Sahrdayaloka Part 01

SR No.: 006908
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 2005
Total Pages: 602
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 123

98
SAHRDAYĀLOKA
Thus Keśava suggests that having either of the attributes (i.e. rasā"dimat/ alamkara-vattva) is the definition of poetry. Having either of the attributes means to be different from something which is different (from poetry) (i.e. to be poetry itself.). Or, the definition terminates into saying that (that sentence is said to be poetry) which is the instrument of special happiness. The ancients hold that these two qualities (viz. rasā"dimat-tva and sukhaviśeşa-kst-tva) are present even in cases (of sentences) where the meaning of the 'samudāya' is even absent (i.e. wherein only the meaning of parts is prevelent such as in 'pankaja' meaning 'that which is born in mud' and not lotus' - the samudāya meaning.) This opinion of the ancients cannot be traced for the present. We cannot say for certain who these ancients are. Or, it may mean that according to the ancients, even if the whole 'samudāya', i.e. the whole of poetry is not found to be 'rasavat', even then the two qualities are at least partially present in a given poem. Keśava then observes : by 'śrutam' is meant 'is said to be only. By this word, 'śruam' the vedic ritual causing 'adrsta' or 'apūrva' giving rise to varieties of happiness is not meant here.
Keśava then has a dig at other definitions. He says - "kecit tu - 'tad adosau...”. This is a clear reference to Mammata. But he does not discuss his point and leaves it at this only showing perhaps his displeasure with Mammața. He also quotes ‘apare' saying, “rasa-pratipatti (guna) dvārā sukhaviśeşa-sādhanam vākyam kāvyam' iti apare." - i.e., by (the attribute) rasa-pratipatti or apprehension of rasa, is meant such sentence to be poetry, which causes a special happiness. Then he says, “kecit tu padāvalī kāvyam" - which is perhaps a reference to Dandin. Perhaps he gives a common answer to all these definitions. He goes on to observe that, "na tu nirdosa-gunavadādi; kāvya-doṣāņām aparigananā-"patteh.” i.e. the attribues viz. ‘nirdosam' (i.e. a-dosau) and 'guņavad' (i.e. sa-gunau) of kāvya cannot be accepted as there arises the contingency of not being able to count the poetic blemishes. (perhaps, he suggests that even some dosas are not permanent dosas, so to count doșas is not possible). He further observes that, “na ca - dosábhāva-ghatitakāvyatva-jñānártham eva, pratiyogi parigañanam - iti vācyam.” (pp. 3 ibid). He
erves : "na ca etat kävyam dustam" iti an-udbhāvanā"patteh, 'idam kāvyam eva na iti abhidhānasya eva, ucitatvāt - ity āhuḥ tanna. tavā’yam heturā”bhāsa itivad ukteh. vyāptivisista-paksa-dharmasyaiva hetutvāt. na ca hetutvena abhimata iti vācyam. tulyatvāt iti. vastutas tat kävyam prthag eva yatra doșa-guņādi-cintā. na hi śariram sariram eva na bhavati, iti anye.
He seems to criticize the attribute ‘adosau' in definitions such as those coined by Mammața and others and seems to recommend that poetry is possible even if poetic