Sahrdayaloka Part 01

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006908/1

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SAHRDAYALOKA | Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism [Vol. I, Part 1] L. D. Series : 141 General Editor Jitendra B. Shah TAPASVI NANDI L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009 For Personal & Private Use Only

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bhAratIya saMskRti CATE SAHRDAYALOKA [Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ] [Vol. I, Part 1] L. D. Series: 141 General Editor Jitendra B. Shah L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009 For Personal & Private Use Only TAPASVI NANDI

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L. D. Series : 141 SAHRDAYALOKA [Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ] [Vol. I, Part-1] TAPASVI NANDI Published by Jitendra B. Shah Director L.D.Institute of Indology Ahmedabad First Edition : 2005 ISBN 81 - 85857-23-7 Price : 650/ Typesetting Swaminarayan Mudranalaya Press Shahibaug, Ahmedabad. Printer Navprabhat Printing Press Gheekanta Road, Ahmedabad Tel. 25508631 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Publisher's Note We feel pleasure to place before the learned "SAHRDAYALOKA" OR "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - (Vol. I) by Prof. Tapasvi Nandi. The author hardly requires any introduction to the learned working in the area of Sanskrit Alamkararsastra or Literary Aesthetics. The work attempts to cover the basic thought - currents prevalent in Sanskrit Literary criticism, trying to unearth the origin and development of each topic beginning with the "Definition and scope of poetry, Sanskrit semantics, the theories of Dhvani, Rasa etc." The author has taken care to record and accept the views of his predecessors in his area of research and has very gratefully acknowledged the honourable acceptance of their views and has also tried to discuss modestly differences of opinion if any, at various places. The whole work presents the material in an historical, critical and comparative perspective. We feel sure that the learned will appreciate his efforts in an unbiased way. Prof. Nandi's observations on Dhvani and Rasa deserve special mention as he has made a special effort to explain how ese thought currents which form a special contribution of Indian Literary Aesthetics are relevant even to-day and how they can be applied to the most modern patterns of literature world over, including absurd poetry and absurd theatre as well. The author also proposes to bring out Vol. II covering the area of literary criticism that is not discussed in the present volume, of course, god willing. We are thankful to Prof. Nandi for agreeing with us to publish the present work. We are also thankful to the Swaminarayan press, and all our colleagues in seeing this work through. Hope this work will stand the test of the learned and will fulfil a gap left out by earlier experts. It may be noted that for the sake of convenience, this work is presented in three parts such as, Part I - chs. I-VII (pp. 1-575); Part II - chs. VIII-XIII (pp. 576-1195) and Part III - chs. XIV - XVIII (pp. 1196-1843), with select Bibliography (pp. 1844-1850) appearing at the end of Part III. The Publisher's note, the author's preface - Namaskaromi, contents, detailed contents and abbriviations appear in all the three parts. Jitendra Shah L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Dedication This work is for, Parth (my grandson, doing medicine) Mit (my grandson, doing physiotherapy) Smt. Chinmayee (my daughter, pharmacist) Dr. Mayur (my son-in-law, Gynecologist) Harsha, (Smt. Nandi, rtd. Librarian) Sragdhara, (The late, my sister) The Late, Smt. Madhumati, The Late, Shri. Shambhucandra, my parents; and my maha-gurus Prof. R. C. Parikh, Prof. R. B. Athavale & Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkerni, .. Awardee, President's Certificate of Honour and also for Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. P. C. Chakravarty Prof. Devasthai, - my sources; To whom I have turned, at places, for inspiration and guidance and for Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi and Dr. Satyavrat Shastri. For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Namaskaromi...." Salutations to the Divine ! Salutations to my three Maha-gurus; Salutations to my parents, Salutations to all the sources consulted by me And, Salutations to all of you, who are all all sparks of the Divine ! "Aum purnam adah, purnam idam purnat purnam udacyate purnasya purnam adaya purnam eva'va sisyate." "That [Source, which has been drawn upon by me is respectable and] is perfect, This (Work, which is presented before you in this respectable shape) is perfect." Perfect (material-; ideas, inspiration) has been drawn from perfect (respectable, reliable source). After drawing upon perfect (material) from perfect (and respectable source), only the perfect is left behind (before you)." This, in short, is the story of my spiritual endeavour that started on 7th Aug. 2000 A.D. and reached its completion on 20th July, 2003 A.D. The great yogin said, "In the stillness of the night, the eternal speaks." And yes; I do not know when, in the stillness of the night, my eyes kept wide open staring in the darkness around me, and when these thought-currents sneaked into my inner consciousness from various sources-first like light ripples of the quiet and dignified flow of the sacred Ganga, and then like the mighty billows of the stormy Atlantic, dashing against the shores, washing them clean. They settled into my mind and then sank deep into it. I do not know when my eyes were closed and For Personal & Private Use Only

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I was overpowered by sleep, as if embraced by the Divine Grace ! I feel floating in the wide stream, rich in currents and cross-currents, whirls and pulls; deep, full fathom five; quiet and dignified. I feel dragged and dragged, up and down, and then I slip towards the bottom, like in the womb of the mother earth, with a hundred thousand daffodils, red and pink, green, blue, white, violet and golden - on top of the surface ! So, as suggested in the beginning, I have accepted, with gratitude, of course after verifying with the original, the material, - line by line, paragraph by paragraph, at times, - from the works of my predecessors, who I thought are most reliable, and for whom I have tremendous respect and love in my heart, - from their works, dealing with the topics of word and meaning as discussed by the ancients - the Mimamsakas, the Naiyayikas and above all the great Vaiyakaranas, - the "prathame hi vidvamsah" as Anandavardhana would call them. I take these works as starting points, and as absolutely relaible sources and they are authored great scholars such as Dr. P. C. Chakrawarty, Prof. Devasthali and Prof. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. Sri P. Ramchandrudu and some others. At every step, wherever I have sought inspiration and help from these master works, I have clearly indicated my indebtedness. My work has grown both in size and dignity due to this, like the sacred flow of the Ganga growing vaster and vaster with the waters from the innumerable springs, rivulets and rivers mixing with the main stream; and shooting out from the bosom of the great Nagadhiraja Himalaya. Those who have undertaken the "caturdhama yatra" are a witness to this. By accepting everything from various springs the Ganga has carved out its own identity, sanctity and dignity. Same is the case with this work. I owe a lot to the great modern rsi-trayi-i.e. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, in particular, who has shaped my views on Bhoja. But it may also be noted that, without showing disrespect, I have ventured to dispute their results, and this happens quite often with Dr. Raghavan, when I feel, on verifying with the original words of Bhoja, that I am on firmer ground. This, the discreet will find out for himself, and there is no doubt about it. But this does not minimize their greatness and my adoration for their lotus-feet. They are the great thinkers spreading light and bearing the torch of Indian Literary Aestetics for the modern scholars, both in east and west alike. Over and above this, I owe everything, - i.e. beginning from my initiation into this ancient lore of Sahitya-sastra to whatever I have done till day, in serving its For Personal & Private Use Only

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cause, to my great gurus - the three of them, the 'guru-sikhi-tray of professors R. C. Parikh, R. B. Athavale, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and especially Dr. Kulkarni; for it is he who even to-day, at the age of 85+ yrs., inspires me, guides me and blesses me and in my moments of personal despondency fills me with warmth, love, guidance and inspiration. I am also indebted to the works of some of my senior contemporaries and to most of them personally also when I have met them, such as Dr. Rama Ranjan Mukherjee, Dr. Mukund Madhava Sharma, Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyaya, Prof. Dr. Satyavrata Shastri, Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi and my most respected and learned friends such as Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. Kamalesh Dutta Tripathi, the late Prof. Ramcandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), the late Prof. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shantiniketan), the late Prof. K. Krishnamoorty, Prof. N. P. Unni, Prof. Dr. K. K. Chaturvedi, and prof. Dr. S. D. Joshi, and some very brilliant young friends such as Prof. Dr. Sarojaben Bhate, Dr. C. Ramchandran, Prof. Dr. V. N. Jha, Dr. G. C. Tripathi, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Prof. M. M. Agrawal Dr. Goparaju, Rama, Dr. Jagannatha Pathak, and the rest. I have met all these dignitaries personally and I stand benifitted. I also will show my respect for Prof. Sri. Ramchandrudu for his great work on Jagannatha. True, my Guru Prof. Athavale taught me some portion of the great R. G., and his work on Pundit Jagannatha is monumental. So, I am made of all these stalwarts. But kindly note that with all this I remain myself, i.e. I have carefully carved out and preserved my identity. If at all I have accepted their ideas and views as sacred mantra, it is because I feel convinced about the same. I feel convinced first about their reliability and integrity, and then their output; their great reputation apart. Believe me, and I am honest, that I have practically verified every source in the original, before putting the stamp of my humble acceptance of their thoughts and writing. It is never a blind acceptance. In the words of Rajasekhara - "tad etad svikaranam, na tu haranam." I have accepted them, for I have found them acceptable, like the great Vagdevatavatara Mammata or the great Kalikala-Sarvajna acarya Hemacandra accepting the dictates of Abhinavaguptapadacarya, or like the latter himself accepting the ruling of his seniors when he says : "urdhvo'rdhvam aruhya yad artha-tattvam dhih pasyati, srantim avedayanti, phalam tad adyaih parikalpitanam viveka-sopana-paramparanam." For Personal & Private Use Only

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However, the discreet will find out that my acceptance ends with the field covering the ancient literature laying down the thoughts of the Mimamsakas, the Naiyayikas and the Vaiyakaranas. With our entry into the wide and open field of Alamkarasastra proper, i.e. with the works of Bharata, Bhamaha and down to Jagannatha, of course including Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, I have tried to project some original line of thinking that may prove to be of great value to the adhikarins. This is a modest claim but a sure one. I have accepted ideas and also drafting from Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, K. Krishnamoothy, and the rest, but with a touch of my own original contribution. I feel I am on absolutely sure and safe ground when I travel through this area of alamkara-Sastra proper, convering nearly two thousand years of creative thinking. My work will surely guide the adhikari aspirant who wants to have a glimpse of the greatness of the Indian acaryas, who have left behind their foot-prints on the sands of literary aesthetics. It may be noted that I have presented the rasa theory in a new perspective, and believe me, this is what I claim for sure, - a perspective which acknowledges the catholicity of rasa theory as it seems to serve the cause even of what they term 'absurd theatre' or 'absurd poetry. I am sure the discerning will take note of all this and try to evaluate this work in an unbiased way. At the same time may I remind the learned of the words of Jayanta who said, "kutosti nutanam vastu ?", or of the words quoted as above of Abhinavagupta suggesting that all fresh results follow the achievements of the earlier masters, i.e. after climbing the 'viveka-sopana-parampara' one gets into something fresh. So, I invite the sensitive and thoughtful adhikarins to have a soft corner for me and extend their helping hand. The great Mahima observes : (Vyakti-viveka) - "yuktoyam atmasadesan prati me prayatno na'sty eva taj jagati, sarva-manoharan yat, kecij jvalanti, vikasanty, apare nimilanty anye yad abhyudayabhaji jagat-pradipe." The discerning are requested to read every line, before pronouncing a judgement.... I wish that only those, through whose arteries and veins alamkarasastra flows, should venture to review this work. No lesser soul should attempt it. So, we humbly say - "adya pratanyate'smabhih vidusam pritaye muda astadasa'dhikarini mimamsa kavya-vartmani." For Personal & Private Use Only

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This forms only the first volume of my "Sahrdaya"loka" or "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism." The proposed second volume will try to study the concepts of guna, dosa, alamkara, laksana, aucitya, riti, vrtti, kavisiksa and some modern writers on Sanskrit poetics, such as Dr. Rewaprasadjee etc. I sincerely thank the publishers and Shri. Dr. Jitendra Shah the Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for seeing this work through. I also thank his collegues, and also Principal Kanjibhai Patel for kindly co-operating with us. The press Shri Swaminarayana Mudrana Mandir, of course deserves full praise and thanks for doing its job so carefully. - I also thank, Smt. Harsha Nandi, my wife, Smt. Chinmayee M. Rali, my beloved daughter, M. Pharm., Dr. Mayur S. Rali, M.D., D.G.O., my son-in-law, and our two grandsons Parth who studies medicine, and Mit, doing physiotherapy bearing with me through all the inconveniences caused due to my sadhana, and providing love and inspiration through out the course of these three years when this work was carried out. I also thank the Divine, and our Sadguru Raja-yogi Shri Narendrajee for his blessings and who has also suggested that even after this polite achievement, I have to travel further, through the woods, dark, deep and lovely, before I rest and lay down my pen. Aum ma Aum. iti Sivam... 19 Aug. 2004 Asopalava, 4, Professors' Colony, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-380009. (Gujarat State) India. - For Personal & Private Use Only TAPASVI NANDI

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Bio-data of Dr. T. S. Nandi M. A. Ph.D Born : 22nd Sept., 1933, Kheda, Gujarat; India. Special achievements : (i) Smt. Nathiba Gold Medal, '53; Guj. Uni., Ahd. (ii) Dr. Nayak Gold Medal for Research '73; Guj. Uni.; Ahmedabad. (iii) Sastra-cudamani fellowship; Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi; Feb. '94 - (iv) Awardee, President's Certificate of Merit, Aug. '90. (v) Emeritus Professor; Uni. Grants. Comm. New Delhi, Feb. '95; Teaching Experience : '55 June - '64 June; H. K. Arts College, Ahd.; as Lecturer and Professor; Jun '64 - '93 Oct. (Total 29 yrs and six months). at P. G. School of Languages Guj. Uni., as lecturer, Reader and Prof. Head, ['84 feb.-'85 Dec. as Director, L. D. Inst. of Indology, on lien.] Area of specialisation : Sanskrit Literature and Literary Criticism - alamkarasastra. Research Articles - A hundred odd articles published in various research journals of repute. Research Works : (i) The Origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics (Doctoral thesis); Pub.; Gujarat Uni. Research publication series; '73. (ii) "Dhvanyaloka-Locana", critical Intro. and Translation in Gujarati; Pub. Guj. Uni. '73 (iii) Sanskrit Natakono paricaya (in gujarat) [Introduction to Sanskrit Drama) Pub.; Uni. Book Production Board; Guj. State; Ahd. '73; Third Edn. '96. (iv) 'Bharatiya Sahitya-sastrani vicara-parmparao" (in Guj.) Uni. Book. Production Board, '74; Third Edn.; 2000. For Personal & Private Use Only

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(v) Mammata's Kavyaprakasa with Saradipika of Gunaratnagani; ullasas I-VI; Vol. I; Critically edited for the first time; Pub; Guj. Uni.; '76. (vi) Mammata's Kavyaprakasa, with Saradipika of Gunaratnagani; critical Edition; (vol. II) Pub. Guj. Uni. '84; (vii) Bharatiya Natyasastrani Vicara-paramparao (in Guj.); Pub. Uni. Bookproduction Board Guj. State; Ahd. '85 (viii) Jinasamudra's Commentary on the Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa; Critical Edn.; Pub. Guj. Sahitya Akademi; Guj. State, Ahd. '85 critical Intro. in English. (ix) Natyasastra Bharata; Ch. VI. with Abhinavabharati; (in Guj.) Critical Intro. Translation, etc. with Harsavati, Guj. Comm.; Pub. Guj. Uni. Research Publication series; '79. - (x) Natyasastra - Bharata; Ch. s I. II and III. and Ch. VI. with Abhinavabharati; (in Guj.); critical Intro, Translation etc.; Pub. Saraswati research prakasana series; Vol. I; Ahd. '94 Second Edn. 2001 A.D. (xi) Natyasastra - Bharata; Ch. VI; with Abhinava-bharati, Chs. XVI, XVIII & XIX, Guj. Trans. Critical Intro. etc. (Vol. II), '94; Saraswati Research Prakasana, series, Vol. 8, 2nd. Edn. 2001, A.D. (xii) Mrcchakatika; Sudraka; - by Sragdhara Nandi; Revised Critical Edn.; Dr. T. S. Nandi; Sarasvati Research Publication Series; Ahd. '97 (xiii) Dhvanyaloka, with Locana; (in Guj.) critical Intro; Translation etc.; Pub. Saraswati; Research Publication series, Vol. 11; Ahd. '98 (in Gujarati) (xiv) Natyasastra - Bharata; Vol. II Gaekwad oriental series; critical Edn. with special ref. to MS. 'N' (from Nepal) - jointly with Dr. V. M. Kulkarni; Intro. in English Pub. Oriented Institute, Vadodara; 2001 A.D. (xv) Haima - vanmaya-vimarsa; Edited by Dr. T. S. Nandi; Jointly with Dr. R. I. Nanavati, Research Articles Read at international and national level seminars in Ahd., and Surat; Pub. skt-sahitya Akademi., Guj. State '87. (xvi) Kavya'nusasana; Acarya Hemacandra, with critical Intro; Trans.; in Gujarati Pub. The L. D. Institute of indology, Ahd.; L. D. Series; Vol. 123; Jun. 2000 A.D. (xvii) "Abhidha"; Pub. L. D. Inst. of Indology, Ahd.; L. D. Series, 131; Feb. 2002 A.D. For Personal & Private Use Only

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(xviii) & (xix) Natyasastra, Vol. III (Ch. XIX-XXVII) (Published; 2004 A.D.); & IV. (Ch. XXVIIIXXXVI) (in press) with Abhinavabharati; Critical new edition with special ref. to Ms. 'N' (from Nepal) - jointly with Dr. V. M. Kulkarni; Pub. - Oriental Institute, Vadodara; under G.O.Series publication; XX - Sahtdayaloka - or Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism; Pub. L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahd., 2004-2005 A.D. Works on Hand XXI - Jayanta's Kavyaprakasa Dipika; Critical Edn. in view of a fresh ms. from Hemacandra Jnana bhandara, Patan (N. Guj.), with critical Intro: and comparative critical observations written in Sanskrit. XXII Alamkarikas from Gujarat. or Jaina Aesthetics; (in English) - XXXIII Kalidasa and Sanskrit Literary criticism; (with ref. to all major alamkara works) XXIV Vyaktiviveka of Mahima Bhatta - critical Intro; Translation etc. in English. Dr. Nandi has attended various seminars, and conferences at local, state, national and international level, sometimes as chairperson or sectional president,He attended the W.S.C., in Philadelphia, U.S.A. '84; and also in Benglore, A.D. '98. He was nominated as chair-person; for a session at the W.S.C., in Delhi, 2002; His works have been favourably reviewed in national and international journals. 14 Students earned their doctorate (Ph.D.) under his supervision and 25 odd got their M. Phil degree under his guidance. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Contents Ch. No. Title Page No. 1-125 126-203 204-229 "Definition and scope of poetry." (Introduction p. 1-12) Sabda-vyapara-vicara; Sabdavrttis; recognised in the works of earlier alamkarika-s such as Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana Udbhata and Rudrata [i.e. Anandavardhana's purva"carya-s] 'Pratiyamana artha' IV or 230-248 V VII VIII 249-368 369-453 454-575 576-709 710-778 Implicit sense, as seen in the earlier alamkarika-s such as Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. Sabda-vittis, the nature of; "Abhidha" Tatparya Laksana Vyanjana Vyanjana-virodha or Opposition to suggestive power Classification of Poetry (form - oriented) Classification of Poetry (contd.) (criticism oriented;) dhvani, gunibhuta-vyangya, citra; or uttama, madhyama, avara, etc. 779-967 968-1041 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Page No. 1042-1152 1153-1195 1196-1277 Ch. No. Title XII Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others and Gunibhuta-vyangya-kavya and citra-kavya XIII Dhvani and other thought currents such as guna, alamkara, samghatana, riti, vitti, etc. and also Dhvani-Virodha. XIV The Concept of 'Rasa', as seen in veda and ancient literature and then in Bharata and earlier alamkarikas from Bhamaha to Rudrata Concept of 'Rasa' as seen in Anandavardhana and others posterior to him. XVI. Rasa-nispatti-vicara in Abhinavagupta XVII Rasa-nispatti-vicara in Mammata, some others and Jagannatha. XVIII Dasa-rupaka-vicara Detailed Contents XV 1278-1490 1491-1593 1594-1629 1630-1843 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Detailed Contents Ch. I Introduction, p. 1-12; Definition and scope of poetry, p. 12-14; Bhamaha, p. 14; Dandin, p. 24; Vamana, p. 30; Udbhata, p. 36; Rudrata, p. 37; Anandavardhana and his followers, p. 39; Rajasekhara, p. 42; Kuntaka, p. 42; Ksemendra, p. 60; Bhoja, p. 60; Agnipurana, p. 63; Mahimabhatta, p. 64; From Mammata to Visvanatha, p. 81; Mammata, p. 81; Hemacandra, p. 86; Vagbhata I, p. 86; Vagbhata II, p. 87; Jayadeva, p. 87; Visvanatha, p. 91; Vidyadhara, p. 88; Vidyanatha, p. 89; Kesava Misra, p. 97; Jagannatha, p. 101; J.'s criticism of Mammata's definition of poetry, p. 109; J.on Visvanatha's definition of poetry, p. 114, later challanges to J.'s definition of poet ry, p. 115; Kavya-hetu and Kavya-prayojana, p. 119; . Ch. II Sabda-vyapara-vicara or Powers of a word; general introduction, p. 126; ancient background, p. 129; word meaning relationship, p. 132; the vakya padiya, p. 134; Mimamsakas, p. 137; artha-jnana or determination of sabdartha, p. 142; pravrtti-nimitta of sabda, p. 146; Naiyayikas, p. 148; how is sanketa apprehended, p. 148; Bharthari, p. 150; word and its import, p. 153; the vaiyakaranas * patanjali *; mimamsakas; p. 157 different views as mentioned in the V.P., p. 164 Naiyayikas; p. 164 Bhartrhari's V.P.; p. 165 Alamkarikas; p. 171 Etimologists; p. 175; Short Summary of total heritage; p. 175 Sabda-vrttis as seen in different schools of thought such as the vaiyakaranas, mimamsakas etc. p. 181; mimamsakas; p. 192 naiyayikas; p. 198 Navya-Naiyayikas, p. 200 Ch. III. Bhamaha; p. 205 Dandin p. 217 Vamana; p. 220 Udbhata; p. 225 Rudrata p. 226 Ch. IV p. 230; Bhamaha; p. 232 Dandin; p. 242 Vamana, p. 247; Udbhata, p. 247; Rudrata; p. 247 Ch. V General Introduction; p. 250 Abhidha; p. 252 classification p. 252; Jagannatha, Maha-siddhantin; p. 253; Bhoja p. 276; Mukula and others p. 289; Kuntaka; p. 300; Mahima; p. 306, rethinking p. 332 Mammata p. 333 Mammata's definition of abhidha p. 345; For Personal & Private Use Only

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Hemacandra; p. 347; Jayadeva p. 349; Vidyadhara, p. 358, Vidyanatha, p. 358; Visvanatha p. 359; Kesava, p. 359; Appayya Dixit p. 360. Ch. VI General Introduction, p. 369; Vakya, its import; p. 370; Vakya; definition p. 371; Patanjali, p. 371; naiyayikas p. 371; The grammarians p. 372; what is vakyartha ? p. 374; Mimamsakas p. 377; constitution of a sentence, different views; p. 378; Naiyayikas p. 381; nimitta of vakyartha p. 385; Prabhakara p. 391; alamkarikas; p. 396 the nature and scope of tatparya-vitti; p. 398 tatparyajnana p. 409; anvita'bhidhanavada and abhihita'nvayavada p. 414; anvitabhidhanavada p. 415; abhihitanvayavada p. 421; tatparya p. 426; dhananjaya/dhanika p. 427; tatparya in Bhoja p. 433; Mammata and his followers p. 444; Ch. VII. three conditions p. 454; grammarians p. 455; Patanjali, Gautama p. 458; mukhya, gauna, mimamsakas, p. 459; alamkarikas 482; Mukula 482; Kuntaka 484; Kumarila 485; types of laksana 489; Mukula 492; Mammata 492; gauni, compound words, sentencelaksana, Bharthari p. 503; Hemacandra p. 521; Bhoja p. 521; Jayadeva p. 526; Vidyadhara p. 531; Vidyanatha p. 534; Visvanatha p. 534; Kesava 539; Appayya p. 540; Jagannatha p. 550; Ch. VIII vedic sages p. 576; grammarians, mimamsakas, naiyayikas, yaska p. 577; dr. Saroja Bhate p. 578; Panini, patanjali p. 589, Bhart;hari, p. 591; Sphotavada and vyanjana p. 599; vyanjana as accepted by Anandavardhana and his followers p. 601; sources; veda p. 602; The Nirukta p. 618; Rk Pratisakhya p. 620; Astadhyayi p. 620; Mahabhasya p. 621; germs of vyanjana in Bhasa, Asvaghosa, Kalidasa etc. p. 622; Anandavardhana; (with Locana); p. 630; Mahima p. 654; Anandavardhana p. 656; Mammata p. 658; abhidhamula-vyanjana, 659; Abhinavagupta; p. 680; Mammata p. 685; Hemacandra p. 687; Jayadeva p. 688; Vidyadhara p. 689; Kesava, p. 690; Vidyanatha p. 690; Visvanatha p. 691; Appayya p. 693; Jagannatha p. 694; Ch. IX. Abhinavagupta p. 711; Mammata p. 726; Mukula p. 748, Kuntaka p. 752, Bhoja p. 752; Mahima p. 752; Dhanika p. 753; Hemacandra p. 772; Vidyadhara p. 773; Vidyanatha p. 773; Visvanatha p. 773; For Personal & Private Use Only

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Detailed Contents Ch. X. Bhamaha p. 780; Dandin p. 785; Vamana p. 795; Rudrata p. 799; Anandavardhana p. 811; Abhinavagupta p. 814; Bhoja p. 816; Bhoja nataka etc., p. 818; nidarsanam p. 820; manthulli p. 821; manikulya p. 822, katha, khanda-katha, upakatha, p. 822; behatkatha, campu, p. 824; parva-bandha, kandabandha, p. 825; sargabandha, asvasaka-bandha, p. 826; sandhibandha, avaskandhakabandha, kavya-sastra, p. 827; kosa, p. 829; samhita, sahitya-prakasa, p. 830; Abhinavabharati p. 836; uparupakas natika p. 834; Hemacandra p. 851, Natyadarpana 852; Saradatanaya, NLRK. 852, Vagbhasa II, "ingabhupala, Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha Visvanatha p. 852; individually considered from Bhoja onwards 853. Ch. XI R. 968; dhvani, dvanyaloka; locanakara p. 975; dhvani-prabheda p. 984; table showing varieties of dhvani p. 988; vyanjaka-mukhena , p. 999; alamkaras, rasavat etc. p. 1006; vyanjaka-mukhena bhedah, 1009; prabandha as rasavyanjaka p. 1012; suggestivity of vitti, riti, p. 1014; varnas as suggestive of rasa p. 1015; padas - rasavyanjaka, p. 1015; rasa-virodhi, its parihara p. 1016; virodhisamavesa p. 1020; supremacy of rasa in poetry p. 1029; .Mammata p. 1030; Hemacandra and Jayadeva p. 1031; Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha Visvanatha, p. 1031; Jagannatha p. 1032; uttamottama, etc. 1032; further classification of dhvani by J. p. 1032; Ch. XII. Dhvani in earlier alamkarikas, Bhamaha and others p. 1043; Kuntaka p. 1045; Bhoja p. 1091; Bhoja-Tatparya, p. 1111; gunibhutavyangya and citra kavya p. 1125; citra kavya p. 1127; gunibhuta - vyangya, Anandavardhana 1127; Abhinavagupta's attitude 1133; Mammata madhyama kavya, etc. p. 1133; Hemacandra, p. 1137, Visvanatha p. 1138; Jagannatha, four-fold scheme p. 1139; Jayadeva p. 1141; Vidyadhara; Vidyanatha; Kesava; citra-kavya p. 1143; Anandavardhana and others p. 1144; Mammata p. 1149; Vidyanatha, p. 1149; Visvanatha p. 1150; Kesava p. 1151; Appayya Diksita p. 1151; Jagannatha p. 1152 Ch. XIII. dhvani and alamkara p. 1154; samghatana p. 1156; riti, vitti, p. 1163; Locana, p. 1165; Mammata p. 1166; Hemacandra p. 1172; Jayadeva p. 1173; Vidyadhara, p. 1174; Vidyanatha p. 1174; Visvanatha p. 1175; Jagannatha p. 1176; Opposition to dhvnikara's For Personal & Private Use Only

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supremacy, p. 1178; Vimarsini, opponents of dhvani p. 1178; Locana p. 1180; refutation, dhvani-twofold- p. 1192; Ch. XIV Rasa in RV. p. 1196; Rasa in Yv. p. 1199; Rasa in Samaveda p. 1199; Rasa in AV p. 1200; Amara, Hemacandra on word 'rasa'; p. 1202; Rasa, various meanings in vedic literature, conclusion p. 1203; NS. I. 7; rasan atharvanad p. 1207; Hymns of AV.; love lyrics p. p. 1217; Rasa in the Upanisads p. 1219; Rasa in the Nirukta; 'Rasa' in Bihaddevata p. 1221; Rasa in Panini and Patanjali p. 1221; Rasa in Asvaghosa, Bhasa, Kalidasa, p. 1224; Rasa in Bharata Muni, NS. p. 1240; Bharata on Bhavas p. 1248; Bhamaha p. 1256; Dandin p. 1262; Vamana p. 1267; Udbhata p. 1268; Rudrata p. 1271; Ch. XIV *; Rasa in Anandavardhana p. 1278; asam'aksyakrama-vyangya (= rasa"di dhvani) with reference to varna etc. p. 1285; and samghatana; types p. 1285; prabandha-suggestive of rasa; p. 1286; rasa"di-dhvani suggested by case-terminations, etc., p. 1287; obstacles in rasa-vyanjana; p. 1288; rasa as aesthetic relish for all art-critics p. 1290; virodhi-rasa-vyavastha; opposite sentiments p. 1291; overcoming opposition between two rasas p. 1293; other concepts, vitti, etc. and rasa p. 1294; alamkara, guna, dosa and rasa 1298; Mukula and rasa p. 1300; Kuntaka p. 1302; Dhananjaya and Dhanika p. 1310; Mahimabhatta p. 1310; Bhoja p. 1317; Agnipurana p. 1330; Mammata p. 1334; Hemacandra p. 1339; Vagbhata I p. 1340; Vagbhata II, p. 1341; Jayadeva p. 1341; Vidyadhara p. 1342; Vidyanatha p. 1343; Visvanatha II p. 1348; Bhanudatta p. 1363; Kesava Misra p. 1364; Jagannatha p. 1367; Rasa in works on dramaturgy; Dasrupaka; p. 1373; Natya darpana; Ramacandra and Gunacandra; 1388; Bhava-prakasana, p. 1401; Saradatanaya; bhava p. 1402; Saradatanaya on rasa; p. 1426; Nataka-laksana ratna kosa; Sagaranandin p. 1459; Rasarnava sudhakara of Singabhupala p. 1465; Bhava and rasa in Rs. 1465. Ch. XVI. rasa-sutra p. 1492; Lollata 1493; Lollata's view; Locana; refutation of Lollata by ssi. Sankuka; as read in Locana; in Abh. p. 1500; ssi. Sankukas views on rasa-nispatti, Abh. p. 1502; Tota Abh. on Sankuka's view p. 1507; samkhya view in Abh. p. 1516; sankuka's view in For Personal & Private Use Only

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Locana p. 1516; Bhattanayaka's view in Abh. and then in Locana; p. 1518; Abhinavagupta's view on rasa-nispatti; p. 1527; seven obstacles; rasa-vighnas; Abh.; p. 1542; Explanation of rasa-sutra by Abhinavagupta p. 1554; Locana; rasa-nispatti p. 1563; All rasas, blissgiving p. 1578; santa rasa p. 1578; catholicity of rasa-theory p. p. 1583; Ch.XVII rasa-nispatti-vicara; Mammata to Jagannatha *; Mammata p. 1594; Jagannatha p. 1601; Ch. XVIII Nataka 1632; Dasarupaka p. 1646; Itivrtta p. 1652; artha-prakrti sp. 1654; five avasths p. 1658; Sandhis and Sandhyangs p. 1661; artho'paksepakas p. 1666; sandhis and sandhangas, further discussion p. 1670; Natya-darpana p. 1676; Bhavaprakasana *; NLRK. p. 1682; Sahityadarpana *; Rasarnava Sudhakara p. 1696; Sandhyantaras p. 1702; Comparative and critical study of sandhi-s and sandhyanga-s p. 1705; Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's view; sixty four sandhyangas p. 1714; conclusions concerning sandhyangas p. 1736; Bhoja p. 1749; A comparative and critical table of sandhyangas p. 1749; Types of drama; nataka p. 1795; five special types of drama in Bava prakasana 1800; Prakarana p. 1807; Samavakara p. 1811; ihamrga p. 1821; Dima 1825; Vyayoga p. 1828; Utsrstika'nka; p. 1830; prahasana p. 1831; Bhana p. 1834; Vithi p. 1836; For Personal & Private Use Only

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Abbreviations AVM. A-bh AG. A-se. Bha B. P. Bho. DR. Da. Dha Dhv. Dhv. L. H. (or. . C.) Abhidhavrtta-Matrka of Mukula. Abhinavabharati Abhinavagupta Alamkara-sekhara-Kesava; Anandavardhana Bhamaha Bhava Prakasana Bharata Bhoja Dasa-rupakaDandin Dhananjaya - Dhanika Dhvanyaloka. Dhvanyaloka-Locana-Abhinavagupta's. Hemacandra. Jagannatha K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof. Kavya'lamkara, Bhamaha.' Kavya'lamkara-Sutra-vrtti-Vamana's Kavya'nusasana, Hemacandra. Kavya"darsa-Dandin Kavya Prakasa. KumarilaKuntaka, Mimamsa-Sutra. K. Kris. Ka. Ka.Su.Vr. Ka-sa KD. - KP. Ku. K. Mi-Su. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Mbh. M. M. NLRK. N.S. P. RS. R. G. sa Sr.Pra. S.B. Sa IIIIIIIIIIIIIII Mahabhasya Mahimabhatta; Mammata. Nataka-Laksana-Ratna-Kosa Natyasastra, Bharata; Panini Punditaraja-Jagannath. Rasa'rnavasudhakara. Rasa-Gangadhara Saradatanaya Srngara-Prakasa; Bhoja Singabhupala Sagaranandin Sa-Sayana (in vedic context) Sahityadarpana-Visvaanatha Sanskrit Poetics, S. K. De. Sarasvati-Kantha"- bharana. Vagbhasa II Vatsyayana Vakrokti Jivita; Kuntaka Visvanatha Vyakti-Viveka Sa S-D. SP. S.K.A. Vag. Vatsya V.J. V. -- - Vya.V. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter 1 Definition and Scope of Poetry (Kavya; Literature i.e. belles lettres) Introduction : Sound thinking on aesthetics started in India in very early period. It was reliable and thought-provoking. It continues to be so even today in modern centext. It centred round arts such as drama, literature, music, dance, architecture, scupture etc. The aesthetics developed with reference to natya i.e. dramatic art, and sahitya, i.e. literary art, in particular, seems to be unparalleled even when compared to the - thinking of modern aesthetes, both in east or west. Our context, for the present, centres round only literary aestetics. It may be noted that in India, thinking rning literary criticism originated from very very early period and this observation is supported by documentary evidences. The natyasastra (= N.S.) of Bharata (4th cen. A.D.) (We have accepted the dates of all works referred to in our writing, as fixed by Dr. S. K. De; Sanskrit Poetics, History of; Calcutta, 60.) which covers critically the dramatic art in all its forms, and in which all forms of dramatic art are subsumed under the terminology viz. rupaka, - deals with certain basic principles concerning literary criticism, such as 'guna' or literary excellence, dosa or literary blemish, alamkara or figures of speech and laksana or distinctive mark, while treating "vag-abhinaya" i.e. vocal acting concerming the speech, along with other three forms of acting such as 'angika abhinaya" i.e. bodily acting or gestural, aharya i.e. extraneous, conveyed by costumes, settings, make-up etc., and 'sattvika' i.e. internal, conveyed by the manifestation of internal feelings, which required greater concentration and subtler effort on the part of the artist. With reference to the same, the N.S. also considers the problem of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience. It For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA should always the kept in centre that Bharata is concerned only with aesthetics concerning the dramatic art. For him dramatic art was totally different and independent of the literary art. He has discussed the topic of rasa i.e. aesthetic experience, in the context of dramatic art only and this thinking which could have originated with reference to dramatic art, or, any art in general, could have been applied to literary art as well by literary critics later. But this could be only a guess work and it may be noted that nobody is in a position to pass any observation on oath. May be dramaturgy preceeded literary criticism and the topic of rasaexperience was later covered up in literary criticism also, when written form of drama was subsumed under literary form called 'drsya-kavya' or visual form of literature. But exactly at what stage of literary criticism and when this happened, one can not say. True, Bharata's N.S. is earlier among available documents concerning art, especially dramatic art, and it does precede any oldest available document concerning literary art, i.e., kavya- alamkara-grantha, but at the same time it is equally true that Bharata himself while dealing with literary principles such as guna, etc. as mentioned above, talks of their application in dramatic art, particularly in preparing written literary script of a play, with reference to 'kavyarasa' i.e. aesthetic experience through literature. Thus, 'kavya-rasa' is an accepted concept for Bharata while dealing with 'natya-rasa' and we do not know exactly when these two thought-currents of kavya-rasa and natya-rasa got mingled with each other, even if they had an independent origin. Actually they were always taken care of together, like two sides of the same coin. The fact remains that this situation is even prior to Bharata, though of course, we have clear evidence of his recognising "rupaka" or drama/play in general, as form of lierature. It is quite possible that later literary critics subsumed drama as a variety of drsya i.e. visual or abhineya i.e. representable form of literature. Thus, dramatic art was embraced and taken in its fold by literary art. Other forms of literature which were 'an-abhineya' i.e. not meant for dramatic representation on stage, i.e. not part of performing art in general, such as verse-form beginning with 'muktaka' or a single-verse composition, ending with maha-kavya or epic form of literature, were topics of works on literary criticism i.e. alamkara-grantha in particular. The literary critics also covered in their kavya-alamkara-granthas, gadya' i.e. prose forms of literature such as katha, akyayika etc. To repeat, one thing is absolutely clear, that Bharata also gave a thought to some form of a written script while dealing with vacikaabhinaya i.e. acting concerning speech. Thus, he had an occasion to think of such topics as guna, i.e. literary excellence, dosa, i.e. literary blemish, alamkara i.e. figure of speech and laksana i.e. distinctive mark, -- topics which normally occupy For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 3 the thinking of literary critics. The use of these categories was recommended by Bharata with reference to 'kavya-rasa'. Thus thinking concerning 'kavya' i.e. literature and 'kavya-rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience through literature was even prior to Bharata. And this should be taken as a fact beyond debate. We can not imagine exactly at which period of time aesthetics concerning literary art only, originated as a separate discipline and that literary aesthetics came to be regarded as independent of aesthetics concerning dramatic art and, or, vice versa. N.S. of Bharata continues to be the oldest available document in art-criticism which centring round dramatic art, also embraces dance, music, literature, architecture, sculpture etc. in its fold, and treats of certain principles of literary criticism which keep aesthetic enjoyment in their focus. We have evidences to this effect from the VII th as well as XVIth chapters of the N.S. (Edn. G.O.S.) e.g., Na-Sa. (Edn. G.O.S. '59) pp. 348 (Vol. I) has - "evam ete kavya-rasabhivyakti-hetavah ekonapancasad bhavah pratyavagantavyah." and also - pp. 339 ibid - "yadi kavyartha-samsritair-vibhava'nubhava-vyanjitairekonapancasadbhavaih samanyaguna-yogena abhinispadyante rasah, tat katham sthayina eva bhava rasatvam apnuvanti"... and also - pp. 380 (N.S. VII. 120) - "nanabhavartha-sampannah sthayi-sattvabhicarinah, puspavakirnahs kartavyah kavyesu hi rasa budhaih." and also pp. 364, Vol. II; - "etani kavyasya ca laksanani sad-trimsad uddesa-nidarsanani, prabandha-sobhakarani tajnaih, samyak prayojyani yatha-rasani." (XVI. 42) So, observes Bharata; "Forty-nine bhavas are to be recognized in view of the manifestation (i.e. suggestion) of this kavya-rasa". "When, with the help of the forty-nine bhavas (i.e. basic feelings/emotions), that are suggested with the help of the vibhavas i.e. determinants, anubhavas i.e. consequents and vyabhicarins or accessories that rest on 'kavyartha' i.e. poetic meaning, 'rasas' i.e. aesthetic experience are born due to generalization, how is it For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA that it is stated that, only the sthayibhavas or basic emotions attain to the status of aesthetic rapture ?" Again, Bharata observes : "The wise have to spread, like flowers, rasas or aesthetic experience, in kavyas i.e. poetry; rasas; that reside in sthayi i.e. basic emotion, sattvika i.e. involuntrtary consequents, (and vyabhicarins) accessories that are accomplished with the help of different feelings and meanings. Again, "The enumeration and illustrations of these thirty-six laksanas i.e. distinctive marks are provided. These make for the beauty of a composition. The experts have to utilize them in poetry) with reference to rasa i.e. aesthetic experience." It is clear from these references from N.S., that rasa was considered with reference to 'kavya' i.e. poetry also and that Bharata was fully cognizant of it. Of course, we do not come across any direct reference to the acceptance of 'rupaka' or a dramatic piece, as a special form of literature or poetry in N.S. But there we have no indications to the contrary either in Bharata. In short, literary criticism has its beginnings even prior to Bharata. The works that dealt primarily with poetic beauty were recognized as - "alamkara-granthas", and the literary critics were designated as alamkarikas. The sastra i.e. discipline, that dealt with literary forms, their varieties and their beauty i.e. alamkara or 'saundarya'; the discipline of literary criticism; was termed "alamkarasastra". There is a definite idea behind the usage, viz, "alamkara-sastra". To-day, normally, by the term 'alamkara' in literature, we refer to the various poetic figures of words and sense such as 'anuprasa' or alleteration, 'yamaka' or rhyme etc. and 'upama' or simele, 'rupaka' or metaphor, 'utpreksa' or poetic fancy etc. Thus we take the term 'alamkara' to refer to a limited sense only. But the earlier Klamkarikas or literary critics did not accept the term alamkara in this specific limited sense only. They took it in a much wider sense. For what we term as 'sahitya' i.e. belles lettres to-day, these earlier critics, used the term 'kavya' which consisted of the co-existence - i.e. beautiful balancing - of both word and sense. As Kuntaka (vakrokti-jivita = V.J. - I. 7) puts it, "Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit, 'out-of-the-way') creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste on the other." (Trans. K.Kris.) Kuntaka makes it clear that normally word and sense go together in ordinary parlance, say for example, in day-to-day worldly talks, in various types of literature such as legal, scientific, etc. or even in a bare statement which reads news etc. But this sort of association of word and sense does not make for "litarature" for an alamkarika or a literary critic. Kuntaka places it clearly when he observes, (V. J., For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry Eda. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, 1977. (V. J. I. 16, 17): "when it is so obvious that word and meaning are ever experienced jointly, what is the special import of mentioning it (in the definition) ? The sahitya or mutual coherence between word and meaning in respect of beauty is nothing but a unique poetic usage, involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful. So, this is exactly meant by the term 'kavya' i.e. poetry, irrespective of its form, i.e. prose or verse. There are many varieties of poetry both in gadya i.e. prose, such as katha, akhyayika etc. and verse beginning with single verses i.e. muktaka and ending with a large composition an epic i.e. mahakavya". Dr. A. K. Warder (Indian kavya literature Vol. I-V; Edn. Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, '72) uses equivalents such as 'novel' and biography' or 'little history' for 'katha' and 'akhyayika' respectively, but we do not accept these terms, for these terms are tainted with different shades of meaning in modern context. The various forms, prose and verse, as mentioned above are all 'an-abhineya' i.e. not to be staged, as against 'abhineya' variety of literature which covers various forms of drama that are to be staged. Poetic beauty as revealed through kavya of all these forms, is brought about by 'sahitya' or special togetherness of word and sense. The alamkarikas or literary critics investigated into the problem of this poetic beauty i.e. 'kavya'lamkara' or 'alamkara of poetry.' From a strict logical point of view, they had two categories viz. 'kavya' and 'kavya-sobha', i.e. poetry and poetic beauty. Whatever was responsible in either creating poetic beauty directly or adding to it, was termed as 'alamkara' in a wider sense of the term. The works which containe discussion concerning the beauty of poetry, were widely called 'kavya'lamkara' works, and the discipline, 'alamkara-sastra'. Thus whatever factors that render some polish to literature, and whatever caused or added to its beauty, were all subsumed under one wider general term viz. 'alamkara'. So, the work, as noted above that concerned itself with poetry and its 'alamkara' i.e. its beauty in general, went under the name of kavya'lamkara-grantha. Thus, we have, "kavya'lamkara' of Bhamaha, 'kavya'lamkara' of Udbhata, 'kavya'lamkara-sutravrtti of Vamana, kavya'lamkara of Rudrata and also that of Kuntaka. The secret is that a work dealing with poetry i.e. belles lettres, and its beauty, i.e. its 'alamkara', is termed kavya'lamkara and the discipline dealing with literary criticism is 'alamkara-sastra'. Thus whatever caused beauty in poetry is termed 'alamkara' in a wider sense of the term in the literary circle of critics of those times. A sort of convention grew in literary circles around the word 'alamkara' For Personal & Private Use Only

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6 SAHRDAYALOKA with reference to all factors that either caused or added to beauty in poetry. Thus, observes Dandin, "The factors that make for beauty in poetry are (all) termed as alamkara", and Vamana observes that, "Poetry is understood through alamkara; verily, beauty is alamkara." Dandin in, kavya"darsa (Edn. B.O.R.I.) observes, - "kavyasobhakaran dharman alamkaran pracakste." . and also Vamana, Kavyalamkara-sutra-virtti - (Edn. '71. Chowkhamba skt. series) - "kavyam grahyam alamkarat, saundaryam alamkarah." - When a man of taste experiences a feeling such as, "it is all perfect now; it is alam'-enough", then only an "alamkara" is said to have taken shape. We have a term, "aramkstih" in the Vedas to the same effect. This tradition - which is prior to Bharata - of literary criticism, in its very initial stages, had literary thinkers attempt a coherent and logical definition of poetry, while directing their search towards deciphering the secret of beauty in poetry. While attempting a thorough investigation in the nature of factors that caused or promoted poetic beauty, these 'alamkarikas' or literary critics of yore, came across various thought currents under terms such as guna or poetic excellence, alamkara, or figures of speech, or turns of expression, riti or style or diction, vitti or mode, dosa i.e. poetic blemish; laksana or natural mark, rasa or aesthetic experience, dhvani or suggestion; vakrata or devitation or beautiful expression, aucitya or propriety, etc. which started gathering currency, weight and momentum. Thus, various currents and cross-currents originated with reference to the quest for the beautiful in poetry. In the works on kavya'lamkara i.e. beauty in poe topics were debated vigoreurly and alamkarikas i.e. literary critics, tried to promote or put more stress on this or that concept according to their individual preference and taste. As a result traditions and theories in thought currents concerning riti, i.e. style, alamkara or figures of speech, rasa or aesthetic pleasure, dhvani or suggestion and vakrokti or beautiful expression and aucitya or propriety, started taking shape. These thought-currents and cross-currents at times vied with one another and at times merged with one another and again parted and merged to form a varitable flux of indian literary criticism termed "alamkarasastra" in general. However, it has to be carefully kept in mind that no alamkarika or literary critic has pressed for the acceptance of this or that concept at the cost of total elimination or disrespect for any other concept. True, we observe passionate insistance on this or that thought-current, but this attitude does not push out any other thought-current as rank bad and useless. On the contrary, by and large, there is a tendency to accomodate, a tendency to tolerate and respect other literary For Personal & Private Use Only

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7 Definition and Scope of Poetry traditions and evolve a fabric of variagated colours. This happens with great thinkers such as Bhamaha and Dandin and Vamana among the earlier alamkarikas, and then the great Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta followed by Mammata, down to Appayya Dixit and Pundita-raja Jagannatha - all belonging to what we may term the Kashmir School of thought as against what we may term the Malava School of literary criticism with Bhoja supposedly taking its lead. Even in the Malava tradition the same spirit of tolerance and respect for rival thought current is equally prominent and this is a trait of Indian culture and tradition in general. These thinkers have tried to accomodate all concepts, all thought-currents in their wider coherent and catholic scheme of thought, but of course, with more or less weightage given to this or that concept. For example, penning 'Hridayadarpana' with a vow to demolish dhvani, its author, Bhattta Nayaka accepts the concept of rasa-rasadhvani - in his own way. The process of arriving at rasa, for Bhatta Nayaka is reached with the help of powers called bhavakatva or revelation and bhojakatva or enjoyment as against vyanjana i.e. suggestion as advocated by Ahandavardhana. Dr. Warder (p. 37. Vol. I. Para, 85) uses the equivalent 'development' for bhavana or bhavakatva. We have preferred 'generalization' as it forms the essence of bhavakatva, or 'revelation' as Dr. Gnoil puts it. Bhatta Nayaka wilded great influence on Bhoja but Bhoja did not reject either dhvani or vyanjana, though Dhananjaya and Dhanika emphasised on 'tatparya', a separate power and denounced vyanjana. But even these two did not reject 'rasa', as well as, implicit sense. Thus, while Bhatta-Nayaka while respecting rasa, marginalized vyanjana and promulgated the cause of bhavakatva and bhojakatva, Mahima, the author of 'Vyakti-viveka' and a great exponent of poetic inference-kavya'numiti accepted only one power of word, called abhidha and covered up everything else than the expressed sense, under anumiti or poetic inference and denounced vyanjana or the power of suggestion as advocated strongly by Anandavardhana who claims that his theory of "vyanjana-dhvani-rasa" has been proclaimed by ancients from times immemorial. So, Mahima revolted against vyanjana/dhvani but accepted implicit sense - pratiyamana artha and 'rasa' or aesthetic experience. He accepted the supremacy of only 'rasa', through 'kavya'numiti', without objecting to the implicit sense in general which also fell under inference in poetry, according to him. Same is the thinking of Dhananjaya and Dhanika, who promote, the cause of tatprayavrtti or purport at the cost of vyanjana, in their famous utterance viz. 'tatparyam na tuladhrtam' i.e. "tatparya or purport is not held in a scale of balance", all the time not rejecting the implicit For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA sense in general and 'rasa' in particular in poetry. Again, the predecessors of Ananda-vardhana such as Bhamaha and the like, have also discussed all topics such as guna, dosa, alamkara, riti etc. Thus all these literary critics beginning with Bhamaha and down to Jagannatha and post-Jagannatha, are all "kavya'lamkaravadins', i.e. 'kavya-saundarya-vadins', i.e. those who investigated into the nature of "beauty" in poetry, or aesthetics of poetry. Of course, it is a different story that the word 'alamkara', used in the general sense of poetic beauty got restricted to a limited sense of 'figures of word and sense' only in the Kashmir tradition of critics who were post-Anandavardhana. But the point to be noted is that none of these critics, has rejected a single topic or thought-current out-right, but has accepted in his own way all these concepts and has accomodated them in his theory of literary criticism. Thus the term 'alamkara' originally made current to connote poetic beauty in general, was instrumental in the very designation of this discipline as 'alamkara-sastra', and also in naming of the works of literary criticism as 'kavya'lamkara-grantha', i.e. a treatise on beauty in poetry. . As observed earlier, the beginning of literary criticism is even prior to Bharata, though of course such written documents, containing principles of literary criticism, prior to Bharata, can not be traced to-day. Works, available to us to-day, that discuss the nature of those forms of poetry that are not to be staged, are all post-Bharata. The oldest available among these, is "Kavya'lamkara" of Bhamaha (end of 7th Cen. A.D. and beginning of 8th A.D.). After this, we have 'Kavyadarsa' of Dandin (first half of 8th Cen. A.D.), followed by "Kavya'lamkara-sutra-vstti' of Vamana (middle of 8th Cen. A.D. to advent of 9th Cen. A.D.), "Kavya'lamkara' of Udbhata (end of 8th Cen. - to beginning of 9th Cen. A.D.), and Kavya'lamkara of Rudrata (first quarter of 9th Cen. to end of 9th Cen. A.D.), to be followed by 'Dhvanyaloka' of the great Anandavardhana (9th, Cen. A.D.) and works of Abhinavaguptapada (Cir. 10th Cen. A.D., last quarter to beginning of 11th Cen. A.D.) in form of commentaries on Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana and N.S. of Bharata Brilliant authors such as those beginning with Mammata dow Jagannatha who firmly backed and established the schools of literary criticism as introduced by Ananandavardhana and supported by Abhinavagupta, capture our attention. These authors belong to what we may loosely term as the Kashmir tradition in literary criticism. Almost parallel to that runs a second flow of literary criticism seeking perhaps its original inspiration in Dandir, Sankuka etc., and yet not completely turning away from Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, which we may term as Malava tradition of literary criticism, when juxtaposed with the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry Kashmir tradition, represented by such great writers as Bhoja, Saradatanaya and the rest with their monumental, works such as Saraswati-kanthabharana, Srngaraprakasa, Bhavaprakasana etc. We do not rate Agnipurana as an older document and our impression is that it is closer to the Malava tradition though not completely departing from the kashmir tradition. We will try to trace the graph of such literature on literary criticism in Sanskrit that spans over between fifteen hundred to two thousand years. The chief trait of the efforts of indian literary critics who attempted to unveil the secrets of poetic beauty, to get closer to what it makes for poetry, to get into the root of it and to explain the whole thing clearly, is the sincerity of the enquiry. The critics are honest, true, forthright and without personal bias. The critics have not hasitated in accepting, to their advantage, the outcome of solid thinking by any predecessor, albeit with certain basic differences in approach and attitude. Application of the thinking of an earlier master in literary criticism and his thought process by a later critic, is a common trait. Even die-hard critics of an earlier master do not hasitate to draw quotations that may suit their purpose from the same critic. They accept the words of honourable antagonists with dignity and self-respect. This is honesty and culture, pure and simple. In doing so, they do not bring in individual differences on certain subtle points, and their criticism never speaks the language of personal prejudice. For example, take the concept of what is termed 'sadharanikarana'; the normal english equivalent sought for this is 'generalization', which we do not accept; and instead we coin a new term such as, 'de-individualization'. Now this concept of 'sadharanikarana' is normally associated with Bhatta Nayaka by modern scholars. Even here we beg to differ. We feel that the germs of this concept can be traced even in the N.S. of Bharata, when he uses terms such as, 'sadharana-guna-yoga'. Perhaps this concept also was floated by some critic not known to us and was even prior to Bharata. Precisely because of this perhaps Abhinavagupta tried to trace the origin of this concept in traditions of mimamsadarsana and even in what is called 'lokavyavahara' or normal worldly business. Whatever it may be, but even Abhinavagupta, a staunch advocate of Anandavardhana's views, quotes with great admiration and respect from Bhatta Nayaka, an avowed opponent of dhvani, - a 'dhvani-dhamsin'. We can observe a similarity of approach in case of Bhoja also, an exponent of Malava tradition, quoting with respect from Anandavardhana, though of course, it may be observed that the Malava-tradition does not oppose the Kashmir tradition tooth and nail. On the other hand Mahima an exponent of kavyanumiti or poetic inference and a die-hard critic of Anandavardhana's vyanjana-dhvani For Personal & Private Use Only

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10 SAHRDAYALOKA concept, also quotes from the Dhvanyaloka with respect, whenever it suits his presentation. The point is that these indian critics, especially the earlier lot, never showed any personal malice against their opponents though of course some sort of veiled malice - mark the term veiled - is noticeable in Jagannatha's criticism of Appayya Dixit. But then this could be the result of the times in which Jagannatha lived; a period of Muslim rulers. The Malava tradition does not seem to be as antagonistic to Kashmir tradition as is 'anumiti' parampara' or thought current of poetic inference which is almost at dagers drawn to the former. But the fact remains that these critics, advocating whichever thought-current, were all gentlemen and were bestowed with highest culture and moved with great human dignity. The crux of the whole argument is that the indian literary critics have never advocated any thought-current in a fanatic and sectarian fashion, and were large hearted and honest and gentlemanly while dealing with critics belonging to different schools of thought. They have been free and liberal in accepting views of others on points where differences were not basic. Actually they even tried to merge their differences and bridge the gulf by giving a new interpretation to certain norms as is seen in case of Abhinavagupta who makes an effort to patch up any difference with Bhatta Nayaka when he explains a famous quotation from Bhatta Nayaka who observed rasa to be * "bhava-samyojana-vyangyah para-samvitti-gocarah." This fact of reconciling on basic issues becomes evident even in the words of the same master Abhinavagupta while initiating a thorough explanation of the famous rasa-sutra by Bharata, where he concedes that when newer and newer ideas flash in his intellect which is ever green and never feels tired, the secret of this event is accredited to the viveka-sopana-parampara, - to the series of steps of discrimination as laid down by hinkers. It is exactly for this reason, he adds, that he has avoided finding faults in the thinking of earlier masters. "tasmat satam atra na dusitani matani tany eva tu sodhitani..." - Abhinavabharati (A.bh.) on N.S. VI-31; Vol. I, pp. 272, Edn. '92, G.O.S. and also, "purva-pratisthapita-yojanasu mula-pratistha-phalam amananti." - ibid., pp. 272. The outcome of this discussion is that the indian literary critics have never entertained any gross sectarian outlook, but have on the other hand, chosen to enrich their own thinking by free exchange and acceptance of views held by others. This is true even in case of the aesthetics advanced by Vaisnava authors For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 11 such as Rupa Goswami and Jiva-Goswami, whose external covering looks sectarian, but virtually it proves to be as aesthetic as any other theory, with of course, devotion to Lord Krsna being the central thing. The indian aesthetes, in their quest for the secret of poetry, have nurtured a healthy and open approach and wherever they absolutely agree with their predecessors, they quote from their masters verbatim, accept the view honestly, and exhibit a sort of rare disinterestedness. Vagdevatavatara Mammata and Kalikala-sarvajnya Acarya Hemacandra are instances in point. This is what Rajasekhara terms "svikaranam, na tu haranam". The alamkarikas thus, to get at the secret of poetic beauty, first tried to form a logical definition of poetry and then tried to coin special terminology for all factors that either contributed directly to cause poetic beauty or added charm to it, - factors such as gunas, alamkaras, riti, vstti, etc. etc., as and when such factors opened out before their discriminative attitude. At the same time it should be clearly understood that there was absolute unanimity of opinion concerning various aspects or categories of literary criticism. We know that different views have been postulated even with reference to the nature and birth of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic experience or art-experience, eventhough it has been held by almost all of them to be the prime purpose of poetry - i.e. 'kavyartha'. When one discipline held 'rasa' to be the centre of all poetic creativity-atma-of poetry', there ran another thought current which held 'rasa' also as 'alamkara' (of course, in a wider sense) of kavya, and perhaps even to-day there are great modern critics such as Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi from Varanasi who subsume 'rasa' under 'kavya'lamkara' and certainly the present writer, Dr. Nandi, also subscribes to this view. The present writer arrived at this conclusion as early as in 1972 A.D. in his first edn. of "Bharatiya Sahitya Sastrani Vicara paramparao" (in Guj.) and when he met Dr. Rewaprasad for the first time in Ujjain at Kalidasa-samaroha in '76, both were overwhelmed with love and respect for each other because Dr. Rewaprasad had also arrived at the same conclusion in his publication in the same year (= '72) - both of them of course, unmindful of each other's efforts. This is what they call - "samvadinyah medhavinam buddhayah bhavanti." It may be said in short, that all earlier masters were correct in their individual assessment from their own point of view, and their presentation was logical and honest and even flawless. We will try to evaluate this broad flux of indian literary criticism that took its shape by the amalgamation of small and smaller currents of literary criticism. We will take its stock in a careful, critical and comparative approach and try to read the whole graph that runs through centuries. For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA We will unfold our discussion, topic by topic. Before we do this I feel like thanking some modern alamkarikas such as Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De, Dr. Rama Ranjan Mukhurjee, Dr. V. Raghavan, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Pandit Visvesvarajee, Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Dr. Mukunda Madhav Sharma, and Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyay through whose works I have drawn inspiration and also my gurus, Prof. Rasiklal Parikh, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and Prof. R. B. Athavale whose guidance and blessings are always with me and whose outstanding contributions in the field of Sanskrit literary criticism has left me richer, and last, but not the least, some of my great friends such as the late Dr. Ram Chandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), Dr. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shanti Niketan), Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (varanasi), and Dr. N. P. Unni (Kerala), Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Dr. Rajendra Nanavati and Dr. S. P. Narang (Delhi). I have always gained with direct or indirect encounters with them. As noted by Abhinavagupta, originality in scientific investigation lies in giving newer and newer dimension, giving newer and newer design to the finding of the earlier masters. Our effort also will be in the direction of providing fresh approach and fresh interpretation to the material collected. 12 The concepts of literary criticism which will be examined by us will follow the sequence as given in the contents at the beginning of this book. We directed our efforts in Gujarati language in the three editions of our book entitled. "Bharatiya Sahityasastrani Vicara-parmparao" (Pub. Uni. Book Production Board, Guj. State) wherein each newer edition had something treated more elaborately and the effort was fresher every time. But the present work is not a mere translation of the original. In all humility we claim it to be a rare transformation, a re-creation, a rebirth so to say, of the thinking carried out in a span of more than five decades. We have embarked upon a new adventure so to say, a new journey. We feel we have scaled greater heights then ever, to the best of our capacity, as we have attempted expansion and eluciation of basic ideas and have seriously contemplated upon the conclusions drawn by such all time greats as even Dr. V. Raghavan, on certain points, and have also ventured to differ from them. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF POETRY: Thus, to begin with, the definition of poetry, the wider concept of poetry as visualized by the masters, its wider scope, the cause and purpose or object of poetry, will be taken up first for our detailed investigation. While treating this or any other topic concerning a given aspect of literary criticism, we will begin with Bhamaha and take up almost all major critics down to Jagannatha and will try to underline For Personal & Private Use Only

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13 Definition and Scope of Poetry the growth of a given concept while critically also attempting a comparative evaluation through various stages of its growth and development. With reference to the available documents, keeping Bharata (N.S.) away from this investigation as his principal interest centred round the dramatic art and not poetry, we will begin the discussion of each given topic with Bhamaha. Bhamaha, yes, because we follow Dr. Dels chronology, and Bhamaha, also because later critics, including Abhinavagupta to begin with, use such terms as "yatha Bhamaha"dibhih uktam" - thus placing Bhamaha as first and foremost and also most honourable. As noted earlier the exact beginning of literary criticism in India cannot be traced, for even in Bharata we come across a fairly developped stage, but practically, with reference to the available documents, Bhamaha's work is the oldest available one. It is true that literary criticism was revolutionized by the advent of Anandavardhana, or at least by the thought current he represented, but for all practical purposes, the investigation of the origin and development of any concept in literary criticism, though shrouded in unknown time and source, should begin with Bhamaha's Kavya'lamkara, for in truth it is the oldest available written document that has come down to us and also because Bhamaha's reputation went on increasing for ever, in the post-Bhamaha period as a rare intellectual. True, Anandavardhana cor-related all the thought-currents in literary criticism that had come down to him, in his wider scheme of vyanjana-dhvani-rasa, without degrading or throwing out any concept of literary criticism and his scheme took deeper roots as he found great supporters in Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, Visvanatha, Appayya and Jagannatha to mention only a few. There were others also who challanged Anandavardhana, or to be precise, who challanged his advocacy of vyajana, the power of suggestion in a word. They were Bhatta-Nayaka, Mukula, Pratiharenduraja, Mahima, Dhananjaya, Dhanika etc. But even these critics had an open mind and are catholic enough to borrow from Anandavardhana with respect, when it suits them. We see this in Mahima also, who posed perhaps the greatest challenge to the concept of vyanjana. Rajasekhara was posterior to Anandavardhana by less than a hundred years and we cannot exactly make out his approach to vyanjana as his magnum opus - Kavyamimamsa-has not come down to us in its complete form, or perhaps he left it unfinished. So, we will try to study the graph of progress of various concepts of literary criticism as painted on the canvas of various documents that fall broadly in three phases such as from untraced beginnings to Bhamaha and earlier writers on poetics upto Rudrata, then Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and their near contemporaries, and then For Personal & Private Use Only

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14 SAHRDAYALOKA post-Anandavardhana period beginning with Mammta, down to Jagannatha. It may be noted however, that Kuntaka, a close successor of Anandavardhana, and perhaps a predecessor or a senior contemporary of Abhinavagupta, commands a special status, because on one hand we may call him "Anandavardhana re incarnated" and perhaps he is held as a 'manasa-putra' - a spiritual heir of Ananandavardhana and is therefore spared the jaws of biting criticism by Abhinavagupta and other dhvanivadins, on the other we can see that he has not openly committed himself to the acceptance of vyanjana, though of course, openly not denouncing it either. Dr. K. Krishamoorthy seems to support this image of Kuntaka. But we feel reluctant at times to brand him as a pure dhvanivadin - i.e. an ardant supporter of 'dhvani'. This topic will be taken up later at the right place. For the present we have to bear in mind first and last, the fact, that all the thoughtcurrents prevelant in the field of Indian Literary Criticism, tend to supplement one another and they seem as streams at times running parallel to one another, at times cutting across one another, while at other times meeting and merging with one another to form a single powerful flux of high thinking, and once again yet parting ways, thus posting mile stones at places. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF POETRY - BHAMAHA : Presenting a logical definition of poetry, Bhamaha notes that, "Word and sense coming together, make for poetry. [sabdarthau sahitau kavyam :]" (Bhamaha, I. 16). From this it is safe to guess that for him word and sense staying in union make for poetry. Apparently this definition suffers from the fault of being 'ativyapta' i.e. too broad. We will go to see when we proceed in our effort, how Sanskrit literary critics have put 'loka-vyavahara' or use of language in ordinary parlance, and also scientific use of language of various scripturessastra or disciplines out of the exact scope of what we term literature. We will also consider, in due course, the tendency of extreme logicality in defining poetry only as "word alone", to keep away from the mixing up of other fine arts such as music, dance, painting etc. which imbibe in themselves the element of meaning also, along with their respective differentia. But in case of Bhamaha, it may be noted that, before striking at the definition of kavya i.e. poetry in I. 16, he prepares a background and also carves out the definition/description of a 'maha-kavya' or an epic form of poetry. Thus we will try to consider his definition of poetry in a wider context and try to understand the full scope of poetry as he wants us to understand. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 15 Bhamaha (I. 2.) declares "dharmarthakama-moksesu vaicaksanyam kalasu ca, karoti pritim kirtim ca, sadhu kavya-nisevanam." that good poetry is composed for the attainment of the four ends of life - purusarthas - viz. dharma, i.e. law of life, i.e. desire, wealth, prosperity, kama or desire for love or any cherished object, and moksa i.e. deliverence from the bondage of birth and death and rebirth. It also brings expertise in various fine arts bringing also in its fold fame and pleasure. By this we come to appreciate Bhamaha's stand on the purpose of poetry both for the poet and the reader. Bhamaha does not seem to encourage the western view point of 'art for art's sake'. He seems to support and perhaps the whole indian thinking sides with the opinion that, art deserves attention because it nourishes some eternal values of life, i.e. 'art for life's sake'. Bhamaha believes that knowledge of scriptures is useless without a poet's genious, like charity of a pauper, or expertness in using weapons by a man wanting in manly virtues, or like self-praise of an idiot. Expertness concerning language is useless without capacity to poetry. On receiving lessons from a great teacher even a dull-witted person can study scriptures, but poetry is born if at all, only in case of one who is blessed with genius alone. (Bhamaha I. 5.) We will discuss the topic of the cause of poetry - kavyahetu - later, but Bhamaha's bias towards inborn genius can be easily noticed here. Bhamaha further notes that though departed from earth and moved into heaven, the body in form of poetic compositions of great poets, being immortal, lasts for ever. People desirous of keeping their fame ever-lasting and staying till the end of earth, should strive for composing poetry after seeking full knowledge and information about everything on earth that deserves to be known. Grammar, prosody, lexicography history, worldly behaviour, logic and fine arts - knowledge of all these is essential for composition of poetry. After learning fully the essence of word and meaning, serving men of knowledge who are experts in the science of word and meaning, having closely studied the works of other great poets, one should make an effort in the direction of composing poetry. Thus, it seems, Bhamaha seems to have underlined the importance of 'vyutpatti' i.e. learning as a kavya-hetu. Thus for him 'vyutpatti' is also a factor that makes for poetry, though of course, he puts greater weight on 'pratibha', i.e. inborri genius. We will go to see later how Dandin attaches equal status to proficiency or learning and practice or application, leading in the end to Mammata's famous observation that genius, learning and application taken together make for the cause, and not "causes" of poetry. A very important point observed by Bhamaha is that in the composition of poetry not a single word used should be faulty. In short, blemish in any form has For Personal & Private Use Only

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16 SAHRDAYALOKA to be carefully avoided in poetry. He has discussed the topic of poetic blemishes at two places and this shows how serious he is regarding avoidance of a blemish i.e. dosa-tyaga, or what Vamana and Bhoja later call 'dosa-hana'. We will discuss this later in a separate chapter. But Bhamaha's concern in this respect is seen clearly when he observes that use of a single faulty word or phrase has to be avoided like the status of having a son of bad character. It becomes a source of censure Bhamaha (I., 12) suggests that nobody is said to commit breach of dharma' - Law, nor is inflicted by disease, or is punished for not writing poetry; but bad poetry, for sure, is death itself. After putting stress on dosa-tyaga' - avoiding blemishes in poetry, Bhamaha talks about 'alamkaras' i.e. sources of beauty in general and also of figures of speech such as upama or simile, utpreksa or poetic fancy etc. He holds that figures of speech such as metaphor - rupaka - and the rest that have been discussed by others, are also a welcome factor in poetry. The face of women, though beautiful does not appear so without ornamentation (Bhamaha I. 13). the same way poetry should be decorated with sources of beauty such as figures of speech etc. May be some modern scholars are prompted to brand Bhamaha as, 'alamkaravadin' - a propagator of figures of speech in poetry by such remarks. But all this makes no sense as we will go to observe that Bhamaha uses the term 'alamkara' in a wider sense of, 'source of poetic beauty in general, and it is precisely this wider sense of 'poetic beauty in general, i.e. 'kavya-saundarya' which has been instrumental in calling this discipline of literary criticism by the name of 'alamkara-sastra'. Kuntaka's thinking - viz. "The truth is this. Poetry is the work of a poet wherein the undivided whole of the 'adorned' and the 'adornment is the reality. Therefore, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned and the question of super-adding adornments to pre-existing poetry does not arise", Vakroktijivita, (vrtti on I. 6., Trans. K. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 292, ibid Edn.,) - finds its roots in Bhamaha's observation. 'Alamkara' here, of course, covers the so called figures of speech also provided, as we will go to see Ananandavardhana observing that, they come naturally to a poet, i.e. are genuine components of a poet's imagination. It is this insistance on the natural place of figurative expression which inspires Mammata, as we will go to observe later, to count it as an essential of poetry and include the terms 'analamkrti punah kvapi' in his famous definition of poetry. The term viz. 'alamkrti' here has a reference to its limited connotation of figures of speech such as pamah simile, anuprasa er alliteration, etc. So then, after observing that in poetry figures of speech are welcome, Bhamaha obliquely refers to what is meant by this. Bhamaha (I. 14-15) holds that, "Others take For Personal & Private Use Only

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17 Definition and Scope of Poetry figures of speech such as, 'rupaka' i.e. metaphor etc. as external. They hold learning concerning nouns and verbs (i.e. grammatical accuracy in use of language) as (real) ornamentation of language. This is called (only) correct use of words (by us). The expertness concerning (the beauty) of meaning is not like this. For us, both the beauty of word and sense is equally welcome." By this beauty of word and sense Bhamaha hints at poetic beauty as a whole, including the correctness of language from the point of view of grammar, and also figures of speech of both word and sense, and also 'poetic beauty in general caused due to any source of charm in poetry. We may quote Bhamaha's exact words here which read as : "rupaka"dim alamkaram bahyam acaksate pare | supam tinam ca vyutpattim vacam vancchanty alamkrtim || (I. 14) tad etad ahuh sausabdyam na'rtha-vyutpattir idrsi | sabdabhidheyalamkara bhedad istam dvayam tu nah ll" (I. 15) Thus purity of language from the point of view of grammar is only one aspect - of poetic beauty, and also the fundamental one with which efforts in t of poetry should start. But it is not an end in itself. The wider scope of poetry, say poetic beauty, is hinted at by Bhamaha when he is open to incorporate any source of beauty - alamkarana-in his concept of poetry. We may also observe that a difference of opinion concerning what makes for natural beauty in poetry and which are the external or artificial devices causing or adding to poetic beauty, must have existed in circles of literary critics even prior to Bhamaha. Perhaps Bhamaha tried to bridge the gulf, and move in the direction of harmoney. Bhamaha is definitly aware of the wider connotation of the term 'alamkara' as, "source of poetic beauty in general" when he refers to what he terms as, "vacam alamkrtih" - i.e. beauty of (poetic) language." We will go to see later how Vamana has clearly used the term 'alamkara' in the wider sense of 'saundarya' or 'poetic beauty' when he observes, "kavyam grahyam alamkarar", "saundaryam alamkarah", (Vamana, I. i; 1, 2). Perhaps the origin of this thought-current was much older than Vamana and Bhamaha. As observed earlier, Bhamaha also clearly distinguishes between poetic beauty caused by mere grammatical correctness, and poetic beauty caused For Personal & Private Use Only

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18 SAHRDAYALOKA by other 'alamkara'. If some scholars feel that by 'rupaka"di alamkara' Bhamaha refers only to the narrow connotation of alamkara as 'figures of speech' only, then also they cannot escape Bhamaha's observation at (I. 36), viz. - "vakrabhidheyasabdoktih ista vacam alamkrtih" i.e. the poetic expression of beautiful meaning and beautiful word, i.e. beauty concerning form and content, word and sense in general in poetry, is the real source of beauty in a poet's composition. Bhamaha, we will go to observe further, takes this 'alamkaratva' i.e. the state of being the source of beauty of any given alamkara, as "conveying of something extra-ordinary - 'atisaya' -", i.e. 'vakrokti' or expression of beauty, or 'atisayokti', an expression of something special, something out of this work-a-day world, something extraordinary; "alaukika". With this introduction, Bhamaha embarks upon the actual definition of at I. 16, when he observes : poetry 'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam' Poetry is word and sense taken together. Not that Bhamaha did not know that in any use of meaningful language, i.e. even in our day to day wordly parlance, or literature of any kind, i.e. dealing with scriptures or any writing covering legal, commercial or any drafting whatsoever, we come accoss of this 'togetherness', 'saha-bhava' of word and sense. We will go to see how Bhoja has enumerated all types of possible 'sahabhava' i.e. 'sahitya' or coming together of word and sense. But all this, 'sahitya' is not what we call 'belles lettres'. And Bhamaha knew this very well and yet there was a purpose behind this which we will go to reveal in due course. Ordinary writing is termed by Bhamaha as 'varta' i.e. 'bare statement' elsewhere, while questioning its capacity to poetry. Bhamaha accepts only a special coming together of word and sense as poetry, i.e. only when it is 'salamkara' and 'adosa' i.e. blessed with some source of charm and is free from poetic blemish. We will go to see that if in Mammata, reference to 'alamkara' in the definition of poetry is with some reservation, in Hemacandra it is forthright and clear, and all this is to be read as the stamp of Bhamaha. Thus Bhamaha and later Kuntaka have prepared a 'pakka' concrete road for the presence of 'alamkara' in poetry; 'alamkara' both in the general sense of source of beauty as well as in the sense of figures of speech, both of word and sense. So, it becomes clear that for Bhamaha, literature, i.e. poetic literature, poetry, is presented in a language which is poetic i.e. beautiful, i.e. something special as compared to the language of ordinary communication, or language of this or that sastra i.e. discipline, including what we call 'scriptures'. While discussing alamkaras For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 19 or figures of speech such as rasavat, preyah, etc. and including thereby the beauty of a feeling or emotion, etc. in alamkaras, Bhamaha has suggested that kavya or poetry for him can be, or even has to be from a different angle, 'sa-rasa' i.e. with emotive or aesthetic appeal also. While discussing the secret of rasa-experience or aesthetic pleasure derived from poetry, we will go to discuss later that the essence of poetic art, or, as a matter of fact any art, lies not only in its emotive appeal but also in its volitional and intellectual appeal also, i.e. in cognitive, emotional and conative aspects, if any, and hence there is chance for any newer form of poetry or drama of being included in such literature as causes art-experience. Bhamaha thus, by including the element of feeling and emotion also as source of charm, has reserved its place in total art experience, which results from sheer intellectual appeal also; as art-experience involves the true participation of the total, integral self of the connoisseur. Indian literary criticism is absolutely clear about the fact that art-experience does not end in the explanation of the enhancement of this or that feeling or emotion only, but reaches out to explain the total effect of art which embraces all aspects of the personality of a connoisseur. Bhamaha talks of the emotive appeal of poetry also, when he discusses the characteristics of a 'mahakavya' or epic poetry, which should be blessed with all rasas i.e. all sentiments : "rasaisca sakalaih prthak" (I. 21, Bhamaha). That it has to be, - 'a-gramya-sabdamarthyam ca, salamkaram' i.e. without any misuse of language resulting in vulgarity concerning word and sense, and also decked by figures of speech or by sources of charm' (Bhamaha, I. 19), suggests his integral approach to understanding poetic art. That Art has to make appeal to the intellectual. imaginative and emotive aspect of the personality of the man of taste. is clear to Bhamaha and also to other earlier literary critics. - - Bhamaha also refers to various forms of literature both prose and verse, enumerating sarga-bandha i.e. a mahakavya, katha and akhyayika, three bigger compositions in verse and prose, and also stray attempts at minor poetic compositions such as gatha, sloka, etc. i.e. individual independent verses. But Bhamaha underlines one major characteristic common to all creative writing, which is that, all this has to be blessed with "expression of artful essence" - yuktam vakra-svabhavoktya sarvam eva etad isyate" (Bhamaha, I. 30), The expression has to be artistic for being branded as poetry. What exactly could this "vakrasvabhavokti" mean? Some modern commentators such as the great D. T. Tatacharya in his Udyana Vrtti (pp. 13, ibid) suggest that Bhamaha here talks of figures of speech such as 'svabhavokti" or "Natural Description" and "vakrokti" or For Personal & Private Use Only

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20 SAHRDAYALOKA "artistic turn of speech" only. But Bhamaha no doubt includes these two figures of speech in his 'vakra-svabhava-ukti' but he also includes everthing beautiful concerning the content, idea and expression of a given piece of poetry. This is against 'varta'-a bare statement of fact only, that is resorted to in our ordinary dayto-day parlance, in our work-a-day-word. It is something special, the beautiful, the a-ordinary, which makes for a poet's creation, 'kavi-karma'. This beautiful statement of something extra ordinary is acceptable to Bhamaha, as poetry. With this clear understanding of Bhamaha's view we will not find it difficult to sail over to Kuntaka's 'vakrokti', and prior to that Anandavardhana's 'dhvani'. This expression of the extraordinary is - vakra-svabhavokti-acceptable to Bhamaha. Thus, for Bhamaha that togetherness of word and sense which is 'a-dosa', free from poetic blemishes, 'salamkara', gifted with a source of charm or a figure of speech, and 'sa-vakrokti' - having an artistic expression is accepted as kavya. It is observed by Bhoja (Sr. Pra. Ch. XI) that - 'vakroktireva kavyanam para bhuseti Bhamahah." - i.e. for Bhamaha charming expression is the highest decoration of poetry. Bhamaha only casually refers to the two patterns of writing, or say, the stylistic peculiarities prevelent in the regions of vidarbha and guada, viz. vaidarbha-marga and gauda-marga as others would have put it. The almost casual approach was perhaps to promote as much individuality in artful expression as possible, a point also underlined by the great Ananavardhana when he said (Dhvanyaloka-Dhv. N. i) that by taking recourse to this path of suggestion as laid down by him, the quality of creative imagination in poets will assume endlessness. (anena anantyam ayati, kavinam pratibhagunah-Dhv. IV-i). He goes to observe that, 'even trite subjects in poetry will put on new freshness, if they get into touch with 'rasa' or aesthetic delight, just as the same trees appear quite new with the advent of spring.' (Dhy. IV 4); and also, "whatever theme it might be, so long as it produces the impression in the minds of people :, "Yes, this is a lovely and unique flash;" . The meaning is, 'so long as the favourable impression that it is an extraordinary flash produced in the minds of refined critics." "Though it might smack of earlier usages, a theme can very well be utilised by a good poet. He will never become an object of censure by so doing." (Dhv. IV. 16; Trans. K. Krishnamoorthy (K. Kris. pp. 297). Thus poetry it is, that carries the stamp of poetic, i.e. extraordinary creation. Precisely for this, Anandavardhana also did not attach any special importance to the concepts of riti j.e. marga and vitti. For him it was 'dhvani'- the essential poetic part of a poet's expression that was the beall and end-all of poetry. He therefore observes, ("Dhv. III 46, 47, Trans. K. Kris. pp. For Personal & Private Use Only

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21 Definition and Scope of Poetry 261), "Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles." And also, "Once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the o called 'Modes' relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will becomes intelligible." So, when Bhamaha pays scant respect to the vaidarbha and gauda styles, it is presumably first to discourage imitation and hypocracy and to promote individual talent. This is exactly the consideration which drives Kuntaka to divorce the concept of styles from any local i.e. geographical colouring and name even the poetic excellences in a different way using his own terminology. However, Kuntaka gives some reasonable consideration to the concept of this or that style - call it by any name and it is rose only - simply because we do find common cultural and educational heritage playing a positive part in an artist's creation. But Bhamaha was perhaps fed up with imitations and so categorically declares that : (Bhamaha I. 36) - "na nitanta"di-matrena jayate caruta giram vakra'bhidheya-sabdoktih ista vacam alamkrtih 11" "Not only by usages such as 'nitanta' etc. (i.e. use of soft consonants as advocated by the so called vaidarbha style), beauty in poetry is caused. (only) The ukti-expression - of vakra i.e. beautiful sense and (vakra, beautiful) expression (or word) is acceptd by us as the alamkrti - or (only) source of beauty in language (i.e. language). Vacam alamkrtih' is beauty of language. The word 'alamkrtin' is used here by Bhamaha in the wider sense of source of beauty in poetry, or poetic beauty, and not in the narrow sense of a figure of speech only, which by itself is, of course, included in the former. The use of the term 'alamkara' in its wider connotation of poetic beauty - saundaryam - is specifically noted by Vamana, if we look at available documents only. But the thought current had its origin even prior to Bhamaha or even Bharata. The point is that we do not have to wait for the arrival of Vamana to understand this underlying basic concept of poetic beauty, for Bhamaha's concept of beautiful expression and beautiful content - vakra sabda and vakra artha, are enough for this. This vakrata or poetic beauty is the highest or only quality a poet has to aspire for in the making of poetry. This is absent in ordinary expression, i.e. 'loka-ukti'. So, sahitya, i.e. coming together of beautiful expression and content is poetic creation, i.e. kavya, poetry. With this Bhamaha also talks of 'asraya-saundarya', i.e. beauty pervading the whole composition. A sort of an idea of contextuality is also engrammed in it, for, observes Bhamaha, that collyrium though black, when applied in the eye of a For Personal & Private Use Only

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22 SAHRDAYALOKA damsel, becomes a source of beauty, in the same way, in a particular context, even a poetic blemish acquires beauty (Bhamaha, I. 54). A further discussion on this will be taken up when we examine Bhamaha's concept of poetic blemishes. But at I. 55 he observes that like a black palasa flower, placed at the right juncture, adds to the general beauty of a garland, a poetically faulty expression only, read in its special context, serves as a source of charm in poetry. Like a gardener, arranging flowers of different hues at right places in a garland, weaves a beautiful garland, so also a poet selects such words which assume beauty when arranged in style in poetry. (Bhamaha, I. 59) Bhamaha says (I. 59) : "etad grahyam surabhi kusumam, gramyam etan nidheyam dhatte sobham viracitam idam sthanam asyaitad asya malakaro racayati yatha sadhu vijnaya malam yojyam kavyesv avahitadhiya tadvad evabhidhanam 11" Thus beauty of an expression or a particular word, read at exactly this or that place in poetry has a poetic appeal for Bhamaha. This can be called beauty in arrangement - or 'vinivesa-gata-saundarya'. This concept of Bhamaha prepares the road leading to Kuntaka's 'bandha-saundarya' - beauty of poetic composition, or style on one hand, and also for the concept of propriety - aucitya - i.e. decorum as advocated by Ksemendra on the other. As observed earlier, Bhamaha has also given thought to the element of aesthetic rapture caused due to the delineation of feelings and emotions by the poet. He holds that the epic-poem - 'mahakavya' has to be endowed with different sentiments (Bhamaha, I. 21). Though this is considered with reference to an epic poem, it can very well go with poetry in general also. Bhamaha seems to favour this idea of application of sentiments to poetry in general, of any form or size, when he advocates certain figures of speech based on feelings and emotions, such as rasavat, preyas, urjasvi, and samahita, the four emotion-based alamkaras and then also 'bhavika' which he says is a 'quality of (the whole composition)'- "prabandhavisaya-guna". Now, we see that, used in this sense, the terms 'alamkara' and 'guna' acquire a wider dimension which is something else than the normal narrower connotation of a figure of speech or a particular poetic embellishment seen in a particular style or going with this or that sentiment. Thus for Bhamaha poetry or kavya is expected to be 'sa-rasa' i.e. endowed with flavour or excellence of feelings and emotions. All this has to be free from poetic blemishes, adorned with figures of speech and beautified by vakrokti or poetic use of language and content. We will consider Bhamaha's handling of the emotive stuff For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 23 i.e. rasa, bhava, tad-abhasa, etc. i.e. of sentiment, feeling, their semblance, etc., later, but for the present suffice it to say that Bhamaha does not attach any less importance to the concept of rasa and bhava i.e. sentiments and emotions in poetry. We have already noticed that though Bharata's prime concern was drama, he has advocated the use of alamkara, guna, laksana and avoiding of dosa with reference to kavya-rasa i.e. aesthetic pleasure in poetry. Bharata observes: (N.S. XVI-113, Vol. II, G.O.S. Edn.) "evam ete hy alamkarah guna dosas ca kirtitah | prayogam esam ca punar vaksyami rasa-samsrayam ||" So. Bharata was not unaware of 'kavya-rasa' i.e. art-expience from poetry, and also the appropriate use of alamkara etc. to derive the same from poetry. Bhamaha also advocates the same usage. So, when Sri G. T. Deshpande observes that sanskrit poetics branched off from dramatargy at a later stage, it looks like a figment of his own imagination. In fact both these enquiries in poetic and dramatic beauty were pari-passu, at times running parallel, at times mixing and merging with each other, thus passing through their next phases, enriching each other and also preserving their distinct character. Bharata (N.S. XVI, 116-128, Vol. II G.O.S. Edn.; also Dr. Nandi's edn., 'Sarasvati Research Prakashana series, Vol. IX, Edn.' 94-'95, Ahmedabad) has clearly declared kavya or poetry as 'rasa"sraya'. Not only this, he has recommended the use of figures of speech, metre etc. also in harmony with the prevailing emotive context; rasa. That the methodical discussion concerning the use of these concepts in conformity with rasa in poetry was done by Anandavardhana, will be observed later by us. At the same time it is equally true that poeticians like Bhamaha and others of the pre-Anandavardhana period were not unaware of this usage. So Bhamaha and other earlier literary critics also attach importance to 'rasa' in poetry and discuss other topics with reference to their contribution to evoking the same in poetry and this was in agreement with Bharata's position. As Bharata co-ordinated the concepts of poetic beauty such as guna, dosa, alamkara and laksana to dramatic art through vacika-abhinaya or acting concerning speech, in the same way, alamkarikas placed the different forms of rupaka or drama, under 'abhineya kavya' or 'poetry that was to be presented on the stage', and thus brought about the integration of dramaturgy and literary criticism. For Personal & Private Use Only

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24 SAHRDAYALOKA DANDIN : In his Kavyadarsa (= Ka.) Dandin has formulated the definition of poetry : "sariram tavad ista'rtha-vyavacchinna-padavalih" (Ka. I. 10b.). There were two major thought-currents prevelent concerning the definition of poetry; one being that as read in Bhamaha which lays equal stress on both word and sense in the making of poetry, i.e. which proclaims that "sabdarthau sahitau kavyam". Actually, according to a variant noticed in the Na-Sa. of Bharata, on pp. 347, under XVI-128, (G.O.S. Edn.), we read as follows : "mtdu-lalita-pada'rtham gudha-sabda'rtha-hinam janapada-sukha-bhojyam yuktiman nittayojyam | bahuksta-rasa-margam sandhi-sandhana-yuktam bhavati sukavi-kavyam natyakale manojnam 11" "Poetry of good poets, that wins the heart at the time of dramatic performance, is having soft and pleasing word and sense, is bereft of word and meaning that are difficult to understand (because of their being hidden or obscure); is enjoyed easily by people, which stands to reason and which can be conveyed through dance, in which there is scope for a style that conveys many sentiments and which is gifted with junctures and their limbs". We can see the thought-current of calling both word and sense together as poetry can be read in the above quotation. But we do not know wether this variant can be taken as reliable. But we can surely begin with Bhamaha who advocated the company of both word and sense to make for poetry. The second thought current seems to be represented by Dandin which takes 'sabdah' i.e. 'word only as the distinctive mark of poetry. Whatever it may be, but the fact remains that definitions explaining the concept of 'kavya' i.e. poetry need not be taken as opposing one another, but only as complementary, because those who accept the second line of thinking giving prominance to the 'word' element in the definition, never support the position where this word stands by itself, regardless of the meaning element. The problem centres round the differentia. Earlier literary critics, perhaps also well versed in logic - i.e. nyayasastra - to exhibit their learning and their absolute faith in the science of logic or reasoning, utilize the technical terminology to cristalise and sharpen literary criticism also. It is because of this tendency to perfection which brings forth the suble designs evolved in literary criticism by succeeding poeticians such as Visvanatha and Jagannatha and which also reveals the close affinity of alamkara-sastra, to the disciplines of nyaya i.e. logic, and vyakarana i.e. grammar. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 25 In his Kavyadarsa, Dandin has defined poetry as, "istartha-vyavacchinna padavali (I. 10b)" i.e. pada-samuha, a collection of words i.e. vakya, a sentence, graced by i.e. associated with 'ista' - desired charming meaning, makes for poetry. But before coming to the actual definition of poetry, Dandin takes note of some basic points concerning poetry, and these points prove to be helpful in fully grasping his concept of 'kavya' i.e. poetry. Talking about the importance of poetry he observes (Ka. I. 4) that the three worlds will plunge into pitchy darkness if the lamp (or light) in form of word does not shine forth. Mirrored into literature, the great men of yore, eventhough parted from life, remain alive. Language showers all gifts, if properly utilised by the intelligent people, and in case misused, it declares the idiotic state of the speaker (Ka. I. 6). So, not even a smallest blemish is to be tolerated in poetry (I. 7 Ka), for it deforms it like beautiful body marked by a small sign of laxoderma. Like a blind man not able to distinguish between various forms, a person not well-versed in the lore of poetry, cannot distinguish between a literary excellence and a literary blemish. These remarks make it clear that not unlike Bhamaha, Dandin also recommends that poetry has to be absolutely free from poetic blemish whatsoever. We will have an occasion later to go into the details of Dandin's handling of this topic of poetic blemishes, but what we have to underline here is his absolute apathy towards accomodating even a slightest blemish in poetry. This characteristic of insistance on absence of blemish gathers momentum in literary criticism, with the result that stalwarts like the great vag-devatavatara Mammata had to incorporate it in the definition of poetry. The 'navinas'-new generation of literary critics led by Mammata-place this 'a-dosatva' i.e. absence of blemish - as an unavoidable characteristic in the definition of poetry and others such as Hemacandra follow the suit. Dandin goes on to declare that men of thought - surayah - have produced manuals concerning writing of poetry, rich in various and beautiful styles (Ka. I. 9). These great souls have laid down the body of poetry i.e. have discussed what poetry is made of, and also the 'alamkaras' or sources of beauty in poetry : "taih sariram kavyanam alamkaras ca darsitah" (Ka. I. 10-a). Experts explain that the particle 'ca' after 'alamkarah' stands to suggest the inclusion of the consideration of poetic blemishes also; while poetic excellences - i.e. the concept of 'gunas' - are covered up by the mention of the word 'sarira' itself. So, when Dandin talks of a collection of words endowed with - 'istartha' - coveted meaning, this 'ista' meaning may include meaning congenial to 'rasa' - or For Personal & Private Use Only

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26 SAHRDAYALOKA sentiment i.e. the emotive stuff of human feelings and emotions or, aesthetic enjoyment in genreral. The commentary 'prabha' (pp. 8, edn. B.O.R. I. Poona) explains it as the desire to provide description leading to 'camatkara' or 'lokottara"hlada' i.e. extra ordinary joy. Or, we may say that by 'ista' or coveted quality is covered Bhamaha's 'vakrokti' or artful expression, covering beauty concerning both the poetic expression and the poetic theme as well, or perhaps the 'vakrata' or art-expression emphasized by Kuntaka later. As if Bhamahas words : "vakra bhidheya-sabdoktih-ista vacam alamkrtih" once again come alive here and are resounded as it were ! Or, as later commentators explain, by 'ista artha' is covered all beautiful meaning at the level of expression-abhidha, and secondary usage i.e. laksana, and even deviation leading to vyangyartha or suggested sense both of the dhvani and gunabhuta variety i.e. meaning suggested principally or in a subordinate way. This insistance on 'padavali i.e. collection of words, i.e. word element in poetry, is supported with great gusto by Jagannatha in his Rasa-gangadhara ( = R.G.) later. Till we reach Jagannatha we find literary critics either putting equal weight on both word and sense taken together, or only on word element in particular, in the definition of poetry. We will go into the details of the views expressed by the protagonists of both these streams of thought, as and when the context permits. One more point is to be noted with reference to Danhin's draft of the definition of poetry. Dandin, in the definition itself uses the term 'sarira' i.e. body of poe which was also used by Bhamaha when he observed, at Bhamaha VI. 65, that, sastya sariram nirmitam satsastya tv alamkrtih | ... i.e. he has talked of kavya sarira in sixty karikas, etc. But this comes at the end of his work and not in the definition. Now, bypassing Bhamaha, we may observe that Danhin's is the first known metaphorical usage concerning literary criticism. Normally 'sarira' goes with sentient beings, the 'saririns' having a body. So, when poetry is said to have a body, this usage should be termed as secondary or metaphorical. In the same vein Dandin further calls poetic excellences or gunas as the vital breath or vital airs of poetic style - i.e. "pranah" of vaidarbha marga' in particular, or say, of poetry in general. So, it should be carefully brone in mind that even where there is the mentioning of 'soul - atma - of poetry, it has to be understood secondarily or metaphorically. This metaphorical usage is drawn to further dimensions in Rajasekhara and later in Vidyanatha's Pratapa-rudra-yaso-bhusana. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 27 But some later commentators, and some leading modern scholars seem to have missed the real spirit behind this metaphor and have been arguing for and against the importance or inclusion of this or that concept in the definition of poetry. This is sad. For basically kavya or poetry is abstraction. Only to explain the secrets of beauty in poetry, and more, the variety of the poetic devices leading to beauty in poetry, the ancients, the "saksat-krta-dharmana rsayah" - the seers, who had the direct vision of poetic beauty, resorted to this sort of metaphorical usage only to bring home the subtle differences between this device of poetic beauty and that, to the smaller people who had no direct vision of poetic beauty. But, this was taken only literally and too seriously by lesser people without grasping the spirit behind this metaphorical style of explanation of various poetic devices, In fact poetry is an abstract art and it need not detain us in naming this or that as 'body', 'soul', 'excellence', 'ornamentation', etc. So, for the enlightened masters this usage was only a means to explain poetic beauty and was never taken as an end in itself. They were open minded and not too earnest or obstinate about this. The great sages of earlier times resorted to such metaphorical use of language only to bring home absolutely abstract ideas in the minds of lesser people. This explains the terminology such as 'sarira', 'jiva' or 'atman', 'guna', 'dosa', 'alamkara' and the like which others with lesser imagination, not unlike Virocana of the Indra-Virocana myth, took just literally. When Danhin takes 'padavali or collection of words having desired (charming) meaning as poetry, we may say that here for him 'word' element serves as 'visesya' or the basic factor which is qualified by 'artha' or the qualifying adjunct, i.e. visesana'. coming together of both word and charming) sense is welcome to him also, but while logically further investigeting, he feels that in poetry the sound or word element makes for the stuff, poetry is made of, and sense or meaning aspect is only a qualifying adjunct. This explains his subtle framing of the definition. As observed earlier (Dandin I. 10 a) by 'alamkaras ca' i.e. 'also figures of speech (or sources of beauty)', he seems to have covered the topics of 'guna' i.e. poetic excellence and 'dosa' or poetic blemish also in his definition of poetry, or in the larger scope of poetry. So, for Dandin also the sum total comes to 'word and sense', which are 'sagunau', 'a-dosau' and 'salamkarau' i.e. with poetic excellences, free from poetic blemishes, and adorned by poetic figures (of both word and sense). Again when he qualified the 'padavalt or 'collection of words' by the term 'istarthavyavacchinna', i.e. 'accompanied by most cherished meaning', he drives out from the domain of poetry such coming together of word and sense that we come across in 'loka-vyavahara' i.e. ordinary parlance, or in 'sastra' i.e. literature on various For Personal & Private Use Only

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28 SAHRDAYALOKA disciplines, i.e. scientific writing. One thing becomes very very clear that Dandin prepares the bridge to reach Jagannatha's famous definition viz. "ramaniyarthapratipadakah sabdah kavyam" which we will have an occasion to consider in greater details later. By 'most cherished' - 'ista' meaning, is meant all meaning inclus the expressed, indicated and also suggested. Though of course, whether the predecessors of Anandavardhana, beginning with Bhamaha to Rudrata, - and here we are mentioning those who are known to us, - had a clear idea of 'vyanjana' or the word-power of suggestion, and 'vyangya' or the suggested meaning, in the technical context, is debtable, and we will pick up this discussion in due course later, we incline to suggest that the earlier poeticians were not totally unaware of the quality of suggestivity of language. At the same time we will do full justice to Dandin if we take 'ramaniya artha' or 'charming sense' as equivalent of 'istartha' - the desired sense - rather than insisting on the reference to the suggested-vyangya-sense. Perhaps this is more advisable and safe also. We can also commence, from this point, our march towards Kuntaka also. In both Dandin and Kuntaka we miss the extreme attitude that expects the beautiful meaning in poetry to put on the garb of suggestivity alone. It can be charming even when it is expressed directly, or conveyed through secondary use of language. The result is that poetic beauty has a wider field in Dandin and Kuntaka, and later in Bhoja also, as compared to the vyanjana dominated approach of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. So, as in Bhamaha, so also in Dandin, the distinction between 'kavikarma' - a poet's creation, and 'lokokti'-ordinary use of language - is to be seen in the poet's writing being endowed with what Bhamaha calls 'vakrata' i.e. beauty or with 'atisaya' or that extra ordinary element, as termed by Dandin. Dandin observes : "vivaksa ya visesasya lokasimativartini | asav atisayoktih syad alamkarottama yatha ||" (II. 214) and alamkarantaranam apy ahur ekam parayanam | vagisa-mahitam uktim imam atisaya"hvayam ||" (II. 220) i.e. "The desire to convey the extra ordinariness or the visesa i.e. contextual superiority (of poetry), is what is termed 'atisayokti' or 'statement of the special', and that is the highest source of beauty." And, "This (= statement of something special or extra ordinary) is the supreme source of charm in case of other sources of beauty also. This speciality called 'atisaya', is honoured even by great masters of language." So this, what Dandin terms as 'atisaya' or the 'extra-ordinary seen in a For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 29 poet's language, is what Bhamaha termed as, 'vakra-svabhava-ukti' - 'statement of the beautiful. This transforms the worldly objects of movable and immovable nature, from their original form of cause, effect etc. into what is termed by Bharata as 'vibhava' and 'anubhava' etc. i.e. determinants and consequents respectively and whatever is ugly or gross or physical, turns into 'sa-rasa' or beautiful. This 'vaktrokti' or 'atisayokti' or beautiful expression of a poet turns worldly objects into what we call vibhava"di' i.e. the poet's milieu; it grants them the capacity to 'vibhavana', i.e. the status of being worthy of aesthetic enjoyment; turns them into objects of aesthetic chewing - 'carvana'. It may also be noted that like Bhamaha, Dandin also has taken a note of the element of rasa/sentiment and bhava/feeling element. He has also, like Bhamaha, placed 'rasa' under 'rasavat alamkara. So, for him the emotive richness of poetry is also welcome as a source of beauty. He has also suggested that the epic form of poetry - i.e. mahakavya - should be overflowing with sentiments, emotions and feelings - "rasa-bhava-nirantaram". (I. 18, Dandin) At I. 51, Kavyadarsa, Dandin offers a useful observation. Says he - "madhuram rasavad; vaci, vastuny api rasa-sthitih , yena madyanti dhimanto madhuneva madhu-vratah 11" "Sweet (poetry) is that which is endowed with rasa (i.e. sentiment or,aesthetic enjoyment). Rasa (i.e. aesthetic delight or sentiment) rests in both word and sense. (It is that element) by which the wise get infatuated like bees by the spring season (or, honey.)." Thus rasa/sentiment or emotive richness, according to Dandin can result from both word and sense in poetry on one hand, and also by form and content i.e. theme. Even a particular form or structure can be suggestive of this or that feeling or emotion as the case may be. Even in Bharata we find particular metres (cchandovisesah) as suggestive of this or that feeling. In Anandavardhana we will go to observe that different styles or structures (riti; samghatana) normally going with shorter or longer compounded words, change their exterior, when used in different forms of art. Thus 'ojas' - the vigorous - guna or excellent, and a structure abounding in long compounds - dirgha-samasa-samghatana., are normally associated with the sentiments and emotions such as vira, the heroic, and raundra, the violent, but when the context concerns the dramatic form, the structure softens. Thus even form and content are suggestive of rasa as observed by Dandin here. Of course, as in Bhamaha, Dandin also places this emotive element under the general For Personal & Private Use Only

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30 SAHRDAYALOKA head of 'alamkara' i.e. a figure of speech, as also guna i.e. poetic excellence. We should carefully note that by subsuming under 'alamkara' both Bhamaha and Dandin have not under-rated the emotive stuff in poetry, on the other hand, they have elevated a figure of speech as a real source of beauty, which is not externally grafted on poetry, but is an inborn quality of poetry, as Kuntaka will make it clear. Actually it is in Anandavardhana and his successors that we read the word 'alamkara' in its narrower or limited sense of a figure of speech only and there too Anandavardhana is absolutely clear that if this element is seen rightly utilized i.e. in conformity with the prevailing sentiment, it is as much an integral portion of poetry as any other element : "nasti bahirangatvam etesam rasabhivyaktau" - The alamkaras, if 'samyak prayojita' i.e. used with discretion, - are not external to poetry so far as rasa is to be suggested. Again, when they are themselves principally suggested, i.e. when it is a case of 'alamkara-dhvani', they are as much the 'soul of poetry as vastu-dhvani or rasa"di-dhvani. We will discuss this in greater details later. But, for the present, it should be clear that the earlier alamkarikas never underrated the value of emotive stuff in poetry, nor were they mad after figures of speech at the expressed level only and thus created, what people under delusion call, the so-called 'alamkara-school of poetics. For Dandin 'alamkara' in its most catholic sense is a 'source of poetic beauty' - "kavya-bobhakara-dharma' and this covers up everything that goes under the names of rasa, bhava, samdhi, samdhyanga, vrtti, vsttyangas, guna, laksana, etc. i.e. everything. Dandin observes : "yac ca samdhyanga-vittyanga-laksana"dy agama'ntare | vyavarnitam idam cestam alamkaratayaiva nah ||" (Dandin, II. 367) "That in other scriptures is discussed under the titles of samdhyangas i.e. parts of junctures or vittyangas i.e. divisions of modes etc. and also as natural marks, is taken as 'alamkara' - the source of poetic beauty - by us." By 'agamantarah' i.e. other scriptures, works on dramaturgy are meant. Thus Dandin also discusses all sources of poetic beauty and this is brought out by discussing the nature and scope of poetry by the ancients. Vamana : In both Bhamaha and Dandin, we noticed the metaphorical use of language such as, '(kavya)sarira'. Vamana drags it still further. Without revelling in hair-splitting concerning what exactly forms the body of poetry, i.e. whether it is sabda - word, or artha - meaning, which is the diffentia of poetry, Vamana straight away points at some other subtlty, taking for granted the equal weight of both word and sense. Equal importance of both word and sense is acceptable to For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 31 Vamana when he notes that, 'the word 'poetry here is used with both word and sense rendered beautiful by both 'guna' i.e. excellence and 'alamkara' i.e. - a figure of speech. Says he : "kavya sabdo'yam gunalamkara-samskrtayoh sabda'rth vartate, bhaktya tu sabda'rtha-matra-vacano'tra glhyate." (Vamana, vitti on Kavyalamkara-sutra-vrtti, (= KSV.) I. 1. i). This remark has to be carefully examined. For Vamana, kavya is sabda and artha i.e. word and sense, that are rendered beautiful by guna and alamkara. Without this beauty of poetic excellences or poetic figures of speech 'kavya' i.e. poetry is primarily no poetry. You may call mere coming together of word and sense as poetry in a secondary sense of the term i.e. by 'bhakti-'secondary usage' only. Thus Vamana also underlines th between kavya and mere 'sahitya'. 'Sahitya' or coming together of word and sense with beauty inherent in it only, makes for kavya or poetry. So, for Vamana also, kavya and 'kavya-sobha' do not seem to be separate entities but are always located in one and the same substratum. Poetry is poetry, only when we experience poetic beauty in it. Poetic beauty is thus an integral portion of the 'whole' called poetry. Thus Vamana accepts the concepts of guna and alamkara in poetry, which make for the beauty - i.e. "saundarya". Vamana at KSV. I. i. 1 & 2, very clearly declares : "kavyam grahyam alamkarat. saundaryam alamkarah." - i.e. poetry is to be recognised through its alamkara or beauty, for poletic beauty is known as 'alamkara'. Going still deeper, Vamana declares that this falamkara' i.e. this source of beauty in poetry is caused by avoiding poetic blemishes and accepting poetic excellences and figures of speech : "sa dosa-guna-'lamkara-hana"danabhyam. sa khalv alamkarah dosahanat guna'lamkara"danac ca sampadyah kaveh" (Vamana, I. ii. 3). This means, that the beauty in poetry (i.e. saundarya/alamkara) has to be acquired by the poet by avoiding poetic blemishes (in poetry) and accepting poetic excellences and figures of speech. So, what Bhamaha and Danhin termed as 'vakrata' and 'atisaya' in poetry, that extra-ordinary element or 'saundarya' is termed as 'alamkara' - the term used here in its wider connotation - by Vamana. In Bhamaha, and more clearly in Danhin (Dandin II. 367) we saw the term 'alamkara' used in a wider sense. This finds still clearer expression in Vamana, and we say 'clearer because Vamana uses the term alamkara both in a wider and also in a technical sense of a figure of speech, side by side. So, whatever was opaque in both Bhamaha and Danhin becomes crystal clear in Vamana; that which was in a concealed form, so to say, is presented in an open, unveiled form in Vamana, or that which was fluid or nebulous takes a solid appearance, or that which was, say, abstract, takes a concrete form in Vamana. That which was perhaps presented by For Personal & Private Use Only

