Sahrdayaloka Part 01

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006908/1

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
| Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism
[Vol. I, Part 1]
L. D. Series : 141
General Editor Jitendra B. Shah
TAPASVI NANDI
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009

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भारतीय
संस्कृति
CATE
SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
[Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ] [Vol. I, Part 1]
L. D. Series: 141
General Editor Jitendra B. Shah

L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009
TAPASVI NANDI

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L. D. Series : 141
SAHRDAYĀLOKA [Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ]
[Vol. I, Part-1]
TAPASVI NANDI
Published by Jitendra B. Shah
Director L.D.Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad
First Edition : 2005
ISBN 81 - 85857-23-7
Price : 650/
Typesetting Swaminarayan Mudranalaya Press
Shahibaug, Ahmedabad.
Printer Navprabhat Printing Press Gheekanta Road, Ahmedabad
Tel. 25508631

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Publisher's Note
We feel pleasure to place before the learned “SAHRDAYĀLOKA” OR "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - (Vol. I) by Prof. Tapasvi Nandi. The author hardly requires any introduction to the learned working in the area of Sanskrit Alamkārarśāstra or Literary Aesthetics. The work attempts to cover the basic thought - currents prevalent in Sanskrit Literary criticism, trying to unearth the origin and development of each topic beginning with the "Definition and scope of poetry, Sanskrit semantics, the theories of Dhvani, Rasa etc.” The author has taken care to record and accept the views of his predecessors in his area of research and has very gratefully acknowledged the honourable acceptance of their views and has also tried to discuss modestly differences of opinion if any, at various places. The whole work presents the material in an historical, critical and comparative perspective. We feel sure that the learned will appreciate his efforts in an unbiased way. Prof. Nandi's observations on Dhvani and Rasa deserve special mention as he has made a special effort to explain how
ese thought currents which form a special contribution of Indian Literary Aesthetics are relevant even to-day and how they can be applied to the most modern patterns of literature world over, including absurd poetry and absurd theatre as well.
The author also proposes to bring out Vol. II covering the area of literary criticism that is not discussed in the present volume, of course, god willing.
We are thankful to Prof. Nandi for agreeing with us to publish the present work. We are also thankful to the Swaminarayan press, and all our colleagues in seeing this work through. Hope this work will stand the test of the learned and will fulfil a gap left out by earlier experts. It may be noted that for the sake of convenience, this work is presented in three parts such as, Part I - chs. I-VII (pp. 1-575); Part II - chs. VIII-XIII (pp. 576-1195) and Part III - chs. XIV - XVIII (pp. 1196-1843), with select Bibliography (pp. 1844-1850) appearing at the end of Part III. The Publisher's note, the author's preface - Namaskaromi, contents, detailed contents and abbriviations appear in all the three parts.
Jitendra Shah
L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.

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Dedication
This work is for,
Parth (my grandson, doing medicine) Mit (my grandson, doing physiotherapy) Smt. Chinmayee (my daughter, pharmacist) Dr. Mayur (my son-in-law, Gynecologist) Harsha, (Smt. Nandi, rtd. Librarian) Sragdharā, (The late, my sister)
The Late, Smt. Madhumati, The Late, Shri. Shambhucandra, my parents;
and my mahā-gurus Prof. R. C. Parikh, Prof. R. B. Athavale
&
Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkerni, .. Awardee, President's Certificate of Honour
and also for Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja,
Dr. P. C. Chakravarty
Prof. Devasthai, - my sources; To whom I have turned, at places, for inspiration and guidance
and for Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi and Dr. Satyavrat Shastri.

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“Namaskaromi....”
Salutations to the Divine ! Salutations to my three Mahā-gurus; Salutations to my parents, Salutations to all the sources
consulted by me And, Salutations to all of you, who are all all sparks of the Divine !
“Aum pūrņam adaḥ, pūrņam idam pūrnāt pūrņam udacyate pūrņasya pūrņam ādāya
pūrnam evā'va śisyate.” "That [Source, which has been drawn upon by me is respectable and] is perfect,
This (Work, which is presented before you in this respectable shape) is perfect."
Perfect (material-; ideas, inspiration) has been drawn from perfect (respectable, reliable source). After drawing upon perfect (material) from perfect (and respectable source), only the perfect is left behind (before you)."
This, in short, is the story of my spiritual endeavour that started on 7th Aug. 2000 A.D. and reached its completion on 20th July, 2003 A.D.
The great yogin said, “In the stillness of the night, the eternal speaks.” And yes; I do not know when, in the stillness of the night, my eyes kept wide open staring in the darkness around me, and when these thought-currents sneaked into my inner consciousness from various sources-first like light ripples of the quiet and dignified flow of the sacred Gangā, and then like the mighty billows of the stormy Atlantic, dashing against the shores, washing them clean. They settled into my mind and then sank deep into it. I do not know when my eyes were closed and

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I was overpowered by sleep, as if embraced by the Divine Grace ! I feel floating in the wide stream, rich in currents and cross-currents, whirls and pulls; deep, full fathom five; quiet and dignified. I feel dragged and dragged, up and down, and then I slip towards the bottom, like in the womb of the mother earth, with a hundred thousand daffodils, red and pink, green, blue, white, violet and golden - on top of the surface !
So, as suggested in the beginning, I have accepted, with gratitude, of course after verifying with the original, the material, - line by line, paragraph by paragraph, at times, - from the works of my predecessors, who I thought are most reliable, and for whom I have tremendous respect and love in my heart, - from their works, dealing with the topics of word and meaning as discussed by the ancients - the Mimāmsakas, the Naiyāyikas and above all the great Vaiyakaranas, - the "prathame hi vidvāmsah" as Anandavardhana would call them. I take these works as starting points, and as absolutely relaible sources and they are authored
great scholars such as Dr. P. C. Chakrawarty, Prof. Devasthali and Prof. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. Sri P. Ramchandrudu and some others. At every step, wherever I have sought inspiration and help from these master works, I have clearly indicated my indebtedness.
My work has grown both in size and dignity due to this, like the sacred flow of the Gangā growing vaster and vaster with the waters from the innumerable springs, rivulets and rivers mixing with the main stream; and shooting out from the bosom of the great Nagádhirāja Himalaya. Those who have undertaken the "caturdhāma yātrā" are a witness to this. By accepting everything from various springs the Gangā has carved out its own identity, sanctity and dignity. Same is the case with this work. I owe a lot to the great modern rși-trayi-i.e. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, in particular, who has shaped my views on Bhoja. But it may also be noted that, without showing disrespect, I have ventured to dispute their results, and this happens quite often with Dr. Raghavan, when I feel, on verifying with the original words of Bhoja, that I am on firmer ground. This, the discreet will find out for himself, and there is no doubt about it. But this does not minimize their greatness and my adoration for their lotus-feet. They are the great thinkers spreading light and bearing the torch of Indian Literary Aestetics for the modern scholars, both in east and west alike.
Over and above this, I owe everything, - i.e. beginning from my initiation into this ancient lore of Sahitya-śāstra to whatever I have done till day, in serving its

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cause, to my great gurus - the three of them, the 'guru-śikhi-tray of professors R. C. Parikh, R. B. Athavale, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and especially Dr. Kulkarni; for it is he who even to-day, at the age of 85+ yrs., inspires me, guides me and blesses me and in my moments of personal despondency fills me with warmth, love, guidance and inspiration.
I am also indebted to the works of some of my senior contemporaries and to most of them personally also when I have met them, such as Dr. Rama Rañjan Mukherjee, Dr. Mukund Madhava Sharma, Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyāya, Prof. Dr. Satyavrata Shastri, Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi and my most respected and learned friends such as Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. Kamalesh Dutta Tripathi, the late Prof. Ramcandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), the late Prof. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shantiniketan), the late Prof. K. Krishnamoorty, Prof. N. P. Unni, Prof. Dr. K. K. Chaturvedi, and prof. Dr. S. D. Joshi, and some very brilliant young friends such as Prof. Dr. Sarojaben Bhate, Dr. C. Ramchandran, Prof. Dr. V. N. Jha, Dr. G. C. Tripathi, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Prof. M. M. Agrawal Dr. Goparaju, Rama, Dr. Jagannatha Pathak, and the rest. I have met all these dignitaries personally and I stand benifitted. I also will show my respect for Prof. Sri. Ramchandrudu for his great work on Jagannātha. True, my Guru Prof. Athavale taught me some portion of the great R. G., and his work on Pundit Jagannātha is monumental.
So, I am made of all these stalwarts. But kindly note that with all this I remain myself, i.e. I have carefully carved out and preserved my identity. If at all I have accepted their ideas and views as sacred mantra, it is because I feel convinced about the same. I feel convinced first about their reliability and integrity, and then their output; their great reputation apart. Believe me, and I am honest, that I have practically verified every source in the original, before putting the stamp of my humble acceptance of their thoughts and writing. It is never a blind acceptance. In the words of Rājasekhara - "tad etad svīkaranam, na tu haranam." I have accepted them, for I have found them acceptable, like the great Vägdevatavatāra Mammata or the great Kalikāla-Sarvajña ācārya Hemacandra accepting the dictates of Abhinavaguptapādācārya, or like the latter himself accepting the ruling of his seniors when he says :
“ūrdhvo'rdhvam āruhya yad artha-tattvam dhīḥ paśyati, śrāntim avedayantī, phalam tad adyaiḥ parikalpitānām viveka-sopāna-paramparāņām.”

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However, the discreet will find out that my acceptance ends with the field covering the ancient literature laying down the thoughts of the Mimāmsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaranas. With our entry into the wide and open field of Alamkāraśāstra proper, i.e. with the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha, of course including Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, I have tried to project some original line of thinking that may prove to be of great value to the adhikārins. This is a modest claim but a sure one. I have accepted ideas and also drafting from Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, K. Krishnamoothy, and the rest, but with a touch of my own original contribution. I feel I am on absolutely sure and safe ground when I travel through this area of alamkāra-Sastra proper, convering nearly two thousand years of creative thinking. My work will surely guide the adhikārī aspirant who wants to have a glimpse of the greatness of the Indian ācāryas, who have left behind their foot-prints on the sands of literary aesthetics. It may be noted that I have presented the rasa theory in a new perspective, and believe me, this is what I claim for sure, - a perspective which acknowledges the catholicity of rasa theory as it seems to serve the cause even of what they term 'absurd theatre' or 'absurd poetry. I am sure the discerning will take note of all this and try to evaluate this work in an unbiased way. At the same time may I remind the learned of the words of Jayanta who said, "kutósti nūtanam vastu ?", or of the words quoted as above of Abhinavagupta suggesting that all fresh results follow the achievements of the earlier masters, i.e. after climbing the 'viveka-sopana-paramparā' one gets into something fresh. So, I invite the sensitive and thoughtful adhikarins to have a soft corner for me and extend their helping hand. The great Mahimā observes : (Vyakti-viveka) -
"yuktóyam ātmasadęśān prati me prayatno nā'sty eva taj jagati, sarva-manoharan yat, kecij jvalanti, vikasanty, apare nimilanty
anye yad abhyudayabhāji jagat-pradīpe.” The discerning are requested to read every line, before pronouncing a judgement.... I wish that only those, through whose arteries and veins alamkāraśāstra flows, should venture to review this work. No lesser soul should attempt it. So, we humbly say -
"adya pratanyate'smābhih viduşām prītaye mudā astādaśā'dhikariņi mīmāmsā kāvya-vartmani."

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This forms only the first volume of my "Sahṛdayā"loka" or "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism." The proposed second volume will try to study the concepts of guna, doṣa, alamkāra, lakṣaṇa, aucitya, rīti, vṛtti, kaviśikṣā and some modern writers on Sanskrit poetics, such as Dr. Rewaprasadjee etc.
I sincerely thank the publishers and Shri. Dr. Jitendra Shah the Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for seeing this work through. I also thank his collegues, and also Principal Kanjibhai Patel for kindly co-operating with us. The press Shri Swaminārāyaṇa Mudraṇa Mandir, of course deserves full praise and thanks for doing its job so carefully.
-
I also thank, Smt. Harsha Nandi, my wife, Smt. Chinmayee M. Rali, my beloved daughter, M. Pharm., Dr. Mayur S. Rali, M.D., D.G.O., my son-in-law, and our two grandsons Parth who studies medicine, and Mit, doing physiotherapy bearing with me through all the inconveniences caused due to my sādhanā, and providing love and inspiration through out the course of these three years when this work was carried out. I also thank the Divine, and our Sadguru Raja-yogi Shri Narendrajee for his blessings and who has also suggested that even after this polite achievement, I have to travel further, through the woods, dark, deep and lovely, before I rest and lay down my pen. Aum mã Aum. iti Śivam...
19 Aug. 2004
Āsopālava,
4, Professors' Colony,
Navrangpura,
Ahmedabad-380009.
(Gujarat State) India.

-
TAPASVI NANDI

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Bio-data of Dr. T. S. Nandi
M. A. Ph.D
Born : 22nd Sept., 1933, Kheda, Gujarat; India. Special achievements : (i) Smt. Nāthībā Gold Medal, '53; Guj. Uni., Ahd. (ii) Dr. Nayak Gold Medal for Research '73; Guj. Uni.; Ahmedabad.
(iii) Šāstra-cūdāmani fellowship; Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi; Feb. '94 - (iv) Awardee, President's Certificate of Merit, Aug. '90.
(v) Emeritus Professor; Uni. Grants. Comm. New Delhi, Feb. '95;
Teaching Experience : '55 June - '64 June; H. K. Arts College, Ahd.; as Lecturer and Professor; Jun '64 - '93 Oct. (Total 29 yrs and six months). at P. G. School of Languages Guj. Uni., as lecturer, Reader and Prof. Head, ['84 feb.-'85 Dec. as Director, L. D. Inst. of Indology, on lien.]
Area of specialisation : Sanskrit Literature and Literary Criticism - alamkāraśāstra.
Research Articles - A hundred odd articles published in various research journals of repute.
Research Works :
(i) The Origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics (Doctoral thesis); Pub.; Gujarat Uni. Research publication series; '73.
(ii) “Dhvanyaloka-Locana", critical Intro. and Translation in Gujarati; Pub. Guj. Uni. '73
(iii) Sanskrit Nātakono paricaya (in gujarat) [Introduction to Sanskrit Drama) Pub.; Uni. Book Production Board; Guj. State; Ahd. '73; Third Edn. '96.
(iv) 'Bhāratīya Sāhitya-śāstranī vicāra-parmparāo" (in Guj.) Uni. Book. Production Board, '74; Third Edn.; 2000.

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(v) Mammaṭa's Kavyaprakasa with Saradīpikā of Gunaratnagani; ullāsas I-VI; Vol. I; Critically edited for the first time; Pub; Guj. Uni.; '76.
(vi) Mammata's Kavyaprakāśa, with Saradīpikā of Gunaratnagani; critical Edition; (vol. II) Pub. Guj. Uni. '84;
(vii) Bharatiya Natyaśāstrani Vicara-paramparão (in Guj.); Pub. Uni. Bookproduction Board Guj. State; Ahd. '85
(viii) Jinasamudra's Commentary on the Raghuvamsa of Kālidāsa; Critical Edn.; Pub. Guj. Sahitya Akademi; Guj. State, Ahd. '85 critical Intro. in English.
(ix) Natyaśāstra Bharata; Ch. VI. with Abhinavabhāratī; (in Guj.) Critical Intro. Translation, etc. with Harṣavati, Guj. Comm.; Pub. Guj. Uni. Research Publication series; '79.
-
(x) Natyaśāstra - Bharata; Ch. s I. II and III. and Ch. VI. with Abhinavabhāratī; (in Guj.); critical Intro, Translation etc.; Pub. Saraswati research prakāśana series; Vol. I; Ahd. '94
Second Edn. 2001 A.D.
(xi) Natyaśāstra - Bharata; Ch. VI; with Abhinava-bharati, Chs. XVI, XVIII & XIX, Guj. Trans. Critical Intro. etc. (Vol. II), '94; Saraswati Research Prakāśana, series, Vol. 8, 2nd. Edn. 2001, A.D.
(xii) Mṛcchakatika; Śudraka; - by Sragdhara Nandi; Revised Critical Edn.; Dr. T. S. Nandi; Sarasvati Research Publication Series; Ahd. '97
(xiii) Dhvanyaloka, with Locana; (in Guj.) critical Intro; Translation etc.; Pub. Saraswati; Research Publication series, Vol. 11; Ahd. '98 (in Gujarati)
(xiv) Natyaśāstra - Bharata; Vol. II Gaekwad oriental series; critical Edn. with special ref. to MS. 'N' (from Nepal) - jointly with Dr. V. M. Kulkarni; Intro. in English Pub. Oriented Institute, Vadodara; 2001 A.D.
(xv) Haima - vānmaya-vimarśa; Edited by Dr. T. S. Nandi; Jointly with Dr. R. I. Nanavati, Research Articles Read at international and national level seminars in Ahd., and Surat; Pub. skt-sahitya Akademi., Guj. State '87.
(xvi) Kavya'nuśāsana; Acarya Hemacandra, with critical Intro; Trans.; in Gujarati Pub. The L. D. Institute of indology, Ahd.; L. D. Series; Vol. 123; Jun. 2000 A.D.
(xvii) "Abhidha"; Pub. L. D. Inst. of Indology, Ahd.; L. D. Series, 131; Feb. 2002 A.D.

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(xviii) & (xix)
Nātyaśāstra, Vol. III (Ch. XIX-XXVII) (Published; 2004 A.D.); & IV. (Ch. XXVIIIXXXVI) (in press) with Abhinavabhārati; Critical new edition with special ref. to Ms. 'N' (from Nepal) - jointly with Dr. V. M. Kulkarni; Pub. - Oriental Institute, Vadodara; under G.O.Series publication;
XX - Sahțdayāloka - or
Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism; Pub. L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahd., 2004-2005 A.D.
Works on Hand
XXI - Jayanta's Kāvyaprakāśa Dīpikā; Critical Edn. in view of a fresh ms. from Hemacandra Jñāna bhandāra, Pātan (N. Guj.), with critical Intro: and comparative critical observations written in Sanskrit.
XXII Alamkārikas from Gujarat. or Jaina Aesthetics; (in English) - XXXIII Kālidāsa and Sanskrit Literary criticism; (with ref. to all major alamkāra works) XXIV Vyaktiviveka of Mahima Bhatta - critical Intro; Translation etc. in English.
Dr. Nandi has attended various seminars, and conferences at local, state, national and international level, sometimes as chairperson or sectional president,He attended the W.S.C., in Philadelphia, U.S.A. '84; and also in Benglore, A.D. '98. He was nominated as chair-person; for a session at the W.S.C., in Delhi, 2002;
His works have been favourably reviewed in national and international journals.
14 Students earned their doctorate (Ph.D.) under his supervision and 25 odd got their M. Phil degree under his guidance.

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Contents
Ch. No.
Title
Page No.
1-125
126-203 204-229
“Definition and scope of poetry.” (Introduction p. 1-12) Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra; Śabdavrttis; recognised in the works of earlier alamkārika-s such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, Vāmana Udbhata and Rudrata [i.e. Ānandavardhana's pūrvā”cārya-s] 'Pratīyamāna artha'
IV
or
230-248
V
VII VIII
249-368 369-453 454-575 576-709 710-778
Implicit sense, as seen in the earlier alamkārika-s such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc. Śabda-vịttis, the nature of; “Abhidhā” Tātparya Laksanā Vyañjanā Vyañjanā-virodha or Opposition to suggestive power Classification of Poetry (form - oriented) Classification of Poetry (contd.) (criticism oriented;) dhvani, gunībhūta-vyangya, citra; or uttama, madhyama, avara, etc.
779-967
968-1041

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Page No. 1042-1152
1153-1195
1196-1277
Ch. No.
Title XII Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja
and others and Guņībhūta-vyangya-kāvya
and citra-kāvya XIII Dhvani and other thought
currents such as guna, alamkāra, samghatanā, rīti, vịtti, etc. and also
Dhvani-Virodha. XIV The Concept of 'Rasa', as
seen in veda and ancient literature and then in Bharata and earlier älamkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudrata Concept of 'Rasa' as seen in Anandavardhana and
others posterior to him. XVI. Rasa-nispatti-vicāra
in
Abhinavagupta XVII Rasa-nispatti-vicăra
in Mammața, some others and
Jagannātha. XVIII Dasa-rupaka-vicāra
Detailed Contents
XV
1278-1490
1491-1593
1594-1629
1630-1843

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Detailed Contents Ch. I Introduction, p. 1-12; Definition and scope of poetry, p. 12-14;
Bhāmaha, p. 14; Dandin, p. 24; Vāmana, p. 30; Udbhața, p. 36; Rudrata, p. 37; Anandavardhana and his followers, p. 39; Rājasekhara, p. 42; Kuntaka, p. 42; Kșemendra, p. 60; Bhoja, p. 60; Agnipurāņa, p. 63; Mahimabhatta, p. 64; From Mammața to Viśvanātha, p. 81; Mammața, p. 81; Hemacandra, p. 86; Vāgbhata I, p. 86; Vāgbhata II, p. 87; Jayadeva, p. 87; Viśvanātha, p. 91; Vidyādhara, p. 88; Vidyānātha, p. 89; Keśava Miśra, p. 97; Jagannātha, p. 101; J.'s criticism of Mammata's definition of poetry, p. 109; J.on Viśvanātha's definition of poetry, p. 114, later challanges to J.'s definition of poet
ry, p. 115; Kāvya-hetu and Kāvya-prayojana, p. 119; . Ch. II Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra or Powers of a word; general introduction, p.
126; ancient background, p. 129; word meaning relationship, p. 132; the vākya padīya, p. 134; Mimāmsakas, p. 137; artha-jñāna or determination of sabdārtha, p. 142; pravrtti-nimitta of sabda, p. 146; Naiyāyikas, p. 148; how is sanketa apprehended, p. 148; Bharthari, p. 150; word and its import, p. 153; the vaiyākaranas * patañjali *; mīmāmsakas; p. 157 different views as mentioned in the V.P., p. 164 Naiyāyikas; p. 164 Bhartrhari's V.P.; p. 165 Alamkārikas; p. 171 Etimologists; p. 175; Short Summary of total heritage; p. 175 Sabda-vrttis as seen in different schools of thought such as the vaiyakaranas, mīmāmsakas etc. p. 181; mimāmsakas; p. 192
naiyāyikas; p. 198 Navya-Naīyāyikas, p. 200 Ch. III. Bhāmaha; p. 205 Dandin p. 217 Vāmana; p. 220 Udbhata; p. 225
Rudrata p. 226 Ch. IV p. 230; Bhāmaha; p. 232 Dandin; p. 242 Vāmana, p. 247; Udbhata,
p. 247; Rudrata; p. 247 Ch. V General Introduction; p. 250 Abhidhā; p. 252 classification p. 252;
Jagannātha, Mahā-siddhāntin; p. 253; Bhoja p. 276; Mukula and others p. 289; Kuntaka; p. 300; Mahimā; p. 306, rethinking p. 332 Mammața p. 333 Mammața's definition of abhidhā p. 345;

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Hemacandra; p. 347; Jayadeva p. 349; Vidyādhara, p. 358, Vidyānātha, p. 358; Viśvanātha p. 359; Keśava, p. 359; Appayya
Dixit p. 360. Ch. VI General Introduction, p. 369; Vākya, its import; p. 370; Vākya;
definition p. 371; Patañjali, p. 371; naiyāyikas p. 371; The grammarians p. 372; what is vākyártha ? p. 374; Mimāmsakas p. 377; constitution of a sentence, different views; p. 378; Naiyāyikas p. 381; nimitta of vākyártha p. 385; Prabhākara p. 391; ālamkārikas; p. 396 the nature and scope of tātparya-vịtti; p. 398 tatparyajñāna p. 409; anvitā'bhidhānavāda and abhihitā'nvayavāda p. 414; anvitābhidhānavāda p. 415; abhihitānvayavāda p. 421; tātparya p. 426; dhananjaya/dhanika p. 427; tātparya in Bhoja p.
433; Mammața and his followers p. 444; Ch. VII. three conditions p. 454; grammarians p. 455; Patañjali, Gautama
p. 458; mukhya, gauna, mīmāmsakas, p. 459; ālamkārikas 482; Mukula 482; Kuntaka 484; Kumārila 485; types of laksanā 489; Mukula 492; Mammaţa 492; gauņi, compound words, sentencelaksana, Bharthari p. 503; Hemacandra p. 521; Bhoja p. 521; Jayadeva p. 526; Vidyādhara p. 531; Vidyānātha p. 534; Viśvanātha
p. 534; Keśava 539; Appayya p. 540; Jagannātha p. 550; Ch. VIII vedic sages p. 576; grammarians, mīmāmsakas, naiyāyikas, yāska
p. 577; dr. Saroja Bhate p. 578; Pāņini, patañjali p. 589, Bhart;hari, p. 591; Sphoțavāda and vyañjanā p. 599; vyañjanā as accepted by Anandavardhana and his followers p. 601; sources; veda p. 602; The Nirukta p. 618; Rk Prātiśākhya p. 620; Astādhyāyī p. 620; Mahābhāsya p. 621; germs of vyañjanā in Bhāsa, Ašvaghosa, Kālidāsa etc. p. 622; Anandavardhana; (with Locana); p. 630; Mahimā p. 654; Anandavardhana p. 656; Mammata p. 658; abhidhāmūlā-vyañjanā, 659; Abhinavagupta; p. 680; Mammata p. 685; Hemacandra p. 687; Jayadeva p. 688; Vidyādhara p. 689; Keśava, p. 690; Vidyānātha p. 690; Viśvanātha p. 691; Appayya
p. 693; Jagannātha p. 694; Ch. IX. Abhinavagupta p. 711; Mammata p. 726; Mukula p. 748, Kuntaka
p. 752, Bhoja p. 752; Mahimā p. 752; Dhanika p. 753; Hemacandra p. 772; Vidyādhara p. 773; Vidyānātha p. 773; Viśvanātha p. 773;

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Detailed Contents Ch. X. Bhāmaha p. 780; Dandin p. 785; Vāmana p. 795; Rudrața p. 799;
Anandavardhana p. 811; Abhinavagupta p. 814; Bhoja p. 816; Bhoja nataka etc., p. 818; nidarśanam p. 820; manthulli p. 821; maņikulyā p. 822, kathā, khanda-kathā, upakathā, p. 822; běhatkathā, campū, p. 824; parva-bandha, kāņdabandha, p. 825; sargabandha, āśvāśaka-bandha, p. 826; sandhibandha, avaskandhakabandha, kāvya-śāstra, p. 827; kośa, p. 829; samhitā, sāhitya-prakāśa, p. 830; Abhinavabhārati p. 836; uparūpakas nātikā p. 834; Hemacandra p. 851, Natyadarpana 852; Saradātanaya, NLRK. 852, Vāgbhasa II, “ingabhūpāla, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha Viśvanātha
p. 852; individually considered from Bhoja onwards 853. Ch. XI R. 968; dhvani, dvanyāloka; locanakāra p. 975; dhvani-prabheda p. 984; table showing varieties of dhvani p. 988; vyañjaka-mukhena
, p. 999; alamkāras, rasavat etc. p. 1006; vyañjaka-mukhena bhedāḥ, 1009; prabandha as rasavyañjaka p. 1012; suggestivity of vịtti, rīti, p. 1014; varņas as suggestive of rasa p. 1015; padas - rasavyañjaka, p. 1015; rasa-virodhi, its parihāra p. 1016; virodhisamāveśa p. 1020; supremacy of rasa in poetry p. 1029; .Mammața p. 1030; Hemacandra and Jayadeva p. 1031; Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha Visvanātha, p. 1031; Jagannātha p. 1032; uttamottama,
etc. 1032; further classification of dhvani by J. p. 1032; Ch. XII. Dhvani in earlier alamkārikas, Bhämaha and others p. 1043;
Kuntaka p. 1045; Bhoja p. 1091; Bhoja-Tātparya, p. 1111; gunībhūtavyangya and citra kāvya p. 1125; citra kāvya p. 1127; gunībhūta - vyangya, Anandavardhana 1127; Abhinavagupta's attitude 1133; Mammața madhyama kāvya, etc. p. 1133; Hemacandra, p. 1137, Visvanātha p. 1138; Jagannātha, four-fold scheme p. 1139; Jayadeva p. 1141; Vidyadhara; Vidyānātha; Keśava; citra-kāvya p. 1143; Ānandavardhana and others p. 1144; Mammața p. 1149; Vidyānātha, p. 1149; Viśvanātha p. 1150;
Keśava p. 1151; Appayya Dīkșita p. 1151; Jagannātha p. 1152 Ch. XIII. dhvani and alamkāra p. 1154; samghatanā p. 1156; rīti, vịtti, p.
1163; Locana, p. 1165; Mammața p. 1166; Hemacandra p. 1172; Jayadeva p. 1173; Vidyadhara, p. 1174; Vidyānātha p. 1174; Viśvanātha p. 1175; Jagannātha p. 1176; Opposition to dhvnikāra's

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supremacy, p. 1178; Vimarsinī, opponents of dhvani p. 1178;
Locana p. 1180; refutation, dhvani-twofold- p. 1192; Ch. XIV Rasa in RV. p. 1196; Rasa in Yv. p. 1199; Rasa in Sāmaveda p.
1199; Rasa in AV p. 1200; Amara, Hemacandra on word 'rasa'; p. 1202; Rasa, various meanings in vedic literature, conclusion p. 1203; NS. I. 7; rasān ātharvaņād p. 1207; Hymns of AV.; love lyrics p. p. 1217; Rasa in the Upanişads p. 1219; Rasa in the Nirukta; 'Rasa' in Bịhaddevatā p. 1221; Rasa in Pāṇini and Patañjali p. 1221; Rasa in Ašvaghosa, Bhāsa, Kālidāsa, p. 1224; Rasa in Bharata Muni, NS. p. 1240; Bharata on Bhāvas p. 1248; Bhāmaha p. 1256; Dandin p.
1262; Vāmana p. 1267; Udbhata p. 1268; Rudrata p. 1271; Ch. XIV *; Rasa in Anandavardhana p. 1278; asam'aksyakrama-vyangya (=
rasā"di dhvani) with reference to varṇa etc. p. 1285; and samghatanā; types p. 1285; prabandha-suggestive of rasa; p. 1286; rasā"di-dhvani suggested by case-terminations, etc., p. 1287; obstacles in rasa-vyañjanā; p. 1288; rasa as aesthetic relish for all art-critics p. 1290; virodhi-rasa-vyavasthā; opposite sentiments p. 1291; overcoming opposition between two rasas p. 1293; other concepts, vịtti, etc. and rasa p. 1294; alamkāra, guna, dosa and rasa 1298; Mukula and rasa p. 1300; Kuntaka p. 1302; Dhananjaya and Dhanika p. 1310; Mahimabhatta p. 1310; Bhoja p. 1317; Agnipurāņa p. 1330; Mammaţa p. 1334; Hemacandra p. 1339; Vägbhata I p. 1340; Vāgbhaţa II, p. 1341; Jayadeva p. 1341; Vidyādhara p. 1342; Vidyānātha p. 1343; Viśvanātha II p. 1348; Bhānudatta p. 1363; Keśava Miśra p. 1364; Jagannātha p. 1367; Rasa in works on dramaturgy; Daśrūpaka; p. 1373; Nātya darpana; Rāmacandra and Gunacandra; 1388; Bhāva-prakāśana, p. 1401; Śäradātanaya; bhāva p. 1402; Saradātanaya on rasa; p. 1426; Nāțaka-laksana ratna kosa; Sāgaranandin p. 1459; Rasārņava
sudhākara of Singabhūpāla p. 1465; Bhāva and rasa in Rs. 1465. Ch. XVI. rasa-sūtra p. 1492; Lollata 1493; Lollata's view; Locana; refutation of
Lollaţa by sși. Sankuka; as read in Locana; in Abh. p. 1500; sși. Sankukas views on rasa-nispatti, Abh. p. 1502; Tota Abh. on Sankuka's view p. 1507; sāmkhya view in Abh. p. 1516; sankuka's view in

Page #22

Locana p. 1516; Bhattanāyaka's view in Abh. and then in Locana; p. 1518; Abhinavagupta's view on rasa-nispatti; p. 1527; seven obstacles; rasa-vighnas; Abh.; p. 1542; Explanation of rasa-sūtra by Abhinavagupta p. 1554; Locana; rasa-nispatti p. 1563; All rasas, blissgiving p. 1578; śānta rasa p. 1578; catholicity of rasa-theory p. p.
1583; Ch.XVII rasa-nispatti-vicāra; Mammata to Jagannātha *; Mammata p. 1594;
Jagannātha p. 1601; Ch. XVIII Nāțaka 1632; Dasarūpaka p. 1646; Itivṛtta p. 1652; artha-prakrti
sp. 1654; five avasths p. 1658; Sandhis and Sandhyangs p. 1661; artho'paksepakas p. 1666; sandhis and sandhangas, further discussion p. 1670; Nātya-darpana p. 1676; Bhāvaprakāśana *; NLRK. p. 1682; Sāhityadarpana *; Rasārņava Sudhākara p. 1696; Sandhyantaras p. 1702; Comparative and critical study of sandhi-s and sandhyanga-s p. 1705; Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's view; sixty four sandhyangas p. 1714; conclusions concerning sandhyangas p. 1736; Bhoja p. 1749; A comparative and critical table of sandhyangas p. 1749; Types of drama; nāțaka p. 1795; five special types of drama in Bāva prakāśana 1800; Prakarana p. 1807; Samavakāra p. 1811; īhāmrga p. 1821; Dima 1825; Vyāyoga p. 1828; Utsrstikā’nka; p. 1830; prahasana p. 1831; Bhāņa p. 1834; Vīthì p. 1836;

Page #23

Page #24

Abbreviations
AVM. A-bh AG. A-se.
Bhā B. P.
Bho.
DR. Da.
Dha Dhv. Dhv. L. H. (or. . C.)
Abhidhāvrtta-Mātrkā of Mukula. Abhinavabhārati Abhinavagupta Alamkāra-sekhara-Keśava; Anandavardhana Bhāmaha Bhāva Prakāśana Bharata Bhoja Daśa-rupakaDandin Dhananjaya - Dhanika Dhvanyāloka. Dhvanyāloka-Locana-Abhinavagupta's. Hemacandra. Jagannātha K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof. Kāvyā'lamkāra, Bhāmaha.' Kāvyā'lamkāra-Sūtra-vrtti-Vāmana's Kävyā’nuśāsana, Hemacandra. Kāvyā"darśa-Dandin Kāvya Prakāśa. KumārilaKuntaka, Mimamsă-Sūtra.
K. Kris.
Ка.
Kā.Sū.Vr. Ka-śă KD.
- KP.
Ku.
K.
Mi-Sū.

Page #25

Mbh. M.
M.
NLRK. N.S.
P.
RS.
R. G. śā Śr.Pra. Ś.B. Sā
IIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Mahābhāsya Mahimabhatta; Mammața. Nāțaka-Laksana-Ratna-Kosa Nātyaśāstra, Bharata; Pāṇini Punditarāja-Jagannāth. Rasā'rnavasudhākara. Rasa-Gangadhara Śaradātanaya Śrngāra-Prakāśa; Bhoja Śingabhūpāla Sāgaranandin Sā-Sāyaṇa (in vedic context) Sāhityadarpana-Viśvaanātha Sanskrit Poetics, S. K. De. Sarasvati-Kanthā”- bharaṇa. Vägbhasa II Vātsyāyana Vakrokti Jivita; Kuntaka Viśvanātha Vyakti-Viveka
Sā
S-D.
SP.
S.K.Ā.
Vāg.
Vātsyā
V.J. V.
— -
Vya.V.

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Chapter 1 Definition and Scope of Poetry
(Kāvya; Literature i.e. belles lettres)
Introduction :
Sound thinking on aesthetics started in India in very early period. It was reliable and thought-provoking. It continues to be so even today in modern centext. It centred round arts such as drama, literature, music, dance, architecture, scupture etc. The aesthetics developed with reference to nātya i.e. dramatic art, and sāhitya, i.e. literary art, in particular, seems to be unparalleled even when compared to the - thinking of modern aesthetes, both in east or west. Our context, for the present, centres round only literary aestetics. It may be noted that in India, thinking
rning literary criticism originated from very very early period and this observation is supported by documentary evidences. The nātyaśāstra (= N.S.) of Bharata (4th cen. A.D.) (We have accepted the dates of all works referred to in our writing, as fixed by Dr. S. K. De; Sanskrit Poetics, History of; Calcutta, 60.) which covers critically the dramatic art in all its forms, and in which all forms of dramatic art are subsumed under the terminology viz. rūpaka, - deals with certain basic principles concerning literary criticism, such as 'guna' or literary excellence, dosa or literary blemish, alamkāra or figures of speech and laksana or distinctive mark, while treating "vāg-abhinaya" i.e. vocal acting concerming the speech, along with other three forms of acting such as 'angika abhinaya” i.e. bodily acting or gestural, āhārya i.e. extraneous, conveyed by costumes, settings, make-up etc., and 'sāttvika' i.e. internal, conveyed by the manifestation of internal feelings, which required greater concentration and subtler effort on the part of the artist. With reference to the same, the N.S. also considers the problem of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience. It

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA should always the kept in centre that Bharata is concerned only with aesthetics concerning the dramatic art. For him dramatic art was totally different and independent of the literary art. He has discussed the topic of rasa i.e. aesthetic experience, in the context of dramatic art only and this thinking which could have originated with reference to dramatic art, or, any art in general, could have been applied to literary art as well by literary critics later. But this could be only a guess work and it may be noted that nobody is in a position to pass any observation on oath. May be dramaturgy preceeded literary criticism and the topic of rasaexperience was later covered up in literary criticism also, when written form of drama was subsumed under literary form called 'drsya-kāvya' or visual form of literature. But exactly at what stage of literary criticism and when this happened, one can not say. True, Bharata's N.S. is earlier among available documents concerning art, especially dramatic art, and it does precede any oldest available document concerning literary art, i.e., kāvya- alamkāra-grantha, but at the same time it is equally true that Bharata himself while dealing with literary principles such as guna, etc. as mentioned above, talks of their application in dramatic art, particularly in preparing written literary script of a play, with reference to 'kavyarasa' i.e. aesthetic experience through literature. Thus, 'kāvya-rasa' is an accepted concept for Bharata while dealing with 'natya-rasa' and we do not know exactly when these two thought-currents of kāvya-rasa and nätya-rasa got mingled with each other, even if they had an independent origin. Actually they were always taken care of together, like two sides of the same coin. The fact remains that this situation is even prior to Bharata, though of course, we have clear evidence of his recognising "rūpaka" or drama/play in general, as form of lierature. It is quite possible that later literary critics subsumed drama as a variety of drśya i.e. visual or abhineya i.e. representable form of literature. Thus, dramatic art was embraced and taken in its fold by literary art. Other forms of literature which were 'an-abhineya' i.e. not meant for dramatic representation on stage, i.e. not part of performing art in general, such as verse-form beginning with 'muktaka' or a single-verse composition, ending with mahā-kāvya or epic form of literature, were topics of works on literary criticism i.e. alamkāra-grantha in particular. The literary critics also covered in their kāvya-alamkāra-granthas, gadya' i.e. prose forms of literature such as kathā, ākyāyikā etc. To repeat, one thing is absolutely clear, that Bharata also gave a thought to some form of a written script while dealing with vācikaabhinaya i.e. acting concerning speech. Thus, he had an occasion to think of such topics as guna, i.e. literary excellence, dosa, i.e. literary blemish, alamkāra i.e. figure of speech and laksana i.e. distinctive mark, — topics which normally occupy

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
3
the thinking of literary critics. The use of these categories was recommended by Bharata with reference to 'kavya-rasa'. Thus thinking concerning 'kāvya' i.e. literature and 'kāvya-rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience through literature was even prior to Bharata. And this should be taken as a fact beyond debate. We can not imagine exactly at which period of time aesthetics concerning literary art only, originated as a separate discipline and that literary aesthetics came to be regarded as independent of aesthetics concerning dramatic art and, or, vice versa. N.S. of Bharata continues to be the oldest available document in art-criticism which centring round dramatic art, also embraces dance, music, literature, architecture, sculpture etc. in its fold, and treats of certain principles of literary criticism which keep aesthetic enjoyment in their focus. We have evidences to this effect from the VII th as well as XVIth chapters of the N.S. (Edn. G.O.S.) e.g.,
Nā-Śā. (Edn. G.O.S. '59) pp. 348 (Vol. I) has -
"evam ete kavya-rasábhivyakti-hetavaḥ ekónapañcāśad bhāvaḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ." and also - pp. 339 ibid - "yadi kāvyártha-samśritair-vibhāvā'nubhāva-vyañjitairekónapañcāśadbhāvaiḥ sāmānyaguṇa-yogena abhinispadyante rasāḥ, tat katham sthāyina eva bhāvā rasatvam āpnuvanti"...
and also - pp. 380 (N.S. VII. 120) -
"nānābhāvártha-sampannāḥ sthāyi-sattvábhicāriṇaḥ, puspávakīrṇāḥs kartavyāḥ kāvyeṣu hi rasa budhaiḥ."
and also pp. 364, Vol. II; -
"etāni kavyasya ca lakṣaṇāni sad-trimśad uddeśa-nidarśanāni,
prabandha-sobhākarāṇi tajñaiḥ,
samyak prayojyāni yathā-rasāni." (XVI. 42)
So, observes Bharata; "Forty-nine bhāvas are to be recognized in view of the manifestation (i.e. suggestion) of this kavya-rasa”.

"When, with the help of the forty-nine bhāvas (i.e. basic feelings/emotions), that are suggested with the help of the vibhāvas i.e. determinants, anubhāvas i.e. consequents and vyabhicārins or accessories that rest on 'kavyártha' i.e. poetic meaning, 'rasas' i.e. aesthetic experience are born due to generalization, how is it

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA that it is stated that, only the sthāyibhāvas or basic emotions attain to the status of aesthetic rapture ?" Again, Bharata observes : "The wise have to spread, like flowers, rasas or aesthetic experience, in kāvyas i.e. poetry; rasas; that reside in sthāyī i.e. basic emotion, sāttvika i.e. involuntrtary consequents, (and vyabhicārins) accessories that are accomplished with the help of different feelings and meanings. Again, "The enumeration and illustrations of these thirty-six laksanas i.e. distinctive marks are provided. These make for the beauty of a composition. The experts have to utilize them in poetry) with reference to rasa i.e. aesthetic experience." It is clear from these references from N.S., that rasa was considered with reference to 'kāvya' i.e. poetry also and that Bharata was fully cognizant of it. Of course, we do not come across any direct reference to the acceptance of 'rūpaka' or a dramatic piece, as a special form of literature or poetry in N.S. But there we have no indications to the contrary either in Bharata. In short, literary criticism has its beginnings even prior to Bharata.
The works that dealt primarily with poetic beauty were recognized as - "alamkāra-granthas", and the literary critics were designated as ālamkārikas.
The śāstra i.e. discipline, that dealt with literary forms, their varieties and their beauty i.e. alamkāra or 'saundarya'; the discipline of literary criticism; was termed "alamkāraśāstra". There is a definite idea behind the usage, viz, "alamkāra-śāstra". To-day, normally, by the term 'alamkāra' in literature, we refer to the various poetic figures of words and sense such as 'anuprāsa' or alleteration, 'yamaka' or rhyme etc. and 'upamā' or simele, 'rūpaka' or metaphor, 'utpreksā' or poetic fancy etc. Thus we take the term 'alamkāra' to refer to a limited sense only. But the earlier Klamkārikas or literary critics did not accept the term alamkāra in this specific limited sense only. They took it in a much wider sense. For what we term as 'sāhitya' i.e. belles lettres to-day, these earlier critics, used the term 'kavya' which consisted of the co-existence - i.e. beautiful balancing - of both word and sense. As Kuntaka (vakrokti-jīvita = V.J. - I. 7) puts it, "Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit, 'out-of-the-way') creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste on the other." (Trans. K.Kris.) Kuntaka makes it clear that normally word and sense go together in ordinary parlance, say for example, in day-to-day worldly talks, in various types of literature such as legal, scientific, etc. or even in a bare statement which reads news etc. But this sort of association of word and sense does not make for "litarature" for an ālamkārika or a literary critic. Kuntaka places it clearly when he observes, (V. J.,

Page #30

Definition and Scope of Poetry
Eda. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, 1977. (V. J. I. 16, 17): "when it is so obvious that word and meaning are ever experienced jointly, what is the special import of mentioning it (in the definition) ? The sahitya or mutual coherence between word and meaning in respect of beauty is nothing but a unique poetic usage, involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful. So, this is exactly meant by the term 'kavya' i.e. poetry, irrespective of its form, i.e. prose or verse. There are many varieties of poetry both in gadya i.e. prose, such as kathā, ākhyāyikā etc. and verse beginning with single verses i.e. muktaka and ending with a large composition an epic i.e. mahākāvya". Dr. A. K. Warder (Indian kävya literature Vol. I-V; Edn. Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, '72) uses equivalents such as 'novel' and biography' or 'little history' for 'kathā' and 'ākhyāyikā' respectively, but we do not accept these terms, for these terms are tainted with different shades of meaning in modern context. The various forms, prose and verse, as mentioned above are all 'an-abhineya' i.e. not to be staged, as against 'abhineya' variety of literature which covers various forms of drama that are to be staged. Poetic beauty as revealed through kāvya of all these forms, is brought about by 'sāhitya' or special togetherness of word and sense. The ālamkārikas or literary critics investigated into the problem of this poetic beauty i.e. 'kāvyā'lamkāra' or 'alamkāra of poetry.' From a strict logical point of view, they had two categories viz. 'kāvya' and 'kāvya-sobhā', i.e. poetry and poetic beauty. Whatever was responsible in either creating poetic beauty directly or adding to it, was termed as 'alamkāra' in a wider sense of the term. The works which containe discussion concerning the beauty of poetry, were widely called 'kāvyā'lamkāra' works, and the discipline, 'alamkāra-śāstra'. Thus whatever factors that render some polish to literature, and whatever caused or added to its beauty, were all subsumed under one wider general term viz. 'alamkāra'. So, the work, as noted above that concerned itself with poetry and its 'alamkāra' i.e. its beauty in general, went under the name of kāvyā'lamkāra-grantha. Thus, we have, "kāvya'lamkāra' of Bhāmaha, 'kāvyā'lamkāra' of Udbhata, 'kāvyā'lamkāra-sūtravrtti of Vāmana, kāvyā'lamkāra of Rudrata and also that of Kuntaka. The secret is that a work dealing with poetry i.e. belles lettres, and its beauty, i.e. its 'alamkāra', is termed kāvyā'lamkāra and the discipline dealing with literary criticism is 'alamkāra-śāstra'. Thus whatever caused beauty in poetry is termed 'alamkāra' in a wider sense of the term in the literary circle of critics of those times. A sort of convention grew in literary circles around the word 'alamkāra'

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6
SAHRDAYĀLOKA with reference to all factors that either caused or added to beauty in poetry. Thus, observes Dandin, "The factors that make for beauty in poetry are (all) termed as alamkāra", and Vamana observes that, "Poetry is understood through alamkāra; verily, beauty is alamkāra." Dandin in, kāvyā”darśa (Edn. B.O.R.I.) observes, - "kāvyaśobhākarān dharmān alamkārān pracakste." . and also Vāmana, Kavyalamkāra-sūtra-virtti - (Edn. '71. Chowkhamba skt. series) - "kāvyam grāhyam alamkārāt, saundaryam alamkāraḥ." -
When a man of taste experiences a feeling such as, "it is all perfect now; it is alam'-enough", then only an "alamkāra" is said to have taken shape. We have a term, "aramkştih" in the Vedas to the same effect.
This tradition - which is prior to Bharata - of literary criticism, in its very initial stages, had literary thinkers attempt a coherent and logical definition of poetry, while directing their search towards deciphering the secret of beauty in poetry. While attempting a thorough investigation in the nature of factors that caused or promoted poetic beauty, these 'ālamkārikas' or literary critics of yore, came across various thought currents under terms such as guna or poetic excellence, alamkāra, or figures of speech, or turns of expression, rīti or style or diction, vịtti or mode, dosa i.e. poetic blemish; laksana or natural mark, rasa or aesthetic experience, dhvani or suggestion; vakratā or devitation or beautiful expression, aucitya or propriety, etc. which started gathering currency, weight and momentum. Thus, various currents and cross-currents originated with reference to the quest for the beautiful in poetry. In the works on kavya'lamkāra i.e. beauty in poe topics were debated vigoreurly and alamkarikas i.e. literary critics, tried to promote or put more stress on this or that concept according to their individual preference and taste. As a result traditions and theories in thought currents concerning rīti, i.e. style, alamkāra or figures of speech, rasa or aesthetic pleasure, dhvani or suggestion and vakrokti or beautiful expression and aucitya or propriety, started taking shape. These thought-currents and cross-currents at times vied with one another and at times merged with one another and again parted and merged to form a varitable flux of indian literary criticism termed "alamkāraśāstra" in general. However, it has to be carefully kept in mind that no ālamkārika or literary critic has pressed for the acceptance of this or that concept at the cost of total elimination or disrespect for any other concept. True, we observe passionate insistance on this or that thought-current, but this attitude does not push out any other thought-current as rank bad and useless. On the contrary, by and large, there is a tendency to accomodate, a tendency to tolerate and respect other literary

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
traditions and evolve a fabric of variagated colours. This happens with great thinkers such as Bhamaha and Dandin and Vamana among the earlier ālamkarikas, and then the great Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta followed by Mammata, down to Appayya Dixit and Pundita-rāja Jagannatha - all belonging to what we may term the Kashmir School of thought as against what we may term the Malava School of literary criticism with Bhoja supposedly taking its lead. Even in the Malava tradition the same spirit of tolerance and respect for rival thought current is equally prominent and this is a trait of Indian culture and tradition in general. These thinkers have tried to accomodate all concepts, all thought-currents in their wider coherent and catholic scheme of thought, but of course, with more or less weightage given to this or that concept. For example, penning 'Hridayadarpana' with a vow to demolish dhvani, its author, Bhatṭṭa Nayaka accepts the concept of rasa-rasadhvani - in his own way. The process of arriving at rasa, for Bhatta Nayaka is reached with the help of powers called bhavakatva or revelation and bhojakatva or enjoyment as against vyañjana i.e. suggestion as advocated by Ahandavardhana. Dr. Warder (p. 37. Vol. I. Para, 85) uses the equivalent 'development' for bhāvanā or bhavakatva. We have preferred 'generalization' as it forms the essence of bhavakatva, or 'revelation' as Dr. Gnoil puts it. Bhatta Nayaka wilded great influence on Bhoja but Bhoja did not reject either dhvani or vyañjanā, though Dhananjaya and Dhanika emphasised on 'tātparya', a separate power and denounced vyañjana. But even these two did not reject 'rasa', as well as, implicit sense. Thus, while Bhatta-Nayaka while respecting rasa, marginalized vyañjanā and promulgated the cause of bhavakatva and bhojakatva, Mahima, the author of 'Vyakti-viveka' and a great exponent of poetic inference-kāvyā'numiti accepted only one power of word, called abhidhā and covered up everything else than the expressed sense, under anumiti or poetic inference and denounced vyañjana or the power of suggestion as advocated strongly by Anandavardhana who claims that his theory of "vyañjana-dhvani-rasa" has been proclaimed by ancients from times immemorial. So, Mahima revolted against vyañjana/dhvani but accepted implicit sense - pratīyamāna artha and 'rasa' or aesthetic experience. He accepted the supremacy of only 'rasa', through 'kāvyā'numiti', without objecting to the implicit sense in general which also fell under inference in poetry, according to him. Same is the thinking of Dhananjaya and Dhanika, who promote, the cause of tatprayavṛtti or purport at the cost of vyañjanā, in their famous utterance viz. 'tātparyam na tuladhṛtam' i.e. "tātparya or purport is not held in a scale of balance", all the time not rejecting the implicit

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sense in general and 'rasa' in particular in poetry. Again, the predecessors of Ananda-vardhana such as Bhāmaha and the like, have also discussed all topics such as guna, dosa, alamkāra, rīti etc. Thus all these literary critics beginning with Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha and post-Jagannātha, are all "kāvyā'lamkāravādins', i.e. 'kāvya-saundarya-vādins', i.e. those who investigated into the nature of "beauty" in poetry, or aesthetics of poetry. Of course, it is a different story that the word 'alamkāra', used in the general sense of poetic beauty got restricted to a limited sense of 'figures of word and sense' only in the Kashmir tradition of critics who were post-Anandavardhana. But the point to be noted is that none of these critics, has rejected a single topic or thought-current out-right, but has accepted in his own way all these concepts and has accomodated them in his theory of literary criticism. Thus the term 'alamkāra' originally made current to connote poetic beauty in general, was instrumental in the very designation of this discipline as 'alamkāra-śāstra', and also in naming of the works of literary criticism as 'kāvyā'lamkāra-grantha', i.e. a treatise on beauty in poetry. .
As observed earlier, the beginning of literary criticism is even prior to Bharata, though of course such written documents, containing principles of literary criticism, prior to Bharata, can not be traced to-day. Works, available to us to-day, that discuss the nature of those forms of poetry that are not to be staged, are all post-Bharata. The oldest available among these, is "Kāvyā'lamkāra" of Bhāmaha (end of 7th Cen. A.D. and beginning of 8th A.D.). After this, we have 'Kāvyādarśa' of Dandin (first half of 8th Cen. A.D.), followed by "Kāvyā'lamkāra-sūtra-vștti' of Vāmana (middle of 8th Cen. A.D. to advent of 9th Cen. A.D.), "Kāvyā'lamkāra' of Udbhata (end of 8th Cen. - to beginning of 9th Cen. A.D.), and Kāvyā'lamkāra of Rudrata (first quarter of 9th Cen. to end of 9th Cen. A.D.), to be followed by 'Dhvanyaloka' of the great Anandavardhana (9th, Cen. A.D.) and works of Abhinavaguptapāda (Cir. 10th Cen. A.D., last quarter to beginning of 11th Cen. A.D.) in form of commentaries on Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana and N.S. of Bharata Brilliant authors such as those beginning with Mammata dow Jagannātha who firmly backed and established the schools of literary criticism as introduced by Ananandavardhana and supported by Abhinavagupta, capture our attention. These authors belong to what we may loosely term as the Kashmir tradition in literary criticism. Almost parallel to that runs a second flow of literary criticism seeking perhaps its original inspiration in Dandir, Sankuka etc., and yet not completely turning away from Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, which we may term as Mālava tradition of literary criticism, when juxtaposed with the

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
Kashmir tradition, represented by such great writers as Bhoja, Śāradātanaya and the rest with their monumental, works such as Saraswati-kanthābharaṇa, Śṛngāraprakāśa, Bhāvaprakāśana etc. We do not rate Agnipuraṇa as an older document and our impression is that it is closer to the Mālava tradition though not completely departing from the kashmir tradition. We will try to trace the graph of such literature on literary criticism in Sanskrit that spans over between fifteen hundred to two thousand years.
The chief trait of the efforts of indian literary critics who attempted to unveil the secrets of poetic beauty, to get closer to what it makes for poetry, to get into the root of it and to explain the whole thing clearly, is the sincerity of the enquiry. The critics are honest, true, forthright and without personal bias. The critics have not hasitated in accepting, to their advantage, the outcome of solid thinking by any predecessor, albeit with certain basic differences in approach and attitude. Application of the thinking of an earlier master in literary criticism and his thought process by a later critic, is a common trait. Even die-hard critics of an earlier master do not hasitate to draw quotations that may suit their purpose from the same critic. They accept the words of honourable antagonists with dignity and self-respect. This is honesty and culture, pure and simple. In doing so, they do not bring in individual differences on certain subtle points, and their criticism never speaks the language of personal prejudice. For example, take the concept of what is termed 'sādhāraṇīkaraṇa'; the normal english equivalent sought for this is 'generalization', which we do not accept; and instead we coin a new term such as, 'de-individualization'. Now this concept of 'sādhāraṇīkaraṇa' is normally associated with Bhaṭṭa Nayaka by modern scholars. Even here we beg to differ. We feel that the germs of this concept can be traced even in the N.S. of Bharata, when he uses terms such as, 'sadhāraṇa-guna-yoga'. Perhaps this concept also was floated by some critic not known to us and was even prior to Bharata. Precisely because of this perhaps Abhinavagupta tried to trace the origin of this concept in traditions of mīmāmsādarśana and even in what is called 'lokavyavahāra' or normal worldly business. Whatever it may be, but even Abhinavagupta, a staunch advocate of Anandavardhana's views, quotes with great admiration and respect from Bhatta Nayaka, an avowed opponent of dhvani, - a 'dhvani-dhamsin'. We can observe a similarity of approach in case of Bhoja also, an exponent of Mālava tradition, quoting with respect from Anandavardhana, though of course, it may be observed that the Malava-tradition does not oppose the Kashmir tradition tooth and nail. On the other hand Mahima an exponent of kävyānumiti or poetic inference and a die-hard critic of Anandavardhana's vyañjanā-dhvani

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
concept, also quotes from the Dhvanyaloka with respect, whenever it suits his presentation. The point is that these indian critics, especially the earlier lot, never showed any personal malice against their opponents though of course some sort of veiled malice - mark the term veiled - is noticeable in Jagannātha's criticism of Appayya Dixit. But then this could be the result of the times in which Jagannātha lived; a period of Muslim rulers. The Malava tradition does not seem to be as antagonistic to Kashmir tradition as is 'anumiti' parampara' or thought current of poetic inference which is almost at dagers drawn to the former. But the fact remains that these critics, advocating whichever thought-current, were all gentlemen and were bestowed with highest culture and moved with great human dignity. The crux of the whole argument is that the indian literary critics have never advocated any thought-current in a fanatic and sectarian fashion, and were large hearted and honest and gentlemanly while dealing with critics belonging to different schools of thought. They have been free and liberal in accepting views of others on points where differences were not basic. Actually they even tried to merge their differences and bridge the gulf by giving a new interpretation to certain norms as is seen in case of Abhinavagupta who makes an effort to patch up any difference with Bhatta Nayaka when he explains a famous quotation from Bhatta Nāyaka who observed rasa to be · "bhāva-samyojanā-vyangyah para-samvitti-gocarah." This fact of reconciling on basic issues becomes evident even in the words of the same master Abhinavagupta while initiating a thorough explanation of the famous rasa-sūtra by Bharata, where he concedes that when newer and newer ideas flash in his intellect which is ever green and never feels tired, the secret of this event is accredited to the viveka-sopāna-paramparā, - to the series of steps of discrimination as laid down by
hinkers. It is exactly for this reason, he adds, that he has avoided finding faults in the thinking of earlier masters.
"tasmāt satām atra na dūsitāni
matāni tāny eva tu sodhitāni..." - Abhinavabhārati (A.bh.) on N.S. VI-31; Vol. I, pp. 272, Edn. '92, G.O.S. and also, "pūrva-pratisthāpita-yojanāsu
mūla-pratisthā-phalam āmananti." - ibid., pp. 272. The outcome of this discussion is that the indian literary critics have never entertained any gross sectarian outlook, but have on the other hand, chosen to enrich their own thinking by free exchange and acceptance of views held by others. This is true even in case of the aesthetics advanced by Vaisnava authors

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
11 such as Rūpa Goswami and Jiva-Goswami, whose external covering looks sectarian, but virtually it proves to be as aesthetic as any other theory, with of course, devotion to Lord Krsna being the central thing. The indian aesthetes, in their quest for the secret of poetry, have nurtured a healthy and open approach and wherever they absolutely agree with their predecessors, they quote from their masters verbatim, accept the view honestly, and exhibit a sort of rare disinterestedness. Vāgdevatávatāra Mammata and Kalikāla-sarvajñya Acārya Hemacandra are instances in point. This is what Rājasekhara terms "svīkaranam, na tu haranam". The ālamkārikas thus, to get at the secret of poetic beauty, first tried to form a logical definition of poetry and then tried to coin special terminology for all factors that either contributed directly to cause poetic beauty or added charm to it, - factors such as gunas, alamkāras, rīti, vștti, etc. etc., as and when such factors opened out before their discriminative attitude. At the same time it should be clearly understood that there was absolute unanimity of opinion concerning various aspects or categories of literary criticism. We know that different views have been postulated even with reference to the nature and birth of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience or art-experience, eventhough it has been held by almost all of them to be the prime purpose of poetry - i.e. 'kāvyārtha'. When one discipline held 'rasa' to be the centre of all poetic creativity-ātmā-of poetry', there ran another thought current which held 'rasa' also as 'alamkāra' (of course, in a wider sense) of kavya, and perhaps even to-day there are great modern critics such as Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi from Vārānasi who subsume 'rasa' under 'kāvyā'lamkāra' and certainly the present writer, Dr. Nandi, also subscribes to this view. The present writer arrived at this conclusion as early as in 1972 A.D. in his first edn. of "Bharatiya Sahitya Sastrani Vicāra paramparāo" (in Guj.) and when he met Dr. Rewaprasad for the first time in Ujjain at Kālidāsa-samāroha in '76, both were overwhelmed with love and respect for each other because Dr. Rewaprasad had also arrived at the same conclusion in his publication in the same year (= '72) - both of them of course, unmindful of each other's efforts. This is what they call - "samvādinyah medhāvinām buddhayah bhavanti." It may be said in short, that all earlier masters were correct in their individual assessment from their own point of view, and their presentation was logical and honest and even flawless. We will try to evaluate this broad flux of indian literary criticism that took its shape by the amalgamation of small and smaller currents of literary criticism. We will take its stock in a careful, critical and comparative approach and try to read the whole graph that runs through centuries.

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA We will unfold our discussion, topic by topic. Before we do this I feel like thanking some modern alamkarikas such as Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De, Dr. Rama Ranjan Mukhurjee, Dr. V. Raghavan, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Pandit Visvesvarajee, Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Dr. Mukunda Madhav Sharma, and Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyay through whose works I have drawn inspiration and also my gurus, Prof. Rasiklal Parikh, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and Prof. R. B. Athavale whose guidance and blessings are always with me and whose outstanding contributions in the field of Sanskrit literary criticism has left me richer, and last, but not the least, some of my great friends such as the late Dr. Ram Chandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), Dr. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shanti Niketan), Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (varanasi), and Dr. N. P. Unni (Kerala), Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Dr. Rajendra Nanavati and Dr. S. P. Narang (Delhi). I have always gained with direct or indirect encounters with them. As noted by Abhinavagupta, originality in scientific investigation lies in giving newer and newer dimension, giving newer and newer design to the finding of the earlier masters. Our effort also will be in the direction of providing fresh approach and fresh interpretation to the material collected.
12
The concepts of literary criticism which will be examined by us will follow the sequence as given in the contents at the beginning of this book. We directed our efforts in Gujarati language in the three editions of our book entitled. "Bhāratīya Sahityaśāstrani Vicara-parmparão" (Pub. Uni. Book Production Board, Guj. State) wherein each newer edition had something treated more elaborately and the effort was fresher every time. But the present work is not a mere translation of the original. In all humility we claim it to be a rare transformation, a re-creation, a rebirth so to say, of the thinking carried out in a span of more than five decades. We have embarked upon a new adventure so to say, a new journey. We feel we have scaled greater heights then ever, to the best of our capacity, as we have attempted expansion and eluciation of basic ideas and have seriously contemplated upon the conclusions drawn by such all time greats as even Dr. V. Raghavan, on certain points, and have also ventured to differ from them.
DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF POETRY:
Thus, to begin with, the definition of poetry, the wider concept of poetry as visualized by the masters, its wider scope, the cause and purpose or object of poetry, will be taken up first for our detailed investigation. While treating this or any other topic concerning a given aspect of literary criticism, we will begin with Bhamaha and take up almost all major critics down to Jagannatha and will try to underline

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Definition and Scope of Poetry the growth of a given concept while critically also attempting a comparative evaluation through various stages of its growth and development.
With reference to the available documents, keeping Bharata (N.S.) away from this investigation as his principal interest centred round the dramatic art and not poetry, we will begin the discussion of each given topic with Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha, yes, because we follow Dr. Dels chronology, and Bhāmaha, also because later critics, including Abhinavagupta to begin with, use such terms as "yathā Bhāmahā”dibhih uktam" - thus placing Bhāmaha as first and foremost and also most honourable. As noted earlier the exact beginning of literary criticism in India cannot be traced, for even in Bharata we come across a fairly developped stage, but practically, with reference to the available documents, Bhāmaha's work is the oldest available one. It is true that literary criticism was revolutionized by the advent of Anandavardhana, or at least by the thought current he represented, but for all practical purposes, the investigation of the origin and development of any concept in literary criticism, though shrouded in unknown time and source, should begin with Bhāmaha's Kävyā'lamkāra, for in truth it is the oldest available written document that has come down to us and also because Bhāmaha's reputation went on increasing for ever, in the post-Bhamaha period as a rare intellectual. True, Anandavardhana cor-related all the thought-currents in literary criticism that had come down to him, in his wider scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa, without degrading or throwing out any concept of literary criticism and his scheme took deeper roots as he found great supporters in Abhinavagupta, Mammața, Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, Visvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha to mention only a few. There were others also who challanged Anandavardhana, or to be precise, who challanged his advocacy of vyājanā, the power of suggestion in a word. They were Bhatta-Nāyaka, Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja, Mahimā, Dhananjaya, Dhanika etc. But even these critics had an open mind and are catholic enough to borrow from Anandavardhana with respect, when it suits them. We see this in Mahimā also, who posed perhaps the greatest challenge to the concept of vyañjanā. Rājasekhara was posterior to Anandavardhana by less than a hundred years and we cannot exactly make out his approach to vyañjanā as his magnum opus - Kāvyamīmāṁsā-has not come down to us in its complete form, or perhaps he left it unfinished. So, we will try to study the graph of progress of various concepts of literary criticism as painted on the canvas of various documents that fall broadly in three phases such as from untraced beginnings to Bhāmaha and earlier writers on poetics upto Rudrata, then Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and their near contemporaries, and then

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA post-Ānandavardhana period beginning with Mammța, down to Jagannātha. It may be noted however, that Kuntaka, a close successor of Anandavardhana, and perhaps a predecessor or a senior contemporary of Abhinavagupta, commands a special status, because on one hand we may call him "Anandavardhana re incarnated" and perhaps he is held as a 'mānasa-putra' - a spiritual heir of Ananandavardhana and is therefore spared the jaws of biting criticism by Abhinavagupta and other dhvanivādins, on the other we can see that he has not openly committed himself to the acceptance of vyañjanā, though of course, openly not denouncing it either. Dr. K. Krishamoorthy seems to support this image of Kuntaka. But we feel reluctant at times to brand him as a pure dhvanivādin - i.e. an ardant supporter of 'dhvani'. This topic will be taken up later at the right place. For the present we have to bear in mind first and last, the fact, that all the thoughtcurrents prevelant in the field of Indian Literary Criticism, tend to supplement one another and they seem as streams at times running parallel to one another, at times cutting across one another, while at other times meeting and merging with one another to form a single powerful flux of high thinking, and once again yet parting ways, thus posting mile stones at places. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF POETRY – BHĀMAHA :
Presenting a logical definition of poetry, Bhāmaha notes that, “Word and sense coming together, make for poetry. [śabdárthau sahitau kāvyam :]" (Bhāmaha, I. 16). From this it is safe to guess that for him word and sense staying in union make for poetry. Apparently this definition suffers from the fault of being 'ativyāpta' i.e. too broad. We will go to see when we proceed in our effort, how Sanskrit literary critics have put 'loka-vyavahāra' or use of language in ordinary parlance, and also scientific use of language of various scripturesśāstra or disciplines out of the exact scope of what we term literature. We will also consider, in due course, the tendency of extreme logicality in defining poetry only as "word alone", to keep away from the mixing up of other fine arts such as music, dance, painting etc. which imbibe in themselves the element of meaning also, along with their respective differentia. But in case of Bhāmaha, it may be noted that, before striking at the definition of kāvya i.e. poetry in I. 16, he prepares a background and also carves out the definition/description of a 'mahā-kāvya' or an epic form of poetry. Thus we will try to consider his definition of poetry in a wider context and try to understand the full scope of poetry as he wants us to understand.

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
15 Bhamaha (I. 2.) declares "dharmārthakāma-mokśeșu vaicakṣaṇyam kalāsu ca, karoti prītim kirtim ca, sādhu kāvya-nişevanam.” that good poetry is composed for the attainment of the four ends of life - puruṣārthas - viz. dharma, i.e. law of life,
i.e. desire, wealth, prosperity, kama or desire for love or any cherished object, and mokṣa i.e. deliverence from the bondage of birth and death and rebirth. It also brings expertise in various fine arts bringing also in its fold fame and pleasure. By this we come to appreciate Bhāmaha's stand on the purpose of poetry both for the poet and the reader. Bhāmaha does not seem to encourage the western view point of 'art for art's sake'. He seems to support and perhaps the whole indian thinking sides with the opinion that, art deserves attention because it nourishes some eternal values of life, i.e. 'art for life's sake'. Bhāmaha believes that knowledge of scriptures is useless without a poet's genious, like charity of a pauper, or expertness in using weapons by a man wanting in manly virtues, or like self-praise of an idiot. Expertness concerning language is useless without capacity to poetry. On receiving lessons from a great teacher even a dull-witted person can study scriptures, but poetry is born if at all, only in case of one who is blessed with genius alone. (Bhāmaha I. 5.) We will discuss the topic of the cause of poetry - kāvyahetu - later, but Bhāmaha's bias towards inborn genius can be easily noticed here. Bhāmaha further notes that though departed from earth and moved into heaven, the body in form of poetic compositions of great poets, being immortal, lasts for ever. People desirous of keeping their fame ever-lasting and staying till the end of earth, should strive for composing poetry after seeking full knowledge and information about everything on earth that deserves to be known. Grammar, prosody, lexicography history, worldly behaviour, logic and fine arts - knowledge of all these is essential for composition of poetry. After learning fully the essence of word and meaning, serving men of knowledge who are experts in the science of word and meaning, having closely studied the works of other great poets, one should make an effort in the direction of composing poetry. Thus, it seems, Bhāmaha seems to have underlined the importance of 'vyutpatti' i.e. learning as a kāvya-hetu. Thus for him 'vyutpatti' is also a factor that makes for poetry, though of course, he puts greater weight on ‘pratibhā', i.e. inborri genius. We will go to see later how Dandin attaches equal status to proficiency or learning and practice or application, leading in the end to Mammața's famous observation that genius, learning and application taken together make for the cause, and not "causes” of poetry.
A very important point observed by Bhāmaha is that in the composition of poetry not a single word used should be faulty. In short, blemish in any form has

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA to be carefully avoided in poetry. He has discussed the topic of poetic blemishes at two places and this shows how serious he is regarding avoidance of a blemish i.e. doșa-tyāga, or what Vāmana and Bhoja later call 'dosa-hāna'. We will discuss this later in a separate chapter. But Bhāmaha's concern in this respect is seen clearly when he observes that use of a single faulty word or phrase has to be avoided like the status of having a son of bad character. It becomes a source of censure Bhāmaha (I., 12) suggests that nobody is said to commit breach of dharma' - Law, nor is inflicted by disease, or is punished for not writing poetry; but bad poetry, for sure, is death itself. After putting stress on dosa-tyāga' - avoiding blemishes in poetry, Bhāmaha talks about ‘alamkāras' i.e. sources of beauty in general and also of figures of speech such as upamā or simile, utpreksā or poetic fancy etc. He holds that figures of speech such as metaphor - rūpaka - and the rest that have been discussed by others, are also a welcome factor in poetry. The face of women, though beautiful does not appear so without ornamentation (Bhāmaha I. 13). the same way poetry should be decorated with sources of beauty such as figures of speech etc. May be some modern scholars are prompted to brand Bhāmaha as, 'alamkāravadin' - a propagator of figures of speech in poetry by such remarks. But all this makes no sense as we will go to observe that Bhāmaha uses the term ‘alamkāra' in a wider sense of, 'source of poetic beauty in general, and it is precisely this wider sense of 'poetic beauty in general, i.e. 'kāvya-saundarya' which has been instrumental in calling this discipline of literary criticism by the name of 'alamkāra-śāstra'. Kuntaka's thinking - viz. "The truth is this. Poetry is the work of a poet wherein the undivided whole of the ‘adorned' and the ‘adornment is the reality. Therefore, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned and the question of super-adding adornments to pre-existing poetry does not arise”, Vakroktijīvita, (vrtti on I. 6., Trans. K. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 292, ibid Edn.,) – finds its roots in Bhāmaha's observation. 'Alamkāra' here, of course, covers the so called figures of speech also provided, as we will go to see Ānanandavardhana observing that, they come naturally to a poet, i.e. are genuine components of a poet's imagination. It is this insistance on the natural place of figurative expression which inspires Mammata, as we will go to observe later, to count it as an essential of poetry and include the terms 'analamkrti punah kvāpi' in his famous definition of poetry. The term viz. 'alamkrti' here has a reference to its limited connotation of figures of speech such as pamah simile, anuprāsa er alliteration, etc.
So then, after observing that in poetry figures of speech are welcome, Bhāmaha obliquely refers to what is meant by this. Bhamaha (I. 14-15) holds that, "Others take

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Definition and Scope of Poetry figures of speech such as, 'rūpaka' i.e. metaphor etc. as external. They hold learning concerning nouns and verbs (i.e. grammatical accuracy in use of language) as (real) ornamentation of language. This is called (only) correct use of words (by us). The expertness concerning (the beauty) of meaning is not like this. For us, both the beauty of word and sense is equally welcome." By this beauty of word and sense Bhāmaha hints at poetic beauty as a whole, including the correctness of language from the point of view of grammar, and also figures of speech of both word and sense, and also 'poetic beauty in general caused due to any source of charm in poetry. We may quote Bhāmaha's exact words here which read as :
“rūpakā"dim alamkāram bāhyam ācakşate pare | supām tinām ca vyutpattim vācām vāñcchanty alamkrtim || (I. 14)
tad etad āhuḥ sausabdyam nā'rtha-vyutpattir īdṛśī | śabdábhidheyálamkāra
bhedād istam dvayam tu naḥ ll” (I. 15) Thus purity of language from the point of view of grammar is only one aspect - of poetic beauty, and also the fundamental one with which efforts in t of poetry should start. But it is not an end in itself. The wider scope of poetry, say poetic beauty, is hinted at by Bhāmaha when he is open to incorporate any source of beauty - alamkarana-in his concept of poetry. We may also observe that a difference of opinion concerning what makes for natural beauty in poetry and which are the external or artificial devices causing or adding to poetic beauty, must have existed in circles of literary critics even prior to Bhāmaha. Perhaps Bhāmaha tried to bridge the gulf, and move in the direction of harmoney. Bhāmaha is definitly aware of the wider connotation of the term 'alamkāra' as, "source of poetic beauty in general” when he refers to what he terms as, "vācām alamkřtih” - i.e. beauty of (poetic) language." We will go to see later how Vāmana has clearly used the term 'alamkāra' in the wider sense of 'saundarya' or 'poetic beauty' when he observes, “kāvyam grāhyam alamkārār”, “saundaryam alamkāraḥ”, (Vāmana, I. i; 1, 2). Perhaps the origin of this thought-current was much older than Vāmana and Bhāmaha. As observed earlier, Bhāmaha also clearly distinguishes between poetic beauty caused by mere grammatical correctness, and poetic beauty caused

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
by other 'alamkara'. If some scholars feel that by 'rupakā"di alamkara' Bhāmaha refers only to the narrow connotation of alamkara as 'figures of speech' only, then also they cannot escape Bhamaha's observation at (I. 36), viz. - "vakrábhidheyaśabdoktiḥ iṣṭā vācām alamkṛtiḥ" i.e. the poetic expression of beautiful meaning and beautiful word, i.e. beauty concerning form and content, word and sense in general in poetry, is the real source of beauty in a poet's composition. Bhāmaha, we will go to observe further, takes this 'alamkāratva' i.e. the state of being the source of beauty of any given alamkara, as "conveying of something extra-ordinary - ‘atiśaya' -”, i.e. ‘vakrokti' or expression of beauty, or 'atiśayokti', an expression of something special, something out of this work-a-day world, something extraordinary; "alaukika".
With this introduction, Bhamaha embarks upon the actual definition of at I. 16, when he observes :
poetry
'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam'
Poetry is word and sense taken together. Not that Bhamaha did not know that in any use of meaningful language, i.e. even in our day to day wordly parlance, or literature of any kind, i.e. dealing with scriptures or any writing covering legal, commercial or any drafting whatsoever, we come accoss of this 'togetherness', 'saha-bhāva' of word and sense. We will go to see how Bhoja has enumerated all types of possible 'sahabhāva' i.e. 'sahitya' or coming together of word and sense. But all this, 'sahitya' is not what we call 'belles lettres'. And Bhamaha knew this very well and yet there was a purpose behind this which we will go to reveal in due course. Ordinary writing is termed by Bhamaha as 'varta' i.e. 'bare statement' elsewhere, while questioning its capacity to poetry. Bhamaha accepts only a special coming together of word and sense as poetry, i.e. only when it is 'sálamkara' and 'adoṣa' i.e. blessed with some source of charm and is free from poetic blemish. We will go to see that if in Mammata, reference to ‘alamkara' in the definition of poetry is with some reservation, in Hemacandra it is forthright and clear, and all this is to be read as the stamp of Bhamaha. Thus Bhamaha and later Kuntaka have prepared a 'pakka' concrete road for the presence of 'alamkara' in poetry; 'alamkara' both in the general sense of source of beauty as well as in the sense of figures of speech, both of word and sense.
So, it becomes clear that for Bhamaha, literature, i.e. poetic literature, poetry, is presented in a language which is poetic i.e. beautiful, i.e. something special as compared to the language of ordinary communication, or language of this or that śāstra i.e. discipline, including what we call 'scriptures'. While discussing alamkāras

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or figures of speech such as rasavat, preyaḥ, etc. and including thereby the beauty of a feeling or emotion, etc. in alamkāras, Bhāmaha has suggested that kāvya or poetry for him can be, or even has to be from a different angle, 'sa-rasa' i.e. with emotive or aesthetic appeal also. While discussing the secret of rasa-experience or aesthetic pleasure derived from poetry, we will go to discuss later that the essence of poetic art, or, as a matter of fact any art, lies not only in its emotive appeal but also in its volitional and intellectual appeal also, i.e. in cognitive, emotional and conative aspects, if any, and hence there is chance for any newer form of poetry or drama of being included in such literature as causes art-experience. Bhāmaha thus, by including the element of feeling and emotion also as source of charm, has reserved its place in total art experience, which results from sheer intellectual appeal also; as art-experience involves the true participation of the total, integral self of the connoisseur. Indian literary criticism is absolutely clear about the fact that art-experience does not end in the explanation of the enhancement of this or that feeling or emotion only, but reaches out to explain the total effect of art which embraces all aspects of the personality of a connoisseur. Bhāmaha talks of the emotive appeal of poetry also, when he discusses the characteristics of a 'māhākavya' or epic poetry, which should be blessed with all rasas i.e. all sentiments : "rasaiśca sakalaiḥ pṛthak" (I. 21, Bhāmaha). That it has to be, - 'a-gramya-sabdamarthyam ca, sálamkaram' i.e. without any misuse of language resulting in vulgarity concerning word and sense, and also decked by figures of speech or by sources of charm' (Bhāmaha, I. 19), suggests his integral approach to understanding poetic art. That Art has to make appeal to the intellectual. imaginative and emotive aspect of the personality of the man of taste. is clear to Bhāmaha and also to other earlier literary critics.
-

-
Bhamaha also refers to various forms of literature both prose and verse, enumerating sarga-bandha i.e. a mahākāvya, kathā and akhyāyikā, three bigger compositions in verse and prose, and also stray attempts at minor poetic compositions such as gāthā, śloka, etc. i.e. individual independent verses. But Bhāmaha underlines one major characteristic common to all creative writing, which is that, all this has to be blessed with "expression of artful essence" - yuktam vakra-svabhāvoktyā sarvam eva etad iṣyate" (Bhāmaha, I. 30), The expression has to be artistic for being branded as poetry. What exactly could this "vakrasvabhāvokti" mean? Some modern commentators such as the great D. T. Tatacharya in his Udyana Vṛtti (pp. 13, ibid) suggest that Bhāmaha here talks of figures of speech such as 'svabhāvokti" or "Natural Description" and "vakrokti" or

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "artistic turn of speech” only. But Bhāmaha no doubt includes these two figures of speech in his 'vakra-svabhāva-ukti' but he also includes everthing beautiful concerning the content, idea and expression of a given piece of poetry. This is against 'vārtā’-a bare statement of fact only, that is resorted to in our ordinary dayto-day parlance, in our work-a-day-word. It is something special, the beautiful, the
a-ordinary, which makes for a poet's creation, 'kavi-karma'. This beautiful statement of something extra ordinary is acceptable to Bhāmaha, as poetry. With this clear understanding of Bhāmaha's view we will not find it difficult to sail over to Kuntaka's 'vakrokti', and prior to that Anandavardhana's 'dhvani'. This expression of the extraordinary is - vakra-svabhāvokti-acceptable to Bhāmaha. Thus, for Bhāmaha that togetherness of word and sense which is ‘a-dosa', free from poetic blemishes, 'sálamkāra', gifted with a source of charm or a figure of speech, and 'sa-vakrokti' - having an artistic expression is accepted as kāvya. It is observed by Bhoja (Śr. Pra. Ch. XI) that - 'vakroktireva kāvyānām parā bhūseti Bhāmahah." - i.e. for Bhāmaha charming expression is the highest decoration of poetry.
Bhāmaha only casually refers to the two patterns of writing, or say, the stylistic peculiarities prevelent in the regions of vidarbha and guada, viz. vaidarbha-mārga and gauda-mārga as others would have put it. The almost casual approach was perhaps to promote as much individuality in artful expression as possible, a point also underlined by the great Ananavardhana when he said (Dhvanyāloka-Dhv. N. i) that by taking recourse to this path of suggestion as laid down by him, the quality of creative imagination in poets will assume endlessness. (anena ānantyam āyāti, kavīnam pratibhāguṇaḥ-Dhv. IV-i). He goes to observe that, 'even trite subjects in poetry will put on new freshness, if they get into touch with 'rasa' or aesthetic delight, just as the same trees appear quite new with the advent of spring.' (Dhy. IV 4); and also, "whatever theme it might be, so long as it produces the impression in the minds of people :, "Yes, this is a lovely and unique flash;" . The meaning is, 'so long as the favourable impression that it is an extraordinary flash produced in the minds of refined critics."
“Though it might smack of earlier usages, a theme can very well be utilised by a good poet. He will never become an object of censure by so doing." (Dhv. IV. 16; Trans. K. Krishnamoorthy (K. Kris. pp. 297). Thus poetry it is, that carries the stamp of poetic, i.e. extraordinary creation. Precisely for this, Ānandavardhana also did not attach any special importance to the concepts of rīti j.e. märga and vịtti. For him it was 'dhvani'- the essential poetic part of a poet's expression that was the beall and end-all of poetry. He therefore observes, (“Dhv. III 46, 47, Trans. K. Kris. pp.

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 261), “Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles.” And also, “Once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the
o called 'Modes' relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will becomes intelligible.” So, when Bhāmaha pays scant respect to the vaidarbha and gauda styles, it is presumably first to discourage imitation and hypocracy and to promote individual talent. This is exactly the consideration which drives Kuntaka to divorce the concept of styles from any local i.e. geographical colouring and name even the poetic excellences in a different way using his own terminology. However, Kuntaka gives some reasonable consideration to the concept of this or that style - call it by any name and it is rose only - simply because we do find common cultural and educational heritage playing a positive part in an artist's creation. But Bhāmaha was perhaps fed up with imitations and so categorically declares that : (Bhāmaha I. 36) -
“na nitāntā"di-mātreņa jāyate cărutā girām
vakrā'bhidheya-sabdoktih istā vācām alamkrtiḥ 11" "Not only by usages such as 'nitānta' etc. (i.e. use of soft consonants as advocated by the so called vaidarbha style), beauty in poetry is caused. (only) The ukti-expression - of vakra i.e. beautiful sense and (vakra, beautiful) expression (or word) is acceptd by us as the alamkrti - or (only) source of beauty in language (i.e.
language). Vācām alamkrtih' is beauty of language. The word 'alamkrtiņ' is used here by Bhāmaha in the wider sense of source of beauty in poetry, or poetic beauty, and not in the narrow sense of a figure of speech only, which by itself is, of course, included in the former. The use of the term 'alamkāra' in its wider connotation of poetic beauty - saundaryam - is specifically noted by Vāmana, if we look at available documents only. But the thought current had its origin even prior to Bhāmaha or even Bharata. The point is that we do not have to wait for the arrival of Vāmana to understand this underlying basic concept of poetic beauty, for Bhāmaha's concept of beautiful expression and beautiful content - vakra śabda and vakra artha, are enough for this. This vakratā or poetic beauty is the highest or only quality a poet has to aspire for in the making of poetry. This is absent in ordinary expression, i.e. 'loka-ukti'. So, sāhitya, i.e. coming together of beautiful expression and content is poetic creation, i.e. kāvya, poetry.
With this Bhāmaha also talks of 'āśraya-saundarya', i.e. beauty pervading the whole composition. A sort of an idea of contextuality is also engrammed in it, for, observes Bhāmaha, that collyrium though black, when applied in the eye of a

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA damsel, becomes a source of beauty, in the same way, in a particular context, even a poetic blemish acquires beauty (Bhāmaha, I. 54). A further discussion on this will be taken up when we examine Bhāmaha's concept of poetic blemishes. But at I. 55 he observes that like a black palāśa flower, placed at the right juncture, adds to the general beauty of a garland, a poetically faulty expression only, read in its special context, serves as a source of charm in poetry. Like a gardener, arranging flowers of different hues at right places in a garland, weaves a beautiful garland, so also a poet selects such words which assume beauty when arranged in style in poetry. (Bhāmaha, I. 59) Bhāmaha says (I. 59) :
"etad grāhyam surabhi kusumam, grāmyam etan nidheyam dhatte sobhām viracitam idam sthānam asyaitad asya mālākāro racayati yathā sādhu vijñaya mālām
yojyam kāvyeşv avahitadhiyā tādvad evábhidhānam 11" Thus beauty of an expression or a particular word, read at exactly this or that place in poetry has a poetic appeal for Bhāmaha. This can be called beauty in arrangement - or 'viniveśa-gata-saundarya'. This concept of Bhāmaha prepares the road leading to Kuntaka's 'bandha-saundarya' - beauty of poetic composition, or style on one hand, and also for the concept of propriety - aucitya - i.e. decorum as advocated by Kşemendra on the other.
As observed earlier, Bhāmaha has also given thought to the element of aesthetic rapture caused due to the delineation of feelings and emotions by the poet. He holds that the epic-poem - 'mahākāvya' has to be endowed with different sentiments (Bhāmaha, I. 21). Though this is considered with reference to an epic poem, it can very well go with poetry in general also. Bhāmaha seems to favour this idea of application of sentiments to poetry in general, of any form or size, when he advocates certain figures of speech based on feelings and emotions, such as rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi, and samāhita, the four emotion-based alamkāras and then also 'bhāvika' which he says is a 'quality of (the whole composition)'- "prabandhavisaya-guna". Now, we see that, used in this sense, the terms 'alamkāra' and 'guna' acquire a wider dimension which is something else than the normal narrower connotation of a figure of speech or a particular poetic embellishment seen in a particular style or going with this or that sentiment.
Thus for Bhāmaha poetry or kāvya is expected to be 'sa-rasa' i.e. endowed with flavour or excellence of feelings and emotions. All this has to be free from poetic blemishes, adorned with figures of speech and beautified by vakrokti or poetic use of language and content. We will consider Bhāmaha's handling of the emotive stuff

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i.e. rasa, bhāva, tad-ābhāsa, etc. i.e. of sentiment, feeling, their semblance, etc., later, but for the present suffice it to say that Bhamaha does not attach any less importance to the concept of rasa and bhāva i.e. sentiments and emotions in poetry.
We have already noticed that though Bharata's prime concern was drama, he has advocated the use of alamkāra, guṇa, lakṣaṇa and avoiding of dosa with reference to kavya-rasa i.e. aesthetic pleasure in poetry. Bharata observes: (N.S. XVI-113, Vol. II, G.O.S. Edn.)
"evam ete hy alamkārāḥ guņā doṣāś ca kīrtitāḥ | prayogam eṣām ca punar vakṣyāmi rasa-samśrayam ||"
So. Bharata was not unaware of 'kavya-rasa' i.e. art-expience from poetry, and also the appropriate use of alamkāra etc. to derive the same from poetry. Bhāmaha also advocates the same usage. So, when Śri G. T. Deshpande observes that sanskrit poetics branched off from dramatargy at a later stage, it looks like a figment of his own imagination. In fact both these enquiries in poetic and dramatic beauty were pari-passu, at times running parallel, at times mixing and merging with each other, thus passing through their next phases, enriching each other and also preserving their distinct character.
Bharata (N.S. XVI, 116-128, Vol. II G.O.S. Edn.; also Dr. Nandi's edn., 'Sarasvati Research Prakashana series, Vol. IX, Edn.' 94-'95, Ahmedabad) has clearly declared kavya or poetry as 'rasa"śraya'. Not only this, he has recommended the use of figures of speech, metre etc. also in harmony with the prevailing emotive context; rasa. That the methodical discussion concerning the use of these concepts in conformity with rasa in poetry was done by Anandavardhana, will be observed later by us. At the same time it is equally true that poeticians like Bhāmaha and others of the pre-Anandavardhana period were not unaware of this usage. So Bhāmaha and other earlier literary critics also attach importance to 'rasa' in poetry and discuss other topics with reference to their contribution to evoking the same in poetry and this was in agreement with Bharata's position. As Bharata co-ordinated the concepts of poetic beauty such as guna, dosa, alamkara and lakṣaṇa to dramatic art through vācika-abhinaya or acting concerning speech, in the same way, alamkarikas placed the different forms of rūpaka or drama, under 'abhineya kāvya' or 'poetry that was to be presented on the stage', and thus brought about the integration of dramaturgy and literary criticism.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA DAŅDIN : In his Kāvyādarśa (= Kā.) Dandin has formulated the definition of poetry : "śarīram tāvad istā’rtha-vyavacchinnā-padāvaliḥ” (Kā. I. 10b.). There were two major thought-currents prevelent concerning the definition of poetry; one being that as read in Bhämaha which lays equal stress on both word and sense in the making of poetry, i.e. which proclaims that “sabdārthau sahitau kāvyam”. Actually, according to a variant noticed in the Nā-Šā. of Bharata, on pp. 347, under XVI-128, (G.O.S. Edn.), we read as follows :
“mțdu-lalita-padā’rtham gūdha-sabdā’rtha-hīnam janapada-sukha-bhojyam yuktiman nịttayojyam | bahuksta-rasa-mārgam sandhi-sandhāna-yuktam
bhavati sukavi-kāvyam nātyakāle manojñam 11" “Poetry of good poets, that wins the heart at the time of dramatic performance, is having soft and pleasing word and sense, is bereft of word and meaning that are difficult to understand (because of their being hidden or obscure); is enjoyed easily by people, which stands to reason and which can be conveyed through dạnce, in which there is scope for a style that conveys many sentiments and which is gifted with junctures and their limbs”. We can see the thought-current of calling both word and sense together as poetry can be read in the above quotation. But we do not know wether this variant can be taken as reliable. But we can surely begin with Bhāmaha who advocated the company of both word and sense to make for poetry. The second thought current seems to be represented by Dandin which takes 'sabdah' i.e. 'word only as the distinctive mark of poetry. Whatever it may be, but the fact remains that definitions explaining the concept of 'kavya' i.e. poetry need not be taken as opposing one another, but only as complementary, because those who accept the second line of thinking giving prominance to the 'word' element in the definition, never support the position where this word stands by itself, regardless of the meaning element. The problem centres round the differentia. Earlier literary critics, perhaps also well versed in logic - i.e. nyāyaśāstra - to exhibit their learning and their absolute faith in the science of logic or reasoning, utilize the technical terminology to cristalise and sharpen literary criticism also. It is because of this tendency to perfection which brings forth the suble designs evolved in literary criticism by succeeding poeticians such as Visvanātha and Jagannātha and which also reveals the close affinity of alamkāra-śāstra, to the disciplines of nyāya i.e. logic, and vyākarana i.e. grammar.

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
25 In his Kāvyādarśa, Dandin has defined poetry as, “istártha-vyavacchinnā padāvali (I. 10b)” i.e. pada-samūha, a collection of words i.e. vākya, a sentence, graced by i.e. associated with 'ista' - desired charming meaning, makes for poetry. But before coming to the actual definition of poetry, Dandin takes note of some basic points concerning poetry, and these points prove to be helpful in fully grasping his concept of ‘kāvya' i.e. poetry. Talking about the importance of poetry he observes (Kā. I. 4) that the three worlds will plunge into pitchy darkness if the lamp (or light) in form of word does not shine forth. Mirrored into literature, the great men of yore, eventhough parted from life, remain alive. Language showers all gifts, if properly utilised by the intelligent people, and in case misused, it declares the idiotic state of the speaker (Kā. I. 6). So, not even a smallest blemish is to be tolerated in poetry (I. 7 Kā), for it deforms it like beautiful body marked by a small sign of laxoderma. Like a blind man not able to distinguish between various forms, a person not well-versed in the lore of poetry, cannot distinguish between a literary excellence and a literary blemish. These remarks make it clear that not unlike Bhāmaha, Dandin also recommends that poetry has to be absolutely free from poetic blemish whatsoever. We will have an occasion later to go into the details of Dandin's handling of this topic of poetic blemishes, but what we have to underline here is his absolute apathy towards accomodating even a slightest blemish in poetry. This characteristic of insistance on absence of blemish gathers momentum in literary criticism, with the result that stalwarts like the great väg-devatāvatāra Mammata had to incorporate it in the definition of poetry. The 'navīnas'-new generation of literary critics led by Mammata-place this 'a-dosatva' i.e. absence of blemish - as an unavoidable characteristic in the definition of poetry and others such as Hemacandra follow the suit. Dandin goes on to declare that men of thought - sūrayaḥ - have produced manuals concerning writing of poetry, rich in various and beautiful styles (Kā. I. 9). These great souls have laid down the body of poetry i.e. have discussed what poetry is made of, and also the 'alamkāras' or sources of beauty in poetry :
"taiḥ śariram kävyānām
alamkārāś ca darsitāḥ" (Kā. I. 10-a). Experts explain that the particle 'ca' after 'alamkārāḥ' stands to suggest the inclusion of the consideration of poetic blemishes also; while poetic excellences - i.e. the concept of 'gunas' - are covered up by the mention of the word 'śarīra' itself. So, when Dandin talks of a collection of words endowed with - 'iştártha' - coveted meaning, this ‘ista' meaning may include meaning congenial to 'rasa' - or

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sentiment i.e. the emotive stuff of human feelings and emotions or, aesthetic enjoyment in genreral. The commentary ‘prabhā' (pp. 8, edn. B.O.R. I. Poona) explains it as the desire to provide description leading to 'camatkāra' or 'lokóttarā"hlāda' i.e. extra ordinary joy. Or, we may say that by 'ista' or coveted quality is covered Bhāmaha's 'vakrokti' or artful expression, covering beauty concerning both the poetic expression and the poetic theme as well, or perhaps the 'vakratā' or art-expression emphasized by Kuntaka later. As if Bhāmahas words : "vakrā bhidheya-śabdoktih-istā vācām alamkrtih” once again come alive here and are resounded as it were ! Or, as later commentators explain, by 'ista artha' is covered all beautiful meaning at the level of expression-abhidhā, and secondary usage i.e. laksaņā, and even deviation leading to vyangyārtha or suggested sense both of the dhvani and guņābhūta variety i.e. meaning suggested principally or in a subordinate way. This insistance on 'padāvali i.e. collection of words, i.e. word element in poetry, is supported with great gusto by Jagannātha in his Rasa-gangādhara ( = R.G.) later. Till we reach Jagannātha we find literary critics either putting equal weight on both word and sense taken together, or only on word element in particular, in the definition of poetry. We will go into the details of the views expressed by the protagonists of both these streams of thought, as and when the context permits.
One more point is to be noted with reference to Danhin's draft of the definition of poetry. Dandin, in the definition itself uses the term 'śarira' i.e. body of poe which was also used by Bhāmaha when he observed, at Bhamaha VI. 65, that,
șaștyā śarīram nirmītam
şatşaștyā tv alamkrtiḥ | ... i.e. he has talked of kāvya sarira in sixty karikās, etc. But this comes at the end of his work and not in the definition. Now, bypassing Bhāmaha, we may observe that Danhin's is the first known metaphorical usage concerning literary criticism. Normally 'śarīra' goes with sentient beings, the 'śarīrins' having a body. So, when poetry is said to have a body, this usage should be termed as secondary or metaphorical. In the same vein Dandin further calls poetic excellences or gunas as the vital breath or vital airs of poetic style - i.e. "prāņāḥ" of vaidarbha märga' in particular, or say, of poetry in general. So, it should be carefully brone in mind that even where there is the mentioning of 'soul - ātmā - of poetry, it has to be understood
secondarily or metaphorically. This metaphorical usage is drawn to further dimensions in Rājasekhara and later in Vidyānātha's Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhūsana.

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But some later commentators, and some leading modern scholars seem to have missed the real spirit behind this metaphor and have been arguing for and against the importance or inclusion of this or that concept in the definition of poetry. This is sad. For basically kävya or poetry is abstraction. Only to explain the secrets of beauty in poetry, and more, the variety of the poetic devices leading to beauty in poetry, the ancients, the "sāksāt-krta-dharmāna rsayah” - the seers, who had the direct vision of poetic beauty, resorted to this sort of metaphorical usage only to bring home the subtle differences between this device of poetic beauty and that, to the smaller people who had no direct vision of poetic beauty. But, this was taken only literally and too seriously by lesser people without grasping the spirit behind this metaphorical style of explanation of various poetic devices, In fact poetry is an abstract art and it need not detain us in naming this or that as 'body', 'soul', 'excellence', 'ornamentation', etc. So, for the enlightened masters this usage was only a means to explain poetic beauty and was never taken as an end in itself. They were open minded and not too earnest or obstinate about this. The great sages of earlier times resorted to such metaphorical use of language only to bring home absolutely abstract ideas in the minds of lesser people. This explains the terminology such as 'śarīra', 'jīva' or 'ātman', 'guna', 'dosa', 'alamkāra' and the like which others with lesser imagination, not unlike Virocana of the Indra-Virocana myth, took just literally.
When Danħin takes 'padāvali or collection of words having desired (charming) meaning as poetry, we may say that here for him 'word' element serves as 'višesya' or the basic factor which is qualified by ‘artha' or the qualifying adjunct, i.e. višeșana'.
coming together of both word and charming) sense is welcome to him also, but while logically further investigeting, he feels that in poetry the sound or word element makes for the stuff, poetry is made of, and sense or meaning aspect is only a qualifying adjunct. This explains his subtle framing of the definition.
As observed earlier (Dandin I. 10 a) by 'alamkārāś ca' i.e. 'also figures of speech (or sources of beauty)', he seems to have covered the topics of 'guna' i.e. poetic excellence and 'dosa' or poetic blemish also in his definition of poetry, or in the larger scope of poetry. So, for Dandin also the sum total comes to 'word and sense', which are 'sagunau', 'a-dosau' and 'sálamkārau' i.e. with poetic excellences, free from poetic blemishes, and adorned by poetic figures (of both word and sense). Again when he qualified the 'padāvalt or 'collection of words' by the term 'istárthavyavacchinnā', i.e. 'accompanied by most cherished meaning', he drives out from the domain of poetry such coming together of word and sense that we come across in 'loka-vyavahāra' i.e. ordinary parlance, or in 'śāstra' i.e. literature on various

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SAHRDAYALOKA disciplines, i.e. scientific writing. One thing becomes very very clear that Dandin prepares the bridge to reach Jagannatha's famous definition viz. “ramanīyárthapratipādakah sabdaḥ kāvyam" which we will have an occasion to consider in greater details later. By 'most cherished' - 'ista' meaning, is meant all meaning inclus the expressed, indicated and also suggested. Though of course, whether the predecessors of Anandavardhana, beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudrata, - and here we are mentioning those who are known to us, - had a clear idea of 'vyañjana' or the word-power of suggestion, and 'vyangya' or the suggested meaning, in the technical context, is debtable, and we will pick up this discussion in due course later, we incline to suggest that the earlier poeticians were not totally unaware of the quality of suggestivity of language. At the same time we will do full justice to Dandin if we take 'ramanīya artha' or 'charming sense' as equivalent of 'istártha' - the desired sense - rather than insisting on the reference to the suggested-vyangya-sense. Perhaps this is more advisable and safe also. We can also commence, from this point, our march towards Kuntaka also. In both Dandin and Kuntaka we miss the extreme attitude that expects the beautiful meaning in poetry to put on the garb of suggestivity alone. It can be charming even when it is expressed directly, or conveyed through secondary use of language. The result is that poetic beauty has a wider field in Dandin and Kuntaka, and later in Bhoja also, as compared to the vyañjanā dominated approach of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.
So, as in Bhāmaha, so also in Dandin, the distinction between 'kavikarma' - a poet's creation, and 'lokokti'-ordinary use of language - is to be seen in the poet's writing being endowed with what Bhāmaha calls 'vakratā' i.e. beauty or with ‘atiśaya' or that extra ordinary element, as termed by Dandin. Dandin observes :
"vivaksā yā višeșasya lokasīmấtivartini | asāv atiśayoktiḥ syād alamkāróttamā yatha ||” (II. 214)
and alamkārántarāņām apy āhur ekam parāyaṇam |
vāgīša-mahitām uktim imām atiśayā”hvayām ||” (II. 220) i.e. "The desire to convey the extra ordinariness or the višesa i.e. contextual superiority (of poetry), is what is termed 'atiśayokti' or 'statement of the special', and that is the highest source of beauty." And, “This (= statement of something special or extra ordinary) is the supreme source of charm in case of other sources of beauty also. This speciality called 'atiśaya', is honoured even by great masters of language." So this, what Dandin terms as 'atiśaya' or the 'extra-ordinary seen in a

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29 poet's language, is what Bhāmaha termed as, 'vakra-svabhava-ukti' - 'statement of the beautiful. This transforms the worldly objects of movable and immovable nature, from their original form of cause, effect etc. into what is termed by Bharata as 'vibhāva' and 'anubhāva' etc. i.e. determinants and consequents respectively and whatever is ugly or gross or physical, turns into 'sa-rasa' or beautiful. This 'vaktrokti' or 'atiśayokti' or beautiful expression of a poet turns worldly objects into what we call vibhāvā"di' i.e. the poet's milieu; it grants them the capacity to 'vibhāvana', i.e. the status of being worthy of aesthetic enjoyment; turns them into objects of aesthetic chewing - 'carvaņā'.
It may also be noted that like Bhāmaha, Dandin also has taken a note of the element of rasa/sentiment and bhāva/feeling element. He has also, like Bhāmaha, placed 'rasa' under 'rasavat alamkāra. So, for him the emotive richness of poetry is also welcome as a source of beauty. He has also suggested that the epic form of poetry - i.e. mahākāvya - should be overflowing with sentiments, emotions and feelings - "rasa-bhāva-nirantaram”. (I. 18, Dandin) At I. 51, Kävyādarśa, Dandin offers a useful observation. Says he -
"madhuram rasavad; vāci, vastūny api rasa-sthitiḥ ,
yena mādyanti dhīmanto madhunéva madhu-vratāḥ 11" “Sweet (poetry) is that which is endowed with rasa (i.e. sentiment or,aesthetic enjoyment). Rasa (i.e. aesthetic delight or sentiment) rests in both word and sense. (It is that element) by which the wise get infatuated like bees by the spring season (or, honey.).”
Thus rasa/sentiment or emotive richness, according to Dandin can result from both word and sense in poetry on one hand, and also by form and content i.e. theme. Even a particular form or structure can be suggestive of this or that feeling or emotion as the case may be. Even in Bharata we find particular metres (cchandovišesah) as suggestive of this or that feeling. In Anandavardhana we will go to observe that different styles or structures (rīti; samghațanā) normally going with shorter or longer compounded words, change their exterior, when used in different forms of art. Thus ‘ojas' - the vigorous - guņa or excellent, and a structure abounding in long compounds - dirgha-samāsā-samghatanā., are normally associated with the sentiments and emotions such as vīra, the heroic, and raundra, the violent, but when the context concerns the dramatic form, the structure softens. Thus even form and content are suggestive of rasa as observed by Dandin here. Of course, as in Bhāmaha, Dandin also places this emotive element under the general

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA head of 'alamkāra' i.e. a figure of speech, as also guņa i.e. poetic excellence. We should carefully note that by subsuming under 'alamkāra' both Bhāmaha and Dandin have not under-rated the emotive stuff in poetry, on the other hand, they have elevated a figure of speech as a real source of beauty, which is not externally grafted on poetry, but is an inborn quality of poetry, as Kuntaka will make it clear. Actually it is in Anandavardhana and his successors that we read the word 'alamkāra' in its narrower or limited sense of a figure of speech only and there too Anandavardhana is absolutely clear that if this element is seen rightly utilized i.e. in conformity with the prevailing sentiment, it is as much an integral portion of poetry as any other element : "násti bahirangatvam etesām rasábhivyaktau" - The alamkāras, if 'samyak prayojita' i.e. used with discretion, - are not external to poetry so far as rasa is to be suggested. Again, when they are themselves principally suggested, i.e. when it is a case of 'alamkāra-dhvani', they are as much the 'soul of poetry as vastu-dhvani or rasā"di-dhvani. We will discuss this in greater details later. But, for the present, it should be clear that the earlier alamkārikas never underrated the value of emotive stuff in poetry, nor were they mad after figures of speech at the expressed level only and thus created, what people under delusion call, the so-called 'alamkāra-school of poetics. For Dandin 'alamkāra' in its most catholic sense is a 'source of poetic beauty' - "kāvya-bobhākara-dharma' and this covers up everything that goes under the names of rasa, bhāva, samdhi, samdhyanga, vrtti, všttyangas, guņa, lakṣaṇa, etc. i.e. everything. Dandin observes :
"yac ca samdhyanga-vịttyanga-laksaņā”dy āgamā’ntare |
vyāvarņitam idam cestam alamkāratayaiva naḥ ||” (Dandin, II. 367) "That in other scriptures is discussed under the titles of samdhyangas i.e. parts of junctures or vịttyangas i.e. divisions of modes etc. and also as natural marks, is taken as ‘alamkāra' - the source of poetic beauty - by us." By ‘āgamántaraḥ' i.e. other scriptures, works on dramaturgy are meant.
Thus Dandin also discusses all sources of poetic beauty and this is brought out by discussing the nature and scope of poetry by the ancients.
Vāmana : In both Bhāmaha and Dandin, we noticed the metaphorical use of language such as, '(kavya)śarira'. Vāmana drags it still further. Without revelling in hair-splitting concerning what exactly forms the body of poetry, i.e. whether it is sabda - word, or artha - meaning, which is the diffentia of poetry, Vamana straight away points at some other subtlty, taking for granted the equal weight of both word and sense. Equal importance of both word and sense is acceptable to

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31 Vāmana when he notes that, 'the word 'poetry here is used with both word and sense rendered beautiful by both 'guna' i.e. excellence and ‘alamkāra' i.e. - a figure of speech. Says he : "kavya sabdo'yam gunálamkara-samskrtayoh sabda'rth vartate, bhaktyā tu śabdā’rtha-mātra-vacano'tra gļhyate." (Vāmana, vịtti on Kävyálamkāra-sūtra-vrtti, (= KSV.) I. 1. i). This remark has to be carefully examined. For Vāmana, kavya is sabda and artha i.e. word and sense, that are rendered beautiful by guna and alamkāra. Without this beauty of poetic excellences or poetic figures of speech ‘kávya' i.e. poetry is primarily no poetry. You may call mere coming together of word and sense as poetry in a secondary sense of the term i.e. by 'bhakti-'secondary usage' only. Thus Vāmana also underlines th between kävya and mere 'sahitya'. 'Sahitya' or coming together of word and sense with beauty inherent in it only, makes for kāvya or poetry. So, for Vāmana also, kavya and 'kāvya-sobhā' do not seem to be separate entities but are always located in one and the same substratum. Poetry is poetry, only when we experience poetic beauty in it. Poetic beauty is thus an integral portion of the 'whole' called poetry. Thus Vāmana accepts the concepts of guna and alamkāra in poetry, which make for the beauty - i.e. "saundarya". Vāmana at KSV. I. i. 1 & 2, very clearly declares : "kāvyam grāhyam alamkārāt. saundaryam alamkāraḥ.” - i.e. poetry is to be recognised through its alamkāra or beauty, for poletic beauty is known as ‘alamkāra'. Going still deeper, Vāmana declares that this falamkāra' i.e. this source of beauty in poetry is caused by avoiding poetic blemishes and accepting poetic excellences and figures of speech : "sa dosa-guna-'lamkāra-hānā”dānābhyām. sa khalv alamkārah dosahānāt guņā'lamkārā”dānāc ca sampadyah kaveh” (Vāmana, I. ii. 3). This means, that the beauty in poetry (i.e. saundarya/alamkāra) has to be acquired by the poet by avoiding poetic blemishes (in poetry) and accepting poetic excellences and figures of speech. So, what Bhāmaha and Danhin termed as 'vakratā' and 'atiśaya' in poetry, that extra-ordinary element or 'saundarya' is termed as 'alamkāra' - the term used here in its wider connotation - by Vāmana. In Bhāmaha, and more clearly in Danhin (Dandin II. 367) we saw the term 'alamkāra' used in a wider sense. This finds still clearer expression in Vāmana, and we say 'clearer because Vāmana uses the term alamkāra both in a wider and also in a technical sense of a figure of speech, side by side. So, whatever was opaque in both Bhāmaha and Danhin becomes crystal clear in Vāmana; that which was in a concealed form, so to say, is presented in an open, unveiled form in Vāmana, or that which was fluid or nebulous takes a solid appearance, or that which was, say, abstract, takes a concrete form in Vāmana. That which was perhaps presented by

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ‘ghuņákśara-nyāya' or accidental design carved out by the movement of a worm on a leaf, appears as letters firmly embroidered on the canvass of poetry.
- With reference to available documents, - we can say that Vāmana is the first to present the terminology viz. ‘alamkāra' both in its wider sense of poetic beauty - śaundarya' - and also in the later narrower connotation of a 'figure of speech only. This could be taken as an important land-mark in the history of literary criticism. He also seems to extend the metaphorical use of language as introduced by Bhāmaha and Dandin, for, as against 'kāvya-śarīra', 'the body of poetry', he also refers to the 'ātman' - 'soul of poetry, which for him is ‘rīti' or 'style'. He declares that, "rītih ātmā kāvyasya”; (Vāmana, I. i. 3) i.e. 'rīti' or 'style' is the soul of poetry and he goes to observe in the gloss over this that, "rītir nāma iyam ātmā kāvyasya; śarīrasya iva iti vākyaśesah” - 'Rīti' is, verily, the soul of poetry; 'as of body is the remainder of this statement". We have to constantly keep this fact in mind that the abstract beauty of poetry was revealed to these great thinkers in all its radince and they revealed this secret to lesser people in a language these people could understand. It is precisely for this reason that these ancient thinkers resorted to the metaphorical use of language such as 'body', 'soul', 'vital airs', etc. of poetry, which
in itself defies all description, it being just abstract and to be experienced only by men of cultivated taste. Even the technical terms such as ‘alamkāra', 'guna', 'dosa', etc. also are part of this effort as they tried to differentiate between one source of beauty and another, or between one form of beauty and another. As a matter of fact, how can an abstract entity be said to possess qualities that go with only the sentient beings? In short, as observed earlier, these metaphorical usages were meant only to bring home the subtle aspect of poetry, an abstract art, within the grasp of lesser people. They are not the end in themselves. We see that even some of the Sanskrit poeticians also are deluded by these terms taking them to be the end of everything, rather taking them as means, as key, to understand the richness of poetic art. We will not mention here some modern innocent scholars writing in Hindi or other modern indian languages such as Gujarati, without caring to have a direct relation with or, insight in the original literature in Sanskrit.
As noted earlier, with reference to available documents, Vāmana, seems to be the first earliest poetician who talks about the soul of poetry. But, even if the word 'souľ is used here, we need not attach extra weight to it, for in the same breath Vāmana explains that, ‘as are lines in a painting, so in rīti rests poetry'. Now if we drag this imagery further, we can say that actually the lines in a picture make for the particular picture, so also ‘rīti' i.e. form should be taken as poetry and thus

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Definition and Scope of Poetry Vāmana becomes a 'dehā”tmavādin', i.e. one who regards the physical body as soul. But all this does not make any sense, as strictly speaking an abstract art as poetry, need not be imagined as having a 'body or a 'soul'. In fact what comes out of this sort of usage is the particular poetician's personal insistance on this or that source of beauty as more or less important. Actually there is no aesthete of poetic arts who has totally rejected any source of beauty altogether. For Vaman, 'rīti' the soul resides in poetry on one hand and on the other when he says, 'rekhāsu iva citram', - i.e. poetry resides in rīti as picture in lines, he almost upturns the 'āśraya-āśrayibhāva' or the relation of a thing and its substratum. In fact, Vāmana is not very serious about these metaphors and we are not supposed to drag them too far!
After suggesting that 'rīti?/style is the soul of poetry, he explains ‘rīti' as a special type of arrangement of words; and that this speciality or 'visesa' is of the form of 'guna' or poetic excellence. Vāmana observes : kim punah iyam rītiḥ iti āha, 'vićiştā padaracanā rītiḥ' (Vāmana, I. ii. 7) And adds, “ko'sau vis'eṣaḥ ? ity āha - višeso gunā"tmā. (Vāmana, I. ii. 8). - "What then is this 'rīti' or style ? Says he, "Rīti is a special arrangement of words.” This 'speciality (= viśesa) is explained as poetic excellence.' Thus perhaps poetic excellence is the category which finds greatest favour with Vāmana. We will go to that when Anandvardhana talks about 'samghatana' i.e. poetic structure, and he expects it to reside in 'guna' or poetic excellence as either its soul or its substratum. But again, the point is, do we hold that the concepts of rīti and samghatan, are absolutely congruent ? But one point emerges that when Anandvardhana suggests the option of those who hold samghatanā as residing in 'guna' which is its 'soul (= ātmabhūta) then, it is likely that perhaps he seems to echo the view of the followers of Vamana, i.e. "Vāmanīyāḥ”.
Vāmana has also tried to present the concept of poetic blemishes in his own way but it does not take us further than Bharata. He takes dosa/poetic blemish as either the opposite or absence of 'guna' i.e. poetic excellence. He has also tried to distinguish between 'alamkāra' i.e. a figure of speech, taken in its narrower connotation and poetic excellence. He observes : (Vamana, III. i. 1) : “kavya śobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāh gunāḥ”, ye khalu śabdā'rthayordharmaḥ kavyaśobhām kurvanti, te guņāḥ 11" and (Vāmana, III, i. 2) - “tad atiśayahetavas tvalamkārāḥ”. - tasyāḥ kävyas'obhāyā atiśayaḥ tadatis'ayah, tasya hetavaḥ. Then at, III. i. 3 he observes : "pūrve nityāh". pūrve gunāh nityāh tair vinā kāvya-s'obhā-'nutpatteh." i.e. Poetic excellences are the cause of poetic beauty. Those that are basically the qualities of word and sense and make for poetic beauty are 'gunas' or poetic

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SAHĄDAYĀLOKA excellences. The alamkāras (such as yamaka, upamā etc.) only enhance the poetic beauty of poetry (which is basically caused by poetic excellences.). The figures of speech only make for the enhancement of poetic beauty (i.e. they do not cause the same). They only add to the poetic beauty caused by guņas or poetic excellences. We will discuss this point later in greater detail but it may be noted at this juncture that more and more clarity and sublety are added to literary criticism and the literary critics now get ready for sharper analysis. We have seen that Vāmana starts with clarifying the concept of poetry from the point where Dandin had Dandin mentioned only the body and 'vital airs' - 'śarīra' and 'prānāh' - of poetry, whereas Vāmana talks of 'soul-ātmā-of poetry. It may also be carefully noted that by the very mention of rīti/style as the 'soul of poetry, we do not score a point in branding Vāmana as a 'rīti-vādin' or promulgator of 'rīti'. Actually even his predecessor Dandin also devoted a lot of space to the consideration of "mārga”, and even Bhämaha was not totally ignorant of this concept. Actually, on the other hand, Vāmana, though declaring 'rīti' as the soul of poetry, has started his work with the famous words that "kāvyam grāhym alamkārāt”, i.e. poetry is to be understood or felt through poetic beauty or alamkāra.” This drives us to believe that even Vāmana, not unlike almost all ālamkārikas or literary critics, is also a kāvālamkāra-vādin' - i.e. one who considers 'alamkāra' (i.e. any source of beauty) as the - soul of poetry. It is only in this sense that we have to understand the so called 'Alamkāra-school. Actually all, including you and I, are kāvvālamkāra-vādin i.e, one who tries to appreciate and realize the secret of poetic charm. The earlier masters, as seen clearly in Dandin considered all factors that caused poetic beauty as 'alamkāra'. It is childish to brand Bhāmaha and the rest as belonging to the so called alamkāra school which took only yamaka-upamā etc. only as the soul of poetry. Actually nobody has sweared in this name and declared from the top of the roof that, “alamkāraḥ (i.e. yamaka, upamā etc., the figures of speech) is the soul of poetry". If some modern scholars take it this way, it is sad
live on their part. Actually, all the literary critics beginning with Bhāmaha, or even earlier, concentrated on one point and that was poetry itself, and by poetry was meant the extra-ordinary literature that was graced by beauty. The decyphering of this poetic beauty is the sole concern of any literary critic, any ālamkārika, worth the name, including the great Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammața. These literary critics started noting down all devices that caused poetic beauty and tried to discriminate among them on their own preference. Thus the devices came to be branded as alamkāra, guna, rīti, vrtti, dhvani, rasa, bhāva,

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vakrokti, atis'aya, aucitya and what not ? To be very clear, poetic beauty or kāvvasaundarva is itself 'alamkāra', is the same as the poet's charming way of expression - vakra-kavi-vyāpāra-, and is the same as the extra-ordinary, the ‘atis'aya' in poetry. This extra-ordinariness is expressed through immense varieties and who can explain the same in its entirety ? - kas tān kārtsnyena vaksysti'? It is this which makes for the countless varieties of dhvani'. Bhoja and his Mālava tradition subsume dhvani also under 'alamkāra' and there is nothing wrong in it for this 'alamkāra' is 'poetic beauty itself. It is only childish to suggest that the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha and the rest were deluded only by the 'external beauty in poetry and only the dhvanivādins delved deeper into the inner and subtle beauty of poetry. In fact whatever pleases the connoisseur, whatever is a poet's creation in the real sense of the term, is ‘kāvya' i.e. poetry. By resorting to such a ca explanation of the poet's muse, Kuntaka, crosses the biggested hurdle viz. that poetic beauty is arrived at only through the word-power of suggestion or vyañjanā, and embarks upon a larger area of poetic beauty which places even at times the expressive power-abhidhā and also the secondary word-power, laksaņā on the same footing as vyañjanā. Poetic beauty may take the form of vyañjanā also, or it can be only an 'abhidhā-vilasita-mātra'. It also depends on the poet's mood at a particular mement. As the famous poet-devotee Narasimha Mehta from Gujarat puts it, 'the endless reveals itself as manifold' - "jūjave rupe ananta bhāse". There can be no rules and regulations that go to restrict the poet's muse. All that is required is that it should be poetry and poetry alone from the point of view of an aesthete or 'rasika'. It is with this in view that Anandvardhana declares :
“pratāyantām vāco nimita-vividhā'rthā’mstarasā | na sādaḥ kartavyaḥ kavibhir anavadye sva-visaye ll” (Dhv. IV. 17 at) parasvā”dānecchā-virata-manaso vastu sukaveh |
sarsvatyaivaisā ghasayati yathéstam bhagavati || (Dhv. IV. 17 cd) "May words that appear (to critics) as full of manifold ideas and ambrosial sentiments be freely spread out. Poets need have no compunctions in the flawless realm of their own. (IV. 17 ab.)."
"The goddess of speech, Saraswati, herself will provide the desired ideas of (to) a good poet whose mind is averse to borrowing the belongings of another." (Dhv. IV. 17 cd). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 299, ibid.)
The poet should be honest, and poetry pure. It is because of this fact, viz. that of poetry being projected effortlessly only by a genuine poet, that Mammața, in his

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
definition of poetry also includes, or refers, to the device of beauty called 'alamkara', deemed as 'external to poetry', by people of smooth intelligence and sensitivity. That poetic muse manitests itself only in a particular form is a dream cherished by innocent souls. Actually all newer and newer forms of poetry, drama or any creative writing is welcome to these alamkarikas and their all-encompassing theory of rasa'nubhuti or art-experience is loving enough and broad enough to welcome the same in its carassing close embrace. In reality, whatever moves a man of taste is poetry; and it can take a form of a figure of speech also, and also that of beautiful suggestion or dhvani. Vamana, in comparision to his predecessors, has also discussed the nature of meaning - 'artha-tattva' - to a greater detail and this we will pick up in due course.
Udbhața: Udbhata has not attempted to float a definition of poetry but with some other reference in mind, scholars are inclined to view him as closer to Bhamaha and think that Udbata's concept of poetry was identical with that of Bhamaha and that perhaps he also called poetry to be, '(a charming) coming together of word and sense.' Udbhața also wrote, now not available, "Bhamahavivarana i.e. commentary on 'Bhāmaha's Kāvyā'lamkāra, a portion from which is quoted by no less an authority than the great Abhinavagupta in his famous 'Locana' commentary on Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka. So, it is safe to surmise that Unbhata's concept of poetry was identical with that of Bhamaha. This conclusion derives strength from another observation, perhaps also from Udbhata's Bhamahavivarana, as quoted by Mammața in his Kavya-prakāśa, that Udbhata laughs at Vamana's distinction of 'guna' or 'poetic excellence' and 'alamkara' or a 'figure of speech' under the pretext that the former is interior to poetry and therefore 'nityadharma' or essential characteristic of poetry, and the latter being external are accidental to poetry and therefore only 'anitya' or 'impermanent'. Mammata has not accepted this observation and has gone for its refutation also. We have also observed that if Vamana calls 'alamkara' as 'anitya' or 'impermanent', it is only in the sense of a figure of speech, a device which may or may not be resorted to by a poet. But in itself, i.e. as 'saundarya' or poetic beauty itself, alamkāra is as essential to poetry as any other device could be, even in Vamana's estimation. No wonder if Udbhata laughs at a purist point of view concerning poetic charm. It may also be noted that Udbhata was also open to poetic beauty as manifested through emotive stuff such as rasa or sentiment, bhāva or feeling and all their newer and newer forms of manifestation. This we will pick up later. But by and large Udbhata also is a kavya'lamkāra-vādin' in the wider sense of the term.

*

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Rudrata : In his Kāvā'lamkāra, II, i, Rudrata, following Bhāmaha suggests that word and sense together make for poetry :
“nanu, śabdárthau kāvyam śabdastatrā'rthavān anekavidhaḥ || varņānām samudāyaḥ, sa ca
bhinnaḥ pañcadhā bhavati ||”. Word is having manifold meaning. In itself it is a collection of letters (that tend to be meaningful). Word is five-fold. They are (II. ii, Rudrata) : nāma, ākhyāta, nipāta, upasarga, and also 'karma-pravacanīya. i.e. noun, verb, particle, prefix and prepositions or adverb. Rudrata adds (II. 3) that nouns are either compounded or single. The compounded state of nouns is divided into three rītis or styles viz. pāñcālī, latīyā and gaudīyā. - We will talk of this later but we may note for the present that the concept of rīti i.e. style based on compounded words leads to 'samghatana' or 'arrangement' or "structure of Anandavardhana. But Rudrata has caused a mix-up here which we will discuss later. Rudrața also discusses like his predecessors alamkāras, dosas etc. and stresses on the need for - 'rasa' or sentiment as the outcome · phala - of kāvya i.e. poetry. Rudrata observes that the connoisseurs - sahrdayas - get to the four ends of life, viz. dharma, artha, etc. in a light or easy way through poetry alone. It is therefore that a poet, involving major effort should make his kāvya full of 'rasas'. If it is not the case then men of taste would suffer from poetry, without rasa, as in case of stāstra or any discipline. The 'rasas' impart joy to the enjoyers endowed with rasas and therefore the poet sh take care to promote 'rasa'. Without knowing this element of 'rasa', a poet can not create poetry which tends to be charming. It should be clearly noted that Rudrata, as compared to his predecessors, is more vocal about incorporating 'rasa' in poetry. He observes : (Rudrata, I. 4):
jvalad-ujjvala-vāk-prasarah sarasam kurvan mahākaviḥ kāvyam | sphuram ākalpam analpam
pratanoti yaśaḥ parasyā'pi 11 Thus, the predecessors of Anandvardhana imagined poetry to be word and sense, or attached little more importance to the word element in the definition of poetry and discriminated between one or the other devices that caused poetic beauty under the titles of guna, alamkāra, mārga, or rīti etc. They also tended to consider in a scientific or disciplined way the concept of poetic blemish, and

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attached more or less importance to the sources of beauty enumerated as above. While doing this they used the term 'alamkāra' in both its wider connotation of a source of poetic beauty', and also in its local context of a figure of speech. They also at times pointed out to rīti or style as the soul of poetry. It is absolutely naive to think that these literary critics, in their total concept of poetry or scope of poetry, talked only of external factors that enhance poetic beauty, and never touched the essentials of poetry, that they cared only for the external of poetry and were not iniciated in the secrets of inherent poetic beauty. Actually they deliberated over the form and also the content of poetry, the external and the interior of poetry, the word and sense, form and content or theme of poetry and everything that laid charm to the expression and turned an ordinary expression into poetry. Singing the songs of glory of alamkāras in poetry, Dandin has suggested any number of internal sources of beauty in poetry. Vāmana has laid down shades of meaning such as sūksma or subtle, bhāvya and vāsanīya. Says Vāmana : (Vāmana, III. 2. s) - artho vyaktah sūksmaś ca. i.e. meaning is two fold, the expressed and the subtle -The subtle then is bhāvya and vāsaniya (vāmana, III, 2.10). That which is easily discernible is 'bhavya'. Vasaniya' is that which is understood by concentration formed by a sympathatic heart. The Kamadhenu commentary explains : "bhāvakānām avadhānamātrena vimarśo bhāvanā. tad yogyah bhāvyah. sahrdayasadvyavahāra - samullasita-samskāra - sampanno yo'vadhāna-prakars'ah tena gamyo vāsanīyah.” We may say that this leads to what Anandavardhana calls vācya or expressed and 'pratīyamāna' or implied. The earlier critics have also given a thought to the emotive stuff in form of 'rasa' or sentiment and 'bhāva' or feeling, or emotion. At this juncture, however, it is not safe to observe that they had a clear concept of the word-power called vyañjanā or suggestion. Actually, like Anandavardhana and his illustrious followers, the earlier critics had never applied themselves to the consideration of what we call the topic of semantics including
ord such as abhidhā, i.e. direct expression, laksaņā i.e. indication and vyañjanā i.e. suggestion. This we can say, so far as available documents are concerned. But, it can be observed safely, as we will go to discuss the topic of wordpowers later, that these earlier literary critics were not absolutely unaware of this system, and they had some glimpses of vyañjanā also. One thing is absolutely clear that they have thought of what we call 'pratīyamana' artha i.e. implicit sense, under various heads of alamkāras. This also will be discussed in dụe course. That Rudrata laid special stress on the element of rasa, goes to create a sort of background for advocating the importance of 'rasa-dhvani' or suggestion of the emotive stuff in

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Anandavardhana, and his great followers. We will now proceed to examine the definition and scope of poetry as thought of by Anandavardhana and his followers.
Anandavardhana and his followers :
Anandavardhana has not attampted a definition of poetry. The reason could be that in the period between Bhāmaha and himself the clear concept of poetry had already evolved. The central point of debate perhaps was giving prominence to either the word element alone or to give equal prominence to both word and meaning. Which of these two should be regarded as the differentia of poetry was a topic hotly debated by literary critics. But, by and large a tendency to pay equal respect to both these i.e. word and sense, seemed to gain ground. It is precisely for this reason that Anandavardhana has kept away from this and observed on Dhv. 1. i, only tantatively that -
“tatra kecid ācakšīran - śabdārtha-śarīram tāvat kāvyam." On this, observes Abhinavagupta in his Locana : "tāvad-grahaņena na kasyā'py atra vipratipattir iti dars'ayati.”
Of course, the remark of Ānandavardhana follows the words : "tad abhāvavādinām cā'mi vikalpāḥ sambhavanti." i.e. "The following are the
different views of those who believe in its (= i.e. dhvani's) non-existence - (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 1 ibid).
But the use of “tāvat” by Ānandavardhana implies that the view of even the opponents regarding the definition of poetry is acceptable to him. This is explained by Abhinavagupta who clarifies that by the use of 'tāvať (- which is a correlative of yāvat) it is implied that nobody (including Anandavardhana) has any dispute or disagreement over this (i.e. over the acceptance of both word and sense taken together to form poetry.)
On Dhv. I. 2, in his yrtti or gloss Anandavardhana has the following observation : “kāvyasya hi lalitócita-sanniveşa-cārunaḥ śarīrasya iva ātmā sārarūpatayā sthitaḥ sahrdaya-s'lāghyo yo'rthas tasya vācyaḥ pratīyamānas'ce ti dvau bhedau.” (pp. 6, ibid)
"That meaning which wins the admiration of perceptive critics and which is of the very essence of poetry - even as the soul is of a body which is naturally handsome by the union of graceful and proper limbs - has two aspects, viz. the explicit and the implicit.” (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 7, ibid). Ānandavardhana is careful here not to call any meaning to be the soul of poetry, not to commit that only word element is poetry. He uses a simile viz. “as soul in a body", implying thereby that

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body and soul can never be thought of separately. Thus for him both word and sense together go to form poetry. Abhinavagupta in his Locana over this, goes to add "kārikābhāgagatam 'kavya'śabdam vyākartum aha- "kāvyasya hi iti". i.e. in order to explain the term 'kavya' i.e. poetry in the kārikā (viz. Dhv. I. 2), Anandavardhana observes... etc. Abhinavagupta, on behalf of Anandavardhana goes to add, "lalita-padena guṇā'lamkārā'nugraham aha, ucita-śabdena rasavisayam aucityam bhavati iti darśayan rasa-dhvaner jīvitatvam sūcayati." i.e. by the term 'lalita' or 'graceful' is meant the beauty caused by excellences and figures of speech (i.e. by sources of beauty), and by the term 'ucita' or 'proper' is meant only propriety concerning aesthetic pleasure-rasa suggesting this, the author (i.e. Anandavardhana) points out to the fact that 'rasa-dhvani' suggestion of 'rasa' is the soul (of poetry)."
The idea is that here as soul rests in body so does meaning as soul, rest in poetry. All meaning is not to be understood as the 'soul' or ātman of poetry. It may also be observed that here the term 'atman' is also used not in the normal sense but only in a metaphorical sense meaning the "most essential" element in poetry. For it was, as observed earlier, very clear to any literary critic in India and also equally to Anandavardhana that poetry is an abstract art and has nothing to do with the idea of body or soul. The simile drives clear only one point viz. that charming sense - "sahṛdayas'lāghya - artha" is all that is required to make poetry what it is. Now all this naturally terminates in aesthetic pleasure, or artexperience or rasa'nubhuti is a distant cry. Thus, we can observe, for the present that for Anandvardhana word and sense taken together, and graced by excellences and figures-, the sources of poetic beauty - make for the definition and concept of poetry. Abhinavagupta's insistence on 'rasa-dhvani' need not contradict this observation, for everything in poetry that helps create poetic beauty, leads to rasadhvani i.e. suggestion of aesthetic pleasure - In fact all art, including the poetic art is meant to cause art-experience which is not a physical experience, but a ‘mānasa-bodha' a mental perception and hence is 'suggested' only. i.e. it is of the form of 'dhvani' or suggestion only. By 'rasa-dhvani' is also meant the suggestion of emotive stuff which results from any poetic milieu. It may also be observed that Anandavardhana has in a way, steadied the metaphorical usage promoted by Vamana regarding the 'body' and 'soul' of poetry. It is out of context, as seen in case of Visvanatha to read contradiction between one observation that calls both 'word and sense' as 'body' of poetry, and another observation which notes that the charming sense as appreciated by the men of taste is the 'soul' of poetry, and then

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Definition and Scope of Poetry again calling only the 'principally suggested sense alone - i.e. 'dhvani' alone', as soul of poetry. The clear picture that emerges from this discussion is that the metaphorical usages of 'body. 'souľ etc. are not to be drawn to their last limits and that they are meant, at the best, as proposed explanations of the abstract art of poetry. In short, the concept that poetry is word and sense taken together with any number of devices to cause poetic beauty which are natural with the combination of word and sense, seems to have taken root in literary circle, and Anandavardhana has no objection to that. As a matter of fact he is prepared to accept any turn of expression, any deviation, provided it is beautiful, as poetry, hough of course in his estimation the highest art lies in concealing art, i.e. in the implicit sense projected as the highest source of beauty in a given piece of poetry It is therefore that the use of poetic excellences and figures of speech has to be conditioned by the fact that they help in evoking rasa, i.e. aesthetic pleasure or even a sentiment, as the principal feature of poetry. This insistance on his part is in keeping with the view held by Bharata also, who has recommended every device with reference to evocation of rasa. Perhaps Anandavardhana is clearer in his understanding as compared to some of his predecessors and as observed earlier, Rudrata's stand was a bridge between Bharata and Anandavardhana. Anandavardhana holds that this evocation of sentiment takes place in poetry through the medium of the word-power called vyañjanā and is termed rasa-dhvani • when it is singled out as the principal source of poetic charm. He holds that in poetry, through this word-power called vyañjanā is arrived at a three-fold suggested meaning, which could be of the form of vastu-or matter of fact, or idea, alamkāra or a figure of speech, or rasādi, i.e. emotive stuff, the sentiment, emotion or feeling, and if any of it proves to be the principal source of poetic beauty, it is termed as 'dhvani' of vastu, alamkāra, or rasādi, as the case may be. The type of poetry having this implicit sense arrived at through the word-power of suggestion or vyañjanā, is also termed as 'dhvani kävya' provided this pratīyamāna or implicit sense proves to be the principal source of charm. We will discuss this in a greater detail later. We will also go to observe that in his wider scheme of poetry Anandavardhana finds suitable space for all the concepts of literary criticism such as alamkāra, guna, rīti, vrtti, dosa, etc., as advanced by earlier ālamkārikas and thus makes his theory of "vyañjanā - dhvani-rasa" more acceptable, logical and catholic. Anandavardhana has advanced the theory of three powers of the poetic word and there too he has attached more importance to the power of suggestion or vyañjanā.

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Rājaśekhara, in the sixth chapter of his Kāvyamīmāmsā, viz. 'pada-vākyaviveka' tries to arrive at the definition of poetry while discussing the varieties of a sentence. He suggests that a sentence blessed with excellences and poetic figures : "gunavad alamkstam ca vākyam eva kāvyam.” (pp. 24, G.O.S., Edn.). We may observe that here when Rājasekhara takes 'vākya' i.e. sentence as poetry he seems to lean towards the tradition represented by Dandin which seems to attach greater weight to the element of sabda or word as against the thought current that holds both word and sense in equal balance. The commentary wants us to understand that the 'ca: placed with 'guna' and 'alamkāra' goes to explain that these have got to be "without blemish”. (See, Madhusudanī, pp. 81, Chowkhamba, edn., '34.) Thus Rājasekhara's definition is in tune with the concept of poetry as divined by the earlier masters. Actually Anandavardhana also talks of dhvani, gunībhūtavyangya and citra, the three varieties of poetry from the point of view of literary criticism. His accepted definition of poetry speaks only of a (harmoneous) combination of word and sense only. We may say that only the first section viz. 'kavirahasya' of the wider project called 'kāvya-mīmāmsā’ is available to us, and so, we do not know the exact attitude of Rājaśekhara towards the concept of dhvani and vyañjanā, though of course, he mentions Anandavardhana in certain contexts with great admiration. But acceptance of dhvani does not compel a critic to mention it in the definition of poetry and we will see that Mammata does exactly this. So, as it were, Rājasekhara seems to pave the way to what we read in the Kävyaprakāśa later.
We can also safely suggest that taking into consideration other references from the available portion of the Kāvya-mimamsă, Rājasekhara has attached supreme importance to the concept of 'rasa' in poetry, though of course, not mentioning it in the pure definition of poetry.
Kuntaka : It may be noted that Kuntaka's concept of literature could be taken as an important mile-stone in the onward journey of poetics. We hear the reverberation of the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha and also echos of his near predecessor Anandavardhana in Kuntaka, who tries to strike a balance and go for a re-evaluation of the two streams of thought. For in Kuntaka, we find the ideas of the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha and the like and also those of Anandavardhana, getting settled in a clearer, and more definite pattern, so to say. We have seen that Anandavardhana thought of the classification of poetry on the basis of more or less influence of vyañjanā power, giving prime importance to this suggestive power of word in poetry, thus promoting a criticism-based classification and concept of poetry. In establishing 'dhvani' i.e. principal

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suggested sense arrived at through the word power of suggestivity, Anandavardhana's approach, we feel, has been little more aggressive in favour of vyañjanā or suggestive power of poetic word, perhaps unwittingly on his part. His approach seems a bit tainted by his rather over enthusiasm for suggestivity. This creates an impression that the great master betrays a distinct partiality towards vyañjanā or word-power of suggestivity thus promoting a purely vyañjanā-biased school of literary criticism. The obvious outcome of this attitude was that eventhough he realized the simple yet beautiful designs prepared by the word power of direct expression i.e. abhidha or denotation, he just ignored it. He almost established a thought - current that prohibited the poets to revel in the beauty of pure expression i.e. denotation - abhidha-vilasita-mātra i.e. what he called 'citra kavya' or 'picture-like poetry', after realizing the secret of what he termed 'dhvani' or principal suggested sense. He however left the field of citra-kavya for only the beginners. His great followers, Mammata being the leader, called this variety as 'adhama' poetry, i.e. poetry of very low order. Thus Anandavardhana's effort led to a sort of negative evaluation of poetry wherein some sterling merits were downgraded to the level of ordinary achievement. On the contrary, without dishonouring in the least the brilliant standard of literary criticism set by the theory of vyañjana-dhvani-rasa, if thoughts are promoted on pure and śāstrīya i.e. scientific process, we can never afford to ignore the beauty of just the expressive word power either. This is exactly what Kuntaka cares for and drives us to. He does not seem to be primarily interested in the three-fold classification of word power, into what is termed as 'abhidha' or expressive power, i.e. denotation, 'lakṣaṇā' or power of indication or, say, deviation, and vyañjanā or the power of suggestivity of a poetic word. He therefore, is inclined to accept only one function, viz. 'vicitră abhidha' or the beautiful poetic expression in poetry and accepts that what we term as 'kāvya' or 'sahitya' or poetry is worth its name only when it creates an impression of its being a poet's work; first and last. Poetry has to be recognised as 'kavi-karma' the creation of a poet's genius, which alone is 'kāvya' for Kuntaka, and all else is "a-kavya" i.e. non-poetry. Kuntaka's definition and concept of poetry are based on this said foundation.
43
Before evaluating Kuntaka's concept of poetry, it is necessary to study the background on which it is nurtured. Among available documents of pure literary aesthetics, Bhāmaha's Kāvyā'lamkāra is considered to be the earliest. His near follower is said to be Dandin and this is accepted by scholars in general. In both Bhamaha and Dandin we find preserved even earlier thought-currents. Bhāmaha

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA has considered the topics of ‘kāvya-s'arīra' i.e. body of poetry in sixty kārikās or verses, that of alamkāras or poetic figures in one hundred and sixty, of blemishes in fifty, of poetry in seventy and of sabda-buddhi i.e. correctness of words in yet another sixty kārikās. The definitions and illustrations read in his work are believed to be Bhāmaha's own creation, i.e. he has not borrowed the same from elsewhere. We have discussed Bhāmaha's concept of poetry earlier, but here, even at the cost of repetition we will take up some topics as discussed by Bhāmaha, as they serve a useful background for Kuntaka's thought-process.
Bhāmaha accepted the coming together of both word and sense as poetry; - śabdárthau sahitau kāvvam .. but this sāhitya acquires an un alaukikatva - only when it is beset with 'alamkāra' i.e. poetic beauty in beauty of poetic language - vācām alamkritiḥ - is brought about by what is termed as vakra artha' and 'vakra s'abda' i.e. by both poetic/beautiful meaning and poetic/ beautiful word of expression (Bhāmaha, I. 36). Thus both poetic expression and poetic content, make for poetry. Bhāmaha notes very candidly at V. 64-66, that descriptions of brilliant jewels, or of trees lowered by fruits, or of flowers in full bloom, do not cause poetic beauty. They only contribute to advance the beauty of ornaments, garden and garland alone respectively. Beauty of expression is brought about by vakrokti' alone, i.e. by beautiful poetic expression only - (Bhămaha, I. 30) - Literature i.e. - poetry worth its name, takes shape through 'vakrokti' alone. At VI. 23, Bhämaha discusses correct or incorrect usages of words with reference to the practices of poets having beautiful expression' - 'vakravācām kavīnām ye, prayogam prati sādhavah.... etc. Here also it is insisted that the poet's expression has to be 'vakra' i.e. 'beautiful for becoming worth its name. In short, we can not imagine the existence of poety in the absence of this 'vakrokti' i.e. poetic expression.
Though Bhāmaha has insisted on the presence of this element of 'vakrokti' in poetry, he has not attempted any technical elaboration of this concept. Only at the end of the discussion on the poetic figure atis'ayokti - i.e. hyperbole ,, at II. 85, Bhāmaha suggests that 'all hyperbole or extra-ordinary expression is 'vakrokti' i.e. beautiful expression which means expression of that which is 'beyond ordinary - i.e. which is 'lokátis'aya'. He observes : "saisā sarvaiva vakroktih, anayā'rtho vibhāvyate” - all this (atis'ayokti) is vakrokti and by this everything (belonging to the day-to-day world) turns into 'vibhāvas' - i.e. (poetic) determinants, or it is that by which things belonging to the ordinary parlance, become objects of delight. The poet has to be active to realize this element of vakrokti. In fact, which poetic expression or figure is without this vakrokti; and without this where is 'kāvya'? The

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Definition and Scope of Poetry full expression (Bhāmaha, II. 85) reads as :
"saisā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ anayā'rtho vibhāvyate | yatno'syām kavinā kāryaḥ
ko'lamkāro'nayā vinā ll" This verse has been quoted by Bhāmaha's successors, beginning with Anandavardhana and Mammata. It is on the count of absence of 'vakrokti' that Bhāmaha (II. 86) rejects hetu, sūksma, and leśa as poetic figures :
"hetuś ca sūksmo leśo'tha nālamkāratayā matāḥ | samudāyábhidheyasya
vaktrokty-anabhidhānataḥ 11". It is surprising that after drawing his basic inspiration from Bhämaha, Kuntaka has not quoted Bhāmaha, II. 85, though he has a number of other quotations from Bhāmaha.
Abhinavagupta has explained Bhāmaha, II. 85, viz. saiņa sarvaiva etc. in his commentary viz. Locana on the Dhv. (III. 36). He explains that the definition of atiśayokti which is given, is form of 'vaktrokti' or a figure of speech, because Bhāmaha (1. 36) himself has observed that expression of vakra (= beautiful, poetic) word and vakra (= beautiful, poetic) meaning makes for the much wanted alamkāra i.e. source of beauty of vāņi i.e. language or poetic expression. Elaborating this line of thinking Abhinavagupta explains further that by 'vaktrtā of sabda i.e. word', and 'vakratā of artha i.e. meaning', is meant the state of word and sense being placed in an extra-ordinary fashion. Thus this 'vakratā' is itself the ‘alamkāratā' of an alamkāra, i.e. this beautiful poetic expression, makes for a true
peech. 'Vakratā' is explained here as avasthāna' or being placed in a lokottirna' form. i.e. extra-ordinary fashion. Bhāmaha means exactly this. 'Atis'aya' is that which is other than i.e. superior to the worldly or śāstric expression. Only this makes for its quality of being 'a-laukika'. Bhāmaha very clearly (II. 81) brings home this point that, an expression causing apprechension of an extra-ordinary meaning (i.e. - content) is atiśayokti. Thus vakratā is, "lokottirna-rūpena avasthanam." An alamkara or a poetic figure becomes worth its name only if this element of atiśaya i.e. extra-ordinariness enters in it, or pervades it.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Anandavardhana clearly observes : (Dhv. III. 36, vrtti):
'tatrā'tiśayoktiryam alamkāram adhitisthati kavi-pratibhāvaśāt tasya cārutvā'tis'ayayogo 'nyasya tv alamkāra-mātratā eva iti' i.e. ‘only that figure in which exaggeration reigns supreme, acquires abundunt beauty due to the poet's genius. Others are ornamental figures only in name." (Trans. K. Kri., pp. 229, ibid). What is arrived at by the advent of this 'atiśaya' or by this 'lokātikrānta-gocaratā' or 'lokottara-tā'? The answer to this question is - anayā arthah vibhavyate' i.e. worldly objects are turned into sources of aesthetic pleasure. The process of 'vibhāvana' is explained by the Locanakāra in three ways, such as -
(i) the meaning which rendered old or respeated due to the use made by all people, is realized in a beautiful form; - or,
(ii) the worldly objects such as a lady, a garden etc., become vibhāvas, i.e. determinants causing a feeling or emotion to be awakened; - or,
(iii) these objects turn into bhāvas i.e. feelings and become objects of rasa - Thus, through vakrokti old objects take newer forms, become vibhāvas that evoke feelings, and get transformed into the shape of bhāvas or feelings themselves leading to rasa.
Thus Bhāmaha recommends the coming together of such word and sense that are promoted by such vakratā, that turns the worldly into aesthetic. The repetition of Bhāmaha's ideas here, is to introduce clearly the views of Kuntaka. That Bhāmaha has under-rated the concept of rīti-or mārga i.e. poetic style, has not missed the attention of the experts. Bhāmaha welcomes both gauda and/or vaidarbha style only if it caters to vakrokti, - without which even the so called 'vaidarbha' composition carries no weight for Bhāmaha, and even gaudacomposition steals his admiration if it is blessed with this vakratā or poetic beauty (Bhāmaha, I. 34, 35)
Kuntaka's advent on the horizen of indian literary criticism took place at the most opportune moment. Anandavardhana had welcomed and woven in his scheme all thought-currents that came from his predecessors. He accomodated everything in his wider scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa, in the context of rasadhvani. At the same time he accorded new connotation to certain terms and thus dwarfed the concepts of alamkāra, rīti and the rest in comparision with the tall all
g concept of dhvani in general and rasa-dhvani in particular. Other thought-currents almost merged and melted into this, leaving very thin individuality of their own. The forceful and successful establishment of vyañjanā as an

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47 independent power of word turned out to be an important mile-stone in the history of literary criticism. New dimensions opened out on the horizen of literary criticism. What Ānandavardhana did, i.e. his rendering all other thought-currents to a position subordinate to rasa-dhvani, demanded some rethinking. Precisely because of this the thinking of Anandavardhana's close successors such as Kuntaka, Kśemendra, Bhatta Nāyaka, Mahim, and the rest, took a different shape. They as it were, challenged, stopped and applied brakes on the gushing flow of Anandavardhana's thought-current; - vyañjanā.
At the root of Kuntaka's thinking lie the views of Bhāmaha and we may say that actually Bhāmaha's ideas are as it were, "sprouted, turned into leaf, budded and blossomed" - (ankuritah pallavitah korakitah, puspitah) in Kuntaka. Of course, it is childish to suggest that Kuntaka echoes only Bhāmaha's views alone. Be it a Kuntaka, or Bhatta Nayaka, or Mahimā, or Bhoja or be it anybody, there is no single successor of Anandavardhana - and this includes Dhananjaya and Dhanika also - who remains completely free from the great impact of the vyañjanā-dhvanirasa doctrine. And yet, there are some sterling peculiarities in Kuntaka's concept of poetry, which cannot be overlooked and which have carved out a nische of their own in literary criticism.
The very first noteworthy point is that Kuntaka lays great emphasis on - ‘kavikarma' i.e. a poet's creation. Whatever goes in the name of poetry should carry an attached stamp that it is first and last, 'a poet's creation'. He is never fed up of mentioning now and again the term, “kavi-vyāpāra” i.e. a poet's effort. So, for him, poetry is 'kavi-karma'. The poet-kavi' and 'poetic effort/creation, kavi-karma' - these two remain in focus in Kuntaka's thinking. He always keeps in mind that a poet's distinct individuality plays an important role in his creation. A poet's nature, his leanings, his likes and dislikes, go to contribute to the creation of newer and newer designs and Kuntaka is of the opinion that differences in a poet's nature bring about different styles of poetic creation. He has called his work by the name, 'alamkāra' and 'vakrokti-jīvita is a gloss written by himself on his own composition. It is under this title viz. 'vakrokti-jīvita' that the whole work is - well-known among the learned. We may observe that by holding this principle of the stamp of a poet's individuality bringing about individualistic creation, Kuntaka comes closer to the western pattern of literary criticism. But it is also true that under the local colouring of a poet's individuality lies concealed an element of eternality of literature resulting in extra-worldly pleasure or 'camatkāra'; 'rasa'.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA In the context of literary criticism Kuntaka has made an important observation that due to a sort of chemical composition brought about by word, meaning and 'alamkāra', poetry is born which is an indivisible whole. He says : (Vakroktijīvita = V.J.; I. 6) :
"alamkştir alamkāryam apóddhịtya vivecyate | tadupāyatayā, tattvam
sā'lamkārasya kāvyatā ||” "The 'adornment' and 'adorned' are distinguished artificially for the purpose of our enquiry, becuase this would be the only means to attain the ultimate goal. The truth of the matter, however, remains that the two together constitute poetry." - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 291, 'VJ. of Kuntaka', Dharwad, Edn. '77).
"Ornament or adornment relates to the act of embellishing. That which is adorned is the content and that which adorns is the linguistic means or medium. Both are subjected to examination here. The method adopted is that of definition of the general and the particular. For purposes of such a definition it becomes essential to consider the two separately, though they form an indivisible unity. The nature of poetry as a whole is realized through the means of the 'adornment and the 'adorned'. Such a distinction is very helpful in offering one a course of instruction in poetry. In fact, this is a common practice in other disciplines also to make such unreal distinctions in order that the purpose of education is fulfilled. For instance in grammar, a whole word is split into base and termination, and a whole sentence is subdivided into words"-(yathā padántarbhūtayoḥ prakrti-pratyayayor-vākyántarbhūtānām padānām ceti.) (vịtti, on VJ. I. 6; Trans. K. Kris., pp. 291, 2, ibid)
Kuntaka further observes that this distinction is attempted only to cultivate understanding. The real truth is that poetry is a work of a poet, wherein the undivided whole of the 'adorned' and the 'adornment'is the reality. So, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned already and the question of adding adornment to pre-existing poetry does not arise :
"tattvam sálamkārasya kāvyatā tad ayam atra paramārthaḥ - sálamkārasya alamkarana-sahitasya sakalasya nirastávayavasya sataḥ, samudāyasya kāvyatā, kavikarmatvam tena alamkrtasya kāvyatvam iti sthitam, na punaḥ kāvyasya alamkārayogah” - (výtti; VJ. I. 6)

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49 It may be noted that here ‘alamkāra' or 'adornment does not stand only for figures of speech such as upamā, or anuprāsa and the like, however these are not excluded either. For Kuntaka this adornment is 'vakrokti', 'a poet's charming expression', which can take any shape including that of a poetic figure also, and also that of vyañjanā. But the condition is that it should be an in-born quality. This is exactly what Anandavardhana had said about the figures of speech, when they seem to stick naturally in the description and therefore are not taken as external to poetry -
“na teșām bahirangatvam rasábhivyaktau” - (Dhv. Vịtti, II. 16). That a work of art is 'akhanda-buddhi-samāsvādya' i.e. something to be enjoyed as a whole undivided unit, is what Kuntaka means here. Actually by taking this holistic view of a poet's creation, Kuntaka has, as it were, disowned the system of 'ātmā' i.e. soul of poetry, śarīra i.e. body of poetry, and the adornment or 'alamkāra'. We may also observe that Anandavardhana also had accepted this view point of poetry being an indivisible, whole unit. Actually he has also talked about the so adornment separately only to cultivate the proper understanding of poetry. His words quoted as above, viz. 'na tesām bahirangatvam' bear out this fact. So, when Kuntaka suggests that poetry is always found with adornment - "salamkārasya kāvyatā", if some understand it as suggesting that, 'poetry is no poetry, if it is without upamā i.e. simile, etc. then this may be taken as pure innocence.
After this Kuntaka makes an effort to strike a definition of poetry. For him poetry is :
"sabdārthau sahitau
vakra-kavi-vyāpāra-śālini bandhe vyavasthitau, kāvyam;
tadvidā'hlāda-kāriņi ||” (V. J. I. 7). "Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit, - 'out of the way) creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving artistic delight to a man of taste on the other."
(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 292, ibid) The first point to be noted is that in his definition of poetry, Kuntaka has called both 'word' and 'sense' taken together as poetry. He goes to observe in his vịtti on VJ. I. 7, that, “Poetry is nothing but word and sense in their unity. The denoter and the denoted' taken together constitute poetry. That they are two yet one is a welcome paradox.” (Trans. K. Kris., ibid) - "śabdārthau kāvyam, vācako vācyam ceti dvau sammilitau kāvyam. dvāvekam iti vicitraivoktih.” (Vrtti, on V.I. I. 7). We

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SAHRDAYALOKA
may observe that as it were, the point which Punditaraja Jagannacha raised later, is anticipated and answered here. Kuntaka further observes: "As a result of this, the view of some that poetry is word alone beautified highly by the skill of the poet, as also the view of some others that poetry is sense alone causing aesthetic delight as a result of beauty in style, both these stand refuted. Thus, the quality of giving aesthetic delight co-exists in both severally, even as oil exists in every grain of sesamum and is not exclusive to either of them. He observes: "yasmāt dvayor api pratyekam vartate, na punar ekasmin." (Vṛtti, on V.J. I. 7). He further observes : "tasmāt sthitam etat - na śabdasyaiva ramaṇīyata-visiṣṭasya kevalasya kavyatvam, na'pyarthasyeti." (Vṛtti, on V.J. I. 7) i.e. "Thus the conclusion is clear that neither beautiful 'word-form' alone, nor beautiful content alone can constitute real poetry." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 295, ibid).
With this observation he offers quotations from Bhamaha (i.e. Bhamaha I. 1517). If either of the two, viz. word and sense, is inferior, poetry does not take shape. To bring home this point, the term 'sahitau' - i.e. 'together' is used in the definition, Normally word and sense are always found together, but Kuntaka here expects a special form of 'sahitya' or coming together. It is a unique kind of togetherness. "The uniqueness lies in the fact that the graces due to excellences and figures of speech assuming complex shades of artistic beauty will compete, as it were, with one another in any given instance." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 296, ibid) - "kintu viśistam eva iha sahityam abhipretam, kīdṛśam ? vakrata-vicitra-gunálamkara-sampadām paraspara-spardha'dhirohaḥ" (Vṛtti - VJ. I. 7) -
Kuntaka explains that the dual form used in 'sahitau' of word and sense is denotative of two classes taken as a whole, and not taken as individuals. For, if two particulars were meant, even a single meaningful word-would have to constitute poetry. So, Kuntaka is clear in suggesting that the two, viz. word and sense, as woven in a composition go to form poetry. By 'bandha' or composition is meant the fashioning out through sentences, i.e. use of a number of sentences. 'vyavasthitau' or 'woven, enshrined', suggests the profusion of excellences like 'grace' and of figures of speech: "bandho vākya-vinyāsaḥ. tatra vyavasthitau, viseṣena lavanya"diguṇā'lamkāra śobhina sanniveśeņa kṛtā'vasthānau." (Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 7). Kuntaka further suggests that in the expression 'together' the togetherness implied is presumably the harmony between one word and another, and between one meaning and another. Or else, it will not attract the readers of cultivated taste : "sahitāv ity atra'pi yatha-yukti sajātīyā'pekṣayā sabdasya sabdántareņa vācyasya vacyā'ntareṇa ca sahityam paraspara-spardhitvalakṣaṇam eva vivakṣitam." (Vṛtti,

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51
VJ. I. 7). Kuntaka observes that the absence of concord or togetherness in one type (i.e. set of words) is sure to mean the absence of concord in the other (i.e. meaning) too. Thus meaning though striking in itself, will be no better than a dead body when it is not embodied in an adequately striking word. Similarly, a word which does not have an adequate meaning-content, but which expresses something out of context is to be taken as, 'disease of a poem.' - "paramarthataḥ punar ubhayor apy ekatarasya sahitya-viraho'nyatarasya api paryavasyati. tatha ca arthaḥ samartha-vācaka-a-sadbhāve svātmanā sphurann api mṛta-kalpa eva avatiṣṭhate. śabdo'pi vākyópayogi-vacyā'sambhave vācya'ntara-vācakaḥ san vākyasya vyādhibhūtaḥ pratibhāti." (Vṛtti, V.J. I. 7).
In short, word and sense, as if competing with each other, used in a given composition, make for poetry. For Kuntaka this 'bandha' or style or composition should be such as, "revealing the artistic creativity of the poet" - i.e. 'kavi-vyāpāraśalini'. By 'vakre' or 'out of the way' as an adjective of style or composition is meant that the poetic process involved is different from the well known denotation of words familiar in scientific writing (i.e. sastra). This 'vakrata' is six-fold according to Kuntaka. The poetic style or composition acquires unique beauty therefrom. This adjective of difference from well-known linguistic usage is not enough to define poetry, as it is too wide and may include instances marked by farfetched conceits. So, Kuntaka adds another attribute viz. "giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste."
After elaborating over the definition and scope of poetry, Kuntaka discusses the nature of word and sense in greater detail. He says (VJ. I. 8) & (VJ. I.9):
vācyo'rtho vācakaḥ śabdaḥ prasiddham iti yady api, tathā'pi kavya-mārge'smin paramā'rtho'yam etayoḥ || śabdo vivaksitaikártha-vācako
'nyeșu satsvapi,
arthaḥ sahṛdaya-hṛdayā"hladakārisva-spanda-sundaraḥ ||
"That 'meaning' is what is signified and 'word' is that which signifies is so wellknown that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows:" (VJ. I. 8) (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 300, ibid)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poet's intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be reckoned as 'meaning' (VJ. I. 9) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300, 301 ibid)
Kuntaka also talks of 'word' being dyotaka' and 'vyañjaka'. The exact distinction between these two is not clear, but Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy perhaps renders the terms as 'indicative' and 'suggestive and the two meanings viz. 'dyotya' and 'vyangya' as 'indicated' and 'suggested'. Actually we use 'indicative' for ‘laksaka' and 'indicated' for 'laksya'. This is common practice. These two, viz. 'dyotaka' and 'vyañjaka' varieties are covered by 'vācaka' because, Kuntaka thinks, that the business of a word is to convey meaning, i.e. apprehension of meaning is the main or only function of a word and this attribute is applicable to all types of words including dyotaka' and 'vyañjaka'. Similarly 'dyotya' and 'vyañgya'
varieties of meaning are also covered up by 'vācya' in general. In his gloss on - VJ. I. 8, Kuntaka observes :
"iti, evamvidham vastu prasiddham pratītam - yo vācakaḥ pratyāyakaḥ sa śabdaḥ, yo vācyaścā'bhidheyaḥ so'rtha iti. nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakāv api śabdau sambhavataḥ, tadasamgrahān na avyāptiḥ, yasmād artha-pratīti-kāritva-sāmānyād upacārāt tau api vācakau eva evam dyotya-vyangyayor arthayoh pratyeyarvasāmányāt upacārāt vācyatvam eva."
Thus for Kuntaka a word i.e. a poetic word is only that which is comunicative of the exact intended sense alone. There may be any number of synonymous expressions, i.e. alternate general expressions in any number, with an outwordly identical meaning. But the unique shade of the particular meaning as intended by the poet cannot be conveyed fully by any or all of them. We may observe here that Kuntaka seems to echo the words of Anandavardhana, who in Dhy. I. viii, observes :
"so'rthaḥ tadvyakti-sāmarthya-yogī śabdaś ca kaścana | yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau,
tau sabdārthau mahā-kaveh ll” "That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiry of a first-rate poet." (Trans. K. Kris. Dhv. pp. 15, ibid)

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53 How does a poet arrive at this rare word to convey the exact sense is explained by Kuntaka, while explaining the process of poetic composition resulting in the togetherness aimed at.
Kuntaka (Vịtti on I. 9) observes that when poets are interested in describing a particular feature, they are seen preferring an apt particular word as in the illustration viz. "dvayam gatam samprati" etc. (Kumāra. V. 71). While explaining the illustration in detail, Kuntaka suggests that the poet's preference for words with possessive terminations in respect of proper names of both i.e. 'kalāvatah' and kāntimatī) is also a means of excellence which cannot be conveyed by using their synonyms. He says:
"kavi-vivaksita-višesā'bhidhāna-ksamatyam eva vācakatva-laksanam. yasmāt pratibhāyām tatkālollikhitena kenacit parispandena parissphurantah padārthāh, praksta-prastāvasamucitena kenacit utkarsena vā samācchādita-svabhāvāḥ santo vivaksā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatāpadavim avatarantas tathāvidhavisesa-pratipadanasamarthyena-abhidhänena abhidhīyamānās cetas camatkāritām āpadyante." (Vrtti, on VJ. I. 9) -
"Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 302, ibid)
Kuntaka 'here seems to convey that while composing poetry, an original invention or a flash takes shape in the poet's mind, as a result of which the external worldly objects leave their worldly nature and become objects, emotive in nature, in the poet's heart, and because of this they turn into 'bhāvas' or emotive or aesthetic stuff. Thus through words, that are appropriate to convey this internal vision of the poet, these objects are signified. Thus, they become objects of aesthetic delight for the sympathetic souls. Two things happen in this process. First, on account of the poet's original invention, the external worldly objects turn into objects of relish, and with the help of the same flash the poet is able to convey his internal stuff in words of poetry. These words are having the capacity to signify exactly what the poet intends to do. Kuntaka says that when the objects first appear in the poet's imagination, they are originally of the nature of a rough

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA stone; they come to be finally polished by the poet in the course of being embodied in beautiful language, and strike the men of taste as a precious diamond, fully polished. - He observes (Vịtti, on VJ. I. 7)
"yasmāt alamkāreņa aprastuta-praśamsā laksanena, anyā'padeśatayā sphuritam eva kavi-cetasi prathamam ca pratibhā-pratibhāsamāna-ghatita-pāsāna-sakalakalpa-mani-prakhyam eva vastu, vidagdhakavi-viracita-vakra-vākyopā”rūdham śāņollidha-maņi-manoharatayā tadvidāhlādakāri-kāvyatvam adhirohati."
About the vācya-signified-meaning in poetry, Kuntaka elaborates : (Vitti, VJ. I. 9)
"arthaś ca vācya-lakṣaṇaḥ kidriśaḥ ? kāvye yah sahsdayā”hlādakāri-svaspandasundaraḥ. sahr'dayāḥ kāvyā’rthavidaḥ teşām āhlādam ānandam karoti yas tena svaspandena atmiyena svabhāvena sundarah, sukumārah. tad etam uktam bhavati-yady api padā'rthasya nānāvidha-dharma-khacitatvam sambhavati tathā'pi tathāvidhena dharmena sambandhaḥ samākhyāyate yah sahrdayā”hlādamā"dhātum ksamate. tasya ca tadā”hlāda-sāmarthyam sambhāvyate yena kācid eva svabhāva- mahattā rasa-parīposā'rgatvam vā vyaktim āsādayati.”
"Coming to meaning, what is its speciality in poetry ? That is precisely what is meant by saying that, that alone which possesses such refreshing beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers, is to be reckoned 'meaning'. The readers referred to are those sensitive to poetic beauty. That which delights them by its own refreshing beauty is the nature of meaning in poetry. To put it in other words; although an object may be qualified to diverse attributes, the poet will select, only one of them which is capable of delighting sensitive readers. Its capacity to delight is referred on the basis of the rare grandeur added to the subject in the poet's treatment or the force added to the literary sentiment developed." (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 304, ibid). After thus clarifying his opinion about 'word' and 'meaning', Kuntaka suggests :
"ubhau etāv alamkāryau tayoḥ punaḥ alamkrtiḥ | vakroktir eva vaidagdhya
bhangībhanitiḥ ucyate 11” (V.J. I. 10) "Both these are the 'adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech”. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 306, ibid)
‘Both these' refer to words and meanings. They are to be taken as subjects of ornamentation for their special appeal. Their ornament - i.e. ornament for both word and sense - is only one viz. 'artistic turn of speech? This stands for a charming

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Definition and Scope of Poetry and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and quite different from familiar usage. Thus, artistic utterence itself makes for ornament. The poetic process itself is the real ornament. So, it is wrong to presume that word and sense are on one side and that they are to be later connected to some ornamentation which lies separate on the other side. Striking turn of expression itself is ornament which is not external to word and sense. It is inherent in the poetic process, it is natural to a poet's speech; it is an inborn quality.
Further elaborating the concept of 'sāhitya' or togetherness of word and sense that make for poetry, Kuntaka (VJ. I. 16) observes :
"sabdarthau sahitau eva pratītau sphurataḥ sadā || sahitāv iti tāv eva
kim apūrvam vidhīyate ll” "When it is so obvious that word and meaning are ever experienced jointly, what is the special import of mentioning it in the definition).” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 310, ibid) -
The idea is that the intimate relation of word and meaning is inherent. What then is the special significance of mentioning this togetherness in the definition ?
The point is that here this innate intimate relationship is not meant. This relationship is found even in Panini's aphorisms and even in irrelevant talking of a cart-driver also. This is not covered by this special 'sāhitya’. For in that case we need not go for the descipline of sāhitya, its purpose being served even by the desciplines of grammar, exegesis and logic also. But then even this difference is also well known. What is the purpose of saying it again ? Kuntaka, with a touch of pride replies : (Vịtti, on I. 16, V.J.) :
"What we call sahitya has been invariably referred to by that name in the long course of the history of poetics and yet, so far, there has not been a single scholar who has devoted his attention to explaining even a little of this concept, although the concept itself is very interesting, representing as it does the highest watermark of the poetic art. So, let us undertake for the delight of the bee-like critics, a consideration of the strikingly beautiful essence of the concept underlying all compositions of the best poets and impressing us as containing the collective beauty of the ambroisal drops to be found in the lotus-heart of Sarasvati, the goddess of poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 310, 311, ibid).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA As compared to Anandavardhana's flow of words which like that of the great Adi Sankara, and which matches with the pure and serene flow of the Gangā, Kuntaka's verbocity makes his effort less remarkable.
Explaining this special togetherness of word and sense, Kuntaka observes : (V.J. I. 17):
"sāhityam anayoh sobhāśālitām prati kā’py asau | anyūna-anatiriktatva
manohāriņy avasthitiḥ ||” “The sāhitya or mutual coherence between word and meaning in respect of beauty is nothing but a unique poetic usage, involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful." . (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 311, ibid).
So, for Kuntaka, what is meant by 'sāhitya' is not merely the mutual conherence necessarily found between word and sense, but their extra-ordinary efficiency in artistic usage of the poet to bring joy to the man of taste. The attribute, viz. 'the usage involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful is placed to suggest that the two are competing with each other, as it were, to produce delight. Between the two, there should be no excess nor deficiency in respect of the contribution of either.
Kuntaka elaborates the idea as given above by citing three 'antara-ślokas (= nos, 34, 35, 36 under VJ. I. 17, pp. 25, ibid) in which he observes :
“The rise of excellences like 'sweetness' in harmony with the 'style', the employment of figures endowed with abundant artistic beauty; (34)
The full development of 'sentiments' in keeping with the prescribed 'modes' - when all these are competitively (= spardhayā) present in both word and meaning; (35)
We have the quintessence of speech classified as word etc., and causing delight to the reader by its beauty. It is this which is designated here as 'sāhitya'. (36) - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 312, ibid)
Kuntaka says that the four śāstras of grammar, exegesis, logic and poetics are also of help to every sentence-construction. Among these, in his opinion, poetics is of supreme importance. It confers a beauty of its own on a composition in the absence of which we miss beauty.

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Kuntaka suggests (Vs. 37-40; VJ. I. 17 Vrtti) in the antaras'lokas that he will now onwards discuss that element which produces delight in sensitive readers, even by the beauty of its style (= bandha), even if it is lacking in thoughtful content, just like melodious music; the element which is relished in its entirety whithout distinction of word and sentence import after the initial grasping of primary meaning, even like the unique savour of a sweet drink (panakaswadavat), by men of taste; the element without which a composition would appear lifeless to critics, like a body without life, or like life without vitality; - the element from the presence of which creative freshness of speech proceeds, the beauty of which is grasped only by the men of taste. This element Kuntaka takes up for discussion now onwards.
After a detailed discussion of the exact import of 'sahitya' the general nature of art as revealed in the poetic process is explained by Kuntaka: (V.J., I. 18):
"Art in the poetic process is divisible into six categories. Each one of them may have numerous subdivisions, every subdivision striking one by a new shade of beauty." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 313, ibid)
kavi-vyāpāra-vakratva-prakārāḥ sambhavanti şat |
pratyekam bahavo bhedāḥ
teṣām vicchitti-śobhinaḥ ||
The process of creative poets is poetry itself - kavīnām vyāpāraḥ kāvya-kriyālakṣaṇaḥ, (vṛtti, on V.J., I. 18). Its art distinguishes it from other forms of composition. The main categories are six, having numerous sub-divisions.
-
Kuntaka enumerates six art-forms or 'vakrata' as: (V.J., I. 19, 20, 21) 'varṇavinyāsa-vakratā' or art in arrangement of syllables; 'pada-pūrvárdha-vakratā' or art in the base-form of substantives; 'pratya-vakrata' i.e. art in inflection forms, 'vākyavakrata' i.e. art in a whole sentence, which has a thousand-varieties and which takes in its fold the whole lot of poetic figures; 'prakaraṇa-vakrata' i.e. art in a section of a work, and 'prabandha-vakrata' i.e. art revealed in a whole composition.
It may be noted that Kuntaka has practically covered up all vyañjakas or suggesters as pointed out by Anandavardhana in his Dhv. III. 16 and at other places scattered over the whole of his Dhv. The Dhv. III. 16 reads as :

"sup-tin-vacana-sambandhaiḥ
tathā kāraka-śaktibhiḥ |

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA krt-taddhita-samāsaiś ca
dyotyo'laksya-kramaḥ kvacit 11". It is one thing that Anandavardhana has harnessed all agents to a direct or indirect suggestion of emotion or aesthetic delight-rasa, while Kuntaka is virtually supporting this position. For Anandavardhana case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes and also compounds become conveyers of suggestion of ‘alaksya-krama-dhvani - i.e. suggestion with imperceptible sequence, i.e. what we may term 'rasādi-dhvani' Kuntaka has also covered up any number of instances of what goes und name of abhidhā or pure expression, and also laksaņā i.e. deviation, which for Anandavardhana also, become instruments of vyañjanā. A number of illustrations from the Dhv. are also accepted by Kuntaka to explain and illustrate this or that sub-variety of vakratā. It makes an interesting study to examine illustrations, especially from Kālidāsa being treated by both these great critics. A comparative study of the approach of these two stalwarts to the great Kālidāsa promises to be an interesting journey.
After this Kuntaka turns his attention to style or diction of composition at V.J., I. 22, wherein he observes :
vācya-vācaka-saubhāgyalāvanya-pariposakaḥ | vyāpāra-śālī vākyasya
vinyāso bandha ucyate.” “Diction is the name given to the art of sentence-construction which is congenial to heighten inner and outer charm of both 'meaning' and 'word' and which is at the same time a partaker of the poetic process.” (Trans. pp. 324, ibid).
Here, in place of the traditional names of excellences, Kuntaka uses new names such as 'saubhāgya' and 'lāvanya’. The former stands for inner charm, which is the fruit of dynamic imagination which causes delight of the heart : "saubhāgyam pratibhā-samrambha-phala-bhūtam, cetanacamatkāritva-laksanam”, (vrtti on V.J. I. 22), while the latter i.e. 'lāvanya' is explained as : "sanniveśa-saundaryam" i.e. the beauty of arrangement-which makes for the outer charm. 'Bandha' i.e. diction makes for both these.

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. At V.J., I. 23, Kuntaka proceeds to explain the term 'tad-vid-ählāda-kāritva' i.e. the quality of delighting men of taste, which is used in his definition of poetry given in V.J., I. 7. He has already explained the other three elements viz. 'meaning' (i.e. arthah), 'word' (i.e. sabdah) and 'artful expression', i.e. 'vakrokti', or ‘alamkarana'. Kuntaka says that poetry has a power that brings delight to the connoisseurs. This is other than 'meaning' i.e. content, 'word' i.e. language, and artful expression i.e. ornament. These three do contribute to excellence in poetry but Kuntaka says that there is something else also viz. beauty which is beyond these three : "tad-vidāhlāda kāritvam kāvya-vid-ānanda-vidhāyitvam | kīdņiśam ? vācya-vācakavakrokti-tritayā-'tiśayottaram |”(Vịtti, on I. 23, V.J.). Kuntaka holds it as the fourth principle having its own distinct nature and excellence. Its charm carries a unique unfailing appeal. Uniqueness consists in its being felt only by men of taste. It is like perfume sweetly surrounding an object : Vịtti on I. 23 runs as :
"svarūpeṇa atiśayena ca svarūpeṇa anyat kim api tattvā'ntaram etad atiśayena etasmāt tritayad api lokottaram iti arthah. anyac ca kīdịśam ? kim api āmodasundaram 1. kim api avyapadeśyam sahridaya-hridaya-samvedyam āmodaḥ sukumāra-vastu-dharmaḥ, rañjakatvam nāma, tena sundaram, rañjakatvaramanīyam ”
We may observe that here we can read the impressions of Anandavardhana's famous uttering, viz. “vibhāti lāvanyam iva anganāsu” (Dhy. I. 4)
After thus discussing at length the definition and scope of poetry in its full concept, Kuntaka observes that there are three styles in poetry which serve the poets as high-roads and these three are the sukumāra i.e. elegant, vicitra i.e. brilliant and madhyama i.e. the mixture of these two. This he gives in VJ. I. 24 :
"santi tatra trayo mārgāḥ kavi-prasthāna-hetavah sukumāro vicitraś ca
madhyamaś ca ubhayātmakaḥ 11”. He is clear that they are three only and neither two nor four. They are the stimulators of creative process in poets and are therefore responsible for the creation of poetry itself. Kuntaka has correlated them with a poet's creative power, his genius, his nature and refuses to link them with any geographical regions. This will be discussed by us in greater detail later in volume II, but for the present we may say that Kuntaka, as compared to the vyañjanā-biased criticism of

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Anandavardhana, has opted for a more broadbased scheme and held 'kavya', which theoratically shuns classification, as only 'kavikarma' or poet's creation. Though of course, without any outward gradation even in Kuntaka we find leanings towards Anandavardhana's rasa-vyañjanā, and this is borne out by the practical poemoriented criticism which Kuntaka works out even in cases of varna-vinyāsa-vakratā.
Kșemendra : In his Kavi-kanthābharana Ksemendra discusses only the external factors concerning poetry, while in Aucitya-vicāra-carcā he touches an absolutely internal condition viz. faucitya' or 'propriety concerning the concept of poetry. He has not attempted to construct any definition of poetry but has concentrated on a very important concept or thought-current concerning the basic idea of poetry. He has called it to be the very life of rasa-oriented poetry. His fuller discussion concerning the propriety or 'aucitya' in all its details has a basic concern with 'rasa' or aesthetic pleasure only. But this does not mean that he has embarked upon a totally new and original thought current or ideology concerning literary criticism. He has tried to put in focus, perhaps with a greater emphasis, whatever was laid down originally by Bharata and approved and supported by Anandavardhana and in his own turn by Abhinavagupta. We will discuss this thought-current or concept of 'aucitya' i.e. propriety in due course later in Vol. II but here, suffice it so say that Ksemendra takes 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure as the 'soul of poetry and 'aucitya', ‘propriety stands for the 'jīvita' i.e. life-force - prāņāḥ - of poetry. Keeping this element of aucitya at the centre does not stand to provide an independent path of literary criticism. It is not a new dimension so to say. Precisely because of this, we do not find any independent school of 'aucitya' and its followers, as in case of dhvani'. We may say that this is only a branch or an off-shoot of dhvani theory and Kșemendra turns out to be a spiritual heir, a 'mānasa-putra' of the great Abhinavagupta his guru, and therefore also of Anandavardhana.
Bhoja : In his Sarasvatī-kanthā”bharaṇa (SKA) and Spingāra-prakāśa, (śr. Pra) Bhoja has discussed the concept of 'sāhitya' and 'kāvya' and has also attempted definition of the same.
At Sarasvati-kanthābharņa (= S.K.Ā.; N.S. Edn. '34, Bombay) I. 2 he defines 'kavya' as :
“nirdosam gunavat kāvyam
alamkāraiḥ alamkrtam, rasánvitam kaviḥ kurvan kīrtim prītim ca vindati.”

