत्कटं घटते । तस्मात् सुखातिशयस्यान्यद् निमित्तम् , अन्यच्च दुःखातिशयस्येति । न च सर्वथैकरूपस्य संकीर्णपुण्यपापलक्षणस्य हेतोः सुखातिशयनिबन्धनं पुण्यांशवृद्धिदुःखातिशयकारणपापांशहान्या सुखातिशयप्रभावाय कल्पयितुं न्याय्या, पुण्यांश-पापांशयोर्भेद प्रसङ्गात् । तथाहि-यद् वृद्धावपि यद् न वर्धते तत् ततो भिन्नम् ; यथा देवदत्तवृद्धावप्यवर्धमानो यज्ञदत्तः, न वर्धते च पुण्यांशवृद्धौ पापांशः, तस्मात् ततो भिन्नोऽसाविति । तस्माद् न सर्वथैकरूपता पुण्य-पापांशयोर्घटते । कर्मसामान्यरूपतया तु यद्यसो तयोरिष्यते तदा सिद्धसाध्यता, सात-यश:-कीर्त्यादेः पुण्यस्य, असाता-ऽयश:-ऽकीादेस्तु पापस्यास्माभिरपि कर्मत्वेनैकताया अभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् पुण्य-पापरूपतया विविक्ते एव पुण्य-पापे स्त इति । ततः सुख-दुःखवैचित्र्यनिबन्धनयोः पुण्य-पापयोर्यथोक्तनीत्या साधितत्वाद् न कर्तव्यस्तत्संशयः ॥ ३९८ (१९४६)
D. C.---(1) There are 46 characteristics which are s'ubha and are hence known as punya-praakrrites. They are enumerated as follows:
Bestowing of gift; propriety of conduct etc purged of all impurities; mirth; masculine form; affection; the three types of ayus ( union or connection with body viz-divine, human, and toryanca, ) thirty-seven prakritis of Nāma Karma (including birth as a Tîrthankara ) and the noble lineage.
(2) According to others, there are 42 prakratis under the category of punya. They insist that samyaktva, purusaveda, hāsya and rati are pāpa-prakritis when they are contrary to the nature of jîva. Excepting these four prakritis, the remaining 42 prakritis are laid down by them as underSayam uccāgoyam nara-tiri-devāuyāim taha nāve Devaduganm manuyadugam paninda-jal ya tanupanagam ॥ 1 ॥ Angovarigāņa tigam padhamam sanghayanameva santhānam i Subhavanņāicaukkamagurulabū taha ya paraghiyam 112

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Ūsásam ayāvam ujjoya vihagagal vi ya pasattha | Tasa-bāyara-pajjattam patteya thiram subhan subhagam 11 3 11 Sussara aejja jasam nimini titthayarameva eyão 1 Bayalam pagaso punnam ti Jinehuu bhanião 11 4 11 [ Sātamuccair-gotram nara-tiryag-devāyuşkāņi tathā nādni 1 Devadvikam manujadvikam pancendriyajátiś ca tanupancakam 11111 Angopāngānām trikam prathamam sanhananameva sansthānam | Subhavarnādı catuṣkamagurulaghu tathāca parāghātam 11 2 11 Uochvāsa ātāpa uddyoto vibāyogatirapi prasastā / Trasa-bādara-paryāptam pratyekam sthiram śubham subhagam11311 Susvaramadeyan yaso nirmāņam tairthakaramevaitāḥ I Dvicatvāriņśat praksitayaḥ punyamiti Jinairbhanitāḥ 11 4 11 ]
The remaining 82 prakritīs are recognized by them as pūpa-prakırtas.
If someone raises a question at this point that how would samyaktva be called pāpa-prakritz ? The answer would be this-The virtuous samyaktva whose natural inclination is undoubtedly s'ubhu, is not referred to in this case. The pudgalas that are classed under samyaktva, though purged out of all perversions, are a-s'ubha because of the evil elements like doubt etc. being present in them. So, they come under the category of pāpa.
The purified pudgalas do not very much obstruct the nature of samyaktva. But they are classed under samyaktua merely by means of upacara, and really speaking they belong to the category of mithyātva.
(3) Both-punya and pāpa-should either have fruition or no fruition. Hence, some Karmas are recognized in their original form on account of their vipākas, while others have either scanty juice ( rasa ) or no juice at all, and hence have very little vipāka. So, pāpa and punyu are recognized by virtue of their various regions of parıņāmu, and are distinguished from each other, on account of their mutually opposite qualities.

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Gañadharavada
: 457
(4) The view that punya and pāpa exist in a combined state, is absolutely unfounded. Secondly, if Karma which acts as the cause of happiness and misery, was taken to exist in a composite state, all the living beings would undergo happiness as well as misery at the same time. But it does not happen so in reality. For, gods have almost everything of happiness and nāralas are always buried in absolute misery. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons of abundant happiness and abundant misery are different from each other Thirdly, if there is one composite entity of punya and pāpa, the theory that increase of punya causes abundance of happiness or that abundance of happiness is produced by the absolute removal of pāpa, would become null and void. Because, that which does not increase with the increase in another, is different from another. Yajnadatta who does not grow fat with the growth of Devadatta is different from Devadatta. The uniform oneness of punya and pāpa is, therefore, not at all proper. If their oneness is believed on the assumption of Karma being common in both, there would be no difficulty.
But so far as an individual is concerned, know it for certain that punya and papa are separate from each other as proved above, and hence 0 Bhadra ! it is not worthy of you to raise any doubt about it. Il 398 H ( 1946 )
Referring to the commandments of Vedas, the author statesअसइ बहि पुन्न-पावे जमग्गिहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स । OCH HET GROTE GT3T1FH 11 38811 (8886 ) Asai bahi punna-pāve jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa i Tadasambaddham savvain dāņāiphalam ca lòammi il 399 II (1947) [ असतोर्बहिः पुण्य-पापयोरग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्धं सर्व दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ३९९ ॥ (१९४७ ) Asatorbahih puạya-pāpayoragnihotrādi svargakāmasya | Tadasambaddham sarvam dānādiphalam ca loke 1139911 (1947)]
58

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Trans. – 399 In ( case of ) punya and pāpa being absent, the commandment of the performance of the sacrifice etc. (prescribed) for one who aspires for Salvation, would become useless. Moreover, all sorts of fruition ( of the good turn ) like munificence etc, (welknown) in the world would also become null and void. ( 1947 )
9
टीका - पुण्य-पापयोरसच्चे यदेतद् वहिरग्निहोत्राद्यनुष्ठानं स्वर्गकामस्य, यच्च दान- हिंसादिफलं पुण्य-पापात्मकं लोके प्रसिद्धं तत् सर्वमसंबद्धं स्यात्, स्वर्गस्यापि पुण्यफलत्वात्, पुण्य-पापयोश्च भवदभिप्रायेणासत्वात् तस्मादभ्युपगन्तव्ये एव पुण्य-पापे । तदेवं वेदवचनप्रामाण्यात्, युक्तितश्च च्छिन्नस्तस्य संशय इति ।। ३९९ ॥ (१९४७ )
1
D. C.—If there were no punya-pāpa in this world, the commandment of the Vedas that one who aspires for Salvation should perform agnihotra etc, would be of no value. Moreover, the results of actions like dana and himsā in the forms of punya and papa respectively which are welknown in this world, would all be futile. Hence, take it for granted that punya and pāpa are existing, and leave off all your doubts. 399 (1947)
Thus,
छिन्नम्म संसयम्मी जिणेण जर मरणविषयमुक्केणं । सो समणो पवइओ तिहि ओ सहखंडियस एहिं ॥ ४००॥ (१९४८)
Chinnammi samsayammi Jinena jara-maraṇavippamukkeṇam So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim || 400 || ( 1948 ) [ छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा - मरणविप्रमुक्तेन |
स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः || ४०० ।। ( १९४८ ) Chinne samśaye Jinena jara-maraṇavipramuktena | Sa śramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikaśataih ||400 (1948)]
Trans. – 400 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksā along with his three hundred pupils. (1948) End of the Discussion with the Ninth Gaṇadhara.

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Chapter X
दशमगणधरवक्तव्यता।
Discussion with the Tenth Ganadhara ते पवइए सोउं मेअज्जो आगच्छई जिणसयासं । वच्चामि य वंदामी वंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४०१॥ (१९४९) Te pavvaie söum Meajjo āgacchai Jinasayāsam | Vaccami ya vandami vanditta pajjuvāsāmi ॥ 401 ॥ ( 1949 ) [तान् प्रबजितान् श्रुत्वा मेतार्य आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ॥ ४०१ ॥ (१९४९) Tān pravrajitan śrutvā Metārya agacchati Jinasakāšam Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase ॥ 401 ॥ ( 1949)]
Trans.--401 Having heard that they have renounced the world, Metārya, comes before the Tirtharkara. (He thinks-) I may go, pay my homages, and worship him. ( 1949 ) आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवण्णू सवदरिसी णं ॥४०२॥ (१९५०) Abhattho ya Jiņemam jāi-jarā-traranavippamukkeņam i Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam ॥402॥ (1950) [ आभाषितश्च जिनेन जाति-जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ॥ ४०२ ॥ (१९५०)

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
The tenth
Abhāşitaśca Jinena jati-jara-niaraṇavipramuktena 1 Namnā ca gotrena ca sarvajnena sarvadarsini 402 ॥ (1950 ) ]
Trans.-402 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirtharkara, who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had (attained ) complete darsana. ( Undifferentiated knowledge. ) ( 1950 )
The Tirtharikara then said, किं मन्ने परलोओ अस्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसि तेसिमो अत्थो॥४०३॥(१९५१) Kim manne paralöo atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha Veyapayana ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 403 ॥ (1951) [किं मन्यसे परलोकोऽस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।।
वेदपदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः ॥ ४०३॥ (१९५१) Kim manyase paraloko’sti nāstīti samsayastava | Veda-padánām cartham na janāsi teşāmayamarthah 114031(1951)]
Trans.-403 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether the next world exists or not. But ( ca) you have not understood the ( real ) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their (real ) interpretation. (1951)
टीका-आयुष्मन् मेतार्य ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-किं भवान्तर गमनलक्षणः परलोकोऽस्ति, नास्ति वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रुतिनिबन्धनो वर्तते । तानि च " विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः" इत्यादीनि प्रथमगणधरोक्तानि द्रष्टव्यानि। "तेषां चार्थं न जानासि" इत्यादि तथैवेति॥ ४०३ ॥ (१९५१)
D. C.-0 long-lived Metārya! your doubt about the existence of para-loka has arisen from your hearing various Veda-padas bearing contradictory senses.
These Veda-padas are "Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyo"

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
•: 461 :etc. which have already been discussed in the First Ganadhara-vāda ll 403 11 ( 1951 )
The author now states the arguments advanced by the student as follows
मन्नसि जइ चेयपणं मजंगमउ व भयधम्मो त्ति । तो नत्थि परलोगो तन्नासे जेण तन्नासो ॥ ४०४ ॥ (१९५२) Mannasi jai ceyannam majjargamau vya bhūyadhammo tti i To natthi paralogo tannāse jena tannāso il 404 11 ( 1952 ) [ मन्यसे यदि चैतन्यं मद्याङ्गमद इव भूतधर्म इति ।
ततो नास्ति परलोकस्तन्नाशे येन तन्नाशः ॥४०४ ॥ (१९५२) Mangase yadi caitanyam Dadyangamada iva bhūtadharma iti 1 Tato nasti paralokastannase yena tannāsah ॥ 404 ।। ( 1952)]
Trans.-404 If you believe consciousness to be the property of bhūtas, just as intoxication is that of the constituents of wine, the destruction of consciousness being consequent at the destruction of the bhūtas, the other world will not exist. (1952) ____टीका-सौम्य! त्वमेवं मन्यसे-यदि तावचैतन्यं पृथिव्यादिभूतधर्म:भूतेभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतमित्यर्थः, यथा गुड-धातक्यादिमद्याङ्गेभ्योऽनन्तरं मदधर्मः, तर्हि नास्त्यवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोका, येन तन्नाशे भूतनाशे तस्यापि चैतन्यस्य नाशो ध्वंसो जायते । यो हि यदनान्तरभूतो धर्मः स तद्विनाशे नश्यत्येव, यथा पटादिधर्मः शुक्लत्वादिः। ततो भूतैरेव सह प्रागेव नष्टस्य चैतन्यस्य कुतो भवान्तरगमनम् ? इति ।। ४०४ ॥ (१९५२)
D. C.-When you take cartanya as the property of a bhūta like prithvi, it will not be separate from bhūtas, just as the constituents of wine such as jaggery and dhātaki puspa etc. are not different from their property of intoxication. Consequently, when bhūtas meet destruction, their property viz caitanya will also meet destruction, just as whiteness of cloth

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•: 462 :. Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The tenth disappears with the cloth. So, when caitanya vanishes with the bhūtas, how is it to go to the other world ? ||40411 (1952)
Even by taking cartanya as different from bhūtas, the existence of para-loka will not be established अह वि तदत्थंतरया न य निच्चत्तणमओ वि तदवत्थं । अनलस्स वाऽरणीओ भिन्नस्स विणासधम्मस्स ॥४०५॥(१९५३) Aha vi tadatthantarayā na ya niccattanamao vi tadavattham Analassa varanio bhinnassa vināsadhammassa ॥ 405 ॥ ( 1953) [ अथापि तदर्थान्तरता न च नित्यत्वमतोऽपि तदवस्थम् ।
अनलस्येवाऽरणितो भिन्नस्य विनाशधर्मणः ॥ ४०५ ॥ (१९५३) Athäpi tadarthāntaratā na ca nityatvanato'pi tadavasthami Analasyevaranito bhinnasya vinasadharimanah ॥ 405 ॥ ( 1953 )]
Trans.-405 And even if it is different, its perpetuality is not (established). Hence, like fire which is transitory and which is different from arani, it is transitory. ( 1953 )
टीका-अथापि तदर्थान्तरता भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरता चैतन्यस्याभ्युपगम्यते, नन्वतोऽपि तदवस्थं भवान्तरगामित्वाभावलक्षणं दूषणम् ; च शब्दो यस्मादर्थे, यतोऽर्थान्तरभूतस्यापि चैतन्यस्य न नित्यत्वम् । कथंभूतस्योत्पत्तिमत्वेन विनाशधर्मकस्य । कस्य यथाऽनित्यत्वम् ? इत्याह-अनलस्य । कथंभूतस्य ? भिन्नस्य । कस्य ? । अरणीतोऽरणेः। इदमुक्तं भवति-भूतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वेऽप्यनित्यं चैतन्यम्, उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् , अरणिकाष्टोत्पन्नतद्भिन्नानलवदिति, यच्चानित्यं तत् किमपि कालं स्थित्वाऽनलवदत्रापि ध्वंसते, इति न तस्य भवान्तरयायित्वम् , अत इत्थमपि न परलोकसिद्धिरिति ।
___ अथ प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नानि भूतधर्मरूपाणि बहूनि चैतन्यानि नेष्यन्ते, किन्त्वेक एव समस्तचैतन्याश्रयः सर्वत्रिभुवनगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽभ्युपगम्यते यत उक्तम्

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Vada 1 Gañadharavada
.: 463 : " एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः । एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥ १॥"
॥४०५ ।। (१९५३) D. C.-Even if castanya were taken to be different from bhūtas, it would not be able to go to the other world. For, like fire which is different from arani, cartanya is a-nitya, as it dies away after living for sometime.
The existence of para-loka is not established from this point of view also.
Some might not admit the existence of plenty of castanya: related to each and every bhūta, and might admit the existence of one all-pervading niskriya soul as said belowEka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ | Ekadbā bahudhä сaiva dşıśyate jalacandravat 11
[ There exists only one soul pervading each and every bhūta. Like moon ( reflected in ) water, it appears as one, and at the same time in many forms. ] ॥ 405 ॥ ( 1953 )
But even in such a case, there is no scope for para-loka, अह एगो सबगओ निकिरिओ तहवि नत्थि परलोओ। संसरणाभावाओ वोमस्स व सबपिडेसु ॥४०६ ॥ (१९५४) Aha ego savvagao nikkirio tahavi natthi paraloo Samsaraņābhāvāo vomassa va savvapindesu 11 406 II ( 1954 ) [अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्कियस्तथापि नास्ति परलोकः ।
संसरणाभावाद् व्योम्न इव सर्वपिण्डेषु ॥ ४०६ ॥ ( १९५४ ) Athaikaḥ sarvagato nişkriyastathapı násti paralokaḥ Samsaranabhavad vyomna iva sarvapindesu ॥ 406 ॥ ( 1954 )]
___ Trans.-406 If there exists one, all-pervading, inactive ( soul), then also, there would be nothing like para-loka because

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•: 464 :. Jinabhadra Gani's
| The tenth of the lack of movement (on its part ) to all beings ( in spite of its being all-pervading ) like ākāśa. ( 1954 )
टीका-अथैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियश्चात्माऽभ्युपगम्यते, ननु तथापि न परलोकगमनसिद्धिः, तस्यात्मनः सर्वेषु गो-मनुष्यादिपिण्डेषु सर्वगतत्वेन निष्कियत्वेन च संसरणाभावात् , व्योमवदिति ।। ४०६ ॥ ( १९५४ )
D. C.-Even when the existence of one, all-pervading, inactive soul is accepted, the existence of para-loka will not be established. For, like ākās'a, it is niskriya in spite of its being spread over all living beings | 406 11 ( 1954 )
The existence of para-loka can be doubted in this manner alsoइहलोगाओ व परो सुराइलोगो न सो वि पञ्चक्खो। एवं पि न परलोगो सुबइ य सुईसु तो संका ॥४०७॥(१९५५) Ihalogāo va paro surāilogo na so vi paccakkho 1 Evam pi na paralogo suvvai ya sussu to sankā 11 407 11 ( 1955 ) [ इहलोकाद् वा परः सुरादिलोको न सोऽपि प्रत्यक्षः ।
एवमपि न परलोकः श्रूयते च श्रुतिषु ततः शङ्का ॥४०७।। (१९५५) Ihalokád va parah suradiloko na so'pi pratyaksah , Evamapi na paralokah srāyate ca Srutisu tatah saika ||4071(1955)]
____Trans.-407 Or, it there is a world like that of gods etc. other than this world, that is also not directly perceived. So, para-loka does not exist even in that way. On the other hand, it has been heard ( about para-loka) in the śāstras. Consequently, the doubt ( about para-loka ) has arisen. ( 1955 )
टीका-अथवा, इहलोकापेक्षया सुर-नारकादिभवः परलोक उच्यते, स च न प्रत्यक्षो दृश्यते, अत एवमपि न परलोकः सिध्यति, श्रूयते चासौ श्रुतिषु शास्त्रेषु, ततस्तच्छङ्का-किमस्ति नास्ति वा ? । इति दर्शितः पूर्वपक्षः ॥ ४०७ ॥ (१९५५)

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Vada ]
Gañadharavāda
6:465 :
___D. C.-If the existence of some world like that of divine beings or hellish beings, is accepted since they, too, are not pratyaksa, their existence is also not acceptible.
On the other hand, the S'āstras refer to them and tell a lot of things about them. Your doubt about the existence of para-loka is based upon such mutually contradictory facts. ॥ 407 ॥ ( 1955 )
Here ends the pūrva-paksa The author now refutes the arguments of pūrva-paksa one after anotherभूइंदियाइरित्तस्स चेयणा सो य दवओ निच्चो।। जाइस्सरणाईहि पडिवजसु वाउभूइ व ॥४०८॥ (१९५६) Bhūindiyāirittassa ceyanā so ya davvao nicco i Jaissaranaihim padivajjasu Vaubhui vva ॥ 408 ॥ ( 1956)
[ भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य चेतना स च द्रव्यतो नित्यः ।
जातिस्मरणादिभिः प्रतिपद्यस्व वायुभूतिरिव ।। ४०८ ॥ (१९५६ ) Bhūtendriyatiriktasya cetanā sa ca dravyato nityaḥ | Jatismaranadibhih pratipadyasva Vayubhutiriva in 408 ॥ ( 1956)]
___ Trans.-408 Consciousness belongs to ( the soul) which is distinguished from elements, as well as, sense-organs. Like Vayubhūti, know it for certain, therefore, that it is more perpetual than dravya by virtue of its ( power of) remembering the former birth etc. ( 1956 )
टीका-इह भूतेन्द्रियातिरिक्तस्य पूर्वाभिहितानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धस्यात्मन एव संबन्धिनी चेतना मन्तव्या, न भूतधर्मः। स चात्मा जातिस्मरणादिहेतुर्द्रव्यतो नित्य इति वायुभूतिरिव प्रतिपद्यस्व । अतो नैकान्तानित्यत्वपक्षोक्तो दोषः, पर्यायत एवाऽस्यानित्यत्वादिति भावः ॥४०८॥ (१९५६)
D. C.-Cetanā is not the property of bhūtas, but it is the property of Soul, which is different from bhūtas, as well as,

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: 466 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The tenth
indriyas, and the existence of which has already been established by means of anumānas and other evidences. This soul has already by accepted by Vāyubhūti † as more nitya than dravya on account of its power of remembering its (previous) existence etc. You too, shall have to accept its nityatva, so that the fault of exclusive nityatva alleged by you does not arise. ॥ 408 ॥ ( 1956)
And, न य एगो सवगओ निकिरिओ लक्खणाइभेआओ। कुंभादउ व बहवो पडिवज्ज तर्मिदभूइ व ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७) Na ya ego savvagao nikkirio lakkhanāibheão i Kumbhādau vva baliavo padivajja tamindabhūi vva 1140911 (1957) [न चैकः सर्वगतो निष्क्रियो लक्षणादिभेदात् ।।
कुम्भादय इव बहवः प्रतिपद्यस्व तदिन्द्रभूतिरिव ।। ४०९ ॥ (१९५७) Na caikaḥ sarvagato nişkriyo lakṣaṇadibhedát | Kumbhādaya iva bahavaḥ pratipadyasva tadinadribhūtiriva 11409||
Trans.-409 It is neither one, nor all-pervading, nor inactive. Like Indrabhūti, believe it as many (in number) like ghata etc. by reason of various characteristics. ( 1957)
टीका-न चास्माभिरेक आत्मेष्यते, किन्तु बहवः-अनन्ताः। कुतः ?। लक्षणभेदात् । उपयोगलक्षणो हि जीवः, स चोपयोगो राग-द्वेष-कषायविषयाध्यवसायादिभिर्भिद्यमान उपाधिभेदादानन्त्यं प्रतिपद्यत इत्यनन्ता जीवाः, लक्षणभेदात् , घटादिवदिति । तथा, न सर्वगत आत्मा, किन्तु शरीरमात्रव्यापकः, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेरित्यादिशब्दोपात्तो हेतुः, स्पर्शनवदिति दृष्टान्तश्च । एवं न निष्क्रिय आत्मा, भोक्तृत्वात् , देवदत्तवदिति । तदेतदिन्द्रभूतिप्रथमगणधरवत् प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४०९ ॥ (१९५७)
D. C.-According to us, Soul is not one, but infinite in † Vide Chap III