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32 SAHRDAYALOKA 'ghunaksara-nyaya' or accidental design carved out by the movement of a worm on a leaf, appears as letters firmly embroidered on the canvass of poetry. - With reference to available documents, - we can say that Vamana is the first to present the terminology viz. 'alamkara' both in its wider sense of poetic beauty - saundarya' - and also in the later narrower connotation of a 'figure of speech only. This could be taken as an important land-mark in the history of literary criticism. He also seems to extend the metaphorical use of language as introduced by Bhamaha and Dandin, for, as against 'kavya-sarira', 'the body of poetry', he also refers to the 'atman' - 'soul of poetry, which for him is 'riti' or 'style'. He declares that, "ritih atma kavyasya"; (Vamana, I. i. 3) i.e. 'riti' or 'style' is the soul of poetry and he goes to observe in the gloss over this that, "ritir nama iyam atma kavyasya; sarirasya iva iti vakyasesah" - 'Riti' is, verily, the soul of poetry; 'as of body is the remainder of this statement". We have to constantly keep this fact in mind that the abstract beauty of poetry was revealed to these great thinkers in all its radince and they revealed this secret to lesser people in a language these people could understand. It is precisely for this reason that these ancient thinkers resorted to the metaphorical use of language such as 'body', 'soul', 'vital airs', etc. of poetry, which in itself defies all description, it being just abstract and to be experienced only by men of cultivated taste. Even the technical terms such as 'alamkara', 'guna', 'dosa', etc. also are part of this effort as they tried to differentiate between one source of beauty and another, or between one form of beauty and another. As a matter of fact, how can an abstract entity be said to possess qualities that go with only the sentient beings? In short, as observed earlier, these metaphorical usages were meant only to bring home the subtle aspect of poetry, an abstract art, within the grasp of lesser people. They are not the end in themselves. We see that even some of the Sanskrit poeticians also are deluded by these terms taking them to be the end of everything, rather taking them as means, as key, to understand the richness of poetic art. We will not mention here some modern innocent scholars writing in Hindi or other modern indian languages such as Gujarati, without caring to have a direct relation with or, insight in the original literature in Sanskrit. As noted earlier, with reference to available documents, Vamana, seems to be the first earliest poetician who talks about the soul of poetry. But, even if the word 'soul is used here, we need not attach extra weight to it, for in the same breath Vamana explains that, 'as are lines in a painting, so in riti rests poetry'. Now if we drag this imagery further, we can say that actually the lines in a picture make for the particular picture, so also 'riti' i.e. form should be taken as poetry and thus For Personal & Private Use Only

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33 Definition and Scope of Poetry Vamana becomes a 'deha"tmavadin', i.e. one who regards the physical body as soul. But all this does not make any sense, as strictly speaking an abstract art as poetry, need not be imagined as having a 'body or a 'soul'. In fact what comes out of this sort of usage is the particular poetician's personal insistance on this or that source of beauty as more or less important. Actually there is no aesthete of poetic arts who has totally rejected any source of beauty altogether. For Vaman, 'riti' the soul resides in poetry on one hand and on the other when he says, 'rekhasu iva citram', - i.e. poetry resides in riti as picture in lines, he almost upturns the 'asraya-asrayibhava' or the relation of a thing and its substratum. In fact, Vamana is not very serious about these metaphors and we are not supposed to drag them too far! After suggesting that 'riti?/style is the soul of poetry, he explains 'riti' as a special type of arrangement of words; and that this speciality or 'visesa' is of the form of 'guna' or poetic excellence. Vamana observes : kim punah iyam ritih iti aha, 'vicista padaracana ritih' (Vamana, I. ii. 7) And adds, "ko'sau vis'esah ? ity aha - viseso guna"tma. (Vamana, I. ii. 8). - "What then is this 'riti' or style ? Says he, "Riti is a special arrangement of words." This 'speciality (= visesa) is explained as poetic excellence.' Thus perhaps poetic excellence is the category which finds greatest favour with Vamana. We will go to that when Anandvardhana talks about 'samghatana' i.e. poetic structure, and he expects it to reside in 'guna' or poetic excellence as either its soul or its substratum. But again, the point is, do we hold that the concepts of riti and samghatan, are absolutely congruent ? But one point emerges that when Anandvardhana suggests the option of those who hold samghatana as residing in 'guna' which is its 'soul (= atmabhuta) then, it is likely that perhaps he seems to echo the view of the followers of Vamana, i.e. "Vamaniyah". Vamana has also tried to present the concept of poetic blemishes in his own way but it does not take us further than Bharata. He takes dosa/poetic blemish as either the opposite or absence of 'guna' i.e. poetic excellence. He has also tried to distinguish between 'alamkara' i.e. a figure of speech, taken in its narrower connotation and poetic excellence. He observes : (Vamana, III. i. 1) : "kavya sobhayah kartaro dharmah gunah", ye khalu sabda'rthayordharmah kavyasobham kurvanti, te gunah 11" and (Vamana, III, i. 2) - "tad atisayahetavas tvalamkarah". - tasyah kavyas'obhaya atisayah tadatis'ayah, tasya hetavah. Then at, III. i. 3 he observes : "purve nityah". purve gunah nityah tair vina kavya-s'obha-'nutpatteh." i.e. Poetic excellences are the cause of poetic beauty. Those that are basically the qualities of word and sense and make for poetic beauty are 'gunas' or poetic For Personal & Private Use Only

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34 SAHADAYALOKA excellences. The alamkaras (such as yamaka, upama etc.) only enhance the poetic beauty of poetry (which is basically caused by poetic excellences.). The figures of speech only make for the enhancement of poetic beauty (i.e. they do not cause the same). They only add to the poetic beauty caused by gunas or poetic excellences. We will discuss this point later in greater detail but it may be noted at this juncture that more and more clarity and sublety are added to literary criticism and the literary critics now get ready for sharper analysis. We have seen that Vamana starts with clarifying the concept of poetry from the point where Dandin had Dandin mentioned only the body and 'vital airs' - 'sarira' and 'pranah' - of poetry, whereas Vamana talks of 'soul-atma-of poetry. It may also be carefully noted that by the very mention of riti/style as the 'soul of poetry, we do not score a point in branding Vamana as a 'riti-vadin' or promulgator of 'riti'. Actually even his predecessor Dandin also devoted a lot of space to the consideration of "marga", and even Bhamaha was not totally ignorant of this concept. Actually, on the other hand, Vamana, though declaring 'riti' as the soul of poetry, has started his work with the famous words that "kavyam grahym alamkarat", i.e. poetry is to be understood or felt through poetic beauty or alamkara." This drives us to believe that even Vamana, not unlike almost all alamkarikas or literary critics, is also a kavalamkara-vadin' - i.e. one who considers 'alamkara' (i.e. any source of beauty) as the - soul of poetry. It is only in this sense that we have to understand the so called 'Alamkara-school. Actually all, including you and I, are kavvalamkara-vadin i.e, one who tries to appreciate and realize the secret of poetic charm. The earlier masters, as seen clearly in Dandin considered all factors that caused poetic beauty as 'alamkara'. It is childish to brand Bhamaha and the rest as belonging to the so called alamkara school which took only yamaka-upama etc. only as the soul of poetry. Actually nobody has sweared in this name and declared from the top of the roof that, "alamkarah (i.e. yamaka, upama etc., the figures of speech) is the soul of poetry". If some modern scholars take it this way, it is sad live on their part. Actually, all the literary critics beginning with Bhamaha, or even earlier, concentrated on one point and that was poetry itself, and by poetry was meant the extra-ordinary literature that was graced by beauty. The decyphering of this poetic beauty is the sole concern of any literary critic, any alamkarika, worth the name, including the great Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. These literary critics started noting down all devices that caused poetic beauty and tried to discriminate among them on their own preference. Thus the devices came to be branded as alamkara, guna, riti, vrtti, dhvani, rasa, bhava, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 35 vakrokti, atis'aya, aucitya and what not ? To be very clear, poetic beauty or kavvasaundarva is itself 'alamkara', is the same as the poet's charming way of expression - vakra-kavi-vyapara-, and is the same as the extra-ordinary, the 'atis'aya' in poetry. This extra-ordinariness is expressed through immense varieties and who can explain the same in its entirety ? - kas tan kartsnyena vaksysti'? It is this which makes for the countless varieties of dhvani'. Bhoja and his Malava tradition subsume dhvani also under 'alamkara' and there is nothing wrong in it for this 'alamkara' is 'poetic beauty itself. It is only childish to suggest that the earlier masters such as Bhamaha and the rest were deluded only by the 'external beauty in poetry and only the dhvanivadins delved deeper into the inner and subtle beauty of poetry. In fact whatever pleases the connoisseur, whatever is a poet's creation in the real sense of the term, is 'kavya' i.e. poetry. By resorting to such a ca explanation of the poet's muse, Kuntaka, crosses the biggested hurdle viz. that poetic beauty is arrived at only through the word-power of suggestion or vyanjana, and embarks upon a larger area of poetic beauty which places even at times the expressive power-abhidha and also the secondary word-power, laksana on the same footing as vyanjana. Poetic beauty may take the form of vyanjana also, or it can be only an 'abhidha-vilasita-matra'. It also depends on the poet's mood at a particular mement. As the famous poet-devotee Narasimha Mehta from Gujarat puts it, 'the endless reveals itself as manifold' - "jujave rupe ananta bhase". There can be no rules and regulations that go to restrict the poet's muse. All that is required is that it should be poetry and poetry alone from the point of view of an aesthete or 'rasika'. It is with this in view that Anandvardhana declares : "pratayantam vaco nimita-vividha'rtha'mstarasa | na sadah kartavyah kavibhir anavadye sva-visaye ll" (Dhv. IV. 17 at) parasva"daneccha-virata-manaso vastu sukaveh | sarsvatyaivaisa ghasayati yathestam bhagavati || (Dhv. IV. 17 cd) "May words that appear (to critics) as full of manifold ideas and ambrosial sentiments be freely spread out. Poets need have no compunctions in the flawless realm of their own. (IV. 17 ab.)." "The goddess of speech, Saraswati, herself will provide the desired ideas of (to) a good poet whose mind is averse to borrowing the belongings of another." (Dhv. IV. 17 cd). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 299, ibid.) The poet should be honest, and poetry pure. It is because of this fact, viz. that of poetry being projected effortlessly only by a genuine poet, that Mammata, in his For Personal & Private Use Only

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36 SAHRDAYALOKA definition of poetry also includes, or refers, to the device of beauty called 'alamkara', deemed as 'external to poetry', by people of smooth intelligence and sensitivity. That poetic muse manitests itself only in a particular form is a dream cherished by innocent souls. Actually all newer and newer forms of poetry, drama or any creative writing is welcome to these alamkarikas and their all-encompassing theory of rasa'nubhuti or art-experience is loving enough and broad enough to welcome the same in its carassing close embrace. In reality, whatever moves a man of taste is poetry; and it can take a form of a figure of speech also, and also that of beautiful suggestion or dhvani. Vamana, in comparision to his predecessors, has also discussed the nature of meaning - 'artha-tattva' - to a greater detail and this we will pick up in due course. Udbhata: Udbhata has not attempted to float a definition of poetry but with some other reference in mind, scholars are inclined to view him as closer to Bhamaha and think that Udbata's concept of poetry was identical with that of Bhamaha and that perhaps he also called poetry to be, '(a charming) coming together of word and sense.' Udbhata also wrote, now not available, "Bhamahavivarana i.e. commentary on 'Bhamaha's Kavya'lamkara, a portion from which is quoted by no less an authority than the great Abhinavagupta in his famous 'Locana' commentary on Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka. So, it is safe to surmise that Unbhata's concept of poetry was identical with that of Bhamaha. This conclusion derives strength from another observation, perhaps also from Udbhata's Bhamahavivarana, as quoted by Mammata in his Kavya-prakasa, that Udbhata laughs at Vamana's distinction of 'guna' or 'poetic excellence' and 'alamkara' or a 'figure of speech' under the pretext that the former is interior to poetry and therefore 'nityadharma' or essential characteristic of poetry, and the latter being external are accidental to poetry and therefore only 'anitya' or 'impermanent'. Mammata has not accepted this observation and has gone for its refutation also. We have also observed that if Vamana calls 'alamkara' as 'anitya' or 'impermanent', it is only in the sense of a figure of speech, a device which may or may not be resorted to by a poet. But in itself, i.e. as 'saundarya' or poetic beauty itself, alamkara is as essential to poetry as any other device could be, even in Vamana's estimation. No wonder if Udbhata laughs at a purist point of view concerning poetic charm. It may also be noted that Udbhata was also open to poetic beauty as manifested through emotive stuff such as rasa or sentiment, bhava or feeling and all their newer and newer forms of manifestation. This we will pick up later. But by and large Udbhata also is a kavya'lamkara-vadin' in the wider sense of the term. * For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 37 Rudrata : In his Kava'lamkara, II, i, Rudrata, following Bhamaha suggests that word and sense together make for poetry : "nanu, sabdarthau kavyam sabdastatra'rthavan anekavidhah || varnanam samudayah, sa ca bhinnah pancadha bhavati ||". Word is having manifold meaning. In itself it is a collection of letters (that tend to be meaningful). Word is five-fold. They are (II. ii, Rudrata) : nama, akhyata, nipata, upasarga, and also 'karma-pravacaniya. i.e. noun, verb, particle, prefix and prepositions or adverb. Rudrata adds (II. 3) that nouns are either compounded or single. The compounded state of nouns is divided into three ritis or styles viz. pancali, latiya and gaudiya. - We will talk of this later but we may note for the present that the concept of riti i.e. style based on compounded words leads to 'samghatana' or 'arrangement' or "structure of Anandavardhana. But Rudrata has caused a mix-up here which we will discuss later. Rudrata also discusses like his predecessors alamkaras, dosas etc. and stresses on the need for - 'rasa' or sentiment as the outcome * phala - of kavya i.e. poetry. Rudrata observes that the connoisseurs - sahrdayas - get to the four ends of life, viz. dharma, artha, etc. in a light or easy way through poetry alone. It is therefore that a poet, involving major effort should make his kavya full of 'rasas'. If it is not the case then men of taste would suffer from poetry, without rasa, as in case of stastra or any discipline. The 'rasas' impart joy to the enjoyers endowed with rasas and therefore the poet sh take care to promote 'rasa'. Without knowing this element of 'rasa', a poet can not create poetry which tends to be charming. It should be clearly noted that Rudrata, as compared to his predecessors, is more vocal about incorporating 'rasa' in poetry. He observes : (Rudrata, I. 4): jvalad-ujjvala-vak-prasarah sarasam kurvan mahakavih kavyam | sphuram akalpam analpam pratanoti yasah parasya'pi 11 Thus, the predecessors of Anandvardhana imagined poetry to be word and sense, or attached little more importance to the word element in the definition of poetry and discriminated between one or the other devices that caused poetic beauty under the titles of guna, alamkara, marga, or riti etc. They also tended to consider in a scientific or disciplined way the concept of poetic blemish, and For Personal & Private Use Only

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38 SAHRDAYALOKA attached more or less importance to the sources of beauty enumerated as above. While doing this they used the term 'alamkara' in both its wider connotation of a source of poetic beauty', and also in its local context of a figure of speech. They also at times pointed out to riti or style as the soul of poetry. It is absolutely naive to think that these literary critics, in their total concept of poetry or scope of poetry, talked only of external factors that enhance poetic beauty, and never touched the essentials of poetry, that they cared only for the external of poetry and were not iniciated in the secrets of inherent poetic beauty. Actually they deliberated over the form and also the content of poetry, the external and the interior of poetry, the word and sense, form and content or theme of poetry and everything that laid charm to the expression and turned an ordinary expression into poetry. Singing the songs of glory of alamkaras in poetry, Dandin has suggested any number of internal sources of beauty in poetry. Vamana has laid down shades of meaning such as suksma or subtle, bhavya and vasaniya. Says Vamana : (Vamana, III. 2. s) - artho vyaktah suksmas ca. i.e. meaning is two fold, the expressed and the subtle -The subtle then is bhavya and vasaniya (vamana, III, 2.10). That which is easily discernible is 'bhavya'. Vasaniya' is that which is understood by concentration formed by a sympathatic heart. The Kamadhenu commentary explains : "bhavakanam avadhanamatrena vimarso bhavana. tad yogyah bhavyah. sahrdayasadvyavahara - samullasita-samskara - sampanno yo'vadhana-prakars'ah tena gamyo vasaniyah." We may say that this leads to what Anandavardhana calls vacya or expressed and 'pratiyamana' or implied. The earlier critics have also given a thought to the emotive stuff in form of 'rasa' or sentiment and 'bhava' or feeling, or emotion. At this juncture, however, it is not safe to observe that they had a clear concept of the word-power called vyanjana or suggestion. Actually, like Anandavardhana and his illustrious followers, the earlier critics had never applied themselves to the consideration of what we call the topic of semantics including ord such as abhidha, i.e. direct expression, laksana i.e. indication and vyanjana i.e. suggestion. This we can say, so far as available documents are concerned. But, it can be observed safely, as we will go to discuss the topic of wordpowers later, that these earlier literary critics were not absolutely unaware of this system, and they had some glimpses of vyanjana also. One thing is absolutely clear that they have thought of what we call 'pratiyamana' artha i.e. implicit sense, under various heads of alamkaras. This also will be discussed in due course. That Rudrata laid special stress on the element of rasa, goes to create a sort of background for advocating the importance of 'rasa-dhvani' or suggestion of the emotive stuff in For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 39 Anandavardhana, and his great followers. We will now proceed to examine the definition and scope of poetry as thought of by Anandavardhana and his followers. Anandavardhana and his followers : Anandavardhana has not attampted a definition of poetry. The reason could be that in the period between Bhamaha and himself the clear concept of poetry had already evolved. The central point of debate perhaps was giving prominence to either the word element alone or to give equal prominence to both word and meaning. Which of these two should be regarded as the differentia of poetry was a topic hotly debated by literary critics. But, by and large a tendency to pay equal respect to both these i.e. word and sense, seemed to gain ground. It is precisely for this reason that Anandavardhana has kept away from this and observed on Dhv. 1. i, only tantatively that - "tatra kecid acaksiran - sabdartha-sariram tavat kavyam." On this, observes Abhinavagupta in his Locana : "tavad-grahanena na kasya'py atra vipratipattir iti dars'ayati." Of course, the remark of Anandavardhana follows the words : "tad abhavavadinam ca'mi vikalpah sambhavanti." i.e. "The following are the different views of those who believe in its (= i.e. dhvani's) non-existence - (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 1 ibid). But the use of "tavat" by Anandavardhana implies that the view of even the opponents regarding the definition of poetry is acceptable to him. This is explained by Abhinavagupta who clarifies that by the use of 'tavat (- which is a correlative of yavat) it is implied that nobody (including Anandavardhana) has any dispute or disagreement over this (i.e. over the acceptance of both word and sense taken together to form poetry.) On Dhv. I. 2, in his yrtti or gloss Anandavardhana has the following observation : "kavyasya hi lalitocita-sannivesa-carunah sarirasya iva atma sararupataya sthitah sahrdaya-s'laghyo yo'rthas tasya vacyah pratiyamanas'ce ti dvau bhedau." (pp. 6, ibid) "That meaning which wins the admiration of perceptive critics and which is of the very essence of poetry - even as the soul is of a body which is naturally handsome by the union of graceful and proper limbs - has two aspects, viz. the explicit and the implicit." (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 7, ibid). Anandavardhana is careful here not to call any meaning to be the soul of poetry, not to commit that only word element is poetry. He uses a simile viz. "as soul in a body", implying thereby that For Personal & Private Use Only

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40 SAHRDAYALOKA body and soul can never be thought of separately. Thus for him both word and sense together go to form poetry. Abhinavagupta in his Locana over this, goes to add "karikabhagagatam 'kavya'sabdam vyakartum aha- "kavyasya hi iti". i.e. in order to explain the term 'kavya' i.e. poetry in the karika (viz. Dhv. I. 2), Anandavardhana observes... etc. Abhinavagupta, on behalf of Anandavardhana goes to add, "lalita-padena guna'lamkara'nugraham aha, ucita-sabdena rasavisayam aucityam bhavati iti darsayan rasa-dhvaner jivitatvam sucayati." i.e. by the term 'lalita' or 'graceful' is meant the beauty caused by excellences and figures of speech (i.e. by sources of beauty), and by the term 'ucita' or 'proper' is meant only propriety concerning aesthetic pleasure-rasa suggesting this, the author (i.e. Anandavardhana) points out to the fact that 'rasa-dhvani' suggestion of 'rasa' is the soul (of poetry)." The idea is that here as soul rests in body so does meaning as soul, rest in poetry. All meaning is not to be understood as the 'soul' or atman of poetry. It may also be observed that here the term 'atman' is also used not in the normal sense but only in a metaphorical sense meaning the "most essential" element in poetry. For it was, as observed earlier, very clear to any literary critic in India and also equally to Anandavardhana that poetry is an abstract art and has nothing to do with the idea of body or soul. The simile drives clear only one point viz. that charming sense - "sahrdayas'laghya - artha" is all that is required to make poetry what it is. Now all this naturally terminates in aesthetic pleasure, or artexperience or rasa'nubhuti is a distant cry. Thus, we can observe, for the present that for Anandvardhana word and sense taken together, and graced by excellences and figures-, the sources of poetic beauty - make for the definition and concept of poetry. Abhinavagupta's insistence on 'rasa-dhvani' need not contradict this observation, for everything in poetry that helps create poetic beauty, leads to rasadhvani i.e. suggestion of aesthetic pleasure - In fact all art, including the poetic art is meant to cause art-experience which is not a physical experience, but a 'manasa-bodha' a mental perception and hence is 'suggested' only. i.e. it is of the form of 'dhvani' or suggestion only. By 'rasa-dhvani' is also meant the suggestion of emotive stuff which results from any poetic milieu. It may also be observed that Anandavardhana has in a way, steadied the metaphorical usage promoted by Vamana regarding the 'body' and 'soul' of poetry. It is out of context, as seen in case of Visvanatha to read contradiction between one observation that calls both 'word and sense' as 'body' of poetry, and another observation which notes that the charming sense as appreciated by the men of taste is the 'soul' of poetry, and then For Personal & Private Use Only

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41 Definition and Scope of Poetry again calling only the 'principally suggested sense alone - i.e. 'dhvani' alone', as soul of poetry. The clear picture that emerges from this discussion is that the metaphorical usages of 'body. 'soul etc. are not to be drawn to their last limits and that they are meant, at the best, as proposed explanations of the abstract art of poetry. In short, the concept that poetry is word and sense taken together with any number of devices to cause poetic beauty which are natural with the combination of word and sense, seems to have taken root in literary circle, and Anandavardhana has no objection to that. As a matter of fact he is prepared to accept any turn of expression, any deviation, provided it is beautiful, as poetry, hough of course in his estimation the highest art lies in concealing art, i.e. in the implicit sense projected as the highest source of beauty in a given piece of poetry It is therefore that the use of poetic excellences and figures of speech has to be conditioned by the fact that they help in evoking rasa, i.e. aesthetic pleasure or even a sentiment, as the principal feature of poetry. This insistance on his part is in keeping with the view held by Bharata also, who has recommended every device with reference to evocation of rasa. Perhaps Anandavardhana is clearer in his understanding as compared to some of his predecessors and as observed earlier, Rudrata's stand was a bridge between Bharata and Anandavardhana. Anandavardhana holds that this evocation of sentiment takes place in poetry through the medium of the word-power called vyanjana and is termed rasa-dhvani * when it is singled out as the principal source of poetic charm. He holds that in poetry, through this word-power called vyanjana is arrived at a three-fold suggested meaning, which could be of the form of vastu-or matter of fact, or idea, alamkara or a figure of speech, or rasadi, i.e. emotive stuff, the sentiment, emotion or feeling, and if any of it proves to be the principal source of poetic beauty, it is termed as 'dhvani' of vastu, alamkara, or rasadi, as the case may be. The type of poetry having this implicit sense arrived at through the word-power of suggestion or vyanjana, is also termed as 'dhvani kavya' provided this pratiyamana or implicit sense proves to be the principal source of charm. We will discuss this in a greater detail later. We will also go to observe that in his wider scheme of poetry Anandavardhana finds suitable space for all the concepts of literary criticism such as alamkara, guna, riti, vrtti, dosa, etc., as advanced by earlier alamkarikas and thus makes his theory of "vyanjana - dhvani-rasa" more acceptable, logical and catholic. Anandavardhana has advanced the theory of three powers of the poetic word and there too he has attached more importance to the power of suggestion or vyanjana. For Personal & Private Use Only

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42 SAHRDAYALOKA Rajasekhara, in the sixth chapter of his Kavyamimamsa, viz. 'pada-vakyaviveka' tries to arrive at the definition of poetry while discussing the varieties of a sentence. He suggests that a sentence blessed with excellences and poetic figures : "gunavad alamkstam ca vakyam eva kavyam." (pp. 24, G.O.S., Edn.). We may observe that here when Rajasekhara takes 'vakya' i.e. sentence as poetry he seems to lean towards the tradition represented by Dandin which seems to attach greater weight to the element of sabda or word as against the thought current that holds both word and sense in equal balance. The commentary wants us to understand that the 'ca: placed with 'guna' and 'alamkara' goes to explain that these have got to be "without blemish". (See, Madhusudani, pp. 81, Chowkhamba, edn., '34.) Thus Rajasekhara's definition is in tune with the concept of poetry as divined by the earlier masters. Actually Anandavardhana also talks of dhvani, gunibhutavyangya and citra, the three varieties of poetry from the point of view of literary criticism. His accepted definition of poetry speaks only of a (harmoneous) combination of word and sense only. We may say that only the first section viz. 'kavirahasya' of the wider project called 'kavya-mimamsa' is available to us, and so, we do not know the exact attitude of Rajasekhara towards the concept of dhvani and vyanjana, though of course, he mentions Anandavardhana in certain contexts with great admiration. But acceptance of dhvani does not compel a critic to mention it in the definition of poetry and we will see that Mammata does exactly this. So, as it were, Rajasekhara seems to pave the way to what we read in the Kavyaprakasa later. We can also safely suggest that taking into consideration other references from the available portion of the Kavya-mimamsa, Rajasekhara has attached supreme importance to the concept of 'rasa' in poetry, though of course, not mentioning it in the pure definition of poetry. Kuntaka : It may be noted that Kuntaka's concept of literature could be taken as an important mile-stone in the onward journey of poetics. We hear the reverberation of the earlier masters such as Bhamaha and also echos of his near predecessor Anandavardhana in Kuntaka, who tries to strike a balance and go for a re-evaluation of the two streams of thought. For in Kuntaka, we find the ideas of the earlier masters such as Bhamaha and the like and also those of Anandavardhana, getting settled in a clearer, and more definite pattern, so to say. We have seen that Anandavardhana thought of the classification of poetry on the basis of more or less influence of vyanjana power, giving prime importance to this suggestive power of word in poetry, thus promoting a criticism-based classification and concept of poetry. In establishing 'dhvani' i.e. principal For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry suggested sense arrived at through the word power of suggestivity, Anandavardhana's approach, we feel, has been little more aggressive in favour of vyanjana or suggestive power of poetic word, perhaps unwittingly on his part. His approach seems a bit tainted by his rather over enthusiasm for suggestivity. This creates an impression that the great master betrays a distinct partiality towards vyanjana or word-power of suggestivity thus promoting a purely vyanjana-biased school of literary criticism. The obvious outcome of this attitude was that eventhough he realized the simple yet beautiful designs prepared by the word power of direct expression i.e. abhidha or denotation, he just ignored it. He almost established a thought - current that prohibited the poets to revel in the beauty of pure expression i.e. denotation - abhidha-vilasita-matra i.e. what he called 'citra kavya' or 'picture-like poetry', after realizing the secret of what he termed 'dhvani' or principal suggested sense. He however left the field of citra-kavya for only the beginners. His great followers, Mammata being the leader, called this variety as 'adhama' poetry, i.e. poetry of very low order. Thus Anandavardhana's effort led to a sort of negative evaluation of poetry wherein some sterling merits were downgraded to the level of ordinary achievement. On the contrary, without dishonouring in the least the brilliant standard of literary criticism set by the theory of vyanjana-dhvani-rasa, if thoughts are promoted on pure and sastriya i.e. scientific process, we can never afford to ignore the beauty of just the expressive word power either. This is exactly what Kuntaka cares for and drives us to. He does not seem to be primarily interested in the three-fold classification of word power, into what is termed as 'abhidha' or expressive power, i.e. denotation, 'laksana' or power of indication or, say, deviation, and vyanjana or the power of suggestivity of a poetic word. He therefore, is inclined to accept only one function, viz. 'vicitra abhidha' or the beautiful poetic expression in poetry and accepts that what we term as 'kavya' or 'sahitya' or poetry is worth its name only when it creates an impression of its being a poet's work; first and last. Poetry has to be recognised as 'kavi-karma' the creation of a poet's genius, which alone is 'kavya' for Kuntaka, and all else is "a-kavya" i.e. non-poetry. Kuntaka's definition and concept of poetry are based on this said foundation. 43 Before evaluating Kuntaka's concept of poetry, it is necessary to study the background on which it is nurtured. Among available documents of pure literary aesthetics, Bhamaha's Kavya'lamkara is considered to be the earliest. His near follower is said to be Dandin and this is accepted by scholars in general. In both Bhamaha and Dandin we find preserved even earlier thought-currents. Bhamaha For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHKDAYALOKA has considered the topics of 'kavya-s'arira' i.e. body of poetry in sixty karikas or verses, that of alamkaras or poetic figures in one hundred and sixty, of blemishes in fifty, of poetry in seventy and of sabda-buddhi i.e. correctness of words in yet another sixty karikas. The definitions and illustrations read in his work are believed to be Bhamaha's own creation, i.e. he has not borrowed the same from elsewhere. We have discussed Bhamaha's concept of poetry earlier, but here, even at the cost of repetition we will take up some topics as discussed by Bhamaha, as they serve a useful background for Kuntaka's thought-process. Bhamaha accepted the coming together of both word and sense as poetry; - sabdarthau sahitau kavvam .. but this sahitya acquires an un alaukikatva - only when it is beset with 'alamkara' i.e. poetic beauty in beauty of poetic language - vacam alamkritih - is brought about by what is termed as vakra artha' and 'vakra s'abda' i.e. by both poetic/beautiful meaning and poetic/ beautiful word of expression (Bhamaha, I. 36). Thus both poetic expression and poetic content, make for poetry. Bhamaha notes very candidly at V. 64-66, that descriptions of brilliant jewels, or of trees lowered by fruits, or of flowers in full bloom, do not cause poetic beauty. They only contribute to advance the beauty of ornaments, garden and garland alone respectively. Beauty of expression is brought about by vakrokti' alone, i.e. by beautiful poetic expression only - (Bhamaha, I. 30) - Literature i.e. - poetry worth its name, takes shape through 'vakrokti' alone. At VI. 23, Bhamaha discusses correct or incorrect usages of words with reference to the practices of poets having beautiful expression' - 'vakravacam kavinam ye, prayogam prati sadhavah.... etc. Here also it is insisted that the poet's expression has to be 'vakra' i.e. 'beautiful for becoming worth its name. In short, we can not imagine the existence of poety in the absence of this 'vakrokti' i.e. poetic expression. Though Bhamaha has insisted on the presence of this element of 'vakrokti' in poetry, he has not attempted any technical elaboration of this concept. Only at the end of the discussion on the poetic figure atis'ayokti - i.e. hyperbole ,, at II. 85, Bhamaha suggests that 'all hyperbole or extra-ordinary expression is 'vakrokti' i.e. beautiful expression which means expression of that which is 'beyond ordinary - i.e. which is 'lokatis'aya'. He observes : "saisa sarvaiva vakroktih, anaya'rtho vibhavyate" - all this (atis'ayokti) is vakrokti and by this everything (belonging to the day-to-day world) turns into 'vibhavas' - i.e. (poetic) determinants, or it is that by which things belonging to the ordinary parlance, become objects of delight. The poet has to be active to realize this element of vakrokti. In fact, which poetic expression or figure is without this vakrokti; and without this where is 'kavya'? The For Personal & Private Use Only

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45 Definition and Scope of Poetry full expression (Bhamaha, II. 85) reads as : "saisa sarvaiva vakroktih anaya'rtho vibhavyate | yatno'syam kavina karyah ko'lamkaro'naya vina ll" This verse has been quoted by Bhamaha's successors, beginning with Anandavardhana and Mammata. It is on the count of absence of 'vakrokti' that Bhamaha (II. 86) rejects hetu, suksma, and lesa as poetic figures : "hetus ca suksmo leso'tha nalamkarataya matah | samudayabhidheyasya vaktrokty-anabhidhanatah 11". It is surprising that after drawing his basic inspiration from Bhamaha, Kuntaka has not quoted Bhamaha, II. 85, though he has a number of other quotations from Bhamaha. Abhinavagupta has explained Bhamaha, II. 85, viz. saina sarvaiva etc. in his commentary viz. Locana on the Dhv. (III. 36). He explains that the definition of atisayokti which is given, is form of 'vaktrokti' or a figure of speech, because Bhamaha (1. 36) himself has observed that expression of vakra (= beautiful, poetic) word and vakra (= beautiful, poetic) meaning makes for the much wanted alamkara i.e. source of beauty of vani i.e. language or poetic expression. Elaborating this line of thinking Abhinavagupta explains further that by 'vaktrta of sabda i.e. word', and 'vakrata of artha i.e. meaning', is meant the state of word and sense being placed in an extra-ordinary fashion. Thus this 'vakrata' is itself the 'alamkarata' of an alamkara, i.e. this beautiful poetic expression, makes for a true peech. 'Vakrata' is explained here as avasthana' or being placed in a lokottirna' form. i.e. extra-ordinary fashion. Bhamaha means exactly this. 'Atis'aya' is that which is other than i.e. superior to the worldly or sastric expression. Only this makes for its quality of being 'a-laukika'. Bhamaha very clearly (II. 81) brings home this point that, an expression causing apprechension of an extra-ordinary meaning (i.e. - content) is atisayokti. Thus vakrata is, "lokottirna-rupena avasthanam." An alamkara or a poetic figure becomes worth its name only if this element of atisaya i.e. extra-ordinariness enters in it, or pervades it. For Personal & Private Use Only

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46 SAHRDAYALOKA Anandavardhana clearly observes : (Dhv. III. 36, vrtti): 'tatra'tisayoktiryam alamkaram adhitisthati kavi-pratibhavasat tasya carutva'tis'ayayogo 'nyasya tv alamkara-matrata eva iti' i.e. 'only that figure in which exaggeration reigns supreme, acquires abundunt beauty due to the poet's genius. Others are ornamental figures only in name." (Trans. K. Kri., pp. 229, ibid). What is arrived at by the advent of this 'atisaya' or by this 'lokatikranta-gocarata' or 'lokottara-ta'? The answer to this question is - anaya arthah vibhavyate' i.e. worldly objects are turned into sources of aesthetic pleasure. The process of 'vibhavana' is explained by the Locanakara in three ways, such as - (i) the meaning which rendered old or respeated due to the use made by all people, is realized in a beautiful form; - or, (ii) the worldly objects such as a lady, a garden etc., become vibhavas, i.e. determinants causing a feeling or emotion to be awakened; - or, (iii) these objects turn into bhavas i.e. feelings and become objects of rasa - Thus, through vakrokti old objects take newer forms, become vibhavas that evoke feelings, and get transformed into the shape of bhavas or feelings themselves leading to rasa. Thus Bhamaha recommends the coming together of such word and sense that are promoted by such vakrata, that turns the worldly into aesthetic. The repetition of Bhamaha's ideas here, is to introduce clearly the views of Kuntaka. That Bhamaha has under-rated the concept of riti-or marga i.e. poetic style, has not missed the attention of the experts. Bhamaha welcomes both gauda and/or vaidarbha style only if it caters to vakrokti, - without which even the so called 'vaidarbha' composition carries no weight for Bhamaha, and even gaudacomposition steals his admiration if it is blessed with this vakrata or poetic beauty (Bhamaha, I. 34, 35) Kuntaka's advent on the horizen of indian literary criticism took place at the most opportune moment. Anandavardhana had welcomed and woven in his scheme all thought-currents that came from his predecessors. He accomodated everything in his wider scheme of vyanjana-dhvani-rasa, in the context of rasadhvani. At the same time he accorded new connotation to certain terms and thus dwarfed the concepts of alamkara, riti and the rest in comparision with the tall all g concept of dhvani in general and rasa-dhvani in particular. Other thought-currents almost merged and melted into this, leaving very thin individuality of their own. The forceful and successful establishment of vyanjana as an For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 47 independent power of word turned out to be an important mile-stone in the history of literary criticism. New dimensions opened out on the horizen of literary criticism. What Anandavardhana did, i.e. his rendering all other thought-currents to a position subordinate to rasa-dhvani, demanded some rethinking. Precisely because of this the thinking of Anandavardhana's close successors such as Kuntaka, Ksemendra, Bhatta Nayaka, Mahim, and the rest, took a different shape. They as it were, challenged, stopped and applied brakes on the gushing flow of Anandavardhana's thought-current; - vyanjana. At the root of Kuntaka's thinking lie the views of Bhamaha and we may say that actually Bhamaha's ideas are as it were, "sprouted, turned into leaf, budded and blossomed" - (ankuritah pallavitah korakitah, puspitah) in Kuntaka. Of course, it is childish to suggest that Kuntaka echoes only Bhamaha's views alone. Be it a Kuntaka, or Bhatta Nayaka, or Mahima, or Bhoja or be it anybody, there is no single successor of Anandavardhana - and this includes Dhananjaya and Dhanika also - who remains completely free from the great impact of the vyanjana-dhvanirasa doctrine. And yet, there are some sterling peculiarities in Kuntaka's concept of poetry, which cannot be overlooked and which have carved out a nische of their own in literary criticism. The very first noteworthy point is that Kuntaka lays great emphasis on - 'kavikarma' i.e. a poet's creation. Whatever goes in the name of poetry should carry an attached stamp that it is first and last, 'a poet's creation'. He is never fed up of mentioning now and again the term, "kavi-vyapara" i.e. a poet's effort. So, for him, poetry is 'kavi-karma'. The poet-kavi' and 'poetic effort/creation, kavi-karma' - these two remain in focus in Kuntaka's thinking. He always keeps in mind that a poet's distinct individuality plays an important role in his creation. A poet's nature, his leanings, his likes and dislikes, go to contribute to the creation of newer and newer designs and Kuntaka is of the opinion that differences in a poet's nature bring about different styles of poetic creation. He has called his work by the name, 'alamkara' and 'vakrokti-jivita is a gloss written by himself on his own composition. It is under this title viz. 'vakrokti-jivita' that the whole work is - well-known among the learned. We may observe that by holding this principle of the stamp of a poet's individuality bringing about individualistic creation, Kuntaka comes closer to the western pattern of literary criticism. But it is also true that under the local colouring of a poet's individuality lies concealed an element of eternality of literature resulting in extra-worldly pleasure or 'camatkara'; 'rasa'. For Personal & Private Use Only

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48 SAHRDAYALOKA In the context of literary criticism Kuntaka has made an important observation that due to a sort of chemical composition brought about by word, meaning and 'alamkara', poetry is born which is an indivisible whole. He says : (Vakroktijivita = V.J.; I. 6) : "alamkstir alamkaryam apoddhitya vivecyate | tadupayataya, tattvam sa'lamkarasya kavyata ||" "The 'adornment' and 'adorned' are distinguished artificially for the purpose of our enquiry, becuase this would be the only means to attain the ultimate goal. The truth of the matter, however, remains that the two together constitute poetry." - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 291, 'VJ. of Kuntaka', Dharwad, Edn. '77). "Ornament or adornment relates to the act of embellishing. That which is adorned is the content and that which adorns is the linguistic means or medium. Both are subjected to examination here. The method adopted is that of definition of the general and the particular. For purposes of such a definition it becomes essential to consider the two separately, though they form an indivisible unity. The nature of poetry as a whole is realized through the means of the 'adornment and the 'adorned'. Such a distinction is very helpful in offering one a course of instruction in poetry. In fact, this is a common practice in other disciplines also to make such unreal distinctions in order that the purpose of education is fulfilled. For instance in grammar, a whole word is split into base and termination, and a whole sentence is subdivided into words"-(yatha padantarbhutayoh prakrti-pratyayayor-vakyantarbhutanam padanam ceti.) (vitti, on VJ. I. 6; Trans. K. Kris., pp. 291, 2, ibid) Kuntaka further observes that this distinction is attempted only to cultivate understanding. The real truth is that poetry is a work of a poet, wherein the undivided whole of the 'adorned' and the 'adornment'is the reality. So, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned already and the question of adding adornment to pre-existing poetry does not arise : "tattvam salamkarasya kavyata tad ayam atra paramarthah - salamkarasya alamkarana-sahitasya sakalasya nirastavayavasya satah, samudayasya kavyata, kavikarmatvam tena alamkrtasya kavyatvam iti sthitam, na punah kavyasya alamkarayogah" - (vytti; VJ. I. 6) For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 49 It may be noted that here 'alamkara' or 'adornment does not stand only for figures of speech such as upama, or anuprasa and the like, however these are not excluded either. For Kuntaka this adornment is 'vakrokti', 'a poet's charming expression', which can take any shape including that of a poetic figure also, and also that of vyanjana. But the condition is that it should be an in-born quality. This is exactly what Anandavardhana had said about the figures of speech, when they seem to stick naturally in the description and therefore are not taken as external to poetry - "na tesam bahirangatvam rasabhivyaktau" - (Dhv. Vitti, II. 16). That a work of art is 'akhanda-buddhi-samasvadya' i.e. something to be enjoyed as a whole undivided unit, is what Kuntaka means here. Actually by taking this holistic view of a poet's creation, Kuntaka has, as it were, disowned the system of 'atma' i.e. soul of poetry, sarira i.e. body of poetry, and the adornment or 'alamkara'. We may also observe that Anandavardhana also had accepted this view point of poetry being an indivisible, whole unit. Actually he has also talked about the so adornment separately only to cultivate the proper understanding of poetry. His words quoted as above, viz. 'na tesam bahirangatvam' bear out this fact. So, when Kuntaka suggests that poetry is always found with adornment - "salamkarasya kavyata", if some understand it as suggesting that, 'poetry is no poetry, if it is without upama i.e. simile, etc. then this may be taken as pure innocence. After this Kuntaka makes an effort to strike a definition of poetry. For him poetry is : "sabdarthau sahitau vakra-kavi-vyapara-salini bandhe vyavasthitau, kavyam; tadvida'hlada-karini ||" (V. J. I. 7). "Poetry is that word and sense together enshrined in a style revealing the artistic (lit, - 'out of the way) creativity of the poet on the one hand and giving artistic delight to a man of taste on the other." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 292, ibid) The first point to be noted is that in his definition of poetry, Kuntaka has called both 'word' and 'sense' taken together as poetry. He goes to observe in his vitti on VJ. I. 7, that, "Poetry is nothing but word and sense in their unity. The denoter and the denoted' taken together constitute poetry. That they are two yet one is a welcome paradox." (Trans. K. Kris., ibid) - "sabdarthau kavyam, vacako vacyam ceti dvau sammilitau kavyam. dvavekam iti vicitraivoktih." (Vrtti, on V.I. I. 7). We For Personal & Private Use Only

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50 SAHRDAYALOKA may observe that as it were, the point which Punditaraja Jagannacha raised later, is anticipated and answered here. Kuntaka further observes: "As a result of this, the view of some that poetry is word alone beautified highly by the skill of the poet, as also the view of some others that poetry is sense alone causing aesthetic delight as a result of beauty in style, both these stand refuted. Thus, the quality of giving aesthetic delight co-exists in both severally, even as oil exists in every grain of sesamum and is not exclusive to either of them. He observes: "yasmat dvayor api pratyekam vartate, na punar ekasmin." (Vrtti, on V.J. I. 7). He further observes : "tasmat sthitam etat - na sabdasyaiva ramaniyata-visistasya kevalasya kavyatvam, na'pyarthasyeti." (Vrtti, on V.J. I. 7) i.e. "Thus the conclusion is clear that neither beautiful 'word-form' alone, nor beautiful content alone can constitute real poetry." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 295, ibid). With this observation he offers quotations from Bhamaha (i.e. Bhamaha I. 1517). If either of the two, viz. word and sense, is inferior, poetry does not take shape. To bring home this point, the term 'sahitau' - i.e. 'together' is used in the definition, Normally word and sense are always found together, but Kuntaka here expects a special form of 'sahitya' or coming together. It is a unique kind of togetherness. "The uniqueness lies in the fact that the graces due to excellences and figures of speech assuming complex shades of artistic beauty will compete, as it were, with one another in any given instance." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 296, ibid) - "kintu visistam eva iha sahityam abhipretam, kidrsam ? vakrata-vicitra-gunalamkara-sampadam paraspara-spardha'dhirohah" (Vrtti - VJ. I. 7) - Kuntaka explains that the dual form used in 'sahitau' of word and sense is denotative of two classes taken as a whole, and not taken as individuals. For, if two particulars were meant, even a single meaningful word-would have to constitute poetry. So, Kuntaka is clear in suggesting that the two, viz. word and sense, as woven in a composition go to form poetry. By 'bandha' or composition is meant the fashioning out through sentences, i.e. use of a number of sentences. 'vyavasthitau' or 'woven, enshrined', suggests the profusion of excellences like 'grace' and of figures of speech: "bandho vakya-vinyasah. tatra vyavasthitau, visesena lavanya"diguna'lamkara sobhina sannivesena krta'vasthanau." (Vrtti, on VJ. I. 7). Kuntaka further suggests that in the expression 'together' the togetherness implied is presumably the harmony between one word and another, and between one meaning and another. Or else, it will not attract the readers of cultivated taste : "sahitav ity atra'pi yatha-yukti sajatiya'peksaya sabdasya sabdantarena vacyasya vacya'ntarena ca sahityam paraspara-spardhitvalaksanam eva vivaksitam." (Vrtti, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 51 VJ. I. 7). Kuntaka observes that the absence of concord or togetherness in one type (i.e. set of words) is sure to mean the absence of concord in the other (i.e. meaning) too. Thus meaning though striking in itself, will be no better than a dead body when it is not embodied in an adequately striking word. Similarly, a word which does not have an adequate meaning-content, but which expresses something out of context is to be taken as, 'disease of a poem.' - "paramarthatah punar ubhayor apy ekatarasya sahitya-viraho'nyatarasya api paryavasyati. tatha ca arthah samartha-vacaka-a-sadbhave svatmana sphurann api mrta-kalpa eva avatisthate. sabdo'pi vakyopayogi-vacya'sambhave vacya'ntara-vacakah san vakyasya vyadhibhutah pratibhati." (Vrtti, V.J. I. 7). In short, word and sense, as if competing with each other, used in a given composition, make for poetry. For Kuntaka this 'bandha' or style or composition should be such as, "revealing the artistic creativity of the poet" - i.e. 'kavi-vyaparasalini'. By 'vakre' or 'out of the way' as an adjective of style or composition is meant that the poetic process involved is different from the well known denotation of words familiar in scientific writing (i.e. sastra). This 'vakrata' is six-fold according to Kuntaka. The poetic style or composition acquires unique beauty therefrom. This adjective of difference from well-known linguistic usage is not enough to define poetry, as it is too wide and may include instances marked by farfetched conceits. So, Kuntaka adds another attribute viz. "giving aesthetic delight to the man of taste." After elaborating over the definition and scope of poetry, Kuntaka discusses the nature of word and sense in greater detail. He says (VJ. I. 8) & (VJ. I.9): vacyo'rtho vacakah sabdah prasiddham iti yady api, tatha'pi kavya-marge'smin parama'rtho'yam etayoh || sabdo vivaksitaikartha-vacako 'nyesu satsvapi, arthah sahrdaya-hrdaya"hladakarisva-spanda-sundarah || "That 'meaning' is what is signified and 'word' is that which signifies is so wellknown that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows:" (VJ. I. 8) (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 300, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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52 SAHRDAYALOKA "That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poet's intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be reckoned as 'meaning' (VJ. I. 9) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300, 301 ibid) Kuntaka also talks of 'word' being dyotaka' and 'vyanjaka'. The exact distinction between these two is not clear, but Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy perhaps renders the terms as 'indicative' and 'suggestive and the two meanings viz. 'dyotya' and 'vyangya' as 'indicated' and 'suggested'. Actually we use 'indicative' for 'laksaka' and 'indicated' for 'laksya'. This is common practice. These two, viz. 'dyotaka' and 'vyanjaka' varieties are covered by 'vacaka' because, Kuntaka thinks, that the business of a word is to convey meaning, i.e. apprehension of meaning is the main or only function of a word and this attribute is applicable to all types of words including dyotaka' and 'vyanjaka'. Similarly 'dyotya' and 'vyangya' varieties of meaning are also covered up by 'vacya' in general. In his gloss on - VJ. I. 8, Kuntaka observes : "iti, evamvidham vastu prasiddham pratitam - yo vacakah pratyayakah sa sabdah, yo vacyasca'bhidheyah so'rtha iti. nanu ca dyotaka-vyanjakav api sabdau sambhavatah, tadasamgrahan na avyaptih, yasmad artha-pratiti-karitva-samanyad upacarat tau api vacakau eva evam dyotya-vyangyayor arthayoh pratyeyarvasamanyat upacarat vacyatvam eva." Thus for Kuntaka a word i.e. a poetic word is only that which is comunicative of the exact intended sense alone. There may be any number of synonymous expressions, i.e. alternate general expressions in any number, with an outwordly identical meaning. But the unique shade of the particular meaning as intended by the poet cannot be conveyed fully by any or all of them. We may observe here that Kuntaka seems to echo the words of Anandavardhana, who in Dhy. I. viii, observes : "so'rthah tadvyakti-samarthya-yogi sabdas ca kascana | yatnatah pratyabhijneyau, tau sabdarthau maha-kaveh ll" "That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiry of a first-rate poet." (Trans. K. Kris. Dhv. pp. 15, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 53 How does a poet arrive at this rare word to convey the exact sense is explained by Kuntaka, while explaining the process of poetic composition resulting in the togetherness aimed at. Kuntaka (Vitti on I. 9) observes that when poets are interested in describing a particular feature, they are seen preferring an apt particular word as in the illustration viz. "dvayam gatam samprati" etc. (Kumara. V. 71). While explaining the illustration in detail, Kuntaka suggests that the poet's preference for words with possessive terminations in respect of proper names of both i.e. 'kalavatah' and kantimati) is also a means of excellence which cannot be conveyed by using their synonyms. He says: "kavi-vivaksita-visesa'bhidhana-ksamatyam eva vacakatva-laksanam. yasmat pratibhayam tatkalollikhitena kenacit parispandena parissphurantah padarthah, praksta-prastavasamucitena kenacit utkarsena va samacchadita-svabhavah santo vivaksa-vidheyatvena abhidheyatapadavim avatarantas tathavidhavisesa-pratipadanasamarthyena-abhidhanena abhidhiyamanas cetas camatkaritam apadyante." (Vrtti, on VJ. I. 9) - "Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 302, ibid) Kuntaka 'here seems to convey that while composing poetry, an original invention or a flash takes shape in the poet's mind, as a result of which the external worldly objects leave their worldly nature and become objects, emotive in nature, in the poet's heart, and because of this they turn into 'bhavas' or emotive or aesthetic stuff. Thus through words, that are appropriate to convey this internal vision of the poet, these objects are signified. Thus, they become objects of aesthetic delight for the sympathetic souls. Two things happen in this process. First, on account of the poet's original invention, the external worldly objects turn into objects of relish, and with the help of the same flash the poet is able to convey his internal stuff in words of poetry. These words are having the capacity to signify exactly what the poet intends to do. Kuntaka says that when the objects first appear in the poet's imagination, they are originally of the nature of a rough For Personal & Private Use Only

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54 SAHRDAYALOKA stone; they come to be finally polished by the poet in the course of being embodied in beautiful language, and strike the men of taste as a precious diamond, fully polished. - He observes (Vitti, on VJ. I. 7) "yasmat alamkarena aprastuta-prasamsa laksanena, anya'padesataya sphuritam eva kavi-cetasi prathamam ca pratibha-pratibhasamana-ghatita-pasana-sakalakalpa-mani-prakhyam eva vastu, vidagdhakavi-viracita-vakra-vakyopa"rudham sanollidha-mani-manoharataya tadvidahladakari-kavyatvam adhirohati." About the vacya-signified-meaning in poetry, Kuntaka elaborates : (Vitti, VJ. I. 9) "arthas ca vacya-laksanah kidrisah ? kavye yah sahsdaya"hladakari-svaspandasundarah. sahr'dayah kavya'rthavidah tesam ahladam anandam karoti yas tena svaspandena atmiyena svabhavena sundarah, sukumarah. tad etam uktam bhavati-yady api pada'rthasya nanavidha-dharma-khacitatvam sambhavati tatha'pi tathavidhena dharmena sambandhah samakhyayate yah sahrdaya"hladama"dhatum ksamate. tasya ca tada"hlada-samarthyam sambhavyate yena kacid eva svabhava- mahatta rasa-pariposa'rgatvam va vyaktim asadayati." "Coming to meaning, what is its speciality in poetry ? That is precisely what is meant by saying that, that alone which possesses such refreshing beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers, is to be reckoned 'meaning'. The readers referred to are those sensitive to poetic beauty. That which delights them by its own refreshing beauty is the nature of meaning in poetry. To put it in other words; although an object may be qualified to diverse attributes, the poet will select, only one of them which is capable of delighting sensitive readers. Its capacity to delight is referred on the basis of the rare grandeur added to the subject in the poet's treatment or the force added to the literary sentiment developed." (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 304, ibid). After thus clarifying his opinion about 'word' and 'meaning', Kuntaka suggests : "ubhau etav alamkaryau tayoh punah alamkrtih | vakroktir eva vaidagdhya bhangibhanitih ucyate 11" (V.J. I. 10) "Both these are the 'adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech". (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 306, ibid) 'Both these' refer to words and meanings. They are to be taken as subjects of ornamentation for their special appeal. Their ornament - i.e. ornament for both word and sense - is only one viz. 'artistic turn of speech? This stands for a charming For Personal & Private Use Only

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55 Definition and Scope of Poetry and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and quite different from familiar usage. Thus, artistic utterence itself makes for ornament. The poetic process itself is the real ornament. So, it is wrong to presume that word and sense are on one side and that they are to be later connected to some ornamentation which lies separate on the other side. Striking turn of expression itself is ornament which is not external to word and sense. It is inherent in the poetic process, it is natural to a poet's speech; it is an inborn quality. Further elaborating the concept of 'sahitya' or togetherness of word and sense that make for poetry, Kuntaka (VJ. I. 16) observes : "sabdarthau sahitau eva pratitau sphuratah sada || sahitav iti tav eva kim apurvam vidhiyate ll" "When it is so obvious that word and meaning are ever experienced jointly, what is the special import of mentioning it in the definition)." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 310, ibid) - The idea is that the intimate relation of word and meaning is inherent. What then is the special significance of mentioning this togetherness in the definition ? The point is that here this innate intimate relationship is not meant. This relationship is found even in Panini's aphorisms and even in irrelevant talking of a cart-driver also. This is not covered by this special 'sahitya'. For in that case we need not go for the descipline of sahitya, its purpose being served even by the desciplines of grammar, exegesis and logic also. But then even this difference is also well known. What is the purpose of saying it again ? Kuntaka, with a touch of pride replies : (Vitti, on I. 16, V.J.) : "What we call sahitya has been invariably referred to by that name in the long course of the history of poetics and yet, so far, there has not been a single scholar who has devoted his attention to explaining even a little of this concept, although the concept itself is very interesting, representing as it does the highest watermark of the poetic art. So, let us undertake for the delight of the bee-like critics, a consideration of the strikingly beautiful essence of the concept underlying all compositions of the best poets and impressing us as containing the collective beauty of the ambroisal drops to be found in the lotus-heart of Sarasvati, the goddess of poetry." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 310, 311, ibid). For Personal & Private Use Only

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56 SAHRDAYALOKA As compared to Anandavardhana's flow of words which like that of the great Adi Sankara, and which matches with the pure and serene flow of the Ganga, Kuntaka's verbocity makes his effort less remarkable. Explaining this special togetherness of word and sense, Kuntaka observes : (V.J. I. 17): "sahityam anayoh sobhasalitam prati ka'py asau | anyuna-anatiriktatva manohariny avasthitih ||" "The sahitya or mutual coherence between word and meaning in respect of beauty is nothing but a unique poetic usage, involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful." . (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 311, ibid). So, for Kuntaka, what is meant by 'sahitya' is not merely the mutual conherence necessarily found between word and sense, but their extra-ordinary efficiency in artistic usage of the poet to bring joy to the man of taste. The attribute, viz. 'the usage involving neither more nor less than the exact form of word and meaning required to make the whole beautiful is placed to suggest that the two are competing with each other, as it were, to produce delight. Between the two, there should be no excess nor deficiency in respect of the contribution of either. Kuntaka elaborates the idea as given above by citing three 'antara-slokas (= nos, 34, 35, 36 under VJ. I. 17, pp. 25, ibid) in which he observes : "The rise of excellences like 'sweetness' in harmony with the 'style', the employment of figures endowed with abundant artistic beauty; (34) The full development of 'sentiments' in keeping with the prescribed 'modes' - when all these are competitively (= spardhaya) present in both word and meaning; (35) We have the quintessence of speech classified as word etc., and causing delight to the reader by its beauty. It is this which is designated here as 'sahitya'. (36) - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 312, ibid) Kuntaka says that the four sastras of grammar, exegesis, logic and poetics are also of help to every sentence-construction. Among these, in his opinion, poetics is of supreme importance. It confers a beauty of its own on a composition in the absence of which we miss beauty. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 57 Kuntaka suggests (Vs. 37-40; VJ. I. 17 Vrtti) in the antaras'lokas that he will now onwards discuss that element which produces delight in sensitive readers, even by the beauty of its style (= bandha), even if it is lacking in thoughtful content, just like melodious music; the element which is relished in its entirety whithout distinction of word and sentence import after the initial grasping of primary meaning, even like the unique savour of a sweet drink (panakaswadavat), by men of taste; the element without which a composition would appear lifeless to critics, like a body without life, or like life without vitality; - the element from the presence of which creative freshness of speech proceeds, the beauty of which is grasped only by the men of taste. This element Kuntaka takes up for discussion now onwards. After a detailed discussion of the exact import of 'sahitya' the general nature of art as revealed in the poetic process is explained by Kuntaka: (V.J., I. 18): "Art in the poetic process is divisible into six categories. Each one of them may have numerous subdivisions, every subdivision striking one by a new shade of beauty." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 313, ibid) kavi-vyapara-vakratva-prakarah sambhavanti sat | pratyekam bahavo bhedah tesam vicchitti-sobhinah || The process of creative poets is poetry itself - kavinam vyaparah kavya-kriyalaksanah, (vrtti, on V.J., I. 18). Its art distinguishes it from other forms of composition. The main categories are six, having numerous sub-divisions. - Kuntaka enumerates six art-forms or 'vakrata' as: (V.J., I. 19, 20, 21) 'varnavinyasa-vakrata' or art in arrangement of syllables; 'pada-purvardha-vakrata' or art in the base-form of substantives; 'pratya-vakrata' i.e. art in inflection forms, 'vakyavakrata' i.e. art in a whole sentence, which has a thousand-varieties and which takes in its fold the whole lot of poetic figures; 'prakarana-vakrata' i.e. art in a section of a work, and 'prabandha-vakrata' i.e. art revealed in a whole composition. It may be noted that Kuntaka has practically covered up all vyanjakas or suggesters as pointed out by Anandavardhana in his Dhv. III. 16 and at other places scattered over the whole of his Dhv. The Dhv. III. 16 reads as : "sup-tin-vacana-sambandhaih tatha karaka-saktibhih | For Personal & Private Use Only

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58 SAHKDAYALOKA krt-taddhita-samasais ca dyotyo'laksya-kramah kvacit 11". It is one thing that Anandavardhana has harnessed all agents to a direct or indirect suggestion of emotion or aesthetic delight-rasa, while Kuntaka is virtually supporting this position. For Anandavardhana case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes and also compounds become conveyers of suggestion of 'alaksya-krama-dhvani - i.e. suggestion with imperceptible sequence, i.e. what we may term 'rasadi-dhvani' Kuntaka has also covered up any number of instances of what goes und name of abhidha or pure expression, and also laksana i.e. deviation, which for Anandavardhana also, become instruments of vyanjana. A number of illustrations from the Dhv. are also accepted by Kuntaka to explain and illustrate this or that sub-variety of vakrata. It makes an interesting study to examine illustrations, especially from Kalidasa being treated by both these great critics. A comparative study of the approach of these two stalwarts to the great Kalidasa promises to be an interesting journey. After this Kuntaka turns his attention to style or diction of composition at V.J., I. 22, wherein he observes : vacya-vacaka-saubhagyalavanya-pariposakah | vyapara-sali vakyasya vinyaso bandha ucyate." "Diction is the name given to the art of sentence-construction which is congenial to heighten inner and outer charm of both 'meaning' and 'word' and which is at the same time a partaker of the poetic process." (Trans. pp. 324, ibid). Here, in place of the traditional names of excellences, Kuntaka uses new names such as 'saubhagya' and 'lavanya'. The former stands for inner charm, which is the fruit of dynamic imagination which causes delight of the heart : "saubhagyam pratibha-samrambha-phala-bhutam, cetanacamatkaritva-laksanam", (vrtti on V.J. I. 22), while the latter i.e. 'lavanya' is explained as : "sannivesa-saundaryam" i.e. the beauty of arrangement-which makes for the outer charm. 'Bandha' i.e. diction makes for both these. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 59 . At V.J., I. 23, Kuntaka proceeds to explain the term 'tad-vid-ahlada-karitva' i.e. the quality of delighting men of taste, which is used in his definition of poetry given in V.J., I. 7. He has already explained the other three elements viz. 'meaning' (i.e. arthah), 'word' (i.e. sabdah) and 'artful expression', i.e. 'vakrokti', or 'alamkarana'. Kuntaka says that poetry has a power that brings delight to the connoisseurs. This is other than 'meaning' i.e. content, 'word' i.e. language, and artful expression i.e. ornament. These three do contribute to excellence in poetry but Kuntaka says that there is something else also viz. beauty which is beyond these three : "tad-vidahlada karitvam kavya-vid-ananda-vidhayitvam | kidnisam ? vacya-vacakavakrokti-tritaya-'tisayottaram |"(Vitti, on I. 23, V.J.). Kuntaka holds it as the fourth principle having its own distinct nature and excellence. Its charm carries a unique unfailing appeal. Uniqueness consists in its being felt only by men of taste. It is like perfume sweetly surrounding an object : Vitti on I. 23 runs as : "svarupena atisayena ca svarupena anyat kim api tattva'ntaram etad atisayena etasmat tritayad api lokottaram iti arthah. anyac ca kidisam ? kim api amodasundaram 1. kim api avyapadesyam sahridaya-hridaya-samvedyam amodah sukumara-vastu-dharmah, ranjakatvam nama, tena sundaram, ranjakatvaramaniyam " We may observe that here we can read the impressions of Anandavardhana's famous uttering, viz. "vibhati lavanyam iva anganasu" (Dhy. I. 4) After thus discussing at length the definition and scope of poetry in its full concept, Kuntaka observes that there are three styles in poetry which serve the poets as high-roads and these three are the sukumara i.e. elegant, vicitra i.e. brilliant and madhyama i.e. the mixture of these two. This he gives in VJ. I. 24 : "santi tatra trayo margah kavi-prasthana-hetavah sukumaro vicitras ca madhyamas ca ubhayatmakah 11". He is clear that they are three only and neither two nor four. They are the stimulators of creative process in poets and are therefore responsible for the creation of poetry itself. Kuntaka has correlated them with a poet's creative power, his genius, his nature and refuses to link them with any geographical regions. This will be discussed by us in greater detail later in volume II, but for the present we may say that Kuntaka, as compared to the vyanjana-biased criticism of For Personal & Private Use Only

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60 SAHRDAYALOKA Anandavardhana, has opted for a more broadbased scheme and held 'kavya', which theoratically shuns classification, as only 'kavikarma' or poet's creation. Though of course, without any outward gradation even in Kuntaka we find leanings towards Anandavardhana's rasa-vyanjana, and this is borne out by the practical poemoriented criticism which Kuntaka works out even in cases of varna-vinyasa-vakrata. Ksemendra : In his Kavi-kanthabharana Ksemendra discusses only the external factors concerning poetry, while in Aucitya-vicara-carca he touches an absolutely internal condition viz. faucitya' or 'propriety concerning the concept of poetry. He has not attempted to construct any definition of poetry but has concentrated on a very important concept or thought-current concerning the basic idea of poetry. He has called it to be the very life of rasa-oriented poetry. His fuller discussion concerning the propriety or 'aucitya' in all its details has a basic concern with 'rasa' or aesthetic pleasure only. But this does not mean that he has embarked upon a totally new and original thought current or ideology concerning literary criticism. He has tried to put in focus, perhaps with a greater emphasis, whatever was laid down originally by Bharata and approved and supported by Anandavardhana and in his own turn by Abhinavagupta. We will discuss this thought-current or concept of 'aucitya' i.e. propriety in due course later in Vol. II but here, suffice it so say that Ksemendra takes 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure as the 'soul of poetry and 'aucitya', 'propriety stands for the 'jivita' i.e. life-force - pranah - of poetry. Keeping this element of aucitya at the centre does not stand to provide an independent path of literary criticism. It is not a new dimension so to say. Precisely because of this, we do not find any independent school of 'aucitya' and its followers, as in case of dhvani'. We may say that this is only a branch or an off-shoot of dhvani theory and Ksemendra turns out to be a spiritual heir, a 'manasa-putra' of the great Abhinavagupta his guru, and therefore also of Anandavardhana. Bhoja : In his Sarasvati-kantha"bharana (SKA) and Spingara-prakasa, (sr. Pra) Bhoja has discussed the concept of 'sahitya' and 'kavya' and has also attempted definition of the same. At Sarasvati-kanthabharna (= S.K.A.; N.S. Edn. '34, Bombay) I. 2 he defines 'kavya' as : "nirdosam gunavat kavyam alamkaraih alamkrtam, rasanvitam kavih kurvan kirtim pritim ca vindati." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 61 "The poet acquires both fame and pleasure by composing poetry which is bereft of (poetic) blemishes, qualified by (poetic) excellences ornamented by ornaments, and is united (or is full of) with 'rasa' i.e. sentiment (or emotional stuff, or aesthetic pleasure)." Thus Bhoja has underlined the four attributes of poetry viz. dosa-hana i.e. avoiding blemishes, 'guna-adana' i.e. acquisition of poetic excellences, 'alamkarayoga' or having ornaments or figures of speech and 'rasa-a-viyoga' i.e. non-exclusion of rasa. But he has not attempted the basic definition of 'kavya' or poetry here, and for that we have to look into the discussion read in his Sringara-prakasa. (= Sr Pra) (Edn. Josyer Vol. I-IV; Mysore) - Bhoja in his Sr. Pra. explains 'sahitya' as relation between word and meaning and this relation is very wide so as to include even sastra i.e. scientific literature. He holds that 'kavya' is togetherness of word and meaning as suggested in the famous definition (of Bhamaha) that takes 'kavya' or poetry as both 'word' and 'meaning' taken together. He says (Sr. Pra. Vol. I, pp. 2 Edn. Josyer), "tat (= kavyam) punah sabdarthayoh sahityam amananti; tad yatha, 'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam'." This relation of word and meaning called 'sahitya' is twelve-fold according to Bhoja. Eight relations out of these twelve are normal relations, and the remaining four are special that go to make this 'sahitya' i.e. togetherness as 'kavya' or poetry. In reply to a querry as to 'what makes for sahitya ?' Bhoja observes that, 'the relation of word and meaning makes for 'sahitya'. This relation is twelve-fold such as : abhidha, vivaksa, tatparya, pravibhaga vyapeksa, samarthya, anvaya, ekarthibhava, and dosahana, gunopadana, alamkarayoga, and rasa-a-viyoga. (Sr. Pra. Vol. I, pp. 2, 3). In the beginning of Ch. VII Bhoja once again mentions these twelve relations. Thus in a wider sense of 'sahitya' or 'togetherness of word and sense', Bhoja seems to cover even the use of language that we come across in loka-vyavakara i.e. day-to-day parlance, and also in scientific literature that we term as 'sastra'. In the special sense of 'sahitya', Bhoja enumerates the last four which only go to make for poetry i.e. 'kavya', proper. It is noteworthy that following the tradition of Bhamaha and Anandavardhana, Bhoja mentions both 'sabda' i.e. word and 'artha' i.e. 'sense' in the definition of 'kavya' i.e. poetry. We, however, may choose to call the first eight relations not by the name of 'sahitya', but by the simple reference of 'vanmaya' i.e. all literature in general, i.e. technical and also that which we come across in our worldly context. For Personal & Private Use Only

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62 SAHRDAYALOKA The wider relationship of word and meaning as suggested by Bhoja can be shown in a tebular form as given below. The first eight varieties of togetherness of word and sense are termed as "kevala-sabda-sambandha-saktayah" by Bhoja, while the latter four are termed as "sapeksa-sambandha-saktayah" i.e. word-powers depending on relationships that are 'relative to something in nature. The table is shown as : Kavya i.e. poetry sabda n t artha sahitya (= word) (= twelvefold) (= togetherness, twelvefold) vyakarana-mulaka i.e. based on gram- kavyagata-i.e. based on poetry; fourmar (= Eight-fold togetherness depend- fold, viz. (i) dosa-hana or = absence of ing on grammar) poetic blemishes (ii) gunopadanam, or (= presence of poetic excelleness) (iii) alamkara-yogah (= use of poetic turns of expression; figures; & (iv) rasa-aviyoga i.e. absence of disconnection with aesthetic experience. kevala-sabda-saktayah - i.e. pure sapeksa-sabda-saktayah or four relaword-powers-of four types viz. (i) abhidha tive word-powers such as (i) vyapeksa = expression; denotation; (ii) vivaksa = i.e. special expectancy (ii) samarthya = desire to express meaning (iii) tatparya = potentiality (iii) anvaya = correlation & purport (i.e. sentence sense) (iv) (iv) ekarthibhavah = having identical pravibhagah = classification, part, portion meaning. Of these, the first eight have been discussed by Bhoja in the VIIth and VIIIth chapters of his Sr. pra, and the last four are discussed in Ch. IX of Sr. pra. These last four relationships are termed as 'samyak-prayoga' i.e. 'right or proper-usage' and he has observed that, "samyak-prayogas ca asya tada upa-padyate, yada dosahanam, guno-padanam, alamkarayogah, rasa-'viyogas ca bhavati', i.e. right usage takes place when there is avoidance of poetic blemishes, acceptance of poetic excellences, acceptance of poetic turns of expression i.e. figures of speech, and absence of disconnection with aesthetic pleasure. (Sr. Pra. Vol. II, Ch. IX, pp. 305). Thus Boja's concept of 'sahitya' i.e. togetherness of word and sense is very wide. He has absorbed all thought-currents promulgated by alamkarikas beginning with Bhamaha, down to Anandavardhana and Dhananjaya-Dhanika, in his Sr. Pra. He For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 63 has welcomed the concept of 'alamkara' or 'source of beauty as advanced by Bhamaha and Dandin and has accepted in toto the definition of kavya viz. 'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam' from Bhamaha. He has practically accepted everthing mentioned in Dandin's Kavyadarsa, while with reference to the concepts of guna i.e. poetic excellence, and alamkara as poetic figures, and their inter-relation, he has accepted Vamana's views. It seems Bhoja is also inspired by Vamana in mentioning the two attributes viz. 'dosa-hana' and 'guno-padana', with reference to 'kavya'. On the other hand by relognizing all poetic figures as forms of 'vakrokti' or poet's special turn of expression, Bhoja seems to be indebted to Bhamaha. He has called 'rasa' and 'gunas' as 'alamkara' in the wider sense, in keeping with Dandin's observation. (Sr. Pra. Vol. II, Ch. XI, pp. 448). Following Vamana, he seems to attach a comparatively greater importance to the thought-current of 'guna' than with reference to 'alamkara'. 'Rasa-aviyoga' or absence of disconnection from rasa is the most important attribute of kavya for Bhoja, and thus he observes in his 'Sarasvati - kantha"bharana (V. 8) that : "vakroktis ca rasoktis' ca svabhavoktis ca vanmayam | sarvasu grahinim tasu rasoktim pratijanate ||" Vaktrokti or beautiful expression, rasokti or expression charged with aesthetic delight, and svabhavokti or natural description, (all these three) make for literature. In all these expressions 'rasokti' is said to be (principal) factor (that goes to make for kavya). Thus, Bhoja has attached supreme importance to 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic delight in poetry, all the time also welcoming the thought currents of 'dosa', 'guna' and 'alamkara' as floated by his predecessors. He has also accepted the concept of 'dhvani' from Anandavardhana in his own style. It may be noted however, that with Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi we can also raise some objection against Bhoja's use of the term "rasokti", for in fact 'rasa' or aesthetic delight is anything but an 'ukti' or expression. Though of course in Bhoja's favour it can be stated that here by 'rasokti' can be understood a poetic expression, charged with 'rasa' or aesthetic delight. It is not rasasya-uktih but it is 'rasa-mayi uktih'. But we will go to observe later especially appreciating Dr. Rewaprasad's views as mentioned in his "Kavyalamkarakarika", a modern work on Sanskrit poetics, that he has some quarrel even against this explanation. This will be discussed later in greater details in a special appendix (in Vol. II). For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA Agnipurana: in the seventh verse of its 337th chapter, the Agnipurana attempts the definition of poetry which is qualified by clear alamkaras, gunas and is bereft of dosas : 64 "kavyam sphurad alamkaram gunavad dosa-varjitam." It should be noted that we have no faith in placing Agnipurana as an ancient document prior to Dandin and we honestly believe that Agnipurana carries clear influence of Dandin, and other earlier alamkarikas. Actually the author seems to be a devout follower of Dandin and hardly deserves the status of an independent thinker on literary aesthetics. Mahima Bhatta: Among the near posterior writers of Anandavardhana, the names of Kuntaka and Mahima figure at the top. Of course, Abhinavagupta also kept the tradition of dhvani running high, but perhaps he was a junior contemporary of Kuntaka, and we accept this observation of Dr. K. Krishna-moorthy, but Abhinavagupta was a protegonist of vyanjana-dhvani-rasa thought-current and Kuntaka had slightly different ideas while Mahima, not unlike Bhatta Nayaka, challenged the very concept of vyanjana-dhvani, though of course accepting the pratiyamana artha or implicit sense and explaining it in his own way and accepting also the supremacy of the concept of rasa, but not through the agency of vyanjana. Mahima has stoutly opposed the concept of vyanjana as a word-power and has tried to give a totally new direction to the definition and scope of kavya or poetry. Anandavardhana, as we know, accepted the thought-currents promulagted by his earlier masters and tried to charge them with a new orientation of vyanjana and thus added a new dimension to literary criticism and aesthetics in general, a new direction, so to say. We will go to see later how this vyanjana-prasthana was challenged and opposed vehemently by critics such as Bhatta Nayaka in his now not available work called "Hrdaya-darpana", drafted specially for demolition of dhvani-theory i.e. 'dhvani-dhvamsa'. This challange and opposition to vyanjana is pursued with a greater gusto by Mahima, the protegonist of kavyanumiti i.e. poetic inference. His sole object is to defy and demolish the concept of vyanjana which he has done in his work named "Vyaktiviveka" or discriminating thinking concerning vyanjana. Instead, he favours 'anumiti' or 'inference' which he calls 'kavyanumiti' or poetic inference. He establishes a new mile-stone on the high-way of literary aesthetics but he was not lucky enough to get staunch and strong supporters as Abhinavagupta in case of Anandavardhana, and so his lonely voice was, say, muffed up in the chorus of vyanjana-dhvani-rasa theory. His shout in favour of poetic inference died down For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 65 - with him and he was subjected to fierce, though undue as we will observe later, criticism advanced by Vagdevata'vatara Mammata, and Visvanatha and the rest. We know that Dandin did not prefer the idea of putting poetry to logical test and called this approach 'karkasa' i.e. rough or, insensitive, and therefore unwelcome in the domain of literary aesthetics, while Mahima seeking inspiration from Bhamaha, who, out of his disgust and scron for a number of Duta-kavyas following the pattern of Kalidasa's Meghaduta, and himself being an intellectual of rare qualities, had considered a number of poetic blemishes from the point of view of logic, and supported the notion of kavya-nyaya or poetic inference, also establishes 'kavyanumiti' i.e. poetic inference at the centre of literary aesthetics and makes a valiant effort to get it stamped as the be all and end-all of poetry. We can observe that we are perhaps not off the mark, if we do not consider Mahima as the first protegonist of poetic or aesthetic inference or kavyanumiti, as there were supporters of kavyanumiti or poetic-inference even prior to him, of course, the un-named aesthetes whose ideas were promulgated by the likes of Sri. Sankuka and also those who figure as holders of prima-facie view the naiyayikas - who oppose vyanjana and whose views are considered thoughtfully and denounced by Anandavardhana under Dhv. III. 33, in the aloka. The obvious purpose of the auother of Vyaktiviveka is to demolish the principle of vyanjana i.e. poetic suggestion. He has never discarded the fact of implicit sense or the 'pratiyamana artha' in poetry, nor has he challanged the element of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure. On the contrary, he feels that these two are arrived at by poetic inference kavya'numiti which is different from 'tarka'numiti' i.e. logic of the sastras. He accepts only the power of direct expression i.e. abhidha in case of a word, and holds that whatever goes under the name of indicated sense or 'laksyartha', and suggested sense or 'vyangyartha' are arrived at by the process of poetic inference or 'kavya'numiti'. It is precisely for this reason that he has severely criticised Anandavardhana's definition of 'dhvanikavya' (Dhv. I. 13) and has pointed out exactly ten blemishes in this definition. We will consider all this in full details. But before we appreciate his presentation, we will look in for the definition of poetry as attempted by him at Vyakti-viveka (= V.V.) (Edn. Rewaprasad, chow-skt. Sr. Varanasi, "64) I. 25. He observes: - - "vacyas tad anumito va yatra'rtho'rthantaram prakasayati | sambandhatah kutascit sa kavya'numitir ity ukta ||" For Personal & Private Use Only

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66 SAHRDAYALOKA "That is designated as kavya'numiti i.e. poetic inference, wherein either the directly expressed sense or a sense inferred therefrom, flashes forth another meaning, based on any relation." OR "That is called kavyanumiti' wherein the literal meaning or the inferred meaning gives rise to another meaning due to some kind of relation between them." (Trans. C. Rajendran, pp. 66, 67 "A study of Mahima Bhatta's Vyaktiviveka" - Edn. '91, Calicut). Thus, Mahima stands in support of the concept of poetry being both word and sense together. For Anandavardhana the principal suggested sense is the soul of poetry and is termed dhvani'. With this in mind Anandavardhana has attempted the definition of poetry gifted with principal suggested sense, i.e. what he calls 'dhvanikavya', as follows : "yatra'rthah sabdo va tam artham upasarjanikrta-svarthau | . vyanktah, kavya-visesah sa dhvanir iti suribhih kathitah 11" (Dhy. I. 13) "That kind of poetry, wherein the conventional) meaning renders itself secondary, or the conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the intended) (or) implied meaning, is designated by the learned as Dhvani or "suggestive poetry". (Trans. K. Kris. pp. ibid), (Edn. '74, Dharwad) Anandavardhana takes dhvanikavya as a special variety of poetry. He attempted to give a definition only of this variety perhaps because he wanted to convey to the younger poets that now that the definition and scope of what he terms as dhvanikavya have been laid down clearly, following the principle of vyanjana-dhvani-rasa, they i.e. the younger poets had to strive for that only, or, as he later concedes, for the next variety of poetry called the 'gunibhuta-vyangyakavya' or poetry with subordinated suggested sense. He only theoretically talks of a third variety of poetry called the 'citra' kavya, wherein only the directly expressed sense is a source of some beauty. He does not recommend it but gives a concession that those who are in a stage of primarily trying out their hand at drafting poetry may have a go at it. We will discuss these varieties when we deal with the topic of classification of poetry. For the present, suffice it to say, that by keeping vyanjana or the suggestive word-power in the centre, Anandavardhana For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 67 talked of varieties of poetry with vyanjana either dominating or remaining subordinate to the other powers of word, and thus he added new dimension to literary criticism. But, with all this, this theory of vyanjana was not received with equal acceptance by literary aesthetes, and we have seen how Kuntaka, though not opposing vyanjana openly, placed his own views of vakrokti with great confidence and fanfare. On the other hand Mahima openly revolted against this concept of vyanjana and applied all his energy in demolishing the same, though without expected success or support. He raised his voice to the highest pitch, aiming at Anandavardhana's definition of dhvani-kavya'. He expanded the horizon of literary criticism by inculcating sastriya or scientific colouring in this field, which can match with the highest traditions of the nyayadarsana. He tried to find ten faults with Anandavardhana's definition of dhvanikavya though of course, all the blemishes pointed out by him, do not carry equal merit. But the fact remains that in the ananda-vatra or journey to bliss-of Anandavardhana, Mahima plays the role of a Jayad-ratha and tries to stall its forward march. As observed earlier, misfortune intervened and he did not get lieutenants to carry on his anti-vyanjana crusade in his absence. It is no small achievement on his part that such stalwarts as the great Mammata and Visvanatha had taken special pains to refute the anumiti-vada, though of course to be candid to Mahima, we will have to accept the fact that what these stalwarts refuted was not the intended kava'numiti or poetic inference of Mahima but anumiti in general or say, tarka'numiti, superimposed on Mahima's kavya'numiti. It may also be observed that on occasions - the difference between Anandavardhana and Mahima looks as thin as that deciphered between Anandavardhana and Bhatta Nayaka, in the estimation of Abhinavagupta. Mahima finds ten faults (w. I) in the definition of dhvanikavya as advanced by Anandavardhana. They are : 'arthasya visistatvam', 'sabdah savisesanah, vyakti, dhvanih, 'va'sabdah, the dual in 'vyanktah', tadah pumstva, the use of the specific term viz. kavya-visesah, and the plural in 'suribhih' i.e. vacanam ca kathana-kartuh. We will examine all this in details as below : (1) Anandavardhana has added the attribute 'upasarjanikrta-sva' to the expressed meaning. Mahima feels that this is redundant because whenever there is apprehension of the implicit sense, the expressed sense is necessarily subordinate to Thus Mahima does not accept the concept of 'gunibhuta-vyangya' or subordinated suggested sense, because for him no suggested sense worth its name can ever be subordinate to the expressed sense. For Personal & Private Use Only

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68 SAHRDAYALOKA This is an interesting situation. In our appreciation of Kuntaka's position, we had observed that eventhough without rebelling against the concept of vyanjana and the supremacy of only dhvani, Kuntaka had exerted to press the point that even an expression pure and simple, provided it is 'vicitra' i.e. artistic, stands on the same pedestal as is a principally conveyed suggested sense. Thus Kuntaka's vicitra abhidha' was inclusive of vyanjana, both when the latter is either principal or subordinate. But Mahima, in his zeal to squash vyanjana and dhvani, actually goes a step further than Anandavardhana, who was liberal enough to accept the possibility of an implicit sense arrived at through vyanjana, to be less charming than the expressed sense arrived at through pure poetic expression i.e. abhidha. What Mahima says is that abhidha and abhidha'rtha or expressed sense can never be more charming than vyangyartha which he terms as 'anumeyartha' arrived at by the channel of kavya'numiti or poetic inference. While Kuntaka was liberal enough to put the same theoretically on equal footing, while Anandavardhana accepted the superiority of either, here is Mahima, the greater champion of the implicit sense, who refuses to recognize the case of an expressed sense as superior to the implicit under special context. Thus we may say that Mahima's approach seems to be narrower and more rigid as compared to the liberal stance of both Anandavardhana and Kuntaka and actually by taking such an extreme position, Mahima becomes a greater champion of vyanjana, which he calls by the name "kavya'numiti", there being no virtual distinction between these two positions as ill be explained later by Visvanatha, the author of Sahityadarpana. Thus in his effort to undo vyanjana, Mahima re-establishes the same with a greater gusto, of course, in a different garb. The second objection Mahima raises is with reference to sabda - i.e. word. A word cannot be instrumental in giving meaning other than only primary. "sabdah punah anupadeya eva. tasya svartha'bhidhanam antarena vyaparantaraanupapatteh, upapadayisyamanatvat. (vrtti on V.V. I. 6, pp. 16, Edn. Rewaprasad, Varanasi, 64). It can make its meaning subordinate only when it is a quote, i.e. quoted for conveying some-one-else's view : na ca tasya anukarana-vyatirekena upasarjaniketa'rthatvam sambhavati - (pp. 16, ibid) (vrtti on v. I. 6). We may observe that there is a lot of truth in Mahima's position, when he convinces us that a means is always subordinate to an end and the word which is used as a means only to convey a given meaning is necessarily subordinate to it : yo hi yadartham upadiyate, na asau tam eva upasarjani karoti iti vaktum yuktam. (pp. 17, ibid). For Personal & Private Use Only

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69 Definition and Scope of Poetry Naturally the pot is subordinate to the water it contains. Thus there is the blemish called 'asambhava' - impossibility, with reference to Anandavardhana's definition. Mahima has pointed out, as observed earlier, ten faults in the definition of dhvanikara, which he summarizes in karikas I. 23, 24 (v.v.) (pp. 110, ibid) as under: arthasya visistatvam, sabdah sa-visesanah, tadah pumstvam dvivacana-va-sabdau ca, vyaktir dhvanirnama, kavya-vaisistyam || (I. 23) "vacananca kathana-kartuh kathita dhvani-laksmani dasa dosah || ye tu-anye tadbheda-prabheda laksanah na te ganitah ||" (I. 24) Accordingly we examined the second and third blemishes as above. We saw that logically he drives at a point that a means is necessarily subordinate to its end and hence a word, the only use of which is to give its primary meaning alone, has to be subordinate. The attribute 'upasarjanikrtasva' has thus no chance. But when we look at Anandavardhana's treatment of the variety of dhvani called sabda-saktimula-dhvani, we have to accept the speciality of a given word which superimposes a sort of principality upon it, though secondarily. The universal experience to this effort of all men of taste can not be wished away and it has to be remembered that whatever way the literary criticism is advanced, it has its concern with poetry which is an absolutely abstract art and therefore, no rules as hard and fast as rules seen to operate in case of natural sciences, can be expected in case of poetry. A critic has to be liberal and has to take a view in wider context, or else he will do injustice both to poetry and to men of taste in general. So, howsoever logical the stand Mahima has taken may be, it cannot be defended rigidy and he himself is on his knees when he accepts that his own 'kavya'numiti' has to be spared the scrutiny of a 'tarka'numiti'. "tadah pumstvam" in 'tam artham', i.e. the reference to the suggested sense in the masculine gender is not in harmony with the neuter gender applied to the same in dhvanikara's earlier karika, when at Dhv. I. 6, the words are : "sarasvati svadu tad-artha-vastu..." etc., Mahima observes : (p. 97, ibid) : "kim ca 'tam iti tadah pumstvena nirdesah anupapannah." Here 'tat' has reference to something which is taken up here through context. Mahima says that the context in Dhv. I. 4 has, "pratiyamanam punah anyad eva" suggesting neuter gender. Same is the case with the expression, "sarasvati svadu tad artha-vastu..." (Dhv. I. 6). Mahima suggests that to support masculine gender in Dhy. I. 13, we will have to reconstruct the text as "pratiyamanah punah anya eva..." and "sarasvati svadutamam tam artham" etc. which involves greater effort. For Personal & Private Use Only

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70 SAHRDAYALOKA Earlier also, Mahima had pointed out that there was 'punarukta dosa' also in the definition because when a word and/or sense is instrumental in giving some other sense, they are automatically subordinate and so the mention of their subordination gives rise to the blemish called 'punar-ukta' or repetition. He also tries to find 'avyapti dosa' or 'inadequate extent. In his opinion there is suggestion of similarity (i.e. upamana-upameya-bhava) in figures such as 'dipaka' (or, Illuminater). The alamkaras such as these are not covered up in the definition (Dhv. I. 13) because the alamkaras are taken as identical with "abhidha', the power of expression of a word, and not as 'word' or 'meaning' itself. So, as the subordination of 'word' and 'sense' is clearly mentioned in the definition (i.e. in Dhv. I. 13), the same should have been clearly mentioned with reference to 'abhidha also. And if it is felt that the clear mention of abhidha' is redundant, then the same of 'sabda' also should be taken as equally useless. Says he : "kim ca, yatha abhidheyo'rthah tad-visesanam ca upattam, tad-vad abhidha api upapadanam arhati eva. anyatha yatra, dipaka"deh alamkarat alamkara'ntarasya upama"deh pratitih tatra dhvanitvam istam na syat; tat-laksanena avyapteh am upagatam, tesam bhangi-bhanitibheda-rupa (pp. 22, ibid). Dr. Rewaprasadjee has tried to refute Mahima's point (pp. 24, 25, ibid). He observes that when Mahima uses the term, 'tesam bhangi-rupatvat', he seems to echo Kuntaka's expression in the VJ., who he quotes elsewhere directly. Kuntaka at VJ. I. 10 has stated : "ubhau etau alamkaryau tayoh punah alamkrtih, vakroktih eva, vaidagdhya-bhangi-bhanitih ucyate." "Both these are 'adorned. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 306, ibid). Kuntaka further observes : (vrtti on I. 10, pp. 20, ibid) : "tad idam tatpayam - yat sabdarthau prthag avasthitau na kena'pi vyatiriktena alamkaranena kimtu, vakrata-vaicitrya-yogitaya abhidhana-matram eva anayoh alamkarah, tasyaiva sobha'tisaya-karitvat." - "Let us sum it up once again : apparently, words and meanings both have their distinct existence in poetry and come to be adorned by something different from themselves. The fact of the matter is that the very process of poetic utterance is constituted by the artistic turns assumed by words and meanings. The poetic process itself, in this sense, is the real ornamentation. For it is extremely delighting in itself." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid). So, the idea is that For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 71 both word and sense are to be adorned'. The adornment is vakrokti or artistic expression, which consists of 'vaidagdhya-bhangi-bhaniti' wherein Mahima takes 'bhangi' as 'vicchitti' i.e. beauty, and "taya uktih, vicitra eva abhidha, vakroktih." So, "vakrata-vaicitrya-yogitaya abhidhanam eva etayoh alamkarah" is taken by Mahima as "abhidha' the famous word-power of expression. Actually 'artistic expression of Kuntaka is not pure abhidhasakti only, as understood by Mahima. Mahima holds that in such cases as dipaka alamkara, the real beauty lies in 'upama' or simile. So, this dipaka alamkara itself should be taken as dhvani or, the attribute 'upasarjanikrta"tmatva' should have touched such cases as of dipaka etc. also. Now, because the alamkaras such as dipaka and the rest are of the form of abhidha i.e. pure expression only, Anandavardhana should have also mentioned the word 'abhidha' in the definition of dhvani in Dhv. I. 13. As the dhvanikara has failed to mention the same, there is 'avyapti dosa' in the definition, as noted above. Now the point is that Mahima takes alamkaras as identical with Sabhidha' or the power of expression of a word. But this approach cannot be accepted. In fact, alamkaras are such qualities of the apprehension of poetic word and sense, that deliver charm, and that are different from both rasa or sentiment and other suggested meanings. Abhidha is only the intellectual relationship of the apprehension of word and meaning. This apprehension of word sense rests in mind i.e. antahkarana, or soul i.e. atman. These two apprehensions, i.e. one each of word and sense, are basically unrelated. The speaker uses one's apprehension of meaning, and to reach the mind of his hearer, he connects it with the apprehension of word. This connection of both apprehensions is termed as abhidha, or vacakatva, or sakti. This can not be called 'alamkara' i.e. a figure, as it is bereft of basic charm. The charm i.e. 'vicitrata' is perceived only in the correlation of word - meanings and this perception is of the form of knowledge. When we say 'mukham candrah', there is no charm in the expression of 'mukha' i.e. face, which reveals only the word-sense of 'face', i.e. 'mukha'. The charm consists in the word-sense of 'mukha' being taken as identical with word-sense of 'candra' i.e. moon. This is not 'abhidha' or the power of expression of a word. But it is 'relation of word-senses'. Thus figures or alamkaras cannot be taken as identical with 'abhidha' as has been wrongly understood by Mahima. Dr. Rewaprasad objects to even Anandvardhana's observation that in dipaka, upama alamkara is not principal because dipaka is designated as 'dipaka' and not 'upama'. Actually Dr. Rewaprasad holds that even in dipaka, there is no 'upama alamkara', but there is apprehension of only 'upamana-upameya-bhava' i.e. idea of upamana and upameya. It is precisely to underline this distinction that Abhinavagupta has explained the word 'upamayah' used by the dhvanikara as For Personal & Private Use Only

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72 SAHRDAYALOKA equivalent to 'upamanopameyabhava' i.e. the idea of similitude and not 'upamaalamkara' or 'expression of similitude'. The notion of being an alamkara i.e. alamkarakatva does not seem to reside in it and hence it is not an alamkara, observes Rewaprasadjee. Actually, we feel that when Rewaprasadjee quotes Abhinavagupta as suggesting that by dhvanikara's expression viz. 'upamayah' is meant only 'upamanopameya-bhavasya', and not 'upama-alamkarasya', then why not accept Anandavardhana also to mean exactly that ? Any way, one thing clearly emerges that Mahima's observation that 'abhidha' should also have been mentioned clearly in the definition of dhvani, stands refuted. Mahima further observes that the use of the indeclinable viz. 'va' is yet another blemish. He observes, (pp. 94-95, ibid) : "kim ca atra 'va'sabdo vikalpa'rtho va syat samuccaya'rtho va. na tavat vikalpa'rthah, paksa'ntaraasambhavasya vyutpaditatvat. sambhave va asya dvi-vacana-anupapattih, tayoh samuccaya'bhavat. yatha.... "sirah sva kako va drupada-tanayo va parimtset" iti atra bahuvacanasya samuccaya'rthatve yatra sabda'rthayor ekaikasya vyanjakatvam tatra dhvanitvam istam na syat." (pp. 94, ibid). The indeclinable 'va' can mean either option (i.e. vikalpa) or conjunction (i.e. samuccaya). But with reference to this context on hand, it cannot mean 'option' because word cannot be considered as an alternate suggestive element along with meaning, because word, as maintained by Mahima, is capable of rendering only the primary sense and hence it has no power to convey the suggested sense at all. If we accept the other alternative, i.e. if we hold that here 'va' is used in sense of conjunction, the definition of Anandavardhana would cover only those instances where both word and meaning together become suggestive. In that case the instances of dhvani where either word alone or sense alone conveys the suggested sense will fall out of the scope of dhvani. Again the attribute, viz. "upasarjanikstasvarthau" will also become useless, because in all poetry both word and meaning, taken together only, become suggestive. Thus, in this situation, the description of only the expressed sense as qualified by the attribute 'upasarjani krta' will cover all instances of dhvani. Even this argument of Mahima taken as a whole falls flat. He rejects the first alternative on the basis of his own assumption that a word has no power except that to convey the primary sense, and rejects the second alternative, resorting to Anandavardhana's stand that both word and sense can individually also convey the suggested sense. To accept a personal position to reject the first alternative and to accept the opponent's position also to reject the second alternative, does not sound logical, but the approach smacks of only personal convenience and a tendency to find fault somehow or other with the opponent. This is just prejudice, pure and For Personal & Private Use Only

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73 Definition and Scope of Poetry simple. And we also know that when Anandavardhana talks of the suggestivity of either word or sense alone, he knows that both are necessarily jointly suggestive in poetry and yet to underline the relative greater importance of a given factor, i.e. either word or sense, he gives these options. And in this he is not only more charitable, but more realistic also. Next, Mahima observes, and this follows his earlier observation, that the dual form in 'vyanktah' also is a blemish in case the indeclinable 'va' means option between word and meaning. Grammatically if Va' governs option, than the verb should be in sigular only as in the illustration viz. "sirah sva kako va drupada tanayo va parimrset" - "Either a dog or a crow or the son of Drupada touches the head (of my father)..." (Venisamhara, III. 22). Here, Mahima examines the defence of the use of dual in 'vyanktah', in Locana by the great Abhinavagupta, against Bhatta Nayaka's lethal attack in his Hrdaya-darpana. As observed earlier, we have explained Anandavardhana's use of dual as suggested by Abhinavagupta that though in fact the two viz. sound and sense jointly act in poetry, the relative greater importance of either is stressed in 'va' and their joint natural operation is aimed at in this use of dual. But Mahima, charged as he is by the enthusiasm to demolish the definition, rejects this explanation suggesting that the cognitions of sound and sense do not take place simultancously and hence the question of their joint operation does not arise at all and also that the sound - sabda-does not have the. power to give any suggested sense beyond only its primary sense: "atra kecin vidvan-maninah dvivacana-samarthana-manoratha"ksipta-cittataya ..... tad bhrantimatra-mulam, na tattvam iti alam avastu-nirbandhena." (pp. 95, 96, ibid). As observed earlier Mahima depicts a biased approach and also perhaps a smaller mind. Next, Mahima attacks the very acceptance of vyanjana' or 'vyakti' in conveying the implicit sense, beyond the literal sense in poetry. Mahima refers to a definition of 'abhivyakti' or suggestion which suggests that it means, "attainment of the state of being illumined, on the part of an object, real or unreal, simultaneously with the illuminating object, without the requirement of the memory of their mutual connection" : tad uktam - "sva-jnanena anya-dhi-hetuh siddhe arthe vyanjako matah, yatha dipo'nyathabhave ko viseso'sya karakat." (pp. 80, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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74 SAHRDAYALOKA If an object illuminates something else, while illuminating itself, then only it is said to be a suggestor, otherwise what is its difference from a normal cause-effect relationship? Mahima explains that abhivyakti of real objects is three-fold : tatra satah abhivyaktih trividha; tasya traividhyat." (pp. 80, ibid). It is thus, either when, "(i) the manifestation of the effect takes place from the material cause in which it pre-exists potentially, e.g, the manifestation of curd from milk, or (ii) there is manifestation of an object with help of a manifester, as in case of a lamp illuminating an object pre-existing in impediments like darkness, but remaining invisible to sight; or (iii) in case of the revival of the impression of an object experienced before, through yet another object invariably connected with it; or through the word that denotes it; e.g. the cognition of fire when we see smoke, and the cognition of cow from its picture, or reflection or representation of the object say a cow, from the word denoting a cow. The manifestation of an unreal object is one of the type of say a rainbow, illumined by the rays of the sun : asatah tu eka-prakara eva, tasya prakara'ntara-asambhavat, yatha arka"lokadina indra-capa"deh." (pp. 80, ibid) Mahima says that given this three-fold explanation of abhivyakti, the definition of dhvanikara is faulty for the manifestation of suggested sense cannot be equated with any of these three alternatives. The apprehension of the suggested sense cannot be included in the first two varieties of manifestation of real objects for it is neither an object of senses like curd, nor does it co-exist in the fashion of a lamp and a pot : "na caital laksanam vacye samgacchate. tatha hi - satobhivyakteh yada"dyayor arthayor laksanam na pratiyamanesu ekam api samsprastum ksamate, tasya dadhyader iva indriyavisaya-bhava"patti-prasangat, ghatadeh iva vacyartha-saha-bhavena idamta. pratiteh asambhavat. na ca svarupa-asamsparsi laksanam bhavati (pp. 81, ibid). The third type of manifestation is nothing else but reasoning or anumana. The cognition of something with the help of another, preceded by the memory of their invariable concomitance should be taken as anumana only and not 'abhivayakti' i.e. manifestation : tsitiyasya astu yallaksanam tad anumanasya eva samgacchate, na vyakteh" (pp. 81, ibid). For in 'abhivyakti' i.e. manifestation the manifestor is not in need of the recollection of the invariable concomitance with the manifested object. Here, the expressed sense does stand in need of the remembrance of its invariable relation with the suggested sense, otherwise any suggested sense would follow from any expressed sense, which is not the case' : "na ca vacyad arthat arthantara-pratitih avinabhava-sambandha-smaranam antarena eva sambhavati; sarvasya api tatpratiti-prasangat." (pp. 83, ibid). For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 75 In abhivyakti or manifestation, both the 'vyanjaka' (i.e. manifestor) and the vyangya' (i.e. manifested) shine simultaneously. But in poetry the suggested meaning is cognised only after the collection of the expressed sense as both are related to each other in form of cause and effect respectively. In case, simultaneity is accepted in case of rasa-dhvani, the definition will still fall short of covering the cases of vastu-dhvani and alamkara-dhvani where sequence between the two senses is glaringly grasped. Even in rasa-dhvani, it is accepted that perception of rasa follows the same of vibhava"dis such as determinants etc. and hence sequence, though not noticeable has to be accepted : na ca rasa"disu api vibhava"diprakasana-sahabhavena prakasanam upapadyate. (pp. 83, ibid). The manifestor can be an attribute (upadhi) or an independent object. Knowledge, word and lamp are manifestors of the first type since these reveal the bjects suggested by them mixing themselves with the latter in the manifestation. Thus, the knowledge and the object known, the word and its meaning and the lamp and the object illumined by it all present themselves simultaneously. The revealer becomes the 'upadhi' or attribute of the revealed object in this process. The independent agent is examplified in case of smoke giving the knowledge of fire. Poetry cannot be the first type of manifestor because only an object perceivable or nameable can fall in this case. The second, like smoke, cannot be a manifestor as in smoke-fire-perception there is no simultaneity, which is expected in manifestormanifested-relationship. The next variety of manifestor is only the probans (i.e. linga) giving rise to probandum (i.e. lingin). Because of sequence, manifested sense and poetry cannot be vyangya-vyanjaka, but only gamya-gamaka : "dvividho hi prakasakorthah upadhirupah svatantras ca. tatra jnana-sabda-pradipa"dih upadhirupah. tad uktam - 'trayah prakasakah sva-para-prakasa'iti, anyah svatantro dhuma"dih. tatra"dyas tavad bhavadhbhir na abhyupagantavyah eva pratyaksa-abhidheyayoh eva arthayoh kavyata'patti-prasangat. anyasya tu lingatvam eva upapadyate, na vyanjakatvam - vyakteh anupapatteh." (pp. 84, ibid) Mahima thus concludes that the so called 'abhivyakti' of the dhvanivadin is just inference and nothing else. Thus Mahim, says that the statement that both word and meaning manifest (vyanktah) the suggested sense, is false and therefore it makes for the blemish called "asambhava dosa" : "tasmat tad avasthah eva asambhavo laksana-dosah" (pp. 86, ibid). We have taken care above to suggest that even the explanation of Mahima in individual instances of poetry abound in logical felacies - tarka-dosas - as pointed out by Mammata and others later, and hence Mahima, apprehensive of this possibility is careful to add that his "poetic inference" i.e. 'kavyanumiti' is not For Personal & Private Use Only

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76 SAHRDAYALOKA absolutely identical with tarka'numiti or strictly logical inference. In the same way the 'abhivyakti' of the dhvanivadins is not absolutely identical with 'darsaniki abhivyakti' i.e. manifestation as explained in philosophical context. If kavya'numiti is not tarka'numiti then vyangva-abhivvakti in poetry is not abhivvakti of the philosophical systems. Thus both kavyanumiti and abhivvakti are loose terms to be understood only in the sense intented by their promoters only. In a way thus, because of the inherent looseness, they can be said to be identical, for both cannot stand the logical objections raised against them. The next blemish, Mahima says is with reference to the term 'dhvani' itself. According to Anandavardhana, the term 'dhvani' as applied to poetry and poetic criticism, was coined after the grammarians, the first among the most learned. For them, 'sabda' i.e. 'sound', is 'dhvani', and it manifests 'sphota' the 'eternal word' which is ever associated with meaning. Thus for them word manitests sphota. Taking a clue from the great grammarians the critics applied the term 'dhvani' to any suggester that suggested the 'vyangyartha'. Abhinavagupta explains in his 'Locana' how the term 'dhvani' is made applicable to 'word', 'sense', 'the power of suggestion', 'the suggested sense', and finally to the variety of poetry itself which carries principal suggested sense. Mahima pooh poohs at this, challanging first, like the Mimamsakas the very concept of sphota, which is only a myth. He maintains that neither sphota nor dhvani of Anandavardhana can be taken as manifested. The relation between word ound and sphota is that of cause and effect only since there is a perceptible sequence between the apprehension of the order of letters, which the word is made of, and the cognition of meaning. So, no relationship of the suggestor and suggested' or vyangya-vyanjaka-bhava can be accepted between the two cognitions. Their actual relationship can be the 'gamya-gamaka-bhava' only, or the relation of the conveyor and the conveyed. Thus the appellation 'Dhvani' seems to be absolutely defective as it is based on false analogy : - "...ata eva sruyamananam sabdanam dhvani-vyapadesyanam antahsannivesinas ca sphota'bhimatasya arthasya vyangyavyanjaka-bhavo na sambhavati iti vyanjakarva-samyad yah sabdartha'tmani kavye dhvani-vyapadesah sopy anupapannah, tatra'pi karya-karana-mulasya gamyagamaka-bhavasya upagamat." We may note a point here that during the viva voce of our doctoral thesis on, "The origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics", Prof. K. V. Abhyankar had also observed that 'manifestation' (i.e. abhivyakti of sphota) is not 'suggestion' (i.e. vyanjana of the Alamkarikas.). And we know it. To bring home this point in a separate paper on, "Bhatta Nayaka's Blunder", we had For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 77 suggested that Bhatta Navaka criticises 'abhivvakti' of Anandavardhana because he fails to collect a point that 'abhivvakti' in strict sense of the darsanas, is not vyanjana, Abhivyakti presupposes pre-existence of a thing, say ghata or a pot covered in darkness, but of course existing in advance and later manifested by light. But 'rasa' is not 'purva-siddha' in this sense. It is 'pari-passu' with the presentation of vibhava"dis. So, the abhivyakti or vyanjana of the alamkarikas is different from the abhivyakti we are acquainted with in sastras. But for want of any other suitable term, the alamkarikas have called it abhivyakti', like the 'kavya'numiti of Mahima, which is not anumiti' in the strict sastra sense. So, it is futile to attack either by either. Mahima also takes abhivyati, or dhvani, or vyanjana as absolutely identical with the abhivyakti or manifestation of the sastra context. This is wrong. Actually dhvani' or 'vyanjana' of the dhyanivadins is an 'apurva', an 'alaukika' i.e. it is "sui generis", not found anywhere else: neither in the world of day to day existence, nor in sastra. So, Mahima's criticism of dhvani is ill-founded like that of Bhatta Navaka. Next, according to Mahima, the designation of Dhvani as 'kavya-visesa' - in the dhvani-karika makes for yet another blemish. Mahima holds that 'viaesa' means either 'superiority or particularity : 'api ca kavya-visesa ity atra kavyasya visistatvam anupapannam..." (pp. 98, ibid). Mahima holds that 'Dhvani' can be either 'superior poetry or 'a particular type of poetry as per its definition. But we fail to apply both the meanings in the present context. Poetry proper is invariably characterised by Rasa which transcends all distinguishing classifications and hence one type of poetry cannot be regarded as superior to another in this respect. Thus 'Dhvani' cannot mean superior variety of poetry. We may say here that Mahima's acceptance of only poetry with principal rasa i.e. emotive appeal here, as poetry and non-acceptance of anything else is equivalent to Visvanatha's position that poetry has to be and can be 'sa-rasa' only i.e. charged with 'rasa' only as its principal source of charm. But this concept of poetry which has basically only emotive character is too narrow a concept. This will not only drive out what Anandavardhana explains as vastu-dhvani and alamkaradhvani from the sphere of poetry, but it will therefore equally frustrate the efforts of newer and newer art-forms such as absurd theatre or absurd poetry as attempted by such great moderns as Sammuel Beckett, or Ionesco, or Albert Camus etc. who gave us modern absurd forms of drama and novel. Actually these artists in their own way tried to communicate their sense of despair and despondency - vastudhvani - or bhava-dhvani, resulting in santa-rasa, ultimately. It is this suggestion of doubts, disputes, distractions and disbelief, - the vastu-dhvani where a man's intellect or rationality is involved, which renders special charm to For Personal & Private Use Only

