Tattva Kaumudi

Author(s): Oriental Book Agency Poona
Publisher: Oriental Book Agency Poona
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/010561/1

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LIST OF CONTENTS
Pages
... 47–49
Introduction List of Abbreviations
Kārikā I 1 Benediction . 2 Introduction to Kārikā 1 ...
3 Necessity of Scientific Enquiry 4 Threefold Division of Pain...
5 Objection- loquiry Superfluous i 6 Reply i7 Auspiciousness of the beginning word...
Kāriki II ! 8 Objection-Adequacy of Vedic means 19 Similarity of the Vedic with the Obvious means ...
10 Impurity, Decay and Excessiveness of the Vedic means 11 The Impurity of animal slaughter in Sacrifice ... 12 Nonpermanence and Excess of the results of Vedic rites 13 Immortality from Vedic rites means long durability 14 Discriminative wisdom the only means 15 Literal interpretation of the Karikā 16 Source of discriminative Knowledge ...
Kārikā III 17 Fourfold Division of Categories 18 The Productive (1) ... 19 The Productive product (2) 20 The Products (3) 21 The non-produci-non-productive (4)
Kirika IV 22 The three kinds of Proof ... 23 Proof defined... ... ... 24 The three-foldness of proof 25 Only three kinds of proof ... 26 The inclusion of all other proofs in the above-mentioned 27 Noconuty of enquiry into the different kinds of proof. 28 The order of Explanation ...
Kirika v 29 Specifio definitions of be proofs 30 * Perception" defined

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(ii)
..
.
31 laseatience of Buddhi .. 32 Differentiation of "Perception" from the other forms of proof 33 Final definition of perception 34 Inference, a distinct proof 35 taference defined 36 The three kinds of Inference 37 The first Division of laference .. . 38 The Negative a posteriori-Inforence 39 The Affirmative priori. loforonco 40 Definition of Valid Assertion 41 Self-evidence of Valid Assertion 42 Reliability of Kapila ... 43 Pseudo-Revelations - ... 44 Differentiation of Valid Assertion from Inferenco 45 Other kinds of proof set aside or included in above 46 "Analogy included in Valid Assertion ... 47 "Presumptioo included in Inference 48 * Absence" included in" Perception" 49 * Probability" in Inference Rumour discarded
Kārikā VI 51 The Sphere of the Means of Cognition
Knowledge of Nature &c., through lnference 53 Knowledge of others by Revelation ...
Karika VII 54 Objection--Nature &c. being not amenable to the senses,
are non existing . ...
Different causes of pon-perception of objects by the Senses $7 Non-perception of an object, no proof of non-existence
Kārikā VIII $8 Objection existence of Nature can be denied like that of sky. ! .. flowers-otated, and set aside : there are effects bearing
.. testimony to the existence of Nature '59 Such effects mentioned ... - ...
Kärikā Ix' 60 Differebit views with regard to the nature of an effect
Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in
accordance with the Vedānta and Bauddha tenets 62 Effect declared to be a permanent Entity . ...
...
28

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hiii)
que,
.
63 Bauddha viow refuted more on 64 Vedłnta view refuted in
. ya ya and Vaisesika views criticised and the Sārnkhya
view ostablished; the first argument in favour thoroof. 66 The second argument in favour of the effect being an entity... 67 The third argument 68 The fourth argument -69 The fifth argument ...
*** 70 Proofs of the non-difference of cause of effect ... 71 The offect only a particular development of the cause 72 Objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the
effect ... 73 Objection set aside as being common to both thoories 94 Production of the cloth not identical with the cloth ... 75 Nocossity of Sausal operation 76 Conclusion of the Karikā
.
.
Kärikā X 77 lątroduction to the consideration of the Manifest 78 The Manifested as having a cause ...
being non-eternal ...
.. non pervading ... .. active
multi-form
component .. soluble .. conjunct
.. dependent .87 The contrary nature of the Unmanifest
Kūrikā XI 88 latroduction to Kārikā Xl ... .89 Similaritios bot woon the Manifest and the Unmanifest! ...(i) with the three attributes 90 (ii) undistinguishable ...
# Qbjection based on the Bauddha idealism 92 fi) losostioni ... . 33 .fiv) Productive ... ... ... ... 4 Similarity with Nature stated ...
Dissimilarity.of these bronn Spirit ... * Otajoction based on similarity of the Spirit with the Manitost...
1

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. Kāriki . XII y latroduction to the consideration of the Attributes 98 Construction of the Karikā 99 Character of the Attributes as pleasure, pain, delusion 160 The functions of the Attributes ... The method of operation of the attributes
- Kārikā XIII Introduction to Kārikā XIII 103 Properties of "Goodness" 104 Nocessity of the properties of " Foulness" 105 Necessity of the properties of “Darkness" 06 Objection based on the impossibility of the co-operation of
Attributes of contradictory properties 107 Necessity of postulating the three Attributes ...
Kārikā XIV 108 Question of the Indiscreetness and other properties of the
Attributes .. 109 Proof of the existence of such properties 110 Question of the Existence of Nature ...
Kārikā XV 111 Why not except the atomic theory ? ... 112 Proofs of Nature's Existence-(1) initial Separation and final ' reunion of cause and effect
(21-Because Evolution is due to Energy Objection: These two reasons might rest with Buddhi, · Reply: (9) from Finitenoss '.. Because of homogeneity
Karika XVI 116 Oporation through the Attributes ... 117. By a blending of the Attributes ... 118 Objection: How can an attribute of uniform natuke produce in diverso effects? Reply ...
Kärikä XVIII 119 Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit', Exibtonce ... 120 Proofs (1)-Bocause all compound objects are for other's
. purpose ... 1. Objection: and reply 19 (2) Because sbore must be superintendenco: ... 123 (3) Boonuse there must be ono to fpol... : *

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...
124 A different interpretation of proof (3) 125 (4) Because of the tendency of writers and sages low * Beatitudo ...
Kiriki XVIII 126 Question of the number of the Spirit raised 127 (1) From allotment of birth, death and the organs 128 (2) Since Activity is not Simultaneous 129 (3) Because the modification of the Attributos are different...
Kārikā XIX 130 Introduction to the consideration of Spirit's Properties 131 Explanation of the force of "this" in the Kārıkā... 132 Necessity of so many properties ... 133 Absence of the attributes leads to Emancipation... 134 Neutrality .... ...
"
Kärikā XX 135 Objection--Intelligence and Activity always coexistent e... 136 The foeling referred to by the objection must be a mistako ...
Kariki XXI 137 Objection-what is the need of union ? 138 Force of the Gonotivo in "Pradhanasya" Explained 139 The need of union explained 140 The creation of Buddhi &c.
Kärikā XXII 141 The Process of Creation ... 142 Process of the production of the Elements
Karika XXIII 143 latroduction to the definition of Buddhi 144 Definition of Buddhi explained ... 145 Properties of Buddhi-Virtue &c. 146 Four kinds of Dispassion ... 147 Eight kinds of Power 148 Rovorno of the above qualities
Kirika XIV 149 Definition of Ahankara ... 150 Produoto of Ahamkāra ...
Kirikt XV 151 Production of Senses ... ... 152 Objection : Purponelessness of Pamions; and Reply thereto
.

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vi)
444
...
..
Kirik. XXVI 153 Sense defined - ". .. . ...
Kariki XXVII S4 Double nature of mind
- 5 Mind defined in 15,6 Qbjection : Why make mind a sense l-and Reply thereto...
7 Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism ? ... 3 Multifariousness also a modification of the Attributes
· Kārikī XXVIII 159 Functions of the ten sense organs
Kankā XXIX 160 Reflection of Manas, Self-consciousness of Abankāre and
Determination of Buddhi 161 The five vital Airs common to all ...
1 Kärikä XXX 162 Function of the organs-a(1) Instantancous 163 (2) Gradual:.... 164, With regard to visible objects function of the intornal organs ... independent of the external ones ...
Kiriki XXXI 165 Objection : Functions permanent or otherwise? ... 166 No collision of the functions of the organs ... 67 Objection: How can insentient organs comprebend aach othor's motives?-Roply thereto ...
Kārikā XXXII hern Division of the organs introduced ..
9 The thirtocn.organs and their fungsions o Objects of these functigns...
.. Kirikā XXXIII 171 Sub-division of the organs introduced 172 The three laternal orgañs ... * * 173 The tea external organs ... 174 External orgaas operating at the present time. ' * internal at all Times ... 73 Time not. distinct principlo

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...
.
Kirika XXW 676 Objects of axternal organs introduced... 17 Specific and gross objects of the functions of intellectual
... organs explained 178 Do. do. organs of action
Karika XXXV 179 The importance of the internal organs
Kārikā XXXVI 180 Predominence of Buddhi ... *81 The external organs as modifications of Attributes
Kārikā XXXVII 182 Purther grounds for the Superiority of Buddhi 83 Cbjection: absence of Mukti-Reply thereto
Karikā XXXVIII 184 The Subtile character of the Tanmātras 185 The gross Elements produced out of the Termātroa 186 These are Specific because soothing, terrific and doluding
Karikā XXXIX 187 Three sorts of Specific Objects ... 188 Subtile bodies are permanent
. Kārkā XL 189 Subtle body unconfined and permanent 190 Objection: Two bodies unnecessary,--and reply 191 Question: How does the Subtle Body migrate ? Raply. 192 Subtle Body Dissolving at cach Pralaya ..
Kārikā XLI 193 Existence of the Subtlo. Body proved ...
Käriká XLII 194 Reason and manner of the migration of the Subtle Body, 195 Power of the Subtle Body due to Nature
Kariká XLIII 196 karidental and Essential Dispositions ... 197 filosh, blood. &c., related to the gross body
Kiriki XLW 198 Consequences of the various means introduced i 199 Virtue leads to higher planos and vice to lower ... 200 From tho rovono, the reverse-the-throcfold bomber

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(vii)
102
102 102
... ...
103 103
104
...
104 104 104 105 105 105
Kiriki XLV 203 Absorption into Prakrti from Dispansion 202 Transmigration from Passionate attachment 203 Nan-impediment from Power
Kārikā XLVI 204 Error. Disability. Contentment and Perfection 205 Fifty Sub-divisions of do do
Karikā LXVII 206 The Fifty forms of Error ...
Kärikä XLVIII 207 The Sub.divisions of Error Sc. introduced 208 Eight forms of Ignorance ... 209 Eight forms of Delusion ... 210 Tea forms of Extra Delusion 211 Eighteen forms of Gloom ... 212 Eighteen forms of Utter Darkness 213 The total coming to sixty-two
Kirikā XLIX 214 The twenty-eight forms of Disability ... 215 Etoven forms of disability, those of the sense organs 216 The sevonteen forms of disability of Buddhi
Kárikā L 217 Nine forms of Contentment 218 Pour forms of internal Contentment 219 (1) Ambha 220 (2) Salila 221 (3) Ogha .. 222 (4) Vrati 223 Five forms of external Contentment 224 (1) Para 225 (2) Supora ... 226 (3) Parapăra ... 221 (4) Aauttamāmbha 22 (5) Uttamāmbha
Kiriki LI 229 Forms of Power introduced 200 The eight forms of Power ... 231. (!) Tiram Study, .
105
106 106
... ...
106 107 107
107 108
108
108
109 109 109 109
110
110

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(ix)
..
111
-
113
114
T15
...
32 (2) Sutāra.Word 33 (3) Tårātāre Reasoning ... 234 (4) Ramyuka-Acquisition of Friends
111 235 (5) Sadāmudita-Purity ..
111 236 The three consequent on the suppression of three kinds of pain 237 The first five forms otherwise explained
112 238 Error &c., arc hooks to the Powers ...
112 Kirikā LII 239 Nocessity of twofold creation 240 Proofs of the above ...
... 113
... 241 Objection of seciprocality set aside .
. 114 Kärikā LIII 242 Porms of the Elemental Creation introduced 243 The eight Divine sorts ...
... 115 14 Five of the Lower Animals
... 115 .45 Mankind single...
Kárikā LIV 246 Threefoldness of the material Evelution introduced 247 Six Heavenly Regions .. ...
Karika LV 248 Evolution productive of pain
... 116 249 Imposition of pleasure and pain on Spirit 250 - Do. due to Spirit's non-discrimination ..
Kürikā LVI 251 Question of the Maker of the Universe introduced 252 Creation due to Nature ...
... 118 253 Creation for another's (Spirit's) sake ...
... 118 Kirika LVII 254 Objection-incapacity of insentient Nature of croation 255 Reply-instance of the flow of milk ... 256 View of a personal God overthrown ... 257 Freedom of the Samkhya theory from faults
120 Kīriki LVIII 258 "How for Spirit's purpose ?" Explained
Karika LIX 259 “Whence the cossation of the operations of Nature .
..Explained. . ... ... ... ... .. . 121
- (
117 117
od
117
119 119 119
-
120

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"uola
125 125
...
126
...
126
...Karika LX Nature aote for no compensation"....
Kiriki LXI No reappearance of Nature with regard to an emancipated Spirit
Kärikā LXII 262 Objection : "emancipation and bondage not possible to
uomodifying Spirit ... Reply: "Na Spirit is bound, nor migrates &c."...
.. Kärikä LXIII 264 "Nature biods herself by seven forms &c." -
Kiriki LXIV 265 "Truth" explained ... ... 266 The purity of wisdom explained 267 Objection based on the eternal tendency to false knowledge 268 The form of discriminative knowledge 269 - Completion of the knowledge ... .
Kärikā LXV 270 Cause of the cessation of Nature's operation ...
Kiriká LXVI 271 Objection " though one sot of objocis has been enjoyed.
... others remain to be enjoyed" ... 272 Reply: “ The Spirit having attainod to wisdom, there is no motive to further action
..
Käriki LXVII 273 Objection: The body dissolving on the attainment of wisdom,
"how could the bodilese Spirit behold Nature? ... 274 Body continues in obedience to the momentum imparted previous Karma
...
Kiriki LXVIII 275 Final release of the Spirit ... ...
Kariki LXIX 26 The procedence of Kapila ...
...
Küriki LXX 277 Importance of the Sámkhya doctrin....
Kariki LXXI 278 Arya" explained ..
Karika LXXII * 279 The Treatise is a whole, not a part ...
128
129
130
131
132
132

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INTRODUCTION 1. The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. No. body even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Samsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, “Every one desists from pain ; every one desires happiness." But what happi. ness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the•creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.
II. The Significance of Samkhya Philosophy Of all the philosophical systems, Sāmkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gains say the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Sāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this S'astra is recognised by all the systems. S'ankarācārya. sayga" The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vodānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E.. XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read“There is no knowledge like that of Samkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sām. khya being the highest knowledge." (S'ānti. 316, 2).
Though the use of the word Simkhya is found first of all in the s'vet. Up.---TEATTUI Farmari etc., ( VI, 13), yet Samkhya reflections are found even in the Rgveda and the other Upanişads. This proves the antiquity of this S'astra. This will be made clear in detail further on.
Simkhya is derived from the word samkhyā. The word sankhyā is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. " pealt pean faarron" (Amara I. V. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and as'akti, atuști, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāmkhya-pravacanabhäşya, by a quotation from the Mbh -
"संख्या प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृति च प्रचक्षते ।
तत्वानि च चतुर्विशतेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम्॥" So, Sankhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word Samkhya was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, sce S. P., p. 189. 2n and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'arma says with regard to Simkhya in Sanskrta-Candrikā, a magazine which becamo defunct long ago, that the Samkhya is lawny, with doop-brown faco, and has a big bolly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi. purana quoted. VII of 1821 S'aka, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really

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INTRODUCTION
speaking, since the word Kapila stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāmkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purana has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāņa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led 10 describe his form and colour.
Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Isvara in the Samkhya-system, have maintained that it is vedaviruddha, or opposed to S'ruti (S. S, p. 21 f.; S.P., 13 ff.). S'ankarācārya also, seeing that Sāmkhya is opposed to advaita, avers that Samkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.
“Although there are many Smstis treating of the soul. we have singled out for refutation the Sāmkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic p1ssage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Samkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (s've. Up. VI, 13). ........., we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāmkhya Smrti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. (S. B. E, XXXIV, pp. 297–8). In deciding also the vaidika or the non-vaidika character of Sāmkhya, the great S'ankara says—"The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakşin bas quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. c., of some Kapila ) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without spoci. fying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, vie., the one who burned the sohs of Sagara and had the surname of Vásudova." (S BE, XKKIV. a 294).

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
Sudanly others have also maintained the opposition of Selling to Sruti. Truly speaking. Samkhya could be divided whto twomone ses' vara, the other niris'vara. Lot the theists 'not take the niris'vara-Sāřkhya, propounded in the Kārkā, etc., as rooted in Sruti, but who can take excep tion to the paidika character of the ses'vara-Sankhya 48 propounded in the Upanişads, the Mahābhārata and the Pltrāvas For instance, we come accross ‘yatha-s'rutini. Hartana as a synonym of Sāmkhya in —
एतानि नव सर्गाणि तत्वानि च नराधिप । चतुर्विशतिरुक्कानि यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शनात् ॥
(Mbh., S'ānti, 310, 25 ) In the 313th chapter of S'antiparvan, in the section wascribing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the oibhutis of Prakrti many synonyms of the upholders of Sārkhya are met with; e. g. Atquifpania: (v. 1) meri.
ta:, (2) gogara, (3) diceraria:, (4) gimaria:, (5) Turg roa:, 1 6,7,8 and 9 ) Tragalantet:, (10) gerarfare Mehmetafa: (12) quraraisia:, (13). Here the word *Yahās rutinidars'inaḥ' being repeated four times esta. blishes the vaidika character of theistic Sāmkhya. Moreover, evtrithe atheistic Sāmkhya is vaidika in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Uspartiçads, etc. (Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāmkhya as older, entirely believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāmkhyas in the later Upaningurds, the Bhagavadgitā and portions of the Mahābhārata. widt-Int. Gott p. 32). Therefore, from the presence of ko hames of the acāryas of Samkhya in the offering to Rşis, Ntray be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most metertintich theists 'Indertook the study of Sāmkhya. (8. B.. A . This could not have been possible if Samkhya nas not founded on S'rutis.

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INTRODUCTION
pun. Germs of Samkhya in the Vedas, etc. The presence of Samkhya categories in the Srutis in a berminall form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean y say that the principles of Sāṁkhya in their detail are .6 be sought in the Vedas and Upanişads as propounded by Sāmkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. Tamas described in the Ķgveda (X. 129, 3) " 311A1 THAT TOE 495ganci” etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to satkāryavāda. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his bhāsya on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains Aja ( the unborn ) as the name of Pradhāna
तमिदर्भ प्रथमं दध्र आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्त विश्वे । अजस्य॒ नाभावघ्येकमर्पित यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुवनानि तस्थुः ।।
(Rgveda, X. 82, 6) Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upanişads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject matter ( Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. 1., p. 141 ff. ).
1. The most ancient : as, Brhadāranyaka, Chandogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauşitaki.
2, Ancient : as, Kāthaka, Isa, S'vetās'vatara, Mundaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.
3. Modern : as, Praśna, Maitrāyaṇi and Māņļūkya. 4. Most modern : the many Atharvaņa Uparişads.
Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruşa is declared to be only a seer, not a door, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything. (in
T. i. 2

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
reality) as in "par pe A9 HTAT transferata......
The got 9901411EFT" (IV. 3, 15 ff ). The word mahat is indicative of the Sāmkhya word Buddhi in", " # Jut सन्धव......यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्तम जन्तमपारं ramaga vaatet at 7: Agrum etc." (Br. Up. II. 4, 12 ). The term Vijñānaghana expounds the intelligent nature of Buddhi. [ Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sámkhya attributes unconsciousness to Buddhi which is by nature intelligence. vide, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the Vatsyāynna Bhāşya on the Gautama-Sūtra “greapumparantavata" ( 1. 15). ]
In the ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of satkārydoāda in “ para FTTH Freemanfarinya" the S'ruti in the same mantra mentions the pūrva-paksa of asat-kāryavāda in "ah BPTETHETTAT TERTE HARTA TEHICHA: FOTO". It then advances in the next mantra sat kāryavāda that is, ( #9: Fara), as a contradiction of the previous statement, e. g., "AG FRÅ Faila mara # #a: F ata, Fieta F AI IQRAATÍSTICO" ( VI. 2, 2k. Here the difference from S'ānkara-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as real and not unreal like mīyā. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds satkāryavāda. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the mantra यथा सोम्यकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्व मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं memoria Argo" ( ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the Pariņāmavāda of the Sāmkhyas ( Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in “ यदने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तदूप. यग्छु तदपां, यत्कृष्णं तदनस्यापागादग्नेरनित्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो Ahorro ito sqropa frita" (ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates Rajas. Just as

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INTRODUCTION
red colour colours cloth, etc., so Rajas colours citta, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates Sattva, because white water has the property of purifying things. Sattva also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of anna=Earth is an indication of Tamas. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient Tamas covers the knowledge born of Sattva. [See, Bāla, p. 3. What has been propounded by Sūryanārāyaṇa Sistri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduc. tion, S. N. S. ]. This very thing is propounded in the mantra “SETİ TEATRUTH (S'v. Up. IV 5; Mahā. nārāyana Up., p. 141, Išādı ). The trivrtkarana (trebling ) S'ruti found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5 ) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word, trivrta has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in " तमेकनेमि त्रिवृतम् etc." (s'v. Up. 1, 4 ) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this ( Ent. Gott., p. 32 ).
The Sārikhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upanışads, e.g, in Katha " HAAFT TTT JG FICAT HELA TT: ( 111, 10). Mahat is the synonym of Ahankāra. Similarly we find Avyakta and Purusa in "aga: 9724 T aa: 9T: Igor që BEAT FIPET ATT TTi siat: 11" (Ibid, Ili, 11), Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and in. activity of Purusa have been indicated in "द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वादत्ति अनभन्यो 379afnafirat Il” in the Mundaka Up. (III, 1) (1. P. I, 259, 1 n!.
It is a well-known fact that Svetās'vatara is essentially a Sānikhya Upanışad. It abounds in the Sārikhya cate. gories. For instance in this alone, the words Sānkhya and Kapila have been used for the first time. "AFFITTOI Fisela

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
TIMETA" (. 13). "Figan nga JFIHO" (V.2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word Kapila. It is again in this Upanışad that the words vyakta, avyakta and jña are found, e g., "Ågatie THETR Toyota Ta funt: etc." (1.8); also "$TFT ara arañaristas difit etc." (1.9). vide also the Mbh. “SETT FETISTISTAICHA: pagal:" (111. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gauda. on the 61st Kārıkā ). Similarly, the use of the words Pradhūna, Prakrti and gura is also found here, e. g. " MTB T798" (1, 10), "argi T ara forg" (IV, 10), "archio Fagunaren" ( 1, 13), etc. Also, the mantra a A Faza acTri parari la tragcath: 1 BTER: agara 99730 Gaming ATHEATER II" (s'v. Up. 1, 4) propounds the ca-egories of Sārikhya. The word triuria refers to the three gunas, the word sodas'ānta refers to sixteen vikūras, the word s'atārdhāra points to the fifty varieties of pratya ya.sarga. Keith's doubt about the Sarikhya character of this verse will not bear examination ( S. S. p. 11 ). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, “The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools." But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.
But simply on the basis of the presence of a few techni. cal terms of Sārikhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upanışad propounds Sārikhya doctrines. For instance, in places like "Argi gana a TinhTITA I 774TH" (s'v. Up. Iv, 10 ) thougk there is a technical term of Sāmkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāmkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upanışadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

Page #21

INTRODUCTION
any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Samkhya and Yoga systems lies betweer. the most ancient and the ancient Upanişads. (Ent. Golt. p. 21).
Among the modern Upanışads, the mention of Sativa, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāmkhya categories of kşetrajña, saņkalpa, adhyavasāya, abhimūna and linga clearly show that these Upa. nişads corne after the formulation of the Sāṁkhya system. As-“तमो वा इदमेकमास, तत्पश्चात्तत्परेणोरतं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद्वै रजमो
1................Fissitsi fra: glages : FOTETTATO . ATASI: garga: etc." ( Maitrāyani, Up. IV, 5), "qoam
Adalara a matā par iepà etc. ( Ibid 111,2), “praat agroamar 3190191917: etc. ( Pr up IV. 8) and so on.
In the Mbh, and the Purāņas, we find Sānikhya philo. sophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three gunas (Mbh. III, 209, 16–21; 211, 4). The distinction between Prakrtı, and Purusa has been extensively expounded in S'āntiparian (285, 33-40). Here the word sattva stands for Prakrti and not Brahman. But Keith, seeing that sattva was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that sattea is referring to Brahman ( S. S., p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :-“ graf Jona, ARE क्षेत्रज्ञ: परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेष सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयो वः ॥३७॥ स्वभावामिद्धमेवे. तपदिमान् मुजते गुणान् । ऊर्णनाभिर्यथा मूत्रं विशेयास्तन्तुवद् गुणाः ॥३८॥". We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sārkhya knowledge be. ing called Vais'eșika which was imparted to Janaka by Pancaśikha of Parāśara gotra, e. g.. “ TEATEERT HET grei ori and gu" (S'anti. 330, 23a ). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

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context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāmkhya lays down a third kind of path, viz., a combination of knowledge and action. S'āntı, 320, 38—40. In this connection, vide my artıcle, P. O. C., Lahore, 11, 1027 f ).
In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word Sāmkhya in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence , -"ATERI AJTETTÁT ETT Pariz: Agİlha: 1 qozari. जातानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप ॥ दोषाणां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागत.. Place T927 AT FRENCITTATA II" (S'ānti. 320, 79 and 82 ). But at one place in the Mhh., thirty qualities of a body have been metioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāmkhya philosophy e. g., (1) S'abda, (2) Spars'a, (3) Rasa, (4) Rūpu, (5) Gandha, (6-10) the five senses, (11) Manas, (12) Buddhi, (13) Sattra, (14) Aham-kartā, (15) Sūmagrya. (16) Sanghāta, (17) Prakrti, (18) Vyakti, (19) Drandvayoga. (20) Kūla, (21-25) the five gross elements, (26) Sadbhūvayoga, (27) Asadbhāvayoga, (28) Vidhi, (29) S'ukra and (30) Bala (Santı 320, 97-112 ). So it has been said "fazia
चवं हि गुणाः संख्यानतः स्मृताः । समग्रा यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम् ॥" (ibid, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of Prakrti and sixteen varities of nodifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same parvan. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāmkhya books. They are as given below :
(1) The creation of mahat from avyakta, (2) from mahat there is the creation of ahamkāra, (3) from the latter of manas, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses. (7) from these, that of " connected with the senses ( aindriyaka )," (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categorios taught by Pancas'ikha in S'ānti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

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INTRODUCTION
ir
Sāmkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the Sānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāmkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of Brahman or İs'vara. Even though the plurality of puruṣas has been accepted, Brahman has been described as the basis of all. (vide- ami geamuri a quant Trafiezā," S'āntı 350. 26 ). Āsuri, having taught Sāṁkhya to Pañcas'ıkha, got merged in Brahman, "JANE at the JESTO I stanjure afera afaga agama II” (S'ānti, 218, 13 ).
In the Bhagavadgitā also, we do not find atheism among the Sānikhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Səmkhya propounded in it ( Tilak's Gitārahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapıla, the pioneer of Samkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Krşna as an example of his own glory, e. g. “fagrai fai afa: " ( Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sámkhya path without karman is only a synomym of Įñāna. Therefore Sankarācārya explains the word krtānta as “ partia njega i arra: qft. HATARI A mara: Para maall" (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'anka. rācārya explains the word gurasamkhyāna (Bh. G. XVIII, 19 ) as the system of Kapıla the subject matter of which is the exposition of the three guņas, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.
Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāņa, the Samkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Vişnu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāmkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2–8; VI. 4. 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khanda, 18, 13-15 : Brah. P. ch. 213 ff ).
In the Manu-smrti also which is contemporary, with the Mbh. ( 8. 8, p. 52 ) there is a detailed description of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (XII. 24–52 ) and reference to the three pramāsas (ibid, 105 ). But the word Sāmkhya is not found

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in it. Medhātithi, commenting on " 371977 fatora pria af: vê:1 (1.76), says- naionageTTEPAT TEHEHT&TY:-, and thu indicates the presence of Sāmkhya doctrine. In Vişnusmrti the distinction of Puruşa from the twenty-four categories preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. Oni of the stanzas ( XX, 25 ) of this Smrtı very closely correspond: with the comment on the second Kārıkā by Gaudapāda (s S. p. 52). In the Sankha-samhıtā we find twenty-five cate gories, but Purusa is identified with Vişnu ( VII 21-25 ). Yājñavalkya Smrtı has also been influenced by Sānikhya, e.g. बुद्धेरुत्पत्तिरव्यक्तात्ततोऽहङ्कारसम्भवः। तन्मात्रादीन्यहङ्कारादकोत्तरगुणानि च ॥" (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the-Samkhya categories expounded in these books give prominence to Is'vara (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvalkar points out five stages of the evolution of Sankhya doctrines. )
IV. Sūmkhya Teachers Names of twenty-sıx Sāmikhya teachers are met with in the Smộtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:
(1) Kapıla, (2) Asuri, (3) Pancas'ıkha, (4) Vindhya. vāsa, or Vindhyavāsaka or Vindhyavāsın, (5) Varşaganya, (6) Jagişavya. (7) Vodhu, (8) Asıtadevala or Devala. (9) Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra, (13) Bhrgu, (14) Sukra, (15) Kās'yapa, (16) Parās ara, (17) Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Ārstişena (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25) Valmiki and (26) S'uka.
1. Kapila Mentioned in the s'v. Up. ( 5, 2 ) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāmkhya philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical personage.' But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

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INTRODUCTION
13
another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Budhists ( S. Y., 2, 83 ). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with Agni or Visnu or Shiva, and is, therefore, another name for Hiranyagarbha (s. S. 9, In; Mbh. S' ānti. 339, 66-67; 342, 92-93 ). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamangala published by me ( p. 3 ). Balarāma Udāsina, in his footnotes to Yogabhāsya 1. 25; " आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमविष्टाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।” says:
" ( 1 ) आदिविद्वान् = सर्गादावाविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभूः, निर्माणचित्तं = योगबलेन स्वनिर्मितं चित्तमधिष्ठाय = स्वांशेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्य परमर्षिर्भूत्वा कारुण्या जिज्ञासवे आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थ: ॥ ( 2 ) ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः श्रूयते ॥ ( 3 ) पञ्चमे कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविप्लुतम् । प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम् | (Bhagavata Purana, I. 3. 11) इति स्मृतौ पञ्चमावतारत्वोक्तेविष्णोरवतारः कपिल इति भावः । ' अग्निः स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्र - प्रवर्तकः' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम् । कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं' इति कपिलपदेनापि हिरण्यगर्भ एव गृह्यते ॥ 'यो ब्रह्माणं इत्यादिबहु पूर्वोत्तरमन्त्रसंवादादित्याहुः ॥ " ( Ch. S. S. p. 62 ) ..
•
an
From a quotation in the Baudhāyana ( 2, 6, 30), we learn that an asura Kapila divided the four asramas. There is other Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmrti dealing with the s'rāddha', vivāha, prāyas' citta ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'ankarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sankhya is different from the Vedic Kapila ( Br. S. Bhāsya II, 1, 1 ). Anandagırı, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapıla is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Samikhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurana that one Kapila alias Vasudeva taught the Sāmkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhrgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught ( the Sanıkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1,

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
p. 4 ). But according to the Bhagavata Purana ( 3. 25. 1 ) Vasudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūti कपिलस्तत्त्वसंख्याता भगवानात्ममायया । जातः स्वयमजः साक्षादात्मप्रज्ञप्तये नृणाम् ॥
"
Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.
2. Asuri
There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Asuri, the first disciple of Kapıla. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3 ). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (t. s. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3 Garbe adds that if Asura is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha Brahmana ). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Asuri are found in the Jayamangalā and the Matharavrttı. In the Mbh., Asuri is made the teacher of Pañcas'ıkha 'तत्र पञ्चशिखो नाम कापिलेयो महामुनि: । ... आमुरे: प्रथमं शिष्यं etc. (S'ānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Asuri, vrs. "विविक्ते दृकूपरिणता बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते । प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छो यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥” in the commentary of Hanbhadra on the Saddars' anasamuccaya ( p. 36 ).
64
3.
Pañcas'ikha
Pañcas'ıkha, the disciple of Asuri is found quoted in the following works :
A. Y. Bh.
( अ ) " एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम् ” [१. ४ ] । ( आ ) " आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्टाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ” । [ १.२५ ] ( इ ) " तमणुमात्रमात्मानमनुविद्याऽस्मीत्येवं तावत्संप्रजानीते " [१.३६ ] । ( उ ) " व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सरवमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य तस्य सम्पदमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशोचस्यात् म-व्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः " [ २५ ] । (ऊ) " बुद्धितः परं

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INTRODUCTION
15
पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन " [२.६] (ऋ) 'स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः । कुशलस्य नापकर्षायाम् कस्मात, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं करिष्यति” [ २, १३ ] । (ऋ) " रूपातिशया वृत्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते [ ३.१३ ] । (ऌ ) " तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदंशश्रुतित्वं भवति ” [ ३.४१.] ॥
""
Vyasa does not give the name of Pañcas'ıkha, but it Is Vacaspati who says so.
B. S. SŪ.
(ए) " आधेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः " [५. ३२ ] । ( ऐ ) " अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः [ ६.६८ ] "
C. S. S. B. -
( ओ ) " सत्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मक मू १. १२७ ] ।
D.
Bhāmati.—'
(अ) " तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात्स्यादय मात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः " [ब्रह्मसूत्र, २.२.१० 1.
E. Gauda. ( Kār. 1 ) and Math. ( Kār. 22 ) -
(क) “पञ्चविंशतितत्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः । जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥
""
This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ıkha by Bhāvāgaṇes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadipana and by Haribhadrasūri in S‘ästravārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Matharavrttu). Bhāvāganes'a was the disciple of Vijñanabhikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasuri is about 725 A.D.

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century A.D. ( F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927 ). In the Mātharavịttı we find : " Tu courrura
TATATERT" a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of Sankarācārya (i. e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or İs'varakrşņa on the basis of the Kanaga. sattari. And, if Vyādı alias Vindhyavāsın, is the author of the Hiranyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṁkhykārıkā, and Vindhyavāsın is different from Isvarakrşņa. Otherwise the date of lóvarkrsna will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (s. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59 ).
5. Vårsaganya We are as uncertain about Varsaganya as about the former teachers of Sāmkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyasabhāşya: (1) "grogaritamateriaafa gegyfraisa ardag.1" (11 53, (2) “TOTAİ R ua Tenja i 17 grege TI FANT FEJFY 11 " ( Ibid. IV, 13 ) Vacaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Şaştıtantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmatī with the remarks : “sta CT VOTETTEN acuarea 341 FH Huarg arg. pot: 1" (on the Brahmasūtrabhāsya, il 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārşaganya, “ *99991 39' CATE FH hara anfrag: 1" is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47 ). The quotation—" gcuratei Tariganal" found in the Gaud., and the Māth. (Kārıkā 17 ), is ascribed to Vārşaganya by Keith ( S. S. 73, 3n ). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Saştıtantra to Pañcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārşaganya being the author of the Sasțitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-6; Hiriyanna: "Sasțitantra and Värşaganya".

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INTRODUCTION
19
Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107–112 ). This has been discussed in detail below.
6. Jaigīşavya According to the Kūrmapurāņa, Jaigīşavya was a classfellow of Pancas'ıkha ( S, S. 51 ). This Jaigişavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga ( Y. Bh., II. 55 and 11. 18). Vacas. patı also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtıkatātparyaţikā as the author of Dhāraņās'āstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita ( 12. 67 ), Arādakalāma refers to Jaigisavya, Janaka and Parās'ara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāmkhya ( Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n. ) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigişavya.
7. Vodhu Vodhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rşıtarpana, we find the name of Vodhu after that of Asuri, and before that of Parcas'ikha. Tlie opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Vodhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the paris'istas of the Atharvaveda (S. S. 51).
8. Devala We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Närada in the Mahābhārata (S'āntı., Ch., 274 ). There we find eight kinds of bhūtas ( bhāva, abhāva, kāla, přthhui, āpas, vāyu, ākās'a and tejas ); and kāla impelled by bhāva creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the kşetrajña. Higher than the senses is citta, higher than the latter is manas, higher than it is buddhi and the highest of all is puruşa. The ear, the skin, the eye

Page #30

TATTVA-KAUMUDI
the nose, the tongue, the citta, the manas and the buddhi are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there : पुण्यपापक्षयार्थं हि सांग्व्यजानं विधीयते । तत्क्षये ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्मara mi ag ll .(Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sānikhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkyasmrti, resemble the Tattvasarāsa very much ( See Yājñavalkyasmrti, Anandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smrtıkāras, vis., Brhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Katyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. ( see p. 218 ). But Udayavīraśāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be d-termined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scho. lars ( says Mr s'astrı ), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. c. Lahore, JI p. 865 ). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. Pp. 465–475 ). Devala does not seem to be much older than Isvarakrşna. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharvrtti : " IRITOTT प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पन्चशिखेन तस्माद् भार्गव-उलूक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवल matarman", (p. 84 ), where the word prabhrti is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Isvarakrşņa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharavrttı does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Isvarakrsna and nothing else.
9-26. Sanaka, etc. Gaudapāda ( on Kār. I ), quotes a verse and a half in which he anumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are: Sanaka, Sananda. Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Vodhu and Pancasıkha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different ( s'āntı. 340, 67–69 ), vis., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

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A
INTRODUCTION
Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanatana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्य: । (S. Su VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smiti, in the Nirnayasındhu and the Tristhalisetu (H., Dh, 1, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, S'ukra, Kasyapa, Parās'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Arstisena, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Paras'ara and Janaka named the Paras'ara gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata ( s'anti., Chs., 290-299), deals with the duties of the varnas and as'ramas and has no vestige of Samkhya teaching in it. It is just possil le that Paras'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Samkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcas'ikha (Mbh., S'anti., 320-23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Samkhya Kārikā, Is'varakıṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay Int p. 2. 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Valmiki and S'uka as teachers of Samkhya. V. 'Standard Works on Samkhya
21
Available
Of the standard works on Samkhya, only three are available. They are "Samkhya-Sutras", "Tattva-samāsa' and Sambhya-Kirikā ".
..
-
"6
44
..
Some scholars are of opinion that S. Su. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, 'आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् " (Br. S, IV. 1, 1) = 8. Su., IV. 3; वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ( Y. S., II. 46 )=. Su., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the sutras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Su., V. 40-51), the influence of the Vedanta is clearly visible. many passages from Samkhya-Krākā,
Again, we find quoted in the
T. i. 3

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
Sūtras. Madhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9 ). Moreover, the commentator on the Sarvopakārini, a commentory on the Samāsa-Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of " Samkhya-Sūtras " is different from Kapıla, the author of Samasa-Sūtra (ch., s. 9., No. 246, pp. 93–94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doublful. And if the author of the s, sū, is Kapıla, then how did he quote Pancas'ıka, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, there. fore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI. 68–69) ?
But Udayavíra S'āstrı has tried to prove that Kapıla himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article “ Antiquity of the Samkhya Sūtras " ( P. C. C, Lahore, II, pp. 855-882 ). He is of opinion that several sūtras have been interpolated in the original of Kapıla. For example, in the I chapter, the sūtras 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th sūtra is literally the same as the 55th sūtra, and because the 53rd and 54th sūtras are identical with the 15th and 16th sūtras. And as we find the names of Srughna and Pataliputra in these interpolated sūtras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B. C., to the 5th century A.D.). The sūtras 79. 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these ( 84-115 ) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāmkhya
Philosophy.
Thus Mr. S'astri thinks that 68 sūtras are interpolated. 1, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighly or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

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INTRODUCTION
23
hand, when Sankarācārya and others quote from SamkhyaKārıkā only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then Sarkarā. cārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a rși and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkrşņa
Mr. S'astrı further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S sū. His contention is :
(1) "gigracypracoiatz AISAI Sramur=#F71aGFTTTT ftragger" (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48 )-here sa raragara is borrowed from “sorra ATEL" (. ST., I. :15). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., vis., “gegafittingfqet: Fof arsaa raha ta". Here the insertion of the word sa shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.
To this we reply--If the word wat is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after “rraTaTQ" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. I, 48 ) quoted above? And as regards the presence of a in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "S TARATA" but the whole passage, vie..-"nyeqat. Fi area 3921aTra." Here Vatsyayana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the & sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.
(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the YājñavalkyaSmrti ( Prāyas'cittādhyaya, v. 109 ), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtrus in S. Su very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.
Mr. Süstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.
(3) Patañjalı, in his Mahābhāşya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus--" : TETT: Fai rara -

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TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
पलब्धिर्भवति - अतिसन्निकादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तव्यवधानात्तमसावृतत्वादिPaveur raunara 1" On this, Kaiyyata says in his gloss Pradipa—at ja taras i lager fir 499CFE2F.Noi ai aikqara i"--According to Kaiyyaļa, Patañjalı here quotes from some other work. It seems that he took this view from "F ragason." (s sū.. I. 109 ) and " geziaragrah." (s. Sū., 1, 110 ). Moreover, we find only five causes of nonperception in the s. Sū., but in the Mahabhāşya, there are six causes of non-perception and in the Sambhya-Karika, there are eight. Therefore, the S. ST. are the oldest of these three. Moreover, the passage of Kayyata vis.. "ara
hela gru01737971 VEIC czapiirialeaniza i" seems to be hased on the two sūtras quoted above.
In reply to Mr. S'astri's arguments, the following may be stated. In thenfirst place, the word gta is not a necessary and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author Here, the word ira denotes conclusion of his remarks. How can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patan jali's own? In the second place if, depending upon the word $T used by Kaiyyai2, it is even admitted that Patañjalı quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove that it is the S. Sū., wherefrom, he borrowed ? It is inost probable that he borrowed the view from some other work. (See H. I. P., I, 2:8-219 ). Again, there is nothing to otlige Kaiyyata, who flourished in the 13th century A.S. (H. S. 1.. p. 431 ), to borrow from the S. Sū. He might have borrowed from the Sārikhya-Kánkā. Moreover, the causes of non-perception as given by Palanjalı tally more with those in the Sāmkhya-Kārıkā than in the S. Sū.
(4) The following sūtras agree verlatım with the Kirikäs (a) “THE CAETIA ALFTATIM fact" (s ļa, 1. 124 = Kar., 10). (b) "ATTA ATT gaña aanzetta" (8. fū., II. 18= Kär., 25). (c) "RAFFTOgrat: 9107771 alga: 42" (s. Sū., H. 31 = Kär. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.

Page #35

INTRODUCTION
Avyāpi in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word pravartate in (6) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. S'astri's possession.
The arguments of Mr. S'āstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word avyāpi, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover. Vijñānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so inportant a question as the authorship of Kapıla In his zeal to disprove the theory that “the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. S'āstrı says that if we change the order of words in" #TATTETULIA: 1071 ATTE: 49" and read it as "ATHIRIFrTorghat: 7107177: qua 17:" we attain anuştubh metre in place of ūrya. But this flight of imagination, vis., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S'āstrı has failed to disprove that the S. Sa are based upon the Kārıkās
There is a tradition that Paramartha translated the Kārıkās into Chinese in 557–569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175–178). According to Paramartha, Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debale by Vindhyavāsa, the Samkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Varşaganya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārşaganya composed Hiranyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavāsa, the author of Hiranyasaptati and. Isvarkņşına, the author of Sāmkhya-Kárikā are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. Das Gupta also thinks Is' varkyąna and Vindhyavāsa us two

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
different persons, see H. I. 1., 1, 218, 3n ). The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Is varakrsna is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A D., see V. A. Smith: Early History of India, 3rd edn., pp 328–334; also Kalıpada Bhattacharya “Sume Problems of Samkhya Philosophy and Sankhya Literature ", 1. H. Q, Sept., 1932, pp. 519–520. According to Bhattacharya İs'varkişna flourished in the 1st century A.D ] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D). The reinark of Svapnes'vara, identifying Is' varakrşna with Kālıdāsa, should be rejected as mistaker. (See I, I, II, 255, In. ).
The work of Is'varakrsna had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the bhūsya of Gaudapada rupning upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāmkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot note to 61st Kārıkā. Mr. S S. Pathak has also attacked this problem ( see, “ The Problein of the Sāmkhya-Kārıkās ', I A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177-181). He says(1) In the 72nd Kāriki we read the phrase "qtarjaai aang" which means “free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārkā found by the late B. G. Tilak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation. To this we reply : In the Karikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely referred to and not expounded. The phrase Tarjaaltat: means the exclusion of the expounding of others opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "zlargfa: A fagfagfasty*:" would also be open to fault, for, here there is no exclusion of the opinion of the Mimāṁsakas. (2) Is varakrsna has summarised the work of Pancas'ıkha in his own 'āryās. Now in the Saştıtantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions i viz., inaking one of Brahman, Puruşa Sakti, Niyati. and Kāla. the cause of creation ) which are to be rejected. But in ths.

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INTRODUCTION
Kärikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S'akti-To this we reply: Is'varakrşņa has summarised the work of Pancas'ıkha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Şaşțitantra is the work of Pañca s'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Is'varkrşņa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above. B. Unavailable
(1) Şaştitantra. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas'ıkha or Vārşaganya as the author of Şaştıtantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Şaştitantra in Jay.
(a) "ag a great care ia faceta geratu fiiera. ATATTETÜ Faia |: 1" (p. 1). (6) “fragathIAHTEYTTA' şia afecta oronala. 1977, Hargazara I” (p. 7). (c) “Pa are 1:1 Q4791:1 gadu te ofenstgagà ” (p. 56), (d) “qa' frati Coastaa g179T Z 774 i samaraj afe
og gafari Aa & pretui z REUTAT: 1” (p. 68 ). (e)“ oferirea f* ARTIFI" (p 6?) (f) “ 377 Team agarsui: asa a CAIE I” (p. 6'?).
From the above passages, Prof Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See-"Şaştitantra and Vārşaganya", J. O R., April-- June, 1929, pp. 107–112 )-(a) Şaşțitantra has 60 parts, (6) its author is Pancas'ıkha and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called “Saştitantra". Vārşaganya is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse
गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्त दृष्टिपथं यातं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥ which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmatī, Vācaspati alludes it to Şasțitantra in Tatt. V., and to Vārşaganya in Bhāmati. On the basis of these two references, people have come to

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
the conclusion that Varsaganya is the author of Şastitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is Aria C , while as the reading in the Bhāmati is ATT TTESE54. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspatı, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, froin the opinions of Virşnganya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, viz., **Tenerigorrarenanya: " (on Br. S, I, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapıla was the author of a Saştıtantra. (See also P. 0. C., Lahore, II, p. 882m where Mr. S'āstri states Şaştıtantra is the real Sāmkhya-dars'ana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See J. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518 ). This old Saşsıtantra of Kapıla has been enlarged by Pancas'ıkha in his Saşțitantra.
To this we reply-One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhatta- Utpala, in his commentary on Bphat-Samhitā, quotes the verses ( 22-30 ) from Sāmkhya. Kárikā, preceded by the remark "Aureferall:". As regards the alteration of Ara into 49a, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vacaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Varşaganya whom Vacaspati refers to with great reverence as arg areas. The opinion of Vārşaganya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakos'a ( viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-kārya theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Samkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Varşagaṇya altered arga into arda. But that requires proof.

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INTRODUCTION
29
Therefore, the question of authorship of Sașțitantra is still undecided.
(2) Rājarārtika. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika
" प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्वमथान्यता । पारायं च तथाऽनक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥
शेपवृत्तिरकर्तत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश । विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥ करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
इति पष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः" । The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakāņņi (ch. 8. S., No. 246, p. 100 ). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahırbudhnya Samhita (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S.. pp. 70-73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (s. Y. p. 7). These maulikārthas are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Math., Samkhya-tattva-vivecana (ch., s. S., No. 245, p. 22 ), Tattva-yatharthya-dipana (ibid. p. 80 ) and Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vrtti ( ibid. p. 135).

Page #40

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF
THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY
BY
Gangānātha Jhā
The lucid writing of Vācaspati Mišra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sārkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received.
To begin with, the Sārikhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into-(1) Productive (2) Productive--and-Produced (3) Produced (4) Neither-Productive-nor Produced. This classification includes all the twenly. five Principles--called Tattvas,- Prakrtı or Nature being the purely productive, since the Sarikhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productie-and-produced are the other Principles-Buddhı, &c. These partake of the nature of both;—thus Buddhi is productive in as much as out of it evolves Ahamkāra, and it is produced in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakytı. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The Puruşa (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the Guņas,•and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.
30

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81
Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.
First of all then we must examine the nature of the allpowerful productive agent of the Sāmkhyas or more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Gunas--Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equılıbrium. When occasion presents itself, i. c. when the Adịşta of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas-the predominance of Sattva givirg rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth.
The three attributes-Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,-have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituied that the one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same line depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties-The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind sorce acting in a haphazard manner.
Here an objector comes forward and says "How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting

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properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe ?"
The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;-c.g. the wick and the oil-both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.
The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties of happiness', 'unhappiness and delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names_Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at - the conclusion that the cause of the Universe--Nature---muse be imbued with the three Attributes.
So much for the action of the Guņas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakrtı, Nature-the Key-stone of the Sānikhya Philosophy.
What, then, is this Prakrti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Bauddha “Sensations"? Or does it correspond t8 the Vedāntic "Māyā''? To all this 'we reply-- 'It is all these, and it is none of these. It resembles the Vedāntic Māyā in as much as it is the one root of the Uni

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INTRODUCTION
33
verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialıtıes due to the Guņas. In short, Prakrti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) imbued with the three Attributes and evolving through these, every kind of entity-save the Purusa, Spirit.
The next point that we have to consider is---How do the Sārökhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakrtı? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Carikhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sānkhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form.. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent-primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recogrized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly prcduced by the cause ?
Firstly.-What is a nonentity can never be made an entity. That is to say--that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect-that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular causc. And this kind of manısestation we find in the produclion of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.
Secondly.-We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity :

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for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity.
Thirdly.—We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists
Foarthly. The effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being an entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g.. a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work c.in be performed by a number of inen together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—“When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constr ined to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, that it has a cause, signify?

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55
If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appear. ance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something-or on the other something becoming nothing.... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause" --Lectures on Metaphysics-XXXIX.
Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Samkhyas employ this fact in proving the existence of their Prakrtı. Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahamkāra which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;--and to this the Sāmkhyas give the names “Pradhana." "Prakıtı"', " Avyakta." (Nature).
Secondly, we find that all entities--from Buddhi downwards-are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this latter is Prakıtı.
Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Samkhya proceeds to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference

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In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities—the effects of Prakrtı. These are caused, and as a necessary consequence of this-transitory. limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Prakịti). made up of parts: these are the characteristics where the Prakrtı differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakrtı is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal, And as all Universe is the result of Its evolution, It must be all-pervadıng; as a necessary conseque nce of this it is im. inoveable i. e., it cannot mave, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-prevading it must be one. It is independent--depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.
These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, thal Prakrtı as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the varicus actions and interactions of the three Guņas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always reinain the observed, and as such common. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common cbject of observation by all, and it is cominon in that sense Fisthly, they are without intelligence-the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, i. e, endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this.
These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakrtı on one hand and its Products on the other.
Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sarikhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must

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37
first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence, sentience. Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi, the Cosmic Mind, for it is material, being the product of Prakrti which is essentially insentient and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct Principle of Sentience.
Secondly. We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from Prakrti downwards are composites. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakrtı, Buddhi and Ahamkāra, yet we must not forget that the body of these apparently immaterial entities is made up of the three Guņas which are as material as anything. Such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is Puruşa, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be composite because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the Guņas that is found to be composite.
Thirdly. We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from Prakyti downwards are made up of the three Guņas, and as such necessarily affected by pleasure, pain and delusion; so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself unaffected in his essence by pleasure, etc.; and as such must be something over and above Praksti. And this is Puruşa, the Spirit.
T. i. 4

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Fourthly.- Prakştı and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. -These latter being made up as they are of the three Guņas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the enjoyer of these ; for that will involve the absurdity of selfcontradictory action-one-made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained ; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakrtı and the rest. And this is Spirit.
Fifthly and lastly.-All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakrtı or Buddhı. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone.
We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Purusa, over and above Prakrti.
The next thing. we have to consider is—What is this Puruşa!-How is it constituted?—What are its properties? -What its aim?--and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.
(1) What is Purusa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the mind. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet

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it is the necessary factor in all these. It is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as material. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness. In short, Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind-feeling, intellecting and willing.
(2) How is this Spirit constituted ? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentience pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.
(3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated : it is free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and nonproductive. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become purposeless.
Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own ; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain, etc., which in reality do not touch him,-under the influence of the different kinds of delusions-the modifications of Buddhı. Now the one allabsorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom which would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

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The next question that presents itself to us is-how does. Puruşa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipa. fion? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sā mkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purusa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from meterpsychosis and attains final Beatitude.
Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakti and Puruşa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.
We have already said that Prakrtı is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakrtı emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi proceeds A hankūra or the l-principle. From this again emanate the eleven, senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour. taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances-Earth,:Water, Fire, Air and Ākās'a, First in this scale comes Buddhı. This is defined as the principle of adhyavasāya. This term literally means “ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that this is to be done by me." It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to will. But the Samkhya Buddhi is not mere will. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists-specially of those belonging to the Kantian School -" Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct : Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence." The Sāmkhyas attribute both these functions

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41
to their Buddhi. That Buddhi resembles will, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sâm. khyas. These proporties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already, will decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that wisdom is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddh is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhi cognate with Intellect and Will combined. We have, therefore, called it the Cosmic Mind.
The principle that we have to consider next is thai of Egoism, the I-principle. It is the principle to which all notions of the "L" are duc. It corresponds with Kant's "apperception" and Hamilton's " self-consciousness:" that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness : The idea that “I have the conciousness,” “I feel, etc.” As immediate effects of this l-principle we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs .consist of the five intellectual ( subjective) senses-milie eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,-and the five of action (objective ) viz.—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (individual inınd). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substancesEarth, Air, Water, Fire and Ākāśa; and these have the subtle frudimentary elements for their essential properties.
Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
to seek. The Samkhyas define sense as the immediate effect of the l.principle under the influence of the Sattva Attribute ; and this differentia we find in Mind as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. What are the functions of this eleventh sense? Manas, mind, is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of sensesthe objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accu. rate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may, for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle, Mind, is technically called in Sāmkhya “reflection " When we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are indefinite and without qualifications ( Anatomy ). This indefinite and vague impression is soon rendered definite, and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the “ reflection " of the Mind. This process follows so quickly that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.
The next question that is started is-whence proceeds. the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of eagerness for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the functioning of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose-experience and subsequent discrminative wisdom and hence emancipation--of the Puruşa, Spirit. If there were no functioning of the different emana

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INTRODUCTION
tions of Prakyti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between himself and the inanimate Prakyti. The only impetus from without is thus supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own inherent eagerness.
Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organsthree internal, Buddhi, Ahamkāra and Manas, and the ten external--the ordinary ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones operate only towards gross ones.
Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinde of substances, and another cause of supremacy we have already noted-118., the one with regard to time. Of thess internal organs again Budhhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhı, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhı is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakrti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme.
Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds Subtle, Parent-born and the Great' substances. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and the third are fading and transient.
This “subtle body" of the Sāmkhyas is born before the visible body and lasts till dissolution ; and till then it remains the body of the Spirit in all its incarnations during

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that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the “Linga-S'arīra", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Linga:Sarira is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit ;-though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtile substratum.
Let us now see how the Sāmkhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions; Vice leads the other way: Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the dhfference between the two-from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thraldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free

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from the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed sentience. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If, on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.
The Samkhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various inanifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These, are made up of five kinds of impediments, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs ), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone.
So much for 'mental creation. The 'inaterial creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation.
All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis-miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character ; "When She retires from the scence like an actress who has

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played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative, wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,-the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth-the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metenipsychosis.