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.:467:.
Vada ]
Gañadharadava number, by virtue of its different characteristics. Like ghata, pața etc, the Soul has various forms on account of various laksanas such as rāga, dveşa, kaşāya etc. Secondly, Soul is not all-pervading, but it pervadas the body alone. Thirdly, because it is the enjoyer like Devadatta, it is not niskriya. Thus, like Indrabhūte,t you, too, shall have to admit 1140911 (1957)
In reply to the argument that the existence of para-lokuu is denied because of the divine and hellish beings being a-pratyaksa, the author statesइहलोगाओ य परो सोम्म ! सुरा नारगा य परलोओ। पडिवज मोरिआ-ऽकंपिउ व विहियप्पमाणाओ॥४१०॥ (१९५८) Ihalogāo ya paro Somma! surā nāragā ya paraloo I Padivajja Moriā-"kampiu vva vihiyappamānão 11 410 11 ( 1958 ) [ इहलोकाच परः सौम्य ! सुरा नारकाश्च परलोकः ।
प्रतिपद्यस्व मौर्या-ऽकम्पिताविव विहितप्रमाणात् ॥४१० ॥ (१९५८) Ihalokácca parah Saumya ! surā nārakāsca paralokaḥ | Pratipadyasva Maurya'kampitaviva vihitapramanat ॥4100(1958)]
Trans.-410 Believe the world other than this, O Saumya! to be that of gods and Nārakas on account of evidences that have been advanced ( in case ) of Maurya and Akampita.* (1958)
The opponent will argue at this point thatजीवो विण्णाणमओ तं चाणिचं ति तो न परलोगो। अह विण्णाणादण्णो तो अणभिण्णो जहागासं ॥४११॥(१९५९) इत्तो च्चिय न स कत्ता भोत्ता य अओ वि नत्थि परलोगो । जं च न संसारी सो अण्णाणा-ऽमुत्तिओ खं व ॥४१२॥(१९६०)
+ Vide Chapter 1 * Vide chapters VII and VIII,

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: 468 :___Jinabhadra Gani's
(The tenth Jivo vinnānamao tam cāniccam ti to na paralogo Aha vinnānādanno to anabhinno jahāgāsam 411 ॥ ( 1959 ) Itto cciya na sa kattā bhottā ya ao vi natthi paralogo i Jam ca na samsārî so annānā-'muttio kham va 11 412 u ( 1960 ) [जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तञ्चानित्यमिति ततो न परलोकः ।
अथ विज्ञानादन्यस्ततोऽनभिज्ञो यथाऽऽकाशम् ॥ ४११ ॥ (१९५९) इत एव न स कर्ता भोक्ता चातोऽपि नास्ति परलोकः ।
यच्च न संसारी सोऽज्ञाना-ऽमूर्तित खमिव ॥ ४१२ ।। (१९६०) Jîvo vijñāmayastaccanityamiti tato na paralokah, Atha, vijñānādanyastato’nabhijio yatha’-kāśam u 411 || ( 1959 ) ] Ita eva na sa kartā bhoktā cāto'pi nāsti paralokahi Yacca na samsārî so'jnānā-murtitah khamiva || 412 || ( 1960 )]
Trans.-411-412 Jiva is ( said to be ) vijñānamaya and vijnana is a-nitya. So, there cannot be paraloka. If it is ( said to be ) different from vijnana, then also, jiva being ignorant like sky, it will neither be a doer nor an enjoyer, and then also, there will be no paraloka. ( For ), that which is ignorant and incorporeal like ākāśa, cannot belong to the mundane world. ( 1959-1960)
__टीका-व्याख्या-जीवो विज्ञानमयस्तावद् युष्माभिरिष्यते विज्ञानादभिन्न इत्यर्थः । तच्च विज्ञानमनित्यं विनश्वरम् , अतस्तद भिन्नस्य जीवस्यापि विनश्वरत्वाद् न भवान्तरगमनलक्षणः परलोकः। अथ विज्ञानादन्यो जीवस्ततोऽनित्ये विज्ञाने जीवाद् भिन्ने सति स्वयं नित्योऽसाविति न परलोकाभावः। यद्येवम् , तर्हि अनभिज्ञो जीवः, विज्ञानादन्यत्वात् , आकाशवत् , काष्ठादिवद् वा । अत एव च नित्यत्वादेवासौ जीवो न कर्ता, नापि भोक्ता । नित्यस्य कर्तृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमे हि सर्वदैव तद्भावप्रसङ्गः, तस्य सदैवैकरूपत्वात् । कर्तृत्वाभावे च न परलोकः, अकृतस्य तस्याभ्युपगमे सिद्धानामपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । भोक्तृत्वाभावेऽपि न परलोकः, अभोक्तुः परलोकहेतुभूतकर्मभोगायोगात् । इतोऽपि च न परलोकः । कुतः ? इत्याह-"जं चेत्यादि " यस्माच्च नासौ

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-: 469 : संसारी, नास्य ज्ञानाद् भिन्नस्य जीवस्य भवाद् भवान्तरगमनलक्षणं संसरणमस्तीत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह-स्वयमज्ञानत्वात् , काष्ठखण्डवत् । तथा, अमर्तत्वात् , आकाशवदिति ।। ४११-४१२ ॥ (१९५९-१९६०)
D. C.-Metārya:--You believe jîva to be vijñānamaya, Now, since vijnana is a-natya, javal will also be u-natya. Consequently, there will be no possiblity of going to the other world and there will be no para-loka also. On the other hand, if you take jîva to be different from vijñāna, java will not be a-nitya, but being different from vajñāna, it will be ignorant, or dull like sky or wood. Consequently, the soul will neither be karti ( doer ) nor bhoktā ( enjoyer ). In absence of kartrritva, existence of para-lokaa will be denied. For, if para-loka is taken as existing even in absence of kartạitva, the Siddha beings that have already attained absolute Liberation will attain para-loka. In absence of bhoktratva also, there will be no para-loka, because the soul which is nutya but not bhoktā, will not be able to attain para-loka in absence of Karma, which acts as the cause of passing to the other world, This jîva, therefore, being distinguished from givana does not belong to the mundane world, as it has no passage to the other world on account of its ignorance like that of wood, and u-murtatvaa like that of akās' co. ॥ 411-412 ॥ ( 1959-1960)
The reply is, मन्नसि विणासि चेओ उप्पत्तिमदादिओ जहा कुंभो। नणु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्तेवि से सोम्म! ॥४१३॥ (१९६१) Mannasi viņāsi ceo uppattimadādio jahā kumbho 1 Nanu eyam ciya sāhanavināsitte vi se Somma! ॥ 413 ॥ (1961) [ मन्यसे विनाशि चेत उत्पत्तिमदादितो यथा कुम्भः।
नन्वेतदेव साधनमविनाशित्वेऽपि तस्य सौम्य ! ॥ ४१३ ॥ (१९६१) Manyase vināsi ceta utpattimadădito yatha kumbhahi Nanvetadeva sadhanamavinaśitve’pi tusya Saumya ! 11413||(1961)]

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[ The tenth
Trans.-413 You take consciousness to be destructible like ghata on account of its ( having ) production etc. ( Because ) in ( case of ) its indestructibility also, the same is the cause, O Saumya ! ( 1961 )
•: 470:
टीका - ननु " जीवो विण्णाणमओ तं चाणिचं " इति ब्रुवाणो नूनं त्वमेवं मन्यसे - विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतश्चेतना चैतन्यं विज्ञानमिति यावत् । उत्पत्तिमत्वादिति हेतुः । यथा कुम्भ इति दृष्टान्त: । आदिशब्दात् " पर्यायत्वात्" इत्यादिकोsपि हेतुर्वक्तव्यः । यो हि पर्यायः स सर्वोऽप्यनित्यः, यथा स्तम्भादीनां नव-पुराणादिपर्यायः । ततश्चानित्याच्चैतन्यादभिन्नत्वे जीवस्याचयनित्यत्वात् परलोकाभाव इति तवाभिप्रायः । न चायं युक्तः, यतो हन्त ! नैकान्तेन विज्ञानमनित्यम्, यतोऽविनाशित्वेऽपि " से " तस्य विज्ञानस्यैतदेव सौम्य ! त्वदुक्तं साधनं प्रमाणं वर्तते । ततोऽनैकान्तिकस्वदुक्तो हेतुरिति भावः । इदमुक्तं भवति - उत्पाद - व्यय - ध्रौव्यात्मकं वस्तु । ततश्च यथोत्पत्तिमन्वाद् विनाशित्वं सिध्यति तथा धौव्यात्मकत्वाद् वस्तुनः कथञ्चिद् नित्यत्वमपि सिध्यति । ततश्वेदमपि शक्यते वक्तुम् - नित्यं विज्ञानम्, उत्पत्तिमत्वात्, घटवत् । ततश्च कथञ्चिन्नित्याद् विज्ञानादभिन्नस्य जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् न परलोकाभाव इति ।। ४१३ || ( १९६१ )
D. C. - Since cantanya is susceptible to production, and exists in various forms due to various specific characteristics, you have accepted it to be a-nitya. That which exists in various forms due to various paryayas, is a-nitya like paryayas as in the case of old and new paryayas of pillar etc. Thus, the Soul which is a-bhinna from the a-nitya caitanya, is taken as a-nitya by you, who have denied the existence of para-loka. But that is not correct. Caitanya-vijñāna is not exclusively a-nitya, but any how, it is reatya to a certain extent also.
Every object is susceptible to three conditions-production, destruction and perpetuality. So, just as a-nityata is established by you on account of utpatti, nityata could also be established by means of the condition of perpetuality. It could easily be stated, therefore, that vijnana is nulya like ghata, and on

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: 471 :. account of the nityatva of jîva, there is no w-bhāva of para-loka. ॥ 413 ॥ ( 1961)
Or, अहवा वत्थुत्तणओ विणासि चेओ न होइ कुंभो छ । उप्पत्तिमदादित्ते कहमविणासी घडो, बुद्धी ? ॥४१४॥ (१९६२) Ahavā vatthuttanao vināsi ceo na höi kumbho vva 1 Uppattimadaditte kahamavinasi ghado, buddhi ? ॥ 414 ॥ ( 1962 )
[अथवा वस्तुत्वतो विनाशि चेतो न भवति कुम्भ इव ।
उत्पत्तिमदादित्वे कथमविनाशी घटो, बुद्धिः १ ॥ ४१४ ॥ ( १९६२ ) Athavă vastutvato vināśi ceto na bhavati kumbha iva i Utpattimadāditve kathamavinasî ghațo, buddhiḥ ? 11414||(1962) ]
Trans.-414 Or, consciousness does not become destructible like ghata on account of its being a ( definite) object. ( The question may be that ) “ How could ghata be indestructible when it is suceptible to production etc ? ” ( 1962 )
____टीका-एकान्तेन विनाशि विनश्वरं चेतो विज्ञानं न भवति, वस्तुत्वात् , कुम्भवत् । ततोऽस्य प्रत्युनुमानस्योपस्थापनाद् विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्यप्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वलक्षणो हेतुः। यदुक्तम्-"नणु एयं चिय साहणमविणासित्ते वि" इत्यादि, तत्र परस्येवं बुद्धिः स्यात् । कथंभूता बुद्धिः ? इत्याह-कथमुत्पत्तिमत्वाद् दृष्टान्तत्वेनापन्यस्तो घटोऽविनाशी सिध्यति ?-न कथञ्चित् , घटेस्य विनाशित्वेन सुप्रतीतत्वात् । ततश्च दृष्टान्तेऽविनाशित्वस्यासिद्धेर्रान्तिके विज्ञाने तद् न सिध्यतीति परस्याभिप्राय इति ॥ ४१४ ॥ (१९६२)
D. C.-Consciouness is never destructible exclusively on account of its being a definite vastu lıke ghata
Metārya:--When ghata is susceptible to production etc, how should it be considered indestructible? It is recognized as destructible by all. Thus when indestructibilty of ghata is

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•: 472 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The tenth
not proved in the illustration stated above, indestructibility ( in case ) of vijnana also, will not be proved. ॥ 414 ॥ (1962)
Bhagavān replies -
रूव-रस-गंध-फासा संखा संठाण-दर-सत्तीओ। कुंभो त्ति जओ ताओ पसूइ-विच्छित्ति-धुवधम्मा ॥४१५॥(१९६३) Rūva-rasa-gandha-phāsā samkhā santhāna-davva-sattîo 1 Kumbho tti jao tao pasui-vicchitti-dhuvadhamma ॥ 415॥ ( 1963) [रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शाः संख्या संस्थान-द्रव्य-शक्तयः।
कुम्भ इति यतस्ताः प्रसूति-व्यवच्छित्ति-ध्रुवधर्माणः॥४१५॥(१९६३) Rupa-rasa-gandhu-sparsah samkha samsthana-dravya-saktayah। Kumbha iti yata stāḥ prasūti-vyavacchitti-dhruvadharmāṇaḥ 1141511 ___Trans.-415 Form, taste, odour, touch, number, configuration, matter, and energy form kumbha. For, all of them possess the characteristics of production, destructibility and perpetuality. ( 1963 ).
टीका-इह रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शलक्षणो गुणसमुदायः, एकलक्षणा संख्या, पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारलक्षणं संस्थानम् , मृद्रव्यम् , जलाहराणादिशक्तिश्चेत्येतानि समुदितानि यतः कुम्भ इत्युच्यते, ताश्च रूप-रस-गन्धस्पर्श-संख्या-संस्थान-द्रव्य-शक्तयः प्रसूति-विच्छित्ति-ध्रौव्यधर्मिण्य उत्पादव्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वरूपाः, तत उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादविनाश्यपि घटः सिध्यति ॥४१५॥ (१९६३)
D. C.--A group of properties such as form, taste, odour, and touch; the number one etc., configuration like that of broad portion from the middle ete; matter ( in the form ) of earth; and capacity for holding water; all these properties combine together and form ghuta. Each one of these properties is again perceptible to production, destructibility and perpetuality. Ghata is, therefore, nitya inspite of its being utpattimat. ||415|| (1963)

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•478 : Explaining the same in details the author proceeds-- इह पिण्डो पिण्डागार-सत्तिपज्जायविलयसमकालं। उप्पजइ कुंभागार-सत्तिपज्जायसवेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४) रूवाइं दवयाए न जाइ न य वेइ तेण सो निच्चो। एवं उप्पाय-वय-धुवस्सहावं मयं सवं ॥४१७॥ (१९६५) Iha pindo pinďāgāra-sattipajjāyavilayasamakālam i Uppajjai kumbhāgāra-sattipajjāyarūvena 1 416 11 ( 1964 ) Rūvāim davvayāe na jāi na ya vei tena so nicco 1 Evam uppāya-vvaya-dhuvassahāvam mayam savvam 1141711 (1965) [इह पिण्डः पिण्डाकार-शक्तिपर्यायविलयसमकालम् ।
उत्पद्यते कुम्भाकार-शक्तिपर्यायरूपेण ॥ ४१६ ॥ (१९६४ ) रूपादिद्रव्यतया न जायते न च व्येति तेन स नित्यः ।
एवमुत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावं मतं सर्वम् ।। ४१७ ।। (१९६५) Iba pindah piņdākāra-saktiparyayavılayasamakālam | Utpadyate kumbhakāra-sakti paryaya rupena ॥ 416 ॥ ( 1964)] Rūpādi dravyataya na jayate na ca vyeti tena sa nityah | Evamutpāda-vyaya-dbrauvgasvabhāvam matam sarvam 1417||(1965)]
Trans ----416-417 The lump (of earth) in this case, is produced in the specific characteristics of the shape and capacity of kambha at the same time when it is destroyed in the specific characteristics of its (own) shape and capacity. It is produced and destroyed neither by (virtue of) its form etc nor by ( virtue of ) its matter. It is, therefore, ( called ) nitya. Everything is thus believed to possess the conditions of ( being susceptible to ) production, destructibility and perpetuality. ( 1964-1965)
टीका-इह मृत्पिण्डः कर्ता । योऽयं वृत्तसंस्थानरूपः स्वकीयो मृत्पि60

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth ण्डाकारः, शक्तिश्च या काचिदात्मीया, एतदुभयलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्तस्य यो विलयो विनाशस्तत्समकालमेवासावुत्पद्यते मृत्पिण्डः । केन ? इत्याहपृथुबुध्नोदरादिको यः कुम्भाकारः, तच्छक्तिश्च या जलाहरणादिविषया, एतदुभयलक्षणो यः पर्यायस्तेनोत्पद्यते । रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्शरूपतया मृद्रव्यरूपतया चासौ मृत्पिण्डो न जायते, नापि व्येति विनश्यति । ततस्तद्रूपतया नित्योऽयमुच्यते, तेन रूपेण तस्य सदैवावस्थितत्वात् । तदेवं मृत्पिण्डो निजाकारस्वशक्तिरूपतया विनश्यति, घटाकार-तच्छक्तिरूपतयोत्पद्यते, रूपादिभावेन मृदद्रव्यरूपतया चावतिष्ठत, इत्युत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावोऽयमुच्यते । एवं घटोऽपि पूर्वपर्यायेण विनश्यति, घटाकारतया तत्पद्यते, रूपादित्वेन मृद्र्व्यतया चावतिष्ठत इत्यसावप्युत्पाद-व्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावमेवाभिमतं तीर्थकृताम् । ततश्च यथोत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् विनाशित्वं घटे सिध्यति तथाऽविनाशित्वमपि । तथा च सति साध्यधर्मिणि चैतन्येऽपि तत्सिद्धिरिति । तदेवं चैतन्यादव्यतिरिक्तोऽपि जीवः कथञ्चिद् नित्य एव ॥ ४१६-४१७ ॥ (१९६४-१९६५)
D. C.-Properties like the shape and capacity of the lump of earth, vanish and at the same time, ghata-having its peculiar shape and its capacity of holding water-is produced. The lump of earth is neither produced nor destroyed in the form of rūpa-rasa-gandha-spars'a or dravya. It continues to exist perpetually in these forms. Thus, the lump of earth vanishes in the form of the shape and capacity of ghata, and exists for ever in the form of rūpa, rasa, gandha, spars'a and dravya. Similarly, ghata also vanishes in the form of its former paryāyas, and comes into existence with new paryāyas of ghatākāra, and lasts for ever in the form of paryāyas of rūpa etc. as well as dravya Consequently, it has also the svabhāva of utpatti, vyaya and dhrauvya. Such is not the case with ghata only, but it is the nature of each and every object of the Universe. So, like destructibility, in-destructibility of ghata is also due to the hetus like utpattimattva etc. Consequently, in case of cartanya and ātmā also, the nityatā shoud be admitted. ॥ 416-417 ॥ ( 1964-1965)

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Vsda ] . Gañadharavada
.: 475 :. Indicating the existence of para-loka thereby, the author statesघडचेयणया नासो पडचेयणया समुब्भवो समयं । संताणेणावत्था तहेह-परलोअ-जीवाणं ॥ ४१८॥ (१९६६) मणुएहलोगनासो सुराइपरलोगसंभवो समयं । जीवतयाऽवत्थाणं नेहभवो नेय परलोओ ॥ ४१९ ॥ (१९६७) Ghadaceyanayā nāso padaceyanayā samubbhavo samayam i Santānenavatthā taheha-paralia-jivanam ॥ 418 ॥ ( 1966) Manuehaloganāso surāiparaloga sambhavo samayam i Jivataya'vatthānam nehabhavo neya paraloo ॥ 419 ॥ ( 1967 ) [ घटचेतनया नाशः पटचेतनया समुद्भवः समकम् ।
संतानेनावस्था तथेह-परलोक-जीवानाम् ॥ ४१८ ।। ( १९६६) मनुजेहलोकनाशः सुरादिपरलोकसंभवः समकम् ।
जीवतयाऽवस्थानं नेहभवो नैव परलोकः ।। ४१९ ॥ (१९६७) Ghatacetanayā nāśaḥ pațacetanaya samadbhavaḥ sama kami Santānenavastha tatheha-paraloka-jivanam ॥ 418 ॥ (1966) Manujehalokanaśaḥ surädiparalokasambhavaḥ samakami Jivata ya’vasthanam nehabhavo naiva paralokaḥ || 419 11 ( 1967 ) ]
Trans.--418-419 Destruction of the cognizance of ghata, production of the cognizance of pata, and retention of their continuous range, are (apprehended ) all at a time. The same is the case with this world, the other world, and the jiva. Vanishing of this human world and coming into existence of the world like that of divine beings are simultaneous. Retention in the state of) jiva is neither this world nor the other world. ( 1966-1967 )
टीका-घटविषय विज्ञानं घटचेतनोच्यते, पटविषयं तु विज्ञानं पटचेतना।

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.: 476 :
Jinabhadra Gani's [The tenth यदा च घटविज्ञानानन्तरं पटविज्ञानमुपजायते जीवस्य, तदा घटचेतनया घटविज्ञानरूपेण तस्य नाश उच्यते, पटचेतनया तु पटविज्ञानरूपेण "समय" युगपदेव समुद्भव उत्पादः, अनादिकालप्रवृत्तेन तु चेतनासंतानेन निर्विशेषणेन जीवत्त्वमात्रेणावस्थानमिति । एवं च यथेहभवेऽपि तिष्ठतो जीवस्योत्पादव्यय-ध्रोव्यस्वभावत्रयं दर्शितम् ; तथा परलोकं गता जीवाः परलोकजीवास्तेषामप्येतत् स्वभावत्रयं दृष्टव्यम् । तद्यथा-यदा मनुष्यो मृत्वा सुरलोकादावुत्पद्यते तदा मनुष्यरूप इहलोको मनुष्येहलोकस्तस्य नाशः, तत्समकालमेव च सुरादिपरलोकस्य संभव उत्पादः, जीवतया त्ववस्थानम् । तस्यां च जीवत्वावस्थायां विवक्षितायां नेहभवो विवक्ष्यते, नापि सुरादिपरलोको विवक्ष्यते, किन्तु निष्पर्यायं जीव-द्रव्यमात्रमेव विवक्ष्यते । तदेवमुत्पादव्यय-ध्रौव्यस्वभावत्वे जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४१८-४१९ ॥ ( १९६६-१९६७)
D. C.-Cognizance about ghata is called ghata-cetanā, and that about pata is called pața-cetanä. When jîva acquires the cognizance of pata after that of ghata, vanishing of ghata, production in the form of pata, and retention in the form of eternal java, are simultaneous.
Utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya are therefore, the three generic characteristios of jiva, as well as, of those who have passed to the other world.
When a person is born in deva-loka after death, he undergoes the state of destruction as regards this world, production as regards deva-loka, and permanent avasthāna as regards java. When a person is said to exist in the state of jîvatva, it is neither said to exist in this world nor in the other world like that of gods etc. Jîva is called mere dravya without any sort of paryāya. Thus, since jîva has the tendency of undergoing utpūda, vyaya and dhrauvya, there is no abhāva of the other world. || 418-419 ॥ ( 1966-1967 )
In reply to the question whether all objects possess all the three characteristics, the author states