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78 SAHRDAYALOKA the play concerned. By rejecting anything else as principal except rasa-dhvani, i.e. emotive poetry only for him, Mahima rejects such excellent attempts by modern playwrights. And it is criminal. We, therefore, cannot endorse Mahima's position. The next alternative Mahima considers is that of 'visesa' being taken as 'particularity'. Mahima holds, that if kavyavisesa simply means, a particular type of poetry', the question that would arise is whether there are other types of poetry also from which the dhvani-kavya is expected to be distinguished. Mahima argues that if, for example, a poem presenting a particular rasa, say stingara, or karuna, for example, is sought to be a kavya-visesa in the present context, and is regarded as excellent, then poems presenting other rasas will fall outside the scope of dhvanikavya ! Mere word and meaning regarded beautiful on account of the presence of gunas i.e. poetic excellences and alamkaras i.e. beautiful turns of speech, cannot also be regarded as poetry in general in order to take dhvani-kavya as particular type, because the former with guna and/or alamkara only, but devoid of the charm caused by rasa, cannot be taken as poetry at all ! 'Nor, can it be regarded as poetry in a secondary sense (gauna-vrtti) also, when poetry in the literal sense - i.e. 'sarasa-kavya' is very much there, and when this primary meaning is not rejected (i.e. badhita). The primary meaning, if not contradicted, can never be reject Mahima poetry without rasa is no poetry, i.e. it is only a misnomer : ata eva ca na guna'lamkara-samskrta-sabdartha-matra-sariram tavat kavyam; tasya yathoktavyangya'rthopanibandhe sati vieistatvam iti sakyam vaktum. tasya rasa"tmata'bhave mukya-vsttya kavya-vyapadesa eva na syat; kim uta visistatvam ?" But all this, as observed earlier by us, suffers from the blemish of its, being "toonarrow" i.e. 'avyapti-dosa' in Mahima's thinking. Mahima goes on to argue that 'kavya-vicesa' cannot also mean poetry suggesting vastu and alamkara, because they also lead us finally to rasarealization like poetry directly responsible for the suggestion of rasa. He also holds that it is not proper to distinguish rasa on the basis of suggestive elements such as gunas i.e. poetic excellences and alamkara i.e. poetic figures of speech. Here he points out by way of an illustration the concept of cowness and cows of different colours. We do not distinguish cows on the basis of different colours as the class of cowness goes equally with all the colours. Says he : (pp. 104, ibid): na ca rasa"tmanah kavyasya vastumatra"dibhir visesah sakyam adhatum, tesam vibhava"dirupataya rasa'bhivyakti-hetutvopagamat; na ca vyanjakanam vaicitrye vyangyasya viseso'bhyupagantum yuktah, sabaleya"dinam iva gotvasya". Mahima further argues that if poetry wherein vastu or alamkara suggests rasa is recognized as dhvanikavya, then poetry directly suggesting rasa will fall out of the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 79 scope of dhvanikavya. Again, poems like 'prahelika', suggesting some sort of 'vastu' or 'alamkara', but with its rasa-pratiti obscured, will have to be counted as dhvanikavya. We can see that in all these arguments Mahima suffers from a too narrow concept of dhvanikavya or even kavya in general, and hence his line of thinking cannot be accepted by us. We have seen how liberal was Kuntaka, who accepts 'vakrata' or poetic beauty even at the level of pure abhidha or direct expression. But regardless of understanding the spirit of what Anandavardhana, Kuntaka and Abhinavagupta stand for, Mahima concludes that "kavya-visesa" can signify only poetry in general and in that case there is no justification for excluding instances of samasokti or condensed speech and other types of gunibhuta-vyangya or poetry with subordinated suggestivity, from the range of dhvani as done by Anandavardhana : "tatosya visistatopagame va yatra tayoh ubhayoh ekaikasya va vyangyata tatraiva dhvani-vyapadesah syat na kevala-rasa". tmani kavye, vaisistya'bhavat. isyate ca sau tatra'pi. prahelika"dau ca nirase syat. tatra'pyukta-prakarena vastumatra"der abhivyangyatvena istatvat, iti anvayavyatirekabhyam kavyatva-matra-prayukto-'sav ity anumiyate". (pp. 104, ibid) and also, atas ca samasokty adav apy asav upagantavya eva, na pratis'edhyah. pratiyamanasya ca'rthasya dvaividhyam eva. trtiyasya rasa"deh prakarasya uktanayena kavyatvad eva siddhatvad iti. na ca tasya tadangabhavo bhanitum yujyate, angitvena istatvat, iti kavyarvam eva dhvani-vyapadesa-visayo 'bhyupagantum yukto, na tad visesah." (pp. 105, ibid). So, according to Mahima, even if, for the sake of an argument, it is accepted that dhvanikavya is a particular type of poetry, the term 'visesa' is superfluous and therefore need not have been mentioned. Mahima argues that the very definition of an object can itself convey the particularity of the object defined, as in the case of a king described as one mounted on a horse. He observes (pp. 107) : ittham ca kavyasya visistata'nupapattau itarat-laksana-vidhayi-matatiriktam na kimcid anena abhihitam syat, anyatra, dhvani-vyapadesa-matrat. na ca tena'pi kimcit. - kathamcit va tad upapattau tad avacyam eva, tat-paryavasayino laksana-visesasambandhat eva tad avagateh. yatha yosvam arudhah sa puruso raja ity atra. Mahima further suggests that if it is argued that the definition befits the object already characterized by particularity, and this particularity cannot be cognised from the definition, even then the term "kavya-visesa' is not necessary because the term 'kavya' itself signifies rasa, and the presence of rasa is the particularity desired to be conveyed by the definition of dhvani : "atha purusasya asva-visistasya eva satah tal laksana-sambandho, na tu tata eva asya vaisistyam iti, tatha'pi avacyam; kavyarvad eva tasya'pi avagatarvat. tat ca uktam, iti avacya-vacanam dosah. For Personal & Private Use Only

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80 SAHRDAYALOKA Mahima thus concludes that in mentioning 'dhvani' as kavya-visesah the blemish of avacya-vacana (i.e. redundant) takes place. We have seen above how Mahima's concept of poetry itself suffers from narrowness of approach as in case of the later alamkarika Visvanatha, who is at least liberal enough to recognise gunibhutavyangya variety and therefore is less objectionable, though his approach to vastu-dhvani is equally unacceptable. We have suggested elsewhere that actually the scope of vastu-dhvani and alamkara-dhvani need not be imagined on the strength of the simple illustrations cited by Anandavardhana. Actually for him rasa'nubhuti is involvement of the total personality of the connoisseur and vastudhvani and alamkaradhvani should be taken as devices that take care of a man's intellectual and imaginative faculties along with the emotional aspect of the enjover's self taken care of by rasadi dhvani. This thinking is broader and healthier and it goes to include even the newer and newer art-forms of absurd theatre and absurd poetry as practiced by modern geniuses. So, Mahima seems to suffer from a too narrow concept of poetry that goes to take care of only the emotive aspect of an ejover's personality. In the end Mahima points out the tenth blemish in the superfluous mentioning of "suribhih" (i.e. by the learned) as the subject of the word "kathitah". He suggests that the presence of the subject can be understood of its own from the verb itself. Mahima argues that perhaps the dhvanikara's intention may be to (i) that the act of 'kathana' has an agent, or (ii) the act of 'kathana' has a particular agent (here, e.g. the learned men). But Mahima finds no need to specify either of these two, as all activity has to have an agent. If the intention is to convey the particularity of the agent, then this can be conveyed by the very definition of dhvani itself. : kim ca, 'suribhih kathitah' iti kathana-kriya-kartr-nirdesah paksadvaye api avacya eva. karts-matra-vivaksayam kriyayam kartravyabhicarat kartp-visesavivaksayam antarena vyapara-visesa-sambandhad eva tad-visesa-avagati-siddheh, iti avacya-vacanam dosah. So, even here Mahima points out "avacya-vacana-dosa", (= redundant) as the agent of 'kathana' is conveyed by the very verb. But we know, as Abhinavagupta has pointed out that by the use of the term 'suribhih' the dhvanikara wants to emphasise that this talk of dhvani is not made prevelent by people of no consequence - 'na khalu yatha-kathancit-pravrtta', but by responsible and honourable people - the 'suris'. In short, Mahima's attempt to denounce dhvanikara's definition of dhvanikavya can be termed only as malice caused by ego-centred approach. We have seen above For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry how he arrives at a definition at the end of all this discussion when he says : (pp. 111, ibid, I. 25 V.V.) "vacyas tadanumito va, yatrarthortha'ntaram prakasayati | sambandhatah kutascit, sa kavya'numitir ity ukta ||" We have already discussed the limitations of Mahima's concept of poetry. We will now proceed to the group of poeticians beginning with Mammata to Visvanatha who have chosen to follow the lead of the dhvanivadius, i.e. of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. But eventhough we fail to agree with Mahima's line of thinking, it can be conceded that we can underline Mahima's contribution in two directions. First is that we know that eventhough Anandavardhana had supported the cause of threefold dhvani i.e. suggestion, at heart he was a great protagonist of only rasa"didhvani. Of course, here 'rasa' should be taken not as emotive stuff only but total aesthetic delight that involves the total personality - i.e. the cognitive, emotive and connetive aspects of the "samasika". Mahima makes bold to break the ice and declare only rasa"di-anumiti of any consequence, denouncing both vastu-anumiti and alamkara-anumiti. For this he receives moral support even from a later dhvanivadin of Visvanatha's stature. Even Abhinavagupta had suggested that the suggestion of both vastu and alamkara has a tendency to terminate in rasa"didhvani. Mahima's second noteworthy achievement is his style of criticism. Anandavardhana was satisfied only in neat presentation of what he believed to be true and never engaged himself in criticising others. His style therefore is simple, direct and flowing. On Mahima's part, he was interested not only in establishing what he considered as true, but in logically denouncing what others laid down in a way not congruent to his line of thinking. Thus in Mahima's writing, an element of scholastic style of discussion becomes an added feather in his cap. As a result his style at times acquires the sharpness of a razor., say "razor's edge': Thus, Mahima promotes a sort of new idea of stylistics of prose writing in literary criticism. Again, it has to be also taken note of that though denouncing Anandavardhana, Mahima is full of respect for him and quotes from him when the point is favourable to his position. He also, not unlike Anandavardhana, accepts all thought-currents prevelent in literary criticism, and keeping kavya'numiti in the centre, in place of Anandavardhana's vyanjana, he also gives due respect to other concepts. In his scheme also we come across such divisions as samlaksya-krama and asamlaksyakrama. We also have anumiti of vastu and alamkara. Thus ultimately the victory of Anandavardhana over all his talented dissidents - Kuntaka, Bhoja. Mahima. Dhananjaya. Dhanika and all - is clearly established. For Personal & Private Use Only

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82 SAHRDAYALOKA "From Mammata to Visvanatha". The age in which some posteriors of Anandavardhana challanged his vyanjanadhvani-rasa theory, also presented to him a great protagonist of dhvani-theory, Abhinavagupta, who by his great commentary - Locana-on the Dhv. supported Anandavardhana's cause. He also made it applicable to the art of drama as well in. his great Abhinavabharati on the N.S. of Bharata. He established the supremacy of the three-fold dhvani as enunicated by Anandavardhana and also established the superiority of rasa"di-dhvani albeit in the wider sense, over the other two varieties. Not that this was not in the mind and heart of the author of the Dhv., but he had not said it in so many terms. Abhinavagupta went flat out to establish this and eventhough with a different bias, both Kuntaka and Mahima also established the evocation of rasa"di as the quintessence of great poetry. The influence of Abhinavagupta was so pronounced that thoughts floated by Kuntaka, Mahima, Dhananjaya and Dhanika could not find roots in the minds of literary critics in general. This resulted in the supremacy of the Dhvani at the hands o beginning with Mammata and Hemacandra and down to Jayadeva, Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha, Visvanatha and Jagannatha. All these literary critics firmly established the kashmir - thinking of literary criticism as promoted by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. At the same time we will go to observe that the scratches carved by Kuntaka, Mahim, and the rest did leave their marks on the thought-process of even stalwarts such as Mammata and the rest. We will observe this in greater detail. Mammata : Mammata is one of the main pillars of the edifice of dhvani. Actually the Dhvanva loka of Anandavardhana, the Locana of Abhinavagupta and the Kavyaprakasa of Mammata can be termed as the "prasthana-trayi" of the kashmir thought-current of literary criticism. There are great commentators such as Candidasa, the author of "kavya-prakasa-dipika" and others who rank Mammata only as a blind imitator of the views of earlier masters, "pracinamata-niryantstva". Candidasa observes : "satyam evam; kintu gaddalika-pravaha-patitanam gauravabandha-niryantrito' yam grantha-krt, traividhyam uktavan" (pp. 23); and also, "etac ca pracina-pranaya'nurodhin, grantha-krta kanthato noktam, pramatreti, vedyantareti ca vadata sucitam eva." On the other hand a majority of commentators respect Mammata as a "vagdevata'vatara". Actually Mammata has systematically arranged all important thought-currents, such as concerning sabdartha-vicara, sabdasakti, subtle discussion on the nature of rasa-nispatti, the establishment of vyanjana, the concepts of gunas, dosas, ritis, and alamkaras - all -- as related to the supreme concept of dhvani' and then 'rasadhvani' in particular. Actually he has churned successfully the ocean in form of the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 83 whole of Dhvanyaloka, Locana and Abhinavabharati and laid bare the essence of the subtle thinking in these works. His is an excellent "akara-grantha", in which all the thought-jewells are collected and then carefully arranged. At the same time he was careful enough to assimilate the wisdom of the ancients beginning with Bhamaha, and also the successors of Anandavardhana, such as Kuntaka Ksemendra, Mahima, Dhananjaya, Dhanika and the rest. Candidasa came down rather heavily on Mammata because he failed to correlate his definition of poetry on one hand and the division, and concept of poetry on the other hand. We know that commentators such as Sridhara, the author of kavyaprakasa-viveka have tried to defend Mammata. A number of alamkarikas have been influenced by Mammata's definition of poetry and there are also those who have made it an object of sharp criticism. These alamkarikas include names such as those of Hemacandra, Jayadeva, Visvanatha, Siddhicandra and also Jagannatha. It goes entirely to the credit of Mammata, that he is an author who has activated so many great literary critics who have either fallen with him or have raised a bogey of arguments against him. Mammata's definition of poetry runs as ; "tad adosau sabda'rthau saganau, analamkrti punah kva'pi." (K. P. I. iv). i.e. "It i.e. poetry) consists of word and sense, which are without blemishes, possessed of excellences, and are, rarely, devoid of figures." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, The Poetic Light, pp. 9) (2nd Edn. Motilal Benarasidass, Delhi, '67). In Mammata's definition of poetry, we observe the following traits; he keeps up the tradition of Bhamaha and Anandavardhana and calls poetry to be "sabdarthau" i.e. both "word and meaning" taken together. These 'sabdarthau' have to be 'sa-gunau' i.e. they have to be qualified by excellences. Thereby Mammata shows respect to the school of thought as represented by both Dandin and Vamana who showed great respect for the thought-current of riti or marga with 'guna' or poetic-excellence as its quint-essence. We remember the words of Dandin saying, "pranah dasa-gunah", and of Vamana saying, "visista padaracana ritih"; and "viseso guna"tma". These two i.e. word and sense are again expected to be 'adosau', i.e. free from (poetic) blemishes. In keeping with the tradition of Bhamaha and other ancients, and especially Mahima whose direct influence is clearly visible on Mammata's tratment of dosas in his VIIth Chapter, Mammata puts great stress on the fact of poetry being free from poetic blemishes. He gives a very catholic interpretation of 'dosa' when he says : "mukhyartha hatih dosah", and by 'mukhyaartha' he convers primarily rasa-bhava etc., and also vacya or expressed meaning also implying laksyartha as well, and then sabda, varna and racana also. Thus Mammata has taken care of all prevedent thought-currents of his time and has tried For Personal & Private Use Only

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84 SAHRDAYALOKA to cor-relate all these with the main stream of rasa-dhvani in the centre. Mammata, though a dhvanivadin to the core has not mentioned either rasa or dhvani directly in the definition of poetry thus suggesting that at gross common-sense level it is only the qualified 'sabdarthau'- word and meaning that make for poetry. We know that even Anandavardhana also had suggested the same when he observed : "sabdarthau tavat kavyam" and Abhinavagupta had explained that, by the word 'tavat', it is suggested that in this matter there is no ghost of a chance of any difference of opinion. Mammata has also specially mentioned 'analamkrti punah kva'pi', meaning thereby that both these word and meaning are almost ever graced by poetic figures, which are rarely found absent. Kuntaka's influence is very obvious, here. If may be noted here that by the acceptance of 'guna', the element of rasa-bhava etc. is covered, because following the thinking of the dhvani-vadins, the relation between gunas and rasa is that of "dharma-dharmin", which is a 'samavaya' or constant relation. As are bravery or saurya and the rest qualities of soul, so also are the poetic excellences are related to the soul called 'rasa'. We can say that bravery etc. are for sure qualities of the soul but they are not observed in each individual at worldly level. So also, the poetic qualities do not go with all sabdarthau'. But Mammata is clear. Whether the poetic excellences are observed with each set of 'sabdarthau' or not, their relation with 'rasa' the 'soul is inseparable or constant, i.e. 'samavaya'. We have also noted that the ancients such as Bhamaha had attached great importance to the concept of poetic figures of speech suggesting that "vacam alamkrtih" makes for the essence of poetry. For Bhamaha, 'atisayokti' or poetic excess is a quality that makes for the 'vibhavana' i.e. relish of poetic content. Thus, alamkara in the wider sense of saundarya or poetic beauty in general was a major thought-currenet which could not be ignored. Kuntaka, who proclaimed, "salamkarasya kavyata", thereby suggesting the natural relationship between poet's language and poetic figures, i.e. poetic expression, had a clear impact on Mammata's thinking and of course Mahima and Bhoja laid the roots still deeper. Thus Mammata as a sensitive and intelligent thinker assimilates the concept of 'alamkara' in his definition and on the other hand the element of guna or poetic excellence, as advocated by Dandin and Vamana, and also seen under 'svabhavokti? also finds favour with Mammata. His predecessors included Bhatta Nayaka, the author of Hrdaya-darpana, Kuntaka, Mahima, Mukula, Dhananjaya, Dhanika and Bhoja on one hand, and Bhatta Tauta, the author of kavya-kautuka and one of the gurus of Abhinavagupta, and Anandavardhana, and Abhinavagupta on the other. It is robust common sense like one characterizing the thinking of Anandavardhana, that prompts Mammata also under the influence of Bhamaha and Kuntaka to include the element of 'alamkara' i.e. poetic turn of expression, in the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 85 definition of poetry and to refuse a direct mention of either dhvani or rasa in the same. Though of course, all these predecessors of Mammata, including Rajaskhara also, gave prominance to the emotive element of rasa-bhava in poetry. But even Anandavardhana chose to call 'kavya' as 'sabdarthau' only, and left the mentioning of dhvani in the criticism aspect wherein he discussed dhvani-kavya and also the gunibhuta variety and citra-kavya. All this he mentioned by way of literary criticism and not as the definition of poetry as such. So, dhvani for him was a "kavya-visesah" and not 'kavya' as such. We do not have a clear idea of Rajasekhara's thinking visa-vis dhvani, as his whole work - the 'Kavyamimamsa' - split in eighteen adhikaranas is not available to us, but even he accepts the common sense line while defining poetry. Perhaps, under, the influence of Bhamaha, Bhatta Nayaka, Kuntaka, Mahim, and Bhoja and also perhaps Anandavardhana himself that Mammata avoided the mention of 'dhvani' in the definition of poetry, and opted for the safer line of mentioning only 'guna', 'dosa' and 'alamkara', in the definition. Candidasa's ons'aught on Mammata was inspired by the apparent controdiction between K. P. I. IV a, which contains the definition of kavya on one hand and I. IV b which embarks upon the three-fold classification of kavya such as uttama i.e. dhvanikavya, madhyama i.e. ganibhuta-vyangya and 'adhama' i.e. citra-kavya. However, we can safely trace the influence of Bhamaha in Mammata's definition of poetry, that of Mahima in the treatment of 'dosa', of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in the delineation of dhvani, rasa, sabdasaktis especially vyanjana, and of a number of his predecessors in the treatment of alamkaras. The criticism-oriented classification of poetry also follows Anandavardhana's lead, with a more pronounced bias. Visvanatha has severely criticised Mammata's definition of poetry as we will go to observe. Candidasa's Dipika (Edn. Nag Publishers, Delhi, '95) is very aggressive, as the editor Dr. Jyotna Mohan suggests. Candidasa is very critical of his predecessors who could not properly interpret Kavya-prakasa. He observes : "kavyaprakasa-tarur-esah ku-sampradaya-vyakhya-vilola-marudakulita-pratanah" perhaps the predecessors were Manikyalandra, Ruyyaka, Somesvara, Narahari Sarasvatitirtha, Jayanta Bhatta, Vacaspati Misra as mentioned by Candidasa, and Sridhara. Candidasa has infuenced later commentaries such as the Vistarika of Paramananda Cakravartin and also Kavyaprakasa Darpana and Sahitya-darpana of Visvanatha, and also Kavya-prakasakhandana of Siddhicandra to a great extent. He criticizes Mammata's definition in the words : ye tv adosav iti laksanamsam icchanti, tesam kavyatvam nirvisayam atyanta-pravirala-visayam va bandha"di-samyad gauna eva, tac ca sarvam uktam vitatya'smabhir dhvani-siddhanta samgraha ity eva dik." (pp. 86, Edn. ibid). For Personal & Private Use Only

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86 SAHRDAYALOKA It seems Candidasa has overlooked what Sridhara has said in his Viveka. Sridhara observes : kavya-samanya-laksane vibhago visesa-laksananca vaktavyam ity aha - 'tadbhedan'iti, slistam padam : bhidyate iti avantara-viseso, bhidyate'nena iti bhedo, vyavartako dharma iti ca. vibhagasya visesa-laksana-prayojaka-dharma rupatvad bhinnam vakyam kriyate. pratilaksanam vakyam tena upadiyate iti na kascid visesah. (pp. 13, edn. Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, skt. college, Calcutta, 1959) (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No.VII) We will discuss the criticism by Visvanatha and Jagannatha at relevant places later. But, suffice it to say for the present, that Mammata did not let go the heritage of thinking that came down from Bhamaha to Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Mahima and the rest. His approach was not aggressive but logical, judicious and conciliatory. Hemacandra : In his Kavyanusasana, I. 11, he says : "a-dos'au sa-gunau salamkarau ca sabdarthau kavyam." Thus he seems to follow the track laid down by Mammata, who also has 'word and sense together as poetry. In place of 'analamkriti punah kva'pi' of Mammata, Hemacnadra (= H.C.) has 'salamkarau ca' which is perhaps more emphatic and clearer in favour of the presence of alamkaras or beautiful turns of expression in poetry, though of course, 'ca' suggests that poetry can be, at times, even without an 'alamkara'. H.C. observes : "ca-karo niralamkarayor-api sabdarthayoh kvacit-kavyatva-khyapanarthah." In his Viveka, H.C. observes : "niralamkarayorapiti" - "anena hi analamkrtam api gunavad vacah svadate" - i.e. by the term 'niralamkaryoh.' it is suggested that excellences are a must for poetry. Even if poetic speech is without adornment it can be relished on account of the presence of excellences. Thus for H.C., excellences are more essential to poetry as compared to adornment i.e. alamkarana. He gives illustrations both positive and negative. Negative illustration suggests that, "alamkrtam api nirgunam na svadate" i.e. eventhough poetry is with figures of speech but without excellences, it does not yield (rasa) -enjoyment. This brings H.C. closer to Dandin and Vamana, but at core he is dhvanivadin first and last. With his ka. sa. and viveka on it, he saw to it that Malava influence of Bhoja remained out of the boundary of Jaisimhadeva's Gujarat, wherein the influence of Kashmir school flourished. Vagbhata (Ist), the author of Vagbhatalamkara, at I. 2 observes : "sadhu-sabdartha-sandarbham guna'lamkara-bhusitam, sphusa-riti-rasopetam kavyam kurvita kirtaye." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 87 A poet should compose poetry for fame. Poetry, which consists of both word and sense that are 'sadhu' - i.e. nirdosa-free from blemishes, and adorned with excellences and figures of speech, is endowed with clear riti-i.e. style and rasa or sentiment (or aesthetic pleasure). Thus by 'sadhu' is meant 'nir-dosarva' as also explained by Simhadevagani, the commentator. The mention of guna and riti brings him closer to the earlier alamkarikas such as Dandin and Vamana. By insistance on 'guna', both Mammata and H.C. had 'rasa' in their mind, but they had avoided a clear mentioning of the same. On the other had, Vagbhata makes a clear mention of rasa and lays down a road to Visvanatha. Vagbhasa (II nk), in his Kavyanusasana almost reverberates the words of Mammata when he observes : "sabdarthau nirdosau, sa-gunau, prayah salamkarau kavyam" - (I. pp. 14) i.e. word and sense, free from poetic blemishes, and having excellences, and mostly adorned by figures of speech, make for poetry." He adds that by "prayah salamkarau" is meant, "niralamkarayoh sabdarthayoh kvacit kavyarvam" i.e. "only at times, even word and sense bereft of adornment, make for poetry." He cites the same illustration viz. "sunyam vasa-grham...." etc. as given by Mammata. We can see that following Mammata and H.C., a clear line of remaining faithful to the kashmir tradition of literary criticism is noticed here. In Gujarat, both the streams of literary criticism, i.e. Kashmir thought-current of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, and Malava tradition of Bhoja, are seen intermingling, at times cutting across each other, at times merging with each other and at other times again bifercating, and at times running even parallel. But the clear out-come is that the kashmir tradition, the tone of which was set by H.C.. emerges as a clear victor. Perhaps the political ambitions of Siddharaja Jaisimhadeva must be at the root of this situation. Jayadeva : The author of Candraloka, Jayadeva, defines poetry at I. 7 : "nirdosa laksanavati sa-ritir guna-bhusana | salamkara-rasa'neka vittir vak kavya-nama-bhak ll". "That speech is termed poetry, which is free from poetic blemishes, having 'laksanas' i.e. natural marks, is accompanied by riti-or style and is adorned by poetic excellences (i.e. gunas), and is having alamkaras or poetic figures and rasa or relish, (and) is with any number of vrttis or diction." For Personal & Private Use Only

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88 SAHRDAYALOKA Over and above the mention of dosa, guna and alamkara, we find herein the mentioning of laksana, riti, rasa and vstti. So far as available documents are concerned after Bharata, Jayadeva seems to be the first alamkarika to revive the concept of 'laksanas', which practically gets merged with alamkaras even in Abhinavabharati, as we will go to observe later in vol. II. So, this revival of the concept of laksanas is surprising and it again fades out after Jayadeva, though of course, we come across 'natya-laksanas' in Sahityadarpana (= S.D.) of Visvanatha. These natyalamkaras come closer to laksanas of Bharata, and Visvanatha also treats them as part of dramaturgy though Jayadeva has tried to correlate them with kavya or poetry, in the third mayukha (= chapter) of his Candraloka. Jayadeva also revives the concepts of 'riti' and 'vrtti? as seen in Vagbhata (Ist) and also 'rasa'. He is hereby trying to revive old literary traditions that were going out of vogue with literary criticism. How far he was successful in this goes by the obvious result seen in his successors again not giving greater thought to the concepts of laksana, riti and vrtti and choosing to follow the royal track of kashmir literary criticism as almost fixed by Mammata. But between Mammata and Visvanatha, Jayadeva can be taken as a very important mile-stone and his encouraging the concept of vittis, which were taken only as varieties of anuprasa even by Abhinavagupta, is a bold step. Gagabhatta, the commentator on Jayadeva explains 'vrtti' as the five kavya-vsttis such as madhura and the rest and also the three powers of word such as abhidha or the power of direct expression and the like. Thus we can take Jayadeva to follow the lead of Kuntaka who accepts great poetry even at abhidha level. The Paurnamasi Commentary expails 'vrtti' as : "vrttis tridha. natyopayukta prathama. esa kaisiki-satrvatiarabhati-bharati-namna caturvidha. dvitiya madhura"dayah sastha-mayukhoktah." tritiya sabda-sakti-rupa." i.e. vittis are three-fold (i) those pertaining to drama such as kaisiki etc., the four vrttis otherwise known as artha-vrttis also elsewhere; (ii) the five-fold vrttis such as madhura, praudha, parusa, lalita and are what others call sabda-vrttis or 'anuprasa-jatayah' as equated in Locana. The third group of vrttis are abhidha, laksana and vyanjana otherwise termed as sabda-saktis by other alamkarikas. Thus Jayadeva istalled a broader look in literary criticism. Next comes Vidyadhara. We observed that Jayadeva was highly critical of Mammata's observation, viz. "analamkrtti punah kva'pi" by saying that those who accept the possibility of poetry without 'alamkara' should also accept that fire (= agni) is not hot. This line of thinking is under strong influence of Bhamaha, Dandin and Kuntaka. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 89 Vidyadhara, the author of Ekavali (I. 6) holds 'kavya' i.e. poetry to be equivalent to a beloved, kanta-sammita and, observes that in poetry having the suggested sense as principal (= dhvani), word and meaning are subordinated to the suggested sense. He explains the etymology of 'kavya' as : kavayate iti kavih. tasya karma kavyam. tat ca arthad varnana"tmakam. i.e. one who describes, is a poet. His act is 'kavya' or poetry. It is descriptive on account of its meaning. In the second chapter he observes that as both word and sense make for poetry, their nature is discussed. At I. 10, Ekavali, he says that in poetry the word is as if mounted on a whetstone and is therefore brilliant. The 'bandha' or arrangement is even superior to the one of "ardha-narisvara". The apprehension of meaning derived therefrom shines forth like a streak of lightening and the aesthetic relish derived from poetry is as pleasing as nectar oozing out from the orb of the moon. The act of a poet having such qualities is poetry. We may say that in all this Vidyadhara equals Kuntaka in verbocity. He goes to suggest that anything else than that described as above (I. 10) as poetry, is 'karna-kolahala' i.e. a jarring noise for the ear. At I. 13, Vidyadhara observes that word and meaning form the body of poetry and 'dhvani' i.e. suggested sense, is the soul of poetry according to the learned. Pointing out the doubts raised again completes the first chapter of his Ekavali. He clearly seems to follow the lead of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. dyanatha : In the kavya-prakarana, karikas 1-5, in his Pratapa-rudriya, Vidyanatha discusses the nature and scope of poetry. He observes - "gunalamkara-sahitau sabdarthau, dosavarjitam, gadya-padyobhaya-mayam kavyam kavya-vido viduh." "The knowers of poetry know that to be poetry, which is word and sense, and is both in prose and verse (in its outer form), to be free from blemishes and is adorned with excellences and alamkaras." This definition follows Mammata and Hemacandra and expects 'alamkara' or figures of speech as an indispensible attribute. In his kavya-prakarana, verses 2-5 (pp. 32) he observes in a metaphorical presentation that, "Sabdarthau murtir akhyatau jivitam vyangya-vaibhavami For Personal & Private Use Only

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90 SAHKDAYALOKA hara"divad alamkarastatra syuh upama"dayah 11211 slesa"dayo gunas tatra saurya"daya iva sthitah 1 atmotkarsa"vahas tatra svabhava iva ritayah 11311 sobham arthikim praptah vittayo vittayo yatha | padanugunya-visrantih sayya sayyeva sammata 11411 rasa"svada-prabhedah syuh pakah paka iva sthitah | prakhyata lokavad iyam samagri kavya-sampadah 11511 Both word and sense are like the body of poetry. The richness of the suggested sense makes for its life. Thus like Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha also accepts 'dhvani' as the 'soul of poetry. Then following the lead of Mammata, he calls figures such as 'upama' i.e. simile and the like, as ornaments such as necklace etc. He takes slesa and other 'gunas' or excellences as qualities such as bravery. It may be noted here that while the kashmir tradition of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata accepts only three excellences such as madhurya, ojas and prasada - i.e. sweetness, floridity and perspicuity - Vidyanatha following Bhoja's lead, accepts twenty four excellences, thereby trying to strike a balance between the Kashmir and Malava schools of thought. Over and above this, Vidyanatha mentions riti i.e. style, which is displaying the predominance of 'soul'-factor. They i.e. 'ritis' are like human nature - svabhava iva - In this respect we can place Vidyanatha along with Vagbhata (I) and Jayadeva Piyusavarsa. Like Jayadeva again, he mentions vittis or modes that reveal the beauty of sense. He again revives the concept of 'sayya', the bed. The 'sayya' or accomodation is a quality of words that are favourably matched with one another. Thus a poet's ability to choose such words that not be replaced by synonyms, makes for this quality of sayya. This quality of sayya is first noticed in Rajasekhara's Kavyamimamsa, so far as available records are concerned. This almost forgotten concept of literary criticism is revived by Vidyanatha. Likewise, from Rajesekhara, he also revives the concept of 'kavya For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 91 saka' i.e. maturity in poetry. He correlates the concept of 'paka' with the concept frasa. 'Paka' for him is 'rasa"-svada-bheda' - the variety of rasa-experience. This tradition of Paka also had dissappeared after Vamana and Rajasekhara. But it is interesting to note that Vidyanatha has called 'paka' to be 'rasa"-svada-bheda', i.e. yariety of taste or relish. In Rajasekhara also we have a hint to this effect and he recommends that certain pakas are not welcome in poetry. This, and the correlation with taste or rasa, would lead us to the obvious conclusion that perhaps Rajasekhara and also Vidyanatha believed in the "sukhaduhkha"tmaka" nature of rasa, i.e. they both took rasas as both pleasurable and also paintful, a tradition already hinted at as early as in the Natyasastra in the expression : "harsa"dins ca adhigacchanti sumanasah preksakah", and openly advocated by the authors of Natyadarpana, - Ramacandra and Gunacandra, and also supported later by Siddhicandra. Thus Vidyanatha has a number of points to his credit in reviving some lost traditions of literary criticism. Visvanatha : Among the followers of Mammata, Hemacandra feels full satisfaction in promoting the Kashmir tradition of literary criticism in Gujarat, but Visvanatha, the author of Sahitya darpana (= S.D.), eventhough being a follower of the vyanjana - dhvani-rasa school of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta makes bold to announce certain conclusions not proclaimed by Anandavardhana clearly in many words, but promoted by Abhinavagupta openly, and again not clearly expounded by Hemacandra, perhaps in view of the political context in Gujarat. Visvanatha not only lays down whatever is concealed yet meant principally by Anandavardhana, but makes bold to criticise Anandavardhana and Mammata for not coming out openly. Visvanatha defines poetry as "vakyam rasa"tmakam kavyam" (S.D.I. 3) We have noticed that Anandavardhana had described dhvani' - principal suggested sense - as the soul of poetry (Dhv. I. 1). In Dhv. I. 2 he had said : "arthah sahridaya-slaghyah kavya"tmeti vyavasthitah vacya-pratiyamana"khyau tasya bhedau ubhau smrtau." (Dhv. I. 2) Thus there seemed to be an apparent contradiction between Dhv. I. 1 and Dhv. I. 2, for in the latter karika, the 'sahridayaslaghya kavyatma artha' - i.e. 'meaning appreciated by men of taste and which is the soul of poetry, is said to be both, vacya' or expressed and 'pratiyamana' or implicit. This apparent contradiction was For Personal & Private Use Only

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92 SAHRDAYALOKA first criticized by Bhatta Nayaka in his Hsdayadarpana, written to denounce dhvani * i.e. for 'dhvani-dhvamsa' only. The answer to this was ably given by Abhinavagupta in his Locana, who observes : (Locana on Dhv. I. 2) : "bhumih iva bhumika. yatha apurva-nirmane cikirsite purvam bhumih viracyate tatha dhvanisvarupe pratiyamana"khye nirupayitavye nirvivada-siddha-vacya'bhidhanam bhumih. tat prsthe'dhika-pratiyamanansollinganat. vacyatvena samasirsikaya gananam tasya'pi anapahnavaniyatvam pratipadayitum." .... 'sabdarthasariram kavyam' iti yad uktam, tatra sarira-grahanad eva kenacid atmana tad anupranakena bhavyam eva. sabdas tavat sarirabhagah eva sannivicate sarvajanasamvedya-dharmatyat sthula-krsa"divat. arthah punah sakala-jana-samvedyah na bhavati, na hi artha-matrena kavya-vyapadesyah laukika-vaidika-vakyesu tad abhavat. tad aha - sahrdavaslaghvah iti. sa eka eva'rtho dvisakhaya vivekibhir vibhagabuddhya vibhajyate. tatha hi tulye'rtha-ruparve kim iti kasmaicid eva sahrdayah slaghante ? vacya-samvalana-vimohita-hrdayais tu tat-prthag bhave vipratipadyate, carvakair iva atma-prhak bhave. ata eva artha iti ekataya upakramya sahrdayas'laghya iti visesana-dvara hetum abhidhaya, apoddhara-drsa tasya dvau bhedav amsau iti uktam, na tu dvav apy a"tmanau kavyasya." Abhinavagupta categorically lays down that both - i.e. the expressed (vacya) and the implicit (pratiyamana) are not to be taken as 'soul of poetry, but they are just the 'bheda' i.e. divisions or parts or varieties of meaning. To take both as soul of poetry is like carvakas not recognising body as apart from soul. But even with this explanation before him, Visvanatha behaves in the same way as Bhatta Nayaka did, and it was nothing else but just practicing "gaja-nimilika' - i.e. ignoring something knowingly. What Anandavardhana has tried to do is to differentiate between what we call belles letteres on one hand and anything else that goes under the name of literature, say scientific, religious, legal etc. on the other. We can also realize the signal of not sticking to the metaphorical usage of terminology such as atman', 'sarira' etc. very literally. Visvanatha, also forgets the subtle point that 'dhvani' is taken either as 'kavya-visesa' - a special variety of poetry, or as the 'soul of a special variety of poetry. Visvanatha on the other hand seems to accept what is already implied in Anandavardhana's delineation. Thus he openly accepts the supreme position of rasa - i.e. aesthetic relish - in poetry. So, when he says, "vakyam rasa"tmakam kavyam' (S.D.I. 3) i.e. a sentence with rasa as its soul is poetry, he accepts the inner truth of poetry which the dhvanivadins wanted to convey, but for reasons more For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 93 important, they refused to lay down clearly. He has also mentioned the preference for 'rasa', which is also noticed in Kuntaka, Mahima, Bhoja or say, in all of his predecessors. Visvanatha does not accept Anandavardhana's ruling that 'the soul of poetry is dhvani', for he accepts only rasa-dhvani as the soul of poetry. Visvanatha carries a false apprehension that if all the dhvani i.e. dhvani in its three-fold varieties - is accepted as the soul of poetry than by the acceptance of vastu-dhvani we will be allowing even trivial poetry in 'prahelika' or riddles as genuine poetry. But it is exactly here that Visvanatha blunders, because under vastu-dhvani and alamkara dhvani Anandavardhana had left space for all intellectual poetry, or, say poetry such as seen in absurd theatre or absurd poetry, and also all flight of fancy to be covered under alamkara-dhvani. In his wide scheme of dhvani Anandavardhana has place for any form of suggesters beginning with a letter or a part of a word to a whole composition, or any other that a newer poet may imagine or advocate in his poetry. All this is welcome under three-fold dhvani and for Anandavardhana, precisely to accomodate for any newer and newer form of literature under the banner of dhvani, only rasa-dhvani alone, which is normally understood as suggestion of emotive stuff only, does not, make for great poetry. Actually rasanubhuti is kala'nubhuti is anandanubhuti, or art-experience, which transcends not only vastudhvani or thereby even absurd theatre, but also alamkaradhvani or highest flight of fancy and imagination and also the so called rasabhava"di-dhvani or emotive stuff. The dhvani theory aims at a rasa-experience which is catholic in its nature and covers up newer and newer forms of literary art such as absurd poetry or absurd theatre, problem plays, social satires, and what not - that have appeared in modern literature and may vet appear in future poetry of centuries to come. So, vastu-dhvani is not mere prahelika or riddle-poetry, for in it there is no delight for the men of taste - i.e. "sahrdaya-slaghyatva". On the contrary we will go to observe that by keeping the doors open only to rasa-bhava"di-oriented poetry, actually Visvanatha has narrowed the scope of poetry and has also promoted the cause of sentimental verse under the guise of 'rasa"tmaka kavya'. We will dwell upon this later. Jagannatha also discusses this point. But for the present, we will consider only the aggressive aspect of Visvanatha's criticism which does not spare Mammata also. He, following the lead of his predecessors, especially Candidasa, the author of Dipika, and others as suggested by us earlier, denounces vehemently Mammata's definition of poetry. This approach can be compared with the negative and non-fruitful approach of Mahima with regard to Anandavardhana. For Personal & Private Use Only

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94 SAHKDAYALOKA Visvanatha comes down heavily on Mammata's definition of poetry. Subtle, forceful and destructive method as seen in Mahima seems to be continued by Visvanatha, who has taken Mammata to task for every word used in the definition of poetry. He has, as it were, mounted the definition of poetry in the K.P. on a grinding wheel. We will first give Visvanatha's views and then try to evaluate his observations. He first picks up the word 'a-dosau' used as an attribute of 'sabdarthau'. He observes that if we take only those word and sense which are completely free from blemishes as poetry, then such examples of poetry as - "nyakkaro hy ayam eva..." will fail to pass the test of being poetry at all, because the blemish viz. 'vidheya-avimarsa' is very much there and hence what is taken as an illustration of "uttama" poetry by aesthetes will have to be discarded as 'no poetry or 'a-kavya'. Thus 'a-vyaptidosa' embraces the definition as coined by Mammata. Continuing with his relentless assault Visvanatha observes that it cannot be held that a part with blemish should be taken as no-poetry (i.e. a-kavya) and a portion with dhvani should be taken as uttama-kavya or highest type of poetry. For this way, in a tug of war the particular piece of poetry will neither remain poetry nor 'no-poetry'. Again, it cannot be said that such blemishes as srutidusta mar only a portion of poetry. Actually such blemishes mar the beauty of a whole piece of poetry. But, in fact, if they do not harm the cause of rasa i.e. aesthetic relish, they are no blemishes at all. The fact of being a blemish depends on its being harmful to rasa. If such blemishes as "sruti-dusta' harm the cause of rasa, then they are positively to be reckoned as blemishes. Precisely for this reason, the aesthetes have thought of the position of 'nitya-anitya-dosa' i.e. of blemishes being all-time blemishes or being occasional blemishes. If we do not accept this position then poetry will either have no scope at all, or will have very little scope, if at all, because poetry being absolutely free from any fault whatsoever is a rare dream ! For Visvanatha, the particular example, viz. "nyakkarohy ayam eva", etc. is excellent poetry for the blemish viz. vidheya-avimars'a is of no consequence at all as it does not interrupt the enjoyment of relish. But, observes Visvanatha, that for Mammata this poem will be no-poetry - i.e. 'a-kavya' as the blemish is very much there and he wants 'sabdarthau' to be "a-dosau". Continuing his tirade against 'a-dosau', Visvanatha further observes that, in case if by 'a-dosau' is meant "isad-dosau" i.e. poetry having negligible amount of blamish, then such poetry which is absolutely free from blemish will cease to be poetry. Now if the negative suggester i.e. nan "T" in 'a' (= '37') is taken as "smallest amount of fault if at all present", then such accidental attributes as "blemish, if at all present" need not find mentioning in the definition of poetry. No accidental For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 95 attributes find a place in a logical definition of poetry. No accidental attributes find a place in a logical definition of anything. When you define a jewel or a diamond, you do not have to say that it should not be having any negative mark in its kita'nuviddhatva; or being damaged in any way need not be mentioned while examining a diamond. For, thereby a diamond does not cease to be a diamond. After this, Visvanatha concentrates on the attributes 'sa-gunau' in the difinition. He holds that gunas or excellences are said to be the attributes of 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic , and in that case how can they be mentioned as attributes of word and sense? Now, it also cannot be mentioned that as word and sense are suggesters of 'rasa'. and therefore 'gunas' or excellences which are the attributes of rasa, can be metaphorically said to be attributes of word and sense. For, in a given poem 'rasa' or aesthetic relish may be either present or absent. In case rasa is not seen with reference to word and sense in a given piece of poetry, then these particular set of word and sense will cease to be 'sa-gunau', because gunas or excellences are associated with 'rasa' only, through the relation of invariable concomittance. And in case 'rasa' is found to be present in word and sense of a given piece of poetry then why not call them 'sa-rasau' directly? The attribute 'sa-rasau' is clearer and more direct as compared to 'sa-gunau' which leads to 'rasa' at the next stage. Visvanatha holds that by 'sa-gunau', it cannot be implied that in poetry only such words and sense should be used which manifest gunas or excellences, because this has no relation with the form of basic nature of poetry, but it can only enhance the charm of poetry. Even here we will go to observe that it is Visvanath's narrow approach which comes in his way of accepting the attribute 'sa-gunau'. Anandvardhana implicitly, and Jagannatha perhaps clearly, suggest that "gunas" are qualities of sabda i.e. word and 'artha', i.e. sense. This also is overlooked by Visvanatha. He also objects to the words, 'an-alamkrtih punah kva'pi'. He holds that the presence or absence of a figure of speech is only an accident. It is not a basic qualification of poetry. So, such features that are accidental to poetry, need not find an expression in the definition of poetry. Again, alamkaras make for the enhancement of poetic charm; they do not cause it. Now, we will critically examine Visvanatha's position. As for his first observation concerning 'a-dosau', even he himself is conscious that a poetic blemish is accepted only as a blemish when it harms the realization of aesthetic pleasure i.e. rasa. Mammata in his K.P. VII - i, clearly says that : "mukhyartha hatih dosah rasas tu mukhyah...." For Personal & Private Use Only

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96 SAHRDAYALOKA So, by 'a-dosau' Mammata wants a poet to avoid such dosas as are capable of damaging the relish of aesthetic pleasure. Literary critics beginning with Bhamaha or even earlier, perhaps even prior to Bharata, have unanimously denounced the occurance of a poetic blemish and if Mammata cautions a poet of keeping clean out of this, he is within his rights to do it, and to be honest any good critic should remind a poet that poetry has to be free from blemishes whatsoever. Even blemishes that seem to go with word and sense in outward expression, also render the relishing of rasa less transparent. This is a universal experience of men of taste. As for the next attribute 'sa-gunau', even here Visvanatha's mind seems to be too much biased in favour of the metaphor given by dhvanivadins concerning poetry. True, rasa or dhvani is 'atman', and 'word and sense' form the 'body of poetry. But, as observed earlier by us, this is only a metaphorical way of presenting things. Mataphor is only a means and not an end in itself. It is used with a specific purpose of enlightening the lesser souls who do not enjoy an entry into the region of abstract thinking. In fact, poetry is an abstract art and it has nothing to do with 'body' or 'soul. Even 'words and meanings are all abstractions and what we read and write are merely physical signs of whatever is only mentally cognized and enjoyed. But, if at all we have to translate, or try to translate the abstract something concrete, we have to use metaphor. Even the great Anandavardhana, while discussing the topic of 'samghatana' or construction, almost concedes the point that 'gunas' or excellences are attributes of word and meaning virtually. Jagannatha, the author of Rasagangadhara (= R. G.) and even Appayya, who was his senior contemporary, also tend to correlate 'gunas' or poetic excellences with word and sense. So, Visvanatha's stubborn approach does not stand to logic. As for the mention of alamkaras in the definition, once again Visvanatha overlooks the fact that the term 'alamkara' had a very very wide connotation almost equivalent to "kavya-saudarya', in earlier times. Actually the discipline of literary criticism and literary critics have acquired such denomination as alamkarasastra', 'alamkarika' etc. only with reference to this wider concept of 'alamkara' as 'poetic beauty'. With Anandavardhana we find a second parallel application of this term 'alamkara', fixed with reference to precisely indicate the figures of word and sense such as anuprasa', 'upama' etc. But even while keeping this narrower connotation before him, Anandavardhana never underestimated the potential charm of these devices causing poetic beauty. It is therefore, that he stated in so many terms that, these alamkaras were not 'external to poetic beauty "tasmat na tesam bahirangatvam rasabhivyaktau" - (Dhv. vrtti on II. 16). The recognition of these For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 97 devices of poetic beauty, as "kataka-keyura"divat" in a metaphorical expression, does not render them as external' to poetry. We have discussed this point on an earlier occasion in greater details. So, Visvanatha's outburst is only peevishness on his part. His criticism is not only not justified but is totally unwanted. He does it because he has failed to collect the very essence of metaphorical usage with reference to poetic devices. Again, as quoted just above, even the Locanakara observes that 'sabda' is said to be sarira only because, it is "sarva-jana-samvedya". So also alamkara-s are sarva-jana-samvedya.' No woder that, smarting under the same illusion, Visvanatha locks horns with Kuntaka also while rejecting the latter's observations. He also rejects Boja's definition of kavya as read in the Sarasvati-kantha"-bharana, while rejecting Mammata's definition. He rejects Vamana's observation viz. 'ritih atma kavyasya', for riti is only arrangement of word and sense in a style. How can it 'atman', when it is a mere arrangement of parts and limbs ? All this is taking the metaphor too far literally. While mentioning 'rasa"tmaka vakya' as poetry, Visvanatha seems to have paid greater importance to the word-element in poetry, not unlike perhaps Dandin. This tradition was forcefully established later by Jagannatha also. Visvanatha attached importance to 'rasa' in poetry in keeping with the highest traditions established by Bharata, Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Mahima, DhananjayaDhanika, Bhoja and of course Mammata, whom he criticises severely. He tried to establish 'rasa' as a central concept in poetry. But in doing so he has only echoed the inner voice of his great predecessors. "Rasa" here is not emotive stuff only, but is aesthetic flavour as a whole. Kesava Misra in his Alamkara-Sekhara (pp. 2 Edn. 26, Bombay, kavyamala, '50;) holds : "kavyam rasadimad vakyam srutam sukha-visesa-krt." i.e. "poetry is said to be sentence charged with aesthetic delight etc., which causes special happiness." He adds : adipadena alamkara-parigrahah i.e. by the term 'adi' is meant the inclusion of alamkaras. He introduces navya-nyaya style in his writing, as if paving way for the advent of the great Appayya Diksita and Jagannatha and also Siddhicandra to some extent. He observes : (pp. 2, 3 ibid) : "tatha ca tad-ubhaya'nyatara-vattvam (va) kavyalaksanam. anyatarattvam ca tad-anya'nyatvam. sukhavisesa-sadhanatvam va laksanam. samudayartha-sunye (V.L. sunyatve)'pi tad-ubhayam asti eva iti vrddhah. adrsta-dvara tad-hetu-sabde ativyaptir aha, - srutam iti. sad iti sesah. sukhe vaijatyam sarvanubhava-siddham eva." - - For Personal & Private Use Only

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98 SAHRDAYALOKA Thus Kesava suggests that having either of the attributes (i.e. rasa"dimat/ alamkara-vattva) is the definition of poetry. Having either of the attributes means to be different from something which is different (from poetry) (i.e. to be poetry itself.). Or, the definition terminates into saying that (that sentence is said to be poetry) which is the instrument of special happiness. The ancients hold that these two qualities (viz. rasa"dimat-tva and sukhavisesa-kst-tva) are present even in cases (of sentences) where the meaning of the 'samudaya' is even absent (i.e. wherein only the meaning of parts is prevelent such as in 'pankaja' meaning 'that which is born in mud' and not lotus' - the samudaya meaning.) This opinion of the ancients cannot be traced for the present. We cannot say for certain who these ancients are. Or, it may mean that according to the ancients, even if the whole 'samudaya', i.e. the whole of poetry is not found to be 'rasavat', even then the two qualities are at least partially present in a given poem. Kesava then observes : by 'srutam' is meant 'is said to be only. By this word, 'sruam' the vedic ritual causing 'adrsta' or 'apurva' giving rise to varieties of happiness is not meant here. Kesava then has a dig at other definitions. He says - "kecit tu - 'tad adosau...". This is a clear reference to Mammata. But he does not discuss his point and leaves it at this only showing perhaps his displeasure with Mammata. He also quotes 'apare' saying, "rasa-pratipatti (guna) dvara sukhavisesa-sadhanam vakyam kavyam' iti apare." - i.e., by (the attribute) rasa-pratipatti or apprehension of rasa, is meant such sentence to be poetry, which causes a special happiness. Then he says, "kecit tu padavali kavyam" - which is perhaps a reference to Dandin. Perhaps he gives a common answer to all these definitions. He goes on to observe that, "na tu nirdosa-gunavadadi; kavya-dosanam apariganana-"patteh." i.e. the attribues viz. 'nirdosam' (i.e. a-dosau) and 'gunavad' (i.e. sa-gunau) of kavya cannot be accepted as there arises the contingency of not being able to count the poetic blemishes. (perhaps, he suggests that even some dosas are not permanent dosas, so to count dosas is not possible). He further observes that, "na ca - dosabhava-ghatitakavyatva-jnanartham eva, pratiyogi parigananam - iti vacyam." (pp. 3 ibid). He erves : "na ca etat kavyam dustam" iti an-udbhavana"patteh, 'idam kavyam eva na iti abhidhanasya eva, ucitatvat - ity ahuh tanna. tava'yam hetura"bhasa itivad ukteh. vyaptivisista-paksa-dharmasyaiva hetutvat. na ca hetutvena abhimata iti vacyam. tulyatvat iti. vastutas tat kavyam prthag eva yatra dosa-gunadi-cinta. na hi sariram sariram eva na bhavati, iti anye. He seems to criticize the attribute 'adosau' in definitions such as those coined by Mammata and others and seems to recommend that poetry is possible even if poetic For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 99 blemishes are seen in it. He says that the observations of the predecessors can not be accepted for those who hold that if it is understood that the mention of pratiyogi * (i.e. a-kavya or absence of poetry) is for the understanding that poetry can be caused by absence of poetic blemish only, it is not proper, because in that case the apprehension viz. "this poetry is free from blemishes" will not arise, and instead, only an apprehension that, "this is no poetry et al", will follow. Because in that case a poetry with no faults only will be called poetry for only there the invariable concomittance of "yatra yatra dosa'bhavatvam tatra tatra kavyarvam" will be applicable. But this sort of vyapti is not accepted as a hetu of kavyatva. As a body with deformities does not cease to be body, in the same way poetry with poetic blemishes does not cease to be poetry. Thus Kesava seems to follow the original source, so far as available documents are concerned, the school of critics such as Candidasa the commentator of Mammata and Visvanatha and the rest who are angry with Mammata and others who include 'adosau' or absence of poetic blemish as an attribute of poetic word and meaning, in the definition of poetry. Kesava then quotes the definitions given by his predecessors. He quotes Mammata first and leaves it without comment. It should be noted that Kesava does not seem to revel in the refutation of others as is done by Visvanatha. He quotes 'apare' - saying, (Ist Marici) : "rasa-pratipatti-dvara sukha-visesa-sadhanam vakyam kavyam !" (pp. 3) i.e. "Poetry is that sentence which through the apprehension of rasa, becomes the instrument of a special (form of) happiness." Who these 'a-pare' are is not known but this comes closer to Visvanatha. Then Kesava observes - "kecit tu padavali kavyam" i.e. for some, 'a string of words' is poetry. These people, he observes, do not include the attributes viz. 'nir-dosa' and 'guna-vat' etc., because of the contingency of there being innumerable) poetic blemishes which defy counting. They hold that it is not pertinent to hold that only for a clear understanding of poetry which is the creation of absense of blemishes, we should cultivate the knowledge of blemishes ( na ca dosabhava-ghatitakavyarva-jnanartham eva pratiyogi-parigananam - pp. 3. Alamkara sekhara, (A. se.), Edn. N.S., Bombay, '26). (objector) Because, in the absence of understanding of poetic blemishes), there will not be such cognition as, 'this poetry is having blamishes', and it will be only a proper observation that 'this is no poetry at all. (So, the objector again suggests that the knowledge of poetic blemishes is essential). To this the siddhantin says that this objection represents only a 'herva"bhasa' i.e. false reasoning. Real 'hetu' is having qualities of 'vyapti-visista-tva' i.e. - having concomittance and it resides in the 'paksa' i.e. substratum. The objector cannot say For Personal & Private Use Only

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100 SAHRDAYALOKA that here it (= knowedge of blemishes) is taken as a 'hetu'. Actually it is no 'hetu'. Actually that poetry in which there is consideration of excellences and blemishes is different altogether. Not that a body having blemishes is no body at all. This is the opinion of some others. Kesava observes that earlier in a definition given by 'apare', there was an attribute viz. 'sukha-vicesa-sadhanam'. Now, by this 'visesa' is meant 'speciality of being an instrument in winning such things as fame and the like.' To support this, he quotes two definitions without mentioning the name, but they are one each from Vagbhata (1) and Bhoja (in S.K.). The definitions are read as : "sadhu-sabdartha-sandarbham gunalamkara-bhusitam sphusa-riti-rasopetam kavyam kurvita kirtaye." (I. 2. vagbhata'lamkara) and, nirdosam gunavat kavyam alamkarair alamkrtam | rasanvitam kavih kurvan pritim kirtim ca vindati. (I. 2. S. K.; Bhoja) Kesava leaves the discussion here only. Kesva is taken as a predecessor of Visvanatha by some scholars. At least this impression is created by Dr. P. Sri. Ramachandrudu in his, "the contribution of panditaraja Jagannatha to sanskrit poetics" (Vol. I. pub. - nirajana publishers and book sellers, Delhi. 7, 1st Edn. '83, pp. 41, 42) where the learned professor treats Kesava first, followed by both Candidasa and Visvanatha-kaviraja (pp. 42 ibid). We have chosen to follow the lead of Dr. De. S. K., (Skt. Poetics) in matters concerning chronology. Dr. Ramacandrudu observes : (pp. 42, ibid) - 'Kesava, while remarking 'tadubhayanyatara-vattvam' must have been influenced by the views expressed by Govinda Thakkura in Pradipa. For there, differing with (from ?) Mammata he remarks that "camatkara" being the essence of poetry, it should contain either Rasa or Alamkara, for producing Camatkara (Pradipa, K.P. p. 10). Again Kesava's last remark, 'sukha-visesa-sadhanatvam va laksanam' is an indirect acceptance of 'camatkara-vattva' as the Laksana. In this context Keshava Mishra quotes two more laksanas by some old unknown authors, who appear to be in favour of accepting sabda as the body of a poem." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 101 Here again, Dr. Sri. Ramacandradu seems to take even Govinda Thakara as prior to Kesava and therefore prior to Visvanatha. Candidasa who comments on the K.P., and who is the great grand-father of Visvanatha, defines kavya as : "asvadajivatuh padasandarbhah kavyam", which is quoted by Dr. P. V. Kane in his History of Sanskrit Poetics (pp. 354). Thus for Candidasa poetry is 'collection or arrangement of words, with (rasa) asvada i.e. relish as its soul." This is what later Visvanatha almost translates as "vakyam rasa"tmakam kavyam". These attempts at giving greater importance to sabda or word element in the definition of poetry, lays the road to Panditaraja Jagannatha who clearly advocates this position. Jagannatha :(= J.). When J. arrived on the horizen of literary criticism, he not only had inherited the above trend, but was also nurtured in the atmosphere of learning, vibrant with the air of navya-nyaya discipline and vyakaranasastra. He tries to frame his definition of poetry in the most accurate terminology with the help of navya-nyaya style of writing. We believe in an opinion aired by responsible scholars that navya-nyaya is less of an independent darsana and more of an attempt at most accurate and scientific drafting of views concerning various subjects, including kavyasastra here in particular. J. starts by definning poetry first as, "ramaniyartha-pratipadakah sabdah (kavyam)." (R. G. pp. 4). Thus for him poetry is that 'word which conveys a beautiful sense." J. then elucidates what is exactly meant by 'ramaniya' or beautiful, and cites two more definitions of poetry trying to improve upon the original definition as quoted above. Thus the next two definitions of poetry serve as amplifications of the earlier definition. As observed by us, the trend of paying greater importance to the 'word' element as compared with the 'artha' element while defining poetry was noticed first, in available docoments, in Dandin's Kavyadarsa, who observed that poetry was, "istartha-vyavacchinna padavalih." Dr. Ramachandrudu (pp. 43, ibid) holds that this is not a full laksana given by Dandin but only a part of it, "and the complete laksana can be inferred only on combining what was said by him in different places..." We beg to differ. Dandin's words are - "sariram tavat...". Here the use of 'tavat', as done later by Anandavardhana and explained by Abhinavagupta, suggests that, "there is no difference of opinion concerning this fact that, poetry is arrangement (or group, combination) of words... etc." The force of 'tavat' is unmistakable. Yes, the scope of poetry is larger than the definition, and is explained by us earlier. But the same is the case with as also explained by us earlier. But the fact stands that Dandin's definition precisely puts greater weight on 'word' element, as is done by J. For Personal & Private Use Only

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102 SAHKDAYALOKA J. after defining poetry as above, continues to explain minutely the import of the term 'ramaniya'. He explains that 'ramaniya-artha' is not to be taken in a broad sense so as to include statements such as, 'putras te jatah', 'a son is born to you', which is a pleasant statement causing joy to the person concerned. Such statements causing boundless pleasure, cannot be termed poetry. So, J. observes that what is meant by 'ramaniyata' is 'lokottara-ahladajanaka-jnana-gocarata.' i.e. being the object of such knowledge or information as that which causes delight of an extra-ordinary type.' The above quoted statement causes only worldly pleasure which is only personal. For J. 'lokottarattva' is equivalent to 'camatkaratva', which is for him a special type - 'jativisesa' and therefore beyond the lack of 'anugama' i.e. comprehension. The R. G. (pp. 5) observes that this special type of joy - camatkaratva - is to be realized through one's own experience and that it cannot be described in words. This special joy - 'lokottara-ahlada' is the result of 'bhavana', which is constant or repeated contemplation over kavyartha. J. is very clear about the fact that as 'kavya' i.e. poetry is the topic of discussion, only that attribute which can distinguish 'kavya' from other likes such as 'sastra', 'purana', etc. can be its distinguishing mark i.e. laksana. Thus, for 'kavya' this special attribute is 'kavyarva'. Thus the examination of what exactly is this distinguishing mark called 'kavyarva' is, - forms the matter of investigation in the present context. The poet and the man of taste stand in need of a clear understanding of the nature of poetry which causes fame and extra-ordinary pleasure. So, a definition of it is being framed to define poetry - kavya - which is presented through the use of excelences and beautiful turns of speech, a definition which clearly explains its speciality, to distinguish kavya from anything else than poetry : (R. G. pp. 4) : "tatra kirti-parama"hlada-guru-raja-devataprasadady aneka-prayojanakasya kavyasya vyutpatteh kavi-sahridayayoravasyakataya gunalamkaradibhir nirupaniye tasmin, visesyatavacchedakam taditara-bheda-buddhau sadhanan ca tallaksanam tavan-nirupyate." Here, particularly the words viz. "tasmin visesyatavacchedakam tad-itarabheda-buddhau ca sadhanam laksanam" deserve special attention. By 'laksana' is meant an un-common attribute i.e. distinuishing mark. Now that which is an exclusive attribute of poetry should be taken as its 'laksana' or distinctive mark. As observed earlier the characteristic viz. 'kavyatva' distinguishes poetry from sastra and the rest, and gives an idea of how the rest are different from poetry. Thus the special attribute viz. 'kavyatva' makes for the instrument that distiuguishes poetry from other substances : "tad itara bheda-buddhau sadhanam." In sastra, two aims or 'prayojanas' of 'laksana' or definition are laid down as : "vyavrittir-vyavaharo va For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 103 laksanasya prayojanam" (Tarka-dipika). Thus the first aim is to distinguish a given item which is to be defined, from other objects. The second aim is that an object which is to be defined becomes useful for vyavahara i.e. practical purposes. Out of these the first aim or prayojana is given as above. Now that laksana i.e. asadharana-dharma-distinguishing characteristic or mark, brings poetry in daily usage, by becoming visesyatavacchedaka - i.e., the mark viz. by becoming an agent of suggesting speciality, brings poetry in daily usage. This is the second aim of 'laksana'. Keeping these two characteristics of a 'laksana' or definition J. has tried to frame the definition of poetry. If we take 'guna-lamkara"di' i.e. excellences and figures of speech as visesana or attributes, then kavya i.e. poetry becomes 'visesya' or a particular entity which is to be defined and which is contextual. Now in that poetry which is 'visesya', a characteristic viz. 'visesyata' is created. This special type of 'visesyata' which is caused by the presence of gunas and alamkaras, removes the possibility of other 'visesyata's - i.e. other particularities caused by 'dravyarva', Sabdatva' etc. creeping in poetry. Thus speciality in form of being a substance (dravyarva) or in being a word (in general) is excluded from the realm of poetry. Thus the characteristic of being poetry is itself a special characteristic which becomes the avacchedaka-dharma i.e. distinguishing attribute of poetry. Thus 'kavya' is a visesya and in it there is the distinctive characteristic of visesyata. Again, there is also a special attribute called 'kavyarva' also associated with it. Thus visesyata' and 'kavyatva' are two characteristics (= dharma) which are 'avacchedya' and 'avacchedaka' i.e. distinguishing that visesyata from other 'visesyatas'. Now, according to Nyaya-sastra, the maxim goes as : "samanadhikaranayoh eva dharmayoh parasparam avacchedya-avacchedakabhavah." i.e. two characteristics residing in the same substratum become 'avacchedya' and 'avacchedaka' with respect to each other. Now this maxim of Nyaya-sastra can be applied to poetry in the following way. As two characteristics viz. 'visesyata' and 'kayyatva' reside in the same substratum i.e. kavya or poetry, out of these two, one viz. 'kavyatva' becomes 'avacchedaka' of the other viz. 'visesyata'. So, it is to be understood that in the definition of poetry, 'kavya' becomes 'visesya' through the characterstic viz. 'kavyatva'. So, we have to consider 'kavya' from the point of view of 'kavyatva' . This means that 'kavya' or poetry is not be looked at as any physical substance. Again, it is implied that this 'kavya' is characterized by attributes such as gunas and alamkaras. If we try to describe its form in such a way, then only We will be able to bring poetry in the sphere of practical usage. Again, when it is stated that poetry is different from other objects like itself, then its 'bhinnatva' or For Personal & Private Use Only

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104 SAHRDAYALOKA distinction is to be understood in two ways. First, we have to point out how kavya' is different from objects which can be termed as its likes - i.e. 'sa-jatiya'. - i.e. similar objects. This means that poetry is dependent on word-element. So also are the other sastras. Thus they (i.e. sastra"di) are 'sa-jatiya' or similar objects. So, when it is explained how 'kavya' is different from its sa-jatiya objects such as sastra"di, this is one kind of 'tad-itara-bheda'. The other type of tad-itara-bheda is of the form of the distinction of poetry from objects such as 'kataksa' i.e. glances of the eye, or 'abhinaya' i.e. acting etc. Now these 'kataksa' i.e. glances etc. do not depend on sabda i.e. word, so this is the second variety of 'tad-icara-bheda'. J. tries to incorporate both types of distinction in his definition of poetry. J."'s definition of poetry is free from the three faults viz. a-vyapti, ati-vyapti and a-sambhava. The term 'ramaniya' in the definition, as observed above, excludes the use of word and sense in works on various disciplines - the sastra-granthas. In the absence of the term 'ramaniya', the sastra-sabda also would have been covered by the realm of poetry, thereby the fault of ati-vyapti could have creapt in the * definition. The word 'sabda' in the definition is also to stop the musical notes from being dubbed as poetry. The musical notes are 'ramaniya' and tend to suggest ramaniya-artha in form of rasa-bhava and the like. So, in order to prevent the musical notes from being dubbed as poetry, as they also tend to suggest various moods and feelings, the term 'sabda' is included in the definition of poetry. Poetry is for J., a creation of 'sabda' and not of musical notes i.e. svara. For J. here, it may be noted that 'sabda' is that unit of sound which is accompanied by expressed meaning. Mere sound, having no dictionary meaning, or 'abhidhartha' is no 'sabda' for J. But if this position is accepted then the whole thing amounts to virtually accepting 'sabdarthau' - i.e. both word and sense as poetry. Normally, 'sabda' is always accompanied by meaning. On the other hand 'dhvani' or mere sound having no primary meaning, may not be termed 'sabda', but it has still the capacity to suggest some meaning, i.e. it is capable of vyangyartha', e.g. the blowing of a horn of a vehicle, though not yielding a primary meaning as read in a dictionary. So, J.'s whole effort, not to call 'sabdarthau' as "kavyam" seems to fall flat. But, it may be said that to his satisfaction he has served his cause of calling poetry as only 'sabdah and not 'sabdarthau'. Again, in his definition J. has used the term, 'pratipadaka'. There is a reason behind this. The term 'pratipadaka' means 'that which yields meaning'. J. suggests that this yielding of meaning can be through the agency of any power of word; be it either abhidha or the primary power of expression, laksana, or the secondary For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 105 power of word, i.e. indication; or vyanjana or the suggestive power of word. Thus the term pratipadaka' means that the word can be a vacaka, laksaka or a vyanjaka. The basic condition however stands that whatever the type of meaning, it has to be 'ramaniya' i.e. beautiful. By this term, viz. 'ramaniya' all such sources of beauty such as sabdalamkara, arthalamkara, guna, bhava, rasa, etc. are covered up, as they all tend to make for supreme delight. J. hereby also tries to indicate as it were, that the field of poetry would be too norrow if only rasa-bhava-oriented poetry i.e. only emotive stuff alone is covered by the definition. Thus, J. tries to expand the limits of poetry that were narrowed by the efforts of Mahima, Visvanatha and such others. He comes closer to Kuntaka who made an effort to expand the limits of poetry, and also to Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta for whom rasa was 'aesthetic delight, and not just emotive stuff only. By the term 'sabdah' J. has precluded such things as 'kataksa' - i.e. glances, abhinaya' i.e. acting etc. from the scope of poetry, as these do not depend on word. By the term 'artha' in the definition he keeps poetry away from the discipline of grammar i.e. vyakarana-sastra. Only a 'ramaniya sabda' by itself does not make for poetry, because the discipline of grammar which accounts for the currency of such a word, is only a 'sabda-pratipadaka' i.e. one taking care of the word, i.e. word in its 'form' only. It is not an artha-pratipadaka discipline. Again, the 'artha' also has to be beautiful or 'ramaniya' to make for poetry. So, bare statements such as, 'ghatam anaya' - (please) "Bring a por", is no poetry. Such statements yielding worldly pleasure as, "There is birth of a son in your family", are also no poetry. By 'ramaniya' is meant something extra-worldly - "a-laukika". J. further elaborating the concept of poetry observes : (R.G. PP. 4, 5): "ittham camatkara-janaka-bhavana-visayartha-pratipadakasabdatvam yat-pratipaditrtha-visayaka-bhavanitram camatkarajanakata'vacchedakam tattvam, sva-visista-janakatavacchedakartha-pratipadakat.samsargena, camatkaratva-vattvam eva va kavyarvam iti phalitam." As observed earlier, the extra-worldly pleasure is the result of 'bhavana' which is constant i.e. repeated contemplation' (over kavyartha). Here, the word 'bhavana substitutes the word 'jnana' Originally, 'ramaniyata' was explained as, "lokottara"hlada-janakajnana-gocarata". Now for 'jnana' the word 'bhavana' is preferred when J. explains 'ramaniyata' as "lokottara-ahlada-janaka-bhavanagocarata." This substitution of the word is necessitated because of the fact that there is some possibility of "samuha-alambana-jnana" (or cognitive mixture) also to be taken as "camatkara-janaka-jnana". The samuha"lambana-jnana comprises For Personal & Private Use Only

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106 SAHRDAYALOKA of two cognitions of which one is 'ramaniyartha' and the other 'a-ramaniyartha'. Such a possibility is removed by replacing the term 'jnana' by the newer term 'bhavana'. 'Bhavana' is a chain of cognitions which is connected only with 'ramaniya-artha' here, i.e. under special circumstances. So, as quoted above, for J. 'that word is poetry, which gives, such a meaning which is the object of 'bhavana' which yields 'camatkara'. Or, poetry is that word, which, yields such a meaning, the bhavana of which has a speciality to create 'camatkara'. Or, 'kavyarva' means being associated with 'camatkarata' caused by collection of words that give a meaning which has the capacity to quality bhavana with ananda-janakata i.e., the bhavana which creates delight qualified by 'camatkarata'. The simple explanation of this discussion amounts to the following easy explanation. There is a specific bhavana (i.e. constant thinking) which yields extraworldly joy. The meaning of poetry becomes the object of such a bhavana'. The word that gives this sort of a meaning yields a special camatkara. This camatkara is kavya. Thus we arrive at ! "camatkara-janaka-bhavana-visayartha - pratipadaka-sabdatvam." (R.G. p. 5). Herein, the word 'bhavana' stands for a special type of knowledge as already xplained by J. So, the word 'jnana' is taken out and is replaced by the word 'bhavana'. As noted earlier the word 'jnana' was wide enough to include 'samuha"lambana jnana' also, which is not acceptable to J., for this means, "nana. prakarata-nirupita-nana-mukhya-visesyatasali ekam (jnanam) samuhalambanam." A congnition which covers many objects appearing differently, is one pertaining to a group and is therefore termed 'samuha"lambana'. For example, when we say, "this pot", "that pillar", "this piece of cloth" etc., the cognition covering all three objects is termed group-cognition i.e. samuha"lambana jnana. The objects of such a cognition are many and so also words that convey these objects are many. If in the definition of poetry, as we explained earlier, the term 'jnana' were preferred to bhavana, then such samuha"lambana-jnana would also have made for poetry. But such group-cognitions have a-ramaniya cognitions also as part of them and so J. disapproves of the term 'jnana' in preference to 'bhavana', which is thinking of only one (ramaniya) object. But even in this amplification there is a loose string. Of course, by the term 'bhavana' the meaning of repeated thinking of only one object is arrived at, which in sastriya jargon can be termed 'dharavahika jnana' or cognition in form of continuity. But by bringing in the definition such a continuous stream of cognition of one object only, there is no guarantees for its making for 'camatkara'. Bhavana is only another name of dharavahikajnana. But this can have a dry object also at For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 107 its centre, which may not cause camatkara. So, there can be the fault of 'ativyapti' i.e. being too wide, in the definition where there is possibility of the creeping in of such a bhavana concerning un-interesting object. To avoid this contingency of 'ativyapti' J. modifies the definition still further. He uses the words, "bhavanarvam camatkara-janakata'vacchedakam." A sabda or a sentence gives a meaning in a particular order and then the bhavana or constant thinking with that vakyartha as its object or 'visaya' arises. This bhavana produces camatkara. As the bhavana is camatkara-janaka, the bhavanatva becomes "camatkara-janakatavacchedaka." Such a sentence in this special order can be taken as 'kavya'. Thus the definition would mean, "the sabda (i.e. sentence) of particular order, the meaning of which is the object of bhavana is kavya, when such a bhavana is camatakara-janaka. Thus the bhavanarva is camatkarajanakatavacchedaka. Now the group of sentences in the dharavahika-jnana cannot ve that particular order that yields camatkara, and so the ativyapti dosa is avoided, because only the sentence first heard in a particular order produces camatkara and not all the sentences in the dharavahika-jnana. Thus the second definition is free from the faults of ativyapti, avyapti and asambhava. But then still a small difficulty has crept in even here. A scientific definition has to be as breef as possible. Dr. P. Sri. Ramacandrudu (pp. 45, 46) observes that, "Not content with this, PR (= Pandita Raja) gives another amplification in Anugama style. He feels that the second one is much cumbersome because it contains "yacchabda" and "tacchabda", which being the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the Anugama. Therefore he gives a third modified laksana which is comparatively simple according to the tradition of the Tarkikas as there will be no need of bringing many things into sabda-bodha as in the case of the second form of laksana. The final laksana is : "sva-visista-ianakatavacchedakarthapratipadakata-samsargena camatkarattva-vattyam kavyattvam." (R.G. pp. 5). In this laksana, a long compound is placed to show the relation with 'camatkara'. According to the nyayasastra, no relation (sambandha) or doubt (samsaya) is expressed by a word directly, because such a sambandha is collected automatically by the force of its own self (sva-mahatmya). So, such relation need not be expressed in a laksana. So, the third definition is as breef and perfect as possible. 'Samsarga' or 'sambandha' is automatically conveyed as in, "ghatavat bhutalam". The relation between pot and surface is that of 'samyoga' (= accidental relation). This relation is automatically brought out - "samsargamaryadaya." Gadadhara observes in "Vyutpattivada', in this context, "sabdabodhe caika-padarthe apara-padarthasya samsargah samsarga-maryadaya bhasate." For Personal & Private Use Only

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108 SAHRDAYALOKA So, J. has framed the third breef definition as - "camatkara-vattvam kavyattvam". In this definition, the samsarga, viz. "sva-visista - janakata-vacchedakarthapratipadakata" is of course a long one, but this may not be brought into verbal explanation viz. sabda-bodha. This means that the word has the capacity to express a meaning which becomes the object of 'bhavana' i.e. constant thinking. This means that the word has the attribute of 'artha-pratipadakata' and by the relation with this attribute, 'camatkaratva' is associated with sabda. And only this camatkaratva can be designated as 'kavyarva'. No other 'chamatkaratva' can be said to be 'kavyatva'. This is the simple meaning of the compound. When the meaning is said to be, "sva-viaista-janakata'-vacchedaka", the 'sva' in it means 'camatkaratva'. Qualified by this, the joy or pleasure (= anand, ahlada) enter into bhavana. Thus 'bhavana' causes ahlada or joy qualified by camatkara. But this joy caused by the bhavana depends on 'kavyartha' i.e. poetic meaning alone. So, in nyaya torminology it is stated here, that 'artha' is the 'avacchedaka' of the janakata (= causality) which lies in the bhavana. In simple words this can be as, "whatever joy is derived by kavya-bhavana in kavya, is caused by its meaning only. No other object, except the kavya'rtha or poetic meaning can cause this special joy. So, the attribute (= dharma) which distinguishes this "janakata' residing in 'bhavana' is the poetic meaning only. So, bhavana with reference to the (poetic) meaning causes a special joy which is poetry itself. 'Artha' - poetic meaning is the distinguishing mark-avacchedaka-of the joy caused by 'bhavana', cannot be said to be born of poetry (= kavya-janya). Thus J. has drafted three definitions with a special intention in his mind. To remove the loop-hole in the first definition, the second one is given, and the third one is attempted to clear any fault seen in the second one. He also accomplished brevity thereby. The long compound seen in the third definition helps the cause of brevity and it indicates only the relation between sabda-poetic word and 'camatkarattva' - "sva-visistajanakata'vacchedaka'rtha-pratipadakata." In the first definition J. has suggested that, "artha-pratipadaka-sabdatva is kavyatva." By this he has emphasised the importance of sabda only in poetry. In the second definition he has put weight on the word 'bhavana'. Thereby he suggests that by repeated thinking of poetry only, the quality of joy or camatkaratva is caused. In the third definition it is emphasised that the 'camatkara' means extra worldly joy and this is derived from poetry only. Only poetry, and poetry alone can generate this extra-ordinary pleasure. Thus in these three definitions J. has emphasized three important points. After this J. evaluates the definitions cited by Mammata and Visvanatha. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 109 Jagannatha on Mammata : Mammata has defined poetry as 'sabdarthau.' J. feels that this is not correct, as there is no authority for this. On the other hand, such popular usages as, "kavya is read loudly," "meaning is derived from poetry," "I heard poetry, but could not catch its meaning," etc. point to the fact that by the term "kavya' is meant a special type of word only, i. e. word which gives a beautiful meaning. The objector (i.e. the supporters of Mammata) can argue that, first define poetry as word and sense and then as we have to give more importance to word from the point of view of practical usage, we can resort to secondary powerlaksana-with reference to the term kavya' to derive the meaning of 'word' only. So, for this, there is no need to define poetry as "sabdah kavyam." The basic purpose can be served by "sabdarthau kavyam" also. To this, J.'s reply is as follows : The objector's view can be accepted only if there is any authority in favour of taking the term 'kavya' to mean 'sabdartha-yugala' i.e. both word and sense--by the power of denotation i. e. abhidhasakti. But there is no greater authority to this effect. We cannot accept this merely relying on the word of the objector. So, in the absence of any authority in favour of accepting the term 'kavya' meaning both word and sense by abhidhasakti, how can we reject the abhidhasakti of the term 'kavya' as 'word yielding a beautiful meaning,' on the basis of usages quoted as above ? So, by 'kavya' is meant only a special type of word alone, and it is therefore pertinent to define only this special variety of word. It is not proper to define 'kavya' which is imagined by the opponent (i. e. Mammata) as both 'word and sense.' J. adds that this practice of taking kavya to mean only word alone, should also be utilized in defining vedas, puranas etc. also, because this practice is supported by public usage. The only difference is that word in poetry is yielding a charming meaning, while the word in vedas and puranas is yielding instruction i.e. "upadesa." J. further continues his refutation and considers yet another option. 'asvadodbodhakatva' 'to evoke delight is the cause of 'kavyatva' i. e. poetry. So at all places where we find this characteristic of causing delight, we understand the presence of 'kavyatva.' Now this special attribute is seen in both word and meaning equally and so, the objector feels that poetry should equally be found resting in sense also and not in word alone. But J. feels that this argument is not valid. The fact is that any 'raga'-melody in music is also asvadodbodhaka,' and this For Personal & Private Use Only

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110 SAHKDAYALOKA is accepted even by the Dhvanikara and others, and so the above definition of poetry will also be found applicable to any raga-melody of music. Again the factors of natya-dramatic-art such as abhinaya or acting, vesa i.e. costumes, bhasana i.e. dialogue, etc. are also conveyors of aesthetic delight (rasa), like 'raga' of music, and so even they will have to be termed 'kavya' or poetry. So, the opinion that whatever is 'asvadodbodhaka'-causing relish-is kavya, is refuted and hence, the definition-viz. "whatever is capable of evoking rasa--'rasodbodhana-samartha' is kavya" does not stand. J. puts a further question to the objectors who uphold M.'s views. The question is, "what do you feel is the 'pravstti-nimitta' of the term 'kavya'? Is it used for the twin of sabda and artha together, or for each of these two independently? : "api ca kavyasabda-pravrtti-nimittam sabdartha-vyasaktam pratyeka-paryaptam va ?" (R. G. pp. 6). First, we have to grasp the exact connotation of the word "pravsttinimitta." This technical term occurs in the purva-mimamsa-sastra, quite often. Its definition is cited as, "pada-sakyata-avacchedakam"-i.e. that which gives the special connotative power to a given 'pada' i.e. word. Why a particular meaning is to be derived from a particular word is explained by the nyaya-sastrin in the following manner. He feels that there is a special meaning in a given 'pada'-word. This dharma' distinguishes that 'padartha' from other 'padarthas' or wordmeanings. Because of such a special 'dharma' or characteristic, special words give special meanings. And this is indicated by the particular 'pada' or word concerned. In the definition of pravstti-nimitta' cited as above, the term 'sakya' means the meaning of a pada. So, that particular 'sakyatacapacity to yield a particular meaning-is whatever the distinguishing factor of a given 'padarthata.' This is termed as "sakyata-vacchedaka." This special attribute in any 'padartha' is the 'nimitta' or cause for the pravrtti' i.e. popular usage of a given 'pada.' This 'pravstti' is its capacity to give a particular meaning. e.g. if you ask how the term 'go' gives the meaning of 'a cow'?-- the answer is, there is a special quality of 'go-tva' in the word 'go', which helps the particular word 'go', to give the meaning viz.-'a cow'. In the same way, there is a special quality of 'kavyatva', in the word 'kavya', which is the 'pravstti-nimitta' of the word 'kavya.' What is the form of this special quality called "kavya-tva' ? The reply to this question as given by Bhamaha, Mammata and others is different from the one given by J. The former take the twin of word and meaning to mean kavyatva, and hold the same as the pravrtti-nimitta of 'kavya.' Now, after clearing the concept of 'pravrtti-nimitta' we will continue with J.'s line of thinking. For J., it is not possible to accept the first alternative i.e. of For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 111 taking the pravrtti-nimitta of kavyatva with reference to both word and sense taken together. Like the usage of a sentence viz. "One cannot be called two," any sloka-vakya i.e. collection of words in poetry will not be said to be poetry. To put it more clearly we may say that, if kavya is accepted as consisting of both of word and sense, we will have to take a position whether the two together (vyasakta) or separately (= pratyeka paryapta) should be taken as kavyatva. Either of these two alternatives is untenable because in the former case such expressions as, 'the sentence of a verse is not a 'kavya'-"sloka-vakyam na kavyam" will come into vogue, on the basis of the general rule that.. 'one is not two'-eko na dvau.' In the latter case, two kavyas will have to be accepted in one verse. So, concludes J., the definition of kavya, be associated with sabda-i.e. 'word' alone as in case of the definitions of veda and purana also-"esaiva ca veda-purana-laksanatve'pi gatih, anyatha tatra'pi iyam duravastha syat. J. therefore concludes: tasmat veda-sastra-purana-laksanasya iva kavya-laksanasya api sabda-nisthata eva ucita." (R. G. pp. 7). The thrust of J.'s argument is that if we take both word and sense together as poetry, then we will have to accept that word alone is not kavya, and if we accept the second alternative then there will follow the contingency of accepting two kavyas in a single sentence, one of the form of word alone, and another of the form of sense alone. So, there is an escape, according to J., from this, by accepting the fact of a word, characterised by charming sense ramaniyartha visista sabda- only as poetry. To be very frank, to us this sounds not as 'tarka' but 'vitanda' i.e. fallacious argument. J. holds that if word and sense together are taken as 'kavya', then only word will not be a kavya. But this is exactly what we want. J. distinguished the 'svara' i.e. note of music as something different from 'sabda' of poetry which is always associated with poetic meaning. So pure word i.e. pure dhvani, i.e. pure 'svara' is no poetry even for us. Such popular usages as "kavyam srtam, artho na jnatah" does not support that poetry is word alone. This usage only suggests that 'poetic word' with a special meaning which is always inherently present, is not understood by all. It requires a special faculty-sahrdayatva-on the part of listener also, to get at poetic meaning. So, popular usages do not go against our taking poetry as both word and sense together. Even for J. poetic word is necessarily associated with poetic meaning. If there are two sides of the coin, the coin does not become 'two'. There is no independent existence of a coin beyond its two sides. So, it is not proper on J.'s part to say 'one is two.' Thus, J.'s position is really vulnerable. - -- For Personal & Private Use Only

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112 SAHRDAYALOKA We know that kuntaka also has thought of J.'s arguments in anticipation and has asserted that both word and sense taken together make for poetry. Next, J. proceeds to criticise Mammata's definition still further with reference to the mentioning of 'gunas' and 'alamkaras. J. argues that if M.'s position is accepted, then such illustrations as "uditam mandalam vidhoh" will cease to be poetry, and hence 'a-vyapti-dosa' will follow. J. argues that when this statement is pronounced by agents such as sarika, or virahini i.e. a woman in separation from her loving husband etc. such matters as "abhisarana', its negation, the time when vital airs are about to leave the body, etc. etc. are suggested which make it an illustration charged with suggested sense. But in the absence of guna-and alamkara this poetry will be taken as 'a-kavya' or no poetry ! Same will be the case of such illustrations as "gatostam arkah" etc. The objector (i. e. M.) will not be able to call it 'no-poetry because in that case whatever is taken as poetry will be branded by the siddhantin (i. e. J.) as no-poetry ! In reality, in both the illustrations cited above, 'camatkara' seems to follow equally. J. further argues that M. has incorporated gunalamkara in the definition of poetry without clarifying the pravstti-nimitta-i. e. the 'anugata-dharma.' Now, argues J., that as 'ghatatva' is the anugata-dharma in ghata, similarly in all alamkaras, there is no alamkaratva as an anugata-dharma. The reason is that as for the nature and number of alamkaratva and alamkaras respectively, there is no unanimity of opinion. Thus, in the absence of a fixed form and nature of both guna and alamkara, how can they find a place in the definition of poetry ? J. says that perhaps the followers of Mammata (= M.) may argue that the 'anugata-dharma' of both guna and alamkara is not uncertain. Because it is fixed respectively, as "kavya-dharmatva or rasa-dharmatva is gunatva," and "kavyadharmatva or kavya-sobha-adhayakatva is alamkaratva." J. for the time being accepts this position and turns his guns towards a new aim, such as "a-dosau." Here also, we disagree with J. As seen above even J. is silenced by the last argument. But even in his earlier thinking there is lack of perfection. The illustration 'uditam mandalam vibhoh' is not without a guna. For, we feel that even here the guna called 'prasada' is very much there for its presence is accepted by Anandavardhana and the whole lot of dhvanivadins in all rasas and all types of good poetic compositions--i. e. 'sarvatra.' Prasada-guna is said to be "sarvatravihita-sthitih." The second argument that the nature and number of poetic figuresalamkaras-is not fixed,- is also not accepted by us. Even from the times of earlier aestheticians as Bhamaha and Dandin, the wider concept of alamkaras was in For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 113 vogue and Vamana had tried to coin it as "saudaryam alamkarah." It was a universal 'kavya-sobha-kara-dharma' for Dandin and "vakroktih" for Bhamaha. It is not proper on the part of J. to perform gaja-nimilika-to this darsana' of the ancients. As for the number, it is innumerable; for any new poetic turn by any newer poet springs a new alamkara which yields poetic beauty ! So, it is not proper for J. to attack M.'s definition of poetry, in this way. Let us now follow J. about his views concerning 'a-dosau'. J. argues that this term need not be read in the definition because a poem does not cease to be poetry even if a poetic blemish is seen therein. J. here also takes recourse to popular usage such as "dustam kavyam" i.e. this poetry is having a poetic blemish." J. feels that if we insist on 'a-dosau', then in the presence of even a small blemish good poetry will turn into no-poetry ! We feel that here J. is under the impression of Visvanatha's line of thinking. J. argues that if 'a-dosau' is insisted upon, then a number of verses or poems from Kalidasa's pen will cease to be poetry, and the popular usage such as "dustam kavyam" will also become redundant. J. here considers the view of the objector (i. e. supporters of M.) which runs as follows. The purva-paksa can say that even in a dusta-kavya i.e. in poetry with poetic blemishes, there is necessarily the presence of both word and sense. So, such poetry with blemishes can be termed poetry secondarily. But for J. this is not acceptable. He feels that it is not proper for the objector first to negate poetry because of the presence of a poetic blemish and then to accept it secondarily only to justify such popular usages as "dustam kavyam"! In fact, argues J., there is no scope for indicative power i.e. laksana-sakti, here. If popular usage is contradicted by any direct means of knowledge, then only there is scope for laksana. But here, in case of dustam kavyam', it is possible to support it from another angle also. So, in the absence of mukhyartha-badha', etc. there is no scope for laksana according to J. When the siddhantin (i. e. J.) does not mention 'a-dosatva' in the definition, he has no difficulty in explaining the loka-vyavahara or popular usage such as "dustam kavyam." The objector has yet another argument to support 'a-dosau.' It proceeds like this - just as a tree which has no external connection i.e. 'samyoga' and yet there is nothing wrong when we say that it is having connection, i.e. it is 'samyogin', in the same way, poetry in one portion is without a blemish if in other part a blemish is located. This argument will be clearer by an illustration. 'Samyoga' or external connection is said to be 'a-vyapya-vstti' when there is atyanta-abhava and partial abhava of the same. When a bird is sitting on the top of a tree, there is relation of For Personal & Private Use Only

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114 SAHRDAYALOKA the bird with the tree, but as the bird is not in connection with the root of that tree, we can also say that there is absense of connection between the bird and the tree. Thus in case of the bird, we can say that both vsksa-samyoga and veksa-samyogaabhava reside simultaneously with reference to the tree concerned. Thus, the samyoga is said to be a-vyapya-vritti i.e. not total, but partial. Similarly, with reference to the usage such as dustam kavyam, there is kavyatva in one portion of poetry, and its absence in another. So, in a given poem both kavyatva and kavyatva-abhava will be accepted to stay simultaneously. But J. is not prepared to accept such a-vyapya-vsttita in case of kavyatva as this is not experienced by all people with exception and without doubt ! So, the argument of the objector, according to J. does not stand to reason. We had earlier seen that Visyanatha had also argued in the same manner suggesting that the tug-of-war between kavyatva and a-kavyatva with reference to the same piece of poetry, will lead us nowhere ! But as in case of Visvanatha, so in case of J. also, the position taken by us earlier while dealing with Visvanatha remains the same. M.'s very concept of a dosa is 'mukhyartha hatih,' and 'mukhya' is only 'rasa'. So, only such 'dosas' are potent dosas and they have not only to be totally avoided but the younger aspirants have to be instructed to that effect while explaining the nature and scope of true poetry. The arguments advanced by both Visvanatha and J. are directed in a wrong direction altogether. J. also exhibits a narrow and too literal understanding of the concepts of both guna and alamkara when he takes the metaphorical usage of 'atman' and 'sarira' in a narrow and limited sense. J., taking the metaphor literally, argues that gunas or excellences are qualities of 'rasa' the soul, and alamkaras of both word and sense go only with the body of poetry, like a garland, necklace, etc. Thus 'guna'lamkara' need not be mentioned while defining poetry, according to J. But on an earlier occasion we have taken sufficient care of this situation and we may here note only this much that J. falls in the same trap as Visvanatha while taking the metaphor too literally. The net result is that Mammata stands fully defended and J.'s effort falls flat. After Mammata J. consider's Visvanatha's definition of kavya, which as we. know runs to this effect that "rasavad-eva-kavyam." It is clear, that in that case poetry with vastu-dhvani and alamkara-dhvani will fall out of the orbit of genuine poetry. J. does not accept this, for we cannot say that this situation is welcome i.e. is an 'ista-apatti', for there will arise a contingency of defeating the tradition set by great poets-maha-kavis-of the past. The poets describe everything including such For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 115 object as the flow and fall of water, the whirpools created in water or the dancing ripples or waves of water, and also the activities of monkeys and even children etc. etc. Such descriptions are like paintings and therefore are without a touch of emotive depth, i.e. rasa. The argument of the opponent that even here there is chance for emotive appeal from the point of ultimate experience, can not be accepted here because such emotive appeal can be traced even in bare statements such as 'gauh calati'-a cow walks; or a dear runs, etc. etc. Any worldly object in form of vibhava or determinant etc. is ultimately connected with rasa-experience. So, everything on earth is ultimately rasa-oriented and this fact can not be negated, argues J. So, far J. Visvanatha's definition is charged with the fallacy of 'avyapti', and is therefore 'too narrow.'J.'s positive placing of ramaniya-artha not only keeps prahelika-or riddles out of the scope of genuine poetry, but keeps him i.e. J. himself, also out of the charge of narrowness associated with Visvanatha. Thus, here his effort is fruitful and we have also on earlier occasion supported such a situation, wherein the efforts of modern writers in writing absurd plays and absurd poetry also can be covered by vastu-dhvani and alamkara-dhvani. Thus we have thus far tried to discuss as fully as possible the efforts of alamkarikas beginning with Bhamaha down to J., in defining poetry. For us the school of thought laying down 'sabdarthau kavyam' seems to have an for even in case of J. who vehemently tries to establish 'sabdah kavyam', we feel that his efforts do not convince us as even for him, the poetic-word has to be qualified as 'ramaniyartha-pratipadaka' i.e. ultimately it can not stand totally divorced from 'artha' i.e. meaning, altogether. We will now take up the next topics, of kavya-hetu and kavya-prayojana, but before that here are some other observations concerning J.'s effort at defining poetry. Later challanges to J.'s definition of poetry. As noted above we, in our personal capacity, have tried to explain independently the short-comings of J.'s definition of poetry. But here also we are not without company. We have no less an authority than Nageca, the great grammarian, on our side. This is explained by Prof. Dr. P. Sri Ramachandrudu (pp. 49-56, ibid.). Nagesa has the following observation : J. is of the opinion that's alone makes for poetry on the strength of loka-vyavahara such as "kavyam srutam, artho na jnatah" etc. Nagesa quotes another popular usage such as 'kavyam buddham'-poetry is understood, suggesting that poetry stands for sense also. Nagesa also suggests that even veda is both 'sabda and artha' together, on the strength of a remark in Patanjali (Ref. sutra, IV. 2. 59, Panini) which says, "tad For Personal & Private Use Only

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116 SAHRDAYALOKA adhite tad-veda" which implies that veda is also both sabda and artha together. Nagesa also holds that though kavya should mean both sabda and artha together only, it may mean either, only through secondary usage i.e. laksana. It may be noted that irrespective of Nagesa our independent criticism as above of J.'s approach is also noteworthy and deserves attention of scholars. Dr. Sri Ramachandrudu (pp. 50, ibid) also quotes the opinion of Gangadhara Sastri (R. G. Kasi, edn., pp. 50) that the attributes viz., 'sa-gunau' and 'a-dosau' need not be taken as uddesyata-avacchedaka' (i.e. they need not be taken as part of the laksana), but 'sabdarthau' has to be taken as uddesyata-avacchedaka, because poets direct their efforts in perfecting both word and sense, and not either alone. He further argues that if sabda alone is taken to be poetry, why should one discuss things connected with 'artha' alone, i. e. alamkaras and dosas concerning 'artha' alone ? One should discuss only sabda-dosas and sabdalamkaras ! We may say that even in his defence Gangadhara Sastri at least concedes half the ground by letting 'sa-gunau' and 'a-dosau' fall way side, by not accepting them as uddesyata-avacchedaka. But in our defence as above we have taken care of even these attributes while defending M.'s definition as above. Our views certainly deserve better attention from scholars. Prof. Dr. Sri Ramcandrudu's personal attitude of accepting J.'s view point that sabda alone is kavya does not look sound in our estimation for we have strongly defended the fact of poetry being both word and sense while accepting wholly the definition as advanced by Mammata. We stand by our criticism and we feel that we have served the cause of 'sabdarthau kavyam' even to a greater extent than the efforts made by Nagesa and Gangadhara Sastri. Dr. Ramacandrudu tries to criticise Nagesa who had quoted Patanjali. He gives a fuller statement which runs as : "kim arthau imau ubhau ? na yodhite vetti api asau. yas tu vetti adhite api asau. na etayoh avasyakah samavesah bhavati; kascit sampatham pathati, na ca vetti, kascit vetti, na ca sampatham pathati." (Mahabhasya, pp. 190). Now it may be said that this fuller quotation also does not preclude the fact of veda being both word and sense together. The fact of reading or memorizing veda without knowing its meaning does not divorce veda from its meaning; for the meaning is very much there inherent in the vedic text even though a person may not get at it. So, veda does not cease to be both word and sense. As for the meaning of veda, investigations were afoot right in the age of Yaska himself who quotes different schools who attempted the explanation of vedic texts. The ritualistic approach as suggested by the Brahmana literature and supported by For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 117 commentators such as Sayana is only one explanation, while the mystic, grammatical, historical, natural, linguistic explanation etc. and the modern attempts at geographical and cultural explanations--all these suggest that veda is both word and sense together. Its sabda-pradhanya is one thing and it should not be confused with sabda-rupatva. "There is not to reason why, there is but to do and die,"--is the spirit in commands made in army. Same is the case with the vedas and they are said to be "prabhu-sammita" only because of the irrrevocability of vedic injunctions. The veda, like the order of a master, is not to be challenged. Actually people while performing rituals follow this command only after they get at the meaning. Without getting at the meaning which is the integral part of a vedic injunction, how are we to follow any injunction. The very fact of the purva-purvabaliyastva i.e. the earlier agent being taken as more authentic in case of sruti, vakya, samakhya, etc. proves that vedic injunctions do carry meaning and that they cannot be divorced of it. 'Sabda-pramanya' of veda means a word in an injunction cannot be replaced by a synonym, but it does not mean that the particular sabda is taken as meaningless. When we say, "agnim ile purohitam" we cannot replace 'agnim' by 'vahnim', but 'agni' would mean fire, and fire alone. It will never mean water. It is like clear and irrevocable drafting in legal literature. This also is divine law and the word in divine injunction cannot ever be substituted, though of course it has to be understood to put it in practice. It is precisely for this purpose that Yaksa explains that the Brahmana texts enjoin that which is stated :- janantam abhivadayate' and this does not go against veda having any meanin Prof. Ramacandrudu observes that the words 'vanmaya' and 'sarasvata' prove that poetry is sabda only. But on the contrary this proves otherwise. It is meaning through vak, or sarasvati which is poetry. Meaning through colours is painting; through mudras it is dancing, through svara-or notes it is music and through 'vak' it is poetry. But this does not mean that poetry is 'vak' alone. Only the innocent would subscribe to such a view. He observes: "Therefore, PR. need not be considered to have committed any serious error, in giving prominance to sabda." We wholly agree with this, because poetic art has word for its external skin as against other arts such as painting, dancing, etc. as explained above. But word, though being, the medium, does not cease to be 'sartha' i. e. necessarily accompanied by meaning --first and last. Prof. Ramachandrudu (p. 53, ibid) rejects the view of scholars quoting both Kalidasa--'vagarthau iva samprktau' and Magha-'sabdarthau iva satkaveh' suggesting that these quotations do not lead us anywhere. But we feel that they For Personal & Private Use Only

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118 SAHRDAYALOKA do lead us where Mammata and others have been striving to reach, and also trying to take us to. The learned professor quotes the Mimamsa maxim viz. "autpattikas tu sabdasya arthena sambandhah" (Jaimini 1.1.5) and asserts that this could not have escaped J.'s notice also; because J. himself, while talking about pratibha at R. G. pp. 9-- "sa sa kavya-ghatananukula-sabdarthopasthitih." The professor argues to support J.'s view about kavya being sabda only, by saying--"Only, thing he wanted to establish is that 'kavya' means sabda conveying artha, but not sabda and artha together." In fact, as will be explained later PR. gives more importance to artha in a kavya, than what is given by ubhayavadins (pp. 54, ibid).--Now, with due respect to the professor we may say that we have yet to read something more funny. For, sabda conveying artha is seen elsewhere also. E. g. when there is a big sound we get at a meaning that something has dashed against another thing. When a railway engine is fixed with a carriage, there is sound and a meaning is conveyed. When tyres of an auto screech we realise that brakes are heavily applied. Now in poetry word conveys meaning through its powers of direct expression, indication and suggestion. The third one, i.e. suggestion is shared by illustrations cited earlier, and also when there is no sound also, as in case of soundless signs and signals. There is no case when a sound does not convey a meaning. yawning makes a sound and it conveys a sense of feeling sleepy or languid etc. So, whenever sound conveys sense, everytime it is not a case of poetry. Actually sound i.e. word conveying beautiful sense through abhidha, or laksana or also vyanjana is the field of poetry. A poetic word has to be accompanied by either an expressed, or an indicated as also a suggested sense; of course its being charming S a pre-condition. Actually J. while insisting on 'ramaniya artha' echoes Bhamaha's famous words viz. "vakrabhidheya-sabdoktih ista vacam alamkrtih." So, when we pass an observation such as, "kavya means sabda conveying artha, but not sabda and artha together" we hardly make any sense. Even when water starts flowing from municipal tap, some sound is created by the fall of water in an empty bucket. It conveys its own meaning. Word of any sort is necessarily accompanied by meaning. Kavya-sabda is never without its charming meaning arrived at through the word-power of abhidha, laksana and vyanjana. It is but illusory to hold that sabda alone is kavya. Sabda in fact is never alone. Even a different bark of a dog conveys different meanings. So, we fail to agree with J.'s observation that poetry is 'sabda' alone, for we reject the very possibility of sabda being absolutely alone. But kavya-sabda is different from other sabdas and herein 'ramaniyata' enters, along with the three powers of a word. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 'Kavya-hetu' or cause of poetry and Kavya-prayojana or aims or purpose of poetry. As for the cause -hetu- of poetry, sanskrit literary critics have advanced pratibha, i.e. poetic genius, vyutpatti, i.e. learning and abhyasa i.e. practice as the cause of poetry, either jointly or individually. By and large the importance of pratibha i.e. poetic genius is held as uppermost by critics. Thus Bhamaha holds that 'pratibha' is the only cause of poetry. He is candid when he observes that: "kavyam tu jayate jatu kasyacit pratibhavatah" (Bhamaha, 1.5b.) Dandin has a different approach when he observes : naisargiki ca pratibha srtam ca bahunirmalam | amandascabhiyogosyah karanam kavya-sampadah || (I. 103) Natural genius, great proficiency in various branches of knowledge, great endeavour and repeatition of efforts-all these taken together make for the cause of poetry for Dandin. Here, for the first time so far as available documents are concerned, we come across an approach which is supported by Mammata later. So, for Dandin, inborn genius as well as human endeavour jointly make for poetry. For him, it seems, poets are both born as well as made. In two more karikas that follow; i.e. at I. 104 and 105 he clearly favours human endeavour as against only inborn genius. Dandin observes na vidyate yady api purva-vasana-guna'nubandhi pratibhanam adbhutam | 119 srtena yatnena ca vag upasita dhruvam karoty eva kam apy anugraham || (I. 104) My guru Prof. Athavale suggested that 'kam api' here refers to 'some extraordinary favour,' and not 'just little favour.' So, for Dandin, even in absence of inborn genius, human endeavour is capable to cause poetry of the highest order. So, at Kavyadarsa I. 105, he eloquently declares that people should wake up from laziness and continuously get themselves engaged in propitiating the goddess of speech and by this honest effort, even with pale inborn genius, people will be able to move in the company of the learned with their heads held high : For Personal & Private Use Only

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120 SAHRDAYALOKA tad asta-tandraih anisam sarasvati sramad upasya khalu kirtim ipsubhih || krse kavitve'pi janah krta-srama vidagadha-gostisu vihartum isate || (1. 105) nus insistance on either pratibha alone, or on both pratibha and vyutpatti (= learning) or on all three - i.e. pratibha, vyutpatti and abhyasa- i.e. practice taken together making a 'single unit seems to continue to be the topic of discussion among literary critics with Mammata preferring to side with the organic unity of all the three factors taken together, while Hemacandra insisting on pratibha at Kavyanusasana (=ka.sa) - I. 4 when he observes : pratibha asya hetuh. (ka. sa. I. 4) He further observes that vyutpatti or learning i.e. proficiency in various branches of knowledge, and abhyasa' i.e. practice give an edge to inborn pratibha. Thus they are welcome as shaping influences. He further classifies pratibha' into 'sahaja' (=inborn) and aupadhiki (=acquired). Sahaja is the result of 'avarana-ksaya', and 'upasama.' The first is the removal of coverings that obstruct the flash of pratibha, and the second is 'removal of possible coverings that may obstruct the flash of genius. The aupadhika is the result of such occult causes as 'mantra' etc. Hemacandra thus seems to move closer to the tradition of Bhamaha, which insists on the basic undeniable necessity of in-born genius, which ultimately finds favour even with Jagannatha the last greatest luminary in the sky of Indian literary criticism. Thus, prior to Jagannatha and before Mammata we have protegonists of only pratibha, such as Bhatta Tauta-who observes : "prajna nava-navollekha-salini pratibha mata. tad anupranana-jiva-varnana-nipunah kavih tasya karma, smstam kavyam" then, Abhinavagupta suggests : "pratibha apurva-vastu-nirmana-ksama prajna. tasya viseso rasa"-vesa-vaieadyasaundarya-kavya-nirmana-ksamatvam, (Locana) and also "saktih, pratibhanam varnaniya-vastu -visaya-nutanollekha-salitvam" For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 121 (also, Locana) It is clear that both Tauta and Abhinava-gupta seem to hold that pratibha is that inborn quality in a poet which prompts him to describe things in newer and newer light and perspective. Vagbhata (I) who is posterior to both Mammata and Hemacandra again holds inborn genius-pratibha-as the supreme cause of poetry. He observes : (vagbhatalamkara I. 3, and 4) : 'pratibha karanam tasya vyutpattis tu vibhusanam | bhtsotpatti-ksd-abhyasah ity adya-kavi=samkatha 11'prasanna-pada-navya'rthayuktyudbodha-vidhayini | sphuranti sat-kaver-buddhih pratibha sarvatomukhi ||But even prior to Abhinavagupta it was Rajasekhara who in his Kavyamimamsa devoted two full chapters (i. e. Chs. IV and V) that discuss the nature of pratibha and vyutpatti. He quotes various opinions of some alamkarikas who are almost forgotten names for us. He gives names of Syamadeva and Mangala. He, on his part, seems to favour only 'pratibha' which is made to flash forth both by internal effort-i.e. samadhi-backed by Syamadeva, and also external effort-abhyasabacked by Mangala. Rajasekhara seems to accept a compromising attitude but for him sakti or pratibha is the prime cause : "tav ubhav api saktim udbhasayatah. sa kevalam kavye hetuh." He explains pratibha as that flash of imagination which prompts a poet to use (appropriate) words, meanings, alamkaras, excellent turns of expressions (-ukti-margam-perhaps riti-marga) and such other things which make for poetry. Says he : (Kavya-mimamsa, ch. IV) : ya sabda-gramam arthasartham, alamkara-tantram, ukti-margam, anyad api tathavidham adhi-hidayam pratibhasayati sa pratibha." It is this which seems to be echoed in the opinion of Vagbhata (I) as quoted above. When Rajasekhara quotes the views of Syamadeva who pressed for samadhithe interal effort, he seems to be quoting a tradition upheld by Syamadeva but perhaps also represented by Rudrata the predecessor of even Anandavardhana. For Rudrata had also, while insisting on pratibha had observed in his Kavyalamkara I. 14 that all the three i.e. pratibha, vyutpatti and abhyasa make for poetry : For Personal & Private Use Only

