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JANUARY 2014
PRABUDDH JEEVAN
39
Knowledge. A valuable contribution on the nature and firmative conclusion. Varieties of correct and incorrect Inferences is made The important parts of the syllogism are the Vyapti by the Nyāya-Vaiseșika Philosophy.
or Universal Relation in the Example, e.g., Whatever Inference consists in asserting something about has smoke, has fire; and the Application. The first corsomething else on the basis of a mark (linga) which is responds to the Major Premise of Western syllogism associated with it. By the knowledge of the sign we and the second to the Minor Premise. know the signate; the latter knowledge follows the The Problem of Induction : How is the Vyapti to former. Anumāna is literally measuring after some- be arrived at? How, in other words does the Nyāya things: thus: Because there is smoke (sign) therefore school tackle with the problem of Induction ? There there is fire (the signate) in this hill: the one knowl- are 3 ways which help us in establishing Inductions: edge follows the other knowledge.
(a) Enumeration, (b) Indirect Proof, and (c) Intuition or Inference has certain points of advantage over per- the Alaukika Pratyakşa of the Universals, which acception, the chief one being that whereas the latter is cording to Nyāya are Reals. restricted only to objects of the present, Inference re- (a) Enumeration means frequency of experience: lates to the Past, the Present, and the Future.
the observations in as many cases as possible, that Syllogism: The Syllogism is presented in the form wherever there is smoke there is fire (Positive Inof a five-membered inference as under:
stances) and where there is no fire there is no smoke. 1. This hill is on fire. The Proposition (Pratijñā) (b) Where we do not get such instances, Indirect 2. Because it smokes. The Reason (Hetu) Proof (Tarka) is to be resorted to. If the proposition, 3. Whatever has smoke, The Example (Drstānata) where there is smoke there is fire' is not true, then has fire e.g., this kitchen.
sometimes there is smoke but not fire' must be true, 4. This hill has smoke. The Application which is absurd, for fire is the cause of smoke. (Upanaya)
(c) Nyāya also asserts that it is not necessary to 5. Therefore this hill is on fire. Conclusion (Nigamana). collect instances. Universal relations are Reals, and
This is the form of a syllogism as stated by the Nyāya can be intuited, of course by those with exceptional system. It will be seen that in the above the Proposi- powers of discrimination. tion is restated in the conclusion, and application is a The Problem of Induction therefore has its peculiar combination of the reason and the example. The three- solution in Nyāya. To Aristotle, Induction was a syllomembered Aristotelian syllogism is compact, and in- gism; to Mill and in Modern Logic, it is an inference volves no repetition as in the Nyāya syllogism. But the other than a syllogism. But to Nyāya, it is neither prolatter is useful from the point of view of debate. It starts cess: it is 3 inch 4, it is extraordinary perception with making the Assertion, and then naturally proceeds (= urrect). RICETruri (Association or Close to the conclusion by stages which drive home to the Proximity). It is some sort of immediate Knowledge inopponent that which is to be proved.
termediate between अनुमान (inference) and प्रत्यक्ष (perIt will also be noticed that in the syllogism as stated ception). For (a) the Enumeration, the 116 and above, there are no figures and moods as in the Aris- the farfar E311- can be only limited, and (b) ach or totelian syllogism. The Nyāya syllogism has only one Hypothesis - the Indirect Proof-only drives away indifigure and one mood: Barbara, and the Universal af- rectly doubts of ATER (Exceptions). The knowledge *प्रत्यक्ष is divided into लौकिक and अलौकिक. लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष is that wherever there is smoke there is fire comes from
1914, sita, PA , TH, EM & HET while stilfcha rais: another source and that is 3 cinch 24-the 447444 (1) 414R TU e.g., All men are mortal. Here we see rf, extraordinary perception of the universal relamortality in man-nature manhood, But how do we per- tion of the Reals, urd and afard, i. e., of smokeness ceive gourd ? By HTHRECTETUT URTAT.
and fireness. Thus we have the position that Nyaya (2) JH 11 e.g., The lake looks cold. Here coldness
did not neglect Induction, but explained it as . This cannot be seen, yet when we say so we connect what
was a wrong handling of the subject, but nevertheless we know-the coldness of water with what we see.
the subject did not escape notice. (3) ifich: When we say: All men are mortal, we con
The Concept of Cause : The cause is that which nect for all time mortality with manhood. This cannot be the outcome of ordinary perception, but of an Intu
invariably precedes and is necessary for the produc
tion of the effect, says the Naiyāyika. Causal relations ition: it isयोगज प्रत्यक्ष.
