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Śabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidhā
269 Let us take another illustration. In the sentence viz. "ghatavat bhūtalam”, when there is knowledge or apprehension of bhūtala, we also have apprehension of
ghata' which is the 'viśesana' or 'prakāra' or 'sāmānya' of 'bhutala'. Now 'sannikarsa' is required for the apprehension of that ghata-rūpa-sāmānya. If with that 'sannikarsa' there occurs the apprehension of all 'ghata-yukta-bhūtala' then that also is called alaukika-pratyaksa-jñāna. The difference between the alaukika pratyaksa caused by the sannikarsa in form of knowledge of gotva-rūpa-sāmānya, on one hand, and the alaukika pratyaksa brought about by the sannikarsa of the knowledge of ghata-rūpa-sāmānya on the other hand, is only this much that in the
rst alaukika pratyaksa, gotva, the sāmānya jāti, is nitya, while in the other alaukika-pratyaksa, ghata-rūpa-samanya becomes 'jñāta' and is 'sannikarsa'. But suppose that in the above illustration of 'ghatavat-bhūtalam', the ghața or pot is broken. Then, if in the absence of the ghata which is broken, next day there is alaukika-pratyaksa of 'ghatavat bhūtalam', then at such places, ghata is not a 'sāmānya-sannikrsta'. But, only the knowledge of that ghatarūpa-samanya becomes sannikarsa in alaukika-pratyakşa. This is the opinion of the second section of the Naiyāyikas. From this, we can say that according to the opinion of this second section of Naiyāyikas, in alaukika-pratyaksa, we accept jñāna of sāmānya itself as sannikarsa in place of jñāta-sāmānya. Jagannātha refers to both these options of the Naiyāyikas in the words : "jñāta-gotvā"di-rūpayā gorvā"di-jñāna: rūpayā vā pratyāsattyā.".
If we put behind this small difference of opinion, then both the opinions of the Naiyāyikas seem to hold that by sāmānya pratyāsatti there is alaukika-pratyakṣa of all individual objects. So all objects are presented individually, and so there is nothing wrong in accepting saktigraha - convention - with reference to all individuals. From the point of view of both the sections of the Naiyāyikas, there is nothing wrong in accepting convention-samketa-with reference to individuals and no contingencies of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra' would walk in, in accepting samketa with reference to a vyakti.
This is so, because according to the Naiyayikas, through the 'sāmānya' residing in one individual 'go', there occurs apprehension of all the rest asamketita 'go' - i.e. all other cows that are not the subject of convention, and thus if we accept convention - 'samketa' - with reference to a given individual 'go' vyakti, no blemishes of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra' will follow. When one individual 'go' is perceived directly, through the 'sāmānya' residing in that govyakti, all other go-vyaktis possessing that sāmānya (i.e. go-tva), are covered by
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