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SAHRDAYĀLOKA But we have seen above how Mahimā rejects the case of tātparya-vrtti and how he subsumes it under ‘anumiti'. Thus Mahimā's concepts of ‘abhidhā' and 'anumiti' are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gaunī, laksanā, tātparya, vyañjanã and even the broad concept of 'vakrokti' involving 'vicitrā abhidhā' of Kuntaka. This is how Mahimā takes Kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such 'sabda' and 'artha’ to be kāvya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry).” So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as are seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahimā. He argues as follows :
Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucityamātra) of word and sense, or is only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all ? Because, no third alternative is possible, it has got to be either of the two.
The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhāvā”di, i.e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for 'rasa' only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahimā accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhavā"dis. Thus 'anauctiya' has no scop in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid) :
"te ca yathāśāstram upanibadhyamānā rasábhivyakter nibandhanabhāvam bhajante. na anyathā. rasā”tmakam ca kāvyam iti kutas tatra anaucityasamsparśaḥ sambhāvyate yan nirāsártham ittham kāvya-lakṣaṇam acakšīran vicaksanammanyāḥ ?"
Mahimā says, that in case you opt for the second atternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-lakṣaṇa goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahimā sticks to his guns and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid)
"atro'cyate'bhidhā-samjñaḥ śabdasya artha-prakāśane, vyāpāra eka eva istaḥ yas tu anyo'rthasya so'khilaḥ.” - (71)
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