Page #518

Vada ] Gañadharavada
•: 477 : असओ नत्थि पसूई, होज व जइ, होउ खरविसाणस्स । न य सबहा विणासो सव्वुच्छेयप्पसंगाओ ॥४२० ॥ (१९६८) तोऽवत्थियस्स केणवि विलओ धम्मेण भवणमन्नण । सव्वुच्छेओ न मओ संववहारोवरोहाओ ॥४२१ ॥ (१९६९) Asao natthi pasūî, hojja va jai, höu kharavisānassa / Na ya sarvaha vinaso savvuccheyappasangao ॥ 420 ॥ ( 1968 ) To’vatthiyassa kenavi vilao dhammena bhavanamannena i Savvuccheo na mao samvavaharovarohao ॥ 421 ॥ ( 1969 ) [असतो नास्ति प्रसूतिः, भवेद् वा यदि, भवतु खरविषाणस्य ।
न च सर्वथा विनाशः सर्वोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् ।। ४२० ॥ (१९६८) ततोऽवस्थितस्य केनापि विलयो धर्मेण भवनमन्येन ।
सर्वोच्छेदो न मतः संव्यवहारोपरोधात् ॥ ४२१ ॥ (१९६९) Asato nāsti prasūtih, bhaved va yadı, bhavatu khara-vişāṇasyai Na ca sarvatha vina.sah sarvocchedaprasangat | 420 ॥ ( 1968) Tato'vasthitasya kenāpi vilayo dharmeņa bhavanamanyena i Sarvocchedo na mataḥ samvyavahāroparodhat || 42111 (1969)]
Trans.--420-421 The non-existant has no production. If it has, there would be production of the horn of an ass (also ). Nor, is there exclusive destruction. (For ), it would result in destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of all. Consequently, there would be destruction of an object existing in a perpetual range by one means and production (of the same) by other means. For fear of obstruction to the mutual usage, exclusive destruction ( of everything ) is not acceptible. ( 1968-1969) ' टीका-इहैकान्तेन सर्वथाऽसतो वस्तुनः प्रसूतिरुत्पत्तिर्नास्ति न घटते। अथ भवति, तर्हि खरविषाणस्यापि भवतु, अमच्चाविशेषात् । तस्मात् केनापि रूपेण सदेवोत्पद्यते । न च सतः सर्वथा विनाशः, क्रमशः सर्वस्यापि

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.:.478 :
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The tenth
नारक-तिर्यगादेरुच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । ततस्तस्मात् तस्यावस्थितस्य जीवादेरस्ति केनापि मनुष्यत्वादिधर्मेण विलयो विनाशः, अन्येन तु सुरादिरूपेण भवनमुत्पादः, सर्वोच्छेदस्तु न मतस्तीर्थकृताम् , संव्यवहारोपरोधात्-अन्यथा व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः; तथाहि-राजपुच्या क्रीडाहेतुभूतं सौवर्णकलशकं भक्त्वा राजतनयस्य क्रीडार्थमेव कन्दुको घटितः; ततो राजपुत्र्याः शोकः, कुमारस्य तु हर्षः, सुवर्णस्वामिनश्च नरपतेरौदासीन्यम् , सुवर्णस्योभयावस्थायामप्यविनष्टत्वात् , इत्यादिको योऽसौ लोकव्यवहारस्तस्य सर्वस्याप्युत्पादव्यय-ध्रौव्यात्मकवस्त्वनभ्युपगमे समुच्छेदः स्यात । तस्मात कथञ्चिदवस्थितत्वे जीवस्य न परलोकाभाव इति ॥ ४२०-४२१ ॥ (१९६८-१९६९) ____D. C.-An object which is absolutely a-vidyamānaa can never undergo production. For, if the production of an a-vidyamāna object is admitted, non-existent objects like khara-vişāņa will also come into existence, which is utterly impossible. It is only a vidyamāna object that undergoes production. Secondly, there is no exclusive destruction of a vidyamāna object If there were absolute destruction of everything, even nārakî and tiryanca beings would be absolutely destroyed. Jiva etc. which are always avasthita, undergo vinās'a by means of characteristics such as that of manusyatva etc. On the other hand, they undergo production by means of characteristics like that of divine beings etcBut exclusive destruction of all, is never possible for fear of the violation of usual vyavahāra. Take an example to understand it more clearly :-Having broken a golden jar belonging to a princess, a ball was made of gold for a prince. On account of that, sorrow on the part of the princess, joy on the part of the prince, and gold being retained in the same quantity in the form of ball as well as jar, indifference on the part of king who is the owner of gold, constitute loka-vyavahāra. If we do not accept utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya in case of all objects, violation of this loka-vyavahāra will undoubtedly take place. In case of jîva being avasthita, there is no para-lokābhāva. ॥ 420-421 ॥ ( 1968-1969)

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.:479.:.
And,
असइ व परम्मि लोए जमग्निहोत्ताइं सग्गकामस्स । तदसंबद्धं सवं दाणाइफलं च लोआम्मि ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०) Asai va parammi löe jamaggihottāim saggakāmassa i Tadasambandham savvam dāņāiphalam ca löammi 114220 (1970) [ असति वा परस्मिल्लोके यदग्निहोत्रादि स्वर्गकामस्य ।
तदसंबद्ध सर्व दानादिफलं च लोके ॥ ४२२ ॥ (१९७०) Asati vā parasminlloke yadagnihotrādi svargakāmasya i Tadasambaddham sarvam danadiphalam ca loke ॥ 422 ॥ ( 1970)]
Trans.--422 In case of the other world being absent ( the commendment of the performance of ) sacrifice etc. for a person aspiring for Salvation, would be useless. Moreover, the fruition of (goon turns like ) munificence etc. (welknown ) in this world, would also be null and void. ( 1970 ) छिन्नम्मि संशयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं। . सो समणो पवइओ तिहि ओसह खण्डियसएहिं ॥४२३॥(१९७१) Chinnammi samsayammî Jinena jara-maranavippamukkenam i So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim ॥ 423 ॥ (1971) [छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
स श्रमणः प्रवजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः ।। ४२३ ॥ (१९७१) Chinne saņśaye Jinena jarā-maraņa vipramuktena | Sa Sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih ॥423॥(1971)]
Trans.—423 When the doubt was removed by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted the Diksā along with his three hundred pupils. ( 1971 ) End of the Discussion with the Tenth Gañadhara.

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Chapter XI
एकादशगणधरवक्तव्यता Discussion with the Eleventh Canadhara
ते पवइए सोउं पहासो आगच्छई जिणसयासं । वच्चामि ण वंदामी वंदिता पज्जुवासामि ॥ ४२४ ॥ (१९७२) Te pavvaie söum Pahāso āgacchai Jinasayāsam i Vaccāmi na vandāmî vanditiā pajjuvāsāmi 11 424 u ( 1972 ) [ तान् प्रव्रजितान् श्रुत्वा प्रभास आगच्छति जिनसकाशम् ।
व्रजामि वन्दे वन्दित्वा पर्युपासे ।। ४२४ ॥ (१९७२) Tan pravrajitan śrutva Prabhāsa agacchati Jinasakāśam i Vrajami vande vanditva paryupase ॥ ॥ 424 ॥ ( 1972 )]
Trans.--424 Having heard that they had renounced the world, Prabhāsa, comes before the Tirthankara. ( He thinks-) I shall go, pay my homages, and worship him. ( 1972 )
Then, आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाइ-जरा-भरणविप्पमुक्केणं । नामेण य गोत्तेण य सवण्णू सवदरिसी णं ॥४२५॥ (१९७३) Ābhattho ya Jineņam jāi-jarā-maranavippamukkeņam i Namena ya gottena ya savvannu savvadarisi nam ॥425॥ (1973)

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
[ आभाषित जिनेन जाति - जरा - मरणविप्रमुक्तेन ।
नाम्ना च गोत्रेण च सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदर्शिना ।। ४२५ ॥ ( १९७३ ) ābhasitaśca Jinena jati- jara-maranavipramuktena 1 Namna ca gotrena ca sarvajñena sarvadarśina ॥ 425 ॥ ( 1973 ) ]
.: 481 :.
Trans-425 He was addressed by his name and lineage by the Tirthankara, who was entirely free from birth old age and death, who was omniscient, and who had complete darśana ( undifferentiated knowledge). (1973)
Having thus addressed him, the Bhagavan said—
किं मन्ने निवाणं अस्थि नत्थि त्ति संसओ तुज्झ । वेयपयाण य अत्थं न याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ||४२६ ॥ (१९७४)
Kim manne nivvānam atthi natthi tti samsao tujjha Veyapayāna ya attham na yānasi tesimo attho ॥ 426 ॥ ( 1974 )
[ किं मन्यसे निर्वाणमस्ति नास्तीति संशयस्तव ।
वेदापदानां चार्थं न जानासि तेषामयमर्थः || ४२६ ॥ ( १९७४ )
Kim manyase nirvāṇamasti nāstiti samśayastava | Veda-padānām cartham na jānāsi teṣamayamarthaḥ ||426|| (1974)]
Trans.—426 What are you thinking about ? You entertain the doubt as to whether nirvana (final emancipation) exists or not. But (ca ) you have not understood the ( real ) meaning of the sentences of Vedas. Here is their (real) interpretation. ( 1974 )
66
टीका - हे आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे - किं निर्वाणमस्ति न वा ? इति । अयं च संशयस्तव विरुद्धवेदपदश्रवणनिबन्धनः । तानि चामूनि वेदपदानि - " जराम वैतत् सर्वं यदग्निहोत्रम् " । तथा, “ सैषा गुहा दुखगाहा । तथा, " द्वे ब्रह्मणी परमपरं च तत्र परं सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तरं बा' इति । एतेषां चायमर्थस्तवचेतसि वर्तते यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तज्जरामर्यमेव
"
17
61

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•:482.
Jinabhadra Gaại's ( The eleventh यावजीवं कर्तव्यमिति । अग्निहोत्रक्रिया च भूतवधहेतुत्वाच्छबलरूपा । सा च स्वर्गफलैव स्याद् नापवर्गफला । " यावजीवम्" इति चोक्ते कालान्तरं नास्ति यत्रापवर्गहेतुभूतक्रियान्तरारम्भः स्यात् । तस्मात् साधनाभावाद् मोक्षाभावः । ततश्चेत्यादिकानि किल मोक्षाभावप्रतिपादकानि । शेषाणि तु तदस्तित्वसूचकानि, यतो गुहाऽत्र मुक्तिरूपा, सा च संसाराभिनन्दिनां दुरवगाहा, दुष्प्रवेशात् । तथा, परं ब्रह्म सत्यं मोक्षः, अनन्तरं तु ब्रह्म ज्ञानमिति । ततो मोक्षास्तित्वं नास्तित्वं च वेदपदप्रतिपादितमवगम्य तव संशयः। तत्रैषां वेदपदानामर्थं त्वं न जानासि, यतस्तेषामयमों वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण इति ॥ ४२६ ॥ (१९७४) ___D. C.-0 long-lived Prabhasa ! your doubt about the existence of mokṣa is based upon your hearing various Vedapadas of contradictory senses. These Veda-padas are as follows:(1) “ Jarā-maryam vaitat sarvnm yadagnihotram.” (2) " Saisā guhā duravagāhā " ( 3 ) " Dive bralamand paramaparam_ca, testoraa param_satyam
gñanamantaram brahma ” etc. These Veda-padas are interpreted by you as follows:(1) Agnihotra should be practised as long as life persists.
The performance of agnihotra constitutes the sacrifice of animals which would turn it subha or a-s'ubha. But that would award the attainment of svarga alone and not mokşa. Since by this commandment, performance of agnihotra is advised to be practised throughout life, there would be no other period of time during which some other performance for the attainment of moksa could be advised. In absence of sādhana, therefore, the sādhya ( viz moksa ) does not exist. In this way, this sentence proves the abhāva of mokşa.
The other two padas try to establish the existence of moksa in this way

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Vada ]
Gaṇadharavada
•: 488 :
(2) The cave of mokṣa is difficult to be entered by the
samsārts.
( 3 ) There are two types of Brahma:--
1. The Param Brahma or principal Brahma is mokṣa and a-param or subordinate Brahma is jñana.
Your doubt has sprung up from these Veda-padas which bear contradictory senses. But you have not grasped their real interpretation. Here, I give their correct interpretation. Please listen carefully. ॥ 426 | (1974)
Bhagavan now states the opponent's view and refutes it, मनसि किं दीवस्स व नासो निवाणमस्स जीवस्स ? | दुक्खक्खयाइरूवा किं होज्ज व से सओऽवत्था ? ॥४२७॥ (१९७५)
Mannasi kim dîvassa va nãso nivvāṇamassa jîvassa ? Dukkhakkhayāirūvā kim hojja va se sao'vatthā ? ॥ 427 ॥ (1975)
[ मन्यसे किं दीपस्येव नाशो निर्वाणमस्य जीवस्य ?
दुःखक्षयादिरूपा किं भवेद् वा तस्य सतोsवस्था ? ||४२७|| (१९७५)
Manyase kim dipasyeva našo nirvāṇamasya jivasya ? Duhkhaksayadirūpā kim bhaved vā tasya sato 'vasthā? ॥427 (1975) ]
Trans.-427 Do you think the nirvana (extinction of life ) to be similar to the extinction of lamp ? Or, would the positive existence of soul in the form of diminution of miseries etc. be its extinction ? ( 1975 )
टीका - आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! त्वमेवं मन्यसे - किं दीपस्येवास्य जीवस्य नाशो ध्वंस एव निर्वाणम् १ यथाऽऽहुः सौगतविशेषाः केचित् तद्यथा
दीपो यथा निर्वृतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनिं गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् ।
दिशं न काश्चिद् विदिशं न काश्चित् स्नेहक्षयात् केवलमेति शान्तिम् ||१||

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
(The eleventh
जीवस्तथा निर्धतिमभ्युपेतो नैवावनिं गच्छति नान्तरिक्षम् । दिशं न काश्चिद् विदिशं न काञ्चित् क्लेशक्षयात् केवलमेति शान्तिम् ॥२॥
इति । किं वा यथा जैनाः प्राहुस्तथा निर्वाणं भवेत् । किं तत् ? इत्याह-सतो विद्यमानस्य जीवस्य विशिष्टा काचिदवस्था । कथंभूता ? रागद्वेष-मद-मोह-जन्म-जरा-रोगादिदुःखक्षयरूपा । उक्तं च
केवलसंविद्-दर्शनरूपाः सर्वातिदुःखपरिमुक्ताः ।
मोदन्ते मुक्तिगता जीवाः क्षीणान्तरारिगणाः ॥१॥ इति ॥ ४२७ ॥ (१९७५) ____D.C.-Like the Buddhists, do you believe moksa to be nothing but the extinction of jîva, like that of a lamp ? For the Buddhists, assert that:-- "Dipo yathă nirvșitimabhyupeto naivāvanım gacchati nāntariksam. Disam na kāncid vidiśim na kancit snehaksayāt kevalameti śāntim 11111 Jivastathā nirvritimabhyupeto naivāvanim gacchati nāntariksam Disam na kancıd vidiśim na kancit klesaksayāt kevalameti śāntim 11211
Or, do you accept moksa, like Jarnas who believe the state of nirvana ( final emancipation ) as a peculiar state of the existent java constituting the removal of rāga, dveşa, mnada, moha, janma, jarā, roga, and duhkha etc ?
It has been laid down by them that " Kevalasamvid-darsanarupah sarvartiduhkha parimuktah | Modante muktigati. jivah ksinantarariganah " ||1॥ 427 (1975)]
Also, अहवाऽणाइत्तणओ खस्स व किं कम्म-जीवजोगस्स । अविओगाओ न भवे संसाराभाव एव त्ति ? ॥४२८॥(१९७६) Ahavā’ņāittanao khassa va kim kamma-jîvajogassa i Aviogao na bhave samsārābhāva eva tti ? || 428 ॥ ( 1976)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
-: 485,. [अथवाऽनादित्वतः खस्येव किं कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।
अवियोगाद् न भवेत् संसाराभाव एवेति ? ॥ ४२८ ( १९७६ ) Athava'naditvataḥ khasyeva kim karma-jîvayogasya i Aviyogād na bhavet samsārābbāva eveti ? || 428 || ( 1976 ) ]
____Trans.-428 Or, is it because Karma and jiva ( which are ) united together eternally do not undergo separation like ākāśa, that there is absence of mundane world ? ( 1976 )
टीका-अथवा, त्वमेवं मन्यसे-नूनं संसाराभाव एव न भवेत् । कुतः १ । अवियोगात्-वियोगायोगात्। कस्य ? । कर्म-जीवयोः संयोगस्य । कुतः । अनादित्वात् ; खस्येव । इह ययोरनादिःसंयोगस्तयोवियोगो नास्ति, यथा जीवा-ऽऽकाशयोः, अनादिश्च जीवकर्मणोः संयोगः, ततो वियोगानुपपत्तिः, ततश्च न संसाराभावः; तथा च सति कुतो मोक्षः ? इति ॥४२८ ॥ (१९७६)
D. C.-There is another ground also, upon which your doubt is based. Objects that are united with each other from time immemorial, could never undergo separation. Just as jiva and ākās'a are never separable from each other on account of their anādi samyoga, jiva and karma will also never undergo separation on account of their anādi samyoga. When Karma is not separated, sumsāra will also never be separable. On account of the absence of separation from samsāra, the absence of moksa will also be established. lll 428 11 ( 1976 )
But, पडिवज्ज मण्डिओ इव वियोगमिह कम्म-जीवजोगस्स । तमणाइणोवि कंचण-धाऊण व णाण-किरियाहि ॥४२९॥(१९७७) Padivajja Mandio iva viyogamiha kamma-jsvajogassa / Tamaņāiņo vi kancaņa-dhāūna va nāna-kiriyāhim 1142911 (1977) [प्रतिपद्यस्व मण्डिक इव वियोगमिह कर्म-जीवयोगस्य ।
त्वमनादेरपि काञ्चन-धात्वोरिव ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्याम् ॥४२९॥ (१९७७)

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•: 486 : •
Jinabhadra Gani's
Pratipadyasva Mandika iva viyogamıha karma-jîva yogasya Tvamanaderapi kāncana-dhātvoriva jñāna-kriyābhyām ||429||1977)]
[ The eleventh
Trans. – 429 In this case, you ( shall have to ) admit the separation of Karma and jiva, in spite of their eternal union on account of cognizance and action, as in the case of gold and metal. ( 1977 )
,
टीका - " अणाण वित्ति " अनादेरपि जीव - कर्मसंयोगस्य ' तं इति त्वं प्रतिपद्यस्व वियोगम्, बन्ध-मोक्षवादे मण्डिकवत् । कयोरिव यो वियोग: ? । काञ्चन-धातुपाषाणयोरिव । किं निर्हेतुक एव जीव-कर्मणोवियोग ः १ | न, इत्याह-ज्ञान- क्रियाभ्याम् । इदमुक्तं भवति - नायमेकान्तो यदनादिसंयोगो न भिद्यते, यतः काञ्चन-धातुपाषाणयोरनादिरपि संयोगोऽग्न्यादिसंपर्केण विघटत एव तद्वञ्जीव- कर्मसंयोगस्यापि सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रियाभ्यां वियोगं मण्डिकवत् त्वमपीह प्रतिपद्यस्वेति ॥ ४२९ ।। ( १९७७ )
D. C.-Even the strongest affinity between gold and metal is broken by the help of heating etc. The same is the case with that between Karma and jiva also. Separation of Karma and jiva is accomplished by means of jñāna and kriyā in spite of their eternal union. It is not true, therefore, to say that the separation of objects joined together by anadi samyoga, is not possible. Like Mandika you, too, shall have to admit that Karma and Jiva are separable from each other in spite of their eternal union. ॥ 429 ॥ ( 1977 )
Also,
जं नारगाइभावो संसारो नारगाइभिण्णो य ।
को जीवो तं मन्नसि तन्नासे जीवनासो ति ॥ ४३०॥ (१९७८)
Jam nāragāibhāvo samsāro nāragāibhinṇo ya
Ko jîvo tam mannasi tannāse jîvanāso tti || 430 u ( 1978 )
[ यद् नारकादिभावः संसारो नारकादिभिन्नश्च ।
को जीवस्त्वं मन्यसे तन्नाशे जीवनाश इति ।। ४३० ।। ( १९७८ )

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.: 487.:.
Yad nārakādıbhāvaḥ samsāro nārakādibhinnasca i Ko jivastvam manyase tannāśe jîvanāśa iti || 430 || ( 1978 ) ]
Trans.-430 Since samsāra includes hellish denizens etc. what jiva do you mean to be different, from hellish denizens etc ? With their destruction, ( there will be ) destruction of jiva also. ( 1978)
टीका-यद् यस्माद् नारक-तिर्यग्-नरा-ऽमरभाव एव नारकादित्वमेव संसार उच्यते नान्यः, नारकादिपर्यायभिन्नश्च कोऽन्यो जीवः ? । न कोऽपीत्यर्थः, नारकादिभावादन्यत्वेन कदाचिदपि जीवस्यानुपलम्भादिति भावः। ततस्तन्नाशे नारकादिभावरूपसंसारनाशे जीवस्य स्वस्वरूपनाशात् सर्वथा नाश एव भवति ततः कस्यासौ मौक्षः । इति त्वं मन्यसे ॥४३०॥ (१९७८)
D. C.-Since sumsūra consists of nāraku, tiryanca, human and divine beings, java cannot exist as different from any one of them. So, when samsāra of nārakas and others, vanishes, jîva will also vanish as it is contained in samsāra. Thus, when hîva vanishes, who would attain moksa ? 1143011 ( 1978 )
This belief is refuted in this wayन हि नारगाइपज्जायमेत्तनासम्मि सबहा नासो । जीवद्दवस्स मओ मुद्दानासे व हेमस्स ॥४३१ ॥ ( १९७९) कम्मकओ संसारो तन्नासे तस्स जुज्जए नासो। जीवत्तमकम्मकयं तन्नासे तस्स को नासो ? ॥४३२॥ (१९८०) Na hi nāragāipajjāyamettanāsammi savvahā nāso i Jîvaddavvassa mao muddānāse va hemassa 11 431 11 ( 1979 ) Kammakao samsāro tannāse tassa jujjae nāso I Jîvattamakammakayam tannāse tasya ko nāso? 11 432 11 (1980) [न हि नारकादिपर्यायमात्रनाशे सर्वथा नाशः ।
जीवद्रव्यस्य मतो मुद्रानाश इव हेम्नः ।। ४३१ ॥ ( १९७९ )

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Jinabhadra Gani's The eleventh कर्मकृतः संसारस्तनाशे तस्य युज्यते नाशः।
जीवत्वमकर्मकृतं तन्नाशे तस्य को नाशः १ ॥ ४३२ ॥ (१९८०) Na hi nāra kādiparyayawātranāśe sarvathá nāśaḥ Jivadravyasya mato mudrānasa ivashemnah | 431 ॥ (1979) Karmakritaḥ samsārastannāśe tasya yujyate näsah Jivatvamakaramakritam tannase tasya ko nasah ? ॥4320 (1980)]
Trans.-431-432 Like gold at the destruction of a ring, the substance of jiva is not believed to vanish entirely at the destruction of nārakas and other. Samsāra is based on Karma. Hence, its destruction with Karma is justified. ( But ) jivatva is not based on Karma. Hence, how could it vanish with Karna? ( 1979-1980)
टीका-नारक-तिर्यगादिरूपेण यो भावः स जीवस्य पर्याय एव । न च पर्यायमात्रनाशे पर्यायिणो जीवद्रव्यस्यापि सर्वथा नाशो मतः, कथश्चित्तु भवत्यपि । न हि मुद्रापर्यायमात्रनाशे हेम्नः सुवर्णस्य सर्वथा नाशो दृष्टः । ततो नारकादिसंसारपर्यायनिवृत्तौ मुक्तिपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिर्जीवस्य, मुद्रापर्यायनिवृत्तौ कर्णपूरपर्यायान्तरोत्पत्तिरिव सुवर्णस्य, न किञ्चिद् विरुध्यत इति । ननु यथा कर्मणो नाशे संसारो नश्यति तथा तन्नाशे जीवत्वस्यापि नाशाद् मोक्षाभावो भविष्यति । एतदप्यसारम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-"कम्मकओ इत्यादि" कर्मकृतः कर्मजनितः संसारः, ततस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य संसारस्य नाशो युज्यत एव, कारणाभावे कार्याभावस्य सुप्रतीतत्वात् । जीवत्वं पुनरनादिकालप्रवृत्तत्वात् कर्मकृतं न भवति, अतस्तन्नाशे कर्मनाशे तस्य जीवस्य को नाशः १-न कश्चित् ; कारण-व्यापकयोरेव कार्य-व्याप्यनिवर्तकत्वात् । कर्म तु जीवस्य न कारणं नापि व्यापकमिति भावः ॥ ४३१-४३२ ॥ ( १९७९-१९८०)
D. C.-Existence of jîva as nārukas or tiryancas is merely one of the forms of jîva. So, when these paryāyas of jiva vanish, the substance of jîva or javatva does not vanish entirely but only partially, just as gold as a dravya does not
.