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122 SAHRDAYALOKA "tasya-asaranirasat sara-grahanat ca carunah karane tritayam idam vyapriyate saktir-vyutpattir abhyasah ll" and then, "manasi sada susamadhini visphuranam anekadha abhidheyasya | aklistani padani ca vibhanti yasyam asau saktih //" (I. 15). Here, syamadeva's 'samadhi' is taken note of. Rudrata further observes : (I. 16): "pratibhety aparair-udita sahajotpadya ca sa dvidhabhavati pumsa saha jatatvad anayos tu jyayasi sahaja ll" Two fold pratibha is accepted by Hemacandra also and later by Jagannatha. Earlier, Vamana while accepting the importance of vyutpatti and abhyasa, had attached greater importance to pratibh, and later Kuntaka while putting stress on pratibha held that a poet's vyutpatti and abhyasa also fall in line of his inherent nature. Supremacy of pratibha is suggested by Kuntaka when he observes : "yat kimcana'pi vaicitryam tat-sarvam pratibhodbhavan | saukumarya-parispanda-syandi yatra virajate ll" - (V. J. J. 28) "wherein every element of beauty is a result of the poet's imagination alone, and succeeds in conveying flashes of gentle gace" (Trans. K. Kri. - This is Sukumara-marga. pp. 329). With all these thoughts in the background we come to evaluate Jagannatha's approach, wherein again 'pratibha' is taken as the supreme and only cause of poetry. Jagannatha is clear when he states that only pratibha is the cause of poetry. He observes : (R. G. pp. 25, Edn. Prof. Athavale, uni. Book Production board, Guj. state, '74): For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 123 "tasya ca karanam 'kavigata kevala pratibha. saca kavya-ghatana'nukulasabdarthopasthitih." - J. has the following observation--The cause of poetry is only genius which rests in a poet. This pratibha or poetic genius is of the nature of flashing forth of word and sense that are congenial to creation of poetry. The special quality of 'pratibhatva' which rests in this pratibha, when taken as the cause of poetry, removes all other factors that may claim to be the cause of poetry. This special attribute viz. pratibhatva is the cause of poetry alone and nothing else whatsoever. Now this special quality of 'pratibhatva' resting in pratibha may either be taken as 'siddho jati visesah a special jati or class, or as 'sa-khanda upadhi' i.e. attribute which can be described in many terms. The idea is that in different poets we come across different flashes of genius. But common to all these flashes, we can imagine a quality called, 'pratibhatva' which goes to make 'pratibha' what it is. Thus taken, 'pratibhatva' can be taken as a 'jati' or class. But such a quality can not be described in brief, as it is united with many qualities. Thus the nature or form of pratibhatva being inherently complex, can only be described by a number of adjectives or words. If we accept this position, then the speciality called 'pratibhatva' can be described as 'sa-khanda-upadhi-rupa-dharma' ! The Nyayakosa (pp. 943) explains sa-khandopadhi as, "bahu-padartha-ghatito dharmah sa-khandopadhih." In the N. - =Nirnaya sagar) Edn. of R. G. we have a reading viz. "upadhirupam va akhandam." But Prof. Athavale observes (pp. 30, ibid) that this reading is faulty and should be emended as "sa-khandam" as Nagesa clearly says. Prof. Athavale supports Nagesa and says that the Nyayakosa explains a-khanda-upadhi as, 'anirvacaniyo dharmah.' Now the special dharma called pratibhatva is not anirvacaniya, but it can be described. Hence, it cannot be termed as 'akhandopadhi.' Now this pratibha is the result of 'adrsta.' This 'adrsta' is either 'punya' meritorious deed or, papa i.e. sinful act done either in previous birth or present birth. This adrsta (of course here caused by meritorious deeds) is caused by the grace of either some divinity or a great man. J. holds that perhaps at times, this pratibha seems to have resulted from extra-ordinary learning and practice of writing poetry also : "kvacit ca vilaksana-vyutpatti-kavyakarana-abhyasau." (R. G. pp. 25, ibid). But the cause of pratibha is never these three factors taken together, i.e. not adrsta vyutpatti and abhyasa taken together-na tu trayam eva. (R. G. pp. 25, ibid). At times even in the absence of vyutpatti and abhyasa, by the grace of some great man alone, pratibha seems to flash forth in a certain child. Some may hold that in case of such a child, along with adrsta, his vyutpatti and For Personal & Private Use Only

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124 SAHRDAYALOKA abhyasa of his earlier birth also make for the cause of his pratibha. But J. holds that this opinion of the objector is not acceptable as there is 'gaurava dosa' or the fault of cumbrousness in accepting vyutpatti and abhyasa of the earlier birth. The idea is that when the purpose is served by recognizing only adrsta, why unnecessarily add vyutpatti and abhyasa of the earlier birth ? Again, in holding this in case of a particular child there is no pramana or guarantee, or authority. Again the presence of pratibha which is of the nature of a 'karya' or result, can be explained even differently from both vyutpatti and abhyasa. Even in our worldly parlance, when we decide the cause of something with the help of the authority of veda, etc., in case a vyabhicara-or deviation is seen from that cause, then only when yet another device is not seen to explain this deviation, meritorious deeds or otherwise, i.e. dharma or adharma are taken as explanations for that devitation. If we do not resort to such normal course of explanation, argues J., then a great mismanagement will follow. Again, we cannot say that only adrsta alone is the cause of pratibha because we see that a particular person cannot write poetry upto -a certain period, but we find the flashing of pratibha in the same person after some time, as a result of vyutpatti and abhyasa. Now, if it is said that even here only 'adrsta' is the cause of pratibha, then this adrsta was present even prior to this acquiring vyutpatti and abhyasa. Then we will have to accept that the pratibha born of that adrsta was also present earlier. If the objector holds that yes, that pratibha was present even prior to those two (i.e. vyutpatti and abhyasa) but there was yet another adrsta coming in way of its external manifestation, then this argument says J. is not satisfactory. For in all such cases, in place of accepting two adrstas. it is safer to hold vyutpatti and abhyasa as cause of pratibha and in this acceptance there is laghava-guna i.e. brievity. Thus, J. holds that it is safer to accept either adrsta or vyutpatti and abhyasa together, as cause of pratibha. Of course, pratibha born of adrsta and pratibha born of both vyutpatti and abhyasa, are different in nature from each other, because the quality of 'karyatavacchedaka' in pratibha born as karya, differentiates the two. When we take these two pratibhas as different, as they are born of different causes, we also understand the difference in the quality of poetry produced by either. And in that case there will not arise any deviation (vyabhicara) in the relation of cause and effect. Now, it is clear that the exceptional quality of pratibhatva residing in these two types of pratibha, establishes pratibha only as the cause of poetry. Again there will not be any misunderstanding in explaining the karya-karanabhava, of each variety of pratibha, if we hold that there is difference in the result i.e. poetry caused by either. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Definition and Scope of Poetry 125 The objector may raise the following point : when inspite of there being vyutpatti' and 'abhyasa', pratibha is not seen, then there will be "vyabhicara' or transgression or deviation in the cause-effect relationship, so it will not be safe to assert this cause-effect relationship. To this, J.'s reply is that it can be so maintained that the vyutpatti and abhyasa are lesser than the required proportion to generate pratibha (=anavacchinna), or, it can be also said that at such places, even if vyutpatti' and 'abhyasa' are sufficiently powerful to cause 'pratibha' here, some special type of unrighteous act comes in its way and hence no transgression should be imagined here. In justifying cause-effect relationship the negation of a 'pratibandhaka' or obstructing factor has to be asserted. This removal of obstructing element has to be taken care of even by those who either hold all the three i.e. pratibha, vyutpatti and abhyasa taken together as 'the cause of poetry, or by those who take only pratibha as the only cause of poetry. For, due to some practice of mantras, the process of poetry writing of a given poet can be stopped for a while. Thus, J. favours 'pratibha' alone as the only cause of poetry. 'Prayojana' -- or purpose or aims of poetry : With reference to the purpose of poetry, sanskrit literary critics have advanced some items such as kirti or yasas, i.e. fame for the poet, 'priti' or 'ananda' or joy i.e. 'sadyah paranirvrti' as coined by Mammata for the reader, bhavaka, as principal aims of poetry. But poetry, they say, is also written for money,-arthakrta, for avoiding evil effects, 'sivetara-ksataye' for knowledge of the worldly business--'vyavaharavide' as Mammata puts it, and also for a message such as you have to behave like Rama and not Ravana.' i.e. 'upadesa-yuje.' But Mammata, and the rest take care to note that the instruction supplied by the poet through poetry is in the fashion of a beloved who lovingly forbids her erring husband from misbehaviour-"kantasammita-taya upadesa-yuje." Poetry does not issue a command in the fashion of sastras, nor does it coax like a friend in the fashion of the purana-literature. These and such other objectives are laid down for a poet's activity of writing poetry, but 'ananda', 'yasas' and kanta-sammita-taya' upadesa-these three have found general favour with sanskrit critics. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter II Sabda-vyapara-vicara or Functions of a word General Introduction : Sanskrit literary criticism has applied itself to classification of poetry both from the angle of its external form, i.e. its being written in prose, verse or in mixed style, and also its being written either for reading or hearing only or also for presentation on stage etc., and also from the point of view of its internal beauty, i.e. from the point of view of how it suggests what. The first is the formal approach and the second which covers all poetry--whether sravya/pathya or preksya-i.e. to be presented on the stage, also, touches the criticism aspect. This criticism oriented approach ultimately finds greater favour and was, so far as available documents go, promoted by Anandavardhana and his earlier dhvanivadins. This approach was kept up by Kuntaka, Mahima, and practically all who followed them including the great Mammata, down to Jagannatha. Now this criticism-based classification and evaluation of poetry required a through inquiry into the semantic aspect and sanskrit critics have, as a result, evolved a virtually perfect science of semantics taking care of different shades of meanings and also imagining different powers of words giving different meanings. But Sanskrit aesthetics, especially literary aesthetics is indebted to a rich heritage received from previous thinking in the branches of knowledge such as purva-mimamsa, nyaya and vyakarana to a great extent. In this chapter we will try to have a glimpse of this rich heritage which in its turn inspired thinking in semantics, which again inspired literary criticism and classification of poetry from the point of view of its literary worth. Thus criticism-oriented classification For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 127 rests on a serious contemplation on the science of semantics evolved by the alamkarikas with original inspirations received from both Mimamsa-sastra and vyakarana-sastra, to a great extent. So, for the sanskrit alamkarikas word in poetry has three powers or functions called sakti or vyapara. These powers or functions are three, the first to begin with is termed as mukhya-sakti or primary power, or abhidhasakti also called vacakasakti or the power of direct expression of primary sense, i.e. denotation or the power which gives the conventional meaning or dictionary meaning. The second is the power of indication or laksana-sakti, also called a-mukhya sakti or secondary power giving a secondary sense. This laksana-vyapara makes for any deviation, giving a-mukhyartha or laksyartha. The third is the power of suggestion or vyanjana-vyapara giving the suggested sense. We will go to see the nature and scope of these three powers or functions of a word and will evaluate the whole discussion by various alamkarikas accepting or rejecting the power of suggestion. The terms vyapara, sakti and vitti are used as synonyms from practical point of view. These different sabda-vyaparas give word-meanings that are different in nature and scope. Alamkarikas by and large have termed kavya i.e. poetry as both word and meaning i.e. the sahitya or coming together of sound and sense. As observed earlier the sense in poetry has to be charming and thus a close study of the powers of a word is basically related to the appreciation and classification of poetry. As noted, the abhida-vrtti or mukhya-vrtti or vacaka-vrtti delivers the abhidhartha, or he mukhyartha, also called the vacyartha or the conventional meaning. The ibhidhartha is termed the samketita-artha also. The laksyartha or secondary or ndicated sense is derived through laksana or the secondary power of a word inder some special circumstances. So, also the vyangyartha or suggested sense is lerived from the suggestive function, the vyanjana vyapara under special context. These powers operate on account of their special conditions. The word giving ibhidhartha or vacyartha is designated as vacaka sabda, and the others responsible or the secondary and suggested senses are termed indicative and suggestive words .e. laksaka and vyanjaka sabdas. One and the same word, under special context an be termed as vacaka and vyanjaka or vacaka, laksaka and vyanjaka as the ase may be. Yet another power or function termed "tatpaya'-vrtti is also mentioned in lamkara works. But the general opinion is in favour of calling it a 'vakya-vitti' and ot a sabda-vrtti. By vakya-vrtti is meant power of conveying sense that goes with For Personal & Private Use Only

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128 SAHRDAYALOKA a sentence as a whole. Here the sense-giving unit is not an individual word but an independent sentence which gives the correlated meaning of all the words taken together. This vakya-vrtti is not a pada-vrtti but has yet a distinct role and hence the sequence fixed is abhidha, tatparya, laksana and vyanjana which is therefore termed as turiya-vrtti also. The consideration of the topic of sabda-vyapara has been followed by Sanskrit alamkarikas in a scientific manner. But as observed earlier, their thinking carries deep influences of disciplines such as vyakarana, nyaya and mimamsa discipline trying to manage the topic of fixing the meaning of the vedas. It is precisely for this that the mimamsa darsana is said to be the 'vakya-sastra' of ancient India, and the mimamsakas are said to be 'vakya-vid.' In the same way the discipline of grammar applied itself to the consideration of a 'pada' or individual word-unit of language. The Naiyayikas, Bauddha and Jaina darsanikas also contributed seriously to semantics. So, when earlier alamkarikas beginning with Bhamaha, followed by Anandavardhana and post-Anandavardhana alamkarikas such as Mammata applied themselves to this topic of sabda-vyapara-vicara, the thinking of philosophers and grammarians serves as a useful background or say, original source to their thinking. Thus a closer acquintance with this original source material becomes useful in understanding the mind-set of the alamkarikas. We will first cultivate this acquaintance with this original source from which thoughtcurrents started in the direction of literary critics who got inspired by it. After this we will consider the stage of sabda-vrtti-vicara as reflected in alamkarikas such as Bhamaha to Rudrata, the predecessors of Anandavardhana. After this we will consider Anandavardhana's approach and then more scientific approach of Mukula Bhatta, Mammata and the rest down to important alamkarikas such as Appayya Dixit and Jagannatha on topics such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, not neglecting in between the position taken by Kuntaka, Mahima, Bhoja and the rest also. We will end with vyanjana or suggestive power of word as an independent and indispensable power of word in poetry. As for the function and nature as well as number of these word-powers differences of opinion are seen not only in philosophers and grammarians, but they continue to surface even among alamkarikas, many of whom do not accept vyanjana as an independent power of a word. Possibly, even the predecessors of Anandavardhana beginning with Bhamaha to Rudrata also could not recognise vyanjana as an independent power of a word and this explains the absence of any direct mention of vyanjana in their works. But this may not be totally conclusive For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara also because these earlier masters were not ignorant of the fact of 'pratiyamana artha' or implicit sense in poetry. The fact emerges that though no clear mentioning by name of vyanjana is seen in their works, indirect references to the same cannot be ruled out, if viewed critically. Tarkikas or logicians, Mimamsakas and their followers such as MahimaBhatta openly vote against the acceptance of vyanjana as an independent separate power of a word. The Tarka-dipika observes : "vyanjana tu saktir laksana'ntarbhuta sabda-sakti-mula | artha-sakti-mula tu anumana"dina anyatha siddha ||" Of course, this evidence is much later in date but it reveals the anti-vyanjana stand among thinkers even after its very successful establishment by leading alamkarikas. And we have Hemacandra from Gujarat the protegonist of Kashmir school of literary criticism advocating the cause of an independent 'gauni-vrtti' over and above the vyapara-traya i.e. the three powers such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana. 129 Ancient Background: First, we will look into the philosophical background. In India darsanikas and vaiyakaranas have seriously discussed the problems connected with linguistics and linguistic philosophy. They have also advanced various principles to explain the multiple activity of language. Bhartrhari, Kumarila and later the great literary critic Anandavardhana have made invaluable suggestions. In Indian thinking with reference to meaning conent, by and large two thought currents seem to be major e.g. khanda-paksa and akhanda-paksa, which may roughly be equated with the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology, observes Dr. K. K. Raja (Ref. Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 6, edn., 69, Adyar.) According to the khanda-paksa or the analytical method, a word is taken as an autonomous unit of thought and sense and studies concerning language are made on the basis of words. A sentence is made up of such independent words coming together. That an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is a common idea found in all schools of Indian Philosophy. In case of nouns the word is taken as the 'name' of a 'thing'. Hence, observes Dr. Raja (pp. 6, ibid) the regular philosophic term for a 'thing', viz. 'padartha' is literally the meaning of a word, or that which a word means. 'Namarupa' is the Sanskrit term which stands for the world of things. It suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes For Personal & Private Use Only

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130 SAHRDAYALOKA or forms and that the name and shape make for the essence of a thing. Only the nature of individual words alone is discussed by the Nyaya-sutras while in late Nyaya-vaisesika works discussion regarding the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence is met with. Panini, Patanjali and Katyayana, the grammarians, concern themselves chiefly with the derivation of correct form of words, while Yaska and his followers deal with the etymological study of wordmeanings. We may add to Dr. Raja's observation, that etymological study in its not so scientific form, is seen as early as in the Brahmana literature also. We humbly suggest that Dr. Raja should have mentioned Yaska prior to Panini as the former is placed earlier than the latter. It is in the Mimamsa discipline, that a detailed study of sentences is observed for the first time. Mimamsa is termed the 'vakya-sastra of ancient India, because it is the first, so far as documents go, to perpetuate cannons of interpretation along with a full fledged study of sentence-unit. Once again the date of Nyayasutras, or Mimamsa-sutras is decided on faith only and hardly any concrete evidences can be floated to discuss the priority of either. And even if it is done, the thought-currents represented in either go back to times of yore. But all this material taken together forms a rich heritage, which India is proud of and such an earlier material is not available in any known language except Sanskrit. Even the study as reflected in the Mimamsa texts was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings and so, the relation between word and sentence, between wordmeaning and sentence-meaning always remained in the centre. A number of Mimamsa documents are available, the oldest being Jaimini's Mimamsa sutras. This is followed by a commentary, the sabara-bhasya, by sabara swamin, with vrtti of Upavarsa (200 B. C.) preceeding it. This is followed by Kumarila's sloka-varttika (630-700 A. D.), Tantra-varttika and Tup-tika. We have Prabhakara Misra's Lighvi Tika or Brihati or Nibandhana Tika (A. D. 650-700 A. D.). Following Dr. Raja, we will record some more documents that could have proved to be shaping influences on the theories held by alamkarikas. They were written upto A. D. 1200, or even A. D. 1300, though many more works were written upto 1700 A. D. These are: Mandana Misra's (680-750 A. D.) Vidhi-viveka, Bhavana-viveka, Mimamsa-sutranukramani and Sphota-siddhi; Umbeka was nicknamed Bhavabhuti wrote (A. D. 670-700 A. D.) Tika on sloka-vartika and also on Bhavana-viveka. Prabhakara Misra's disciple Salikantha (A. D. 68-760) gave Dipasikha Tika on Laghvi (i.e. Bhasya-vivarana), and also commentaries such as Rju-vimala and Prakarana-panjika on Brihati; Vacaspati Misra (A. D. 800-900 A. D.) wrote Nyaya-kanika and Tattva-bindu on Vidhi-viveka. Sucitra Misra (A. D. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 131 1000-1100 A. D.) wrote kasika on sloka-varttika. Partha-sarathi Misra (A. D. 10501120 A. D.) contributed Nyaya-ratnakara, Tantra-ratna, sastra-dipika and Nyayaratna-mala, and Bhavanatha Bhatta gave Nyaya-Viveka (A. D. 1050-1150 A. D.). We have Bhavadeva Bhatta's (A. D. 1100) Ajita or Tantra-tika-nibandhana and Bhatta Somesvara's (A. D. 1200) Nyayasudha. Murarimisra's (A. D. 1150-1220 A. D.) Tripadi-niti-nayana, Nandisvara's (A. D. 1200-1300 A. D.) Prabhakara-vijaya, and Cidananda-Pandita's (A. D. 1200-1300 A. D.) Niti-tattva-samgraha also are noteworthy. Thus literature both on Mimamsa, and Nyaya disciplines swelled and the tradition was kept alive even upto 17th or 18th Cent. A. D. when we have such works as Gagabhatta's or Visvesvara Bhatta's (A. D. 1630-1730) Bhatta-cintamani, Kolura-Narayana Sastri's (A. D. 1630-1700 A. D.) Mimamsa-sarvasva and Vidhiviveka and Partha-Sarathi Misra's Nyaya-ratna-mala-Tika. We have seen that in ancient india, there were acaryas who insisted on the 'anityatva' or unreality of words, i.e. for them the nature of words was unreal. Yaska, we know, quotes one Audumbarayana's view to this effect such as - indriyanityam vacanam audumbarayanah (Nirukta I. i.). This means that it is the statement as a whole which is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer-, and that the 'catustva' or the four-fold classification of words in to noun, verb, upasarga and nipata does not stand. He is of the opinion that-"vyaptimattvat tu sabdasya, aniyastvac ca sabdena samjnakaranam vyavaharartham loke" (Nirukta, I, i.)-i.e. words are used for naming in daily parlance, because of their universal applicability and convenience in their case due to simplicity. Bhartehari while referring to this view in the Vakyapadiya (II. 345-349) observes that Vartaksa also accepted this and held that it is only the sentence that remains present for all time in the mind of the hearer. The akhanda-paksa of Bhartrihari accepts sentence as the fundamental linguistic fact and it is taken as Gestalt, in which parts are not deemed as relevant. The view of Audumbarayana as seen quoted in Nirukta stands at the root of this line of thinking. Among the protegonists of those who accept reality of words, i.e. those who are sabda-nityatva-vadins, two thought-currents such as abhihitanvaya-vada and anvitabhidhana-vada held by some naiyayikas and mimamsakas of the Bhatta and Prabhakara school respectively are noted. We will consider these at a later stage. Dr. Raja suggests that in the akhanda-paksa advanced by Bharthari the fundamental linguistic unit is a sentence, which is taken as a Gestalt whose parts are irrelevant. This thought-current was perhaps inspired by the view of For Personal & Private Use Only

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132 SAHRDAYALOKA Audumbarayana and was perfected by Bharthari who explains all irregularities in language behaviour. His definition of sentence reads as : eko'navayavah sabdah - i.e. word i.e. sentence is one without parts and it is revealed by the letters and words that go to make it. The meaning is conveyed by this integral unit, the vakyasphota. The sentence is thus taken as an indivisible and integral liinguistic symbol. Its meaning is 'instantaneous flash of intuition' i.e. pratibha, which is also partless. Words have no reality of their own except on worldly parlance i.e. pragmatic level. We also come across different thought-currents with reference to the change of meaning. Indian thinkers have dealt with the conditions of metaphorical tranfer of meaning from a synchronic point of view and not from diachronic or historical point of view except with reference to nirudha-laksana or faded metaphor as suggested by Dr. Raja. The importance of a word lies in its significative power. The power of a word, sakti, means the relation between a word and its sense : "saktis ca padena saha padarthasya sambandhah"- (Siddhanta-muktavali, pp. 265). The Laghumanjusa (pp. 28) observes : "pada-padarthayoh sambandha'ntaram eva Saktih, vacya-vacaka-svabhava-apara-paryayah." Whenever a word is pronounced it is through the agency of this sakti or word-power that a meaning is conveyed. With reference to the relation between word and its meaning two principal thought-currents are noticed such as one each held by the Mimamsa darsana and the Nyaya-darsana. We also come across the thought-current represented by the grammarians also. . Word-Meaning Relationship : Actually the problem of relationship between word and meaning seems to have originated even prior to the composition of the Nighantu, wherein words are arranged in different groups such as those signifying the same sense, those having multiple sense etc. The Nirukta (ch. IV) observes : "eka'rtham aneka-sabdam ity etad uktam. atha yani aneka'rthani ekasabdani tani ato'nukramisyamah. anavagata-svara-samskaran ca nigaman. tad aika-padikam ity acaksate." Patanjali also draws attention to this: (M.bh. on Vartika 16. Pa. su. I. 3.1) Language has both physical and psychological aspects. Our thoughts find audible expression through sounds produced through the agency of vocal organs. Of course all sounds may not constitute words but surely those sounds that directly signify objects are popularly known as 'sabda.' Patanjali observes in the M. bh. (=Mahabhasya) on Vartika 15, Pa. Su. III. 1.7 viz. "artha-gatyarthah sabda For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 133 prayogah. "artham sampratyayayisyami iti sabdah prayujyate." The Tantra-Vartika on Mimamsa sutra (= Mi. Su.) I. 3.8. also observes - sarvo hi sabdo'rthapratyayana'rtham prayujyate. Language thus becomes an instrument to convey our thoughts and sentiments, and the science of meaning i.e. semantics deals with this psychological aspect of language. Thus it shows how certain things are signified by certain words, how things are named, how meanings are widened or narrowed or specialised. Etymologists like Yaska had attached great importance to this psychological aspect of language in their principles of derivation. Yaska categorically emphasizes that while attempting an etymological derivation of a word, the meaning has to be taken care of first and last. Says he : 'artha-nityah parikseta'-Ni. (=Nirukta) II. Durga here observes: "artho hi pradhanam. tadguna-bhutah sabdah." Thus, grammar is concerned with the formal aspect and Nirukta is concerned with the semantic aspect of language, as Durga observes : "tasmat svatantram eva idam vidya-sthanam, artha-nirvacanam. vyakaranam tu laksana-pradhanam iti visesah." The Indian thinkers tried to approach this problem of word-meaning relationship in more, say, metaphysical way, than pure linguistic, though of course, the latter was equally important to them. They looked upon language, more as an expression of internal consciousness. Punyaraja observes (on V. P. I. i)--"pratyakcaitanyasya-antah-sannivistasya para-bodhanaya saktih abhi-syandate." Thus, a constant and invariable association of word with sense follows. When we utter any particular word at any time, some special sense is conveyed at once. To signify everything, there is always a competent word for it. Vatsyayana on the Nyaya-sutra (Nya-Su.) I. i. 4, observes -yavad artham vai namadheya-sabdah; taih arthapratyayah. artha-sampratyayat ca vyavaharah." Worldly business proceeds from understanding of a meaning. In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad II. iv - the first manifestation of the Indeterminate is said to be dual aspects of mind and speech-i.e. sabda and artha. Thus consciousness first splits itself up into the categories of subject and object"sa manasa vacam mithunam sama-bhavat." For the upanisads thought and speech are interchangeable. The mind finds its full expression in speech and also viceversa. The Aitarya upanisad observes : "van me manasi pratistha, mano me vaci pratisthitam. The Chandogya upanisad VI.8.6. observes : "purusasya prayato van manasi sampadyate," i. e. when a man dies, his speech sinks into that of mind, the mind into prana, and so on. What is implied is that speech is the product of mind. Punyaraja on V. P. I. i., quotes a sruti which suggests that there is a subtle form For Personal & Private Use Only

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134 SAHRDAYALOKA of speech i. e. vak, which is inherent in soul i. e. pure consciousness and that it is not divided from meaning : "suksmam arthena a-pravibhakta-tattvam ekam vacam abhisyandamanam uta anye viduh. anyam iva ca putam nanarupam atmani sannivistam." Speech and thought are not spearable, and this is realised only in a stage of higher spirituality. It is consciousness itself which is presented to us in two inseparable parts thus suggesting that sabda and artha are but different aspects of one and the same thing. The V. P. II. 31, says the same when it is observed that: "ekasya eva atmano bhedau sabda-tattvam yad aksaram | vivartate artha-bhavena prakriya jagato yatah ||" -- V. P. I. Being himself under the influence of Vedantic non-dualism, Bhartrhari holds that all speculations about sabda and artha are more internal than external. He observes : "artha-bhagais tatha tesam antaro'rthah prakasate" So, Punyaraja observes that for those who hold speech to be purely an internal phenomenon i.e. a manifestation of the consciousness that lies within, word and meaning which are in reality basically unseparated, appears as though distinct, only through (maya': "tesam antara-vakya-vadinam acaryanam mate, antara eva atra vakya'rthah. tau ca tatra sabda'rthau abhinnau, ekasya anyatarasya tattvasya sambandhinau, vastutah bahih sthitau bhedau iva pratibhasate iti boddhavyam." The Vakyapadiya -- In his sambandha - samuddesa Bharthari observes that the relation between word and meaning is by no means such as anyone can deny - "sambandhah samavasthitah." Helaraja observes here : "svabhavatah eva nirudho, na tu purusena nivesitah ity arthah." The relation is absolutely natural and not man-made. It is fixed by nature. V. P. III. 3 holds that the mutual relation between both word and meaning is proved by the very fact that the word is called 'vacaka' and the meaning, vacya' - "asya'yam vacako vacya iti sasthya pratiyate, yogah sabda'thayo's - tattvam apy ato vyapadisyate." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 135 When it is said that this is pointed out by the word', or, when it is said, 'this word expresses this sense,' it is understood that there is some kind of relation between vacya and vacaka. When Bhartshari observes at V. P. I. 6 that 'sabdanam yatasakti-tvam...,' he implies, explains Punyaraja, that words by their very nature have the power to signify definite ideas of which they are treated as symbols, and that their potency is never exhausted and remains particularly inherent in them : --"sabdanam yatasaktitvam; niyata'rtha-pratyayana-samarthyam." V. P. II. 29 observes: "yasmins tuccarite sabde yaya yo'rthah pratiyate | tam ahur artham tasyaiva na'nyad arthasya laksanam 11" The meaning of a word is what presents itself to us whenever that word is heard. The utterance of the word 'gauh' gives rise, immediately, to the idea in our mind of a being, possessing dewlap, hump, etc. and this naturally is its meaning. Word and its meaning are related to each other from times immemorial. The analogy to this relation is found in the functioning of sense-organs with respect to the object-world. Thus both are without beginning, observes Bhartrhari at V. P., . Sambandha-samuddesa, III. 29 : indriyanam sva-visayesu anadir yogyata yatha, anadir arthaih sabdanam sambandho yogyata tatha." Word and meaning are being so absolutely connected with each other that it is impossible to think of one without the other. Kalidasa has suggested the relation of vag-arthau' for the union of Siva-Parvati. The V. P. I. 50 observes that word, like knowledge, reveals itself as well as the idea or thing comprehended : "atma-rupam yatha jnane jneya-rupam ca disyate, artha-rupam tatha sabde sva-rupam ca prakasate." For Bhartshari, three things are simultaneously comprehended when we utter a word, such as, the particular word, the intention of the speaker, and the object For Personal & Private Use Only

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136 SAHKDAYALOKA denoted : "jnanam prayoktur, bahyo'rthah svarupam ca pratiyate sabdair uccaritais tesam sambandhah samavasthitah." (V. P. III. 1) A sound is meaningless, if it does not convey these three things, viz. the sound itself, its import and the actual fact. So, in case of an absence of relation existing between word and its meaning, we cannot account logically for the derivation of a given meaning from a given word. So, in such a relation, a fundamental solution of a question, as to why things are invariably signified by their corresponding words, is seen by Bhartshari. Different Views : The relation of word and meaning has been explained differently by different schools of thought. The Mimamsakas and the grammarians. hold the relation between word and meaning as permanent : Vacaspati in his Tatparya-tika on Nyaya-sutra (=Nya. Su.) II.1.55 takes note of this : ye'pi mimamsaka vaiya-- karana va svabhavikam sabda'rthayoh sambandham asthisata." - The Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas look upon this relation as conventional i.e. 'samketita' or creation of Divine Will. Still others maintain that the relation between sound and sense is like one that exists between cause and effect, or manifester and manifested, i.e. grahaka and grahya, etc.: Punyaraja on V. P. I. observes : sabdarthasya karya-karana-sambandhasca iti eke. - The V. P. I. has : "grahyatvam grahakatvam ca dve sakti tejaso yatha, tathaiva sarva-sabdanam ete prthag avasthite." and also, "prakasaka-prakasyatvam karya-karana-rupata, antar matra"tmanas tasya sabda-tattvasya sarvada." (V. P. II) For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 137 For still others, speech and thought, or word and things are mutually convertible, and, there is also some reciprocality of causal connection between the two : V. P. III. 32. Sambandha-samuddesa reads as . "sabdah karanam arthasya, sa hi tenopajayate, tatha ca buddhi-visayad artha cchabdah pratiyate." For some, again, sound and sense are essentially the same, i.e. they come from the same source : "ekasyaiva atmano bhedau sabdarthav apsthak sthitau." (V. P. I.) This view is criticised by some who feel that in case word and sense are essentially the same, then one should experience burn while pronouncing 'agnih' or fire. But this criticism is misdirected. What is actually meant by the view quoted as above is that one and the same thing gets manifested in different forms in which objects are usually comprehended by all beings. Thus quotes Punyaraja :-eko'yam sakti-bhedena bhavatma pravibhajyate, buddhi-vstty anusarena bahudha jnanavadinam." He further quotes : "sabdarthayor a-sambhede vyavahare prthak-kriya yatah sabdarthayos-tattvam ekam tat samavasthitam." i.e. word and meaning, fundamentally non-different appear to be different only in popular usage. We will consider as below, different views as held by the Mimamsakas, Nyayavaisesikas etc. in greater details. Mimamsakas : The Mimamsakas have seriously thought about this problem. Before discussing the relation as such between word and its meaning, the Vsttikara (pp. 43) discusses in the beginning as to whether there is any possibility of there being any relation as such between word and sense. They, for sure, can not be connected by samslesa or samyoga i.e. association, because in that case, the utterance of a word, say 'ksura' or 'modaka', could cut or sweeten the mouth respectively. This is not our For Personal & Private Use Only

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138 SAHRDAYALOKA common experience. There again cannot be the relation of karya-karana or causeeffect, or nimitta-naimittikabhava, or asraya-asrayi-bhava i.e. the relation of a thing and its substratum, existing between them. As the sabda and artha are both 'nitya' or eternal, the first two relations are out of question. The third is also not possible, because of the fact that they have different asrayas or substratum as the sabda or word resides in akasa, ether, and the artha i.e. meaning resides in prthivi. So then, what kind of relation can there be ?-The Vrtti, pp. 43 reads as "naiva sabdasya arthena sambandhah, kuto'sya pauruseyata a-pauruseyata va iti. katham ? syac ced arthena sambandhah, ksra-modako-ccarane, mukhasya patana-purane syatam; yadi samslesa-laksanam abhipretya ucyate. karyakarana, nimitta-naimittika,-asrayasrayibhavadayas tu sambandhah, sabdasya anupapanna eva. To this, the answer from the Mimamsaka, is very simple, viz. that the sabda is 'pratyayaka' and the artha is 'pratyayya', i.e. there is the relation of 'conveyor and conveyed' or "pratyayya-pratyayaka-sambandha." So, between sabda and artha, there is 'pratyayya-pratyayaka-bhava or "samjna-samjni-laksana-sambandhah." Now, if this relation is accepted, then we should expect the word to convey its artha even on its first hearing. But our experience goes against this. The word listened for the first time does not convey a meaning -i.e. The prathama-sruta-sabda is not a 'pratyayaka.' In that case the relation cannot be that of 'pratyayya-pratyayaka.' But this argument can be refuted by pointing out to our experience which surely is of the form that the word is pratyayaka-conveyor, and the sense is 'pratyayya' or conveyed; for we find invariably that sabda conveys 'artha.' In case of its not being 'pratyayaka'--or conveyor, when 'prathama-sruta' or heard for the first time, it may be observed that it becomes 'pratyayaka' or conveyor, as many times as it is necessary for it to become so. Only thus our normal experience can be explained. We cannot regard an eye to be an adrastr-or non-perceiver-only because it fails to see objects in the absence of light. The same is the case with reference to the word Just as light is the ancillary cause or sahakari karana in the act of perceiving objects, similarly 'bahukrt-sravana' or repeated hearing is the sahakari-karana in sabda being an artha-pratyayaka or a word conveying some sense vrtti on pp. 43 observes "sarvatra no darsanam pramanam, pratyayaka iti pratyayam drstva avagacchamo, na prathama-sruta iti. prathama-sravane pratyayam adrstva yavatkrtvah srutena iyam samjna ayam samjni iti avadharitam bhavati, tavat-krtvah srutad arthavagamah, iti. yatha caksur drastru, na bahyena prakasena vina, prakasayati iti a-drastru na bhavati."-- For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 139 Jaimini and Sabara reject the view that this relation viz. pratyayaka-pratyayya sambandha is a temporal relation and is therefore temporary, or impermanent. They hold that it exists permanently and that it is not created after the existence of word and meaning. Jaimini and Sabara have very often made it clear that the relation between sabda and artha is "autpattika" i.e. 'nitya' or eternal, and not man-made. See :- Mi. Su. I. 15-autpattikas tu sabdasya'rthena sambandhah; also V. i. 13 - autpattikatvat, also Mi. Su. VII. 2.5-vikaro nautpattikatvat; Mi. Su. VI. 8.41-utpatti-namadheyatvad bhaktya prthak satisu syat; Mi. Su. VII. 3. 22 - autpattiko hi nami-namnoh sambandhah; see also Sabara bhasya on VI. 8.41, pp. 1522; on VII. 2.5, pp. 1543, and on VIII 3. 3. pp. 1550. So, according to both Jaimini and Sabara, because the relation between word and sense is eternal, i.e. autpattika, a word can be expressive of one and only one signification and that it cannot be made to signify that, with which it is not connected naturally. As for the objection (i.e. purva-paksa) to this, it may be said that the main defect of this view (i.e. of the siddhantin) is that there is no 'purusa' whom they can prove to be sambaddha or connector or co-ordinator. His existence can not be proved by pratyaksa, or direct means. Again, when pratyaksa fails, the other means of knowledge i.e. pramanas dependent on it also fail. You cannot say that he must have been pratyaksa to people of his times, because we do not have any traditional account to support this. The tradition can be broken also. Actually the purva-paksa i.e. objectors should furnish us with strong reasons to support their plea. The tanks etc. on the Himalayas, for example, must be the work of some purusa totally unknown to us even by tradition. But here the absence or break of tradition is caused by desotsada or kulotsada, resulting ultimately in the loss of memory of men. But the same cannot be said about sabda and artha, as we cannot imagine a period when man was not connected with sabda-vyapara. Thus, in the absence of any break or 'viyoga' there is no reason why there should be no memory i.e. smarana of some sambaddha. The absence of his smarana, therefore, can be taken as an indication of the absence of any sambaddha himself. Thus the objector's view stands refuted - see vrtti on pp. 53 : --"tad idanim ucyate, apauruseyatvat sambandhasya siddham iti. katham punah avagamyate apauruseya eva sambandhah iti ? purusasya sambandhuh abhavat. katham sambandho nasti ? pratyaksasya pramanasya abhavat. tat-purvakatvaccetaresam. nanu cira-vitta-tvat pratyaksasya a-visayo bhaved idanintananam. na hi cira-vrttah san na smaryeta. na ca hima-vrksadisu For Personal & Private Use Only

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140 SAHRDAYALOKA kupa-arama-adivad asmaranam bhavitum arhati, purusa-viyogo hi tesu bhavati desotsadena va kulotsadena va. na ca sabdartha-vyavahara-viyogah purusanam asti." Now, it may be argued that the sambaddha goes out of memory because it was not necessary to remember him in the sabdartha-vyavahara which could be continued even without remembering him. We tend to forget things which cease to be useful for our immediate purpose. It should not mean that they never existed before. So, mere non-remembrance does not prove the total absence of a coordinator or sambaddha. But this point of the objector can be set aside as fallicious. It is true that people are primarily concerned with the relation or sambandha of word and meaning, and not with the sambaddha or co-ordinator. But, it can not be said that the relation of sambaddha is useless, as it is the pre-requisite of vyavahara-siddhi, i.e. the common activity depends on that. For any vyavahara to be fruitful, it should be necessarily preceded by the full agreement between sambandha-karta and vyavahara, because in the absence of either sampratipatti or agreement, or vipratipatti or disagreement, fruition i.e. artha-siddhi becomes impossible. Thus, the terms viddhi' and 'ma-kara' will not convey the senses of 'ai' and 'an' and 'a-sarva-gurutrika' respectively, when used by somebody who does not agree with Panini or Pingala. Now, the point is that, if there is no smarana or remembrance of the karta i.e. agent or doer, the sampratipatti illustrated as above, cannot follow. So, it is wrong to say that karty-smarana or remembering the agent is not necessary for immediate purposes. So, in the absence of smarana, it can be safely concluded that there was no karta i.e. doer i.e. co-ordinator at all (see vrtti on pp. 53). Jaimini and Sabara hold that the existence of a sambandha-karta cannot be proved by arthapatti i.e. implication. We can resort to it only in the absence of any other possible explanation. In arthapatti we attempt to explain facts which are apparently inexplicable. Impossibility of application of any other pramana or means of knowledge forms the very basis of arthapatti (see vstti on pp. 38, and also Sabara-bhasya on Mi. Su. II. 2. 1., pp. 462, and on VI. 6. 3., on pp. 481). We will consider the objector's position in greater detail. According to the objector, no word was connected in the beginning with any meaning at all. Then, somebody, sometime, established the connection between word and meaning. Thus words came to be significatory of a given sense. This is one explanation of the sabdartha-vyavahara. Then, vrddha-vyavahara forms yet another explanation. Even to-day we see the younger ones getting at a given sense from a given word, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 141 by first observing the speeches i.e. spoken words and then the consequent transactions or activity of the elders. The elders on their part might themselves have learnt their first lessons in gathering of meaning i.e. artha-grahana by observing the practice of their seniors and so on. Thus veddha-vyavahara is a second explanation, the first being that of a sambandha-karta, such as Panini or Pingala in case of words such as veddhi and 'ma-kara' respectively. Now, the point to be raised is that when vrddha-vyavahara can be pointed out as a possible solution, why then postulate the theory of a 'sambandha-karta' ? So, the Siddhantin concludes that there is no scope for 'arthapattsi'-pramana, in this case. The other explanation, viz. vrddha-vyavahara, being strengthened by pratyaksapramana, should be more acceptable (Vstti, pp. 55). The fact that youngsters catch 'artha' even if they do not know the sambandha, is a matter of everyday experience which defeats all questions. They do not arrive at artha-jnana by the smarana of a sambandha-karta, i.e. co-ordinator. So, it has to be rejected. See vstti on pp. 58--"syad etat. a-pratisambandha balah katham vrddhebhyah pratipayanta iti. nasti drste anupapannam nama. drsta bala vaddhebhyah pratipadyamanah, na ca pratipannah sambandhah sambandhasya kartuh. tasmat vaisamyam."--The very presumption of sambandha-karta is absurd. Sambandha-karana means giving names to things. To assume that all things having names were present when this ceremory of giving names was performed, sounds absurd. At least some things could have come into existence later. Thus the assumption of a sambandha-karta sounds futile :- "anupalabdhe ca devadattav arthe anarthakam samjna-karanam, asakyam ca. visesan pratipattum eva hi samjnah kriyante, visesansca upadisya. tad-vicesesu ajnayamanesu, ubhayam api anavakliptam. tasmat apauruseyah sabdasya arthena sambandhah" (Vitti. pp. 58). Jaimini and Sabara also show that it is impossible to think of any sambandha-karta in case of the Veda also. (See, Mi. Su. I. i, 27-32; Sabara bhasya thereon). Thus the relation between word and meaning is 'autpattika' i. e. 'nitya', i. e. not man-made but eternal. The Mimamsakas were compelled to ascribe eternality to both words and their relation with meanings, because, as Kumarila explains, they maintained the trustworthiness of the Vedas beyond question. Kumarila seeks logical justification also. Just as the operation of the visual organs is said to be immediate instrument n of form i.e. rupa, eventhough, ultimately the conjunction of the soul with the mind makes for it, similarly, the cognition of the relation and not that of the word itself, is popularly considered as what directly helps us in determining For Personal & Private Use Only

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142 SAHRDAYALOKA the meaning :- sloka-vartika, sambandhaksepa-vada 41-42 reads : "sarira'tma-mano-yogat asadharanatabalat, vijnana'sattibhavac ca, caksuh karanam isyate." "tathaivehadhi-sambandhajnanamangam prasiddhitah, gauravat karanatvena matam cet, kena varyate ?" Artha-jnana, OR Determination of Sabdartha : The Mimansakas have also given thought to the problem of how to determine the sabdartha. The simplest way is - yah pratiyate sa sabda'thah - i.e. that which is understood is the meaning of a word. But then in a sentence such as "purvo dhavati," the sense of 'aparo dhavati' also clicks, and sure, the word 'purvah' does not yield the sense of "aparah." So, the rule as mentioned above viz. 'yah pratiyate sa sabda'rthah' can be modified as, "whatever sense is conveyed, and is intended to be conveyed is the meaniong of a word." Jaimini observes : "tad agame hi tad drsyate." Sabara reads--"yasya ca agame, yad upajayate sa tasya artha iti gamyate." This can be termed the rule of anvaya-vyatireka. (See Sabara bhasya on Mi. Su. IV. 1. 14. pp. 1203, and on Mi. Su. IV. 1. 15;) see also -- yasya ca'game yad upajayate sa tasya artha iti gamyate. tasya jnanam yatha anyesam sabdanam. asvam anaya iti ukte, asvanayanam pratiyate. gam anaya iti ukte, gavanayanam. tatra asvo'paiti, gauh ca upajayate. tena jnatena asva-sabdasya asvo'rtho goabdasya gauh iti ca." (Sabara bhasya on Mi. Su. I. 3. 9.) The next source of artha-jnana is the 'abhi-yuktas' or the Sastra-stha's. Jaimini says: "sastrastha va tannimitta-tvat." Sabara says - yah sastrasthanam, sa sabdarthah. (S. B.= Sabara bhasya; on Mi. Su. VIII. 2. 24. pp. 1610). See also -- "sabdartha'-dhigame abhiyuktopadesah pramanam; S. B. on I. 3. 10, pp. 226, and 'abhiyuktah sabdarthesu sistah; S. B. on I. 3. 10. pp. 226; and -- sastrasthanam sa sabdarthah-S. B. on I. 3. 9. pp. 217; see also S. B. on I. 3. 27. The question is who are these sastrasthas or abhiyuktas or sistas ? Why are they held as pramanas ? To this Sabara says that their tradition and acquaintance with vedas and sastras is unbroken and hence they are to be looked upon as authority. Sabara observes : (S. B. on I. 3. 9. pp. 217)--ke sastrastha sistah. tesam avicchinna smstih sabdesu vedesu ca. tena sistanam iti sruti-smrty avadharane; and also -- "aryavartanivasinam sabdarthopayesu abhiyuktanam abhi-vya haratam karmani For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 143 ca'nutisthatam antya-janapada-vasibhyo mlecchebhyah samicinatarah acaro bhavati (S. B. on II. 3. 3., pp. 585). (All references are shown, courtesy - Prof. Devasthali's, "Mimamsa; or the Vakya-Sastra of ancient India.") Yet another source is said to be Nigama, Nirukta and Vyakarana. This is more so with reference to such words as -- jarbhari, turi, turgari, etc. found in the Vedas. (see S. B. on I. 2. 41, pp. 156). In the case of words that do not belong to the language of the aryans, and yet are found in the scriptures, Jaimini and Sabara hold that here, i.e. where it is a question of borrowed words, we should accept their original sense which they normally convey in their particular language from which they are taken up. So the rule is--"coditam tu pratiyate, avirodhat pramanena." But if there are such words as are not understood even by the Mlecchas, then, in that case, once again, we have to seek the sistas or Nigama, Nirukta and Vyakarana (S. B. on Mi. Su. I. 3. 10; pp. 225, pp. 227 etc.). Again there might be certain cases in which one and the same word might show different usages among different people. For this, Sabara says that a usage which is less wide is not to be accepted when it conflicts with a wider usage --a-sarva-laukikasya prayogasya sarva-laukikena prayogena virudhyamanasya a-pramanyam syat. abhyupagacchanti hi te janapadinah saryabhaumam prayogam." (S. B. on Mi. Su. II. 3. 3., pp. 581). Yet another criterion is that, what conflicts with the sastras is less acceptable, than what, though not actually supported by the sastras, at least does not stand in conflict with it. As the inhabitants of aryavarta are much in touch with the sabda'rthopayas, their view is more acceptable than the antya-janapada-vasin mleccha : "api ca avipragita laukika vipragitebhyah pratyayita-tarah bhavanti. tathaca aryavarta-nivasinam sabdarthopayesu abhiyuktanam abhivyaharatam karmani ca anutisthatam antya-jana-pada-vasibhyo mlecchebhyah samicinataro acaro bhavati." - (S. B. on Mi. Su. II. 3. 3. pp. 581). Again, whenever there is conflict between anumana and pratyaksa prayoga; or between prayoga and smrti, the latter is to be regarded as stronger in each case - sabara says -- "prayogacca smtitir baliyasi., or prayogo durbalah smoteh, and also, anumanatah prayogo balavan, etc. etc. And finally, -laukikah prayogah labda'rtha-paricchede hetuh.' Words in a vidhi-sastra like vedas or words in law should be understood exactly as we understand them in ordinary language. Pravrttinimitta of sabda is also discussed by the Mimamsakas. The word putra' denotes 'akrti' but it can come into existence, when a person referred to by hat word is related to somebody as a son. Thus, in this case, 'sambandha' i.e. relation is the pravrtti-nimitta, i.e. the cause of its being current in usage, of the For Personal & Private Use Only

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144 SAHRDAYALOKA word 'putra.' Thus, the word 'yupa' is a samskara-sabda. The word 'rajya' depends on the relation between 'karman' and 'rajan', which shows that it is a yaugika' word. Thus 'samskara' and 'yoga' are the pravrtti-nimittas in these two cases. Before considering the various pravrtti-nimittas, we should know what actually it means. Sabara observes : ye naimittikah sabdah te nimittam upalabhya prayujyante, yatha dandi, cchatri, iti.; i.e. only that factor can be called a pravrttinimitta, in the absence of which the particular word cannot be used. Thus in the absence of samskaras or religious inuction a pillar cannot be termed yupa.' 'Jati'class, of akrti-figure itself is the chief pravrtti-nimitta. When there is nothing else in particular to be conveyed by a word, it conveys aksti-form/figure. So aksti is the pravrtti-nimitta of such words. Same is the case with "jati' in case of 'jati-nimittasabdah.' It may be noted that when jati becomes the pravitti-nimitta of a sabda, as a rule, this sabda is to be accepted as a jati-sabda, even though in special cases, the word might appear to convey something else, e. g. samskara etc. also. (See, Mi. Su I. iv. 10, and S. B. thereon). Loka-prayoga or common usage becomes the determinant cause in such cases. The next pravrtti-nimitta is 'yoga' or relation, and such words are termed 'yaugika' e. g. the word "proksani." Sabara explains the word 'yaugika' when he says-raja-sabdah prasiddher mulam. tad-yogat rajya-sabdah. Thus when a word comes into usage, not directly for its own artha, but owing to its connection i.e. yoga or samyoga with some other word, already in usage, such word is called yaugika or yoga-siddha i.e. derived from some relation. Jaimini suggests this in the sutra-- "proksanisu artha-samyogat,"; see also SB. on Mi. Su. I. iv. 11, pp. 344; - proksani-sabdam prati sandehah, kim samskara-nimittah uta jati-nimittah.....etc. tasmad yaugikah." Then samskara i.e. inuction is also another pravstti-nimitta as in case of words such as yupa' etc. If a word is sometimes found to be used as a jati-sabda, it must always be taken as a jati-sabda, eventhough in certain cases it might appear as a samskara sabda e.g. the word 'barhih'. Sabdara justifies the above rule on logical grounds. If words such as 'barhih' are taken as samskaranimittas,, setting aside their laukika usage in that case, we take them as 'alaukika' words. But this is not the right approach. The rule regarding the 'bala'bala' of 'samskara' and 'jati' as pravrtti-nimittas is suggested by Jaimini in the sutra I. iv. 10. viz. barhirajyayorasamskare sabda-labhat-a-tac-chabdah.' Fourth pravrttinimitta is 'sambandha.' A yaugika word, say, rajya is dependent upon some jatisabda e.g. rajan which is the source of its currency-prasiddhi-mula.' But the word raja by itself is quite independent. The word putra' depends upon the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 145 relation with someone to whom a person is related as a son. Now, in case of words such as frajan' and 'rajya', the former is "jati' sabda, and is the source- prasiddhimula-of the usage of the word rajya. But this is not the case with the words 'putra' and 'pitr', which are mutually dependent and therefore called 'sambandhi' sabdas. Sabara explains it as : 'sambandhi-sabdas ca sarve sapeksah, vina padantarena, na paripurnam artham abhi-vadanti.' (See also SB. on VII 7.24, pp. 1500,-bahutvam capeksikam etc.) "Rudhi' i.e. practice is also a pravitti-nimitta. The word 'kusala' i.e. one who cuts kusa grass, is an illustration here. Now it suggests all the qualities which a man should possess while plucking kusa blades. Usage has now restricted the sense of this word to this 'nipunata' i.e. expertise alone. Later alamkarika Mammata takes rudhi-mula laksana here, and Visvanatha rejects it. For Sabara also it is not a case of laksana. Sabara holds that such a phenomenon occurs where a word is a composite whole. It gives one signification when taken as a whole-i.e. samudaya, and another signification when taken as made of parts. Sabara opines that in such cases the meaning of the composite whole is to be taken as stronger--"avayavaprasiddheh, samudaya-prasiddhih baliyasi." (S. B. on VI. 7. 21, 22, pp. 14991500), ---yatha kusalah, pravinah"....etc. All the pravrtti-nimittas refer to the expressed sense i.e. vacyartha and not laksyartha or indicated sense. For laksana, the Mimamsakas suggest different pravrtti-nimittas or conditions. Naiyayikas : We will now consider the Nyaya-Vaisesika views on the subject of the relationship of word and meaning, or the association of symbol and the symbolised. The Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas do not differ much on this issue. For both of them, the meaning of a word is determined by 'samaya' or 'samketa' i.e. convention. Difference of opinion between the two i.e. the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas lies in the fact that while the Vaisesikas include sabda-bodha i.e. verbal cognition in the category of inference, the Naiyayikas take it as an independent source of knowledge. It should be noted that the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas, both do not recognise the possibility of any relation-i.e. either samyoga or samavaya--(= impermanent or permanent relation) between a word and the object it denotes : "sabdartha-sambandhau"--Vai. Su. II. 2.18; "tatha ca asata ghata"dina sabdasya na samyogo na va samavaya iti bhavah." Upaskara; and "purana For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA pradaha-patana-anupapattes ca sambandha'-bhavah." Nya. Su. I. 53, and also see Nyayamanjari pp. 241-"na hi kundala-badaryor iva samyoga-svabhavah, tantupatayor iva samavaya"tma va sambandhah pratyaksam upalabhyate." The author of Nyayamanjari has found fault from logical point of view with the views of Mimamsakas and Vaiyakaranas who have tried to establish some sambandha or relation between word and its denotation. Nyaya-manjari (pp. 241) observes: "na sams'lesa-laksanah sabda'rtha-sambando'smabhir abhyupagamyate. tatah kim karya-karana, nimitta-naimittika, asrayasrayibhava-adayah sabdasya arthena sambandhah ? ete'pi na-taram. tatah kim sabda'rthayor avinabhava-sambandhah ? so'pi nasti. kas tarhi ? samayah" 146 The Vaisesika view-point is as below-conjunction or samyoga is a kind of quality. Sabda or word being itself a quality of akasa, cannot possess 'samyoga'another quality. With the object denoted by it :-'gunatvat'-Vai. Su. VII. 2. 14.; also, 'tatha ca gunasya sabdasya gunah samyogah katham syat ? --upaskara. Again, there is no action as such which takes place when things are denoted by words. So, we cannot find out any connection between the two: 'niskriyatvat'-- Vai. Su. VII. 2. 16. Things that are formless (i.e. not material) and inactive by nature, can never be related to one another without the intervention of external force. Again, in cases like, 'there is no pot,' one fails to think of any conjunction between the word and its meaning, which is non-existent at present--"asti na'sti ti ca prayogat," Vai. Su. VII. 2. 16. Our universal experience is that things that are mutually related are found to have co-existence. The word 'nasti' (= there is no pot), now uttered, does not logically co-exist with the thing which is simply negated. Similarly, samavaya-sambandha between a word and the object also does not stand. The Naiyayikas do not agree even to the idea of natural relation, either samyoga or samavaya, but on the contrary, tried to refute the theory of eternal relation between sabda and artha. A sambandha i.e. connection as such is negated because there is neither pratyaksa nor anumana proof for it :-"prapti-laksanas tu sabda'rthayo sambandhah pratisiddhah. kasmat? pramanatonupalabdheh." Vatsyayana on Nya. Su. II. 1. 52. Again, a union of the two is not possible, as the two do not remain in the same locality. A word exists in the vocal organ of the speaker and the object lies in a different place :-"prapti-laksane ca grhyamane sambandhe sabda'rthayoh sabda'ntike va arthah syat, artha'ntike va sabdah syat. tasman na sabdena arthah praptah iti." (Vatsyayana, on Nya. Su. II. 1. 52.) and also "mukhe hi sabdam upalabhamahe bhumav artham," (sabara, on M. S. I. i. 5.). So, in this state of affairs, the conclusion that, the words and things referred For Personal & Private Use Only -

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara to by them are not connected, forces itself upon us.-"sabdarthau sambaddhau."-Vai. Su. VII. 2. 18. svabhavato hy a-sambaddhav etau sabdarthau. mukhe hi sabdam upa-labhamahe, bhumav artham."-Sabara; and also see Nya. Su. II. 1. 5-sabdartha-vyavasthanad a-pratisedhah." A sound has its origin in the mouth while the object, such as a pot, lies on the earth. But, at the same time, the entire absence of relationship is also against all popular experience. To deny any relation is to strike at the very root of our knowledge of things. There has to be at least some relation-whether real or imposed-between the two, because in the absence of any relation whatsoever, any word would have denoted any object, e.g. the word 'ghata' would have denoted the object viz. 'pata' also (See V. P. i. 125). On the contrary, we find that the utterance of a particular word is always accompanied by the comprehension of a definite thing. "artha-smaranasya'pi sabdollekhenaiva darsanat." (punyaraja)-there is, no knowledge which is not associated with its word "na so'sti pratyayo loke yah sabda'nugamad rte, anuviddham iva jnanam sarvam sabdena bhasate." (V. P. I. 124). The cognition of a thing from a word is in itself a strong evidence of some relation existing between the two "sati pratyaya-hetutve sambandha upapadyate sabdasya'rthe yatas tatra sambandho'stiti gamyate." (V. P. Sambandha-samuccaya, III. 37). 147 The Naiyayikas did not accept the natural connection between the two, but at the same time, they did not, in any way, deprecate the uniformity of cognition as is represented by words in the way of denoting things.-sabdah sambandho'rtham pratipadayati, pratyaya-niyama-hetutvat, pradipavat."-Nyaya-Varttika. If it is asked that in case of the absence of relation between the two, how can a word as a rule denote some object?: "nanu yadi na samyoga, na samavayah sabdarthayos tarhi kena sambandhena sabdo niyatam artham pratipadayatity ata-aha-" Upaskara. Kanada, with the Naiyayikas, says that the cognition of a meaning is not because of any connection as such, but it results from the 'samketa'-The Will of God-expressed in the following way, viz., 'let this meaning be gathered from this word.'-"samayikah sabda'rtha-pratyayah" Vai. Su. VII. 2. 20.; na samayikatvat saba'rtham sampratyayasya." Vai. Su. II. 1. 55; and also - samayika iti samayah isvarah, samketah. asmat-sabdad ayamartho boddhavyah itya"karah. yah sabdo yasminn arthe bhagavata samketitah sa tam artham pratipadayati." a Samketa thus, is caused by Divine Will and not established by human agency: "sargantaresv api vacya-vacaka-saktyapeksah sanketah kriyate,"-on sutra-"tasya vacakah pranavah."-This relation between vacya and vacaka will never come to an end, and will continue even in future stage of existence. It is a fact and not a For Personal & Private Use Only

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148 SAHRDAYALOKA fiction. Vyasa refers to this in his yogasutra. A word expresses only that sense which is assigned to it by the Divine Will. Thus, between the word and the object, this samketa exists, and not that of samyoga or samavaya. The Vaisesikas and the Naiyayikas had to go for it. It may be noted however, that from the Nyayasutras and the bhasya thereon, it is not sufficiently clear whether by 'samketa' is meant the Divine Will or the human will. The expression--"prayujyamanagrahanac ca samayopayogo laukikanam"-it is intended to imply that samketa follows from vsiddha-vyavahara. Grammar also contributes to the same purpose by analysing words into 'praksti' and 'pratyaya', -- "samayaparipalana'rtham cedam padalaksanaya vaco'nvakhyanam vyakaranam." Vacaspati, Jayantabhatta and Gadadhara have clearly referred to the Will of God as Samketa--"paramesvarena hi srsty adau yo gavadi sabdanam arthe samketah krtah, so'dhuna vsiddhavyavahare prayujyamananam sabdanam a-vidita-sangatibhir api balaih sakyo grahitum-" Tatparya-tika; and see also : tasmadisvara-viracitasambandha'dhigamopayabhuta-veddha-vyavahara-balat tad-avyutpatti-sapekso sabdo'rtham avagamayati-ti siddham.: Nyayamanjari- pp. 246This Divine Volition represents the relation and is rightly called the real power of denotation of a word, i.e. sakti. :- "saktirupah sambandhah iti uktam."-Nyayamanjari; "saktis ca padena saha padarthasya sambandhah"-Muktavali. Gotama also arrives at the same point. He holds the relation to be just conventional and certainly not natural or innate : "samayikah sabda'rthasampratyayah na svabhavikah. rsyacarya-mlecchanam yathakamam sabdaprayogo'rtha-pratyayanam pravartate."--Vatsyayana, under Nya. Su. II. i. 56. If it were natural, as held by the grammarians (siddhah svabhavikah sabdarthayah sambandhah"Helaraja) he argues, then the same word would have been used by different races of mankind in the same sense, and consequently no varieties of language would have resulted : "jativisese ca'-niyamat" : Nya. Su. II. i. 56. The word 'gauh' is so fashioned by the Divine Will, that it always denotes a particular thing and not anything else. We feel that modern thinkers on this topic would also chose to side with the Naiyayikas. How is the Samketa apprehended ? To this, it is said that its cognition is current from time without beginning. (Nyayamanjari-na hi sabdartha-vyavahara-rahita kascit kalah upapadyate). We cannot think of any people any day incapable of signifying objects by the use of sounds Udayana says that God became a magician in the beginning and brought the words and objects--vacya and vacaka-together. He assumed the dual forms of For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 149 the denotative and the denoted before he could make the first group of people familiar with the samketa, which he invented. --"isvaro'pi prayojya-prayojakabhavapannam sarira-dvayam parigthya vyavaharam krtva tadanintananam saktim grahayati."--(comm. by Haridasa Bhattacarya). From this first group of men, the others of later generations gathered the meaning of words. THERE ARE VARIOUS SOURCES OF SAMKETA-GRAHANA : (Jagadisa quotes in sabda-sakti-prakasika) --"saktigraham vyakaranopamanakosaptavakyad-vyavaharatas ca, vakyasya sesad vivste vadanti sannidhyatah siddhapadasya vTddhah." First of all comes the vsddha-vyavahara. The logicians and grammarians have explained this. Samketa is two-fold :ajanika i.e. one not of human origin but current from eternity; and adhunika i.e. man-made : "ajanikah adhunikah samketo dvividho matah, nitya ajanikas tatra Saktir ity abhigiyate." "kadacitkas tu adhunikah sastrakaradibhih krtah"--(V. P.) Primary signification known as sakti comes under the former and the technical terms such as guna, vaddhi, etc. come under the latter. We have examined the views of the grammarians. The view of Vyadi as given by Punyaraja is that there is no author of the relation that exists between words (both vedic and popular) and the object denoted by them: "sambandhasya na karta'sti sabdanam loka-vedayoh." (quoted by Punyaraja, under V. P. I. 26.) The grammarians insist on the eternality of both words and meanings. The Mahabhasya (= M. bh.) says that the words, the meanings, and the relation between them are all eternal. - "siddhe sabdartha-sambandhe."--varttika I Patanjali has explained the word 'siddha' as a synonym of 'nitya' (nitya-paryaya-vaci siddha-sabdah), and also "nityo'hy arthavatam arthaih abhi-sambandhah"-M. bh. I. i. 1. How is this permanent relation known ? To this, it is said that the object for which words are expressly used constitutes in itself a sufficient proof to show that the relation between words and meanings is natural and permanent : --"katham punarjnayate siddhah sabdartha-sambandhah ca iti ? lokatah. yalloke'rtham upadaya sabdan prayunjate tesam vivrtau yatnam kurvanti." (M. bh. I. i. 1). In the absence of this permanent and natural relation no one would have ever felt the need for using words for the purposes of communicating For Personal & Private Use Only

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150 thoughts to others. Bhartrhari - It has been noted that for Bhartrhari the relationship between word and meaning is as beginningless as the relation between sense-organs and their objects-i.e. indriya'rtha-sambandha. This relation is explained differently. He regards it as unconventional : "akrtrimo'bhisambandho visesana-visesyavat." (V. P. II. 370), It is as between a noun and adjective. He also suggests that the proper names (such as Dittha) and the technical terms (as vrddhi, guna, etc.) are also permanently related to their specialised senses"-- "nitya eva tu sambandho dittha'disu gavadivat" (V. P. II) He also shows the mutual causal connection between sabda and artha. A word appears to be the immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is gathered and again, a word is comprehended only through the instrumentality of sense that is previously ascertained by the intellect. (V. P. III. 32. sambandha-samuddesa). The meaning of a word is an object which exists externally in the world : "sabda'rtho hy artho bahirupataya'vasthiyamanah."-Helaraja. SAHRDAYALOKA Again, it is held that both sabda and artha stay unseparated in our intellect prior to their outward manifestation : "yatha hi buddhau sabdar'thayoh purvam abhedena avasthanam"-Helaraja, and also Durga on Nirukta I. ii. "sarirehy abhidhanabhidheya-rupa buddhih hrdaya'ntargata"kasa-pratisthita." By this inseparable relation, they become convertible or interchangeable with each other : "sabdarthayor abhedena sambandho'dhyasa-laksanah."-Helaraja. But in the Yoga-sutra and Nyaya-manjari, an objection is raised against such a view. It is as follows: A word, its meaning, and the cognition produced by it are all really different from one another. In ordinary usage, we treat these three as one and identical; e. g. we have no other criterion, but the term 'go' itself to distinguish the word 'go' from its meaning and the cognition : For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 151 "gaur iti sabdo, gaur ity artho, gaur iti jnanam. ya esam pravigrah sa sarvavit." - Vyasabhasya. The author of yogasutra says that this false identification prevents us from understanding the speech of all beings (Yoga-sutra III. 17), just as maya hides from us the essential unity of brahman. The doctrines of sabda'dhyasa and sabda-vivarta as suggested by Bhartrhari have been noted by us. But these doctrines were strongly criticised by the Naiyayikas. Jayantabhatta refutes the interchangeablility of word and meaning (i.e. sabda'dhyasa-vada), and also sabda-vivarta-vada and brands it as inadequate and irrational --"sarvatha na sambandhah sabda'dhyasavadah, vivartavado'pi."-- But, Bhartsihari was a great exponent of the natural relationship between sabda and artha and considered it as the most plausible explanation appealing to one's reason, --"siddhah svabhavikah sabda'rthayoh sambandhah"-Helaraja. He thus opposes the theory of samketa which brings in the unnecessary discussion of human or Divine volition. He says that if words were naturally not associated with their meanings, nobody could ever connect the one with the other in any way possible : --"samayikas tu sambandhah na yujyate. -"nitye'nitye' pi bahye'rthe purusena kathancana sambandho'mrtasambandhaih sabdaih kartum na sakyate." (V. P. IV. 38). . We may now note as to how the meaning is comprehended from a word. The cognition as to the denotative power of the words (sakti) is usually derived from popular usages. There are other means also such as -- (i) grammar; -Bhartrhari and Jayantabhatta emphasise the importance of grammar - "artha-pravstti-tattvanam sabda eva nibandhanam, tattva'vabodhah sabdanam nasti vyakaranad ste." - V. P. IV. 38. and also sadhupayogan ucitans ca sistan na veda yo, vyakaranam na veda. quoted by Punyaraja on V. P. I. 16, For Personal & Private Use Only

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152 SAHRDAYALOKA and also "sarvatha prakrti-nirmalam atyudaram vakarana'dambaram eva prayaih parivada-pamsu-pataih, na manag api durikartum paryate iti siddham. tasmat pavitrat sarvasmat pavitram jana-bahumatam adhigata-caturvarga-gramam atmanam kartum adhyeam vyakaranam." "rupa'ntarena devas te vicaranti mahitale, ye vyakarana-samskara-pavitrita-mukha narah." manuna ca pankti-pavanatvena adhigata-vyakarano mimamsakas ca sva. smotau pathitau. "yas ca vyakurute vacam yas ca mimamsate giram" iti | --Nyayamanjari pp. 425-426. (ii) Analogy e.g. 'gauriva gavayah' (iii) lexicon, (iv) testimony - --"aptopadesat samarthyat artha-sampratyayah--Nya. Su. II. i. 52. Words like svarga, apsaras, devata, uttar-kuru, etc. as pointed out by Vatsyayana, denote objects which are never perceived by human beings. Their meaning is gathered through aptavakya-- _"svargah, apsarasah, uttarah kuravah, sapta-dvipah, samudro, lokasannivesa ity evam ader apratyaksasya arthasya na sabdamatrat sampratyayah. kim tarhi ? aptaih ayam uktah sabda ity atah sampratyayah. -Bhasya on Nya. Su. II. i. 53. and also, na hy ayam sabdamatrat svargadin pratipadyate, kimtu purusavisesa'bhihitatvena pramanatvam pratipadyate, tathabhutat sabdat svarga pratipadyate-Nyaya-varttika and also apurva-devata-svargaih samam ahur gadadisu.--V. P. II. 121, etc. (v) Popular usage, i.e. vaddha-vyavahara (VI) Contact, (VII) synonyms and (VIII) association with the words of known signification also, meaning is collected. These sources will be discussed in greater details under abhidha or word-power of direct expression. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 153 -Bhartshari also says, "vakyat prakaranat arthat, arthaucityat desakalatah, sabdarthah pravibhajyante na samayad eva kevalat."-V. P. II. 316. In case of words having multiple sense (aneka'rtha) the exact contextual meaning is determined by such factors as 'samyogah' or conjunction, viprayogah or disjunction, etc. -Bhartshari enlists these factors under V. P. II. 317, 'samyogo viprayogasca'....etc. In case of multiplicity of meanings two courses are open to us. We may either hold that one meaning is conventional and the rest are of secondary importance as held by alamkarikas such as Mammata and others, or hold that all are equally conventional as held by Naiyayikas and also by such alamkarikas as Jagannatha and others. It may also be noted that by multiplicity of meanings with reference to the same word, it is implied that there is some laxity of conventional restrictions. Again, this shows the different stages of linguistic development. Many reasons such as analogy, metaphor, and expansion of knowledge etc. can be given for this happening. Thus, we have examined the different views concerning the relationship of word and meaning. The alamkarikas have not dwelt upon this topic elaborately but they can be taken normally to follow the lead of the grammarians. WORD AND ITS IMPORT : We will also discuss this topic of import of a word, as part of general introduction to the topic of word and its powers or 'sabda-vypara-vicara. This consideration, as the earlier one of word-meaning relationship is also important from the point of view of studying the theoretical background of the thinking of alamkarikas concerning sabda-vyapara-vicara. Here again, the topic of word and its import will be closely studied taking into account the views of Vaiyakaranas, Mimamsakas, and the different views as expressed in the vakyapadiya, the views of the Naiyayikas, Vakyapadiya's own views, views as held also by the Buddhists, the alamkarikas, etymologists, etc. etc. The Vaiyakaranas : The first question to be considered is, 'what precisely is a word ?' The normal asnwer is that, sound which is articulate and significant, is word--"srotra-grahane hi arthe loke sabda-sabdah prasiddhah (S. B. on Mi. Su. I. i. 5). Patanjali has raised For Personal & Private Use Only

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154 SAHRDAYALOKA this question in the beginning of his sabda'nusasana. For him, word, in its essential aspect, differs from substance i.e. dravya, action i.e. kriya, quality i.e. guna and class i.e. jati. A sound expressive of sense is called sabda by people : "athava pratita-padarthako loke dhvanih sabda ity ucyate." (M. bh. I. i. 1). That which really constitutes the 'word', when one utters 'gauh' is the sound, which along with its utterance, simultaneously gives the idea of an animal having dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc. etc. A word, therefore, is sound--"tasmat dhvanih sabdah."-"atha gauh ity atra kah sabdah ? kim yat, tat sasnadi-langula-kakudkhura-visana-rupam sa sabdah ? na ity aha. dravyam nama tat ..... tasmat dhvanih sabdah." (M. bh. I. i. 1). When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced, the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearers, viz. - the individual cow, cow's action, qualities, gen class cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of 'g', 'au' and 'h'the visarga'. The hearer wants to find out the exact significance. The individual cow, her qualities, etc. are perceived by the eye, while the word 'gauh' is perceived by the ear. So, how can these two perceptions of different senses be taken as the meaning of the word ? But this can be taken as the meaning on the basis of a rule of the grammarians viz. that a thing is not different from another thing, when it is so also with a third thing not different from that another thing-tad abhinna'bhinnasya tad abhinnatvam." Patanjali, however, says that akriti, guna, etc. are not the true significance of a sabda, but the true significance is 'sphota' --that which, when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear apprehension of the object cow. Patanjali has given a detailed discussion in the form of the purva-paksa or the objector's view and uttara-paksa i.e. the view of the siddhantin which is a rejoinder to the objection,-to prove that varnas or sound units by themselves have no meaning. In order to understand this discussion, we may refer to the opinion of Upavarsa, accepted by the purva-mimamsaka Sabara, and the uttara-mimamsaka Sankara. Sabara refers to this view of Upavarsa at Mi. Su. I. i. 5, and Sankara refers to it at I. iii. 28, in his bhasya on the Vedanta Sutras. : "gaur ity atra kah sabdah ? gakara-aukara-visarjaniyah iti bhagavan Upavarsah" (S. B. on Mi. Su. I. i. 5), and 'varnah eva tu sabdah' iti bhagavan Upavarsah" (Sankara, on Vedanta Sutra, I. iii. 28). Sabara holds that 'aksarany eva padam' (S. B. on Mi. Su. I. i. 5), i.e. syllables alone constitute a word. Thus, he refuses to recognise sound as distinct from syllables.-"ato na tebhyo vyatiriktam anyat padam nama iti." The purvapaksa as given by Patanjali is akin to this--"kim punar ime varnah For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 155 arthavantah ahosvit anarthakah? arthavanto varnah. dhatu-pratipadika-pratyanipatanam ekavarnanam artha-darsanan manyamahe arthavanto varnah iti. etc. and also - samghata'rthatvac ca manyamahe arthavanto varnah iti; yesam samghatah arthavantah, avayava api tesam arthavantah. yesam avayavah arthavantah samudayah api tesam artha-vantah." The purva-paksa as cited by Patanjali is akin to this. It runs as below : (This is given while explaining the sutra, "hayavarat.') : "Do these varnas or sound-units have meaning or not? (Patanjali thus starts here with the prima-facie view)--"Sound units have meaning, since there is meaning in one-lettered roots, stems, affixes, and nipatas. One-lettered roots having meaning are found as in, "eti" (Vin), adhyeti (Vik), adhite (Via); one-lettered stems having meaning are found as in, "abhyam, ebhih, esuh" etc.; affixes such as 'aupa-gavayah', 'kapatavah'; nipatas as in, 'a aphehi,' 'i indram pasya', 'u, uttistha,' 'a, apakrama,' etc. etc. Thus letters have meaning. Again, on account of change in meaning due to change in letters, letters should be held to be meaningful. We see that meaning changes in words if one letter is replaced by another, e.g. in kupah, supah, yupah, etc.--the words having different meanings with the change of k, s, y, respectively. Again, "varna'nupalabdhau ca anarthagateh"-i.e, on account of the absence of that meaning in the absence of that letter (varnas should be taken as meaningful). ---varnanupalabdhau ca'narthagateh, manyamahe arthavanto varna iti; vrksah, rksah, kandirah,-vrksa iti sa-vakarena kascid artho gamyate, sksah iti va-karapaye so'rtho na gamyate. kandira iti sa-ka-karena kascid artho gamyate andira iti ka-kara-apaye so'rtho na gamyate." -Again, 'samghata'rthatvac ca.' on account of the collection having meaning, letters should be held as meaningful. If the collections of letters have meaning, their parts too must have meaning. If the parts have meaning, their wholes too have meaning. If one man with eyes, is able to see, a collection of a hundred men is able to see. If one grain of sesamum (i.e. tilah) is capable of giving oil, its collection is ly capable of it. But if the parts have no meaning, their wholes also cannot have any meaning. If one blind man is unable to see, a collection of hundred blind men also is unable to see. If one particle of sand cannot give oil, hundred bags of the same cannot give oil. But Patanjali is of the opinion that letters have no meaning. For, if they have meaning, they will be subject to the same rules which apply to those that have For Personal & Private Use Only

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156 SAHRDAYALOKA meaning. Thus, they will get the designation, 'pratipadika' by the rule, "arthavat pratipadikam'; they will receive case-affixes after them by the rule'pratipadikat....' and will get the designation, 'padam', by the rule 'sub antam padam.'-"yadi tarhi ime varnah arthavantah, arthavat-krtani prapnuvanti. kani ? arthavat pratipadikam iti pratipadika-samjna; pratipadikat iti svadyut-pattih, sub antam padam iti pada-samjna."-(M. Bh. I.) Again, letters have no meaning se a meaning is not found for every letter-"anarthakas tu prativarnam artha'nupalabdheh, anarthakas tu varnah. kutah ? prativarnam artha'nupalabdheh. na hi prativarnam arthah upalabhyante. kim idam prativarnam iti ? varnam varnam prativarnam.-(M. bh. I). Letters are meaningless also because the same meaning is not present when there is metathesis, elision, augment or substitution--"varna-vyatyaya-apaya-vikaresu arthadarsanat. [M. bh. 1). and also," varna-vyatyapayopajanavikaresu arthadarsanat manyamahe anarthaka varna iti; varna-vyatyaye ksten tarkahkaseh sikata, himseh simhah, varnavyatyayah na artha-vyatyayah. apayo lopah-hatah, ghnanti, gnantu, aghnan, - varnapayo na arthapayah; upajanah agamah, lavita, lavitum, - varnopajanah na arthopajanah. vikarahadesah. ghatayati, ghatakah, varnavikarah, na arthavikarah. yathaiva varnavyatyayapayopajanavikarah bhavanti, tadvat artha-vyatyayapayopajana-vikaraih bhavitavyam, na ca iha tadvat. ato manyamahe anarthakah varnah iti. (M. Bh. I.). Patanjali adds that at times, some of those persons who study equally with the one hope of getting money, get it, while others do not. Now because one gets money, it is not necessary that all get it; and because one does not get money it is not necessary that all do not get money. So, in the same way, we may hold that such single letters as stand as roots, affixes, stems, and nipatas have meaning. This is quite natural-ubhayam idam varnesu uktam; arthavanto' narthakasca iti ca. kim atra nyayyam ? ubhayam iti aha. kutah ? svabhavatah. tad yatha-mamanamihamanantam cadhiyananam kecid arthe yujyante, apare na. na cedanim kascid arthavan iti krtva sarvaih arthavadbhih sakyam bhavitum. kascit va'narthakah iti krtva sarvaih anarthakaih. tatra kim asmabhih sakyam kartum ? yad dhatupratyaya-pratipadika-nipata eka--varna arthavanto, ato'nye'narthakah, iti svabhavikam etat."-- The words such as 'kupah,' 'supah,' 'yupah,' etc. etc. are different letter-groups having different meanings. If the change in their meaning is due only to the change in a single letter, the major portion of the meaning of 'kupah' should lie in 'supah', that of 'supah' in 'kupah', that of "kupah' in yupah' and that of yupah' in 'kupah', For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 157 and finally that of 'supah' in yupah' and vice versa, 'upah' being common to all these three words. But we know them as different letter-groups having different meanings. And it has been actually very well suggested by the opponent himself that letters have no meaning even while actually proving that they have meaning. For, he who holds that the meaning in 'kupah' rests in 'ka'-kara, or that of 'supah' in 'sa'-kara, and that of 'yupa' in 'ya'-kara, has to accept that 'upa' is meaningless: "katham ya eva bhavata varnanam arthavattayam hetur upadistah, arthavanto varnah, dhatu-pratipadika-pratyaya-nipatanam ekavarnanam artha-darsanat, varne vyatyaye ca artha'ntaragamanat, varna'nupalabdhau ca anarthagateh samghatarthatvac ca iti ? .... yatah tu khalu na kincit kupasya va supe, supasya va kupe, kupasya va yupe, yupasya va kupe, supasya va yupe, yupasya va supe ato na manyamahe, samghata'ntarany eva etani evam jatiyakani artha'ntaresu vartante iti. 'upa'sabdas tu asya'narthakah syat. (M. Bh. on 1. 1. 2.). Now, with reference to objects denoted by words, Patanjali gives a four-fold classification of words such as words signifying genus or class, quality, action and personal names (=samjna). This division is based on the distinction in regard to things for the signification of which words are used-(pravstti-nimitta). : 'catustayi sabdanam pravsttih. jati-sabdah. guna-sabdah, kriya-sabdah, yadrcchasabdas caturthah." (M. Bh. I. i. 2.)--and also--"sabdanam arthe ya pravsttih sa pravrtti-nimitta-bhedat prakara-catustayavati iti arthah." (pradipodyoteNagesah)-This division does not apply to things but to their adjuncts i.e. upadhis. Thus, for Patanjali, words signify these upadhis : 'upadhav eva samketah.' We may note here that alamkarika Dandin has 'dravya' in place of yadrccha sabda.' Jagadisa takes him to task because his classification is not extensive enough to comprehend such private terms as 'jada', 'muka', 'murkha' and also words such as "anya', 'sunya', etc.--" "sabdair eva pratiyante jati-dravya-guna-kriyah, caturvidhyad aminam tu sabda uktah caturvidhah."and also, "tadetaj jada-muka-murkha'dinam anya sunyadinam ca sabdanam aparigrahapattya parityaktam asmabhih. - Sabda-sakti-prakasika, Jagadish; (karika 18). Mimamsakas :- Both Jaimini and Sabara hold that the real import of a sabda is "akrti" and not "vyakti.' Sabara says that 'akrti' signifies the mere generality that For Personal & Private Use Only

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158 SAHRDAYALOKA pervades all individuals belonging to a class, while 'vyakti' signifies individual, i.e. something which is possessed of certain characteristics which it possesses in common with none else.--"ka punarakrtih, ka vyaktir iti? dravya-gunakarmanam samanyamatram akrtih. asadharana-visesa vyaktih."--(S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 30). The question is which of these is expressed by a word ? But the point is, why then should there be any doubt in this matter? Well, it is so, because on hearing the word 'go', we get the idea of generality, but when it comes to action, we find that it is related to the generality resting in an individual. The actual usage would seem to show that a word expresses both 'akrti' and 'vyakti' in succession - "kutah samsayah ? gaurit yukte samanya-pratyayat vyaktau kriyasambandhat." -S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 30. Sabara does not accept the vyaktivada of the purvapaksa, which he considers fully under Mi. Su. I. iii 30-32.-The purva-paksa is briefly as below :- The authenticity of the sastra is unquestionable and we find some of the scriptures enjoining such acts as killing, sprinkling, and cutting with reference to some 'pasu'. Now, if by this 'pasu' only generality is meant, these acts which have been enjoined would be impossible. Again, it is not sound to argue that words should be generally taken to signify 'aksti', but at times, in order to avoid 'anarthakya-dosa' or, the fault of being not sensible, may be taken to signify 'vyakti' i.e. individual. For, this will take us to a position where we make the word express two senses-a position which cannot plausibly be allowed to stand. So, now, how do we account for the notion of generality that we get from a word ? The objector says that 'akrti' is the mark i.e. 'cinha', or 'linga'--that leads the hearer on to the vyakti'. Just as the idea of a danda that we derive from hearing the word 'dandin,' only serves as a mark to perceive the man with 'danda' or a stick, which alone is the real sense of the word 'dandin'-i.e. a man with a stick, similarly, the 'akrti' which is conveyed by a word, is only the mark or 'linga' to perceive the vyakti, which must therefore be taken as the real sense expressed by a word. Usage also seems to go against akrtivada. We have such expressions as 'sad deyah', and 'catur-vimsatir-deyah', where numerals are used with reference to words like 'gavah'. These seem to signify clearly that "vyaktis' are not 'akrties. Aksti is only one and we cannot think of any numeral except one with reference to it. Again, the acceptance of akrtivada would lead to the futility of the "arati-nidhisastra.' The substitution will be impossible if akrti is accepted as the real import of a word like 'pasu.' For, the word 'anya', will have 'no sense, since any 'pasu' becomes the same and not 'anya', if 'akrti' i.e. pasutva, be the meaning of the word For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 159 'pasu'. Now, every pasu is possessed of 'pasutva', so much so that no 'pasu' can be described as "anya.' To avoid this contingency, vyaktivada has to be accepted. :- "vyaktih padarthah iti. kutah ? prayoga-codana'bhavat. alambhanaproksana-visa-sanadinam prayoga-codana akrtyarthena sambhaveyuh. atra uccarana'narthakyam, tatra vyaktyarthah ato'nyatra aksti-vacana, iti cet. uktam anyayasca'nekarthatvam iti. katham samanyavagatir iti cet, vyakti-padarthakasya akrtis' cihnabhuta bhavisyati, ya evam akrtikah sa gaur iti. yatha yasya dando' sti sa danditi, na ca danda-vacano dandi-sabdah. evam iha'pi." IS. B. on Mi. Su. 30, pp. 296-301) and also, "na tatra, dravyasraya-vacanah sabdo bhaved vatha'krtih sabdartho bhavet. sad deyah, dvadasa deyah, catur-vimsatir deyah iti. na hyakstih sad-adibhih samkhyabhir yujyate. tasmat na akriti-vacanah." [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 32, pp. 301] and also, "yadi pasu-rupakrtih palayeta anyam tad varnam tad dvaya-samalabheta iti. yathakrti-vacano sabdo bhaved anyasya'lambho no'papadyeta anyasya api pasudravyasya saivakrtih. tasmad vyaktivacana iti." [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 32, pp. 302] Sabara holds that vyaktivada is unsatisfactory. Take, for example, the texts like "syenecitam cinvita." Now, here, if the word 'syena' is not akstivacaka, how can one obey the said injunction ? For, what is needed for making a 'syena' is the 'sadrsya' i.e. similarity of the shape carved with bricks, with an actual 'syena'. This similarity must naturally be with the form that is common to all syenas i.e. with syenatva jati. Now, if the sadrsya is with reference to syena-vyakti, then this will not be possible for all sacrificers of different times and places. How can all these meet with one and the same individual syena simultaneously ? How can the earlier sacrificers have done it ? There again, cannot be a 'vyakti' or individual devoid of all samanyas and visesas i.e. generalities and particularities. Thus, some vedic texts favour vyaktivada, while others favour akrtivada. It is therefore, necessary to seek some more decisive grounds on which to solve this problem.--"akrtih sabdarthah. kutah ? kriya'rthatvat. syenecitam cinvita iti vacanam akrtau sambhavati, yathakrtyarthah syenasabdah. vyaktivacane tu na cayanena syenavyaktir utpadayitum sakyata ity asakyavacanad anarthakah. tasmad akstivacanah. [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33). We come across such definite ground in the fact that the same word is used in respect of several individuals and this decides the point in favour of the akrtivada. The fact that one and the same word signifies more than one vyakti of the same class, suggests that it signifies something which is common to all. "akrtih sabda'rthah iti. For Personal & Private Use Only

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160 SAHRDAYALOKA yadi vyaktih sabdartho bhavet, vyakty antare na prayujyeta. atha vyakty antare prayujyate, na tarhi vyaktih sabda'rthah. sarva-samanya-visesa-vinimukta hi vyaktir iti ucyate." [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33]. When the word 'go' is applied to other 'govyaktis, which are devoid of all 'samanya-visesa' according to the objector, then, in that case this absence of all 'samanya-visesa' itself is the 'samanya' signified by the word 'go'. So, it is not safe to suggest that what is signified by a word everytime, is not the absence of samanya-visesa but vyakti, which is but the asraya i.e. substratum of all these. For then, the word 'go' will be applicable to asva-vyakti as well, and not to go-vyaktis alone, since the former is a vyakti in the sense of the term as seen above. "naisa dosah. vyaktyantare sarva-samanya-visesa-vinirmukta eva pravartisyate. yadi vyaktantare sarva-samanya-visesa-viyukte pravartisyate, samanyam eva tarhi syat. 'na' ity ucyate yo'hy arthah samanyasya visesanam ca asrayah, sa vyaktih. vyakti-vacanas ca sabdo na samanye na visese vartate, tesam tv asrayam eva abhidadhati. tena vyaktyantare vrttir adosah. na hi tatsamanyam, yadi vyaktantaresu api bhavati, sarva-samanya-visesa-viyuktayam asva-vyaktau gosabdah kim iti na vartate ?" [S. B. on I. iii. 33., pp. 303.] In order to avoid this contingency, one cannot argue that the word applies to only those vyaktis where its use is known by the abhiyuktas-the elite, for, in that case, the word could not be applied to a new born cow!-"aha. yesv eva prayogah drstas tesu vartate, na sarvatra. na ca asvavyaktau go-sabdasya prayoga drstah. tasmat tatra na vartisyate. yadi yatra prayogah drstah tatra vrittih, adya jatayam gavi prathama-prayogo na prapnoti, tatra adrstatvat.". [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii, 33, pp. 303] And we see this actually happening in practice. If, for the sake of argument, the above view is accepted, then the class-perception will become impossible, as this or that vyakti for which 'samketa' is known by us by usage alone will be recognised as a 'go'-vyakti, but actually in practice we see that any 'go-vyakti', even one so far not seen by us also produces 'go-pratyaya' - i.e. apprehension of a cow in us. Thus, the view that the application of a word 'go' to go-vyakti depends on usage, has to be discarded. "samanya-pratyayas ca na prapnoti. iyam api gauh iti, iyam va gaur iti syat. bhavati ca samanya-pratyayo drsta-purvayam api go-vyaktau." "tasman na prayoga'pekso 'go' sabdah vyaktivacana iti sakyate asrayitum."-- [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33, pp. 303]. Moreover, it can be held that a word may be applied to a vyakti which possesses a certain 'sakti' i.e. potency or power, for it is possible that this sakti may exist in For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 161 all the vyaktis denoted by the word. Sakti by its very nature resides in some only. Thus, a word cannot denote vyakti which is without sakti. And that 'sakti' cannot be 'gotva', because to say that the word 'go' applies to that vyakti where 'gotva' is found to exist means that the idea of 'visista-vyakti' is accepted, and this means that apprehension i.e. pratiti of 'gotva-visista-vyakti.' But in such a cognition or apprehension, 'gotva,' the qualifying attribute, will be naturally perceived first, and this means that 'aksti' is the first import of a word.--"evam sakteh svabhavah esah yat kasyamcit vyaktau vartate kasyams cit na. 'agnih usnah', udakam 'sitam,' evam etad bhavisyati iti. naivam siddhyati, na hy etad gamyate kasyam cid vyaktau vartate kasyam cid na iti. satyam etat, gotvam laksanam bhavisyati iti. yatra gotvam tasyam vyaktav iti evam tarhi visista vyaktih pratiyeta. yadi ca visistam kecana purvataram visesanam avagamyeta- na hyapratite visesane visistam kecana pratyetum arhanti iti." (S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. pp. 304.] Again, it should be noted that here, akrti is signified by the word not in the fashion of a danda' or a stick which is a visesana and is conveyed by the word dandin.' For, such a position is totally unacceptable because if aksti is once admitted as the artha or meaning of a sabda, e.g. 'go', it must be supposed to have exhausted its abhidha' in its expression. It is not necessary to extend the abhidha to perceive the vyakti, for 'akrti' is inevitably associated with vyakti, and due to this, by the perception of aksti, vyakti' is also perceived "astu visesanatvena akstim vaksyati, visesyatvena vyaktim. na hi akrtipadarthakasya vyaktirna padartho, vyakti-padarthakasya va na"krtih. ubhayam ubhayasya padarthah. kasyacit kimcit pradhanyena vivaksitam bhavati. tena atra"krtirgunabhavena, vyaktih pradhanabhavena vivaksyate iti. -S. B. on I. iii. 33, pp. 304, and also, - "naitad evam, ubhayor ucyamanayor guna-pradhanabhavah syat. yadi ca'tra akrtih pratiyate sabdena tada vyaktir api padartha iti na sakyate vaditum. kutah ? akrtir hi vyaktya nitya-sambaddha sambandhinyam ca tasyam avagatayam sambandhyantaram avagamyate."--S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33, pp. 304. So, it is needless to extend abhidha to vyakti. Anvaya-vyatireka i.e. argument in presence and absence exists between sabda and 'aksti' and not between sabda and vyakti. For one who sees the akrti is invariably observed to see the vyakti also, even in the absence of a word. On the other hand, if through some mental disturbance, one is not able to perceive the akrti even on the word being uttered, it is not at all possible for him to perceive vyakti. This shows that for the observer, the perception or non-perception of vyakti depends on the perception or non-perception of akrti, For Personal & Private Use Only

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162 SAHRDAYALOKA and that this has no connection whatsoever with the uttering or hearing of a sabda.-"tad etad atma-pratyaksam yad sabda uccarite vyaktih pratiyate iti. kim sabdad uta akrteh iti vibhago na pratyaksah. so'nvaya-vyatirekabhyam avagamyate, avabudhyetaiva'sau vyaktim. yas tuccarite'pi sabde manasad upacarat kadacid akrtim no'palabheta, na jatucid asav imam vyaktim avagacchet."-[S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33, pp. 304]. Thus, on the strength of this anvaya-vyatireka relation between akrti and vyakti, it can be concluded that it is not necessary to extend the abhidhasakti or power of expression of a word to vyakti. Sabara holds that the idea of a vyakti-visista-akrti is totally unacceptable for the simple reason that such an assumption would disqualify a word from being applicable to "vyaktyantara-visista-akrti." -"nanu vyaktivisistayam akrtau vartate. vyakti-visistayam ced varteta vyaktyantara-visista na pratiyeta"-[S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33. pp. 317]. Sabara also holds that primarily word signifies 'akrti', and 'vyakti' only by implication, and that it is immaterial for him whether akrti is conveyed by a word only as being subordinate to a vyakti or not. The question of the mutual relationship of akrti and vyakti does not fall within the province of sabda-sakti. It is decided on the strength of some other factor viz. the purpose in view for which the word is employed. If akrti is spoken of with reference to itself, it becomes principal or 'pradhana,' and if it is spoken of with reference to something else, it becomes subordinate i.e. 'gauna.' The word is incapable of deciding this. : "tasmacchabda akrti-pratyayasya nimittam. akrti-pratyayo vyakti-pratyayasya." [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. ii. 33, pp. 317] and also "nanu gunibhuta pratiyate iti uktam. na gunabhavo'smatpaksasya badhakah. sarvatha tavat pratiyate. arthad gunabhavah pradhanabhavo va. svartham ced uccaryate, pradhanabhuta. atha na svartham parartham eva, tato gunabhuta. na tatra sabda-vyaparo'sti." [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33, pp. 317]. He says that the analogy of the word 'dandin' is also inapplicable, because the word 'dandin' is a composite word made up of two separate parts, while it is not so in case of 'gauh.' In case of 'gauh' we do not find two parts conveying 'ga-vyakti' and 'gotva' separately. Thus, Sabara holds that "akrti-visista-vyakti" is not tenable. Even in the case of 'dandin', the 'visesana' viz. 'danda' must be cognised first or else 'visista-kalpana' itself becomes impossible and this shows that the perception of the qualifying attribute must come first. Thus, if 'akrti' is perceived first, it should naturally be accepted as the real import of a word. Thus, according to Sabara, 'akrti' and not 'vyakti' is the real import of a word."-- "nanu ca dandiiti na tavat dandi-sabdena dando'bhidhiyate, atha dandavisisto'vagamyate, evam iha'pi na tavad akrtih abhidhiyate. atha ca akrti-visista For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 163 vyaktir gamyate iti, naitat sadhu ucyate. satyam, dandi-sabdena dando na'bhidhiyate na tv apratite dande dandi-pratyayo'sti. asti tu dandi-sabdasya ekadesabhuto danda-sabdo yena dandah pratyayitah. tasmat sadhv etat yat pratite visesane visistah pratiyate iti. na tu go-sabda'vayavah kascid aksteh pratyayakah anyo vyakteh, yata ucyate tata akrtir avagata, na go-sabda akstivacana iti. na ca yatha dandi-sabdo dande na prayuktah, evam go-sabdo nakrtau. tad artham eva nidarsitam kevala"krty abhidhanah syena-sabda iti. tad evam anvayavyatirekabhyam asati syena-vyakti-sambandhe syena-sabdoccaranad aksti-vacanah iti gamyate. na tu vrihyakrti-sambandham antarena, vrihivyaktau sabdasya prayogo drstah. tasmas aksti-vacanah sabdah iti etad jyayah."- [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 33. pp. 317]. Again adds Sabara, the texts enjoying killing and such other acts, will not be rendered useless even on accepting 'aksti-vada,' because "aksti' by implication conveys 'vyakti.' So, it can be shown that aksti-vacana words in such texts are used to mark out vyaktis which form the substratum of the acts enjoined by them. Thus, when in such cases, akrti conveys vyakti by implication, anarthakya is wiped out. Mi. Su. I. iii. 35-tad 'arthatvat prayoga-vibhagah."--See, S. B. on this sutra, pp. 319 "aksty arthatvac chabdasya yasya vyakterakrtya sambandhah tatra prayogah. proksanam hi dravyasya kartavyataya sruyate. katamasya ? yad yajati sadhanam; apurva-prayuktatvat tasya. na"krteh. asakyatvat. tatra vrihi-sabdah aksti-vacanah prayujyate, proksanasraya-visesanaya. sa hi akstim pratyayayisyati. akrtih pratita sati proksanasrayam virodhyati. tena akrti-vacanam na virudhyate iti."-- - In the same way, the objection on the score of numerals used in opposition to nouns can also be refuted by pointing out that even here, it is the number that is intended to be enjoined, and that the aksti-vacana sabda is used only as a qualifier (i.e. visesaka) only.- Similarly, the word 'anya' is used with reference to the substitute and is the aksti-vacana sabda--"evam sad deya gavo, daksinadravye samkhyayah prayoktavye gava ityakrti-vacano viseksyati. [S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 35, pp. 319], and, "tatha anyam iti vinastasya pratinidher anyatvasambandhah, tatra pasu-sabdah akrti-vacanah akrtya viseksyati iti."-- [S. B. on Mi. Su. iii. 35, pp. 319]. Thus, the Mimamsakas hold that words like 'go', 'asva,' etc. are expressive primarily of 'akrti' or class and not vyakti or individual -- "tasmad gaur-asva ityevamadayah sabdah akrter abhidhayakah iti siddham." -- S. B. on Mi. Su. I. iii. 35. pp. 319). For Personal & Private Use Only

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164 SAHRDAYALOKA Different views as mentioned in the V. P. : For the Mimamsakas, as seen above words signify genus or universal or class, and not 'vyakti' or individual. We come across a variety of views on this topic in the Vakyapadiya III. 2. - "vajapyayana"carya-matena sarvatriki jati-padarthavyavastha, upapadyate"; Helaraja on V. P. III. 2. "dravya'bhidhanam vyadih," vartika, under panini I. ii. 64, and also "vyadimate tu sarva-sabdanam dravyam arthas tasyaiva saksat kriya samanvayopapatteh;" [Helaraja, on V. P. II. iii. 2.] Vajapyayana's view concerning the import of words is in agreement with that of the Mimamsakas. But Vyadi does not agree with the same. The main argument in support of vyaktivada is that as a positive element directly concerned with action, the individual should be considered as the proper significance of all words. Not the genus 'ghatatva,' but the individual 'ghata' serves the purpose of fetching water. But this view is unacceptable on the face of it. The vyaktivada is open to the fallacies of endlessness and vagueness-observes Mammata in the K. P. II--"yady api arthakriya-karitaya pravstti-nivitti-yogya vyaktir eva, tatha'pi anantyad vyabhicarac ca tatra sanketam kartum na yujyate." Patanjali explains that according to Panini both genus and individual are meant by words - "panini-darsane jati-dravye sabdena abhidhiyete. -- (Helaraja, on V. p. III. 2], and also, "kim punah akrtih padarthah ahosvit dravyam? ubhayam ity aha. katham jnayate ? ubhayatha hy acaryena sutrani pathitani."-[M. bh. on I. 1, 1.). Naiyayikas : The Naiyayikas define padartha in a very comprehensive way such as"vyaktyakrtijatayas tu padarthah"-Nya. Su. III. ii. 65. The Nyayabhasya suggests as follows. The class theory of the Mimamsakas is not a sufficient explanation by itself. A class, pure amd simple, i.e. as dissociated from individuals is far from being the significance of a word. The reason is that the very conception of a class invariably comprehends both the individual as well as the particular physical arrangement i.e. aksti, whereby the individual is distinguished from others. (Nya. Su. II. ii. 64). The vyaktivada suffers from anavastha (Nya. Su. II. ii. 60) because an individual without its correlation to a particular class is nowhere signified by a word--"na ca dravya-matra-visistam jatya vina'bhidhiyate." (Vatsyayana bhasya, on Nya. Su. II. ii. 60). An unqualified individual is nowhere signified by a word. An individual related to its genus is signified by a sabda. But, even here, there are some difficulties. So, the Nyaya view holds that padartha comprehends three elements viz. individual, its form and its genus or class; these three-which are connected with For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 165 one another by inseparable relation or "avinabhava-sambandha." None of these is singly signified by a word. So, when we consider the import of a word, what we generally understand is an individual belonging to a particular class and possessing a certain physical form peculiar to itself. (Nya. Su. II. ii. 58). The Navya-Nyaya practically maintains the same position. Neither the class or genus alone, nor the individual alone, but the individual conditional or qualified by the genus constitutes the significance of a word--"jatiman padarthah. Saktir jatyakrtivisista-vyaktau visramyati."-Muktavali. The class therefore makes the cognition of an individual almost impossible."--jatimatre hi samketat vyakter manam su-duskaram" (sabdasakti-prakasika] So, it is more reasonable to restrict the samketa to the individual qualified by genus. The Navya-Nyaya holds that the addition of akrti in the conception of padartha is quite immaterial in view of the fact that there is an inseparable relation existing between an individual and its form. All individuals belonging to the same class have a particular configuration of their physical structure. Perhaps this led Patanjali to hold that a class is determined by 'krti' i.e. physical form.-"akrtigrahana jatih." M. bh. on Pa. IV. i. 63. Bhartphari's Vakyapadiya : The discussion that follows is in the light of Dr. Kunjunni Raja's learned observations. The grammarian Bhartrhari discusses this topic in two sections, viz. jati-samuddesa' and 'vyakti-samuddesa.' He discusses in greater details the various issues involved in this problem. He considers and presents in a logical way, all the different views on the topic and arrives at a position which can be regarded more as philosophical than grammatical. First, he takes up the class theory for discussion. A rigid adherence to this view makes us incapable of meeting the situation in which we find that jati or class is nowhere found directly related to activity i.e. 'kriya,' as signified by the main constituent of a sentence i.e. the verb. In 'gam anaya,' kriya or activity is connected with "karaka' (case) and not with class i.e. 'gotva.' The jativadis are divided in their way of dealing with this point. Some of them hold class or jati as 'upalaksana' i.e. a characteristic mark of the power of signification (saktyupalaksana). Others hold that jati itself is signified by the force of implication-kesam cit sahacaryena jatih sakyupalaksanam"-V. P. III. 3. The former view lays stress on association i.e. 'sahacarya,' the latter on implication or tatparya,"iha kesam cit jativadinam ekartha-samavayat saktaih pratipadane jatirupalaksanam upaya iti matam. anyesam punas tatparyena jatir eva sabdena pratipadyate." - Helaraja, on V. P. III. 3. For Personal & Private Use Only

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166 SAHRDAYALOKA By association it is meant that a class comprises of a good many individuals that are naturally associated with the very idea of that class. The Indian philosophers thus recognise more than one kind of jati, such as sva-jati, sabdatva jati, artha-jati etc. Bhartrhari says that every word, as a rule, first signifies a jati, which is not only un-common i.e. a-sadharana, but also immediately connected with it, and then indicates the community of objects i.e. artha-jati, by means of adhyaropa, i.e. transference. "sva jatih prathamam sabdaih sarvair eva'bhidhiyate, tato'rtha-jati-rupesu tad-adhyaropa-kalpana." V. P. III. 3. Thus, e.g. the word 'gauh', gives the class like 'go-sabdatva' i.e. a class pertaining to all go-sabdas. Word in its own form 'sabda-svarupa' implies this kind of 'jati' which is characterised by the particular form of the word itself. This differs from the class known as "sabdatva" which inheres in all varieties of words and not confined to some specific group only. -"sva atmiya go-sabdatmika, na tu sakala-sabda-sadharani, sabdatvadih" How to bring 'sabda-jati' and 'artha-jati' into correlation is a problem. These are not at all convertible in terms of each other but on the contrary for all practical purposes, they remain distinct. As Helaraja observes, the meaning seems to be understood at once from the utterance of a word, because of the supposed identity of sabda and artha, but here also, succession of time actually intervenes between the two. :-"arthasya jhatity eva sabda-svarupa'bhedena'vabodhepi yatha pratipadita-kramasrayena."--Helaraja. Actually it so happens that word first gives the idea of its own class (=svajati), and signifies the intended object only later on :-"svajati-pratyayad anantaram artha-jatinam gotvadinamatmasu tasyah sabda-jateh samaropasya kalpana."-Helaraja. Through 'adhyaropa' or transference, they are made convertible in terms of each other. This sort of aropa becomes the cause of the apparent identity between sabda and artha. We resort to this same aropa when we try to discern the relation of a word with its meaning. The jativadis thus try to prove that jati forms the meaning of words. For them, the proper names (samjna-sabda) also have a class. This sounds rather strange. They also hold that one class can be included in another class. But this position is not philosophical :-"evam ca samjna-sabdanam api jativadi-mate jatisabdatvam iti For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara eka eva sabdanam pravrttih"-Helaraja; on V. P. III. 2. and also, "jatya'bhidhayino jatyadisabda api jativacina eva."- Thus, go-tva is capable of having 'gotva-tva', and this is not easily conceivable. The considered opinion viz. "nih-samanyani samanyaniti"-a class cannot have another class,-is violated. This theory results in a number of misconceptions. Thus, for them, even quality and action are liable to be considered as 'jati' for the simple reason of their being signified by their corresponding words "tatha ca'nvayi-rupena guno'py abhidhiyamano jatir-eva. evam kriyam apy abhedena abhidhiyamana jatih." -Helaraja. on V. P. III. 12. For the dravya-vadins all that is signified by words is essentially the property pertaining to dravya "dravya-dharma padarthe tu dravye sarvartha isyate, dravya-dharmasrayad dravyam atah sarvartha isyate."-V. P. III. 130 167 So, quality, action, number, class and gender-all might be looked upon as inherent properties of matter.- "sabdaih pratyayamanah gunadayo daivyadharmanah. sarvo'rtho dravya-rupena abhidhiyate"-Helaraja. There are certain common features between these two views. Whether the meaning is either jati or 'dravya', we have got to resort to 'upacara' or 'adhyaropa' i.e. transference of sense "tatha mama'pi jativadino mukhyam jatim abhidadhati kecit upacarati tam anya iti mata-dvaye'pi samyam.-Helaraja.-Just as for the jativadin things other than jati are also treated as such by the help of upacara, so also with the other one, quality, action, etc. have been taken up as properties of matter by upacara. Bhartrhari also suggests that the problem of 'padartha,' especially by the jativada, can be approached from an epistemological point of view also.-"idanim vijnanavadena api padartha-vyavastham aha."-Helaraja, (on V. P. III. 19). The meaning of a word is exactly the same as is connected by it. This is accepted by the Vijnanavadi. It is suggested that the use of words gives rise to a kind of intelligence with a definite form which generally corresponds to the object of experience. What actually is known by us whenever we hear the sound 'gauh' is the particular form in which the individual makes its impression on the mind. A dravya (i.e. thing) is, according to this philosophy, not necessarily a material object, but an intellectual image or form only. "anupravrtti-rupam yam prakhyatam akrtim viduh, For Personal & Private Use Only