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"The poet acquires both fame and pleasure by composing poetry which is bereft of (poetic) blemishes, qualified by (poetic) excellences ornamented by ornaments, and is united (or is full of) with 'rasa' i.e. sentiment (or emotional stuff, or aesthetic pleasure)."
Thus Bhoja has underlined the four attributes of poetry viz. doșa-hāna i.e. avoiding blemishes, 'guna-ādāna' i.e. acquisition of poetic excellences, 'alamkarayoga' or having ornaments or figures of speech and 'rasa-a-viyoga' i.e. non-exclusion of rasa. But he has not attempted the basic definition of 'kavya' or poetry here, and for that we have to look into the discussion read in his Śringāra-prakāśa. (= Sr Pra) (Edn. Josyer Vol. I-IV; Mysore)
-
Bhoja in his Sr. Pra. explains 'sahitya' as relation between word and meaning and this relation is very wide so as to include even sastra i.e. scientific literature. He holds that 'kavya' is togetherness of word and meaning as suggested in the famous definition (of Bhamaha) that takes 'kāvya' or poetry as both 'word' and 'meaning' taken together. He says (Sr. Pra. Vol. I, pp. 2 Edn. Josyer), "tat (= kavyam) punaḥ śabdárthayoḥ sahityam amananti; tad yathā, 'sabdarthau sahitau kāvyam'."
This relation of word and meaning called 'sahitya' is twelve-fold according to Bhoja. Eight relations out of these twelve are normal relations, and the remaining four are special that go to make this 'sahitya' i.e. togetherness as 'kavya' or poetry. In reply to a querry as to 'what makes for sahitya ?' Bhoja observes that, 'the relation of word and meaning makes for 'sahitya'. This relation is twelve-fold such as : abhidha, vivakṣā, tātparya, pravibhāga vyapekṣā, sāmarthya, anvaya, ekárthibhāva, and doṣahāna, guṇopādāna, alamkārayoga, and rasa-a-viyoga. (Sr. Pra. Vol. I, pp. 2, 3).
In the beginning of Ch. VII Bhoja once again mentions these twelve relations. Thus in a wider sense of 'sahitya' or 'togetherness of word and sense', Bhoja seems to cover even the use of language that we come across in loka-vyavakara i.e. day-to-day parlance, and also in scientific literature that we term as 'sastra'. In the special sense of 'sahitya', Bhoja enumerates the last four which only go to make for poetry i.e. 'kavya', proper. It is noteworthy that following the tradition of Bhāmaha and Anandavardhana, Bhoja mentions both 'sabda' i.e. word and 'artha' i.e. 'sense' in the definition of 'kavya' i.e. poetry. We, however, may choose to call the first eight relations not by the name of 'sahitya', but by the simple reference of 'vānmaya' i.e. all literature in general, i.e. technical and also that which we come across in our worldly context.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The wider relationship of word and meaning as suggested by Bhoja can be shown in a tebular form as given below. The first eight varieties of togetherness of word and sense are termed as "kevala-sabda-sambandha-śaktayah” by Bhoja, while the latter four are termed as "sāpeksa-sambandha-saktayah" i.e. word-powers depending on relationships that are 'relative to something in nature. The table is shown as :
Kāvya i.e. poetry sabda
n t artha
sahitya (= word)
(= twelvefold) (= togetherness, twelvefold)
vyākarana-mülaka i.e. based on gram- kāvyagata-i.e. based on poetry; fourmar (= Eight-fold togetherness depend- fold, viz. (i) dosa-hāna or = absence of ing on grammar)
poetic blemishes (ii) gunópādānam, or (= presence of poetic excelleness) (iii) alamkāra-yogaḥ (= use of poetic turns of expression; figures; & (iv) rasa-aviyoga i.e. absence of disconnection with aesthetic experience.
kevala-sabda-śaktayaḥ - i.e. pure sāpeksa-sabda-śaktayaḥ or four relaword-powers-of four types viz. (i) abhidhā tive word-powers such as (i) vyapeksā = expression; denotation; (ii) vivaksā = i.e. special expectancy (ii) sāmarthya = desire to express meaning (iii) tātparya = potentiality (iii) anvaya = correlation & purport (i.e. sentence sense) (iv) (iv) ekārthībhāvah = having identical pravibhāgah = classification, part, portion meaning.
Of these, the first eight have been discussed by Bhoja in the VIIth and VIIIth chapters of his Sr. pra, and the last four are discussed in Ch. IX of Sr. pra. These last four relationships are termed as 'samyak-prayoga' i.e. 'right or proper-usage' and he has observed that, “samyak-prayogaś ca asya tadā upa-padyate, yadā dosahānam, guno-pādānam, alamkārayogah, rasá-'viyogaś ca bhavati', i.e. right usage takes place when there is avoidance of poetic blemishes, acceptance of poetic excellences, acceptance of poetic turns of expression i.e. figures of speech, and absence of disconnection with aesthetic pleasure. (Sr. Pra. Vol. II, Ch. IX, pp. 305).
Thus Boja's concept of 'sāhitya' i.e. togetherness of word and sense is very wide. He has absorbed all thought-currents promulgated by ālamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha, down to Anandavardhana and Dhananjaya-Dhanika, in his Sr. Pra. He

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has welcomed the concept of 'alamkara' or 'source of beauty as advanced by Bhāmaha and Dandin and has accepted in toto the definition of kavya viz. 'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam' from Bhamaha. He has practically accepted everthing mentioned in Dandin's Kävyädarśa, while with reference to the concepts of guna i.e. poetic excellence, and alamkāra as poetic figures, and their inter-relation, he has accepted Vamana's views. It seems Bhoja is also inspired by Vamana in mentioning the two attributes viz. ‘doṣa-hāna' and 'guṇó-pādāna', with reference to 'kavya'. On the other hand by relognizing all poetic figures as forms of 'vakrokti' or poet's special turn of expression, Bhoja seems to be indebted to Bhāmaha. He has called 'rasa' and 'gunas' as 'alamkara' in the wider sense, in keeping with Dandin's observation. (Sr. Pra. Vol. II, Ch. XI, pp. 448).
Following Vamana, he seems to attach a comparatively greater importance to the thought-current of 'guna' than with reference to 'alamkara'. 'Rasa-aviyoga' or absence of disconnection from rasa is the most important attribute of kavya for Bhoja, and thus he observes in his 'Sarasvati - kantha"bharana (V. 8) that :
"vakroktiś ca rasoktis' ca svabhāvoktiś ca vanmayam | sarvāsu grāhiṇīm tāsu
rasoktim pratijānate ||"
Vaktrokti or beautiful expression, rasokti or expression charged with aesthetic delight, and svabhavokti or natural description, (all these three) make for literature. In all these expressions 'rasokti' is said to be (principal) factor (that goes to make for kāvya).
Thus, Bhoja has attached supreme importance to 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic delight in poetry, all the time also welcoming the thought currents of 'dosa', 'guna' and 'alamkara' as floated by his predecessors. He has also accepted the concept of 'dhvani' from Anandavardhana in his own style. It may be noted however, that with Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi we can also raise some objection against Bhoja's use of the term "rasokti", for in fact 'rasa' or aesthetic delight is anything but an 'ukti' or expression. Though of course in Bhoja's favour it can be stated that here by 'rasokti' can be understood a poetic expression, charged with 'rasa' or aesthetic delight. It is not rasasya-uktiḥ but it is 'rasa-mayī uktiḥ'. But we will go to observe later especially appreciating Dr. Rewaprasad's views as mentioned in his "Kāvyalamkārakārikā", a modern work on Sanskrit poetics, that he has some quarrel even against this explanation. This will be discussed later in greater details in a special appendix (in Vol. II).

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
Agnipurana: in the seventh verse of its 337th chapter, the Agnipurāṇa attempts the definition of poetry which is qualified by clear alamkāras, guņas and is bereft of dosas :
64
"kavyam sphurad alamkāram gunavad doșa-varjitam."
It should be noted that we have no faith in placing Agnipurana as an ancient document prior to Dandin and we honestly believe that Agnipurana carries clear influence of Dandin, and other earlier alamkarikas. Actually the author seems to be a devout follower of Dandin and hardly deserves the status of an independent thinker on literary aesthetics.
Mahima Bhaṭṭa: Among the near posterior writers of Anandavardhana, the names of Kuntaka and Mahima figure at the top. Of course, Abhinavagupta also kept the tradition of dhvani running high, but perhaps he was a junior contemporary of Kuntaka, and we accept this observation of Dr. K. Krishna-moorthy, but Abhinavagupta was a protegonist of vyañjana-dhvani-rasa thought-current and Kuntaka had slightly different ideas while Mahima, not unlike Bhatta Nayaka, challenged the very concept of vyañjana-dhvani, though of course accepting the pratīyamāna artha or implicit sense and explaining it in his own way and accepting also the supremacy of the concept of rasa, but not through the agency of vyañjanā.
Mahima has stoutly opposed the concept of vyañjanā as a word-power and has tried to give a totally new direction to the definition and scope of kavya or poetry. Anandavardhana, as we know, accepted the thought-currents promulagted by his earlier masters and tried to charge them with a new orientation of vyañjana and thus added a new dimension to literary criticism and aesthetics in general, a new direction, so to say. We will go to see later how this vyañjanā-prasthāna was challenged and opposed vehemently by critics such as Bhatta Nayaka in his now not available work called "Hṛdaya-darpaṇa", drafted specially for demolition of dhvani-theory i.e. 'dhvani-dhvamsa'. This challange and opposition to vyañjana is pursued with a greater gusto by Mahima, the protegonist of kāvyānumiti i.e. poetic inference. His sole object is to defy and demolish the concept of vyañjană which he has done in his work named "Vyaktiviveka" or discriminating thinking concerning vyañjanā. Instead, he favours 'anumiti' or 'inference' which he calls 'kāvyánumiti' or poetic inference. He establishes a new mile-stone on the high-way of literary aesthetics but he was not lucky enough to get staunch and strong supporters as Abhinavagupta in case of Anandavardhana, and so his lonely voice was, say, muffed up in the chorus of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa theory. His shout in favour of poetic inference died down

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with him and he was subjected to fierce, though undue as we will observe later, criticism advanced by Vägdevatā'vatāra Mammața, and Viśvanatha and the rest. We know that Dandin did not prefer the idea of putting poetry to logical test and called this approach 'karkasa' i.e. rough or, insensitive, and therefore unwelcome in the domain of literary aesthetics, while Mahimā seeking inspiration from Bhamaha, who, out of his disgust and scron for a number of Duta-kāvyas following the pattern of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, and himself being an intellectual of rare qualities, had considered a number of poetic blemishes from the point of view of logic, and supported the notion of kavya-nyāya or poetic inference, also establishes 'kāvyānumiti' i.e. poetic inference at the centre of literary aesthetics and makes a valiant effort to get it stamped as the be all and end-all of poetry. We can observe that we are perhaps not off the mark, if we do not consider Mahima as the first protegonist of poetic or aesthetic inference or kävyánumiti, as there were supporters of kävyánumiti or poetic-inference even prior to him, of course, the un-named aesthetes whose ideas were promulgated by the likes of Śrī. Śankuka and also those who figure as holders of prima-facie view the naiyāyikas - who oppose vyañjanā and whose views are considered thoughtfully and denounced by Anandavardhana under Dhv. III. 33, in the aloka.
The obvious purpose of the auother of Vyaktiviveka is to demolish the principle of vyañjana i.e. poetic suggestion. He has never discarded the fact of implicit sense or the 'pratīyamāna artha' in poetry, nor has he challanged the element of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure. On the contrary, he feels that these two are arrived at by poetic inference kāvyā'numiti which is different from 'tarka'numiti' i.e. logic of the śāstras. He accepts only the power of direct expression i.e. abhidha in case of a word, and holds that whatever goes under the name of indicated sense or 'laksyártha', and suggested sense or 'vyangyártha' are arrived at by the process of poetic inference or 'kavya'numiti'. It is precisely for this reason that he has severely criticised Anandavardhana's definition of 'dhvanikavya' (Dhv. I. 13) and has pointed out exactly ten blemishes in this definition. We will consider all this in full details. But before we appreciate his presentation, we will look in for the definition of poetry as attempted by him at Vyakti-viveka (= V.V.) (Edn. Rewaprasad, chow-skt. Sr. Varanasi, "64) I. 25. He observes:

-
-
"vācyas tad anumito vā yatra'rtho'rthántaram prakāśayati | sambandhataḥ kutaścit
sā kāvyā'numitir ity uktā ||"

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "That is designated as kavya'numiti i.e. poetic inference, wherein either the directly expressed sense or a sense inferred therefrom, flashes forth another meaning, based on any relation."
OR "That is called kāvyānumiti' wherein the literal meaning or the inferred meaning gives rise to another meaning due to some kind of relation between them.” (Trans. C. Rajendran, pp. 66, 67 “A study of Mahima Bhatta's Vyaktiviveka" - Edn. '91, Calicut).
Thus, Mahimā stands in support of the concept of poetry being both word and sense together. For Anandavardhana the principal suggested sense is the soul of poetry and is termed dhvani'. With this in mind Anandavardhana has attempted the definition of poetry gifted with principal suggested sense, i.e. what he calls 'dhvanikāvya', as follows :
“yatrā'rthaḥ śabdo vă tam artham upasarjanīkrta-svārthau | . vyanktaḥ, kāvya-viśeṣaḥ sa
dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ 11" (Dhy. I. 13) "That kind of poetry, wherein the conventional) meaning renders itself secondary, or the conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the intended) (or) implied meaning, is designated by the learned as Dhvani or “suggestive poetry". (Trans. K. Kris. pp. ibid), (Edn. '74, Dharwad)
Anandavardhana takes dhvanikävya as a special variety of poetry. He attempted to give a definition only of this variety perhaps because he wanted to convey to the younger poets that now that the definition and scope of what he terms as dhvanikāvya have been laid down clearly, following the principle of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa, they i.e. the younger poets had to strive for that only, or, as he later concedes, for the next variety of poetry called the ‘gunībhūta-vyangyakāvya' or poetry with subordinated suggested sense. He only theoretically talks of a third variety of poetry called the 'citra' kāvya, wherein only the directly expressed sense is a source of some beauty. He does not recommend it but gives a concession that those who are in a stage of primarily trying out their hand at drafting poetry may have a go at it. We will discuss these varieties when we deal with the topic of classification of poetry. For the present, suffice it to say, that by keeping vyañjanā or the suggestive word-power in the centre, Ānandavardhana

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67 talked of varieties of poetry with vyañjana either dominating or remaining subordinate to the other powers of word, and thus he added new dimension to literary criticism. But, with all this, this theory of vyañjanā was not received with equal acceptance by literary aesthetes, and we have seen how Kuntaka, though not opposing vyañjanā openly, placed his own views of vakrokti with great confidence and fanfare. On the other hand Mahimā openly revolted against this concept of vyañjanā and applied all his energy in demolishing the same, though without expected success or support. He raised his voice to the highest pitch, aiming at Anandavardhana's definition of dhvani-kāvya'. He expanded the horizon of literary criticism by inculcating śāstrīya or scientific colouring in this field, which can match with the highest traditions of the nyāyadarśana. He tried to find ten faults with Anandavardhana's definition of dhvanikāvya though of course, all the blemishes pointed out by him, do not carry equal merit. But the fact remains that in the ananda-vātra or journey to bliss-of Ānandavardhana, Mahimā plays the role of a Jayad-ratha and tries to stall its forward march. As observed earlier, misfortune intervened and he did not get lieutenants to carry on his anti-vyañjanā crusade in his absence. It is no small achievement on his part that such stalwarts as the great Mammata and Visvanatha had taken special pains to refute the anumiti-vāda, though of course to be candid to Mahimā, we will have to accept the fact that what these stalwarts refuted was not the intended kāvā'numiti or poetic inference of Mahimā but anumiti in general or say, tarkā'numiti, superimposed on Mahima's kavya'numiti. It may also be observed that on occasions - the difference between Anandavardhana and Mahimā looks as thin as that deciphered between Anandavardhana and Bhatta Nayaka, in the estimation of Abhinavagupta.
Mahimā finds ten faults (w. I) in the definition of dhvanikavya as advanced by Anandavardhana. They are : 'arthasya viśistatvam', 'śabdaḥ saviśesanah, vyakti, dhvanih, 'vā'sabdah, the dual in 'vyanktah', tadah pumstva, the use of the specific term viz. kāvya-višeṣaḥ, and the plural in 'sūribhiḥ' i.e. vacanam ca kathana-kartuḥ. We will examine all this in details as below :
(1) Ānandavardhana has added the attribute 'upasarjanīkrta-sva’ to the expressed meaning. Mahimā feels that this is redundant because whenever there is apprehension of the implicit sense, the expressed sense is necessarily subordinate to
Thus Mahimā does not accept the concept of 'gunībhūta-vyangya' or subordinated suggested sense, because for him no suggested sense worth its name can ever be subordinate to the expressed sense.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA This is an interesting situation. In our appreciation of Kuntaka's position, we had observed that eventhough without rebelling against the concept of vyañjanā and the supremacy of only dhvani, Kuntaka had exerted to press the point that even an expression pure and simple, provided it is 'vicitra' i.e. artistic, stands on the same pedestal as is a principally conveyed suggested sense. Thus Kuntaka's vicitrā abhidhā' was inclusive of vyañjanā, both when the latter is either principal or subordinate. But Mahimā, in his zeal to squash vyañjanā and dhvani, actually goes a step further than Anandavardhana, who was liberal enough to accept the possibility of an implicit sense arrived at through vyañjanā, to be less charming than the expressed sense arrived at through pure poetic expression i.e. abhidhā. What Mahimā says is that abhidhā and abhidhā'rtha or expressed sense can never be more charming than vyangyārtha which he terms as 'anumeyártha' arrived at by the channel of kávyā'numiti or poetic inference. While Kuntaka was liberal enough to put the same theoretically on equal footing, while Anandavardhana accepted the superiority of either, here is Mahimā, the greater champion of the implicit sense, who refuses to recognize the case of an expressed sense as superior to the implicit under special context. Thus we may say that Mahima's approach seems to be narrower and more rigid as compared to the liberal stance of both Anandavardhana and Kuntaka and actually by taking such an extreme position, Mahimā becomes a greater champion of vyañjanā, which he calls by the name "kāvyā'numiti", there being no virtual distinction between these two positions as
ill be explained later by Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhityadarpana. Thus in his effort to undo vyañjanā, Mahimā re-establishes the same with a greater gusto, of course, in a different garb.
The second objection Mahimā raises is with reference to sabda - i.e. word. A word cannot be instrumental in giving meaning other than only primary. "sabdaḥ punaḥ anupādeya eva. tasya svārthā’bhidhānam antareņa vyāpārántaraanupapatteḥ, upapādayisyamāṇatvāt. (vrtti on V.V. I. 6, pp. 16, Edn. Rewaprasad, Varanasi, 64). It can make its meaning subordinate only when it is a quote, i.e. quoted for conveying some-one-else's view : na ca tasya anukarana-vyatirekeņa upasarjanīkệtā'rthatvam sambhavati - (pp. 16, ibid) (vrtti on v. I. 6). We may observe that there is a lot of truth in Mahimā's position, when he convinces us that a means is always subordinate to an end and the word which is used as a means only to convey a given meaning is necessarily subordinate to it : yo hi yadartham upādīyate, na asau tam eva upasarjanī karoti iti vaktum yuktam. (pp. 17, ibid).

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
Naturally the pot is subordinate to the water it contains. Thus there is the blemish called 'asambhava' - impossibility, with reference to Anandavardhana's definition.
Mahimā has pointed out, as observed earlier, ten faults in the definition of dhvanikāra, which he summarizes in kārikās I. 23, 24 (v.v.) (pp. 110, ibid) as under:
arthasya viśistatvam, śabdaḥ sa-viśesanah, tadah pumstvam dvivacana-va-sabdau ca, vyaktir dhvanirnāma, kāvya-vaisistyam || (I. 23) "vacanañca kathana-kartuḥ kathitā dhvani-lakṣmaṇi daśa dosāḥ || ye tu-anye tadbheda-prabheda laksaņāḥ na te ganitāḥ ||” (I. 24)
Accordingly we examined the second and third blemishes as above. We saw that logically he drives at a point that a means is necessarily subordinate to its end and hence a word, the only use of which is to give its primary meaning alone, has to be subordinate. The attribute 'upasarjanīkrtasva' has thus no chance. But when we look at Anandavardhana's treatment of the variety of dhvani called sabda-śaktimūla-dhvani, we have to accept the speciality of a given word which superimposes a sort of principality upon it, though secondarily. The universal experience to this effort of all men of taste can not be wished away and it has to be remembered that whatever way the literary criticism is advanced, it has its concern with poetry which is an absolutely abstract art and therefore, no rules as hard and fast as rules seen to operate in case of natural sciences, can be expected in case of poetry. A critic has to be liberal and has to take a view in wider context, or else he will do injustice both to poetry and to men of taste in general. So, howsoever logical the stand Mahimā has taken may be, it cannot be defended rigidy and he himself is on his knees when he accepts that his own 'kavyā'numiti' has to be spared the scrutiny of a 'tarkā'numiti'.
"tadaḥ pumstvam” in 'tam artham', i.e. the reference to the suggested sense in the masculine gender is not in harmony with the neuter gender applied to the same in dhvanikāra's earlier kārikā, when at Dhv. I. 6, the words are :
"sarasvatī svādu tad-artha-vastu..." etc., Mahimā observes : (p. 97, ibid) :
“kim ca 'tam iti tadaḥ pumstvena nirdeśaḥ anupapannah.” Here 'tat' has reference to something which is taken up here through context. Mahimā says that the context in Dhv. I. 4 has, "pratiyamānam punah anyad eva" suggesting neuter gender. Same is the case with the expression, "sarasvati svādu tad artha-vastu..." (Dhv. I. 6). Mahimā suggests that to support masculine gender in Dhy. I. 13, we will have to reconstruct the text as "pratīyamānaḥ punaḥ anya eva..." and "sarasvati svādutamam tam artham" etc. which involves greater effort.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Earlier also, Mahima had pointed out that there was 'punarukta dosa' also in the definition because when a word and/or sense is instrumental in giving some other sense, they are automatically subordinate and so the mention of their subordination gives rise to the blemish called 'punar-ukta' or repetition. He also tries to find 'avyāpti dosa' or 'inadequate extent. In his opinion there is suggestion of similarity (i.e. upamāna-upameya-bhāva) in figures such as 'dīpaka' (or, Illuminater).
The alamkāras such as these are not covered up in the definition (Dhv. I. 13) because the alamkāras are taken as identical with "abhidhā', the power of expression of a word, and not as 'word' or 'meaning' itself. So, as the subordination of 'word' and 'sense' is clearly mentioned in the definition (i.e. in Dhv. I. 13), the same should have been clearly mentioned with reference to 'abhidhā also. And if it is felt that the clear mention of abhidhā' is redundant, then the same of 'sabda' also should be taken as equally useless. Says he :
"kim ca, yathā abhidheyo'rthaḥ tad-višesanam ca upāttam, tad-vad abhidhā api upapādanam arhati eva. anyathā yatra, dīpakā"deh alamkārāt alamkārā'ntarasya upamā”deh pratītih tatra dhvanitvam istam na syāt; tat-laksanena avyāpteh
am upagatam, teşām bhangi-bhanitibheda-rupa (pp. 22, ibid).
Dr. Rewaprasadjee has tried to refute Mahimā's point (pp. 24, 25, ibid). He observes that when Mahima uses the term, 'tesām bhangi-rūpatvāt', he seems to echo Kuntaka's expression in the VJ., who he quotes elsewhere directly. Kuntaka at VJ. I. 10 has stated :
"ubhau etau alamkāryau tayoḥ punaḥ alamkrtiḥ,
vakroktiḥ eva, vaidagdhya-bhangi-bhanitiḥ ucyate.” “Both these are ‘adorned. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 306, ibid).
Kuntaka further observes : (vrtti on I. 10, pp. 20, ibid) : “tad idam tātpayam - yat sabdārthau prthag avasthitau na kenā'pi vyatiriktena alamkaranena kimtu, vakratā-vaicitrya-yogitayā abhidhāna-mātram eva anayoh alamkārah, tasyaiva sobhā'tiśaya-kāritvāt." - "Let us sum it up once again : apparently, words and meanings both have their distinct existence in poetry and come to be adorned by something different from themselves. The fact of the matter is that the very process of poetic utterance is constituted by the artistic turns assumed by words and meanings. The poetic process itself, in this sense, is the real ornamentation. For it is extremely delighting in itself.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid). So, the idea is that

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71 both word and sense are to be adorned'. The adornment is vakrokti or artistic expression, which consists of 'vaidagdhya-bhangi-bhaniti' wherein Mahimā takes 'bhangi' as 'vicchitti' i.e. beauty, and “tayā uktih, vicitrā eva abhidhā, vakroktih.” So, "vakratā-vaicitrya-yogitayā abhidhānam eva etayoh alamkārah" is taken by Mahimā as "abhidhā' the famous word-power of expression. Actually 'artistic expression of Kuntaka is not pure abhidhāśakti only, as understood by Mahimā.
Mahimā holds that in such cases as dīpaka alamkāra, the real beauty lies in 'upamā' or simile. So, this dipaka alamkāra itself should be taken as dhvani or, the attribute 'upasarjanīkrtā”tmatva' should have touched such cases as of dīpaka etc. also. Now, because the alamkāras such as dīpaka and the rest are of the form of abhidhā i.e. pure expression only, Anandavardhana should have also mentioned the word 'abhidhā' in the definition of dhvani in Dhv. I. 13. As the dhvanikāra has failed to mention the same, there is 'avyāpti dosa' in the definition, as noted above.
Now the point is that Mahimā takes alamkāras as identical with Sabhidhā' or the power of expression of a word. But this approach cannot be accepted. In fact, alamkāras are such qualities of the apprehension of poetic word and sense, that deliver charm, and that are different from both rasa or sentiment and other suggested meanings. Abhidhā is only the intellectual relationship of the apprehension of word and meaning. This apprehension of word sense rests in mind i.e. antahkarana, or soul i.e. ātman. These two apprehensions, i.e. one each of word and sense, are basically unrelated. The speaker uses one's apprehension of meaning, and to reach the mind of his hearer, he connects it with the apprehension of word. This connection of both apprehensions is termed as abhidhā, or vācakatva, or śakti. This can not be called 'alamkāra' i.e. a figure, as it is bereft of basic charm. The charm i.e. 'vicitratā' is perceived only in the correlation of word - meanings and this perception is of the form of knowledge. When we say 'mukham candrah', there is no charm in the expression of 'mukha' i.e. face, which reveals only the word-sense of 'face', i.e. 'mukha'. The charm consists in the word-sense of 'mukha' being taken as identical with word-sense of 'candra' i.e. moon. This is not 'abhidhā' or the power of expression of a word. But it is 'relation of word-senses'. Thus figures or alamkāras cannot be taken as identical with 'abhidhā' as has been wrongly understood by Mahimā.
Dr. Rewaprasad objects to even Anandvardhana's observation that in dīpaka, upamā alamkāra is not principal because dīpaka is designated as 'dīpaka' and not ‘upamā'. Actually Dr. Rewaprasad holds that even in dīpaka, there is no 'upamā alamkāra', but there is apprehension of only ‘upamāna-upameya-bhāva' i.e. idea of upamāna and upameya. It is precisely to underline this distinction that Abhinavagupta has explained the word 'upamāyāh' used by the dhvanikara as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA equivalent to 'upamānopameyabhāva' i.e. the idea of similitude and not 'upamāalamkāra' or 'expression of similitude'. The notion of being an alamkāra i.e. alamkārakatva does not seem to reside in it and hence it is not an alamkāra, observes Rewaprasadjee. Actually, we feel that when Rewaprasadjee quotes Abhinavagupta as suggesting that by dhvanikāra's expression viz. 'upamāyāh' is meant only ‘upamānopameya-bhāvasya', and not 'upamā-alamkārasya', then why not accept Anandavardhana also to mean exactly that ?
Any way, one thing clearly emerges that Mahimā's observation that 'abhidhā' should also have been mentioned clearly in the definition of dhvani, stands refuted.
Mahimā further observes that the use of the indeclinable viz. 'vā' is yet another blemish. He observes, (pp. 94-95, ibid) : "kim ca atra 'vā'sabdo vikalpā'rtho vā syāt samuccayā'rtho vā. na tävat vikalpā'rthah, paksā'ntaraasambhavasya vyutpăditatvāt. sambhave vā asya dvi-vacana-anupapattiḥ, tayoḥ samuccayā'bhāvāt. yathā.... "sirah śvā kāko vā drupada-tanayo vā parimțset” iti atra bahuvacanasya samuccayā'rthatve yatra sabdā'rthayor ekaikasya vyañjakatvam tatra dhvanitvam istam na syāt.” (pp. 94, ibid).
The indeclinable 'vā' can mean either option (i.e. vikalpa) or conjunction (i.e. samuccaya). But with reference to this context on hand, it cannot mean 'option' because word cannot be considered as an alternate suggestive element along with meaning, because word, as maintained by Mahimā, is capable of rendering only the primary sense and hence it has no power to convey the suggested sense at all. If we accept the other alternative, i.e. if we hold that here 'vā' is used in sense of conjunction, the definition of Anandavardhana would cover only those instances where both word and meaning together become suggestive. In that case the instances of dhvani where either word alone or sense alone conveys the suggested sense will fall out of the scope of dhvani. Again the attribute, viz. "upasarjanīkstasvārthau” will also become useless, because in all poetry both word and meaning, taken together only, become suggestive. Thus, in this situation, the description of only the expressed sense as qualified by the attribute 'upasarjanī krta' will cover all instances of dhvani.
Even this argument of Mahimā taken as a whole falls flat. He rejects the first alternative on the basis of his own assumption that a word has no power except that to convey the primary sense, and rejects the second alternative, resorting to Anandavardhana's stand that both word and sense can individually also convey the suggested sense. To accept a personal position to reject the first alternative and to accept the opponent's position also to reject the second alternative, does not sound logical, but the approach smacks of only personal convenience and a tendency to find fault somehow or other with the opponent. This is just prejudice, pure and

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Definition and Scope of Poetry simple. And we also know that when Anandavardhana talks of the suggestivity of either word or sense alone, he knows that both are necessarily jointly suggestive in poetry and yet to underline the relative greater importance of a given factor, i.e. either word or sense, he gives these options. And in this he is not only more charitable, but more realistic also.
Next, Mahimā observes, and this follows his earlier observation, that the dual form in 'vyanktah' also is a blemish in case the indeclinable 'vā' means option between word and meaning. Grammatically if Vā' governs option, than the verb should be in sigular only as in the illustration viz. "sirah śvā kāko vā drupada tanayo vā parimrśet” - “Either a dog or a crow or the son of Drupada touches the head (of my father)...” (Venisamhāra, III. 22). Here, Mahima examines the defence of the use of dual in ‘vyanktah', in Locana by the great Abhinavagupta, against Bhatta Nayākā's lethal attack in his Hrdaya-darpana. As observed earlier, we have explained Anandavardhana's use of dual as suggested by Abhinavagupta that though in fact the two viz. sound and sense jointly act in poetry, the relative greater importance of either is stressed in 'vā' and their joint natural operation is aimed at in this use of dual. But Mahimā, charged as he is by the enthusiasm to demolish the definition, rejects this explanation suggesting that the cognitions of sound and sense do not take place simultancously and hence the question of their joint operation does not arise at all and also that the sound - śabda-does not have the. power to give any suggested sense beyond only its primary sense: "atra kecin vidvan-māninah dvivacana-samarthanā-manorathā”kşipta-cittatayā ..... tad bhrāntimātra-mūlam, na tattvam iti alam avastu-nirbandhena." (pp. 95, 96, ibid).
As observed earlier Mahimā depicts a biased approach and also perhaps a smaller mind.
Next, Mahimā attacks the very acceptance of vyañjanā' or 'vyakti' in conveying the implicit sense, beyond the literal sense in poetry. Mahimā refers to a definition of 'abhivyakti' or suggestion which suggests that it means, “attainment of the state of being illumined, on the part of an object, real or unreal, simultaneously with the illuminating object, without the requirement of the memory of their mutual connection" : tad uktam -
"sva-jñānena anya-dhi-hetuḥ
siddhe arthe vyañjako mataḥ, yathā dīpo'nyathābhāve ko viseșo'sya kārakāt.” (pp. 80, ibid)

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SAHRDAYALOKA If an object illuminates something else, while illuminating itself, then only it is said to be a suggestor, otherwise what is its difference from a normal cause-effect relationship?
Mahimā explains that abhivyakti of real objects is three-fold : tatra satah abhivyaktih trividhā; tasya traividhyāt.” (pp. 80, ibid). It is thus, either when, “(i) the manifestation of the effect takes place from the material cause in which it pre-exists potentially, e.g, the manifestation of curd from milk, or (ii) there is manifestation of an object with help of a manifester, as in case of a lamp illuminating an object pre-existing in impediments like darkness, but remaining invisible to sight; or (iii) in case of the revival of the impression of an object experienced before, through yet another object invariably connected with it; or through the word that denotes it; e.g. the cognition of fire when we see smoke, and the cognition of cow from its picture, or reflection or representation of the object say a cow, from the word denoting a cow. The manifestation of an unreal object is one of the type of say a rainbow, illumined by the rays of the sun : asatah tu eka-prakārā eva, tasya prakārā'ntara-asambhavāt, yathā arkā”lokādinā indra-cāpā"deh.” (pp. 80, ibid)
Mahimā says that given this three-fold explanation of abhivyakti, the definition of dhvanikāra is faulty for the manifestation of suggested sense cannot be equated with any of these three alternatives.
The apprehension of the suggested sense cannot be included in the first two varieties of manifestation of real objects for it is neither an object of senses like curd, nor does it co-exist in the fashion of a lamp and a pot : “na caital laksanam vācye samgacchate. tathā hi - satóbhivyakteh yada"dyayor arthayor laksanam na pratiyamăneșu ekam api samspraştum ksamate, tasya dadhyader iva indriyavisaya-bhāvā”patti-prasangāt, ghatādeh iva vācyártha-saha-bhāvena idamtā. pratīteh asambhavāt. na ca svarūpa-asamsparsi laksanam bhavati (pp. 81, ibid).
The third type of manifestation is nothing else but reasoning or anumăna. The cognition of something with the help of another, preceded by the memory of their invariable concomitance should be taken as anumāna only and not 'abhivayakti' i.e. manifestation : tsitiyasya astu yallakṣaṇam tad anumānasya eva samgacchate, na vyakteh" (pp. 81, ibid). For in ‘abhivyakti' i.e. manifestation the manifestor is not in need of the recollection of the invariable concomitance with the manifested object. Here, the expressed sense does stand in need of the remembrance of its invariable relation with the suggested sense, otherwise any suggested sense would follow from any expressed sense, which is not the case' : "na ca vācyād arthāt arthántara-pratitih avinābhāva-sambandha-smaranam antarena eva sambhavati; sarvasya api tatpratīti-prasangāt.” (pp. 83, ibid).

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75 In abhivyakti or manifestation, both the 'vyañjaka' (i.e. manifestor) and the vyangya' (i.e. manifested) shine simultaneously. But in poetry the suggested meaning is cognised only after the collection of the expressed sense as both are related to each other in form of cause and effect respectively. In case, simultaneity is accepted in case of rasa-dhvani, the definition will still fall short of covering the cases of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani where sequence between the two senses is glaringly grasped. Even in rasa-dhvani, it is accepted that perception of rasa follows the same of vibhāva"dis such as determinants etc. and hence sequence, though not noticeable has to be accepted : na ca rasā"dişu api vibhāvā”diprakāśana-sahabhāvena prakāśanam upapadyate. (pp. 83, ibid).
The manifestor can be an attribute (upādhi) or an independent object. Knowledge, word and lamp are manifestors of the first type since these reveal the
bjects suggested by them mixing themselves with the latter in the manifestation. Thus, the knowledge and the object known, the word and its meaning and the lamp and the object illumined by it all present themselves simultaneously. The revealer becomes the 'upādhi' or attribute of the revealed object in this process. The independent agent is examplified in case of smoke giving the knowledge of fire. Poetry cannot be the first type of manifestor because only an object perceivable or nameable can fall in this case. The second, like smoke, cannot be a manifestor as in smoke-fire-perception there is no simultaneity, which is expected in manifestormanifested-relationship. The next variety of manifestor is only the probans (i.e. linga) giving rise to probandum (i.e. lingin). Because of sequence, manifested sense and poetry cannot be vyangya-vyañjaka, but only gamya-gamaka : "dvividho hi prakāśakórthaḥ upādhirūpaḥ svatantraś ca. tatra jñāna-sabda-pradīpā"diḥ upādhirūpah. tad uktam - 'trayah prakāśakāh sva-para-prakāśā'iti, anyah svatantro dhūmā"dih. tatrā"dyas tāvad bhavadhbhir na abhyupagantavyah eva pratyaksa-abhidheyayoh eva arthayoh kāvyatā'patti-prasangāt. anyasya tu lingatvam eva upapadyate, na vyañjakatvam - vyakteḥ anupapatteh.” (pp. 84, ibid)
Mahimā thus concludes that the so called 'abhivyakti' of the dhvanivādin is just inference and nothing else. Thus Mahim, says that the statement that both word and meaning manifest (vyanktah) the suggested sense, is false and therefore it makes for the blemish called "asambhava dosa" : "tasmāt tad avasthah eva asambhavo laksaņa-dosaḥ” (pp. 86, ibid).
We have taken care above to suggest that even the explanation of Mahima in individual instances of poetry abound in logical felacies - tarka-dosas - as pointed out by Mammața and others later, and hence Mahimā, apprehensive of this possibility is careful to add that his "poetic inference" i.e. 'kāvyánumiti' is not

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA absolutely identical with tarkā'numiti or strictly logical inference. In the same way the 'abhivyakti' of the dhvanivādins is not absolutely identical with 'dārśaniki abhivyakti' i.e. manifestation as explained in philosophical context. If kävyā'numiti is not tarkā'numiti then vyangva-abhivvakti in poetry is not abhivvakti of the philosophical systems. Thus both kavyánumiti and abhivvakti are loose terms to be understood only in the sense intented by their promoters only. In a way thus, because of the inherent looseness, they can be said to be identical, for both cannot stand the logical objections raised against them.
The next blemish, Mahimā says is with reference to the term 'dhvani' itself. According to Anandavardhana, the term 'dhvani' as applied to poetry and poetic criticism, was coined after the grammarians, the first among the most learned. For them, 'sabda' i.e. 'sound', is 'dhvani', and it manifests 'sphota' the 'eternal word' which is ever associated with meaning. Thus for them word manitests sphoța. Taking a clue from the great grammarians the critics applied the term 'dhvani' to any suggester that suggested the 'vyangyártha'. Abhinavagupta explains in his 'Locana' how the term 'dhvani' is made applicable to 'word', 'sense', 'the power of suggestion', 'the suggested sense', and finally to the variety of poetry itself which carries principal suggested sense.
Mahimā pooh poohs at this, challanging first, like the Mīmāmsakas the very concept of sphota, which is only a myth. He maintains that neither sphoța nor dhvani of Ānandavardhana can be taken as manifested. The relation between word
ound and sphota is that of cause and effect only since there is a perceptible sequence between the apprehension of the order of letters, which the word is made of, and the cognition of meaning. So, no relationship of the suggestor and suggested' or vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāva can be accepted between the two cognitions. Their actual relationship can be the 'gamya-gamaka-bhāva' only, or the relation of the conveyor and the conveyed. Thus the appellation 'Dhvani' seems to be absolutely defective as it is based on false analogy : - "...ata eva śrüyamāṇānām śabdānām dhvani-vyapadeśyānām antaḥsanniveśinaś ca sphotā'bhimatasya arthasya vyangyavyañjaka-bhāvo na sambhavati iti vyañjakarva-sāmyad yaḥ śabdárthā'tmani kāvye dhvani-vyapadeśaḥ sópy anupapannaḥ, tatrā'pi kārya-kāraņa-mülasya gamyagamaka-bhāvasya upagamāt.”
We may note a point here that during the viva voce of our doctoral thesis on, "The origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics", Prof. K. V. Abhyankar had also observed that 'manifestation' (i.e. abhivyakti of sphoța) is not 'suggestion' (i.e. vyañjanā of the Alamkārikas.). And we know it. To bring home this point in a separate paper on, “Bhatta Näyaka's Blunder", we had

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77 suggested that Bhatta Nāvaka criticises 'abhivvakti' of Anandavardhana because he fails to collect a point that 'abhivvakti' in strict sense of the darśanas, is not vyañjanā, Abhivyakti presupposes pre-existence of a thing, say ghata or a pot covered in darkness, but of course existing in advance and later manifested by light. But 'rasa' is not 'pūrva-siddha' in this sense. It is 'pari-passu' with the presentation of vibhāvā"dis. So, the abhivyakti or vyañjanā of the alamkārikas is different from the abhivyakti we are acquainted with in śāstras. But for want of any other suitable term, the alamkārikas have called it abhivyakti', like the 'kavyā'numiti of Mahimā, which is not anumiti' in the strict śāstra sense. So, it is futile to attack either by either. Mahimā also takes abhivyati, or dhvani, or vyañjanā as absolutely identical with the abhivyakti or manifestation of the śāstra context. This is wrong. Actually dhvani' or 'vyañjanā' of the dhyanivādins is an 'apūrva', an 'alaukika' i.e. it is “sui generis", not found anywhere else: neither in the world of day to day existence, nor in sastra. So, Mahima's criticism of dhvani is ill-founded like that of Bhatta Nāvaka.
Next, according to Mahimā, the designation of Dhvani as 'kāvya-visesa' - in the dhvani-kārikā makes for yet another blemish. Mahimā holds that 'viấesa' means either 'superiority or particularity : ‘api ca kāvya-viśesa ity atra kāvyasya viśistatvam anupapannam...” (pp. 98, ibid). Mahimā holds that 'Dhvani' can be either 'superior poetry or 'a particular type of poetry as per its definition. But we fail to apply both the meanings in the present context. Poetry proper is invariably characterised by Rasa which transcends all distinguishing classifications and hence one type of poetry cannot be regarded as superior to another in this respect. Thus 'Dhvani' cannot mean superior variety of poetry.
We may say here that Mahimā's acceptance of only poetry with principal rasa i.e. emotive appeal here, as poetry and non-acceptance of anything else is equivalent to Viśvanātha's position that poetry has to be and can be 'sa-rasa' only i.e. charged with 'rasa' only as its principal source of charm. But this concept of poetry which has basically only emotive character is too narrow a concept. This will not only drive out what Anandavardhana explains as vastu-dhvani and alamkāradhvani from the sphere of poetry, but it will therefore equally frustrate the efforts of newer and newer art-forms such as absurd theatre or absurd poetry as attempted by such great moderns as Sammuel Beckett, or Ionesco, or Albert Camus etc. who gave us modern absurd forms of drama and novel. Actually these artists in their own way tried to communicate their sense of despair and despondency - vastudhvani - or bhāva-dhvani, resulting in śānta-rasa, ultimately. It is this suggestion of doubts, disputes, distractions and disbelief, - the vastu-dhvani where a man's intellect or rationality is involved, which renders special charm to

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the play concerned. By rejecting anything else as principal except rasa-dhvani, i.e. emotive poetry only for him, Mahimā rejects such excellent attempts by modern playwrights. And it is criminal. We, therefore, cannot endorse Mahimā's position.
The next alternative Mahimā considers is that of 'viśesa' being taken as 'particularity'. Mahimā holds, that if kávyavisesa simply means, a particular type of poetry', the question that would arise is whether there are other types of poetry also from which the dhvani-kāvya is expected to be distinguished. Mahimā argues that if, for example, a poem presenting a particular rasa, say sțingāra, or karuņa, for example, is sought to be a kāvya-viśesa in the present context, and is regarded as excellent, then poems presenting other rasas will fall outside the scope of dhvanikāvya ! Mere word and meaning regarded beautiful on account of the presence of gunas i.e. poetic excellences and alamkāras i.e. beautiful turns of speech, cannot also be regarded as poetry in general in order to take dhvani-kavya as particular type, because the former with guna and/or alamkāra only, but devoid of the charm caused by rasa, cannot be taken as poetry at all ! 'Nor, can it be regarded as poetry in a secondary sense (gauņa-vrtti) also, when poetry in the literal sense - i.e. 'sarasa-kāvya' is very much there, and when this primary meaning is not rejected (i.e. badhita). The primary meaning, if not contradicted, can never be reject Mahimā poetry without rasa is no poetry, i.e. it is only a misnomer : ata eva ca na gunā'lamkāra-samskrta-śabdártha-mātra-śarīram tāvat kävyam; tasya yathoktavyangyā'rthópanibandhe sati viếistatvam iti śakyam vaktum. tasya rasā”tmatā'bhāve mukya-vșttyā kāvya-vyapadeśa eva na syāt; kim uta visistatvam ?”
But all this, as observed earlier by us, suffers from the blemish of its, being "toonarrow" i.e. 'avyāpti-dosa' in Mahimā's thinking.
Mahimā goes on to argue that ‘kāvya-vićeşa' cannot also mean poetry suggesting vastu and alamkāra, because they also lead us finally to rasarealization like poetry directly responsible for the suggestion of rasa. He also holds that it is not proper to distinguish rasa on the basis of suggestive elements such as gunas i.e. poetic excellences and alamkāra i.e. poetic figures of speech. Here he points out by way of an illustration the concept of cowness and cows of different colours. We do not distinguish cows on the basis of different colours as the class of cowness goes equally with all the colours. Says he : (pp. 104, ibid): na ca rasā"tmanaḥ kāvyasya vastumātrā"dibhir viśeşaḥ śakyam adhātum, tesām vibhāvā"dirūpatayā rasā'bhivyakti-hetutvopagamāt; na ca vyañjakānām vaicitrye vyangyasya višeşo'bhyupagantum yuktah, śābaleya”dīnām iva gotvasya”. Mahimā further argues that if poetry wherein vastu or alamkāra suggests rasa is recognized as dhvanikāvya, then poetry directly suggesting rasa will fall out of the

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scope of dhvanikävya. Again, poems like 'prahelikā', suggesting some sort of 'vastu' or 'alamkāra', but with its rasa-pratiti obscured, will have to be counted as dhvanikāvya. We can see that in all these arguments Mahima suffers from a too narrow concept of dhvanikāvya or even kävya in general, and hence his line of thinking cannot be accepted by us. We have seen how liberal was Kuntaka, who accepts 'vakratā' or poetic beauty even at the level of pure abhidhā or direct expression. But regardless of understanding the spirit of what Anandavardhana, Kuntaka and Abhinavagupta stand for, Mahimă concludes that "kävya-viśesa” can signify only poetry in general and in that case there is no justification for excluding instances of samāsokti or condensed speech and other types of guņībhūta-vyangya or poetry with subordinated suggestivity, from the range of dhvani as done by Anandavardhana : "tatósya višiştatopagame vā yatra tayoh ubhayoh ekaikasya vā vyangyatā tatraiva dhvani-vyapadeśah syāt na kevala-rasā”. tmani kavye, vaišistya'bhāvāt. isyate ca sau tatrā'pi. prahelika"dau ca nīrase syāt. tatrā'pyukta-prakārena vastumātrā"der abhivyangyatvena istatvāt, iti anvayavyatirekābhyām kāvyatva-mātra-prayukto-'sāv ity anumīyate”. (pp. 104, ibid)
and also, ataś ca samāsokty ädāv apy asāv upagantavya eva, na pratis'edhyah. pratiyamānasya cā’rthasya dvaividhyam eva. třtīyasya rasā"deḥ prakārasya uktanayena kāvyatvād eva siddhatvād iti. na ca tasya tadangabhāvo bhanitum yujyate, angitvena istatvāt, iti kävyarvam eva dhvani-vyapadeśa-visayo 'bhyupagantum yukto, na tad višesah.” (pp. 105, ibid).
So, according to Mahimā, even if, for the sake of an argument, it is accepted that dhvanikāvya is a particular type of poetry, the term 'višesa' is superfluous and therefore need not have been mentioned. Mahimā argues that the very definition of an object can itself convey the particularity of the object defined, as in the case of a king described as one mounted on a horse. He observes (pp. 107) : ittham ca kāvyasya višistatā'nupapattau itarat-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyi-matátiriktam na kimcid anena abhihitam syāt, anyatra, dhvani-vyapadeśa-mātrāt. na ca tenā'pi kimcit. - kathamcit vā tad upapattau tad avācyam eva, tat-paryavasāyino laksana-višeșasambandhāt eva tad avagateh. yathā yóśvam ārūdhaḥ sa puruso rājā ity atra.
Mahimā further suggests that if it is argued that the definition befits the object already characterized by particularity, and this particularity cannot be cognised from the definition, even then the term “kāvya-viśesa' is not necessary because the term 'kāvya' itself signifies rasa, and the presence of rasa is the particularity desired to be conveyed by the definition of dhvani : "atha purusasya aśva-viśistasya eva sataḥ tal lakṣaṇa-sambandho, na tu tata eva asya vaiśistyam iti, tathā'pi avācyam; kāvyarvād eva tasyā'pi avagatarvāt. tat ca uktam, iti avācya-vacanam dosah.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Mahimā thus concludes that in mentioning 'dhvani' as kāvya-višesah the blemish of avācya-vacana (i.e. redundant) takes place. We have seen above how Mahimā's concept of poetry itself suffers from narrowness of approach as in case of the later alamkārika Viśvanātha, who is at least liberal enough to recognise gunībhūtavyangya variety and therefore is less objectionable, though his approach to vastu-dhvani is equally unacceptable. We have suggested elsewhere that actually the scope of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani need not be imagined on the strength of the simple illustrations cited by Anandavardhana. Actually for him rasā'nubhūti is involvement of the total personality of the connoisseur and vastudhvani and alamkāradhvani should be taken as devices that take care of a man's intellectual and imaginative faculties along with the emotional aspect of the enjover's self taken care of by rasādi dhvani. This thinking is broader and healthier and it goes to include even the newer and newer art-forms of absurd theatre and absurd poetry as practiced by modern geniuses. So, Mahimā seems to suffer from a too narrow concept of poetry that goes to take care of only the emotive aspect of an ejover's personality.
In the end Mahimā points out the tenth blemish in the superfluous mentioning of "sūribhih" (i.e. by the learned) as the subject of the word "kathitah”. He suggests that the presence of the subject can be understood of its own from the verb itself. Mahimā argues that perhaps the dhvanikāra's intention may be to (i) that the act of 'kathana' has an agent, or (ii) the act of 'kathana' has a particular agent (here, e.g. the learned men). But Mahimā finds no need to specify either of these two, as all activity has to have an agent. If the intention is to convey the particularity of the agent, then this can be conveyed by the very definition of dhvani itself.
: kim ca, 'sūribhiḥ kathitah' iti kathana-kriya-kartr-nirdeśah paksadvaye api avācya eva. karts-mātra-vivaksāyām kriyāyām kartravyabhicārāt kartp-višeșavivaksāyām antarena vyāpāra-višesa-sambandhād eva tad-višesa-avagati-siddheh, iti avācya-vacanam dosah.
So, even here Mahimā points out "avācya-vacana-dosa", (= redundant) as the agent of 'kathana' is conveyed by the very verb. But we know, as Abhinavagupta has pointed out that by the use of the term 'sūribhih' the dhvanikāra wants to emphasise that this talk of dhvani is not made prevelent by people of no consequence - 'na khalu yathā-kathancit-pravrtta', but by responsible and honourable people - the 'sūris'.
In short, Mahimā's attempt to denounce dhvanikara's definition of dhvanikāvya can be termed only as malice caused by ego-centred approach. We have seen above

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Definition and Scope of Poetry how he arrives at a definition at the end of all this discussion when he says : (pp. 111, ibid, I. 25 V.V.)
"vācyas tadanumito vā, yatrárthórthā'ntaram prakāśayati |
sambandhataḥ kutaścit, sa kāvyā'numitir ity uktā ||” We have already discussed the limitations of Mahimā's concept of poetry. We will now proceed to the group of poeticians beginning with Mammaţa to Visvanātha who have chosen to follow the lead of the dhvanivādius, i.e. of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.
But eventhough we fail to agree with Mahimā's line of thinking, it can be conceded that we can underline Mahima's contribution in two directions. First is that we know that eventhough Anandavardhana had supported the cause of threefold dhvani i.e. suggestion, at heart he was a great protagonist of only rasā"didhvani. Of course, here 'rasa' should be taken not as emotive stuff only but total aesthetic delight that involves the total personality - i.e. the cognitive, emotive and connetive aspects of the "sāmāsika". Mahimā makes bold to break the ice and declare only rasā"di-anumiti of any consequence, denouncing both vastu-anumiti and alamkāra-anumiti. For this he receives moral support even from a later dhvanivādin of Viśvanātha's stature. Even Abhinavagupta had suggested that the suggestion of both vastu and alamkāra has a tendency to terminate in rasa"didhvani. Mahima's second noteworthy achievement is his style of criticism. Anandavardhana was satisfied only in neat presentation of what he believed to be true and never engaged himself in criticising others. His style therefore is simple, direct and flowing. On Mahimā's part, he was interested not only in establishing what he considered as true, but in logically denouncing what others laid down in a way not congruent to his line of thinking. Thus in Mahimā's writing, an element of scholastic style of discussion becomes an added feather in his cap. As a result his style at times acquires the sharpness of a razor., say “razor's edge': Thus, Mahimā promotes a sort of new idea of stylistics of prose writing in literary criticism.
Again, it has to be also taken note of that though denouncing Anandavardhana, Mahimā is full of respect for him and quotes from him when the point is favourable to his position. He also, not unlike Ānandavardhana, accepts all thought-currents prevelent in literary criticism, and keeping kävyā'numiti in the centre, in place of Anandavardhana's vyañjanā, he also gives due respect to other concepts. In his scheme also we come across such divisions as samlaksya-krama and asamlaksyakrama. We also have anumiti of vastu and alamkāra. Thus ultimately the victory of Anandavardhana over all his talented dissidents - Kuntaka, Bhoja. Mahimā. Dhananjaya. Dhanika and all - is clearly established.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA “From Mammaţa to Viśvanātha".
The age in which some posteriors of Anandavardhana challanged his vyañjanadhvani-rasa theory, also presented to him a great protagonist of dhvani-theory, Abhinavagupta, who by his great commentary - Locana-on the Dhv. supported Anandavardhana's cause. He also made it applicable to the art of drama as well in. his great Abhinavabhāratī on the N.S. of Bharata. He established the supremacy of the three-fold dhvani as enunicated by Anandavardhana and also established the superiority of rasā”di-dhvani albeit in the wider sense, over the other two varieties. Not that this was not in the mind and heart of the author of the Dhv., but he had not said it in so many terms. Abhinavagupta went flat out to establish this and eventhough with a different bias, both Kuntaka and Mahimā also established the evocation of rasā”di as the quintessence of great poetry. The influence of Abhinavagupta was so pronounced that thoughts floated by Kuntaka, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika could not find roots in the minds of literary critics in general. This resulted in the supremacy of the Dhvani at the hands o beginning with Mammata and Hemacandra and down to Jayadeva, Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. All these literary critics firmly established the kashmir - thinking of literary criticism as promoted by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. At the same time we will go to observe that the scratches carved by Kuntaka, Mahim, and the rest did leave their marks on the thought-process of even stalwarts such as Mammata and the rest. We will observe this in greater detail.
Mammata : Mammata is one of the main pillars of the edifice of dhvani. Actually the Dhvanvā loka of Anandavardhana, the Locana of Abhinavagupta and the Kavyaprakāśa of Mammata can be termed as the “prasthāna-trayı” of the kashmir thought-current of literary criticism. There are great commentators such as Candidāsa, the author of “kāvya-prakāśa-dīpikā” and others who rank Mammața only as a blind imitator of the views of earlier masters, "prācīnamata-niryantstva”. Candidāsa observes : “satyam evam; kintu gaddalikā-pravāha-patitānām gauravabandha-niryantrito' yam grantha-krt, traividhyam uktavān” (pp. 23); and also, "etac ca prācīna-pranayā'nurodhin, grantha-krtā kanthato noktam, pramātreti, vedyāntareti ca vadatā sūcitam eva.” On the other hand a majority of commentators respect Mammața as a "vāgdevatā'vatāra".
Actually Mammata has systematically arranged all important thought-currents, such as concerning sabdārtha-vicāra, śabdaśakti, subtle discussion on the nature of rasa-nispatti, the establishment of vyañjanā, the concepts of gunas, dosas, rītis, and alamkāras - all — as related to the supreme concept of dhvani' and then 'rasadhvani' in particular. Actually he has churned successfully the ocean in form of the

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83 whole of Dhvanyaloka, Locana and Abhinavabhārati and laid bare the essence of the subtle thinking in these works. His is an excellent "ākara-grantha”, in which all the thought-jewells are collected and then carefully arranged. At the same time he was careful enough to assimilate the wisdom of the ancients beginning with Bhāmaha, and also the successors of Anandavardhana, such as Kuntaka Ksemendra, Mahimă, Dhananjaya, Dhanika and the rest.
Candidāsa came down rather heavily on Mammata because he failed to correlate his definition of poetry on one hand and the division, and concept of poetry on the other hand. We know that commentators such as Sridhara, the author of kävyaprakāśa-viveka have tried to defend Mammata. A number of alamkarikas have been influenced by Mammata's definition of poetry and there are also those who have made it an object of sharp criticism. These ālamkārikas include names such as those of Hemacandra, Jayadeva, Viśvanātha, Siddhicandra and also Jagannatha. It goes entirely to the credit of Mammata, that he is an author who has activated so many great literary critics who have either fallen with him or have raised a bogey of arguments against him.
Mammata's definition of poetry runs as ; "tad adośau sabdā'rthau saganau, analamkrti punah kvā'pi." (K. P. I. iv). i.e. "It i.e. poetry) consists of word and sense, which are without blemishes, possessed of excellences, and are, rarely, devoid of figures." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, The Poetic Light, pp. 9) (2nd Edn. Motilal Benarasidass, Delhi, '67). In Mammata's definition of poetry, we observe the following traits; he keeps up the tradition of Bhāmaha and Anandavardhana and calls poetry to be "sabdārthau" i.e. both "word and meaning" taken together. These 'sabdārthau' have to be 'sa-guņau' i.e. they have to be qualified by excellences. Thereby Mammata shows respect to the school of thought as represented by both Dandin and Vamana who showed great respect for the thought-current of rīti or mārga with 'guna' or poetic-excellence as its quint-essence. We remember the words of Dandin saying, “pranāḥ daśa-guņāḥ”, and of Vāmana saying, “viśistā padaracanã rītih"; and “višeso guna"tma". These two i.e. word and sense are again expected to be 'adośau', i.e. free from (poetic) blemishes. In keeping with the tradition of Bhämaha and other ancients, and especially Mahimā whose direct influence is clearly visible on Mammata's tratment of dosas in his VIIth Chapter, Mammaţa puts great stress on the fact of poetry being free from poetic blemishes. He gives a very catholic interpretation of 'dosa' when he says : “mukhyārtha hatiḥ dosaḥ”, and by ‘mukhyaartha' he convers primarily rasa-bhāva etc., and also vācya or expressed meaning also implying laksyārtha as well, and then sabda, varna and racanā also. Thus Mammata has taken care of all prevedent thought-currents of his time and has tried

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to cor-relate all these with the main stream of rasa-dhvani in the centre. Mammata, though a dhvanivādin to the core has not mentioned either rasa or dhvani directly in the definition of poetry thus suggesting that at gross common-sense level it is only the qualified 'sabdārthau'- word and meaning that make for poetry. We know that even Ānandavardhana also had suggested the same when he observed : "śabdārthau tāvat kävyam” and Abhinavagupta had explained that, by the word 'tāvat', it is suggested that in this matter there is no ghost of a chance of any difference of opinion. Mammața has also specially mentioned 'analamkrti punaḥ kvā'pi', meaning thereby that both these word and meaning are almost ever graced by poetic figures, which are rarely found absent. Kuntaka's influence is very obvious, here.
If may be noted here that by the acceptance of ‘guna', the element of rasa-bhāva etc. is covered, because following the thinking of the dhvani-vādins, the relation between gunas and rasa is that of "dharma-dharmin", which is a 'samavāya' or constant relation. As are bravery or saurya and the rest qualities of soul, so also are the poetic excellences are related to the soul called 'rasa'. We can say that bravery etc. are for sure qualities of the soul but they are not observed in each individual at worldly level. So also, the poetic qualities do not go with all śabdārthau'. But Mammata is clear. Whether the poetic excellences are observed with each set of 'sabdārthau' or not, their relation with 'rasa' the 'soul is inseparable or constant, i.e. 'samavāya'. We have also noted that the ancients such as Bhāmaha had attached great importance to the concept of poetic figures of speech suggesting that "vācām alamkrtih" makes for the essence of poetry. For Bhāmaha, 'atiśayokti' or poetic excess is a quality that makes for the 'vibhāvana' i.e. relish of poetic content. Thus, alamkāra in the wider sense of saundarya or poetic beauty in general was a major thought-currenet which could not be ignored. Kuntaka, who proclaimed, “sálamkārasya kāvyata”, thereby suggesting the natural relationship between poet's language and poetic figures, i.e. poetic expression, had a clear impact on Mammata's thinking and of course Mahima and Bhoja laid the roots still deeper. Thus Mammata as a sensitive and intelligent thinker assimilates the concept of 'alamkāra' in his definition and on the other hand the element of guna or poetic excellence, as advocated by Dandin and Vamana, and also seen under 'svabhāvokti?
also finds favour with Mammata. His predecessors included Bhatta Nāyaka, the author of Hrdaya-darpana, Kuntaka, Mahimā, Mukula, Dhananjaya, Dhanika and Bhoja on one hand, and Bhatta Tauta, the author of kávya-kautuka and one of the gurus of Abhinavagupta, and Anandavardhana, and Abhinavagupta on the other. It is robust common sense like one characterizing the thinking of Anandavardhana, that prompts Mammata also under the influence of Bhāmaha and Kuntaka to include the element of 'alamkāra' i.e. poetic turn of expression, in the

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definition of poetry and to refuse a direct mention of either dhvani or rasa in the same. Though of course, all these predecessors of Mammaţa, including Rājaśkhara also, gave prominance to the emotive element of rasa-bhāva in poetry. But even Anandavardhana chose to call 'kavya' as 'śabdārthau' only, and left the mentioning of dhvani in the criticism aspect wherein he discussed dhvani-kavya and also the gunībhūta variety and citra-kāvya. All this he mentioned by way of literary criticism and not as the definition of poetry as such. So, dhvani for him was a "kāvya-viśesah” and not 'kavya' as such. We do not have a clear idea of Rājasekhara's thinking visa-vis dhvani, as his whole work - the 'Kavyamīmāmsā' - split in eighteen adhikaranas is not available to us, but even he accepts the common sense line while defining poetry. Perhaps, under, the influence of Bhāmaha, Bhatta Nāyaka, Kuntaka, Mahim, and Bhoja and also perhaps Anandavardhana himself that Mammata avoided the mention of 'dhvani' in the definition of poetry, and opted for the safer line of mentioning only 'guna', 'dosa' and 'alamkāra', in the definition.
Candidāsa's ons'aught on Mammata was inspired by the apparent controdiction between K. P. I. IV a, which contains the definition of kāvya on one hand and I. IV b which embarks upon the three-fold classification of kāvya such as uttama i.e. dhvanikavya, madhyama i.e. ganībhūta-vyangya and 'adhama' i.e. citra-kāvya. However, we can safely trace the influence of Bhāmaha in Mammata's definition of poetry, that of Mahimā in the treatment of 'dosa', of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in the delineation of dhvani, rasa, sabdaśaktis especially vyañjanā, and of a number of his predecessors in the treatment of alamkāras. The criticism-oriented classification of poetry also follows Anandavardhana's lead, with a more pronounced bias. Visvanātha has severely criticised Mammața's definition of poetry as we will go to observe.
Candidāsa's Dīpikā (Edn. Nag Publishers, Delhi, '95) is very aggressive, as the editor Dr. Jyotna Mohan suggests. Candidāsa is very critical of his predecessors who could not properly interpret Kāvya-prakāśa. He observes : “kāvyaprakāśa-tarur-esaḥ ku-sampradāya-vyakhya-vilola-marudākulita-pratānah" perhaps the predecessors were Manikyalandra, Ruyyaka, Someśvara, Narahari Sarasvatitirtha, Jayanta Bhatta, Vācaspati Miśra as mentioned by Candidāsa, and Śrīdhara. Candidāsa has infuenced later commentaries such as the Vistārikā of Paramānanda Cakravartin and also Kāvyaprakāśa Darpana and Sāhitya-darpana of Viśvanātha, and also Kāvya-prakāśakhandana of Siddhicandra to a great extent. He criticizes Mammata's definition in the words : ye tv adoṣāv iti laksanāmśam icchanti, teşām kāvyatvam nirvisayam atyanta-pravirala-visayam vā bandhā"di-sāmyad gauna eva, tac ca sarvam uktam vitatyā'smābhir dhvani-siddhānta samgraha ity eva dik." (pp. 86, Edn. ibid).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA It seems Candidāsa has overlooked what Śrīdhara has said in his Viveka. Śrīdhara observes : kāvya-sāmānya-laksane vibhāgo višeșa-laksaņañca vaktavyam ity āha - 'tadbhedān'iti, ślistam padam : bhidyate iti avāntara-viśeso, bhidyate'nena iti bhedo, vyāvartako dharma iti ca. vibhāgasya viśeşa-laksana-prayojaka-dharma
rūpatvād bhinnam vākyam kriyate. pratilaksanam vākyam tena upādīyate iti na kaścid višesah. (pp. 13, edn. Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, skt. college, Calcutta, 1959) (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No.VII)
We will discuss the criticism by Visvanātha and Jagannātha at relevant places later. But, suffice it to say for the present, that Mammața did not let go the heritage of thinking that came down from Bhāmaha to Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Mahimā and the rest. His approach was not aggressive but logical, judicious and conciliatory.
Hemacandra : In his Kāvyānuśāsana, I. 11, he says : "a-dos'au sa-gunau sálamkārau ca sabdārthau kāvyam.” Thus he seems to follow the track laid down by Mammata, who also has 'word and sense together as poetry. In place of 'analamkriti punaḥ kvā'pi' of Mammata, Hemacnadra (= H.C.) has 'sālamkārau ca' which is perhaps more emphatic and clearer in favour of the presence of alamkāras or beautiful turns of expression in poetry, though of course, 'ca' suggests that poetry can be, at times, even without an 'alamkāra'. H.C. observes : "ca-kāro niralamkārayor-api sabdārthayoḥ kvacit-kāvyatva-khyāpanárthaḥ." In his Viveka, H.C. observes : "niralamkārayorapīti" - "anena hi analamkrtam api gunavad vacaḥ svadate" - i.e. by the term ‘niralamkāryoh.' it is suggested that excellences are a must for poetry. Even if poetic speech is without adornment it can be relished on account of the presence of excellences. Thus for H.C., excellences are more essential to poetry as compared to adornment i.e. alamkarana. He gives illustrations both positive and negative. Negative illustration suggests that, "alamkrtam api nirgunam na svadate” i.e. eventhough poetry is with figures of speech but without excellences, it does not yield (rasa) -enjoyment. This brings H.C. closer to Dandin and Vāmana, but at core he is dhvanivādin first and last. With his kā. śā. and viveka on it, he saw to it that Mālava influence of Bhoja remained out of the boundary of Jaisimhadeva's Gujarat, wherein the influence of Kashmir school flourished. Vāgbhața (Ișt), the author of Vāgbhatálamkāra, at I. 2 observes :
"sādhu-sabdārtha-sandarbham
gunā'lamkāra-bhūsitam, sphusa-rīti-rasopetam kāvyam kurvīta kīrtaye.”

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87 A poet should compose poetry for fame. Poetry, which consists of both word and sense that are 'sādhu' - i.e. nirdosa-free from blemishes, and adorned with excellences and figures of speech, is endowed with clear rīti-i.e. style and rasa or sentiment (or aesthetic pleasure). Thus by 'sādhu' is meant 'nir-dosarva' as also explained by Simhadevagani, the commentator. The mention of guna and rīti brings him closer to the earlier alamkārikas such as Dandin and Vāmana. By insistance on 'guna', both Mammata and H.C. had 'rasa' in their mind, but they had avoided a clear mentioning of the same. On the other had, Vägbhata makes a clear mention of rasa and lays down a road to Viśvanātha.
Vāgbhasa (II ņķ), in his Kāvyānuśāsana almost reverberates the words of Mammata when he observes :
"sabdārthau nirdośau, sa-guņau, prāyaḥ sālamkārau kāvyam" - (I. pp. 14) i.e. word and sense, free from poetic blemishes, and having excellences, and mostly adorned by figures of speech, make for poetry.” He adds that by “prāyaḥ sālamkārau" is meant, "niralamkārayoh sabdārthayoh kvacit kāvyarvam" i.e. "only at times, even word and sense bereft of adornment, make for poetry.” He cites the same illustration viz. "sünyam vasa-grham...." etc. as given by Mammaţa. We can see that following Mammata and H.C., a clear line of remaining faithful to the kashmir tradition of literary criticism is noticed here. In Gujarat, both the streams of literary criticism, i.e. Kashmir thought-current of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, and Mālava tradition of Bhoja, are seen intermingling, at times cutting across each other, at times merging with each other and at other times again bifercating, and at times running even parallel. But the clear out-come is that the kashmir tradition, the tone of which was set by H.C.. emerges as a clear victor. Perhaps the political ambitions of Siddharāja Jaisimhadeva must be at the root of this situation. Jayadeva : The author of Candrāloka, Jayadeva, defines poetry at I. 7 :
“nirdosā laksanavati sa-rītir guna-bhūsaņā | sālamkāra-rasā'neka
vịttir vāk kāvya-nāma-bhāk ll”. "That speech is termed poetry, which is free from poetic blemishes, having 'laksaņas' i.e. natural marks, is accompanied by rīti-or style and is adorned by poetic excellences (i.e. guņas), and is having alamkāras or poetic figures and rasa or relish, (and) is with any number of vrttis or diction."

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Over and above the mention of dosa, guna and alamkāra, we find herein the mentioning of laksana, rīti, rasa and vstti. So far as available documents are concerned after Bharata, Jayadeva seems to be the first ālamkārika to revive the concept of 'laksanas', which practically gets merged with alamkāras even in Abhinavabhāratī, as we will go to observe later in vol. II. So, this revival of the concept of laksanas is surprising and it again fades out after Jayadeva, though of course, we come across 'nātya-laksaņas' in Sāhityadarpana (= S.D.) of Viśvanātha. These nātyalamkāras come closer to laksanas of Bharata, and Viśvanātha also treats them as part of dramaturgy though Jayadeva has tried to correlate them with kāvya or poetry, in the third mayūkha (= chapter) of his Candrāloka. Jayadeva also revives the concepts of 'rīti' and 'vrtti? as seen in Vāgbhata (Ist) and also 'rasa'. He is hereby trying to revive old literary traditions that were going out of vogue with literary criticism. How far he was successful in this goes by the obvious result seen in his successors again not giving greater thought to the concepts of laksana, rīti and vrtti and choosing to follow the royal track of kashmir literary criticism as almost fixed by Mammata. But between Mammata and Viśvanātha, Jayadeva can be taken as a very important mile-stone and his encouraging the concept of vịttis, which were taken only as varieties of anuprāsa even by Abhinavagupta, is a bold step. Gāgābhatta, the commentator on Jayadeva explains 'vrtti' as the five kavya-vșttis such as madhurā and the rest and also the three powers of word such as abhidhā or the power of direct expression and the like. Thus we can take Jayadeva to follow the lead of Kuntaka who accepts great poetry even at abhidhā level. The Paurnamāsī Commentary expails 'vrtti' as : "vrttis tridhā. nātyopayuktā prathamā. esā kaisiki-sātrvatiārabhati-bhārati-nāmnā caturvidhā. dvitiya madhurā"dayah sastha-mayükhoktāh." tritīyā śabda-śakti-rūpā." i.e. vịttis are three-fold (i) those pertaining to drama such as kaiśiki etc., the four vrttis otherwise known as artha-vrttis also elsewhere; (ii) the five-fold vrttis such as madhurā, praudhā, parusā, lalitā and
are what others call sabda-vrttis or 'anuprāsa-jātayah' as equated in Locana. The third group of vrttis are abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjanā otherwise termed as sabda-śaktis by other ālamkārikas. Thus Jayadeva istalled a broader look in literary criticism.
Next comes Vidyadhara. We observed that Jayadeva was highly critical of Mammata's observation, viz. "analamkrtti punah kvā'pi" by saying that those who accept the possibility of poetry without 'alamkāra' should also accept that fire (= agni) is not hot. This line of thinking is under strong influence of Bhāmaha, Dandin and Kuntaka.

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89 Vidyādhara, the author of Ekāvali (I. 6) holds 'kavya' i.e. poetry to be equivalent to a beloved, kāntā-sammita and, observes that in poetry having the suggested sense as principal (= dhvani), word and meaning are subordinated to the suggested sense. He explains the etymology of ‘kāvya' as : kavayate iti kavih. tasya karma kävyam. tat ca arthād varnanā"tmakam. i.e. one who describes, is a poet. His act is ‘kāvya' or poetry. It is descriptive on account of its meaning. In the second chapter he observes that as both word and sense make for poetry, their nature is discussed. At I. 10, Ekāvalī, he says that in poetry the word is as if mounted on a whetstone and is therefore brilliant. The 'bandha' or arrangement is even superior to the one of "ardha-nārīśvara”. The apprehension of meaning derived therefrom shines forth like a streak of lightening and the aesthetic relish derived from poetry is as pleasing as nectar oozing out from the orb of the moon. The act of a poet having such qualities is poetry. We may say that in all this Vidyadhara equals Kuntaka in verbocity. He goes to suggest that anything else than that described as above (I. 10) as poetry, is 'karna-kolāhala' i.e. a jarring noise for the ear. At I. 13, Vidyādhara observes that word and meaning form the body of poetry and 'dhvani' i.e. suggested sense, is the soul of poetry according to the learned. Pointing out the doubts raised again completes the first chapter of his Ekávali. He clearly seems to follow the lead of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata.
dyānātha : In the kāvya-prakarana, kārikās 1-5, in his Pratāpa-rudrīya, Vidyānātha discusses the nature and scope of poetry. He observes -
"guņālamkāra-sahitau śabdárthau, dosavarjitam, gadya-padyobhaya-mayam
kävyam kāvya-vido viduḥ.” "The knowers of poetry know that to be poetry, which is word and sense, and is both in prose and verse (in its outer form), to be free from blemishes and is adorned with excellences and alamkāras." This definition follows Mammata and Hemacandra and expects 'alamkāra' or figures of speech as an indispensible attribute. In his kävya-prakarana, verses 2-5 (pp. 32) he observes in a metaphorical presentation that,
"Sabdārthau mūrtir ākhyātau jīvitam vyangya-vaibhavami

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA hārā”divad alamkārāstatra syuḥ upamā”dayaḥ 11211 śleşā”dayo guņās tatra śauryā”daya iva sthitāḥ 1 ātmotkarşā”vahās tatra svabhāvā iva rītayaḥ 11311 śobhām ārthikīm prāptāḥ vịttayo vịttayo yathā | padánugunya-viśrāntiḥ śayyā śayyeva sammatā 11411 rasā”svāda-prabhedāḥ syuh pākāh pākā iva sthitāh | prakhyātā lokavad iyam
sāmagri kāvya-sampadaḥ 11511 Both word and sense are like the body of poetry. The richness of the suggested sense makes for its life. Thus like Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha also accepts 'dhvani' as the 'soul of poetry. Then following the lead of Mammața, he calls figures such as ‘upama' i.e. simile and the like, as ornaments such as necklace etc. He takes ślesa and other 'guņas' or excellences as qualities such as bravery. It may be noted here that while the kashmir tradition of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata accepts only three excellences such as mādhurya, ojas and prasada - i.e. sweetness, floridity and perspicuity - Vidyānātha following Bhoja's lead, accepts twenty four excellences, thereby trying to strike a balance between the Kashmir and Mālava schools of thought. Over and above this, Vidyānātha mentions rīti i.e. style, which is displaying the predominance of 'soul'-factor. They i.e. 'rītis' are like human nature - svabhāvā iva - In this respect we can place Vidyānātha along with Vāgbhata (I) and Jayadeva Piyūṣavarsa. Like Jayadeva again, he mentions vịttis or modes that reveal the beauty of sense. He again revives the concept of 'śayyā', the bed. The 'sayyā' or accomodation is a quality of words that are favourably matched with one another. Thus a poet's ability to choose such words that not be replaced by synonyms, makes for this quality of sayyā. This quality of sayyā is first noticed in Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāmsā, so far as available records are concerned. This almost forgotten concept of literary criticism is revived by Vidyānātha. Likewise, from Rājeśekhara, he also revives the concept of 'kavya

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91 sāka' i.e. maturity in poetry. He correlates the concept of 'pāka' with the concept frasa. 'Pāka' for him is 'rasā"-svāda-bheda' - the variety of rasa-experience. This tradition of Pāka also had dissappeared after Vāmana and Rājasekhara. But it is interesting to note that Vidyānātha has called 'pāka' to be 'rasā”-svāda-bheda', i.e. yariety of taste or relish. In Rājasekhara also we have a hint to this effect and he recommends that certain pākas are not welcome in poetry. This, and the correlation with taste or rasa, would lead us to the obvious conclusion that perhaps Rājasekhara and also Vidyānātha believed in the "sukhaduhkhā”tmaka" nature of rasa, i.e. they both took rasas as both pleasurable and also paintful, a tradition already hinted at as early as in the Natyaśāstra in the expression : "harsā"dīns ca adhigacchanti sumanasaḥ preksakāh”, and openly advocated by the authors of Nātyadarpana, - Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, and also supported later by Siddhicandra. Thus Vidyānātha has a number of points to his credit in reviving some lost traditions of literary criticism.
Viśvanātha : Among the followers of Mammata, Hemacandra feels full satisfaction in promoting the Kashmir tradition of literary criticism in Gujarat, but Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhitya darpana (= S.D.), eventhough being a follower of the vyañjana - dhvani-rasa school of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta makes bold to announce certain conclusions not proclaimed by Anandavardhana clearly in many words, but promoted by Abhinavagupta openly, and again not clearly expounded by Hemacandra, perhaps in view of the political context in Gujarat. Viśvanātha not only lays down whatever is concealed yet meant principally by Anandavardhana, but makes bold to criticise Anandavardhana and Mammața for not coming out openly. Viśvanātha defines poetry as “vākyam rasā”tmakam kāvyam” (S.D.I. 3)
We have noticed that Anandavardhana had described dhvani' - principal suggested sense - as the soul of poetry (Dhv. I. 1). In Dhv. I. 2 he had said :
"arthaḥ sahridaya-ślāghyaḥ kāvyā”tméti vyavasthitaḥ vācya-pratīyamānā”khyau
tasya bhedau ubhau smrtau.” (Dhv. I. 2) Thus there seemed to be an apparent contradiction between Dhv. I. 1 and Dhv. I. 2, for in the latter kārikā, the 'sahridayaślāghya kávyātma artha' - i.e. 'meaning appreciated by men of taste and which is the soul of poetry, is said to be both, vācya' or expressed and 'pratīyamāna' or implicit. This apparent contradiction was

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA first criticized by Bhatta Nayaka in his Hşdayadarpaņa, written to denounce dhvani • i.e. for 'dhvani-dhvamsa' only. The answer to this was ably given by Abhinavagupta in his Locana, who observes : (Locana on Dhv. I. 2) :
"bhūmiḥ iva bhūmikā. yathā apūrva-nirmāne cikīrșite pūrvam bhūmih viracyate tathā dhvanisvarūpe pratīyamānā”khye nirūpayitavye nirvivāda-siddha-vacyā’bhidhānam bhūmiḥ. tat prsthe'dhika-pratīyamānāņšollinganāt. vācyatvena samaśīrşikayā gananam tasyā'pi anapahnavanīyatvam pratipādayitum." .... 'śabdārthaśarīram kāvyam' iti yad uktam, tatra śarīra-grahaņād eva kenacid ātmanā tad anuprāņakena bhāvyam eva. sabdas tāvat śarīrabhāgah eva sannivićate sarvajanasamvedya-dharmatyāt sthūla-krśā”divat. arthah punah sakala-jana-samvedyah na bhavati, na hi artha-mātrena kavya-vyapadeśyah laukika-vaidika-vākyeșu tad abhāvāt. tad āha - sahrdavašlāghvah iti. sa eka evā'rtho dviśākhayā vivekibhir vibhāgabuddhyā vibhajyate. tathā hi tulye'rtha-rūparve kim iti kasmaicid eva sahrdayāh slāghante ? vācya-samvalanā-vimohita-hrdayais tu tat-prthag bhāve vipratipadyate, cārvākair iva ātma-prhak bhāve. ata eva artha iti ekatayā upakramya sahrdayas'laghya iti višesana-dvārā hetum abhidhāya, apoddhāra-dršā tasya dvau bhedāv amśau iti uktam, na tu dvāv apy a"tmānau kāvyasya.”
Abhinavagupta categorically lays down that both - i.e. the expressed (vācya) and the implicit (pratiyamāna) are not to be taken as 'soul of poetry, but they are just the 'bheda' i.e. divisions or parts or varieties of meaning. To take both as soul of poetry is like cārvākas not recognising body as apart from soul.
But even with this explanation before him, Viśvanātha behaves in the same way as Bhatta Näyaka did, and it was nothing else but just practicing "gaja-nimīlikä' - i.e. ignoring something knowingly. What Anandavardhana has tried to do is to differentiate between what we call belles letteres on one hand and anything else that goes under the name of literature, say scientific, religious, legal etc. on the other. We can also realize the signal of not sticking to the metaphorical usage of terminology such as ātman', 'śarīra' etc. very literally. Viśvanātha, also forgets the subtle point that 'dhvani' is taken either as 'kāvya-visesa' - a special variety of poetry, or as the 'soul of a special variety of poetry.
Viśvanātha on the other hand seems to accept what is already implied in Anandavardhana's delineation. Thus he openly accepts the supreme position of rasa - i.e. aesthetic relish - in poetry. So, when he says, "vākyam rasā"tmakam kāvyam' (S.D.I. 3) i.e. a sentence with rasa as its soul is poetry, he accepts the inner truth of poetry which the dhvanivādins wanted to convey, but for reasons more

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important, they refused to lay down clearly. He has also mentioned the preference for 'rasa', which is also noticed in Kuntaka, Mahimā, Bhoja or say, in all of his predecessors. Viśvanātha does not accept Anandavardhana's ruling that 'the soul of poetry is dhvani', for he accepts only rasa-dhvani as the soul of poetry. Visvanatha carries a false apprehension that if all the dhvani i.e. dhvani in its three-fold varieties - is accepted as the soul of poetry than by the acceptance of vastu-dhvani we will be allowing even trivial poetry in 'prahelikā' or riddles as genuine poetry. But it is exactly here that Viśvanātha blunders, because under vastu-dhvani and alamkāra dhvani Anandavardhana had left space for all intellectual poetry, or, say poetry such as seen in absurd theatre or absurd poetry, and also all flight of fancy to be covered under alamkāra-dhvani. In his wide scheme of dhvani Anandavardhana has place for any form of suggesters beginning with a letter or a part of a word to a whole composition, or any other that a newer poet may imagine or advocate in his poetry. All this is welcome under three-fold dhvani and for Anandavardhana, precisely to accomodate for any newer and newer form of literature under the banner of dhvani, only rasa-dhvani alone, which is normally understood as suggestion of emotive stuff only, does not, make for great poetry. Actually rasanubhūti is kalā'nubhūti is ānandánubhūti, or art-experience, which transcends not only vastudhvani or thereby even absurd theatre, but also alamkāradhvani or highest flight of fancy and imagination and also the so called rasabhāvā"di-dhvani or emotive stuff. The dhvani theory aims at a rasa-experience which is catholic in its nature and covers up newer and newer forms of literary art such as absurd poetry or absurd theatre, problem plays, social satires, and what not - that have appeared in modern literature and may vet appear in future poetry of centuries to come. So, vastu-dhvani is not mere prahelikā or riddle-poetry, for in it there is no delight for the men of taste - i.e. "sahrdaya-ślāghyatva". On the contrary we will go to observe that by keeping the doors open only to rasa-bhāvā"di-oriented poetry, actually Visvanātha has narrowed the scope of poetry and has also promoted the cause of sentimental verse under the guise of 'rasā”tmaka kāvya'. We will dwell upon this later. Jagannātha also discusses this point.
But for the present, we will consider only the aggressive aspect of Viśvanātha's criticism which does not spare Mammata also. He, following the lead of his predecessors, especially Candidāsa, the author of Dipikā, and others as suggested by us earlier, denounces vehemently Mammața's definition of poetry. This approach can be compared with the negative and non-fruitful approach of Mahimā with regard to Anandavardhana.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Viśvanātha comes down heavily on Mammata's definition of poetry. Subtle, forceful and destructive method as seen in Mahimā seems to be continued by Visvanātha, who has taken Mammata to task for every word used in the definition of poetry. He has, as it were, mounted the definition of poetry in the K.P. on a grinding wheel. We will first give Visvanātha's views and then try to evaluate his observations. He first picks up the word 'a-dosau' used as an attribute of 'sabdárthau'. He observes that if we take only those word and sense which are completely free from blemishes as poetry, then such examples of poetry as - "nyakkāro hy ayam eva...” will fail to pass the test of being poetry at all, because the blemish viz. 'vidheya-avimarśa' is very much there and hence what is taken as an illustration of “uttama” poetry by aesthetes will have to be discarded as 'no poetry or 'a-kavya’. Thus 'a-vyāptidosa' embraces the definition as coined by Mammața. Continuing with his relentless assault Viśvanātha observes that it cannot be held that a part with blemish should be taken as no-poetry (i.e. a-kavya) and a portion with dhvani should be taken as uttama-kavya or highest type of poetry. For this way, in a tug of war the particular piece of poetry will neither remain poetry nor ‘no-poetry'. Again, it cannot be said that such blemishes as śrutidusta mar only a portion of poetry. Actually such blemishes mar the beauty of a whole piece of poetry. But, in fact, if they do not harm the cause of rasa i.e. aesthetic relish, they are no blemishes at all. The fact of being a blemish depends on its being harmful to rasa. If such blemishes as "śruti-dusta' harm the cause of rasa, then they are positively to be reckoned as blemishes. Precisely for this reason, the aesthetes have thought of the position of 'nitya-anitya-dosa' i.e. of blemishes being all-time blemishes or being occasional blemishes. If we do not accept this position then poetry will either have no scope at all, or will have very little scope, if at all, because poetry being absolutely free from any fault whatsoever is a rare dream ! For Viśvanātha, the particular example, viz. “nyakkārohy ayam eva”, etc. is excellent poetry for the blemish viz. vidheya-avimars'a is of no consequence at all as it does not interrupt the enjoyment of relish. But, observes Viśvanātha, that for Mammata this poem will be no-poetry - i.e. 'a-kavya' as the blemish is very much there and he wants ‘sabdárthau' to be “a-dośau”.
Continuing his tirade against 'a-dosau', Viśvanātha further observes that, in case if by 'a-dośau' is meant “işad-dosau” i.e. poetry having negligible amount of blamish, then such poetry which is absolutely free from blemish will cease to be poetry. Now if the negative suggester i.e. nan "T" in 'a' (= '37') is taken as “smallest amount of fault if at all present", then such accidental attributes as "blemish, if at all present" need not find mentioning in the definition of poetry. No accidental

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95 attributes find a place in a logical definition of poetry. No accidental attributes find a place in a logical definition of anything. When you define a jewel or a diamond, you do not have to say that it should not be having any negative mark in its kītā'nuviddhatva; or being damaged in any way need not be mentioned while examining a diamond. For, thereby a diamond does not cease to be a diamond.
After this, Viśvanātha concentrates on the attributes 'sa-guņau' in the difinition. He holds that gunas or excellences are said to be the attributes of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic
, and in that case how can they be mentioned as attributes of word and sense? Now, it also cannot be mentioned that as word and sense are suggesters of 'rasa'. and therefore 'gunas' or excellences which are the attributes of rasa, can be metaphorically said to be attributes of word and sense. For, in a given poem 'rasa' or aesthetic relish may be either present or absent. In case rasa is not seen with reference to word and sense in a given piece of poetry, then these particular set of word and sense will cease to be 'sa-gunau', because gunas or excellences are associated with 'rasa' only, through the relation of invariable concomittance. And in case 'rasa' is found to be present in word and sense of a given piece of poetry then why not call them 'sa-rasau' directly? The attribute 'sa-rasau' is clearer and more direct as compared to 'sa-gunau' which leads to 'rasa' at the next stage. Visvanātha holds that by 'sa-gunau', it cannot be implied that in poetry only such words and sense should be used which manifest gunas or excellences, because this has no relation with the form of basic nature of poetry, but it can only enhance the charm of poetry. Even here we will go to observe that it is Viśvanāth's narrow approach which comes in his way of accepting the attribute 'sa-gunau'. Anandvardhana implicitly, and Jagannātha perhaps clearly, suggest that "guņas” are qualities of śabda i.e. word and 'artha', i.e. sense. This also is overlooked by Visvanātha.
He also objects to the words, 'an-alamkrtih punah kvā'pi'. He holds that the presence or absence of a figure of speech is only an accident. It is not a basic qualification of poetry. So, such features that are accidental to poetry, need not find an expression in the definition of poetry. Again, alamkāras make for the enhancement of poetic charm; they do not cause it.
Now, we will critically examine Viśvanātha's position.
As for his first observation concerning 'a-dosau', even he himself is conscious that a poetic blemish is accepted only as a blemish when it harms the realization of aesthetic pleasure i.e. rasa. Mammata in his K.P. VII - i, clearly says that :
"mukhyártha hatiḥ dosaḥ
rasas tu mukhyaḥ...."

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So, by 'a-dosau' Mammata wants a poet to avoid such dosas as are capable of damaging the relish of aesthetic pleasure. Literary critics beginning with Bhāmaha or even earlier, perhaps even prior to Bharata, have unanimously denounced the occurance of a poetic blemish and if Mammaţa cautions a poet of keeping clean out of this, he is within his rights to do it, and to be honest any good critic should remind a poet that poetry has to be free from blemishes whatsoever. Even blemishes that seem to go with word and sense in outward expression, also render the relishing of rasa less transparent. This is a universal experience of men of taste.
As for the next attribute 'sa-gunau', even here Viśvanātha's mind seems to be too much biased in favour of the metaphor given by dhvanīvādins concerning poetry. True, rasa or dhvani is 'ātman', and 'word and sense' form the 'body of poetry. But, as observed earlier by us, this is only a metaphorical way of presenting things. Mataphor is only a means and not an end in itself. It is used with a specific purpose of enlightening the lesser souls who do not enjoy an entry into the region of abstract thinking. In fact, poetry is an abstract art and it has nothing to do with 'body' or 'soul. Even 'words and meanings are all abstractions and what we read and write are merely physical signs of whatever is only mentally cognized and enjoyed. But, if at all we have to translate, or try to translate the abstract something concrete, we have to use metaphor. Even the great Anandavardhana, while discussing the topic of 'samghatanā' or construction, almost concedes the point that 'gunas' or excellences are attributes of word and meaning virtually. Jagannātha, the author of Rasagangadhara (= R. G.) and even Appayya, who was his senior contemporary, also tend to correlate 'gunas' or poetic excellences with word and sense. So, Viśvanātha's stubborn approach does not stand to logic.
As for the mention of alamkāras in the definition, once again Viśvanātha overlooks the fact that the term 'alamkāra' had a very very wide connotation almost equivalent to "kāvya-saudarya', in earlier times. Actually the discipline of literary criticism and literary critics have acquired such denomination as alamkāraśāstra', 'ālamkārika' etc. only with reference to this wider concept of 'alamkāra' as 'poetic beauty'. With Ānandavardhana we find a second parallel application of this term 'alamkāra', fixed with reference to precisely indicate the figures of word and sense such as anuprāsa', 'upamā' etc. But even while keeping this narrower connotation before him, Anandavardhana never underestimated the potential charm of these devices causing poetic beauty. It is therefore, that he stated in so many terms that, these alamkāras were not 'external to poetic beauty "tasmāt na teşām bahirangatvam rasábhivyaktau" - (Dhv. vrtti on II. 16). The recognition of these

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devices of poetic beauty, as "kataka-keyūra"divat" in a metaphorical expression, does not render them as external' to poetry. We have discussed this point on an earlier occasion in greater details. So, Viśvanātha's outburst is only peevishness on his part. His criticism is not only not justified but is totally unwanted. He does it because he has failed to collect the very essence of metaphorical usage with reference to poetic devices.
Again, as quoted just above, even the Locanakāra observes that 'sabda' is said to be śarīra only because, it is “sarva-jana-samvedya”. So also alamkāra-s are sarva-jana-samvedya.'
No woder that, smarting under the same illusion, Viśvanātha locks horns with Kuntaka also while rejecting the latter's observations. He also rejects Boja's definition of kāvya as read in the Sarasvati-kanthā”-bharana, while rejecting Mammața's definition. He rejects Vāmana's observation viz. 'rītiḥ ātmā kāvyasya', for rīti is only arrangement of word and sense in a style. How can it 'ātman', when it is a mere arrangement of parts and limbs ? All this is taking the metaphor too far literally.
While mentioning 'rasā"tmaka vākya' as poetry, Viśvanātha seems to have paid greater importance to the word-element in poetry, not unlike perhaps Dandin. This tradition was forcefully established later by Jagannātha also. Viśvanātha attached importance to 'rasa' in poetry in keeping with the highest traditions established by Bharata, Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Mahimā, DhananjayaDhanika, Bhoja and of course Mammata, whom he criticises severely. He tried to establish 'rasa' as a central concept in poetry. But in doing so he has only echoed the inner voice of his great predecessors. “Rasa” here is not emotive stuff only, but is aesthetic flavour as a whole.
Keśava Miśra in his Alamkāra-Sekhara (pp. 2 Edn. 26, Bombay, kāvyamālā, '50;) holds : "kävyam rasādimad vākyam śrutam sukha-visesa-krt." i.e. “poetry is said to be sentence charged with aesthetic delight etc., which causes special happiness.” He adds : ādipadena alamkāra-parigrahaḥ i.e. by the term 'ādi' is meant the inclusion of alamkāras. He introduces navya-nyāya style in his writing, as if paving way for the advent of the great Appayya Diksiţa and Jagannātha and also Siddhicandra to some extent. He observes : (pp. 2, 3 ibid) : “tathā ca tad-ubhayā'nyatara-vattvam (vā) kavyalaksanam. anyatarattvam ca tad-anya'nyatvam. sukhaviśesa-sādhanatvam vā laksanam. samudāyártha-sūnye (V.L. śūnyatve)'pi tad-ubhayam asti eva iti vrddhāḥ. adrsta-dvārā tad-hętu-sabde ativyāptir āha, - śrutam iti. sad iti śeṣaḥ. sukhe vaijātyam sarvánubhava-siddham eva.” -
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Thus Keśava suggests that having either of the attributes (i.e. rasā"dimat/ alamkara-vattva) is the definition of poetry. Having either of the attributes means to be different from something which is different (from poetry) (i.e. to be poetry itself.). Or, the definition terminates into saying that (that sentence is said to be poetry) which is the instrument of special happiness. The ancients hold that these two qualities (viz. rasā"dimat-tva and sukhaviśeşa-kst-tva) are present even in cases (of sentences) where the meaning of the 'samudāya' is even absent (i.e. wherein only the meaning of parts is prevelent such as in 'pankaja' meaning 'that which is born in mud' and not lotus' - the samudāya meaning.) This opinion of the ancients cannot be traced for the present. We cannot say for certain who these ancients are. Or, it may mean that according to the ancients, even if the whole 'samudāya', i.e. the whole of poetry is not found to be 'rasavat', even then the two qualities are at least partially present in a given poem. Keśava then observes : by 'śrutam' is meant 'is said to be only. By this word, 'śruam' the vedic ritual causing 'adrsta' or 'apūrva' giving rise to varieties of happiness is not meant here.
Keśava then has a dig at other definitions. He says - "kecit tu - 'tad adosau...”. This is a clear reference to Mammata. But he does not discuss his point and leaves it at this only showing perhaps his displeasure with Mammața. He also quotes ‘apare' saying, “rasa-pratipatti (guna) dvārā sukhaviśeşa-sādhanam vākyam kāvyam' iti apare." - i.e., by (the attribute) rasa-pratipatti or apprehension of rasa, is meant such sentence to be poetry, which causes a special happiness. Then he says, “kecit tu padāvalī kāvyam" - which is perhaps a reference to Dandin. Perhaps he gives a common answer to all these definitions. He goes on to observe that, "na tu nirdosa-gunavadādi; kāvya-doṣāņām aparigananā-"patteh.” i.e. the attribues viz. ‘nirdosam' (i.e. a-dosau) and 'guņavad' (i.e. sa-gunau) of kāvya cannot be accepted as there arises the contingency of not being able to count the poetic blemishes. (perhaps, he suggests that even some dosas are not permanent dosas, so to count doșas is not possible). He further observes that, “na ca - dosábhāva-ghatitakāvyatva-jñānártham eva, pratiyogi parigañanam - iti vācyam.” (pp. 3 ibid). He
erves : "na ca etat kävyam dustam" iti an-udbhāvanā"patteh, 'idam kāvyam eva na iti abhidhānasya eva, ucitatvāt - ity āhuḥ tanna. tavā’yam heturā”bhāsa itivad ukteh. vyāptivisista-paksa-dharmasyaiva hetutvāt. na ca hetutvena abhimata iti vācyam. tulyatvāt iti. vastutas tat kävyam prthag eva yatra doșa-guņādi-cintā. na hi śariram sariram eva na bhavati, iti anye.
He seems to criticize the attribute ‘adosau' in definitions such as those coined by Mammața and others and seems to recommend that poetry is possible even if poetic

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99 blemishes are seen in it. He says that the observations of the predecessors can not be accepted for those who hold that if it is understood that the mention of pratiyogi • (i.e. a-kāvya or absence of poetry) is for the understanding that poetry can be caused by absence of poetic blemish only, it is not proper, because in that case the apprehension viz. “this poetry is free from blemishes" will not arise, and instead, only an apprehension that, "this is no poetry et al”, will follow. Because in that case a poetry with no faults only will be called poetry for only there the invariable concomittance of “yatra yatra dosā'bhāvatvam tatra tatra kāvyarvam” will be applicable. But this sort of vyāpti is not accepted as a hetu of kāvyatva. As a body with deformities does not cease to be body, in the same way poetry with poetic blemishes does not cease to be poetry. Thus Keśava seems to follow the original source, so far as available documents are concerned, the school of critics such as Candidāsa the commentator of Mammata and Viśvanātha and the rest who are angry with Mammata and others who include 'adosau' or absence of poetic blemish as an attribute of poetic word and meaning, in the definition of poetry.
Keśava then quotes the definitions given by his predecessors. He quotes Mammata first and leaves it without comment. It should be noted that Kesava does not seem to revel in the refutation of others as is done by Viśvanātha. He quotes 'apare' - saying, (Ist Marici) : "rasa-pratipatti-dvārā sukha-visesa-sādhanam vākyam kāvyam !” (pp. 3) i.e. "Poetry is that sentence which through the apprehension of rasa, becomes the instrument of a special (form of) happiness." Who these 'a-pare' are is not known but this comes closer to Viśvanātha. Then Keśava observes - "kecit tu padāvali kävyam” i.e. for some, 'a string of words' is poetry. These people, he observes, do not include the attributes viz. ‘nir-dosa' and 'guna-vat' etc., because of the contingency of there being innumerable) poetic blemishes which defy counting. They hold that it is not pertinent to hold that only for a clear understanding of poetry which is the creation of absense of blemishes, we should cultivate the knowledge of blemishes ( na ca dosábhāva-ghatitakávyarva-jñānártham eva pratiyogi-parigananam - pp. 3. Alamkāra śekhara, (A. śe.), Edn. N.S., Bombay, '26). (objector) Because, in the absence of understanding of poetic blemishes), there will not be such cognition as, 'this poetry is having blamishes', and it will be only a proper observation that 'this is no poetry at all. (So, the objector again suggests that the knowledge of poetic blemishes is essential). To this the siddhāntin says that this objection represents only a 'hervā”bhāsa' i.e. false reasoning. Real ‘hetu' is having qualities of 'vyāpti-višișța-tva' i.e. - having concomittance and it resides in the 'paksa' i.e. substratum. The objector cannot say

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that here it (= knowedge of blemishes) is taken as a 'hetu'. Actually it is no 'hetu'. Actually that poetry in which there is consideration of excellences and blemishes is different altogether. Not that a body having blemishes is no body at all. This is the opinion of some others.
Keśava observes that earlier in a definition given by 'apare', there was an attribute viz. 'sukha-vićeşa-sādhanam'. Now, by this 'viśesa' is meant 'speciality of being an instrument in winning such things as fame and the like.' To support this, he quotes two definitions without mentioning the name, but they are one each from Vāgbhata (1) and Bhoja (in S.K.). The definitions are read as :
"sādhu-sabdārtha-sandarbham guņálamkāra-bhūșitam sphusa-rīti-rasopetam
kāvyam kurvīta kīrtaye.” (I. 2. vāgbhatā'lamkāra) and,
nirdosam guṇavat kävyam alamkārair alamkrtam | rasănvitam kaviḥ kurvan
prītim kīrtim ca vindati. (I. 2. S. K.; Bhoja) Keśava leaves the discussion here only.
Keśva is taken as a predecessor of Viśvanātha by some scholars. At least this impression is created by Dr. P. Sri. Ramachandrudu in his, "the contribution of panditarāja Jagannātha to sanskrit poetics" (Vol. I. pub. - nīrājanā publishers and book sellers, Delhi. 7, 1st Edn. '83, pp. 41, 42) where the learned professor treats Keśava first, followed by both Candidāsa and Visvanātha-kavirāja (pp. 42 ibid). We have chosen to follow the lead of Dr. De. S. K., (Skt. Poetics) in matters concerning chronology. Dr. Ramacandrudu observes : (pp. 42, ibid) - 'Keśava, while remarking 'tadubhayānyatara-vattvam' must have been influenced by the views expressed by Govinda Thakkura in Pradīpa. For there, differing with (from ?) Mammața he remarks that “camatkāra” being the essence of poetry, it should contain either Rasa or Alamkāra, for producing Camatkāra (Pradīpa, K.P. p. 10). Again Keśava's last remark, 'sukha-visesa-sādhanatvam vă laksanam' is an indirect acceptance of 'camatkāra-vattva' as the Laksana. In this context Keshava Mishra quotes two more laksanas by some old unknown authors, who appear to be in favour of accepting śabda as the body of a poem."

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101 Here again, Dr. Sri. Ramacandradu seems to take even Govinda Thakara as prior to Keśava and therefore prior to Viśvanātha.
Candidāsa who comments on the K.P., and who is the great grand-father of Viśvanātha, defines kāvya as : "āsvādajīvātuh padasandarbhah kāvyam", which is quoted by Dr. P. V. Kane in his History of Sanskrit Poetics (pp. 354). Thus for Candidāsa poetry is 'collection or arrangement of words, with (rasa) āsvāda i.e. relish as its soul.” This is what later Visvanātha almost translates as "vākyam rasā"tmakam kavyam". These attempts at giving greater importance to śabda or word element in the definition of poetry, lays the road to Panditarāja Jagannatha who clearly advocates this position.
Jagannātha :(= J.). When J. arrived on the horizen of literary criticism, he not only had inherited the above trend, but was also nurtured in the atmosphere of learning, vibrant with the air of navya-nyāya discipline and vyākaranaśastra. He tries to frame his definition of poetry in the most accurate terminology with the help of navya-nyāya style of writing. We believe in an opinion aired by responsible scholars that navya-nyaya is less of an independent darśana and more of an attempt at most accurate and scientific drafting of views concerning various subjects, including kävyaśāstra here in particular.
J. starts by definning poetry first as, “ramanīyártha-pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ (kāvyam).” (R. G. pp. 4). Thus for him poetry is that 'word which conveys a beautiful sense.” J. then elucidates what is exactly meant by 'ramaniya' or beautiful, and cites two more definitions of poetry trying to improve upon the original definition as quoted above. Thus the next two definitions of poetry serve as amplifications of the earlier definition. As observed by us, the trend of paying greater importance to the 'word' element as compared with the 'artha' element while defining poetry was noticed first, in available docoments, in Dandin's Kävyādarśa, who observed that poetry was, "istártha-vyavacchinnā padāvalih.” Dr. Ramachandrudu (pp. 43, ibid) holds that this is not a full laksana given by Dandin but only a part of it, "and the complete laksana can be inferred only on combining what was said by him in different places..." We beg to differ. Dandin's words are - "śarīram tāvat...”. Here the use of 'tāvat', as done later by Anandavardhana and explained by Abhinavagupta, suggests that, "there is no difference of opinion concerning this fact that, poetry is arrangement (or group, combination) of words... etc." The force of 'tavat' is unmistakable. Yes, the scope of poetry is larger than the definition, and is explained by us earlier. But the same is the case with
as also explained by us earlier. But the fact stands that Dandin's definition precisely puts greater weight on 'word' element, as is done by J.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA J. after defining poetry as above, continues to explain minutely the import of the term 'ramaniya'. He explains that 'ramaniya-artha' is not to be taken in a broad sense so as to include statements such as, 'putras te jātaḥ', 'a son is born to you', which is a pleasant statement causing joy to the person concerned. Such statements causing boundless pleasure, cannot be termed poetry. So, J. observes that what is meant by 'ramaniyatā' is 'lokottara-āhlādajanaka-jñāna-gocaratā.' i.e. being the object of such knowledge or information as that which causes delight of an extra-ordinary type.' The above quoted statement causes only worldly pleasure which is only personal. For J. 'lokottarattva' is equivalent to 'camatkāratva', which is for him a special type - 'jātivisesa' and therefore beyond the lack of 'anugama' i.e. comprehension. The R. G. (pp. 5) observes that this special type of joy - camatkāratva - is to be realized through one's own experience and that it cannot be described in words. This special joy - 'lokottara-āhlāda' is the result of 'bhāvanā', which is constant or repeated contemplation over kävyártha. J. is very clear about the fact that as 'kāvya' i.e. poetry is the topic of discussion, only that attribute which can distinguish ‘kāvya' from other likes such as 'śāstra', 'purana', etc. can be its distinguishing mark i.e. laksana. Thus, for ‘kāvya' this special attribute is 'kāvyarva'. Thus the examination of what exactly is this distinguishing mark called 'kávyarva' is, - forms the matter of investigation in the present context. The poet and the man of taste stand in need of a clear understanding of the nature of poetry which causes fame and extra-ordinary pleasure. So, a definition of it is being framed to define poetry - kāvya - which is presented through the use of excelences and beautiful turns of speech, a definition which clearly explains its speciality, to distinguish kāvya from anything else than poetry : (R. G. pp. 4) : "tatra kīrti-paramā”hlāda-guru-rājā-devatāprasādādy aneka-prayojanakasya kavyasya vyutpatteh kavi-sahřidayayorāvaśyakatayā gunálamkārádibhir nirūpanīye tasmin, višesyatávacchedakam taditara-bheda-buddhau sādhanañ ca tallakṣaṇam tāvan-nirūpyate.”
Here, particularly the words viz. "tasmin višesyatávacchedakam tad-itarabheda-buddhau ca sādhanam laksanam” deserve special attention. By 'laksana' is meant an un-common attribute i.e. distinuishing mark. Now that which is an exclusive attribute of poetry should be taken as its 'laksana' or distinctive mark. As observed earlier the characteristic viz. ‘kāvyatva' distinguishes poetry from śāstra and the rest, and gives an idea of how the rest are different from poetry. Thus the special attribute viz. 'kāvyatva' makes for the instrument that distiuguishes poetry from other substances : "tad itara bheda-buddhau sadhanam." In śāstra, two aims or 'prayojanas' of 'laksana' or definition are laid down as : "vyavrittir-vyavahāro vā

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laksanasya prayojanam" (Tarka-dīpikā). Thus the first aim is to distinguish a given item which is to be defined, from other objects. The second aim is that an object which is to be defined becomes useful for vyavahāra i.e. practical purposes. Out of these the first aim or prayojana is given as above. Now that laksana i.e. asādhāraṇa-dharma-distinguishing characteristic or mark, brings poetry in daily usage, by becoming viseșyatávacchedaka - i.e., the mark viz. by becoming an agent of suggesting speciality, brings poetry in daily usage. This is the second aim of 'laksana'. Keeping these two characteristics of a 'laksana' or definition J. has tried to frame the definition of poetry. If we take 'guņá-lamkārā”di' i.e. excellences and figures of speech as višeşana or attributes, then kāvya i.e. poetry becomes 'višesya' or a particular entity which is to be defined and which is contextual. Now in that poetry which is 'viśesya', a characteristic viz. 'viśesyatā' is created. This special type of 'višesyatā' which is caused by the presence of gunas and alamkāras, removes the possibility of other 'viśesyatā's - i.e. other particularities caused by 'dravyarva', Sabdatva' etc. creeping in poetry. Thus speciality in form of being a substance (dravyarva) or in being a word (in general) is excluded from the realm of poetry. Thus the characteristic of being poetry is itself a special characteristic which becomes the avacchedaka-dharma i.e. distinguishing attribute of poetry. Thus 'kávya' is a viśesya and in it there is the distinctive characteristic of visesyatā. Again, there is also a special attribute called 'kavyarva' also associated with it. Thus višesyatā' and 'kāvyatva' are two characteristics (= dharma) which are 'avacchedya' and 'avacchedaka' i.e. distinguishing that visesyatā from other 'viśesyatās'. Now, according to Nyāya-śāstra, the maxim goes as : "samānádhikaranayoh eva dharmayoh parasparam avacchedya-avacchedakabhāvah." i.e. two characteristics residing in the same substratum become 'avacchedya' and 'avacchedaka' with respect to each other. Now this maxim of Nyāya-śāstra can be applied to poetry in the following way.
As two characteristics viz. 'visesyatā' and 'kāyyatva' reside in the same substratum i.e. kavya or poetry, out of these two, one viz. 'kāvyatva' becomes 'avacchedaka' of the other viz. 'višesyatā'. So, it is to be understood that in the definition of poetry, 'kāvya' becomes 'višesya' through the characterstic viz. 'kävyatva’. So, we have to consider 'kavya' from the point of view of ‘kāvyatva'
. This means that 'kavya' or poetry is not be looked at as any physical substance. Again, it is implied that this 'kāvya' is characterized by attributes such as gunas and alamkāras. If we try to describe its form in such a way, then only We will be able to bring poetry in the sphere of practical usage. Again, when it is stated that poetry is different from other objects like itself, then its 'bhinnatva' or

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distinction is to be understood in two ways. First, we have to point out how kāvya' is different from objects which can be termed as its likes - i.e. 'sa-jātiya'. - i.e. similar objects. This means that poetry is dependent on word-element. So also are the other śāstras. Thus they (i.e. śāstrā”di) are 'sa-jātīya' or similar objects. So, when it is explained how ‘kāvya’ is different from its sa-jātīya objects such as śāstrā”di, this is one kind of 'tad-itara-bheda'. The other type of tad-itara-bheda is of the form of the distinction of poetry from objects such as ‘katāksa' i.e. glances of the eye, or 'abhinaya' i.e. acting etc. Now these 'katāksa' i.e. glances etc. do not depend on sabda i.e. word, so this is the second variety of 'tad-icara-bheda'. J. tries to incorporate both types of distinction in his definition of poetry.
J.”'s definition of poetry is free from the three faults viz. a-vyāpti, ati-vyāpti and a-sambhava. The term 'ramanīya' in the definition, as observed above, excludes the use of word and sense in works on various disciplines - the śāstra-granthas. In the absence of the term 'ramanīya', the śāstra-śabda also would have been covered by
the realm of poetry, thereby the fault of ati-vyāpti could have creapt in the · definition. The word 'sabda' in the definition is also to stop the musical notes from
being dubbed as poetry. The musical notes are 'ramaniya' and tend to suggest ramanīya-artha in form of rasa-bhāva and the like. So, in order to prevent the musical notes from being dubbed as poetry, as they also tend to suggest various moods and feelings, the term 'sabda' is included in the definition of poetry. Poetry is for J., a creation of 'sabda' and not of musical notes i.e. svara. For J. here, it may be noted that 'sabda' is that unit of sound which is accompanied by expressed meaning. Mere sound, having no dictionary meaning, or ‘abhidhártha' is no 'śabda' for J. But if this position is accepted then the whole thing amounts to virtually accepting 'sabdārthau' - i.e. both word and sense as poetry. Normally, 'sabda' is always accompanied by meaning. On the other hand 'dhvani' or mere sound having no primary meaning, may not be termed 'sabda', but it has still the capacity to suggest some meaning, i.e. it is capable of vyangyártha', e.g. the blowing of a horn of a vehicle, though not yielding a primary meaning as read in a dictionary. So, J.'s whole effort, not to call 'sabdārthau' as “kāvyam" seems to fall flat. But, it may be said that to his satisfaction he has served his cause of calling poetry as only 'sabdaḥ and not 'śabdārthau'.
Again, in his definition J. has used the term, 'pratipadaka'. There is a reason behind this. The term 'pratipădaka' means 'that which yields meaning'. J. suggests that this yielding of meaning can be through the agency of any power of word; be it either abhidhā or the primary power of expression, laksanā, or the secondary

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105 power of word, i.e. indication; or vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word. Thus the term pratipadaka' means that the word can be a vācaka, laksaka or a vyañjaka. The basic condition however stands that whatever the type of meaning, it has to be 'ramanīya' i.e. beautiful. By this term, viz. 'ramaniya' all such sources of beauty such as sabdálamkāra, arthálamkāra, guna, bhāva, rasa, etc. are covered up, as they all tend to make for supreme delight. J. hereby also tries to indicate as it were, that the field of poetry would be too norrow if only rasa-bhāva-oriented poetry i.e. only emotive stuff alone is covered by the definition. Thus, J. tries to expand the limits of poetry that were narrowed by the efforts of Mahimā, Viśvanātha and such others. He comes closer to Kuntaka who made an effort to expand the limits of poetry, and also to Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta for whom rasa was ‘aesthetic delight, and not just emotive stuff only.
By the term 'sabdah' J. has precluded such things as 'katākṣa' - i.e. glances, abhinaya' i.e. acting etc. from the scope of poetry, as these do not depend on word. By the term 'artha' in the definition he keeps poetry away from the discipline of grammar i.e. vyākārana-śāstra. Only a 'ramaniya sabda' by itself does not make for poetry, because the discipline of grammar which accounts for the currency of such a word, is only a 'sabda-pratipadaka' i.e. one taking care of the word, i.e. word in its 'form' only. It is not an artha-pratipadaka discipline. Again, the 'artha' also has to be beautiful or 'ramanīya' to make for poetry. So, bare statements such as, 'ghatam ānaya' - (please) “Bring a por”, is no poetry. Such statements yielding worldly pleasure as, "There is birth of a son in your family", are also no poetry. By 'ramanīya' is meant something extra-worldly - "a-laukika".
J. further elaborating the concept of poetry observes :
(R.G. PP. 4, 5): “ittham camatkara-janaka-bhāvanā-visayartha-pratipādakasabdatvam yat-pratipaditrtha-visayaka-bhāvanitram camatkarajanakatā'vacchedakam tattvam, sva-visista-janakatávacchedakártha-pratipadakat.samsargeņa, camatkāratva-vattvam eva vā kävyarvam iti phalitam.”
As observed earlier, the extra-worldly pleasure is the result of 'bhāvanā' which is constant i.e. repeated contemplation' (over kāvyártha). Here, the word 'bhāvanā substitutes the word 'jñāna' Originally, 'ramanīyatā' was explained as, "lokottarā"hlāda-janakajñāna-gocaratā”. Now for 'jñāna' the word 'bhāvanā' is preferred when J. explains 'ramanīyatā' as “lokottara-āhlāda-janaka-bhāvanāgocaratā.” This substitution of the word is necessitated because of the fact that there is some possibility of "samüha-ālambana-jñāna" (or cognitive mixture) also to be taken as "camatkāra-janaka-jñāna". The samūhā"lambana-jñāna comprises

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SAHRDAYALOKA of two cognitions of which one is 'ramanīyártha' and the other ‘a-ramanīyártha'. Such a possibility is removed by replacing the term 'jñāna' by the newer term 'bhāvanā'. 'Bhāvanā' is a chain of cognitions which is connected only with ‘ramaniya-artha' here, i.e. under special circumstances. So, as quoted above, for J. 'that word is poetry, which gives, such a meaning which is the object of 'bhāvana' which yields 'camatkāra'. Or, poetry is that word, which, yields such a meaning, the bhāvanā of which has a speciality to create 'camatkāra'. Or, ‘kāvyarva' means being associated with 'camatkāratā' caused by collection of words that give a meaning which has the capacity to quality bhāvanā with ānanda-janakatā i.e., the bhāvanā which creates delight qualified by 'camatkārata'.
The simple explanation of this discussion amounts to the following easy explanation. There is a specific bhāvanā (i.e. constant thinking) which yields extraworldly joy. The meaning of poetry becomes the object of such a bhāvanā'. The word that gives this sort of a meaning yields a special camatkāra. This camatkāra is kävya. Thus we arrive at !
"camatkāra-janaka-bhāvanā-visayártha - pratipādaka-śabdatvam.” (R.G. p. 5). Herein, the word 'bhāvanā' stands for a special type of knowledge as already
xplained by J. So, the word 'jñāna' is taken out and is replaced by the word 'bhāvanā'. As noted earlier the word 'jñāna' was wide enough to include 'samūhā"lambana jñāna' also, which is not acceptable to J., for this means, "nānā. prakārată-nirūpita-nānā-mukhya-višesyatāśāli ekam (jñānam) samūhálambanam." A congnition which covers many objects appearing differently, is one pertaining to a group and is therefore termed 'samūhā"lambana'. For example, when we say, "this pot", "that pillar”, “this piece of cloth” etc., the cognition covering all three objects is termed group-cognition i.e. samūhā"lambana jñāna. The objects of such a cognition are many and so also words that convey these objects are many. If in the definition of poetry, as we explained earlier, the term 'jñana' were preferred to bhāvanā, then such samūhā"lambana-jñāna would also have made for poetry. But such group-cognitions have a-ramaniya cognitions also as part of them and so J. disapproves of the term 'jñāna' in preference to 'bhāvanā', which is thinking of only one (ramanīya) object.
But even in this amplification there is a loose string. Of course, by the term 'bhāvanā' the meaning of repeated thinking of only one object is arrived at, which in śāstriya jargon can be termed 'dhārāvāhika jñāna' or cognition in form of continuity. But by bringing in the definition such a continuous stream of cognition of one object only, there is no guarantees for its making for 'camatkāra'. Bhāvanā is only another name of dhārāvāhikajñāna. But this can have a dry object also at

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107 its centre, which may not cause camatkāra. So, there can be the fault of 'ativyāpti' i.e. being too wide, in the definition where there is possibility of the creeping in of such a bhāvanā concerning un-interesting object. To avoid this contingency of 'ativyāpti' J. modifies the definition still further.
He uses the words, "bhāvanārvam camatkāra-janakatā'vacchedakam." A sabda or a sentence gives a meaning in a particular order and then the bhāvanā or constant thinking with that vākyārtha as its object or 'vișaya' arises. This bhāvanā produces camatkāra. As the bhāvanā is camatkāra-janaka, the bhāvanātva becomes "camatkāra-janakatávacchedaka." Such a sentence in this special order can be taken as 'kāvya'. Thus the definition would mean, "the sabda (i.e. sentence) of particular order, the meaning of which is the object of bhāvanā is kávya, when such a bhāvanā is camatakāra-janaka. Thus the bhāvanārva is camatkārajanakatávacchedaka. Now the group of sentences in the dhārāvāhika-jñāna cannot
ve that particular order that yields camatkāra, and so the ativyapti dosa is avoided, because only the sentence first heard in a particular order produces camatkāra and not all the sentences in the dhārāvāhika-jñāna. Thus the second definition is free from the faults of ativyāpti, avyāpti and asambhava.
But then still a small difficulty has crept in even here. A scientific definition has to be as breef as possible. Dr. P. Sri. Ramacandrudu (pp. 45, 46) observes that, “Not content with this, PR (= Pandita Rāja) gives another amplification in Anugama style. He feels that the second one is much cumbersome because it contains "yacchabda" and "tacchabda", which being the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the Anugama. Therefore he gives a third modified laksana which is comparatively simple according to the tradition of the Tarkikas as there will be no need of bringing many things into sābda-bodha as in the case of the second form of laksana. The final laksana is : "sva-visista-ianakatávacchedakárthapratipādakatā-samsargena camatkarattva-vattyam kavyattvam.” (R.G. pp. 5). In this laksana, a long compound is placed to show the relation with 'camatkāra'. According to the nyāyaśāstra, no relation (sambandha) or doubt (samsaya) is expressed by a word directly, because such a sambandha is collected automatically by the force of its own self (sva-māhātmya). So, such relation need not be expressed in a lakṣaṇa. So, the third definition is as breef and perfect as possible. 'Samsarga' or 'sambandha' is automatically conveyed as in, "ghatavat bhūtalam". The relation between pot and surface is that of 'samyoga' (= accidental relation). This relation is automatically brought out - "samsargamaryadaya.” Gadādhara observes in "Vyutpattivāda', in this context, "śābdabodhe caika-padárthe apara-padárthasya samsargaḥ samsarga-maryādayā bhāsate.”

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA So, J. has framed the third breef definition as - "camatkāra-vattvam kävyattvam". In this definition, the samsarga, viz. "sva-visista - janakata-vacchedakárthapratipădakatā” is of course a long one, but this may not be brought into verbal explanation viz. śābda-bodha. This means that the word has the capacity to express a meaning which becomes the object of 'bhāvana' i.e. constant thinking. This means that the word has the attribute of 'artha-pratipadakatā' and by the relation with this attribute, 'camatkāratva' is associated with sabda. And only this camatkåratva can be designated as 'kavyarva'. No other ‘chamatkāratva' can be said to be 'kävyatva'. This is the simple meaning of the compound. When the meaning is said to be, "sva-viãista-janakatā'-vacchedaka”, the 'sva' in it means 'camatkāratva'. Qualified by this, the joy or pleasure (= anand, āhlāda) enter into bhāvanā. Thus 'bhāvanā' causes āhlāda or joy qualified by camatkāra. But this joy caused by the bhāvanā depends on 'kávyārtha' i.e. poetic meaning alone. So, in nyāya torminology it is stated here, that ‘artha' is the 'avacchedaka' of the janakatā (= causality) which lies in the bhāvanā. In simple words this can be as, "whatever joy is derived by kävya-bhāvanā in kāvya, is caused by its meaning only. No other object, except the kāvyā'rtha or poetic meaning can cause this special joy. So, the attribute (= dharma) which distinguishes this "janakata' residing in 'bhāvanā' is the poetic meaning only. So, bhāvanā with reference to the (poetic) meaning causes a special joy which is poetry itself. 'Artha' - poetic meaning is the distinguishing mark-avacchedaka-of the joy caused by 'bhāvanā', cannot be said to be born of poetry (= kāvya-janya). Thus J. has drafted three definitions with a special intention in his mind. To remove the loop-hole in the first definition, the second one is given, and the third one is attempted to clear any fault seen in the second one. He also accomplished brevity thereby. The long compound seen in the third definition helps the cause of brevity and it indicates only the relation between sabda-poetic word and 'camatkārattva' - "sva-visistajanakatā'vacchedakā'rtha-pratipadakată.”
In the first definition J. has suggested that, "artha-pratipadaka-sabdatva is kāvyatva." By this he has emphasised the importance of śabda only in poetry. In the second definition he has put weight on the word 'bhāvanā'. Thereby he suggests that by repeated thinking of poetry only, the quality of joy or camatkāratva is caused. In the third definition it is emphasised that the 'camatkāra' means extra worldly joy and this is derived from poetry only. Only poetry, and poetry alone can generate this extra-ordinary pleasure. Thus in these three definitions J. has emphasized three important points. After this J. evaluates the definitions cited by Mammata and Viśvanātha.

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109 Jagannātha on Mammața :
Mammata has defined poetry as 'sabdārthau.' J. feels that this is not correct, as there is no authority for this. On the other hand, such popular usages as, "kāvya is read loudly,” “meaning is derived from poetry," "I heard poetry, but could not catch its meaning,” etc. point to the fact that by the term “kāvya' is meant a special type of word only, i. e. word which gives a beautiful meaning.
The objector (i.e. the supporters of Mammata) can argue that, first define poetry as word and sense and then as we have to give more importance to word from the point of view of practical usage, we can resort to secondary powerlaksanā-with reference to the term kāvya' to derive the meaning of 'word' only. So, for this, there is no need to define poetry as "sabdah kāvyam.” The basic purpose can be served by "sabdārthau kāvyam” also.
To this, J.'s reply is as follows : The objector's view can be accepted only if there is any authority in favour of taking the term 'kāvya' to mean 'sabdārtha-yugala' i.e. both word and sense—by the power of denotation i. e. abhidhāśakti. But there is no greater authority to this effect. We cannot accept this merely relying on the word of the objector. So, in the absence of any authority in favour of accepting the term 'kāvya' meaning both word and sense by abhidhāśakti, how can we reject the abhidhāśakti of the term 'kāvya' as 'word yielding a beautiful meaning,' on the basis of usages quoted as above ?
So, by ‘kāvya' is meant only a special type of word alone, and it is therefore pertinent to define only this special variety of word. It is not proper to define 'kāvya' which is imagined by the opponent (i. e. Mammata) as both 'word and sense.' J. adds that this practice of taking kāvya to mean only word alone, should also be utilized in defining vedas, puranas etc. also, because this practice is supported by public usage. The only difference is that word in poetry is yielding a charming meaning, while the word in vedas and puranas is yielding instruction i.e. "upadeśa.”
J. further continues his refutation and considers yet another option. 'āsvādodbodhakatva' 'to evoke delight is the cause of 'kāvyatva' i. e. poetry. So at all places where we find this characteristic of causing delight, we understand the presence of ‘kāvyatva.' Now this special attribute is seen in both word and meaning equally and so, the objector feels that poetry should equally be found resting in sense also and not in word alone. But J. feels that this argument is not valid. The fact is that any 'rāga'-melody in music is also āsvādódbodhaka,' and this

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA is accepted even by the Dhvanikāra and others, and so the above definition of poetry will also be found applicable to any rāga-melody of music. Again the factors of nātya-dramatic-art such as abhinaya or acting, veśa i.e. costumes, bhāsana i.e. dialogue, etc. are also conveyors of aesthetic delight (rasa), like 'rāga' of music, and so even they will have to be termed 'kāvya' or poetry. So, the opinion that whatever is 'āsvādódbodhaka'-causing relish-is kāvya, is refuted and hence, the definition-viz. "whatever is capable of evoking rasa—'rasódbodhana-samartha' is kāvya” does not stand.
J. puts a further question to the objectors who uphold M.'s views. The question is, “what do you feel is the 'pravstti-nimitta' of the term 'kavya'? Is it used for the twin of sabda and artha together, or for each of these two independently? : "api ca kāvyaśabda-pravrtti-nimittam sabdārtha-vyāsaktam pratyeka-paryāptam vā ?" (R. G. pp. 6). First, we have to grasp the exact connotation of the word “pravsttinimitta.” This technical term occurs in the pūrva-mīmāmsā-śāstra, quite often. Its definition is cited as, “pada-sakyatā-avacchedakam”-i.e. that which gives the special connotative power to a given 'pada' i.e. word. Why a particular meaning is to be derived from a particular word is explained by the nyāya-śāstrin in the following manner. He feels that there is a special meaning in a given 'pada'-word. This dharma' distinguishes that 'padārtha' from other 'padārthas' or wordmeanings. Because of such a special 'dharma' or characteristic, special words give special meanings. And this is indicated by the particular 'pada' or word concerned. In the definition of pravstti-nimitta' cited as above, the term 'sakya' means the meaning of a pada. So, that particular 'sakyatācapacity to yield a particular meaning-is whatever the distinguishing factor of a given 'padārthatā.' This is termed as "sakyată-vacchedaka.” This special attribute in any 'padārtha' is the ‘nimitta' or cause for the pravrtti' i.e. popular usage of a given ‘pada.' This ‘pravstti' is its capacity to give a particular meaning. e.g. if you ask how the term 'go' gives the meaning of 'a cow'?— the answer is, there is a special quality of 'go-tva' in the word 'go', which helps the particular word 'go', to give the meaning viz.-'a cow'. In the same way, there is a special quality of ‘kāvyatva', in the word 'kāvya', which is the 'pravstti-nimitta' of the word 'kāvya.' What is the form of this special quality called “kāvya-tva' ? The reply to this question as given by Bhāmaha, Mammața and others is different from the one given by J. The former take the twin of word and meaning to mean kāvyatva, and hold the same as the pravrtti-nimitta of 'kāvya.'
Now, after clearing the concept of 'pravrtti-nimitta' we will continue with J.'s line of thinking. For J., it is not possible to accept the first alternative i.e. of

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taking the pravṛtti-nimitta of kavyatva with reference to both word and sense taken together. Like the usage of a sentence viz. "One cannot be called two," any śloka-vakya i.e. collection of words in poetry will not be said to be poetry. To put it more clearly we may say that, if kavya is accepted as consisting of both of word and sense, we will have to take a position whether the two together (vyāsakta) or separately (= pratyeka paryāpta) should be taken as kavyatva. Either of these two alternatives is untenable because in the former case such expressions as, 'the sentence of a verse is not a 'kāvya'-"śloka-vākyam na kavyam" will come into vogue, on the basis of the general rule that.. 'one is not two'-eko na dvau.' In the latter case, two kavyas will have to be accepted in one verse. So, concludes J., the definition of kavya, be associated with śabda-i.e. 'word' alone as in case of the definitions of veda and purāņa also-"eṣaiva ca veda-purāṇa-lakṣaṇatve'pi gatiḥ, anyathā tatrā'pi iyam duravasthā syāt. J. therefore concludes: tasmāt veda-śāstra-purāṇa-lakṣaṇasya iva kavya-lakṣaṇasya api śabda-nisthatā eva ucită." (R. G. pp. 7).
The thrust of J.'s argument is that if we take both word and sense together as poetry, then we will have to accept that word alone is not kāvya, and if we accept the second alternative then there will follow the contingency of accepting two kavyas in a single sentence, one of the form of word alone, and another of the form of sense alone. So, there is an escape, according to J., from this, by accepting the fact of a word, characterised by charming sense ramaṇīyārtha visiṣṭa śabda- only as poetry.
To be very frank, to us this sounds not as 'tarka' but 'vitaṇḍā' i.e. fallacious argument. J. holds that if word and sense together are taken as 'kāvya', then only word will not be a kavya. But this is exactly what we want. J. distinguished the 'svara' i.e. note of music as something different from 'sabda' of poetry which is always associated with poetic meaning. So pure word i.e. pure dhvani, i.e. pure 'svara' is no poetry even for us. Such popular usages as "kāvyam śṛtam, artho na jñātaḥ" does not support that poetry is word alone. This usage only suggests that 'poetic word' with a special meaning which is always inherently present, is not understood by all. It requires a special faculty-sahṛdayatva-on the part of listener also, to get at poetic meaning. So, popular usages do not go against our taking poetry as both word and sense together. Even for J. poetic word is necessarily associated with poetic meaning. If there are two sides of the coin, the coin does not become 'two'. There is no independent existence of a coin beyond its two sides. So, it is not proper on J.'s part to say 'one is two.' Thus, J.'s position is really vulnerable.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA We know that kuntaka also has thought of J.'s arguments in anticipation and has asserted that both word and sense taken together make for poetry.
Next, J. proceeds to criticise Mammata's definition still further with reference to the mentioning of 'gunas' and 'alamkāras. J. argues that if M.'s position is accepted, then such illustrations as “uditam mandalam vidhoh” will cease to be poetry, and hence 'a-vyāpti-dosa' will follow. J. argues that when this statement is pronounced by agents such as sārikā, or virahini i.e. a woman in separation from her loving husband etc. such matters as "abhisarana', its negation, the time when vital airs are about to leave the body, etc. etc. are suggested which make it an illustration charged with suggested sense. But in the absence of guna-and alamkāra this poetry will be taken as 'a-kāvya' or no poetry ! Same will be the case of such illustrations as "gatośtam arkah” etc. The objector (i. e. M.) will not be able to call it ‘no-poetry because in that case whatever is taken as poetry will be branded by the siddhāntin (i. e. J.) as no-poetry ! In reality, in both the illustrations cited above, 'camatkāra' seems to follow equally. J. further argues that M. has incorporated gunàlamkāra in the definition of poetry without clarifying the pravstti-nimitta-i. e. the 'anugata-dharma.' Now, argues J., that as 'ghatatva' is the anugata-dharma in ghata, similarly in all alamkāras, there is no alamkāratva as an anugata-dharma. The reason is that as for the nature and number of alamkāratva and alamkāras respectively, there is no unanimity of opinion. Thus, in the absence of a fixed form and nature of both guna and alamkāra, how can they find a place in the definition of poetry ?
J. says that perhaps the followers of Mammata (= M.) may argue that the 'anugata-dharma' of both guna and alamkāra is not uncertain. Because it is fixed respectively, as "kāvya-dharmatva or rasa-dharmatva is gunatva," and "kāvyadharmatva or kāvya-sobhā-adhāyakatva is alamkāratva.” J. for the time being accepts this position and turns his guns towards a new aim, such as "a-dosau.”
Here also, we disagree with J. As seen above even J. is silenced by the last argument. But even in his earlier thinking there is lack of perfection. The illustration 'uditam mandalam vibhoh' is not without a guna. For, we feel that even here the guna called 'prasāda' is very much there for its presence is accepted by Anandavardhana and the whole lot of dhvanivādins in all rasas and all types of good poetic compositions—i. e. 'sarvatra.' Prasāda-guna is said to be "sarvatravihita-sthitih.” The second argument that the nature and number of poetic figuresalamkāras-is not fixed,- is also not accepted by us. Even from the times of earlier aestheticians as Bhāmaha and Dandin, the wider concept of alamkāras was in

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vogue and Vāmana had tried to coin it as "saudaryam alamkārah.” It was a universal 'kāvya-sobhā-kara-dharma' for Dandin and "vakroktih” for Bhāmaha. It is not proper on the part of J. to perform gaja-nimīlikā-to this darśana' of the ancients. As for the number, it is innumerable; for any new poetic turn by any newer poet springs a new alamkāra which yields poetic beauty ! So, it is not proper for J. to attack M.'s definition of poetry, in this way.
Let us now follow J. about his views concerning 'a-dosau'. J. argues that this term need not be read in the definition because a poem does not cease to be poetry even if a poetic blemish is seen therein. J. here also takes recourse to popular usage such as "dustam kāvyam" i.e. this poetry is having a poetic blemish.” J. feels that if we insist on 'a-dosau', then in the presence of even a small blemish good poetry will turn into no-poetry ! We feel that here J. is under the impression of Viśvanātha's line of thinking. J. argues that if 'a-dosau' is insisted upon, then a number of verses or poems from Kālidāsa's pen will cease to be poetry, and the popular usage such as "dustam kāvyam" will also become redundant. J. here considers the view of the objector (i. e. supporters of M.) which runs as follows. The pūrva-paksa can say that even in a dusta-kāvya i.e. in poetry with poetic blemishes, there is necessarily the presence of both word and sense. So, such poetry with blemishes can be termed poetry secondarily. But for J. this is not acceptable. He feels that it is not proper for the objector first to negate poetry because of the presence of a poetic blemish and then to accept it secondarily only to justify such popular usages as “dustam kāvyam”! In fact, argues J., there is no scope for indicative power i.e. laksanā-sakti, here. If popular usage is contradicted by any direct means of knowledge, then only there is scope for laksanā. But here, in case of dustam kāvyam', it is possible to support it from another angle also. So, in the absence of mukhyartha-bädha', etc. there is no scope for laksanā according to J. When the siddhāntin (i. e. J.) does not mention 'a-dosatva' in the definition, he has no difficulty in explaining the loka-vyavahāra or popular usage such as "dustam kāvyam.”
The objector has yet another argument to support 'a-dosau.' It proceeds like this - just as a tree which has no external connection i.e. 'samyoga' and yet there is nothing wrong when we say that it is having connection, i.e. it is 'samyogin', in the same way, poetry in one portion is without a blemish if in other part a blemish is located. This argument will be clearer by an illustration. 'Samyoga' or external connection is said to be 'a-vyāpya-vstti' when there is atyanta-abhāva and partial abhāva of the same. When a bird is sitting on the top of a tree, there is relation of

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the bird with the tree, but as the bird is not in connection with the root of that tree, we can also say that there is absense of connection between the bird and the tree. Thus in case of the bird, we can say that both vşkşa-samyoga and vệkşa-samyogaabhāva reside simultaneously with reference to the tree concerned. Thus, the samyoga is said to be a-vyāpya-vritti i.e. not total, but partial. Similarly, with reference to the usage such as dustam kāvyam, there is kāvyatva in one portion of poetry, and its absence in another. So, in a given poem both kāvyatva and kāvyatva-abhāva will be accepted to stay simultaneously. But J. is not prepared to accept such a-vyāpya-vșttitā in case of kāvyatva as this is not experienced by all people with exception and without doubt ! So, the argument of the objector, according to J. does not stand to reason. We had earlier seen that Viśyanātha had also argued in the same manner suggesting that the tug-of-war between kāvyatva and a-kavyatva with reference to the same piece of poetry, will lead us nowhere !
But as in case of Viśvanātha, so in case of J. also, the position taken by us earlier while dealing with Viśvanātha remains the same. M.'s very concept of a dosa is 'mukhyårtha hatih,' and 'mukhya' is only 'rasa'. So, only such 'dosas' are potent dosas and they have not only to be totally avoided but the younger aspirants have to be instructed to that effect while explaining the nature and scope of true poetry. The arguments advanced by both Viśvanātha and J. are directed in a wrong direction altogether.
J. also exhibits a narrow and too literal understanding of the concepts of both guna and alamkāra when he takes the metaphorical usage of 'atman' and 'śarīra' in a narrow and limited sense. J., taking the metaphor literally, argues that gunas or excellences are qualities of 'rasa' the soul, and alamkāras of both word and sense go only with the body of poetry, like a garland, necklace, etc. Thus 'gunā'lamkara' need not be mentioned while defining poetry, according to J. But on an earlier occasion we have taken sufficient care of this situation and we may here note only this much that J. falls in the same trap as Viśvanātha while taking the metaphor too literally. The net result is that Mammata stands fully defended and J.'s effort falls flat.
After Mammata J. consider's Visvanātha's definition of kāvya, which as we. know runs to this effect that "rasavad-eva-kāvyam.” It is clear, that in that case poetry with vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani will fall out of the orbit of genuine poetry. J. does not accept this, for we cannot say that this situation is welcome i.e. is an 'ista-āpatti', for there will arise a contingency of defeating the tradition set by great poets-mahā-kavis-of the past. The poets describe everything including such

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object as the flow and fall of water, the whirpools created in water or the dancing ripples or waves of water, and also the activities of monkeys and even children etc. etc. Such descriptions are like paintings and therefore are without a touch of emotive depth, i.e. rasa. The argument of the opponent that even here there is chance for emotive appeal from the point of ultimate experience, can not be accepted here because such emotive appeal can be traced even in bare statements such as 'gauḥ calati'-a cow walks; or a dear runs, etc. etc. Any worldly object in form of vibhāva or determinant etc. is ultimately connected with rasa-experience. So, everything on earth is ultimately rasa-oriented and this fact can not be negated, argues J. So, far J. Viśvanātha's definition is charged with the fallacy of 'avyāpti', and is therefore 'too narrow.'J.'s positive placing of ramaniya-artha not only keeps prahelikā-or riddles out of the scope of genuine poetry, but keeps him i.e. J. himself, also out of the charge of narrowness associated with Viśvanātha. Thus, here his effort is fruitful and we have also on earlier occasion supported such a situation, wherein the efforts of modern writers in writing absurd plays and absurd poetry also can be covered by vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani.
Thus we have thus far tried to discuss as fully as possible the efforts of ālamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha down to J., in defining poetry. For us the school of thought laying down 'sabdarthau kävyam' seems to have an for even in case of J. who vehemently tries to establish 'sabdah kāvyam', we feel that his efforts do not convince us as even for him, the poetic-word has to be qualified as 'ramanīyārtha-pratipādaka' i.e. ultimately it can not stand totally divorced from 'artha' i.e. meaning, altogether. We will now take up the next topics, of kāvya-hetu and kāvya-prayojana, but before that here are some other observations concerning J.'s effort at defining poetry.
Later challanges to J.'s definition of poetry. As noted above we, in our personal capacity, have tried to explain independently the short-comings of J.'s definition of poetry. But here also we are not without company. We have no less an authority than Nägeća, the great grammarian, on our side. This is explained by Prof. Dr. P. Sri Ramachandrudu (pp. 49-56, ibid.). Nāgesa has the following observation : J. is of the opinion that's alone makes for poetry on the strength of loka-vyavahāra such as “kāvyam śrutam, artho na jñātaḥ” etc. Nāgesa quotes another popular usage such as ‘kāvyam buddham'-poetry is understood, suggesting that poetry stands for sense also. Nāgeśa also suggests that even veda is both 'sabda and artha' together, on the strength of a remark in Patañjali (Ref. sūtra, IV. 2. 59, Pānini) which says, “tad

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA adhīte tad-veda" which implies that veda is also both sabda and artha together. Nāgesa also holds that though kāvya should mean both sabda and artha together only, it may mean either, only through secondary usage i.e. laksanā. It may be noted that irrespective of Nāgesa our independent criticism as above of J.'s approach is also noteworthy and deserves attention of scholars.
Dr. Sri Ramachandrudu (pp. 50, ibid) also quotes the opinion of Gangadhara Sastri (R. G. Kasi, edn., pp. 50) that the attributes viz., 'sa-gunau' and 'a-dosau' need not be taken as uddeśyatā-avacchedaka' (i.e. they need not be taken as part of the laksana), but 'sabdārthau' has to be taken as uddesyatā-avacchedaka, because poets direct their efforts in perfecting both word and sense, and not either alone. He further argues that if sabda alone is taken to be poetry, why should one discuss things connected with 'artha' alone, i. e. alamkāras and dosas concerning 'artha' alone ? One should discuss only sabda-dosas and sabdālamkāras ! We may say that even in his defence Gangadhara Šāstri at least concedes half the ground by letting 'sa-gunau' and 'a-dosau' fall way side, by not accepting them as uddeśyata-avacchedaka. But in our defence as above we have taken care of even these attributes while defending M.'s definition as above. Our views certainly deserve better attention from scholars. Prof. Dr. Sri Ramcandrudu's personal attitude of accepting J.'s view point that śabda alone is kāvya does not look sound in our estimation for we have strongly defended the fact of poetry being both word and sense while accepting wholly the definition as advanced by Mammața. We stand by our criticism and we feel that we have served the cause of 'sabdārthau kāvyam' even to a greater extent than the efforts made by Nāgeśa and Gangadhara Śāstrī.
Dr. Ramacandrudu tries to criticise Nāgesa who had quoted Patañjali. He gives a fuller statement which runs as : "kim arthau imau ubhau ? na yódhīte vetti api asau. yas tu vetti adhīte api asau. na etayoh āvaśyakaḥ samāveśaḥ bhavati; kaścit sampātham pathati, na ca vetti, kaścit vetti, na ca sampātham pathati." (Mahābhāsya, pp. 190). Now it may be said that this fuller quotation also does not preclude the fact of veda being both word and sense together. The fact of reading or memorizing veda without knowing its meaning does not divorce veda from its meaning; for the meaning is very much there inherent in the vedic text even though a person may not get at it. So, veda does not cease to be both word and sense. As for the meaning of veda, investigations were afoot right in the age of Yäska himself who quotes different schools who attempted the explanation of vedic texts. The ritualistic approach as suggested by the Brahmana literature and supported by

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commentators such as Sāyana is only one explanation, while the mystic, grammatical, historical, natural, linguistic explanation etc. and the modern attempts at geographical and cultural explanations--all these suggest that veda is both word and sense together. Its sabda-prādhānya is one thing and it should not be confused with sabda-rūpatva. "There is not to reason why, there is but to do and die,"—is the spirit in commands made in army. Same is the case with the vedas and they are said to be "prabhu-sammita” only because of the irrrevocability of vedic injunctions. The veda, like the order of a master, is not to be challenged. Actually people while performing rituals follow this command only after they get at the meaning. Without getting at the meaning which is the integral part of a vedic injunction, how are we to follow any injunction. The very fact of the pūrva-pūrvabalīyastva i.e. the earlier agent being taken as more authentic in case of śruti, vākya, samākhyā, etc. proves that vedic injunctions do carry meaning and that they cannot be divorced of it. 'Sabda-prāmānya' of veda means a word in an injunction cannot be replaced by a synonym, but it does not mean that the particular sabda is taken as meaningless. When we say, "agnim ile purohitam" we cannot replace 'agnim' by 'vahnim', but 'agni' would mean fire, and fire alone. It will never mean water. It is like clear and irrevocable drafting in legal literature. This also is divine law and the word in divine injunction cannot ever be substituted, though of course it has to be understood to put it in practice. It is precisely for this purpose that Yāksa explains that the Brāhmana texts enjoin that which is stated :- jānantam abhivadayate' and this does not go against veda having any meanin
Prof. Ramacandrudu observes that the words 'vānmaya' and 'sārasvata’ prove that poetry is sabda only. But on the contrary this proves otherwise. It is meaning through vāk, or sarasvati which is poetry. Meaning through colours is painting; through mudras it is dancing, through svara-or notes it is music and through 'vāk’ it is poetry. But this does not mean that poetry is 'vāk' alone. Only the innocent would subscribe to such a view. He observes: "Therefore, PR. need not be considered to have committed any serious error, in giving prominance to śabda.” We wholly agree with this, because poetic art has word for its external skin as against other arts such as painting, dancing, etc. as explained above. But word, though being, the medium, does not cease to be 'sàrtha' i. e. necessarily accompanied by meaning —first and last.
Prof. Ramachandrudu (p. 53, ibid) rejects the view of scholars quoting both Kalidāsa—'vāgarthau iva samprktau' and Māgha-'sābdarthau iva satkaveh' suggesting that these quotations do not lead us anywhere. But we feel that they

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do lead us where Mammaţa and others have been striving to reach, and also trying to take us to. The learned professor quotes the Mīmāmsä maxim viz. “autpattikas tu sabdasya arthena sambandhah" (Jaimini 1.1.5) and asserts that this could not have escaped J.'s notice also; because J. himself, while talking about pratibhā at R. G. pp. 9— "sä сa kāvya-ghatanànukūla-śabdàrthopasthitih.” The professor argues to support J.'s view about kāvya being sabda only, by saying—“Only, thing he wanted to establish is that ‘kāvya' means sabda conveying artha, but not sabda and artha together.” In fact, as will be explained later PR. gives more importance to artha in a kāvya, than what is given by ubhayavādins (pp. 54, ibid).—Now, with due respect to the professor we may say that we have yet to read something more funny. For, śabda conveying artha is seen elsewhere also. E. g. when there is a big sound we get at a meaning that something has dashed against another thing. When a railway engine is fixed with a carriage, there is sound and a meaning is conveyed. When tyres of an auto screech we realise that brakes are heavily applied. Now in poetry word conveys meaning through its powers of direct expression, indication and suggestion. The third one, i.e. suggestion is shared by illustrations cited earlier, and also when there is no sound also, as in case of soundless signs and signals. There is no case when a sound does not convey a meaning. yawning makes a sound and it conveys a sense of feeling sleepy or languid etc. So, whenever sound conveys sense, everytime it is not a case of poetry. Actually sound i.e. word conveying beautiful sense through abhidhā, or laksaņā or also vyañjanā is the field of poetry. A poetic word has to be accompanied by either an expressed, or an indicated as also a suggested sense; of course its being charming S a pre-condition. Actually J. while insisting on 'ramanīya artha' echoes Bhāmaha's famous words viz. "vakrábhidheya-sabdoktih istā vācām alamkrtih." So, when we pass an observation such as, "kāvya means sabda conveying artha, but not śabda and artha together” we hardly make any sense. Even when water starts flowing from municipal tap, some sound is created by the fall of water in an empty bucket. It conveys its own meaning. Word of any sort is necessarily accompanied by meaning. Kāvya-sabda is never without its charming meaning arrived at through the word-power of abhidhā, laksanā and vyañjanā. It is but illusory to hold that śabda alone is kāvya. Sabda in fact is never alone. Even a different bark of a dog conveys different meanings. So, we fail to agree with J.'s observation that poetry is 'śabda' alone, for we reject the very possibility of sabda being absolutely alone. But kāvya-sabda is different from other sabdas and herein ‘ramanīyatā' enters, along with the three powers of a word.

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Definition and Scope of Poetry
'Kavya-hetu' or cause of poetry and
Kavya-prayojana or aims or purpose of poetry.
As for the cause -hetu- of poetry, sanskrit literary critics have advanced pratibha, i.e. poetic genius, vyutpatti, i.e. learning and abhyasa i.e. practice as the cause of poetry, either jointly or individually. By and large the importance of pratibha i.e. poetic genius is held as uppermost by critics. Thus Bhamaha holds that 'pratibha' is the only cause of poetry. He is candid when he observes that: "kāvyam tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ" (Bhāmaha, 1.5b.) Dandin has a different approach when he observes :
naisargiki ca pratibhā
sṛtam ca bahunirmalam | amandaścàbhiyogośyāḥ
kāranam kāvya-sampadaḥ || (I. 103)
Natural genius, great proficiency in various branches of knowledge, great endeavour and repeatition of efforts-all these taken together make for the cause of poetry for Dandin. Here, for the first time so far as available documents are concerned, we come across an approach which is supported by Mammata later. So, for Dandin, inborn genius as well as human endeavour jointly make for poetry. For him, it seems, poets are both born as well as made. In two more kärikäs that follow; i.e. at I. 104 and 105 he clearly favours human endeavour as against only inborn genius. Dandin observes

na vidyate yady api pūrva-vāsanā-guṇā'nubandhi pratibhānam adbhutam |
119
sṛtena yatnena ca vāg upāsitā dhruvam karoty eva kam apy anugraham || (I. 104)
My guru Prof. Athavale suggested that 'kam api' here refers to 'some extraordinary favour,' and not 'just little favour.' So, for Dandin, even in absence of inborn genius, human endeavour is capable to cause poetry of the highest order. So, at Kāvyādarśa I. 105, he eloquently declares that people should wake up from laziness and continuously get themselves engaged in propitiating the goddess of speech and by this honest effort, even with pale inborn genius, people will be able to move in the company of the learned with their heads held high :

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA tad asta-tandraih anisam sarasvati śramād upāsyā khalu kīrtim ipsubhiḥ || krse kavitve'pi janāh krta-śramā
vidagadha-goștīşu vihartum iśate || (1. 105) nus insistance on either pratibhā alone, or on both pratibhā and vyutpatti (= learning) or on all three - i.e. pratibhā, vyutpatti and abhyāsa- i.e. practice taken together making a 'single unit seems to continue to be the topic of discussion among literary critics with Mammata preferring to side with the organic unity of all the three factors taken together, while Hemacandra insisting on pratibhā at Kāvyānuśāsana (=kā.śā) – I. 4 when he observes :
pratibhā asya hetuh. (kā. śā. I. 4) He further observes that vyutpatti or learning i.e. proficiency in various branches of knowledge, and abhyāsa' i.e. practice give an edge to inborn pratibhā. Thus they are welcome as shaping influences. He further classifies pratibhā' into 'sahajā' (=inborn) and aupādhiki (=acquired). Sahajā is the result of 'āvarana-ksaya', and 'upaśama.' The first is the removal of coverings that obstruct the flash of pratibhā, and the second is ‘removal of possible coverings that may obstruct the flash of genius. The aupādhikā is the result of such occult causes as 'mantra' etc. Hemacandra thus seems to move closer to the tradition of Bhāmaha, which insists on the basic undeniable necessity of in-born genius, which ultimately finds favour even with Jagannāthā the last greatest luminary in the sky of Indian literary criticism.
Thus, prior to Jagannātha and before Mammata we have protegonists of only pratibhā, such as Bhatta Tauta-who observes :
"prajñā nava-navollekha-śālini pratibhā matā. tad anuprāņanā-jīva-varṇanā-nipunaḥ kaviḥ tasya karma, smstam kāvyam” then, Abhinavagupta suggests : "pratibhā apūrva-vastu-nirmāņa-kşamā prajñā. tasya viśeso rasā”-veśa-vaiếadyasaundarya-kāvya-nirmāņa-kşamatvam, (Locana) and also “saktiḥ, pratibhānam varṇanīya-vastu -visaya-nūtanóllekha-śälitvam"

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(also, Locana)
It is clear that both Tauta and Abhinava-gupta seem to hold that pratibhā is that inborn quality in a poet which prompts him to describe things in newer and newer light and perspective.
Vägbhata (I) who is posterior to both Mammata and Hemacandra again holds inborn genius-pratibhā-as the supreme cause of poetry. He observes : (vāgbhatålamkāra I. 3, and 4) :
'pratibhā kāraṇam tasya vyutpattis tu vibhūṣaṇam | bhțśotpatti-kşd-abhyāsaḥ ity adya-kavi=samkathā 11‘prasanna-pada-navyā’rthayuktyudbodha-vidhāyini | sphuranti sat-kaver-buddhih
pratibhā sarvatomukhi ||But even prior to Abhinavagupta it was Rājasekhara who in his Kāvyamīmāmsā devoted two full chapters (i. e. Chs. IV and V) that discuss the nature of pratibhā and vyutpatti. He quotes various opinions of some alamkārikas who are almost forgotten names for us. He gives names of Syāmadeva and Mangala. He, on his part, seems to favour only 'pratibhā' which is made to flash forth both by internal effort-i.e. samadhi-backed by Syāmadeva, and also external effort-abhyāsabacked by Mangala. Rājasekhara seems to accept a compromising attitude but for him sakti or pratibhā is the prime cause : "tāv ubhāv api śaktim udbhāsayataḥ. sā kevalam kāvye hetuh.” He explains pratibhā as that flash of imagination which prompts a poet to use (appropriate) words, meanings, alamkāras, excellent turns of expressions (-ukti-mārgam-perhaps rīti-mārga) and such other things which make for poetry. Says he : (Kāvya-mīmāmsā, ch. IV) : yā śabda-grāmam arthasārtham, alamkāra-tantram, ukti-mārgam, anyad api tathāvidham adhi-hỉdayam pratibhāsayati să pratibhā.”
It is this which seems to be echoed in the opinion of Vāgbhata (I) as quoted above. When Rājasekhara quotes the views of Syāmadeva who pressed for samādhithe interal effort, he seems to be quoting a tradition upheld by Syāmadeva but perhaps also represented by Rudrata the predecessor of even Ānandavardhana. For Rudrata had also, while insisting on pratibhā had observed in his Kāvyālamkāra I. 14 that all the three i.e. pratibhā, vyutpatti and abhyāsa make for poetry :

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "tasya-asāranirāsāt sāra-grahaņāt ca cāruñaḥ karaņe tritayam idam vyāpriyate
śaktir-vyutpattir abhyāsaḥ ll” and then,
"manasi sadā susamādhini visphuraņam anekadhā abhidheyasya | akliştāni padāni ca
vibhānti yasyām asau saktiḥ //” (I. 15). Here, śyāmadeva's 'samādhi' is taken note of. Rudrața further observes : (I. 16):
"pratibhety aparair-uditā sahajótpădyā ca să dvidhābhavati pumsā saha jātatvād
anayos tu jyāyasī sahajā ll” Two fold pratibhā is accepted by Hemacandra also and later by Jagannātha. Earlier, Vāmana while accepting the importance of vyutpatti and abhyāsa, had attached greater importance to pratibh, and later Kuntaka while putting stress on pratibhā held that a poet's vyutpatti and abhyāsa also fall in line of his inherent nature. Supremacy of pratibhā is suggested by Kuntaka when he observes :
"yat kimcanā’pi vaicitryam tat-sarvam pratibhodbhavan | saukumārya-parispanda-syandi
yatra virājate ll” – (V. J. J. 28) "wherein every element of beauty is a result of the poet's imagination alone, and succeeds in conveying flashes of gentle gace" (Trans. K. Kri. - This is Sukumāra-mārga. pp. 329).
With all these thoughts in the background we come to evaluate Jagannātha's approach, wherein again 'pratibhā' is taken as the supreme and only cause of poetry.
Jagannātha is clear when he states that only pratibhā is the cause of poetry. He observes : (R. G. pp. 25, Edn. Prof. Athavale, uni. Book Production board, Guj. state, '74):

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123 "tasya ca kāraṇam 'kavigatā kevalā pratibhā. sāca kāvya-ghatanā’nukūlaśabdārthopasthitiḥ.” -
J. has the following observation—The cause of poetry is only genius which rests in a poet. This pratibhā or poetic genius is of the nature of flashing forth of word and sense that are congenial to creation of poetry. The special quality of ‘pratibhātva' which rests in this pratibhā, when taken as the cause of poetry, removes all other factors that may claim to be the cause of poetry. This special attribute viz. pratibhātva is the cause of poetry alone and nothing else whatsoever. Now this special quality of 'pratibhātva' resting in pratibhā may either be taken as ‘siddho jāti višesah a special jāti or class, or as 'sa-khanda upādhi' i.e. attribute which can be described in many terms. The idea is that in different poets we come across different flashes of genius. But common to all these flashes, we can imagine a quality called, 'pratibhātva' which goes to make 'pratibhā' what it is. Thus taken, 'pratibhātva' can be taken as a 'jāti' or class. But such a quality can not be described in brief, as it is united with many qualities. Thus the nature or form of pratibhātva being inherently complex, can only be described by a number of adjectives or words. If we accept this position, then the speciality called 'pratibhātva' can be described as 'sa-khanda-upādhi-rūpa-dharma' ! The Nyāyakośa (pp. 943) explains sa-khandopādhi as, “bahu-padārtha-ghatito dharmaḥ sa-khandopādhiḥ." In the N. -
=Nirnaya sāgār) Edn. of R. G. we have a reading viz. "upādhirūpam vā akhandam." But Prof. Athavale observes (pp. 30, ibid) that this reading is faulty and should be emended as "sa-khandam" as Nāgeśa clearly says. Prof. Athavale supports Nāgeśa and says that the Nyāyakośa explains a-khanda-upādhi as, 'anirvacanīyo dharmaḥ.' Now the special dharma called pratibhātva is not anirvacanīya, but it can be described. Hence, it cannot be termed as 'akhandópādhi.'
Now this pratibhā is the result of 'adrsta.' This 'adrsta' is either 'punya' meritorious deed or, pāpa i.e. sinful act done either in previous birth or present birth. This adrsta (of course here caused by meritorious deeds) is caused by the grace of either some divinity or a great man. J. holds that perhaps at times, this pratibhā seems to have resulted from extra-ordinary learning and practice of writing poetry also : "kvacit ca vilaksana-vyutpatti-kāvyakarana-abhyāsau." (R. G. pp. 25, ibid). But the cause of pratibhā is never these three factors taken together, i.e. not adrsta vyutpatti and abhyāsa taken together-na tu trayam eva. (R. G. pp. 25, ibid). At times even in the absence of vyutpatti and abhyāsa, by the grace of some great man alone, pratibhā seems to flash forth in a certain child. Some
may hold that in case of such a child, along with adrsta, his vyutpatti and

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abhyasa of his earlier birth also make for the cause of his pratibhā. But J. holds that this opinion of the objector is not acceptable as there is 'gaurava dosa' or the fault of cumbrousness in accepting vyutpatti and abhyāsa of the earlier birth. The idea is that when the purpose is served by recognizing only adrsta, why unnecessarily add vyutpatti and abhyāsa of the earlier birth ? Again, in holding this in case of a particular child there is no pramāna or guarantee, or authority. Again the presence of pratibhā which is of the nature of a 'kārya' or result, can be explained even differently from both vyutpatti and abhyāsa. Even in our worldly parlance, when we decide the cause of something with the help of the authority of veda, etc., in case a vyabhicāra-or deviation is seen from that cause, then only when yet another device is not seen to explain this deviation, meritorious deeds or otherwise, i.e. dharma or adharma are taken as explanations for that devitation. If we do not resort to such normal course of explanation, argues J., then a great mismanagement will follow. Again, we cannot say that only adrsta alone is the
cause of pratibhā because we see that a particular person cannot write poetry upto -a certain period, but we find the flashing of pratibhā in the same person after some time, as a result of vyutpatti and abhyāsa. Now, if it is said that even here only 'adrsta' is the cause of pratibhā, then this adrsta was present even prior to this acquiring vyutpatti and abhyāsa. Then we will have to accept that the pratibhā born of that adrsta was also present earlier. If the objector holds that yes, that pratibhā was present even prior to those two (i.e. vyutpatti and abhyāsa) but there was yet another adrsta coming in way of its external manifestation, then this argument says J. is not satisfactory. For in all such cases, in place of accepting two adrstas. it is safer to hold vyutpatti and abhyāsa as cause of pratibha and in this acceptance there is lāghava-guna i.e. brievity. Thus, J. holds that it is safer to accept either adrsta or vyutpatti and abhyāsa together, as cause of pratibhā. Of course, pratibhā born of adrsta and pratibhā born of both vyutpatti and abhyāsa, are different in nature from each other, because the quality of 'kāryatăvacchedaka' in pratibhā born as kārya, differentiates the two. When we take these two pratibhās as different, as they are born of different causes, we also understand the difference in the quality of poetry produced by either. And in that case there will not arise any deviation (vyabhicāra) in the relation of cause and effect. Now, it is clear that the exceptional quality of pratibhātva residing in these two types of pratibhā, establishes pratibhā only as the cause of poetry. Again there will not be any misunderstanding in explaining the kārya-kāraṇabhāva, of each variety of pratibhā, if we hold that there is difference in the result i.e. poetry caused by either.

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The objector may raise the following point : when inspite of there being vyutpatti' and 'abhyāsa', pratibhā is not seen, then there will be "vyabhicāra' or transgression or deviation in the cause-effect relationship, so it will not be safe to assert this cause-effect relationship. To this, J.'s reply is that it can be so maintained that the vyutpatti and abhyāsa are lesser than the required proportion to generate pratibhā (=anavacchinna), or, it can be also said that at such places, even if vyutpatti' and 'abhyasa' are sufficiently powerful to cause 'pratibhā' here, some special type of unrighteous act comes in its way and hence no transgression should be imagined here. In justifying cause-effect relationship the negation of a 'pratibandhaka' or obstructing factor has to be asserted. This removal of obstructing element has to be taken care of even by those who either hold all the three i.e. pratibhā, vyutpatti and abhyāsa taken together as 'the cause of poetry, or by those who take only pratibhā as the only cause of poetry. For, due to some practice of mantras, the process of poetry writing of a given poet can be stopped for a while. Thus, J. favours 'pratibhā' alone as the only cause of poetry.
'Prayojana' — or purpose or aims of poetry : With reference to the purpose of poetry, sanskrit literary critics have advanced some items such as kīrti or yaśas, i.e. fame for the poet, 'prīti' or 'ananda' or joy i.e. 'sadyah paranirvrti' as coined by Mammata for the reader, bhāvaka, as principal aims of poetry. But poetry, they say, is also written for money,-arthakrta, for avoiding evil effects, 'śivetara-ksataye' for knowledge of the worldly business—'vyavahāravide' as Mammata puts it, and also for a message such as you have to behave like Rāma and not Rāvanā.' i.e. 'upadeśa-yuje.' But Mammata, and the rest take care to note that the instruction supplied by the poet through poetry is in the fashion of a beloved who lovingly forbids her erring husband from misbehaviour-"kāntāsammita-tayā upadeśa-yuje.” Poetry does not issue a command in the fashion of śāstras, nor does it coax like a friend in the fashion of the purana-literature. These and such other objectives are laid down for a poet's activity of writing poetry, but 'ānanda', 'yasas' and kāntā-sammita-taya' upadeśa-these three have found general favour with sanskrit critics.

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Chapter II Sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra
or Functions of a word
General Introduction :
Sanskrit literary criticism has applied itself to classification of poetry both from the angle of its external form, i.e. its being written in prose, verse or in mixed style, and also its being written either for reading or hearing only or also for presentation on stage etc., and also from the point of view of its internal beauty, i.e. from the point of view of how it suggests what. The first is the formal approach and the second which covers all poetry—whether śravya/pāthya or preksya-i.e. to be presented on the stage, also, touches the criticism aspect. This criticism oriented approach ultimately finds greater favour and was, so far as available documents go, promoted by Anandavardhana and his earlier dhvanivādins. This approach was kept up by Kuntaka, Mahimā, and practically all who followed them including the great Mammata, down to Jagannātha.
Now this criticism-based classification and evaluation of poetry required a through inquiry into the semantic aspect and sanskrit critics have, as a result, evolved a virtually perfect science of semantics taking care of different shades of meanings and also imagining different powers of words giving different meanings. But Sanskrit aesthetics, especially literary aesthetics is indebted to a rich heritage received from previous thinking in the branches of knowledge such as pūrva-mīmāmsā, nyāya and vyākarana to a great extent. In this chapter we will try to have a glimpse of this rich heritage which in its turn inspired thinking in semantics, which again inspired literary criticism and classification of poetry from the point of view of its literary worth. Thus criticism-oriented classification

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127 rests on a serious contemplation on the science of semantics evolved by the alamkārikas with original inspirations received from both Mīmāmsā-śästra and vyakarana-śāstra, to a great extent.
So, for the sanskrit ālamkārikas word in poetry has three powers or functions called sakti or vyāpāra. These powers or functions are three, the first to begin with is termed as mukhyā-sakti or primary power, or abhidhāśakti also called vācakaśakti or the power of direct expression of primary sense, i.e. denotation or the power which gives the conventional meaning or dictionary meaning. The second is the power of indication or laksanā-sakti, also called a-mukhyā sakti or secondary power giving a secondary sense. This laksanā-vyāpāra makes for any deviation, giving a-mukhyàrtha or laksyàrtha. The third is the power of suggestion or vyañjanā-vyāpāra giving the suggested sense. We will go to see the nature and scope of these three powers or functions of a word and will evaluate the whole discussion by various ālamkārikas accepting or rejecting the power of suggestion. The terms vyāpāra, śakti and vịtti are used as synonyms from practical point of view. These different śabda-vyāpāras give word-meanings that are different in nature and scope.
Alamkārikas by and large have termed kāvya i.e. poetry as both word and meaning i.e. the sāhitya or coming together of sound and sense. As observed earlier the sense in poetry has to be charming and thus a close study of the powers of a word is basically related to the appreciation and classification of poetry. As noted, the abhidā-vrtti or mukhyā-vrtti or vācaka-vrtti delivers the abhidhảrtha, or he mukhyårtha, also called the vācyàrthā or the conventional meaning. The ibhidhårtha is termed the samketita-artha also. The laksyårtha or secondary or ndicated sense is derived through laksanā or the secondary power of a word inder some special circumstances. So, also the vyangyàrtha or suggested sense is lerived from the suggestive function, the vyañjanā vyāpāra under special context. These powers operate on account of their special conditions. The word giving ibhidhårtha or vacyårtha is designated as vācaka sabda, and the others responsible or the secondary and suggested senses are termed indicative and suggestive words .e. lakṣaka and vyañjaka sabdas. One and the same word, under special context an be termed as vācaka and vyañjaka or vācaka, lakşaka and vyañjaka as the ase may be.
Yet another power or function termed "tātpaya’-vrtti is also mentioned in lamkāra works. But the general opinion is in favour of calling it a 'vākya-vịtti' and ot a sabda-vrtti. By vākya-vrtti is meant power of conveying sense that goes with

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a sentence as a whole. Here the sense-giving unit is not an individual word but an independent sentence which gives the correlated meaning of all the words taken together. This vākya-vṛtti is not a pada-vṛtti but has yet a distinct role and hence the sequence fixed is abhidhā, tātparya, lakṣaṇā and vyañjana which is therefore termed as turīyā-vṛtti also.
The consideration of the topic of sabda-vyāpāra has been followed by Sanskrit ālamkarikas in a scientific manner. But as observed earlier, their thinking carries deep influences of disciplines such as vyākaraṇa, nyāya and mīmāmsa discipline trying to manage the topic of fixing the meaning of the vedas. It is precisely for this that the mīmāmsā darśana is said to be the 'vākya-śāstra' of ancient India, and the mīmāmsakas are said to be 'vākya-vid.' In the same way the discipline of grammar applied itself to the consideration of a 'pada' or individual word-unit of language. The Naiyāyikas, Bauddha and Jaina dārśanikas also contributed seriously to semantics. So, when earlier alamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha, followed by Anandavardhana and post-Anandavardhana ālamkarikas such as Mammata applied themselves to this topic of sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra, the thinking of philosophers and grammarians serves as a useful background or say, original source to their thinking. Thus a closer acquintance with this original source material becomes useful in understanding the mind-set of the alamkarikas. We will first cultivate this acquaintance with this original source from which thoughtcurrents started in the direction of literary critics who got inspired by it. After this we will consider the stage of sabda-vṛtti-vicāra as reflected in alamkarikas such as Bhāmaha to Rudrața, the predecessors of Anandavardhana. After this we will consider Anandavardhana's approach and then more scientific approach of Mukula Bhatta, Mammața and the rest down to important ālamkārikas such as Appayya Dixit and Jagannatha on topics such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, not neglecting in between the position taken by Kuntaka, Mahima, Bhoja and the rest also. We will end with vyañjana or suggestive power of word as an independent and indispensable power of word in poetry.
As for the function and nature as well as number of these word-powers differences of opinion are seen not only in philosophers and grammarians, but they continue to surface even among ālamkārikas, many of whom do not accept vyañjanā as an independent power of a word. Possibly, even the predecessors of Anandavardhana beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudrața also could not recognise vyañjanā as an independent power of a word and this explains the absence of any direct mention of vyañjanā in their works. But this may not be totally conclusive

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also because these earlier masters were not ignorant of the fact of 'pratīyamāna artha' or implicit sense in poetry. The fact emerges that though no clear mentioning by name of vyañjanā is seen in their works, indirect references to the same cannot be ruled out, if viewed critically. Tārkikas or logicians, Mīmāmsakas and their followers such as MahimaBhatta openly vote against the acceptance of vyañjanā as an independent separate power of a word. The Tarka-dīpikā observes :
"vyañjanā tu śaktir
lakṣaṇā'ntarbhūtā śabda-śakti-mūlā |
artha-śakti-mūlā tu
anumānā❞dinā anyathā siddhā ||"
Of course, this evidence is much later in date but it reveals the anti-vyañjanā stand among thinkers even after its very successful establishment by leading ālamkarikas. And we have Hemacandra from Gujarat the protegonist of Kashmir school of literary criticism advocating the cause of an independent 'gauni-vṛtti' over and above the vyāpāra-traya i.e. the three powers such as abhidha, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā.

129
Ancient Background: First, we will look into the philosophical background. In India darśanikas and vaiyakaranas have seriously discussed the problems connected with linguistics and linguistic philosophy. They have also advanced various principles to explain the multiple activity of language. Bhartṛhari, Kumārila and later the great literary critic Anandavardhana have made invaluable suggestions. In Indian thinking with reference to meaning conent, by and large two thought currents seem to be major e.g. khanda-pakṣa and akhanda-paksa, which may roughly be equated with the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology, observes Dr. K. K. Raja (Ref. Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 6, edn., 69, Adyar.) According to the khanda-pakṣa or the analytical method, a word is taken as an autonomous unit of thought and sense and studies concerning language are made on the basis of words. A sentence is made up of such independent words coming together. That an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is a common idea found in all schools of Indian Philosophy. In case of nouns the word is taken as the 'name' of a 'thing'. Hence, observes Dr. Raja (pp. 6, ibid) the regular philosophic term for a 'thing', viz. 'padartha' is literally the meaning of a word, or that which a word means. 'Namarūpa' is the Sanskrit term which stands for the world of things. It suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA or forms and that the name and shape make for the essence of a thing. Only the nature of individual words alone is discussed by the Nyāya-sūtras while in late Nyāya-vaisesika works discussion regarding the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence is met with. Panini, Patañjali and Kätyāyana, the grammarians, concern themselves chiefly with the derivation of correct form of words, while Yaska and his followers deal with the etymological study of wordmeanings. We may add to Dr. Raja's observation, that etymological study in its not so scientific form, is seen as early as in the Brāhmaṇa literature also. We humbly suggest that Dr. Raja should have mentioned Yāska prior to Pānini as the former is placed earlier than the latter. It is in the Mimāmsā discipline, that a detailed study of sentences is observed for the first time. Mimāmsā is termed the 'vākya-śāstra of ancient India, because it is the first, so far as documents go, to perpetuate cannons of interpretation along with a full fledged study of sentence-unit. Once again the date of Nyāyasūtras, or Mīmāmsā-sūtras is decided on faith only and hardly any concrete evidences can be floated to discuss the priority of either. And even if it is done, the thought-currents represented in either go back to times of yore. But all this material taken together forms a rich heritage, which India is proud of and such an earlier material is not available in any known language except Sanskrit. Even the study as reflected in the Mimāmsā texts was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings and so, the relation between word and sentence, between wordmeaning and sentence-meaning always remained in the centre.
A number of Mīmāmsā documents are available, the oldest being Jaimini's Mīmāmsā sūtras. This is followed by a commentary, the sābara-bhasya, by śabara swāmin, with vrtti of Upavarsa (200 B. C.) preceeding it. This is followed by Kumārila's śloka-vārttika (630-700 A. D.), Tantra-vārttika and Tup-tikā. We have Prabhakara Miśrā's Lighvi Tika or Brihati or Nibandhana Tikā (A. D. 650-700 A. D.). Following Dr. Raja, we will record some more documents that could have proved to be shaping influences on the theories held by ālamkārikas. They were written upto A. D. 1200, or even A. D. 1300, though many more works were written upto 1700 A. D. These are: Mandana Miśra's (680-750 A. D.) Vidhi-viveka, Bhāvanā-viveka, Mimāmsā-sūtrầnukramanī and Sphota-siddhi; Umbekā was nicknamed Bhavabhūti wrote (A. D. 670-700 A. D.) Tikä on śloka-vārtika and also on Bhāvanā-viveka. Prabhākara Misra's disciple Śālikantha (A. D. 68-760) gave Dīpaśikhā Tikā on Laghvi (i.e. Bhāsya-vivarana), and also commentaries such as Rju-vimalā and Prakarana-pañjikā on Brihatī; Vācaspati Miśra (A. D. 800-900 A. D.) wrote Nyāya-kanikā and Tattva-bindu on Vidhi-viveka. Sucitra Miśra (A. D.

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131 1000-1100 A. D.) wrote kāśikā on śloka-vārttika. Pārtha-sārathi Miśra (A. D. 10501120 A. D.) contributed Nyāya-ratnākara, Tantra-ratna, śāstra-dīpikā and Nyāyaratna-mālā, and Bhavanātha Bhatta gave Nyāya-Viveka (A. D. 1050-1150 A. D.). We have Bhavadeva Bhatta's (A. D. 1100) Ajitā or Tantra-tīkā-nibandhana and Bhatta Someśvara's (A. D. 1200) Nyāyasudhā. Murārimiśra's (A. D. 1150-1220 A. D.) Tripādī-nīti-nayana, Nandīśvara's (A. D. 1200-1300 A. D.) Prabhākara-vijaya, and Cidānanda-Pandita's (A. D. 1200-1300 A. D.) Nīti-tattva-samgraha also are noteworthy. Thus literature both on Mīmāmsā, and Nyāya disciplines swelled and the tradition was kept alive even upto 17th or 18th Cent. A. D. when we have such works as Gāgābhatta's or Viśveśvara Bhatta's (A. D. 1630-1730) Bhātta-cintāmani, Kolūra-Nārāyana Šāstri's (A. D. 1630-1700 A. D.) Mīmāmsā-sarvasva and Vidhiviveka and Pārtha-Sārathi Miśra's Nyāya-ratna-māla-Tika.
We have seen that in ancient india, there were ācāryas who insisted on the 'anityatva' or unreality of words, i.e. for them the nature of words was unreal. Yaska, we know, quotes one Audumbarāyana's view to this effect such as - indriyanityam vacanam audumbarāyanah (Nirukta I. i.). This means that it is the statement as a whole which is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer-, and that the 'catustva' or the four-fold classification of words in to noun, verb, upasarga and nipāta does not stand. He is of the opinion that-"vyāptimattvāt tu śabdasya, anīyastvāc ca śabdena samjñākaranam vyavahāràrtham loke" (Nirukta, I, i.)-i.e. words are used for naming in daily parlance, because of their universal applicability and convenience in their case due to simplicity. Bhartěhari while referring to this view in the Vākyapadīya (II. 345-349) observes that Vārtāksa also accepted this and held that it is only the sentence that remains present for all time in the mind of the hearer.
The akhanda-paksa of Bhartrihari accepts sentence as the fundamental linguistic fact and it is taken as Gestalt, in which parts are not deemed as relevant. The view of Audumbarāyana as seen quoted in Nirukta stands at the root of this line of thinking. Among the protegonists of those who accept reality of words, i.e. those who are sabda-nityatva-vādins, two thought-currents such as abhihitănvaya-vāda and anvitàbhidhāna-vāda held by some naiyāyikas and mīmāmsakas of the Bhātta and Prābhākara school respectively are noted. We will consider these at a later stage.
Dr. Raja suggests that in the akhanda-paksa advanced by Bharthari the fundamental linguistic unit is a sentence, which is taken as a Gestalt whose parts are irrelevant. This thought-current was perhaps inspired by the view of

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Audumbarāyana and was perfected by Bharthari who explains all irregularities in language behaviour. His definition of sentence reads as : eko’navayavaḥ śabdah - i.e. word i.e. sentence is one without parts and it is revealed by the letters and words that go to make it. The meaning is conveyed by this integral unit, the vākyasphota. The sentence is thus taken as an indivisible and integral liinguistic symbol. Its meaning is 'instantaneous flash of intuition' i.e. pratibhā, which is also partless. Words have no reality of their own except on worldly parlance i.e. pragmatic level.
We also come across different thought-currents with reference to the change of meaning. Indian thinkers have dealt with the conditions of metaphorical tranfer of meaning from a synchronic point of view and not from diachronic or historical point of view except with reference to nirūdha-lakṣaṇā or faded metaphor as suggested by Dr. Raja.
The importance of a word lies in its significative power. The power of a word, śakti, means the relation between a word and its sense :
“saktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhah"- (Siddhānta-muktāvalī, pp. 265). The Laghumañjusā (pp. 28) observes : “pada-padārthayoh sambandhā'ntaram eva Śaktiḥ, vācya-vācaka-svabhāva-apara-paryāyah.” Whenever a word is pronounced it is through the agency of this sakti or word-power that a meaning is conveyed. With reference to the relation between word and its meaning two principal thought-currents are noticed such as one each held by the Mīmāmsā darśana and the Nyāya-darśana. We also come across the thought-current represented by the grammarians also.
. Word-Meaning Relationship : Actually the problem of relationship between word and meaning seems to have originated even prior to the composition of the Nighantu, wherein words are arranged in different groups such as those signifying the same sense, those having multiple sense etc. The Nirukta (ch. IV) observes : "ekā'rtham aneka-śabdam ity etad uktam. atha yāni anekā’rthāni ekaśabdāni tāni ato'nukramisyāmah. anavagata-svara-samskārān ca nigamān. tad aika-padikam ity ācaksate.” Patañjali also draws attention to this: (M.bh. on Vārtika 16. Pā. sū. I. 3.1)
Language has both physical and psychological aspects. Our thoughts find audible expression through sounds produced through the agency of vocal organs. Of course all sounds may not constitute words but surely those sounds that directly signify objects are popularly known as 'sabda.' Patañjali observes in the M. bh. (=Mahābhāsya) on Vārtika 15, Pā. Sū. III. 1.7 viz. "artha-gatyarthah sabda

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prayogah. "artham sampratyāyayisyāmi iti sabdah prayujyate." The Tantra-Vārtika on Mimāmsā sūtra (= Mī. Sū.) I. 3.8. also observes - śarvo hi śabdo'rthapratyāyanā'rtham prayujyate. Language thus becomes an instrument to convey our thoughts and sentiments, and the science of meaning i.e. semantics deals with this psychological aspect of language. Thus it shows how certain things are signified by certain words, how things are named, how meanings are widened or narrowed or specialised. Etymologists like Yāska had attached great importance to this psychological aspect of language in their principles of derivation. Yāska categorically emphasizes that while attempting an etymological derivation of a word, the meaning has to be taken care of first and last. Says he : 'artha-nityah parīkseta'-Ni. (=Nirukta) II. Durga here observes: "artho hi pradhānam. tadguna-bhūtaḥ śabdaḥ.” Thus, grammar is concerned with the formal aspect and Nirukta is concerned with the semantic aspect of language, as Durga observes : "tasmāt svatantram eva idam vidyā-sthānam, artha-nirvacanam. vyākaranam tu laksana-pradhānam iti višesah."
The Indian thinkers tried to approach this problem of word-meaning relationship in more, say, metaphysical way, than pure linguistic, though of course, the latter was equally important to them. They looked upon language, more as an expression of internal consciousness. Punyarāja observes (on V. P. I. i)—"pratyakcaitanyasya-antah-sannivistasya para-bodhanāya saktih abhi-syandate.” Thus, a constant and invariable association of word with sense follows. When we utter any particular word at any time, some special sense is conveyed at once. To signify everything, there is always a competent word for it. Vātsyāyana on the Nyāya-sūtra (Nyā-Sū.) I. i. 4, observes -yāvad artham vai nāmadheya-sabdāh; taih arthapratyayah. artha-sampratyayāt ca vyavahāraḥ.” Worldly business proceeds from understanding of a meaning.
In the Brhadāranyaka Upanişad II. iv – the first manifestation of the Indeterminate is said to be dual aspects of mind and speech-i.e. sabda and artha. Thus consciousness first splits itself up into the categories of subject and object"sa manasā vācam mithunam sama-bhavat." For the upanişads thought and speech are interchangeable. The mind finds its full expression in speech and also viceversa. The Aitarya upanişad observes : "vān me manasi pratisthā, mano me vāci pratisthitam. The Chandogya upanisad VI.8.6. observes : "puruşasya prayato vān manasi sampadyate,” i. e. when a man dies, his speech sinks into that of mind, the mind into prāņa, and so on. What is implied is that speech is the product of mind. Punyarāja on V. P. I. i., quotes a śruti which suggests that there is a subtle form

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of speech i. e. vāk, which is inherent in soul i. e. pure consciousness and that it is not divided from meaning : "sūksmām arthena a-pravibhakta-tattvām ekām vācam abhisyandamānām uta anye viduh. anyām iva ca pūtām nānārūpām ātmani sannivistām.”
Speech and thought are not spearable, and this is realised only in a stage of higher spirituality. It is consciousness itself which is presented to us in two inseparable parts thus suggesting that sabda and artha are but different aspects of one and the same thing. The V. P. II. 31, says the same when it is observed that:
"ekasya eva ātmano bhedau śabda-tattvam yad akşaram | vivartate artha-bhāvena
prakriyā jagato yatah ||” — V. P. I. Being himself under the influence of Vedantic non-dualism, Bhartrhari holds that all speculations about sabda and artha are more internal than external. He observes : "artha-bhāgais tathā tesām āntaro'rthah prakāśate"
So, Punyarāja observes that for those who hold speech to be purely an internal phenomenon i.e. a manifestation of the consciousness that lies within, word and meaning which are in reality basically unseparated, appears as though distinct, only through (māyā':
"tesām āntara-vākya-vādīnām ācāryānām mate, āntara eva atra vākyā'rthah. tau ca tatra sabdā'rthau abhinnau, ekasya anyatarasya tattvasya sambandhinau, vastutaḥ bahiḥ sthitau bhedau iva pratibhāsate iti boddhavyam."
The Vākyapadīya — In his sambandha - samuddeśa Bharthari observes that the relation between word and meaning is by no means such as anyone can deny - "sambandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ.” Helārāja observes here : "svabhāvataḥ eva nirudho, na tu purusena nivesitah ity arthah.” The relation is absolutely natural and not man-made. It is fixed by nature. V. P. III. 3 holds that the mutual relation between both word and meaning is proved by the very fact that the word is called 'vācaka' and the meaning, vācya' -
"asyā'yam vācako vācya iti șașthyā pratīyate, yogaḥ śabdā’thayo's - tattvam apy ato vyapadiśyate.”