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तत्त्वकौमुदी.
(सांख्य.)
(१) मङ्गलाचरणम् ॥ अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां नमामः । मजा ये तां जुषमाणां भजन्ते जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां नुमस्तान् ॥ १॥ कपिलाय महामुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चासुरये । पञ्चशिखाय तथेश्वरकृष्णायैतान्नमस्यामः ॥ २ ॥ इह खलु प्रतिपिस्सितमथं प्रतिपादयन् प्रतिपादयिताऽवधेयवचनो
भवति प्रेक्षावताम् । अप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं तु प्रतिपाद(२) शास्त्रविषयक- यन् ' नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक ' इति प्रेक्षाव. जिज्ञासावतरणम् ॥ । द्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत । स चैषां प्रतिपित्सितोऽर्थों यो
ज्ञातः सन् परमपुरुषार्थाय कल्पते । इति प्रारिप्सितशास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनहेतुत्वात् तद्विषयजिज्ञासामवतारयति
दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १॥ " दुःख-" इति । एवं हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत, यदि दुःखं नाम
जगति न स्यात् , सद्वा न जिहासितम् , जिहासितं (३) शास्त्रविषयक- वा अशक्यसमुच्छेदम् । ( अशक्यसमुच्छेदता च द्वेधा, जिज्ञासाया आवश्य. दुःखस्य नित्यत्वात् , तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा)। कत्वशङ्का ॥ शक्यसमुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानु
पायभूतस्वाद्वा, सुकरस्योपायान्तरस्य सद्भावाद्वा ॥ त. कौ. १

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दुःखत्रयम् ।
[ सा. त. तत्र न तावदुःखनास्ति नाप्यजिहासितमित्युक्तम् - "दुःखत्रयाभिघातात"
__ इति । दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम् । तत् खलु आध्या(४) त्रयाणां दुःखानां त्मिकम् , आधिभौतिकम् , आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राध्या. व्युत्पादनम् , तदस्तित्व- त्मिकम् द्विविधम् , शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं वातसाधनं च ॥ पित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तम् , मानसं कामक्रोधलोभ
मोहभयेाविषादविषयविशेषादर्शननिबन्धनम् । सर्वन्चतदान्तरिकोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखम् । बायोपायसाध्यं दुःखं द्वेधा, आधिभौतिकम् , आधिदैविकन्च । तत्राधिभौतिकं मानुषपशुमृगपक्षिसरी. सृपस्थावरनिमित्तम् , आधिदैविकं तु यक्षराक्षसविनायकग्रहाद्यावेशनिबन्ध नम् । तदेतत् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यते प्रत्याख्यातुम् । तदनेन दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना चेतनाशक्तेः प्रतिकूल वेदनीयतया ऽभिसम्बन्धोऽभिघात इति । एतावता प्रतिकूलवेदनीयस्वं जिहासाहेतुरुक्तः । यद्यपि न सन्निरुध्यते दुःखम् , तथापि तदभिभवः शक्यः कर्तुमित्युपरिष्टादु. पपादयिष्यते । तस्मादुपपन्नम् , “ तदपघातके हेतौ' इति । तस्य दुःखत्र यस्य अपघातकः तदपघातकः' । उपसर्जनस्यापि बुद्धया सनिकृष्टस्य 'तदा' परामर्शः । अपघातकश्च हेतुः शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यो, नान्य इत्याशयः॥ अत्र शङ्कते- " दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेत्” इति । अयमर्थः । अस्तु तर्हि
दुःखत्रयम् , जिहासितं च तद्भवतु, भवतु च तच्छ(५) सुकरस्य दृष्टस्यो- क्यहानम् , सहतां च शास्त्रगम्य उपायस्तदुच्छेत्तुम्। पायस्य सत्त्वे शास्त्रविष. तथाऽप्यत्र प्रेक्षावतां जिज्ञासा न युक्ता, दृष्टस्यैवो. यकजिज्ञासाया वैय्य- पायस्य तदुच्छेदकस्य सुकरस्य विद्यमानस्वात् , झंपत्तिः ॥
तत्वज्ञानस्य तु अनेकजन्माभ्यासपरम्परायाससाध्यतयाऽतिदुष्करत्वात् । तथा च लौकिकानामाभाणकः,
• अत्के४ चन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।
इष्टस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ' इति । १. अनागतसूक्ष्मदुःखनिवृत्तौ तात्पर्यमिति केचित् । २. समासगौणावयवस्य । ३. समासस्थतत्पदेन । ४. 'अत' सातत्यगमने-इत्यस्माद्वातोनिष्पन्नोऽयं शब्द:अतोऽस्य स्वरूपम् ' अत्क' इति । अर्थश्चास्य ' यस्मिन्स्थाने सततं गच्छन्ति लोका' इति ।

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का. २]
शास्त्रजिज्ञासावश्यकता।
सन्ति चोपायाः शतशः शारीरदुःखप्रतीकारायेषत्करा भिषजां वरैरुपदिष्टाः। मानसस्यापि सन्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजनविलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिरुपायः सुकरः । एवमाधिभौतिकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीषत्करः । तथा ऽऽधिदैविकस्यापि मणिमन्त्रौषधाधुपयोगः सुकरः प्रतिकारोपाय इति ॥ निराकरोति-- न " इति । कुतः ? " एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात्"।
" एकान्तो” दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यम्भाव:; “ अत्यन्तो" (६) वैयर्थ्यापत्तिनिरा- निवृत्तस्य दुःखस्य पुनरनुत्पादः, तयोः एकान्तात्यन्तकरणम्-परिगणितो- योरभावः " एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावः " । षष्ठीस्थाने पायेभ्य आत्यन्तिकै- सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिः। एतदुक्तं भवति, यथाविधि रसाकान्तिकदुःखनिवृत्ते- यनादिकामिनीनीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपाययोगेऽपि रदर्शनम् ।। तस्य तस्याध्यास्मिकादेर्दुःनस्य निवृत्तेरदर्शनात्
अनैकान्तिकत्वम् , निवृत्तस्यापि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् अनास्यन्तिकत्वम्, इति सुकरोऽपि ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदु.खनिवृत्तेर्न दृष्ट उपाय इति नाऽपार्था जिज्ञासेत्यर्थः ।।
___ यद्यपि दुःखममङ्गलम् , तथाऽपि तत्परिहारार्थस्वेन (७) दुःखापघातकीर्त- तदपघातो मङ्गलमेवेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ तत्कीर्तननम् मङ्गलमेव ॥ मिति ॥ १ ॥ (८) वैदिकस्य दुःखाप- स्यादेतत् । मा भूदृष्ट उपायः, वैदिकस्तु ज्योतिकघातकस्य सुकरस्य सत्त्वे. ष्टोमादिः संवत्सरपर्यन्त. कर्मकलापस्तापत्रयमेशास्त्रविषयजिज्ञासायाः कान्तमत्यन्तम्चापनेष्यति । श्रुतिश्च, " स्वर्गकामो पुनर्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः ॥ यजेत" इति । स्वर्गश्च
" या दुःखेन सम्भिनं न च प्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम्" इति । १. एतत् ( वक्ष्यमाणम्, आशङ्कितम् ) स्यात्-इति ग्रन्थकारोक्तिः । अथवाएतत् (भवतोक्तम् ) स्यात् (भवतु), स्वीकृतमस्माभिरिति शङ्काकृदुक्तिः । उभ. यथाऽपि युज्यते।

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दृष्टवैदिकोपाययोस्साम्यम् । [सां. त. दुःखविरोधी सुखविशेषश्च स्वर्गः । स च स्वशक्तया समूलघातमपहन्ति दुः. खम्। न चष क्षयी। तथा हि श्रूयते-"मपाम सोमममृता अभूम” इति [अथर्वशिरस् ३]। तत्क्षये कुतोऽस्यामृतत्वसम्भवः १ तस्माद्वैदिकस्योपायस्य तापत्रय. प्रतीकारहेतोर्मुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रमाससंवत्सरनिर्वर्तनीयस्यानेकजन्मपरम्पराया. ससम्पादनीयात विवेकज्ञानात् ईषत्करत्वात् पुनरपि व्यर्था जिज्ञासा इत्याश. क्याह
दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः, स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः । तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥२॥ " दृष्ट-" इति । गुरुपाठादनुभूयते इत्यनुश्रवो वेदः। एतदुक्तं भवति
'श्रूयत एव परं न केनापि क्रियत' इति । तत्र भव आनु(९) वैदिकानाम- श्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्तो ज्ञात इति यावत् । आनुश्रविकोप्युपायानां दृष्टोपा- ऽपि कर्मकलापो दृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकान्तिकात्ययैस्सह तुल्यत्वम्॥ तिकदुःखत्रयप्रतीकारानुपायत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् ।
यद्यपि च "आनुश्रविक" इति सामान्याभिधानं, तथापि कर्मकलापाभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम् , विवेकज्ञानस्याप्यानुश्रविकत्वात् । तथा च श्रूयते- “मात्मा वा रे ज्ञातव्यः प्रकृतितो विवेक्तव्यः " [ बृहदारण्यक, २।४।५1. “न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते" [छान्दोग्य ८।१५] इति || अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह- " स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः" इति ।
___ "अविशुद्धिः” सोमादियागस्य पशुबीजादिवसाध. (१०) दृष्टवैदिकयो- नतो । यथाऽऽह स्म भगवान् पञ्चशिखाचार्य:-" स्वरुपाययोःअविशु. ल्पसङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः” इति । 'स्व. द्विक्षयातिशययुक्त. ल्पसङ्करो' ज्योतिष्टोमादिजन्मनः प्रधानापूर्वस्य त्वम् तुल्यम् ॥ स्वल्पेन पशुहिंसादिजन्मना ऽनर्थहेतुनाऽपूर्वेण सङ्करः । 'सपरिहारः, ' कियताऽपि प्रायश्चित्तेन परिहतुं शक्यः । अथ च प्रमादतः प्रायश्चित्तमपि नाचरितं, प्रधानकर्मविपाकसमये स पच्यते । तथाऽपि यावदसावनथै सूते तावत् प्रत्यवमर्षेण ( सहिष्णुतया) सह वर्तत इति
१. अङ्गवैगुण्यं च

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को. २] वैदिकोपायस्याविशुद्धत्वं, सातिशयत्वं च । ५ "सप्रत्यमवर्षः' । मृष्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्भारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधामहादावगाहिनः कुशलाः पापमानोपलादिता दुःखवह्निकणिकाम् ।। न च-- "मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि" इति सामान्यशास्त्रं विशेषशास्त्रेण
" अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत " इत्यनेन बाध्यत-- (११) याज्ञिकहिंसाया इति युक्तम् , विरोधाभावात् । विरोधे हि बलीयसा अप्यनर्थहेतुत्वसाधनम् || दुर्बलं बाध्यते । न चेहास्ति कश्चिद्विरोधः, भिन्नविष
यत्वात् । तथा हि-" मा हिंस्यात् " इति निषेधेन हिंसाया अनर्थहेतुभावो ज्ञाप्यते, न त्वक्रत्वर्थत्वमपि, “भग्नीषोमीयं पशुमाल. भेत" इत्यनेन वाक्येन च पशुहिंसायाः क्रत्वर्थत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः, तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । न चानर्थहेतुत्वऋतूपकारकत्वयोः कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति । हिंसा हि पुरुषस्य दोषमावक्ष्यति, तोश्वोपकरिष्यतीति ।
क्षयातिशयौ च फलगतावप्युपाय उपचरितौ । क्षयित्वं च स्वर्गादेः सत्त्वे (१२) वैदिकोपायस्य सात कायत्वादनुमितम् । ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमात्रस्य सातिशयत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥
। साधनम् , वाजपेयादयस्तु स्वाराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्त.
। त्वम् । परसम्पदुत्कर्षों हि हीनसम्पदं पुरुषं दुःखाकरोति ॥ .
“अपाम सोमममृता अभूम” इति चामृतत्वाभिधानम् चिरस्थेमानमुप
लक्षयति । यदाहुः- "आभूतसम्प्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं (१३) अमृतत्वश्रुतिः हि भाष्यते” इति (विष्णुपुराणे)। अत एव च श्रुतिःविरोधपरिहारः-अमृत- " न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमात्वस्य चिरस्थेम्न उप- नशुः । परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतयो लक्षकत्वात् ।। विशन्ति” इति [ महानारायण १०५] । तथा “ कर्मणा मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमीहमानाः । तथा परे ऋषयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमानशुः” इति च ।।
१. विधेयद्वयापत्तेः । हिंसा यागसाधिका अनर्थशून्या चेति वाक्यभेदः ।

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शास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य श्रेयस्त्वम् । [सां. त. तदेतत् सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह--" तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् , व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्"
___ इति । तस्मात् (भानुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकोपायात् (१४) लौकिकवैदिको सोमपानादेरविशुद्धात् अनित्यसातिशयफलात् ) पायेभ्यः शास्त्रविषयज्ञा- विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिंसादिसङ्कराभावात् , नित्यनिरनस्य श्रेयस्त्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ तिशयफलः, असकृत् पुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेः । न च
कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावरूपस्य कार्यस्य तथाभावात् , दुःखप्रध्वंसनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तद्वैपेरीत्यात् । न च दुःखान्तरोत्पादः, कारणाप्रवृत्तौ कार्यस्यानुत्पादात् , विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यन्त. त्याच्च कारणप्रवृत्तेः । एतच्चोपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते ॥ अक्षरार्थस्तु-तस्मात् (भानुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकात् हेतोः ) विपरीतः
(सत्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारो ) दुःखापघा. (१५) “ तद्विपरीतः तको हेतुः, अत एव श्रेयान् । भानुश्रविको हि वेदश्रेयान्" इत्यस्याक्षरार्थः। विहितत्वात् मात्रया दुःखापघातकत्वाच्च प्रशस्यः ।
सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययोऽपि प्रशस्यः । तदनयोः प्रश. स्ययोर्मध्ये सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः श्रेयान् ॥ कुतः पुनरस्योत्पत्तिरित्यत आह- " व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्" इति ।
__ व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां (१६) शास्त्रविषयस्य विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम् , व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम् । दुःखापघातकस्य तत्त्वज्ञा व्यक्तज्ञानपूर्वकमव्यक्तस्य तत्कारणस्य ज्ञानम् । तयोश्च नस्योत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनम् ॥ पारायेंनात्मा परो ज्ञायते, इति ज्ञानक्रमेणाभिधा
नम् । एतदुक्तं भवति--श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्यो व्यक्तादीन् विवेकेन श्रुत्वा, शास्त्रयुक्त्या च व्यवस्थाप्य दीर्घकालादरनरन्तर्य. सत्कारसेवितात् भावनामयात् विज्ञानादिति । तथा च वक्ष्यति--
१ अनित्यत्वात् । २ अभावरूपत्वात् । ३ (६६ ) कारिकायाम् । ४ व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः परार्थत्वेन । व्यक्ताव्यक्ते अचेतने कस्यचिच्चेतनस्यार्थाय वर्तेते स च चेतन आत्मेत्यादिक्रमेण ।

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को. ३]
शास्त्रसंक्षेपः । " एवं तत्वाभ्यासानास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् । अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् " इति [ कारिका, ६४ ] ॥ २ ॥
(१७) शास्त्रार्थसंक्षेप.- तदेवं प्रेक्षावदपेक्षितार्थत्वेन शास्त्रारम्भं समाधाय प्रकृति-प्रकृतिविकृति- शास्त्रमारभमाणः श्रोतृबुद्धिसमवधानाय तदर्थ संक्षे. विकृत्यनुभयरूपक्रमेण ॥ पतः प्रतिजानीते
मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त । षोडशकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिन विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥
"मूल-” इति । संक्षेपतो हि शास्त्रार्थस्य चतस्रो विधाः । कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिदर्थो विकृतिरेव, कश्विरप्रकृति विकृतिः, कश्चिदनुभयरूपः ।
तत्र का प्रकृतिरित्युक्तम्- “मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः" इति । प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः (१८) प्रकृतिकथनम् ॥
र प्रधानम् , सत्त्वरजस्तमला साम्यावस्था, सा अवि
" कृतिः, प्रकृतिरेवेत्यर्थः । कुत इत्युक्तम्-, "मूलेति" मूलचासौ प्रकृतिश्चेति मूलप्रकृतिः। विश्वस्य कार्यसंघातस्य सा मूलम् , न स्वस्या मूलान्तरमस्ति, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । न चानवस्थायां प्रमाणमस्तीति भावः।।
कतमाः पुनः प्रकृतिविकृतयः, कियत्यश्चेत्यत उक्तम् - " महदाद्याः प्रकृति(१९) प्रकृतिविकृति- विकृतयः सप्त ' इति । प्रकृतयश्च विकृतयश्च ता इति
"प्रकृतिविकृतयः", सप्त । तथा हि महत्तत्त्वम् मह. कारस्य प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतेः । एवमहङ्कारतत्त्वं तन्मात्राणामिन्द्रियाणां च प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च महतः । एवं पञ्चतन्मात्राणि तत्त्वानि भूतानामाकाशादीनां प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥ मथ का विकृतिरेव, कियती चेत्यत उक्तम्-"षोडशकस्तु विकारः" इति ।
षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । 'तु' शब्दो (२०) विकृतिकथनम् ।। ऽवधारणे भिन्नक्रमः-पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रि
याणीति षोडशको गणो विकार एव, प्रकृतिरिति । यद्यपि पृथिव्यादीनां गोघटवृक्षादयो विकाराः, एवन्तद्विकारभेदानां पयो. बीजादीनां दध्यकुरादयः, तथाऽपि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्यादि.
कथनम् ॥

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प्रमाणनिरूपणम् ।
सां. त. भ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम् , इति न दोषः। सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता च समेति न तत्त्वान्तरम्॥
भनुभयरूपमाह-" न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः” इति । एतत् सर्वमुपरिष्टा(२१) अनुभयरूपकथनम् ॥ दुपपादयिप्यते ॥ ३ ॥
तमिममर्थं प्रामाणिकं कर्तुमभिमताः प्रमाणभेदा लक्षणीयाः । न च (२२) प्रमाणसामा- सामान्यलक्षणमन्तरेण शक्यते विशेषलक्षणम् कर्तुम् । न्यलक्षणम् ॥ इति प्रमाणसामान्यं तावल्लक्षयति
दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । त्रिविधम्प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥४॥ " प्रमाणमिष्टम्" इति । अत्र-च 'प्रमाणम्' इति समाख्या लक्ष्यपदम् ।
तन्निर्वचनं च लक्षणम् । प्रमीयते ऽनेनेति निर्वचनात् (२३) प्रमाणपदस्य- प्रमा प्रति करणत्वमवगम्यते। तच्चासन्दिग्धाविपरीता. निर्वचनम् ॥ नधिगतविषया चित्तवृत्तिः । बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलम्
प्रमा, तत्साधनम् प्रमाणमिति । एतेन संशयविपर्ययस्मृतिसाधनेष्वप्रमाणेष्वप्रसङ्गः ।। संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरोति- " त्रिविधम्" इति । तिस्रो विधा
यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविधम् , न न्यूनम् , (२४) प्रमाणसंख्या ॥ नाप्यधिकमित्यर्थः । विशेषलक्षणानन्तरञ्चैतदुपपाद.
यिष्यामः ॥ कतमाः पुनस्तास्तिस्रो विधा इत्यत आह-“ दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनम्"
व इति । एतच्च लौकिकप्रमाणाभिप्रायम् , लोकव्युत्पादना. (२५) प्रमाणत्रय
र्थत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य, तस्यैवात्राधिकारात् । आर्ष तु विज्ञानं नम् । योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां न लोकव्यत्पादनायालमिति सदपि नाभिहितम् , अनधिकारात् ॥
१ नैयायिकानामनुव्यवसाय:-घटज्ञाने 'घटमहं जानमीति ” -पुरुषगतः ।

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कौ. ५] प्रमाणानां विशेषलक्षणम् ।
स्यादेतत्-मा भून्न्यूनम् , अधिकं तु कस्मान भवति ? सङ्गिरन्ते हि प्रति(२६) प्रमाण
वादिन उपमानादीन्यपि प्रमाणानि, इत्यत माहसंख्याऽऽधिक्यशङ्का, सजन
__ "सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्" इति । एष्वेव दृष्टानुमानाप्ततत्परिहारश्च ॥
' वचनेषु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वात् , अन्तर्भावा
दित्यर्थः । एतच्चोपपादयिष्यत इत्युकम् ॥ अथ प्रमेयव्युत्पादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मात् प्रमाणं सामान्यतो विशेषतश्च(२७) प्रमेयवर्ण- लक्षयति ? इत्यत आह- "प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि" नात् प्रागेव प्रमाण- इति । सिद्धिः प्रतीतिः ॥ निर्वचनस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥ (२८) कारिका- सेयमार्याऽर्थक्रमानुरोधेन पाठक्रममनादृत्यैव व्यापाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥ ख्याता ।। ४ ।।
सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणावसरे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधी(२९) प्रमाणानां नत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववादिनामविप्रतिपत्तेश्च, विशेषलक्षणम् ॥ तदेव तावल्लक्षयति--
प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् । तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् , आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥५॥ "प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् ” इति । अत्र “ दृष्टम्” इति लक्ष्यनिदेशः, परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम् । समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदो लक्षणार्थः । ___ अवयवार्थस्तु-विषिण्वन्ति, विषयिणमनुबध्नन्ति, स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं
कुर्वन्तीति यावत् = " विषयाः," पृथिव्यादयः सुखा(३०) प्रत्यक्ष- दयश्चास्मदादीनाम् अविषयाः तन्मात्रलक्षणाः योगिनालक्षणावयवार्थः ॥ मूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च विषयाः । विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते
इति प्रतिविषयम् = इन्द्रियम् । वृत्तिश्च' सनिकर्षः । अर्थसनिकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः । मध्यबसायश्च बुद्धिब्यापारो ज्ञानम् । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्ती

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सो
१० प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम् ।
[स. त. सत्याम् , बुद्धस्तमोऽभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्रेकः सोऽध्यवसाय' इति । वृत्तिरिति ज्ञानमिति चाख्यायते । इदं तावत् प्रमाणम् , अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्तेरतुमाहस्तस्फलं प्रमाबोधः ।। बुद्धितस्वं हि प्राकृतस्वादचेतनम्, इति तदीयोऽध्यवसायोऽप्य चेतनो,
घटादिवत् । एवं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सुखादयोऽपि परिणाम(३१) ज्ञानानाम- भेदा अचेतनाः । पुरुषस्तु सुखाधननुषङ्गी चेतनः । चेतनत्वम् ॥ सोऽयं बुद्धितत्ववर्तिना ज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रति
बिम्बितस्तच्छायापत्त्या ज्ञानसुखादिमानिव भवतीतिचेतनोऽनुगृह्यते । चितिच्छायापत्त्याऽचेतनाऽपि बुद्धिस्तदध्यवसायोऽप्यचेतनश्चेतनवद्भवतीति । तथा च वक्ष्यति
" तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ।।" इति [कारिका. २० ]. भन्नाध्यवसायग्रहणेन संशयं व्यवच्छिनत्ति, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणेनानिश्चितरूपत्वात् । निश्चयोऽध्यवसाय इति चानान्तरम् । विषय(३२) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणा- ग्रहणेन चासद्विषयं विपर्ययमपाकरोति । प्रतिग्रहणेन न्तर्गतानां शब्दानां चेन्द्रियार्थससिकर्षसूचनादनुमानस्मृत्यादयश्च पराकृता व्यावृत्तिः ॥ भवन्ति ॥
तदेवं समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् "प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाय” इति (३३) प्रत्यक्षस्य दृष्टस्य सम्पूर्ण लक्षणम् । तन्त्रान्तरेषु लक्षणान्तराणि पर्यवसितं लक्षणम् ॥ तैर्थिकानां न भूषितानि, न दूषितानि, विस्तरभयादिति।। नानुमानम्प्रमाणमिति वदता लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपन्नः सन्दिग्धो विपर्यस्तो
वा पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपधेत ? न च पुरुषान्तरगत (३४) अनुमानस्य
___ अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्ययाः शक्या अर्याग्दृशा प्रत्यक्षेण
प्रतिपत्तुम् । नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण, मनभ्युपगमात् । अनवरताज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययस्तु यं कंचन पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानोऽनवधेयवचनतया
प्रमाणत्वस
१. अयमध्यवसाय एव च प्रत्यक्षमिति शेषः। २. समानार्थकमेवेति ।

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को. ५ ]
अनुमानलक्षणम् प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत । तदनेनाज्ञानादयः परपुरुषवर्तिनो ऽभिप्रायभेदाद्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः, इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानप्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥ तत्र प्रत्यक्षकार्यत्वात् अनुमान प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं लक्षणीयम् । तत्रापि
सामान्यलक्षणपूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणस्यानुमानसामान्य (३५) अनुमानस्य
तावल्लक्षयति- “ तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् ” इति । सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥
" लिङ्गम् व्याप्यम् । लिङ्गि व्यापकम् । शङ्कितसमारोपितोपाधिनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिबद्धं व्याप्यम् , येन प्रतिबद्धं तद्वयापकम् । लिङ्गलिङ्गिग्रहणेन विषयवाचिना विषयिणं प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति । धूमादियांप्यो वह्नयादिर्व्यापक इति यः प्रत्ययस्तत्पूर्वकम् । लिङ्गग्रहणं चावर्तनीयम् । तेन च लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमपि दर्शितम्भवति । तद्वयाप्यव्यापकभावपक्षधर्मताज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यं लक्षितम् ॥
अनुमानविशेषान् तन्त्रान्तरलक्षितान् अभिमतान, स्मारयति- “ त्रिवि(३६) अनुमानस्य धमनुमानमाख्यातम्" इति । तत् सामान्यतो विशेषलक्षम्-त्रैविध्यम् पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो उपासतमानमान विशषतास्त्रावध, पूर्ववत्
नुलक्षितमनुमानं विशेषतस्त्रिविधं, पूर्ववत्-शेषवत्दृष्टभेदात्
सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्चेति ॥ तत्र 'प्रथमं तावत् द्विविधम्-चीतमवीतं च । अन्वयमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं (३७) वीतावीतरूपेणा; विधायकं वीतम् , व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं निषेधनुमानस्य द्वैविध्यम् ॥ कमवीतम् ॥
तत्रावीतं शेषवत् । शिष्यते परिशिष्यते इति शेषः, स एव विषयतया यस्या(३८) अवीतनि- स्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्य तच्छेषवत् । यदाहः-" प्रसक्त
प्रतिषेधे, अन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः रूपणम्
परिशेष" इति [वात्स्यायन-न्यायभाष्य १. १.५.]. भस्य चावीतस्य व्यतिरेकिण उदाहरणमग्रेऽभिधास्यते ॥
१. एकेन विभागप्रकारेण अनुमानम् द्विविधमिति भावः । २. अत्राहू राघवा. नन्दतीर्थाः-"सतां सम्मतिमाह यथाहुरिति-गुणत्वात् पृथिव्याश्रयः शब्दः स्यादिति प्रसक्तस्य शब्दस्य न पृथिवीगुणत्वम् , अपाकजविशेषगुणत्वात् , तद्विशेषगुणेन गन्धेन च सहावृत्तित्वात् । एवं निषेधे कृते आकाशादन्यत्र भूम्याद्यष्टस्वप्रसङ्गात्, शिष्यमाणे आकाशे एव शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन सम्यक्प्रत्ययः " - इति ॥

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वीतनिरूपणम् । [सां. त. वीतं द्वेधा-पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्रैकम् दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयं
यत्तत्पूर्ववत् , पूर्व प्रसिद्धं, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति (३९) वीतनिरूपणम् यावत् , तदस्य विषयत्वेनास्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्येति पूर्व-तद्वैविध्यम् ॥ वत् । यथा धूमावह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषः पर्वतेऽनुमी
यते, तस्य वह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निविशेषो दृष्टो रसवत्याम् । अपरं च वीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमदृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयम् । यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुमानम् । अत्र हि रूपादिविज्ञानानां क्रियात्वेन करणवत्त्वमनुमीयते । यद्यपि करणत्वसामान्यस्य छिदादौ वास्यादि स्वलक्षणमुपलब्धम् , तथाऽपि यजातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणत्वमनुमीयते तजातीयस्य करणस्य न दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षेण । इन्द्रियजातीयं हि तत्करणम् , न चेन्द्रियत्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणमिन्द्रियविशेषः प्रत्यक्षगोचरोऽर्वाग्दृशाम् , यथा वह्नित्वसामान्यस्य॑ स्वलक्षणं वह्निः । सोऽयं पूर्ववत: सामान्यतो दृष्टात् सत्यपि वीतत्वेन तुल्यत्वे विशेषः। अत्र च दृष्टं दर्शनम् , सामान्यत इति सामान्यस्य, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिल् । अदृष्टस्वलक्षणस्य सामान्यविशेषस्य दर्शनम् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमित्यर्थः । सर्वं चैतदस्माभिर्व्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायां व्युत्पादितमिति नेहोक्तं विस्तरभयात् ॥ प्रयोजकवृद्धशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिहेसुज्ञानानुमानपूर्वकत्वा
.. च्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणस्य, स्वार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानसहकारि(४०) शब्दप्रमाण
णश्च शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादनुमानपूर्वकत्वमित्यनुमालक्षणम् ॥
नानन्तरं शब्दं लक्षयति- “ आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु " इति । आप्तवचनमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आप्ता प्राप्ता युक्तति यावत् । आप्ता चासौ श्रुतिश्चेति ‘आप्तश्रुतिः । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥ ___ तश्च स्वतः प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषाशङ्कावि(४१) तस्य स्वतः- निर्मुक्तेर्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतीतिहासपुराणप्रामाण्यम् ॥ · वाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञान युक्तं भवति ॥
१. दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं यस्य सामान्यस्य-तत् सामान्यं विषयो यस्येति विग्रहः ।

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को. ५] आप्तश्रुतेरनुमानाब्यवच्छेदः । मादिविदुषश्च कपिलस्य कल्पादौ कल्पान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुप्त
. प्रबुद्धस्येव पूर्वेधुरवगतानामर्थानामपरेयुः । तथा (४२) कपिलस्य पूर्व चावट्यजगीषव्यसंवादे भगवान जैगीषव्यो दशजन्माधीतश्रुतिस्मरणम्।। महाकल्पवर्तिजन्मस्मरणमात्मन उवाच " दशसु महाकल्पेषु विपरिवर्तमानेन मया" इत्यादिना ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण ॥
माप्तग्रहणेनायुक्ताः शाक्यभिक्षुनिर्ग्रन्थकसंसारमोचकादीनामागमाभासाः (४३) आगमाभास
___परिहृता भवन्ति । अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानात्
विच्छिन्नमूलत्वात्प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाञ्च कैश्चिदेव निरूपणम्
म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापसदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहादोद्धव्यम्। __'तु' शब्देनानुमानाब्यवच्छिनत्ति । वाक्यार्थो हि प्रमेयो, न तु तद्धर्मों (४४) आप्तश्रुतेरनु
. वाक्यम् , येन तत्र लिङ्गं भवेत्। न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थ
बोधयत् सम्बन्धग्रहणमपेक्षते, अभिनवकविरचितस्य मानायवच्छेदः ॥
वाक्यस्यादृष्टपूर्वस्याननुभूतचरवाक्यार्थबोधकत्वादिति ॥
१. अत्राहुर्भारतीयत्यादयः-"कथं 'तु' शब्देनानुमानायवच्छेद आप्तवचनस्येत्यत आह - 'वाक्यार्थोहि' इति । नन्वस्तु तावद्वाक्यार्थस्य प्रमेयत्वम्, एतावता कथमनुमानाद् व्यवच्छेदः स्यात् , शब्दस्य तत्कारणत्वात् , यथा धूमेन लिनेन लिङ्गी वह्निञ्जयते तथा वाक्येन लिङ्गेन शब्दार्थलिङ्गयनुमानं भवेदित्याशङ्कयाह-'न तु तद्धर्म' इति । धूमस्य वह्निधर्मत्वात् तल्लिङ्गत्वम् , न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थधर्मत्वम् , येन तल्लिङ्ग वाक्यं स्यादिति यावत् । ननु यद्यपि धूमाग्निवत् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोधर्मधर्मिभावो नास्ति, तथाऽपि यथा धूमोऽमिना सम्बन्धिना सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्ष एव तद्गमकः, तथा वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षमेव तद्बोधकमिति घट्टकुट्यामेव प्रभात इति चेत्तत्राह-' न च' इति । औल्पत्तिकसूत्रे जैमिनिना शब्दार्थयोनित्यसम्बन्धे साधितेऽपि शब्दस्यैव वृद्धव्यवहारतः सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षस्यैावबोधकत्वात् , पदार्थपूर्वकत्वात्तु वाक्यार्थस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षा नास्ति । विशिष्टार्थसप्रत्ययो हि वाक्यार्थः" इति । यदि वाक्यार्थज्ञानेऽनुमानं स्यात् तर्हि वाक्य

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१४ उपमानस्य शब्देऽनुमाने चान्तर्भावः । [सा. त. (४५) शास्त्रान्तरोक्त- एवं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणेषु तद्विशेषलक्षणेषु च सत्सु, प्रमाणान्तराणामुक्तेष्वः यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रतिवादिभिरभ्युन्तर्भावः॥ पेयन्ते तान्युक्तलक्षणेष्वेव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥ तथा हि-उपमानं तावद्यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यम् । तजनिता धीरा
गम एव । योऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशस्य वाचक (४६) उपमानस्य
इति प्रत्ययः, सोऽप्यनुमानमेव । यो हि शब्दो यत्र शब्दे ऽनुमाने चान्त
वृद्धैः प्रयुज्यते, सोऽसति वृत्त्यन्तरे, तस्य वाचकः, र्भावः।
यथा गोशब्दो गोत्वस्य । प्रयुज्यते चैवं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशे, इति तस्यैव वाचक, इति तत् ज्ञानमनुमानमेव । यत्तु गवयस्य चक्षुःसनिकृष्टस्य गोसादृश्यज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमेव । अत एव स्मर्यमाणायां गवि, गवयसादृश्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । न स्वन्यद्गवि सादृश्यमन्यश्च गवये । भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोगो हि जात्यन्तरवर्ती जात्यन्तरे सादृश्यमुच्यते । सामान्य. योगश्चैकः । स चेद्वये प्रत्यक्षो, गव्यपि तथेति नोपमानस्य प्रमेयान्तरमस्ति, यत्र प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानं भवेत् , इति न प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानम् ।। वाक्यार्थयोाप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धोऽपेक्षितः स्यात् । न च तथा। तथाहि वाक्यं प्रमाणं वाक्यार्थः प्रमेयः । एवं च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य धर्मो न भवति-यथा भवति धूमो वह्वेर्धर्मः । अतो वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य लिंगं न भवतीत्याशयः ।
शान्दज्ञानं येऽनुमानेऽन्तर्भावयंति तेषां मते-यथा व्याप्तिज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमान तथैव शब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकं शाब्दं ज्ञानम् । तत्र चेत्थमनुमानस्वरूपम्-यत्र यत्र घटमानयेति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तत्र तत्र घटानयनं बोध्यते-यथा मम बाल्यावस्थायामुच्चरितोक्तशब्द:-अधुनाऽपि स एव शब्दः प्रयुज्यते-तस्मादधुनापि घटानयनमेव बोध्यत इति ॥ अस्यैव मतस्य परिहारोऽत्र ग्रन्थे प्रदर्श्यते न च वाक्यमित्यादिना । व्याप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धज्ञानं विनाऽनुमानं नैव प्रसरति । शान्दज्ञाने त्वेवं. विधशब्दार्थ- सम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं न सार्वत्रिकम्-अभिनवकविरचितवाक्यस्याश्रुतपूर्वत्वात्तत्र तादृशसम्बन्धज्ञानस्यासम्भवः । तथा च सति पूर्वपक्षिमतेन तत्र शानदशानं नैवस्यादिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

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को. ५]
अर्थापत्तेरनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः ।
एवमर्थापत्तिरपि न प्रमाणान्तरम् । तथा हि-जीवतश्चैत्रस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन
र बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पनमर्थापत्तिरभिमता वृद्धा
। नाम् । साऽप्यनुमानमेव । यदा खल्वव्यापकः सझेकत्र रनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः ॥
' नास्ति तदाऽन्यत्रास्ति । यदाऽव्यापक एकत्रास्ति तदा. ऽन्यत्र नास्तीति सुकरः स्वशरीरे व्याप्तिग्रहः । तथा च सतो गृहाभावदर्शनेन लिङ्गेन बहिर्भावदर्शनमनुमानमेव । न च चैत्रस्य कचित्सत्त्वेन गृहाभावः शक्योऽपह्नोतुम् , येनासिद्धो गहाभावो बहिर्भावे न हेतुः स्यात् । न च गृहाभावेन वा सत्त्वमपह्वयते, येन सत्त्वमेवानुपपद्यमानमात्मानं न बहिरवस्थापयेत् । तथा हि-चैत्रस्य गृहासत्त्वेन सत्त्वमात्रं विरुध्यते, गृहसत्त्वं वा ? न तावद्यत्र वचन सत्त्वस्यास्ति विरोधो गहासत्त्वेन, भिन्न विषयत्वात् । “देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिक इति समानविषयतया विरोध" इति चेत् , न, प्रमाणविनिश्चितस्य गृहे ऽसत्त्वस्य पाक्षिकतया सांशयिकेन गृहसत्त्वेन प्रतिक्षेपायोगात् । नापि प्रमाणनिश्चितो गहाभावः पाक्षिकमस्य गहसत्त्वं प्रतिक्षिपन् सत्त्वमपि प्रतिक्षेप्तुं सांशयिकत्वं च व्यपनेतुमर्हतीति युक्तम् ।
१. “देशसामान्यप्रविष्टग्रह विशेषमादाय समानविषयतया विरोध इति शङ्कते" इति राघवानन्दाः । सत्त्वं हि गृहबहिस्साधारणतया सामान्यप्रवृत्तं विशेषगृहासत्त्वेन विरुद्धमिति शङ्काकृद्भवः । क्वचिदस्तीति कथनेन स्थलविशेषविनिगमनाविरहात् गृहाभावोऽपि बाध्यते, गृहस्यापि क्वचित्पदेऽन्तर्भावात् , अतएव गृहसत्त्वेन विरोध इति हृदयम् ।
"देशसामान्येनेति" सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संशयहेतुतया उच्चस्तरत्वज्ञानेन स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोरिव गृहबहिर्देशयोराधेयतासम्बन्धेन चैत्रे संशये गृहत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकज्ञानस्य गृहाभावज्ञानविरोधितया गृहाभावरूपहेतोञ्जनं न सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । शब्दार्थस्तु " देशसामान्येन” देशसामान्यज्ञानेन, “ गृहविशेषाक्षेपः” गृहात्मकविशेषसम्बन्धः, "पाक्षिकः" संशयविषयः, "समानविषयतया" गृहाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नतया, “ विरोधः ” एकसत्त्वे ऽपरासत्त्वनियमः।
" प्रमाणेति " प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रकारकनिश्चयस्यैवाभावधीहेतुतया संशयस्य न विरोधितेत्यभिसन्धिः, अक्षरार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ।

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१६ अभावसम्भवयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरन्तर्भावः । [सो. त. गृहावच्छिन्नेन चैत्राभावेन गृहसत्त्वं विरुद्धत्वात् प्रतिक्षिप्यते, न तु सत्त्व. मात्रम् , तस्य तत्रौदासीन्यात् । तस्माद्गृहाभावेन लिङ्गेन सिद्धेन सतो बहि. आँवोऽनुमीयत इति युक्तम् । एतेन ‘विरुद्धयोः प्रमाणयोविषयव्यवस्थयाऽविरोधापादनमर्थापत्तेविषय' इति निरस्तम् , अवच्छिन्नानवच्छिन्नयोर्विरोधाभावात् । उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्थापत्तेरेवमेवानुमानेऽन्तर्भावनीयानि । तस्मानानुमानात्प्रमाणान्तरमापत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ॥ एवमभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षमेव । न हि भूतलस्य परिणामविशेषात् कैवल्य.
लक्षणादन्यो घटाभावो नाम । प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनो हि (४८) अभावस्य सर्व एक भावाः, ऋते चितिशक्तेः । स च परिणामप्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः॥ भेद ऐन्द्रियक इति नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानवरुद्धो विषयो
यत्राभावाह्वयं प्रमाणान्तरमभ्युपेयेतेति ॥ सम्भवस्तु, यथा-खायां द्रोणाढकप्रस्थायवगमः । स चानुमानमेव । (४९) सम्भवस्यानुः खारीत्वं हि द्रोणाद्यविनाभूतं प्रतीतम् खायां द्रोणामानेऽन्तभवः ॥ दिसत्त्वमवगमयति । यच्चानिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यमात्रम्- ' इति होचवृद्धाः, ' -इस्यै
तिह्यम् , यथा 'इह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति' इति, (५०) ऐतिह्यस्य न तत् प्रमाणान्तरम् , अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांश प्रमाणत्वाभावः ॥ यिकस्वात् । भाप्तवक्तकस्वनिश्वये स्वागम एव ।
इत्युपपन्नम् " त्रिविधम्प्रमाणम्" इति ॥ ५ ॥
एवं तावब्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञलक्षणप्रमेय सिद्धयर्थं प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि । तत्र व्यक्त
पृथिव्यादि स्वरूपतः पांसुलपादको हालिकोऽपि प्रत्य(५१) प्रमाणानां क्षतः प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववता चानुमानेन घूमादिदर्शनात् शक्ति निर्णयः॥ वह्नयादीनि चेति, तद्वयुत्पादनाय मन्द्रप्रयोजनं
शास्त्रम् इति दुरधिगममनेन व्युत्पाद्यम् । तत्र यत्प्रमाणं यत्र शतम् तदुक्तलक्षणेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो निष्कृष्य दर्शयति--
१. धूलिधूसरचरणः हलवाही, ग्राम्यजन इति यावत् ।

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को. ७ ]
अतीन्द्रियाणामनुमानात् प्रतीति: ।
सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात् । तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥
""
सामान्यत ” इति । ‘तु' शब्द: प्रत्यक्षपूर्ववद्भयां विशिनष्टि । सामान्यतो दृष्टानुमानादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनां (५२) अतीन्द्रियाणां सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् प्रतीतिः - चितिच्छायापत्तिर्बुद्धेरध्यवसाय इत्यर्थः प्रतीतिः उपलक्षणं चैतत् शेषवदित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥
T: 11
किं सर्वेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु सामान्यतो दृष्टमेव प्रवर्तते ? । तथा च यत्र तन्नास्ति, महदाद्यारम्भक्रमे स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादौ च तत्र तेषामभावः प्राप्त इत्यत आह- तस्मादपि " इति । तस्मादित्येतावतैव सिद्धे 'च' कारेण शेषवदित्यपि समुच्चितम् ॥ ६ ॥
"I
(५३) सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादसिद्धानामातागमात् सिद्धिः ॥
"
स्यादेतत्, यथा गगनकुसुमकूर्मरोमशशविषाणादिषु प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानम् (५४) प्रत्यक्षाभावात् तदभावमवगमयति, एवं प्रधानादिष्वपि । तत्कथं प्रधानादीनामभावशङ्का || तेषां सामान्यतो दृष्टादिभ्यः सिद्धिरित्यत आहअतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् । सौक्ष्म्याव्यवधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराश्च ॥ ७ ॥
"
-
१. यथा कौमुद्यां तथैवेयं कारिका व्याख्याता गौडपादेनाथ जयमङ्गलायाम् ॥ इदमपरमपि व्याख्यानमुपलभ्यते चन्द्रिकायाम् - 'सामान्यतः ' साधारणस्य वस्तुजातस्य प्रतीतिः 'दृष्टात्' प्रत्यक्षात् भवति 'अतीन्द्रियाणां' तु प्रतीतिः 'अनुमानात्' भवति - ' तस्मात् ' अनुमानात् अपि केचित् पदार्थाः प्रत्येतुं न शक्याः - : - तेषां प्रतीतिस्तु ' आप्तागमात् ' सिध्यति -- इति ॥ त. कौ. २

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प्रधानाधप्रत्यक्षे हेतवः। [सां. त. “मतिदूरात्" इति । अनुपलब्धिरिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिंहावलोकनन्याये (५५) तन्निरासः, नानुषअनीयम् । यथा उत्पतन् वियति पतस्त्रि अतिदूरअतिदूरातिसामी- तया, सञ्चपि, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । सामीप्यादित्यत्राप्येन्द्रियघातमनो- प्यतिरनुवर्तनीयः, यथा लोचनस्थमजनमतिसामीप्यान ऽनवस्थानसौ. दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातोऽन्धत्वबधिरत्वादिः । “ मनोऽन. म्यव्यवधानाभि- वस्थानात् , " यथा कामाद्युपहतमनाः स्फीतालोकमध्यभवसमानाभि- वर्तिनमिन्द्रियसनिकृष्टमर्थ न पश्यति । “ सौक्ष्म्यात् ," हारेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षा- यथेन्द्रियस निकृष्टम् परमाण्वादि प्रणिहितमना अपि न भावः ॥ पश्यति । “ व्यवधानात् ," यथा कुख्यादिष्यवहितं राजदारादि न पश्यति । “भभिभवात् ," यथाऽहनि सौरीभिर्भाभिरभि. भूतं प्रहनक्षत्रमण्डलं न पश्यति । " समानाभिहारात् ,” यथा तोयद. विमुक्कानुदबिन्दून् जनाशये न पश्यति ॥
'च' कारोऽनुक्तसमुश्चयार्थः । तेनानुद्भवोऽपि संगृहीतः । तद्यथा (५६) अनुद्भवादपि क्षीरायवस्थायां दध्यायनुवान पश्यति ॥ प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥
एतदुक्तं भवति । न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्राद्वस्वभावो भवति, मतिप्रसङ्गात् । (५७) प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्ति- तथा हि गृहाद्विनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यंस्तदभावं खे नाभावस्य कारणम् । विनिश्चिनुयात् , न स्वेवम् । मपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष. अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष निवत्तेरयमभावं विनिश्चिनोति । न च प्रधानपुरुषानिवृत्तिः॥
दीनामस्ति प्रत्यक्षयोग्यता, इति न तनिवृत्तिमात्रा.
सदभावनिश्चयो युक्तः प्रामाणिकानाम् इति ॥ ७ ॥ कतमपुनरेतेषु कारणं प्रधानादीनामनुलब्धावित्यत माह
सौनयात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात् , कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्य प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८॥ १. यथा सिंहः पुरतो गत्वा पश्चात् पश्यति तथाऽग्रिमपदस्य यत्र प्राग्गतशब्दैः सम्बन्धस्तत्रास्य न्यायस्य प्रवृत्तिरित्यादिकमस्मदीयन्यायलतिकायां द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

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१९
को.८] प्रधानसाधनकार्यम् । "सौक्ष्म्यात्" इति । अथाभावादेव सप्तमरसवदेतेषामनुपलब्धिः कस्मात्र
___भवतीत्यत आह- " नाभावात् ” इति । कुतः ? (५८) प्रधानानुप. "कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः" इति । 'तत्' इति प्रधानं परालब्धौ सौक्ष्म्यम् कार. मृशति । पुरुषोपलब्धौ तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति " सका. णम् ।
तपरार्थत्वात् " (कारिका १७) इति । दृढतरप्रमाणा
वधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यत्वात्र प्रवर्तते इति कल्प्यते । सप्तमस्तु रसो न प्रमाणेनावधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्था. योग्यता शक्याऽध्यवसितुमित्यभिप्रायः ॥ किं पुनस्तत्कार्य यतः प्रधानानुमानमित्यत आह-"महदादि तच्च कार्यम्"
इति । एतश्च यथा गमकम् तथोपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते। (५९) प्रधानास्तिः तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी सारूप्यवैरूप्ये त्वसाधनकारणभूतम- माह- " प्रकृतिसरूपं विकार च” इति । एते हदादिकार्यम् ॥ तूपरिष्टाद्विभजनीये इति ॥ ८॥ कार्यात् कारणमात्रं गम्यते । सन्ति चात्र वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः । तथा हि
केचिदाहुः, ' असतः सत् जायते' इति, 'एकस्य (६०) कार्यकारणस- सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तु सत्' इत्यपरे, अन्ये म्बन्धे वादिविप्रति- तु 'सतः असत् जायते' इति, 'सतः सत् जायते' पत्तयः ॥
इति वृद्धाः॥ तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पत्रये प्रधानं न सिध्यति । सुखदुःखमोहभेदवत्स्वरूप
परिणामशब्दाचात्मकं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधानस्य (६१) सत्कार्यपक्ष प्रधानत्वं सत्वरजस्तमस्स्वभावस्वमवगमयति । यदि एव प्रधानास्तित्वसाधकः।। पुनरसतः सजायेत असबिरुपाख्यं कारणं सुखादिरूप
शब्दायात्मकं कथं स्यात् , सदसतोस्तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः ? मथैकस्य सतो विवर्तः शब्दादिप्रपन्चः, तथाऽपि सतः सजायत इति न स्यात् । न चास्याद्वयस्य प्रपन्चारमकत्वम् , अपि त्वप्रपम्चस्व प्रपम्चात्मकतया प्रतीतिर्धम एव । येषामपि कणभक्षाक्षचरणादीनां सत एवं कारणादसतो जन्म तेषामपि सदसतोरेकरवानुपपत्तेने कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति न तन्मते प्रधानसिद्धिः

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सत्कार्यपक्षविरुद्धपक्षाणां निरासः [सां. त. (६२ ) सत्कार्यप्रति- भतः प्रधानसिद्धयर्थ प्रथमं तावत्सस्कार्य प्रतिपादनम् ॥
जानीते-- असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् , कारणभावाञ्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९॥ " असदकरणात्" इति । “ सत् कार्यम् "-कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति
शेषः । तथा च न सिद्धसाधनं नैयायिकतनयैरुद्भा(६३.) बौद्धसिद्धान्त- वनीयम् । यद्यपि बीजमृत्पिण्डादिप्रध्वंसानन्तरमनिरासः ॥
कुरघटाद्युत्पत्तिरुपलभ्यते, तथाऽपि न प्रध्वंसस्य
___ कारणत्वम् , अपि तु भावस्यैव बीजाधवयवस्य । प्रभावात्तु भावोत्पत्ती, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात् , सर्वदा सर्वकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥ (६४) वेदान्तमत• • प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदि. निरासः
तुम् इति ॥ कणभक्षाक्षचरणमतमवशिष्यते । तत्रेदं प्रतिज्ञानम् , “सत् कार्यम्"
इति । अत्र हेतुमाह "असदकरणात् ” इति । असत् (६५)न्यायमतनिरासः। चेत् कारणव्यापारात् पूर्व कार्यम् , नास्य सत्त्वं कर्तुं असतः करणायोग्यत्वात् केनापि शक्यम् , न हि नीलं शिल्पिसहस्रणापि पीतं सत् कार्यमपि प्रथमो कतुं शक्यते । 'सदसत्त्वे घटस्य धौं' इति चेत् , तथा. हेतुः (१)॥ ऽप्यसति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्म इति सत्वं तदवस्थमेव ।
तथा च नासत्वम् , असम्बद्धनातदात्मना चासत्वेन कथमसन् घटः ? तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वमिव ततः प्रागपि सदेव कार्यमिति । कारणाचास्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तिरेवावशिष्यते । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपना, यथा पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्यावघातेन धान्येषु तण्डुलानां दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु
१. धर्मिणि (घटे) नासत्त्वम् ( घटस्य धर्मः ) ॥ " असत्त्वं घटे संबद्धं तदात्मकं भवति न वा ? आये असदात्मकस्य घटस्य असत्वं धर्मो न स्यात् । सम्बन्धस्य तदात्मकस्य घटसापेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वं स्यात् घटस्येति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव । द्वितीयं प्रत्याह-- 'असम्बद्धन' इति, तस्यासत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतिप्रसङ्गः स्यादित्युभयथाऽपि सत्त्वं घटस्येति " भारतीयत्यादयः ॥

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को. ९] कार्यसत्त्वसाधनानि । पयसः । असतः करणे तु न निदर्शनं किञ्चिदस्ति । न खल्वभिव्यज्यमानं चोरपद्यमानं वा क्वचिदसददृष्टम् ॥ इतश्च कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सदेव कार्यम्- “ उपादानग्रहणात्"।
उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषा ग्रहणं, कार्येण सम्बन्धः। सम्बन्धाच्च सत्कार्यमिति उपादानैः कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति यावत् । एतदुक्तं द्वितीयो हेतुः ( २ ) ॥ भवति-कार्येण सम्बद्धं कारणम् कार्यस्य जनकम् ,
सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यासतो न सम्भवति, तस्मादिति ॥ स्यादेतत्-असम्बद्धमेव कार्य कारणैः कस्मान जन्यते ? तथा चासदेवो. (६७) कार्यकारण. त्पत्स्यत इत्यत आह-"सर्वसम्भवाभावात्" इति । योर्नियतसम्बन्धाभावे असम्बद्धस्य जन्यस्वे, असम्बद्धत्वाविशेषेण सर्व सर्वकार्यकारणभाव. कार्यजातं सर्वस्माद्भवेत् । न चैतदस्ति, तस्मानाविप्लवापत्तिः॥ सम्बद्धमसम्बद्धन जन्यते अपि तु सम्बद्धं सम्बद्धेन,
जन्यत इति । यथाहुः सांख्यवृद्धाः" असत्त्वे नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसङ्गिभिः ।
असम्बद्धस्य धोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः " इति ॥ स्यादेतत्-मसम्बद्धमपि सत् तदेव करोति यत्र यत् कारणं शक्तम् ।
शक्तिश्च कार्यदर्शनादवगम्यते । तेन नाव्यवस्थेत्यत (६८) कारणशक्तेः ' आह "शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्" इति । सा शक्तिः शक्तकार्यपरत्वाच्च सत्कार्यम् कारणाश्रया सर्वत्र वा स्यात् , शक्ये एव वा ? सर्वत्र (३)॥ चेत्तदवस्थैवाव्यवस्था, शक्ये चेत्, कथमसति शक्ये
तत्र, इति वक्तव्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एतादृशो यतः किञ्चिदेव कार्य जनयेत् न सर्वमिति चेत् , हन्त भोः शक्तिविशेषः कार्यसम्बद्धो वाऽसम्बद्धो वा ? सम्बद्धस्वे नासता सम्बन्धः इति सन् कार्यम् । असम्बद्धत्त्वे सैवाव्यवस्था, इति सुष्टूक्तं "शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् " इति ॥
इतश्च सत् कार्यमित्याह- " कारणभावाच्च" । कार्यस्य कारणात्म(६९) कारणात्मकत्वात् कस्वात् । नहि कारणाग्निं कार्यम् , कारणं च कार्यस्य सत् कार्यम् (४)॥ सत्, इति कथं तदभिवं कार्यमसत् भवेत् ॥
१. पञ्चशिखादयः।

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२२
कार्यकारणाभेदसाधनम् । [सां. त. कार्यस्य कारणाभेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि-(१) न पटस्तन्तुभ्यो भियते,
तन्तुधर्मस्वात् । इह यत् यतो मिद्यते तत् तस्य धर्मों (७०) कार्यकारणा- न भवति, यथा गौरश्वस्य । धर्मश्च पटस्तन्तूनां, तस्माभेदसाधनानि ॥ मार्थान्तरम् । (२) उपादानोपादेयभावाच नार्था
न्तरवं तन्तुपटयोः । ययोरर्थान्तरत्वम् न तयोरुपा दागोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपटयोः । उपादानोपादेयभावाश्च तन्तुपटयोः । वस्मानार्थान्तरस्वम् । (३) इतश्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः, संयोगाप्राप्त्यमावात् । अर्थान्तरत्वे हि संयोगो दृष्टो यथा कुण्डबदरयोः, भप्राप्तिर्वा यथा हिमपद्विन्ध्ययोः । न चेह संयोगाप्राप्ती, तस्मानार्थान्तरत्वमिति । (४) इतश्च पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते, गुरुत्वान्तरकार्याग्रहणात् । इह यत् यस्मा. मित्रम् , तत् तस्मात् तस्य गुरुत्वान्तरं कायं गृह्यते, यथैकपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुस्वकार्योऽवनतिविशेषस्तस्माद्विपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्योऽवनतिभेदोऽधिकः । न च तथा तन्तुगुरुस्वकार्यात् पटगुरुत्वकार्यान्तरं दृश्यते । तस्मादमिनस्तन्तुभ्यः पट इति । तान्येतान्यभेदसाधनान्यवीतानि ॥ एवमभेदे सिद्धे, तन्तव एव तेन तेन संस्थानभेदेन परिणताः पटो, न
तन्तुभ्योऽर्थान्तरं पटः । स्वोत्मनि क्रियाविरोधसंब(७१) कार्यकारण. धबुद्धिव्यपदेशार्थक्रियाभेदाश्च नैकान्तिकं भेदं साधयोरभेदात् कारणपरि- यितुमर्हन्ति, एकस्मिन्नपि तत्तद्विशेषाविर्भावतिरोणामभेद एव कार्यम्। भावाभ्यामेतेषामविरोधात् , यथा हि कुर्मस्याङ्गानि तन्मते विरोधादिपरि. कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरम्ति हारः॥
चाविर्भवन्ति । न तु कूर्मतस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वं.
सन्ते वा । एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटादयो विशेषाः निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते, निविशमाना. स्तिरोभवन्ति विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते । न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः । पवाह भगवान् कृष्णद्वैपायनः
१ व्यतिरेकानुमानानि । २. स्वात्मनि उत्पत्तिविनाशलक्षणविरुद्धक्रिया, इह तन्तुषु पट इति । अत्र तन्तुपटयोः सम्बन्धस्य शानं भासते तादृशी चोक्तिर्भवति । न्यपदेशः, प्रावरणार्थक्रियाभेदश्च ।