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168 kecid vyavrtti-rupam tu dravyatvena pracaksate."-V. P. III. 19 A thing denoted by a word is more mental than material. What is primarily signified by a word is the sense that originates in the intellect (= buddharthasya vacyatvam), and the world of objects is only a copy of mental states (= antahkarana-dharmasya bhagah bahir avasthitah) (V. P.)-For the vijnanavadin, the whole world of thought is just conceptual; all universals and individuals having their existence in the mind with or without correspondence to the material object perceived by our sense-organs "vijnana-naye sarvah eva pratyayatmakam angikrtam;"-V. P. "antahstha eva ayam sarvam, vyavaharo na vijnanavyatirikto bahyo'rtho'stiti"-sankara-bhasya on Brahma Sutra, II. ii. 28. Thus, along with the utterance of a word, a definite intellectual image arises in the mind and it is that which one usually understands as the significance of words : "sabdad uccaritat sabdakaravati buddhir utpadyate, tad akarasyaiva sabda'rthatvam na buddheh."-Helaraja, on V. P. III. 19. Whether this image has or has not a corresponding embodiment in the world of realities is immaterial. SAHRDAYALOKA -"sa hy akaro bahyo'stu na va, sabda-vacyatvasya na kacit ksatih"Helaraja;-whatever is signified by a word in the mind, may or may not have its objective equivalent. It is possible for us to picture before our mind a purely subjective world of concepts apart from the one we are familiar with. The yogacara school of Buddhists actually does so. For them an external world of atoms apart from the internal knowledge, does not exist. The external world is a mere copy of mental impressions. Bhartrhari finally winds up the discussion with reference to Vedantic monism. The question of jati and vyakti (i.e. universal and particular) could not stand before the all eliminating advaita- i.e. non-dualism of the vedantin. Although, there appears to be difference due to 'upadhis' or adjuncts, such as time, space, etc. yet all things having an ultimate common source are said to be one among themselves. -"nanu vastunam desa-kala'di-nimitto bhedah iti tad anadarena abhinnany eva tani siddhani iti "bhinna api paropadhir abhinna iti va punah, bhavatmasu prapanco'yam samsrstesveva jayate."-V. P. III. 20. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 169 Adhyasa or superimposition is the cause of manifoldness which is only apparent. The difference of adjuncts makes for the distinction between class and individual. We fail to visualise a thing in its own real form. So, nothing separated from its adjunct-upadhi-is comprehended by us.-"nirupadhino vastuno'vyavaharyyatvat sarva eva paropasrayo vyavaharah."-Helaraja. So, observes Bhartrhari, that there is only one supreme thing beyond the limitations of time and space and possessing all activity by its very nature, and which is beyond division and distinction of any kind. - "sarva-saktya'tmabhutatvam ekasyaiveti nirnayah, bhavanam atma-bhedasya kalpana syad anarthika."-V. P. III. 22. Therefore, the categories or padarthas of the Vaisesikas are not different objects of thought but they, in fact, stand for the various types of potency--or sakti -- belonging to one and the same thing.-- "tasmad dravyasrayah sarvah saktayo bhinna-laksanah, samssstah purusarthasya sadhika na tu kevala."-V. P. III. 23. Thus, the division, into class and individual, of padarthas, is more formal or imaginary than real--"asmin mate sarvatraiva jati-vyakti-pravibhagah kalpitah"-- Helaraja. And this division is not inconsistant with advaita-vada. Bhartrhari says that the unreal and real elements in all the phenomenal entities, indicate respectively, class and individual "satyasatyau tu yau bhavau pratibhavam vyavasthitau, satyam yat tatra sa jatih asatyah vyaktayah smotah."-V. P. III. 32. Individuals are of short duration, of limited nature, and suffer distortions and mutations of various kinds. The class is such a reality whereof the essence or identity cannot be removed, and it remains above distortions and mutations of all types and its identity is absolutely unchanged, thus forming a life-giving essence of a thing as well as shining in its own form, detached from individuals. For Personal & Private Use Only

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- 170 SAHRDAYALOKA "vikara'pagame satyam suvarnam kundale yatha vikara'pagame satyam tam ahuh prakstim param." V. P. III. 33. We find in the Chandogya Upanisad a saying, viz.--"vacarambhanam vicaro namadheyam mrttikety eva satyam." (VI. 4)--i.e. The earth is real, the modifications viz. ghata, pata, etc. are unreal. Patanjali gives the illustration- of gold and its modifications "suvarnam kayacid, akstya yuktam pindo bhavati. pindakrtim upamrdya rucakah kriyante. akrtir anya ca anya ca bhavati, dravyam punah tad eva."-M. bh. I. i. 1. Helaraja says that the agamavid has identified jati with the ultimate reality or premordial entity (i.e. para-prakrti)--"antya para prakstih satya, sarvavikara'nuyayini prasanta-kallola cid eka-ghana brahma, iti agamavidah-Helaraja, on V. P. III. 32. This para-prakrti by itself is an eternal flow of pure consciousness undisturbed from outside. Thus, for the grammarian i.e. agamika this is the Highest Being and it gives the loftiest idea of a class. This maha-satta or maha-samanya permeates the entire universe and appears in different forms through all the individuals. This is the summum genus that is ultimately signified by all words, pratipadikas i.e. crude forms, verbal roots, and suffixes like tva, tal, etc. etc. "sambandhi-bhedat sattaiva bhidyamana gava'disu, jatir ity ucyate tasyam sarve sabdah vyavasthitah." V. P. III. 34. All words refer to this 'satta.' It reveals itself, according to Varsyayani in six forms "saiva bhava-vikaresu sad-avasthah prapadyate" -V. P. III. 36. Thus, observes Helaraja, all activity is satta-vivartai.e. revealation of 'satta.' "samagrah kriya-kalapah satta-vivartah"--Helaraja. This jati is eternal and indestructible. Vyadi and his followers who uphold the theory of dravya' i.e. the theory that words signify things and not class, also give a highly philosophical explanation. Under the Varttika viz. "siddhe sabda'rtha For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 171 sambandhe" Patanjali shows how eternality can be attributed to dravya. It is this eternal dravya that constitutes the meaning of all words. 'Dravya' in its ultimate form is like 'brahma.' -- "tad eva brahma-rupam satyam, atmaivedam satyam iti hi srtih."-Helaraja. Bhartshari also takes dravya in a wider sense, when he gives the following synonyms in V. P. I-such as "atma vastu svabhavas ca sariram tattvam ity api, dravya-nityasya paryayastacca nityam iti smetam." (drava-samuddesa) V. P. Thus, whether the pada'rtha or significance of a word happens to be class or an individual, we are to believe that all that we feel and express is but manifestation of the eternal. Buddhists :- The Buddhists advance the doctrine of 'apoha' in connection with the significance of words. 'Apoha' means the negation of the contrary. The Buddhists, especially the ksana-bhanga-vadins, refused to accept the eternality of any thing, either class or individual. So, a word does not signify either, as the reality of them is highly controvertial. As there is doubt about the existence of a constant thing like class, the class theory cannot stand. The same is the case with dravyavada on the same ground of dravya being momentary.--"ksana-bhanga-vadinah sthira-samanya'bhavad ity arthah"-Udyota. So, the word signifies 'apoha' i.e. the act of distinguishing one thing or species from those that are distinct from it. "atad-vyavsittir-apohah, padartha iti ksana-bhanga-vadinah."--Vistarika. Thus, 'gauh necessarily implies, the differentiation of cow individuals from non-cows. i.e. atad-vyavrttih. The Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas refute this theory. (See sloka-vartika). Alamkarikas :- The writers on poetics follow the lead of the grammarians -"esueva vyakteh upadhisu samketah grhyate, na vyaktau."-S. D. I. (=Sahityadarpana). They are interested in the implication of words which may be at times rendered For Personal & Private Use Only

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172 SAHRDAYALOKA striking, so as to lend some special charm to a given piece of literary composition. On the ground of this implication, words, are either vacaka or expressive or denotative, i.e. they express the same thing as is fixed by God's will--i.e. 'samketa', or words are laksanika or having a secondary sense or implicit/metaphorical sense, or words are vyanjaka i.e. are suggesters, having the suggested sense. -"syad vacakolaksanikah, sabdo'tra vyanjakas tridha"-Kavyaprakasa (=K.P.) I. The meanings conveyed by these are called respectively 'vacya' i.e. directly expressed, or mukhya i.e. principal, laksya i.e. indicated or secondary and vyangya i.e. suggested. The alamkarikas have inherited this thinking from their predecessors i.e. grammarians, and also the mimamsakas and naiyayikas. Among the alamkarikas, there are some who do not accept the vyanjana-vyapara and the vyangya'rtha resulting therefrom. They instead try to explain away vyanjana/vyangyartha, by either including it in abhidha, tatparya or laksana. Or, still others postulate 'anumitivyapara' or poetic inference instead. We will deal with all these views later when we discuss the topic of sabda-vritties in the following chapters. But before that, it should be noted that the traditional threefold division of a word into vacaka, laksaka and vyanjaka, pertains more to the adjuncts than to the word itself."-atra upadhinam eva tritvam, na tu upadheyanam."-Sarabodhini, comm. on the K. P. The same word can be vacaka, laksaka, and vyanjaka as the case may be. The vyangya'rtha, when it becomes the principal source of charm in poetry, is termed as 'dhvani' by the dhvanivadins. We will go to observe all this in greater details as and when required, but it may be noted for the present that this particular sakti or power of word called vyanjana' or suggestive power or suggestion is nowhere else recognised as a sabda-vrtti accept in the field of poetry and there too by some alamkarikas who go by the name of dhvanivadins only. So, for the present we may conclude that no system of Indian Philosophy, dealing with the problem of word and meaning in whatever context, seems to discuss and much less accept this vyanjana-vyapara. To do justice to both the schools of darsanikas on one hand and vyanjana-vadins on the other, we may say that the philosophers had nothing to do with the poetic beauty of language and that they had to talk of the great questions concerning jiva or soul, jagat i.e. phenomenal creation, and isvara i.e. God, and had therefore to confine themselves to the problems of the direct or at the most an indirect expressive power of words and had no business to deal with the poetic or beautiful or the aesthetic aspect of language i.e. suggestive use of words. So, according to For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 173 Naiyayika explanation it is, either unnecessary or it falls under the wider scope of laksana i.e. indirect or secondary expression or deviation in general. It is only such later grammarians as Nagesa who strongly come out in support of vyanjana. Actually Nagesa has emphasised the desirability of recognising vyanjana as a wordpower even from the stand point of grammar also "vaiyakarananam api etat svikarah avasyakah"--Manjusa pp. 160. The old school of logic held that the 'padartha' is a trinity of objects viz. class, form and individual. So, accordingly, words, or more properly nouns are for them either (i) rudha i.e. words with conventional meaning assigned to them, or (ii) laksaka, i.e. words with secondary signification, or (iii) yoga-rudha i.e. words having both conventional and derivative or analytical meaning and (iv) yaugika' i.e. words possessing derivative or analytical meaning alone : "rudham ca laksakam caiva yoga-rudham ca yaugikam, tat-caturdha paraih rudhayaugikam manyate 'dhikam." sabda-sakti-prakasika- pp. 16. (= sa. sa. pra.) Under (i) fall words such as 'gauh'. The characteristic feature of such words having fixed conventional meaning is that when such words are analysed into stems and suffixes, the analysis does not correspond to their popular or current meaning. The derivative or etymological sense does not count for much in such cases, e.g. the word 'gauh' means, 'that which goes,' when derived from the Vgam'to go.' Such words are termed as 'samjna.' "saiva samjneti kirtyate." sa. sa. pra. In the expression viz. "gangayam ghosah"-the word 'ganga' is an example of 'laksaka' type, for it yields, the sense of 'ganga-tata' or the bank of the river Ganga,' in place of the flow i.e. 'jala-pravaha' of the particular river concerned. The yogarudha' type is seen represented by such words as 'pankaja', having both the elements of convention when the meaning is taken as a lotus flower, and also derivation when taken as 'a substance born in mud,' i.e. mud+production+agent. "(panka + jani + kartrtva)- yan nama savayava-vrtti-labhya'rthena samam svarthasya'nvaya-bodha-krt, tan-nama yogarudham, yatha pankaja-krsna-sarpadharmadi." (Sa. Sa. pra. pp. 26). The sense derived from parts - i.e. avayavasakti-has coincidence with what is conveyed by the same as a whole i.e. samudaya-sakti. For Personal & Private Use Only

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174 SAHRDAYALOKA -"yoga-rudham tu pankaja'dipadam, avayava-vrttya rudha'rtham eva, aktya ca avayava-labhya'rtham eva anubhavayati, na tv anyam." --Sa. Sa. Pra.;. P. 27. The yaugika words as such as; 'karaka,' 'pacaka,' 'pathaka,' etc. are signified by their component parts into which they can be grammatically analysed. Some hold that there is a class such as "rudha-yaugika" which is slightly similar to the 'yoga-rudha' class. The illustration in this case is such as the word, "mandapa" having two meanings viz. a pendal or house taken as a whole, and also, "one who drinks gruel," when etymologically explained. -- "mandapa-maharavainadi kadacid avayavavrttya yoga'rthameva, kadacit samudayasaktya rudhyartham eva abhidhatte." Sa. Sa. pra. pp. 27. - The difference between yogarudha and rudha-yaugika class is that in the case of the former, the meanings indicated mutually correspond with each other, while in case of the latter, the meaning of the whole seems to be different from the meaning of the parts. The use of certain words in the secondary sense is noticed by the Mimansakas, Naiyayikas, and the Vaiyakaranas as well. Patanjali has explained the condition of laksana. He has given various examples of laksana under Pa. Su. IV. i. 48. "mancah hasanti, gangayam ghosah, yastih pravesaya" - We will have an occasion to deal with all this in greater detail when we pick up the topics of abhidha, laksana, etc. individually, and also their special treatment by such great writers on poetics as Appayya Diksita, and Jagannatha Pandita. Etymologists i.e. the Nairuktas have a distinct method of classifying words. It is based not on the general meaning signified by the word, but on direct or indirect implication of action (i.e. kriya) as seen in the word. Thus, with 'kriya' as the sole criterian, words are said to be three-fold such as (i) pratyaksa-vrtti i.e. words having the idea of action seen transparent, (ii) paroksa-vrtti i.e. words having 'kriya' at the base seen in a less transparent way, i.e. in which the underlying 'kriya is not easily perceptible, and (iii) 'ati-paroksa-vitti' i.e. words having any' relation with whatsoever 'kriya' underlying, almost evaporated, i.e. they are either without any kriya at their base, or it requires a great effort on the part of a scholar to locate and correlate the element of kriya in them.-See Durga on Nirukta I. i. "trividha hi sabda-vyavastha. pratyaksa-vittayah, paroksa-vyttayah ati-paroksa-vrttayas ca."-- For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 175 Accordingly, Durga attempts a three-fold explanation of the word 'nighantu' such as "nigamayitarah, nigantavah, nighantavah." We have tried to understand the great heritage in the field of word-senserelationship, as preserved in the writings of the great Mimamsakas, Naiyayikas, and Vaiyakaranas, and also philosophers belonging to other schools of thought such as the Buddhists. The writers on poetics, alamkarikas inherited all these thoughtcurrents and we will go further to see how they developed this thinking almost to perfection, which could be an envy for modern western thinkers on topics of linguistics, or semantics in particular. Before we start with what the literary aesthetes seem to have finally advocated, we will once again go for a short summary of the total heritage as indicated above. We have seen that in ancient India there were great teachers such as Audumbarayana as mentioned by Yaska, who advocated the impermanancy - anityatva - of spoken word and supported its 'indriya-nityatva.' For them the sentence-unit stays alive in the sense organs or perspective faculty of the listeners thus rendering the scheme of the four-fold classification of words as totally redundant. People use words in daily parlour because of their universal applicability and their convenience due to simplicity. Bhartrhari refers to this view and says that Vartaksa also held a similar view, that it is only the sentence that is regularly present in the mind of the hearer (V. P. II. 345-9). Among those who accept the eternality of word--the sabda-nityatva-vadin - some Naiyayikas and Bhatta Mimamsakas opt for what we will go to discuss later as 'abhihita'nvayavada', and the Prabhakaras accept 'anvita'bhidhana-vada.' These trends of thought will be taken up in fuller details later. Dr. Raja observes that according to the 'akhanda-paksa' supported by Bhartrhari, the fundamental linguistic unit is a sentence, which is as a Gestalt whose parts are not relevant to it. Perhaps at the back of this thought current is the original inspiration derived from the view of Audumbarayana quoted above, such s--"indriya-nityam vacanam." For Bhartshari, a sentence is--"eko'navayavah sabdah"-i. e. "a single integral symbol," revealed by individual letters and words that comprise it. Meaning is gathered through the agency of this vakya-sphota" - or the sentence considered as an indivisible and integral linguistic symbol. Meaning thus collected is an, "instantaneous flash of insight or intuition," (= pratibha)," and is also 'nir-avayava' i.e. partless. Words have no reality of their own and are only For Personal & Private Use Only

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176 SAHKDAYALOKA of the form of hints that help the listener to collect the meaning. They have 'satta' or existence only at the popular worldly level. We will go to see how alamkarikas, with Anandavardhana perhaps taking the lead, derived their inspiration and strength for establishing 'vyanjana' as an independent function or power of word, from Bharthari. Anandavardhana's vyanjana touches the emotive as well as the socio-cultural significance of utterances, suggested with the help of contextual factors. On one hand the logicians and philosophers were satisfied only with that portion of the total meaning of an utterance which is absolutely precise and accurate, and which could be the subject of objective study, the poets, linguists and literary critics on the other hand went beyond this and did not choose to neglect vast areas of language behaviour as unreal and indescribable. We will go into this at a later stage. Thinkers of ancient India have also considered the problem of change of meaning. The conditions for a metaphorical transfer of meaning, through laksana, are discussed mainly from a sychronic point of view, observes Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja--(Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 10). This is different from the Western study and only in what we call instances of 'nirudha laksana' or faded metaphor that a historical approach is visible. Dr. Raja observes that even etymology is not studied from a diachronic point of view. The essential nature of a word lies in its power to render meaning i.e. in its significative power. This power or sakti is normally accepted to be, "Saktis ca padena saha padarthasya sambandhah," i.e. the relation between a given word and its meaning. This follows the dictum as stated in, "Siddhanta-muktavali" (pp. 265). The Laghu-manjusa, pp. 28, puts it as, "pada-pada'rthayoh sambandha'ntaram eva Saktih; vacya-vacaka-svabhava'para-paryaya." (pp. 28). Thus sakti or power is that relation between word and meaning, by which the meaning is collected whenever the word is heard. As observed earlier, among the thought-currents prevailing with reference to the explanation of this relationship of word and meaning, two accepted by the Mimamsadarsana and the Nyaya-darsana are principal; the former opting for the 'natural' or 'autpattika' i.e. 'nitya' or eternal relationship, and the latter supporting the 'conventional-relationship. The Mimamsakas, as observed above, brush aside the idea of the relationship of word and meaning brought about or established a new, at a particular moment. For, according to them we cannot imagine a period of time in the history of human society, when language, in any form, was not current. We learn language through the agency of our parents who again learnt it from their parents and so on. So, what the Mimamsakas hold by For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 177 eternality of the relationship of word and meaning is that it is impossible to trace the origin either to a person or an assembly of persons. This natural relationship of word and meaning is known as 'pravaha-nityata' and, as observed by Dr. Raja, is different from the natural theory of Greek scholars (pp. 20, ibid, ft. n. 2) who believed that, in giving names to objects the primitive man was inspired by some "innate quality or psychological effect of the thing itself." This of course, does not sound convincing to us. The grammarians agree with the Mimamsakas and also hold that this permanent relationship between a given word and meaning has to be understood from popular or worldly usage. We have referred to this view as explained by Karyayana and Patanjali on an earlier occasion. The natural relationship between word and meaning has also been explained in terms of yogyata' i.e. inherent capacity of words. The V. P. III. 3.29, as quoted above goes to observe that like sense-organs having an innate power to perceive objects of their sphere, words have the power to render particular meanings. Thus, any word has the natural capacity to express a particular meaning and this is restricted by convention. "sarva'kara-paricchedyasakte'rthe vacake'pi va, sarvakara'rtha-vijnanasamarthe niyamah krtah." slokavarttika, Pratyaksa Section, V. 228. We have seen that the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas accept the relationship between word and meaning to be conventional. Gautama suggests this when he observes at Nya. Su. II. i. 55 that, "samayikatvat sabda'rtha-sambandhapratyayasya," i.e. the cognition of the relation between word and meaning is through convention. The same view is supported by the Vaisesikas as read in Vai. Su. VII. 2. 20 : "samayikah sabdad artha-prayayah." The ancient Naiyayikas (ref. Nya. Su. II. i. 55) and also the Vaisesikas hold this conventional relation as being established by God's will. The Tarka-samgraha also supports this. But for the later Naiyayikas it is not only God's will, but "icchamatra," i.e. even human will can be an instrument to bring about this relationship. When the 'samketa' or conventional relation is established by the will of God, it is deemed as permanent and is termed as "abhidha' or 'sakti,' but when it is impermanent and established by human agency, it is termed as 'paribhasa.' This is observed by Jagadica in his Sabda-sakti prakasika, pp. 122. Bhartrhari also refers to this two-fold convention and calls them For Personal & Private Use Only

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178 SAHRDAYALOKA 'ajanika' i.e. permanent and adhunika' or modern, fixed by experts of various disciplines. The first one is 'nitya' or 'abhidha,' the latter is 'paribhasa'. In both these cases the relationship is direct. When the relation is deemed to be indirect we get a case of either laksana or gauni, in which the meaning is collected on the basis of the 'mukhyartha' i.e. primary direct sense. Thus for the Indian thinkers of all schools, a functional definition of meaning is accepted and thus 'vrtti' or 'function of a word is its relation to sense. This relation is also termed as 'power' i.e. 'sakti' residing in a word, which enables it to render a particular sense. For the Mimamsakas this power is a separate category i.e. 'padartha,' but for the Naiyayikas it is only conventional. Eight factors are counted to explain how a meaning is gathered from a word. They are --Sakti-graha, vyakarana, upamana, kosa, apta-vakya, vakya-sesa, vivrti or explanation, and siddha-pada-sannidhya. Dr. Raja explains that Mathuranatha observes in Tattva-cintamani, p. 481 "Saktigraham vakaranopamanakosaptavakyad vyavaharatas ca, vakyasya sesad vivoter vadanti sannidhyatah siddha-padasya veddhah." The Mimamsakas, Naiyayikas, and Vaiyakaranas differ on this or that factor. Prabhakaras pay special importance to vrddha-vyavahara and Nagesa also calls this factor to be "sakti-grahaka-siromani," (ref. Laghumanjusa, pp. 64). The Indian thinkers have also considered the problem of homonyms (=nanartha). Are homonyms to be taken as the same word with different senses, or different words with different senses--is a problem that pins their attention. Punyaraja (on V. P. II. 252) calls them as 'one-word-theory' and 'many-wordstheory', i.e. Weka-sabda-darsana' and 'aneka-sabda-darsana' respectively. The Indian thinkers are primarily more concerned with the primary sense or 'mukhya'rtha' and not with the metaphorical meaning. Even Yaska and Panini do not pay much attention to the latter. Of course, Yaska has suggested different etymologies for different senses derived from the same word, and this could be taken as a pointer to his approach. The author of unadi sutras has given a thought to multiple senses collected from the same word. Panini does not refer, as noted above, to the metaphorical usages, but the explanation of the term "parimana' in the sutra II. iii 46, suggests that perhaps Panini also thought of covering up the metaphorical usage under primary sense. Later laxicographers seem to accept 'one-word theory.' For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 179 They use the terms 'nana'rtha' and 'aneka'rtha' for homonyms. This suggests that they believed that one word can have more than one meaning. They also do not seem to follow the distinction between primary and secondary sense. In the works on Mimamsa, we come across fuller discussion which seems to have influenced the alamkarikas. We feel that Udbhata seems to accept aneka-sabda-darsana.' Mammata also, later (K. P. IX. 84) seems to accept that actually in slesa, the apparent one word is not one, but many. Some Naiyayikas seem to hold ekatvapaksa with reference to homonyms. For them words are classified in the four-fold way, viz. yaugika, rudha, yoga-rudha, and yaugika-rudha or rudha-yaugika. They feel that the last variety can be taken both as yaugika as well as rudha. The importance of contextual factors is accepted from early times, in determining the exact meaning of an expression. The Brhaddevata II. 118, observes : "arthat prakarnat lingat aucityad desakalatah, mantresv artha-vivekah syad itaresv iti ca sthitih."-- Bharthari also supports this, and suggests that the meaning of an expression is determined not merely by its form, but by contextual factors also. He quotes the above list with a slight change, such as: "samsargo viprayogas ca sahacaryam virodhita arthah prakaranam lingam, sabdasya'nyasya sannidhih, samarthyam auciti desah kalo vyaktih svara'dayah arthasya anavacchede visesa-smoti-hetavah." (V. P. II. 317). Nagesa and alamkarikas such as Mammata, Hemacandra, Visvanatha, Appayya and Jagannatha, quote this from Bhartrhari and discuss the same fully. We have also noted above the differences among darsanikas concerning the exact import of a word. For the Naiyayikas, it is 'vyakti,' 'akrti' and 'jati', and for the navya-Naiyayikas (see Sabdasakti-prakasika, under V. 19), it is 'vyakti qualified by 'aksti' and 'jati'. Some are jati-visista-vyakti-vadins, and rest are jativadins. For e abhidha yields the conventional-samketika-meaning and the philosophers also have differences concerning the exact samketa.' This will be also taken up in greater details when we will go to discuss abhidha.' For Personal & Private Use Only

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180 SAHRDAYALOKA For the sankhyas and the navya-naiyayikas, vyakti' is the only conventional meaning of a word.See Nyaya-sara, II. ii. 59 and bhasya thereon and also-- Vivarana-prameha-samgraha p. 181; and Nyayakosa, pp. 855 has, "vyaktau eva saktih, na tu gotvadi jatav api, iti navya ahuh." For the Jaina philosophers, the word 'gauh' has no convention with reference to 'go' the vyakti i.e. individual, but it refers to all creatures having a form similar to a cow. For the Mimansakas, the classjati'-is the samketa of the word 'gauh.' On the strength of this convention with reference to the 'go-jati,' in practice, as an individual cow is involved, the meaning of 'go-vyakti' i.e. an individual cow is arrived at through 'aksepa' i.e. implication. This meaning is the result of the secondary function-i.e. laksana-for them. Prabhakara and Murari Mishra choose to collect the meaning concerning 'govyakti' i.e. an individual cow as implied only. The Vedantins, though theoretically do not adhere to the distinction of 'jati' i.e. class and 'vyakti' i.e. individual, from the highest point of view, also, from a practical point of view, accept this difference and admit, following the Mimamsakas, convention with reference to 'go-jati.' They believe that either by savinabhava' or by 'laksana' the meaning of 'go-vyakti' or individual cow is arrived at. For the Vaiyakaranas, Vyadi takes the meaning of a word to refer to vyakti' i.e. individual. Vajapyayana recommends, after Mimamsakas, the samketa with reference to a class, or "jati.' Patanjali informs us that for Panini the convention is with reference to both a 'jati' and a 'vyakti,' for Panini I. ii. 58, caters to jativada and Pa. I. ii. 64, supports vyaktivada.--Mahabhasya, pp. 6. -"kim punah akrtih padarthah, ahosvit dravyam, ubhayam iti aha. katham jnayate? ubhayatha hi acaryena sutrani prasthitani." -Helaraja also takes note of Panini's acceptance of both 'jati' and 'vyakti' as convention. In Vakypadiya III, Jati-samuddesa and Vyakti-samuddesa, Bhartrhari has also discussed a number of topics bearing relevance to this. We will go for a detailed discussion when we take up abhidha, later. We will also alot more space there to 'apoha' of the Buddhists. The alamkarikas, as already observed earlier, normally choose to follow the lead of the grammarians and this line of thinking is also adopted by them when they discuss various sabda-vrttis. Anandavardhana in projecting the case of vyanjana relies on the views of the grammarians with reference to 'spota'. Thus grammar is closest to poetics. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 181 -Sabda-vsttis, as seen in different schools of thought such as the anas, mimamsakas, etc. :-Vaiyakaranas-Patanjali in his Mahabhasya discusses the topics of 'mukhya'rtha', i.e. primary meaning of a word, and 'laksya'rtha' i.e. secondary meaning of a word. He uses terms such as 'abhidhana' while discussing primary meaning. His thinking with reference to the 'guana' i.e. secondary meaning seems to have blossomed in the later concepts of gauna-vrtti and laksana-vrtti. We come across, for a number of times such usages as 'gauna', 'mukhya,' abhidhatum,' abhidhanavat,' 'abhidhana'rtha,' abhidhiyamana,' etc. in the Mahabhasya. See, for example, Mahabhasya on I. i. 15--"evam tarhi gauna-mukhyayoh mukhye karya-sampratyayah-iti.; and also, I. iv. 108--"gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. tad yatha gaur anubandhyah, ajo'gnisomiya iti na vahiko'nubadhyate." etc. etc. and also, VIII. 3. 82,-'agneh somah.....gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratipattih. tad yatha gaur anubandhyo...... 'abhidhatum' occurs at II. iii. 1, -karoter utpadyamanah kto'navayavena sarvam karma abhidhatte, kata-sabdat punah utpadyamanaya dvitiyaya yat katastham karma tat sakyam abhidhatum, na hi karma-visesah. 'abhidhiyamana' occurs at II. ii. 24, 25 ... samanya'bhidhane hi visesa'nabhidhanam. samanye hy abhidhiyamane viseso anabhihito bhavati. tatra avasyam visesarthina viseso 'nuproktavyah... etc. athava vibhaktartho'bhi-dhiyate etac catra yuktam yo vibhaktyarthobhidhiyate tatra hi sarvam pascat padam vartate'syeti.... abhidhavat-occurs at I. i. 58, I. iii. 153; .... anadvaham udahari ya tvam harasi sirasa kumbham bhag ini, sacinam abhidhavantam adraksiriti. yasya yathestam abhisambandho bhavati. udahari bhagini ya tvam kumbham harasi sirasa 'nadvaham sacinam abhidhavantam adraksir iti. abhidhanatah -at, I. iii. 1; 6. prathamabhavagrahanam ca. ||11|| For Personal & Private Use Only

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182 SAHRDAYALOKA "prathama-bhava-grahanam ca kartavyam. prathamam yo bhavam aheti. kutah punah prathamyam ? kim sabdatah ahosvid arthatah ? kim ca'tah ? yadi sabdatah sanadinam dhatusamkhya na prapnoti, putriyati vastriyati iti. atha arthatah ? siddha sanadinam dhatusamjna sa eva tu doso bhava-vacane tadartha-pratyayapratisedha iti. evam tarhi, naiva arthato na'pi sabdatah. kim tarhi ? abhidhanatah. sumadhyame. abhidhane yah prathama bhavam aha." VI. 3.46. ....pradhanato va yato vrttih. VI. atha va gauna-mukhyayor mukhye karya-sampratyayah. tad yatha gaur anubandhyo ajo'gnisomiya iti vahiko'nubadhyate." abhidhana-laksana--III. iii. 19; 7/146; a-kartari karake ca samjnayam. III. iii. 19. ati-prasanga iti ced abhidhana-laksanatvat pratyayasya siddham 11311 atiprasanga iti cet tanna. kim karanam ? abhidhana-laksanatvat pratyayasya siddham. abhidhana-laksanah krt-taddhitasamasah. anabhidhanan na bhavisyanti. abhidhanavat and abhidheyavat at I. 2. 51, 15/227; lupi yuktavad avyakti-vacane. I. iii. 51. "anyatrabhidheya-vyakti-vacanabhavallupi yuktavad anudesah." ||1|| anyatrabhidheyavallinga-vacanani bhavanti. kvany atra? luki. lavanah sapah. lavana yavaguh. lavanam sakam iti. anyatra abhidheyavad a-vyakti-vacanani bhavanti. luki. ihapi abhidheyaval linga-vacanani prapnuvanti. isyante ca. abhidhanavat syur iti, tat ca antarena yatnam na siddhyati iti lupi yuktavad anudesah. evam artham idam ucyate. asti prayojanam etat. kim tarhi iti .... etc. abhidhanartha.-II. i. 51; 13/395; 'tad abhidadhatar'thottara-pada-samahare ca." 2/1/51; abhidhanrtham tu 7 For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 183 abhidhanartham tu samahara-grahanam. kartavyam. samaharena abhidhanam yatha syat taddhitarthena ma bhud iti.... etc. abhidhaya--V. iii. 74; V. vi. 424; kutsite V. iii. 74. ... iha kutsitakah anukampitaka iti sva-sabdenoktatvat tasya'rthasya pratyayo na prapnoti. naisa dosah. kutsitasya anukampayam bhavisyaty anukampitasya kutsayam. athava svartham abhidhaya sabdo nirapekso dravyam aha samavetam. samavetasya ca vacane linga-vacana-vibhaktih ca. abhidhaya tan visesan apeksamanas ca, krtsnam atmanam, priya-krtnadisu punah pravartate'sau vibhaktyantah."......etc. abhidhana -- I. i. 69; 1/178; anudit savarnasya ca'pratyayah. I. ii. 69. abhidhanat pratyayah savarnan na grahisyati. yan hi pratyayah sarvagrahanena glhniyat na tair arthasya abhidhanam syat. anabhidhanan na bhavisyati. etc. I. ii. 60, 6/231; phalguni-prostha-padanam ca naksatre. I. ii. 60; phalguni-samipagate cadramasi phalguni-sabdo vartate. bahavas te'rthas tatra yuktam bahuvacanam. yada tayor eva abhidhanam tada dvi-vacanam bhavisyati. I. ii. 64; 18.21, 233 "sarupanamekasesa eka-vibhaktau." I. ii. 64; pratyartham sabda-nivesan naikenanekasya abhidhanam. ||1|| pratyartham sabdah abhinivisante. kim idam pratyartham iti. artham artham prati pratyartham. pratyartham sabda-nivesad etasmat karanat na ekena sabdena anekasya'rthasya abhidhanam prapnoti. tatra ko dosah ... .etc. also, lines 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 22/pp. 241--* ....... nanu coktam pratyartham iti. yadi caikena sabdena anekasya'rthasya'bhidhanam syan na pratyartham sabda-nivesah ketah syat. pratyartham sabda-nivesad ekena anekasya abhidhanad apratyartham iti cet tadapi pratyartham eva.||30|| pratyartham sabda-nivesad ekena anekasya abhidhanad a-pratyartham iticed evam ucyate-yad apyekena anekasya abhidhanam bhavati tad api pratyartham eva. yavatam abhidhanam tavatam prayogo nyayyah. yavatam arthanam abhidhanam sa bhavati tavatam sabdanam prayoga ity eva pakso nyayyah. * All references to the Mbh. are to the Edn.-Keilhorn. Vol. I, II & III BSS. 1906. For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA yavatam abhidhanam tavatam prayoga nyayya iti ced ekena api anekasya abhidhanam. ||1|| yavatamabhidhanam tavatam prayoga nyayya iti ced evam ucyate. eso'pi nyayya eva yada ekena anekasya abhidhanam bhavati. yadi tarhi ekena anekasya'pyabhidhanam bhavati plaksa-nyagrodhau ekena uktatvat aparasya prayogo'nupapannah.... etc. See also, 1, 2, 3, 5, 79/pp. 242; 184 ekena uktavad aparasya prayogo'nupapanna iti ced anuktah plaksena nyagrodhartha iti krtva nyagrodha-sabdah prayujyate. katham anukto yavatedanim evaoktam ekena api anekasya abhidhanam bhavatiti. sarupanam ekena api anekasya abhidhanam bhavati, na virupanam. abhidhanam punah svabhavikam. ||33|| svabhavikam abhidhanam. ubhaya-darsanac ca. ||38|| ubhayam khalvapi drsyate. virupanam api ekena anekasya abhidhanam bhavati. tad yatha-dyava ha ksama. dyava cid asmai prthivi namete, iti. virupanam kila nama ekena anekasya abhidhanam syat kim punah sarupanam. also, at I. iii. 1.; 6/258; bhuvadayo dhatavah. I. iii. 1; prathamava-grahnam ca. ||11||.... etc. etc., see above; abhidhanatah....; again at I. iv. 51; 8/335; kathite' bhihite tva-vidhistvamatir guna-karmani ladi-vidhih sapare. kathite ladibhir abhihite tva-vidhir-esa bhavati, kim idam tvavidhir iti....etc. again, 2. 1. 1. 7/363; samkhya-viseso vyaktabhidhanam upasarjana-visesanam ca yoga. athaitasmin nekartibhava-krte visese kim svabhavikam sabdair arthabhidhanam ahosvid vacanikam...etc. again, 3. 1. 17. 18/12; dhatoh karmanah samana-kartrkadicchayam va. III. i. 7; anabhidhanad va. ||5|| athava anabhidhanat subantad utpattir na bhavisyati....etc. again, II. i. 36; 2/389; -artha sabdo'yam pumllinga uttara-padarthapradhanasca, tat-purusastena pumllingasyaiva samasasya'bhidhanam syat, strinapumsaka-lingasya na syat; etc. etc. II. i. 51, 13/395-taddhitarthottara-pada-samahare ca. II. i. 51, see, abhidhanartham, above; II. i. 69; 24/403; -karma-dharaya-prakrti-bhir-matvartham caiva abhidhanam syat... etc. II. i. 67, line 10, 10, 15/ p. 404 -evam api yady atra kadacit For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 185 karmadharayo bhavati karmadharaya-prakrti-bhir matvarthiyair abhidhanam prapnoti. --sarvasca'yam eva artho gatnatah karmadharaya-prakstibhir matvarthiyair abhidhanam ma bhud iti... etc. tatra karmadharaya-prakstibhir matvarthiyair abhidhanam astu, bahuvrihineti bahuvrihina bhavisyati laghutvat....etc. II. ii. 24. - 18/421; - padartha'bhidhane'nuprayoga'nupapattir abhihitatvat 11411. padarthasya abhidhane'nuprayogasya anupapattih chitragur devadatta iti. kim karanam ? abhihitatvat. citragu-sabdena abhihitah so'rthah iti krtva'nuprayoga na prapnoti. II. ii. 24: 13. 15/424 -- na va'nabhidhanad asamanadhikaranesu samjnabhavah ||16|tacca'vasyam anabhidhanamasrayitatvam. kriyamane'pi vai pariganane yatrabhidhanam nasti na bhavati tatra bahuvrihih. tad yatha panca bhuktavanto'syeti. athaitasmin satyabhidhane yadi vitti-parigananam kriyate vartiparigananam api kartavyam. tat katham kartavyam? .... etc. II. ii. 29. 23/432; - plaksasya nyagrodhatvan nyagrodhasya plaksatvat svasabdena abhidhanam bhavisyati. again at II. ii. 29, 25/433-- "abhidhanam punah svabhavikam ||15||. svabhavikam abhidhanam....etc. and II. iii. 1, 12-13/442 -- na va'nyatarena'-nabhi dhanat. 11811. na vaisa dosah. kim karanam ? anya-tarena'nabhidhanat. anyatarena'tra'nabhidhanam. sadi-pratyayenabhidhanam asipratyayena anabhidhanam. yato'nabhidhanam tadasraya saptami bhavisyati. kuto na khalvetat satya-abhidhane ca'nabhidhane ca'nabhihitasraya-saptami bhavisyati na punar abhihitasrayah pratisedha iti. anibhihite hi vidhanam.1911 anabhihite hi saptami vidhiyate. na'bhihite pratisedhah....kim punah dravyam sadhanam ahosvit gunah kim ca'tah yadi dravyam sadhanam naitad anyad bhavaty abhihitat. atha hi guna sadhanam bhavaty etad anyad abhihitat.....etc. II. iii. 5; 14/445 -kaladhvanor atyantasamyoge II. iii. 5. ladibhir abhidhanam yatha syat .... etc. III. i. 7 18/12, see above. III. i. 7. 13/13; 11/15 - a-karmano hyasamana-kartrkad va'nabhidhanam. 11711. icchayam abhidheyayam san vidhiyate na cakarmano'samana-kartekad votpadyamanena sanecchaya abhidhanam syat. anabhidhanat tata utpattir na bhavisyati. .... sarvasya va cetanavatvat ||15|| For Personal & Private Use Only

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186 SAHRDAYALOKA evam api isyate gramo gantum iti parasadhana utpadyamanena lena gramasya abhidhanam na prapnoti. III. i. 22, 9-11/29. ekaj-jhaladigrahane ca. 1|2|| yatraikaco haladiscotpadyamanena yangarthasya abhidhanam bhavati, na bhavati tatrotpattih. .....etc. ....yatra ca'nekaco haladevotpadyamanena yangarthasya abhidhanam bhavati bhavati tatrotpattih.... etc. III. i. 26, 22/31 - iha tarhi pacayatyodanam devadatto yajnadattenety ubhayoh kartror lenabhidhanam prapnoti. pratyayartha-visesane punah sati na dosah. pradhana-kartari ladayo bhavantiti pradhanakarta lenabhidhiyate yascatrapradhanam siddha tatra kartarityeva tritiya.....etc. IIII. i. 67, 1/1/3/9/58--kim ucyate krtabhihita iti na lena'pyabhidhanam bhavati, asakyam lena'bhidhanam asrayitum....yadi ca lena'pyabhidhanam syan dam vaktum lena'pyabhidhanam bhavati ti. bhavati ced abhihite vikaranabhava ity eva.....etc. again at III. iv. 26., 13-18/174... nanu ca bhuji-pratyayena anabhihitah karta iti krtva anabhihitasrayo vidhir bhavisyati trtiya. yadi saty abhidhane ca'nabhidhane ca kutscid anabhidhanam iti krtva anabhihitasrayo vidhir bhavisyati trtiya yavagvam dvitiya prapnoti. kim karanam ? na-mulanabhihitam karmeti.... etc. etc. pp. 175;... yadi satyabhidhane tu kutscid anabhidhanam iti krtva'nabhihitasrayo vidhir bhavisyati trtiya yadukta-modane dvitiya prapnotiti sa iha doso na jayate..... IV. i. 48; 6/218-siddham tu striyah pum-sabdena'bhidhanat. siddham etat. katham ? striyah pumsabdena bhidhanat, stri-pumsabdenakarantena'bhidhiyate. IV. i. 91, 14/15/; 246; apatyabhidhane stri-pumllingasya'prasiddhirnapumsakatvat ||4||| apatyabhidhane stri-pumllingasya'prasiddhih. kim karanam ? napumsakalingatvat. apatyam napumsaka-lingam tena napumsaka-lingasya eva abhidhanam syat, stri-pum-lingasya na syat. nanu cedam purastad eva coditam parihrtam ca. utpattis tatra codyata iha punar utpannena abhidhanam codyate. IV. i. 93; 5/248; - utpadayitari ca'patyayukte striya yuktya abhidhanam na prapnoti. 14/249-evam api striya yuvatya abhidhanam na prapnoti.... 25/250; - kriyamane'pi hi samjnakari-grahane yatra jatyadibhya utpadyamanena pratyayena arthasya abhidhanam bhavati, bhavati tattvotpattih .... etc. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 187 IV. ii. 1.; 5/271; raktadinam arthabhidhane pratyaya-vidhanad upadhy anarthakyam. ||1|| raktadinam arthabhidhane pratyavidhanad upadhigrahanam anarthakam. na hy aragad utpadyamanena pratyayena arthasya abhidhanam syat. anabhidhana'ntatah utpattir na bhavisyati. IV. iii. 25; 13/307 ... kasman na bhavati tatraste tatra sete iti. anabhidhanat. tac cavasyam anabhidhanam asrayitavyam. kriyamanesv api hy artha-nirdesesu yatra jatadinu utpadyamanena prayatnena arthasya abhidhanam na bhavati, na bhavati tatra pratyayotpattih. also at -- IV. iii. 155; 3-6/325; IV. iv. 76, 14/333; V. i. 59; 24/355; and VIII. i. 4; 4.4/365-in the same sense. But apart from this, in the Mbh. we neither come across any direct mention by name of abhidha, gauni, laksana and vyanjana, nor any attempted definition of any of these functions. With reference to the discussion on 'gaunartha' i.e. secondary sense, Patanjali mentions four contexts which we may term as four-fold 'tadyoga'; e.g. "tatsthya" or 'sthanadi' -sambandha, taddharmyasambandha, or relation based on 'samana-dharma' i.e. common qualities, then 'samipya-sambandha' and 'sahacarya-sambandha.' See Mbh. on Pa. IV. i. 48. : Pa. IV. i. 48 is "pumyogadakhyayam." siddham tu striyah pumsabdana abhidhanat ||3||| ....athava punar astu tasy edame ity anena abhisambandhena. nanu coktam pumyogadakhyayam tadighatalugvacanamiti. naisa dosah. navasyam ayam evabhisambandho bhavati tasyedam iti. ayam apy abhisambandho'sti soyam iti. katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati. tatsthyat taddharmyat samipyat sahacaryad iti. tatsthyat tavat, manca hasanti. girir dahyate. taddharmyat jatinam yantam brahmadatta ityaha. brahmadatte yani karyani jatiny api tani kriyanta ity ato jati brahmadatta ity ucyate. tatsamipyat, gangayam ghosah. kupe garga-kulam. tatsahacaryat, kuntan pravesaya-, 'yastih pravesaya' iti. Thus we see that four-fold 'tadyoga' i.e. the relation of location or tatsthya, the relation of substance and quality or function i.e. tad-dharmya, proximity or samipya, and sahacarya or being together-are mentioned under Pa. IV. i. 48. Thus we find terms such as 'abhidhana' etc. as used by Patanjali and such usages pave the way for the conception of "abhidhavrtti.' Abhidha in its shadow is thus seen under such names as abhidhana or mukhyartha, in the Mbh. and material for later vrttis of gauni and laksana is also read in the Mbh. The basic material for the For Personal & Private Use Only

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188 SAHRDAYALOKA concept of gauni lies in the sadharanya relation as noted above, and that for laksana in other relations such as tatsthya, samipya, etc., which led to the secondary sense. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gauni and laksana. * Nyayakosa; --sakti-laksanabhyam atirikta eva gauni vrttiriti mimamsakah. saca tad atirikta na iti naiyayikah ahuh-(Nyaya-siddhantamanjari-prakasa). When we come to the later grammarian of repute, i.e. Bhartrhari, we find material which could prove to be the source for the later concept of vyanjana. Bhartshari, the author of V. P. (=Vakyapadiya), as seen by us, has divided sabda'rtha into gauna and mukhya and has shown two-fold upacara (i.e. imposition) with reference to sabda and artha. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e.g. the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and vahika', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accident meaning.-see V. P.-II. 252; "ekam ahur aneka'rtham sabdam anye paroksakah, nimitta-bhedad ekasya sarvarthyam tasya bhidyate."-- See also, Punyaraja--tatra ekasabda-darsane sabdopacarah prasiddhy asiddhinimittakah. A word does not express more than one meaning at a time - "yaugapadyam atikramya paryaye vyavatisthate."-(V. P.). The other meanings that are not mukhyartha, are to be comprehended by either context, (or prakarana), or connection with some other words (yogat, sabdantarena va).- "arthaprakaranabhyam va yogat sabdantarena va."-V. P. II. Bhartrhari holds that the word go which denotes go-vyakti is also applied to vahika' on account of his sadharmya with 'go'-- "yatha sasnadiman pindo go-sabdena'bhidhiyate, tatha sa eva go-sabdo vahike'pi vyavasthitah." -- V. P. II. Bhartrhari observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes 'gauna' and 'mukhya,'--"prasiddhi-bhedat gaunatyam mukhyatyam copapadyate."-(V. P. II). As explained by Punyaraja on V. P. II. 256, the 'artha' is two-fold viz. 'svarupa' and 'bahya.' Svarupa is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'go-tva' of the word 'go.' The 'bahya' is that which is indicated by 'upacara' e.g. when vahika is said to be 'go.'--Punyaraja says: For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 189 "arthah sabdasya dvividhah; svarupam bahyasca. tatra nimittad jadyader gotvam vahike'py anusajyate, sabdas tu go-tvameva'bhidhatte iti bahyarthopacarah."Thus far, Bhartrhari gives basis for abhidha, gauni and laksana, almost on the lines of the Mbh. Over and above this, Bhartrhari discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i.e. a word having multiple sense. Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having multiple senses, all of which are mukhyarthas. In his view, the particular meaning out of several possible, is determined by factors such as context, time, place etc. In this connection, he cites V. P. II. 316 and 317, 318. -V. P. II. 316-318; vakyat prakaranad arthad aucityad desa-kalatah sabdarthah pravibhajyante na rupad eva kevalat."--V. P. II. 316 samyogo viprayogas ca sahacaryam virodhita arthah prakaranam lingam sabdasya'nyasya sannidhih, samarthyam auciti desah kalo vyaktih svaradayah sabdarthasya anavacchede visesa-smrtihetavah" (V. P. II.317-18) Here, we may ask as to what is it that fixes the particular meaning of a given word and debars other multiple sense which it has by convention and usage ? To Bhartrhari, this question does not seem to have occurred. For him, samsarga or conjunction and the like limit the word to one mukhyartha or primary sense. But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional sabda-vrtti, over and above abhidha, gauni and laksana. In this, we may see the inspiration for the recognition of a separate and independent vyanjana-vrtti. This is supported by the fact that later writers on alamkara such as Mammata, Visvanatha and others mention these very verses (i. e. V. P. II. 317-318) as authority for their theory of 'abhidhamula vyanjana.' For Punyaraja these verses contain the views of others and not Bhartrhari. Jagannatha also does not read abhidhamula vyanjana here. Among later grammarians Nagesa (cir. 18th Cen. A. D.) was the first to recommend the case of vyanjana. He apparently follows the lead of the alamkarikas in this respect and repeats the same arguments. For Personal & Private Use Only

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190 SAHRDAYALOKA Nagesa holds that in certain cases, after 'mukhyartha' or principal sense is collected, or, after 'mukhyartha-badha' or when the mukhyartha is negated, as the case may be, a further sense is to be seen. This artha is either 'prasiddha' i.e. known or 'a-prasiddha' i.e. unknown, and is either related to the mukhyartha or is unrelated to it. This sort of meaning is flashed upon the mind through what is termed as vyanjana-sakti. -Nagesa notes :- "mukhyartha-sambaddha-asambaddha sadharana-mukhyarthabadha-grahadi-prayojya-prasiddha-apra siddha'rtha-visayaka-dhi-janakatvam vyanjana." Thus, Nagesa holds vyanjana to be abhidhamula and laksana-mula. This vyanjana rests on sabda, artha, pada, padaikadesa, varna, recana and cestadi. When a woman casts a glance of her eye, with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested (i.e. by cesta). This apprehension is supported by experience-i.e. it is "anubhava-siddha." So, even in 'cesta,' vyanjana can be seen.-* Nagesa observes : "anaya kataksena abhilaso vyanjitah, iti sarva-jana-siddheh, tasyam cesta-vsttitvasya api avasyakatvac ca." Vyanjakatva lies both in padas and arthadi. That vyanjana wherein arthadi are suggested, rests on, "vakr-boddhavya-adi-vaisistya-jnana," or the knowledge of the speciality of a speaker, listener, etc. The pratibha or the genius of the hearer acts as an accessory i.e. 'sahakari' karana.-Nagesa observes : "anaya ca'rthabodhe jananiye vaktr-boddhavya-vacya-vaisistya-jnanam, pratibha ca sahakari tad-dhijanaka-jnana-janakam eva va."-- In the absence of pratibha or the genius of the hearer, there is absence of the apprehension of the suggested sense. By pratibha is meant the "nava-navonmesasalini buddhih." This nava-navonmesa is due to impressions carried from the past birth i.e. purva-janma-samskaras. So, for Nagesa pratibha is that factor which accompanied by prakarana-jnana in form of the speciality of the speaker etc., makes for the apprehension of suggested sense. * "vaktr-adi vaisistya-sahakarena tajjanika buddhih pratibha iti phalitam." This vyanjana is held to be connected even with the previous life. Nagesa observes: "evam ca saktir etajjanma-grhitaivartha-bodhika, vyanjana tu janmantara-gphita api, iti api sakteh asyah bhedakam. In the case of gatostam arkah, when we desire different meanings, the mukhyartha i.e. primary meaning viz. that, the sun has set is never contradicted - For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 191 (badhita). So, the other meaning is not gathered through laksana. So, vyanjana is not to be included in laksana. Nagesa observes: evam gatostam arkah ityadeh sisyena sandhya-vandanadeh kartavyatvabhiprayena, gurum prati prayuktatvat vaktri-tatparyabhave'pi prativesyadinam abhisaraniya-kramadi-bodhasya vacyartha-pratiti-purvakasya vacyartha-badha-jnane ajayamanasya laksanaya upapadayitum asakyatvat ca. The nipatas and upasargas also are suggestors as are the padas. The sphota is always 'vyangya' i.e. suggested and is described as such in the works of grammar. Bhatrhari also takes sphota to be 'vyangya'. Thus Nagesa considers vyanjana to be useful even for the grammarians: Vaiyakarananam api etat-svikarah avasyakah. After going through Nagesa's views carefully it may be noted that Nagesa was clearly under the influence of the alamkarikas in this respect, he being himself a commentator on the Rasagangadhara of Jagannatha. So, historically speaking, Nagesa's acceptance of vyanjana should not take us very far in considering the stance of the Vaiyakaranas. Actually, even Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also seem to have interpreted the earlier thinking on 'sphota' by the grammarians to their advantage only. As Prof. K. V. Abhyankar had told us while taking the vivavoce for our Ph. D. thesis, there is a difference between sphota-manifestation and suggestion of the alamkarikas. Manifestation and suggestion can not be taken as absolutely congruent ideas. But we can also say in defence of Anandavardhana and Abhinava-gupta that we can always give a benefit of doubt to their interpretation and application of sphota theory to dhvani-vyanjana-theory. For, to be very frank, neither the earlier Vaiyakaranas such as Panini or Patanjali, not to mention Bhartrhari, nor even, the earlier Mimamsakas, Naiyayikas, Vaisesikas, Bauddhas and Jainas i.e. all ancient darsanikas, had any business to talk, much less to think in detail, about vyangya artha i.e. suggested sense or vyanjana i.e. the suggestive power of a word, to be considered only with reference to poetry alone and certainly never with reference to the sastras or literature of various disciplines which had business, first and last, about the injunctions they contained in direct primary sense. As we go to see that for the Mimamsakas laksana or secondary function is a dosa-to be avoided as far as possible. Sastra-vacana has to be direct and clear in its meaning, while ambiguity seems to be the soul in poetry. Naturally therefore, earlier thinkers, while treating their respective sastra, dealt with word and sense, the import of words and the relation between word and sense, only from the direct view point of language and never concerned themselves with the For Personal & Private Use Only

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192 SAHRDAYALOKA as problem of poetic deviations and suggestion seen in literature. This does not mean, and should not mean, that while considering poetic use of language, they would have opposed vyanjana and vyangyartha. At least we can not say so on oath, for Panini, as a poet and writer of mahakavyas such as Patala-vijaya quoted by Anandavardhana must be fairly acquainted with the poetic use of language but had no business to refer to it when he drafted his sastra-grantha. The very fact of mentioning of 'gauna artha' by Patanjali, and consideration, as we will go to observe further, of various types of laksana in Mimamsa works, goes to suggest that earlier thinkers were conversant with deviation in use of language and also perhaps knew vyanjana. We will go to observe in greater details the sources of vyanjana later. For the present let us see what the Mimamsakas have to offer. Mimamsakas - We have seen above in greater detail the views of the Mimamsakas as represented by Jaimini and Sabara. We will go for a short resume of the same and also look in for some further aproach to laksana as seen in Mimamsa sources. It is clear that Jaimini and Sabara hold that the language of the sutras must, as far as possible, be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance. Jaimini makes this expressly clear in Mi. Su. I. iii. 30., when it is said, "prayoga-codana'bhavad arthaikatvam avibhagat." Here, 'avibhagat' means that no difference is seen between the language of the scriptures and that of common parlance. Thus, both words and sentences in the veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage. "See, Mi. Su. I. ii. 32-"a-visistas tu vakyarthah." * and also, avisistas tu loke prayujyamananam vede ca padanam arthah. sa yathaiva loke vivaksitas tathaiva vede'pi bhavitum arhati."-S. B. on Mi. Su. I. ii. 32, pp. 150. However, the cases of veda and loka are not absolutely parallel. The Vaidika vakya is "a-pauruseya" i.e. not of human agency, and is always true, while the laukika vakya, which is 'pauruseya' or having human agency, may not be necessarily true in all cases. Because of its human agency there is a scope for errors. A further important point of distinction between the two is that in case of a laukika vakya, the abhipraya or some drsta artha or personal intention of the particular speaker is more important than sabda or word element itself. This is underlined later by Anandavardhana also while establishing vyanjana as an independent power of word. Thus 'sabda' becomes only a means of conveying the 'artha' or abhipraya i.e. intention of the speaker. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 193 MS. XI. i. 26. "loke, karma'rtha laksanam."-S. B. on it-"yac ca lokavad iti loke karmartha-pradhanam. karya-vasat sakrd api ukto sakrd aharati na"harati va. atha iha sabda-laksane karmani yathasabdarthe pravrttih. tasmat lokavad iti adrstantah." pp. 2114; and also see MS. XI. i. 62-"arthalloke vidhitah pratipradhanam syat." and also S. B. on it-"arthalloke pradipasya sakrd asakrd va kriya. yadi sakrtkritah sarvam prakasayati, sakrt kriyate, atha na prakasayati, tato'sakrt. tatas ca asya pratyaksa-samarthyam. atheha vidhitah upakaro'nupakaro va gamyate, na pratyaksena. S. B. pp. 2129; and also sabdalaksane karmani sabdabhihitam gamyate, na lokabhiprayah. (S. B. on X. 5. 57, pp. 1968).-loke karmartha-laksanam bhavati, na sabdalaksanam yatha arthas tatha kriyate, na yatha sabdah. vede tu sabdena eva artho'vagamyate. tathaiva anustheyam iti., on VI. 8. 27, pp. 1516, and also, "sabda-pramanaka vayam. yac chabda aha tad asmakam pramanam,....loke tu karyam drstva coditam acoditam api anusthiyate eva.-S. B. on III. i. 17 pp. 726; and also-loke artha laksanah sa vyavaharah. yena yena'rthah samristena ukto'nukto va sa mrjyeta eva. iha tu vede sabda-laksanah. S. B. on III. 1. 16; pp. 725, etc. Therefore, in a laukika vakya, sabda in its vacyartha is not strictly honoured. Sometimes, the vacyartha is given up in favour of some laksyartha which suits the 'abhipraya' i.e. intention of the speaker in a much better way. yatha loke prasthabhug devadatta ity ucyate. yad yapi supa-sakadibhir adhikah prastho bhavati, tatha'pi bhujau prastho nirdisyate vyanjananyodanarthani.--S. B. on Mi. Su. X. viii. 29, pp. 2079. In the laukika vakya, at times such devices as adhyahara or implication and viparinama, or transference are also resorted to. In the Vaidika vakya nothing else but sabda is pramana. See S. B. on IV. 3. 2, pp. 1247 "laukikesu tu vakyesu evam gamyate. tani hi vijnate'rthe prayujyamanani aharyapadani gaunani vi-parinata-vyavahita'rthani ca prayujyante. tasmat tat-sadrsyad vacana'vagamesv apy arthesu bhavati tattvarupo mithya-pratyayah. yatha mrga-trsnadisu.; and also see on Mi. Su. XI. 1. 26 above, and also - "na sabda-pramanakanam antarena sabdamavagatir nyayya. S. B. on VI. i. 3, pp. 1353; and also, sabda-laksane ca karmani, sabdo na pramanam.-S. B. on X. 5. 44, pp. 1962. Sabara therefore very often refers to the general rule that laksana is not admissible in vidhi-vakya, while it has scope elsewhere. For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA nanu anuvade'pi laksana. na'nuvadapakse laksanayam dosah. S. B. on I. 4. 22, pp. 364;- anuvade hi laksana nyayya, na vidhau. S. B. on IV. 4. 91, pp. 1278."yajnayudha-sabdas canuvadapakse nyayyo, na vidhi-pakse. gauno hi sa ayudhasabdah sankhyadisu.-S. B. on IV. i. 8., pp. 1201. 194 -Thus, the Mimamsakas mention both mukhya and gauna arthas. They seem to accept mukhya vrtti, and gauni or laksana. We will try to see if in the opinion of the Mimamsakas there is any distinction between gauni and laksana. Jaimini and Sabara discuss the two senses viz. 'mukhya' and 'gauna' under Mi. Su. III. 2. 1; 2. Sabara holds that 'mukhya' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and is as it were the face of the word. While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as 'jaghanya,' it being also termed as 'gauna' as it is connected with some 'guna.' -kah punar mukhyah, ko va gaunah iti. ucyate. yah sabdad eva avagamyate sa prathamo'rthah mukhyah. mukham iva bhavatiti mukhya iti ucyate. yas tu khalu pratitad arthat kenacit sambandhena gamyate, sa pascadbhavaj jaghanam iva bhavatiti jaghanyah, guna-sambandhac ca gaunah."-S. B. on III. 2. 2; Thus, the Mimamsakas seem to accept at least two sabda-vrttis viz. mukhya and gauni. They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more senses, one is its mukhyartha, while the rest are all gathered by the secondary power through the relation such as sadrsya or similarity and the like. The word 'barhih' means grass primarily. But, it is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through sadrsya. The word 'parvan' in the same way, primarily means 'samudaya,' but through 'samudaya-sambandha,' it also secondarily means 'kala.' -nayam ubhayatra parva-sabdo vartate. yadi kalavacanah tatsambandhat samudaye gamyate. yadi va samudaya-vacanah tat-sambandhat kale. anyataravacano no'bhaya-vacanah. tatra samudaya-vacane. kalpyamane prakaranam anugrhitam bhavati. api ca prinateh parva-sabdah. prinotis ca dane prasiddhah. danani ca samudayah. tasmat samudayamijya. evam sabdavayavaprasiddhir anugrhita bhavati. S. B. on IX. 2. 53. pp. 1739. Words such as 'mata', having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one. S. B. on X, i, 14, pp. 1810-"anekasya api ekah sabdo bhavati vacakah. tad yatha 'mata' iti mataram api vadati, mataram api. mata ca paramam daivatam sama ca putresu iti etair upabadhyamano janani-vacano'vagamyate. mata samah For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara ksiprascaityaih anubadhyamano dhanyasya matur vacakah." It should be noted that Sabara seems to suggest that in case of a gaunartha, it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at random. The sabda'rtha-sambandha is nitya or eternal, and therefore it is inadmissible to apply any word to anything which it has no power to signify. Read Sabara sabde uccarite tatra tavan mukhya pratipattih. sabde karyasya a-sambhavad arthe karyam vijnapyate. yatha, "gamanaya" iti. iha tu sabda iva karyam sambhavati, na'rthe. ato'tra sabdam vijnasyamah. purvasmad esa vadah papiyan. kasmat? autpattikatvat. autpattiko hi nami-namnoh sambandhah, yo hi sabdo yasmin arthe autpattikena sambandhena prasiddho, na tato'nyam pratyayayitum saknoti. na hi go sabdena asvo'-'bhidhatum sakyate.-S. B. on "sabdamatram iti cennotpattikatvat."-Mi. Su. VII. 2. 4; 5; pp. 1542. 195 It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e.g. kusala, pravina, etc. In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed the 'yaugikartha' and the other one is based on 'rudhi' i.e. usage, and is termed as rudhartha. On account of 'prasiddhi' i.e. because of its being more current, the rudhartha is taken as the 'mukhyartha' i.e. primary sense in such cases. The Mimamsakas seem to hold that laksana is resorted to only as a means to avoid 'anarthakya' i.e. a state of being useless or meaningless, when the primary sense is found to be not suited to the context. This again is only as a last resort. Read S. B. on pp. 488 -"yadanjasyena sabdartho navakalpate tada laksanaya'pi kalpyamanah sadhur bhavati. yatha "agnau tisthati," "avate tisthati," "agni-samipe tisthati," "avata-samipe tisthati" iti bhavati, sam-vyavaharah. laksanadi hi laukiky eva." -and also- "sruty asambhave laksanaya'pi vyavaharo bhavati. yatha'gnau tisthati, avate tisthati, iti" S. B. on pp. 1485; and also, "srutyasambhave laksana api nyayyaiva.", S. B. on pp. 1280; "asati srutyarthe laksana'rtho grahyah."-S. B., pp. 1551, and again -"mukhya'bhave gauno grhyate." S. B. on pp. 1437, "asambhavati sruty arthe laksana'rtho grahyah."-S. B. on pp. 1550, and also, "bhavati laksanaya'pi sabdarthah." S. B. pp. 1230; "agatis caisa yallaksana-parigrahah.-S. B. on pp. 1545; again, tritvam hi catustavadini sahacaryat saknoti laksayitum. laksana tv a"srita bhavati. kim kriyatam? agatya asriyate, satyam gatau na"srayitavya. B. pp. 2021. - S. For Personal & Private Use Only

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196 * SAHRDAYALOKA , The Mimamsakas hold that the most important principle to be borne in mind is that between the two functions of a word, viz. sruti (i.e. abhidha) and laksana, the former is stronger than the latter.-- - "srutisca laksanaya jyayasi." -- S. B. pp. 734; "sruti laksanadi vinaye srutir jyayasi." S. B. pp. 324; 'sruti-laksanadi visaye ca srutir nyayya, na laksana.' S. B. on pp. 565, 1244, 1262; "sruti-laksana-visaye ca srutir nyayya." S. B. pp. 1210, 1222 again-"srutisca laksanaya baliyasi." S. B. pp. 1278; "sruti-laksanayonca srutir nyayya." S. B. pp. 1556, and also "srutisca laksana'to nyayya." S. B. on pp. 2243. srutyasambhava or mukhyartha-badha is the first pre-requisite of laksana. On Mi. Su. VIII. 3. 34, Sabara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the vacyartha cannot be entirely abandoned. Thus, even the laksyartha is bound to be 'sabdartha' it cannot be "a-sabdartha." - "svarthe vartamanah sadrsyam gamayati. svartham jahat katham gamayet ?"-S. B. on Mi. Su. VIII. 3. 34; and also, "na ca laksanaya prayoge sabdarthah paricchidyate. yat-karanam svarthe vartamano'rtha'ntaram laksayati. svartham jahanneva laksayet."-S. B. on Mi. Su. VIII. 3. 34. Thus, the condition of 'tadyoga' or 'connection comes in. This is explained under Mi. Su. I. 4. 23. See S. B. on I. 4.23.-"katham nu svartha'bhidhanena pratyaya-vyavast eti cet, artha-sambandhat. 'simha' iti nirjnaya prasahyakarita tatra prayeneti prasahyakariti gamyate. artha-pratyaya-samarthyat. yo hi mar prasahyakarinam pratyayayeyam iti sa yadi simha-sabdam uccarayati siddhyati asya abhipretam. simharthah pratitah sambandhad itaram artham pratyayayati. evam svartha'bhidhane tad-guna-sambandhah pratiyate." S. B. on I. 4. 22; 23 pp. 357-360. The illustration cited is that of the word 'simha'. Sabdara says that when the word 'simha' is uttered, with reference to a certain individual, the idea of 'prasahyakarita' i.e. force is conveyed therewith, and therefore, 'this gentleman is violent or prasahyakari is gathered. It should be noted that the Mimamsakas thus recognise abhidha and laksana, while vyanjana is not referred to by them. The above illustration goes to prove that probably for the Mimamsakas the prayojana or the pose is also collected by laksana alone, i.e. they probably accept "prayojanena sahita laksana." But this is only a hazard, for as observed earlier, they, primarily For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 197 being concerned with sastra i.e. scientific use of language, had not concerned themselves with what we call the "emotive use of language." 'Gauna' is another term used for laksyartha. "guna-yogad-gaunah", is the explanation. It should be noted that the two vrttis viz. 'gauni' and 'laksana' are taken as almost synonyms by Sabara. The Nyayakosa mentions that the Mimamsakas take 'gauni' as a vrtti different from laksana. But this is not borne out, at least, while referring to Sabara. We will go to see that among alamkarikas normally 'gauni is taken as a variety of laksana, and this is perhaps settled by Mammata, once and for all. But, it is Hemacandra who again raises the banner of 'gauni as a vrtti, independent of laksana. But, we see confusion even in Hemacandra, when the acarya goes into greater details and tries to illustrate the same. We will examine this later. We come across, among Mimamsakas the recognition of different types of laksanas, such as those which convey, (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, i.e. 'matvartha laksana', (ii) desa-laksana, (iii) dharma-laksana or gunavada, (iv) kalalaksana, (v) karma-laksana (vi) karya-laksana, or sadhya-laksana. (vii) karana or sadhana laksana, (viii) laksana conveying some sva-jatiya and also (ix) laksana with reference to lingin. Sentences like "simho devadattah" and "agnir-manavakah" are given as popular examples of dharma-laksana. (Mi. Su. III. 2. 4;) 'gund va'pyabhidhanam syat, ... etc. "guna-samyogad yad agaunam idam abhidhanam bhavisyati. bhavati hi gunad api abhidhanam. yatha simho devadattah, agnir manavaka iti." The words 'simha' and 'agni' convey the qualities. This laksana corresponds to 'gauni-saropa' of the later alamkarikas. It should be noted that though it appears that this dharma laksana is termed as "guna-vada" by Jaimini at Mi. Su. I. 2. 10, actually, the term guna-vada is used both by Jaimini and Sabara in a sense much wider than dharma-laksana. -- "gunavadas tu, gauna esa vado bhavati, yat-sambandhini stotavye sambandyantaram stuyate." S. B. on Mi. Su. I. 2. 10. It means upacara or secondary application in general, as is evident from the fact that 'ansta-vadini vak' is given as another example of gunavada where laksana does not convey dharma but bahulya' or 'prasastya.' Hence we find that Jaimini is laying down 'rupa' and 'praya' as two possible grounds for gunavada, among others. - See S. B. on Mi. Su. I. 2. 11; pp. 127 : "gunavadas tu rupat. yatha stenapracchannarupa evam ca mana iti gaunah sabdah."--Thus 'stenam manah' is a gunavada; and also frupat prayat,' Mi. Su. I. 2. 11. For Personal & Private Use Only

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198 SAHRDAYALOKA Later Mimamsakas such as Kumarila and others mention the tatparya-vrtti also, which we will discuss later. Thus the earlier Mimamsakas give us abhidha and a variety of laksanas. As noted earlier, they had no business to refer to vyanjana, which perhaps for them is of no use when either prayojana-visista-laksana, or dirgha-dirghatara-abhidha, or tatparya is accepted. The references to the original works are cited on the authority of Prof. Devasthali. Naiyayikas : We have observed earlier in our discussion on samketa, that Gotama recognises what is specified as abhidha lateron. For him, the padarthas or the meanings of a word consist in vyakti i.e. individual, aksti, or form, and jati or class. These are aspects of reality expressed by a word. The acceptance of abhidha by Gotama and other Naiyayikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on samketa earlier. As to what is expressed by a word is shown in the Nya. Su. II. 2. 65; "vyaktyaksitijatayas tu padarthah." This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class. Now let us examine Gotama's views on laksana. This follows Dr. Raja's observations. We come across some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or 'upacara' at Nya. Su. II. 2. 64 - "saha-carana-sthana-tadarthya-vrtta samipya-sadhana'-dhipatyebhyo brahmana-manca-kata-raja-saktu-candanaganga-satakanna-purusesv atadbhave'pi tad upacarah."--Thus Gotama holds that secondary usage or upacara operates on the strength of ten relations such as sahacarana i.e. going together, sthana, i.e. place, etc. etc. The Vatsyayana bhasya cites llustrations to the point. Thus, 'yastikam bhojaya' or feed the stick, means that the brahmana with a stick is to be fed. This explains the relation of 'sahacarana' (i.e. going together). 'sthana' or location is illustrated in 'mancah krosanti,' 'tadarthya' or the relation of purpose is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. 'vrtta' or behaviour is the relation as seen in, 'this king is Yama or Kubera.' He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. "Mana' i.e. measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure. 'Dharana' or relation of weighing is illustrated when sandal wood held in balance is called 'tula-candana.' The relation of 'samipya' or proximity is seen as in, 'gangayam sah,' or 'cattle are grazing in the Ganges.' Thus the place near the river is called by the name of the river on the strength of 'samipya' i.e. proximity. 'Yoga' or combination is one more relation as illustrated in a black piece of cloth being called 'black', as it is united with black colour. Later in his Sahityadarpana (S. D.) Visvanatha has an illustration viz. "sveto dhavati" meaning the white dog or horse For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 199 is running. 'Sadhana' or 'means' is illustrated when food is said to be 'prana' or life itself. In later alamkara works we have "ayur ghetam." Actually food or ghee is the sadhana or means of life. 'Adhipatya' or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of the family is said to be family or house himself. -ayam purusah kulam, ayam gotrah, etc. Elsewhere also in the Vatsyayana-bhasya we come across numerous references to 'bhakti' and 'bhakta-artha.' Now, as with the Mimamsakas, so also with these Naiyayikas it can be observed that as they were concerned only with the scientific use of language, or as their concern was primarily with the sastra-granthas, as the present context reveals, they had no business to get involved in anything concerning vyanjana or the emotive use of language as reflected in literature. It is true that Kalidasa, and of course Vyasa and Valmiki must have preceded most of the great commentators in various disciplines, but they observe examplary silence about the poetic use of language in their works on sastra. So, at least we can give a benefit of doubt to these great thinkers, who were concerned with popular usages in language also as the illustrations quoted above go to prove, and perhaps hold that they too while dealing with poetry knew and accepted vyanjana. Perhaps Anandavardhana hints exactly at this when he says that 'dhvani' was "samamnatapurvah," and when Abhinavagupta remarks, "vina'pi visista-pustakesu vinivesanat." So these earlier thinkers simply had no business with vyanjana when they talked of use of language in sastra. Thus, they can be explained away, or forgiven. But later thinkers such as the Navya-Nyaya dignitaries as Gangesa, Gadadhara and Jagadisa knowingly disown vyanjana and we feel it is criminal. Even the great alamkarika Mahima, who did not have faith in vyanjana is prepared to accept what he calls 'kavya'numiti' in its place and in our opinion this 'kavya'numiti' which is certainly not 'tarka'numiti' is just something over and above abhidha and laksana. Call it by any other name, a rose is a rose, is a rose. Be it kavya'numiti, or tatparya as advanced by Dhananjaya and Dhanika, or the bhavakatva/bhojakatva of Bhatta Nayaka--it is something else than the known track of daily usage i. e. abhidha and/ or laksana. We will come to this in greater details later. For the present, it may be noted that the Naiyayikas, do not accept the word to be nitya and abhivangya or manifested as with the grammarians. We now turn to the school of thought as represented by the NavyaNaiyayikas such as Gangesa (1200 A. D.), Gadadhara (1700 A. D.) and also Jagadisa (1700 A. D.) Gadadhara, Jagadisa and Mathuranatha, all of the 1700 For Personal & Private Use Only

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200 SAHKDAYALOKA A. D. approximately, are the authors of Saktivada, Sabdasaktiprakasika, and Vyutpattivada respectively wherein they have dealt with the topic of sabda, sabdartha and sabdavrttis. Dr. Raja suggests that in the sabda-sakti-prakasika (= sa. sa. pra.) words are classified as below: (i) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (i.e. ruoha), (ii) words with secondary meaning (laksana); (iii) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i.e. yoga-rudha) and (iv) words having derivative meaning alone (i.e. yaugika).' The sa. Sa. Pra. 16 reads : "rudham ca laksakam caiva yogarudham ca yaugikam, tat caturdha parair rudha-yaugikam manyate 'dhikam." We see that this division into four or five varieties has come down from earlier sources. The word 'gangayam' in the illustration 'gangayam ghosah' forms an example of laksana. 'Pankaja' is a yoga-rudha word defined as --"yan nama svavayava-vrttilabhyarthena samam svarthasya anvaya-bodha-krt, tan nama yoga-rudham yatha pankaja-krsna-sarpadharmadi-; sa. sa. Pra. 26. -- i.e. they are those which combine in themselves twofold signification i.e. conventional as well as derivative. The yaugika words are those such as karaka, pacaka, etc., that connote the same meanings as are gathered by their component parts in which they may be grammatically analysed. Gadadhara in his Saktivada (= s. va.), discusses the problem of saktigraha. By sakti he means the mukhya vrtti called abhidha. He discusses at length the topic of samketa-grahakatva of this mukhya vrtti. At places, he picks up laksana also which is connected with abhidha. In the beginning of his work, he recognizes two functions viz. 'samketa' and 'laksana' with reference to padartha. "samketo laksana ca arthe pada-vsttih." (s. va.). He does not go for any further relation. He has neither mentioned nor rejected 'vyanjana' as a vrtti, but his commentators try to interpret him so as make him refute vyanjana. Thus, Krisnabhatta observes that For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 201 vyanjana need not be recognized as distinct from laksana and so also gauni. Both gauni and vyanjana can be included in laksana. "evam ca gauni-vyanjanayoh prthag vrttitvam ayuktam, tayoh laksanayam antarbhava-sambhavat." * Madhava, yet another commentator of his, tries to refute vyanjanavada. The vyanjanavadin figures as an objector-purva-paksin-here. The objection is that, saktivibhaga of Gadadhara is not correct, for vyanjana is a separate vrtti. When it is said by the heroine that "gaccha gacchasi cet kanta,...." etc. The meaning viz. that, "if you will go, I will die", is gathered through vyanjana alone, in the absence of which we fail to collect this sense. Read, "etad vibhajanam anupapannam, vyanjanayah atirikta-vrtta-tvat." The Siddhantin (i.e. Naiyayika, as represented in the commentary by Madhava) does not agree with this. If Vyanjana is recognised as a separate vrtti, it must have some definite form. If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of vacya. When there is apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to abhidhajnana. Thus, even in vyanjana, we cannot proceed without the vacyartha, which is its cause. Thus vyanjana is not a separate vritti. When the suggested meaning is not at all caused by any vrtti, other than abhidha, it should not be taken as the result of vyanjana. --- *--"vyanjana-vrttya-janya-sabdatve'pyasya karyata-vacchedakatoktau gauravat."-- Madhavi, (S. Va. Tika). The vyanjanavadin accepts something like a sabdi-vyanjana e.g. "vayastha nagarasangad anganam hanti vedanam." From this sentence, two senses, viz. (i) 'a young woman, in company of a young man, removes the torment of limbs of the body,'-and (ii) "Haritaki with Sunthi, removes physical pain," are derived. For the supporter of vyanjana, it is a case of abhidhamula vyanjana. But for the Naiyayikas, the other sense is also collected through abhidha, and it is futile to go for an abhidhamula vyanjana with reference to the pratiyamanartha. *-tadrsa-bodhe tatparya-jnanasya hetutve saktya eva tadrsa-bodha-sambhave abhidhamula-vyanjana-svikara-anupapatteh."-Madhavi, on s. va; pp. 2. Others (i.e. vyanjanavadins, i.e. the purvapaksin here) hold that the fact of pratiyamanartha i.e. implicit sense can be gathered in poetry, only through vyanjana, and therefore its acceptance is inevitable. For Personal & Private Use Only

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202 SAHRDAYALOKA - Read "na ca vyanjana-vrttitva-anupagame tatra tatra tadnga-bodhasya anubhava-siddhasya anutpattir iti agatya vTttitvam angikartavyam. iti vacyam." - Madhavi, pp. 3. But for the Naiyayikas, this implicit sense is gathered not by a special power i.e. vrtti-visesa, but by the faculty of mind. Thus, vyangyartha is just a mental apprehension --"manasa-bodha-matra." Madhavi observes : "manasaiva tadrsabodha-svikarat."-But here may we ask Madhava or any Naiyayika worth his name, that which sense is not a mental apprehension ? Whatever is collected even with the help of 'sanketa' is also the ultimate result of mental perception. This is recognized even by the Mimamsakas who accept anvita' bhidhanavada, a process in which direct perception, anumana and arthapatti are the three pramanas involved even in simple collection of primary sense. Jagadisa in his sa. Sa. Pra., karika 24 refers to the illustration viz. "mukham vikasita-smitam...." etc., whereby Mammata and others have sought to establish suggestiveness. He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of vyanjana. He, to his satisfaction, holds that there is no justification to recognize something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned. -yatha-kathancit upanayavasena manasaiva visista-dhi-sambhavat, manorathika-sukha-prabheda-paryavasitam camatkaram saty api sabdasyaiva manasasya'pi bodha-visesasya hetutayah suvacatvat. vyanjanakhyapadarthantarasya svarupa-sattayah anvaye buddhau tad-hetutvasya ca pramanavirahena asattvacca iti samksepah." Sa. Sa. Pra. -ka 24.: The so called vyangyartha i.e. saitya and pavanatva, or saurabha (i.e. the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers -mukham vikasitasmitam, etc.) is derived by the usual mental apprehension; the special beauty of erotic sentiment (camatkara) is also a mental apprehension according to Jagadisa. But as noted by us collection of any meaning - including vacyartha-involves a mental effort and is therefore a 'manasa-bodha. But there is a difference between one and the other. We had observed earlier that benefit of doubt can be granted to the great Panini, Patanjali, Jaimini, sabara, Gotama, and Kanada. But, after such great efforts of asthetes of the status of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, it is criminal on the part of Jagadisa and Madhava to denounce vyanjana in the field of art in general and poetry in particular. Or, shall we quote yaska ? - "na esa sthanor aparadhah yad enam andho na pasyati." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabda-vyapara-vicara 203 Thus, we have seen that language is used both in a scientific mode in various sastras or disciplines of thought, and also in an emotive mode in poetry. Scientific usage hovers round what we call abhidha and gauni or laksana, and the emotive use has vyangyartha and vyanjana at its centre. We have tried to give an idea of how the ancients, i.e. the Mimamsakas, Vaiyakaranas, Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas and also Jain and Bauddha philosophers had discussed the problem of language and collection of meaning from a historical perspective. We have also tried to correlate this great heritage to the linguistic thinking of literary critics, the aesthetes. Thus the concept of sabdavrttis in different darsanas in its historical perspective is discussed by us in all possible details. The grammarians and the Mimamsakas were concerned more with the scientific use of language as they were concerned with topic of their special disciplines. Thus they restrict themselves to the discussion of only abhidha and laksana, or gunavada. The ancient Naiyayikas also, for the same obvious reason had no business to talk of vyanjana. The grammarians of course, in advancing the doctrine of sphota, especially its manifestation, perhaps touched the fringes of vyanjana and we have seen how Anandavardhana has ventured to make capital out of this to his advantage. Thus Anandavardhana and his followers advocate vyanjana as a separate function in the field of poetry. Alamkarikas normally follow his lead but there have been some exceptions as we will go to observe. But even these so called opponents of vyanjana are prepared to accept something else, with a different name, in place of vyanjana, but certainly over and above abhidha, and laksana. We will go to observe all this in greater details later. But it must be confessed that the predecessors of Anandavardhana even in the field of literary aesthetics, such ancients as the great Bhamaha down to Rudrata, had failed to clearly discuss the topic of sabdavittis. So, if at all there is any recognition of vyanjana in the works of these acaryas, it is only veiled. We will first, try to discuss which sabda-vrttis and arthas, are exactly recognised by Anandavardhana's purvacaryas and what is their exact approach to the problem of vyanjana. Then only we will be able to bridge the two ends, one of the thinkers of various disciplines and the other of Anandavardhana and his followers. After discussing this topic of recognition of various sabda-vrittis by the ancient alamkarikas, we will pick up individual sabdavrtti such as abhidha, tatparya, laksana and vyanjana, for detailed discussion. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter III Sabdavsttis; recognised in the works of earlier Alamkarikas such as Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana, Udbhasa and Rudrata. (i.e. Anandavardhana's purvacaryas.) Systematic treatment of the topic of sabdavrittis such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana by attempting their definitions and carving out their scope and distinguishing one from the other etc., has to wait, to the best of our knowledge, till the arrival of Mammata. Of course Anandavardhana, in his attempt to establish vyanjana as an independent vitti tries to lay down the 'visayabheda' and 'svarupabheda' of vyanjana when compared to abhidha and laksana, and he does initiate a systematic treatment of this topic, but by the time Mammata arrived it was taken as one of the basic problems concerning literary criticism. Mammata not only devotes two full chapters in defining and distinguishing these sabda-vrttis and also laying down their divisions and sub-divisions, he has also written a separate treatise named 'sabda-vyapara-paricaya' (or vicara) devoted exclusively to this topic. This shows how important and relevant was the topic of sen sanskrit literary critics. Independent works such as "Vyaktiveka' of Mahima for rejecting Anandavardhana's vyanjana, Abhidhavstta-matrika of Mukula, Vrittidipika of Krsna Bhatta, Vitti-Vartika of Appayya, on the subject of sabda-Vittis followed in due course but after Mammata almost all writers on poetics beginning with Hemacandra, made it almost customary to discuss this very important topic along with 'dhvani' and such other relevant topics. But all this follows Anandavardhana. For his predecessors i.e. for Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana, Udbhata and Rudrata, the great names whose words have come down to us, this topic of sabdavrttis never commanded enough attention from them For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis; recognised in the works.... 205 for being treated as important topic independently. So, as in case of some other sources of still earlier age such as the Nirukta, Mahabhasya, Vakyapadiya etc. which we will make it a point to examine while treating each sabda-vrtti separately, even in case of Bhamaha and the rest, we will have to find out direct and indirect occurrences and references that may reveal their approach to different sabdavsttis. Thus all references concerning any indication of their acquaintance of knowledge of abhidha, laksana and vyanjana will go to suggest once again the heritage that proved to be a shaping influence in crystallizing the concepts of different sabdavrttis in the hands of later alamkarikas beginning with Anandavardhana, Mammata, Hemacandra and the rest. We will also, in the next chapter look into the topic of implicit sense or 'pratiyamana-artha' in these earlier masters. Whether Bhamaha and the rest, the predecessors of Anandavardhana were cognisant of the fact of implicit sense in poetry, whether they collected it through vyanjana or otherwise, will be an interesting enquiry paving the way to Anandavardhana's recognition of vyanjana and dhvani. Thus begins our exercise to get at the exact amount of, either only a nodding acquaintance or a fully conscious approval, of various sabda-vittis and pratiyamana sense in the works of ancient alamkarikas beginning with Bhamaha to Rudrata. This enquiry will pave the way to the topic of scientific treatment of various sabdavrttis and dhvani by later alamkarikas. We are taking up the consideration of the earlier alamkarikas first because independent and scientific enquiry concerning the topics of sabda-vrttis and dhvani follows this rich heritage.. Once again, it should be noted at the outset that, the earlier writers whose works have come down to us such as Bhamaha and others, do not discuss the problem of sabda-vrttis or pratiyamana artha i.e. implicit sense theoretically like later writers such as Mammata and the rest. So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in their works, nor an attempt to define and classify a given sabda-vrtti. However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the idea of the various functions-vrttis-of a word. We will go by the authors individually accepting the chronology as suggested by Dr. S. K. De in his Sanskrit Poetics. Bhamaha :- We begin with Bhamaha. We come across direct or indirect references to abhidha as below :In the verse I. 9., he reads - "sabdaschando'bhidhanartha itihasasrayah kathah, For Personal & Private Use Only

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206 SAHRDAYALOKA loko yuktih kalasceti mantavyah kavya-vaikhari. (Edn. Tiruvadi, 34, Tatacarya Comm.) vl. (or kavya-hetavah) vl (or kavyagair hyami) (Patna Edn. 52). Here he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study. They are sabda i.e. grammar, chandas i.e. metrics, abhidhana or lexicography, itihasa i.e. tradition, loka i.e. worldly affairs, yuktih i.e. logic, and kala or various fine arts. We find the word 'abhidhana' ir lexicon. D. T. Tatacarya in his udyanavrtti (Edn. ibid) (pp. 4-5) however observes: "sabdo namakhyatadih sadhu-sabda-svarupam yavat. chandah vrttaratnakaradyukta-laksanam, abhidhanam sabdasyartha-pratipadana-vyaparah saktilaksanadi-svarupah arthah, asya sabdasya ayam eva arthah iti, ayam artho'syaiva sabda-sya vacya iti ca vivekah. mahabharata-ramayanadisu pratipadyah kathah, lokah stri-purusadi-svabhavavisesa-avasthavisesadi, yuktih nyaya-mimamsadi rupani darsanani, kala gita-vadyadayah, ity evam etad astaka-rupa kavya-vaikhari mantavya." Here Tatacharya explains abhidhana' as abhidha, laksana, etc. suggesting Bhamaha's acquaintance and also acceptance of sabdavrttis. Of course, he is careful not to mention vyanjana. But we beg to differ from Tatacharya's explanation because had Bhamaha been conscious of various sabdavrttis, he would have treated them independently. Of course, this does not go to suggest that he was totally oblivious of the concepts of abhidha and laksana. For, he also was fairly conversant with the heritage we discussed earlier,--the discussion of abhidha and laksana in the works on sastras or various disciplines such as Mimamsa, Vyakarana, Nyaya, etc. But for the present here, we would like to take the word 'abhidhana' in the sense of dictionary or lexicon i.e. kosa, knowledge of which was a must in the making of a poet. But we have some other more weighty evidence in favour of taking abhidhana' to mean abhidha-vrtti and gunavrtti. In his Locana on Dhvanyaloka(=Dhv.) I, i, Abhinavagupta has the following remark : bhamahena uktam-"sabdas chando bhidhanarthah" iti. ( pp. 16, Edn. Dhv. - Tapasvi Nandi, '98, Ahmedabad.] abhidhanasya sabdadbhedam vyakhyatum bhattodbhato babhase -sabdanam abhidhanam, abhidhavyaparo, mukhyo gunavrttisca, iti."--Here, according to For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis; recognised in the works.... 207 Abhinavagupta Bhatta Udbhata who wrote his now lost Bhamaha-vivarana, explains the term "abhidhana' as abhidha-vyapara, which again is two-fold i.e. mukhya i.e. principal, and guna-vrtti i.e. a-mukhya or secondary. Udbhata wants us to believe that Bhamaha means abhidha and gunavrtti by the term 'abhidhana.' He rejects the normal interpretation of the term 'abhidhana' meaning a word- i.e. sabda itself, as is seen in normal usages such as "abhidhana-abhidheya-bhava" meaning "vacaka-vacya-bhava." Thus for Udbhata and perhaps it is acceptable to Abhinavagupta, and therefore also accepted by Tatacharya the word 'abhidhana' here stands for sabdavrttis such as mukhya abhidha and a-mukhya gunavrtti or laksana which is only an extension-"puccha bhuta"-of abhidha. This suggests that Bhamaha was fairly conversant with the topics of sabdavrttis such as abhidha and laksana which a poet-aspirant has to be conscious of. But Bhamaha has not given independent thought and space to this topic and so we humbly submit that perhaps he means 'kosa' or laxicon by the term 'abhidhana', for a poet aspirant has to have a fairly good knowledge and command over what we call dictionary or a small glossary. That Bhamaha must have known abhidha and laksana will be clear, and s absolutely acceptable to us also, from a number of clearer references to the same at other places. And of course, as a learned person and a rare intellectual, 3hamaha is supposed to be well-versed in various sastras such as the Mimamsa, Nyaya and of course vyakarana which as we have seen talk clearly of abhidha and aksana. But with all this, in the present context, we stick to our interpretation of he word 'abhidhana' meaning a lexicon as Bhamaha here seems to enumerate everal branches of learning which a poet aspirant should study. At III. 21. Bhamaha discusses apahnuti, "apahnutir abhista ca kincid antargatopama bhutarthapahnavad asyah kriyate ca abhidha yatha." and III. 25, we have, "gunasya va kriyaya va viruddhanya-kriya-'bhidha, ya visesabhidhanaya virodham tam vidur budhah." At both these places we have abhidha' in the sense of direct statement, taking For Personal & Private Use Only

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208 SAHKDAYALOK us to perhaps 'mukhya-vyapara.' Of course in both the cases, the mention of word 'abhidha' is clear, but it means 'clear expression' or direct expression is 'naming' and not "abhidhavyapara," which at the most is only implied. But at I. 4 Bhamaha, while discussing the 'avacaka' blemish observes : "himapahamitradharair vyaptam vyomety avacakam, saksad aruoham vacyerthe nabhidhanam pratiyate." This means, the expression 'himapahamitradharair' involves 'avacaka' dosa i this expression is not having clear direct convention with reference to the meanir of 'a cloud' here. Tatacarya (pp. 23) explains, "himapaho'gnih, tasya'mitra apal tasam dharah meghah, tair vyoma vyaptam iti." Tatacarya further remarks : "na 1 yatha kathancit kasyacid arthasya upasthapakam padam tasya vacakam bhavat ma bhrt vahnipadena dahe smrte tat tasya vacakam. kim tu yasya padasya yasmi arthe saksad rudhih prasiddhih asti, tat tasya vacakam. yattu padam vacye arth saksat na rudham tat tasya abhidhayakam vacakam iti na pratiyate." Here Bhamaha wants to convey that an expression which is not conventionall related to the direct meaning, is not understood. Here the terms such as 'vacy arthe,' 'saksad arudham' etc. show Bhamaha's familiarity with the concept abhidha. The following discussion shows that Bhamaha knows very well the theories 'sphota' and 'apoha' in connection with the sabdavrttis concerned. Bhamaha, i course, does not endorse to the concepts of sphota as well as apoha. In the Vith pariccheda Bhamaha discusses the nature and scope of sabda. H also attempts to strike some definition. In the discussion, he sets aside the views the sphotavadins and the apohavadins. This has a bearing on his views on th import of a word. At VI. 7, he observes : "pratitir arthesu yatas, tam sabdam bruvate pare, dhumabhasor api prapta sabdata agnyanumam prati." Tatacharya observes : "prasangat padasvarupam avadharayan paramatan apakaroti....pratitih........... etc. .....arthapratitihetutvam sabdatvam iti any bruvate. tannopapadyate. dhumalokayorapi vahner anumityatmaka pratitihetutvena sabdatvaprasangat iti." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis; recognised in the works.... 209 The idea is that some define sabda as one from which apprehension of meaning follows. Bhamaha rejects this view on the ground that in that case, the appearance of smoke which causes the knowledge of fire through reasoning, should also be recognised as a word. At VI. 8. Bhamaha quotes another view which holds that a collection of letters having a meaning, and used for conveying a meaning, is a word. Says he : "nanu akaradivarnanam samudayo'bhidheyavan, artha-pratitaye gitah sabda ity abhidhiyate." 'abhidheyavan' suggests that for him vacyartha is 'abhidheyartha', and sabda is vacaka, and the power of expression is 'abhidha.' Tatacharya observes : "nanu' iti avadharane. abhidheyavan vacyarthavan vrttiman iti yavat. abhidheyavan abhidheyartha-pratityartham uccarito varna-samudaya eva padam iti uktam bhavati. varnasamudaya iti anena dhumader vyavrttih. abhidheyavan iti padaikadesasya padantaraksaropetapadasya ca. lipi-vyavrttaye visesanantaram. kambugrivadimad arthabhidhayino ghatadipadasya akasarthe sabdatva varanaya va." But Bhamaha rejects this view also. He observes: (VI 9, 10)-- "pratyekam asamarthanam samudayo'rthavan katham varnanam krama-vartitvan nyayya na'pi ca samhatih." and, "na ca'pi samudayibhyo samudayo'tiricyate, darubhittibhuvo'titya kim anyat sadma kalpyate." The rejection perhaps here is of the view held by the Naiyayikas as observed earlier. Bhamaha says that how can a collection of letters that are meaningless taken individually convey meaning? Again, as letters follow one another in sequence, no collection of letters is possible because when the next letter is pronounced the earlier one has evaporated. Now a whole cannot be different from its parts; a house cannot be anything else than wall, sticks, and land. The thrust is that how can impermanent letters form a collection? When letters individually are ephemeral how can their combination remain steady and give a meaning ? Bhamaha gives an illustration of a house which in itself is the sum total of the materials it is built with. But we fear that this illustration is not proper. Bhamaha has drawn an illustration from physical plane to disprove a matter which it not at For Personal & Private Use Only

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210 SAHRDAYALOKA a physical plane but is a matter staying at the higher level of consciousness. So, there seems to be some logical fallacy in citing this illustration. Obviously, the arguments mentioned in VI. 9, 10 are in harmony with those advocated by the upholders of the theory of sphota. But Bhamaha does not seem to accept the sphotavada either. While the upholders of sphota hold sphota to be eternal, Bhamaha differs from them because he feels that neither pratyaksa or direct perception, nor anumana or inference supports the sphotavada. He observes: tasmat kutastha ity esa sabdi vah kalpana vstha, pratyaksam anumanam va yatra, tat paramarthatah.} (VI. 11) Tatacharya comments (pp. 136, Ibid) : "esa uktavidha vah sphotavadinam sabda-sambandhini atiriktatva-nityatva-kalpana nisphala, angikara-anarha. kasmat ? apramanikatvat. yasmin visaye pratyaksam anumanam va sambhavati tat paramarthato'sti iti abhyupagamyeta. na ca varnatirikte pade pratyaksam asti. adarsanat. na api anumanam. tadnsapadanirupita-vyaptimato hetoh kasyacid abhavat. tasmat a-paramarthikam tat."-- Bhamaha then proceeds to refute the apoha-vada in the following verses. At VI. 16, he quotes the view of those who hold that a word connotes a particular meaning through the negation-"apoha"-of something else : "anyapohena sabdo'rtham ahety anye pracaksate, anyapohas ca namani apadarthapakstih kila." (VI. 16) By 'apoha' is meant the negation of something else. Bhamaha argues at VI. 17 that if the particular word 'gauh' has its connotation over only in the negation of something else, then we will have to find out some other sound which makes for the connotation of 'gauh' in that particular word. "yadi gaur ity ayam sabdah krtartho' nya-nirakstau, janako gavi gobuddher mtgyatam aparo dhvanih." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis; recognised in the works.... 211 He further argues that the word has artha-jnana or connection of a particular meaning as its phala or object. So, it cannot have two objects viz. negation as well as injunction. Here Bhamaha takes into consideration the argument of the apohavadin viz. that by 'apoha' is meant "apoha-visisto vidhih"-- Tatacharva observes before VI. 18. : nanu ekah 'go'sabdah ubhayam api janayati apohabuddhim gotva-buddhim ca. na etat upapadyate. tatha hi, "artha-jnana-phalah sabdah na ca ekasya phala-dvayam, apavada-vidhi-jnane phale ca ekasya vah katham." -(VI. 18) Tatacarya further comments (pp. 140, ibid) : sabdanam arthajnanam phalam. tatra ekasya sabdasya ekam eva artha-jnanam phalam. na tad dvayam. ahus ca sakrt prayuktah sabdah sakrd eva artham gamayati iti. tatha sati katham yusmakam mate ekasya sabdasya dve jnane phale ucyete ? apavadah apohah vyavsttih bhedah. vidhih bhavah gotvadih. tayor-jnane. phala-dvayopapadanam ratnakirti-krtav apohasiddhau drastavyam. At VI. 19, Bhamaha further argues that if you want to negate something else than 'gauh', at least in the first instant you must apprehend the meaning of a cow from the word 'gauh', or else how are you to negate non-cow from it ? So, at Vi, 13, Bhamaha gives his own view as follows, which we think, is closer to the Nyaya discipline : "iyanta idrsah varnah idTg arthabhidhayinah, vyavaharaya lokasya prag ittham samayah kstah." Tatacharya explains (pp. 137, ibid) : "prak sargadau lokasya vyavaharaya anyonya-abhipraya-pratyayanaya samayah sanketa) ittham krtah. katham ? etavantah etadisa-krama-visista varnah etad arthabhidhayinah iti. 'kha' iti khakaraakarau dvau viyad-vacinau. 'khara' iti khakara-akara-raipha-akaras catvaro tigmavacinah. tatha 'ma' iti dvau varnau pratisedha-vacinau laksmi-vacinau ca. 'mala' iti catvarah srag-vacinah. raja, jara, iti ubhayatra'pi yady api varnas' catvara eva, tatha'pi krama-bhedad artha-bhedah. tatha ca ittham sanketasya grhitatve kramavartinam eva varnanam sravananantaram tadrsa-krama-visistanam eva, eka-smrtyarudhanam artha-pratiti-janakatve, na kascit sankatam iti yatkincit For Personal & Private Use Only

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212 SAHRDAYALOKA pramana-agocara-sphota-kalpanaprayaso'tyantam anapeksita iti abhisamdhih." -- Bhamaha holds that 'samaya' or convention, since ages, has been formed to the effect that these many letters of such and such a type and in such and such a sequence should give such and such a meaning. He further notes, VI, 14. "sa kutasthah anapayi ca, nadad anyas ca kathyate, mandah sanketikah arthah manyante paramarthikah." Tatacharya observes : (pp. 138, 9) :- "sah ukta-vidha-sanketa-visayah sabdah kutasthah avikriyah viksti-rahitah anapayi ca vinasa-sunyas ca. yatha tat-tad govyakteh kincit kalam avasthaya vinasvaratve'pi gotvavacchinnasya vastuno na vinasah kimtu a-pralayam anuvartamanata eva tathavia devadattoccarite go-pada varnanam sadyo nivsttatve'pi yajnadattady uccaranakale varnantarapradurbhavi'pi gakaratvavacchinnottaraukaratvarupanupurvyavacchinnasya sthayitvat tasyaiva sanketa-visayattvac ca nasty anupapattir artha-pratyayasya iti. nanu sphota'nangikare nada eva bhavatam sabdah prapnoti nadabhivy-angyas ca sabda isyate. tena sruyamanadhvanyapara-paryaya-nadatmaka-varnasamuhatiriktam padam estavyam. atra ucyate 'nadad anyas ca kathyate.' na asmakam nadah sabdah prapnoti. nadad anyo'smakam api sabdah. kah? akaradi-varna-samudayah. nanu nada eva ayam. na. kas tarhi nadah ? vayvadisamyoga-vibhaga-santanah yah sabda-janakah iti. evah sabda-svarupam sthitam. asya arthena kidrsah sambandhah ? tad etad purvam eva uktam 'prag ittham samayah krtah' iti. gautamo'pyaha 'samayikatvat sabdartha- sampratyayasya' iti. atra anye vipratipadyante. yatha jvalanasya dahasaktih svabhaviki tatha sabdasya artha-pratyayana-saktir iti esam darsanam. Bhamaha lays his own track. He neither follows the grammarians, nor even the the Naiyayikas fully. He does not stay to answer any questions that you may raise against his conviction also. So, for him this word is eternal and imperishable (VI. 14a), and is different from sound i. e. 'nada'. He adds that the fools take the conventional meanings to be 'paramarthika' or referring to realtity. He does not choose to enter into any controversy as to whether word is related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal. Finally at VI. 20, he concludes that : varna-bhedad idam bhinnam varnah svamsa-vikalpatah, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis; recognised in the works.... 213 ke sabdah kinca tad-vacyam iti aho vartma dustaram." Thus, for Bhamaha, it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is, because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts. He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on dravya or object, kriya or action, jati or class and guna or quality. (VI. 21). On, Bhamaha VI 20, read Tatacharya : (PP. 141, ibid) : "dam padam. 'varnabhedat padam bhinnam' iti eva pathitum yuktam. varnas ca svavayava-nirupanavasena bhidyante. sva-laksanapara-paryaya-vyakti-vyatiriktam samanyam sangatair nesyate. yatha ahuh : "etasu pancasv avabhasinisu pratyaksabodhe sphutam angulisu, sadharanam sasthamiheksate yah srngam sirasi atmana iksate sah" tena sarve varnan tada tada ucsarita-pradhvasta bhavanti. tatha sati eko gosabdah eko ghata-sabdah iti nasti. kimtu yatha ghata-sabda-go-sabdau mitho bhidyete, tathaiva adyeha ucsaritah kalantara-desantara-uccaritasca go-sabda anyonyam bhidyante. yathaviva padani savayavani tada tada tat tad avayavavinasanupativinasani anyani anyani bhavanti, tathaiva varna api sarvanityatva-vadinam tathagatanam mate svayam api savayavah santo vinasyanti iti anye anye bhavanti. evam sati, ayam sabdah asyarthasya vacaka, iti ciranuvartamana-vyavahara-darsanadhinah sankerta-graha eva na nispattum arhati iti tesam mate sabda-pramana-margo' tiva duradhigama iti. ||(20)|| From the above discussion it follows that Bhamaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VI 13. 14), and his views seem to be very near to the Mimamsakas when he takes sabda do be (vi. 14) Kutastha', 'anapayi' etc. But at times, as observed earlier, he seems to be closer to the Naiyayikas also as at VI. 14. At least he does not accept 'sphota' and mocks at those who believe in it. One thing is very clear from all this discussion that Bhamaha is quite familiar with abhidha.' As to Bhamaha's familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particulary 'vyanjana', we may say that, 'vyanjana' does not occupy the same place as 'abhidha in his mind, i. e. he does not seem to have known vyanjana' as a separate vrtti. He however, uses different forms of vi+ Vanj with the later meaning For Personal & Private Use Only

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214 SAHRDAYALOKA of 'vyanjana' at different places. Let us examine these usages. At. II. 73, we have 'vyajyate' as in, "hi-sabdenapi hetvartha. prathanad ukta-siddhaye, ayam arthantaranyaso sutaram vyajyate yatha. Tatacharya observes : (PP. 54, ibid) : "apih prakarantara samuccaye. uktasya prakstasya siddhaye heturupam artham prathayan 'hi' sabdah sutaram arthantaranyasam 'vyanakti'." - The idea is that by the use of the word 'hi', the idea of "samarthya-samarthaka-bhava"- i. e. the idea of 'supporter and the supported is suggested. At II. 79. Bhamaha defines 'samasokti' as : "yatrokte gamyate'nyo'rthastatsamana-visesanah, sa samasoktir uddista samksiptarthataya yatha." Tatacharya (pp. 55, ibid) has, " ...yasyam uktau uktad anyo'rtho gamayate, sa samasoktih." Here, we have a reference to another unexpressed sense which is collected by implication. This gathering of unexpressed sense is mostly by way of suggestion i.e. vyanjana. 'Implication may mean something else than vyanjana also. At III. 8, 9, Bhamaha explains and illustrates 'paryayokta' as, "paryayoktam yad anynena prakarena abhidhiyate, uvaca ratnaharane caidyam sarnga-dhanur yatha." - III. 8 glhesvadhvasu va nannam bhunjmahe yad adhitinah, na bhunjate dvijas tac ca rasa-dana-nivrttaye." - III. 9. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavittis; recognised in the works.... 215 Tatacharya has--(pp. 64, ibid)--"vaktavyam saksad anuktva yad bhangyantarena abhidhanam tat paryayoktam." Bhamaha says that Krsna's reply to Sisupala's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison-rasa-dana-nivrttaye.' This is also only implied or in a way expressed differently. We know that paryayokta comes closer to vyanjana but Bhamaha is not absolutely clear about it here. At III. 11, Bhamaha illustrates 'udatta' without defining the same : "udattam saktiman ramo - guru-vakyanurodhakah, vihayopanatam rajyam yatha vanam upagamat." (III. 11) Here the idea of Rama's virtue is only implied. 'asaya-mahatmya' on the part of Rama is implied here but Bhamaha does not say clearly that it is understood through vyanjana. Bhamaha III, 21 defines 'apahnuti.' "apahnutir abhista ca kincid antar-gatopama, bhutartha'phnavad asyah kriyate ca abhidha yatha."'kriyate abhidha' has direct mentioning of 'abhidha' but it is only in the sense of "expression." It has no reference to 'abhidha vrtti', though of course 'statement' or 'abhidha' here is direct. Again, apahnuti is 'kincid antargatopama' -- i.e. with 'upama' or similarity, inherent in it. This means that the external refusal - pratisedha -- has upama implied in it. Tatacharya (pp. 69 ibid) observes : "kim tu yatropama gamyate sa pratisedha iha apahnutih." - This clearly means that the element of 'upama' is contained in apahnuti and this 'upama' is only suggested. But Bhamaha does not make it explicit that the charm lies in 'upama being suggested' also. Of course Tatacharya is clear and so are we that, "kimcid antargatih, vina vacanam pratiyamanata." (pp. 69, ibid). At Bhamaha V, 58, we have "yatra drstanta-matrena vyajyete sadhya-sadhane, For Personal & Private Use Only