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When it is said that this is pointed out by the word', or, when it is said, 'this word expresses this sense,' it is understood that there is some kind of relation between vācya and vācaka. When Bhartshari observes at V. P. I. 6 that 'śabdānām yataśakti-tvam...,' he implies, explains Punyarāja, that words by their very nature have the power to signify definite ideas of which they are treated as symbols, and that their potency is never exhausted and remains particularly inherent in them :
—“śabdānām yataśaktitvam; niyatā’rtha-pratyāyana-sāmarthyam.” V. P. II. 29 observes:
"yasmins tūccărite sabde yayā yo'rthaḥ pratiyate | tam āhur artham tasyaiva
nā’nyad arthasya lakṣaṇam 11" The meaning of a word is what presents itself to us whenever that word is heard. The utterance of the word 'gauh' gives rise, immediately, to the idea in our mind of a being, possessing dewlap, hump, etc. and this naturally is its meaning.
Word and its meaning are related to each other from times immemorial. The analogy to this relation is found in the functioning of sense-organs with respect to the object-world. Thus both are without beginning, observes Bhartrhari at V. P., . Sambandha-samuddesa, III. 29 :
indriyāņām sva-visayeșu anādir yogyatā yathā, anādir arthaiḥ śabdānām
sambandho yogyatā tathā." Word and meaning are being so absolutely connected with each other that it is impossible to think of one without the other. Kālidāsa has suggested the relation of vāg-arthau' for the union of Siva-Pārvatī. The V. P. I. 50 observes that word, like knowledge, reveals itself as well as the idea or thing comprehended :
“ātma-rūpam yathā jñane jñeya-rūpam ca dịśyate, artha-rūpam tathā śabde
sva-rūpam ca prakāśate.” For Bhartshari, three things are simultaneously comprehended when we utter a word, such as, the particular word, the intention of the speaker, and the object

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“jñānam prayoktur, bāhyo’rthaḥ svarūpam ca pratīyate śabdair uccaritais teșām
sambandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ.” (V. P. III. 1) A sound is meaningless, if it does not convey these three things, viz. the sound itself, its import and the actual fact. So, in case of an absence of relation existing between word and its meaning, we cannot account logically for the derivation of a given meaning from a given word. So, in such a relation, a fundamental solution of a question, as to why things are invariably signified by their corresponding words, is seen by Bhartshari.
Different Views :
The relation of word and meaning has been explained differently by different schools of thought. The Mīmāmsakas and the grammarians. hold the relation between word and meaning as permanent : Vācaspati in his Tātparya-tīkā on Nyāya-sūtra (=Nyā. Sū.) II.1.55 takes note of this : ye’pi mīmāmsakā vaiyā— karanā vā svābhāvikam sabdā'rthayoh sambandham āsthisata." -
The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśesikas look upon this relation as conventional i.e. 'samketita' or creation of Divine Will. Still others maintain that the relation between sound and sense is like one that exists between cause and effect, or manifester and manifested, i.e. grāhaka and grāhya, etc.: Punyarāja on V. P. I. observes : śabdārthasya kārya-kārana-sambandhaśca iti eke. - The V. P. I. has :
"grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca dve sakti tejaso yathā, tathaiva sarva-sabdānām
ete přthag avasthite." and also,
"prakāśaka-prakāśyatvam kārya-kāraņa-rūpatā, antar mātrā"tmanas tasya śabda-tattvasya sarvadā.” (V. P. II)

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137 For still others, speech and thought, or word and things are mutually convertible, and, there is also some reciprocality of causal connection between the two : V. P. III. 32. Sambandha-samuddeśa reads as .
"sabdaḥ kāraṇam arthasya, sa hi tenópajāyate, tathā ca buddhi-viṣayād
arthā cchabdaḥ pratīyate.” For some, again, sound and sense are essentially the same, i.e. they come from the same source :
"ekasyaiva ātmano bhedau
śabdārthāv apsthak sthitau.” (V. P. I.) This view is criticised by some who feel that in case word and sense are essentially the same, then one should experience burn while pronouncing ‘agnih' or fire. But this criticism is misdirected. What is actually meant by the view quoted as above is that one and the same thing gets manifested in different forms in which objects are usually comprehended by all beings. Thus quotes Punyarāja :-eko'yam śakti-bhedena bhāvātmā pravibhajyate, buddhi-vștty anusāreņa bahudhā jñānavādinām." He further quotes :
"śabdārthayor a-sambhede vyavahăre prthak-kriyā yataḥ śabdārthayos-tattvam
ekam tat samavasthitam.” i.e. word and meaning, fundamentally non-different appear to be different only in popular usage.
We will consider as below, different views as held by the Mimāmsakas, Nyāyavaiśeșikas etc. in greater details.
Mimāmsakas :
The Mīmāmsakas have seriously thought about this problem. Before discussing the relation as such between word and its meaning, the Vsttikāra (pp. 43) discusses in the beginning as to whether there is any possibility of there being any relation as such between word and sense. They, for sure, can not be connected by samślesa or samyoga i.e. association, because in that case, the utterance of a word, say ‘ksura' or 'modaka', could cut or sweeten the mouth respectively. This is not our

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common experience. There again cannot be the relation of karya-kāraṇa or causeeffect, or nimitta-naimittikabhāva, or aśraya-āśrayi-bhāva i.e. the relation of a thing and its substratum, existing between them. As the śabda and artha are both 'nitya' or eternal, the first two relations are out of question. The third is also not possible, because of the fact that they have different aśrayas or substratum as the sabda or word resides in ākāśa, ether, and the artha i.e. meaning resides in pṛthivi. So then, what kind of relation can there be ?-The Vṛtti, pp. 43 reads as
"naiva śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ, kuto'sya pauruṣeyata a-pauruṣeyatā vā iti. katham ? syac ced arthena sambandhaḥ, kṣra-modako-ccāraṇe, mukhasya pāṭana-pūraṇe syātām; yadi samśleṣa-lakṣaṇam abhipretya ucyate. kāryakāraṇa, nimitta-naimittika,-āśrayāśrayibhāvādayas tu sambandhāḥ, śabdasya anupapannā eva.
To this, the answer from the Mīmāmsaka, is very simple, viz. that the sabda is 'pratyāyaka' and the artha is 'pratyāyya', i.e. there is the relation of 'conveyor and conveyed' or "pratyāyya-pratyāyaka-sambandha." So, between sabda and artha, there is 'pratyāyya-pratyāyaka-bhāva or "samjñā-samjñi-lakṣaṇa-sambandhaḥ." Now, if this relation is accepted, then we should expect the word to convey its artha even on its first hearing. But our experience goes against this. The word listened for the first time does not convey a meaning -i.e. The prathama-śruta-śabda is not a 'pratyāyaka.' In that case the relation cannot be that of 'pratyāyya-pratyāyaka.' But this argument can be refuted by pointing out to our experience which surely is of the form that the word is pratyāyaka-conveyor, and the sense is 'pratyayya' or conveyed; for we find invariably that sabda conveys 'artha.' In case of its not being 'pratyāyaka'—or conveyor, when 'prathama-śruta' or heard for the first time, it may be observed that it becomes 'pratyāyaka' or conveyor, as many times as it is necessary for it to become so. Only thus our normal experience can be explained. We cannot regard an eye to be an adrastr-or non-perceiver-only because it fails to see objects in the absence of light. The same is the case with reference to the word Just as light is the ancillary cause or sahakāri kāraṇa in the act of perceiving objects, similarly 'bahukṛt-śravana' or repeated hearing is the sahakari-kāraṇa in śabda being an artha-pratyāyaka or a word conveying some sense vṛtti on pp. 43 observes "sarvatra no darśanam pramāņam, pratyāyaka iti pratyayam dṛstvā avagacchāmo, na prathama-śruta iti. prathama-śravane pratyayam adṛṣṭvā yāvatkṛtvaḥ śrutena iyam samjñā ayam samjñī iti avadhāritam bhavati, tāvat-kṛtvaḥ śrutad arthāvagamaḥ, iti. yatha cakṣur drastru, na bahyena prakāṣena vinā, prakāśayati iti a-draṣṭru na bhavati."—

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Jaimini and Sabara reject the view that this relation viz. pratyāyaka-pratyāyya sambandha is a temporal relation and is therefore temporary, or impermanent. They hold that it exists permanently and that it is not created after the existence of word and meaning. Jaimini and Sabara have very often made it clear that the relation between sabda and artha is "autpattika" i.e. 'nitya' or eternal, and not man-made. See :- Mi. Sū. I. 15-autpattikas tu śabdasyā'rthena sambandhaḥ; also V. i. 13 - autpattikatvāt, also Mī. Sū. VII. 2.5-vikāro nautpattikatvāt; Mī. Sū. VI. 8.41-utpatti-nāmadheyatvād bhaktyā prthak satīsu syāt; Mi. Sū. VII. 3. 22 - autpattiko hi nāmi-nāmnoh sambandhah; see also Šābara bhāsya on VI. 8.41, pp. 1522; on VII. 2.5, pp. 1543, and on VIII 3. 3. pp. 1550.
So, according to both Jaimini and Sabara, because the relation between word and sense is eternal, i.e. autpattika, a word can be expressive of one and only one signification and that it cannot be made to signify that, with which it is not connected naturally.
As for the objection (i.e. pūrva-paksa) to this, it may be said that the main defect of this view (i.e. of the siddhāntin) is that there is no 'purusa' whom they can prove to be sambaddhā or connector or co-ordinator. His existence can not be proved by pratyakşa, or direct means. Again, when pratyakșa fails, the other means of knowledge i.e. pramānas dependent on it also fail. You cannot say that he must have been pratyaksa to people of his times, because we do not have any traditional account to support this. The tradition can be broken also. Actually the pūrva-paksa i.e. objectors should furnish us with strong reasons to support their plea. The tanks etc. on the Himālayas, for example, must be the work of some puruşa totally unknown to us even by tradition. But here the absence or break of tradition is caused by desotsāda or kulotsāda, resulting ultimately in the loss of memory of men. But the same cannot be said about sabda and artha, as we cannot imagine a period when man was not connected with śabda-vyāpāra.
Thus, in the absence of any break or 'viyoga' there is no reason why there should be no memory i.e. smarana of some sambaddhā. The absence of his smarana, therefore, can be taken as an indication of the absence of any sambaddhā himself. Thus the objector's view stands refuted - see vrtti on pp. 53 :
—“tad idānīm ucyate, apauruseyatvāt sambandhasya siddham iti. katham punaḥ avagamyate apauruseya eva sambandhaḥ iti ? puruşasya sambandhuh abhāvāt. katham sambandho nāśti ? pratyakşasya pramānasya abhāvāt. tat-pūrvakatvāccetaresām. nanu cira-vịtta-tvāt pratyakşasya a-visayo bhaved idānīntanănām. na hi cira-vrttah san na smaryeta. na ca hima-vrksādisu

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA kūpa-ārāma-ādivad asmaranam bhavitum arhati, purusa-viyogo hi tesu bhavati deśotsādena vā kulotsādena vā. na ca śabdārtha-vyavahāra-viyogah purusānām asti."
Now, it may be argued that the sambaddhā goes out of memory because it was not necessary to remember him in the śabdārtha-vyavahāra which could be continued even without remembering him. We tend to forget things which cease to be useful for our immediate purpose. It should not mean that they never existed before. So, mere non-remembrance does not prove the total absence of a coordinator or sambaddhā. But this point of the objector can be set aside as fallicious. It is true that people are primarily concerned with the relation or sambandha of word and meaning, and not with the sambaddhā or co-ordinator. But, it can not be said that the relation of sambaddhā is useless, as it is the pre-requisite of vyavahāra-siddhi, i.e. the common activity depends on that. For any vyavahāra to be fruitful, it should be necessarily preceded by the full agreement between sambandha-kartā and vyavahāra, because in the absence of either sampratipatti or agreement, or vipratipatti or disagreement, fruition i.e. artha-siddhi becomes impossible. Thus, the terms viddhi' and 'ma-kāra' will not convey the senses of 'ai' and 'an' and 'a-sarva-gurutrika' respectively, when used by somebody who does not agree with Panini or Pingala. Now, the point is that, if there is no smarana or remembrance of the kartā i.e. agent or doer, the sampratipatti illustrated as above, cannot follow. So, it is wrong to say that karty-smarana or remembering the agent is not necessary for immediate purposes. So, in the absence of smarana, it can be safely concluded that there was no kartā i.e. doer i.e. co-ordinator at all (see vrtti on pp. 53).
Jaimini and Sabara hold that the existence of a sambandha-kartā cannot be proved by arthāpatti i.e. implication. We can resort to it only in the absence of any other possible explanation. In arthāpatti we attempt to explain facts which are apparently inexplicable. Impossibility of application of any other pramāņa or means of knowledge forms the very basis of arthāpatti (see vștti on pp. 38, and also Śābara-bhāsya on Mi. Sū. II. 2. 1., pp. 462, and on VI. 6. 3., on pp. 481).
We will consider the objector's position in greater detail. According to the objector, no word was connected in the beginning with any meaning at all. Then, somebody, sometime, established the connection between word and meaning. Thus words came to be significatory of a given sense. This is one explanation of the sabdārtha-vyavahāra. Then, vrddha-vyavahāra forms yet another explanation. Even to-day we see the younger ones getting at a given sense from a given word,

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141 by first observing the speeches i.e. spoken words and then the consequent transactions or activity of the elders. The elders on their part might themselves have learnt their first lessons in gathering of meaning i.e. artha-grahana by observing the practice of their seniors and so on. Thus věddha-vyavahāra is a second explanation, the first being that of a sambandha-kartā, such as Pānini or Pingala in case of words such as věddhi and 'ma-kāra' respectively. Now, the point to be raised is that when vrddha-vyavahāra can be pointed out as a possible solution, why then postulate the theory of a 'sambandha-kartā' ? So, the Siddhāntin concludes that there is no scope for ‘arthāpattsi'-pramāņa, in this case. The other explanation, viz. vrddha-vyavahāra, being strengthened by pratyakşapramāna, should be more acceptable (Vștti, pp. 55).
The fact that youngsters catch ‘artha' even if they do not know the sambandha, is a matter of everyday experience which defeats all questions. They do not arrive at artha-jñāna by the smaraņa of a sambandha-kartā, i.e. co-ordinator. So, it has to be rejected. See vștti on pp. 58—“syād etat. a-pratisambandhā bālāḥ katham vrddhebhyah pratipayanta iti. nāśti drste anupapannam nāma. drstā bālā vặddhebhyaḥ pratipadyamānāḥ, na ca pratipannāḥ sambandhāḥ sambandhasya kartuḥ. tasmāt vaisamyam.”—The very presumption of sambandha-kartā is absurd. Sambandha-karana means giving names to things. To assume that all things having names were present when this ceremory of giving names was performed, sounds absurd. At least some things could have come into existence later. Thus the assumption of a sambandha-kartā sounds futile :- "anupalabdhe ca devadattāv arthe anarthakam samjñā-karanam, aśakyam ca. viśeşān pratipattum eva hi samjñāḥ kriyante, višeşānsca upadiśya. tad-vićeșeșu ajñāyamānesu, ubhayam api anavaklịptam. tasmāt apauruseyaḥ śabdasya arthena sambandhah” (Vịtti. pp. 58). Jaimini and Sabara also show that it is impossible to think of any sambandha-kartā in case of the Veda also. (See, Mī. Sū. I. i, 27-32; Šābara bhāsya thereon).
Thus the relation between word and meaning is 'autpattika' i. e. 'nitya', i. e. not man-made but eternal. The Mimamsakas were compelled to ascribe eternality to both words and their relation with meanings, because, as Kumārila explains, they maintained the trustworthiness of the Vedas beyond question. Kumărila seeks logical justification also. Just as the operation of the visual organs is said to be immediate instrument
n of form i.e. rūpa, eventhough, ultimately the conjunction of the soul with the mind makes for it, similarly, the cognition of the relation and not that of the word itself, is popularly considered as what directly helps us in determining

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the meaning :- śloka-vārtika, sambandhäksepa-vāda 41-42 reads :
"śarīrā’tma-mano-yogāt asādharāņatābalāt, vijñānā'sattibhāvāc ca, cakṣuḥ kāraṇam isyate.” “tathaivèhàdhi-sambandhajñānamangam prasiddhitah, gauravāt kāraṇatvena
matam cet, kena vāryate ?” Artha-jñāna, OR Determination of Sabdārtha :
The Mīmāņsakas have also given thought to the problem of how to determine the śabdārtha. The simplest way is - yah pratīyate sa śabdā'thaḥ - i.e. that which is understood is the meaning of a word. But then in a sentence such as “pūrvo dhāvati," the sense of ‘aparo dhāvati' also clicks, and sure, the word 'pūrvaḥ' does not yield the sense of “aparah.” So, the rule as mentioned above viz. 'yah pratīyate sa sabdā'rthah' can be modified as, "whatever sense is conveyed, and is intended to be conveyed is the meaniong of a word.” Jaimini observes : "tad āgame hi tad drśyate." Sabara reads--"yasya ca āgame, yad upajāyate sa tasya artha iti gamyate.” This can be termed the rule of anvaya-vyatireka. (See Śābara bhāsya on Mi. Sū. IV. 1. 14. pp. 1203, and on Mi. Sū. IV. 1. 15;) see also — yasya cā'game yad upajāyate sa tasya artha iti gamyate. tasya jñānam yathā anyeşām sabdānām. aśvam ānaya iti ukte, aśvānayanam pratīyate. gām ānaya iti ukte, gavānayanam. tatra aśvo’paiti, gauḥ ca upajāyate. tena jñātena aśva-sabdasya aśvo'rtho goabdasya gauḥ iti ca.” (Šābara bhāsya on Mī. Sū. I. 3. 9.)
The next source of artha-jñāna is the ‘abhi-yuktas' or the Šāstra-stha's. Jaimini says: "śāstrasthā vā tannimitta-tvāt.” Sabara says – yah śāstrasthānām, sa śabdārthah. (S. B.= Śābara bhāsya; on Mī. Sū. VIII. 2. 24. pp. 1610). See also — "sabdārthā’-dhigame abhiyuktopadeśaḥ pramāņam; S. B. on I. 3. 10, pp. 226, and ‘abhiyuktāh śabdārthesu śistāh; S. B. on I. 3. 10. pp. 226; and — śāstrasthānām sa śabdārthaḥ-S. B. on I. 3. 9. pp. 217; see also S. B. on I. 3. 27. The question is who are these śāstrasthas or abhiyuktas or śistas ? Why are they held as pramānas ? To this Sabara says that their tradition and acquaintance with vedas and śāstras is unbroken and hence they are to be looked upon as authority. Śabara observes : (S. B. on I. 3. 9. pp. 217)—ke śāstrasthā śistāḥ. teşām avicchinnā smstiḥ śabdesu vedesu ca. tena śistānām iti śruti-smrty avadhārane; and also — "āryāvartanivāsinām śabdārthopāyesu abhiyuktānām abhi-vyā haratām karmāni

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143 ca'nutisthatām antya-janapada-väsibhyo mlecchebhyah samicīnatarah ācāro bhavati (S. B. on II. 3. 3., pp. 585). (All references are shown, courtesy - Prof. Devasthali's, “Mimāmsā; or the Vākya-Šāstra of ancient India.")
Yet another source is said to be Nigama, Nirukta and Vyākarana. This is more so with reference to such words as — jarbharī, turī, turgarī, etc. found in the Vedas. (see S. B. on I. 2. 41, pp. 156). In the case of words that do not belong to the language of the aryans, and yet are found in the scriptures, Jaimini and Sabara hold that here, i.e. where it is a question of borrowed words, we should accept their original sense which they normally convey in their particular language from which they are taken up. So the rule is—"coditam tu pratīyate, avirodhāt pramāṇena.” But if there are such words as are not understood even by the Mlecchas, then, in that case, once again, we have to seek the sistas or Nigama, Nirukta and Vyākarana (S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. 3. 10; pp. 225, pp. 227 etc.). Again there might be certain cases in which one and the same word might show different usages among different people. For this, Sabara says that a usage which is less wide is not to be accepted when it conflicts with a wider usage —a-sārva-laukikasya prayogasya sārva-laukikena prayogeņa virudhyamānasya a-prāmānyam syāt. abhyupagacchanti hi te janapadinaḥ sāryabhaumam prayogam." (S. B. on Mī. Sū. II. 3. 3., pp. 581).
Yet another criterion is that, what conflicts with the śāstras is less acceptable, than what, though not actually supported by the śāstras, at least does not stand in conflict with it. As the inhabitants of āryāvarta are much in touch with the śabdā’rthopāyas, their view is more acceptable than the antya-janapada-vāsin mleccha : "api ca avipragītā laukikā vipragītebhyaḥ pratyayita-tarāḥ bhavanti. tathāca āryāvarta-nivāsinām śabdārthopāyesu abhiyuktānām abhivyāharatām karmāņi ca anutişthatām antya-jana-pada-vāsibhyo mlecchebhyaḥ samīcinataro ācāro bhavati." - (S. B. on Mi. Sū. II. 3. 3. pp. 581).
Again, whenever there is conflict between anumāna and pratyaksa prayoga; or between prayoga and smrti, the latter is to be regarded as stronger in each case – śabara says — “prayogācca smțitir balīyasī., or prayogo durbalaḥ smộteḥ, and also, anumănatah prayogo balavān, etc. etc. And finally, -laukikah prayogah labdā’rtha-paricchede hetuh.' Words in a vidhi-śāstra like vedas or words in law should be understood exactly as we understand them in ordinary language.
Pravrttinimitta of sabda is also discussed by the Mīmāmsakas. The word putra' denotes 'ākrti' but it can come into existence, when a person referred to by hat word is related to somebody as a son. Thus, in this case, 'sambandha' i.e. relation is the pravrtti-nimitta, i.e. the cause of its being current in usage, of the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA word 'putra.' Thus, the word 'yūpa' is a samskara-sabda. The word 'rājya' depends on the relation between 'karman' and 'rājan', which shows that it is a yaugika' word. Thus 'samskāra' and 'yoga' are the pravrtti-nimittas in these two cases.
Before considering the various pravrtti-nimittas, we should know what actually it means. Śabara observes : ye naimittikāḥ śabdāḥ te nimittam upalabhya prayujyante, yathā dandī, cchātrī, iti.; i.e. only that factor can be called a pravrttinimitta, in the absence of which the particular word cannot be used. Thus in the absence of samskāras or religious inuction a pillar cannot be termed yūpa.' 'Jāti'class, of akrti-figure itself is the chief pravrtti-nimitta. When there is nothing else in particular to be conveyed by a word, it conveys ākşti-form/figure. So āksti is the pravrtti-nimitta of such words. Same is the case with “jāti' in case of 'jāti-nimittaśabdāḥ.' It may be noted that when jāti becomes the pravịtti-nimitta of a sabda, as a rule, this sabda is to be accepted as a jāti-sabda, even though in special cases, the word might appear to convey something else, e. g. samskära etc. also. (See, Mi. Sü I. iv. 10, and S. B. thereon). Loka-prayoga or common usage becomes the determinant cause in such cases.
The next pravrtti-nimitta is 'yoga' or relation, and such words are termed 'yaugika' e. g. the word "prokşaņi.” Sabara explains the word 'yaugika' when he says-rāja-sabdaḥ prasiddher mülam. tad-yogāt rājya-śabdaḥ. Thus when a word comes into usage, not directly for its own artha, but owing to its connection i.e. yoga or samyoga with some other word, already in usage, such word is called yaugika or yoga-siddha i.e. derived from some relation. Jaimini suggests this in the sūtra— “prokşanīsu artha-samyogāt,"; see also SB. on Mi. Sū. I. iv. 11, pp. 344; - proksani-sabdam prati sandehah, kim samskāra-nimittah uta jāti-nimittah.....etc. tasmād yaugikah.” Then samskāra i.e. inuction is also another pravstti-nimitta as in case of words such as yūpa' etc. If a word is sometimes found to be used as a jāti-sabda, it must always be taken as a jāti-sabda, eventhough in certain cases it might appear as a samskāra śabda e.g. the word 'barhih'. Sabdara justifies the above rule on logical grounds. If words such as 'barhih' are taken as samskāranimittas,, setting aside their laukika usage in that case, we take them as 'alaukika' words. But this is not the right approach. The rule regarding the 'balā'bala' of 'samskāra' and 'jāti' as pravrtti-nimittas is suggested by Jaimini in the sūtra I. iv. 10. viz. barhirājyayorasamskāre sabda-lābhāt-a-tac-chabdah.'
Fourth pravrttinimitta is 'sambandha.' A yaugika word, say, rājya is dependent upon some jātiśabda e.g. rājan which is the source of its currency-prasiddhi-mūla.' But the word rājā by itself is quite independent. The word putra' depends upon the

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relation with someone to whom a person is related as a son. Now, in case of words such as frājan' and 'rājya', the former is “jāti' sabda, and is the source- prasiddhimūla-of the usage of the word rājya. But this is not the case with the words 'putra' and 'pitr', which are mutually dependent and therefore called 'sambandhi' śabdas. Sabara explains it as : 'sambandhi-sabdāś ca sarve sāpeksāh, vinā padàntarena, na paripūrņam artham abhi-vadanti.' (See also SB. on VII 7.24, pp. 1500,-bahutvam cấpeksikam etc.)
“Rūdhi' i.e. practice is also a pravịtti-nimitta. The word 'kuśala' i.e. one who cuts kusa grass, is an illustration here. Now it suggests all the qualities which a man should possess while plucking kusa blades. Usage has now restricted the sense of this word to this ‘nipunatā' i.e. expertise alone. Later ālamkārika Mammata takes rūdhi-mūlā laksanā here, and Viśvanātha rejects it. For Sabara also it is not a case of laksanā. Sabara holds that such a phenomenon occurs where a word is a composite whole. It gives one signification when taken as a whole-i.e. samudāya, and another signification when taken as made of parts. Sabara opines that in such cases the meaning of the composite whole is to be taken as stronger—"avayavaprasiddheh, samudāya-prasiddhih balīyasī." (S. B. on VI. 7. 21, 22, pp. 14991500), ---yathā kuśalaḥ, pravīņaḥ"....etc.
All the pravrtti-nimittas refer to the expressed sense i.e. vācyārtha and not laksyàrtha or indicated sense. For laksanā, the Mīmāmsakas suggest different pravrtti-nimittas or conditions.
Naiyāyikas :
We will now consider the Nyāya-Vaiseșika views on the subject of the relationship of word and meaning, or the association of symbol and the symbolised. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiseșikas do not differ much on this issue. For both of them, the meaning of a word is determined by 'samaya' or 'samketa' i.e. convention. Difference of opinion between the two i.e. the Naiyāyikas and Vaisesikas lies in the fact that while the Vaisesikas include sābda-bodha i.e. verbal cognition in the category of inference, the Naiyāyikas take it as an independent source of knowledge. It should be noted that the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiseșikas, both do not recognise the possibility of any relation-i.e. either samyoga or samavāya—(= impermanent or permanent relation) between a word and the object it denotes :
"sabdārtha-sambandhau”—Vai. Sū. II. 2.18; "tathā ca asatā ghatā”dinā śabdasya na samyogo na vā samavāya iti bhāvaḥ." Upaskāra; and "purāņa

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pradāha-pāṭana-anupapatteś ca sambandhā'-bhāvaḥ." Nyā. Sū. I. 53, and also see Nyāyamañjari pp. 241-"na hi kundala-badaryor iva samyoga-svabhāvaḥ, tantupaṭayor iva samavāyā”tmā vā sambandhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate." The author of Nyāyamañjarī has found fault from logical point of view with the views of Mīmāmsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas who have tried to establish some sambandha or relation between word and its denotation. Nyaya-mañjarī (pp. 241) observes: "na sams'lesa-lakṣaṇaḥ śabdā'rtha-sambando'smābhir abhyupagamyate. tataḥ kim kārya-kāraṇa, nimitta-naimittika, āśrayāśrayibhāva-ādayaḥ śabdasya arthena sambandhāḥ ? ete'pi na-tarām. tataḥ kim śabdā'rthayor avinābhāva-sambandhaḥ ? so'pi nāsti. kas tarhi ? samayaḥ"
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The Vaiseṣika view-point is as below-conjunction or samyoga is a kind of quality. Śabda or word being itself a quality of ākāśa, cannot possess 'samyoga'another quality. With the object denoted by it :-'guṇatvāt'-Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 14.; also, 'tatha ca gunasya sabdasya gunaḥ samyogaḥ katham syat ? —upaskāra. Again, there is no action as such which takes place when things are denoted by words. So, we cannot find out any connection between the two: 'niskriyatvāť'— Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 16. Things that are formless (i.e. not material) and inactive by nature, can never be related to one another without the intervention of external force. Again, in cases like, 'there is no pot,' one fails to think of any conjunction between the word and its meaning, which is non-existent at present—“asti nā❜stī ti ca prayogāt," Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 16. Our universal experience is that things that are mutually related are found to have co-existence. The word 'nāśti' (= there is no pot), now uttered, does not logically co-exist with the thing which is simply negated. Similarly, samavāya-sambandha between a word and the object also does not stand. The Naiyāyikas do not agree even to the idea of natural relation, either samyoga or samavāya, but on the contrary, tried to refute the theory of eternal relation between sabda and artha. A sambandha i.e. connection as such is negated because there is neither pratyakṣa nor anumāna proof for it :-"prāpti-lakṣaṇas tu śabdā'rthayo sambandhaḥ pratiṣiddhah. kasmāt? pramāṇatónupalabdheḥ." Vatsyāyana on Nyā. Sū. II. 1. 52. Again, a union of the two is not possible, as the two do not remain in the same locality. A word exists in the vocal organ of the speaker and the object lies in a different place :-"prāpti-lakṣaṇe ca gṛhyamāņe sambandhe śabda'rthayoḥ śabda'ntike vā arthaḥ syāt, artha'ntike vā sabdaḥ syāt. tasmān na śabdena arthaḥ prāptaḥ iti." (Vātsyāyana, on Nyā. Sū. II. 1. 52.) and also "mukhe hi sabdam upalabhāmahe bhūmāv artham," (śabara, on M. S. I. i. 5.). So, in this state of affairs, the conclusion that, the words and things referred

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to by them are not connected, forces itself upon us.-"śabdārthau sambaddhau."-Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 18. svabhāvato hy a-sambaddhāv etau śabdarthau. mukhe hi śabdam upa-labhāmahe, bhūmāv artham."-Sabara; and also see Nyā. Sū. II. 1. 5-śabdārtha-vyavasthānād a-pratiṣedhaḥ." A sound has its origin in the mouth while the object, such as a pot, lies on the earth. But, at the same time, the entire absence of relationship is also against all popular experience. To deny any relation is to strike at the very root of our knowledge of things. There has to be at least some relation-whether real or imposed-between the two, because in the absence of any relation whatsoever, any word would have denoted any object, e.g. the word 'ghata' would have denoted the object viz. 'pata' also (See V. P. i. 125). On the contrary, we find that the utterance of a particular word is always accompanied by the comprehension of a definite thing. "artha-smaraṇasya'pi śabdollekhenaiva darśanāt." (punyarāja)-there is, no knowledge which is not associated with its word "na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdā'nugamad ṛte, anuviddham iva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate." (V. P. I. 124). The cognition of a thing from a word is in itself a strong evidence of some relation existing between the two "sati pratyaya-hetutve sambandha upapadyate śabdasya'rthe yatas tatra sambandho'stīti gamyate." (V. P. Sambandha-samuccaya, III. 37).
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The Naiyayikas did not accept the natural connection between the two, but at the same time, they did not, in any way, deprecate the uniformity of cognition as is represented by words in the way of denoting things.-śabdaḥ sambandho'rtham pratipadayati, pratyaya-niyama-hetutvāt, pradīpavat."-Nyāya-Värttika. If it is asked that in case of the absence of relation between the two, how can a word as a rule denote some object?: "nanu yadi na samyoga, na samavāyaḥ śabdarthayos tarhi kena sambandhena śabdo niyatam artham pratipadayatīty ata-āha-" Upaskāra. Kaṇāda, with the Naiyāyikas, says that the cognition of a meaning is not because of any connection as such, but it results from the 'samketa'-The Will of God-expressed in the following way, viz., 'let this meaning be gathered from this word.'-"samayikaḥ śabda'rtha-pratyayaḥ" Vai. Su. VII. 2. 20.; na samayikatvāt saba'rtham sampratyayasya." Vai. Su. II. 1. 55; and also - sāmayika iti samayaḥ iśvaraḥ, samketaḥ. asmāt-śabdad ayamartho boddhavyaḥ ityā"kāraḥ. yaḥ śabdo yasminn arthe bhagavatā samketitaḥ sa tam artham pratipadayati."

a
Samketa thus, is caused by Divine Will and not established by human agency: "sargāntareṣv api vācya-vācaka-śaktyapekṣaḥ sanketaḥ kriyate,"-on sutra-"tasya vācakaḥ pranavah."-This relation between vācya and vācaka will never come to an end, and will continue even in future stage of existence. It is a fact and not a

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA fiction. Vyāsa refers to this in his yogasūtra. A word expresses only that sense which is assigned to it by the Divine Will. Thus, between the word and the object, this
samketa exists, and not that of samyoga or samavāya. The Vaiśesikas and the Naiyāyikas had to go for it. It may be noted however, that from the Nyāyasūtras and the bhāsya thereon, it is not sufficiently clear whether by 'samketa' is meant the Divine Will or the human will. The expression—"prayujyamānagrahanāc ca samayopayogo laukikānām"-it is intended to imply that samketa follows from vșiddha-vyavahāra. Grammar also contributes to the same purpose by analysing words into 'praksti' and 'pratyaya', — “samayaparipālanā’rtham cedam padalaksanayā vāco'nvākhyānam vyākaranam." Vācaspati, Jayantabhatta and Gadādhara have clearly referred to the Will of God as Samketa—"parameśvarena hi srsty adau yo gavādi sabdānām arthe samketaḥ krtah, so'dhunā vsiddhavyavahāre prayujyamānānām śabdānām a-vidita-sangatibhir api bālaiḥ śakyo grahītum-” Tātparya-ţikā; and see also : tasmādīśvara-viracitasambandhā'dhigamopāyabhūta-vệddha-vyavahāra-balāt tad-avyutpatti-săpekso śabdo'rtham avagamayati-ti siddham.: Nyāyamañjari- pp. 246This Divine Volition represents the relation and is rightly called the real power of denotation of a word, i.e. sakti. :- "saktirūpah sambandhah iti uktam."-Nyāyamañjarī; "saktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhah"-Muktāvalī.
Gotama also arrives at the same point. He holds the relation to be just conventional and certainly not natural or innate : “sāmayikaḥ śabdā’rthasampratyayaḥ na svābhāvikaḥ. rsyācārya-mlecchānām yathākāmam śabdaprayogo'rtha-pratyāyanam pravartate.”—Vātsyāyana, under Nyā. Sū. II. i. 56. If it were natural, as held by the grammarians (siddhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ śabdārthayaḥ sambandhah"Helārāja) he argues, then the same word would have been used by different races of mankind in the same sense, and consequently no varieties of language would have resulted : “jātivisese cā'-niyamāt" : Nyā. Sū. II. i. 56. The word 'gauh' is so fashioned by the Divine Will, that it always denotes a particular thing and not anything else. We feel that modern thinkers on this topic would also chose to side with the Naiyāyikas.
How is the Samketa apprehended ?
To this, it is said that its cognition is current from time without beginning. (Nyāyamañjari-na hi sabdārtha-vyavahāra-rahita kaścit kālah upapadyate). We cannot think of any people any day incapable of signifying objects by the use of sounds Udayana says that God became a magician in the beginning and brought the words and objects--vācya and vācaka-together. He assumed the dual forms of

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the denotative and the denoted before he could make the first group of people familiar with the samketa, which he invented. —"iśvaro'pi prayojya-prayojakabhāvāpannam śarīra-dvayam parigțhya vyavahāram kṛtvā tadānīntanānām śaktim grāhayati.”—(comm. by Haridāsa Bhattācārya). From this first group of men, the others of later generations gathered the meaning of words. THERE ARE VARIOUS SOURCES OF SAMKETA-GRAHANA : (Jagadīša quotes in śabda-śakti-prakāśikā)
—“saktigraham vyākaraṇopamānakoşăptavākyād-vyavahārataś ca, vākyasya śeşād vivște vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vȚddhāḥ." First of all comes the vșddha-vyavahāra. The logicians and grammarians have explained this. Samketa is two-fold :ājānika i.e. one not of human origin but current from eternity; and adhunika i.e. man-made : "ājānikah ādhunikah samketo dvividho mataḥ, nitya ājānikas tatra Śaktir ity abhigīyate." "kādācitkas tu ādhunikah śāstrakārādibhiḥ krtah”—(V. P.)
Primary signification known as śakti comes under the former and the technical terms such as guna, vặddhi, etc. come under the latter.
We have examined the views of the grammarians. The view of Vyādi as given by Punyarāja is that there is no author of the relation that exists between words (both vedic and popular) and the object denoted by them: "sambandhasya na kartā’sti śabdānām loka-vedayoḥ.” (quoted by Punyarāja, under V. P. I. 26.)
The grammarians insist on the eternality of both words and meanings. The Mahābhāsya (= M. bh.) says that the words, the meanings, and the relation between them are all eternal.
- "siddhe śabdàrtha-sambandhe.”—vārttika I Patañjali has explained the word 'siddha' as a synonym of 'nitya' (nitya-paryāya-vāci siddha-sabdah), and also "nityo'hy arthavatām arthaih abhi-sambandhah”-M. bh. I. i. 1.
How is this permanent relation known ? To this, it is said that the object for which words are expressly used constitutes in itself a sufficient proof to show that the relation between words and meanings is natural and permanent :
—“katham punarjñāyate siddhaḥ śabdartha-sambandhaḥ ca iti ? lokataḥ. yalloke'rtham upādāya śabdān prayuñjate tesām vivrtau yatnam kurvanti." (M. bh. I. i. 1). In the absence of this permanent and natural relation no one would have ever felt the need for using words for the purposes of communicating

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thoughts to others.
Bhartṛhari - It has been noted that for Bhartṛhari the relationship between word and meaning is as beginningless as the relation between sense-organs and their objects-i.e. indriya'rtha-sambandha. This relation is explained differently. He regards it as unconventional :
"akṛtrimo'bhisambandho
viśeṣaṇa-viśeşyavat." (V. P. II. 370),
It is as between a noun and adjective. He also suggests that the proper names (such as Dittha) and the technical terms (as vṛddhi, guna, etc.) are also permanently related to their specialised senses"—
"nitya eva tu sambandho
dittha'dișu gavadivat" (V. P. II)
He also shows the mutual causal connection between sabda and artha. A word appears to be the immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is gathered and again, a word is comprehended only through the instrumentality of sense that is previously ascertained by the intellect. (V. P. III. 32. sambandha-samuddeśa). The meaning of a word is an object which exists externally in the world :
"sabda'rtho hy artho bahīrupataya'vasthiyamānaḥ."-Helārāja.
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Again, it is held that both śabda and artha stay unseparated in our intellect prior to their outward manifestation :
"yatha hi buddhau śabdār'thayoḥ pūrvam abhedena avasthānam"-Helārāja,
and also Durga on Nirukta I. ii.

"śarīrehy abhidhānábhidheya-rupā buddhiḥ
hṛdayā'ntargatā”kāśa-pratiṣṭhitā."
By this inseparable relation, they become convertible or interchangeable with each other :
"śabdarthayor abhedena sambandho'dhyāsa-lakṣaṇaḥ."-Helārāja.
But in the Yoga-sūtra and Nyāya-mañjarī, an objection is raised against such a view. It is as follows: A word, its meaning, and the cognition produced by it are all really different from one another. In ordinary usage, we treat these three as one and identical; e. g. we have no other criterion, but the term 'go' itself to distinguish the word 'go' from its meaning and the cognition :

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151 "gaur iti śabdo, gaur ity artho, gaur iti jñānam. ya esām pravigrāḥ sa sarvavit." - Vyāsabhāsya.
The author of yogasūtra says that this false identification prevents us from understanding the speech of all beings (Yoga-sūtra III. 17), just as māyā hides from us the essential unity of brahman.
The doctrines of sabdā'dhyāsa and sabda-vivarta as suggested by Bhartrhari have been noted by us. But these doctrines were strongly criticised by the Naiyāyikas. Jayantabhatta refutes the interchangeablility of word and meaning (i.e. śabdā'dhyāsa-vāda), and also śabda-vivarta-vāda and brands it as inadequate and irrational
—“sarvathā na sambandhaḥ śabdā’dhyāsavādaḥ, vivartavādo’pi.”—
But, Bhartsihari was a great exponent of the natural relationship between śabda and artha and considered it as the most plausible explanation appealing to one's reason,
—“siddhah svābhāvikaḥ śabdā’rthayoh sambandhah”-Helārāja.
He thus opposes the theory of samketa which brings in the unnecessary discussion of human or Divine volition. He says that if words were naturally not associated with their meanings, nobody could ever connect the one with the other in any way possible :
—“sāmayikas tu sambandhaḥ na yujyate.
-"nitye'nitye' pi bāhye'rthe purusena kathañcana sambandho'mrtasambandhaiḥ śabdaiḥ kartum na sakyate.” (V. P. IV. 38). . We may now note as to how the meaning is comprehended from a word. The cognition as to the denotative power of the words (sakti) is usually derived from popular usages. There are other means also such as — (i) grammar; -Bhartrhari and Jayantabhatta emphasise the importance of grammar -
"artha-pravstti-tattvānām śabdā eva nibandhanam, tattvā'vabodhah sabdānām nāśti
vyākaraņād ste.” – V. P. IV. 38. and also
sādhūpayogān ucitāñś ca śiştān na veda yo, vyākaraṇam na veda. quoted by Punyarāja on V. P. I. 16,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
and also
"sarvathā prakrti-nirmalam atyudāram vākaranā'dambaram eva prāyaih parivāda-pāmsu-pātaiḥ, na manāg api dūrīkartum pāryate iti siddham. tasmāt pavitrāt sarvasmāt pavitram jana-bahumatam adhigata-caturvarga-grāmam ātmānam kartum adhyeam vyākaranam."
“rūpā’ntareņa devās te vicaranti mahītale,
ye vyākarana-samskāra-pavitrita-mūkhā narāḥ.” manunā ca pankti-pāvanatvena adhigata-vyākaraṇo mīmāmsakaś ca sva. smộtau pathitau.
"yaś ca vyakurute vācam yaś ca mīmāmsate giram” iti |
--Nyāyamañjarī pp. 425-426. (ii) Analogy e.g. 'gauriva gavayaḥ' (iii) lexicon, (iv) testimony - —“āptopadeśāt sāmarthyāt artha-sampratyayaḥ—Nyā. Sū. II. i. 52.
Words like svarga, apsaras, devatā, uttar-kuru, etc. as pointed out by Vātsyāyana, denote objects which are never perceived by human beings. Their meaning is gathered through āptavākya--
_"svargah, apsarasah, uttarāh kuravah, sapta-dvīpāh, samudro, lokasanniveśa ity evam āder apratyaksasya arthasya na sabdamātrāt sampratyayah. kim tarhi ? áptaiḥ ayam uktaḥ śabda ity ataḥ sampratyayah.
-Bhāsya on Nyā. Sū. II. i. 53. and also,
na hy ayam sabdamātrāt svargādīn pratipadyate, kimtu purusavišesā'bhihitatvena pramānatvam pratipadyate, tathābhūtāt sabdāt svarga pratipadyate-Nyāya-vārttika and also
apūrva-devatā-svargaiḥ
samam āhur gadädișu.—V. P. II. 121, etc. (v) Popular usage, i.e. vặddha-vyavahāra
(VI) Contact, (VII) synonyms and (VIII) association with the words of known signification also, meaning is collected. These sources will be discussed in greater details under abhidhā or word-power of direct expression.

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153 -Bhartshari also says,
"vākyāt prakaraņāt arthāt, arthaucityāt deśakālataḥ, śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante
na samayād eva kevalāt."-V. P. II. 316. In case of words having multiple sense (anekā'rtha) the exact contextual meaning is determined by such factors as 'samyogah' or conjunction, viprayogah or disjunction, etc. -Bhartshari enlists these factors under V. P. II. 317, 'samyogo viprayogasca'....etc. In case of multiplicity of meanings two courses are open to us. We may either hold that one meaning is conventional and the rest are of secondary importance as held by alamkārikas such as Mammata and others, or hold that all are equally conventional as held by Naiyāyikas and also by such ālamkārikas as Jagannātha and others. It may also be noted that by multiplicity of meanings with reference to the same word, it is implied that there is some laxity of conventional restrictions. Again, this shows the different stages of linguistic development. Many reasons such as analogy, metaphor, and expansion of knowledge etc. can be given for this happening.
Thus, we have examined the different views concerning the relationship of word and meaning. The ālamkārikas have not dwelt upon this topic elaborately but they can be taken normally to follow the lead of the grammarians. WORD AND ITS IMPORT :
We will also discuss this topic of import of a word, as part of general introduction to the topic of word and its powers or 'sabda-vypāra-vicāra. This consideration, as the earlier one of word-meaning relationship is also important from the point of view of studying the theoretical background of the thinking of ālamkārikas concerning sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra.
Here again, the topic of word and its import will be closely studied taking into account the views of Vaiyākaranas, Mīmāmsakas, and the different views as expressed in the vākyapadīya, the views of the Naiyāyikas, Vākyapadiya's own views, views as held also by the Buddhists, the ālamkārikas, etymologists, etc. etc. The Vaiyākaraņas :
The first question to be considered is, 'what precisely is a word ?' The normal asnwer is that, sound which is articulate and significant, is word—“śrotra-grahane hi arthe loke sabda-sabdah prasiddhah (S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. i. 5). Patañjali has raised

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA this question in the beginning of his sabdā'nuśāsana. For him, word, in its essential aspect, differs from substance i.e. dravya, action i.e. kriyā, quality i.e. guna and class i.e. jāti. A sound expressive of sense is called sabda by people : "athavā pratīta-padārthako loke dhvanih sabda ity ucyate.” (M. bh. I. i. 1). That which really constitutes the 'word', when one utters 'gauh' is the sound, which along with its utterance, simultaneously gives the idea of an animal having dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc. etc. A word, therefore, is sound—"tasmāt dhvanih śabdah."-"atha gauh ity atra kah sabdah ? kim yat, tat sāsnădi-langūla-kakudkhura-visāna-rūpam sa sabdah ? na ity āha. dravyam nāma tat ..... tasmāt dhvanih śabdah.” (M. bh. I. i. 1).
When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced, the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearers, viz. - the individual cow, cow's action, qualities, gen class cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of 'g', 'au' and 'h'the visarga'. The hearer wants to find out the exact significance. The individual cow, her qualities, etc. are perceived by the eye, while the word 'gauh' is perceived by the ear. So, how can these two perceptions of different senses be taken as the meaning of the word ? But this can be taken as the meaning on the basis of a rule of the grammarians viz. that a thing is not different from another thing, when it is so also with a third thing not different from that another thing-tad abhinnā'bhinnasya tad abhinnatvam." Patañjali, however, says that äkriti, guna, etc. are not the true significance of a sabda, but the true significance is 'sphota' --that which, when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear apprehension of the object cow.
Patañjali has given a detailed discussion in the form of the pūrva-paksa or the objector's view and uttara-paksa i.e. the view of the siddhāntin which is a rejoinder to the objection,-to prove that varnas or sound units by themselves have no meaning. In order to understand this discussion, we may refer to the opinion of Upavarsa, accepted by the pūrva-mīmāmsaka Sabara, and the uttara-mīmāmsaka Sankara. Sabara refers to this view of Upavarsa at Mi. Sū. I. i. 5, and Sankara refers to it at I. iii. 28, in his bhāsya on the Vedānta Sūtras. : "gaur ity atra kah śabdaḥ ? gakāra-aukāra-visarjanīyāh iti bhagavān Upavarśah" (S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. i. 5), and 'varṇāḥ eva tu sabdah' iti bhagavān Upavarşah” (Sankara, on Vedānta Sūtra, I. iii. 28). Sabara holds that 'aksarāny eva padam' (S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. i. 5), i.e. syllables alone constitute a word. Thus, he refuses to recognise sound as distinct from syllables.-"ato na tebhyo vyatiriktam anyat padam nāma iti." The pūrvapaksa as given by Patañjali is akin to this—“kim punar ime varnaḥ

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arthavantah āhosvit anarthakāh? arthavanto varnāh. dhātu-prātipadika-pratyanipātānām ekavarnānam artha-darśanān manyāmahe arthavanto varnah iti. etc. and also – samghātā'rthatvāc ca manyāmahe arthavanto varnaḥ iti; yeşām samghātāḥ arthavantah, avayavā api teşām arthavantah. yeşām avayavāḥ arthavantaḥ samudāyāḥ api teşām artha-vantah.”
The pūrva-paksa as cited by Patañjali is akin to this. It runs as below : (This is given while explaining the sūtra, “hayavarat.') :
“Do these varņas or sound-units have meaning or not? (Patañjali thus starts here with the prima-facie view)—"Sound units have meaning, since there is meaning in one-lettered roots, stems, affixes, and nipātas. One-lettered roots having meaning are found as in, “eti” (Vin), adhyeti (Vik), adhīte (Vią); one-lettered stems having meaning are found as in, "ābhyām, ebhiḥ, eșuh” etc.; affixes such as 'aupa-gavayah', 'kāpatavah'; nipātas as in, 'a aphehi,' 'i indram paśya', 'u, uttistha,' 'a, apakrama,' etc. etc. Thus letters have meaning.
Again, on account of change in meaning due to change in letters, letters should be held to be meaningful. We see that meaning changes in words if one letter is replaced by another, e.g. in kūpaḥ, sūpah, yüpah, etc.—the words having different meanings with the change of k, s, y, respectively.
Again, "varņā'nupalabdhau ca anarthagateh”-i.e, on account of the absence of that meaning in the absence of that letter (varnas should be taken as meaningful). ---varnánupalabdhau câ'narthagateh, manyāmahe arthavanto varnā iti; vrksah, rkşah, kandīrah,-vřksa iti sa-vakārena kaścid artho gamyate, șkşah iti va-kārăpāye so'rtho na gamyate. kāndīra iti sa-ka-karena kaścid artho gamyate ändira iti ka-kāra-apāye so’rtho na gamyate."
-Again, 'samghātā'rthatvāc ca.' on account of the collection having meaning, letters should be held as meaningful. If the collections of letters have meaning, their parts too must have meaning. If the parts have meaning, their wholes too have meaning. If one man with eyes, is able to see, a collection of a hundred men is able to see. If one grain of sesamum (i.e. tilah) is capable of giving oil, its collection is
ly capable of it. But if the parts have no meaning, their wholes also cannot have any meaning. If one blind man is unable to see, a collection of hundred blind men also is unable to see. If one particle of sand cannot give oil, hundred bags of the same cannot give oil.
But Patañjali is of the opinion that letters have no meaning. For, if they have meaning, they will be subject to the same rules which apply to those that have

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA meaning. Thus, they will get the designation, 'prātipadika' by the rule, "arthavat prātipadikam'; they will receive case-affixes after them by the rule‘prātipadikāt....' and will get the designation, 'padam', by the rule 'sub antam padam.'-"yadi tarhi ime varnah arthavantah, arthavat-krtāni prāpnuvanti. kāni ? arthavat prātipadikam iti prātipadika-samjña; prātipadikāt iti svādyut-pattiḥ, sub antam padam iti pada-samjñā."-(M. Bh. I.) Again, letters have no meaning
se a meaning is not found for every letter-"anarthakās tu prativarnam arthā'nupalabdheḥ, anarthakās tu varṇaḥ. kutah ? prativarnam arthā'nupalabdheḥ. na hi prativarņam arthāḥ upalabhyante. kim idam prativarnam iti ? varņam varnam prativarnam.-(M. bh. I). Letters are meaningless also because the same meaning is not present when there is metathesis, elision, augment or substitution—"varna-vyatyaya-apāya-vikāresu arthadarśanāt. [M. bh. 1). and also," varna-vyatyāpāyopajanavikāreșu arthadarśanāt manyāmahe anarthakā varņa iti; varna-vyatyaye ksteņ tarkaḥkaseh sikatā, himseh simhaḥ, varnavyatyayaḥ na artha-vyatyayah. apāyo lopah-hataḥ, ghnanti, gnantu, aghnan, - varnăpāyo na arthàpāyah; upajanah agamaḥ, lavitā, lavitum, - varnopajanaḥ na arthopajanaḥ. vikāraḥādeśaḥ. ghātayati, ghātakaḥ, varnavikāraḥ, na arthavikāraḥ. yathaiva varnavyatyayápāyopajanavikārāḥ bhavanti, tadvat artha-vyatyayāpāyopajana-vikāraih bhavitavyam, na ca iha tadvat. ato manyāmahe anarthakāḥ varṇaḥ iti. (M. Bh. I.).
Patañjali adds that at times, some of those persons who study equally with the one hope of getting money, get it, while others do not. Now because one gets money, it is not necessary that all get it; and because one does not get money it is not necessary that all do not get money. So, in the same way, we may hold that such single letters as stand as roots, affixes, stems, and nipātas have meaning. This is quite natural-ubhayam idam varnesu uktam; arthavanto' narthakāśca iti ca. kim atra nyāyyam ? ubhayam iti āha. kutaḥ ? svabhāvataḥ. tad yathā-mamānamīhamānantam cādhiyānānām kecid arthe yujyante, apare na. na cedānīm kaścid arthavan iti krtvā sarvaih arthavadbhih sakyam bhavitum. kaścit vā'narthakah iti krtvā sarvaih anarthakaih. tatra kim asmābhih śakyam kartum ? yad dhātupratyaya-prātipadika-nipātā eka--varņā arthavanto, ato'nye'narthakāḥ, iti svābhāvikam etat.”—
The words such as 'kūpah,' 'sūpah,' 'yūpah,' etc. etc. are different letter-groups having different meanings. If the change in their meaning is due only to the change in a single letter, the major portion of the meaning of 'kūpah' should lie in 'sūpah', that of 'sūpaḥ' in 'kūpaḥ', that of “kūpah' in yūpah' and that of yūpah' in 'kūpaḥ',

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and finally that of 'sūpah' in yüpah' and vice versa, 'üpah' being common to all these three words. But we know them as different letter-groups having different meanings. And it has been actually very well suggested by the opponent himself that letters have no meaning even while actually proving that they have meaning. For, he who holds that the meaning in 'kūpah' rests in ‘ka’-kāra, or that of 'sūpah' in 'sa'-kāra, and that of 'yūpa' in 'ya’-kāra, has to accept that ‘ūpa' is meaningless: “katham ya eva bhavatā varņānām arthavattāyām hetur upadistah, arthavanto varņāḥ, dhātu-prātipadika-pratyaya-nipātānām ekavarnānām artha-darśanāt, varne vyatyaye ca arthā'ntarăgamanāt, varnā'nupalabdhau ca anarthagateh samghātàrthatvāc ca iti ? .... yataḥ tu khalu na kiñcit kūpasya vā sūpe, sūpasya vā kūpe, kūpasya vā yūpe, yūpasya vā kūpe, sūpasya vā yūpe, yūpasya vā sūpe ato na manyāmahe, samghātā’ntarāny eva etāni evam jātīyakāni arthā’ntareșu vartante iti. 'ūpa'śabdas tu asyā'narthakah syāt. (M. Bh. on 1. 1. 2.).
Now, with reference to objects denoted by words, Patañjali gives a four-fold classification of words such as words signifying genus or class, quality, action and personal names (=samjñā). This division is based on the distinction in regard to things for the signification of which words are used-(pravstti-nimitta). : 'catustayī śabdānām pravsttiḥ. jāti-śabdāḥ. guna-sabdāḥ, kriyā-sabdāḥ, yadrcchāśabdāś caturthāḥ.” (M. Bh. I. i. 2.)--and also—“sabdānām arthe yā pravsttiḥ sā pravrtti-nimitta-bhedāt prakāra-cātustayavati iti arthah." (pradipodyoteNāgesah)-This division does not apply to things but to their adjuncts i.e. upādhis. Thus, for Patañjali, words signify these upādhis : 'upādhāv eva samketah.' We may note here that alamkārika Dandin has 'dravya' in place of yadrcchā śabda.' Jagadīša takes him to task because his classification is not extensive enough to comprehend such private terms as 'jada', 'mūka', 'mūrkha' and also words such as “anya', 'śünya', etc.—”
"sabdair eva pratīyante jāti-dravya-guna-kriyāḥ, cāturvidhyād amīņām tu
śabda uktah caturvidhah."and also, “tadetaj jada-mūka-mūrkhā'dīnām anya sūnyādīnām ca śabdānām aparigrahāpattyā parityaktam asmābhiḥ. – Sabda-śakti-prakāsikā, Jagadish; (kārikā 18).
Mīmāmsakas :- Both Jaimini and Sabara hold that the real import of a śabda is "ākrti” and not "vyakti.' Sabara says that 'ākrti' signifies the mere generality that

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA pervades all individuals belonging to a class, while 'vyakti' signifies individual, i.e. something which is possessed of certain characteristics which it possesses in common with none else.—"kā punarakrtih, kā vyaktir iti? dravya-gunakarmanām sāmānyamātram ākrtih. asādhārana-višesā vyaktih.”—(S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 30). The question is which of these is expressed by a word ? But the point is, why then should there be any doubt in this matter? Well, it is so, because on hearing the word 'go', we get the idea of generality, but when it comes to action, we find that it is related to the generality resting in an individual. The actual usage would seem to show that a word expresses both 'ākřti' and 'vyakti' in succession
- "kutah samśayah ? gaurit yukte sāmānya-pratyayāt vyaktau kriyasambandhāt.” -S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 30.
Sabara does not accept the vyaktivāda of the pūrvapaksa, which he considers fully under Mi. Sū. I. iii 30-32.-The pūrva-paksa is briefly as below :- The authenticity of the śāstra is unquestionable and we find some of the scriptures enjoining such acts as killing, sprinkling, and cutting with reference to some 'paśu'. Now, if by this 'pasu' only generality is meant, these acts which have been enjoined would be impossible. Again, it is not sound to argue that words should be generally taken to signify ‘āksti', but at times, in order to avoid 'ānarthakya-dosa' or, the fault of being not sensible, may be taken to signify 'vyakti' i.e. individual. For, this will take us to a position where we make the word express two senses-a position which cannot plausibly be allowed to stand. So, now, how do we account for the notion of generality that we get from a word ? The objector says that 'ākrti' is the mark i.e. 'cinha', or 'linga'—that leads the hearer on to the vyakti'. Just as the idea of a danda that we derive from hearing the word 'dandin,' only serves as a mark to perceive the man with ‘danda' or a stick, which alone is the real sense of the word 'dandin'-i.e. a man with a stick, similarly, the 'ākrti' which is conveyed by a word, is only the mark or 'linga' to perceive the vyakti, which must therefore be taken as the real sense expressed by a word.
Usage also seems to go against akrtivāda. We have such expressions as 'sad deyāh', and 'catur-vimsatir-deyāḥ', where numerals are used with reference to words like 'gāvah'. These seem to signify clearly that "vyaktis' are not 'ākrties. Āksti is only one and we cannot think of any numeral except one with reference to it. Again, the acceptance of ākřtivāda would lead to the futility of the "ārati-nidhiśāstra.' The substitution will be impossible if äkrti is accepted as the real import of a word like 'paśu.' For, the word 'anya', will have 'no sense, since any 'paśu' becomes the same and not 'anya', if 'akrti' i.e. paśutva, be the meaning of the word

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'pasu'. Now, every pasu is possessed of 'paśutva', so much so that no 'pasu' can be described as "anya.' To avoid this contingency, vyaktivāda has to be accepted.
:- "vyaktih padārthah iti. kutah ? prayoga-codanā'bhāvāt. ālambhanaproksana-viša-sanādīnām prayoga-codanā ākrtyarthena sambhaveyuḥ. atra uccāraņā'narthakyam, tatra vyaktyarthaḥ ato'nyatra āksti-vacana, iti cet. uktam anyāyaścā'nekārthatvam iti. katham sāmānyavagatir iti cet, vyakti-padārthakasya akrtis' cihnabhūtā bhavisyati, ya evam ākrtikah sa gaur iti. yathā yasya dando' sti sa dandīti, na ca danda-vacano dandi-sabdah. evam ihā'pi.” IS. B. on Mi. Sū. 30, pp. 296-301) and also,
"na tatra, dravyāśraya-vacanah sabdo bhaved vatha'krtih sabdārtho bhavet. sad deyāḥ, dvādaśa deyāḥ, catur-vimsatir deyāḥ iti. na hyākstiḥ sad-ādibhiḥ samkhyābhir yujyate. tasmāt na ākriti-vacanah." [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 32, pp. 301]
and also,
"yadi paśu-rūpākrtiḥ palāyeta anyam tad varņam tad dvaya-samālabheta iti. yathākrti-vacano śabdo bhaved anyasyā'lambho no'papadyeta anyasya api pasudravyasya saiväkṛtiḥ. tasmād vyaktivacana iti." [S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 32, pp. 302]
Śabara holds that vyaktivāda is unsatisfactory. Take, for example, the texts like "syenecitam cinvīta." Now, here, if the word 'śyena' is not ākstivācaka, how can one obey the said injunction ? For, what is needed for making a 'syena' is the 'sādrśya' i.e. similarity of the shape carved with bricks, with an actual 'śyena'. This similarity must naturally be with the form that is common to all śyenas i.e. with śyenatva jāti. Now, if the sādrśya is with reference to śyena-vyakti, then this will not be possible for all sacrificers of different times and places. How can all these meet with one and the same individual śyena simultaneously ? How can the earlier sacrificers have done it ? There again, cannot be a 'vyakti' or individual devoid of all sāmānyas and viśesas i.e. generalities and particularities. Thus, some vedic texts favour vyaktivāda, while others favour ākrtivāda. It is therefore, necessary to seek some more decisive grounds on which to solve this problem.—“ākrtih sabdārthah. kutah ? kriyā'rthatvāt. śyenecitam cinvīta iti vacanam akrtau sambhavati, yathākrtyarthah śyenaśabdah. vyaktivacane tu na cayanena śyenavyaktir utpādayitum sakyata ity aśakyavacanād anarthakaḥ. tasmād ākstivacanaḥ. [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 33). We come across such definite ground in the fact that the same word is used in respect of several individuals and this decides the point in favour of the ākrtivāda. The fact that one and the same word signifies more than one vyakti of the same class, suggests that it signifies something which is common to all. "ākrtih sabdā'rthah iti.

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
yadi vyaktiḥ śabdartho bhavet, vyakty antare na prayujyeta. atha vyakty antare prayujyate, na tarhi vyaktiḥ śabdā'rthaḥ. sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-vinimuktā hi vyaktir iti ucyate." [S. B. on Mĩ. Sū. I. iii. 33]. When the word 'go' is applied to other 'govyaktis, which are devoid of all 'sāmānya-viseṣa' according to the objector, then, in that case this absence of all 'sāmānya-viśeṣa' itself is the 'sāmānya' signified by the word 'go'. So, it is not safe to suggest that what is signified by a word everytime, is not the absence of sāmānya-viśeṣa but vyakti, which is but the aśraya i.e. substratum of all these. For then, the word 'go' will be applicable to aśva-vyakti as well, and not to go-vyaktis alone, since the former is a vyakti in the sense of the term as seen above.
"naisa doṣaḥ. vyaktyantare sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-vinirmukta eva pravartisyate. yadi vyaktantare sarva-sāmānya-viseṣa-viyukte pravartiṣyate, sāmānyam eva tarhi syāt. 'na' ity ucyate yo'hy arthaḥ sāmānyasya viśeṣāṇām ca āśrayaḥ, sā vyaktiḥ. vyakti-vacanaś ca śabdo na sāmānye na viseṣe vartate, teṣām tv āśrayam eva abhidadhāti. tena vyaktyantare vṛttir adoṣaḥ. na hi tatsāmānyam, yadi vyaktantareṣu api bhavati, sarva-sāmānya-viseṣa-viyuktāyām aśva-vyaktau gośabdaḥ kim iti na vartate ?" [S. B. on I. iii. 33., pp. 303.]
In order to avoid this contingency, one cannot argue that the word applies to only those vyaktis where its use is known by the abhiyuktas-the elite, for, in that case, the word could not be applied to a new born cow!-"aha. yesv eva prayogah drstas teṣu vartate, na sarvatra. na ca aśvavyaktau go-śabdasya prayoga drstah. tasmāt tatra na vartiṣyate. yadi yatra prayogaḥ drstaḥ tatra vṛittiḥ, adya jātāyām gavi prathama-prayogo na prāpnoti, tatra adṛṣṭatvāt.".
[S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii, 33, pp. 303]
And we see this actually happening in practice. If, for the sake of argument, the above view is accepted, then the class-perception will become impossible, as this or that vyakti for which 'samketa' is known by us by usage alone will be recognised as a 'go'-vyakti, but actually in practice we see that any 'go-vyakti', even one so far not seen by us also produces 'go-pratyaya' - i.e. apprehension of a cow in us. Thus, the view that the application of a word 'go' to go-vyakti depends on usage, has to be discarded. "sāmānya-pratyayaś ca na prāpnoti. iyam api gauḥ iti, iyam vā gaur iti syāt. bhavati ca sāmānya-pratyayo dṛṣṭa-pūrvāyām api go-vyaktau." "tasmān na prayoga'pekso 'go' sabdaḥ vyaktivacana iti śakyate āśrayitum."— [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 303].
Moreover, it can be held that a word may be applied to a vyakti which possesses a certain 'śakti' i.e. potency or power, for it is possible that this śakti may exist in

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161 all the vyaktis denoted by the word. Sakti by its very nature resides in some only. Thus, a word cannot denote vyakti which is without sakti. And that 'sakti' cannot be 'gotva', because to say that the word 'go' applies to that vyakti where 'gotva' is found to exist means that the idea of 'visista-vyakti' is accepted, and this means that apprehension i.e. pratīti of 'gotva-visista-vyakti.' But in such a cognition or apprehension, 'gotva,' the qualifying attribute, will be naturally perceived first, and this means that 'āksti' is the first import of a word.—"evam śakteh svabhāvah esah yat kasyāmcit vyaktau vartate kasyāmś cit na. 'agnih usnah', udakam 'śītam,' evam etad bhavisyati iti. naivam siddhyati, na hy etad gamyate kasyām cid vyaktau vartate kasyām cid na iti. satyam etat, gotvam laksanam bhavisyati iti. yatra gotvam tasyām vyaktāv iti evam tarhi viśistā vyaktih pratiyeta. yadi ca viśistam kecana pūrvataram višeșanam avagamyeta- na hyapratīte višesane viśistam kēcana pratyetum arhanti iti." (S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. pp. 304.]
Again, it should be noted that here, ākrti is signified by the word not in the fashion of a danda' or a stick which is a visesana and is conveyed by the word dandin.' For, such a position is totally unacceptable because if āksti is once admitted as the artha or meaning of a sabda, e.g. 'go', it must be supposed to have exhausted its abhidhā' in its expression. It is not necessary to extend the abhidhā to perceive the vyakti, for 'ākrti' is inevitably associated with vyakti, and due to this, by the perception of āksti, vyakti' is also perceived
"astu višesanatvena ākstim vaksyati, viśesyatvena vyaktim. na hi ākrtipadārthakasya vyaktirna padārtho, vyakti-padārthakasya vā nā"krtih. ubhayam ubhayasya padārthaḥ. kasyacit kimcit prādhānyena vivaksitam bhavati. tena atrā”krtirgunabhāvena, vyaktih pradhānabhāvena vivaksyate iti. -S. B. on I. iii. 33, pp. 304, and also,
- "naitad evam, ubhayor ucyamānayor guna-pradhānabhāvah syāt. yadi cā'tra ākrtih pratīyate śabdena tadā vyaktir api padārtha iti na śakyate vaditum. kutah ? ākrtir hi vyaktyā nitya-sambaddhā sambandhinyām ca tasyām avagatāyām sambandhyantaram avagamyate.”—S. B. on Mī. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 304.
So, it is needless to extend abhidhā to vyakti. Anvaya-vyatireka i.e. argument in presence and absence exists between sabda and 'āksti' and not between sabda and vyakti. For one who sees the akrti is invariably observed to see the vyakti also, even in the absence of a word. On the other hand, if through some mental disturbance, one is not able to perceive the akrti even on the word being uttered, it is not at all possible for him to perceive vyakti. This shows that for the observer, the perception or non-perception of vyakti depends on the perception or non-perception of akrti,

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA and that this has no connection whatsoever with the uttering or hearing of a sabda.-"tad etad ātma-pratyakṣam yad sabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratīyate iti. kim śabdad uta äkṛteḥ iti vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ. so'nvaya-vyatirekābhyam avagamyate, avabudhyetaivā'sau vyaktim. yas tūccarite'pi śabde mānasād upacārāt kadācid ākṛtim no❜palabheta, na jātucid asāv imām vyaktim avagacchet."-[S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 304]. Thus, on the strength of this anvaya-vyatireka relation between ākṛti and vyakti, it can be concluded that it is not necessary to extend the abhidhāśakti or power of expression of a word to vyakti.
Śabara holds that the idea of a vyakti-visiṣṭa-ākṛti is totally unacceptable for the simple reason that such an assumption would disqualify a word from being applicable to "vyaktyantara-viśista-akṛti." -"nanu vyaktiviśiṣṭāyām ākṛtau vartate. vyakti-visiṣṭāyām ced varteta vyaktyantara-viśiṣṭā na pratīyeta"-[S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 33. pp. 317]. Śabara also holds that primarily word signifies 'ākṛti', and 'vyakti' only by implication, and that it is immaterial for him whether ākṛti is conveyed by a word only as being subordinate to a vyakti or not. The question of the mutual relationship of ākṛti and vyakti does not fall within the province of sabda-sakti. It is decided on the strength of some other factor viz. the purpose in view for which the word is employed. If ākṛti is spoken of with reference to itself, it becomes principal or 'pradhana,' and if it is spoken of with reference to something else, it becomes subordinate i.e. 'gauna.' The word is incapable of deciding this. : "tasmācchabda ākṛti-pratyayasya nimittam. äkṛti-pratyayo vyakti-pratyayasya." [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. ii. 33, pp. 317] and also "nanu guṇībhūtā pratīyate iti uktam. na guṇabhāvo'smatpakṣasya badhakaḥ. sarvathā tāvat pratīyate. arthād guṇabhavaḥ pradhanabhāvo vā. svartham ced uccāryate, pradhanabhutā. atha na svārtham parārtham eva, tato guṇabhūtā. na tatra śabda-vyāpāro'sti." [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 33, pp. 317]. He says that the analogy of the word 'dandin' is also inapplicable, because the word 'dandin' is a composite word made up of two separate parts, while it is not so in case of 'gauḥ.' In case of 'gauḥ' we do not find two parts conveying 'ga-vyakti' and 'gotva' separately. Thus, Sabara holds that "akṛti-viśista-vyakti" is not tenable. Even in the case of 'dandin', the 'viseṣaṇa' viz. 'danda' must be cognised first or else 'viśista-kalpana' itself becomes impossible and this shows that the perception of the qualifying attribute must come first. Thus, if 'ākṛti' is perceived first, it should naturally be accepted as the real import of a word. Thus, according to Sabara, 'ākṛti' and not 'vyakti' is the real import of a word."— "nanu ca daṇdíiti na tāvat dandi-śabdena dando'bhidhīyate, atha dandaviśisto'vagamyate, evam ihā'pi na tāvad ākṛtih abhidhīyate. atha ca akṛti-visiṣṭā

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163 vyaktir gamyate iti, naitat sādhu ucyate. satyam, dandi-sabdena dando nā'bhidhiyate na tv apratīte dande dandi-pratyayo'sti. asti tu dandi-sabdasya ekadeśabhūto danda-sabdo yena dandah pratyāyitah. tasmāt sādhv etat yat pratite visesane višistaḥ pratīyate iti. na tu go-śabdā'vayavaḥ kaścid āksteh pratyāyakah anyo vyakteh, yata ucyate tata ākrtir avagatā, na go-śabda ākstivacana iti. na ca yathā dandi-sabdo dande na prayuktah, evam go-śabdo nàkrtau. tad artham eva nidaršitam kevalā”krty abhidhānaḥ syena-sabda iti. tad evam anvayavyatirekābhyām asati śyena-vyakti-sambandhe śyena-sabdoccāraṇād āksti-vacanaḥ iti gamyate. na tu vrīhyākrti-sambandham antarena, vrīhivyaktau sabdasya prayogo drstaḥ. tasmās āksti-vacanaḥ śabdaḥ iti etad jyāyah."- [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 33. pp. 317].
Again adds Sabara, the texts enjoying killing and such other acts, will not be rendered useless even on accepting 'āksti-vāda,' because "āksti' by implication conveys 'vyakti.' So, it can be shown that āksti-vacana words in such texts are used to mark out vyaktis which form the substratum of the acts enjoined by them. Thus, when in such cases, akrti conveys vyakti by implication, anarthakya is wiped out. Mi. Sū. I. iii. 35-tad ‘arthatvāt prayoga-vibhāgah.”—See, S. B. on this sūtra, pp. 319 "āksty arthatvāc chabdasya yasyā vyakterākrtya sambandhah tatra prayogah. proksanam hi dravyasya kartavyatayā śrūyate. katamasya ? yad yajati sādhanam; apūrva-prayuktatvāt tasya. nā”krteh. aśakyatvāt. tatra vrīhi-sabdah āksti-vacanah prayujyate, proksanāśraya-visesanāya. sa hi ākstim pratyāyayiśyati. ākrtih pratītā sati prokșanāśrayam virodhyati. tena ākrti-vacanam na virudhyate iti.”—
- In the same way, the objection on the score of numerals used in opposition to nouns can also be refuted by pointing out that even here, it is the number that is intended to be enjoined, and that the āksti-vacana sabda is used only as a qualifier (i.e. viśeşaka) only.- Similarly, the word 'anya' is used with reference to the substitute and is the āksti-vacana sabda—"evam sad deyā gāvo, daksinādravye samkhyāyāḥ prayoktavye gāva ityākrti-vacano višeksyati. [S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 35, pp. 319], and, "tathā anyam iti vinastasya pratinidher anyatvasambandhah, tatra pasu-sabdah akrti-vacanah akrtyā višeksyati iti."— [S. B. on Mī. Sū. iii. 35, pp. 319].
Thus, the Mimāmsakas hold that words like 'go', 'aśva,' etc. are expressive primarily of 'ākrti' or class and not vyakti or individual — "tasmād gaur-aśva ityevamādayah sabdah akrter abhidhāyakāh iti siddham." — S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. iii. 35. pp. 319).

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Different views as mentioned in the V. P. :
For the Mīmāmsakas, as seen above words signify genus or universal or class, and not 'vyakti' or individual. We come across a variety of views on this topic in the Vākyapadīya III. 2. - "vājapyāyanā"cārya-matena sārvatrikī jāti-padārthavyavasthā, upapadyate"; Helārāja on V. P. III. 2. "dravyā'bhidhānam vyādih," vārtika, under pānini I. ii. 64, and also “vyādimate tu sarva-sabdānām dravyam arthas tasyaiva sākṣāt kriyā samanvayopapatteh;" [Helārāja, on V. P. II. iii. 2.] Vājapyāyana's view concerning the import of words is in agreement with that of the Mīmāmsakas. But Vyādi does not agree with the same. The main argument in support of vyaktivāda is that as a positive element directly concerned with action, the individual should be considered as the proper significance of all words. Not the genus 'ghatatva,' but the individual ‘ghata' serves the purpose of fetching water. But this view is unacceptable on the face of it. The vyaktivāda is open to the fallacies of endlessness and vagueness-observes Mammaţa in the K. P. II—"yady api arthakriyā-kāritayā pravstti-nivịtti-yogyā vyaktir eva, tathā'pi ānantyād vyabhicārāc ca tatra sanketam kartum na yujyate.” Patañjali explains that according to Pāṇini both genus and individual are meant by words – “pāņini-darśane jāti-dravye sabdena abhidhīyete. — (Helārāja, on V. p. III. 2], and also, “kim punah akrtih padārthah āhosvit dravyam? ubhayam ity aha. katham jñāyate ? ubhayathā hy ācāryena sūtrāni pathitāni."-[M. bh. on I. 1, 1.).
Naiyāyikas :
The Naiyāyikas define padārtha in a very comprehensive way such as"vyaktyākrtijātayas tu padārthah"-Nyā. Sū. III. ii. 65. The Nyāyabhāsya suggests as follows. The class theory of the Mīmāmsakas is not a sufficient explanation by itself. A class, pure amd simple, i.e. as dissociated from individuals is far from being the significance of a word. The reason is that the very conception of a class invariably comprehends both the individual as well as the particular physical arrangement i.e. āksti, whereby the individual is distinguished from others. (Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 64). The vyaktivāda suffers from anavasthā (Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 60) because an individual without its correlation to a particular class is nowhere signified by a word—“na ca dravya-mātra-visistam jātyā vinā'bhidhīyate." (Vātsyāyana bhāsya, on Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 60). An unqualified individual is nowhere signified by a word. An individual related to its genus is signified by a sabda. But, even here, there are some difficulties. So, the Nyāya view holds that padārtha comprehends three elements viz. individual, its form and its genus or class; these three-which are connected with

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165 one another by inseparable relation or "avinābhāva-sambandha.” None of these is singly signified by a word. So, when we consider the import of a word, what we generally understand is an individual belonging to a particular class and possessing a certain physical form peculiar to itself. (Nyā. Sū. II. ii. 58).
The Navya-Nyāya practically maintains the same position. Neither the class or genus alone, nor the individual alone, but the individual conditional or qualified by the genus constitutes the significance of a word—“jātimān padārthah. Śaktir jātyākrtivisista-vyaktau viśrāmyati."-Muktavalī. The class therefore makes the cognition of an individual almost impossible.”—jātimātre hi samketāt vyakter mānam su-duşkaram" (sabdaśakti-prakāśikā]
So, it is more reasonable to restrict the samketa to the individual qualified by genus. The Navya-Nyāya holds that the addition of äkrti in the conception of padārtha is quite immaterial in view of the fact that there is an inseparable relation existing between an individual and its form. All individuals belonging to the same class have a particular configuration of their physical structure. Perhaps this led Patañjali to hold that a class is determined by 'krti' i.e. physical form.-"ākrtigrahanā jātih." M. bh. on Pā. IV. i. 63. Bhartphari's Vākyapadīya :
The discussion that follows is in the light of Dr. Kunjunni Raja's learned observations. The grammarian Bhartrhari discusses this topic in two sections, viz.
jāti-samuddeśa' and 'vyakti-samuddesa.' He discusses in greater details the various issues involved in this problem. He considers and presents in a logical way, all the different views on the topic and arrives at a position which can be regarded more as philosophical than grammatical. First, he takes up the class theory for discussion. A rigid adherence to this view makes us incapable of meeting the situation in which we find that jāti or class is nowhere found directly related to activity i.e. 'kriyā,' as signified by the main constituent of a sentence i.e. the verb. In 'gām ānaya,' kriyā or activity is connected with "kāraka' (case) and not with class i.e. 'gotva.' The jātivādis are divided in their way of dealing with this point. Some of them hold class or jāti as 'upalaksana' i.e. a characteristic mark of the power of signification (śaktyupalaksana). Others hold that jāti itself is signified by the force of implication-kesam cit sāhacaryena jātih sakyupalaksanam"-V. P. III. 3. The former view lays stress on association i.e. 'sāhacarya,' the latter on implication or tātparya,"iha kesām cit jātivādinām ekārtha-samavāyāt saktaiḥ pratipādane jātirūpalaksanam upāya iti matam. anyesām punas tātparyena jātir eva sabdena pratipădyate." - Helārāja, on V. P. III. 3.

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By association it is meant that a class comprises of a good many individuals that are naturally associated with the very idea of that class. The Indian philosophers thus recognise more than one kind of jāti, such as sva-jāti, śabdatva jāti, artha-jāti etc. Bhartṛhari says that every word, as a rule, first signifies a jāti, which is not only un-common i.e. a-sādhāraṇa, but also immediately connected with it, and then indicates the community of objects i.e. artha-jāti, by means of adhyāropa, i.e. transference.
"svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evā'bhidhiyate,

tato'rtha-jāti-rūpeṣu tad-adhyāropa-kalpanā."
V. P. III. 3.
Thus, e.g. the word 'gauḥ', gives the class like 'go-śabdatva' i.e. a class pertaining to all go-śabdas. Word in its own form 'śabda-svarūpa' implies this kind of 'jāti' which is characterised by the particular form of the word itself. This differs from the class known as "śabdatva" which inheres in all varieties of words and not confined to some specific group only.
-"svā ātmīyā go-śabdātmikā, na tu sakala-śabda-sādhāraṇī, śabdatvādiḥ"
How to bring 'sabda-jāti' and 'artha-jāti' into correlation is a problem. These are not at all convertible in terms of each other but on the contrary for all practical purposes, they remain distinct. As Helārāja observes, the meaning seems to be understood at once from the utterance of a word, because of the supposed identity of sabda and artha, but here also, succession of time actually intervenes between the two. :-"arthasya jhaṭity eva sabda-svarūpā'bhedena'vabodhepi yathā pratipādita-kramāśrayeṇa.”—Helārāja. Actually it so happens that word first gives the idea of its own class (=svajāti), and signifies the intended object only later on :-"svajāti-pratyayād anantaram artha-jātīnām gotvādīnāmātmasu tasyāḥ śabda-jāteḥ samāropasya kalpanā."-Helārāja. Through 'adhyāropa' or transference, they are made convertible in terms of each other. This sort of āropa becomes the cause of the apparent identity between sabda and artha. We resort to this same āropa when we try to discern the relation of a word with its meaning.
The jātivādis thus try to prove that jāti forms the meaning of words. For them, the proper names (samjñā-śabda) also have a class. This sounds rather strange. They also hold that one class can be included in another class. But this position is not philosophical :-"evam ca samjñā-śabdānām api jātivādi-mate jātiśabdatvam iti

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ekā eva śabdānām pravṛttiḥ"-Helārāja; on V. P. III. 2. and also, "jatya'bhidhāyino jätyādiśabdā api jātivācina eva."- Thus, go-tva is capable of having 'gotva-tva', and this is not easily conceivable. The considered opinion viz. "niḥ-sāmānyāni ⚫ sāmānyānīti"-a class cannot have another class,-is violated. This theory results in a number of misconceptions. Thus, for them, even quality and action are liable to be considered as 'jati' for the simple reason of their being signified by their corresponding words "tathā ca'nvayi-rūpeṇa guno'py abhidhīyamāno jātir-eva. evam kriyām apy abhedena abhidhīyamānā jātiḥ." -Helārāja. on V. P. III. 12.
For the dravya-vādins all that is signified by words is essentially the property pertaining to dravya
"dravya-dharmā padarthe tu dravye sarvartha isyate,
dravya-dharmāśrayad dravyam
ataḥ sarvartha isyate."-V. P. III. 130
167
So, quality, action, number, class and gender-all might be looked upon as inherent properties of matter.- "sabdaiḥ pratyāyamānāḥ guṇadayo daivyadharmāṇaḥ. sarvo'rtho dravya-rūpeṇa abhidhīyate"-Helārāja. There are certain common features between these two views. Whether the meaning is either jāti or 'dravya', we have got to resort to 'upacara' or 'adhyāropa' i.e. transference of sense
"tathā mamā'pi jātivādino mukhyām jātim abhidadhati kecit upacarati tām anya iti mata-dvaye'pi samyam.-Helārāja.-Just as for the jātivädin things other than jāti are also treated as such by the help of upacara, so also with the other one, quality, action, etc. have been taken up as properties of matter by upacara.

Bhartṛhari also suggests that the problem of 'padartha,' especially by the jātivāda, can be approached from an epistemological point of view also.-"idānīm vijñānavādena api padartha-vyavasthām āha."-Helārāja, (on V. P. III. 19). The meaning of a word is exactly the same as is connected by it. This is accepted by the Vijñānavādī. It is suggested that the use of words gives rise to a kind of intelligence with a definite form which generally corresponds to the object of experience.
What actually is known by us whenever we hear the sound 'gauh' is the particular form in which the individual makes its impression on the mind. A dravya (i.e. thing) is, according to this philosophy, not necessarily a material object, but an intellectual image or form only.
"anupravṛtti-rūpām yām prakhyātām ākṛtim viduḥ,

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kecid vyāvṛtti-rūpām tu
dravyatvena pracakṣate."-V. P. III. 19
A thing denoted by a word is more mental than material. What is primarily signified by a word is the sense that originates in the intellect (= buddharthasya vācyatvam), and the world of objects is only a copy of mental states (= antaḥkarana-dharmasya bhāgaḥ bahir avasthitaḥ) (V. P.)-For the vijñānavādin, the whole world of thought is just conceptual; all universals and individuals having their existence in the mind with or without correspondence to the material object perceived by our sense-organs "vijñāna-naye sarvaḥ eva pratyayatmakam angīkṛtam;"-V. P. "antaḥstha eva ayam sarvam, vyavahāro na vijñānavyatirikto bahyo'rtho'stīti"-śānkara-bhāṣya on Brahma Sutra, II. ii. 28. Thus, along with the utterance of a word, a definite intellectual image arises in the mind and it is that which one usually understands as the significance of words :
"śabdād uccaritat śabdākāravatī buddhir utpadyate, tad ākārasyaiva śabdā'rthatvam na buddheḥ."-Helārāja, on V. P. III. 19. Whether this image has or has not a corresponding embodiment in the world of realities is immaterial.
SAHṚDAYALOKA
-"sa hy ākāro bahyo'stu na vā, sabda-vacyatvasya na kācit kṣatiḥ"Helārāja;-whatever is signified by a word in the mind, may or may not have its objective equivalent. It is possible for us to picture before our mind a purely subjective world of concepts apart from the one we are familiar with. The yogācāra school of Buddhists actually does so. For them an external world of atoms apart from the internal knowledge, does not exist. The external world is a mere copy of mental impressions.
Bhartṛhari finally winds up the discussion with reference to Vedantic monism. The question of jāti and vyakti (i.e. universal and particular) could not stand before the all eliminating advaita- i.e. non-dualism of the vedantin. Although, there appears to be difference due to 'upadhis' or adjuncts, such as time, space, etc. yet all things having an ultimate common source are said to be one among themselves. -"nanu vastūnām deśa-kāla'di-nimitto bhedaḥ iti tad anādareṇa abhinnany eva tāni siddhāni iti

"bhinnā api paropādhir
abhinnā iti vā punaḥ, bhāvātmasu prapañco'yam
samsṛṣṭeşveva jāyate."-V. P. III. 20.

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169
Adhyāsa or superimposition is the cause of manifoldness which is only apparent. The difference of adjuncts makes for the distinction between class and individual. We fail to visualise a thing in its own real form. So, nothing separated from its adjunct-upādhi-is comprehended by us.-"nirupādhino vastuno'vyavahāryyatvāt sarva eva paropāśrayo vyavahāraḥ."-Helārāja.
So, observes Bhartrhari, that there is only one supreme thing beyond the limitations of time and space and possessing all activity by its very nature, and which is beyond division and distinction of any kind. -
"sarva-saktyā'tmabhūtatvam ekasyaiveti nirnayah, bhāvānām ātma-bhedasya
kalpanā syād anarthikā."-V. P. III. 22. Therefore, the categories or padārthas of the Vaiseșikas are not different objects of thought but they, in fact, stand for the various types of potency—or śakti — belonging to one and the same thing.--
"tasmād dravyāśrayāḥ sarvāḥ śaktayo bhinna-lakṣaṇāḥ, samsșştāḥ puruşārthasya
sādhika na tu kevalā."-V. P. III. 23. Thus, the division, into class and individual, of padārthas, is more formal or imaginary than real—"asmin mate sarvatraiva jāti-vyakti-pravibhāgah kalpitah”— Helārāja. And this division is not inconsistant with advaita-vāda. Bhartrhari says that the unreal and real elements in all the phenomenal entities, indicate respectively, class and individual
“satyàsatyau tu yau bhāvau pratibhāvam vyavasthitau, satyam yat tatra sā jātiḥ
asatyāḥ vyaktayaḥ smộtāḥ."-V. P. III. 32. Individuals are of short duration, of limited nature, and suffer distortions and mutations of various kinds. The class is such a reality whereof the essence or identity cannot be removed, and it remains above distortions and mutations of all types and its identity is absolutely unchanged, thus forming a life-giving essence of a thing as well as shining in its own form, detached from individuals.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "vikārā'pagame satyam suvarņam kundale yathā vikārā'pagame satyām
tām āhuḥ prakstim parām.” V. P. III. 33. We find in the Chāndogya Upanișad a saying, viz.—"vācārambhanam vicāro nāmadheyam mrttikety eva satyam." (VI. 4)—i.e. The earth is real, the modifications viz. ghata, pata, etc. are unreal. Patañjali gives the illustration- of gold and its modifications "suvarnam kayācid, ākstyā yuktam pindo bhavati. pindākrtim upamrdya rucakāh kriyante. äkrtir anyā ca anyā ca bhavati, dravyam punaḥ tad eva."-M. bh. I. i. 1.
Helārāja says that the āgamavid has identified jāti with the ultimate reality or premordial entity (i.e. parā-prakrti)—"antyā parā prakstiḥ satyā, sarvavikārā'nuyāyini praśānta-kallolā cid eka-ghanā brahma, iti āgamavidaḥ-Helārāja, on V. P. III. 32.
This parā-prakrti by itself is an eternal flow of pure consciousness undisturbed from outside. Thus, for the grammarian i.e. āgamika this is the Highest Being and it gives the loftiest idea of a class. This mahā-sattā or mahā-sāmānya permeates the entire universe and appears in different forms through all the individuals. This is the summum genus that is ultimately signified by all words, prātipadikas i.e. crude forms, verbal roots, and suffixes like tva, tal, etc. etc.
"sambandhi-bhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavā'dişu, jātir ity ucyate tasyām
sarve sabdāḥ vyavasthitāḥ.” V. P. III. 34. All words refer to this 'sattā.' It reveals itself, according to Vārsyāyaṇi in six forms
"saiva bhāva-vikāreșu
şad-avasthāḥ prapadyate” –V. P. III. 36. Thus, observes Helārāja, all activity is sattā-vivartai.e. revealation of 'sattā.' “samagraḥ kriyā-kalāpaḥ sattā-vivartaḥ”—Helārāja.
This jāti is eternal and indestructible. Vyādi and his followers who uphold the theory of dravya' i.e. the theory that words signify things and not class, also give a highly philosophical explanation. Under the Vārttika viz. "siddhe sabdā'rtha

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sambandhe” Patañjali shows how eternality can be attributed to dravya. It is this eternal dravya that constitutes the meaning of all words. 'Dravya' in its ultimate form is like 'brahma.' --
“tad eva brahma-rūpam satyam,
ātmaivedam satyam iti hi śṛtiḥ."-Helārāja. Bhartshari also takes dravya in a wider sense, when he gives the following synonyms in V. P. I-such as
"ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śariram tattvam ity api, dravya-nityasya paryāyāstacca nityam iti smệtam."
(drava-samuddeśa) V. P. Thus, whether the padā'rtha or significance of a word happens to be class or an individual, we are to believe that all that we feel and express is but manifestation of the eternal.
Buddhists :- The Buddhists advance the doctrine of 'apoha' in connection with the significance of words. 'Apoha' means the negation of the contrary. The Buddhists, especially the kşana-bhanga-vādins, refused to accept the eternality of any thing, either class or individual. So, a word does not signify either, as the reality of them is highly controvertial. As there is doubt about the existence of a constant thing like class, the class theory cannot stand. The same is the case with dravyavāda on the same ground of dravya being momentary.—“ksana-bhanga-vādinah sthira-sāmānyā'bhāvad ity arthah”-Udyota. So, the word signifies 'apoha' i.e. the act of distinguishing one thing or species from those that are distinct from it.
"atad-vyāvsittir-apohaḥ, padārtha iti
kşaņa-bhanga-vādinaḥ.”—Vistārikā. Thus, 'gauḥ necessarily implies, the differentiation of cow individuals from non-cows. i.e. atad-vyāvrttih. The Mimāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas refute this theory. (See śloka-vārtika).
Alamkārikas :- The writers on poetics follow the lead of the grammarians
-"eșueva vyakteh upādhișu samketaḥ grhyate, na vyaktau."-S. D. I. (=Sāhityadarpana).
They are interested in the implication of words which may be at times rendered

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striking, so as to lend some special charm to a given piece of literary composition. On the ground of this implication, words, are either vācaka or expressive or denotative, i.e. they express the same thing as is fixed by God's will—i.e. 'samketa', or words are lāksanika or having a secondary sense or implicit/metaphorical sense, or words are vyañjaka i.e. are suggesters, having the suggested sense.
-"syād vācakolāksanikah, sabdo'tra vyañjakas tridhā"-Kävyaprakāśa (=K.P.) I.
The meanings conveyed by these are called respectively 'vācya' i.e. directly expressed, or mukhya i.e. principal, laksya i.e. indicated or secondary and vyangya i.e. suggested. The ālamkārikas have inherited this thinking from their predecessors i.e. grammarians, and also the mīmāmsakas and naiyāyikas. Among the ālamkārikas, there are some who do not accept the vyañjanā-vyāpāra and the vyañgyā'rtha resulting therefrom. They instead try to explain away vyañjanā/vyañgyārtha, by either including it in abhidhā, tātparya or laksaņā. Or, still others postulate 'anumitivyāpāra' or poetic inference instead. We will deal with all these views later when we discuss the topic of sabda-vritties in the following chapters. But before that, it should be noted that the traditional threefold division of a word into vācaka, laksaka and vyañjaka, pertains more to the adjuncts than to the word itself."-atra upādhīnām eva tritvam, na tu upādheyānām."-Sārabodhini, comm. on the K. P.
The same word can be vācaka, laksaka, and vyañjaka as the case may be. The vyangyā'rtha, when it becomes the principal source of charm in poetry, is termed as 'dhvani' by the dhvanivādins. We will go to observe all this in greater details as and when required, but it may be noted for the present that this particular sakti or power of word called vyañjanā' or suggestive power or suggestion is nowhere else recognised as a sabda-vrtti accept in the field of poetry and there too by some ālamkārikas who go by the name of dhvanivādins only. So, for the present we may conclude that no system of Indian Philosophy, dealing with the problem of word and meaning in whatever context, seems to discuss and much less accept this vyañjanā-vyāpāra. To do justice to both the schools of dārśanikas on one hand and vyañjanā-vādins on the other, we may say that the philosophers had nothing to do with the poetic beauty of language and that they had to talk of the great questions concerning jīva or soul, jagat i.e. phenomenal creation, and īśvara i.e. God, and had therefore to confine themselves to the problems of the direct or at the most an indirect expressive power of words and had no business to deal with the poetic or beautiful or the aesthetic aspect of language i.e. suggestive use of words. So, according to

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Naiyāyika explanation it is, either unnecessary or it falls under the wider scope of lakṣaṇā i.e. indirect or secondary expression or deviation in general. It is only such later grammarians as Nāgeśa who strongly come out in support of vyañjanā. Actually Nāgeśa has emphasised the desirability of recognising vyañjanā as a wordpower even from the stand point of grammar also
"vaiyākaraṇānām api etat svīkāraḥ āvaśyakah”—Mañjusā pp. 160. The old school of logic held that the 'padārtha' is a trinity of objects viz. class, form and individual. So, accordingly, words, or more properly nouns are for them either (i) rūdha i.e. words with conventional meaning assigned to them, or (ii) laksaka, i.e. words with secondary signification, or (iii) yoga-rūdha i.e. words having both conventional and derivative or analytical meaning and (iv) yaugika' i.e. words possessing derivative or analytical meaning alone :
“rūdham ca lakṣakam caiva yoga-rūdham ca yaugikam, tat-caturdhā paraiḥ rūdhayaugikam manyate 'dhikam."
śabda-sakti-prakāśikā- pp. 16. (= śa. śa. pra.) Under (i) fall words such as 'gauh'. The characteristic feature of such words having fixed conventional meaning is that when such words are analysed into stems and suffixes, the analysis does not correspond to their popular or current meaning. The derivative or etymological sense does not count for much in such cases, e.g. the word 'gauh' means, 'that which goes,' when derived from the Vgam'to go.' Such words are termed as 'samjñā.'
"saiva samjñeti kīrtyate.” śa. śa. pra. In the expression viz. “gangāyām ghosah”-the word 'gangā' is an example of 'laksaka' type, for it yields, the
sense of 'gangã-tata' or the bank of the river Gangā,' in place of the flow i.e. 'jala-pravāha' of the particular river concerned. The yogarūdha' type is seen represented by such words as 'pankaja', having both the elements of convention when the meaning is taken as a lotus flower, and also derivation when taken as 'a substance born in mud,' i.e. mud+production+agent.
"(panka + jani + kartrtva)- yan nāma sàvayava-vrtti-labhyā'rthena samam svārthasyā’nvaya-bodha-krt, tan-nāma yogarūdham, yathā pankaja-krsna-sarpādharmādi.” (Śa. Śa. pra. pp. 26).
The sense derived from parts - i.e. avayavaśakti-has coincidence with what is conveyed by the same as a whole i.e. samudāya-sakti.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA -"yoga-rūdham tu pankajā'dipadam, avayava-vrttyā rūdhā'rtham eva,
aktyā ca avayava-labhyā'rtham eva anubhāvayati, na tv anyam.” —Śa. Śa. Pra.;. P. 27.
The yaugika words as such as; 'kāraka,' 'pācaka,' 'pāthaka,' etc. are signified by their component parts into which they can be grammatically analysed.
Some hold that there is a class such as "rūdha-yaugika” which is slightly similar to the 'yoga-rūdha' class. The illustration in this case is such as the word, "mandapa” having two meanings viz. a pendal or house taken as a whole, and also, "one who drinks gruel,” when etymologically explained. —
"mandapa-mahāravainādi kadācid avayavavrttyā yogā’rthameva, kadācit samudāyaśaktyā rūdhyartham eva abhidhatte." Sa. Sa. pra. pp. 27. – The difference between yogarūdhā and rūdha-yaugika class is that in the case of the former, the meanings indicated mutually correspond with each other, while in case of the latter, the meaning of the whole seems to be different from the meaning of the parts.
The use of certain words in the secondary sense is noticed by the Mimāņsakas, Naiyāyikas, and the Vaiyākaranas as well. Patañjali has explained the condition of lakṣaṇā. He has given various examples of lakṣaṇā under Pā. Sü. IV. i. 48.
"mancāh hasanti, gangāyām ghosah, yastīh praveśaya" - We will have an occasion to deal with all this in greater detail when we pick up the topics of abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, etc. individually, and also their special treatment by such great writers on poetics as Appayya Dīksita, and Jagannātha Pandita.
Etymologists i.e. the Nairuktas have a distinct method of classifying words. It is based not on the general meaning signified by the word, but on direct or indirect implication of action (i.e. kriyā) as seen in the word. Thus, with 'kriya' as the sole criterian, words are said to be three-fold such as (i) pratyaksa-vrtti i.e. words having the idea of action seen transparent, (ii) paroksa-vrtti i.e. words having ‘kriyā' at the base seen in a less transparent way, i.e. in which the underlying ‘kriyā is not easily perceptible, and (iii) 'ati-paroksa-vịtti' i.e. words having any' relation with whatsoever ‘kriya' underlying, almost evaporated, i.e. they are either without any kriyā at their base, or it requires a great effort on the part of a scholar to locate and correlate the element of kriya in them.-See Durga on Nirukta I. i.
"trividhā hi śabda-vyavasthā. pratyakşa-vịttayaḥ, paroksa-výttayaḥ ati-parokșa-vrttayaś ca.”—

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175 Accordingly, Durga attempts a three-fold explanation of the word 'nighantu' such as “nigamayitāraḥ, nigantavaḥ, nighantavaḥ."
We have tried to understand the great heritage in the field of word-senserelationship, as preserved in the writings of the great Mimāmsakas, Naiyāyikas, and Vaiyākaranas, and also philosophers belonging to other schools of thought such as the Buddhists. The writers on poetics, ālamkārikas inherited all these thoughtcurrents and we will go further to see how they developed this thinking almost to perfection, which could be an envy for modern western thinkers on topics of linguistics, or semantics in particular.
Before we start with what the literary aesthetes seem to have finally advocated, we will once again go for a short summary of the total heritage as indicated above.
We have seen that in ancient India there were great teachers such as Audumbarāyaṇa as mentioned by Yāska, who advocated the impermanancy - anityatva - of spoken word and supported its 'indriya-nityatva.' For them the sentence-unit stays alive in the sense organs or perspective faculty of the listeners thus rendering the scheme of the four-fold classification of words as totally redundant. People use words in daily parlour because of their universal applicability and their convenience due to simplicity. Bhartrhari refers to this view and says that Vārtāksa also held a similar view, that it is only the sentence that is regularly present in the mind of the hearer (V. P. II. 345-9). Among those who accept the eternality of word—the sabda-nityatva-vādin - some Naiyāyikas and Bhātta Mīmāmsakas opt for what we will go to discuss later as 'abhihitā’nvayavāda', and the Prābhākaras accept 'anvitā'bhidhāna-vāda.' These trends of thought will be taken up in fuller details later.
Dr. Raja observes that according to the 'akhanda-paksa' supported by Bhartrhari, the fundamental linguistic unit is a sentence, which is as a Gestalt whose parts are not relevant to it. Perhaps at the back of this thought current is the original inspiration derived from the view of Audumbarāyana quoted above, such
s—“indriya-nityam vacanam.” For Bhartshari, a sentence is—"eko’navayavah śabdah”-i. e. "a single integral symbol," revealed by individual letters and words that comprise it. Meaning is gathered through the agency of this vākya-sphota" - or the sentence considered as an indivisible and integral linguistic symbol. Meaning thus collected is an, "instantaneous flash of insight or intuition,” (= pratibhā)," and is also 'nir-avayava' i.e. partless. Words have no reality of their own and are only

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA of the form of hints that help the listener to collect the meaning. They have 'sattā' or existence only at the popular worldly level. We will go to see how ālamkārikas, with Anandavardhana perhaps taking the lead, derived their inspiration and strength for establishing 'vyañjanā' as an independent function or power of word, from Bharthari. Anandavardhana's vyañjanā touches the emotive as well as the socio-cultural significance of utterances, suggested with the help of contextual factors. On one hand the logicians and philosophers were satisfied only with that portion of the total meaning of an utterance which is absolutely precise and accurate, and which could be the subject of objective study, the poets, linguists and literary critics on the other hand went beyond this and did not choose to neglect vast areas of language behaviour as unreal and indescribable. We will go into this at a later stage.
Thinkers of ancient India have also considered the problem of change of meaning. The conditions for a metaphorical transfer of meaning, through laksanā, are discussed mainly from a sychronic point of view, observes Dr. K. Kunjunni Rajā—(Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 10). This is different from the Western study and only in what we call instances of 'nirudha laksaņā' or faded metaphor that a historical approach is visible. Dr. Raja observes that even etymology is not studied from a diachronic point of view.
The essential nature of a word lies in its power to render meaning i.e. in its significative power. This power or sakti is normally accepted to be, "Śaktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhah," i.e. the relation between a given word and its meaning. This follows the dictum as stated in, “Siddhānta-muktāvali” (pp. 265). The Laghu-mañjusā, pp. 28, puts it as, “pada-padā’rthayoḥ sambandhā’ntaram eva Śaktih; vācya-vācaka-svabhāvā'para-paryāyā.” (pp. 28). Thus sakti or power is that relation between word and meaning, by which the meaning is collected whenever the word is heard. As observed earlier, among the thought-currents prevailing with reference to the explanation of this relationship of word and meaning, two accepted by the Mīmāmsādarśana and the Nyāya-darśana are principal; the former opting for the 'natural' or 'autpattika' i.e. 'nitya' or eternal relationship, and the latter supporting the 'conventional-relationship. The Mīmāmsakas, as observed above, brush aside the idea of the relationship of word and meaning brought about or established a new, at a particular moment. For, according to them we cannot imagine a period of time in the history of human society, when language, in any form, was not current. We learn language through the agency of our parents who again learnt it from their parents and so on. So, what the Mīmāmsakas hold by

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177 eternality of the relationship of word and meaning is that it is impossible to trace the origin either to a person or an assembly of persons. This natural relationship of word and meaning is known as 'pravāha-nityatā' and, as observed by Dr. Raja, is different from the natural theory of Greek scholars (pp. 20, ibid, ft. n. 2) who believed that, in giving names to objects the primitive man was inspired by some "innate quality or psychological effect of the thing itself.” This of course, does not sound convincing to us. The grammarians agree with the Mīmāmsakas and also hold that this permanent relationship between a given word and meaning has to be understood from popular or worldly usage. We have referred to this view as explained by Kāryāyana and Patañjali on an earlier occasion.
The natural relationship between word and meaning has also been explained in terms of yogyatā' i.e. inherent capacity of words. The V. P. III. 3.29, as quoted above goes to observe that like sense-organs having an innate power to perceive objects of their sphere, words have the power to render particular meanings. Thus, any word has the natural capacity to express a particular meaning and this is restricted by convention.
"sarvā’kāra-paricchedyasakte'rthe vācake'pi vā, sarvākārā’rtha-vijñānasamarthe niyamah krtah."
ślokavārttika, Pratyaksa Section, V. 228. We have seen that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiseșikas accept the relationship between word and meaning to be conventional. Gautama suggests this when he observes at Nyā. Sū. II. i. 55 that, "sāmayikatvāt sabdā’rtha-sambandhapratyayasya," i.e. the cognition of the relation between word and meaning is through convention. The same view is supported by the Vaiseșikas as read in Vai. Sū. VII. 2. 20 : "sāmayikah sabdad artha-prayayah." The ancient Naiyāyikas (ref. Nyā. Sü. II. i. 55) and also the Vaiśesikas hold this conventional relation as being established by God's will. The Tarka-samgraha also supports this. But for the later Naīyāyikas it is not only God's will, but "icchāmātra," i.e. even human will can be an instrument to bring about this relationship. When the 'samketa' or conventional relation is established by the will of God, it is deemed as permanent and is termed as "abhidhā' or 'sakti,' but when it is impermanent and established by human agency, it is termed as 'paribhāsā.' This is observed by Jagadića in his Śabda-sakti prakāśikā, pp. 122. Bhartrhari also refers to this two-fold convention and calls them

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'ājānika' i.e. permanent and adhunika' or modern, fixed by experts of various disciplines. The first one is 'nitya' or 'abhidhā,' the latter is ‘paribhāsa'. In both these cases the relationship is direct. When the relation is deemed to be indirect we get a case of either lakṣaṇā or gauņi, in which the meaning is collected on the basis of the 'mukhyārtha' i.e. primary direct sense.
Thus for the Indian thinkers of all schools, a functional definition of meaning is accepted and thus 'vrtti' or 'function of a word is its relation to sense. This relation is also termed as 'power' i.e. 'sakti' residing in a word, which enables it to render a particular sense. For the Mīmāmsakas this power is a separate category i.e. 'padārtha,' but for the Naiyāyikas it is only conventional.
Eight factors are counted to explain how a meaning is gathered from a word. They are —Śakti-graha, vyākarana, upamāna, kośa, āpta-vākya, vākya-śesa, vivrti or explanation, and siddha-pada-sannidhya. Dr. Raja explains that Mathurānātha observes in Tattvā-cintāmaņi, p. 481
"Śaktigraham vākaraṇopamānakośāptavākyād vyavahārataś ca, vākyasya śeșād vivộter vadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddha-padasya vệddhāḥ.” The Mīmāmsakas, Naiyāyikas, and Vaiyākaraṇas differ on this or that factor. Prābhākaras pay special importance to vrddha-vyavahāra and Nāgeśa also calls this factor to be "sakti-grāhaka-siromanī," (ref. Laghumañjusā, pp. 64).
The Indian thinkers have also considered the problem of homonyms (=nānårtha). Are homonyms to be taken as the same word with different senses, or different words with different senses—is a problem that pins their attention. Punyarāja (on V. P. II. 252) calls them as 'one-word-theory' and 'many-wordstheory', i.e. Weka-sabda-darśana' and 'aneka-sabda-darśana' respectively. The Indian thinkers are primarily more concerned with the primary sense or ‘mukhyā'rtha' and not with the metaphorical meaning. Even Yāska and Pānini do not pay much attention to the latter. Of course, Yāska has suggested different etymologies for different senses derived from the same word, and this could be taken as a pointer to his approach. The author of uņādi sūtras has given a thought to multiple senses collected from the same word. Pānini does not refer, as noted above, to the metaphorical usages, but the explanation of the term “parimāna' in the sūtra II. iii 46, suggests that perhaps Pāṇini also thought of covering up the metaphorical usage under primary sense. Later laxicographers seem to accept 'one-word theory.'

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They use the terms 'nānā'rtha' and 'anekā'rtha' for homonyms. This suggests that they believed that one word can have more than one meaning. They also do not seem to follow the distinction between primary and secondary sense. In the works on Mimāmsā, we come across fuller discussion which seems to have influenced the alamkārikas. We feel that Udbhata seems to accept aneka-sabda-darśana.' Mammata also, later (K. P. IX. 84) seems to accept that actually in śleșa, the apparent one word is not one, but many. Some Naiyāyikas seem to hold ekatvapakṣa with reference to homonyms. For them words are classified in the four-fold way, viz. yaugika, rūdha, yoga-rūdha, and yaugika-rūdha or rūdha-yaugika. They feel that the last variety can be taken both as yaugika as well as rūdha.
The importance of contextual factors is accepted from early times, in determining the exact meaning of an expression. The Brhaddevatā II. 118, observes :
"arthāt prakarņāt lingāt aucityād deśakālatāḥ, mantreșv artha-vivekaḥ syād
itareșv iti ca sthitiḥ.”— Bharthari also supports this, and suggests that the meaning of an expression is determined not merely by its form, but by contextual factors also. He quotes the above list with a slight change, such as:
"samsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryam virodhitā arthaḥ prakaraṇam lingam, śabdasyā’nyasya sannidhiḥ, sāmarthyam auciti deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarā’dayaḥ arthasya anavacchede viśeșa-smộti-hetavah.”
(V. P. II. 317). Nāgeśa and alamkārikas such as Mammața, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha, quote this from Bhartrhari and discuss the same fully.
We have also noted above the differences among dārśanikas concerning the exact import of a word. For the Naiyāyikas, it is 'vyakti,' 'ākrti' and 'jāti', and for the navya-Naiyāyikas (see Sabdaśakti-prakāsikā, under V. 19), it is 'vyakti qualified by 'āksti' and 'jāti'. Some are jāti-viśista-vyakti-vādins, and rest are jātivādins. For
e abhidhā yields the conventional-sāmketika-meaning and the philosophers also have differences concerning the exact samketa.' This will be also taken up in greater details when we will go to discuss abhidhā.'

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA For the sāņkhyas and the navya-naiyāyikas, vyakti' is the only conventional meaning of a word.See Nyāya-sāra, II. ii. 59 and bhāsya thereon and also— Vivarana-prameha-samgraha p. 181; and Nyāyakośa, pp. 855 has, "vyaktau eva śaktih, na tu gotvādi jātāv api, iti navyā āhuḥ.” For the Jaina philosophers, the word 'gauh' has no convention with reference to 'go' the vyakti i.e. individual, but it refers to all creatures having a form similar to a cow. For the Mīmāņsakas, the classjāti'-is the samketa of the word 'gauḥ.' On the strength of this convention with reference to the 'go-jāti,' in practice, as an individual cow is involved, the meaning of 'go-vyakti' i.e. an individual cow is arrived at through 'āksepa' i.e. implication. This meaning is the result of the secondary function-i.e. laksanā-for them. Prabhākara and Murāri Mishra choose to collect the meaning concerning 'govyakti' i.e. an individual cow as implied only. The Vedāntins, though theoretically do not adhere to the distinction of 'jāti' i.e. class and 'vyākti' i.e. individual, from the highest point of view, also, from a practical point of view, accept this difference and admit, following the Mīmāmsakas, convention with reference to 'go-jāti.' They believe that either by savinābhāva' or by 'laksanā' the meaning of 'go-vyakti' or individual cow is arrived at.
For the Vaiyākaranas, Vyādi takes the meaning of a word to refer to vyakti' i.e. individual. Vājapyāyana recommends, after Mīmāmsakas, the samketa with reference to a class, or "jāti.' Patañjali informs us that for Pānini the convention is with reference to both a 'jāti' and a 'vyakti,' for Pānini I. ii. 58, caters to jātivāda and Pā. I. ii. 64, supports vyaktivāda.—Mahābhāsya, pp. 6.
-"kim punah akrtih padārthah, āhosvit dravyam, ubhayam iti āha. katham jñāyate? ubhayathā hi ācāryena sūtrāni prasthitāni."
-Helārāja also takes note of Pāṇini's acceptance of both 'jāti' and 'vyakti' as convention.
In Vākypadīya III, Jāti-samuddeśa and Vyakti-samuddeśa, Bhartrhari has also discussed a number of topics bearing relevance to this. We will go for a detailed discussion when we take up abhidhā, later. We will also alot more space there to 'apoha' of the Buddhists.
The ālamkārikas, as already observed earlier, normally choose to follow the lead of the grammarians and this line of thinking is also adopted by them when they discuss various sabda-vrttis. Anandavardhana in projecting the case of vyañjanā relies on the views of the grammarians with reference to 'spota'. Thus grammar is closest to poetics.

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-Śabda-vșttis, as seen in different schools of thought such as the
anas, mīmāmsakas, etc. :-Vaiyākaranas-Patañjali in his Mahābhāsya discusses the topics of 'mukhyā'rtha', i.e. primary meaning of a word, and ‘laksyā’rtha' i.e. secondary meaning of a word. He uses terms such as ‘abhidhāna' while discussing primary meaning. His thinking with reference to the 'guana' i.e. secondary meaning seems to have blossomed in the later concepts of gauna-vrtti and laksaņā-vrtti.
We come across, for a number of times such usages as 'gauna', 'mukhya,' abhidhātum,' abhidhānavat,' 'abhidhānā'rtha,' abhidhiyamāna,' etc. in the Mahābhāsya.
See, for example, Mahābhāsya on I. i. 15—"evam tarhi gauna-mukhyayoḥ mukhye kārya-sampratyayah-iti.; and also, I. iv. 108—"gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. tad yathā gaur anubandhyah, ajo'gnīsomīya iti na vāhiko’nubadhyate." etc. etc. and also, VIII. 3. 82,-'agneh
somāḥ.....gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratipattiḥ. tad yathā gaur anubandhyo......
'abhidhātum' occurs at II. iii. 1, -karoter utpadyamānah kto'navayavena sarvam karma abhidhatte, kata-sabdāt punah utpadyamānayā dvitīyayā yat kațastham karma tat sakyam abhidhātum, na hi karma-visesah.
‘abhidhīyamāna' occurs at II. ii. 24, 25 ... sāmānyā'bhidhāne hi višesā'nabhidhānam. sāmānye hy abhidhīyamāne višeso anabhihito bhavati. tatra avaśyam višesārthinā višeso 'nuproktavyah... etc. athavā vibhaktārtho'bhi-dhīyate etac cátra yuktam yo vibhaktyarthóbhidhīyate tatra hi sarvam paścāt padam vartate'syeti.... abhidhāvat-occurs at I. i. 58, I. iii. 153;
.... anadvāham udahāri yā tvam harasi śirasā kumbham bhag ini, sācīnam abhidhāvantam adrākṣīriti. yasya yatheștam abhisambandho bhavati. udahāri bhagini yā tvam kumbham harasi śirasā 'nadvāham sācīnam abhidhāvantam adrākṣīr iti. abhidhānatah -at, I. iii. 1; 6. prathamabhāvagrahanam ca. ||11||

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"prathama-bhāva-grahaņam ca kartavyam. prathamam yo bhāvam āheti. kutaḥ punaḥ prāthamyam ? kim śabdataḥ āhosvid arthataḥ ? kim cā’taḥ ? yadi sabdataḥ sanādīnām dhātusamkhyā na prāpnoti, putrīyati vastrīyati iti. atha arthatah ? siddhā sanādīnām dhātusamjñā sa eva tu doso bhāva-vacane tadartha-pratyayapratiședha iti. evam tarhi, naiva arthato nā'pi śabdataḥ. kim tarhi ? abhidhānataḥ. sumadhyame.
abhidhāne yaḥ prathama bhāvam āha.” VI. 3.46. ....pradhānato vā yato vrttih. VI.
atha vā gauna-mukhyayor mukhye kārya-sampratyayah. tad yathā gaur anubandhyo ajo'gnīsomīya iti vāhīko'nubadhyate."
abhidhāna-laksana—III. iii. 19; 7/146; a-kartari kārake ca samjñāyām. III. iii. 19. ati-prasanga iti ced abhidhāna-lakṣaṇatvāt
pratyayasya siddham 11311 atiprasanga iti cet tanna. kim kāranam ? abhidhāna-laksanatvāt pratyayasya siddham. abhidhāna-laksanāh krt-taddhitasamāsāḥ. anabhidhānān na bhavisyanti.
abhidhānavat and abhidheyavat at I. 2. 51, 15/227; lupi yuktavad avyakti-vacane. I. iii. 51. "anyatrābhidheya-vyakti-vacanabhāvāllupi yuktavad anudeśah." ||1|| anyatrăbhidheyavallinga-vacanāni bhavanti. kvāny atra?
luki. lavaṇaḥ sāpaḥ. lavaņā yavāgūḥ. lavanam śākam iti. anyatra abhidheyavad a-vyakti-vacanāni bhavanti. luki. ihāpi abhidheyaval linga-vacanāni prāpnuvanti. isyante ca. abhidhānavat syur iti, tat ca antarena yatnam na siddhyati iti lupi yuktavad anudesah. evam artham idam ucyate. asti prayojanam etat. kim tarhi iti .... etc.
abhidhānārtha.-II. i. 51; 13/395; ‘tad abhidadhatār'thottara-pada-samāhāre ca.” 2/1/51; abhidhānrtham tu 7

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abhidhānārtham tu samahara-grahanam. kartavyam. samāhārena abhidhānam yathā syāt taddhitārthena mā bhūd iti.... etc.
abhidhāya—V. iii. 74; V. vi. 424;
kutsite V. iii. 74. ... iha kutsitakah anukampitaka iti sva-sabdenoktatvāt tasyā'rthasya pratyayo na prāpnoti. naisa dosah. kutsitasya anukampāyām bhavisyaty anukampitasya kutsāyām. athavā
svārtham abhidhāya sabdo nirapekso dravyam āha samavetam. samavetasya ca vacane linga-vacana-vibhaktih ca. abhidhāya tān viśesān apeksamānaś ca, krtsnam ātmānam, priya-krtnādișu punaḥ pravartate'sau vibhaktyantaḥ.”......etc.
abhidhāna — I. i. 69; 1/178; aņudit savarnasya cā'pratyayaḥ. I. ii. 69.
abhidhānāt pratyayaḥ savarṇān na grahisyati. yān hi pratyayaḥ sarvagrahanena gļhnīyāt na tair arthasya abhidhānam syāt. anabhidhānān na bhavisyati. etc. I. ii. 60, 6/231;
phalgunī-prostha-padānām ca nakșatre.
I. ii. 60; phalgunī-samīpagate cadramasi phalgunī-sabdo vartate. bahavas te'rthās tatra yuktam bahuvacanam. yadā tayor eva abhidhānam tadā dvi-vacanam bhavisyati.
I. ii. 64; 18.21, 233 "sarūpānāmekaśesa eka-vibhaktau." I. ii. 64;
pratyartham sabda-niveśān naikenānekasya abhidhānam. ||1|| pratyartham śabdāh abhinivisante. kim idam pratyartham iti. artham artham prati pratyartham. pratyartham sabda-niveśād etasmāt kāraṇāt na ekena śabdena anekasyā'rthasya abhidhānam prāpnoti. tatra ko dosah ... .etc.
also, lines 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 22/pp. 241—*
....... nanu coktam pratyartham iti. yadi caikena śabdena anekasyā'rthasyā'bhidhānam syān na pratyartham sabda-niveśah kệtah syāt.
pratyartham sabda-niveśād ekena anekasya abhidhānād apratyartham iti cet tadapi pratyartham eva.||30|| pratyartham sabda-niveśād ekena anekasya abhidhānād a-pratyartham iticed evam ucyate-yad apyekena anekasya abhidhānam bhavati tad api pratyartham eva. yāvatām abhidhänam tävatām prayogo nyāyyah. yāvatām arthānām abhidhānam sa bhavati tāvatām sabdānām prayoga ity eva pakso nyāyyah.
* All references to the Mbh. are to the Edn.-Keilhorn. Vol. I, II & III BSS. 1906.

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yāvatām abhidhānam tāvatām prayoga nyāyya iti ced ekena api anekasya abhidhānam. ||1|| yāvatāmabhidhānam tāvatām prayoga nyāyya iti ced evam ucyate. eṣo'pi nyāyya eva yada ekena anekasya abhidhānam bhavati. yadi tarhi ekena anekasya'pyabhidhānam bhavati plakṣa-nyagrodhau ekena uktatvāt aparasya prayogo'nupapannaḥ.... etc. See also, 1, 2, 3, 5, 79/pp. 242;
184
ekena uktavād aparasya prayogo'nupapanna iti ced anuktaḥ plakṣena nyagrodhartha iti kṛtvā nyagrodha-sabdaḥ prayujyate. katham anukto yāvatedānīm evaoktam ekena api anekasya abhidhānam bhavatīti. sarūpāṇām ekena api anekasya abhidhānam bhavati, na virūpāṇām. abhidhānam punaḥ svābhāvikam. ||33||
svābhāvikam abhidhānam.
ubhaya-darśanāc ca. ||38||
ubhayam khalvapi dṛsyate. virūpāṇām api ekena anekasya abhidhānam bhavati. tad yathā-dyāvā ha kṣāmā. dyāvā cid asmai pṛthivi namete, iti. virūpāṇām kila nāma ekena anekasya abhidhānam syāt kim punaḥ sarūpāṇām.
also, at I. iii. 1.; 6/258;
bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ. I. iii. 1; prathamāva-grahṇam ca. ||11||.... etc. etc., see above; abhidhānataḥ....; again at I. iv. 51; 8/335; kathite' bhihite tva-vidhistvamatir guna-karmaṇi lādi-vidhiḥ sapare. kathite lādibhir abhihite tva-vidhir-eşa bhavati, kim idam tvavidhir iti....etc.
again, 2. 1. 1. 7/363;
samkhyā-viseṣo vyaktābhidhānam upasarjana-viseṣaṇam ca yoga. athaitasmin nekārtībhāva-kṛte viseṣe kim svābhāvikam śabdair arthábhidhānam āhosvid vācanikam...etc.
again, 3. 1. 17. 18/12; dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samāna-kartṛkādicchāyām vā. III. i. 7; anabhidhānād vā. ||5||
athavā anabhidhānāt subantād utpattir na bhavisyati....etc.
again, II. i. 36; 2/389; -artha śabdo'yam pumllinga uttara-padarthapradhānaśca, tat-purusastena pumllingasyaiva samāsasyā'bhidhānam syāt, strīnapumsaka-lingasya na syāt; etc. etc.
II. i. 51, 13/395-taddhitārthottara-pada-samāhāre ca. II. i. 51, see, abhidhānārtham, above;
II. i. 69; 24/403; -karma-dhāraya-prakṛti-bhir-matvartham caiva abhidhānam syat... etc. II. i. 67, line 10, 10, 15/ p. 404 -evam api yady atra kadācit

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karmadhārayo bhavati karmadhāraya-prakrti-bhir matvarthīyair abhidhānam prāpnoti. —sarvaścā'yam eva artho gatnataḥ karmadhāraya-prakstibhir matvarthiyair abhidhānam mā bhūd iti... etc. tatra karmadhāraya-prakstibhir matvarthiyair abhidhānam astu, bahuvrīhineti bahuvrihinā bhavisyati laghutvāt....etc.
II. ii. 24. - 18/421; - padārthā'bhidhāne'nuprayogā'nupapattir abhihitatvāt 11411. padārthasya abhidhāne'nuprayogasya anupapattiḥ chitragur devadatta iti. kim kāranam ? abhihitatvāt. citragu-sabdena abhihitah so'rthaḥ iti krtvā'nuprayoga na prāpnoti.
II. ii. 24: 13. 15/424 — na vā'nabhidhānād asamānādhikaranesu samjñābhāvah ||16|taccā'vaśyam anabhidhānamāśrayitatvam. kriyamāne'pi vai pariganane yatrābhidhānam nāsti na bhavati tatra bahuvrīhih. tad yathā pañca bhuktavanto'syeti. athaitasmin satyabhidhāne yadi vịtti-parigananam kriyate vartiparigananam api kartavyam. tat katham kartavyam? .... etc.
II. ii. 29. 23/432; - plaksasya nyagrodhatvān nyagrodhasya plaksatvāt svaśabdena abhidhānam bhavisyati.
again at II. ii. 29, 25/433— "abhidhānam punaḥ svābhāvikam ||15||. svābhāvikam abhidhānam....etc. and II. iii. 1, 12-13/442 — na vā'nyatarenā'-nabhi dhānāt. 11811.
na vaisa dosah. kim kāranam ? anya-tarenā'nabhidhānāt. anyatarenā'trā'nabhidhānam. sadi-pratyayenābhidhānam asipratyayena anabhidhānam. yato'nabhidhānam tadāśrayā saptami bhavisyati. kuto na khalvetat satya-abhidhāne ca'nabhidhane cā'nabhihitāśrayā-saptami bhavisyati na punar abhihitāśrayah pratisedha iti.
anibhihite hi vidhānam.1911 anabhihite hi saptami vidhiyate. nā'bhihite pratisedhah....kim punah dravyam sādhanam āhosvit gunah kim cā'tah yadi dravyam sādhanam naitad anyad bhavaty abhihitāt. atha hi guna sādhanam bhavaty etad anyad abhihitāt.....etc. II. iii. 5; 14/445 -kālādhvanor atyantasamyoge II. iii. 5. lādibhir abhidhānam yathā syāt .... etc.
III. i. 7 18/12, see above.
III. i. 7. 13/13; 11/15 - a-karmano hyasamāna-kartrkād vā'nabhidhānam. 11711. icchāyām abhidheyāyām san vidhīyate na cākarmaņo'samāna-kartěkād votpadyamānena sanecchayā abhidhānam syāt. anabhidhānāt tata utpattir na bhavisyati.
.... sarvasya vā cetanāvatvāt ||15||

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA evam api isyate grāmo gantum iti parasādhana utpadyamānena lena grāmasya abhidhanam na prāpnoti.
III. i. 22, 9-11/29. ekāj-jhalādigrahane ca. 1|2|| yatraikāco halādiścotpadyamānena yangarthasya abhidhānam bhavati, na bhavati tatrotpattih. .....etc. ....yatra cā'nekāco halādevotpadyamānena yangarthasya abhidhānam bhavati bhavati tatrotpattih.... etc.
III. i. 26, 22/31 - iha tarhi pācayatyodanam devadatto yajñadattenety ubhayoh kartror lenābhidhānam prāpnoti. pratyayārtha-višesane punah sati na dosah. pradhāna-kartari lādayo bhavantiti pradhānakartā lenābhidhīyate yaścātrāpradhānam siddhā tatra kartarītyeva třitīyā.....etc.
IIII. i. 67, 1/1/3/9/58—kim ucyate krtābhihita iti na lenā'pyabhidhānam bhavati, asakyam lenā'bhidhānam āśrayitum....yadi ca lenā'pyabhidhānam syan
dam vaktum lena'pyabhidhānam bhavati ti. bhavati ced abhihite vikaranābhāva ity eva.....etc.
again at III. iv. 26., 13-18/174... nanu ca bhuji-pratyayena anabhihitaḥ kartā iti krtvā anabhihitāśrayo vidhir bhavisyati trtīyā. yadi saty abhidhāne cā'nabhidhāne ca kutścid anabhidhānam iti krtvā anabhihitāśrayo vidhir bhavisyati trtīyā yavāgvām dvitīyā prāpnoti. kim kāraṇam ? na-mūlānabhihitam karmeti.... etc. etc. pp. 175;... yadi satyabhidhāne tu kutścid anabhidhānam iti krtvā'nabhihitāśrayo vidhir bhavisyati trtīyā yadukta-modane dvitīyā prāpnotīti sa iha doso na jāyate.....
IV. i. 48; 6/218-siddham tu striyāh pum-sabdenā'bhidhānāt. siddham etat. katham ? striyāh pumśabdenà bhidhānāt, strī-pumśabdenàkārāntenā'bhidhīyate.
IV. i. 91, 14/15/; 246; apatyābhidhāne strī-pumllingasyā'prasiddhirnapumsakatvāt ||4|||
apatyàbhidhāne strī-pumllingasyā’prasiddhiḥ. kim kāraṇam ? napumsakalingatvät. apatyam napumsaka-lingam tena napumsaka-lingasya eva abhidhānam syāt, strī-pum-lingasya na syāt. nanu cedam purastād eva coditam parihrtam ca. utpattis tatra codyata iha punar utpannena abhidhānam codyate.
IV. i. 93; 5/248; - utpadayitari cā'patyayukte striyā yuktyā abhidhānam na prāpnoti.
14/249-evam api striyā yuvatyā abhidhānam na prāpnoti....
25/250; - kriyamāne'pi hi samjñākāri-grahane yatra jātyādibhya utpadyamānena pratyayena arthasya abhidhānam bhavati, bhavati tattvotpattiḥ ....
etc.

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IV. ii. 1.; 5/271; raktādīnām arthābhidhāne pratyaya-vidhānād upadhy ānarthakyam. ||1|| raktādīnām arthābhidhāne pratyavidhānād upādhigrahanam anarthakam. na hy arāgād utpadyamānena pratyayena arthasya abhidhānam syāt. anabhidhānā'ntataḥ utpattir na bhavisyati.
IV. iii. 25; 13/307 ... kasmān na bhavati tatrāste tatra sete iti. anabhidhānāt. tac cāvaśyam anabhidhānam āśrayitavyam. kriyamānesv api hy artha-nirdeśesu yatra jātādiņu utpadyamānena prayatnena arthasya abhidhānam na bhavati, na bhavati tatra pratyayotpattiḥ.
also at — IV. iii. 155; 3-6/325; IV. iv. 76, 14/333; V. i. 59; 24/355; and VIII. i. 4; 4.4/365-in the same sense.
But apart from this, in the Mbh. we neither come across any direct mention by name of abhidhā, gauni, laksanā and vyañjanā, nor any attempted definition of any of these functions. With reference to the discussion on 'gauņārtha' i.e. secondary sense, Patañjali mentions four contexts which we may term as four-fold 'tadyoga'; e.g. "tātsthya” or 'sthānādi' -sambandha, tāddharmyasambandha, or relation based on 'samāna-dharma' i.e. common qualities, then 'sāmīpya-sambandha' and 'sāhacarya-sambandha.' See Mbh. on Pā. IV. i. 48.
: Pā. IV. i. 48 is "pumyogādākhyāyām." siddham tu striyāḥ pumśabdana abhidhānāt ||3|||
....athavā punar astu tasy edame ity anena abhisambandhena. nanu coktam pumyogādākhyāyām tadighatalugvacanamiti. naisa dosaḥ. nāvaśyam ayam evábhisambandho bhavati tasyedam iti. ayam apy abhisambandho'sti sóyam iti. katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati.
tātsthyāt tāddharmyāt sāmīpyāt sāhacaryād iti. tātsthyāt tāvat, mañcā hasanti. girir dahyate. tāddharmyāt jatinam yāntam brahmadatta ityāha. brahmadatte yāni kāryāņi jaținy api tāni kriyanta ity ato jațī brahmadatta ity ucyate. tatsāmīpyāt, gangāyām ghosah. kūpe garga-kulam. tatsāhacaryāt, kuntān praveśaya-, 'yastih praveśaya' iti.
Thus we see that four-fold 'tadyoga' i.e. the relation of location or tātsthya, the relation of substance and quality or function i.e. tād-dharmya, proximity or sāmīpya, and sāhacarya or being together-are mentioned under Pā. IV. i. 48. Thus we find terms such as 'abhidhāna' etc. as used by Patañjali and such usages pave the way for the conception of "abhidhāvrtti.' Abhidhā in its shadow is thus seen under such names as abhidhāna or mukhyārtha, in the Mbh. and material for later vrttis of gaunī and laksanā is also read in the Mbh. The basic material for the

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concept of gauni lies in the sādhāranya relation as noted above, and that for laksanā in other relations such as tātsthya, sāmīpya, etc., which led to the secondary sense. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gaunī and laksanā.
* Nyāyakośa; —śakti-laksaņābhyām atiriktā eva gaunī vrttiriti mīmāmsakāh. sāca tad atiriktā na iti naiyāyikāh āhuh-(Nyāya-siddhāntamañjari-prakāśa).
When we come to the later grammarian of repute, i.e. Bhartrhari, we find material which could prove to be the source for the later concept of vyañjanā.
Bhartshari, the author of V. P. (=Vākyapadīya), as seen by us, has divided śabdā'rtha into gauna and mukhya and has shown two-fold upacāra (i.e. imposition) with reference to śabda and artha. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e.g. the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and vāhīka', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accident meaning.-see V. P.-II. 252;
"ekam āhur anekā’rtham śabdam anye parokşakāḥ, nimitta-bhedād ekasya
sārvārthyam tasya bhidyate.”— See also, Punyarāja—tatra ekaśabda-darśane śabdopacāraḥ prasiddhy asiddhinimittakaḥ.
A word does not express more than one meaning at a time - "yaugapadyam atikramya paryāye vyavatisthate."-(V. P.). The other meanings that are not mukhyārtha, are to be comprehended by either context, (or prakarana), or connection with some other words (yogāt, sabdāntarena vā).- "arthaprakaranābhyām vā yogat sabdāntarena vā."-V. P. II. Bhartrhari holds that the word go which denotes go-vyakti is also applied to vāhika' on account of his sādharmya with 'go'— "yathā sāsnādimān pindo go-śabdenā'bhidhīyate, tathā sa eva go-śabdo vāhike’pi vyavasthitah.” — V. P. II.
Bhartrhari observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes 'gauna' and 'mukhya,'—"prasiddhi-bhedāt gaunatyam mukhyatyam copapadyate."-(V. P. II). As explained by Punyarāja on V. P. II. 256, the ‘artha' is two-fold viz. 'svarūpa' and 'bāhya.' Svarūpa is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'go-tva' of the word 'go.' The 'bāhya' is that which is indicated by 'upacāra' e.g. when vāhīka is said to be 'go.'--Punyarāja says:

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"arthaḥ śabdasya dvividhaḥ; svarūpam bahyaśca. tatra nimittad jāḍyāder gotvam vāhīke'py anuṣajyate, śabdas tu go-tvameva'bhidhatte iti bāhyārthopacāraḥ."Thus far, Bhartṛhari gives basis for abhidhā, gauņi and lakṣaṇā, almost on the lines of the Mbh.
Over and above this, Bhartṛhari discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i.e. a word having multiple sense. Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having multiple senses, all of which are mukhyārthas. In his view, the particular meaning out of several possible, is determined by factors such as context, time, place etc. In this connection, he cites V. P. II. 316 and 317, 318.
-V. P. II. 316-318;
vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād
aucityād deṣa-kālataḥ
śabdarthāḥ pravibhajyante
na rūpād eva kevalāt."—V. P. II. 316
samyogo viprayogaś ca sahacaryam virodhitā
arthaḥ prakaranam lingam sabdasya'nyasya sannidhiḥ, sāmarthyam auciti deṣaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svaradayaḥ
śabdarthasya anavacchede viseṣa-smṛtihetavaḥ" (V. P. II.317-18)
Here, we may ask as to what is it that fixes the particular meaning of a given word and debars other multiple sense which it has by convention and usage ? To Bhartṛhari, this question does not seem to have occurred. For him, samsarga or conjunction and the like limit the word to one mukhyārtha or primary sense. But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional sabda-vṛtti, over and above abhidhā, gauņī and lakṣaṇā. In this, we may see the inspiration for the recognition of a separate and independent vyañjana-vṛtti. This is supported by the fact that later writers on alamkāra such as Mammata, Viśvanatha and others mention these very verses (i. e. V. P. II. 317-318) as authority for their theory of 'abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā.' For Punyarāja these verses contain the views of others and not Bhartṛhari. Jagannatha also does not read abhidhāmūla vyañjanā here.
Among later grammarians Nāgeśa (cir. 18th Cen. A. D.) was the first to recommend the case of vyañjanā. He apparently follows the lead of the ālamkarikas in this respect and repeats the same arguments.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Nāgeśa holds that in certain cases, after 'mukhyārtha' or principal sense is collected, or, after ‘mukhyārtha-bādha' or when the mukhyārtha is negated, as the case may be, a further sense is to be seen. This artha is either 'prasiddha' i.e. known or 'a-prasiddha' i.e. unknown, and is either related to the mukhyārtha or is unrelated to it. This sort of meaning is flashed upon the mind through what is termed as vyañjanā-sakti. -Nāgeśa notes :- “mukhyārtha-sambaddha-asambaddha sādhāraṇa-mukhyārthabādha-grahādi-prayojya-prasiddha-apra siddhā'rtha-visayaka-dhi-janakatvam vyañjanā.”
Thus, Nāgeśa holds vyañjanā to be abhidhāmūlā and laksanā-mūlā. This vyañjanā rests on śabda, artha, pada, padaikadeśa, varna, recanā and cestādi. When a woman casts a glance of her eye, with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested (i.e. by cestā).
This apprehension is supported by experience-i.e. it is "anubhava-siddha." So, even in ‘cestā,' vyañjanā can be seen.-* Nāgeśa observes : "anayā katāksena abhilaso vyañjitaḥ, iti sarva-jana-siddheḥ, tasyām cestā-vșttitvasya api āvaśyakatvāc ca."
Vyañjakatva lies both in padas and arthādi. That vyañjanā wherein arthàdi are suggested, rests on, "vakr-boddhavya-ādi-vaiśistya-jñāna,” or the knowledge of the speciality of a speaker, listener, etc. The pratibhā or the genius of the hearer acts as an accessory i.e. 'sahakāri' kārana.-Nāgeśa observes : "anayā cā'rthabodhe jananīye vaktr-boddhavya-vācya-vaiśistya-jñānam, pratibhā ca sahakāri tad-dhijanaka-jñāna-janakam eva vā.”—
In the absence of pratibhā or the genius of the hearer, there is absence of the apprehension of the suggested sense. By pratibhā is meant the "nava-navonmesaśālini buddhih." This nava-navonmesa is due to impressions carried from the past birth i.e. pūrva-janma-samskāras. So, for Nāgeśa pratibhā is that factor which accompanied by prakarana-jñāna in form of the speciality of the speaker etc., makes for the apprehension of suggested sense. * "vaktr-ādi vaisistya-sahakārena tajjanikā buddhiḥ pratibhā iti phalitam."
This vyañjanā is held to be connected even with the previous life. Nāgesa observes: "evam ca saktir etajjanma-grhītaivārtha-bodhikā, vyañjanā tu janmāntara-gphītā api, iti api sakteḥ asyāḥ bhedakam.
In the case of gatośtam arkah, when we desire different meanings, the mukhyārtha i.e. primary meaning viz. that, the sun has set is never contradicted -

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(badhita). So, the other meaning is not gathered through lakṣaṇā. So, vyañjanā is not to be included in lakṣaṇā. Nāgeśa observes: evam gatostam arkaḥ ityādeḥ śisyena sandhyā-vandanādeḥ kartavyatvābhiprāyeṇa, gurum prati prayuktatvāt vaktṛi-tātparyābhāve'pi prativeśyādīnām abhisaraṇīya-kramādi-bodhasya vacyārtha-pratīti-pūrvakasya vācyārtha-badha-jñāne ajāyamānasya lakṣaṇayā upapādayitum aśakyatvāt ca.
The nipātas and upasargas also are suggestors as are the padas. The sphota is always 'vyangya' i.e. suggested and is described as such in the works of grammar. Bhatṛhari also takes sphota to be 'vyangya'. Thus Nāgeśa considers vyañjanā to be useful even for the grammarians: Vaiyākaraṇānām api etat-svīkāraḥ āvaśyakaḥ.
After going through Nageśa's views carefully it may be noted that Nageśa was clearly under the influence of the ālamkārikas in this respect, he being himself a commentator on the Rasagangadhara of Jagannātha. So, historically speaking, Nāgesa's acceptance of vyañjanā should not take us very far in considering the stance of the Vaiyākaraṇas. Actually, even Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also seem to have interpreted the earlier thinking on 'sphota' by the grammarians to their advantage only. As Prof. K. V. Abhyankar had told us while taking the vivavoce for our Ph. D. thesis, there is a difference between sphota-manifestation and suggestion of the ālamkarikas. Manifestation and suggestion can not be taken as absolutely congruent ideas. But we can also say in defence of Anandavardhana and Abhinava-gupta that we can always give a benefit of doubt to their interpretation and application of sphota theory to dhvani-vyañjanā-theory. For, to be very frank, neither the earlier Vaiyākaraṇas such as Pānini or Patañjali, not to mention Bhartṛhari, nor even, the earlier Mīmāmsakas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Bauddhas and Jainas i.e. all ancient dārśanikas, had any business to talk, much less to think in detail, about vyangya artha i.e. suggested sense or vyañjana i.e. the suggestive power of a word, to be considered only with reference to poetry alone and certainly never with reference to the śastras or literature of various disciplines which had business, first and last, about the injunctions they contained in direct primary sense. As we go to see that for the Mīmāmsakas lakṣaṇā or secondary function is a dosa-to be avoided as far as possible. Śastra-vacana has to be direct and clear in its meaning, while ambiguity seems to be the soul in poetry. Naturally therefore, earlier thinkers, while treating their respective śāstra, dealt with word and sense, the import of words and the relation between word and sense, only from the direct view point of language and never concerned themselves with the

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problem of poetic deviations and suggestion seen in literature. This does not mean, and should not mean, that while considering poetic use of language, they would have opposed vyañjana and vyangyārtha. At least we can not say so on oath, for Pāṇini, as a poet and writer of mahākāvyas such as Pātāla-vijaya quoted by Anandavardhana must be fairly acquainted with the poetic use of language but had no business to refer to it when he drafted his sastra-grantha. The very fact of mentioning of 'gauna artha' by Patañjali, and consideration, as we will go to observe further, of various types of lakṣaṇā in Mīmāmsā works, goes to suggest that earlier thinkers were conversant with deviation in use of language and also perhaps knew vyañjana. We will go to observe in greater details the sources of vyañjanā later. For the present let us see what the Mīmāmsakas have to offer.
Mīmāmsakas - We have seen above in greater detail the views of the Mīmāmsakas as represented by Jaimini and Sabara. We will go for a short resume of the same and also look in for some further aproach to lakṣaṇā as seen in Mīmāmsā sources. It is clear that Jaimini and Śabara hold that the language of the sūtras must, as far as possible, be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance. Jaimini makes this expressly clear in Mi. Sū. I. iii. 30., when it is said, "prayoga-codana'bhāvād arthaikatvam avibhāgāt." Here, 'avibhāgāt' means that no difference is seen between the language of the scriptures and that of common parlance. Thus, both words and sentences in the veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage.
"See, Mi. Sū. I. ii. 32-"a-viśistas tu vākyārthaḥ." * and also, aviśistas tu loke prayujyamānānām vede ca padānām arthaḥ. sa yathaiva loke vivakṣitas tathaiva vede'pi bhavitum arhati."-S. B. on Mĩ. Sū. I. ii. 32, pp. 150.
However, the cases of veda and loka are not absolutely parallel. The Vaidika vākya is "a-pauruşeya" i.e. not of human agency, and is always true, while the laukika vākya, which is 'pauruşeya' or having human agency, may not be necessarily true in all cases. Because of its human agency there is a scope for errors. A further important point of distinction between the two is that in case of a laukika vākya, the abhipraya or some dṛṣṭa artha or personal intention of the particular speaker is more important than sabda or word element itself. This is underlined later by Anandavardhana also while establishing vyañjanā as an independent power of word. Thus 'sabda' becomes only a means of conveying the 'artha' or abhipraya i.e. intention of the speaker.

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MS. XI. i. 26. "loke, karmā'rtha lakṣaṇam."-S. B. on it-"yac ca lokavad iti loke karmartha-pradhānam. kārya-vaśāt sakṛd api ukto sakṛd āharati nā”harati vā. atha iha śabda-lakṣaṇe karmani yathāśabdarthe pravṛttiḥ. tasmāt lokavad iti adṛṣṭāntah." pp. 2114; and also see MS. XI. i. 62-"arthalloke vidhitaḥ pratipradhānam syāt." and also S. B. on it-"arthalloke pradīpasya sakṛd asakṛd vā kriya. yadi sakṛtkritaḥ sarvam prakāśayati, sakṛt kriyate, atha na prakāśayati, tato'sakṛt. tataś ca asya pratyakṣa-samarthyam. atheha vidhitaḥ upakāro'nupakāro vā gamyate, na pratyakṣeņa. S. B. pp. 2129; and also sabdalakṣaṇe karmani śabdabhihitam gamyate, na lokābhiprāyaḥ. (S. B. on X. 5. 57, pp. 1968).-loke karmartha-lakṣaṇam bhavati, na śabdalakṣaṇam yathā arthas tathā kriyate, na yathā sabdaḥ. vede tu śabdena eva artho'vagamyate. tathaiva anustheyam iti., on VI. 8. 27, pp. 1516, and also, "śabda-pramāṇakā vayam. yac chabda āha tad asmākam pramāṇam,....loke tu kāryam dṛṣṭvā coditam acoditam api anusthīyate eva.-S. B. on III. i. 17 pp. 726; and also-loke artha lakṣaṇaḥ sa vyavahāraḥ. yena yenā'rthaḥ samṛistena ukto'nukto vā sa mrjyeta eva. iha tu vede śabda-lakṣaṇaḥ. S. B. on III. 1. 16; pp. 725, etc.
Therefore, in a laukika vākya, śabda in its vācyārtha is not strictly honoured. Sometimes, the vācyārtha is given up in favour of some lakṣyārtha which suits the 'abhipraya' i.e. intention of the speaker in a much better way.
yathā loke prasthabhug devadatta ity ucyate. yad yapi sūpa-śākādibhir adhikaḥ prastho bhavati, tathā'pi bhujau prastho nirdiśyate vyañjanānyodanārthāni.—S. B. on Mi. Sū. X. viii. 29, pp. 2079.
In the laukika vākya, at times such devices as adhyāhāra or implication and vipariņāma, or transference are also resorted to. In the Vaidika vākya nothing else but sabda is pramāṇa.
See S. B. on IV. 3. 2, pp. 1247 "laukikeṣu tu vākyeṣu evam gamyate. tāni hi vijñāte'rthe prayujyamānāni āhāryapadāni gauṇāni vi-pariṇata-vyavahitā'rthāni ca prayujyante. tasmāt tat-sādṛśyād vacanā'vagameṣv apy artheṣu bhavati tattvarūpo mithya-pratyayaḥ. yathā mṛga-trsnadiṣu.; and also see on Mi. Sū. XI. 1. 26 above, and also - "na śabda-pramāṇakāṇām antarena śabdamavagatir nyāyyā. S. B. on VI. i. 3, pp. 1353; and also, śabda-lakṣaṇe ca karmani, śabdo na
pramāṇam.-S. B. on X. 5. 44, pp. 1962.
Śabara therefore very often refers to the general rule that lakṣaṇā is not admissible in vidhi-vākya, while it has scope elsewhere.

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nanu anuvāde'pi lakṣaṇā. nā'nuvādapakṣe lakṣaṇāyām doṣaḥ. S. B. on I. 4. 22, pp. 364;- anuvāde hi lakṣaṇā nyāyyā, na vidhau. S. B. on IV. 4. 91, pp. 1278."yajñāyudha-sabdaś cánuvadapakṣe nyāyyo, na vidhi-pakse. gauņo hi sa ayudhaśabdaḥ sankhyādiṣu.-S. B. on IV. i. 8., pp. 1201.
194
-Thus, the Mīmāmsakas mention both mukhya and gauna arthas. They seem to accept mukhyā vṛtti, and gauṇī or lakṣaṇā. We will try to see if in the opinion of the Mīmāmsakas there is any distinction between gauņi and lakṣaṇā.
Jaimini and Sabara discuss the two senses viz. 'mukhya' and 'gauņa' under Mi. Sū. III. 2. 1; 2. Śabara holds that 'mukhya' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and is as it were the face of the word. While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as 'jaghanya,' it being also termed as 'gauņa' as it is connected with some 'guna.'
-kaḥ punar mukhyaḥ, ko vā gauṇaḥ iti. ucyate. yaḥ śabdad eva avagamyate sa prathamo'rthaḥ mukhyah. mukham iva bhavatīti mukhya iti ucyate. yas tu khalu pratītād arthāt kenacit sambandhena gamyate, sa paścāḍbhāvāj jaghaṇam iva bhavatiti jaghanyah, guna-sambandhāc ca gaunah."-S. B. on III. 2. 2;
Thus, the Mīmāmsakas seem to accept at least two śabda-vṛttis viz. mukhyā and gauņi. They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more senses, one is its mukhyārtha, while the rest are all gathered by the secondary power through the relation such as sādṛśya or similarity and the like. The word 'barhiḥ' means grass primarily. But, it is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through sadṛśya. The word 'parvan' in the same way, primarily means 'samudaya,' but through 'samudaya-sambandha,' it also secondarily means 'kāla.'
-nāyam ubhayatra parva-śabdo vartate. yadi kālavacanaḥ tatsambandhāt samudaye gamyate. yadi va samudaya-vacanaḥ tat-sambandhāt kāle. anyataravacano no'bhaya-vacanaḥ. tatra samudaya-vacane. kalpyamāne prakaraṇam anugṛhītam bhavati. api ca prināteḥ parva-śabdaḥ. prinotiś ca dāne prasiddhaḥ. dānāni ca samudāyāḥ. tasmāt samudāyāmījyā. evam sabdāvayavaprasiddhir anugṛhītā bhavati. S. B. on IX. 2. 53. pp. 1739.
Words such as 'mātā', having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one.
S. B. on X, i, 14, pp. 1810-"anekasya api ekaḥ śabdo bhavati vācakaḥ. tad yathā 'mātā' iti mātaram api vadati, mātāram api. mātā ca paramam daivatam samă ca putreșu iti etair upabadhyamāno jananī-vacano'vagamyate. mātā samaḥ

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kṣipraścaityaiḥ anubadhyamāno dhānyasya mātur vācakaḥ."
It should be noted that Sabara seems to suggest that in case of a gauṇārtha, it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at random. The śabda'rtha-sambandha is nitya or eternal, and therefore it is inadmissible to apply any word to anything which it has no power to signify.
Read Śabara
śabde uccarite tatra tavan mukhyā pratipattiḥ. śabde kāryasya a-sambhavād arthe kāryam vijñāpyate. yathā, "gāmānaya" iti. iha tu śabda iva kāryam sambhavati, na'rthe. ato'tra sabdam vijñāsyāmaḥ. pūrvasmād eșa vādaḥ pāpīyān. kasmāt? autpattikatvāt. autpattiko hi nāmi-nāmnoḥ sambandhaḥ, yo hi sabdo yasmin arthe autpattikena sambandhena prasiddho, na tato'nyam pratyāyayitum śaknoti. na hi go śabdena aśvo'-'bhidhātum śakyate.-S. B. on "śabdamātram iti cennotpattikatvāt."-Mi. Sū. VII. 2. 4; 5; pp. 1542.
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It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e.g. kuśala, pravīņa, etc. In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed the 'yaugikārtha' and the other one is based on 'rūḍhi' i.e. usage, and is termed as rūḍhārtha. On account of 'prasiddhi' i.e. because of its being more current, the rūḍhārtha is taken as the 'mukhyārtha' i.e. primary sense in such cases. The Mīmāmsakas seem to hold that lakṣaṇā is resorted to only as a means to avoid 'anarthakya' i.e. a state of being useless or meaningless, when the primary sense is found to be not suited to the context. This again is only as a last resort.
Read S. B. on pp. 488 -"yadāñjasyena śabdartho nāvakalpate tadā lakṣaṇaya'pi kalpyamānaḥ sadhur bhavati. yathā "agnau tiṣṭhati," "avate tisthati," "agni-samīpe tisthati," "avata-samīpe tisthati" iti bhavati, sam-vyavahāraḥ. lakṣaṇādi hi laukiky eva." -and also- "śruty asambhave lakṣaṇayā'pi vyavahāro bhavati. yathā'gnau tisthati, avate tisthati, iti"
S. B. on pp. 1485; and also, "śrutyasambhave lakṣaṇā api nyayyaiva.", S. B. on pp. 1280; "asati śrutyarthe lakṣaṇā'rtho grahyaḥ."-S. B., pp. 1551, and again
-"mukhyā'bhāve gauno grhyate." S. B. on pp. 1437, "asambhavati śruty arthe lakṣaṇā'rtho grahyaḥ."-S. B. on pp. 1550, and also, "bhavati lakṣaṇayā'pi śabdarthaḥ." S. B. pp. 1230; "agatiś caiṣā yallakṣaṇā-parigrahaḥ.-S. B. on pp. 1545; again, tritvam hi catustavādīni sāhacaryāt saknoti lakṣayitum. lakṣaṇā tv ā"śrita bhavati. kim kriyatām? agatyā āśrīyate, satyam gatau nā"śrayitavyā. B. pp. 2021.
- S.

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The Mimāmsakas hold that the most important principle to be borne in mind is that between the two functions of a word, viz. śruti (i.e. abhidhā) and laksanā, the former is stronger than the latter.--
- “śrutiśca laksaņāyā jyāyasī." — S. B. pp. 734; "śruti lakṣaṇādi viņaye śrutir jyāyasī.” S. B. pp. 324; 'śruti-laksanādi viśaye ca śrutir nyāyya, na laksanā.' S. B. on pp. 565, 1244, 1262; "śruti-laksanā-visaye ca śrutir nyāyyā.” S. B. pp. 1210, 1222 again-"śrutiśca laksanāyā balīyasī." S. B. pp. 1278; "śruti-laksanayońca śrutir nyāyyā.” S. B. pp. 1556, and also "śrutiśca laksanā'to nyāyyā.” S. B. on pp. 2243.
śrutyasambhava or mukhyārtha-bādha is the first pre-requisite of laksanā. On Mi. Sū. VIII. 3. 34, Sabara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the vācyārtha cannot be entirely abandoned. Thus, even the laksyārtha is bound to be 'sabdārtha' it cannot be "a-sabdārtha."
- "svārthe vartamānah sādrśyam gamayati. svārtham jahat katham gamayet ?"-S. B. on Mī. Sū. VIII. 3. 34; and also,
"na ca laksanayā prayoge sabdārthaḥ paricchidyate. yat-kāranam svārthe vartamāno'rthā'ntaram laksayati. svārtham jahanneva laksayet."-S. B. on Mi. Sū. VIII. 3. 34.
Thus, the condition of 'tadyoga' or 'connection comes in. This is explained under Mi. Sū. I. 4. 23.
See S. B. on I. 4.23.-“katham nu svārthā'bhidhānena pratyaya-vyavast eti cet, artha-sambandhāt. 'simha' iti nirjñāya prasahyakāritā tatra prāyeneti prasahyakārīti gamyate. artha-pratyaya-sāmārthyāt. yo hi mar prasahyakārinam pratyāyayeyam iti sa yadi simha-sabdam uccārayati siddhyati asya abhipretam. simhārthah pratītaḥ sambandhād itaram artham pratyāyayati. evam svārthā'bhidhāne tad-guna-sambandhah pratīyate.” S. B. on I. 4. 22; 23 pp. 357-360.
The illustration cited is that of the word 'simha'. Sabdara says that when the word 'simha' is uttered, with reference to a certain individual, the idea of 'prasahyakārita' i.e. force is conveyed therewith, and therefore, 'this gentleman is violent or prasahyakārī is gathered. It should be noted that the Mīmāmsakas thus recognise abhidhā and laksanā, while vyañjanā is not referred to by them. The above illustration goes to prove that probably for the Mīmāmsakas the prayojana or the
pose is also collected by laksaņā alone, i.e. they probably accept "prayojanena sahitā laksanā.” But this is only a hazard, for as observed earlier, they, primarily

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being concerned with śāstra i.e. scientific use of language, had not concerned themselves with what we call the "emotive use of language." 'Gauna' is another term used for laksyārtha. "guna-yogād-gaunah”, is the explanation. It should be noted that the two vrttis viz. 'gauni' and 'laksanā' are taken as almost synonyms by Sabara. The Nyāyakośa mentions that the Mīmāmsakas take 'gauni' as a vrtti different from laksanā. But this is not borne out, at least, while referring to Sabara. We will go to see that among alamkārikas normally 'gauni is taken as a variety of laksanā, and this is perhaps settled by Mammata, once and for all. But, it is Hemacandra who again raises the banner of 'gauņī as a vṛtti, independent of laksanā. But, we see confusion even in Hemacandra, when the ācārya goes into greater details and tries to illustrate the same. We will examine this later.
We come across, among Mīmāmsakas the recognition of different types of laksanās, such as those which convey, (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, i.e. 'matvartha laksaņā', (ii) deśa-laksanā, (iii) dharma-laksaņā or gunavāda, (iv) kālalaksaņā, (v) karma-lakṣaņā (vi) kārya-laksanā, or sādhya-lakṣaṇā. (vii) kārana or sādhana lakṣaṇā, (viii) laksaņā conveying some sva-jātīya and also (ix) lakṣaņā with reference to lingin. Sentences like "simho devadattah" and "agnir-māņavakah” are given as popular examples of dharma-laksanā. (Mī. Sū. III. 2. 4;) 'gund vā'pyabhidhānam syāt, ... etc.
"guņa-samyogād yad agaunam idam abhidhānam bhavisyati. bhavati hi gunad api abhidhānam. yathā simho devadattah, agnir māņavaka iti.”
The words 'simha' and 'agni' convey the qualities. This lakṣaṇā corresponds to 'gauni-säropā' of the later alamkārikas. It should be noted that though it appears that this dharma laksanā is termed as "guna-vāda" by Jaimini at Mi. Sū. I. 2. 10, actually, the term guna-vāda is used both by Jaimini and Sabara in a sense much wider than dharma-laksanā.
— "guņavādas tu, gauņa esa vādo bhavati, yat-sambandhini stotavye sambandyantaram stūyate.” S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. 2. 10.
It means upacara or secondary application in general, as is evident from the fact that 'ansta-vādini vāk’ is given as another example of gunavāda where lakṣanā does not convey dharma but bāhulya' or 'prāśastya.' Hence we find that Jaimini is laying down ‘rūpa' and 'prāya' as two possible grounds for gunaväda, among others.
- See S. B. on Mi. Sū. I. 2. 11; pp. 127 : “gunavādas tu rūpāt. yathā stenāpracchannarüpā evam ca mana iti gaunah sabdah.”—Thus 'stenam manah' is a gunavāda; and also früpāt prāyāt,' Mi. Sü. I. 2. 11.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Later Mimāmsakas such as Kumārila and others mention the tātparya-vrtti also, which we will discuss later. Thus the earlier Mīmāmsakas give us abhidhā and a variety of laksaņās. As noted earlier, they had no business to refer to vyañjanā, which perhaps for them is of no use when either prayojana-viśistā-lakṣaṇā, or dīrgha-dirghatara-abhidhā, or tātparya is accepted. The references to the original works are cited on the authority of Prof. Devasthali.
Naiyayikas : We have observed earlier in our discussion on samketa, that Gotama recognises what is specified as abhidhā lateron. For him, the padārthas or the meanings of a word consist in vyakti i.e. individual, āksti, or form, and jāti or class. These are aspects of reality expressed by a word. The acceptance of abhidhā by Gotama and other Naiyāyikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on samketa earlier. As to what is expressed by a word is shown in the Nyā. Sū. II. 2. 65; "vyaktyāksitijātayas tu padārthah.” This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class. Now let us examine Gotama's views on laksaņā. This follows Dr. Raja's observations.
We come across some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or ‘upacāra' at Nyā. Sū. II. 2. 64 – "saha-carana-sthāna-tādarthya-vrtta sāmīpya-sādhanā’-dhipatyebhyo brāhmana-mañca-kata-rāja-saktu-candanagangā-śatakanna-purusesv atadbhāve'pi tad upacārah.”—Thus Gotama holds that secondary usage or upacāra operates on the strength of ten relations such as sahacarana i.e. going together, sthāna, i.e. place, etc. etc. The Vātsyāyana bhasya cites
llustrations to the point. Thus, 'yastikām bhojaya' or feed the stick, means that the brahmana with a stick is to be fed. This explains the relation of 'sahacarana' (i.e. going together). 'sthāna' or location is illustrated in ‘mañcāḥ krośanti,' 'tādarthya' or the relation of purpose is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. 'vrtta' or behaviour is the relation as seen in, 'this king is Yama or Kubera.' He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. “Māna' i.e. measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure. 'Dhārana' or relation of weighing is illustrated when sandal wood held in balance is called ‘tulā-candana.' The relation of 'sāmīpya' or proximity is seen as in, 'gangāyām
sah,' or 'cattle are grazing in the Ganges.' Thus the place near the river is called by the name of the river on the strength of 'sāmīpya' i.e. proximity. 'Yoga' or combination is one more relation as illustrated in a black piece of cloth being called 'black', as it is united with black colour. Later in his Sāhityadarpana (S. D.) Visvanātha has an illustration viz. "sveto dhāvati" meaning the white dog or horse

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is running. 'Sadhana' or 'means' is illustrated when food is said to be 'prana' or life itself. In later alamkāra works we have "āyur ghệtam.” Actually food or ghee is the sādhana or means of life. 'Ādhipatya' or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of the family is said to be family or house himself.
-ayam puruṣaḥ kulam, ayam gotraḥ, etc.
Elsewhere also in the Vātsyāyana-bhāsya we come across numerous references to 'bhakti' and 'bhākta-artha.' Now, as with the Mimāmsakas, so also with these Naiyāyikas it can be observed that as they were concerned only with the scientific use of language, or as their concern was primarily with the śāstra-granthas, as the present context reveals, they had no business to get involved in anything concerning vyañjanā or the emotive use of language as reflected in literature. It is true that Kālidāsa, and of course Vyāsa and Vālmīki must have preceded most of the great commentators in various disciplines, but they observe examplary silence about the poetic use of language in their works on śāstra. So, at least we can give a benefit of doubt to these great thinkers, who were concerned with popular usages in language also as the illustrations quoted above go to prove, and perhaps hold that they too while dealing with poetry knew and accepted vyañjanā. Perhaps Anandavardhana hints exactly at this when he says that 'dhvani' was "samāmnātapūrvah,” and when Abhinavagupta remarks, "vinā’pi visista-pustakesu viniveśanāt.” So these earlier thinkers simply had no business with vyañjanā when they talked of use of language in śāstra. Thus, they can be explained away, or forgiven. But later thinkers such as the Navya-Nyāya dignitaries as Gangesa, Gadādhara and Jagadīša knowingly disown vyañjanā and we feel it is criminal. Even the great ālamkārika Mahimā, who did not have faith in vyañjanā is prepared to accept what he calls ‘kāvyā’numiti' in its place and in our opinion this ‘kāvyā’numiti' which is certainly not 'tarkā’numiti' is just something over and above abhidhā and laksanā. Call it by any other name, a rose is a rose, is a rose. Be it kāvyā'numiti, or tātparya as advanced by Dhananjaya and Dhanika, or the bhāvakatva/bhojakatva of Bhatta Nāyaka—it is something else than the known track of daily usage i. e. abhidhā and/ or laksanā. We will come to this in greater details later. For the present, it may be noted that the Naiyāyikas, do not accept the word to be nitya and abhivangya or manifested as with the grammarians.
We now turn to the school of thought as represented by the NavyaNaiyāyikas such as Gangesa (1200 A. D.), Gadādhara (1700 A. D.) and also Jagadīša (1700 A. D.) Gadādhara, Jagadīša and Mathuranātha, all of the 1700

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA A. D. approximately, are the authors of Śaktivāda, Šabdaśaktiprakāśikā, and Vyutpattivāda respectively wherein they have dealt with the topic of sabda, śabdārtha and sabdavrttis.
Dr. Raja suggests that in the sabda-sakti-prakāśikā (= śa. śa. pra.) words are classified as below:
(i) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (i.e. rūờha), (ii) words with secondary meaning (laksaņā);
(iii) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i.e. yoga-rūdha)
and (iv) words having derivative meaning alone (i.e. yaugika).' The sa. Śa. Pra. 16 reads :
"rüdham ca laksakam caiva yogarūdham ca yaugikam, tat caturdhā parair
rūdha-yaugikam manyate 'dhikam." We see that this division into four or five varieties has come down from earlier sources.
The word 'gangāyam' in the illustration 'gangāyām ghosah' forms an example of laksanā. 'Pankaja' is a yoga-rūdha word defined as —"yan nāma svāvayava-vrttilabhyārthena samam svārthasya anvaya-bodha-krt, tan nāma yoga-rūdham yathā pankaja-krsna-sarpādharmādi-; śa. sa. Pra. 26. — i.e. they are those which combine in themselves twofold signification i.e. conventional as well as derivative. The yaugika words are those such as kāraka, pācaka, etc., that connote the same meanings as are gathered by their component parts in which they may be grammatically analysed.
Gadādhara in his Śaktivāda (= s. vā.), discusses the problem of saktigraha. By śakti he means the mukhyā vrtti called abhidhā. He discusses at length the topic of samketa-grāhakatva of this mukhyā vrtti. At places, he picks up laksanā also which is connected with abhidhā. In the beginning of his work, he recognizes two functions viz. 'samketa' and 'laksanā' with reference to padārtha. "samketo laksana ca arthe pada-vsttih.” (s. vā.). He does not go for any further relation. He has neither mentioned nor rejected 'vyañjanā' as a vrtti, but his commentators try to interpret him so as make him refute vyañjanā. Thus, Krisnabhatta observes that

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vyañjanā need not be recognized as distinct from lakṣaṇā and so also gauņi. Both gauņi and vyañjană can be included in lakṣaṇā.
"evam ca gauni-vyañjanayoḥ pṛthag vṛttitvam ayuktam, tayoḥ lakṣaṇāyām antarbhāva-sambhavat."
*
Madhava, yet another commentator of his, tries to refute vyañjanāvāda. The vyañjanāvādin figures as an objector-pūrva-pakṣin-here. The objection is that, śaktivibhāga of Gadadhara is not correct, for vyañjanā is a separate vṛtti. When it is said by the heroine that "gaccha gacchasi cet kanta,...." etc. The meaning viz. that, "if you will go, I will die", is gathered through vyañjanā alone, in the absence of which we fail to collect this sense.
Read, "etad vibhājanam anupapannam, vyañjanāyāḥ atirikta-vṛtta-tvāt." The Siddhantin (i.e. Naiyayika, as represented in the commentary by Madhava) does not agree with this. If Vyañjana is recognised as a separate vṛtti, it must have some definite form. If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of vācya. When there is apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to abhidhājñāna. Thus, even in vyañjanā, we cannot proceed without the vācyārtha, which is its cause. Thus vyañjanā is not a separate vṛitti. When the suggested meaning is not at all caused by any vṛtti, other than abhidhā, it should not be taken as the result of vyañjanā.
---
*—“vyañjanā-vṛttya-janya-śabdatve'pyasya kāryatā-vacchedakatoktau gauravāt."— Mādhavī, (Ś. Vā. Ṭikā).
The vyañjanāvādin accepts something like a śābdī-vyañjanā e.g. "vayastha nāgarāsangad angānām hanti vedanām." From this sentence, two senses, viz. (i) 'a young woman, in company of a young man, removes the torment of limbs of the body,'-and (ii) "Harītaki with Ṣunthi, removes physical pain," are derived. For the supporter of vyañjanā, it is a case of abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā. But for the Naiyāyikas, the other sense is also collected through abhidha, and it is futile to go for an abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā with reference to the pratīyamānārtha.
*-tādṛśa-bodhe tatparya-jñānasya hetutve śaktyā eva tādṛśa-bodha-sambhave abhidhamula-vyañjana-svīkāra-anupapatteḥ."-Mādhavī, on ś. vā; pp. 2.
Others (i.e. vyañjanāvādins, i.e. the pūrvapakṣin here) hold that the fact of pratīyamānārtha i.e. implicit sense can be gathered in poetry, only through vyañjanā, and therefore its acceptance is inevitable.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA - Read "na ca vyañjanā-vrttitva-anupagame tatra tatra tādņģa-bodhasya anubhava-siddhasya anutpattir iti agatyā vȚttitvam angīkartavyam. iti vācyam.” – Mādhavī, pp. 3.
But for the Naiyāyikas, this implicit sense is gathered not by a special power i.e. vrtti-višesa, but by the faculty of mind. Thus, vyangyārtha is just a mental apprehension —"mănasa-bodha-mātra.” Mādhavi observes : “manasaiva tādrśabodha-svīkārāt."-But here may we ask Mādhava or any Naiyāyika worth his name, that which sense is not a mental apprehension ? Whatever is collected even with the help of 'sanketa' is also the ultimate result of mental perception. This is recognized even by the Mīmāmsakas who accept anvitā' bhidhānavāda, a process in which direct perception, anumāna and arthāpatti are the three pramānas involved even in simple collection of primary sense.
Jagadīša in his śa. Śa. Pra., kārikā 24 refers to the illustration viz. “mukham vikasita-smitam...." etc., whereby Mammata and others have sought to establish suggestiveness. He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of vyañjanā. He, to his satisfaction, holds that there is no justification to recognize something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned.
-yatha-kathañcit upanayavaśena manasaiva viśista-dhi-sambhavāt, mānorathika-sukha-prabheda-paryavasitam camatkāram saty api śābdasyaiva mānasasyā'pi bodha-viśeșasya hetutāyāḥ suvacatvāt. vyañjanākhyapadārthāntarasya svarūpa-sattāyāh anvaye buddhau tad-hetutvasya ca pramānavirahena asattvācca iti samksepah.” Śa. Śa. Pra. -kā 24.:
The so called vyangyārtha i.e. śaitya and pāvanatva, or saurabha (i.e. the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers -mukham vikasitasmitam, etc.) is derived by the usual mental apprehension; the special beauty of erotic sentiment (camatkāra) is also a mental apprehension according to Jagadīša. But as noted by us collection of any meaning - including vācyārtha-involves a mental effort and is therefore a ‘mānasa-bodha. But there is a difference between one and the other. We had observed earlier that benefit of doubt can be granted to the great Pāṇini, Patañjali, Jaimini, sabara, Gotama, and Kanāda. But, after such great efforts of asthetes of the status of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, it is criminal on the part of Jagadīša and Mädhava to denounce vyañjanā in the field of art in general and poetry in particular. Or, shall we quote yāska ? - "na esa sthānor aparādhah yad enam andho na paśyati.”

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Thus, we have seen that language is used both in a scientific mode in various śāstras or disciplines of thought, and also in an emotive mode in poetry. Scientific usage hovers round what we call abhidhā and gauni or laksanā, and the emotive use has vyañgyártha and vyañjanã at its centre.
We have tried to give an idea of how the ancients, i.e. the Mīmāmsakas, Vaiyākaranas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiseșikas and also Jain and Bauddha philosophers had discussed the problem of language and collection of meaning from a historical perspective. We have also tried to correlate this great heritage to the linguistic thinking of literary critics, the aesthetes. Thus the concept of śabdavrttis in different darśanas in its historical perspective is discussed by us in all possible details. The grammarians and the Mīmāmsakas were concerned more with the scientific use of language as they were concerned with topic of their special disciplines. Thus they restrict themselves to the discussion of only abhidhā and laksanā, or guņavāda. The ancient Naiyāyikas also, for the same obvious reason had no business to talk of vyañjanā. The grammarians of course, in advancing the doctrine of sphota, especially its manifestation, perhaps touched the fringes of vyañjanā and we have seen how Anandavardhana has ventured to make capital out of this to his advantage. Thus Anandavardhana and his followers advocate vyañjanā as a separate function in the field of poetry. Alamkārikas normally follow his lead but there have been some exceptions as we will go to observe. But even these so called opponents of vyañjanā are prepared to accept something else, with a different name, in place of vyañjanā, but certainly over and above abhidhā, and laksanā. We will go to observe all this in greater details later. But it must be confessed that the predecessors of Anandavardhana even in the field of literary aesthetics, such ancients as the great Bhāmaha down to Rudrata, had failed to clearly discuss the topic of śabdavịttis. So, if at all there is any recognition of vyañjanā in the works of these ācāryas, it is only veiled. We will first, try to discuss which sabda-vrttis and arthas, are exactly recognised by Anandavardhana's pūrvācāryas and what is their exact approach to the problem of vyañjanā. Then only we will be able to bridge the two ends, one of the thinkers of various disciplines and the other of Anandavardhana and his followers. After discussing this topic of recognition of various sabda-vrittis by the ancient ālamkārikas, we will pick up individual śabdavrtti such as abhidhā, tātparya, laksanā and vyañjanā, for detailed discussion.