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कौ. ९] कारणव्यापारावश्यकता । "नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः” इति । (भगवद्गीता,
२०१६) यथा कूर्मः स्वावयवेभ्यः सङ्कोचविकासिभ्यो न भिन्नः, एवं घटमुकुटादयोऽपि मृत्सुवर्णादिभ्यो न भिन्नाः । एवबेह तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशो, यथेह बने तिलका' इत्युपपन्नः। न चार्थक्रियाभेदोऽपि भेदमापादयति, एकस्यापि नाना. र्थक्रियादर्शनात् । यथैक एव वहिर्दाहकः पाचकः प्रकाशकश्चेति । नाप्यर्थक्रियाम्यवस्था वस्तुभेदे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्यस्तानामर्थक्रियाव्यवस्थादर्शनात् । यथा प्रत्येकं विष्टयो वर्मदर्शनलक्षणामर्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति, न तु शिबिकावहनम् । मिलितास्तु शिबिकामुद्वहन्ति, एवं तन्तवः प्रत्येक प्रावरणमकुर्वाणा अपि मिलिता आविर्भूतपटभावाः प्रावरिष्यन्ति ।।
स्यादेतत्-आविर्भावः पटस्य कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सन् असन् वा ?
मसंचेत् प्राप्तं तीसदुत्पादनम् । अथ सन् , कृतं तर्हि कारणव्यापारेण । नहि (७२)कार्यस्य कारणपरि- सति कार्ये कारणव्यापारप्रयोजनं पश्यामः । भाविणामविशेषत्वे कारण- र्भावे चाविर्भावान्तरकल्पनेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः। तस्मादा. व्यापारस्याप्रयोजकत्वमनवस्थापत्तिश्च ॥ विर्भूतपटभावास्तन्तवः क्रियन्त इति रिकं वचः॥
मैवम् । अथासदुत्पद्यत इति मते केयमसदुत्पत्तिः ? सती, असती (७३) तत्परिहारः । उक्त- वा? सती चेत् , कृतं तर्हि कारणैः । असती चेत्, दोषस्योभयमते तुल्यत्वम्॥ तस्या अप्युत्पत्त्यन्तरमित्यनवस्था ॥ मथ 3-' उत्पत्तिः पटामार्थान्तरम् , अपि तु पट एवासौ', तथाऽपि
यावदुक्तं भवति 'पट' इति तावदुक्तं भवति (७४) पटतदुत्पत्त्योरैक्य- 'उत्पद्यते' इति । ततश्च 'पट' इत्युक्ते, 'उत्पद्यते' शङ्का-तत्परिहारश्च ॥ इति न वाच्यम, पौनरुत्यात् । 'विनश्यति' इत्यपि
न वाध्यम् , उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्युगपदेकत्र विरोधात् ।। १. तिलकवृक्षमयवनविषये यथा " इह वने तिलका” इति सङ्गच्छते तथा तन्तुमयपटेऽपीति ! २. एवं च शङ्काकृदुद्भावितो दोषः समान एव पक्षदये । ततश्च नैकेनापरम्प्रत्युद्भावनीय इति । यथाहुर्ब्रह्मसूत्रकारा:-स्वपश्दोषाच्चेति-। ३. उक्तानवस्थालक्षणदोषपरिजिहीर्षया पटोत्पत्त्योरैक्यं शङ्कते 'पट एवासौ' ततश्च नानवस्थेति शेषः ॥ तर्हि पर्यायशब्दावेतावित्यभिप्रेत्य परिहरति च

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२४
कारिकोपसंहारः। [सां. त. तस्मादियं पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा, स्वसत्तासमवायो वा,उभयथा
ऽपि नोत्पद्यते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणानि व्यापार्यन्ते । (७५) पटोत्पत्तौ सत्या- एवं सत एव पटादेराविर्भावाय कारणापेक्षेप्युपपनम् ।। मपि कारणव्यापारा- न च पटरूपेण कारणानां सम्बन्धः, तद्रूपस्याक्रियापेक्षा ॥
त्वात् , क्रियासम्बन्धित्वाच्च कारणानाम् , अन्यथा
कारणात्वाभावात् ॥ (७६) कारिकोप
तस्मात् सत् कार्यमिति पुष्कलम् ॥ ९ ॥ संहारः॥
" १. पटोत्पत्तौ सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारस्य प्रयोजनमित्यभिप्रेत्याह- 'तस्मात् ' इति । न्यायमतेऽपि पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणभूततन्तुभिरयुतसिद्धा, स्वसत्तामात्रेणायुतसिद्धा वा भवितुमर्हति । उभयथाऽपि तु कारणव्यापारमन्तरेण न पटोत्पत्तिरुपपद्यते । न चाभिव्यक्तेरपि जन्यत्वे सत्कार्यबाधोऽनवस्था चेत्यादि वाच्यम् । व्यवहारोपयोगितत्तत्कार्याभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तत्कार्यनिष्ठसत्त्वगुणरूपतया नित्यत्वेऽपि तमसा प्रतिबद्धत्वान्न व्यवहारोपयोगित्वम् । अभिव्यञ्जकसामग्रथा तु तमसः प्रतिबन्धः । उत्तेजकस्याप्युत्तेजनमात्राङ्गीकारान्न सत्कार्यबाधः । कार्यकारणयोर्भेदेऽपि व्यवहारक्षमता कार्यात्मनाभिव्यक्तस्यैव नान्यथा इत्यादि चन्द्रिकायां स्पष्टम् ॥ " उपसंहरति 'तस्मादिति' उत्पत्त्युत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गेनानुत्पन्नाया अप्युत्पत्तेः कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्ववदस्मन्मतेऽपि सत एव घटस्याविर्भावाय कारणव्यापारापेक्षा । घटोत्पत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणेन घटे कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्वस्य प्रयोज्यत्वरूपस्यैवादरणीयतयाऽऽविर्भावे एव तदङ्गीकारमात्रेण निर्वाहे कृतमुत्पत्यङ्गीकारेण, युक्तं चैतत् , अन्यथोत्पत्तिवादे च कार्यस्येव कारणसापेक्षतया तस्य च क्रियात्वाभावे क्रियासम्बन्धित्वप्रयुक्तकारकत्वकारणत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः सत्कार्यवाद एव साधीयानित्याशयः” इति केचित् । २. न्यायमते कारणस्य सत्तायाः सकलस्य सम. वायस्य नित्यत्वादित्याशयः । 'नोत्पद्यते', अपि तु आविर्भवत्येवेति शेषः । ३. भवन्मतेऽपीति शेषः ॥ ४. ननु 'अस्मत्पक्षे-पटरूपाणि कारणानि कुर्वन्ति इति सदुक्तिस्त्वत्पक्षबाधिका' इति चेत् , तत्राह " न च” इति । तद्रूपं चानित्यमेवेति भवति तस्योत्पत्तिरिति हृदयम् ।

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कौ. १०] व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यम् ।
तदेवं प्रधानसाधनानुगुणं सत् कार्यमुपपाद्य यादृशं तत् प्रधानं साधनीयं (७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्त- तादृशमादर्शयितुं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवैरूप्ये ॥ सारूप्यवैरूप्ये तावदाह
हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥ (७८) व्यक्तानां सारू-
- " हेतुमत्" इति । व्यक्तं हेतुमत् , हेतुः कारणम् ,
, प्यम् । तत्र हेतुम
- तद्वत् , यस्य च यो हेतुः तमुपरिष्टावक्ष्यति ॥ त्वम् ॥ (१) (७९) अनित्य- “अनित्यम." विनाशि, तिरोभावीति यावत् ॥ त्वम् ॥ (२) ___ "अव्यापि", सर्व परिणामिनं न व्याप्नोति । कारणेन हि कार्यमाविष्टम् , (८०) अव्यापि- न कार्येण कारणम् । न च बुद्धधादयः प्रधानं वेवित्वम् ॥ (३) षन्तीत्यव्यापकाः ।। " सक्रियम्”, परिस्पन्दवत्' । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देई
त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपाददत, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः । (८१) सक्रियत्वम् ।। (४)
शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव । " भनेकम्”, प्रतिपुरुषं बुद्धयादीनां भेदात् पृथिव्याद्यपि शरीरघटा(८२) अनेकत्वम् ।। (५) दिभेदेनानेकमेवे ।।
" आश्रितम्", स्वकारणमाश्रितम् । बुद्धयादिकार्याणामभेदेऽपि कथ( ८३ ) आश्रित- विभेदविवक्षयाऽऽश्रयाश्रयिभावः, यथेह वने तिलका त्वम् ।। (६) इत्युक्तम् ॥ ___ “लिङ्गम् ” प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्धयादय प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् तथो.
परिष्टावक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् (८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७) पुरुषस्य लिङ्गम्भवदपीति भावः ॥
१. 'सक्रियम् ' अध्यवसायादिरूपनियतक्रियाकारित्वमिति • भाष्ये । २. अथवा सर्गभेदेन भिन्नम् । ३. ' लिङ्गयति' अनुमानेन भोक्तारं ज्ञापयतीति लिङ्गम् ।

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२६
व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यम् ।
[सां. त. "सावयम्" अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि । अथ वा अवयवनम् अवयवः,
अवयवानामवयविनां मिथः संश्लेषो मिश्रणम् संयोग (८५) सावयव- इति यावत् । अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः । तेन त्वम् ॥ (८) सह वर्तत इति सावयवम् । तथाहि पृथिव्यादयः
परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते, एवमन्येऽपि । न तु प्रधानस्य बुद्धयादिभिः संयोगः, तादात्म्यात् । नापि सत्वरजस्तमसां परस्परं संयोगः, भप्राप्तेरभावात् ॥ " परतन्त्रम् " बुद्धयादि । बुद्धया स्वकार्येऽहङ्कारे जनयितव्ये प्रकृत्या
पूरोऽपेक्ष्यते, अन्यथा क्षीणा सती नालमहङ्कारं ( ८६ ) परतन्त्र- जनयितुमिति स्थितिः । एवमहङ्कारादिभिरपि त्वम् ।। (९) स्वकार्यजनने । इति सर्वः स्वकार्येषु प्रकृत्या पूरम
. पेक्षते । तेन परां प्रकृतिमपेक्षमाणं कारणमपि स्वकार्यजनने परतन्त्रं व्यक्तम् ।।
"विपरीतमव्यक्तम्”–व्यकात् । अहेतुमन्नित्यं व्यापि निष्क्रियम् , (८७ ) अव्यक्तस्य [यद्यप्यव्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया तथाऽपि वैपरीत्यम् ॥ परिस्पन्दो नास्ति ॥] एकमनाश्रितमलिङ्गमनवयवम् स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥
(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोस्साधाणि पुरुषाच्च
तदनेन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयो_धर्म्यमुक्तम् , सम्प्रति तयोर्वेधम्यम् ॥
__तयोः साधर्म्यम्, पुरुषाच्च वैधर्म्यम् , माहत्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनम्प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम् , तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान ! ११ ॥ (८९) त्रिगुणत्वम् "त्रिगुणम्" इति । त्रयो गुणाः सुखदुःखमोहा प्रथमम् साधर्म्यम् ॥ अस्येति त्रिगुणम् । तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वम् (१) . पेराभिमतमपाकृतम् ।
१. अवयव् + अनट् । २. नैयायिकाद्यभिमतम् ।

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कौ. ११ ] व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यम् । "अविवेकि " । यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवम्महदादयोऽपि न
। प्रधानात् विविच्यन्ते, तदात्मकत्वात् । अथ वा ( ९० ) अविवेकित्वम् सम्भूयकरिताऽत्राविवेकिता । न हि किञ्चिदेकं द्वितीयम् ॥ (२) पर्याप्तम् स्वकार्ये, अपि तु सम्भूय । तत्र नैकस्मात्
यस्य कस्यचित् केनचित्सम्भव इति ॥ ये' त्वाहुः-' विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम् , न पुनरितो
ऽन्यस्तद्धर्मा' इति-तान् प्रत्याह-" विषय" इति । ( ९१ ) विषयत्वम् ‘विषयो' ग्राह्यः, विज्ञानाद्वहिरिति यावत् । अत सामान्यत्वं च तृतीय- एव "सामान्यम्" साधारणम् , भनेकैः पुरुषैर्गृहीत. चतुर्थ ( ३ ) (४) मित्यर्थः । विज्ञानाकारत्वे तु, असाधारण्याद्विज्ञानानां
वृत्तिरूपाणां, तेऽप्यसाधारणाः स्युः । विज्ञानं परेण न गृह्यते परबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यभिप्रायः । तथा च नर्तकी-भ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन् बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानं युक्तम् । अन्यथा तन्न स्यात् इति भावः ॥ ( ९२ ) अचेतनत्वम् “अचेतनम्” । सर्व एव प्रधानबुद्धयादयोऽचेतनाः, पञ्चमम् ॥ (५) न तु वैनाशिकवत् चैतन्यम्बुद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥
"प्रसवधर्मि"। प्रसवरूपो धर्मों यः सोऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि । [प्रसव( ९३ ) प्रसवधर्मित्वम् धर्मेति वक्तव्ये मत्वर्थीयः प्रसवधर्मस्य नित्ययोगषष्ठम् ॥ (६) माख्यातुम् ] । स्वरूपविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदाचिदपि वियुज्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ( ९४ ) उक्तव्यक्तधर्मा- व्यक्तवृत्तमन्यक्तेऽतिदिशति, “ तथा प्रधानम्" णामव्यक्तेऽतिदेशः ॥ इति । यथा व्यक्तं तथाऽव्यक्तमित्यर्थः ॥ ( ९५ ) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः ताभ्यां वैधयं पुरुषस्याऽऽह - " तद्विपरीतः पुरुषात् वैधर्म्यम् ॥ पुमान् ” इति ॥
१. विज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धाः । २. तेषां विज्ञानाकारत्वे । ३. त्रिगुणत्वादिसाधर्म्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोरिति यावत् ।

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२८
गुणस्वरूपनिरूपणम् । [मां. त. स्यादेतत्-अहेतुमत्त्वनित्यत्वादि प्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, एवमने
कत्वं व्यक्तसाधर्म्यम्, तत्कथमुच्यते 'तद्विपरीतः (९६ ) साधर्म्य च ॥ पुमान् ' इति ? मत माह- " तथा च” इति ।
चकारोऽप्यर्थः' । यद्यप्यहेतुमत्त्वादिकं साधर्म्यम् , तत्राप्यत्रैगुण्यादि वैपरीत्यमस्स्येवेत्यर्थः ।। ११ ॥
त्रिगुणमित्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः, किं च तदुपलक्षणमित्यत
आह- . (९७) गुणनिरूपणम्॥
प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥ " गुणाः " [ परार्थाः ] " सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् ” [ कारिका १३ ] (९८ ) गुणानां स्वरू- इत्यत्र निर्देक्ष्यन्ते। तदनागतावेक्षणेन तन्त्रयुक्त्या वा पाणि, सुखदुःखयोः पर- प्रीत्यादीनां यथासंख्यं वेदितव्यम् ॥ स्पराभावरूपता व्युदासश्च॥ ऐतदुक्तं भवति-प्रीतिः सुखम् , प्रीत्यात्मकः सत्त्वगुणः; अप्रीतिर्दुःखम् ,
मप्रीत्यात्मको रजोगुणः; विषादो मोहः, विषादात्मक. (९९) उक्तलक्षणस- स्तमोगुणः इत्यर्थः । ये तु मन्यन्ते "न प्रीतिर्दुःखाभा
वादतिरिच्यते एवं दुःखमपि न प्रीत्यभावादन्य
दिति," तान् प्रति “ आत्म"-ग्रहणम् । नेतरेतराभावाः सुखादयः, अपि तु भावाः, आत्मशब्दस्य भाववचनत्वात् । प्रीतिः मात्मा भावो येषां ते प्रीत्वात्मानः । एवमन्यदपि व्याख्येयम् । भावरूपता चैषामनुभवसिद्धा । परस्पराभावात्मकत्वे तु परस्पराश्रयापत्तरेकस्याप्यसिद्धे. रुभयासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥
१. च = अपि । २. आर्जवश्रद्धादीनां प्रीतावान्तर्भावः, द्वेषमोहविप्रलम्भभयादीनां चाप्रीती।
मन्वयः ॥

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को. १२ ] गुणानां क्रियाः।
२९ स्वरूपमेषामुक्त्वा प्रयोजनमाह- " प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः" इति ।
यो अत्रापि यथासंख्यमेव । रजः प्रवर्तकत्वात् सर्वत्र लघ जनम यथासंख्यं प्रकाश- सत्त्वं प्रवर्तयेत् , यदि तमसा गुरुणा न नियम्येत । प्रवृत्तिनियमरूपम् ॥ तमोनियतन्तु क्वचिदेव प्रवर्तयतीति भवति तमो
नियमार्थम् ॥ प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा क्रियामाह- " अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च"
इति । वृत्तिः क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते । (१०१) गुणानां क्रियाः, 'अन्योन्याभिभववृत्तयः । एषामन्यतमेनार्थवशादुअन्योन्याभिभव- अन्यो- भूतेनान्यदभिभूयते । तथा हि सत्त्वं रजस्तमसी न्यापेक्षा-अन्योन्यापेक्ष- अभिभूय शान्तामात्मनो वृत्तिं प्रतिलभते, एवं रजः जनन-अन्योन्यमिथुन- सत्त्वतमसी अभिभूय घोराम् , एवं तमः सत्त्वरजसी वृत्तिरूपाः ॥ अभिभूय मृढामिति । 'अन्योन्याश्रयवृत्तयः' ।
यद्यप्याधाराधेयभावेन नायमर्थो घटते, तथा ऽपि यदपेक्षया यस्य क्रिया स तस्याश्रयः । तथा हि, सत्त्वं प्रवृत्ति नियमावाश्रित्य रजस्तमसोः प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशनियमावाश्रित्य प्रवृत्त्येतरयोः, तमः प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आश्रित्य नियमेनेतरयोरिति । 'अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः । अन्यतमो ऽन्यतममपेक्ष्य जनयति । जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां सहशरूपः । अत एव न हेतुमत्त्वम् , तत्त्वान्तरस्य हेतोरसम्भवात् ; नाप्य. निस्यत्वम् , तत्त्वान्तरे लयाभावात् । अन्योन्यमिथुनवृत्तयः । अन्योन्यसहचराः, अधिनाभाववृत्तय इति यावत् । 'चः' समुच्चये । भवति चात्रागमः
“ अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगामिनः । रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ॥ तमसश्चापि मिथुने ते सरवरजसी उभे । उभयोः सत्वरजसोमिथुनं तम इच्यते ॥ नैषामादिः सम्प्रयोगो वियोगो वोपलभ्यते” ॥ इति देवी
भागवते-३८. ॥ १२ ॥

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गुणत्रयनिरूपणम् । [सां. त. " प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः” इत्युक्तम् , तत्र के ते इत्थम्भूताः कुतश्चेत्यत (१०२) गुणत्रयनिरूप. _ णम् , तेषां पृथस्वभावश्च॥
सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टभ्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवञ्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥ " सत्त्वम्" इति । सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्-सांख्याचार्यैः । तत्र
कार्योगमने हेतुर्धर्मो लाघवम् गौरवप्रतिद्वन्द्वि यतो (१०३ ) सत्त्वगुणस्व- ऽग्नेरूद्धज्वलनं भवति, तदेव लाघवम् कस्यचित्तिर्यभावः-लाघवम् , प्रका- ग्गमने हेतुर्भवति, यथा वायोः । एवं करणानां वृत्तिशकत्वम् ॥ पटुत्वहेतुर्लाघवम् , गुरुत्वे हि मन्दानि स्युरिति
सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ॥ सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यवसीदन्ती रजसोपष्टभ्येते
___अवसादात् प्रच्याव्य स्वकार्ये उत्साहं प्रयत्नं कार्यते । (१०४) रजोगुणस्व- तदिदमुक्तम्- " उपष्टम्भकं रजः” इति । कस्मा. भावः-उपष्टम्भकत्वम्, दित्यत उक्तम्- “चलम्" इति । तदनेन रजसः चलत्वम् ।। प्रवृत्त्यर्थत्वं दार्शतम् ॥
रजस्तु चलतया परितस्वैगुण्यं चालयेत्, गुरुणाऽऽवृण्वता च तमसा तत्र ( १०५) तमोगुणस्व
... तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकेन क्वचिदेव प्रवर्त्यते इति तत.
स्ततो व्यावृत्त्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्- “ गुरु भावः-गुरुत्वम् आवर
पवरणकमेव तमः" इति । एवकारः प्रत्येकं भिन्नक्रमः कत्वम् ।।
सम्बध्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रज एव, तम एवेति ।। ननु 'एते परस्परविरोधशीला गुणाः सुन्दोपसुन्दवत् परस्परं ध्वंसन्त
इत्येव युक्तम् , प्रागेव त्वेतेषामेकक्रियाकर्तृता'-इत्यत (१०६) परस्परविरु- आह—“प्रदीपवञ्चार्थतो वृत्तिः” इति । दृष्टमेद्धानामपि गुणानामर्थ- वैतत् , यथा वर्तितले अनलविरोधिनी, अथ मिलिते वशात् सहवृत्तित्वम् ॥ सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कायं कुरुतः; तथा च वात
पित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षण१. अर्थावभासकमिति यावत ॥ २. प्रकाशकत्वमिति यावत् । ३. दूर एव । का कथा परस्परध्वंसकानामेकक्रियाकारिताया इति भावः।

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कौ. १४ ] . सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकित्वासंभवशङ्का ।
३१
कार्यकारिणः; एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिथोविरुद्धान्यप्यनवय॑न्ति स्वकार्य करिष्यन्ति च । ' अर्थत" इति पुरुषार्थत इति यावत् , यथा च वक्ष्यति
" पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्” इति ।। [कारिका ३१] अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरोधिनः स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहा
त्मकान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । तेषां च परस्पर( १०७ ) सुग्वदुःख- मभिभाव्याभिभावकभावानानात्वम् । तद्यथा एकैव मोहानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वा. स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशीलसम्पन्ना स्वामिनं सुखाकरोति; त्तेषां निमित्तरूपेण गुण- तत्कस्य हेतोः ? स्वामिनं प्रति तस्याः सुखरूपसमु. त्रयस्या ऽऽवश्यकत्वम् ।। द्भवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नीवुःखाकरोति, तत् कस्य
हेतोः ? ताः प्रति तस्याः दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति; तत् कस्य हेतोः ? तम्प्रति तस्याः मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्व भावा व्याख्याताः । तत्र यत् सुखहेतुः तत् सुखात्मकम् सत्त्वम् . यत् दुःखहेतुः तत् दुःखात्मकं रजः, यन्मोहहेतुस्तन्मोहात्मकं तमः । सुखप्रकाशलाघवानां त्वेकस्मिन् युगपदुद्भूतावविरोधः, सहदर्शनात् । तस्मात् सुखदुःखमोहैरिव विरोधिभिः अविरोधिभिरेकैकगुणवृत्तिभिः सुखप्रकाशलाघवैन निमित्तभेदा उन्नीयन्ते । एवं दुःखोपष्टम्भकत्वप्रवर्तकत्वैः, एवं मोहगुरुत्वावरणैः--इति सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यमिति
स्यादेतत्-अनुभूयमानेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुभवसिद्धाः भवन्त्वविवेकि( १०८) अननुभवसि- त्वादयः । ये पुनः सत्त्वादयो नानुभवपथमधिरोहन्ति द्वेषु सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकि- तेषां कुतस्त्यमविवेकित्वम् , विषयत्वमचेतनत्वम् त्वादिगुणासम्भवशङ्का । प्रसवधर्मित्वं च ? इत्यत माह--
१. सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि । २. सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीव सुखदुःखमोहानाम् , सुखप्रकाशलाघवानामपि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानीत्याशङ्कया ऽह" सुखेति”। ३. तथा सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरुद्धाः भिन्नानि निमित्तानि सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि कल्पयान्त-न तथा सुखप्रकाशलाघवादीनामेकैकगुणवृत्तित्त्वे कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्पेरन् इति भावः । अविरोधिनामपि भिन्ननिमित्तकल्पने ऽनवस्थाऽपि ॥

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अव्यक्तसाधनानि . [सां. त. अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिबैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥ " अविवेक्यादेः” इति । अविवेकित्वमविवेकि-यथा 'येकयोर्द्विवचनै
कवचने' [पाणिनिसूत्र. १।४।२२] इत्यत्र द्वित्वै. (१०९) तन्निरासः- कत्वयोरिति अन्यथा ब्येकेष्विति स्यात् । कुतः पुनरविगुणत्रयाविवेकित्वसाध- वेकित्वादेः सिद्धिरित्यत आह-"त्रैगुण्यात्" इति। यद्यत् नान्वयव्यतिरेको ॥ सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्तदविवेकित्वादियोगि यथेदमनु
भूयमानं व्यक्तम् ' इति स्फुटरवादन्वयो नोक्तः । व्यतिरेकमाइ-" तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ” इति । अविवेक्यादिविपर्यये पुरुषे त्रैगुण्याभावात् । अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तं पक्षीकृत्यान्वयाभावेनावीत एव हेतुस्नैगुण्यादिति वक्तव्यः ॥ स्यादेतत्-अव्यक्तसिद्धौ सत्यां तस्याविवेकित्वादयो धर्माः सिध्यन्ति ।
अव्यक्तमेव स्वद्यापि न सिध्यति, तत्कथमविवेकित्वा(११०) अव्यक्तसा- दिसिद्धिरत आह-" कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् ” इति । धनम् ॥
अयमभिसन्धिः -कार्य हि कारणगुणात्मकं दृष्टम् , यथा
___ तन्वादिगणात्मकं पटादि । तथा महदादिलक्षणेनापि कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहरूपेण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहात्मना भवितव्यम् । तथा च तस्कारणं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धम् भवति ॥ १४ ॥
स्यादेतत्-'व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते' इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनयाः॥ पर
(१११) व्यक्तादेव माणवो हि व्यक्ताः, तैzणुकादिक्रमेण पृथिव्यादिसर्वकार्यकारणभावोपप- लक्षणं कार्य व्यक्तमारभ्यते । पृथिव्यादिषु च कारणगुणत्तेरव्यक्तकारणकल्पना- क्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः। तस्मात् व्यक्तात् व्यक्तस्य तद्गुवैयर्थ्यशङ्का ॥ णस्य चोत्पत्तेः कृतमदृष्टचरेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत माह१. सत्त्वादयोऽविवेकित्वादियोगिनः त्रैगुण्यात् सुग्वदुःखमोहात्मकत्वादिति स्वरूपमनुमानस्य । २, पृथिव्यादि। ३. 'यत्राविवेकित्वाभावस्तत्र त्रैगुण्याभाव' इत्येवंरूपम् ।

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को. १५ ] अव्यक्तकारणसाधनानि ।
भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥ __ " भेदानाम्” इति । भेदानाम् विशेषाणां महदादीनां भूतानां कार्याणां (११२) तत्परिहारः। कारणं मूलकारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम् । कुतः ? "कारणकार्य. अव्यक्तकारणसाध. विभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य" । कारणे सत् कार्यनानि । तत्र कारण- मिति स्थितम् । तथा च यथा कर्मशरीरे सन्स्येवाकार्ययोविभागाविभागा- ङ्गानि निःसरन्ति विभज्यन्ते-'इदं कर्मशरीरं, एता. भ्यामव्यक्तसिद्धिरिति न्येतस्याङ्गानि '-इति; एवं निविशमानानि तस्मिन् प्रथमम् (१)। अव्यक्तीभवन्ति । एवं कारणान्मृत्पिण्डाद्धेमपिण्डाद्वा
कार्याणि घटमुकुटादीनि सन्त्येवाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते । सन्त्येव पृथिव्यादीनि कारणात्तन्मात्रादाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते, सन्त्येव च तन्मात्राण्य हङ्कारात् कारणात् , सन्नेवाहङकारः कारणान्महतः, सन्नेव च महान् परमाव्यक्तात् । सोऽयं कारणात् , परमाव्यक्तातू साक्षात् पारम्पर्येणान्वितस्य विश्वस्य कार्यस्य विभागः । प्रतिसगै तु मृत्पिण्डं सुवर्णपिण्डं वा घटमुकुटादयो विशन्तोऽव्यक्तीभवन्ति । तत्कारणरूपमेवानभिव्यक्तं कार्यमपे. क्ष्याव्यक्त भवति । एवं पृथिव्यादयस्तन्मात्राणि विशन्तः स्वापेक्षया तन्मात्राण्यव्यक्तयन्ति, एवं तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कार विशन्स्यहङ्कारमव्यकयन्ति, एवमहकारो महान्तमाविशन् महान्तमव्यक्तयति, महान् प्रकृति स्वकारणं विशन् प्रकृतिमव्यक्तयति । प्रकृतेस्तु' न क्वचिनिवेश इति सा सर्वकार्याणामव्यक्तमेव । सोऽयमविभागः प्रकृतौ वैश्वरूप्यस्य नानारूपस्य कार्यस्य स्वार्थिकः प्यम् ] । तस्मात् कारणे कार्यस्य सत एव विभागाविभागाभ्यामव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति ॥ इतश्चाव्यक्तमस्तीत्यत आह-“ शक्तित: प्रवृत्तेश्च इति" । कारणशक्तितः
कार्य प्रवर्तत इति सिद्धम् , अशक्तात् कारणात् कार्य( ११३) कारणस्य स्यानुपपत्तेः, शक्तिश्च कारणगता न कार्यस्याव्यक्तशक्तिस्तस्मिन् कार्य- स्वादन्या । न हि सत्कार्यपक्षे कार्यस्याव्यक्तताया स्याव्यक्ततया स्थितिरे- ऽन्यस्यां शत्तौ प्रमाणमस्ति । अयमेव हि सिकताभ्यवेति च द्वितीयम् (२)॥ स्तिलानां तैलोपादानानां भेदो यदेतेष्वेव सैलमस्त्य
नागतावस्थं न सिकतास्विति ॥ १ अनवस्थाभयात् । २. वैश्वरूप्यपदे । ३. कारणे कार्यस्याव्यक्तरूपेण स्थितिरेव तस्य ( कारण- ) शक्तिरितिभावः ॥
सां. का. ३

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३४
अव्यक्तस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारः। . [सां. त. स्यादेतत्-शक्तितः प्रवृत्तिः कारणकार्यविभागाविभागौ च महत एव परमा.
व्यक्तस्वं साधयिष्यतः, कृतं ततः परेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत (११४ ) महदादिपर्यः माह - " परिमाणात्" इति । परिमितत्वात् , न्तस्य कार्यजातस्य अव्यापित्वादिति यावत् । विवादाध्यासिता महदादिपरिमितत्वाच्चेति तृती- भेदाभव्यक्तकारणवन्तः, परिमितत्वात् , घटादिवत् । यम् ( ३ )॥ घटादयो हि परिमिताः मृदाधन्यक्तकारणका दृष्टाः ।
उक्तमेतद्यथा कार्यस्याध्यक्तावस्था कारणमेवेति, यन्महतः कारणं तत् परमाव्यक्तम् , ततः परतराव्यक्तकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात् ॥ इतश्च विवादाध्यासिता भेदाः अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः- " समन्वयात् "।
भिन्नानां समानरूपता समन्वयः । सुखदुःखमोहस(११५) समन्वयाच्चेति मन्विता हि बुद्धयादयोऽध्यवसायादिलक्षणाः प्रती. चतुर्थम् (४)॥ " यन्ते । यानि च यद्पसमनुगतानि तानि तत्स्वभावा
व्यक्तकारणानि, यथा मृद्धेमपिण्डसमनुगताः घटमुकुटादयो मृद्धेमपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणका इति-कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं भेदानामिति सिद्धम् ॥ १५॥
अव्यक्तं साधयित्वा अस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह- .
कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम् , प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाश्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥ " प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः" इति । प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सत्वं रजस्तमश्च सदृश
परिणामानि भवन्ति । परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नाप(११६ ) प्रकृतेस्त्रि- रिणमय्य क्षणमप्यवतिष्ठन्ते । तस्मात् सत्वं सस्वरूपगुणतः प्रवृत्तिः प्रथमा तया रजो रजोरूपतया तमस्तमोरूपतया प्रतिसर्गा(१)॥ वस्थायामपि प्रवर्तते । तदिदमुक्तम् " त्रिगुणतः "
इति ॥
१. अनवस्थापाताच्च । २. बुद्धयादीनामुपचयापचयदर्शनादिति भाष्ये ।

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को. १७ ] पुरुषास्तित्वसाधनम् ।
३५ प्रवृत्यन्तरमाह-" समुदयाच्च" इति । समेत्य उदयः 'समुदयः' सम.
वायः । समुदयश्च गुणानाम् न गुणप्रधानभावमन्त(११७) प्रकृतेस्समु. रेण सम्भवति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैषम्यं विना, दयात् प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया न च वैषम्यमुपमर्दोपमर्दकभावादृते । इति मह(२)॥ दादिमावेन प्रवृत्तिद्धितीया ॥ स्यादेतत्-कथमेकरूपाणां गुणानामनेकरूपा प्रवृत्तिरित्यत आह-"परिणा
मतः सलिलवत्" इति । यथा हि वारिदविमुक्तमुद(११८) प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिः कमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाद्य नारिकेलतालतापरिणामतो नानाप्रकारा।। लीबिल्वचिरबिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपित्थ
फलरसतया परिणमन्मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकषायकटुतया विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति । तदिदमुक्तम्-" प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्" । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥ १६ ॥
ये तु तौष्टिका अध्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा ऽहकारं वा इन्द्रियाणि वा भूतानि
वा ऽऽस्मानमभिमन्यमानास्तान्येवोपासते तान्
(११९ ) पुरुषास्तित्व. प्रत्याह
साधनम् ॥
संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषो ऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेश्च ।। १७ ।। " संघातपरार्थत्वात् ” इति । पुरुषो ऽस्ति, अव्यक्तादेर्व्यतिरिक्तः । कुतः ?
“संघातपरार्थत्वात्” । अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारादयः (१२०) संघातानां परार्थाः, संघातत्वात् , शयनासनाभ्यङ्गादिवत् , परार्थत्वादिति प्रथम- सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया व्यक्तादयः सर्वे साधनम् (१)॥ संघातोः॥
१ यदर्थाः सङ्घाताः सोऽत्रिगुणविवेकित्वादियोग्यवश्यं स्यात् । स च पुरुष एव।

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पुरुषास्तित्वसाधनम् ।
[ai, a.
(C
स्यादेतत्-शयनासनादयः संघाताः संहतशरीरार्था दृष्टाः, न स्वात्मानमव्यक्ताद्यतिरिक्तं प्रति परार्थाः । तस्मात् संघातान्तरमेव परं गमयेयुः, त स्वसंहतात्मानम् इत्यत आहत्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् " इति । अयमभिप्रायःसंघातान्तरार्थत्वे हि तस्यापि संघातत्वात् तेनापि संघातान्तरार्थेन भवितव्यम् ; एवं तेन तेनेत्यनवस्था स्यात् । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामनवस्था युक्ता, कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गात् । न च ' प्रमाणबलेन कल्पनागौरवमपि मृष्यत ' इति युक्तम्, संहतत्वस्य पारार्थ्य मात्रेणान्वयात् । दृष्टान्तदृष्टपर्वधर्मानुरोधेन त्वनुमानमिच्छतः सर्वानुमानोच्छंद्रप्रसङ्ग इत्युपपादितं न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः । तस्मादनवस्थाभिया ऽस्यासंघातत्वमिच्छता ऽत्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वमसामान्युत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्चाभ्युपेयम् । त्रिगुणत्वादयो हि धर्माः संहतत्वेन व्याप्ताः । तत्संहतत्वमस्मिन् परे व्यावर्तमानं त्रैगुण्यादि व्यावर्तयति ब्राह्मणत्वमिव व्यावर्तमानं कठत्वादिकम् । तस्मादाचार्येण त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्' इति वदता ऽसंहतः परो विवक्षितः, स चात्मेति सिद्धम् ॥
इतश्च परः पुरुषोऽस्ति - " अधिष्ठानात् ", त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमानत्वात् | यद्यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीय( १२२ ) त्रिगुणात्मका- मानं दृष्टम्, यथा रथादिर्यन्त्रादिभिः । सुखदुःखनामधिष्ठीयमानत्वादिति मोहात्मकं चेदं बुद्ध्यादि, तस्मादेतदपि परेणाधिष्ठाद्वितीयं साधनम् (२ ) ॥ तव्यम् । स च परस्त्रैगुण्यादन्य भात्मेति ॥ इतश्चास्ति पुरुषो - "भोक्तृभावात् " । भोक्तृभावेन भोग्ये सुखदुःखे उपलक्षयति । भोग्ये हि सुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये प्रत्यात्ममनुभूयेते । तेनानयोरनुकूलनीयेन प्रतिकूलनीयेन च केनचिदप्यन्येन भवितव्यम् । न चानुकूलनीयाः प्रतिकूलनीया वा बुद्ध्यादयः, तेषां सुखदुःखाद्यात्मक
३६
( १२१ ) संघातानां संघातान्तरार्थत्वे ऽनवस्थात्रिगुणादिविपर्य
यश्च ॥
८
( १२३ ) भोक्तृभावादिति तृतीयम् ( ३ ) ॥
-
१. सुखदुःखादयो भोगाः । अतो भोक्तरि पुरुषे सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकत्वन्न सम्भवति । तस्मात् पुरुषे त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययः ॥

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को. १८ ] पुरुषबहुत्वसाधनम् ।
३७ त्वेन स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात् । तस्मात् यो ऽसुखाचारमा सो ऽनुकूलनीयः प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, स चा ऽऽत्मति ॥ अन्ये स्वाहुः-भोग्या दृश्या बुद्धयादयः । न च द्रष्टारमन्तरेण दृश्यता युक्ता
तेषाम् । तस्मादस्ति द्रष्टा दृश्यबुद्धयायतिरिक्तः, स ( १२४ ) भोक्तृभावा- चाम
चा ऽऽस्मेति । भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टभावात् , दृश्येन दित्यस्य द्रष्टुभावादि.
" द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः । दृश्यत्वं च बुद्धयादीनां सुखा.
8 त्यर्थोऽपि सम्भवति ॥ धात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवदनुमितम् ॥ हतश्चास्ति पुरुष इत्याह- "कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च" इति । शास्त्राणां महर्षीणां
दिव्यलोचनानां च कैवल्यमात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रशम(१२५) शास्त्राणां केव- लक्षणं न बुद्धयादीनां सम्भवति । ते हि दुःखाचा. ल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेरिति चतुर्थ त्मकाः कथं स्वभावाद्वियोजयितुं शक्यन्ते । तदतिरि. साधनम्- (४)॥ तस्य स्वतदात्मनस्ततो विपोगः शक्यसम्पादः,
तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेरागमानां महाधियां चास्ति बुद्धयादिव्यतिरिक्त भास्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ १७॥ तदेवं पुरुषास्तित्वं प्रतिपाद्य, स किं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः किमनेकः प्रतिक्षेत्रमिति
संशये, तस्य प्रतिक्षेत्रमनेकत्वमुपपादयति( १२६ ) पुरुषबहुत्व.. साधनानि ।।
जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥ जननेत्यादिना.। “पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम् " । कस्मात् ? “ जननमरण
करणानां प्रतिनियमात्"। निकायविशिष्टाभिरपूर्वा( १२७ ) जन्ममरण. भिर्देहेन्द्रियमनोऽहकारबुद्धिवेदनाभिः पुरुषस्याभिप्रतिनियमादिति प्रथ- सम्बन्धो जन्म, न तु पुरुषस्य परिणामः, तस्यापरिमम् (१)॥ णामित्वात्। तेषामेव च देहादीनामुपात्तानां परित्यागो
मरणम् , नस्वात्मनो विनाशः, तस्य कूटस्थनित्यत्वात्। करणानि बुद्धयादीनि प्रयोदश। तेषां जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमोम्यवस्था।

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३८
पुरुषधर्मकथनम् ।
[सां. त.
सा खल्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तदा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वे जायरन् , म्रियमाणे च म्रियेरन् , अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्व एव अन्धादयो, विचित्ते चैकस्मिन् सर्व एव विचित्ताः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । न च 'एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादानभेदाब्यवस्था' इति युक्तम् , पाणिस्तनाद्युपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । न हि पाणौ वृक्णे, जाते वा स्तनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति ॥ इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह-" अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । प्रवृत्तिः
प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि (१२८ ) पुरुषाणाम- पुरुषे उपचर्यते । तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयतयुगपत्प्रवृत्तरिति द्विती- माने, स एव सर्वशरीरेवेक इति सर्वत्र प्रयतेत , यम् (२)॥ • ततश्च सर्वाण्येव शरीराणि युगपच्चालयेत् । नानात्वे
___ तु नायं दोष इति ॥ इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह-"वैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव" इति । एवकारो भिन्नक्रमः
'सिद्धम् ' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यः; सिद्धमेव नासि(१२९) त्रैगुण्यविपर्य- द्धम्। त्रयो गुणास्त्रैगुण्यम् , तस्य विपर्ययोऽन्यथात्वम्। यादिति तृतीयम् (३)॥ केचित्खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्यबहुलाः, यथोलस्रो
तसः; केचिद्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमो. बहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः । सो ऽयमीदृशस्वैगुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावस्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेत् ययेकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे स्वयमदोष इति ॥१॥
(१३० ) पुरुषधर्माः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया
धर्मानाह-- तस्माच विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य । कैवल्यम्माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टुत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

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को. १९ ] पुरुषधर्मकथनम् ।
३९ " तस्माच्च ” इति । 'च' शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि
- समुच्छिनोति । 'विपर्यासादस्मात् ' इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्य. ( १३१ ) तस्मात्पदस्य विपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्तमिरासाय सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥ तस्मात्' इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हि सन्निधानादि.
दमो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तदः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगणमविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥ तस्मास्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वम
__ साधारणस्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेना(१३२ ) अत्रैगुण्यादेः विषयत्वेन च साक्षित्वद्रष्टुत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम् द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो भवति; द्रष्टुत्वं च ॥ यस्मै प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोके
ऽर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनौ विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेननो विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दर्शयितुम्, इति चैतन्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टाऽपि भवति ।
भत्रैगुण्याच्चास्य कैवल्यम् । भात्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च ।
तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहि
( १३३) कैवल्यम् ॥ तत्वारिसद्धम् ॥
अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं
............ द्विषन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु ( १३४ ) माध्यस्थ्यम् ,
" मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकिस्वाअकर्तृत्वं च ॥
दप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥
स्यादेतत्-प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य 'चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि' इति (१३५) चैतन्यकर्तृ- कृतिचैतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यनुभवसिद्धम् ; तदेत्वयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्ति- तस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुश्चाचैतशङ्का ॥
न्यात् इत्यत माह

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पुरुषप्रधानसंयोगः । [ सां. त. तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥ “ तस्मात्" इति । यतश्चैतन्यकर्तृत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तितः सिद्धे, तस्मात् (१३६ ) इष्टापत्तिः। धान्तिरियमित्यर्थः । “लिङ्गम् ' महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं वक्ष्यति । भ्रान्तिबीजम् तत्संयोगः तत्सविधानम् । भ्रान्तिविलसितम् ॥ तिरोहितार्थमन्यत् ॥ २० ॥
'तत्संयोगात् ' इत्युक्तम् , न च भिन्नयोः संयोगोऽपेक्षां विना, न चेय(१३७) पुरुषप्रधानयोः मुपकार्योपकारकभावं विनेत्यपेक्षाहेतुमुपकारमाहसंयोगे शङ्का ॥
पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थ कैवल्यार्थ तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पैङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥ " पुरुषस्य " इति । प्रधानस्येति कर्मणि षष्टी । प्रधानस्य सर्वसाधारणस्य
- यद्दर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्थम् । तदनेन भोग्यता प्रधानस्य पुरुषापेक्षा-भोक्त्रपेक्षा ॥
दर्शिता । ततश्च भोग्यं प्रधान भोक्तारमन्तेण न
" सम्भवतीति युक्ताऽस्य भोक्त्रपेक्षा ॥ "पुरुषस्यापेक्षा दर्शयति-" पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम्" इति। तथाहि भोग्येन
प्रधानेन सम्भिन्नः पुरुषस्ततं दु:खत्रयं स्वात्मन्यभि( १३९ ) कैवल्यार्थ मन्यमानः कैवल्यम् प्रार्थयते। तच्च सत्वपुरुषान्यतापुरुषस्य प्रधानापेक्षा ॥ ख्यातिनिबन्धनम् । न च सत्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिः
प्रधानमन्तरेणेति कैवल्यार्थ पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते अनादित्वाच्च संयोगपरम्पराया भोगाय संयुक्तोऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संयुज्यत इति युक्तम् ॥
१. गुणानां कर्तृत्वे उदासीनोऽपि पुरुषः कर्तेव भवति । न च स तस्वतः कर्तेत्येवकाराभिप्रायः । २. कारिकास्थाः पदार्थाः स्पष्टा एवेत्यर्थः । ३. पुरुषो निष्क्रियत्वात् ' पङ्गुः,' प्रधानमचेतनत्वात् 'अन्धम् ।

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४१
को. २२-२३ ] सर्गक्रमकथनम् ।
ननु भवत्वनयोः संयोगो, महदादिसर्गस्तु कुत इत्यत आह- " तस्कृतः (१४० ) भोगापवर्गार्थ- सर्गः” इति । संयोगो हि न महदादिसर्गमन्तरेण मेव महदादिसर्गस्या- भोगाय कैवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग एव भोगापवश्यकत्वम् ॥ वर्गार्थ सर्ग करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥ सर्गक्रममाह
प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥ " प्रकृतेः" इति । प्रकृतिरव्यक्तम् । महदहङ्कारौ । वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणौ । एका
दशेन्द्रियाणि वक्ष्यमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च पञ्च, सो (१४१ ) प्रकृतेमहानि- ऽयं षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । तस्मात्यादिः सर्गक्रमः ॥ दपि षोडशकादपकृष्टेभ्यः परसभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्य पञ्च
भूतान्याकाशादीनि ॥ तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम् , शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात् स्पर्शतन्मात्रा
द्वायुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शतन्मानसहितापत( १४२ ) तन्मात्रेभ्यो मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम् , शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मागुणक्रमेण भूतसर्गः ॥ • त्रसहितादमतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः,
शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहिताद्गन्धतन्मात्राच्छन्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी, जायत इत्यर्थः ॥ २२ ॥ भव्यक्तं सामान्यतो लक्षितम् “ तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ” ( कारिका १०)
इत्यनेन; विशेषतश्च "सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् " ( १४३ )बुद्धिलक्षण- ( कारिका १३ ) इत्यनेन । व्यक्तमपि सामान्यतो प्रस्तावः॥
लक्षितम् “ हेतुमत् " ( कारिका १०) इत्यादिना ।
सम्प्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया व्यक्तविशेषं बुद्धिं लक्षयति
अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् । ' सात्त्विकमेतदूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

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बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् , धर्माश्च । [सां. त. “ अध्यवसाय " इति । ' अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः ' क्रियाक्रियावतोरभेदविव.
क्षया । सो ब्यवहर्ता ऽऽलोच्य मत्वा ऽहमत्राधि(१४४ ) बुद्धलक्षणम् कृत इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति, ततश्च अध्यवसाय इति ॥ प्रवर्तत इति लोकसिद्धम् । तत्र यो ऽयं कर्तव्यमिति
बिनिश्चयश्चितिसन्निधानादापनचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सोऽध्यवसायः, बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः; तदभेदा बुद्धिः । स च बुद्धलक्षणम् समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् ॥ तदेवं बुद्धिं लक्षयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनस्तस्या धर्मान्सात्विकतामसानाह
“धर्मों ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं, ( १४५) बुद्धेः सात्त्विका तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम्” इति । धर्मो ऽभ्युदधर्माः धर्मज्ञानविरागैश्वर्या; यनिःश्रेयसहेतुः, तत्र यागदानाद्यनुष्ठानजनितो धर्मों भिधानाः । तत्र धर्मज्ञान- ऽभ्युदयहेतुः, अष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानजनितश्च निःश्रेयस. वैराग्याणां निरूपणम् ॥ हेतुः । गुणपुरुषान्यताख्यातिञ्जनम् । विरागो वैरा
ग्यम् रागाभावः ।।
तस्य-यतमानसंज्ञा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा एकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा वशीकारसंज्ञा-इति
चतस्रः संज्ञाः । रागादयः कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः, (१४६ ) विरागस्य यत- तैरिन्द्रियाणि यथास्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तन्मा ऽत्र मानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियव- प्रवर्तिषत विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनायारम्भः शीकाररूपाश्चतस्रः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचि. संज्ञाः ॥
स्कषायाः पक्काः, पक्ष्यन्ते च केचित् , तत्रैवं पूर्वापरी.
भावे सति पक्ष्यमाणेभ्यः कषायेभ्यः पकानां व्यतिरे. केणावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । इन्द्रियप्रवृत्त्यसमर्थतया पक्कानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । नौत्सुक्यमात्रस्यापि निवृत्तिरुपस्थितेष्वपि दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयेषु, या संज्ञात्रयात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा । यामत्रभगवान् पतञ्जलिर्वर्णयान्चकार-" दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् " इति [ योगसूत्र-१५] । सोऽयं बुद्धिधमो, विराग इति ।।

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को. २४]
अहङ्कारलक्षणम् ।
४३
ऐश्वर्यमपि बुद्धिधमों, यतो ऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः । ( १ ) अत्राणिमाSणुभावो, यतः शिलामपि प्रविशति । ( २ ) लघिमा ( १४७ ) ऐश्वर्यनिरूपणे लघुभावः, यतः सूर्यमरीचीनालम्ब्य सूर्यलोकं यति । अष्टसिद्धिनिरूपणम् ॥ ( ३ ) गरिमा गुरुभाव:, यतो गुरुर्भवति । ( ४ ) महिमा महतो भावः यतो महान् भवति । (५) प्राप्तिः, यतो ऽङ्गुल्यप्रेण स्पृशति चन्द्रमसम् । ( ६ ) प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिघातो यतो, भूमाबुन्मज्जति निमज्जति च यथोदके । ( ७ ) वशित्वम्, यतो भूतभौतिकं वशीभवत्यवश्यम् । ईशित्वम् यतो भूतभौतिकानां प्रभवस्थितिमीष्ट । (८) यच्च कामावसायित्वम् मा सत्यसङ्कल्पता, येन यथाऽस्य सङ्कल्पो भवति भूतेषु तथैव भूतानि भवन्ति । अन्येषां मनुष्याणां निश्वयाः निश्चेतव्यमनुविधीयन्ते योगिनस्तु निश्चेतव्याः पदार्थाः निश्चयम् । इति चत्वारः साविका बुद्धिधर्माः ॥ ( १४८) बुद्धेस्तामसा धर्मा धर्मादयः ॥
1
अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमाह
अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥
(१४९) अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणम् ॥
तामसास्तु तद्विपरीता बुद्धिधर्माः । अधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याभिधानाश्चत्वारः इत्यर्थः ॥ २३ ॥
>
6
" अभिमान " इति । ' अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः ' । यत् खल्वालोचितम्मतं च तत्र ' अहमधिकृत ः ', ' शक्तः खल्वहमत्र', 'मदर्था एवामी विषयाः, मत्तो नान्यो ऽत्राधिकृतः कश्चिदस्ति', अतो ऽहमस्मि' इति यो ऽभिमानः सो साधारण व्यापारत्वादहङ्कारः । तमुपजीव्य हि बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति - ' कर्तव्यमेतन्मया ' इति निश्चयं करोति ॥
तस्य कार्यभेदमाह - "तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः” इति । प्रकारद्वयमाह " एकादशकश्च गण. " इन्द्रियाह्नः तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव । द्विविध एव सर्गे ऽहङ्कारात् न त्वन्य इति 'एव' - कारेणावधारयति ॥ २४ ॥
( १५० ) अहङ्कारस्य कार्यभेदाः ॥
·
"

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अहङ्कारस्य कार्यभेदाः ।
[ खां. त.
स्यादेतत्-महङ्कारादेकरूपात्कारणात्कथं जडप्रकाशको गणौ विलक्षणौ भवत
४४
इत्यत आह
--
सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः सः तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥
" सात्विक " इति । प्रकाशलाघवाभ्यामेकादशक इन्द्रियगणः सात्त्विको (१५१) एकरूपस्याप्य- वैकृतादहङ्कारास्प्रवर्तते । भूतादेस्त्वहङ्कारात्तामसात्तहङ्कारस्य गुणभेदाद्विकार- न्मात्री गणः प्रवर्तते । कस्मात् ? यत् ' स तामसः' । भेदाः - सत्त्वादिन्द्रियगणः, एतदुक्तम्भवति ' यद्यप्यको ऽहङ्कारस्तथा ऽपि गुणतामसात्तन्मात्रगणः ॥ भेदोद्भवाभिभवाभ्यां भिन्नं कार्यं करोतीति ' ॥
""
ननु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतम किञ्चित्करेण रजसे९ स्यत आह- 'तैजसादुभयम्” इति । तैजसाद्राजसादुभयं गुणद्वयं भवति, यद्यपि रजसो न कार्यान्तरमस्ति तथा ऽपि सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रिये समर्थे अपि न स्वस्वकार्यं कुरुतः; रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चालयति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति । तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये araaमसोः क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति न व्यथं रज इति ॥ २५ ॥
( १५२ ) सत्त्वतमसो :प्रवर्तकतया रजसः सा
र्थकता ॥
6 "
१. भाष्यमतेन मनस एवैकस्य सात्त्विकत्वम् इतरेषां दशानां राजसत्त्वमेवेति । २।१८ सूत्रे द्रष्टव्यम् । अहङ्कारतत्त्वं त्रिधा विभक्तम्- 'वैकृत' - 'भूतादि - ' 'तैजसंसंज्ञाभेदात् ' - तदुक्तं गौडपादेन- सत्त्वेनाभिभूते रजस्तमसी यदा अहंकारे भवतः तदा सो ऽहंकारः सात्त्विकः- तस्य संज्ञा कृता ' वैकृत' इति । एवं च तमसाऽभिभूते सत्त्वरजसी यदा ऽहंकार भवतस्तदा सोहंकारस्तामसः - तस्य संज्ञा कृता 'भूतादिः इति ॥ एवमेव यदा ऽहंकारे सत्त्वतमसी रजसाऽभिभूते तदा सोऽहंकारो राजसः ' तैजस' इति संज्ञां लभते " - इति
-
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को. २६-२७ ]
बाह्येन्द्रियदशकम् ।
सात्त्विकमेकादशमाख्यातुं बाह्येन्द्रियदशकं तावदाहबुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुः श्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि । वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि " इति । सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । तच्च द्विविधम् बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च । उभयमप्येतदि( १५३ ) बाह्येन्द्रियदश न्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते । तानि च स्वसंकम् इन्द्रियलक्षणम् पद- ज्ञाभिश्चक्षुरादिभिरुक्तानि । तत्र रूपग्रहणलिङ्गं चक्षुः, व्युत्पत्तिश्च ॥ शब्दग्रहणलिङ्गं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धग्रहणलिंगं घ्राणम्, रसग्रहणलिङ्गं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलिङ्ग त्वक्, इति ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां संज्ञा । एवं वागादीनां कार्यं वक्ष्यति ( कारिका २८ ) ॥ २६॥
एकादशमिन्द्रियमाह -
"C
-
उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् । गुणपरिणाम विशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥
४५
66 उभयात्मकम् ” इति । एकादशस्विन्द्रियेषु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्, ( १५४ ) मनसो बुद्धिक- बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च चक्षुरादीनां वागादीनां च
•
र्मोभयात्मकत्वसाधनम् ॥ मनोऽधिष्ठितानामेव स्वस्वविषयेषु प्रवृत्तेः ॥
तदसाधारणेन रूपेण लक्षयति - " सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः " इति । सङ्कल्पेन
रूपेण
( १५५ ) मनसो लक्षणम् -सङ्कल्पकम्, लक्ष
समन्वयश्च ॥
सम्मुग्धं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्णन्त्यविकल्पितम् ।
तत् सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः ' || इति ॥ तथाहि,
मनो लक्ष्यते । 'आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वस्त्विदम् ' इति सम्मुग्धम् ' इदमेवम्, नैवम् ' इति सम्यक्कल्पयति विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत् । यदाहुः
१. ' इं ' विषयाः, तान् प्रति द्रवन्तीति 'इन्द्रिय ' शब्दव्युत्पत्तिः कैश्चित्
क्रियते ।

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मनस इन्द्रियत्वम् ।
[खांत. अस्ति झालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमनिर्विकल्पकम् । बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशम् मुग्धवस्तुजमिति ॥ ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्फ़जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्धया ऽवसीयते सा ऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ।। सो ऽयं सङ्कल्पलक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानासमानजातीयाभ्यां व्यवच्छिन्दन् मनो लक्षयति ।। स्थादेतत्-असाधारणव्यापारयोगिनौ यथा महदहङ्कारौ नेन्द्रियम् , एव
___म्मनो ऽप्यसाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्ह( १५६ ) मनस इन्द्रिय. तीत्यत आह ---" इन्द्रियं च” इति । कुतः ? .. त्वसाधनम्-इन्द्रियैः " साधात्" । इन्द्रियान्तरः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारो. सह सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपा- पादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम् नस्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् , महदहदानत्वरूपसाधात् ॥• कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् , तस्मा.
द्वयुत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।। अथ कथं सात्त्विकाहङ्कारादेकस्मादेकादशेन्द्रियाणीत्यत आह-- " गुणपरि(१५७) एकस्याहङ्का- णामविशेषात् नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च" इति शब्दाद्युपरस्य गुणपरिणामवि- भोगसम्प्रवर्तकादृष्टसहकारिभेदारकार्यभेदः । अदृष्टशेषात्कार्यभेदः॥ भेदोऽपि गुणपरिणाम एव । ( १५८ ) बाह्यभेदाश्चेति ‘बाह्यभेदाश्च' इति दृष्टान्तार्थम्-यथा बाह्य. दृष्टान्तार्थम् ॥ भेदास्तथैतदपीत्यर्थः ।। २७ ॥ (१५९) दशेन्द्रियव- तदेवमेकादशेन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपत उक्त्वा दशानामप्य. त्तिकथनम् ॥ साधारणीवृत्तीराह
शब्दादिषु पश्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः । वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पश्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥ बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां सम्मुग्धवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुत्तम् । “वचनादानविहरणोत्स. र्गानन्दाश्च पन्नानाम् " कर्मेन्द्रियाणाम् । कण्ठनाल्वादिस्थानमिन्द्रियं वाक्, तस्या वृत्तिर्वचनम् । ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तयः स्पष्टाः ॥ २८ ॥