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
.: 489 :. entirely vanish when ring etc, are destroyed. When the nāraka paryāyas of samsāra are destroyed, jiva vanishes as a samsārî and comes into existence as the paryāya of moksc e. g. in case of gold, when one paryāya, say ring, is destroyed, another paryāya, say ear-ring, is produced.
Prabhāsa :-But like samsāra, java will also have to vanish with Karma, and hence, there will be nothing like mokşa.
Bhagavān:-It is not so. Samsāra is generated by means of Karma, and hence it would vanish with Karma. But, javatva being at work from times immemorial, cannot be called Karmajanya. So, java will not vanish with Karma, since Karma is neither the cause of hîvatva nor is it invariably concomitant with jîvatva. Il 431-432 11 ( 1979-1980) न विगाराणुवलंभादागासं पिव विणासधम्मो सो। इह नासिणो विगारो दीसइ कुंभस्स वाऽवयवा ॥४३॥ (१९८१) Na vigārānuvalambhādāgāsam piva viņāsadhammo so i Iha nāsiņo vigāro dîsai kumbhassa vā'vayavā 11 433 11 ( 1981) [न विकारानुपलम्भादाकाशमिव विनाशधर्मा सः।
इह नाशिनो विकारो दृश्यते कुम्भस्येवावयवाः ॥ ४३३ ॥ (१९८१) Na vikarānupalambhādākāśamiva vināśadharmā saḥ Iha nasino vikāro drisyate kumbhasyevpvayavah ॥433॥ (1981)]
Trans.-433 It ( i. e. jiva) is immortal lıke sky on account of the non-apprehension of changes. In case of a destructive ( object ), a change is visible like the ( various) parts of ghata ( 1981) ___टीका-न विनाशधर्मा जीव इति प्रतिज्ञा। विकारानुपलम्भादिति हेतुः । इह यो विनाशी तस्य विकारो दृश्यते, यथा मुद्गरादिध्वस्तस्य कुम्भस्य कपाललक्षणा अवयवाः, यस्त्वविनाशी न तस्य विकारदर्शनम् , यथाऽऽ
63

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:: 490 :.
Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The eloventh काशस्येति । ततो मुक्तस्य जीवस्य नित्यत्वाद् नित्यो मोक्ष इति ॥ ४३३ ॥ (१९८१)
____D. C.-The Soul is immortal like akasar, because it does not undergo any vikāra. That which is destructible has undoubtedly to undergo vikāras like the different parts of ghata. Muktātmā being, thus immutable, moksa is also immutable. I1433॥ (1981)
Also,
कालंतरनासी वा घडो व कयगाइओ मई होजा। नो पद्धंसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा विजं निच्चो ॥ ४३४ ॥(१९८२) Kālantaranāsî vā ghado vya kayagāio maî hojjā i No paddhamsābhāvo bhuvi taddhammā vi jam nicco 114340 (1982) [ कालान्तरनाशी वा घट इव कृतकादितो मतिर्भवेत् ।
नो प्रध्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धर्मापि यद् नित्यः ॥ ४३४ ॥ (१९८२) Kāläntaranāší vā ghata iva kțitakādito matirbhavet i No pradhvamsābhāvo bhuvi taddharmāpi yad nityaḥ 1143411 (1982)] ___Trans.-434 Or, the belief may be that it is destructible at a ( certain ) period of time like ghata on account of its being factitious etc. ( But ) it is not so. Indestructibility is everlasting on this earth in spite of ( its ) having ( destructible ) characteristics. ( 1982 )
The author then states the opponent's view and its replyअणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंगं पिव मई न तं जम्हा । कुंभविणासविसिट्ठो भावो चिय पोग्गलमओ सो॥४३५॥(१९८३) Anudāharanamabhāvo kharasangam piva maî na tam jamhāi. Kumbhavināsаvisittho bhāvo cciyya poggalamao so 114351(1983) [ अनुदाहरणमभावः खरशृंगमिव मतिर्न तद् यस्मात् ।
कुम्भविनाशविशिष्टो भाव एव पुद्गलमयः सः॥ ४३५ ॥ (१९८३)

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
.:491:.
Anudāharaṇamabhāvaḥ kharaśpigamiva matir na tad yasmāti Kumbhavinasavisisto bhava eva pudgalamayan sah ||435॥ (1983)]
___ Trans.-435 ( The opponent might say that ) “ It has no illustration. Abhāva is non-existent like kharasriga." ( But ) it is not so. The quality of pudgala characterized by the destruction of ghata, is itself ( indestructibility ). (1983)
Or, किं वेगतेण कयं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स? । किं निबत्तियमहियं नभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि?॥४३६॥ (१९८४) Kim veganteņa kayam poggalamettavilayammi jîvassa ?, Kim nivvattiyamahiyam nabhaso ghadamettavilayammi ? ॥ 436 ॥ [किं वैकान्तेन कृतं पुद्गलमात्रविलये जीवस्य ? ।
किं निर्वर्तितमधिकं नभसो घटमात्रविलये ॥ ४३६ ( १९८४) Kim vaikāntena kritam pudgalamātravilaye jivasya ? | Kim nirvartitamadhikam nabhaso ghatamatravilaye ? ॥4361(1984)] ___Trans.-436 Or, at the destruction of mere pudgalas, how is jiva to be affected ? At the destruction of ghata, how is sky affected all the more ? † ( 1984 )
The author proves immortality of muktātmā by another inference also, दवामुत्तत्तणओ मुत्तो निच्चो नभं व दवतया । नणु विभुयाइपसंगो एवं सइ, नाणुमाणाओ ॥४३७॥(१९८५) Davvāmuttattanao mutto nicco nabham va davvatayā i Naņu vibhuyāipasango evam sai, nāņumāņāo 11 437 11 ( 1985 ) [ द्रव्यामूर्तत्वतो मुक्तो नित्यो नभ इव द्रव्यतया ।
ननु विभुतादिप्रसङ्ग एवं सति, नानुमानात् ।। ४३७ ॥ (१९८५)
+ Vide v. 1839.

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
[The eleventh
Dravyāmūrtvato mukto nityo nabha iva dravyatayā ! Nanu vibhutadiprasanga evam sati, nānumanat ॥ 437 ॥ (1985)] ___Trans.---437 The free ( soul ) is everlasting like sky on account of the incorporeal nature of ( its ) substance. (The opponent might object here that ) “in that case, there would be all-pervading characteristic etc as well. ” ( But ) it is not so, because of ( an opposite inference ). ( 1985 )
टीका-नित्यो मुक्तात्मा, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात् , “ दवतय त्ति" यथा द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वाद् नित्यं नमः । आह-नन्वनेन दृष्टान्तेन व्यापकस्वाद्यपि सिध्यति जीवस्य; तथाहि-विभुर्व्यापकः सर्वगतो जीवः, द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात् , यथा नभः । तदेतद् न । कुतः १। सर्वगतत्वबाधकानु मानसद्भावात् ; तथाहि-त्वपर्यन्तदेहमात्रव्यापको जीवः, तत्रैव तद्गुणोपलब्धेः, स्पर्शनवत् , इत्युनुमानाद् बाधते सर्वगतत्वं जीवस्य । एवं "न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते जीवः द्रव्यत्वे सत्यमूर्तत्वात् , नभोवत्" इत्याद्यपि दूषणं, " बध्यते पुण्य-पापकर्मणा जीवः, दान-हिंसादि क्रियाणां सफलत्वात् , कृष्यादिक्रियावत् , तथा, विघटते सम्यगुपायात् कोऽपि जीव-कर्मसंयोगः, संयोगत्वात् , काश्चन-धातुपाषाणसंयोगवत् " इत्याद्यनुमानात् परिहर्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३७ ॥ (१९८५)
D. C.-Like ākās'a dravya, java dravya of a free soul is also nitya, because it is a-mūrta as a dravya.
Prabhāsa:-As you proved notyatva (in case ) of muktātmā by the help of the example of sky, the example will lead to prove other characteristics of sky in muktātmā, say for example, like sky, muktātmā is all pervading due to its a-mūrtatva. Similarly, it can also be said that jîva dravya has neither bandha nor moksa just as ākās'a dravya has none due to a-mūrtatva.
Bhagavān. It is not proper to establish other characteristics such as vibhută etc in muktātmā by the help of the example of sky. Because, there is another inference opposite

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 493 :to it which contradicts the existence of those characteristics. Say, for example, jiva is pervading only upto the skin of body like the sense of touch, because the javatva is found only in body.
This anumāna refutes the all-pervading nature of jîva. Similarly, the anumānas that javas are formed by means of punya and pāpa, and that the combination of jîva and Karma could any how be brought about like the combination of gold and stone, refute the assertion that hava has neither bandha nor moksa due to the a-murtatva of its dravya like ākās'a. ॥ 437 ॥ ( 1985.)
Or,
को वा निच्चग्गाहो सवं चिय वि भव-भङ्ग-ठिइमइयं । पज्जायंतरमेत्तप्पणादनिच्चाइववएसो ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६) Ko vā niccaggāho savvam ciya vibhava-bhanga-thiimaiyam | Pajjantaramettappaņādiniccāivavaeso 11 438 11 ( 1986 ) [को वा नित्यग्रहः सर्वमेवापि भव-भङ्ग-स्थितिमयम् ।
पर्यायान्तरमात्रार्पणादनित्यादिव्यपदेशः ॥ ४३८ ॥ ( १९८६ ) Ko vá nityagrahah sarvamevāpi bhava-bhanga-sthitinayam Paryāyāntaramātrārpaņādanityādivyapadeśaḥ 11 438 | ( 1986 ) ] ___Trans.-438 Or, why insist upon immutability ( at all ) ? Everything is suceptible to the state of production-break-and retention. Only by ( means of ) imposition of various methods, attributes like mutability etc, are designated.t ( 1986 )
टीका-अथ कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वेऽपि मोक्षस्य न किञ्चिद् नः क्षयत इति भावः । इह "कालंतरनासी वा घडो व" इत्यादिगाथाः प्रागपि षष्ठगणधरे बन्ध-मोक्षविचारे व्याख्याता एव । ततो यदिह न व्याख्यातं तत् ततोऽवगन्तव्यमिति ॥ ४३८ ॥ (१९८६)
+ Vide v. 1843.

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• 494 : •
Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eleventh
D. C.-It is no use insisting exclusively upon nityata of muktātmā. Its a-nityata could also be admitted to a certain extent by means of various methods. But, realy speaking, all objects are susceptible to utpada-vyaya-and dhrauvya | 438 || (1986)
For a detailed discussion of bandha and moksa, see Chap. VI.
Now, in reply to the assertion that the extinction of soul resembles that of lamp etc, the author states
न य सहा विणासोऽणलस्स परिणामओ पयस्व । कुंभस्स कवालाण व तहाविगारोवलंभाओ || ४३९ ॥ (१९८७)
Na ya savvahā vināso'ṇalassa pariņāmao payasseva Kumbhassa kavālāna va tahāvigārovalambhão || 439 ॥ ( 1987 )
[ न च सर्वथा विनाशोऽनलस्य परिणामतः पयस इव ।
कुम्भस्य कपालानामिव तथाविकारोपलम्भात् ।। ४३९ ॥ ( १९८७ ) Na ca sarvatha vinaso'nalasya parināmataḥ payasa iva Kumbhasya kapālānāmiva tathavikāropalambhat ||4391 (1987) ]
Trans.-439 Fire being mutable like milk does not vanish entirely, because of the apprehension of changes like those ( in case ) of the pieces of ghata. ( 1987 )
9
टीका - न प्रदीपानलस्य सर्वप्रकारैर्विनाशः, परिणामत्वात् पयसो दुग्धस्येव, अथवा, यथा मुद्गराद्याहतस्य कपालतया परिणतस्य घटस्य, यथा वा चूणीकृतानां कपालानाम् । कुतो न सर्वथा विनाशः १ । इत्याह- तथा तेन रूपान्तरप्रकारेण विकारस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपलम्भादिति ॥ ४३९ ॥ ( १९८७ )
D. C-When a lamp is extinguished, its fire does not enirely vanish. It is only mutable like milk. So, like milk turning into curds or like ghata changing into various pieces

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Vada ) Ganadharavada
.: 495:. by means of a stick eto light changes into darkness, but it does not vanish absolutely. ॥ 439 ॥ ( 1987 )
Again, there is an objection and its replyजइ सबहा न नासोऽणलस्स किं दीसए न सो सक्खं ? । परिणामसुहुमयाओ जलयविगारंजणरउ व ॥४४०॥ (१९८८) Jai savvahā na nāso'nalassa kim disae na so sakkham ? | Pariņāmasuhumayāo jalayavigāranjanarau vva 11 440 V ( 1988 ) [ यदि सर्वथा न नाशोऽनलस्य किं दृश्यते न स साक्षात् ।
परिणामसूक्ष्मतातो जलदविकारोऽञ्जनरज इव ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८) Yadi sarvatha na našo’nalasya ku driśyate na sa sākṣāt 1 Pariņamasūksmatāto jaladavikāro’njanaraja iva || 440 11 ( 1988 )]
Trans.-440 “ If there is no absolute extinction of light, why it is not seen before our eyes ? ” “ Because of the subtlety of fruition as in the case of a change in cloud or dust particle. ( 1988)
टीका-यदि सर्वथाऽनलस्य न नाशः, तर्हि विध्यातानन्तरं किमित्यसौ साक्षाद् न दृश्यते ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह-" परिणामेत्यादि" विध्याते प्रदीपेऽनन्तरमेव तामसपुद्गलरूपो विकारः समुपलभ्यत एव, चिरं चासौ पुरस्ताद् यद् नोपलभ्यते, तत् सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्मतरपरिणामभावात् । तथाहि-विशीर्यमाणस्य जलदस्यापि यः कृष्णाभ्रपुद्गलविकारः स परिणामसौक्षम्याद् नोपलभ्यते । तथा, अञ्जनस्यापि पवनेन ह्रियमाणस्य यदुत्कृष्टरज उड्डीयते तदपि परिणामसौक्षम्याद् नोपलभ्यते, न पुनरसत्त्वादिति ॥ ४४० ॥ (१९८८)
D. C.-Prabhāsa:-If there were no absolute extinction of fire, why is it not perceived before our eyes?
Bhagavān:-The vokāra of the light extinguished viz darkness-is not directly perceptible, because its pariņāma is very subtle in form. Changes in a black cloud at the time of dissolution of a cloud, are not perceived because of their very

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•: 496 :.
Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh
subtle parināma, and the pollen of a collyrium also blown away by wind is not directly perceived, because it is very minute. But in no way, it means that it 'does not exist. So, the vikāra of darkness in case of light is also non-apprehensible, not because it is non-existent but because its parināma is sūkesma. ॥ 440 ॥ ( 1988 )
Also,
होऊण इंदियंतरगज्झा पुणरिंदियंतरग्गहणं ।
खंधा एंति न एंति य पोग्गलपरिणामया चित्ता ॥४४१ ॥ (१९८९)
Houna indiyantaragajjhā punarindiyantaraggahanam | Khandhā enti na enti ya poggalaparināmaya cittā ॥ 441 ॥ (1989) [ भूत्वेन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्याः पुनरिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणम् ।
स्कन्धा यान्ति न यान्ति च पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्रा ॥ ४४१ || (१९८९) Bhutvendriyantaragrahyaḥ punarindriyantaragrahaṇam | Skandha yānti na yānti ca pudgalaparināmatā citrā ॥441॥ ( 1989 ) ] Trans.-441 (Some) objects apprehensible by (one group of sense organs, are again apprehended by (another group of ) sense organs, while others are not apprehended (by another set of sense-organs). Manifold is the nature of their fruitions. ( 1989 )
*
टीका - इह सुवर्णपत्र - लवण-सुण्ठी- हरीतकी - चित्रक - गुडादयः एकन्धाः पूर्वमिन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्माश्चक्षुरादीन्द्रियविषया भूत्वा पुनर्द्रव्य-क्षेत्र - कालादि सामयन्तरं प्राप्य पुलपरिणामवे चित्र्यादिन्द्रियान्तरग्रहणं स्पर्शन - रसनादीन्द्रियग्राह्यतामायान्ति; तथाहि - सुवर्णं पत्रीकृतं चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं भूत्वा शोधनार्थ मनौ प्रक्षिप्तं भस्मना मिलितं सत् स्पर्शनेन्द्रियग्राह्यतामेति पुनः प्रयोगेण भस्मनः पृथक्कृतं चक्षुर्विषयतामुपगच्छति । लवण-सुण्ठी- हरीतकी - चित्रकगुडादयोsपि प्राक् चक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् रूपाद्यन्ते वौषधसमुदाये च क्वाथ - चूर्णा - ऽवलेहादि परिणामान्तरमापन्नाः सन्तो रसनेन्द्रियसंवेद्या भवन्ति । कर्पूर- कस्तूरिकादीनामपि पुद्गलाक्षुग्रह्या अपि वायुना

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
• 497 : दूरमुपनीता घ्राणसंवेद्या भवन्ति । योजननवकात्तु परतो गतास्तथाविधं कश्चित् सूक्ष्मपरिणाममापन्ना नैकस्यापीन्द्रियस्य विषयतां प्रतिपद्यन्त इति । अनया दिशाऽन्यापि पुद्गलपरिणामता चित्रा भावनीयेति ॥४४॥ (१९८९)
D. C.- The manifold nature of pudgala-pariņāmas is explained by means of the following example. Substances such as a sheet of gold, salt, ginger, harîtakî ( yellow iuyrobalans), citrakavela, jaggery eto-are first apprehended by senseorgans like eye etc, and then they undergo apprehension by means of other sense-organs such as that of touch, taste eto, when accompained by different substances, fields, and times etc. A sheet of gold is first apprehended by eyes, but when passed through fire and mixed with ashes for purification, it is apprehended by the sense of touch as well. Afterwards when it is separated from it, again it becomes apprehensible by eyes, The same is the case with objects like salt, ginger, green vegetables, jaggery etc. They are also caksurgrāhya at the first instance, but when mixed with ashes or other groups of medicines or when turned into liquid, powder or paste, they are perceived by the sense of touch. Pudgalus like camphor and musk although perceptible by eyes at first, undergo perception by the sense of smell when carried by wind to a long distance.
On the other hand, some pudgalas when carried to a distance longer than nine yojanast do not undergo perception by means of any sense-organ on account of their subtle changes. In all these cases, variegated nature of the changes of pudgalas, is the main cause. ll 441 11 ( 1989)
Besides, एगेगेंदियगज्झा जह वायवादओ तहग्गेया। होउं चक्खुग्गज्झा घाणिंदियगज्झयामेंति ॥ ४४२॥ (१९९०)
+ One Yojana=Four Kos'as or 9 miles (approximately)

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: 498 :
Jinabhadra Gani's (The eleventh Egegendiyagájjhā jaha vāyavvādao tahaggeyā i Höum cakkhuggajjhā ghāṇindiyagajjhayāmenti 11 442 11 ( 1990 ) [एकैकेन्द्रियग्राह्या यथा वायव्यादयस्तथाऽऽग्नेयाः।
भूत्वा चक्षुाद्या घ्राणेन्द्रियग्राह्यतां यान्ति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०) Ekaikendriyagrahya yathā vāyavyadayastathā”greyāḥ 1 Bhutvā caksurgrāhya ghranendriyagrahyatam yanti 14420 (1990)]
Trans.-442 Just as ( the particles of ) wind etc, are perceptible by each single sense-organ ( one by one), (those ) of fire also undergo perception by means of the sense of smell after being perceptible by eyes. ( 1990)
टीका-वायुः स्पर्शनेन्द्रियस्यैव ग्राह्यः, रसो रसनस्यैव, गन्धो घ्राणस्यैव, रूपं चक्षुष एव, शब्दस्तु श्रोत्रस्यैव ग्राह्यः । तदेवं यथा वायाव्यदयः पुद्गला एकैकस्य प्रतिनियतस्येन्द्रियस्य ग्राह्या भूत्वा पश्चात् परिणामान्तरं किमप्यापन्ना इन्द्रियान्तरग्राह्या अपि भवन्तीति स्वयमेव गम्यते, तथा प्रस्तुता अपि प्रदीपगता आग्नेयाः पुद्गलाश्चक्षुह्या भूत्वा पश्चाद् विध्याते तस्मिन् प्रदीपे त एव तामसीभूताः सन्तो घ्राणेन्द्रियग्राह्यतामुपयान्ति, तत् किमुच्यते-" किं दीसए न सो सक्खं " इति ?। ननु घ्राणेन्द्रियेणोपलभ्यत एव विध्यातप्रदीपविकार इति ॥ ४४२ ॥ (१९९०)
____D. CWind is perceptible by the sense of touch, juice by that of taste alone, odour by that of smell alone, form by that of eyes alone, and sound by that of ears alone. The particles of vāyu are thus apprehended by one particular sense only. Still however, these pudgalas are apprehended by other sense-organs also when they undergo changes.
In case of light, particles of flanie are perceptible by eyes. When light is extinguished, these particles change into darkness and are perceived by the sense of smell. Light, therefore, does not turn into nothingness, but its change into darkness is apprehended. ॥ 442 ॥ ( 1990)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
•: 499 :. जह दीवो निवाणो परिणामन्तरमिओ तहा जीवो। भण्णइ परिनिवाणो पत्तोऽणाबाहपरिणामं ॥ ४४३॥ (१९९१) Jaha dîvo nivvāno parināmantaramio tahā jīvo | Bhannai parinivvāno patto'nābāhaparinamam n 443 ॥ ( 1991 )
[ यथा दीपो निर्वाणः परिणामान्तरमितस्तथा जीवः ।
भण्यते परिनिर्वाणः प्राप्तोऽनाबाधपरिणामम् ॥ ४४३ ॥ ( १९९१ ) Yathā dipo nirvanah pariņāmāntaramitastathā jīvaḥ | Bhanyate parinirvāṇaḥ prapto’nābād haparıņānam 1144311 (1991)]
Trans.—443 Just as light changed into another form, is said to have attained nirvāņa (final extinction) the Soul also, is said to have attained nirvana ( final liberation when it has turned into a faultless form. ( 1991) ___टीका-यथऽनन्तरोक्तस्वरूपपरिणामान्तरं प्राप्तः प्रदीपो “निर्वाणः" इत्युच्यते तथा जीवोऽपि कर्मविरहितकेवलामूर्तजीवस्वरूपभावलक्षणमबा, परिणामान्तरं प्राप्तो निर्वाणो निर्वृति प्राप्त उच्यते । तस्माद् दुःखादिक्षयरूपा सतोऽवस्था निर्वाणमिति स्थितम् ॥ ४४३ ॥ (१९९१) ___D C.-Just as light is said to have atained nevāna when it changes into darkness, the Soul is also said to have attained nirvāna when it has changed into a form which is void of Karma, and which possesses absolutely a-mūrtu characteristics of the form and nature of the Soul. This sbows that moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of jîva when miseries etc are exterminated.
Prabhāsa:—If moksa is nothing but the pure eternal positive condition of gîva, at the removal of miseries etc, then, in absence of objects of pleasure like s'abda etc, the free Soul will have no happiness. ll 443 11 ( 1991 )
Bhagavān replies:

