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TATTVA-KAUMUDI
[V34
excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers. have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity. (34) The Lokāyatika (materialist) says that Inserence is
not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he Inference, a dis know whether the person he was addressing tinct Means of Cognition was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Cer
tainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception.- Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random-he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not be listened to. In fact, the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of a person could only be inferred from such signs as the man's intention or words. Thus, however much he may dislike it, the Materialist has to admit of Inference as a Means. of Cognition (35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it
, is only right that it should be defined after Definition of Inference general Perception; then again, inasmuch as a defini
tion of Inference in general must precede that of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of Inference in general. It is led up to by the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term;-the Middle Term is that which is less extensive, and the Major Term is that which is more extensive; the 'less extensive' Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance ( with the Major Term ) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious