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APRIL2014
PRABUDDH JEEVAN
THE GLORIOUS DARŚANAS
BY: ATISUKHSHANKAR TRIVEDI
CHAPTER-V: THE PÛRVA MIMÅNSÅ
The Pûrva Mimânsâ : Its main spirit: Jaimini's system known as the Pûrva Mimânsâ, i.e., Prior Critical Philosophy (logically prior) is to be distinguished from Bâdarâyana's system known as Uttara Mimânsâ or the Vedanta, i.e., Posterior Critical Philosophy. Jaimini's system is mainly a sacrifical system. Its main endeavour is to lay down rules for the interpretation of Vedic texts for sacrifical rites. Its emphasis is on action as the key to salvation, opposed to which Vedanta says that it is Knowledge that does so. The Vedas are eternal and are not dependent on the authority of God. The world has no God-creator; it is eternal. Knowledge is self-valid; it does not need any external test. In this theory of Knowledge the Mimänsä Philodophy differed fron the Nyaya, and Buddhists as well as Vedântist view; and accordingly its explanations of Error and illusion as Akhyâti or Non-apprehension of the discrimination between the real and the unreal, as in Illusion between the conch
shell and silver.
The Mimânsâ Literature: The Jaimini Sûtras were written about 200 B.C. They are the groundwork of the system. Śâbara Bhâşya is the first known commentary on these Sûtras. There were probably other commentators, but their works are not available. Śâbara lived about 57 B.C. Next we have Kumârila who commented both on Sûtras and on Bhâşya. Kumârila Bhatta is a little earlier than Sankara and lived about the 7th century A.D. His exposition is in 3 parts: the Ślokavârtika, the Tantravârtika and the Tuptikâ. The next is Prabhakara who, according to tradition, was Kumârila's pupils. He wrote a commentary on the Śâbara Bhâşya, the Bṛhati. Among other Mimânsakas worth mentioning is Mandana Misra, the follower of Kumârila, who was defeated in arguments and converted to Vedantism by Sankara. His chief works were Vidhiviveka, Mimânsânukramani, and the commentary on
Tantravârtika.There are various other Mimânsâkâs of
minor importance, too numerous to be noticed. The system was of great practical utility to Hindu Religion and
Law.
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Pramanas or the Means of Knowledge: Different schools differ on this subject, Jaimini accepts only Perception, Inferences and Testimony, to which Prabhakara adds Comparison and Implication (Arthâpatti), and Kumârila one more, Non-Apprehension (Anupalabdhi).
Perception is explained realistically as proceeding directly from the contact of the sense-organ with the object, and both Prabhâkara and Kumârila admit determinate and indeterminate perception. Again, both of them admit the reality of the Universals as objects of Perception. the Mimânsâkas thus differ from the Buddhists who deny reality to the Universals, and the Jains who identify Universality with Similarity, and so deny reality to it.
Non-apprehension is admitted as an independent Pramâna, because Absence is not apprehended by Perception or by any other Pramâna. Prabhâkara does not accept it, for he says: Non-apprehension is included in Inference.
The Mimânsâka Theory of Knowledge: The Doctrine of the self-validity of Knowledge (:) forms the very central principle of the Mimânsâka's theroy of Knowledge as opposed to the Naiyâyika veiw of
Knowledge gives its own validity: this means all cognitions are true, and their validity can be set aside by the contrary nature of their objects or by discrepancies in their causes. When I see a serpent instead of a rope, the congnition for the time is valid; it is set aside only when we realise the object, rope. When a jaundiced man sees silver as yellow, the cognition is for the time valid; it is set aside when he knows of the disorder in his eye. The invalidity of a conception is never inherent; every cognition is valid. Even a cognition of shell as silver is valid as cognition. Then how is Erroneous Cognition dealt with by the Mimânsâka? He simply calls it Akhyâti, i.e., Non-Apprehension; when we see silver where there is shell, there is non-Apprehension of the difference between the this and the silver (the remem