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Jinabhadra Gaại's [The eleventh मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं जाणाणाबाहओ जहा मुणिणो । तद्धम्मा पुण विरहादावरणा-ऽऽबाहहेऊणं ॥ ४४४ ॥ (१९९२) Muttassa param sokkham nānāņābāhao jahā muņino Taddhammā puna virahādāvaranā="bāhaheūņam 11 44411 (1992) [ मुक्तस्य परं सौख्यं ज्ञानानाबाधतो यथा मुनेः ।
तद्धर्मा पुनर्विरहादावरणा-ऽऽवाधहेतूनाम् ॥ ४४४ ॥ ( १९९२ ) Muktasya param saukhyam jäānānābādhato yatha muneḥ Taddharmā punarvirabadávaraņā,"bhādhahetūnām ||444|| (1992)]
Trans.-444 Like a sage, the free soul ( enjoys) perfect happiness by ( virtue of ) its ( high ) knowledge, in absence of ( all) obstructions. In absence of interruptions and obstructions, it ( enjoys) ( all ) its qualities. ( 1992)
टीका-मुक्तस्य जन्तोःपरं प्रकृष्टमकृत्रिमममिथ्याभिमानजं स्वाभाविक सुखमिति प्रतिज्ञा । " णाणाणाबाहउ ति" ज्ञानप्रकर्षे सति जन्म-जराव्याधि-मरणे-ष्टवियोगा-ऽरति-शोक-क्षुत्-पिपासा-शीतोष्ण-काम-क्रोधमद-शाठ्य-तृष्णा-राग-द्वेष-चिन्तौत्सुक्यादिनिः शेषाबाधविरहितत्वादिति हेतुः । तथा विधप्रकृष्टमुनेरिव । यथोक्ताबाधरहितानि काष्ठादीन्यपि वर्तन्ते, परं तेषां ज्ञानाभावाद् न सुखम् ; अतस्तद्वयवच्छेदार्थ ज्ञानग्रहणम् । कथं पुनरसौ प्रकृष्टज्ञानवान् , आवाधरहितश्च ? इत्याह--" तद्धर्मेत्यादि " तद्धर्माप्रकृष्टज्ञाना-ऽनाबाधवान् मुक्तात्मा । कुतः । विरहात्-अभावात् । केषाम् ।। आवरणहेतूनाम् , आवाधहेतूनां च । एतदुक्तं भवति-क्षीणनिः शेषावरणत्वात् प्रकृष्टज्ञानवानसौ, वेदनीयकर्मादीनां च सर्वेषामप्या बाधहेतूनां सर्वथाऽपगमात् सर्वाऽऽवाधरहितोऽयमिति । प्रयोगः-स्वाभाविकेन स्वेन प्रकाशेन प्रकाशवान् मुक्तात्मा, समस्तप्रकाशावरणरहितत्वात् , तुहिनांशुवत् । तथा चाह
स्थितः शीतांशुवजीवः प्रकृत्या भावशुद्धया।
चन्द्रिकावच्च विज्ञानं तदावरणमभ्रवत् ॥ १॥
इति । तथा, अनाबाधसुखो मुक्तात्मा, समस्ताबाधहेतुरहितत्वात् , ज्वराद्यपगमे स्वच्छाऽऽतुरवत् । तथा चोक्तम्

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स व्यावाधाभावात् सर्वज्ञत्वाच्च भवति परमसुखी ।" व्याबाधाभावोऽत्र स्वच्छस्य ज्ञस्य परमसुखम् ॥ १ ॥ इति ॥ ४४४ ॥ ( १९९२ )
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.: 501 :.
D. C.-Muktātmā enjoys a perfect but natural happiness. When there is no avarana, it attains high cognizance and when there is absolute abhava of Karma, which is nothing but a cause of un-happiness, it is free from all sorts of miseries. So, like a sage, muktātmā enjoys the delight of high cognizance. It enjoys perfect happiness as it is free from the miseries of birth, old age, disease, death, separation from the beloved, absence of love, sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire, anger, pride, passion, hatred, anguish, wickedness, and eagerness etc. Lik the Sun, the free soul shines by its own lustre. It has therefore been said that
Sthitaḥ śitanśuvajjîvah prakritya bhāvaśuddhayā | Candrikavacca vijñām tādavaranamabhravat | 1 ||
With reference to the unobstructed happiness, it has also been said
Sa vyabadhābhāvāt sarvajnatvacca bhavati paramasukhi | Vyabadhabhavo'tra svacchasya jňasya para masuk ham ||2|444(1992)] The opponent, then, asks and Bhagavan replies
मुत्तो करणाभावादण्णाणी खं व, नणु विरुद्धोऽयं । ancftayı fâ q1ag gà fau xoş aaıı 1188411(1993)
Mutto karaṇābhāvādaṇṇānî kham va, naņu viruddho'yam Jamajîvayā vi pāvar etto cciya bhaṇai tannāma ■ 445 u (1993) [ मुक्तः करणाभावादज्ञानी खमिव, ननु विरुद्धोऽयम् ।
यदजीवतापि प्रानोत्येतस्मादेव भणति तन्नाम || ४४५ ॥ (१९९३) Muktaḥ karanabhavadajuanî khamiva, nanu viruddho'yam Yadajîvatapi prapnotyetasmādeva bhanati tannāma 445μ (1993) ]

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh Trans.-445 “A free ( soul ) is ignorant like the sky, in absence of senses.” “ This is really fallacious. Because, in that case, it would attain lifelessness as well." "Let it ( attain lifelessness.)" ( 1993 )
टीका-नन्वज्ञानी मुक्तात्मा, करणाभावात् , आकाशवत् । अत्राचार्यः प्राह-ननु धर्मिस्वरूपविपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः। तथाहि-अनेनैतदपि सिध्यति-अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, करणाभावात् , आकाशवत् । अत्र पर: सोत्कर्ष भणति-" तन्नाम त्ति" 'नाम' इत्यभ्यनुज्ञायाम्-अस्त्वेतत् , न नः किमपि भूयते । न हि मुक्तात्मनामजीवत्वेऽस्माकं किञ्चिद् नश्यति, येन हेतोविरुद्धता प्रेर्यमाणा शोभेत । अत्राह कश्चित्-ननु मुक्तस्याजीवत्वमाईतानामप्यनिष्टमेव ततश्चैतद् दूषणमाचार्येणापि परिहर्तव्यमेव, यच्चात्मनोऽपि दूषणं समापतति तत् कथं परस्यैवैकस्योद्भाव्यते । सत्यमेतत्, किन्तु परशक्तिपरीक्षार्थ प्रेर्यमाचार्यः कृतवान् , कदाचित् क्षोभाद् विगलितप्रतिभा परोऽत्रापि प्रतिविधाने स्खलितस्तूष्णीं विदध्यात् । परमार्थतस्तु जीवस्याजीवत्वं कदाचिदपि न भवत्येव ॥४४५ ॥ (१९९३)
D. C.-Prabhāsa:-When a muktātmā is free from senseorgans, it will be called ignorant like ākās'a.
Bhagavan :--It is not so. The argument advanced by you, proves even a contrary paryāyu of soul. It will prove muktātmā to be lifeless in absence of endriyas.
Prabhāsa:-Well, what is wrong if muktātmā is taken as lifeless १ ॥ 445॥ ( 1993 )
Bhagavān repliesदवा-ऽमुत्तत्त सहावजाइओ तस्स दूरविवरीयं । न हि जच्चतरगमणं जुत्तं नभसो व जीवत्तं ॥४४६ ॥ (१९९४) Davvā-'muttatta sahāvajāio tassa dūravivarîyam Na hijaccantaragamanam juttam nabhaso vva jīvattam 11446||(1994)

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• 503:. [ द्रव्याऽमूर्तत्ववत् स्वभावजातितस्तस्य दूरविपरीतम् ।
न हि जात्यन्तरगमनं युक्तं नभस इव जीवत्वम् ॥ ४४६ ।। (१९९४) Dravya’mūrtatvavat svabhāvajātitastasya dūraviparstain i Na hijātyantaragamanam yuktam nabhasa ivajivatvam|446||(1994)]
Trans.--446 By virtue of its natural genesis like dravyatva and a-mūrtatva, it is far the most fallacious. Like life to sky, its transgression to the other genesis, is not proper. ( 1994 )
टीका-तस्य मुक्तात्मनो हि यस्मात् कारणाद् न युक्तमिति संबन्धः । किं तद् न युक्तम् ? इत्याह-एकस्या जीवत्वलक्षणाया जातेयंदजीवत्वलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं जात्यन्तरगमनम् , तन्न युक्तम् । कथंभूतं जात्यन्तरम् ? इत्याह-दूरमत्यर्थ विपरीतं दूरविपरीतम् । कस्या दूरविपरीतम् ? इत्याह - " सहावजाइउ ति" जीवत्वलक्षणा या स्वाभाविकी स्वभावभूता जातिः स्वभावजातिस्तस्याः। किंवद् या स्वभावजातिः ? इत्याह--उपमानप्रधानत्वाद् निर्देशस्य, द्रव्या-ऽमूर्तत्ववदिति द्रव्यत्ववदमूर्तत्ववञ्चत्यर्थः । स्वभावजातेदूरविपरीतं सत् कस्य यथा किं न युक्तम् ? इत्याह--नमस इव जीवत्वम् । इदमत्र हृदयम्-द्रव्यत्वम् , अमूर्तत्वं च जीवस्य तावत् स्वभावभूता जातिः, तस्याश्च यद् दूरविपरीतं जात्यन्तरमद्रव्यत्वम् , अमूतत्वं च, तत्र गमनं तस्य कस्यामप्यवस्थायां न भवति । एवं जीवत्वमपि जीवस्य स्वभावभूतैव जातिः, ततस्तस्या अपि स्वभावजातेयद् द्रविपरीतम जीवत्वलक्षणं जात्यन्तरं तत्र गमनं मुक्तावस्थायामपि तस्य न युज्यते । न ह्यजीवस्य सतो नभसः कदाचिदपि जीवत्वाप्राप्तिर्भवति । तस्माद् मुक्तो जीवो यथाऽद्रव्यं मूर्तश्च न भवति, तद्विपक्षस्वभावत्वात् एवं जीवस्वाभाव्याद जीवोऽप्यसौ कदाचिदपि न भवति; अन्यथा नभः-परमाण्वादीनामपि स्वस्वभावत्यागेन वैपरीत्यापच्याऽतिप्रसङ्गादिति ।
अत्राह-यद्येवम् , तर्हि यद् भवतैवोक्तम्-"अजीवो मुक्तात्मा, कारणाभावात् , आकाशवत्" इति, तत् कथं नेतव्यम् । अत्रोच्यते--परस्य प्रसङ्गापादनमेव तदस्माभिः कृतम्, तत्करणे च कारणमुक्तमेव, न पुनरनेन हेतुना मुक्तस्याजीवत्वं सिध्यति, प्रतिबन्धाभावात् ; तथाहि-यदि करणैर्जीवत्वं

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh कृतं भवेत् , यथा दहनेन धूमः, व्यापकानि वा जीवत्वस्य करणानि यदि भवेयुः, यथा शिंशपाया वृक्षत्वम् , तदा करणनिवृत्तौ भवेजीवत्वनिवृत्तिः, यथाऽग्नि-वृक्षत्वनिवृत्तौ धूम-शिंशपात्वयोः; न चैतदस्ति, जीवत्वस्यानादिपारिणामिकभावरूपत्वेनाकृतकत्वात् । व्याप्य-व्यापकभावोऽपीन्द्रियाणां शरीरेणैव सह युज्यते, उभयस्यापि पौलिकत्वात् , न तु जीवत्वेन, जीवस्यामूर्तत्वेनात्यन्तं तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मात् करणनिवृत्तावप्यनिवृत्तमेव मुक्तस्य जीवत्वमिति ॥ ४४६ (१९९४)॥
___D. C.-Bhagawan :-Your statement is absolutely fallacious. Just as drayatva and a-mūrtatva are the innate characteristics of a soul, and just as that genesis of jîva never exists in any condition in a genesis having contrary characteristics like a-dravyatva and c-mūrtatva, javatva is also the innate and natural characteristic of jîva, and that genesis of jîva never exists in a genesis having opposite characteristics. Consequently, in the state of muktăitmii, Jiva does never become a-zivot
Just as a free soul never attains the condition of a-dravyatva and mūrtatva, it never reaches a life-less state leaving aside its own innate living characteristics. For, if it leaves its own svabhūva, the sky and molecules will also leave their innate characteristics and accept the unnatural tendency.
Prabhāsa :-If it is so, how do you explain your statement that muktātmā is a-java like ākās'a, on account of the abhāva of sense-organs.
Bhagavān:-The statement was made by me only to refute the opponent's view. In doing so, the reason has already been explained, but this argument does not lead to prove mūktātmā to be lifeless, as there is no pratibandha for it For, if jîvatva is established by the existence of indriyas, it goes without saying that in absence of sence-organs, Jîva will also be absent, as in the cases of fire and smoke, and As'oka and vrkșatva. But it does not happen actually. The sense-organs

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are connected with body by the relation of part, and whole, but they are not connected with giva because of its a-mūrtatva. It is not correct, therefore, to say that with the abhāva of indriyas, there is abhāva of gîvatva in muktātmā.
Prabhāsa :-But, even in that case, how will you answer my contention that muktātma is ignorant like sky in absence of sense-organs ?
The reply isमुत्ताइभावओ नोवलद्धिमंतिंदियाइं कुंभो छ । उवलंभद्दाराणि उ ताई जीवो तदुवलद्धा ॥ ४४७॥ (१९९५) तदुवरमे वि सरणओ तवावारे वि नोवलंभाओ। इंदियभिन्नो आया पंचगवक्खोवलद्धा वा ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६) Muttāibhāvao novaladdhimantindiyāim kumbho vva i Uvalambhaddārāni u tāim jîvo taduvaladdhā || 447 || ( 1995 ) Taduvarame vi saranao tayvāyāre vi novalambhāo 1 Indiyabhinno āyā pancagavakkhovaladdhā vā 11 448 11 ( 1996 ) [ मूर्तादिभावतो नोपलब्धिमन्तीन्द्रियाणि कुम्भ इव । उपलम्भद्वाराणि तु तानि जीवस्तदुपलब्धा ।। ४४७ ॥ ( १९९५ ) तदुपरमेऽपि स्मरणतस्तद्वयापारेऽपि नोपलम्भात् ।
इन्द्रियभिन्न आत्मा पञ्चगवाक्षोपलब्धेव ॥ ४४८ ॥ (१९९६) Mārtādıbhāvato nopalabdhımantîndriyāṇi kumbha iva i Upalambhadvārāņi tu tāni jîvastdupalabdha || 447 || ( 1995 ) Taduparame’pı smaranastadvyāpāre'pi nopalambhāti Indriyabhinna ātmā pancagavaksopalabdheva || 448 11 ( 1996 )]
Trans.-447-448 On account of their ( qualities like ) mūrtatva etc like ghata, sense-organs do not attain apprehension, but they are mere mediums of apprehension. Their
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[The eleventh
( real ) agent of apprehension is jiva. Because of ( its power of) recollection, even when they cease to work and for want of apprehension even when they are working, the soul is distinguished from sense-organs like an observer from the five windows. ( 1995-1996)
टीका-अनयोाख्या पूर्ववत् । केवलं प्रस्तुते भावार्थ उच्यते-यदीन्द्रियाण्युपलब्धिमन्ति भवेयुस्तदा तन्निवृत्तावप्युपलब्धिनिवृत्तिर्भवेत् , न
चैतदस्ति, अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां जीवस्योपलब्धिमचनिश्चयादिति ॥ ४४७-- ४४८ ॥ (१९९५-१९९६ ) ॥
D. C.-If the indriyas were the real agents of apprehension, there would have been no perception when they ceased to work. But it does not happen so. On the other hand, when they worked, perception should positively take place, but due to the absent-mindedness of the observer it does not happen so. The power of jîva is thus established from the positive as well as negative point of view. [1447–44811 (1995–1996)
Indicating that gnana would not vanish with indriyas, but it is the very innate nature of jîva, the author statesनाणरहिओ न जीवो सरूवओऽणु व मुत्तिभावेणं । जं तेण विरुद्धमिदं अत्थि य सो नाणरहिओ य ॥४४९॥ (१९९७) Nānarahio na jîvo sarūvao'nu vya muttıbhāveņam i Jam tena viruddhamidam atthi ya so nānarahio ya ॥449॥ (1997) [ ज्ञानरहितो न जीवः स्वरूपतोऽणुरिव मूर्तिभावेन ।
यत् तेन विरुद्धमिदमस्ति च स ज्ञानरहितश्च ।। ४४९ ॥ (१९९७) Jnánarahito na jivah svarūpato’ņuriva mūrtıbhävena / Yat tena virudd hamıdamasti ca sa jñānarahitaśca ||44911 (1997)]
Trans.--449 Like an atom, jiva as such is not void of cognizance, because of its corporeal nature. Hence, the statement that it is void of cognizance is incorrect. ( 1997 )

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.. 507 : टीका-यद् यस्माज्ज्ञानरहितो जीवः कदाचिदपि न भवति, ज्ञानस्य तत्स्वरूपत्वात् , यथा मूर्तिभावेन रहितोऽणुन भवति, तेन तस्माद् कारणाद् विरुद्धमेतत्-" अस्ति चासौ मुक्तो जीवः, अथ च स ज्ञानरहितः" इति । न हि स्वरूपस्याभावे स्वरूपवतोऽवस्थानं युज्यते, तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य तस्यासत्वात् , तथा चानन्तरमेवोक्तम्-" न हि जच्चतरगमणं जुत्तं नभसो व जीवत्तं " इति ॥ ४४९ ( १९९७ ) ॥
D. C.-Just as an atom cannot exist without a finite form, Java could also never exist without cognizance, as cognizance is the very nature of jîva. Since a corporeal body cannot exist without a finite form, your statement that muktātmā is void of jñāna, is absolutely incorrect. Il 449 11 ( 1997)
Again there is a question and its reply-- किह सो नाणसरूवो नणु पञ्चक्खाणुभूइओ नियए। परदेहम्मिवि गज्झो स पवित्ति-निवित्तिलिंगाओ ॥४५०॥ (१९९८) Kiha so nānasarūvo naņu paccakkhānubhūio niyae 1 Paradehammi vi gajjho sa pavitti-nivittilingāo 11 450 # ( 1998 ) [ कथं स ज्ञानस्वरूपो ननु प्रत्यक्षानुभूतितो निजके ।
परदेहेऽपि ग्राह्यः स प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिलिङ्गात् ।। ४५० ॥ (१९९८ ) Katham sa jñānasvarūpo nanu pratyakşānubhūtito nijake i Paradehe’pi grāhyaḥ sa pravritti-nivrittılıngāt || 450 || ( 1998 )]
Trans.-450 “ How does it exist in the form of cognizance ? ” “By direct apprehension, it is cognizible in case of its own body, and in the capacity of engagement and retirement in case of another's body.” ( 1998 )
टीका-ननु कथमसौ जीवो ज्ञानस्वरूप इति निश्चीयते । अत्रोत्तरमाह-' ननु' इत्यक्षमायाम् , ननु निजे देहे तावत् प्रत्यक्षानुभवादेव ज्ञानस्वरूपो जीव इति विज्ञायते, इन्द्रियव्यापारोपरमेऽपि तद्व्यापारोपलब्धार्थानुस्मरणात् , तद्व्यापारेऽपि चान्यमनस्कतायामनुपलम्भात् ,

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [The eleventh अदृष्टा-ऽश्रुतानामपि चार्थानां तथाविधक्षयोपशमपाटवात् कदाचिद् व्याख्यानावस्थायां चेतसि स्फुरणात् । एतच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धमपि भवतः प्रष्टव्यतां गतम् । तथा, स जन्तुः परदेहेऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूप एवेति ग्रायः। कुतः । तथाविधप्रवृत्ति-निवृत्तिलिङ्गादिति ।। ४५० ।। (१९९८ ) ॥ ____D. C.-Prabhāsa:-With what authority can you say that Jiva is jñānasvarūpa ?
Bhagavān:-That gîva exists as cognizance in its own body is seen by means of direct apprehension. Even when sense-organs cease to work, the object perceived by senseorgans, is recollected, while sometimes the object is not apprehended even when the sense-organs are working because of absent-mindednes-sometimes perception crops up in the mind due to the relaxation of their destruction at the time of explanation.
In case of another's body also, gîva is known to be gnänasvarūpa on account of its inclination (to the desirable objects ) and aversion ( from the undesirable ones ). 14501(1998)]
And, सबावरणावगमे सो सुद्धयरो भवेज सूरो छ। तम्मयभावाभावादण्णाणित्तं न जुत्तं से ॥ १५१ ॥ (१९९९) Savvāvaraṇāvagame so suddhayaro bhavejja sūro vva Tammayabhāvābhāvādannānitlam na juttam se u 451 ll (1999) [ सर्वावरणापगमे स शुद्धतरो भवेत् सूर इव ।
तन्मयभावाभावादज्ञानित्वं न युक्तं तस्य ॥ ४५१ ॥ ( १९९९ ) Sarvávaraṇāpagame sa suddhataro bhayet sūra iva i Tanmayabhavabhavadajianitvam na yuktam tasya ॥451॥ (1999)]
Trans.-451 At the removal of all interruptions, that ( muktātma ) would be purer like the Sun. It is not, therefore, proper to attribute ignorance to it. ( 1999 )