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216 SAHRDAYALOKA tam ahuh suddha-drstantam tanmatraviskrter yatha." 'drstanta' is defined here with a clear use of a form of 'vi+ Vani' viz. vyajyete.' So, vyanjana can not be far behind in Bhamaha's mind. In the illustration that follows wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilipa, Pururavas, and Pradyuma, etc., the underlying qualities of the hero, equating him with these big names, are suggested. Tatacharya observes: "iti tatra tatra sadhya-sadh drastavya." (pp. 126, ibid). Thus, we may say that we come across a clearer reference and also acceptance of vyanjana here in Bhamaha. Similarly at V. 60, Bhamaha has. "katham eka-padenaiva vyajyeran asya te gunah, iti prayunjate santah kecid vistara-bhiravah." vyajyeran' has a clear reference to 'vyanjana.' In V. 59 as seen above Bhamaha has given an illustration of pure drstanta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilipa, etc. thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king. In V. 60 Bhamaha says that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word in V. 59 as above. So, herein, a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dilipa, etc. are suggested by their meaning. In his discussion of various alamkaras, we see that Bhamaha seems to take for granted the presence of implicit sense-i.e. pratiyamana artha-or vyangyartha, e.g. in a-prastuta-prasamsa, dipaka, vyajastuti, nidarsana, etc. etc. This point will be further elaborated to support our observation that Bhamaha was not unfamiliar with vyanjana. We will take up this investigation in the next chapter in greater details. But one thing that emerges clearly from our discussion so far, is that 'vyanjana' is not totally absent from Bhamaha's mind, though of course, and this applies to all other predecessors of Anandavardhana such as Dandin, Vamana, etc. also, that a systematic treatment of the topic of sabdavrttis is not seen in earlier works, but at least we have traces of vyanjana scattered everywhere and that vyanjana as a sabdavrtti is not only known to them but they all, i.e. Bhamaha and the rest are inclined to accept it with reference to the poetic word. We will now pass over to the next great name, i.e. Dandin. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. 217 Dandin : In the Kavyadarsa (= K.D.) of Dandin, we come across the following direct or indirect references to different sabdavrttis. Actually, there is no reference to 'abhidha' as such, but references to 'gunavrtti' or laksana are as follows: K.D. I. 95, has, "nisthutodgirna-vanta"di gauna-vytti-vyapasrayam, atisundaram anyatra gramya-kaksam vigahate." the 'prabha' (pp. 106), (Edn. B.O.R.I.) observes : "kanicit padani kavye gaunavittya eva sobham avahanti, na tu mukhya-vittya." - Thus it is clear that Dandin here not only clearly refers to the a-mukhya or gauna or subordinate power of a word in poetry, but recommends it to create beauty it poetry. At II. 254, Dandin observes, "te'mi prayoga-margesu gauna-vstti-vyapasrayat atyanta-sundara dsstas tad-udahstayah yatha." Dr. D. K. Gupta, the author of 'sudarsana vyakhya' (Edn. '76, Delhi) (pp. 214) observes : "te ami anantaroktah durakaryadayas' citrahetavah prayoga-margesu kaviprabandha-paddhatisu gauna-vstti-vyapasrayad gaunyah prasiddha-visayaviparitayah samaropitayah vitteh sabda-vyaparasya, hetuvyaparasya va vyapasrayad alambanad hetoh atyanta-sundarah ekanta-hrdyah drstah laksitah bhavanti." Dandin favours the use of 'gauna-vitti' as against abhidha, or mukhya vittih. He says that at times in hetu alamkara, the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or, the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place. These actually, are instances where guna-vrtti functions. III. 100, samanarupa prahelika is defined as, "samanarupa gaunartha"ropitair grathita padaih, parusa laksanastitvamatra-vyutpadita-srutih 11" For Personal & Private Use Only

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218 SAHRDAYALOKA Dr. Gupta observes : (pp. 345 ibid) : "prahelikadvayam aparam aha - samanarupeti; gaunartha"ropitaih gaunarthena sadhyavasana-gauna-laksanikena arthena aropitaih upacaritaih padaih grathita." The texture of samanarupa prahelika is woven with 'gaunartha"ropita' padas, i.e. words having a secondary sense. As in Bhamaha, so also in Dandin, we do not come across any mentioning of 'vyanjana' as such by name. However, we come across different forms of the root vi + Vanj in the sense of, 'to suggest. We also meet with the term 'pratiyate' in the sense of, 'is implied'. Thus Dandin seems to know a lot also of what is called implicit sense or, 'pratiyamana artha'. The examination of this point will be taken up in due course. At I. 76 (K.D.), Dandin defines the 'guna' called 'udarata' as - "utkarsavan gunah kascid yasminn ukte pratiyate tad udara"hvayam tena sanatha sarva-paddhatih." Thus udarata occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is conveyed, - yasmin ukte - there is an implication of some high quality. This can be taken as an indirect reference to vyanjana. II. 14, upama is described as, "yatha-kathancit sadrsyam yatrodbhutam pratiyate, upama nama sa, tasyah prapancoyam nidarsyate." So, for Dandin, in upama there is an experience of similarity either by abhidha, or laksana or vyanjana. II. 16, 'vastupama is said to be "pratiyamanaika-dharma". II. 46 (K.D.) has 'prativastupama' where there is 'samya-pratiti' or apprehension of similarity in an implied way. We will see in due course that so many varieties of upama have similarity only implied. At II. 65, Dandin says that words such as 'spardhate', 'jayati', dvesti', etc. are 'sadnsya-sucakah', i.e. suggestive of similarity. II. 136, 'anujna aksepa' is said to occur where through apparent 'anujna' or acceptance, something else is implied. Says Danlin, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. 219 "ity anujna-mukhenaiva kantasya"ksipyate gatih, maranam sucayantyaiva sonujna"ksepa ucyate." Thus, there is some element of suggestion involved in this. So also in "asirvacana-aksepa" (II. 242 K.D.), the heroine suggests her own helplessness - "svavastham sucayantya". At II. 280, 'vyatireka' is defined as - "sabdopatte pratite va sadrsye vastunor dvayoh, tatra yad bheda-kathanam vyatirekah sa kathyate." Thus, vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity. II. 189 mentions vyatireka, having pratiyamana-sadnsya : "sabdopadana-sadnsyavyatirekoyam idrsah, pratiyamana-sadrsyopy asti sonuvidhiyate." Dr. Gupta observes : (pp. 175) : "...atha pratiyamanam a-sabdopattam gamyam sadisyam yatra tadisopi vyatirekah asti..." At II. 234, Dandin holds utpreksa to be suggested by words such as - 'manye, sanke', dhruvam", etc. He observes, "manye sanke, dhruvam prayo nunam ity evam adibhih, utpreksa vyajyate sabdair iva-sabdopi tadrsah." Thus it seems that Dandin considers utpreksa to be implied only. There is a clear mention of the term, 'vyajyate', 'is suggested', and this proves the fact that vyanjana was not unknown to Dandin. At II. 303, 'udatta' is explained. Dandin says that in the two illustrations, (i.e. at II. 301 & II. 302) 'asraya-mahatmya' and 'abhyudaya-gaurava' are respectively, For Personal & Private Use Only

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220 SAHRDAYALOKA 'su-vyan jita', i.e. "clearly suggested". He observes : "purvatra-asayamahatmyam atra abhyudaya-gauravam, su-vyanjitam iti proktam udatta-dvayam apy adah." (II. 303, K.D.) Dr. Gupta explains : (pp. 243, ibid) : "purvatra, purvasmin guror ity adi sloke ramagatam asaya-mahatmyam abhipraya-gauravam, atra ca anantarokte ratnao ityadi padye ravana-sambandhi abhyudaya-gauravam aisvarya-mahima suvyanjitam, samyak prakasitam, iti tad udatta-dvayam dvividham udattam api proktam varnitam." At II. 350, Dandin holds Nidarsana as containing suggestions : "sucayanti dur antatam". Thus, we can read here an indirect reference to vyanjana. We will go to read in both Bhamaha, Dandin and, the rest of earlier alamkarikas the 'pratiyamana' - or implicit sense, in various figures of speech, such as dipaka, samasokti, aprastuta-prasamsa, vyajastuti, etc. and also in emotion-based alamkaras such as rasavat, preyah, arjasvi, and samahita, etc. Vamana : Vamana, in his Kavyalamkara-sutra, -vrtti (= KSV.) often refers to 'bhakti' or laksana, or gunavrtti and upacara. But he also does not mention vyanjana-vrtti directly. He seems to touch vyanjana only indirectly. At KSV. I. i, 1, Vamana observes that the word 'kavya' here stands for word and sense embellished by guna and alamkara, but by 'bhakti' i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to 'sabdartha-matra' i.e. 'word and sense' alone. Says he : - 'kavya-sabdoyam guna'lamkara-samsketayoh sabda'rthayoh vartate. bhaktya tu sabdartha-matra-vacanotra grhyate." The kamadhenu on this (pp. 6, edn. Becan Jha, Chowkhamba Skt. Sr. - Varanasi, 1971), explains, bhaktya upacarena'. Thus secondary power of the word is refered to by Vamana under the very first sutra of his KSV. Vamana says that the word 'kavya' here stands for word and sense embellished by guna and alamkara i.e. by excellences and figures of speech or poetic turns of expression. But by 'bhakti i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference with sabdartha-matra or word and sense alone. On I. ii. 1 KSV. Vamana observes that the words 'arocaki' and 'satrna'bhyavahari are metaphorically used : "gaunarthau". Vamana holds that in vaidarbhi style, the presence of all the artha-gunas i.e. excellences enumerated with reference to sense, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. 221 makes for the charm : "tasyam artha-guna-sampat asvadya bhavati." Now this totality of artha-gunas by themselves, as it resides in the vaidarbhi, is itself known by the name of 'vaidarbhi. I ii. 22 - he says : "sa'pi vaidarbhi tatsthyat." Vamana then adds : sapi iyam artha-guna-sampat vaidarbhi iti ucyate. tatstyat, iti upacaratah vyavaharam darsayati." Thus, we come across a clear reference to the secondary usage of language. At V. i. 12, Vamana considers the blemish called 'neyartha'. He observes that when some meaning which is not heard of in a particular sentence is inferred, it makes for the blemish called 'neyartha'. The term viz. 'pankti-vihamgamanama-bhrt', used for Dasaratha is an instance in point. By 'pankti' is meant 'ten', by 'vihamgama-nama' is meant 'cakravaka'. 'Ratha' i.e. chariot is one that bears the name of cakra-vaka on itself. Thus 'pankti' and vihamgama-namabhrt mean 'Dasa-ratha'. This makes for the blemish called neyartha. Then it is argued that if you find neyartha-dosa in such illustrations then the word 'rathanganama' for cakravaka used by all poets also will be an illustration of neyartha-dosa. To this, Vamana says : na tesam, "nirudha-laksanatvat." Such words as rathanga-nama for cakravaka are instances of nirudha laksana and are therefore free from any blemish. Thus Vamana seems to be conversant with what later alamkarikas term as 'rudhi-mula laksana', i.e. secondary usage based on convention. At II. i. 14 Vamana says that whatever has an obscene sense as another sense is 'aslila' which is a dosa or a blemish : "a-sabhya'rtha'ntaram asabhya-smrtihetus ca aslilam." But he adds at II. i. 15 (KSV.) that, secondary usages do not fall under this, He reads - "na gupta-laksita-samavstani." - "apavadartham idam. guptam, laksitam, samvitam ca na'slilam." Thus, secondary usage of language is clearly referred to by Vamana and is recommended also in poetry. At II. i. 17 he defines 'laksita' as : laksanika - asabhyabhyam laksitam." i.e. if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is called 'laksita' and it does not give rise to the blemish of vulgarity. The illustration cited is 'janma-bhumih'. Vamana says - "tad eva asabhya'rtha'ntaram laksanikena asabhyena arthena anvitam padam laksitam, yatha janma-bhumih iti." Vamana adds that here, this word viz. 'janmabhumih' means the female organ - i.e. 'yonih', only secondarily and not by the power of expression - "tad hi laksanaya guhyartham, na sva-saktya iti." Here 'sva-sakti' of a word is 'abhidha' or the power of direct expression and 'laksana' is secondary power - both of which are clearly known to Vamana and clearly referred to here by him also. For Personal & Private Use Only

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222 SAHRDAYALOKA Under, IV. iii. 7, Vamana notes that like 'gauna'rtha', the 'laksanika'rtha' can also become an alamkara. This means that as in case of a metaphorical expression, so in case of any secondary usage also, poets can create some beauty, i.e. alamkara. He says : "yatha ca gaunasya arthasya alamkaratvam tatha laksanikasya api darsayitum aha" - and he quotes 1V. iii. 8 here, viz. "sadnsyallaksana vakroktih". He observes: "bahuni hi nibandhanani laksanayam. tatra sadrsyallaksana vakroktih asau iti." Thus Vamana knows a variety of laksanas but has a preference for one based on sadrsya i.e. similarity, as the germ for vakrokti i.e. poetic expression. He quotes an illustration in which "unmilana" and "nimilana", i.e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of an eye, are superimposed on 'kamala' and 'kairava', the flowers, through similarity, and secondary meaning of blossoming and fading of the respective flowers is collected at the next step : "sadrsyat vikasa-samkocau laksayatah." He cites some more illustr same effect and adds : "iti evam adinu laksanartho nirupyate iti, laksanayam jhatiti artha-pratipatti-ksamatvam rahasyam acaksate iti." The secret of laksana lies in an immediate gathering of the sense. He says that laksana based on something else than similarity does not make for vakrokti i.e. poetic expression : "a-sadrsyanibandhana tu laksana na vakroktih." At IV. iii. 9, Vamana defines 'utpreksa' : "a-tadrupasya anyatha'dhyavasanam atisayartham utpreksa." To describe an object as one which it is not, and this description to bring about some added charm of it, is utpreksa. Thus in utpreksa, the source of charm is 'adhyavasana' which is neither 'adhyaropa' i.e superimposition as in case of rupaka, nor laksana as in case of vakrokti. Vamana abserves : "na punar adhyaropo laksana va." 'Adhyavasana' is determination'. It is to determine and present an object in a form and quality which it is not. This is aharya' i.e. done knowingly by a poet's will to impart beauty to a given expression. This is artificial identification wherein the original object is not totally absorbed but also finds independent expression. Vamana's concept of utpreksa also suggests that he has a clearer and fuller knowledge of different varieties of laksana. At V. i. 15 Vamana discusses a topic concerning words, that can and should be used in poetry, and others that cannot be used in poetry, i.e. the topic of 'prayojya' and 'a-prayojya' words, with reference to a poetic expression. He observes - "laksana-sabdas ca". - Vamana says that words having secondary usage can be utilized by the poets if their practice is very frequent : "laksana-sabdas ca atiprayuktah prayojyah, yatha dvi-refa-rodara-sabdau bhramara-cakravakarthau, laksanaparau. anati-prayuktasca na prayojyah yatha dvikah, kakah iti." The word For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. 223 dvika' in the sense of 'kaka' or a crow is not very frequently used in language and so it cannot be used. It is clear that Vamana here refers to what is termed as 'rudhimula-laksana, later on. As already observed by us, Vamana does not refer to 'vyanjana' directly. But at places, he notes certain illustrations of 'punar ukta' or 'repitition', which are actually not 'punar ukta dosa' or blemish resulting from repitition. He says that such words or such repititions are charged with some further sense. Now acceptance of this 'further sense' amounts to the acceptance of implicit sense through the medium of 'vyanjana' or suggestion, though of course Vamana does not make it clear that this 'further sense' is derived through the agency of vyanjana or suggestive power of a word. Under II. ii. 13, Vamana cites certain illustrations. He says: "dhanur jyadhvanau; dhanuh srutir arudheh pratipattyai." He further observes : 'dhanur jyadhvanau' iti atra 'jya'sabdena ukta'rthatvepi dhanuh srutih prayujyate, arudheh pratipattyai. arohanasya pratipattyai. arohanasya pratipattyartham. The idea is that in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of dhanuh' or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jya' or bow-string itself. So, the use of dhanuh' should be termed redundant. But Vamana says that here it is not so, i.e. it is not redundant because the idea of arohana' or stretching the string is not collected in the absence of the word 'dhanuh' : na hi dhanuh sruti-antarena dhanusi arudha jya dhanur-jya iti sakyam pratipattum. Under II. ii. 14, Vamana cites further illustrations to the same effect. Says he - "karnavatamsa-sravana-kundala-sirah-sekharesu karna"di nirdesah sannidheh." Thus, in 'karnavatamsa' the word 'karna' is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'sannidhi' i.e. juxtaposition. The idea of closeness cannot be collected merely by the use of the word 'avatamsa' which by itself means an ear ornament. That this ornament is close to the ear and is dangling on the cheeks is understood only by the presence of the word 'karna'. The Kamadhenu (pp. 71, ibid) observes : "avatamsa"dibhih karna"bharana"dinieva ucyante iti avatamsadi-prayoge karna"dinam gatarthatvam iti abhiprayah." II. ii. 15, Vamana observes : "muktaharasabde mukta-sabdah suddheh." - muktaharasabde mukta-sabdah harasabdena eva gata"rthah prayujyate, suddheh pratipattyartham iti sambandhah." In case of the word mukta-hara the word 'mukta' is redundant because the word 'hara' is by itself capable of conveying the sense of a pearl-necklace, but an additional word 'mukta' is used to convey that the pearls are very pure i.e. are of the highest quality that is available in the market. Now, Vamana does not specify that this extra For Personal & Private Use Only

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224 SAHRDAYALOKA sense of purity is collected through vyanjana but his finger does point in the direction of vyanjana which is instrumental in gathering this extra sense. Thus the concept of vyanjana cannot be said to be totally absent from his mind. Similarly, at II. ii. 6, 'puspa-mala' is an expression with a separate mention of 'puspa', eventhough the idea is covered by a mere use of the term 'mala'. Here, by a special mention of 'puspa' the idea of 'utkarsa' or excellence is conveyed. Vamana adds : "utkrstanam puspanam mala iti." When we come across the use of 'mala' with reference to 'ratna' or 'sabda', as in the expression 'ratna-mala' or 'sabda-mala', the usage is said to be a secondary one - "sa tavad upacaritasya prayogah. nir-upapado hi mala-sabdah puspa-racana-visesam eva abhidhatte iti." In the same way, the word 'kari' in the expression 'kari-kalabha', is not redundant as it brings about the apprehension of 'tad-rupya' or similarity. Vamana says - "kari-kalabha-sabde karisabdah kalabhena eva gatarthah prayujyate, tad-rupyasya pratipattyartham iti." So, this type of added sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to sabda-Sakti-mula vyanjana or not is not made clear by Vamana. In the third adhikarana-second adhyaya, Vamana deals with "samadhi guna" with reference to sense. He defines it as - "artha-drstih samadhih." (III. ii. 7) The dawning or flashing of (a special) meaning is the excellence called 'samadhi'. When a mind is in a state of poise, meanings flash upon it. At II. ii. 7, Vamana classifies 'artha' or meaning into 'vyakta' i.e. one that is expressed clearly, and 'suksma' i.e, one that is subtle : "artho vyaktah suksmas'ca". At III. ii. 10, he says that 'suksma' or subtle is also two-fold such as 'bhavya' or that which can be easily grasped, and 'vasaniya' or that which can be understood after close application : "suksmo dhvidha bhavati. bhavyo vasaniyas'ca. sighra-nirupana-gamyo bhavyah, ekagrata-prakarsa-gamyo vasaniyah iti." He goes on illustrating the same. Now both 'bhavya' and 'vasaniya' are more subtle as compared to the 'vyakta' or barely expressed. Out of these two also, 'vasaniya' is subtler. Thus, we come across a clear recognition of implied sense, without however any reference to the relevant vrtti viz. vyanjana here. KSV. III. ii. 5 defines "kanti-guna' as, "dipta-rasatvam kantih", i.e. the narration involving full-fledged rasa-delineation makes for 'kanti-guna' in Vamana's estimation. The illustration he reads is purely an instance with songara-rasa as the dominant one. But again, inspite of recognition of rasa-delineation in poetry, Vamana does not discuss as to which power of word brings about the particular rasa-realization. But, it is certain that in all the cases pointed out as above, Vamana comes very close to the recognition of vyanjana without naming it, of course. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis in Bhamaha, Dannin, etc 225 Udbhata : In Udbhata's kara (K.L.) we come across some direct or indirect references to all the three vsttis as below : At V. 16, Udbhata defines 'vyajastuti' as : "sabda-sakti-svabhavena yatra nindeva gamyate. vastutas tu stutih srestha vajastutir asau mata." 'sabda-sakti' here stands for abhidhasakti. 'gamyate' i.e. 'is implied', can refer to 'is suggested'. I. 21, Udbhata defines rupaka as, "srutya sambandha-virahat yat padena padantaram, guna-vTtti-pradhanena yujyate rupakam tu tat." Pratiharenduraja in his Laghu-vrtti (pp. 11, Edn. N.S., Bombay '28) says : "padantarasya gunavstteh aparena padena yoge rupakam bhavati", ... and adds - "srutir nirantara'rtha-nisthah sabda-vyaparah. taya sruty, anupapadyamanapadantara-sambandham sat padantaram gunavstti yatra'parena padena yujyate tatra rupakata." The Vivrti (Edn. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1931), pp. 7, observes : "yat padena pada'ntaram sambadhyate tad-rupakam. ... srutir nirantara'rtha-nisthah sabda-vyaparah... gunavstritvam iti hi mukhya'rthabadhah." - Thus, we come across a clear mentioning of both 'abhidha' and 'gunavrtti' here, as is explained by Pratiharenduraja (approxinately the last half of the 10th Cen. A.D. - De, pp. 74) At IV. 11, Udbhata defines paryayokta as, "paryayoktam yad anyena prakarena abhidhiyate, vacya-vacaka-vsttibhyam sunyena avagamana"tmana." Here, vacaka-vstti is pure abhidha, vacya-vitti could be laksana, while. 'avagamana' could be vyanjana. The commentators viz. Pratiharenduraja, the author of Laghuvitti and Rajanka Tilaka, the author of Vivrti, have the following observations : (pp. 60, Edn. Bom. ibid) : "vacakasya abhidhayakasya sva-sabdasya vittir vyaparo vacyartha-pratyayanam. vacyasya tu abhidheyasya vyaparo vacya'ntarena saha For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA akanksa-sannidhi-yogyata-mahatmyat samsarga-gamanam. evamvidhas ca yo vacyavacakayor vyaparas tam antarena api prakara'ntarena artha-samarthya"tmana avagamana-svabhavena yad avagamyate tat paryayena svakanthanabhihitam api santarena sabda-vyaparena avagamyamanatvat paryayoktam vastu. tena ca svasamslesa-vasena kavyartholamkriyate." - Tilaka (pp. 35) has - "vacakavrttih abhidha. vacyavrttir akanksa-sannidhi-yogyata-vasat samsarga-gamanam. tabhyam vina artha-samarthya"tmana avagamana-svabhavena yat pratipadyate tat paryayena anyena rupena abhidhanam iti paryayoktam. avagamana-vyaparena katham abhidhanam iti cet, paryayokta-tattvam-aprastutaprasamsa-vyakhyane vaksyamah." - Thus, according to these two commentators, Udbhata here seems to refer to vacakavrtti i.e. abhidha, vacyavrtti i.e. tatparya and avagamana i.e. vyanjana in all prohability. As noted above, "vacya-vrtti" could also mean laksana. 226 Rudrata: In Radrata we do not come across any direct reference to 'abhidha', however, at VI. 3 he defines 'a-samartha' blemish as: "padam idam asamartham syad vacakam arthasya tasya na ca vaktum, tam saknoti tirohita tat-samarthyam, nimittena." 'asamartha' occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors. Read Namisadhu (pp. 151, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, Edn. '66) "padam iti. yatpadam tasya nirdistasya arthasya vacakam. atha ca tam eva artham vaktum na saknoti tada asamartham. vacakam cet katham na saknoti iti aha, nimittena kena-cid sabdantara-sambandha"dina tirohitam yasya tat, tam abhidhatum na saknoti iti. etena a-vacakatva-dosad asamarthyam dosa-bheda uktah." Herein we may read an indirect reference to, and recognition of, 'abhidha'. At VI. 5, and 6 in the same context, Rudrata describes another variety of a-samartha wherein a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e.g. "han" in the sense of 'going'. At VI. 6, Rudrata says: "sabda-prakrti-hetau, satyam apy asamartham eva rudhi-balat, yaugikam artha-visesam padam yatha varidhau jalabhrt." Namisadhu observes (pp. 153, ibid): "jala-dharana-kriya-laksane pravrttinimitte satyapi jalabhrt sabdo varidhim samudram abhidhatum asamarthah megha eva tasya rudhitvat, iti." - For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. 227 'Asamartha' also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology, but is rendered incapable to convey it on account of rudhi or usage; e.g. 'jalabhrt' cannot be used for 'varidhi' i.e. an ocean. The maxim viz. 'rudhir yogat baliyasi' seems to be known to Rudrata also and he thus knows a variety of abhidhartha. Apratita, a blemish is defined by Rudrata at VI. II, - "yuktya vakti tam artham na ca rudham yatra yad abhidhanataya, dvedha tad apratitam samsayavad asamsayam ca padam." Namisadhu has: (pp. 156, ibid): "atha ca tatra artha'bhidhanataya vacakatvena na rudham, na prasiddham, tat ca apratitam dvedha." Thus, Rudrata mentions "abhidhanataya rudham artham" i.e. a meaning fixed by the power of expression abhidha. VI. 12 gives an illustration of 'apratita' involving doubt; e.g. 'himaha... etc. VI. 13 gives an illustration of apratita-dosa having no doubt, - 'a-samsaya' - 'asvayosin mukharcisman' is the illustration, and it means 'vadavanala'. Radrata observes that here this particular word is used for the normally used 'yaugika' or 'rudha' words. Here again, we come across, a reference to yaugika and rudha sabdas, which lead to abhidha. - At VII. i. also, Rudrata seems to refer to abhidhartha very clearly when he says: "arthah punar abhidhavan - pravartate, yasya vacakah sabdah, tasya bhavanti dravyam, gunah, kriya, jatir iti bhedah." We do not come across any reference to gunavrtti or laksana in Rudrata except at VII. 58 and here too indirectly when he illustrates 'viparita' anumana. The anumana is said to be 'viparita' because the 'sadhya' is described as following the sadhakas : The illustration cited is (VII. 58) : "vacanam upacara-garbham durad udgamanam asanam sakalam, idam adya mayi tatha te yatha'si nunam priye kupita." For Personal & Private Use Only

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228 SAHRDAYALOKA Herein, 'vacana' is said to be 'upacaragarbha', and thus a reference to 'upacara' is found here of course indirectly. Similarly at VII. 49, we have, 'abhidhiyate sato va" ... etc., giving a clear reference of abhidha'. VII. 38, Rudrata defines 'bhava' as : "yasya vikarah prabhavan apratibaddhena hetuna yena, 'gamayati' tad abhiprayam tat-pratibandham ca bhavo sau." The illustration is, "grama-tarunam tarunya nava-vanjula-manjari-sanatha-karam, pasyantya bhavati muhur. nitaram malina mukha-cchaya." Bhava also occurs, holds Rudrata (VII. 40), when a sentence conveying the direct sense, also suggests another sense : "abhidheyam abhidadhanam tad eva tat-sadrsa-sakala-guna-dosam, artha'ntaram avagamayati yad vakyam soparo bhavah." The illustration (VII. 41) is - ekakini yad abala, taruni tatha'ham, asmin glhe glhapatis ca gato videsam, kim yacase tad iha vasam iyam varaki svasrur mama'ndha-badhira nanu mudha pantha !" Namisadhu explains : (pp. 209, ibid) - "ekakini iti. taruna-pathikasya vasam yacamanasya kacit sabhilasa yosid idam prakata-pratisedha'rtham vakyam aha. etena caukta-padarthena vilaksano vasa'numati-vidhi-laksano bhavovagamyate." This is an indirect. but clear recognition of waniana, pure and simple. At VIII. 74, Rudrata defines anyokti as - "asamana-visesanam api yatra samana-itivittam upameyam, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc 229 uktena gamyate param upamanena iti sa anyoktih." This also is a veiled reference to vyanjana. Thus, we have observed that in earlier alamkarikas from Bhamaha to Rudrata, we do not find the topic of the word-powers i.e. sabda-vsttis discussed as an independent topic as is done by later alamkarikas such as Mammata and his followers. But we do, however, find references - both direct or indirect but equally positive, in their works, to various sabda-vittis and various types of meanings such as the principal or mukhya, which is abhidheya and the secondary i.e. a-mukhya or gauna, upacarita etc. Thus, we do find references in their works which go to prove that they were absolutely aquainted with abhidha and laksana to be sure, and that the concept of vyanjana was not absent from their minds. The idea of vyanjana was surely in its embryonic form, if not flowered in their minds. Though of course they have not clearly defined vyanjana, but then they have not defined either abhidha or laksana also, precisely because they had no compulsion to do so. Perhaps samajikas in those days never confused between one and the other. But for Anandavardhana, who tried to make a clear distinction between one and the other, explaining and establishing vyanjana had become a necessity. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter 1 Pratiyamana artha OR Implicit sense, - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas such as Bhamaha, Dandin etc. Some of the greatest exponents of the dhvani school such as Anandavardhana (middle of the 9th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 101), Abhinavagupta (1015 A.D.), Ruyyaka (IInd and Illrd quarters of the 12th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 181;) and Jagannatha (17th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 231, SK. Poetics; 1620 A.D. to 1660 A.D.-) hold that the earlier writers such as Bhamaha and the like, though they had not defined either vyanjana or dhvani, were more or less familiar with the fact of dhvani. Anandavardhana observes : "yadyapi ca dhvani-sabda-samkirtanena kavyalaksana-vidhayibhir gunavrttir anyo va na kascit prakarah prakasitah, tathapi amukhya-vittya kavyesu vyavaharam darsayata dhvanimargo manak sprstopi na laksita iti parikalpya evam uktam, 'bhaktam ahus tam anye' iti." - (Dhv. I. i, aloka; pp. 4, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dharwad, '74) Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. i, (above passage), tries to explain as to who were the alamkarikas referred to by Anandavardhana - Says he - (pp. 16, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Dhv. with Locana, Ahd. '97, '98) : darsayata iti, bhatrodbhata-vamana"dina. bhamahena uktam - "sabdas' cchando'bhidhanarthah" iti. abhidhanasya sabdad bhedam vyakhyatum bhatdbhato babhase - sabdanam abhidhanam abhidhavyaparo mukhyo, guna-vittis' ca. Vamanopi 'sadrsyallaksana vakroktih' iti. manak sprsta iti. tais tavad dhvani-digunmilita, yathalikhita-pathakais tu svarupa-vivekam kartum asaknuvadbhih tat For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... 231 svarupa-viveko na krtah, praty uta upalabhyate, abhagna-narikelavat yathasrutatad-granthodgrahana-matrena, iti." It is very clear that both Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are absolutely clear that the ancients knew dhvani, and therefore, we may add, vyanjana also, eventhough they did not make any attempt to arrive at its definition. Ruyyaka, in the beginning of his work Alamkara-sarvasva says : ('65 pp. 2, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass) "iha hi tavad bhamahodbhata-prabhitayas cirantanalamkarakarah pratiyamanam artham vacyopaskarakataya alamkarapaksa-niksiptam manyante. tatha hi . paryayokta-aprastuta - prasamsa-samasoktyaksepa-vyajastuti-upameyopamaananvaya"dau vastumatram gamyamanam vacyopaskarakatvena, 'sva-siddhaye paraksepah' 'parartham sva-samarpanam' iti yatha-yogam dvividhaya bangya pratipaditam tai). rudrasena tu bhava'lamkaro dvi-dhaivoktah. rupaka-dipaka-apahnutitulyayogita"dau upama"dy alamkaro vacyopaskarakatvena uktah. utpreksa tu svayam eva pratiyamana kathita. rasavat-preyah-prabhrtau rasabhava"dir vacyasobhahetutvena uktah. tad ittham trividham api pratiyamanam alamkarataya khyapitam 'eva. vamanena tu sadrsya-nibandhanaya laksanaya vakroktyalamkaratvam bruvata kascid dhvanibhedolamkarataya eva uktah. kevalam guna-visista-padaracana"tmika ritih kavya"tmatvena ukta..." Thus Ruyyaka has analytically specified how threefold implicit sense is covered under various figures of speech by earlier alamkarikas. Jagannatha in his Rasa-gangadhara (pp. 555 Edn. N.S. Bombay, '47) observes : idam tu bodhyam. dhvanikarat pracinair bhamahodbhata-prabhrtibhih svagranthesu kutra'pi dhvani-gunibhutavyangya"di sabda na prayuktah iti etavata eva tair dhvanya"dayo na svikriyante iti adhunikanam vacoyuktir ayukta eva. yatah samasokti-vyaja-stuti-aprastutaprasamsady-alamkara-nirupane kiyantopi gunabhuta-vyangya-bhedas tair api nirupitah. aparas ca sarvopi vyangyaprapancah paryayokta-kuksau niksiptah. na hi anubhavasiddhortho balena api apahnotum sakyate. dhvanva"di-padaih param vyavaharo na krtah. tena na hi etavata anangikaro bhavati. It can be said that the presence of vyanjana and vyangyartha or suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the Rig-veda, but perhaps it is quite different to discover in poets and critics any theoretically conscious understanding For Personal & Private Use Only

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232 SAHRDAYALOKA of vyanjana and vyangvartha and 'dhvani' in its technical sense. So, it can be argued that in the discussion that follows, of alamkaras and gunas in which vyanjana and vyangyartha are subsumed, in case of the treatment by earlier alamkarikas, there is no positive proof of their conscious understanding of these entities. But, by and large, on second thought, we may choose to go with Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruwvaka and Jagannatha, that the earlier alamkarikas knew both wanjana and vyangvartha, but they had no apparent reason to define and elaborate these topics, like Yaska, Panini and Patanjali and perhaps also the Mimamsakas, who had no occasion and therefore no business to define these topics separately and carve out their independent existence. Actually after the age of the earlier alamkarikas and before the time of Anandavardhana, some misunderstanding started in the circles of literary critics and therefore Anandavardhana took it upon himself to systematically expound and establish the concept of dhvani' in its technical sense, with of course 'vyanjana' as its poetic instrument. It may be noted that in whole-heartedly supporting the remarks of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jagannatha we are shifting from the position taken by us on an earlier occasion, while we prepared our thesis -- "The Origin and Development of the theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit poetics", - and got it published. (See pp. 179, Edn. Guj. Uni. Ahmedabad, '73) We will go to see how the fact of pratiyamana artha i.e. implicit sense is incorporated under various heads by the earlier alamkarikas such as Bhamaha, Dandin and the rest. Bhamaha : At - II. 85 Bhamaha's general outlook towards all alamkaras becomes clear when he observes : "saisa sarvaiva vakroktih anayartho vibhavyate yatosyam kavina karyah kolamkaro'naya vina ?" (II. 85, Bhamaha) Read Tatacharya (pp. 57, ibid) : vakroktih alamkarah. 'vakra'bhidheyasabdoktir-ista vacam alamkstih." iti vacanat ya nirupita atisayoktih sa eva sarva vakroktih, sarvolamkarah. anaya atisayoktya kavyarthah rasa-carvana-'nugunavisada-pratiti-gocarikriyate. etad ghatane kavina samrambhah karyah. anaya vina alamkarah eva na bhavati." - Thus for Bhamaha, atisayokti or vakrokti i.e. beauty lies at the root of all the alamkaras or beautiful turns of expressions. It is implied in all alamkaras in one way or the other. The presence of 'prativamana' element Isl. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... 233 is thus reconised as the very basis on which the whole of art, architecture and edifice of poetry is built. At I. 30, Bhamaha asserts that this 'vakrokti' should be present in all poetry beginning from a muktaka i.e. a single independent verse to a mahakavya or an epic : "anibaddham punar gatha sloka-matra"di tat punah, yuktam vakra-svabhavoktya sarvam eva etad isyate." Thus vakrokti is omnipresent for Bhamaha. At I. 34, he is even prepared to reject the so called vaidarbha kavya if it is found bereft of this element of vakrokti : "a-pustartham a-vakrokti prasannam rju-komalam, bhinnam geyam iva idam tu kevalam sruti-pesalam." "If the composition is meagre in meaning and bereft of beautiul expression, though clear, uninvolved and soft, it is to be taken as different from poetry, (and) something akin to a musical composition appealing only to the ear.". Tatacharya writes : (pp. 15, ibid) : a-pustartham a-gambhirartham, ata eva prasannam kavi-pratibha-janita-rasopaskara-rahitam, a-vakrokti alamkarasunyam, ata eva rju pamara-sadharana-varta-tulyam evam kavya-jivita-vikalam api komalam lalita-pada-bandham idam tu vaidarbham vilaksanam geyam iva kevalam sstimadhuram, na tu priti-hetu-bhuta-visista-sabdarthamaya-kavya-vyapadesa-nidanasobhasali. tatha ca kavyatyam eva nastiti kutas tad-visesata. geyam gitipradhana padaracana." Bhamaha very clearly affirms the use of only 'vakra' 'word and sense' in poetry when he observes at I. 36 : "na nitanta"di-matrena jayate caruta giram, vakrabhidheyasabdoktir ista vacam alamkrtih." "By the use of soft words such as 'nitanta' and the like, poetic beauty is not caused. A poetic expression graced by beauty in word and sense is welcome as true 'alamkara' (i.e. inherent poetic beauty) of speech." For Personal & Private Use Only

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234 SAHRDAYALOKA Tatacharya is ill at ease to explain 'nitanta-adi-matrena' (pp. 17, ibid). Bui ultimately falls upon the right explanation when he observes : "vaksyamana anuprasa-visesa-upasthapana-dvarena nitanta"diti bandha-komalatvam iha laksayati. srtipesalatva-sampadakena bandhasya komalatva-matrena kavya-vyapadesa-ucita caruta giram na jayate-vakrayor abhidheya-sabdayor-ghatana tu vacam alamkrtih. ka sabdasya vakrata. anuprasa"dimatta." Thus for Bhamaha, word and sense charged with vakroti alone make for poetry, and this element of vakroti is mostly implicit, though it could be even explicit at times. It will be interesting here, even at the cost of little diversion, to note some inherent parallalism in the thinking of both Bhamaha and Dandin, the earlier masters. Dandin also at K.D. II. 214, observes that 'atisayokti' is at the root of all poetic expression. He observes : (K.D. II. 214): . "vivaksa ya visesasya loka-simativartini asau atisayoktih syat alamkarottama yatha.." Thus atisayokti, the best of alamkaras, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way. The 'atisaya' is 'lokatisaya', i.e. something beyond ordinary. It is this something special in poetry which makes for the aesthetic beauty in literature. Dandin, at II. 216 observes : "samsayatisaya"dinam vyaktyai kincin nidarsyate." 'vyaktyai' takes us to inherent vyanjan, in the said description. At II. 220 (K.D.) Dandin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech. He observes : "alamkarantaranam apy ekam ahuh parayanam, vagiaa-mahitam uktim imam atisaya"hvayam." So, for Dandin this 'atisaya', or vakrata of Bhamaha, forms the essence which makes poetry what it is and separates it from local ordinary expressions. This 'atisaya' of Dandin or 'vakrata' of Bhamaha is seen implicit in poetic expression. This leads to the acceptance by both of implicit sense in poetry and also possibly vyanjana as an instrument conveying this hidden treasure. Both Bhamaha and For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... 235 Dandin seem to have an indentical attitude to alamkara or aesthetic beauty revealed through poetry. Both are not struck merely by the outward expression only of a given alamkara, but by something else, by inner beauty lying at the root of a given poetic figure. We will be able to underline the element of 'avagamana' i.e. pratiyamanata', perhaps through the agency of vyanjana, in some of the figures described by both of them. If may be noted here incidentally, that it is more in this implicit element that the charm of a given alamkara lies. Bhamaha's treatment of various alamkaras will bring home this point. Bhamaha begins with 'rupaka'. Rupaka occurs when in consideration of similarity in qualities the upameya is identified with the upamana (KL. II. 22). Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rupaka, that is to say, upama is itself implied in rupaka, or better say 'aupamya' is inherent in rupaka. At II. 24, Bhamaha describes 'eka-desa-vivarti-rupaka' and it is already clear that this sort of expression involves an element of unexpressed or implied sense also. II. 25 describes dipaka as three-fold. The element of upama is implied in all the varieties of dipaka as illustrated by Bhamaha (II. 27, 28, 29). Prativastupama (parallel) occurs - "samana-vastu-nyasena prativastupamocyate, yatheva-anabhidhanepi gunasamya-pratiti-tah." (II. 34, K.L.) Thus, there is prativastupama when, even in the absence of words such as yatha, va, etc., which are directly expressive of upama, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also the idea of similarity seems to be implied only. At II. 68, 'aksepa' (paraleipsis) is defined as : "pratisedha iva istasya yo visesabhidhitsaya, aksepa iti tam santah samsanti dvividham yatha." Aksepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense - "visesabhidhitsaya". This 'visesa' is of course, implied only. At II. 75, Bhamaha defines 'vyatireka' (excellence) as : "upamanavatorthasya yad visesa-nidarsanam, For Personal & Private Use Only

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236 SAHRDAYALOKA vyatirekam tam icchanti visesa"padanad yatha." Thus vyatireka has also an element of similarity implied in it and the external expression has something more to convey : "visesa-apadana iccha". In the same way in vibhavana, (abnormal causation) at (II. 77, 78) karanantara-kalpana' - imagining some other cause which is not directly expressed, is at implicit level. This could be through the agency of vyanjana. Bhamaha, at II. 79, defines samasokti : (Condensed Speech) - "yatrokte gamyatenyorthah tat-samana-visesanah, sa samasoktir uddista samksiptarthataya yatha." Tatacharya writes (pp. 55, ibid) : yasmin arthe ukte, anyortho gamyate. nanu katham ekasminn artha ucyamane aparortho gamyeta? ucyate. tat-samanavisesanat. ukrasya arthasya yani visesanani tani ced anyasyapi samanani, tani tam gamayanti. This 'anyartha-gamana' is implied and is mostly through the agency of vyanjana. At least, there is a clear recognition of an implied sense here. After defining atisayokti (hyperbole) at II. 81, as noted earlier, Bhamaha wants it to remain present in all the alamkaras. The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in kavya as such. Anything bereft of this element of atisaya is mere varta' a bare local statement not involving the poetic beauty. Precisely for this reason, in Bhamaha's understanding, or by the way Bhamaha has imagined them, the three figures of speech such as hetu, suksma, and lesa are no alamkaras, as there is no element of vakrokti or poetic beauty involved in them : "hetus ca suksmo lesotha nalamkarataya matah, samudayabhidhanasya vakrokty anabhidhanatah." Tatacharya writes : (pp. 58, ibid) : "vakrabhidheya-sabdoktih ista vacam alamkstih", iti tavat sthitam. lokatikrantata ca sabdarthayor vakrata, sa yatra nasti sa katham alamkarah. na ca hetvadyalamkara-vattayabhimatesu sthalesu vakrata kacid asti. tad ete na"lamkarataya matah. samudayena abhidhanam yasya For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... 237 vivaksitasya vakyarthasya sa samudayabhidhanah, tasya tatra vakroktya anabhidhanat na alamkarata iti." This vakrokti or poetic beauty is implicit in any alamkara worth the name. II. 91, defines utpreksa, (poetic fancy) as : "a-vivaksita-samanya kincit ca upamaya saha, a-tad-guna-kriyayogat utpreksa atisayanvita." Thus utpreksa has no 'samanya' i.e. idea of similarity, commonness, as its purport, i.e. utpreksa centres round sambhavana or probability and not mere similarity or sadrsya. But, it has again some element of upama, and thus similarity is only implied. In utpreksa the upameya is said to possess such quality or action as normally does not go with it. Thus, it has an element of atisaya implied in it. At II. 50 also Bhamaha clearly recognises an element of atisaya involved in both upama and urpreksa. Bhamaha observes : "yas ca atisayavan arthah katham sosambhavo matah, istam catisayarthatvam upamotpreksayor yatha." (II. 50) Tatacharya (pp. 89, ibid) observes: "...nispatatam saranam tivra-patitvam sanubandha-patitvam asamkhyeyatvam ca pratipadaniyam. soyam atisaya iha upamarthah na hi ayam na sambhavati iti vaktum sakyate. tad evam yasya asambhavo na sortho vivaksitah. yas tu vivaksitah sortho na asambhavi iti nirnimitta upalambhah, iti uktam bhavati. sabdarthas tu yasya upamana-visesasya atisayavan upameya-visesah arthah tatparya-visayah sa upamana-visesah katham sambhava-sunyah iti manyata iti. na kevalam upamayam kim tu alamkarantarepi atisaya-vivaksaya asti asambhavatorthasya nibandhanam. In the third chapter, Bhamaha begins his treatment with alamkaras such as preyas, rasavat, and urjasvi. These alamkaras will be taken up for discussion later when we consider the treatment of rasa, bhava, etc. in earlier alamkarikas in a separate chapter (= ch. XIV). For Personal & Private Use Only

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238 SAHRDAYALOKA Bhamaha defines paryayokta (periphrasis) - at III. 8a as - "paryayoktam yad anyena prakarena abhidhiyate." and 8b - supplies the illustration, the context of which is described as, "uvaca ratnaharane caidyam sarnga-dhanur yatha" with III. 9 - "grhesu adhvasu va na annam bhunjmahe yad adhitinah, na bhunjate dvijas, tac ca rasa-dana-nivsttaye." Bhamaha holds that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is implied in Krsna's speech who words it differently. Thus, paryayokta has an element of implied sense. Though Bhamaha is not so explicit as Mammata who says, "yad eva vyangyam tad eva vacyam yatha tu vyangyam na tatha tad ucyate." Though Bhamaha does not call the implicit sense as 'vyangya', by name, but he almost seems to be inclined favourably to accept it; and also vyanjana. Bhamaha does not define the figure called 'udatta' (exalted) (III. 11, 12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of asaya-mahattva or vibhutimahattva is only implied. Bhamaha has a totally novel connotation of slesa (paronomasia) (III. 14), which occurs according to him, when there is realization of identity of the upameya with the upamana through a guna i.e. quality, kriya or action, or proper noun i.e. namna. It differs from the figure rupaka (metaphor) in this respect that in rupaka there is a clear mention of both upameya and upamana in different terms (III. 15). Thus, for Bhamaha, an element of similarity is implied in slesa also. He says : (III. 14) : "upamanena yat tattvam upameyasya sadhyate, guna-kriyabhyam namna ca slistam tad abhidhiyate." Tatacharya explains : "...upameya-sambandhinam gunakriyanamnam upamanasambandhibhir guna-kriya-namabhir abheda-sampadanam iti vivaksitam. (pp. 67, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... Bhamaha defines apahnuti (concealment) at III. 21, as - "apahnutir abhista ca kincid antargatopama, bhrtarthapahnavad asyah kriyate cabhidha yatha." Thus, for Bhamaha, aphnuti has clearly an element of upama implied - 'kincid antargata' in it. Tatacharya explains (pp. 69, ibid) : "apahnutih pratisedha"tma prasiddha. tatra sarvatra alamkarabhavo nesyate. kim tu yatra upama gamyate, sa pratisedha iha apahnutih. tad aha - kincid iti. 'kincid antargatih vina vacanam pratiyamanata..." III. 23 (K.L.) defines visesoktih (peculiar allegation) as, : "ekadesasya vigame ya gunantara-samsthitih, visesa-prathanayasau visesoktir mata yatha..." when a portion of it is lost, another quality (or portion) survives to enhance the superiority of an object, the figure of speech is visesokti. This added sense i.e. of karanantara-kalpana is always implied. In the same way tulyayogita (equal pairing) (Bhamaha, III. 27) has an element of similarity implied in it. It occurs when in order to suggest some similarity in qualities, in case of two objects, one of which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected through an identical action. Bhamaha, III. 27 says: "nyunasyapi visistena guna-samya-vivaksaya tulya-karya-kriya-yogat iti ukta tulyayogita." III. 29, defines aprastuta-prasamsa (indirect eulogy) as, "adhikarad apetasya vastunonyasya ya stutih, aprastuta-prasamseti sa caivam kathyate yatha." 239 For Personal & Private Use Only

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240 SAHRDAYALOKA Herein, there is mention of a matter not in hand, implying the matter in hand. Similarly, vyajastuti (artful praise) (Bhamaha III. 31) has apparent censure and implied praise and is defined as : Bhamaha III. 31 - "duradhika-gunastotravyapadesena tulyatam, kincid vidhitsor ya ninda vyajastutir asau yatha." Tatacharya (pp. 71) observes : "duram atyantam adhika guna yasya sa duradhika-gunah, tasya stotram gunakirtanam krtva tad apeksaya apakrstatvena yadi prakrtasya nindam karoti, kim icchan ? kena-cid amsena tat-tulyatam prakstasya vidhatum pratipadayitum icchan sa vyajastutih..." Nidarsana (illustration) has also implied similarity, because in it, without the use of such terms as yatha, iva, etc., through action only, some idea is expressed. Bhamaha defines nidarsana at III. 34, as : "kriyaya eva visistasya tad arthasya upadarsanat, jneya nidarsana nama yatheva-vatibhir vina." In upameyopama (reciprocal simile) (III. 57) the idea of elimination of any third similar object i.e. trtiya-sadrsa-vyavaccheda is implied. In sahokti (unified description) also (III. 39), there is implied similarity. Sasamdeha (doubtful) is defined at III. 43 as, "upamanena tattvam ca bhedam ca, vadatah punah, sasamdeham vacah stutyai sasamdehah vidur yatha." Thus, the idea of praise of upameya is implied only. Bhamaha defines 'ananvaya' (self-comparision) at III. 45, as, "yatra tenaiva tasya syad upamanopameyata a-sadisya-vivaksatah tam iti ahur ananvayam." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... 241 Thus, ananvaya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison; that is to say it is unrivalled, ananvaya occurs. The idea of asadesya-vivaksa is implied only : Thus utpreksavayava (at Bhamaha III. 47) having in itself the use of doublemeaning words, and an element of both utpreksa and rupaka, has the idea of similarity between upameya and upamana necessarily implied. III. 53, 54 define 'bhavikatva' (vivid presentation) which is a guna i.e. excellence with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present, and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated, and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged, wherein the expression is not involved. The definition runs as : "Davikatvam iti prahuh prabandha-visayam gunam, pratyaksa iva drsyante yatrarthah bhuta-bhavinah." and, "citrodattadbhutarthatvam kathayah sv abhinitata, sabdanakulata ceti tasya hetum pracaksate." Tatacharya observes : (pp. 78, ibid) : "mahakavinam tu kavya-visesesu prasphutabhi-vyaktartha-varnanavisesa atra udaharanatvena drastavyah." Thus, bhavika alamkara is by itself of the nature of implied only, as it rests on a whole composition. We have thus examined how Bhamaha has incorporated the pratiyamana or implied sense in various alamkaras. But he has not declared it to be derived through the agency of vyanjana, and he has not called it 'gunibhuta-vyangya' by name also. But what he is aware of can not be brushed aside and hence Jagannatha has said that the ancients know dhvani, of course without naming it as such - 'dhvaninama-samkirtanena vina', and much earlier Abhinavagupta had also vouchsafed that there was a living oral tradition of dhvani, without of course, putting it in a book form - vinapi visista-pustakesu vinivesanat. Thus Bhamaha knew it and so also Dandin and the rest of pre-Anandavardhana writers on literary aesthetics. For Personal & Private Use Only

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242 SAHRDAYALOKA We will 'go to examine how this is borne out in the works of Dandin, Vamana, Udbhata and Rudrata in the following pages. Dandin Dandin in his Kavyadarsa (K.D.) defines 'madhura guna' at I. 51, 52 as a statement (= vaci) which is gifted with rasa or aesthetic rapture, and also when rasa is experienced with reference to the object or vastu described (= vastuni). Dandin says that such a composition, padasattih, has words that look similar when heard, and is also capable of conveying rasa. Dandin I. 51, 52 read as - "madhuram rasavad, vaci vasturi api rasah sthitah, yena madyanti dhimantah madhuna iva madhuvratah." "yaya kayacit srutya yat samanam anubhuyate tad-rupa hi padasattih sanuprasa rasavaha." The illustration viz. I. 53, "esa raja yada laksmim praptavan brahmana-priyah, tada-prabhrti dharmasya lokesmin utsavo'bhavat." The illustration nourishes the emotion with reference to a religious king. Thus madhurya has a lot of implicit sense in it.. In I. 62, Dandin proceeds to explain that though all alamkaras make for rasa in sense, it is a-gramyata i.e. absence of vulgarity, which carries the burden to a greater extent. This a-gramyata is virtually artha-gata-madhurya. Dandin observes: (I. 62) : "kamam sarvopy alamkaro rasam arthe nisincati, tatha'pi agramyata eva enam bharam vahati bhuyasa." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... Dandin further observes that (I. 63, 64) such statements as, "kanye kamayamanam mam na tvam kamayase katham" - are basically vulgar and make for the detriment of rasa. Says he : "iti gramyoyam artha"tma vairasyaya prakalpate." He holds that, if the same statement is modified as - "kamam kandarpa-candalo mayi vamaksi nirdayah tvayi nir-matsaro distyaiti agramyortho rasa"vahah." Thus the statement in its new form becomes charged with rasa and is totally free from vulgarity. This madhura is full of implied sense in form of rasa or aesthetic pleasure. Dandin (exalted) defines 'udaraguna' (rich) at I. 76, as, "utkarsavan gunah kascid yasmin ukte pratiyate, tad udara"hvayam, tena sanatha kavya-paddhatih." Thus udara guna consists of a statement which when expressed makes for the implication of some lofty quality, and poetry is highly dependent on it. The prabha tika observes (pp. 86): 243 "yasmin vakye ukte sati utkarsavan, varnaniya-utkarsa-pratipadakah, lokottaracamatkara-adhayi gunah dharma-visesah pratiyate vakyam udara"hvayam udarasamjnakam." Thus, jnana-visayo bhavati tad 'udara' is gifted with a lot of implied element. Dandin adds that (I. 78) in the illustration cited as above, the excess of generosity is clearly indicated - "iti tyagasya vakyesmin utkarsah sadhu laksyate." This is implicit sense, pure and simple. K.D.; I. 79 gives another variety of udara which consists of significant adjectives such as 'lilambuja', krida-sara, hemangada, etc. Here also the idea of opulence is implied. I. 79 reads as : "slaghyair visesanair yuktam udaram kaiscid isyate, For Personal & Private Use Only

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244 SAHRDAYALOKA yatha lilambuja-kridasaro hemargada"dayah." 'kanti guna' (beauty) is defined at I. 85 as, "kantam sarva-jagat-kantam laukikartha-an-atikramat, tac ca vartabhidhanesu varnanasv api drsyate." Kanta (beautiful) occurs when there is an absence of hyperbole, i.e. when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts (= varta-bhidhana) or in description of objects (varnanasu api) and is liked by all. Thus kanti guna has a natural mode of expression and thereby it implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I. 86, 87, as -- "glhani nama tany eva taporasir bhavadesah sambhavayati yany eva pavanaih pada-pamsubhih." and, "anayor anavadyangi stanayor jrmbhamanayor avakaso na paryaptah tava bahu-latantare." In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied, and in the second, feeling of love with reference to the heroine is implied, In samadhi-guna (facilitation) (I. 93 K.D.), according to Dandin, somebody else's quality is superimposed on somebody else. This is a clear instance of laksana based on similarity which is implied. K.D. I. 93 reads as - "anyadharmas tatonyatra loka-simanurodhina samyag adhiyate yatra sa samadhih smoto yatha." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... I. 94 is given to illustrate the above, such as - "kumudani nimilanti kamalany unmisanti ca, iti netra-kriyadhyasal labdha tad-vacini srtih." Dandin then adds that words such as nisthyuta, udgirna, vanta, etc. convey a charming sense when used metaphorically. If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar. Thus, even here, there is not only an acceptance of implicit sense, but there is clear mentioning of "gauna-vrtti" also. K.D. I. 95 says: "nisthyuta-udgirna-vanta"di gunavrtti-vyapasrayam, 245 atisundram anyatra gramakaksam vigahate." This samadhi-guna, observes Dandin, in which a metaphorical expression is involved, is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets: KD. I. 99 reads as, "tad-etat-kavya-sarvasvam samadhir nama yo gunah, kavi-sarthah samagropi tam enam anugacchati." Thus, in his treatment of gunas or excellences Dandin seems to cover a lot of implicit sense. In his treatment of the figures of sense, i.e. arthalamkaras also, like Bhamaha he has incorporated a lot of imlicit sense. We have noted earlier his general attitude towards alamkaras. We will not repeat our discussion concerning alamkaras such as rupaka, dipaka, apahnuti, vyajastuti, aprastuta-prasamsa, samasokti tulyayogita, nidarsana, paryayokta, aksepa, etc., which contain implied sense as explained when we dealt with these alamkaras in Bhamaha's Kavyalamkara, but we will deal with a good many varieties of upama pointed out by Dandin, and go to underline that almost all these sub-varieties of upama are beautified by an element of implied sense inherent in them. With this general note we will go to examine Dandin's treatment of arthalam karas as below. For Personal & Private Use Only

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246 SAHRDAYALOKA Dandin defines upama at II. 14, as - "yatha-kathancit sadesyam yatrodbhutam pratiyate, upama nama sa, tasyah prapancoyam pradarsyate." Thus, for Dandin upama occurs when similarity is apprehanded in any way - "yatha-kathan-cit" i.e. either in a directly expressed fashion or in an implied way. Most of the varieties counted by Dandin have implied similarity. Thus, vastupama (II. 16) has the common quality implied only * "pratiyamanaika-dharma". Viparyasopama has upamana in place of upamaya and vice versa, thereby implying the superiority of upameya over upamana (K.D. II. 17). Anyonyopama (II. 19) is the same as upameyopama, having the idea of trtiya-sadrsa-vyavaccheda or elimination of a possible third similar object, as implied only. Niyamopama (II. 19) has the idea of restriction implied, when the face is described as similar to lotus alone. In atisayopama also (II. 22), in the absence of any upama-vacaka, the similarity is only implied. K.D. II. 23 gives utpreksitopama and has an element of utpreksa implied in it. Adbhutopama (II. 24), which is the same as what later alamkarikas recognize as 'yady artha-tisayokti', has also implied similarity. Mohop has moha or bhranti implied. Samsayopama (II. 26), is the same as sa-samdeha of the later alamkarikas having implied similarity. Nirnayopama (II. 27) is what Visvanatha later recognizes as niscayalamkara having implied comparision. II. 30 gives nindopama which has also the same quality of implied sense. Similar is the case with prasamsopama (II. 31), acikhyasopama (II. 32), virodhopama (II. 33), pratisedhopama (II. 34), catupama (II. 35), tattvakhyanopama (II. 36), asadharanopama (II. 37), a-sambhavitopama (II. 39), bahupama (II. 40), vikriyopama (II. 41), etc. etc. Prativastupama (parallel) (II. 46) is, 'vastu kincid upanyasya nyasanat tat sadharmanah, samya-pratitir astiti prativastupama yatha." Thus, there is implied comparision between the statements. Tulya-yogopama (II. 48), also has the same charm of implied sense. Thus we see that in Dandin also there is a clear recognition of pratiyamana or implied sense. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Pratiyamana artha' - as seen in the earlier alamkarikas... 247 Vamana : For Vamana the position is still clearer for he recognizes upama as the basis of all the alamkaras which are termed by him as "upama-prapanca". His 'kantiguna' is defined as 'dipta-rasatvam' i.e. one in which rasas are clearly marked, and are in an aroused condition. All this clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense. His 'samadhi' guna is defined as 'artha-drstih' i.e. perception of the sense (III. 2.7. KSV.). Vamana goes on classifying 'artha' as 'vyakta' and 'suksma' (III. 2.9) and the latter again is 'bhavya' and 'vasaniya', i.e. that which is easily elicited, and that which is elicited after concentration, respectively (III. 2.10 KSV.). The illustrations of both these varieties contain implied sense. Udbhata - In his Kavyalamkara-sara-samgraha (= K.S.S.), Udbhata follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhamaha and seems to incorporate the element of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhamaha. Pratiharenduraja (first half of 10th Cen. A.D., De, pp. 74, ibid), wants us to believe that Udbhata had knowingly incorporated 'dhvani' under alamkaras, when he observes : (pp. 92, 3, NS. Edn. Bombay, '28) : - 'nanu yatra kavye sahidaya-hrdaya"hladinah pradhanabhutasya, sva-sabdavyapara-asprstatvena pratiyamanaika-rupasya arthasya sadbhavas tatra vidharthabhivyaktihetuh kavya-jivita-bhutah kaiscit sahrdayair dhvanir nama, vyanjakatva-bheda"tma kavya-dharmobhihitah. sa katham iha nopadistah ? ucyateesv evalamkaresu antar bhavat. Pratiharenduraja then goes to explain with illustrations at places how different alamkaras of Udbhata contain this or that type of dhvani. Rudrata : Rudrata also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implicit sense with reference to all the alamkaras such as rupaka, dipaka, paryayokta, etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold bhava also in VIII. 38-41, which contains an implied sense. VII. 38, reads as : "yasya vikarah prabhavan apratibaddhena hetuna yena, gamayati tad abhiprayam tat-pratibandham ca bhavosau." III. 40 reads as, "abhidheyam abhidhanam tad eva tat-sadesa-sakala-gunadosam, arthantaram avagamayati yad-vakyam soparo bhavah." Rudrata's use of words clearly suggest that he is conscious not only of the implied sense, but also of vyanjana. He has gone for an elaborate treatment of rasa also but is silent about the theoretical discussion concerning rasa-realization. For Personal & Private Use Only

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248 SAHKDAYALOKA Our detailed examination as above goes to establish the fact that alamkarikas earlier than Anandavardhana positively knew the pratiyamana-artha, without naming it either as 'dhvani' or 'gunibhutavyangya' arrived at through the agency of vyanjana. We feel that the use of such words as 'avagamayati' and 'gamayati', goes to establish their awareness concerning perhaps vyanjana also. Perhaps they had no occasion, as had Anandavardhana, to establish dhvani and vyanjana clearly due to confusion created about their nature by less gifted alamkarikas that followed the earlier masters and preceeded Anandavardhana. We will now go to examine the nature of sabdavrtti's i.e. abhidha, laksana and vyanjana and also tatparya in greater details in the following pages. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter V Sabdavrttis, the nature of: 'Abhidha' General Introduction : We have seen how the concept of sabda-vyapara is reflected in recognition of abhidha and gunavrtti or laksana in various philosophical disciplines such as those represented by the Mimamsakas, Naiyayikas and the rest and also the earlier grammarians such as Panini, Patanjali etc. All this was a rich heritage which shaped the concepts in their chiseled form in the hands of alamkarikas such as Mammata and others who followed Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Actually Anandavardhana is the first one, so far as available written documents are concerned, who devotes space to draw a line between abhidha and/or laksana gunavrtti, on one hand and vyanjana on the other. He underlines the difference between abhidha/vyanjana and laksana/vyanjana by establishing 'svarupabheda' and 'visayabheda', and finally establishing vyanjana as an independent. power of words. But it is left to Mammata and his followers to systematically define and distinguish between one and the other function of a word and we will therefore first take up this aspect of definition and distinction of each of these sabdavrttis and then see how Anandavardhana establishes vyanjana as an independent function. Vyanjana will be treated in greater details because the other two viz. abhidha and laksana have been given enough space when we discussed their position and nature as reflected in various philosophical disciplines on an earlier occasion. We will then first start with abhidha. We know that according to sanskrit writers on poetics, words possess three distinct saktis or vyaparas i.e. powers or functions, viz. (i) abhidha sakti or the power of direct expression, (ii) laksana sakti or the secondary power of a word, or, the power of indication, and (iii) the vyanjana sakti or the suggestive power of a word. The terms vrtti and vyapara are used as synonyms for the term sakti. Thus, by the abhidha sakti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to For Personal & Private Use Only

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250 SAHRDAYALOKA give the conventional meaning or the 'samketita artha'. It is also called mukhya Sakti i.e. principal power of a word because like the face of a human being normally sighted first when we look at a person, this conventional meaning comes first to mind and is therefore termed 'mukhya' and the sakti intrumental in bringing home this 'mukhya' or principal meaning derived through convention, is termed 'mukhya' or principal power of a word. The laksanavrtti which is an 'a-mukhya' i.e. secondary power of a word, gives laksyartha or the secondary or extended meaning. It is based upon certain conditions which we will discuss later. The third power is 'vyanjana' or the power of suggestion, giving 'vyangyartha' or suggested meaning. The mukhyartha which is abhidheyartha is also termed vacyartha and so, abhidha is also known as 'vacakatva' or vacakasakti. The word giving this vacyartha, which is the conventional meaning, is termed vacaka. The word giving laksyartha is called laksaka, and the one giving vyangyartha or suggested meaning is termed 'vyanjaka'. Thus vacya, laksya and vyangya meanings are derived from vacaka, laksaka and vyanjaka words, with the help of vacakarva or abhidha power, laksana and vyanjana respectively. We also come across, the mention of a fourth vrtti or power called 'tatparya' i.e. 'purport', but as it is connected with the sentence - unit, and not with individual word unit, and as it is therefore instrumental in giving the correlated meaning of all the words in a given sentence or statement, the alamkarikas generally do not choose to include it under the functions of a word. As regards the nature of these sabda-vyaparas, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools of thought. The grammarians, the earlier ones among them to be specific, and so also the philosophers or darsanikas of various schools of thought such as the mimamsa, nyaya, vaisesika, bauddha, jaina etc. had, as observed earlier, no business to think about vyanjana, or perhaps - only perhaps - they did not accept it. In the same way even the earlier alamkarikas such as Bhamaha, Dandin and the rest do not come out clearly in favour of vyanjana and vyangyartha, though as observed by us in the previous chapters we cannot categorically say that they were against vyanjana. Alamkarikas later, normally chose to follow the lead of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata in accepting vyanjana as an independent and important function of a word. But then there were some who challanged the lead of Anandavardhana, and writers on literary aesthetics such as Mahima, or even Bhattanayaka and Sankuka prior to Mahima, and then Mukula, Dhananjaya, Dhanika, and some others challanged the concept of vyanjana as a separate power and tried to incorporate For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of: Abhidha 251 it under various heads. Some later naiyayikas such as Gadadhara and Jagadisa vehemently opposed vyanjana. The Tarkadipika observes: "vyanjana tu saktir laksanantarbhuta, sabda-saktimula; artha-sakti-mula tu anumana"dina anyatha siddha." We will look into all this later. There are also others who distinguish between gauni and laksana taking the former to be an independent vrtti. Abhidha We begin with abhidha or the function of denotation or direct expression. Abhidha, as noted above, is that function by which the word gives its primary or conventional meaning. The word here is termed vacaka, and the sense is termed vacya : "saksat samketitam yortham abhidhatte sa vacakah." K.P. I. 7b. (Kavyaprakasa - (K.P.) of Mammata, Edn. B.O.R.I. Pune). Thus, for example, the word 'gauh' by abhidhavyapara means "sasna"dimat pasu-visesah", or an entity having a dew-lap, horns, hoofs, etc. This conventional or samketita artha is gathered directly and hence is called 'mukhyartha' or principal meaning and the word is termed 'mukhya' and the power, the abhidhasakti, the mukhya sakti. As to the nature of 'samketa-grahana' or gathering of convention there is a considerable difference of opinion. We have discussed this problem at length in an earlier chapter (i.e. Ch. II). This samketa i.e. - convention has been classified in different ways. The Naiyayikas classify samketa as 'paribhasika', 'naimittika' and 'aupadhika'. When we fix up a name for calling someone, say, when a father calls his son Devadatta, or, when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in a given discipline, say dhvani, guna, etc., in alamkarasastra, it is termed as paribhasika-sanketa. 'Naimittika-samketa' is that which refers to jati or, class, such as 'asva', 'manusya', etc., and 'aupadhika' is that which refers to the upadhis or attributes. For the Naiyayikas upadhi means that jati in which so many apara-jatis reside, e.g. pasu consists of asva, go, etc. etc. The sabda-sakti-prakasika observes: "yac cartho yannama adhunika-samketavat, tad eva paribhasikam, yatha pitra"dibhih putra"dau samketitam, caitra"di, va sastra-krdbhih sidhyabhava"dau paksata"di. jati-vacyata-saktiman nama naimittikam, yatha go, gavaya"di; yad upadhy-avacchinna-saktiman-nama tad aupadhikam yatha akasa, pasva"di." - For Bhartrhari, samketa is two-fold viz. 'ajanika' i.e. natural, and 'adhunika' i.e. artificial or man-made. By ajanika is meant the same as naimittika of the Naiyayikas. Thus ajanika is nitya. Adhunika samketa is of the form of 'yada-kada' i.e. 'kadacitka', and sastrakaras make its use - For Personal & Private Use Only

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252 252 SAHRDAYALOKA "ajanikasty adhunikah samketo dvividho matah, nitya ajanikas tatra ya saktir iti giyate." V.P. kadacitkas tv adhunikah sastra-karadibhih krtah." - V.P. (quoted in sabdas'akti-prakasika) Abhidha is classified in a three-fold way such as (i) rudhi. (in voga and (iii) vogarudhi. These are again known as (i) kevala-samudaya-saktih, (ii) kevala-avayavasaktih, and (iii) samudaya-avayava-sakti-samkara. - Jagannatha observes : seyam abhidha trividha, kevala-samudaya-saktih, kevala-avayava-saktih, samudayavayavasakti-samkaras ca - (R.G. pp. 141). We will discuss Jagannatha's views in greater detail below. Rudhi is said to be there, where the word as a whole-samud . the meaning. Here we gather the meaning with the help of 'akhanda-sakti' of a word - "akhanda-sakti-matrenaikartha-pratipadakatvam rudhih." holds Vsttivartika of Appayya Dixita. Here rudhi is formed because the meaning of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or even if the meaning of the word is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised. Again, when the meaning of the components of a word becomes important, in order to get the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of yoga"tmaka abhidha. Appayya in Vrtti-vartika observes, - "avayava-sakti-matra-sapeksam padasya ekartha-pratipadakatvam yogah." Yoga-rudhi is said to be there in cases where avayavasakti, and samudayasakti both are required. Appayya observes, - "avayava-samudaya-ubhaya-saktisapeksam ekartha-pratipaddkatvam yoga-rudhih." In the case of 'pankaja', the etymological meaning is, that which is born in mud.' This can be applicable to anything born in mud, other than lotus also. The Naiyayikas do not accept either rudhi or yoga in this case. Appayya observes that it is better to accept yoga-rudhi here : (pp. 5, Vittivartika) : "naiyayikas tu pankaja"di-sabda-rupaikopadanarupaya'ntaranga-pratyasattya, nabhi-kamala-kumudanvayat prag eva, pankajanikartstva-vaisistyena-upasthitasya paprakhya padmasraya-tvenopasthitasya pankajanikartstvasya ca nabhikamala-kumuda"dyanvaye nakanksa, na ca visistasya tad anvaya-visayini sabda-dhih, iti tad anvayarthm svatantra-padmatvapankajanikartstva-upasthitaye pankaja"dipadasya laksanaiva-bhyupagantavya, na tu rulhir yogo va." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 253 At times it happens that there are more than one conventional meunings attached to one and the same word. Here abhidhartha is decided with the help of various factors such as context and others (see. Ch. II). Bhartshari has mentioned all these factors. Visvanatha has also given a fuller explanation such as, (S.D.I.) : 'sa-sankacakro harih', iti sankha-chakra-prayogena hari-sabdo visnum eva abhidhatte. asankha-cakro harih, iti tad-viyogena tam eva. bhimarjunau iti arjunah parthah. karnarjunau iti karnah sutaputrah. sthanum vande iti sthanuh sivah. sarvam janati devah iti devo bhavan. kupito makara-dhvajah iti makaradhvajah kamah. devah purarih iti purarih sivah. madhuna mattah pikah, iti madhur vasantah, patu vo dayitamukham iti mukham sammukhyam, vibhati gagane candrah iti candrah sasi. nisi citrabhanuh iti citra-bhanur vahnih. bhati rathangam napumsaka-vyaktya rathangam svaras tu veda eva viaesa-pratiti-krt na kavye iti tasya visaye nodahstam." Jagannatha: Maha-siddhantin : We will go into greater discussion on abhidh, in context of the Rasagangadhara of Jagannatha. Jagannatha while dealing with sabda-sakti mula dhvani comes to the two varieties of abhidhamulaka dhvani, viz. arthasaktimulaka and ubhaya-sakti-mulaka citing proper illustrations. Then after dealing with the varieties of laksanamulaka dhvani, Jagannatha comes to a very meaningful discussion concerning abhidha. First he attempts a logical and scientific definition of abhidha and then comes down heavily on Appayya Dixit's definition of abhidha as read in his Vrtti-vartika. Jagannatha's definition of abhidh, reads as : "saktyakhyorthasya sabdagatah, sabdasya arthagatah va sambandhaviseso bhidha" (pp. 429, Edn. Prof. R. B. Athavale, Ahmedabad, Edn. '74). This means that abhidha, which is called sakti, is a special relation residing in both sabda i.e. word and artha i.e. sense. Relation is an entity connected between two objects as such. One of them is termed 'pratiyogin' and the other, 'anuyogin'. In the absence of any deciding factor, i.e. vinigamana abhava' both sabda and artha can be termed either pratiyogin or anuyogin. So, when Jagannatha says 'arthasya sabdagatah', he means, 'artha-pratiyogikah sabdanuyogikah', and when he says 'sabdasya arthagato va', he means, 'sabdapratiyogi arthanuyogikah. So, abhidha is a special relation residing in both word and sense and is therefore not separate from them. Jagannatha then starts discussing the views of others. He says : (pp. 429, ibid) : "sa ca padarthantaram iti kecid. "asmat sabdat ayam arthah avagantavyah itiakara isvareccha eva abhidha. tasyah ca visayataya sarvatra sattvat pata"dinam api ghata"di-pada-vacyata syat. atah vyakti-visesopadhanena ghata"di-padabhidhatvam vacyam iti apare." 'evam api isvara-jnana"dina vinigamana-virahah syat, atah prathama-matam eva jyayah' iti api vadanti." For Personal & Private Use Only

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254 SAHRDAYALOKA Here, 'kecit' refers to the Mimamsakas and the Vaiyakaranas and 'apare' refers to the Naiyayikas. The Nyayamanjari (8-3) observes : "samketa-grahyah saktirupah atiriktah padarthah iti mimamsakah ahuh'. 'pada-padarthayor vacya-vacakabhava-niyamakam sambandhantaram saktih iti sabdika vadanti." The Naiyayikas hold that abhidha cannot be taken as a separate padartha, because it is none else than god's desire that, 'such and such a word should give 'such and such' a meaning.' This 'isvareccha' i.e. god's desire can take two forms such as, 'asmat padat ayam arthah bodhavyah.' or 'idam padam amum artham bodhayatu.' - i.e. let this word give this meaning. Actually both the forms of expression differ externally only and there is no virtual difference between these two expressions of 'isvareccha'. The first type of bodha i.e. apprehension can be technically put as, "sabda-prakarika artha-visesyika' (isvareecha), and the second one can be placed as, 'artha-prakarika sabda-visesyaka. Now Jagannatha argues that if 'isvareccha' is to be taken in a general way, i.e. if we accept that all worldly objects could be the subject of God's desire, then that desire will stay with all objects through the relation of 'visayata', i.e. all objects will fall under the subject-field by God's desire. Thus God's desire is common to both ghata and pata i.e. a pot and a piece of cloth, so in that case, what harm is there in understanding the meaning of 'pata', from an object called 'ghata' and vice versa ? For this, 'isvareccha' or God's desire will not have to be understood in a general way, but will have to be accepted as different with reference to the difference in upadhi or attribute - i.e. 'upadhi-bheda'. Thus God's desire will take the form - "ghata-pada-janya-bodha-visayatavan ghato bhavatu", and "patapada-janya-bodha-visayatavan pato bhavatu", etc. Thus pata-visista or patopadhikaisvareccha is the abhidha of the word 'pata', and 'ghata-visista ghatopadhikaisvareccha' is the abhidha of 'ghata'-pada. Similarly all worldly objects become the attribute or upadhi or dharma, or visesana of isvareccha. This 'padarthavisesa-visista-isvareccha' is the abhidha of a particular word in a particular sense. Thus only a special type of God's desire is to be taken as abhidha. This theory of Naiyayikas taking God's desire as abhidha is criticised by Mimamsakas and Vaiyakaranas. They hold that if we accept abhidha as 'padarthavisesa-visista-isvareccha, then along with isvareccha, isvarajnana and isvaraprayatna will have to be taken as abhidha. For, as any worldly object is the subject of God's desire, it is the subject of both isvara-jnana and isvara-prayatna also. Thus because all worldly objects are covered by isvareccha, they could as well be the subject of isvara-jnana and isvara-prayatna as well. Thus even these two also could For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 255 be called 'abhidha'. And as there is no authority to reject these two also being called abhidha, they have to be accepted as abhidha. So, in this situation, the view expressed by the Mimamsakas and Vaiyakaranas emerges as more acceptable. Prof. P. Ramachandradu (pp. 231, ibid) puts the whole argument this way. He observes : "This theory of Naiyayikas accepting isvareccha as the abhidha is criticised by both the Mimamsakas and Vaiyakaranas. They contend that according to this theory, the isvareccha is eternal one, and all comprehensive. Isvara being Omniscient, is having the knowledge which is also eternal one and all-comprehensive. Now the question arises whether his iccha should be accepted as Abhidha or his Jnana'? In the absence of any deciding factor, both of them will have to be accepted as Abhidha which only results in needless 'gaurava'. Therefore, it is better to accept Abhidha as a separate padartha. This Abhidha may be Bodhya-bodhaka-bhava, Bodhakatva, Bodhyatva, or Tadatmya between the word and the meaning." After this, Jagannatha examines Appayya Dixit's definition of abhidha, as read in Vrtti-vartika. It reads as : "saktya pratipadakatvam abhidha." Jagannatha calls it of no use - 'tat tuccham, upapatti-virodhat' - (pp. 429, ibid): This definition goes against any type of fitness or proof or attainment. Jagannatha argues that here what is contextual is that word-power called abhidha which is instrumental in the cognition of meaning caused by a word. Now how can simply the knowledge of 'artha-pratipadakata' in a word give the meaning intended. The idea is that by simply knowing that the word has the special quality - i.e. dharma or samarthya to yield meaning alone, can it suffice for cognition of meaning ? That 'dharma' or 'samarthya' must be accompanied by some 'vyapara' for a particular cognition of meaning. Now, if it is contended that the 'pratipadakatva' i.e. capacity to yield meaning which is in the sabda is a 'vyapara' or activity effecting the cognition - 'pratipatti' - and this vyapara will be useful in the cognition itself being known. To put it more clearly Jagannatha's argument could be placed as follows : Abhidha according to Dixita means that dharma of sabda which is of the nature of making a particular cognition effective. But even then, Jagannatha argues that there is a blemish called "anyonya"sraya'. By saying, 'saktya pratipadakatvam', it is accepted that this power is either in sabda or in artha which is responsible for the cognition of artha. Thus this sakti cannot be else than abhidha, and so the definition would come to, "abhidhaya pratipadakatvam abhidha'. This is absurd and involves atma"sraya-dosa. Jagannatha observes : (pp. 429, ibid) : "yat tu yrtti-va 'saktya pratipadakatvam abhidha' iti appayya-diksitair uktam tat tuccham, upapatti virodhat. tatha hi-iha sabdajjayamanayam arthopasthitau karanibhutam yadiya For Personal & Private Use Only

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256 SAHRDAYALOKA jnanam sa sabda-vittir abhidha"khya laksyataya prastuta. pratipadakatvasya ca pratipattihetutva-rupasya sabdagatasya na jnanam pratipattau karanam. atah katham nama pratipadakatvam abhidhety ucyate ? atha pratipadakatvam pratipattyanukula-vyapararupam jnatam sad eva upayujyate pratipattau iti ucyeta, evam api 'saktya' iti anena sabdagata-arthagata va kacid saktih pratipattihetuta vivaksita, sa eva abhidha iti, 'abhidhaya pratipadakatvam abhidha' iti laksanam paryavasannam. tatha ca sphuta eva asamgatih atma"srayas ca. na ca abhidhatah saktih atirikta sabdajanya-pratipatti-prayojika kacid asti iti atra pramanam asti." Dr. Ramachandradu (pp. 232, ibid) further, quotes, Nagesa who tries to defend Appayya's definition, by suggesting an expression such as 'dhanyena dhanavan', equivalent to 'abhidhaya pratipadakatvam abhidha. Nagesa observes : (pp. 181, N.S. Edn., 1888, Kavyamala, 12). "prakrtyaditvad dhanyena dhanavan ity adivat titiyayah abhedarthakatvena na kascid dosah." But Prof. Ramachandradu observes that this analogy is not applicable here. 'Dhanya' being visesa and 'Dhana' being 'samanya' such expression as 'dhanyena dhanavan' meaning 'dhanyabhinnadhanavan' may be correct. But, argues the learned professor, how can it be correct when the same thing is mentioned at both the ends? We have here, 'abhidhaya pratipadakatvam abhidha.' This expression has only 'abhidha' at both the ends. So the analogy cited above is not applicable here. It may be contented that 'abhidha' is a visesa and 'pratipadakatva' is a samanya and so the analogy could be applied here too. But here, observes Dr. Ramachandrudu, it may be correct so far as 'abhidhaya pratipadakatvam' is concerned, but when it is said that such 'pratipadakatva' is itself abhidha' then the blemish of anyonya"sraya walks in. This sentence would be equivalent to say, 'dhanyena dhanavatvam dhanyam' or dhanyavarvam'. This is absurd and so, Jagannatha is correct in his criticism. Jagannatha then proceeds with the divisions of abhidha. Abhidha for him is three-fold, viz. 'kevala-samudava-saktih, kevala-avayava-saktih, and samudayaavayava-sakti-samkara.' These varieties are otherwise known as rudhi, yoga and yoga-rudhi respectively. The first variety is illustrated by examples such as dittha, (kapittha, manavaka) etc. In these particular names there is total absence of 'avayava-sakti' i.e. power of the parts seen in a given word. That means that the word as a whole only renders some sense and no individual part of it has any independent meaning. The second variety is illustrated by words such as 'pacaka', 'pathaka', etc. In the first illustration, the basic root is Vpac. According to Panini sutra 3/1/133 viz. 'nvultacau' the suffixes 'nvul' and 'trc' are added to it in the sense of agent or doer. Thus we have 'nvu' i.e. krt i.e. 'aka' added to the Vpac. From the For Personal & Private Use Only

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257 Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha power of these two parts i.e. the root and the suffix, we get the senses of 'to cook' and 'the agent (of cooking)'. The combination of these senses renders the sense of 'a cook'. Now beyond this total of two senses there is no extra meaning of the word 'pacaka', 'pathaka' etc. Thus these words do not have a samudaya-sakti over and above their avayava-sakti's. The third variety is illustrated by words such as 'pankaja'. One part of this word is the root Vjan meaning 'to be born'. Prior to that there is one part viz. 'panka' meaning 'mud', which is 'upa-pada'. Now when the upapada is in locative 'da' suffix is attached to the root vjan, according to panini sutra (3/2/97) - "saptamyam janerdah". This da (= a) is attached in the sense of agent, and it forms the third portion of the word. Through the three powers of these three individual parts, viz. 'mud, to be born, and agent, coming together by the conditions of akanksa, i.e. expectancy, 'yogyata' or compatibility, and 'asatti' i.e. proximity we derive the meaning viz. 'that which is born of mud.' But after that total sense is derived by combination of three senses of three parts, there is a special sense of lotus, 'padmatvayukta padma' - which is derived further. Here it is stated as 'padmatva-visista-padma', because out of mud even moss is generated and it is not called 'pankaja'. For this added sense of 'lotus', we have to imagine a special 'samudaya-sakti' in the word 'pankaja'. Thus there is 'samkara' or mixing up of 'avayava-sakti' and 'samudaya-sakti'. These three varieties are also respectively named as rudhi-sakti, yoga-sakti and yoga-rudhi-sakti also as noted above. Appaya Dixit has cited in his Vrttivartika the definitions of these three varieties as : "akhanda-sakti-matrena ekartha-pratipadakatvam rudhih", "avayava-saktisapeksam padasya ekartha-pratipadakatvam yogah", and "ubhaya-sakti-sapeksam ekartha-pratipadaktvam yoga-rudhih" - respectively. Jagannatha observes that these definitions are not acceptable because the blemishes pointed out in Appayya's original definition of abhidha continue here also. Thus, in the definition of the first variety viz. to convey a single meaning by akhanda-sakti, involves the blemish called 'a-samgati' because here also the sense, viz. 'that which is conveyed by sakti is sakti', continues. Jagannatha's argument is that here also, whether you call it Sakti or rudhi-sakti the meaning is the same. So, when these two are of identical nature, there is a 'atma"sraya-dosa'. Again the difficulty pointed out earlier, - viz. that the knowledge of the 'pratipadakatva' of 'artha' does not render 'arthajnana', - also continues. After thus refuting Appayya, Jagannatha concentrates on a different topic, of concerning abhidha. He mentions words such as, "asvagandha", "asvakarna", "mandapa", "nisanta", and "kuvalaya", etc. Which variety of abhidha is For Personal & Private Use Only

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258 SAHRDAYALOKA applicable in these cases ? The conventional meaning of the word "asva-gandha" is "a particular medicine or herb." The yogartha i.e. 'kevala-avayavartha' gives the sense of "smell like that of a horse", or the stable which carries the smell of a horse. Similarly by samudayasakti the word 'asva-karna' also means a particular medicine. The avayavartha or yogartha gives the sense of "an ear of a horse" first instance the two meanings are illustrated respectively in, "asvagandha-rasam piber", and, "asvagandha vajisala". 'Mandapa' conventionally means a temporary hall raised for some occasion, and it means, through avayava-sakti, "one who drinks water or scum on curd." 'nisanta' has a conventional meaning of 'a house and its yogartha is 'end of night. Kuvalaya means "blue lotus" by convention, and its yogartha is 'the globe of earth'. Now all these illustrations carry two meanings, one each by convention, and by avayava-sakti. Jagannatha raises a question as to which variety of abhidha is to be accepted in case of these illustrations. We cannot accept only 'samudaya-sakti' for we get 'yogartha' also, and we cannot accept only 'yogartha' and accept only 'avayavasakti' either. If we accept the 'samkara' or commixture of both the varieties, then we need not accept both the saktis in one meaning. But in case of 'pankaja', both these saktis viz. avayava and samudaya, have a common conventional meaning. Such is not the case here. So, which power is to be ascertained in these illustrations ? The idea is that though these words are having both the saktis, i.e. samudayasakti and yoga-sakti, one of them will be ineffective when the other operates. Jagannatha continues the discussion as follows: "atra kecit, 'asvagandha rasam pibet' ity adinu visaya-visese kevala-samudayasaktih. asvagandha vajisala, ity adisu tu kevala-yoga-saktih." etc. (pp. 430, Prof. Athavale's Edn.) - Some people are of the opinion that in expressions like, "he drinks the liquid of asvagandha", 'asvagandha' means a particular herb, and here only the 'samudaya-sakti' has to be accepted. In cases like, "The stable with a smell of a horse", we should accept only yoga-sakti. Now someone may argue that in the word 'asvagandha', actually both the saktis are seen to reside. So, accepting either "kevala-samudaya-sakti", or "kevala-avayava-sakti" is not possible at all. But this objection does not stand because we do not find any correlation of both the senses derived through two different saktis here, at a time. So, actually when each sense is derived each esponding sakti operates alone and independently here. When we use the term, 'kevala-samudaya-sakti'. or, 'kevala-avayava-sakti', the part 'kevala' means "to apprehend that meaning by that particular sakti, - that meaning which is not correlated with the meaning of the other sakti." That way, we may say that we For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 259 cannot accept a samkara or commixture of the two saktis giving two senses in cases such as 'asvagandha' etc. Samkara' can be said to take place only between such saktis which convey meaning that can be correlated. So, no 'samkara' is possible here. Still others believe that, in illustrations such as 'asvakarna' etc., there is no question of the first two varieties of abhidha, because neither of them function here alone i.e. 'kevala' - Jagannatha observes : (pp. 430, ibid) : anye tu - "asvakarna"di sabdesu nabhidhayah prathama-dvitiyayor vidhayoh prasaktih, kaivalya-virahat." But, they say we should accept the commixture or samkara of these two varieties. But this 'samkara' is two fold viz. (i) yoga-rudhi-samkara and (ii) yaugika-rudhisamkara. The first is illustrated by such words as 'pankaja' etc., as both the senses caused by two Saktis operate together here. The second samkara is illustrated by such words as 'asvakarna' etc. In this samkara, the two senses caused by two saktis are never correlated because they are never apprehended simultaneously. While according to still others, i.e. the Naiyayikas, says Jagannatha, in case of such words as asvagandha etc. a fourth variety of abhidha has to be recognised. It may be called 'yaugika-rudhi'. Jagannatha quotes still another opinion held by the vaiyakaranas. It reads as : (pp. 431, ibid) : "akhandah eva hi sabdah. tatra samasesu padanam, kettaddhita-tin-antes'u ca prakrti-pratyayanam vibhagah kalpanika eva, iti kutrastiyogasaktih ? visistasya visistarthe rudher eva abhyupagamat' - iti api vadanti - The idea is that for the grammarians a word is an indivisible unit. So how can there be a meaning of its parts, when there is total absence of parts ? So, in case of such as an indivisible word-unit, the pada-vibhaga in a compound, or the division of praksti (original stem) and pratya-suffix as in case of krdanta, taddhita or tin-anta formation, - all this has to be taken as imaginary only. So, how can we imagine yogasakti or avayava-sakti in such illustrations ? So, we accept only rudhi-sakti in case of visista-akhanda-sabdas with reference to special (visista) artha - : obviously this view has a reference to the famous karika, 66 of Vakyapadiya, brahmakanda which reads as : "pade na varna vidyante varnesy avayava na ca. vakyat padanam atyantam pravibhago na vidyate." (V.P. - Brahmakanda, 66) Dr. Ramachandradu (pp. 234, ibid) observes that, "Though he mentions this For Personal & Private Use Only

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260 SAHRDAYALOKA theory only as a paramarthika satya, PR. does not have any objection in accepting, in vyavaharika level, the above mentioned three or four varieties of abhidha, and. this assumption is justified by the ensuing discussion on the basis of yoga etc." We also feel that at practical level Jagannatha is inclined to accept three or four varieties of abhidha, though he does not openly commit himself to either acceptance or rejection of the same. Jagannatha further discusses a fresh point. He says there is a verse viz., "gispatir api angiraso gaditum guna-ganan sagarvo na, indrah sahasra-nayanopi adbhutarupam paricchettum." i.e. - "Brhaspati, - Angirasa-the lord of speech is rendered without pride when it comes to the topic of describing the total virtues residing in you, and Indra with a thousand eyes can not fully grasp your exceptional beauty." In this verse, observes Jagannatha, that if we take the conventional meaning of the word 'gispati' which means Brhaspati, there will occur a blemish called 'punar-ukti' or tautology, for angirasa also would mean 'brhaspati'. In the same way both 'Indra' and 'sahasranayana' would mean the same thing and thus lead to tautology. Some may say that in such illustrations as gispati and sahasranayana, we have to accept only avayavartha-pratipadaka-sakti in case of these yoga-rudha-padas. We have not to accept rudhi-sakti at all here, because here only the 'yogartha' is utilized. It means that to suggest the access of virtues in case of the king described in context, only 'yogartha' is utilized. The rudhyartha of gispati is of no use here, because another term viz. 'angirasa' expressive of Brhaspati is also present here. But, says Jagannatha, this observation is faulty, because, even if we accept that here only the yogartha is found to be useful, but the rudhi-sakti of the words gispati and sahasranayana is not limited in such cases. It is also not correct to say that only yogartha alone is apprehended here, because the apprehension of rudhyartha automatically gets in, with the result that in such verses as illustrated above, punar ukti-dosa will positively appear. Again, because only with the yogarudha word 'gispati' alone, both the rudhyartha and yogartha are arrived at, the other padas such as angirasa etc. will be redundant. Jagannatha replies to this objection in the following way: Here what happens is this. By a single word (i.e. gispati, here) there is apprehension of both the conventional meaning and the etymological meaning - i.e. yogartha. So, first of all, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 261 with the help of internal expectancy (antaranga akanksa) both of them are correlated with each other. From the special sense (i.e. Brhaspati, the Lord of Speech) derived from this, correlation is established with the sense of the second word (i.e. with the meaning of the second 'pada' - 'angirasa' here). Before we proceed with Jagannatha let us first grasp the exact import of 'antaranga-akanksa'. When two things that have come together are united with a third external thing, these two are first correlated with each other by an internal relation. Thus, it is necessary that first these two things are correlated with each other. This necessity itself is called "antaranga akanksa" or internal expectancy. After these two things are mutually correlated through internal expectancy, they become fit for getting related with a third external thing. Now, proceeds Jagannatha, it is true that (- nyayasiddhorthah) the two viz. rudhyartha and yogartha in their separate form (visakalita) are not correlated with the other word viz. angirasa, but we accept that this rule is applicable when it is a case of a meaning to be collected by the power of expression i.e. abhidhasakti. But in case of illustrations such as the verse 'gispatir api' etc. laksana or secondary power is resorted to, so with the help of the word, 'gispati' which is a yoga-rudha-pada, there is no harm in establishing 'kevala-yogartha' (of course taking the yogartha as laksyartha). Thus, by resorting to the secondary function i.e. laksana here, it cannot be said by anyone that such other words as angirasa' are used without any purpose. For, at such places, if the second pada i.e. 'angirasa' is not used, the result will be that someother difficulty will prop up. It is like this. Because the meaning of 'Bphaspati' which is a rudhyartha is already accomplished by the yoga-rudha pada viz. gispati, the function of conveying any meaning through that yoga-rudha-pada being already accomplished, there will be a fresh problem, a fresh objection, as to whether the yogartha subsequently apprehended by the yogarudha pada, can be an object of principal intention (= tatparya) or not? - Now we know that the word 'gispati' conveys two meanings viz. (i) lord of speech and (ii) bihaspati. But when the poet has, inspite of this, used the word 'angirasa' meaning also bihaspati in the same verse, anybody will start thinking about the poet's motive. Naturally there must be some special underlying intention of the poet after this usage. The reader understands this. So, to justify such a usage by the poet, when both the mukhyarthas are contradicted in case of the word gispati, one is forced to resort to laksana in the yogartha. The 'prayojana' or intention behind this laksana is to convey the high qu king under description. For Personal & Private Use Only

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262 SAHRDAYALOKA Jagannatha says that here we have to explain the special usage, as in case of words such as 'pankajaksi etc. The idea is that while describing a particular heroine, if we use an adjective such as 'pankajaksi i.e. the lotus-eyed-one, then here the particular meaning of 'lotus' of the word 'pankaja' becomes important The poet's intention is only to convey that the heroine's eyes are as beautiful as a lotus. Now, the question is, 'can we take the meaning of 'that which is born of mud', here ? Naturally such meaning cannot be taken. And this is the right answer, because the 'yogartha' of 'pankaja' viz. 'that which is born of mud', is not of any use here. On the contrary it goes against the primary principal sense. So, at such places, because the yogartha of the word 'pankaja' is not of any use here (i.e. kurvadrupa), it has to be abandoned. Similarly in such cases as the word 'gispati' in the verse illustrated, the yogartha of gispati is useless. Now when the usefulness i.e. effectiveness, - 'kurvad-rupatva' - of the yogartha of gispati (i.e. lord of speech) is not accepted, there will be another contingency viz. to say whether that yogartha can be instrumental in suggesting the special qualities of the king - or not - (paksikatva"patteh). But when the same second word (i.e. angirasa) is used along with the yoga-rulha-pada viz. gispati, then by that word viz. angirasa, the rudhyartha or conventional sense viz. bihaspati is directly conveyed and hence the objection that yogartha conveyed by yogarudha pada in such cases is of no use (nantariyaka), i.e. it is not the object of principal intention, - does not arise at all. For, the rudhyartha in that yogarudha pada is of no use as that rudhyartha is already conveyed by the second pada - viz. angirasa which is also placed side by side. So that yogartha now gains the capacity to do its real job viz. that of conveying some special sense. So, it necessarily suggests the special suggested sense in form of the high qualities of the king under description - "vyangya-visesavyanjakatvam niyamena siddhyati" (pp. 431, ibid, R.G.) The idea is that in the first illustration there was doubt about the importance of the yogartha as the yogarudha word was used to convey rudhyartha. But now in this illustration, with the help of the second pada, viz. angirasa, the conventional sense being already conveyed, the yogartha's real use is with reference to convey the suggested sense. Jagannatha says : "esa pada-dvayopadane gatih ukra" (pp. 431, ibid). i.e. hereby a way is laid out in such cases where in a single verse, two words i.e. one a yogarudha word and the other a rudhyarthaka word - are used together. But now Jagannatha discusses a new situation as below : In instances such as: "puspa-dhanva vijayate jagat, tvat karuna-vasar", one and the same word viz. 'puspadhanva' first gives the meaning of cupid through rudhi, and by the yogartha For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 263 (i.e. one who holds a bow in form of a flower) cupid's weakness is also suggested. In such instances, the poet has not used the word 'manmatha' also meaning cupid, but has resorted to the yoga-rudha pada viz. 'puspadhanva'. Taking this special choice of the poet into account we realize the 'kurvad-rupata i.e. effectiveness of the yogartha of the word 'puspadhanva' : "tatra kavi-ksta-manmatha-rudhapadantara-anupadana-purvaka-puspadhanva- padopadana-pratisamdhanena tadiyayogarthe kurvad-rupata"dhanam bodhyam." (pp. 431, R.G., ibid). In the same way, along with the yogarudha-pada, whether there is or is not another rudhapada, nothing is lost. The importance of the yogartha of the yogarudha pad In the same way, if in a single verse, a word indicating a common class is used and along with that, side by side, another word indicating a sub-class born of that wider class is used (i.e. samabhivyahrta), then we have to understand that the yogartha of the word indicating broder class is to be taken into account and not its rudhyartha, e.g. in, "disi disi jalajani santi kumudani", the word 'jalaja' expresses a broder class. Only the yogartha is conveyed in such cases through laksana; because the yogartha i.e. born in water', rendered through yoga-sakti (i.e. jala + ja) is restricted by the rudhyartha i.e. lotus, and so that yogartha cannot be dently construed directly with 'kumuda'-padartha. Thus, says Jagannatha, abhidha is explained - "tad ittham abhidha nirupita" (pp. 432, ibid). Now Jagannatha turns his attention to the meaning conveyed by abhidha, after discussing the nature, scope and varieties of abhidha. Says he : "anaya yah sabdo yam artham bodhayati sa tasya vacakah" (pp. 432, ibid). With this abhidha when a particular word conveys a particular meaning, that word is called the 'vacaka' of that primary sense. The meaning that is arrived at through abhidha, is to be termed 'abhidheya'. This abhidheya-artha is four-fold such as jati or class, guna or quality, kriya or action and yadrechika - i.e. samina-rupa or name or substance. Jati is of the form of 'go-tva', which is manifested through the special figure - aksti - of an object : "tatra jatir gotva"dih samsthana-visesa-abhivyangya, pratyaksa-siddha, gava"dipadanam abhidheya" (R.G. pp. 432, ibid) - Because it is manifested by a figure it is said to be apprehended by direct means of knowledge. The idea is that objects such as 'go' qualified by 'gotva-jati' are perceived directly. This 'go-tva jati' is said to be the abhidheyartha or directly expressed sense of the word 'go'. There are other jatis or classes such as 'ghranatva', 'rasanatva' etc. which are apprehended through anumana or inference. The idea is that the organs of smell (i.e. ghranendriya), etc., which are qualified by 'ghranatva-jati', etc. are themselves 'atindriya' i.e. beyond sensoral porception, so they can only be inferred. The For Personal & Private Use Only

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264 SAHRDAYALOKA convention is made with reference to class alone and not an individual, for fault of 'anantya' and 'vyabhicara' : "anumana-siddha ca ghrana-rasanatva-a"dirghrana-rasana"di-padanam; anantyad, vyabhicarac ca, vyaktinam abhidheyataya akalpanat." (pp. 432, R.G. ibid). The contingency of 'anantya' walks in because if take samketa with reference to an individual, the individuals being innumerable, the samketas also will tend to be beyond calculation. Vyabhicaradosa walks in when one samketa once when used for a given individual, if it is used for another individual of the same class, it brings in this contingency, because how can one samketa fixed for one individual be used for any other individual ? So, convention is not made with reference to an individual i.e. 'vyakti'. Thus it cannot be said that that a 'pada' means an individual. An objector has the following submission - we accept such 'alaukika-pratyaksajnana' with reference to objects having relation of the form of 'gotva'-adi jati. : The idea is that direct apprehension results from the mutual relation of sense-organs and objects. This relation is termed 'sannikarsa' or 'pratyasatti' technically. Jagannatha here uses the term 'pratyasatti' in this technical sense. Now this relation according to some is 'jnata', i.e. is of the form of 'gotva-adi-samanya-rupa' - i.e. of the form of the class - 'go'tva. This is one opinion of some Naiyayikas. Another section of the Naiyayikas holds that this relation is of the form of the knowledge of 'go-tva' - adi-samanya.' - Whatever it may be, but by that relation which is of the nature of samanya or generality, there results direct perception of all cows endowed by that generality. So, there is no dosa-contingency - in accepting the 'abhidhasakti' of the word 'go' with reference to all individual cows. To this objection of the vyakti-sakti-vadins Jagannatha's reply is : "na ca jnatagotva"di-rupaya, gotva"di-jnana-rupaya va pratyasattya, pratyaksena pari-kalitasu sakalatadiya-vyaktisu abhidhayah kalpane nasti dosah iti vacyam. samanyapratyasatter nirakaranat. gaurava-dosasya-anuddharac ca." (pp. 432, R.G. ibid). Prof. Dr. Ramachandrudu puts it this way : (pp. 238, ibid) - "According to the Naiyayikas, the pratyaksa is of two kinds, laukika-pratyaksa, and A-laukikapratyaksa. Laukika-pratyaksa is the one which is produced by the contact of the senses with the objects which is effected by six kinds of samband has or relations, viz., samyoga, samyukta-samavaya, samyukta-samaveta-samavaya, samavaya, samaveta-samavaya, and visesana-visesya-bhava. 'A-laukika' pratyaksa is produced by three kinds of alaukika-sannikarsas which are called, 'samanya laksanapratyasatti, jnana-laksana-pratyasatti, and yogaja-pratyasatti. (Muktavali, I. 59-63). The meaning of the samanya-laksana-pratyasatti is explained in Muktavali (pp. 272) For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidh, 265 as a samanya-rupa-pratyasatti. Though the samanya is not directly connected with the Indriyas, it is said to be sannikarsa, because it is prakari-bhuta in the Indriyasambaddha-visesyaka- jnana. For example when there is contact of Indriyas with Dhuma"di, there arises a Dhuma-jnana in which Dhumatva is a prakara i.e. visesana. By the help of this Dhumatva-sannikarsa, one can have the knowledge of all the Dhumas, past, present and future. It is necessary to accept the samanya-laksana. pratyasatti, because unless all the Dhumas and Vahnis are known by Dhumatva and vahnitva respectively, there can be no samsaya about the vahni-vyapyatva of the Dhuma which is a condition precedent for the Anumana, for the Vahni-sambandha of the pratyaksa dhuma is known without doubt by pratyaksa itself and other Dhumas are not known. (Muktavali, p. 280) The 'samanya' in the 'samanya-laksana-pratyasatti' need not necessarily mean, Muktavali states, the 'Nitya-jati' alone. According to the vigraha"samananam bhavah samanyam" it can mean such anitya-padarthas like ghata also. Thus, once a ghata is known, as existing on the ground by 'samanyasambandha', or on the 'kapala' by 'samavaya-sambandha', one can later on have the knowledge of all such Bhutalas and kapala"di with the help of this samanyalaksana-pratyasatti (Muktavali, pp. 275). But one inconvenience appears cropping up here by accepting the samanya-laksana-pratyasatti as samanyarupa-pratyasatti. When the ghata is lost and even if the place having is rememberd all the places having the ghata cannot be cognised by samanyapratyasatti, because the samanya i.e. ghata is no more. In order to avoid this avyapti, the word 'laksana' in 'samanya-laksana-pratyasatti' is explained to mean visaya and thus 'samanya-laksana-pratyasatti - is to be understood as "samanyavisayakajnana-pratyasatti." In the above place, even though the ghata is lost, its jnana which is still existing can help as pratyasatti and thereby produce the cognition of all the 'bhutalas' having ghara"di. Now coming to the point on hand, the purva-paksin contends that there is nothing wrong even if the abhidha is only in vyakti because all vyaktis can be the object of pratyaksa by the above pratyasatti, whether it is 'jnata-gotva"di-samanyarupa-pratyasatti', or 'gotva"di-samanya-jnana-rupa pratyasate'. Pandita Raja refutes this contention by simply saying that the 'samanyapratyasatti - is not acceptable and that the gaurava-dosa levelled against your theory is not answered. (R.G. p. 183) (R.G. pp. 432, Edn. Athavale) - "na ca jnatagotva"di-rupaya gorva"di-jnana-rupaya va pratyasattya pratyaksena parikalitasu For Personal & Private Use Only