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Chapter III Sabdavșttis; recognised in the works of earlier
Alamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, Vāmana, Udbhasa and Rudraţa. (i.e.
Ānandavardhana's pūrvācāryas.)
Systematic treatment of the topic of śabdavrittis such as abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjanā by attempting their definitions and carving out their scope and distinguishing one from the other etc., has to wait, to the best of our knowledge, till the arrival of Mammața. Of course Anandavardhana, in his attempt to establish vyañjanā as an independent vịtti tries to lay down the 'visayabheda' and 'svarūpabheda' of vyañjanā when compared to abhidhā and laksanā, and he does initiate a systematic treatment of this topic, but by the time Mammata arrived it was taken as one of the basic problems concerning literary criticism. Mammața not only devotes two full chapters in defining and distinguishing these sabda-vrttis and also laying down their divisions and sub-divisions, he has also written a separate treatise named 'sabda-vyāpāra-paricaya' (or vicāra) devoted exclusively to this topic. This shows how important and relevant was the topic of sen sanskrit literary critics. Independent works such as "Vyaktiveka' of Mahimā for rejecting Anandavardhana's vyañjanā, Abhidhāvstta-mātřikā of Mukula, Vrittidīpikā of Krsna Bhatta, Vịtti-Vārtika of Appayya, on the subject of sabda-Vịttis followed in due course but after Mammata almost all writers on poetics beginning with Hemacandra, made it almost customary to discuss this very important topic along with 'dhvani' and such other relevant topics.
But all this follows Anandavardhana. For his predecessors i.e. for Bhāmaha, Dandin, Vāmana, Udbhata and Rudrata, the great names whose words have come down to us, this topic of sabdavrttis never commanded enough attention from them

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Śabdavșttis; recognised in the works....
205 for being treated as important topic independently. So, as in case of some other sources of still earlier age such as the Nirukta, Mahābhāşya, Vākyapadīya etc. which we will make it a point to examine while treating each sabda-vrtti separately, even in case of Bhāmaha and the rest, we will have to find out direct and indirect occurrences and references that may reveal their approach to different sabdavsttis. Thus all references concerning any indication of their acquaintance of knowledge of abhidhä, laksanā and vyañjanā will go to suggest once again the heritage that proved to be a shaping influence in crystallizing the concepts of different śabdavrttis in the hands of later ālamkārikas beginning with Anandavardhana, Mammata, Hemacandra and the rest. We will also, in the next chapter look into the topic of implicit sense or 'pratīyamāna-artha' in these earlier masters. Whether Bhāmaha and the rest, the predecessors of Anandavardhana were cognisant of the fact of implicit sense in poetry, whether they collected it through vyañjanā or otherwise, will be an interesting enquiry paving the way to Anandavardhana's recognition of vyañjanā and dhvani. Thus begins our exercise to get at the exact amount of, either only a nodding acquaintance or a fully conscious approval, of various sabda-víttis and pratīyamāna sense in the works of ancient ālamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudrata. This enquiry will pave the way to the topic of scientific treatment of various sabdavrttis and dhvani by later ālamkārikas. We are taking up the consideration of the earlier alamkārikas first because independent and scientific enquiry concerning the topics of sabda-vrttis and dhvani follows this rich heritage..
Once again, it should be noted at the outset that, the earlier writers whose works have come down to us such as Bhāmaha and others, do not discuss the problem of śabda-vrttis or pratīyamāna artha i.e. implicit sense theoretically like later writers such as Mammata and the rest. So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in their works, nor an attempt to define and classify a given śabda-vrtti. However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the idea of the various functions-vrttis-of a word. We will go by the authors individually accepting the chronology as suggested by Dr. S. K. De in his Sanskrit Poetics.
Bhāmaha :- We begin with Bhāmaha. We come across direct or indirect references to abhidha as below :In the verse I. 9., he reads -
"sabdaśchando'bhidhānărthā itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
loko yuktiḥ kalāsceti
mantavyāh kāvya-vaikhari. (Edn. Tiruvadi, 34, Tatacarya Comm.) vl. (or kāvya-hetavaḥ) vl (or kāvyagair hyamī) (Patna Edn. 52).
Here he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study. They are sabda i.e. grammar, chandas i.e. metrics, abhidhāna or lexicography, itihāsa i.e. tradition, loka i.e. worldly affairs, yuktih i.e. logic, and kalā or various fine arts. We find the word 'abhidhāna' ir lexicon. D. T. Tātācārya in his udyānavrtti (Edn. ibid) (pp. 4-5) however observes:
"sabdo nāmākhyātādiḥ sādhu-sabda-svarūpam yāvat. chandah vrttaratnākarādyukta-lakṣaṇam, abhidhānam śabdasyàrtha-pratipādana-vyāpāraḥ śaktilaksaņādi-svarūpaḥ arthaḥ, asya śabdasya ayam eva arthaḥ iti, ayam artho'syaiva śabda-sya vācya iti ca vivekah. mahābhārata-rāmāyaṇādişu pratipadyāḥ kathāh, lokah stri-purusādi-svabhāvavisesa-avasthāvišesādi, yuktih nyāya-mīmāmsādi rūpāni darśanāni, kalā gīta-vādyādayah, ity evam etad aştaka-rūpā kāvya-vaikharī mantavyā."
Here Tatacharya explains abhidhāna' as abhidhā, laksanā, etc. suggesting Bhāmaha's acquaintance and also acceptance of śabdavrttis. Of course, he is careful not to mention vyañjanā. But we beg to differ from Tatacharya's explanation because had Bhāmaha been conscious of various sabdavrttis, he would have treated them independently. Of course, this does not go to suggest that he was totally oblivious of the concepts of abhidhā and laksanā. For, he also was fairly conversant with the heritage we discussed earlier,—the discussion of abhidhā and laksanā in the works on śāstras or various disciplines such as Mīmāmsā, Vyākarana, Nyāya, etc. But for the present here, we would like to take the word 'abhidhāna' in the sense of dictionary or lexicon i.e. kośa, knowledge of which was a must in the making of a poet.
But we have some other more weighty evidence in favour of taking abhidhāna' to mean abhidhā-vrtti and gunavrtti. In his Locana on Dhvanyāloka(=Dhv.) I, i, Abhinavagupta has the following remark : bhāmahena uktam-“sabdaś chando bhidhānārthāh" iti. ( pp. 16, Edn. Dhv. - Tapasvi Nandi, '98, Ahmedabad.]
abhidhānasya śabdādbhedam vyākhyātum bhattodbhato babhase -sabdānām abhidhānam, abhidhāvyāpāro, mukhyo gunavrttiśca, iti.”—Here, according to

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Sabdavrttis; recognised in the works....
207 Abhinavagupta Bhatta Udbhata who wrote his now lost Bhāmaha-vivarana, explains the term "abhidhāna' as abhidhā-vyāpāra, which again is two-fold i.e. mukhya i.e. principal, and guna-vrtti i.e. a-mukhya or secondary. Udbhata wants us to believe that Bhāmaha means abhidhā and gunavrtti by the term 'abhidhāna.' He rejects the normal interpretation of the term 'abhidhāna' meaning a word- i.e. śabda itself, as is seen in normal usages such as "abhidhāna-abhidheya-bhāva" meaning "vācaka-vācya-bhāva." Thus for Udbhata and perhaps it is acceptable to Abhinavagupta, and therefore also accepted by Tatacharya the word 'abhidhāna' here stands for sabdavrttis such as mukhyā abhidhā and a-mukhyā gunavrtti or laksanā which is only an extension-"puccha bhūtā"-of abhidhā. This suggests that Bhāmaha was fairly conversant with the topics of sabdavrttis such as abhidhā and laksanā which a poet-aspirant has to be conscious of. But Bhāmaha has not given independent thought and space to this topic and so we humbly submit that perhaps he means 'kosa' or laxicon by the term 'abhidhāna', for a poet aspirant has to have a fairly good knowledge and command over what we call dictionary or a small glossary. That Bhāmaha must have known abhidhā and laksaņā will be clear, and s absolutely acceptable to us also, from a number of clearer references to the same at other places. And of course, as a learned person and a rare intellectual, 3hāmaha is supposed to be well-versed in various śāstras such as the Mīmāmsā, Nyāya and of course vyākarana which as we have seen talk clearly of abhidhā and aksaņā. But with all this, in the present context, we stick to our interpretation of he word 'abhidhāna' meaning a lexicon as Bhāmaha here seems to enumerate everal branches of learning which a poet aspirant should study. At III. 21. Bhāmaha discusses apahnuti,
"apahnutir abhīstā ca kiñcid antargatopamā bhūtárthápahnavād asyāḥ
kriyate ca abhidhā yatha.” and III. 25, we have,
"guṇasya vā kriyāyā vā viruddhānya-kriyā-'bhidhā, yā viśeşābhidhānāya
virodham tam vidur budhāḥ." At both these places we have abhidhā' in the sense of direct statement, taking

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SAHĶDAYĀLOK us to perhaps ‘mukhya-vyāpāra.' Of course in both the cases, the mention of word ‘abhidhā' is clear, but it means 'clear expression' or direct expression is 'naming' and not "abhidhāvyāpāra," which at the most is only implied. But at I. 4 Bhāmaha, while discussing the 'avācaka' blemish observes :
"himāpahằmitradharair vyāptam vyomety avācakam, sākṣād arūờham vācyerthe
nàbhidhanam pratīyate.” This means, the expression 'himāpahảmitradharair' involves ‘avācaka' dosa i this expression is not having clear direct convention with reference to the meanir of 'a cloud' here. Tatacarya (pp. 23) explains, “himăpaho'gniḥ, tasyā’mitrā āpal tāsām dharāḥ meghāḥ, tair vyoma vyāptam iti." Tatacarya further remarks : “na 1 yathā kathancit kasyacid arthasya upasthāpakam padam tasya vācakam bhavat mā bhrt vahnipadena dāhe smrte tat tasya vācakam. kim tu yasya padasya yasmi arthe sāksād rüdhih prasiddhih asti, tat tasya vācakam. yattu padam vācye arth sāksāt na rūdham tat tasya abhidhāyakam vācakam iti na pratīyate."
Here Bhāmaha wants to convey that an expression which is not conventionall related to the direct meaning, is not understood. Here the terms such as 'vācy arthe,' 'sāksād arūdham' etc. show Bhāmaha's familiarity with the concept abhidhā.
The following discussion shows that Bhāmaha knows very well the theories 'sphoța' and 'apoha' in connection with the śabdavrttis concerned. Bhāmaha, i course, does not endorse to the concepts of sphoța as well as apoha.
In the Vith pariccheda Bhāmaha discusses the nature and scope of sabda. H also attempts to strike some definition. In the discussion, he sets aside the views the sphotavādins and the apohavādins. This has a bearing on his views on th import of a word. At VI. 7, he observes :
"pratitir artheşu yatas, tam sabdam bruvate pare,
dhūmabhāsor api prāptā śabdatā agnyanumām prati." Tatacharya observes : "prasangāt padasvarūpam avadhārayan paramatan apākaroti....pratītih........... etc. .....arthapratītihetutvam sabdatvam iti any bruvate. tannopapadyate. dhūmālokayorapi vahner anumityātmaka pratītihetutvena sabdatvaprasangāt iti."

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209
The idea is that some define sabda as one from which apprehension of meaning follows. Bhāmaha rejects this view on the ground that in that case, the appearance of smoke which causes the knowledge of fire through reasoning, should also be recognised as a word. At VI. 8. Bhamaha quotes another view which holds that a collection of letters having a meaning, and used for conveying a meaning, is a word. Says he :
"nanu akāradivarṇānām samudāyo'bhidheyavān, artha-pratītaye gītaḥ śabda ity abhidhīyate."
'abhidheyavān' suggests that for him vācyārtha is 'abhidheyàrtha', and sabda is vācaka, and the power of expression is 'abhidha.' Tatacharya observes :
"nanu' iti avadhāraṇe. abhidheyavān vācyàrthavan vṛttiman iti yāvat. abhidheyavān abhidheyartha-pratītyartham uccarito varṇa-samudaya eva padam iti uktam bhavati. varṇasamudaya iti anena dhūmāder vyāvṛttiḥ. abhidheyavān iti padaikadeśasya padantarakṣaropetapadasya ca. lipi-vyāvṛttaye viseṣaṇantaram. kambugrīvādimad arthàbhidhāyino ghatadipadasya ākāśarthe śabdatva vāraṇāya
vā."
But Bhamaha rejects this view also. He observes: (VI 9, 10)— "pratyekam asamarthānām samudayo'rthavan katham varṇānām krama-vartitvān nyāyyā nā'pi ca samhatiḥ." and, "na ca'pi samudayibhyo samudāyo'tiricyate, dārubhittibhuvo'tītya kim anyat sadma kalpyate."
The rejection perhaps here is of the view held by the Naiyāyikas as observed earlier. Bhāmaha says that how can a collection of letters that are meaningless taken individually convey meaning? Again, as letters follow one another in sequence, no collection of letters is possible because when the next letter is pronounced the earlier one has evaporated. Now a whole cannot be different from its parts; a house cannot be anything else than wall, sticks, and land. The thrust is that how can impermanent letters form a collection? When letters individually are ephemeral how can their combination remain steady and give a meaning ? Bhamaha gives an illustration of a house which in itself is the sum total of the materials it is built with. But we fear that this illustration is not proper. Bhāmaha has drawn an illustration from physical plane to disprove a matter which it not at

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA a physical plane but is a matter staying at the higher level of consciousness. So, there seems to be some logical fallacy in citing this illustration.
Obviously, the arguments mentioned in VI. 9, 10 are in harmony with those advocated by the upholders of the theory of sphoța. But Bhāmaha does not seem to accept the sphotavāda either. While the upholders of sphota hold sphota to be eternal, Bhāmaha differs from them because he feels that neither pratyaksa or direct perception, nor anumāna or inference supports the sphoțavāda. He observes:
tasmāt kūtastha ity esā śābdī vaḥ kalpanā vșthā, pratyakşam anumānam vā
yatra, tat paramàrthataḥ.} (VI. 11) Tatacharya comments (pp. 136, Ibid) : "esā uktavidhā vaḥ sphotavādinām śabda-sambandhini atiriktatva-nityatva-kalpanā nisphalā, angīkāra-anarhā. kasmāt ? aprāmānikatvāt. yasmin visaye pratyakşam anumānam vā sambhavati tat paramārthato'sti iti abhyupagamyeta. na ca varnātirikte pade pratyakşam asti. adarśanāt. na api anumānam. tādņśapadanirūpita-vyāptimato hetoh kasyacid abhāvāt. tasmāt a-pāramārthikam tat.”—
Bhāmaha then proceeds to refute the apoha-vāda in the following verses. At VI. 16, he quotes the view of those who hold that a word connotes a particular meaning through the negation-"apoha"-of something else :
"anyàpohena śabdo'rtham āhéty anye pracakşate, anyàpohaś ca nāmāni
apadārthàpākstiḥ kila.” (VI. 16) By 'apoha' is meant the negation of something else. Bhāmaha argues at VI. 17 that if the particular word 'gauh' has its connotation over only in the negation of something else, then we will have to find out some other sound which makes for the connotation of 'gauh' in that particular word.
"yadi gaur ity ayam sabdaḥ krtàrtho' nya-nirākṣtau, janako gavi gobuddher mțgyatām aparo dhvanih.”

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Śabdavșttis; recognised in the works....
211 He further argues that the word has artha-jñāna or connection of a particular meaning as its phala or object. So, it cannot have two objects viz. negation as well as injunction. Here Bhāmaha takes into consideration the argument of the apohavādin viz. that by ‘apoha' is meant "apoha-viśisto vidhih”—
Tatacharva observes before VI. 18. : nanu ekah 'go'sabdah ubhayam api janayati apohabuddhim gotva-buddhim ca. na etat upapadyate. tathā hi,
"artha-jñāna-phalāḥ śabdāḥ na ca ekasya phala-dvayam, apavāda-vidhi-jñāne
phale ca ekasya vah katham.” -(VI. 18) Tatacarya further comments (pp. 140, ibid) : śabdānām arthajñānam phalam. tatra ekasya śabdasya ekam eva artha-jñānam phalam. na tad dvayam. āhuś ca sakrt prayuktah sabdah sakrd eva artham gamayati iti. tathā sati katham yuşmākam mate ekasya śabdasya dve jñāne phale ucyete ? apavādah apohaḥ vyāvsttih bhedaḥ. vidhiḥ bhāvah gotvādih. tayor-jñāne. phala-dvayopapādanam ratnakīrti-krtāv apohasiddhau drastavyam.
At VI. 19, Bhāmaha further argues that if you want to negate something else than 'gauh', at least in the first instant you must apprehend the meaning of a cow from the word 'gauh', or else how are you to negate non-cow from it ?
So, at Vi, 13, Bhāmaha gives his own view as follows, which we think, is closer to the Nyāya discipline :
"iyanta īdřśāḥ varņāḥ idȚg arthàbhidhāyinah, vyavahārāya lokasya
prāg ittham samayaḥ kṣtaḥ.” Tatacharya explains (pp. 137, ibid) : “prāk sargādau lokasya vyavahārāya anyonya-abhiprāya-pratyāyanāya samayah sanketa) ittham krtah. katham ? etāvantaḥ etādịśa-krama-viśistā varnāh etad arthàbhidhāyinah iti. 'kha' iti khakāraakārau dvau viyad-vācinau. 'khara' iti khakāra-akāra-raipha-ākārāś catvāro tigmavācinaḥ. tathā ‘mā' iti dvau varnau pratisedha-vācinau laksmi-vācinau ca. 'mālā' iti catvāraḥ srag-vācinaḥ. rāja, jarā, iti ubhayatrā'pi yady api varnās' catvāra eva, tathā'pi krama-bhedad artha-bhedah. tathā ca ittham sanketasya grhītatve kramavartinām eva varnānām śravanānantaram tādṛśa-krama-viśistānām eva, eka-smrtyārüdhānām artha-pratīti-janakatve, na kaścit sankatam iti yatkiñcit

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
pramāna-agocara-sphota-kalpanāprayāso'tyantam anapeksita iti abhisamdhiḥ." —
Bhāmaha holds that 'samaya' or convention, since ages, has been formed to the effect that these many letters of such and such a type and in such and such a sequence should give such and such a meaning. He further notes, VI, 14.
"sa kūtasthah anapāyi ca, nādād anyaś ca kathyate,
mandāh sänketikāh arthāh manyante pāramārthikāh." Tatachārya observes : (pp. 138, 9) :- "sah ukta-vidha-sanketa-visayah sabdah kūțasthaḥ avikriyaḥ viksti-rahitaḥ anapāyī ca vināśa-śūnyaś ca. yathā tat-tad govyakteh kiñcit kālam avasthāya vinaśvaratve'pi gotvăvacchinnasya vastuno na vināśah kimtu ā-pralayam anuvartamānatā eva tathavia devadattóccărite go-pada varṇānām sadyo nivșttatve'pi yajñadattādy uccāraṇakāle varņàntaraprādurbhāvi'pi gakāratvàvacchinnottaraukāratvarūpånupūrvyavacchinnasya sthāyitvāt tasyaiva sanketa-visayattvāc ca nāsty anupapattir artha-pratyayasya iti.
nanu sphotā'nangīkāre nāda eva bhavatām sabdah prāpnoti nādàbhivy-angyaś ca sabda isyate. tena śrūyamānadhvanyapara-paryāya-nādātmaka-varnasamühătiriktam padam estavyam. atra ucyate
‘nādād anyaś ca kathyate.'
na asmākam nādah sabdah prāpnoti. nādād anyo'smākam api sabdah. kah? akārādi-varņa-samudāyaḥ. nanu nāda eva ayam. na. kas tarhi nādaḥ ? vāyvādisamyoga-vibhāga-santānah yah sabda-janakah iti.
evaḥ śabda-svarūpam sthitam. asya arthena kīdṛśaḥ sambandhaḥ ? tad etad pūrvam eva uktam 'prāg ittham samayaḥ krtah' iti. gautamo'pyāha 'sāmayikatvāt sabdàrtha- sampratyayasya' iti. atra anye vipratipadyante. yathā jvalanasya dāhasaktih svābhāvikī tathā sabdasya artha-pratyāyana-saktir iti esām darśanam.
Bhāmaha lays his own track. He neither follows the grammarians, nor even the the Naiyāyikas fully. He does not stay to answer any questions that you may raise against his conviction also. So, for him this word is eternal and imperishable (VI. 14a), and is different from sound i. e. 'nāda'. He adds that the fools take the conventional meanings to be 'pāramārthika' or referring to realtity. He does not choose to enter into any controversy as to whether word is related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal. Finally at VI. 20, he concludes that :
varņa-bhedād idam bhinnam varņāḥ svāmśa-vikalpatah,

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213 ke sabdāh kiñca tad-vācyam
iti aho vartma dustaram.” Thus, for Bhāmaha, it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is, because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts. He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on dravya or object, kriyā or action, jāti or class and guna or quality. (VI. 21).
On, Bhāmaha VI 20, read Tatacharya : (PP. 141, ibid) : "dam padam. 'varnabhedāt padam bhinnam' iti eva pathitum yuktam. varnāś ca svăvayava-nirūpanavašena bhidyante. sva-laksanăpara-paryāya-vyakti-vyatiriktam sāmānyam sangatair nesyate. yathā āhuḥ :
"etāsu pañcasv avabhāsinīşu pratyakşabodhe sphuţam angulīşu, sādhāraṇam şaşthamiheksate yah
srngam śirasi ātmana īkșate sah” tena sarve varnän tadā tadā ucсārita-pradhvastā bhavanti. tathā sati eko gośabdaḥ eko ghata-śabdaḥ iti nāsti. kimtu yathā ghața-sabda-go-śabdau mitho bhidyete, tathaiva adyeha ucсāritāh kālàntara-deśāntara-uccāritāśca go-sabdā anyonyam bhidyante. yathaviva padāni sàvayavani tadā tadā tat tad avayavavināsànupātivināśāni anyāni anyāni bhavanti, tathaiva varnā api sarvānityatva-vādinām tathāgatānām mate svayam api sāvayavāḥ santo vinasyanti iti anye anye bhavanti. evam sati, ayam sabdaḥ asyàrthasya vācaka, iti cirầnuvartamāna-vyavahāra-darśanädhīnaḥ sankerta-graha eva na nispattum arhati iti tesām mate sabda-pramāna-mārgo' tiva duradhigama iti. ||(20)||
From the above discussion it follows that Bhāmaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VI 13. 14), and his views seem to be very near to the Mimāmsakas when he takes sabda do be (vi. 14) Kūtastha', 'anapāyi' etc. But at times, as observed earlier, he seems to be closer to the Naiyāyikas also as at VI. 14. At least he does not accept 'sphota' and mocks at those who believe in it. One thing is very clear from all this discussion that Bhāmaha is quite familiar with abhidhā.'
As to Bhāmaha's familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particulary 'vyañjanā', we may say that, 'vyañjanā' does not occupy the same place as 'abhidhã in his mind, i. e. he does not seem to have known vyañjanā' as a separate vrtti. He however, uses different forms of vi+ Vañj with the later meaning

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA of 'vyañjanā' at different places. Let us examine these usages. At. II. 73, we have 'vyajyate' as in,
"hi-sabdenápi hetvartha. prathanād ukta-siddhaye, ayam arthàntaranyāso
sutarām vyajyate yathā. Tatacharya observes : (PP. 54, ibid) : "apih prakāràntara samuccaye. uktasya prakstasya siddhaye heturūpam artham prathayan 'hi' sabdah sutarām arthāntaranyāsam 'vyanakti'.” - The idea is that by the use of the word 'hi', the idea of "samarthya-samarthaka-bhāva"- i. e. the idea of 'supporter and the supported is suggested.
At II. 79. Bhāmaha defines 'samāsokti' as :
“yatròkte gamyate’nyo’rthastatsamāna-viseșaṇaḥ, sā samāsoktir uddiștā
samkşiptàrthatayā yathā.” Tatacharya (pp. 55, ibid) has, “ ...yasyām uktau uktād anyo'rtho gamayate, sā samāsoktih.” Here, we have a reference to another unexpressed sense which is collected by implication. This gathering of unexpressed sense is mostly by way of suggestion i.e. vyañjanā. 'Implication may mean something else than vyañjanā also. At III. 8, 9, Bhāmaha explains and illustrates ‘paryāyokta' as,
"paryāyoktam yad anynena prakāreņa abhidhīyate, uvāca ratnàharaņe caidyam śārnga-dhanur yathā.” – III. 8 gļheșvadhvasu vā nànnam bhuñjmahe yad adhītinah, na bhunjate dvijās tac ca rasa-dāna-nivṛttaye." - III. 9.

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215 Tatacharya has—(pp. 64, ibid)—“vaktavyam sākṣād anuktvā yad bhangyantarena abhidhānam tat paryāyoktam."
Bhāmaha says that Krsna's reply to Siśupāla's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison-rasa-dana-nivṛttaye.' This is also only implied or in a way expressed differently. We know that paryāyokta comes closer to vyañjanā but Bhāmaha is not absolutely clear about it here. At III. 11, Bhāmaha illustrates 'udātta' without defining the same :
"udāttam saktimān rāmo - guru-vākyànurodhakaḥ, vihāyòpanatam rājyam
yathā vanam upāgamat." (III. 11) Here the idea of Rāma's virtue is only implied. 'āśaya-māhātmya' on the part of Rāma is implied here but Bhāmaha does not say clearly that it is understood through vyañjanā. Bhāmaha III, 21 defines 'apahnuti.'
"apahnutir abhīșță ca kiñcid antar-gatopamā, bhūtàrthā'phnavād asyāḥ
kriyate ca abhidhā yathā.”‘kriyate abhidha' has direct mentioning of 'abhidhā' but it is only in the sense of "expression." It has no reference to 'abhidhā vrtti', though of course 'statement' or 'abhidhā' here is direct. Again, apahnuti is 'kiñcid antargatopamā' — i.e. with ‘upamā' or similarity, inherent in it. This means that the external refusal – pratisedha — has upamā implied in it. Tatacharya (pp. 69 ibid) observes : "kim tu yatropamā gamyate sa pratisedha iha apahnutih." - This clearly means that the element of 'upamā' is contained in apahnuti and this ‘upamā' is only suggested. But Bhāmaha does not make it explicit that the charm lies in 'upamā being suggested' also. Of course Tatacharya is clear and so are we that, "kimcid antargatih, vinā vacanam pratīyamānatā." (pp. 69, ibid). At Bhāmaha V, 58, we have
"yatra drstānta-mātreņa vyajyete sādhya-sādhane,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA tam āhuḥ śuddha-drșțāntam
tanmātrāviskřter yathā.” 'drstānta' is defined here with a clear use of a form of 'vi+ Vañi' viz. vyajyete.' So, vyañjanā can not be far behind in Bhāmaha's mind. In the illustration that follows wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilīpa, Purūravas, and Pradyuma, etc., the underlying qualities of the hero, equating him with these big names, are suggested. Tatacharya observes: "iti tatra tatra sādhya-sādh drastavyā.” (pp. 126, ibid). Thus, we may say that we come across a clearer reference and also acceptance of vyañjanā here in Bhāmaha. Similarly at V. 60, Bhāmaha has.
"katham eka-padenaiva vyajyeran asya te guņāḥ, iti prayuñjate santaḥ
kecid vistāra-bhīravah.” vyajyeran' has a clear reference to 'vyañjanā.' In V. 59 as seen above Bhāmaha has given an illustration of pure drstānta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilīpa, etc. thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king. In V. 60 Bhāmaha says that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word in V. 59 as above. So, herein, a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dilīpa, etc. are suggested by their meaning.
In his discussion of various alamkāras, we see that Bhāmaha seems to take for granted the presence of implicit sense-i.e. pratīyamāna artha-or vyangyàrtha, e.g. in a-prastuta-praśamsā, dīpaka, vyājastuti, nidarśanā, etc. etc. This point will be further elaborated to support our observation that Bhāmaha was not unfamiliar with vyañjanā. We will take up this investigation in the next chapter in greater details. But one thing that emerges clearly from our discussion so far, is that 'vyañjanā' is not totally absent from Bhāmaha's mind, though of course, and this applies to all other predecessors of Anandavardhana such as Dandin, Vāmana, etc. also, that a systematic treatment of the topic of sabdavrttis is not seen in earlier works, but at least we have traces of vyañjanā scattered everywhere and that vyañjanā as a sabdavrtti is not only known to them but they all, i.e. Bhāmaha and the rest are inclined to accept it with reference to the poetic word. We will now pass over to the next great name, i.e. Dandin.

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Śabdavșttis in Bhāmaha, Daņdin, etc.
217 Daņdin : In the Kāvyādarśa (= K.D.) of Dandin, we come across the following direct or indirect references to different sabdavrttis. Actually, there is no reference to 'abhidhā' as such, but references to 'gunavrtti' or laksana are as follows: K.D. I. 95, has,
“nișthūtódgirņa-vāntā"di gauņa-výtti-vyapāśrayam, atisundaram anyatra
grāmya-kaksām vigāhate.” the 'prabhā' (pp. 106), (Edn. B.O.R.I.) observes : “kānicit padāni kāvye gauņavịttyā eva śobhām āvahanti, na tu mukhya-vịttyā.” - Thus it is clear that Dandin here not only clearly refers to the a-mukhya or gauņa or subordinate power of a word in poetry, but recommends it to create beauty it poetry. At II. 254, Dandin observes,
"te'mi prayoga-mārgeşu
gauņa-vștti-vyapāśrayāt atyanta-sundarā dsstās
tad-udāhstayah yathā.” Dr. D. K. Guptā, the author of 'sudarśanā vyākhyā' (Edn. '76, Delhi) (pp. 214) observes :
"te ami anantaroktāḥ dūrakāryādayas' citrahetavaḥ prayoga-mārgeşu kaviprabandha-paddhatișu gauņa-vștti-vyapāśrayād gaunyāḥ prasiddha-visayaviparītāyāḥ samāropitāyāḥ vịtteḥ śabda-vyāpārasya, hetuvyāpārasya vā vyapāśrayād alambanād hetoh atyanta-sundarāḥ ekānta-hrdyāḥ drstāḥ lakṣitāḥ bhavanti.”
Dandin favours the use of 'gauņa-vítti' as against abhidhā, or mukhyā vịttiḥ. He says that at times in hetu alamkāra, the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or, the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place. These actually, are instances where guna-vrtti functions. III. 100, samanarūpā prahelikā is defined as,
“samānarūpā gauņárthā”ropitair grathitā padaiḥ, parușā laksaņástitvamātra-vyutpädita-śrutiḥ 11"

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Dr. Gupta observes : (pp. 345 ibid) : “prahelikādvayam aparam āha - samānarūpeti; gauņárthā”ropitaiḥ gauņárthena sādhyavasāna-gauna-laksaņikena arthena āropitaiḥ upacaritaiḥ padaiḥ grathitā."
The texture of samānarūpā prahelikā is woven with 'gauņárthā”ropita' padas, i.e. words having a secondary sense.
As in Bhāmaha, so also in Dandin, we do not come across any mentioning of 'vyañjanā' as such by name. However, we come across different forms of the root vi + Vañj in the sense of, 'to suggest. We also meet with the term 'pratīyate' in the sense of, 'is implied'. Thus Dandin seems to know a lot also of what is called implicit sense or, 'pratīyamāna artha'. The examination of this point will be taken up in due course. At I. 76 (K.D.), Dandin defines the 'guna' called 'udāratā' as -
"utkarsavān gunah kaścid yasminn ukte pratīyate tad udārā”hvayam tena
sanāthā sarva-paddhatiḥ." Thus udaratā occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is conveyed, - yasmin ukte - there is an implication of some high quality. This can be taken as an indirect reference to vyañjanā. II. 14, upamā is described as,
"yathā-kathancit sādrśyam yatrodbhūtam pratīyate, upamā nāma sā, tasyāḥ
prapancóyam nidarśyate.” So, for Dandin, in upamā there is an experience of similarity either by abhidhā, or laksaņā or vyañjanā.
II. 16, 'vastūpamā is said to be “pratīyamānaika-dharmā”. II. 46 (K.D.) has 'prativastūpamā' where there is ‘sāmya-pratīti' or apprehension of similarity in an implied way. We will see in due course that so many varieties of upamā have similarity only implied. At II. 65, Dandin says that words such as 'spardhate', 'jayati', dvesti', etc. are 'sādņśya-sūcakāḥ', i.e. suggestive of similarity. II. 136, 'anujñā āksepa' is said to occur where through apparent 'anujñā' or acceptance, something else is implied. Says Danļin,

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219 "ity anujñā-mukhenaiva kāntasyā”kṣipyate gatiḥ, maraṇam sūcayantyaiva
sónujñā”ksepa ucyate.” Thus, there is some element of suggestion involved in this. So also in "aśīrvacana-āksepa” (II. 242 K.D.), the heroine suggests her own helplessness - "svávasthām sūcayantyā”. At II. 280, ‘vyatireka' is defined as -
"sabdópātte pratīte vā sādrśye vastunor dvayoḥ, tatra yad bheda-kathanam
vyatirekaḥ sa kathyate.” Thus, vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity. II. 189 mentions vyatireka, having pratīyamāna-sādņśya :
"sabdopādāna-sādņśyavyatirekóyam īdrśaḥ, pratīyamāna-sādrśyópy asti
sónuvidhīyate." Dr. Gupta observes : (pp. 175) : “...atha pratīyamānam a-śabdopāttam gamyam sādịśyam yatra tādịśópi vyatirekaḥ asti...”
At II. 234, Dandin holds utpreksā to be suggested by words such as - 'manye, saņke', dhruvam”, etc. He observes,
“manye śanke, dhruvam prāyo nūnam ity evam ādibhiḥ, utprekṣā vyajyate sabdair
iva-sabdópi tādrśaḥ.” Thus it seems that Dandin considers utpreksā to be implied only. There is a clear mention of the term, 'vyajyate', 'is suggested', and this proves the fact that vyañjanā was not unknown to Dandin.
At II. 303, 'udātta' is explained. Dandin says that in the two illustrations, (i.e. at II. 301 & II. 302) 'āśraya-māhātmya' and 'abhyudaya-gaurava' are respectively,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'su-vyañ jita', i.e. "clearly suggested”. He observes :
“pūrvatra-āśayamāhātmyam atra abhyudaya-gauravam, su-vyañjitam iti proktam
udātta-dvayam apy adaḥ.” (II. 303, K.D.) Dr. Gupta explains : (pp. 243, ibid) : “pūrvatra, pūrvasmin guror ity ādi śloke rāmagatam āśaya-māhātmyam abhiprāya-gauravam, atra ca anantarokte ratnao ityādi padye rāvana-sambandhi abhyudaya-gauravam aiśvarya-mahimā suvyañjitam, samyak prakāśitam, iti tad udātta-dvayam dvividham udāttam api proktam varņitam."
At II. 350, Dandin holds Nidarśanā as containing suggestions : "sūcayanti dur antatām”. Thus, we can read here an indirect reference to vyañjanā. We will go to read in both Bhāmaha, Dandin and, the rest of earlier alamkārikas the 'pratīyamāna' - or implicit sense, in various figures of speech, such as dīpaka, samāsokti, aprastuta-praśamsā, vyājastuti, etc. and also in emotion-based alamkāras such as rasavat, preyaḥ, ārjasvi, and samāhita, etc.
Vāmana : Vāmana, in his Kāvyālamkāra-sūtra, -vrtti (= KSV.) often refers to 'bhakti' or laksanā, or gunavrtti and upacara. But he also does not mention vyañjanā-vrtti directly. He seems to touch vyañjanā only indirectly.
At KSV. I. i, 1, Vāmana observes that the word 'kāvya' here stands for word and sense embellished by guna and alamkāra, but by 'bhakti' i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to 'sabdartha-matra' i.e. 'word and sense' alone. Says he : - 'kāvya-śabdóyam guņā'lamkāra-samskệtayoḥ śabdā'rthayoḥ vartate. bhaktyā tu śabdārtha-mātra-vacanótra grhyate.”
The kāmadhenu on this (pp. 6, edn. Becan Jha, Chowkhamba Skt. Sr. - Varanasi, 1971), explains, bhaktyā upacārena'. Thus secondary power of the word is refered to by Vāmana under the very first sūtra of his KSV. Vāmana says that the word 'kāvya' here stands for word and sense embellished by guna and alamkāra i.e. by excellences and figures of speech or poetic turns of expression. But by 'bhakti i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference with sabdārtha-mātra or word and sense alone.
On I. ii. 1 KSV. Vāmana observes that the words 'arocaki' and 'satrnā'bhyavahārī are metaphorically used : "gauņārthau”. Vāmana holds that in vaidarbhi style, the presence of all the artha-gunas i.e. excellences enumerated with reference to sense,

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221 makes for the charm : "tasyām artha-guna-sampat asvadyā bhavati." Now this totality of artha-guņas by themselves, as it resides in the vaidarbhī, is itself known by the name of 'vaidarbhí. I ii. 22 - he says : “sā'pi vaidarbhī tātsthyāt.” Vāmana then adds : śāpi iyam artha-guna-sampat vaidarbhi iti ucyate. tātstyāt, iti upacaratah vyavahāram darśayati." Thus, we come across a clear reference to the secondary usage of language.
At V. i. 12, Vāmana considers the blemish called 'neyártha'. He observes that when some meaning which is not heard of in a particular sentence is inferred, it makes for the blemish called 'neyártha'. The term viz. 'pankti-vihamgamanāma-bhrt', used for Daśaratha is an instance in point. By 'pańkti' is meant 'ten', by 'vihamgama-nāma' is meant 'cakravāka'. 'Ratha' i.e. chariot is one that bears the name of cakra-vāka on itself. Thus 'pankti' and vihamgama-nāmabhrt mean 'Dasa-ratha'. This makes for the blemish called neyartha. Then it is argued that if you find neyártha-dosa in such illustrations then the word ‘rathánganāma’ for cakravāka used by all poets also will be an illustration of neyártha-dosa. To this, Vāmana says : na teşām, “nirūdha-lakṣaṇatvāt.” Such words as rathánga-náma for cakravāka are instances of nirudhā laksaņā and are therefore free from any blemish. Thus Vāmana seems to be conversant with what later alamkārikas term as 'rūdhi-mūlā laksana', i.e. secondary usage based on convention.
At II. i. 14 Vāmana says that whatever has an obscene sense as another sense is 'aślīla' which is a dosa or a blemish : "a-sabhyā'rthā’ntaram asabhya-smrtihetuś ca aślīlam.” But he adds at II. i. 15 (KSV.) that, secondary usages do not fall under this, He reads - "na gupta-lakṣita-samāvstāni.” - "apavādártham idam. guptam, lakṣitam, samvitam ca nā'ślilam." Thus, secondary usage of language is clearly referred to by Vāmana and is recommended also in poetry. At II. i. 17 he defines 'laksita' as : läksanika - asabhyabhyām laksitam." i.e. if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is called 'lakṣita' and it does not give rise to the blemish of vulgarity. The illustration cited is 'janma-bhūmih'. Vāmana says - "tad eva asabhyā'rthā'ntaram lākṣanikena asabhyena arthena anvitam padam lakṣitam, yathā janma-bhūmih iti.” Vāmana adds that here, this word viz. 'janmabhūmih' means the female organ - i.e. 'yonih', only secondarily and not by the power of expression - "tad hi laksanayā guhyártham, na sva-śaktyā iti." Here 'sva-sakti' of a word is ‘abhidhā' or the power of direct expression and 'laksana' is secondary power - both of which are clearly known to Vāmana and clearly referred to here by him also.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Under, IV. iii. 7, Vāmana notes that like 'gaunā'rtha', the 'laksanikā'rtha' can also become an alamkāra. This means that as in case of a metaphorical expression, so in case of any secondary usage also, poets can create some beauty, i.e. alamkāra. He says : "yathā ca gaunasya arthasya alamkāratvam tathā lākṣaṇikasya api darśayitum āha” - and he quotes 1V. iii. 8 here, viz. “sādņśyāllaksaņā vakroktiḥ”. He observes: “bahūni hi nibandhanāni laksanāyām. tatra sādrśyāllaksanā vakroktih asau iti." Thus Vāmana knows a variety of laksanās but has a preference for one based on sādrśya i.e. similarity, as the germ for vakrokti i.e. poetic expression. He quotes an illustration in which “unmīlana” and “nimīlana”, i.e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of an eye, are superimposed on ‘kamala' and ‘kairava', the flowers, through similarity, and secondary meaning of blossoming and fading of the respective flowers is collected at the next step : "sadrśyāt vikāsa-samkocau laksayatah.” He cites some more illustr same effect and adds : “iti evam ādiņu laksanártho nirūpyate iti, laksaņāyām jhatiti artha-pratipatti-kşamatvam rahasyam acaksate iti.” The secret of laksaņā lies in an immediate gathering of the sense. He says that lakṣaṇā based on something else than similarity does not make for vakrokti i.e. poetic expression : "a-sādrśyanibandhanā tu laksanā na vakroktih.”
At IV. iii. 9, Vāmana defines 'utpreksā' : "a-tadrūpasya anyathā'dhyavasānam atiśayártham utpreksā.” To describe an object as one which it is not, and this description to bring about some added charm of it, is utpreksā. Thus in utpreksā, the source of charm is 'adhyavasana' which is neither 'adhyāropa' i.e superimposition as in case of rūpaka, nor laksanā as in case of vakrokti. Vāmana abserves : "na punar adhyāropo laksaņā vā." 'Adhyavasāna' is determination'. It is to determine and present an object in a form and quality which it is not. This is āhārya' i.e. done knowingly by a poet's will to impart beauty to a given expression. This is artificial identification wherein the original object is not totally absorbed but also finds independent expression. Vāmana's concept of utpreksā also suggests that he has a clearer and fuller knowledge of different varieties of laksanā.
At V. i. 15 Vāmana discusses a topic concerning words, that can and should be used in poetry, and others that cannot be used in poetry, i.e. the topic of 'prayojya' and 'a-prayojya' words, with reference to a poetic expression. He observes - "laksanā-sabdās ca". - Vāmana says that words having secondary usage can be utilized by the poets if their practice is very frequent : "laksaņā-sabdāś ca atiprayuktāḥ prayojyāḥ, yatha dvi-refa-rodara-sabdau bhramara-cakravākárthau, lakṣaṇāparau. anati-prayuktāśca na prayojyāḥ yathā dvikaḥ, kākaḥ iti.” The word

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223 dvika' in the sense of ‘kāka' or a crow is not very frequently used in language and so it cannot be used. It is clear that Vamana here refers to what is termed as 'rūdhimūlā-lakṣaṇā, later on.
As already observed by us, Vāmana does not refer to 'vyañjana' directly. But at places, he notes certain illustrations of 'punar ukta' or 'repitition', which are actually not 'punar ukta dosa' or blemish resulting from repitition. He says that such words or such repititions are charged with some further sense. Now acceptance of this 'further sense' amounts to the acceptance of implicit sense through the medium of 'vyañjanā' or suggestion, though of course Vamana does not make it clear that this 'further sense' is derived through the agency of vyañjanā or suggestive power of a word.
Under II. ii. 13, Vāmana cites certain illustrations. He says: "dhanur jyādhvanau; dhanuḥ śrutir ārūdheh pratipattyai.” He further observes : 'dhanur jyādhvanau' iti atra 'jyā’śabdena uktā'rthatvépi dhanuḥ śrutiḥ prayujyate, ārūdheh pratipattyai. ārohanasya pratipattyai. arohanasya pratipattyartham. The idea is that in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of dhanuh' or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jyā' or bow-string itself. So, the use of dhanuh' should be termed redundant. But Vamana says that here it is not so, i.e. it is not redundant because the idea of arohana' or stretching the string is not collected in the absence of the word 'dhanuḥ' : na hi dhanuḥ śruti-antareņa dhanuși ārūdhā jyā dhanur-jyā iti śakyam pratipattum.
Under II. ii. 14, Vāmana cites further illustrations to the same effect. Says he - “karņāvatamsa-śravana-kundala-sirah-sekhareșu karņā”di nirdeśaḥ sannidheḥ.” Thus, in 'karņávatamsa' the word 'karna' is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'sannidhi' i.e. juxtaposition. The idea of closeness cannot be collected merely by the use of the word 'avatamsa' which by itself means an ear ornament. That this ornament is close to the ear and is dangling on the cheeks is understood only by the presence of the word 'karna'. The Kāmadhenu (pp. 71, ibid) observes : "avatamsā”dibhiḥ karņā”bharaṇā”dīnieva ucyante iti avatamsādi-prayoge karņā”dinām gatárthatvam iti abhiprāyaḥ.” II. ii. 15, Vāmana observes : "muktāhāraśabde muktā-sabdah suddheh." - muktāhāraśabde muktā-śabdah hārašabdena eva gatá”rthah prayujyate, suddheh pratipattyartham iti sambandhah." In case of the word muktā-hāra the word 'muktā' is redundant because the word 'hāra' is by itself capable of conveying the sense of a pearl-necklace, but an additional word 'muktā' is used to convey that the pearls are very pure i.e. are of the highest quality that is available in the market. Now, Vamana does not specify that this extra

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sense of purity is collected through vyañjanā but his finger does point in the direction of vyañjanā which is instrumental in gathering this extra sense. Thus the concept of vyañjanā cannot be said to be totally absent from his mind. Similarly, at II. ii. 6, 'puśpa-mālā' is an expression with a separate mention of 'puśpa', eventhough the idea is covered by a mere use of the term 'mālā'. Here, by a special mention of 'puśpa' the idea of 'utkarsa' or excellence is conveyed. Vāmana adds : "utkrstānām puśpānām mālā iti.” When we come across the use of 'mālā' with reference to ‘ratna' or 'śabda', as in the expression ‘ratna-mālā' or 'sabda-mālā', the usage is said to be a secondary one - "sa tävad upacaritasya prayogah. nir-upapado hi mālā-sabdah puspa-racanā-višesam eva abhidhatte iti.” In the same way, the word 'kari' in the expression 'kari-kalabha', is not redundant as it brings about the apprehension of 'tād-rūpya' or similarity. Vāmana says - "kari-kalabha-śabde kariśabdaḥ kalabhena eva gatárthaḥ prayujyate, tād-rūpyasya pratipattyartham iti."
So, this type of added sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to śabda-Śakti-mūlā vyañjanā or not is not made clear by Vamana.
In the third adhikarana-second adhyāya, Vāmana deals with “samādhi guna" with reference to sense. He defines it as - "artha-drstih samādhih.” (III. ii. 7) The dawning or flashing of (a special) meaning is the excellence called 'samadhi'. When a mind is in a state of poise, meanings flash upon it. At II. ii. 7, Vamana classifies 'artha' or meaning into 'vyakta' i.e. one that is expressed clearly, and 'sūksma' i.e, one that is subtle : "artho vyaktah sūksmas'ca”. At III. ii. 10, he says that 'sukṣma' or subtle is also two-fold such as 'bhāvya' or that which can be easily grasped, and 'vāsaniya' or that which can be understood after close application : "sūksmo dhvidhā bhavati. bhāvyo vāsaniyas'ca. sighra-nirūpanā-gamyo bhavyah, ekāgratā-prakarsa-gamyo vāsanīyah iti.” He goes on illustrating the same. Now both 'bhavya' and 'vāsaniya' are more subtle as compared to the 'vyakta' or barely expressed. Out of these two also, 'vāsaniya' is subtler. Thus, we come across a clear recognition of implied sense, without however any reference to the relevant vrtti viz. vyañjanā here.
KSV. III. ii. 5 defines "kānti-guna' as, “dīpta-rasatvam kāntih”, i.e. the narration involving full-fledged rasa-delineation makes for ‘kānti-guna' in Vāmana's estimation. The illustration he reads is purely an instance with sộngāra-rasa as the dominant one. But again, inspite of recognition of rasa-delineation in poetry, Vāmana does not discuss as to which power of word brings about the particular rasa-realization. But, it is certain that in all the cases pointed out as above, Vamana comes very close to the recognition of vyañjanā without naming it, of course.

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225 Udbhata : In Udbhata's
kāra (K.L.) we come across some direct or indirect references to all the three vșttis as below : At V. 16, Udbhața defines 'vyājastuti' as :
"sabda-śakti-svabhāvena yatra nindeva gamyate.
vastutas tu stutiḥ śresthā vājastutir asau matā.” 'sabda-sakti' here stands for abhidhāśakti. 'gamyate' i.e. 'is implied', can refer to 'is suggested'. I. 21, Udbhața defines rūpaka as,
"śrutyā sambandha-virahāt yat padena padántaram, guņa-vȚtti-pradhānena
yujyate rūpakam tu tat.” Pratīhārenduraja in his Laghu-vrtti (pp. 11, Edn. N.S., Bombay '28) says : "padántarasya gunavstteḥ aparena padena yoge rūpakam bhavati", ... and adds - "śrutir nirantarā'rtha-nisthah sabda-vyāpārah. tayā śruty, anupapadyamānapadántara-sambandham sat padántaram guņavstti yatrā'pareņa padena yujyate tatra rūpakatā." The Vivrti (Edn. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1931), pp. 7, observes : "yat padena padā'ntaram sambadhyate tad-rūpakam. ... śrutir nirantarā'rtha-nişthaḥ śabda-vyāpārah... guņavstritvam iti hi mukhyā'rthabādhah.” - Thus, we come across a clear mentioning of both ‘abhidhā' and ‘guņavrtti' here, as is explained by Pratīhārendurāja (approxinately the last half of the 10th Cen. A.D. - De, pp. 74) At IV. 11, Udbhața defines paryāyokta as,
"paryāyoktam yad anyena prakāreņa abhidhīyate, vācya-vācaka-vșttibhyām
śūnyena avagamanā”tmanā.” Here, vācaka-vștti is pure abhidhā, vācya-vítti could be laksaņā, while. 'avagamana' could be vyañjanā. The commentators viz. Pratīhārendurāja, the author of Laghuvịtti and Rājānka Tilaka, the author of Vivrti, have the following observations : (pp. 60, Edn. Bom. ibid) : “vācakasya abhidhāyakasya sva-sabdasya vịttir vyāpāro vācyārtha-pratyāyanam. vācyasya tu abhidheyasya vyāpāro vācyā'ntareņa saha

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
ākānkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-māhātmyāt samsarga-gamanam. evamvidhaś ca yo vācyavācakayor vyāpāras tam antarena api prakārā'ntarena artha-samarthyā❞tmanā avagamana-svabhāvena yad avagamyate tat paryāyeṇa svakanṭhánabhihitam api sántareṇa śabda-vyāpāreņa avagamyamānatvāt paryāyoktam vastu. tena ca svasamśleṣa-vasena kävyárthólamkriyate." - Tilaka (pp. 35) has - "vācakavṛttiḥ abhidhā. vācyavṛttir ākānkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-vaśāt samsarga-gamanam. tābhyām vinā artha-samarthyā"tmanā avagamana-svabhāvena yat pratipadyate tat paryāyeṇa anyena rūpeṇa abhidhānam iti paryāyoktam. avagamana-vyāpāreņa katham abhidhānam iti cet, paryāyokta-tattvam-aprastutapraśamsā-vyākhyāne vakṣyāmaḥ.” - Thus, according to these two commentators, Udbhata here seems to refer to vācakavṛtti i.e. abhidhā, vācyavṛtti i.e. tatparya and avagamana i.e. vyañjanā in all prohability. As noted above, "vācya-vṛtti" could also mean lakṣaṇā.
226
Rudrața: In Radrata we do not come across any direct reference to 'abhidha', however, at VI. 3 he defines 'a-samartha' blemish as:
"padam idam asamartham syad
vācakam arthasya tasya na ca vaktum, tam śaknoti tirohita
tat-samarthyam, nimittena."
'asamartha' occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors. Read Namisādhu (pp. 151, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, Edn. '66) "padam iti. yatpadam tasya nirdistasya arthasya vācakam. atha ca tam eva artham vaktum na śaknoti tadā asamartham. vācakam cet katham na śaknoti iti āha, nimittena kena-cid śabdántara-sambandhā"dinā tirohitam yasya tat, tam abhidhātum na śaknoti iti. etena a-vācakatva-doṣād asāmarthyam dosa-bheda uktaḥ." Herein we may read an indirect reference to, and recognition of, 'abhidha'. At VI. 5, and 6 in the same context, Rudrata describes another variety of a-samartha wherein a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e.g. √"han" in the sense of 'going'. At VI. 6, Rudrața says:
"śabda-prakṛti-hetau, satyam apy asamartham eva rūḍhi-balāt,
yaugikam artha-viseṣam padam yathā vāridhau jalabhṛt."
Namisādhu observes (pp. 153, ibid): "jala-dhāraṇa-kriyā-lakṣane pravṛttinimitte satyapi jalabhṛt śabdo varidhim samudram abhidhātum asamarthaḥ megha eva tasya rūḍhitvät, iti."

-

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227
'Asamartha' also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology, but is rendered incapable to convey it on account of rūḍhi or usage; e.g. 'jalabhṛt' cannot be used for 'varidhi' i.e. an ocean. The maxim viz. 'rūḍhir yogāt baliyasi' seems to be known to Rudrața also and he thus knows a variety of abhidhártha.
Apratīta, a blemish is defined by Rudrața at VI. II, -
"yuktyā vakti tam artham
na ca rūḍham yatra yad abhidhānatayā, dvedhā tad apratītam
samsayavad asamśayam ca padam."
Namisādhu has: (pp. 156, ibid): "atha ca tatra artha'bhidhānatayā vācakatvena na rūḍham, na prasiddham, tat ca apratītam dvedhā."
Thus, Rudrața mentions "abhidhānatayā rūḍham artham" i.e. a meaning fixed by the power of expression abhidhā. VI. 12 gives an illustration of 'apratīta' involving doubt; e.g. 'himaha... etc. VI. 13 gives an illustration of apratīta-doṣa having no doubt, - ‘a-samśaya' - ‘aśvayoṣin mukhárciṣman' is the illustration, and it means 'vadavānala'. Radrața observes that here this particular word is used for the normally used 'yaugika' or 'rudha' words. Here again, we come across, a reference to yaugika and rūḍha sabdas, which lead to abhidhā.
-
At VII. i. also, Rudrața seems to refer to abhidhártha very clearly when he says: "arthaḥ punar abhidhāvān

-
pravartate, yasya vācakaḥ śabdaḥ, tasya bhavanti dravyam,
guṇaḥ, kriyā, jātir iti bhedāḥ."
We do not come across any reference to gunavṛtti or lakṣaṇā in Rudrata except at VII. 58 and here too indirectly when he illustrates 'viparita' anumāņa. The anumāna is said to be 'viparīta' because the 'sadhya' is described as following the sādhakas :
The illustration cited is (VII. 58) :
"vacanam upacara-garbham dūrād udgamanam āsanam sakalam, idam adya mayi tathā te yatha'si nūnam priye kupitā."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Herein, 'vacana' is said to be 'upacāragarbha', and thus a reference to 'upacāra' is found here of course indirectly. Similarly at VII. 49, we have, 'abhidhiyate sato vā” ... etc., giving a clear reference of abhidha'. VII. 38, Rudrața defines 'bhāva' as :
“yasya vikāraḥ prabhavan apratibaddhena hetunā yena, 'gamayati' tad abhiprāyam
tat-pratibandham ca bhāvó sau.” The illustration is,
"grāma-taruņam tarunya nava-vanjula-mañjarī-sanātha-karam, paśyantyā bhavati muhur.
nitarām malinā mukha-cchāyā.” Bhāva also occurs, holds Rudrata (VII. 40), when a sentence conveying the direct sense, also suggests another sense :
"abhidheyam abhidadhānam tad eva tat-sadrśa-sakala-guna-dosam, arthā'ntaram avagamayati
yad vākyam sóparo bhāvaḥ." The illustration (VII. 41) is -
ekākini yad abalā, taruņī tathā'ham, asmin gļhe gļhapatiś ca gato videśam, kim yācase tad iha vāsam iyam varāki
śvaśrūr mamā'ndha-badhirā nanu mūdha pāntha !" Namisādhu explains : (pp. 209, ibid) -
"ekākini iti. taruņa-pathikasya vāsam yācamānasya kācit sābhilāsā yoșid idam prakata-pratisedhā'rtham vākyam āha. etena caukta-padārthena vilaksano vāsā'numati-vidhi-laksano bhāvóvagamyate." This is an indirect. but clear recognition of wañianā, pure and simple. At VIII. 74, Rudrata defines anyokti as -
"asamāna-višesanam api yatra samāna-itivíttam upameyam,

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229 uktena gamyate param
upamānena iti să anyoktih.” This also is a veiled reference to vyañjanā.
Thus, we have observed that in earlier alamkārikas from Bhāmaha to Rudrața, we do not find the topic of the word-powers i.e. sabda-vșttis discussed as an independent topic as is done by later alamkārikas such as Mammata and his followers. But we do, however, find references - both direct or indirect but equally positive, in their works, to various sabda-vịttis and various types of meanings such as the principal or mukhya, which is abhidheya and the secondary i.e. a-mukhya or gauna, upacarita etc. Thus, we do find references in their works which go to prove that they were absolutely aquainted with abhidhā and laksanā to be sure, and that the concept of vyañjanā was not absent from their minds. The idea of vyañjanā was surely in its embryonic form, if not flowered in their minds. Though of course they have not clearly defined vyañjanā, but then they have not defined either abhidhā or laksaņā also, precisely because they had no compulsion to do so. Perhaps sāmājikas in those days never confused between one and the other. But for Anandavardhana, who tried to make a clear distinction between one and the other, explaining and establishing vyañjanā had become a necessity.

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Chapter 1
Pratīyamāna artha
OR Implicit sense, - as seen in the earlier ālamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Daņdin etc.
Some of the greatest exponents of the dhvani school such as Anandavardhana (middle of the 9th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 101), Abhinavagupta (1015 A.D.), Ruyyaka (IInd and Illrd quarters of the 12th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 181;) and Jagannātha (17th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 231, SK. Poetics; 1620 A.D. to 1660 A.D.-) hold that the earlier writers such as Bhāmaha and the like, though they had not defined either vyañjanā or dhvani, were more or less familiar with the fact of dhvani.
Anandavardhana observes : "yadyapi ca dhvani-sabda-samkirtanena kavyalaksana-vidhāyibhir gunavṛttir anyo vā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakaśitaḥ, tathápi amukhya-vịttyā kāvyesu vyavahāram darśayatā dhvanimārgo manāk sprstopi na lakṣita iti parikalpya evam uktam, 'bhāktam āhus tam anye' iti.” - (Dhv. I. i, aloka; pp. 4, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, '74)
Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. i, (above passage), tries to explain as to who were the ālamkārikas referred to by Anandavardhana - Says he - (pp. 16, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Dhv. with Locana, Ahd. '97, '98) :
darśayatā iti, bhatrodbhata-vāmanā"dinā. bhāmahena uktam - "sabdas' cchando'bhidhānárthāh” iti. abhidhānasya sabdad bhedam vyākhyatum bhatdbhato babhāṣe - śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvyāpāro mukhyo, guņa-vịttis' ca. Vāmanópi 'sādrsyallaksanā vakroktih' iti. manāk sprsta iti. tais tāvad dhvani-digunmīlitā, yathālikhita-pathakais tu svarūpa-vivekam kartum aśaknuvadbhih tat

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svarūpa-viveko na krtaḥ, praty uta upālabhyate, abhagna-nārikelavat yathāśrutatad-granthodgrahaņa-mātrena, iti."
It is very clear that both Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are absolutely clear that the ancients knew dhvani, and therefore, we may add, vyañjana also, eventhough they did not make any attempt to arrive at its definition.
Ruyyaka, in the beginning of his work Alamkāra-sarvasva says : ('65 pp. 2, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass)
"iha hi tāvad bhāmahodbhața-prabhịtayaś cirantanálamkārakārāḥ pratīyamānam artham vācyopaskārakatayā alamkārapakşa-niksiptam manyante. tathā hi . paryāyokta-aprastuta - praśamsā-samāsoktyāksepa-vyājastuti-upameyopamāananvayā"dau vastumātram gamyamānam vācyopaskārakatvena, 'sva-siddhaye parāksepaḥ' 'parārtham sva-samarpanam' iti yathā-yogam dvividhayā bangyā pratipaditam tai).
rudrasena tu bhāvā'lamkāro dvi-dhaivoktaḥ. rūpaka-dīpaka-apahnutitulyayogitā"dau upamā”dy alamkāro vācyopaskārakatvena uktah. utpreksā tu svayam eva pratīyamānā kathitā. rasavat-preyah-prabhrtau rasabhāvā"dir vācyaśobhāhetutvena uktah. tad itthām trividham api pratīyamānam alamkāratayā khyāpitam 'eva.
vāmanena tu sādrśya-nibandhanāyā laksaņāyā vakroktyalamkāratvam bruvatā kaścid dhvanibhedólamkāratayā eva uktaḥ. kevalam guna-viśista-padaracanā"tmikā rītih kāvyā"tmatvena uktā..."
Thus Ruyyaka has analytically specified how threefold implicit sense is covered under various figures of speech by earlier ālamkārikas.
Jagannātha in his Rasa-gangādhara (pp. 555 Edn. N.S. Bombay, '47) observes :
idam tu bodhyam. dhvanikārāt prācīnair bhāmahodbhata-prabhṛtibhih svagranthesu kutrā'pi dhvani-gunībhūtavyangya"di sabda na prayuktah iti etāvatā eva tair dhvanyā"dayo na svīkriyante iti adhunikānām vācoyuktir ayuktā eva. yataḥ samāsokti-vyāja-stuti-aprastutapraśamsādy-alamkāra-nirūpaņe kiyantópi guņābhūta-vyangya-bhedās tair api nirūpitāḥ. aparaś ca sarvópi vyangyaprapancah paryāyokta-kuksau niksiptah. na hi anubhavasiddhórtho bālena api apahnotum śakyate. dhvanvā"di-padaih param vyavahāro na krtah. tena na hi etāvatā anangīkāro bhavati.
It can be said that the presence of vyañjanā and vyangyārtha or suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the Rig-veda, but perhaps it is quite different to discover in poets and critics any theoretically conscious understanding

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA of vyañjanā and vyangvārtha and 'dhvani' in its technical sense. So, it can be argued that in the discussion that follows, of alamkāras and gunas in which vyañjanā and vyañgyārtha are subsumed, in case of the treatment by earlier ālamkārikas, there is no positive proof of their conscious understanding of these entities. But, by and large, on second thought, we may choose to go with Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruwvaka and Jagannātha, that the earlier ālamkārikas knew both wanjanā and vyangvārtha, but they had no apparent reason to define and elaborate these topics, like Yāska, Pānini and Patañjali and perhaps also the Mimāmsakas, who had no occasion and therefore no business to define these topics separately and carve out their independent existence. Actually after the age of the earlier ālamkārikas and before the time of Anandavardhana, some misunderstanding started in the circles of literary critics and therefore Anandavardhana took it upon himself to systematically expound and establish the concept of dhvani' in its technical sense, with of course 'vyañjana' as its poetic instrument. It may be noted that in whole-heartedly supporting the remarks of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jagannātha we are shifting from the position taken by us on an earlier occasion, while we prepared our thesis — “The Origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit poetics", - and got it published. (See pp. 179, Edn. Guj. Uni. Ahmedabad, '73)
We will go to see how the fact of pratīyamāna artha i.e. implicit sense is incorporated under various heads by the earlier alamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and the rest.
Bhāmaha : At - II. 85 Bhāmaha's general outlook towards all alamkāras becomes clear when he observes :
"saişa sarvaiva vakroktiḥ anayártho vibhāvyate yatósyām kavinā kāryaḥ
kólamkāro'nayā vină ?” (II. 85, Bhāmaha) Read Tātacharya (pp. 57, ibid) : vakroktiḥ alamkāraḥ. 'vakrā'bhidheyaśabdoktir-istā vācām alamkştih." iti vacanāt yā nirūpitā atiśayoktiḥ sā eva sarvā vakroktih, sarvólamkāraḥ. anayā atiśayoktyā kāvyārthah rasa-carvanā-'nugunavisada-pratīti-gocarīkriyate. etad ghatane kavinā samrambhah kāryaḥ. anayā vina alamkāraḥ eva na bhavati.” - Thus for Bhāmaha, atiśayokti or vakrokti i.e. beauty lies at the root of all the alamkāras or beautiful turns of expressions. It is implied in all alamkāras in one way or the other. The presence of 'pratīvamāna' element
Isl.

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233 is thus reconised as the very basis on which the whole of art, architecture and edifice of poetry is built.
At I. 30, Bhămaha asserts that this 'vakrokti' should be present in all poetry beginning from a muktaka i.e. a single independent verse to a mahākāvya or an epic :
"anibaddham punar gāthā śloka-mātrā"di tat punah, yuktam vakra-svabhāvoktyā
sarvam eva etad isyate.” Thus vakrokti is omnipresent for Bhāmaha. At I. 34, he is even prepared to reject the so called vaidarbha kävya if it is found bereft of this element of vakrokti :
“a-pustártham a-vakrokti prasannam rju-komalam, bhinnam geyam iva idam tu
kevalam śruti-peśalam." "If the composition is meagre in meaning and bereft of beautiul expression, though clear, uninvolved and soft, it is to be taken as different from poetry, (and) something akin to a musical composition appealing only to the ear.”.
Tatacharya writes : (pp. 15, ibid) : a-pustártham a-gambhīrártham, ata eva prasannam kavi-pratibhā-janita-rasopaskāra-rahitam, a-vakrokti alamkāraśünyam, ata eva rju pāmara-sādhārana-vārtā-tulyam evam kavya-jīvita-vikalam api komalam lalita-pada-bandham idam tu vaidarbham vilakṣaṇam geyam iva kevalam sștimadhuram, na tu priti-hetu-bhūta-viśista-śabdárthamaya-kāvya-vyapadeśa-nidānaśobhāśāli. tathā ca kāvyatyam eva nástīti kutas tad-višeșatā. geyam gītipradhānā padaracanā."
Bhāmaha very clearly affirms the use of only 'vakra' 'word and sense' in poetry when he observes at I. 36 :
"na nitāntā”di-mātrena jāyate cărutā girām, vakrábhidheyaśābdoktir
iştā vācām alamkṛtiḥ.” "By the use of soft words such as 'nitānta' and the like, poetic beauty is not caused. A poetic expression graced by beauty in word and sense is welcome as true 'alamkāra' (i.e. inherent poetic beauty) of speech."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Tatacharya is ill at ease to explain 'nitānta-ādi-mātrena' (pp. 17, ibid). Bui ultimately falls upon the right explanation when he observes : "vaksyamāna anuprāsa-viśesa-upasthāpana-dvārena nitāntā”díti bandha-komalatvam iha laksayati. srtipeśalatva-sampadakena bandhasya komalatva-mātrena kavya-vyapadeśa-ucitā cărutā giram na jāyate-vakrayor abhidheya-sabdayor-ghatanā tu vācām alamkṛtiḥ. kā śabdasya vakratā. anuprāsā”dimattā.”
Thus for Bhāmaha, word and sense charged with vakroti alone make for poetry, and this element of vakroti is mostly implicit, though it could be even explicit at times.
It will be interesting here, even at the cost of little diversion, to note some inherent parallalism in the thinking of both Bhāmaha and Dandin, the earlier masters. Dandin also at K.D. II. 214, observes that 'atiśayokti' is at the root of all poetic expression. He observes : (K.D. II. 214): .
"vivakşā yā viśeşasya loka-sīmátivartini asau atiśayoktiḥ syāt
alamkārottamā yathā..” Thus atiśayokti, the best of alamkāras, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way. The ‘atiśaya' is ‘lokātiśaya', i.e. something beyond ordinary. It is this something special in poetry which makes for the aesthetic beauty in literature. Dandin, at II. 216 observes :
"samśayātiśayā”dīnām
vyaktyai kiñcin nidarśyate.” 'vyaktyai' takes us to inherent vyañjan, in the said description. At II. 220 (K.D.) Dandin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech. He observes :
"alamkārántarāņām apy ekam āhuḥ parāyaṇam,
vāgiấa-mahitām uktim imām atiśayā”hvayām.” So, for Dandin this ‘atiśaya', or vakrată of Bhāmaha, forms the essence which makes poetry what it is and separates it from local ordinary expressions. This 'atiśaya' of Dandin or 'vakratā' of Bhāmaha is seen implicit in poetic expression. This leads to the acceptance by both of implicit sense in poetry and also possibly vyañjanā as an instrument conveying this hidden treasure. Both Bhāmaha and

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Dandin seem to have an indentical attitude to alamkara or aesthetic beauty revealed through poetry. Both are not struck merely by the outward expression only of a given alamkāra, but by something else, by inner beauty lying at the root of a given poetic figure. We will be able to underline the element of 'avagamana' i.e. pratīyamānatā', perhaps through the agency of vyañjanā, in some of the figures described by both of them. If may be noted here incidentally, that it is more in this implicit element that the charm of a given alamkāra lies.
Bhāmaha's treatment of various alamkāras will bring home this point.
Bhamaha begins with 'rupaka'. Rūpaka occurs when in consideration of similarity in qualities the upameya is identified with the upamāna (KL. II. 22). Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rupaka, that is to say, upamā is itself implied in rūpaka, or better say 'aupamya' is inherent in rūpaka. At II. 24, Bhāmaha describes 'eka-deśa-vivarti-rūpaka' and it is already clear that this sort of expression involves an element of unexpressed or implied sense also. II. 25 describes dīpaka as three-fold. The element of upama is implied in all the varieties of dīpaka as illustrated by Bhamaha (II. 27, 28, 29). Prativastūpamā (parallel) occurs -
"samāna-vastu-nyasena
prativastūpamócyate,
yatheva-anabhidhānépi
gunasamya-pratiti-taḥ." (II. 34, K.L.)
Thus, there is prativastūpamā when, even in the absence of words such as yathā, vā, etc., which are directly expressive of upamā, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also the idea of similarity seems to be implied only.
At II. 68, 'ākṣepa'
(paraleipsis) is defined as : "pratiṣedha iva iṣṭasya yo viseṣábhidhitsayā,
ākṣepa iti tam santaḥ śamsanti dvividham yathā."
Akṣepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense - “viseṣábhidhitsaya”. This 'viseṣa' is of course, implied only. At II. 75, Bhāmaha defines 'vyatireka' (excellence) as :

"upamanavatórthasya
yad viseṣa-nidarśanam,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA vyatirekam tam icchanti
viśesā”pādanād yathā.” Thus vyatireka has also an element of similarity implied in it and the external expression has something more to convey : "višesa-āpādana icchā". In the same way in vibhāvanā, (abnormal causation) at (II. 77, 78) kāranántara-kalpanā' - imagining some other cause which is not directly expressed, is at implicit level. This could be through the agency of vyañjanā. Bhāmaha, at II. 79, defines samāsókti : (Condensed Speech) -
“yatrókte gamyatényórthaḥ tat-samāna-viśesaņaḥ, sā samāsóktir uddistā
samkṣiptárthatayā yathā.” Tatacharya writes (pp. 55, ibid) : yasmin arthe ukte, anyórtho gamyate. nanu katham ekasminn artha ucyamāne aparórtho gamyeta? ucyate. tat-samānavišesaņāt. ukrasya arthasya yāni viśesaņāni tāni ced anyasyápi samānāni, tāni tam gamayanti.
This 'anyārtha-gamana' is implied and is mostly through the agency of vyañjanā. At least, there is a clear recognition of an implied sense here.
After defining atiśayokti (hyperbole) at II. 81, as noted earlier, Bhāmaha wants it to remain present in all the alamkāras. The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in kävya as such. Anything bereft of this element of atiśaya is mere vārtā' a bare local statement not involving the poetic beauty. Precisely for this reason, in Bhāmaha's understanding, or by the way Bhāmaha has imagined them, the three figures of speech such as hetu, sūksma, and leśa are no alamkāras, as there is no element of vakrokti or poetic beauty involved in them :
"hetuś ca sūksmo leśótha nálamkāratayā matāḥ, samudāyābhidhānasya
vakrokty anabhidhānataḥ.” Tatacharya writes : (pp. 58, ibid) : "vakrábhidheya-sabdoktiḥ istā vācām alamkştih”, iti tāvat sthitam. lokátikrāntatā ca śabdárthayor vakrată, să yatra násti sa katham alamkāraḥ. na ca hetvádyalamkāra-vattayábhimateșu sthalesu vakratā kācid asti. tad ete nā”lamkāratayā matāḥ. samudāyena abhidhānam yasya

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vivakṣitasya vakyárthasya sa samudayábhidhānaḥ, tasya tatra vakroktyā anabhidhānāt na alamkāratā iti." This vakrokti or poetic beauty is implicit in any alamkāra worth the name.
II. 91, defines utprekṣā, (poetic fancy) as :
"a-vivakṣita-sāmānyā kiñcit ca upamaya saha, a-tad-guṇa-kriyāyogāt utprekṣā atiśayánvitā."
Thus utprekṣā has no 'sāmānya' i.e. idea of similarity, commonness, as its purport, i.e. utprekṣā centres round sambhāvanā or probability and not mere similarity or sādṛśya. But, it has again some element of upamā, and thus similarity is only implied. In utprekṣā the upameya is said to possess such quality or action as normally does not go with it. Thus, it has an element of atiśaya implied in it. At II. 50 also Bhāmaha clearly recognises an element of atiśaya involved in both upamā and urprekṣā. Bhāmaha observes :
"yaś ca atiśayavān arthaḥ
katham sósambhavo mataḥ, istam cátiśayārthatvam
upamotprekṣayor yatha." (II. 50)
Tatacharya (pp. 89, ibid) observes: "...niṣpatatām sarāṇām tīvra-pātitvam sānubandha-pātitvam asamkhyeyatvam ca pratipādanīyam. sóyam atiśaya iha upamárthaḥ na hi ayam na sambhavati iti vaktum śakyate. tad evam yasya asambhavo na sórtho vivakṣitaḥ. yas tu vivakṣitaḥ sórtho na asambhavi iti nirnimitta upālambhaḥ, iti uktam bhavati. śabdarthas tu yasya upamana-viseṣasya atiśayavān upameya-viśeṣaḥ arthaḥ tātparya-viṣayaḥ sa upamana-viseṣaḥ katham sambhava-śunyaḥ iti manyata iti.
na kevalam upamāyām kim tu alamkarántarépi atiśaya-vivakṣayā asti asambhavatórthasya nibandhanam.
In the third chapter, Bhamaha begins his treatment with alamkāras such as preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvi. These alamkāras will be taken up for discussion later when we consider the treatment of rasa, bhāva, etc. in earlier alamkarikas in a separate chapter (= ch. XIV).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bhāmaha defines paryāyokta (periphrasis) - at III. 8a as -
“paryāyoktam yad anyena
prakāreņa abhidhīyate.” and 8b - supplies the illustration, the context of which is described as,
"uvāca ratnāharane
caidyam śārnga-dhanur yathā” with III. 9 -
"grhesu adhvasu vā na annam bhuñjmahe yad adhītinah, na bhuñjate dvijās, tac ca
rasa-dāna-nivsttaye." Bhāmaha holds that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is implied in Krsna's speech who words it differently. Thus, paryāyokta has an element of implied sense. Though Bhāmaha is not so explicit as Mammata who says,
"yad eva vyangyam tad eva vācyam
yathā tu vyangyam na tathā tad ucyate.” Though Bhāmaha does not call the implicit sense as 'vyangya', by name, but he almost seems to be inclined favourably to accept it; and also vyañjanā.
Bhāmaha does not define the figure called 'udātta' (exalted) (III. 11, 12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of aśaya-mahattva or vibhūtimahattva is only implied.
Bhāmaha has a totally novel connotation of ślesa (paronomasia) (III. 14), which occurs according to him, when there is realization of identity of the upameya with the upamāna through a guņa i.e. quality, kriyā or action, or proper noun i.e. nāmnā. It differs from the figure rūpaka (metaphor) in this respect that in rūpaka there is a clear mention of both upameya and upamāna in different terms (III. 15). Thus, for Bhāmaha, an element of similarity is implied in ślesa also. He says : (III. 14) :
"upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya sādhyate, guna-kriyābhyām nāmnă ca
ślistam tad abhidhīyate.” Tatacharya explains : “...upameya-sambandhinām gunakriyānāmnām upamānasambandhibhir guna-kriya-namabhir abheda-sampadanam iti vivaksitam. (pp. 67, ibid)

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Bhamaha defines apahnuti (concealment) at III. 21, as -
"apahnutir abhiṣṭā ca kiñcid antargatopamā, bhṛtārthápahnavād asyāḥ kriyate cábhidha yathā."
Thus, for Bhāmaha, aphnuti has clearly an element of upama implied - 'kiñcid antargata' in it.
Tatacharya explains (pp. 69, ibid) :
"apahnutiḥ pratiṣedhā"tmā prasiddhā. tatra sarvatra alamkārabhāvo neṣyate. kim tu yatra upamā gamyate, sa pratiṣedha iha apahnutiḥ. tad āha - kiñcid iti. 'kiñcid antargatiḥ vinā vacanam pratīyamānatā..."
III. 23 (K.L.) defines viseṣoktiḥ (peculiar allegation) as, :
"ekadeśasya vigame ya gunántara-samsthitiḥ, viseṣa-prathanāyásau
viseṣoktir matā yathā..."
when a portion of it is lost, another quality (or portion) survives to enhance the superiority of an object, the figure of speech is viseṣokti. This added sense i.e. of kāraṇántara-kalpana is always implied.
In the same way tulyayogita (equal pairing) (Bhamaha, III. 27) has an element of similarity implied in it. It occurs when in order to suggest some similarity in qualities, in case of two objects, one of which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected through an identical action.
Bhamaha, III. 27 says:
"nyūnasyapi viśiştena guṇa-sāmya-vivakṣayā tulya-karya-kriyā-yogāt iti uktā tulyayogitā."
III. 29, defines aprastuta-praśamsā (indirect eulogy) as,
"adhikārād apetasya vastunónyasya yā stutiḥ, aprastuta-prasamseti
să caivam kathyate yathā."
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Herein, there is mention of a matter not in hand, implying the matter in hand. Similarly, vyājastuti (artful praise) (Bhāmaha III. 31) has apparent censure and implied praise and is defined as : Bhāmaha III. 31 -
"dūrádhika-guņastotravyapadeśena tulyatām, kiñcid vidhitsor yā nindā
vyājastutir asau yathā.” Tatacharya (pp. 71) observes : "dūram atyantam adhikā gunā yasya sa dūrádhika-gunaḥ, tasya stotram gunakīrtanam krtvā tad apeksayā apakrstatvena yadi prakrtasya nindām karoti, kim icchan ? kena-cid amsena tat-tulyatām prakstasya vidhātum pratipādayitum icchan sā vyājastutiḥ...”
Nidarśanā (illustration) has also implied similarity, because in it, without the use of such terms as yathā, iva, etc., through action only, some idea is expressed. Bhāmaha defines nidarśanā at III. 34, as :
“kriyayā eva visistasya tad arthasya upadarśanāt, jñeyā nidarśanā nāma
yatheva-vatibhir vinā.” In upameyopamā (reciprocal simile) (III. 57) the idea of elimination of any third similar object i.e. trtiya-sadrsa-vyavaccheda is implied. In sahokti (unified description) also (III. 39), there is implied similarity. Sasamdeha (doubtful) is defined at III. 43 as,
"upamānena tattvam ca bhedam ca, vadataḥ punaḥ, sasamdeham vacaḥ stutyai
sasamdehaḥ vidur yathā.” Thus, the idea of praise of upameya is implied only. Bhāmaha defines 'ananvaya' (self-comparision) at III. 45, as,
"yatra tenaiva tasya syād upamānópameyatā a-sādịśya-vivaksātaḥ tam iti āhur ananvayam.”

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Thus, ananvaya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison; that is to say it is unrivalled, ananvaya occurs. The idea of asādęśya-vivaksā is implied only :
Thus utpreksāvayava (at Bhāmaha III. 47) having in itself the use of doublemeaning words, and an element of both utpreksā and rüpaka, has the idea of similarity between upameya and upamāna necessarily implied.
III. 53, 54 define 'bhāvikatva' (vivid presentation) which is a guna i.e. excellence with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present, and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated, and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged, wherein the expression is not involved. The definition runs as :
"Dāvikatvam iti prāhuḥ prabandha-visayam guņam, pratyaksā iva drśyante
yatrárthāḥ bhūta-bhāvinaḥ." and,
"citródāttádbhutárthatvam kathāyāḥ sv abhinītatā, śabdánākulatā ceti
tasya hetum pracaksate.” Tatacharya observes : (pp. 78, ibid) : “mahākavinām tu kāvya-višeșeșu prasphuţábhi-vyaktārtha-varnanāviśesā atra udāharaṇatvena drastavyāḥ.” Thus, bhāvika alamkāra is by itself of the nature of implied only, as it rests on a whole composition.
We have thus examined how Bhāmaha has incorporated the pratiyamāna or implied sense in various alamkāras. But he has not declared it to be derived through the agency of vyañjanā, and he has not called it 'gunībhūta-vyangya' by name also.
But what he is aware of can not be brushed aside and hence Jagannātha has said that the ancients know dhvani, of course without naming it as such - 'dhvanināma-samkirtanena vinā', and much earlier Abhinavagupta had also vouchsafed that there was a living oral tradition of dhvani, without of course, putting it in a book form - vinápi viśista-pustakeșu viniveśanāt. Thus Bhāmaha knew it and so also Dandin and the rest of pre-Anandavardhana writers on literary aesthetics.

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We will 'go to examine how this is borne out in the works of Dandin, Vāmana, Udbhata and Rudrata in the following pages.
Dandin Dandin in his Kāvyādarśa (K.D.) defines 'madhura guna' at I. 51, 52 as a statement (= vāci) which is gifted with rasa or aesthetic rapture, and also when rasa is experienced with reference to the object or vastu described (= vastuni). Daṇḍin says that such a composition, padāsattiḥ, has words that look similar when heard, and is also capable of conveying rasa.
Dandin I. 51, 52 read as -
"madhuram rasavad, vāci vasturi api rasaḥ sthitaḥ, yena madyanti dhimantaḥ madhuna iva madhuvratāḥ."
"yaya kayācit śrutya yat samānam anubhūyate tad-rūpā hi padāsattiḥ sánuprāsā rasāvahā."
The illustration viz. I. 53,

"eṣa rājā yadā lakṣmīm prāptavān brāhmaṇa-priyaḥ, tada-prabhṛti dharmasya
lokésmin utsavo'bhavat."
The illustration nourishes the emotion with reference to a religious king. Thus madhurya has a lot of implicit sense in it..
In I. 62, Danḍin proceeds to explain that though all alamkāras make for rasa in sense, it is a-grāmyatā i.e. absence of vulgarity, which carries the burden to a greater extent. This a-grāmyata is virtually artha-gata-mādhurya. Daṇḍin observes: (I. 62) :
"kāmam sarvópy alamkāro rasam arthe niṣiñcati,
tatha'pi agrāmyatā eva enam bhāram vahati bhūyasā."

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Dandin further observes that (I. 63, 64) such statements as,
"kanye kamayamānam mām na tvam kāmayase katham"
- are basically vulgar and make for the detriment of rasa. Says he : "iti grāmyóyam arthā❞tmā
vairasyāya prakalpate."
He holds that, if the same statement is modified as -
"kāmam kandarpa-cāṇḍālo mayi vāmákṣi nirdayaḥ
tvayi nir-matsaro distyāiti agrāmyórtho rasā”vahaḥ.”
Thus the statement in its new form becomes charged with rasa and is totally free from vulgarity. This madhura is full of implied sense in form of rasa or aesthetic pleasure.
Dandin (exalted) defines 'udaraguṇa' (rich) at I. 76, as,
"utkarṣavān guṇaḥ kaścid yasmin ukte pratīyate,
tad udārā"hvayam, tena sanāthā kāvya-paddhatiḥ."
Thus udara guna consists of a statement which when expressed makes for the implication of some lofty quality, and poetry is highly dependent on it. The prabha țikā observes (pp. 86):
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"yasmin vākye ukte sati utkarṣavān, varṇanīya-utkarṣa-pratipadakaḥ, lokottaracamatkāra-ādhāyī guṇaḥ dharma-viseṣaḥ pratiyate vakyam udārā"hvayam udārasamjñakam." Thus, jñāna-viṣayo bhavati tad 'udara' is gifted with a lot of implied element. Dandin adds that (I. 78) in the illustration cited as above, the excess of generosity is clearly indicated - "iti tyāgasya vākyésmin utkarṣaḥ sadhu lakṣyate." This is implicit sense, pure and simple.
K.D.; I. 79 gives another variety of udara which consists of significant adjectives such as 'lilámbuja', krīḍā-sara, hemángada, etc. Here also the idea of opulence is implied. I. 79 reads as :

"ślaghyair viseṣaṇair yuktam udāram kaiścid isyate,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA yathā līlámbuja-krīdāsaro
hemárgadā”dayah." ‘kānti guna' (beauty) is defined at I. 85 as,
"kāntam sarva-jagat-kāntam laukikártha-an-atikramāt, tac ca vārtábhidhāneșu
varṇanāsv api dṛśyate.” Kanta (beautiful) occurs when there is an absence of hyperbole, i.e. when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts (= vārtá-bhidhāna) or in description of objects (varnanāsu api) and is liked by all. Thus kānti guna has a natural mode of expression and thereby it implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I. 86, 87, as --
"gļhāņi nāma tāny eva taporaśir bhavādęśaḥ sambhāvayati yāny eva
pāvanaiḥ pāda-pāmsubhiḥ.” and,
"anayor anavadyángi stanayor jrmbhamāņayor avakāśo na paryāptaḥ
tava bāhu-latántare." In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied, and in the second, feeling of love with reference to the heroine is implied,
In samādhi-guņa (facilitation) (I. 93 K.D.), according to Dandin, somebody else's quality is superimposed on somebody else. This is a clear instance of laksanā based on similarity which is implied. K.D. I. 93 reads as -
"anyadharmas tatónyatra loka-sīmánurodhinā samyag ādhīyate yatra sa samadhiḥ smộto yathā."

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I. 94 is given to illustrate the above, such as -
"kumudāni nimîlanti kamalāny unmiṣanti ca, iti netra-kriyádhyāsāl
labdhā tad-vācinī śṛtiḥ."
Dandin then adds that words such as niṣṭhyuta, udgīrṇa, vānta, etc. convey a charming sense when used metaphorically. If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar. Thus, even here, there is not only an acceptance of implicit sense, but there is clear mentioning of "gauna-vṛtti" also. K.D. I. 95 says:
"nisthyūta-udgirṇa-vāntā"di gunavṛtti-vyapāśrayam,
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atisundram anyatra
grāmakakṣām vigāhate."
This samadhi-guna, observes Dandin, in which a metaphorical expression is involved, is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets: KD. I. 99 reads as,
"tad-etat-kavya-sarvasvam samādhir nama yo gunah, kavi-sārthaḥ samagrópi
tam enam anugacchati."
Thus, in his treatment of gunas or excellences Daṇḍin seems to cover a lot of implicit sense. In his treatment of the figures of sense, i.e. arthālamkāras also, like Bhāmaha he has incorporated a lot of imlicit sense. We have noted earlier his general attitude towards alamkāras. We will not repeat our discussion concerning alamkāras such as rūpaka, dīpaka, apahnuti, vyājastuti, aprastuta-praśamsā, samāsokti tulyayogita, nidarśanā, paryāyokta, ākṣepa, etc., which contain implied sense as explained when we dealt with these alamkāras in Bhamaha's Kavyalamkāra, but we will deal with a good many varieties of upamā pointed out by Daṇḍin, and go to underline that almost all these sub-varieties of upamă are beautified by an element of implied sense inherent in them. With this general note we will go to examine Dandin's treatment of arthálam kāras as below.

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Dandin defines upamā at II. 14, as -
“yatha-kathañcit sāděśyam yatrodbhūtam pratiyate, upamā nāma sā, tasyāḥ
prapancóyam pradarśyate.” Thus, for Dandin upamā occurs when similarity is apprehanded in any way - "yathā-kathan-cit" i.e. either in a directly expressed fashion or in an implied way. Most of the varieties counted by Dandin have implied similarity. Thus, vastúpamā (II. 16) has the common quality implied only · "pratīyamānaika-dharmā”. Viparyāsopamā has upamāna in place of upamaya and vice versa, thereby implying the superiority of upameya over upamāna (K.D. II. 17). Anyonyopamā (II. 19) is the same as upameyopamā, having the idea of třtīya-sadrśa-vyavaccheda or elimination of a possible third similar object, as implied only. Niyamópamā (II. 19) has the idea of restriction implied, when the face is described as similar to lotus alone.
In atiśayopamā also (II. 22), in the absence of any upamā-vācaka, the similarity is only implied. K.D. II. 23 gives utpreksitopamā and has an element of utpreksā implied in it. Adbhutópamā (II. 24), which is the same as what later ālamkārikas recognize as 'yady artha-tiśayokti', has also implied similarity. Mohop has moha or bhrānti implied. Samśayopamā (II. 26), is the same as sa-samdeha of the later alamkārikas having implied similarity. Nirnayopamā (II. 27) is what Viśvanātha later recognizes as niścáyálamkāra having implied comparision. II. 30 gives nindópamā which has also the same quality of implied sense. Similar is the case with praśamśópamā (II. 31), ācikhyāsópamā (II. 32), virodhópamā (II. 33), pratiśedhópamā (II. 34), cātúpamā (II. 35), tattvākhyānópamā (II. 36), asādhāraṇopamā (II. 37), a-sambhavitópamā (II. 39), bahúpamā (II. 40), vikriyopamā (II. 41), etc. etc. Prativastúpamā (parallel) (II. 46) is,
'vastu kiñcid upanyasya nyasanāt tat sadharmaṇaḥ, sāmya-pratītir astíti
prativastúpamā yathā.” Thus, there is implied comparision between the statements. Tulya-yogopamā (II. 48), also has the same charm of implied sense. Thus we see that in Dandin also there is a clear recognition of pratīyamāna or implied sense.

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Vāmana : For Vāmana the position is still clearer for he recognizes upamā as the basis of all the alamkāras which are termed by him as “upamā-prapañca”. His ‘kāntiguna' is defined as 'dīpta-rasatvam' i.e. one in which rasas are clearly marked, and are in an aroused condition. All this clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense. His 'samadhi' guna is defined as 'artha-drstih' i.e. perception of the sense (III. 2.7. KSV.). Vāmana goes on classifying 'artha' as 'vyakta' and 'sūksma' (III. 2.9) and the latter again is 'bhāvya' and 'vāsanīya', i.e. that which is easily elicited, and that which is elicited after concentration, respectively (III. 2.10 KSV.). The illustrations of both these varieties contain implied sense.
Udbhata - In his Kāvyálamkāra-sāra-samgraha (= K.S.S.), Udbhata follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhāmaha and seems to incorporate the element of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhāmaha. Pratīhāréndurāja (first half of 10th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 74, ibid), wants us to believe that Udbhata had knowingly incorporated 'dhvani' under alamkāras, when he observes : (pp. 92, 3, NS. Edn. Bombay, '28) :
- 'nanu yatra kāvye sahỉdaya-hrdayā”hlādinaḥ pradhānabhūtasya, sva-sabdavyāpāra-asprstatvena pratīyamānaika-rūpasya arthasya sadbhāvas tatra
vidhárthábhivyaktihetuh kavya-jīvita-bhūtah kaiścit sahrdayair dhvanir nāma, vyañjakatva-bhedā”tmā kāvya-dharmóbhihitaḥ. sa katham iha nopadistaḥ ? ucyateesv eválamkāresu antar bhāvāt.
Pratīhārendurāja then goes to explain with illustrations at places how different alamkāras of Udbhața contain this or that type of dhvani.
Rudrata : Rudrața also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implicit sense with reference to all the alamkāras such as rūpaka, dīpaka, paryayokta, etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold bhāva also in VIII. 38-41, which contains an implied sense. VII. 38, reads as :
"yasya vikāraḥ prabhavan apratibaddhena hetunā yena,
gamayati tad abhiprāyam tat-pratibandham ca bhāvosau.” III. 40 reads as,
"abhidheyam abhidhānam tad eva tat-saděśa-sakala-gunadosam,
arthántaram avagamayati yad-vākyam sóparo bhāvah.” Rudrata's use of words clearly suggest that he is conscious not only of the implied sense, but also of vyañjanā. He has gone for an elaborate treatment of rasa also but is silent about the theoretical discussion concerning rasa-realization.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Our detailed examination as above goes to establish the fact that alamkārikas earlier than Anandavardhana positively knew the pratīyamāna-artha, without naming it either as 'dhvani' or 'gunībhūtavyangya' arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā. We feel that the use of such words as 'avagamayati' and 'gamayati', goes to establish their awareness concerning perhaps vyañjanā also. Perhaps they had no occasion, as had Anandavardhana, to establish dhvani and vyañjanā clearly due to confusion created about their nature by less gifted alamkārikas that followed the earlier masters and preceeded Ānandavardhana. We will now go to examine the nature of sabdavrtti's i.e. abhidhā, laksanā and vyañjanā and also tātparya in greater details in the following pages.

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Chapter V Śabdavṛttis, the nature of: 'Abhidhā'
General Introduction :
We have seen how the concept of sabda-vyāpāra is reflected in recognition of abhidhā and guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā in various philosophical disciplines such as those represented by the Mimāmsakas, Naiyāyikas and the rest and also the earlier grammarians such as Pāņini, Patanjali etc. All this was a rich heritage which shaped the concepts in their chiseled form in the hands of alamkarikas such as Mammata and others who followed Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Actually Anandavardhana is the first one, so far as available written documents are concerned, who devotes space to draw a line between abhidhā and/or lakṣaṇā gunavṛtti, on one hand and vyañjana on the other. He underlines the difference between abhidha/vyañjanā and lakṣaṇā/vyañjanā by establishing 'svarūpabheda' and 'visayabheda', and finally establishing vyañjanā as an independent. power of words. But it is left to Mammata and his followers to systematically define and distinguish between one and the other function of a word and we will therefore first take up this aspect of definition and distinction of each of these sabdavṛttis and then see how Anandavardhana establishes vyañjana as an independent function. Vyañjana will be treated in greater details because the other two viz. abhidhā and lakṣaṇā have been given enough space when we discussed their position and nature as reflected in various philosophical disciplines on an earlier occasion. We will then first start with abhidhā.
We know that according to sanskrit writers on poetics, words possess three distinct śaktis or vyāpāras i.e. powers or functions, viz. (i) abhidhā sakti or the power of direct expression, (ii) lakṣaṇā śakti or the secondary power of a word, or, the power of indication, and (iii) the vyañjana śakti or the suggestive power of a word. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra are used as synonyms for the term sakti. Thus, by the abhidhā sakti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA give the conventional meaning or the 'samketita artha'. It is also called mukhyā Śakti i.e. principal power of a word because like the face of a human being normally sighted first when we look at a person, this conventional meaning comes first to mind and is therefore termed 'mukhya' and the sakti intrumental in bringing home this ‘mukhya' or principal meaning derived through convention, is termed 'mukhyā' or principal power of a word. The laksanavrtti which is an 'a-mukhyā' i.e. secondary power of a word, gives laksyártha or the secondary or extended meaning. It is based upon certain conditions which we will discuss later. The third power is 'vyañjanā' or the power of suggestion, giving 'vyangyártha' or suggested meaning. The mukhyártha which is abhidheyártha is also termed vācyártha and so, abhidhā is also known as 'vācakatva' or vācakaśakti. The word giving this vācyártha, which is the conventional meaning, is termed vācaka. The word giving laksyártha is called laksaka, and the one giving vyañgyártha or suggested meaning is termed 'vyañjaka'. Thus vācya, laksya and vyangya meanings are derived from vācaka, laksaka and vyañjaka words, with the help of vācakarva or abhidhā power, laksanā and vyañjana respectively. We also come across, the mention of a fourth vrtti or power called 'tātparya' i.e. 'purport', but as it is connected with the sentence - unit, and not with individual word unit, and as it is therefore instrumental in giving the correlated meaning of all the words in a given sentence or statement, the ālamkārikas generally do not choose to include it under the functions of a word.
As regards the nature of these sabda-vyāpāras, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools of thought. The grammarians, the earlier ones among them to be specific, and so also the philosophers or dārśanikas of various schools of thought such as the mīmāmsā, nyāya, vaišesika, bauddha, jaina etc. had, as observed earlier, no business to think about vyañjanā, or perhaps - only perhaps - they did not accept it. In the same way even the earlier alamkarikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and the rest do not come out clearly in favour of vyañjanā and vyangyártha, though as observed by us in the previous chapters we cannot categorically say that they were against vyañjanā. Alamkārikas later, normally chose to follow the lead of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaţa in accepting vyañjanā as an independent and important function of a word. But then there were some who challanged the lead of Anandavardhana, and writers on literary aesthetics such as Mahimā, or even Bhattanāyaka and Sankuka prior to Mahimā, and then Mukula, Dhananjaya, Dhanika, and some others challanged the concept of vyañjanā as a separate power and tried to incorporate

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it under various heads. Some later naiyayikas such as Gadadhara and Jagadīśa vehemently opposed vyañjanā. The Tarkadīpikā observes: "vyañjanā tu śaktir lakṣaṇántarbhūtā, śabda-śaktimūlā; artha-śakti-mūlā tu anumānā”dinā anyathā siddhā." We will look into all this later. There are also others who distinguish between gauņi and lakṣaṇā taking the former to be an independent vṛtti.
Abhidha We begin with abhidhā or the function of denotation or direct expression. Abhidhā, as noted above, is that function by which the word gives its primary or conventional meaning. The word here is termed vācaka, and the sense is termed vācya :
"sākṣāt samketitam yórtham abhidhatte sa vācakaḥ."
K.P. I. 7b. (Kavyaprakása - (K.P.) of Mammata, Edn. B.O.R.I. Pune). Thus, for example, the word 'gauḥ' by abhidhāvyāpāra means "sāsnā”dimat paśu-viseṣaḥ", or an entity having a dew-lap, horns, hoofs, etc. This conventional or samketita artha is gathered directly and hence is called 'mukhyartha' or principal meaning and the word is termed 'mukhya' and the power, the abhidhāśakti, the mukhyā śakti.
As to the nature of 'samketa-grahaṇa' or gathering of convention there is a considerable difference of opinion. We have discussed this problem at length in an earlier chapter (i.e. Ch. II). This samketa i.e. - convention has been classified in different ways. The Naiyāyikas classify samketa as 'pāribhāṣika', 'naimittika' and 'aupādhika'. When we fix up a name for calling someone, say, when a father calls his son Devadatta, or, when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in a given discipline, say dhvani, guṇa, etc., in alamkāraśāstra, it is termed as paribhāṣika-sanketa. 'Naimittika-samketa' is that which refers to jāti or, class, such as 'aśva', 'manusya', etc., and 'aupādhika' is that which refers to the upādhis or attributes. For the Naiyāyikas upādhi means that jāti in which so many apara-jātis reside, e.g. paśu consists of aśva, go, etc. etc. The śabda-śakti-prakāsikā observes: "yac cártho yannāma adhunika-samketavat, tad eva pāribhāṣikam, yathā pitrā”dibhiḥ putrā”dau samketitam, caitrā”di, vā śāstra-kṛdbhiḥ sidhyabhāvā❞dau pakṣatā"di. jāti-vācyatā-śaktiman nāma naimittikam, yathā go, gavayā"di; yad upadhy-avacchinna-śaktiman-nāma tad aupādhikam yathā ākāśa, paśvā❞di." -
For Bhartṛhari, samketa is two-fold viz. ‘ājānika' i.e. natural, and 'adhunika' i.e. artificial or man-made. By ājānika is meant the same as naimittika of the Naiyāyikas. Thus ājānika is nitya. Ādhunika samketa is of the form of 'yadā-kadā' i.e. 'kādācitka', and śāstrakāras make its use -

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "ājānikasty adhunikah samketo dvividho matah, nitya ājānikas tatra yā śaktir iti gīyate.” V.P. kādācitkas tv ādhunikaḥ
śāstra-kārādibhiḥ krtaḥ.” - V.P. (quoted in sabdas'akti-prakāśikā)
Abhidhā is classified in a three-fold way such as (i) rūdhi. (in voga and (iii) vogarūdhi. These are again known as (i) kevala-samudāya-śaktiḥ, (ii) kevala-avayavaśaktiḥ, and (iii) samudaya-avayava-śakti-samkara. - Jagannātha observes : seyam abhidhā trividhā, kevala-samudāya-śaktiḥ, kevala-avayava-śaktiḥ, samudáyāvayavasakti-samkaraś ca - (R.G. pp. 141). We will discuss Jagannātha's views in greater detail below. Rudhi is said to be there, where the word as a whole-samud . the meaning. Here we gather the meaning with the help of 'akhanda-śakti' of a word
- "akhanda-śakti-mātrenaikārtha-pratipadakatvam rūdhiḥ." holds Vșttivārtika of Appayya Dixita. Here rūdhi is formed because the meaning of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or even if the meaning of the word is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised. Again, when the meaning of the components of a word becomes important, in order to get the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of yogā"tmaka abhidhā. Appayya in Vrtti-vārtika observes, - "avayava-śakti-mātra-sāpekşam padasya ekārtha-pratipadakatvam yogah.” Yoga-rūdhi is said to be there in cases where avayavasakti, and samudāyaśakti both are required. Appayya observes, - "avayava-samudāya-ubhaya-saktisāpekşam ekártha-pratipāddkatvam yoga-rūdhiḥ.” In the case of 'pankaja', the etymological meaning is, that which is born in mud.' This can be applicable to anything born in mud, other than lotus also. The Naiyāyikas do not accept either rūdhi or yoga in this case. Appayya observes that it is better to accept yoga-rūdhi here : (pp. 5, Vịttivārtika) : "naiyāyikās tu pankajā"di-sabda-rūpaikopädānarūpayā’ntaranga-pratyāsattyā, nābhi-kamala-kumudānvayāt prāg eva, pankajanikartstva-vaišistyena-upasthitasya paprakhya padmāśraya-tvenopasthitasya pankajanikartstvasya ca nābhikamala-kumudā"dyanvaye nákānkṣā, na ca višistasya tad anvaya-visayiņi śābda-dhīḥ, iti tad anvayárthm svatantra-padmatvapankajanikartstva-upasthitaye pankajā”dipadasya laksanaivá-bhyupagantavyā, na tu rūļhir yogo vā."

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253 At times it happens that there are more than one conventional meunings attached to one and the same word. Here abhidhártha is decided with the help of various factors such as context and others (see. Ch. II). Bhartshari has mentioned all these factors. Viśvanātha has also given a fuller explanation such as, (S.D.I.) : 'sa-śankacakro harih', iti sankha-chakra-prayogena hari-sabdo visnum eva abhidhatte. aśankha-cakro hariḥ, iti tad-viyogena tam eva. bhīmárjunau iti arjunaḥ pārthaḥ. karņárjunau iti karṇaḥ sūtaputraḥ. sthāņum vande iti sthāņuḥ śivaḥ. sarvam jānāti devaḥ iti devo bhavān. kupito makara-dhvajaḥ iti makaradhvajaḥ kāmaḥ. devaḥ puráriḥ iti puráriḥ śivah. madhunā mattah pikah, iti madhur vasantaḥ, pātu vo dayitāmukham iti mukham sammukhyam, vibhāti gagane candraḥ iti candraḥ śaśī. nisi citrabhānuh iti citra-bhānur vahnih. bhāti rathangam napumsaka-vyaktya rathangam
svaras tu veda eva viấesa-pratīti-krt na kāvye iti tasya visaye nodāhstam." Jagannāthā: Mahā-siddhāntin : We will go into greater discussion on abhidh, in context of the Rasagangadhara of Jagannātha. Jagannātha while dealing with śabda-sakti mūla dhvani comes to the two varieties of abhidhāmülaka dhvani, viz. arthaśaktimülaka and ubhaya-sakti-mülaka citing proper illustrations. Then after dealing with the varieties of laksanāmülaka dhvani, Jagannātha comes to a very meaningful discussion concerning abhidhā. First he attempts a logical and scientific definition of abhidhā and then comes down heavily on Appayya Dixit's definition of abhidhā as read in his Vrtti-vārtika. Jagannātha's definition of abhidh, reads as : “śaktyākhyórthasya śabdagataḥ, śabdasya arthagataḥ vā sambandhaviśesó bhidhā” (pp. 429, Edn. Prof. R. B. Athavale, Ahmedabad, Edn. '74). This means that abhidhā, which is called sakti, is a special relation residing in both sabda i.e. word and artha i.e. sense. Relation is an entity connected between two objects as such. One of them is termed 'pratiyogin' and the other, 'anuyogin'. In the absence of any deciding factor, i.e. vinigamana abhāva' both śabda and artha can be termed either pratiyogin or anuyogin. So, when Jagannātha says 'arthasya śabdagatah', he means, 'artha-pratiyogikaḥ śabdanuyogikah', and when he says 'sabdasya arthagato vā', he means, 'sabdapratiyogi arthánuyogikah. So, abhidhā is a special relation residing in both word and sense and is therefore not separate from them.
Jagannātha then starts discussing the views of others. He says : (pp. 429, ibid) : "sā ca padārthántaram iti kecid. “asmāt sabdāt ayam arthaḥ avagantavyaḥ itiäkārā īśvarecchā eva abhidhā. tasyāḥ ca visayatayā sarvatra sattvāt pațā"dīnām api ghatā"di-pada-vācyatā syāt. ataḥ vyakti-viśesopadhānena ghatā"di-padábhidhātvam vācyam iti apare.” 'evam api īśvara-jñānā”dinā vinigamanā-virahaḥ syāt, ataḥ prathama-matam eva jyāyaḥ' iti api vadanti."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Here, 'kecit' refers to the Mimāmsakas and the Vaiyākaranas and ‘apare' refers to the Naiyāyikas. The Nyāyamañjarī (8-3) observes : "samketa-grāhyaḥ śaktirūpaḥ atiriktah padārthaḥ iti mīmāmsakāḥ āhuh'. 'pada-padārthayor vācya-vācakabhāva-niyāmakam sambandhantaram saktiḥ iti śābdikā vadanti."
The Naiyāyikas hold that abhidhā cannot be taken as a separate padārtha, because it is none else than god's desire that, 'such and such a word should give 'such and such' a meaning.' This ‘īśvarecchā' i.e. god's desire can take two forms such as, 'asmāt padāt ayam arthah bodhavyah.' or 'idam padam amum artham bodhayatu.' - i.e. let this word give this meaning. Actually both the forms of expression differ externally only and there is no virtual difference between these two expressions of ‘īśvarecchā'. The first type of bodha i.e. apprehension can be technically put as, "sabda-prakārikā artha-viśesyikā' (iśvareechā), and the second one can be placed as, ‘artha-prakārikā sabda-viśesyakā. Now Jagannātha argues that if 'iśvarecchā' is to be taken in a general way, i.e. if we accept that all worldly objects could be the subject of God's desire, then that desire will stay with all objects through the relation of 'visayatā', i.e. all objects will fall under the subject-field by God's desire. Thus God's desire is common to both ghata and pata i.e. a pot and a piece of cloth, so in that case, what harm is there in understanding the meaning of 'pata', from an object called 'ghata' and vice versa ? For this, 'īśvarecchā' or God's desire will not have to be understood in a general way, but will have to be accepted as different with reference to the difference in upādhi or attribute - i.e. 'upādhi-bheda'. Thus God's desire will take the form - "ghata-pada-janya-bodha-visayatāvān ghato bhavatu”, and “pațapada-janya-bodha-visayatāvān pato bhavatu", etc. Thus pata-visista or patopādhikaīśvarecchā is the abhidhā of the word 'pata', and 'ghața-visista ghatopādhikaīśvarecchā' is the abhidhā of 'ghata'-pada. Similarly all worldly objects become the attribute or upādhi or dharma, or višeşana of iśvarecchā. This ‘padārthavisesa-visista-īśvarecchā' is the abhidhā of a particular word in a particular sense. Thus only a special type of God's desire is to be taken as abhidhā.
This theory of Naiyāyikas taking God's desire as abhidhā is criticised by Mimāmsakas and Vaiyākaranas. They hold that if we accept abhidhā as 'padārthavišesa-viśista-īśvarecchā, then along with iśvarecchā, īśvarajñāna and iśvaraprayatna will have to be taken as abhidhā. For, as any worldly object is the subject of God's desire, it is the subject of both īśvara-jñāna and īśvara-prayatna also. Thus because all worldly objects are covered by īśvarecchā, they could as well be the subject of īśvara-jñāna and īśvara-prayatna as well. Thus even these two also could

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255 be called 'abhidhā'. And as there is no authority to reject these two also being called abhidhā, they have to be accepted as abhidhā. So, in this situation, the view expressed by the Mimāmsakas and Vaiyākaranas emerges as more acceptable. Prof. P. Ramachandradu (pp. 231, ibid) puts the whole argument this way. He observes : "This theory of Naiyāyikas accepting iśvarecchā as the abhidhā is criticised by both the Mimāmsakas and Vaiyākaranas. They contend that according to this theory, the īśvarecchā is eternal one, and all comprehensive. Iśvara being Omniscient, is having the knowledge which is also eternal one and all-comprehensive. Now the question arises whether his iccha should be accepted as Abhidhā or his Jñāna'? In the absence of any deciding factor, both of them will have to be accepted as Abhidhā which only results in needless 'gaurava'. Therefore, it is better to accept Abhidhā as a separate padārtha. This Abhidhā may be Bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva, Bodhakatva, Bodhyatva, or Tādātmya between the word and the meaning."
After this, Jagannātha examines Appayya Dixit's definition of abhidhā, as read in Vrtti-vārtika. It reads as : "śaktyā pratipadakatvam abhidhā.” Jagannatha calls it of no use - 'tat tuccham, upapatti-virodhāt' - (pp. 429, ibid): This definition goes against any type of fitness or proof or attainment. Jagannātha argues that here what is contextual is that word-power called abhidhā which is instrumental in the cognition of meaning caused by a word. Now how can simply the knowledge of 'artha-pratipadakatā' in a word give the meaning intended. The idea is that by simply knowing that the word has the special quality - i.e. dharma or sāmarthya to yield meaning alone, can it suffice for cognition of meaning ? That 'dharma' or 'sāmarthya' must be accompanied by some 'vyāpāra' for a particular cognition of meaning. Now, if it is contended that the 'pratipādakatva' i.e. capacity to yield meaning which is in the sabda is a 'vyāpāra' or activity effecting the cognition - 'pratipatti' - and this vyāpāra will be useful in the cognition itself being known. To put it more clearly Jagannātha's argument could be placed as follows : Abhidhā according to Dixita means that dharma of śabda which is of the nature of making a particular cognition effective. But even then, Jagannātha argues that there is a blemish called “anyonyā”śraya'. By saying, 'śaktyā pratipādakatvam', it is accepted that this power is either in sabda or in artha which is responsible for the cognition of artha. Thus this sakti cannot be else than abhidhā, and so the definition would come to, "abhidhayā pratipadakatvam abhidhä'. This is absurd and involves ātmā"śraya-dosa. Jagannātha observes : (pp. 429, ibid) : "yat tu yrtti-vā 'śaktyā pratipādakatvam abhidhā' iti appayya-dīkṣitair uktam tat tuccham, upapatti virodhāt. tathā hi-iha sabdājjāyamānāyām arthopasthitau kāranībhūtam yadiya

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA jñānam sā śabda-víttir abhidhā”khyā laksyatayā prastutā. pratipādakatvasya ca pratipattihetutva-rūpasya śabdagatasya na jñānam pratipattau kāraṇam. ataḥ katham nāma pratipādakatvam abhidhety ucyate ? atha pratipādakatvam pratipattyanukūla-vyāpārarūpam jñātam sad eva upayujyate pratipattau iti ucyeta, evam api 'saktya' iti anena sabdagatā-arthagatā vā kācid śaktih pratipattihetuta vivakṣitā, sā eva abhidhā iti, ‘abhidhayā pratipādakatvam abhidhā' iti laksanam paryavasannam. tathā ca sphutā eva asamgatih ātmā”śrayaś ca. na ca abhidhātah śaktiḥ atiriktā sabdajanya-pratipatti-prayojikā kācid asti iti atra pramāņam asti."
Dr. Ramachandradu (pp. 232, ibid) further, quotes, Nāgeśa who tries to defend Appayya's definition, by suggesting an expression such as 'dhānyena dhanavān', equivalent to ‘abhidhayā pratipadakatvam abhidhā. Nāgeśa observes : (pp. 181, N.S. Edn., 1888, Kāvyamālā, 12). "prakrtyāditvād dhānyena dhanavān ity ādivat tỉtīyāyāḥ abhedārthakatvena na kaścid dosah.” But Prof. Ramachandradu observes that this analogy is not applicable here. 'Dhānya' being viśesa and 'Dhana' being 'sāmānya' such expression as 'dhānyena dhanavān' meaning 'dhānyábhinnadhanavān' may be correct. But, argues the learned professor, how can it be correct when the same thing is mentioned at both the ends? We have here, 'abhidhayā pratipadakatvam abhidhā.' This expression has only ‘abhidhā' at both the ends. So the analogy cited above is not applicable here. It may be contented that ‘abhidhā' is a viśesa and 'pratipādakatva' is a sāmānya and so the analogy could be applied here too. But here, observes Dr. Ramachandrudu, it may be correct so far as 'abhidhayā pratipādakatvam' is concerned, but when it is said that such 'pratipadakatva' is itself abhidhā' then the blemish of anyonya"śraya walks in. This sentence would be equivalent to say, 'dhānyena dhanavatvam dhānyam' or dhānyavarvam'. This is absurd and so, Jagannātha is correct in his criticism.
Jagannātha then proceeds with the divisions of abhidhā. Abhidhā for him is three-fold, viz. 'kevala-samudāva-saktih, kevala-avayava-saktih, and samudāyaavayava-śakti-samkara.' These varieties are otherwise known as rūdhi, yoga and yoga-rūdhi respectively. The first variety is illustrated by examples such as dittha, (kapittha, māņavaka) etc. In these particular names there is total absence of 'avayava-śakti' i.e. power of the parts seen in a given word. That means that the word as a whole only renders some sense and no individual part of it has any independent meaning. The second variety is illustrated by words such as 'pacaka', 'pāthaka', etc. In the first illustration, the basic root is Vpac. According to Pāṇini sūtra 3/1/133 viz. 'nvultặcau' the suffixes ‘nvul' and 'trc' are added to it in the sense of agent or doer. Thus we have ‘nvu' i.e. krt i.e. 'aka' added to the Vpac. From the

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidhā power of these two parts i.e. the root and the suffix, we get the senses of 'to cook' and 'the agent (of cooking)'. The combination of these senses renders the sense of 'a cook’. Now beyond this total of two senses there is no extra meaning of the word 'pacaka', 'pāthaka' etc. Thus these words do not have a samudāya-sakti over and above their avayava-sakti's. The third variety is illustrated by words such as ‘pankaja'. One part of this word is the root Vjan meaning 'to be born'. Prior to that there is one part viz. 'panka' meaning ‘mud', which is ‘upa-pada’. Now when the upapada is in locative 'da' suffix is attached to the root vjan, according to pānini sūtra (3/2/97) - "saptamyam janerdah”. This da (= a) is attached in the sense of agent, and it forms the third portion of the word. Through the three powers of these three individual parts, viz. ‘mud, to be born, and agent, coming together by the conditions of akānksā, i.e. expectancy, 'yogyatā' or compatibility, and 'āsatti' i.e. proximity we derive the meaning viz. 'that which is born of mud.' But after that total sense is derived by combination of three senses of three parts, there is a special sense of lotus, 'padmatvayukta padma' - which is derived further. Here it is stated as ‘padmatva-viśista-padma', because out of mud even moss is generated and it is not called 'pankaja'. For this added sense of 'lotus', we have to imagine a special 'samudāya-śakti' in the word 'pankaja'. Thus there is 'samkara' or mixing up of 'avayava-śákti' and 'samudāya-sakti'. These three varieties are also respectively named as rüdhi-sakti, yoga-sakti and yoga-rūdhi-sakti also as noted above.
Appaya Dixit has cited in his Vrttivārtika the definitions of these three varieties as : "akhanda-śakti-mātrena ekártha-pratipadakatvam rūdhih", "avayava-śaktisāpekşam padasya ekártha-pratipādakatvam yogaḥ”, and “ubhaya-śakti-sāpeksam ekártha-pratipādaktvam yoga-rūdhiḥ” - respectively. Jagannātha observes that these definitions are not acceptable because the blemishes pointed out in Appayya's original definition of abhidhā continue here also. Thus, in the definition of the first variety viz. to convey a single meaning by akhanda-śakti, involves the blemish called 'a-samgati' because here also the sense, viz. 'that which is conveyed by sakti is śakti', continues. Jagannātha's argument is that here also, whether you call it Śakti or rūdhi-sakti the meaning is the same. So, when these two are of identical nature, there is a 'ātmā”śraya-dosa'. Again the difficulty pointed out earlier, - viz. that the knowledge of the 'pratipādakatva' of 'artha' does not render 'arthajñāna', - also continues. After thus refuting Appayya, Jagannātha concentrates on a different topic, of
concerning abhidhā. He mentions words such as, "ašvagandhä", "aśvakarņa”, “mandapa”, “niśānta”, and “kuvalaya”, etc. Which variety of abhidhā is

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA applicable in these cases ? The conventional meaning of the word “aśva-gandhā” is "a particular medicine or herb." The yogártha i.e. 'kevala-avayavártha' gives the sense of "smell like that of a horse", or the stable which carries the smell of a horse. Similarly by samudāyasakti the word 'aśva-karņa' also means a particular medicine. The avayavártha or yogártha gives the sense of "an ear of a horse" first instance the two meanings are illustrated respectively in, “aśvagandhā-rasam piber”, and, "ašvagandhā vājiśālā”. 'Mandapa' conventionally means a temporary hall raised for some occasion, and it means, through avayava-sakti, "one who drinks water or scum on curd.” 'niśānta' has a conventional meaning of 'a house and its yogártha is ‘end of night. Kuvalaya means “blue lotus” by convention, and its yogartha is 'the globe of earth'. Now all these illustrations carry two meanings, one each by convention, and by avayava-śakti. Jagannātha raises a question as to which variety of abhidhā is to be accepted in case of these illustrations. We cannot accept only 'samudāya-śakti' for we get 'yogārtha' also, and we cannot accept only 'yogārtha' and accept only 'avayavaśakti' either. If we accept the 'samkara' or commixture of both the varieties, then we need not accept both the śaktis in one meaning. But in case of 'pankaja', both these saktis viz. avayava and samudāya, have a common conventional meaning. Such is not the case here. So, which power is to be ascertained in these illustrations ? The idea is that though these words are having both the saktis, i.e. samudāyasakti and yoga-sakti, one of them will be ineffective when the other operates.
Jagannātha continues the discussion as follows: "atra kecit, 'aśvagandha rasam pibet' ity ādiņu visaya-viśese kevala-samudāyaśaktiḥ. aśvagandhā vājiśālā, ity adisu tu kevala-yoga-saktih.” etc. (pp. 430, Prof. Athavale's Edn.) - Some people are of the opinion that in expressions like, “he drinks the liquid of aśvagandhā”, ‘aśvagandhā' means a particular herb, and here only the 'samudāya-śakti' has to be accepted. In cases like, “The stable with a smell of a horse", we should accept only yoga-sakti. Now someone may argue that in the word 'aśvagandhā', actually both the śaktis are seen to reside. So, accepting either "kevala-samudāya-śakti”, or "kevala-avayava-śakti" is not possible at all. But this objection does not stand because we do not find any correlation of both the senses derived through two different śaktis here, at a time. So, actually when each sense is derived each
esponding sakti operates alone and independently here. When we use the term, ‘kevala-samudāya-sakti'. or, 'kevala-avayava-sakti', the part 'kevala' means "to apprehend that meaning by that particular sakti, - that meaning which is not correlated with the meaning of the other śakti.” That way, we may say that we

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259 cannot accept a samkara or commixture of the two śaktis giving two senses in cases such as 'ašvagandha' etc. Samkara' can be said to take place only between such śaktis which convey meaning that can be correlated. So, no 'samkara' is possible here.
Still others believe that, in illustrations such as 'aśvakarna' etc., there is no question of the first two varieties of abhidhā, because neither of them function here alone i.e. 'kevala' - Jagannātha observes : (pp. 430, ibid) : anye tu - "aśvakarnā”di śabdesu nábhidhāyāh prathama-dvitiyayor vidhayoh prasaktih, kaivalya-virahāt.” But, they say we should accept the commixture or samkara of these two varieties. But this 'samkara' is two fold viz. (i) yoga-rūdhi-samkara and (ii) yaugika-rūdhisamkara. The first is illustrated by such words as 'pankaja' etc., as both the senses caused by two Śaktis operate together here. The second samkara is illustrated by such words as 'aśvakarna' etc. In this samkara, the two senses caused by two śaktis are never correlated because they are never apprehended simultaneously. While according to still others, i.e. the Naiyāyikas, says Jagannātha, in case of such words as aśvagandhā etc. a fourth variety of abhidhā has to be recognised. It may be called 'yaugika-rūdhi'.
Jagannātha quotes still another opinion held by the vaiyākaranas. It reads as : (pp. 431, ibid) : “akhandah eva hi sabdẫh. tatra samāsesu padānăm, kếttaddhita-tin-antes'u ca prakrti-pratyayānām vibhāgah kālpanika eva, iti kutrástiyogaśaktiḥ ? viśistasya viśistárthe rūdher eva abhyupagamāt' - iti api vadanti - The idea is that for the grammarians a word is an indivisible unit. So how can there be a meaning of its parts, when there is total absence of parts ? So, in case of such as an indivisible word-unit, the pada-vibhāga in a compound, or the division of praksti (original stem) and pratya-suffix as in case of krdanta, taddhita or tin-anta formation, - all this has to be taken as imaginary only. So, how can we imagine yogaśakti or avayava-sakti in such illustrations ? So, we accept only rudhi-sakti in case of viśista-akhanda-śabdas with reference to special (visista) artha - : obviously this view has a reference to the famous kārika, 66 of Vākyapadiya, brahmakānda which reads as :
“pade na varņā vidyante varņeșy avayavā na ca. vākyāt padānām atyantam
pravibhāgo na vidyate." (V.P. - Brahmakānda, 66) Dr. Ramachandradu (pp. 234, ibid) observes that, “Though he mentions this

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
theory only as a pāramārthika satya, PR. does not have any objection in accepting, in vyāvahārika level, the above mentioned three or four varieties of abhidha, and. this assumption is justified by the ensuing discussion on the basis of yoga etc." We also feel that at practical level Jagannatha is inclined to accept three or four varieties of abhidha, though he does not openly commit himself to either acceptance or rejection of the same.
Jagannatha further discusses a fresh point. He says there is a verse viz.,
"giṣpatir api āngiraso
gaditum guna-gaṇān sagarvo na, indraḥ sahasra-nayanópi
adbhutarupam paricchettum."
i.e. - "Bṛhaspati, - Angīrasa-the lord of speech is rendered without pride when it comes to the topic of describing the total virtues residing in you, and Indra with a thousand eyes can not fully grasp your exceptional beauty." In this verse, observes Jagannatha, that if we take the conventional meaning of the word 'gispati' which means Bṛhaspati, there will occur a blemish called 'punar-ukti' or tautology, for angirasa also would mean 'bṛhaspati'. In the same way both 'Indra' and 'sahasranayana' would mean the same thing and thus lead to tautology. Some may say that in such illustrations as gīṣpati and sahasranayana, we have to accept only avayavártha-pratipādaka-sakti in case of these yoga-rudha-padas. We have not to accept rūḍhi-śakti at all here, because here only the 'yogártha' is utilized. It means that to suggest the access of virtues in case of the king described in context, only 'yogártha' is utilized. The ruḍhyartha of gispati is of no use here, because another term viz. 'āngirasa' expressive of Bṛhaspati is also present here. But, says Jagannatha, this observation is faulty, because, even if we accept that here only the yogártha is found to be useful, but the ruḍhi-śakti of the words gispati and sahasranayana is not limited in such cases. It is also not correct to say that only yogártha alone is apprehended here, because the apprehension of rūḍhyartha automatically gets in, with the result that in such verses as illustrated above, punar ukti-dosa will positively appear. Again, because only with the yogarūḍha word 'gişpati' alone, both the rudhyartha and yogártha are arrived at, the other padas such as angīrasa etc. will be redundant.
Jagannatha replies to this objection in the following way: Here what happens is this. By a single word (i.e. giṣpati, here) there is apprehension of both the conventional meaning and the etymological meaning - i.e. yogártha. So, first of all,

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261 with the help of internal expectancy (antaranga ākāńksā) both of them are correlated with each other. From the special sense (i.e. Brhaspati, the Lord of Speech) derived from this, correlation is established with the sense of the second word (i.e. with the meaning of the second 'pada' - 'angīrasa' here). Before we proceed with Jagannātha let us first grasp the exact import of 'antaranga-ākānkşa'. When two things that have come together are united with a third external thing, these two are first correlated with each other by an internal relation. Thus, it is necessary that first these two things are correlated with each other. This necessity itself is called "antaranga ākānksā" or internal expectancy. After these two things are mutually correlated through internal expectancy, they become fit for getting related with a third external thing.
Now, proceeds Jagannātha, it is true that (- nyāyasiddhórthah) the two viz. rūdhyartha and yogártha in their separate form (višakalita) are not correlated with the other word viz. angirasa, but we accept that this rule is applicable when it is a case of a meaning to be collected by the power of expression i.e. abhidhāśakti. But in case of illustrations such as the verse 'gīspatir api' etc. laksaņā or secondary power is resorted to, so with the help of the word, 'gispati' which is a yoga-rūdha-pada, there is no harm in establishing ‘kevala-yogártha' (of course taking the yogártha as laksyártha). Thus, by resorting to the secondary function i.e. laksanā here, it cannot be said by anyone that such other words as angīrasa' are used without any purpose. For, at such places, if the second pada i.e. 'angirasa' is not used, the result will be that someother difficulty will prop up. It is like this. Because the meaning of 'Bphaspati' which is a rūdhyartha is already accomplished by the yoga-rūdha pada viz. gispati, the function of conveying any meaning through that yoga-rūdha-pada being already accomplished, there will be a fresh problem, a fresh objection, as to whether the yogártha subsequently apprehended by the yogarūdha pada, can be an object of principal intention (= tātparya) or not? - Now we know that the word 'gispati' conveys two meanings viz. (i) lord of speech and (ii) bịhaspati. But when the poet has, inspite of this, used the word 'āngīrasa' meaning also bịhaspati in the same verse, anybody will start thinking about the poet's motive. Naturally there must be some special underlying intention of the poet after this usage. The reader understands this. So, to justify such a usage by the poet, when both the mukhyárthas are contradicted in case of the word gīspati, one is forced to resort to laksaņā in the yogártha. The 'prayojana' or intention behind this laksanā is to convey the high qu king under description.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Jagannātha says that here we have to explain the special usage, as in case of words such as 'pankajákṣī etc. The idea is that while describing a particular heroine, if we use an adjective such as 'pankajákşi i.e. the lotus-eyed-one, then here the particular meaning of 'lotus' of the word 'pankaja' becomes important The poet's intention is only to convey that the heroine's eyes are as beautiful as a lotus. Now, the question is, 'can we take the meaning of 'that which is born of mud', here ? Naturally such meaning cannot be taken. And this is the right answer, because the 'yogártha' of 'pankaja' viz. 'that which is born of mud', is not of any use here. On the contrary it goes against the primary principal sense. So, at such places, because the yogártha of the word 'pankaja' is not of any use here (i.e. kurvadrūpa), it has to be abandoned. Similarly in such cases as the word 'gispati' in the verse illustrated, the yogártha of gispati is useless. Now when the usefulness i.e. effectiveness, - 'kurvad-rūpatva' - of the yogártha of gispati (i.e. lord of speech) is not accepted, there will be another contingency viz. to say whether that yogartha can be instrumental in suggesting the special qualities of the king - or not - (pāksikatvā"patteh). But when the same second word (i.e. angīrasa) is used along with the yoga-rūļha-pada viz. gīspati, then by that word viz. angīrasa, the rūdhyartha or conventional sense viz. bịhaspati is directly conveyed and hence the objection that yogártha conveyed by yogarūdha pada in such cases is of no use (nāntarīyaka), i.e. it is not the object of principal intention, - does not arise at all. For, the rūdhyartha in that yogarūdha pada is of no use as that rūdhyartha is already conveyed by the second pada - viz. angirasa which is also placed side by side. So that yogártha now gains the capacity to do its real job viz. that of conveying some special sense. So, it necessarily suggests the special suggested sense in form of the high qualities of the king under description - "vyangya-viśesavyañjakatvam niyamena siddhyati” (pp. 431, ibid, R.G.)
The idea is that in the first illustration there was doubt about the importance of the yogártha as the yogarūdha word was used to convey rūdhyartha. But now in this illustration, with the help of the second pada, viz. angīrasa, the conventional sense being already conveyed, the yogártha's real use is with reference to convey the suggested sense. Jagannātha says : "eşā pada-dvayópādāne gatih ukrā” (pp. 431, ibid). i.e. hereby a way is laid out in such cases where in a single verse, two words i.e. one a yogarüdha word and the other a rūdhyarthaka word - are used together. But now Jagannātha discusses a new situation as below : In instances such as: “puspa-dhanvā vijayate jagat, tvat karuņā-vaśār”, one and the same word viz. 'puśpadhanvā' first gives the meaning of cupid through rūdhi, and by the yogártha

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263 (i.e. one who holds a bow in form of a flower) cupid's weakness is also suggested. In such instances, the poet has not used the word 'manmatha' also meaning cupid, but has resorted to the yoga-rūdha pada viz. 'puspadhanvā'. Taking this special choice of the poet into account we realize the 'kurvad-rūpatā i.e. effectiveness of the yogártha of the word 'puspadhanvā' : "tatra kavi-kşta-manmatha-rūdhapadántara-anupādāna-pūrvaka-puspadhanva- padopādāna-pratisamdhanena tadiyayogárthe kurvad-rūpatā”dhānam bodhyam.” (pp. 431, R.G., ibid). In the same way, along with the yogarūdha-pada, whether there is or is not another rūdhapada, nothing is lost. The importance of the yogártha of the yogarūdha pad In the same way, if in a single verse, a word indicating a common class is used and along with that, side by side, another word indicating a sub-class born of that wider class is used (i.e. samabhivyāhrta), then we have to understand that the yogartha of the word indicating broder class is to be taken into account and not its rūdhyartha, e.g. in, "diśi disi jalajāni santi kumudāni”, the word 'jalaja' expresses a broder class. Only the yogártha is conveyed in such cases through laksanā; because the yogártha i.e. born in water', rendered through yoga-śakti (i.e. jala + ja) is restricted by the rūdhyartha i.e. lotus, and so that yogártha cannot be
dently construed directly with 'kumuda'-padārtha. Thus, says Jagannatha, abhidhā is explained - “tad ittham abhidhā nirūpitā” (pp. 432, ibid).
Now Jagannātha turns his attention to the meaning conveyed by abhidhā, after discussing the nature, scope and varieties of abhidhā. Says he : "anayā yah sabdo yam artham bodhayati sa tasya vācakah” (pp. 432, ibid). With this abhidhā when a particular word conveys a particular meaning, that word is called the 'vācaka' of that primary sense. The meaning that is arrived at through abhidhā, is to be termed 'abhidheya'. This abhidheya-artha is four-fold such as jāti or class, guņa or quality, kriyā or action and yādrechika - i.e. samiña-rupa or name or substance. Jāti is of the form of 'go-tva', which is manifested through the special figure - āksti - of an object : “tatra jātir gotvā"dih samsthāna-viśesa-abhivyangyā, pratyaksa-siddhā, gavā"dipadānām abhidheyā” (R.G. pp. 432, ibid) - Because it is manifested by a figure it is said to be apprehended by direct means of knowledge. The idea is that objects such as 'go' qualified by 'gotva-jāti' are perceived directly. This 'go-tva jāti' is said to be the abhidheyártha or directly expressed sense of the word 'go'. There are other jātis or classes such as 'ghrāņatva', 'rasanātva' etc. which are apprehended through anumana or inference. The idea is that the organs of smell (i.e. ghrāņendriya), etc., which are qualified by 'ghrāņatva-jāti', etc. are themselves 'atīndrīya' i.e. beyond sensoral porception, so they can only be inferred. The

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA convention is made with reference to class alone and not an individual, for fault of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra' : "anumāna-siddhā ca ghrāna-rasanatva-ā"dirghrāna-rasanā"di-padānām; ānantyād, vyabhicārāc ca, vyaktīnām abhidheyatāyā akalpanāt.” (pp. 432, R.G. ibid). The contingency of 'ānantya' walks in because if
take samketa with reference to an individual, the individuals being innumerable, the samketas also will tend to be beyond calculation. Vyabhicāradosa walks in when one samketa once when used for a given individual, if it is used for another individual of the same class, it brings in this contingency, because how can one samketa fixed for one individual be used for any other individual ? So, convention is not made with reference to an individual i.e. 'vyakti'. Thus it cannot be said that that a 'pada' means an individual.
An objector has the following submission - we accept such 'alaukika-pratyakşajñāna' with reference to objects having relation of the form of 'gotva'-adi jāti. : The idea is that direct apprehension results from the mutual relation of sense-organs and objects. This relation is termed 'sannikarsa' or 'pratyāsatti' technically. Jagannātha here uses the term 'pratyāsatti' in this technical sense. Now this relation according to some is 'jñāta', i.e. is of the form of 'gotva-ādi-sāmānya-rūpa' - i.e. of the form of the class - 'go'tva. This is one opinion of some Naiyāyikas. Another section of the Naiyāyikas holds that this relation is of the form of the knowledge of 'go-tva' - adi-sāmānya.' - Whatever it may be, but by that relation which is of the nature of sāmānya or generality, there results direct perception of all cows endowed by that generality. So, there is no dosa-contingency - in accepting the 'abhidhāśakti' of the word 'go' with reference to all individual cows.
To this objection of the vyakti-sakti-vādins Jagannātha's reply is : “na ca jñātagotvā"di-rūpayā, gotvā"di-jñāna-rūpayā vā pratyāsattyā, pratyakşeņa pari-kalitāsu sakalatadīya-vyaktisu abhidhāyāḥ kalpane násti dosah iti vācyam. sāmānyapratyāsatter nirákaraṇāt. gaurava-dosasya-anuddhārāc ca.” (pp. 432, R.G. ibid).
Prof. Dr. Ramachandrudu puts it this way : (pp. 238, ibid) - “According to the Naiyāyikas, the pratyaksa is of two kinds, laukika-pratyaksa, and A-laukikapratyakşa. Laukika-pratyaksa is the one which is produced by the contact of the senses with the objects which is effected by six kinds of samband has or relations, viz., samyoga, samyukta-samavāya, samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, samavāya, samaveta-samavāya, and visesana-višesya-bhāva. 'A-laukika' pratyaksa is produced by three kinds of alaukika-sannikarşas which are called, 'sāmānya laksanapratyāsatti, jñāna-laksana-pratyāsatti, and yogaja-pratyāsatti. (Muktāvali, I. 59-63). The meaning of the sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsatti is explained in Muktāvali (pp. 272)

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as a sāmānya-rūpa-pratyāsatti. Though the sāmānya is not directly connected with the Indriyas, it is said to be sannikarsa, because it is prakārī-bhūta in the Indriyasambaddha-viśesyaka- jñāna. For example when there is contact of Indriyas with Dhūmā"di, there arises a Dhūma-jñāna in which Dhūmatva is a prakāra i.e. viśesana. By the help of this Dhūmatva-sannikarsa, one can have the knowledge of all the Dhūmas, past, present and future. It is necessary to accept the sāmānya-laksanā. pratyāsatti, because unless all the Dhūmas and Vahnis are known by Dhūmatva and vahnitva respectively, there can be no samsaya about the vahni-vyāpyatva of the Dhūma which is a condition precedent for the Anumāna, for the Vahni-sambandha of the pratyaksa dhūma is known without doubt by pratyaksa itself and other Dhūmas are not known. (Muktāvali, p. 280)
The 'sāmānya' in the 'sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsatti' need not necessarily mean, Muktāvali states, the 'Nitya-jāti' alone. According to the vigraha"samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam” it can mean such anitya-padárthas like ghața also. Thus, once a ghata is known, as existing on the ground by 'sāmānyasambandha', or on the ‘kapāla' by 'samavāya-sambandha', one can later on have the knowledge of all such Bhūtalas and kapālā”di with the help of this sāmānyalaksana-pratyāsatti (Muktāvali, pp. 275). But one inconvenience appears cropping up here by accepting the sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsátti as sāmānyarūpa-pratyäsatti. When the ghata is lost and even if the place having is rememberd all the places having the ghata cannot be cognised by sāmānyapratyāsatti, because the sāmānya i.e. ghata is no more. In order to avoid this avyāpti, the word 'laksana' in 'sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsatti' is explained to mean visaya and thus 'sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsatti - is to be understood as "sāmānyavisayakajñāna-pratyāsatti." In the above place, even though the ghata is lost, its jñāna which is still existing can help as pratyāsatti and thereby produce the cognition of all the 'bhūtalas' having gharā"di.
Now coming to the point on hand, the pūrva-paksin contends that there is nothing wrong even if the abhidhā is only in vyakti because all vyaktis can be the object of pratyaksa by the above pratyāsatti, whether it is 'jñāta-gotvā"di-sāmānyarūpa-pratyāsatti', or 'gotvā"di-sāmānya-jñāna-rūpa pratyāsate'.
Pandita Rāja refutes this contention by simply saying that the 'sāmānyapratyāsatti - is not acceptable and that the gaurava-dosa levelled against your theory is not answered. (R.G. p. 183) (R.G. pp. 432, Edn. Athavale) - "na ca jñātagotvā"di-rūpayā gorvā”di-jñāna-rūpayā vā pratyāsattyā pratyakşeņa parikalitāsu

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA sakala-tadīya-vyaktişv abhidhāyāḥ kalpane násti dosa iti vācyam. sāmānyapratyāsatter nirākaraṇāt. gaurava-dosasya anuddhārāt ca."
The following is the contention of the siddhāntin : It is not necessary to accept the sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsatti. Even without its help, the 'cakşus-samyoga' with one go-vyakti which is gotvā"śraya, can produce the cognition of other go-vyaktis which are at a distance, by the laukika-sannikarsa of samyukta-samavetasamavāya. Like-wise the go-vyaktis of distant time can be known by becoming buddhi-visaya through the same sambandha, because they also are gotvā”śraya. To know the go-vyakti as gorvā"śraya is inevitable even in the vyakti-bakti-vāda. Because a man may know the sakti of go-pada in only one vyakti at the first instance. But on a second occasion when he sees an elderly man ordering a young man saying 'gām ānaya', 'gām naya', 'gām badhāna', etc., and the young man brings, takes and ties the cow accordingly, he understands that the second cow also is having the gotva-jāti and that is being meant by the go-pada as the previous one. It may be contended, as explained above, that samānya-pratyāsatti is required for vyāpti-samsaya and vyāpti-jñāna etc. But the vyāpti jñāna can be had in the 'mahānasīya dhūma' in the dhūmatva-rūpa itself. It may be argued again that there can be no vyāpti-samsaya, because there is vyāpti-niścaya in the dhūma which is actually seen, and other dhūmas do not come to the mind of the perceiver (anupasthita). But this argument is unfounded, because even though there is vyāpti-niscaya in a particular dhūma, there is scope for vyāpti-samsaya by dhūmatva in general.
Moreover sāmānya cannot be taken as sambandha at all; because every sambandha invariably implies the existence of anuyogin and pratiyogin which are
the case of samanya. Again, we do not find also visista-buddhi which is produced by the sambandha.
Thus, in the absence of sāmānya-laksana-pratyāsatti, the vyabhicāra-dosa pointed out in vyakti-Śakti-vāda remains unanswered. Even if the 'samanyalaksana-pratyāsatti were to be accepted, where is the answer for the gaurava dosa raised above ? Because innumerable śaktis will have to be accepted according to the endless number of vyaktis.
Again Pandita Raja (PR.) refers to another argument of the pūrva-pakṣin in answer to the vyabhicāra-dosa and says that the persistence of the gauravadosa makes it useless. The argument of pūrvapakşin runs as follows : of the three things, sakti-graha, padārthopa-sthiti and śābda-bodha, each preceeding

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one is the cause of the following, and in all of them only one thing should appear, as prakāra or viseṣaṇībhūta (samāna-prakāratayaiva) but all of them need not have only one viseṣya. In other words, gotva-prakāraka-śakti-graha is the cause for the gotva-prakarakopasthiti, gotva-prakāropasthiti is the cause of gotva-prakārka-śābda-bodha. It need not be taken that gotva-prakārakaśaktigraha is the cause of gotva-viśeşyakopasthiti. Thus even if the śakti-graha was only in a vyakti-viśeṣa, one can have with the help of the above śaktigraha, the śābda-bodha when a particular vyakti is not taken as viśesya and so there is no vyabhicāra though there is no śakti-graha in all the vyaktis. In spite of this explanation to avoid vyabhicāra, PR. says, gaurava-dosa can not be avoided.
In fact the above kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva among śakti-graha, padárthopasthiti and sabda-bodha itself is defective. Because if it is not accepted that tatprakaraka-śakti-graha etc. is the cause of tad-viseṣyaka-padārthopasthiti etc., the gotva-prakaraka, śakti-graha may produce aśva-viśeşyakopasthiti and gotva-prakarakopasthiti would result in gotva-prakārakāśva-viśeṣyaka-śābdabodha." (pp. 238 to 247, Prof. Ramachandrudu.)
Jagannatha then explains that the apprehension of an individual can be had by ākṣepa i.e. arthapatti, because the jäti cannot exist without vyakti or, it can be had through lakṣaṇā because there can be no anvaya or correlation of jāti in a sentence sense. The lakṣaṇa theory is normally favoured because the verbal explanation (i.e. sabda-bodha) connected with a particular artha can be produced by padárthopasthiti which depends on the vṛtti-jñāna about that particular artha only.
Jagannatha further observes (pp. 432, ibid, R.G.) "ayam ca jāti-rūpaḥ padarthaḥ prāṇada iti ucyate. prāṇam vyavahāra-yogyatām dadāti sampādayati iti vyutpatteḥ."
Before we proceed further let us have a look at Prof. R. B. Athavale's (pp. 456, 460) explanation of the above discussion. We have already quoted at length the explanation of Dr. Ramachandrudu as above. (pp. 238-248, ibid). Prof. Athavale explains the same point thus: The Naiyāyikas accept alaukika pratyakṣa also along with laukika-pratyakṣa. In laukika pratyakṣa, they accept six sannikarṣas or sambandhas or relations such as samyoga, samaväya, etc., while in a-laukika-pratrakṣa they accept only three sannikarṣas. The sannikarṣas in alaukika pratyakṣa are enumerated in kārikā 63, in Siddhānta

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA muktāvali, such as :
"alaukikas tu vyapāras trividhaḥ parikīrtitaḥ, sāmānya-laksano jñāna . laksaņo yogajas tathā.”
(Si. Mu. pratyaksa khanda kārikā-63) In this kārikā, the term 'vyāpāra' means sannikarsa, which is said to be three fold such as, sāmānya-laksana, jñāna-laksana and 'yogaja'. Out of these three, the sāmānya-laksana-sannikarsa (or, sāmānya-pratyāsatti) is the first one, which is projected by the Naiyāyikas to support their plea that there is no harm in accepting samketa or convention with reference to vyakti i.e. individual. By samanya-laksana' is meant such which has 'sāmānya! as its laksana or svarūpa. Just as when there is direct apprehension of a thing in the world, the sannikarsa or sambandha between any worldly object and sense-organ has to take place first, in the same way for a-laukika pratyaksa also, the sāmānya-rūpa sannikarsa of the object is required. This means that the apprehension of an individual i.e. object takes place with the help of sāmānya or jāti such as gotva etc. For example - I saw an individual go-vyakti. This means I have laukika-pratyaksa-jñāna or direct apprehension of a particular go-vyakti. With the knowledge of that individual go-vyakti, knowledge or apprehension of 'gotva' sāmānya or jāti also is accomplished. This is the theory accepted by the Naiyāyikas. They hold that, “yā vyaktih yena indriyena grhyate, tannisthā jātih, tad abhāvaś ca tena eva indriyena grhyate." i.e. the sense-organ with which an individual object is apprehended, also brings forth the apprehension of the class-sāmānya i.e. - jātiof that particular object concerned, and it also brings forth the apprehension of the abhāva - absence-of that object also. The Nyāyaśāstra calls that jñāna or apprehension as alaukika-pratyaksa, whereby knowledge of all go-vyaktis is also brought about through the gotva-rūpa-sāmānya residing in a single go-vyakti, directly apprehended. We have to accept sāmānya-rūpa-sannikarsa in the alaukika-pratyaksa-jñāna, because to bring about the knowledge of all individual go-vyaktis, there is no other agency except the sămânya. In the illustration cited above of an individual go-vyakti, along with that go-vyakti as there is also an apprehension of the 'sāmānya' residing in it, this apprehension is termed sāmānya and, here, i.e. in this alaukika-pratyaksa, "jñāta-sāmānyasannikarsa" is the cause of apprehension.

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269 Let us take another illustration. In the sentence viz. "ghatavat bhūtalam”, when there is knowledge or apprehension of bhūtala, we also have apprehension of
ghata' which is the 'viśesana' or 'prakāra' or 'sāmānya' of 'bhutala'. Now 'sannikarsa' is required for the apprehension of that ghata-rūpa-sāmānya. If with that 'sannikarsa' there occurs the apprehension of all 'ghata-yukta-bhūtala' then that also is called alaukika-pratyaksa-jñāna. The difference between the alaukika pratyaksa caused by the sannikarsa in form of knowledge of gotva-rūpa-sāmānya, on one hand, and the alaukika pratyaksa brought about by the sannikarsa of the knowledge of ghata-rūpa-sāmānya on the other hand, is only this much that in the
rst alaukika pratyaksa, gotva, the sāmānya jāti, is nitya, while in the other alaukika-pratyaksa, ghata-rūpa-samanya becomes 'jñāta' and is 'sannikarsa'. But suppose that in the above illustration of 'ghatavat-bhūtalam', the ghața or pot is broken. Then, if in the absence of the ghata which is broken, next day there is alaukika-pratyaksa of 'ghatavat bhūtalam', then at such places, ghata is not a 'sāmānya-sannikrsta'. But, only the knowledge of that ghatarūpa-samanya becomes sannikarsa in alaukika-pratyakşa. This is the opinion of the second section of the Naiyāyikas. From this, we can say that according to the opinion of this second section of Naiyāyikas, in alaukika-pratyaksa, we accept jñāna of sāmānya itself as sannikarsa in place of jñāta-sāmānya. Jagannātha refers to both these options of the Naiyāyikas in the words : "jñāta-gotvā"di-rūpayā gorvā"di-jñāna: rūpayā vā pratyāsattyā.".
If we put behind this small difference of opinion, then both the opinions of the Naiyāyikas seem to hold that by sāmānya pratyāsatti there is alaukika-pratyakṣa of all individual objects. So all objects are presented individually, and so there is nothing wrong in accepting saktigraha - convention - with reference to all individuals. From the point of view of both the sections of the Naiyāyikas, there is nothing wrong in accepting convention-samketa-with reference to individuals and no contingencies of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra' would walk in, in accepting samketa with reference to a vyakti.
This is so, because according to the Naiyayikas, through the 'sāmānya' residing in one individual 'go', there occurs apprehension of all the rest asamketita 'go' - i.e. all other cows that are not the subject of convention, and thus if we accept convention - 'samketa' - with reference to a given individual 'go' vyakti, no blemishes of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra' will follow. When one individual 'go' is perceived directly, through the 'sāmānya' residing in that govyakti, all other go-vyaktis possessing that sāmānya (i.e. go-tva), are covered by

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
convention. So, there is no need to go for numberless samketas on numberless individuals. The vyabhicāra-dosa also disappears as all vyaktis are covered by samketa.
As noted above, Jagannātha holds that when samketa or convention is held with reference to a class, i.e. jāti, the apprehension of a vyakti is either through inference or through laksanā or secondary function. The jāti-rūpa-sabdārtha is also the 'prāņa-prada-dharma' of the objects, because it is this which gives 'vyavahārayogyatā'. Here Jagannātha quotes from Mammata (K.P. II. 2, vrtti) the words which are quoted again from what Bharthari has said in the Vākyapadiya : (pp. 432, ibid)
"gauḥ svarūpeṇa na gauḥ, na api agauḥ, gotvábhisambandhād gauh.” The idea is that a 'go-vyakti' by its form (svarūpena) does not become a 'go'. This means that without accompanied by its jāti-class-cowness', - 'go-tva', an individual go, i.e. go-vyakti does not become the object of usage - vyavahāra. It does not become the object of such usage as 'a-go'-either. But once we realize the relation of that go-vyakti with go-jāti (gotvábhisambandhāt) - then only it becomes fit for the usage of the word 'go' with reference to it. Jagannātha explains it clearly as follows : (pp. 432, ibid) :
"asya arthaḥ - gauḥ sāsnādimān dharmī. svarūpena, ajñāta-gotva-kena, dharmi-svarūpa-mātrena, na gauh, nā'pi go-bhinna-iti vyavahārasya-nirvāhakah nápyagauḥ, nápi go-bhinna iti vyavahārasya nirvāhakaḥ. tathā sati, dūrād anabhivyakta-samsthānatayā gotvāgraha-daśāyām gavi gaur iti go-bhinna iti vā vyavahāraḥ syāt.”
The idea is that by the special outward form of having a dewlap, etc. an object, by the help of only its external form only, the form by which the apprehension of 'go-tva' has not followed, does not become a 'go', i.e. it does not become the object of the usage of the word 'gauh' for it. Nor, it becomes an object of a usage such as 'a-gauh', merely by the external form. The idea is that even without the apprehension of go-tva, 'cowness', i.e. class of jāti, if a go-vyakti can become an object of the usage of the word 'gauh', then, an object such as 'go' whose 'form is not clearly seen and determined because of distance and in whose case there is no apprehension of gotva-jāti, will also be an object of such usage as, 'this is a cow, or this is some other animal than cow', etc. or, as the special form of that object in not determined, that individual, in absence of apprehension of its speciality, there will follow the usage-vyavahāra of ghasa in 'go', and of 'go' in 'ghata'. - "svarūpasya a-viśeșād ghate gaur iti, gavi ca agaur

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271 iti vă vyavahāraḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ gotvábhisambandhāt gotva-vattayā jñānād gaur gau-sabda-vyavahārya iti.” (pp. 432, ibid, R.G.)
But no such vyavahāra follows. The idea is that due to distance, when an object is not recognized, we have the apprehension, viz. 'there is something'. No cognition such as, 'that object is not a cow but a jar, or it is not a jar but a cow - follows. So, when a vyakti is united with go-tva, i.e. when it is realized that the individual is associated with gotva-dharma, i.e. characteristics of a cow, it becomes fit for the usage 'go', with reference to itself. Now Jagannātha turns his attention to what 'guna' is and what ‘kriya' is. Gunas
a, and the rest are the expressed sense (abhidheya) of words such as śukla, etc. In the same way ‘kriyā' or action is the abhidheyártha of 'calana' and the rest : "gunaḥ śuklā”diḥ śukládi-padānām abhidheyah, kriyā calanā"di-sabdānām. An objection is raised such as follows : In case of colours such as śukla and the rest, and kriyā such as 'calana' and the rest, we see difference with reference to different individuals with which they are associated. So, if we accept 'samketa' with reference to a single śukla or a single calana, then we will have to face contingencies of ānantya and vyabhicāra as in case of samketa with reference to a vyakti i.e. individual : R.G. pp. 432, ibid - "śuklā"dīnām calanā"dīnām ca prativakti-bhedadarśanātānantya-vyabhicārābhyām, vyakti-sakti-vāda-dosābhyām ihā'pi kalusīkaranam, iti cet, - The reply to this is - tesām lāghavāt pratyabhijñābalāc ca ekatayā abhyupagamāt. - i.e. in case of guna and kriyā if we believe that there is only one śukla guņa, and there is only one 'calana’ kriyā, then we will have ‘lāghava' guna, i.e. we will have achieved brievity of expression. Again, we expreience that all white colours at different substratum are virtually one and the same, and so also 'calana' kriyā is one and the same in case of different individuals
o. So, due to lāghava, and due to experience as such, pratyabhijñā-balāt, we accept only one whiteness and one action. Jagannātha here quotes from the K.P. of Mammata : "guna-kriya-yadrcchānām vastutah ekarūpānām āśrayabhedad bheda iva laksyate.” (K.P. II. 2, vrtti). So, bhedajñāna or perception of difference in case of śukla, or calana, etc. with reference to difference in substratum is virtually an illusion : “tathā ca bheda-pratītir bhrama eva iti bhāvah.” (R.G. pp. 433, ibid). Jagannātha says that this is to be understood as an 'upalaksana' or an accidental mark. Such an illusion takes place with reference to other objects also. For example, there is a feeling that guņas and kriyās are born and distroyed. But actually this impression is illusory. Those who hold letters to be eternal hold that the impression of 'utpatti' and 'vināśa' with reference to individual letters such as 'g' 'au' and 'h' etc., are also an illusion.

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This objection is refuted by Jagannātha thus. He says that even he accepts the fact that sphota is of the form of a word. But because it is of the form of a word it resides in ākāśa, as all words have ākāśa as their substratum : "sarvaḥ śabdaḥ nabho-vșttiḥ” (Muktāvali) - But the individual pointed out by samjñā-sabda (i.e. samjñi) is without the dharma called 'sāmānya' or 'jāti'. So, in a vyakti or individual, there is no dharma or quality present which can be taken as the pravrtti-nimitta of a śabda. That an individual is apprehended by a given samjña śabda (such as e.g. dittha), rests only on the wish of the speaker alone. So, as no other quality as pravstti-nimitta can be pointed out in a given individual, only the akhanda-samjñā-rūpa-sphoța, manifested by a word that is uttered, is imagined to be the pravsttinimitta of the vyakti. There is no harm is accepting this situation. Therefore, eventhough the sphoța is of the form of a word, it is considered as the dharma of vyakti through parmparā-sambandha i.e. in a successive way, or sequential way. All worldly objects are the 'vivarta' of akhandasphotā"tmaka sabda which is non-different from brahma. Thus the worldly objects are ‘pariņāmas' so to say. But from the point of view of sabda, the sphota is said to be the dharma of a vyakti through the sva-janya-bodhavişayatā-sambandha. It means that the meaning of the cognition brought about by śabda is 'visaya'. Thus sphota is held to be the dharma of the sense or vyakti. With this idea in mind, Mammata in his K.P. also holds akhanda-sphota as the dharma' of a vyakti. Says he : "ditthā”di-sabdānām antya-buddhi-nirghyāhyam samhsta-kramam-svarūpam vaktrā yadrcchayā ditthā"dişu arthesu upādhitvena samniveśyate iti sóyam samjñārūpah yadrcchā”tmakaḥ.” (K.P. II). The term "antya-buddhi-nirgrahya' of Mammata, is read as 'carama-varnabhivyangya' by Jagannātha. Both the terms mean one and the same thing. The 'samhţtakrama' svarūpa of samjñā-sabda is itself the akhanda-svarūpa. In it, the whole word and not the sequence of letters, is to be taken as sphoța. Such a sphoța is accepted by a speaker by his own will, as the dharma or attribute of an individual. So, "I am going to take the whole word in form of special sphoța, as the dharma of a vyati” - with this determination in mind, the speaker arranges the samjñā-sabda. Here, akhanda-spoța is knowingly taken as an attribute of an idividual, the cognition of that individual will be termed in śastriya i.e. technical jargon, as 'visesaņa-viśista' - i.e. 'sa-vikalpa' - bodha. This is the view of the grammarians.
Now, because the Naiyāyikas and Mimāmsakas do not accept akhanda-sphota, manifested by a samjñā sabda, they accept 'varna-samudāya' as the pravrtti

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA A meaning ascribed by a speaker following his own will to words such as 'Dittha' etc. is called 'yādrcchika-abhidheya'. There are three views regarding this yādịcchika-dharma : "R.G. pp. 433, ibid : "yādịcchikas tu vaktrā svecchayā ditthā"di-sabdānām pravrtti-nimittarve sannivesito dharmah. sa ca, 'paramparayā vyaktigatah carama-varņábhivyangyo'khandaḥ sphoțah' iti eke. "ānupūrvyavacchinno varna-samudāyah' iti apare. “kevalā vyaktir eva” iti itare. tatrā”dya-mata-dvaye viśesana-jñānād visista-pratyayaḥ. třtīyamate ca nirvikalpakā”tmakaḥ pratyayah. tad ittham catuṣtayī śabdānām pravșttir iti darśanam vyavasthitam.” - The three views are as follows. For the vaiyākaranas, the yādịcchika-dharma which is said to be the expressed sense of the words such as Dittha and the like, is only the akhanda-sphota which is manifested by the last letter of the particular word, associated with the samskāra or impression left by the cognition of each preceeding letter. The last letter alone is the only suggester of sphota, because this sphoța cannot be suggested by the whole varņa-samudāya, because varnas perish immediately after being uttered and therefore they cannot he grouped together. The second view goes like this. As seen above, varnas or letters cannot be grouped together, they being perishable the moment they are uttered. So, some are of the opinion that the individual vyakti alone is dharma' meant by words like 'dittha' etc. Jagannātha explains that according to the first two views, words like "dittha' etc. would first convey the dharma 'sphoța' or 'varnasamudāya', and then the cognition of vyakti or individual is inferred by sphota, which leads to the apprehension of vyakti as associated with the above dharmas or qualities. The third view holds that such words convey the vyakti directly and this cognition being devoid of viśesaņas is nirvikalpa, the earlier one leading to savikalpajñāna.
Prof. R. B. Athavale explains these views in greater details as follows - (pp. 461, 463, R. G. Edn., ibid) He explains that here there is scope for raising one objection viz. that the word in form of akhanda sphota is manifested by samjñā śabda. So, it is of the form of a word. So, how do you accept 'sphoța' as the nimitta or cause of the pravrtti of a word ? i.e. how do you take it as the ‘nimitta' of the power - Śakti - that gives a particular sense ? Normally a 'pravstti-nimitta' is a special quality - i.e. 'visista dharma' of a given object. So, on account of that special quality residing in a given object, that particular word yields that
ense. Now sphota, being of the form of word, can never be a special dharma of a vyati or object.

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This objection is refuted by Jagannatha thus. He says that even he accepts the fact that sphota is of the form of a word. But because it is of the form of a word it resides in ākāśa, as all words have ākāśa as their substratum : "sarvaḥ śabdaḥ nabho-vṛttiḥ" (Muktāvali) - But the individual pointed out by samjñā-śabda (i.e. samjñī) is without the dharma called 'sāmānya' or 'jāti'. So, in a vyakti or individual, there is no dharma or quality present which can be taken as the pravṛtti-nimitta of a sabda. That an individual is apprehended by a given samjña śabda (such as e.g. dittha), rests only on the wish of the speaker alone. So, as no other quality as pravṛtti-nimitta can be pointed out in a given individual, only the akhanda-samjñā-rūpa-sphoța, manifested by a word that is uttered, is imagined to be the pravṛttinimitta of the vyakti. There is no harm is accepting this situation. Therefore, eventhough the sphota is of the form of a word, it is considered as the dharma of vyakti through parmparā-sambandha i.e. in a successive way, or sequential way. All worldly objects are the 'vivarta' of akhaṇḍasphoṭā"tmaka sabda which is non-different from brahma. Thus the worldly objects are 'pariņāmas' so to say. But from the point of view of sabda, the sphota is said to be the dharma of a vyakti through the sva-janya-bodhaviṣayatā-sambandha. It means that the meaning of the cognition brought about by sabda is 'viṣaya'. Thus sphota is held to be the dharma of the sense or vyakti. With this idea in mind, Mammața in his K.P. also holds akhanda-sphota as the 'dharma' of a vyakti. Says he "dittha"di-śabdānām antya-buddhi-nirghyāhyam samhṛta-kramam-svarūpam vaktrā yadṛcchayā ditthā"diṣu artheṣu upadhitvena samniveśyate iti sóyam samjñārūpaḥ yadṛccha"tmakaḥ." (K.P. II). The term "antya-buddhi-nirgrahya' of Mammata, is read as 'carama-varṇábhivyangya' by Jagannatha. Both the terms mean one and the same thing. The 'samhṛtakrama' svarūpa of samjñā-śabda is itself the akhanda-svarupa. In it, the whole word and not the sequence of letters, is to be taken as sphota. Such a sphota is accepted by a speaker by his own will, as the dharma or attribute of an individual. So, "I am going to take the whole word in form of special sphota, as the dharma of a vyati" - with this determination in mind, the speaker arranges the samjñā-śabda. Here, akhanda-spota is knowingly taken as an attribute of an idividual, the cognition of that individual will be termed in śastriya i.e. technical jargon, as 'viseṣaṇa-viśista' - i.e. 'sa-vikalpa' - bodha. This is the view of the grammarians.
Now, because the Naiyāyikas and Mimāmsakas do not accept akhanda-sphoța, manifested by a samjñā sabda, they accept 'varṇa-samudaya' as the pravṛtti

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA nimitta-dharma of an individual which is the object of convention through a samjñā-sabda. And this is also in fitness of things. Here also, as varņa-samudāya is of the form of a word, it is taken knowingly as the dharma of a vyakti through pamparā, i.e. succession, because for the pravstti i.e. sakti of that particular samjñā-sabda, no other dharma or attribute can be pointed out in that individual. Now, this varņa-samudāya itself is non-existent as each letter when pronounced evaporates in air, so the three or four or any number of letters in a given word do not exist at a fixed given moment at a time. So, to bring a varņa-samudāya into existence, i.e. to make it possible, the Naiyāyikas believe that each letter, after it is pronounced, leaves its samskāra i.e. mental impression behind. So with this impression of each preceeding letter or with the memory caused by the impression of each preceeding letter, the last letter is heard and this makes for the whole collection of letters i.e. varņa-samudāya. Even in this view of the Naiyāyikas, varnasamudāya becomes the višesana or attribute of a vyakti i.e. individual. So, the
cognition of that vyakti, is also visesana-visista' or 'sa-vikalpa'. • Now still others feel that such an artificial samjñā-rūpa-dharma can not be
attached to an individual, because as pravrttinimitta, normally sāmānya-rupadharma cannot possibly reside in an individual. The samjñā-rūpa-dharma, on the other hand, being of the nature of a word, cannot be taken as dharma of a vyakti. So, if any dharma is to be fixed as a pravrtti-nimitta of a samjñā-sabda, then only the vyakti, i.e. individual himself can be fixed as such. These people do not accept any other dharma residing in a vyakti. Jagannātha has expresse view among the three mentioned, through the words : "kevalā vyaktir eva iti itare." This same view is expressed in his Nyāya-Mañjarī, by the famous logician Jayanta Bhatta, as follows:
“yeşām artheșu sāmānyam, na sambhavati taiḥ punaḥ ucyate kevalā vyaktir ākāśādi-padair iva. evam ditthādi-śabdānām samjñātva-viditātmanām abhidheyasya sāmānya-śūnyatvād vyakti-vācitā. ata eva hi dravya-sabda iti ucyate, ye punaḥ kalpitäneka-vșttim pracakșate. vācyam tatrā'pi sāmānyam drśyate gaganatva-vat kalpanāyās tu no bhūmih kācid asti vipaścitām.”
- Nyāya-mañjarī, āhnika 5.

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275 - It means : In such samjñā"di i.e. dittha"di words or objects, wherein sāmänya or class is not possible, with the help of such samjñā words (like words such as akāśa' and the like), only the vyakti, bereft of a sāmänya, is cogn meaning of samjñā-rūpa-ditthā"di words, is without 'sāmānya', the ‘vyakti' or individual alone follows as the meaning. Some people may say that even the words such as dittha etc. are used by many with reference to many objects. So, why not accept a 'sāmānya' or 'jāti' in such words also ? To this, the reply is, even if that be so, the vyakti cognised by such ditthā”di words, is without a 'sāmānya'. So, there is no escape from taking such words as 'vyakti-mātra-vācī i.e. expressive only of an individual. As there is no such substance as 'gaganatva', in the same way, there can not be any sāmānya as 'ditthatva'. So, the wise do not subscribe to such imagination of such sāmānya.
So, when the Naiyāyikas can not point out any dharma as pravrtti-nimitta for the samjñā-sabda used for a vyakti with samjñā, it is quite appropriate for them to take vyakti itself as pravstti-nimitta-dharma in case of a samjñā sabda. That 'samjni', i.e. that vyakti is bereft of any visesana or dharma, and hence, the cognition of such a vyakti is taken as 'nirvisesa' or 'nirvikalpa'. This is simple. Jagannātha thus concludes that - "tad ittham catustayi sabdānām pravrttir iti darśanam vyavasthitam.” (pp. 433, R.G., ibid)
Next, he presents the view of the Jātivādins. They take only 'jāti' as the meaning of all the words, in place of the four viz. jāti, guna, kriya and dravya. In case of guna-vācaka and kriyāvācaka words, the jāti as realised in guņa and kriyā is the real ‘abhidheya' for them. In case of samjñā-sabdas also, i.e. in case of yadșcchā words, the samjñā or particular name as pronounced by different agents such as the old men, a child, a parrot, or any such other speaker, etc., forms a 'jāti' which is the abhidheya in that case. The idea is that in this view the dharma called jāti is supposed to reside in a word. But, through succession, th jāti residing in such words has to be taken as residing in meaning - 'arthanistha'. To remove this difficulty, it is suggested that : the vyakti understood by that samjñā-sabda though seems to be different when he is a child, or a young man, an old man, carries an identical name or samjñā, and hence these different vyaktis have a common jāti in form of an indentical name. This jāti' is the meaning of a particular samjñāśabda. Thus, for all words, sakti resides in 'jāti' only. With this the last view is fully discussed : (pp. 433, R.G., ibid) : "guna-kriyā śabdānām guna-kriya-gatāyāḥ, yadrccha-śabdānām ca bāla-vrddha-sukā”di

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA udīritā-tattat sabda-vịttes tat-tat-samaya-bhinnártha-vștter vā jāter eva abhidheyatā-sambhavāt. iti jāti-sakti darśanam" - with this ends the discussion on abhidhā in the R.G. we will pick up the thread and discuss Jagannātha's view on lakṣaņā at its proper place in due course. For the present we will take up the views of Bhoja on abhidhā.
Bhoja : We know that Bhoja, as he lived much earlier cronologically, should have been taken up prior to Jagannātha, but as he represents, according to us, a tradition, which we call 'the Mālava tradition', to distinguish it from the kashmir tradition as respresented by Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemacandra, Vidyadhara, to mention a few, we will have to take up Bhoja separately at the end of the discussion of any given topic. This is not to suggest that Bhoja is always at cross-roads with the kashmir tradition and that he always exchanges swords with Anandavardhana and the rest, but one thing is certain that the tradition Bhoja represents, one which we call the Mālava tradition of literary aesthetics, has certain special traits of its own. So, Bhoja will - be considered separately by us. It has to be candidly admitted that the views of
Bhoja as interpreted by the great modern ālamkārika Dr. Raghavan, for whom we have tremendous respect and love, will be our sole friend, philosopher and guide so far as Bhoja is concerned. But with due respect to the great savant of indian literary criticism, we have to make an humble confession that at times we fail to understand what Dr. Raghavan explains, or at times we feel we can supplement his efforts, or in vary rare cases we may even attempt to correct his impression. In doing this, we will surely go with the text of Bhoja as read in both of his works, viz. the Sarasvati-kanthā”bharana and the Srngāra-prakāśa. Our efforts should not be misunderstood by the world of scholars, for to us, Dr. Raghavan remains, and will remain for a thousand years to come, as the greatest interpreter of Bhoja, but we try to approach only in the fashion of a student with his curiocity a little more awakened as compared to a general reader. So, with pranams to both Bhoja and Dr. Rāghavan, who for us is an 'abhinava-bhoja'. we will try to explain the concept of abhidhā, and also other śabda-vrttis as explained by Bhoja.
It has to be noted that Bhoja has not discussed independently the topic of śabda-výttis in his Sarasvati-kaņțhā”bharaṇa, comprising of five chapters. However there could be traced stray references to the sabda-vrttis here and there which do not carry any theoratical value, e.g. on pp. 709 (N.S. Edn. 1934 A.D.) we read : “yato rasā”kşepāt-parihāsa-leśoktyā'mangalam, praviśa, pindīm,

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277 dvāram, bhakşaya, itinyāyāt prasiddha-adhyāhāraḥ, 'darī vadati, mañcāḥ krośanti' iti prayogadarśanāt adhārādheyayor abhedopacārasca viruddhalaksaņā"dibhiḥ prayujyamāno na dosāya iti." - Such direct or indirect references to śabda-vșttis do not carry any value for us. We will have to turn to the other work, The Sạngāra-prakāśa for a comparatively more systemetic approach to the topic of śabdavrttis, though it has to be admitted at the outset, that Bhoja, in keeping with the tradition which he seems to have directly inherited from alamkāra writers prior to Anandavardhana, does not treat 'this topic as systemetically as is done by Mammaţa and other followers of the kashmir school. We will pick up the thread with the help of Dr. Raghavan. We propose to reach him with honest enquiry as an advanced student.
Bhoja's treatment of sabda-śaktis is part of his larger scheme of explaining what 'sāhitya' is. Dr. Raghavan thus explains : (pp. 87, Bhoja's Śr. Pra, '63) “We have already said that poetry being speech supreme, sāhitya is, between the two parts of language - śabda and Artha-relation supreme. Thus, sāhitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense; and then it means poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by sāhitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general sāhitya; higher up the language has risen above itself and has bloomed in poetry, and here, the sāhitya is poetic relation between word and sense. Bhoja defines kāvya as the sāhitya or unity of word and sense.
"tat (kāvyam) punaḥ; śabdārthayoḥ; sāhityam āmananti.”
tad yathā - "śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam” iti. It is to a treatment of this Sāhitya of śabda and Artha that the śr. Pra. is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself Sāhitya Prakāśa in Chapter XI.
yasmin aseșa-vidyāsthānártha-vibhūtayaḥ prakāśante, samhịtya, sa sāhityaprakāśa etādņšo bhavati.”
(Chap. XI, pp. 430, Śr. Pra Vol. II) The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, 'sabdārthau sahitau kāvyam', and under the edifice of the śr. Pra. lies the foundation and system called sāhitya. This has been already pointed out above in Ch. IV (of Śr. Pra. Raghavan). Sāhitya is thus defined by Bhoja : It is the relation between

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sabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sahityas can be called general and the last four, are special and can be classed as the poetic Sāhityas.
“kim sāhityam ? yaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sa ca dvādaśadhā, - abhidhā, vivakṣā, tātparyam, pravibhāgaḥ, vyapekṣā, sāmarthyam, anvayaḥ, ekārthi-bhāvaḥ, - dosahānam, guņopādānam, alamkārayogaḥ, rasa-aviyogaś ceti.”
Again, at the beginning of chapter VII which begins the treatment of Sāhitya, Bhoja repeats these twelve-fold relations between sabda and Artha as constituting Sāhitya.
"tatra abhidhā-vivaksā-tātparya-pravibhāga-vyapekşā-sāmarthya-anvayaekārthībhāva- dosahāna-gunopādāna-alamkārayoga-rasa-aviyogarūpāḥ śabdārthayoḥ dvādaśa sambandhāḥ sāhityam ucyate.” Vol. I. p. 428, Sp. Pra.
Even the earlier work of Bhoja, the S.K.Ā. contains indications of this conception of sahitya of Bhoja. The first verse of the work - "dhvanir varnah padam vākyam etc. covers part of contents of chapters I-VI of the Śr. Pra. and the second verse of the S.K.Ā. gives the last four-fold poetic Sāhitya, - dosahāna, gunā"dāna, alamkārayoga, and rasáviyoga or rasānvaya; commenting on the above-said first verse of the S.K.A., Ratneśvara who is acquainted well with Śị. Pra, says : - tad ayam atra tātparya-samkṣepaḥ. - sāhitya-nirūpanāya kila eșa granthā"rambhaḥ. sāhityam ca sabdárthayoh sambandhaḥ tatra sabda eva ka ity apeksāyām ayam vibhāgo dhvanir ityā"di. arthas tu stambha-kumbha-ādi-laksaņaḥ loke śāstre ca prasiddhaḥ sambandhaḥ kaścid anādiḥ. sarvasvāyamānas tu sambandhaḥ nānyatreti asminnāyatate. sa caturvidhaḥ - dosahānam, guņopā”dānam, alamkārayogaḥ, rasábhi(vi)yogaś ceti.”
Ratneśvara on S.K.Ā.I. i.
This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan brings out how ambitious project Bhoja has sat himself to. By taking Sāhitya in its widest sense as “coming together of word and meaning", he wants to cover under this banner both poetry (i.e. kāvya) and non-poetry (i.e. śāstra and loka-bhāsā). So, Bhoja first takes Sāhitya merely as relation between word and sense in general and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical. Among the eight grammatical relations four are classed as kevala-sabda - sambandha-śaktis and the other four as sāpekṣaśabda-sambandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 88 ibid) gives the following table to

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Śabdavșttis, the nature of : Abhidhā explain Bhoja's classification :
kāvyam
sabdaḥ (12 types)
arthah (12 kinds)
tayoh sāhityam
(12 kinds)
grammatical 8 kinds of sabda
sambandha-saktis
4-kevala-saktayah 1-abhidhā 2-vivaksā 3-tātparyam 4-pra-vibhāgah
4-sāpekṣa-śaktayah 5-vykpeksā 6-sāmarthyam 7-anvayaḥ 8-ekárthībhāvaḥ
4 poetical kinds 9-dosahānam 10-guņā"dānam 11-alamkārayogaḥ 12-rasa-aviyogaḥ.
The first eight go under the name of śabda-sambandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan - notes that in Bhoja, (pp. 89, ibid) Abhidhā comprises the three vrttis, Mūkhyā, Gaunī, and Laksaņā. Vivaksā is of three kinds - kākvā”di-vyangyā, prakaraṇā”di-vyangyā and abhinayā”di-vyangyā. In Tatparya is included the pratīyamāna and Dhvani. (See below, Chapter XII on Bhoja and Dhvani). These eight sabda-sambandhas are treated in chapters VII and VIII. Poetic Sāhitya begins in chapter IX.
With this explanation furnished by Dr. Raghavan, we will start our investigation as to what exactly Bhoja wants to cover under 'abhidhā' and whether his treatment is more, or equally or less scientific as compared to Mammata's scheme.
When it is observed by Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja's abhidhā covers three vșttis viz. mūkhyā, gaunī, and lakṣaṇā, we feel that Bhoja seems to be under the influence of such writers as Mukula and even Mahimā, who take lakṣaņā only as part of abhidhā. For Mukula, the ten-fold abhidhā covered the field of a-mukhyā vịtti also. On the face of it the treatment in the works of Mammaţa and his followers belonging to the kashmir tradition, seems to be more scientific.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bhoja (pp. 223, Edn. Josyer, Ch. VII) says :
"tatra abhidhā-vivaksā... dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityam iti ucyate." - Then he proceeds -
“teșu sabdasya arthábhidhāyinī śaktir abhidhā. tayā svarūpa iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdo vrtti-trayeņa vartate, tāś ca-mukhyā, gaunī, laksaņā iti tisrah.” - We have a quarrel with the very first statement which is loose. When Bhoja defines abhidhā as, “sabdasya arthábhidhāyinī saktiḥ” - he fails to discriminate between the directly expressed sense, called samketitártha, the indicated sense or laksyártha and the suggested sense called vyangyártha in the kashmir school of thought. Even Kuntaka’s ‘vicitrā abhidhā' covered all these three under one banner. May be we are in a frame of mind, or we have inherited a mind-set that tends to appreciate more the system as presented by Ananda-Abhinava-MammațaJagannātha-led school of thought. • Bhoja then proceeds as follows: (pp. 233, ibid) “tatra sākṣād avyavahitárthá-bhidhāyikā mukhyā. gamyamā”na-śauryā”di-guna-yoga-vyavahitárthā gauņi svārthávinābhūta-arthántaropalakṣaṇā tu lakṣaṇā iti. tathā hi gaur iti ayam śabdo mukhyayā vrttyā sāsnā”di-mantam artham pratipādayati sa eva tişthan-mūtratā"di-guna-sampadam apekşamāņo yadā bāhlike vartate tadā gauņīm vịttim anuvadati.”
So, it is clear that Bhoja's mukhyā is the ‘abhidhā' proper of the kashmir school. Gauņī and laksaņā are treated by Mammața as part of a-mukhyā vịtti, i.e. laksaņā which is for him six-fold, sad-vidhā. But Bhoja takes these two as extention of his wider abhidhā, as done by Mukula. Perhaps even the earlier Mīmāmsakas also took laksaņā (including gaunī) as extention of abhidhā. Bhoja keeps gauņī reserved for relations - 'tadyoga' as put by the kashmir school, : based on similarity, and his laksaņā is characterised by such meaning which is another one following from the svártha. So, 'tadyoga' is accepted even by Bhoja here. He illustrates gauni by the same illustration such as "gaur vāhikah” (= bāhlīkah). One who urinates while standing, like a bull, is called 'gauh', due to similarity. The kashmir school seeks comparision in 'jādya and māndya' - dullness and stupidity as seen in both.

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Bhoja further observes:
tad āha -
"rūḍhya yatra sad arthópi loke śabdo niveśitaḥ
sa mukhyas tat sāmyāt gauņónyatra skhalad-gatih"
yadā tu sabdaḥ svarthaṭaḥ kriyāsiddhau sadhana-bhāvam gantum asamarthaḥ, tada abhidheya-avinābhūtam arthántaram lakṣayati. tadā sā ca lakṣaṇā vṛttiḥ. yathā gangāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasati. atra gangā-śabdo visiṣṭodaka-pravāhe nirudha'bhidhāna-śaktiḥ. sa ca ghoṣa-kartṛkāyāḥ prativasana-kriyāyā adhikaraṇabhavam gantum asamarthaḥ, svārthávinābhūtam taṭam lakṣayati." (pp. 223, ibid)
281
This means Bhoja is absolutely clear about the concepts of abhidha, and also gauņi and lakṣaṇā and surely he had read what Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written. But he chooses a different tradition which recognises 'gauni' as an independent vṛtti from lakṣaṇā, as seen later also in Hemacandra. But what Bhoja does is still different. Over and above taking gauņi and lakṣaṇā as separate functions, he clubs them together as extension of abhidha and thus his abhidha is wide enough to contain these two in its fold. This is, as observed earlier, like Mukula.
He then quotes from Kumarila viz. "abhidheyávinabhūta-pratītir lakṣaṇā" and calls it the life of artful expression: "sā eṣā vidagdha-vakrokti-jīvitam." Now this expression makes it clear that he appreciates the concept of 'vicitra-abhidha' of Kuntaka, and in the same way he absorbs the influence of Vamana also. Who suggested: "sādṛśyāt lakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ". (KSV. IV. iii 8).

