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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one.
The latter, i.e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyártha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again three-fold viz. (i) vastu or idea, or a matter of fact, (ii) alamkāra i.e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasā"di, i.e. aesthetic rapture or feeling, sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vācyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred.
Mahimā holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vācya or expressed, because there is no sādhya-sadhana-bhāva between a 'pada' and its meaning. It means there is no inferenial relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sādhya-sādhana-bhāva can not exist.
We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of selfcontradiction can be read in Mahimāls position. At the outset Mahimā had declared that : "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhya-sādhana-garbhatayā prāyeņa anumāna-rūpóbhyupagantavyaḥ, tasya para-pravstti-nivstti-nibandhanatvāt, tayoś ca sampratyaya-a-sampratyayā”tmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvāt.” (pp. 26, 27, ibid). Here Mahimā suggests that the vācyārtha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Anandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyañjanā even for the Naiyāyikas under Dhv. III. 33. Mahimā has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks, he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to śābdavyavahāra to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this - "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." Thus there must be something behind A's activity of speaking, and this fact is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words utterred, follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahimā wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statement.
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