________________
TATTVA-KAUMUDI
for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity.
Thirdly.—We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists
Foarthly. The effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being an entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g.. a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work c.in be performed by a number of inen together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—“When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constr ined to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, that it has a cause, signify?