Bhoja then attempts the classification of the three-fold abhidha, out of which the first viz. mukhyā, which is pure abhidhā for the kashmir school, is two-fold: "tatra mukhyā dvidhā, tathā-bhūtárthā, tad-bhāvā"pattiś ca" (pp. 223, ibid). Then, he proceeds: "tatha bhūtárthā ṣoḍhā, jāti-viṣayā, vyakti-viṣayā, ākṛti-viṣayā, guṇaviṣayā, kriyā-viṣaya sambandha-viṣayāś ca iti."
Now, it may be said that the divisions and subdivisions suggested here and also elsewhere normally are six or twelve. This is Bhoja's special feature. Again, here also, the sub-divisions of 'tathābhūtártha mukhya' which are six, go by the difference in the nature of the objects described. These are broad divisions seen in the word and there is hardly anything special to be noted. Though Bhoja has taken 'sahitya' in a very wide sense and his concept covers sastra-bhāṣā and loka-bhāṣā

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SAHṚDAYALOKA or vyavahāra-bhāṣā i.e. language in general also, we may say to his credit that he has drawn illustrations from poetry only. 'Sambandha-viṣaya' is illustrated from the Vikramorvaśīyam where Puraravas is said to be the grand son of Son and Moon. But our observation stands that the varieties enumerated by Bhoja, all follow the nature of the object under description. Thus if a guna is described, it is guna-visayā, if a kriya is described it is kriya-viṣayā, and so on. We may say this is just Bhoja's love for hair-splitting.
'tadbhāvā"patti' variety of mukhyā is explained as "arthasya a-tathātve adhyāsā"dibhiḥ tathātvā"pādanam tad-bhāvā"pattiḥ." (pp. 224, ibid). This again is six-fold such as - "sápi ṣoḍha, adhyāsā"tmikā, kalpanā"tmikā, vivartā❞tmikā, vipariņāmā"tmikā, viparyayā”tmikā, pravādā❞tmikā ca iti."
The adhyāsā"tmika is illustrated by "kamalam anambhasi, kamale ca kuvalaye"... etc. (pp. 225). We know that in the K.P. of Mammața, this is a famous illustration of the figure atiśayokti. Thus, Bhoja has quoted famous illustrations every where which we would put under this or that alamkara. The Kashmir school, as we know, puts the whole of 'alamkara' - under vācya-vācaka-bhāva, with some under current of vyañjana or vyangyártha in many alamkāras such as samāsokti, ākṣepa, paryāyokta, aprastuta-praśamsă etc. So, they are a 'vācya-vācaka-bhāva-vivarta' for those who follow the kashmir school of thought. Dr. Raghavan should have gone for such critical and comparative study of Bhoja's concept of Śabda-vṛttis. 'mithyājñāna' seems to be, for example, not different from niscayanta sa-samdeha, or bhrāntimān alamkāra (pp. 225, ibid). The 'pravāda' variety is illustrated by the famous verse from the Megha-dūta, viz. “ratna-cchāyā-vyatikara iva..." (pp. 226, ibid), which is for us a beautiful utprekṣā in "barheṇa iva sphurita-rucina gopa-veśasya visnoḥ."
Bhoja then proceeds with the second variety of abhidhā, viz. 'gauņi as (pp. 226, ibid) "gauņi dvividhā. guṇa-nimittā, upacara-nimittă ca. tatra yasyam dvayor vacanayoḥ sāmānádhikaranyena vaiyadhikaranyena vā prayogaḥ, viseṣaṇa-viśesyabhāványathā'nupapattyaikasya pratīyamāna-abhidhīyamāna-guṇa-dvārakaḥ sambandho bhavati, sā guṇa-vyavahitárthā guṇa-nimittā." guṇaḥ svartho viseṣaṇam pravṛtti-ākṛti-jāti-svarūpā"di bhedad anantaḥ. tat sambandhena yady api tannimittā vṛttir ananta-prakārā eva kalpyate, tathápi tasyāḥ ṣad eva vikalpā bhavanti. mukhya-viṣayaḥ, amukhya-viṣayaḥ, bheda-viṣayaḥ, abheda-viṣayaḥ, viseṣaṇa-visayaḥ, a-viseṣaṇa-visayaḥ, iti."
Now this again confirms our observation that the divisions and sub-divisions suggested by Bhoja go with the nature of the thing described. There is hardly any logical divide. Bhoja also knows that there can be innumerable varieties that go

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283 with difference in the nature of the thing described. But he insists on six only. So, virtually there is no rhyme or rhythm in Bhoja's varieties except of course the outward system of dividing a point into six or twelve sub-varieites.
The 'upacāra' variety of gauni which is also six fold is explained as (pp. 229, ibid) : “mukhyayā gaunyā vā anya-viśesaṇasya satónyatra āropaņam upacāraḥ” tannimittaka-upacara-nimittā. sā tu gauna-vyavahitárthatvāt gauni bhavati, tasya api dharma-guna-āksti-kriya-svarūpa-jātyā”dayaḥ pravstti-nimitta-tad-bhedāt. sápi şad-prakāra bhavati-dharma-nimittā, guna-nimittā, āksti-nimittā, kriyā-nimittā, svarūpa-nimittā, jātinimittā ca."
We are reminded of the words of Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaņa (S.D. II. 9. vịtti) viz. "upacāro nāma atyantam višakalitayoḥ padárthayoḥ sādņśyátiśayamahimnā bheda-pratīti-sthagana-mātram."
Bhoja holds that laksaņā is basically two-fold : (pp. 233, ibid) - “lakṣaṇā lakṣitalaksaņā ca. tayor yasyām upātta-śabdasya arthasya kriyāsiddhau sādhanarvaayogāt svārthóvinā-bhūtam arthántaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sā laksaņā, tadvyatiriktā tu vakşyamāna-anekarūpā lakṣita-lakṣaṇā iti.
tatra lakṣaṇā soļhā. sāmīpya-lakṣaṇā, sāhacarya-lakṣaṇā, saha-carita-lakṣaṇā, hetulakṣaṇā, tādarthya-lakṣaņā, parimāņa-laksaņā ca.
lakṣita-laksaņápi sodhaiva. rūļha-laksaņā, pratīka-lakṣaṇā, vivakṣita-lakṣaṇā, viruddha-laksanā, tad-anya-laksanā, prakīrna-laksanā ca.
It is surprising that Bhoja refuses to go beyond lakṣaṇā, especially in varieties called 'vivaksita-laksana' and viruddha-laksanā' which normally for a follower of the kashmir school, takes us further to vyañjanā and vyangyártha. Dr. Raghavan has also not discussed all this in details. On the contrary he has not at all chosen to treat the topic of sabdavrttis in Bhoja as an independent topic. Bhoja's illustration of vivaksita-laksanā follows his explanation of this variety such as : “yatra yathā-kathamcit śabdaprayoge vivaksitam eva laksyánusārato laksyate sā vivaksita-lakṣaṇā” (pp. 235, ibid) - The illustrations cited are - 'manasija-jaitraratham', etc. and, 'cakita-harini-hāri-netra-tribhāgah." Bhoja observes (pp. 235 ibid) - ‘atra na ardha-śabdasya tribhāga-sabdasya arthaḥ, kimtu, tābhyām asamagrā”lokanam lakṣyate. na hi bhavati netra-caturbhāgo netra-șadbhāgo vā iti."
Bhoja does not go beyond lakṣaņā here. We know that Anandavardhana has quoted the verse viz. vridāyogānnata. etc. with its fourth line ending in, "...harinetra-tribhāgah” once under Dhv. III. 3, 4; - with the words : “padāvayavena dyotanam yathā.” Thus the part 'tribhāgah' of the whole compound is for him

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suggestive of 'rasa'. Elsewhere under Dhv. III. 33 also this illustration is quoted to explain how ‘ceştāvisesa' becomes suggestive of śrngāra-rasa. Under I. 19, Kuntaka also picks up this illustration to demonstrate - viśeşana-vakratva, a variety of padapūrvārdha-vakratā. But Bhoja seems to be satisfied only with the secondary sense here, which is for him only 'a-samagra-ālokanam'. Similarly Bhoja's tad-anyalaksanā, which is illustrated by the famous verse : "suvarna-puspām prthivīm..." etc. also ends with laksyártha only. Says he - "atra na suvarna-sabdártho, na - api puşpa-sabdárthaḥ kimtu suvarna-śabdena sarva-puruşártha-mūlam hiranyam, puspa-śabdena ca prasavártho laksyate. tābhyām ca lakṣitābhyām vyavasāyinām purusa-viśeşāņām vasumati sarvān kāmān prasūta iti.” Bhoja does not go beyond this while we know that this verse is given by Anandavardhana under Dhv. I. 13, as an illustration of 'a-vivaksita-vācya-dhvani.' Abhinavagupta in his Locana on this explains both laksaņā and vyañjanā such as - (pp. 78, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. '97, 98) "suvarnāni puspyati iti suvarna-puspā. etac ca vākyam eva a-sambhavad-svārtham iti kịtvā avivakṣita-vācyam. tata eva padārtham abhidhāya anvayam ca tātparya- Śaktyā avagamayya eva, bādhakavaśena tam upahatya sādrśyāt sulabhasamțddhisambhāra-janatām laksayati. tal laksanāprayojanam śura-krtavidya-sevakānām prāśastyam a-sabda-vācvatyena gopyamānam san nāvika-kuca-kalasa-yugalam iva mahārghatām upanayan dhvanyate iti.” We do not know why Bhoja stops at laksană only. But one thing is clear that though Bhoja does not mention 'vyangvārtha' by name, he very much knows the same. In a number of illustrations of lakṣita-laksanā this is bourne out. He observes (pp. 236, ibid) - "anye punaḥ lakṣita-laksanām anyathā vyācakşate. laksaņaya upacarita-vịttyā gaunyábhihitárthena yatra arthántaram laksyate să lakṣita-laksaņā iti." He illustrates such a variety by 'rathānganāma', 'pankti-rathah' etc. Then he gives poetic illustrations which for us are charged with vyañjanā also, a name which he does not mention. For example in, “parimlānam pina-stana....” etc. we have 'vadati bisinī-patra-sayanam.' Bhoja has a note (pp. 237, ibid) : "atra vadati iti anena upacāra-vịttyā jñāpayati iti, parimlānam ityā"dibhiḥ tad-dharmaiḥ tanu-sanniveśacărutvotkarşo laksyate.” Mammața has quoted this verse as an illustration of prasāda-guņa (K.P. VIII), while Anandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 14, takes it as an illustration of 'upacarita-sabda-vrtti'. Says he, "yatra hi vyañjakatva-krtam mahatsausthavam násti tatrápi upacarita-śabda-vrttyā prasiddhy-anurodha-pravartitavyavahārāḥ kavayo dịśyante'. Read Abhinavagupta (Locana, pp. 82, Edn. Dr. Nandi) on this : “vayam tu brūma) - prasiddhyām prayojanasya a-nighūdhatā ity arthah. uttānena api rūpena, tat-prayojanan cakāsan nighūdhatām nidhānavad apekșate iti bhāvah.” Bhoja also cites the verse : 'niśvāsándha ivā”darśaḥ candramā

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285 na prakāśate' and adds (pp. 237, ibid) - "atra yathā andhe rūpa-viśeşábhivyaktir na sambhāvyate, evam tamasi api .... yo rūpa-grahaņásamarthaḥ sóndha ucyate. tatra upacarita-vịttyā yondhavat na paśyati sa evándha iti ucyate. iha yatra kimcit na drśyate tatrā'pi andha-śabdopalaksita-laksanayā pravartate. We know that Anandavardhana cites this verse (Dhv. II. i) as an illustration of atyanta-tirasktavācya-dhvani. With this we come to the end of Bhoja's concept of abhidha, which includes mukhyā (i.e. abbidhā proper), gaunī and laksanā. Bhoja as observed earlier does not treat it as a special topic as is done by alamkārikas of the kashmir school of thought, but it falls under the twelve types of 'sāhitya' or relation of word and meaning in general, and of course as his illustrations suggest, with a special reference to the poetic use of word and meaning also. With this Bhoja's treatment of abhidhā is screened. His approach to vyañjanā will be examined in due course when we will discuss the concept of vyañjanā. (Ch. 5 VIII, IX)
Mukula and others : We may compare Bhoja's approach, as noted above to that of Mukula Bhatta, Kuntaka and also Mahima Bhatta, because these three writers also do not fall in line with the so called kashmir school of thought. Though of course Mukula and Kuntaka were definitely Bhoja's predecessors, Mahimā was perhaps almost a senior contemporary. The consideration of these writers also is taken up here in this chapter, due to the reason that they also do not fall in line with the kashmir tradition. As it is, they are all pre-Mammata, but of course unique in their approach and Bhoja was under their influence. We examine Mukula Bhatta first.
Mukula Bhatta, to the best of our knowledge, has contributed a single work called the "Abhidhā-vstta-mātřkā.” Mukula virtually accepts two śabda-vrttis such as abhidhā and laksaņā, but the latter is also an extention of, and therefore part of abhidhā for him, and is broad enough to include even vyañjanā. In the very first kārikā he observes :
“sabdavyāpārato yasya pratītis tasya mukhyatā arthāvaseyasya punar laksyamāṇatvam ucyate.” - AVM. I. pp. 2
(Edn. Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, '73) He further observes : (pp. 2, ibid) “sabda-vyāpārād yasyávagatis tasya mukhyatvam. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastā”dibhyóvayavebhyaḥ pūrvam mukham

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyaḥ pratīyamānebhyah arthántarebhyah pūrvam avagamyate. tasmān mukham iva mukhya iti śākhādiyántena mukhya-śabdena abhidhīyate. tasya udāharanam, gaur anubandhya' iti. atra hi go-śabda-vyāpārāt yāga-sādhana-bhūtā go-tva-laksaņā jātir avagamyate. atas tasyāḥ mukhyatā. tad evam śabda-vyāpāra-gamyo mukhyo'rthah.” i.e. - "The apprehension of which is derived through the function of employment of a word is termed mukhya i.e. principal. It is said to be 'mukhya' because as is mukha i.e. face seen first as compared to hands and other limbs, in the same way that meaning also is apprehended first in comparision will all other meanings apprehended. So, 'that which is like 'mukha' or 'face' is termed 'mukhya' i.e. principal, which is formed with the help of Pāṇini sūtra 5/3/103, viz. “śākhādibhyo yah” - which recommends 'ya' suffix which is in the sense of comparision and seen in words such as 'śākhā' etc. The illustration is, "gaur anubandhyaḥ” i.e. 'the cow/ox may be fixed for a sacrifice.' Here, 'go' is a word, and due to its employment gotva-jāti is apprehended as instrument for performing a sacrifice. So, the mukhyatā or principality will be - fixed with reference to 'go-jāti'. From this illustration, it is understood that the meaning viz. 'gotva-ādi-rūpa' which is derived by the function of the word 'gauh' is its mukhya i.e. principal meaning.
But, observes Mukala, that is called 'laksanika' or secondary, whose apprehension follows the examination of a meaning derived through śabdavyāpāra - "yasya tu sabda-vyāpāra-avagamyártha-paryālocanayā avagatis tasya lāksanikatvam. yathā pūrvasmin eva udāharane vyakteh.” - Mukula thus holds that the meaning of go-vyati or individual cow follows the first apprehension of go-jāti, and therefore the go-vyakti-jñāna is lāksanika for him. Mukula holds that - (pp. 2, 3, ibid) : "sā hi na sabda-vyāparād avasiyate, 'višesyam nábhidha gacched ksīna-śaktir viśesaņe' iti nyāyāt sabdasya jātimātra-paryavasitatvāt. jātis tu vyaktim antarena yāga-sādhana-bhāvam na pratipadyate iti śabda-pratyāyitajāti-sāmarthyād atra jāter āśraya-bhūtā vyaktir ākṣipyate. tena asau lākṣaṇiki. evam ayam mukhya-lākṣaṇikā”tma-visayopavarnana-dvāreņa sabdasya abhidhāvyāpāro dvividhaḥ pratipadito, nirantarártha-nisthah, sántarártha-nișthas' ca.”
Mukula holds that go-vyakti is not understood through the function of a word, because there is an all accepted dictum that, "abhidhā can express only one of the two viz. viśesana or viśesya. If it conveys viśesana then it cannot express viśesya, for the whole of its capacity is exhausted in apprehending viśesana alone. Following this principle, in the said illustration, the word 'go' has a capacity to convey only

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287 gotva-jāti'. When the apprehender thinks that 'jāti' by itself, cannot be instrumental in the act of sacrifice, without its reference to the 'go-vyati', then this ‘go-vyakti' is covered by aksepa i.e. implication (= i.e. either by anumāna or inference, or arthāpatti). Thus the meaning of go-vyakti is said to be “laksaņika”, according to Mukula. He further observes that thus by the discription of two aspects such as 'mukhya' and 'lākṣaṇika', two fold abhidhāvyāpāra of a word is established. The first (mukhya) flows directly from the word without anything coming in between, and is therefore said to be ‘nirantarártha-nistha' i.e. directly apprehended from a word. The other is termed “sántarártha-nistha" as it passes through a veil. It starts from word - goes through mukhyártha i.e. jāti - and rests in vyakti at the next step. It is 'sántarártha-nista' because it has antara=vyavadhāpa, in form of first meaning which is jāti-rūpa.
Mukula accepts a four-fold division of abhidhā : (pp. 4, ibid) - samprati mukhyā'bhidhā-vyāparasya cāturvidhyam abhidhīyate”
“tatra mukhyas' caturbhedo
jñeyo jātyā”di-bhedataḥ." Mukula says that the Mahābhāsyakāra has suggested a four-fold classification of words in form of jāti-sabda, guna-sabda, kriyā-sabda and yadịcchā-sabda. When words operate to convey their meaning (svārthábhidhānāya pravarttamānānām), they are colourd by the upādhis i.e. attributes - upādhy - uparañjita-visaya-vivekatvād upādhi-nibandhanā pravrttih. This upādhi i.e. attribute is two-fold, viz. vaktp-sannivesita, i.e. which is grafted by the speaker, i.e. which is not natural to it, and 'vastu-dharma' i.e. one that naturally resides in an object. The first is illustrated by such words as dittha' and the like. The form of such words is collected by the last letter - "antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam samhrtakramam svarūpam” (pp. 5, ibid). This capacity to yield meaning is injected into a particular word by a speaker, who wants to flash the abhidhāpower of that particular word according to his own choice. - "tat khalu tām tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā, yadệcchayā tasmin tasmin samjñini upādhitayā samniveśyate." (pp. 5)
It may be noted that as Mukula was posterior to Anandavardhana, he knew vyañjanā very well and yet he willingly disowns it. He uses such words as "abhivyañjayatā", but he does not encourage vyañjanā sakti' of a word. He only means, "making it manifest, or making it flash something."

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Mukula considers another view point also. Says he - some people hold that no such 'samhṛta-krama-svarūpa' is injected into the 'samjñï' because there cannot be such form independent of 'da' kāra, etc. Thus it being 'abhāvā"tmaka', it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadṛccha-sabdatva of such words as 'dittha' and the like is also formed because for them also words such as 'ḍittha' and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudayabhāva, come into exercise for 'abhidhana' of whatever samjñā is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of ḍittha, even if some imagined 'dittha-tva' is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word dittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5): "yeṣām api ca 'ḍa' kārā"di-varṇa-vyatirikta-samhṛta-krama-svarupábhāvāt na dittha"diśabda-svarūpam, samhṛta-kramam samjñiṣu adhyavasyate, iti darśanam, teṣām api vaktṛ-yadṛccha'-bhivyajyamāna-saktibhedánusāreņa kālpanika-samudayarūpasya ḍittha"deḥ śabdasya tat tat samjñábhidhānāya pravartamānatvāt yadṛcchā śabdatvam ditthā"dīnām upapadyata eva."
288
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Mukul of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyakaraṇas.
vastu-dharma-rupa upādhi is also two-fold; 'sadhya' and 'siddha'. The former are the words expressing action-i.e. they are kriyāśabdas, e.g. 'pacati' and the like. The latter i.e. 'siddha upadhi' is also two fold such as 'jati' and 'guna'. 'Jāti' is said to be prāṇa-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with 'jāti'. So, 'jāti' is said to be 'prāṇaprada-siddha-vastudharma'. Mukul quotes Vakyapadīya : "gaur iti; na hi gauḥ svarupena gauḥ, nápya-gauḥ. gotvábhisambandhāt tu gauḥ." Some attribute (upadhi) becomes the cause of viseṣā"dhāna for an object which has obtained its own form (pp. 5, ibid) : "kaścit punar upadhir labdha-svarūpasyavastunaḥ viseṣā"dhānahetuḥ, yathā śuklā"dir gunah." i.e. like 'guna' in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only 'jāti' is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its 'viseṣā"dhana' - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The 'guna's such as 'paramāņutva' - 'atom-ness' or the quality of being an atom, which are permanent (i.e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guna' - "teṣām api sarveṣām guna-jātīyatvāť, they are also of the same type as these, i.e. śuklatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jati', but because they are 'viseṣā"dhanahetu', they are termed guņas, and not jāti. Thus Mukula concludes: (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evam prāṇa-prado'pādhi-nibandhanatvam yasya sabdasya sa jāti-śabdo yathā gavā"diḥ. yasmāt labdha-svarūpasya vastuno viseṣā"dhana-hetuḥ arthaḥ pratiyate, sa guṇaśabdo yathā śuklā"diḥ."

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We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammata. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammața to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patanjali and Bhartṛhari.
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Now, Mukula considers a pūrva-pakṣa. It goes like this - Is it not possible that words connoting 'guna', 'kriya' or 'yadṛccha' - all can be taken as jāti-śabda ? For example take the word śukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balākā (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word 'śukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus 'jāti-nibandhanatva' of 'guṇa-vācī' words is seen. This can be said of kriya sabdas also. The kriya of cooking in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. is different yet it is conveyed by the same word viz., 'pacati'. The yadṛccha words such as 'dittha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jāti i.e. 'ḍittha-sabdatva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'catuṣṭayi pravṛtti' of words does not hold good: "ataś ca gunakriya yadṛcchā-śabdānām api jāti-śabdatvāt caṭuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid)
The siddhantin's answer follows: It is not 'jāti' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity in case of guna-sabdas or kriyāśabdas. But it is 'samjn?' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i.e. the āśraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the individual quality such as whiteness etc., owing to difference with reference to time, place, and context, and thus due to difference in medium, 'kāraṇabheda' - appear differt when vested in a conch, and the like. The colour looks, as though different. But thereby 'śuklatva' - 'jāti' is not proved to have existence. For 'jāti' is that one 'dharma' which resides in many. But the substratum of the imagined śuklatva jāti, viz. śulkla-vyakti is basically one and identical. Same is the case with such words as 'pacati', 'dittha', etc. Thus the 'vyakti' in form of paka-kriya is one and the same, and so also the individual-samjñī-named 'dittha'. The illusory manifoldness nānātva-seen in different stages of paka-kriyā, or in an individual at different years such as of a child, young boy, young man, etc. etc. - makes for this wrong perception of jāti in such cases. This is not real. Says Mukula (pp. 10, ibid) - "atra api ekasyā eva pākā"di-kriya-vyakteḥ, ditthā"di-śabda-vyakteḥ, ditthā"deś ca samjñino yathākramam abhivyañjakānām pākā"dīnām tathā dhvanīnām vayóvasthā-viśeṣāṇām

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kaumārā❞dīnām ca yo bhedas tad vaśena nānāvidhena rūpeṇa avabhāsamānatvāt sthitam etat sabda-pravṛtti-nimittānām śabdarthas' catur vidhaḥ iti."
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After this Mukula turns to the second variety of abhidhā, i.e. lākṣaṇika abhidhā. This also is two fold. The AVM 2B reads:
"śuddhopacara-miśratvāt lakṣaṇā dvividhā matā."
Because of its being either śuddha i.e. pure or upacāramiśra, i.e. with (metaphorical) expression, lakṣaṇā is two-fold. The illustrations are 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ' and 'gaur vähīkaḥ' respectively. The śuddha-lakṣaṇā is also divided twofold, such as upādāna-lakṣaṇā i.e. inclusive indication and lakṣaṇa-lakṣanā i.e. exclusive indication. (AVM. 3A). Mukula suggests that when something else is imposed to support one thing: sva-siddhyarthatayā"kṣepo yatra vastvantarasya tat (AVM. 3B) - This is called upādānam; or 'inclusive' variety. The other is the opposite of this (AVM. IV. A) : lakṣaṇam tu tad-viparyāsato matam." This is exclusive type. We know that all this has been accepted by Mammata without challanging. But the - illustration that Mukula cites for upādāna-lakṣaṇa viz. "gaur-anuvandhyaḥ" is rejected by Mammata. It is taken as 'arthāpatti' or presumption or inference from circumstances, i.e. implication, for in the illustration cited by Mukula we cannot show either rūḍhi or prayojana which is the basis of lakṣaṇā. Mammața also feels that sabda-pramāņa is resorted to only when other pramāņas do not operate. Here, go-vyakti in the present illustration of 'gaur-anuvandhyaḥ' is known through implication. So it is no use utilizing a sabda-vṛtti here.
Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā occurs when one's meaning is sacrificed to obtain the other sense, as in "gangāyām ghoṣaḥ".
Mukula proceeds to give a four-fold division of upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā (AVM. 4B-5A). He says:
"āropā'dhyavasānābhyām
śuddha-gauṇopacārayoḥ (4B) AVM.

pratyekam bhidyamānatvāt
upacāraś caturvidhaḥ." (5A) AVM.
Thus superimposition (āropa) and introsusception (adhvasāna) make for these varieties. Thus in all four-fold upacara-metaphorical imposition - is available.
Thus Mukula first begins with upacara or identification as śuddha and gauņa. Śuddha is that which has no upamana-upameya-bhāva or similarity at its basis. The

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guna in form of similarity is absent here. This is illustrated by such examples as ayur ghrtam' where karya-karanabhāva-is at its base. Gauna upacara, or identification based on guna such as similarity between upamāna and upameya which results in superimposition of the sabda and artha describing upamāna on that concerning upameya, is illustrated as in "gaur vāhikah".
Now this two-fold upacāra or or identification is also two-fold on the basis of adhyāropa or superimposition and adhyavasāna or absorption, i.e. partial and complete identification. Adhyāropa or partial imposition occurs when the difference between the object superimposed and the basic object on which superimposition is done, is not concealed, i.e. the difference between the two is not eroded. Here a lesser object whose identity is not convered up is seen clearly and on this object, another object of superior quality is superimposed. This is called 'adhyāropa'. This is illustrated in both the illustrations i.e. ayur ghrtam' and 'gaur-vāhikah' cited above. Prior to this Mukula had made one remark that : kecit tu upacāre śabdópacāram eva manyante; na arthópacāram. tad ayuktam. śabdópacārasya arthópacāra-avinābhāvitvāt.” (pp. 16) i.e. only śabdopacăra is not possible as believed by some, because it necessarily involves 'arthopacāra'. It may also be observed that when Mukula says (pp. 16), dvividhaḥ upacāraḥ; śuddho gaunaś ca. tatra suddho yatra mūla-bhūtasya..." This suggests that Mukala is in favour of taking only upacara based on similarity as real upacāra. In Mammata's mind this impression was lying at the root. It is therefore that by the end of his discussion on upādāna-laksaņā and laksana-laksanā, he writes : "ubhayarūpā ca iyam suddhā, upacarena a-miśratvāt. So, for Mammața also 'upacāra' is basically rooted in similarity. Precisely for this, Mammața does not use the term 'upacāra' while treating sāropā and sādhyavasānikā. Mammata also did not favour the upacara which was sabda-gata.
Mukula explains 'āropa' and 'adhyavasāna' as : (pp. 18, ibid) : “yatra adhyāropya-āropa visayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram
tatra an-apahnuta-svarūpa eva vastvantare vastvantarasya adhikasya āropyamāṇatvād adhyāropah.” - We have explained it as above. Adhyavasāna is said to be there - when, "yatra tu upacaryamāņa-visayasya upacaryamāṇe antarlīnatayā vivakṣitatvāt svarūpápahnavaḥ kriyate, tatra adhyavasānam.”
The suddha-upacāragata-adhyavasāna is seen in, “pañcālāḥ”. The word 'pañcāla' through lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, it being the place for stay of a child of pañcāla, is itself used in the sense of a village : "atra hi pañcālápatya-nivāsádhikaranatvāj janapade lakṣita-laksanayā pañcāla-śabdaḥ prayujyate.” (pp. 18, ibid) Gauņa upacāragata

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA adhyavasāna is illustrated as in, ‘rājā'. Here 'gaunatva' does not come to mind immediately, but only after some thought is given to it. So, it looks as it were it is ordinary - 'bhrastam iva', for the importance of rūdhi is more powerful here. Thus we have "adhyavasāna-yukta-gauņa-upacāra” here.
When to these four upacāra-based varieties two as stated above are added, we have in all six varieties of laksanā. - "etena caturvidhena upacārena saha pūrvoktau dvau laksanābhedau samkalayya sat prakārā laksanā vaktavyā" . observes Mukula (pp. 18, ibid).
Now this lakṣaṇā is said to be 'tri-skandhā (i.e. having three basic varieties) on account of its suddhatva, adhyāropa and adhyavasāna : "esā ca laksanā triskandhā, śuddhatvāt, adhyāropad, adyavasānāt ca.” (pp. 20. ibid) - Thus when these three each are divided into two we have a scheme of six-fold laksanā. Mammata also has the same observation : "laksana tena sad-vidhā" (K.P. II). Mukula explains the sub-divisions such as -
"tațasthe lakṣaṇā śuddhā syād āropastv adūrage || (AVM. VB) nigirne'dhyavasānam tu
rūdhyāsannataratvataḥ | (AVM VI. A). i.e. śuddha laksaņā will have āropa with reference to taţastha (i.e. independently present), 'āropa' i.e. superimposition is with reference to 'a-dūraga', and 'adhyavasāna' or complete identification is in 'nigarana' i.e. swallowing up. This is two fold; - either through rūdhi or asannataratā i.e. nearness.”
The idea is - Laksanā is said to be two-fold such as ‘upādāna' and 'laksana'. Now wherever this occurs, the laksya object is not covered up (anuparaktatvāt tatasthatayā pratiyamāne) by the 'laksaka' object, and so it remains 'tatastha' i.e. independend of the other object.
This means that the ‘laksya' object is not apprehended as covered up by the ‘laksaka' object, e.g. "gangāyām ghosah." Here 'tata' or the bank of the river Gangā is in mind and so, 'taţa' is not realized as completely covered up by a special flow of water, because that special flow is restricted to the limit of only indicating the bank from a distance. So, the apprehension of the bank takes place independently and not as identified with the Gangā. We have to accept the same situation in case of upādāna laksaņā also, e.g. in "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day.” : “tathā hi - 'gangāyām ghoșa' iti atra ghoṣadhikarana-bhūta-tatopalakṣaṇabhisamdhānena

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Śabdavṛttis, the nature of : Abhidhā
293 'gangāyām ghoso na vitástāyām' iti gangā-sabde prayujyamāne tatasya srotovišeşeņa-upalaksakatvam-atropayuktatvena uparāgo na pratīyate, taţasthatvena eva tasya tatasya pratyayāt. evam upādāne'pi vacyam - yathā, 'pīno devadatto divā na bhunkta' iti.” (AVM. pp. 20, ibid).
Mukula further observes that when it is required for the taţa to express itself as covered up by the special flow and yet its own form is also to be revealed, then in the illustration viz. 'gangāyām ghosah', first there is superimposition i.e. āropa, for in such an āropa there is apprehension of taţa as coloured by the flow. So, the apprehension takes this form : "ghosa or dwelling is on such a bank which as it is in proximity of a special flow of water, is itself of the form of the flow itself.' As against that when the idea is to convey extreme proximity - ‘atyanta āsannatā', and when the particular statement is used to convey this extreme proximity, then the bank is presented as completely covered up by the special flow. So, it is shown that the dwelling is, 'directly on the Gangā, not anywhere else.' There it is the case of complete identification or swollowing up - 'adhyavasāna' : "yadā tu gangā-śabdábhidheyasya sroto-višeşasya a-vidūravartitayā taţam anapahnuta-svarūpam sroto-višeşoparaktayā tatasya pratīteh sroto-višeşa-a-vidūra-vartitvāt srotovićeşa-rūpe tate ghosa iti. yadā tu atyantam āsannatām ghosam prati srotovišeșasya pratipādayitum etad vākyam srotovišeșa-nigirmatayā tatam apahnutya prayujyate 'gangāyām eva sākṣād ghosah na tu anyatra iti', tadā adhyavasānam. (pp. 20, 21, ibid)
Thus, "gaur vāhīkah" and "gaur eva ayam", are illustrations of gauna-upacāramülaka, sāropā and sādhyavasānikā, respectively. Just as adhyavasāna-lakṣaṇā is possible with reference to proximity, similarly it is possible with reference to rūdhi also : "yathā ca asanna-tatatvena adhyavasānam pūrvam pravibhaktam ta rūdhatvena api pravibhaktavyam” (pp. 22 ibid). The illustrations are 'pañcālāh' and 'rājā'. Precisely for this the kārikā said, "rūdhyā"sannataratvatah” rūdhatvāt āsannataratvāt ca nigīrne arthe adhyavasānam syād ity arthaḥ.” (pp. 22, ibid). Thús rudhi is also based on a forgotten relation, while prayojanavati has its sambandha fresh in mind. Mukula has not counted 'prayojana' as the hetu of laksaņā. Mukula here discusses a prima facie view. The objector's contention is - "The 'mukhyártha' i.e. primary meaning is necessarily conveyed by word itself. As against this, the 'laksanika' i.e. secondary meaning is not collected through the word. To put it more clearly, it can be said that, the kārya-kārana-relation of a particular meaning with a particular word is ascertained through 'anvaya-vyatireka'. Again this apprehension is with reference only to the four-fold primary meaning such as jāti, guna, kriyā and

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294
SAHRDAYĀLOKA yadệcchā. But this is not so in case of the six-fold lākṣanika i.e. secondary meaning. This again is in the fitness of things, for if the word is connected directly even with the secondary sense, then even this 'lākṣaṇika' also will be branded as 'mukhya'. Again, as the lākṣaṇika artha is connected with the mukhya i.e. primary sense, and in that case if it is held that this secondary sense is also derived through the agency of the word itself, then the question which arises is that when a word also conveys the secondary sense along with conveying of its primary sense also, is it so that this secondary sense is conveyed in a sápeksa way, i.e. with some expectancy, or nirapeksa i.e. in an independent way without expectancy ? - If it is conveyed independently i.e. (nirapekṣaḥ), then its apprehension should take place for all time. If on the other hand its apprehension occurs in a correlated way - (sápekṣaḥ), then the question is what is expected here ? : "atha sabdasya mukhyo yósāv arthas tena saha sambandho laksyamāṇasya arthasya drsta iti tad-dvāreņa tasya avagatir iti abhidhīyate, evam sati yadi nirapeksah svārtha-pratipadana-dvārena laksyamānam artham avagamayati tadā sarvadā tam artham avagamayet, atha sápekṣaḥ, kim tasya apekşanīyam iti āśankya āha” - (pp. 24, ibid). With reference to the above objection, Mukula observes that -
“vaktur vākyasya vācyasya rūpabhedávadhāraṇāt
laksaņā șat-prakāraisā vivektavyā manīşibhiḥ.” - (7A) (pp. 24, ibid) “The learned divide this laksaņā, in a six-fold fashion, keeping in mind the formal varieties of vaktā i.e. speaker, vākya i.e. the sentence and vācya i.e. the sense conveyed.” The idea is that each of vaktā, vākya and vācya are either staying independently or with one of the other two. (i) 'Vaktā' is that person, who utters a sentence to convey some sense to someone else. (ii) 'Vākya' is the use of words having expectancy and which jointly convey a single sense. (iii) Vācya' is the meaning which is the object of a word either through its primary or secondary function. All these three have two sub-divisions each - i.e. samasta or vyasta i.e. each one stays either with either of the other two, or stays independently. The idea is that with reference to the different situations caused by space and time, these factors are united either in a 'samasta' or 'vyasta' form. As a result there occurs a difference in their nature. Due to this difference in nature, the experts have thought of the six-fold division of laksana : "etesām trayāņām vakrā"dīnām vyasta-samasta-bheda-bhinnānām deśa-kālāv-asthāvailaksanya-gata-samasta-vyasta-bheda-samyojitānām yah svabhāva-bhedaprapancah, tata esā sat-prakārā laksanā parāmarśa-kušalair vivecanīyā.” (pp. 24, 25, ibid). Through this six-fold meaning only, a word causes the

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidhā
295 apprehension of the secondary sense. Thus, through the agency i.e. kāranasāmagri such as vaktā or speaker and the rest, the word is connected with the secondary sense and then becomes capable to give the secondary sense. The idea is that the word has expectancy with reference to these six-fold vaktā, vācya etc., when it gives its primary sense. Then, through usage - vrddha-vyavahāra-through this primary sense, it fixes its relation with the secondary sense. Through the said six-fold meaning the word conveys the secondary sense. So, a word does not give a secondary sense, till its relation with secondary sense is not comprehended. This relation is not brought about naturally, but only through the agency or kārana-samagri such as vaktā or speaker etc., and also only after the primary sense is collected. As is said by Sabarasvāmin - "Then, how is it that a different word (= say, gangā) is used for a different opinion, we say, it is through the medium of conveying of one's own meaning." (Mi. sū. I. 4. 12). Here, the
ense is intended through the primary sense. Sabara has further stated, (Mi. sū. I. iv. i) that lakṣaṇā is from day to day usage, i.e. laukikī. Through this it is suggested by him that, when a word proceeds towards the secondary sense, it has an expectancy of a sort of relation. By 'loka' is meant the means of knowledge that comes into function in day to day affairs. So, 'laukiki' means 'that which is known in ordinary parlance', i.e. which is established by a .
d which carries some relation : "etad uktam bhavati. na śabdānām anavadhārita-lāksanikārtha-sambandhānām lāksanikam artham prati gamakatvam, nápi ca tatra sākṣāt sambandha-grahaņam, kim tarhi? vaktrā"di-sāmagrīapeksayā svārtha-vyavadhānena iti. yad uktam-ācārya-sabarasvāminā - "katham punaḥ parąśabdaḥ paratra vartate ? svārthábhidhānena iti brūmah” - iti. atra hi svārtha-dvārena laksyamānārthābhinivesitā sabdānām uktā. punaś ca asau eva āha - "lakṣaṇápi laukiki eva", iti. atra hi sambandhāvadháraña-sāpekśāņām śabdānām laksyamāṇe arthe pravịttir uktā. vyavahāropā”rūdhāni hi pratyaksā”dīni pramāṇāni loka-śabdena abhidhīyante. loka eva viditā laukikī, vyavahāra-gamyā, parigrhīta-sambandha-śabda-nişthā iti arthah." Here Mukula also quotes from Kumārila -
“nirūļhā laksanāḥ kāścit sāmarthyād abhidhānavat, kriyante sāmpratam kāścit
kāşcin naiva tv aśaktitaḥ.” - iti. • i.e. Some laksanās are based on usage. They carry the strength of conveying a meaning like the primary function (= abhidhānavat). While some (other) laksanās

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA are formed on the spot. Still others are not formed at all (i.e. they are not acceptable at all), because they are bereft of the power to convey sense.” (Tantravārtika - 3/1/6 - aruņādhikarana).'
The first one is illustrated by 'rājā' and the like. The second variety which is floated on the spot, i.e. the 'tātkāliki, is the result of the context of vrddha
vaktā (i.e. the speaker) etc.. such as seen in the verse, "snigdhasyāmala.” etc. In this verse the word 'lipta' has its primary sense contradicted: because lustre or kānti has no inherent capacity to smear anything as is done by saffron powder. This is so with reference to words such as 'suhrd', 'rāma', etc. also. The third variety is such which is not marked even in the vșddhavyavahāra or practice of the seniors and the like. Nor, do we find such situation as in case of words such as 'lipta' and the like. So, this third type is unacceptable. They cannot be put into practice. What Mukula drives at is that laksanā is possible only in cases of such words as are put into practice by seniors, or which are similar to such practice. Laksaņā is not possible anywhere and everywhere. For in that case any word will be able to deliver any sense, and this we do not find in reality : "tad evam, vaktrādi-sāmagrī-anupraveśena śabdānām svārtham arpayatām arthāntaram prati svarūpa-dvārena sajātīya-sabda-dvārena vā gamakatayā avadhāritānām laksakatvam iti sthitam.” (pp. 30, ibid). The principle established is that, in the context of the instrumentality (sāmagri) of the speaker etc., words become indicator (laksaka) only when through the same instrument (such as vaktā etc.), they are accepted as conveying meaning through their very form either in the practice of the seniors or through such other device."
After deaing with the four-fold ‘mukhya artha' and the six-fold laksaņā, Mukula discusses a fresh problem. He discusses the four views concerning (i) abhihitánvaya, (ii) anvitábhidhāna, (iii) the samuccaya of these two and (iv) the ‘abhāva' of these two. He discusses the position of laksanā with reference to these four alternatives. Says he -
"anvayébhihitānām sā vācyatvād ürdhvam isyate - 7B anvitānām tu vācyatve, vācyatvasya puraḥ sthitāḥ, vākyārtha paramārthataḥ - 8 nāsty asau kalpitérthe tu pūrvavat pravibhajyate.” - 9A

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funerions
Śabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidhā
297 i.e. In abhihitánvayavāda laksaņā is believed to take place after vācyatva is over. In anvitábhidhānavāda it is believed to occur prior to the primary i.e., vācyarva. In the two (together), at both the places (i.e. earlier and later), and where 'akhandatā' is accepted with reference to sentence sense, laksaņā does not take place at all. It is believed and divided as done earlier in an imagined sense such as word-sense (because in reality only the sentence-sense exists)."
Mukula observes : (pp. 48, ibid) : akhande tu vākyárthésau lakṣaņā paramārthena násti. bhinnānām padārthānām paramārthatóbhidheya-bhāvasya anupapadyamānatvāt, tad āśritatvāc ca laksanāyāh. kalpita-padārthā”śrayena tu sā laksaņā yathā-ruci pūrvavad abhihitánvaya-anvitábhidhāna - tat-samuccayakalpanayā vibhaktavyabhāge niveśyā, parasparasya deśa-kālávacchedena'sesavyavahart--nişthatayā rūdhatvāt.”
Mukula observes that in all the four alternatives such as the abhihitánvayavāda and the rest, wherever it is not proper to accept the primary sense, the functioning of laksaņā is suggested. This laksaņā, according to Mukula
(i) the primary sense, being contradicted by any other means of knowledge becomes impossible,
(ii) the laksyártha being closer to mukhyártha and (iii) and also when this acceptance of the secondary sense - 'sántarārtha-grahaņa' - rests on some 'prayojana' or reason : .
"yā ca iyam sat-prakārā lakṣaṇā pūrvam uktā, sā - (i) mukhyárthasya pramāņántara-bādhitatvena-a-sambhavāt. (ii) lakṣyamāṇasya ca arthasya mukhyártham prati āsannatvāt,
(iii) sántarártha-grahanasya ca sa-prayojanatvāt iti evamvidha-kāranatritayā”tmaka-sāmagrī-samāśrayeņa vặddha-vyavahāre paridrśyate.
Now, says Mukula, the 'āsannatva' or nearness of laksyártha with mukhyártha is five-fold, according to Bhartrmitra-such as,
"abhidheyena sambandhāt sādrśyāt, samavāyataḥ vaiparītyāt kriyā-yogāt
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā” iti (pp. 50, ibid) i.e. through (i) relation with the primary meaning (ii) through similarity (iii) 'samavāya' i.e, intimate relation, (iv) opposition (iv) relation with verb-kriyāyoga;

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298
SAHRDAYĀLOKA laksanā is said to be five-fold. Thus, says Mukula, the 'prayojana' is also two-fold. One 'prayojana' is such which depends on vrddhavyavahāra which is beginningless in accepting the meaning that it conveyed and therefore depending on the established custom. This is as good as 'rūdhi' or convention, e.g. in case of words such as dvi-refa' etc. This word is having two 'ra’-kāras, as the word 'bhramara' meaning a bee consists of two ra-kāras. So, dvi-refa' - i.e. one having two-fra’kāras, also conveys the same sense without dragging in the word 'bhramara'. Thus, this is as good as 'rudhi or convention. Now Mukula has suggested that 'following a rūdhi' is a 'prayojana' here.
The second prayojana is different from the above rūdhi-tulya-prayojana. Mukula observes (pp. 50, ibid) : "aparam tu rūdhyanusaranátmakam yat prayojanam uktam, tad-vyatirikta-vastyantara-gatasya samvijñāna-padasya rupaviśeşa-pratipādanam nāma, yathā pūrvam udāhstam, “rāmósmīti”o. - This second prayojana is in form of establishment of a special form of an object, which is concealed in that object, but the conveying of which is intended. The illustration is, "rāmósmi...” etc.
Both these purposes or aims (i.e. prayojanas) are to be determined through the secondary meaning arrived at with the help of the above mentioned five-fold relation, when the primary meaning is set aside; it being in-appropriate.
Now it may be observed here, that in nirūdhā laksaņā Mukula tries to find a 'prayojana' in form of 'following convention' as established by usage made current by seniors. But accepting or imagining a 'prayojana' in rūdhi-mūlā, does not look possible to us. Dr. Rewaprasad observes that even if we accept what Mukula holds here, greater charm is caused by such usages as 'dvi-refa' in place of the direct mention of 'bhramara'. Thus, causing a greater charm could be a prayojana here. But we feel that it is better to hold only rūdhi as the cause of laksanā here and such rūdhi in itself carries its own charm, for ultimately lakṣaṇā or say, poetic deviation of any kind causes charm. So, rūļhi laksaņā has an inherent charm which does not stand in need of any prayojana.
Mukula provides illustrations for this five-fold lakṣaṇā. At the end of it he observes that in this five-fold laksaņā the expressed meaning is at times (i) atyantatiraskrta i.e. completely lost, or (ii) the expressed is either intended or unintended (vivakṣita/a-vivakṣita) : (pp. 58, ibid) "idānīm pañcavidha-sambandhanibandhanāyām āsattau pūrvopavarnitāyām kvacid vācyasya ati-tiraskāraḥ, kvacid vivakṣitatvam, kvacic ca a-vivakṣitarvam iti evamvidham trayam yat sahțdayair

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Śabdavịttis, the nature of : Abhidhā
299 upadarśitam, tasya visaya-vibhāgam upadarśayitum āha -
sādssye vaiparītye ca vācyasya ati-tiraskriyā - (10 B) vivaksā ca avivaksā ca, sambandha-samavāyayoh, upādāne vivaksā'tra lakṣaṇe tv avivaksanam || - (11)
tiraskriyā kriyāyoge, kvacit tad-viparītatā - (12 A) i.e. the expressed is totally abandoned in case of the relations such as sādrśya and vaiparītya. There is intended and un-intended expressed sense in varieties based on 'sambandha' and 'samavāya'. In 'upādāna' we have only the vivaksā of the expressed, i.e. it is always expected, and in 'laksanā' there is only a-vivaksā, while in 'kriya-yoga' the expressed is either abandoned (tiraskriya) or not. Mukula explains this with reference to the illustrations cited by him, but we feel there is overlapping in these cases and his treatment is not as scientific as that of either his predecessor Anandavardhana or his successor Mammaţa.
Mukula also observes : (pp. 66, ibid) : “laksaņāmārgávagāhitvam tu dhvaneh sahrdayair nútanatayopavarņitasya vidyate iti diśam unmīlayitum idam atra uktam. etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpanīyam, na tu jhagity eva asūyitavyam iti alam atiprasangena."
i.e. “This is just to suggest that the newly advocated dhvani by the connoisseurs falls into the region of 'lakṣaṇā' only. The learned with very sharp intelligence have to brood over our observation and that it need not be immediately discarded. So now, enough of further elaboration.”
Mukula, thus tries to incorporate 'dhvani' under laksyártha and thus for him vyañjanā is part of laksaņā which again is abhidhā itself because it is only an extension of abhidhā.
Mukula concludes to his satisfaction that the word-element which is in itself undivided in form of pure sabda-tattva, i.e. prior to its being classified into the fourfold scheme of jātivācaka, etc., the word-element which is 'a-bhinna' in its original form, attains to the 'vivarta' i.e. illusive change in form of 'sabda', 'artha' and 'sambandha' i.e. word, its meaning and their relation later, then only the abhidhāsakti is said to be ten-fold. In its original non-dualistic form of word, there is no scope for this ten-fold division : (pp. 69, ibid) -
“idānīm sakala-śabda-a-vibhāgā”tmakasya śabda-tattvasya yadā šabdárthasambandha-tritaya-rūpatayā rajju-sarpatayā vivarta-mānatvam tadā etad abhidhāvșttam daśa-vidha-vyavahāro-pārohitayopapadyate, na tu samhịtártha-vāk

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300
tattva-viṣayataya iti darśayitum aha
21
-
vivartamānam vāk-tattvam daśadhaiva vilokyate. - 12
samhṛta-kramabhede tu
tasmin teṣām kuto gatiḥ." - 13A. ity etad abhidhāvṛttam
daśadhátra vivecitam. - 13B.
mukhyasya abhidhavṛttasya prakārāś catvāraḥ lākṣanikasya tu sad iti evam
33
daśaprakārakam abhidhā-vṛttam atra vivecitam.
This treatment of Mukula's views suggests how he has influenced Bhoja in taking abhidhā as three-fold such as mukhyā, gauņī and lakṣaṇā. We know that this approach is different from the one seen in the kashmir school, the highest expression of which we noticed above in Jagannatha. But prior to that we have also to take note of Kuntaka and Mahima also, who influenced the Malava school like Mukula. The flowering of the thought as seen in the kashmir school is to be traced in Anandavardhana, who discusses abhidhã only from the angle of its difference from vyañjanā, and then in the treatment of Mammata and his followers. Jagannatha of course comes last but as in him we see the highest flight of abstract thinking and the final word on sabda-vrttis, we placed him first. Mukula, and Kuntaka are viewed as shaping influences for the Mālava tradition as seen in Bhoia and also for the kashmir tradition as seen in Mammata, for the K.P. is influenced by both the Dhv. and also the Abhidhāvṛtta-mātṛkā of Mukula. Hemacandra, we will go to observe, follows Mammata, but absorbs the teaching of Mukula and Bhoja also, while Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Kesava follow the lead of Mammata. So, now we will consider Kuntaka, who like Mukula had his share in shaping the views of Bhoja, because for Kuntaka also, 'abhidha' has a connotation wider then permitted by the kashmir school of thought.

Kuntaka After explaining the general definition of poetry and before explaining the special definition of it, Kuntaka first of all explains the form of word and meaning. He observes: evam kavyasya samanya-lakṣaṇe vihite viśeṣalakṣaṇam upa-kramate. tatra śabdárthayos tavat svarūpam nirupayati -
SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
"vācyórtho vācakaḥ śabdaḥ prasiddham iti yady api,

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Sabdavṛttis, the nature of: Abhidha
tathápi kavya-margésmin paramārthóyam etayoḥ." - VJ. I. 8.
(pp. 13, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy) i.e. 'After the general explanation of poetry, the question of its detailed definition is taken up. First of all, the nature of word and meaning is examined :
301
That 'meaning' is what is signified, and 'word' is that which signifies, is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows:" (V.J.I. 8) (Trans. K. Kri.) (pp. 300, ibid).
Kuntaka goes on observing that the general meaning of the terms, 'word' and 'meaning' is of course, well known. The 'word' is the signifier and the 'meaning' is the signified: "yo vācakaḥ pratyāyakaḥ sa śabdaḥ, yo vācyaś ca abhidheyaḥ sórtha iti' (pp. 14, ibid). Thus the word for Kuntaka is that which causes apprehension of meaning, and the meaning is that which is expressed i.e. apprehended. Now, let us first make it clear that Kuntaka also does not attempt any scientific definition of abhidhā, vācaka sabda and vācyārtha here. He does not have a fool-proof scheme as is seen in the K.P. of Mammata. Or, it may be that he knowingly defies the ruling of Anandavardhana who clearly distinguished between abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, and vācya, lakṣya and vyangya senses which are rendered in English generally as the expressed, indicated and suggested senses. No; he has his own - approach and is closer to Mukula in the sense that he names only 'abhidha' as the sabda-vṛtti or say, visista or, vicitra abhidha, i.e. poetic expression, which is wide enough to include lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in its fold, provided, this deviation is poetic.
It is this trend which is perhaps inherited by Bhoja also. We noticed that it was Bhoja who tried to furnish illustrations, not from worldly usage only, but from pure poetry to illustrate the main three divisions of what he calls abhidha, with its any number of sub-divisions. This trend is perhaps inherited by Bhoja both from Mukula to some extent and Kuntaka to a greater extent. For Kuntaka, as far as poetry, i.e., the result of the effort of a poet - is concerned, there is only one function of the poetic word and it is 'abhidha' which is not to be confused with the abhidhā or power of expression of a word giving the conventional meaning only, as is seen in the Kashmir school of thought, but it is the 'power of poetic expression', which includes poetic usages such as lakṣaṇā or indication and vyañjanā i.e. - suggestion, provided they carry the stamp of being pure and beautiful poetic expression, i.e. artistic expression only.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Kuntaka, as Dr. Krishnamoorthy wants us to believe, uses such terms as dyotaka', 'dyotya', and 'vyañjaka', 'vyangya' in the sense of indicator-indicated (i.e. laksaka-laksya) and suggestor-suggested. But we are not convinced. It is only in a very loose sense that the terms dyotaka-dyotya are used by Kuntaka, and we fail to ascertain the exact import of these terms. Normally in the Kashmir school these pairs of terms are taken as synonyms, but Kuntaka does not do it. Whether he takes it to mean laksaka-laksya is also not clear. But it is clear that he is out to include dyotaka-dyotya and vyañjaka-vyangya under his wider vācakavācya. He raises an objection and then silences it to his satisfaction thus : (under V.J.I. 8. pp. 14, ibid) :
“nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakau api śabdau sambhavataḥ, tad asamgrahāt na avyāptiḥ, yasmāt artha-pratīti-kāritva-sāmānyād, upacārāt, tau api vācakau eva. evam dyotya-vyangyayor api arthayoh pratyeyatva-sāmānyāt upacārād vācyatvam eva. tasmāt vācakatvam vācyatvam ca śabdárthayor loke suprasiddham yady api
lakṣaṇam, tathápi asmin alaukike kāvyamārge, kavikarmavartmani ayam etayor - vaksyamāṇaḥ paramárthaḥ kim api apūrvam tattvam ity arthah.”
Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy translates : (pp. 300, ibid): "The general meaning of the terms 'word' and 'meaning' is quite well known indeed. The 'word' is the signifier and the meaning' is the signified. One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed 'word' and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of "too narrow”. Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to are as good as denoted meaning because of the similarity in point of being understood. Thus, although 'signifying', and 'being signified' are enough qualifications to mark off the nature of word and meaning everywhere in the practical world, they do not serve the purpose of poetry, whose province is supramundane. Therefore, their essence in the world of poetry deserves to be pointed out clearly as is done in the next verse.”
One thing is clear. Kuntaka knows the difference between pure abhidhā, gaunī, laksaņā and vyañjanā. But he refuses to accept any scheme of śabda-vsttis as is done by the kashmir school. Bhāmaha had rejected certain alamkāras as 'vārtā', and promoted the cause of "vakrábhidheya-sabdoktih”. Anandavardhana had also advised the poet to be in search of 'special word and sense that make for poetry : "yatnatah pratyabhijñeyau, tau śabdárthau mahākaveh” Dhv. I. 8. Kuntaka therefore chooses to concentrate only on the poetic use of word and sense and as

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303 he has to give some name to this special poetic power of a word, he gives the name ‘abhidhā' to it, which is not the technical abhidhā of the Kashmir school.
Kuntaka, it seems, has no concern for the fool-proof scheme of word/ meaning/word-power, as seen in the Kashmir school of thought. He is concerned only with the poetic. On the otherhand we saw Mukul carrying on from grammar and Mimāmsā, but ending in poetry. Bhoja has a much broad-based scheme as we observed above but is trying to absorb both non-poetic and poetic literature. His scheme with twelvefold releationship of word and meaning of course aims at the poetic in the end. He takes care to illustrate the varieties and sub-varieties of first eight varieties of sāhitya from poetic literature and many of his illustrations are read as this or that variety of dhvani in the Dhv. So, clearly we have two trends of thought. One represented by Anandavardhana and his followers who present a perfect scheme and the other by such writers as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhananjaya and Dhanika and some others who do not fall in line with the Kashmir school of thought. We will continue with Kuntaka who also forms part of the shaping influence that moulds Bhoja's thinking, Mukula being the earlier one.
As seen above Kuntaka, though not accepting the thinking of the Kashmir school in a sense that he does not welcome the fool-proof scheme of the functions of a word, on the other hand follows the author of the Dhv. when he talks of 'the unique expression' as 'word'. He observes : (VJ. I. 9 pp. 14, ibid) :
"sabdo vivakṣitárthaikavācako' nyeșu satsu api,
arthaḥ sahsdayā”hlāda-kāri
· sva-spanda sundarah.” "That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poet's intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of deligated readers is to be marked as 'meaning'. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300-301, ibid) - That Kuntaka's scheme is broad enough to embrace vyañjana and vyangyártha is borne out by the famous illustration from Kumārasambhava, viz. "dvayam gatam” in which he pin-points the use of the special word “kapālinah”, that is the source of beauty. He observes : (pp. 15, ibid) :
"atra parameśvara-vācaka-sabda-sahasra-sambhavépi 'kapalina' iti bībhatsarasa-ālambana-vibhāva-vācakaḥ śabdah jugupsā"spadatvena prayujyamānaḥ kām api vācaka-vakratām vidadhāti." : "Though a thousand and one synonyms are

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possible to refer to the Almighty Lord Siva, the poet has chosen here the word, “One whom only skulls adorn", in order that, it may suggest disgust through a word which serves here as a pointer to the primary sentiment of the 'horrid'. And he succeeds in endowing the verse with artistic beauty of expression.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 302, ibid).
Kuntaka (V.J. I., Vștti) further remarks - kavi-vivakṣita-višeşábhidhānaksamatvam eva vācakarva-laksanam. yasmāt pratibhāyām tat-kālollikhitena kenacit parispandena parisphurantah padárthāh prakrta-prastāva-samucitena kenacit utkarsena vā samācchādita-svabhāvāḥ santo vivaksā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatā-padavim avatarantaḥ tathāvidha-višesa-pratipādana-samarthenaabhidhānena-abhidhīyamānāś cetaś camatkāritām āpadyante.” :
"Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light, as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured.” (Trans. K.Kris.; pp. 302, ibid)
From this it becomes absolutely clear that Kuntaka accepts only one power of word and that is abhidhā, or say, 'vicitrā abhidhā' meaning 'beautiful or artful expression'. It is not the abhidhā which signifies only the conventional meaning But it is that abhidhā, which conveys any meaning intended by the poet, be it vācya, laksya, dyotya or vyangya. So, his is the 'vicitrā abhidhā' which covers up the laksanā and vyañjanā also. So, we may say, Kuntaka has a definite approach, but no definite scheme. He wants to convey only the poetic.
After mentioning the unique features of words and meanings in poetry as distinct from their commonplace aspect, Kuntaka proceeds to convey that there should also be the presence of positive artistic beauty. He observes (V.J. I. 10) (pp. 20, ibid) -
"ubhau etau alamkāryau, tayoḥ punar alamkştiḥ vakroktiḥ eva, vaidagdhya
bhangi-bhanitiḥ ucyate.” (V.J. I. 10) "Both these are the adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 306, ibid). Thus 'word and

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305 sense' are ‘alamkārya' and 'vakrokti' is the ‘alamkāra' for Kuntaka. This is what he calls “vicitrā abhidhā” :
"ubhau etau sabdárthau alamkāryau, kenápi śobhátiśayakāriņā alamkaranena yojanīyau. kim tat tayor alamkaranam iti abhidhīyate-tayoh punah alamkrtih - tayoh dvitva-samkhyā-viśistayoh api alamkrtih prasiddhábhidhāna-vyatirekini vicitrā eva abhidhā.” (vịtti on VJ. I. 10) (pp. 20, ibid) :
“ 'Both these refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal. "What then is their ornament ?", one might ask. The answer is that though they are two in number, they have only one common ornament.
What exactly is this common ornament ? “Artistic turn of speech” is the reply. It stands for a charming and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and distinct from familiar usage. In other words, artistic utterance itself is the ornament in question." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid)
That Kuntaka is thus a 'kevala-abhidhāyādink or better say, "kevala-vicitrāabhidhā-vādin" is now clear. This follows even from the treatment he presents concerning paryāya-vakratā and upacara-vakratā as well. In the former he incorporates what we call śābdi vyañjanā. For upacāra-vakratā Kuntaka observes -(V.J. II. 13, 14) (pp. 93, ibid):
“yatra dūrántare'nyasmāt sāmānyam upacaryate. leśenā'pi bhavat kāñcid
vaktum udrikta-víttitām.” (V.J. II. 13) and, “yan mūlā sarasollekhā
rūpakā”dir alamkrtiḥ, upacāra-pradhānásau
vakratā kācid ucyate.” (V.J. II. 14) i.e. “Wherein even when the two are far apart from each other, a common attribute, however slight, is metaphorically superimposed in order to indicate that the resemblance is very close... (13)
... and which forms the basis for various pleasing and inventive figures of speech headed by metaphor - such a type of poetic beauty is designated by the name, 'beauty of metaphorical expression.' (II. 14). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 381, ibid).

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Kuntaka's upacara-vakratā is 'prayojanavati gauni laksanā' itself. So, he seems to accept lakṣaņā-mūlā-vyañjanā under 'upacāra-vakratā’.
In this context, the author of Ekāvalī, Vidyadhara, observes that, "etena yatra kuntakena bhaktau antarbhāvito dhvanis tad api..." - But we may say that Kuntaka has only partly subsumed dhvani under bhakti'. Morover, when Kuntaka on one hand holds that 'word and sense' are "alamkāryau", and on the other hand when he rejects the case of 'rasavad alamkāra' on the ground that 'rasa' is always ‘alamkārya' and never an ‘alamkāra', he seems to contraclict himself. On the otherhand, Anandavardahana has a perfect scheme, which holds the whole of 'alamkāra' field as "vācya-vācaka-rūpa". In short, Kuntaka has no perfect scheme and his 'vicitrā abhidhā' is a loose concept; thus rendering his approach unscientific. Dhananjaya and Dhanika also accept only abhidhā but their approach shall be dealt with in greater details later when we will pick up the concept of ‘tātparya' vștti for consideration.
'Bhoja' as observed by us earlier is influenced by Mukula and Kuntaka and carries his own concept of 'abhidhā'. But Mahima Bhatta is also an important name who defies the scheme of sabda-vrttis as presented by Anandavardhana and the whole of the Kashmir school of thought.
Mahimā accepts sādhya-sādhana-bhāva in any verbal function. He not only does not accept Anandavardhana's scheme of the three functions of a word such as abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjanā, but positively denounces it and installs only one function of the word, i.e. only abhidhā and leaves all other meaning to be collected by what he calls 'anumiti' or ‘kāvyánumiti' i.e. 'poetic inference to be precise. We will have to examine his approach in greater details as below.
While refering to the powers belonging to word and sense, Mahimā, observes Prof. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 67, “A study of Mahima Bhatta's Vyaktiviveka” pub. Calicut, '91), discusses the various aspects of language like word and sentence. According to him, all verbal expressions should be considered as inference since they consist of establishing something (sādhya) by means of something else (sādhana). The fact that language is used to persuade the hearer to do or not to do something, implies that the hearer has to be convinced of the logic of the speaker's argument. The hearer has to grasp the connection between sabda and artha, the sādhya and sābdhana, through inference and then only he is convinced of the soundness of the speaker's idea :

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307 (Vy. Viveka, pp. 26, 27, Edn. Dr. Rawaprasāda Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Skt. series, office, Varanasi, '64) - "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhya-sādhanagarbhatayā prāyena anumānarūpóbhyupagantavyah, tasya para-pravstti-nivsttinibandhanatvāt, tayoś ca sampratyaya-a-sampratyayā"tmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvatah. na hiyuktim anavagacchan kaścid vipaścid vacana-mātrāt sampratyayabhāg bhavati.”
Mahimā divides sabda into two such as 'pada' or word and 'vākya' or sentence. Word is further subdivided into (i) năman i.e. noun, (ii) ākhyāta or verb, (iii) upasarga i.e. semantic prefix, (iv) nipāta or preposition, and (v) karmapravacanīya i.e. adverb. - "dvividho hi sabdah, pada-vākya-bhedāt. tatra padam aneka-prakāram nāmā"khyātópa-sarga-nipāta-karmapravacanīya-bhedāt (pp. 27, ibid). 'nāmā' denotes an existing object, which is qualified by either jāti i.e. class, guna, i.e. quality, kriyā i.e. action or dravya i.e. substance. - Mahimā observes : (pp. 28, ibid) : "tatra sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni. tāni api bahuprakārāni sambhavanti. jāti-gunakriyā-dravyāņām tat-pravrtti-nimittānām bahutvāt.” Thus jāti, guņa etc. are the pravrtti-nimittas.
'Artha', for Mahimā, is two-fold, viz. 'vācya' and 'anumeya'. The 'vācya' or expressed is the object of verbal functioning and it is this which is termed 'mukhya' or principal. He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : “arthópi dvividho, vācyónumeyaś ca. tatra śabda-vyāpāravisayo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyate.” yad āhuh -
. “śrutimātreņa yatrásya
tādarthyam avasīyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante
gauņam yatnopapāditam.” - iti. tata eva, tad anumitād vā, lingabhūtād yad arthántaram anumīyate sónumeyaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ vastumātram alamkārā rasādayas ca, iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavataḥ. anyaḥ tu anumeya eva iti. tatra padasyártho vācya eva, na anumeyaḥ, tasya nir amśarvāt, sādhya-sādhana-bhāva-abhāvataś ca. (V.V. pp. 47, ibid)
Mahimā classifies meaning into two viz. (i) expressed (= vācya) and (ii) inferred (i.e. anumeya). The former is called 'mukhya' i.e. principle and is collected by word-power i.e. abhidhā). It is said, "It is believed to be 'mukya' i.e. principal

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one.
The latter, i.e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyártha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again three-fold viz. (i) vastu or idea, or a matter of fact, (ii) alamkāra i.e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasā"di, i.e. aesthetic rapture or feeling, sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vācyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred.
Mahimā holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vācya or expressed, because there is no sādhya-sadhana-bhāva between a 'pada' and its meaning. It means there is no inferenial relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sādhya-sādhana-bhāva can not exist.
We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of selfcontradiction can be read in Mahimāls position. At the outset Mahimā had declared that : "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahāraḥ sādhya-sādhana-garbhatayā prāyeņa anumāna-rūpóbhyupagantavyaḥ, tasya para-pravstti-nivstti-nibandhanatvāt, tayoś ca sampratyaya-a-sampratyayā”tmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvāt.” (pp. 26, 27, ibid). Here Mahimā suggests that the vācyārtha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Anandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyañjanā even for the Naiyāyikas under Dhv. III. 33. Mahimā has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks, he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to śābdavyavahāra to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this - "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." Thus there must be something behind A's activity of speaking, and this fact is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words utterred, follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahimā wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statement.

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309 Thus, here, with the acceptance of the 'mukhya' artha, Mahimā accepts the power of direct expression, i.e. abhidhā'. Mahimā accepts only one word-power i.e. abhidhā. All else is ‘anumiti' for him. In his 'vyakti-viveka-vyākhyāna', Ruyyaka puts it thus : (pp. 48, ibid) : “arthópi iti. śabdasya vyāpārántara-nirākaranártham, arthadvaividhya-ghatanam. tathā hi-vrddhavyavahārāt, samketāt vā, śabdesu arthanirņayaḥ. teşām ca yatrárthe vidyamānatvam tasya vācyatvam eva. anyasya tu teşām abhāvād artha-samarthyād avagatih. na ca asambaddhórthas tam artham pratyāyayati. sambaddhāc ca arthántara-pratipattau anumānam eva. tena laksanāyāh anumānántarbhāvah pratipădito bhavati. tasya ca vyāpakatvāt.... na ca laksanāyām anumānasya antarbhāvah iti vācyam, tasya tat parihāreņa vṛtter vyāpakatvāt. vyañjakatvam anumānam eva iti vaksyate vitatya. tad evam vācyanumeyatva-bhedena arthasya dvaividhyam.”
Ruyyaka explains that in order to eliminate the possibility of the word having any other (i.e. even a second) power, 'meaning' is said to be two-fold. Meaning is decided in case of a given word with the help of either the vřddha-vyavahāra, i.e. practice of the seniors, or through 'samketa' i.e., convention. In whichever meaning these two factors reside, that meaning is called the 'vācya' i.e. expressed. In case of any other meaning where either of these two does not stay at the basis, the other meaning is collected through implication. If the primary meaning is not connected (i.e. is 'a-sambaddha) with the other meaning, the latter is not conveyed at all. And when through connection, the first meaning yields the second meaning, this apprehension is nothing else but ‘anumāna' or 'inference only. So lakṣaṇā is covered up by 'anumāna', the latter having a wider scope... It cannot be said that 'anumāna' is covered up by laksanā, because even in the absence of laksanā, anumāna can take place. (Thus, anumāna has a wider field). That (the so called) suggestion is nothing but only inference i.e. 'anumāna' will be discussed in greater details (by Mahimā).
So, for Mahimā there is only one śabda-vyāpāra and that is ‘abhidhā'. All else - i.e. laksaņā and vyañjana' - falls in the province of anumāna or inference. This means that though not accepting these two functions, Mahimā accepts the meanings derived through these functions and subsumes these meanings-viz. the so-called 'laksyārtha' and 'vyangyārtha' in the terminology of the Kashmir school of thought, - under anumeya artha' i.e. inferred meaning arrived at through
anumiti', or precisely 'kävyánumiti', and certainly not by any function or vyāpāra of a word.

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310
SAHRDAYĀLOKA For Mahimā, the 'vācya' is the meaning of a 'pada' i.e. word, arrived at through
na' on the strength of either 'samketa' or 'vrddha-vyavahāra'. But the vākyartha, or sentence-sense can be either (i) a fact which is already known and which is not required to be substantiated, and (ii) a fact, which is unknown, expecting to be substantiated. This unknown fact is always established with the help of a known fact with which it is invariably related. The concomitance is realized from means of valid knowledge i.e. pramānas which are three, such as, (i) 'loka' or worldly context, (ii) veda or revealed literature, and (iii) direct experience i.e. adhyātma.
Mahimă observes : (pp. 49, ibid) : "vākyarthas tu vācyasya arthasya ambaparikalpanāyām, amśānām vidhyanuvāda-bhävena avasthiter, vidheyámśasya siddha-asiddha-tayā upapādana-anapekșa-sāpekșatvena dvividho boddhavyaḥ.
Mahimā had suggested that the meaning derived from a pada is without parts i.e. nir-amsa. But the sentence-sense is having 'amśa' or parts. Some par 'vidheya' i.e. principal and some is 'anuvādya' i.e. subordinate, i.e. Some part is 'newly enjoined' - i.e. it is predicated, and some is 'anuvādya' i.e. which is the 'subject part and hence already known. The vidheya-amsa is also either 'siddha' or 'sādhya'. The former does not stand in need of being substantiated, the latter needs substantiation. Thus vākyártha is two-fold. When the vidheya-amsa is ‘a-siddha', it takes the form of sādhya-sādhana-bhāva, the 'anuvāda' portion turning into a 'sādhana'. This sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is decided through invariable concomitance i.e. avinābhāva-sambandha. And this depends on means of knowledge which are three-fold : "asiddhau sādhya-sādhana-bhāva-rūpaḥ, anūdyamānasya amśasya sādhana-dhurā-adhirohāt.” (pp. 49, ibid)
(pp. 52, ibid) sādhya-sādhana-bhāvaś ca anayoh avinābhāvāvasāyakrto'vagantavyah. sa ca pramāna-mülah. tat ca trividham-yad āhuh - "loko vedas tathā'dhyātmam pramānam trividham smstam." iti.
Mahimā holds that 'loka' pramāna depends only on welknown worldly matters - "tatra loka-prasiddhártha-visayo lokah.” (pp. 52, ibid). 'śāstra-mātra-prasiddharthavisayo vedah.” (pp. 53, ibid) - i.e. Veda-pramāņa is that, the subject of which is known in śāstra only i.e. in various disciplines. Mahimā adds that by mentioning 'veda', other sources such as itihāsa, purāna, dharma-śāstra etc. are also to be understood, as they all rest on veda : "veda-grahanam itihāsa-purāņa-dharma śāstrā”di-upalakṣaṇam, teşām tan-mūlatvopagamāt.” (pp. 53, ibid). And,

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"adhyātmikárthaviṣayam adhyātmam." (pp. 53, ibid) : "The adhyātma-pramāṇa has spirituality as its subject." This means that it is self-apprehended.
This sadhya-sādhana-bhāva is two-fold viz., (i) śābda i.e. that which is expressly stated, and (ii) 'ārtha' or that which is implicit. Again both the sadhya and sadhana may be expressed either by means of words or by sentence: "sa hi dvividhaḥ śabdas' ca arthaś ca, iti. sópi ca sadhya-sadhanayóḥ pratyekam padartha-vākyārtharūpatvāt yathayogyam anyonya-sankaryāt bahuvidha iti, tasya din-matram idam upadarśyate." (pp. 54, ibid) - i.e. Words that convey the sadhya-sādhanabhāva could be jāti-vācaka, guṇa-vācaka, etc. The meaning of the word again can be an attribute - i.e. dharma, or a substratum, i.e. dharmin. Dharma again can be samānādhikaraṇa, or vaiyadhikaraṇa as when both sadhya and sadhana reside either in the same substraturn or not. The sadhya-sadhana-bhāva expressed by a sentence differs on the basis of kārakas used.
➖➖➖➖➖
One thing that emerges very clearly from this is that Mahimā accepts only abhidhā, and that too in the normal accepted sense of the term as a word-power that yields the conventional meaning which is called primary or mukhya. All else is collected by inference, i.e. all other meaning is 'anumeya' for Mahimā. So, he refutes other sabdavrttis such as gunavṛtti, laksanā, tātparya and vyañjanā.
The trend of incorporating other sabda-vṛttis such as lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā in abhidha was traced by us in Mukula, a near successor of Anandavardhana. Kuntaka also without rejecting positively any other sabda-vṛtti advocated the case of his vicitra-abhidha which as observed by us is not the same as 'abhidha' that gives the primary meaning, but it is only a 'poetic expression' in general. Bhoja also does not name vyañjana and incorporates gauni and lakṣaṇā under his three-fold abhidhā, the mukhyā being the first variety equivalent to our normal 'abhidha'. Mahima does not subsume other śabda-vrttis under abhidhā but he totally rejects them as śabda-vṛttis as such and advocates the case of only abhidha that gives the primary sense, as śabda-vṛtti, one and only. The rest for him is ‘anumāna' i.e. kävyánumiti. We will examine how he presents his case.
Mahimā proceeds as follows. In such an example as, "upoḍharāgena vilolatārkam", etc. we have double-meaning statements. Here, the apprehension of the second meaning takes place according to Mahimā, in the following way :
(pp. 113, 114, ibid): "yat punaḥ asya aneka-śakti-samāśrayatvāt vyāpārántarakalpanam, tad arthasya eva upapadyate, na śabdasya, tasya aneka-śakti

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samāśrayatva-a-siddheh.” - i.e. when a word in such illustrations as quoted above) is said to have such functions that deliver several meanings, and when based on such a premise an additional word-power called vyañjanā is postulated with reference to a word, virtually it is only the meaning which promotes other meanings and not the word, for a word can never be proved to be the substratam of many functions.
Mahimā further argues : "tathā hi, ekāśrayāḥ hi śaktayaḥ anyonya-anapeksapravsttayah aprāksta-paurvāparya-niyamā, yugapad eva svakārya-kārinyo drstāh yathā dāhakatva-prakāśakatvā"dayógneh.” - i.e. Those more than one powers residing in a single substratum, have their functions independent of each other and there is no sequence of earlier and later seen with reference to them. The idea is that these powers operate independently of one another and also simultaneously, or at least without a fixed sequence. For example - Fire burns a substance and also gives light. But the imagined other functions of words are not such - "na ca śabdā”śrayāḥ śaktayas tathā dịśyante, abhyupagamyante vā, niyogatah abhidhāśakti-pūrvakarvena itara-śakti-pravstti-darśanāt. tasmāt bhinnā”śrayā eva tā na sabdaika-samāśrayā iti avaseyam - i.e. In case wordpowers this is not so, because other powers (such as laksanā and vyañjana) function after abhidhā's function is over. Thus there is no simultaneity but sequence. So, it is better that different objects should be imagined as their substratum and not just 'word'.
Now this bhinna-āśraya or different substratum could be 'artha' i.e. meaning and not sabda or word. Mahimā observes (pp. 114, ibid) : yaścā'sau āśrayo bhinnah sa ‘artha' eva iti tad vyāpārasya anumānántarbhāvo'bhyupagantavya eva." - This different substratum could be 'meaning', and the functions of this meaning' element, should be subsumed under 'anumāna' or inference alone.
Before we proceed with Mahimā's contention, we have to evaluate his conviction. He gives the illustration of fire which has different powers operating simultaneously. But we can have instances of objects having different powers not operating simultaneously but only in a sequence and such powers may not be absolutely independent of each other. For example a cricketer can also be a singer and a performing artist and his different powers may not operate simultaneously. Sachin can be a good batsman and also a modest speaker. Sunil Gavaskar, we know was a great batsman, a captain of the team and now also a good sports-critic and a very good commentator also. When he bats he does not comment. So,

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Now let us see how Mahimā further argues : "tathā hi - (pp. 114, ibid) - gaur vāhīka ity adau tāvad gavā"dayórthāḥ bādhita-vāhīkādy arthántaraikātmyāḥ tādrūpya-vidhāna-anyathā-anupapattya kenacid amsena tatra tattvam anumāpayanti, na sarvā”tmanā.”
Now this other separate substratum is nothing else but 'sense'. So, its function has to be subsumed under inference. In such illustrations as, “The vāhīka is a bull”, the meaning such as 'go' - 'bull' etc., is not identified with other meaning such as that of vāhīka. For Mahimā the process involved is ‘anumāna'. In order to establish ‘abheda’ - superimposition - when no other means is available, the meaning such as 'go' makes us infer the superimposition through some portion of it, and not through the whole of it.
No speaker, who is not out of his mind, goes for superimposition of one thing over the other, without realizing any element of similarity between the two. So any intelligent listener, who has knowledge of the speaker's mind, accepts similarity as the basis of superimposition. He does not hold mere physical expression of identity as the basis. Mere physical expression of identity is refuted on the first count by itself, for we can see that 'vāhika', the man, cannot be a bull.
So, the expression of identity by the speaker, is only to make the listener apprehend the similarity. The 'prayojana' behind this expression is to cause apprehension of such qualities as inertia (jädya) etc. which are associated with 'go', as also seen in the vāhīka. This sort of an expression - to use different word for conveying a different substance - is called an 'atideśa'. Here 'go' is used for 'jadyā"di'. For, it is said,
“jātis'abdo'antarenápi jātim yatra prayujyate, sambandhi-sadȚs'ād dharmāt
tam gaunīm apare viduh.” - (V.V. 45, pp. 115) i.e. When a word denoting “jāti' or class, is used with reference to something else than itself (i.e. sva-vācya), it is done when in that other object there is a quality of similarity. Others call such a usage as, "gauni".

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The idea is that in such instances as "upoḍha-rageṇao" etc. the word, through abhidhā power gives only the vācya i.e. expressed sense. The power that makes for the apprehension of another snese (arthántara), rests in the 'sense' i.e. 'artha' and not the word i.e. sabda. Now this apprehension of another sense, through sense, is, according to Mahimā, through ‘anumiti' or inference only. So, the power wrtested in sense should be taken as inference. In the illustration viz. "gaur-vāhīkaḥ" etc., as there is an apparent difference between 'go-tva' and 'vähika-tva', the identity through 'ekádhikaraṇa' i.e. the use of same case-termination, does not click to sense. Then it makes us infer the identity of qualities such us jāḍyā”di - intertness - etc. So the identity is based on the qualities of vāhika, which are similar to gotulya-jāḍyā"di i.e. inertia and the like that are associated with vāhīka are similar to those resting in the bull. It is clear that any speaker who is not out of sense, never asserts identity between two separate objects without sensing common qualities between the two. Again, the prayojana or the reason behind such awkward or artful expression as calling a humanbeing a bull, is the existence of such qualities as inertia etc. that normally go with the objects such as bull etc. in the object called 'vähika' on which go-tva is superimposed.
It may be noted that Mahima has expressed such terms as 'sādṛśya' and 'sādharmya', simultaneously. He has observed: (pp. 114, ibid): "na hi an-unmattaḥ kaścit, kvacit, kiñcit, kathamcit, sādharmyam an-utpas'yan eva akasmāt tattvam āropayati" - i.e. without perceiving 'sadharmya' i.e. the state of having similar or common qualities in anyway whatsoever, nobody goes for superimposition of any object on any other object. So the cause of superimposition is apprehension of similarity alone. 'sādṛśya' i.e. similarity, and 'sādharmya' or having common qualities, are two important terms used in literary criticism. Dr. Rewaprasad observes (pp. 115, ibid) that Mammata has accepted 'upama' i.e. simile as "sādharmya resting on difference", while his followers (such as Viśvanatha) have defined it as similarity (based on difference of objects). Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar in his Bāla-bodhini commentary on the K.P. has discussed at length with reference to both 'sadharmya' and 'sādṛsya'. Between these two he accepts "prayojya-prayojakabhāva-sambandha" i.e. the relation of promoter and promoted; here sadharmya being the promoter and 'sādṛśya' being promoted thereby. For Bhartṛhari 'sādharmya' stands for 'samāna-dharma-sambandha', i.e. relation based on similar or common qualities. The etymology of the term 'sadharmya' goes as, "samāno dharmo yayos tau sa-dharmāṇau, tayor bhāvaḥ." Bhartṛhari explains the taddhita

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-
pratyaya conveying 'bhāva', and used after a compound, as 'sambandha' or relation. - “kṛt-taddhita-samāsebhyaḥ sambandhábhidhānam bhāva-pratyayena" - In the term 'sādharmya', the 'ṣyañ' pratyaya is in the sense of 'bhāva' only. In the notes attached to the 'kama-dhenu' commentary on Vamana, Kaiyata's words are quoted. There the explanation of 'bhāva' as - "prakṛti-janya-bodhe prakārībhūto bhavaḥ" is also useful in the present context. The meaning of this expression is that, "by 'bhāva' is meant that 'dharma' or quality, which is lying inside that portion, of a word, to which a pratyaya is attached. In the word 'sādharmya', the pratyaya 'syan' is attached to the word 'sa-dharma' or 'sa-dharman'. Its meaning is "that which has similar (or common) qualities." Thus here 'samana-dharma' is the viśeṣaṇa and the vyakti or person adorned with this is 'vis'esya'. 'syañ' suffix is used in the sense of 'bhāva'. So, it means, “samāna-dharma". But the apprehension of "samana-dharma" is caused by 'samana-śabda' as well. By 'sadharmya' we have apprehension not only of the equality, but also of the vyakti or person in whom this similarity rests, and also of the relation with it. So, Bhartṛhari's view as quoted above is more authentic.
To point out the relation between 'sādṛs'ya' and 'sādharmya', Jhalkikar (pp. 541, bālabodhini on G.P.) observes : "yaḥ sadhāraṇa-dharma-pratiyogikaḥ, upamānopameyo-bhayánuyogikaḥ, sambandhaḥ, sa sad harmyam iti ucyate; yas'ca upamana-pratiyogikaḥ, upameyánuyogikaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa sādṛśyam iti ucyate." - iti sādharmya-sādṛśyayor bhedaḥ" - This explanation in 'navya-nyāya'-style pertains to this much that "The relation that simultaneously rests in both upamāna and upameya, is called sadharmya." "Sādṛsya' is different from this. It does not stay simultaneously in two, but it rises from one and settles in the other. 'Sadṛśya' or similarity is of one into the other, it is not resting in the two - vice versa. In fact, with reference to sadharmya, we cannot call the substratum as upamāna and upameya, because in the apprehension caused by 'sādharmya' the qualities of the two objects are found to be equal. In sādṛśya there is 'nyūna-adhikatva' between the two i.e. there is difference in quantity of the qualities. In case of one we apprehend 'utkarṣa' and in case of the other, 'apakarṣa'. So, the upamanaupameya-bhāva rests on this 'utkarṣa-apakarṣa' or more and less quantity with reference to the dharma i.e. quality. That having higher degree of quality, 'dharmotkarṣa' is termed upamana, and that having 'dharmapakarṣa' is termed upameya. The 'sādṛśya' resting in object having utkarṣa travels into that having 'apakarṣa'. The sadṛs'ya of both does not go into eachother. Thus 'sādharmya' suggests equality

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA with reference to qualities while sādrsya suggests equality in which the 'upamāna' - element is having a greater quantity of equal quality. The dissimilarity betu sādharmya and sādrśya rests on normal worldly usage. In ordinary parlance it is stated that, “there is 'sādharmya' between these two objects, while there is ‘sādrśya' between those two."
But actually this difference is not exactly borne out by such normal usages also. For, the normal usage can take the form of such expression also as, “there is sādharmya of this into that object, and between them is sādrśya.” In the usage quoted above, where the prakrti of the term 'sādharmya' was taken as ending in dual (dvi-vacanánta), and wherein that of sādrśya as ending in singular (i.e. ekavacanánta) the opposite can also follow in the present usage.
In different disciplines there is difference with reference to the concepts of 'sādharmya' and 'sādrsya'. The discipline of grammar takes them as different. While the nyāya-darśana takes them as indentical and this is acceptable to Mahimā, he being closer to the nyāya discipline.
So, in expressions like 'gaur-vāhīkah', taken as 'gauņi-vștti' and, like 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ', taken as laksaņā, Mahimā accepts only ‘anumāna'. As noted above, in the case of the former, Mahimā holds that no sensible person will identify one object with a totally different object without seeing some similarity between the two. The expression 'gaur vāhīkah' cannot be taken literally as it is perceived directly as incongruous, so, we infer that vāhīka is a bull in some respects. This secondary sense which is not given by the word directly is only inferred. In the same way the fact of a hamlet being situated on the flow of the river Gangā being contradicted by direct perception, we infer the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet from the expressed meaning. Mahimā does not accept dhvanivādin's observation that the meaning of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the Gangā is derived through lakṣaṇā, and the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet are derived through the suggestive power i.e. vyañjanā. For Mahimā both the secondary and suggested senses are arrived at through anumiti kriyā - or inference and so the distinction observed by the Dhvanikāra between bhakti and dhvani is uncalled for.
Mahimā observes (pp. 118) "tasmād yoyam vāhīkā”dau gavā"di-sādharmyávagamaḥ, sa tattvā”ropa-anyathā-anupaptti-parikalpito'numānasya eva visayaḥ na śabda-vyāpārasya, iti sthitam.”

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He further observes (pp. 119, ibid) :
"gangāyām ghosa ity ādau api gangādayórthāḥ svātmani-anupapatti-bādhitaghosā”dy adhi-karana-bhāvāh, tad-upādāna-samarthyāt sambandha-mātraparikalpita-tattvā” ropam tad adhikarana-bhāvopagama-yogyam arthántaram eva tatā"di-rūpam anumāpayanti.
Mahimā further observes that only siinilarity can not be the cause of identification or superimposition. Other relations such as 'samyoga' or conjunction, etc. also can be the cause. So, through 'ganga' etc. the objects such
etc. are inferred, and not through any other vrtti or function of a word, because the fact of being the substratum of the hamlet can not be understood by any other way : (pp. 119, ibid)
"na hi tat sāděśyam eva ekam tattvā”ropa-nibandhanam isyate, kim tarhi ? tatsambandhā”dir api, iti tat-sambandha-mātra-samāropita-tadbhāvas tatā”dir eva ghosā"dy adhikaranabhāvópādāna-anyathā-anupapattyā gangā"dīnām arthānām anumeya eva bhavitum arhati.
Mahimā accepts only one power of the word and that is the power of direct expression viz. abhidhā. He rejects anything else than that and whatever other meaning is comprehended, he holds, is through ‘anumāna' or inference. He firmly believes that the power of a word is exhausted after giving its expressed sense. So, it has no capacity even to know about the existence of the secondary sense, such as the 'tata' or bank, in this case, then what to think of actually touching this secondary sense ? The metaphorical expression is resorted to only to convey the knowledge of the existence of coolness and purity of the Gangā resting in the hamlet, the object of superimposition, and not similarity, as in the first illustration. The cause viz. 'tattvā”ropa' i.e. superimposition is identical in both the cases. Mahimā holds that similarity of the object which is superimposed, or its samyogā"di relations, are manifold. He quotes a famous kārikā here, with a difference in reading from the same quoted by Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. i - with reference to the expression, "bhāktam āhuḥ tam anye."
Mahimā observes : (pp. 119, ibid) : “sabdaḥ punaḥ svārthábhidhāna-mātravyāpāra-paryavasita-sāmarthyo na arthántarasya tatā"der vārtām api veditum utsahate, kim punah samsparsam iti uktam.
prayojanam punaḥ asya evam-vidhasya ukti-vaicitrya-parigrahasya tatā”dau āropa-visaye vastuni āropyamāna-gangā”di-gata-punyatva-sitalatvā”di-dharma

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
pratipattiḥ, na sādṛśyam iti pūrvasmād asya viśeṣaḥ. ubhayatra api ca tattvā❞ropa eva hetuḥ. sa hi tat-samya-tat-sambandhā"di-nibandhanatvād bahuvidha dṛṣṭaḥ. - yad āhaḥ -
318
"abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ,
vaiparītyāt kriyāyogād
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā." - iti.
In the Locana, we have, "abhidheyena samyogāt" and also, "sāmīpyāt" for 'sādṛśyāt' of Mahimā.
In Locana, we have 'abhidheyena samyogat'. The idea is that 'samyoga' or conjunction is a type of 'sambandha' i.e. relation in general. Abhinavagupta explains 'samyogāť' as, 'bhramara-śabdena yasya samyogaḥ sambandhaḥ'. Mahimā does not like this usage of a specific term to denote a general term. So, he goes for the reading 'samyogat', retaining the term denoting a general relation. Similarly, in Locana we have 'sāmīpyāt', while Mahima reads 'sadṛśyat'. Abhinavagupta has explained 'samavāya' as 'sambandha-matra' i.e. any relation whatsoever. The relations such as 'sāmīpya' or proximity could be believed to be covered up by 'samavaya, so Mahima opts for sādṛsya. Actually we can say that not only 'samipya', but even 'sādṛsya', 'vaiparītya' or any other relation could be contained in 'samaväya'. Because of this only, later naiyayikas such as Gadadhara and the rest have taken only "abhidheyena sambandha", as definition of lakṣaṇā, which they choose to define as "śakya-sambandho lakṣaṇā." The expression of special relations such as sādṛśya, vaiparītya etc. is covered by 'sambandha' only, but they are mentioned only to make things clearer. This way, argues Prof. Rewaprasad, the reading of Locana as 'samyogat', is more acceptable. The reading 'sādṛśya' is not preferred to 'sāmīpya' by Locanakāra, because by using the term 'gauna', the explanation of lakṣaṇā based on similarity is already covered up by him. Virtually 'sambandha' being manifold, lakṣaṇā may not be taken as five-fold only.
Mahimabhaṭṭa also incorporates what is known as tātparya-sakti under abhidha only. Some people hold that to convey the correlated meaning of different words in a sentence, there is a separate power called the tatparya sakti which rests in a sentence. Tätparya sakti is thus advocated by some to explain the apprehension of the intention of the speaker from a sentence or a statement. Mahima feels that the import of the speaker is inferred by the hearer from the expressed sense. When

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someone says, "eat poison, but do not eat at his house", the hearer infers that taking food at his house is more despisable than eating poison. The inference follows the commonsense that, without some special reason, a friend or a wellwisher will never stop anyone from taking food at some person's place. The hearer understands, thus through inference, that eating food will be more harmful than taking poison. Mahima observes: (pp. 133, ibid)
"viṣabhakṣaṇánujñānā"der vakyārthasya aprastutasya eva upanyāso hi pūrvoktena nayena prastutatiriktárthántara-pratipadana-paratvāt, tatra hetutaya avagantavyaḥ, iti na śabdasya tatra vyāpāraḥ parikalpanīyaḥ.
"viṣabhakṣaṇād api parām etad gṛhabhojanasya dāruṇatām, vācyād atónumimate
prakaraṇa-vaktṛ-svarūpajñāḥ." - 67 viṣabhakṣaṇam anu manute
na hi kaścid akanḍa eva suhṛdi sudhiḥ, tena atra arthántaragatir ārthī tātparya-śaktijā na punah." - 67 iti sangraha❞rye.
Mahima, who accepts only 'abhidha' as word-power, further rejects the views of those who hold a 'dirgha-dirghatara-vyāpāra' of a word, like that of an arrow. The purva-pakṣin argues as follows:
Starting with the expressed sense, till the implied sense is collected, the power of the word extends further and further like an arrow. There is no separate power of a word for collecting the other (= implicit) sense. Like an arrow shot by a brave bow-wielder cuts through the armour, rips through the chest and takes the breath away of an enemy, and there is no difference seen in the function of this single arrow, similarly, a word used by a clever poet, in sequence, conveys its primary meaning through abhidhāna (i.e. abhidhā-vyāpāra), and makes the apprehension of the second implied sense by the same power of the word used. There is no difference in the power or function of one and the same word. Again, argues the objector, that the ultimate meaning should be taken as the meaning of a given word, for conveying which it is used. Thus, this is the power of the word only and not that of the sense: "kiñca yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdártha iti sabdasya eva asau

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA vyāpāro nyāyyo na arthasya." - (pp. 137, ibid). The objector here seems to be the commentator Dhanika, the brother of Dhananjaya, the author of Daśarūpaka. This is suggested by Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (pp. 140, ibid).
Mahimā does not accept this. He argues as follows : “This is not correct. : (pp. 140, ibid) tad ayuktam. sākśāt-śabdasya artha-pratītiheturva-asiddheh.” The word cannot be taken as cause of the (implied) sense. If it is held as cause through sequence (pāramparyena), there will be difficulty in placing some objects as effect
ers as cause, for there is no regulation to that effect. - "paramparyena tu tasya hetutvopagame vastūnām hetu-phala-bhāva-vyavahāra-niyamo na vyavatisthate.” (pp. 140, ibid)
Mahimā observes : This cannot be accepted. The reason is that in arriving at the sense, word is not the direct cause. It cannot be taken as a cause in sequence also for it will be difficult to name something specific as cause and also something as effect. In case sabda is held as a parmparā-hetu, then as in case of the spring season being held as the cause of flowering, we will also have to hold a potter who fashions a pot used in watering a plant, as the main cause of flowering. So, it is wiser to accept 'artha' or sense as the cause of further sense, and not 'word'. It is not proper to say that when some function is carried out by a son, his father also is considered the chief substratum of the function concerned. For, in such cases there will follow the contingency of 'sāńkarya-dosa', - “na hi yatra putrasya vyāpārah sa pituh eva iti mukhyatayā sakyate vaktum, tayor anyonya-vyāpārasāńkarya-dosa-prasangāt.” (pp. 140, ibid). The fault will be of mixing up of activities of different agents.
Mahimā further argues that this illustration of an arrow is also not congruent with the situation : “kiñca ayam visamaḥ śara-drstāntopanyāsah” (pp. 140, ibid). - The line of his argument proceeds as below : This 'sara-drstānta' is a mis-fit, because as the arrow on its own does the activities of cutting, etc. through a single power, the word does not. The word executes its function with the help of 'sanketa' or convention. The word has its function only at places where convention is fixed. So, the function of the word is limited upto the expressed sense only, not upto any ‘arthántara' i.e. sense beyond the expressed one, as no 'sanketa' or convention is fixed with reference to the other extra sense. In case we accept the capacity of a word to give 'arthantara' also, i.e. added sense also, then people will be able to apprehend any sense with the help of any word. So, for a meaning which stands in need of convention, to that only

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321 the function of a word is limited, and it does not extend further upto any added sense, in absence of any convention. For the added sense, the function, not of word, but of the expressed sense only, should be accepted : "tatasca abhidheyártha-visaya eva asya vyāpāro yuktaḥ, na arthấntara-vișayaḥ, tatra sanketábhāvāt. tad abhāve'pi tatra tat parikalpane sarvaḥ kutaścid abhidheyárthavad arthántaram api pratīyāt. tasmad yatra sanketā”peksā, tatra eva asya vyāpāra iti avagantum yuktam, na arthántare; tatra vaksyamāņa-nayena arthasya eva tadupapatti-samarthanād iti.” (pp. 140, 141, ibid)
We may observe with Dr. Rewaprasad that Mahimā here pushes two arguments in favour of his thinking. First, he holds that a word cannot convey another sense directly, as it does with reference to its conventional sense, and secondly, a word can convey only that sense with reference to which a convention is fixed. Mahimā is of the opinion that the formation of a pot is the
f coming together of the two halves, and not the potter, as the joining of halves immediately preceeds the formation of a pot. Similarly in case of added sense, i.e. 'arthántara' the immediate predecessor is the expressed sense, and not the word itself. So, being an immediate cause the primary sense is the cause of any additional sense, and not the word.
Mahimā also argues that the functions of the arrow and word are not identical. The function of the arrow, in cutting, ripping through and taking the breath away, is its own, i.e. it is an independent power of an arrow. But for the word it is not so. It conveys meaning remaining dependent on the convention. So, the function of the word is not independent but is dependent on something else. Thus a word has a limited capacity to convey only that meaning with reference to which convention is made. It cannot proceed to an added target, like an arrow. It cannot proceed to an added sense of its own. The added sense is collected only by the function of the primary sense, which should be taken here as the cause. So, the added sense has to be accepted as inferred only.
But, we may say that Mahimā's thinking is faulty. The arrow also, when placed in a sheath does not have any capacity even to pierce the softest thing on earth. Only when it is discharged by a mighty shooter, it does the said tricks. So, even the function of an arrow has its capacity, originally borrowed from the shooter's strength. Similary, a word when used by an expert poet attains the added function to convey an added sense also. But, this is not to justify 'dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra'. Actually, as explained by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we have to accept

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA difference in function to explain difference in meaning, otherwise we will get into a mess where any word will start giving any meaning !
Mahimā, as stated above believes only in one power of word and that is abhidhā. For him artha' or meaning is two-fold viz. vācya or expressed and 'anumeya' or inferred. He quotes a kārika - "That whose significance is cognised on hearing alone, is believed to be the primary meaning, and the gauņa or secondary meaning is that which is collected as a result of (special) effort.” He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) :
"artho'pi dvividho, vācyo'numeyas'ca. tatra sabda-vyāpāra-visayo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyate. yad āhuḥ : śrutimātrena yatrásya tādarthyam avasīyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante
gauņam yatnópapāditam." 'Anumeya' or inferred meaning is that, in whose apprehension, the primary meaning or vācyārtha serves as 'hetu' or 'linga' i.e. cause, or the 'hetu' can also be that meaning which is derived from the primary sense. - "tata eva, tad anumitād vā linga-bhūtād arthántaram anumiyate, sah anumeyah." (pp. 47, ibid). We know that Bhartphari incorporates all meaning other than the primary in 'gauna' or secondary, but for Mahimā all meaning else than primary is 'anumeya'. The primary meaning for Mahimā is also the 'mukhya' or principal sense. Mahimā accepts the relationship between word and meaning as conventional. meaning only when there is convention to that effect. He rejects the view that a word can ever convey such a meaning which is other than primary, i.e. one with reference to which a convention is not formed. He feels any other meaning, beyond the primary one, can never be collected by the function of a word and that such added sense is arrived at by inference, the primary sense serving as 'hetu' or cause in it. We have seen that Mahim, therefore rejects all other functions such as laksanā, tātparya and vyañjanā as functions of a word and subsumes them under 'anumāna' or inference.
Mahimā of course accepts the added sense or what may be called the unexpressed sense. This, for Mahimā, is threefold viz. (i) vastumātra i.e. of the

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323 form of 'vastu' or a mattor of fact, or, an idea, (ii) alamkāra i.e. figures of speech or artful expression, and (iii) rasādayaś ca, i.e. the emotive stuff such as feelings, emotions, sentiments etc. or, aesthetic rapture in general. The first two could be directly expressed, but for Mahimā, the third variety is 'anumeya' or 'inferred' only. The direct meaning of a word is always expressed, it being without parts and there being no relation of 'sādhya' or that which is to be established and the sādhana or the instrument with - which it is established, between the two i.e. 'vācya artha' and 'sabda'. He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : “sa ca trividhaḥ. vastumātram alamkārā rasādayas' ca. iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavatah. anyastv anumeya eva iti. tatra padasya artho vācya eva, na anumeyah, tasya nir aņśatvāt sādhya-sādhana-bhāvā'bhāvataḥ.” Mahimā, like Anandavardhana, also believes that the vācya or expressed is not so charming as is the unexpressed or inferred : "vācyo hy artho na tathā camatkāram ātanoti yathā sa eva vidhinised hä"dih kakvā”bhidheyatām anumeyatām vā avatirnah iti svabhāva eva ayam arthānām.” The expressed is not as charming as the same when presented through artful intonation or conveyed through inference. This is in the nature of a meaning. The meaning conveyed through simple assertion is also less charming than the same conveyed through double negation. He substantiates his observation by quoting Anandavardhana who observes :
"sārarūpo'hy arthaḥ sva-sabda-anabhidheyatvena prakāśitaḥ sutarām śobhām avahati. prasiddhiś ca iyam asti eva vidagdhaparişatsu yad abhimatataram vastu vyangyatvena prakāśyate na vācyatvena” iti.
The sequence i.e. krama, observes Mahimā, in the first two varieties such as vastu or matter of fact or, idea, and alamkāra or artful expression, is self-evident and is clearly observed. So, if we resort to vyañjakatva to explain this sequence it is of no use at all. He rejects vyangya-vyañjaka relation between dhvani (i.e. word) and so called sphota also. Similarly on this analogy the promulgation of dhvani visa-vis kāvya which is of the form of word and meaning placed together, is also not acceptable to Mahimā. He accepts 'gamya-gamaka-bhāva’ instead.
Mahima Bhatta does not accept Anandavardhana's idea of three types of meaning such as the expressed or vācya, the indicated or laksya and the suggested or vyangya. For Mahimā the indicated or lāksanika i.e. metaphorical or secondary sense and the suggested or vyangya fall in the category of the inferred on 'anumeya' only, and thus for Mahim, there is a scheme of two-fold meaning only; the vācya and the anumeya. Thus he seems to reject

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SAHṚDAYALOKA lakṣyamāṇa and the
Anandavardhana's observation that the indicated
suggested i.e. the vyajyamāna are also different from each other. For Anandavardhana the secondary function or a-mukhya vyavahara is only an extention of the primary function and it is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be non-congruent with the context. This secondary sense may not be charming also, and is arrived at only when the primary sense is rejected. This abandonment of the primary sense, in the opinion of Anandavardhana, could be either partial or total. This secondary function is seen only when we use language. The suggestive function, for Anandavardhana, is of wider scope and travels beyond language. When use of language is concerned, then also this suggestive function completely differs from either the primary function of a word in language, i.e. abhidhā, or the secondary function i.e. gunavṛtti or lakṣaṇā or a-mukhya-vyāpāra, both from the point of view of nature and scope i.e. "svarupataḥ viṣayataḥ ca." Suggestivity, as noted above, travels beyond the medium of language and is seen in any other art-form such as drama, music, painting and what not, taking the form of abhinaya or acting, or notes i.e. śuddha svara, or colours etc. as the case may be. Thus for Anandavardhana the suggestivity has to be completely distinguished from lakṣaṇā or secondary function of a word.
324
Not so with Mahimā. He rejects the very basis on which the concept of lakṣaṇā rests. He rejects any other power or function beyond, abhidhā or the direct expressive power in case of a word. Mahima is of the opinion that the fact of 'krama' or sequence in the functioning of powers called abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā goes against them belonging to the same substratum, i.e. word. As seen earlier, he feels that if more than one power belongs to the same thing, these powers should function simultaneously like heat and light emanating from fire. But we had observed earlier that this analogy is not applicable in case of a word, as there is no hard and fast rule that all powers belonging to the same thing should function simultaneously only. Even in day to day life we see agents using their various powers as and when the situation so demands. A brave soldier enjoys life also to the full and also fights against the enemy as and when required. A man may be gifted with a number of special capacity which he chooses to exhibit or utilize only when the situation so demands. But Mahima is satisfied with his own argument and his own illustration of fire oozing light and heat simultaneously, and therefore concludes that word has only one power - abhidhā - that gives the primary

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325 sense alone and whatever added sense follows, - call it laksyártha, tātparyártha or vyangyártha - call it by any name, it follows from the primary sense alone as an inferred sense, and the word has nothing to do with it. The other meaning follows from the primary sense due to the relation of linga-lingi-bhāva only. Mahimā observes : (pp. 121, ibid) : "kiñca upacāravrttau śabdasya mā bhūd atiprasanga iti avaśyam kim api nimittam anusartavyam. anyathā anyatra prasiddha-sambandhah katham asamitam (= sanketa-virahita) eva arthántaram pratyāyayet ? yat ca tannimittam tad eva asmābhir iha lingam iti ākhyātam. yuktam ca etat, śabdasya tatra vyāpārā'bhāvāt. vyāpārábhāvas' ca sambandhábhāvāt. lingăt ca linginaḥ pratitir anumānam eva, na guņa-víttau arthántara-pratītiḥ śābdi iti tasyāḥ vācakās'rayatvam asiddham eva." Mahimā (pp. 122) further observes in Samgraha verses :
“yaḥ satattva-samāropaḥ tat-sambandha-nibandhanaḥ, mukhyártha-bādhe sópy artham sambandham anumāpayet.” (46)
and,
stat-sāmya-tat-sambandhau hi tattvā”ropaika-kāraṇam, guņavstter dvirūpāyāḥ
tat-pratītir ato'numā.” (47) i.e. 'tat-sāmya' and 'tat-sambandha' - these two are the causes of 'tattvā”ropa' i.e. superimposition of one object over the other. So, in two types of guņavrtti (or laksanā) the apprehension of the cause - i.e. prayojana - is through inference only.
Thus, Mahimā accepts two types of gunavrtti : (i) based on 'tat-sāmya', as in 'gaur vāhikah' and (ii) based on 'tat-sambandha' as in 'mañcāḥ kros'anti'.
He further observes that abandoning of mukhya-vrtti is not possible in case of a word. So, only a meaning superimposed on a (primary) meaning causes inference of similarity.
“mukhya-vrtti-parityāgah na sabdasya upapadyate, vihito'rthántare hy arthaḥ sva-sāmyam anumāpayet.” - (48)

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
Thus, when the function of a word is not established with reference to another sense, how, can we hold śabda as 'askhalad-gati' with reference to a result (phala, i.e. another sense) which follows through inference from a given linga or mark i.e. cause?
"ittham arthántare sabda
vṛtter anupapattitaḥ,
phale lingaika-gamye syāt
kutaḥ śabdaḥ skhalad-gatiḥ." - (50)
Thus, observes Mahimā, that whatever factors are considered in favour of gauņi vṛtti, are taken by us as promoting anumana -
"guna-vṛttau girām yāvat
sāmagrī-īṣṭā nibandhanam,

saiva lingataya'smābhir
isyate arthántaram prati." - (55) (pp. 123, ibid)
"na hi tat samayábhāvāt
vācyam śabdasya kalpyate
pratīyamānatāyām ca vyaktasya anumeyatā." (56) "tasmāt svārtha'tirikteņa gatir na arthántare girām, vācakatvās'rayeṇā'to
gunavṛtter asambhavaḥ." - (57)
Mahima suggests that when we resort to metaphorical expression or gunavṛtti, the secret underlying this activity is that it is the natural linguistic habit of people that they identify similar or mutually connected objects. When we see a person with long neck and ugly figure we call him 'karabha' or a youngone of a camel. Again on seeing children crying in a cradle, we describe the cradle as crying (pp. 121, ibid) :
"loko hi tat-sadṛśam tat-sambaddham ca tattvena vyavaharan dṛśyate, tad yathā dirgha-grīvam vikaṭa-kāyam ca kamcit paśyan 'karabha' iti vyapadiśati, mañcasambaddhān ca kāmścit krośato mañcāḥ krośanti iti." On hearing such sentences which are non-congruent by nature, an intelligent person concludes that such an

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327
incongruous identification has some valid reason as its basis. This he decides through reasoning. Mahimā does not accept 'arthāpatti' or, implication as a separate means of knowledge - i.e. pramāna-and subsumes it under 'anumāna' or inference.” arthāpatter anumānántarbhāvā'bhyupagamāt iti uktam.” (pp. 118, ibid)
Mahimā classifies guņavrtti or metaphorical expression into two, such as (i) based on similarity, and (ii) based on some other connection : "tat-sāmya-tatsambandhau hi tattvā"-ropa-eka-kāraṇam” (pp. 122, 47a, ibid). For him the apprehension of metaphorical meaning is only logical deduction from literal sense. It is a case of inference where the sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is collected from loka i.e. worldly parlour. We have noted that for Mahimā, as both 'bhakti' i.e. metaphorical expression and dhvani are covered up by inference, there is no cause to distinguish between the two as is done by Anandavardhana. Secondary meaning and the so-called suggested sense are, for Mahimā, arrived at by the same process of 'anumiti' i.e. inference, because both are collected from the primary meaning. For Mahimā, even terms involving 'faded metaphors' i.e. rūdhimūlā laksaņā, have consideration of second meaning and are therefore collected by inference. In that case they are, in the opinion of Mahimā, not different from Dhvani : (pp. 124, ibid) :
rūdhā ye vișayényatra śabdāḥ sva-visayās api, lāvanyā"dyāḥ prasaktās te
na bhavanti padam dhvaneḥ - (61) Mahimā as observed earlier, also rejects tātparya sakti, which for him falls under anumiti. It may be noted that for Abhinavagupta 'tātparya' is a sentencefunction, as explained by the Abhihitánvayavādins, which makes for the correlated meaning of various 'pada's or words in a given sentence. Thus this can be equated with samsarga-maryādā of the later navya-naiyāyikas, and the laksanā of the Bhättas (Ref. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, p. 222, ibid). But Dhanika's tātparya travels farther than mere sentence-sense as a result of the total of word-meanings. It is wider enough to cover Anandavardhana's vyangyártha also. The famous words of Dhanika are, "tātparyam na tuladhrtam", for it extends upto any limit till the speaker's intention is collected - "yavat-karya-prasaritvat". Dr. Raja observes (pp. 216, ibid) it can, "cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense.”

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA But we have seen above how Mahimā rejects the case of tātparya-vrtti and how he subsumes it under ‘anumiti'. Thus Mahimā's concepts of ‘abhidhā' and 'anumiti' are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gaunī, laksanā, tātparya, vyañjanã and even the broad concept of 'vakrokti' involving 'vicitrā abhidhā' of Kuntaka. This is how Mahimā takes Kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such 'sabda' and 'artha’ to be kāvya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry).” So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as are seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahimā. He argues as follows :
Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucityamātra) of word and sense, or is only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all ? Because, no third alternative is possible, it has got to be either of the two.
The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhāvā”di, i.e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for 'rasa' only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahimā accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhavā"dis. Thus 'anauctiya' has no scop in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid) :
"te ca yathāśāstram upanibadhyamānā rasábhivyakter nibandhanabhāvam bhajante. na anyathā. rasā”tmakam ca kāvyam iti kutas tatra anaucityasamsparśaḥ sambhāvyate yan nirāsártham ittham kāvya-lakṣaṇam acakšīran vicaksanammanyāḥ ?"
Mahimā says, that in case you opt for the second atternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-lakṣaṇa goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahimā sticks to his guns and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid)
"atro'cyate'bhidhā-samjñaḥ śabdasya artha-prakāśane, vyāpāra eka eva istaḥ yas tu anyo'rthasya so'khilaḥ.” - (71)

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329 tataśca, "vācyād arthántaram bhinnam yadi tallingam asya saḥ, tan nántarīyakatayā nibandho hy asya laksanam." - (72) "abhede bahutā na syād ukter mārgántarágrahāt, tena dhvanivad esā'pi
vakroktir anumā na kim? - (73) Mahimā also rejects suggestivity - vyañjakatva - as word-power, for there is no other power of the word except ‘abhidhā'. : (pp. 146, ibid) - Mahimā observes - "nā'pi śabdasya abhidhā-vyatirekeņa vyañjakatvam vyāpārántaram upapadyate, yena arthántaram pratyāyayed; vyakteh anupapatteh, sambandhántarasya ca asiddheh. Even in the absence of 'vyakti' or 'sambandhántara', if suggestivity is accepted with reference to a word, then no fixed scheme will hold good in that case - "tad abhāve'pi tad abhyupagame tasya artha-niyamo na syād, nibandhana-abhāvāt." (pp. 146, ibid) - Word cannot have any direct relationship with suggested meaning. If word had any natural relationship with suggested sense in form of 'rati' and other emotions, as in case of songs (i.e. music), then one and all could have been able to apprehend the same - "na hi asya, geyasya iva ratyā"dibhir bhāvaih svābhāvika eva sambandhaḥ, sarvasya eva tat-pratīti-prasangāt.” (pp. 146, ibid)
No relation of a word with the suggested sense can be believed to be born of convention as suggestion is 'aupādhika' and 'upādhis' are innumerable and uncertain. One and the same word may suggest different meanings under different contexts. So, to fix a particular suggested sense in case of a fixed word, like convention in case of expressed sense, is impossible.
Mahimā also examines the possibility of prefixes (= upasargas) being suggestive. He is clear that if suggestivity is totally denied in case of a word, the prefixes can never be accepted as suggesting any meaning. Dr. C. Rajendran in a foot-note (no. 58, pp. 72, ibid) notes : "Here the assumption of MB (i.e. Mahima Bhatta) is that Dyotakarva of the grammarians is the same as the vyañjakatva of the Dhvani theorists. There is however, no supporting evidence adduced." It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we have also noted that the 'manifestation of

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
sphota cannot be taken as identical with the suggestion of the dhvanivadins. Mahima holds that the prefixes are said to be 'dyotaka' i.e. suggestive i.e. capable of manitestation, only in a metaphorical sense. Actually they are capable of expression only and not suggestion, or manifestation.
Mahima argues that in fact when we use such words as 'ghata' or pot and the like, for directly conveying the meaning of the object called a pot, even there these words such as 'ghata' should be held not as directly expressive of a meaning, but only as 'dyotakas' or suggestive, for the meaning of 'ghața-padartha is already existent in our mind and is only revealed by the expression of the word 'ghata'. Thus even the whole väcya-vācaka-vyavahāra' - the business of expression and expressed - will be negated. So, it is better to accept metaphorical suggestivity here. Says he (pp. 153, ibid) :
6
·
"evam ca antar-mātra viparivartitaya siddha-sadbhāvānām ghaṭā"dīnām ghaṭā"dis'abdā api dyotaka eva syuḥ, na vācakā iti vācya-vācaka-vyavahāro'stam iyāt. tasmāt bhāktam eva dyotakatvam upagantavyam na mukhyam. bhakeḥ ca prayojanam vācyasya arthasya sphutatva-pratipattiḥ, nimittam ca viseṣaṇa-viśesyapratītyor-āśubhāvitayā kramánupalakṣaṇāt sahabhāvapratītiḥ."
Mahima holds that it is only to describe the clarity of the meaning derived from a root modified by a prefix, that the prefix is figuratively stated as suggestive. If it is argued that actually a prefix manifests a particularity i.e. viseṣa alreadly existent in a verb and so they are suggestive and not denotative of a 'viśesa' in a verb, than Mahima's reply is that you cannot cognise the exact form of viseșa i.e. particularity manifested by a prefix. The meaning invariably apprehended should be taken only as 'expressed' meaning If we do not accept this dictum then an adjective applied to a noun will also have to be regarded as 'dyotaka'. If taken to its exteme end, this would take us to believe that words like 'ghata' are also dyotakas as they manifest objects that are in the mind. So also will be the case of words such as 'nila' etc. which are taken as viseṣaṇas as a rule - "sāmānyāni ca garbhikṛta-viśeṣāņi bhavanti iti teṣām tatra sadbhāva-siddhau satyām nīlā"di-śabdā api tat-tat-dyotana-mātra-vyāpārāḥ prādi-vad dyotaka bhavitum arhanti, na abhidhāyakā iti." (pp. 152, ibid).
-

Thus, Mahima emphatically denies the existence of what is termed as vyañjakatva. He thus accepts only 'abhidha' as word-power and all sense, other than the expressed is collected, according to him by 'anumāna'. He declares (pp. 157, ibid) (samgrahas'lokas)
-

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331 "svābhāvikam dhvaner yuktam vyañjakatvam na dīpavat, dhūmavat kintu krtakam sambandhā”der apeksaņāt.”- (74) "prā”dīnām dyotakatvam yat kais'cid abhyupagamyate, tad bhāktam eva, tatra istam na mukyam tad asambhavāt." - (75) yathā hi yasya sabdasya bhāvā'bhāvā'nusarini, yad arthabuddhiḥ tasya asau vācyo'rtha iti kathyate.” - (76) "go-śabdasya iva gaur arthaḥ sā'nyathātvā'vyavasthitā. vācyatva-vyavahāraś ca na syād arthasya kasya-cit.” - (77) "prā"di-prayogā'nugamavyatirekánusāriņi, prakarsā”dau matis tena tasya tad-vācyatā na kim." - (78) "viśeșá”vagamasyā”subhāvād anupalaksaņāt kramasya sahabhāvitvam
bhramo bhakter nibandhanam.” - (79) (pp. 158, ibid) We have seen how there was a stiff opposition to the Kashmir school of thought that advocates a fool-proof scheme of chiseled concepts of abhidhā, lakṣaņā and vyañjanā. The challangers were great names such as Mukula, Bhoja, Kuntaka and Mahimā. But this challange was taken up by the Kashmir-school again with a successful counter attack by Mammata, Hemacandra and their followers, culminating in the efforts of Appayya and Jagannātha. We discussed the views of

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Jagannātha as the Mahā-siddhāntin in the beginning, but the road to him is bedecked by efforts of such greats as Mammata and his followers whose views on abhidhā will be examined by us in brief as follows, to sum up this chapter on abhidhā.
What necessitated this rethinking and re-establishment from Mammața and his followers is creating again a conceptual clarity which originated with Anandavardhana who established vyañjanā as a distinct power of word and explained how abhidhā and laksanā were different from it on account of visayabheda and svarūpabheda i.e. difference in nature and scope. But Anandavardhana's attempts were challanged by some anti-vyañjanā thinkers and again they mixed up abhidhā, laksana and vyanjana also in an incurable way. Kuntaka, though not an anti-dhvani thinker, was also slightly different from Anandavardhana in the sense that he cared only for the poetic expression and so his concept of vicitrā abhidhā was more ambitious and less clear. Nobody except Mahimā cared strictly for vişayabheda and svarūpabheda underlying the sabda-vșttis. But Mahima erred on the other side. He accepted abhidhā as abhidhā pure and simple as taught by the mīmāmsakas, grammarians, naiyāyikas and also Anandavardhana. But for the extra meaning, the pratīyamāna artha, he postulated kävyánumiti in place of any word-power. For him, anything beyond expressed sense directly following from the word, was due to inference, and the word never could give any other sense beyond vācyártha. Thus, even laksaņā - what Mammaţa calls ‘āropitā-kriya' also was not acceptable to him. As was laksanā/laksyártha so was vyañjanā/vyangyártha - equally non-acceptable as following from word. So, for him there was no hasitation in accepting dhvani as 'bhäkta' and therefore, only "anumeya". But with all his vehemence, he was not convincing, for the fact remained that whatever was experienced by a man of taste from poetry, was directly from poetry and not from anyother thing such as inference. It was poetry, poetry and poetry alone, with its magic web of word and sense, that delighted the aesthete. Even Mahimā had to concede a point when he accepted that his Kāvyánumiti was not congruent with tarkánumiti. So, once again the balance swung in favour of Anandavardhana, and so Mammata and others rediculed Mahimā for rejecting different powers of a word. A clear-cut scheme of three powers of a word was the requirement of the context to explain the experience that accrued from reading of poetry. A change in a word here and there upset the balance of aesthetic experience and therefore it was, word and word and word alone that was held responsible for bringing about the pleasure through the richness of its meaning. Thus, once again Mammața and his followers

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333 laid down the royal road of three word-powers that led to the destination of aesthetic experience from poetry. We will now examine their concept of abhidhā.
Mammata : In the lind and IIIrd ullāsas of his K.P., Mammata deals with the topic of word and sense. He has also written an independent treatise called "sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra" on this same topic. He had defined poetry as 'word and sense', with some qualifications, in the first ullāsa, and he now deals with the nature and classification of word and sense. He begins with a three-fold classification of word such as 'vācaka' or directly expressive, laksaka or word giving secondary sense, i.e. indicator and vyañjaka i.e. word giving the suggested sense, the suggestor. It may be observed at the outset that, with reference to available documents, we meet with a systematic delineation of this topic for the first time in a work on poetics, though of course, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and later Mukula also had laid the foundation for such thinking. Following this threefold division of word, Mammata (= M.) explains that the meaning is also three-fold such as, vācya, laksya and vyangya. He observes :
kramena sabdarthayoh svarūpam āha - (sū. 5): "syād vācako lūksanikah śabdo'tra vyañjakas tridhā.”
atra iti kāvye. eşām svarūpam vaksyate - (sū. 6) : "vācyā”dayas tad arthāḥ syūḥ.”
vācya-laksya-vyañgyāḥ. - (pp. 25, edn. Jhalkikar) He cites an opinion that some others accept the so-called 'import' i.e. 'tātpayārtha' - also (sū. 7) : “tātparyārtho'pi kesucit.” (pp. 26, ibid) :
Jalkikar (pp. 25, ibid) makes it clear that : "atra kāvye vācako laksaniko vyañjakaś ca iti tridhā triprakāraḥ śabdaḥ syād iti arthah. vyañjakasya vācakalākṣaṇikau upajīvyau iti krameņa upanyāsaḥ.
Jhalkikar observes that by this (three-fold) division itself this 'tri-tva' is clear. Yet to remove the possibility of either lesser or greater number of varieties, M. has said, "tri-dhā” i.e. "three-fold”. : (pp. 25, ibid) - “vibhāgād eva tri-tve siddhépi nyūnádhikasamkhyā-vyavacchedāya 'tridhéti uktam”. Some people may argue, observes Jhalkikar, that as 'gauni and 'laksaņā' are separate vsttis, and as therefore the term 'gauna' as a variety of word is not mentioned, there is deficiency - or defect - nyunatā-in the division. Again as there is no authority with reference to vyañjanā, there cannot be a 'vyañjaka' word and so there is ‘ādhikya' - excess - also. To remove this sort of doubt in the minds of others M. has.clarified his position. In the 16th sūtra, 'gauni' is to be described as a sub-division of lāksanā, and so 'gauna' word

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA will be subsumed under 'lākṣaṇika'. Vyañjanā also will be established as an independent word-power in the Vth ullāsa. .
It may again be noted that this three-fold division of words as suggested by M., is with reference to the attributes - upādhis - and not with reference to words themselves - 'upādheyas'. We have not to understand that some words are only 'vācakas', some are only 'laksakas' and some are only 'vyañjakas'. There is no rule as such. It is the context and the attribute thereof which makes for the word as vācaka, etc. Jhalkikar, (pp. 25, ibid) quotes the Sārabodhinīkāra i.e. Sri Vatsalañcchana-Bhattācārya : "atra āhuḥ sārabodhinīkārāḥ - “tridheti”. atra upādhīnām eva tritvam, na tu upādheyānām. na hi kaścid vācaka eva, kaścid lākṣanika eva, kaścid vyañjaka eva iti asti niyamah”, iti. ata eva 'gangāyām ghosah' ity ādau ekasyā'pi gangā"dis'abdasya vācakatvam, lākṣaṇikatvam, vyañjakatvam ca upapadyate.”
In his sūtra M. has used the term 'atra' and explained it as 'atra iti kāvye'. The reason behind this is that this three-fold classification is true with reference to poetry. For, in śāstras such as vaiseșika or nyāya, etc., no term such as 'vyañjaka' is ever mentioned or read. But in poetry charm or camatkāra can not be generated without 'vyañjaka' word. Jhalkikar observes (pp. 25, ibid) : “nanu vaiśeșikaśāstrā”dau vyañjakasya nāmā'pi na srūyate. atah katham traividhyam iti ata āha, ‘kāvye’ iti. camatkāra-viśeșasya anyathā anupapattiḥ iti bhāvaḥ.”
Before explaining the nature and scope of 'vācaka'/vācya, word and sense respectively, M. observes that some accept what is termed as ‘tātparyártha' also. He observes : (pp. 26, ibid):
(sūtra. 7) “tātparyárto'pi keșu cit.” -
ākānkşa-yogyatā-sannidhi-vaśāt vaksyamāņasvarūpāņām padárthānām samanvaye tātparyártho višeșa-vapur a-padārtho'pi vākyárthaḥ samullasati iti abhihitánvayavādinām matam.”
“There is also the purport sense in the opinion of some.
When owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, after the word-meanings whose nature will be explained later, have been co-rrelated, there springs up the purport-sense, which possesses a special form and which, though not the sense of individual) words, is yet the sense of the sentence - this is the view of those who hold that the correlation is of the expressed words (abhihitánvayavādins).

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335 M. also quotes the views of others who hold that, "the primary sense itself is the sense of the sentence.” This is held by theorists of, "expression of the correlated meaning.” (anvitábhidhāna)
[The translation of the K.P. text is accepted by us from that of our friend, the late, respected professor, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi the author of, 'The Poetic Light - pub. Motilal Banarasidass, Edn. '67, Delhi]
Jalkikar has the following observation : (pp. 26, ibid) :
"nanu padārthavad vākyārthasya'pi vyañjanā-vrtty ars'rayatayā bhāttamīmāmsaka-mata-siddha-tātpary-ākhya-vrtti-pratipadyatayā ca tad-vibhāgo'pi kartum ucita iti tad akaraṇāt nyūnatā iti ata āha - tātparyártho’pi iti -
The idea is that as the word-sense is held to be suggestive, even the sentencesense is also suggestive, and the Bhātta Mimāmsakas have established the tātparyavrtti, so the inclusion of that (i.e. tātparyārtha) was proper. As it is not done, there is ‘nyūnata' i.e. narrowness too in the three-fold classification. To consider this objection M. has used the words - "tātparyártho'pi” etc. By 'keșu cit' we have to understand "kesām cit" observes Jhalkikar. So, both tatparyártha and tātparyā vrtti have to be counted. Jhalkikar observes : (pp. 26, ibid) : "ayam bhāvaḥ. vșttim vinā arthabodhane atiprasangaḥ iti anvaye (vākyārtharūpe samsarge) sabdasya tātparyā”khyā vịttir abhyupagantavyā, tatpratipădyórthas tātparyártha iti cakravarti · kamalākarabhatta-narasimha-thakkura-krta-tikāsu amśatah spastam."
We will consider abhihitánvayavāda and anvitábhidhānavāda when we will deal with 'tātparya-vịtti' separately in the next chapter. Before treating ‘abhidhā' M. descusses what is meant by vācaka sabda, as -
"säksāt sanketitam yo'rtham
abhidhatte sa vācakah.” (sūtra 9) "That is the expressive word which conveys a meaning that is directly conventional.” (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 21, ibid). M. further observes : "iha agrhītasanketasya śabdārtha-višesa-pratipatter abhāvāt samketa-sahāya eva sabdorthavišeşam pratipadayati iti yasya yatra avyavadhānena samketo gphyate sa tasya vācakah." . "Here, for want of comprehension of the meaning of a word, whose convention is not grasped, a word conveys a particular meaning only when aided by convention. Hence that word is expressive of that meaning in which unimpeded convention is assertained." (Trans. pp. 21, ibid)

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Discussing the nature of this convention M. observes that the conventional meaning is said to be four-fold from the point of view of jāty adi i.e. class and the rest. Or, it may be only the class or universal.
M. further observes that though an individual alone is competent of activity or passivity, on account of its capacity for performing a fruitful function, yet it is not compatible to establish the convention with reference to the individual on account of the contingencies of infinitness and anomaly, because the classification would not obtain in the case of words such as a bull - gauh, or 'white/sukla'; 'calah/ moving', or dittha'. Hence there is convention with reference to the attribute (upādhi) alone.
Poeticians in general and here M., it may be observed, follow the dictum of the grammarians as observed by us earlier.
Now, M. further observes that 'upādhi' or attribute is two fold : vastudharma and 'vaktr-yadrcchā-sannivesita, i.e. the inherent property of a thing and the one applied to it by the free will of the speaker. The former is also two-fold viz. tha which is accomplished and that which is to be accomplished. Again here the accomplished is two-fold viz. that which gives life to an entity, and the one which endows it with a speciality. There, the first is the universal or class. It is said in the Vākyapadīya that : 'a cow is not a cow by its own self, nor even a non-cow; but it is a cow on account of its relation with cowness.”
Jhalkikar (= J.) observes : (pp. 34, ibid) : "vākyapadīyam nāma bhartharikrto mahābhāsya-vyākhyānarūpo vyākarana-granthah. "gauḥ" - 'go'śabdoddesyo dharmī. svarūpeṇa iti - jāti-rahita-vyakti-mātrena iti arthah' iti tīkākāraḥ. 'ajñātagotvakena dharmi-svarūpa-mātrena' ityarthaḥ, iti udyotakārāḥ. na gauḥ - na gauh iti vyavahāra-visayaḥ. anyathā ghatópi gauh syāt svarūpa-avisesāt, iti bhāvah. nā’pya-gauh iti vyavahāra-visayah. tathā sati gauh api agauh syāt iti bhāvah." Jhalkikar then explains how Jagannātha has put it. We have seen the view of Jagannātha earlier as we have called him 'mahā-siddhāntin'.
The second one, observes M. further, is 'gunah' or quality. For, a thing, which has come into existence, is differentiated by a quality such as white. The property, which is being accomplished, is of the form of action, parts of which are prior and posterior (i.e. they are in a sequence).
M. has observed that there is difference between “jāti' and 'guna'. Jāti' comes first and 'guna' next. Jhalkikar explains : (pp. 34, ibid) : "labdha-sattākam” jātyā prāpta-vyavahāra-yogyatākam. vastu vyaktiḥ. viśisyate, sajātīyebhyo vyāvartyate.

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337 atra 'labdha' iti arīta-nirdeśena utpannasya dravyasya paścād gunena yoga iti darśitam. evam ca utpannasya dravyasya kşanam ekam nirgunatvam. jāti-yuktadravyasya eva utpattiḥ - "janmanā jāyate jātiḥ” iti abhiyuktokteh. ato jātigunayor mahān bheda iti tīkākārāḥ. pradīpakāras tu, "yadyapi śuklā”di-gunasya nityatva-abhyupagame gotvā"dinā samakālam eva sambandhitvam, tathā'pi śukla"digunasya sambandhah kadācid apaity api, na tu gotvā"der iti jāti-gunayorbhedaḥ iti āhuḥ. -
For M., the form of words such as Dittha and the like, is completely apprehended by the impression of the last letter. It is divested of successive order. It is imposed by the speaker at his will on entities such as Dittha as an attribute - So, the attribute, characterized by free will is known as poper name : "ạitthā”di śabdānām antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam samhsta-kramam svarūpam vaktrā yadrcchayā ditthā”dişu arthesu upādhitvena sanniveśyate iti samjñārūpo yadrcchā”tmakah.” (pp. 35, ibid).
M. quotes the authority of Mahābhasya in support of the four-fold classification of words as based on attributes.
As for the 'upādhi' or attribute that is imposed on an individual at free will of the speaker, it may be observed that the 'upādhi' is the 'sphota' of that name, which is here designated as 'samjña'. The pradīpa, (pp. 32, Edn. '11, Anandas’rama skt. granthavalih) has the
ervation - "vaktr-yadrccha-sannivesitas tu sabda-rūpah, ditthā"diyadrcchā-sannivesitas tu pratītyā kimcit prakās'itam antya-varņa-buddhyā niủsesato grāhyam nānā-varnā”tmaka-ghatā"divarṇavad varna-krama-sūnyam sphotā”khyam śabda-svarūpam ditthā'di'şu artheșu upādhitvena vaktrā yadrcchayā kalpyate iti samjñārūpayadệcchā”tmako ditthā"di-sabdaḥ.”
We have seen that Jagannātha puts it as : “yādịcchikas tu vaktrā svecchayā ditthā"diśabdānām pravrtti-nimittarve sannivesito dharmaḥ. sa ca paramparayā vyakti-gataḥ carama-varņábhi-vyangyaḥ akhandah sphoța iti... etc. ānupūrvyavacchinno varna-samudāya iti apare. kevalā vyaktir eva iti itare. tatra tộtīyamate ca nirvikalpā”tmakaḥ pratyayaḥ. (R.G. pp. 145, ibid)
Prof. Gajendragadkar (Edn. K.P., Bombay, pp. 230, 231) observes : "The sentence "ditthā"di-sabdānām..." etc. is explained in other ways also. The Pradipa notes the interpretation of Candidāsa (latter half of 13th Cen.), grand-uncle of Viśvanātha. This interpretation is referred to by Jagannātha in the sentence "kevalā vyaktir eva iti itare" in the passage from the R.G. quoted above.

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According to Candidāsa as 'samjñāśabdas' or proper names directly denote individuals alone, no other attribute is imposed upon those individuals by the speaker, when he endows them with the proper names. Thus, proper names have no basis than the individuals they signify, as jāti, guna and kriyāvācaka words possess the basic of generality, quality and action, in addition to the individuals they express. It will thus be seen that according to Candidāsa's interpretation samjñāśabdas, otherwise called 'dravya-śabdas' ('ayam eva samjñāśabdo dravyaśabda iti vyavahriyate', - udyota), denote individuals alone, as opposed to the first interpretation according to which samjñāśabdas express 'sphoța-visista' individuals, even as jāti, guna and kriyāśabdas, denote jāti-visista, guna-visista and kriyā-visista individuals.
The interpretation of Candidāsa cannot be easily obtained from the passage under discussion. Candidāsa, therefore, has to interpret some of Mammata's words in a fanciful manner. Those words are, antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam', 'samhstakramam', and 'upādhitvena'. 'Antya' according to him, means 'vyakti', which is socalled, because it is understood at the end. Thus, 'antya-buddhi-nirgrāhyam = antyam dharmimātram vyaktimātram vā buddhi-nirgrāhyam yasmin, idrśam śabda-svarūpam, 'samhrta-kramam'. In the case of jāti, guna and kriya-vācaka words, we first get the idea of jāti, guna and kriya and then of vyakti. This is the krama or order in their case. In the case of samjñā-sabdas as there is no separate attribute, the individual is directly perceived. So, samjñā-śabdas are 'samhịtakrama' or 'krama-śünya' in the sense of tādau visesana-pratyayah, tato vyaktipratyayah iti jāti-guna-kriyā-śabdesu drsyamānena kramena virahitam.'. ‘upādhitvena' - As according to Candidāsa, no 'upādhi' or attribute is imposed on the individual in the case of samjñāśabdas, he cannot take 'upādhitvena' in the natural sense of, 'as an attribute', but interprets it as, 'padārthopasthity-anukūlatayā' i.e. because it is favourable to the understanding of the meaning of the words."
[It may be noted that Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar's explanation follows the one given by Jhalkikar on pp. 36, ibid.). Prof. Gajendragadkar continues : (pp. 231, ibid) : "Candidāsa's explanation is unacceptable for three reasons. First the words, antya-buddhi-nirgrāhya' and 'samhrta-krama' in their natural sense are quite clear and unmistakably point to 'sphoța' as the attribute in question. Secondaly, Patañjali suggests that the convention of the four classes of words is understood in the attributes of the individual. This means even in the case of a 'samjñā', it is an attribute of the individual that convention is understood. Therefore, Candidāsa's statement that there is no separate attribute is against the view of Patañjali.” [This

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explanation also follows Jhalkikara - pp. 36, who observes : "tacca mahābhāsyaviruddham. mahābhāsye śabdasya eva upādhitvena vyavasthāpanāt.”]
Prof. Gajendragadkar proceeds - "Thirdly, Candidāsa's interpretation of the three words referred to is unsatisfactory. 'antya' cannot mean 'vyakti'. Then, with this sense, the compound should have been 'buddhi-nirgāhyántyam'. Again, ‘antyabuddhi-nirgrāhya' in this sense cannot be exclusive to 'samjñā-vācaka' words. For vyakti' is comprehended at the end from jāti, guna and kriyā-vācaka words as well. The explanation of samhrta-krama, though understandable, is unnatural. The sense given to 'upādhi' by Candidāsa, viz. 'padārthapa-sthity-anukūlatā' is different from what Mammata understands as 'upādhi' in the case of the three other kinds of words. Besides such 'upādhi' is by no means exclusive to samjñā-sabdas. For, it is present in all words.'
Prof. Gajendragadkar here quotes relevant passages from both Pradeepa and Udyota, the summary of which is contained in Jhalkikar's explanation (pp. 36, ibid) who also concludes with the words : "sarveșām eva śabdānām tathātvena asya vailaksanya-anā”patter-laksaņā”patteśca iti pradīpodyotayoḥ spastam.”
Earlier, we observed that Mammața quotes the authority of the Mahābhāsya in his support : "catustayī śabdānām pravsttih." - Here 'pravsttih' means currency or use in the language, i.e. the reason why words are used in the language - (pravsttinimittam) i.e. the conventional meaning. Thus the word becomes current in four ways; which amounts to saying that 'samketa' is four-fold.
Mammata here anticipaters an objection such as that “jāti' as 'prāna-pradadharma' is not comprehensive because there are certain prāņa-prada-dharmas which are not regarded as 'jāti'. For the Vaiśésikas pārimandalya' i.e. the atomic size of a 'paramāņu' or atom is taken as a 'guna' and not "jāti'. This is so because pārimāndalya' and 'vibhutva' are 'parimānas' or dimensions which fall under the category of 'guna'.
The fact is that an atom is an atom due to its pārimandalya', which if removed, the atom will cease to be an atom. 'Vibhutva' also is a prāna-prada-dharma of ākāśa. How can the Vaiśesikas put these under 'guna' ?
Mammața's reply is that both these viz. 'pārimāņdalya' and 'vibhutva' are 'jāti' only. The Vaiśeșikas place them under 'guna' because they subsume 'parimāna' i.e. measure under 'guna'. So, this is only from a technical point of view. Thus the definition of 'jāti’ as prāna-prada-dharma' is not violated. The principle of classification as advocated by the Vaiseșikas and the one held by the grammarians
TLC

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA are different. The former admitted categories such as dravya, guna, karman, sāmānya, višesa and samavāya (and also 'abhāva'), the latter have jāti, guna, kriyā and dravya. The Vaiseșikas did not distinguish between a 'prāņa-prada-dharma', and 'vaisistyā"pādaka-dharma'. Whatever was a 'dharma' was subsumed by them under 'guna'. The category of 'sāmānya' for them, though based on a 'prāna-pradadharma', refers to the unifying common principle that holds together the individuals of the class - 'jāti' - and it is not an 'attribute qualifying an individual. The Vaiseșikas technically observe that if two jātis are found in an object, they must be related to each other as 'para' (i.e. more extensive) and 'apara' (i.e. less extensive). Say, for example 'prthivi' has 'dravyatva' and also 'prthivītva'. 'Prthivi' is not only a earth, but also a substance. Out of these two jātis that reside in the earth, 'dravyatva' i.e. being a substance' is 'para' or more extensive than, 'being earth' i.e. 'prthivītva' which is ‘a-para' or less extensive. The former i.e. dravyatva is found in 'ap' i.e. water, 'tejas' or 'light', and six other substances over and above 'prthivi' or earth. - "tatra dravyāni prthivī-ap-tejo-vāyu-ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātma-manāmsi navaiva.” Similarly, out of prthivītva and ghatatva seen in a ghata, the former is 'para' and the latter is ‘apara'. But here we may observe that even 'ghata' may be earthen, or made from minerals such as copper, iron, etc. or from brass, aluminium, glass etc also. Now, according to the Vaiseșikas, mf we were to regard 'paramānutva' as 'jāti', it will not be possible to fix it as 'para' or 'apara'. In case of a 'pārthiva paramānu', we have both 'prthivītva' and also 'paramāņutva'. If we take 'paramānutva' as 'para' or more extensive, then a 'ghata' which possesses 'prtivītva' will be a paramānu. For the rule is that 'para-jāti' is also found in places where 'apara-jāti' is also seen. But 'ghata’ is not a paramāņu and this is common knowledge. So, 'paramānutva' cannot be a para-jāti. If we take it as an apara-jāti with reference to 'prthivitva', then jala-paramāņus will be prthivī for the atoms of water possess paramānutva and as prthivītva is para-jāti, we will have to accept its presence in jala-paramāņu. But common knowledge goes against this also. Thus paramānutva, if taken as a jāti, is neither ‘para-jāti' nor 'apara-jāti'. Thus Vaiśeskas do not place 'paramānutva' under jāti. The technical rule thus stops paramānutva, though a prāna-pradadharma, from being taken as jāti. But the grammarians do not admit any such rule that when two jātis are found in one object, they must be related as 'para' and 'apara'. So, they have no objection in taking 'paramānutva' as 'jāti'. They are satisfied only if two jātis residing in one and the same object are not inherently opposed to each other. For them ‘manusyatva' and 'simhatva' cannot stay together in one and the same substratum.

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341 In the K.P. we read 'paramānvā"dīnām'. But prof. R. C. Dwivedi in his K.P. (pp. 22, ibid) reads, 'paramāņutvā”dīnām, which reading follows the Sampradāyaprakāśini of Sri Vidyā-cakravartin. This perhaps is a better reading.
But in both cases, 'ādīnām' refers to parama-mahat or vibhu, the dimension which belongs to 'ākāśa' and 'ātmā' as their prānaprada-dharma. If we take away parama-mahattva or all-pervasiveness from ether or soul, they will cease to be ether or soul. Thus parama-mahattva or vibhutva, though really a jāti, it being a prānaprada-dharma, is taken as 'guna' by the Vaiseșikas only technically.
We have seen how Jagannātha, whom we have taken as a mahā-siddhāntin and whose views we have therefore placed in the beginning, has also respected Mammata's observations.
Mammața further observes that guņas i.e. qualities, kriyā i.e. actions, and yadrcchā i.e. proper names, though uniform in reality appear to be diverse on account of diversity of substratum. The same face appears to be different when reflected in a sword, mirror and oil. Thus, these - guna, kriyā and yadrochā sabdasare not to be subsumed under jāti. We had seen that Mukula had also observed this. Thus Mammata also absorbs Mukula's influence if it does not go against his basic faith. Thus Mammata does not accept only 'jāti' as the pravrttinimitta of all words. He also rejects the views of jāti-viśista-vyakti-vādins and also of 'apoha'-vādins, who thus say that the meaning of a word is 'exclusion from what it is not. The former view is held by the Naiyāyikas and the latter by the Bauddhas, while 'kevala-jātivāda' was acceptable to the Mimāņsakas.
The Mimāmsaka view is stated in the akrti-saktyadhikarana - in Jaimini's sūtras - I. ii. 30-35. We have seen this earlier. Kaiyata in his Pradīpa (pp. 17, NS. Edn.) also explains this kevala-jāti-vāda as follows : "tatra jātivādinah āhuh : jātir eva śabdena pratipădyate vyaktīnām ānantyāt sambandha-grahana-asambhavāt să ca jātiḥ sarva-vyaktiņu ekākāra-pratyaya-darśanāt asti iti avasīyate. tatra gavā”dayah śabdā bhinnadravya-samavetām jātim abhidadhati. tasyām pratītāyām tad-āveśāt tad-avacchinnam dravyam pratīyate. śuklā”dayaḥ śabdāḥ guna-samavetām jātim ācakșate. gune tu tat-sambandhāt pratyayaḥ, dravye sambandhi-sambandhāt. samjñā-sabdānām api utpatti-prabhști-avināśāt pindasya kaumāra-yauvanādyavasthā-bhedépi sa eva ayam iti abhinna-pratyaya-nimittā dittharvā”dikā jātirvācyā. kriya-sabdeșu api jātir vidyate sā eva dhātu-vācyā. pathati, pathataḥ, pathanti ity āder abhinnasya pratyayasya sadbhāvāt tannimitta-jāty-abhyupagamaḥ.”

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The Naiyāyika view of “jātiviśista-vyakti' is explained in Pradīpa as : (pp. 36, edn. ibid) : "naiyāyikā”dayas tu - na vyaktimātram sakyam, na vā jāti-mātram. ādya ānantyād vyabhicārāc ca. antye vyakti-pratīty-abhāva-prasangāt. na ca āksepād vyakti-pratītiḥ. tasmād visista eva samketaḥ. na ca ānantyād aśakyatā vyabhicāro vā. go-tvā”di-sāmānya-laksanayā sarva-vyaktīnām upasthitau sarvatra sanketa-graha-saukaryāt' - iti ātişthante."
saugatās tu - "vyaktau ānantyā"didoşād bhāvasya ca deśakālánugamábhāvāt tad anugatāyām atad-vyāvșttau samketah.'
Māņikyacandra in his Samketa (pp. 15, Edn. Poona, 1921 A.D. - Anandaśrama - SKT. - granthāvalih) - puts it as : "jāter artha-kriyā-kāritva-abhāyād viphalaḥ samketah. vyaktes tu artha-kriya-kāritve api anantya-vyabhiçārābhyām na samketaḥ kartum sakyate iti jati-matī vyaktih sabdārtha iti vaisesika"dayah - apoha iti - jati vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāņām sabdárthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavayā”di-śabdānām a-go-vyāvrttyā"di-rūpo"pohah sabdártha iti bauddhāh.”
Jhalkikara (pp. 38, ibid) explains the Baudha view as :. "go-sabdaíravanāt sarvāsām go-vyaktīnām upasthita-itarasmāt aśvā"dito vyāvrtti-darśanāt ca a-tadvyāvstti-rūpaḥ apohaḥ vācya iti bauddha-matam. - “atad-vyāvșttih apohaḥ padártha iti kşanabhanga-vādinah. tanmate sthirasya sāmānyasya abhāvāt apoha-mātrena anugata-vyavahāraḥ iti tatraiva saktiḥ - iti cakravarti-bhattacārya-krta-vistārikāyām api spastam. - jāter adrstatvena vicāra-asahatvāt vyakteś ca ksanikatvād ubhayatrā’pi sanketasya kartum aśakyatvāt gavā"di-śabdānām a-gavā”divyāvsttirūpaḥ apohaḥ arthaḥ, iti vaināśikamatam iti anyatrā'pi vyākhyātam.”
So, with reference to samketa-grahaņa, or convention of words, we have seen four views viz. jāryā"divāda of the grammarians, the jātivāda of the Mimāmsakas, the jāti-viśistavāda of the ancient Naiyāyikas, and the apohavāda of the Buddhists, of which the first held by the grammarians is favoured by Mammața and his followers belonging to the Kashmir school. We have seen above that this was accepted even by Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā and the rest also, though their concept of abhidhā' was not congruent with the Kashmir school of thought. A fifth view of vyakti-vāda or kevala-vyaktivāda is also not accepted by Mammaţa though it is indirectly referred. This view is held by Navya-Naiyāyikas. These modern Naiyāyikas rely only on 'vyavahāra' for determining sanketa, and vyavahāra or day-to-day activity is concerned with individual alone. Kaiyata's pradīpa (N.S. Edn. pp. 17) puts this view as : "vyaktivādinas tu āhuh. śabdasya vyaktih eva vācyā. jātes tu upalakṣaṇabhāvena āśrayaņāt ānantyä"didosa-anavakāśaḥ.

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343 Mammața has dealt with the views concerning the conventional meaning of words. But he has not explained how conventional meaning is apprehended from words. There are eight ways in which the conventional meaning is collected. They are :
"saktigraham vyākaranápamānakośā”ptavākyād vyavahārataś ca, vākyasya śesād vivrter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vặddhāḥ.”
(read in-parama-laghu-mañjusa, pp. 145) Mathurānātha also reads this quotation on Tattvacintāmaņi, pp. 481. (Ref. K. Kunjunni Raja)
also Tattva-cintāmaņi pp. 649; Siddhāntamuktvvali, p. 266.
These eight ways of collecting conventional meaning can be explained as follows : śaktigraha or collection of conventional meaning from Vyākarana is understood as - (i) "vākaranād śaktigraho yathā, 'kartari parasmai padam' iti anusāsanāt karmarvā"dau dvitīyādeh saktigrahah; dhātu-prakrti-pratyayā"dinām Śaktigraho vyākaranād bhavati." - We learn the meanings of the roots, suffixes and derivatives from grammar. The most important use of grammar is to help people to learn language quickly - 'laghu', as Patañjali puts in M.bh. first Ahnika, - and correctly. All the normal derivative words and their meanings can be collected from grammar on knowing the root-meanings and the significance of the suffixes.
(ii) Upamānāt sakti-graho yathā gavādi-pada-sakti-dhi-sācivyena go-sādrśyátideśa-vākyāt gavaya-pada-vācyatva-bodhottaram gavayatva-jāty-avacchinne gosādrśya-grahaņāt gavayo gavaya-sabda-vācyaḥ ity-ākāraḥ. - 'Upamana' or analogy helps us as follows. A man does not know for example a 'gavaya' i.e. a wild-cow. He can identify it through perception after 'gavaya' is explained to him as, "go-sadrśah gavayah" - i.e. 'gavaya' is like a cow. This method of knowing is taken by the Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas as a means of knowledge-pramāņadifferent from direct perception and inference. Some scholars translate ‘upamāna' not as 'analogy but as 'identification'.
(iii) Kośa or lexicon in useful thus - "kośād api saktigraho yathā - "svaravyayam svarga-nāka-tridiva-tridaśālayah." ityādinā nākā"dipadasya svarge saktigrahaḥ. - The lexicon may even give the metaphorical senses sanctioned by usage; but the primary power of signification should not be assumed in such cases. Thus when a kośa gives synonyms we understand the meanings of unknown words. Also at times 'nīla' figuratively is described as 'nīla-vastu', also.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA (iv) āptavākya or the direct statement issued by an authority also explains convention. The Nyāya-kośa (pp. 860) puts it as - "angulī-prasarana"di-pūrvakam nirdeśena śaktigraho bhavati. yathā-bāla, taveyam mātā, tavayam pitä, ayam te bhrātā kadalīphalam abhyavaharati iti nirdeśena bālasya mātrādau śaktigrahah." Or, it can be explained as - "āptavākyād api śaktigraho yathā ‘kokilaḥ pika-padavācyaḥ' ityādi-āptavākyāt pikā”di-padānām kokile śaktigrahaḥ."
(v) 'Vyavahāra' or vặddha-vyavahāra can be useful as follows : “vyavahārād api śaktigraho yathā, “ghațam naya”, “gām ānaya” ityādy-āvāpódvāpābhyām pārsvastha-bālasya ghatā"di-padasya ghata-matre saktigraho bhavati iti. - usage of the words by elders is the most important method. The Prābhākaras, who support anvitábhidhāna, respect this method as the only method to get at the conventional meaning. Mammata, following Kumārila bhatta says that in this method three pramānas or means of knowledge are involved such as pratyaksa-or direct perception, anumāna or inference, and arthāpatti or postulation. Nāgeśa considers this method as the best - "Śakti-grāhaka-siromani.” (Laghumañjusā, pp. 64) Jagadīša, the great Naiyāyika also carries this opinion - In his sabdaśakti-prakāśikā, (pp. 103) he observes : “sanketasya grahah pūrvam vrddha-vyavahāratah." Gangesa also in Tattvacintāmaņi (Vol. IV. pt. 2, pp. 462) observes - vặddhavyavahārāt eva sarveșām ādyā vyutpattih." (vi) Vākyaśesa - i.e. frest of the passage in the context is yet another source :
"vākyaśeşād hi śakti-graho yathā, 'yava-mayaścarur bhavati' ity-asya yavapadasya dirgha-sūka-višeșe kangau vā saktir iti samdehe vākyaśeşād dirgha-śūkavišese saktir nirniyate. vākyaśesas tu yatránya osadhayo, mlāyante atha etc. modamānā iva uttisthanti iti. 'vasante sarva-sasyānām jāyate patra-śāsanam. modamānāśca tisthanti yavāḥ kanisa-śālinaḥ", iti ca. - Jaimini, - M.S. I. iv. 24 - i.e. - samdigdhesu vākyaśeşāt - informs that when there is some doubt about the meaning of a word, the rest of the passage must be consulted. In the vedic sentence, “aktāḥ sarkarā upadadhāti”, (= The wet pebbles are placed nearby), the meaning of the term akta (= wet) is to be collected from the rest of the passage - 'tejo vai ghệtam' (= ghee is the brilliance); from this it is clear that the pebbles are to be soaked in ghee or clarified butter. This method can be tried in arriving at the correct meaning of a word. Thus in 'yavamayas' carur bhavati', the meaning of yava' - used for long-beared barley by Arya-s and in the sense of panic seed by Mlecchas, - is known to be long-beared barley here from the rest of the sentence. Thus here 'yava' means 'dīrgha-suka-viśeşa'. The rest of the passage viz. 'yatrányā osadhayo mlāyante athaite modamānā iva uttisthanti' - i.e. when the other plants

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345 fade out these stand up as if, they are happy. The illustration is cited in Nyāyakośa, p. 859, and Siddhānta-muktāvali, p. 275.
(vii) 'Vivarana' / 'vivsti' or explanation is the next source of collecting meaning. : vivaraņād api śakti-graho yathā, 'ghato'sti'. ity-asya 'kalaśo'sti' ity-anena vivaranād ghaça-padasya kalaśe śaktigrahaḥ. - We may say that all tikā-literature is an illustration here to the point. The meaning of a word can be known from commentary citing a synonymous word, or explaining the meaning. In the M. bh. - Vol. I. pp. 42, - Patañjali observes : "vyākhyānato visesa-pratipattir na hi samdehād alaksanam.” The meaning of a word is to be understood by a commentator's explanation especially in cases involving doubt. .
(viii) "Prasiddha-pada-sānnidhya" also helps in fixation of meaning : "prasiddha-padasya sānnidhyād api śakti-graho yathā, "iha sahakāra-tarau madhuram piko rauti”, ity-ādau 'pika'-sabdasya śaktigrahaḥ.” - [Nyāyakośa 858859 pp.). In a statement viz. “The 'pika' sings beautifully on this mango tree”, “pika' means a 'cuckoo'. This meaning is gathered from the presence of other words whose meaning is well-known.
Nyāyakośa also refers to yet another method of collecting meaning : "vedäntinas tu 'anguli-prasārana"di pūrvakam nirdeśena sakti-graho bhavati. yathā 'bāla, taveyam mātā, taváyam pitā, ayam te bhrātā, kandalī-phalam abhyavaharati' iti nirdeśena bālasya mātrādau sakti-grahaḥ - ityāhuḥ.” But we have seen above a method viz. 'aptavākya' under which this can be subsumed.
Mammata's definition of abhidhā : In his K.P. II. sū. 11, Mammata arrives at the definition of abhidhā, such as - sa mukhyo'rthaḥ, tasya mukhyo vyāpāro'sya'bhidhocyate."
Here 'saħ' stands for 'sāksāt samketitaḥ' i.e. 'directly expressed conventional meaning'. 'asya' means of the word' - 'sabdasya. So, M. observes : “That is the primary meaning; there the primary function of this (i.e. the word) is called denotation." Sāhityacūļāmani of Srividya-cakravartin explains 'mukhya' as : “mukhyaḥ prāthamikaḥ, na tu pradhānabhūtaḥ” - i.e. by ‘mukhya', we have to understand 'primary', and not 'principal. Mānikyacandra in his sanketa, (pp. 16, ibid) explains : "sa sāksāt samketitaḥ, mukham iva, hastā”dy-avayavebhyo'rthántarebhyaḥ prāg jñāyamānatvāt.” - Just as the face is seen first, of all other limbs such as hands and the rest, the primary meaning is grasped first of all. The primary function of the word with reference to the direct conventional meaning - 'säksāt samketita-artha', is called "abhidhā' or the power of direct expression.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Mammata has placed the word - "asya" as an adjective of 'vyāpāral exclude "abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā” (also called - nānártha-vyañjanā) by means of which also "sāksāt-samketitártha" is conveyed. But this another directly conventional meaning is irrelevant to the context and this second irrelevant meaning is conveyed only after the relevant meaning is first expressed, with the help of factors such as, 'samyoga' or 'conjunction etc. Thus, the 'abhidhā-mülāvyañjanā' also conveys 'sākṣāt samketita artha', but as it in not a 'mukhya' i.e. primary function with reference to it, it is not 'abhidhā'. If Mammata had defined abhidhā as, "tatra (= sāksāt samketite arthe) vyāpārah..." then the definition would have been two wide (= ativyāpta) to include 'abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā' also, which also serves to give a primary meaning, but of course a second primary meaning, when the first one is decided by factors such as 'samyoga' and the like. But this definition - viz. "sāksāt sanketite arthe mukhyo vyāpāro bhidhā” saves the situation and stops "abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjanā” from entering into the field of pure abhidhā. This "abhidhā-mūlā-vyañjana' is not a 'mukhya' vyāpāra, but is an 'a-mukhya' i.e "else than primary" . function. It is 'a-mukhya' in the sense that it is based on abhidhā' and starts functioning after abhidhā' is over.
Vācyártha' or 'expressed meaning' is called 'mukhyártha', as seen above, not because it is principal, but because it is comprehended first. Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar also notes : (pp. 39, ibid) - "nanu vācya-laksya-vyangyāḥ padārthā iti vibhāgo'nupapannaḥ. mukhyatvena prasiddhasya turīyasyā'pi sattvād iti ata āha - 'sa mukhyo’rthaḥ iti.” - Jhalkikar here meets with an objection. The objector says that the three-fold division of meaning into vācya', laksya' and 'vyangya' is not acceptable, as the turīya or the fourth one is also known to be mukhya (= principal).” To eliminate this objection Mammata has said, 'sa mukhyo'rthah' iti. - Jhalkikar explains : "sa' iti avadhāraņā-garbham padam.” 'Avadhāraņā' is ascertaining, affirming, determining, emphasising, restraining.' - This means that only that which is directly conveyed is ‘mukhya' : sa sākṣāt sanketita eva artho mukhyaḥ, mukhyatvena prasiddhaḥ, ityarthaḥ, prathamam pratiyamānatvena eva asya arthasya mukhyatvopapattiḥ. tathā hi. sabda-vyāpārāt yo’rtho'vyavadhānena (= directly) gamyate so'rtho mukhyaḥ. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastā”dibhyo'vayavebhyaḥ pūrvam mukham avalokyate, tathā sarvebhyaḥ (= laksya, - vyangya-tātparya-rūpebhyaḥ) pratīyamānebhyaḥ pūrvam avagamyate. tasmāt mukham iva mukhya iti “śākhā"dibhyo yah” (pā. 5/3/03) iti pāņini-sūtreņa 'ya'-pratyayaḥ iti. evam mukhyártha-visayaḥ śabdo’pi mukhyah ata eva agre 13 sūtre “mukhya-sabdábhidhānāl-laksaņāyāḥ ko bhedah” iti vịtti-grantha upapadyate, iti bodhyam.

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347 We can say that Mammata is here under the influence of Mukula, who, as observed earlier, had said - "śabda-vyāpārād yasya avagatih, tasya [arthasya] mukhyatvam. sa hi yathā sarvebhyo hastā”dibhyo'vayavebhyaḥ pūrvam mukham avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyaḥ pratīyamānebhyaḥ arthántarebhyaḥ pūrvam avagamyate. tasmāt 'mukham iva mukhyah' itiśākhā"di-ya-antena mukhyaśabdena abhidhīyate (A.V.M., pp. 1, ibid). In accordance with this term, viz. 'mukhyártha', the word which gives the same is also called the 'mukhya-śabda', or, is also called 'vācaka-sabda'.
Though Mammata has not given the divisions of abhidhā, we have noted above, when we dealt with the views of Jagannātha, the Mahā-siddhāntin, that abhidhā is also subdivided into (i) yogaḥ i.e. etymology, (ii) rūdhiḥ or convention and (iii) yoga-rūdhi - i.e. etymology - cum-convention. We have a fourth variety also, as noted above, viz. 'rūdha-yaugika', or "yaugika-rūdha”. The last one is illustrated by the word 'ud-bhid' which means a tree or a bush which comes out after breaking open the surface of the earth. But it is also the name of a sacrifice. This is its conventional meaning. For "yaugika-rūdha" words, read : "yaugikártharūdhárthayoḥ svātantryeņa bodhakam padam yaugika-rūdham. yathā udbhidādi padam. atra udbhit-padam yogena taru-gulmā”deh rūụhyā tu yāgavićeșaya vācakam.' - Nilakanthi.
Hemacandra - gives a four-fold classification of words such as - mukhya, gauna, laksaka and vyañjaka. Kā. Šā. (I. 15) : “mukhya-gauna-laksayavyangyártha-bhedāt mukhya-gauņa-laksaka-vyañjakāḥ śabdāḥ” (pp. 18, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Ahmedabad, June 2000, pub. L. D. Institute of Indology).
He explains ‘mukhya' artha as : "sākṣāt samketa-visayo mukhyah.” (Kā. Šā. I. 16, pp. 18, ibid) - He adds in his vịtti - "avyavadhānena yatra sanketaḥ kriyate, sa mukham iva, hastā”dy-avayavedhyaḥ prathamam pratīyate iti mukhyaḥ. sa ca jātiguņa-kriyā-dravya-rūpaḥ, tad-visayaḥ śabdo mukhyo vācakaḥ iti ca ucyate. yathā gauḥ, śuklah, calati, devadatta iti. yad āha. mahābhāsyakāraḥ - 'catustayi śabdānām pravṛttiḥ' iti.
Hemacandra is clearly under the impression of both Mukula and Mammata. But the chief merit of this ācārya is that he puts things with absolute clarity and lucidity. He observes that the discussion on the nature of 'jāti' and the like is irrelavent to the point and is therefore not discussed here : "jātyādi-svarūpam ca praksta-anupayogāt na iha vipancyate." He refers in brief to the views on sanketagrahaņa such as : “jātiḥ eva sanketa-visaya iti eke. tadvān iti apare, aphoha iti anye.”

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Though Hemacandra has not elaborated in the body of text which he calls the Kā. Šā. and alamkāra-cūdāmani, the name given by him to his svopajñā vịtti, he discusses at length in his 'viveka' a commentary attached to the text, but also written by himself. Obviously, he has written 'viveka' for the more advanced students of this śāstra, i.e. literary aesthetics. He says : (pp. 1, Edn. Kā. Sā. with viveka, by Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64) :
"vivarīkartum kvacid dřbdham navam sandarbhitum kvacit, kávyānušāsanasyayam
vivekaḥ pravitanyate." 'to explain something presented, and to add something fresh, - this viveka is presented at length.' So, in his 'viveka' on sūtra I. 16 Kā. Sā. he has covered everything that is read in Mammata and Mukula. Hemacandra observes : (pp. 43, ibid)
"catuṣayı iti. jāti-śabdāḥ guņa-śabdāḥ, kriyāśabdāḥ yadịccha-sabdāśca. tathā hi, sarvesām śabdānām svárthā'bhidhānāya pravartamānānām upādhi-upadarśitavișaya-vivekatvāt upādhinibandhanā pravsttiḥ.
upādhiśca dvividhah - vaktr-sannivesitah, vastudharmaś ca. tatra yo vaktrā yadscchayā tat-tat-samjñi-visaya-sakti-abhi-vyakti-dvāreņa tasmin tasmin samjñini niveśyate sa vaktr-sannivesitaḥ. yathā ditthā"dīnām sabdānām antya-buddhinirgrāhyam samhsta-svarūpam. tat khalu tām tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā yadrcchayā tasmin tasmin samjñini upādhitayā sanniveśyate. ataḥ tannibandhanā yadịcchā-sabdāḥ ditthādayah.”
Hemacandra now makes an interesting note : "yeşām api ca da-kārādi-varnavyatirikta-samhịta-krama-svarūpábhāvāt na ditthādi-sabda-svarūpam samhịtakramam samjñișu adhyavasyata iti darśanam, teşām api vaktr-yadrcchāabhivyajyamāna-sakti-bhedānusāreņa kālpanika-samudāya-rūpasya qitthādeḥ śabdasya tattat samjñā’bhidhānāya pravartamānatvād yadṛcchāśabdarvam upapadyata eva. - This is from Mukula - (pp. 5, ibid) Hemacandra then gives the two varieties of vastudharma, such as siddha, and sādhya. He proceeds exactly in the fashion of Mammața and Mukula and also quotes from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartặhari.
He also discusses the views of kevala-jātivādins, jāti-visista-vyaktivādins and apohavādins.

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349 The second opinion - viz. 'tadvān' is explained by Hemacandra as : (pp. 44, ibid) - “jāter artha-kriyāyām anupayogāt viphalaḥ samketah. yad-āha
"na hi jātir dāha-pākā”dau upayujyate iti vyakteś ca artha-kriyā-kāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na sanketaḥ kartum śakyate iti jātyupahitā vyaktiḥ śabdārthah."
Now this can be placed with Māņikyacandra's (= M.C.) remark in his Sanketa on the K.P. (pp. 15, ibid) :
"vyaktes tu artha-kriyākāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na sanketah kartum śakyate iti jātimatī vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti vaiśeșikā"dayah.”
We do not know who has influenced whom as both Hemacandra and Manikyacandra (M.C.) were almost contemporary. (See. Dr. De.: Dr. Kane).
On 'apoha' also H.C.'s remarks are almost identical and then more explanatory when placed with those passed by M.C. -
M.C. reads : (pp. 15, ibid):
‘apoha iti.' - jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāņām śabdárthatvasya anupapadyamānarvāt gavayā”di sabdānām a-go-vyāvịttyā”di-rūpaḥ apohaḥ śabdártha iti bauddhāh.”
H.C. (pp. 44, ibid) reads: jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāņām śabdárthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavādi-sabdānām a-go-vyāvịttyā”dirūpas tad-visistam vā buddhi-pratibimbakam sarvathā bāhyártha-sparsa-bunyam anyápohaśabda-vācyam sabdārtha iti."
Clearly H. C. seems to offer better comments. Again M.C. has 'gavayādi sabdānām', and H.C. has 'gavādi sabdanăm' which makes better sense. Then the remark - 'tad-visistam vā...' in H.C. also is further explanatory. Thus, our impression is that perhaps H.C. had M.C.'s 'samketa' before him, though he may be himself a senior contemporary of M.C.
With this we move on to Jayadeva. The Candrā”loka carries a stamp of originality not only in its treatment of different topics, but also in the overall scheme. He has ten 'mayūkhas' - rays - chapters of his work 'Candrā”loka' - the light of the moon. In the first chapter he gives kāvya-laksana and examines Mammata's definition of kāvya and deals with 'sabda-laksana' and 'sabda-bheda', etc. Then dosa, laksana, guna and alamkāra concepts are taken up in the II-V chapters. The Vith is devoted to 'rasa', 'rītis' and 'vrttis'. VIIth, VIIIth IXth & Xth chapters are devoted to the concepts of vyañjanā, dhvani, laksana and abhidhā respectively.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Thus, while other alamkārikas treat vịttivicāra along with kāvya-laksana in the beginning of their works, Jaydeva has almost reversed the treatment and performed a 'śīrsā"sana', so to say. We will try to examine the merit of his scheme and also the treatment of various topics as and when the context permits. Jayadeva defines poetry or kāvya at I. 7 :
“nirdosā laksanavati sa-rītir guna-bhūsaņā sálamkāra-rasā.
anekavịttir vāk kāvya-nāma-bhāk.” Thus for Jayadeva, 'vāk’ i.e. - 'vānī i.e. language - is kāvya, and it is bereft of faults, accompanied by laksanas (i.e. marks), rītis (= style, diction), bedecked by guņas (i.e. excellences), and is having alamkāras (i.e. figures of speech) (and) rasas and many vrttis (= functions or powers; the nātya-vrttis such as kaisiki and the rest, and sabda-vrttis i.e. abhidhā and the rest).
We will deal with other topics such as dosa, guna, alamkāra and rīti later, but for the present we will concern ourselves with 'vāk' and 'aneka-vștti'.
The 'paurņamāsī (Edn. Chawkhamba skt. series - varanasi; '64); observes : (pp. 10, ibid) “etādņšī vāk, ukta-viśesaņa-viśistā vāņi kävyam, kavikarma, tasya namaākhyām bhajatīti kāvya-nāma-bhāk, kāyya-pada-pravrtti-nimittam bhavati."
The commentator further explains that Jayadeva hereby wants to convey that poetry is 'word' : etena nirdosā”dy-ukta-dharma-viśista-śabdatvam kāvyatvam iti kavya-laksanam sampannam. tac ca kāvyam śabda-niştham iti api asya abhipretam.
kāvyaprakāśam apahāya prāyaḥ sarvépy-ālamkārikāḥ kāvyasya śabdanisthatām eva urari-kurvate. kävyaprakāśakāras tu tasya vyāsajya-vịttyā sabdárthobhayanişthatām svīkurute.
śabda-nisthatāvādinām tu ayam āśayah - "autpattikas tu sabdasya arthena sambandhah” ityādi-mīmāmsā-sūtrena śabdárthayoḥ svābhāvika-sambandhe niścite krte śabda-grahane arthaḥ svayam eva āpatati. artha-śūnye śabde tu prayogárhatā eva nástīti kāvyasya śabda-nișthatā eva ucitā iti alam vistarena."
There is yet another commentary by Dr. Trilokī Nātha Dwivedi (Edn. Bharatiya Vidya prakāśana, Varanasi, Delhi, '92) - both in Sanskrit and then in Hindi. This commentary explains the word 'vākas : (pp. 11, ibid) : vāk (ucyate anena iti

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351 śabdaḥ, ucyate asau iti arthah) kāvyam kavikarma, tasya nāma samjñā bhajatī, samksepeņa vāk kāvyam iti."
Now this commentator takes 'vāk' as both word and sense, and in the paurņamāsī, only 'word' was taken as kāvya, according to Jayadeva.
Now, Jayadeva first takes up 'word for discussion. He defines 'word at Candrā”loka I. 9 - as :
"vibhaky-utpattaye yogaḥ śāstrīyah sabda ucyate, rūdha-yaugika-tanmiśraiḥ
prabhedaiḥ sa punas-tridhā.” That (collection of letter) which deserves the appending of case-terminations and is therefore termed 'śāstrīya' i.e. scientific (such a collection of letters) is termed 'sabda' or word (with reference to poetry). This word is three-fold viz. (i) rūdha i.e. conventional, (ii) yaugika i.e. etymological and (iii) yoga-rūdha i.e. etymogical cum conventional.
For Jayadeva such words as dittha and the like, which render meaning depending only on the power of the total collection of letters - kevala-samudāyaŚakti, are rūdha or conventional. Yaugika words are 'pācaka' and the like, that give meaning through the association of both 'prakrti' and 'pratyaya' i.e. 'yoga' sakti, and those which render meaning through both samudāya-sakti and avayava-sakti are yogarūdha words such as 'pankaja' and the like.
Because Jayadeva had defined poetry as ‘nirdosā"di-viśesanaviśistā vāk', he has to explain and define vāk'. This is what 'paurnamāsī has to explain. Thus here 'vāk” is taken only as 'word'. The other commentary by Dr. Trilokīnātha Dwivedi takes 'vāk' as both 'word and sense'. He observes : (pp. 19-20, ibid):
"kävyarvena abhimatāyāḥ vāco vyutpatti-bhedāt sabdártha-rūpatve kramasah prathamatvāt, prathamopasthiteḥ, arthasya upasthāpakatayā prādhānyāc ca, prathamam sabdam laksayan aha - vibhakty-utpattaye itya"di. vibhakt rūpāḥ tin-rūpāś-ca, tāsām utpattaye, dhāraņāya yogyaḥ prayoga-yogyatām āpannah sabdah varņa-samudāyaḥ śāstrīyaḥ, śāstra-sambandhi isyate kathyate. evam cátra śástrīya-sabdatvam laksyatávacchedakam, na tu sabdatva-mātram eva., arthāt ‘apadam na prayunjīta', tathā ca 'vibhakty-antam padam' ityādi. siddhāntānām jāgarūkatayā vibhaktīnām utpatteḥ samāgamād anantaram eva śabdaḥ prayogayogyo bhavati vibhakti-rahita-varga-samudāyena arthasya 'apratīteḥ

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
sa vibhaktiyuktaḥ, prayoga-yogyaḥ artha-samanvitaś-ca śabdaḥ śāstrīyo vyākaraṇaśāstránukūla iti kathyate.
evam prathamam śabdo dvividhaḥ aśāstrīyaḥ śāstrīyaś ca, iti. tatra aśāstrīyaḥ sabdaḥ yatha'pi bhavatu, kimtu śāstrīyaḥ śabda eva sa bhavitum arhati yo vibhaktiyuktaḥ, prayogayogyaḥ, niścitártha-pratipādakaś ca bhavati.
punaḥ bhūyaḥ rūḍhaḥ, yaugikaḥ, tābhyām bhinnaś ca iti rūḍha-yaugikatanmiśrās taiḥ prabhedaiḥ, bhedopabhedaiḥ tridhā tri-prakārako bhavati-rūḍhaḥ, yaugikaḥ, rūḍha-yaugikaś ca, iti.
tatra prakṛti-pratyayártha-vicāram vinaiva kevalam samudāya-śaktyā arthapratipādakatvam rūḍhatvam. rūḍhiḥ prasiddhiḥ. evañca prasiddhya yaḥ śabdaḥ artha-viseṣam pratipadayati sa sabdaḥ rūḍha iti ucyate.
yogad agato yaugikaḥ iti su-spastam. yogaḥ prakṛti-pratyayárthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sammiśraṇam iti, tasmād artha-pratipadakaḥ śabdaḥ yaugikaḥ.
rūḍhena miśro yaugikaḥ, yaugikena miśro rūḍhaḥ, arthāt yaḥ rūḍhópi yaugikópi bhavati, prakṛti-pratyayártha-vicāram vinā, prakṛti-pratyayártha-vicārapūrvakam ca'pi ubhayártha-pratipadanam karoti, sa śabdo rūḍha-yaugika iti."
The Paurṇamāsī (pp. 11, ibid) explains: sa sabdo rūḍho yaugiko yoga-rūḍha iti prabhedais tridha bhavati. tatra kevala-samudāya-śaktyā arthabodhakatvam rūḍhatvam. yathā ḍitthā”di. kevalāvayava-śaktyā artha-bodhakatvam yaugikatvam. yathā pācakā"di. samudayávayava-ubhayaśaktyā-arthabodhakatvam yogarūḍhatvam., yathā pankajā”di.
rasagangadharakāraḥ eta eva śabdāḥ kevala-samudāyasakti, kevalaavayavaśakti-samudáyávayava-ubhaya-śakti-padaiḥ vyapadiśyate.
Jayadeva goes for further sub-division.
At Candra"loka I. 10, he states that avyakta-yoga, niryoga and yoga"bhāsa are the three sub-divisions of rūḍha-sabda. Words such as vṛkṣā"di, bhūvādi and maṇḍapā"di are the illustrations respectively. When avayavártha (i.e. yaugika artha) is a-sphuța i.e. not clear and when meaning is collected through samudayaśakti, that word is called 'a-vyakta-yoga' śabda. Say, 'vṛksa' is so called because it removes the sunshine - "vṛścati atapam iti vṛkṣaḥ". Here, the apprehension of the yaugikártha in the sense of 'atapa-nivāraṇa' or removal of sunshine does not take place everywhere, but we have apprehension in a general form of vṛkṣatva-jāti - or the generality only, though the 'avayavártha-pratīti' is not totally negated.