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को. २९.३०]
अन्तःकरणवृत्तयः ।
४७
४७
अन्तःकरणत्रयस्थ वृत्तिमाह
स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या । सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥
" स्वालक्षण्यम्" इति । स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य । स्वमसाधारणं लक्षणं
__ येषां तानि स्वलक्षणानि महदहकारमनासि, तेषां (१६० ) अन्तःकरणत्र. भावःस्वालक्षण्यम् , तच्च स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव । यस्य स्वस्वलक्षणरूपमे- तद्यथा-महतो ऽध्यवसायो ऽहङ्कारस्याभिमानः वासाधारणं वृत्तित्रयम् ॥ सङ्कल्पो मनसो वृत्तिापारः ॥ वृत्तिद्वैविध्यं साधारणासाधारणत्वाभ्यामाह- “ सैषा भवत्यसामान्या"
____ असाधारणी । “ सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः (१६१) पञ्चवायुरूपा- पञ्च"। सामान्या चासौ करणवत्तिश्चेति । त्रयाणा. साधारणी वृत्तिः॥ मपि करणानां पन्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तद्भावे
भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहनाभिपादाङ्गुष्ठवृत्तिः, अपानः कृकाटिकापृष्ठपादपायूपस्थपार्श्ववृत्तिः, समानो हनाभिसर्वसन्धिवृत्तिः, उदानो हृत्कण्ठतालुमूर्धभ्रमध्यवृत्तिः, व्यानस्त्वग्वृत्तिरिति पञ्च वायवः ।। २९ ॥
चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यासाधारणीषु वृत्तिषु क्रमाक्रमौ सप्रकारावाह
युगपञ्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा । दृष्टे तथा ऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ।। ३० ॥
"युमपत् " इति, दृष्टे यथा--यदा सन्तमसान्धकारे विद्युत्सम्पातमात्रा.
द्वयाघ्रमभिमुखमतिसन्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्या(१६२ ) चतुर्विधकरण. लोचनसझल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भस्य प्रत्यक्षे युगपवृत्तिः। वन्ति, यतस्तत उत्प्लुत्य तत्स्थानादेकपदेऽपसरति ॥

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४८
कारणानां परस्परापेक्षा। [सां. त. " क्रमशश्च” यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमन्तावद्वस्तुमानं सम्मुग्धमालोचयति,
अथ प्रणिहितमनाः कर्णान्ताकृष्टसशरसिब्जिनीमण्डली. (१६३) क्रमशश्च ॥ कृतकोदण्डः प्रचण्डतरः पाटच्चरोऽयमिति निश्चिनोति,
अथ च माम्प्रत्येतीत्यभिमन्यते, अथाध्यवस्यत्यपसरामीतः स्थानादिति ॥ परोक्षे त्वन्तःकरणत्रयस्य बाह्येन्द्रियवर्ज वृत्तिरित्याह- “ अदृष्टे त्रयस्य
तत्पर्विका वृत्तिः" इति । अन्त:करणत्रयस्य युगप. ( १६४) अन्तःकर- क्रमेण वत्तिदृष्टपूर्विकेति । अनुमानागमस्मृतयो हि णत्रयस्य परोक्षे वृत्ति- परोक्षे ऽर्थे दर्शनपूर्वाः प्रवर्तन्त नान्यथा। यथा दृष्टे द्वयम् दृष्टपूर्वकमेव ॥ तथा ऽदृष्टे ऽपीति योजना ॥ ३० ॥
स्यादेतत्-चतुर्णा त्रयाणां वा वृत्तयो न तावन्मात्राधीनाः, तेषां मदातन (१६५) करणाना स्व- त्वेन वृत्तीनां सदोत्पादप्रम्पङ्गात् , आकस्मिकत्वे तु तन्त्रत्वे दोषाः ॥ वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्गो नियमहेतोरभावादित्यत आह
खां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् । पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥ " स्वाम्" इति । करणानीति शेषः । यथा हि बहवः पुरुषाः शाक्ती.
कयाष्टीकधानुष्ककार्याणिकाः कृतसङ्केताः परावस्कन्द(१६६ ) तन्निराकर- नाय प्रवृत्ताः, तत्रान्यतमस्याकृतमवगम्यान्यतमः णम्-परस्परसापेक्षाण्ये प्रवर्तते, प्रवर्तमानस्तु शाक्तीकः शक्तिमेवादत्ते न तु व करणानि स्वस्वव. यष्टयादिकम् , एव याष्टीकोऽपि यष्टिमेव, न शक्त्यात्तिषु ॥
दिकम् । तथा ऽन्यतमस्य करणस्याकूतात् स्वकार्य:
करणाभिमुख्यादन्यतमं करणं प्रवर्तते । तत्प्रवृत्तेश्व हेतुत्वान वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम् –“ स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते " इति ।।
१. मनस्सहकृतबाह्यन्द्रियाणाम् । अन्तःकरणत्रयाणां वा ।

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कौ.३१-३२] पुरुषार्थस्य प्रवर्तकत्वम् , करणविभागश्च। ४९ स्यादेतत्-याष्टीकादयश्चेतनत्वात् परस्पराकूतमवगम्य प्रवर्तन्त इति युक्तम्
करणानि त्वचेतनानि, तस्मात्रैवं प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहन्ते । (१६७ ) करणानामः तेनैषामधिष्ठात्रा करणानां स्वरूपसामोपयोगाभिशेन चेतनत्वे ऽपि पुरुषार्थ- भवितव्यमित्यत आह-"पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, न केनस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥ चित्कार्यते करणम्” इति । भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरु
षार्थ एवानागतावस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमत्र तत्स्वरूपाभिशेन का । एतच्च "वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम् ” ( कारिका ५७ ) इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥ (१६८) करणवि- “न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्" इत्युक्तम् । तत्र करणं भागः ॥
विभजतेकरणं त्रयोदशविधम् , तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
कार्य च तस्य दशधा, हार्य धार्य प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२॥ "करणं त्रयोदशविधम्" इति । इन्द्रियाण्येकादश बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चेति त्रयो( १६९) त्रयोदश- दशप्रकारं करणम् | कारकविशेषः करणम् । न च विधकरणपरिगणनम् । व्यापारावेशं विना कारकत्वमिति व्यापारावेशमाह" तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्” इति यथायथम् । तत्र कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्याहरन्ति, यथास्वमुपाददतें, स्वव्यापारेण व्याप्नुवन्तीति यावत् । बुद्धयहकारमनांसि तु स्ववृत्त्या प्राणादिलक्षणया धारयन्ति । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति ॥
आहरणधारणादिक्रियाणां सकर्मकतया किं कर्म कतिविधं चेत्यत आह(१७० ) करणव्या- "कार्य च तस्य" इति । कार्य तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य पारपरिगणनम् ॥ करणस्य दशधा, आहार्य धार्य प्रकाश्यं च । माहार्य व्याप्यम् । कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिश्यतया दश-इत्याहार्य दशधा । एवं धार्यमप्यन्त:करणत्रयस्य प्राणादिलक्षणया वृत्या शरीरम् , तच्च पार्थिवादिपाचभौतिकम् । शब्दादीनां पचानां समूहः पृथिवी, ते च पञ्च दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति धार्यमपि दशधा एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते च यथायथं दिग्यादिव्यतया दशेति प्रकाश्यमपि दशधेति ॥ ३२ ॥
स. कौ. ४

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५०
त्रयोदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागः ।
( १७१ ) त्रयोद
शविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागः - बाह्यान्तरभेदात् ॥
अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् । साम्प्रतकाल बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥
८"
योदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागं करोति -
( १७४ ) बाह्यान्तरकरणयोर्भेदः बाह्यकरणानां वर्तमानकालीनत्वं, अन्तःकरणानां त्रिकालीनत्वम् ॥
( १७२ ) अन्तःकरणस्य त्रैविध्यम् ॥ 'दशधा "
"6
( १७३ ) बाह्य- विषयमाख्याति विषयसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायेषु करणानां दशधात्वम् || ' कर्तव्येषु द्वारीभवति । तत्र बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यालोचनेन, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु यथास्वं व्यापारेण' ॥
बाह्यान्तरयोः करणयोविंशेषान्तरमाह - " साम्प्रतकालम् " इति । वर्तमानकालं बाह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीतमपि वर्तमानम्; अतो वागपि वर्तमानकालविषया भवति । " त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम्" इति । तद्यथा-नदीपूरभेदादभूवृष्टिः; अस्ति धूमादभिरिह नगनिकुञ्जे, असरयुपघात के पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणाद्भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति, तदनुरूपाश्च सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्य
८
( १७५ ) सांख्यमत कालस्य न तत्त्वान्तरत्वम् ॥
अन्तःकरणम्" इति । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन' इति; शरीराभ्यन्तरवर्तिस्वा
दन्तःकरणम् ॥
८८
बाह्यकरणम् त्रयस्य अन्तःकरणस्य विषयाख्यम् "
1
[ सां. a.
"
१. द्वारीभवन्तीति शेषः ।
"
वसाया भवन्ति ||
कालश्च वैशेषिकाभिमत एको न अनागतादिव्यवहारभेदं प्रवर्तयितुमर्हति । तस्मादयं यैरुपाधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु त एवोपाया, ये नागतादिव्यवहारहेतवः, कृतमत्रा - तर्गडुना कालेनेति सांख्याचार्याः, तस्मान्न कालरूपतत्त्वान्तराभ्युपगम इति ॥ ३३ ॥

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को. ३४-३५] करणविषयविवेचनम् ।
(१७६ ) बाह्येन्द्रि. साम्प्रतकालानां बायेन्द्रियाणां विषयं विवे. यविषयविवेचनम् ॥ चयति
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥३४॥ "बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" इति । “बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" तेषां दशानामिन्द्रियाणा
___ म्मध्ये " पन्च" " विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि" विशेषा (१७७) बुद्धीन्द्रि. स्थूलाः शब्दादयः शान्तघोरमूढरूपाः पृथिव्यादि. याणां विषयाः स्थूल- रूपाः, अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माः शब्दादयः, सूक्ष्मरूपाः॥ मात्रग्रहणेन 'स्थूलभूतमपाकरोति । विशेषाश्च भवि
शेषाश्च विशेषाविशेषाः, त एव विषया येषां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां तानि तथोक्तानि । तत्रो_स्रोतसां योगिनाञ्च श्रोत्रं शब्दतन्मात्रविषयं स्थूलशब्दविषयं च, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलशब्दविषयमेव । एवन्तेष स्वक् स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्पर्शविषया, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलस्पर्शविषयैव । एवम्चधुरादयो ऽपि तेषामस्मदादीनां च रूपादिषु सूक्ष्मस्थूलेषु द्रष्टव्याः ।। एवं कर्मेन्द्रियेषु मध्ये “वाग्भवति शब्दविषया" स्यूलशब्दविषया, तदे.
तुत्वात् । न तु शब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहकारिकस्वेन (१७८) कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वागिन्द्रियेण सहककारणकत्वात् । “शेषाणि तु" विषयाः ॥ चत्वारि पायूपस्थपाणिपादाख्यानि “ पन्चविषयाणि "
पाण्याचाहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाचात्मकरवादिति ॥ ३४ ॥
साम्प्रतं प्रयोदशसु करणेषु केषाम्चित्प्रधानभावं सहेतुकमाह
सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्व विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात्त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥ १. तन्मात्रपदे । २. 'भूतभाविनावपाकरोति' इति पाठान्तरम् ।

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अन्तःकरणानां प्राधान्यम् । [सां. त. " सान्तःकरणा" इति । “द्वारि" प्रधानम् । “द्वाराणि" करणानि
म बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि । तैरूपनीतं सर्व विषयं रणेषु अन्तःकरणानां
समनो ऽहङ्कारा बुद्धिः यस्मादवगाहते ऽध्यवस्यति प्राधान्यम्
तस्माद्वाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारवती च सान्तः.
करणा बुद्धिरिति ।। ३५ ॥ न केवलं बाह्यानीन्द्रियाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रधानं बुद्धिः, अपि तु ये ऽप्यहङ्कारमनसी द्वारिणी ते अप्यपेक्ष्य बुद्धिः प्रधानमित्याह
एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थ प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥ " एते" इति । यथा हि प्रामाध्यक्षः कौटुम्बिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषया.
अन.. ध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, स करणेष्वपि बढेः प्राधा- च भूपतये; तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्प. न्यम् ॥
यन्ति, मनश्च सङ्कल्प्याहङ्काराय, अहङ्कारश्चाभिमत्य
बुद्धौ सर्वाध्यक्षभूतायां, तदिदमुक्तम्- "पुरुषस्यार्थ प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति" इति ।।
बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराश्च “गुणविशेषाः" गुणानां सत्वरजस्तमसां विकारा,
(१८१) परस्पर- ते त परस्परविरोधशीला अपि पुरुषार्थेन भोगापवर्गविरोधशीलानामपि रूपेणैकवाक्यतानीताः, यथा वर्तितैलवह्नयः सन्तम. गुणाना पुरुषार्थरूप सापनयेन रूपप्रकाशाय मिलिताः प्रदीपः, एवमेते एककार्ये प्रवृत्तिः प्रदी. गुणविशेषाः इति योजना ॥ ३६ ॥ पवत् ॥
कस्मात्पुनर्बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहकाराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेत्यत
माह
सर्व प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥ "सर्वम्" इति । पुरुषार्थस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् तस्य यत्साक्षात्साधनं तत्

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सर्वेभ्यो बुद्धेः प्राधान्यम् ।
५३
प्रधानम् । बुद्धिश्चास्य साक्षात्साधनम्, तस्मात्सव प्रधानम् । यथा सर्वाध्यक्षः साक्षाद्राजार्थसाधनतया प्रधानमितरे तु ग्रामाध्यक्षादयस्तम्प्रति गुणभूताः । बुद्धिर्हि पुरुषसन्निधानात् तच्छायापत्त्या तद्रूपेव सर्वविषयोपभोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति । सुखदु:खानुभवो हि भोगः, स च बुद्धौ, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषरूपैवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपभोजयति । यथा ऽर्थालोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाश्च तत्तद्रूपपरिणामेन बुद्धावुपसंक्रांताः तथेन्द्रियव्यापारा अपि बुद्धेरेव स्वव्यापारेणाध्यवसायेन सहैकव्यापारीभवन्ति, यथा स्त्रसैन्येन सह ग्रामाध्यक्षादिसैन्यं सर्वाध्यक्षस्य भवति । " सर्व " शब्दादिकं " प्रति " य " उपभोगः " “ पुरुषस्य " तं साधयति ॥
कौ. ३७-३८]
( १८२) बुद्धेः प्राधान्यसाधनम् - साक्षापुरुषार्थसाधनत्वात् ॥
""
ननु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपभोगसम्पादिका यदि बुद्धिः तर्ह्यनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत आह--पश्चात् “ प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरं" विशेषं "विशिनष्टि" करोति यथौदनपाकं पचतीति, करणं च प्रतिपादनम् । ननु प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरस्य कृतकत्वादनित्यस्वम्, तत्कृतस्य मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादित्यत आह-- “ विशिनष्टि " - ' प्रधानं सविकारमन्यदहमन्य ' इति विद्यमानमेवान्तरमविवेकेनाविद्यमानमिव बुद्धिर्बोधयति न तु करोति, येनानित्यत्वमित्यर्थः । अनेनापवर्गः पुरुषार्थो दर्शितः, " सूक्ष्मम् " दुर्लक्ष्यम् तदन्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ ३७ ॥
(१८३ ) पुरुषार्थस्याप वर्गस्य कृतकत्वादपि नानित्यत्वम्-करणस्यात्रबाधनार्थत्वात् ॥
D
-
तदेवं करणानि विभज्य विशेषाविशेषान् विभजते-
तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पश्च पश्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥
•
" तन्मात्राणि " इति । शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि । न चैष ( १८४ ) अविशेष - शान्तत्वादिरस्ति उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति ( सूक्ष्म ) कथनम् ॥
मात्रशब्दार्थः ॥

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विशेषकथनम्।
[सां. त. भविशेषानुक्रवा विशेषान्वक्तुमुत्पत्तिमेषामाह-" तेभ्यो भूतानि " इति । (१८५) विशेष(स्थूल) तेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो यथासंख्यमेकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चभ्यो कथनम्-तदुत्पत्तिप्रद- भूतान्याकाशानिलानलसलिलावनिरूपाणि “ पन्च"
" पञ्चभ्यः" तन्मात्रेभ्यः ॥ स्वेतेषामुत्पत्तिः, विशेषस्वे किमायातमित्यत आह-"एते स्मृता विशेषाः'
इति । कुतः-"शान्त घोराश्च मूढाश्च" । चकार (१८६) भूतानां स्थू. एको हेतौ द्वितीयः समुचये । यस्मादाकाशादिषु लत्वे हेतुकथनम् ॥ स्थूलेषु सत्त्वप्रधानतया केचिच्छान्ताः सुखाः, प्रकाशा लघवः, केचिद्रजःप्रधानतया घोराः दुःखा: अनवस्थिताः, केचित्तमःप्रधानतया मूढा विषण्णा गुरवः । ते ऽमी परस्परव्यावृत्त्या ऽनुभूयमाना 'विशेषा'। इति च ' स्थूलाः' इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मात्राणि स्वस्मदादिभिः परस्परव्यातानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषाः सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥ विशेषाणामवान्तरविशेषमाह--
सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतैत्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥ " सूक्ष्मा" इति । "त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः" इति, तान् विशेषप्रकारा
नाह-" सूक्ष्माः " सूक्ष्मदेहाः. परिकल्पिताः, “ माता(१८७) अवान्तरविशे- पितृजाः " षाटकौशिकाः । तत्र मातृतो लोमलोहित. षकथनम्-सूक्ष्ममातृपि- मांसानि, पितृतस्तु स्नायवस्थिमज्जान इति षट् कोशाः। तृजभेदेन ॥ प्रकृष्टानि महान्ति भूतानि "प्रभूतानि"-तैस्सह । सूक्ष्म शरीरमेको विशेषः, मातापितृजो द्वितीयः, महाभूतानि तृतीयः; महाभूतवर्गे च घटादीनां निवेश इति ॥
, सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्देहयोर्विशेषमाह- "सूक्ष्मातापितृजयोर्भेदः नित्य
स्तेषाम्” इति । विशेषाणां मध्ये ये ते 'नियताः'"। त्वानित्यत्वनिबन्धनः॥ "मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते” इति, रसान्ता वा
भस्मान्ता वा विडन्ता वेति ॥ ३९ ॥
१. नित्याः । २. अनित्याः ।

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कौ. ४० ] सूक्ष्मशरीरविभागः ।
५५ सूक्ष्मशरीरं विभजते
पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४०॥ 'पूर्वोत्पश्चम्' इति । " पूर्वोत्पन्नम्” प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमेकै.
कमुस्पादितम् । " असक्तम्" अव्याहतम् शिलाम(१८९) सूक्ष्म- प्यनुविशति । " नियतम्'' मा चादिसर्गादा शरीरोपपादनम्-तस्य च महाप्रलयादवतिष्ठते, - " महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्" लक्षणानि-(१)असक्त- महदहङ्कारकादशेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपर्यन्तम् । एषां त्वम्-(२) नित्यत्वम्॥ समुदायः सूक्ष्म शरीरम् , शान्तघोरमूडैरिन्द्रियैरवितत्वाद्विशेषः॥
नन्वस्त्वेतदेव शरीरं भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, कृतं दृश्यमानेन पाटकौशिकेन (१९०)(१) संसर
शरीरेणेत्यत आह-" संसरति" इति । उपात्त. जम निभोगच मुपात्तं षाटकौशिकं शरीरं जहाति हाय हायं चोपादत्तेततश्च षाट्कौशिक- कस्मात् इति “ निरुपभोगम् ” यतः, षाट कौशिक शरीरस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥ शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निरुपभोगं
यस्मात्तस्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति ॥ ननु धर्माधर्मनिमितः संसारः, न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यास्ति तद्योगः, तत्कथं (१९१) धर्माधर्मादि- संसरतीत्यत माह-" भावैरधिवासितम्" इति । भावैरधिवासितत्वमलकं धर्माधर्मज्ञानाज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानैश्वर्याणि भावाःतत्संसरणम् ॥ तदन्विता बुद्धिः, तदन्धितच सूक्ष्म शरीरमिति तदपि
भावैरधिवासितम् , यथा सुरभिचम्पककुसुमसम्पर्काद्वसं वदामोदवासितम्भवति । तस्माद्भावैरेवाधिवासितस्वात्संसरति ॥
कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिव महाप्रलये ऽपि तच्छरीरन तिष्ठतीत्यत माह( १९२) महाप्रलये
“लिङ्गम् ” इति । लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्-हेतुमत्त्वेन
। तस्य लयं गमितत्वा- चास्य लिङ्गन्त्वमिति भावः ॥ ४० ॥ ल्लिङ्गत्वम् ।
१. प्रत्यात्मभिन्नमिति केचित् ।

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सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् । [सां. त. स्यादेतत्-बुद्धिरेव साहकारेन्द्रिया कस्मान्न संसरति ? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीरेणाप्रामाणिकेनेत्यत आह
'चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥ "चित्रम्” इति । लिङ्गनात् ज्ञापनात् बुद्धयादयो 'लिङ्गम् ', तत् अना.
श्रयन्न तिष्ठति । जन्ममरणान्तराले बुद्धयादयः प्रत्यु( १९३) सूक्ष्मशरीर- त्पन्नशरीराश्रयाः, -प्रत्युत्पन्नपञ्चतन्मात्रवत्त्वे सति स्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ बुद्ध्यादित्वात् - दृश्यमानशरीरवृत्तिबुद्धधादिवत् ।
“विना विशेषैः " इति, सूक्ष्मैः शरीरित्यर्थः । भागमश्चात्र भवति
"ततः सत्यवतः कायात् पाशबद्धं वशङ्गतम् ।
अगुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष बलायमः " ( महाभारत वनपर्व-अध्याय २९६.) इस्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वेन सूक्ष्मशरीरत्वमुपलक्षयति । आत्मनो निष्कर्षासम्भवात् सूक्ष्ममेव शरीरम् 'पुरुषः', तदपि पुरि स्थूलशरीरे शेते इति ॥ ४ ॥ एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरास्तित्वमुपपाथ यथा संसरति, येन हेतुना च-तदुभयमाह
पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥ "पुरुषार्थहेतुकम्" इति । पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रयुक्तम् । “ निमित्तम् "
धर्माधर्मादि, “नौमत्तिकम् ” तेषु तेषु निकायेषु ( १९४ ) सूक्ष्मशरीर- यथायथं षाटकौशिकशरीरग्रहः, स हि धर्मादिनिमित्त. संसरणप्रकारः॥ प्रभवः । निमित्तम्च नैमित्तिकन्च-तत्र यः प्रसङ्गः
प्रसक्तिस्तया " नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्" सूक्ष्मशरीरम् । यथा हि नटस्तां तां भूमिकां विधाय परशुरामो वा ऽजातशत्रुर्वा
१. केचिदिमां कारिकां स्थूलशरीरपरतया व्याख्याय 'लिङ्गम् ' लिङ्गशरीरं 'विशेषैः' स्थूलशरीरौरत्याहुः ॥ अन्ये तु 'लिङ्गम् ' लिङ्गशरीरं 'विशेषैः' लिङ्गशरीराधिष्ठानभूतैः सूक्ष्मशरीरौरीत । एतन्मते शरीरत्रयम्-लिङ्गशरीरम् , तदधिष्ठानभूतं सूक्ष्मशरीरम् , तदधिष्ठानभूतं च स्थूलशरीरमिति ।

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कौ. ४२-४३ ]
निमित्तनैमित्तिकविभागः ।
५७
वत्सराजो वा भवति, एवन्तत्तत्स्थूलशरीरपरिग्रहणाद्देवो वा मनुष्यो वा पशुव वनस्पतिर्वा भवति सूक्ष्मं शरीरमित्यर्थः ॥
कुतस्त्यः पुनरस्येदृशो महिमेत्यत आह - " प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वायोगात् " इति । ( १९५ ) सूक्ष्मशरीरतथा च पुराणम् — संसरणे हेतुः प्रकृतेर्वि
-
" वैश्वरूप्यात् प्रधानस्य परिणामोऽयमद्भुत इति ॥ ४२ ॥
भुत्वम् ॥
निमित्तनैमित्तकप्रसङ्गेन " इत्युक्तम् - तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिके विभजतेसांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः । दृष्टाः केरणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥
"C
""
1
" सांसिद्धिकाश्च " इति । " वैकृतिका: " नैमित्तिकाः पुरुषस्य जातस्यो" प्राकृतिकाः ( १९६ ) निमित्त नै तरकालदेवताराधनादिनोत्पन्नाः, स्वाभाविका भावाः सांसिद्धिकाः । तथा हि-सर्गामित्तिकविभागः धर्मादिदावादिविद्वानत्र भगवान् कपिलो महामुनिर्धर्मज्ञानरूपनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिक- वैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्रादुर्बभूवति स्मरन्ति । वैकृताश्च वैकृतिकभावकथनम्, भावा असांसिद्धिकाः, ये उपायानुष्ठानेनोत्पन्नाः, तस्य च करणाश्रयित्वयथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनाम्महर्षीणाम् । एवमधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याण्यपि ||
वर्णनम् ॥
"
कार्यं शरीरं तदाश्रयिणः, तस्यावस्थाः, कललबुद्बुदमांसपेशीकरण्डाद्यङ्ग( १९७ ) शरीरग्रह- प्रत्यङ्गव्युहाः गर्भस्थस्य, ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य रूपनैमित्तिकस्य कार्या- बाल्यकौमारयौवनवार्धकानीति ॥ ४३ ॥ श्रयित्वकथनम् ॥
( १९८ ) निमित्तविशेषाणां कार्यविशेषनिरूपणम् ॥
अवगतानि निमित्तनैमित्तिकानि । कतमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कतमन्नैमि - त्तिकमित्यत आह
१. करणमंत्र बुद्धिः । २. ' स्वाभाविकाः ' यावद्वस्तुभाविनः, 'वैकृतिकाः ' कादचित्कवृत्तयः॥ गौडपादभाष्ये तु - 'भावास्त्रिधा चिन्त्यन्ते - सासिद्धिकाः, प्राकृताः, वैकृता श्रेत्युक्तम् ।

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५८
बन्धत्रैविध्यनिरूपणम् । [सां. त. धर्मेण गमनमर्च, गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण । ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो, विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥४४॥
"धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम्” थुप्रभृतिषु लोकेषु । “गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण" (१९९) धर्मस्य ऊर्ध्व- सुतलादिषु' लोकेषु । “ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः।" तावदेव गमनं प्रति अधर्मस्या- प्रकृतिभॊगमारभते न यावद्विवेकख्यातिं करोति; अथ धोगमनम्प्रति ज्ञानस्या- विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां कृतकृत्यतया विवेकख्यातिमन्त. पवर्गम्प्रति, अज्ञानस्य म्पुरुषम्प्रति निवर्तते । यथाहुःच बन्धनम्प्रति-कारणत्वम् ॥
" विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिचेष्टितम्" इति ।।
"विपर्ययात् ।' मतत्त्वज्ञानात् “ इष्यते बन्धः" ॥ स च त्रिविधः-प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको दाक्षिणकश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावात्म( २०० ) बन्धवैविध्य. ज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः, यः निरूपणम् प्राकृतिक-वै- पुराणे प्रकृतिलयान् प्रत्युच्यते | कृतिक-दाक्षिणकरूपम् ॥ , " पूर्ण शतसहस्रं हि तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः” इति ॥
वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहङ्कारबुद्धीः पुरुषधियोपासते, तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते
" दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।
भौतिकास्तु शतम्पूर्ण, सहस्त्रन्त्वाभिमानिकाः ।। बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः ।
ते खल्वमी विदहा येषां वैकृतिको बन्धः" इति ॥ . १. भूतलेति पाठान्तरम् । २. ' भौतिकाः'-ये भूतान्येव पुरुषधियोपासते । 'आभिमानिकाः'-येऽहङ्कारमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । 'बौद्धा. '-ये बुद्धिमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । ३. विदेहाः वैकृतिकबन्धवतां संज्ञान्तरमिदम् पारिभाषिकम् ।

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कौ. ४५-४६] वैराग्यादीनां फलकथनम् । ___ इष्टापूर्तेन दाक्षिणकः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो हीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना बध्यते इति ॥ ४४ ॥
वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् । ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥ " वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः” इति-पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञस्य वैराग्यमात्रात्
प्रकृतिलयः, प्रकृतिग्रहणेन प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारभूते(२०१ ) वैराग्यात्
न्द्रियाणि गृह्यन्ते, तेष्वात्मबुद्धयोपास्यमानेषु लयः । प्रकृतिलयः ।
__ कालान्तरेण च पुनराविर्भवति' ।। " संसारो भवति राजसादागात्” इति । ' राजसात् ' इत्यनेन रजसो
( २०२ ) राज- दुःखहेतुत्वात् संसारस्य दुःखहेतुता सूचिता ॥ सादागात् संसारः।
" ऐश्वर्यादविघात" इति-इच्छायाः । ईश्वरो हि यदेवेच्छति तदेव करोति । ( २०३ ) ऐश्व
म “विपर्ययात्" अनैश्वर्यात् “ तद्विपर्यासः " सर्वत्रेर्यादिच्छानभिघातः, . छविधात ३
4 च्छाविघात इत्यर्थः ॥ ४५ ॥ अनैश्वर्याच्वेच्छाभिघातः॥
बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनष्टौ भावान् समासब्यासाभ्यां मुमुक्षूणां हेयोपादेयान् दर्शयितुं प्रथमन्तावत् समासमाह
एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धयाख्यः । गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात , तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥
१. वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामाः पूतमर्थ्याः प्रचक्षते ॥ एकाग्निकर्महवनं त्रेतायां यच्च हूयते । अन्तर्वेद्यां च यद्दानमिष्टन्तदभिधीयते । २. यः प्रकृतिलयं गच्छति ।

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प्रत्ययसर्गभेदाः
[सां. त.
" एषः” इति । प्रतीयते ऽनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः । तत्र
"विपर्ययः” अज्ञानमविद्या, सा ऽपि बुद्धिधर्मः ( २०४ ) विपर्ययादि- "अशक्तिः" भपि करणवैकल्यहेतुका बुद्धिधर्म एव । बुद्धिसर्गस्य समासेन “तुष्टिसिद्धी” अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे बुद्धिधर्मावेव | कथनम् ॥
तत्र विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिषु यथायोगं सप्तानाञ्च धर्मा
दीनां ज्ञानवर्जमन्तर्भावः; सिद्धौ च ज्ञानस्येति ।। व्यासमाह- " तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्" इति । कस्मात् ? " गुण.
वैषम्यविमर्दात् ” इति । गुणानां वैषम्यमेकैकस्या( २०५ ) तस्यैव व्यासेन धिकबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोवी, एकैकस्य न्यूनबलता द्वयो. कथनम्-पञ्चाशद्भेदाः ॥ ईयोर्वा, ते च न्यूनाधिक्ये मन्दमध्याधिक्यमात्रतया
यथाकार्यमुन्नीयेते । तदिदं गुणानां वैषम्यम् तेनोपमर्दः एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोर्ताऽभिभवः । तस्मात्तस्य भेदाः पञ्चाशदिति ॥ ४६ ॥
तानेव पञ्चाशद्भेदान् गणयति-- पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् । अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधा ऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥ " पञ्च” इति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा यथासंख्यं तमो.
मोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रसंज्ञकाः पञ्च विपर्यय(२०६ ) विपर्ययादीनां विशेषाः, विपर्ययप्रभवानामप्यस्मितादीनां विपर्ययपञ्चाशद्भेदपरिगणनम् ॥ स्वभावत्वात् । यद्वा-यदविद्यया विपर्ययेणावधार्यते
वस्तु, अस्मितादयस्तत्स्वभावाः सन्तस्तदभिनिविशन्ते । अत एव पञ्चपर्वावियेत्याह भगवान् वार्षगण्यः ॥ ४७ ॥
(२०७) विपर्ययादीनां सम्प्रति पन्चानां विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदमाह - प्रत्येकमवान्तरभेदकथनम्-तत्र प्रथमं विपर्यः यस्य द्वाषष्टिः॥

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विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदाः ।
भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥
,
कौ. ४८ ]
" भेदः" इति । भेदस्तमसोऽविद्याया अष्टविधः । अष्टस्वव्यक्तमहदहङ्कार( २०८ ) अविद्यारूप- पञ्चतन्मात्रेष्वनात्मस्वात्मबुद्धिरविद्या तमः, अष्टविधविपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥ विषयत्वात्तस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥
"
मोहस्य च इति, अत्राप्यष्टविधो भेदश्चकारेणानुषज्यते । देवा ह्यष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्यामृतत्वाभिमानिनोऽणिमादिकमात्मीयं शाश्वतिकमभिमन्यन्ते, सेयमस्मिता मोहो ऽष्टविधेश्वर्यविषयत्वादष्टविधः ॥
" दशविधो महामोहः " इति । शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु दिव्यादिव्यतया दश( २१० ) रागरूपवि- विधविषयेषु रम्जनीयेषु राग आसक्तिर्महामोहः स
र्ययस्य दशविधत्वम् ॥ च दशविधविषयत्वाद्दशविधः ॥
"6
( २०९ ) अस्मितारूपविपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ||
६१
" तामिस्रो" द्वेषो " ऽष्टादशधा " । शब्दादयो दशविषया रज्जनीयाः स्वरूपतः, ऐश्वर्यन्त्वणिमादिकन स्वरूपतो रज्जनी
||
( २११ ) द्वेषरूपविपर्ययम् । किं तु रञ्जनीयशब्दाद्युपायाः । ते च शब्दादय यस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥ उपस्थिताः परस्परेणोप हन्यमानास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयः स्वरूपेणैव कोपनीया भवन्तीति शब्दाभिर्दशभिः सहाणिमाद्यष्टकमष्टादशधेति, तद्विषयो द्वेषस्तामित्रो ऽष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टादशधेति ।
.
( २१२ ) अभिनिवेशरूपविपर्ययस्याष्टादश
विधित्वम् ॥
दशधेति ||
८
तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्र: " | अभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्र: । तथेत्यनेनाष्टादशधेत्यनुषज्यते । देवाः खल्वणिमादिकमष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्य दश शब्दादीन् विषयान् भुज्जाना:' शब्दादयो भोग्यास्तदुपायाश्वाणिमादयो ऽस्माकमसुरादिभिर्मोपघानिषत ' इति - बिभ्यति । तदिदं भयमभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामित्रो ऽष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टा
'

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अष्टाविंशतिप्रकारका अशक्तयः ।
[सां. त.
( २१३ ) विपर्ययावा- सोऽयं पञ्चविधो विकल्पो विपर्ययोऽवान्तरभेदाद् न्तरभेदसमष्टिसंख्या- द्वाषष्टिरिति ॥ ४८ ॥ द्वाषष्टिः ॥
( २१४ ) अष्टाविंशति- तदेवं पञ्चविपर्ययभेदानुक्त्वा ऽष्टाविंशतिभेदामप्रकारकाशक्तिकथनम् ॥ शक्तिमाह--
एकादशेन्द्रियबधाः सह बुद्धिबधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।। सप्तदश बधा बुद्धेविपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥
" एकादश" इति । इन्द्रियबधस्य ग्रहो बुद्धिबधहेतुत्वेन, न त्वशक्ति(२१५ ) एकादशेन्द्रियबधजन्यैकादशविधा- ' भेदपूर्णत्वेन “ एकादशेन्द्रियबधाः "-- ऽशक्तिः ॥
बाधिर्य कुष्टिता ऽन्धत्वं जडता ऽजिघ्रता तथा ।
मूकताकौण्यपशुत्वक्लैब्योदावर्तमन्दताः ।। यथासंख्यं श्रोत्रादीनामिन्द्रियाणां बधाः । एतावत्येव तु तद्वेतुका बुद्धरशक्तिः स्वव्यापारे भवति । तथा चैकादशहेनुकत्वादेकादशधा बुद्धेरशक्तिरुच्यते । हेतुहेतुमतोरभेदविवक्षया च सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥ तदेवमिन्द्रियबधद्वारेण बुद्धेरशक्तिमुक्त्वा स्वरूपतो ऽशक्तीराह--" सह... बुद्धिबधैः” इति । कति बुद्धः स्वरूपतो बधा इत्यत
। माह-“ सप्तदश बधा बुद्धेः" । कुतः ? “ विपर्यदशक्तिः सप्तदशविधा ॥
१॥ यात्तष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ।" तुष्टयो नवधेति तद्विपर्ययास्त. निरूपणानवधा भवन्ति, एवं सिद्वयो ऽष्टाविति तद्विपर्ययास्तनिरूपणादष्टौ भवन्तीति ॥ १९ ॥
(२१७) नवविधतु• ष्टिकथनम् ॥
तटिनवधेत्युक्तम् , ताः परिगणयति--

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को. ५० ] नवविधतुष्टिवर्णनम् ।
आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः । बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,--नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥ "आध्यात्मिकाः" इति । आध्यात्मिका:--'प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा ऽस्ति'
इति प्रतिपद्य, ततो ऽस्य श्रवणमननादिना विवेक. (२१८) चतुर्विधा- साक्षात्काराय स्वसदुपदेशतुष्टो यो न प्रयतते तस्याध्यात्मिकतुष्टिकथनम् ॥ ध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयो भवन्ति; प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त
मात्मानमधिकृत्य यस्मात्तास्तुष्टयस्तस्मादाध्यात्मिकाः। कास्ता इत्यत माह-"प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः”, प्रकृत्यादिराख्या यासां तास्तथोक्ताः ॥
तंत्र प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,-'विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि प्रकृति( २१९ ) अध्यात्मि
परिणामभेदस्तञ्च प्रकृतिरेव करोतीति कृतन्तद्धथा.
नाभ्यासेन, तस्मादेवमेवास्तु वत्स,'-इति सेयमुपदेष्टकतुष्टिपु प्रथमा प्रकृ
व्यस्य तुष्टिः प्रकृती, सा तुष्टिः प्रकृत्याख्या अम्भ त्याख्या अम्भः ॥
उच्यते ॥ या तु,-'प्राकृत्यपि विवेकख्यातिर्न, सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्भवति, माभूत्सर्वस्य ( २२० ) द्वितीया उपाः सव
- यास्तु सा भवति, तस्मात् प्रव्रज्यामुपाददीथाः, पानामा ताम्।। कतन्ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनायुष्मन'-इति उपदेश या तुष्टः सोपादानाख्या 'सलिलम्' उच्यते ॥
या तु,- प्रव्रज्याऽपि सद्योनिर्वाणदेति सैव कालपरिपाकमपेक्ष्य सिद्धिन्ते ( २२१) तृतीया काला- विधास्यति, अलमुत्तप्ततया तव'-इति उपदेशे या ख्या मेघः ॥
तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या 'मेघ' उच्यते ।
१. अत्राय सङ्ग्रह श्लोकः-अम्भः सलिलं मेघो वृष्टिः पारं तथा सुपारं च । अन्यच्च पारापारमनुत्तमाम्भ उत्तमाम्भश्च' इति । २. प्रकृत्या निवृत्ता। ३. प्रकृतिमात्राद्विवेकख्यातौ सत्या प्रकृतेः सर्व प्रति तुल्यसम्बन्धत्वात् सकलजनस्य विवे. कख्यातिः स्यादिति हृदयम् । ४. 'ओघ' इति पाठान्तरम् ।

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नवविधतुष्टिवर्णनम् ।
[ सां. त. या तु,-'न प्रकृतेर्न कालान्नाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः, अपि तु भाग्यादेव ।
। अत एव मदालसापत्यान्यतिबालानि मातुरुपदेशादेव ( २२२ ) चतुर्थी भा. ग्याख्या वृष्टिः ॥
विवेकख्यातिमन्ति मुक्तानि बभूवुः, तस्माख्याद्भाग्य
मेव हेतुर्नान्यत्'-इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या 'वृष्टिः' उच्यते ॥ बाह्या दर्शयति-" बाह्याः" तुष्टयः " विषयोपरमात् , पञ्च" । याः
खल्वनात्मनः प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारादीनात्मेत्यभिमन्य ( २२३ ) पञ्चविधबाह्य- मानस्य वैराग्ये सति तुष्टयस्ता बाह्याः, आत्मज्ञानातुष्टिकथनम् ॥ भाव सत्यनात्मानमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तेरिति । ताश्च वैराग्य
सति तुष्टय इति वैराग्यहेतुपन्चत्वाद्वैराग्याण्यपि पन्च, तत्पन्चत्वात् तुष्टयः पञ्चेति । उपरम्यते ऽनेनेत्युपरमो वैराग्यम् , विषयादुपरमो विषयोपरमः । विषया भोग्याः शब्दादयः पन्च, उपरमा अपि पञ्च ॥
तथा हि-अर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतु जन्मानः पञ्चोपरमा ( २२४ ) बाह्यतुष्टिषु भवन्ति । तथा हि-सेवादयो धनार्जनोपायाः, ते च प्रथमा, पारम् ॥ सेवकादीन् दुःखाकुर्वन्ति,
" दृप्यदुरीश्वरद्वाःस्थदण्डिचण्डार्धचन्द्रजाम् ।
वेदनां भावयन् प्राज्ञः कः सेवास्वनुषजते" ॥ एवमन्ये ऽप्यर्जनोपायाः दुःखा इति विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सैषा 'पारम्' उच्यते ।।
तथा ऽर्जितन्धनम् राजैकागारिकाग्निजलौघादिभ्यो विनक्ष्यतीति तद्रक्षणे (२२५ ) द्वितीया महदुःखमिति भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा सुपारम् ॥ द्वितीया 'सुपारम्' उच्यते ॥
तथा महता ऽऽयासेनार्जितन्धनं भुज्यमानं क्षीयते इति तत्प्रक्षयम्भावयता (२२६ ) तृतीया पारा- विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा तृतीया 'पारापारम्' पारम् ॥ • उच्यते ॥
१. एकागारिकः-चौरः।

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कौ. ५०-५१] अष्टसिद्धिकथनम् ।
एवं शब्दादिभोगाभ्यामात् प्रवर्धन्ते कामाः, ते च विषयप्राप्तौ कामिनं (२२७) चतुर्थी, अनुत्त- दुःखाकुर्वन्तीति भोगदोषम् भावयतो विषयोपरमे या माम्भः ॥
तुष्टिः सा चतुर्थी ' अनुत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते ॥ एवमानुपहत्य भूतानि विषयोपभोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसादोषदर्शनाद्विषयो(२२८) पञ्चमी उत्त- परमे या तुष्टिः सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते || माम्भः ॥
एवमाध्यात्मिकीभिश्चतसृभिः बाह्याभिश्च पञ्चभिः 'नव तुष्टयो ऽभि. मताः' ॥ ५० ॥
( २२९ ) सिद्धिभेदक- गौणमुख्यभेदैः सिद्धीराहथनम् ॥
ऊहः शब्दो ऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः । दानं च सिद्धयो ऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वो ऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥ " ऊह” इति । विहन्यमानस्य दुःखस्य त्रिस्वात्तद्विघातास्त्रय इतीमा
मुख्यास्तिस्रः सिद्धयः, तदुपायतया स्वितरा गौण्यः ( २३० ) सिद्धिभेदक
पञ्च सिद्धयः, ता अपि हेतुहेतुमत्तया व्यवस्थिताः । थनम् ॥
तत्राद्या ऽध्ययनलक्षणा सिद्धिर्हेतुरेव । मुख्यास्तु सिद्धयो हेतुमस्य एव । मध्यमास्तु हेतुहेतुमत्यः ।।
विधिवद्गुरुमुखादध्यात्मविद्यानामक्षरस्वरूपग्रहणमध्ययनम् प्रथमा सिद्धि. ( २३१) अध्ययनरूपा स्तारमुच्यते ॥ प्रथमा सिद्धिः, तारम् ॥
तत्कार्यम् शब्दः; 'शब्द' इनि पदम् शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति, ( २३२ ) शब्दरूपा कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । मा द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतारद्वितीया, सुतारम् ॥ मुच्यते । पाठाभ्यान्तदिदन्द्विधा श्रवणम् ॥
त. कौ. ५

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F
अष्टसिद्धिवर्णनम् ।
[ सां. त.
"अहः" तर्कः आगमाविरोधिन्यायनागमार्थपरीक्षणम् । परीक्षणञ्च सशय( २३३ ) ऊहरूपा- पूर्वपक्षनिराकरणेनोत्तरपक्षव्यवस्थापनम् । तदिदम्मनतृतीया तारतारम् ॥ नमाचक्षते मागमिनः । सा तृतीया सिद्धिस्तारतारमुच्यते ॥
"सुहृत्प्राप्तिः" । न्यायेन स्वयम्परीक्षितमप्यर्थ न श्रद्दधते; न यावद्गुरु(२३४ ) सुहृत्प्राप्तिरूपा शिष्यसब्रह्मचारिभिस्सह संवाद्यते । अतः सुहृदां गुरुचतुर्थी-रम्यकः ॥ शिष्यसब्रह्मचारिणां संवादकानां प्राप्तिः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः सा सिद्धिश्चतुर्थी ' रम्यक' उच्यते ॥ "दानं" च शुद्धिविवेकज्ञानस्य, 'दैप् शोधने' [पाणिनि ६।४।६८]
इत्यस्माद्धातोर्दानपदव्युत्पत्तेः । यथाह भगवान् पत. ( २३५ ) दानरूपा जलि:-" विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवो दुःखत्रयस्य हानोपञ्चमी, सदामुदितम् ।। • पायः” इति [ योगसूत्र २।२६] । 'अविप्लवः'
शुद्धिः, सा च सवासनसंशयविपर्यासानां परिहारेण विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्य स्वच्छप्रवाहे ऽवस्थापनम् । सा च ने विना ऽऽदरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेविताभ्यसपरिपाकाद्भवतीति दानेन (विवेकख्यात्याः कार्येण ) सो ऽपि संगृहीतः । सेयम्पन्चमी सिद्धिस्सदामुदितमुच्यते ॥ ( २३६ ) दुःखविघात- तिस्रश्च मुख्याः सिद्धयः प्रमोदमुदितमोदमाना, त्रयरूपास्तिस्रो मुख्या:- इत्यष्टौ सिद्धयः ॥ प्रमोदमुदितमोदमानाः॥ अन्ये व्याचक्षते-विनोपदेशादिना प्रारभावीयाभ्यासवशात्तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं
यत् सा सिद्धिरूहः। यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीय. ( २३७ ) गौणसिद्धि- माकर्ण्य तत्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा सिद्धिः शब्दः, शब्दपञ्चकस्य प्रकारान्तरेण पाठादनन्तरम्भावात् । यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन व्याख्यानम् ॥ सांख्यशास्त्रं ग्रन्थता ऽर्थतश्वाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा
ऽध्ययनहेतका सिद्धिरध्ययनम् । सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति १. " मननम् अमननमेवासुहृत्सम्मतम् . इति द्वितीयं मननमाह सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति" इति पाठान्तरम् ।
२. “ निबिडादेव नैरन्तर्यम्" इति पाठान्तरम् । ३. अभ्यासो ऽपि ।

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कौ. ५१-५२]
प्रत्ययतन्मात्रोभयसर्गावश्यकत्वम् ।
यस्याधिगततत्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा शानलक्षणा सिद्धिस्तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिः । दानञ्च सिद्धिहेतुः, धनादिदानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानम्प्रयच्छति । अस्य च युक्तायुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतम्परदोषोद्भावनेन नः सिद्धान्तमात्रव्याख्यानप्रवृत्तानामिति || सिद्धितुष्टिविपर्ययेणाशक्तिबुद्धिबधस्सप्तदशधा दृष्टव्यः । अत्र प्रत्ययसगै
- सिद्धिरुपादेयेति प्रसिद्ध मेव । तशिवारणहेतवस्तु
विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्याह-"सिद्धेः पूर्वो ययाशक्तितुष्टीना सिद्धे.
ऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः" इति । 'पूर्व' इति विपर्ययारङ्कुशत्वम् ततश्च तासा
शक्तितुष्टीः परामृशति । ताः सिद्धि करिणीनामकुशो, हेयत्वम् सिद्धेश्वोपादेय
निवारकत्वात् । अतः सिद्विपरिपन्थित्वात् विपर्ययात्वम् ॥
शक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्यर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥
स्यादेतत्-पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता सृष्टिः । स च पुरुषार्थः प्रत्ययसर्गाद्वा (२३९) उभयसर्गा- तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा सिध्यतीति कृतमुभयसर्गेणेत्यत वश्यकत्वशङ्का ॥ माह
न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः । लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥५२॥ "न विना” इति ।' “लिङ्गम्" इति तन्मात्सर्गमुपलक्षयति, “भावैः"
इति च प्रत्ययसर्गम् । एतदुक्तम्भवति-तन्मात्र( २४० ) उभयविध- सर्गस्य पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वं स्वरूपञ्च न प्रत्ययसर्गाद्विना सर्गावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ भवति, एवं प्रत्ययसर्गस्य स्वरूपं पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वम्च
न तन्मात्रसर्गादृते, इत्युभयथा सर्गप्रवृत्तिः। भोगः पुरुषार्थों न भोग्यान् शब्दादीन् भोगायतनं शरीरद्वयञ्चान्तरेण सम्भवतीत्युपपनस्तन्मात्रसर्गः । एवं स एव भोगो भोगसाधनानीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणानि चान्तरेण
१. चन्द्रिकायामन्यथा वर्णनम्- 'लिङ्गाख्यः' लिङ्ग्यते अनुमीयत एव न साक्षात् क्रियत-स महदाद्यतीन्द्रियवर्गः । 'भावाख्यः ' भूयते प्राप्यते इन्द्रियेणेति विषयवर्गः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः॥

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तन्मात्रसर्गविभागः।
[सां. त. न सम्भवति । न च तानि धर्मादीन् भावान् विना सम्भवन्ति । न चापवर्गहेतुर्विवेकख्यातिरुभयसर्ग विना । इत्युपपन्न उभयविधः सर्गः ॥
अनादित्वाच्च बीजाङ्कुरवनान्योन्याश्रयदोषमावहति, कल्पादावपि प्राचीन( २४१) उभयविधसमें कल्पोत्पन्नभावलिङ्गसंस्कारवशाद्भावलिङ्गयोरुत्पत्ति - अन्योन्याश्रयदोष- नुपपन्नेति सर्वमवदातम् ॥ ५२॥ परिहारः॥
( २४२ ) भूतसर्गः विभक्तः प्रत्यसर्गः । भूतादिसर्ग विभजतेविभागः॥
अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पश्चधा भवति । मानुषश्चैकविधः, समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥५३॥ "अष्टविकल्प" इति । ब्राह्मः, प्राजापत्यः, ऐन्द्रः, पैत्रो, गान्धर्वो, याक्षो, ( २४३ ) तत्र-(१) राक्षसः, पैशाचः, इत्यष्टविधो "दैवः" सर्गः ॥ देवो ऽष्टविधः॥ (२४४) (२) तैर्य- “तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति,” पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपग्योनःपञ्चधा ॥ स्थावराः ॥ "मानुषश्चैकविधः" इति, ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यवान्तरजातिभेदाविवक्षया, संस्था
नस्य चतुर्वपि वर्णेष्वविशेषात् । इति " समासतः"
संक्षेपतः " भौतिकः सर्गः” । घटादयस्त्वशरीरत्वे. एकविधः ॥
ऽपि स्थावरा एवेति ।। ५३ ।।
(२४६ ) भौतिकसर्गे
भौतिकस्यास्य सर्गस्य चैतन्योत्कर्षनिकर्षतारतम्यागुणभेदादूर्वाधोमध्य
- भ्यामूर्धाधोमध्यभावेन त्रैविध्यमाह -- भावकथनम् ।
ऊर्ध्व सवविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः । मध्ये रजोविशालो, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४॥

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कौ. ५४-५५ ] सर्गस्य दुःखहेतुता।
६९ ___ " ऊर्ध्व सत्वविशालः” इति । द्युप्रभृतिसत्यान्तो लोकः सत्त्वबहुलः ।
' तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः", पश्वादिस्थावरान्तः ( २४७ ) ऊर्ध्व सत्त्व- सोऽयम्मोहमयत्वात्तमोबहुलः । भूलॊकस्तु सप्तद्वीपप्रधानाः-मध्ये रजः- समुद्रसनिवेशो "मध्ये रजोविशालो" धर्माधर्मानुष्ठाप्रधानाः अन्ते तमः नपरत्वाद्दुःखबहुलत्वाच्च । तामिमां लोकसंस्थितिं प्रधानाः॥
संक्षिपति “ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः", स्तम्बग्रहणन वृक्षादयः संगृहीताः ॥ ५४ ॥
तदेवं सर्ग दर्शयित्वा तस्यापवर्गसाधनवैराग्योपयोगिनी दुःखहेतुतामाह( २४८) सर्गस्य दुःखहेतुता ॥
तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखम्प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः । लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन ।। ५५ ॥
" तत्र" इति । 'तत्र' शरीरादौ । यद्यपि विविधा विचित्रानन्दभोगभागिनः प्राणभृदेहाः, तथा ऽपि सर्वेषां जरामरणकृतं दुःखमविशिष्टम् । सर्वस्य खलु कृमपि मरणत्रासो-' मा न भूवम् ' 'भूयासम् ' इत्येवमात्मको. ऽस्ति । दुःखं च भयहेतुरिति दुःखम्मरणम् ।।
स्यादेतत्-दुःखादयः प्राकृता बुद्धिगुणाः तत्कथमेते चेतनसम्बन्धिनो ( २४९ ) प्राकृतगुणभूत भवन्तीत्यत आह-" पुरुष" इति । पुरि लिङ्गे शेते दुःखादीनां पुरुषेण सह इति पुरुषः, लिङ्गञ्च तत्सम्बन्धीति चेतनो ऽपि सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनन् ॥ तत्सम्बधी भवतीत्यर्थः ॥
कुत पुनर्लिङ्गसम्बन्धि दुःखम्पुरुषस्य चेतनस्येत्यत आह-" लिङ्गस्या ( २५० ) पुरुषप्रकृति- विनिवृत्तेः " - पुरुषाद्भदाग्रहाल्लिङ्गधर्मानात्मन्यध्यवभेदाग्रहनिबन्धनपुरुषे स्यति पुरुषः । अथवा दुःखप्राप्ताववधिराङी कथ्यते दुःखाध्यवसायः॥ लिङ्गम् यावन्न निवर्तते तावदिति ।। ५५ ॥
१. आविनिवृत्तेरित्यत्र 'आङ्'-उपसर्गेणेत्यर्थः ।

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सृष्टेः प्रकृतिकार्यत्वम् । [ सां. त. ( २५१ ) सृष्टिकारणवि- उक्तस्य सर्गस्य कारणविप्रतिपत्तीनिराकरोतिप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणम् ॥
इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः । प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थ स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥ " इत्येष" इति । आरभ्यते इति " मारम्भः " सर्गः महदादिभूतः प्रकृ.
र त्यैव कृतो नेश्वरण, न ब्रह्मोपादानो, नाप्यकारणः ।
" आकारमत्वे ह्यत्यन्ताभावो ऽत्यन्तभावो वा स्यात् । चामावूषणम् । न ब्रह्मोपादानः चितिशक्तेरपरिणामात् । नेश्वराधिष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो, निर्व्यापारस्याधिष्ठातृत्वासम्भवात् । न हि निर्व्यापारस्तक्षा वास्यायधितिष्ठति ॥ ___ ननु प्रकृतिकृतश्चेत्, तस्या नित्यायाः प्रवृत्तिशीलाया अनुपरमात् सदैव
सर्गः स्यादिति न कश्चिन्मुच्यतेत्यत आह-" प्रति( २५३ ) निन्यप्रवृत्ति- पुरुषविमोक्षार्थ स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः" इति । शीलप्रकृतिकृतसृष्टिपक्षे यथौदनकाम ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ संसृतिनित्यत्वस्यानिर्मो
निवर्तते,- एवं प्रत्येकम्पुरुषान् मोचयितम्प्रवृत्ता प्रकृक्षस्य च प्रसङ्गशङ्का
तियं पुरुषम्मोचयति तम्प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते-तदिदतन्निरासश्च ॥
माह-'स्वार्थ इव, ' स्वार्थे यथा तथा परार्थे आरम्भ इत्यर्थः ॥ ५६ ॥
स्यादेतत्- स्वार्थ परार्थ वा चेतनः प्रवर्तते । न च प्रकृतिरचेतनैवं भवितु
- महति तस्मादस्ति प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाता चेतनः। न च प्रवृत्तिशङ्का ।
क्षेत्रज्ञाश्चेतना अपि प्रकृतिमधिष्ठातुमर्हन्ति, तेषां प्रकृति
स्वरूपानभिज्ञत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति सर्वार्थदर्शी प्रकृते रधिष्ठाता, स चेश्वर'-इत्यत आह -
वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य । पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