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टीका - सेन्द्रियो जन्तुर्देशतोऽप्यावरणक्षये तावत् तारतम्येन ज्ञानयुक्त एव भवति, यस्य त्वनिन्द्रियस्य सर्वमध्यावरणं क्षीणम् स निःशेषावरणापगमे शुद्धतर एव भवति - संपूर्णज्ञानप्रकाशयुक्त एव भवतीत्यर्थः यथा समस्ताआवरणापगमे संपूर्ण प्रकाशमयः सूर्यः । ततस्तन्मयभावस्य प्रकाशमयत्वस्य करणाभावेनाभावाद् हेतोः " से " तस्य मुक्तस्य यदज्ञानित्वं प्रेर्यते भवता, तद् न युक्तम्, आवारकाभावे तस्यैव प्रकर्षवतो ज्ञानप्रकाशस्य सद्भावादिति ।। ४५१ ॥ ( १९९९ ) ॥
D. C. - Muktātmā possesses the power of complete cognizance. A soul having sense-organs is cognizant but to a more or less extent on account of its avaranas being removed partially Since all the avaranas are removed in case of a muktātmā, it is completely cognizant
Just as the Sun becomes completely resplendent with lustre when all the avaranas like clouds etc are removed, the muktātmā is also completely resplendent with the lustre of cognizance when all avaranas of indriyas have been removed. || 451 || (1999)
एवं पगासमइओ जीवो छिदावभासयत्ताओ | किंचिम्मेत्तं भासइ छिद्दावरणपईवो व ॥ ४५२ ॥ ( २००० ) सुबहुयरं वियाणइ मुत्तो सवप्पाणविगमाओ | अवणीघरो व नरो विगयावरणप्पईवो व ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१)
Evam pagāsamaio jîvo chiddāvabhāsayattāo | Kincimmettam bhāsai chiddāvaranapaívo vva ॥ 452 (2000) Subahuyaram viyānai mutto savvappihānavigamão | Avaniyagharo vva naro vigayāvaranappaivo vva || 453 ॥ (2001)
[ एवं प्रकाशमयो जीवच्छिद्रावभासकत्वात् ।
किंञ्चिन्मात्रं भासते छिद्रावरणप्रदीप इव ।। ४५२ ।। ( २००० )

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सुबहुतरं विजानाति मुक्तः सर्वपिधानविगमात् ।
अपनीतगृह इव नरो विगतावरणप्रदीप इव ॥ ४५३ ॥ (२००१) Evam prakāšanjayo jivaśchidrāvabhāsakatvāti Kincinmātram bhāsate chidrāyaraņapradipa iva 11452|| ( 2000 ) ] Subabutaram vijanāti muktah sarvapidhānavigamäti Apanitagriha iva naro vigatavaranapradipa iva ॥ 453 ॥ (2001)]
Trans.-452-453 The soul is thus lustrous. It shines only a little, like a lamp (shining ) under a porous obstruction on account of its shining through holes. ( But ) like a person relieved from home or like a lamp shining without obstructions, the muktātmā perceives completely, when all its interruptions have been removed. (2000-2001 )
टीका-तदेवं सति सर्वदा प्रकाशमयः प्रकाशस्वभाव एव जीवः, केवलं संसार्यवस्थायां छद्मस्थः किञ्चिन्मात्रमवभासयति, क्षीणाऽक्षीणावरणच्छिद्रैरिन्द्रियच्छिद्रेश्चावभासनात्, सच्छिद्रकुट-कुड्याद्यन्तरितप्रदीपवदिति । मुक्तस्तु मुक्तावस्थायां प्राप्तो जीवः सुबहुतरं विजानाति-यदस्ति तत् सर्व प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः, सर्वपिधानविगमात्-सर्वावरणक्षयादित्यर्थः, अपनीतसमस्तगृहः पुरुष इव, विगतसमस्तकुट-कुड्याद्यावरणप्रदीप इव वेति । यो हि सच्छिद्रावरणान्तरितः स्तोकं प्रकाशयति स निःशेषावरणापगमे सुबह्वेव प्रकाशयति । न तु तस्य सर्वथा प्रकाशाभाव इति भावः । तस्मात् "मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं गाणा-ऽणाबाहओ" इत्यादि स्थितम् ॥ ४५२-४५३ ॥ (२०००-२००१)
D. C.-Jival is thus shown as lustrous with complete perception. In the mundane life, jîva is obstructed by various ävaraņas and hence it will be able to perceive through the holes of indriyas to a certain extent like a lamp shining through a porous wall.
But in the mukta state, the free soul illumines everything perfectly with its power of cognizance like a lanp shining

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without any obstruction or like a man relieved of all household worries.
This proves, therefore, the assertion that a free soul enjoys perfect happiness by means of perfect perception, when all its obstructions have been removed. ॥ 452-453 ॥ ( 2000-2001)]
Then doubting the existence of happiness to a free soul, the opponent arguesपुण्णा-ऽपुण्णकयाइं जं सुह-दुक्खाइं तेण तन्नासे । तन्नासाओ मुत्तो निस्सुह-दुक्खो जहागासं ॥४५४॥ (२००२) अहवा निस्सुह-दुक्खो नभं व देहें-दियादभावाओ। आधारो देहो च्चिय जं सुह-दुक्खोवलद्धीणं ॥४५५॥ (२००३) Punnā-'punnakayāim jam suha-dukkhāim tena tannāse i Tannāsão mutto nissuha-dukkho jahāgāsam 11 454 II ( 2002 ) Ahavā nissuha-dukkho nabham va dehe'ndiyāi bhāvāo 1 Adhāro deho cciya jam suha-dukkhovaladdhînam 1145511 (2003) [ पुण्या-ऽपुण्यकृते यत् सुख-दुःखे तेन तन्नाशे ।
तन्नाशाद् मुक्तो निःसुख-दुःखो यथाकाशम् ।। ४५४ ॥ (२००२) अथवा निःसुख-दुःखो नभ इव देहे-न्द्रियाद्यभावात् ।
आधारो देह एव यत् सुख-दुःखोपलब्धीनाम् ।। ४५५ ।। (२००३) Punys-'punyakrite yat sukha-duhkhe tena tannase | Tanna.sad mukto nihsukha-duhik ho yathākāsam ॥ 454 ॥ (2002) Athavă nihsukh-duḥkho nabha iva dehe-ndriyadyabhāvāti Ādhāro deha eva yat sukha-duhkhopalabdhînām ||455||(2003)]
Trans.-454-455 Since happiness and misery are the products of punya and papa ( respectively ), the mukta ( soul ) will be free from punya and pāpa like ākāśa, because it vanishes with them. Or, since body ( itself ) is the means of

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apprehension of happiness and misery, it is free from happiness and misery like the sky, in absence of body as well as senseorgans. ( 2002-2003)
टीका-पुण्यात् सुखमुपजायते, पापाच दुःखम् , इति भवतामपि संमतम् , तेन तस्मात् तयोः पुण्य-पापयोः कारणभूतयोन शे सुख-दुःखयोः कार्यरूपयो शाद् निःसुख-दुःख एव मुक्तात्मा प्रामोति, तत्कारणाभावात् आकाशवदिति । अथवा, निःसुख-दुःखोऽसौ, देहे-न्द्रियाभावात् , नभोवत् , यद् यस्माद् देह एव, तथेन्द्रियाणि च सुख-दुःखोपलब्धीनामाधारो दृश्यते, न पुनर्देहाभावे सुख-दुःखे दृश्येते, नापीन्द्रियाभावे ज्ञानं काप्युपलभ्यते । ततः सिद्धस्य कथं तदभावात् तानि श्रद्धीयन्ते ? इति ॥ ४५४-४५५ ॥ (२००२-२००३)
D. C.--Prabhāsu. That happiness is born of punya and misery of papu, has already been accepted by you. Now, when punya and pipa vanish, happiness and misery being their kāryas, will naturally vanish Hence, like: the sky muktātmā will be free from sukha-duhkha. Or, it will be free from sukha-duḥkhu in absence of deha and indriyas.
Since deha is an active means of apprehending sukha duhkha there will be no apprehension of sukha-duḥkha in absence of dela In absence of indriyas, there will be no cognizance. Consequently, a mukta ( being ) can never experience sukher-duhcha. ॥ 454-455 ॥ (2002-2003)
Bhagavān replies-- पुण्णफलं दुक्खं चिय कम्मोदयओ फलं व पावस्स । नणु पावफले वि समं पच्चक्खविरोहिआ चेव ॥४५६॥ (२००४) Punnaphalam dukkham ciya kammodayao phalam va pāvassa | Nanu pāvaphale vi samam paccakkhavirohia ceva |456 ॥ (2004) [ पुण्यफलं दुःखमेव कर्मोदयतः फलमिव पापस्य ।
ननु पापफलेऽपि समं प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता चैव ॥ ४५६ ॥ (२००४)

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Punyaphalam duḥkhameva karmodayataḥ phalamiva' papasya Nanu papaphale'pi samam pratyakṣavirodhita caiva. ||456||(2004)]
Trans.-456 “ On account of ( the rise of ) Karma, the fruition of virtuous deeds is even distressful like the fruition of sins. The same is really the case with the fruition of sins also. And it is ( nothing but ) clear contradiction. (2004)
•: 518:
""
टीका - चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिकं पुण्यफलं निश्चयतो दुःखमेव, कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, नरकत्वादिपापफलवत् । परः प्राह - ननु पापफलेऽपि समानमिदम्, तथाहि - अत्रापि वक्तुं शक्यत एतत् उक्तं पापफलं दुःखत्वेनाभिमतं परमार्थतः सुखमेव कर्मोदयजन्यत्वात्, पुण्यफलवत् । एवं च वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोधिता, स्वसंवेद्यसुख-दुःखयोर्वैपरीत्येन संवित्यभावादिति ॥ ४५६ ॥ ( २००४ )
,
D. C—Bhagavān: – Like pāpa phalas, the punya phalas like that of attaining cakravarti pada ( sovereignty of the world) etc, are also distressful on account of their being produced by Karma.
Prabhāsa:—The same could be said of pāpa-phalas as well. The papa-phalas although known as distressful are in reality happy, on account of their being produced by Karma.
Bhagavan:-Since you have not understood the real sense of sukha-dukkha, you have said so. But it is really contra. dicting. ॥ 436 ॥ ( 2004 )
जत्तो चि पञ्चक्खं सोम्म ! सुहं नत्थि दुक्खमेवेदं । तप्पडियारविभत्तं तो पुण्णफलं ति दुक्खं ति ॥४५७॥ (२००५)
Jatto cciya paccakkham Somma! suham natthi dukkhamevedam Tappadiyāravibhattam to punnaphalam ti dukkham ti ॥4571 (2005)
66
[ यत एव प्रत्यक्षं सौम्य ! सुखं नास्ति दुःखमेवेदम् ।
तत्प्रतीकारविभक्तं ततः पुण्यफलमिति दुःखमिति || ४५७|| (२००५)

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Yata eva pratyakşam Saumya ! sukham năsti duḥkhamevedami Tatpratīkāravibhaktam tataḥ puņyaphalamiti duhkhamiti 1145711] ____Trans.-457 That which is directly perceived as happiness is riot happiness, O Saumya ! but it is only misery. It has been distinguished (from duhkha ) only as its resistance. The fruition of virtuous deeds is, therefore, ( nothing but ) duhkha. (2005)
टीका-सौम्य ! प्रभास ! यत एव दुःखेऽनुभूयमाने कस्याप्यविपर्यस्तमतेः सुखं प्रत्यक्षं नास्ति, सुखानुभवः स्वसंविदितो न विद्यते, अत एवास्माभिरुच्यते-" दुक्खमेवेदं " इति, यत् किमप्यत्र संसारचक्रे सक्चन्दना-ऽङ्गनासंभोगादिसमुत्थमपि विद्यते तत् सर्व दुःखमेवेत्यर्थः, केवलं तस्याङ्गनासंभोगादिविषयौत्सुक्यजनितारति रूपस्य दुःखस्य प्रतीकारोऽङ्गनासंभोगादिकस्तत्प्रतीकारस्तेन तत्प्रतीकारेण दुःखमपि सद् विभक्तं मूढै देन व्यवस्थापितम्-तत्प्रतीकाररूपं कामिनीसंभोगादिकं पामाकण्डूयनादिवत् सुखमध्यवसितम्, शूलारोपण-शूल-शिरोबाधादिव्याधि-बन्ध-वधादिजनितं तु दुःखमिति। रमणीसंभोग-चक्रवर्तिपदलाभादिसुखं स्वसंविदितं "दुःखम्" इति वदतां प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् , मोहमूढप्रत्यक्षत्वात् तस्य, तल्लाभौत्सुक्यजनितारतिरूपदुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वाद् दुःखेऽपि तत्र सुखाध्यवसायः, पामाकण्डूयना-ऽपथ्याहारपरिभोगादिवत् ; तथा चोक्तम्
नमः प्रेत इवाविष्ट क्वणन्तीमुपगृह्य ताम् ।
गाढायासितसर्वाङ्गः स सुखी रमते किल ॥ १ ॥ औत्सुक्यमात्रमवसादयति प्रतिष्ठा क्लिश्नाति लब्धपरिपालनवृत्तिरेव । नातिश्रमापगमनाय यथा श्रमाय राज्यं स्वहस्तगतदण्डमिवातपत्रम् ॥ २ ॥ भुक्ताः श्रियः सकलकामदुधास्ततः किं संप्रीणिताः प्रणयिनः स्वधनैःस्ततः किम ? दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किं कल्पं स्थितं तनुभृतां तनुभिस्ततः किम् ॥३॥ इत्थं न किञ्चिदपि साधन-साध्यजातं स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशं परमार्थशून्यम् । अत्यन्तनिर्वृतिकरं यदपेतबाधं तद् ब्रह्म वाञ्छत जनाः! यदि चेतनास्ति ॥४॥

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Gañadharavada इत्यादिना । " पुण्यफलं ति दुक्खं ति" यत एवमुक्तंप्रकारेण दुःखेऽपि सुखाभिमानः, तस्मात् पुण्यफलमपि सर्व तत्वतो दुःखमेवेति 11 849 11 (2004)
D. C.-Bhagavān:-Pleasure afforded by objects like garlands, sandal-wood, and woman etc is, in reality, nothing but misery in this world. This sukha has been distinguished from duḥkha ( in the form ) of passions generated from the eagerness to enjoy sexual pleasures with woman etc. Only ignorant people call it happiness.
But really speaking, such sorts of happiness are only temporarily pleasant like the scratching of herpes.
While, putting to the gallows, aching in the stoniach, headache, and the fetters of imprisonment etc, are known as miseries.
Prabhāsa: -It is evidently contradictory to say that, sukha of the enjoyment with woman etc. and of the attainment of the sovereignty etc. are duḥkha.
Bhagavān: It is not contradictory to say so. It is perceived as sukha only to those who are disillusioned by ignorance. There will be establishment of sukha similar to the scratching of herpes or enjoying the forbidden food even in misery as they act as resistance against the distress of passions produced by eagerness to attain pleasure.
So, it has been said
Nagnaḥ preta ivāvistaḥ kvaṇantīmupgrihya tām
Gādhayasitasarvāngah sa sukhî ramate kila alill Autsukyamatramavasādayati pratiştha kliśnāti labdha
paripälanavrittireva i Natiśramāpagamanāya yathă śramaya rājyam svabastagata
daņdamivatapatram 112 11

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's I The eleventh Bhuktaḥ śriyah sakala kamadudhästataḥ kim sampriņitaḥ
pranayinah svadhanaistataḥ kim ? | Dattam padam širasi vidvişatām tataḥ kim kalpam sthitam
tanubhritam tanubhistatah kim? ॥ 3 ॥ Ittham na kincidapi sadhana-sadhyajātam svapnendrajala
sadrišam paramārthagūnyam Atyantanirvritikaram yadapetabād ham tad Brahma vänchata janah |
___yadi cetanasti ॥ 4 ॥ The punya phalas awarding the attainment of visaya sukhas are thus proved as nothing but duḥkhamaya in reality. ॥ 457 ॥ (2005) विसयसुहं दुक्खं चिय दुक्खपडियारओ तिगिच्छ छ । तं सुहमुवयाराओ न उवयारो विणा तचं ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६) Visayasuham dukkham ciya dukkhapadiyārao tigiccha vya i Tam suhamuvayārāo na uvayāro viņā taccam II 458 » ( 2006 ) [ विषयसुखं दुःखमेव दुःखप्रतीकारतश्चिकित्सेव ।
तत् सुखमुचाराद् नोपचारो विना तथ्यम् ॥ ४५८ ।। (२००६) Visayasukham duhkhameva duḥkhpratīkarataścikitseva | Tat sukhamupacārad nopacaro vina tathyam || 458 II ( 2006 ) ]
Trans.—458 The sensuous pleasure is distressful like medicine on account of its being a resistance against distress. It is ( known as ) happiness by ( virtue of ) usage ( only ). And there is no usage without fact. ( 2006 )
टीका-विषयसुखं तत्वतो दुःखमेव, दुःखप्रतीकाररूपत्वात् , कुष्ठगण्डाऽझरोग-क्वाथपान-च्छेदन-दम्भनादिचिकित्सावत् । यश्च लोके तत्र सुखव्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते स उपचारात् । न चोपचारस्तथ्यं पारमार्थिकं विना क्वापि प्रवर्तते, माणवकादौ सिंहाद्युपचारवदिति ॥ ४५८ ॥ (२००६)
D. C.-Since visaya sukha is after all a resistance against duhkha, it is nothing but duḥkha. For the removal of diseases like leprosy, boil, or piles, just as a dose of decoction and
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Gaṇadharavada
•:517 :.
cutting off or burning some rotten part, are considered as pleasant inspite of their causing pain, the visaya sukhas are also considered as duḥkhamaya inspite of their affording pleasure.
The visaya sukha is known as sukha by means of upacara only. This upacara is not reality but its existence is based on real objects. Without the existence of a real lion, the attribute of lion could never be given to mānavaka. ॥ 458॥ (2006)
तम्हा जं मुत्तसुहं तं तच्चं दुक्खसंखऽवस्सं । मुणिणोऽणाबाहस्स व णिप्पडियारप्पसूईओ ॥ ४५९॥ (२००७)
Tamha jam muttasuham tam taccam dukkhasamkhae'vassam Munino'nābāhassa va nippadiyārappastiio ॥ 459 ॥ ( 2007 )
[ तस्माद् यद् मुक्तसुखं तत् तथ्यं दुखसंक्षयेऽवश्यम् । मुनेरनाबाधस्येव निष्प्रतीकार प्रसूतेः ॥ ४५९ ।। ( २००७ ) Tasmad yad muktasukham tat tathyam duḥkhasamksaye'vasyamı Muneranābhādhasyeva nispratikaraprasūteh || 459 || (2007) ]
Trans. – 459 Hence, at the removal of ( all ) miseries, happiness of a free (soul) being produced unresisted and unobstructed like a sage, is undoubtedly a real (happiness) ( 2007 )
टीका - तस्माद् यद् मुक्तस्य संबन्धि तदेव सुखं तथ्यं निरुपचरितम् । कुतः ? | स्वाभाविकत्वेन निष्प्रतीकाररूपस्य तस्य प्रतेरुत्पत्तेः । कथम् ? | अवश्यम् । क्व' सति १ । दुःखसंक्षये । सांसारिकं हि सर्व पुण्यफलमपि दुःखरूपतया समर्थितम्, ततः पापफलम्, इतरच सर्वं दुःखमेवेहास्ति नान्यत्, तच्च मुक्तस्य क्षीणम् ; अतस्तत्संक्षयेऽवश्यंतया यत् तस्य निष्प्रतीकारं स्वाभाविकं निरुपमं सुखमुत्पद्यते तदेव तथ्यम् । कस्येव । विशिष्टज्ञानवतो Sनाबाधस्य मुनेरिव उक्तं च
" निर्जितमद - मदनानां वाक्- काय - मनोविकाररहितानाम् । निवृत्तपराशानामिव मोक्षः सुविहितानाम् ॥ १ ॥

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D. C.-Happiness enjoyed by a mukta being is real, and is not based upon upacāra because it is naturally generated without any resistance. Like that of a learned sage, having no obstacle in his way, this sukha is free from all sorts of miseries found in the mundane world.
It has been said, therefore, that, Nirjitamada-madanānām vak-kaya-manovikirarahitānārn | Vinivrittaparasanāmihaiva moksah suvihitānām ॥ 459 ॥ (2007)
Also, जह वा नाणमओऽयं जीवो नाणोवघाइ चावरणं । करणमणुग्गहकारिं सबावरणक्खए सुद्धी ॥४६०॥ (२००८) तह सोक्खमओ जीवो पावं तस्सोवघाइयं नेयं । पुण्णमणुग्गहकारि सोक्खं सबक्खए सयलं ॥४६१॥(२००९) Jaha vā nāṇamao'yam jīvo nāņovaghôi cāvaranami Karanamanuggahakārim savvāvaranakkhae suddhi 1146011 (2008) Taha sokkhamao jīvo pāvam tassovaghāiyam neyam | Punnamanuggahakārim sokkham savvakkhae sayalam 11461||(2009) [ यथा वा ज्ञानमयोऽयं जीवो ज्ञानोपघाति चावरणम् ।
करणमनुग्रहकारि सर्वावरणक्षये शुद्धिः ॥ ४६० ।। ( २००८) तथा सौख्यमयो जीवः पापं तस्योपघातिकं ज्ञेयम् ।
पुण्यमनुग्रहकारि सौख्यं सर्वक्षये सकलम् ॥ ४६१ ॥ (२००९) Yathā Vå jnanamayo'yam jīvo, jnanopaghāti cāvaraṇam i Karanamanugrahakari sarvavaranaksaye suddhih ॥ 460 ॥ (2008) Tathā saukhyamayo jīvaḥ pāpanı tasyopaghātikam jieyam | Punyamanugrahakari saukhyam sarvaksaye 'sakalam ॥4610 2009)]