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353 Now, when there is no ‘avayavártha-pratīti' whatsoever, it is a case of 'niryoga' word. For example, there is no possibility of any yaugika artha in case of words such as the Vbhū and such other dhātus - i.e. verbs.
Yogā”bhāsa' occurs when the avayavártha or yaugika-meaning is having no relation whatsoever with the meaning which is supposed to be the purport or tātparya. For example we have ‘mandam pibati iti mandapah'. But this has nothing to do with a pendal or a reception gate which is raised on occasions such as marriage, etc.
The 'yaugika' word is again three-fold such as - suddha-yaugika, yaugika-mulayaugika and sambhinna-yaugika. The illustrations are respectively - bhrānti', 'sphurat-kānti' and 'kaunteya’. The first, i.e. śuddha-yaugika is one where meaning is apprehended by the union of praksti and pratyaya. V'bhramu' is a verb meaning 'gati' and 'bhrama'. When the ‘ktin’-pratyaya in feminine gender is attached to it, we get the word 'bhranti' in the sense of gamana/bhramana or 'bhrama' i.e. illusion. This is 'śuddha-yaugika'.
When two śuddha-yaugika words form a compound, we get "yaugika-mūla yaugika”, e.g. "sphurat-kānti”. This word is derived by a compound of 'sphurat' and ‘kānti', which are by themselves śuddha-yaugika words individually. 'sphurat' is formed by attaching 'śatru’-pratyaya to the root V'sphur'. By attaching 'ktin'in feminine gender, to the root V'kamu', we arrive at 'kanti', a suddha-yaugika-pada by itself.
Sambhinna-yaugika occurs when there is relation between 'yaugika' and 'ayaugika' word. 'Kuntī is the daughter of king 'Kunti'. This is a yaugika word. There is 'vyang' pratyaya here, and its 'lopa' i.e. (luk) disappearance also takes place. Then again from ‘kunti', we apply 'nis'-pratyaya because of faminity, and get ‘kuntī, which is yaugika'. Then by dhak-pratyaya we get kaunteya'. But by this apprehend only 'Arjuna' and no other son of Kuntī. So, this word “kaunteya' becomes 'a-yaugika'. Thus by the relation of both 'yaugika' and 'a-yaugika' words, the word 'kaunteya', meaning 'Arjuna' is arrived at and is called 'sambhinna-yaugika'.
Paurņamāsī explains (pp. 14, ibid) : "yaugika-ayaugikayoḥ sambandhena artha-bodhakatvam sambhinna-yaugikam. yathā ‘kaunteya' - śabdo yaugikáyaugikasambandhena artha-bodhakah. rājādi vācakāt 'kunti' sabdāt "vrddhet-kausalājādāñvyang" ityanena kunteh apatyam stri 'kuntī ity arthake vyani pratyaye křte sati tatah tatra, 'striyāmavanti-kunti-kurubhyasca' ityanena tal-luki striyām nisi krte kunti sabdo yaugiko bhavati.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'kuntyā apatyam pumān kaunteyórjunaḥ'iti, 'strībhyo dhak’ity anena taddhitena nişpannaḥ kaunteya-śabdó’rjuna-vācako'yaugiko bhavati. kuntyāḥ putrántarāņām api sattvāt. evam yaugika-ayaugika yoḥ sambandhena kaunteyaśabdasya artha-pratyāyakatvāt sambhinna-yaugikatvam sammiśrita-yaugikatvam iti yāvat.”
The yoga-rūdha is also three-fold such as by the two, by exchange of general and particular quality, - anyonyam mitho yat sāmānya-viśesayor yogā”rūdhayoh parivartanam vinimayaḥ, tasmāt kāraṇāt. This means that at times (i) the general meaning is discarded in favour of the particular and (ii) vice-versa.
The third variety is 'tan-misra' i.e. a mixture of both these, i.e. where at one and the same place both the sāmānya or general and viśesa or particular imeanings are understood.
The illustrations are - nīradhi, pankaja, saudha, sāgara, bhūruha, and śaśī. These words leave their sāmānyártha i.e. yaugikártha and give the višesārtha i.e. rūdhártha : nirāņi dadhāti iti niradhiḥ - putting aside this sāmānya/i.e. yaugika meaning it gives only a viśesārtha - a particular rūdha artha of a sea or ocean. Thus, the term pankaja puts aside the meaning of 'anything that is born of mud', 'saudha' puts aside the meaning of a substance, used for white-wash - born of sudhā, 'sāgara' puts aside the meaning of 'that which is connected with king sagara', 'bhūruha' puts aside the meaning of anything that grows on earth, 'Śaśī, puts aside the meaning of a person with a hare or rabbit, - these words give only their famous conventional meanings only.
If the third variety of yogarūdha word is accepted, we come across such words as 'kşīra-niradhi' and 'ākāśa-pankaja' etc. In case of the former, there is the apprehension of rūdha or viśeşārtha in place sāmānyártha, and in case of the latter there is accepting the sāmānya/yaugika in place of viseșártha; say, for example in case of ‘kšīranīradhi' if the sāmānya meaning in form of a reservoire
ater is taken to understand 'nīradhi', then ‘ksīra' or milk will not be able to stay with water. So here 'nīradhi' has to be taken in the particular sense of an ocean only. Opposite is the illustration namely 'ākāśa-pankaja'. 'ākāsa' is 'panka' or mud, and so the word means 'moon' that has come out of akāśagangā. So here višeşa artha is left out and sāmānya artha of 'that which is born in mind', is accepted. The third variety is illustrated by niradhitayā kūpah samudra iva, rājate.
A table explaining the varietics of śabda can be seen as below :

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Śabdavșttis the nature of : Abhidhā
śabdaḥ
rūdhah
yaugikah
yoga-rūdhaḥ avyakta-yogal niryoga2 yogābhāsa3
śubddha-yaugika4 yaugika-mūla-yaugika5 sambhinna-yaugika6
sāmānyárthe7
višeşárthe8 sāmánya-vićeşa-ubhayavišeşártha-bodhaka sāmānyárthabodhaka vidhártha-bodhakara 9
(here ‘niradhi' means sea and reservoire of water) In sabda-sakti-prakāśikā (1590 A.D.), Jagadīsa Tarkālamkāra also has given a nine-fold division which is seen in Jayadeva also.
We have seen that Jayadeva has qualified 'sabda' by 'vibhaktyutpattaye'. Now vibhaktis are mainly two-fold, 'sup' and 'tin'. The 'sup'-case-terminations are twenty one. They are used in kāraka-rūpa (i.e. words). The 'tin' are of two types - (i) concerning parasmai pada, which are nine 'tip-ādi”. (ii) The other nine are concerning the ātmanepada - 'ta'-ādi'. On account of the futpatti' of these Vibhaktis', i.e. when a collection of letters deserves to take up these caseterminations, it becomes useful for and are utilized in a language. When these case-terminations are attached to a word, it is called a śāstrīya sabda. Jayadeva thus (I. 13b) comes to the explanation of 'pada' and 'vākya', as :
vibhaktyantam padam, vākyam - (136)
tadvyūho'rtha-samāptitah, - (14a) The word with (sup/tin) case-terminations appended is termed 'pada' (in grammar). The collection of such 'padas' is a (grammatical) sentence which conveys one meaning and the padas in which are free from expectancy.
Paurnamāsi observes : (pp. 18, ibid): "arthasya padárthasya samāptih, avasānam iti artha-samāptiḥ, tasyām artha-samāptito artha-samāptau iti yāvat. nirakānkşam iti yāvat.”
After explaining the concepts of 'sabda' and vākya' in the first Mayukha, Jayadeva - picks up the topic of śabda-vsttis which are three for him, viz. vyañjanā, laksanā and abhidhā, Jayadeva compares these three with the three flows of the Gangā which look to be 'gambhira', 'kutila' and 'sarala', following three vrttis. Jayadeva observes -
"vịtti-bhedais tribhir yuktā srotobhir iva jhāhnavi,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA bhārati bhāti gambhīrā kutilā saralā kvacit.
(chandrāloka VII. i) Jayadeva's 'vịtti' is the same as 'sakti' of Viśvanātha and others. Paurņamāsī explains : (pp. 230, ibid) : "vartate, śabdárthe pravartate anayā iti vịttiḥ.” ... yuktā sambaddhā bhārati vāņi. tribhiḥ srotobhiḥ pravāhair yuktā, jāhnavī gangeva. kvacit gambhīrā, vyangyártha-bodha-rūpā. kutilā laksyártha-bodha-rūpā. saralā vācyárthabodha-rūpā.”
In the Vith chapter 'rasa' was explained and as 'rasa' is arrived at through 'vyañjanā', Jayadeva treats it first in Ch. VII. Ch. VIII is devoted to dhvani and gunībhūta-vyangya. Ch. IX deals with laksanā and Ch. X with abhidhā. Frankly, there is no rhyme or rhythm in this scheme.
We will examine Jayadeva's treatment of abhidhā first. He has called it ‘sarala and the framātikā of Vidyanātha explains this as : "a-vilambena arthapratyāyakatvam saralātvam.” Abhidhā is termed 'sarala' because the meaning is collected immediately through it. Abhidhā is defined by Jayadeva at, Candrā”loka X. i, as :
"dharmam kamcit puraskrtya
prāyaḥ śabdah pravartate, yayā’rtham spastam ācaste
śabdas tām abhidhām viduḥ.” The idea is that a word is used in language, with reference to some 'dharma' i.e. some speciality here, which is of the form of either jāti or class/generality, guņa/quality kriyā/action or dravya/i.e. a thing, substance, etc. Abhidhā is that function, by which, a word clearly conveys the exact - yathártha - meaning, which here is the conventional or 'sanketita' meaning. By 'yathártha' is meant 'sanketita artha', because that exactly is its real meaning. By the term 'spastam' is 'sāksāt sanketitam' understood. This word which gives the 'sāksāt sanketita artha' is called vācaka' or directly expressive.
Jayadeva wants us to accept six-fold abhidhā with reference to the six-fold primary meanings it conveys. Over and above the four-fold meaning such as jāti, guna, etc. - the attributes , Jayadeva has two more, such as 'vastu-yoga' and ‘nirdeśa'. He observes; (Candraloka X. ii) :

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357
“jātyā gunena kriyayā vastu-yogena samjñayā, nirdeśena tathā prāhuḥ
sadvidhām abhidhăm budhāh.” The six-fold division of abhidhā is due to the six-fold nature of dharma' with reference to which a word is used in worldly business. By 'vastu-yoga' is meant attachment of something which gives the thing a special name such as a person is called dandin' because he is having a danda' or a stick. 'Nirdeśa' is pointing out. When we point out someone by name, that term is called 'nirdeśa'vācī, e.g. Kamsao.
Dr. Trilokīnārtha Dwivedi explains vastu-yoga, samjñā and nirdeśa as follows : (pp. 395, ibid) -
'vastunaḥ apara-dravyasya samyogena, sambandhena yathā 'dandi iti atra dandasya samyogena danda-dhāriņaḥ purusasya jñānam bhavati. samjñāyā vaktryadệcchayā ditthā”di-rūpayā, yathā dittho'yam', davittho'yam', ityādi. tathā nirdeśena sadvidhā iti. vācaka-śabdānām sva-paratvam nirdeśarvam. yathā, “hiranya-pūrvam kasipum pracakşate', iryādinā hiramyakaśipor nirdeśaḥ; yathā 'deva-pūrvam girim te' ity anena deva-girer nirdeśaḥ iti.
The paurnamāsī observes : (pp. 301, ibid) : vastuno yogah sambandhah vastuyogah yathā dandī iry ādau danda-sambandhah. ayamdand-sambandho vācyo, vācyatā'vacchedako-atra dandasambandhasya višesanatvena bhānam. ayam eva vastu-yoga-śabdah. yatra jāty adayah sambandhena ca vyavahitās tatra ta eva pravrtti-nimittáni vācyā vā. yatra tu tena vyavahitās tatra vastu-yoga eva tathā. yathā dando gotvavān ity ādau. ata eva dravya-yoga iti. upeksya vastu-yoga iti uktam.
ditthā"disabdah samjñā. yadsccha-śabda-iti nāmántaram. ete sabdā eka eva vyakti-vācino bhavanti. “hiranya-pūrvam kasipum pracakşate' (śi. śu. I. 42), dhanur upapadam asmai vedam abhyādideśa (Kirāta. XVIII. 44), 'devapūrvam girim te' (Megha. pūrva. 42) ity adi sthalesu nirdeśa-sabdāh santi. vācakavarnānām sva-paratvam nirdeśatvam. uktodāharanesu 'hiranyapūrva-kasipu' padābhyām hiranya-kasipu-varna-vattā eva vācyā, vācakatávacchedikā vā. tenátra nirdeśaśabdatvam vijñeyam. prastuta-granthakāramate nirdeśa-sabdatayā abhidhayárthapratītiḥ. anye tv atra lakṣaṇām svīkurvanti.
The commentary tries to explain that by 'nirdeśa' only the letters are meant. The individual is not referred to by this, as in a samjñā sabda.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Jayadeva, at X. 3 cites illustrations of all these six varieties of abhidhā, such as -
"gaur nīlaḥ pācako dandi ditthah kamsa iti kramất, kam samhinasti kamsárir
naram ca kam samāśritam.” Here 'dandi' gives meaning by danda-sambandha i.e. vastu-yoga. In the illustration, viz. 'kamsam hinasti', etc., the term “kamsa' is nirdeśa-vācaka. There is a question asked viz. "Who was killed by Krsna ? The answer is, "A person who was associated with 'ka’kāra." This means krsna killed 'naraka' and also 'sa' associated with 'kam', i.e. íkamsa'. As only letters are mentioned, this is a case of 'nirdeśa', and not samjñā or yadrcchā. When 'kamsa' is referred to by such letters it is ‘nirdeśa'. When he is referred directly as, "krsna killed kamsa" - it is samjñā and not nirdeśa. Jayadeva (X. 4) suggests that :
“na yogā"der āyatanam na samketa-niketanam, vịttyā nirdeśa-śabdo'yam
mukhyayā svábhidheyayā.” Jāti' etc. are negated in the nirdesa-pada. This sort of an expression i.e. nirdeśa, is neither capable of 'vyutpatti' nor is there any sanketa in it. Only letters are apprehended through abhidhā. It makes only for 'sva-rūpa' - "ato’yam nirdese svarūpe śabdo nirdeśa-śabdah kamsā"dih. svam varna-dvayam eva abhidheyam yasyām sā tayā.” Paurņamāsī; pp. 303, ibid. In the Mahābhāsya we have a four-fold scheme of words : "catustayi śabdānām pravrttih iti uktam. Here, for Jayadeva, abhidhā is, six-fold - 'atra tu sā sadvidhā iti visesah. (pp. 303, ibid)
Vidyādhara (Ekāvalī II. 2) follows Mammata and holds that meaning of a word which conveys 'sāksāt samketa' - i.e. convention directly is 'mukhya' or primary and the power which directly conveys this 'samketita artha' - is 'abhidha' and is also ‘mukhya' i.e. primary.
Vidyānātha, the author of Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhāṣaṇa, holds that tātparyártha or purport is covered up by vyañjanā only and supports only three powers of a word viz. abhidhā, laksanā and vyañjanā. He does not accept, as is done by Hemacandra, 'gauņi' as an independent power over and above laksanā. He incorporates 'gauņī in laksaņā and thus, like the kashmir school opts for the

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359 vrtti-traya' i.e. three powers or functions of a word. His definition of abhidhā, viz. "that function of a word which has the conventional meaning as its object, is called abhidhā" - (Pra. Ru. Kāvyaprakarana, pp. 35) follows Mammata. He gives two varieties of abhidhā, viz. (i) rūdha-pūrvikā and (ii) yoga-pūrvikā. The first variety is one which makes for the conventional meaning of a word, and the second yields the etymological sense. The verse, viz. “tapo-višesaih prathitaiḥ...” etc. illustrates the first one, while in “rājñi rudra-narādhiše.” the 'yaugika' - etymological-meaning is resorted to.
Viśvanātha (Sāhitya-darpaņa, Ch. II) explains the nature of a sentence and gives its varieties. Vākya or sentence for him is 'pada-samūha' or collection of words, and 'pada' is collection of letters capable of yielding sense. Then he gives three varieties of meaning such as vācya/expressed, laksya/indicated and vyangya/ suggested. Three powers of a word are accepted with reference to these three types of meaning, and they are respectively abhidhā, lakṣaņā and vyañjanā (S.D. II. 3). Visvanātha has used the term 'sakti' for all the three functions. Normally, by 'sakti' the alamkārikas refer only to abhidhā. For Viśvanātha these three powers are also 'vrtti' or vyāpāra' also. In fact the 'vrtti' is called 'sakti' because it has the power to
Id a certain meaning. Abhinavagupta also takes 'śakti' as a synonym of 'vyāpāra'. Rucirā explains that as they stay in a word they are called 'vrtti', but on account of their power to yield a particular meaning, they are termed 'sakti' : See, Rucirā on S.D. II. 3 : "atra idam boddhavyam. artha-bodha-hetu-bhūtarvāt saktirūpatvam, śabda-gatatvāt tu vịttitvam.”
Explaining the nature of abhidhā Visvanātha observes - that, as it signifies the conventional meaning, the abhidhā Śakti is called 'agrimā' i.e. primary or ‘mukhyā' : “tatra samketitárthasya bodhanād agrimā abhidhā.” (S.D. II. 49). He has discussed the factors such as vrddha-vyavahāra etc., which make for the formation of convention-samketa. He has also explained that by the proximity of a famous word - 'prasiddha-pada-sannidhya' ., and also by aptopadeśa i.e. instructions from seniors, conventional meaning is collected. This abhidhā Śakti is without intervention from any other power. There are other factors also for collecting the convention and these are clarified by the vivstikāra - (pp. 29-30, vivsti on S.D.). Viśvanātha accepts samketa with reference to the four attributes such as jāti, guna, etc., in conformity with Mammața.
Keśava Miśra in the third Mayukha of his Alamkāra-sekhara talks of three vșttis such as (abhidhā) sakti, laksanā and vyañjanā. Sakti is God's will - īśvarecchā-and

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
is termed 'samketa' - "padānām vṛttayās tisraḥ - tisro vṛttayaḥ padānām bhavanti, śaktir-lakṣaṇā-vyañjanā ceti. tatra śaktir īśvarecchā, ya samketa iti ucyate. sā padeșu prasiddhā eva. să ca -
"kośa-vyākaraṇa-āptokti-vākya-seṣa-upamā"ditaḥ
prasiddha-pada-sambandhāt vyavahārāc ca budhyate."
(pp. 9, Alam. śe. Edn. N.S. Bombay, 1926) Thus, while others hold that sakti i.e. abhidhāśakti gives samketita-artha, Kesava makes a simpler equation and calls sakti itself to be iśvarecchā or samketa. He does not elaborate.
Appayya Dikṣita has given a serious thought to the concept of sabada-vṛttis in his Vṛtti-vārtika (Vr. V. Edn. Avasthi, Indu Prakashan, Delhi - '77). Of course our Mahā Siddhāntin i.e. Panditarāja Jagannatha controverts Appayya at many places and this we have seen earlier, but that does not reduce the importance of the Vr. V. in the least. He, of course follows the Kashmir tradition but, to his credit it may be observed that he has gone much deeper in his discussions and has been very analytical in his observations and this provides the back ground and the heritage which ultimately flowers to its highest in Jagannatha. We will consider his thoughts in detail.

In the beginning of his work, Appayya observes that the alamkarikas have thought of three vṛttis such as abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā, to arrange for alamkāras in the kavya-mārga i.è. the path of poetry. In the first pariccheda (= chapter) he picks up abhidha for consideration. He holds that 'abhidha is apprehending meaning through śakti.': "śaktyā pratipādakatvam abhidhā." (pp. 1, Vr. V.). This is three-fold viz. rūḍhi, yoga, and yoga-rūḍhi. Appayya observes that "rudhi-abhidha is that which gives a single meaning by akhanḍa-śakti (i.e. by the whole pada), i.e. without the power of avayava or parts of a word." "akhaṇḍa-śakti-mātreņa ekárthya-pratipādakatvam rūḍhiḥ" (pp. 1, ibid). This giving of a single meaning, which is rūḍhi, is two-fold, viz. (i) by the nonmanifestation of the meaning of parts or (ii) by rejection of the apprehended meaning of parts. In the illustration viz. "yat te padámbuja-ruha." etc. the meaning of the parts - i.e. avayavártha - of the words 'mani' and 'nupura', viz. to make noise from √man, and 'to admire' from √nu + pur, is not apprehended at all, and in case of the word 'atimukta', the meaning of, "transending the mukta i.e. free" is apprehended but is not considered and therefore rejected. In

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361 both these illustrations the meaning is collected by the whole - akhanda-pada and hence it is ‘rūdhi.
After that he treats of yoga-śakti. He observes that, “the capacity to apprehend a single meaning, through the avayava-śakti i.e. power of the parts, is yoga' : "avayavaśakti-mātra-sāpekśaḥ padasya ekártha-pratipadakatvam yogah.” (pp. 2, ibid) - This yoga-śakti is also two-fold, viz. (i) the rendering of meaning by the meaning of the parts is due to the non-apprehension of the meaning of the whole, (i.e. the whole has no meaning of itself except the collected meaning of its parts), and (ii) even if the meaning of the whole is conveyed, it is not congruent with the meaning collected from parts. The first variety is illustrated by, “ūrdhvam virañciḥo..." etc., and the second by, "vastu-trayī-maya-tanus-tava.” etc. The third viz. yoga-rūdhi is explained by Appayya as - one in which one meaning is arrived at both with the help of avayava-i.e. parts and samudāya i.e. whole word, as in, “paksa-dvaya-kraśima.” etc. Here the word 'surā”laya' illustrates this variety word-meaning as a whole is ‘The mount meru', and the meaning collected through the meanings of the parts is, - "The abode of gods”, and these two taken together render the meaning of, "mount Meru, which is the abode of gods." Thus it is an illustration of "yoga-rūdhi'.
Appayya here picks up a longer discussion. The objector raises a question as follows :- In such illustrations as above, i.e. 'surā"laya', wherein if both the meanings, i.e. one derived through parts and one through whole, are found to be identical, why should we not accept here rūdhi-sakti, and why should we think of yoga-rūdhi in such cases at all ? For, if we do not accept this suggestion, there will follow the contingency of 'punar-ukti' or 'repetition'.
To this Appayya's answer is as follows :- In accepting yoga-rūdhi here, the reason is that in the meaning derived through parts in such cases, i.e. in ‘avayavártha' here, there is possibility of a suggested sense here and this avayavártha actually rests in this implied sense alone. So, when we use a pada giving the whole meaning - i.e. samudayártha-vācaka-padántara - there is no fault of repetition. For example, in the illustration, viz. "tava prasādāt kusumā”yudho’pi.” etc. in the word 'pinaka-pāni', we arrive at the apprehension of the greatness (= mahimā) of the bow called 'pināka'. The final apprehension rests in understanding this greatness of Siva's bow. So, the use of the word viz. 'hara' giving the samudāya-vācī-meaning, is not found to be faulty at all. Appayya here considers an objection also. The objection is as follows. As in ‘pināka-pāni', so also in the word 'kusumā”yudha' also, we arrive at the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA apprehension of the greatness of the weapon in form of a flower i.e. ‘kusuma'. So, why does the poet here not use another word also giving the meaning of 'cupid' or ‘kāma-deva'? The answer to this querry is that the poet has used the word 'kuryām’ i.e. 'I shall do', in the first person signgular and thereby the implied word will be ‘aham' i.e. “I” by which kāmadeva will be implied. So, its separate mention is not required. Dixita observes that this reply follows the view of some 'sāhitya-cintāmanikāra'. But Appayya further adds that there is no rule or regulation to the effect that when a poet wants to convey the implied sense with the help of the meaning of parts - avayavártha -, there must necessarily be the use of a samudāyavācī pada or a word giving the whole meaning. For example, in “manye nija-skhalana." etc., we do not see this. To support this observation Appayya quotes the view of the Ekāvalīkāra, i.e. Vidyadhara and says that, 'there is a two-fold narration such as, when there is apprehension of an implied sense, in case of a yoga-rūdha pada, which springs with the help of yaugikártha-sakti, there may or may not be the use of a samudayárthavācī-pada, or a word giving only the meaning as a whole. So, there is no rule or regulation in this respect.
After this Appayya proceeds to give such an illustration of yoga-rūdha pada in which there is no anvaya or correlation of the avayavártha i.e. meaning of parts, with reference to the subject on hand i.e. visaya-višesa. Here the apprehension rests only in the collective meaning i.e. samudāyártha alone. For example the verse, "ullāsayati.” etc. In this illustration, as with reference to the word 'amburuha', the correlation of the avayavártha viz. 'bhagavannābhi-padma' is not established, we find here only rūdhi. And in the next illustration, viz. 'kalhāra-kairava.' etc. there is no correlation with samudāyártha, and the final apprehension rests only in the avayavártha alone. The word 'pankaja' here is not correlated with the samudāyártha in form of kalhāra, kumuda, etc., and so, we see here only 'yoga'. Appayya here quotes the views of Naiyāyikas but does not give his own observation on the same.
After this, covering up the topic of abhidhā, Appayya observes that thus abhidhā is explained as three-fold. Then he picks up the topic of words having a multiple sense; i.e. 'anekártha sabda'. He holds that a word having a mutiple sense is restricted to a single meaning with the help of factors such as 'samyoga', 'viprayoga', etc. etc. He explains each abhidhā-niyāmaka with illustration in a scientific way. He observes that in case of a word having multiple sense, if the abhidhā-niyāmaka or restricting factor is seen at more than one places in a general way i.e. in ‘aviśista' form, then there is no restriction of abhidhã in any particular

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363 meaning. For example the verse, “yena dhvastamanobha .” etc. In this verse both Lord śiva and Lord Keśava are delineated as praiseworthy, the regulating factor viz., 'prakarana' or context is used in a general form i.e. not in a particular form-avisista-rūpa. So, it is advisable to accept the figure, 'ślesa' or paronomasia here. Thus both the meanings here are vācyártha i.e. expressed-sense only.
Now, Appayya discusses a point further. He observes that in cases such as quoted above (i.e. in, "yena-dhvasta. etc.") let the abhidhā power operate with reference to senses more than one; i.e. let there be a case of ślesa alamkāra. But when the meaning of regulatory factors such as prakarana etc. have a fixed sense, and even here if an out-of-context a-prākaranika-artha is conveyed, what shall we say? We know that Mammata and some others have accepted the apprehension of additional sense through vyañjanā or suggestion.
But Appayya has the following observation. He says that in instances such as "asau udayam ārūdhah.” etc., the ancients hold that here vyañjanā has to be accepted. But Appayya does not subscribe to this observation of the ancients. He says : "iti artha-dvayasya api prākaranikatvam eva, prākaranika-a-prākaraṇikarūpatve api ubhayatra abhidhā eva vyāpārah, yathokta-samabhivyāhārasya api śabdāntara-sannidhi-rūpatvena prakaranavad abhidhā niyāmakatvāt.” (pp. 12, ibid) - i.e. In instances such as, 'asau udayam ārūdhah.” etc. in case of both the contextual and non-contextual senses, the words such as rājā, kara, mandala, etc., the quality of being simultaneously cited - 'saha-uccaritatva-rūpa-dharma' is also taken as restrictor of abhidhā as in case of 'prakarana' and the like. So, both the contextual and non-contextual meanings are arrived at through abhidhā alone. Appayya further explains this by an illustration such as for example in a water can flow both in intended and unintended region. Similar is the case of abhidhā here which can give both the contextual and non-contextual meaning as well. We have seen that Jagannātha has also taken this line and elsewhere in a research paper we have indicated that Abhinavagupta in his Locana cites three views in such cases and is also inclined to favour this line of thinking.
Normally if the poet intends to convey non-contextual sense to deliver charm-camatkāra-in poetry, or when it is a case of obscene sense - 'a-ślīla-artha', there is scope for vyañjanā. But this is not so always. Hence, the regulators such as samyoga and the like, and similar other factors also should be accepted. This way even the supporters of vyañjanā also will have to accept vyañjana in such cases only.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA So, if there is abhidhā, it is very much there even with reference to the noncontextual-sense as well. If according to Mammaţa, abhidhā is a power yielding 'sakyártha', then it is there with reference to the non-contextual - ‘aprākaranika’sense as well, for this aprākaranika sense is also derived through the word alone and not through any other means. If it is said that, "abhidhā is that function, which proceeds to deliver meaning in accordance with śakti-graha' i.e. convention, then can we say that when there is apprehension of non-contextual meaning, the 'agļhīta-śakti' meaning is not through abhidhā ?” The answer is that it is through abhidhā alone.
The objector may say that, giving directly a meaning through śakti is abhidhā. If the term 'sāksāt or direct' is not accepted, then laksanā also will be called abhidhā, for the indicated sense is arrived at by the vyavadhāna - intervention - of the expressed sense through the primary power. In the same way through factors such as 'context' or 'prakarana', the meaning yielded by this factor will come first and after its intervention second meaning will be derived and thus here also it will not be a case of abhidhā. So, the objector feels that to avoid such a contingency, the term 'sākṣātrva' - directness has to be accepted. Thus if we describe abhidh, as 'sāksāt pratipadakatva' - conveying a meaning directly, - then only laksaņā and also abhidhā with reference to the non-contextual sense, both will be negated. Thus, we have to accept that the non-contextual meaning is arrived at through vyañjanā or the power of suggestion alone.
To this Appayya says that the objection of the objector, as well as its refutation, both are uncalled for here. In fact by the adjective viz. "sāksātva", further difficulty will be created. The definition viz. "tad-visaya-saktigraham apeksya tatpratipādanam abhidhā" - is sufficient even in the absence of the term, "saksātrva". For, there will be gaurava-dosa in taking this term viz. 'sākṣātrva', in such cases as when there is 'padántara-višeşa’ accepted due to 'pada-višeșa' or 'pada-bhanga', especially when no obstruction i.e. vyavadhāna is caused in form of apprehension of another meaning. On the other hand, by accepting this višeșaņa i.e. 'sākṣātrva, there will be a-vyāpti-dosa in illustrations such as "yena dhvasta-manobhavena." etc., for here the contextual meaning is with reference to Vişnu and the noncontextual meaning is with reference to Siva. The words used in this verse are
usly expressive of the meaning with reference to Lord Siva. The apprehension to this effect is also faster, though the meaning with reference to Lord Siva is noncontextual. The visnu-paraka meaning, though contextual, is arrived at in an asphuta - indirect-way. The terms such as "sašimacchirohara" and "andhaka-ksaya

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Śabdavșttis the nature of : Abhidhā kara", which make for the apprehension of meaning with reference to Visnu, are charged with defects such as 'a-prayuktatva', and 'nihatártharva'. So, when these words are 'a-prasiddha' with reference to meaning connected with Vişnu, this meaning is derived late - So, if we accept abhidhā with reference to the contextual meaning connected with Visnu here, due to its lateness, the adjective viz. 'sāksāttva' will be out of tune here, and the definition of abhidhā will therefore tend to be too narrow i.e. 'a-vyāpta'. .
Take the case of a particular 'pada' i.e. word. Now, looking at the context, there may be a meaning which is contextual and another meaning which is noncontextual. But here, it may happen that a particular meaning which is noncontextual for the present, may actually be more current in daily affairs. So, this meaning will flash first in the mind and therefore it will be arrived at by abhidhā. The contextual meaning which is less current will be the subject of vyañjanā. It is exactly for such a case, that the ālamkārikas have accepted the blemish called ‘nihatártha' when a word having more than one sense is used in a non-current sense. Now, if through prakarana or context, a non-current meaning is also accepted, then there will not remain any reason to accept ‘nihatārtha dosa' whatsoever. So, this amounts to the fact, observes Appayya that, whether the more current meaning is contextual or otherwise, its apprehension always comes first, and this fact has to be accepted. Again there will be 'vyavadhāna' i.e. obstruction by the first apprehension of the more current but non-contextual sense in the apprehension of less-current contextual sense. Thus, the adjective “sākṣātrva” does not stand a chance of being fitted in the definition of abhidhā.
So, for Appayya, the real reason of vrtti-bheda, i.e. difference in function, lies in dharma-bhada i.e. difference in the fact of the proximity or otherwise of the words that are useful in giving a meaning. The idea is that we either get abhidhā or laksaņā depending on the fact of there being proximity or otherwise which is of the form of usage due to sequence of words having multiple sense in a single statement. We cannot decide upon the difference in vrtti or function without taking into account the above factor. The net conclusion is that we will accept abhidhā where padas, which are sabda-viśista are present and are in proximity. Here the apprehension of meaning could be either direct or indirect i.e. vyavahita. Where there is proximity of such words that are sabdártha-sambandha-visista, we have to accept laksaņā. So, the definition of abhidhā viz. "tad-vișayaka-sakti-graham apeksya, tat-pratipadakatvam abhidhā" is the right definition, and thus even the non-contextual meaning also will be collected by abhidhā.

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According to the Naiyāyikas, 'prakarana' i.e. context and the like are not the limiting factors of abhidhā, because even in their absence, due to the strength of currency (i.e. prasiddhi), the non-contextual meaning is also apprehended and in the absence of the said 'prasiddhi' i.e. currency, even the contextual meaning is also not remembered. Thus only the expertness (pațutā) of the samskāras i.e. impressions of the sakti-graha or convention, is the sole limiting factor of abhidhā. We have to accept, however, this much that 'samyoga' and the like, also help the cause of apprehending the meaning, only in form of 'linga' or mark.
Thus, Appayya concludes that the presence or otherwise of 'prakaranā"di' i.e. context and the like, can not be the limiting factors - 'niyāmaka' - of abhidhā. So, when both contextual and non-contextual meanings are present, the apprehension of the expressed sense is solely due to abhidhā. - "tasmāt prastutáprastutobhayapare’pi prastutaprastutobhaya-vācyārthe abhidhā eva." - (pp. 43, ibid). In both the cases, whatever sense is conveyed through words, with the help of expectancy - ākāńksā etc., we arrive at the apprehension of sentence-sense, be they contextual or otherwise. Vyañjanā should be accepted for the apprehension of word-sense or sentence-sence, only in case of non-contextual subject. Dixita is very clear here that when the ancients accept vyañjanā in illustrations such as, “asau udayam ārūdhaḥ..." etc. it is only with reference to the figure 'upamā' which is suggested by comparision of the contextual and non-contextual matter.
Now, the problem arises that what shall we do about sabda-sakti-mūla-vastudhvani ? There is no suggestion of any figure of speech here. Only the non-contextual meaning is accepted as vastu-dhvani or suggested idea, or matter. So, if this is the position, then shall we have to totally let go śabda-sakti-mūla-vastu-dhvani, where according to Dixita, even the non-contextual meaning is collected through abhidhā alone ? Appayya's answer to this is that even here, both the non-contextual and contextual senses are arrived at through abhidhā alone, but after that some implied fact - anabhidheya vastu - flashes forth which becomes the subject of dhvani, e.g. in the verse, “sanih aśaniś ca..." etc. For Dixita, Mammaţa's observation that the verse, "bhramim aratim..." etc. is an illustration of sabda-sakti mūla-dhvani is not sound. It is only 'praudhivada' i.e. bold assertion. In reality, even in that illustration, the noncontextual meaning is arrived at through abhidhā alone. Thus through a sound scientific discussion Appayya has widened the scope of abhidhā so as to cover even a non-contextual sense also, and this is accepted by Jagannātha also.
We have seen above, when we took up the discussion of the views of Jagannātha who for us is a mahā siddhānts that Appayya's all the three definitions

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śabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidhā
367 of the three varieties of abhidhā are ably challanged and refuted by Jagannātha. (pp. 442, onwards)
Dr. Prof. Bhagavatiprasad Pandya (Ahmedabad) who worked on Appayya Dixita for his doctoral thesis (“Appayya Dixita, Kavi ane Alamkārika" (in Gujarati), pub. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, '74), under the supervision of our great alamkāra-guru Prof. R. B. Athavale who has produced in three volumes, - including the first volume comprising of the bio-data of Jagannātha and the critical appreciation of the R.G. in both Marathi and Gujarati, - has tried to defend Appaya's observations on abhidhā against J.'s attack. The substance of the defence is as under. (Ref. pp. 196, ibid) - Jagannātha had pointed out the belmish, called ātmā"śraya or asangati in Appayya's definition. But Appayya's observation can be defended if we explain his definition as below. We have to take the meaning of the term 'sakryā' in Appayya's definition as “sakti of sanketa”. If śakti called abhidhā takes the help of this sanketa-sakti then only a special meaning can be directly apprehended from a special word; and not otherwise. So, if by 'śaktyā' we mean 'sanketa-śaktyä' then the blemish of ātmā”śraya or asangati as pointed out by Jagannātha will have no chance ! Thus, no 'sva-skandhā”rohana' will take place. Of course, there is verbal gimmick in this defence, but then it does not cease to be convincing either.
Dr. Pandya has tried to defend Appayya in one more context also (pp. 199, ibid). He observes that Jagannātha has enumerated a fourth variety of a word such as "yaugika rūdha”, which is not directly mentioned by Appayya. But then the latter, could have accomodated it under either 'rūdha' or yaugika' variety. Jagannātha has given the word 'aśvagandhā' as an illustration. Appayya has also cited a word such as 'niśānta' which means grha or house as its rūdha meaning and which has the sense of 'end of night as its yaugika sense. But he has not called it 'yaugika-rūdha' by name, for here both the meanings are not simultaneously apprehended. Thus, Dr. Pandya argues that eventhough Appayya knows the fourth variety of 'yaugika, rūdha' he did not enumerate it for want of justification. One and the same word, say, 'niśānta' here or 'ašvagandha' there, can be taken either as rūdha or yaugika as the context permits, and because both the meanings are not simultaneously apprehended no fourth variety should be considered. This is how Dr. Pandya justifies Appayya's three-fold scheme. We may not find it that convincing.
Thus we have tried to sketch the full graph of ‘abhidhā'. We have seen how the original concept was inherited from the śāstras such as the Vyākarana, Mimamsā, and Nyāya. We have seen how various disciplines tried to fix 'samketa' at various

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA places and how ultimately the ālamkārikas opted for the four-fold convention with reference to the attributes such as jāti, or class, guna or quality etc. Thus the ālamkārikas followed the dictates as laid down by the grammarians. We also saw how Anandavardhana and then Abhinavagupta, followed by the whole kashmir school of alamkārikas beginning with Mammata down to Jagannātha tried to evolve the nature and scope of abhidhā and portrayed it as distinct from either gauni and laksaņā on one side, or vyañjanā on the other. But we also observed in between how some successors of Anandavardhana such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā and Dhananjaya tried to evolve a wider concept of abhidhā so as to include laksanā, and/or even vyañjana in its fold. All this makes a very interesting reading which is a glorious chapter not only in semantics as discussed in India but also in the subject as expounded even in the west, even to-day.

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Chapter VI "Tātparya"
General Introduction :
Some thinkers feel that through abhidha we arrive at the primary meaning of a word. Thus abhidha is a word-power, a śabda-śakti. It is capable of yielding individual meaning of an individual word or 'pada'. But this abhidhā power can not give us the sentence-sense which is of the form of correlated meaning of all individual word-meanings in a given sentence. The sentence-sense is thus a total sense as against individual word-sense derived from words that are independent units having individual meaning not related to each other. So, according to these thinkers to arrive at this total sense of a statement, i.e. 'vākyártha' a separate function - vrtti or sakti of the sentence-unit has to be considered. This is named as tätparya-sakti or vakya-śakti, purport, which is supposed to deliver the sentencesense, which is a correlated sense of individual words that give individual meanings - i.e. padártha-through abhidha or vācaka-śakti which is thus a pada-sakti. The tātparya-vṛtti, which is supposed to be a vakya-vṛrtti thus gives the total meaning of a given statement and some thinkers suggest that it not merely a sum total of individual padas only, not just a 'samudaya' of 'padárthas', but is something specialviśista-over and above that. We will examine the concept of tatparya first in its historical context, i.e. how its separate recognition evolved in the thinking of various schools of thought such as the Vaiyakaraṇas, Mimāmsakas, Naiyāyikas etc. and then how this topic was handled by the alamkārikas.
It is clear by now that tatparya sakti is supposed to be that power which assimilates the sense given by abhidha and renders a new meaning-abhinavártha "> which is not just the assimilation of vacyártha, i.e. not 'yoga-matra', but is something unique - "a-padártho'pi vakyárthaḥ" as Mammața explains later. The Dhvanivādins have termed it as "tātparya-vṛtti". We will go to see that in this

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370
SAHRDAYĀLOKA observation of the Dhvanivādins, we may be able to read the influence of the abhihitánvaya-vāda of Kumārila Bhatta. It may be noted at the outset that, though Kumārila recommends a separate function for sentence-sense i.e. vākyártha, as something different from and independent of abhidhā, which is a word-power, we do not get the clear mentioning of 'tātparya-vstti' by name, in the Mīmāmsā works till we come to Mimāmsā-Kaustubha of Khandadeva in the 13th or 14th Cen. A.D. (Ref. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja)
Vākya-; its import : First, we will discuss the nature of a sentence or vākya and then its import. (courtesy, Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja)
The sole purpose of the use of language is expression of thoughts, which is carried out best through the medium of sentence as such and not just by means of individual words. So a sentence is the real unit of significant speech. An idea resting in mind becomes definite only when expressed in form of a sentence. Thought in language will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in a coherent combination of words, called sentence, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. The Naiyāyikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions. A logical proporition is, to all appearance, a sentence i.e. a combination of words connected together by mutual relation. Jagadīša explains that the so-called verbal cognition i.e. śābda-bodha is derivable only from a sentence, that is to say, when a number of significant words - (sārthaka) having expectancy akānksā, and compatibility - yogyatā-with one another are related so as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term :
“vākyabhāvam avāptasya sārthakasyávabodhanaḥ sampadyate śābda-bodho
na tanmātrasya bodhataḥ.” - (ś. ś. pra. 32) So, a logical proposition as an idea or judgement is expressed in form of a sentence. However, it should be carefully noted that the meaning of a sentence which follows from it as a whole, should be distinguished from that of its constitutent parts. Jagadisa notes that verbal cognition or sābda-bodha is not materially the same as sabdártha or the meaning of isolated words. The meaning of a sentence is something more than the mere sum total of the significations of component parts - 'vilaksaņo bodhaḥ’ - (ś. ś. pra. 32)

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"Tātparya"
371 Vākya; definition - Before we discuss various views as per the import of a sentence, we will first try to understand the definition of a sentence. Patañjali is of the opinion that action - ākhyāta-along with the help of all or each of the following viz. an indeclinable, i.e. avyaya, kāraka and visesana or adjective makes for a sentence : "Whyātam sá-vyaya-kāraka-višesanam vākyam." - M. bh. II. i. 9 - He observes - (pp. 367 Edn. Keilhorn, Vol. I. '62, third Edn. Abhyankar) - ākhyātam sávyayam sa-kārakam sa-kāraka-visesanam vākya-samjñam bhavati iti vaktavyam. savyayam, ucсaih pathati, nicaih pathati. sa-kārakam odanam pacati. sa-kārakavićeşanam-odanam mrdu-visadam pacati. sa-kriyāvišesanam ceti vaktavyam. susthu pacati dustu pacati." etc. - A kriyāvišeşana i.e. an adverb is also included herein - sa-kriyāvisesanam ca (ibid, pp. 367). Just action, aided by a višesana alone can also make for a sentence - ākhyatam sa-višesanam. At times a sentence is of the nature of an action alone - "ekatin” (mbh. II. i. i., pp. 367). The grammarians hold that the pada-padámía aspect of a vākya is ultimately illusory; they accept the sentence-whole as a single unit and give us the concept of vākya-sphota. See Punyarāja on V.P. - "tad asmān manyāmahe padāni asatyāni ekam abhinnasvabhāvakam vākyam. tad abudha-bodhanāya pada-vibhāgah kalpitah iti. - For the Naiyāyikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy :
“mithaḥ sā”kānksa-sabdasya
vyūho vākyam caturvidham.” ś. ś pra. 13 We know that later, ālamkārika Visvanātha defines sentence as collection of words having expectancy, compatibility and proximity -
"vākyam syāt yogyatā”kānkṣā"sattiyuktaḥ
padoccayaḥ.” S.D. II. i. ab. - We will discuss the views of the alamkārikas later.
In the vedas we come across only consolidated sentences i.e. sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The Taittirīya Samhitā supports this - "vāg vai parāci avyākrtā." The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of samhitā or emphonic combination of letters as we find in the Rk-prātiśākhya : “padaprakstiḥ samhitā." It is said that the samhitā or the close combination of letters such as, “agnim lle" - is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up i.e. into ‘agnim' and "lle", shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum - 'pada-prakrtih samhita' gave rise to a great controversy. The Mimāmsakas i.e. the padavādins, and the Vaiyākaranas or Vākyavādins have explained it in different ways. The Padavādins take padas as real and

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA significant and for them the sentence is only a combination of such padas i.e. inflected words. They explain the compound ‘pada-praksti” as ‘padāni prakrtiḥ yasyāḥ' i.e. samhitā which has ‘padas as its original nature', and thus they try to prove the priority or being a source' - prakrtitva - of the padas or words. The Vākyavādins explain it as "padānām prakrtih" i.e. samhitā is the original source or original form of padas or words which have no real existence. Thus they take the sentence, or say, Vākya-sphoța to be the only significatory unit of speech. They simply reject the concept of the precedence or priority of the padas in preference to that of a sentence. It is difficult for us to say, which interpretation is more acceptable or which one was earlier. We may humbly add that if 'padas' have no real existence, how can a vākya—their prakrti-have any existence at all ? We know that Durgācārya on Nirukta I. 17 observes : "samhitāyāḥ prakstitvam jyāyaḥ. mantro samhitayaiva abhivyajyate, na padaiḥ. ataś ca samhitām eva pūrvam adhyāyanti anūcānā brāhmaṇā adhīyate cádhyetāraḥ. api ca yājñe karmani samhitayaiva viniyujyante mantrāḥ na padaih." Thus it is emphasized that the mantras, as they were revealed through the holy seers of yore, manifested themselves in the compact form of the samhitā or combination and not in form of isolated words. The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the vedas in their samhitā form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing vedic rites, the priest cites the mantra in their consolidated-samhita-form only. Now, can we think of word and sentence absolutely divorced from the said ritual ? What about those who have a complete disregard for vedic samhitā and ritual ? Can we think of this topic independently of the ritual context ?
Grammarians : They attach much importance to vākya-sphota as the really significant element of speech. Thus the sphoța-vādins are the same as vākya-vādins. The author of the Sabda-kaustubha says that of the eight varieties of sphoța, only vākya-sphoța is accepted to be real and significant : "yady api iha astau paksāḥ uktāḥ, tathā’pi vākya-sphoța-pakse tātparyam grantha-krtām” - (Sabda-kaustabha.) So, for the sphoțavādin the sentence is an indivisible unit - akhanda - and analytical method of grammar that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people. - The V.P. II. 240, observes -
"upāyāḥ śiksamāņānām bālānām apalāpanāḥ, asatye vartmani sthitva
tataḥ satyam samīhate.” (II. 238 (pp. 19 appendix) in word-indext to V.P. - Saroja Bhate)

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"Tātparya"
373 Punyarāja on V.P. II. 57 observes : "tasmān manyāmahe padāni asatyāni, ekam
bhāvakam vākyam. tad abudha-bodhanaya pada-vibhāgah kalpitah.” Punyaraāja also holds that this view is shared even by Pāṇini and Patañjali : “evam sūtrakārasya bhāsyakārasya ca akhanda-pakso'bhirucitah.” - on V.P. II. 37. So, “padāni asatyāni vākyam eva satyam iti arthah” notes Punyarāja on V.P. I. 174. Bhartrhari establishes this view very emphatically. He uses such vedantic terms as upādhi or attribute, and adhyāsa or superimposition to explain the cognition of the diversity of words in the unity of a sentence. Punyarāja observes : "upādhibhedena eva bheda-pratibhāso, na svato nityatvāt.” on V.P. II. 228 See also: abhijanyatvam adhyāsarūparvam āgatah sabdah-Punyarāja on V.P. II. 129a. For Bhartrhari the 'akhanda' is real, and the divisible - khanda is unreal i.e. a-satya. The grammarians enter into the investigation of the nature of words, but they reach the supreme truth : "asatye vartmani sthitvā tatah satyam samīhate.” (quoted as above). It is thus said as letters like vk, kh, etc. do not admit of further division into parts so there are no parts in a word, and words have no separate existence apart from a sentence :
"pade na varnā vidyante varņeșu avayavā iva, vākyāt padānām atyantam
praviveko no kaścana.” - V.P. I. 173. Again, just as we have recourse to an unnatural thing like the practice of analysing a word into stem (prakrti) and affixes or formative elements (pratyaya), in the same way, we disjoin the words from the sentence in pursuance of the principle of 'apoddhāra' i.e. disintegration :
yathā pade vibhakşyante praksti-pratyayā"dayaḥ, apoddhāras tathā vākye
padānām upavarnyate." - V.P. II. 10. It is also stated that the sense conveyed by a sentence is also indivisible : "vākyasya arthasya api tathaiva nirvibhāgatvam pratipādayitum äha... Punyarāja on V.P. II. 10. Just as a word (śabda-sphota) or a sentence does not really consist of any parts, so the meaning conveyed by it does not admit of any division :
"sabdasya na vibhāgósti kutórthasya bhavisyati ? vibhāgaiḥ prakriyābhedam a-vidvān pratipadyate.” V.P. II. 13

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
What is emphasised here in particular by the Vakyavādin is that words which seem to enter into the composition of a sentence do not retain their separate identity, either in their formal or material aspect. The meaning of each individual word is found to lose itself almost entirely in the sense that is finally expressed by the sentence in its harmoneous unity, e.g. the word 'Brahmana' has no separate meaning in the expression Brāhmaṇa-kambala :
"brahmaṇártho yatha násti
kaścid brāhamaṇa-kambale
devadattā”dayo vakye
tathaiva syur anarthakāḥ." V.P. II. 14
Again we may beg to differ. If "brāhmaṇa" has no separate meaning in "brāhmaṇa-kambala", then it should have an indentical meaning with either a "vaiśya-kambala" or a "śūdra-kambala" etc. But this is not so.
374
What is Väkyártha ? As to the nature of Vākyārtha we read different views (Ref. Dr. Kapil Dev Dwivedi; 'Artha-vijñāna', quoting Jayanta Bhatta. This again is quoted by Dr. Bholashanker Vyas). The views are -
(i) The sense of a sentence is 'jñāna'.
(ii) The vakyártha is 'kriya' or action, which is the most important element in
a statement.
(iii) The vakyártha is 'phala' - result or fruit as we perform any action with a view to some 'phala'.
(iv) The vakyártha is 'purușa' (i.e. īśvara) for the 'phala' of an action is directed towards him.
(v) The vakyártha is 'bhavana' i.e. the activity or vyāpāra of the kartā, the doer, or agent, with reference to some desired object such as heaven/'svarga'.
(vi) The vakyártha is śabda-bhāvanā or vidhi.
(vii) The vakyártha is 'niyoga' or preraṇā.
(viii) The vakyártha is 'udyoga'.
(ix) The vakyártha is 'pratibha'.
The Naiyayikas hold phala to be the Vakyártha while the Vaiyakaraṇas believe it to be pratibha or intution. We may assume that, as is normally the case elsewhere, in this respect also the ālamkarikas follow the lead of the Vaiyakaranas and accept 'pratibha' to be 'väkyártha'.

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"Tātparya"
375
Thus for the grammarians the meaning expressed by a sentence is pratibha or intuition, which is innate or ingrained in all of us: "tatra akhanda-pakṣe pratibhā väkyárthaḥ." - observes Punyarāja on V.P. II. i. This pratibha is inborn and not postnatal; it is neither a sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience. It is termed as 'samskāra' or 'bhāvanā', firmly seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Thus it is termed as pūrvavāsanā also. The Vaiyakaraṇa has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of 'pratibha'.
So, ultimately it comes to this that what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (bauddhárthasya vācyatvam). Words may have different meanings and they may be taken individually, but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the padárthas or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called pratibha or intuition :
"viccheda-grahaṇérthānām pratibha'nyaiva jāyate, vākyártha iti tām āhuḥ
padárthair upapaditam." V.P. II. 145
According to Punyarāja, the padárthas, unreal in themselves, help in the manifestation of pratibha. : "padair asatyair eva upadhibhūtair upapāditām abhivyaktām iti." on V.P. II. 145. According to Bhartṛhari the first thing that pratibhā achieves is to bring about an association of the meanings which seem to be otherwise unconnected - 'asamsṛsta' It is this objective (visaya) that is directly conveyed by a sentence :
-
"upaśleṣam iva arthānām sā karoti avicāritā, sārva-rūpam iva āpannā
viṣayatvena vartate." V.P. II. 147.
This pratibha is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of previous lives:
"sākṣāt sabdena janitām bhāvanā'nugamena vā
iti kartavyatāyām tām
na kaścid ativartate." V.P. II. 148

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Pratibhā is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable evidence determining the ultimate reason for one's particular inclination (pravstti) :
"pramānatvena tām lokah
sarvaḥ samanupaśyati.” V.P. II. 149 It is seen in the human beings as well as in all creatures alike :
"samārambhāh pratīyante
tiraścām api tādịśāt.” V.P. II. 14 cd. The swan, the moment it comes out of its egg, begins to swim, the younger-one of a monkey clings to the branch of a tree and the newly born babe sucks its mother. Thus, the existence of pratibhā is self-certifying. It flashes upon a being as an intellectual heritage by the force of abhyāsa i.e. practice, experienced in the long chain of previous cycles of births : Punyarāja observes - "janmántarábhyāsa-hetukā iyam” - on V.P. II. 149. The cuckoo pours its music in the spring, the birds build their nests, and their simple mode of dancing, jumping, amusement, jealousy, and the very manner of their collecting food etc. are inborn with them, and all this is due to pratibhā, according to Bhartrhari :
"svaravsttim vikurute madhau pumskokilasya kah, jantv ādayah kulāyā”dikarane kena śikṣitāḥ." - II. 151, āhāra-prīty-abhidveșaplavanā"di-kriyāsu kaḥ, jātyanvaya-prasiddhāsu
prayoktā mrga-paksinām." - II. 152 Thus, pratibhā actually means the same as instinct. Bharthari concludes that the use of words rouses this innate intelligence : Punyarāja observes : - "pratibhāyāś ca sabda eva mülam iti äha." and also -
“bhāvanánugatād etad āgamād eva jāyate, āsatti-viprakarsābhyām āgamas tu viśisyate.” V.P. II. 53

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"Tātparya"
377 This pratibhā again, is six-fold, as arising from nature, exercise, repeated practice, concentration of mind, actions done in previous lives and special efficiency or aptitude :
"svabhāva-acarana-abhyāsayogāt drstā upapāditā, viśistopahitā ceti
pratibhām șadvidhām viduḥ.” V.P. II. 54 It is really difficult to define precisely a sentence. From the logical point of view, it is not mereby a group of words as Jagadīša remarks rightly. The words that constitute a sentence should be having ākānksā/expectancy, yogyatā/compatibility and asatti or sannidhi i.e. proximity. These are indespensable for the making of a sentence. Proximity pertains to the formal closeness of words and has very little to do with meaning. Expectancy and Compatibility refer, on the other hand, to the logical aspect i.e. consistent correlation of meaning: The Laghumañjusā (pp. 497) observes : "ayam arthórthántara-sākānksa iti vyavahārāt.” Āsatti or sannidhi implies the extreme proximity of words, without which the very idea of combination becomes impossible - The S.D. of Viśvanātha puts it in this way : (S.D. II. I. vịtti) - "yogyatā padárthānām paraspara-sambandhe badhábhāvaḥ. padoccayasya tad abhāvépi vākyatve, ‘agninā’ siñcati” ity ady api vākyam syāt. ākānksā pratītiparyavasāna-virahaḥ. sa ca śrotur jijñāsārūpaḥ. nirākānkşasya vākyatve, 'gaur aśvah puruso hastī-ity adīnām api vākyatvam syāt. āsattih buddhyavacchedah buddhi-vicchede’pi vākyatve idānīm uccaritasya devadatta-śabdasya, dinántoccaritena gacchati iti padena sangatiḥ syāt. atra ākānksā-yogyatayor ātmárthadharmatve'pi padoccaya-dharmatvam upacārāt.” Thus, a mere combination, i.e. inconsistent group of words, whether subanta or tinganta, is not competent to be a sentence : "sup-tin-cayo naivam, ativyāptā"di doşatah” - observes ś. ś. pra. pp. 13.
This is why Jagadīša rejects the definition given by Amarasimha as ativyāpta and avyāpta or too-wide and too-narrow. There is some peculiarity in the logical conception of a sentence. Sometimes, a single inflected word (pada) is as good as a sentence. To the Naiyāyikas, the form 'ghatam' is as good as a sentence, as it conveys karmatva, or the status of being an object, pertaining to a pot : 'ghatavrtti-karmatva'. Thus, according to this view, ghatam karoti' should therefore be regarded as a mahāvākya or a compound-sentence.
Mīmāmsakas : According to the Mimāmsakas, a sentence is a combination of words, with oneness of sense : "arthaikatvād ekam vākyam, sākānksam ced

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA vibhāge syāt." - Mi. Sū. II. 146 and also see SB. on Mi. Sū. II. 146 - "ekárthah padasamūhah vākyam.” Here, oneness of sense is an important condition. It implies that a sentence in its synthetical form yields only one sense or a single idea, though on analysis it is found to be made up of words that are mutually expectant : V.P. II. 4 observes :
"sākānksávayavam bhede paránākānkşa-sabdakam, karma-pradhānam gunavad
ekártham vākyam ucyate.” A combination of words, though capable of being split up into many significant parts, is considered by the Mimāmsakas as a single sentence, provided it is found to express only one connected idea. Not only is there a formal combination, but the meanings too are related to one another in such a way to produce one coherent idea resulting from the association of the meanings. The dictum that a sentence signifies either difference or association does not render the oneness of the meaning inconsistent, because a sentence as a whole is generally used for the purpose of conveying an idea that is complete in itself. : See SB. on Mi. Sū. II. i. 45, - "bhedah samsargo vā vākyārtha iti yad ucyate." - The Mimāmsakas attach the greatest importance to the verbal form i.e. 'kriyā-pada' in a sentence. So, according to them, the verb 'yajeta' is the most predominant element in the sentence viz. 'svargakāmo yajeta", in as much as the force of the object of the whole sentence i.e. 'attainment of heaven', is particularly determined by the verb. 'Apūrva' or the unseen result, to which the action ultimately leads, is said to be conveyed by the verb and not by any other word in the sentence : Read SB. on Mi. Sū. II. i. 4, - "tasmāt tebhyah pratiyeta aścitarvāt prayogasya." and also, “apūrvasya ākhyātapada-pratipădyatvam", and also - "bhāva-sabdā eva apūrvasya codakāh." - SB. ibid. Constitution of a sentence :
Different Views :
We come across a number of views with reference to the constitution of a sentence as noted down by Bhartrhari in the V.P. Nearly eight views are counted by him.
"ākhyātam-sabdasamghāto jātiḥ samghāta-vartinī, ekonavayavah sabdah

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379 kramo buddhyanusamhștiḥ. padam adyam, prthak, sarvampadam sā”kānksam (sápeksam) ity api, vākyam prati matir bhinnā
bahudhā nyāyavādinām.” - V.P. II., 1-2, (nyāya-darsinām) From the point of view of linguistic studies, the first view is of great importance. It is - "ākhyātaśabdo vākhyam iti.” -
"ākhyātaśabde niyatam sādhanam yatra gamyate, tad apy ekam samāpty artham
vākyam iti abhidhīyate.” - V.P. II. 327 It is said here that a verbal form - ākhyātaśabda is alone sufficient to constitute a sentence. This will remind us of the vārtika that defines a sentence as "tin anta" or verbal form - eka tin. The verb 'varșati' may be used with the same significance as that expressed by “varşati devo jalam”, - both the subject and object being understood from the very association of ideas. So, according to this view, the essence of a sentence is necessarily action i.e. ‘kriya'. Punyarāja observes on V.P. II. 1, - "ākhyātaśabdo vākyam iti pakşe, kriyā vākyárthah.” The definition enunciated by the vārtika-kāra has also put emphasis on the predominance of the verb : Vārtika-9 on pā. II. i. i. reads : "ākhyātam sávyaya-kāraka-visesanam vākyam.” For Kātyāyana, a verb is efficient enough to constitute a sentence in combination with either an indeclinable, a kāraka, an adjective or an adverb, as the case may be, e.g. ‘uccaiḥ pathati', where 'uccaih' is an indeclinable, i.e. avyaya. In ‘odanam pacati', ‘odanam' is a kāraka, etc. Those who look upon indeclinables, cases (= kārakas), and adverbs, as virtually the same as qualifying adjuncts in relation to the verb, are likely to reduce the above definition to a much simipler form such as that a verb with its possible adjuncts is competent enough to make a sentence : "apara āhaakhyātam sa-višeṣaṇam iti eva. sarvāṇi hi etāni kriya-viśesaņam iti eva. sarvāṇi hi etāni kriyā-visesanāni. - Mbn. on Vārtika 9, (cited as above). (pp. 367, Vol. I. The Vyākarana Mahābhāsya of Patañjali Edn. Keilhorn; third Edn. Abhyankar K.V. '62, Poona). The next vārtika says that a sentence is just 'tin-anta' or 'eka-tin'. : “ekatin vākya-samjñam bhavati iti vaktavyam. brūhi, brūhi” - (pp. 367, ibid). These two vārtikas lead to the assumption that a sentence should contain one and only one verb. But if there are more than one verb in a sentence, e.g. - 'pūrvam snāti, pacati,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA tato vrajati.', we find it difficult to determine whether it is a single sentence or a number of sentences put together. The V.P. II. 6 observes : :
"yathanekam api kvāntam tingantasya višesakam, tathā tin-antam tatrā"hus
tinantasya višesakam." - (V.P. II. 6) Following the second vārtika, we will find herein, at least three sentences as constituted by different verbs. But the śāstrakāra does not accept it. According to him vrajati' is the main verb with which the sense is completed and the rest are only subordinate to it, or are just qualifying attributes of the same-Punyarāja on V.P. II. 6 observes: “násti atra vākyabhedah, 'vrajati' iti etat prādhānyena ekam kriyāpadam atra sthitam anyāni kriyántarāņi tin-viśesaņāni eva., see also - “bahusvapi tin-anteșu, sākāńkseșu ekavākyatā.” V.P. II. 450.
For others, the full import of a sentence lies in the inflected word i.e. pada. Not only the verbal form as seen above, but also an inflected word is found capable of receiving the designation of a sentence, provided it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root : V. P. II. 326 observes -
"vākyam tad api manyante yatpadam carita-kriyam, antarena kriyāśabdam
vāky āder dvitva-darśanāt.” We find certain sentences in which, some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature, as to denote the entire meaning by themselves, without the help of others. The meaning of the sentence, "gāyako gāyati", can be collected by a single word, “gāyakah” the verbal form 'gāyati' being unnecessary. Only in such cases, a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But, so far as the grammatical conception of a sentence is concerned, one can not just do away with 'vyāpāra' i.e. action. We can easily notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (i.e. either a nāma or an ākhyāta), or a combination of words, must be, as a rule, indicative of some action, either expressed directly, or understood. To the grammarian, a sentence without a verb is an impossibility,

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381 The Naiyāyikas, however, have a different idea. Jagadīša maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion of a verb. It is not necessary that the verb should be explicitly mentioned, especially when kriyā i.e. action is easily understood from the context. So, Jagadīša rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no sentence, without a verb - Read Sa. śa. pra. on Kā. 13 - "kriyārahitam na vākyam asti iti prācām pravādo niryuktikatvāt a-śraddheyah." - Jagadīša bases his contention on popular usage, such as, "kuto bhavan ?". This is an instance which is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet it is a perfect sentence. So, it is not correct to say, observes Jagadīša, that a sentence without a verb is
ractically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein also, a verb viz. "agacchati", is implied and without it neither the sense is complete nor is the proper kāraka (i.e. apādāna) determinable.
We have noticed that Bharthari has referred to as many as eight different views on the constitution of a sentence. These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories viz. akhanda-paksa and khanda-paksa. The sphotavādins, who take the sentence as an indivisible unit, support the akhanda-paksa, and the Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas, who take the sentence to be a combination of wordunits, favour the latter view, i.e. khanda-paksa.
Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja (ref. Indian Theories of Meaning, Edn. '69) observes (pp. 6, 7, ibid) : “In Indian thought, we find two main approaches to the study of the problem of meaning; the 'khanda-paksa', and the ‘akhanda-paksa', which are roughly analogous to the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology. According to the Khanda-pakşa, or the analytical method, a word is considered as an autonomous unit of thought and sense, and language studies are made on the basis of words, and the sentence is taken to be a concatenation of words. In the early stages of liuguistic studies in India, as elsewhere, attention is found focused on individual words and their isolated meanings; the idea that an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is generally current in all schools of Indian Philosophy in ancient times, and in the case of nouns the word is taken as a 'name' of the 'thing'. Thus, the regular philosophic term for a 'thing' viz. 'padārtha' is literally 'the meaning of a word, that which a word means.' (J. Borough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', TPS. 1953, p. 163) - The Sanskrit term 'nāma-rūpa' which stands for the world of things also suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes, and that the name and shape constitute the essence of a

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA thing. The Nyāya-sūtras discuss the nature of the individual words only : The discussions about the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence are found only in later Nyāya-Vaiśesika works. Grammarians like Pāṇini, Kāryāyana and Patañjati are mainly concerned with the derivation of the correct forms of words; and Yaska and his followers deal with the etymological study of wordmeanings. It is the Mīmāmsā school that started a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate canons of interpretation (Hence Mimāmsā is called the Vākyaśāstra. - ft. n. 1, pp. 7); but even this study was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings, and consequently, the relationship between word and sentence, between word-meaning and sentence-meaning, remained a central problem.”
We have observed above, that to the sphoțavādin, sphota represents the real word, i.e. the eternal word, sound being only a quality of it. Punyarāja observes : (on V.P. II. 1) - "sphotah sabdah, dhvanih sabda-gunah, iti." Sphota is two-fold, viz. external and internal - "sphotaś ca dvividhah; bāhyah ābhyantaraś ca” - observes Punyarāja on V.P. II. 1. The external sphota admits of further division into class and individual : "bāhyópi jāti-vyakti-bhedena dvividhah." Those who support the indivisibility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class - jāti-sphota-pertaining to a combination-samghāta-vartini-, or an individualvyakti-sphota-, that is to say that a sentence is one without parts - 'eko’navayavah' - or an intellectual assimilation - "buddhy-anusamhștih”. Punyarāja on V.P. II. 1 observes : "tatra akhandapakse jātiḥ samghāta-vartinī, ekonavayavaḥ śabdaḥ buddhy-anusamhștih iti trīņi laksanāni.” These three definitions according to the sphoța-vādins are duly noticed and explained by Bhartphari. According to sphoțavāda, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts. - "evam nir-amsam eva vākyam vācakam iti eva yuktam.”, observes Punyarāja on V.P. II. 12. It represents esther vyakti-sphoța or jātisphoța, i.e. an individual or a class, in so for as the outward manifestation of sphoța is concerned. The formal difference seen in these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to upādhi viz. the operation of vocal organs employed in production of sound and so on. - Punyarāja observes, on V.P. II. 19, : “yas tu pratibhāsaḥ sósāv upādhikrta eva ity arthah." Sphota has its internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual. The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the internal world of thought, remains essentially intelectual in its origin, before it is materialized into audible sound. It is 'nāda' or 'sound', says Bhartshari, that turns

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383 such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression of a sentence : V.P. II. 30 observes :
“yadantah-sabda-tattvam tu bhāgair ekam prakāśitam, tam āhur apare sabdam
tasya vākye tathaikatām.” For the khanda-paksa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order, or succession, a collection of words, the first inflected word, i.e. pada, or inflected words i.e. padas having mutual expectancy with one another. For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama' is used in the following way. Though usually the word ‘krama' implies a property of time such as 'paurvyāparya' - i.e. priority and posteriority - ‘krama hi dharmaḥ kālasya, tena vākyam na vidyate' - V.P. II. 51 - its particular use in grammar is explained by Bhartshari and Punyarāja as below. Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance as that of karmatva, kartstva, etc., which come to our notice in a successive or wellmarked order, together with similar meanings (višesa) conveyed by other words -
"santa eva višeşā ye padártheșu vyavasthitā), te kramād anugamyante
na vākyam abhidhāyakam." - V.P. II. 50. For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a sentence like, 'devadatto grāmam gacchati', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way - "the act of moving, which has devadatta as the agent, and the village as its object”. Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which as a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'viśesa' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order - Read .Punyarāja on V.P. II. 50 - "karmatvam ity ādayo viśesāh santa eva padebhyaḥ kramena pratītebhyo'vagamyanta iti krama eva vākyam.” This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence. Again, it is stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order : Punyarāja observes - "kramavyatirekeņa śabdā”tmakam na vākyam abhidhāyakam asti iti ucyate.” Thus, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order, in which words are combined together in such a way as to express an intended sense : Punyaraja, on V.P. II. 52, observes - "krama eva vākyam iti pada-kramo vākyam uktam."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the khanda-paksa, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well-known schools of the Mimāmsā system viz. Bhatta (i.e. of Kumārila) and 'guru', (i.e. of Prabhākara Bhatta.) Kumārila and his followers uphold the 'abhihitánvaya-vāda', as against the anvitábhidhāna-vāda' of Prabhākara and his supporters.
According to Kumārila, therefore, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (samghāta), or as an order-krama, and according to Prabhākara, it is a verbal form (ākhyāta), or the first inflected word (adyam padam), or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy . sarvapadam säkänksam - that make for a sentence. - Punyarāja or V.P. II. 1 observes : "atrā'pi samghātaḥ kramaḥ iti abhihitánvayapakşe, sarvapadam sākānkşam iti anvitábhidhāna-pakse lakṣaṇa-trayam iti vibhāgah.”
These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. There is a great difference of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence. For the sphoțavādin it is pratibhā, to one who defines vākya as a verbal form, it is action (kriyā), for the abhihitánvaya-vāda it is association-samsarga, meaning that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (tātparyārtha) when it conveys the intended sense : See Punyarāja - "tatra akhanda-pakṣe trişv api laksaņeșu pratibhā vākyárthaḥ (on V.P. II. 1), - and also, “ākhyāta-śabdo vākyam iti asmin pakşe kriyā vākyárthaḥ, (on V.P. II. 1), “samghāta-pakse kramapakşe ca samsargo vākyárthah” (on V.P. II. 1) - and also read, “padānām parasparánvaye padārthavaśād adhikyam samsargaḥ sa vākyárthaḥ. (on V.P. II. 41) and also read V.P. II. 42 -
"sambandhe sati yat tu anyat ādhikyam upajāyate, vākyārtham eva tam prāhur
aneka-pada-samśrayam.” It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional significance, distinct from those of the constitutents. Thus, the sense that evolves out of such ‘anvaya' or correlation of meaning is something more than a mere sum-total of them : Mammaţa explains - (K.P. II. 7) - "padānām samanvaye tātparyártho višeşavapur apadārthópi vākyárthaḥ samullasati iti abhihitánvayavādinām matam. - Jagadīsa calls it, “vilaksaņo bodhaḥ” i.e. special significance that results from the correlation of meanings. For the anvitábhidhānavādins, on the other hand, the

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385 meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as signified by its component parts: "padártha eva vākyarthah" . observes Punyarāja., see also - "vācya eva vākyárthaḥ iti anvitábhidhānavādinah” - K.P. II. 27, vrtti. - Thus the import or the tātparyártha of the anvitábhidhānavādins is nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves” - pūrvam ete yo vākyárthaḥ sa vācyántargata eva ity arthaḥ” - Punyarāja.
As to what forms the 'Nimitta' of the vākyārtha, there are different views. Vācaspati Mishra in the Tattvabindu refers to these views and establishes the Bhātta view as siddhānta. The views as recorded in the Tattvabindu are as below :
(i) According to the sphoțavādin the nimitta of the vākyārtha is akhandavākya, the pada-varna-vibhāga being only the result of avidya :
“anavagatam eva vākyam anādy avidyopadarśita-alīka-padavibhāgasya nimittam iti kecit. Tattvabindu, pp. 6.
(ii) According to some Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas, the nimitta for the vākyārtha is the knowledge of that last letter, which is accompanied by the samskāras or impression of the experience of the meaning of the preceeding padas - “pāramārthika-pūrvapūrva-pada-padārtha-anujanita-samskāra-sahitam antya varna-vijñānam iti eke.” - Tattvabindu pp. 6.
(iii) According to some other Mimāmsakas, it is the varņa-mālā i.e. series of letters, that is reflected in the mirror of memory, accompanied by the expression or 'anubhava-bhāvanā' or 'tat-tad pada-padārtha', = those words and those letters - which is the nimitta. - "pratyeka-varna-pada-padārtha-nubhava-bhāvitabhāvanā-nicaya-labdha-janma-smrti- darpaņā”rūdhā varņamālā iti anye." - Tattvabindu, pp. 6.
(iv) or, Vākyārtha is just the expressed meaning - abhidheyártha ,, of the words correlated with other words on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity. Thus anvita i.e. correlated pada or words make for the expression of vākyártha. This is according to Prabhākara - “padaiḥ eva samabhivyāhāravadbhiḥ abhihitāḥ svārthāh ākānksa-yogyatā-āsatti-sadhrīcīnā vākyārtha-dhi-hetavah ity ācāryāḥ.” - Tattvabindu, pp. 8.
(v) The padārtha, which is accompanied by ākānkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi, and expressed by the words used, makes for vākyártha. Thus, first of all the padas give padárthas and then with the help of ākānksā, yogyatā, etc., they give vākyártha. This is the anvitábhidhānavāda of Kumārila. Vācaspati Miśra also accepts this view. On this abhihitánvayavāda is based the Tātparya Vstti.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Vācaspati takes up other views for further consideration and refutation. The first view is held by the sphotavādin, who holds that, if it be held that the varnas or letters in the 'vyasta' form make for the vākyártha, then the other letters become redundant - "sa na tāvat pratyekam, anupalambha-virodhāt, varnántaroccāranaanarthakya-prasangāt" - Tattvabindu, pp. 25, ibid. If it is held that all the letters i.e. samastavarņas make for the vākyártha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (a) do you consider this correlation - samüha - as genuine or vāstavika' or (b) artificial - i.e. aupādhika ? - "nā’pi militāh, tathābhāv-ábhāvāt. tathā hi vāstavo vā samūha etesām āśrīyate, anubhavopādhiko vā ?- (Tattvabindu, pp. 25). The idea is that whether the varņas i.e. letters are naturally - vastutaḥ i.e. genuinely, correlated to one another or not, we have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the hearer they become related. But as the varnas are nitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated. - "tatra sarvesām eva varnānām nityatayā vibhutayā ca vāstavī samgatir iti prasangini keşām cid eva pada-vākyabhāvam na upapādayitum arhati. anubhūyamānā nava-navānubhavasārini tat paryāyena paryāyavati na samūhabhāg bhavati. na khalu eka-deśa kālā’nvacchinnā samūhavanto bhavanti bhāvāḥ, atiprasangāt.” pp. 25, ibid -
The sphotavādin also refutes the view of those who held the view, that 'pūrvapūrva-samskārayukta antimavarna' makes for the vākyārtha. The sphoțavādin asks as to what do the varnavādins mean by the word 'samskāra' or 'impression'. It is either the smrtibīja or something like the purification of rice etc. by chaffing etc. - “ko nu khalu ayam-samskāróbhimataḥ, āyuşmatah ? kim smrti-bijam anyo vā prokşaņā"dibhya iva vrīhy ādeh ?” pp. 25, ibid. - Certainly the second alternative is not meant here. So, here the samskāra stands for smộti-bīja. But smrti itself being just a vāsanā or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the vākyārtha-pratīti thus becomes the result of not the samkāra but that of the power of the soul. Again, the sphoțavādin says that even though we have identical letters in words such as nadi, dīna, sāra, rasā, etc., we have different meanings. So, letters in their akhanda form only, make for sense. Thus, akhandavākya should be accepted by the varņavādin. - "tasmāt sva-siddhānta-vyāmoham apahāya abhyupeyatām anu-samhārabuddher ekapada-vākya-gocaratā.” (pp. 35, ibid). The sphotavādin cites the illustration of the word 'gauh' and says that the experience of the word 'gauh' suggests that there is ekatā or oneness - and akhandatā-or wholeness in this word. For, if we take the different letters to be objects of our

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387 experience, it runs contrary to our day to day experience : "gauḥ iti ekam idam padam iti eka-padávabhāsini dhir asti, laukika-parīksakāņām.” (pp. 49, ibid). If it is argued by the varnavādin that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different varnas make for a pada and thus 'pada' is aupādhika; to this we ask as to what is meant by this upādhi ? Upādhi or attribute can be two-fold viz. (i) eka-jñana-visayatā i.e. becoming the object of one and the same experience, or (ii) ekábhidheya-pratyaya hetutā i.e. becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same bhāva. Now, if the upādhi is meant as (i), then we will have to accept the padajñāna even before varna-jñāna which goes against the varna-vādin; and if by upādhi is meant as (ii), then, there is 'iteretara-āśraya-dosa'. As artha-bhinnatā or difference in meaning - is the cause of the distinction between one pada and another, and as pada bhinnatā is gathered with the help of artha-bhinnatā, the fault of 'itaretarā"śraya' arises. Thus, the vākyártha should be connected only with the akhanda-sphota. This is the view of the sphota-vādin which forms the pūrva-paksa or prima facie view in the Tattva-bindu.
After explaining the first view held by the Sphoțavādin in detail, Vācaspati goes on refuting it. Vācaspati argues thus - Do the sphotavādins establish their view on the foundation of our (i) normal experience, or (ii) on the difference of senses of pada and vākya ? : “sa khalv ayam eko vākyártho vākyártha-dhi-hetuh anubhavād vā vyavasthāyate, artha-dhi-bhedad vā anyathā anupapadyamānāt ?" pp. 9, ibid. - If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein
pt vākya to be avayavī, i.e. having avayavas or form of padas, or (b) you do not accept any avayavas or parts with reference to the vākyártha. Now (a) cannot be accepted as 'pada' is held to be 'vibhu' or allpervasive even by the objector, and in that case, it is not possible to dream of an avayavī vākya which is 'vibhu-tara' or more pervasive, for the very concept of 'vibhu-tara' is illogical. : na tāvat pūrvah kalpah, avayavi-nyūna-parimānatvad avayavānām. parama-mahatām ca varņānām tad anupapatteh.” (pp. 9, ibid) Again, the Naiyāyikas take sabda to be the quality of ākāśa, and quality or 'guna' is avibhājya, i.e. incapable of division, and it cannot be the 'samavāyi-kārana' of anything else, it being always 'dravya' itself. Thus, padas cannot be the 'angas' or factors of the vākyártha : "gagana-gunatve ca adravyatayā samavāyikāranatvaabhāvena avayavabhāva-abhāvāt.” (pp. 10, ibid)
Now if you accept the second alternative, i.e. (b), viz. that there is no 'avayava' in a vākya, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sense, and neither the 'varna', nor the 'pada', is important and therefore 'varna', or 'pada' has no independent existence in a language. Well, it will be true that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this akhanda paksa is manifested by 'dhvani, but all this is putting aside the reality, and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if the first dhvani reveals the sense, what would be the use of other dhvanis ? Again, your 'antimadhvani' also fails to reveal the sphoța fully. So, this sphoța and akhanda-vākya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis. The final dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. So, they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vākyártha, 'with the help of the final dhvani, aided by the impression of the preceeding dhvanis. It is because of this, that we, the padavādins, accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceeding letters, to be the cause of vāhyártha : “pūrva-pūrvaabhivyakti-samskāra-sacitra-uttara-uttara-abhivyakti-kramena tu anyo dhvanih sphusa-taram višişta-sphota-vijñānam ādhatte, iti na vaiyarthyam dvitīyā"didhvanīnām. nā'pi pūrvesām, tad abhāve tad-abhivyakti-janita-samskāraabhāvena anyasya dhvaner asahāyatayā vyakty-avabhāsa-vākyadhi-hetu-bhāva. abhāvāt.” (pp. 20, ibid).
The varna-vādin refutes the theory of sphoța, for according to him, for vākyārtha-grahana i.e. collection of the sentence-sense, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of sphota. The varnas i.e. letters themselves, used in a pada, make for artha-pratīti or apprehension of meaning. When they are in a particular order, say - 'sarah', they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order say - rasah , they give a different meaning. Thus the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of 'krama/sequence, nyūnátiriktatva, swara, vākya, śruti, smrti, etc. If different letters of the same pada are produced by different people, we do not get the meaning. If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say, 'rah', we do not get the idea of 'sarah'. Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, 'eka-kartstva' is an important factor in arthánubhava, and is the jñāpaka-hetu of it. So, the vākyártha-jñāna is the result of varņa-samūha, and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an 'anavayava' vākya. : "tat siddham etad arthāpatter anumānasya vā nivsttis tad-ekagocara-pada-vākyā-'vasādhani iti sthitam na-anavayavam ekam vākyam vākyārthasya bodhakam iti.” (pp. 76, ibid)

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It may be noted that Mandana Miśra in his sphota-siddhi finally establishes the sphoṭavāda in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumārila and his supporters. We do not go into these details here.
Vacaspati then considers the second view held by some Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first view as there is no postulation of any adṛṣṭa like sphota herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of vakyártha-pratīti. We get some trace of this view in the Nyayabhāṣya of Vatsyāyana. According to Vatsyāyana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas and therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of words, (= pada-vyavasayena), and with the help of memory, he correlates different words also, and gathers thereby the sentence-sense, 1.e. vakyártha. Read Vatsyāyana bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtra III. 2.62 - "väkya-sthaleṣu khalu varṇeṣu uccaratsu tavat śravanam bhavati śrutam varnam ekam anekam vā padabhāvena pratisandhate, pratisamdhāya padam vyavasyati, pada-vyavasayena smṛtvā padártham pratipadyate, pada-samuha-pratisamdhānāc ca vakyam vyavasyati, sambaddhānśca padárthān gṛhītvā vākyártham pratipadyate."
So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish immediately, (aśu-nāśitva) and in a moment (ksaṇikatva), every first letter dissappears when the next one is uttered. Thus when the sentence - whole is completed, the listener hears only the last letter at the moment. But he undoubtedly gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even though the preceeding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered, they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With the hearing of the last letter, this impression comes up in form of memory and produces the sentence-sense, i.e. vākyártha-dhi. - "sa khalu ayam antyo varṇaḥ pūrva-pūrva-varṇa-pada-padarthavijñāna-janita-vāsanā-nicaya-saciva- śravanendriya-samad higata-janma-grahaṇa
smaraṇa-rupa-sad-asad-varṇa-nirbhasa-pratyaya-parivarti-pada-väkyártha-dhi hetur upeyate." (Tattvabindu, pp. 77, ibid)
The siddhantin, viz. the Abhihitánvayavādin refutes the above view as below: Is it so that the last syllable explains the vakyārtha after causing the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vakyártha ? Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its strength viz. the remembering of padárthas, the pada-pratyakṣa etc., at this moment, the cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener remembers the correlation of pada and padártha he

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA cannot clarify the position of the final syllable of a pada or vākya. So, the hearing of the last letter, accompanied by memory of the preceeding letter etc., cannot make for the vākya-dhī. : "na antya-varna-śrutih, smrtyā nītā vākyārtha-bodhinī.” - pp. 76, ibid.
The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mimamsakas. According to the commentator of the Tattva-bindu, this view is not held by any particular ācārya, but both this and the preceeding one are just placed as prima-facie views by Vācaspati Miśra. : "etat tu mata-dvayam sambhāvanāmātrena upanyastam iti kecit.” - (Tattabindu tikā, Tattva-vibhāvanā, pp. 7) - According to some, this view is held by the earlier Mimāmsaka Upavarsa, who is older than Sabara : "varnā eva tu sabdā iti bhagavān upavarsah.” Mimāmsā bhāsya, on I. i. 5, and also see, "gaur ity ayam kaḥ śabdah ? gakāra-aukāra-visarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarşah” - yogasūtra-bhāsya on III. 17. So according to Upavarsa, 'gauh' is constituted of 'g', 'au' and 'h' i.e. visarga.
These varņavādins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people. Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters of words, but use sentence to convey meaning. But a sentence cannot be without parts (an-avayava). So sentence is just the correlation of letters - varņa-samūha-left in memory. This varņa-mālā or dhvanimālā is the cause and vākyārtha-dhi is the effect. The knowledge of pada-padártha is held to be instrumental only - i.e. nimitta-mātra, while the vākyártha-dhī follows genuinely from the varnamālā or a group of 1 or phonemes or syllables : Read Tattvabindu :
víddha-prayogā"dhīnávadhāraṇo hi śabdártha-sambandhaḥ. na ca padamātram vyavahārangam prayuñjate věddhāḥ, kimtu vākyam eva, tat ca anavayavam nyasedhi iti. smstisamā”rūdhā varņamālā parisisyate... naimittikam vākyárthabodham adhatte. pāramārthikas tu pada-tad-artha-bodho nimitta-matrena avatisthate... tad eva vākyárthadhi-hetuh, iti. - Tattvabindu. pp. 83, 84, ibid. also read,
"gauravād viņayábhāvāt tad-buddher eva bhāvataḥ, vākyártha-dhiyam adhatte
smstisthā nákṣarā”valiḥ.” - Tattvabindu, pp. 84. The Bhāra Mimāņsakas do not accept this view. They find two faults with this viz. those of 'gauravadosa' and 'visayábhāva-dosa'. - "iti astānām vākyānām astau

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391 śaktayah kalpanīyāḥ tava iti kalpanā-gauravam. pada-vādinas tu saprānām saptaiva sakyate iti kalpanālāghavam. śuklām iti pada-praksepanena padavādinostānām padānām astau saktaya iti. tava tu sodasáparā iti mahad gauravam āpannam. (pp. 84, 85, ibid)
Another fault that is seen in this view is that of viņayábhāva. The varņa-mālā in a vākya can cause vākyárthadhīḥ only when there is first padártha-dhīḥ. Padártha-jñāna is a must before vākyártha-jñāna. It is only when the padárthas are correlated, that the vākyārtha flashes upon our mind. Thus, padārtha-jñāna is necessary before their correlation i.e. 'anvaya'. In this case, how can we take varņamālā as the cause of vākyártha-dhi ? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence, full of many words ? - "api ca tri-catura-pañca-pada vākya-vartini-padártha-pratyaya-vyavahitā'pi kleśena varņamālā smaryeta api, tadabhyadhika - padavati tu vākye să ati-duskarā.” pp. 89, ibid - Thus, this (i.e. the third view) cannot be accepted.
The fourth view is the one held by Prabhākara and his followers, who are known as 'anvitábhidhānavādins”. For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position, are first correlated and then they yield the vākyartha, through the power called abhidhā. : "padāni ākānkṣitā”sanna-yogyatántara-samgatān, svārthān abhidadhanti iha vākyam vākyártha-gocaram.” (pp. 90, ibid) The Bhāsta Mimāmsakas or the abhihitánvayavādins object against this view. Their objections are as below - when the anvitábhidhānavādin says that the abhidhā power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation i.e. anvaya, is it so that the vākyártha is gathered through all the padárthas together or not? If they (i.e. the anvitábhidhānins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vākyártha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vākyártha. So, the use of other padas becomes redundant as the vivaksā i.e. intention of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone - "tatra anabhihita-svārthántara-anvita-svārthábhidhāne padād ekasmād eva uccaritād vivaksā-pratīte” vaiyarthyam itareșām.” (pp. 93, ibid)
Or, if it be said that other words also convey vākyártha, then in the sentence, "hariḥ gām badhnāti”, wherein we get these words, the meaning of the action 'badhnāti' will not become clear until it is connected with ‘harih', the agent, and 'gām, the object. The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency of itaretara-āśraya. The illustration cited by Vācaspati Miśra is ‘ukhāyām paced'.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Anvitábhidhānvādin may argue as follows :
If we do not accept the anvitábhidhānavāda, then, in that case, we will have to postulate two abhidhā-saktis, viz. the one that conveys the sense of individual words, and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense. Again, there is no blemish in anvitábhidhānavāda. Even though every word in a sentence with abhidhā-sakti conveys the correlated meaning, still the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone. So, it should be held that a word, by abhidhā, conveys its own meaning and correlation, and not the meaning of other words. The anvitábhidhānavādins again put the following question to the abhihitánvayavādins, viz. that when we get some knowledge from the words, what type of knowledge is it? The śāstra speaks of four types of knowledge viz. pramāna, samsaya, viparyaya and smộta. Now, artha-pratīti cannot be taken as a pramāna, because pramāna occurs only with reference to that which is already existent. Padártha cannot be supposed to be exmstent before pada-śravana i.e. learing of a word. Nor cen we take padártha-jñāna as either samsaya or viparyaya i.e. mithyā-jñāha. As there is no fifth type of jñāna, we should take pedártha-jñāna as smrta only. - "na ca pañcamī vidhā samastīti smrtih pariśisyate" - (pp. 100, ibid) Thus, a pada depends on samskāródbodha and they make for the smrti in form of padártha-jñāna.
The fifth view is held by abhihitánvayavādins or by Kumārila and his followers. According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the vākyártha.
Vācaspati Miśra in his Tattvabindu refutes Prabhākara's anvitábhidhānavāda and establishes abhihitánvayavāda as the siddānta. The siddhantin i.e. anvitábhidhānavādin says that unless a contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceeding factor as the cause of it. - “evam tāvad autsargiko nyāyo yad asati balavad-bādhakopanipāte sahakāriņi kārye ca, pratyāsannām hi kāranam. sati tad-bhāva-bhävite tathā cártha-smrtih padät." . (pp. 111, ibid). Whenever there is vākyártha-jñāna, it is preceeded by padártha
which should be then recognised as its cause. Again, this padárthasmarana alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important. Thus the smarana of the padárthas in mind, qualified by ākānksā, yogyatā and sannidhi, makes for the vākyártha-dhī. : “tad amūṣām eva (mānasīnām) svārtha-smộtīnām ākānksā-yogyatā-āsatti-sahakāriņīnām kāranatyam vakyárthapratyayam pratyadhvasyāmah.” (pp. 112, ibid) - Again, the

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abhihitānvayavādin holds that the mental impression (= manovāsanā) by itself does not create the smộti or memory of the objects of experiences that were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padárthas of a given pada-samūha qualified by ākāńksā, yogyatā, etc., Thus, padártha-smrti goes with (i.e. is shakştā) äkānksā"di, and thus only (i.e. ākākṣā”di-traya-sahakrta) makes for the knowledge of the vākyártha.
As for the argument that if padártha-jñāna is caused by smrti, which is different from padas, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vākyártha, for in case, if it is held capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramāna over and above the six held by the Mimāmsā darśana, or the sabda-pramana will have to be included in this novel pramāna, and this is not noticed by Sabara and others, who have not accepted padártha as a separate pramāna because they have already mentioned āgama-pramāna which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padartha-pramāņa., - "nanu uktam na mānántaránubhūtānām artha-rūpāņām vākyártha-dhi-prasava-sāmarthyam upalabdham, upalambhe vā saptama-pramāņa-prasangah, āgamasya vā tatraiva antarbhāvah. tad eva pratyaksā”dibhiḥ saha tulya-kaksyatayā upanyasanīyam, na tu agamaḥ tadbhedaḥ." - (tattvabindu, pp. 120) - and also that if agama-pramāņa is a sub-variety of padártha, then, padártha should be mentioned along with other five pramānas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship and omniscience (i.e. vidvattā and sarvajñatva) of Bhagavān Bhāsyakāra. Moreover, if we take padártha-jñāna as the nimitta of vākyártha-jñāna, then we will have to accept either three vrttis or two such as (i) the first sakti that helps the pada to give its individual meanings and (ii) the second that causes its memory and (iii) the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padártha-jñāna and vākyárthajñāna respectively, while on the part of the anvitábhidhāna-vāda, only one śakti is required and thus there is no kalpanā-gaurava or the contingency of imagining many vịttis : "tathā ca tisrah saktayah, dve vā. padānām hi rāvad artharūpábhidhāna-rūpā śaktiḥ, tad artha-rūpāņam anyonyánvaya-saktiḥ, tad-ādhānaśaktiś ca aparā padānām eva iti. smārakatva-pakse tu uktam sakti-dvayam. anvitábhidhāna-pakse tu padānām ekā eva Śaktiḥ, tat kalpanālāghavāt - etad eva nyāyyam.” (pp. 123, ibid) -
Vācaspati gives the following reply : The abhihitánvayavādin holds that only one sakti as mentioned by the Prābhākaras cannot be connected with the anvaya or correlation. For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA padas stand for one another as synonyms : "tanmātra-visaye tasya a-višesāt sarvaśabdānām paryāyatā-prasangah.” (pp. 123, ibid)
The abhihitánvayavāda again asks the following question to the anvitábhidhānavādin - viz. - 'Is it so that a pada by its sakti conveys only the meaning as such (padárthasvarūpa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also, which makes for the vākyártha-dhi ?, or, is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the vākyártha-dhi ? The knowledge of the correlation of one padártha with another padártha is born of some other pada, either known (i.e. spasta) or unknown (i.e. aspasta), and not by the padas themselves. Those who are learned in the vedas also hold this view, and according to them, kriyā or action, by abhidhā, cannot convey the kartā or agent. : "ananyalabhyah sabdárthah iti trividya-vrddhāh. ata eva ākhyātā”dau karmā"dyabhidhāyitām nā”driyante.” (pp. 131, ibid).
Thus, the abhitánvayavādin accepts another sakti, different from abhidhā. And it is termed as laksanā-sakti. For them in laukika and vaidic sentences, the vākyárthadhi is caused by laksanā. Vācaspati Misra clarifies the stages which the śrotā i.e. listener has to pass through while going from hearing of a sentence i.e. vākya-śravana to apprehension of sentence-sense - i.e. vākyártha-jñāna. It is as follows - an individual listens to the sentences spoken by elderly people and thereby become conscious of activity i.e. pravrtti or inactivity i.e. nivrtti, joy or sorrow i.e. harşa and soka, etc. Thus, he records these sentences as the cause of pravrtti or nivștti, etc. As the elderly person goes on using one word (i.e. pada) after another, he collects newer and newer meaning i.e. an-upajāta), and this new i.e. anupajāta meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular words (i.e. viśesa-pada) even though the words already spoken are very well there. This knowledge is only with reference to the padártha alone and as such it can not make for pravstti/nivștti etc. But when the whole sentence sense is gathered, then only it causes pravṛtti, nivịtti, etc. This visista artha goes with the whole sentence. The words used in vrddha-vyavahāra have this conveying of the visista-artha i.e. specific sense, as its object, but by abhidhā they convey only the individual padártha alone. Thus, as in the case of laukika vākyas i.e. sentences used in worldly context, so also in the case of the vaidika vākyas, the words convey the sentence-sense through laksanā alone : "tathā hi, vrddha-prayukta-vākya-śravana-samanantaram pravstti-harsa-soka-bhaya-sampratipatteh vyutpannasya vyutpitsu-tad-hetupratyayam anumīyate. tasya satsu api anekeșu anupajātasya pada-jāta-śravanasamanantaram sambhavatah tad-hetubhāvam avadhārayati. na caisah pratyayah

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395 padártha-mātra-gocaraḥ, pravrttyādi-bhyaḥ kalpyate iti višistártha-gocaro'bhyupeyate, tad-vićiștárthaparatā avasitā vrddha-vyavahāre padānām... tasmāt lokánusāreņa vaidikasya api pada-samdarbhasya viśişțártha-pratyaya-prayuktasya aviśistárthábhidhānamātrena, laksanayā višistārtha-gamakatvam.” . pp. 153, il
la-gamakatvam.” - pp. 153, ibid. It becomes quite clear that for the Bhātta Mīmāmsaka, the grasping of the meaning of a sentence i.e. the vākyártha-grahaņa, is achieved with the help of laksanā. Kumārila himself notes in his vārtika that - "vākyártho laksyamāno hi
sarvatraiveti nah sthitiḥ.”
Pārthasārathi Mishra in his ‘Nyāya-ratna-mālā refutes the anvitábhidhānavāda •and establishes that even though in a single sentence, we get many padas, still, with the help of ākānksā"di we gather the correlation between different padas" -
“sānnidhya peksā yogyatvah upalaksaņa lābhataḥ ānanye’pyanvitānām syāt
sambandha-grahanam mama.” - Nyāya-ratna-mālā, Vākyártha-prakaraña, pp. 78
Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for vākyártha-dhī. First of all, from the pada-svarūpa we arrive at the padártha through abhidhā, and then vākyártha becomes indicated i.e. lakṣita. : “tasmāt na vākyam, na padāni sāksāt vākyártha-buddhim janayanti, kintu, padártha-rūpābhihitaih padárthaih, samlaksyate asau iti siddham etat.” - pp. 79. In a sentence, there are many words, but when there is vākyártha-dhiḥ, all the padárthas are united, just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains -
"vrddhā yuvānaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ khale yathā’mī yugapat patanti, tathaiva sarve yugapat-padárthāḥ
parasparenā'nvayino bhavanti.” - pp. 79, ibid. Vācaspati has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word - senses in a sentence, is quite different from abhidhā, and it is laksanā. But this lakṣaṇā is different from laksaņā of the alamkārikas and thus we come across at least four vịttis viz. abhidhā, laksaņā, gauņi and padárthánvaya-sakti. In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many vịttis, the padárthávaya-śakti is also termed as laksaņā. : “evam ca, na ced iyam pada-vịttir laksaņā-laksanam anveti,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA bhavatu tarhi caturthi, drstatvāt. astu vā laksaņā eva. - (Tattvabindu, pp. 157, ibid) - This laksaņā or padárthánvaya-sakti is different from laksaņā of the ālamkārikas and probably because of this, others might have named it differently as Tātparya sakti -
Alamkārikas : As seen above some of the later Bhātra Mimāmsakas called it Tātparya vrtti in order to distinguish it from laksanā as such. It is suggested by some scholars that probably the Mimāmsakas in kashmir followed this tradition which was mentioned by Abhinavagupta and Mammața. These two have also placed gaunī under laksanā though of course Hemacandra revives gaunī as an independent vịtti. So, for the alamkārikas of the kashmir school in general, following the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammata, tātparya is an additional vrtti, with vyañjanā as the fourth or turīyā vștti. Abhinavagupta observes : (Locana on Dhv. I. 4) : "tena samayápekṣā vācyávagamanaśaktir abhidhāśaktiḥ, tad anyathāanupapatti-sahāyā’rthāvabodhanaśaktis tātparya-śaktiḥ, mukhyártha bādhā'disahakaryapeksā’rtha pratibhāsana-śaktis lakṣaņā-śaktiḥ. tat-sakti-traya
nita'rthā'vagama-mula-jātatpratibhāsa-pavitrita-pratipatr-pratibhāsahāyā'rtha dyotana-śaktir dhvanana-vyāpāraḥ, sa ca prāgvịttam vyāpāratrayam nyakkurvan pradhānabhūtah kāvyā"tmā iti āśayena niședha pramukhatayā ca prayojanavişayo'pi nisedha-visaya iti uktam." Viśvanātha in his S.D. observes :
"tātparyākhyām vịttim āhuḥ padārthánvayabodhane, tātparyártham tad artham ca
vākyam tad-bodhakam pare.” (II. 20, S.D.) and also,
- abhidhāyāḥ ekaika-padártha-bodhana-virāmad vākyártha-rūpasya padárthánvayasya bodhikā tātparyam nāma vrtcih. tad arthaś ca tātparyárthah. tad bodhakam ca vākyam iti abhihitánvayavādinām matam. - (vștti on II. 20)
and also, read K.P. II
· ākānkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhivaśād vaksyamāņa-svarūpāņām samanvaye tātparyártho višeşavapuh a-padárthópi vākyárthaḥ samullasati iti abhinitánvayavādinām matam.
We will go to see in detail the nature of tātparya-vrtti and its acceptance or otherwise by different ālankārikas as below.

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397 Before we proceed, it may be noted that both Abhinavagupta and M also accept the view of the abhihitánvayavāda. This becomes clear when we read the Balabod hini of Jhalkikar on the K.P. of Mammata, (pp. 27), which reads as - "abhihitánvayavādinām iti bahuvacanena ayam eva pakṣaḥ prāmānikaḥ (granthakrtsammatah) (na tv anvitábhidhānavādi-paksah] iti sūcitam iti sarasvatitīrtha-krtatīkāyām spastam. ata eva mülakāro'sminnevollāse 31 sūtra-vrttau, pañcamollase vyañjanāsthāpanávasare ca yathākramam vaksyati. "te ca abhidhā-tātparyalaksaņābhyo vyāpārāntarena gamyāh." iti. “abhidhā-tātparya-laksanā”tmakavyāpāratrayátivarti dhvananā”di-paryāyo vyāpāro'napahnavanīya eva” iti ca. bahuvacana-nirdeśasya sva-sammatarva-pradarśana-paratvād eva caturthollāse 83 sūtra-vịttau "iti śrīmad abhinavaguptā"cāryapādāh" ityanta-granthena upapăditasya abhinavaguptā"cārya-sammatapakşasya 'bahuvacana-śrīmad-pādā"cārya padaiḥ sva-sammatatvam uktam' iti tīkākāraiḥ sarvaiḥ uktam iti dik.”
We will go to see that lateron, certain dhvanivādins rejected this tātparya-vítti and Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudrīya includes it in vyañjanā and mentions tātparyártha as indentical with vyangyártha. In the same way perhaps, the view viz. "so'yam işoriva dirgha-dīrghataró-bhidhā-vyāparaḥ..." etc. supposedly mentioned by Bhatta Lollața, considers tātparya-vịtti as just a part of abhidhāvstti. Mahimā chooses to arrive at the so called tātparyártha with the help of anumāna i.e. poetic inference. He does not recognise tātparyavrtti in collecting the sense of 'nised ha' from the sentence viz. "bhrama dhārmika... etc." or nisedha from the statement, viz. "vişam bhaksaya, mā cā'sya grhe-bhunkthāḥ...” etc. For him, the niședhártha or sense of negation does not fall in the province of sābda-bodha or verbal cognition, but is gathered by the process of anumiti where the vācyártha becomes the hetu. For him, here we have an arthi prakriya and not sābdī prakriya. He observ I. 67, 68) (pp. 133, ibid)
"vișa-bhakşaņād api parām etad-gpha-bhakṣaṇasya dāruņatām, vācyād ato'numinute prakarana-vaktr-svarūpajñāh.” - I. 67 visabhaksanam anumanute na hi kaścid akānda eva suhrdi sudhīḥ, tenátrárthāntaragatir ārthi tātparya-śaktijā na punaḥ.” - I. 68 (V.V.)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
• The Nature and scope of Tātparyavștti
As noted above the tātparyavrtti is intrumental in giving the sentence-sense and is therefore connected with the sentence-unit and not a word unit. Words in a sentence, to give a coherent meaning have to have three features such as 'ākāńksa' i.e. expectancy, 'yogyatā' i.e. compatibility and 'āsatti' or 'sannidhi' i.e. proximity or juxta-position. It is observed by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja (pp. 151, Indian Theories of Meaning, Edn. '69, Madras) that, "Next to the sphota theory of linguistic symbols advocated by Bhartřhari stressing the importance of taking the sentence or complete utterance as an integral and indivisible symbol conveying its meaning in a flash, the most important contribution of ancient Indian to general linguistics is the concept of “ākāńksā”. The Mimāmsaka school brought forward this concept to explain, from the analytical and associationistic standpoint, how syntactic unity is effected among the various isolated words which comprise the sentence. If the word is taken as an autonomous unit of sound and sense, it is necessary to point out the cementing factors which unite the different words, with their individual meanings, when they form a single sentence. The Mimāmsakas first enunciated, and the other schools of thought later accepted with slight modifications, the three factors of phonetic contiguity or samnidhi, logical consistency or yogyatā, and syntactic expectancy or ākānksā among the parts of a sentence'as constituting the bases of syntactic unity. Of these three, ākāńksā is all-comprehensive and the most important."
We have noticed earlier the simple definition of a sentence which takes it as a collection of words : "pada-samghātajam vākyam" as the Brhaddevata, II. 117, puts it. The Mi. Sū. II. i. 46, as noticed earlier puts it on a real scientific basis when it observes : “arthaikatvād ekam vākyam, sā”kānksam ced vibhāge syāt.” Thus words taken together and yielding a single meaning form a sentence. These words when taken separately are characterized by expectancy or ākānkṣā. The Mimāmsakas evolved this scientific approach to get at the exact sense of a given sentence in the yajurveda dealing with sacrificial ritual. Thus a single yajus-mantra was expected to be a single 'syntactical unit', giving a single sense : Here 'arthaikatva', as Sabara explains, means “serving a single purpose.” . "eka-prayojanatvād upapannam." (SB. on Mi. Sū. II. i. 46) - Bhartphari accepts this concept and states :
"sā”kāńksávayavam bhede paránākānkşa-sabdakam,

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karma-pradhānam guṇavad ekártham vākyam isyate."
V.P. II. 4 (pp. 9, Edn. 92 Dr. Bhate Saroja) - Delhi Eastern Book Linkers) Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also was prepared to apply śabara's idea to ordinary sentence also and not the yajus mantra alone. Ganganath Jha, [trans. Tantravārttika, pp. 586 f; (p. 190)] observes: "It must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognizant of a single idea must be regarded as one sentence... either ordinary or of the 'mantra' and 'brāhmaṇa'. As explained above, this understanding follows if we take the note, viz. "arthaikatvad" as meaning, 'because of its having a single sense." Parthasarathimiśra follows Śabara and takes 'arthaikatva' to mean 'having a single purpose', but Someśvarabhaṭṭa in his Nyāyasudhā interpretes it liberally so as to cover a sense in ordinary worldly usage also.
399
Prabhakara observes that 'artha' stands for both 'meaning' and 'purpose'. Sabara insists on purpose, so Prabhakara also says that the words of a sentence must be related to purpose which is the most important factor in a sentence. When sentences are independent of one another they form distinct sentences and are therefore 'nir-ākānkṣa'. Thus 'ākānkṣā' or expectancy among words is an essential condition to form an independent sentence. The Katyayana-śrauta-sūtra (I. 3.2) also lays stress on mutual expectancy among words to form a single sentence and describes a sentence as a whole as 'nir-ākānkṣa'. This is supported even by Satyāṣāḍha-śrauta-sūtra (Anandashrama skt. series, 53. part I., pp. 38) as observed by Dr. Raja. The Mīmāmsakas thus were perhaps the first to recognise this quality viz. ākānkṣā among words as a basic one to form a sentence. But the necessity for independence. of words to give a unified sense, as in a compound word or a sentence, was recognized even earlier by the grammariaus as observed by Dr. Raja (pp. 154, ibid). Panini observes at II. i. 1: "samarthaḥ pada-vidhih." Thus for him, words can form a compound word only if they have 'samarthya' i.e. 'capacity'. Now 'sāmarthya' is explained differently by various commentators. Some take it as 'vyapekṣā' or 'mutual connection pertaining to the meaning.' - The Mbh. pp. 365 notes: "paras-para-vyapekṣām sāmarthyam eke icchanti. kā punaḥ śabdayor vyapekṣā? na brūmaḥ śabdayor iti. kim tarhi ? arthayoḥ. This 'vyapekṣā' seems to be closer in sense to the 'ākānkṣa' of the Mimamsakas. The Vārttika, under Pā. II. i. 1 observes - "pṛthag arthānām ekárthībhāvaḥ samartha-vacanam." (pp. 361 Mbn.) Thus, for some, samarthya' is 'ekárthībhāva' i.e. unification of meaning. Thus words having independent meanings are made to signify a united sense, when taken together. Jaimini also recognizes this quality of a sentence when he mentions

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'arthaikatva' of a sentence. Dr. Raja observes (pp. 155, ibid): "Pānini discusses compound words, whereas Jaimini deals with a sentence, still the conditions referred to seem to be similar.” We support this observation of Dr. Raja for on Vārttika 4, Pā. II. i. 1, pp. 365, the Mbh. discusses the point with reference to the compound word 'rāja-puruşa’. Patañjali observes : "iha rājñaḥ purusa iti ukte rāja puruşam apekṣate mamayam iti, purușo’pi rājānam apeksate, aham asya iti.” Patañjali explains these two views as mutually exclusive and accepts 'ekárthībhāva' view-point as the correct one. This fekárthībhāva' means that the words when united give up their individual meanings and acquire a special signification. The other view meaintains that the individual members retain their original meanings but they are mutually related. P. C. Chakravarti in his 'philosopy of Sanskrit Grammar, pp. 293, observes that for Haradatta both 'vyapeksa' and 'ekárthībhāva are necessary in a compound word, for in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed to form a compound. Kaiyata in his M.bhpradipa, under Pā. II i. 1, observes that : "iha vyapeksāyām samāso na bhavati, ekárthībhāve vākyam neti." i.e. he seems to take them as conditions for a sentence and a compound only respectively.
To this quality of 'ākāńksā' were added 'yogyatā' or compatibility and 'āsatti' or 'sannidhi' i.e. Juxta position or proximity as qualities of a sentence. The Mimāmsakas were the first to promulgate these three conditions for a sentence to explain the correlation of words in a given sentence. Kumārila in his Ta Vol. I. pp. 455 observęs - "ākānksā sannidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam, sambandha-karanatvena klptam nánantaraśrutih." Thus for Kumarila, mere immediate sequence or 'anantarśruti' is not enough in the making of a sentence, but these three, i.e. mutual expectancy among words used in a given sentence, their compatibility and their proximity are all basic to form a given sentence. Other systems of thought later picked up these conditions with minor changes. To these some have later added a fourth condition viz. the knowledge of intention of the speaker or ‘tātparya-jñāna', which also means the general purport of a sentence.
Ākāńksa' as observed earlier, consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word. Thus, it is the desire on the part of the listener to know the other unspoken words or their meanings to complete the sense. A word is said to be 'sā”kāńksa' i.e. having 'ākāńksā' for another word, if by itself, it cannot, without the help of the latter, produce full sense or knowledge of its inter-connection in a given utterance. The Tarkasamgraha pp. 30 observes : "padasya padántara-vyatireka-prayuktánvayánanubhāvakatvam ākānkṣā.” Vedānta

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401 paribhāsā IV. 3 has - "tatra padarthānām paraspara-jijñāsā-visayatva-yogyatvam ākāñksā, kriyāśravane kārakasya, kāraka-śravane kriyāyāh, karana-śravane itikartavyatāyāśca jijñāsā-visayatvāt.” Stray collection of words such as "gauh aśvah puruso hasti”, or 'daśa dāļimāni şad apūpāḥ kundam ajājinam palala-pindah adharorukam etat kumāryāḥ sphaiyakstasya pitā pratiśīnaḥ” - as observed in the Mbh. pp. 1, and 38, do not make for a sentence.
Dr. Raja (pp. 157) observes that the Mīmāmsakas are not quite clear in distinguishing between syntectic expectancy and psychological expectancy and Bharthari actually criticises their definition of a sentence on the ground that the 'ākāńksā’ of the Mimāmsaka, would imply that a passage of several grammatical sentences would have to be considered as one sentence. (V.P. II. 3) - Bhartrhari observes :
"nighātā”di-vyavasthārtham śāstre yat-paribhāṣitam, sā"kāňkşa-yayavam tena na sarvam tulya-laksaņam.” V.P. II. 3 and he further observes : "sā”kānksá-vayavam bhede paránākānkşa-sabdakam, karma-pradhānam guṇavad
ekártham vākyam ucyate.” - V.P. II. iv. Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara, holds that 'ākānksā being the curiosity on the part of the listeners has to be explained by some on the basis of invariable association such as an action necessarily implying an agent, a place, an instrument etc. and an agent or an instrument implying an action to complete its sense. But this view is criticized on the ground that there is no end to the curiocities of the listeners through such associations. The Vākyártha-mātņkā-vștti (pp. 5) observes : “kā punar iyam ākānksā ? pratipattur jijñāsā. kim nibandhanā punar asau ? avinābhāva-nibandhanā iti kecit. kriyā hi kārakā'vinābhāvini iti tām pratītya kārakam jijñāsate. evam kārakam api buddhvā kriyām iti. tad ayuktam iti manyante. jijñāsā tathā tadiya-janaka-tat-kriyā-tat-karakántara"di-jijñāsām api āpadyate.” Newer and newer expectancies are caused due to newer and newer and newer associations coming in the minds of listeners. This could be endless. So, only those curiosities that are essential for the accomplishment of the intended purpose

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA need be taken as true requirements. The omission by the speaker of a particular nature of the instrument, place, etc., for the action recommended suggests that he is indifferent about it. Thus, “gām ānaya" is a complete sentence eventhough the instrument viz. 'dandena' - 'with a stick' is not mentioned. It is added only if it intended. Thus the scope of 'ākāńksā' depends on the intention of the speaker. In case of an elliptical sentence like, “the door, door”, - i.e. “dvāram dvāram”, this requires some verb such as 'pidhāna' or 'close for syntactic completeness. But in case of, "gām ānaya” it is not so.
For Advaita Vedāntins this "ākānksā' is two-fold viz. utthita-ākāńksā and utthāpya-ākānksā. The former takes place when it is actual or natural, i.e. when there is natural expectancy of one word for the other to complete sense. The other one is seen when there is potential expectancy which could be roused in case it is required. Thus, when one utters, "gām ānaya”, the listener may think of the cow being white, red, black and so forth. The possibility of such potential adjectives of a cow, is limitless. According to this view therefore, the ākānkṣā that exists between words in a sentence, must be mutual and not one sided. For instance "dhavalām gām ānaya", the adjective dhavala' has a direct and natural expectancy for the substantive "gām", whereas the latter i.e. the cow has only a postential expectancy for the adjective 'dhavala' i.e. white.
The Mimāmsakas explain ākāńksā also on the basis of psychological incompleteness of an idea. The Vākyártha-mātřkāvrtti, p. 7 has -
"anvitasyā bhidhānártham uktártha-ghațanāya vā, pratiyogini jijñāsā
yā sā”kānkşeti giyate.” abhidhānā’paryavasānam abhidheyártha-paryavasānam ca jijñāsodayanibandhanam.”
We may add that, if ákānksā is with reference to artha-grahana, then necessarily it has to include the psychological aspect concerning the listener and perhaps even Bhartshari goes astray in his attack on the definition of a sentence as noted above. Actually a group of sentences stringed together are ruled out from the scope of being a single sentence as the ākānksā of the Mimāmsakas does take care of the psychological requirement of a listener.
As to the nature of ākānksā the two schools of Mimāmsā, viz. the Prābhākara and the Bhätta seem to differ. Of course both are concerned with the interpretation

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403 of vedic injunctions, but they differ with reference to the exact meaning or interpretation of an injunction. For the Prābhākaras every vedic injunction is a command - a niyoga - to be followed without considering the outcome i.e. the beneficial result. Neither fear of punishment nor greed for benefit should guide one to follow the injunction which is a command just to be followed - "There is not to reason why" is the spirit behind it. So, for the Prābhākara school of thought, the three essential psychological ākānkṣās are for 'visaya' i.e. the act enjoined, for 'niyojya' i.e. the person who is enjoined to perform an act, and for 'karana' or the means to perform. Thus in a passage, say, “viśvajitā yajeta”, there is no mentioning of the ‘niyojya' or the person who is expected to perform a particular sacrifice, and so to complete the meaning we add the word "svargakāmah" - a person desirous of heaven and arrive at complete sense.
But for the Bhātta school of thought, the content of the injunction is the realization that the action enjoined will bring some special benefit. Kumārila, in his Śloka-vārttika, p. 653, observes :
"prayojanam anuddiśya
na mando’pi pravartate.” - even a man with less than ordinary intelligence also does not proceed to do anything without keeping a purpose in mind. The ākānksā of a vedic injunction therefore, is for the 'iti-kartavyatā' of the act enjoined, for the sādhana or karana i.e. means, and also for the 'phala' or the result of the action. There is no ‘ākānksā’ for the 'niyojya' or a person who is to perform an act. Anyone who has interest in a particular fruit or result, has to perform a particular action enjoined by the veda. So, in “viśvajitā yajeta", the word 'svargakāmah' is meant to satisfy the expectancy concerning the fruit of the action.
We may find an extention of this psychological expectancy in the Mīmāmsā definition of a compound sentence i.e. a 'mahāvākya', with reference to the mutual expectancy of clauses that make for the whole compound sentence. This interdependence of sentences makes up for a 'prakarana' i.e. topic, in which sentences are related by anga-angin-bhāva, i.e. one principal sentence and the rest being subordinate. When these - i.e. main clause and sub-clauses serve a single purpose, they are taken as a 'mahāvākya'. (Mi. Sū. III. 7.4). Here we see syntactic unity or 'eka-vākyatā' based on a two-fold relation viz. "padaika-vākyatā” i.e. that of a word to a sentence and vākyaika-vākyatā, i.e. that of a sentence to another sentence. For the Mimāmsakas, only the injunctive sentences carry direct

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA significance and the others are mere fartha-vādas' i.e. only corroborative or eulogistic utterances, which are therefore dubbed as subordinate. The arthavādas carry their meanings only as syntactically connected with the principal injunctive statement. Just as a word is related to a sentence, an arthavāda-vākya is related to the injunctive sentence i.e. vidhi-vākya. This is termed as 'padaika-vākyatā', in a single sentence, and 'vākyaika-vākyatā', in a compound sentence with individual subordinate clauses that carry individual self-sufficient meaning. Kumārila in his Tantravārttika pp. 366 reads :
"svārthabodhe samāptānām angángitvā”dy apeksayā, vākyānām ekavākyatvam
punaḥ samhatya jāyate.”. This is acceptable to the Vedāntins also.
But the ākānksā that rests between words in a sentence is a grammatical one and therefore 'sabdr and not merely psychological. It is the exact need for the syntactic completeness of a given statement. Later on the Naiyāyikas clearly distinguished between the grammatical and psychological 'ākāńksā'. They define ākāńksā as a kind of syntactic need which one word has for another in a given sentence, to convey interrelation of the words. It is therefore, the ākānksā which causes the knowledge of the syntactic relation of words in a sentence. The Klárýäýikas hold an opinion that even in case of a word there should be mutual expectancy between root or stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other.
Nāgeśa in his Parama-laghu-mañjusā, ākānksā section, observes that - (pp. 33)
- "sā ca ekapadárthajñāne tad-arthánvaya-yogyárthasya yaj jñānam tad vişayecchā; asyánvayy arthaḥ ka iti evam-rūpā puruşa-nişthaiva, tathā’pi tasyāḥ svavisaye’rthe āropah.”
This means that for Nāgeśa, akānksā is the desire on the part of listeners on hearing a word in a sentence, to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense; and thus the expectancy is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings. Thus it is a psychological one. For him, only metaphorically this ākāńksā has a concern with words and their meanings.
Yogyatā : This means logical compatibility of words with one another in a given sentence. This quality makes for mutual association. The Tarka-samgraha,

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405 pp. 30 observes - arthābādho yogyatā. Nāgeśa, in his parama-laghu-mañjuşā puts it as (p. 36) - "parasparā' nvaya-prayojaka-dharma-vattvam.” The Tattvacintamani, Vol. III, sabda section, p. 262 - has - "bādhaka-pramā-virahah” (Nyāyakośa, 675). This quality actually makes for the judgement concerning a sentence as to whether it is sense or non-sense. When the meaning of a sentence is not contradicted by experience it is said to have 'yogyatā' or compatibility between its words. Sālikanātha in his Väkyārtha - mātrkā-vrtti, p. 9, observes : “kim punar idam yogyatvam nāma ? yat sambandhárhatvam. sambandhārham iti katham jñāyeta ? sambandhitvena drstatvāt.” This means that yogyatā demands the words in a sentence to have mutual compatibility for their connection. This compatibility is known from experience. Thus, 'agninā siñcati', he wets (the plants) with fire carries no sense as 'agni' is not compatible to the idea of sprinkling. But, "jalena siñcati” makes sense as 'jala' or water has a sense compatible with the idea of sprinkling or wetting
However, as Kuppuswami Shastri observes, in his 'A primer of Indian Logic, p. 257, there is difference of opinion about the exact function of 'yogyatā' in the comprehension of meaning from a given sentence. Some Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that a decisive knowledge of 'yogyatā’ is a pre-requisite for verbal cognition, while others suggest that since a decisive knowledge of incompatibility prevents verbal cognition, only the absence of such a counteracting agent is the real requirement. - The Nyāyakośa p. 676 has - “bādha-niscayábhāvo yogyatā iti navyāḥ āhuḥ.” For the former, it is a positive entity, for the latter it is only the absence of an impediment in verbal cognition.
Dr. Raja (p. 165) observes that it is necessary to distinguish between such inconceivable combinations like, "the circular square", and the conceivable combinations such as, 'a rabbit's horn.' Kumārila suggests in a vārttika quoted in Khandana-khanda-khādya p. 168, that,
"atyantā’saty api hy-arthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi, abādhāt tu pramām atra
svataḥ-prāmānya-niścalām.” This means that incompatibility with actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension, but only the validity of knowledge prevents the same lack of co-rrelation with actual facts but the inconceivability of the mutual association of word-meanings renders the whole sentence nonsensical. The

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA impossibility of connecting the word-meanings stands in the way of verbal comprehension. This other condition of yogyatā' therefore, is not for mere verbal knowledge but for a valid judgement.
At times lack of 'yogyatā' is only apparent and is explained in metaphorical expressions such as 'simho māņavakaħ', 'mañcāḥ krośanti', etc. by explaining the metaphorical sense. Actually, this apparent incompatibility or 'yogyatā-abhāva' is the essence of laksaņā.
Samnidhi - or proximity or 'āsatti' is a condition having reference to the time of pronouncement of words in a sentence. These words should be pronounced continuously at a given time. The Tarkasamgraha, p. 30 has. - "padānām avilambena ucсāranam samnidhih." The Vedāntaparibhāsā puts it as (IV. 10)
"āsattiścávyavadhānena pada-janya-padárthópasthitih” - Thus āsatti or juxtaposition is the un-interrupted utterance or unbroken apprehension of words. Words pronounced at long intervals cannot produce the knowledge of any interrelation among them, even if there be 'ākāńksā' and 'yogyatā'. If words are seperated by the intervention of irrelevant words, then also the connection of meaning is not grasped. Kumārila Bhatta in his Tantra-Vārtika, p. 455 observes :
"ākānkṣā samnidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam, sambandha-kāranatvena
kļptam nánantaraśrutiḥ.” Thus, he distinguishes between samnidhi and mere "immediate sequence of utterance." i.e. “anantara-śruti”. Samnidhi is explained by him as the continuous moving about of the words or their meanings in the mind - "buddhau viparivrttih", Śālikanātha in his Vākyártha-mātņkā-vștti, pp. 8, gives a similar explanation. According to the Bhātta school of Mīmāmsā, the lack of samnidhi is of two types. (i) not being uttered together, and (ii) not being signified by words. Mānameyodaya, p. 99 has - "samnihitatvábhāvāt sabda-bodhitatvábhāvāc ca dvedhā samnidhy abhāvo bhavati." No syntactic relation is possible in case of words pronounced at distant time-gaps such as for instance "bring" is pronounced to-day and "the cow" is pronounced the day-after, no relation can be established. Again, a sentence such as "gām badhana" cannot have syntactic affinity with the word "aśvam", even though the horse is also seen in front requiring to be tied up. Mānameyodaya

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observes - pp. 100 - "gām badhāna" - ity atra bandhanápekṣayā dṛśyamānasya aśvasya sabda'bodhitatvāt eva ananvayaḥ." - Thus syntactic relation is possible only for what have been comprehended through words - see also, "sabda-pratipannānām eva anvaya iti niyamaḥ siddhaḥ" - (in Manameyodaya). (Dr. Raja; p. 167, ibid)
The Prabhakara school, on the other hand holds that samnidhi is only the contiguity of cognition of the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered - The Väkyārtha-mātṛkā-vṛtti, p. 9. observes
"samnidhiḥ śabda-janmaiva
-
407
vyutpattau nopalakṣaṇam, adhyāhṛtena'pi arthena
loke sambandha-darśanāt."
Thus in case of elliptical sentences the syntactic relation is known by supplying the necessary meaning. But the Bhāṭṭa school rejects this view and insists that even in elliptical sentences, the syntactic relation is known only by supplying the missing words themselves. The Manameyodaya p. 101, observes in this connection, viz. "śabdádhyāhāra eva syād ity evam mādṛśām matam."

According to the Prabhakara school, samnidhi does not mean simultaneous mental comprehension of the words; as in case of ākānkṣā it goes step by step, in order of sequence, in which they are cognized. The Väkyártha-mātṛkā-vṛtti p. 9 observes ākānkṣāvac ca samnidhau api samnidhāpaka-krameņa eva kramo veditavyaḥ." The mutual connection of the meanings of words is comprehended step by step with the knowledge of ākānkṣā, yogyata and samnidhi.
For the early Naiyayikas, the recollection of the meanings of words is simultaneous. It is transient like perception and so, it is not possible to recollect the meanings of individual words one by one and then have a collective cognition. Simultaneous comprehension is explained on the analogy of 'khale kapota nyāya' i.e. pigeons on the threshing floor. The Siddhanta muktavali p. 305 observes :
"vṛddhā yuvānaḥ śiśavaḥ kapotāḥ khale yatha'mi yugapat patanti,
tathaiva sarve yugapat padarthāḥ paraspareṇánvayino bhavanti."
Like pigeons, young and old come down together to pick up grains, similarly, in a sentence, the meanings of words become interrelated simultaneously.

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But we feel that analogy is not necessarily a sound argument. For there are others, some Naiyāyikas among them, who seem to explain differently. For them, in a sentence viz. “gām ānaya, śvetām, dandena”, first of all, the word 'gām' is known as related to the verb 'ānaya'. Then this connected sense gets related to the meaning of "svetām” or 'white', and then with the instrument viz. dandena'. This has the anvitábhidhāna theory at its basis. The Siddhāntamuktāvali, pp. 306 puts it as -
“yad yad ākānkṣitam yogyam samnidhānam prapadyate, tena tenánvitaḥ svārthaḥ
padair evā’vagamyate.” The Navya Nyāya school defines samnidhi or āsatti as an immediate recollection of meanings of words through their expressive power or laksanā, and eventhough the words are separated, as in case of a verse at times, there is āsatti if the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption. The Nyāya-siddhántamañjarī, quoted in Nyāyakośa p. 135, observes - “vrttyā padajanya-padárthópasthitiḥ.” This 'āsatti' is the cause of verbal apprehension, and not the knowledge of 'āsatti' as believed by early Naiyāyikas : sa ca "sva-rūpasati śābda-bodha-hetuḥ, na tu jñātā.” observes the same source. This recollection is explained to be collective cognition viz. 'samūhā”lambana-jñāna'. Thus, the perception of every single word leaves its impression on the mind, and when the last word is uttered, its last letter serves as a stimulas to bring in collective recollection. It is thus, a single cognition arising out of the contact of senses with a collection of objects.
Dr. Raja has at length discussed the problem of elliptical sentences also, giving a full record of the views of the various schools of Mimāms, and also that of Bhartrhari at the end. Dr. Raja (pp. 169-176) has also considered the view of Bhoja the author of Srngāraprakāśa. We feel it would have been more advisable to discuss the views of alamkārikas only at the end of the discussion concerning the topic as contained in the darśana and grammar sources. We are gratefully repeating the views concerning a word, its sense, a sentence, sentence-sense, various sabdavșttis etc., as laid bare by our great predecessors such as Dr. P. C. Chakravarti, Dr. K. K. Raja, Prof. Devasthali and the rest, only to explain the heritage of thought currents that shaped the views of ālamkārikas. This heritage as explained by these savants is most important for us to grasp and fully understand then to further understand and explain the various thoughtcurrents concerning word, sense, sentence and sabda-yrttis and other

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concepts of literary criticism in India. I have therefore fully accepted the discussion concerning these though-currents from works of very reliable scholars of great repute whom I honour and love. I have done it for it is absolutely required to grasp the same for an introduction to the understanding of thought-currents in literary criticism. But in all honesty I will confess, that I have personally varified and looked into practically all original material as far as possible, before accepting the same as laid down by these masters. One thing is clear, as suggested above that very often I have felt that something is lacking in the methodology adopted even by these great scholars for, without caring for the chronological aspects, I feel Dr. P. C. Chakravarty drags in the views of Gadadhara, Jagadiśa and the rest while discussing the views as read in ancient scriptures. Similarly Dr. Raja quotes from Nyāyakośa, Māna-meyodaya, Vedāntaparibhāṣa, Siddhānta-muktāvali, Vākyārtha-mātṛkā-vṛtti, and also the Mahabhāṣya, Jaimini, Śabara, Bhartṛhari and Mīmāmsā and Nyāya-sūtras all in a single breath. However, I feel this is pardonable because the later writers on Nyāya and Vyakaraṇa and also Mimāmsă are absolutely faithful to the original sources and therefore the whole of it, i.e. the earliest sources as well as nearmodern interpretation of the same by stalwarts - forms a unitary whole which is indivisible and one. My accepting from Dr. Chakravarti, Dr. Raja. Prof. Devasthali and the rest therefore is justified in the same vein as I want to give all this at one and the same place, to be scaled at a glance for whatever follows as my humble contribution and interpretation of various alamkāra sources beginning with Bharata and Bhāmaha, down to Jagannatha. My work therefore belongs to the same type of effort, if not of the same class in terms of merit, to the one put in by Acarya Hemacandra in his Viveka on the Kāvyānuśāsana, or the one put in the great Bala-bodhini by Jhalkikar on the Kavyaprakāśa of Mammata. The sincerity and honesty of effort are the same, if not the class.
-

Tātparyajñāna:
Some of the later Naiyāyikas believe that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker i.e. tātparya-jñāna is most essential while arriving at any verbal comprehension. Some Naiyāyikas giving great importance to the speaker's intention in fixing the meaning of an utterance hold that even in ordinary sentences like, "ghaṭam ānaya”, the intention of the speaker gives the meaning of 'pot' to the word 'ghata'. Given a different intention of the speaker, they say, that even the word 'ghata', through lakṣaṇā, would yield the sense of 'pata'. The Nyāyakośa p. 327, reads -
·

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "pare tu ghatā"di-śābda-sthale’pi ghața-padam kumbhaparam, laksanayā pataparam veti samśraye ghata-śābda-bodhābhāvāt sarvatra tātparya-niscayah kāraṇam ity āhuḥ.” - They also feel that the compatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker prompts the listener to interpret a passage by resorting to indication or laksanā. Thus in an expression viz. "gangāyām ghosah”, it is the speaker's intention that gives the meaning of 'gangātaţa’ to the word
was intended by the speaker differently, perhaps 'gosa' would have yielded the meaning of a 'mahā-mīna' i.e. a big fish, and the 'gangā' would have retained its original meaning of the flow of a river. But then, driven to such extreme, this view flagrantly overlooks the status of language as an objective instrument of communication. Dr. Raja correctly observes that (pp. 177, ibid) linguistic discourse would be absolutely impossible if normal signification of words, independent of the speaker's intention is totally disrespected.
It is therefore, that the Vedāntins reject this extreme view. When a parrot, or say a recorded material, repeats the speech of an original speaker, there is no personal intention on the part of this second speaker or recorder. The Vedānta-paribhāsa IV 38 explains it this way. But the Naiyāyikas hold that intention of the actual speaker is the same as that of the original speaker and in Vedic utterances there is always the intention of God. But the Vedāntins and Mimāmsakas suggest that all people do not believe in God. So it is not advisable to accept the veiw that (Nyāyakośa, p. 326) : "śukavākye bhagavad icchaiva gatih." They therefore feel that every word has an inherent capacity to express its meaning and even a sentence has a natural capacity to produce cognition of a unified sense in form of mutual association of the word-meanings (Vedānta-paribhāṣā, IV. 38-43). The primary meaning of a word therefore, is an innate power in the word itself which is there on the basis of the natural and permanent relation that exists between the word and the thing meant by it. The Vedāntins of course acknowledge that the knowledge of the speaker's intention does play an important role in the comprehension of meaning in case of ambiguous expressions. So, in case of a double-meaning expression, the meaning is restricted to just one sense only, in the absence of the speaker's intention to convey another sense also. The Vedāntaparibhāśa IV. 41 observes that 'tātparya' has to be defined as : "tad-anya-pratīti-icchayā anuccăritatvam." This qualification is a must before”, “tat-pratīti-janana-yogyatvam.”
Dr. Raja (pp. 179, ibid) observes that we have to keep in mind the fact that the difference in the views of the Naiyāyikas on one hand, and Mimāmsakas and Vedāntins on the other, concerning the part played by the speaker's intention in

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411 determining the meaning of a sentence is ultimately due to the difference in their
VS as to the nature of the knowledge derived from language. For the Naiyāyikas, sabda as a means of knowledge is valid verbal testimony which consists in the statement of a trustworthy person, an āpta-jana. The Nyāyasūtra I. i. 7 reads : "āptopadeśaḥ śabdah.” The agent may be either human or divine. But for the Mimāmsakas and Vedāntins the verbal testimony has self-evident validity i.e. "svatah-prāmānya”, i.e. it is irrespective of the speaker's intention. For the Mimāmsakas, in case of word-meanings also, the significative power is inherent in the words themselves and for the Naiyāyikas it is injected into the words by God's will or by that of the speaker. The Naiyāyikas call this meaning intended by the speaker by the name 'tātparya', but the Mimāmsakas and the Vedāntins use the term 'tātparya' for the meaning conveyed by the capacity of the words themselves. We will go to see later that Anandavardhana while establishing vyañjanā as a vrtti independent of abhidhā or lakṣaṇā, uses the term 'tātparya' to mean the intention of the speaker.
Even for the Naiyāyikas opinions differ regarding the importance of the speaker's intention as a factor in the understanding of the meaning of a given passage. Some are of the opinion that as the intention of the speaker is already covered up by 'ākāńksā', it need not be taken as an independent condition of verbal comprehension. Others hold that the knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is essential for verbal comprehension only in cases of equivocal terms and ambiguous expressions. For the former, in a statement such as "ayam eti putro rājñah puruso'pasāryatām" the knowledge of the speaker's intention only can decide whether the word 'rājñah' is to be construed with either 'putrah' or 'purusah', for the satisfaction of its ākānkṣā. But for the latter only equivocal expressions such as, "saindhavam anaya” require the knowledge of the intention of the speaker as 'saindhava' would mean both 'salt as well as 'a type of horse'. The Nyāyakośa p. 327, observes : "kecit tu "saindhavam anaya" ityādau nānártha-sthala eva tātparya-samśayā"deh sambhavena tatratya-śābda-bodha eva tātparya-niscayo hetuh... ity āhuh.” The Siddhāntamuktāvali, p. 316 also passes a similar observation. Nāgesa the grammarian, also accepts the importance of knowing the speaker's meaning in such equivocal expressions : The Laghumañjușa p. 524, has - “nānārtha-pada-sthale padavișayo’pi sa tathā. tad-grāhakam ca prakaraņā”dikam.”
Gangesa and Viśvanātha take knowledge of tātparya as the fourth requisite over and above ākānksā, yogyatā and samnidhi, for verbal comprehension. For the Naiyāyikas, “vaktur icchā tu tātparyam” i.e. tātparya is the meaning intended

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA by the speaker (Siddhāntamuktāvali. pp. 315, as quoted in, 'A History of Indian Logic' by S. C. Vidyabhusana). Other Naiyāyikas consider that tātparya is an allembracing factor and that it has an important part to play in the functioning of the first three factors viz. ākānksā, yogyatā and samnidhi. The Siddhānta muktavali pp. 303 observes - "tātparyagarbhā cā"sattih".
Even though, a speaker's intention is subjective, contextual factors can reasonably ascertain the speaker's intention. This intention is roughly termed ‘tātparya' which for the Naiyāyikas means what is intended to be conveyed, while for the Mîmāmsakas it means what is actually conveyed. It is only in the former sense that Ānandavardhana uses the term while meeting with the pūrvapaksa in form of Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas while establishing vyañjanā. Many ancients believe that the contextual factors should be taken as decisive in fixing the meaning of an utterance. Thus for them, these contextual factors are the causes of verbal comprehension. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this. The Siddhānta Muktāvali p. 35, observes: “na ca tātparya-grāhakānām prakaranā"dīnām śābda-bodhe kāraṇatvam iti vācyam.” They maintain that the contextual factors are not directly helping in the understanding of an utterance but they only indirectly show the meaning intended by the speakers.
All philosophical systems accept the importance of getting at the speaker's intention in understanding a sentence. The difference lies in the proportion of importance they attach to this. Both viz. intention of the speaker as well as the objective strength of language are important in conveying the meaning.
The Mimāmsakas use the term 'tātparya' for the purport of a passage dealing with a topic and refer to six indications or 'lingas', by which we can arrive at the ‘tātparya' of a given expression, objectively without reference to the speaker or author. These six lingas are · (i) upakramó-pasam-hārau, i.e. 'upakrama' or introduction or beginning and 'upasamhāra' or conclusion, (ii) 'abhyāsa' i.e. repetition of the main topic, (iii) 'apūrvatā' or novelty of the theme or subject matter, (iv) 'phala' or the result intended, (v) 'arthavāda' or eulogistic remarks, and (vi) 'upapatti' i.e. arguments in favour of the main theme - The Nyāyakośa p. 714 observes :
"upakramópasamhārau abhyāso'pūrvatā phalam, arthavādópapatti ca lingam tātparya-nirnaye.”

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The Mimāmsakas hold that the real purport or tatparya of a given sentence can be studied objectively without reference to the subjective element, viz. intention of the speaker. Not unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Mimāmsakas also analyse the sentence into two parts such as the uddeśya and the vidheya or roughly the subject and the predicate. The first part i.e. uddeśya carries a sense which is siddha i.e. it is already existent and is known from other sources - The Nyayakośa p. 34, observes - "pramāṇántara-siddhasya kimcid dharmántara-vidhānártham punar upanyāsyatā."
The second part consists of meanings that are brought into existance i.e. which are 'sādhya'. They are also termed as 'bhūta' and 'bhavya' or 'anuvādya' and 'vidheya' respectively. We know that Mammața while dealing with a pūrva-pakṣa against vyañjana uses these terms such as 'bhūta' and 'bhavya'. For the Mimāmsakas the tatparya or real import of a sentence lies in the 'vidheya' element. Mammata has put it as "bhūta-bhavya-samuccāraṇe bhūtam bhavyāya vyapadiśyate..." etc. The anuvadya - i.e. subject element is that which discloses to the listener what any utterance is about and is not always indispensable, and is used in a sentence only to help the listener to grasp the meaning clearly. It is actually 'vidheya' which is something newly stated and is to be known by the listener and from the standpoint of the speaker it is enough if the 'vidheya' alone is uttered.
Normally in sanskrit the order of sequence of words indicating either subject or predicate is not fixed as a rule, but writers on Mimamsā and even literary critics want the subject to be mentioned first i.e. ahead of the predicate or vidheya. A wellknown maxim reads as-anuvadyam anuktvā ca na vidheyam udirayet. This is supposed to be from Kumārila but is not actually found in the Śloka-vārtika, Hemacandra (viveka, p. 244, Edn. Parikh and Kulkarni, '64, Bombay) also quotes it without mentioning the source. This is quoted by Mahima also (pp. 432, Kārikā 94, vya. vi. II. Edn. Rewaprasad). The violation of this untold subject-predicatesequence-rule makes for 'vidheya-avimarśa'-dosa or a poetic blemish in view of the ālamkarikas. It is also called a-vimṛsta-vidheyámsa-dosa.
The Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas take the sentence to be a chain of individual words and so they have necessarily to depend on the power of tātparya to explain how a connected meaning is collected from a sentence. Thus for them a sentence necessarily conveys something over and above the meanings of individual words that go to form a sentence. The whole i.e. the sentence sense is always something more than the sum total of individual word-meanings. Some Naiyayikas explain this by resorting to the function of vṛtti called tatparya-vṛtti.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Normally we use language to convey some sense. When words are used in juxtaposition viz. samabhivyāhāra, it is understood that the speaker wants to convey a connected sense. The Tattvabindu p. 131, has - "pratipitsitam khalu etad iti pratipādayisyantah padāni uccārayanti.” Kumārila also has - "visistárthaprayuktā hi samabhivyāhrtir jane” i.e. samabhivyāhști or use of words in juxtaposition is done with a special meaning (in mind). The anvitábhidhāna theory holds that the intention or tātparya makes the primary significative power i.e. abhidhā convey the additional significance of a sentence. According to the abhihitánvaya theory, abhidhā or the power of expression has a limited capacity to yield only the samketita artha of a word. Thus, abhidhā is restricted to wordmeanings alone. These word-meanings convey the additional significance through the power of 'laksaņā' based on the strength of tātparya along with the other three such as ākānkṣā, yogyatā and ásatti or samnidhi. This function of the sentence to convey the sentence-sense on the basis of the speaker's intention is called tātparyavrtti by some ancient Naiyāyikas and is termed 'samsarga-maryādā' by later Naiyāyikas. We come across these terms in the R.G. of Jagannātha also. Anvitábhidhānavāda and Abhihitánvayavāda :
We will now go into a detailed understanding of the two principal ways of
xing among the Mimāmsakas and others who attempt to explain the fact of a correlated sentence-sense. These are termed as the anvitábhidhānavada and the abhihitánvayavāda. For that we will have to begin with the relation of words in a sentence. The basic problem discussed by indian thinkers is that if every word in a sentence has its own specific meaning, how does a sentence, which is only a collection of these words, has a unified meaning ? This problem has relevance with compound word also having units with individual senses. For Vājapyāyana, like the Mimāmsakas, the meaning of a word is “jāti' i.e. a class or a universal, and that of a sentence is the samsarga or mutual relation of the word-meanings. Helārāja (on V.P. III Jāti-samuddeśa) observes - "jātivādino vājapyāyanasya tu mate samsargo vākyárthaḥ, sāmānyānām samśleşamātra-rūpatvāt vākyárthasya.” Kumārila (Tantravārtika, p. 446) says - "samsargo'pi padárthānām anyonyenā’nurañjanam... gotve śuklatva-samsargah, śuklatve vā gotva-samsargah." - Thus, an expression 'śuklā gauh', means the association of cowness and whiteness. As this association is one, words make for a syntactic unity.
For Vyādi the meaning of a word was any particular i.e. dravya of a class. It is a concrete thing and not a quality. Thus Vyādi holds that the function of a word

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415 is to distinguish the thing it stands for, from all similar objects. Kumārila observes at the same source that, “bhedo nāma padárthānām vyavacchedaḥ parasparam... Vyakti-padártha-pakse sarvavyaktīnām śuklā”dibhih krsnā"di-vyavaccheda-mātram vaktavyam.” Helārāja also observes (there only) - "vyādi-mate bhedo vākyárthah, padavācyānām dravyānām dravyántara-nivrtti-tātparyena abhidheyatvāt.” Thus a 'cow' means not that object which is characteriszed by cowness, but that which is distinguished from a horse. Thus in a sentence words are not expected to signify things not having certain attributes but as excluding some. Vyādi's view can be understood to contain the germs of the Apoha theory of the Buddhists, provided Vyādi is taken as earlier.
Anvitábhidhānavāda : Prabhākara and his followers held that words convey a meaning only in the context of a sentence eventhough for them words are real and actual constitutents of language. Each word, though having its only meaning, serves only as part of a sentence. When we hear a sentence, we collect a unitary sense which follows as the sentence-sense. The basic problem is whether this sentence-sense or the unitary sense arises directly from the collection of words or whether it is arrived at indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of individual words that make for a sentence. The anvitábhidhāna-vāda opts for the former while the abhihitánvaya-vāda supports the latter option.
For the anvitábhidhānavāda, the meaning of a sentence is made up of individual word-meanings and their mutual correlation, and these two i.e. individual word-meanings and their mutual relations are conveyed by the words themselves. For the abhihitánvaya theory, words convey only their individual meanings and the mutual relation is conveyed by these word-meanings and not the words themselves. Prabhākara and his followers emphasise the natural method by which children learn individual meanings of individual words. Mammata puts it brilliantly in his K.P. (V), when he observes :
“ye’py āhuhśabda-vrddhábhidheyāmś ca pratyaksenā’tra paśyati, śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena cestayā. - 1 anyathā'nupapattyā tu bodhet saktim dvayā"tmikām,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA arthāpatyā’vabodheta sambandham tri-pramāņakam. - 2
iti pratipādita-diśā, devadatta 'gām ānaya' ityādi uttama-vrddha-vākya-prayogāt deśād deśántaram sasnādimantam artham madhyama-vrddhe nayati sati, 'anena asmās vākyād ayam arthaḥ pratipannah' iti tacceștayā anumāya, tayor akhanda-vākya-vākyárthayor arthāpattyā vācya-vācaka-bhāva-laksanam sambandham avadhārya bālas tatra vyutpadyate.
parataḥ, 'caitra, gām ānaya, devadatta aśvam ānaya, devadatta gām naya' ity ādi vākya-prayoge tasya tasya śabdasya tam tam artham avadhārayati iti anvayavyatirekābhyām pravstti-nivịtti-kāri vākyam eva prayoga-yogyam iti vākyasthitānām eva padānām anvitaih padárthaih anvitānām eva samketo grhyate iti vićiştā eva padārthā vākyártho, na tu padārthānām vaiśistyam.
vady api väkyántara-prayuktāni api pratyabhijñā-pratyayena täni eva etāni padāni niścīyante iti padārthantara-matrena anvitah samketa-gocarah tathā'pi sāmānyávacchādito viśesa-rūpa eva asau pratipadyate, vyatisaktānām padārthānām tathābhūtatvād iti anvitábhidhānavādinah."
“And some others expound (the process of denotation) as follows :
The word, the elderly men and the object denoted are directly perceived here (i.e. in the process of learning) by a child. The listener's understanding of it is deduced (by the child) through inference and action. The two-fold power (of the word to denote and of the object to be thus denoted by that particular word) is cognised by presumption based on otherwise in-explicability'. Thus the relationship (between word and its meaning) is known through three means of cognition (i.e. perception, inference and presumption).
According to what is stated above when a sentence, such as, “Devadatta bring a cow", is uttered by an elderly man, the younger man is seen to bring from one place to another an object with the dewlap etc., the child then infers from this action that such and such meaning has been understood by the younger man from such a sentence. Thereupon the child makes out the denotative relationship between the above sentence and its meaning as one indivisible whole, and thus the child himself comprehends its meaning. Later on when sentences such as, “Caitra, bring the cow”, “Devadatta, bring the horse”, “Devadatta, take away the cow", are used, he makes out a particular meaning from a particular word on the basis of positive and negative considerations. From this it follows that a sentence alone, that

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makes a man act or refrain from it, is fit for being used. Hence, the denotative convention is apprehended from the connected words occuring in a sentence only with the meanings of words (generally) connected with one another. To conclude, only the correlated meanings of words are the meaning of a sentence; it is not that there is correlation of (unconnected) word meanings.
Though the individual words, found to be used in other sentences, are regarded to be the same by recognitive apprehension, and thus convention of word-meaning is found as connected with the other words (i.e. the denotative convention is comprehended as connected with particular word-meaning), yet, that particular. form itself is comprehended as qualified by generic character becaus intermixed word-meanings are of the said (i.e. of particular and not generic) character. (Since the particular and the generic cannot be divided, the comprehension of the particular form is not without the apprehension of its generic character). This is the view of the theorists of correlated denotation (anvitábhidhāna)." - (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, K.P. pp. 159-161).
The anvitábhidhāna theory thus stands for 'conveying the meaning of the correlated words' i.e. "anvitānām abhidhānam”.
Normally, the injunctive sentences produce a visible reaction in a listener. So, only from such sentences in the imperative (or potential) mood, that the meanings of words can be naturally collected. For the Bhātta Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas, listerner's reaction can be noted even in case of indicative sentences such as, “putras te jātah” or “kanyā te garbhiņi”, producing joy or shock in the listener respectively. The Mimāmsaka's preoccupation with vedic injunctions led to the view that a typical sentence should be in an imperative mood, since the whole direct denotation of the veda, according to them, must lie in enjoining something to be done. (codanā-laksano dharmah). If such an interpretation is not seen in some cases, then the comprehension of meaning has to depend on something indirectly connected with the injunction. But for the Vedāntins, the direct denotation of the important vedic texts is seen in pointing out some well-established facts, and not in commanding something. Thus for them, the importance lies in indicative sentences. Later Indian logic also deals with such indicative sentences. Prabhākara, however, is of the opinion that even in case of indicative sentences, the comprehension of the denotation of words can be obtained only by observing the usage of elders, and that this can be known only from injunctive sentences as seen in the passage quoted from Mammața as above.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA But, if the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in injunctive sentences, it follows that every word must express its meaning only as related to the other factors of injunction. Word expressing a verb involving a command would be taken as the principal word in a sentence. So, the Prābhākaras are of the opinion that no word can be comprehended as having an independent meaning when isolated from a sentence. The meaning of words for them, is to be understood only as related to something which has to be done i.e. kārya. For Prabhākara the
ng maxim is - 'väkyārthena vyavahārah' i.e. all usage is through a sentence and its meaning. For Prabhākāra the relation of a sentence with its meaning is the only parmanent entity (Ref. Brhati, pp. 135, 188 etc.). Sālikanātha elaborating on this observes that the word alone, by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only the sentence that does it; and this is clear from the fact that we learn individual word-meanings later after observing the usage of older people. This usage is necessarily in form of sentences. So, only sentence has to be accepted as expressive of meaning and never a word by itself. This does not mean that the followers of Prabhākara totally deny the existence of individual word-meaning. But they only insist that gathering of individual word-meanings is rendered possible only as part of the correlated sentence-sense alone. Collecting of isolated word-sense is impossible except from its relation with the sentence-sense. Words do yield their sense separately, but they do not end there. The listener knows the general meaning of words, but his experience leads him to believe that words are meaningful only when they are connected in a sentence, and certainly not when they are isolated. Thus words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the strength of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position. Words convey, thus, not only their individual meanings but also their syntactic relation. So, the sentencemeaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves. We may, say that for these theorists 'abhidhā' or the power of expression is vested in a sentence only. The Vākyārtha-mātļkā-vștti, pp. 5 observes -
"ākānkṣā-samnidhi-prāptayogyárthántara-samgatān, svārthān āhuḥ padānīti
vyutpattiḥ samśritā mayā.” It seems that the ancient Mimāņsakas held this ‘anvitábhidhāna' theory. The Mi. Sū. I. i. 25 seems to support this when it declares - "tad-bhūtānām kriyárthena samāmnāyah, arthasya tan-nimittarvāt.” Dr. Raja, however observes (pp. 199, ibid)

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419 that the Sabarabhāsya passage explaining the comprehension of the sentence-sense seems to go against this. He observes - (Sabarabhāsya on Mi. Sū. I. i. 25) - "padani hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivștta-vyāpārāņi, athédānīm padārthā avagatā santo vākyártham gamayanti.” Prabhākara and his followers explain this passage as supporting their theory for according to them what is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing - the meaning of words as qualified by one another. For this we can consult Brhati on this passage and also Vākyártha-mātrkāvrtti p. 21. This interpretation however, is criticised in the Nyāyaratnamālā in its Vakyárthanirnaya section. However, we feel like going with the Prabhākara-school-explanation and not find contradiction for as Dr. Raja himself concedes that the ancient Mimāmsakas were inclined towards anvitábhidhāna theory.
It will be interesting to quote from prof. G. V. Devasthali here, when he observes, (pp. 213 - in his, “Mimāmsā the Vākyaśāstra of Ancient India” - Vol. I, - Booksellers' publishing Company, - Bombay-4, '59) - as follows -
15 - "From this discussion we thus arrive at another point which has been expressly stated by Sabara at Mi. Sū. III. 2.1. There it is in clear terms declared by Sabara that a padārtha, if it is not connected with another padārtha, can't give rise to vākyārtha. - “sāmānyavrtti hi padam, viśeşa-vịtti vākyam. sāmānyena-abhipravsttānām padārthānām yad viśese avasthāpanam sa vākyārthah. tad etad uktam-tad bhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyo'rthasya tan-nimittatvāt, iti. tatra pratyaksataḥ padārtho, vākyārthaḥ punar anumānikah. tad etad avagamyatām. kevala-svārtha vrtti padam anupadeśakam iti padāntarena samnihitena ekavākyatām abhyupaiti, nā’nyathā iti." . This is obviously so because in the absence of any such connection the pada by itself will yield only the 'sāmānya', which is its signification, and not the 'visesa', which is the vākyārtha, since there is no reason why it should do so. For, as we have already seen above, it is only to avoid 'anarthakya-prasanga' that a sāmānya-vāci pada is made to yield some visesa artha; while as long as the word stands by itself there is no such prasanga at all.”
Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. 4 (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi '97-'98, Ahmedabad) refers to this theory as the dirgha-dirghatara-vyāpāra-vāda which holds that there is no limit to the extent of the meaning of a given expression. For these theorists abhidhā power can extend itself to any limit and even cover the collection of an implicit sense as well. Bhartrhari - V.P. II. 329 also refers to this

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SAHẮDAYĀLOKA when he has
"apare tu padasyaiva tam artham pratijānate śabdāntarábhi-sambandham antareņa vyavasthitam." and also, V.P. II. 330 - "yasmin uccarite śabde yadā yórthaḥ pratīyate, tam āhur artham tasyaiva
nányad arthasya lakṣaṇam." This theory therefore chooses to explain the subtle implications and suggestions - the whole of pratīyamāna artha i.e. implicit sense, as seen in poetry, also by this extended abhidhā power. So, for the anvitábhidhāna theory though there are many words in a sentence and therefore many word-meanings, they are meaningful only in the context of the total sentence-sense and therfore, through unity of purpose they give rise to unity of sentence - sense.
This theory has been strongly criticized by the Bhātța-school of Mimāmsakas. They argue as follows: Tattvabindu p. 93 - "padántarasya vaiyarthyam asrutánvayabodhane." If it is held that the first word or any word in its full sense means the unitary sense of the sentence itself, the other words in the sentence will be superfluous. This argument is similar to the one raised against the sphota theory also. It may be said that the subsequent words repeat the same sentence-sense and makes it clearer, or it can also be said that the other words are used to restrict the meaning indicated by the first word. Yet another objection against the anvitábhidhāna theory is that it involves the fallacy of interdependence - (p. 93, ibid) :
"śrutánvitábhidhāne tu
vyaktam anyonya-samśrayam." Thus, if one of the words, say the first, in a sentence, is to convey its own meaning as well as its relation to the other words, the full meaning of the word can be collected only after understanding the other words; and in the same way, the meanings of the other words depend on this word. If it is suggested that the individual word-meaning and its relation to other words are not conveyed simultaneously, but gradually, the individual word-meaning being conveyed first, and the relation later, then there will not be the fallacy of interdependence, but in

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421 this case, this explanation will involve the unwarranted assumption of two separate functions for the primary power called abhidhā - (pp. 94, ibid) -
It is therefore that the anvitábhidhānavādins hold that there is only one potency for words to express the meaning as related to the rest of the words. It is through recollection that we remember the meanings of words, and this is by rousing the mental impressions of previous experiences of the use of the words. As a matter of experience, normally we never come across words except as related in a sentence and that isolated words have no existence in normal speech-activity. The word-meaning and the relation to other words are both known through abhidhā.
The Bhātra school has objection to this position also (Tattvabindu, p. 95). They hold that eventhough we observe words functioning in different contexts of situations, in all of which they occur as related to a sentence, still we are able to understand the isolated senses of the individual words separately also. Otherwise, a word learnt through from its use in one context, cannot be applied in another context. Again, the very principle of recognition is based on our capacity to recognize something isolated from a given context. We are able to recognize a person in a place and time different from those when we had met him first. (Tattvabindu, pp. 116). It can be argued here, that we do recognize a person, may be for a second time, also in some given time and place, and not as isolated of all situations.
A further obiection raised against the anvitábhidhāna theory is that the meaning of a sentence can be known from the meanings of the words remembered eventhough the words might have been forgotten. Our experience says that in a long sentence we forget the earlier words used, but we remember their meanings and yet we arrive at the full sentence-sense. The Šāstradīpikā p. 153, observes :
"pūrvabhāgeșu vākyasya vismrtesy api drọyate, vākyárthávagatiḥ puņsām
padártha-smrtiśālinām." The relation of the words in a sentence is not the same as that of the letters in a word; for in case of a word we do not arrive at word-sense if we forget the initial letters. Abhihitánvaya-vāda :
The Bhāțţa-school of Mīmāmsakas and some Naiyāyikas support this theory. The Vākyártha section of the Nyāyaratnamālā and the Tattvabindu, Mānameyodaya

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SAHṚDAYALOKA and the śabda section of the Siddhānta-muktāvali suggest the acceptance of abhihitánvayavāda by some Naiyāyikas also. For these theorists the meaning of a sentence is a correlated meaning of individual word-senses. From the sentence, first we collect individual word-meanings one by one and then we correlate these meanings with the help of ākānkṣā, yogyatā and samnidhi.
Śabara on MI. Sū. I. i. 25, refers to this theory when he observes: "padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya, nivṛtta-vyāpārāṇi, athedānīm padarthā avagatāḥ santo vakyártham gamayanti." - Thus in a sentence the words make for their individual senses and stop at that. So the meanings of the words thus known make for the meaning of a sentence. But the Prabhakaras explain this passage differently by taking 'artha' in the sense of 'anvaya' i.e. syntactic relation. Sälikanatha thus explains in the Vākyártha-mātṛkā-vṛtti, pp. 22 that by the word 'artha' the bhāṣyakāra means 'anvaya' "artha-śabdena bhāṣyakāro'nvayam aha." But Kūmārila in his Tantravartitika, p. 445 has -
"padárthaiḥ padavijñatair, väkyárthaḥ pratipadyate."
- i.e. the meaning of a sentence is collected with the help of word-senses expressed through individual words. The sentence, like words, does not have a meaning of its own independently. It is observed "pṛthag-bhūtair eva padair itaretara-nirapekṣaiḥ sveṣu padártheṣu ukteṣu tatsamsargād eva padavyāpāraanapekṣo vākyártha-pratyayo bhavati." - Thus, the meanings of words having been conveyed by each word, independently of one another, it is exclusively from the connection among word meanings, that there follows the apprehension of the sentence. The correlated meaning is brought about by the three factors such as ākānkṣā, yogyatā and samnidhi.
Tantravārttika, pp. 455 has

"ākānkṣā samnidhānam ca yogyată ceti ca trayam, sambandha-kāraṇatvena
kiptam na-'nantara-śrutiḥ."
We know that the grammarian Vājapyāyana held that the sentence-sense is the 'samsarga' or mutual correlation of individual word-senses, expressed by words. The theory of Vyāḍi, as observed earlier, was a later one which held that the sentencesense is a mutual exclusion of word-meanings. This developed into Apoha theory.
-

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“Tātparya"
423 As to the nature of cognition produced by a word there are two views. The first one holds that by observing the contexts of situations we arrive at the word-sense. Thus a word indicates its meaning only by rousing the mental impressions of such contexts. So, ultimately, the knowledge of a word is only a kind of recollection. This view is held by the anvitábhidhāna school of Prābhākaras and also by some from the abhihitánvaya school such as Cidānanda, the author of Niti-tattvā"virbhāva. The Mānameyodaya observes - (p. 93) "sabdo'pi samskārodbodhana-dvārena eva padārtham bodhayati iti samsargam eva padārthajñānam iti cidānandaprabhrtayah (Nititattvā” virbhāva, p. 233). Kumārila also refers to this view when he says that a word is nothing more than a reminder of the meaning - Ślokavārtika, p. 432, sabda-section observes :
“padam abhyadhikábhāvāt
smārakam na viśisyate.” The Vākyártha-mātņkā-vítti, p. 15, quotes a vārttika -
"te’pi naivásmộtā yasmād vākyártham gamayanti nah, tasmāt tatsmaraneșv eva
samhatesu pramāṇatā.” Vācaspatimiśra also says that, the relation between the word and its meaning is, strictly speaking, that between a recollector and the recollected, and that a word does not produce the cognition of the meaning directly and independently, but by rousing the mental impressions of the things previously known. The Tattvabindu, p. 160 has - "vācya-vācakatvam ca pratyāyya-pratyāyakatvam tat ca vicāryamānam smārya-smārakatvam eva." also see p. 159 - "na céyam sāksād artha-dhiyam adhatte, yena na tat sādhikā syāt, api tu samskārodbodhana-kramena." - The Yogasūtra-bhāsya III. 17. also has - "samketas tu pada-padárthayor itaretaradhyāsarūpaḥ smrtyā"tmakaḥ.” But according to Pārthasārathimiśra and some others also, the meaning of a word is conveyed by the primary significative potency of the word i.e. by abhidhā. The Mānameyodaya pp. 93 has - "padaih padártha-bodhanam śabda-śakti-janyatvāt abhidhānam eva iti pārthasarathi-miśrā”dayah.” Our experience suggests that the meaning is conveyed directly by a word and not indirectly through remembering the various contexts of situations in which a word was used. Again, it is easier to assume that the meaning flows directly from a given word through its power of expression, rather then to accept that it reminds us of our former experiences of situations when a particular word was used and thus gives us the meaning. The Nyāya-ratna-mālā, p. 107, has - "sabdántaram artha

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA pratyaya-darśanāt tasyaiva tatra kāranatvam kalpayitum yuktam, na tu śabdāt samskāródbodhaḥ, tataś ca artha-pratitir iti yuktam; praņālyām pramāņābhāvāt. tasmāt abhidhāyakam eva padam, na smārakam."
According to the Abhihitánvayavādins, when we hear a sentence, we first of all collect the individual meanings of words in a sentence. This we do one after the other. Then these word-meanings are cor-related on the basis of expectancy, consistancy and juxta-position. Thus we collect the unified meaning of a given sentence - as a whole. The expression of individual meanings comes before the knowledge of the logical connection among them. The collective memory - samūhā”lambana-smrti-puts the isolated ideas together. The individual wordmeanings are remembered separately till all the words are heard. This is followed by the simultaneous cognition of the sentence meaning in which all wordmeanings are properly cor-related to one another on the strength of ākāńksā"di i.e. expectancy, etc. For the anvitábhidhāna theory, as we know, each word in a sentence, when spoken, contributes to the meaning of the sentence which is thus gradually revealed, leading to its full grasping at the end. This revealation of sentence-sense is getting clearer and clearer with the utterance of each subsequent words.
But for the abhihitánvayavāda, the sentence-sense is something plus, i.e. something more than the sum total of individual word-meanings. This additional sense arises after the word-meanings get inter-related through ākānksā"di. : "tātparyartho višesa-vapuh, apadārtho'pi vākyārthah samullasati"-observes Mammata in the K.P. II. This unified sentence-sense is termed differently as 'vākyártha', i.e. sentence-sense, or 'samsarga' or association of word-meanings, or tātparyártha or purport or intention of the speaker. Where this speciality of signification comes from is difficult to explain. Some call it vākya-sakti or the power of a sentence. Others term it as 'samsarga-maryādā' or the 'law of association'. Still others advance a power called tātparya-śakti i.e. purport, the power of a sentence to convey the intended sense in form of a related and unified meaning. The V.P. II. 42 observes :
"sambandhe sati yattv anyad ādhikyam upajāyate, vākyártham eva tam prāhur: aneka-pada-samśrayam."

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"Tātparya"
425 Pynyarāja observes on this - “padānām parasparánvaye padārtha-vaśād yad ādhikyam, samsargaḥ, sa vākyárthaḥ”. See also M.bh. I. p. 462 - on Vārttika 2 - on Pa. 2.3.46
"na vā vākyárthatvāt.” - na vā vaktavyam. kim kāraṇam ? vākyárthatvāt. yad atra adhikyam vākyárthaḥ saḥ
But how is this association or samsarga conveyed ? This is perhaps not satisfactorily explained. The individual words have completed their function of conveying their individual meaning. They cannot convey their inter-relation also and thus make for the sentence-sense. Words cannot convey their mutual relation directly because between the words and the sentence-sense, lie the individual wordsenses. Thus, it is only the word-meanings that can be held responsible to convey the sentence-sense and this also in their mutually related form. This is the view of the anvitábhidhänavādins. There is a slight difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Bhātta Mimamsakas regarding as to how this mutual relation is conveyed. For the Naiyāyikas the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation of meanings. But the Bhātta Mimāmsakas hold that the sentence-sense is always conveyed by the secondary power of words : Tattvabindu p. 153 quotes Kumārila Bhatta -
“vākyártho laksyamāņa hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthiti).” The two conditions of lakṣaṇā viz. mukhyārtha-bādha or incompatibility of the expressed sense, and 'tadyoga' i.e. relation between the primary sense and secondary intended sense are present here also. But this should not mean that the sentence-sense is not derived from words. Kumārila Bhatta observes that though the letters of words do convey the word-senses directly, but they do not stop at that. The knowledge of word-senses only is useless for the hearer. The co individual meanings by the words has to be there for the cognition of the sentencesense, as is the case of the generating of fire by fuel for cooking meals. The ślokavārttika, p. 943, and also the Tattvabindu p. 153 which quotes the same, has -
“sākṣād yady api kurvanti padártha-pratipādanam, varnās tathā'pi naitasmin paryavasyanti nisphale." vākyárthamitaye teşām pravṛttau nántarīyakam,

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426
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA päke jvāléva kästhānām
padártha-pratipādanam." S. C. Chatterjee in his 'Nyāya Theory of knowledge', Uni. of calcutta, 1939, explains as shown by Kunjunni Raja (p. 211, ibid) that the abhihitánvaya theory gains support for the following reasons : "If the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, then the classification of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc., becomes meaningless. Further, in every case in which we are to understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first understand the meaning of its component words. Without a previous understanding of words no one can understand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover if the meaning of a sentence were quite independent of the meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence c convey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the basis of our knowledge of words and there separate meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding of the sentences, since they are new and unitelligible to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words
Perhaps the anvitábhidhānavāda is an advance over this. The fact is that the sentence-sense is more useful to both the speaker and the hearer. Later writers such as Mukula Bhatta tried to reconcile these two views. For him both these theories contain partial truth. He holds that if we look at from the point of view of a sentence, the anvitábhidhānavāda stands to gain. He therefore suggests a combination of these views and calls it a theory of samuccaya. He also discusses the abhāva of these two. We have discussed in detail these views while dealing with abhidh, in Mukula's Abhidhāvrtta-mātrkā (Ch. V).
Alamkārikas - Tātparya : Abhinavagupta is perhaps the first Alamkārika, who names tātparya as a separate vstti or function of words accepted by abhihitånvayavāda. He speaks of four distinct functions of words such as abhidhā, tātparya, laksana and vyañjanā. Locana reads as follows: (under Dhv. I. 4, pp. 26, 28 Edn. Nandi) : ... “trayo hy atra vyāpārā samvedyante. padártheșu sāmānyā”tmasu abhidhāvyāpāraḥ, samayápeksayárthávagamana-śaktir hy abhidhā. samayaś ca tāyaty eva, na višeşámse, ānantyād vyabhicārācсaikasya. tato višesarūpe vākyárthe tātparyaśaktiḥ parasparánvite, “sāmānyāny anyathāsiddher višesam gamayanti hi" iti nyāyat. .... na caivam bhaktir eva dhvanih. bhaktir hi lakṣaṇāvyāpāras tệtīyakaksyā-niveșī. caturthyām tu kaksāyām dhvana-vyāpāraḥ.... tena samayápeksā vācyávagamana- śaktir abhidhāśaktih. tad anyathā'nupaptisahāyárthávabodhanaśaktis tātparya-saktih. mukhyārtha-bādhā"di-sahakāry apekşártha-pratibhāsana-śaktir lakṣaṇāsaktiḥ. tat-sakti-trayopajanitárthávagama

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“Tātparya"
427 mūlajāta-tat-pratibhāsa-pavitrita-pratipattr-pratibhā-sahāyárthávadyotanaśaktir dhvanavyāpāraḥ. sa ca prāgvrttam vyāpāratrayam nyakkurvan pradhānabhūtah kāvyā”tmety āśayena niședhapramukhatayā ca prayojana-viśesópi nișed ha-visaya ity uktam."
Thus, abhidhā is the power of the words to signify the primary meaning which refers only to the class-jāti and not viśesa or the particular. In a sentence the individual words give only the isolated word-meaning with the help of abhidhā. The correlation or syntactic relation of these is conveyed by the tātparya-śakti of the words. The intention of the speaker, which is the general purport of a sentence is of course the unified sentence-sense. So, the words are considered to have a power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. This power is tātparyasakti. Laksanā, the third power, comes in only when the primary word-meanings are not compatible with one another : “mukhyartha-bädhāyām laksanāyāḥ prakļptiḥ. bādhā ca virodha-pratītir eva.” (Locana).
Anandavardhana does refer to 'tātparya' or intention of the speaker while dealing with the Mimāmsakas where he explains the difference in nature and scope of abhidhā and vyañjanā. But he never direcly mentions or discusses the tātparya śakti as a power of word or sentence. He has an occasion to mention the 'vakyārtha-padārtha-nyaya' also. But here also he does not talk of the tātparya-vrtti. He observes (pp. 312, ibid, under Dhv. III. 33) : “tad evam śābdavyavahāre trayah prakārāh. vācakatvam gunavrttir vyañjakatvam ca. tatra vyañjakatve yadā vyangyaprādhānyam tadā dhvanih..." We will deal with Anandavardhana's views in greater detail when we will look into Dhanika, later.
We have seen how Mukula has no business to talk about tātparya, however he has a detailed discussion concerning the abhihitánvayavāda and the anvitábhidhānavāda under his all encompassing abhidhā, as noted above. Kuntaka also had no business to talk of tātparya-vrtti for his broader concept of vicitrā abhidhā covers everything.
It is interesting to note that Dhananjaya and Dhanika pick up the case of tātparya against vyañjanā or dhvani of Anandavardhana. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 181183) (śr. pra) gives the text of Dhanika's avaloka as read by Prof. Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. It reads as : "nā'pi vākyarthatvam vyangyasya, trtiya-kaksā visayatvāt. tathā hi - 'bhrama dhārmika' ityādau padártha-visayábhidhālakṣaṇaprathama-kakşátikrānta-kriyākāraka-samsargátmakavidhivisaya-vākyártha kaksátikrānta-trtīya-kaksátikrānto nisedhā"tmā vyangya-laksanórthah vyañjakaśaktyadhīnaḥ sphusam evávabhāsate. ato nā’sau vākyárthaḥ. nanu ca třtiya-kaksā

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
viṣayatvam aśrūyamāṇa-padártha-tātparyeṣu 'visam bhunkshva' itya"divākyeṣu nisedhárthaviṣayeṣu pratīyate eva vakyárthe; na cátra vyañjakatvavādinā'pi väkyárthatvam neṣyate, tātparyād ananyatvad dhvaneḥ. tanna; svarthasya dvitīyakakṣyāyām aviśrantasya tṛtīyakakṣábhāvāt, saiva niṣedha-kakṣā tatra dvitiyakakṣā; vidhau kriyākāraka-samsargá-nupapatteḥ; prakaraṇāt pitari vaktari putrasya visabhakṣaṇa-niyogabhāvāt. rasavad-vākyeṣu ca vibhāva-pratipattilakṣaṇa-dvitiyakakṣāyām rasanavagamat. tad uktam -
apratistham aviśrantam
428
atrocyate
svarthe yat paratām idam,
vākyam vigāhate tatra nyāyyā tatpartásya sā. yatra tu svartha-viśrantam pratisthām tāvad āgatam, tat prasarpati tatra syāt sarvatra dhvaninā sthitiḥ.

"vācyā prakaraṇádibhyo buddhisthā vā yathā kriyā, vākyārthaḥ kārakairyuktaḥ
sthāyibhāvas tathetaraiḥ."
yathā laukika-vākyeṣu śrūyamāṇakriyeṣu 'gām abhyaja' ityā"diṣu aśrūyamāṇakriyeṣu ca "dvāram dvāram", ityā"diṣu sva-śabdópādānāt prakaraṇā"divaśād' buddhisanniveśinī kriyéva kārakópacitā vākyárthaḥ, tatha kāvyeṣvapi sva-śabdopādānāt kvacit, "prityai navoḍhā priyā" ityevam ādau, kvacic ca prakaraṇā"di-vaśāt niyata-vihita-vibhāvā"dyavinābhāvād vā, sākṣād bhāvaka-cetasi viparivartamānaḥ ratyā"diḥ sthāyī sva-sva-vibhāvánubhāva-vyabhicāribhiḥ tat-tatśabdopanitaiḥ samskāra-paramparayā parām praudhim ānīyamānaḥ ratyā"divākyárthaḥ. na ca apadárthasya vakyárthatvam nástīti vācyam. kārya-paryavasayitvat tätparya-śakteḥ. tatha hi pauruṣeyam a-pauruṣeyam vākyam sarvam kāryaparam, a-tatparatve'nupādeyatvāt, unmattā"di-vākyavat. kāvyaśabdānām ca anvayavyatirekābhyām niratiśaya-sukhā"svāda-vyatirekeņa pratipādya-pratipadakayoḥ pravṛtti-viṣayayoḥ prayojanántaránupalabdheḥ svadódbhutir eva kāryatvena avadhāryate. tad udbhūtinimittatvam ca vibhāvā"di-samsṛstasya sthāyina eva avagamyate. ato vākyasya-abhidhānaśaktiḥ tena tena rasena ākṛṣyamāṇā tat-tat

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429
"Tātparya" svādā’pekṣitávāntara-vibhāvā”di-pratipādana-dvārā sva-paryavasāyitām ānīyate, tad etad vibhāvā”dayaḥ padārtha-sthānīyāḥ tat-samsęsto rasā”dir vākyárthaḥ, tad etad kāvya-vākyam, yadīyau tāv imau padārtha-vākyārthau. na ca evam sati gītā”divad vācya-vācaka-bhāvā'nupayogah, visista-vibhāvā"di-samagri-vidusām eva tathā-vidharatyādi-bhāvanāvarām eva svādodbhuteh. tad anena atiprasango’pi nirastaḥ. īdrśi ca vākyártha-nirūpane parikalpitábhidhāśakti-vasenaiva samstavākyárthá-vagateh śaktyantara-parikalpanam prayāsaḥ. yad avocāma kāvyanirnaye -
tātparyanatirekāc ca vyañjakarvasya na dhvanih, kim uktam syād aśrutártha-tātparye’nyokti rūpiņi. 'vişam bhakşaya' vākye yac caivam pitr-suta”disu, prayujyate pradhanatvāt dhvanitvam kena vāryate. dhvaniś cet svārtha-viśrāntam vākyam arthántarāśrayam, tatparatvam tv aviśrāntau, tanna, viếrānty asambhavāt. etāvatyeva viśräntis tātparyasyéti kim krtam, yāvat kārya-prasāritvāt, tātparyam na tuladhrtam. bhrama dhārmika viśrabdham iti bhrami-kştā"spadam, nirvyāvștti katham vākyam niședham upasarpati. pratipādyasya viśrāntir apeksāpūraņād yadi, vaktur vivaksitáprāpteḥ aviśrāntir na vā katham ? pauruṣeyasya vākyasya vivaksā-paratantratā
vaktrabhipreta-tātparyam ataḥ kāvyasya yujyate." iti - -ato na rasā”dīnām kāvyena saha vyangya-vyañjakabhāvaḥ. kim tarhi ? bhāvyabhāvaka-sambandhah. kāyyam hi bhāvakam, bhāvvāh rasā”dayah. te hi svato'bhavanta eva bhāvakeșu viếista-vibhāvā"dimatā kāvyena bhāvyante. na cányatra śabdántareșu bhāvya-bhāvaka-laksana-sambandhābhāvāt kāvya-śabdeșvapi tathā bhāvyam iti vācyam. bhāvanā-kriyāvādibhiḥ tathángīkstatvāt. kiñca mā cányatra tathā'stu anvaya-vyatirekābhyām iha tathāvagamāt. tad uktam -
"bhāvábhinaya-sambaddhān bhāvayanti rasān imān, yasmāt tasmad ami bhāvāḥ vijñeyā nāțya-yoktļbhiḥ.” (N.S. VII. 4)

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA iti. katham punar agļhīta-sambandhebhyah padebhyaḥ sthāyyā”di-pratipattir iti cet, tathāvidha-cestā-yukta-strī-pumsādisu ratyādyavinā-bhāva-darśanāt ihā’pi tathopanibandhe sati ratyādyavinābhūta-cestā"di-pratipadaka-sabda-śravanad abhidheyávinābhāvena lākṣaniki ratyādi-pratītiḥ. yathā ca kāvyárthasya rasabhāvakatvam tathā agre vaksyāmah.”
We will now look into this view. We know that for Anandavardhana the two senses viz. vācya and vangya are related to each other as subordinate and principal respectively when it is a case of dhvanikāvya. The two senses being not of equal merit do not harm the principle of eka-vākyatva or 'vākyaikárthya'. But it is only when the suggested sense is principal, that the tātparyavādin would hold that it
es under the intention of the speaker and as such it should be lebelled as 'tātparya' or purport and not dhvani. Dhananjaya and Dhanika are advocates of the tātparya-sakti or purport and challange the dictates of Anandavardhana. Dhanika first gives a brief exposition of dhvanivada. He observes that the suggested sense cannot be the sentence-sense, as it falls in the third stage. Thus 'dhvani' cannot be 'tātparya' of a sentence. In such examples as, “bhrama dhārmika...” etc. the first stage is padártha i.e. word-sense, which is derived by abhidhāśakti or power of expression. The second stage is that of vākyártha i.e. sentence-sense, i.e. tātparya in form of an injunction i.e. vidhi such as 'bhrama' or 'move around'. The suggested sense appears in the third stage and is different in nature, it being negation or nisedha. This ‘nisedha' is arrived at with the help of a sakti or power called vyañjanā or suggestion. This forms the view of Anandavardhana as presented by Dhanika in his Avaloka, as a prima facie view. Dhanika further argues as follows. He observes that all cases of tātparya are not cases of the second stage. In expressions such as, "visam bhunksva” addressed by a father to his son, the meaning is exactly the opposite. The expressed sense is an injunction viz. "eat poison”. But the father's intention seems to be that his son should know that it is better to eat poison than to eat at the (enemy's) house. The sense is, “do not eat at his house; better eat poison than eat in his house.” In this expression, viz. "eat poison", there are three stages wherein vidhi-injunction and nisedha/prohibition appear as second and third stages. Even the third stage here is only vākyártha and tātparya. So the vyāpti or rule or invariable concomitance that vyangya is the third stage does not hold good. The reply to this is that a father's injunction to his own son to eat poison appears absolutely absurd. So, the sentence obviously would mean something else. The real meaning of this expression, viz. prohibition of eating at the enemy's place is also at the second stage only and not at the third stage. The rule that vyangya comes after

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"Tātparya"
431
the second stage therefore stands. In case of rasa-realization, there is only the knowledge of vibhāvā"dis at the second stage. Only in the third stage the rasa is realized. It is proper to hold tātparya in those cases where there is no completeness of sense or exhaustion of expressed sense and the words tend to mean something else and stop only at that. But in such cases where words stop with conveying their expressed sense, and where no incompleteness or unintelligibility is noticed and yet from this complete expressed sense arises another meaning the case is one of dhvani.
The point of discussion is this. The tātparyavādin presses that tāparya is not exhausted with collection of the first expressed sense. It is a-viśränta. For the dhvanivādin it is viśrānta, with the collection of the expressed sense. The further sense is arrived at through vyañjanā. For the tātparyavādin this further meaning is also tātparya and projection of vyañjanā is meaningless. For the tātparyavādin, there is no limit to tātparya. It is not the sum total of individual word-senses only. Tātparya for him extends over the whole range of the speaker's intention and covers all implications coming up with the directly expressed sense. 'tātparyam na tulādhịtam'. You do not have to hold tātparya in a balance.
In the illustration viz. 'bhrama dhārmika, etc.' the stopping of the religious person from going to the banks of the river Godavarī is the chief intention of the speaker and is therefore included in the tātparya. There is no need to postulate vyañjanā/dhvani : "tātparya-anatirekāc ca vyañjakarvatya, na dhvanih.” The dhvanivādins may argue as follows : If it is held by the tātparyavādin that the intention of the speaker is the indication of extent of the tātparya of his utterance, and therefore the implied and suggested matter is also tātparya, the answer of the dhvanivādin is that the tātparya of a vākya, like abhidhā of a pada is limited in its scope and can give only the bear meanings of all the words put together in a grammatical order, and that the suggested ideas are not invariably associated through convention or samaya, that dhvani exists also in sounds which do not convey dictionary meaning (i.e. which are a-vācaka), and that dhvani or suggestion is possible even in tunes of music and is conveyed by gestures also where there is no sound at all : Again dhvani must be accepted for cases of realization of rasas which cannot be experienced through abhidhā or mention of the name of a particular rasa. If suggestion/dhvani is not accepted says the dhvanivādin, and if only tātparya is accepted, then the tātparyavādin will have to accept that rasa is realized by abhidhā and tātparya also. Thus for the tātparyavādin 'sva-sabdavācyatva' of rasa will not only have to be discarded as a poetic blemish, but will have to be accepted as a possible way of rasa-experience.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
To this Dhanika says yes'. He says that ordinarily we speak two types of sentences such as one in which a verb is directly mentioned and the other one in which a verb is not mentioned. The instance of the first is, “gām abhyāja”. i.e. drive away the cow. The verb is clearly mentioned in this. In the other instance, viz. "dvāram dvāram”, meaning "door... door”, the speaker wants to convey that the listener may please shut the door. Thus through context alone, the action of closing the door, which is at the mental level, is conveyed - “yathā laukika-vākyesu śrūyamānakriyeșu, 'gām abhyāja' ityādişu, a-śrūyamanakriyeșu ca dvāram dvaram' ityādişu, sva-sabdopādānāt, prakaranā"divaśāt buddhi-sannivesini kriyaiva kārakopacitā vākyárthah...” The case of rasa-realization is akin to this. Mostly in poetry 'rasa' is not directly expressed and rasa is arrived at through vibhāvas etc. which have an invariable concomittance with rasa-experience. But at times, even in poetry there is mentioning of rasa through its name also e.g. in “prītyā navodhā priyā”.
All sentences such as 'gām abhyāja' or 'dvāram dvāram', terminate in some activity. Similarly all poetic expressions end in a 'kriya' called 'svādodbhūti' or rasa/ taste-experience, i.e. the manifestation of relish which is the sthāyin nourished to that extent. Towards this end, i.e. ralish, all poetry is addressed. Thus vibhāvā"dis form the word-units i.e. padárthas leading to the sentence-unit or vākyártha, the sthāyin. This sthāyin is enjoyed by the bhāvaka. This is ābhidhāniki-ratyādi-pratītih. Now Dhanika holds that if this apprehension does not clear the issue, then the understanding of the sthāyin from the vibhāvas etc. may be held as arriving through laksaņā, i.e. lākṣaṇika-ratyādi-pratītiḥ, i.e. apprehension or rati etc. through secondary usage. This could resemble Kumārila's position which takes 'ākhyātártha' as 'laksya'. Dhanika, in order to make the process less prosaic, calls it bhāvyabhāvaka-sambandha like Bhatta Nāyaka. He quotes Bharata “bhāvayanti rasan yasmāt tasmad bhāvāh", (N.S. VII. 4) in his support.
He says : "ato na rasā"dīnām kāvyena saha vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāvaḥ kim tarhi ? bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandhaḥ. kāvyam hi bhāvakam, bhāvyāḥ rasā”dayaḥ.
We know that for obvious difficulties in accepting this broder concept of tātparya, it could not hold good before vyañjanāvāda. The fourfold division of word powers into abhidhā, tātparya, laksaņā and vyañjanā by Abhinavagupta was so logical that Dhananjaya/Dhanika's onslaught could not stand. Actually if tātparya is inclusive of vyangya, over and above the sum-total of word-senses in a sentence, then it is another name of vyañjanā. We will go to see how Viśvanātha removes all air from the sail of tātparya later.
We will now turn to Bhoja.