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कौ. ५७-५८] ईश्वराधिष्ठाने दोषाः । ___"वत्सविवृद्धि निमित्तम्” इति । दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोज-म्प्रवर्तमानम् , ( २५५) तत्परिहारः- यथा वत्मविवृद्धयर्थं क्षीरमचेतनम् प्रवर्तते । एवक्षीरप्रवृत्तिवत्तस्याः प्र. प्रकृतिरचेतना ऽपि पुरुषविमोक्षणाय प्रवर्तिष्यते ॥ वृत्तिः ॥ न च-क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीश्वराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यत्वान्न साध्यव्यभि
चार' इति, साम्प्रतम्प्रेक्षावतः प्रवृत्तेः स्वार्थकारु( २५६ ) ईश्वराधिष्ठित- ण्याभ्यां व्याप्तत्वात् । ते च जगत्सर्गाव्यावर्तमाने प्रेक्षाप्रधानसृष्टौ दोषाः ॥ वत्प्रवृत्तिपूर्वकस्वमपि व्यावर्तयतः । न ह्याप्तसकले.
प्सितस्य भगवतो जगत् सृजतः किमप्यभिलषितम्भवति । नापि कारुण्यादस्य सर्गे प्रवृत्तिः, प्राक् सर्गाजीवानामिन्द्रियशरीरविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखाभावेन कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारुण्यम् ? सर्गोत्तरकालं दुःखिनो ऽवलोक्य कारुण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वन्दूषणम् ,-कारुण्येन सृष्टिः सृष्टया च कारुण्यमिति । अपि च करुणया प्रेरित ईश्वरः सुखिन एव जन्तून् सृजेन्न विचित्रान् । 'कर्मवैचित्र्याद्वैचित्र्यम्' इति चेत्-कृतमस्य प्रेक्षावतः कर्माधिष्ठानेन, तदनधिष्ठानमात्रादेवाचेतनस्यापि कर्मणः प्रवृत्यनुपपत्तेस्तत्कार्यशरीरोन्द्रियविषयानुत्पतौ दुःखानुत्पत्तेरपि सुकरस्वात् ॥ __प्रकृतेस्त्वचेतनायाः प्रवृत्तेर्न स्वार्थानुग्रहो न वा कारुण्यम्प्रयोजकमिति ( २५७ ) प्रकृतिसृष्टी
नोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गावतारः । पारायं मात्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुप
पद्यते । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तम् - " वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्' तद्दोषा भावः ॥
इति || ५७ ॥
" स्वार्थ इव" इति दृष्टान्तितम् [ कारिका. ५६ ] तद्विभजते( २५८ ) पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः ॥
औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः । ' पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थे प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

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प्रधाननिवृत्तिप्रकारः।
[सां. तं. ___ "औत्सुक्य-" इति । औत्सुक्यमिच्छा, मा खल्विष्यमाणप्राप्तौ निव. तते । इष्यमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वात् फलस्य । दान्तिके योजयति"पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थम्प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम्” इति ॥ ५८ ॥
ननु भवतु पुरुषार्थः प्रकृतेः प्रवर्तकः, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्त्या प्रकृतेः (२५९) विवेकख्यात्य- इत्यत माहनन्तरम् प्रधाननिवृत्तिः॥
रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् । पुरुषस्य तथा ऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९॥
" रङ्गस्य" इति, स्थानेन स्थानिनः पारिषदानुपलक्षयति । 'आत्मानम् ' शब्दाद्यात्मना पुरुषाद्भेदेन च प्रकाश्येत्यर्थः ॥ ५९॥
स्यादेतत्-'प्रवर्तताम्प्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थम् । पुरुषादुपकृतात्प्रकृतिर्लप्स्यते कश्चि(२६०) गुणवत्याः प्रकृतेः दुपकारम् , आज्ञासम्पादनाराधितादिवाज्ञापयितुर्भुप्रत्युपकारं विनैव जिष्या। तथा च न परार्थोऽस्या भारम्भः' -इत्यत पुरुषोपकारः ।। आह
नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपाकरिणः पुंसः । गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥ ६ ॥
" नाना-" इति । यथा गुणवानुपकार्यपि भृत्यो निर्गुणे ऽत एवानुपकारिणि स्वामिनि निष्फलाराधनः, एवमियम्प्रकृतिस्तपस्विनी गुणवत्युपकारिण्यनुपकारिणि पुरुषे व्यर्थपरिश्रमेति पुरुषार्थमेव यतते न स्वार्थमिति सिद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

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कौ. ६१] प्रकृतेरात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिः।
स्यादेतत्- नर्तकी नृत्यम्परिषद्भयो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताऽपि पुनस्तदृष्टिकौतू(२६१) विवेकख्यात्यन- हलात् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषार्थायात्मानं न्तरम् प्रधानस्यात्य- दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता ऽपि पुनः प्रवर्त्यति' इत्यत न्तिकी निवृत्तिः॥ आह
प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरन्न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति । या दृष्टा ऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥'
" प्रकृतेः " इति । सुकुमारतरता ऽतिपेशलता, परपुरुषदर्शनासहिष्णुतेति यावत् । असूर्यम्पश्या हि कुलवधूरतिमन्दाक्षमन्थरा प्रमादाद्विगलितसिचयाचला चेदालोक्यते परपुरुषेण, तदा ऽसौ यथा प्रयतते, अप्रमत्ता यथैनां पर
१.-अस्याः कारिकाया अनन्तरमेवान्ययैकया कारिकया भवितव्यमिति स्वर्गतस्य तिलकान्वयजस्य बालगङ्गाधरपण्डितस्य सिद्धान्तः । तत्संक्षेपस्तु-- ___ " "सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थाः' इतीश्वरकृष्णवचनानुरोधेनार्याणा सप्तन्या भाव्यम् । किन्तु गौडपादभाष्ये त्वेकोनसप्ततिरेवोपलभ्यते । भाष्यं चैकषष्टितमाया उपरि नैकस्या अपि तु कारिकयोः । अत एकषष्टितमाया अनन्तरमेवानया लुप्तया कारिकया भाव्यम् । भाष्यगतप्रतीकानुरोधेन चैषा कारिकैवं निर्मातुं शक्यते--
कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥ अस्ति चास्याः कारिकायाः पूर्वापरसन्दर्भसङ्गतिः । निरीश्वरत्वप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च केनचिदसहिष्णुना च्यावितेयम् । किन्तु भाष्यच्यावनमसौ विस्मृतवान् । पूर्वेषां मते स्वभावस्य, कालस्य ईश्वरस्य वा जगन्मूलत्वमिति श्वेताश्वतरमन्त्रेण द्योत्यते
स्वभावमके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः ।
देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते बाह्यचक्रम् ॥ " इति अस्या नष्टायाः कारिकायाः पूर्वार्द्धमस्मन्मतानुसारेण त्वेवं पठनीयम् |--
कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरुषं कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।' सूर्यनारायणशास्त्रिणा च कृतमेतत्कारिकारखण्डनं न सयुक्तिकम् । तन्मतानुरोधेनैकषष्टितमकारिकाया भाष्यस्यान्तिमे कृतः, वृतौ च माठरेण कृतः सुकुमारतरमितिशब्दस्य परामर्शः, प्रकृतकारिका विहायान्यस्याः कारिकाया भाष्यवृत्त्योः सम्भावनां निराकरोति । एतदत्र विचारणीयम्--

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प्रकृतेरात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिः। [सा. त. पुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति,-एवम्प्रकृतिरपि कुलवधूतो ऽप्यधिका दृष्टा विवेकेन न पुनद्रक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ६१ ॥
भाष्यस्यादिमे भाग एवं पठ्यते--'अहमनेन पुरुषेण दृष्टाऽस्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनदर्शनं नोपैति, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयातीत्यर्थः । तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति--' एतदनन्तरं भाष्यचरमभागः--'न पुनदर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य' इति पठनीयः। 'सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति' इत्यनन्तरं 'केचिदीश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते' इत्यादिपाठस्तु नितरामसङ्गत एव । नहीश्वरादीनां कारणत्वं प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरत्ववर्णनम् । अतो रुवं केनचिदीश्वरनिरासासहि. ष्णुना कारिकेयं लोपिता । अन्येन च केनचिद्वराकेण भाष्यमेतन्मूलकारिकाविहीनमिति मत्वा तथैकषष्टितमकारिफाभाष्यान्तनिवेशितं यथा स्थूलदर्शनैरपि विभाव्यते । अत एव 'न पुनदर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य' इत्येतदनन्तरं तेन 'अत प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति' इति सङ्गत्यर्थ प्रक्षिप्तम् । यथा च नैतत्सङ्गच्छते तथा स्फुटमेव । परं च, ईश्वरादीना सुभोग्यत्वादिकथनमपि भृशमनर्थकम् । एवं माठरवृत्तावपि यथाकथञ्चित् संग्रन्थनमेव । अतो वाचस्पत्यादीनां पुरत एव लुप्तेयं कारिका ।
यस्तु ‘ननु ईश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुत्वं कारिकाविलोपे प्रयोजकं चेत्, कथं नाम तद्भाष्यविलोपे प्रयोजकं न स्यात् ' इति सूर्यनारायणशाख्यभिप्रायस्तत्र ब्रूमः-- यस्य खलु कुटिलमतेः स्वानभिमतेयं कारिका दृष्टिपथं याता, न तस्य भाष्यं दृग्गोचरी. भूतमिति सम्भाव्यते । न खलु भाष्यकारिकयोरव्यभिचारि सहावस्थानं, येन कारिकां निस्सारयन् भाष्यमपि बहिः कुर्यात् । भाष्यं चास्मद्भाग्यवशान्न तद्धस्ते पतितम् । अतस्तादृशकुटिलमत्यनन्तरभाविभिलेखकैलेखकेन वा मूलकारिकाविहीनं भाष्यमेतद्विलोक्य यथाकथञ्चिदेकषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्ये नियोजितमिति राद्धान्तः ॥
अधुनापि प्राचीनहस्तलिखितपुस्तकेषु मूलग्रंथः टीकाग्रंथश्च पृथक् पृथक् लेखनावस्थितित्वेन दृश्येते । तेन मूलग्रंथस्थिता कारिका च्यावितैव । भाष्यग्रंथस्य तत्समये अप्राप्तत्वात् भाष्यस्य अद्यापि स्थितिरस्ति । [ हरदत्तशर्मा ]

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कौ. ६२-६३] बन्धमोक्षयोः प्रकृतिपरत्वम् ।
७५ स्यादेतत्-“ पुरुषश्चेदगुणोऽपरिणामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः ? मुचंबन्धनविश्ले
षार्थत्वात् , सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानाञ्च बन्धनसमा( २६२ ) निर्गुणपुरुषमो. ख्यानां पुरुषे ऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात् । अत एवास्य च क्षसंसाराद्यसम्भवशङ्का ॥ पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामाऽस्ति, निष्क्रि.
यत्वात् । तस्मात् 'पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् ' इति रिक्तं वचः"-इतीमां शङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नपाकरोति ॥
तस्मान्न बध्यते ऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् । संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२॥ " तस्मात् ” इति । अद्धा न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति:
न कश्चिन्मुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सती ( २६३ ) तत्परिहारः- बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते चेति । बन्धमोक्षसंसाराः पुरुषेप्रकृतिगतानां संसारा- खूपचर्यन्ते यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिदीनां पुरुषे उपचारः।। न्युपचर्येते, तंदाश्रयेण भृत्यानान्तद्भागित्वात् , तत्फ
लस्य च शोकलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्भवात् । भोगापवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषसम्बन्ध उपपादित इति सर्वम्पुष्कलम् ॥ ६२॥
नन्ववगतम् ‘प्रकृतिगता बन्धसंसारापवर्गाः पुरुषे उपचर्यन्ते' इति । (२६४) प्रकृत्या धर्मादि- किंसाधनाः पुनरेते प्रकृतेः ? इत्यत आहसप्तरूपैबन्धनमेकरूपेण तत्त्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्षणम् ॥
रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः । सैव च पुरुषार्थम्प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥
" रूपैः” इति । तत्त्वज्ञानवर्ज बध्नाति धर्मादिभिस्सप्तभी रूपैर्भावैरिति । " पुरुषार्थम्प्रति" भोगापवर्गम्प्रति “आत्मनाऽऽत्मानम् ” एकरूपेण तत्वज्ञानेन विवेकख्यात्या विमोचयति, पुनर्भोगापवर्गों न करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६३ ।।
१. 'आत्मना' बुद्धिरूपेण, 'आत्मानम् ' पुरुषमिति चन्द्रिका ।

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७.
तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिकथनम् ।
सां, त. भवगतमीदृशं तस्वम् , ततः किमित्यत आहएवन्तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् । अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥
" एवम्” इति । तत्त्वेन विषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानमुपलक्षयति । उक्तरूपप्रका(२६५) अभ्यासातत्वज्ञा- रतत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यासादादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवितात नोत्पत्तिः ॥
सत्वपुरुषान्यतासाक्षात्कारिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। यद्विषयश्चा
भ्यासस्तद्विषयकमेव साक्षात्कारमुपजनयति, - तत्त्ववि. षयश्वाभ्यास इति तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारं जनयति । अत उक्तम् - " विशुद्धम्" इति ॥ कुतो विशुद्धमित्यत आह-“अविपर्ययात् " इति । संशयविपर्ययौ हि
. ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्रहितम् विशुद्धम्तदिदमुक्तम्( २६६ ) तत्त्वज्ञानस्य विशुद्धिहेतुः अविपर्यय
__"अविपर्ययात" इति । नियतमनियततया गृह्णन् त्वम् ॥
संशयो ऽपि विपर्ययः, तेन ‘अविपर्ययात् ' इति
संशयविपर्ययाभावो दर्शितः । तत्त्वविषयस्वाश्च संशयविपर्ययाभावः ॥
स्यादेतत् - ' उत्पद्यतामीदृशाभ्यासात् तत्त्वज्ञानम् , तथा ऽप्यनादिना (२६७) अनादेर्मिथ्या- मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारेण मिथ्याज्ञानं जनयितव्यम् तथा ज्ञानसंस्कारस्यादिमत्या च तन्निबन्धनस्य संसारस्यानुच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्यत उक्तम्तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेण “केवलम्" इति=विपर्ययणासम्भिनम् । यद्यप्य समुच्छेदः ।। नादिविपर्ययवासना तथा ऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानवासनयातत्त्वविषयसाक्षात्कारमादधत्या ऽऽदिमत्या ऽपि शक्या समुच्छेत्तुम् । तत्त्वपक्ष- . पातो हि धियां स्वभावः, यदाहुर्बाह्या अपि
" निरुपद्रधभूतार्थस्वभावस्य विपर्ययैः । न बाधो ऽयस्नयस्वे ऽपि बुद्धस्तत्पक्षपाततः" इति ।।

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को. ६४-६५] तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूपकथनम् । ज्ञानस्वरूपमुक्तम् - " नास्मि, न मे, नाहम्” इति । 'नास्मि' इस्या
रमनि क्रियामात्रनिषेधति । यथाहुः ‘कृभ्वस्तयः (२६८) तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूप- क्रियासामान्यवचनाः' इति [सिद्धान्तकौमुदी.] । प्रदर्शनम्-सर्वविधाहका- तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानसङ्कल्पालोचनानि चान्तराणि रनिवृत्तिः ॥ बाह्याश्च सर्वे व्यापारा आत्मनि प्रतिबद्धानि बोद्ध
व्यानि। यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्त्यतो 'नाहम्'। अहमिति कर्तपदम् , अह जानाम्यहं जुहोम्यहन्ददे' इति सर्वत्र कर्तुः परामर्शात् । निष्क्रियत्वे च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाभावः । ततः सुष्ठूक्तम्- " नाहम् ' इति । अत एव " न मे" । कर्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तस्मात् कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः । अथवा “ नास्मि" इति “ पुरुषो ऽस्मि, न प्रसवधर्मा"। भप्रसवधर्मित्वाचाकर्तृत्वमाह-" नाहम्” इति । अकर्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्यत माह-" न मे" इति ॥ ___ ननु ‘एतावत्सु ज्ञातेष्वपि कश्चित् कदाचिदज्ञातो विषयो ऽस्ति, तदज्ञान
जन्तून् बन्धयिष्यति' इत्यत आह-" भपरिशेषम् " (२६९) तत्त्वज्ञानस्या- इति । नास्ति किञ्चिदस्मिन् परिशिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यम् परिशेषत्वम् ॥ यदज्ञानं बन्धयिष्यतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६४ ।। (२७०) तत्त्वसाक्षात्कार- किं पुनरीदृशेन तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेण सिध्यतीत्यत फलम् ॥
माहतेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् । प्रकृतिम् पश्यति पुरुष: प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वच्छः ॥ ६५॥
"तेन” इति । भोगविवेकसाक्षात्कारौ हि प्रकृतेः प्रसोतन्यौ। तौ घ प्रसूताविति नास्याः प्रसोतव्यमवशिष्यत इति निवृत्तप्रसवा प्रकृतिः । विवेकज्ञानरूपो यो ऽर्थस्तस्य वशः सामर्थ्यम् तस्मात् । अतत्वज्ञानपूर्वकाणि खलु धर्माधर्माज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानैश्वर्याणि । वैराग्यमपि केवलतौष्टिकानामतस्वज्ञानपूर्वकमेव । तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं विरोधिस्वेनातत्त्वज्ञानमुग्छिनत्ति । कारण
१. 'नाहमिति ' तादात्म्यनिषेध इति केचित् २. “ सुस्थ” इति पाठान्तरम् । ३. विशुद्धकेवलज्ञानेनेति यावत् ।

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७८ मुक्तपुरुषम्प्रति प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्त्यभावः । [सां. त. निवृत्त्या च सप्तरूपाणि निवर्तन्त इति “ सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः " “ अवस्थित" इति निष्क्रियः, “स्वच्छः” इति रजस्तमोवृत्तिकलुषया बुद्धया ऽसम्भिन्नः । सात्त्विक्या तु बुद्धया तदा ऽप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदो ऽस्त्येव, अन्यथैवम्भूतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ६५ ।।
स्यादेतत्-'निवृत्तप्रसवामिति न मृण्यामहे । संयोगकृतो हि सर्ग इत्युक्तम् , (२७१) एकविषयम- योग्यता च संयोगः, भोक्तृत्वयोग्यता च पुरुषस्य पेक्ष्य निवृत्ताया अपि चैतन्यम् , भोग्यत्वयोग्यता च प्रकृतेर्जडत्वम् विषयप्रकृतर्विषयान्तरं प्रति त्वञ्च । न चैतयोरस्ति निवृत्तिः । न च करणीयाप्रवृत्तिशङ्का ॥ भावानिवृत्तिः, तज्जातीयस्यान्यस्य करणीयत्वात् पुनः पुनः शब्दाद्युपभोगवत्।'-इत्यत आह
दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टा ऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥ " दृष्टा " इति । करोतु नाम पौनःपुन्येन शब्दाद्युपभोगम्प्रकृतिर्यया विवेक
ख्यातिर्न कृता, कृतविवेकख्यातिस्तु शब्दाद्युपभोगन्न (२७२ ) तन्निरासः ॥ जनयति । अविवेकख्यातिनिबन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो,
निबन्धनाभावे न तद्भवितुमर्हति, अंकुर इव बीजाभावे । प्राकृतान् हि सुखदुःखमोहात्मनः शब्दादींस्तदविवेकात् 'ममैतत् ' इत्यभिमन्यमान आत्मा भुञ्जीत । एवं विवेकख्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेकादेवात्मा 'मदर्थेयम् ' इति मन्यते । उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिस्तु तदसंसर्गाच्छब्दादीनोपभोक्तु. महति नापि विवेकख्यातिम्प्राकृतीमपि कर्तुम् । ततो विविक्त' आत्मा न स्वार्थमभिमन्तुमर्हति पुरुषाथों च भोगविवेकौ प्रकृत्यारम्भप्रयोजकावित्यपुरुषार्थों सन्तौ न प्रकृति प्रयोजयतः । तदिदमुक्तम्-"प्रयोजनम्नास्ति सर्गस्य " इति । अथ प्रयुज्यते सर्गे प्रकृतिरनेनेति प्रयोजनम् , तदपुरुषार्थे नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ ६६ ॥
१. उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिः

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कौ. ६७] मुक्तस्यापि संस्कारवशाच्छरीरधारणम् । स्यादेतत्-" उत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारश्चेत्तदनन्तरमेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देह
पातः स्यादिति कथमदेहः प्रकृतिम्पश्येत् । अथ (२७३ ) विविक्तस्या- तत्त्वज्ञाने ऽपि न मुच्यते कर्मणामप्रक्षीणत्वात् ? तेषां स्मनो देहपातात्प्रकृति- कुतः प्रक्षयः ? ' भोगात्' इति चेत् , हन्त भोस्तदर्शनासम्भवशङ्का ॥ त्वज्ञानान्न मोक्षसाधनम्-इति 'व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञान
जन्मना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्ग' इति रिक्तं वचः । 'भोगेन चापरिसंख्येयः कर्माशयपचयो ऽनियतविपाककालः क्षेतव्यः, ततश्चापवर्गप्राप्तिः' इत्यपि मनोरथमात्रम्" इत्यत आह
सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात् , चक्रभ्रमिवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६ ॥ " सम्यक् ” इति । तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदयादेवनादिरप्यनियतविपाक
कालो ऽपि कर्माशयप्रचयो दग्धबीजभावतया न ( २७४ ) तन्निरासः- जात्यायु गलक्षणाय फलाय कल्पते । क्लेशसलिलाविविक्तस्यापि संस्कार- वसिक्तायां हि बुद्धिभूमौ कर्मबीजान्यङ्करं प्रसुवते । यशाच्छरीरधारणम् ॥ तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिपीतसकलक्लेशसलिलायामूषरायां
कुतः कर्मबीजानामङ्करप्रसवः ? तदिदमुक्तम् “धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ” इति, अकारणत्व प्राप्तापित्यर्थः । उत्पन्नतत्वज्ञानो ऽपि च संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यथोपरते ऽपि कुलालव्यापारे चक्रं वेगाख्यसंस्कारवशात् भ्रमत् तिष्ठति । कालपरिपाकवशात्तपरते संस्कारे निक्रियम्भवति । शरीर. स्थितौ च प्रारब्धपरिपाको धर्माधर्मों संस्कारौ । तथा चानुश्रयते-“ भोगेन वितरे क्षपयित्वा ऽथ सम्पद्यते” इति "तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन विमोक्ष्ये ऽथ सम्पत्स्ये" इति च [छान्दोग्य, ६।१४।२] | प्रक्षीयमाणाविद्यासंस्कारावशेषश्च संस्कारस्तद्वशात् तत्सामर्थ्यात् पृतशरीरस्तिष्ठति ॥ ६७ ।।
स्यादेतत्-" यदि संस्कारशेषादपि धृतशरीरस्तथा ऽपि कदा ऽस्य मोक्षो ( २७५ ) शरीरनाशे ऐ. भविष्यति ? इत्यत माहकान्तिकात्यन्तिकमुक्तिः ॥

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सांख्यशास्त्रस्य प्रामाणिकत्वम् । [सां. त. प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥ "प्राप्ते" इति । अनारब्धविपाकानान्तावत् कर्माशयानां तत्त्वज्ञानाग्निना बीजभावो दग्धः । प्रारब्धविपाकानान्तूपभोगेन क्षये सति, “प्राप्ते, शरीरभेदे " इति-विनाशे-" चरितार्थत्वात् " इति-कृतप्रयोजनत्वात् । प्रधानस्य तम्पुरुषम्प्रति विनिवृत्तौ-“ ऐकान्तिकम् "अवश्यम्भावि “ आत्यन्तिकम् "= अविनाशि-इत्युभयं “कैवल्यम् ” दुःखत्रयविगमम्प्राप्नोति पुरुषः ॥ ६८ ॥ ( २७६ ) सांख्यशास्त्र प्रमाणेनोपपादिते ऽप्यत्यन्तश्रद्धोत्पादनाय परस्य परमर्षिप्रणीतत्वम् मर्षिपूर्वकत्वमाह
पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यम्परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् । स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥ "पुरुष ” इति । “ गुह्यम् ” गुहानिवासि, स्थूलधियां दुर्बोधमिति यावत् । “परमर्षिगा" कपिलेन तामेव श्रद्धामागमिकत्वेन द्रढयति" स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ” इति । 'यत्र ' ज्ञाने यदर्थम् , यथा 'चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति ' इति । “ भूतानाम् " = प्राणिनां " स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाः " आगमैः " चिन्त्यन्ते " ॥ ६९ ॥ ( २७७ ) सांख्यशा- स्यादेतत्-" यत् परमर्षिणा साक्षात्कथितम् तच्छस्त्रस्य गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा बधीमहि, यत्पुनरीश्वरकृष्णेन कथितम् तत्र कुतः कपिलादारभ्य पञ्चशिख- श्रद्धा? "-इत्यत आहपर्यन्तम् ॥
एतत् पवित्रमग्न्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतन्तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥
" एतत् ” इति । " एतत् पवित्रम् " पावनम्- दुःखत्रयहेतोः पाप्मनः पुनातीति-" अग्न्यम् "= सर्वेभ्यः पवित्रेभ्यो मुख्यम्, “ मुनिः ” कपिलः

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कौ. ७१-७२ ] गुरुशिष्यपरंपरा । आसुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ, आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् " ॥ ७० ॥
शिष्यपरम्परया ऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ।। ७१ ॥ (२७८ ) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य “शिष्य " इति । आरात् याता तत्त्वेभ्य इत्यार्या, गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा ॥ आर्या मतिर्यस्य सो ऽयम् “आर्यमतिः” इति ॥ ७१ ॥ ( २७९ ) सप्ततिकारि- एतच्च शास्त्रम् , मकलशास्त्रार्थसूचकत्वात् , न तु काणां शास्त्रत्वम् ॥ प्रकरणमित्याहसप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥ " सप्तत्याम् ” इति । तथा च राजवार्तिकम् ॥ "प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता । पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥ शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश । विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः॥ करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः" ॥ इति ॥ सेयं षष्टिपदार्थी कथितेति सकलशास्त्रार्थकथनानेदम्प्रकरणमपि तु शास्त्रमेवेदमिति सिद्धम् । एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वम् पारार्थ्यञ्च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्वमकर्तृत्वम् बहुत्वञ्चति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अस्तित्वम् वियोगे योगश्चेत्युभयमधिकृत्य । वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ।। ७२ ॥
मनांसि कुमुदानीव बोधयन्ती सतां सदा। श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्राणां कृतिः स्तात् तत्त्वकौमुदी॥ इत्यखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभद्वादशदर्शनटीकाकुच्छ्री
मद्वाचस्पतिमिश्रकृता सांख्यतत्वकौमुदी ॥

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Page #139

THE TATTVA-KA
[SĀM KHYA
An English Translation. (1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her on having undergone the experiences afforded by her.
To the Great Sage Kapıla, and to his disciple Āsuri, as also to Pancas'ıkha and Is'varakļşņa—10 these we bow in reverence.
(2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the Introduction to audience, who offers expositions of facts
Kariká I whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject matter :
* The translation of the Tattvakaumudī was done by me as a class. exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an im. provement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. (Ganganath Jha.)

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[13—
Karika I There being ( in this world ) an impediment caused • by the three kinds of pain ( there arises ) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is ) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.
(3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquirNecessity of ed into-(1) if there existed no pain in this scientific enquiry world; or (2) 1f, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible-such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.
(4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is 'The three-fold not universally desired, are opposed to facts.
division of pain This is what is meant by the words: There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain. The three kinds of pain constitute ( what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." These are : (1) the intrinsic (Adhyātmika), (2) the extrinsic (Adhibhautika) and (3) the divine or superhuman (Adhidaivika). Of these the intrinsic is twofold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, gnel, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two-fold : extrinsic and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones are due to the evil influence of

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-1']
planets and the various elementals (Yakṣa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rajas-is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. Impediment (Abhighāta) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate its will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) into the means of alleviating the three kinds of pain. In the compound tadapaghātake, the pronoun tat refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (duḥkhatraya etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound).—What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,-none other.
TRANSLATION
Objection Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious
means
3
(5) An objection is raised: "On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous. That is to say: We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible; we go further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences, which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: 'When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains? So, when

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(16_
the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt?' Hundreds of remedies for bodily pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment-such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in sale places, etc. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest." (6) This objection is answered as follows-Not so
why ? — Because these are neither absolute Reply: Obvious thor final. Absoluteness of the means conmeans are not absolute nor final sists in the certainty of its effect; and its
finality consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is. denoted by the expression, "Ekāntātyantato bhāvaḥ." The universal affıx tasi has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest—the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous. (7) Though the mention of the word pain in the very
beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the ex. Auspiciousness tirpatory means as leading to its removal is of the beginning word
auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

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-11]
TRANSLATION
pain
(8) The following argument might be put forward: Obiection. Vedic "We grant the inadequacy of the obvious means adequate remedies; but we have others prescribed in to removal of the Vedas in the shape of a host of such
acts as the Jyotistoma etc., which extend over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the S'ruti : ‘Desir. ing heaven one must perform sacrifices,' and Heaven is thus described : ‘Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it is what is denoted by the word Heaven.' Heaven thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived, --for, declares the S'ruti : “We drank the Soma and became immortal." (Atharvaśıras 111]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be ' immortality ? Hence the Vedic reme. dies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,-are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous." The answer to this is suggested in the following Kārkā.
Karikā II The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).*
* This Kārıkā embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.

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[119(9) Anus'rava is Veda, that which is heard during the
tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher and Reply : The not done ( written ). Anus'ravika 18 that Vedic is like the obvious
which is related to Anus'rava or Veda, i. e.
which is derived or known therefrom. The host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious ( remedies mentioned before );- both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the three kınds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term “ Vedic " (Anus'rvaika), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda ( which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (Brhadāranyaka, 2-4-5); (bg, so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return ( into this world )". ( Chăndogya, 8-15). (10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: since
it is connected with impurity, decay and Because impure, excess. The impurity lies in the fact of the decaying and excessive - Soma and other sacrifices being accompanied
by the killing of animals and the destruction of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pancas'ıkhācārya : " It ( the sin attendant upon slaughter ) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect ( Apūrva i. e. merit) of the Jyotisłoma and other sacrifices, with the minor apūrva due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet
remediable' implies that the sin is removable by certain expiatory rites; but if somehow these are neglected, then at the time of the fruition of the principal karma (merit), the evil element ( denyrit caused by the slaughter ) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification ‘bearable'. Ex. perts ( in rituals ) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven

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attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin ( involved in the rituals ). (11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law
-"Kill not any animal," is set aside by The impurity of the specific one, "Kill the animal dedicated animal slaughter in a sacrifice to Agni-Soma "-because they do not conestablished
tradıct each other; and it is only when two
laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, how. ever, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law " Kill not etc.," only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil ( and hence pain ); but it does not deny the fact of its being necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same manner, the injunction “ Kill the animal etc., " declares that the killing of animal helps in the performance of sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If it did so, there would be a syntactical split [. e. the sentence “Kill the animal etc., " would bear two predicates (1) 'The killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice,' (2) and that it is not conducive to sin ]. Nor is there any contradiction between the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the performance of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite consistently help the performance of the sacrifice. (12) The properties—' decay' and 'inequality '-belong
really to the effect; but are here attributed Decay and ex- to the means. This liability to decay is inferred cess shown to apply to the ro- from the fact of Heaven being a positive sults of Vedic action
identity and a product. Further, the Jyotistoma
and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of Heaven only, whereas the Vājapeya and others lead to the attainment of the kingdom of Heaven (or ‘self

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sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the inequality spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.
8
..
(13) In the passage "Drinking Soma, we became immortal "-immortality stands for long-dura. tion,- -as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the S'ruti: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahānārāyaṇa Upanışad X-5], and again 'Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality."
Immortality as a result of Vedic action is only long-durability
r1118
06
is discriminative wisdom
(14) With all this in view it is declared: That which is contrary to that is preferable-proceeding The only means from discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. The term that stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method-contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results, -is pure i. e. unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the S'ruti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect-the removal of pain-though a product, is a negative entity. And when the productivity of the cause (ignorance) has been destroyed (by discriminative knowledge) there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the efficiency of the

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cause lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on ( under Kārikā LXVI). (15) The literal meaning of the words of the Kārikā is
. as follows: The means of removing pain, Literal meaning of the Karikh consisting in the direct discriminative know
ledge of the Spirit as apart from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means, and hence is better. The Vedic remedy is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent; the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Maiter is also good; and of these two, the latter is better, superior. (16) Question :-“Whence does such discriminative
knowledge arise ? Source of discri- Answer-From the right cognition of minative know the Manifested, the Unmakifested and the ledge
Cogniser. Cognition of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested ) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the cognition thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this : The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from right cognition-consisting in meditation and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently carried on for a long time, of the Manifested, etc., the character of these latter having been previously learnt from the Veda, the Smrtis and the Itihāsas, and duly strengthened by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail later on in Kärıkā LXIV. (17.) Having thus established the fact of the under
.. taking of scientific enquiry being useful for Fourfold division the of categories,
on the enquirer, the author, with a view to
commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to focus the attention of the enquirer.

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[11118
Karikā III
Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.
Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely productive, some merely products, others both productive and products, and others, neither the one nor the other. (18) To the question-What is the productive — the
answer is—Primordial Root-matter is not a The Productive product; 'Root-matter' ( Prakrti)* is that
which produces (prakaroti); it is also called * Pradhāna' (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of Sattvas, Rajas and Tamas in the state of equilıbrium, – that is purely productive. Why it is so is explained by the term 'Mala', 'Root'; i. e. it is that ‘Matter which is the 'Root'; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no rout; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted regresus ad infinitum. (19) How many are the objects that are both prouuctive
and products, and which are these? The The Productive- answer is—The group of seven consisting of Products
the Great Principle and the rest are both; i.e. they are products as well as productive. The Great Principle (Buddhi) is the root of Egoism (Ahankāra), and the pro. duct of Root-matter; so is Principle of Egoism the root of the
* What the term prakrti' stands for has been made clear here. Henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as Root-matter' or sim. ply as 'Nature.'

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five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven senseorgans, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Ākāśa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism.
(20) How many are the products, pure and simple,
and what are they? Answer: The products The Products are sixteen-i. e., sixteen in number; the
five gross substances ( earth etc., ) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications, not productive; this is what is emphasised by the particle 'tu', which should be taken as coming after 'vikārah' (in the text ). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and Sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of soinething different in essence, for which the term Root, “ Prakrti" stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility.
(21) That which is neither productwe nor product, is now
described :--the Spirit is neither a product nor The non-product. productive productive. All this will be explained later
on.
(22) In order to prove the above statement, the different
kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition) Three kinds of have to be described. Nor can there be proofs
a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:

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[IV23
Karikă IV Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition, It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised. (23) Means of Cognition are accepted :-here the term
* Means of Cognition' only states the thing Proof defined to be defined; and the explanation of the
term would constitute the definition of *Means of Cognition ;' this explanation being that the Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised. Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the Instrument of Right Cognition. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown; what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the Means of Cognition. Thus the 'Means of Cognition' become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz. doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the 'Means of Right Cognition. (24) The author now rejects the different views with
regard to the number of Pramāņas: "Of three The three-fold- kinds; "—that is, of the Means of Right ness of proof
Cognition in general there are three kinds -- neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition.
(25) Now, there arises the question—which are the
. .. three kınds of Means of Right Cognition ? Only three kinds The answer is Perception, Inference and of proof
Valid Assertion. The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical

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system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The intuition or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,-though realities, do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.
(26) Objection:-"We grant that the number of Pramāṇas is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, such as Analogy (Upamâna) and the rest". Reply-Because these three include all forms of Means of Right Cognition. That is, all forms of Right Cognition are included-i. e. comprehended-under these three, Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above.
The inclusion of all other proofs in the above. mentioned
13:
· (27) Question :-"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the Prameyas, i. e. the objects of Right Cognition ?" Answer-It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised. Siddhi means apprehension-Cognition.
Necessity of enquiry into the
different kinds of proof
(28) The explanation of the Karika follows the sense, The order of ex- not the order of words.
planation
(29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the Kārikā, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed.
The specific de. finition of the proofs

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[V80Karika V 'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects through the contact of the senses; 'Inference 'has been declared to be of three kinds; and it is led up to by (based upon) the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term; and 'Valid Assertion ’is Right Revelation.
'Perception is definite sense-cognition.'— The term 'Perception' means what is defined; the remainder of the sentence is the definition; by which word is meant the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as well as from those of other classes.
(30) The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception Damen de prativişayādhyavasāyaḥ ’) may be thus fined as the de- explained: Vişaya (object) stands for that finite cognition which bears upon the Visayin (cognition); of particular objects obtained that which impresses its own form upon the through senses Cognition.
The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain and the rest are objects' for us; but things in the form of the Elemental Substances are not 'objects' for us; though these also are 'objects' for the Yogin and the divine beings. The term ' prativisaya' denotes that which bears upon each particular objcct, i. e. the sense-organ;—' bearing upon' means contact so that what the term ' prativişaya' stands for is the sense-organ in contact with the object-,'Prativisayādhyavasāya' ('sense.cognition) is the adhyavasāya, definite cognition in i. e. through, the sense organ in contact with the object; 'adhyavasāya' is Cognition, the function of Buddhi(Will); in fact adhyavasāya stands for that exuberance of the attribute of Sattva which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute of 'Tamas' due to the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects:---this is what is called vrtti and also' jñāna, --.e. 'Cognition. This sense-cognition is a means

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TRANSLATION of cognition and what is brought about by this means is the Right Cognition which is a form of assistance rendered to the Sentient Faculty. (31) In its essence the Buddhi is insentient, being, as it is,
a product of Root Matter; consequently the Cognitions are intention Cognition which is a function of the Buddhi
is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of Buddhi also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient ; this Spirit appears as if having the Cognition and the Pleasure and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the Cognition and the Pleasure which really subsist in Buddhi; also it is in this manner that the Sentient Being (Spirit) comes to be favoured ( by Buddhı ); and Buddhi as also its Cognition, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the Sentience ( of the Spirit ). This is what is going to be described under Kārikā 20, below. (32) The use of the term 'adhyavasāya,' 'Definite
Cognition,' in the text excludes Doubt. Differentiation of terms in the ful Cognition, as Doubt, being of the nature of definition of Per- uncertainty, is never positive; and definite ception
is the same as 'positive'.—The use of the term 'vişāya,' 'object,' excludes Wrong Cognition, the object of which is non-existent.— The use of the particle 'prati' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition. (33) Thus it follows that prativişa yādhyavasõyo drstam,
'Perception is definite cognition of objects Final Definition
ion
the
through the contact of the senso-organs,' is of Perception
the complete definition of Perception,

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[V34
excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers. have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity. (34) The Lokāyatika (materialist) says that Inserence is
not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he Inference, a dis know whether the person he was addressing tinct Means of Cognition was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Cer
tainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception.- Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random-he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not be listened to. In fact, the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of a person could only be inferred from such signs as the man's intention or words. Thus, however much he may dislike it, the Materialist has to admit of Inference as a Means. of Cognition (35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it
, is only right that it should be defined after Definition of Inference general Perception; then again, inasmuch as a defini
tion of Inference in general must precede that of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of Inference in general. It is led up to by the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term;-the Middle Term is that which is less extensive, and the Major Term is that which is more extensive; the 'less extensive' Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance ( with the Major Term ) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious

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·
•
accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive Major Term. The terms Middle Term' and 'Major Term which are really denotative of the objects (of Cognition) stand for the Cognition of those objects. Thus then, taking the case of the Inference, of Fire on the hill from the presence of Smoke, this Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive than the Fire which is more extensive;'i. e. 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire [i. e. Smoke is invariably concomitant with Fire]-The term 'lingi' (which has been taken above as standing for the Major Term) has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the 'Linga' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the Middle Term (Smoke) is present in the Minor Term (Hill). -Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to this-Inference is that Cognition which is led up to by (a) the Cognition of invariable concomitance between the Major Term and the Middle Term (i. e. the Major Premiss) and (b) the Cognition of the Presence of the Middle Term in the Minor Term (i. e. the Minor Premiss).
Definition of particular forms of Inference
TRANSLATION
스
•
(36) The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (Nyāya)-- Inference has been declared to be of three kinds'; i. e. Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) Purvavat, A priori, (2) 'S'eṣavat,' A posteriori, and (3) Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, based on general observation.
First division of Inference into Vita and Avita
T. 2
17
(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds-Vita and Avita; that which functions through an affirmation is the Vita-affirmative; and that which functions through negation Is the Avita, Negative.

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Avita, the negative Inference defined
(38) Of these two, the Avita is also called 'S'esavat, Inference, A posteriori.-S'eṣa' is that which remains, the residue; hence that Inference is 'S'eṣavat' which has this residue for its object. This has been thus described (in the Nyāyabhāṣya on 1, 1. 5)—The S'eṣavat Inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the Cognition of that which remains (undenied and uneliminated)'. An example of this negative Avita will be cited later on (under Kārikā 9, Para 70).
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
Two kinds of Víto
[V88
•
(39) The Vita Inference is of two kinds-(1) The Purvavat, A Priori, and (2) the Samanyatoḍrsta, 'Based on general observation.' Of these the first Purvavat, has for its object that universal' of which a specific individual' has been perceived; the term 'Purvavat (contained in the name 'Purvavat') means well-known,-i. e. that 'universal' of which the specific individual' has been perceived:-and that Inferential Cognition of which such a 'universal' is the object is called Purvavat'; e. g. when, from the presence of Smoke, we infer the presence of the particular 'Universal' Fire in the Hill; and in this case this Universal' Fire is one of which a 'specific individual', in the shape of a particular Fire, has been previously perceived in the kitchen.-The second form of Vita Inference is the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, which is the inferential Cognition having for its object a 'universal' of which a specific individual' has not been perceived; e. g. when we have an Inferential Cognition of the sense-organ; what is inferred in this case is the fact of the Cognition of colour and such things being brought about by the instrumentality of an organ [i. e. 'there must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about'];-though of
•
•

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-V40]
TRANSLATION
10
the Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific in. dividuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been perceived; that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that Universal sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision, in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the Universal Fire' is seen. This is what distinguishes the Pūrvavat from the Sāmānyatodľsta,. though both are equally 'Vita'.- In the term "Sāmānyato dřsta, 'drsta' stands for dars'ana,' Cognition'Sāmānyataḥ stands for 'Sāmānyasya', of the ‘Universal',--the affıx 'tasil' being capable of signifying the sense of all cast-endings;—thus the term · Sāmānyatodssta—anumāna 'stands for the 'Anu mīna, ' Inferential Cognition, of that particular ' universal of which a ' specific individual' has not been perceived.— All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyā yavārtikatāt. paryațīkā, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix.
Valid Assertion
(40) When an experienced person, directing another
experienced person, utters a few words (such Definition of as 'Bring the Cow'),—and the latter, thus
" directed, acts in a certain manner (i.e. brings the cow).-the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person was due to his understanding the sense of the words uttered by the directing person,--and therefrom he comes to recognise the connection between the words used and the action performed;-further, a word is found to express its meaning only when there is recognition of the zonnection between that word and its meaning;—from these two facts it follows that Verbal Cognition is led up to by Inference; consequently, after having defined Inference, the author de

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TATIVA-KAUMUDI
[V41
fines Valid Assertion— Valid Assertion is right revelation'; "Valid Assertion''āptavacana' is the term to be defined. and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term 'āptas'ruti' means that 'S'ruti', revelation, which is 'āpta': ‘right"; the term 'revelation 'stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence. (41) This Valid Assertion is self-sufficient in its
authority; i. e. it is always right, in as much 'Valid Assertion as it is brought about by the words of the is self-sufficient in its authority Veda which being independent of human
authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the Itihāsa and the Smrti, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right. (42) As regards the primeval sage Kapila (the founder
of the Sārikhya Philosophy ), it is possible Reliability of the that he remembered the revealed texts that
he had studied during previous time-cycles; ust as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between Avațya, and Jaigīşavya, where the revered Jaigişavya speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles in the text-' while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc. (43) The introduction of the epithet 'āpta' Right', in
the term 'Right Revelation ('āptavacanam'); Pseudo-Revela. serves to exclude all pseudo-revelations, such tions
as the scriptures of the 'S'ākya-Bhiksu (Buddhist) the 'Nirgranthaka' (Jaina), the 'Samsāramocaka" (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal

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TRANSLATION
21
contradictions, (6) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons Mlecchas and others. (44) The particle 'tu' (' and ') distinguishes 'Valid
Assertion' from 'Inference'. What the Sentence • Valid Assertion' expresses (the meaning) is an object cognised distinct from 'In ference'
( by means of that Sentence ); but the
Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that object, and hence it could not serve as its infer. ential indication (as the Smoke :s of the Fire). Further, when the Sentence expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection ( concomitance ) between itself and the meaning; as we find that in the case of the work of a new poet, the sentence is one never heard before and it, therefore, expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. [ So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference ]. (45) Thus then, the nature of Means of Cognition 'in
c . general and of that of the particular means 'Means of Cogni. tion" posited in of cognition being as described above, -it other Systems in- follows that all the other means of cognition, cluded in those
-such as · Analogy' and the rest,- which
have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been des. cribed above. (46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by
means of the assertion 'As the Cow so the 'Analogy 'includ... led under validegava ya'; and (in as much as this is a verbal Auertion', and assertion ), the cognition brought about by its "Inference and Perseption'
means must be regarded as purely Verbal.As for the notion that 'the term gavaya is
three

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[V46
denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [ which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from Analogy ).—this is purely inferential; the inference being in the following. form
When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it,—specially, when there is no function other than Direct Denotation, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing )'; -as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus 'cow '; ( Major Premiss ).
The term gavaya is used ( by experienced persons ) in reference to the animal similar to the cow :-(Minor Premiss).
• Therefore, the term gavaya must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (Conclusion )
This cognition is purely inferential.
Lastly, the notion that the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow':-this is purely perceptional. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the gavaya, this is perception pure and simple ; certainly the resemblance or similarity in the cow is not something different from that in the gavaya ; for it is regarded to be a case of 'Resemblance' only when the conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this same conglomeration can be one only ; so that when it has been perceived in the gavaya, it must be the same in the cow also.—Thus then, ( every notion involved in what has been regarded as Analogical Cognition being found to be either verbal or inferential or perceptional ), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of ' Analogy'. We conclude therefrom, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition

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23
(47) Similarly 'Presumption also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the Presumption' in- example of 'Presumption that has been cited cluded under ' Inference by the Ancients is the case where on finding that Caitra, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place, and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';-when, therefore, we find that the living Caitra is not in the house,and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be some. where outside the house,-this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of Caitra somewhere in the world cannot set aside his absence in the house; and when it is not so set aside this absence in the house cannot fail to be a valid reason for his presence outside the house. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does Caitra's absence in the house set aside his existence entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this existence be unable to establish itself outside the house. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explainIs Caitra's non-existence in the house inconsistant with his existence itself? Or only with his existence in the house? -It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the house; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different. It might be argued that-"When it is asserted that he must be somewhere, his existence in some place in general being asserted (without any particular place being specified).-in as much as the House also would be included under place in general, the assertion might imply existence

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in the house also; and in this manner the subject matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the House.”—This, however, cannot be right. Non-existence in the house is known defini. tely and for certain, while ( even in the manner shown ) the notion of existence in the house (as implied by existence somewhere) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition. And though the definitely ascertained non-existence in the House sets aside the implied and doubtful existence in the House, it cannot set aside the man's existence; nor can it remove the doubt ( regarding the possibility of existence in the house implied in the general notion of existence somewhere ). What is set aside by the Caitra's non-existence in relation to the House is his existence in the House; as the latter is incompatible with it; but it cannot set aside his existence in general; because there is no incompatibility with this. From all this it follows that, when on the basis of non-existence in the House, as the only ascertained reason ( Middle term ). we deduce the man's existence outside,—it is a case of Inference.
This same reason disposes of also another definition of ‘Presumption' as consisting in the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter fact, there is no inconsistency between what is restricted ( non-existence in the House ) and what is not restricted ( existence somewhere).
Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference.
From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference,

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(48) Similarly, Abhāva, ‘Absence', is only a form of
Perception. The absence of the Jar, at a
ded certain place is not anything distinct from a under Percep. tion'
particular modification of the place itself in
the form of vacancy; all entities-with the sole exception of the Sentient Faculty, -are consequently undergoing modifications; and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses; hence there can be no object, not already covered by these modifications, which could form the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of 'Absence'. (49) 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means
of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as . Probability that of the presence of the lesser weights included under Inference C such as the 'Drona' the Adhaka' the
*Prastha' in the heavier weight the 'Khārī' -This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the Khārī has been found to be invari. ably concomitant with the lesser weights of the Droņa etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights. (50) As for 'Rumour' it is a mere continuity of a vague
assertion of which the original source cannot Rumour' is not be traced ; it generally appears in the form a valid means of cognition
of the old people have said so and so '; such
assertions for instance as 'there is a ghost living on this banyan tree:- This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of * Verbal Cognition' pure and simple.
Thus it becomes established that there are three Means of Cognition.

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(51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or
Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of The 'Sphere' of the existence of the Manifest ', the 'Unthe Means of Cog. nition
og manifest' and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). As
for the 'Manifest', in the shape of Earth and the rest -- even the dusty-footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible). things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of a priori Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge.- Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things. -
Karik VI The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through 'Inference, based on general observation;' that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation, (52) The particle 'tu' (in the text ) distinguishes the
'Inference based on general observation Knowledge of from 'Perception' and from the 'A priori supersensuous
vous Inference'.-'The knowledge of supersensuous things
things,'—such as Primordial Matter, Spint and the rest-'is obtained through Inference based on general observation; what is meant by this knowledge' is the definitive operation of the Buddhi in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.—The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the A posteriori Inference also.

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Things known through Revelation
(53) Question-" Is it only the Inference based on general observation that is effective in bringing about the cognition of all supersensuous things? If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force, Divinities, or the order of evolution of the Mahat and the other Principles,-in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable. "-In answer to this it is added- That inperceptible thing etc.;' what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term 'Tasmat' only; hence the presence of the particle 'ca' is to be taken as meant to include the A Posteriori Inference also.
(54)
'Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as 'sky-flowers,
tortoises
Objection
hair, hare's horns' and the like leads to their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature and the rest (which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception). This. being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?" The answer to this is as follows
TRANSLATION
66
The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained
*
27
Karika VII
(Non-perception of things arises) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, (of other objects), and intermixture with other like objects. (55) From excessive distance -The "non-perception" of the following Karika is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the Lion's back-ward glance'*
•
4.
The maxim of the lion's back-ward glance' is generally used. to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows. "

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A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its extreme remoteness. 'Excessive' fati) must also be taken with proximity' (sāmipya lm e. g. the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of extreme nearness.
“ Destruction of organs"-e. g., blindness, deafness, etc.
" From absence of mind"-e. g., a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses.
"From subtlety "me. 8., however much one may concentrate one's mind ( i. e., however attentively one may look ) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes.
" From Intervention "-e. g., one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls.
" From suppression"-e. g., the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.
“From intermixture"-e.g., one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.
(56) The particle 'ca' in the Karikā has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned ; such as * non-manifestation' also becomes included ( among the causes of non-perception )--as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested
(57) The upshot of the whole then is this :-The nonexistence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only

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with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their nonexistence. And this capability of being perceived can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception.
Question-Which of the above mentioned causes (of non-perception ) applies in the case of Nature etc.?
The answer is
Karika VIII The non-perception of these ( Nature and the rest ) The non-appre
orer is due to its subtlety, not to its nonhension of Nature existence; since it is actually apprehenddue to subtelty ed through its effects. and not to non
These effects existence. Its are the Great Principle, and the rest existence verified by its effects effects (some of which are similar. and
(some ) dissimilar to Nature. (58) “Why should we not," continues the objector, "attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Rasa (in eatables )?"
The Author replies.—“Not due to its non-existence". Why? "Because it is apprehended through its effects." 'It' refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Kärikā XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of know. ledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself).* The seventh
* This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects the proof being based on the geno. ral proposition "Every effect must have a cause." The effects, Mahat etc., are perceptible; these must have a cause and this cause is Nature.

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Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge; and hence the incapacity of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the
text.
(59) Question.—“What are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature ?"
Answer.-" The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects." This will be explained later on (Karikā XXII):
Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature-the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom :-"Similar and dissimilar to Nature."
This will be further explained in Kārkā XXIII et. seq.
(60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is Different views that there is a Cause; in regard to this subwith regard to the nature of the ef. ject (of cause and effect) there is a difference fect. (1) The Bauddha'view of of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some the effect being an
people assert that the existent' (effect) ema. entity arising from non-entity: (2) The nates from the non-existent' ( cause ): Vedanta view of the whole series (2) others represent all effects as mere of effects being a : mere evolution illusory evolutions from out of a single from a single real entity. (3) The
The entity, and not real entities in themselves; Nyaya and (3) others again hold that the 'non-exisVais' esika view of the effect being tent' (effect) emanates from the existent a non-entity arising from entity.
(cause): (4) lastly, the revered ones declare (4) The şam that the existent' (effect) emanates from khya view of the effect being an the 'existent' (cause). entity arising from an entity

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31
(61) Under the first three of these theories, the exis
tence of Nature ( Primordial Root-Matter ) The impossibility cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the of the existence of Nature being world is found to consist of Sound and other proved in accord. Elements which are only different forms and ance with the first three views modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delu
sion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter ( Nature ) whose 'primordiality' must consist in its being of the nature of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (which alone are the essence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion ). Such being the case, if the existent' effect were the product of the ' non-existent' cause ( the first view above ).-then, how could the non-existent Cause which must be characterless, be of the nature of Sound and other Elements consisting of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion? As, certainly the non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent - If (as under the second view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent Being.--then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent effect emanates from the existent cause '; and the second view is open to the further objection that the One Being could never constitute what is phenomenal; in fact the conception of the nonphenomenal as constituting the phenomenal must be wrong. Even under the theory of Kaņāda and Gautama,-that 'the nonexistent effect is born out of the existent cause,'-as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Pri. mordial Matter (Nature).
(62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation).

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Karika IX
The effect is existent; (1) because what is ‘non
existent' cannot be produced; (2) because The five proofs of there is a definite relation of the cause the effect being
ing (with the effect); (3) because all is not an entity
possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly). because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.
(63) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. 'The effect is existent,'-- even before the operation of the cause,—this is what is meant. The followers of Nyāya cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of doing what is already done' (1. e., if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);—such an objection cannot be raised [ for reasons to be explained later on].
[As regards the theory that 'the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause'] though it is true that products like the sprout and the jar are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump [ so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this Destruction, which is non-existent].-yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to Destruction, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay-lump. If a positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such negation (of things) would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyāyavārtikatātparyaţikā.

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33
(64) [ As regards the Vedanta theory ) the belief in Th.
the existence of the phenomenal world can view met ta not be said to be illusory unless we have
some proof invalidating its existence.* [ Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere illusory evolution ']. (65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kaņāda,
with reference to which the author asserts The Nyaya and " The effect is existent." Vais'e sika view
In support of criticised; and the this assertion, the following proofs are adSamkhya view established
niew duced — (1) “What is non-existent cannot be
produced." If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If it be held that “ 'existence and 'non-existence are mere properties belonging to the jar,' even so, if the object to which the property belongs is ‘nonexistent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because of the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, ex-hypothesis), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent' ?-Hence it follows that, as after the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'.
Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i. e., its ernanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent). The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience; e, g. there
* This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.
T.3

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is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,-of rice from paddy by thumping.--and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is ‘nonexistent' is never found to be either manifested or produced.
(66) (2) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause: “Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect." The term 'Upādāna' (in the text) stands for Cause,--and the Grahana' of the cause stands for its relation to the effect: so that the compound 'Upādanagrahanāt' means 'because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect'. What is meant is that the cause produces the effect only when in relation with it; and there could be no such relation with Che effect of the latter were 'non-existent '; hence [the effect must be regarded as `existent']
(67) Objection: “Granted all this; bul why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a 'non-existent' effect that would be produced."
In answer to this we have the next clause
(3) "Because all is not possible."--If the effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then every effect would arise from every cause ( without restriction ), as all would be equally unrelated to the cause.--But such is not the case. Hence a related effect only can be produced by a related cause, and not an unrelated effect by an unrelated cause. This is thus asserted by the teachers of Sārkhyas'Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent ; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all.
(68). Objection : "Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from
www

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35
actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction ( such as has been argued above)".
Answer : (4) “Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient. "-Now then, asks our author, does this efficiency' subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things or upon that effect only which is amenable to that efficiency? If the former, then the same confusion arises; of the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted that "the ( causal ) efficiency itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not all”,-then we ask-Is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours connected with the particular effect or not ? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is ‘non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent '; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.-Thus it is rightly argued that because the cfficient cause can do only that for which it is efficient' (the effect cannot be 'non-existent').
(69) (5) For the following reason also the effect should be regarded as existent:-"Because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.”—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is existent; then how can the effect, nonseparate from this latter, be 'non-existent'? (70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the
effect from the cause are the following: (a) Proofs of the non-The cloth ( an effect) is not different from difference of cause and effect the yarns (constituting it),--because it sub
sists in the yarns;-an object differing in ats essence from another, can never subsist in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth does subsist in the yarns;-hence it follows that it is not different from the cause.
(6) The Cloth and the Yarns cannot be different things, because the latter is the constituent cause of the former ;whore any two things are entirely different, one is never found

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to be the constituent cause of the other, e.g., in the case of the Jar and the Cloth; as between the Cloth and the Yarns, however, the Yarns are the constituent cause of the Cloth ;hence it follows that the two are not different.-(c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the Cloth and Yarns : because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them ;'conjunction' is found 10 take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to separation', as between the Himavān and the Vindhya;-in the case of the Cloth and the Yarns, however, there is neither conjunction' nor separation', - hence it follows that they are not different.-(d) For the following reason too, the Cloth and the Yarns are not different things: because the Cloth does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the Yarns constituting it,-as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter-e.g., the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two palas is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single pala ;—but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the Cloth and that of the weight of the Yarns constituting it;-hence the Cloth is not different from the Yarns. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference-[ Avitānumāna—see, Karika V] establishing the non-difference (of the Cloth and the Yarns in particular, and of cause and effect in general).
(71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as -(a) "If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self-contradictory actions [ that is, when the cloth' is.