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266 SAHKDAYALOKA sakala-tadiya-vyaktisv abhidhayah kalpane nasti dosa iti vacyam. samanyapratyasatter nirakaranat. gaurava-dosasya anuddharat ca." The following is the contention of the siddhantin : It is not necessary to accept the samanya-laksana-pratyasatti. Even without its help, the 'caksus-samyoga' with one go-vyakti which is gotva"sraya, can produce the cognition of other go-vyaktis which are at a distance, by the laukika-sannikarsa of samyukta-samavetasamavaya. Like-wise the go-vyaktis of distant time can be known by becoming buddhi-visaya through the same sambandha, because they also are gotva"sraya. To know the go-vyakti as gorva"sraya is inevitable even in the vyakti-bakti-vada. Because a man may know the sakti of go-pada in only one vyakti at the first instance. But on a second occasion when he sees an elderly man ordering a young man saying 'gam anaya', 'gam naya', 'gam badhana', etc., and the young man brings, takes and ties the cow accordingly, he understands that the second cow also is having the gotva-jati and that is being meant by the go-pada as the previous one. It may be contended, as explained above, that samanya-pratyasatti is required for vyapti-samsaya and vyapti-jnana etc. But the vyapti jnana can be had in the 'mahanasiya dhuma' in the dhumatva-rupa itself. It may be argued again that there can be no vyapti-samsaya, because there is vyapti-niscaya in the dhuma which is actually seen, and other dhumas do not come to the mind of the perceiver (anupasthita). But this argument is unfounded, because even though there is vyapti-niscaya in a particular dhuma, there is scope for vyapti-samsaya by dhumatva in general. Moreover samanya cannot be taken as sambandha at all; because every sambandha invariably implies the existence of anuyogin and pratiyogin which are the case of samanya. Again, we do not find also visista-buddhi which is produced by the sambandha. Thus, in the absence of samanya-laksana-pratyasatti, the vyabhicara-dosa pointed out in vyakti-Sakti-vada remains unanswered. Even if the 'samanyalaksana-pratyasatti were to be accepted, where is the answer for the gaurava dosa raised above ? Because innumerable saktis will have to be accepted according to the endless number of vyaktis. Again Pandita Raja (PR.) refers to another argument of the purva-paksin in answer to the vyabhicara-dosa and says that the persistence of the gauravadosa makes it useless. The argument of purvapaksin runs as follows : of the three things, sakti-graha, padarthopa-sthiti and sabda-bodha, each preceeding For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 267 one is the cause of the following, and in all of them only one thing should appear, as prakara or visesanibhuta (samana-prakaratayaiva) but all of them need not have only one visesya. In other words, gotva-prakaraka-sakti-graha is the cause for the gotva-prakarakopasthiti, gotva-prakaropasthiti is the cause of gotva-prakarka-sabda-bodha. It need not be taken that gotva-prakarakasaktigraha is the cause of gotva-visesyakopasthiti. Thus even if the sakti-graha was only in a vyakti-visesa, one can have with the help of the above saktigraha, the sabda-bodha when a particular vyakti is not taken as visesya and so there is no vyabhicara though there is no sakti-graha in all the vyaktis. In spite of this explanation to avoid vyabhicara, PR. says, gaurava-dosa can not be avoided. In fact the above karya-karana-bhava among sakti-graha, padarthopasthiti and sabda-bodha itself is defective. Because if it is not accepted that tatprakaraka-sakti-graha etc. is the cause of tad-visesyaka-padarthopasthiti etc., the gotva-prakaraka, sakti-graha may produce asva-visesyakopasthiti and gotva-prakarakopasthiti would result in gotva-prakarakasva-visesyaka-sabdabodha." (pp. 238 to 247, Prof. Ramachandrudu.) Jagannatha then explains that the apprehension of an individual can be had by aksepa i.e. arthapatti, because the jati cannot exist without vyakti or, it can be had through laksana because there can be no anvaya or correlation of jati in a sentence sense. The laksana theory is normally favoured because the verbal explanation (i.e. sabda-bodha) connected with a particular artha can be produced by padarthopasthiti which depends on the vrtti-jnana about that particular artha only. Jagannatha further observes (pp. 432, ibid, R.G.) "ayam ca jati-rupah padarthah pranada iti ucyate. pranam vyavahara-yogyatam dadati sampadayati iti vyutpatteh." Before we proceed further let us have a look at Prof. R. B. Athavale's (pp. 456, 460) explanation of the above discussion. We have already quoted at length the explanation of Dr. Ramachandrudu as above. (pp. 238-248, ibid). Prof. Athavale explains the same point thus: The Naiyayikas accept alaukika pratyaksa also along with laukika-pratyaksa. In laukika pratyaksa, they accept six sannikarsas or sambandhas or relations such as samyoga, samavaya, etc., while in a-laukika-pratraksa they accept only three sannikarsas. The sannikarsas in alaukika pratyaksa are enumerated in karika 63, in Siddhanta For Personal & Private Use Only

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268 SAHRDAYALOKA muktavali, such as : "alaukikas tu vyaparas trividhah parikirtitah, samanya-laksano jnana . laksano yogajas tatha." (Si. Mu. pratyaksa khanda karika-63) In this karika, the term 'vyapara' means sannikarsa, which is said to be three fold such as, samanya-laksana, jnana-laksana and 'yogaja'. Out of these three, the samanya-laksana-sannikarsa (or, samanya-pratyasatti) is the first one, which is projected by the Naiyayikas to support their plea that there is no harm in accepting samketa or convention with reference to vyakti i.e. individual. By samanya-laksana' is meant such which has 'samanya! as its laksana or svarupa. Just as when there is direct apprehension of a thing in the world, the sannikarsa or sambandha between any worldly object and sense-organ has to take place first, in the same way for a-laukika pratyaksa also, the samanya-rupa sannikarsa of the object is required. This means that the apprehension of an individual i.e. object takes place with the help of samanya or jati such as gotva etc. For example - I saw an individual go-vyakti. This means I have laukika-pratyaksa-jnana or direct apprehension of a particular go-vyakti. With the knowledge of that individual go-vyakti, knowledge or apprehension of 'gotva' samanya or jati also is accomplished. This is the theory accepted by the Naiyayikas. They hold that, "ya vyaktih yena indriyena grhyate, tannistha jatih, tad abhavas ca tena eva indriyena grhyate." i.e. the sense-organ with which an individual object is apprehended, also brings forth the apprehension of the class-samanya i.e. - jatiof that particular object concerned, and it also brings forth the apprehension of the abhava - absence-of that object also. The Nyayasastra calls that jnana or apprehension as alaukika-pratyaksa, whereby knowledge of all go-vyaktis is also brought about through the gotva-rupa-samanya residing in a single go-vyakti, directly apprehended. We have to accept samanya-rupa-sannikarsa in the alaukika-pratyaksa-jnana, because to bring about the knowledge of all individual go-vyaktis, there is no other agency except the samanya. In the illustration cited above of an individual go-vyakti, along with that go-vyakti as there is also an apprehension of the 'samanya' residing in it, this apprehension is termed samanya and, here, i.e. in this alaukika-pratyaksa, "jnata-samanyasannikarsa" is the cause of apprehension. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 269 Let us take another illustration. In the sentence viz. "ghatavat bhutalam", when there is knowledge or apprehension of bhutala, we also have apprehension of ghata' which is the 'visesana' or 'prakara' or 'samanya' of 'bhutala'. Now 'sannikarsa' is required for the apprehension of that ghata-rupa-samanya. If with that 'sannikarsa' there occurs the apprehension of all 'ghata-yukta-bhutala' then that also is called alaukika-pratyaksa-jnana. The difference between the alaukika pratyaksa caused by the sannikarsa in form of knowledge of gotva-rupa-samanya, on one hand, and the alaukika pratyaksa brought about by the sannikarsa of the knowledge of ghata-rupa-samanya on the other hand, is only this much that in the rst alaukika pratyaksa, gotva, the samanya jati, is nitya, while in the other alaukika-pratyaksa, ghata-rupa-samanya becomes 'jnata' and is 'sannikarsa'. But suppose that in the above illustration of 'ghatavat-bhutalam', the ghata or pot is broken. Then, if in the absence of the ghata which is broken, next day there is alaukika-pratyaksa of 'ghatavat bhutalam', then at such places, ghata is not a 'samanya-sannikrsta'. But, only the knowledge of that ghatarupa-samanya becomes sannikarsa in alaukika-pratyaksa. This is the opinion of the second section of the Naiyayikas. From this, we can say that according to the opinion of this second section of Naiyayikas, in alaukika-pratyaksa, we accept jnana of samanya itself as sannikarsa in place of jnata-samanya. Jagannatha refers to both these options of the Naiyayikas in the words : "jnata-gotva"di-rupaya gorva"di-jnana: rupaya va pratyasattya.". If we put behind this small difference of opinion, then both the opinions of the Naiyayikas seem to hold that by samanya pratyasatti there is alaukika-pratyaksa of all individual objects. So all objects are presented individually, and so there is nothing wrong in accepting saktigraha - convention - with reference to all individuals. From the point of view of both the sections of the Naiyayikas, there is nothing wrong in accepting convention-samketa-with reference to individuals and no contingencies of 'anantya' and 'vyabhicara' would walk in, in accepting samketa with reference to a vyakti. This is so, because according to the Naiyayikas, through the 'samanya' residing in one individual 'go', there occurs apprehension of all the rest asamketita 'go' - i.e. all other cows that are not the subject of convention, and thus if we accept convention - 'samketa' - with reference to a given individual 'go' vyakti, no blemishes of 'anantya' and 'vyabhicara' will follow. When one individual 'go' is perceived directly, through the 'samanya' residing in that govyakti, all other go-vyaktis possessing that samanya (i.e. go-tva), are covered by For Personal & Private Use Only

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270 SAHRDAYALOKA convention. So, there is no need to go for numberless samketas on numberless individuals. The vyabhicara-dosa also disappears as all vyaktis are covered by samketa. As noted above, Jagannatha holds that when samketa or convention is held with reference to a class, i.e. jati, the apprehension of a vyakti is either through inference or through laksana or secondary function. The jati-rupa-sabdartha is also the 'prana-prada-dharma' of the objects, because it is this which gives 'vyavaharayogyata'. Here Jagannatha quotes from Mammata (K.P. II. 2, vrtti) the words which are quoted again from what Bharthari has said in the Vakyapadiya : (pp. 432, ibid) "gauh svarupena na gauh, na api agauh, gotvabhisambandhad gauh." The idea is that a 'go-vyakti' by its form (svarupena) does not become a 'go'. This means that without accompanied by its jati-class-cowness', - 'go-tva', an individual go, i.e. go-vyakti does not become the object of usage - vyavahara. It does not become the object of such usage as 'a-go'-either. But once we realize the relation of that go-vyakti with go-jati (gotvabhisambandhat) - then only it becomes fit for the usage of the word 'go' with reference to it. Jagannatha explains it clearly as follows : (pp. 432, ibid) : "asya arthah - gauh sasnadiman dharmi. svarupena, ajnata-gotva-kena, dharmi-svarupa-matrena, na gauh, na'pi go-bhinna-iti vyavaharasya-nirvahakah napyagauh, napi go-bhinna iti vyavaharasya nirvahakah. tatha sati, durad anabhivyakta-samsthanataya gotvagraha-dasayam gavi gaur iti go-bhinna iti va vyavaharah syat." The idea is that by the special outward form of having a dewlap, etc. an object, by the help of only its external form only, the form by which the apprehension of 'go-tva' has not followed, does not become a 'go', i.e. it does not become the object of the usage of the word 'gauh' for it. Nor, it becomes an object of a usage such as 'a-gauh', merely by the external form. The idea is that even without the apprehension of go-tva, 'cowness', i.e. class of jati, if a go-vyakti can become an object of the usage of the word 'gauh', then, an object such as 'go' whose 'form is not clearly seen and determined because of distance and in whose case there is no apprehension of gotva-jati, will also be an object of such usage as, 'this is a cow, or this is some other animal than cow', etc. or, as the special form of that object in not determined, that individual, in absence of apprehension of its speciality, there will follow the usage-vyavahara of ghasa in 'go', and of 'go' in 'ghata'. - "svarupasya a-visesad ghate gaur iti, gavi ca agaur For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 271 iti va vyavaharah syad iti bhavah gotvabhisambandhat gotva-vattaya jnanad gaur gau-sabda-vyavaharya iti." (pp. 432, ibid, R.G.) But no such vyavahara follows. The idea is that due to distance, when an object is not recognized, we have the apprehension, viz. 'there is something'. No cognition such as, 'that object is not a cow but a jar, or it is not a jar but a cow - follows. So, when a vyakti is united with go-tva, i.e. when it is realized that the individual is associated with gotva-dharma, i.e. characteristics of a cow, it becomes fit for the usage 'go', with reference to itself. Now Jagannatha turns his attention to what 'guna' is and what 'kriya' is. Gunas a, and the rest are the expressed sense (abhidheya) of words such as sukla, etc. In the same way 'kriya' or action is the abhidheyartha of 'calana' and the rest : "gunah sukla"dih sukladi-padanam abhidheyah, kriya calana"di-sabdanam. An objection is raised such as follows : In case of colours such as sukla and the rest, and kriya such as 'calana' and the rest, we see difference with reference to different individuals with which they are associated. So, if we accept 'samketa' with reference to a single sukla or a single calana, then we will have to face contingencies of anantya and vyabhicara as in case of samketa with reference to a vyakti i.e. individual : R.G. pp. 432, ibid - "sukla"dinam calana"dinam ca prativakti-bhedadarsanatanantya-vyabhicarabhyam, vyakti-sakti-vada-dosabhyam iha'pi kalusikaranam, iti cet, - The reply to this is - tesam laghavat pratyabhijnabalac ca ekataya abhyupagamat. - i.e. in case of guna and kriya if we believe that there is only one sukla guna, and there is only one 'calana' kriya, then we will have 'laghava' guna, i.e. we will have achieved brievity of expression. Again, we expreience that all white colours at different substratum are virtually one and the same, and so also 'calana' kriya is one and the same in case of different individuals o. So, due to laghava, and due to experience as such, pratyabhijna-balat, we accept only one whiteness and one action. Jagannatha here quotes from the K.P. of Mammata : "guna-kriya-yadrcchanam vastutah ekarupanam asrayabhedad bheda iva laksyate." (K.P. II. 2, vrtti). So, bhedajnana or perception of difference in case of sukla, or calana, etc. with reference to difference in substratum is virtually an illusion : "tatha ca bheda-pratitir bhrama eva iti bhavah." (R.G. pp. 433, ibid). Jagannatha says that this is to be understood as an 'upalaksana' or an accidental mark. Such an illusion takes place with reference to other objects also. For example, there is a feeling that gunas and kriyas are born and distroyed. But actually this impression is illusory. Those who hold letters to be eternal hold that the impression of 'utpatti' and 'vinasa' with reference to individual letters such as 'g' 'au' and 'h' etc., are also an illusion. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 273 This objection is refuted by Jagannatha thus. He says that even he accepts the fact that sphota is of the form of a word. But because it is of the form of a word it resides in akasa, as all words have akasa as their substratum : "sarvah sabdah nabho-vsttih" (Muktavali) - But the individual pointed out by samjna-sabda (i.e. samjni) is without the dharma called 'samanya' or 'jati'. So, in a vyakti or individual, there is no dharma or quality present which can be taken as the pravrtti-nimitta of a sabda. That an individual is apprehended by a given samjna sabda (such as e.g. dittha), rests only on the wish of the speaker alone. So, as no other quality as pravstti-nimitta can be pointed out in a given individual, only the akhanda-samjna-rupa-sphota, manifested by a word that is uttered, is imagined to be the pravsttinimitta of the vyakti. There is no harm is accepting this situation. Therefore, eventhough the sphota is of the form of a word, it is considered as the dharma of vyakti through parmpara-sambandha i.e. in a successive way, or sequential way. All worldly objects are the 'vivarta' of akhandasphota"tmaka sabda which is non-different from brahma. Thus the worldly objects are 'parinamas' so to say. But from the point of view of sabda, the sphota is said to be the dharma of a vyakti through the sva-janya-bodhavisayata-sambandha. It means that the meaning of the cognition brought about by sabda is 'visaya'. Thus sphota is held to be the dharma of the sense or vyakti. With this idea in mind, Mammata in his K.P. also holds akhanda-sphota as the dharma' of a vyakti. Says he : "dittha"di-sabdanam antya-buddhi-nirghyahyam samhsta-kramam-svarupam vaktra yadrcchaya dittha"disu arthesu upadhitvena samnivesyate iti soyam samjnarupah yadrccha"tmakah." (K.P. II). The term "antya-buddhi-nirgrahya' of Mammata, is read as 'carama-varnabhivyangya' by Jagannatha. Both the terms mean one and the same thing. The 'samhttakrama' svarupa of samjna-sabda is itself the akhanda-svarupa. In it, the whole word and not the sequence of letters, is to be taken as sphota. Such a sphota is accepted by a speaker by his own will, as the dharma or attribute of an individual. So, "I am going to take the whole word in form of special sphota, as the dharma of a vyati" - with this determination in mind, the speaker arranges the samjna-sabda. Here, akhanda-spota is knowingly taken as an attribute of an idividual, the cognition of that individual will be termed in sastriya i.e. technical jargon, as 'visesana-visista' - i.e. 'sa-vikalpa' - bodha. This is the view of the grammarians. Now, because the Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas do not accept akhanda-sphota, manifested by a samjna sabda, they accept 'varna-samudaya' as the pravrtti For Personal & Private Use Only

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272 SAHRDAYALOKA A meaning ascribed by a speaker following his own will to words such as 'Dittha' etc. is called 'yadrcchika-abhidheya'. There are three views regarding this yadicchika-dharma : "R.G. pp. 433, ibid : "yadicchikas tu vaktra svecchaya dittha"di-sabdanam pravrtti-nimittarve sannivesito dharmah. sa ca, 'paramparaya vyaktigatah carama-varnabhivyangyo'khandah sphotah' iti eke. "anupurvyavacchinno varna-samudayah' iti apare. "kevala vyaktir eva" iti itare. tatra"dya-mata-dvaye visesana-jnanad visista-pratyayah. trtiyamate ca nirvikalpaka"tmakah pratyayah. tad ittham catustayi sabdanam pravsttir iti darsanam vyavasthitam." - The three views are as follows. For the vaiyakaranas, the yadicchika-dharma which is said to be the expressed sense of the words such as Dittha and the like, is only the akhanda-sphota which is manifested by the last letter of the particular word, associated with the samskara or impression left by the cognition of each preceeding letter. The last letter alone is the only suggester of sphota, because this sphota cannot be suggested by the whole varna-samudaya, because varnas perish immediately after being uttered and therefore they cannot he grouped together. The second view goes like this. As seen above, varnas or letters cannot be grouped together, they being perishable the moment they are uttered. So, some are of the opinion that the individual vyakti alone is dharma' meant by words like 'dittha' etc. Jagannatha explains that according to the first two views, words like "dittha' etc. would first convey the dharma 'sphota' or 'varnasamudaya', and then the cognition of vyakti or individual is inferred by sphota, which leads to the apprehension of vyakti as associated with the above dharmas or qualities. The third view holds that such words convey the vyakti directly and this cognition being devoid of visesanas is nirvikalpa, the earlier one leading to savikalpajnana. Prof. R. B. Athavale explains these views in greater details as follows - (pp. 461, 463, R. G. Edn., ibid) He explains that here there is scope for raising one objection viz. that the word in form of akhanda sphota is manifested by samjna sabda. So, it is of the form of a word. So, how do you accept 'sphota' as the nimitta or cause of the pravrtti of a word ? i.e. how do you take it as the 'nimitta' of the power - Sakti - that gives a particular sense ? Normally a 'pravstti-nimitta' is a special quality - i.e. 'visista dharma' of a given object. So, on account of that special quality residing in a given object, that particular word yields that ense. Now sphota, being of the form of word, can never be a special dharma of a vyati or object. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 273 This objection is refuted by Jagannatha thus. He says that even he accepts the fact that sphota is of the form of a word. But because it is of the form of a word it resides in akasa, as all words have akasa as their substratum : "sarvah sabdah nabho-vrttih" (Muktavali) - But the individual pointed out by samjna-sabda (i.e. samjni) is without the dharma called 'samanya' or 'jati'. So, in a vyakti or individual, there is no dharma or quality present which can be taken as the pravrtti-nimitta of a sabda. That an individual is apprehended by a given samjna sabda (such as e.g. dittha), rests only on the wish of the speaker alone. So, as no other quality as pravrtti-nimitta can be pointed out in a given individual, only the akhanda-samjna-rupa-sphota, manifested by a word that is uttered, is imagined to be the pravrttinimitta of the vyakti. There is no harm is accepting this situation. Therefore, eventhough the sphota is of the form of a word, it is considered as the dharma of vyakti through parmpara-sambandha i.e. in a successive way, or sequential way. All worldly objects are the 'vivarta' of akhandasphota"tmaka sabda which is non-different from brahma. Thus the worldly objects are 'parinamas' so to say. But from the point of view of sabda, the sphota is said to be the dharma of a vyakti through the sva-janya-bodhavisayata-sambandha. It means that the meaning of the cognition brought about by sabda is 'visaya'. Thus sphota is held to be the dharma of the sense or vyakti. With this idea in mind, Mammata in his K.P. also holds akhanda-sphota as the 'dharma' of a vyakti. Says he "dittha"di-sabdanam antya-buddhi-nirghyahyam samhrta-kramam-svarupam vaktra yadrcchaya dittha"disu arthesu upadhitvena samnivesyate iti soyam samjnarupah yadrccha"tmakah." (K.P. II). The term "antya-buddhi-nirgrahya' of Mammata, is read as 'carama-varnabhivyangya' by Jagannatha. Both the terms mean one and the same thing. The 'samhrtakrama' svarupa of samjna-sabda is itself the akhanda-svarupa. In it, the whole word and not the sequence of letters, is to be taken as sphota. Such a sphota is accepted by a speaker by his own will, as the dharma or attribute of an individual. So, "I am going to take the whole word in form of special sphota, as the dharma of a vyati" - with this determination in mind, the speaker arranges the samjna-sabda. Here, akhanda-spota is knowingly taken as an attribute of an idividual, the cognition of that individual will be termed in sastriya i.e. technical jargon, as 'visesana-visista' - i.e. 'sa-vikalpa' - bodha. This is the view of the grammarians. Now, because the Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas do not accept akhanda-sphota, manifested by a samjna sabda, they accept 'varna-samudaya' as the pravrtti For Personal & Private Use Only

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274 SAHRDAYALOKA nimitta-dharma of an individual which is the object of convention through a samjna-sabda. And this is also in fitness of things. Here also, as varna-samudaya is of the form of a word, it is taken knowingly as the dharma of a vyakti through pampara, i.e. succession, because for the pravstti i.e. sakti of that particular samjna-sabda, no other dharma or attribute can be pointed out in that individual. Now, this varna-samudaya itself is non-existent as each letter when pronounced evaporates in air, so the three or four or any number of letters in a given word do not exist at a fixed given moment at a time. So, to bring a varna-samudaya into existence, i.e. to make it possible, the Naiyayikas believe that each letter, after it is pronounced, leaves its samskara i.e. mental impression behind. So with this impression of each preceeding letter or with the memory caused by the impression of each preceeding letter, the last letter is heard and this makes for the whole collection of letters i.e. varna-samudaya. Even in this view of the Naiyayikas, varnasamudaya becomes the visesana or attribute of a vyakti i.e. individual. So, the cognition of that vyakti, is also visesana-visista' or 'sa-vikalpa'. * Now still others feel that such an artificial samjna-rupa-dharma can not be attached to an individual, because as pravrttinimitta, normally samanya-rupadharma cannot possibly reside in an individual. The samjna-rupa-dharma, on the other hand, being of the nature of a word, cannot be taken as dharma of a vyakti. So, if any dharma is to be fixed as a pravrtti-nimitta of a samjna-sabda, then only the vyakti, i.e. individual himself can be fixed as such. These people do not accept any other dharma residing in a vyakti. Jagannatha has expresse view among the three mentioned, through the words : "kevala vyaktir eva iti itare." This same view is expressed in his Nyaya-Manjari, by the famous logician Jayanta Bhatta, as follows: "yesam arthesu samanyam, na sambhavati taih punah ucyate kevala vyaktir akasadi-padair iva. evam ditthadi-sabdanam samjnatva-viditatmanam abhidheyasya samanya-sunyatvad vyakti-vacita. ata eva hi dravya-sabda iti ucyate, ye punah kalpitaneka-vsttim pracaksate. vacyam tatra'pi samanyam drsyate gaganatva-vat kalpanayas tu no bhumih kacid asti vipascitam." - Nyaya-manjari, ahnika 5. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 275 - It means : In such samjna"di i.e. dittha"di words or objects, wherein samanya or class is not possible, with the help of such samjna words (like words such as akasa' and the like), only the vyakti, bereft of a samanya, is cogn meaning of samjna-rupa-dittha"di words, is without 'samanya', the 'vyakti' or individual alone follows as the meaning. Some people may say that even the words such as dittha etc. are used by many with reference to many objects. So, why not accept a 'samanya' or 'jati' in such words also ? To this, the reply is, even if that be so, the vyakti cognised by such dittha"di words, is without a 'samanya'. So, there is no escape from taking such words as 'vyakti-matra-vaci i.e. expressive only of an individual. As there is no such substance as 'gaganatva', in the same way, there can not be any samanya as 'ditthatva'. So, the wise do not subscribe to such imagination of such samanya. So, when the Naiyayikas can not point out any dharma as pravrtti-nimitta for the samjna-sabda used for a vyakti with samjna, it is quite appropriate for them to take vyakti itself as pravstti-nimitta-dharma in case of a samjna sabda. That 'samjni', i.e. that vyakti is bereft of any visesana or dharma, and hence, the cognition of such a vyakti is taken as 'nirvisesa' or 'nirvikalpa'. This is simple. Jagannatha thus concludes that - "tad ittham catustayi sabdanam pravrttir iti darsanam vyavasthitam." (pp. 433, R.G., ibid) Next, he presents the view of the Jativadins. They take only 'jati' as the meaning of all the words, in place of the four viz. jati, guna, kriya and dravya. In case of guna-vacaka and kriyavacaka words, the jati as realised in guna and kriya is the real 'abhidheya' for them. In case of samjna-sabdas also, i.e. in case of yadsccha words, the samjna or particular name as pronounced by different agents such as the old men, a child, a parrot, or any such other speaker, etc., forms a 'jati' which is the abhidheya in that case. The idea is that in this view the dharma called jati is supposed to reside in a word. But, through succession, th jati residing in such words has to be taken as residing in meaning - 'arthanistha'. To remove this difficulty, it is suggested that : the vyakti understood by that samjna-sabda though seems to be different when he is a child, or a young man, an old man, carries an identical name or samjna, and hence these different vyaktis have a common jati in form of an indentical name. This jati' is the meaning of a particular samjnasabda. Thus, for all words, sakti resides in 'jati' only. With this the last view is fully discussed : (pp. 433, R.G., ibid) : "guna-kriya sabdanam guna-kriya-gatayah, yadrccha-sabdanam ca bala-vrddha-suka"di For Personal & Private Use Only

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276 SAHRDAYALOKA udirita-tattat sabda-vittes tat-tat-samaya-bhinnartha-vstter va jater eva abhidheyata-sambhavat. iti jati-sakti darsanam" - with this ends the discussion on abhidha in the R.G. we will pick up the thread and discuss Jagannatha's view on laksana at its proper place in due course. For the present we will take up the views of Bhoja on abhidha. Bhoja : We know that Bhoja, as he lived much earlier cronologically, should have been taken up prior to Jagannatha, but as he represents, according to us, a tradition, which we call 'the Malava tradition', to distinguish it from the kashmir tradition as respresented by Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemacandra, Vidyadhara, to mention a few, we will have to take up Bhoja separately at the end of the discussion of any given topic. This is not to suggest that Bhoja is always at cross-roads with the kashmir tradition and that he always exchanges swords with Anandavardhana and the rest, but one thing is certain that the tradition Bhoja represents, one which we call the Malava tradition of literary aesthetics, has certain special traits of its own. So, Bhoja will - be considered separately by us. It has to be candidly admitted that the views of Bhoja as interpreted by the great modern alamkarika Dr. Raghavan, for whom we have tremendous respect and love, will be our sole friend, philosopher and guide so far as Bhoja is concerned. But with due respect to the great savant of indian literary criticism, we have to make an humble confession that at times we fail to understand what Dr. Raghavan explains, or at times we feel we can supplement his efforts, or in vary rare cases we may even attempt to correct his impression. In doing this, we will surely go with the text of Bhoja as read in both of his works, viz. the Sarasvati-kantha"bharana and the Srngara-prakasa. Our efforts should not be misunderstood by the world of scholars, for to us, Dr. Raghavan remains, and will remain for a thousand years to come, as the greatest interpreter of Bhoja, but we try to approach only in the fashion of a student with his curiocity a little more awakened as compared to a general reader. So, with pranams to both Bhoja and Dr. Raghavan, who for us is an 'abhinava-bhoja'. we will try to explain the concept of abhidha, and also other sabda-vrttis as explained by Bhoja. It has to be noted that Bhoja has not discussed independently the topic of sabda-vyttis in his Sarasvati-kantha"bharana, comprising of five chapters. However there could be traced stray references to the sabda-vrttis here and there which do not carry any theoratical value, e.g. on pp. 709 (N.S. Edn. 1934 A.D.) we read : "yato rasa"ksepat-parihasa-lesoktya'mangalam, pravisa, pindim, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 277 dvaram, bhaksaya, itinyayat prasiddha-adhyaharah, 'dari vadati, mancah krosanti' iti prayogadarsanat adharadheyayor abhedopacarasca viruddhalaksana"dibhih prayujyamano na dosaya iti." - Such direct or indirect references to sabda-vsttis do not carry any value for us. We will have to turn to the other work, The Sangara-prakasa for a comparatively more systemetic approach to the topic of sabdavrttis, though it has to be admitted at the outset, that Bhoja, in keeping with the tradition which he seems to have directly inherited from alamkara writers prior to Anandavardhana, does not treat 'this topic as systemetically as is done by Mammata and other followers of the kashmir school. We will pick up the thread with the help of Dr. Raghavan. We propose to reach him with honest enquiry as an advanced student. Bhoja's treatment of sabda-saktis is part of his larger scheme of explaining what 'sahitya' is. Dr. Raghavan thus explains : (pp. 87, Bhoja's Sr. Pra, '63) "We have already said that poetry being speech supreme, sahitya is, between the two parts of language - sabda and Artha-relation supreme. Thus, sahitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense; and then it means poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by sahitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general sahitya; higher up the language has risen above itself and has bloomed in poetry, and here, the sahitya is poetic relation between word and sense. Bhoja defines kavya as the sahitya or unity of word and sense. "tat (kavyam) punah; sabdarthayoh; sahityam amananti." tad yatha - "sabdarthau sahitau kavyam" iti. It is to a treatment of this Sahitya of sabda and Artha that the sr. Pra. is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself Sahitya Prakasa in Chapter XI. yasmin asesa-vidyasthanartha-vibhutayah prakasante, samhitya, sa sahityaprakasa etadnso bhavati." (Chap. XI, pp. 430, Sr. Pra Vol. II) The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, 'sabdarthau sahitau kavyam', and under the edifice of the sr. Pra. lies the foundation and system called sahitya. This has been already pointed out above in Ch. IV (of Sr. Pra. Raghavan). Sahitya is thus defined by Bhoja : It is the relation between For Personal & Private Use Only

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278 SAHRDAYALOKA sabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sahityas can be called general and the last four, are special and can be classed as the poetic Sahityas. "kim sahityam ? yah sabdarthayoh sambandhah sa ca dvadasadha, - abhidha, vivaksa, tatparyam, pravibhagah, vyapeksa, samarthyam, anvayah, ekarthi-bhavah, - dosahanam, gunopadanam, alamkarayogah, rasa-aviyogas ceti." Again, at the beginning of chapter VII which begins the treatment of Sahitya, Bhoja repeats these twelve-fold relations between sabda and Artha as constituting Sahitya. "tatra abhidha-vivaksa-tatparya-pravibhaga-vyapeksa-samarthya-anvayaekarthibhava- dosahana-gunopadana-alamkarayoga-rasa-aviyogarupah sabdarthayoh dvadasa sambandhah sahityam ucyate." Vol. I. p. 428, Sp. Pra. Even the earlier work of Bhoja, the S.K.A. contains indications of this conception of sahitya of Bhoja. The first verse of the work - "dhvanir varnah padam vakyam etc. covers part of contents of chapters I-VI of the Sr. Pra. and the second verse of the S.K.A. gives the last four-fold poetic Sahitya, - dosahana, guna"dana, alamkarayoga, and rasaviyoga or rasanvaya; commenting on the above-said first verse of the S.K.A., Ratnesvara who is acquainted well with Si. Pra, says : - tad ayam atra tatparya-samksepah. - sahitya-nirupanaya kila esa grantha"rambhah. sahityam ca sabdarthayoh sambandhah tatra sabda eva ka ity apeksayam ayam vibhago dhvanir itya"di. arthas tu stambha-kumbha-adi-laksanah loke sastre ca prasiddhah sambandhah kascid anadih. sarvasvayamanas tu sambandhah nanyatreti asminnayatate. sa caturvidhah - dosahanam, gunopa"danam, alamkarayogah, rasabhi(vi)yogas ceti." Ratnesvara on S.K.A.I. i. This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan brings out how ambitious project Bhoja has sat himself to. By taking Sahitya in its widest sense as "coming together of word and meaning", he wants to cover under this banner both poetry (i.e. kavya) and non-poetry (i.e. sastra and loka-bhasa). So, Bhoja first takes Sahitya merely as relation between word and sense in general and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical. Among the eight grammatical relations four are classed as kevala-sabda - sambandha-saktis and the other four as sapeksasabda-sambandha-saktis. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 88 ibid) gives the following table to For Personal & Private Use Only

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279 Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha explain Bhoja's classification : kavyam sabdah (12 types) arthah (12 kinds) tayoh sahityam (12 kinds) grammatical 8 kinds of sabda sambandha-saktis 4-kevala-saktayah 1-abhidha 2-vivaksa 3-tatparyam 4-pra-vibhagah 4-sapeksa-saktayah 5-vykpeksa 6-samarthyam 7-anvayah 8-ekarthibhavah 4 poetical kinds 9-dosahanam 10-guna"danam 11-alamkarayogah 12-rasa-aviyogah. The first eight go under the name of sabda-sambandha-saktis. Dr. Raghavan - notes that in Bhoja, (pp. 89, ibid) Abhidha comprises the three vrttis, Mukhya, Gauni, and Laksana. Vivaksa is of three kinds - kakva"di-vyangya, prakarana"di-vyangya and abhinaya"di-vyangya. In Tatparya is included the pratiyamana and Dhvani. (See below, Chapter XII on Bhoja and Dhvani). These eight sabda-sambandhas are treated in chapters VII and VIII. Poetic Sahitya begins in chapter IX. With this explanation furnished by Dr. Raghavan, we will start our investigation as to what exactly Bhoja wants to cover under 'abhidha' and whether his treatment is more, or equally or less scientific as compared to Mammata's scheme. When it is observed by Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja's abhidha covers three vsttis viz. mukhya, gauni, and laksana, we feel that Bhoja seems to be under the influence of such writers as Mukula and even Mahima, who take laksana only as part of abhidha. For Mukula, the ten-fold abhidha covered the field of a-mukhya vitti also. On the face of it the treatment in the works of Mammata and his followers belonging to the kashmir tradition, seems to be more scientific. For Personal & Private Use Only

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280 SAHRDAYALOKA Bhoja (pp. 223, Edn. Josyer, Ch. VII) says : "tatra abhidha-vivaksa... dvadasa samarthah sahityam iti ucyate." - Then he proceeds - "tesu sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktir abhidha. taya svarupa iva abhidheye pravartamanah sabdo vrtti-trayena vartate, tas ca-mukhya, gauni, laksana iti tisrah." - We have a quarrel with the very first statement which is loose. When Bhoja defines abhidha as, "sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktih" - he fails to discriminate between the directly expressed sense, called samketitartha, the indicated sense or laksyartha and the suggested sense called vyangyartha in the kashmir school of thought. Even Kuntaka's 'vicitra abhidha' covered all these three under one banner. May be we are in a frame of mind, or we have inherited a mind-set that tends to appreciate more the system as presented by Ananda-Abhinava-MammataJagannatha-led school of thought. * Bhoja then proceeds as follows: (pp. 233, ibid) "tatra saksad avyavahitartha-bhidhayika mukhya. gamyama"na-saurya"di-guna-yoga-vyavahitartha gauni svarthavinabhuta-arthantaropalaksana tu laksana iti. tatha hi gaur iti ayam sabdo mukhyaya vrttya sasna"di-mantam artham pratipadayati sa eva tisthan-mutrata"di-guna-sampadam apeksamano yada bahlike vartate tada gaunim vittim anuvadati." So, it is clear that Bhoja's mukhya is the 'abhidha' proper of the kashmir school. Gauni and laksana are treated by Mammata as part of a-mukhya vitti, i.e. laksana which is for him six-fold, sad-vidha. But Bhoja takes these two as extention of his wider abhidha, as done by Mukula. Perhaps even the earlier Mimamsakas also took laksana (including gauni) as extention of abhidha. Bhoja keeps gauni reserved for relations - 'tadyoga' as put by the kashmir school, : based on similarity, and his laksana is characterised by such meaning which is another one following from the svartha. So, 'tadyoga' is accepted even by Bhoja here. He illustrates gauni by the same illustration such as "gaur vahikah" (= bahlikah). One who urinates while standing, like a bull, is called 'gauh', due to similarity. The kashmir school seeks comparision in 'jadya and mandya' - dullness and stupidity as seen in both. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of Abhidha Bhoja further observes: tad aha - "rudhya yatra sad arthopi loke sabdo nivesitah sa mukhyas tat samyat gaunonyatra skhalad-gatih" yada tu sabdah svarthatah kriyasiddhau sadhana-bhavam gantum asamarthah, tada abhidheya-avinabhutam arthantaram laksayati. tada sa ca laksana vrttih. yatha gangayam ghosah prativasati. atra ganga-sabdo visistodaka-pravahe nirudha'bhidhana-saktih. sa ca ghosa-kartrkayah prativasana-kriyaya adhikaranabhavam gantum asamarthah, svarthavinabhutam tatam laksayati." (pp. 223, ibid) 281 This means Bhoja is absolutely clear about the concepts of abhidha, and also gauni and laksana and surely he had read what Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written. But he chooses a different tradition which recognises 'gauni' as an independent vrtti from laksana, as seen later also in Hemacandra. But what Bhoja does is still different. Over and above taking gauni and laksana as separate functions, he clubs them together as extension of abhidha and thus his abhidha is wide enough to contain these two in its fold. This is, as observed earlier, like Mukula. He then quotes from Kumarila viz. "abhidheyavinabhuta-pratitir laksana" and calls it the life of artful expression: "sa esa vidagdha-vakrokti-jivitam." Now this expression makes it clear that he appreciates the concept of 'vicitra-abhidha' of Kuntaka, and in the same way he absorbs the influence of Vamana also. Who suggested: "sadrsyat laksana vakroktih". (KSV. IV. iii 8). Bhoja then attempts the classification of the three-fold abhidha, out of which the first viz. mukhya, which is pure abhidha for the kashmir school, is two-fold: "tatra mukhya dvidha, tatha-bhutartha, tad-bhava"pattis ca" (pp. 223, ibid). Then, he proceeds: "tatha bhutartha sodha, jati-visaya, vyakti-visaya, akrti-visaya, gunavisaya, kriya-visaya sambandha-visayas ca iti." Now, it may be said that the divisions and subdivisions suggested here and also elsewhere normally are six or twelve. This is Bhoja's special feature. Again, here also, the sub-divisions of 'tathabhutartha mukhya' which are six, go by the difference in the nature of the objects described. These are broad divisions seen in the word and there is hardly anything special to be noted. Though Bhoja has taken 'sahitya' in a very wide sense and his concept covers sastra-bhasa and loka-bhasa For Personal & Private Use Only

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282 SAHRDAYALOKA or vyavahara-bhasa i.e. language in general also, we may say to his credit that he has drawn illustrations from poetry only. 'Sambandha-visaya' is illustrated from the Vikramorvasiyam where Puraravas is said to be the grand son of Son and Moon. But our observation stands that the varieties enumerated by Bhoja, all follow the nature of the object under description. Thus if a guna is described, it is guna-visaya, if a kriya is described it is kriya-visaya, and so on. We may say this is just Bhoja's love for hair-splitting. 'tadbhava"patti' variety of mukhya is explained as "arthasya a-tathatve adhyasa"dibhih tathatva"padanam tad-bhava"pattih." (pp. 224, ibid). This again is six-fold such as - "sapi sodha, adhyasa"tmika, kalpana"tmika, vivarta"tmika, viparinama"tmika, viparyaya"tmika, pravada"tmika ca iti." The adhyasa"tmika is illustrated by "kamalam anambhasi, kamale ca kuvalaye"... etc. (pp. 225). We know that in the K.P. of Mammata, this is a famous illustration of the figure atisayokti. Thus, Bhoja has quoted famous illustrations every where which we would put under this or that alamkara. The Kashmir school, as we know, puts the whole of 'alamkara' - under vacya-vacaka-bhava, with some under current of vyanjana or vyangyartha in many alamkaras such as samasokti, aksepa, paryayokta, aprastuta-prasamsa etc. So, they are a 'vacya-vacaka-bhava-vivarta' for those who follow the kashmir school of thought. Dr. Raghavan should have gone for such critical and comparative study of Bhoja's concept of Sabda-vrttis. 'mithyajnana' seems to be, for example, not different from niscayanta sa-samdeha, or bhrantiman alamkara (pp. 225, ibid). The 'pravada' variety is illustrated by the famous verse from the Megha-duta, viz. "ratna-cchaya-vyatikara iva..." (pp. 226, ibid), which is for us a beautiful utpreksa in "barhena iva sphurita-rucina gopa-vesasya visnoh." Bhoja then proceeds with the second variety of abhidha, viz. 'gauni as (pp. 226, ibid) "gauni dvividha. guna-nimitta, upacara-nimitta ca. tatra yasyam dvayor vacanayoh samanadhikaranyena vaiyadhikaranyena va prayogah, visesana-visesyabhavanyatha'nupapattyaikasya pratiyamana-abhidhiyamana-guna-dvarakah sambandho bhavati, sa guna-vyavahitartha guna-nimitta." gunah svartho visesanam pravrtti-akrti-jati-svarupa"di bhedad anantah. tat sambandhena yady api tannimitta vrttir ananta-prakara eva kalpyate, tathapi tasyah sad eva vikalpa bhavanti. mukhya-visayah, amukhya-visayah, bheda-visayah, abheda-visayah, visesana-visayah, a-visesana-visayah, iti." Now this again confirms our observation that the divisions and sub-divisions suggested by Bhoja go with the nature of the thing described. There is hardly any logical divide. Bhoja also knows that there can be innumerable varieties that go .... For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 283 with difference in the nature of the thing described. But he insists on six only. So, virtually there is no rhyme or rhythm in Bhoja's varieties except of course the outward system of dividing a point into six or twelve sub-varieites. The 'upacara' variety of gauni which is also six fold is explained as (pp. 229, ibid) : "mukhyaya gaunya va anya-visesanasya satonyatra aropanam upacarah" tannimittaka-upacara-nimitta. sa tu gauna-vyavahitarthatvat gauni bhavati, tasya api dharma-guna-aksti-kriya-svarupa-jatya"dayah pravstti-nimitta-tad-bhedat. sapi sad-prakara bhavati-dharma-nimitta, guna-nimitta, aksti-nimitta, kriya-nimitta, svarupa-nimitta, jatinimitta ca." We are reminded of the words of Visvanatha in his Sahityadarpana (S.D. II. 9. vitti) viz. "upacaro nama atyantam visakalitayoh padarthayoh sadnsyatisayamahimna bheda-pratiti-sthagana-matram." Bhoja holds that laksana is basically two-fold : (pp. 233, ibid) - "laksana laksitalaksana ca. tayor yasyam upatta-sabdasya arthasya kriyasiddhau sadhanarvaayogat svarthovina-bhutam arthantaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sa laksana, tadvyatirikta tu vaksyamana-anekarupa laksita-laksana iti. tatra laksana solha. samipya-laksana, sahacarya-laksana, saha-carita-laksana, hetulaksana, tadarthya-laksana, parimana-laksana ca. laksita-laksanapi sodhaiva. rulha-laksana, pratika-laksana, vivaksita-laksana, viruddha-laksana, tad-anya-laksana, prakirna-laksana ca. It is surprising that Bhoja refuses to go beyond laksana, especially in varieties called 'vivaksita-laksana' and viruddha-laksana' which normally for a follower of the kashmir school, takes us further to vyanjana and vyangyartha. Dr. Raghavan has also not discussed all this in details. On the contrary he has not at all chosen to treat the topic of sabdavrttis in Bhoja as an independent topic. Bhoja's illustration of vivaksita-laksana follows his explanation of this variety such as : "yatra yatha-kathamcit sabdaprayoge vivaksitam eva laksyanusarato laksyate sa vivaksita-laksana" (pp. 235, ibid) - The illustrations cited are - 'manasija-jaitraratham', etc. and, 'cakita-harini-hari-netra-tribhagah." Bhoja observes (pp. 235 ibid) - 'atra na ardha-sabdasya tribhaga-sabdasya arthah, kimtu, tabhyam asamagra"lokanam laksyate. na hi bhavati netra-caturbhago netra-sadbhago va iti." Bhoja does not go beyond laksana here. We know that Anandavardhana has quoted the verse viz. vridayogannata. etc. with its fourth line ending in, "...harinetra-tribhagah" once under Dhv. III. 3, 4; - with the words : "padavayavena dyotanam yatha." Thus the part 'tribhagah' of the whole compound is for him For Personal & Private Use Only

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284 SAHRDAYALOKA suggestive of 'rasa'. Elsewhere under Dhv. III. 33 also this illustration is quoted to explain how 'cestavisesa' becomes suggestive of srngara-rasa. Under I. 19, Kuntaka also picks up this illustration to demonstrate - visesana-vakratva, a variety of padapurvardha-vakrata. But Bhoja seems to be satisfied only with the secondary sense here, which is for him only 'a-samagra-alokanam'. Similarly Bhoja's tad-anyalaksana, which is illustrated by the famous verse : "suvarna-puspam prthivim..." etc. also ends with laksyartha only. Says he - "atra na suvarna-sabdartho, na - api puspa-sabdarthah kimtu suvarna-sabdena sarva-purusartha-mulam hiranyam, puspa-sabdena ca prasavartho laksyate. tabhyam ca laksitabhyam vyavasayinam purusa-visesanam vasumati sarvan kaman prasuta iti." Bhoja does not go beyond this while we know that this verse is given by Anandavardhana under Dhv. I. 13, as an illustration of 'a-vivaksita-vacya-dhvani.' Abhinavagupta in his Locana on this explains both laksana and vyanjana such as - (pp. 78, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. '97, 98) "suvarnani puspyati iti suvarna-puspa. etac ca vakyam eva a-sambhavad-svartham iti kitva avivaksita-vacyam. tata eva padartham abhidhaya anvayam ca tatparya- Saktya avagamayya eva, badhakavasena tam upahatya sadrsyat sulabhasamtddhisambhara-janatam laksayati. tal laksanaprayojanam sura-krtavidya-sevakanam prasastyam a-sabda-vacvatyena gopyamanam san navika-kuca-kalasa-yugalam iva maharghatam upanayan dhvanyate iti." We do not know why Bhoja stops at laksana only. But one thing is clear that though Bhoja does not mention 'vyangvartha' by name, he very much knows the same. In a number of illustrations of laksita-laksana this is bourne out. He observes (pp. 236, ibid) - "anye punah laksita-laksanam anyatha vyacaksate. laksanaya upacarita-vittya gaunyabhihitarthena yatra arthantaram laksyate sa laksita-laksana iti." He illustrates such a variety by 'rathanganama', 'pankti-rathah' etc. Then he gives poetic illustrations which for us are charged with vyanjana also, a name which he does not mention. For example in, "parimlanam pina-stana...." etc. we have 'vadati bisini-patra-sayanam.' Bhoja has a note (pp. 237, ibid) : "atra vadati iti anena upacara-vittya jnapayati iti, parimlanam itya"dibhih tad-dharmaih tanu-sannivesacarutvotkarso laksyate." Mammata has quoted this verse as an illustration of prasada-guna (K.P. VIII), while Anandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 14, takes it as an illustration of 'upacarita-sabda-vrtti'. Says he, "yatra hi vyanjakatva-krtam mahatsausthavam nasti tatrapi upacarita-sabda-vrttya prasiddhy-anurodha-pravartitavyavaharah kavayo disyante'. Read Abhinavagupta (Locana, pp. 82, Edn. Dr. Nandi) on this : "vayam tu bruma) - prasiddhyam prayojanasya a-nighudhata ity arthah. uttanena api rupena, tat-prayojanan cakasan nighudhatam nidhanavad apeksate iti bhavah." Bhoja also cites the verse : 'nisvasandha iva"darsah candrama For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 285 na prakasate' and adds (pp. 237, ibid) - "atra yatha andhe rupa-visesabhivyaktir na sambhavyate, evam tamasi api .... yo rupa-grahanasamarthah sondha ucyate. tatra upacarita-vittya yondhavat na pasyati sa evandha iti ucyate. iha yatra kimcit na drsyate tatra'pi andha-sabdopalaksita-laksanaya pravartate. We know that Anandavardhana cites this verse (Dhv. II. i) as an illustration of atyanta-tirasktavacya-dhvani. With this we come to the end of Bhoja's concept of abhidha, which includes mukhya (i.e. abbidha proper), gauni and laksana. Bhoja as observed earlier does not treat it as a special topic as is done by alamkarikas of the kashmir school of thought, but it falls under the twelve types of 'sahitya' or relation of word and meaning in general, and of course as his illustrations suggest, with a special reference to the poetic use of word and meaning also. With this Bhoja's treatment of abhidha is screened. His approach to vyanjana will be examined in due course when we will discuss the concept of vyanjana. (Ch. 5 VIII, IX) Mukula and others : We may compare Bhoja's approach, as noted above to that of Mukula Bhatta, Kuntaka and also Mahima Bhatta, because these three writers also do not fall in line with the so called kashmir school of thought. Though of course Mukula and Kuntaka were definitely Bhoja's predecessors, Mahima was perhaps almost a senior contemporary. The consideration of these writers also is taken up here in this chapter, due to the reason that they also do not fall in line with the kashmir tradition. As it is, they are all pre-Mammata, but of course unique in their approach and Bhoja was under their influence. We examine Mukula Bhatta first. Mukula Bhatta, to the best of our knowledge, has contributed a single work called the "Abhidha-vstta-matrka." Mukula virtually accepts two sabda-vrttis such as abhidha and laksana, but the latter is also an extention of, and therefore part of abhidha for him, and is broad enough to include even vyanjana. In the very first karika he observes : "sabdavyaparato yasya pratitis tasya mukhyata arthavaseyasya punar laksyamanatvam ucyate." - AVM. I. pp. 2 (Edn. Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, '73) He further observes : (pp. 2, ibid) "sabda-vyaparad yasyavagatis tasya mukhyatvam. sa hi yatha sarvebhyo hasta"dibhyovayavebhyah purvam mukham For Personal & Private Use Only

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286 SAHRDAYALOKA avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyah pratiyamanebhyah arthantarebhyah purvam avagamyate. tasman mukham iva mukhya iti sakhadiyantena mukhya-sabdena abhidhiyate. tasya udaharanam, gaur anubandhya' iti. atra hi go-sabda-vyaparat yaga-sadhana-bhuta go-tva-laksana jatir avagamyate. atas tasyah mukhyata. tad evam sabda-vyapara-gamyo mukhyo'rthah." i.e. - "The apprehension of which is derived through the function of employment of a word is termed mukhya i.e. principal. It is said to be 'mukhya' because as is mukha i.e. face seen first as compared to hands and other limbs, in the same way that meaning also is apprehended first in comparision will all other meanings apprehended. So, 'that which is like 'mukha' or 'face' is termed 'mukhya' i.e. principal, which is formed with the help of Panini sutra 5/3/103, viz. "sakhadibhyo yah" - which recommends 'ya' suffix which is in the sense of comparision and seen in words such as 'sakha' etc. The illustration is, "gaur anubandhyah" i.e. 'the cow/ox may be fixed for a sacrifice.' Here, 'go' is a word, and due to its employment gotva-jati is apprehended as instrument for performing a sacrifice. So, the mukhyata or principality will be - fixed with reference to 'go-jati'. From this illustration, it is understood that the meaning viz. 'gotva-adi-rupa' which is derived by the function of the word 'gauh' is its mukhya i.e. principal meaning. But, observes Mukala, that is called 'laksanika' or secondary, whose apprehension follows the examination of a meaning derived through sabdavyapara - "yasya tu sabda-vyapara-avagamyartha-paryalocanaya avagatis tasya laksanikatvam. yatha purvasmin eva udaharane vyakteh." - Mukula thus holds that the meaning of go-vyati or individual cow follows the first apprehension of go-jati, and therefore the go-vyakti-jnana is laksanika for him. Mukula holds that - (pp. 2, 3, ibid) : "sa hi na sabda-vyaparad avasiyate, 'visesyam nabhidha gacched ksina-saktir visesane' iti nyayat sabdasya jatimatra-paryavasitatvat. jatis tu vyaktim antarena yaga-sadhana-bhavam na pratipadyate iti sabda-pratyayitajati-samarthyad atra jater asraya-bhuta vyaktir aksipyate. tena asau laksaniki. evam ayam mukhya-laksanika"tma-visayopavarnana-dvarena sabdasya abhidhavyaparo dvividhah pratipadito, nirantarartha-nisthah, santarartha-nisthas' ca." Mukula holds that go-vyakti is not understood through the function of a word, because there is an all accepted dictum that, "abhidha can express only one of the two viz. visesana or visesya. If it conveys visesana then it cannot express visesya, for the whole of its capacity is exhausted in apprehending visesana alone. Following this principle, in the said illustration, the word 'go' has a capacity to convey only For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 287 gotva-jati'. When the apprehender thinks that 'jati' by itself, cannot be instrumental in the act of sacrifice, without its reference to the 'go-vyati', then this 'go-vyakti' is covered by aksepa i.e. implication (= i.e. either by anumana or inference, or arthapatti). Thus the meaning of go-vyakti is said to be "laksanika", according to Mukula. He further observes that thus by the discription of two aspects such as 'mukhya' and 'laksanika', two fold abhidhavyapara of a word is established. The first (mukhya) flows directly from the word without anything coming in between, and is therefore said to be 'nirantarartha-nistha' i.e. directly apprehended from a word. The other is termed "santarartha-nistha" as it passes through a veil. It starts from word - goes through mukhyartha i.e. jati - and rests in vyakti at the next step. It is 'santarartha-nista' because it has antara=vyavadhapa, in form of first meaning which is jati-rupa. Mukula accepts a four-fold division of abhidha : (pp. 4, ibid) - samprati mukhya'bhidha-vyaparasya caturvidhyam abhidhiyate" "tatra mukhyas' caturbhedo jneyo jatya"di-bhedatah." Mukula says that the Mahabhasyakara has suggested a four-fold classification of words in form of jati-sabda, guna-sabda, kriya-sabda and yadiccha-sabda. When words operate to convey their meaning (svarthabhidhanaya pravarttamananam), they are colourd by the upadhis i.e. attributes - upadhy - uparanjita-visaya-vivekatvad upadhi-nibandhana pravrttih. This upadhi i.e. attribute is two-fold, viz. vaktp-sannivesita, i.e. which is grafted by the speaker, i.e. which is not natural to it, and 'vastu-dharma' i.e. one that naturally resides in an object. The first is illustrated by such words as dittha' and the like. The form of such words is collected by the last letter - "antya-buddhi-nirgrahyam samhrtakramam svarupam" (pp. 5, ibid). This capacity to yield meaning is injected into a particular word by a speaker, who wants to flash the abhidhapower of that particular word according to his own choice. - "tat khalu tam tam abhidhasaktim abhivyanjayata vaktra, yadecchaya tasmin tasmin samjnini upadhitaya samnivesyate." (pp. 5) It may be noted that as Mukula was posterior to Anandavardhana, he knew vyanjana very well and yet he willingly disowns it. He uses such words as "abhivyanjayata", but he does not encourage vyanjana sakti' of a word. He only means, "making it manifest, or making it flash something." For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA Mukula considers another view point also. Says he - some people hold that no such 'samhrta-krama-svarupa' is injected into the 'samjni' because there cannot be such form independent of 'da' kara, etc. Thus it being 'abhava"tmaka', it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadrccha-sabdatva of such words as 'dittha' and the like is also formed because for them also words such as 'dittha' and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudayabhava, come into exercise for 'abhidhana' of whatever samjna is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of dittha, even if some imagined 'dittha-tva' is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word dittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5): "yesam api ca 'da' kara"di-varna-vyatirikta-samhrta-krama-svarupabhavat na dittha"disabda-svarupam, samhrta-kramam samjnisu adhyavasyate, iti darsanam, tesam api vaktr-yadrccha'-bhivyajyamana-saktibhedanusarena kalpanika-samudayarupasya dittha"deh sabdasya tat tat samjnabhidhanaya pravartamanatvat yadrccha sabdatvam dittha"dinam upapadyata eva." 288 - Mukul of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyakaranas. vastu-dharma-rupa upadhi is also two-fold; 'sadhya' and 'siddha'. The former are the words expressing action-i.e. they are kriyasabdas, e.g. 'pacati' and the like. The latter i.e. 'siddha upadhi' is also two fold such as 'jati' and 'guna'. 'Jati' is said to be prana-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with 'jati'. So, 'jati' is said to be 'pranaprada-siddha-vastudharma'. Mukul quotes Vakyapadiya : "gaur iti; na hi gauh svarupena gauh, napya-gauh. gotvabhisambandhat tu gauh." Some attribute (upadhi) becomes the cause of visesa"dhana for an object which has obtained its own form (pp. 5, ibid) : "kascit punar upadhir labdha-svarupasyavastunah visesa"dhanahetuh, yatha sukla"dir gunah." i.e. like 'guna' in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only 'jati' is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its 'visesa"dhana' - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The 'guna's such as 'paramanutva' - 'atom-ness' or the quality of being an atom, which are permanent (i.e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guna' - "tesam api sarvesam guna-jatiyatvat, they are also of the same type as these, i.e. suklatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jati', but because they are 'visesa"dhanahetu', they are termed gunas, and not jati. Thus Mukula concludes: (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evam prana-prado'padhi-nibandhanatvam yasya sabdasya sa jati-sabdo yatha gava"dih. yasmat labdha-svarupasya vastuno visesa"dhana-hetuh arthah pratiyate, sa gunasabdo yatha sukla"dih." For Personal & Private Use Only -

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 289 We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammata. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammata to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patanjali and Bhartrhari. - Now, Mukula considers a purva-paksa. It goes like this - Is it not possible that words connoting 'guna', 'kriya' or 'yadrccha' - all can be taken as jati-sabda ? For example take the word sukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balaka (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word 'sukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus 'jati-nibandhanatva' of 'guna-vaci' words is seen. This can be said of kriya sabdas also. The kriya of cooking in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. is different yet it is conveyed by the same word viz., 'pacati'. The yadrccha words such as 'dittha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jati i.e. 'dittha-sabdatva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'catustayi pravrtti' of words does not hold good: "atas ca gunakriya yadrccha-sabdanam api jati-sabdatvat catustayi sabdanam pravrttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid) The siddhantin's answer follows: It is not 'jati' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity in case of guna-sabdas or kriyasabdas. But it is 'samjn?' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i.e. the asraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the individual quality such as whiteness etc., owing to difference with reference to time, place, and context, and thus due to difference in medium, 'karanabheda' - appear differt when vested in a conch, and the like. The colour looks, as though different. But thereby 'suklatva' - 'jati' is not proved to have existence. For 'jati' is that one 'dharma' which resides in many. But the substratum of the imagined suklatva jati, viz. sulkla-vyakti is basically one and identical. Same is the case with such words as 'pacati', 'dittha', etc. Thus the 'vyakti' in form of paka-kriya is one and the same, and so also the individual-samjni-named 'dittha'. The illusory manifoldness nanatva-seen in different stages of paka-kriya, or in an individual at different years such as of a child, young boy, young man, etc. etc. - makes for this wrong perception of jati in such cases. This is not real. Says Mukula (pp. 10, ibid) - "atra api ekasya eva paka"di-kriya-vyakteh, dittha"di-sabda-vyakteh, dittha"des ca samjnino yathakramam abhivyanjakanam paka"dinam tatha dhvaninam vayovastha-visesanam For Personal & Private Use Only -

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SAHRDAYALOKA kaumara"dinam ca yo bhedas tad vasena nanavidhena rupena avabhasamanatvat sthitam etat sabda-pravrtti-nimittanam sabdarthas' catur vidhah iti." 290 After this Mukula turns to the second variety of abhidha, i.e. laksanika abhidha. This also is two fold. The AVM 2B reads: "suddhopacara-misratvat laksana dvividha mata." Because of its being either suddha i.e. pure or upacaramisra, i.e. with (metaphorical) expression, laksana is two-fold. The illustrations are 'gangayam ghosah' and 'gaur vahikah' respectively. The suddha-laksana is also divided twofold, such as upadana-laksana i.e. inclusive indication and laksana-laksana i.e. exclusive indication. (AVM. 3A). Mukula suggests that when something else is imposed to support one thing: sva-siddhyarthataya"ksepo yatra vastvantarasya tat (AVM. 3B) - This is called upadanam; or 'inclusive' variety. The other is the opposite of this (AVM. IV. A) : laksanam tu tad-viparyasato matam." This is exclusive type. We know that all this has been accepted by Mammata without challanging. But the - illustration that Mukula cites for upadana-laksana viz. "gaur-anuvandhyah" is rejected by Mammata. It is taken as 'arthapatti' or presumption or inference from circumstances, i.e. implication, for in the illustration cited by Mukula we cannot show either rudhi or prayojana which is the basis of laksana. Mammata also feels that sabda-pramana is resorted to only when other pramanas do not operate. Here, go-vyakti in the present illustration of 'gaur-anuvandhyah' is known through implication. So it is no use utilizing a sabda-vrtti here. Laksana-laksana occurs when one's meaning is sacrificed to obtain the other sense, as in "gangayam ghosah". Mukula proceeds to give a four-fold division of upacara-misra laksana (AVM. 4B-5A). He says: "aropa'dhyavasanabhyam suddha-gaunopacarayoh (4B) AVM. pratyekam bhidyamanatvat upacaras caturvidhah." (5A) AVM. Thus superimposition (aropa) and introsusception (adhvasana) make for these varieties. Thus in all four-fold upacara-metaphorical imposition - is available. Thus Mukula first begins with upacara or identification as suddha and gauna. Suddha is that which has no upamana-upameya-bhava or similarity at its basis. The For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 291 guna in form of similarity is absent here. This is illustrated by such examples as ayur ghrtam' where karya-karanabhava-is at its base. Gauna upacara, or identification based on guna such as similarity between upamana and upameya which results in superimposition of the sabda and artha describing upamana on that concerning upameya, is illustrated as in "gaur vahikah". Now this two-fold upacara or or identification is also two-fold on the basis of adhyaropa or superimposition and adhyavasana or absorption, i.e. partial and complete identification. Adhyaropa or partial imposition occurs when the difference between the object superimposed and the basic object on which superimposition is done, is not concealed, i.e. the difference between the two is not eroded. Here a lesser object whose identity is not convered up is seen clearly and on this object, another object of superior quality is superimposed. This is called 'adhyaropa'. This is illustrated in both the illustrations i.e. ayur ghrtam' and 'gaur-vahikah' cited above. Prior to this Mukula had made one remark that : kecit tu upacare sabdopacaram eva manyante; na arthopacaram. tad ayuktam. sabdopacarasya arthopacara-avinabhavitvat." (pp. 16) i.e. only sabdopacara is not possible as believed by some, because it necessarily involves 'arthopacara'. It may also be observed that when Mukula says (pp. 16), dvividhah upacarah; suddho gaunas ca. tatra suddho yatra mula-bhutasya..." This suggests that Mukala is in favour of taking only upacara based on similarity as real upacara. In Mammata's mind this impression was lying at the root. It is therefore that by the end of his discussion on upadana-laksana and laksana-laksana, he writes : "ubhayarupa ca iyam suddha, upacarena a-misratvat. So, for Mammata also 'upacara' is basically rooted in similarity. Precisely for this, Mammata does not use the term 'upacara' while treating saropa and sadhyavasanika. Mammata also did not favour the upacara which was sabda-gata. Mukula explains 'aropa' and 'adhyavasana' as : (pp. 18, ibid) : "yatra adhyaropya-aropa visayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram tatra an-apahnuta-svarupa eva vastvantare vastvantarasya adhikasya aropyamanatvad adhyaropah." - We have explained it as above. Adhyavasana is said to be there - when, "yatra tu upacaryamana-visayasya upacaryamane antarlinataya vivaksitatvat svarupapahnavah kriyate, tatra adhyavasanam." The suddha-upacaragata-adhyavasana is seen in, "pancalah". The word 'pancala' through laksita-laksana, it being the place for stay of a child of pancala, is itself used in the sense of a village : "atra hi pancalapatya-nivasadhikaranatvaj janapade laksita-laksanaya pancala-sabdah prayujyate." (pp. 18, ibid) Gauna upacaragata For Personal & Private Use Only

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292 SAHRDAYALOKA adhyavasana is illustrated as in, 'raja'. Here 'gaunatva' does not come to mind immediately, but only after some thought is given to it. So, it looks as it were it is ordinary - 'bhrastam iva', for the importance of rudhi is more powerful here. Thus we have "adhyavasana-yukta-gauna-upacara" here. When to these four upacara-based varieties two as stated above are added, we have in all six varieties of laksana. - "etena caturvidhena upacarena saha purvoktau dvau laksanabhedau samkalayya sat prakara laksana vaktavya" . observes Mukula (pp. 18, ibid). Now this laksana is said to be 'tri-skandha (i.e. having three basic varieties) on account of its suddhatva, adhyaropa and adhyavasana : "esa ca laksana triskandha, suddhatvat, adhyaropad, adyavasanat ca." (pp. 20. ibid) - Thus when these three each are divided into two we have a scheme of six-fold laksana. Mammata also has the same observation : "laksana tena sad-vidha" (K.P. II). Mukula explains the sub-divisions such as - "tatasthe laksana suddha syad aropastv adurage || (AVM. VB) nigirne'dhyavasanam tu rudhyasannataratvatah | (AVM VI. A). i.e. suddha laksana will have aropa with reference to tatastha (i.e. independently present), 'aropa' i.e. superimposition is with reference to 'a-duraga', and 'adhyavasana' or complete identification is in 'nigarana' i.e. swallowing up. This is two fold; - either through rudhi or asannatarata i.e. nearness." The idea is - Laksana is said to be two-fold such as 'upadana' and 'laksana'. Now wherever this occurs, the laksya object is not covered up (anuparaktatvat tatasthataya pratiyamane) by the 'laksaka' object, and so it remains 'tatastha' i.e. independend of the other object. This means that the 'laksya' object is not apprehended as covered up by the 'laksaka' object, e.g. "gangayam ghosah." Here 'tata' or the bank of the river Ganga is in mind and so, 'tata' is not realized as completely covered up by a special flow of water, because that special flow is restricted to the limit of only indicating the bank from a distance. So, the apprehension of the bank takes place independently and not as identified with the Ganga. We have to accept the same situation in case of upadana laksana also, e.g. in "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day." : "tatha hi - 'gangayam ghosa' iti atra ghosadhikarana-bhuta-tatopalaksanabhisamdhanena For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 293 'gangayam ghoso na vitastayam' iti ganga-sabde prayujyamane tatasya srotovisesena-upalaksakatvam-atropayuktatvena uparago na pratiyate, tatasthatvena eva tasya tatasya pratyayat. evam upadane'pi vacyam - yatha, 'pino devadatto diva na bhunkta' iti." (AVM. pp. 20, ibid). Mukula further observes that when it is required for the tata to express itself as covered up by the special flow and yet its own form is also to be revealed, then in the illustration viz. 'gangayam ghosah', first there is superimposition i.e. aropa, for in such an aropa there is apprehension of tata as coloured by the flow. So, the apprehension takes this form : "ghosa or dwelling is on such a bank which as it is in proximity of a special flow of water, is itself of the form of the flow itself.' As against that when the idea is to convey extreme proximity - 'atyanta asannata', and when the particular statement is used to convey this extreme proximity, then the bank is presented as completely covered up by the special flow. So, it is shown that the dwelling is, 'directly on the Ganga, not anywhere else.' There it is the case of complete identification or swollowing up - 'adhyavasana' : "yada tu ganga-sabdabhidheyasya sroto-visesasya a-viduravartitaya tatam anapahnuta-svarupam sroto-visesoparaktaya tatasya pratiteh sroto-visesa-a-vidura-vartitvat srotovicesa-rupe tate ghosa iti. yada tu atyantam asannatam ghosam prati srotovisesasya pratipadayitum etad vakyam srotovisesa-nigirmataya tatam apahnutya prayujyate 'gangayam eva saksad ghosah na tu anyatra iti', tada adhyavasanam. (pp. 20, 21, ibid) Thus, "gaur vahikah" and "gaur eva ayam", are illustrations of gauna-upacaramulaka, saropa and sadhyavasanika, respectively. Just as adhyavasana-laksana is possible with reference to proximity, similarly it is possible with reference to rudhi also : "yatha ca asanna-tatatvena adhyavasanam purvam pravibhaktam ta rudhatvena api pravibhaktavyam" (pp. 22 ibid). The illustrations are 'pancalah' and 'raja'. Precisely for this the karika said, "rudhya"sannataratvatah" rudhatvat asannataratvat ca nigirne arthe adhyavasanam syad ity arthah." (pp. 22, ibid). Thus rudhi is also based on a forgotten relation, while prayojanavati has its sambandha fresh in mind. Mukula has not counted 'prayojana' as the hetu of laksana. Mukula here discusses a prima facie view. The objector's contention is - "The 'mukhyartha' i.e. primary meaning is necessarily conveyed by word itself. As against this, the 'laksanika' i.e. secondary meaning is not collected through the word. To put it more clearly, it can be said that, the karya-karana-relation of a particular meaning with a particular word is ascertained through 'anvaya-vyatireka'. Again this apprehension is with reference only to the four-fold primary meaning such as jati, guna, kriya and For Personal & Private Use Only

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294 SAHRDAYALOKA yadeccha. But this is not so in case of the six-fold laksanika i.e. secondary meaning. This again is in the fitness of things, for if the word is connected directly even with the secondary sense, then even this 'laksanika' also will be branded as 'mukhya'. Again, as the laksanika artha is connected with the mukhya i.e. primary sense, and in that case if it is held that this secondary sense is also derived through the agency of the word itself, then the question which arises is that when a word also conveys the secondary sense along with conveying of its primary sense also, is it so that this secondary sense is conveyed in a sapeksa way, i.e. with some expectancy, or nirapeksa i.e. in an independent way without expectancy ? - If it is conveyed independently i.e. (nirapeksah), then its apprehension should take place for all time. If on the other hand its apprehension occurs in a correlated way - (sapeksah), then the question is what is expected here ? : "atha sabdasya mukhyo yosav arthas tena saha sambandho laksyamanasya arthasya drsta iti tad-dvarena tasya avagatir iti abhidhiyate, evam sati yadi nirapeksah svartha-pratipadana-dvarena laksyamanam artham avagamayati tada sarvada tam artham avagamayet, atha sapeksah, kim tasya apeksaniyam iti asankya aha" - (pp. 24, ibid). With reference to the above objection, Mukula observes that - "vaktur vakyasya vacyasya rupabhedavadharanat laksana sat-prakaraisa vivektavya manisibhih." - (7A) (pp. 24, ibid) "The learned divide this laksana, in a six-fold fashion, keeping in mind the formal varieties of vakta i.e. speaker, vakya i.e. the sentence and vacya i.e. the sense conveyed." The idea is that each of vakta, vakya and vacya are either staying independently or with one of the other two. (i) 'Vakta' is that person, who utters a sentence to convey some sense to someone else. (ii) 'Vakya' is the use of words having expectancy and which jointly convey a single sense. (iii) Vacya' is the meaning which is the object of a word either through its primary or secondary function. All these three have two sub-divisions each - i.e. samasta or vyasta i.e. each one stays either with either of the other two, or stays independently. The idea is that with reference to the different situations caused by space and time, these factors are united either in a 'samasta' or 'vyasta' form. As a result there occurs a difference in their nature. Due to this difference in nature, the experts have thought of the six-fold division of laksana : "etesam trayanam vakra"dinam vyasta-samasta-bheda-bhinnanam desa-kalav-asthavailaksanya-gata-samasta-vyasta-bheda-samyojitanam yah svabhava-bhedaprapancah, tata esa sat-prakara laksana paramarsa-kusalair vivecaniya." (pp. 24, 25, ibid). Through this six-fold meaning only, a word causes the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 295 apprehension of the secondary sense. Thus, through the agency i.e. karanasamagri such as vakta or speaker and the rest, the word is connected with the secondary sense and then becomes capable to give the secondary sense. The idea is that the word has expectancy with reference to these six-fold vakta, vacya etc., when it gives its primary sense. Then, through usage - vrddha-vyavahara-through this primary sense, it fixes its relation with the secondary sense. Through the said six-fold meaning the word conveys the secondary sense. So, a word does not give a secondary sense, till its relation with secondary sense is not comprehended. This relation is not brought about naturally, but only through the agency or karana-samagri such as vakta or speaker etc., and also only after the primary sense is collected. As is said by Sabarasvamin - "Then, how is it that a different word (= say, ganga) is used for a different opinion, we say, it is through the medium of conveying of one's own meaning." (Mi. su. I. 4. 12). Here, the ense is intended through the primary sense. Sabara has further stated, (Mi. su. I. iv. i) that laksana is from day to day usage, i.e. laukiki. Through this it is suggested by him that, when a word proceeds towards the secondary sense, it has an expectancy of a sort of relation. By 'loka' is meant the means of knowledge that comes into function in day to day affairs. So, 'laukiki' means 'that which is known in ordinary parlance', i.e. which is established by a . d which carries some relation : "etad uktam bhavati. na sabdanam anavadharita-laksanikartha-sambandhanam laksanikam artham prati gamakatvam, napi ca tatra saksat sambandha-grahanam, kim tarhi? vaktra"di-samagriapeksaya svartha-vyavadhanena iti. yad uktam-acarya-sabarasvamina - "katham punah parasabdah paratra vartate ? svarthabhidhanena iti brumah" - iti. atra hi svartha-dvarena laksyamanarthabhinivesita sabdanam ukta. punas ca asau eva aha - "laksanapi laukiki eva", iti. atra hi sambandhavadharana-sapeksanam sabdanam laksyamane arthe pravittir ukta. vyavaharopa"rudhani hi pratyaksa"dini pramanani loka-sabdena abhidhiyante. loka eva vidita laukiki, vyavahara-gamya, parigrhita-sambandha-sabda-nistha iti arthah." Here Mukula also quotes from Kumarila - "nirulha laksanah kascit samarthyad abhidhanavat, kriyante sampratam kascit kascin naiva tv asaktitah." - iti. * i.e. Some laksanas are based on usage. They carry the strength of conveying a meaning like the primary function (= abhidhanavat). While some (other) laksanas For Personal & Private Use Only

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296 SAHRDAYALOKA are formed on the spot. Still others are not formed at all (i.e. they are not acceptable at all), because they are bereft of the power to convey sense." (Tantravartika - 3/1/6 - arunadhikarana).' The first one is illustrated by 'raja' and the like. The second variety which is floated on the spot, i.e. the 'tatkaliki, is the result of the context of vrddha vakta (i.e. the speaker) etc.. such as seen in the verse, "snigdhasyamala." etc. In this verse the word 'lipta' has its primary sense contradicted: because lustre or kanti has no inherent capacity to smear anything as is done by saffron powder. This is so with reference to words such as 'suhrd', 'rama', etc. also. The third variety is such which is not marked even in the vsddhavyavahara or practice of the seniors and the like. Nor, do we find such situation as in case of words such as 'lipta' and the like. So, this third type is unacceptable. They cannot be put into practice. What Mukula drives at is that laksana is possible only in cases of such words as are put into practice by seniors, or which are similar to such practice. Laksana is not possible anywhere and everywhere. For in that case any word will be able to deliver any sense, and this we do not find in reality : "tad evam, vaktradi-samagri-anupravesena sabdanam svartham arpayatam arthantaram prati svarupa-dvarena sajatiya-sabda-dvarena va gamakataya avadharitanam laksakatvam iti sthitam." (pp. 30, ibid). The principle established is that, in the context of the instrumentality (samagri) of the speaker etc., words become indicator (laksaka) only when through the same instrument (such as vakta etc.), they are accepted as conveying meaning through their very form either in the practice of the seniors or through such other device." After deaing with the four-fold 'mukhya artha' and the six-fold laksana, Mukula discusses a fresh problem. He discusses the four views concerning (i) abhihitanvaya, (ii) anvitabhidhana, (iii) the samuccaya of these two and (iv) the 'abhava' of these two. He discusses the position of laksana with reference to these four alternatives. Says he - "anvayebhihitanam sa vacyatvad urdhvam isyate - 7B anvitanam tu vacyatve, vacyatvasya purah sthitah, vakyartha paramarthatah - 8 nasty asau kalpiterthe tu purvavat pravibhajyate." - 9A For Personal & Private Use Only

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funerions Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 297 i.e. In abhihitanvayavada laksana is believed to take place after vacyatva is over. In anvitabhidhanavada it is believed to occur prior to the primary i.e., vacyarva. In the two (together), at both the places (i.e. earlier and later), and where 'akhandata' is accepted with reference to sentence sense, laksana does not take place at all. It is believed and divided as done earlier in an imagined sense such as word-sense (because in reality only the sentence-sense exists)." Mukula observes : (pp. 48, ibid) : akhande tu vakyarthesau laksana paramarthena nasti. bhinnanam padarthanam paramarthatobhidheya-bhavasya anupapadyamanatvat, tad asritatvac ca laksanayah. kalpita-padartha"srayena tu sa laksana yatha-ruci purvavad abhihitanvaya-anvitabhidhana - tat-samuccayakalpanaya vibhaktavyabhage nivesya, parasparasya desa-kalavacchedena'sesavyavahart--nisthataya rudhatvat." Mukula observes that in all the four alternatives such as the abhihitanvayavada and the rest, wherever it is not proper to accept the primary sense, the functioning of laksana is suggested. This laksana, according to Mukula (i) the primary sense, being contradicted by any other means of knowledge becomes impossible, (ii) the laksyartha being closer to mukhyartha and (iii) and also when this acceptance of the secondary sense - 'santarartha-grahana' - rests on some 'prayojana' or reason : . "ya ca iyam sat-prakara laksana purvam ukta, sa - (i) mukhyarthasya pramanantara-badhitatvena-a-sambhavat. (ii) laksyamanasya ca arthasya mukhyartham prati asannatvat, (iii) santarartha-grahanasya ca sa-prayojanatvat iti evamvidha-karanatritaya"tmaka-samagri-samasrayena vaddha-vyavahare paridrsyate. Now, says Mukula, the 'asannatva' or nearness of laksyartha with mukhyartha is five-fold, according to Bhartrmitra-such as, "abhidheyena sambandhat sadrsyat, samavayatah vaiparityat kriya-yogat laksana pancadha mata" iti (pp. 50, ibid) i.e. through (i) relation with the primary meaning (ii) through similarity (iii) 'samavaya' i.e, intimate relation, (iv) opposition (iv) relation with verb-kriyayoga; For Personal & Private Use Only

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298 SAHRDAYALOKA laksana is said to be five-fold. Thus, says Mukula, the 'prayojana' is also two-fold. One 'prayojana' is such which depends on vrddhavyavahara which is beginningless in accepting the meaning that it conveyed and therefore depending on the established custom. This is as good as 'rudhi' or convention, e.g. in case of words such as dvi-refa' etc. This word is having two 'ra'-karas, as the word 'bhramara' meaning a bee consists of two ra-karas. So, dvi-refa' - i.e. one having two-fra'karas, also conveys the same sense without dragging in the word 'bhramara'. Thus, this is as good as 'rudhi or convention. Now Mukula has suggested that 'following a rudhi' is a 'prayojana' here. The second prayojana is different from the above rudhi-tulya-prayojana. Mukula observes (pp. 50, ibid) : "aparam tu rudhyanusaranatmakam yat prayojanam uktam, tad-vyatirikta-vastyantara-gatasya samvijnana-padasya rupavisesa-pratipadanam nama, yatha purvam udahstam, "ramosmiti"o. - This second prayojana is in form of establishment of a special form of an object, which is concealed in that object, but the conveying of which is intended. The illustration is, "ramosmi..." etc. Both these purposes or aims (i.e. prayojanas) are to be determined through the secondary meaning arrived at with the help of the above mentioned five-fold relation, when the primary meaning is set aside; it being in-appropriate. Now it may be observed here, that in nirudha laksana Mukula tries to find a 'prayojana' in form of 'following convention' as established by usage made current by seniors. But accepting or imagining a 'prayojana' in rudhi-mula, does not look possible to us. Dr. Rewaprasad observes that even if we accept what Mukula holds here, greater charm is caused by such usages as 'dvi-refa' in place of the direct mention of 'bhramara'. Thus, causing a greater charm could be a prayojana here. But we feel that it is better to hold only rudhi as the cause of laksana here and such rudhi in itself carries its own charm, for ultimately laksana or say, poetic deviation of any kind causes charm. So, rulhi laksana has an inherent charm which does not stand in need of any prayojana. Mukula provides illustrations for this five-fold laksana. At the end of it he observes that in this five-fold laksana the expressed meaning is at times (i) atyantatiraskrta i.e. completely lost, or (ii) the expressed is either intended or unintended (vivaksita/a-vivaksita) : (pp. 58, ibid) "idanim pancavidha-sambandhanibandhanayam asattau purvopavarnitayam kvacid vacyasya ati-tiraskarah, kvacid vivaksitatvam, kvacic ca a-vivaksitarvam iti evamvidham trayam yat sahtdayair For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavittis, the nature of : Abhidha 299 upadarsitam, tasya visaya-vibhagam upadarsayitum aha - sadssye vaiparitye ca vacyasya ati-tiraskriya - (10 B) vivaksa ca avivaksa ca, sambandha-samavayayoh, upadane vivaksa'tra laksane tv avivaksanam || - (11) tiraskriya kriyayoge, kvacit tad-viparitata - (12 A) i.e. the expressed is totally abandoned in case of the relations such as sadrsya and vaiparitya. There is intended and un-intended expressed sense in varieties based on 'sambandha' and 'samavaya'. In 'upadana' we have only the vivaksa of the expressed, i.e. it is always expected, and in 'laksana' there is only a-vivaksa, while in 'kriya-yoga' the expressed is either abandoned (tiraskriya) or not. Mukula explains this with reference to the illustrations cited by him, but we feel there is overlapping in these cases and his treatment is not as scientific as that of either his predecessor Anandavardhana or his successor Mammata. Mukula also observes : (pp. 66, ibid) : "laksanamargavagahitvam tu dhvaneh sahrdayair nutanatayopavarnitasya vidyate iti disam unmilayitum idam atra uktam. etac ca vidvadbhih kusagriyaya buddhya nirupaniyam, na tu jhagity eva asuyitavyam iti alam atiprasangena." i.e. "This is just to suggest that the newly advocated dhvani by the connoisseurs falls into the region of 'laksana' only. The learned with very sharp intelligence have to brood over our observation and that it need not be immediately discarded. So now, enough of further elaboration." Mukula, thus tries to incorporate 'dhvani' under laksyartha and thus for him vyanjana is part of laksana which again is abhidha itself because it is only an extension of abhidha. Mukula concludes to his satisfaction that the word-element which is in itself undivided in form of pure sabda-tattva, i.e. prior to its being classified into the fourfold scheme of jativacaka, etc., the word-element which is 'a-bhinna' in its original form, attains to the 'vivarta' i.e. illusive change in form of 'sabda', 'artha' and 'sambandha' i.e. word, its meaning and their relation later, then only the abhidhasakti is said to be ten-fold. In its original non-dualistic form of word, there is no scope for this ten-fold division : (pp. 69, ibid) - "idanim sakala-sabda-a-vibhaga"tmakasya sabda-tattvasya yada sabdarthasambandha-tritaya-rupataya rajju-sarpataya vivarta-manatvam tada etad abhidhavsttam dasa-vidha-vyavaharo-parohitayopapadyate, na tu samhitartha-vak For Personal & Private Use Only

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300 tattva-visayataya iti darsayitum aha 21 - vivartamanam vak-tattvam dasadhaiva vilokyate. - 12 samhrta-kramabhede tu tasmin tesam kuto gatih." - 13A. ity etad abhidhavrttam dasadhatra vivecitam. - 13B. mukhyasya abhidhavrttasya prakaras catvarah laksanikasya tu sad iti evam 33 dasaprakarakam abhidha-vrttam atra vivecitam. This treatment of Mukula's views suggests how he has influenced Bhoja in taking abhidha as three-fold such as mukhya, gauni and laksana. We know that this approach is different from the one seen in the kashmir school, the highest expression of which we noticed above in Jagannatha. But prior to that we have also to take note of Kuntaka and Mahima also, who influenced the Malava school like Mukula. The flowering of the thought as seen in the kashmir school is to be traced in Anandavardhana, who discusses abhidha only from the angle of its difference from vyanjana, and then in the treatment of Mammata and his followers. Jagannatha of course comes last but as in him we see the highest flight of abstract thinking and the final word on sabda-vrttis, we placed him first. Mukula, and Kuntaka are viewed as shaping influences for the Malava tradition as seen in Bhoia and also for the kashmir tradition as seen in Mammata, for the K.P. is influenced by both the Dhv. and also the Abhidhavrtta-matrka of Mukula. Hemacandra, we will go to observe, follows Mammata, but absorbs the teaching of Mukula and Bhoja also, while Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha, Visvanatha and Kesava follow the lead of Mammata. So, now we will consider Kuntaka, who like Mukula had his share in shaping the views of Bhoja, because for Kuntaka also, 'abhidha' has a connotation wider then permitted by the kashmir school of thought. Kuntaka After explaining the general definition of poetry and before explaining the special definition of it, Kuntaka first of all explains the form of word and meaning. He observes: evam kavyasya samanya-laksane vihite visesalaksanam upa-kramate. tatra sabdarthayos tavat svarupam nirupayati - SAHRDAYALOKA "vacyortho vacakah sabdah prasiddham iti yady api, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of: Abhidha tathapi kavya-margesmin paramarthoyam etayoh." - VJ. I. 8. (pp. 13, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy) i.e. 'After the general explanation of poetry, the question of its detailed definition is taken up. First of all, the nature of word and meaning is examined : 301 That 'meaning' is what is signified, and 'word' is that which signifies, is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows:" (V.J.I. 8) (Trans. K. Kri.) (pp. 300, ibid). Kuntaka goes on observing that the general meaning of the terms, 'word' and 'meaning' is of course, well known. The 'word' is the signifier and the 'meaning' is the signified: "yo vacakah pratyayakah sa sabdah, yo vacyas ca abhidheyah sortha iti' (pp. 14, ibid). Thus the word for Kuntaka is that which causes apprehension of meaning, and the meaning is that which is expressed i.e. apprehended. Now, let us first make it clear that Kuntaka also does not attempt any scientific definition of abhidha, vacaka sabda and vacyartha here. He does not have a fool-proof scheme as is seen in the K.P. of Mammata. Or, it may be that he knowingly defies the ruling of Anandavardhana who clearly distinguished between abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, and vacya, laksya and vyangya senses which are rendered in English generally as the expressed, indicated and suggested senses. No; he has his own - approach and is closer to Mukula in the sense that he names only 'abhidha' as the sabda-vrtti or say, visista or, vicitra abhidha, i.e. poetic expression, which is wide enough to include laksana and vyanjana in its fold, provided, this deviation is poetic. It is this trend which is perhaps inherited by Bhoja also. We noticed that it was Bhoja who tried to furnish illustrations, not from worldly usage only, but from pure poetry to illustrate the main three divisions of what he calls abhidha, with its any number of sub-divisions. This trend is perhaps inherited by Bhoja both from Mukula to some extent and Kuntaka to a greater extent. For Kuntaka, as far as poetry, i.e., the result of the effort of a poet - is concerned, there is only one function of the poetic word and it is 'abhidha' which is not to be confused with the abhidha or power of expression of a word giving the conventional meaning only, as is seen in the Kashmir school of thought, but it is the 'power of poetic expression', which includes poetic usages such as laksana or indication and vyanjana i.e. - suggestion, provided they carry the stamp of being pure and beautiful poetic expression, i.e. artistic expression only. For Personal & Private Use Only

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302 SAHRDAYALOKA Kuntaka, as Dr. Krishnamoorthy wants us to believe, uses such terms as dyotaka', 'dyotya', and 'vyanjaka', 'vyangya' in the sense of indicator-indicated (i.e. laksaka-laksya) and suggestor-suggested. But we are not convinced. It is only in a very loose sense that the terms dyotaka-dyotya are used by Kuntaka, and we fail to ascertain the exact import of these terms. Normally in the Kashmir school these pairs of terms are taken as synonyms, but Kuntaka does not do it. Whether he takes it to mean laksaka-laksya is also not clear. But it is clear that he is out to include dyotaka-dyotya and vyanjaka-vyangya under his wider vacakavacya. He raises an objection and then silences it to his satisfaction thus : (under V.J.I. 8. pp. 14, ibid) : "nanu ca dyotaka-vyanjakau api sabdau sambhavatah, tad asamgrahat na avyaptih, yasmat artha-pratiti-karitva-samanyad, upacarat, tau api vacakau eva. evam dyotya-vyangyayor api arthayoh pratyeyatva-samanyat upacarad vacyatvam eva. tasmat vacakatvam vacyatvam ca sabdarthayor loke suprasiddham yady api laksanam, tathapi asmin alaukike kavyamarge, kavikarmavartmani ayam etayor - vaksyamanah paramarthah kim api apurvam tattvam ity arthah." Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy translates : (pp. 300, ibid): "The general meaning of the terms 'word' and 'meaning' is quite well known indeed. The 'word' is the signifier and the meaning' is the signified. One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed 'word' and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of "too narrow". Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to are as good as denoted meaning because of the similarity in point of being understood. Thus, although 'signifying', and 'being signified' are enough qualifications to mark off the nature of word and meaning everywhere in the practical world, they do not serve the purpose of poetry, whose province is supramundane. Therefore, their essence in the world of poetry deserves to be pointed out clearly as is done in the next verse." One thing is clear. Kuntaka knows the difference between pure abhidha, gauni, laksana and vyanjana. But he refuses to accept any scheme of sabda-vsttis as is done by the kashmir school. Bhamaha had rejected certain alamkaras as 'varta', and promoted the cause of "vakrabhidheya-sabdoktih". Anandavardhana had also advised the poet to be in search of 'special word and sense that make for poetry : "yatnatah pratyabhijneyau, tau sabdarthau mahakaveh" Dhv. I. 8. Kuntaka therefore chooses to concentrate only on the poetic use of word and sense and as For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 303 he has to give some name to this special poetic power of a word, he gives the name 'abhidha' to it, which is not the technical abhidha of the Kashmir school. Kuntaka, it seems, has no concern for the fool-proof scheme of word/ meaning/word-power, as seen in the Kashmir school of thought. He is concerned only with the poetic. On the otherhand we saw Mukul carrying on from grammar and Mimamsa, but ending in poetry. Bhoja has a much broad-based scheme as we observed above but is trying to absorb both non-poetic and poetic literature. His scheme with twelvefold releationship of word and meaning of course aims at the poetic in the end. He takes care to illustrate the varieties and sub-varieties of first eight varieties of sahitya from poetic literature and many of his illustrations are read as this or that variety of dhvani in the Dhv. So, clearly we have two trends of thought. One represented by Anandavardhana and his followers who present a perfect scheme and the other by such writers as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahima, Dhananjaya and Dhanika and some others who do not fall in line with the Kashmir school of thought. We will continue with Kuntaka who also forms part of the shaping influence that moulds Bhoja's thinking, Mukula being the earlier one. As seen above Kuntaka, though not accepting the thinking of the Kashmir school in a sense that he does not welcome the fool-proof scheme of the functions of a word, on the other hand follows the author of the Dhv. when he talks of 'the unique expression' as 'word'. He observes : (VJ. I. 9 pp. 14, ibid) : "sabdo vivaksitarthaikavacako' nyesu satsu api, arthah sahsdaya"hlada-kari * sva-spanda sundarah." "That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poet's intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of deligated readers is to be marked as 'meaning'. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300-301, ibid) - That Kuntaka's scheme is broad enough to embrace vyanjana and vyangyartha is borne out by the famous illustration from Kumarasambhava, viz. "dvayam gatam" in which he pin-points the use of the special word "kapalinah", that is the source of beauty. He observes : (pp. 15, ibid) : "atra paramesvara-vacaka-sabda-sahasra-sambhavepi 'kapalina' iti bibhatsarasa-alambana-vibhava-vacakah sabdah jugupsa"spadatvena prayujyamanah kam api vacaka-vakratam vidadhati." : "Though a thousand and one synonyms are For Personal & Private Use Only

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304 SAHRDAYALOKA possible to refer to the Almighty Lord Siva, the poet has chosen here the word, "One whom only skulls adorn", in order that, it may suggest disgust through a word which serves here as a pointer to the primary sentiment of the 'horrid'. And he succeeds in endowing the verse with artistic beauty of expression." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 302, ibid). Kuntaka (V.J. I., Vstti) further remarks - kavi-vivaksita-visesabhidhanaksamatvam eva vacakarva-laksanam. yasmat pratibhayam tat-kalollikhitena kenacit parispandena parisphurantah padarthah prakrta-prastava-samucitena kenacit utkarsena va samacchadita-svabhavah santo vivaksa-vidheyatvena abhidheyata-padavim avatarantah tathavidha-visesa-pratipadana-samarthenaabhidhanena-abhidhiyamanas cetas camatkaritam apadyante." : "Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light, as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured." (Trans. K.Kris.; pp. 302, ibid) From this it becomes absolutely clear that Kuntaka accepts only one power of word and that is abhidha, or say, 'vicitra abhidha' meaning 'beautiful or artful expression'. It is not the abhidha which signifies only the conventional meaning But it is that abhidha, which conveys any meaning intended by the poet, be it vacya, laksya, dyotya or vyangya. So, his is the 'vicitra abhidha' which covers up the laksana and vyanjana also. So, we may say, Kuntaka has a definite approach, but no definite scheme. He wants to convey only the poetic. After mentioning the unique features of words and meanings in poetry as distinct from their commonplace aspect, Kuntaka proceeds to convey that there should also be the presence of positive artistic beauty. He observes (V.J. I. 10) (pp. 20, ibid) - "ubhau etau alamkaryau, tayoh punar alamkstih vakroktih eva, vaidagdhya bhangi-bhanitih ucyate." (V.J. I. 10) "Both these are the adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 306, ibid). Thus 'word and For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 305 sense' are 'alamkarya' and 'vakrokti' is the 'alamkara' for Kuntaka. This is what he calls "vicitra abhidha" : "ubhau etau sabdarthau alamkaryau, kenapi sobhatisayakarina alamkaranena yojaniyau. kim tat tayor alamkaranam iti abhidhiyate-tayoh punah alamkrtih - tayoh dvitva-samkhya-visistayoh api alamkrtih prasiddhabhidhana-vyatirekini vicitra eva abhidha." (vitti on VJ. I. 10) (pp. 20, ibid) : " 'Both these refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal. "What then is their ornament ?", one might ask. The answer is that though they are two in number, they have only one common ornament. What exactly is this common ornament ? "Artistic turn of speech" is the reply. It stands for a charming and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and distinct from familiar usage. In other words, artistic utterance itself is the ornament in question." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid) That Kuntaka is thus a 'kevala-abhidhayadink or better say, "kevala-vicitraabhidha-vadin" is now clear. This follows even from the treatment he presents concerning paryaya-vakrata and upacara-vakrata as well. In the former he incorporates what we call sabdi vyanjana. For upacara-vakrata Kuntaka observes -(V.J. II. 13, 14) (pp. 93, ibid): "yatra durantare'nyasmat samanyam upacaryate. lesena'pi bhavat kancid vaktum udrikta-vittitam." (V.J. II. 13) and, "yan mula sarasollekha rupaka"dir alamkrtih, upacara-pradhanasau vakrata kacid ucyate." (V.J. II. 14) i.e. "Wherein even when the two are far apart from each other, a common attribute, however slight, is metaphorically superimposed in order to indicate that the resemblance is very close... (13) ... and which forms the basis for various pleasing and inventive figures of speech headed by metaphor - such a type of poetic beauty is designated by the name, 'beauty of metaphorical expression.' (II. 14). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 381, ibid). For Personal & Private Use Only

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306 SAHRDAYALOKA Kuntaka's upacara-vakrata is 'prayojanavati gauni laksana' itself. So, he seems to accept laksana-mula-vyanjana under 'upacara-vakrata'. In this context, the author of Ekavali, Vidyadhara, observes that, "etena yatra kuntakena bhaktau antarbhavito dhvanis tad api..." - But we may say that Kuntaka has only partly subsumed dhvani under bhakti'. Morover, when Kuntaka on one hand holds that 'word and sense' are "alamkaryau", and on the other hand when he rejects the case of 'rasavad alamkara' on the ground that 'rasa' is always 'alamkarya' and never an 'alamkara', he seems to contraclict himself. On the otherhand, Anandavardahana has a perfect scheme, which holds the whole of 'alamkara' field as "vacya-vacaka-rupa". In short, Kuntaka has no perfect scheme and his 'vicitra abhidha' is a loose concept; thus rendering his approach unscientific. Dhananjaya and Dhanika also accept only abhidha but their approach shall be dealt with in greater details later when we will pick up the concept of 'tatparya' vstti for consideration. 'Bhoja' as observed by us earlier is influenced by Mukula and Kuntaka and carries his own concept of 'abhidha'. But Mahima Bhatta is also an important name who defies the scheme of sabda-vrttis as presented by Anandavardhana and the whole of the Kashmir school of thought. Mahima accepts sadhya-sadhana-bhava in any verbal function. He not only does not accept Anandavardhana's scheme of the three functions of a word such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, but positively denounces it and installs only one function of the word, i.e. only abhidha and leaves all other meaning to be collected by what he calls 'anumiti' or 'kavyanumiti' i.e. 'poetic inference to be precise. We will have to examine his approach in greater details as below. While refering to the powers belonging to word and sense, Mahima, observes Prof. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 67, "A study of Mahima Bhatta's Vyaktiviveka" pub. Calicut, '91), discusses the various aspects of language like word and sentence. According to him, all verbal expressions should be considered as inference since they consist of establishing something (sadhya) by means of something else (sadhana). The fact that language is used to persuade the hearer to do or not to do something, implies that the hearer has to be convinced of the logic of the speaker's argument. The hearer has to grasp the connection between sabda and artha, the sadhya and sabdhana, through inference and then only he is convinced of the soundness of the speaker's idea : For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 307 (Vy. Viveka, pp. 26, 27, Edn. Dr. Rawaprasada Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Skt. series, office, Varanasi, '64) - "sarva eva hi sabdo vyavaharah sadhya-sadhanagarbhataya prayena anumanarupobhyupagantavyah, tasya para-pravstti-nivsttinibandhanatvat, tayos ca sampratyaya-a-sampratyaya"tmanor anyathakartum asakyatvatah. na hiyuktim anavagacchan kascid vipascid vacana-matrat sampratyayabhag bhavati." Mahima divides sabda into two such as 'pada' or word and 'vakya' or sentence. Word is further subdivided into (i) naman i.e. noun, (ii) akhyata or verb, (iii) upasarga i.e. semantic prefix, (iv) nipata or preposition, and (v) karmapravacaniya i.e. adverb. - "dvividho hi sabdah, pada-vakya-bhedat. tatra padam aneka-prakaram nama"khyatopa-sarga-nipata-karmapravacaniya-bhedat (pp. 27, ibid). 'nama' denotes an existing object, which is qualified by either jati i.e. class, guna, i.e. quality, kriya i.e. action or dravya i.e. substance. - Mahima observes : (pp. 28, ibid) : "tatra sattva-pradhanani namani. tani api bahuprakarani sambhavanti. jati-gunakriya-dravyanam tat-pravrtti-nimittanam bahutvat." Thus jati, guna etc. are the pravrtti-nimittas. 'Artha', for Mahima, is two-fold, viz. 'vacya' and 'anumeya'. The 'vacya' or expressed is the object of verbal functioning and it is this which is termed 'mukhya' or principal. He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : "arthopi dvividho, vacyonumeyas ca. tatra sabda-vyaparavisayo vacyah. sa eva mukhya ucyate." yad ahuh - . "srutimatrena yatrasya tadarthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante gaunam yatnopapaditam." - iti. tata eva, tad anumitad va, lingabhutad yad arthantaram anumiyate sonumeyah. sa ca trividhah vastumatram alamkara rasadayas ca, iti. tatra adyau vacyau api sambhavatah. anyah tu anumeya eva iti. tatra padasyartho vacya eva, na anumeyah, tasya nir amsarvat, sadhya-sadhana-bhava-abhavatas ca. (V.V. pp. 47, ibid) Mahima classifies meaning into two viz. (i) expressed (= vacya) and (ii) inferred (i.e. anumeya). The former is called 'mukhya' i.e. principle and is collected by word-power i.e. abhidha). It is said, "It is believed to be 'mukya' i.e. principal For Personal & Private Use Only

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308 SAHRDAYALOKA sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one. The latter, i.e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyartha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again three-fold viz. (i) vastu or idea, or a matter of fact, (ii) alamkara i.e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasa"di, i.e. aesthetic rapture or feeling, sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vacyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred. Mahima holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vacya or expressed, because there is no sadhya-sadhana-bhava between a 'pada' and its meaning. It means there is no inferenial relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sadhya-sadhana-bhava can not exist. We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of selfcontradiction can be read in Mahimals position. At the outset Mahima had declared that : "sarva eva hi sabdo vyavaharah sadhya-sadhana-garbhataya prayena anumana-rupobhyupagantavyah, tasya para-pravstti-nivstti-nibandhanatvat, tayos ca sampratyaya-a-sampratyaya"tmanor anyathakartum asakyatvat." (pp. 26, 27, ibid). Here Mahima suggests that the vacyartha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sadhya-sadhana-bhava is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Anandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyanjana even for the Naiyayikas under Dhv. III. 33. Mahima has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks, he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to sabdavyavahara to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this - "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." Thus there must be something behind A's activity of speaking, and this fact is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words utterred, follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahima wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statement. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 309 Thus, here, with the acceptance of the 'mukhya' artha, Mahima accepts the power of direct expression, i.e. abhidha'. Mahima accepts only one word-power i.e. abhidha. All else is 'anumiti' for him. In his 'vyakti-viveka-vyakhyana', Ruyyaka puts it thus : (pp. 48, ibid) : "arthopi iti. sabdasya vyaparantara-nirakaranartham, arthadvaividhya-ghatanam. tatha hi-vrddhavyavaharat, samketat va, sabdesu arthanirnayah. tesam ca yatrarthe vidyamanatvam tasya vacyatvam eva. anyasya tu tesam abhavad artha-samarthyad avagatih. na ca asambaddhorthas tam artham pratyayayati. sambaddhac ca arthantara-pratipattau anumanam eva. tena laksanayah anumanantarbhavah pratipadito bhavati. tasya ca vyapakatvat.... na ca laksanayam anumanasya antarbhavah iti vacyam, tasya tat pariharena vrtter vyapakatvat. vyanjakatvam anumanam eva iti vaksyate vitatya. tad evam vacyanumeyatva-bhedena arthasya dvaividhyam." Ruyyaka explains that in order to eliminate the possibility of the word having any other (i.e. even a second) power, 'meaning' is said to be two-fold. Meaning is decided in case of a given word with the help of either the vrddha-vyavahara, i.e. practice of the seniors, or through 'samketa' i.e., convention. In whichever meaning these two factors reside, that meaning is called the 'vacya' i.e. expressed. In case of any other meaning where either of these two does not stay at the basis, the other meaning is collected through implication. If the primary meaning is not connected (i.e. is 'a-sambaddha) with the other meaning, the latter is not conveyed at all. And when through connection, the first meaning yields the second meaning, this apprehension is nothing else but 'anumana' or 'inference only. So laksana is covered up by 'anumana', the latter having a wider scope... It cannot be said that 'anumana' is covered up by laksana, because even in the absence of laksana, anumana can take place. (Thus, anumana has a wider field). That (the so called) suggestion is nothing but only inference i.e. 'anumana' will be discussed in greater details (by Mahima). So, for Mahima there is only one sabda-vyapara and that is 'abhidha'. All else - i.e. laksana and vyanjana' - falls in the province of anumana or inference. This means that though not accepting these two functions, Mahima accepts the meanings derived through these functions and subsumes these meanings-viz. the so-called 'laksyartha' and 'vyangyartha' in the terminology of the Kashmir school of thought, - under anumeya artha' i.e. inferred meaning arrived at through anumiti', or precisely 'kavyanumiti', and certainly not by any function or vyapara of a word. For Personal & Private Use Only

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310 SAHRDAYALOKA For Mahima, the 'vacya' is the meaning of a 'pada' i.e. word, arrived at through na' on the strength of either 'samketa' or 'vrddha-vyavahara'. But the vakyartha, or sentence-sense can be either (i) a fact which is already known and which is not required to be substantiated, and (ii) a fact, which is unknown, expecting to be substantiated. This unknown fact is always established with the help of a known fact with which it is invariably related. The concomitance is realized from means of valid knowledge i.e. pramanas which are three, such as, (i) 'loka' or worldly context, (ii) veda or revealed literature, and (iii) direct experience i.e. adhyatma. Mahima observes : (pp. 49, ibid) : "vakyarthas tu vacyasya arthasya ambaparikalpanayam, amsanam vidhyanuvada-bhavena avasthiter, vidheyamsasya siddha-asiddha-taya upapadana-anapeksa-sapeksatvena dvividho boddhavyah. Mahima had suggested that the meaning derived from a pada is without parts i.e. nir-amsa. But the sentence-sense is having 'amsa' or parts. Some par 'vidheya' i.e. principal and some is 'anuvadya' i.e. subordinate, i.e. Some part is 'newly enjoined' - i.e. it is predicated, and some is 'anuvadya' i.e. which is the 'subject part and hence already known. The vidheya-amsa is also either 'siddha' or 'sadhya'. The former does not stand in need of being substantiated, the latter needs substantiation. Thus vakyartha is two-fold. When the vidheya-amsa is 'a-siddha', it takes the form of sadhya-sadhana-bhava, the 'anuvada' portion turning into a 'sadhana'. This sadhya-sadhana-bhava is decided through invariable concomitance i.e. avinabhava-sambandha. And this depends on means of knowledge which are three-fold : "asiddhau sadhya-sadhana-bhava-rupah, anudyamanasya amsasya sadhana-dhura-adhirohat." (pp. 49, ibid) (pp. 52, ibid) sadhya-sadhana-bhavas ca anayoh avinabhavavasayakrto'vagantavyah. sa ca pramana-mulah. tat ca trividham-yad ahuh - "loko vedas tatha'dhyatmam pramanam trividham smstam." iti. Mahima holds that 'loka' pramana depends only on welknown worldly matters - "tatra loka-prasiddhartha-visayo lokah." (pp. 52, ibid). 'sastra-matra-prasiddharthavisayo vedah." (pp. 53, ibid) - i.e. Veda-pramana is that, the subject of which is known in sastra only i.e. in various disciplines. Mahima adds that by mentioning 'veda', other sources such as itihasa, purana, dharma-sastra etc. are also to be understood, as they all rest on veda : "veda-grahanam itihasa-purana-dharma sastra"di-upalaksanam, tesam tan-mulatvopagamat." (pp. 53, ibid). And, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 311 "adhyatmikarthavisayam adhyatmam." (pp. 53, ibid) : "The adhyatma-pramana has spirituality as its subject." This means that it is self-apprehended. This sadhya-sadhana-bhava is two-fold viz., (i) sabda i.e. that which is expressly stated, and (ii) 'artha' or that which is implicit. Again both the sadhya and sadhana may be expressed either by means of words or by sentence: "sa hi dvividhah sabdas' ca arthas ca, iti. sopi ca sadhya-sadhanayoh pratyekam padartha-vakyartharupatvat yathayogyam anyonya-sankaryat bahuvidha iti, tasya din-matram idam upadarsyate." (pp. 54, ibid) - i.e. Words that convey the sadhya-sadhanabhava could be jati-vacaka, guna-vacaka, etc. The meaning of the word again can be an attribute - i.e. dharma, or a substratum, i.e. dharmin. Dharma again can be samanadhikarana, or vaiyadhikarana as when both sadhya and sadhana reside either in the same substraturn or not. The sadhya-sadhana-bhava expressed by a sentence differs on the basis of karakas used. One thing that emerges very clearly from this is that Mahima accepts only abhidha, and that too in the normal accepted sense of the term as a word-power that yields the conventional meaning which is called primary or mukhya. All else is collected by inference, i.e. all other meaning is 'anumeya' for Mahima. So, he refutes other sabdavrttis such as gunavrtti, laksana, tatparya and vyanjana. The trend of incorporating other sabda-vrttis such as laksana and vyanjana in abhidha was traced by us in Mukula, a near successor of Anandavardhana. Kuntaka also without rejecting positively any other sabda-vrtti advocated the case of his vicitra-abhidha which as observed by us is not the same as 'abhidha' that gives the primary meaning, but it is only a 'poetic expression' in general. Bhoja also does not name vyanjana and incorporates gauni and laksana under his three-fold abhidha, the mukhya being the first variety equivalent to our normal 'abhidha'. Mahima does not subsume other sabda-vrttis under abhidha but he totally rejects them as sabda-vrttis as such and advocates the case of only abhidha that gives the primary sense, as sabda-vrtti, one and only. The rest for him is 'anumana' i.e. kavyanumiti. We will examine how he presents his case. Mahima proceeds as follows. In such an example as, "upodharagena vilolatarkam", etc. we have double-meaning statements. Here, the apprehension of the second meaning takes place according to Mahima, in the following way : (pp. 113, 114, ibid): "yat punah asya aneka-sakti-samasrayatvat vyaparantarakalpanam, tad arthasya eva upapadyate, na sabdasya, tasya aneka-sakti For Personal & Private Use Only