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"Tātparya"
Tatparva' in Bhoja :
We will first go along with Dr. Raghavan who has ably explained Bhoja's position. After that we will try to see if we can differ from or supplement the efforts of Dr. Raghavan. We will quote the full text in the beginning. (pp. 246, Śr. Pra. Edn. Josyer) :
yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdárthaḥ iti tātparyam. tac ca vakya eva upapadyate. padamātrena abhiprāyasya prakāśayitum aśakyatvāt.
tac
ca vākya-pratipadyam vastu trirupam bhavati; abhidhīyamānam, pratīyamānam, dhvanirupam ca. yatra yad upatta-śabdeṣu mukhya-gauņilakṣanā"dibhiḥ śabda-śaktibhiḥ svam artham abhidhāya uparata-vyāpāreṣu ākānkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā"dibhir vākyārtha-matram abhidhīyate, tad abhidhīyamānam. yatha-gaur gacchatīti vākyárthávagater uttarakālam vākyárthe upapadyamāno'nupapadyamāno vártha-prakaraṇaucityā”di-sahakṛtau yat pratyayayati tat pratīyamānam. yathā 'viṣam bhunkṣva, mã cāsya gṛhe bhunkthāḥ”, ity ukte varam visam bhakṣitam, na punar asya gṛhe bhuktam iti pratīyate. arthaśabdópāyād upasarjanīkṛta-svārtho, vākyárthávagater anantaram anunādarūpam pratiśabdarūpam vā abhivyañjayati tad dhvanirupam.
tac ca na sārvatrikam. tatha hi, yatha nivṛtte abhighāte kasyacid eva kāmsyā"der dravyasya anunādo jāyate, kasyacid eva kandarā"deḥ pratiśabdaḥ., yatha kasyacid eva vākyasya pratīyamānā'bhidhīyamāna-vākyārtha-pratīter anantaram dhvanir upalabhyate iti. 'nimisati eșa' ityukte akṣṇor nimeṣo'bhidhiyate, devī na bhavati iti pratīyate. rūpátiśayaś ca dhvanati. atha eṣām prayogaḥ - vidhirupam, niṣedharūpam, vidhi-nisedha
tatrábhidhīyamānam caturdhā
rūpam, a-vidhi-niṣedharupam ca. ...

-
pratīyamānam punar anekadhā kvacid vidhau nisedhah..... kvacinniṣedhe vidhiḥ,...... kvacid vidhau vidhyantaram..... kvacinniṣedhe nised hántaram..... kvacid vidhi-niṣedhe nisedhaḥ..... kvacid a-vidhi-niṣedhe nisedhaḥ..... kvacid vidhi-niṣedhayor vidhyantaram.....
433

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA kvacid vidhi-niședhayor nised hántaram..... kvacid vidhau an-ubhayam..... kvacin niședhe anubhayam..... kvacid vidhinişedhayor anubhayam.....
kvacid a-vidhi-niședhe anubhayam..... .... pratīyamāna-abhidhiyamāna-vākyárthānām anantyäd dhvanirūpam api aneka-prakāram. dhvaniś ca dvidhā. artha-dhvanih, sabdadhvanić ca. tayor arthadhvanir anunāda dhvanirūpah pratiśabda-dhvanirūpaś ca. ..... (pp. 253). evam laukike’pi vacasi abhidhiyamānam pratiyamānam tātparyam ca paryālocanīyam iti. etena kāvya-vacasor dhvani-tātparyayoś ca kvacit samplavo’pi vyākhyātaḥ. -
On pp. 251, 252 we read "evam anye’pi mahākaviprayogeșu dhvani-višesā gaveșaniyāḥ, iti yad uktam, tātparyam eva vacasi, dhvanir eva kavye, ityādi :
kaḥ punaḥ, kāvya-vacasor dhvanitātparyayor višesah ? nanúktam purastāt; yad avakram vacaḥ śāstre loke ca, vaca eva tat, vakram yad arthavādā”dau tasya kāvyam iti smrti). yad abhiprāya-sarvasvam vaktur vākyāt pratiyate, tātparyam arthadharmas tacchabdadharmah punar-dhvanih. saubhāgyam iva tātparyam antaro guna isyate, vagdevatāyā lāvanyamiva bāhyas tayor dhvanih. adūra-viprakarsāt tu dvayena dvayam ucyate, yathā surabhi-vai ākhau
madhu-madhava-samjñayā.” iti. Now we will first quote at length from Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, śr. pra) along

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435 with our observations. He observes -
"What is Bhoja's Tātparya ? The tātparya-sakti refuted by Anandavardhana is the Mimāmsaka's. Upholding it, Dhanika says that it is not necessary to recognise a new function called dhvani."
We may add that it could be true that Anandavardhana discarded tātparya of the Mimāmsakas, without of course naming the same. We know that Ananda uses the term 'tātparya' meaning 'intention of the speaker and not the 'tātparya-vrtti', though of course Abhinavagupta mentions it in the strict Mimāmsaka sense of the Abhihitánvayavādins and takes it to be the second sabda-vrtti, counted after abhidhā and before lakṣaṇā, vyañjanā being the turīyā. So, Dr. Raghavan's observation seems to be slightly off the mark. Actually 'tātparya' is used in various senses by Anandavardhana as quoted by Dr. Raghavan himself and we will go to see it later.
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, ibid) proceeds, “Bhoja follows in the gap between the two and greets both with both his hands." We know that Dhanika's tātparya is more extended than that of the Mimāmsakas. For Dhanika tātparya comes after abhidhā and laksaņā and it includes the whole meaning of a given sentence, be it only abhidhártha, or one with laksyártha, or one charged with even vyangyártha on top of both these, i.e. abhidhártha and laksyártha. Thus Dhanika's and so also Dhananjaya's concept of tātparya is unique and it crosses the limits of mīmāmsaka's traditional tātparya, not acceptable to the dhvanivadins as a vehicle of the suggested sense.
Dr. Raghavan is perhaps near the truth when he observes that 'Bhoja greets both' i.e. the dhvani-vādin and also Dhanika simultaneously. His observation is near the truth because Bhoja talks of both 'tātparya' and 'dhvani' in the same breath. Dhanika totally discards dhvani but Bhoja has a place for it. But we will have to carefully read between the lines and try to underline the exact difference between these two concepts of 'tātparya' and 'dhvani' as advocated by Bhoja. We will go to see further how we beg to differ from Dr. Raghavan. But for the present, a fuller quotation from Dr. Raghavan who observes... (pp. 161, ibid).
"He accepts Ānandavardhana's Dhvani and his adversaries' Tātparya. Tātparya is used by Bhoja in two meanings, one larger and another a more restricted one. While he speaks of tātparya as a one of the four kevala-sabda-sambandha-śaktis, (vrtti, vivaksā, tātparya, and pravibhāga), he uses tātparya in a larger sense. Under it comes the Abhidhīyamāna vākyártha, which Ānandavardhana urges must be the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA proper meaning of tātparya. But Bhoja brings under it Anandavardhana's dhvani, as Dhanika and other earlier critics of Anandavardana urged. The abhidhiyamāna is not called exactly tātparya. A special sakti like that is not called forth by Bhoja for the primary import of a sentence, as by the Mimāmsakas. The primary sense of a sentence he says, is got by akānksā, sannidhi, yogyatā etc., when the words themselves deliver the meaning of each through abhidhā, laksanā, or gaunī, śakti. Or, as Kumārasvamin puts it, the very sentence in proper grammatical build gives its vākyártha by its own inherent nature. : “tarhy atra samsarga-rūpo vākyārthah katham pratiyata iti cet, tārkikāņām iva vākyamahimnā, na punaḥ tātparyena mīmāmsakānām iva iti brūmah. ata eva te varnayanti ākānksa"dimatve sati
adānām padárthānām vā samanvayaśaktih vākyam. tad balā”yāto vākyárthah.” (pp. 32-33 Pratāparudrīya vyākhyā, Bālamanorama Edn.)."
Now here we have to scrutinize this observation of Dr. Raghavan as supported by Kumārasvāmin on the Pratāparudrīya.
Dr. Raghavan's two remarks above need attention. As quoted above we read- "While he speaks of Tātparya as one of the four kevala-sabda-sambandha-śaktis, he uses Tātparya in the larger sense. Under it comes the Ābhidhīyamāná vākyártha which Anandavardhana urges must be the proper meaning of Tātparya. .... The Abhidhīvamāna is not called exactly tātparya."
Now these two statements seem to contradict one another. Bhoja's words as quoted above read - (pp. 246, Edn. Josyer, Sr. Pra) -
"yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdártha iti tātparyam. tac ca vākya eva upapadyate padamātrena abhiprāyasya prakāśayitum aśakyarvāt.
tacca vākya-pratipādyam vastu tri-rūpam bhavati. abhidhīyamānam, pratīyamānam, dhvanirūpam ca. yatra yad-upātta-śabdesu mukhya-gauņalaksaņā"dibhiḥ śabda-śaktibhiḥ svam artham abhidhāya uparatavyāpāreņu ākāńksāsannidhi-yogyatā"dibhir vākyárthamātram abhidhīyate tad abhidhiyamānam."
Thus for Bhoja there is clear recognition of what he calls abhidhiyamānatātparya arrived at as vākyártha. True, he has called tātparya to be “kevala-sabdasambandha sakti”, thus we can equate it - at least so far as "abhidhīvamāna tātparya' goes, - with the ‘tātparya' of the Mimāmsakas. That Bhoja also calls, it a 'śabda-Śakti' is absolutely clear. So Dr. Raghavan's remarks as quoted above do not explain exactly what is intended by Bhoja. Even Kumārasvāmin on Pratāparudra as quoted by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, ibid) also seems to be off the mark. Bhoja clearly calls the four viz. vịtti, vivaksā, tātparya and pravibhāga as “kevala-sabda

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437 sambandha-sakrayah”. The Vākyamahimā' of the tārkikas is at least a recognition of the Mimāmsakatātparya, be it not an overt one. But Bhoja has his own tradition and his own terminology.
It should be very clear in our minds that Bhoja accepts three-fold tātparya viz. abhidhīyamāna, pratīyamāna and dhvani. The first one is purely the tātparya of the Mimāmsakas. The second is reserved for implicit sense in sentences used in ordinary parlance, such as 'visam bhunksva..." etc. Pratīyamāna thus should be equated with the unspoken intension of the speaker, not directly expressedi.e. abhidhīyamāna-in a statement. The word 'dhvani' is reserved by Bhoja for 'poetic intention' covered by poetic expression. 'Dhvani-tātparya' for Bhoja is met with only in the domain of what we call poetry or literature and never in 'loka' - worldly context or in discourses of various disciplines, i.e. śāstra. “tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanireva kāvye" would mean only this. By 'vacas', Bhoja means language as used in loka and śāstra alone, and 'kāvya' is absolutely different from this 'vacas'. So, poetic intention of a kāvya-vākya is 'dhvani-tātparya' for Bhoja. But we should again very carefully note that Bhoja never mentions 'wyañjana' in this context. So, his dhvani-tātparya i.e. poetic intention would equate with 'vicitrā abhidhā' of Kuntaka which embraces in its fold every poetic expressions at all levels such as abhidhā, laksana and also vyañjanā. Bhoja's 'pratīvamāna' is a special term clubbed with intention of a speaker at worldly parlance. It is all implicit sense in ordinary conversation. It is anything but poetic. Everything that is poetic is all 'dhvanitātparva' for Bhoja. This is clear thinking.
In view of the above, I would venture to observe with due respect for Dr. Raghavan that his observation, viz. "He even goes so far as to restrict the name tātparya to the suggested, that is, to Dhvani, within which we can include his
na also. Therefore, Bhoja's position is a compromise and at a later stage, it deserts Dhanika and others to follow Anandavardhana and makes Tātparya a name for dvani" - (pp. 162) - is off the mark. Bhoja's 'pratīyamāna' is implied sense i.e. sense not directly expressed in sentences used at ordinary parlance. This can never be identical with, or this can never be included in 'Dhvani' of Bhoja, which is for him “implicit sense in a poetic expression, i.e. kāvya alone.” Dr. Raghavan urther discusses Vidyānātha's view which we will pick up in due course later.
Dr. Raghavan himself partly comes to realize what we have observed above when he says, (pp. 163, ibid) -
“Both the sections on Dhvani in the 6th and 7th chapters of the Śr. Pra (pp. 221, and pp. 251-2 Edn. Josyer) close with the following verses - (Actually the Ch. 7 does

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA not close with these verses) -
“tātparyam eva vacasi, dhvanir eva kāvye saubhagyam eva guna-sampadi vallabhasya. lāvanyam eva vapuși svadate’nganāyāḥ śrngāra eva hrdi mānavato janasya."
and,
yad-abhiprāya-sarvasvam vaktur vākyāt pratīyate tātparyam, artha-dharmas tat, śabda-dharmaḥ punar dhvanih. saubhāgyam iva tātparyam āntaro guņa ișyate vāgdevatāyā lāvanyam iva, bāhyas tayor dhvaniḥ, adūra-viprakarsāt tu dvayena dvayam ucyate,
yathā surabhi-vaišākhau madhu-madhava-samjñayā." In ordinary speech and writing, the purport is called Tātparya; but the purport in poetic expression is called Dhvani. It is even as the same Caitra and Vaišākha months are called, from another point of view, Madhu and Madhava, or to add a further illustration, the Kārana, Kārya and Sahakārin of the world are called in kāvya, the Vibhāva, Anubhāva, and Sañcărin. And what is the difference in the nature of the ordinary utterance and the poetic utterance, that the purports in the two cases must be called by two different names, Tātparya, and Dhvani ? Ordinary talk and writing is 'a-vakra' not beautiful; poetic expression is 'vakra', beautiful
“yad avakram vacaḥ śāstre loke ca vaca eva tat vakram yad arthavādādau
tasya kāvyam iti smrtih.” Dr. Raghavan further observes - (pp. 164) - “Therefore a more graceful name for tātparya is dhvani; this is the idea we get from the two verses of Bhoja, ‘tātparyam eva vacasi' etc. and, 'yad avakram... etc. But suddenly he turns the statement the other way and says that the Abhiprāya, the entire intended idea, is a quality of artha. That is, Tātparya is artha-dharma; Dhvani on the other hand is sabda-dharma. What does Bhoja mean by this? Does he mean that, looked at from the point of view of the sabda it is Dhvani and, from that of artha, Tātparya ? Or that Dhvani is the name of the vyañjaka-sabda and that Tātparya is the name of vyangya-Artha ? That Dhvani is the vyañjanā sabda-vyāpāra and

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439 Tātparya is its result ? Or, does he mean that sabda-dhvani is Dhvani and arthadhvani is tātparya ? The last is clearly impossible; for he speaks of Dhvani as pertaining to both sabda and Artha. Again, there is more poetry than scientific analysis when Bhoja says that Tātparya is internal, is the saubhāgya of vāk or speech, and Dhvani is external, the lāvanya of vāk. Another attempt, Bhoja makes to clarify the issue; he says in conclusion that you can call either by either name; they are identical; just as the months of Caitra and Vaišākha, so called from an astronomical point of view, are called Madhu and Madhava from another point of view, by two other names, so also purport of an expression can be called Tātparya or Dhvani. To sum up :
(1) Bhoja accepts Anandavardhana's Dhvani (2) He first calls it a department of Tātparya, but finally says that the two are identical. In the latter stage, Tātparya does not include Abhidhīyamāna-Väkyártha, but is a name of the pratīyamāna and the Dhvanyamāna Arthas.
(3) Bhoja makes an artificial division of the suggested element to pratīyamāna and the Dhvanirūpa, which is unnecessary.
(4) The distinction into Dhvani of Alamkāra, Vastu and Rasā"di found in Anandavardhana is absent from Bhoja.
(5) 'Upasarjanīkrta-svārtharva' is mentioned by Bhoja as part of the definition of Dhvani, but its implications are not realized and worked out. "Dhvanikavya where Dhvani is predominant, Gunībhūta-vyangya and citra-kavya or Avyangya" is other classification of Anandavardhana, missed in Bhoja."
We will now try to discuss Dr. Raghavan's observations at length. Before we start analysing his observations, we may express our hunch, and perhaps the observation may be nearer the truth, that when Bhoja talks of "saubhāgya” and "lāvanya" in the above quotation, he borrows these terms and their connotation as seen in Kuntaka first.
We know that Kuntaka talks of three mārgas such as sukamāra mārga, vicitra mārga and madhyama mārga. In both sukumāra and vicitra mārgas we find lāvanya with different connotation. 'Madhyama' as the name itself suggests is a pleasing mixture of the two having a separate identity of a mixed variety. But Kuntaka later adds 'aucitya' and 'saubhāgya' as excellences common to the three märgas. The 'auchitya' puts stress on fitness of words and ideas, while 'saubhāgya' arises out of the realization of all the resources of a composition. We will examine this with apt quotations from Kuntaka as follows:
a.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ‘lāvanya' as manifested in the sukumāra mārga is defined as - (pp. 49, Edn. K. Kris.)
"evam prasādam abhidhāya lāvanyam laksayati - "varna-vinyāsa-vicchittipada-samdhāna-sampadā, svalpayā bandha-saundaryam
lāvanyam abhidhīyate.” (V.J., I. 32) bandho varna-vinyāsah, tasya saundaryam rāmaniyakam lāvanyam abhidhīyate, lāvanyam ity ucyate. kīdņśam ? varṇānām akşarāņām vinyāso, vicitram nyasanam, tasya vicchittih, sobhā vaidagdhya-bhangī, tayā laksitam padānām sup-tinantānām samdhānam samyojanam, tasya sampat, sā'pi śobhaiva, taya lakṣitam. kīdrśyā ? ubhaya-rūpayā’pi svalpayā manān mātrayā náti-nirbandha-nirmitayā, tad ayam atra arthaḥ-sabdártha-saukumārya-subhagah sanniveśa-mahimā lāvanyarūpo gunaḥ kathyate -
(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 335, 336) - “After perspicuity, grace is explained -
When even a little beauty in respect of alleterative syllables and in the choice of diction results in the charm of syntax and contributes to the strikingness of style. we have the excellence called 'grace'. (32)
Syntax refers to effective sentence-construction. Its charm is designated 'grace'. It is characterised by the beauty of alleterative syllables on one hand and in the choice of striking diction on the other. But both these contributory elements remain only in the background and do not attract forced attention as they are created by the poet effortlessly. The idea is the charm in synctactic construction with striking edge and trenderness in words and meanings is regarded as excellence called 'grace'.”
The 'lāvanya' as revealed in vicitra-mārga is defined by Kuntaka at V.J. I. 47 - as
"atrálupta-visargántaiḥ padaiḥ protaiḥ parasparam, hșsvaiḥ samyoga-pūrvaiś ca
lāvanyam atiricyate.” (I. 47) - asminn evamvidhaiḥ padair lāvanyam atiricyate, pariposam prāpnoti. kīdrśaiḥ ? parasparam anyonyam protaiḥ samśleșam nītaiḥ. anyac ca kīdṛśaiḥ ?

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441 alupta-visargántaiḥ, alupta-visargāḥ śrūyamāņa-visarjanīyā antā yeşām tāni tathoktāni, taiḥ. hrsvaiś ca laghubhiḥ. samyogebhyaḥ pūrvaiḥ. atiricyate iti sambandhaḥ. tad idam atra tātparyam - pūrvokta-laksanam lāvanyam vidyamānam anena atiriktatām nīyate.
(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 348, 349, ibid) -
"By words without elision of the final aspirates and in euphonic combination with each other, and by syllables which precede conjuncts, 'grace' is enriched.” (I. 47)
In the 'brilliant' style, the quality of 'grace' gets enriched by the use of the following : words which mutually coalesce in harmonious combination; which contain final aspirate sounds without elision, i.e. with fully intonated aspirates at the end, and with short syllables preceding conjunct consonants. The idea is that besides the features already noted of grace' under the 'elegant, these new additions will enrich it in the 'brilliant'.
'Aucitya' and 'Saubhāgya' go with all the mārgas. 'Saubhāgya' is defined at V.J. I. 55 as - (pp. 69, ibid)
"evam aucityam abhidhāya saubhāgyam abhidhatte - 'ity upādeya-varge'smin yad artham pratibhā kaveḥ, samyak samrabhate tasya
gunaḥ saubhāgyam ucyate.” (I. 55) - ity evamvidhe asmin upādeyavarge śabdā”dyupeya-samūhe yad artham, yannimittam kaveḥ sambandhini pratibhā Śaktiḥ samyak, sāvadhāntayā samrabhate, vyavasyati, tasya vastunaḥ prastutatvāt kāvyābhidhānasya yo guṇaḥ sa saubhāgyam iti ucyate bhanyate.
tacca na pratibhā-samrambha-mātra-sädhyam, kintu tad-vihita-samastasāmagrī-sampādyam, iti āha -
"sarva-sampat-parispandsampādyam sarasā"tmanām, alaukika-camatkāra-kāri
kāvyaika-jīvitam.” (I. 56) sarva-sampat-parispanda-sampādyam sarvasyopādeyarāśer yā sampattiranavadyatā-kāsthā tasyāh parispandah sphuritatvam tena sampadyam nispādaniyam.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA anyac ca kīdęśam ? sarasā”tmanām ārdracetasām alaukika-camatkāra-kāri, lokottarā"hlāda-vidhāyi. kim bahunā ?, tac ca kāvyaika-jīvitam, kavyasya parah paramárthaḥ, ity arthaḥ - [Trans. K. Kris. pp. 354, 355, ibid]
"In the wide-ranging material before the poet, that which is pitched upon by the genius of the poet for its activity endows the whole with the quality of 'splendour'. (I. 55)
The poet has before him a lot of raw material like words and so on, awaiting to be picked up. Now the poet's genius selects only one amidst them to show its wonderous capacity and since that becomes most relevant to the poetic acitivity as a whole, there arises a quality which is designated as 'splendour.
In fact it is a quality which can not be achieved merely by the activity of creater nius either; one and all the different constituents will have to co-operate in bringing it about :
'It is something attained by the full co-operation of all the constitutent elements and it is something which surely results in an extra-ordinary aesthetic effect in the mind of the connoisseurs; in short, it is the whole and sole essence of poetry.' (I. 56)
The first epithet explains how each and every constituent in the vast raw material available to the poet, should shine at its best without a single flaw. It is only then that the over-all literary quality of 'splendour' is achieved. The second epithet points out that its appeal to the sensitive tastes of connoisseurs is unfailing and extra-ordinary. In a word it deserves to be the life-essence or 'sine quanon' of poetry.”
Perhaps here lies Bhoja's original inspiration of his treatment of - 'prabandhagunas'. Dr. Raghavan observes about these (pp. 314) : “Bhoja gives here a list of features which go to make up the best poem. It is almost a statement of the criticism of work as a whole. sabda-gunas are the physical or formal features; Artha-gunas pertain to the content and theme; the ubhaya-gunas embrace both.” ... (pp. 315 ibid) "These features of the Prabandha are called gunas by Bhoja because they contribute to the beauty of the poem”.
Though Bhoja does not directly name 'lāvanya' and 'Saubhāgya' as guņas, he does mention them here while treating 'tātparya'. Let us see it once again.
He observes that, that which is 'tātparya' or purport in ordinary speech is termed dhvani' in poetry. Here we may say that Bhoja's 'dhvani' is not 'principal suggested sense' alone. But whatever is the puport of a beautiful poetic-expression, whatever

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443 may be lebelled as 'aesthetic' in poetry at any level - expressed, indicated and also suggested - is dhvani' 'principal purport of a beautiful poetic expression.' Then Bhoja explains this 'dhvani' in ‘kāvya' as
"saubhāgyam eva guņa-sampadi vallabhasya
lāvanyam eva vapuși svadaténganāyāḥ
śộngāra eva hrdi mānavato janasya." Among the treasure of guņas only 'saubhāgya' is tasted, (both) in case of a vallabha i.e. beloved person (as well as in the person of a kāvya-purusa). Now 'saubhāgya' as seen in Kuntaka above is everything in poetry. It is t everything. It is pratibhā, it is pratibhā's launching pad, it is suggested meaning, + + + + ... Among the wealth of gunas of a lover, 'Saubhāgya' is the most praiseworthy. In case of a lady ‘lāvanya' is the quality which is tasted by the aesthetes. Abhinavagupta in his Locana mentions “lāvanya-candrikā” - “na ca avayavānām eva nirdosatā vā bhūsaņāyogo vā lāvanyam. prthan-, nirvarnyamāna-kāņā"di-dosaśūnya-śarīrā'vayavayoginyām api alamkrtāyām api ‘lāvanya-śūnyā iyam' iti, atathābhūtāyām api kasyāñcil, lāvyanyāmrta-candrikā iyam' iti sahrdayānām vyavahārāt.' (pp. 24, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid; Locana on Dhy. I. 4)
Bhoja also equates this ‘dhvanireva kāvye' with 'anganāyāḥ lāvanyam', which for Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta was not a physical quality but something over and above mere physicality, a quality emerging from the total personality of a lady. Beauty is thus abstract, though revealed by physical and other features alike.
Bhoja further gives one more explanation. He says - and this is by implication - that as is the quality of 'Srngāra' - “rasóbhimāno’hamkāraḥ śộngāra iti giyate”. the highest quality of an aesthete, so is this ‘dhvani' in kāvya. It is not just the dhvani' of Anandavardhana and it is not the charm of vyañjanā alone, a name = vyañjana) Bhoja is never enthusiastic to mention. But this quality is that which emerges from 'total poetry. This can be equated with Kuntaka's 'Saubhāgya'.
Now we will be able to explain the other observations of Bhoja in a more satisfactory fashion. He says,
"yad abhiprāya-sarvasvam vaktur vākyāt pratīyate, tātparyam; artha-dharmas tat,
śabda-dharmaḥ punaḥ, dhvanih.” We may add 'kāvya' before 'vākyāt to mean 'kāvya-vākyāt. The essence (abhiprāya-sarvasva) which is understood from a poetic statement, that (we may

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444
SAHRDAYĀLOKA add 'tat before tātparya) is tātparya, which is artha-dharma and also śabdadharma, and is termed 'dhvani' (śabdadharmaḥ punaḥ, sa dhvaniḥ iti ucyate)
Then Bhoja further observes that this (poetic) tātparya (which is ‘dhvani") is like the quality of saubhāgya (of a beloved person, 'vallabhasya'), an internal quality (of poetry). It is like the 'lāvanya' or abstract beauty of the godess of speech (like lāvanya' of a beautiful lady.) This is an external quality-bāhya guna. It is something manifested at external level like 'having beautiful eyes' - 'sulocanātva' of a lady, - we may add.
The fact is that this poetic tātparya i.e. dhvani is beauty both internal and external, for Bhoja.
Both, observes Bhoja, are explained by both - 'dvayena dvayam ucyate'. The idea is that if we dig deeper we will realise that poetry or kāvya itself being an abstract - amūrta - entity, there is hardly anything which can be stamped as 'external or 'internal in the literal sense. Actually both are both, for both are beyond physicality. Just as caitra and vaisakha are also termed madhu and madhava, similarly the artha-dharma and sabda-dharma both make for the supreme beauty of poetry.
So, this, we feel explains Bhoja's concept of tātparya satisfactorily and had he been alive, perhaps Dr. Raghavan would have accepted this explanation.
Now we will see how Mammața and his followers deal with tātparya. Mammața in his K.P. II (pp. 25 observes that : Edn. Jalkikar '21) ‘krameņa śabdárthayoḥ svarūpam āha.
“syād vācako lākṣaṇikaḥ
śabdo’tra vyañjakas tridhā.” (Sū. 5) atra iti kāvye. eșām svarūpam vaksyate. (Sū. 6) - "vācyā’dayas tad arthāḥ syuh.” vācya-laksya-vyangyāḥ.
(Sū. 7) “tātparyártho’pi keșu cit." |16||
ākānkşa-yogyatā-sannidhi-vaśād vaksyamāna-svarūpāņām padárthānām samanvaye tātparyár'thópi vākyarthaḥ samullasati iti abhihitánvayavādinām matam. vācva eva vākvárthah iti anvitábhidhānavādinah.” Translation, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi - The Poetic Light - pub. Motilal Banarsidass, second Edn. '77, pp. 17, Vol. I):
"Now the author states the nature of word and sense in order : 6ab - Word, here would be of three kinds -expressive, indicative and suggestive.
novah.

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"Tātparya"
445 'Here' means in poetry. The characteristic of these (three kinds of words) will be described later.
6c - The expressed and others would be their sense. That is, expressed, indicated and suggested. 60. There is also the purport - sense in the opinion of some.
When owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, after the word-meanings, whose nature will be explained later, have been correlated, there springs up the purport-sense, which possesses a special form and which, though not the sense of individual) words, is yet the sense of the sentence - this is the view of these who hold that the correlation is of the expressed words (abhihitánvayavādins). The primary sense itself is the sense of the sentence - thus hold the theorists of, 'expression of the correlated meaning.' (anvitábhidhāna)."
All this follows Abhinavagupta's explanation and the Mimāmsaka view-points. Jhalakikar (pp. 26, ibid) has the following -
"nanu padártha-vākyárthasyā’pi vyañjanā-vșttyā”śrayatayā bhātramīmāmsakamatasiddha - tātparyā”khya-vrtti-pratipādyatayā ca tadvibhāgo’pi kartum ucita iti tad-akaraṇān nyūnatā iti ata āha - "tātparyártho’pi iti”. tātparyā”khyavrtti - pratipădyo'rtha ity arthah. samullasati iti adhyāhāraḥ, keșucid iti. șasthyarthe saptamī’yam. abhihitánvayavādinām ity arthaḥ. mate iti śeṣaḥ. "abhitánvayavādinām matam" iti vrtty anurodhad iti bodhyam. ayam bhāvah - vrttim vinā arthabodhane'tiprasanga iti anvaye (vākyártharūpe samsarge) śabdasya tātparyákhyā vrttir abhyanugantavyā. tatpratipādyórthas tātparyártha iti cakravartikamalākarabhatta - narasimha thakkura-krta-tikā-șy amśataḥ spastam.
Vidyadhara follows Mammata. He has a very brief remark : (Ekāvalī unmesa II, with Malinātha's Taralā; Edn. Trivedi K.P. Bombay Sanskrit Series, Bombay, 1903) - “anuvādyānām arthānām vidheyárthaparatvam tātparyam iti vyāpārántaram parair abhyupagatam. yathā -
"umām sa paśyam-rjunaiva cakṣuṇā
pracakrame vaktum anujjhita-kramaḥ.” ity atra darśanasya cakṣuḥkaranakatvā’vyabhicārāt tad upādānam tadvisesanártham tad eva cátra vidheyam tatpartvam eva tātparyam.”
We have seen earlier that Mukula had incorporated tātparya in abhidhā and Mahima takes it to be of no use as it is covered by inference, i.e. anumiti. He has discussed the same illustration viz. “visam bhunksva...” etc. as given by Dhanika.

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudra-yaśobhūṣaṇa (Edn. with Ratnapana of Kumārasvāmin, S. Chandrasekhar Sastrigal, Madras, '14) equates tātparyártha with vyangyártha and thus incorporates tātparya in vyañjanā. We will look into this as below.
446
Vidyanatha observes: (pp. 31, 32, Edn. ibid)
atha kavya-svarūpa-nirupaṇam.
"gunálamkārasahitau śabdarthau dosavarjitau.
gadya-padyóbhayamayam
kavyam kavya-vido viduḥ." - 1
a-doṣau sa-guṇau sálamkārau śabdārthau kāvyam iti kavya-sāmānya lakṣaṇam.

"sabdárthau mūrtir ākhyātau jīvitam vyangya-vaibhavam, hārā"divad alamkārās
tatra syur upamā"dayaḥ." - 2 "śleṣā"dayo guņās tatra śaurya"daya iva sthitāḥ, ātmotkarṣā"vahās tatra
svabhāvā iva rītayaḥ. - 3 sobhām āhāryikim prāptāḥ vṛttayo vṛttayo yathā padánugunya-viśrantiḥ śayya sayyeva sammatā. - 4 rasă"svāda-prabhedāḥ syuḥ
pākāḥ pākā iva sthitaḥ, prakhyātā lokavad iyam
sāmagrī kāvya-sampadaḥ. - 5
vācaka-lakṣaka-vyañjakatvena trividham śabda-jātam. vācya-lakṣya-vyangyatvena arthajātam api trividham. tātparyárthópi vyangyártha eva, na punaḥ prthak bhūtaḥ. abhidhā-lakṣaṇā-vyañjanākhyās tisraḥ śabda-vṛttayaḥ."

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“Tātparya”
447 It is clear that Vidyanātha, coming after Vidyadhara and of course Mammata, almost accepts the tenets of the dhvani-school, the kashmir tradition. Here, we will see his treatment of tātparyārtha and tātparyavrtti
Kumāraswamin in his Ratnāpana observes : (pp. 32, ibid)
nanu caturthe tātparyárthe jāgrati katham artha-traividhyoktir iti āśankya tasya trtiye antarbhāvah. ity āha. tātparyártha iti. atra vaktr-buddhi-sannidhāpito vākyávagamyo vākyártho rasā”dirūpas tacchabdena ucyate. tasmin parās tatparās tadāsaktāḥ tadvisayā iry arthaḥ. teşām bhāvas tātparyam. nanu abhidhitānām padárthānām arthábhidhāyinām vā padānām visistartha-pratyāyanaśaktis tātparyam iti matabhedena mīmāmsakā varņayanti. atas tanmate, 'devadatta gām āņaya' ity adau devadatta-kartěka-danda-karanaka-go-karmakā”nayana-rūpo višiştártha eva vangyatva-vidhuraḥ tātparyād avagatatvāt tātparyártha ity ucyate, katham asya vyangye antarbhāvaḥ, iti cet, satyam.
na hi tavanmātre kavisamrambha-viśrāntih. kāvya-sabdānām anvayavyatirekābhyām pravrtti-nivrtti-visayabhūtasya pradhānasya prayojanāntarasya asambhavāt. kim tu tad artha-nyakkārena pratīyamāne sāmājikā”nandā"svādaphale rasā”dāv arthántare. ataḥ sa eva tātparyárthaḥ, tatpratyāyaka-padártha-śaktir eva tātparyam, kavisamaye..."
After this Kumāraswaming tries to suggest that this special tātparya is neither abhidhā, nor laksanā and says -
"ato vaksyamāņa-laksaņasya vyañjanasya eva idam nāmántara-karanam iti tad arthasya vyangyárthatvam eva."
Now this is extending the original scope of tātparya. Kumāraswāmin himself says that in "devadatta, gām ānaya', the tātparya is what it is, because it is an expression of the ordinary worldly level. But in case of a poetic expression, the intention is higher and ends in rasa-experience. So, that should be taken as tātparya. But it is here exactly that Vidyānātha and Kumārasvāmin are mistaken. The thought currents of Abhidhā, Tātparya and Laksanā were inherited from shastric literature and the sanctity of any inherited thought-current had to be preserved. It is exactly this scientific approach which characterizes the thinking of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Any liberty with the original concept would be unscientific. It is exactly such an erroneous approach which is pointed out in Locana when Abhinavagupta observes at one place that, "yad āha, khadgalaksanam karomi ity uktvā ātāna-vitānā”tmā, prāvriyamānah, sakala-dehācchā”dakah sukumāras' citra-tantu-viracitah samvartana-vivartanasahisnur acchedakah

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448
SAHRDAYĀLOKA succhedyah utkrstah khadgah, iti bruvānah, paraih patah khalu evamvidho bhavati na khadga iti uktatayā paryanuyujyamānah evam brūrāt īdņśa eva khadgo mayā abhimata iti tādřg eva etat.” (Locana on Dhv. I. i., pp. 10, Edn. Nandi)
So, this insistance on equating tātparya with vyañjanā is like the above unscientific approach.
Bhoja, as observed earlier called tātparvārtha as 'dhvani' with reference to poetic expressions, but if we search with a microscope, it will be clear that here Bhoja's 'dhvani' is not identical with Anandavardhana's dhvani and he too, like Vidyadhara and Kumāraswāmin commits the same blunder of explanding or narrowing the accepted connotation of a given word used as 'terminology or 'paribhāsā'. The crime is lesser in case of Bhoja because he is not weded to wanjanā, while it is greater in case of Vidyadhara and Kumāraswāmin who vow in the name of dhvanivāda and take liberty with the accepted terminology. We feel that flirting with age-old accepted terminology is a crime. Abhinavagupta has wisely called vyañjanā to be a 'tūriya', 'fourth' vịtti.
Again, when Anandavardhana tries to silence the Mimāmsakas by suggesting that the intention of the speaker of a worldly statement or 'pauruseya vākya' is 'suggested' or 'vyangya', he knows the limitation of his own argument which he clears while silencing the Naiyāyikas. Vidyadhara and Kumāraswāmin, like Virocana, caught hold only of a portion of Anandavardhana's argument and tried to jump in. This is sad and unscientific.
Now we will turn to Visvanātha, the author of Sāhityadarpana. He clearly followed the lead of the kashmir school of thought and takes tātparya as a power delivering the sentence-sense. He accepts three powers of a word such as abhidhā, laksanā and vyañjanā, but by the end of the first pariccheda, after talking about the three-fold classification of words also into vācaka, laksaka, and vyañjaka, he observes. (- S.D.I. 20, pp. 67, Edn. Chawkhamba Sanskrit Samsthāna, Varanasi, 4th Edn. '85) -
"tātparyā”khyām vsttim āhuḥ padárthánvaya-bodhane, tātparyártham tad artham ca
vākyam tadbodhakam pare." - (S.D.I. 20) "abhidhāyā ekaika-padártha-bodhana-virāmā vākyártharūpasya padárthánvayasya bodhikā tātparyam nāma vṛttiḥ. tad arthaś ca tātparyárthaḥ. tad-bodhakam ca vākyam iti abhihitánvayavādinām matam.”

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"Tātparya"
The Laksmi (pp. 67, ibid) on this passage reads -
"ayam āśayaḥ "ghatam karoti" ity adau ghata-vṛtti-karmatánukūlā kṛtir ity artho bodhyate, tatra ca ghata-śabdasya kambu-grīvā"dirupa-ghato'rthaḥ, 'am'pratyayasya ca karmatā, vṛttitā tu na kasyápy arthaḥ, tat tadartham pratipādya viratāyā abhidhāyāḥ punar utthanásambhavat, tat-tat-śabdena punar vṛttitārūpo'rtho'padarthópi pratipadayitum śakyate. ato vṛttitä-rūpártha-bodhikā tātparyam nāma vṛttir avaśyam angīkaraṇīyā. iyam eva tātparya-vṛttir ādhunikaiḥ samsargamaryādā ucyate. abhihitánvayavādinām padair upasthitānām arthānām anvaya iti vādinām bhaṭṭa-mīmāmsakānām prācīna-naiyāyikānām ca matam..."
Viśvanatha's position is clear and he mentions tātparya as a vākya-vṛtti in keeping with the second tradition that he has inherited. But he knows that Dhanika had tried to incorporate vyañjanā under tätparya, and so also a section of the Mimāmsakas who were dirgha-dirghatara-vyāpāravādins wanted to place vyañjanā under abhidhā. He controverts the views of both these prima facie views in his chapter on vyañjana-sthāpana. He does not care for Vidyadhara, it seems. But his arguments to distinguish tätparya from vyañjana are very interesting and they proceed as follows:
449
(S.D. V. pp. 296, 297, 298, Edn. ibid): yac ca kecid āhuḥ - 'so'yam īṣor iva dirgha-dirghataro 'bhidha-vyāpāraḥ' iti. yac ca dhanikena uktam
"tātparyā-'vyatirekac ca vyañjakasya na dhvaniḥ,
yāvat-kārya-prasārittvāt
tātparyam, na tuladhṛtam."
iti. tayor upari 'sabda-buddhi-karmaṇām viramya vyāpārábhāvaḥ' iti vādibhir eva pātanīyo dandah. evam ca lakṣaṇa'pyupāsyā ? dirgha-dirgha-abhidhā vyāpāreņa api tad artha-bodha-siddhiḥ. kim iti ca, 'brāhmaṇa putras te jātaḥ, kanyā te garbhiņi ity ādāv api harṣa-śokā"dīnām api na vācyatvam.
yat punar 'pauruseyam a-pauruṣeyam ca vakyam sarvam eva kāryaparam, atatparatve anupadeyatvād unmatta-vākyavat. tataś ca kavya-śabdānām niratiśayasukhā"sväda-vyatirekeṇa pratipadya-pratipādakayoḥ pravṛttyaupayika-prayojanaanupalabdher niratiśaya-sukhā"svāda eva karyatvena avad haryate. 'yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdartha' iti nyāyāt' iti.

-
tatra-prastavyam; kim idam tātparatvam nāma ? tad arthatvam vā, tātparyavṛttyä tad-bodhakatvam vā ? ādye na vivādaḥ, vyangyatve'pi tad-arthatā-anapāyāt.

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450
SAHRDAYĀLOKA dvitiye tu - keyam tātparyākhyā vịttiḥ ? abhihitánvayavādibhir angīkstā tad anyà vā ? ādye dattam eva uttaram.
dvitīye tu-nāmamātre vivādaḥ, tanmate’pi turīya-vrtti-siddheḥ.
nanu astu yugapad eva tātparya-śakryā vibhāvā”di-samsargasya rasā”des ca prakāśanam - iti cet ? na; tayor hetu-phala-bhāvángīkārāt. yad āha munih - 'vibhāvánubhāva-vyabicāri-samyogād rasa-nispattih', iti. sahabhāveca kutah savyetara-vişāņayor iva kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ ?, paurváparya-virahāt. 'gangāyām ghosah' ity ādau taţā”dy artha-mātra-bodha-viratāyā laksaņāyās' ca kutah śītatvapāvanatvā"di-vyangya-bodhakatā ? tena turīyā vrtcir ūpāsyā eva iti nirvivādam etat.” .
So, any extention of the traditionally accepted connotation of ‘tātparya-vịtti' is not acceptable to Viśvanātha, it being unscientific.
We did not mention Hemacandra after Mammata, because he follows the footsteps of Mammata and observes : (pp. 58, Edn. 2nd '64, Dr. Kulkarni and Prof. Parikh, Bombay, and pp. 28, Edn. Nandi, L. D. Insti. publication, Ahmedabad A.D. 2000) : "abhidhānántaram ca yady api anvaya-pratipatti-nimittam tātparya-śaktir apy asti, tadvisayas tātparya-laksaņo'rtho'pi, tathā’pi tau vākya-visayāv eva iti nā'tra uktau."
In the 'Viveka' he adds only this much- “ 'tāv iti' - sä сa sa ca, tau. atréti saktimadhye arthamadhye ca". This suggests Hemacandra's absolute clerity concerning both the tātparya-sakti and the tātparyártha, which he is not in a mood to discuss because they concern themselves with a sentence only. Tātparya is for Hemacandra, a vākya-sakti and tātparyártha is vākyártha arrived at with the help of a sentence. So, these two - tau i.e. să (= tātparya-sakti) and 'sa' (i.e. tātparyártha) were not to be considered when only word-powers and word-senses were discussed. But even for Hemacandra vyañjană continues to be a turiyā = fourth power, because he accepts 'gauņi' as a separate vrtti over and above laksanā.
Jayadeva and Keśava have nothing to say about tātparya-vrtti.
It will be interesting to end this chapter with a long quotation from : Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, who in his 'Indian Theories of Meaning" observes (pp. 217, ibid) -
"It is well known that the Bhāțța-Mimāmsakas who followed Kumārilabhatta are staunch supporters of the abhihitánvaya theory of verbal comprehension; as a result of this whenever the term is found, there is a tendency among commentators to associate it exclusively to the Bhātra school, without waiting to inquire whether the theory explained is the same as that adopted by the Bhättas. Some of the commentators, and modern scholars following them, have thus associated 'tātparya-vrtti' with the Bhātta-school of Mimāmsā.

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"Tātparya"
451
[In a foot-note no. 1 Dr. K. Kunjuni Raja (pp. 218, ibid) to support his finding mentions the names of Manikyacandra, Govinda Thakkur, Jhalakikar, P. V. Kane, K. C. Pandey, S. S. Sukthankar, - we may add even Gajendragadkar. We can add other names also.] [Dr. Raja then proceeds] -
"But there is one difficulty in such an assumption; which many of the scholars have not noticed. All the great authoritative writers on Bhātta Mimāmsā like Kumārilabhatta, Pārthasārathi Mishra, Vācaspati Miśra, Candidāsa and Nārāyanabhatta have unequivocally stated that according to the abhihitánvaya theory advocated by them, the syntactically unified sentence-meaning is to be conveyed through the secondary power, laksaņā." [in foot note 2, pp. 218, 219, Dr. Raja quotes names of those who hold this view)..
"Even critics like Śālikanātha who tried to refute this theory have described it in that way. Nārāyanabhatta says that tātparya is not a separate factor in conveying the syntactic relationship of the word meanings."
But, one thing is certain that this 'laksana' is not held as identical with normal laksaņā of the ālamkārikas. This is for certain. So, this special laksaņā becomes so to say, another name of tātparya-vștti itself.
Dr. Raja (pp. 219) proceeds - "It may be pointed out here that Jayanta Bhatta, the great Naiyāyika scholar of the tenth cen. A.D., who wrote the Nyāya-mañjarī, was the first to bring forward the theory of tātparya being a separate vṛtti. The abhihitánvaya theory is not the monopoly of the Bhātta Mimāmsakas; we have seen that the Association theory of the grammarian Vājapyāyana, that samsarga is vākyártha, is a kind of abhihitánvaya theory. Bhartphari has also referred to such views. Early Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of a sentence; they discussed only the exact import of words. Jayanta says that their silence is eloquent as it shows that they believed that the sentence is only a collection of words, and that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings. After discussing in detail the various theories about verbal comprehension held by various schools, Jayanta advocates a modified form of abhihitánvaya theory. The words express their isolated word-meanin power of abhidhā; they have another power, the tātparya-sakti which indicates the mutual relationship among the word-meanings. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of the words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words in common and lasts till the independent judgement is produced.

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452
SAHRDAYĀLOKA [foot-note 5 : "abhidhātrī matā saktiḥ padānām svārtha-nisthatā, tesām tātparya-śaktis tu samsargávagamávadhiḥ.”]
It may be noted that this tātparya-śakti is the same as the samsarga-maryādā accepted by the later Navya Nyāya school. [Gadādhara's Vyutpatti-vāda p. 1. : śābdabodhe caika-padárthéparapadártha-samsargah samsargamaryadaya bhāsate.] - “The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts - (padártha-samsarga), and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of verbal judgement (vākyártha) is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (samsarga-maryādā), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (abhidhā or laksaņā).” (S. Kuppuswami Sastri - A primer of Indian Logic, p. 258).
What prompted Abhinavagupta to accept Jayanta's modified form of Abhihitánvaya theory and not that of the real followers of the Bhätta school seems to be the fact that the Alamkārikas of the dhvani school could not accept laksanā to explain the syntactic relation among the word-meanings, since they accepted it only in cases of 'anvayánupapatti' and not in cases of 'tātparyánupapatti'.”
[Here, before we proceed further, we may ask a question as to who were these 'ālamkārikas of the dhvani school who preceded Abhinavagupta and prompted him to accept whatever he accepted ?. Actually 'tātparyánupatti' in such illustrations as "kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām' has also been discussed by dhvanivādi alamkārikas.]
Some of the discerning commentators of the alamkāra texts have already pointed out that the view about tātparya-vștti being responsible for conveying the syntactic relation of the word-meaning does not refer to the Bhātta Mimāmsaka theory, but only to the concient Naiyāyikas, who were also abhihitánvayavādins. In the Sudhāsāgara commentary of the Kāvyaprakāśa Bhimasena Dixita explains this point in detail. He says that for all practical purposes this tātparya-vrtti may be identified with the laksanā of the Mimāmsakas and that it is the same as the samsarga-maryādā of the Navya-nyāya-school. (kindly refer to our remarks above, before citing Dr. Raja's words on his page 219).
The distinction between laksanā and tātparya in this case is very subtle. Mere juxtaposition of isolated words, giving out a string of unconnected separate concepts, is of no use in linguistic discourse. It is certain that the co-utterance of words is with the intention of conveying a connected unified meaning. It is this apparent contradiction between the juxta-position of words in a sentence and their

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"Tātparya"
453
not being related to serve some purpose that gives the power to the words to resort to lakṣaṇā, through inference of the arthāpatti type, and convey the syntactically related sentence meaning. The speaker's intention, taken in a general sense, is at the back of resorting to laksanā. According to the Prābhākaras, on the other hand, the tātparya makes the primary significatory power, itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when tātparya is not taken as a separate vrtti, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation; in fact Pārthasārathimiśra himself refers to the function of tātparya; and Jayanta quotes Kumārila-bhatta in support of his theory that tātparya is a separate vrtti of the words which conveys the relation of the word meanings.
Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri says that the 'samsarga' or mutual relation of the word-meanings is conveyed by a process of suggestion, and quotes Jespersen's views that, 'suggestion is impression through suppression'. A kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought; the individual words give only their own individual isolated meanings, leaving the samsarga or the mutual relation of the meanings to be conveyed by suggestion. The Naiyāyikas may call it tātparya-výtti or samsargamaryādā, the Bhātta Mimāmsakas may call it laksanā, and the
ikaras may take it to be the extension of the primary power abhidhā itself. Tātparya, the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance, has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension; but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called Tātparya-śakti. That is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers."
We beg to differ and would like to follow the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammata. We have seen how Hemacandra has dubbed it as a vākya-sakti, but actually the concept of vākya cannot be formed in the absence of words and hence it is all right if we call it as a power of words, i.e. one of the four, the fourth being vyañjanā.

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Chapter : VII ‘Lakşaņā
‘Laksanā' is broadly a metaphorical use of language. When a word in a sentence is not seen to carry its normal expressive meaning that we are accustomed to, through usage, dictionary etc., it adopts a secondary sense, of course given certain conditions. This is called laksanā. Another power of a word called 'gauni is also mentioned by sanskrit theorists and some ālamkārikas take it as a separate power, independent of laksaņā or secondary usage. But the normal tendency is to incorporate 'gaunī into laksanā, as a sub-variety. We will look into this in greater detail as below.
We know that secondary usage is common to all languages spoken by humans, even in worldly use of language. When 'X' addresses someone as 'a donkey for example, the person addressed, we know, being a human being is not a donkey. So, when he is addressed as a 'donkey', the word can not convey its normal expressed meaning of a special four-legged animal. It has to be understood not literally but figuratively in a different sense. This makes for 'laksana'. Poets also resort to laksanā in poetry. When a word, in ordinary parlance is used in a secondary sense, it excites special attention, interpretation and understanding. The purport of the speaker has to be understood in a proper context. This secondary sense has to be related to the primary sense in one way or the other. We come across terms such as ‘upacāra', 'amukhyā vịtti', 'gauņi and 'bhakti' alternatively used for lakṣaṇā, the secondary or indicative function. It is termed 'indication' also.
Normally three conditions are accepted for the operation of laksaņā or indication by alamkārikas. They are (i) The primary meaning, under given context, looks inapplicable or unsuitable. (ii) as a result of (i), another meaning is resorted to and this meaning has to have some relation with the primary sense. This relation is of different types, as will be seen later. (iii) This secondary meaning should be based either on normal usage, i.e. rūdhi, or a special motive - 'prayojana’. This third

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'Laksanā
455 condition, viz. of there being a motive behind resorting to such a usage, was not underlined by earlier writers and this is so with some later writers also who belong to different schools of thought. The alamkārikas however, are by and large unanimous in accepting these three conditions.
The normally served example of lakṣaṇā is “gangāyām ghosah”. i.e. ‘a village on (the stream of the Gangā'. The word 'gangāyām'in sanskrit is to be understood as 'in the stream of the river Gangā'. But we know that a village cannot be located on the stream and hence we have to resort to the secondary sense viz. 'on the bank of the river Ganga'. The primary meaning is thus unsuitable and hence the secondary meaning is resorted to. This secondary sense is not the dictionary meaning of the given word, i.e. it is not the directly expressed sense, but is understood only indirectly as somehow related to the primary sense. With this secondary sense the incompatibility so to say, is removed from the expression. Now the motive behind resorting to such apparently incompatible use of language remains vague and it depends mainly on contextual factors. Here the motive is perhaps to suggest that the qualities of coolness and sanctity prevelant in the Gangā are also experienced in the village situated on its bank. The relation is that of nearness. Another stalk illustration is "gaur vāhīkah” meaning 'the 'Vāhīka' (a resident of Bālha;) is a bull.' But 'vāhika' being a man cannot be a 'bull. So, through the relation of similarity in qualities such as laziness etc., the Vāhika is called a bull, meaning he is similar to a bull on account of his laziness.
As for the grammarians, we comes across usages of terms such as 'gauna' in Pānini and Patañjali as follows : The word 'gauna' occurs at Pā. 1.1.15, pp. 71, M.bh (= Mahābhāsya, Edn. Keilhorn, Edn. 3rd '72); Pā. 1.4.108, pp. 354; Pa. 6.3.46, pp. 161; and Pā. 8.3.82, pp. 445. We will examine these occurrences. Under Pā. 1.1.15 - 'Or, we have a vārttika viz. “Otaśvipratiśedhah”. The M.bh. on it reads as : "odanto nipāta ity atra cvyantansya pratişedho vaktavyah. anadah adah abhavat adóbhavat. niróbhavat. na vaktavyaḥ. laksana-pratipadoktayoḥ pratipadoktasyaivaty evam na bhavisyati. evam apy agaur gauh samapadyata go'bhavat atra prāpnoti. evam tarhi gaunamukhyayor mukhye kārya-sampratyaya iti. tad yathā. gaur anubandhyo 'jo' gnisomiya iti na vāhiko’nubadhyate. katham tarhi bāhīke výddhyattve bhavataḥ. gaus tisthati. gām ānayeti. arthāśraya etad evam bhavati. yaddhi śabdāśrayam sabdamātre tadbhavati. śabdāśraye ca vrddhyattve.
Under Pā. 1.4.108, pp. 354, we read - (M.bh.) “...gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. tad yathā gaur anubandhyo'jo'gnisomiya iti na vāhiko'nubandhyate. kat am tarhi vāhīke vrddhyātrve bhavatah. gaustisthati, gām

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456
SAHRDAYĀLOKA ānayeti. arthāśraya etad evam bhavati. yaddhi śabdāśrayam, śabdamātre tad bhavati. sabdaśrave ca vrddhyāteve.
ā. 6.3.46. pp. 161. we have : "pradhānato vā yato vrttih". 4. The M.bh. on this reads - "athavā gaunamukhyayor mukhye kārya-sampratyayah. tad yathā gaur anūbandhyo'jo'gnisomiya iti na vāhīko'nubadhyate... etc.
Under Pā 8.3.82, on ‘itarathā hyanista-prasangah-2, The M.bh. reads...
"itarathā hyanistam prasajyeta. agnisomau mānavakāviti. tat tarhi vaktavyam. na vaktavyam. gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratipattih. tadyathā. gaur anubandhyo jo'gnisomiya iti na vāhīko'nubadhyate.... etc. etc.
The occurrences show that the primary and secondary - i.e. mukhya and gauna or a-mukhya meanings were known to the ancient grammarians.
In the Vākyapadīya (Edn. Bhate) We have 'gauna' at, V.P. II. 84 - prasajya-pratiședhóyam
paryudāsóyam atra tu, idam gauņam idam mukhyam
vápídam guru laghvidam. V.P. II. 264 - artha-prakaranápekṣau
yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha, yuktaḥ pratyāyayaty artham
tam gaunam apare viduḥ. V.P. II. 267 - svārthe pravartamāno’pi
yasyártham yo'valambate, nimittam tatra mukhyam syāt
nimitti gauna ucyate. V.P. II. 273 - jāti-sabdo’ntareņā’pi
jātim yatra prayujyate, sambandhi-sadrśāddharmāt
tam gauņam apare viduḥ. V.P. II. 274 - viparyāsād ivárthasya
yatrarthantakatām iva, manyante sa gavādis tu gauna ity ucyate kvacit.

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'Laksana'
457 V.P. II. 278 - śrutimātrena yatrásya
samarthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante
gaunam vatnopapāditam. V.P. II. 281 - agni-somā”dayaḥ śabdā
ye svarūpa-padárthakāḥ, samjñibhiḥ samprayujyante
aprasiddhes teșu gaunātā. V.P. II. 257. ekatvam tu sarūpatvāt
cchabdayor gauna-mukhyayoh prāhur atyanta bhede’pi
bhedamārgánudarsinaḥ. We have 'gauna-mukhya-prakalpanā', at V.P. II. 263d, and 'gaunārthábhinivesin' at V.P. II. 266d. We have 'laksanā' at V.P. III. I. 50a, and III. 1.70d V.P. III. 1.50 reads as -
"laksanā sabda-samskāre vyāpārah kārya-siddhyaye, samkhyā-karmā”di-śaktīnām
sputisāmyépī drsyate. V.P. III. 1.70 - "sammārgasya vidheyatvāt
anyatra vihite grahe, vidhivākye śrutā samkhyā laksanāyām na bādhyate.
We have 'laksaņártha' at V.P. II. 384a, III. 14. 452d, etc. These occurrences prove that the ancient grammarians were fairly conversant with the concepts of a secondary sense and a secondary power of word, of course at worldly usage level. They were not concerned with the poetic usage of secondary power as they were not out to discuss the poetic use of language. But gauni or laksanā is as old as hills.

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458
SAHRDAYĀLOKA We have also noted earlier that Patañjali not only knows about the primary and secondary senses, but is fairly conversant with the various relations they may have between them. Thus, under Pā. 4.1.48, pp. 218 (Vol. II), Patañjali reads - "katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati ? caturbhih prakāraih a-tasmin sa ity etad bhavati, tātsthyāt, tāddharmyāt sāmīdyāt sāhacaryād iti. tātsthyāt tāvat mañcāh hasanti, girir dahyate, tāddharmyāt, jatinam yāntam brabmadatta ity Wha brahmadatte yāni karmāni, jaținy api tāni kriyante ity ato jațī brahmadatta ity ucyate. tat-sāmīpyāt gangāyām ghosaḥ, kūpe garga-kulam, tat sāhacaryāt kuntān praveśaya, yastih praveśaya.
Thus the discipline of grammar was fairly conversant with the secondary use of language. We will now turn to the Nyāya discipline.
Gautama in his Nyāya sūtras applies the term 'upacāra' to this secondary usage and holds it to be quite common. He also knows the various relations between the primary and the secondary senses. The Nyaya-sūtra, II. 2. 62 reads as : sahacaranasthāna-tādarthya.-vrtta-māna-dharana-samīpyayoga-sādhanā."dhipatyebhyo brāhmana-manca-kata-rāja-saktu-candana-gangā-śātakā’nna-puruşeşv atadbhāve'pi tad upacāraḥ. -
The relation of 'sahacarana' or association is illustrated as in yastikām bhojaya'. i.e. feed the stick. Now here by 'stick' a brahmin with a stick is meant for he is normally always associated with a stick which he carries in his hand while walking. Similarly in, 'kuntāḥ praviśanti' by 'kuntāḥ' or lances are meant the lance-bearers.
'Sthāna' or location is illustrated as in 'mañcāh krośanti', i.e. the beds (or cradles) are making noise or crying. The term 'manca' is used for children sleeping in a cot or a cradle.
"Tādarthya' or purpose is illustrated as in 'katam karoti' - 'he makes a mat', when actually he collects reeds for the preparation of a mat. Here the reeds used for making a mat are called a mat.
'Vrtta' or behaviour is illustrated as in 'yamo rājā', i.e. the king is the God of death. Here the term 'yama' is used in the sense of a king who acts like yama i.e. who strikes terror among people.
'māna' or measure is illustrated as in 'ādhaka-saktavah' - i.e. one adhaka (= say, a pound, or kg.) of floor. Here the term 'ādhaka' signifying a measure, is used to mean that which is measured'. i.e. adhakena mitāḥ saktavaḥ.
dhārana' or wheighing, as in 'tulā-candanam' meaning one tulā of candana. Here tulā or balance stands for that which is weighed in a balance : 'tulāyām

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'Lakṣaṇā'
459
dhṛtam candanam'. Dr. Raja (pp. 234 ibid) observes in a foot-note (no. 1) and we agree with this fully that, "(e) [i.e. māna] and (f) [i.e. dhāraṇa] are similar; the former refers to the measurement of volume, and the latter to the measurement of weight. Aḍhaka primarily means the measure and secondarily the volume measured by it; tula primarily means the balance which gives a particular weight, and secondarily that which is weighed in it. According to Panini such shifts of meaning are included in the primary sense itself. See Panini II. 3.46."
'Proximity' - or sāmīpya is illustrated as in 'gangāyām gāvaḥ caranti.', meaning the cows are grazing on the Gangā. Here 'ganga' stands for the bank of gangā.
Inherent connection or 'yoga' is seen as in 'kṛṣṇaḥ śāṭakaḥ' or the black cloth. The word 'kṛṣṇa' or black primarily means blackness, but here it means 'the thing having blackness'. Here the term suggesting quality is used for the thing qualified.
Cause or 'sadhana' is seen as in 'annam prāṇāḥ' i.e. food is life. In the Sahityaśāstra the illustration favoured is 'ayur ghṛtam'. In 'annam prāṇāḥ' 'anna' or food which is the cause of life is itself said to be life or breath itself.
Prominance or adhipatya is illustrated as in 'ayam kulam', meaning 'He is the family'. Here 'kula' is used in the sense of highest authority in a family. A prominant person in a family is himself said to be 'kula' or family.
Gautam has cited all illustrations of figurative usage from common usage. Again the list is supposed to be only illustrative and not exhaustive. At Nyāyasūtra II. 2. 64, he also refers to the Mimāmsaka view that the primary meaning of any word is the class or universal i.e. jāti and that the particular or vyakti to which it refers in a given statement is arrived at through the secondary function i.e. upacara. Gautam does not accept this because for him a word means jāti, ākṛti and vyakti at a time.
The Mimāmsakas are primarily concerned with the basic rules of interpretation of Vedic injunctions. Among vedic passages, naturally there are some with metaphorical expressions. So, in the Mimāmsā sūtras, Jaimini enumerates six bases for metaphorical description which are explained in Sabara's bhāṣya in greater detail. The MI. Sū. I. 4, 23 states - "tat-siddhi-jāti-sārūpya-praśamsā-bhūmalinga-samavāya - iti guṇāśrayāḥ. (Ref. Prof. Devasthali's work; "Mimāmsā, or the Väkya-śāstra of ancient India)".
First we will get at these six bases in brief and later we will deal in greater detail about the Mimāmsaka's general attitude towards gauna or secondary sense and lakṣaṇā as a whole.

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460
SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'Tat-siddhi' or acomplishment of purpose is seen as in, “yajamānaḥ prastarah” - i.e. the grass-bundle or a grass-bed is the yajamāna or sacrificer. Another illustration is, 'yajamāno vā eka-kapālah', i.e. the purodāśa cake prepared in a single pan is the sacrificer. These vedic sentences do not make any sense when taken in the primary meaning. So, a figurative sense has to be resorted to. The grass-bed and the cake accomplish the purpose served by the sacrificer and hence are indicated by the term 'sacrificer'.
“Jāti' means 'same origin. Kumārila Bhatta in Tāntravārttika (p. 362) explains : Jātir iti cátra janmopādānam vivakṣitam.' The illustration cited is - "āgneyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ”. This Brahmin is Āgneya. This figurative usage is based on the fact that both the Brahmin and Agni are born of a common origin viz. 'prajāpati'.
'Sārūpya' or similarity is also a base of figurative expression as in, "ādityo yüpah”, - 'the sacrificial post is āditya i.e. sun. This metaphorical expression is based on the similarity of the post to the sun in brightness and height and this statement is meant to eulogize the post.
'Praśamsā' i.e. praise as a base of a figurative expression is illustrated as in, 'a-paśavo vā anye go-aśvebhyah'. - i.e. 'Those other than cows or horses are not animals'. Again, 'yan malinam avāsas tat' - 'That which is dirty is not clothing', and, 'yad aghstam abhojanam tat', - 'that which is without purified butter is no food', etc. are expressions of figurative usages based on praise. In these illustrations words such as pašu, vāsas, bhojana etc. are meant only for genuinely praiseworthy animals, clothing and food.
‘Bhūma' means preponderance. This is illustrated as in 'srstir upadadhāti' - 'The srsti-bricks are placed'. Here the word 'Srsti' stands for the bricks that are associated with a group of vedic hymns with or without the word 'spsți'.
'Linga-samavāya' i.e. presence of indicative sign, is illustrated as in, 'chatrino yānti', i.e. people with umbrellas are going. Here the reference to the umbrella is just to indicate the people, not to describe them and even if there be few umbrellas such a statement can be used. Another illustration is, dandino gacchanti', 'people with sticks are going'.
Actually we know that the Mimāmsakas were aware of both the 'mukhya' or primary sense and the gauna' or secondary sense, and their relative strength. Śabara actually begins with the question as to whether this division of arthas into two classes such as ‘mukhya' and 'gauna' can reasonably be admitted. With this

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‘Laksaņā
461 object in view, he first takes up the definitions of the terms 'mukhya' and 'gauna', saying that ‘mukhya' or primary is that which is perceived from the word directly, and is so called because as it were it is the face of the word itself. On the other hand, that signification, the perception of which follows from the primarily perceived signification, on the strength of some connection, is said to be 'jaghanya' as it is, as it were, the hinder part of the sabda. This latter is also called 'gauna', owing to its being connected with some guņa or quality. Sabara observes : "kah punar mukhyaḥ ko vā gauna iti. ucyate. yah sabdād eva avagamyate, sa prathamo'rtho mukhyaḥ. mukham iva bhavati iti mukhya ucyate. yastu khalu pratītād arthāt kenacit-sambandhena gamyate, sa paścād-bhāvāt jaghanam iva bhavati iti jaghanyaḥ. guņa-sambandhāc ca gauna iti."
These definitions of 'mukhya' and 'gauna' are not completely free from faults. It can be argued, for example, that all the senses are perceived from śabda only and hence this division into primary and secondary is futile. Say, for example, statements such as 'agnir jvalati', and 'agnir mānavakah'. In both of these, the sense of 'fire' in the first illustration, and the sense of 'manavaka' i.e. his 'paingalya' or yellowness, the common source is the word 'agni' itself. So, as both the senses follow from the same word, viz. fagni', both will have to be termed 'mukhya' i.e. primary or principal : "yady evam sarva eva mukhyah. sarvo hi śabdās gamyate. yathaiva hi 'agnir jvalati' iti ukte jvalana-sampratyayah, evam eva 'agnir mānavaka' iti śabda eva ucсārite mānavakasampratyayah." - But such a conclusion can not be admitted for we know for certain that only one of these viz. the idea of fire is the mukhya artha, and the other is 'gauna'.
To remove this defect, the above definitions may be revised by saying that 'mukhyártha' is that sense, which is perceived from the word independently of any attributive adjunct; while 'gauna' is that which is perceived from the word acompanied and aided by a qualifying adjunct. For, if not accompanied by qualifying adjuncts, a word is not supposed to convey a sense which it has no direct power to convey. So, if a word conveys a sense, even when accompanied by any adjunct, we will have to take that sense to the conveyed by the word itself, and the adjunct will be taken as a 'sahakāri kārana'. Thus the presence or absence of a qualifying adjunct can not give us ground enough to distinguish the mukhya sense from the gauna sense, for in either case the sense will be perceived from the same source, i.e. word itself ! It is the sabda which is the nimitta of artha jñāna and as soon as the nimitta is there, whether accompanied by a qualifying adjunct or not,

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462
SAHRDAYĀLOKA
the naimittika i.e. the perception of artha follows from it. Thus there cannot be any distinction between the 'sopapada' and a 'nirupapada' sabda, which, therefore, in the light of the definitions under discussion, amounts to saying that there is no distinction between mukhya and gauņa artha at all - "atha uchyeta yasmin nirupapadāt sabdās sampratyayah sa mukhyah, yasmin sopapadāt sabdāt sa gauna iti. naitad yuktam. yasya hi śabdasya rūpam kasyacid arthasya nimittam, sopapadasyā’pi tad eva rūpam, nirupapadasyā’pi. na ca śakyam nimitte sati naimittikena na bhavitum. kim ato yady evam. idam saktate vaditum upapadād rte na sórtho bhavati, upapade tu sañjāte sórthaḥ sañjanisyate iti. -
An attempt to distinguish between the two by pointing out that the idea of fire is obtained from śabda, while the idea of māņavaka is obtained from the samudāya viz. of both the words agniḥ and māņavakaḥ, would be of no use for the simple reason that ‘agnih' and 'māņavakah' can't be taken as a 'samudāya' in the same sense in which the word 'aśva-karna' is called by the name. In case of 'agni' and 'mānavaka' we realize the individual senses separately and not jointly as in case of 'aśva' and 'karna' in ‘aśva-karņa'. Again, it cannot be a vākyártha. In a sentence say 'nīlam utpalam' the ideas of nīlatva and'utpalatva are conved by two words 'nīlam' and 'utpalam'. These are the attributes of one and the same individual. In 'agnih' and 'mānavakah' however the attribute's agnitva and 'māṇavakatva', are quite distinct and separate from each other and normally they abide in two different individuals. Thus there is no plausible ground to distinguish between mukhyartha and gaunartha and the best course is to admit that agni expresses both fire as well as Mänavaka and that there is no distinction between mukhya and gauņa arthas : "na cásau samudāyárthaḥ śaktyate vijñātum. anvaya-vyatirekābhyām hi vibhāgóvagamyate. atha vākyártho ‘yam ity ucyate. naivam sakyam. na hi ananvitaḥ padártho bhavati vākyárthaḥ. tad evam drśyatām. agni-sabda eváyam jvalanavacanah. agni sabda eva māņavakasya abhidhātā iti. tasmān na mukhyo gauņa iti kaścid visesah.”
It can be argued here that the distinction between the two arthas may be based on 'prasiddhi', so that the sense which is well known is taken to be 'mukhya'. The ess known is gauna. But this argument is not at all strong. 'Prasiddhi' is nothing but 'prajñāna' or knowledge, or the quality of being well known. It is not possible to distinguish between one prajñāna and another. 'Prajñāna' is knowledge, whether extensive or limited i.e. susthu or manāk. There is no difference in its character. Again, we should not argue that 'susthu prasiddhi', and 'manāk prasiddhi', are used

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“Lakşaņā'
463 by us to singify frequency or otherwise of the use of expressions. - “atha ucyate, yaḥ susthu prasiddhaḥ sa mukhyah, yo manāg iva sa gaunaḥ iti. idam api nópapadyate. prasiddhir nāma prajñānam. na ca prajñāne kaścid višesósti." - Even this explanation is unsatisfactory, for the very fact that a 'sabda' conveys an 'artha', is enough to show that it has the potentiality - the samarthya to convey it; and so long as there is sāmarthya, it does not matter whether its prayoga - practice - is 'suşthu' or 'manāk'. This alpatva' or 'bahutva' of 'prayoga' does not make any difference between the senses from the point of view of the sāmarthya of the word to convey a particular sense. In any case the sense will be conved by the word and so, will have to be branded as 'mukhya' only - "athocyeta, yasya bahuśaḥ prayogo''sti sa mukhyaḥ, alpaśaḥ prayujyamāno gauņaḥ iti. naitad evam. alpaśópi prayujyamāno
sāmrthye pratyāyayet. atah sópi sabdāt pratiyata iti mukhya eva.” [SB. pp. 748] So, unavoidable conclusion follows that ‘artha' is always mukhy there is only one type of meaning and that is 'mukhya' only. It is no use, therefore to talk of 'mukhya' and 'gauna' artha. [Mahimā seems to follow this logic.]
This pūrva-paksa or prima facie view is not totally unsound. For, we find that the idea of fire is conveyed by the word 'agni' but the idea of 'mānavaka' is not conveyed by it. This is clear from the general rule that one word conveys one sense and when the word ‘agni' conveys the meaning of 'fire', it can not convey the meaning of 'māņavaka'. Now if it can be said that why should we not accept the idea of mānavaka as directly conveyed by the word agni ? Why should we insist on the sense of fire being conveyed by the word 'agni'? The answer to this lies in our own day-to-day experience. We find people perceiving the idea of fire from the word agni without any reference to the idea of māņavaka, and not vice versa. This is confirmed by usage. Again there is not even a popular usage supporting the use of the word agni to denote persons having similarity to fire. The pravrtti-nimitta is agni-sādrsya in such cases. But how can this agni-sādrśya be perceived if the thing in itself viz. fire is not perceived ? Thus, we have to conclude that the idea of fire is first perceived from the word 'agni' and then is perceived the idea of 'sādrśya' or similarity. Thus the word 'agni' is primarily the means to perceive the idea of fire and not of 'mānavaka'. Thus we have to conclude that the word 'agni' primarily applies to fire and not to mānavaka, to which it may apply only secondarily. In the same way, the word 'barhih' primarily applies to 'trna' or grass, and not to tộna-sadrśa things. Thus it is unreasonable to say that there can be no distinction between one type of artha and another type of artha. - "SB. pp. 748 :

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464
SAHRDAYĀLOKA atra ucyate. asti atra višesaḥ. māņavako na agni-śabdāt pratīyate. katham avagamyate ? uktam, anyāyaścánekárthatvam. katham na viparyayah ? ucyate. anādstya eva māņavaka-pratyayam jvalanam agni-sabdad pratiyanto drśyante. na tu anādệtya jvalana-pratyayam mānavakam agni-sabdāt pratiyanti. kuta etat . yo yo agni-sadrs'o vivaksyate, tatra tatra agniśabdo niyata iti. ata eva agni-gatasādrśyād ayam tu drśyate. ataḥ agni-sādrśyam asya pravsttau nimittam. na ca jvalane a-pratīte tat-sādņśyam pratīyate. tasmāt jvalanasya agniśabdo nimittam, na mānavakasya. tasmāt jvalane mukhyo, na mānavake. evam eva trnéty asya barhiḥ śabdo nimittam, na trņa-sadrśa-pratyayasya.
From this discussion, it is now clear that all arthas or senses are not alike. Some are mukhya while the rest are jaghanya or gauņa. Mukhya artha is that which is primarily conveyed by a sabda, while the gauna artha is that which of course is conveyed by the word but only through the mukhyártha. After establishing the twofold division of artha, we will now go to decide as to which of these arthas should be understood as regularly conveyed by the word.
This problem is discussed by Jaimini and Sabara in an adhikarana called by the name, “barhir nyaya”. This is so named due to the circumstance that the word they have chosen for theoratical consideration is "barhih", which occurs in the mantra, viz. "barhir deva-sadanam dāmi". The question raised by them is connected with the vedic mantra. The purpose of the mantra portion of veda is to bring to mind the enjoined act, at the time of ritual performance. This can be done by the mantra by yielding the artha. But when there are two types of arthas which one is to be understood as being conveyed by the words of the mantras ? Do we have to accept the mukhya or the gauņa or both the arthas ?
The prima facie view is that as both the mukhya and gauna arthas are perceived by a word, both should to be accepted. Again, there is nothing to prevent this position of both being accepted. There is no restrictive factor that limits our perception to only one and not the other artha. - SB. pp. 749 - “tad evam dvaite sati mukhyaparatā sabdasya, uta gauņópi iti yukto vicāraḥ. kim tāvat prāptam ? mukhye gaune ca viniyogaḥ. kutaḥ ? ubhayasya śakyatvāt ubhayam api barhiḥ śabdena śakyate pratyāyayitum trnam ca, trna-sadṛśam ca. třnam sākṣāt, trnasadỊśam tỉna-pratyayena. yac ca nāma darśapūrņamāsayoḥ sādhanabhūtena barhiḥ śabdena śakyate pratyāyayitum tat-sarvam pratyāyayitavyam. vinigamanāyām hetvabhāvāt.”

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'Lakşaņā
465 The Siddhantin does not accept this and shows that it is not possible to hold that the words of the mantras would convey both the arthas simultaneously inspite of the assertion of the pūrvapaks'in to that effect. Since the mantras occur in some context, it is natural therefore to assume a syntactical unit with the main sentence i.e. the vidhi vākya which lays down a particular act, so that ultimately the idea to be derived from the mantra comes to be that one should accomplish by the mantra whatever one is capable of accomplishing thereby. But for want of any other possibility it has to be admitted that the mantras help in the performance of an act by bringing to mind its several details which they can do only because they are endowed with an ever ready power to express an artha. But because, on account of context, and eka-vākyatā with vidhi-vākya, it must convey the mukhya artha, and because it cannot convey both the arthas simultaneously, it is clear that the mantras are to be employed in their primary and not their secondary signification. - “SB. pp. 749 - "evam prāpte brūmaḥ - mukhya eva viniyoktavyo mantro na gauna iti. kutah ? ubhayasya asakyatvāt. prakarane hi samāmnānāt pradhānenaikavākyatām upaiti. tatraitad āpatati, yat saknuyād anena mantreņa sādhayitum tathā sādhayed iti. sa cásāv arthábhidhāna-samyogāt saknoti upakartum, na gauņam artham saknoti abhidhātum. tasmān na gauņe viniyogah.
Prof. Devasthali (pp. 68) further elaborates, as follows. But, it may be argued, that the gauņa artha is also conveyed by the mantra, after first conveying the mukhyartha. So, there is nothing wrong in holding that the mantra is also conveying the gauna artha, and is also employed in that sense also, for the gauna sense is also connected with it. But the point is that when the purpose of the mantra is served by conveying just the mukhyártha there is no need to proceed for the gauņártha. The conveying of meaning, i.e. arthábhidhāna serves the purpose of proving that the mantra is not futile and this purpose of 'anarthakyaparihāra' is served by conveying the primary meaning. Thus there is no motivation for further conveying the secondary sense also. So, it has to be concluded that 'mukhyártha' alone is conveyed by the mantra, and not the gauņártha also - SB. pp. 750 reads - "nanu mukhyapratyayā cchakyate gauņaḥ pratyāyayitum. satyam etat. mukhya-pratyāyanena eva asya prayojanavattā nirvșttā iti na gauņam prati viniyoge kiñcit pramāņam asti. mukhye viniyogena tu ānarthakyam parihryate. parihrte anarthakye na gaunábhidhānam āpatati, na hy anabhidhāya mukhyam gauņam abhivadati sabdaḥ. ataḥ pramāņábhāvāt na gauņe viniyujyeta.”

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
Over and above this, there are many different means by which the gaunártha can be conveyed, and if mantra is invariably accepted as one of these, it naturally means that the other ways of conveying the same have to be overlooked. But where shall we find a pramāņa for doing so? Mantrámnāna could not have the power to exclude the other means of arriving at the gaunártha, for fear of parisamkhyā, which has no motive. Of course, it can be asked as to on what ground or pramāṇa do you take the mantra to be the means of conveying the mukhyártha? The reply to this is that we do so to save the mantras from being meaningless i.e. anarthaka. For, if the mantra is not used even in its mukhyártha, then it will not be able to be of any help in the main sacrificial ritual and therefore will consequently be rendered totally useless. Thus the conclusion forces upon us that the mantras are to be employed in their primary signification only. - SB. pp. 750, "api ca. gauņasya pratyāyane samarthyād bahavo'bhyupāyāḥ präpnuvanti. samarthyam ca sabdaikadese ityuktam. arthād vā kalpanaikadeśatvād iti. tatra mantre niyogato gaunam prati viniyujyamāna upayántaram vinā pramāṇena badhyeta. mantra"mnānam pramāṇam iti ced, na tasya upayántara-nivṛttau samarthyam asti. nanu mukhyépi viniyujyamānasya eşa eva doṣaḥ. na iti ucyate. yadi mukhyépi na viniyujyeta naiva pradhanasya upakuryāt. tatra tasya utpattir anarthikā eva syāt. tasmad asti gaune mukhye ca viseṣaḥ."
466
It can be further asked, why does the mantra convey its mukhyártha at all, if its gaunártha alone is to be ultimately employed? If it is argued that the mukhyártha has to be conveyed since the gaunártha can not otherwise be understood, then the reply is that, there do exist other means of getting at the gaunártha such as arthāpatti etc. and mukhyártha of a given mantra is not the only means to it. Again, if it be argued that mukhyártha is to be accepted as one of the several alternative remedies for arriving at the gaunártha, the reply is that in this case, mantrámnāna does not become compulsory for our object is to convey the gauṇártha and it necessarily may not be through the mantra, so the mantra may easily be neglected. But this goes against practice. On the other hand, if once the mantra is admitted as necessary for conveying the gaunártha by accepting a 'niyama', then there remains no purpose for the mantra to convey the gaunártha after it has once conveyed the mukhyartha. The purpose, viz. anarthakya parihara is served by the mukhyártha itself, as
noted above. ·
SB. pp. 750 - api ca yo gaune mantram viniyunkte sa vaktavyaḥ - kim artham mukhyam pratyāyasīti. sa ced brūyād -

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'Laksana'
467
nānyathā gauņa-pratyayo'stīti. pratibrüyād enam anye'pi gauņapratyayasya abhyupāyāḥ santīti. atha sa evam abhiyuktaḥ pratibrūyāt mukhya-pratyayo'pi pāksiko'bhyupāyaḥ iti. brūyād enam, na tarhi niyogato gaune viniyojanīyah. yadā gauņapratyayāya mukhyam upādatte, tadā etad āpatitam bhavati mukhya eva viniyoga iti. arthena ca pratitena prayojanam na pratyāyakena mantrena. ato'nyenāpyupāyena gaunah pratyāyayitavyah. na sa eva mantra ādartavyaḥ. athā’pi mantreņa pratyāyakena prayojanam syāt tathā’pi mukhya - pratyāyanenaiva nirvșttam prayojanamitinatarām gauņeviniyujyeta.” (SB. pp. 750).
The outcome of this discussion is that of the two senses viz. mukhya and gauna, it is only the mukhya which is to be accepted as being conveyed by the mantra and it is the mukhya alone which has to be connected with the enjoined act - "SB. pp. 751 - tasmān mukhya-gaunayor mukhye kārya-sampratyaya iti siddham” - Thus, words, as far as possible must be understood as conveying their mukhyartha alone, which as will be discussed later, supplies us with one of the pre-conditions of lakṣaṇā, as held by the Mimāmsakas.
Thus as seen above, the Mimāmsakas are fairly conversant with the primary and also the secondary sense of words in a sentence. We will now go to see their attitude towards laksanā.
As noted above, the mantra, according to the Mīmāmsā discipline, has to be taken in its mukhya or primary sense rather than in the secondary sense or gauņártha or laksyártha. For the Mimāmsakas there are only two powers of a word, i.e. they recognize only two śabda-vịttis i.e. abhidhā or the power of expression and laksanā or the power of indication which makes for the secondary sense. We will look into this problem in greater details as it is this central issue which forms the common heritage for the ālamkārikas or aestheticians to start with. It may be observed that the mimamsaka means abhidhā only when he uses the term sabda-sakti; but there are cases where even he has to pay attention to the fact that at times the sense rendered by abhidhā does not serve the purpose and that he has to travel further. At this juncture he resorts to what he calls gauņi-vștti or bhakti or lakṣaṇā or the secondary power or function of a word.
The mīmāmsaka has noted, as already discussed by us earlier, various means of determining the mukhyártha. It has also been noted that for the Mimāmsaka, as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
a rule, it is not right to assume one word as having more than one senses. The Mimāmsaka is generally, inclined to believe that where a word appears to have more that one senses, only one is the mukhyartha and the rest are conveyed only through sādrsya or other relations by laksanā. So then, the word 'barhih' primarily means 'grass in general and is applied to "sanctified grass” only secondarily through sādrsya. Yet another illustration is the word 'parvan' which is used in the sense of 'kāla' as well as of 'samudāya' (i.e. of the two sacrifices called 'darśa' and 'paurnamāsa'.). But the context and derivation suggest the right view viz. that the word primarily denotes the samudāya and is only secondarily used in the sense of kāla', owing to samudāya-sambandha - The SB., on Mi. Sū. IX. 2.53, pp. 1739 - reads as - "náyam ubhayatra parvaśabdo vartate. yadi kālavacanas tatsambandhāt samudaye gamyate. yadi vā samudāyavacanas tat-sambandhāt kāle. anyataravacano nóbhaya-vacanaḥ. tatra samudāya vacane kalpyamāne prakaranam anugrhītam bhavati. api ca prnāteh parva-sabdah. prnātiś ca dāne prasiddhah. dānāni ca samudāyāḥ. tasmāt samudāyā”bhījyā. evam śabdávayava-prasiddhir anugrhītā bhavati.”
Same is the case with the word 'caru', which on the authority of the smrti texts is declared to convey primarily 'odana', and the 'sthālī only secondarily. (See. Mi. Sū. X. i. 34-43, and SB on the same). The case of the word 'mātā' is, however, different. It means both, “mother” and, “one who measures (corn).” Both these are the vācyárthas of the word 'mātā'. - The SB. on Mi. Sū. X. 1.14 pp. 1810 reads - "anekasyápy ekah sabdo bhavati vācakah. tad yathā māteti mātaram api vadati, mātāram api. ātāca paramam daivatam samā ca putreşvity etair upabaddhamāno jananīvacano'vagamyate. mātā samah ksiprascetyebhir anubudhyamāno dhānyasya mātur vācakaḥ." In such cases, the context becomes helpful in deciding the exact meaning of a word in a given passage : SB. on Mi. Sū. VI. 8.35, pp. 1519 reads - "chāgopakaranam asya upadarśitam. yad upadamśane paśu-sabdaś chāgábhiprāya iti gamyate. yathā yugavastra upadamsita īsācakrādi-sannidhāne ced akşamānayety ucyate, tadā yānākşam adhikrtya brūte iti gamyate, na tu videvanākşam iti."
Actually, though such a word appears to be one, it is not one but two.
But what does our first perception refer to when we use or hear a word ? Does the form come first or its sense ? This problem is discussed by the Mimamsakas when the meaning of the text viz. 'rathantaram uttaryor gāyati.' is discussed. The conclusion is that words are meant to convey primarily their senses and not only their forms. It is also observed that words primarily denote 'jāti' and 'vyakti' is

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'Lakşaņā
469 conveyed only by implication, when action cannot be correlated with 'jāti'. At times we come across words that convey two senses e.g. words such as 'aśvakarna', ‘kusala', or 'praviņa'. Such words give two sets of meanings, one by etymology and the other by usage. So, these arthas are called 'yaugika artha' and 'rūdhy artha'. Now, the question is, which one will be taken as primary meaning ? It can be said that as the etymological meaning is conveyed by the constituents it must be accepted as primary meaning and the rūdhy artha which sets aside these meanings should be taken as gauna artha. But this is not the correct view. 'Prasiddhi' is the decider and here samudāya-prasiddhi is held higher than avayava-prasiddhi. Thus the mīmāmsakas conclude that rūdhy artha is to be preferred to the yaugikártha. Sabara has made this clear at many places and Jaimini does the same while discussing the meaning of the term 'rathakāra' in the adhikarana when he has discussed the text - 'varsāsu rathakāra ādadhīta'. Jaimini suggests that the term ‘rathakāra' must be taken to mean, 'a person of mixed caste called rathakāra'. This rule is very often referred to as 'rathakāra nyāya'. (Mi. Sū. VI. 1. 44-50). Sabara also opines that words must be so construed as to convey only their natural meaning and not any other signification that the interpreter may find it necessary to assign to them. Thus for Sabara even sāmānya-vācī sabda can not denote višesa, at least not by abhidhā : SB on Mi. Sū. X. 8.16, p. 2073 reads - "na hi sāmānyavāci śabdo višesān abhivadati. yadica abhivaded adya-jāte gavi návakalpeta. pūrvadarśanabhāvāt. sāmānye ca drstapūrvatvāt avakalpate. tasmān na sāmānyam viśeşān abhivadati ... abhivadan vā na mukhyayā vịttyā abhivadet. katham tarhi ? lakṣanayā. laksaņā ca śrutyā bādhyate.
This is how laksană comes up for consideration. First, let us see how Jaimini and Sabara interpret the text, “saptadaśaratnir vai vājapeyasya yūpo bhavati.” The purva paksa view here favours laksana on the word 'yūpa' and would choose to mean it to be sodasipātra; for he argues that vājapeya has no 'yūpa' at all. But the siddhāntin suggests that even if vājapeya has no yūpa directly, it can be said to have yūpa as its ‘anga', for it is an 'anga' of pasu yajña, which itself is again the anga of väjapeya. The genitive ending applied to vājapeya expresses the sambandha with yüpa and this is understood without resorting to laksanā. Laksanā is after all a dosa, a blemish, because to resort to laksanā we have to put aside the natural expressed sense, and take up an indirect sense. So, it is only as a last resort that laksanā has to be admitted. The S.B. on Mi. Sū. III. i. 18 - "ānarthakyāt tad angesu" · reads as follows - yaś ca yasyopakārina upakaroti bhavati sa tasya sambaddho mukhyena eva sambandhena. na caikántaritam iti krtvā a-sambandho bhavati.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA yathā devadattasya napteti putreņa cā’sāvantaritaḥ. atha devadattena mukhyena eva sambandhena sambandhyate, tasmād esa eva paksa āśrayaniyah. na hi etasmin pakṣe kaścid api laksaņāśabdo bhavati iti.
But at times, the primary meaning of a word is inapplicable in some context. This results in 'ānarthakya' of a vedic-text. This is seen quite often in laukika vākyas but for vedic texts ānarthakya is an intolerable position. Veda is never a-pramāna and hence not even a syllable, not to talk of a word, can be said to be 'anarthaka' i.e. bereft of meaning. Anarthakya is a-nyāya, and arthavattva is nyāya as emphasized at all places by both Jaimini and Sabara. So, when a literal sense is not found to be applicable, to avoid this greater anarthakya blemish, a lesser evil called laksanā is admissible in special cases for the Mimāmsaka. So, the figurative meaning is at times permissible. In a sentence, say, "simham alabheta" there is no need to resort to the secondary sense as the primary sense is quite applicable. But in statements like, “simho devadattah" or "agnau tisthati”, or 'chatrino gacchanti', the vācyártha looks irrelevant in case of 'simhah', 'agnau' and 'chatrinah respectively. So, to avoid 'anarthakya dosa' we find another sense that would be congruous with the context on hand, and which sense of course could be indirectly conveyed by the words concerned. So, for the Mimāmsakas, laksaņā is resorted to only to avoid the greater evil of 'ānarthakya' in case of a vedic text which is always a highest 'pramāna' or authority. Thus laksaņā is resorted to only if the literal sense is found to be unsuitable to the context, and this too only as a last resort. Read SB. p. 488 - "yadāñjasyena śabdártho nā'vakalpate, tadā laksanayā’pi kalpyamanah sādhur bhavati. yathā ‘agnau tisthati', 'avate tisthati', 'agni-samīpe tisthati', 'avațasamīpe tişthati', iti bhavati samvyavahāraḥ.”, again SB. p. 1485 - "śruty asambhave laksanayā’pi vyavahāro bhavati. yatha’gnau tişthaty avațe tsthati. iti.', SB. p. 1551 - asati śșty arthe laksanártho grāhyah., SB. p. 1280 - 'śrtyasambhave laksanā’pi nyāyyaiva."; SB. p. 1437 - “mukhyā'bhāve gauņo gļhyate."; SB. p. 1560 - "sambhavati śrutyarthe laksanayā’pi śabdárthaḥ; SB. p. 2021 · tritvam hi catustvā”dīni sāhacaryācchaknoti laksayitum. laksaņā tvāśritā bhavati. kim kriyatām. agatyā"srīyate. satyām gatau nāśrayitavyā.; SB. on IX. 1.13, pp. 1660 - "vrihīn prokşatīti, vrīhi-jātir nirdiśyate. vrīhi-drava-laksanárthā vā, apūrva-sādhanaviśesa-laksanárthā vā."
Prof. Devasthali (pp. 79, ibid) observes : "The first and the foremost principle to be borne in mind, in this connection is that between the two powers of a word, viz. śruti (or Abhidha) and laksanā, the former being more conventional or direct is certainly stronger and hence preferable."

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471 Sabara insists on this principle at different places in varying expressions. - See
134 - śruti-laksanāvićaye śrutir iyāyasi; SB. pp. 565, 1244, 1262 śrutilaksaņā-visaye ca śrutir nyāyyā; SB. p. 1210, 1222, śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā garīyasi. SB. p. 1260; śrutiśca laksanāyā gariyasī; SB. p. 1278 - śrutiśca lakṣaṇāyā balīyasī; SB. p. 1556 - śruti-laksaņayoś ca śrutir nyāyyā; SB. p. 2243 - śrutiśca laksaņāto nyāyyā;. Thus lakṣaṇā has some scope against śruti or abhidhā, which is clearly favoured by the Mimāmsaka. Laksaņā is admissible only as a strong weapon against 'ānarthakya dosa'. So, 'śruty asambhava' or “mukhyábhāva” is therefore, laid down as the most important pre-requisite of lakṣaṇā.
But this inapplicapility of 'vācyártha' is not the only basis for laksaņā. There is yet another basis for resorting to laksanā. In a statement such as, for example, ‘vedam adhītya snāyāt', meaning, "one should take a bath after studying the veda", the primary sense is not impossible. But the point is that if one takes a bath on the completion of vedic studies, what purpose can be served by this bath ? Perhaps, it can be said that here, 'snāna' or bath serves an 'adrsta' purpose - an unseen reason. But as far as there is drsta-hetu we should not imagine an adrsta-hetu. Prof. Devasthali notes that, “It is for avoiding this ‘adrstárthatā' that in the text under consideration, we resort to laksaņā and take it to mean, “As soon as one finishes his vedic studies one should relinguish the vows of 'asnāna' and others, but remain with his guru and prosecute the dharma-jijñāsā.” (pp. 80, ibid). - The SB. p. 7, on Mi. Sū. I. i. 1, reads - “na vā idam snānam adrstártham vidhīyate. kimtu laksanaya asnānā”di-niyamasya paryavasānam vedádhyayana-samakālam āhuḥ. vedam adhitya snāyād gurukulān mā samāvartista iti, adrsta-parihārāya eva.” The Mimāmsaka is of the opinion that - "drste sati” i.e. when a 'drsta' reason can be imagined, the assuming of a-drsta, i.e. - 'adrsta kalpanā' makes for a more serious draw-back than laksanā. drste sati adrsta-kalpana' involves an assumption unwarranted by our experience, but laksanā is comparatively a more acceptable thing, it being a matter of everyday experience and sanctioned by daily usage. - SB. pp. 324 has - "laksane ced varam laksaņā kalpitā na yāgābhidhānam. laukiki hi laksanā, hatho’prasiddha-kalpanā. - again, “lakṣaṇā hi adrsta-kalpanāyā jyāyasī. pramānād hi sā bhavati; and also, "laksanā cā'drsta-kalpanāyā jyāyasī." - Then, (pp. 80, ibid) - "Avoidance of conflict or contradiction between the several words of the text itself, or between several texts of scriptures affords yet another basis for resorting to laksaņā, as is seen in the case of text like, 'aditir dyaur aditir antariksam', or, 'rvam eva mātā, tvam eva pita', etc. - See SB. on Mi. Sü. I. 2.39 - “guņād a-vipratiședhaḥ syāt.” Again, laksaņā is welcome in view of the context. For

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example, the word 'sarva' in texts like, "pūrṇāhutyā sarvān kāmān avāpnoti", has to be taken to mean only those desires - i.e. kāmas as intended at the time when the sacrifice is started - The Mi. Su. I. 12-16 reads, "sarvatvam ādhikārikam", and the SB. p. 129, has, "sarva-kāmápti-vacanam gaunam. a-sarveșu sarva-vacanam adhikṛtápekṣam."
Thus, resorting to lakṣaṇa is permissible under four different circumstances, which makes it impossible to avoid lakṣaṇā. We have to let go the vācyártha and accept lakṣaṇā if by sticking to vācyārtha we find that (i) a vedic text, or any part thereof, is rendered useless or meaningless. This is a case of anarthakya. or (ii) Vācyārtha yields a sense which is not congruent with the sense conveyed by other parts, or (iii) if vācyārtha is found to no visible purpose and to support the same we have to resort to a-dṛṣṭa-kalpana or assuming an invisible purpose, or (iv) it if is so required by the preamble, if we may so translate the word 'adhikara'. We may add that these conditions in general make for the 'mukhyārtha-bādha' and also. 'tatparya-anupapatti', of the later thinkers.
After having decided the Mīmāmsaka approach as to under which circumstances lakṣaṇā has to be resorted to in case of a word or words the question that comes up before us is that (i) what sense or senses are conveyed by lakṣaṇā and (ii) how are they conveyed? The latter, i.e. the manner in which the lakṣyártha is conveyed has been fully answered and discussed by Sabara at several places. On MI. Sū. VIII. 3. 34, Sabara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the word can't yet abandon it for good. For, if the primary sense, vācyártha, is totally abandoned, how can the laksyártha be conveyed at all? SB. on VIII. 3.34 MI. Sū. reads - 'svarthe vartamānaḥ sādṛśyam gamayati. svartham jahat katham gamayet? - Thus even this lakṣyártha has to be sabdártha. We can observe that the condition of 'tad-yoga' finds acceptance here. A word, Śabara observes, even by lakṣaṇā, has no power to convey 'a-śabdártha', i.e. some sense, which has no connection whatsoever with the sabda : SB. on Mi. Sū. VIII. iii. 24, pp. 1622 reads - "na ca lakṣaṇayā prayoge a-sabdárthaḥ paricchidyate. yatkāraṇam svårthe vartamāno'rthántaram lakṣayati. svártham jahan naiva lakṣayet." And if the word has to have any connection with the indicated sense or laksyártha, it can have it only through its vācyártha. So, if the word does not first express its vacyártha, there is no possibility of its going further and conveying lakṣyártha. If stated simply, it means that the lakṣyártha must be connected with the mukhyártha in one way or the other, and this we can suggest in the words of later alamkarikas, by the term 'tad-yoga' i.e. "relation with that (= vācyártha)". This fact is beautifully

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473 explained by Śabara, under Mi. Sū. I. iv. 23. Sabara observes - (pp. 357, 360) katham nu svárthábhidhānena pratyavasthā iti cet, artha-sambandhāt. simha iti nirjñāte prasahya-kāritā tatra prāyeņa iti prasahyakārīti gamyate, artha-pratyayasāmarthyāt. yo hi manyate prasahyakāriņam pratyāyaye yam iti, sa yadi simhaśabdam uccārayati siddhyati asya abhipretam. simhárthaḥ pratītaḥ, sambandhāt itaram artham pratyāyayati.' evam svárthábhidhāne tad-guna-sambandhaḥ pratīyate.”
Now we come to decide the exact nature of the secondary sense that we arrive at with the help of laksana. So, we will examine the different kinds of 'tad-yoga' which make laksaņā possible. In this context, it may be noted that, in general, a word may figuratively convey (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, i.e. - matvarthalaksaņā, (ii) the place - i.e. deśa-laksaņā, (iii) the dharma or guņa, i.e. dharmalaksaņā or guņa-vāda., (iv) the time or kāla-laksaņā, (v) the action, i.e. karmalaksaņā, (vi) the kārya or the sādhya (vii) the karana or sādhana, (viii) some sajātīya or (ix) the lingin. Which of these is conveyed in a given illustra depends on the will of the speaker, though some general indications regarding these can be pointed out with some amount of certainty.
"Udbhidā yajeta" is an illustration, which the pūrva-paksin holds to be one of natvarthiya laksanā'. This means that that the sentence can be put as : udbhidā yāgena svargam bhāvayet.” . But how can we explain the apposition between ‘udbhidā' and yāgena' ? The pūrva-paksin seeks explanation in matvartha-laksanā and takes ‘udbhidā' to mean 'udbhidvatā'. The argument is that lakṣaṇā is a commonplace matter, laukikī, and hence it has to be preferred to a-prasiddha-kalpanā or asuming an uncommon thing such as taking the word 'udbhid' as the name of a sacrifice. For the siddhāntin the word 'udbhid', on the strength of etymology can signify the vāga, and hence no question of a-prasiddha kalpanā ever arises. The appoisition can be satisfactorily explained by the vācyártha', or, say, the 'yaugikártha' only. So, for the siddhāntin there is no scope for laksana in the text under discussion. Read SB. pp. 323, on Mi. Sū. I. iv. 2 : yāgena kuryād iti yajeta’ ity asyárthaḥ. karanam hi yāgah. udbhidädy api hi trtīyā-nirdeśāt karanam. tatra udbhidā yāgena iti karmanāma-dheyatvena sāmānádhikaranyā'sāmañjasyam. dravyavacanatve matvarthalaksanayā sāmānādhikaranyam syāt.... laksaneti ced varam lakṣaņā kalpitā na yāgábhidhānam. laukiki hi laksaņā, atho'aprasiddha-kalpanā iti.... anuvādā hy udbhidādayaḥ. kutaḥ prāptir iti cet, tato bhidhīyate. ucсhabda-sāmarthyād bhicchabda-sāmarthyāt ca udbhid-sabdah kriyāvacanaḥ. udbhedanam prakāśanam paśūnām anena kriyate ity udbhid yagaḥ... evam sarvatra.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The pūrvapaksa is silenced but the observation that resorting to laksaņā is better than a-drsta-kalpanā is a sound one. The illustration of matvarthiya laksanā is, “somena yajeta”, where the text is explained as, 'somavatā yāgena istam bhāvayer. It is possible to explain the apposition i.e. sāmānādhikaranya between 'somena' and 'yāgena' only through lakṣaṇā.
Deśa-lakṣaṇā is illustrated by such popular expressions as, “agnau tişthati” or, 'avate-tişthati'. A vedic illustration is seen in the text, viz. “kavatīşu rathantaram gāyati”. Here the vācyártha of 'kavațīșu' is a mis-fit. The pūrvapakşin suggests that by resorting to laksana 'kavatīşu' should be taken as 'kavati-dese'. The siddhāntin
idea. He says that the word 'rathantaram' is not a samskāra sabda and so there is no difficulty if we accept even the vacyártha of kavatīsu'. So, for want of mukhyárthabādha, there is no scope for laksanā at all in this text. However, the type of laksaņā suggested by the pūrva-paksin is noteworthy. Sabara has given another illustration of this variety in 'gangāyām gāvaḥ', which, comes closer to our 'gangāyām ghosah'. This, for the alamkārikas is "buddhā laksana-laksanā”.
a-paksin suggests another alternative. He says that the word ‘rathantaram' should be taken to mean ‘rathantara-dharmāh' : SB. p. 1545 reads - "dharma-laksanā vā syāt. rathantaradharmā vā kavatīsu rathantara-sabdena atidiśyante. yathā rathantare prastūyamāne prthivim manasādhyayed ity evamā”dayah. yathā ācārye proșite ācāryānī bhavatām ācārya iti ācārya-susrūsā "cāryānyām atidiśyate”.
But this proposal of dharma-laksanā is also rejected by the siddhāntin who refuses to accept any laksana in the said text. Sentences like 'simho devadattah' and 'agnir mānavakah' are popular illustrations of this type of dharma-laksanā. : SB. p. 755 - reads - "gunād vā'py abhidhānam syāt..." (Mi. Sū. III. ii. 4) - guna-samyogāt gauņam idam abhidhānam bhavisyati. bhavati hi guņād apy abhidhānam. yathā simho devadattaḥ, agnir māņavaka it." - Here the words ‘simha' and 'agni' stand for their qualities. This type can be placed with 'gauni sāropā laksanā' of the ālamkārikas, normally illustrated by, "gaur vāhīkah”. For the alamkārikas, however, the laksyártha is 'vyakti', but for the mīmāmsakas, it is dharmas. Sabara here observes : 'para-sabdah paratra prayuktas san dharmān atidiśati. (on Mi. Sū. VII. iv. 8). Sabara also observes, under Mi. Sū. VII. 3.17, that, “śruty arthasambhavāt ca laksanāyā dharmānām grāhaka ucyate.
Jaimini, under Mi. Sū. I. ii. 10, calls this dharma-laksanā as gunavāda. SB. p. 213 has - "guņavādas tu. gauņa eșa vādo bhavati yat-sambandhini stotavye

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475 sambandhy antaram stūyate.” So, “stenam manaḥ”, is given as an example of guna-vāda, and Sabara explains the sentence as - “yathā stenaḥ pracchanna-rupa evam ca mana it gaunaḥ śabdah.” But we should note that the word 'guņa-vāda' is used by Jaimini and Sabara in a sense much wider than dharma-laksanā. It means ‘upacāra' or secondary usage in general. This is borne out by the fact that, ‘anrtavādinī vāk' is given as yet another example of gunavāda where laksana does not convey dharma or guna but 'bāhulya' or 'prāsastya'. Sabara observes - (on Mi. Sū. I. ii. 11, pp. 127) : "guņavādas tu rūpāt. yathā stenāḥ pracchannarūpāḥ evam ca mana iti gauņaḥ śabdah. prāyāc ca amstavādinī vāg iti." - Thus, it seems, Jaimini lays down ‘rūpa' and 'prāya' as two possible grounds for guņavāda, among others - "Mi. Sū. I. ii. 11, - "rūpāyat prāyāt”.
Next variety of laksaņā is "kāla-laksaņā” Quite often time is indicated by an incident which normally occurs at a particular hour. The popular illustration, is, "go-raja-muhurta". Sabara gives another illustration while commenting on Mi. Sū. VI. iv. 42. A friend invites his intimate person with the words, “sankha-velayam āgantavyam”, though in fact a conch may not be blown in the village where both of them are staying. But the other person knows that actual blowing of conch is not meant but only the particular hour of blowing is meant. Sabara observes : (on Mi. Sū. VI. iv. 42, pp. 1454) - “yathā śankha-velāyām āgantavyam iti. yasminn api grāme sankho nā'dhmāyate tasminn api sa tathā kālo'stīti nā”gamanam parihāsyate."
We may observe that even Šabara has not provided illustrations from vedic texts only for all sub-varieties of laksanā which the Mimāmsakas accept. So, in fact the difference between language patterns as seen in the veda and, in the popular usage are identical.
Karma-laksanā is opposite in nature to kāla-laksanā, which occurs when a word expressive of an incident or an act is used to indicate time. Karma-laksanā requires that a word expressive of time is used to indicate an incident or act. In the text viz., "amāvāsyāyām nisi”, the word amāvāsyā primarily expressing time is proposed to be understood as secondarily indicating sacrifice called 'darśa'. : SB. on Mi. Sū. XII. ii. 14, pp. 2243 reads - "nā’māvāsyā-sabdaḥ karma-vacanaḥ. kim tarhi ? kāla-vacanah. kāle śrutih karmani laksaņā.” Read also SB. on Mi. Sū. IV iv. 19 - pp. 1278 - "atra kāla evayam mukhyah sabdo na karmani, karmaṇi laksaņā.”
Next comes a variety of laksanā, where a word expressive of the sādhya or kārya is used to indicate the sādhana or the kārana, and vice versa. In the vedic

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA text, viz. “prsthair upatișthate”, the word 'prstha' is to be understood to signify, not the sacrificial act called 'prstha', but the mantras which are used during the performance of that act. Read Mi. Sū. VII. iii. 36 and SB on it - "abhidhānopadeśād vā vipratisedhāt dravyesu prstha-śabdah syāt.” In the text, viz. "atha yat tristubha paridadhāti nántam gacchati”, the word 'tristubh' stands for “usņik-kakubhau”, on which Śabara observes - "karane kāryavad upacāraḥ kṣtah.” He observes : (pp. 1323, on Mi. Sū. V. iii. 6) - "tristubham eváyam usnik-kakubhāv iti brūte. katham ? tristubho vīryam ity evam ante samstuteḥ. tristubho vā etad vīryam yad uşņikkakubhāv iti. kāraṇe kāryavad upacāraḥ krtah.”
We come across a similar type of laksaņā in texts like, 'yajamānāḥ prastaraḥ yajamānāh ekādaśa-kapālah'. It is clear that this apposition of the two words 'yajamāna' and 'prastara' or 'yajamāna' and 'ekādaśa-kapāla', can not be adequately explained by sticking to the vācyártha of these words. So, by lakṣaṇā, the word 'yajamāna' has to be taken to mean 'yajamāna-siddhi-kara'. T apposition between two words can be explained by adopting 'siddhi-karatvalaksanā', which is explained by Sabara citing popular illustration viz. “rājā pattiganakah”. - Read SB. on Mi. Sū. I. 4, pp. 360 : “iha tu yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ, yajamānah eka-kapāla iti kidrśo guna-sambandhah pratīyate. tat-siddhikara iti. sarvo hi ātmanah kārya-siddhim karoti. anyo'pi yas tasya kārya-siddhim karoti sa tasmin uccarite hrdayam agacchati. yathā rājā pattiganaka iti. patti-gañako rājñaḥ kāryam sādhayati. sa rāja-śabda uccarite pratīyate. evam ihā’pi yajamāna-kāryam prastaraika-kapālau sādhayataḥ. tasmāt tau yajamānaśabdena pratyāyyete.
Bhūmā or bāhulya is one more principle underlying lakṣaṇā. There is a vedic expression viz. "srstir upadadhāti”. The literal meaning of this text is, 'srstimantrakā upadadhāti istakāḥ'. All the mantras required for 'istakā-cayana', are normally given beforehand, and the text has to be understood as referring to them only. But, some of these mantras are, “a-srsti-linga” - (i.e. not containing the word srsti or Vsrj, in them). Yet they are to be in the srsti-mantras with the help of a-jahallaksaņā based on bhūmā. Read SB. pp. 363, Mi. Sū. I. iv. : bhūmā; katham tu asrstisu ca srsti-sabdah iti. bhūmnā. bahavas tatra srsti-lingā mantrā, alpaśo vi-lingāḥ.”
'Linga-samavāyāt' is a sūtra in which, Jaimini notes a type of laksaņā having a widely different process involved. The text, by way of illustration is, “prāņabhỉta upadadhāti”. If taken in its primary sense, it would mean, “prāṇabhịnmantrakā upadadhāti istakāḥ.” This will not include the 'a-prāṇabhỉn-mantras' and lead to

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477 the 'ānarthakya' of such other mantras. Thus the word 'prānabhru' is to be taken in its secondary sense so as to contain all other mantras which are 'a-prānabhỉn' and which are placed in the same group of mantras, one or two of which are 'prānabhrn-mantraka'. This is known as chatri-nyāya, and the popular illustration is, "chatrino yānti', or 'chatrino gacchanti'. Here the underlying principle is not 'bhūmā' or 'bāhulya', but the 'prādhānya' or principality of the expressed sense. The basis then, in such cases of laksanā is some peculiar or prominant mark or 'linga'. See Mi. Sū. I. 4 - and Sabara on it - "linga-samavāyāt". - linga-samavāyāt para-sabdaḥ paratra vartate. yathā 'chatriņo gacchanti' iti ekena chatriņā sarve laksyante. na cā’yam prāṇabhrcchabdaḥ sșsti-sabdaś ca jahatsvārtham mantraganam laksayet. yad-gane ca srsti-prāṇabhrcchabdau samavetau tau api parigrhyete. yathā chatri-sabdena svārtha-laksanárthena so'pi chatrī grhyate.” Thus, this 'linga', the basis of this type of laksanā, is noticed in any part or portion, of what is to be indicated. But this ‘linga' has to be pradhāna or principal among all.
The last variety of laksana as explained by the Mimāmsaka theorists is 'praise' or praśamsā-laksanā. The illustration is the vedic text viz. "a-paśavo vā anye goaśvebhyah, paśavo vā go-aśvāḥ.” Other animals, excepting cows and horses are here said to be no animals at all. But this statement surely does not mean what it says. So, sabara explains it as, “góśvān praśamsitum anyeşām paśūnām nindā." (SB. on Mi. Sū. I. 4 - praśamsā.). This praśamsā laksanā comes closer to dharma-laksanā for naturally the praise intended is addressed to some quality. At Mi. Sū. VIII. ii. 6, Jaimini clearly says that the word 'soma' is used for praśamsā. Sabara takes one more illustration to explain this variety by taking, 'yathā simho devadatta iti' as an example. Sabara concludes with a remark that, “tasmāt nāma ayam dharmátideśaḥ.”
All these varieties share some common traits such as, (i) there is mukhyárthabādha, (ii) laksyártha is conveyed by the word through its vācyártha and (iii) the laksyártha accepted meets the need of the context. Any meaning cannot be taken up as laksyártha. Sabara has a clear statement to this effect, viz. "yena ca tatra prayojanam sa laksyate." Thus the three conditions for laksanā as laid down by the alamkārikas are met with here. But Prof. Devasthali makes an interesting observation (pp. 90. ibid) that, “prayojana (the third condition) spoken of by the Mimāmsakas is not the same as the prayojana of the rhetoritians mentioned in connection with laksanā. For the latter is 'wanga' i.e. conveyed by wanjan, which certainly can't find any place in the mīmāmsā view. which refuses

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA to accept vyañjanā as a śabda-śakti at all. Thus prayojana as spoken of by the Mimāmsakas as a condition for laksana is not a technical term, but has the ordinary sense viz. the purpose in view. It is but natural therefore, that the Mimāmsaka does not recognize 'rūḍhi' as one of the pre-requisites of lakṣaṇā as the rhetoricians do it as an alternative for prayojana; for he does not accept rūḍhilakṣaṇā at all. As we have already seen above, 'kuśala' and 'pravina' which are given as illustrations of rūḍhi-lakṣaṇā by the rhetoritians are only cases of abhidhā according to the Mīmāmsakas." (SB. on Mi. Sū. VI. iv. 42).
Prof. Devasthali's remarks are sound but we may add something to supplement the same. We know that there are some alamkarikas who also do not accept 'rūḍhi' in case of lakṣaṇā. Acārya Hemacandra (kā. śā. pp. 22, Edn. Dr. Nandi) observes - "kuśala-dvirepha-dvikā"dayas tu sākṣāt-samketa-viṣayatvāt mukhyā eva iti na rudhir laksyasya arthasya hetutvena asmābhir uktā." We feel that even 'gauni' which Hemacandra recognises as a separate vṛtti from lakṣaṇa, also does not seem to be 'rūḍhi-mūlā'. This apart, we feel that Prof. Devasthali's observation that for the Mīmāmsaka, the term 'prayojana' does not carry the 'technical sense' of the ālamkarikas, but means just, "the purpose in view" - an 'ordinary sense', is debatable. He himself has quoted Śabara (pp. 89) saying "go-aśvān praśamsitum anyeṣām paśūnām nindā". - Now this 'praśamsa' is not directly stated and even 'ninda' is also, we may add, not directly stated. Even in ordinary speech, and also in scientific documents you come across the unmistakable undertone of vyañjanā. Our humble argument is that the thinkers of various disciplines such as grammar, nyāya or logic, and Mīmāmsā did not talk about vyañjanā because they were dealing with śastra - or discipline in which only the scientific use of language mattered. They did not concern themselves with aesthetic and the poetic use of language because they had no business to do it while discussing the śastra. Or else, if praśamsā or dharma is taken as 'vyangya', we are sure, the Mimamsaka would not commit suiside !
Prof. Devasthali further continues that the circumstance about lakṣaṇā gives us another fact about it, viz. that it would be wrong, after taking up a lakṣyártha we are again required to resort to lakṣaṇā for a second time in case of one and the same word. So, Prof. Devasthali here rules out what may be termed a case of lakṣitalakṣaṇā. Lakṣaṇā once resorted to, will satisfy the purpose and there would be no question of resorting to lakṣaṇā for a second time. We know that alamkarikas also reject this. Śabara on Mi. Sū. X. iii. 23, and X. V. 58, gives two examples of lakṣitalakṣaṇā. The point is as to what exactly is indicated by the word agni, when it is used to enjoin the devata of a 'haviḥ' i.e. - offering. If the word is taken to stand for the

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479 meaning i.e. artha i.e. fire, and not for the sabda i.e. its form only, we find that the purpose of the passage remains unserved. As is known to us, it is by its verbal form, rather than its physical form, that a deity serves the purpose of sacrifice. So, if the word agni is accepted to stand for its artha, i.e. fire, we will have to put this position aside, it being not relevant for the purpose and we will have to go for laksaņā and get at the 'verbal form' as something indicated. Thus, we travel first from sabda to artha, and then again resort to śabda. But then it will be simpler to hold that the form of the word is itself directly expressed by the word and it is futile to get engaged in laksanā. Another instance given by Sabara is exactly of the same type as is seen from Sabara's remark in that connection. He observes - "anyatha rathantara-sāmāni adhyavasiya antarena padam laksyate padena sama, saisā, laksita-laksanā syāt.” (SB. on Mi. Sū. X. v. 58, 'dvitīya-varnakam'.)
One more point to be noted concerning laksaņā is a natural outcome of the fact that laksanā is laukikī. We notice that before we arrive at the laksyártha, we are acquainted with the requirement of the sentence in question. This shows that the laksyártha is already known. Now, it is obvious that what is already known can't be the concern of a 'vidhi'. It must be only, 'anuvāda'. So, we come to the finding that laksanā is possible in an 'anuvāda' only, and never in 'vidhi'. This fact is differently stated when it is observed that a sentence where we have to resort to laksanā shall not be construed as a vidhi' and that it must be taken as an 'anuvāda' only. Sabara observes : (pp. 1278), "anuvāde hi laksanā nyāyyā, na vidhau.” and (pp. 364) nā’nuvādapakse laksanāyām dosah; and also (pp. 1201) - yajñā"yudhasabdaśc a'nuvādapakse nyāyyo, na vidhi-pakse. gauno hi sa āyudhaśabdah sphyādiņu.; and (p. 141) - vidhau hi na paraḥ śabdárthaḥ pratīyate.” Sabara refers to this point at many places but at one place (Mi. Sū. X. ii. 47) he has very clearly explained the truth behind this observation. The text concerned is - "tatah samvatsare asthini yajayet.” The question is with reference to the sense of the word 'yājayet'. The observation is that as this is a 'vidhi', it is not allowed to resort to laksanā, and take the term 'yājayet' to stand for something else. Sabara clearly says that a figurative signification is not perceived from a vidhi-sabda. He says that a figurative word is connected with a sense which is determined on the strength of some other thing i.e. laukika-pramāņa. - Read SB. on Mī. Sū. X. ii. 47, pp. 1847 - "na ca gaunortho vidhi-sabdād avagamyate. anyena hi pramānena paricchinnérthe gauņaḥ śabdah sambadhyate. yathā gaur anubandhyaḥ iti go-jāti-viśistaḥ pasur anubadhyate, na vāhīkaḥ. gaurayam vāhīka iti tu samvāde vāhīke gaunaḥ śabdaḥ pravartate.” What is meant is that 'vidhi' is 'svatah-pramāņa' so the sense perceived

Page #506

480
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA through vidhi will have to be perceived from the words of the text only and from no other source beyond that. But the metaphorical sense is known from pramāna other than the sabda i.e. words of the text. This shows that laksyártha cannot be the purport of a vidhi-vākya. This clearly amounts to say that laksaņā is not admissible, or it has no scope, in an injunctive statement. This rule is limited to vedic injunctions and it is not applicable to statements in ordinary parlance, wherein an injunction also can be laid down in a metaphorical style.
All this discussion pertains to one single fact that as a discipline, the Mimāmsā concerns itself only with direct statements where clear vācyártha predominates and where there are no overtones of senses to be countered. This is so because all such metaphorical expressions are likely to cause confusion as to the intention of a vedic text concerned. Precisely because of this that laksana is looked upon as a 'dosa' - a blemish. Setting aside the natural and direct mode of interpretation and resorting to an unnatural or indirect mode is a dosa', simply because, the latter involves 'gaurava' and is, as such, slow in its functioning. Any mode or construction, which yields us the required sense in a shorter span of time and with less trouble is certainly to be preferred and therefore we reject the other as being more elaborate and therefore faulty. Laksana thus involves a lengthier process than abhidhā and is therefore a dosa when scientific literature is concerned. It is only to avoid a greater eventuality of ‘ānarthakya’ that laksaņā is permitted by the Mimāmsā.
'Anarthakya' is termed as a greater evil. To save a text from being stamped as nugatory, laksana is admitted. And naturally in a scientific use of language where things are expected to be placed only in the straightest way possible, it is ‘abhidha or direction expression which scores over the figurative way of presentation. But lakṣaṇā is preferable to anarthakya per se, or ānarthakya caused by vipratiședha. Adrsta-kalpanā is another evil which is also accepted to be greater than laksanā. So, laksaņā is ever preferred here. For, lakṣaṇā, after all, is laukiki and sanctioned by normal usage, while adrsta-kalpanā or aprasiddha-kalpanā has no such sanction behind it. Sabara also points out 'vyavadhāna' and 'vākyabheda', as two other evils taken as worse than laksanā which is to be preferred over them. In the text, viz. “khalevālī yupo bhavati”, there is a question regarding the construction of the word "khalevālī”. Is it to be construed with 'yūpa' or 'bhavati' ? If it is construed with the word 'yūpa', we shall have to take the word 'yūpa' as indicating 'yūpakārya' by resorting to kārya-laksaņā. In this case, the construction of the word with 'bhavati' is vitiated by ‘vyavadhāna'. Thus we have to choose between two evils. We opt for a lesser evil by accepting the former construction. Here laksanā is taken as

Page #507

'Laksanā'
481 a lesser evil, as Sabara suggests that 'vākya' is 'pratyaksa' in 'laksaņā', but it is 'parokşa’ in vyavadhāna. - Read SB. on Mi. Sū. X. ii. 69, pp. 1861 - "khalevālyā yüpatā vidhiyate na yüpasya khalevālītā. tathā'vyavahitena bhavatinā sambandhāt pratyaksam vākyam. itarathā vyavahitena paroksam syāt. khalevālīšabdaś ca yah khale vārane pravartate tasya vācakah. tathābhūtaś ca yüpakārye viniyujyate. yah khalevālī sa yūpa iti. śakyate ca yūpakārye viniyoktum. yat tu yūpa-śabdah kāryalakṣaṇārtha iti. vyavadhānāllaksaņā api jyāyasī. pratyakşam vyavadhāne vākyam.”
What Śabara aims to explain here is that in the former though we have to resort to laksanā, yet the ‘ekavākyatā' we protect is direct, and does not involve any reshuffle of the constitutent words. In the latter case, there is absence of ekavākyatā if we do not re-arrange the words in a different way. Thus the ekavākyatā in the latter case is only indirect i.e. paroksa, while in the former it is direct or pratyakşa. Sabara suggests while commenting on Mi. Sū. XI. ii. 2, that laksanā is preferred to vākyabheda, where while discussing the meaning of the text - viz. "same darśa-pürņa-māsābhyam yajeta....” etc., he points out that the word viz. darśa-pūrņa-māsābhyām' in the text, must be understood as indicating the whole group of sacrifices like the 'āgneya', so that the text may be construed as one vākya. If we do not do this, we will have to admit the text as being 'anekártha' and thus admit 'vākyabheda' here. Here again two evils prop up, and we have to choose the lesser evil called 'laksaņā', as, ultimately, it being 'laukiki will yield good sense. 'Anekárthatva' of what surely is one vākya, will positively lead to confusion - SB. on Mi. Sū. XI. ii. 2; pp. 2136 - "nanu evam api laksanā”śritā bhavati. varam laksanā naika-vākyasya anekárthatvam. anekártharve a-gamakatvam. lakṣaṇā’nugamikā, laukikatvāt."
Thus for the Mimāmsakas, anekárthatva or vākyabheda is a greater blemish as compared to lakṣaṇā. This fact can be put in a different way also. Laksaņā, as is clear, is only a pada-dosa, i.e. it has reference to pada or śabda only to which it does some injustice by putting aside its vācyártha. But anekárthatva or vākyabheda is a blemish of a vākya, as we are doing injustice with the whole sentence in it. Thus
a more serious nature as compared to laksanā, and therefore, it should be considered as worse.
Thus, laksanā, a dosa in itself is preferred only as a last resort to avoid greater dosas. So, every acceptance of laksanā has to be defended or justified by itself. It is not correct to hold that if one word is metaphorically used in a given text, it is so everywhere. This is so even in ordinary usage where the word 'gangāyām' does not mean 'gangā taţe' in all expression. For the Mīmāmsaka, a lakṣaṇā, only if

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482
SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
justified, is admissible. The word 'simha' is lākṣaṇika in an expression like, 'simho devadattaḥ', but it is not so, holds Sabara, in statements like, 'simham alabheta'. Śabara observes under Mi. Sū. II. 22, pp. 531,
"tasmin vākye sa yatra samprayukta iti gamyate pramāṇántareṇa, na śabdena, yatra tu tat pramāṇántaram nā'sti na tatra vartitum arhati. yathā simho devadatta iti devadatta-vacanaḥ pramāṇántareṇa, na tu simham ālabheta iti yatra. tatra tu pramāṇántaram násti."
So, another natural outcome of this thinking is stated very consisely in the statement, viz. "gune tu anyāya-kalpanā."
This then is the thought-heritage as obtained from various schools of thought such as the vyakaraṇa, nyāya and mīmāmsā, that shaped the concept of lakṣaṇā with reference to the aestheticians i.e. ālamkārikas.
Alamkarikas by and large accept the three vṛttis, viz. abhidha, lakṣaṇā and vyañjana and also refer to the tatparya vṛtti casually. We have seen how 'abhidha' is taken in a broader or narrower connotation by different alamkarikas. We have also noted that Anandavardhana's predecessors did not take up the problem of śabda-vyāpāra-vicara in greater details but it was perhaps the demand of situation that Anandavardhana took upon himself the establishment of vyañjanā as a separate and independent sabda-Sakti over and above the much heard of, of course in his times, sabdavṛttis such as abhidha and lakṣaṇā and also tatparya. But we know that even he does not spend time in defining clearly any śabda-vṛtti and was perhaps not much interested in the classification and varieties of this or that sabdavṛtti. He did not wait for this because perhaps it was not his prime concern or perhaps also because by his time an all acceptable formula was evolved. It was only after the great challanges to vyañjanā surfaced in the works of some of his great successors that Mammata and some of his illustrious successors thought it pertinent to exactly define and differentiate and even classify the various śabdavṛttis. So, the actual task of defining and describing fully various sabda-vṛttis, given available documents, begins with Mammața; but prior to him, as seen in case of abhidha, a discordant note was heard as early as in Mukula. We have treated Mukula's approach in his famous Abhidha-vṛtta-mātṛkā earlier while dealing with abhidha. However a short resume here also will be able to freshen up our impressions about how Mukula moves about with his task.
We know that for Mukula lakṣaṇā is part of abhidhā. Mukula quotes Bhartṛmitra suggesting five relationships that exist between the primary and the

Page #509

"Laksanā
483 indicated meaning. As noted earlier, they are :
"abhidheyena sambandhāt sādrśyāt samavāyataḥ, vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā.” (quoted in AVM.) We will catch up with what exactly is meant in brief as follows :
Abhidheyena sambandha : means some kind of relationship with the primary meaning - e.g. dvirepha’ - primarily meaning having two ʻr-s, indicates ‘a bee', through the word 'bhramara'. Yet another example is, “turanga-kāntā-"nanahavyavāha” meaning ‘agni', through its relation to the word - vadavāmukhā'gniḥ - This sort of laksanā is accepted only if it has the backing of popular usage, or if we can find a special motive in resorting to such involved expression. Else than this, it is a blemish, called 'neyártha'. Mukula considers that all cases of arriving at some other meaning through the agency of the primary sense, make for laksanā. Thus, for Mukula, the so called arthāpatti as illustrated in such an expression as. "pīno devadattah divā na bhunkte", which leads to the understanding of his eating by night, also is a case of laksanā. This is a far fetched application of "abhidheyena - sambandha”, which is not acceptable to other thinkers.
Actually we may say that abhidheyena-sambandha' is nothing else but the condition of 'tad-yoga' and this tad-yoga as we know from later alamkārikas is of various types such as sādrśya, samavāya, vaiparītya, samipya, sva-svāmibhāva, adhārā”dheyabhāva and what not ? So, actually Bhartsmitra's kārikā harps upon this condition of tadyoga only and broadly speaking the first condition may be taken as covering up the rest also, which hardly deserve separate mentioning.
'sādrśya' is illustrated as in, "simho māņavakah”, samavāya as in 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, vaiparītya as in, “brhaspatir ayam mūrkhaḥ'; kriyāyoga, as 'samare śatrghnah tvam', and we may say that here through association with some action, someone is described to be 'satsghna' - the killer of foes, as well as the great hero of the Rāmāyaṇa.
Such other lists of conditions that make for lakṣaņā are also advanced by later writers. Nāgeśa, for example, in his Parama-laghu-mañjasā (p. 7) names five such relations adding ‘tādarthya' to the list of four as given by Patañjali earlier. They are -

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484
SAHRDAYĀLOKA "tätsthyāt tathaiva tāddharmyāt tat-sāmipyāt tathaiva ca, tat-sāhacaryāt tādarthyāt
jñeyā vai laksana budhaih." We will go to see how actually Mammaţa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and some others also mention these. Broadly speaking these relations between the primary sense and the indicated sense can be classified into two categories such as (i) sādrśyamūlaka and (ii) sādrśyetara-mülaka relations. Kumārila clearly distinguishes between one based on similarity and the other based on anything else than that. He calls the former as 'gauni and the latter as 'laksana', but as we will later that eventhough Mammata has subsumed these two under laksanā, Hemacandra has once again raised the bogie of an independent 'gauni which is not just based on similarity but which is something else. So, the traditionally accepted division of laksanā into gaunī or upacara laksanā and suddhā based on relations other than similarity is not seen in Kumārila and some Mīmāmsakas for whom gauņī is a separate vstti. We will talk of this later.
We have seen how Kuntaka in his 'vicitrā abhidhā' meaning just 'poetic expression' and not just either abhidhā, or laksaņā or vyañjanā, covers up even laksanā. We have also noted how Bhoja also, in his wider concept of abhidhā, covers up both gauni and laksaņā. Mammaţa in his Kavyaprakāśa quotes Kumārila Bhatta saying,
"abhidheya'vinābhūtapratītir laksanócyate, laksyamāņaguņairyogāt
vștter istā tu gaunatā."
(K.P. II. pp. 50, Edn. Jalkikar), (Tantravārttika I. iv. 22) He adds, - "avinābhāvo'tra sambandha-mātram, na tu nāntariyakatvam. tattve hi, ‘mañcāḥ krośanti' ityādau na laksanā syāt. avinābhāve cā”ksepena eva siddher laksanāyā nopayoga ity uktam.” (Tr. Prof. Dwivedi.)
"Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication. (viz. vāhīka)."

Page #511

‘Lakşaņā
485 Here, 'the state of not being without' (avinābhāva) means connection in general, but not an invariable relation. For, if it were so, there would be no indication in such cases as, “the cots cry"; and if invariable relation were to exist then the assumption (or inference) alone will do, there will be no use of indication.” Mammara explains that if the relation is that of similarity, the transfer is qualitative (gaunī); and if it is any other relation as for instance of cause and effect, owner and owned, measure and measured, part and whole, etc. etc., it is pure laksaņā.
So, the secondary meaning is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be incompatible with the context. However, we will go to see later that not only mukhyártha-bädha but even 'tātparya-anupapatti' or non-realization of the speaker's) intention is also taken to be at the root of laksanā by later thinkers. The fact, hower, remains that the indicated sense, or secondary meaning is arrived at, not directly from the word itself but only through the primary meaning.
We have seen the position of laksaņā in general in the thinking of various schools of philosophy such as the Vyakarana, Nyāya, Mimāmsā etc. We have also clearly, seen the treatment of laksanā under Sabara : Now, following Sabara, Kumārila discusses some of the theories about the real nature of secondary usage based on qualities, i.e. gauni in instances such as "simho devadattah". What follows is in the light of Dr. K. K. Raja's presentation.
(i) The first theory holds that the word 'lion' is denotative of the whole aggregate of the class, its qualities and actions. Though, of course, all the elaments of this meaning are not applicable to the individual called 'devadatta', the word is applied to him indirectly on the basis of some elements found in him. - Tantravārttika, p. 356 observes - "anyeşām tu darśanam sarva eva hi simhā"di-sabdā jāti-guna-kriyasamudāya”dişu katipaya-guna-kriyāyogat upacaryanta iti.” Sabara had rejected this view on the ground that an aggragate cannot refer to one part separately. Kumārila also notes that the term 'hundred' cannot refer to 'fifty' even if the latter is part of the total aggregate :
“samudāyártha-vācitve naikadeśe bhaved gatih, śataśabdān na pañcāśan
mukhya-rūpeṇa gamyate.” The Mimāmsakas again hold that, the primary meaning of a word is the class or universal, and not actions or qualities.

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486
SAHRDAYĀLOKA (ii) Kumārila discusses another theory also. It holds that in a secondary usage based on quality, i.e. in qualitative metaphor, the character of one is imposed on another. - "kaścit punar aha, samāropita-tadbhāvo gauna iti." In the illustration viz., 'simho devadattah', the full nature of the lion is imposed on devadatta' on the basis of actions and qualities of this individual called 'devadatta', which are found to be similar to those of the lion. Sabara and following him Kumārilabhatta criticize this view on the ground that such an identity is totally impossible, since the man and the lion have distinct characteristics. Only under some delusion on the part of the speaker, or the hearer, or both, that the characteristics of one object can be superimposed on the other. Thus, for example, there is imposition of water on mirage. But in case of the secondary usage, there is no delusion, as both the speaker and the listener are aware of the difference between a man and a lion, and hence none can have the power to impose the character of the lion on the body - Tantravarttika p. 358 has
"dvāv api pratipadyete simha-pumsor viviktatām, nádhyā”ropayitum śaktis
tenaikasyā’pi vidyate." (iii) The Mimāmsakas hold that a qualitative metaphor is based on the existence of some common qualities between the primary and the actual. They argue that all significations of a word are, in one way or the other, connected with its primary sense and that we should not assume any other potency in a word, if it is possible to explain the secondary meanings also as derived from the primary meaning. In the illustration, viz. simho devedattah, the word simha, conveys the universal simhatva which indicates such qualities as courage, and the presence of such qualities as courage in 'devadatta', justifies calling him a lion : Tantravārttika, p. 354 reads :
"vahnitva-lakṣitād arthād yad paingalyā”di gamyate, tena māņavake buddhiḥ
sādņśyād upajāyate." The Buddhist view : In Sthiramati's commentary on the Trimśikā of Vasubandhu, there is some discussion on the metaphorical expression such as, "agnir māņavakah”. Three conditions for such a figurative expression are given as

Page #513

'Laksanā'
487 (i) the primary thing referred to, (ii) the actual thing resembling the primary one and (iii) a common quality existing between the two. In the illustration on hand, the primary meaning of the word 'agni' is fire; the actual thing referred to is the boy Mänavaka, who resembles the fire and the qualities common to both are the quality of brightness, tawny colour and fiery nature.
A prima-facie view is presented. The point is that this figurative description cannot be applied to the boy either on the ground of universal common attribute of "fire-ness", nor on the basis of the qualities a particular fire. The colour or fiery nature is not the essential quality of fire, as, on that ground, 'fire-ness' will be present in the boy also and no need will arise for a figurative transfer. Again, it cannot be applied to the boy on the basis of qualities in a particular fire, for as the quality is inseparably linked with the substratum, the brightness of the boy is essentially different from that of the fire. What, at the most we can say is that the quality of the fire is similar to that of the boy and hence the qu figuratively applied to that of the boy, but not to the boy himself : Read - vijñāna mātratā-siddhi, pt. I. pp. 17 - "upacāro hi trișu bhavati, nányatamábhāve, mukhyapadārthe tatsadrśe tayośca sādņśye. tad yathā mukhye’gnau tatsadệśe māņavake tayośca sādhāraṇadharme kapilatve, tīkṣaṇatve vā saty agnir māņavaka ity upacāraḥ kriyate...”
and also - avinābhāvitve cópacārabhāvo'gnāv iva māņavake’pi jātisadhbhāvāt. tasmān na mānavake'pi jātisadbhāvāt. tasmān na mānavake jāty upacārah sambhavati. nā’pi dravyopacāraḥ, sāmānyadharmā’bhāvāt. na hi yo'gnes tīksno guṇaḥ, kapilo vā, sa eva māņavake... evam agniguṇasyaiva māņavake... evam agniguṇasyaiva māņavakagune sădrśyād upacāro yuktah.”
Again, for the Buddhist logicians, there is no primary referent of a word, for the essential nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms of knowledge as noted by Prof. K. K. Raja (pp. 247, ibid). Each word, according to them, is applied to its object only indirectly by a sort of transfer or upacārā. The thing-in-itself-i.e. - svalaksana-can never be directly denoted by a word. Read - “mukhya-padártho násti, tasya sarvajñāná-bhidhāna-visayatikrāntarvāt... api ca sarva evā’yam gauņa eva, na mukyo'sti."
The same view is read even in Vigraha-vyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna, a buddhist writer again : Read, there on p. 1,
"sarvesām bhāvānām sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvas'cet, tvadvacanam asvabhāvam na nivartayitum svabhāvam alam.” There, an objection is raised to the

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488
SAHRDAYĀLOKA effect that, if the words are themselves devoid of essential nature, it should not be possible to apply them to refute that essential nature. Non-existent fire does not burn; then how could words which have no reality be used to prove that very unreality ? - Read pp. 2, ibid - "na hy asad agninā śakyam dagdhum, ... evam asatā vacanena na śakyah sarvabhāva-pratiședhah kartum". The answer is to be found in the Buddhist view that even though words have no direct connection with the ultimate reality, they have the power of practical utility - artha-kriyā-kāritva -, as they can refer to objects indirectly through figurative transfer i.e. upacāra.
We may also note that among the schools of thought which are opposed to the Buddhists and which accept the primary meaning of words to be a class, there are some mīmāmsakas who also accept that words denote the particular objects in a sentence, through the secondary power. For them the primary meaning of a word is universal which is the essential quality common to all the particular instances of the class. But when the word is used in a sentence, it has to refer to the particulars. Some are of the opinion that the particular comes from the universal because of invariable connection between the two, and still others explain it as being due to the secondary significative power i.e. transfer : Read - Vedāntaparibhāsă, IV. 17 - "katham tarhi gavādipadād vyakter bhānam iti cet, jāter vyaktisamāna-samvitsamvedyatvāt iti brūma)... athavā vyaker lakṣaṇayávagamaḥ."
So, according to Buddhists of the Yogācāra school, and also according to some Mimāmsakas, there is an element of transfer of meaning even in ordinary sentences. So, the normal cases of transfers like 'agnir māņavakah', have to be taken as transfers of the second degree. Such metaphors based on quality are termed gauņī by the Mimāmsakas. But for the Buddists, the first type of ordinary usage is a metaphorical expression from the absolute point of view (i.e. pāramārthika), whereas ordinary metaphors are metaphorical expressions from the worldly (vyāvahārika) point of view, observes Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 249, ibid).
We will continue to follow the lead of Dr. Raja till we start with alamkārikas, one by one, in their individual capacity, reviewing their esteemed works on poetics.
Dr. Raja observes (pp. 249), that in all cases of metaphorical transfer of meaning, there has to be some intimate relation between the primary and the actual referents. Keeping in view the degree of intimacy to which the primary meaning is retained in the actual meaning, it is possible to note three types of laksaņās. Though of course, the primary meaning of the word cannot be totally excluded in a transfer, we can observe its retention to a greater or lesser extent.

Page #515

'Laksanā'
489 • Šamkara, in Brahma-sūtra-bhāsya on IV. 1.6, observes : “laksaņā ca yathāsambhavam samnikrstena viprakrstena vā svārtha-sambandhena pravartate". Kumārila also observes - Tantravārttika, pp. 356 - "ajahatsvārthāh sarvāh sabdapravṛttayah”.
The three kinds of laksanā, generally accepted are - (i) Jahallaksanā, or jahatsvārthā laksaņā, (ii) ajahallaksaņā or ajahat-svārthā laksaņā, and (iii) jahadajahallaksaņā.
(i) Jahallaksanā - In a sentence like 'gangāyām ghosah', the primary sense of the word 'gangā', is abandoned and the secondary meaning, 'the bank of the ganges', is resorted to. This is called 'jahallaksaņā”. In this variety, there will be nonintelligibility of the syntactical relation between the terms, if we take the primary meaning of the word. So, the primary sense has to be rejected to a great extent and another sense having some connection with the primary has to be accepted that can go with the context. We will go to see that Mammața calls it laksana-laksaņā.
(ii) Ajahallakṣaņā occurs when the primary sense is not completely rejected. The Tatrvabindu p. 155, observes - "na ca sarvatra svārtha-parityāgena eva laksanā iti aikāntikam. laksaniyánurodhenaiva hi sarvatra parigraha-parityāgau.” times, the primary sense is not substantially modified, but only specified by context, or is restricted by the function of the syntaxt, or is extended by the inclusion of another sense. In all such cases, the primary sense is not rejected but is included in the secondary sense. In the illustration, viz. “kuntāḥ praviśanti”, the word kuntāḥ - meaning lances, - indicates, through indication, the lances themselves, and also the men who carry them. In the same way 'chatriņo yānti' - i.e. people holding umbrellas are going', - indicates through laksaņā, a group of people, some with and others without umbrellas. We have seen above when we discussed the view of the Mimāmsakas, that in the vedic text, viz.: srstir upadadhāti', i.e. the srsti-bricks are placed, the word 'srsti' means by laksanā, the bricks that are associated with a group of hymns with and without the word 'srsti'. This type of metaphorical transfer is called a-jahallaksaņā. We will go to see that Mammața will name it as ‘upādāna-laksaņā”. According to the Bhātta Mimāmsakas however, the primary meaning of a word is universal, and its power is exhausted in delivering this general sense only. So, for them, the sense of the particular has to be arrived at through laksaņā of the 'ajahat type. Mammața however, has no faith in this as we will see later. He seems to follow the prābhākaras in holding that, on account of the invariable connection between the universal and the particular, the latter is cognized as implied in the former.

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SAHRDAYALOKA (iii) 'Jahad-a-jahad-laksaņā' is the third variety accepted by the Vedāntins, in cases where only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is retained while the rest stands rejected. In, illustrations such as 'pato dagdhah' (i.e. the cloth is burnt), or, 'grāmo dagdhah', (i.e. a village is burnt), it is only a part of the cloth or village that is actually meant as burnt. Only a part of the primary meaning of the word 'pata' and 'grāma' is retained. In a sentence, for example, 'so'yam devadattah', the term'sah' refers to 'devadatta' as determined by the past time and space, and the term 'ayam' refers to the same person as determined in the present time and place. Here, 'sah' and 'ayam' meaning 'that' and 'this' are two incompatible determinants and the sentence does not mean their identity. The sentence further does not mean also that the person as determined by 'this' is identical with the person determined by 'that. It simply means this much that there is identity of the substantive devadatta', by rejecting the elements that are incompatible. The two qualified entities, though not identical refer yet to the same substantive, viz. 'devadatta’. Thus the identity has relevance to the individual devadatta', who is not related to time, either past or present. The vedāntins are keen on this type of laksanā as they have to explain expressions like, 'tat tvam asi', 'aham bhrama asmi', etc. In the first sentence, 'tvam' does not mean 'Svetaketu the son of Uddālaka', but it refers to one who is stripped of all individual attributes such as limited intelligence etc. Again, 'tad' means 'universal soul, free from all qualifications such as omniscience etc. It is only the pure consciousness in the individual soul that is identified with the universal soul. Such instances, where a word signifying a qualified entity gives up a portion of its primary meaning and keeps up another portion, are taken as 'jahadajahad-laksanā. Mallinātha, in his commentary on Ekāvali observes :
"svárthaikámśa-tyāgād amśántaram eva laksyate yatra, sā jahad-ajahatsvārthā
'tat tvam asīty ādivisaya-drśyeyam." Sadānanda in Vedāntasāra calls it, bhāgalaksaņā'. - (p. 95). Vedāntaparibhāṣā, IV. 26 - has - "yatra hi višistavācakaḥ śabdaḥ svárthaikadeśam vihāya, ekadeśe vartate, tatra jahadajallaksanā. Appayya Dixit in Siddhāntaleśa-samgraha
ls it to be - "bhaga-tyaga-laksana". The alamkarikas and the Naiyāyikas have nothing to do with this third variety of laksanā.
All systems of philosophy have interest in laksaņā, as they try to define and explain the highest reality which in itself is beyond any explanation and our

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491 language always falls short, or say fumbles in trying to explain the Supreme reality. Ordinarily speaking the word 'absolute' in the expression, say, 'absolute reality', is beyond definition. Sentences such as, "aham brahma asmi", "tat tvam asi”, “sarvam khalu idam brahma”, “vijñānam brahma", etc. are imperfect efforts to define the absolute and we see that first, second and third person-pronouns are all used to define, or say, explain the absolute. All this is metaphorical expression. Sankara observes in the Bșhadāranyaka-upanişad-bhāsya, that, - “nāma vā rūpam vā, karma vā, bhedo vā, jātir vā, guņo vā, tad dvāreņa hi sabda-pravsttiḥ bhavati; na caisām kaścid višeso brahmany asti, ato na nirdestum sakyate." (Samkara, on Br. Up. II. 3.6) - This means that words denote things through one or ot! following : name, form, action, distinction, genus and quality, but in Brahman there is none of these differences and hence, It is beyond any description. But, to an extent, metaphorical expression, laksaņā becomes helpful in going beyond the limits of primary sense in matters concerning philosophical truths. Vyañjanā has scope in poetry and also in worldly context to an extent, but is of no use in philosophical discourses and for this reason only the ancient thinkers have not talked of vyanjana in their writings concerning scientific disciplines.
(iv) 'Lakṣita-laksaņā' is a fourth variety of figurative expression mentioned as accepted by some thinkers, but totally rejected, as we will go to see later, by ālamkārikas of the eminence of Mammața and others. This occurs when the relation between the primary sense and the actual thing referred are not directly related, but have an indirect relation through some other word as in case of, say the word 'dvirepha' meaning, 'a word having two 'r-s', indicating the word 'bhramara' giving 'bee' as its primary meaning. According to the modern Naiyāyikas, this can be subsumed under jahallaksaņā itself, and the Vedāntaparibhāsā is inclined to take even gauni laksanā under this type, the relation being two referents being only indirect and brought about through the agency of the common qualities only.
This then is the intellectual heritage with which ālamkārikas start. We have noted that the earlier ālamkārikas did not find it necessary, or perhaps compelling to define, describe and classify individual sabda-vrttis in their works, for reasons, perhaps best known to them. We have tried to screen their efforts and tried to suggest their know-how concerning the sabda-vșttis. Even Anandavardhana does not take upon himself the task of clearly defining the nature and scope of different śabda-vrttis, but while establishing vyañjanā under Dhv. III. 33, in his Āloka, he distinguishes between vyañjanā on one hand and abhidhā and laksanā, which he

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calls by the name of 'gunavrtti', on the other. This portion of Anandavardhana's thinking will be taken care of by us when we deal with vyañjanā. In the same way, Abhinavagupta's brooding over śabda-vịttis also will be subsumed under our general discussion on vyañjanā. For the present, we will also note that we have dealt with even Mukulabhatta's treatment of laksaņā, under his wider concept of abhidha. However, being the first alamkārika after Anandavardhana to discuss the problem of Sabda-vrttis Mukula's views will be repeated here by way of a resume of the earlier lengthy discussion.
Mukula, in his Abhidhāyrtta-mātrkā has given a three-fold classification of laksanā, such as (i) śuddhā, (ii) sāropā and (iii) sādhyavasānā.
In suddhā both the objects appear to be clearly distinct from each other, while in sāropā, there is superimposition of one over the other, and in the third variety, the closeness between the two objects being so great, the difference is almost not apprehended. The object of superimposition is completely eclipsed or is swollowed by the object superimposed. The former i.e. the object of superimposition is not mentioned by a word, but only the other, the latter, i.e. the object superimposed is mentioned by a word. We have discussed Mukula's views on laksana on an ea occasion, so we will now begin with Mammata, who, as available written documents suggest, is the first great ālamkārika, who clearly defines and classifies individual sabdavrttis in a very scientific way. Mammața :- In his K.P. II. 9 he observes :
"mukhyárthabādhe tad yoge rūdhito'tha prayojanāt, anyo’rtho laksayate yat sā
lakṣaṇā"ropitā kriyā.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi) “Indication is that superimposed function whereby another meaning is conveyed either through usage or motive, when there is incompatibility of the primary meaning as well as its iterconnection.” (Trans. R.C.D.; pp. 27, ibid)
Thus, lakṣaṇā or indication, or secondary usage, or metaphorical transfer in general takes place under certain conditions such as ‘mukhyárthabādha' or incompatibility of the primary sense, tad yoga i.e. interconnection with the primary sense of the other sense dragged in, and finally rūdhi i.e. usage or prayojana' i.e. motive make for the secondary usage coming into action.
Mammața further elaborates in his vịtti that - "karmani kuśala ity ādau darbha

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grahaņā"dy ayogāt, gangāyām ghosa ity ādau ca gangā"dīnām ghosā”dy adhikaranatvā'sambhavād mukhyárthasya bādhe, vivecakatv ādau sāmīpy adau ca sambandhe, rūdhitaḥ prasiddheḥ, tathā gangātațe ghosa ity adeh prayogād yeşām tathā na pratipattis tesām pāvanatv adīnām dharmānām pratipādanā"tmanah prayojanāc ca, mukhyenā'mukhyrtho laksyate yat, sa aropitaḥ śabda-vyāpārah, sántarártha-nistho laksanā.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi pp. 27. ibid) - "When owing to the absence of (logical) connection with the fetching of the grass etc., as in the cases like, 'expert in work, and owing to the impossibility of Gangā and the like being the site of a hamlet and the like in cases such as, 'a hamlet on the Gangā', there is the incompatibility of the primary meaning, and when there is the connection such as discrimination and proximity (respectively in the above cases), through usage i.e. through universal apprehension (in the first case), similarity
ugh motive in the form of conveying in that manner those properties of coolness and holiness etc., which would not be so conveyed by the use of, 'a hamlet on the bank of the Gangā', (in the second case), that superimposed function of a word abiding in the intermediate sense is indication, conveying the secondary meaning through the primary."
Govinda Thakkura (pp. 37, Edn. Anandashram SKT. Granthāvalih - Pune, A.D. 1911, or pp. 256, Edn. Nag Prakashan, Dr. Jyotna Mohan, '95, Delhi) - in his Pradīpa observes : “rūdhiḥ prasiddhiḥ, prayojanam vyangyártha-pratipādanarūpam. kriyā vyāpāraḥ. atra, fanyo'rtho yal laksyate să laksanā iti laksanam laksyate pratipadyate ity arthah. ato nā”tmā”śrayah. mukhyárthabādhah sakyárthasambandho rūļhīprayojanányatarac ceti hetutraya-vacanam vyañjanāyām saktismộtau jāti-vyāpti-vāraṇāya tadyoga iti laksanépi praveśanīyam. yogasya ca hetutvam vivaksitam. ato na mukhyártha-sambandhi-vyañjanāyām ativyāptiḥ. mukhyasya abhidhārūpa-mukhyártha-sambandhena pratipadyam sambhavati iti tadvāraṇāyánya ity uktam. anyo’mukhyaḥ. yad iti guṇībhūta-laksaņa-kriyā-mātraparāmarśaḥ. tena, "sakya-sambandhena a-sakya-pritipattir laksaņā iti prācīnamatena etal laksanam. 'tad-hetuh sakya-sambandho laksana' iti paramárthah.”. pratipattiḥ hetur hi vịttiḥ., na tu pratipattir eva. yat tu 'yadity asya 'yata' ity arthakatayā sambandha-paratayaiva sūtravyākyānam tad ayuktam. 'nā bhidhā samayábhāvāt hetvábhāvānna laksaņā’ity atra 'mukhyártha-bādhā'di-trayam "hetuh', iti vyākhyānavirodhāt, na hi sambandha-rūpatve laksaņāyāḥ sambandho hetur ghatate. nanu pratipādanam cel laksaņā tarhi śabda-dharmaḥ. gangā"disabdānām nīra"dikam upasthāpya virāme, nīra"dy arthenaiva sambandhena tīrā”dy artha-pratipādanād ity ata āha, - 'äropitā kriya' iti. śakya-vyavahita

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA laksyárthá-visayatvācchabde aropita eva sa vyāpāraḥ. vastuto’rthanistha eva ity arthaḥ. tad etad uktam, 'sántarártha-nisthah' iti.” .
The idea is that, 'yat anyaḥ arthaḥ laksyate să kriyā laksaņā’ is the definition of laksanā. "mukhyarthabādhe tadyoge rūdhito'tha prayojanāt" - talks about the three conditions under which laksaņā operates. "āropitā” is descriptive part. “yaḥ anyaḥ arthah laksyate sa laksyārthah" is the definition of laksyārtha that is indicated. This means that for Govinda Thakkura, according to Mammata, mukhyarthabādha etc. are the three factors placed in the ‘nimitta' portion of laksanā, while that by which another meaning is indicated', - is the only portion placed in the definition part of laksaņā. So, Mammata has not incorporated the 'tadyukta' pada in it, which is necessary. For, if this is not added in the definition, the definition will be wide enough to include even vyañjana in the fold of laksanā. Thus the difinition will be too-wide or "ati-vyāpta”. We will go to observe that Viśvanātha has taken greater care in defining lakṣaṇā.
It may be noted here that yat' means 'yayā kriyayā ity arthah'. 'yaya' ity arthe lupta-karana-trtiyāntam avyayam. 'laksyate' means 'pratipădyate', and not
ratipădyate'. For, if laksyate were to mean 'laksanayā pratipadyate', there would be the blemish called 'anyonyā”śraya-dosa'. The presence of the word ‘laksanā' in the definition of laksaņā makes it impossible for us to understand the definition and thus leads to the blemish of 'mutual dependence'
Jhalkikar (pp. 40, ibid) observes : - 'yad' iti 'yayā' ity arthe lupta-karaṇatļtīyantam avyayam. yayā (vịttyā) anyo’rthaḥ arthántaram (mukhyabhinnah) tatā”dirūpa iti yāvat, laksyate pratipădyate să (vrttih) laksanety ucyate ity arthaḥ. yad vā, 'yad' iti laksaņa-kriya-višesanam. anyor'tho yat laksyate, yat pratipădyate să laksanety anvayah laksyate iti nijantād ākhyātam. nijartho hetu-vyāpāraḥ. hetusca śabda iti anyártha-pratipatti-hetuh sabda-vyāpāro laksanetyárthah śakyatávacchedakā”ropa-rūpā, sakya-sambandha-rūpā vā, vaktstātparyarūpā vā iti anyad etat. 'āropite'ti, ‘kriye'ti ca na laksana-ghatakam. kintu loksaņā-svarūpakathana-param. sā hi āropitā mukhyártha-vyavahita-laksyártha-visayatvāt śabde kalpitā. sākṣāt-sambandhena mukhyárthanisthā, paramparā-sambandhena tu śabda-nisthā ity arthaḥ. kriyā vyāpāra-rūpā ca iti sūtrárthaḥ. yattv atra 'yad' iti kriya-višeșanam. tathā ca yat lakṣyate yat pratipādyate să pratipattir eva (jñānam eva) laksanā iti kaiścid vyākhyātam, tad ajñāna-vijrmbhitam. laksanāyā abhidhāvyañjanayor iva vrtti-rūpatayā vịtti-janyāyāḥ pratipatter laksaņārva-a-sambandhāt. na hi vịtter-vyāpāratve kaścid vivādah. asmāt padad ayam artho boddhavya ity ākārikā īśvarecchā’pi preraņāgarbhatvena sādhyarūpā eva iti pratibhāvadbhiḥ

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495 sūksmadrśā avadhātavyam - na ca "pratitir laksaņocyate'iti agrima-granthavirodhah iti vācyam. tasyaikadesimatottankana-mātra-paratvāt. pratiti-padasya karana-vyutpannatvād vā iti dik.”
It is clear that Jhalkikar explains yať by 'yayā vrttyā', the power with which the secondary meaning is conveyed. 'yat laksyate' means that which is established, i.e. the power of words that is instrumental in conveying the secondary sense is 'laksaņā'. This 'laksaņā' is said to be an "āropitā kriyā” by Mammata and this can be explained as follows : It is 'sakyatávacchedakā”ropa-rūpā' - sakya-sambandharūpā vá. The first attribute explains the fact that the meaning of 'vyakti' is implied by the meaning of 'jāti'. The other explains that a meaning associated with sakyártha or mukhyártha is forced in as in 'gangāyām ghosah'. This laksanā is also said to be 'vaktr-tātparya-rūpā', i.e. where the intention of the speaker is taken care of; as in case of viparīta-lakṣaṇā'. As Jhalkikar (pp. 40) clearly notes, the terms āropitā kriya', are not part of the definition of laksanā, but they merely describe its form. The idea is that through 'sākṣāt' i.e. direct relation, it resides only in the 'mukhyártha' or 'primary meaning of a word', but through 'paramparā-sambandha' through a chain-relation or indirect relation, it sticks with the word itself and hence it is termed 'āropitā kriyā', 'a superimposed function'. Here ‘kriyā' stands for 'vyāpāra' or 'function', 'activity'. Mammața terms laksaņā as 'kriya' i.e. 'vyāpāra'. Some people take 'yatra' as a 'kriyā-višeşana'; an 'adverb'. They define laksaņā as - "yat laksyate, yat pratipădyate să pratipattir eva (= jñānam eva) laksanā.” i.e. the apprehension itself is laksanā. But this is not correct, as laksaņā is of the form of vyāpāra, a function. It is a 'vrtti', and 'jñāna' or apprehension is ‘vrtti-janya' entity, i.e. that which is born of a 'vrtti'. It may be said that this will be in contradiction to the statement viz. "pratitir laksaņocyate.", but this can be understood as follows. Here by 'pratīti' we understand the activity leading to congnition - "pratīyate anayā iti pratītih”. That function by which a meaning is cognised is termed as ‘pratīti'.
Before we move to the topic of the varieties of lakṣaṇā, here is something interesting from Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 258 etc.) -
Regarding the condition, viz. mukhyártha-bādha or incompatibility of the primary meaning, it is observed that without this, laksanā is an impossibility. The moment a word is heard, its primary meaning flashes in our mind, it having a "direct and natural link with a given word. Only due to unsuitability of context, a resistance to our understanding of sentence-sense is caused and then to remove this resistance we resort to the secondary sense. Sabara, as seen above in detail, repeatedly points out that the secondary signification is to be resorted to only when

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the direct primary sense of a given word is inapplicable under a given context. He instists that whenever the direct statement and implied meaning are in conflict, the former has to be given preference. For this See Sābara-bhāsyā on Mi. Sū. I. iv. 2, "śruti-laksanā viśaye ca śrutir jyāyasi; Mi. Sū. IV. III-26 - "śrutis' ca laksanāyā gariyasi"; Mi. Sü. VI. i. 51 - "śruti-laksanā-visaye ca śrutir nyāyyā, na laksanā, Mi. Sū. VII. ii. 13 - agatis' caisā yā laksanā"śrayanam."
According to the Mīmāmsakas and the Vedāntins, the secondary signification of a given word is apprehended through reasoning of the 'arthāpatti' type, which makes for the postulation of a fact to explain two known facts which are apparently unaccountable. In the famous illustration viz. pīno devadattah divā na bhunkte', - (The fat devadatta does not eat by day), the two known facts viz. of devatta being fat and his not eating by day, look to contradict each other if we do not postulate one more fact that he eats by night ! In the case of laksanā, we have to find a way to reconcile two known facts, viz. the primary meaning of a given word known through remembrance and popular usage, and the intention of the speaker inferred from the context. When we here a boy being spoken of as lion, the primary meaning of the term lion looks impossible and the secondary meaning is known through immediate inference of the 'arthāpatti' type and it is of the form of "the boy is similar to a lion in qualities such as courage, etc.” This secondary meaning is related to the primary meaning and it can remove the apparent conflict between the primary and contextual meanings.
Dr. Raja then tries to elaborate the exact meaning of 'mukhyárthabādha' or incompatibility of the primary meaning. According to ancient Naiyāyikas and later ālamkārikas (ref. pp. 259, ibid, Dr. Raja) - it is only the impossibility of the logical connection in the sentence. The Mimamsakas of the Prābhākara School also think alike. Sālikanātha defines laksaņā as, “that which is resorted to for conveying a new sense which can be related to the sentence-meaning through the cognition of its primary sense, when that primary sense of the word has no logical connection with the sentence-meaning.' See, Vākyártha-mātņkā-vrtti, pp. 13 -
"vācyasyārthasya vākyarthe sambandhān upapattitaḥ, tat-sambandha-vasa-prāptasya
anvayāl lakṣaṇā matā.” But for the later Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins, as well as later grammarians, the incompatibility of the primary sense lies not merely in the difficulty of

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establishing the logical connection in the sentence, but in the unsuitability of the primary sense with the intended sense in the context - "tātparyánupapatti”. The Siddhanta-muktāvali, p. 285, observes -
"lakṣaṇā śakya-sambandhas
tātparya'nupapattitaḥ", -
The Laghumañjuṣā, p. 114, has "vastutas tu tatparyánupapattir eva tadbījam." - See also, Vedanta-paribhāṣā, IV. 30.
-
Dr. Raja proceeds to inform (p. 260, ibid) that the Mimāmsakas of the Bhattaschool also favour this view. In the Tattvabindu, Vacaspati criticizes Śālikanātha's definition of lakṣaṇā and suggests that any kind of incompatibility of the primary sense should be taken as the condition of lakṣaṇā and not merely its incompatibility with the sentence-meaning.
We know that in all cases of jahallakṣaṇā, where the primary meaning of a word is not retained, the primary sense is unsuitable in establishing logical connection with the sentence sense. But in cases of a-jahallakṣaṇā, where the primary sense is not completely rejected, the sentence meaning can still be comprehended if the word is taken in the primary sense, and hence there will be no 'lakṣaṇā', if the first condition of mukhyártha-badha is strictly applied. Thus the sentence, say, "chatrino yānti", can mean a group of people with or without umbella is marching, eventhough the literal sense refers only to people carrying umbrellas. Similarly in instances such as, 'kakebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' (i.e. protect the curd from crows), the primary meanings of the term 'kāka' is not impossible in the context, but it is clear that the intension is to protect the curd from all curdeating bird's and beings! To include all such instances under lakṣaṇā we have to take incompatibility with the intended sense as the condition of lakṣaṇā. Again, all the cases of impossibility of establishing logical connection with the sentence-sense, can be explained by the incompatibility of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker or purport of a sentence.
Those who hold impossibility of establishing a logical connection with the sentence meaning as the condition of lakṣaṇā explain such instances by taking the words to be the upalakṣaṇa for the actual referents. Thus in 'kakebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām', the word 'kaka' is an upalakṣaṇa for all animals that might eat the curd i.e. for all 'dadhy upaghatakas'. 'Upalakṣaṇa' is the act of implying any analogous object where only one is specified. The word 'käka' is an indication for the animals which might eat the curd; the word is a means of referring to the whole

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA group including the crow to which the literal meaning of the word refers - (Nyāyakośa, p. 172).
Now here we will stop for a while and try to discuss a point raised by Dr. Raja in the foot-note no. 3, on pp. 241 wherein he seems to argue against 'tātparyánupapatti'. There he observes : pp. 241 (text) - "It is clear that the various
Sision mana wanger mere must be some kind of relation between the primary and the actual referents." Then in the foot-note no. 3 he observes : “Hence it seems strange that some of the later writers should have overlooked this fundamental point in the course of their arguments. Thus to show that the condition for a transfer is not the impossibility of the literal sense in the context, but its incompatibility with the intention of the speaker, it is argued that in the well-known example of 'gangāyām-ghosah', it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning, the bank of the Ganges', to the word Gangā, and that if the intention were otherwise, the implied meaning of the term 'ghosa' might be 'fish', since even by resorting to that sense the impossibility of the literal sense in the context could be removed. See Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 287 - yadi cánvayánupaputtir-laksaņābījam syāt, tadā kvacid gangā-padasya tīre, kvacid ghosapadasya matsykdau laksaneti niyamo na syāt.” Also Laghumañjusā, p. 114. In this argument, they forget that there is no conceivable relation between the village and fish and that such a transfer of meaning is not at all possible.”
Now we have to apply ourselves to Dr. Raja's remark. For once, to begin with we can not agree that there is no relation - tadyoga - whatsoever between the primary meaning of 'village' and 'fish'. Actually, just as on account of sāmipyasambandha we can derive the meaning of 'gangā-tata' from the word 'gangā', similarly on account of “sādęśya”-sambandha, i.e., relation of similarity we may be able to derive the sense, of 'mahāmīna' or 'a very big fish', from the meaning of a village. The fish in the Ganga is so big, that the speaker's intention goes to suggest, that as if a whole village is afloat on the flow of the Ganga ! So, Dr. Raja's remark is not acceptable. Again, even in instances of jahallaksanā we cannot rule out the condition of 'tātparya-anupapatti', which occurs also in case of 'a-jahallaksanā' such as illustrated in 'chatrino yānti'. Or, we may put such instances as 'kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām', under what the Vedāntins recognized as, 'jahad-ajahad-laksanā! Of course, this is open to critical discussion.
Dr. Raja (p. 261, ibid) then proceeds to observe that 'yogyatā' or congruity of sense is accepted to be one of the conditions of a sentence, the others as we know, being 'ākāńksā' and 'āsatti'. Thus a statement, say, 'agninā siñcati' observes Dr.

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‘Laksaņā
499 Raja, is not a sentence, there being a breach of the condition of 'yogyatā'. He then raises a point, (p. 262) “If there is any incompatibility of the primary sense, as we find in all cases of laksanā, how can there be 'yogyatā' in a sentence ? The explanation is that in the case of lakṣaṇā, the incompatibility of the sense is only for the sense when taken literally, and not real. This could be removed by resorting to the secondary meaning of the word. Even in cases like 'agninā siñcati', if the incongruity could be explained by resorting to a secondary meaning, the sentence would be regarded as correct."
This remark also has to be supplemented by us. Yes, if by ‘agninā siñcati', we mean, “he is wetting by a highly, inflammable liquid or petrol, we can explain the incompatibility. To sprinkle such highly inflammable liquid, say kerosene, on an object, may be said to be 'agninā siñcati'. But here also, it may be noted that by conceding such cases Dr. Raja accepts “tātparyánupāpatti' as more basic to laksanā. In all cases making sense, non-sense or half-sense involving laksanā, we have to pay greatest importance to the condition of 'tātparyánupapatti', which in our opinion is a more fundamental 'laksaņā-beeja'.
We have seen that for Mammata laksanā has to be rooted either in local usage - rūdhi-or a motive-prayojana'.
The first i.e. laksaņā based on rūdhi or usage is termed rudhi-mūlā or nirūdhā. laksanā, i.e. faded metaphor. The writers in various disciplines paid more attention to this element of popular usage, and did not pay much respect to the factor of motive behind laksana as primarily they were concerned with scientific use of language and perhaps not at all with the poetic use. We have seen the position of various disciplines concerning laksanā. For Sabara, laksanā is based on usage in everyday life. Dr. Raja explains it as an arbitrary assumption of a sense by society," and, he adds, at times the newly assumed sense becomes so prominent through usage, that the primary, original sense of a word remains unnoticed, except by the grammarians. Read SB. on Mi. Sū. I. iv. 2 : laksanā iti ced varam laksanā kalpitā, na yāgábhidhānam. laukikī hi lakṣaņā hatho’prasiddha-kalpanā. We have already observed this point in greater details and the net outcome is that for the Mimāmsaka laksanā is a blemish, a dosa', resorted to only as a lesser evil, to avoid any greater evil such as anarthakya or a-prasiddha-kalpanā. In certain cases the secondary sense is accepted as the primary sense itself while the original sense is treated only as a gimmik of etymology.
Kumārila is of the opinion that old and deep-rooted laksanās expr secondary sense as if it were the primary sense itself, and in case of modern and

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500
SAHRDAYĀLOKA newly made laksaņās, some are possible, but some are impossible as they are disallowed by usage : Read Tantravārtika, pp. 683 -
"nirudhā laksanāh kāścit sāmarthyad abhidhānavat, kriyante sampratam kāścit
kāścin naiva tv aśaktitah.” Mammața also accepts this broad classification - Read, Sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra,
p. 7.
“nirūdhā kācanányā tu
kāryā sā kācid anyathā...” In case of nirūąha lakṣaṇās, the actual meaning is as good as normal meaning itself, and there is no need for incompatibility of the original meaning or any special motive for its usage. In the case of these faded metaphors, the association
e word with the original i.e. primary meaning has almost disappeared and the word becomes an ordinary name for the actual thing referred with any cognitive or emotive association.
Mukula is of the opinion that such cases of nirudhā laksaņā are acceptable, as they are established by the usage of the ancients, and that analogous cases must also be warranted by usage, as otherwise any word will go to have any meaning. If there is a special clear motive, metaphors can be resorted to. For example on the analogy of the word dvirepha' for a bee, we cannot coin a word such as 'dvika' (= having two 'ka'-kāras) for a 'cuckoo' (= kokila).
Hemacandra dismisses nirudhā laksanā as abhidhā only and so also, Viśvanātha, the author of Sahityadarpana has a different note. Viśvanātha says that such illustrations as given by Mammata, e.g. 'kušala', need not be taken as cases of nirudhā laksaņā for, he argues, it is no use taking the etymological meaning as an original meaning - "anyac ca śabdānām pravstti-nimittam, anyac ca vyutpattinimittam”. In case we accept ‘kusala' as an illustration of nirudhā laksanā, then we will have to admit, on the same logic, laksaņā in case of expressions such as 'gauh sete' - the cow (or bull) sleeps, because here also by resorting to the etymology of the word 'gauh', we will have a sense such as, “that which goes, sleeps". Precisely because of such possibilities perhaps, as noted above, Hemacandra was inclined to take all cases of nirūdha laksanā as cases of abhidh, only and thus he dismisses ‘kušala', and 'dvirepha' etc. as pure cases of abhidhā. Read - Kā. Šā. (pp. 22, Edn.

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‘Laksanā
501
Nandi), - under I. 18 : kusala-dvirepha-dvikā"dayas tu saksāt-samketitarvāt mukhyā eva iti na rūdhir laksyárthasya hetutvena asmābhir uktā.
Later critics, that is those who followed the ancients such as Bhāmaha and others, stressed the importance of prayojanavati laksanā, or the one with a motive in appreciating instances of poetic beauty. But even the ancients such as Dandin and Vāmana had also accepted the poetic beauty of prayojanavati laksanā, though without naming or classifying it as the same. We have thoroughly screened the approach of these ancient masters towards the problem of various word-powers or śabda-vrttis and this includes even vyañjanā, which is perhaps not even mentioned by name. We have seen that various disciplines such as those represented by Vyakarana, Nyāya and Mimāmsā had, for their own reasons, not shown any interest in this motive-oriented-prayojanavati-lakṣaṇā. We will discuss in greater detail the opinions of Anandavardhana, Mammața and the rest, regarding the actual understanding of the motive or prayojana, which for them by and large, is accepted to be suggested, i.e. is collected by a separate function of the word, a function, called by the name of 'vyañjanā”.
An interesting case deserves attention. It is the case of compound-words. According to Naiyāyikas and the Mimāmsakas, no special function may be accepted in case of compound words. They explain all cases of compounds where the intended sense is not arrived at directly from the members of the compound themselves as cases of laksanā. So, in case of a Bahuvrīhi compound such as ‘citraguh' (a person possessing brindled cows), they accept laksana to obtain the sense of owner. But the grammarians go for a special power to explain the new meaning distinct from those of its members, because in their opinion, laksana with reference to either citra' or 'go', is not enough to bring about the signification of the owner of brindled cows. Read Vaiyakaranabhūsana, p. 177, - "citragur ity adau svāmy ädipratītaye saktir āvaśyakī, na ca laksanayā nirvāhah.” (Also, the Mbh. under Pā. II. i. 1, may be referred - pp. 359, Vol. I., etc.) The word 'citra' cannot indicate the owner of brindled cows, and if we take the word 'go' to indicate this meaning, the meaning of 'citra' will not be compatible with that of the owner, as it is not the owner who is brindled. See Tattvacintamani, sabda-kānda, pp. 732 - na ca citrapadam citra-go-swāmi-laksakam; tatra 'go' padárthā'nanvayāt. nā’pi 'go' padam laksakam go-swāmini citra-padárthā’nanvayā"patteh. The grammarians assign the power of expressing such additional senses to the compounds, taking the whole as an indivisible unit of speech - "samāse khalu bhinnaiva saktih" - Vaiyakaranabhūsana, V. 31. The Mimāmsakas explain this difficulty by taking the whole sentence as

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502
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA laksanā. In a tat-purusa compound like rāja-purusa, (the king's man, officer), for rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ, the relation denoted by the genitive is known through laksanā. The Naiyāyikas resort to laksaņā only in case of one word, i.e. either in case of 'citra or 'go'; and take the other as suggestive of the purport - i.e. tātparya-grāhaka': Read - śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, p. 238 - "na hi bahuvrīhau samasta-padānām lāksanikatvāt, ... eka-pada mātra-laksanayā'pi bahuvrīher vyavasthāpyarvāt.” The tatpuruşa compound has laksaņā for the first word only; in the case of ‘karmadhāraya' compound, there is no necessity to resort to laksaņā, as the sense of identity of members is obtained from the relation of the meaning themselves. The Vaiyakarana-bhūsana observes : (p. 157) - "karmadhāraye ca na śaktir na vā laksaņā padárthayoh padābhyām abhedasya ca samsargatayā lābhāt.”
The Mimāmsakas are of the opinion that since the natural relation of a word is to its primary meaning, no recourse should be taken to the secondary function of words, if it possible to explain the passage concerned by recourse to the primary meaning itself. This they observe under the discussion concerning the te sthapati”. (See. Mi. Sū. VI. i. 51, 52), If it is taken as a karmadhāraya compound, it means, 'a king who is a nisāda'; but if it is taken as a tat-puruşa compound, it means, 'king of the nişādas'. The Mīmāmsakas thus come to a conclusion that this word has to be taken as a karmadhāraya compound, in which case the members retain their primary senses, and not as a tat-puruşa compound, since that involves resorting to lakṣaṇā.
The Mimāmsakas and the Vedāntins accept that there can be laksanā not only for words, but also for, sentences as well. The eulogistic portions of the Vedic texts containing ‘arthavāda' are taken as illustrations of sentence-laksanā. Read Vedāntaparibhāṣā - IV. 31-4; “laksaņā ca na padártha-mātra-vrttiḥ, kim tu vākya-vrttir api... evam arthavāda-vākyānām praśamsārūpānām prāśastye laksanā; The śabda-śaktiprakāśikā, pp. 140 - also refers to this view. It is really not easy to explain say statements full of irony by assuming laksanā for only a particular word in it. It is not a single word, but the whole passage that gives the implication. This is observed by Dr. Raja (pp. 269, ibid). But we feel that such cases of ironical statements, such as those exemplified by the famous speech of Vasanti in the Uttare-rāma-carita, such as, "tyam jīvitam, tvam asi me"...etc. are more instances of laksanā, and we would rather make bold to assert that we may find traces of actually vākya-vyañjanā, rāther accept laksanā, even in cases of sentences involving the vedic texts containing arthavāda.
The Naiyāyikas, however, do not admit lakṣaṇā for sentences, but they accept lakṣaṇā only for words. In case, in some passages if there is difficulty in

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'Laksanā'
503 understanding them, they consider that some other word is indicative of the intention of the speaker - i.e. 'tātparya-grāhaka'. Thus in the example, say, "gambhīrāyām nadyām ghosah”, (the village is on the deep river), the term 'nadi? or 'gambhīrā' is said to indicate through lakṣaṇā, the bank of the deep river, the other word being taken as indicative of the intention of the speaker. The Sabdaśakti-prakāśikā observes, pp.143 - "gambhīrā-padam nadī-padam vā tatra gambhīrā-nadi-tīra-lakṣaṇam, padántaram tu tatra tātparya-grāhakam iti siddhānta-vidah."
We have noted earlier, in the beginning of this chapter the views of the grammarians, particularly of Bhartshari concerning lakṣaṇā. For Bhartęphari, the unit of speech is a sentence and it is indivisible. So, the meaning of a se cannot be grasped from the knowledge of the meanings of individual words. We have seen that he does refer to the primary and secondary meaning and to distinguish between the two he cites different views.
Thus, for those who accept multiplicity of the meaning of a word, the distinction between the primary and secondary meaning is based on the relative frequency of usage - Read V.P. II. 263 - (Edn. S. Bhate, word Index to... Ed. '92 Delhi) -
"anekárthatvam ekasya yaiḥ śabdasyā’nugamyate, siddhy asiddhi-kṛtā teşām
gauņa-mukhya-prakalpanā.” Those who hold that a word can have only one meaning consider that the word having primary sense and the word having secondary sense, are different, though they sound alike - V.P. II. 257 (Edn. Bhate)
reads : “ekatvam tu sarūpatvāt
chabdayor gauņa-mukhyayoḥ, prāhur atyantabhede'pi
bheda-mārgā’nudarsinah.” Punyarāja suggests that according to Vyādi, the primary meaning of a word is that which is well known and which depends only on its form. Secondary meaning is that which, with the help of context, is established with some effort. The primary is conveyed by the word itself, the secondary, whereas, is different from it and depends on the other words in the sentence on the context.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Read, V.P. II 264, 265 (Edn., ibid) - and V.P. II. 278 (Edn. ibid) -
"artha-prakarañápekṣo yo vā śabdántaraiḥ saha, yuktaḥ pratyáyayatyartham tam gauņam apare viduḥ.” śuddhasy óccarane svārthah prasiddho yasya gamyate, sa mukhya iti vijñeyo
rūpamātra-nibandhanaḥ." (V.P. II. 264, 265) . and, V.P. II. 278 -
"śrutimātrena yatrā'sya sāmrthyam avasīyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante
gaunam yatnopapaditam." Still next view considers the words to refer to the qualities. That object which possesses these qualities to a greater degree is the primary one and the other is termed secondary. Bhartrhari does not accept this view as, according to him, it is against usage. Read V.P. II. 272 -
“naivádhikatvam dharmāņām nyunatā vā prayojikā, ādhikyam api manyante
prasiddher, nyūnatām kvacit.” There are also others, who consider that the secondary usage is based on similarity, 'simho devadattah' only means that devadatta' possesses some qualities similar to those of the lion. Or, may be it is based on some confusion between the two because of similarity. V.P. II. 273-274 read as :
“jātiśabdo’ntareņā’pi jātim yatra prayujyate sambandhi-sadrśād-dharmāt tam gauna apare viduh.”