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37
torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and that of being produced on the part of the threads or yarns; the identity of the cloth and the yarns would thus mean that the same thing is both destroyed and produced at the same time);-(b) there is notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being related (which means that the two members of the relationship are different); (c) the function of the useful purpose served by the cause is different from that served by the effect (e. g., the cloth serves the useful purpose of covering things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns ]." These arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the appearance and disappearance of certain factors: (a) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its bɔdy and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be produced on emanating and appearing from these latter, and to be destroyed on entering them again (i. e., being formed into clay, etc.,) and disappearing. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no 'production' or birth for what is ‘non-existent', nor destruction for what is 'existent';-as has been declared by the revered Krşņadvaipāyana ( Vyāsa in the Bhagavadgitā, 2. 16 )—'There is no being for the non-existent, nor non-being for the existent.' -In the instance cited, the Tortoise is not different from its appearing and disappearing limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth.—b) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth is in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being

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analogous to the assertion ‘There are Tilaka trees in the forest'.-(c) As for the difference in the useful purpose served, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of burning, cooking and lighting. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the furction of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of covering, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the cloth, they can serve the purpose of covering.
(72) Opponent.—“[You say that the cloth is already
existent in the cause, the yarns; and when An objeccion based on the nature of it is supposed to be produced, it is only the mantestation manifested. )--Now, was this manifestation of the cffect
fect of the cloth existent, before the operation of the cause ? Or was it non-existent ? If the latter, then the production of what was non-existent becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the manifestation of the cloth) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the manifestation is 'existent', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed); -- then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth."

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39
(73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own
theory that the non-existent effect is produced, Reply-The objection set aside what is this production"? Is it existent or as common to non-existent ? If it is existent, then there is both theories
no need for the causes. If it is non-existent, then there should be production of that 'production' also, - so that there would be an endless series of productions'.
(74) If, in order to avoid the endless series of productions', you hold that the 'production' is nothing more or less than the 'cloth' itself, then the term 'cloth' would be syno. nymous with production'; so that, when the term 'cloth has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say 'the cloth is destroyed '; because destruction and production (denoted by cloth) can never co-exist. :
(75) Thus, (Even under the Nyāya theory] the 'produc. tion of the cloth' must consist either in the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in the inherence of the cloth in its Being '; in either case, the said Production cannot be produced (as Inherence is eternal); and yet for the purposes of that production' several causes have to be set into operation. And (just as you need the causes for the bringing about of the
production' which is eternal), so would there be need for causes for the manifestation of the already existent products like the cloth.—The causes cannot be related to the form of the cloth; because the form is not an operation, and it is only to an operation that causes are directly related; as otherwise ( without being related to operation ) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all.
(76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever existent.
(77) Having thus proved the effect to be existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the

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reverse of this.
Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved.
Karika X The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not
pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'comPoints of dissimi. larity between ponent', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and the Unmanifest the Manifest and dependent':-The Unmanifest is the
(78) 'With cause' (Product ). The question as to All the walifice. what is the cause of what, will be dealt with tions explained later on ( Kārıkā XXII ).
(79) 'Not eternal'-destructible, i.e., evanescent [being absorbed in its material cause.* ]
(80) 'Not pervasive ' ,--that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade over all evolutes. It is the effect that is pervaded over by the cause,- not the cause by the effect; e. g., the Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and other products can never pervade Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'.
(81) 'Active'--. e., mobile. The Sentient Faculty ( Buddhı ), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another ; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation ).
(82) Multiform';-as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things.
(83) 'Component',--of its cause; though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in
* Since the Samkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.

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6
41
the relation of 'composite and component' has been made on the basis of some sort of assumed difference; just as in the case of such assertions as There are Tilaka trees in this forest' (when the trees have no existence apart from the forest).
(84) Soluble',-into Nature. The Sentient Faculty and the rest are soluble into Nature, as is going to be explained later on.- -Nature cannot be soluble in itself though it may be so regarded in its relation to the Spirit.
(85) Conjunct'.-Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [ Unsatisfied with this explanation on the the ground of the relationship between the whole and its parts being eternal, the author offers another explanation].-Or, the term 'avayava' (in the compound Savayavam') may be explained as equivalent to 'avayavana', i. e., the mutual adhesion, contact,-1. e., Conjunction,-between wholes and parts. Conjunction consists in union following on disunion;
"
and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word Savayavam. For instance, there is such mutual conjunction among earth, water and other substances; there can be no such conjunction between Nature on the one hand and (its products) Sentient Faculty and the rest; be. cause these latter are essentially the same as Nature. Nor can there be any conjunction between the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, because there is no disunion (absence of contact) among these.
(86) 'Dependent',-the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the I-principle, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature: without such assistance it would be too weak to pro" duce the I-principle. Similarly, the I-principle and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products. Thus, in the producing of its product, 'everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though efficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the Mani

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fest is dependent, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature.
(87) 'The Unmanifest is the reverse, - of the Manifest. That is to say—the Unmanifest is without cause, eternal, pervasive, and inactive-[ though to Nature does belong the action of evolution, yet it can have no mobility ]-one, notcomponent, not-soluble, unconjunct and independent.
(88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the sunılarıties between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:
Karika XI The Manifest is 'with the three Attributes' (Guņas). The points of “undistinguishable' (or non-separative"), similarity betweer obiective': 'common', 'insentient' and the Manifest and the Unmanifest productive'. So also is Nature. The and those of dis- Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in similarity of these from the soul some respects ) similar.
(89) With the three Attributes. —That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit.
(90) Undistinguishable ;-just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi). being connate with Nature, cannot be distinguished from Nature. Or 'aviveki' may stand for non-separativeness', i e., for the character of being co-operative, among the 'manifest things, there is no one thing that is adequate by itself to produce its effect; it can do so only when in co-operation with other things; and hence it is not possible for anything to be produced out of anything taken singly by itself. (91) Some people have held that it is Idea (Vijñāna)
alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and An objectio: based delusion, and that there exists nothing beon the Idealism of the Bauddhas
sides this Idea that could possess these (pleasure, etc.,) as its attributes.

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In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest
is 'objective"; "objective' here stands for jection set aside
0.5- 'what can be apprehended'. That is, it is
exterior to the Idea.-And because it is 'objective', therefore, 'common —i. e., apprehended ( simultaneously) by several persons. If it were nothing more or less than the Idea, then in that case,-in as much as Ideas, being in the form of 'functions', belong specially to particular individuals, all that is ‘manifest' would have to belong specially to particular individuals. That is to say, as a matter of fact, the Idea of one person is not apprehended by another, the cognition of another person being always uncognisable. In the case of [ Manifest substance such as the ) glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case of it were otherwise ( i. e., if the glance were a mere Idea ).
(92) 'Insentient'-Nature (Prakıtı), Sentient Faculty (Buddhı) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the Buddhi as held by the Vainās'ika (Buddhist).
(93) 'Productive' ---i. e., possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been prasavadharmā', but the author has used the particular possessive asfix (rin), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of productiveness as belonging to the Manifest; the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products.
(94) The author attributes the properties of the Manifest to the Unmanifest-So also is Nature',-i.e., as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the Manifest, just enumerated, belong to Nature also). o
(95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated. The spirit is the reverse.

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(96) 'Objection':-"How can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse' of the Manifest and the Unmanifest; Objection-There when we see that there are points of similaare points of simi
larity also beween rity between the Spirit and the Unmanifestthe soul and the such as being without cause', 'eternal'
Manifest as well
as the Unmanifest and so on-as also between the Spirit and the Manifest-such as being multiform' ?"
44
[X.96
Answer: 'Yet also similar';-that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as being without cause' and the rest, yet there are points there are points of of dissimilarity also, in the form of being similarity as well as of dissimilarity devoid of the three Attributes and the rest.
The objection conceded to
(97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the question arisesWhat are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text:
"
*This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation It stands for the Gunas of the Samkhyas-a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;-as says Colebrooke-" These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition. On this Davies remarks- Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed. there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, this inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Rajas. Davies has rendered this im. portant word-'Guna'-by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, quality which it may have or not, without effecting its essence or existence." The Guna of the Samkhyas, however, is almost the reverse of this-it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have preferred to translate Guna as Attribute'-using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode: "By Attribute, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence; by Mode, I understand the affections of substances, etc."
a

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Karikā XII The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain
and delusion; they serve the purpose of The Character of illumination, action and restraint; and the three Attributes (Gunas)" they are mutually subjugative, and sup
porting, and productive and co-operative. (98) These are called Guņus (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spırıts). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Karikā. And according to the maxim cf presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the *pleasure' (pain' and 'delusien ') of this Kārıkā are to be taken in the same crder (as 'Sattua, etc.,' in the next).
(99) Thus then, the meaning is that ‘Priti' being Pleasure, the Sativa attribute is of the nature of pleasure;
Apriti' being Pain, the Rajas attribute is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, 'Vişūda' being Delusion, the Tamas attribute is of the nature of delusion. The word 'Ātman', 'nature' has been added with a view to discard the theory that "pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain and vice versa."' As a matter of fact, Pleasure and Pain are not mere negations of one another; on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term 'ātman' 'nature' connotes positive reality, so that those things are 'prityātman', whose nature, i. e., Existence, is in the form of pleasure; similarly with the other terms (*aprityātman' and 'vişādātman"). The idea of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, 13 vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other. (100) Having thus described the nature of the Aetributes,
the author next describes their several Their functions
tions functions:-"They serve the purpose of illumi

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nation, action and restraint."--Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. The Rajas-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant Sattvaattribute to action, if it were not restrained by the sluggish Tamas-attribute-by which restraint it operates only at intervals; thus the Tamas-attribute becomes a restraining force.
(101) Having thus described their functions, the author
proceeds to describe the method of their The method of
operation-" They are mutually subjugative their operation
and supporting and productive and co-operative." The term 'vrttı' at the end of the compound is to be construed with each member of the compound (thus the compound is to be resolved into the four terms (1) anyonyā. bhibhavavrtta’yaḥ, (2) anyonyās'ra yavrttayaḥ, (3) anyonya - jananavrttayaḥ and (4) anyonyamithunavrttayaḥ].
Now to explain, (1) “ Mutually subjugatile "_The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other; e. g., the Sattva attrbute attains its calm state only after having subdued the Rajas and Tamas attributes. Similarly the Rajas attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the Sattva and Tamas attributes; and the Tamas attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the Sattva and Rajas attributes.-(2) “Mutually supporting."
-Though this epithet is not applicable here, in the sense of the container and the contained, yet what is meant by support (Assraya) here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. For instance, the Sattva attribute helps the Rajas and Tamas attributes through the help of activity and restraint (which are the functions of the Rajas and Tamas attributes). [Or else, the Sattva attribute by itself, without the help of Rajas, would remain inert, and never be moved to action].

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Similarly the Rajas attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of illumination and restraint,and the Tamas attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of illumination and activity. (3) “Mutually productive." That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By production here is meant modification, and this is always of the same character as the parent Attribute. This is the reason why this 'modification is not regarded as 'caused' (produced), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it non-eternal, transient,--there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) “Mutually co-operative." That is to say, they are mutual concomitants not existing apart from one another. The particle ca has the cumulative force.
In support of the above, we have the following Smrtı text: “All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; Sattva is the consort of Rajas, Rajas of Sattva, both of these again of Tamas, which latter again of both, Sattva and Rajas. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived." (Devi-Bhāgavata, 3. 8).
(102) It has been said that the Attributes "serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint." Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so :
Kārikā XIII The Sattva-attribute is held to be buoyant and illumiThe three stil nating; the Rajas-attribute exciting and butos named and mobile; and the Tamas-attribute sluggish their nature ex- and enveloping. Their functioning is for plained.
a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XIII103
Goodness (Sattva)
(103) The Sattva-attribute, etc.-The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of The Properties of Samkhya, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy-as opposed to sluggishness-is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); sluggish
Buoyancy
Illuminativeness ness, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Karikā XII).
Necessity of the properties of Foulness (Rajas) -activity and excitingness
(104) Sattva and Tamas, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects; the driving force is supplied by Rajas, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. It is for this reason that Rajas is said to be exciting. This exciting character of Rajas is next accounted for-" (it is also) mobile. This shows that the operation of Rajas is necessary for all activity.
Necessity of the properties of
(105) On account of its mobility, Rajas would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the Darkness (Tamas), "sluggish and enveloping" Tamas, which sluggishness and obstructs its activity, which is operative envelopingness in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active Rajas, Tamas has been said to be the restrainer-" Darkness is sluggish and enveloping." The particle eva' is to be construed-not only with 'Tamas but with 'Sattva' and 'Rajas' also.

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natures cannot
(106) The enquirer objects: “Instead of co-operating for
a single purpose, the Attributes, being enObjection-The dowed as they are with contradictory proAttributes of contradictory perties, would counteract each other, like
Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champiCo-operate
ons ); there can be no possibility of their combining for a single purpose." The author replies
“Their functioning is for a single purpose, Reply-they can, like that of the lamp." We have all like wick and oil, in giving light observed how the wick and the oil-each,
by itself, opposed to the action of fire-cooperate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; similarly, the three humours of the body-wind, bile, and phlegm-though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end ;-' for the single purpose', of the emancipation of the Spnt. This will be further explained in Kârıkā XXXI. (107) Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual con.
tradictions, lead to the assumption of three Necessity of different causes connate with themselves postulating the three Attri.** respectively, (and it is these causes that we butes as causes have postulated the three Attributes ). These of pleasure, pain and delusionres- three causes also must be multiform, since, pectively by their very nature, they are mutually sup
pressive. As an example (of the multiform character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion ), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband, - why?-because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives-why?-because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same gırl deludes or
T.4

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stupesies another man who is unable to get at her--why?because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the Attribute
of Sattva, the essence of which is Pleasure; Goodness the the cause of pain is the Attribute of Rajas, cause of Pleasure; Foulness of Pain,' the essence of which is Pain; and lastly, the and Darkness of cause of delusion is the Attribute of Tamas, Delusion
the essence of which is Delusion. As regards Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy
(which are the properties attributed to The Properties of Sattva), these are not mutually contradiccach of the Attri. butes are not tory, and as such, not incapable of cocontradictory, and existing in a single substratum; in fact, they so they do not necessitate the are actually found together (subsisting in assumption of Sattva). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminative. different causes for each of them ness and Buoyancy, being mutually not
contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally) --as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a single substratum). In the same manner, Pain, Mobility and Activity (the properties of Rajas),-as also Delusion, Sluggishness, and Envelopingness (the properties of Tamas), [ do not necessitate the assumption of several causes). Thus it is established that there are three-and only three-Attributes.
(108) Objection:-"As regards earth, and other things
known to us, we actually perceive the Question-Indis. creetness, etc., of properties of 'undistinguishableness' and the Attributes, the rest (described in Kârıka XI) as belong. bow provad?
80 ing to them, and we admit them so far, But the Sattva and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri

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51
bute to these latter, the said properties of being 'undistin. guishable,' 'objective,' 'insentient' and 'productive' ( as described under Kârıkā XI above)?" Answer :
Kārikā XIV The properties of being 'undistinguishable and the
rest are proved by the existence of the Two reasons for the above given. three Attributes, and by the non-existence Existence of, of these (the three Attributes) in their Nature proved
absence. And the existence of the Unmanifest (Nature) too is establised on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause. (109) By “aviveki" in the Kārıkā is to be understood
the abstract form .avivekıtva'; just as 'dur' First Proof: From the existence of and ‘eka'-in the Sātra “Doyeka yordvivaca. the three Attri- naikavacane" (Pānını I-IV-22) -stand for butes
dvitva' and 'ekatva' respectively; if it were not so, then the form of the compound would be “duye kesu” (and not “duyeka yoh").* Question.—How do you prove the properties of "undistinguishableness" and the rest ?Answer:-"By the existence of the three Attributes." That is, in the case of manifested entities known to us, it has been found that 'whatever is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, is endowed with the properties of being undistingui. shable and the rest';—this affirmative universal proposition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many words because it is clearly known,-- It proceeds to state the negative premiss in the next term-' by the non-existence of these in their absence'; that is, where the said properties of
* For if the compound were analysed into 'dur' and `eka', the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual, which is explained by making 'dur' and 'eka' stand for .dvitra" and 'ekatva' making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

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being undistinguishable' and the rest are absent.--as in the Spirit,--the three Attributes of Sattva etc., are non-existent. Or, we may have the Manifest and the Unmanifest (both together ) as the subject ( minor term ) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning-"By the existence of the three Attributes"-as a purely negative inference* (Avita ), there being no other case ( besides the minor term ) where there could be an affirmation (of the reason, Middle termexistence of the Attributes). (110) Objection:-“The existence of the properties of
'being undistinguishable and the rest, cannot Question--How, be proved before the object possessing these is Nature proved to exist ?
e properties ( the Unmanifest ) has been prov.
ed to exist. The existence of the Unmanifest itself has nat yet been proved; how then can the existence of the said properties be proved ?". Answer :--The existence of the Unmanifest is established
on the ground of the properties of the effect Reply : From the properties of the being of the same nature as those of the effect being due cause. The sense of the argument is as to those of the cause.
follows : All effects are found to possess
properties similar to those of their respective * The syllogism has been previously explained as-" Whatever has pleasure etc., is undistinguishable, as the perceptible, material substences." -and here we have the affirmation ( Anvaya ) of the reason in the perceptible substances " whose connotation 19 different from that of the subject of the syllogrsm," All things having pleasure etc." Now, what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus “ All things besides the Spirit (the Manifest and the Unmanifest ) are undistinguishable, since they have the three Attributes, and whatever is not undistinguishable does not have the three Attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism, we have for ths, minor term The Manifest and the Unmanifest which comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifest and the Unmanifest can be said to have the three Attributes.

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causes; e. g., the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;-t is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the Unmanifest, Primordial Matter ( Nature ) is established.*
(111) Says the enquirer, “the followers of Kaņāda (the
cont Vais'eşikas ) and Gautama ( the Naiyāyıkas ) Why not accept the atomic assert that Manifest is produced out of the theory, which dis- Manifest ; According to them Atoms are cards the necessity of an manifest, and these produce the manifest Unmanifested product, from the binary compound onwards Entity ?
to the Earth, Water and other substances ; and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the
* And consequently Nature too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before-"What. ever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also." The reason. ing may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristote. lan syllogisms.-- Properties of the effect ( Intellect) are properties of the cause
(Nature ). Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect ( Intellect)
.. Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause ( Nature ). And again :
Whatever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreetness, etc. Nature has pleasure, etc., ( as first proved ). .. Nature has indiscreetness, etc.

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( constituent ) atoms.* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the Manifest what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity ( in the form of Nature ? )" We reply--
Karika XV (1) Because of the finite nature of specific objects,
(11) because of homogeneity, (111) because Reply-we must postulate an Un- of evolution being due to the efficiency manifested Reali- of the cause, (iv) because of separation ty-reasons given between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects ), --there is the Unmanifest as the cause ( next Karikā). (112) “Of specific objects" i. e., of the products
in the shape of the Great Principle and the First proof of the existence of rest--the cause, root-cause is the UnmaniPraksti. Since fest (Nature ). Why so ?-(iv) “because tion of cause and
ord of the separation between the cause and effect effect, and reunion and because of the merging of the whole of the whole Universe
Universe";-It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause ; the
there 28 separa
# The atomic theory of Kanada and Gautama may be thus summed up-In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth. Water, Fire and Air ) besides, of course, Akās'a, etc., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively en. dued with four different sets of properties, latter'y perceived in their compounds By some agency or other mainly that of Adrsta, the Unseen ( Fate )--all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com. pounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else, they could not be permanent But as far as I know, no Navyāyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine point which affords the strongest handle to Sankarācārya in his refutation of the atomic theory. See s'āriraka-Bhasya on the Brahma-Sutras II 11-12-17.

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55
already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it--'this is the Body of the Tortoise and these are its limbs' and on again entering the body, they become unmanisest, hidden; similarly, the already existing products, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, on emerging out of the cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, come to be distinguished from this cause;—similarly, the already existing products in the shape of the Earth and other subtances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmatras ) become distinguished from them ; the already existing Primary Elements on emer. ging out of their cause, the 'I-principle', come to be disting. uished from it; the already existing 'l-principle', emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest ( Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This distinguishing' or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects-related to it either mediately ( as with Earth, etc.) or immediately ( as with Great Principle ) -is what is meant by the " distinction between the cause and its product". Similarly, at counter-evolution or dissolution, the product, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears. i. e., becomes Unmanifest ; which means that it is a form of the cause itself which becomes unmanifest, so far as the particular product is concerned. Thus also when the Earth and the other substances merge into the Primary Elements, they render these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as the forms of those substances themselves are concerned ;-similarly, when the Primary Elments merge into the I-principle, they render these latter unmanifest' in so far as their own form concerned; - when the l.principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(XV118_
concerned;--and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of Nature itself into anything else, it is unmanifest pure and simple. This is what is meant by 'the non-separation or merging of the whole world of effects', of all kinds. The term 'Vais'varūpya' is formed by the adding of the reflexive affıx 'syan' ( to the term 'vis' varūpa '). From all this it follows that, in as much as there is ‘distinction' and also 'merging of the already existing product in the cause, there must be Unmanifest as the cause. (113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest
is the cause— 'Because of evolution being due Second proof Be. to the efficiency of the causc;" – It is a wellcause Evolution is due to Energy
ery known fact that the evolution of the effect
is due to the efficiency of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent 'efficiency in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being existent, there can be no other form of causal efficiency, apart from the fact of the effect being latent in the cause. The difference of sand from sesamum—the mate. rial cause of oil-lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition. (114) Objection: “The above two reasons that you have
urged—the fact of evolution being due to the Objection: These efficiency of the cause and that the separatwo reasons might rest with Intelleci tion and merging of the cause and effect
might be taken as proving the supreme *Unmanifest' character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?"
Answer: "Because of the finite nature of specific Reply-Third objects";- parimāņāt stands for ‘parimitatproof_" Fran vāt', 'because of being measured, i.e., finite'. finitene88" (of all manifested [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic existence )
form]-The specific objects in question, the

Page #197

-XV115]
TRANSLATION
Great Principle and the rest, have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (i. e., they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state),-because, they are finite, -like the jar and other things:--the jar and other things are found to have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested ( state of the effects ); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Uamanifest which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.* (115) For the following reason also the specific objects
in question must have causes wherein they lie Fourth proof, unmanifested:- Because of homogeneity":"Because of homogeneity" 'Homogeneity' consists in the similarity of
the different objects. The Great Principle and the rest-manifesting themselves as 'volition' and the rest-are found to be 'homogeneous' in the sense that they consist in Pleasure Pain and Delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it becomes established that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.**
Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation:
* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of the Great Principle) 18 not finite, as its effects, 'l.principle' and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.
** Thus we have in the present case: The Great Principle and the rest are invariably connected, with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; and as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all Re unmani. fested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its constituent elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in Pleasure. Pain and Delusion.

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58
The method of Nature's operation
Karika XVI
There is the Unmanifest as the cause (gone before); it operates through the three Attributes, by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
Through the Attributes
[XVI116
(116) "Operates through the three Attributes".-At the time of the cosmic dissolution, each of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, continues its homogeneous modifications. Modification forms the very nature of the Attributes; and as such, they can never, for a moment, remain unmodified. Hence even at the time of dissolution, each of the Attributes, Sattva and the rest, operates through its own particular form* [This is at the period of dissolution].
By a blending of
the Attributes
(117) Another method of operation (which comes in at the creative period) is next stated-" By blending". The term 'samudaya' signifies samet ya udaya', appearing in combination, i. e., blending. This blending of the Attributes is not possible. without some sort of relative subserviency among them; and this relative subserviency again is not possible without some diversity among the Attributes;-this diversity again is not possible without one being suppressive of the other ( i. e., unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another).-This is the second method of operation which brings about the Great Principle and other products.**
*This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible.
** The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations -Intellect and the rest.

Page #199

_XV1[119]
TRANSLATION
(118) The enquirer objects—"How can diverse methods
of operation belong to the Attributes, when Objection-How each of them is of one uniform nature?" We can an Attribute of uniform nature reply—“By modification like water;"-we bring about
all know how the water falling from the diverse actions
clouds, though naturally of itself, having one taste, * becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and hot,
according as it comes into contact with Reply:-" By different modifications of earth and becomes modification as water.''
transformed into the juice of fruits such as
cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, ( owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the Attributes), the Attributes of Nature come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about various modifications (in the state of various products ). This is what is meant by the phrase: “on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes." That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.
(119) There are some self-contented (Materialists) who accept, as 'Spirit', either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the ‘I-principle' or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. As against these, the Author makes the following declaration.
Karikä XVII (a) Because all composite objects are for another's
use, (b) because there must be absence of Reason for the the three Attributes and other properties, existence of Spirit
(c) because there must be control, (d) be
cause there must be some one to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards
#Sweet' according to the Naiyāyikas.

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60
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there.
[XVII120
The Spirit exists : because all
are for another
(120) The Spirit must be there, apart from the Unmanifest (Nature) and other things. (a) "Because all composite objects are for another's use"compound objects This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand thus-Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things.-Nature and the rest are all composite', being composed as they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.* (represented by the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas).
(121) "But"
an Elementary Spirit
Objection: The above reasoning
says the objector, the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to exist for the Body which is itself a composite would only lead thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from compounds, not to Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c.,
to another set of
being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing-(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit.
06
We reply-" Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties."-That is to Reply-Since the say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being reverse of that which possesses for another's use', we were to infer only the three Attributes another composite object, then in that case,
must exist
we would have to assume such composite
*This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.

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-X111121]
TRANSLATION
objects ad infinitum; for even this latter compound would lead
to the influence of another for whose use it The view of the objector would will exist and this again to another, and so lead to compounds on ad infinitum. And when we can escape ad infinitum
this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a reasonable terininus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that “Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence" because when the 'composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with being for another's use' (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects); in fact if one were to insist upon the Inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),--then there would be an end to all Inference (no Inference being possible ).* We have explained this in our Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā.** Thus then, in order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, if we accept the non-composite nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being “without the three Attributes", " distinguishable", "non-objective".
* Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyāyıkag--"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"-we have a dissimilarity between the subject matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.
** This is a commentary on Udyotakara's Nyāyavārtika (a glogs on the Vātsyāyanbhāsya on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama). This work with the Paris'uddhi of Udayanācārya is generally counted as olosing the epoch of ancient Nyāya.- latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Ganges'a Upadhyāya, in his Tattva.Cintā maņı.

Page #202

TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XV11122
must be
( subjective ), "uncommon (specific) ", " sentient", and "not productive". Because 'being with three Attributes' and other properties are always accompanied by that of 'being composite', which latter being absent in the Spirit, must lead to the inference of the absense of the three Attributes, &c., just as when a certain individual is not a ' Brāhmaṇa; he cannot be a ‘katha' (a special class of Brāhmaṇas). Hence when he laid down that "there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.," he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit. . (122) For the following reason also there must be a
Spirit apart from Matter: "Because there must Because there be control"; that is to say, because the superintendences objects constituted by the three Attributes
are such as 'are always controlled ';--as a matter of fact it is found that everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, (1. e. in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else—c. g., the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to 'consist in pleasure, pain and delusion"; therefore, they must have a 'controller'—and this controller' must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent;--and this is the Spirit. (123) Again there must be the Spirit “because there
. must be some one to experience". The term Because there someone to experience' indicates the must be one to objects of experience in the shape of pleasure
and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must
feel
* Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a regressus ad infinitum.

Page #203

-XVII126]
TRANSLATION
63
be something other than the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to the Great Principle and other products; as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.* Thus, then, something else, which does not consist of pleasure, etc., must be the one to whom things are agreeable or disagreeable; and this something else must be the Spirit.
A different interpretation of the above reason
(124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Karika thus: The term 'Bhogya stands for visible; and the visibility of the Great Principle and the rest not being possible without an observer, there must be one outside of, and beyond them; and this is the Spirit. What the word 'bhoktṛbhāvāt ' of the text means is 'because the observer is to be inferred from the visible'. The visibility of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,-like the Earth and other substances,-of pleasure, pain and delusion.
(125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there-"because there is tendency towards Isolation."-The 'Iso. Because of the lation' which is found in all scriptures and tendency of writers and sages is recognised by great sages and others towards beatitude possessed of divine insight as the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain-can never belong to the Great Principle and other products; because, by their very nature, the pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved,
* That is to say-the Great Principle, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;--or worse still-by pain; and vice versa, which is absurd.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XVII[126
since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element. It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards ‘Isolation', there must be something beyond ( pleasure, etc., and hence ) the Great Principle and the rest, ---and this is the Spirit.
(126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this Spirit one* ( manifesting itself ) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body? And in reply he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.
Karika XVIII (1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth,
death, and the organs, (2) because there Plurality of is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) be. Spirits-reasons
cause there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established. (127) “Because etc."--The plurality of Spirits is
established, -why? "Because there is From allotment of definite adjustment of birth, death and the birth, death and the organs
a organs. The Birth of the Spirit consists
in its connection with a new set of body, sense-organs, mind, 'l.principle'. Great Principle and feeling** ( Vedanā )-all these latter forming a composite
* As the Vedāntin asserts.
** " Vedanā might be taken severally with 'body' etc., In that case the passage would be translated thus: 'bodily' sensuous, mental egoistic and intellectual cognitions ; but the translation given above is preferable, for certainly there can be no fognition through body etc., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone without the aid of ( the sense organs ) mind etc., and so on with the rest.

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-XV11128]
TRANSLATION
65
of a particular character; it does not mean modification; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable ( unchangeable ). Death also consists in the giving up of the body and the rest; it cannot mean destruction, as the Spirit is unchangeably eternal. The organs' are thirteen, beginning with the Great Principle. The definite adjustment of these-birth and the rest, stands for the fact that one set of these-Body etc., are connected with only one Spirit, and this cannot be explained on the hypothesis of there being only one Spirit; for, if the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then on the birth of one, all would be born.-on the death of one, all would die,-on one becoming blind or deaf, all would become blind ur deaf,-on one becoming unsound of mind, all would become unsound of mind,-so that there would be no adjustment. On the other hand, if there is a distinct Spirit, belonging to each set of Body etc., the adjustment becomes secured. Nor can one explain the above adjustment by attributing it to the single Spirit, as diversely conditioned by contact with different bodies, etc. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing ( on analogous ground, the birth or death of the Spirit), in connection with the hands, the wrists and others. This, however, can never be right, for a gırl does not become dead' by the derangement of her hands, or ' born 'on the appearance of her breasts or other parts of her body.
18 not simulta. neous"
(128) For the following reason also, the Spirit must be
different with different bodies: “Because "Since activity activity is not simultaneous." Though 'Acti
a vity' in the form of effort, is a function of
the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of 'one man would lead to similar activity in all other men-as the Spirit would be the same; so that the moving of one man would
T. 5

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60
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XVII1139
lead to the moving of all others at the same time—a palpable absurdity, which is avoided on the hypothisis of plurality. (129) Again, the Spirits must be many—“ because there
is diversity due to the three Attributes." The Because the modifications of the particle 'eva" should be constructed with Attributes are siddham', not with 'viparyayāt'; the sense different
being that 'the plurality of Spirits must be taken as proved, not as unproved.' The term 'traigunya" stands for the three Attributes" ;—by the diversity of these is meant differentiation. Some persons abounding in the Sattva--attribute, represent aggregates of that attribute-e. g. the deities and saints; others abound in the Rajas-attribute, - such as men; othors again in the Tamas-attribute, -such as beasts. This 'diversity' or 'differentiation due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.
(130) Having thus established the plurality of Spirts the author now states the properties of the Spirit—as a knowledge of these is conducive to discriminative wisdom:
Kärikā XIX And from that contrast, it follows that the Spirit is
'Witness,' and has 'Isolation, ‘NeutraThe properties lity,' and is the ' Seer,' and 'Inactive. of the Soul
'From that &c.'— The particle “Ca,' "And connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality. (131) If it were said." And from this contrast." then
it would refer to the aiversity due to the three Why that
Attributes', of the last Kärika. In order to avoid this, it is said " and from that, etc."
contrast?

Page #207

-X18184]
TRANSLATION
dence
A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pro. noun this; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by that; hence the that here refers to Karikā XI. (132) Thus, the contrast of the character of “having the
... three Attributes, etc.", and the rest (which The necessity of so many properties. have been set forth in Kärikā XI as belongTheir Inter-depen- ing to the Unmanifest, Nature, as also to the
Manifest, Products.)--connotes the Spirit's property of being without the three Attributes and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', ‘not common', 'sentient and 'non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being witness', and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a 'seer', and one can be ‘seer', and one can bea 'witness' only when the things have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute showing the object of their dispute to the witness; similarly does the Nature exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the witness. And again, no object can be shown to one who is himself an object and insentient; and since the Spirit is both sentient and non-objective, it becomes the witness. For the same reasons, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.
(133) Further, from the absence of the three Attributes in the Spirit follows its Isolation by which is meant the final and absolute removal of the three kinds of pain; and this properly, as belonging to the Spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the Spirit being by its very, nature without the three Attributes, and hence without Pleasure, Pain or Delusion.
(134) From the absence of the Attributes, again, follows neutrality; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure

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68
[XX135
and pain, who can be called neutral-also called Udasina (indifferent). Lastly, the inactivity of the Spirit follows from its being distinguishable' and 'non-productive.'
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(135) Objection. We We grant all this; but in ordinary experience, we first decide, what is to be Objection-Intelli, gence and activity done by us and then think in the following always found costrain- I, who am a sentient being, wishing existent to do a certain act, am going to do it; so that, we find by our experience that sentience.' and 'activity are co-existent in the same person. And this goes against the Sankhya' tenets which make the 'Sentient being inactive and the active agent' insentient.'
•
6
Answer
44
.
Karika XX
Reply :-The
Thus from this union, the insentient
apparent activity
6
of the soul due to 'Evolute appears as if sentient'; and union with Buddhi similarly, from the
activity really
and the apparent intelligence of the belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, latter due to union which is neutral appears as if it were with Purusa
active.
.
(136) The sense is that in as much as 'sentience' and 'activity' have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word 'Linga Evolute', here stands for everything from the Great Principle primary elements to be described later on. the mistake is said to be the 'union i. e., Spirit with the Evolute. The rest is clear enough.
down to the The cause of
proximity of the

Page #209

-XXi139]
TRANSLATION
(137) Objection :-"You say that the feeling is due to
Union, etc. But no union between two disObjection :- . tinct things is possible, without some need. What is the need of the Union ? which again is not possible without the
relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute ?]"
In reply, the author explains the 'help' or 'benefit which forms the basis of the need.
Karikā XXI For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for Reply:-The need the Isolation of the Spirit, there is union is that of final Emancipation
of both, like that of the, halt and the
blind; and from this union proceeds evolution.
(138) In the term “ Pradhānasya" the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being—"for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things, "-thus implying the fact of Nature being an object--something to be enjoyed. This enjoyabılity, however, is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature. (139) The author next explains the need of the Spirit
(for Nature )—" For the Isolation of the The need Spirit "_The Spirit, while in union with the explained
' enjoyable' Nature, believes the three kınds of pain-the constituents of Nature to be his own; and from this ( self-imposed bond ) he seeks liberation, Isola. tion; this Isolation is dependent upon due discrimination bet. ween the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus dısarimination is not possible without the Nature ( and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(XX[140
of any kind is possible );-thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions ( between the Spirit and Nature ) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of enjoyment', should be united with it again, for the purpose of Isolation'. (140) “Granted that there is this union between these
two ; but whence the evolution of the Great The necessity of Principle and the rest ?" Answer “ From the creation of Buddhi etc
this union proceeds evolution." The said
' union' (of Spirit with Nature ) cannot by itself suffice either for enjoyment' or 'Isolation of the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the union itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of enjoyment' and · Isolation."
The process of Evolution is now explained.
Kärikā XXII . From the (Parkrti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues The process of Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Princiele) ; Evolution from from this issues Ahankara (I-principle); PrakȚti down from which proceed the set of sixteen wards
from five of this set of sixteen 'proceed the five elementary substances.
(141) From Prakrti, etc.,- Prakrii is the Unmanifest ( Nature ); Mahat (Great Principle ) and Ahankāra (1Principle ) will be described later. The set of sixteen' is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and thu five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Ākās'a, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).

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-XX11[143]
TRANSLATION
71
(142) Thus, (a) from the primary element of ‘sound'
proceeds Ākās'a, having sound as its characThe process of the teristic property; (6) from the primary production of the elements element of 'touch' as combined with that of
'sound proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the primary element of colour combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds Fire, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element 'taste combined with those of sound', 'touch' and colour proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (e) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of ‘sound', 'touch', colour' and 'taste" proceeds Earth with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.
(143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in Kārıkā X, and specifically in Kärikā XIII; the Manifest also has been generally defined in Karıkā X; now the author defines Buddhi, a particular form of the Manifest, the Buddhi--the knowledge of which is helpfu towards discriminative wisdom.
Karikā XXIII Buddhi, the Great Principle, 'is determination' li. e.
determining Principle, Will)*; Virtue, Buddhi defined. Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, constiIts properties
tute its form when abounding in the
Sattva-attribute,--and the reverse of these when abounding in the Tamas-Principle.
stated
*Though there is some difference of opinion or this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyavasāya means 'determining' and of all the faculties will appears to be the only determining principle in Man.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
(XX[1[141
(144) Buddhi is described as “determination"-on the principle that there is no difference between the action (of determining) and the active agent (that which determines). It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation; he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now
determination consists in the notion that 'this should be done,' and it belongs to, and forms the characteristic function of Buddhi ( the Great Principle. Will ), which acquires sentience from its proximity to the Sentient Faculty (of the Spirit); and · Buddhi' is regarded as not different from the said determination' (on the principle that the action is not different from the active agent); this also constitutes the definition' (differentia) of Buddhi, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things. (145) Having thus defined Buddhi, the author, in order
to help the attainment of discriminative The properties of wisdom states the properties of Buddhi, as Buddhi-Virtue, Wisdom, Dispag- abounding in the Sattva and Tamas attrision and Power,
butes: “Virtue, etc, etc.". Virtue 'leads and the reverse
to prosperity and the Highest Good,--that
brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold Yoga lead to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attri. butes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of Attachment (Love). (146) Of this Dispassion there are four stages named
(1) 'Yatamāna-Samjñā,' (2) Vyatıreka-Samjñā The four kinds of (3) Ekendriya-Samjñā and (4) Vas'ikāra
Samjñā. (1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and
of these

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-XXII1147]
TRANSLATION
73
they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects; in order that the sense-organs may not turn towards their objects, it is necessary that the said impurities should be cured; the effort made to effect this cure constitutes the first form of Dispassion, 'Yatamāna-Samjñā', the 'Endeavourstage.' (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured; this sequence being there, those got to be cured have to be discriminated from those already cured; this discrimination constitutes the second stage of Dispassion, the Vyatireka-Samjñā, the Discriminationstage. (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere 'longing (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the 'Ekendriya-Samjñā', the ' One-organ stage. (4) The supression of even this longing towards all perceptible objectssensuous as well as super-sensuous-is the fourth stage called Vas'ikāra-Samjña. the control-stage'; this is superior to the first three stages, this has been thus discribed by the revered Patanjali : The dispassion named Vas'ikara-Samjñā ' belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or supersensuous objects." [Yoga-Sutra I-15].-Such is Dispassion, a property of Buddhi.
64
The eight kinds of
power
(147) Power also is a property of Buddhi, and it is to this that the perfections, Attenuation and the rest (Anima etc.) are due.* Of these (1) Anima (Lit. Atomic character), 'Attenuation' is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) Laghima, 'Buoyancy' is that to which
There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine; but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken Vas'itva and Is'itva as one.

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is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) Garimā, 'Gravity' leads to heaviness; and (4) Mahimā, 'Grandeur' brings greatness. (5) Prāpti, * Approach is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) Prākāmya, Fulfilment of desires, is such as can enable one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7) Vas'ıtva, 'supremacy'-by this all matter and material things come under one's control; this differs from 'Ts'itva' 'sovereignity', which consits in the power to create and maintain matter and material things. (8) Kāmāvasāyıtā, Infallıbility of purpose is that by which all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary inortals follow the course of events, where as those of the trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.'
(148) These four are the properties of Buddhı, abounding in the Sattva-Attribute. Those abounding in the Tamasattribute are the reverse of these-vis., Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.
The author next defines Ahankāra-the ‘l-Principle —
Kārikā XXIV The 'T-Principle' is self-consciousness; from that The principle of proceeds a two-fold evolution-the set of Ahankara defined. Its effects
"eleven and the five rudimentary sub
stances. (149) “The I principle is egotism" and this 'l-principle' is perceptible in such ideas as— “To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled, --'I am able to do this —'all these things are for my use'—'there is no one else entitled to it'herce I am;"-the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the 'I-principle :it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter

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TRANSLATION
75
minative function appearing in such decisions as “this is to be done by me."
(150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned—“From that proceeds a two-fold evolution." The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned—“ The set of eleven" consisting of the sense organs, and the five rudimentary substances, "-only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;—this is what has been emphasised by the particle 'eva'.
Objection :-" The l-principle itself being of one uniObjetion-How form nature, how can two different kinds of kinders in evolution the dull and inert ( elements ) proceed from a and the illuminative ( the sense organs ) uniform Egotism? proceed from it ?". Answer.
Kärikä XXV The' set of eleven' abounding in Sattva attribute,
evolves out of the 'Vaikrta' form of the Reply-The dif- l-principle '; the set of Rudimentary ference due to the diversity of substances from the 'Bhūtādi' form of
subst the operating
the 'l-principle'; and both of them from Attributes.
the 'Taijasa' form of the 'l-principle.'* (151) "The set of eleven', sense-organs, being illumina tive and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute;
* (a) 'Vaiksta,' (6) Bhutādi and (c) Taijasa are purely technical terms.names applied to the three forms or states of the 'I principle' When the 'I. principle' is dominated by the Sattva-attribut called Vaikrta', when it is dominated by the Tamas attribute, it is called 'Bhutadi' and when it is dominated by the Rajas-attribute, it is called 'Taijasa'. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything-Gaudapāda.

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[XXV182.
and it proceeds from the Vaiksta' 'I-principle'. From the 'I-principle' as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in Sattva-attribute. That is to saythough the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.
dona
(152) Objection :—When all the necessary products
are brought about by the action of the Objection. The attributes of Sattva and Tamas only, have purposelessness of Passions done with the attribute of Rajas, which
serves no useful purpose. Answer :-“ And both of these from the Taijasa 'form
1 of the l.principle" i. e., from the 'Taijasa Reply-Passion
Form', that is from the form abounding in necessary for urging the other the Rajas-attribute, proceed both, the 'set of Attributes to
eleven' as also the set of rudimentary subaction
stances.' Even though there is no separate product from the Rajas-attribute exclusively by itself, yet (it is a necessary factor. as) the Sattva and Tamas attributes are, by themselves, absolutely inert and as such do not per. forın their functions at all; it is only when they are energised and moved by the Rajas-attribute, that they perform their functions; thus the Rajas-attribute is instrumental in the evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, Sattva and Tamas. Thus it is not true that the Rajasattribute serves no useful purpose.
In onder to describe the 'set of eleven' abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

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-XXVI[154]
TRANSLATION
Karika XXVI The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the
Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of The ten External action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms Organs
and the generative organ. (153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which
has, for its constituent cause, the ‘l-principle Sense defined
abounding in the Sattva-attribute. The organs are of two kinds of sensation (sensory)' and 'of action (motor)'. Both of these are called 'Indriya', in the sense that they are characteristics of 'Indra' (the Spirit). The Sense-organs are named. “The eye etc. "-Of these,
the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, Named. Functions the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving 'taste, and the skın for feeling touch. These are the names of the Sensory sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārıkā XXVIII.)
The eleventh sense-organ is next described
Karika XXVII Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature
of both (Sensory and Motor): it is the The eleventh sense Observing' principle; and is called a Mind defined
'sense-organ' since it has properties common to sense-organs. Its multifariousness, as also its diverse external forms, are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes.
(154) "Partakes, etc."-Among the eleven sense-organs The double nature the mind partakes of the nature of both-.e., of mind
it is an organ of sensation, as well as one of action; Since the eye and the other sensory

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[XXVI1155
organs, as well as speech and other motor organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind. (155) The author next gives specific definition of the
Mind-It is the observing principle” —That Mind defined
is to say Mind is defined by observation; when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a
sense-organ as 'a thing', there follows the The reflecting. , definite cognition in the form ‘it is such and character of Mind explained such a thing, not that'; and it is this observing
i. e., the perception of definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended, -that is done through the Mind. This has been thus described by an ancient writer—“At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a thing and then the mindful people observe-cognisemit definitely as belonging to a certain genus and possessing certain well-defined properties": -Again (says another writer) -"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that it is a thing, this idea being inderterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as senseperception"— This function of observing belongs to the Mind, and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its differentia. (156) Objection:-“Granted all this : But we have
seen that the l•principle and the Will, Objection:-Why
Why having distinct functions of their own, are
h make Mind a sense when it has not classed among 'sense-organs'; in the distinct function
on same manner, the Mind also, having a
or of its own ?
distinct function of its own, should not be classod among 'sense-organs.'

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TRANSLATION
79
The author replies--" It is a sense-organ'. Why?
"Because it has properties common to senseReply-It is a organs." The property meant is that consistsense in as much as it is an immediate ing in its having for its constituent cause. effect of the prin- the 'l-principle' abounding in the Sattvaciple of Egoism,
m, attribute, and not in its being a characteristic as effected by a Goodness which is of Indra (Spirit): for this latter property the difinition of
I belongs to the Will and the 'l-principle also; a Sense
and as such these two also would have to be classed among 'sense-organs'. Thus then “ being the characteristic of the Spirit" should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term Indriya; it cannot be said to form its connotation. (157) Question—“How can the eleven sense-organs
proceed out of the single entity in the shape Whence the Multi- of the 'l-principle' abounding in the "Sattvafarious effects from Egoism
s attribute?" Answer: "Its multifariousness
as well as its diverse external forms are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes"-The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the 'Unseen Force' which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the ‘Unseen Force' also is only a 'modification of the Attributes.
(158) The diverse external forms' has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that just as the diverse external forms, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes.
(159) Having thus described the forms of she eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(XXIX160_
the external organs
Karika XXVIII The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound,
etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving '; The functions of 'speaking,' ' handling', 'walking ',
'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the
functions of ) the other five. By " Perception " here is meant the primary abstract
apprehension (Nirvikalpa ) through the Observation.-the function of the sensory sense-organs. “Speaking, Handling. five intellectual Walkıng, Excretion and Gratification are the senses Speech
a functions of the other five," 1. e., of the five
.. handling, walking, excretion pertain motor organs ( of action ). The vocal organ to the senses of
is located in the throat, the palate, etc.,
and the function of this organ is 'Speaking. The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear.*
action
The functions of the three Internal organs' are next described:
Kārikā XXIX Of the three (the internal organs), the functions
consist of their respective characterisFunction of the internal organs tics; this is peculiar to each. The func
tion common to the organs consists in the five Prāna and the rest. (160) “The functions of the three consist of their respec
tive characteristics." In the compound term Reflection of
"Svālaksanyam', the term 'Svalaksana Manas, Self Consciousness stands for those that have their own disof Ahnkara and
tinctive characteristics',- that is, the Will, determination of Buddhi
the l-principle and the Mind ; 'Svālakṣaṇya'
(formed with the reflexive affıx 'syañ'); * That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions e. g., the car is defined as the sense for perceving ( or comprehending) sound and thus the function of the car is percoption of sound, and so with the others.

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-XXX161]
TRANSLATION
stands for those distinctive characteristics themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the three internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus 'determination of the Will, 'egoism of the I-principle and 'observation of the Mind (161) The next sentence describes the dual character
of these fuctions based on the fact of their The five vital being specific or common—" Thes, are airs, the common function of the peculiar," etc. “The five Breaths constithree internal tute the common function". The five 'vital
airs' 1.e., the Life itself-forms the common function of the three internal organs; siitce the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the 'Air' called * Präna', is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the genera. tive organ; that called Samāna' in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called 'Udāna', in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye-brows; and that called ‘Vyāna', in the skin. These are the ' five vital airs.'
organs
The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the external organs and the three in. ternal organs).
Karikā XXX With regard to perceptible things, the functions of
the whole set of the four organs are said The instantaneous to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; and the gradual character of these with regard to imperceptible (as well as functions perceptible) things, the functions of the
three (internal organs) are preceded by that:( i. e., the cognition of some perceptible object.)
T.6

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[XXX162cm
(162) "Simultaneous, "-" With regard to perceptible
things "; e. g., when one seos in the dark Instantaneous by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger with regard to visible objects facing him, his perception (by the Eye).
observation (by the Mind). Egoism or selfconsciousness (by the l-principle) and determination (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once. (163) “Gradual"'; c. g., in dım-light, a person has at
first only a vague perception of a certain Gradual with re- object; then fixing his Mind intently he gard to visible objects
ble observes that it is a robber with his drawn
bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that 'the robber is advancing against me'; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place.
(164) With regard to inperceptible things, on the other With regard to hand, the (three) internal organs operate invisible objects, without the aid of the external organs-" The the operation of the internal orga-function of the three is preceded by that," ns independent i. e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual 'of the external organs
functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since The functions of Inference, Testimony and Remembranceinternal organs which are the means of cognising imperpreceded by those of the external" ceptible things, -operate only when they ones
have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things ). The sense is that in regard to 'perceptible as well as 'imperceptible' things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

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TRANSLATION
82
(165) Objection : "The functions, either of the four or
of the three ( organs ), cannot depend on Objection : Func- themselves alone; for in that case, as these tions permanent or otherwise ?" organs are everlasting their functions also
would be everlasting; if, on the other hand, the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them." Answer :
Karikā XXXI They (the organs ) betake themselves to their Reply-Functions respective functions, through mutual imof the organs due to mutual impluse. pulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the Soul purposes the sole motive; by nothing (else ) is an incentive
organ made to act.
The word 'Karanāni,' 'organs', has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence).
(166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons:—lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.,combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other's 'impluse' (motive).-and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,—similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs operates only by the reason of the ‘impluse-. e., proneness to action—f the other; since this impulse is the cause ( and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any commingling of the functions.

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(XXX1|167–
(167) Another objection—“The lancers, etc., being
sentient beings, it is only right that they Objection--How
ow should comprehend each other's 'impluse can the non-intelligont organs ( motive ) and act towards the fulfilment understand each
ch thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are other's motives?
all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the insentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses.'
Answer :-" The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive,
by nothing (else) is an organ made to act." Reply--Soul's What urges the organs to act is the Spirit's purpose urging them to action purpose in the shape of ‘Experience' and
'Isolation ',--prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Karikā LVII.
(168) It has been declared that " by nothing is an organ made to act." The author next proceeds to classify the organs :
Karika XXXII
Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions
divid. of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminaThe organg dividod-their lunc. ting.' The objects of these are of ten tions seizing, kinds, the 'seized', the sustained' retaining and manifesting and the illumined.'

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TRANSLATION
85
(169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven
sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will.
An organ is a particular kind of active gans—the ten external organs, agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' Manas, Ahaikāra unless it has a function ; hence the author and Buddhi.
Seizing the next states the functions of the organsfunction of the “Having the functions of seizing, sustainsenses of action. Retention the ing and illuminating, respectively; that is
dhe, to say, the Motor organs have the fuction of Ahankara and Manas.
seizing; that is, they take up their respecManifestation- tive objects; i. e., extend their activities over of the intellectual organs
them;-the Will, the l-principle and the
Mind 'sustain' things through their function in the shape of the Vital Airs and the rest (mentioned before ); and lastly, the sensory organs 'illumine' (render perceptible ) their respective objects. (170) Since every action must have an object, the
objects of the above-mentioned functions The objects of are next named and classified—“The these functions, tenfold
18. seized" etc. These objects to be acted upon
by the thirteen organs are those that are to be seized, to be sustained and to be illumined. By 'seizure here is meant pervasion (extension). The five motor sense-organs * extend' over Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification; and each of these being both 'celestial' and * non-celestial', these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object 'to be sustained by the three internal organs through their functions in the shape of the Vital Airs' etc., is the body, which is fivefold, being an aggregate of the five elementary substances; of these the Earth being an aggregate of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both. celestial and non-celestial', these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be tenfold. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five-sound, touch,

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TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become tenfold.
(171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated:
Karika XXXIII
The internal organs are three; and the external, ten, The organs num- exhibiting objects to the former three. bered and the difference betThe external organs act at the preween the external sent time and the internal at all the and internal in point of time three points of time.
noted
[XXXIII.
66
"
(172) The internal organs are three:" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called internal because located inside the body.
(173) The external-organs are ten; viz., the ten senseorgans. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs; i. e., they supply the means for observation, selfconsciousness and determination regarding objects;-the senseorgans doing this through perception, and the motor-organs, through their respective fuctions.
The external
(174) The author next states a further point of difference between the internal and external organs. senses acting at The external organs act at the present time present; the time." The internal with rehere includes also ference to all the time closely preceding and following the three divisions of immediate present; so that, Speech* also pertains to the present. 'The internal
present
time
66
66
*The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the present if by this were meant the present moment only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as • present.