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Vada ) Gañadharavada
-: 519 :Trans.-460-461 Or, just as since this soul is full of knowledge, (any sort of ) interruption is an obstacle to ( the apprehension of ) knowledge, sense-organs are helpful ( to it ) ( and just as ), at the destructiou of all interruptions, (there is ) pure ( cognizance ), the soul is full of happiness. Sinful deed is ( its ) obstruction, a virtuous deed is (the) helpful ( element ) and at the destruction of all deeds, there is perfect ( apprehension of ) happiness. ( 2008-2009)
टीका-व्याख्या-यथा वाऽनन्तज्ञानमयोऽसौ स्वरूपेण जीवः । तदीयज्ञानस्य च मत्यावरणादिकमावरणमुपघातकं मन्तव्यम् । करणानि त्विन्द्रियाणि तज्झानस्य, सूर्यातपस्य तदावारकमेघपटलच्छिद्राणीवोपकारकाणि । सर्वावरणक्षये तु ज्ञानशुद्धिनिर्मलता सर्वथावभासकत्वलक्षणा भवति । प्रकृतयोजनामाह-तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण स्वरूपतः स्वाभाविकानन्तसौख्यमयो जीवः, तस्य च सुखस्यैवोपघातकारकं पापकर्म विज्ञेयम् । पुण्यं त्वनुत्तरसूरपर्यन्तसुखफलंतस्य स्वाभाविक सुखस्यानुग्रहकारकम् । ततः सर्वावरणापगमे प्रकृष्टज्ञानमिव समस्तपुण्यपापक्षये सकलं परिपूर्ण निरुपचरितं निरुपम स्वाभाविकमनन्तं सुखं भवति सिद्धस्येति ॥४६०-४६१॥ (२००८-२००९)
___D. C.-The soul is full of infinite knowledge of which Mats-jñāna etc are the obstructions, and sense-organs are the supporting agents like the holes in a cluster of clouds covering the sun--shine. When all the obstructions are removed, there is absolute apprehension of pure cognizance.
Similarly, the soul possesses infinite happiness of which päpa is the obstructive element, and punya the helping element. When all sorts of pāpa and punya are removed, the muktātmā attains perfect happiness which has neither obstructions nor upacāras. ॥ 460-461 ॥ ( 2008-2009 ) ___Or, जह वा कम्मक्खयओ सो सिद्धत्ताइपरिणइं लभइ । तह संसाराईयं पावइ तत्तो चिय सुहं ति ॥४६२॥ (२०१०)

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Jaha vā kamimakkhayao so siddhattāiparinaim labhail Taha samsaraiyam pavai tatto cciya suham ti ॥ 462 ॥ ( 1020 )
[ यथा वा कर्मक्षयतः स सिद्धत्वादिपरिणतिं लभते ।
तथा संसारातीतं प्रामोति तत एव सुखमिति ।। ४६२ ॥ (२०१०) Yatba vā karmaksayataḥ sa siddhatvadipariņatim labhate i Tatha samsāratitam prāpnoti tata eva sukhamiti ॥ 462॥ (2010)]
Trans.-462 Just as it attains the form of siddhatva etc, on account of the destruction of Karma, it attains the celestial happiness also, due to the same reason. ( 2010 )
टीका-यथा वा सकलकर्मक्षयादसौ मुक्तात्मा सिद्धत्वादिपरिणति लभते, तत एव सकलकर्मक्षयात् संसारातीतं वैषयिकसुखाद् विलक्षणस्वरूपं निरुपमं तथ्यं सुखं प्रामोति । एतेन यदुक्तम्-" क्षीणपुण्य-पापत्वेन कारणाभावाद् निःसुख-दुःखो मुक्तात्मा, व्योमवत् " इत्येतदपि प्रत्युक्तं द्रष्टव्यम् , “ कारणाभावात्" इत्यस्य हेतोरसिद्धत्वात् , सकलकर्मक्षयलक्षणकारणजन्यत्वेन सिद्धसुखस्य सकारणत्वादिति ॥ ४६२ ।। ( २०१० )
D. C.-Just as a muktātmā attains siddhatva etc when it is free from the bondages of Karma, it attains celestial happiness also due to the same reason. So, your argument that since muktātmā is free from pāpa-punya, it has no sukha-duhkha also like sky, proves itself absolutely unfounded. ॥ 462 ॥ (2010)
Now, in reply to the argument that ' deha is the only agent of perceiving sukha-duḥkha, the author statesसाया-ऽसायं दुक्खं तविरहम्मि य सुहं जओ तेणं। देहि-दिएसु दुक्खं सोक्खं देहि-दियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११) Sāyā’-sāyam dukkham tavvirahamni ya suham jao tenami Dehin-diesu dukkham sokkham dehin-diyābhāve ॥ 463 ॥ (2011)

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 321 : [ साता-ऽसातं दुःखं तद्विरहे च सुखं यतस्तेन ।
देहे-न्द्रियेषु दुःखं सौख्यं देहे-न्द्रियाभावे ॥ ४६३ ॥ (२०११) Sātā-'sātam duḥkham tadvirake ca sukham yatastena i Dehe-ndriyeșu duhkham saukhyam dehe-ndrıyābhāve 11463||(2011)]
___ Trans.-463 Results of sinful and virtuous deeds are only distressful. And since happiness is ( attained ) in their absence, ( there is ) misery ( in case of ) body and sense-organs existing, (and) (there is ) happiness in absence of body and sense-organs. (2011)
टीका-ननु यत् पुण्यफलं सातं सुखतया लोकव्यवहारतो रूढं तत् सर्व दुःखमेवेत्यनन्तरमेव समर्थितम् , असातं तु पापफलत्वाद् निर्विवादं दुःखमेव । एवं च सति सर्व दुःखमेवास्ति संसारे, न सुखम् । तच्च दुःखं सिद्धस्य सर्वथा क्षीणम् । अतस्तद्विरहे यद् यस्मात् सिद्धस्य स्वाभाविकं निरुपमम् , अनन्तं च युक्ति सिद्धमेव सुखम् तेन तस्मात् कारणात् पारिशेष्यन्यायात् संसारिणामेव जीवानां देहे-न्द्रियेष्वाधारभूतेषु यथोक्तस्वरूपं दुःखम् , सुखं तु देहे-न्द्रियाभाव एव, सिद्धस्य क्षीणनिःशेषसुख-दुःखत्वेन तस्य तत्र युक्तिसिद्धत्वादिति ।। ४६३ ॥ (२०११) ___D. C.-It has already been proved that even punya-phalas are duhkhamaya in this mundane world. And pāpa-phalas are undoubtedly duhkhamaya. This shows that everything in this world is full of misery. This sort of duḥkha can never affect muktātmās.
Muktātmā being free from such duḥkhas, enjoys perfect and infinite happiness showing there-by that duhkha exists only where deha and indriyas exist; and real sukha is always found in a siddha being who is free from deha and andrrayas. ॥463॥ (2011)
____Or,
जो वा देहि-दियजं सुहमिच्छइ तं पहुन्च दोसोऽयं । संसाराईयमिदं धम्मंतरमेव सिद्धिसुहं ॥ ४६४ ॥ (२०१२)
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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh
Jo vā dehin-diyajam suhamicchai tam paducca doso'yami Samsārāîyamidam dhammantarameva siddhisuham 11 4641 (2012) [ यो वा देहे-न्द्रियजं सुखमिच्छति तं प्रतीत्य दोषोऽयम् ।
संसारातीतमिदं धर्मान्तरमेव सिद्धिसुखम् ।। ४६४ ॥ (२०१२) Yo vá dehe-ndriyajam sukhamicchati tam pratîtya doso'yami Samsāratîtamidam dharmántarameva siddhisukham 1146411 (2012)]
Trans.--464 Or, according to one who believes in the happiness (afforded) by body and sense alone, this (may involve) a difficulty. But this celestial happiness is far above the mundane world and has ( perfectly ) different characteristics. ( 2012 )
टीका-यो वा कश्चित् संसाराभिनन्दी मोहमूढः परमार्थादर्शी विषया. मिषमात्रगृद्धो देहे-न्द्रियजमेव सुखं मन्यते, न तु सिद्धिसुखम् , तस्य तेन स्वमेऽप्यदर्शनात् , तस्य वादिनः संसारविपक्षे मोक्षे प्रमाणतः साधिते सति "निःसुखः, सिद्धः, देहे-न्द्रियाभावात्" इत्ययं दोषो भवेत; न त्वस्माकं संसारातीतं पुण्य-पापफलसुख-दुःखाभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणं धर्मान्तरमेवाऽनुपममक्षयं निरुपचरितं सिद्धिसुखमिच्छतामिति ।। ४६४ ॥ (२०१२) ___D. C-According to one who is disillusioned by the infatuation of this mundane world and its sensuous pleasures, the happiness of deha and indriyas would be the only happiness and there would be nothing like moksc-sukha in his view-point. He would, therefore, find fault with our belief by saying that muktātmā can never experience sukha as it has no deha and andrreyas.
But those like us who recognize the existence of muktātmā and its uncomparable infinite happiness, understand that moksa-sukha being samsārātîta, has absolutely different characteristics and hence, there is no dosa. || 464 || ( 2012 )
Here again, there is a question and its replyकह नणु मेयं ति मई नाणा-णाबाहउ ति नणु भणियं । तदणिचं गाणं पि य चेयणधम्मो त्ति रागो व ॥४६५॥ (२०१३)

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Gañadharavada Kaha nanu meyam ti maî nanā—’nābāhau tti nanu bhaniyamı Tadaņiccam ņāņam pi ya ceyanadhammo tti rāgo vva 114651 (2013) [कथं ननु मेयमिति मतिआना-ऽनावाधत इति ननु भणितम् ।
तदानित्यं ज्ञानमपि च चेतनधर्म इति राग इव ।। ४६५ ॥ (२०१३) Katham nanu meyamiti matirjñāna-'nābādbata iti nanu bhaạitamı Tadānityanı jnanamapi ca cetanadharma iti räga iva li 465 ll(2013)]
Trans.--465 ( The question may be that ). “ How could it really be taken like that? (The reply is)-" It has already been said that ( it is so ) on account of the uninterrupted cognizance." Then, even cognizance being a quality of consciousness, it will be a-nitya like affection. ( 2013 ) ____टीका-अत्रैवंभृता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-नन्विच्छन्ति भवन्तः सिद्धस्य यथोक्तं सुखम् , किन्तु नेच्छामात्रतो वस्तुसिद्धिः, अपि तु प्रमाणतः ततो येन प्रमाणेन तत् सिध्यति तद् वक्तव्यम् । अनुमानेन तदनुमीयत इति चेत् । तर्हि केनानुमानेन तदनुमेयम्-अनुमीयत इत्यर्थः ? इत्याह-" नाणा-ऽणा. बाहउ त्ति नणु भणियं ति" ननु भणितमत्रार्थे प्रागनुमानम्-सिद्धस्य प्रकृष्टं सुखम् , ज्ञानत्वे सत्यनाबाधत्वात् , मुनिवदिति । पुनरपि परः प्राहयद्येवम् , तद्यनित्यं सुखं ज्ञानं च सिद्धस्य, चेतनधर्मत्वात् , रागवदिति ।। ४६५ ॥ (२०१३)
___D. C.-Prabhasa:--With what pramāna or anumāna do you establish the existence of the above-mentioned mokşasukha?
Bhagavān:- The anumāna has already been stated that, like a sage, muktātmā enjoys perfect happiness by virtue of its uninterrupted cognizance.
___Prabhāss:-In that case, as happiness and cognizance on, the part of free soul are cetana-dharmas, they would be a-notya like rāga. ॥ 465 ॥ (2013)
There is another inference also

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[ The eleventh
कयगाइभावओ वा नावरणा - ssबाहकारणाभावा । उप्पाय - ट्ठिइ-भङ्गस्सहावओ वा न दोसोऽयं ॥ ४६६॥ (२०१४)
Kayagaibhāvao vā nāvaranā”bāhakāraṇābhāvā | Uppāya—tthii-bhangassahāvao vā na doso'yam ॥ 466 ॥ ( 2014 )
[ कृतकादिभावतो वा नावरणा-ssबाधकारणाभावात् ।
उत्पाद -स्थिति-भङ्गस्वभावतो वा न दोषोऽयम् ।। ४६६ ।। (२०१४) Kritakadibhavato vā nāvaraṇā"bhādhakāranābhāvāt | Utpada-sthiti-bhaigasvabhavato va na doso 'yam || 466 (2014) ]
Trans.—466 “ Or, is it a- nitya because of (its ) being factitious etc?” It is not so, as there is no cause for ( the production of ) obstacles and interruptions. Or, this fault ( of a-nityatā) does not arise ( at all ) on account of its nature of being susceptible to production, retention and destruction.” (2014)
"
,
टीका - अथवा, अनित्ये सिद्धस्य सुख-ज्ञाने, तपःप्रभृतिकष्टानुष्ठानेन क्रियमाणत्वात्, आदिशब्दादभूतप्रादुर्भावात् घटवदिति । अत्रोत्तरमाह" नावरणेत्यादि " न सिद्धस्यानित्ये ज्ञान - सुखे । कुतः ? | आवरणं चाचाघवावरणा-ऽऽबाधौ तयोः कारणं हेतुस्तस्याऽभावात्, आकाशवदिति । इदमुक्तं भवति - सिद्धस्य ज्ञानं सुखं च यद्यपगच्छेत् तदा स्यादनित्यम्, अपगमश्च ज्ञानस्यावरणोदयात्, सुखस्य त्वाबाधहेतुभूतादसात वेदनीयोदयादिकारणाद्भवेत् ; आवरण- वेदनीयादीनि च मिथ्यत्वादिभिर्बन्धहेतुभिर्बध्यन्ते, तेच सिद्धस्य न विद्यन्ते, ततस्तदभावाद् नावरणा-ऽऽबाधाकारणसद्भावः, तदभावाच्च न सिद्धस्य ज्ञान - सुखापगमः, तदसत्वे च तयोः सदाऽवस्थित - त्वात् कथमनित्यत्वम् १ । न च चेतनधर्माः सर्वेऽप्यनित्या भवन्ति, जीवगत? द्रव्यत्वा मूर्त्तत्वादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् । ततश्च " चेतनधर्मस्वात" इत्यनैकान्तिको हेतुः । तथा, कृतकत्वादिरप्यनैकान्तिकः, घटप्रध्वंसाभावेन व्यभिचारात् । असिद्धश्चायम्, सिद्धस्य ज्ञानसुखयोः स्वाभाविकत्वेन कृतकत्वा द्ययोगात्, आवरणा - ssबाधकारणाभावेन च तत्तिरोभावमात्रमेव निवर्तते, न पुनस्ते क्रियेते, घटादिवत् ; नाप्यभूते प्रादुर्भवतः, विद्युदादिवत् येन तयोर
•

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
:: 525:. नित्यत्वं स्यात् । न हि घनपटलापगमे चन्द्रज्योत्स्नायाः सूर्यप्रभाया वा तिरोभावमात्रनिवृत्तौ कृतकत्वम् , अभूतप्रादुर्भावो वा वक्तुं युज्यत इति ।
अथ तेनाविर्भूतेन विशिष्ठेन रूपेण कृतकत्वादनित्ये सिद्धस्य ज्ञानसुखे प्रतिक्षणं च पर्यायरूपतया ज्ञेयविनाशे ज्ञानस्य विनाशात् , सुखस्यापि प्रतिसमयं परापररूपेण परिणामादेतयोरनित्यत्वंमुच्यते । तर्हि सिद्धसाध्यता, इति दर्शयति-"उप्पाय-ट्टिईत्यादि" इत्थमात्माऽऽकाश-घटादिरूपस्य सर्वस्यापि वस्तुस्तोमस्य स्थित्यु-त्पाद-प्रलयस्वाभाव्याभ्युपगमात् सिद्धसुख ज्ञानयोरपि कथञ्चिदनित्यत्वाद् नायं तदनित्यत्वापत्तिलक्षणो ऽस्माकं दोष इति ॥ ४६६ ।। (२९१४)
D. C.-Prabhāsa:--Jnana and sukha of a suddha being, are a-nitya firstly because they are produced by means of the painful observance of penances etc, and secondly, because they are susceptible to production like ghata.
Bhagavān:-Your argument is absolutely unfounded. O Prabhāsa' Jnāna and sukha of a muktātmā would be co-nitya only if they vanished. By means of jñanāvaranas, jnana would be obscured and hence destroyed and with the rise of sinful deeds, sukha would vanish. Both these obstructions jñānāvaranas and papa-karmas are bound by the hetus of muthyātva etc, muktātmā being free from such hetus it is free from jñānāvaraṇas and pāpa-karmas also. Consequently, its jnāna and sukha do not meet destruction and hence they are never called a-nitya.
Secondly, all the qualities of cetana are not a-nitya. Dravyatva and co-mūrtatva are nitya. Therefore, the argument that jñāna and sukha are a-nitya because they happen to be cetana-dharmas, is anekāntika Simularly, the hetu of kritakatva etc is also anekāntika. Indestructiblity of ghata is a-siddha inspite of its being kritaka This hetu is a-siddha also, because jñāna and sukha of a siddha being are natural. Since there is no reason for the existence of avaranas and bādhās, that which is in obscurity becomes manifest, Thus, they are not factitious

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eleventh
like ghata etc. nor are they produced like lightning etc. The moonlight and sun-shine obscured by clouds are not said to have been produced when the obstruction of the clouds has been removed. They are only said to have been manifested in a particular way.
Still however, jñāna and sukha of a muktātmā could easily be considered as a-nitya by virtue of their being kritaka. Because, at every time when jneya vanishes, jñāna is also vanishing and sukha also comes into existence in various forms at various times. So, there is no difficulty in taking both of them to be a-nitya to a certain extent as all objects like soul, sky, gheta, and pata etc are susceptible to utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya after all. 11 466 11 ( 2014 )
Establishing the existence of moksa and moksa-sukha by the help of Veda-vacanas, the author proceeds— नह वइ ससरीरस्स प्पिय-ऽप्पियावहतिरेवमादि व जं । तदमोक्खे नासम्मि व सोक्खाभावम्मि व न जुत्तं ॥४६७॥(२०१५) Na ha vai sasarîrassa ppiya-ppiyāyahatirevamādi va jami Tadamokkhe nāsammi va sokkhābhāvammi va na juttam 1146711 [न ह वै सशरीस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रियापहतिरेवमादि वा यत् ।
तदमोक्षे नाशे वा सौख्याभावे वा न युक्तम् ॥ ४६७ ॥ (२०१५) Na ha vai sa-sarîrasya priya-'priyāpahatirevamādi va yati Tadamokse nāse vā saukhyabhave va na yuktam ॥467॥ (2015)]
___ Trans.-467 (The sentence of Vedas that ) " One having body has no likes and dislikes etc ” would becoine worthless in ( case of ) accepting the negation or destruction of moksa and absence of ( absolute ) happiness. ( 2015 )
टीका-" न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति" "अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रिया-प्रिये न स्पृशतः" इति च यद् वेदोक्तम् , तदप्यमोक्षे मोक्षाभावे-जीव-कर्मणोवियोगेऽनभ्युपगम्यमान इत्यर्थः, तथा, "मविरपि न

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Gaṇadharavada
.: 527 :.
प्रज्ञायते " इति वचनाद् मुक्तावस्थायां सर्वथा नाशे वा जीवस्याभ्युपगम्यमाने, सच्चेवामुक्तात्मनः सुखाभाव इष्यमाणे न युक्तं प्राप्नोति - अभ्युपगमविरोधस्तवेत्यर्थः । अनेन हि वाक्येन किल यथोक्तो मोक्षः, मुक्तौ च निष्कर्मणो जीवस्य सभ्यम्, निरुपमसुखं च तस्य, एतानि त्रीण्यप्यभ्युपगम्यन्ते । एतच्च पुरस्ताद् व्यक्तीकरिष्यते । ततोऽस्य त्रितयस्य निषेधं कुर्वतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति भावः ॥ ४६७ ॥ ( २०१५ )
D. C.-The sentences of Vedas such as "Na ha vari sa-sarirasya priya' priyayo-rapahatırasti " and " Asariram vā vasantam priya'priye na spris'atah" etc would prove themselves futile if the existence of moksa, jiva and moksa-sukha were denied. Because, the existence of mokṣa-separating jîva and Karma from each other-existence of pure soul in the mukta state and the attainment of perfect and infinite happiness by a mukta being, have already been established by the Veda-padas. || 467 || ( 2015 )
The opponent then asks
नो असरी चि सुह - दुक्खाई पिय-ऽप्पियाई च । ताइं न फुसंति नट्टं फुडमसरीरं ति को दोसो ? || ४६८|| (२०१६)
Nattho a-sariro cciya suha-dukkhāim piya' - ppiyāim ca। Tāim na phusanti nattham phudamasariram ti ko doso? ||468 (2016)
[ नष्टोऽशरीर एव सुख-दुःखे प्रिया - ऽप्रिये च ।
ते न स्पृशतो नष्टं स्फुटमशरीरमिति को दोषः १ ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१६) Nasto’śarira_eva sukha duhkha priya' priye ca|
Te na spriśato nastam sphutamaśariramiti ko dosah ? | 468 | (2016)
Trans.-468 One who is dead, is bodiless. Happiness and misery, likes and dislikes do not touch him. ( Then ) what harm is there in taking a bodiless person to have been distinctly destroyed ? (2016)
टीका - " न ह वै ० " इत्यादिवेदवाक्यस्य किल परोऽमुमर्थं मन्यते - शरीरसर्वनाशेन नष्टः खरविषाणकल्प एवोच्यते, तमेवंभूतम शरीरं नष्टं प्रिया

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Jinabhadra Gaņi's [ The eleventh ऽप्रिये सुख-दुःखे यद् न स्पृशतः, तत् स्फुटमेव बुध्यत एवेदम् , नष्टस्य सुख-दुःखस्पर्शायोगात् , अशरीरशब्देन च जीवनाशाभिधानात् । एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्यार्थे मुमुक्षुजीवस्य निर्वाणप्रदीपस्येव सर्वनाशमभ्युपगच्छतां कोऽस्माकमभ्युपगमविरोधलक्षणो दोषः?-न कश्चिदपीति पराभिप्राय इति ॥ ४६८ ॥ (२०१६)
D. C.---Prabhāsa:-Since a bodiless person is absolutely perished, it is not-existent like khara-s'rnga. It is, therefore, clear that sueh bodiless persons are not affected by happiness or misery and likes or dislikes. Consequently, there would be no harm in accepting the absolute destruction of a soul which has attained molesa. ॥ 468 ॥ (2016)
In reply to this, Bhagavān explains the real interpretation of the Veda-padas such as “ Na ha vai ” etc and proceeds. वेयवयाण य अत्थं न सुटु जाणसि इमाण तं सुणसु । असरीरववएसो अधणो व सओ निसहाओ ॥४६९ ॥(२०१७) ननिसेहओ य अन्नम्मि तबिहे चेव पञ्चओ जेण । तणासरीरग्गहणे जुत्तो जीवो न खरसिंगं ॥ ४७० ॥ (२०१८) Veyavayāņa ya attham na sutthu jānasi imāna tam suņasu / Asariravvavaeso adhano vva sao nisehao ॥ 469 ॥ (2017) Nanisehao ya annammi tavvihe ceva paccao jena i Tenasariraggahane jutto jivo na kharasingam ॥ 470 ॥ ( 2018) [ वेदपदानां चार्थं न सुष्टु जानास्येषां तं शृणु ।
अशरीरव्यपदेशोऽधन इव सतो निषेधात् ॥ ४६९ ॥ (२०१७) ननिषेधतश्चान्यस्मिस्तद्विध एव प्रत्ययो येन ।
तेनाशरीरग्रहणे युक्तो जीवो न खरशृङ्गम् ।। ४७० ॥ (२०१८) Veda-padanām cârtham na susțhu jānāsyeşām tam śruņu | Asariravyapadeso'dhana iva sato nisedhat ॥ 469 ॥ ( 2017 )] Nannised hataścānyasminstadvidha eva pratyayo yena 1 Tenasariragrahane yukto jivo na kharasrigam ॥ 470 ॥ (2018)]

