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are reciprocal; there is nothing like a plurality of causes in the Nyaya -Vaiseṣika theoery fo causation. The process of causation is a redistribution of energy. The cause is the totality of conditions (Kāraṇa Samagri), the collocations which produces the effect. It was the Nyāya view that cause ceases and the effect is newly produced. In other words the effect is non-existent before it was produced by its cause. This view is known as Asatkāryavāda and is opposed to the Sankhya and the Vedanta theory of causation according to which the effect potentially exists in the cause (satkāryavāda). The Nyaya texts define cause as कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति (त.सं. & त.दी.) ie, that which is not अन्यथासिद्ध (proved by any anything else, dependent on any other condition) and which invariably precedes the effect. The effect is fifi.e., the counterpart of antecedent negation.
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PRABUDDH JEEVAN
The Sankhya view is that what is existent cannot be destroyed and the non-existent can never be produced. If the non-existent can be produced as Nyaya says, then even a hare's horn can be produced. But the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika reply to this is that their view is, not that anything which is non-existing can be produced, but only that what is produced is non-existing.
Nyaya-Vaiseṣika view is the common-sense or Realistic theory of causation, which gives explanations on the basis of mere perceptions. As a matter of fact, cause and effect are not two facts, before and after, but two aspects of a process which is one; and the Satkāryavāda is therefore better theory of causation. Nyaya will have to treat development as mere appearance; and the causal process as merely artificial.
The Sankhyas reject the Nyaya view of causation on several gorunds. The सांख्यकारिका of ईश्वरकृष्ण says: असदकरणात् उपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ।।
FEBRUARY 2014
real, the effect real; to the Vedantists, the cause is real, the effect unreal; to the fs and is, both cause and effect are real, but the former regard the effect not existing before causation, while the latter regard cause and effect as co-existing. This difference of opinion on the subject of causation has coloured their Cosmic Philosophy and Metaphysics in general; for to the Buddhists, Creation is the creation of a thing out of Nothing; to the if it is a new thing out of an old thing; to the Hi, an evolution of one aspect of a thing into another, i.e. the properties of the cause into the effect; and to the Vedantis, it is mental conception only; the cause is real, the effect unreal, and causation mere faad or H. This controversey about Causation has arisen about what is called 3 or Material Cause.
1. What is can never be created. e.g., blue cannot be created out of yellow. 2. The matter of the cause exists in the effect e. g. seasamum with oil. 3. Anything will be produced out of anything. 4. The power in the cause exists in the effect. 5. The effect has in it-is of the same nature as cause. In short, there will be no-determining principle if the effect be quite distinct from the cause. This position would be very near to the Buddhistic one which says that from an unreal cause a real effect is produced. No wonder, the was called fa-fi (Pseudo-Buddhist) by his opponentsSānkhyas and Vedāntins.
The whole position regarding the controversy about causation was that, to the Buddhists, the cause is un
Three Kinds of Causes: There are three kinds of causes (1) the Material or Inherent Cause (Upādāna or Samaväyi Karāṇa; e.g., the clay of the jar; (2) The NonMaterial or Non-Inherent cause (Asamaväyi Kāraṇa); e.g. the colour of the clay in relation to the jug; and (3) The Instrumental Cause (Nimitta and Sahakari KāraṇaInsrumental and Accessory Cause), e.g., the potter, turnstick, the wheel in relation to the jug. No. 1 corresponds to Aristotle's Material Cause, No. 2, to his formal Cause, and No. 3 to his Efficient and Final Causes. The Final Cause of Aristotle would be the idea of the end, the jug itself. Nyaya mentions three distinctions as noted above.
Fallacies: The Nyaya system pays a great deal of attention to the treatment of fallacies. Several of them are dialetical rather than logical. The logical fallacies may be due to the wrong use of the Minor Term or False Minor, or False Example, or False Middle Term (the Hetvābhāsas). Five kinds Hetvābhāsas are mentioned by Gotama: (1) The Inconclusive Reasoning (Savyabhichāra), i.e. the Reason which leads to more conclusions than one, e.g., Sound is eternal, as it is intangible. Here it is wrong to infer eternality from intangibility; for even non-eternity follows from it, e.g. that of the Intellect. This fallacy can also be called the Irregular Middle. (2) The Contradictory reasoning (Viruddha) is the Reason which contradicts the fact, e.g., `Man is mortal, as he is divine.' Divinity contradicts mortality. (3) Neutralised Reasoning (fr) is the Contradicted Middle. In it, the Reason meant to establish a conclusion only gives rise to suspense, does not establish the conclusion. (Prakaraṇasama or the equivalent to the Proposition). It simply varies the question that is to be proved. ч is illustrated as: `Man