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XXXIV 177]
TRANSLATION
argans at all the three points of time." e. g., the idea that " there has been rain, because the river has risen-" (for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke" (for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"--(for the future). (175) According to the Vais'eşikas, Time is one (in.
divisible ) and hence it cannot admit of such Time--not a dis. divisions as 'past,' 'present' and 'future, cording to ac. They attribute these divisions to certain khyas
'accidents (adventitious conditions ): but what the Teachers of Sankhya hold is that these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions. of 'future,' 'present and past, and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity.
(176) The author next discusses the objects of the external senses operating at time present :
sense touching
a mannerned with fiva ahiant
Kärikā XXXIV Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with
objects specific as well as non-specific. The intellectual Speech is concerned with sound : the rest specific as well as are concerned with five objects. unspecific objects; (177) Of the ten external organs, the five speech touching sound: the rest sensory ones are concerned with specific regarding the as well as 'non-specific' objects:—The term five objects of
'specific' here stands for the gross Sound
(Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their 'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deluding forms, as manifested in the form of Earth (Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa );-and
sense

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TATTVA-KAU
[XXXIV178
non-specific' stands for the subtile forms of Sound etc., manifested as the Rudimentary Elements. (Tanmātrās);' in this name 'tanmātra,' the particle 'mātra' serves to exclude the Gross forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory organs are those that have for their objects the gross and subtile things. For instance, the Ear of deities and sages can perceive the subtile Rudimentary-Sound as also the gross Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive only the gross Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive gross as well as subtile Touch, while our organ can perceive gross Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their gross as well as subtile forms, while our organs can perceive these in their gross forms only.
(178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the l-principle ( Ahankāra ); and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself ( which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the l.principle ).
“ The rest" i. e., the four other motor-organs—the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are 'concerned with five objects"; because the jar and such other objects—which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the five primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour.
Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others, reasons for which are given :

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TRANSLATION
89
Kārikā XXXV ity of Since the Will along with the other The superiority of internal over ex. internal organs extends over all things, ternal organs these three are the 'warders', and the others are the gates. (179) Warders' 1. e., most important superior,
'Gates', i.e., mere instruments ; the external The superiority organs are mere instruments. Since the Will accounted for
along with the ‘I-principle' and the Mind 'extends over', (1. e., determines)—all objects exhibited by the external organs, therefore, these latter are mere 'gates (secondary organs), and the Will along with the other internal organs, is the 'warder' (chief).
The Will, Buddhı is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said:
Kärikā XXXVI The (external organs together with the Mind and
the I-principle) characteristically differThe superiority ent from one another and being different of Buddhi over all others accounted modifications of the Atributes, resemble for
a lamp in action; (and as such) having
first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit's purpose, present it to the Will.
(180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to the Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having 'perceived' an object, present it to the Mind, which observes it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(XXXVM18L.
Verse combina
sents it to the * I-principle,' which lakes personal cognizance of them, and finally delivers it to the chief officer, Will. Hence it is said: “These having illumined the whole of the Spirit's purpose present it to the Will." (181) The external organs, the Mind and the l-princi
ple are various modifications of the Attri'In spite of di- butes i. e., phases of Sattva, Rajas and tion of the Attri- Tamas. Even though these are mutually butos, yet the
nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for internal organs co-operate to the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wards a single
wick, oil and fire (though variously purpose like a lamp
opposed to the action of one another,) yet
combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and fhus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the modifications of the Attributes; such is the connection.
Objection :-“ Why should it be said that the other Objection-Why organs present their impressions to the Will ? not make Buddhi Why should not we make it the other way : -sub-ordinate to the Will presents its impressions to the the others?
l.principle and the Mind, which latter being ' superior'?" Answer :
Kärikä XXXVII In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Reply: the su. Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will periority of Buddhi accounted for that discriminates the subtle difference because it direct between Nature and Spirit [it is Will ly fulfils cae soulpurpose, und bri- that is regarded as superior to the other dges the gap bet- twol. woen Spirit and Matter

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-XXXVII 183]
(182) In as much as the 'purpose of the Spirit' is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is the Will alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the Governor of the Country is the immediate and direct agent of the king, is supreme over the village officer and other officials who are subordinate to him. By reason of its proximity to the Spirit, the Spirit becomes reflected in the Will, whereby the Will assumes the form of the Spirit and thus accomplishes the Spirit's experiencing of all things. 'Experiencing' consists in the feeling of Pleasure and Pain,this feeling takes place in the Will,-the Will has assumed the form of the Spirit -it is thus that the Will makes the Spirit go through the experience. Just as the Perception, Observation and 'Self-consciousness' of things take the form of the things and become transferred to the Will, in the same manner the functions of sense-organs also become mingled with the determining which is the function of the Will. Just as the army of the village-officer is joined with the army of the Governor,-it is thus that the Will 'accomplishes' Sadhayati -The Spirit's experience' Upa-bhoga of prati all things -Sarvam-in the shape of Sound and the rest.
"
TRANSLATION
91
(183) Objection- If the Will serves to accomplish the Objection-Buddhi Spirit's experience of all things then no supplying the soul with pleaemancipation (Isolation) is possible."* sure, no Mukti is possible
* For Buddhi would continue to help the Spirit to its enjoyment. of pleasure, and bence this latter could never attain to final beatitudewhich consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

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92
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XXXVI183
Answer—" It afterwards discriminates the difference Roololi letterlo between Spirit and Nature." - Descrimina. showo to the soul tes' Vișinaști' here stands for 'bringing its distinction about the construction of clause ' Antarum from Matter
Visinasti'--' discriminates the difference'; and is similar to that of Odanpākam pacati * (cooks the cooking of rice); and bringing about' in this context stands for showing' or 'expressing'. The objector retorts: “ The difference between Spirit
and Nature being thus, according to yourThe difference being caused, will sell, something that is produced, it must have end and thus an end in time ; and hence the Isolation or would emancipation cease with it Emancipation brought about by that differ.
ience would also be transitory." The answer to this is contained in the word 'dis
criminates"; the meaning is that the idea that Reply--the dif- 'I am one thing and Nature with its evolutes ference is perma. nent. Buddhi only is different thing is always there. serving to expose What the Will does is to make known this it to the soul's view
already existing difference, which through
non-discrimination, has appeared to be nonexistent; the Will does not produce the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that Emancipation (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit.
Subtile--the said difference is' subtile i. e., 'hard to perceive.'
The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects):
* Višinasti itself has been explained as "expresses the dif. ference", then the montion of Antaram would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

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-XXXVII[186]
TRANSLATION
93
Kärikā XXXVIII The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from The division of these five proceed the five gross elements: objects into spe- these latter are said to be 'specific, cific and non-spe- becauee they are calm, turbulent and cific
deluding (184) The Rudimentary Elements i. e., Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle 'Mātra' (in the term 'tanmātra, which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,') connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience.
(185) Having thus described the non-specific things, the author, with a view to describing the specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production : “ From these etc.," from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—ākās'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth-these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements.
(186) Objection :-“We grant that these are thus pro. Specific because duced; but what about their being specific". soothing terrific Answer : "These are said to be specific;" – and deluding why? because “they are calm, turbulent and deluding. The first indicates the reason ( meaning because ) and the second has the cumulative force ( meaning that the things have all the three characteristics ). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Ākās'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute, are calm, pleasing, illuminating and buoyant; others abounding in the Rajas-attribute are turbulent, painful and 'unstable; the rest abounding in the Tamas-attribute are deluded, confounded and sluggish. These gross elements. thus

Page #234

TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[ XXXIX187
perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be specific and gross. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be non-specific and subtle.
those
great ele.
A further sub-division among the specific' objects is next stated :
Kärikā xxxix (1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents', Specific objects and (3) the 'gross elements,--these are divided into (1) Jubtle bodies. 7) the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these bodies produced the 'subtle ' bodies are everlasting, and of parents and those born of parents' are perishable. (3) the great elements
(187) “The specific objects are of three kinds", these three forms are mentioned : (1) subtle bodies which (are not visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) Those born of parents, 1. e., those consisting of the six ‘sheaths (Kośas). Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six sheaths' (of the physical body): (3) The last are the 'prabhūta' i. e., the 'prakrsta', Great, 'bhūta', Elements; along with these, the other two constitute the specific'. Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents, the second kind and the 'gross elements the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last. (188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and
.. the body 'born of parents' is next explainedThe subtle bodies The subtle bodies are permanent and those are pormanent, those produced born of parents, perishable"; that is to say, of parents peri
among the specific things, those that are shable
subtle are lasting, while those 'born of

Page #235

-XL190]
TRANSLATION
95
parents', are perishable, i. e., ending in (dissolving into either fluids or ash or dirt.
The subtle body is described
Permanent
Karikā XL The nergent' (subtle) body formed primevally, The Body is un- un
in unconfined, lasting, composed of Will confined, perma- and the rest down to Rudimentary ing, invested with
gratih Elements --migrates, is devoid of experi. dispositions ences, and is invested with dispositions. (189) · Formed primevally ;-when the emanations
from Nature began, the first object to evolve Unconfined and therefrom. was the subtle Body, one for
each Spirit. This body is "unconfined" untrammeled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "lasting"*: since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is "composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements". That is to say, it is an aggregate consisting of the Will, I-principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Rudimentary Elements; it is also specific, equipped with sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'.
(190) Objection:-“ This Subtle body might be the only Objection:-un. vehicle of experience for the Spirit;--what necessariness of postulating two is need of the Physical Body comprised of bodies, subtle the six 'sheaths' "'? and gross
* The word niyata is differently interpreted by Nārāyana Tirtha (in his Sankhya.Candrika). He takes it in the sense of "restricted" i. e., the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudapada closely resembles that of the Kaumudī.

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96
TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
Answer:-"It migrates" i. e. the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other.-"But why?" -Because it is" devoid of experience", that is to say, because the subtle body by itself. without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience-would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.
Necessity of the physical body, because the subtle body migrates
(191) Objection:-" As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit): then how can this Subtle Body migrate ?"
Objection: -How can the subtle Body migrate, being without dispositions?
•
Reply-It has dispositions?
Answer: Because) "it is invested with dispositions. The dispositions' are Virtue and Vice, Wisdom and Ignorance, Passion and Dispassion, Power and Weakness; and it is the Will which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions: just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the Campaka flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is invested with dispositions, that the Subtle Body migrates.
[XL 191
•
(192) Question:-" Why should not the Subtle BodyThe subtle Body like Nature-last even after the Final Dissolution?"
dissolving at each
pralaya
64
Answer:-( Because it is) mergent, that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature). This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being a product; i. e., having a cause it must merge into it.
".

Page #237

-XL1193)
TRANSLATION
97
Objection :-“We grant all this. But why not attribute
migration to the Will itsclf as equipped Objection-Wny not attribute mit with the l-principle and sense organs? There gration to Buddhi is no need for the postulating of the Subtle
Body, for which there is no authority, Answer :
etc.?
Karikā XLI As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a
shadow without a solid object like the Reply-the Bud- pillar,--so neither does the 'Linga' (Will dhi cannot rast
rale etc) subsisi supportless, without 'Speci.
fis Bodies'. (193) The term 'Linga' here stands for the Will, the I-principle and the Rudimentary Elements, because they are the means of knowing ( lı! ganāt) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism-During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have sone sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such Will and the rest as are equipped with thc five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body. “Without specific bodies" 1. e., without Subtle Bodies. In
support of this assertion, we have the pollowThe existence of the Subtle Body" ing scriptural text (from the Mahābhārata ). corroborated by “Then Yama extracted from Satyavan's
hārata body the thumb-sized body which he had entrapped and under his control." Here the mention of the extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit
* Cf. The Pancikarana-vivarana-Tattvacandrika - where a similar explanation of the word is given.
T. 7
the Mahabharata

Page #238

98
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XLII194–
could have been so extracted. 'Puruşa' in the above extrast, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that it sleeps (lies--s'ete ) in the body (puri ).
Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration .
Karikā XLII Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle
Body acts like a dramatic actor, on Reasons and manner of the account of the connection of 'causes and migration of the effects' and by union with the all-emSubtle Body
bracing power of Nature. (194) “Pormed for the Spirit's purpose", the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of its connection with the causes' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc., and 'effects' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc, That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paras'urāma or Yudhışthıra or Vatsarāja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree. (195) Question :-"Whence this capacity of the Subtle
Ime Body ?" Answer:-“ By union with the The capacity of the Subtle Body all-embracing Power of Nature." As is is due to the Po- declared in the Purāna:-“All this wonderwer of Nature
ful evolution is the all-embracing Power of Nature."
It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts “on account of connection with causes and effects"; the author next describes the causes and effects :

Page #239

-XL113197)
TRANSLATION
99
consequences
nate
Kärikā XLIII Virtue and other dispositions are--a) natural, which
are innate and (b) incidental, and these The means and are related to the 'cause '; and the Dharma, etc. ovum etc., related to the effect. '*
(196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; i. e., brought about 1. Incidental dis- after the man's birth, by the subsequent propositions
pitiating of the deities and such other causes. “The natural dispositions are innate," e. g., it is declared
that at the beginning of the Evolution the i Essential, in. revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into
existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. The 'incidental dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate; that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Valmiki and other great sages. The opposites of the same is to be understond with regard to Dharma etc., similarly explained ** Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness. (197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus,
flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mocher's Flesh, blood, etc., womb is related to the gross physical related to the Gross Body body; that is to say, they are particular states
of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.**
* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Karika. In the first place he renders Samsiddhikah by 'trans. cendental" the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders Karanas'ruyinah by "including cause," though in reality the compound means "located in organs"-as explained by the Kaumudi as well as the Candrika.
** Gaudapāda has taken the kārıkā as setting forth three kinds of dispositions-(1) · Särsiddhika' innate. (2) Prakrtıka' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) 'Vaikrtika incidental.

Page #240

100
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XLIII198–
(198) Question :-“ We have understood what are 'causes' and ' effects in general ; what are the particular effects of particular causes ?"
Answer :
Kärikä XLIV By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes, Consequences of by vice, descent to the lower; from the various means wisdom (results) the Highest Good;
and bondage from the reverse. (199) “By virtuc ctc"1.0., to the Heaven and other Virtue leads to regio higher planes
“By vice, etc,” 1. C., to the nether regions known as Vice to lower Sutala etc. “ From wisdom, the Highest Goodl." Nature ministers
to the experience of the Spirit only so long Wisdom brings about beatitude as discriminative wisdom is not brought
about; after, however, this has been accomplished, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared, “The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge." “ From the reversc, etc." i. e., from wrong knowledge, results bondage. (200) This bondage is of three kinds : Natural
'Evolutional' and Personal', (1) The From the reverse Natural' bondage is that of those who of the above, res.. pectively, contra. worship Nature as the Spirit, with reference dictory results. to such men, who are called “Prākrtıka' The three kinds of bondage
(Merged into Nature'), it is said in the Purīņas : “ The contemplators of the Un.

Page #241

-XLIV200]
TRANSLATION
101
manifest ( Nature ) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years "; (2) The 'Evolutional' bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature, the elements, the sense-organs, the l-principle, and the Willas Spirit. With regard to these it is said. “The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras , those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras, those of the I-principle till thousand, and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue +ll ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under this incidental bondage are Videhas. (3) The ‘Personal 'bondage is due to Iştāpārta ( actions like charities, sacrifices, digging of tanks etc., done with the cole motive of personal gains here. after ). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.
Karikā XLV From Dispassion results 'mergence* into Nature';
from Attachment which abounds in the Consequences of
of Rajas-attribute, transmigration ; from
Power, non-impediment, and from the reverse, the contrary.
various means
* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks “It (the Samkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subil. body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free ... Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion the influence of the material world 19 destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally like rated." All this is quite truc; but it is not clear how this affects the position of the Hindu Commentators,' who, at least Vācaspati Misra, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature ; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul-or more properly, its seat, the subtle body-is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is forn again.

Page #242

102
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XLV2:}–
(201) “From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature.''
Those who are free from passion, but are I Absorption ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, into Prakrti from dispassion
om become merged into nature. 'Nature'
here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, Will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as 'Spırıt', become absorbed into these (1.0, those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on ), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.
(202) “From attachment which abounas in the Rajasil Transmigia. attribute, results transmigration." The epithet tion from passion-" Rõjasa " implies the painful character of ate attachment
mem transmigration, because ( as has been previously described ) the Rajas attribute is the source of pain.
(203) “Frum power, non-impediment", 1. l., the nonu Non imperdie obstruction of desires. A man with power ment from power can do whatever he likes.
"From the reverse",, e., from absence of Power "the IV Obstruction contrary "ne, the obstruction of one's de. of desires from weakness
sires everywhere
With a view to describe collectively as well as severally the eight dispositions of the Will–Virtue, Vice etc., -In order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which relinquished, by those desiring Isolation-the author first describes them collectively :
Karikā XLVI Such is the volitional' (Subjective ) Evolution
distinguished by Error, Disability, ConThe intellectual creation described tentment and Success. By reason of the
mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolution become fifty.

Page #243

-XLVI30]
4
TRANSLATION
(204) Pratyaya' is that by which anything is known i. e., Will; and' pratyayasarga' is the 'sarga' 'evolution' proceeding from the Will i. e..
103
I. E... II. Disability III. Contentment the volitional or 'Subjective evolution.
IV. Success
$6
"Error" 1. e., ignorance, illusion, is a property of the Will; so is also disability which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;-" contentment" and "success" also are properties of the Will, as will be described later on.
Of these, the three former,-error." disability and "contentment"-include Virtue and the other six Virtue &c., inclu- dispositions leaving aside Wisdom which Is included in success".
ded in the above
four
Subdivisions of the above are fifty
""
(205) These properties are next described severally. "The forms of these are fifty." How so? "By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities." This 'inequality' may consist either in the individual strength of the c.e in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third, or in the individual weakness of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two conjointly with that of the third. The various grades of this inequality' are assumed in accordance with the requirements of particular cases, and it leads to the suppression of Attributes by one another or by one of them of the other twothus giving rise to the fifty forms of Subjective Evolution.'
The 'fifty forms' are next enumerated:
Karika XLVII
There are five forms of Error; twenty eight of 5 forms of Error. Disability, arising from the imperfection 28 of Disability. of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Success eight.
9 of Contentment,
8 of Perfection

Page #244

104
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XLVI1206
(206) The five forms of Error are ignorance, egotism, love, hate and clinging, respectively named 'obscurity' (Tamas), delusion' (Moha), 'extreme delusion' (Mahāmoha)
gloom' (Tūmisra) 'blind gloom' (Andhatāmisra). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of 'Error'; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or. the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of Error that Egotism and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Varşaganya has declared that "Ignorance is five-jointed.'
(207) The author next describes the sub-divisions of the five forms of Error:
Karika XLVIII Of Error there are eight forms; as also of Delusion,
. Extreme Delusion is ten-foid ; Gloom is Sixty-two subdivisions of Erroreighteen-fold, and so is also 'Blind Gloom'.
(208) “Of Error"; 2. c., of Ignorance. "there are eight of Ignorance eight forms
Of Darkness .i. e., Ignorance, there are eight forms; Eight of Delusion it consists in the notion of 'Spirit' with
*** regard to (1) Nature, (2) Will, (3) l-principle, (4-8) the Five Rudimentary Elements,--all eight of which are not-Spirit, it is this eight-fold notion that constitutes Darkness' or Ignorance.
(209) The particle 'ca' connects 'eight forms' with Dclusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers—' animā' and the rest-also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this appertains to the eight Powers it is said to be eight-fold.

Page #245

-XLVIII214]
(210) 'Extreme Delusion is ten-fold". By Extreme Delusion is meant the attachment to the Ten of Extreme objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest— which are ten-fold, each of the five being earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be ten fold.
Delusion
66
Eighteen of Gloom
44
(211) Gloom", 1. e, Hatred,
is eighteen-fold." The ten objects of sense, sound, &c are loveable by themselves; the eight occult 'powers-Attenuation &c., however are not lovcable, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,-in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteen fold.
(212)
TRANSLATION
Eighteen of Utter Darkness
So is Blind Gloom "- Blind Gloom' stands for Clinging]. The word tatha applies eighteen-fold-ness to Blind Gloom. The deities having attained the eight occult powers-Attenuation and the rest-and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,-Sound and the restlive in continual dread of these ( powers and objects) being wrested away from them by the Rakṣasas; and this dread constitutes the Clinging' or solicitude which is Blind Gloom'; and this latter having for its objects the aforesaid eighteen thing-the eight powers and the ten objects-s said to be eighteen-fold.
105
..
•
1
(213) Thus the five forms of Error which is a sort of Fancy, with their sub-divisions becane sixty two.
(214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty-eight forms of Disability.

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106
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
Twenty-eight forms of Disability
Karika XLIX
The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability; the injuries of the Will (itself) are seventeen-due to the reversion of contentment and success'.
[XLIX2
"
sense-organs
ness,
(215) The injuries of the organs are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, The eleven caused and not as, by themselves. independent by injuries to the forms of Disability. These injuries-Deafinsensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,--consequent on the failure of the several sensc-organs-auditory and the rest-are the eleven forms of disability. The disability of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the scnses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to eleven causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in cordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect. (216) Having thus described the disabilities of the Will, arising from the of the senseby the reversion organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next descubed.-" With injuries of the
ac
injury
Seventeen caused
of contentment and success
Will." Question- How many Disabilities are there of the Will itself ?" Answer "Seventeen are the injuries of the Will;" why? "due to the reversion of contentment and success. Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are also nine-fold; and similarly success being eight-fold,-the disability caused by its reversion is eightfold, thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the Will.
(217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:

Page #247

-L220]
TRANSLATION
107
Karikā L The nine forms of Contentment have been held to
be the following:-Four internal named Nine forms of
ms of ‘Prakrti' (Nature ), (2) Upadāna Acquiescence
(Means), (3) 'Kala', (Time) and (4) 'Bhagya' (Luck ); and five external due to the abstinence from objects. (218) The four 'internal forms of Contentment belong
to those who have understood that the Spirit The four internal is different from Nature, but being illadvised, forms
do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference.by such means as * Hearing'. 'Contemplating' and the lıke;- these forms are called internal (Adhyātmıka) because they presuppose the difference of Atman (Spirit) and Prakrti (Nature). It being asked—which are these?-the reply is—those "named 'Nature', "Mouns', 'Time' and 'Luck' 1. e., whose names are · Nature and the rest (219) The Contentment called "Nature" consists in
thot feeling of satisfaction which the disciple 1. Ambha
has on being told that 'discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Nature and, as such, would come to everyone in the natural course of events, and there is no need of having recourse to the practice of meditation, &c. So, my child, remain as you are! This Contentment is called ' Ambha'.
(220) The second form of Contentment arises from the Solile following instruction; 'wisdom cannot be
attained in the ordinary course of nature ; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom at all times as the course of nature sunctions equally for all individuals ; such wisdom can only be attained through

Page #248

108
TATTVA-KAUMU
[L2214
Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upādāna' ( Means ), also called 'Salila."
(221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling w. Oeha of satisfaction arising from the instruction
that “. Renunciation' also cannot bring about Emancipation at once, Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of 'Renunciation.'". This is the Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha' . (222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of
satisfaction arising from the following ; IV Vrst: "" Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither
from nature nor from any other nicans (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madalasă obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Emancipation. This form of contentment is named. Luck' also called . Vrsti'. (223) The external forms of Contentment are next
described The external forms are five, The five external arising from abstinence from sound, odour, forms
etc.,—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits Nature, Will, I principle and the rest to be Spirit. These forms are called external because they presuppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and apperta'n to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of Contentment appear only when there is absence of attachment.--and as the sources of such absence are five, - the absence also is five-fold; and as the absence of attach:

Page #249

-L227]
TRANSLATION
109
ment is five.fold, the forms of Contentinent in question also are five in number.-The term 'Uparama' here stands for absence of attachment; and the compound Vışayoparama' means 'absence of attachment to objects'. So that the objects of sense being five, the 'abstinence' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinences are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment, involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing.
(224) To explain - The means of acquiring wealth 1. Pura
consist of service etc., and these are sources
of pain to the servants;-—as is declared in the following words –" who would ever be atiracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffcred at the hands of the wardens of a haughly and wicked master ?" Similar is the case with other ineans of acquiring wealth. The contentment resuluing from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called “ Pāra.'
(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it Suure brings with it further trouble of saving it
from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;-the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called ' Supūra '.
(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with o ru pise great effort (and safely hoarded ), there
arises the fear of its being spent up,-this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called “ Pārāpūra (227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense
e objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; IV. Anuttamämbha
uttamamona the non-fulfilment of these desireso brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called ' Anuttamāmbha'.

Page #250

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[L221
Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upadāna' ( Means ), also called 'Salıla.'
(221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling m. Och of satisfaction arising from the instruction
that “ Renunciation also cannot bring about Emancipation at once, Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of 'Renunciation. This is the Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha. (222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of
sausfaction arising from the following ; IV Vrst “Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither
from nature nor from arıy other means (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madalasă obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Einancipation. This form of contentment is named Luck' also called Vrsti'. (223) The external forms of Contentment are next
described. The external forms are five, The five external arising from abstinence from sound, odour,
etc.,—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits--Nature, Will, I principle and the rest to be Spirit. These forms are called external because they pre. suppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and appertain to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of Contentment appear only when there is absence of attachment, and as the sources of such absence are five, -the absence also is five-fold; and as the absence of attach
forms

Page #251

-L227]
TRANSLATION
109
ment is five-fold, the forms of Contentment in question also are five in number. --The term • Upara ma' here stands for absence of attachment, and the compound 'Vuşayoparama " means ' absence of attachment to ohjects'. So that the objects of sense being five, the 'abstinence' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinences are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and kıllıng.
(224) To explain -The means of acquiring wealth 1. Pura
consist of service etc., and these are sources
of pain to the servants,-as is declared in the following words —" who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master ?" Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called ' Pāra.'
(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it II Supuru Su brings with it further trouble of saving it
from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;-the contentmert due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called 'Supūra'.
(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with as more great effort (and safely hoarded ), there
arises the fear of its being spent up,--this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called ' Pārāpūra'. (227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense
objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; IV. A nuttamàmbha
amona the non-fulfilment of these desires brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called 'Anuttamāmbha'.
w

Page #252

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[L1228
(228) Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be
no enjoyment of things without the cruel V. Uttamamla
"process of killing animals; and contentment due to the abstinence arısıng from this perception of cruelty of the process, is the fifth one, called 'Uttamāmbha'.
Thus the five external forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.
(229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of success:
Kärikā LI The eight forms of success are--(1) reasoning.
(2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4-6) The eight powers three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acqui. sition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success.
(230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain--three fold, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed.
The other successes ' mentioned are only the means to said suppression of pain, and as such are regarded as secondary in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects ; e. g., of these study is only a cause ; those of the more important kınd are only effects ; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect. (231) The first study consists in reading in due form
with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; (1) Tara
this is also called 'Tāra'..

Page #253

-L1239]
TRANSLATION
111
(232) Following from this last is oral instruction, which 12) Sutira term implies the comprehension of the mean
ing of the texts studied—the cause ( distinction ) standing for the effect ( comprehension of the meaning). This constitutes the second success also called 'Sutāra'.
- These two-reading of the text and comprehension of the meaning together constitute the 'Sravana' (Hearing )
(which along with manana and nididhyāsana is the means of realising the highest Truth.]
(233) Reasoning consists in the investigating of the (3) Tāratāra
meaning of the scriptures by a process of acara reasoning not inconsistent with the scriptures
reas themselves. This 'investigation' consists in establishing the ultimate Truth by setting aside all doubts and",objections with regard to it. This process is also called 'Manana' (meditation) by writers on the Vedas. This success is called 'Tāratūra'. (234) The fourth is the acquisition of friends. Even
though one has arrived at the truth by the 14) Kamyaka right process of reasoning, yet one has no confidence in lus conclusions until he has discussed them with, and won the agreement of, his teacher and fellowstudents. Hence the 'acquisition of such 'friends' as the teacher and fellow-students is said to be the fourth success called 'Ramyaka'. (235) By dāna here is meant purity, of discriminative
... wisdom-the word being derived from the (5) Sadāmudita
Sadamudita root 'Darp', to purify. This 'purity' has been thus described by the revered Patañjalı: “An unimpeded discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain" (Yoga-Sūtra 11—26). By unimpededness in the Sūtra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with

Page #254

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(L1236
different kinds of cravings or desires. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice, hence the word Dīna 'purity' includes (as a means to success) this practice also. This the fifth Success called 'Sadā-muarta'.
(236) The aforesaid thrce prima y successes' (three suppressions of Pain) are called, ' Prouoda', 'Mudita' and
Modamāna'. And these three with last five are eight forms of Success (237) Other people explain the text is follows :-(1)
the perception of math, without the instrucAnother explara- toz of others, I cought about purely by tion of the Powers
means of practices durms past lives, is what is the first 'suċcess' me.dit by ühi, (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sankhya Philosophy, is the second success called 'Schda', because it follows solely from the verbal text (3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sirikhya texts in the course of regular residence at the Teacher's, -t is the third form of success, due to study, and is called 'adhyayana'. (4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got at it. This form of Success distinguished by knowledge, is called 'Suhrtprūptı. (5) Fifthly, Dāna (Generosity) is said to be means to Success' because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with gifts.
The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Samkhya Philosophy.
(238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the 'reversion of Contentment and Success' thus become seventeen

Page #255

--L1)340]
TRANSLATION
113
in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution', Success is the most desired by all; and Error, Disability, and Contentment are impediments to Success; this is what is said in the words : “ The aforesaid thrce are checks to Success." "The aforesaid three' are Error, Disabılty and Contentinent. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success, --because they retard their progress: the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the goad, · Ankus'a,' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned.
239) Objection:-“Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can he fulfilled either by the Subjective Esolution' or by Objective Evolution alone. Why have bóth the Evolu
tions ?"
-4.75wer --
Kārika LII Without the 'Subjective', there would be no
'Objective', and without the 'Objective' Necessity of two- there would be no Subjective. Therefold creation
fore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, the Objective' and the 'Subjective'.
(240) The term · Linga' Objective 'stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and Bhāva' * Subjective for the evolution out of the Will.
The meaning of the Kärıkā is that the Objective Evolution cannot manifest itself or accomplish the purpose of the Spirit without the Subjective Evolution': nor conversely can the latter manifest itself or serve the Spirit's purpose without the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution,
T.8

Page #256

114
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[L11241.
That is to say, Experience, which is the purpose of the
Spirit, is not possible unless there are the Necessity of the
of the objects of experience and also the vehicle demental creation
of experience in the form of the two bodies ( Subtle and Physical). Hence the necessity of the objective evolution;-conversely that same Experience is not possible without the organs of experience, in the shape of the Sense
organs and the Internal organs; and these Necessity of the are not possible without Virtue and the intellectual creation
* other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discrimina
tive wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established. (241) The possible objection of mutual interdepend
ence is explained away on the analogy of The fault of reci. procal causality the seed and sprout, due to the fact of Evoluexplained as due tion having had no beginning in time, the to the eternality of creation
my 'subjective' and 'objective evolutions at the
beginning of the present cycle are due to the impluse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle.—Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties.
(242) The various forms of the subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution:
Kärikā LIII The celestial 'evolution has eight forms, the 'ani
mal' has five; the 'human' has only one The force of ele- form: thus in brief is the 'material' montal creation
evolution.

Page #257

-LIV 247]
TRANSLATION
115
sorts
(243) The eight celestial forms are those pertaining to
(1) the Brahmā, (2) the Prajāpatı, (3) the The eight divine Indra, (4) Pitr, (5) Gandharva, (6) Yakşa,
(7) Rākşasa and (8) Pis'āca. (244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird,
reptile, and the immobile things. Five of the lower animals (245) Mankınd is single, not counting its sub-divisions
, Brühmanas &c. as separate, as the Lodily Mankind single form is the same in all classes of men.
Such, in brief, is the material evolution. Such objects as the Jar and the like,-though not having a 'body in the ordinary sense. --are all included under the category of the * Immobile':
(246) The author next describes the three-foldness of this material evolution', based on the higher and lower degrees of intelligence, in the form of the higher, the 'middle' and the 'lower'.
Karikā LIV The ‘higher' evolution abounds in the Sattva-attri
w bute; the lower' evolution abounds The different divisions of beings
" in the Tamas-attribute; and the ‘Middle' based on the evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute; predominance of the Attributes
of -all these comprising the entire Uni
verse, from Brahmā down to the tuft of grass. (247) All the Heavenly regions-Bhuvah, Svah,
Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya--abound in The six Heavenly the
leavenly the Sattva-attribute.-The 'lower' evolution Regions
abounds in the Tamas-attribute; that all

Page #258

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TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
[LIV248
things from the cattle down to the Immobile things, abound in the Tamas-attribute, as full of . Delusion'. The regions of the earth-consisting of the seven Dvipas ( continents ) and Oceans--form the 'middle' evolution abounding in the Rajas-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actioris, righteous and unrighteous, are performed.
The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase "from Brahmā to the tuft of griuss"the 'tuft of grass' including the trees and such other things.
(248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain--a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that ‘Dispassion' (Freedom fron attachment) which is belpful in attaining the Final Goal
pain
Kärikā LV Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain
arising from decay and death, due to the The sources of
non-discrimination of the Spirit from the
body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body], thus Pain is in the very nature of things.
Therein'-in the body. Among corporeal beings the Pain of decay body is the vehicle of various forms of and death. the Pleasure, and yet the pain of decay and common lot of death' is the common lot of all. The fear all creatures
of death, -" may I not cease to be; may I continue to be" &c.,-being common to man as well as io the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*
* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. It is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.

Page #259

-LV:51]
TRANSLATION
117
(249) Objection :-“Pleasure and pain, (according to the Samkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient
Spirit ?"
Answer - The term “Puruşa," literally means “one
who lies in the subtle body;" and this latter Explanation of
of being connected with the Will and its prothe word Purusa
perties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with then
(250) Question - How can pain which is related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?.
Reply:--"Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from Limit of the pain the body: the wpirit cognising ils
**** from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the 341 in 3 . may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pam—the meaning being, “ Until the subtle body has ceased io be, the Spirit suffers pain."
(251) The author next deals with the vifferent views that have been held regarding the caușe of 'Evolution' or * Creation'.
Kärikā LVI This evolution from the Will down to the specific The question as
ion as elements, is brought about by the (modito the Maker of fications of) Prakrti. This work is the Universe done for the emancipation of each Spirit, decided
and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

Page #260

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(LVT1257–
Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the Spirits would be without bodies, organs and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextri. cable nooze of interdependence'. creation due to pity, and pity due to creation and again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deedo, then what is the necessity of postulating intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of ait intelligent agent would inean ( according to the opponent that the deeds of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs and objects could not be produced, -and the result of this would be that there would be no pain; so that the removal of pains would be very easy! (and there would be no ground for God's compassion).
(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on None of the
the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness above objections nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the apply to the case above incongruilies arise, the only motive of of Nature
Nature is the fulfilment of another's purpose. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kurikā is quite appropriate.
(258) It has been said "as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:" -

Page #261

-LIX360)
TRANSLATION
121
Kärikā LVIII As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does The Spirit's end the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the the motive of Nature
emancipation of the Spirit. 'Autsukya 'is' icchi,' desire Desire is satisfied and ceases on the attimaent i the desired object; the object is the purpose of the agent, because the end of an action is that which is desired
The analogy is pointed. it. "Si us the Unmo.cfest ( Nature ) ait for the Emancipalwn of ihr Spirit"
(259) Objection --"We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations ?"
Answer –
Kárikā LIX As a dancing giri, having exhibited herself to the The cause of the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance. cessation of so does Nature cease to operate when Nature's operations she has made herself mainfest to the Spirit.
The word "Stage', -the place-unplies the spectators-the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself, 1. e., having shown that her different modifications, sound, &c., are different from the Spirit.
(260) Objection :--"We grant that the action of Nature is for the Sput's purpose. But she could surely expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit. - just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for another's purpose.
Answer.

Page #262

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
(LX3..
Kärikā LX Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings
about by manifold means, without Nature excepts no benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, compensation
who is devoid of Attributes, and confers no benefit in return.
'As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master-who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits, -hrough purely unselfish motives, without any benelut to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motres is established.
(261) Objection :-“ We grant all this. But a dancing gırl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators, similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit." cinswer.
Karika LXI Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my The reason why conviction , once aware of having been Nature does not seen, she does not again expose herself revert to her actions to the view of the Spirit.
By modesty here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the Purusa's view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in'such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature alsoeven more modest than such a lady-having once been seen by the Puruşa (Spirit) will in no case show herself again.

Page #263

-LX11244]
TRANSLATION
123
(262) Objection -“This may be so. But Puruşa (Spirit), being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is any emancipation possible for him ? For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage ; and bondage being only another name for the Karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying Purusa. And as the Puruşa is devoid of action, it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for Rebirth. Hence it is meaningless assertion that 'Evolution 13 for the purpose of the · Puruşu
The author meets the above olvection by accepting it in the curse of winding up his disquisition
Kärikā LXII . Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated: nor Bondage and does he migrate; it is Nature alone that release in reality having many vehicles is bound, or is apply to Nature released, or migrates.
(263) Verily no Spirit is bound, nor does any migrate; nor is any einancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates and is released. Bundage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers, because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which-grief or profit -accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature, as has been already explained. So our doctrine is entirely sound
(264) Objection .-"We understand that bondage, migration and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit ; but of what good are these to Nature herself ?" Answer :

Page #264

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
LX111965
Kärika LXIII Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven
forms; and by means of one form, she Nature binds and releases herself causes deliverance for the benefit of the by means of her Spirit. own developments
“Nature binds herself by means of seven forms"; i. c. by Virtue and other dispositions (all properties of the Will ) except wisdom For the benefit of the Spirit in the shape of Experience and Final Release, she releases herself by herself, by means of one form', i.e. by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit.
Objection —“We have understood all this; what then ?".
Kārikā LXIV Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows The form and
wisdom in the form,-"I am not, naught character of dis- is mine, and not-I"-which is complete, wisdom
pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute.
criminative
(265) The term "truth" stands for the knowledge of Truth.-From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,--there follows the wisdom, inanifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice perlains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called ' pure.'

Page #265

-LXIV 268
TRANSLATION
64
The purity of the
(266) 'Why pure"?-"On account of the absence of Error." Doubt and Error are the two im. wisdom explained purities of wisdom; and as the above wisdom is free from these, it is called pure. This is what is meant by the term 'aviparyayāt. Doubt consists in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of Error. Thus absence of Error' means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this absence of Error also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth.
Absoluteness explained
125
•
".
(267) Objection It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end."
1. e.,
In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is 'Absolute', unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of being removed by the tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge, even though it has a beginning in time. For, partiality towards truth is natural to the Will, buddhi, as declared by outsiders also (here, the Bauddhas). "No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless knowledge of the true character of objects, for such is the partiality of the Will.
(268) The form of the said knowledge is stated:-I am not, naught is mine, and Not-1. 'I am not
knowledge
6
The form of the merely precludes all action from the Spirit; as is declared (by grammarians), "The root as (as in asmi) together with bhu and kr signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal, such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension-all become precluded from the

Page #266

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[LXIV 269
Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea of Not-1; "I" here stands for active agency in general, such as in "I give", " I eat", “I offer libations", in all of which the active agent is represented by "I"; because wherein there is no action, there can be no active agent; hence it is rightly expressed as 'Not-1.' From this follows the idea that “ Naught is mine ;" for it is only an active agent that can be a possessor: and hence the preclusion of action implies the preclusion of possession also.
Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I am not," means that “ I am the Spirit, not productive; " and because non-productive, “I have no action"-'Not l; and since without action, “I can have no possessions,” hence "naught is mine."
(269) Objection :-“Even after the knowledge of all this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to Bondage.”
Answer:-“It is complete," 1 e. there is nothing left, unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage
(270) Question:-"What is it that is acccomplished by the said knowledge of truth?” Answer:
Karikā LXV Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a
spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature, The cause of the which has ceased to be productive and cessation of Nature's operation has turned back from the seven forms
of evolution, under the influence of the purpose of the Spirit).
The two things for the production of which Nature had begun her action were experience and the perception of truth; so

Page #267

- XV271]
TRANSLATION
127
that when these two have been produced there is nothing left to be produced by her; hence, Nature "ceases to be productive".
“Under the influence of purpose"; i. e., by the force of discriminative Wisdom. The scven forms of Evolution - Virtue, Vice, Error, Dispassion, Passion, Power and Weakness—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion also as of those who have it through mere contentment is due to erroneous knowledge And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its opposite--true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects in the shape of the 'seven forms' are also removed, and thus is Nature ' turned back from the seven forms of coolution.'
"At ease", 1.e inactive, “Pure", 1.6., unmixed with the unpurities of the Will due to Rajas and Tamas Attributes,though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in slight touch with the Will abounding in the Sattva Attribute;--as otherwise no vision of the Nature in the said condition would be possible.
(271) Objection — " This may be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature ceasing to be productive. But Evolution has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Nature); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the 'sentience' of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the 'insentience' and 'objectivity' of Nature; and these two capabılıtıes can never be said to cease; it cannot be said that they cease because there is nothing left to be done; because though one set of objects may have been experienced by the Spirit, there might be others of the same kind still to be experienced; as is found to be the case with the perception of sound and other objects of sense". (Thus no emancipation is possible). Answer:

Page #268

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TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
[LXVI226
Karika LXVI
"She has been seen by me", thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases (to wisdom for want act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further
No birth after attainment of
of motive
evolution
(272) So long as Nature has not brought about discrominative wisdoin, she might continue to bring about the enjoyment of sound and other objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. It is only on account of the want of discrimination, that the Spirit regards as his own and enjoys the pleasing, displeasing and deluding modifications of Nature, the objects of sense,-the sound and the rest Similarly discriminative wisdom also, which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as for himself-only by reason of the want of discrimination. When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a modification of Nature Thus the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot regard any purpose as his own. Further, experience and emancipation being the 'purpose of the Spirit, supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the ' purpose of the Spirit, there is no motive for the operation. This is what is Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

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129
meant by the words—“ There is no motive for evolution." A "Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution: and no such motive is possible, when there is no 'purpose of the Spirit.'
(273) Objection :-" We grant all this. But no oner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off: and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature ( as distinct from himself) ? If it be asserted that “emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds "--chen, we ask,--how is this residuum destroyed ? , If by mere fruition (1. e. by experience), then you tacıtly imply the mabılıty of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation, and hence the assertion that " emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit," becomes meaningless. The hope 100--that * emancipation would be obtained on the destruction oi the residua of Karma, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"-15 too sanguine ever to be realised."
Answer :
Karikā LXVII By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the
rest become devoid of causal energy ; Reason why the vet the Spirit remains awhile invested body does not dissolve immedia- with the body, just as a potter's wheel tely on the attain- continues to revolve through the momenment of wisdom
tum of the impluse previously imparted to it.
T.9

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TATTVA-KAUMUDÍ
(LXV11275.
(274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic residuum'-even though it is beginningless and its time of fruition is uncertain,-has its productivity destroyed and is unable to produce any 'fruit' in the shape of 'birth, life and life's experiences'. It is oniy when the soil of the Will' 15 watered with the waters of the 'Kles'as' (1. e. Ignorance, Egolis", Love, Hate and Clinging), that the · Karmic seeds' give ou: sprouts ; so that when the said soil is rendered barren ny reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having ren sucked up by the heat of the knowledge of Truth',- how could there be any possibility of the Karmic seeds Sprouting up? With this view it is said "Virtue and the rest recome vlevold of causal cnergy;"'--1., they cease to be causes. Even, so, when wisdim has been attained, the body continue for a while, on account of the previous impulse , just a-, ti en efter the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel connues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted :: it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it beco nes inactive. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose srution has already commenced; as is declared in S'ruti-"i Having exhausted the others by insans of experience, the soul citains beatitude” and “The delay is only so long as beatise is not attained" [ Chandogya VI, 1, 2). The 'impuls ( to wluch the continuance of the Body is due ) 15 in the r ant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance, it is true that on account of the momentum of this inpulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a lime.
(275) Question — “This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about ?"

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131
Answer:
Kärikā LXVIII When the separation from the body has at length Final beatitude be
been attained, and by reason of the pur
pose having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,—then he attains eternal and absolute Isolation
The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those aiso whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience,--the purpose having been fulfilled, Nat:ire desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute 'Isolation,' 1. e. cessation of the three kinds of pain.
(276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated :
Karikā LXIX This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment
of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein The precedence (wherefore ) the origin, duration, and of Kapila
dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage.
"Absiruse",-- guhya'( lit. in a case ) i e. hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons.
"By the great sage" 1. e. by Kapıla. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. “Wherein are considered, etc; 'in which knowledge means for the sake of which knowledge; as in the expression 'Carmani dvipinam hantı', the word 'carmani (lit. in the skin) is taken to mean for the sake of the skin, one

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[LXX271
kills the tiger", -'Bhūtānām; of living beings,-'the origin, duration and dissolution are considered:-which is done in the scriptures.
(277) Objection:-"Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great sage (Kapıla); wherefore should we have every regard for the assertion made by Isvarakrsna ?" Answer:
Karikā LXX-LXXI This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the Sage imparted Importance of the to Asuri, who taught it to Pancas'ikha. by Science
whom the philosophy was extensively
propagated. Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in the Aryā metre by the noble-minded Is varakrsna who has thoroughly understood the philosophical doctrine.
Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all evils causing the three kinds of pain.
Supreme, i. e. the most important of all purifying Sage'—Kapıla-Imparted to Āsuri &c.
(278) “Arya"—that which has arrived at truth, and one whose mind is such as 'noble-minded'.
doctrines.
(279) This philosophy is one organic whole in itself, nou a mere section--as it treats of all branches of knowledge:
Kārikā LXXII The subjects that are treated of in the seventy
distiches are those of the complete The sixty topics “Philosophy of the Sixty Topics,' excludof science
ing the illustrative tales, and omitting the doctrines of other people.

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The sixty topices are thus enumerated in the Rājas Vārtika: 1 The existence of Nature (Kārıkā XIV). 2 Its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (xi); 4 Distinctiveness (of Nature from Spirit) (xi); 5 Subordination (of Nature to Spırıt) (XVII); 6 Plurality (of Spirits) (XVIII); 7 Disjunction (of Spirit from Nature in the end) (xx); 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Nature in the beginning) (XXI); 9 Duration (XIX); 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX); these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kınds of Error, (XLVII), nine of Contentment (L), and twenty-eight of Disabılıty of the organs (xLix); these together with the eight forms of Power (LI) make up the sixty "topics". All these sixty topics are treated of in the above disticl:cs, which therefore form a complete Philosophy and cannot be said to be only a section thercof.
Of the above (ten radical categories) sihgleness, objectivity and subordination relate to Nature; distinctness, inactivity and plurality to Spirit; and existence, disjunction and conjunction to both; and duration—i. e. continuance relates to the gross and subtle things.
May this work of Vācaspatı Mıs'ra, Tattva-Kaumudi (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lıly-lıke) hearts of good men !
Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vacaspatı Mıs'ra.
END

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NOTES
The first benedictory stanza -75112*i etc., is taken from ÀO (8.4). aao has changed the readings as follows — (6) 7914: in place of F697:; (c) 37 da TqHIOTT A in place of Fish THTOTSTA; (d) gerai i 34672 in place of
ERHAN YAMTAFÌSST: 1 The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in Aicy, which is nct favoured by the readings of the उपनिषद्. The वेदान्तिन explain this verse quite differently. TETTI has refuted the claim of the nices that this verse lays down the principles of the ficou system. For fuller discussion, see TIETHIST on
Harrastara (1. Æ. 3.2.c). It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three Its. It is, therefore, in the fıtness of things that this verse should have been chosen by वाच० for मङ्गलाचरण.
About कपिल, आसुरि, पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरकृष्ण, see Introduction.
efütter. The word ya stands for living beings according to arrit.
आधिदैविक, according to गोड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On Carathi , Davies remarks—“But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig Veda (.i. 33, 7), Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods ( daivya)." (p. 15). ____ The reading adopted by गौड०, vis., तदभिघातके 1s more expressive of the pict idea of complete cessation of pain, than anat of argo ( See, S. N. S., 1, in. ). cf. fata. Guerreriarency Trü: ( FT. .?.?). The reading of 790

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
vis., तदवघातके does not materially differ from तदपघातके. Com. pare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading. विष्णुपुराण describes the three दु:खs in the following verses :
अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा । शारीरो बहुभिर्भेदैर्भिद्यते श्रूयतां च सः ॥ २ ॥ शिरोरोगप्रतिश्यायज्वरशूलभगन्दरैः । गुल्मार्शःश्वयथुश्वासछादिभिरनेकधा ॥ ३ ॥ तथाक्षिरोगातीसारकुष्टांगामयसंज्ञितैः । भिद्यते देहजस्तापो मानसं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥ ४ ॥ कामक्रोधभयद्वेषलोभमोहविषादजः । शोकासूयावमानामात्सर्यादिमयस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥ मानसोऽपि द्विजश्रेष्ट तापो भवति नैकधा । इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो ह्याध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥ मृगपक्षिमनुष्याथैः पिशाचोरगराक्षसैः । सरीसृपाद्यैश्च नृणां जायते चाधिभौतिकः ॥ ७ ॥ शीतवातोष्णवर्षाम्बुवैद्युतादिसमुद्भवः ।
तापो द्विजवरश्रेष्ठैः कथ्यते चाधिदैविकः ॥ ८॥ (६. ५) The reading set, ( found in some editions ), in the verse अके चेन्मधु etc., has अर्के as its variant. On this बालराम remarks
-अके इति पाठे तु-समीपे-गृहकोणे, इति वार्थो बोध्यः। वस्तुतस्तु जैमिनीयसूत्रभाष्ये शबरस्वामिभिः पथि जातेऽर्के मधूत्सृज्य तेनैव पथा यथा मध्वार्थिनः पर्वतं न गच्छेयुरित्यभिधाय 'अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत' इत्येवमपन्यासाद् अर्के-इत्येव पाठः साधीयान् ॥ (p. 14, note 1).
The quotation 'यन दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं etc., is ascribed to श्रुति by वाच०. On this बालराम remarks- यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नम्' इति भट्टवार्तिकरिति केचित् , स्मृतिरियमिति विज्ञानभिक्षवः, परिमलादिषु प्रामाणिकग्रन्थेषु श्रुतित्वेन व्यवहारादर्थवादरूपा श्रुतिरियमिति मादृशाः॥ (p. 16, note 3 ). The word eaf in this quotation has been variously

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explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See बालराम (pp. 39-40 ) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question.
__ अपाम सोमममृता अभूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, माठर and जय० With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत
श्रुतं च दृष्टवदुष्टं स्पर्धासूयात्ययव्ययैः । बह्वन्तरायकामत्वात् कृषिवच्चापि निष्फलम् ॥ (११.१०.२१) एवं लोकं परं विद्यान्नश्वरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।
सतुल्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनाम् ॥ (११.३.२०) It is interesting to compare --जय- अस्या आर्याया वक्ष्यमाणा याः, सर्वा एवार्थेन भाष्यस्थानीया दृष्टव्याः (p. 4 ), with the remark of Davies, quoted in the foot-note in the translation ( p. 5).
The quotation of पक्षशिख, vis., स्वल्पः सङ्करः etc., is found in full in व्यासभाष्य on यो० मू० २. १३. See Introduction also.
___The reconciliation of वेदिकी हिंसा with the श्रुति text-मा हिंस्यात् सी भूतानि-, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy ( See, S. N. S., p. 5, in.; Sovani, p. 400 ). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors ( See pages 24-36 ).
न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावकार्यस्य तथात्वात् etc., ( para 14 )-Says an objector : Just as स्वर्ग has been declared to be
आनित्य, because it is an effect ( यद्यत्कार्य तदनित्यम्), similarly, this दु:खध्वंस should also be अनित्य, because it is an effect, To this apao replies that this maxim of targra holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like दु:खध्वंस. But how can दुःखध्वंस be called Ale according to the picy philosophy, which advocates सत्कार्यवाद? To this बालराम rephes-यद्यपि सांख्यनये सत्कार्यवादाङ्गीकारेण दुःखप्रध्वंसस्य मोक्षत्वाभिधानं व्याहतं, तथापि दुःखप्रध्वंसपदेनात्र दु:खातीतावस्थाया एवं तात्पर्यविषयत्वेनाभिधानात् व्याहत्यभावोऽवसेयः॥ (p. 43 ).

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Compare the notion of ghi according to the area philosophy -दुःखनिवृत्तेश्चात्यन्तिकत्वं समानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमकालीनस्वं. युगप. दुत्पन्नसमानाधिकरणसर्वात्मविशेषगुणध्वंससमामकालीनत्वं वा, अशेषविशेषगुणध्वंसावधिकदुःखप्रागभावो वा ।। ( उपस्कार on वैशेषिकसूत्र १. ४ )
The order of व्यक्ताव्यक्तशविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following fi. &.
-स्थूलात् पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य (१.६२); बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तेश्चाहकारस्य । १.६३ ); तेनाहकारस्य (१.६४); ततः प्रकृतेः (१.६५); and संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य (१.६६).
Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word og.. Some call the महाभूतs as व्यक्त, whileas, the author of कारिकाs seems to regard everything व्यक्त ( and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य ), Except the प्रधान and पुरुष. वाच०.agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this pateit, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th it. At the latter place he says -सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्तत्त्व etc., by the word आदि (See बालराम p. 16 In.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpre', the word आदि, according to वंशीधर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and पुरुष. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगग्रहः। प्रकृतिपुरुषतत्संयोगा नित्यानुमेया इत्युक्तेः (वंशीधर, p. 183) 1 See Sevani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.
In connection with Jacobi's remark that it 15 very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Samkhyas Y See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32 ), it is interesting to compare Da\vies (p. 17, 3n)-Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for

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NOTES
the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).
The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सस्यजन्य इत्यर्थः । आचविशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिरास:, द्वितीयेनेन्द्रियसामान्यादिमिरासः। Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य 1s a product.
On you as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, In. ) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute: "It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light.” (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].
From Een (Ego) proceed not only the sprays, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the l.principle) is the base of the reality of all our senseperceptions (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (Systêm des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—“ If at all there exists Something Real as opposed to ideal, then that Something Real must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the a ir, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle ( 3EET) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (1999),—the l-principle itself being imaginary and due to HIT. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-बौद्ध also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The Hieu en does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. - an1994 augia: (mi Æ. ?. 87.).
IV Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शय, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog

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[IV
nised by other schools. The aris materialist recognises only प्रत्यक्ष, the जैन and वैशेषिक schools recognise प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the मावs also recognise only two प्रमाणs, but they are प्रत्यक्ष and your according to them. The followers of THIEF, the जरनेयायिकs, and the सांख्य and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द. The oldest and the most modern नैयायिका and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school add अर्थापत्ति as the fifth. The मीमांसकs of कुमारिलभट्ट school and the अद्वैतवेदान्तिनs recognise one more, vis., अनुपलब्धि or S . The number of us reaches eight in the case of the पौराणिकs who add संभव and ऐतिय to the list. Some तान्त्रिक recognise aer also in addition to the above: others add afarar to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven Thrs, apart from the three recognised by the Fil, fall under the latter. 1. 394719
arao splits it up into URTET, 37TATA and Ta; ATST regards it to be THTA; जय० includes it under अनुमान and शब्द:
गौड includes it under शब्द;
and चन्दिका under अनुमान. 2. surga
All the commentators include it under अनुमान. 3. 37719
वाच. and जय regard it as प्रत्यक्ष; माठर includes it under अनुमान. Although गौडs. remark-सम्भवाभावप्रतिभतित्योपमाश्चाप्तवचने, suggests its inclusion under 1784, yet another remark of his, vis., शुष्कधान्यदर्शनावृष्टेरभावो गम्यते, would lead us — to infer that he will have it under अनुमान;
aparent regards it as a help-mate of years, and, therefore, no independent TATT.

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4. संभव
वाच०, जय० and माठर include it under अनुमान;
गौर and चन्द्रिका include it under शब्द. 5. ऐतिय
वाच. opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is शब्द, otherwise it is no प्रमाण; गोड and चन्द्रिका also include it under शब्दः
माठर includes it under अनुमान. 6. प्रतिभा
arao and arout do not mention it; जय includes it under प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, when it is correct, otherwise it is no प्रमाण; माठर includes it
under अनुमान ; and गोड includes it under शब्द. 7. चेटा
Noticed only by चन्द्रिका and माठर, and included
under अनुमान. Wilson is right in remarking that although the मीमांसक do recognise six प्रमाणs, yet गौड०'s remark that they are अर्थापत्ति, संभव, अभाव, प्रतिभा, ऐतिय and उपमान, is not correct; for संभव, ऐतिय and प्रतिभा are nowhere recognised as प्रमाणs by the मीमांसकs; rather, "the author of शाखदीपिका excludes ex. pressly संभव, प्रतिभा and ऐतिय from the character of proofs. " (p. 28 ). जैमिनि nowhere mentions the प्रमाणs, but the six प्रमाणs (vis., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, शब्द, उपमान, अर्थापत्ति and अभाव ) are discussed by शबरस्वामिन् in his भाष्य on मीमांसासूत्र I. 1. 5. प्रभाकर does not recognise अभाव, but कुमारिल does.
The word FATEQT ( in para 23 ) is a technical term of मीमांसा; cf. श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थवि. प्रकर्षात् (मी० म०३. ३. १४ ). It means a name, the sense of which depends upon its derivation, unlike other proper names cf. आख्या चैवं तदर्थस्वात् (मी० स० ३. ३. १३), and शाबरभाष्य on itसमाख्या सति सम्बन्धे भवति, यथा पाचको लावक इति । तत्र पाचकशब्द. मुपलभ्य पचतिमा अस्य सम्बन्ध इति गम्यते ॥

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(IV.
प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा 1s that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indeci. sion and memory“, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच० says-बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलं प्रमा. Ths mmght mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit ? No, we reply-what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit ) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the I AS- 21 1417: gasta para939:' ( 11. 20 ) and feature AHTEVATI grand' (IV. 22).
__Following the न्यायसूत्र-तत्पूर्वकं विविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । (1, 1, 5), वाच० first divides अनुमान into three kınds. Again he gives another classification :
अनुमान
वीत
अवीत or शेषवत्
पूर्ववत् सामान्यतोदृष्ट
The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. aturan himself proposes two alternative explanations.
(1) (a) qaQ-A priori or inference of effect from cause.--as orain from the clouds in the sky.
(6) 99-A posteriori, or an inference of cause from effect, -as of rain from the flood in a river.

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(c) Amaie-Commonly seen, cr based on Analogy,-- e. g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.
Or (2) (a) & If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.
(6) 1996-Inference by exclusion ( TATA asenJAETT FETHIOT HARTT: oitaa:). The question is--, under which of the seven categories (79, TOT Etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under you has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, 70% falls under ju.
(c) सामान्यतोदृष्ट-Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the lo in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the sea from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects ( as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest ). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit
The two alternative explanations given by appedita show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper--- Trividham anumânam', POC., Poona, pp. 251–280.
वास. agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But अवीत or भेषवर according to वाच, is a negative reasoning.

