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explain all that we imply by term 'creation'. There are always two causes in any event, namely, the Upūdāna (substantial cause) and the Nimitta (the instrumental cause). Viz., fire would be the instrumental cause determining water to boil, water being the substantial cause of the event 'boiling'. Each of the above named substances or realities is both substantial cause and instrumental cause, each act upon the others and is itself acted upon by the others. Each has the power of originating new states, destroying old ones and keeping permanent. The basic substance with its qualities is something that is permanent, while the modes or accidental characters appear and disappear. Viz., the soul is eternal with its inseparable character of consciousness; but at the same time it is subjected to accidental characters like pleasure and pain and super-imposed modes such as body etc., both of which changing constantly. This power is called 'Satta'. It is not a separate entity existing outside these six realities. It is a power inherent in them and inseparable from them.
The modern physics also proved "Nothing new is created, nothing is destroyed, only modifications appear. Nothing comes out of nothing, nothing altogether goes out of existance; but only substances are modified."
As Jainism is a dynamic realism, its doctrine is similar to the views held by the philosophers in the west, especially those belonging to the Realistic School. The Jaina conception of Drarya, Guna and Paryāya is aproximately similar to Spinoza's view of substance, attributes and modes, though he uses the term 'attribute' with a technical meaning, while in Jaina metaphysics it means qualities. Hegal had a conception of reality similar to the Jaina conception of Dravya. Satrā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel maintained. Thing-in-itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravyas refer to facts of experience and Sattā refers to existence or reality. The French philosopher Bergson also recognised substance as a permanent thing existing through change.
The position is the same in Jainism and Samkhya so far as the initial start is concerned. One accepts the thesis and antethesis of Jiva and Ajīva and the other of Puruşa and Prakrti. Thus both are dualistic of even pluralistic in view. But in Jaina system, Jiva is an active agent, while in Samkhya system Purusa is always Udāsīnu (indifferent) and is only a passive spectator. Jainism is a realistic religion with a philosophical background, while Sāṁkhya remained till the end only a system of intellectual pursuit.
Jainas and Mimānsakas agree in holding that Ātman is constituted of Caitanya and that there is a multitude of separate souls. But according to Jainism pleasure and pain come to be experienced because of Karmic association; while Mimarsakas simply say that they are changes in the Soul. In the condition of liberation, the soul, according to Mimärsakas, exists without cognition, but Jainism holds that the liberated soul is an embodiment of entire cognition (Ananta-Darsana), omniscience (Ananta-Jñana), infinite energy (Ananta-Virya) and the highest bliss (Ananta-Sukha).
The Jaina Atman is a permanent individuality and will have to be distinguished from Buddhistic Vijnanas which rise and disappear, one set giving rise to a corresponding set.
Unlike in the Nyāya system the soul in Jainism is not physically all-pervading but of the same size as that of the body which it comes to occupy. Jainism does not accept any idea like the individual souls being drawn back into some Higher soul Brahman or Isvara periodically.
Soul's inherent qualities cognition (Darśana) and knowledge (Jñana) are similar to that of Kant's view of sensibility and understanding.
The Jaina conception that Jivas are potentially divine and are found in different states of existence is echoed in the following lines of the Sufi Mystic :
God sleeps in the minerals Dreams to consciousness in animals
जैन दर्शन मीमांसा
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