Tattva Kaumudi

SR No.: 010561
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Oriental Book Agency Poona
Publisher: Oriental Book Agency Poona
Total Pages: 329
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 19 MB

Page 190

TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[X11|108
stupesies another man who is unable to get at her--why?because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the Attribute
of Sattva, the essence of which is Pleasure; Goodness the the cause of pain is the Attribute of Rajas, cause of Pleasure; Foulness of Pain,' the essence of which is Pain; and lastly, the and Darkness of cause of delusion is the Attribute of Tamas, Delusion
the essence of which is Delusion. As regards Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy
(which are the properties attributed to The Properties of Sattva), these are not mutually contradiccach of the Attri. butes are not tory, and as such, not incapable of cocontradictory, and existing in a single substratum; in fact, they so they do not necessitate the are actually found together (subsisting in assumption of Sattva). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminative. different causes for each of them ness and Buoyancy, being mutually not
contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally) --as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a single substratum). In the same manner, Pain, Mobility and Activity (the properties of Rajas),-as also Delusion, Sluggishness, and Envelopingness (the properties of Tamas), [ do not necessitate the assumption of several causes). Thus it is established that there are three-and only three-Attributes.
(108) Objection:-"As regards earth, and other things
known to us, we actually perceive the Question-Indis. creetness, etc., of properties of 'undistinguishableness' and the Attributes, the rest (described in Kârıka XI) as belong. bow provad?
80 ing to them, and we admit them so far, But the Sattva and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri