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SAHRDAYĀLOKA equivalent to 'upamānopameyabhāva' i.e. the idea of similitude and not 'upamāalamkāra' or 'expression of similitude'. The notion of being an alamkāra i.e. alamkārakatva does not seem to reside in it and hence it is not an alamkāra, observes Rewaprasadjee. Actually, we feel that when Rewaprasadjee quotes Abhinavagupta as suggesting that by dhvanikāra's expression viz. 'upamāyāh' is meant only ‘upamānopameya-bhāvasya', and not 'upamā-alamkārasya', then why not accept Anandavardhana also to mean exactly that ?
Any way, one thing clearly emerges that Mahimā's observation that 'abhidhā' should also have been mentioned clearly in the definition of dhvani, stands refuted.
Mahimā further observes that the use of the indeclinable viz. 'vā' is yet another blemish. He observes, (pp. 94-95, ibid) : "kim ca atra 'vā'sabdo vikalpā'rtho vā syāt samuccayā'rtho vā. na tävat vikalpā'rthah, paksā'ntaraasambhavasya vyutpăditatvāt. sambhave vā asya dvi-vacana-anupapattiḥ, tayoḥ samuccayā'bhāvāt. yathā.... "sirah śvā kāko vā drupada-tanayo vā parimțset” iti atra bahuvacanasya samuccayā'rthatve yatra sabdā'rthayor ekaikasya vyañjakatvam tatra dhvanitvam istam na syāt.” (pp. 94, ibid).
The indeclinable 'vā' can mean either option (i.e. vikalpa) or conjunction (i.e. samuccaya). But with reference to this context on hand, it cannot mean 'option' because word cannot be considered as an alternate suggestive element along with meaning, because word, as maintained by Mahimā, is capable of rendering only the primary sense and hence it has no power to convey the suggested sense at all. If we accept the other alternative, i.e. if we hold that here 'vā' is used in sense of conjunction, the definition of Anandavardhana would cover only those instances where both word and meaning together become suggestive. In that case the instances of dhvani where either word alone or sense alone conveys the suggested sense will fall out of the scope of dhvani. Again the attribute, viz. "upasarjanīkstasvārthau” will also become useless, because in all poetry both word and meaning, taken together only, become suggestive. Thus, in this situation, the description of only the expressed sense as qualified by the attribute 'upasarjanī krta' will cover all instances of dhvani.
Even this argument of Mahimā taken as a whole falls flat. He rejects the first alternative on the basis of his own assumption that a word has no power except that to convey the primary sense, and rejects the second alternative, resorting to Anandavardhana's stand that both word and sense can individually also convey the suggested sense. To accept a personal position to reject the first alternative and to accept the opponent's position also to reject the second alternative, does not sound logical, but the approach smacks of only personal convenience and a tendency to find fault somehow or other with the opponent. This is just prejudice, pure and
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