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'Laksaņā'
505 and,
"viparyāsād ivā’rthasya yatrárthántaratām iva, manyante sa gavādis tu
gauņa ity ucyate kvacid.” - (Edn. Bhate) For Bharthari the sentence has to be considered as a whole and in the particular context in which it is uttered. Therefore, it is meaningless to discuss the primary and secondary referents of an individual word. Bhartshari says that when, for example, a mother tries to stop her child from crying, by saying, “the tiger eats children who cry", she really does not mean it. When a traveller says to his friend, "we must go, look at the Sun", he simply means that it is getting late and that he does not insist on actually looking at the sun. When it is said, “kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām", it is implied that it is to be protected from dogs etc. also. Again, when it is said, "brāhmaṇa-kambala”, there is nothing special about 'brāhmana'. Thus, such usages cannot be explained by resorting to laksanā. As seen earlier, ironic or sarcastic expressions carry a sense entirely different from the expressed one. Some later writers try to read laksaņā in these expressions but 'Bhartshari has clearly shown the imperfectness of the theory depending on word meanings, eventhough he recognizes the usefulness of the discussion of word-meanings. Read the references for all this from V.P. as follows :
"vyāghrā"divyapadeśena yathā bālo nivartyate, asatyo'pi tathā kaścitpratyavāyo bhidhīyate.” (V.P. II. 321) “gantavyam dịśyatām sūrya iti kālasya laksane, jñāyatām kāla ity etatsópāyam abhidhīyate.” (V.P. II. 310) “kākebhyo raksyatām sarpir iti bālo’pi coditaḥ, upaghātapare vākye na śvādibhyo na raksyati.” (V.P. II. 312)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "brāhmaṇártho yathā nā’sti kaścid brāhmaṇa-kambale, devadattā”dayo vākye tathaiva syur anarthakāḥ.” (V.P. II. 14) "stuti-nindā-pradhāneșu vākyeşv artho na tādrśaḥ, padānām pravibhāgena
yādrśaḥ parikalpyate.” (V.P. II. 247), (Edn. Bhate) We will now proceed with Mammața's classification of lakṣaņā as follows : kārikās 10-12 K.P. II read as -
"svasiddhaye parā”kṣepaḥ parártham sva-samarpanam, upādānam lakṣaṇam ca ity uktā śuddhaiva să dvidhā.” (II. K.D.) "sāropā’nyā tu yatróktau visayī visayas tathā, visayyantaḥ krte'nyasmin sā syāt sādhyavasānikā.” (K.P. II. 11) “bhedāv imau ca sādņśyāt sambandhántaratas tathā, gaunau śuddhau ca vijñeyau
laksaņā tena şad vidhā.” - (K.P. II. 12) We will have to go into greater details as to how the six-fold laksana is explained differently by different commentators, but for the time being we will follow the text of the K.P. - i.e. the kārikās (II. 10-12) and the vrtti thereon. Mammața observes :
(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid, pp. 29-37) 10 - “Assumption of another (i.e. secondary meaning) to establish itself (i.e. primary meaning) and the surrender of itself (i.e. primary meaning) are 'inclusive indication', and 'exclusive indication' (respectively). Thus, that pure indication alone is two-fold."

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'Laksaņā'
507 In cases like 'Lances enter' and, 'Staffs enter the (words) lances and others point to persons connected with them in order to make their own entrance possible. Therefore, this indication is by inclusion (of the primary meaning).
In cases like, "A bull should be immolated', the individual (bull) is implied by the universal (bullness) for the reason, “how can the immolation, enjoined by the Veda, be possible in my case ?". But the individual bull) is not denoted by the word, on account of the rule - "Denotation world not go to (express) the qualified, when its power has been exhausted in (expressing) the qualification." But this (viz. a bull should not be immolated) should not be quoted as an example of inclusive indication. For, there is no motive here. Nor is this inclusive indication. Nor is this usage. The individual is implied by the universal on account of the universal being invariably connected with the individual. As for example, an agent is implied in, "Let (it) be done", and the object is implied in, “Do”. And in cases like, “Enter”, "Sweet-ball”, etc. words like, “a house" and "eat” are understood.
And in example, "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day" the eating at night is not indicated. For that (example) is a case of verbal presumption or factual presumption.
In the example, "A hamlet on the Gangā", the word 'Gangā' surrenders its meaning in order to establish the bank as the location of the hamlet. Thus, in such cases the indication is by exclusion. And this two-fold (indication) is pure, as it is not mixed with fancied identification founded on resemblance.
In these two divisions (of indication), there is no separateness amounting to distinction between the indicated (sense) and the indicative. For, when the words like Gangă and the like convey (the sense of) the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive while is sought to be established is obta the comprehension of the identity (of the Gangā with the bank). If (by the use of indication) merely a relation with Gangā (viz. stream) were to be apprehended then what difference would there be of indication and a direct mode of expression - "A hamlet on the bank of the Gangā" ?
11 ab - "But another (variety) is the superimponent indication wherein are expressed the object superimposed (visayin) as also the substratum of superimposition (visaya).
Where the object superimposed and the substratum of superimposition are stated in the same case-ending with their distinction non-suppressed - that indication is-superimponent.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 11 cd - Wherein the other, (viz. the substratum of superimposition) is swallowed by the thing superimposed - that would be introsusceptive (indication).
When the other, namely, the substratum of superimposition, is put within, or swallowed by the object which is being superimposed, that would be introsusceptive (indication).
12 - abc. And these two divisions (of indication), arising from resemblance and from some other relation, should be known as qualitative (i.e. as divisions of Gauņi laksanā) and pure (i.e. - divisions of Suddhā laksanā).
These two divisions (of Gauni laksanā), characterized by the superimposition and introsusception and caused by resemblance, are (respectively) instanced in, "Vāhika is a bull”, and, “This is a bull”.
Here, for instance, the qualities like dullness and stupidity, associated with the primary sense, though indicated, serve the purpose of using the word 'Gauh' to express the other meaning (i.e. vāhīka)-thus hold some. Owing to their identity with the qualities associated with the primary sense, the qualities belonging to the other
(i.e. Vähika) alone are indicated, but the other object is not expressed - SO say others. On account of being the substratum of common qualities, the other object itself is indicated-thus maintain others.
And it is said elsewhere - "Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication (viz. Vähika)."
(Tantravārttika. I. iv. 22) Here, 'the state of not being without' (a-vinābhāva) means connection in general, but not an invariable relation. For, if it were so, there would be no indication in such cases as, 'The cots cry'; and if invariable relation were to exist then the assumption (or inference) alone will do, there will be no use of indication.
In cases such as, “Ghee is life”, “This is life itselp', there is a relation other than similarity, like the relation of cause and effect. And in such cases the superimposition and introsusception are based on relations such as the one found in cause and effect.
Here in the two varieties of qualitative (indication), cognition of identity despite difference in substratum and the cognition of complete identity (respectively), is the purpose. But in the two varieties of pure (indication), the capability of bringing about the result in a way distinct from others and without fail is the purpose).

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509
In some cases the secondary application is owing to subserviency; for example, sacrificial post for Indra is called Indra. In some cases (it is) owing to relation of oneself with one's master; for example, an officer of a king is (called) the king. In some cases (it is) owing to the relation of the parts with the whole; for example, in the foremost hand (i.e. palm). Here the word 'hand' stands for its foremost part only. In some cases (it is) owing to the sameness of occupation, for example, a non-carpenter (by caste) is, owing to carpentry, called carpenter.
12 d. Indication, therefore, is six-fold. - Along with the first two divisions (viz. śuddhā upādāna lakṣaṇā and śuddha-lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā.) indication is of six kinds."
This makes for the basic classification of lakṣanā, according to Mammata. But commentators differ in interpreting the expression viz. “lakṣanā tena ṣad-vidhā”. We will try to examine this in details, very carefully as below:
It must be carefully noted in the beginning that 'ruḍhi' and 'prayojana' make for the conditions and not the divisions of lakṣaṇā and hence, it is only the latter i.e. prayojanavati lakṣaṇā, that is sub-divided into six varieties. Before we resort to the views of different commentators, a simple table can be seen expressing this six-fold division, and it is like this -
rūḍhimūlā
lakṣaṇā
gauņi
śuddha
+
(i) sāropā (ii) sadhyavasānā (iii) upādāna (iv) lakṣaṇa (v) śāropā (vi) sādyavasānā

prayojanamūlā
The illustrations respectively are - (i) gaurvāhikaḥ, (ii) gaur eva'yam, (iii) kuntaḥ praviśanti, (iv) gangāyām ghoṣaḥ (v) ayurghṛtam, & (vi) ayur eva idam.
Before we proceed with the views of different commentators on the classification of lakṣaṇā, we will quote Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar's views (pp. 297 onwards, Edn. K.P., Bombay). The Numbers of kārikās differ in Dwivedi and Gajendragadkar. He observes :
"There is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the above represents the classification of lakṣaṇā intended by Mammața. But commentators of the

Page #536

510
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Kavyaprakāśa, guided more, it seems to us, by extraneous considerations than by natural construction of Mammata's words, have advanced two other divisions, which they regard as intended by Mammața. That is why some discussion about this problem becomes necessary.
We regard the above as Mammata's classification for three reasons, which are as follows
-
(1) This is the only classification that naturally and directly follows Mammata's words. In Kārikā 5, Mammața treats of two divisions, viz. upādāna and lakṣaṇa, which he states are, 'suddha'. Kārikā 6 gives two more divisions viz. 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasana', which are declared to be both 'gauna' and 'śuddha'. From this it follows that suddha has four varieties viz. upādāna, lakṣaṇa, sāropa, and sādhyavasāna, and gauna has two viz. sãropa and sadhyavasana. The above classification gives the divisions exactly in this manner.
(2) In kārikā 7 abc, four varieties of lakṣaṇa are mentioned and in kārikā 7d, lakṣaṇā is stated to be six-fold. The vṛtti explains this statement by pointing out that the six varieties are made up by adding previously mentioned two (adya-bhedābhyām saha) viz. śuddha upādāna and suddha lakṣaṇa to the four referred to in kārikā 7 abc. From this it is clear that the previously mentioned two varieties viz. śuddha-upādāna and suddha-lakṣaṇa, are on the same level as the four now mentioned viz. gauņa sāropa and gauṇa-sādhyavasāna, śuddha-sāropa and suddha-śadbhyavasana. In other words the explanatiory addition, 'adya-bhedabhyam saha', shows that upādāna and lakṣaṇa are the final divisions of suddha and not merely intermediate divisions, which are each to be further divided into sāropa and sādhyavasāna, as the Pradipa understands and gauņa two, viz. sāropa and sādhyavasāna.
(3) kārikā 7 abc - ("bhedāvimau ca sādṛśyāt sambandhántaratas tatha | gauņau śuddhau ca vijñeyau.") - corroborate the above view. From this it is clear that Mammata intends 'saropa' and 'sādhyavasana' to be different divisions of both gauna and suddha. It would therefore, not be correct to regard, as the Pradipa does, 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasam' as the direct divisions of only 'gauna' and as the indirect divisions of 'suddha' through the medium of 'upādāna' and 'lakṣaṇā'. There is no justification whatsoever for making a distinction between 'gauņa' and 'suddha' in the matter of their subdivision into 'sāropa' and 'sādhyavasāna'.
Thus we feel sure that the above is the classification of Mammata.
It must, however, be remarked that Mammata's classification given above is not logically accurate, because the divisions are not mutually exclusive, but overlap.

Page #537

'Laksaņā'
511 For example, 'āyur ghrtam' and "ãyuh pibati", which are given as 'suddha sāropa' and 'suddha-sādhyavasāna' respectively, may well be regarded as 'laksana-laksana', because in both these illustrations 'yuh' completely gives up its mukhyártha. Similarly, 'gaur-vāhikaḥ', and 'gām āhvayati', which illustrate "gauņa sāropa" and "gauņa sadhyavasāna" respectively, can again be 'laksana-lakṣaṇā' also, because 'gauh' completely sacrifices its primary sense for the sake of the secondary. Then again, it is pointed out that in 'gangāyām ghosah', which is given as an illustration of 'laksana-laksaņā', there is an element of sādhyavasāna laksaņā also. For, here the visayi (gangā) swallows the visaya (tatah). Similarly, in 'kuntāh pravišanti', which illustrates upādāna-laksaņā the visayi (kuntāḥ) swallows the visaya (kuntinah purusāh). Thus, these two viz. 'upādana' and 'laksana' can also be looked upon as 'sādhyavasāna'.
Though Mammata's classification of laksanā is thus logically inaccurate, it is simple and useful from the practical point of view. Any example of laksanā that we may come across can be classed under one or the other of his six divisions. To give a logically accurate and simple division is almost an impossibility. (we do not agree).
With a view perhaps to remove the overlapping involved in the above classification, the Pradīpa (p. 33) says : "laksanā tāvad dvividhā. śuddhā gauni ca. tatra ādyā dvividhā. upādāna-lakṣaṇā laksana-laksaņā ca; te api pratyekam sāropā sadhyavasānā ca iti dvividhe. iti suddha-bhedās' catvārah. gauni tu dvedhā, sāropā sādhyavasānā ca. iti sadvidhatvam laksanāyāḥ. This will give us the following classification
laksaņā
śuddhā
gauni
laksana laksaņā
upādāna laksanā
sāropā sādhyavasānā (v) (gaur vāhikah) (vi) (gaur ayam)
(i) sáropā (kuntāh kuntinaḥ
pravišanti)
(ii) sādhya-vasānā
(kuntāḥ pravišanti)
(iii) sāropā (āyur ghệtam) (gangāyāṇtate
ghosah)
(iv) sādhyavasāņā (āyur eva idam (gangāyām ghosah)

Page #538

SAHṚDAYALOKA
This classification is unsatisfactory for the following reasons: (1) The idea that 'upādāna' and 'lakṣaṇa' are intermediate and not final divisions of suddha finds no support in the text of the Kavyaprakāśa. It seems to have been introduced by Pradipa in order to get rid of the overlapping which is involved in what we regard as Mammata's classification. (we feel Pradīpa is right). (2) Though this classification removes overlapping from 'suddha saropa' and 'śuddha sadhyavasāna', still overlapping continues in gauṇa-sāropa and gauṇa-sādhyavasāna. So this classification also is not logically accurate. (3) Expressions like 'kuntāḥ kuntinaḥ praviśanti', and 'gangāyām tate ghoṣaḥ', which illustrate śuddha-upādāna-sāropa and suddha-lakṣaṇa-sāropa in this classification, are such as are never used in the language. (We add, the expression ‘kuntāḥ kuntinah praviśanti' sounds senseless to us). (4) If this classification be supposed to represent the one intended by Mammata, we shall have to believe that Mammata forgot to give an illustration for one variety viz. śuddha-upādāna-sāropa and gave two illustrations for another viz. śuddha-lakṣaṇa-sādhyavasāna, separating them by a long interval."
512
Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar proceeds, (p. 300) "Mukulabhaṭṭa in his Abhidhāvṛtti (tta) mātṛkā (pp. 6-9) speaks of the classification of lakṣaṇā thus
2

"śuddhópacāra-miśratvāt lakṣaṇā dvividhā matā."
“upādānāllakṣaṇāc ca śuddhā sā dvividhóditā."
"āropā'dhyavasānābhyām
śuddha-gauņópacārayoḥ,
pratyekam vidyamānatvād upacaraś caturvidhaḥ."
4. eșă ca lakṣaṇā tri-skandhā, śuddhatvāt, adhyāropāt, adhyavasānāc ca. tatra śuddha-skandhasya dvaividhyam upādāna-lakṣaṇābhyām uktam. adhyāropā'dhyavasāna-skandhayor api pratyekam dvi-prabhedata. śuddha-gauṇópacāra-miśratvāt.
-

Page #539

513
'Laksaņā His scheme of division may be represented as follows :
laksanā
Suddhā
Upacara-miśrā
Upādāna
(kuntah pravišanti)
Laksana (gangāyām ghosah)
suddhópacāra Miśrā
gaunopacāra miérā
sāropā sādhyavasānā
sāropā sādhya-vasānā (āyurghỉtam) (ayur eva idam)
(gaur vāhikah) (gaurevāyam) The ancient commentators Mānikyacandra and Jayanta think that Mammata follows Mukulabhatta in his classification of laksaņā. Consequently they interpret Mammata's words in such a way as to support the above classification. We think that this view is incorrect for the following reasons :
(1) Mammata has nowhere stated, neither in any of the kārikās nor in vrtti, that ‘upacāramiśrā' forms a primary division of laksanā, along with śuddhā. We have shown above that the natural and direct conclusion from his kārikās and vrtti is that the primary divisions of laksaņā are 'śuddha' and 'gauna'.
The primary division upacaramiīrā is, however, deduced from the words, "ubhayarūpā ceyam śuddhā, upacāreņa a-miśratvāt.” But this deduction is unwarranted. What these sentences tell us is that suddha-laksaņā is upacāreņa amiśritā, i.e. possesses no admixture of upacāra. The whole question here is what
er division of laksanā Mammata has in view, when he says that suddha-laksanā, is upacāra-a-misritā or what other division of laksana is excluded by the characteristic "upacāreņa a-miśritatvam" of suddhā-laksana or what other division of laksanā Mammaţa regards as "upacāreņa miśrita". On the answer that we give to this question, will depend the meaning in which the word 'upacāra' must be understood to have been used by Mammața.
In this connection kārikā 7abc (i.e. bhedāv imau ca sādrśyāt, sambandhánta

Page #540

d.
514
SAHRDAYĀLOKA ratas tathā. gaunau suddhau ca vijñeyau...") appears to us to be decisive. There 'gauna' and 'śuddha' are mentioned together, from which we conclude that here the other division intended by Mammața is 'gauna'. 'Gauņa' then is 'upacāra-miśrita', - and is, therefore, vyāvștta or excluded by the characteristic 'upacārena amiśritatvam', which belongs to śuddha-laksaņā. Note - ‘ubhayarūpā ceyam udāhstā śuddhā, na tu gauņi. Upacāramiśrā hi gauni ity ucyate.” Pradīpa. This being so, ‘upacāra' here evidently possesses its restricted sense, viz. “sādrśya-sambandhena pravrttih", for it is only in this sense that 'upacara' can distinguish 'gauna laksana'
'suddha'. Thus the sentences 'ubhaya-rūpā ceyam śuddhā, upacarena amiśritatvat, read along with kārikā 7 abc, show that 'suddha' and 'gauna' are the primary divisions of laksanā, according to Mammața.
On the other hand the passage 'ubhayarūpā ceyam śuddhā. upacāreņa amiśritatvāt' is understood to imply, that while these two varieties viz. 'upadana' and ‘laksana' are 'upacārā-miśra', the other four, to be presently mentioned, are 'upacāra-miśra'. Thus, it is held that suddhā, covering 'upādāna' and 'laksana', is one division of laksanā, and 'upacaramiśrā' covering the other four, is another. If this be so, 'upacāra' must mean, 'atacchabdasya tacchabena abhidhānam' or 'the identification of one thing with another generally. Only in this sense, upacāra can be present in all four remaining divisions viz. śuddha sāropa, suddha sādhyavasāna, gauņa sāropa and gauņa-sādhyavasāna. But as the division upacāramiśrā has not been mentioned by Mammaţa anywhere, the above implication cannot be accepted.
(2) It is clear that in the passage "ubhaya-rūpā ceyam śuddhā, upacāreņa amiśritatvāt”, the characteristic 'upacāra-amiśritatvam' is intended to be vyāvartaka i.e. to distinguish śuddha-laksaņā from some other. If we understand that other to be 'gauņa-laksanā', upacāra in the sense of 'sādrśya-sambandhena pravsttih' will distinguish 'suddha' from 'gauna' all right. For, while ‘upacāra' in this sense is absent in 'suddha', it is present in 'gauna'. But if, as is supposed to be th implication, 'upacāra-a-miśritatvam' be 'vyāvartaka' of the other four kinds of laksanā, it will be found that 'upacāra' does not serve this purpose. We saw above that with this implication 'upacāra' must be understood in its general sense viz. 'atacchabdasya tacchabdena abhidhānam'. But 'upacāra' in this sense is not absent in (from?) suddha. For in 'kuntah pravišanti', and 'gangāyām ghosah', we have 'atacchabdasya tacchabdena abhidhānam', in the words 'kuntāh' which stands for 'kuntinah', and 'gangāyām', which stands for 'tate'. In other words, even in śuddha laksaņā we have 'upacāra' in its general sense, viz. the identification of one thing

Page #541

'Laksana'
515 (kuntāh and gangā) with another (kuntinah and tatah). Consequently 'upacara cannot distinguish the two varieties of suddha laksanā from the four others, as it is supposed to do in the interpretation, which follows from the above implication. This is enough to show that the interpretation of the passage, "ubhayarūpā ... amiśritatvāt", which sees in it an implied reference to 'upacara-miśrā', distinguished from 'śuddhā' on the ground of its being mixed with upacāra, is incorrect. But this point does not seem to have struck any interpreter.
(3) If the lead of Māņikyacandra and Jayanta be followed in the matter of classification of laksanā, we shall have to suppose that the words 'gaunau' and 'suddhau' in the kārikā 'gaunau śuddhau ca vijñeyau' are used in 'gaunopacāra-miśrau', and 'śuddhópacāra-miśrau'. Similarly, the word 'gaunabhedayoh', and 'śuddha-bhedayoh', will have to be understood as standing for 'gaunopacāra-miśra-bhedayoh', and 'suddhópacāra-miśra-bhedayoh'. This appears to us to be highly improbable. Mammata nowhere speaks of any divisions like 'gaunópacara-miśrā', and "suddhópacara-miśrā".
(4) In the classification of Mukulabhatựa the division of 'upacāra' into 'śuddha' and 'gauna' plays an important part. It is the principle on which 'upacāramiśrā' is further divided. But Mammața nowhere speaks of this division of upacāra into 'śuddha' and 'gauna'. He cannot, therefore, be regarded as subscribing to Mukulabhatta's classification of laksanā. It is true, as we have already noted, that Mammața uses the word 'upacara' in its general as well as its restricted sense. But this cannot be supposed to imply that he wanted to divide ‘upacāra' into 'śuddha' and 'gauna' in the manner of Mukulabhatta. If he had intended to do so, he would have specifically made that division and not left it to be understood by implication.
(5) The word 'anyā’ in 'sāropā’nyā tu yatróktau' (kārikā 6a) is supposed to refer to 'upacāramiśrā' and the particle 'tu' to imply that 'upacara miśrā' alone is 'sāropā', but not 'śuddhā'. This supposition is not correct. Upacarar been mentioned anywhere before, neither in kārikā 5, nor in the vștti thereon. Therefore, 'anyā' cannot refer to it. 'anyā' just means another variety, different from the two mentioned in the preceding kārikā. 'tu' suggests that a new topic viz. 'sāropā laksaņā' is commenced. Mammața uses 'tu' in the sense of such suggestion several times in the tenth ullāsa. See kārikā X. 6C, 106, 14a, 15d, 34d, etc. Or, 'tu' may suggest that the divisions 'upādāna' and 'laksana', which have been mentioned in the preceding kārikā are possible in 'śuddha' only and not in 'gauņa”. “suddhaiva upādāna-laksanābhayam bhidyate, na tu gauny api iti 'tu'-sabdárthah".

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516
SAHRDAYĀLOKA
(6) Mammața apparently did not hold Mukulabhatta in very great esteem. (We beg to differ.) We have already seen that he controverts Mukulabhatta's views in two places (= in case of gaur anuvandhyah, and on Mukula's views on, “tatasthe laksanā śuddhā" etc.). In his treatment of laksanā he does not seem to follow Mukula. As a matter of fact, Mukula himself is not quite consistent in his classification of lakṣaṇā. In his kārikās he begins by dividing laksaņā in two ('suddhopacāra-misratvāt laksanā dvividhā matā) viz. 'suddhā' and 'upacāramiśrā'. But in his vrtti, on pp. 9 he says that laksaņā is primarily three-fold (eşā ca laksanā tri-skandhā). The classification given above is according to kārikā. The classification according to his vrtti, quoted above (on p. 300, Gadkar's Edn.) would be as follows :
laksaņā
śuddhā
sāropā
sādhyavasānā
upādāna lakṣaṇa śuddhópacāra gauņópacāra śuddhópacāra gauņópacāra miśrā miśrā miśrā
miśrā miśrā
miśrā Mammața does not follow Mukula either in his two-fold primary division of laksanā into śuddha and upacāra-miśra, or in his three fold primary division of the same into śuddhā, sāropā and sādhyavasānā. It is therefore not proper, to discover in Mammata's words unintended implications so as to bring his classification of laksaņā in line with Mukula's.
For these reasons, we think that the view of Mānikyacandra and Jayanta that Mammata's classification of laksana is the same as Mukula's can not be accepted.”
Narahạri Sarasvatitīrtha in his Bālacittānurañjani has the following remark : laksaneti. laksanā prayojana-laksanetyarthah. tena uktaprakārena, anantaróktam bhedacatastayam eva pratīyate, katham sadvidhā iti āśankya vyavahitam bhedadvayam smārayati adyeti. tena sadbhedā upādānalaksanā (lal gauņa-sāropā, gauņa-sādhyavasānā, śuddha-sāropā, śuddha-sādhyavasānā ceti. vyangyarahitā rūļhi-lakṣaṇā ekā. ukta-șadvidhā prayojana-lakṣaņā gūdhāgūdhavyangyatvena dvādaśa-vidhā. evam laksanāyās trayodaśa-vidhatvam darśayati.” (p. 322, Edn. Nag. Pub., 95)
Narahari counts thirteen varieties of laksanā including the six varieties of prayojanavati or one with motive which become twelve due to the concealed (i.e. gūdha) suggested sense or the non-concealed suggested sense and the thirteenth is

Page #543

'Laksaņā
517 the one based on usage and therefore which has no suggested sense. The six-fold classification goes as upādāna-laksanā, laksana-laksanā, gauņi sāropā and gaunisādhyavasānā, śuddhā-sāropā and suddhā-sādhyavasānā.
Ruyyaka in his samketa has not discussed this point but Manikyacandra's samketa has the following : "tena iti upasamhäre. adyabhedābhyām saha sankalanena sodhā. samkṣepenaivátra lakṣaṇā-vicāraḥ kṣtaḥ, vistareņa tu mukulā"di-viracitábhidhā-mātrkā"di-granthebhyah jñeyah - Thus, Manikyacandra also cuts the discussion short, and refers it to Mukula.
Someśvara's samketa or Kāvyādarśa has a brief observation : (pp. 22, Edn. Parikh) - tena iti upasamhāre. adyabhedābhyām iti upādāna-laksaņābhyām sāropāsādhyavasānayośca gauņa-buddhabhedāt pratyekam dvaividhyam iti. samkalane sodhā.” Thus with upādāna and laksana, and with gauna-and sud each of sāropā and sādhyavasānā, Someśvara counts six varieties.
The Viveka of Śrīdhara has - "sadvidheti. upādhi-samkalanam idam. tatránantaram caturnām eva prakārānam abhidhānāt dūrántaritam prakāradvayam smāritam. adyeti-upādāna lakṣaṇā-laksana-lakṣaṇābhyām saha iti. tad ayam paramárthaḥ - laksaņādvayi rūdhā ca arūdhā ca. pratyekam upādānalaksana-laksana-laksaņābhyām catvāro bhedāḥ. tatrā’pi prabhidya sāropasādhyavasānābhyām aştau. tatrā’pi sādrśya-sambandhántarābhyām sodaśeti. Thus Sridhara has sixteen varieties
laksanā
rūdhā
a-rudhā
upādāna
laksana
upādāna
upādāna
laksana
sāropā
sādhya-vasanā
sā.
sādhya
så.
sādhya.
sā.
sādhya
så
sā.itara så
sā.itara
sādrsya * mūlā
sādrśyetara
mūlā
sā
sā.itara
să
sā.itara să sā.itara sā sā.itara
So, for him the expression sad-vidhā points not to the six varieties only but to the basics of classification. This means rūļhi, prayojana, upādāna, lakṣaṇa, sāropa

Page #544

518
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA and sādhyavasāna are six basics which explain the expression sad-vidhā. Thus the base of classification is six-fold giving rise to sixteen varieties.
Dipikā of Jayanta-Bhatta has the following - sadbhir upādhibhī rudhiprayojanópādāna-laksaņā-āropa-adhyavasānair vidhāḥ prakārāḥ kalpanīyā asyā iti sadvidhā. na tu sat-pakara prakarantara-sambhavasya pratipaditatvāt. bhidyate ābhyām iti bhedau, upādānalakṣaṇe rūdhi-prayojane-vā adyau bhedau, tābhyām prakstābhyām āropā'dhyavasānābhyam prathamam uktatvāt tābhyām ādyabhedābhyām saha iti grantha-samgatiḥ -
Jayanta seems to follow Sridhara. He says that by sadvidhā it is not suggested that laksaņā is six-fold only - na tu sat-prakārā. But actually these six are the upādhis, the attributes, which are at the base of the classification of lakṣaṇā which are rūdhi, prayojana, upādāna, laksana, āropa and adhyavasāna.
The Kävyaprakāśa - darpana of Viśvanātha has the following : esāñca sodaśānām lakṣaṇā bhedānām iha a-darsitāni udāharaṇāni mama Sahityadarpaņe avagantavyāni. -
şadvidhā iti. - rūdhi - prayojana-upādāna-laksana-āropa-adhyavasānaiḥ sadbhir upādhibhir dvidhā uktā. şodaśaprakāra yasyāḥ sā șaļvidhā na tu sat-prakārā.
Viśvanātha also follows the lead of Sridhara and Jayanta, who as noted above take the six as the attributes or principles of classification. They do not take 'six' as the number of varieties, which for them is sixteen and not six.
Viśvanātha observes that illustrations which are not furnished by Mammata have to sought from his Sāhitya-darpana. He also adds -
adyabhedābhyām prathamóktópādhibhyām rūdhi-prayojanābhyām saha, yad vā prathamam rūļhi-prayojanābhyām sāmānyata uktam laksaņādvayam bhidyate. ādya-bhedābhyām iti. bhedāv upādāna-laksaņa - [lakṣita) laksaņe. tābhyām saha iti grantha-samgatih.
The Sāhitya-cūdāmani of Bhatta Gopāla has -
nigamayati - laksaneti. - nanu sāropā sādhyavasānā iti dve gaunau, dve ca śuddhe iti tāścatasraḥ, tat katham vā sāļvidhyam iti atra āha-ādyeti. prāg uktau bhedau upādāna-laksana-laksanau tābhyām saha iti.
Thus, he follows the earlier pattern as suggested by Prof. Gajendragadkar.

Page #545

'Laksaņā'
519
Laksaņā
upādāna
laksana
saropā
sādhyavasāna
gauni śuddha gauni suddha The Sampradāyaprakāśini of Śrī Vidyā Cakravartin has -
“atha lakṣaṇópasamhāraḥ. 'laksaņā tena' iti vyavahitam bheda-dvayam smārayati, adya-bhedābhyām iti. upādāna-laksaņā, lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā gauna-säropā, gauna-sādhya-vasānā, śuddha-sāropā, śuddha-sādhyavasānā ca iti. lakṣaṇāpraghattako'yam asmābhir laghuțīkāyām vitatya vivecita iti tataḥ avadhāryaḥ. ihā’pi yathā yogam uktaḥ.
Śrividyacakravarti also follows the lead of Sāhityacūdamaņi. He observes that he has discussed the topic of laksana in greater details in his 'laghutikā' but here also whatever is useful is discussed.
The Vistārikā of Sri Vatsalañchana Bhattācārya has the following observation -
nanu sāropādhyavasānayor gauna-śuddhatā ca, tāvad upādānādiyogenā’pi bhedántaram sambhavati, tat katham nódāhstam ityata āha-laksaņā tenéti. şadvidhā şadbhedāḥ, sāropādānādau upādānādyasaskarasya darśitatvāt.
nanu gauņa-śuddhabhedena cāturvidhye katham sāļvidhyam ity āha-adyeti upādāna-laksanābhyām saha ityarthah-tayor eva adyatvāt. na ca rūdha-prayojane eva adye, tayor laksaņā-svarūpa-nirvāhakayor bhedatvábhāvāt.
He seems to follow the traditional line taking sadvidhā as six-fold. This approach was set in vogue by Narahari Sarasvatitīrtha,
Govinda Thakkura's explanation in the Kävyapradīpa is seen above while quoting from Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar. Govinda in Pradīpa reads as -
lakṣaṇā tena șaờvidhā. - upādāna-laksana-rūpaśuddha bhedābhyām saha. rüdhi-prayojanābhyām bhede sambhavatyapi na te vibhājakatvena ukte, kintu hetutvena, iti na tatkệto bhedaḥ ganitaḥ ata eva ca paścād 'vyangyatvena rahitā’ ityādinā tat-kstam bhedam darśayisyati. anyathā punarukti-prasangāt. evam ca yathokta-vyakhyānena şadvidhatve nirvyūdhe yat 'sadvidheti rūdhi-prayojanaupādāna-laksana-āropā-adhyavasānarūpaih sadbhih upādhibhih kalpitäh vidhāh

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA prakārā yasyām iti sadvidhā' iti candidāsa-vyākhyānam, tat, “suddhaiva sā dvidhā. sāropā’nyā tu' iti 'eva-tu-sabdayor anālocana-vijrmbhitatvād anādeyam.” ādyabhedābhyām upādāna-laksana-laksanā-bhyām ityarthah.”
Govinda criticizes the trend of thought set by Candidāsa and others taking 'sadvidhā' as 'having six attributes'. He seems to follow Narahari's line of thinking which seems to accept 'sadvidhā' as 'sad-prakāra' i.e. six-fold. Thus there are two distinct approaches in interpreting the term 'sad-vidhā', and we are affraid, both are right!
Sudhāsāgara of Bhīmasena Dixit has :
"atra ca sphuţā eva laksaņāḥ. tena şadvidhā. ślokaś chandah. upādāna-laksanarūpa-śuddha-bhedābhyām saha. atropādāna lakṣaṇābhyām arthántara-samkramitaatyanta-tiraskrta-vācyau, vivakṣita-vācya-dhvanibhedau gaunībhyām sāropāsādhyavasānābhyām rūpakātiśayoktī, śuddhābhyām tābhyām hetvalamkāram nirūpayisyati, iti sadvidha-nirūpaņa-phalam iti dik.” - He also takes sadvidhā as six-fold and tries to connect various varieties with various types of dhvani and various alamkāras as the case may be !
Jhalkikar, (pp. 54, ibid) has the following observation -
laksanām upasamharati-lakşaneti - tena uktaprakāreņa. şadvidheti-buddhāgauņi-sāropā-sādhyavasānā-upādāna-laksaņai” şadbhedā ityarthah.” Thus he seems to follow the line of Pradīpa and he likes to take 'sadvidhā' - as six-fold. Jhalkikar Continues -
nanu 'sāropā'nyā tu' ityādinā prabheda-catustayam eva uktam ataḥ katham şadvidhetyata āha-ādyabhedābhyām saha iti. upādāna-laksaņā-laksanalaksaņābhyām saha ity arthah.
laksanā prathamato dvividhā, śuddhā-gauni ca. suddhā'pi punas' caturdhā. upādāna-laksaņā, lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, sāropā-sādhyavasānā ceti. gauny api sāropā sādhyavasānā ceti dvividheti sadvidheti bhāvaḥ.
vastutastu laksanā tāvad dvividhā. śuddhā gaunī ca. tatrā"dy, dvividhā. upādānalaksaņā-laksana-laksaņā ca iti. upādānalaksanā-laksana-laksane api pratyekam sāropā-sādhyavasānā ceti dvividheti śuddhāyā bhedāś catvāraḥ. gauņi tu dvedhā, sāropā-sādhyavasänä сa.
tatrópādānasāropā yatha 'kuntāh purusāh praviśanti' iti. upādāna-sādhyavasānā yathā “kuntāḥ pravišanti” iti. laksana-sāropā yathā "āyur ghỉtam”, iti. laksanasādhyavasānā yathā āyur eva idam” iti, 'gangāyām ghosa' iti ca. gauna-sāropā

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521 yatha 'gaurvāhīkah' it. gauņa-sādhyavasānā yathā 'gaur ayam' iti, iti pradīpadyotayoḥ spastam.
nanu śuddhatvā”dibhiḥ sadbhir upādhibhir laksaņāyāḥ sadvidharvopavarnanam ayuktam nirūdhātva-prayojanavattvam ādāya astavid hatvasyā’pi sambhavād iti cet śļņu -
nirūdhā-prayojanavatī ceti prathamato lakṣaṇāyāḥ vibhāgah. tataḥ prayojanavatyāḥ śuddhatvādy upādhibhiḥ sodhā vibhāga iti vibhakta-vibhāgo'yam iti na anupapattiḥ. 'lakṣaṇā tena sadvidhā’ iti atra laksaņāpadam prayojanavatī yā laksanā tatparam iti narasimha-thakkurā”di matam. vastutas tu rūg prayojanābhyām bhedádhikyam tu nāsty eva tatkrtabhedasya iha anukteh. "vyangyena rahitā rūờhau” ityādinā 18 sūtrenágre eva vaksyamāṇatvāt. yady api “rūdhi-prayojanāt” ity anena rūdhi-prayojane ukte tathā’pi na te vibhājakatvena ukte, kintu hetutvena. anyathā punaruktiprasangah syad iti pradipodyotayoh spastam."
Ācārya Hemacandra, the author of Kavyānuśāsana revives a forgotton or let us say forsaken tradition of taking 'gauņi and 'lakṣaṇa' as independent wordpowers, separate and distinct from each other. We had seen earlier how Bhoja had clubbed 'gauni' and 'laksanā' as part of abhidhā. We will have to refer once again to Bhoja in brief because Hemacandra seems to come closer to Bhoja in his concepts of 'gauni and laksanā, though of course Bhoja did not give these two any status independent of abhidhā. Bhoja first of all enumerates 12 relations of word and sense.
Bhoja (pp. 223, Josyer Edn.) observes : "tatra abhidhā-vivaksā-tātparyapravibhāga-vyapekṣā-sāmarthya-anvaya-ekárthībhāva-dosahāna, - guņopādāna - alamkārayoga-rasa-aviyoga-rūpāḥ śabdárthayor dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityam iti ucyate.”
teșu śabdasya arthábhidhāyinī śaktir abhidhā. tayā svarupa iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdaḥ vịtti-trayeņa vartate, tāś ca mukhyā, gaunī, lakṣaṇās tisrah. tatra sākṣād avyavahitárthábhidhāyikā mukhyā gamyamāna-śauryā”digunayogavyavahitấrthā gauņi. svārtha-avinābhūtárthántarópalakṣaṇā tu lakṣaṇeti.” .: Bhoja (pp. 226, ibid) continues - "gauņī dvidhā, gunanimittā, upacāranimittā ca.
We have discussed these observations of Bhoja on an earlier occasion but here we will once again go through Bhoja's writing for attempting a comparative study of Bhoja and Hemacandra. Bhoja's abhidhā is 'that power of word that expresses

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA meaning and is termed abhidhā'; Now here 'sabdasya arthábhidhāyini saktir' can be one which directly expresses the meaning or indirectly also. When it directly expresses the meaning it is termed as 'mukhyā' i.e. principal. Bhoja observes that a word operates in its meaning (this is strange, because we normally say that a meaning stays in a word) - "svarūpe iva abhidheye pravartamānah sabdah" - in three-fold way. Thus there are three functions-vrtti-traya' of a word where in his 'mukhyā' which directly and without any interference gives a meaning is sub-variety of abhidhā', which is our normal abhidhā of the alamkārikas of the Kashmir school, Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Hemacandra including.
Bhoja's 'gauni' is peculiar. He observes : "gamyamāna-śaurya"di gunayogavyavahitárthā gaunī.” So, for Bhoja 'gauni' is that variety of abhidhā which has connection with a meaning which is 'gamyamāna' - implied, and not sāksāt - or directly connected. Again this meaning is of the nature of such qualities as 'saurya' i.e., bravery and the like. Thus this variety of abhidhā is connected with implied quality. Bhoja does not term it as subordinate but it is 'a-mukhyā' in the sense that his mukhyā variety of abhidhā yields a direct meaning and his 'gaunī yields gamyamāna i.e. implied meaning. On the other hand we will go to see that for Hemacandra and even for the earlier Mimāmsā thinking which talked of 'gauna' function, 'gauņi was a secondary function i.e. 'a-mukhya' in the etymological sense, i.e. not-principal function. Again, Hemacandra's concepts of 'gauņi and 'laksanā' are not absolutely identical with those of Bhoja and this will be clear from the following discussion. But for the present we continue with Bhoja who observes : (pp. 226, ibid) : "gauņi dvidhā. guna-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā.”
Thus 'guna' and 'upacāra' are distinct entities with Bhoja. For the Kashmere tradition normally we have a division between sādharmya-mūla identification and sādharmyetaramūla i.e. upacāra-mūla identification. But Hemacandra, as we will go to analyse his concepts of gauņi and laksaņā does not base his classification on similarity i.e. sādharmya on non-similarity. He has some other base of distinction. So, his 'gauņi' thus viewed comes closer to that of Bhoja who has a 'guņa-nimittā' and 'upacāranimitta' gauņi. Bhoja observes that in his gauņi, words are placed either in 'sāmānádhikaranya' or 'vaiyadhikaranya', and on account of the viśeșaņa-višesyabhāva which is not understood otherwise - "anyathā-anupapattyā" there emerges a sort of relation between two words through implied and stated quality. This relationship which is promoted or caused by guna and hence is termed guņa-nimittā gauņi.

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523 Bhoja explains ‘upacāra' (pp. 229, ibid) as that state of things where someone else's quality is superimposed on someone else. This ‘upacara' for Bhoja takes place at both the levels i.e. at mukhya and gauna level : “mukhyayā gaunyā vā anya višesaṇasya sato'nyatra aropanam upacāraḥ.” “sā tu gauņa-vyavahitárthatvāt gauņī bhavati." Qualities of say a solid substance, if superimposed on an abstract thing it is upacāra for Bhoja. Basically anya-dharmasya anyatra-āropaņa may be or may not be inspired by similarity. As noted above in 'gunanimittā gauņī two words either in sāmānádhikaranya or vaiyadhikaranya are brought together and there has to be established a relationship of visesana-viśesyabhāva, which as there is no other choice-anyathā anupapattyā-has to be substantiated through the qualities these two words convey, in one case implicitely conveyed and in the other directly conveyed. So, a sort of similarity between these qualities is expected by Bhoja. In upacāra there is no comparision but superimposition of say 'A's qualities on 'B'. It may be noted that 'B' has nothing of it, or say, 'B', is incapable of having these qualities. Thus, in “bhavatu rusi kathora, kintu ramyā mrgāksī” or, in, "tālaih siñjad-valayasubhagaiḥ nartitah kāntayā me” - the qualities of “kathora” and “subhaga” go with a physical entity-mūrtimad-dravya and prāņi-višesa, but they are superimposed on anger (rosa), and tinkling bangles (śiñjad-valaya).
Now in this 'upacāra’ the meaning is secondarily imposed and hence it is ‘upacāra-nimittā-gauņi for Bhoja.
Laksanā for Bhoja is also two-fold viz. laksana and laksita-laksanā. When for the realisation of meaning of a given word, on account of there being no other instrumentality available, a meaning indicates another meaning which is having a relation of 'a-vinābhāva', it is a case of laksanā which is six-fold. "tayor (i.e. between laksaņā and lakṣita-laksaņā)" yasyām upātta-śabdasyárthasya kriya-siddhau sadhanatvā'yogāt svārtho'vinābhūtam arthántaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sā laksanā, tadvyatiriktā tu vaksyamānā'neka-rūpā lakṣita-laksanā, iti. Bhoja says that the farthántara' which is having a close-connection (= avinābhāva) such as closeness or sāmīpya, comes up in laksanā. The illustrations are 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ', ‘mañcāḥ krośanti' etc. Sāhacarya laksaņā is seen in ‘kuntān praveśaya', 'chatriņo gacchanti', etc. Bhoja's concept of lakṣita-laksaņā is hazy. It is certainly not laksana mounted on laksana - which is rejected by Mammața. Whatever is not guided by samipya, sāhacarya, sahacarita, hetu, tādarthya, and parināma - is lakṣita-laksaņā, which includes rūdha-laksaņā as in dvirepha-which is only abhidhā for Hemacandra, and pratīka-laksaņā, viruddha-laksaņā, tad-anya-laksanā, prakīrņa-laksaņā etc. But for Hemacandra, 'gaunī and 'laksanā' are clearly distinct.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Hemacandra at Kā. Šā. I. 17 explains 'gauna' artha and at I. 18 explains 'laksya' artha and at Kā. Sā. I. 20 he enumerates the functions of a word. We will examine 'gaunī and 'laksana' that tend to deliver 'gauna' and 'laksya' meanings respectively as follows.
Kā. Šā. I. 17 talks of 'gauņa' meaning as : “mukhyārthabādhe, nimitte, prayojane ca bhedábhedābhyām āropito gaunaḥ.” This 'gauna' meaning for Hemacandra is caused when (i) primary meaning is contradicted, (ii) when there is 'prayojana' i.e. motive. This 'gauna' is superimposed either through non-identity or 'bheda', or through identity i.e. ‘a-bheda'.
Hemacandra explains in his vịtti gaur vāhīkah', 'gaur evā’yamity adau mukhyasya arthasya sāsnā”dimattvā”deḥ pratyaksā”dinā pramāṇena bādhe, nimitte ca sādrśya-sambandhā”dau, prayojane ca sādrśya-tādrūpya-pratīpatti-rūpe sati, āropya-āropa-visayayor bhedā bhedena ca samāropito'tathābhūto'pi tathātvenā’dhyavasito, gunebhya āyatatvād gauņaḥ, tadvisayaḥ śabdo’pi gaunaḥ, upacarita iti cocyate.”
This meaning and the word conveying this meaning are both designated as 'gauna'. It is also called 'upacarita'. The illustrations are 'gaur vāhīkah' and 'gaurevā'yam. The first clearly mentions both 'gauḥ' the object superimposed, and the person - vāhīka - The subject on whom the object is superimposed. Thus 'visaya' and 'visayin' are clearly mentioned - 'bhedena'. In the other illustration only the 'vişayin' figures and so this is 'a-bhedena äropa'. The direct meaning of 'gauh' - an animal having dewlap, etc. - is contradicted by direct perception or pratyaksa-pramāna as we can see that 'vāhīka' is a human being and not a bull. This superimposition is caused due to ‘nimitta' - others call it tadyoga-in form of similarity in qualities possessed by both the vāhika and the bull. The qualities are those of dullness and stupidity. They are similar in both the visaya and the visayin. The motive is to suggest the extreme similarity or one-ness between the subject through 'guna' and is therefore termed 'gauna'. The relation was that of sādņśya.
But when the relation is that of kārya-kārana, i.e. anything other than sādrśya, then also 'gauņī takes place, says Hemacandra. Thus kāryakāraṇabhāva is at the base of the illustration viz. 'āyur ghrtam' (bhedena) and ‘ayur eva idam' (abhedena); tādarthya is illustrated in 'indrāḥ', for ‘indrárthā sthūna', svasvāmibhāva is in, 'rājā for rājakiyaḥ puruṣaḥ, or 'grāmaḥ' for 'grāma-svāmī, agramātre avayave 'agrah' etc. Here, it may be noted that we have all cases of

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abhedena-āropah as 'visaya' is not separately mentioned. These illustrations are in a way dubious. This will be seen when we discuss Hemacandra's 'laksya' artha and 'laksanā vrtti'. Kā-Śā I. 18 says -
“mukhyártha-sambadhas tattvena laksyamāņo laksyah.” This means that the connected meaning which is indicated as identical with the primary meaning is called 'laksya'. While in 'gauni for Hemacandra there is superimposition of one object over another one either through complete identification i.e. a-bheda or through difference i.e. bheda, in 'laksana' there is superimposition of one meaning over 'another meaning through a-bheda or complete identity only. The two meanings denote two objects but they are derived from one and the same word. Say for example "gangāyām ghosah", wherein there is identity between two objects viz. the current of the 'gangā' and the bank of the gangā. But these two objects are not separately or inseparately mentioned as in the case in 'gaur vāhīkah' or 'gaur eva ayam'. From the word 'ganga' these two ar understood and there is superimposition, through absolute identity, of the meaning of the current of gangā on the meaning of the bank of 'ganga', both of which are expressed through one and the same word i.e. 'gangāyām'. Hemacandra observes in his vrtti - (pp. 45, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh)
“mukhyo'rtho gangādiśabdānām srotah-prabhștiḥ, tena sambaddhaḥ taţādir arthah tattvena abhedena laksyamāno laksyaḥ. tatevena laksyamāņa iti vacanād bhedábhedābhyām āropita iti na vartate. sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartate eva. tadvisayo śabdo laksakah yathā-gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, kuntāḥ pravišanti. atra gangāvām ghosádhikaranatvasya, kuntānām praveśasya ca asambhavāt mukhyártha badhah. sāmīpyam sāhacaryam ca nimittam. gangātaţa iti kuntavanta iti ca prayogāt yesām na tathā pratītih teşām pāvanatva-raudratvā"dīnām dharmānām tathā-pratipādanam prayojanam."
Thus, the difference between gauņi and laksaņā for Hemacandra is that in gauni there is superimposition one object over another object; i.e. one thing over another thing. This is realised either through complete identification or through a state where both are separately mentioned. On the other hand in laksaņā there is also superimposition. But it takes place at meaning level. There is superimposition of the meaning of something over the meaning of another thing but both are mentioned through one and the same word. Again this superimposition is through absolute identity, 'gangã-tata' and 'gangā-pravāha' are not separately mentioned as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA in gaur-vāhīkaḥ, but their meanings are identified through a common expression viz. 'gangā'.
We observed that some illustrations of ‘a-bhedena gauņártha' such as ‘indraḥ'; 'taksā', 'ādhakaḥ', 'raktaḥ', 'grāmaḥ, seem to be in a way dubious'. This is so because here also the meanings of two separate objects not directly and separately mentioned are taken as one. The colour is 'raktaḥ', the cloth is ‘red cloth' or 'raktaḥ pataḥ', but only one word is used for two meanings. Even in laksaņā this happens. Two meanings of two different words are identified through a common expression. Thus the sacrificial post for Indra is said to be Indra. This is gaunī. But here also meanings indicated by an identical word are identified through complete identity -'a-bhedena'. It would have been better if like Mammata and many others Hemacandra also had mentioned 'gauņi' as a subvariety of laksaņā, based on similarity, the rest being suddhā laksanā. Thus the classification of lakṣaṇā into gauni and suddhā as presented by Mammața seems more natural. Hemacandra's effort to distinguish between two śabda-vrttis such as gauni and laksaņā which for him are independent of each other, appears to be unnatural or acquired. May be Hemacandra was guided by one criterian. It can be this. In all illustrations of gauni of two varieties, the two objects were different from each other. In laksaņā the object is the same but two things connected with the same object are identified e.g. 'ghosa' and 'pravāha' - both belong to gangā. But this is also not applicable in kuntāh pravišanti. So, it seems there is no logic in his approach. He finally observes (pp. 46). "yatra ca vastvantare laksya iti-vastvantaram upacaryate sa gaunah arthah, yatra tu na tathā sa vivekah." The only point of difference is that in laksanā the meaning indicated is 'tattvena laksyamāṇah', i.e. is indicated through identity, while in 'gauni it is either through identity or through difference also i.e. 'bhedábhedena'. But the thin line demarketing "abhedena gauņi” and "tattvena laksanā” remains undefined clearly. For Hemacandra himself says "sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartata eva." At the same time one thing, for sure, is clear that Hemacandra's 'gauni is not the same as 'gauni variety of laksana as conceived by Mammaţa.
Jayadeva, as seen earlier accepts three powers of a word and he treats vyañjanā first (VIlth Mayūkha) and then lakṣaṇā (IXth Mayūkha) and abhidhā (Xth mayūkha). These three functions are compared with the three currents of Gangā at Candrāloka VII. 1. Jayadeva observes :

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527 "vsttibhedais tribhir yuktā
srotobhir iva jhāhnavī, bhārati bhāti gambhīrā,
kutilā saralā kvacit." Laksaņā then is termed 'kuțilā'. Ramā tīkā explains ‘kuțilatva' as : śakyárthasya tyāgena atyāgena arthántara-pratīti-janakatvam kuțilatvam' • 'kuțilatva' i.e. deviation is apprehension of another sense with the primary meaning being either left out or not left out. Jayadeva defines laksaņā (IX. i) as -
“mukhyárthasyā’vivakṣāyām pūrvā’rvācī ca rūdhitaḥ, prayojanāc ca sambaddham
vadanti laksaņā matā.” "When 'mukhyártha' i.e. primary sense is not intended, laksanā is that power which yields a sense which is related (to the primary). It is either (rūdhitah) based on usage and is termed 'pūrvā' or is based on motive, and is called 'arvācī.
It may be noted here that Jayadeva lays down - "mukhyárthasya a-vivaksā” as the basic condition of laksanā. This means that when the speaker's intention is different from the one appearing from the primary sense, laksanā is resorted to. So, Jayadeva here seems to differ from the traditionally accepted thinking concerning laksaņā which, according to Mammaţa and many others, takes 'mukhyártha-bādha' i.e. contradiction of the primary sense as the basic condition of laksanā. Here Jayadeva seems to replace 'mukhyārthabādha' by 'tātparya-anupapatti', as we had observed while treating the views of early Mimāmsakas though of course, there, in the Mimāmsā thinking 'mukhyártha-bādha' was not totally ruled out. The Ramā commentary observes : “mukhyárthasya a-vivakṣāyā laksaņābījatvam vadatā mukhyartha-bādhasya laksanā-bījatvam nirastam."
The 'Paurņamāsī (pp. 270, Edn. Chawkhamba Sk. Sr. - Varānasi - Haridas Skt. Granthamālā, '64) observes : "anvayā’nupapattis tātparyā’nupapattis ceti dvau laksanavakāśahetū prācīnā manyante. tanna. 'kākebhyo raksyatām annam' ity atra anvayā'nupapater abhāvāt, tātparyā'nupapater eva ca kārya-siddheh."
Dr. Trilokinath Dwivedi (Edn. Candrāloka, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi, Delhi, '92) pp. 373 observes in his sanskrit commentary -
"mukhyas' cásāv artho mukhyárthaḥ vācakena śabdena mukhyayā abhidhayā śaktyā pratipădito'rtho mukhyáthaḥ. tasya avivaksāyām vastutātparyā'visayı

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA bhūtāyām, arthad yatra sabdasya mukhye arthe vaktus tātparyam na bhavati, api tu mukhyártha-bhinne mukhyárthatávacchedakā’-tirikta-dharmávacchinnatvarūpe’rthe eva vaktus tātparyam bhavati, idam eva anyaiḥ mukhyártha-bādha ity uktam. tātparyábhāva-rūpa-mukhyárthabadhe sati iti bhāvah.”
We do not agree. "Tātparyābhāva' can never be equated with 'mukhyárthabadha', and 'intention of the speaker with reference to another sense' is not 'mukhyártha'. It is clear.
The Ramā Țikā explains that Jayadeva seems to accept ‘mukhyártha-bādha' or contradiction of the primary sense through 'anvaya-anupapatti' i.e. when the correlation of words in a sentence is damaged. But Jayadeva seems to take ‘tātparyā’nupapatti' - 'not realizing the motive' as 'mukhyártha-avivaksā' i.e. 'lack of motive of (promoting) the primary sense'. Ramā observes that even though there is absence of anvaya-anupapatti - i.e. even when the correlation of words in a sentence does not suffer, in varieties (of dhvani) such as 'arthántara-samkramitavācya' i.e. when the primary sense is merged in another meaning, there is tātparyaanupapatti-non-realization of motive - in form of mukhyartha-avivaksā i.e. 'the primary sense being not intended'. Thus, only tātparya-anupapatti or 'nonrealization of motive' is to be taken as the basis of laksanā, i.e. 'laksanā-bījam'. Ramā observes that in all types of verbal cognition - i.e. in śābda-bodha-mātra', - there is no causality vested in tātparyajñāna or knowledge of motive. But only in “lākṣanika-śābdabodha" i.e. in verbal cognition of words charged with laksaņā alone, there is requirement of the knowledge of motive, because it stands as a cause - "ata eva na śābdabodha-mātre tātparya-jñānasya hetutā, kimtu läksanika-śābdabodha eva.” (Ramā on Candrāloka IX. 1)
Jayadeva's two varieties of laksanā such as pūrva and arvācī are respectively rūdhi-mūlā and prayojanamūlā varieties only; observes Ramā :
"sā dvividhā, pūrvā arvācīnā ca. tayoḥ pūrvā nirūdha-laksaņā, prayojanapratity anuddeśikā; arvācīnā prayojanavatī, tātparya-visaya-prayojana-pratīty uddeśyikā ity arthah.” (on IX. 1) Jayadeva (IX. 2) further classifies lakṣaṇā into -
"laksanīya-sva-sabdasya mīlanā'mīlanād dvidhā, laksaņā, sā tridhā siddhasādhya-sādhyárgabhedatah.”

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'Laksaņā
When, the 'sva-sabda' of the implicit sense is mixed or not-mixed we have twofold laksaņā.
The idea is that when in a word which is laksyártha-bodhaka i.e. one which gives the implicit sense the laksya-vācaka-pada is merged or not merged we get two varieties.
By ‘lakṣanīya' is meant the meaning intended to be indicated by lakṣaṇā. Now the word giving that meaning is either merged or not merged. The idea is that at times in the indicated sense given by 'laksaka' word, the primary meaning of the laksaka is merged. Thus the indicative word totally leaves behind its primary sense and brings into light only the indicated sense. This is said to be laksana-laksana by others. At times the primary meaning continues along with the indicated sense. This is termed as upādāna-laksanā by others. Thus for Jayadeva the two are rūdhi and prayojanavatī. Both these are again three-fold on account of siddha, sādhya and sādhyánga-bhedas. Thus, for Jayadeva we have
Lakşaņā
rūdhi
prayojanavati
milana
a-mīlana
sphuta
sphuţa
a-sphupa
a-sphuţa
milana a-milana 1siddhā 2sádhyā 3sādhyángā
4siddha 5sādhya 6sādhyánga
7tațastha-sphuţa prayojana
Sarthagata-sphuţa-prayojana
Sarthaniştha taţastha 10laksyanistha 11laksakanistha 12tațasthe-asphuţa-prayojanā
Thus we have six varieties of rudhi-mūlā and six of prayojana-mūlā.
Jayadeva further says (IX. 3) that the prayojana may be sphuţa and asphuţa. So we get a-gūdha-vyangya and gudha-vyangyā. The sphuta prayojana is taţastha and artha-gata, i.e. two-fold. Thus prayojanavati is divided into tatastha-prayojanā and artha-gata-prayojanā. Similarly asphuta-vyangya is also two-fold i.e. artha-nistha

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA and tatastha. So, gūdhavyangyā is also two-fold. (IX. 4a). Again artha-gata-sphuţa and asphuţa vyangya is also either laksya-nistha or laksaka-nistha (IX. 4b) thus the prayojanavati is 36-fold !
When sphuţa-prayojana is in 'laksaka' we get one variety. While giving three more varieties Jayadeva takes note of 'a-sphuţatva' etc. The prayojana is either asphuţa, sphuta, or tatastha, giving rise to three-fold laksanā. Ramā observes further that, laksaņā "which is different from sakti is four-fold” is intended here. As 'prayojana' is not apprehended by “sakti', so laksaņā has to be accepted as four-fold. This seems to be the ultimate idea.
Ramā (pp. 113, ibid) observes that in counting the varieties of laksana in Jayadeva there is some irregularity either due to 'bhrasta-pātha' i.e. currupt reading, or due to pātha-bheda i.e. different reading. Even Paurņamāsī also feels that the portion beginning with "a-sphuţatvam” and ending with “sā caturvidhā” - is useless as it is additional and unnecessary. In short, even the commentators find the printed text difficult to explain.
Jayadeva has furnished illustrations of different varieties of laksanā. He has also indicated the various relations that are taken as the basis of laksanā i.e. "laksanabīja". The relations that make for laksana bīja are 'ābhimukhya', 'sannidhi', 'ākārapratiti', karyakarana-bhāva, etc. Jayadeva observes
ābhimukhyāt sannidhānāt tathā”kārapratītitah. (IX. 8b) kāryakāraṇabhāvāt sā vācyavācakabhāvatah, ity evam ādeḥ sambandhāt kiñcányasmāt catustayāt. (IX. 9) sādrśyāt samavāyāt-sā vaiparītyāt kriyānvayāt, sāropā'dhyavasānā”khye
gauņa-buddhe prthak prthak.” (IX. 10) After this Jayadeva talks about the accepted varieties of lakṣaṇā, furnishing almost the stock illustrations. He speaks of sāropā, sādhyavasānā, these again are seen as gaunī, and suddhā. Two Varieties of suddhā sāropā and suddhā sādhyavasānā are termed as upādāna-laksanā and arpana-laksanā. Thus, for

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531 him, prayojanavatī becomes six-fold. These are illustrated but not defined by Jayadeva.
After this Jayadeva gives some other varieties bron of the speciality-vaiśistya - of laksya and laksaka-padas. They are termed as viśesanavati siddhā, and višesanavatī sādhyā. The illustrations furnished are 'sarasam kāvyam amstam', and "sā ca mūrtimati ratih”. He also talks of varieties of laksanā based on 'ādhāra' i.e., substratum, for example in words, word-sense, vākyārtha, samkhyā, kāraka and in linga we find laksaņā. This rather sounds funny. Or perhaps Jayadeva overdoes this under the influence of Anandavardhana who read dhvani in sūp, tin, vacana, sambandha, etc. (Dhv. II 16) and also Kuntaka who explained vakrokti in padapūrvārdha, pada-parārdha, vākya, etc.
Jayadeva observes in the end that a number of the varieties of laksanā are seen as the basis of many a alamkāra. He says:
śabde padárthe vākyárthe samkhyāyām kārake tathā, linge ceyam alamkārá
nkura-bījatayā sthitā. (IX. 16). Vaidyanātha in Ramā observes that the word ‘alamkāra', is an 'upalaksana' andtherefore even 'rasā"di' are covered by the same. Thus laksanā is at the root of rasā”di also, according to Jayadeva.
It may be noted that when Jayadeva, putting aside the current and accepted titles of the varieties of laksaņā, floats new names such as 'pūrvā' and 'arvācī, perhaps either he is reviving an old forgotten tradition, or being a poet by temperament also, goes for these terms, which of course nobody of his successor accepted and promulgated. May be, at places, either through faulty readingbhrasta-pāțha-or some inexplicable variant, Jayadeva looks clumsy, but he has explained laksana with precision and beautiful illustrations. It is perhaps his treatment which inspires Viśvanātha to explain an 80-fold laksanā later. Perhaps a platform is built for the deep and thoughtful dilectics as seen in Appayya and Jagannātha later, through the efforts of Jayadeva.
Vidyādhara in his Ekāvalī, Unmesa II. Observes that lakṣaṇā is the function of a lākṣaṇika-word. He observes :

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "sabdo'yam lāksaniko vyāpāro lakṣaṇā bhaved yasya, etallakṣaṇam asyāḥ
sāmānyam laksyate pūrvam.” (Ekāvali II. 4) He proceeds,
‘mukhyárthā’nupapattau tadyoge rūdhito’thavā phalāt, anyo’rtho yadi laksyo bhavati
tadā laksaņā’bhimatā.” (II. 5, ibid) “mukhyasya arthasya bādhaḥ, tena sambandhaḥ, prasiddhiḥ prayojanam vā laksanāyām upayujyate. tataś ca mukhyárthasya bādhe tenaiva sambandhe mukhyena arthena a-mukhyártho yal laksyate, sa āropitaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ, sántarārtha-nistho laksanā. tatra kuśala ity adau rūdhito laksanā, gangāyām ghosa ity adau tu prayojanāt.
It may be noted that Vidyādhara uses the term “mukhyárthá-nupapattau” for 'mukhyārtha-bādha' which of course he mentions in his vștti. Again he resorts to the titles such as jahat-svārthā and a-jahat-svārtha and later observes that the same are termed laksana-laksanā and upādāna-laksanā. Vidyādhara observes (II. 6, 7, Ekāvalī)
“sabdórpayati parártham
yady ātmānam tadā jahat-svārthā” (II. 6a) ... iyam eva aprastutā’der alamkārasya bījam. iyam tu laksana-laksaneti parair abhidhīyate.
'sā viparītā yasyām laksayati padam sva-vācya-viparītam.” (II. 6B) iyam eva vyājastuter bijam. "siddhi nija-kriyāyāh kartum yasyām parasya śabdena, āksepaḥ kriyate'sāv
ajahat-svārthā samākhyātā.” (II. 7) ... iyam eva samāsokty āder bījam. iyam punar upādāna-laksaneti matántare giyate...

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533 More important point Vidyādhara makes is that he talks of jahad-ajahad-variety of lakṣaņā also. Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 251, 252 ibid) mentions this variety as accepted by the vedāntins who want to explain passages such as, "tat tvam asi" etc. But Dr. Raja has not suggested that even Vidyadhara, a later alamkārika also talks of this variety. Vidyadhara observes :
amśenaikena punar jahāti na jahāti cányena, śabdah svārtham yadi
jahad-ajahat-svārthā samākhyātā. (Ekāvalī. II. 8) The illustration given is beautiful. It reads as -
“yatkarnatāla-prabhavaiḥ samīraiḥ pratāpadīpāḥ śamitā ripūņām, sóyam tava nyakkrta-dikkarindra
līlāyito vīra karenurājaḥ.” He reads this variety in the expression “sóyam” which he explains as - “ 'so'yam’ityatra tattāmśe jahāti svārtham idantāmse tu na jahātīti' jahad-ajahtsvārthā iyam”.
The general impression is that Vidyadhara accepts Mammata as his master. He also mentions sāropā laksanā which is both gauni and suddhā. In gauni 'similarity prevails in form of super-imposition of qualities, while suddhā is 'upacārayuktā', 'upacāra' being that identification which is not based on similariy in qualities. So śuddhā is sādrśyetara-sambandha-mūlā, for Vidyādhara. This upacāra is five-fold. Vidyadhara observes : (pp. 70, ibid, under Ekāvali. 2.8) - "śuddhā punar upacaravati. ... upacaraśca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvā"der nimittasya pāñcavidhyāt pancadh bhavati. He mentions (i) kāryakaranabhāva, (ii) tādarthya (iii) svasvāmibhāva-sambandha (iv) avayavávayavibhāva & (v) tātkarmya among the fivefold upacāras. He says (II. 10, pp. 72, 73 ibid) -
"ity asmābhir bhidāḥ sapta laksaņāyāḥ pradarśitāḥ, samkarena tri-rūpeņa samsrstyā caika-rūpayā (II. 10)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA asyāḥ samkalanenyónyam astāviņśatir īritāḥ, panca-trimsat samākhyātāḥ
śuddha-bhedaiḥ samam punaḥ.” (II. 11) Thus according to Vidyadhara, laksanā is basically seven-fold which multiples into 28 Varieties due to three-fold samkara and one type of samsrsti and if we add the seven suddha varieties, we arrive at 35 varieties of laksanā.
Vidyānātha in his Pratāpa-rudra-yaśobhușaņa, pp. 36 (Edn. S. Chandrasekhara Sastrigal, Madras, '14) observes :
"vācyárthā’nupapattyā tat-sambandhinyāropitaḥ śabda-vyāpāro laksanā” . Thus when the primary meaning is unacceptable laksaņā operates as 'āropita', 'sabdavyāpāra' - with reference to the primary one. This function is ‘āropita' in the sense in which Mammata has called laksanā an "āropitā kriyā”. The fact is that laksaņā is not basically a sabda-vyāpāra but is an artha-vyāpāra and hence is described metaphorically as a function of a word. The Ratnāpana o Kumāraswamin explains it as - (pp. 36, ibid) - "vācyárthā’nupapattyā mukhyárthabādhena hetunā, tatsambandhini mukhyártha-sambandhe vișaye aropitaḥ śabdavyāpāro laksanety arthah. atra yady api svārtham prattyyāya uparatavyāpārasya śabdasya punar vyāpārántara-ayogād artha eva laksakah, iti arthavyāpāro laksanā tathā'pi vācyadharmo vācaka upacryate iti laksanāyāh śabdavrttitva-vyavahāra iti vijñeyam."
He talks of jahallaksaņā and ajahallaksanā, without defining the same. He provides illustrations. Then he enumerates sāropa laksana with an illustration and a remark later such as (pp. 37, ibid) -
visaya-visayiņor abhihitayor abheda-pratipattir āropaḥ. Visaya-nigaranena abheda-pratipattir adhyavasāyaḥ. - He illustrates sādhyavasāya laksaņā also. Vidyānātha's laksanā is both sādrśyanibandhanā and (sādrsyetara) sambandhanibandhanā. These two are sub-divided into sāropā and sādhyavasānā. It may be noted that by and large Vidyānātha follows Mammata but as he does not notice the two - i.e. sāropa & and sādhyavasānā as sub-varieties of suddhā, he has four varieties of laksanā in place of Mammața's six.
Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpana meets out a fuller treatment of laksanā. He has tried to furnish a comparatively better definition of laksana and has also counted 80-varieties of the same, thus furnishing a more scientific attempt at

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classification. While defining laksanā, he has also tried to improve upon Mammata. In his Sāhityadarpana II. 5, (pp. 35, Edn. with Laksmī tikā, Chawkhamba, Skt. Samsthāna, Varanasi, '85, Ācārya Krsnamohan śāstri) - Viśvanātha defines laksaņā as -
"mukhyárthabādhe tadyukto yayā’nyorthaḥ pratīyate, rūdheḥ prayojanās vā’sau
laksaņā śaktir arpitā.” (S.D. II. 5) - Lakşmi (pp. 35, ibid) observes : “mukhyárthasy abhidheyárthasya bādhe, anvayā’nupapattigrahe, tādrūpyeņa, tātparyávisayatve vā sati, rūdheḥ anādivặddha-vyavahāra-prasiddhi-vaśāt, prayojanād uddeśya-viśesad vā, yayā śaktyā, tadyuktah mukhyártha-sambandha-yuktah, anyaḥ, mukhyárthatávacchedakā'tiriktadharmávacchinno’rthaḥ pratīyate, buddhyate, asau sā, arpitā āropitā, mukhyárthavyavahita-laksyártha-visayakatvād arvācīnaiḥ śabdeșu kalpitā ity arthaḥ, śaktir vịttiḥ, laksaņā laksyate, jñāyate anyā iti tādrśī ucyate iti seṣaḥ. tathā ca abhidheyárthā’nvayā’nupapattigrahatve sati rūdhi-prayojanányatara-prayojyamukhyártha-sambandhavat tad atiriktárthe-pratipādaka-saktitvam laksanātvam. kārikákşarena tu, "yayā’nyorthaḥ pratīyate'sau laksaņā” iti lakṣaṇāyā laksanam. mukhyártha-bādhaḥ, mukhyártha-yoga), rūdhi-prayojanányatarac ceti trayam laksaņāyā hetuḥ. ādyayor danda-cakrā'di-nyāyena militayor eva kāraṇatvam, rūdhiprayojanayos tu 'trņåraņi-mani-nyāyena pratyekam eva kāraṇatvam.”
But we feel we cannot agree fully with Laksmī's observation, for, if 'yayā'nyorthaḥ pratiyate sā laksaņā' is to be taken as the definition part, then, we are afraid, it can be made applicable to vyañjanā as well. Even the word 'arpitā' also cannot exclude vyañjanā. So, the whole, - along with the conditions such as ‘mukhyárthabādhe tadyuktaḥ' and 'rūdheḥ prayojanād vā', - has to be taken as definition. Roughly, of course, we can says that, "yayā'nyorthaḥ pratīyate" is the definition, the three nimitta-hetus are rūdhi/prayojana, preceded by mukhyárthabādha and tad-yoga. 'arpitā sakti' is the description of laksanā. It cannot form part of the definition.
Viśvanātha goes to observe that 'mukhyártha-bādha' i.e. the fact of the primary sense being contradicted is the first condition for laksanā i.e. secondary or metaphorical usage. When the primary sense becomes inapplicable, either there is lack of correlation i.e. anvayā’nupapatti' in a sentence, or there is tātparyā’nupapatti' i.e. non-realisation of the speaker's intention as in case of,

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA "kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām". So, Viśvanātha includes 'tă
yo aaani raksyatam". So, visvanatha includes tatparya'nupapatti' also as condition of lakṣaṇā, but he subsumes it under ‘mukhyartha-bādha' itself.
It may be noted that some take 'bādha' to mean 'tātparya-bādha' only. For, if only ‘anvaya-bādha' is held as the cause of laksaņā, then instances such as “kakebhyo dadhi raksyatām' will cease to be illustrations of laksanā. In reality this condition of "tātparyā’nupatti" seems to be more basic to laksaņā. Jayadeva has tried to bring home this point. Jagannātha, we will go to observe, has discussed this point in greater details. 'Rucirā' commentary on the Sāhitya-darpana observes (pp. 43, ibid) that it has to be noted that anyathā’nupapatti i.e. sambandhā’nupapatti, meaning absence of apprehension, is either detected in form of 'absence of direct relation', or by 'absence of gathering the intention i.e. 'tātparyā’nupapatti'.
ivananda Vidyasagar, the author of Vimalā, a commentary on the Sahitya-darpana observes that, “it is because of this only that it is stated that laksanā is a 'sakyasambandha' i.e. 'relation with a meaning' brought about by non-realisation of tātparya-i.e. 'tātparyā’nupapatti' - "anvayasya sambandhasya anupapattiḥ upapatty abhāvah, sa ca kvacit saksāt sambandhábhāva-mukhena, kvacit punah tātparyavisaya-gata-tayā vā iti bodhyam." says Rucirā, (pp. 43).
At times 'anvayabādha' i.e. contradiction of correlation, as well as ‘tātparyabādha' i.e. contradiction of motive-both these are seen together as, for example, in - "gangāyām ghosah". It is clear that there is no correlation established. Again there is tātparya i.e. motive concerning the coolness and piousness of the hamlet. This is also important. Jivānanda Vidyāsāgar observes in 'Vimalā (pp. 37, ibid) - “ata eva āhuḥ, śakya-sambandhas tātparyā’nupapattitaḥ” and also - “tad āhuh-yadi vā anvayā’nupapattir, laksaņābījam syāt tadā ‘gangāyām ghoṣaḥity ādau kvacid gangādipadānām nīrādau, kvacid ghosa"dipadānām matsyādau laksaneti niyamo na syad iti." If lack of correlation alone would be the cause of laksana, says, Vimala, then in case of 'gangayam ghosah, there will be the contingency of taking 'gangā' to mean the stream of water but 'ghosa' will be taken to mean 'a big fish'. In that case the piousness and coolness of the hamlet, which is the motive, will not be realised. Thus, by 'mukhyártha-bādha' both anvaya-bādha and tātparya-anupapatti must be understood. In the two basic divisions of laksaņā viz. rūdhi-mūlā and 'prayojanamūla', only in the first one, i.e. rūdhimālā there is only 'anvayánupatti' as there is no motive in it. But in prayojanavati variety there has to be 'anupapatti' or contradiction with reference to both i.e. correlation as well as motive.

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537 If, observes Viśvanātha, 'mukhyárthabādha' is not held as the pre-condition of laksaņā, then there will be overlapping-ativyāpti-of laksaņā in instances of meanings collected through vyañjanā or suggestivity of words as in case of e.g. ‘rājati umā-vallabhah'. Then he explains the utility of the second condition viz. 'tadyoga'. It is not proper if the secondary sense is having no connection at all with the primary sense. In the absence of 'tad-yoga', for example, we will have the apprehension of 'yamunātata' in place of 'gangātata', from the word, say, "gangāyām”. This is absurd. This way also there will be over-lapping - ativyāpti - of laksaņā. It is precisely to do away with this contingency that Viśvanātha has placed the term 'tad-yuktah' in the definition of laksanā. By this, the defect in Mammața's definition is removed and the definition sounds more scientific.
The third prerequisite of laksanā is that it is based either on 'rūdhi' i.e. usage, or 'prayojana' i.e. motive. Even in the presence of 'mukhyárthabādha', and
dyoga', laksana will be able to indicate a secondary sense other than the primary one only if it based either on usage or motive. It may be asked that the apprehension of motive is done through vyañjanā or suggestivity of words when the power of indication -i.e. laksaņā is exhausted. In that case how can this 'prayojana' which is realized only after the power of indication or laksanā is over, be the 'cause of laksanā ? To reply to this prima facie view, the commentator on the Sāhityadarpana, Tarkavāgīša observes in his 'Vivști' commentary that, “avācaka-sabda-prayogaḥ sa-prayojanakaḥ, iti sāmānyataḥ prayojana-jñānās vā” - i.e. A sound which is a-vācaka i.e. having no dictionary meaning (say, for example blowing the horn of a vehical) is produced only with a motive (in one's mind).” The horn is blown with a motive to suggest the people on road that a vehicle is arriving. The motive appears first in mind as a cause and the signal follows. Same is the case with laksaņā which is practiced first with a motive already present in the mind, eventhough the motive itself is realized later through vyañjanā based on laksanā in case of 'sāhitya'. Thus knowledge of 'prayojana' precedes the actual result. So, in laksanā the fact of there being a 'prayojana' precedes the actual process of laksaņā. Many commentators tend to explain the use of fifth conjugation (= pancamī vibhakti) in the word 'prayojanāt' as, “prayojanam uddiśya" i.e. "taking into consideration the motive". But Udyotakāra (pp. 37, ibid) explains it as "prayojakā’bhisamdhi-pūrvakam”, i.e. “being connected with a motive”, i.e. "with reference to the motive". From this point of view, a 'prayojana' or motive is the 'prayojaka' - sponsoring agency of the definition. Thus all the three i.e. "mukhyárthabādha, tadyoga, and rūdhi or prayojana” - are unavoidable preconditions for

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
lakṣaṇā. The first two causes operate hand in hand through 'danda-cakra-nyāya', and the last one through "trnárani-maṇi-nyāya". Again this last condition suggests the basic two-fold classification of lakṣaṇā also. The term "anyórthaḥ" should not be taken to mean "mukhyártha-bhinnórthaḥ". In this case the definition will be too broad as observed earlier and will take even vyañjanā in its fold. But by 'anyórthah' what is intended is "śakyatvávacchedakátiriktad harmávacchinnatva-rūpórthaḥ". This is precisely 'lakṣyártha'. If 'mukhyártha-bhinna' is understood as the meaning of 'anyórthah', then in instances such as, 'kadali kadali', lakṣaṇā will not operate and thus the definition, will be too norrow. So, by 'anyórthaḥ' should be understood "that meaning which is having the quality different from the quality of the primary sense."
By the term 'arpita' is meant that lakṣaṇā is not a natural function of a word and hence it is said to be 'else than abhidha' and therefore, "sväbhāviketara" - or 'else than natural. If some take abhidhā to be one created by God, "svarodbhāvita", then lakṣaṇā, being artificial, is 'not' created by 'God', i.e. 'iśvara'nudbhāvita'. As the term 'arpita' is merely a descriptive term, it may not be feared that due to calling lakṣaṇā as 'arpitā saktiḥ', it will cover even vyañjana in its fold!
Viśvanatha has carefully divided, lakṣaṇā into 80 varieties. This is not 'love for hair-splitting' as commented by some scholars, but it is scientific and clean thinking. The table showing 80 sub-divisions of lakṣaṇa runs as below:
Lakṣaṇā
rūḍhimūlā
The rūḍhimūlā is sub-divideded into 8 varieties such as :
rūḍhimūlā lakṣaṇa
sāropā
upādāna lakṣaṇā
śuddhā gauņi

sādhyavasānā
śuddhā
gauņi
prayojanamūlā.
lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā
sāropā
sādhyavasānā
śuddhā gauņi śuddhā gauņi

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'Laksanā
539 The Prayojanavati has (32) varieties. When we add (8) varieties of rūdhimülā we arrive at (40) varieties which, all of them are either (i) padagata or (ii) vākyagata, thus taking to (80) sub-divisions in total. The (32) varieties of Prayojanavati are
upādāna
sāropā
sādhyavasāna
śuddha
gauni
śuddhā
gauni
gudhavangyā
a-gūdhāvangyā (This sub-division goes with all eight divisions
of prayojanavatī.)
and lakşaņa
sāropā
sādhyavasānā
śuddhā gauņi
śuddha
gauņi All these 8 are two-fold, i.e. gudha-vyangya and a-gūdha-vyangyā. This makes for 16, which are again either (i) dharma-gatā or (ii) dharmi-gatā, making (32) in all. + 8 rūdhimulā = 40. These are (i) pada-gatā or (ii) vākyagatā making a total of (80).
Keśavamiśra in his Alamkāra-sekhara, (pp. 9, Marici III Edn. N. S. Bombay, '26) talks of laksanā as 'sakya-sambandhah'. He observes that laksanā operates due to 'tātparyā’nupapattyā' and 'mukhyartha’nupapattyā' - "sā ca tātparyā’nupapattyā mukhyárthā’nupapattyā vā pravartate.” This is clearly Viśvanātha's influence. He gives an illustration such as, “nirmālyam nayanaśriyah” etc. The word 'nirmālya' is charged with laksanā. He does not go beyond this and is not interested in giving any classification. From this very brief delineation, it is clear that keśava is not greatly in favour of only mukhyártha-bādha' as the condition of laksanā. He also does not talk of either rūdhi or prayojana' as the condition here. Perhaps for him the concept was so firmly and cleanly established that he does not care to discuss it in any detail.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
Appayya Dixit has discussed the topic of sabda-vrttis viz. - abhidhā, laksaņā and also vyañjanā in his brilliant work named "Vrtti-vārttika", which unfortunately is available till day only upto the portion containing discussion on abhidhā and laksaņā only. Though Appayya did recognize vyañjanā, the portion containing vyañjanā is not available. We will deal with his concept of lakṣaņā as below :
For Dixit laksaņā is that power of a word wherein, through the relation with the primary sense, the word becomes a conveyer (of meaning): "sā ca mukhyárthasambandhena śabdasya pratipādakatvam” (pp. 50, Edn. Avasthi; Induprakāśana, Delhi, '77). It may be noted that for Dixit also laksanā is exactly the same as that defined by Mammata but the latter's definition is clearer and so also is Viśvanātha's. While Mammata has laid down three causes of the secondary function called laksanā i.e. indication, such as mukhyártha-bādha, tad-yoga, and either rūdhi or prayojana remaining at the base, and all these three connected to one another through the danda-cakrā”di-nyāya i.e. analogy of the rod and the wheel (of a potter), Appayya on the other hand has not taken care to discuss mukhyártha-bādha etc. - the factors being much debated by earlier authors. This means that he starts with the acceptance of these three basic factors which for him are clear to an advanced student.
Appayya Dixit, like Mammața, takes laksaņā to be basically two-fold such as śuddhā and gaunī. He has denounced the opinion of those who hold 'gauni' as an independent sabda-vrtti. He believes that as in both laksanā as well as gaunī, the meaning apprehended is that only which is connected with the primary sense, it is futile to take these two vịttis, i.e. gauņi and laksaņā as separate and independent of each other as is done by Mukula and Hemacandra. He feels that this relation with the primary sense gives rise to a secondary sense in both these vșttis, which therefore do not deserve independent reckoning : “atha laksaņā nirņiyate, să ca mukhyártha-samband hena sabdasya pratipadakatvam. tat-sadrśyena pratipādakatvarūpā gauny api laksaņā-prabheda eva, tat-sadrśepi tannirūpitasādrśyādhi-karanatva-paramparā-sambandha-sattvāt." (pp. 50, ibid)
Mukula, as seen earlier accepts gauņī as an independent power of word, separate from laksanā. He is indebted to some Mimāmsaka thinkers for this approach. Kumārila, as seen earlier, observes :
"abhidhayávinābhūtapratītir laksaņocyate, lakṣyamāņa-guņair yogāt vịtter istā tu gaunatā." (Tantravārttika I. IV. 22)

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'Laksaņā'
541 "Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 34, ibid)
For Mammata gauni is a variety of laksan, in which 'upacara' or metaphor takes place due to similarity, while in other varity of laksanā there is absence of this 'upacāra', based on similarity and hence is termed 'suddhā'. Mukula was of the opinion that 'upacara' is a broader term and it includes relations both based or similarity or any other factor else than similarity. Dixit accepts Mammata's verdict while his predecessor and Mammata's successor Hemacandra has a different attitude. We have seen above that Hemacandra accepts gauni as an independent śabda-sakti and the difference between gauni and laksanā for him is so thin that it is hardly traceable. For Hemacandra 'gauņártha' is that secondary meaning which is superimposed, either through identity or otherwise, when contradiction of primary sense, (nimitta i.e.) tadyoga and motive are (as causes). - "mukhyarthabādhe nimitte, prayojane ca, bhedā'bhedābhyam āropito gaunah.” (Kā. śā. I. 17, pp. 44, Edn. 2nd, Prof. Parikh & Dr. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64).
Now this ‘āropita' artha or superimposed sense is brought about by ‘nimitta' i.e. 'tadyoga' or relation with the primary sense, such as “sādrsya-samband i.e. through the relation of similarity and others. This is for the apprehension of similarity or identity etc. This is the motive, or 'prayojana'. The crux of the point is that this superimposition is, "āropya-āropa-visayayor bhedā'bhedena” i.e. through either identity or difference between the subject of superimposition and the object (vişayin) superimposed. Hemacandra independently of this 'gauna' meaning, also accepts 'laksyārtha' which is also connected with the primary sense (mukhyārtha) but is indicated through identity only. - “mukhyártha-sambaddhas tattvena laksyamāno laksyah." (Kā. Sā. I. 18). He says that by 'tattvena' is meant that it is not superimposed either through difference or identity (as in the case with gauņa artha). The rest of laksyártha is the same as gaunártha. "tattvena laksyamāna iti vacanād bhedá-bhedābhyām āropita iti na vartate. sesam tu gauņa-lakṣaṇam anuvartata eva.” (pp. 45, ibid. vrtti on kā. śā. I. 18).
Though of course Hemacandra has not illustrated sādrśya-mülaka-laksyártha, but he has not ruled it out either. The illustration is 'gangāyām ghosah' in which both the meanings of gangā-tata' and 'gangā-pravāha' are in absolute identity (tattvena). But in case of 'gauna' meaning as illustrated by him in 'Indrah' for 'indrárthā sthūņā, or in 'grāmaḥ' for 'grama-svāmī - etc. the same thing appers viz.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA (tattvena). Of course Hemacandra does mention, that in 'gauņártha’ both 'bheda’ and ‘abheda' are seen, but the point is that how are we to distinguish between abheda-mülaka gaunártha and laksyártha which is necessarily abheda-mül only difference obvious is to believe 'gauna' as that meaning which is based on similarity of qualities. But then we arrive at a more logical presentation of Mammața and Appayya who take superimposition based on similar qualities, i.e. sāděśya as 'gauņi, a variety of laksaņā, the other being sādrśyetara-sambandhamülā 'śuddha' laksanā. So, Appayya is very right when, like Mammata, he also observes that - "tat-sādịśyena pratipādakatva-rūpā gauny api lakṣaṇā-prabheda eva." - i.e. as in case of suddhā laksana in gauni also, because the meaning is apprehended through the primary meaning being discarded and through the relation of similarity, gauni also has to be taken as a variety of laksanā, (over and above suddhā).
Appaya further observes that the objector may argue that, in places such as, 'simho māņavakah', and 'gaur vāhīkaḥ', there is no apprehension of the sādrśya but - in ‘simha-sadrśaḥ māņavakah', there is apprehension of a similar object i.e. 'sadrśa' only, and in this case how can we call it 'sādrśya-mülaka-gauni-laksanā' here? The reply to this is that even in 'a similar object, i.e. 'sadrśa', the idea of similarity or 'sādřśya' is inherent. Thus in the expression “Mānavaka is similar to a lion or 'simhasaděśaḥ māņavakah', the similarity is also between 'simha' and 'māņavaka', through paramparā or indirectly. The objector may argue that can such an indirect or 'paramparā' relation be taken as a cause in gauni laksaņā ? The answer is 'yes'. Appayya here cites an illustration. Between the eye and a pot there is ‘pratyaksa sannikarsa' or direct relation, i.e. samyoga-sambandha. Now the 'neela-varna' or colour in the pot is related to eye through indirect relation or paramparā sambandha such as 'samyukta - samavāya-sambandha. Similarly in simhasardịśamāṇavaka, the relation of sādņśya is paramparā-siddha. Appayya Dixit observes : (pp. 50, ibid): na hi, 'sākṣāt samband he viśista-buddhi-yogya-samband he vā saty eva laksanā'itiniyamah, cakşurăder ghatanailyā"dişu samyuktasamavāyā"divad-viśista-buddhi-yogyasya paramparā-sambandhasya'pi pratyāsattitvopapatteh."
Appayya Dixit also observes that in what he calls a vyatireka-laksana also, such a paramparā relation i.e., indirect relation exists. In Instances such as, “upakstam bahu tatra..." etc., the relation of opposition with reference to both the opponents is collected only indirectly. The objector may argue that as in case of an illustration viz. "dandi devadattah” i.e. 'Devadatta is having a staff there is apprehension of a

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'Laksanā'
543 qualified sense-visista-buddhi-such as danda-visista-devadatta' i.e. devadatta qualified by a staff, - in the same way there is no apprehension of such qualified sense - visista-buddhi-in case of sādịśya or similarity. For if there is cognition of such a qualified apprehension in 'simho devadattah', then the words such as 'simhavān devadattah' should have been used. But there is no such use. So, 'sadrśya' cannot be taken as causing a qualified cognition i.e. viśista-buddhi.
Appayya refutes this argument in the following way - Through the indirect relation, i.e. paramparā sambandha', even sadrsya makes for a qualified cognition - i.e. viśista-buddhi. Thus, in ‘simho māņavakah', we can say that the similarity qualified by simhatva (i.e. simhatva-viśista-sādrśya) qualifies on its part a similar object. Māņavaka is non-different (abhinna) from such a qualified similar object. Dixit thus comes to the conclusion that though sadrśya-relation may not control the visista-buddhi or qualified cognition directly, but it causes such a cognition through paramparā i.e. indirect relation, which also is a relation in itself. Laksaņā based on
on is therefore said to be gauni-laksanā. He observes : (pp. 50, ibid) · "...vyatireka-laksanā-sthale, tannirūpita-virodhā'dhikaranatvā"di-paramparāsambandha - mātrena tādrsena laksanā klptes' ca. etena-'sādrśyam na sambandha iti gauni laksanāto bhinnā, visista-dhi-yogyasyaiva sambandhatvät. samyoge sati'dandi devadatta' itivat saty api sādrsye 'simhavān devadattah' iti visistabuddher adarśanāt', iti nirastam; visista-buddhi-niyāmaka-paramparā-sambandha-mātrasya pratyāsattitvopapatteh tāvatā laksanā-klptes' ca darsitatvāt." - tasmāt sādrsyagarbha-tad-anya-sambandha-nimittatayā gauni suddhā ca iti laksanāyā eva dvaividhyam.” (pp. 50, 51, ibid).
Appayya Dixita then attempts the classification of laksanā. He basically gives nine varieties of laksanā. First of all laksaņā is divided into sādrśya-garbhā (gauni) and tad-anyā i.e. suddhā. These two are again two-fold such as nirudhā-laksaņā and phala-laksanā (i.e. prayojanavati). That which is based or rūdhi or usage is ‘nirūdha-laksana', while that based on motive i.e. 'prayojana' is phala-laksaņā, which is defined as that, “which has a motive, the apprehension of a sense other than the primary one." This phala-laksanā is sub-divided into seven varieties such as (i) jahallaksaņā, (ii) a-jahallaksaņā, (iii) jahad-ajahllakṣaṇā, (iv) sāropā (v) sādhyavasānā (vi) suddhā and (vii) gauni. Rūdha-laksanā is two-fold i.e. suddha and 'gauni'. Thus Dixit gives a nine-fold classificationas against Mammata's sixfold, though in case of the latter, commentators differ in explaining the term 'sadvidhā' as explained earlier. The table for Dixit's varieties can be read as under :

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
lakşaņā
gauni
gauni
śuddha
nirudhā
phalavati
nirudhā
phalavati
sāropā
sādhyavasānā
sāropā sādhyavasānā jahallaksaņā ajahallaksaņā jahad-ajahallaksaņā
Mammața's upādāna and laksana-laksaņā are termed respectively jahallaksaņā and a-jahallaksaņā by Dixita. In the vyākaranaśāstra we come across terms such as jahat-svārthā and ajahat-svārthā. May be Appayya sought inspiration from there. The third variety viz. jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā is an independent variety of phalalaksana and is termed as either bhāga-laksanā or bhāga-tyāga-laksanā in the śāstras.
We saw earlier that actually the Vedāntins, to explain such sentences as, 'tat tvam asi' etc. have advanced this third variety. They leave the 'visesana' element (jahat) and continue with the 'viśesya' element (a-jahat) in such upanişadic sentences. We have seen that works on Vedānta such as the Vedāntasāra discuss this variety. For this third variety viz. jahad-ajahallaksaņā, Appayya cites the illustrations
rāmo dagdhah” and “puspitam vanam”. He observes (pp. 53, ibid) "grāmaikadeśa-dāhā”dau sati, "grāmo dagdhaḥ”, “puspitam vanam”, ityādi prayoge "grāmā"di padasya svārthaika-deśa-parityāgena tad ekadeśe vștter jahadajahallakṣaṇā, dagdha-bhūyastv ādi dyotanam phalam.” - When such statements are utterred it is not meant that the whole village is burnt, or that each and everytree in the forest is flowered, but in fact the burning takes place of some part of a village and some trees in a forest bear flowers. So, in such statements one portion of 'sva-artha' in case of the words viz. 'grāma' and 'vana' are left out and some portion of the same is preserved and apprehended. Major portion of a village and majority of the trees in a forest are the obvious motive in these instances.
Nāgesa in his 'udyota' on the Pradīpa of Govinda Thakkura on the Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammața denounces this variety viz. jahad-ajahallaksaņā by observing that this variety is covered under jahallakṣaṇā itself as here also the

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"Lakşaņā'
545 expressive word gives a meaning different from its primary sense. But it can be argued against this, that there is no clear apprehension in jahallaksanā of the fact that only some portion of the primary sense is to be left out while some other is to be carried forward. Again, in sentences such as 'tat-tvam asi', this third variety is accepted by tradition and threfore also it does not deserve any repudication.
Appayya Dixit has tried to establish 'gauni laksana' as a variety of laksana with special arguments. This speaks of his logical thinking. He has also mentioned nine sub-divisions as against the six advanced by Mammata. His establishment of jahadajahallaksanā is also original. He has also contributed originally while discussing sāropā and sādhyavasānā varieties.
In his Vrtti-vārttika, in the very beginning he includes (śuddhā) sādhyavasānā variety in śuddhā jahallaksanā. For him it is useless to take (śuddha) sādhya-vasānā as independent of and separate from (śuddhā) jahallaksaņā. The obvious reason behind this is that in both these varieties, the 'laksanika pada' - i.e. word charged with laksaņā, gives up its primary meaning for apprehending some other sense. For example, in the illustration viz. 'gangāyām ghosah', an instance of suddhājahallaksanā, the word 'gangā' leaves its primary sense of 'gangā-pravāha' or the stream of the gangā, in order to convey 'parártha' or some other sense in form of ‘gangā-tata' or the bank of the gangā. In the same way in śuddhā sādhyavasānā as in ‘ayam rājā', where on sighting a king's officer, such a statement as, “Here is the king' is issued, the meaning viz. “king's man/officer” i.e. frājakīya-purusa”, is swollowed up. Thus in both śuddhā jahallaksanā and 'śuddhā sādhyavasānā variety, the primary sense i.e. svārtha is given up (= samarpita) for realizing another sense i.e. parártha. Thus, for Dixit, śuddhā jahallaksaņā and suddhā sādhyavasānā are identical with each other.
It may be asked here that when suddhā sāropā and suddhā jahallaksaņā are held as different what harm is there in differentiating suddhā sādhya vasānā and śuddhā jahallaksaņā also ? For this Appayya says that in both śuddhā sāropā and suddhā sadhyavasānā the fact of non-difference i.e. a-bheda is one and the same, due to samāna-vibhaktikatva i.e. apposition. But at the same time there is some speciality of this sort of a superimposition. This fact of speciality of superimposition distinguishes śuddhā sāropā from śuddhā jahallaksaņā while there is no such distinction available with reference to superimposition that is taking place with both śuddhā sādhyavasānā and suddhā jahallaksanā. So the former should be included in the latter.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
Again in writing off the variety called śuddhā sādhyavasānā Appayya argues that if someone holds that in suddhā sādhyavasānā as illustrated by, “āyur eva idam”, there is the relation of cause and effect i.e. kārya-kārana-sambandha, while in suddhā jahallaksanā, as in gangāyām ghosah, the relation is that of nearness i.e. sāmīpya-sambandha which is different from the kārya-karana-sambandha, this argument is not valid. For if the difference is with reference to the kārya-karanarelation, then due to such other relations as sva-svāmibhāva, tādarthya, tātkarmya, etc. also any number of varieties of laksana will prop up and in this case our basic stand that (phalavatī) laksana is seven-fold will be vitiated. Due to this also it is not advisable to accept difference between suddhā sadhyavasānā and suddha jahallaksaņā. Appayya observes - (pp. 56-57, ibid) -
"atrédam pratibhāti. - 'suddhāsu sādhyavasāyabheda-kathanam ayuktam, parártha-sva-samarpanasya a-višesena tasya jahallaksanā-'natirekāt. na hi tad avišesépi sāropa-laksanāyām visaya-vācaka-sāmānādhikaranya-krta-vaicitryántaram asti, yena tad-vad eva jahallaksaņātaḥ prthag udāhriyeta.
nanu-'kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-sambandhena vṛttiḥ ity ata eva prthaktvam astu, kāryakārana-bhāvātiriktena gangā-tīrā”di-gata-samyogā"di-sambandhena yrttau jahallakṣaṇā’ity asamkaropapatte»'; - mā evam - 'rājakīyaḥ puruṣo rājā' 'indrārthā sthūņā indraḥ, 'a-taksā’yam takşā', 'agra-hasto'yam hastaḥ', iti sva-svāmibhāvatādarthya-tātkarmya-avayavávayavi-bhāveșvapi kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva iva sāropā'dhyavasāya-laksanayor akara-granthesuudāharanād, aśrayāśrayibhāvasambandhe api alamkāra-sudhā-nidhau udāharaṇāc ca, vaicitryántarábhāvépi vidhāntaropagame sambandha-bhedántaram avalambyápi vidhāntaropavarnanasya pratyākhyātum a-sakyatayā sapta-vidharva-niyama-a-sāmañjasya-prasangāc ca.”
Now, says Appayya Dixita, that if it is argued that in śuddhā sādhyavasānā the apprehension of suggested sense is preceded by that of identification, while it is not the case in śuddhā jahallaksanā, and hence both are different on account of this speciality of suggested sense brought about by identification preceding it, then this also is not a sound argument. Appayya says that even in suddhā jahallaksanā also there is apprehension of suggested sense with the apprehension of identity preceding it. In 'gangāyām ghosah', only after the apprehension of identity between the stream-pravāha-of ganga and the bank-tata-of gangā, the phala in form of the suggestion of coolness and piousness is apprehended. For this Dixit has quoted illustrations from 'Kavya-sarani', 'kavya-prakāśa' and also 'Ratnākara'. It may be said, observes Prof. Dr. B. D. Pandya (Ref. Appayya Dixita, kavi ane alamkārika - in Gujarati - pp. 216. doctoral thesis, published by Guj. Uni. '74, Ahd.) that the

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547 presentation of Dixitajee is 'revolutionary and original'. But the fact is that Appayya's views on laksanā also are challanged and almost blasted at so many places by Punditarāja Jagannātha and this is not taken care of by Dr. B. D. Pandya but nicely presented by Prof. P. Ramacandrudu in his "The Contribution of Panditaraja Jagannātha to Sanskrit Poetics" (Vol. I. Edn. Nirajana publishers Delhi - 7, '83). This we will examine in due course.
For the present we will continue with Appayya Dixit, when he comes to discuss sāropā laksanā. The famous illustration of sāropā laksaņā is, 'mukham candrah'. Here 'mukha' is said to be 'visaya' or 'upameya', and 'candra' is 'visayi or ‘upamāna'. The relation between these two is that of similarity i.e. sādrśyasambandha. On the basis of this relation it is imagined that 'the face is itself the moon'. Thus identity is brought about between the two. This identification shows the relation of tād-rūpya' between 'mukha' and 'candra'. This relation of identity i.e. tādrūpya-sambandha is impossible to be established by the primary senses of 'mukha' and 'candra', because both these things are absolutely different from each other. So, to bring out the apprehension of identification, we have to resort to laksaņā or indication with reference to 'candra', and through laksana we have to arrive at a meaning viz. 'candra-sadrśa' i.e. 'similar to the moon'. The motive or prayojana behind this laksanā is to suggest the 'tādrūpya' abheda between 'mukha' and 'candra'.
Now, Appayya holds that to begin with, in instances such as, 'mukham candrah', there is no need to resort to sāropā laksaņā at all! In Vịttivārttika as well as in the portion on rūpaka alamkāra in his Citra-mīmāmsā, he has vociferously argued to denounce sāropā laksaņā in such cases. The gist of his argument is that the word 'candra' through its indicated sense of 'candra-sadrśa' i.e. 'similar to the moon', is incapable of the expression of 'mukhatva', because 'mukhatva' can never be found to be present in 'candra'. Even if you say that, the word 'candra' indicates the sense of one having kānti or beauty, through the sāmānya (i.e. class) in form of ‘kāntimattā' or 'the quality of having beauty', the apprehension of tādrūpya or identity will not take place. Again, in ‘mukham candrah', if it is said that there is scope for laksaņā on account of similarity residing in the moon, then as this meaning of similarity is dawned, this illustration viz. 'mukham candrah', will have to be taken as an illustration of upamā i.e. simile. This being the situation in place of rūpaka alamkāra, the position of sāropā (gaunī) laksaņā becomes impossible.
Again, in the illustration viz. ‘mukham candrah', for the identification between the face and the moon, indication on the word candra giving the meaning candra

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sadrśa - i.e. 'similar to moon', is resorted to and the motive or prayojana here is said to be tādrūpya i.e. abheda or identification between 'mukha' and 'candra'. The ancients hold that this tādrūpya' is the 'phala' i.e. 'prayojana', of laksaņā here. But Dixit strongly objects to this ‘phala' or 'prayojana' also. Appayya observes : (pp. 61, ibid) - "tasmāt sāropa-laksanódāharaneșu sādhārana-dharmā"di-mukena laksanā’ ity uktam. tathā-'tādrūpya-pratītir atra phalam’ity api uktam. sāmānya-dharmamukhena sādņśyamukhena vā laksanopagame tādrūpyábhivyakty ayogāt, tathā hi ‘kāntiman mukham', 'candra-sadịśam mukham', ity adir arthaḥ sampadyate.
Appayya has also objected to Mammața's illustration of ślista-paramparitarūpaka, such as 'vidvan-mānasa-hamsa.' etc. in which according to Mammata laksaņā is resorted to. Appayya is of the opinion that in the illustration viz. 'vidvan mānasahamsa...” etc., according to the ancients there is at the first stage, sāropā laksanā due to sādrśya or similarity in form of ‘mānasa-vāsitva', i.e. staying in ‘mānasa' (i.e. both mind and manasa-lake). Then according to the ancients at the
next step, when identification between the swan and the king is realized there is - the figure of speech called 'rūpaka' i.e. metaphor. Here while realizing the metaphor of the swan in the king, in this illustration, viz. vidvan-mānasa-hamsa. etc., first comes the ślesa i.e. paronomasia in form of “mānasa is mānasa” - ‘mānasam eva mānasam'. This śleșa gives two meanings of the word 'mānasa'. Thus here similarity is based on ślesa. Without the realisation of this slesa, the similarity in form, of 'stay in mānasa' or 'mānasa-vāsitva', can not be realized. And so the rupaka based on this realization also becomes impossible.
But Appayya opposes this view of the ancients. He is of the opinion that in the illustration viz. vidvanmānasa, there is no sequence such as first comes ślesa and next comes rūpaka. Here, actually the rūpaka takes place first, because the word ‘mānasa' itself, through the medium of rūpaka or metaphor, is able to suggest the motive or intention of the poet. Thus in the apprehension of ślesa through the agency of rūpaka, śleşa comes later then rūpaka, thus it cannot be accepted that ślesa is either instrumental in bringing about rūpaka or in that of the similarity which is at the base of laksaņā : tallambhakasya śleşasya rūpakotthāpyatayā rūpakā”peksa-laksaņā-daśāyām tasya buddhipathánārohāt. - (pp. 62, ibid), To substantiate his view Appayya quotes from ācārya named Cakravarti.
“rūpakam pūrva-samsiddham ślesam tajjñāpayed yadi, tadā rūpakam eva syāt anyathā śleșa ucyate.” (alamkāra-sarvasva-nikrstártha kārika - 21]

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549 - iti śleşa-rūpakayor vibhāgam vyavasthāpitavatā cakravartinā’py asminnudāharane rūpakopavarnanenā’tra ślesa-pāścātryasya sphutīkaraṇāc ca.” (pp. 62, ibid)
In the illustration viz. "vidvan-mānasa." etc., there is no requirement of resorting to laksanā to realize the identity between 'rājā' and 'hamsa' i.e. the king and the swan, because it takes place through 'samsarga-maryādā' or apposition i.e. 'sāmānādhikaranya' itself. There is a rule that if two 'nāmárthas' - names have come together, they are correlated through the relation of identity only. Following this rule, the two words such as 'rājā' and 'hamsa' which are placed in the same case (i.e. vibhakti), have their abheda-or identity realized through apposition or vākyártha itself and hence there is no need to resort to 'sāropā laksaņā”. Appayya observes - (pp. 62, ibid) : "atra idam tattvam, - 'vidvan'-mānasa-hamsa'. - ityadau 'hamsā"di padānām varnye rājani laksana na'ngīkartavyā, sāmānādhikaranyena varnyasya rājñah prasiddha-hamsa-jātīyā"dibhir abhedasya vākyārtha-vidhayaiva pratīty upapatteh.” If it is argued against this that let there be identity-abhedarealized between 'rājā' and 'hamsa', but the apprehension of tādrūpya' or identity based on similarity or sādrya also cannot be prevented which occurs to the aesthetes. So, laksanā is a necessity here. To this Dixit's reply follows like this. Rūpaka takes place, at places of apposition even where there is intention of mere identity. He quotes a verse from Varadarāja-stava to illustrate this point. The verse is, "ürdhvam viriñcibhavanāt tava nābhi-padmāt...” etc. In this verse, observes Appayya that, in the intention of conveying identity between “urah-sthala" the visaya and 'paramam padam' the visayī, their similarity-tādrpya-is underscored. And yet there is ‘rūpaka' here, and that only identity-abheda-is inteded by the poet is brought out by the words 'eva' and 'sāksāt'. Now here, if there is apprehention of 'abheda' or identity then, on the strength of the fact that rūpaka takes place due to similarity - i.e. tādrūpye rūpakam', or that rūpaka takes place when there is apposition between the visaya and the visayin - "visaya-visayi-sāmānādhikaranyasthale rūpakam” - then here we will have rūpaka. The ancients also think that, when there is apprehension of identity there is 'atiśayokti' - "abhede atiśayoktih”, i.e. "visyyabheda-mātra-nirdeśa-sthale atiśayoktih”, i.e. atiśayokti takes place when there is delineation of only the identity of visayi. So, in that case, in the illustration viz. "vidvan-mānasa-hamsa", etc., as abheda or (total nigarana) is seen between visayin-hamsa and visaya-rājā, we will have to go for atiśayokti here. But Dixit first of all finds fault with the observation of the ancients itself. For, according to this rule, we will start apprehending ‘atiśayokti' in the illustration of rūpaka, such

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA as 'vidvan-mānasa'. etc., as there is only identity between 'hamsa' and 'rājā' and there is no 'tādrūpya' or similarity observed. So, to denounce the belief of the ancients concerning the difference between rūpaka and atiśayokti, Appayya cites the illustration viz. "hrtpankajāni." etc. The meaning of this illustration is this - "O lord, the light - jyotsnā - (of the form of lustre of your nails) oozing out from the moon in form of your nails, acquires another nature as it blossoms the lotuses in
rm of the hearts of vour devotees, and it dries up the ocean in form of worldly existence.” In this illustration the visayi-pada in form of 'jyotsnā' completely swallows up - (nigarana) the visaya-in form of nakha-kānti i.e. lustre of the nails - and hence there should be atiśayokti in this illustration. But the ancients believe that there is rūpaka when there is similarity - tādrūpye rūpakam' and there is ‘atiśayokti' when there is (total) identity, 'abhede-atiśayoktih : Here, even if there is mentioning of only “jyotsnā' which is a visayi-pada, this 'jyotsnā' or moon-light
pecial as it blossoms the lotuses and hence this visayin jyotsnā is different from nakha-kāntin-the luster of the nails, which is 'visaya' here. So, we will acquire apprehension of similarity or 'tādrūpya' between the two and hence there will be realization of 'rūpaka' here. So, it is advisable, argues Dixit, to dispense with the view of the ancients taking "tādrūpye rūpakam”, and “abhede'tiśayoktiḥ”. We should go for a new belief. Appayya here suggests this new arrangement such as - “vişaya-visayi-pada-asāmānádhikaranye rūpakam” - i.e. rūpaka takes place when visaya-pada and visayi-pada are clearly mentioned as separate entities. And, when their is mentioning of only the visayi-pada, there is atiśayokti - "visayimātranirdese atiśayoktiḥ”. If we accept this new arrangement there will not be any mixup, because in the illustration viz. "vidvanmānasa." etc. as there is separate mentioning of 'rājā' and 'hamsa' clearly, it is a case for rūpaka, and in "jyotsnā tvad-anghri.” etc. only the visayi-pada, viz. 'jyotsnā’ is clearly mentioned, it is a case for atiśayokti only. Says he, (pp. 63, ibid) : "tathā ca, yadi 'tādrūpye rūpakam, abhede'tisayoktih, iti vyavasthām parityajya 'visaya-visayi-pada-sāmānádhikaranye rūpakam, visayı-pada-mātra-nirdeśe'tiśayoktih iti vyavasthā adriyate, tadā, "vidvan-mānasa-hamsa.” ityādau abheda-pratītau satyām api rūpakam sambhavati iti na kācid anupapattiḥ.”
Thus in case of rūpaka, Appayya has established a new norm in dispensing with sāropā laksanā, and also in rejecting the belief of the ancients that we have ‘tādrūpye rūpakam' i.e., rūpaka in case of tādrūpya, and ‘abhede-atiśayoktiņ'.
With this we come to the end of Appayya's treatment of lakṣaṇā. Jagannātha (R.G. pp. 464, Edn. Prof. Athavale, ibid) observes : “atha keyam laksanā,

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551 yanmūlascaramam nirūpito dhvanih, ucyate, śakya-sambandho laksanā." i.e. what is the form of laksanā based on which is enumerated dhvani which is laksanāmūla ? It is said, “The relation of the primary sense with other sense is lakṣaṇā i.e. indication.” Here 'sakyártha' is itself 'mukhyártha' or vācyártha.
We have seen earlier that the Vaiyākaranas, Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas also discuss laksaņā and the ālamkārikas also hold their own position in this case. As observed earlier, it was Mukula, so far as available written documents go, the first among alamkārikas who dealt with the topic of śabda-vrttis seriously and Mammața followed him in this respect. Though without dealing with the topic of śabda-vrttis separately Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also have considered this topic. Mammata is followed in this respect later by almost all ālamkārikas beginning with Hemacandra down to Viśvanāthā, but Appayya and now Jagannātha have a special word on laksaņā.
We have seen that many vaiyakaranas have accepted laksanā as a separate śabda-vrtti, but there are some who take it only as an aspect of abhidhā, as done by Mukula. Kaunda Bhatta - the author of Vaiyākarana-bhūsana-sāra is thus against lakṣaṇā to be reckoned as a separate and independent śabda-vrtti. It is only an aspect, or an extension of abhidhā for him. But majority of the grammarions are in favour of accepting laksanā as an independent word-power as is evident from Nāgeśa's Vaiyakarana Laghu-Mañjusā (pp. 94-133), where he finally takes up a stand in favour of laksanā defining it as - 'sakyatāvacchedakarūpā. (pp. 112).
The Naivaikas take laksanā as 'sakya-sambandha' (see Muktavalī, pp. 3-5) and Jagannātha seems to follow this. Jagannātha observes: “tasyāśca arthopasthāpakatve mukhyárthatávacchedake tātparyavisayánvayitávacchedakatāyā abhāvo na tantram. śakyatávacchedaka-rūpeṇa laksyabhānasya svīkārāt. kimtu tātparya-visayánvaye mukhyárthatávacchedaka-rūpeṇa mukhyártha-pratiyogikatāyā abhāvo rūdhi-prayojanayor anyatarac ca tantram. mukhyárthánvayā--nupapatteh tantratve tu, 'käkebhyo dadhi raksyatām'ity atra laksanotthānam na syāt. 'gangāyām ghosah' ity atra sāmīpyam, 'mukham candraḥ', ity adau sādrśyam, vyatireka-lakṣaņāyām virodhaḥ, āyur ghệtam' ity adau kāranatvā”dayas'ca sambandhā yathā yogam lakṣaṇā-śarīrāņi." (pp. 464, R. G. Edn. ibid) -
Through laksaņā we arrive at laksyártha, a secondary sense, which is other than the primary sense. But here the reason is not this that the quality of speciality of the primary sense i.e. muk avacchedaka dharma - is not present in the correlation (anvaya) with laksyártha or the secondary sense, which is the object of

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the motive
'tātparya-viṣayánvayita'vacchedakatāyā abhāvaḥ na tantram'.
because lakṣyártha or secondary sense is realized through the avacchedaka dharma of the primary sense or through the form of the avacchedaka-dharma. This is accepted by all.
-
We will try to make this clear as follows. We have observed that Jagannatha following the Naiyayikas, and also the Vedantins, defines lakṣaṇā very simply as, 'sakya-sambandho lakṣaṇa'. The Sarala commentary (pp. 185, R.G.) explains it as an expression, by a word, of a secondary sense, as is related to the primary sense. As Prof. Athavale explains, (pp. 486, ibid) in instances like 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ' the primary meaning of 'gangāyām' i.e. on the stream of gangā, is inapplicable and hence we have to resort to another meaning such as, 'on the bank of ganga'. The primary meaning of 'stream of Ganga' is discarded but there is some relation of the primary sense with the newly accepted meaning of 'the bank of Ganga.' If there is no relation whatsoever between these two senses, then any meaning will start to flow from the word 'gangāyām'. Thus the unavoidable condition for resorting to lakṣaṇā is to show some relation between the primary sense and the secondary sense. Thus, Jagannatha terms such fixed relation only as lakṣaṇā. In this illustration this relation is that of nearness or 'sāmīpya'. Such other relations are also possible between the primary and the secondary sense.
Now there is a subtle point to be considered. The point is whether, over and above such relations as sāmīpya etc., is there any relation absolutely common to all, between the primary sense and the secondary sense? With regard to this, there are two views, which may be put as follows: Some are of the opinion that between the primary and the secondary sense there is no other relation beyond those such as sāmīpya, etc., which are welknown. The primary sense is completely negated and in its place the secondary sense is resorted to. The special dharma or quality - avacchedaka dharma of the primary sense is not seen at all in this new secondary sense. Thus it is in fitness of things when there is no relation between the special quality of the primary sense with the secondary sense, the relations between the primary and the secondary senses must be totally different. This view is held by earlier ālamkarikas.
Jagannatha holds the view held by Mammata, which forms the second opinion. This view believes that it is not necessary that the special characteristics avacchedaka darma - of the mukhyártha and the lakṣyártha have got to be necessarily different. It is not so that the avacchedaka-dharma of the primary sense

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553 is never observed in the secondary sense. On the contrary, this view holds that the special characteristic of the mukhyártha and that of the laksyártha should be one and the same. This means that there should be a relation of identity - abhedasambandha-between these two. Mammata and the like hold that between, mukhyártha and laksyártha there is no 'bheda-rūpa-tāțasthya' - i.e. difference. Jagannātha observes : “sakyatávacchedaka-rūpena laksyabhānasya svīkārāt." He further adds - "kim tu, tātparya-visayánvaye mukhyárthatávacchedaka-rūpena mukhyártha-pratiyogikatāyā abhāvo rūdhi-prayojanayor anyatarac ca tantram. mukhyárthánvayā’nupapatteḥ tantratve tu 'kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām'ity atra laksanótthānam na syāt. 'gangāyām ghosah' ity atra sāmipyam, 'mukha-candrah', ity adau sādrśyam, vyatireka-laksanāyām virodhah, ayur ghrtam' ity adau kāraṇatvā”dayaśca sambandhā yathāyogam lakṣaṇā-śarīrāņi.”
When the earlier alamkārikas counted the sāmīpya, sadrśya and other relations, they held that these relations are of the form of non-identity or 'bheda'. For them, between the mukhyártha viz. 'stream of Ganga' and the laksyártha viz. 'the bank of Gangā', the relation was only of nearness i.e. sāmīpya. Mammaţa pointed out a mistake in this view that if this bheda-sambandha is held in samīpya etc., the qualities of coolness - śaitya - and piousness i.e. pāvanatva will not appear in the bank while the chief purpose of laksana is to make one apprehend these qualities in the bank also. Thus, it is inevitable to accept, in any variety of laksanā, this relation of non-distinction or a-bheda between the primary and the secondary senses. If the apprehension of śaitya and pāvanatva does not occur in the bank through laksanā, then the whole process becomes futile, as the speaker can use a sentence such as "gangātīre ghosah”, in place of 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ”. But one resorts to laksanā only with a special motive in mind and in this case it is the apprehension of saitya and pāranatva and this motive can not be realized without accepting non-distinction i.e. ‘a-bheda' between mukhyártha and laksyártha.
Though Jagannātha has not pointedly criticized Hemacandra here, but this discussion explains the futility of holding ‘gauņi as a separate vrtti from laksanā, for in the latter, i.e. in laksanā for Hemacandra the relation between the two senses is that of absolute identity, 'tattvena', while in the former i.e. gauņi, it is through
neda' and 'a-bheda'. Hemacandra's thinking and therefore his keeping ‘gaunī as a separate word-power, distinct from laksaņā, are both faulty.
It so happens that in some instances of laksana there is absence of a motive. This is termed rūdhi-laksaņā, or one based on popular usage, for example the word, 'kušala' primarily means 'kuśān lāti' i.e. one who cuts the kusa grass, and

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA secondarily it means 'an expert in any activity, and it is in this sense only that the word is fixed through usage. Any person who uses this word, uses it in the sense of 'an expert only and there is no motive behind this usage. But it has to be borne in mind that there has to be some relation between the primary and the secondary senses as it is the first condition of laksanā. Even in 'kušala' there is a relation of 'expert handling of any task. It is precisely for this end in view that Jagannātha defines laksaņā as 'sakya-sambandhah laksaņā.” Thus relation between the two senses is very important. He goes a step further and says, as noted above, that in 'prayojanavati laksanā, there has to be an apprehension of the special quality - avacchedaka dharma - of the mukhyártha in the laksyártha; and the relation between the two meanings has got to be that of non-difference or abheda' only. Without this the speaker's motive can never be realized. .
So, the view of the ancients that between the two senses any relation whatsoever will do is thus negated by both Mammața and Jagannātha alike. . Jagannātha, however points out a defect in Mammata's definition of laksanā. While Mammata has introduced 'mukhyártha-badha' as one of the basic conditions for laksanā, this is not so in Jagannātha's view. The obvious reason is that if we accept this i.e. mukhyártha-badha as a pre-condition for laksanā, then such instances as, “kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām” will fall out of the scope of laksanā as there is no difficulty in correlating (anvaya) the words in this sentence. But it is clear that the purport of this statement is that curd is to be protected not only from crows but also from all agency that may foul it and cause disturbance. So, we have to resort to laksana in the word 'käkebhyah' and arrive at the secondary sense such as - "dadhyupaghātakaprāņinah.”
In the Kāvyaprakāśa, Mammața observes : "anayor laksyasya lakṣakasya ca na bhedarūpam tāțasthyam. tatā’dīnām gangādiśabdaiḥ pratipādane tattvapratipattau hi pratipipădayisita-prayojana-sampratyayah. gangāsambandha-mātra pratītau tu gangātațe ghoṣaḥ iti mukhya-śabdábhidhānāl lakṣaṇāyāḥ ko bhedah.” (vrtti; K.P. II)
"In these two divisions (of indication) there is no separateness amounting to distinction between the indicated (sense) and the indicative. For, when the words like Gangā and the like, convey (the sense of the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive which is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Gangā with the bank). If (by the use of indication) merely a relation with Gangā (viz. stream) were to be apprehended,

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‘Lakşaņā
555 then what difference would there be of indication and a direct mode of expression - "A hamlet on the bank of Gangā ? (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 31, ibid)
The point is that to say that in the two varieties of suddhā laksaņā such as ‘upādāna' and 'laksana', there is apprehension of 'bheda' or separateness, but in gauni laksan, there is 'a-bheda' or no apprehension of separateness, is not proper. On the contrary, the apprehension of motive in prayojanavati laksanā takes place only if we apprehend a-bheda between mukhyártha and laksyártha, observes Mammața. This is acceptable to Jagannātha also but the condition of mukhyárthabadha is not acceptable as seen above as it keeps out such statements as 'käkebhyo.' etc. out of the scope of laksanā. Similar is the case of a statement such as, "naksatram dệstvā vācam visrjet.” Thus, 'tātparyā’nupapatti' or 'non-opprehension of motive' should be recognized as 'laksana-bīja' or the condition for laksanā. But even this 'tātparyā’nupapatti' can be explained in two ways -, either as - “mukhyārthatā’vacchedakā'dhikaranakaḥ tātparya-visayanvayitā’vacchedakatāyāḥ abhāvaḥ”, or as, “tātparya-visayanvayā”dhi-karanakah mukhyárthatā'vacchedakarūpena mukhyārtha-pratiyogitāyā abhāvah." (candrikā commentary, pp. 150, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, Benares, '55). The idea is that what is meant by tātparya in these cases ? By ‘tātparyā'nupapatti' is it meant that laksaņā takes place only when the two conditions - viz. 'mukhyárthávacchedaka' and 'tātparya-visayanvayitā'vacchedaka' - are present ? Or, is it meant that in the correlation - anvaya - meant by the speaker there is
the state of being 'mukhyārtha-pratiyogikatā' i.e. of being ‘mukhyarthiya' in what we know as mukhyárthávacchedaka ?
The substance is that by 'tātparyā’nupapatti' is it meant that the correlation of anvaya (which is the motive of the speaker) by its own form is not of the primary meaning ? Explaining the views in Candrikā, Dr. Ramacandrudu (pp. 250, ibid) puts it as - "In simple language it may, be said that the 'mukhyárthávacchedaka (i.e. gangārva etc.) should not be the same as 'tātparya-visayánvayitā’vacchedaka', and then only laksaņā arises. Or it may be explained that the mukhyártha, in its capacity of being mukhyártha should not be associated with the intended 'anvaya' while giving rise to laksaņā. But the first explanation of tātparyā’nupapatti is against the accepted theory of Alamkārikas, because in places like 'gangāyām ghosah', etc., they accept, in order to fecilitate the suggestion of pāvanatva etc., that the cognition of the taţa is only 'gangātva-rūpa'. Thus, tātparyavisayanvayitā'vacchedakatā' rests with 'gangātva' itself. Therefore, the second explanation of the tātparyā’nupapatti can be accepted, because, in the above

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA example, we get the cognition of the 'tīra' only, though in form of gangātva', and so 'tata' only (but not gangā) is the pratiyogin in the adhārā’dheya-bhāva. Thus the tātparyā'nupapatti is one of the laksaņā-hetus, according to Panditarāja, the other being rūļhi or prayojana. It is to be noted, Pandita-rāja does not take mukhyárthayoga as one of the laksanāhetus, because, as explained above, it is the laksanāsvarūpa but not its hetu.”
Following closely the discussion in Candrikā (pp. 150, 151) Sri Rāmachandrudu observes (pp. 252, ibid) *. "The above contention of the ālamkārikas as presented by PR. (= Panditarāja) that the cognition of the laksyártha is 'śakyártha-prakāraka', is objected to by some critics on the following ground. In the verse -
“kacatas trasyati vadanam
vadanāt kucamandalam bibheti, madhyād bibheti nayanam
nayanād adharaḥ samadvijati.” The words 'kaca', 'vadana', 'kuca', 'madhya', 'nayana' and 'adhara', are used to mean by laksaņā, rāhu, moon, lotus, lion, dear and sprout respectively. But if the 'sakyatávacchedaka' i.e. kacatva etc., also were to be included in the laksya-śābdabodha, the statement that the vadanam etc. are afraid of ‘kaca' etc. would be improper. Such statement can be justified only when the ‘kaca' etc. are taken completely as ‘rāhu' etc., without any tinge of 'kacatva', 'vadantva', etc. in them. This objection is voiced in the Darpana commenting on the following lines of Vaiyākarana-bhūsana-sāra - "laksanāyām ālamkārikāņām śakyatávacchedakaprakāraka eva bodhah.” (p. 65)
While repeatiting the above objection, Candrikā shows another objection also. In 'kākebhyo dadhi raksyatām' the word 'kākebhyah' means by laksaņā, 'dadhyupaghātakebhyaḥ, and according to the contention of PR., the laksyártha 'dadhyupaghātakebhyah' will be 'sakyatávacchedakaprakāraka'. Now ‘kāka’ also being one of the dadhyupaghātakas, comes under the general laksyártha which is kākatvaprakāraka. Thus the mukhyártha (= kāka) is the pratiyogin (sambandha) in the 'tātparya-visayánvaya' (i.e. avadhyavadhi-mad-bhāva in the present context) and this pratiyogitā of the mukhyártha is mukhyártha-pratiyogitā’vacchedaka-rūpa (i.e. kākatva) only. Thus in the absence of such pratiyogitā, how can it be accepted as an instance of laksaņā ? After posing this question, Candrikā itself suggests a method to avoid this trouble. If it is said that the mukhyārtha alone should not be

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'Laksana'
557
pratiyogin in such sambandha, the above objection can be got over, because in the present case 'kāka' only is not the pratiyogin of such sambandha, but the 'bidālā"di'
But even if this objection is met, Candrikā contends, the first objection stands unanswered. (Candrika pp. 150-151)
It may be pointed out here, this objection is not so formidable as is opined to be by Candrikā. Even if the rāhu and candra etc. are cognised in their kacatvā"dyavacchinna-rūpas, importance is to be given to their rāhurvā"di only, in view of the vidheya i.e. trāsa, and the sakyatāvacchedaktā fades into insignificance. Thus there is nothing wrong in accepting the above theory. Moreover the same objection can be raised in the well-known example of laksanā, ‘gangāyām ghosah', etc., because even after the tira-laksanā, how can it be taken as the adhāra of ghosa when the 'gangātva' is lurking in the mind of the hearer? Whatever answer is found to meet this objection, can be applied in this case also, because it is against the common experience that the kacā"di rūpā’rtha would completely disappear from the mind of the hearer when he cognises the laksyártha.
In fact it is doubtful if this comes under laksanā at all. There is a possibility of taking it as an instance of gauni-laksaņā only; but even this does not seem to be justified here. For, it cannot come either under the sāropā or sādhyavasānā, because there is no mention of both the, visaya and the visayin as in ‘mukham candrah', etc., or of the visayin alone as in, 'vāpī kā'pi sphurati gagane', etc. (kuvalayā”nanda, p. 38), and the mention of visaya does not come under either category. Therefore it may have to be taken as 'bhrāntimad alamkāra-dhvani'.
It is interesting to note, Nāgeśa meets this objection in an altogether different way. In the Vaiyākarana-laghu-mañjusā, in the context of explaining laksaņā as 'sakyatávacchedaka', he states that there is nothing wrong in the 'kacataḥ trasyati' etc., because kacatva is ascribed to rāhutya etc. Though Nāgesa does not say like this directly, (he says that 'rāhutvā"di-visista' is expressed with kacatvā”di) it should be the purport of his statement, in view of the context of his definition of laksanā.
"atra sarvatra tat-tad-dharma-viśiste śakyatávacchedaka-dharmā”ropah. ata eva 'kacatas trasyati vadanam' ity adinā kacatvā”dau rāhutvā"di-visistasya bodhāt na trāsā”dyanvayā’nupapattiḥ.” (Parama-laghu-mañjusā - p. 122).
Nageśa's statement appears to be self-contradicting, because when there is āropa of the sakyatávacchedaka on the laksyatávacchedaka, the possibility of anvayā’nupapatti is more, for the rāhuvā”di would be cognized in kacā"dirūpa only. Even the commentary, Ratnaprabhā, on the above passage does not try

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA to give proper explanation. It simply says - rāhutva-viśiste kacatvā"ropāt rāhutva-visistatvāt trāsopapattih, kacatva-vaisistyena camatkāra-siddhir iti na dosah.” (pp. 125)
Jagannātha then proceeds to mention some relations following the famous kārikā of Bhartsmitra, as quoted by Mukula, viz."abhidheyena sambandhāt, sādrśyāt, samavāyataḥ, vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt, laksaņā pañcadhā matā.” Jagannātha observes (pp. 464, Edn. Athavale, ibid) - "gangāyām ghosah ity atra sāmipyam, "mukham candraḥ” ity ādau sādęśyam, vyatireka-laksaņāyām virodhaḥ, 'yurghstam' ity ādau kāraṇatvā”dayas' ca sambandhā yathāyogam laksaņā-sarīrāņi.”
But, it may be noted that Jagannātha is not inclined to confine the number of relations to just five only. Jagannātha discards 'samavāya' and 'kriyāyoga' for which Mukula has cited illustrations such as 'chatrino yānti' and 'satrughnah'. Jagannatha's understanding is that in what Mukula takes 'samavāya' as group and illustrates with ‘chatriņo yānti' it is better to take 'sāmīpya' or nearness as the relation as those without umbrellas i.e. 'a-chatrinah' are near by or close to those having unbrellas and in the same way thinks Jagannātha that ‘kriyāyoga' can be discarded in favour of 'sādrsyä' and therefore 'satrughna' - the distroyer of enemies is a king who can be compared with 'satrughna', Rāma's brother as he had also destroyed the enemies. We have noted that Jagannātha calls these 'sambandhas' to be 'laksaņā
Nägeśa is dissatisfied with Jagannātha's, "sakyatávacchedaka-laksyártha-bodha" and therefore has this comment, viz. "laksaņājñāna-kāryatávacchedakañca tādrśa-sakya-sambandha-prakāraka-viśesyaka-śabdabuddhitvam iti prācīnálamkārika-matam. tad anantarañca vyañjanayā tādrśaśakyávacchedaka prakārakabodhaḥ iti ca. (pp. 146, N.S. Edn. 1888) This means that laksyártha-bodha would consist of śakya-sambandha only but not śakyatávacchedaka. But, the vyañjanā that follows laksaņā would produce the śābda-bodha consisting of sakyatávacchedaka also. This statement of Nāgeśa is approved and quoted by Candrika with a note (pp. 152, ibid) - etena śakyatávacchedaka-rūpeṇa laksyamānam mūloktam kațākṣitam.
Dr. Ramacandrudu observes (pp. 254, ibid) that it is not known, the views of which 'prācīna-ālamkārika-Nāgeśa is referring to. Mammata is favourable to accepting lakṣaņā-sthala, 'gangātvā”di-prakāraka-tīrā’di-bodha for the purpose of vyangyártha, for only such laksyártha can suggest ‘pāvanatvā"di' which stand as a prayojana. Mammața observes, as quoted above that, "tațā"dīnām gangā"di

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'Laksaņā'
559 śabdaiḥ pratipādane tattva-pratītau hi pratipipādayişita-prayojana-sampratyayah." “For, when the words like Gangā and the like convey (the sense of the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive which is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Gangā with the bank).” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 31, ibid)
Here, it is clear that by 'tattva-pratipattau' we mean 'gangātva-pratipattau’ which then means 'gangārva-prakāraka-bodha, which is required for the establishment - prati-pipadayisā - of the prayojana motive - which is vyangya. In this respect how can this apprehension of motive be attained through vyañjanā - i.e. how can it be called, vyañjanā-vrtti-sādhya' ? Pradīpakāra Govinda observes - "tatra gangātvā”di-pratītir-eva bījam, na tu tīratvā”di-pratitir eva. tire ghosa ity atrā'pi tat-pratīti-prasangāt.” (pp. 44, Edn. Poona, Anandāśrama, Skt. Granthāvalih.
A.D.). This supports the above understanding of Mammata's words. So, at least Nāgeśa is not supported by Mammața. Then who are these prācīna - ālamkārikas is yet not clear.
Jagannātha proceeds with the classification of laksana with the words : "iyam tāvad dvividhā, nirudhā prayojanavati ca. tatrā’pi dvitīyā dvividhā, gaunī, śuddhā ca tatra ādyā sāropā sādhyavasānā ca iti dvividhā antyā caturvidhā - jahatsvārthā, ajahatsvārthā, sāropā, sādhyavasānā ca iti prayojanavati sadvidhā sampadyate." (pp. 464, Edn. Athavale, ibid) So, his classification goes like this
lakṣaņā
nirudhā
prayojanavati
sāropā
sādhyavasānā
gauni
gauni
sudah
śuddhā
sāropā
sādhyavasānā
jahatsvārtha ajahatsvārthā sāropā sādhyavavasānā The illustrations are cited as follows. Words such as anukūla, pratikūla, anuloma, pratiloma, lāvanya etc. are examples of nirudhā laksaņā. In expressions like - dharmasya ayam anukūlah' the word 'anuküla' cannot have its primary

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA meaning of 'following the bank', it being unsuitable to context. Through usage this word means 'anu-guņa', as there is similarity of ‘eka-vastu-pravanatva' in both the meanings. Same is the case with 'anuloma', 'pratiloma' etc. Thus the sense such as 'anuguna' is apprehended through nirudhā-lakṣaṇā. Jagannātha observes : (pp. 464, ibid) : “tatra nirudha-laksanāyā anukūla-pratikūla-anuloma-pratilomalāvanyā”daya udāharanam nīlā”dayaśca. “dharmasyā’yam anukūlah” ity ādau mukhyārthasya kūlānugatatvā"der bādhāt anādi-prayoga-pravāha-vaśād eka-vastupravanā"tmanā külánugatā"dirūpa-sakyasya sadrsyena sambandhena anukūlā"di śabdair anugunā”dayo laksante. ... tatra ādyavarge sādęśya-sambandhena dvitiyavarge ca tad itara-sambandhena laksanāyāḥ pravṛtter nirudhāyām api gauņītvaśuddhatvābhyām dvaividhyam amananti.” (pp. 464-465, ibid).
Such words as ‘nīlah', 'raktah' originally stand for 'blue' or 'red' colour, but are used in expressions such as, “nūlah ghataḥ” etc. Here, through lakṣaṇā, 'nīlah' stands for the thing having that particular colour, and the relation between the primary and the secondary senses is that of 'samavāya'. Thus there are two types of nirudha-laksaņā, the first being represented by such words as anuküla, pratikūla, etc., and the second by words suggesting quality as 'nīlah', 'raktah' etc. In the first type the relation between 'mukhyártha' and 'laksyártha' is that of sādrśya or similarity, in the latter such relations as 'samavāya' etc., are located, which are other than ‘sādṛśya'.
Jagannātha then proceeds to explain next varieties. He observes that places, where both 'visaya' and 'vişayin' are clearly and separately mentioned, are places of 'āropa' i.e. superimposition. When they are not separately mentioned, it is case of ‘adhyavasāna' (or nigarana) i.e. 'swallowing'. The laksaņā with ‘āropa' is 'sāropā', while with 'adhyavasāna' is termed 'sādhyavasānā. Jagannātha then proceeds to give illustrations. Gauni sāropā is illustrated by examples such as ‘mukham candrah', while the other variety, viz. 'gauni - sādhyavasānā is illustrated by, 'pure'smin saudha-śikhare candra-rāji virajate', etc. He does not illustrate the four varieties of suddhā-laksanā which are to be taken from other sources, they being commonly acceptable. Thus, 'kuntāḥ pravišanti 'gangāyām ghosah', 'ayur ghrtam', 'āyuh idam', could serve as illustrations of ajahallaksaņā, jahallaksanā, śuddhā sāropā and suddhā-sādhyavasānā varieties respectively.
Jagannātha's classification seems to be completely in tune with that of Mammata with difference in naming only. Mammata's suddhā is two-fold such as upādāna and lakṣaṇa, which are termed as ajahat-svārthā and jahat-svārthā by Jagannātha. Mammata's sāropā and sadhyavasāna are both gauņi and suddhā.

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'Laksanā
561 Thus Mammata has suddhā-upādāna-laksanā equivalent to a-jahatsvārthā, then
-laksana-laksanā which equates with jahatsvartha in the Rasa-gangadhara Śuddhā-sāropā, śuddhā-sādhyavasānā, gauņi-sāropā and gaunī-sādhyavasānā are found in common.
As already discussed earlier, Jagannatha also accepts, following Mammața, the existence of a special relation over and above that of sādņśya, etc. between the mukhyártha and laksyártha.
Jagannātha then proceeds to discuss the verbal explanation or 'śābda-bodha' that is seen in example of sāropa-laksanā, such as 'mukham candrah', which illustrates 'gaunī sāropā', and 'pure'smin saudha-śikhare...' etc. which illustrates 'gauņi-sādhyavasānā. He says that in gauņī-sāropā the śābda-bodha is of the form of 'candra-sadrśā bhinnam mukham ! He says that in gauņi-sāropā-laksanā, there is secondary meaning collected from the visayi-pada viz. 'candra' and it means 'candra-sadrśa'. The relation between the two is that of 'abheda', or identity. The direct perception of 'bheda' or non-identity cannot obliterate this perception of identity arrived at through vyañjanā. Thus the bādha-buddhi is not 'pratibandhaka' of 'abheda-bodha'. Thus 'laksyártha' is correlated through abheda sambandha with objects such as 'mukha' which are characterized by such qualities as 'mukhatva' etc., brought about by words such as 'mukha'. Jagannātha observes that here, if we go for the laksyártha such as 'candrasādssya' or 'similarity with moon', which is expressive of quality - i.e. dharma-vācaka, in place of the dharmi-vācaka-laksyártha viz. 'candra-sadrśa' i.e. 'similar to the moon', then, that laksyártha (i.e. 'indicated sense which is dharma-vācaka) will not be correlated with 'mukha', i.e. correlation will not be possible here. The reason is that 'sādrśya' and 'mukha' can have only abheda-relation between them. Now if we resort to the lakṣaṇā of sāděśya-dharma then it will have only one relation with 'mukha' such as that of visesana-višesyabhāva, which in its turn is necessarily bheda'-rūpa. The idea is that as in a sentence viz. 'candra-sadrśam mukham''sadęśam' and 'mukham' being in aposition or same vibhakti, there is 'a-bheda' relation between them and between 'candra-sadrśyam' and 'mukham', there can not be the same relation. So, 'sāc
be the same relation. So, 'sadrśvábhinnam mukham' is a sābda-bodha which is not possible here as between these two there is no 'abheda'relation.
Dr. Ramachandrudu (pp. 262, 263 ibid) puts it as follows : “Here the upamānavācaka (candrah) expreses by laksanā the sense 'candrasadríah', and the word 'mukha' expresses the sense 'face' by abhidh, only. Ultimately there will be an abhedánvaya between the lakṣaṇópasthitártha (candra-sadrśa) and the sense

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA expressed by abhidhā (mukha) according to the well-known rule - “nāmárthayor abhedenā’nvayah.” Thus the final śābda-bodha of the sentence 'mukham candrah', will be 'sādęśyábhinnam mukham'. Now, the question arises, what is then the difference between rūpaka which gives the sabda-bodha 'candra-sadrsábhinnam mukham' and upamā in 'candra-sadssam mukham ? It may be argued that there is slight variation in the ultimate sābda-bodha of the rūpaka and upama'lamkara which makes all the difference. While the sabda-bodha of rūpaka is 'candrasadrśā bhinnam mukham', as explained above, the sābda-bodha in upamā-sthala like 'candra-sadrśam mukham', is 'candrā’bhinnam yat sadṛśam tad abhinnam mukham'. The reason for the difference is this - According to the rule that only the 'samsarga' (relation) of the two padárthas expressed by two different words would appear in śābda-bodha by samsarga-maryādā. 'Candra' in 'candra-sadrśam mukham', expresses the sense 'moon', and 'sadrśa' by laksaņā expresses 'candrasadrśa'. Now 'candra' and 'candra-sadrśa' being expressed by different words, there will be abhedánvaya' between them (by samsarga-maryāda). Thus the ultimate - śābda-bodha will be, 'candra bhinna-candra-sadrsā'bhinnam mukham'. But in 'mukham candrah' (rūpaka-sthala) 'candrah' itself conveys the meaning of candrasadrsa by laksana and there is no possibility of abheda-samsarga between 'candra and 'sadrśa' because both of them are expressed by one word only and therefore the ultimate śābda-bodha is - 'candra-sadrśábhinnam mukham'. Thus there is a difference in the sābda-bodhas of upamā and rūpaka. But the objector suggests that such a slight difference in the final sābda-bodha is not sufficient to distinguish between the two alamkāras. For, if it were so, due to difference in śābdabodha, two expressions viz. 'mukham candra iva', and 'mukham candra-sadrśam' should be taken as separate alamkāras. So, the original position that there is absence of difference between rūpaka and upamā remains as it is - "bodhasya vailaksanyena prthag alamkāratāyā a-siddheḥ. anyathā 'mukham candra iva' ity atra candrasadrśam ity etadgatāt prthag alamkāratāpartir iti cet.” (pp. 465, ibid).
In reply to this objection, some are of the opinion that, though there is no difference in the sābda-bodha of these two alamkāras, there is difference in the ultimate result - ... laksaņā-phalībhūta-tādrūpya-samvedanam ādāya vailaksanyam nirbädham. (pp. 465, ibid). As the visayitávacchedaka (i.e. candrarva etc.) is ascribed to visaya (i.e. mukha), there is a tādātmya-jñāna in the rūpaka-stala which is not observed in the upamā-sthala. As pointed out above, the word 'candra' in ‘mukham candrah', conveys the sense of candra-sadrśaḥ by laksaņā and thus, as in śleșa-sthala, there will be apprehension of identity i.e. abheda-sampratyaya between

Page #589

'Laksana'
563 the candra and sadrśa expressed by the same word. This abheda or tādātmyasampratyaya can not be obstructed by the bheda-jñāna, because its antidote vyañjanā also is present in the lakṣaṇā-sthala, which is not found in the upamāsthala: "śleşasthalaivā’trāpyekaśabdópādānótthasya vyañjanasya upāyatvād vaiyañjanika-bodhasya bādha-buddy apratibadhyattvāc ca.” (pp. 465, ibid). Once
andráhhinna-candra-sadrsábhinnatva' is accepted in mukha, also follows automatically, according to the maxim, 'tadabhinnábhinnam tad abhinnam'. In view of this, expressions such as, 'vaktre candramasi, sthite kim aparaḥ śītámśur ujjrmbhate' etc., that express tādātmya between the visaya and visayin are to be supported. Thus, this view of some ālamkārikas maintains the difference between the rūpaka and upamā because of the difference in their phala.
Jagannātha used such words as, "atra kecit”, in the beginning of the above view. This shows that he feels that there is no need of bringing in the difference of phala, when we can show the difference in sābda-bodha itself.
Jagannātha then gives the view of still others. He says, 'anye tu, candrā”dipadebhyah laksanayā candra-sadrśatvenā’pi rūpenópasthitānām mukhā"dīnām candratvena rūpeņaiva mukhā”dipadópasthāpitaiḥ saha abhedánvayabodho jāyāte...” (pp. 466, ibid).
These 'anye' or others hold that inspite of the general rule that the cognition of the meaning of the words - padárthopasthiti and the sābda-bodha that follows should be of similar form, it is suggested that, on the strength of the experience that laksyánvaya-bodha in the lakṣaṇā-sthala will be having sakyatávacchedaka (i.e. gangātva) as its prakāra; to be put in otherwise, the cognition of the laksyártha will be more in form of mukhyártha itself - “tat-tat-pada-laksanā-jñānasya tat-tat-padaśakyatā’vacchedaka-prakāraka-laksyánvaya-bodhatvávacchinnam prati hetutāyāḥ, padárthopasthiti-śābdabodhayoḥ samānā”kāratvasyā’nubhava-sākṣika-vailaksanyakalākṣaṇika-bodhā’tirikta-visayatāyāśca kalpanāt.” (pp. 466, ibid).
Thus in places like 'gangāyām ghosah', though the 'tata' (laksyártha) is first cognised with only tatatva, the final anvayabodha will be 'gangātva' to make it possible to suggest the śaitya, pāvanatva, etc. - 'ata eva gangāyām ghosa ity atra taţatvenā'pyupasthitasya tatasya gangātvenā'nvayabodhas tatprayojyaḥ śaitya pāvanatvā”di-pratyayaś ca samgacchate.” (pp. 466, ibid). By applying this principle in 'mukham candrah', the apprehension of identity-abheda-bodhabetween the face that is conveyed by 'candra' by laksanā (as candra-sadrśa) and the face that is expressed by the word 'mukha' (by abhidhā) will be restricted by

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the 'mukhyárthatā"vacchedaka' i.e. candratva, and this kind of abheda-bodha will be helpful in bringing about the realisation of the guņas or qualities of moon in the face. Thus the second view explains that the distinguishing factor between rūpaka and upamā is not only the ultimate result i.e. phala, but also the intermidiary śābda-bodha. "ittham krtaś co'pamāto rūpakasya bhedah sphuta eva.” iti vadanti.
Yet another view of the ancients is put by Jagannātha as follows : "apare tu bheda-karambitam sādrśyam upamā-jivātu-bhutam bheda-karambitam ca gaunasāropā-lakṣaṇāyā iti sphuțe bhede kệtam phala-ksta-vailaksanyaparyantā’nudhāvanena.. etc.” (pp. 466, ibid). This view holds that there is difference in sādrsya associated with both upamā and rūpaka. Upamā is based on sādrsya which is embraced by 'bheda' i.e. non-identity, while rūpaka has sādrśya rooted in 'a-bheda' or identity. Thus it is suggested here that there is no need to rest on the ultimate result i.e. phala. Jagannātha says that, “tad ittham prācām āśayah matabhedena varņitaḥ.” (pp. 466, ibid).
Now he considers the views of the 'Navyāh', the group of modern alamkārikas. Candrikā says - "appayya dīksitā"dayah”. Here, the view held by such ālamkārikas as Appayya Dixit is presented. These 'navyas' hold that there is no need of accepting laksana at all, in places such as 'mukham candrah' and 'vāhiko gauh' : "navyās - ‘mukham candrah”, vāhīko gauņ' ity adau candrā”dīnām mukhā”dibhiḥ saha sambhavati, laksaņām vinaiva, abheda-samsargeņa anvayabodhah.” (pp. 466, ibid). In these illustrations the abheda-samsarga between the 'candra' and 'mukha', 'go' and 'vähīka' can be effected by the general rule, viz. "nāmárthayor abhedenā'nvayah”, without resorting to laksanā. If it is argued that such abhedasamsarga cannot take place due to some confirmation of incongruity - i.e. badhaniscaya in the form that the moon and the face cannot be indetical with each other, according to the rule-tadvattā-buddhim prati tadabhāva-vattā”tmaka-badhaniścayaḥ pratibandhakah.”
But the Navyas argue that this general rule can have exemption in the case of the śabda-jñāna, as there was exemption granted in case of the 'āhārya jñāna', or intentional cognition. It is accepted, that 'badha-niscaya' cannot obstruct the 'tadvattā-jñāna' when a man has an intention to have such jñāna'. In the same way, Navyas suggest that the śābda-jñāna also can not be obstructed by the bādhaniścaya. So, the improved version of the above rule could be, as Candrikā puts it (pp. 165, ibid) - "laukika-sannikarsájanya-dosa-viśesájanya-anāhārya-śābdánya

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'Laksanā
565 buddhitvávacchinnam prati bādha-niscayaḥ pratibandhakaḥ.” The navyas also claim that their theory is supported by the well-known observation, viz. ‘atyantāsatyapi hy arthe jñānam sabdaḥ karoti hi', according to which such expressions as 'śaśa-srngam paśya' etc. can also produce a śābda-jñāna like 'gośộngam paśya', etc.
Now somebody may argue that according to this observation, expressions such as 'vahninā siñcati' will also produce 'sabda-bodha'. The answer is 'No'. Navinas say that such expressions cannot produce sābda-bodha because there is no 'yogyatājñāna' or knowledge of compatibility. But in case of 'mukham candrah', 'gauh vāhikah', etc. there is no lack of yogyatājñāna, at least the āhārya one, on account of the strong intention to have such sabda-jñāna for the ultimate camatkāra from such bodha or apprehension. Such āhārya-yogyatā-jñāna can not be accepted in the case of vahninā siñcati', as there is no such desire. This thinking of the Navyas has the support of the Prācinas also, who have gone for the general rule that yogyatājñāna is the cause for the śābda-jñāna : “mukham candrah', 'gaur vāhīkah' ityā"dau tvista-camatkāra-prayojakatā-jñānā"dhīnāyāḥ icchāyāḥ sattvād āhāryayogyatā-jñāna-sāmrājyam ata eva śābdabodhe yogyatā-jñānasya kāranarvoktih prācām samgacchate.' (pp. 467, ibid).
The Candrikā has (pp. 166 ibid) : "śābda-buddhitvávacchinne yogyatājñānam kāranam” iti kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ prācīnábhimataḥ...
This rule would have been useless because the śābda-boodha in 'vahninā siñcati' etc. can be averted by the badha-jñāna itself, if the 'śabnányatva' were not to be included in the 'badha-niscaya-prati-bandhyatā'vacchedaka-koti'. When the 'sabdányatva' is added, it justifies the above rule related to 'yogyatā-jñāna'. Because the badhajñāna is not powerful enough to obstruct the śābda-bodha in 'vahnināsiñcati', this rule comes in to stop this undesired bodha. Dr. Ramachandradu
es (pp. 266, ibid). 'Even if the 'sabdányatva' is not added in the "pratibaddhyatávacchedaka-koti, the Navinas contend, the abhedánvaya in 'mukham candrah', etc., will be taken as āhārya-jñāna, and so cannot be obstructed by the 'bādha-niscaya? Thus there is no need of accepting the āhāryajñāna to facilitate the sabda-bodha in 'mukham candrah' etc. In fact, the rule 'śābda-buddhitvávacchinne yogyatājñānam kāranam' is itself not necessary because the sābda-bodha in 'vahninā-siñcati' etc., can be prevented by the badhaniścaya itself. It is baseless to say that āhārya-jñāna can be accepted only in pratyaksa-jñāna, because we come across the āhārya-śābda-jñāna also in many places like atiśayokti.”

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The result of the discussion as above is that, in the illustration of sāropā laksaņā, such as ‘mukham candrah', there is no harm in accepting ‘abhedánvaya' directly between the vācyárthas of the words ‘mukham' and 'candrah'. There is no need to accept abhedánvaya between the expressed sense of 'mukham', and the indicated sense of 'candrah'. It is safe to accept abhedánvaya' between two vācyárthas only. For, if this is not done, i.e. if we do not accept the 'anvaya' between to vācyárthas, then there will be difficulty in accepting on one hand the alamkāras
rupaka and upamā respectively in illustrations such as, “raja-nārāyanam laksmīh...", and "pādāmbujam bhavatu...” etc., and the abhedánvaya' accepted between the vācya and laksya artha on the other. To remove this difficulty we have to accept anvaya between two vācyárthas themselves.
We will try to understand this point in details. In the two illustrations we have upamā and rūpaka respectively, depending on the upamita-samāsa and the višesanasamāsa. Now if we accept these compounds, we will have to face some 'a-samgati’ such as the embrace by Lakmī to the king, when upamita-samāsa such as 'Nārāyanalike-king', is resorted to. The discrepancy arises when we say that Laxmi embraces the king and not Nārāyana. In the upamita-samāsa the prādhānya is given to 'rāja' the pūrva-pada. In the other illustration we have a rūpaka-samāsa in 'padámbuja' with ‘ambuja' the uttarapada being principal. Now the ‘manohāritā' or loveliness caused due to the sweet tinkling of the anklet cannot go with 'ambuja' and hence discrepancy will be there. So, if abhedánvaya is accepted with reference to vācya and laksya arthas, we will have difficulty in accepting ‘upama' and 'rūpaka' in the said illustrations. So, ultimately we have to accept rūpaka and upamā respectively, as done by Mammata, in the said illustrations. So only vacyartha'bhedanvaya has to be accepted in the so called sāropā laksanā illustrations.
Jagannātha observes that even when there is no compound this fact operates. In 'krpayā sudhayā siñca...' etc., if vācyā'bheda is not resorted to, importance cannot be given to 'sudha', to make it suitable for the act of sprinkling - i.e. sekakriya. In case laksanā is accepted, importance would go to 'krpā' in the śābdabodha which follows.
The crux of the matter is that in the illustration viz. 'rāja-nārayanam...' etc., for those who accept laksanā, the sābda-bodha in form of, "the king is like Nārāyana', is identical even if either upamita or visesana-samāsa is resorted to. Now if 'upamā’ is accepted the embrace by Laxmi cannot be explained but it can be explained if rūpaka is accepted. So the an-upapatti resulting from the upamā alamkāra is decisive in favour of accepting rūpaka. This is observed by Mammața. But this will

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'Laksana'
567
not be found tenable if the śābda-bodha remains identical, and it remains so if laksanā is resorted to. Mammata did accept difference in the śābda-bodha here, and so the śābdabodha such as 'nārāyana-sadrśa' as seen in rūpaka, through resorting to laksanā, was not acceptable to Mammata, the obvious reason is that it is only by taking into account the anvaya of vācyártha that the upapatti or otherwise of anvaya is considered, and not by taking the anvaya of laksyártha into consideration. Because the vācyártha of upamita samāsa is not congruent here, therefore only the vācyártha of rūpakasamāsa has to be accepted here. So, laksyártha has no business at all here. In the second illustration also, for the lakṣaṇāvādins, if laksaņā is resorted to, or if rūpaka is accepted, in both the cases, the śābdabodha will be of the form of 'ambuja-sadrśa-päda' only. So it will be futile to suggest any anupapatti such as absence of anvaya between the anklet and the foot, and therefore ruling out of rūpaka in the end.
The lakṣaṇāvādin objector may now argue as follows. He may say that perhaps it is possible to arrive at the upapatti of śābda-bodha without resorting to laksaņā in such illustrations as 'mukha-candrah' which is a compounded construction. But when there is no samāsa (such as in mukham candrah) there cannot be any objection to laksanā. But the siddhāntin says that even this observation is incorrect. For, in illustrations such as, “krpayā sudhayā siñca.." etc. which has noncompounded single words, the 'upapatti' of the correlation (anvaya) of ‘artha' does not take place. The idea is that if laksanā is resorted to in case of words such as 'sudhā', and if it is taken to mean 'sudhā-sadrśa', then also the 'secana' or 'sprinkling of sudhā-sadrśa-krpā will not be possible. So, the śābdabodha caused by laksanā will not be of any use. On the other hand, the Navīnas believe in the abhedánvaya and tādrūpya-pratīti between krpā and sudha and hence the sprinkling of krpā in form of sudhā or nectar will give a meaning which will be congruent to the śābda-bodha.
Now if the supporters of laksaņā here say that, if by resorting to laksaņā, the cogruence of the sābda-bodha of laksyártha is not seen, then in that case, take the dhātvartha of 'siñcati' as visayin, and through this visayin, let there be swallowing nigarana - of 'kuru' (= visayártha), and now the upapatti i.e.-justification of the śābdabodha of laksyártha will be accomplished. The idea is that with 'siñcana' as visayin, as it happens in case of 'atiśayokti', let there be nigarana of the meaning of 'kuru'. So, the meaning of 'sprinkling with nectar' - will be, 'shower grace like sprinkling of nectar'. Thus the 'anvaya' will hold good. This is the argument in selfdefence by the laksaņā-supporters.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA But against this, the navīnas observe that, putting aside certain alamkāras such as utpreksā and the like, in alamkāras such as atiśayokti, apahnuti etc., merely on the strength of acquired knowledge - i.e. 'āhāryajñāna', the śābda-bodha can be justified (= upapatti). In the same way in rūpaka also this key is applicable and hence there is no compulsion to resort to laksaņā here (bījábhāva). To accept laksaņā at such places goes against common experience also.
The idea is this. When the Navīnas say that, 'utpreksady atirikta-atiśayoktiapahnattva-ādişu iva āhārya-jñānena upapattau, laksaņāyām bījábhāvād anubhavavirodhāc ca (R.G. pp. 467, ibid) - it becomes clear that in such alamkāras as utpreksā, sa-samdeha, etc. there is no escape from laksaņā even according to the Navīnas. The reason behind this is that in āhāryajñāna there should be the quality of certainty according to the normal opinion of the Naiyāyikas, who define āhāryajñāna as - "badhakālinecchājanyam jñānam.” (Nyayakośa, pp. 36). This means that, it is āhārya-jñāna, when we hold a clearly contradicted matter as not contradicted, through our desire or intelligence. For example the cognition such as 'the lake is on fire' - 'hrdo vahnimān iti jñānam'. Now even in the absence of fire in a lake, if we hold that there is fire in it, this sort of belief is only acquired - āhārya jñāna. From this point of view, the figures such as utprekṣā, sa-samdeha, etc. are purely āhārya-jñana, because when one says that, 'the darkness is like smoke', one knows that darkness is not smoke. But he knowingly imagines the darkness to be smoke. But the fancy in utpreksā is not of the form of a certainty and in āhāryajñāna what is recquired is certainty-or niscaya, according to the Naiyāyikas. Keeping this in mind the Navīnas have suggested that it is advisable to accept laksaņā in utpreksa.
Jagannātha further argues that in rūpaka alamkāra such as 'mukham candrah', according to the laksanavādins there is laksana on the upamāna-vācaka word, viz. 'candra' in the sense of 'candra-saděśa'. This is the opinion of the prācīnas : ‘api ca upamānavācakasya candrā"dipadasya rūpake, upamānasadrśe laksaņā iti hi prācām samayaḥ - (R.G. pp. 467, ibid). Now, continues Jagannātha, in the laksyártha viz. candra-sadřśa, the avacchedaka dharma - i.e. speciality in quality is sādņśya : 'tatra laksyarávacchedakam sādrśyam'. It is of the form of 'common quality' naturally - 'tac ca samāna-dharma-rūpam'. This is so because if 'sādrsya' which is an avacchedaka-dharma is not explained as 'samāna-dharma', then the rūpaka alamkāra based on 'common qualities' - 'or 'sādharmya', will not take place at all.

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‘Lakşaņā
569 Now, here, the point is - "sa ca laksyamse sundaratvā"dinā viśesa-rūpena pratiyate uta āho sāmānya-rūpeṇa ?” - i.e. is that samāna-dharma of the form of sādņśya apprehended here in the special form of paritucularity of beautysundaratva - or in a general form ? These two options prop up here. The first alternative, viz. that sadrśya is apprehended in form of particularity such as 'sundaratvā"di', is untenable. Because in such a case, there will be paunaruktyadosa in, 'sundaram mukham candrah', for saundarya, the sādhāranadharma of a particular nature, is expressed by the word 'candra' itself by laksanā, and is again mentioned by the word 'sundaram'. To avoid this blemish, it may be said, that in such cases where the sādhārana-dharma is mentioned, some other dharma, i.e. other than what is mentioned, should be taken as 'laksyatā'vacchedaka-dharma'. But, even if 'paunaruktya' dosa can be avoided by this argument, it goes contray to the common experience, because we do not generally understand any other dharma except saundarya in the expression 'sundaram mukham candraḥ'. Again, in some instances, there may not be any possibility of an additional dharma over and above the one mentioned in a given illustration. "na caivam ādāv upātta-dharmake rūpake tad dharma'tirikto dharma eva laksyatāvacchedakābhūta-sādrsyarūpa iti vācyam. anubhava-virodhāt. (pp. 467, ibid). As for example in the verse, “ankitāny aksasamghātaih...” etc. We do not find any other sādhārana-dharma, over and above those based on ślesa, i.e. aksa-sanghatánkitatva' and 'sarogatva'. Thus the first alternative is unacceptable. In case, now, if the second atternative is accepted, it would be an illustration, not of rūpaka, but of upamā because the sādrśya is mentioned by sabda. It is not proper to hold that upamā would arise only when the sādrśya is vācya, because in that case, in instances such as ‘nalina-pratipakşam ānanam', where sādrśya is not vācya but laksya, will cease to be illustrations of upamā.
Again, if laksaņā be accepted in rūpaka, in the example of ślista-paramparitarūpaka such as, 'vidvanmānasa-hamsa. etc., where we know that 'sadrśya' will be apprehended only when śleșa is accomplished first, and due to the abhedádhyavasāya brought about by ślesa, sādrśya between the king who dwells in mānasa (= mind) and the swan who dwells in mānasa lake, will be apprehended and then only the rūpaka - “rājahamsa” - will take shape based on sādrśya-mülakalaksyártha. Then only we will be able to say that here is an instance of rūpakalamkāra. As against this, when rūpaka is derived as based on the la in 'hamsa-sadrśa', - i.e. when rūpaka is formed with a lakṣaṇā in form of hamsasadrśa at its base, then only the ślesa on "mānasa” meaning (i) mānasa lake and

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
(ii) mind will come into existence. Thus, by accepting lakṣaṇā, there will be "anyonya"śraya-dosa". Now this can be avoided by accepting āhārya'bheda-jñāna between the king and the 'hamsa' for which we need not depend on śleṣa. This abheda-jñāna would ultimately be justified by accepting śleṣa. Thus the śleṣa depends on rūpaka but the rūpaka does not depend upon śleṣa and there will be no 'anyonya"śraya-dosa'. Therefore, it is better to apply the general rule of abhedánvaya in rūpaka-sthala also.
-
Again, the Navīnas hold that the argument of the contenders of lakṣaṇā, viz. that the phala of lakṣaṇā, which indicates lakṣyártha in form of 'sadṛśa', is the ultimate tādrūpyapratīti or apprehension of identity in rūpaka, is also not acceptable, for, if we accept this, then, as in the expression 'tat-sadṛśa' also there is apprehension of similarity, i.e. even in cases of upamā such as, 'candra-sadṛśam mukham there will be tādrūpyapratīti, or apprehension of identity even here (i.e. even in upamā). Thus, the Navīnas hold that there is no requirement for acceptance of lakṣaṇā in the śābda-bodha of rūpaka, - "ato nāmárthayor abhedánvaya-saranir eva rūpakasthale ramaṇīyā. sadṛśa-lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalam rūpake trādrūpya-pratyaya ity api na hṛdayangamam. tat-sadṛśa iti śabdāt-sādṛśya-pratyaye saty api tādrūpyapratyaya"-patteḥ" - ity āhuḥ." (pp. 468, ibid)
Now Jagannatha proceeds to discuss the view of the Navīnas also. Says he - "atra idam vicāryate'. (pp. 497, ibid)
He refutes the view of the Navīnas with some very important arguments supported by common sense and general experience. He observes: 'yat tavad ucyate nämárthayor abhedánvaya-bodhena eva upapattau rūpake nā'sti lakṣaṇā iti, tatra camatkāri-sādhāraṇa-dharmā'nupasthiti-daśāyām upamā'lamkārasya iva rūpakālamkārasyā'pi násti niṣpattis' camatkāro vā iti sakala-hṛdaya-siddham." The general experience goes, argues Jagannatha, that there can be no existence of either upama-alamkāra or rūpaka-alamkāra, till the 'camatkari' or lovely sādhāraṇa-dharma is cognised. If at all there is such an instance in the absence of a beautiful sadhāraṇadharma, the alamkāra does not take shape, as there is no charm in it. This is common experience. If we do not hold that rūpakálamkāra does not take shape in the absence of a beautiful sadhāraṇa-dharma, then such example as, "bhāratam naka-manḍalam" i.e. the Mahabharata is heaven", or 'nagaram vidhumandalam' i.e. this city is the orb of moon', will not cause the apprehension of rūpaka, but this apprehension is surely caused when we hear such words as "suparválamkṛtam", and "sa-kala-kalam", respectively. What can be the reason behind this? Same is the case with reference to the famous illustration of rūpaka, such as

Page #597

'Laksaņā'
571 'mukham chandrah'. There is however, some difference between the two ślistarūpakas, and this simple illustration viz. mukham candrah. It is that in the two instances of ślista rūpakas, the sādhāraṇa dharma being not known, i.e. aprasiddha, it is pertinent to express it in so many words. But in the illustration viz. 'mukham candrah' the sādhāranadharma is well known and hence need not be expressed in so many words. But if abhedánvaya is held to be the cause of the apprehension of rūpaka, and if we do not place sadrśya in form of sādhāranadharma, i.e. if we hold that the dharma' is not mentioned, we do not get rūpaka. How do we explain this ? Or, where the 'sādhārana dharma' is not present there is no experience of camatkāra in such rūpakas. How do we explain this also ? On the contrary from the objector's point of view this should not happen, because at such places, the āhārya-abheda-jñāna between upamāna and upameya, without having expectancy of anything else, stays here independently on its own in a perfect form. So, accordingly here rūpaka also should take place and also the camatkara resulting therefrom. Now those who believe in the abhedánvaya' of nămárthas may say that, "for the apprehension of the abheda-jñāna between two padárthas, or for the camatkāra caused thereby, it is required that there is an apprehension of a special or particular sādhārana-dharma. But this also can not be held.
For, in the verse, viz. "yady anusno bhaved vahnir...” etc., even in the absence of the apprehension of the sădhārana-dharma, the āhārya-abheda or identification between 'anusna' and 'vahnih', and aśīta and 'jala' is apprehended. Thus you cannot say that the apprehension of sādhāraņa-dharma is a must for āhārya abhedánvaya. Now, if you say that the special mark of the requirement of the apprehension of sādhārana-dharma is only where it is a case of upamānópameya, i.e. when there is ahārya-abheda only, but then this is untenable since there is no authority in suggesting that the apprehension of that particular sūdhāraṇa-dharma is a must in case of upamānópameya only, when elsewhere there is apprehension of āhārya-abheda independent of this. Again, in the absence of a sādhāranadharma, all ālamkārikas accept the apprehension of abhedánvaya between ‘mukham' and 'candrah', in the illustration viz. “mukham yadi candrah syāt tadā bhūmy avasthitam na syāt.” (In this sentence, there is no escape from accepting abhedánvaya because the rule of vyutpatti-śāstra suggests that the anvaya between two nāmárthas is always through abheda-sambandha).
You may suggest that if it is accepted that there is only sādrśyalakṣaṇā in rūpaka, there will be no identity (i.e. tādātmya) between vişaya and viņayin, because, the abheda that is expressed in rūpaka, is only between the upameya and upamāna

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
sadrśa i.e. mukham and candra-sadrsa. In the obsence of such identity, statements like "simhena sadņšo nā’yam, kintu simho narádhipah”, which are focussed on conveying abheda between the upameya and the upamāna would be meaningless. But this argument does not stand because such tādātmya is acceptable even to the laksanāvādins as explained while discussing the second and third views of the prācīnas.
It may again be held that according to the laksaņāvādins, sādrśya also is included in rūpaka and as such, it may be wrong to deny the sadrśya (= simhena sadrśaḥ nā’yam) while having rūpaka in ‘simho narádhipaḥ. This argument is rejected by saying that the negation meant here is only of the upamā based on bheda-gharita-sādņśya, while favouring rūpaka based on a-bheda-ghatita-sādrśya.
Jagannātha now rejects an objection raised in case of “rāja-nārāyanam', and ‘pādámbujam', etc., as follows. As suggested above, the laksyánvayabodha will be only 'sakyatávacchedaka-prakāraka' and thus by accepting rūpaka in 'rājanārayana', the 'rājan' would be understood only in form of 'nārāyanatva' so there will be nothing wrong in his having the embrace of Laxmī. In the same way if rūpakalamkāra is to be accepted in 'padámbujam', the pāda-jñāna will be ambujatvaprakāraka and thus 'mañjira-siñjita-manoharată in it will be incongruous. That is why upamā is to be accepted here in order to give importance to 'pada' because the pāda-jñāna then, will be 'pādatvávacchinna’ “pādámbajam'ity ādau api rūpakasya svīkāre pradhānībhūtottara-padasyā’rthasyā’mbujatvenaiva pratiter mañju-mañjīra-siñjita-manoharatāyā anupapatteh. upamita-samāsā”yattópamāyām tu pradhānasya pādasya pādatvenaiva pratītasya nā’sti tasyā anupapattir iti, na kópi dosah.” (R.G. pp. 498, ibid)
Again, it is incorrect to hold that there would be no difference between upamā and rūpaka, on the ground that in both of them, the sadrśya is being expressed by śabda (though of course by lakṣaṇā in rūpaka); because the sādrśya in rūpaka is abheda-ghatita while in upamā it is bheda-karambita, and J. explains the difference between the two. - "bhedā’karambita-sādrśya-viśistasya rūpake laksyatvād upamāvyapadeśasya a-prasakteh” (R.G. pp. 498, ibid). If it is argued that there can be an instance where the speaker makes a laksanika-prayoga like 'mukham candrah', etc., with the specific intention of conveying bheda-ghațita-sādrśya', and this will have to be accepted as upamā, because sādrśya is bheda-karambita, but Jagannātha says that there cannot be any scope, in such places, for laksaņā at all, as the main purpose of laksanā is to convey tādātmya which promises negation of bheda :

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‘Lakşaņā
573 “nanu yatra bheda-ghațita-sādrśyavati vaktrā laksanayā mukham candra iti prayuktam, tatra tathā’pyupamālamkārā”pattiḥ sthitaiveti cet, bheda-ghatitasādrśya-pratipipādayişākāle lakṣaṇayā tadvatisabda-prayogasya viruddhatvāt. laksanāyās tādrūpya-pratipipādayişā”dhīnatvāt, na hi prayojanam anuddiśya rūdhi-vyati-riktayā laksaņayā'rtham pratipadayanty āryāḥ bhedatādrūpyayor vipratisiddhatvena yugapat-pratipatr-buddhyupārohā'sambhavāc ca." (R.G. pp. 498, ibid).
The objector here raises a point as follows. In words like 'purusa-vyāghra', which are instance of upamā, in the sense of 'tiger-like man', the uttara-pada has to be taken to mean 'vyāghra-sadrśa' by laksaņā, because there is no other word which expresses sādrśya. The acceptance of laksaņā results in the acceptance of tādātmya-pratīti also as its prayojana; and this tādātmya-pratipatti makes it as an instance of rūpaka and not upamā. Now, when the position is like this, how is it that it is taken by the ancients as an instance of dvi-luptópamā ? Jagannātha answers this question in two ways. According to the grammarians who accept sakti in the whole of a samāsa, the word purusa-vyāghra itself conveys the meaning viz. "vyāghra-sādrśya-visista-purusa”, where the sādņśya is bheda-ghasita, or the upamāna-sabda, i.e. vyāghra, expresses by nirūdha-lakṣaṇā, bheda-ghațitasādrśya-višişta' and this 'bheda-ghațitatva' will explain how it has been taken as an example of upamā by the prācīnas. - "atrocyate-upamita-samāsasya bhedaghatitopamāna-sādssya-viśistópameye śaktes tad-ghatakībhūtópamānaśabdasya bheda-ghațita-sādrśya-višiște nirūdha-lakṣaṇāyā vā svīkārād adoṣaḥ.” (R.G. pp. 499, ibid).
The anyonya"śrayadosa which is raised in 'vidvan-mānasa-hamsa' etc., holds Jagannātha, is of no consequence because everything in a poem, or say in art, being mainly based on fancy i.e. kalpanā or pratibhā, it is not a serious defect if one thing is dependent on another. In this connection Jagannātha gives an example of the beautiful construction by a mason, where the bricks are supported by each other. This is done in the discussion on rūpaka alamkāra later.
Jagannātha now takes care of the last objection raised by the Navīnas. It was suggested that the tādrūpya-pratyaya or cognition of tādrpya-can not be the phala of sādrśya-laksaņā in rūpaka, lest it should be accepted, in places like 'candrasadrśam mukham' also - "yad api uktam, rūpake sadrśa-laksaņāyāḥ phalam tādrśya-pratyayo na yujyate. tat-sadrśa iti śabdaja-bodha-nantaram api tathāpratyayā"patter iti, tan na (R. G. pp. 499, ibid). Jagannātha holds that there is no

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
fear of such tādrpya-pratyaya in the case of the latter, because there is no laksanā in it; and tādrpya-pratyaya is only the phala of laksaņā. Jagannātha concludes that the contention of the ancient writers has thus to be accepted on the authority of the Mahābhāsya and such other works. In the Mahābhāsya, while commenting on Pā. IV. i. 48, viz. 'pumyogād ākhyāyām', Patañjali raises a question viz. how can abheda exist between two distinctly different things ? In reply he contends that the abheda is being ascribed on four grounds; viz. 'tātstya' (i.e. being on a particular thing), 'tāddharmya' (i.e. having the quality of a particular thing), 'tat-sāmīpya' (or being closer to a thing), and 'tat-sahacarya', (or being associated with a particular thing), and he furnishes four examples to illustrate these respectively. Here, the sentence, “tādrūpyam āropyate na tu mukhyam”, indicates that also in 'mukham candrah', the tādātmya is being ascribed by laksaņā. All this goes against the Navīnas. Jagannātha thus defends the view of the ancients by refuting the views of the Navīnas such as Appayya Dixita, of course here, without naming him . "tatsadrśa ity atra laksanāyā abhāvena tādrūpya-pratyayasyā'pādana'yogāt. tādrūpyapratyayo laksaņāyāḥ phalam iti prācām samayaḥ. mahābhāsyā"di-granthānām asminnevā'nukūlatvāc ca. navyamate tu tesām ākulībhāvah syād iti dik” - (R.G. pp. 499, ibid). See also Candrikā (pp. 189), on this - "navya-mate vācyayor evā'bhede, 'caturbhih prakārais tādrūpyam āropyate na tu mukhyam', ityāder asamgatih spastā eva iti sārāmśah."
After dealing with śābda-bodha of sāropā-laksaņā, Jagannātha picks up the topic of śābda-bodha in sādhyavasānā laksanā. Here he discusses two views. In the illustration, viz. "candra-rājī virājate”, where the upameya is completely omitted, the 'candra' sabda expresses the 'mukha' with its 'dharma', viz. 'mukhatva', but the ultimate śābda-bodha will be 'candratvaprakāraka' only. The idea is that here, the ‘mukha' will be cognized in the guise of 'candra', and not as 'mukha', and this difference between the padárthopasthiti and, sabda-bodha, as seen above, is the result of 'laksaņā-jñāna.' : "sādhyavasānāyām ca 'candra-rājī virājate',
candra"disabdaih laksanaya mukhyatvenopasthāpitasyā'pi mukhā"deh śābda-bodhaś candratvā”dinā bhavati, lakṣaṇā-jñānasyaiva māhātmyāt” iti eke. - (R.G. pp. 699, ibid).
The other view is - "laksanayā mukhatvena mukhā”deḥ śādba-bodhe vștte, vyañjanayaika-śabdópāttatva-prādurbhūtayā candratvena bodhaḥ" ity apare. (R.G. pp. 499, ibid) - This second view holds that even after the laksanā-jñāna the śābdabodha will be mukhatva-prakāraka-bodha, which is brought about by one vyañjanā, caused by 'eka-padópāttatva'.

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'Laksana'
575 According to both these views, there will be the apprehension of 'mukhatva' and candratva directly, where as in sāropa-sthala the candratva is cognised indirectly through 'candra-sadrśa', which is taken as the differentiating factor between sāropā and sādhyavasānikā. - "matadvaye'py asmin mukhā"dau' candrarvabhānasāmagryā, mukhatvā”deḥ svadharmasya bhānam na nivāryate. ittham caikasmin dharmini candratvā"dīnām mukhatva"dinām ca sāksad bhānam eva sāropāto'sya vicchedakam”. (R.G. pp. 499. ibid) - Thus the śābda-bodha in 'candra-raji., is "candratvavān mukhatvavān ca mukha-padárthah'. But for the ālamkārikas, the 'mukhatva' is completely concealed by 'candratva' just like the suktitva at the time of the apprehension of silver in the mother of pearl, and so there can be no cognition of the same in the śābda-bodha. Accordingly, therefore, the difference between sāropā and sadhyavasānā is that mukhatva is cognized in the former while it is totally hidden in the latter.
Thus, the discussion on laksanā which started with the śāstrakāras such as the Vaiyākaranas, Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas, and for whom it was only applied to the problem of language, takes a marvellous turn when discussed by the ālamkārikas who discuss laksanā from the point of view of a poetic expression. Laksaņā which started as a dosa with the Mimamsakas becomes a source of beauty with the poets, and later giants like Appayya and Jagannātha maintain the balance between śāstra and aesthetics, while discussing the śābdabodha on one hand of some varieties of lakșana, of course as evidenced in poetic illustrations, and the poetic beauty capped by the prayojana on the other, maintaining the aesthetic analysis.

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