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[v
वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, vis. शब्द is a गुण, 1s rejected by वाच० in bis तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतसीरीज ). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान, The inference of शब्द being a गुण 1s not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अन्वयव्यतिरोक. Thecorrect example of 1960, therefore, is that the qualities'desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु ; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external senseorgan (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being partajuts cannot be the qualities of दिशा, काल and मनस्-for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्यs are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the nineth द्रव्य, vis., आत्मन्. So there beingno सपक्ष of आत्मन् It is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. जय० and गौड० agree with the first explanation of वाक्यायन. गोड and माठर explain शेषवत् differently -समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाथ शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति (गोड०)॥.
लिङ्गलिभिपूर्वकम्-वाच° would read one more लिङ्गि i. e. लिङ्ग लिङ्गिालिङ्गिपूर्वकम् . गोड has a curious explanation to offer-तदनुमानं लिङ्गापूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी अनुमीयते. यथा दण्डेन यतिः। लिङ्गिापूर्वकं च यत्र लिगिन्ना लिङ्ग-मनुमीयते, यथा दृष्टा यति, अस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति । जय० agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of AFFIS which ought to exist between the for and the fit. They are
(1) स्वस्वामिभाव as between राजा and पुरुष. (2) प्रकृतिविकार ,, , यव , सक्तु. (3) कार्यकारणभाव ,
वत्स. (4) पात्रपात्रिक
परिवृद् , त्रिविष्टब्ध. (5) साहचर्य
चक्रवाक , चकवाकी. (6) प्रतिद्वन्द्वि
शीत
उष्ण. (7) निमित्तनैमित्तिक ..
भोज्य , भोजक. The conversation between आवव्य and जैगीषव्य, referred to by वाच०, occurs in व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. ३. १८.
The अयुक्तs mentioned by चाच. are
(a) शाक्यभिक्षुs or the Buddhist monks, described in the विवेकविलास, vil 275 (as quoted in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह ) as
धनु

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कृत्तिः कमण्डलुमौंण्डयं चीरं पूर्वाह्नभोजनम् ।
संघो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिश्रिये बौद्ध भिक्षुभिः ॥ (b) निर्यन्थकs or the Jains, and
(c) संसारमोचकs or the materialists. बालराम observesसंसारमोचका:-(संसारमोचकादेश्च हिंसा पुण्यत्वसंमता ) इत्याभिहिता हिंसादि. परायणाः घटभङ्गे तदन्तर्वर्तिसलिलविलयवद् देहभने तदन्तर्गतजीवभङ्ग एव मोक्ष इत्येवं बुवाणाश्चार्वाकविशेषाः॥ (p. 82 ).
'तु शब्देनानुमानाद् व्यवच्छिनत्ति-As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the astra school do not recognise शब्द as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच० says that the relation between a 4149 and its ps is not that of लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वहि. वाक्यार्थ, being only an object of cognition cognised by the atte, cannot be known by inference.
उपमान. According to the नैयायिकs (प्रसिद्धसाधात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्-न्या० सू० 1 1 6), उपमान is that sentence which esta blishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, ac: cording to the सांख्यs, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge (ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकड, उपमान is the सादृश्यज्ञान (or the cognition of simlarity, as of गो residing in the directly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a stay in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of may directly perceived. Ths is the फल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोत्व in गो, so we have गोसादृश्य in गो. And as we directly perceive गोत्व along with गो, so we perceive गोसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवय. Therefore, गोसादृश्यज्ञान (अपमान) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमानफल ) both are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation ( like संयोग ) which should reside on two objects; it is only भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोग, that is, the

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existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This FET" is, thus, one like vita; and if it is perceived in o, then it is perceived in Tay also.
spararat is Presumption. We presume the existence of living in outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसक objects-देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि
a: etc. He says that when we hear flera en: pregrafie, then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र 15 देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of a also. Thus, it's non-existence in the TV is opposed to his existence in GTRIHTRY. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्थापति. वाच० replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in TATATE. Similarly sa's non-existence in ( which is opposed to his existence in T ) cannnot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.
Te is no garut, but is included under tre. For, 47919at is merely a modification of ms. But, says an objector, how can spare (a negation) be a (something positive)? Answer. Under pita were veronate PTOTTAT STORTIT:
O o III. 13), 5TTA has defined Yrrono as BraTFUTTET ETTER quefortfargent Appa: TROTTA STA-i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when it was on the me, then it was सद्वित्तीयपरिणाम of भूतल; and when there is no घट, then it is the केवल or अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल.
VI Things directly perceived by the senses nood not be taught by the 774, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now" things beyond the senses are not

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un
only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes " ( Davies, p. 27). The latter is an Instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाचo regards to be as important for our inquiry as the . The most important kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोदृष्ट ( and शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाच० ), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जय० rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत् both (p. 9 ).
NOTES
VII
पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि ( महाभाष्य IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of mentioned in
the कारिका are reduced to four by जय०
19
13:
(1) देशशेष includes अतिदूर and अतिसामीप्य. इन्द्रियघात and मनोऽनवस्थान.
(2) इन्द्रियदोष (3) विषयदोष
सौक्ष्म्य, and
( 4 ) अर्थान्तरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभव and समानाभिहार. Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two - इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष ( See p. 405). माठर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of असत् ( non-existent) things even— इदानीमसतां चतुर्धा भवति । तत्रोच्यते- प्राक्प्रध्वंसेतरेतरात्यन्ताभावभेदात्...... एवमियं द्वादशधानुपलब्धिः । सतामष्टधा ह्यसतां चतुर्थी ॥
-
VIII
On the reading प्रकृतिसरूपं, Davies remarks—— Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं ( having its own form ), from the सांख्यकौमुदी, which must be referred to intellect ( महत् ). All the Mss. but one have (like ), which the sense requires. In his translation he has " dissimile et simile". ( p. 27, 1n ).

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IX
वाच० here lays down the opinions of ( 1 ) the बौद्धs, ( 2 ) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and ( 3 ) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.
14
[IX
(1) The s maintain that existence comes into being from non-existence ( असत: सज्जायते ).
(2) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an existent cause produces a non-existent effect ( सतोऽसज्जायते ).
(3) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change ( एकस्य सतो विवर्तः न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत् ). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.
जय,
उपादानग्रहणात् वाच० interprets ग्रहणात् as सम्बन्धात्. But गौड, माठर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although • ́s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्. बाच॰'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावात्. “It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former. " ( S. N. S. p. 28, 1n ).
कारणभावाच्च – जय० gives two explanations of this phrase— कारणस्य सत्त्वादित्यर्थः । यथसत्कार्यमुत्पयते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति । भवति च । तस्माच्छक्तिरूपेणावस्थितमिति गम्यते । अथवा कारणभावादिति कारणस्वभावात् । यत्स्वभावं कारणं तत्स्वभावं कार्यम् । यथा स्निग्धस्वभावभ्यस्तिलेभ्यः स्निग्धमेव तैलम्, मृदो मृत्स्वभावो घटः ।। ( p. 12 ). माठर and गोडo agree with the latter explanation वाच०, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात् - -on account of the identity of cause and effect.
तस्मादियं पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा स्वसत्तासमवायो वा उभयथापि नोत्पयते etc. (para 75 ). After having disproved the नैयायिक's theory of origination of effect ( उत्पत्ति ), वाच० proceeds further —Now, what is your उत्पत्ति ? Is it the समवाय ( Inherence ) of the effect in its cause? That is, is it the which is

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15
produced? If you say yes, then your produces only the 9 and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that उत्पत्ति is the समवाय of सत्ता ( existence ) in the effect ? That is, is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as is, because she is related to me, similarly, a सत्पदार्थ is सत्, because it is related to सत्ता. So, the other alternative of the नैयायिक is that what is originated is the समवाय (Inherence) of in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is समवाय and not the effect. Moreover, asks बालराम, how can you establish the relation of the non-existent with the existents? And, how again, can there be the समवाय of सत्ता in the असतू पट, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects?
Thus, it will be seen that a T is related with the आविर्भाव of कार्य. The opponent asks — why should a कारण be not related with the रूप of कार्य ? वाच० replies. — Because आविर्भाव is a क्रिया and रूप is a गुण. A कारण can be related with क्रिया only and not with गुण; otherwise, a कारण will not be a कारण. The very derivation of the word कारण - क्रियतेऽनेनेति कारणम् - implies its relation with क्रिया.
X
-, i. e., caused.
or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to T, is of two kinds: (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्च's are the 's, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्राs are हेतुs and हेतुमत्s both, whileas, अव्यक्त (i. e. प्रधान ) is only a हेतु. The शापक हेतुs are five-fold, viz., विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तुष्टि, सिद्धि and अनुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति तुष्टि and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्गs (ie creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-threes. (But what is this अनुग्रह ? ) Thus अव्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.

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[x
नित्यम्-non-eternal, destructible. Destruction 1s the return of a product to its cause. cf.-नाश: कारणलयः (सां० स० १. १२१). For, according to the theory of सरकार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. Tot is forry, because it has no firror to which it could return.
अव्यापि- The twenty-three तत्त्वs are not all-pervading, like Tita and gry; "each of these prir.ciples (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महतत्व all-pervading? To this वंशीधर replies--महदादेः स्वस्वकारणाव्यापक. स्वादुपचरितव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थः (p. 201),-the pervading-ness of महत् , etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रधान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि.
__ सक्रियम्-परिस्पन्द means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञान, on the other hand, says-सक्रियत्वमध्यवसायादिरूपनियतकार्यकारित्वम्। प्रधानस्य तु सर्वकियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वान्न कार्यैकदेशमात्रकारित्वम् । न च क्रिया कमैंव वक्तुं शक्यते । प्रकृतिक्षोभात् मुष्टि. श्रवणेन प्रकृतेरपि कर्मवत्तयात्र सक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति ( १. १२४). On this बालराम remarks-क्षोभादिपरिणामलक्षणक्रियायाः प्रधाने सत्वेऽपि गमनागमन. लक्षणपरिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया असत्त्वान्न प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्थोऽयं भिक्षोः प्रयास इति बोध्यम् (p. 121).
अनेकम्-i. e, सजातीयभेदवत्, having a variety of similar objects: as a mango-tree has सजातीयभेद, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, बुद्धि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But furto explains it otherwise-अनेकत्वं सर्गभेदेन भिन्नत्वम्-सर्गद्वयसाधारण्यमिति यावत् । न पुनः सजातीयानेशव्यक्तिकत्वम्, प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तः। प्रकृतेरपि सत्त्वाचनेकरूपत्वात् . The fallacy of विज्ञान० 1s pointed out by बालराम-प्रकृतेरनेकरूपत्वेs प्यनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावस्य प्रकृतावसम्भवात् , किञ्च
-'अजामेकाम्' इति श्रवणादप्रामाणिकं प्रकृतेरनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभिधानमित्यस्थान एव व्यामोहो भिक्षोरिति । (pp. 121-122).
FFA-According to figo and Arst, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanatıcn, to and Amito give another alternative explana

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tion. viz., that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of car. This is the sense taken by a77. also. But start itself is a characteristic (लिङ्ग) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच. remarks-tar a a Paraty por gente para ena 19: On this, S. N. S. remarks that it “ seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved. (p. 32, in.)
Why can there be no oragaraylangt between 1997 and gie, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is Fhara (=identity or तादात्म्य ), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the press and the qe produced out of them. But, will there be any in between gia and STEETT, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गौड०, माठर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc., But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire a i (vis., gis, 345FIT etc. ) cannot be called as TETRAITEAFT. If it be urged that these 75 and the rest do reside in a latent form in gfs and the rest, then it may be pointed out that $176 and the rest do reside in a latent form in gut also. Even arac, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this szi as—ATE 1202187: 97896 संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि ।
T77H-Although, each of the twenty-three afats is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to TBA. Again, although ga is indepen. dent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रिय and the FFAIATs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon gaat, the fountain-head of all energy.
XI PROCTA-The three gols or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति; प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium.
N. 2

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The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the site theory of three gors, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks-" In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes : (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material ( Hylic). This corresponds to the गुणs of कपिल and is probably an importation from India." (p. 37, 2n. )
fang:-The view.point of the faranga area is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously;"cf. 'सहोपलम्भानियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः। भेदश्च भ्रान्ति. विज्ञानदृश्यतेन्दाविवाद्वये॥ (सर्वदर्शन०,p. 32), वाचस्पति's refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बालराम यत्र किलैकस्मिन्नेव योषिपे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विष्टविमूढानां जनानां विभिन्नानि मुखादिज्ञानानि जायमानान्युपलभ्यन्ते तत्र प्रमातृणां परस्परप्रतिसन्धानाद् वस्त्वैक्येऽपि ज्ञाननानात्वं दृश्यते । यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्यासाधारण्यादनेकविज्ञानालम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु म सम्भवत् । अतः वस्तुसाधारण्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तदभ्युपेयमिति । (p. 128 ).
अचेतनम्-बुद्धि ( intellect ) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चेतन्य, and not identical with it, because बुद्धि 1s a material product of प्रकृति.
The phrase तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to guth and stout, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अध्यक्त.
Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्तव्यक्त and अव्यक्त
पुरुष त्रिगुण
अगुण अविवेकि
विवेकी विषय
अविषय

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पुरुष
हेतुमत्
व्यक्त and अव्यक्त सामान्य
असामान्य अचेतन
चेतन प्रसवधर्मि
अप्रसवधर्मी Similarity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त frorn अव्यक्तव्यक्त
अव्यक्त अहेतुमत्
अहंतुमान् अनित्य नित्य
नित्य अव्यापि व्यापि
व्यापी सक्रिय निष्क्रिय
निष्क्रिय अनेक एक
अनेक आश्रित अनाश्रित
अनाश्रित लिङ्ग अलिङ्ग
अलिङ्ग सावयव निरवयव
निरवयव परतन्त्र स्वतन्त्र
स्वतन्त्र It should be noted that गौड० and माठर say पुरुष एकः, which 1s opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व. जय० andवाच०, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अनकत्व. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes“Either, therefore, Gaurapada has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31). 'individual'. So in the Sutras it is said, that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body). The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapada, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65 )

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XII
Jurs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the 17 and as119systems. They are of the nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच° says-गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called Jots ( secondary ), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.
agrafi literally means 'device of science, and probably refers to the device of the मीमांसकs known as स्थान ( position or order ). So it will mean that प्रीति, अप्रीति and विषाद stand for सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् respectively.
गौड०, माठर and जय० mention अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः also, whileas वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योऽन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिभव, आश्रय, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation ). 540 explains that as gare agor artara.. According to गौड०, अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, i.e. are reciprocally present. AroT, however, seems to take afat in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks-“ means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each yer may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect." (p. 36, 1n. ) ___The quotation, अन्योऽन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे, etc., ascribed to आगम by वाच०, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd स्कन्ध of देवी. भागवत. गोड० माठर and जय० quote only one verse, vis., रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc., जय० ascribes this verse to विष्णुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for Eftiar=#irasiat. But there is no such verse in the wall. The verse found there is—TERETA HA yara HTZETI TG: APT 1974: FFA
Freerer II (XIV. 10). We find a simular verse in the 37ha. पर्वन् of the महाभारत-तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्वस्य मिथुनं रजः। रजसथापि FTA FEITE HEART Y 79: 11( 36. & ).

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XII ___ सांख्याचार्यः-stands for पश्चशिख and others. विज्ञान० quotes 'पञ्चशिख on प्रीत्यप्रीतिबिषादायर्गुणानामन्योऽन्यं वैधर्म्यम् (सां. म. I. 127 )"सत्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि 'मिद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् ।"
अर्थत:-जय० and वाच. explain it as पुरुषार्थतः, but गौड takes it in the sense of साधना, and माठर explains it as कार्यवशात्.
Now, these guys, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्याभिभव, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these guts perform functions of so different a nature ? In reply to this arao gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणs. गोड०, माठर and जय०, on the other harrd, illustrate सत्व by a lady, THA by warriors and te by clouds. A virtuous woman ( and therefore, a सात्त्विक type ) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers ( and therefore, representing रजस् ) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugi. tives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तामस type ) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणs ( = प्रकृति or मूलकारण ) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण 1s not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिकs who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.-नन्वेवं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिमासंख्यव्यक्तिकत्वे वैशेषिकमतादत्र को विशेष इति चेत्-The reply is कारणव्यस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ।। 'शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम्। त्रिगुणं तजगयोनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥' इति विष्णुपुराणादिभ्यः ॥ विज्ञान ( I. 128 ).
But are not these gors opposed to one another ? The reply is---yes. Still they unite for gearů, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वर्ति and दीप in spite of

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the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.-दीपोपरि तेलपतनेन दीपनाशात् तैलमपि दीप. विरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वल्पकेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच० gives another example of this विरोध,-vis., यथा वा वातपित्त. श्लेष्माण: etc., बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवी. भागवत ( 3.9)-" "प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्य प्रकरोत्यर्थदर्शनम् । वर्तिस्तैलं यथाश्चि विरुद्धाश्च परस्परम् ॥ २९ ॥ विरुद्ध हि तथा तैलमग्निना सह सङ्गतम् । तैलं वार्ते. विरोध्येव पावकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥३०॥ एकत्रस्थाः पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम्॥" ( pp. 139-140 ). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of these gots in any evolved thing ( say, a human body ). If at all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था i. e. प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुणs in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is to तुल्यबलत्व in the विकारs. Cf. रूपातिशया वृत्यतिशयाक्ष परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते-(व्याप्त. भाष्य on यो. मू. II. 15 ).
अत्र च मुखदुःखमोहा परस्परविरोधिन: etc.-Here वाच० has in his view the attack of the वेदान्तिन् against the सांख्य philosophy. According to the latter, all the objects (or evolved entities ) are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The वेदान्तिन् ( वाच० himself ) retorts--आन्तराः खल्वमी सुखदुःखमोहविषादा बाह्येभ्यश्चन्दनादिभ्योऽतिविच्छिन्नप्रत्ययवेदनीयेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ता अध्यक्षमीक्ष्यन्ते । यदि पुनरेत एव सुखदुःखादिस्वभावा भवेयुस्तत: स्वरूपत्वात् हेमन्तेऽपि चन्दनः सुख:स्यात् । न हि चन्दन. कदाचिदचन्दनः ।............तस्मादमुखादिस्वभावा अपि चन्दनकुङ्कुमादयो जातिकालावस्थाअपेक्षया मुखदुःखादिहेतवो न तु स्वयं मुखादिस्वभावा इति रमणीयम् ।। (भामती on ब्र. मू. II. 2. 1). To this argu. ment arao ( as an exponent and defender of FITCH ) replies
-स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहात्मकान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । Although सुख, दुःख and मोह are all present in every object, yet, they are not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one or the other of these ( मुख, दुःख and मोह ), they stand in need of excitant,causes, which themselves are of the nature of सुख, दुःख and मोह. For example, सुख, for its own experience, stands in need of the predominance of which is of the nature of Arayut ( or ga ).

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XIV
The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गोड ० and explain it as- on account of the absence of the contraries of त्रैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान. वाचo offers an alternative explanation —— on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, i. e., पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents. चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. 4 also agrees with it. cf. त्रैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोरभावात् ( ? ) । न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्मात् त्रैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ ( p. 20 ). The explanation of गौडo, as rightly pointed out by S. N S. ( See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the redundant, because,
it simply repeats the same argument.
XV and XVI
The term stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest जय ० uses a curious expression, ( संसर्गिन् ) for cause. It seems that the word stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf. - तस्मादेतेषामेकेन संसर्गिणा भवितव्यम् । यत्रैतेषां संसर्गस्तदव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति (p. 21 ).
समन्वय = एकरूपता, similarity, or एकजात्यनुगम (i. e. belonging to one genus ), according to जय०. गौड ० understands समन्वय in the sense of inference —' यथा व्रतधारिणं बटुं दृष्ट्वा समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्राह्मणाविति । The explanation of समन्वयात् ( तां. सू. I. 131 ) as offered by विज्ञान •, vis, उपवासादिना क्षीणं हि बुद्धयादितत्त्वमनादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतेन पुनरुपचीयते ( ie intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc. ), ' does not directly fit in this Kārika, as rightly pointed out by Sovani ( p. 411 ).

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कारणकार्यविभागात्-वाच० understands the word विभाग as 'emergence',-just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. जय०, माठर and गोड० explain it as "separation ' or dis. tinction ' between the functions of the cause and the effect; -just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes ( पृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात् ). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम. जय here quotes the explanation of some other commentary ( which is not traceable) :-अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम्' इत्यनेमवसिद्धत्वादन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते-यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते सत्कार्यम, तयोविभागात् , उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः । यथाध्यात्मिकानां बायानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो, बुर्द्धिकृत इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद व्यवस्थापिता [पायता] स्यात् , कुतोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः॥ ( pp. 21-22). ___अविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यस्य-According to वाच०, गौड० and माठर, the term fat means 'merging ;-because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. 5770 also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading भविभागे, where अविभाग means लय. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes आविभाग in the sense of अविभक्त, and ex. plains the phrase as—' because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. इह लोकेऽविभक्तादेकस्मादिक्षुद्रव्याद्रसफाणितगुडखण्डशर्करादि. वैश्वरूप्यं नानात्वं दृश्यते......एवमाध्यात्मिकानां वाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम्। तस्मा. देषामविभक्तेनेकेन भवितव्यम् । (p. 22 ).
प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च-According to वाच० and जय०, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of प्रवृत्तिs of गुणs, because गुणs are in constant modification-cf. परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम् ( व्यासभाष्य on यो. म. IV. 33 ). The first kind of modification is that सत्व, रजस् and तमस् modify themselves as सत्व, रजम् and तमस्. Here, the साम्यावस्था Is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a विषमपरिणाम (or समुदय ), we have creation. Here fra and the rest combine with one

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NOTES
another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take त्रिगुणतः and समुदयात् both, as referring only to the creative activity of refa.
XVII
ärefit:-Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of gres (dealt with in 4 50). But apao here refers to only the five external (ara) gfes. The internal (आध्यात्मिक) तुष्टिs are gaaned after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal gfes are not referred to here. Therefore, atao says-अध्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा, etc.
The reading igarriera, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by so, who reads Featralg. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the
Fi. 7.- Tantecald, I. 140 ), as it is not supported by any commentary.
___ दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन, etc. In order to prove that a संघात is arrů, pop, etc., are given as an illustration.— Just as Feli, आसन and the rest, being संघातs, are परार्थ, so अव्यक्त and its constituents are for another person, viz., gen. But in this illustration, पर 15 शरीर, which is itself a संघात; and thus पुरुष also becomes a Bata. On this atao remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a Eure with all the qualities found in a 97, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the m ains (Chowkhamba edn., pp. 344-345) and the organá matcrizinit ( Kāshi Sanskrit Series, No. 24, p. 600 ).
TheTart—is the strüeral of gata, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question :-But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण-निष्क्रिय, is not active, how can he become an Sprum? Reply :-It is not essential that only an

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[XVII.
active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contanct brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवद् (सां. स. 1. 96 ). Or, mere presence also can bnng about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf. -
न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् । चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुक्त च्छेदनं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥ सेनापतिस्तु वाचव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः । राजा सन्निधिमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥ तस्मादचलतोऽपि स्याञ्चलने कर्तृतात्मनः ।
(कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक on मी. सू. I. 5,
Chowkhamba edn., p. 710). बालराम thinks that this argument about the आधिष्ठातृत्व of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by शङ्कराचार्य in his भाष्य on रचनानुपपत्तेश्च and प्रवृत्तेश्च (ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2 ).
स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात्-It is very succinctly explained by बालराम as follows-न सिधारात्मानं छिनत्ति वह्निर्वात्मानं दहतीति भावः।
अन्ये त्वाहुः-भोग्या दृश्या बुद्धयादयः etc. अन्ये refers to those who cannot reconcile the निःसङ्गता of पुरुष with his भोक्तृत्व. They would, therefore, explain भोक्ता as द्रष्टा. But the same objection can be brought against these people also.- 9 being निःसङ्ग can be a द्रष्टा, only through बुद्धि; see व्यासभाष्य on द्रष्टा दृशिमात्र: शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः (यो. सू. II. 20 ). Similarly, he can be a भोक्ता also through बुद्धि.-"एवं च द्रष्टुत्ववद् भोक्तृत्वस्यापि सम्भवादायव्याख्यानमपि समीचीनमेवेति ध्येयम् ॥" ( बालराम, p. 160 ).
कैवल्यार्थ प्रवृत्तेश्च-माठर assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्रधान, whileas, 470 and others take this gafar as belonging to the 79 and the sages-आगमानां महाधियां च ॥

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-XVIII)
NOTES
XVIII निकाय-The word is derived from नि + चि + घञ् (संघ चानोतराधर्ये-पाणिनि III. 3. 42 ), " in the sense of a multitude or assembly (of living beings possessing some common characteristics), but not merely a confused crowd of men.” (S. C. Vasu's translation of सिद्धान्तकौमुदी, p. 347 ). 'निकायः = देवमनुष्यतिर्यगादीनामनौत्तराधर्येणावस्थितः संघात:, तद्विशिष्टाभिरित्यर्थः' इति तात्पर्यटीकायाम्मिश्राः ( बालराम, p. 161 ).
On जन्म and मरण, विज्ञान says-जन्ममरणे चात्र नोत्पत्तिविनाशी पुरुषनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । किन्त्वपूर्वदेहेन्द्रियादिसंघातविशेषेण संयोगश्च वियोगश्च भोगतदभावनियामकाविति ( सां. सू. I. 149 ).
न चैकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपधानभेदात् etc.. The view of the वेदान्तिन् is that one and the same आत्मन् assuines plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. 'उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः। " " उपाधिर्भियते न तु तद्वान् । " " एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः।" (सां० स० । 150-152 ). माठर sets the पूर्वपक्ष in the following words :-इह केचिदाचार्या वेदेवादिन इति मन्यन्ते-, एकोऽयं पुरुषः सर्वशरीरेषुपलभ्यते मणिसूत्रवत्। इह रसनायां यावन्तो मणयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वेकमेव सत्र प्रवर्तते । एवं माणभूतेषु शरीरेषु किमेकः सूत्रभूतः परमात्मा, आहोश्चित् जलचन्द्रवत् पुरुष इत्येक एव बहुषु नदीकूपतडागादिष्विवोपलभ्यते इति॥Cf.षिमानन्द (सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246 ):- "आकृतिगर्भाशयभावसङ्गतिशरीरविभागाल्लिङ्गबहुत्वात् सांख्याचार्याः कपिलामुरिपञ्चशिखपतञ्जलिप्रभृतयः पुरुषबहुत्वं वर्णयन्ति । वेदवादिन आचार्या, हरिहरहिरण्यगर्भव्यासादय एकमात्मानं, तथा च श्रुतिः......... एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूत भूते व्यवस्थितः। एकथा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्॥" ( This verse from ब्रह्मविन्दूपनिषद्, १.२, is quoted by विज्ञान also on सां. सु. I. 153). _But, does not this doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व contradict the श्रुति which lay down the unity of soul ( i. e. आत्मैक्य )? The सां. म. says, No.-"नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् (I. 154 ). These scriptures speak of one 1842 in the sense of class notion. वाच. also tries to reconcile the अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोध as follows

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TATTVA-KAUMUDÍ (XIX, XX-XXI– " एकत्वश्रुतीनां च प्रमाणान्तरविरोधात् कथंचिद्देशकालविभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्पु. पपत्तेः। प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानात्वयोश्च श्रुत्यैव साक्षात् प्रतिपादनात । 'अजामेकां लोहितशुककृष्णां बह्वीः प्रमाः सृजमानां सरूपाः। अजो टेको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां मुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥" (ते. आ. ६. १०)॥” तत्त्ववैशारदी, on यो. म. II. 22.
Further on, says the AIGT, if you are going to explain away this नानात्व by उपाधिs, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs ( अवयवs) are the उपाधिs of a body (a संघात ). And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the easta call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body?
. .XIX,XX and XXI __माध्यस्थ्य or औदासीन्य 1s of seven kinds according to जय:सप्तविघं चास्यौदासीन्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्-पश्यति श्रृणोति सर्व करोति स्थिति प्रसङ्गं च मापि। स्वतो न परतो...नोभयतश्चाप्युदासीनः ॥ जय०, further raises the question that if पुरुष 1s मध्यस्थ and अकर्ता, then how is he a भोक्ता ?-ननु च ययकर्ता तत्कथं भोक्तभावादस्ति पुरुषः? तथा चाहुःबालहुताशनतरवः स्वयमकृतानां यथा हि मोक्तारः। पुरुषोऽपि विषयफलानां स्वयमकृतानां तथापि भोक्ता ।। इति ।
अचेतन चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the pro. ximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience - I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes ( transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest ), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सानिध्यात् ( सां. सू. I. 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators-'यथानिसंयोगात् लोहमाणिरित्युच्यते। (जय०) 'अनुष्णाशीतो घटः शीताभिरद्भिः संस्पृष्टः शीतो भवति, अनिमा संयुक्त उष्णो -भवति । (माठर) ॥ यथान्ययसोः परस्परं संयोगविशेषात् परस्परधर्मव्यवहार

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NOTES
-XXII]
औपाधिको यथा वा जलसूर्ययोः संयोगात् परस्परधर्मारोपस्तथैव बुद्धिपुरुषयोरिति भाव: । ( विज्ञान०, सां. सू. I, 164 ) ॥
29
अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय • by the following quotation - प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः । अहं करोमीत्यबुधोऽभिमन्यते तृणस्य कुब्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः । This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमाससूत्रवृत्ति (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 124) and सांख्य तत्वविवेचन' also ( ibid, p, 12 ) with slight variants.
वाचo connects दर्शनार्थं (in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं केवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ) with प्रधानस्य, and कैवल्यार्थं with पुरुषस्य. The other commentators take the line as it stands, i. e. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं and प्रधानस्य कैवल्यार्थम्. While explaining 'विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ वा ' ( सां. स. II, 1). विज्ञान • also connects कैवल्य with प्रधान.
XXII
In the भाग्य ( on यो. सू. II 19 ) व्यास describes the तन्मात्रs as the products of महत्तत्त्व ( - एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महतः षडविशेषपरिणामाः). But there the should not be taken as the immediate cause ( i. e. producer ) of these तन्मात्रs. व्यास has himself said at another place ( यो. मृ, I. 45 ) that these तन्मात्रs are the products of अहङ्कार.
माठर and गौडo hold that these तन्मात्रs singly produce the महाभूतs. The other commentators hold that the each succeed. ing is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्रs. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायु: शब्द तन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजस् and so on. But this theory of वाच० violates the orthodox पञ्जीकरण theory of the वेदान्तिन्s. The point is noticed by कल्पतरुकार, who saysसम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम् । तथापि युक्तिष्टत्वाद्वाचस्पतिमतं शुभम् ॥ पृथिव्यनलात्मत्वं गगने पवने ऽपि चेत् । रूपवस्व महत्त्वाभ्यां चाक्षुषत्वं प्रसज्यते ||

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TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
अर्द्धभूयस्त्वतः क्षित्याद्यविभावनकल्पने । व्यवहारयथाप्राप्ता मुधा पञ्चीकृतिर्भवेत् ॥ अनपेक्ष्य फलं वेदसिद्धेत्येवेप्यते यदि । त्रिवृत्कृति: ः श्रुता पञ्चीकृतिर्न वचन श्रुता ॥
[XXIII
( quoted by वंशीधर in his comm on तत्त्वकौमुदी, p. 293 Chow. S. S. ).
A gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहङ्कार – चतुःषष्टिवर्णै: परादिवैखरी पर्यन्ताभिधेयैर्यत्किमप्यभिधीयते बुद्धया समर्थ्य तत्सकलमाथन्ताकारहकारवर्णद्वयग्रहणेनो परिस्थितपिण्डानुकारिणा विन्दुना भूति:
-
प्रत्याहारन्यायेनाहङ्कार इत्यभिधीयते ।।
XXIII
गौड ० and माठर curiously divide ज्ञान and वैराग्य into two kinds-internal and external. Sovanı is right in criticising this classification (p. 414 ), as ज्ञान means only प्रधानपुरुषान्यताज्ञान in this, and not the knowledge of the a and the rest. Similarly, the आभ्यन्तर - वैराग्य (vis., प्रधानमप्यत्र स्वप्रेन्द्रजालसदृशमिति विरक्तस्य मोक्षे सोर्यदुत्पव्यते ) is the principal वैराग्य which leads to the also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोक्षेच्छु ?
बादराम does not read गरिमा in his text of तत्त्वकौमुदी. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी, जय०, माठर and गौडo mention nine kinds of ऐश्वर्यs although each one ( except वाच० ) says अष्टविधमैश्वर्यम्. It seems, therefore, thats text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी and वंशीवर's edition, however, combine ईशित्व and वशित्व and thus make the total eight.
जयo roads यत्रकामावशावित्वम् in place of यत्रकामावसायित्वम्, and derives it as - कामेनेच्छ्यावशेतुं शीलं यस्य स यत्रकामावशायी । तस्य भावः यत्रकामावशायित्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वात् धातूनां' शी ' बिष्टतौ वर्तते ।

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XXV
अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds
अहङ्कार
सात्विक
or
वैकृत
NOTES
सात्त्विक
1
मनस
राजस
or
तैजस
the eleven इन्द्रियs
सन्मात्रापश्ञ्चक
This is the scheme adopted by a and others. But विज्ञान o (on सां. सू. II. 18 ) would have
अहङ्कार
24
तामस
or
भूतादि
वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्वेत्यहं त्रिधा । अहं तस्वाद्विकुर्वाणान्मनो वैकारिकादभूत् ॥ वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः । तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥ तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।
31
राजस
the ten इन्द्रियs
पञ्चतन्मात्राs.
In support of his classification, विज्ञान० quotes from some स्मृति
तामस
But this explanation is wrong; for a and Я are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile रजस्. वंशीधर's explanation, viz.,—' समधीन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽल्पसत्त्वत्वेन राजसकार्यत्वेनैव स्मृतिषु निर्दिष्टान्यत्र तु व्यष्टीन्द्रियापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्वत्वेन सात्विकाहङ्कारकार्यतयोक्तानीत्यविरोधः । " is very lame ( See सांख्यतत्वकौमुदीटीका of वंशीधर. Chow. S. S., p. 343; see further बालराम, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415 ) .

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[XXVII
XXVII
The first phrase 3491H*, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase q*i : gives the proper function of the mind. गौड० interprets संकल्पकं as प्रवृत्ति peggia, i. e., which determines the functioning of the two sets of spaces ). ara understands tega as @aqoratoarea progna 1. e. perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जय° and चन्द्रिका agree with वाच०. What ajao means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is Arame #cute or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a defır.te and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called flame TRUT or complex-perception The first is नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं आलोचनज्ञानं, and, therefore, Array; the second is 71AFICOIATTI Fri, and, therefore, सविकल्पक. In his support. वाच० cites अस्ति यालोचितज्ञानं etc., from
It's teará ( on 1. Ħ. I. 4, verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.). The phrase a: qi gadirt risicareer I TETAÁTja, has been thus explained by TreTTO in his commentary on the above-ai fiatalgica BEUT
EMTA TT That ma-, which is the same as fataTootfagura fazer of argo. S. N. S. is beside the point when he says that according to grao “mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vācaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind." (p. 61 ). For, according to the author of the
tamaa whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of सामान्य and विशेष both in the निर्विकल्पक stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the fame94. stage. We are cognisant of both, and spera in the Araras99stage, but separately; but we cognise

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NOTES
33
घटत्वविशिष्टो घटः in the सविकल्पक stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of gufto, is evident from his own verse in this context :-"निर्विकल्पकबोधेऽपि यात्मकस्यापि वस्तुनः। ग्रहणं लक्षणाख्येयं ज्ञात्रा शुद्धं तु गृह्यते ॥ ११८ ॥'' (p. 171 ). पार्थसारथि explains itव्यात्मकस्य, सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्येत्यर्थः । सामान्यावभासोऽपि प्रतीतिसिद्ध एव । न हि निर्विकल्पकेनाऽगृहीतस्य सविकल्पकेनापि ग्रहणं सम्भवति, न वाऽगृहीते सामान्ये व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञा संभवति । तस्मात् सामान्य विशेषश्च निर्विकल्पेऽपि प्रकाशत एव etc.
इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्-जय० remarks :-यथान्यदिन्द्रलिङ्ग तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच० criticises this view:-इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारो. पादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम्, न विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् । महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।
माठर reads पाह्यभेदाच in place of बाह्यभेदाश्च. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. माठर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the Artan lays down the reasons of the arrira of इन्द्रियs, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and ग्राभेदात् .
The question is—how can one 3TEFIT create these mania fold fys whose functions differ? This question is raised by उद्योतकर in his न्यायवार्तिक ( Chow S. S., p. 70)-यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाण्येकात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादेकात्म्याद्विषयव्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वे सार्थमेकं वा सर्वार्थमति स्यात् । The reply to it is-गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणs, accompanied by: 7 and 3rah, act and react upon one another ; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार (i. e. the इन्द्रियs) differ in their functions.
XXVIII
माठर reads रूपादिषु in place of शब्दादिषु in the text:' बालराम also adopts this reading and observes :--चक्षुरादिक्रमेण पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणामभिधानात् 'शब्दादिषु ' इति पाठगे न सनिवेशितः । (p. 184, In.)
N.3

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[XXIX
XXIX
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाया वायवः पञ्च। Does the word करण stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or प्रयोदशविध करण? While वाच adbpts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although From curiously says at one place
-समस्तस्यान्त:करणस्येत्यर्थः । विज्ञान also explains the word करण as अन्त:करण in his भाष्य ( on सां. सू. II 31 ). But वाच०, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, vix., स हि प्रयत्नभेदः शरीरोपगृहीतमारुतक्रियाभेदहेतुः सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथाहुः 'सामान्यकरणवृत्ति प्राणाणा वायवः पञ्च' इति । बालराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियशन्देनान्त:करणत्रयमेव पाय, न तु बालेन्द्रियप, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.
Xxx
Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांस्य philosophy, vis., perception (प्रत्यक्ष ), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्त:करणs and one of the organs of sense,-all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिक there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानायोगपयोदकं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57 ), म युगपदनेक. कियोपटम्धेः (ibid, III. 2. 58 ), अलतचक्रदर्शनवत् तदुपलाधिराशुप्त चारात (ibid, III. 2. 59 ). For, according to the मैयायिकs, the mind 18 अपरिमाण. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपवृत्ति.

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NOTES
35
In the case of अनुमान and शब्द, only the three अन्त:करणs function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.
XXXI 37797 - Davies observes :- Akūta is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by Absicht ( = purpose), Antrieb (=motive). Colebrooke's translation is “incited by mutual invitation."... ......The meaning of “incitement to activity,"mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of a kūta ...... It is composed of ā, to, towards, and kū, to cry. Gaudapāda says that it means ādarasambhrama ( respectful eagerness in action ).' (p. 68, In ).
Davies is wrong in considering that is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, in ). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every say functions for goari.
The spirit of the Hi. .., “ Hata amar" ( 111. 56 ) and “FETTATE: THAT " ( 111. 57 ), goes directly against the theory of the areals, where no $is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञान's remark. vis, प्रकृतिलीनस्य जन्येITFT FATA: : HÄN: Faila Tau 397747 09:' spune Sfat: fel. FTFHTE, FACUTETTEYE CETTETET Patrego: Il ........ hittaray. विरोधस्तत्राह-ईदुशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिहा । सानिध्यमात्रणेश्वरस्य सिद्विस्तु सर्वFATTY: 1 ( fi. &. III. 57).
XXXII The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points outs ( pp. 69-70 ), common to all the organs. Thus "the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas." (ibid). According to it, ora and TOT

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belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. माठर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच० followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs.
36
[XXXIII
The word in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty वाचo takes दशधा with आहार्य, धार्य and प्रकाश्य each. The objects seized by the s, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is retained by the era, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also f and, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the s are also tenfold because of being divided into and varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the ft. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.
XXXIII
o explains why is not recognised as a separate category in the philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकसूत्र "अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपश्चिरं क्षिप्रमिति विङ्गानि (II. 2. 6), काल is one category which is divided into three parts-past, present and future, according to different circumstances. प्रशस्तपाद clarifies this point - " एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भक्रियाभिनिर्वृत्तिस्थितिनिरोधोपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचार:; that is, just as one and the same man is called a 9 or a in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one . To this ara repliesWhy should we first assume one and then assume differ

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NOTES
ent circumstances or imūs to make this a multifarious ?
Why should we not recognise the उपाधिs only ? Cf. स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशन्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां ब्युत्थितदर्शनानां EROFTET AUTO-Otomapy on III, 52.
XXXIV anahta = non-specific, i. e., FATIS. Farata = specific, i. e., 99HT.
qoyfenterTOTI getraTi 213141Charg–Here arao suggests that the विषयs of the कर्मेन्द्रियs (except वा ) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of Torontot, which is opposed to arqo's view on ta XXII, where he says *779: शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः. Can a person not brees water with his hands? If so, then water must also be any17. See notes on Karıka XXII and S. N. S., pp. 72–73 with footnotes.
XXXV The word ant has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon go's phrase gitmeye Fortfa. I think that 'warder 'expresses the sense of art better than ' principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the port: Po, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to go, as is clear from the next 1797. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right of 3pa: tut were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold 371: Fico acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal ( one ).
XXXVII arao interprets both the lines of this as the causes of the superiority of gf. eo, on the other hand, inter

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[XXXVII
prets the first line as the cause of the second;--because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, there fore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. Hroe quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार.
अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैनं सुप्तं प्रबोधय । प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तजगत् ॥ मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः । तस्ववृन्दं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥ योऽसौ सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।
देहीति पदमुच्चार्य हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥ माठर further remarks-न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुष्ठेयतया, किं तु सांग यानां पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्येण वैधर्येण च नि:श्रेयसहेतुः । उक्तं च
इस पिब लल मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुज कुरु च मा शङ्काम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्स्यसे मोक्षसोख्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the Aitor philosophy than an exposition.
XXXVIII In para 185, read भूतान्याकाशानिलानलसलिलावनिरूपाणि.
Why तन्मात्राs are called अविशेषs?-This has been explained by गोड० and माठर as देवानामेते मुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिताः, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राs, being evolved out of त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दु:ख and मोह (%3 रजस् and तमम्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच०, vis., न चैषां शान्तत्वादिरस्त्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राs, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.
XXXIX The specific elements are divided into three divisions" (1) Subtle body: (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.........

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NOTES
It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to 977o, p roti prentararaquarante: ( Kar. 40 );--the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense. organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.
XL
ara-According to arzo, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to #. #. Haga Ron ( III. 9 ), there is an aggregate of subtle bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. farao. Progetti, e Fei Furtwater rü:. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate ? To this, the replies
t ifatatara ( III. 10 )--they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this fantae comments-यवपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्वयक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो नानात्वमपि भवति । But, is not this idea of recograf foreign to fire ?
According to this #1, the number of the constituents of Royait is eighteen, but according to 7, it is seventeen. fancto has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying-- अहङ्कारस्य च बुद्धावेवान्तर्भाव. ।
XLI
A distinction should be made between fee and possa fie The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteon principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as 8417: go in the authority quoted by 979. .
The reading of site and 7167 is fear fasta:, whileas atro has विना विशेष:. वाच. calls the सूक्ष्मभरीर as विशेष in Karika XL.

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(XLII
So विना विशेषैः means विना सामः शरीरैः. But this is confusing because, to say that there (composed of thirteen principles) cannotlexist without सूक्ष्मशरीर (composed of लिr and पञ्चतन्मात्राs) is not logical. Eo's explanation is better when he says that for cannot exist without faites viz., the five subtle elements. चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of sorne commentator :-केचितु स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकमिदमिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्ग समुदायात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेष: स्थलदेहे विना निराश्रयं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाश्रित्यैव तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीरस्यान्यथासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥
XLIII According to argo and 590 dispositions may be divided like this
भावाः
प्राकृता;
वकृताः
करणाायणः
कार्यायिण: The प्राकृतभावs, which are innate, are of four kinds, vis., धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिल only. Those de. pending on the instruments (करणाश्रयिणः) are eight viz., धर्म, अधर्म, ज्ञान, अज्ञान, वैराग्य, अवैराग्य, ऐश्वर्य and अनैश्वर्य. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (770i aftur:) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i. e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गोड and माठर, however, divide the भावs into three kinds-सांसिहिक, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐपयं are born along with कपिल, so they are सांसिद्धिक or cognate in his case; but they come to समक, सनन्दन, सनातन and सनत्कुमार (the four sons of pe ) after their birth, and are therefore, flat or natural in their case. The arm or acquired dispositions re. side in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

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XLVI]
NOTES
XLIV and XLV According to hrot, the mafic rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are all, qrs1Tacy, Den for fo, TTT, TTTH and are the gives Hity for faza, and yra nas been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the g utie sinks to the five states of qy. Test, ITfree and FUTAT. The प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with amat itself; but are includes the eight kinds of evolvents (tras ) in this bondage. The a r t, according to arzo, is the identification of the Spirit with the farmarts of gaat (i. e. the evolutes); but according to her, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ATE, TF197 and others, as the summum monum. These three kinds of bondages are explained by atao at length in his Tareh on iTT 1. 24.
The word gaat in afarsa:, stands for H erramira, according to atao; but, according to fire and Art. the word denotes gaTEETGERA177:
XLVI
For the criticisun of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424 ). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fisty kınds.
fit and for illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is facin, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is open, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is are, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is FHA when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of th

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'. [XLVI
post. The explanation of apao is better. Ante is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. “Incapacity (safn) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (fa) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (Para) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue." (Davies, pp. 84-85).
XLVII facere or art is of five kınds :- parent, TT, TT, ano and aft, which are called 148, HIE. HETHTG, mfua and 37-4mther by the fifT.
XLVIII तमस् or अविद्या 1s ceight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements.
___ मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varities of Altainment or fares as the summum bonum.
HETIC or T is of ten kınds and arises from the attach, ment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings.
a te or entre 18 of eighteen kınds, and arises froin the o hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense a( mentioned above ) and the eight varieties of Attainment or
C
i ferras.
अन्यतामिस्र or अभिनिवेश 1s also of eighteen kinds and arises kifrom the fear of losing the eight fafes or the ten objects of besense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct cathe enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cl. # rufafara: forms: स्वरसवाही कृमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यवानुमानागमैरसंभावितो मरणत्रास na ECETA: GET ITT Arong: ayat (prerapa on .. sedl. 9). "ATUNITETSMA Fera I" (pro p. 51 ). me Thus, there are 62 kinds of fan980s.

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NOTES
XLIX The quotation in apero, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant ( gramm: for AT: ) in the सांख्यसंग्रह ( Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 77 ). गौड uses प्रसुप्ति ( or paralysis) for कुष्ठ, and उपजिबिका for जडता. Cr. " जिह्वाया जाब्यम्," in जय०, p. 52. माठर and गोड adopt गुदावर्त for उदावर्त ( = obstruction of bowels).
___ माठर ( and not गाड०, as S N. S. says, page 91, in) reads आध्यात्मिक्यः in place of आध्यात्मिका:. आध्यात्मिकाः is grammatically wrong,asआध्यात्मिक is derived from अध्यात्म + ठम् ("अध्यात्मादेष्ठमिष्यते" वार्तिक on पाणिनि IV. 3. 60). आत्मनि = अध्यार. is an अव्ययीभाव compound in the sense of locative case, according to "अव्ययं विभाक्ति०" grofa II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination in ( and not टाप् ) is added to आध्यात्मिक by the सूत्र of पाणिनि, " टिड्डाण०' IV. 1. 15 and the form will be आध्यात्मिकी.
The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators:वाच० जय०
माटर गौड० पारम् सुतारम् । तारम्
मुतमः सुपारम् सुपारम्
सुतारम् पारम् पारापारम् lost
सुनेत्रम् सुनेत्रम् अनुत्तमांभः अनुत्तमांभः समरीचम् अनुत्तमांभासकम् उतमांभः उत्तमांभः उत्तमांभसिकम् मारीकम्
If अर्जन, रक्षण, क्षय, भोग ( or संग, according to गौड० ) and fEAT are named in the order given above, then Meo calls the last two as arts and TTATHAA respectively, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahamahopādhyāya P. Rāmavatāra S'arma has tried to explain these varieties of oft as follows :धमार्जनदुःखपारप्रापयितृत्वात् पाराल्येयं तुष्टिः । ......... अर्जनदोषदर्शमेऽपि

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[LI
कदाचिद्रोगाभिलाषेण प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्, रक्षणभयार्तस्य तु प्रवृत्तेरतितरामसंभव इति तदीयायास्तुष्टेः सुपारता, क्षयं भावयतः कदाचित् प्रवृत्तिः कदाचिदप्रवृत्तिः इति तदीया तुष्टिः पारावाराख्या ( read पारापाराख्या ! ), भोगे रोगभयं भावयतस्तुष्टिः स्वार्थपरेति तस्या उत्तरेतराम्भस्त्वम्, हिंसादोषतस्तस्यास्तुष्टेस्तु कारुण्य. मूलकत्वादुत्तमाम्भस्त्वम् ॥ बालराम, pp. 219-220.
th
No commentator has given the names of असिद्धि; जय० which gives them-तासां चासिद्धीनां मोषमुष्णमानरमित्यायाः (?) संज्ञा:-, has a defective reading.
arao criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article (" Jayamangala and other commentares on the Samkhya-Karikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, in, p. 429 ), belongs to जय; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.
Following is the scheme of the division of Afes according to वाचक
1. अध्ययन 2. शब्द 3. जह 4. सुहृत्प्राप्ति 5. दान
boser
cash
fount 6. प्रमोद
7. मुदित
8. मोदमान The last three are the effects of all the remaining five sidll. together.
natus
mci

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NOTES
While apa. construes BFT as fearea and refers by it to विपर्यय, अशक्ति and तुष्टि, विज्ञान (on सां. मु. III. 44) explains अकुश as 370* and refers by it to the three falas, viz. 56 ya and अध्ययन, leaving सुहृत्प्राप्ति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाच० as follows-कश्चित्वेतासामष्टसिद्धीनामङ्कुशो निवारक: पूर्वविविधो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिरूपो भवति बन्धकत्वादिति व्याचष्टे तन्न । तुष्टय. भावस्याशक्तितया बाधिर्यादिवत् सिद्धिविरोधितालाभेन तुष्टयतुट्योः सिद्धिविरोधित्वासंभवात् . In reply to this it may be said that तुष्टि and अतुष्टि are not mutually contradictory, but positive ris. See Sovani p. 427.
LIL
The word focus has been explained as haar greinar by rata (on fi. &. III 45 ). But this is iron correct. arg. is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies-subtle and gross. Davies remarks :“Some commentators make the linga itself to be Buddhi (intellect) and bhāvas to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i.e.arao H. ) is preferable, for the linga, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to 'intellect. (p. 90 ).
LIV ___ सत्त्वविशाल means where सत्व predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after het? To this the replies :3Tierenartignagrungy: ( F. &. III 52 ). fara explains it as-तत्राप्यूर्ध्वगतावपि सत्यामावृत्तिरस्त्यत्र उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगादयोऽधोयोनि. Fra: Atsia arhit RÅ: This very idea is expressed in the next after.
According to virgo there are sixteen forms of creations" that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings

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proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements. ( Wilson, p. 220 ). It seems that गौड • takes देव, मानुष and तैर्यग्योन ( = two, जङ्गम and स्थावर ), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., अभौतिक, लिङ्ग, भाव and भूत.
[LIV
LV
•
पतन्जलि also expresses the same idea - परिणामतापसंस्कार -दुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ( यो. सू. II. 15 ). Compare also, समानं जरामरणजं दुःखम् (सां. सू. III. 53 ).
स्वभावेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वत एव सर्गो दुःखरूपः, विवेकिनामिति शेषः ।
माठर reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समासेन in place of स्वभावेन in the text. The former term he explains as त्रिषु लोकेषु and the latter as संक्षेपेण.
चन्द्रिका quotes two योगसूत्रs in support of
..
"
LVI
The illustration of a cook cited by वाच० and the (सां. मू. III 63 ) – विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूदवत् पाके, has got this disadvantage that सद is चेतन. The illustration of गोड० viz., यथा कश्चित् स्वार्थे त्यक्त्वा मित्रकार्याणि करोति, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड०, viz., तथा चोतं कुम्भवत् प्रधानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते, 19 better, because कुम्भ is nonintelligent.
" this कारिका - " तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा - मध्यमष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ( II 22 ).
LVII
साध्यव्यभिचार: । The syllogism of the प्रतिपक्षिन् is चेतनानाधिष्ठितं अचेतनं प्रवृत्तिशून्यम् अचेतनत्वात् रथादिवत्
the purport of
..
( II 21 ) and कृतार्थ प्रति नष्ट

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-LXI]
NOTES
47
Now, the साध्य is प्रवृतिशून्यम्. The सिद्धान्तिम् says that we can show a case which is the reverse of your syllogism. That is,
वेतनानधिष्ठितं अचेतनं अपि प्रवृत्तियुक्तम्, अचेतनत्वात्, क्षवित् ।
Here we have साध्यव्यभिचार. Now, the प्रतिपक्षिन् says that your case does not bring about the fare, because, even in your case we shall assume as the cause of . To this the faf replies:-Your argument is not sound, because a चेतन or प्रेक्षावान् can act only with the motive of स्वार्थ or But, it would be absurd to impute any motive to God, much less these two motives.
माठर, गौड° and जय°, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति ( of प्रधान ) both while as वाच० speaks of प्रवृत्ति only.
LVIII
औत्सुक्य means इच्छा; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three is in philosophy. It is not the of the s according to whom at is the quality of a sentient being.
LXI
This has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word? Is it which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing than myself? The first meaning is adopted by माठर; वाच० and गौड would seem to mean that it is the author of the who feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति.
The next difficulty is about the meaing of the term सुकुमारता. जय • explains it by 'subtlety', वाच० and माठर, by bashfulness, and o by enjoyability'.

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[LXI
Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नटी but here to a कुलवधू.
As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गौड०, see my foot-note to the text of the fast and introduction
"पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य"-वाच० explains it as-अप्रमत्तां यर्थनां परपुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति। This is not a good interpretation. गोड is much nearer the mark when he says-अहमनेन परपुरुषण दृष्टास्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनदर्शनं नोपैति।
LXII यथा जयपराजयो भृत्यगतो etc., ( वाच० ) is evidentely derived from व्यासभाष्य-“यथा जयः पराजयो वा योद्धा वर्तमानः स्वामिनि व्यपदिश्यते" ( यो. मू. I. 24 ) :
LXIV
The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय०, गोड and माठर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the itwenty-five तस्व. वाच. clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति.
The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नास्मि, न मे and नाहम, as given by various commentators.
माठर गोड० जय० नास्मि अहं क्रियावान् नास्मि तत्वानि । नाहमेव भवामि । सूक्ष्मशरीरे भौतिके नास्मि ।
चन भवामि, अपि
तु प्रकृतिः । न मे न मे स्वामितास्ति। न मे तत्त्वानि। न मम शरीरम, न ममेदमपि तु
यतोऽहमन्यः, प्रकृतेः।
शरीरमन्यत्। नाहम् अहं कर्ता न नाहं तत्त्वानाम् । अहङ्काररहितो- नाप्यहं प्रकृतिः।
ऽहम्।
वाच०

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NOTES
The quotation-"निरुपदवभूतार्थ, etc., " given by वाच०, 1s also found in this तत्त्ववैशारदी on यो. सू. I. 50, where, वाच° reads म बाधोऽनादिमत्त्वेऽपि in place of न बाधोऽयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि. The meaning of the verse is-निरुपद्रवः यो भूतार्थः, तदुपलक्षितः स्वभावो यस्य, तस्य ज्ञानस्य विपर्ययैः, अयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि न बाधः, बुद्धस्तत्पक्षपाततः। निरुपद्रव = free from all ( the ) flaws (of प्रवृत्ति, etc., according to the बौद्धs). भूतार्थ = truth ( आलयविज्ञान, according to the बौद्धs ). वियर्ययैः = .contradictions ( in the shape of falanta, according to the बौद्धs ). अयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि, etc., = although there is no effort to free this आलयविज्ञान from the flaws of प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान, yet this आलयविज्ञान 1s not contradicted because बुद्धि is partial to it. वाच०'s introduction here favours the reading अनादिमत्वेऽपि, which will mean-"although विपर्ययवासना is अनादि."
LXVI " एवं विवेकख्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेकादेवात्मा 'मदर्थयम्' इति मन्यते "। (arao, para 271 ) = on account of ignorance, the Spirit thinks that as the enjoyable products of Nature, viz., sound and the rest, are for my sake, so the discriminative knowledge brought about by Nature ( and hence a product of Nature ) is also for my sake.
प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य-The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (i. e., gegris ). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. tot and अपवर्ग are no more पुरुषार्थs. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, and 379ai cannot urge the Nature into activity.
- LXVII "भोगेन वितरे क्षपयित्वाऽथ सम्पद्यते" is ब्रह्मसूत्र, IV. I.. 19. शङ्करा. चाय explains it as-अनारब्धकार्ययोः पुण्यपापयोविद्यासाम क्षय उक्तः, इतरेत्वारब्धकार्ये पुण्यपापे उपभोगेन क्षपयित्वा ब्रह्म संपद्यते ' तस्य तावदेव चिरं पावन विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये' (छान्दोग्य-६।१४।२)।

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[LXXVII
LXXVII The ten मौलिकार्थs are
(१) प्रधानास्तित्व, (२) प्रधानेकत्व, (३) प्रधानस्य अर्थवस्वम् (=विष. यता), (४) प्रधानस्य अन्यता ( = पुरुषाद्भेदः), (५)प्रधानस्य पारार्थ्यम्, (६) अनैक्यम् (= पुरुषबहुत्वम् ), (७) वियोगः (= पुरुषात् प्रकृतेः), (८) योगः (=पुरुषेण सह प्रकृत्याः ). (९) शेपवृत्तिः ( = संस्कारवशात् स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरद्वयस्थितिः) and (१०) अकर्तृत्वम् ( = पुरुषस्य ). For this quotation and राजवार्तिक, see introduction.

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1яння

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