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
: 529 :. • Trans.-469-470 You do not properly understand the (real) meaning of those sentences of Vedas. It is this. Hear please. Like 'a-dhana,' the word a-sarira is meant to denote the negation of an existent object. By ( means of ) negation due to — na', ( its ) existence would be found in another of the same type. In understanding the word 'a-śarira', it is better, therefore, to accept ( the existence of ) jiva and not ( its non-existence like ) kharabriga. ( 2017-2018 )
___टीका-आयुष्मन् ! प्रभास ! न केवलं युक्तिम् , वेदपदानाममीषामर्थ च त्वं सुष्टु न जानासि, ततस्तं शृणु " न ह वै०" इत्यादि पूर्वार्धं सुगमत्वादत्र गाथाद्वये न व्याख्यातम् , तदपि सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं व्याख्यायते-'न' इति निपातो निषेधार्थः । 'ह' 'वै' इत्येतदपि निपातद्वयं हिशब्दार्थत्वाद् यस्मादर्थे । सह शरीरेण वर्तत इति सशरीरो जीवस्तस्य सशरीरस्येत्यत्रैवकारो द्रष्टव्यः । ततश्चायमर्थः-यस्मात् सशरीरस्य जीवस्य प्रिया-ऽप्रिययोः सुखदुःखयोरपहतिर्विघातोऽन्तरं नास्ति, न त्वशरीरस्य; तस्मादशरीरं शरीर. रहितं मुक्त्यवस्थायां वसन्तं लोकान्तस्थितं जीवं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये सुख-दुःखे न स्पृशतः । इदमुक्तं भवति-यावदयं जीवः सशरीरः, तावत् सुखेन दुःखेन वाऽन्यतरेण कदाचिदपि न मुच्यते; अशरीरस्त्वसौ क्षीणवेदनीयत्वात् सुखदुःखाभ्यां कदाचिदपि न स्पृश्यत इति । एवंभूते चास्य वाक्यस्याथै सति योऽयमशरीरव्यपदेशः, असौ सत एव विद्यमानस्यैव जीवस्य मुक्त्यवस्थायां विधीयते, न तु सर्वथा नष्टस्य । कुतः ? इत्याह-निषेधात् । इह यो यस्य निषेधः स तस्य सत एव विधीयते, न त्वसतः, यथाऽधन इति, अत्र सत एव देवदत्तस्य धननिषेधो विधीयते, न त्वसतः खरविषाणस्य ।
आह-न विद्यते शरीरं यस्येत्येवं निषेधादन्यपदार्थे जीव एव कथं प्रतीयते ? इत्याह-" ननिसेहओ य इत्यादि " व्याख्यातो विशेषप्रतिपत्तेः पर्युदासवृत्तिना नत्रा निषेधो ननिषेधस्तस्माद् ननिषेधात् कारणात् सशरीरादन्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एव शरीरसदृशे कस्मिंश्चिदन्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो विज्ञेयः, यथा " न ब्राह्मणोऽबाह्मणः" इत्युक्ते बाह्मणसदृशः क्षत्रियादिरेव गम्यते, न

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Jinabhadra Gaại’s [The eleventh तु तुच्छरूपोऽभावः । उक्तं च-" नजिवयुक्तमन्यसदृशाधिकरणे लोके तथा ह्यर्थगतिः" इति । इह च शरीरसदृशोऽशरीरो जीव एव गम्यते, द्वयोरप्युपयोगरूपत्वेन सदृशत्वात् । न चेह शरीरं सादृश्यबाधकम् , तस्य जीवेन सह क्षीर-नीरन्यायतो लोलीभूतत्वेनैकत्वादिति । तदेवं येन यस्मात् कारणात ननिषेधादन्यस्मिंस्तद्विध एवान्यपदार्थे संप्रत्ययो भवति, तेन तस्मात् कारणात् “ अशरीरं वा वसन्तं" इत्यत्राशरीरग्रहणे जीव एवाशरीरो युज्यते, न तु खरविषाणं तुच्छरूपोऽभाव इत्यर्थः । तदेवमशरीरमिति व्याख्यातम् ।। ४६९-४७० ॥ (२०१७-२०१८)
D. C.--Bhagavān:-0 Prabhasa ! Really you do not understand the proper meaning of the sentences such as “ Na ha vai ” etc. In this sentence, the particle 'na' denotes negation and the particles 'ha' and 'vai' are used in the ablative sense. " Sa-s'arîrasya " means to a soul having a body and " priya-"priyayorapahatirasti ” denotes the destruction of happiness and misery. The whole sentence will be interpreted as follows:
Jîva being possessed of a body, has no abhāva of sukhaduḥkha. In the same way, Jîva existing in a bodiless state of moksc, never undergoes sukha-duhkha i, e. As long as soul is encompassed in a body, it has to undergo sukha-duhkha, but as the bodiless muktātmā is free from Karma-good or bad-it is never affected by sukha-duḥkha.
In the word " a-s'arîra ” here, there is a negation of the body and not of the soul. In the expression " Adhano Devcom dattah” the riches are denied to the vidyamāne Devadatta and not to an a vidhomāna kharas'rriga. Similarly, here also the existence of soul is not denied, but only that of body is denied. That which is denied must belong to an existent source and not to a non-existent source.
Prabhāsa: How could it be believed that that which is denied at one place must be found at another ?

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Vada ]
Gañadharavada
•: 531 :
Bhagavān: --Just as by the word " na-brāhmana ” a nonbrahmin like a ksatriya or a vais'ya is understood, but the absolute abhāva of brāhmana as a whole, is not meant. So also, the expression “a-s'arira” signifies a bodiless mukta jîva of the type of mukta jîva having body, but that does not absolutely deny the existence of soul. There is resemblance in both owing to the common property of upacāra.
Moreover," s'arira" does not come in the way of resemblance. As body is mixed with soul like milk and water, it is one and the same as soul. Thus, by the denial of the particle 'na', the same soul is apprehended at another place but the existence of soul is never denied thereby. So, the word 'a-s'arira' denotes nothing but giva which is vidyamāna like Devadatta, and not a-vidyamāna like kharas'rga. 11 469-470 11 ( 2017-2018 )
The expression “ Vā vasantam " is now explained:जं व वसंतं संतं तमाह वासद्दओ सदेहं पि। न फुसेज वीयरायं जोगिणमिटे-यरविसेसा ॥ ४७१ ॥(२०१९) Jam va vasantam santam tamāha vāsddaö sadeham pi 1 Na phusejja vîyarāyam joginamiţthe-yaravisesā 1 471 11 (2019) [ यद् वा वसन्तं सन्तं तमाह वाशब्दतो सदेहमपि ।
न स्पृशेयुर्वीतराग योगिनमिष्टे-तरविशेषाः ॥ ४७१ ॥ (२०१९) Yad vā vasantan santam tamaha vāśabdato sadehamapi i Na spěšeyur vitarāgam yoginamişte-taraviśeşāḥ || 471 || ( 2019 )]
Trans.-471 Happiness and misery do not affect him who is existing in a free state and also by the word 'va' (they do not affect ) a dispassionate ascetic having a body. ( 2019 )
टीका-यस्माचाशरीरम् । कथंभूतम् ? । वसन्तं लोकाग्रे निवसन्तं तिष्ठन्तमिति यावत् । अनेन वसनविशेषणेन तमशरीरशब्दवाच्यमर्थ सन्तं

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Jinabhadra Gani's
[The eleventh
विद्यमानमाह, न त्वसद्भूतम् , वसनस्य सद्धर्मत्वात् । तस्मात् कथं जीवनाशरूपं निर्वाणं स्यात् ?, न केवलमशरीरं मुक्तम् , किन्तु वाशब्दात् सदेहमपि सशरीरमपि वीतरागं-क्षीणोपशममोहयोगिनं परमसमाधिमन्तं भवस्थमपि न स्पृशेयुः । के ? । इष्टे-तरविशेषाः सुख-दुःखभेदा इत्यर्थः ।।४७१।। (२०१९)
D. C-A bodiless mukta being is not affected by the sukha-duḥkha bhedas. The word 'vā' includes dispassionate ascetics having bodies. ॥ 471 ॥ ( 2019 )
Also, वाव त्ति वा निवाओ वासदत्थो भवंतमिह संतं । बुज्झाऽव त्ति व संतं नाणाइविसिट्ठमहवाह ॥४७२॥ (२०२०) Vāva tti vā nivāö vāsaddattho bhavantamiha santami . Bujjha'va tti va santam nānaivisitthamahavāha ॥ 472॥ (2020)
[वावेति वा निपातो वाशब्दार्थो भवन्तमिह सन्तम् ।
बुध्यस्वाऽवेति वा सन्तं ज्ञानादिविशिष्टमथवाऽथ ।। ४७२॥ (२०२०) Vāveti vā nipāto vāśabdártho bhavantamiha santam i Budhyanvā’veti va santam jñānādivisistamathava’tha 11472||(2020)] _____Trans.--472 Or, “ vāva" is a particle meaning "Or", and — santam' means a soul existing ( in the mukta state ). Or, take ' ava' as a particle and 'santam' meaning ( a soul ) characterised by ( the qualities of ) knowledge, etc. ( 2020 )
टीका-'वा' इत्यथवा, 'वाव' इत्ययं शब्दो निपातः, स च वाशब्दार्थः । ततश्चाशरीरं सन्तं भवन्तं मुक्तौ विद्यमानं जीवं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः, वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतराग न ते स्पृशतः। यदिवा, 'वसन्तम्' इत्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते-" बुज्झाऽव त्ति वेत्यादि " "वा" इत्यथवाऽयमर्थः । “वाव संतं ति" रक्षण-गति-प्रीत्यादिष्वेकोनविंशतावर्थेष्ववधातुः पठ्यते । गत्यर्थाश्च धातवो ज्ञानार्था अपि भवन्ति । ततश्चाहविनेय ! त्वमेवं बुध्यस्व । किं तत् ? इत्याह-अशरीरं सन्तं मुक्त्यवस्थायां

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Vada ] Gañadharavāda
•: 533 : विद्यमानं जीवम् । अथवा, ज्ञानादिभिर्गुणैर्विशिष्टं सन्तमित्याह ब्रूते, प्रियाऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः; वाशब्दात् सशरीरमपि वीतरागमिति तथैवेति ॥ ४७२ ॥ ( 2o po )
D C.--The expression "vā vasantam could be dissolved as vāva santan, the particle vāva meaning "or" and santan meaning a bodiless jîva existing in the moksa state. The word vāva here will signify that sukha-duḥkha do not touch not only a bodiless jîva existing in a moksa state, but also the dispassionate ascetics having bodies.
Or, the expression could be dissolved as vā ava santam also. The prefix ava has nineteen different meanings such as to protect, to go, to love etc. Since a root signifying motion signifies knowledge also, a bodiless soul existing in the mukta state and characterized by the qualities of cognizance eto, is not affected by sukha-duhkha. Here also, the word 'vā' brings in the dispassionate sa-deho ascetic. ll 472 11 ( 2020 )
The opponent asksन वसंतं अवसंतं ति वा मई नासरीरगहणाओ। फुसणाविसेसणं पि य जओ मयं संतविसयं ति ॥४७३॥ (२०२१) Na vasantam a-vasantam ti vā maî nāsarîragahaņāö 1 Phusaņāvisesaņam pi ya jaö mayam santavisayam ti 114731 (2021) [न वसन्तमवसन्तमिति वा मति शरीरग्रहणात् ।
स्पर्शनाविशेषणमपि च यतो मतं सद्विषयमिति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१) Na vasantamavasantamiti vā matirnāšarîragrahaņāt i Sparśanā višesaņamapi ca yato matam sadvisayamiti 114731|(2021)]
Trans.----473 Or, it may be dissolved as “ na vasantam iti avasantam" meaning thereby not existing ( anywhere ).' ( But ) it is not proper. ( Since ) jiva is understood from *a-sarîra.' Moreover, the adjective sparśanā' is also accepted with regard to existent objects ( only ). ( 2021 )

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Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh टीका-" अशरीरं वावसन्तं " इत्यत्र लुप्तस्याकारस्य दर्शनाद् " न वसन्तमवसन्तं काप्यतिष्ठन्तम्" इति व्याख्यानतो नास्ति मुक्त्यवस्थायां जीवः, काप्यवसनात् , असत्त्वादेव च नामुं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये स्पृशत इति परस्य मतिर्भवेत् । तदेतद् न । कुतः ? इत्याह-अशरीरग्रहणात् । एतदुक्तं भवति" न विद्यते शरीरं यस्य " इत्यत्र पर्युदासनिषेधात् पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या मुक्क्यवस्थायामशरीरो जीवो गम्यते, इत्यतोऽत्राकारप्रश्लेषव्याख्यानं कर्तुं न पार्यते, अशरीरग्रहणाद् मुक्तौ जीवसिद्धेः । किञ्च, 'प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः' इति यदशरीरस्य स्पर्शनाविशेषणं तदपि यस्मात् सद्विषयमेव मतम् , तस्माद् न मुक्तौ जीवस्याभावः। यदि ह्यशरीरशब्दस्य जीवाभावो वाच्यः स्यात तदा तं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशत इति विशेषणमनर्थकं स्यात् । न हि "वन्ध्यापुत्रं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इति विशेष्यमाण विराजते । तस्माद् मुक्त्यवस्थो जीव एवाशरीरशब्दवाच्यः, न पुनस्तदभावः । ततो नाकारप्रश्लेषव्याख्यानं युज्यत इति । तदेवं "अशरीरं वा वसन्तं" इत्यनेन जीवकार्मणशरीरवियोगलक्षणस्य मोक्षस्य मुक्तजीवसत्त्वस्य चाभिधानात् तनिषेधं कुर्वतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध एवेति ॥ ४७३ ॥ (२०२१)
D. C.-Prabhāsa:- If you can dissolve the expression as done above, I can also dissolve the expression at my will and pull the meaning in my favour. This, in no way, leads to establish the existence of molesa. For, by dissolving "a-sararam. vā vasantam' as ' a-s'ariram vă a-vasantam' I can interpret it as a bodiless ( soul ) not existing at any place, and thus prove jiva to be absent from muktāvasthā, proving thereby the the negation of moksa as well as java
Bhagavān:-Your interpretation does not fit in properly. By interpreting'a-s'arîrî' as one having no body, vidyamānatā of jîva in the muktāvasthā is clearly understood. It is not proper, therefore, to interpret it in another way by prefixing "a".
Secondly, in the sentence " Sukha-duḥkhe na spris'atah " spars'anā becomes the adjective of' as'arîra'. If 'as'arîra' were meant to denote the negation of soul, the adjective

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Gaṇadharavada
• 535:•
would have lost its sense as found in the case of assertions like “ Sukha-duhkha do not affect the vandhyāputra.” The adjective, therefore, is befitting 'as'arira' only if it means "mukta-jiva". Your interpreting the expression by dissolving it as ‘vā a-vasantam ' is thus useless, while our interpretation is perfectly proper. This proves the existence of mokṣa which separates jiva and karmana s'arira and that of mukta-jiva also. If the existence of jiva were denied, Veda-vacanas would prove worthless as shown above. ॥ 473 ॥ ( 2021 )
The opponent said
एवं पि होज मुत्तो निस्सुह - दुक्खत्तणं तु तद्वत्थं । तं नो पिय-प्पियाई जम्हा पुणे - यरकयाई ॥ ४७४॥(२०२२)
नाणाबाहत्तणओ न फुसति वीयराय - दोसस्स । तस्स प्पियमप्पियं वा मुत्तसुहं को पसंगोऽत्थ ? ॥ ४७५॥ (२०२३)
Evam pi hojja mutto nissuha-dukkhattanam tu tadavattham Tam no piya - 'ppiyāim jamhā punneyarakayāim ॥ 474 ॥ ( 2022 ) Nānā'bāhattanaï na phusanti viyarāya-dosassai Tasya ppiyamappiyam vā muttasuham ko pasarigo 'ttha? ॥475u
[ एवमपि भवेद् मुक्तो निःसुख-दुःखत्वं तु तदवस्थम् ।
तद् नो प्रिया - प्रिये यस्मात् पुण्ये - तरकृते ।। ४७४ ।। (२०२२) ज्ञानाsनाबाधत्वतो न स्पृशतो वीतराग-द्वेषस्य ।
तस्य प्रियमप्रियं वा मुक्तसुखं कः प्रसङ्गोऽत्र १ ।।४७५ ।। (२०२३)
Evamapi bhaved mukto niḥsukha-duḥkhatvam tu tadavastham I Tad no priya'-priye yasmat punye-tarakrite | 474 || (2022 )] Jnānā'nābādhātvato na spriśato vitaraga-dvesasya | Tasya priyamapriyam vā muktasukham kah prasañgotra ? ॥475॥
Trans.—474-475. Such being a mukta soul, it will have no happiness and misery. ( But ) it is not (so), as likes and

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:: 536 :.
Jinabhadra Gaņi's (The eleventh dislikes are produced from sinful or virtuous deeds. Moreover, likes and dislikes cannot affect a dispassionate ( person ) owing to his ( high ) knowledge and irresistability. He enjoys natural and perfect happiness. So, what is the sense in asserting the negation of happiness ? ( 2022-2023)
टीका-एवमुक्तप्रकारेण मुक्तो जीवो भवेदित्यकामैरप्यभ्युपगतमस्माभिः, तथा च सति जीवस्य कर्मवियोगलक्षणो मोक्षः, तत्र जीवसत्वं च सिद्धम् । यत्तु निःसुख-दुःखत्वं सिद्धस्य मया प्रेरितं तत् "प्रिया-ऽप्रिये अशरीरं न स्पृशतः" इति वचनात् तदवस्थमेव । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तदेतद् न, यस्मात् पुण्य-पापकर्मजनिते एव जीवानां प्रिया-ऽप्रिये सांसारिकसुख-दुःखे भवतः। ते च तं क्षीणनिःशेषपुण्य-पापकर्माणं सकलसंसारार्णवपारप्राप्त मुक्तात्मानं न स्पृशत इत्युत्तरगाथायां संबन्धः। न चैतावता तस्य निःसुखत्वमिति स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-" नाणेत्यादि" ज्ञानत्वे सत्य. नाबाधरूपत्वादित्यर्थः । यच्च तद् मुक्तस्य सुखं मुक्तसुखं स्वाभाविक निष्प्रतीकारं निरुपमं च। “ मुत्तस्स परं सोक्खं जाणा-ऽणाबाहओ जहा मुणिणो" इत्यादिना प्रागेव साधितम् , तत् तस्य वीतराग-द्वेषस्य मुक्तात्मनो न प्रियं न पुण्यजनितं सुखं भण्यते, न चाप्रियं न पापजनितं दुःखं भण्यते, किन्त्वेताभ्यां सर्वथा विलक्षणम् , अकर्मजनितत्वेन स्वाभाविकत्वात् , निष्प्रतीकाररूपत्वात् , निरुपमत्वात् , अप्रतिपातित्वाचेति ।
अथ " को पसंगोऽत्थ ति" " अशरीरं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इत्युक्ते कोऽत्र मुक्तात्मनि मुक्तसुखाभावप्रसङ्गः ?-न कश्चिदित्यर्थः, पुण्यपापजनितप्रिया-ऽप्रिययोरभावे तस्य सुतरामेव भावात् । तस्मात् " न ह वै सशरीरस्य०" इत्यादिवेदपदैर्यथोक्तनीत्या जीव-कार्मणशरीरविरहलक्षणो मोक्षः, मुक्तावस्थस्य च जीवस्य सत्त्वम् , तथा, " अशरीरं प्रिया-ऽप्रिये न स्पृशतः" इत्यतोऽपि वचनात् पुण्य-पापक्षयसमुत्थं स्वाभाविकम् , अप्रतिपाति सुखं चास्य, इत्येतत्रितयं सिद्धम् । अत एतदनभ्युपगच्छतस्तवाभ्युपगमविरोध इति स्थितम् ।
यदपि "जरामयं वैतत् सर्व यदग्निहोत्रम्" इत्येतस्माद् वाक्याद् मोक्ष

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Vada ] Gañadharavada
.: 537 : हेतुक्रियारम्भयोग्यकालाभावाद् मोक्षाभावं शङ्कसे; तदप्ययुक्तम्, तदर्थापरिज्ञानात् । तस्य ह्ययमर्थः-यदेतदग्निहोत्रं तद् यावजीवं सर्वमपि कालं कर्तव्यम् , वाशब्दाद् मुमुक्षुभिर्मोक्षहेतुभूतमप्यनुष्ठान विधेयमिति । इत्येवं वेदपदोक्तद्वारेण yf en gargāt #ta: 1 faqat q1AFT akt: |898-810411 ( 2088-2023)
D. C.-Prabhāsa:-—I grant the existence of muktātmā, mokşa, and soul as such. But according to the Veda-vacanas that siddha beings are free from happiness and misery, likes and dislikes will not affect the bodiless soul; consequently, a muktātmā will have no experience of happiness.
Bhagavān:-Priya and a-priya and hence sukha and duhkha are produced by punya-pāpas from which muktātmā is free. But this in no way, means that muktātmā has no scope for the experience of happiness. Since muktātmā is highly cognizant and perfectly irresistible owing to its being free from rāga-dveşa, it enjoys the highest and most natural happiness which never vanishes.
Or, it is no use discussing about the negatiou of happiness to a mukta being, by saying that likes and dislikes do not affect the bodiless. Muktātmā will thus have no experience of the mundane sukha-duhkha, because it is always free from likes and dislikes. Thus, the sentences of Vedas such as Na ha vai sa-s'arîrasya etc establish, O blessed Prabhāsa! the existence of mokşa, jiva, and the immutable happiness of muktātmā at the removal of punya-päpa.
Lastly, the sentence that "Jarāmaryam vaitat sarvam yadagnshotram ” means that one should practise agnihotra etc, till the end of life.
Your suspicion about the existence of mokşa generated from this sentence ( as the time of beginning the performance has not been mentioned in it ) is out of place. The sentence really means as follows:

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*; 538 : Jinabhadra Gani's [The eleventh One should performi sacrifice throughout the life at all times. The word 'va'here signifies that he who aspires for moksa should also perform the sacrifice, which acts as the hetu of their moksa. Thus, the Tirthankara removes the doubt of Prabhasa, 11 474-475 11 ( 2022-2023 ) Then, छिन्नम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जर-मरणविप्पमुक्केण / सो समणो पवइओतिहि ओ सह खंडियसएहि // 476 // (2024) So samano pavvaio tihi o saha khandiyasaehim 11 476 II ( 2024 ) [छिन्ने संशये जिनेन जरा-मरणविप्रमुक्तेन / / स श्रमणः प्रव्रजितस्त्रिभिस्तु सह खण्डिकशतैः // 476 // (2024) Chinne samsaye Jinena jari-marana vipramuktena 1 Sa sramanah pravrajitastribhistu saha khandikasataih 1476||(2024) Trans.-476 When the doubt was thus removed by the Tirthankara who was entirely free from old age and death, that saint accepted diksa along with his three hundred pupils. (2024) End of the Discussion with the Eleventh Ganadhara. & End