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312 SAHRDAYALOKA samasrayatva-a-siddheh." - i.e. when a word in such illustrations as quoted above) is said to have such functions that deliver several meanings, and when based on such a premise an additional word-power called vyanjana is postulated with reference to a word, virtually it is only the meaning which promotes other meanings and not the word, for a word can never be proved to be the substratam of many functions. Mahima further argues : "tatha hi, ekasrayah hi saktayah anyonya-anapeksapravsttayah apraksta-paurvaparya-niyama, yugapad eva svakarya-karinyo drstah yatha dahakatva-prakasakatva"dayogneh." - i.e. Those more than one powers residing in a single substratum, have their functions independent of each other and there is no sequence of earlier and later seen with reference to them. The idea is that these powers operate independently of one another and also simultaneously, or at least without a fixed sequence. For example - Fire burns a substance and also gives light. But the imagined other functions of words are not such - "na ca sabda"srayah saktayas tatha disyante, abhyupagamyante va, niyogatah abhidhasakti-purvakarvena itara-sakti-pravstti-darsanat. tasmat bhinna"sraya eva ta na sabdaika-samasraya iti avaseyam - i.e. In case wordpowers this is not so, because other powers (such as laksana and vyanjana) function after abhidha's function is over. Thus there is no simultaneity but sequence. So, it is better that different objects should be imagined as their substratum and not just 'word'. Now this bhinna-asraya or different substratum could be 'artha' i.e. meaning and not sabda or word. Mahima observes (pp. 114, ibid) : yasca'sau asrayo bhinnah sa 'artha' eva iti tad vyaparasya anumanantarbhavo'bhyupagantavya eva." - This different substratum could be 'meaning', and the functions of this meaning' element, should be subsumed under 'anumana' or inference alone. Before we proceed with Mahima's contention, we have to evaluate his conviction. He gives the illustration of fire which has different powers operating simultaneously. But we can have instances of objects having different powers not operating simultaneously but only in a sequence and such powers may not be absolutely independent of each other. For example a cricketer can also be a singer and a performing artist and his different powers may not operate simultaneously. Sachin can be a good batsman and also a modest speaker. Sunil Gavaskar, we know was a great batsman, a captain of the team and now also a good sports-critic and a very good commentator also. When he bats he does not comment. So, For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 313 hima's illustration proves something which is partially true. Even fire, when it gives heat and light does not help in cooking or burning, when not so required. Now let us see how Mahima further argues : "tatha hi - (pp. 114, ibid) - gaur vahika ity adau tavad gava"dayorthah badhita-vahikady arthantaraikatmyah tadrupya-vidhana-anyatha-anupapattya kenacid amsena tatra tattvam anumapayanti, na sarva"tmana." Now this other separate substratum is nothing else but 'sense'. So, its function has to be subsumed under inference. In such illustrations as, "The vahika is a bull", the meaning such as 'go' - 'bull' etc., is not identified with other meaning such as that of vahika. For Mahima the process involved is 'anumana'. In order to establish 'abheda' - superimposition - when no other means is available, the meaning such as 'go' makes us infer the superimposition through some portion of it, and not through the whole of it. No speaker, who is not out of his mind, goes for superimposition of one thing over the other, without realizing any element of similarity between the two. So any intelligent listener, who has knowledge of the speaker's mind, accepts similarity as the basis of superimposition. He does not hold mere physical expression of identity as the basis. Mere physical expression of identity is refuted on the first count by itself, for we can see that 'vahika', the man, cannot be a bull. So, the expression of identity by the speaker, is only to make the listener apprehend the similarity. The 'prayojana' behind this expression is to cause apprehension of such qualities as inertia (jadya) etc. which are associated with 'go', as also seen in the vahika. This sort of an expression - to use different word for conveying a different substance - is called an 'atidesa'. Here 'go' is used for 'jadya"di'. For, it is said, "jatis'abdo'antarenapi jatim yatra prayujyate, sambandhi-sadTs'ad dharmat tam gaunim apare viduh." - (V.V. 45, pp. 115) i.e. When a word denoting "jati' or class, is used with reference to something else than itself (i.e. sva-vacya), it is done when in that other object there is a quality of similarity. Others call such a usage as, "gauni". For Personal & Private Use Only

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314 SAHRDAYALOKA The idea is that in such instances as "upodha-ragenao" etc. the word, through abhidha power gives only the vacya i.e. expressed sense. The power that makes for the apprehension of another snese (arthantara), rests in the 'sense' i.e. 'artha' and not the word i.e. sabda. Now this apprehension of another sense, through sense, is, according to Mahima, through 'anumiti' or inference only. So, the power wrtested in sense should be taken as inference. In the illustration viz. "gaur-vahikah" etc., as there is an apparent difference between 'go-tva' and 'vahika-tva', the identity through 'ekadhikarana' i.e. the use of same case-termination, does not click to sense. Then it makes us infer the identity of qualities such us jadya"di - intertness - etc. So the identity is based on the qualities of vahika, which are similar to gotulya-jadya"di i.e. inertia and the like that are associated with vahika are similar to those resting in the bull. It is clear that any speaker who is not out of sense, never asserts identity between two separate objects without sensing common qualities between the two. Again, the prayojana or the reason behind such awkward or artful expression as calling a humanbeing a bull, is the existence of such qualities as inertia etc. that normally go with the objects such as bull etc. in the object called 'vahika' on which go-tva is superimposed. It may be noted that Mahima has expressed such terms as 'sadrsya' and 'sadharmya', simultaneously. He has observed: (pp. 114, ibid): "na hi an-unmattah kascit, kvacit, kincit, kathamcit, sadharmyam an-utpas'yan eva akasmat tattvam aropayati" - i.e. without perceiving 'sadharmya' i.e. the state of having similar or common qualities in anyway whatsoever, nobody goes for superimposition of any object on any other object. So the cause of superimposition is apprehension of similarity alone. 'sadrsya' i.e. similarity, and 'sadharmya' or having common qualities, are two important terms used in literary criticism. Dr. Rewaprasad observes (pp. 115, ibid) that Mammata has accepted 'upama' i.e. simile as "sadharmya resting on difference", while his followers (such as Visvanatha) have defined it as similarity (based on difference of objects). Vamanacarya Jhalkikar in his Bala-bodhini commentary on the K.P. has discussed at length with reference to both 'sadharmya' and 'sadrsya'. Between these two he accepts "prayojya-prayojakabhava-sambandha" i.e. the relation of promoter and promoted; here sadharmya being the promoter and 'sadrsya' being promoted thereby. For Bhartrhari 'sadharmya' stands for 'samana-dharma-sambandha', i.e. relation based on similar or common qualities. The etymology of the term 'sadharmya' goes as, "samano dharmo yayos tau sa-dharmanau, tayor bhavah." Bhartrhari explains the taddhita For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of Abhidha 315 - pratyaya conveying 'bhava', and used after a compound, as 'sambandha' or relation. - "krt-taddhita-samasebhyah sambandhabhidhanam bhava-pratyayena" - In the term 'sadharmya', the 'syan' pratyaya is in the sense of 'bhava' only. In the notes attached to the 'kama-dhenu' commentary on Vamana, Kaiyata's words are quoted. There the explanation of 'bhava' as - "prakrti-janya-bodhe prakaribhuto bhavah" is also useful in the present context. The meaning of this expression is that, "by 'bhava' is meant that 'dharma' or quality, which is lying inside that portion, of a word, to which a pratyaya is attached. In the word 'sadharmya', the pratyaya 'syan' is attached to the word 'sa-dharma' or 'sa-dharman'. Its meaning is "that which has similar (or common) qualities." Thus here 'samana-dharma' is the visesana and the vyakti or person adorned with this is 'vis'esya'. 'syan' suffix is used in the sense of 'bhava'. So, it means, "samana-dharma". But the apprehension of "samana-dharma" is caused by 'samana-sabda' as well. By 'sadharmya' we have apprehension not only of the equality, but also of the vyakti or person in whom this similarity rests, and also of the relation with it. So, Bhartrhari's view as quoted above is more authentic. To point out the relation between 'sadrs'ya' and 'sadharmya', Jhalkikar (pp. 541, balabodhini on G.P.) observes : "yah sadharana-dharma-pratiyogikah, upamanopameyo-bhayanuyogikah, sambandhah, sa sad harmyam iti ucyate; yas'ca upamana-pratiyogikah, upameyanuyogikah sambandhah, sa sadrsyam iti ucyate." - iti sadharmya-sadrsyayor bhedah" - This explanation in 'navya-nyaya'-style pertains to this much that "The relation that simultaneously rests in both upamana and upameya, is called sadharmya." "Sadrsya' is different from this. It does not stay simultaneously in two, but it rises from one and settles in the other. 'Sadrsya' or similarity is of one into the other, it is not resting in the two - vice versa. In fact, with reference to sadharmya, we cannot call the substratum as upamana and upameya, because in the apprehension caused by 'sadharmya' the qualities of the two objects are found to be equal. In sadrsya there is 'nyuna-adhikatva' between the two i.e. there is difference in quantity of the qualities. In case of one we apprehend 'utkarsa' and in case of the other, 'apakarsa'. So, the upamanaupameya-bhava rests on this 'utkarsa-apakarsa' or more and less quantity with reference to the dharma i.e. quality. That having higher degree of quality, 'dharmotkarsa' is termed upamana, and that having 'dharmapakarsa' is termed upameya. The 'sadrsya' resting in object having utkarsa travels into that having 'apakarsa'. The sadrs'ya of both does not go into eachother. Thus 'sadharmya' suggests equality For Personal & Private Use Only

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316 SAHRDAYALOKA with reference to qualities while sadrsya suggests equality in which the 'upamana' - element is having a greater quantity of equal quality. The dissimilarity betu sadharmya and sadrsya rests on normal worldly usage. In ordinary parlance it is stated that, "there is 'sadharmya' between these two objects, while there is 'sadrsya' between those two." But actually this difference is not exactly borne out by such normal usages also. For, the normal usage can take the form of such expression also as, "there is sadharmya of this into that object, and between them is sadrsya." In the usage quoted above, where the prakrti of the term 'sadharmya' was taken as ending in dual (dvi-vacananta), and wherein that of sadrsya as ending in singular (i.e. ekavacananta) the opposite can also follow in the present usage. In different disciplines there is difference with reference to the concepts of 'sadharmya' and 'sadrsya'. The discipline of grammar takes them as different. While the nyaya-darsana takes them as indentical and this is acceptable to Mahima, he being closer to the nyaya discipline. So, in expressions like 'gaur-vahikah', taken as 'gauni-vstti' and, like 'gangayam ghosah', taken as laksana, Mahima accepts only 'anumana'. As noted above, in the case of the former, Mahima holds that no sensible person will identify one object with a totally different object without seeing some similarity between the two. The expression 'gaur vahikah' cannot be taken literally as it is perceived directly as incongruous, so, we infer that vahika is a bull in some respects. This secondary sense which is not given by the word directly is only inferred. In the same way the fact of a hamlet being situated on the flow of the river Ganga being contradicted by direct perception, we infer the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet from the expressed meaning. Mahima does not accept dhvanivadin's observation that the meaning of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the Ganga is derived through laksana, and the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet are derived through the suggestive power i.e. vyanjana. For Mahima both the secondary and suggested senses are arrived at through anumiti kriya - or inference and so the distinction observed by the Dhvanikara between bhakti and dhvani is uncalled for. Mahima observes (pp. 118) "tasmad yoyam vahika"dau gava"di-sadharmyavagamah, sa tattva"ropa-anyatha-anupaptti-parikalpito'numanasya eva visayah na sabda-vyaparasya, iti sthitam." For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 317 He further observes (pp. 119, ibid) : "gangayam ghosa ity adau api gangadayorthah svatmani-anupapatti-badhitaghosa"dy adhi-karana-bhavah, tad-upadana-samarthyat sambandha-matraparikalpita-tattva" ropam tad adhikarana-bhavopagama-yogyam arthantaram eva tata"di-rupam anumapayanti. Mahima further observes that only siinilarity can not be the cause of identification or superimposition. Other relations such as 'samyoga' or conjunction, etc. also can be the cause. So, through 'ganga' etc. the objects such etc. are inferred, and not through any other vrtti or function of a word, because the fact of being the substratum of the hamlet can not be understood by any other way : (pp. 119, ibid) "na hi tat sadesyam eva ekam tattva"ropa-nibandhanam isyate, kim tarhi ? tatsambandha"dir api, iti tat-sambandha-matra-samaropita-tadbhavas tata"dir eva ghosa"dy adhikaranabhavopadana-anyatha-anupapattya ganga"dinam arthanam anumeya eva bhavitum arhati. Mahima accepts only one power of the word and that is the power of direct expression viz. abhidha. He rejects anything else than that and whatever other meaning is comprehended, he holds, is through 'anumana' or inference. He firmly believes that the power of a word is exhausted after giving its expressed sense. So, it has no capacity even to know about the existence of the secondary sense, such as the 'tata' or bank, in this case, then what to think of actually touching this secondary sense ? The metaphorical expression is resorted to only to convey the knowledge of the existence of coolness and purity of the Ganga resting in the hamlet, the object of superimposition, and not similarity, as in the first illustration. The cause viz. 'tattva"ropa' i.e. superimposition is identical in both the cases. Mahima holds that similarity of the object which is superimposed, or its samyoga"di relations, are manifold. He quotes a famous karika here, with a difference in reading from the same quoted by Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. i - with reference to the expression, "bhaktam ahuh tam anye." Mahima observes : (pp. 119, ibid) : "sabdah punah svarthabhidhana-matravyapara-paryavasita-samarthyo na arthantarasya tata"der vartam api veditum utsahate, kim punah samsparsam iti uktam. prayojanam punah asya evam-vidhasya ukti-vaicitrya-parigrahasya tata"dau aropa-visaye vastuni aropyamana-ganga"di-gata-punyatva-sitalatva"di-dharma For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA pratipattih, na sadrsyam iti purvasmad asya visesah. ubhayatra api ca tattva"ropa eva hetuh. sa hi tat-samya-tat-sambandha"di-nibandhanatvad bahuvidha drstah. - yad ahah - 318 "abhidheyena sambandhat sadrsyat samavayatah, vaiparityat kriyayogad laksana pancadha mata." - iti. In the Locana, we have, "abhidheyena samyogat" and also, "samipyat" for 'sadrsyat' of Mahima. In Locana, we have 'abhidheyena samyogat'. The idea is that 'samyoga' or conjunction is a type of 'sambandha' i.e. relation in general. Abhinavagupta explains 'samyogat' as, 'bhramara-sabdena yasya samyogah sambandhah'. Mahima does not like this usage of a specific term to denote a general term. So, he goes for the reading 'samyogat', retaining the term denoting a general relation. Similarly, in Locana we have 'samipyat', while Mahima reads 'sadrsyat'. Abhinavagupta has explained 'samavaya' as 'sambandha-matra' i.e. any relation whatsoever. The relations such as 'samipya' or proximity could be believed to be covered up by 'samavaya, so Mahima opts for sadrsya. Actually we can say that not only 'samipya', but even 'sadrsya', 'vaiparitya' or any other relation could be contained in 'samavaya'. Because of this only, later naiyayikas such as Gadadhara and the rest have taken only "abhidheyena sambandha", as definition of laksana, which they choose to define as "sakya-sambandho laksana." The expression of special relations such as sadrsya, vaiparitya etc. is covered by 'sambandha' only, but they are mentioned only to make things clearer. This way, argues Prof. Rewaprasad, the reading of Locana as 'samyogat', is more acceptable. The reading 'sadrsya' is not preferred to 'samipya' by Locanakara, because by using the term 'gauna', the explanation of laksana based on similarity is already covered up by him. Virtually 'sambandha' being manifold, laksana may not be taken as five-fold only. Mahimabhatta also incorporates what is known as tatparya-sakti under abhidha only. Some people hold that to convey the correlated meaning of different words in a sentence, there is a separate power called the tatparya sakti which rests in a sentence. Tatparya sakti is thus advocated by some to explain the apprehension of the intention of the speaker from a sentence or a statement. Mahima feels that the import of the speaker is inferred by the hearer from the expressed sense. When For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 319 someone says, "eat poison, but do not eat at his house", the hearer infers that taking food at his house is more despisable than eating poison. The inference follows the commonsense that, without some special reason, a friend or a wellwisher will never stop anyone from taking food at some person's place. The hearer understands, thus through inference, that eating food will be more harmful than taking poison. Mahima observes: (pp. 133, ibid) "visabhaksananujnana"der vakyarthasya aprastutasya eva upanyaso hi purvoktena nayena prastutatiriktarthantara-pratipadana-paratvat, tatra hetutaya avagantavyah, iti na sabdasya tatra vyaparah parikalpaniyah. "visabhaksanad api param etad grhabhojanasya darunatam, vacyad atonumimate prakarana-vaktr-svarupajnah." - 67 visabhaksanam anu manute na hi kascid akanda eva suhrdi sudhih, tena atra arthantaragatir arthi tatparya-saktija na punah." - 67 iti sangraha"rye. Mahima, who accepts only 'abhidha' as word-power, further rejects the views of those who hold a 'dirgha-dirghatara-vyapara' of a word, like that of an arrow. The purva-paksin argues as follows: Starting with the expressed sense, till the implied sense is collected, the power of the word extends further and further like an arrow. There is no separate power of a word for collecting the other (= implicit) sense. Like an arrow shot by a brave bow-wielder cuts through the armour, rips through the chest and takes the breath away of an enemy, and there is no difference seen in the function of this single arrow, similarly, a word used by a clever poet, in sequence, conveys its primary meaning through abhidhana (i.e. abhidha-vyapara), and makes the apprehension of the second implied sense by the same power of the word used. There is no difference in the power or function of one and the same word. Again, argues the objector, that the ultimate meaning should be taken as the meaning of a given word, for conveying which it is used. Thus, this is the power of the word only and not that of the sense: "kinca yatparah sabdah sa sabdartha iti sabdasya eva asau For Personal & Private Use Only

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320 SAHRDAYALOKA vyaparo nyayyo na arthasya." - (pp. 137, ibid). The objector here seems to be the commentator Dhanika, the brother of Dhananjaya, the author of Dasarupaka. This is suggested by Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (pp. 140, ibid). Mahima does not accept this. He argues as follows : "This is not correct. : (pp. 140, ibid) tad ayuktam. saksat-sabdasya artha-pratitiheturva-asiddheh." The word cannot be taken as cause of the (implied) sense. If it is held as cause through sequence (paramparyena), there will be difficulty in placing some objects as effect ers as cause, for there is no regulation to that effect. - "paramparyena tu tasya hetutvopagame vastunam hetu-phala-bhava-vyavahara-niyamo na vyavatisthate." (pp. 140, ibid) Mahima observes : This cannot be accepted. The reason is that in arriving at the sense, word is not the direct cause. It cannot be taken as a cause in sequence also for it will be difficult to name something specific as cause and also something as effect. In case sabda is held as a parmpara-hetu, then as in case of the spring season being held as the cause of flowering, we will also have to hold a potter who fashions a pot used in watering a plant, as the main cause of flowering. So, it is wiser to accept 'artha' or sense as the cause of further sense, and not 'word'. It is not proper to say that when some function is carried out by a son, his father also is considered the chief substratum of the function concerned. For, in such cases there will follow the contingency of 'sankarya-dosa', - "na hi yatra putrasya vyaparah sa pituh eva iti mukhyataya sakyate vaktum, tayor anyonya-vyaparasankarya-dosa-prasangat." (pp. 140, ibid). The fault will be of mixing up of activities of different agents. Mahima further argues that this illustration of an arrow is also not congruent with the situation : "kinca ayam visamah sara-drstantopanyasah" (pp. 140, ibid). - The line of his argument proceeds as below : This 'sara-drstanta' is a mis-fit, because as the arrow on its own does the activities of cutting, etc. through a single power, the word does not. The word executes its function with the help of 'sanketa' or convention. The word has its function only at places where convention is fixed. So, the function of the word is limited upto the expressed sense only, not upto any 'arthantara' i.e. sense beyond the expressed one, as no 'sanketa' or convention is fixed with reference to the other extra sense. In case we accept the capacity of a word to give 'arthantara' also, i.e. added sense also, then people will be able to apprehend any sense with the help of any word. So, for a meaning which stands in need of convention, to that only For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 321 the function of a word is limited, and it does not extend further upto any added sense, in absence of any convention. For the added sense, the function, not of word, but of the expressed sense only, should be accepted : "tatasca abhidheyartha-visaya eva asya vyaparo yuktah, na arthantara-visayah, tatra sanketabhavat. tad abhave'pi tatra tat parikalpane sarvah kutascid abhidheyarthavad arthantaram api pratiyat. tasmad yatra sanketa"peksa, tatra eva asya vyapara iti avagantum yuktam, na arthantare; tatra vaksyamana-nayena arthasya eva tadupapatti-samarthanad iti." (pp. 140, 141, ibid) We may observe with Dr. Rewaprasad that Mahima here pushes two arguments in favour of his thinking. First, he holds that a word cannot convey another sense directly, as it does with reference to its conventional sense, and secondly, a word can convey only that sense with reference to which a convention is fixed. Mahima is of the opinion that the formation of a pot is the f coming together of the two halves, and not the potter, as the joining of halves immediately preceeds the formation of a pot. Similarly in case of added sense, i.e. 'arthantara' the immediate predecessor is the expressed sense, and not the word itself. So, being an immediate cause the primary sense is the cause of any additional sense, and not the word. Mahima also argues that the functions of the arrow and word are not identical. The function of the arrow, in cutting, ripping through and taking the breath away, is its own, i.e. it is an independent power of an arrow. But for the word it is not so. It conveys meaning remaining dependent on the convention. So, the function of the word is not independent but is dependent on something else. Thus a word has a limited capacity to convey only that meaning with reference to which convention is made. It cannot proceed to an added target, like an arrow. It cannot proceed to an added sense of its own. The added sense is collected only by the function of the primary sense, which should be taken here as the cause. So, the added sense has to be accepted as inferred only. But, we may say that Mahima's thinking is faulty. The arrow also, when placed in a sheath does not have any capacity even to pierce the softest thing on earth. Only when it is discharged by a mighty shooter, it does the said tricks. So, even the function of an arrow has its capacity, originally borrowed from the shooter's strength. Similary, a word when used by an expert poet attains the added function to convey an added sense also. But, this is not to justify 'dirgha-dirghatara-vyapara'. Actually, as explained by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we have to accept For Personal & Private Use Only

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322 SAHRDAYALOKA difference in function to explain difference in meaning, otherwise we will get into a mess where any word will start giving any meaning ! Mahima, as stated above believes only in one power of word and that is abhidha. For him artha' or meaning is two-fold viz. vacya or expressed and 'anumeya' or inferred. He quotes a karika - "That whose significance is cognised on hearing alone, is believed to be the primary meaning, and the gauna or secondary meaning is that which is collected as a result of (special) effort." He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : "artho'pi dvividho, vacyo'numeyas'ca. tatra sabda-vyapara-visayo vacyah. sa eva mukhya ucyate. yad ahuh : srutimatrena yatrasya tadarthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante gaunam yatnopapaditam." 'Anumeya' or inferred meaning is that, in whose apprehension, the primary meaning or vacyartha serves as 'hetu' or 'linga' i.e. cause, or the 'hetu' can also be that meaning which is derived from the primary sense. - "tata eva, tad anumitad va linga-bhutad arthantaram anumiyate, sah anumeyah." (pp. 47, ibid). We know that Bhartphari incorporates all meaning other than the primary in 'gauna' or secondary, but for Mahima all meaning else than primary is 'anumeya'. The primary meaning for Mahima is also the 'mukhya' or principal sense. Mahima accepts the relationship between word and meaning as conventional. meaning only when there is convention to that effect. He rejects the view that a word can ever convey such a meaning which is other than primary, i.e. one with reference to which a convention is not formed. He feels any other meaning, beyond the primary one, can never be collected by the function of a word and that such added sense is arrived at by inference, the primary sense serving as 'hetu' or cause in it. We have seen that Mahim, therefore rejects all other functions such as laksana, tatparya and vyanjana as functions of a word and subsumes them under 'anumana' or inference. Mahima of course accepts the added sense or what may be called the unexpressed sense. This, for Mahima, is threefold viz. (i) vastumatra i.e. of the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 323 form of 'vastu' or a mattor of fact, or, an idea, (ii) alamkara i.e. figures of speech or artful expression, and (iii) rasadayas ca, i.e. the emotive stuff such as feelings, emotions, sentiments etc. or, aesthetic rapture in general. The first two could be directly expressed, but for Mahima, the third variety is 'anumeya' or 'inferred' only. The direct meaning of a word is always expressed, it being without parts and there being no relation of 'sadhya' or that which is to be established and the sadhana or the instrument with - which it is established, between the two i.e. 'vacya artha' and 'sabda'. He observes : (pp. 47, ibid) : "sa ca trividhah. vastumatram alamkara rasadayas' ca. iti. tatra adyau vacyau api sambhavatah. anyastv anumeya eva iti. tatra padasya artho vacya eva, na anumeyah, tasya nir ansatvat sadhya-sadhana-bhava'bhavatah." Mahima, like Anandavardhana, also believes that the vacya or expressed is not so charming as is the unexpressed or inferred : "vacyo hy artho na tatha camatkaram atanoti yatha sa eva vidhinised ha"dih kakva"bhidheyatam anumeyatam va avatirnah iti svabhava eva ayam arthanam." The expressed is not as charming as the same when presented through artful intonation or conveyed through inference. This is in the nature of a meaning. The meaning conveyed through simple assertion is also less charming than the same conveyed through double negation. He substantiates his observation by quoting Anandavardhana who observes : "sararupo'hy arthah sva-sabda-anabhidheyatvena prakasitah sutaram sobham avahati. prasiddhis ca iyam asti eva vidagdhaparisatsu yad abhimatataram vastu vyangyatvena prakasyate na vacyatvena" iti. The sequence i.e. krama, observes Mahima, in the first two varieties such as vastu or matter of fact or, idea, and alamkara or artful expression, is self-evident and is clearly observed. So, if we resort to vyanjakatva to explain this sequence it is of no use at all. He rejects vyangya-vyanjaka relation between dhvani (i.e. word) and so called sphota also. Similarly on this analogy the promulgation of dhvani visa-vis kavya which is of the form of word and meaning placed together, is also not acceptable to Mahima. He accepts 'gamya-gamaka-bhava' instead. Mahima Bhatta does not accept Anandavardhana's idea of three types of meaning such as the expressed or vacya, the indicated or laksya and the suggested or vyangya. For Mahima the indicated or laksanika i.e. metaphorical or secondary sense and the suggested or vyangya fall in the category of the inferred on 'anumeya' only, and thus for Mahim, there is a scheme of two-fold meaning only; the vacya and the anumeya. Thus he seems to reject For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA laksyamana and the Anandavardhana's observation that the indicated suggested i.e. the vyajyamana are also different from each other. For Anandavardhana the secondary function or a-mukhya vyavahara is only an extention of the primary function and it is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be non-congruent with the context. This secondary sense may not be charming also, and is arrived at only when the primary sense is rejected. This abandonment of the primary sense, in the opinion of Anandavardhana, could be either partial or total. This secondary function is seen only when we use language. The suggestive function, for Anandavardhana, is of wider scope and travels beyond language. When use of language is concerned, then also this suggestive function completely differs from either the primary function of a word in language, i.e. abhidha, or the secondary function i.e. gunavrtti or laksana or a-mukhya-vyapara, both from the point of view of nature and scope i.e. "svarupatah visayatah ca." Suggestivity, as noted above, travels beyond the medium of language and is seen in any other art-form such as drama, music, painting and what not, taking the form of abhinaya or acting, or notes i.e. suddha svara, or colours etc. as the case may be. Thus for Anandavardhana the suggestivity has to be completely distinguished from laksana or secondary function of a word. 324 Not so with Mahima. He rejects the very basis on which the concept of laksana rests. He rejects any other power or function beyond, abhidha or the direct expressive power in case of a word. Mahima is of the opinion that the fact of 'krama' or sequence in the functioning of powers called abhidha, laksana and vyanjana goes against them belonging to the same substratum, i.e. word. As seen earlier, he feels that if more than one power belongs to the same thing, these powers should function simultaneously like heat and light emanating from fire. But we had observed earlier that this analogy is not applicable in case of a word, as there is no hard and fast rule that all powers belonging to the same thing should function simultaneously only. Even in day to day life we see agents using their various powers as and when the situation so demands. A brave soldier enjoys life also to the full and also fights against the enemy as and when required. A man may be gifted with a number of special capacity which he chooses to exhibit or utilize only when the situation so demands. But Mahima is satisfied with his own argument and his own illustration of fire oozing light and heat simultaneously, and therefore concludes that word has only one power - abhidha - that gives the primary For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 325 sense alone and whatever added sense follows, - call it laksyartha, tatparyartha or vyangyartha - call it by any name, it follows from the primary sense alone as an inferred sense, and the word has nothing to do with it. The other meaning follows from the primary sense due to the relation of linga-lingi-bhava only. Mahima observes : (pp. 121, ibid) : "kinca upacaravrttau sabdasya ma bhud atiprasanga iti avasyam kim api nimittam anusartavyam. anyatha anyatra prasiddha-sambandhah katham asamitam (= sanketa-virahita) eva arthantaram pratyayayet ? yat ca tannimittam tad eva asmabhir iha lingam iti akhyatam. yuktam ca etat, sabdasya tatra vyapara'bhavat. vyaparabhavas' ca sambandhabhavat. lingat ca linginah pratitir anumanam eva, na guna-vittau arthantara-pratitih sabdi iti tasyah vacakas'rayatvam asiddham eva." Mahima (pp. 122) further observes in Samgraha verses : "yah satattva-samaropah tat-sambandha-nibandhanah, mukhyartha-badhe sopy artham sambandham anumapayet." (46) and, stat-samya-tat-sambandhau hi tattva"ropaika-karanam, gunavstter dvirupayah tat-pratitir ato'numa." (47) i.e. 'tat-samya' and 'tat-sambandha' - these two are the causes of 'tattva"ropa' i.e. superimposition of one object over the other. So, in two types of gunavrtti (or laksana) the apprehension of the cause - i.e. prayojana - is through inference only. Thus, Mahima accepts two types of gunavrtti : (i) based on 'tat-samya', as in 'gaur vahikah' and (ii) based on 'tat-sambandha' as in 'mancah kros'anti'. He further observes that abandoning of mukhya-vrtti is not possible in case of a word. So, only a meaning superimposed on a (primary) meaning causes inference of similarity. "mukhya-vrtti-parityagah na sabdasya upapadyate, vihito'rthantare hy arthah sva-samyam anumapayet." - (48) For Personal & Private Use Only

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326 SAHRDAYALOKA Thus, when the function of a word is not established with reference to another sense, how, can we hold sabda as 'askhalad-gati' with reference to a result (phala, i.e. another sense) which follows through inference from a given linga or mark i.e. cause? "ittham arthantare sabda vrtter anupapattitah, phale lingaika-gamye syat kutah sabdah skhalad-gatih." - (50) Thus, observes Mahima, that whatever factors are considered in favour of gauni vrtti, are taken by us as promoting anumana - "guna-vrttau giram yavat samagri-ista nibandhanam, saiva lingataya'smabhir isyate arthantaram prati." - (55) (pp. 123, ibid) "na hi tat samayabhavat vacyam sabdasya kalpyate pratiyamanatayam ca vyaktasya anumeyata." (56) "tasmat svartha'tiriktena gatir na arthantare giram, vacakatvas'rayena'to gunavrtter asambhavah." - (57) Mahima suggests that when we resort to metaphorical expression or gunavrtti, the secret underlying this activity is that it is the natural linguistic habit of people that they identify similar or mutually connected objects. When we see a person with long neck and ugly figure we call him 'karabha' or a youngone of a camel. Again on seeing children crying in a cradle, we describe the cradle as crying (pp. 121, ibid) : "loko hi tat-sadrsam tat-sambaddham ca tattvena vyavaharan drsyate, tad yatha dirgha-grivam vikata-kayam ca kamcit pasyan 'karabha' iti vyapadisati, mancasambaddhan ca kamscit krosato mancah krosanti iti." On hearing such sentences which are non-congruent by nature, an intelligent person concludes that such an For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 327 incongruous identification has some valid reason as its basis. This he decides through reasoning. Mahima does not accept 'arthapatti' or, implication as a separate means of knowledge - i.e. pramana-and subsumes it under 'anumana' or inference." arthapatter anumanantarbhava'bhyupagamat iti uktam." (pp. 118, ibid) Mahima classifies gunavrtti or metaphorical expression into two, such as (i) based on similarity, and (ii) based on some other connection : "tat-samya-tatsambandhau hi tattva"-ropa-eka-karanam" (pp. 122, 47a, ibid). For him the apprehension of metaphorical meaning is only logical deduction from literal sense. It is a case of inference where the sadhya-sadhana-bhava is collected from loka i.e. worldly parlour. We have noted that for Mahima, as both 'bhakti' i.e. metaphorical expression and dhvani are covered up by inference, there is no cause to distinguish between the two as is done by Anandavardhana. Secondary meaning and the so-called suggested sense are, for Mahima, arrived at by the same process of 'anumiti' i.e. inference, because both are collected from the primary meaning. For Mahima, even terms involving 'faded metaphors' i.e. rudhimula laksana, have consideration of second meaning and are therefore collected by inference. In that case they are, in the opinion of Mahima, not different from Dhvani : (pp. 124, ibid) : rudha ye visayenyatra sabdah sva-visayas api, lavanya"dyah prasaktas te na bhavanti padam dhvaneh - (61) Mahima as observed earlier, also rejects tatparya sakti, which for him falls under anumiti. It may be noted that for Abhinavagupta 'tatparya' is a sentencefunction, as explained by the Abhihitanvayavadins, which makes for the correlated meaning of various 'pada's or words in a given sentence. Thus this can be equated with samsarga-maryada of the later navya-naiyayikas, and the laksana of the Bhattas (Ref. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, p. 222, ibid). But Dhanika's tatparya travels farther than mere sentence-sense as a result of the total of word-meanings. It is wider enough to cover Anandavardhana's vyangyartha also. The famous words of Dhanika are, "tatparyam na tuladhrtam", for it extends upto any limit till the speaker's intention is collected - "yavat-karya-prasaritvat". Dr. Raja observes (pp. 216, ibid) it can, "cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense." For Personal & Private Use Only

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328 SAHRDAYALOKA But we have seen above how Mahima rejects the case of tatparya-vrtti and how he subsumes it under 'anumiti'. Thus Mahima's concepts of 'abhidha' and 'anumiti' are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gauni, laksana, tatparya, vyanjana and even the broad concept of 'vakrokti' involving 'vicitra abhidha' of Kuntaka. This is how Mahima takes Kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such 'sabda' and 'artha' to be kavya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry)." So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as are seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahima. He argues as follows : Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucityamatra) of word and sense, or is only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all ? Because, no third alternative is possible, it has got to be either of the two. The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhava"di, i.e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for 'rasa' only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahima accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhava"dis. Thus 'anauctiya' has no scop in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid) : "te ca yathasastram upanibadhyamana rasabhivyakter nibandhanabhavam bhajante. na anyatha. rasa"tmakam ca kavyam iti kutas tatra anaucityasamsparsah sambhavyate yan nirasartham ittham kavya-laksanam acaksiran vicaksanammanyah ?" Mahima says, that in case you opt for the second atternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-laksana goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahima sticks to his guns and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid) "atro'cyate'bhidha-samjnah sabdasya artha-prakasane, vyapara eka eva istah yas tu anyo'rthasya so'khilah." - (71) For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 329 tatasca, "vacyad arthantaram bhinnam yadi tallingam asya sah, tan nantariyakataya nibandho hy asya laksanam." - (72) "abhede bahuta na syad ukter margantaragrahat, tena dhvanivad esa'pi vakroktir anuma na kim? - (73) Mahima also rejects suggestivity - vyanjakatva - as word-power, for there is no other power of the word except 'abhidha'. : (pp. 146, ibid) - Mahima observes - "na'pi sabdasya abhidha-vyatirekena vyanjakatvam vyaparantaram upapadyate, yena arthantaram pratyayayed; vyakteh anupapatteh, sambandhantarasya ca asiddheh. Even in the absence of 'vyakti' or 'sambandhantara', if suggestivity is accepted with reference to a word, then no fixed scheme will hold good in that case - "tad abhave'pi tad abhyupagame tasya artha-niyamo na syad, nibandhana-abhavat." (pp. 146, ibid) - Word cannot have any direct relationship with suggested meaning. If word had any natural relationship with suggested sense in form of 'rati' and other emotions, as in case of songs (i.e. music), then one and all could have been able to apprehend the same - "na hi asya, geyasya iva ratya"dibhir bhavaih svabhavika eva sambandhah, sarvasya eva tat-pratiti-prasangat." (pp. 146, ibid) No relation of a word with the suggested sense can be believed to be born of convention as suggestion is 'aupadhika' and 'upadhis' are innumerable and uncertain. One and the same word may suggest different meanings under different contexts. So, to fix a particular suggested sense in case of a fixed word, like convention in case of expressed sense, is impossible. Mahima also examines the possibility of prefixes (= upasargas) being suggestive. He is clear that if suggestivity is totally denied in case of a word, the prefixes can never be accepted as suggesting any meaning. Dr. C. Rajendran in a foot-note (no. 58, pp. 72, ibid) notes : "Here the assumption of MB (i.e. Mahima Bhatta) is that Dyotakarva of the grammarians is the same as the vyanjakatva of the Dhvani theorists. There is however, no supporting evidence adduced." It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we have also noted that the 'manifestation of For Personal & Private Use Only

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330 SAHRDAYALOKA sphota cannot be taken as identical with the suggestion of the dhvanivadins. Mahima holds that the prefixes are said to be 'dyotaka' i.e. suggestive i.e. capable of manitestation, only in a metaphorical sense. Actually they are capable of expression only and not suggestion, or manifestation. Mahima argues that in fact when we use such words as 'ghata' or pot and the like, for directly conveying the meaning of the object called a pot, even there these words such as 'ghata' should be held not as directly expressive of a meaning, but only as 'dyotakas' or suggestive, for the meaning of 'ghata-padartha is already existent in our mind and is only revealed by the expression of the word 'ghata'. Thus even the whole vacya-vacaka-vyavahara' - the business of expression and expressed - will be negated. So, it is better to accept metaphorical suggestivity here. Says he (pp. 153, ibid) : 6 * "evam ca antar-matra viparivartitaya siddha-sadbhavanam ghata"dinam ghata"dis'abda api dyotaka eva syuh, na vacaka iti vacya-vacaka-vyavaharo'stam iyat. tasmat bhaktam eva dyotakatvam upagantavyam na mukhyam. bhakeh ca prayojanam vacyasya arthasya sphutatva-pratipattih, nimittam ca visesana-visesyapratityor-asubhavitaya kramanupalaksanat sahabhavapratitih." Mahima holds that it is only to describe the clarity of the meaning derived from a root modified by a prefix, that the prefix is figuratively stated as suggestive. If it is argued that actually a prefix manifests a particularity i.e. visesa alreadly existent in a verb and so they are suggestive and not denotative of a 'visesa' in a verb, than Mahima's reply is that you cannot cognise the exact form of visesa i.e. particularity manifested by a prefix. The meaning invariably apprehended should be taken only as 'expressed' meaning If we do not accept this dictum then an adjective applied to a noun will also have to be regarded as 'dyotaka'. If taken to its exteme end, this would take us to believe that words like 'ghata' are also dyotakas as they manifest objects that are in the mind. So also will be the case of words such as 'nila' etc. which are taken as visesanas as a rule - "samanyani ca garbhikrta-visesani bhavanti iti tesam tatra sadbhava-siddhau satyam nila"di-sabda api tat-tat-dyotana-matra-vyaparah pradi-vad dyotaka bhavitum arhanti, na abhidhayaka iti." (pp. 152, ibid). - Thus, Mahima emphatically denies the existence of what is termed as vyanjakatva. He thus accepts only 'abhidha' as word-power and all sense, other than the expressed is collected, according to him by 'anumana'. He declares (pp. 157, ibid) (samgrahas'lokas) - For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis, the nature of : Abhidha 331 "svabhavikam dhvaner yuktam vyanjakatvam na dipavat, dhumavat kintu krtakam sambandha"der apeksanat."- (74) "pra"dinam dyotakatvam yat kais'cid abhyupagamyate, tad bhaktam eva, tatra istam na mukyam tad asambhavat." - (75) yatha hi yasya sabdasya bhava'bhava'nusarini, yad arthabuddhih tasya asau vacyo'rtha iti kathyate." - (76) "go-sabdasya iva gaur arthah sa'nyathatva'vyavasthita. vacyatva-vyavaharas ca na syad arthasya kasya-cit." - (77) "pra"di-prayoga'nugamavyatirekanusarini, prakarsa"dau matis tena tasya tad-vacyata na kim." - (78) "visesa"vagamasya"subhavad anupalaksanat kramasya sahabhavitvam bhramo bhakter nibandhanam." - (79) (pp. 158, ibid) We have seen how there was a stiff opposition to the Kashmir school of thought that advocates a fool-proof scheme of chiseled concepts of abhidha, laksana and vyanjana. The challangers were great names such as Mukula, Bhoja, Kuntaka and Mahima. But this challange was taken up by the Kashmir-school again with a successful counter attack by Mammata, Hemacandra and their followers, culminating in the efforts of Appayya and Jagannatha. We discussed the views of For Personal & Private Use Only

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332 SAHRDAYALOKA Jagannatha as the Maha-siddhantin in the beginning, but the road to him is bedecked by efforts of such greats as Mammata and his followers whose views on abhidha will be examined by us in brief as follows, to sum up this chapter on abhidha. What necessitated this rethinking and re-establishment from Mammata and his followers is creating again a conceptual clarity which originated with Anandavardhana who established vyanjana as a distinct power of word and explained how abhidha and laksana were different from it on account of visayabheda and svarupabheda i.e. difference in nature and scope. But Anandavardhana's attempts were challanged by some anti-vyanjana thinkers and again they mixed up abhidha, laksana and vyanjana also in an incurable way. Kuntaka, though not an anti-dhvani thinker, was also slightly different from Anandavardhana in the sense that he cared only for the poetic expression and so his concept of vicitra abhidha was more ambitious and less clear. Nobody except Mahima cared strictly for visayabheda and svarupabheda underlying the sabda-vsttis. But Mahima erred on the other side. He accepted abhidha as abhidha pure and simple as taught by the mimamsakas, grammarians, naiyayikas and also Anandavardhana. But for the extra meaning, the pratiyamana artha, he postulated kavyanumiti in place of any word-power. For him, anything beyond expressed sense directly following from the word, was due to inference, and the word never could give any other sense beyond vacyartha. Thus, even laksana - what Mammata calls 'aropita-kriya' also was not acceptable to him. As was laksana/laksyartha so was vyanjana/vyangyartha - equally non-acceptable as following from word. So, for him there was no hasitation in accepting dhvani as 'bhakta' and therefore, only "anumeya". But with all his vehemence, he was not convincing, for the fact remained that whatever was experienced by a man of taste from poetry, was directly from poetry and not from anyother thing such as inference. It was poetry, poetry and poetry alone, with its magic web of word and sense, that delighted the aesthete. Even Mahima had to concede a point when he accepted that his Kavyanumiti was not congruent with tarkanumiti. So, once again the balance swung in favour of Anandavardhana, and so Mammata and others rediculed Mahima for rejecting different powers of a word. A clear-cut scheme of three powers of a word was the requirement of the context to explain the experience that accrued from reading of poetry. A change in a word here and there upset the balance of aesthetic experience and therefore it was, word and word and word alone that was held responsible for bringing about the pleasure through the richness of its meaning. Thus, once again Mammata and his followers For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis, the nature of : Abhidha 333 laid down the royal road of three word-powers that led to the destination of aesthetic experience from poetry. We will now examine their concept of abhidha. Mammata : In the lind and IIIrd ullasas of his K.P., Mammata deals with the topic of word and sense. He has also written an independent treatise called "sabda-vyapara-vicara" on this same topic. He had defined poetry as 'word and sense', with some qualifications, in the first ullasa, and he now deals with the nature and classification of word and sense. He begins with a three-fold classification of word such as 'vacaka' or directly expressive, laksaka or word giving secondary sense, i.e. indicator and vyanjaka i.e. word giving the suggested sense, the suggestor. It may be observed at the outset that, with reference to available documents, we meet with a systematic delineation of this topic for the first time in a work on poetics, though of course, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and later Mukula also had laid the foundation for such thinking. Following this threefold division of word, Mammata (= M.) explains that the meaning is also three-fold such as, vacya, laksya and vyangya. He observes : kramena sabdarthayoh svarupam aha - (su. 5): "syad vacako luksanikah sabdo'tra vyanjakas tridha." atra iti kavye. esam svarupam vaksyate - (su. 6) : "vacya"dayas tad arthah syuh." vacya-laksya-vyangyah. - (pp. 25, edn. Jhalkikar) He cites an opinion that some others accept the so-called 'import' i.e. 'tatpayartha' - also (su. 7) : "tatparyartho'pi kesucit." (pp. 26, ibid) : Jalkikar (pp. 25, ibid) makes it clear that : "atra kavye vacako laksaniko vyanjakas ca iti tridha triprakarah sabdah syad iti arthah. vyanjakasya vacakalaksanikau upajivyau iti kramena upanyasah. Jhalkikar observes that by this (three-fold) division itself this 'tri-tva' is clear. Yet to remove the possibility of either lesser or greater number of varieties, M. has said, "tri-dha" i.e. "three-fold". : (pp. 25, ibid) - "vibhagad eva tri-tve siddhepi nyunadhikasamkhya-vyavacchedaya 'tridheti uktam". Some people may argue, observes Jhalkikar, that as 'gauni and 'laksana' are separate vsttis, and as therefore the term 'gauna' as a variety of word is not mentioned, there is deficiency - or defect - nyunata-in the division. Again as there is no authority with reference to vyanjana, there cannot be a 'vyanjaka' word and so there is 'adhikya' - excess - also. To remove this sort of doubt in the minds of others M. has.clarified his position. In the 16th sutra, 'gauni' is to be described as a sub-division of laksana, and so 'gauna' word For Personal & Private Use Only

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334 SAHRDAYALOKA will be subsumed under 'laksanika'. Vyanjana also will be established as an independent word-power in the Vth ullasa. . It may again be noted that this three-fold division of words as suggested by M., is with reference to the attributes - upadhis - and not with reference to words themselves - 'upadheyas'. We have not to understand that some words are only 'vacakas', some are only 'laksakas' and some are only 'vyanjakas'. There is no rule as such. It is the context and the attribute thereof which makes for the word as vacaka, etc. Jhalkikar, (pp. 25, ibid) quotes the Sarabodhinikara i.e. Sri Vatsalancchana-Bhattacarya : "atra ahuh sarabodhinikarah - "tridheti". atra upadhinam eva tritvam, na tu upadheyanam. na hi kascid vacaka eva, kascid laksanika eva, kascid vyanjaka eva iti asti niyamah", iti. ata eva 'gangayam ghosah' ity adau ekasya'pi ganga"dis'abdasya vacakatvam, laksanikatvam, vyanjakatvam ca upapadyate." In his sutra M. has used the term 'atra' and explained it as 'atra iti kavye'. The reason behind this is that this three-fold classification is true with reference to poetry. For, in sastras such as vaisesika or nyaya, etc., no term such as 'vyanjaka' is ever mentioned or read. But in poetry charm or camatkara can not be generated without 'vyanjaka' word. Jhalkikar observes (pp. 25, ibid) : "nanu vaisesikasastra"dau vyanjakasya nama'pi na sruyate. atah katham traividhyam iti ata aha, 'kavye' iti. camatkara-visesasya anyatha anupapattih iti bhavah." Before explaining the nature and scope of 'vacaka'/vacya, word and sense respectively, M. observes that some accept what is termed as 'tatparyartha' also. He observes : (pp. 26, ibid): (sutra. 7) "tatparyarto'pi kesu cit." - akanksa-yogyata-sannidhi-vasat vaksyamanasvarupanam padarthanam samanvaye tatparyartho visesa-vapur a-padartho'pi vakyarthah samullasati iti abhihitanvayavadinam matam." "There is also the purport sense in the opinion of some. When owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, after the word-meanings whose nature will be explained later, have been co-rrelated, there springs up the purport-sense, which possesses a special form and which, though not the sense of individual) words, is yet the sense of the sentence - this is the view of those who hold that the correlation is of the expressed words (abhihitanvayavadins). For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha 335 M. also quotes the views of others who hold that, "the primary sense itself is the sense of the sentence." This is held by theorists of, "expression of the correlated meaning." (anvitabhidhana) [The translation of the K.P. text is accepted by us from that of our friend, the late, respected professor, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi the author of, 'The Poetic Light - pub. Motilal Banarasidass, Edn. '67, Delhi] Jalkikar has the following observation : (pp. 26, ibid) : "nanu padarthavad vakyarthasya'pi vyanjana-vrtty ars'rayataya bhattamimamsaka-mata-siddha-tatpary-akhya-vrtti-pratipadyataya ca tad-vibhago'pi kartum ucita iti tad akaranat nyunata iti ata aha - tatparyartho'pi iti - The idea is that as the word-sense is held to be suggestive, even the sentencesense is also suggestive, and the Bhatta Mimamsakas have established the tatparyavrtti, so the inclusion of that (i.e. tatparyartha) was proper. As it is not done, there is 'nyunata' i.e. narrowness too in the three-fold classification. To consider this objection M. has used the words - "tatparyartho'pi" etc. By 'kesu cit' we have to understand "kesam cit" observes Jhalkikar. So, both tatparyartha and tatparya vrtti have to be counted. Jhalkikar observes : (pp. 26, ibid) : "ayam bhavah. vsttim vina arthabodhane atiprasangah iti anvaye (vakyartharupe samsarge) sabdasya tatparya"khya vittir abhyupagantavya, tatpratipadyorthas tatparyartha iti cakravarti * kamalakarabhatta-narasimha-thakkura-krta-tikasu amsatah spastam." We will consider abhihitanvayavada and anvitabhidhanavada when we will deal with 'tatparya-vitti' separately in the next chapter. Before treating 'abhidha' M. descusses what is meant by vacaka sabda, as - "saksat sanketitam yo'rtham abhidhatte sa vacakah." (sutra 9) "That is the expressive word which conveys a meaning that is directly conventional." (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 21, ibid). M. further observes : "iha agrhitasanketasya sabdartha-visesa-pratipatter abhavat samketa-sahaya eva sabdorthavisesam pratipadayati iti yasya yatra avyavadhanena samketo gphyate sa tasya vacakah." . "Here, for want of comprehension of the meaning of a word, whose convention is not grasped, a word conveys a particular meaning only when aided by convention. Hence that word is expressive of that meaning in which unimpeded convention is assertained." (Trans. pp. 21, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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336 SAHRDAYALOKA Discussing the nature of this convention M. observes that the conventional meaning is said to be four-fold from the point of view of jaty adi i.e. class and the rest. Or, it may be only the class or universal. M. further observes that though an individual alone is competent of activity or passivity, on account of its capacity for performing a fruitful function, yet it is not compatible to establish the convention with reference to the individual on account of the contingencies of infinitness and anomaly, because the classification would not obtain in the case of words such as a bull - gauh, or 'white/sukla'; 'calah/ moving', or dittha'. Hence there is convention with reference to the attribute (upadhi) alone. Poeticians in general and here M., it may be observed, follow the dictum of the grammarians as observed by us earlier. Now, M. further observes that 'upadhi' or attribute is two fold : vastudharma and 'vaktr-yadrccha-sannivesita, i.e. the inherent property of a thing and the one applied to it by the free will of the speaker. The former is also two-fold viz. tha which is accomplished and that which is to be accomplished. Again here the accomplished is two-fold viz. that which gives life to an entity, and the one which endows it with a speciality. There, the first is the universal or class. It is said in the Vakyapadiya that : 'a cow is not a cow by its own self, nor even a non-cow; but it is a cow on account of its relation with cowness." Jhalkikar (= J.) observes : (pp. 34, ibid) : "vakyapadiyam nama bhartharikrto mahabhasya-vyakhyanarupo vyakarana-granthah. "gauh" - 'go'sabdoddesyo dharmi. svarupena iti - jati-rahita-vyakti-matrena iti arthah' iti tikakarah. 'ajnatagotvakena dharmi-svarupa-matrena' ityarthah, iti udyotakarah. na gauh - na gauh iti vyavahara-visayah. anyatha ghatopi gauh syat svarupa-avisesat, iti bhavah. na'pya-gauh iti vyavahara-visayah. tatha sati gauh api agauh syat iti bhavah." Jhalkikar then explains how Jagannatha has put it. We have seen the view of Jagannatha earlier as we have called him 'maha-siddhantin'. The second one, observes M. further, is 'gunah' or quality. For, a thing, which has come into existence, is differentiated by a quality such as white. The property, which is being accomplished, is of the form of action, parts of which are prior and posterior (i.e. they are in a sequence). M. has observed that there is difference between "jati' and 'guna'. Jati' comes first and 'guna' next. Jhalkikar explains : (pp. 34, ibid) : "labdha-sattakam" jatya prapta-vyavahara-yogyatakam. vastu vyaktih. visisyate, sajatiyebhyo vyavartyate. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidh, 337 atra 'labdha' iti arita-nirdesena utpannasya dravyasya pascad gunena yoga iti darsitam. evam ca utpannasya dravyasya ksanam ekam nirgunatvam. jati-yuktadravyasya eva utpattih - "janmana jayate jatih" iti abhiyuktokteh. ato jatigunayor mahan bheda iti tikakarah. pradipakaras tu, "yadyapi sukla"di-gunasya nityatva-abhyupagame gotva"dina samakalam eva sambandhitvam, tatha'pi sukla"digunasya sambandhah kadacid apaity api, na tu gotva"der iti jati-gunayorbhedah iti ahuh. - For M., the form of words such as Dittha and the like, is completely apprehended by the impression of the last letter. It is divested of successive order. It is imposed by the speaker at his will on entities such as Dittha as an attribute - So, the attribute, characterized by free will is known as poper name : "aittha"di sabdanam antya-buddhi-nirgrahyam samhsta-kramam svarupam vaktra yadrcchaya dittha"disu arthesu upadhitvena sannivesyate iti samjnarupo yadrccha"tmakah." (pp. 35, ibid). M. quotes the authority of Mahabhasya in support of the four-fold classification of words as based on attributes. As for the 'upadhi' or attribute that is imposed on an individual at free will of the speaker, it may be observed that the 'upadhi' is the 'sphota' of that name, which is here designated as 'samjna'. The pradipa, (pp. 32, Edn. '11, Anandas'rama skt. granthavalih) has the ervation - "vaktr-yadrccha-sannivesitas tu sabda-rupah, dittha"diyadrccha-sannivesitas tu pratitya kimcit prakas'itam antya-varna-buddhya niusesato grahyam nana-varna"tmaka-ghata"divarnavad varna-krama-sunyam sphota"khyam sabda-svarupam dittha'di'su arthesu upadhitvena vaktra yadrcchaya kalpyate iti samjnarupayadeccha"tmako dittha"di-sabdah." We have seen that Jagannatha puts it as : "yadicchikas tu vaktra svecchaya dittha"disabdanam pravrtti-nimittarve sannivesito dharmah. sa ca paramparaya vyakti-gatah carama-varnabhi-vyangyah akhandah sphota iti... etc. anupurvyavacchinno varna-samudaya iti apare. kevala vyaktir eva iti itare. tatra totiyamate ca nirvikalpa"tmakah pratyayah. (R.G. pp. 145, ibid) Prof. Gajendragadkar (Edn. K.P., Bombay, pp. 230, 231) observes : "The sentence "dittha"di-sabdanam..." etc. is explained in other ways also. The Pradipa notes the interpretation of Candidasa (latter half of 13th Cen.), grand-uncle of Visvanatha. This interpretation is referred to by Jagannatha in the sentence "kevala vyaktir eva iti itare" in the passage from the R.G. quoted above. For Personal & Private Use Only

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338 SAHRDAYALOKA According to Candidasa as 'samjnasabdas' or proper names directly denote individuals alone, no other attribute is imposed upon those individuals by the speaker, when he endows them with the proper names. Thus, proper names have no basis than the individuals they signify, as jati, guna and kriyavacaka words possess the basic of generality, quality and action, in addition to the individuals they express. It will thus be seen that according to Candidasa's interpretation samjnasabdas, otherwise called 'dravya-sabdas' ('ayam eva samjnasabdo dravyasabda iti vyavahriyate', - udyota), denote individuals alone, as opposed to the first interpretation according to which samjnasabdas express 'sphota-visista' individuals, even as jati, guna and kriyasabdas, denote jati-visista, guna-visista and kriya-visista individuals. The interpretation of Candidasa cannot be easily obtained from the passage under discussion. Candidasa, therefore, has to interpret some of Mammata's words in a fanciful manner. Those words are, antya-buddhi-nirgrahyam', 'samhstakramam', and 'upadhitvena'. 'Antya' according to him, means 'vyakti', which is socalled, because it is understood at the end. Thus, 'antya-buddhi-nirgrahyam = antyam dharmimatram vyaktimatram va buddhi-nirgrahyam yasmin, idrsam sabda-svarupam, 'samhrta-kramam'. In the case of jati, guna and kriya-vacaka words, we first get the idea of jati, guna and kriya and then of vyakti. This is the krama or order in their case. In the case of samjna-sabdas as there is no separate attribute, the individual is directly perceived. So, samjna-sabdas are 'samhitakrama' or 'krama-sunya' in the sense of tadau visesana-pratyayah, tato vyaktipratyayah iti jati-guna-kriya-sabdesu drsyamanena kramena virahitam.'. 'upadhitvena' - As according to Candidasa, no 'upadhi' or attribute is imposed on the individual in the case of samjnasabdas, he cannot take 'upadhitvena' in the natural sense of, 'as an attribute', but interprets it as, 'padarthopasthity-anukulataya' i.e. because it is favourable to the understanding of the meaning of the words." [It may be noted that Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar's explanation follows the one given by Jhalkikar on pp. 36, ibid.). Prof. Gajendragadkar continues : (pp. 231, ibid) : "Candidasa's explanation is unacceptable for three reasons. First the words, antya-buddhi-nirgrahya' and 'samhrta-krama' in their natural sense are quite clear and unmistakably point to 'sphota' as the attribute in question. Secondaly, Patanjali suggests that the convention of the four classes of words is understood in the attributes of the individual. This means even in the case of a 'samjna', it is an attribute of the individual that convention is understood. Therefore, Candidasa's statement that there is no separate attribute is against the view of Patanjali." [This For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 339 explanation also follows Jhalkikara - pp. 36, who observes : "tacca mahabhasyaviruddham. mahabhasye sabdasya eva upadhitvena vyavasthapanat."] Prof. Gajendragadkar proceeds - "Thirdly, Candidasa's interpretation of the three words referred to is unsatisfactory. 'antya' cannot mean 'vyakti'. Then, with this sense, the compound should have been 'buddhi-nirgahyantyam'. Again, 'antyabuddhi-nirgrahya' in this sense cannot be exclusive to 'samjna-vacaka' words. For vyakti' is comprehended at the end from jati, guna and kriya-vacaka words as well. The explanation of samhrta-krama, though understandable, is unnatural. The sense given to 'upadhi' by Candidasa, viz. 'padarthapa-sthity-anukulata' is different from what Mammata understands as 'upadhi' in the case of the three other kinds of words. Besides such 'upadhi' is by no means exclusive to samjna-sabdas. For, it is present in all words.' Prof. Gajendragadkar here quotes relevant passages from both Pradeepa and Udyota, the summary of which is contained in Jhalkikar's explanation (pp. 36, ibid) who also concludes with the words : "sarvesam eva sabdanam tathatvena asya vailaksanya-ana"patter-laksana"pattesca iti pradipodyotayoh spastam." Earlier, we observed that Mammata quotes the authority of the Mahabhasya in his support : "catustayi sabdanam pravsttih." - Here 'pravsttih' means currency or use in the language, i.e. the reason why words are used in the language - (pravsttinimittam) i.e. the conventional meaning. Thus the word becomes current in four ways; which amounts to saying that 'samketa' is four-fold. Mammata here anticipaters an objection such as that "jati' as 'prana-pradadharma' is not comprehensive because there are certain prana-prada-dharmas which are not regarded as 'jati'. For the Vaisesikas parimandalya' i.e. the atomic size of a 'paramanu' or atom is taken as a 'guna' and not "jati'. This is so because parimandalya' and 'vibhutva' are 'parimanas' or dimensions which fall under the category of 'guna'. The fact is that an atom is an atom due to its parimandalya', which if removed, the atom will cease to be an atom. 'Vibhutva' also is a prana-prada-dharma of akasa. How can the Vaisesikas put these under 'guna' ? Mammata's reply is that both these viz. 'parimandalya' and 'vibhutva' are 'jati' only. The Vaisesikas place them under 'guna' because they subsume 'parimana' i.e. measure under 'guna'. So, this is only from a technical point of view. Thus the definition of 'jati' as prana-prada-dharma' is not violated. The principle of classification as advocated by the Vaisesikas and the one held by the grammarians TLC For Personal & Private Use Only

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340 SAHRDAYALOKA are different. The former admitted categories such as dravya, guna, karman, samanya, visesa and samavaya (and also 'abhava'), the latter have jati, guna, kriya and dravya. The Vaisesikas did not distinguish between a 'prana-prada-dharma', and 'vaisistya"padaka-dharma'. Whatever was a 'dharma' was subsumed by them under 'guna'. The category of 'samanya' for them, though based on a 'prana-pradadharma', refers to the unifying common principle that holds together the individuals of the class - 'jati' - and it is not an 'attribute qualifying an individual. The Vaisesikas technically observe that if two jatis are found in an object, they must be related to each other as 'para' (i.e. more extensive) and 'apara' (i.e. less extensive). Say, for example 'prthivi' has 'dravyatva' and also 'prthivitva'. 'Prthivi' is not only a earth, but also a substance. Out of these two jatis that reside in the earth, 'dravyatva' i.e. being a substance' is 'para' or more extensive than, 'being earth' i.e. 'prthivitva' which is 'a-para' or less extensive. The former i.e. dravyatva is found in 'ap' i.e. water, 'tejas' or 'light', and six other substances over and above 'prthivi' or earth. - "tatra dravyani prthivi-ap-tejo-vayu-akasa-kala-dig-atma-manamsi navaiva." Similarly, out of prthivitva and ghatatva seen in a ghata, the former is 'para' and the latter is 'apara'. But here we may observe that even 'ghata' may be earthen, or made from minerals such as copper, iron, etc. or from brass, aluminium, glass etc also. Now, according to the Vaisesikas, mf we were to regard 'paramanutva' as 'jati', it will not be possible to fix it as 'para' or 'apara'. In case of a 'parthiva paramanu', we have both 'prthivitva' and also 'paramanutva'. If we take 'paramanutva' as 'para' or more extensive, then a 'ghata' which possesses 'prtivitva' will be a paramanu. For the rule is that 'para-jati' is also found in places where 'apara-jati' is also seen. But 'ghata' is not a paramanu and this is common knowledge. So, 'paramanutva' cannot be a para-jati. If we take it as an apara-jati with reference to 'prthivitva', then jala-paramanus will be prthivi for the atoms of water possess paramanutva and as prthivitva is para-jati, we will have to accept its presence in jala-paramanu. But common knowledge goes against this also. Thus paramanutva, if taken as a jati, is neither 'para-jati' nor 'apara-jati'. Thus Vaiseskas do not place 'paramanutva' under jati. The technical rule thus stops paramanutva, though a prana-pradadharma, from being taken as jati. But the grammarians do not admit any such rule that when two jatis are found in one object, they must be related as 'para' and 'apara'. So, they have no objection in taking 'paramanutva' as 'jati'. They are satisfied only if two jatis residing in one and the same object are not inherently opposed to each other. For them 'manusyatva' and 'simhatva' cannot stay together in one and the same substratum. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 341 In the K.P. we read 'paramanva"dinam'. But prof. R. C. Dwivedi in his K.P. (pp. 22, ibid) reads, 'paramanutva"dinam, which reading follows the Sampradayaprakasini of Sri Vidya-cakravartin. This perhaps is a better reading. But in both cases, 'adinam' refers to parama-mahat or vibhu, the dimension which belongs to 'akasa' and 'atma' as their pranaprada-dharma. If we take away parama-mahattva or all-pervasiveness from ether or soul, they will cease to be ether or soul. Thus parama-mahattva or vibhutva, though really a jati, it being a pranaprada-dharma, is taken as 'guna' by the Vaisesikas only technically. We have seen how Jagannatha, whom we have taken as a maha-siddhantin and whose views we have therefore placed in the beginning, has also respected Mammata's observations. Mammata further observes that gunas i.e. qualities, kriya i.e. actions, and yadrccha i.e. proper names, though uniform in reality appear to be diverse on account of diversity of substratum. The same face appears to be different when reflected in a sword, mirror and oil. Thus, these - guna, kriya and yadrocha sabdasare not to be subsumed under jati. We had seen that Mukula had also observed this. Thus Mammata also absorbs Mukula's influence if it does not go against his basic faith. Thus Mammata does not accept only 'jati' as the pravrttinimitta of all words. He also rejects the views of jati-visista-vyakti-vadins and also of 'apoha'-vadins, who thus say that the meaning of a word is 'exclusion from what it is not. The former view is held by the Naiyayikas and the latter by the Bauddhas, while 'kevala-jativada' was acceptable to the Mimansakas. The Mimamsaka view is stated in the akrti-saktyadhikarana - in Jaimini's sutras - I. ii. 30-35. We have seen this earlier. Kaiyata in his Pradipa (pp. 17, NS. Edn.) also explains this kevala-jati-vada as follows : "tatra jativadinah ahuh : jatir eva sabdena pratipadyate vyaktinam anantyat sambandha-grahana-asambhavat sa ca jatih sarva-vyaktinu ekakara-pratyaya-darsanat asti iti avasiyate. tatra gava"dayah sabda bhinnadravya-samavetam jatim abhidadhati. tasyam pratitayam tad-avesat tad-avacchinnam dravyam pratiyate. sukla"dayah sabdah guna-samavetam jatim acaksate. gune tu tat-sambandhat pratyayah, dravye sambandhi-sambandhat. samjna-sabdanam api utpatti-prabhsti-avinasat pindasya kaumara-yauvanadyavastha-bhedepi sa eva ayam iti abhinna-pratyaya-nimitta dittharva"dika jatirvacya. kriya-sabdesu api jatir vidyate sa eva dhatu-vacya. pathati, pathatah, pathanti ity ader abhinnasya pratyayasya sadbhavat tannimitta-jaty-abhyupagamah." For Personal & Private Use Only

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342 SAHRDAYALOKA The Naiyayika view of "jativisista-vyakti' is explained in Pradipa as : (pp. 36, edn. ibid) : "naiyayika"dayas tu - na vyaktimatram sakyam, na va jati-matram. adya anantyad vyabhicarac ca. antye vyakti-pratity-abhava-prasangat. na ca aksepad vyakti-pratitih. tasmad visista eva samketah. na ca anantyad asakyata vyabhicaro va. go-tva"di-samanya-laksanaya sarva-vyaktinam upasthitau sarvatra sanketa-graha-saukaryat' - iti atisthante." saugatas tu - "vyaktau anantya"didosad bhavasya ca desakalanugamabhavat tad anugatayam atad-vyavsttau samketah.' Manikyacandra in his Samketa (pp. 15, Edn. Poona, 1921 A.D. - Anandasrama - SKT. - granthavalih) - puts it as : "jater artha-kriya-karitva-abhayad viphalah samketah. vyaktes tu artha-kriya-karitve api anantya-vyabhicarabhyam na samketah kartum sakyate iti jati-mati vyaktih sabdartha iti vaisesika"dayah - apoha iti - jati vyakti-tadyoga-jatimad-buddhyakaranam sabdarthatvasya anupapadyamanatvat gavaya"di-sabdanam a-go-vyavrttya"di-rupo"pohah sabdartha iti bauddhah." Jhalkikara (pp. 38, ibid) explains the Baudha view as :. "go-sabdairavanat sarvasam go-vyaktinam upasthita-itarasmat asva"dito vyavrtti-darsanat ca a-tadvyavstti-rupah apohah vacya iti bauddha-matam. - "atad-vyavsttih apohah padartha iti ksanabhanga-vadinah. tanmate sthirasya samanyasya abhavat apoha-matrena anugata-vyavaharah iti tatraiva saktih - iti cakravarti-bhattacarya-krta-vistarikayam api spastam. - jater adrstatvena vicara-asahatvat vyaktes ca ksanikatvad ubhayatra'pi sanketasya kartum asakyatvat gava"di-sabdanam a-gava"divyavsttirupah apohah arthah, iti vainasikamatam iti anyatra'pi vyakhyatam." So, with reference to samketa-grahana, or convention of words, we have seen four views viz. jarya"divada of the grammarians, the jativada of the Mimamsakas, the jati-visistavada of the ancient Naiyayikas, and the apohavada of the Buddhists, of which the first held by the grammarians is favoured by Mammata and his followers belonging to the Kashmir school. We have seen above that this was accepted even by Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahima and the rest also, though their concept of abhidha' was not congruent with the Kashmir school of thought. A fifth view of vyakti-vada or kevala-vyaktivada is also not accepted by Mammata though it is indirectly referred. This view is held by Navya-Naiyayikas. These modern Naiyayikas rely only on 'vyavahara' for determining sanketa, and vyavahara or day-to-day activity is concerned with individual alone. Kaiyata's pradipa (N.S. Edn. pp. 17) puts this view as : "vyaktivadinas tu ahuh. sabdasya vyaktih eva vacya. jates tu upalaksanabhavena asrayanat anantya"didosa-anavakasah. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 343 Mammata has dealt with the views concerning the conventional meaning of words. But he has not explained how conventional meaning is apprehended from words. There are eight ways in which the conventional meaning is collected. They are : "saktigraham vyakaranapamanakosa"ptavakyad vyavaharatas ca, vakyasya sesad vivrter vadanti sannidhyatah siddhapadasya vaddhah." (read in-parama-laghu-manjusa, pp. 145) Mathuranatha also reads this quotation on Tattvacintamani, pp. 481. (Ref. K. Kunjunni Raja) also Tattva-cintamani pp. 649; Siddhantamuktvvali, p. 266. These eight ways of collecting conventional meaning can be explained as follows : saktigraha or collection of conventional meaning from Vyakarana is understood as - (i) "vakaranad saktigraho yatha, 'kartari parasmai padam' iti anusasanat karmarva"dau dvitiyadeh saktigrahah; dhatu-prakrti-pratyaya"dinam Saktigraho vyakaranad bhavati." - We learn the meanings of the roots, suffixes and derivatives from grammar. The most important use of grammar is to help people to learn language quickly - 'laghu', as Patanjali puts in M.bh. first Ahnika, - and correctly. All the normal derivative words and their meanings can be collected from grammar on knowing the root-meanings and the significance of the suffixes. (ii) Upamanat sakti-graho yatha gavadi-pada-sakti-dhi-sacivyena go-sadrsyatidesa-vakyat gavaya-pada-vacyatva-bodhottaram gavayatva-jaty-avacchinne gosadrsya-grahanat gavayo gavaya-sabda-vacyah ity-akarah. - 'Upamana' or analogy helps us as follows. A man does not know for example a 'gavaya' i.e. a wild-cow. He can identify it through perception after 'gavaya' is explained to him as, "go-sadrsah gavayah" - i.e. 'gavaya' is like a cow. This method of knowing is taken by the Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas as a means of knowledge-pramanadifferent from direct perception and inference. Some scholars translate 'upamana' not as 'analogy but as 'identification'. (iii) Kosa or lexicon in useful thus - "kosad api saktigraho yatha - "svaravyayam svarga-naka-tridiva-tridasalayah." ityadina naka"dipadasya svarge saktigrahah. - The lexicon may even give the metaphorical senses sanctioned by usage; but the primary power of signification should not be assumed in such cases. Thus when a kosa gives synonyms we understand the meanings of unknown words. Also at times 'nila' figuratively is described as 'nila-vastu', also. For Personal & Private Use Only

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344 SAHRDAYALOKA (iv) aptavakya or the direct statement issued by an authority also explains convention. The Nyaya-kosa (pp. 860) puts it as - "anguli-prasarana"di-purvakam nirdesena saktigraho bhavati. yatha-bala, taveyam mata, tavayam pita, ayam te bhrata kadaliphalam abhyavaharati iti nirdesena balasya matradau saktigrahah." Or, it can be explained as - "aptavakyad api saktigraho yatha 'kokilah pika-padavacyah' ityadi-aptavakyat pika"di-padanam kokile saktigrahah." (v) 'Vyavahara' or vaddha-vyavahara can be useful as follows : "vyavaharad api saktigraho yatha, "ghatam naya", "gam anaya" ityady-avapodvapabhyam parsvastha-balasya ghata"di-padasya ghata-matre saktigraho bhavati iti. - usage of the words by elders is the most important method. The Prabhakaras, who support anvitabhidhana, respect this method as the only method to get at the conventional meaning. Mammata, following Kumarila bhatta says that in this method three pramanas or means of knowledge are involved such as pratyaksa-or direct perception, anumana or inference, and arthapatti or postulation. Nagesa considers this method as the best - "Sakti-grahaka-siromani." (Laghumanjusa, pp. 64) Jagadisa, the great Naiyayika also carries this opinion - In his sabdasakti-prakasika, (pp. 103) he observes : "sanketasya grahah purvam vrddha-vyavaharatah." Gangesa also in Tattvacintamani (Vol. IV. pt. 2, pp. 462) observes - vaddhavyavaharat eva sarvesam adya vyutpattih." (vi) Vakyasesa - i.e. frest of the passage in the context is yet another source : "vakyasesad hi sakti-graho yatha, 'yava-mayascarur bhavati' ity-asya yavapadasya dirgha-suka-visese kangau va saktir iti samdehe vakyasesad dirgha-sukavisese saktir nirniyate. vakyasesas tu yatranya osadhayo, mlayante atha etc. modamana iva uttisthanti iti. 'vasante sarva-sasyanam jayate patra-sasanam. modamanasca tisthanti yavah kanisa-salinah", iti ca. - Jaimini, - M.S. I. iv. 24 - i.e. - samdigdhesu vakyasesat - informs that when there is some doubt about the meaning of a word, the rest of the passage must be consulted. In the vedic sentence, "aktah sarkara upadadhati", (= The wet pebbles are placed nearby), the meaning of the term akta (= wet) is to be collected from the rest of the passage - 'tejo vai ghetam' (= ghee is the brilliance); from this it is clear that the pebbles are to be soaked in ghee or clarified butter. This method can be tried in arriving at the correct meaning of a word. Thus in 'yavamayas' carur bhavati', the meaning of yava' - used for long-beared barley by Arya-s and in the sense of panic seed by Mlecchas, - is known to be long-beared barley here from the rest of the sentence. Thus here 'yava' means 'dirgha-suka-visesa'. The rest of the passage viz. 'yatranya osadhayo mlayante athaite modamana iva uttisthanti' - i.e. when the other plants For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha 345 fade out these stand up as if, they are happy. The illustration is cited in Nyayakosa, p. 859, and Siddhanta-muktavali, p. 275. (vii) 'Vivarana' / 'vivsti' or explanation is the next source of collecting meaning. : vivaranad api sakti-graho yatha, 'ghato'sti'. ity-asya 'kalaso'sti' ity-anena vivaranad ghaca-padasya kalase saktigrahah. - We may say that all tika-literature is an illustration here to the point. The meaning of a word can be known from commentary citing a synonymous word, or explaining the meaning. In the M. bh. - Vol. I. pp. 42, - Patanjali observes : "vyakhyanato visesa-pratipattir na hi samdehad alaksanam." The meaning of a word is to be understood by a commentator's explanation especially in cases involving doubt. . (viii) "Prasiddha-pada-sannidhya" also helps in fixation of meaning : "prasiddha-padasya sannidhyad api sakti-graho yatha, "iha sahakara-tarau madhuram piko rauti", ity-adau 'pika'-sabdasya saktigrahah." - [Nyayakosa 858859 pp.). In a statement viz. "The 'pika' sings beautifully on this mango tree", "pika' means a 'cuckoo'. This meaning is gathered from the presence of other words whose meaning is well-known. Nyayakosa also refers to yet another method of collecting meaning : "vedantinas tu 'anguli-prasarana"di purvakam nirdesena sakti-graho bhavati. yatha 'bala, taveyam mata, tavayam pita, ayam te bhrata, kandali-phalam abhyavaharati' iti nirdesena balasya matradau sakti-grahah - ityahuh." But we have seen above a method viz. 'aptavakya' under which this can be subsumed. Mammata's definition of abhidha : In his K.P. II. su. 11, Mammata arrives at the definition of abhidha, such as - sa mukhyo'rthah, tasya mukhyo vyaparo'sya'bhidhocyate." Here 'sah' stands for 'saksat samketitah' i.e. 'directly expressed conventional meaning'. 'asya' means of the word' - 'sabdasya. So, M. observes : "That is the primary meaning; there the primary function of this (i.e. the word) is called denotation." Sahityaculamani of Srividya-cakravartin explains 'mukhya' as : "mukhyah prathamikah, na tu pradhanabhutah" - i.e. by 'mukhya', we have to understand 'primary', and not 'principal. Manikyacandra in his sanketa, (pp. 16, ibid) explains : "sa saksat samketitah, mukham iva, hasta"dy-avayavebhyo'rthantarebhyah prag jnayamanatvat." - Just as the face is seen first, of all other limbs such as hands and the rest, the primary meaning is grasped first of all. The primary function of the word with reference to the direct conventional meaning - 'saksat samketita-artha', is called "abhidha' or the power of direct expression. For Personal & Private Use Only

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346 SAHRDAYALOKA Mammata has placed the word - "asya" as an adjective of 'vyaparal exclude "abhidha-mula-vyanjana" (also called - nanartha-vyanjana) by means of which also "saksat-samketitartha" is conveyed. But this another directly conventional meaning is irrelevant to the context and this second irrelevant meaning is conveyed only after the relevant meaning is first expressed, with the help of factors such as, 'samyoga' or 'conjunction etc. Thus, the 'abhidha-mulavyanjana' also conveys 'saksat samketita artha', but as it in not a 'mukhya' i.e. primary function with reference to it, it is not 'abhidha'. If Mammata had defined abhidha as, "tatra (= saksat samketite arthe) vyaparah..." then the definition would have been two wide (= ativyapta) to include 'abhidha-mula-vyanjana' also, which also serves to give a primary meaning, but of course a second primary meaning, when the first one is decided by factors such as 'samyoga' and the like. But this definition - viz. "saksat sanketite arthe mukhyo vyaparo bhidha" saves the situation and stops "abhidha-mula-vyanjana" from entering into the field of pure abhidha. This "abhidha-mula-vyanjana' is not a 'mukhya' vyapara, but is an 'a-mukhya' i.e "else than primary" . function. It is 'a-mukhya' in the sense that it is based on abhidha' and starts functioning after abhidha' is over. Vacyartha' or 'expressed meaning' is called 'mukhyartha', as seen above, not because it is principal, but because it is comprehended first. Vamanacarya Jhalkikar also notes : (pp. 39, ibid) - "nanu vacya-laksya-vyangyah padartha iti vibhago'nupapannah. mukhyatvena prasiddhasya turiyasya'pi sattvad iti ata aha - 'sa mukhyo'rthah iti." - Jhalkikar here meets with an objection. The objector says that the three-fold division of meaning into vacya', laksya' and 'vyangya' is not acceptable, as the turiya or the fourth one is also known to be mukhya (= principal)." To eliminate this objection Mammata has said, 'sa mukhyo'rthah' iti. - Jhalkikar explains : "sa' iti avadharana-garbham padam." 'Avadharana' is ascertaining, affirming, determining, emphasising, restraining.' - This means that only that which is directly conveyed is 'mukhya' : sa saksat sanketita eva artho mukhyah, mukhyatvena prasiddhah, ityarthah, prathamam pratiyamanatvena eva asya arthasya mukhyatvopapattih. tatha hi. sabda-vyaparat yo'rtho'vyavadhanena (= directly) gamyate so'rtho mukhyah. sa hi yatha sarvebhyo hasta"dibhyo'vayavebhyah purvam mukham avalokyate, tatha sarvebhyah (= laksya, - vyangya-tatparya-rupebhyah) pratiyamanebhyah purvam avagamyate. tasmat mukham iva mukhya iti "sakha"dibhyo yah" (pa. 5/3/03) iti panini-sutrena 'ya'-pratyayah iti. evam mukhyartha-visayah sabdo'pi mukhyah ata eva agre 13 sutre "mukhya-sabdabhidhanal-laksanayah ko bhedah" iti vitti-grantha upapadyate, iti bodhyam. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 347 We can say that Mammata is here under the influence of Mukula, who, as observed earlier, had said - "sabda-vyaparad yasya avagatih, tasya [arthasya] mukhyatvam. sa hi yatha sarvebhyo hasta"dibhyo'vayavebhyah purvam mukham avalokyate, tadvad eva sarvebhyah pratiyamanebhyah arthantarebhyah purvam avagamyate. tasmat 'mukham iva mukhyah' itisakha"di-ya-antena mukhyasabdena abhidhiyate (A.V.M., pp. 1, ibid). In accordance with this term, viz. 'mukhyartha', the word which gives the same is also called the 'mukhya-sabda', or, is also called 'vacaka-sabda'. Though Mammata has not given the divisions of abhidha, we have noted above, when we dealt with the views of Jagannatha, the Maha-siddhantin, that abhidha is also subdivided into (i) yogah i.e. etymology, (ii) rudhih or convention and (iii) yoga-rudhi - i.e. etymology - cum-convention. We have a fourth variety also, as noted above, viz. 'rudha-yaugika', or "yaugika-rudha". The last one is illustrated by the word 'ud-bhid' which means a tree or a bush which comes out after breaking open the surface of the earth. But it is also the name of a sacrifice. This is its conventional meaning. For "yaugika-rudha" words, read : "yaugikartharudharthayoh svatantryena bodhakam padam yaugika-rudham. yatha udbhidadi padam. atra udbhit-padam yogena taru-gulma"deh ruuhya tu yagavicesaya vacakam.' - Nilakanthi. Hemacandra - gives a four-fold classification of words such as - mukhya, gauna, laksaka and vyanjaka. Ka. Sa. (I. 15) : "mukhya-gauna-laksayavyangyartha-bhedat mukhya-gauna-laksaka-vyanjakah sabdah" (pp. 18, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Ahmedabad, June 2000, pub. L. D. Institute of Indology). He explains 'mukhya' artha as : "saksat samketa-visayo mukhyah." (Ka. Sa. I. 16, pp. 18, ibid) - He adds in his vitti - "avyavadhanena yatra sanketah kriyate, sa mukham iva, hasta"dy-avayavedhyah prathamam pratiyate iti mukhyah. sa ca jatiguna-kriya-dravya-rupah, tad-visayah sabdo mukhyo vacakah iti ca ucyate. yatha gauh, suklah, calati, devadatta iti. yad aha. mahabhasyakarah - 'catustayi sabdanam pravrttih' iti. Hemacandra is clearly under the impression of both Mukula and Mammata. But the chief merit of this acarya is that he puts things with absolute clarity and lucidity. He observes that the discussion on the nature of 'jati' and the like is irrelavent to the point and is therefore not discussed here : "jatyadi-svarupam ca praksta-anupayogat na iha vipancyate." He refers in brief to the views on sanketagrahana such as : "jatih eva sanketa-visaya iti eke. tadvan iti apare, aphoha iti anye." For Personal & Private Use Only

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348 SAHRDAYALOKA Though Hemacandra has not elaborated in the body of text which he calls the Ka. Sa. and alamkara-cudamani, the name given by him to his svopajna vitti, he discusses at length in his 'viveka' a commentary attached to the text, but also written by himself. Obviously, he has written 'viveka' for the more advanced students of this sastra, i.e. literary aesthetics. He says : (pp. 1, Edn. Ka. Sa. with viveka, by Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64) : "vivarikartum kvacid drbdham navam sandarbhitum kvacit, kavyanusasanasyayam vivekah pravitanyate." 'to explain something presented, and to add something fresh, - this viveka is presented at length.' So, in his 'viveka' on sutra I. 16 Ka. Sa. he has covered everything that is read in Mammata and Mukula. Hemacandra observes : (pp. 43, ibid) "catusayi iti. jati-sabdah guna-sabdah, kriyasabdah yadiccha-sabdasca. tatha hi, sarvesam sabdanam svartha'bhidhanaya pravartamananam upadhi-upadarsitavisaya-vivekatvat upadhinibandhana pravsttih. upadhisca dvividhah - vaktr-sannivesitah, vastudharmas ca. tatra yo vaktra yadscchaya tat-tat-samjni-visaya-sakti-abhi-vyakti-dvarena tasmin tasmin samjnini nivesyate sa vaktr-sannivesitah. yatha dittha"dinam sabdanam antya-buddhinirgrahyam samhsta-svarupam. tat khalu tam tam abhidhasaktim abhivyanjayata vaktra yadrcchaya tasmin tasmin samjnini upadhitaya sannivesyate. atah tannibandhana yadiccha-sabdah ditthadayah." Hemacandra now makes an interesting note : "yesam api ca da-karadi-varnavyatirikta-samhita-krama-svarupabhavat na ditthadi-sabda-svarupam samhitakramam samjnisu adhyavasyata iti darsanam, tesam api vaktr-yadrcchaabhivyajyamana-sakti-bhedanusarena kalpanika-samudaya-rupasya qitthadeh sabdasya tattat samjna'bhidhanaya pravartamanatvad yadrcchasabdarvam upapadyata eva. - This is from Mukula - (pp. 5, ibid) Hemacandra then gives the two varieties of vastudharma, such as siddha, and sadhya. He proceeds exactly in the fashion of Mammata and Mukula and also quotes from the Vakyapadiya of Bhartahari. He also discusses the views of kevala-jativadins, jati-visista-vyaktivadins and apohavadins. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha 349 The second opinion - viz. 'tadvan' is explained by Hemacandra as : (pp. 44, ibid) - "jater artha-kriyayam anupayogat viphalah samketah. yad-aha "na hi jatir daha-paka"dau upayujyate iti vyaktes ca artha-kriya-karitve api anantya-vyabhicarabhyam na sanketah kartum sakyate iti jatyupahita vyaktih sabdarthah." Now this can be placed with Manikyacandra's (= M.C.) remark in his Sanketa on the K.P. (pp. 15, ibid) : "vyaktes tu artha-kriyakaritve api anantya-vyabhicarabhyam na sanketah kartum sakyate iti jatimati vyaktih sabdartha iti vaisesika"dayah." We do not know who has influenced whom as both Hemacandra and Manikyacandra (M.C.) were almost contemporary. (See. Dr. De.: Dr. Kane). On 'apoha' also H.C.'s remarks are almost identical and then more explanatory when placed with those passed by M.C. - M.C. reads : (pp. 15, ibid): 'apoha iti.' - jati-vyakti-tadyoga-jatimad-buddhyakaranam sabdarthatvasya anupapadyamanarvat gavaya"di sabdanam a-go-vyavittya"di-rupah apohah sabdartha iti bauddhah." H.C. (pp. 44, ibid) reads: jati-vyakti-tadyoga-jatimad-buddhyakaranam sabdarthatvasya anupapadyamanatvat gavadi-sabdanam a-go-vyavittya"dirupas tad-visistam va buddhi-pratibimbakam sarvatha bahyartha-sparsa-bunyam anyapohasabda-vacyam sabdartha iti." Clearly H. C. seems to offer better comments. Again M.C. has 'gavayadi sabdanam', and H.C. has 'gavadi sabdanam' which makes better sense. Then the remark - 'tad-visistam va...' in H.C. also is further explanatory. Thus, our impression is that perhaps H.C. had M.C.'s 'samketa' before him, though he may be himself a senior contemporary of M.C. With this we move on to Jayadeva. The Candra"loka carries a stamp of originality not only in its treatment of different topics, but also in the overall scheme. He has ten 'mayukhas' - rays - chapters of his work 'Candra"loka' - the light of the moon. In the first chapter he gives kavya-laksana and examines Mammata's definition of kavya and deals with 'sabda-laksana' and 'sabda-bheda', etc. Then dosa, laksana, guna and alamkara concepts are taken up in the II-V chapters. The Vith is devoted to 'rasa', 'ritis' and 'vrttis'. VIIth, VIIIth IXth & Xth chapters are devoted to the concepts of vyanjana, dhvani, laksana and abhidha respectively. For Personal & Private Use Only

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350 SAHRDAYALOKA Thus, while other alamkarikas treat vittivicara along with kavya-laksana in the beginning of their works, Jaydeva has almost reversed the treatment and performed a 'sirsa"sana', so to say. We will try to examine the merit of his scheme and also the treatment of various topics as and when the context permits. Jayadeva defines poetry or kavya at I. 7 : "nirdosa laksanavati sa-ritir guna-bhusana salamkara-rasa. anekavittir vak kavya-nama-bhak." Thus for Jayadeva, 'vak' i.e. - 'vani i.e. language - is kavya, and it is bereft of faults, accompanied by laksanas (i.e. marks), ritis (= style, diction), bedecked by gunas (i.e. excellences), and is having alamkaras (i.e. figures of speech) (and) rasas and many vrttis (= functions or powers; the natya-vrttis such as kaisiki and the rest, and sabda-vrttis i.e. abhidha and the rest). We will deal with other topics such as dosa, guna, alamkara and riti later, but for the present we will concern ourselves with 'vak' and 'aneka-vstti'. The 'paurnamasi (Edn. Chawkhamba skt. series - varanasi; '64); observes : (pp. 10, ibid) "etadnsi vak, ukta-visesana-visista vani kavyam, kavikarma, tasya namaakhyam bhajatiti kavya-nama-bhak, kayya-pada-pravrtti-nimittam bhavati." The commentator further explains that Jayadeva hereby wants to convey that poetry is 'word' : etena nirdosa"dy-ukta-dharma-visista-sabdatvam kavyatvam iti kavya-laksanam sampannam. tac ca kavyam sabda-nistham iti api asya abhipretam. kavyaprakasam apahaya prayah sarvepy-alamkarikah kavyasya sabdanisthatam eva urari-kurvate. kavyaprakasakaras tu tasya vyasajya-vittya sabdarthobhayanisthatam svikurute. sabda-nisthatavadinam tu ayam asayah - "autpattikas tu sabdasya arthena sambandhah" ityadi-mimamsa-sutrena sabdarthayoh svabhavika-sambandhe niscite krte sabda-grahane arthah svayam eva apatati. artha-sunye sabde tu prayogarhata eva nastiti kavyasya sabda-nisthata eva ucita iti alam vistarena." There is yet another commentary by Dr. Triloki Natha Dwivedi (Edn. Bharatiya Vidya prakasana, Varanasi, Delhi, '92) - both in Sanskrit and then in Hindi. This commentary explains the word 'vakas : (pp. 11, ibid) : vak (ucyate anena iti For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 351 sabdah, ucyate asau iti arthah) kavyam kavikarma, tasya nama samjna bhajati, samksepena vak kavyam iti." Now this commentator takes 'vak' as both word and sense, and in the paurnamasi, only 'word' was taken as kavya, according to Jayadeva. Now, Jayadeva first takes up 'word for discussion. He defines 'word at Candra"loka I. 9 - as : "vibhaky-utpattaye yogah sastriyah sabda ucyate, rudha-yaugika-tanmisraih prabhedaih sa punas-tridha." That (collection of letter) which deserves the appending of case-terminations and is therefore termed 'sastriya' i.e. scientific (such a collection of letters) is termed 'sabda' or word (with reference to poetry). This word is three-fold viz. (i) rudha i.e. conventional, (ii) yaugika i.e. etymological and (iii) yoga-rudha i.e. etymogical cum conventional. For Jayadeva such words as dittha and the like, which render meaning depending only on the power of the total collection of letters - kevala-samudayaSakti, are rudha or conventional. Yaugika words are 'pacaka' and the like, that give meaning through the association of both 'prakrti' and 'pratyaya' i.e. 'yoga' sakti, and those which render meaning through both samudaya-sakti and avayava-sakti are yogarudha words such as 'pankaja' and the like. Because Jayadeva had defined poetry as 'nirdosa"di-visesanavisista vak', he has to explain and define vak'. This is what 'paurnamasi has to explain. Thus here 'vak" is taken only as 'word'. The other commentary by Dr. Trilokinatha Dwivedi takes 'vak' as both 'word and sense'. He observes : (pp. 19-20, ibid): "kavyarvena abhimatayah vaco vyutpatti-bhedat sabdartha-rupatve kramasah prathamatvat, prathamopasthiteh, arthasya upasthapakataya pradhanyac ca, prathamam sabdam laksayan aha - vibhakty-utpattaye itya"di. vibhakt rupah tin-rupas-ca, tasam utpattaye, dharanaya yogyah prayoga-yogyatam apannah sabdah varna-samudayah sastriyah, sastra-sambandhi isyate kathyate. evam catra sastriya-sabdatvam laksyatavacchedakam, na tu sabdatva-matram eva., arthat 'apadam na prayunjita', tatha ca 'vibhakty-antam padam' ityadi. siddhantanam jagarukataya vibhaktinam utpatteh samagamad anantaram eva sabdah prayogayogyo bhavati vibhakti-rahita-varga-samudayena arthasya 'apratiteh For Personal & Private Use Only

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352 SAHRDAYALOKA sa vibhaktiyuktah, prayoga-yogyah artha-samanvitas-ca sabdah sastriyo vyakaranasastranukula iti kathyate. evam prathamam sabdo dvividhah asastriyah sastriyas ca, iti. tatra asastriyah sabdah yatha'pi bhavatu, kimtu sastriyah sabda eva sa bhavitum arhati yo vibhaktiyuktah, prayogayogyah, niscitartha-pratipadakas ca bhavati. punah bhuyah rudhah, yaugikah, tabhyam bhinnas ca iti rudha-yaugikatanmisras taih prabhedaih, bhedopabhedaih tridha tri-prakarako bhavati-rudhah, yaugikah, rudha-yaugikas ca, iti. tatra prakrti-pratyayartha-vicaram vinaiva kevalam samudaya-saktya arthapratipadakatvam rudhatvam. rudhih prasiddhih. evanca prasiddhya yah sabdah artha-visesam pratipadayati sa sabdah rudha iti ucyate. yogad agato yaugikah iti su-spastam. yogah prakrti-pratyayarthayoh sambandhah sammisranam iti, tasmad artha-pratipadakah sabdah yaugikah. rudhena misro yaugikah, yaugikena misro rudhah, arthat yah rudhopi yaugikopi bhavati, prakrti-pratyayartha-vicaram vina, prakrti-pratyayartha-vicarapurvakam ca'pi ubhayartha-pratipadanam karoti, sa sabdo rudha-yaugika iti." The Paurnamasi (pp. 11, ibid) explains: sa sabdo rudho yaugiko yoga-rudha iti prabhedais tridha bhavati. tatra kevala-samudaya-saktya arthabodhakatvam rudhatvam. yatha dittha"di. kevalavayava-saktya artha-bodhakatvam yaugikatvam. yatha pacaka"di. samudayavayava-ubhayasaktya-arthabodhakatvam yogarudhatvam., yatha pankaja"di. rasagangadharakarah eta eva sabdah kevala-samudayasakti, kevalaavayavasakti-samudayavayava-ubhaya-sakti-padaih vyapadisyate. Jayadeva goes for further sub-division. At Candra"loka I. 10, he states that avyakta-yoga, niryoga and yoga"bhasa are the three sub-divisions of rudha-sabda. Words such as vrksa"di, bhuvadi and mandapa"di are the illustrations respectively. When avayavartha (i.e. yaugika artha) is a-sphuta i.e. not clear and when meaning is collected through samudayasakti, that word is called 'a-vyakta-yoga' sabda. Say, 'vrksa' is so called because it removes the sunshine - "vrscati atapam iti vrksah". Here, the apprehension of the yaugikartha in the sense of 'atapa-nivarana' or removal of sunshine does not take place everywhere, but we have apprehension in a general form of vrksatva-jati - or the generality only, though the 'avayavartha-pratiti' is not totally negated. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 353 Now, when there is no 'avayavartha-pratiti' whatsoever, it is a case of 'niryoga' word. For example, there is no possibility of any yaugika artha in case of words such as the Vbhu and such other dhatus - i.e. verbs. Yoga"bhasa' occurs when the avayavartha or yaugika-meaning is having no relation whatsoever with the meaning which is supposed to be the purport or tatparya. For example we have 'mandam pibati iti mandapah'. But this has nothing to do with a pendal or a reception gate which is raised on occasions such as marriage, etc. The 'yaugika' word is again three-fold such as - suddha-yaugika, yaugika-mulayaugika and sambhinna-yaugika. The illustrations are respectively - bhranti', 'sphurat-kanti' and 'kaunteya'. The first, i.e. suddha-yaugika is one where meaning is apprehended by the union of praksti and pratyaya. V'bhramu' is a verb meaning 'gati' and 'bhrama'. When the 'ktin'-pratyaya in feminine gender is attached to it, we get the word 'bhranti' in the sense of gamana/bhramana or 'bhrama' i.e. illusion. This is 'suddha-yaugika'. When two suddha-yaugika words form a compound, we get "yaugika-mula yaugika", e.g. "sphurat-kanti". This word is derived by a compound of 'sphurat' and 'kanti', which are by themselves suddha-yaugika words individually. 'sphurat' is formed by attaching 'satru'-pratyaya to the root V'sphur'. By attaching 'ktin'in feminine gender, to the root V'kamu', we arrive at 'kanti', a suddha-yaugika-pada by itself. Sambhinna-yaugika occurs when there is relation between 'yaugika' and 'ayaugika' word. 'Kunti is the daughter of king 'Kunti'. This is a yaugika word. There is 'vyang' pratyaya here, and its 'lopa' i.e. (luk) disappearance also takes place. Then again from 'kunti', we apply 'nis'-pratyaya because of faminity, and get 'kunti, which is yaugika'. Then by dhak-pratyaya we get kaunteya'. But by this apprehend only 'Arjuna' and no other son of Kunti. So, this word "kaunteya' becomes 'a-yaugika'. Thus by the relation of both 'yaugika' and 'a-yaugika' words, the word 'kaunteya', meaning 'Arjuna' is arrived at and is called 'sambhinna-yaugika'. Paurnamasi explains (pp. 14, ibid) : "yaugika-ayaugikayoh sambandhena artha-bodhakatvam sambhinna-yaugikam. yatha 'kaunteya' - sabdo yaugikayaugikasambandhena artha-bodhakah. rajadi vacakat 'kunti' sabdat "vrddhet-kausalajadanvyang" ityanena kunteh apatyam stri 'kunti ity arthake vyani pratyaye krte sati tatah tatra, 'striyamavanti-kunti-kurubhyasca' ityanena tal-luki striyam nisi krte kunti sabdo yaugiko bhavati. For Personal & Private Use Only

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354 SAHRDAYALOKA 'kuntya apatyam puman kaunteyorjunah'iti, 'stribhyo dhak'ity anena taddhitena nispannah kaunteya-sabdo'rjuna-vacako'yaugiko bhavati. kuntyah putrantaranam api sattvat. evam yaugika-ayaugika yoh sambandhena kaunteyasabdasya artha-pratyayakatvat sambhinna-yaugikatvam sammisrita-yaugikatvam iti yavat." The yoga-rudha is also three-fold such as by the two, by exchange of general and particular quality, - anyonyam mitho yat samanya-visesayor yoga"rudhayoh parivartanam vinimayah, tasmat karanat. This means that at times (i) the general meaning is discarded in favour of the particular and (ii) vice-versa. The third variety is 'tan-misra' i.e. a mixture of both these, i.e. where at one and the same place both the samanya or general and visesa or particular imeanings are understood. The illustrations are - niradhi, pankaja, saudha, sagara, bhuruha, and sasi. These words leave their samanyartha i.e. yaugikartha and give the visesartha i.e. rudhartha : nirani dadhati iti niradhih - putting aside this samanya/i.e. yaugika meaning it gives only a visesartha - a particular rudha artha of a sea or ocean. Thus, the term pankaja puts aside the meaning of 'anything that is born of mud', 'saudha' puts aside the meaning of a substance, used for white-wash - born of sudha, 'sagara' puts aside the meaning of 'that which is connected with king sagara', 'bhuruha' puts aside the meaning of anything that grows on earth, 'Sasi, puts aside the meaning of a person with a hare or rabbit, - these words give only their famous conventional meanings only. If the third variety of yogarudha word is accepted, we come across such words as 'ksira-niradhi' and 'akasa-pankaja' etc. In case of the former, there is the apprehension of rudha or visesartha in place samanyartha, and in case of the latter there is accepting the samanya/yaugika in place of visesartha; say, for example in case of 'ksiraniradhi' if the samanya meaning in form of a reservoire ater is taken to understand 'niradhi', then 'ksira' or milk will not be able to stay with water. So here 'niradhi' has to be taken in the particular sense of an ocean only. Opposite is the illustration namely 'akasa-pankaja'. 'akasa' is 'panka' or mud, and so the word means 'moon' that has come out of akasaganga. So here visesa artha is left out and samanya artha of 'that which is born in mind', is accepted. The third variety is illustrated by niradhitaya kupah samudra iva, rajate. A table explaining the varietics of sabda can be seen as below : For Personal & Private Use Only

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355 Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha sabdah rudhah yaugikah yoga-rudhah avyakta-yogal niryoga2 yogabhasa3 subddha-yaugika4 yaugika-mula-yaugika5 sambhinna-yaugika6 samanyarthe7 visesarthe8 samanya-vicesa-ubhayavisesartha-bodhaka samanyarthabodhaka vidhartha-bodhakara 9 (here 'niradhi' means sea and reservoire of water) In sabda-sakti-prakasika (1590 A.D.), Jagadisa Tarkalamkara also has given a nine-fold division which is seen in Jayadeva also. We have seen that Jayadeva has qualified 'sabda' by 'vibhaktyutpattaye'. Now vibhaktis are mainly two-fold, 'sup' and 'tin'. The 'sup'-case-terminations are twenty one. They are used in karaka-rupa (i.e. words). The 'tin' are of two types - (i) concerning parasmai pada, which are nine 'tip-adi". (ii) The other nine are concerning the atmanepada - 'ta'-adi'. On account of the futpatti' of these Vibhaktis', i.e. when a collection of letters deserves to take up these caseterminations, it becomes useful for and are utilized in a language. When these case-terminations are attached to a word, it is called a sastriya sabda. Jayadeva thus (I. 13b) comes to the explanation of 'pada' and 'vakya', as : vibhaktyantam padam, vakyam - (136) tadvyuho'rtha-samaptitah, - (14a) The word with (sup/tin) case-terminations appended is termed 'pada' (in grammar). The collection of such 'padas' is a (grammatical) sentence which conveys one meaning and the padas in which are free from expectancy. Paurnamasi observes : (pp. 18, ibid): "arthasya padarthasya samaptih, avasanam iti artha-samaptih, tasyam artha-samaptito artha-samaptau iti yavat. nirakanksam iti yavat." After explaining the concepts of 'sabda' and vakya' in the first Mayukha, Jayadeva - picks up the topic of sabda-vsttis which are three for him, viz. vyanjana, laksana and abhidha, Jayadeva compares these three with the three flows of the Ganga which look to be 'gambhira', 'kutila' and 'sarala', following three vrttis. Jayadeva observes - "vitti-bhedais tribhir yukta srotobhir iva jhahnavi, For Personal & Private Use Only

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356 SAHRDAYALOKA bharati bhati gambhira kutila sarala kvacit. (chandraloka VII. i) Jayadeva's 'vitti' is the same as 'sakti' of Visvanatha and others. Paurnamasi explains : (pp. 230, ibid) : "vartate, sabdarthe pravartate anaya iti vittih." ... yukta sambaddha bharati vani. tribhih srotobhih pravahair yukta, jahnavi gangeva. kvacit gambhira, vyangyartha-bodha-rupa. kutila laksyartha-bodha-rupa. sarala vacyarthabodha-rupa." In the Vith chapter 'rasa' was explained and as 'rasa' is arrived at through 'vyanjana', Jayadeva treats it first in Ch. VII. Ch. VIII is devoted to dhvani and gunibhuta-vyangya. Ch. IX deals with laksana and Ch. X with abhidha. Frankly, there is no rhyme or rhythm in this scheme. We will examine Jayadeva's treatment of abhidha first. He has called it 'sarala and the framatika of Vidyanatha explains this as : "a-vilambena arthapratyayakatvam saralatvam." Abhidha is termed 'sarala' because the meaning is collected immediately through it. Abhidha is defined by Jayadeva at, Candra"loka X. i, as : "dharmam kamcit puraskrtya prayah sabdah pravartate, yaya'rtham spastam acaste sabdas tam abhidham viduh." The idea is that a word is used in language, with reference to some 'dharma' i.e. some speciality here, which is of the form of either jati or class/generality, guna/quality kriya/action or dravya/i.e. a thing, substance, etc. Abhidha is that function, by which, a word clearly conveys the exact - yathartha - meaning, which here is the conventional or 'sanketita' meaning. By 'yathartha' is meant 'sanketita artha', because that exactly is its real meaning. By the term 'spastam' is 'saksat sanketitam' understood. This word which gives the 'saksat sanketita artha' is called vacaka' or directly expressive. Jayadeva wants us to accept six-fold abhidha with reference to the six-fold primary meanings it conveys. Over and above the four-fold meaning such as jati, guna, etc. - the attributes , Jayadeva has two more, such as 'vastu-yoga' and 'nirdesa'. He observes; (Candraloka X. ii) : For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 357 "jatya gunena kriyaya vastu-yogena samjnaya, nirdesena tatha prahuh sadvidham abhidham budhah." The six-fold division of abhidha is due to the six-fold nature of dharma' with reference to which a word is used in worldly business. By 'vastu-yoga' is meant attachment of something which gives the thing a special name such as a person is called dandin' because he is having a danda' or a stick. 'Nirdesa' is pointing out. When we point out someone by name, that term is called 'nirdesa'vaci, e.g. Kamsao. Dr. Trilokinartha Dwivedi explains vastu-yoga, samjna and nirdesa as follows : (pp. 395, ibid) - 'vastunah apara-dravyasya samyogena, sambandhena yatha 'dandi iti atra dandasya samyogena danda-dharinah purusasya jnanam bhavati. samjnaya vaktryadecchaya dittha"di-rupaya, yatha dittho'yam', davittho'yam', ityadi. tatha nirdesena sadvidha iti. vacaka-sabdanam sva-paratvam nirdesarvam. yatha, "hiranya-purvam kasipum pracaksate', iryadina hiramyakasipor nirdesah; yatha 'deva-purvam girim te' ity anena deva-girer nirdesah iti. The paurnamasi observes : (pp. 301, ibid) : vastuno yogah sambandhah vastuyogah yatha dandi iry adau danda-sambandhah. ayamdand-sambandho vacyo, vacyata'vacchedako-atra dandasambandhasya visesanatvena bhanam. ayam eva vastu-yoga-sabdah. yatra jaty adayah sambandhena ca vyavahitas tatra ta eva pravrtti-nimittani vacya va. yatra tu tena vyavahitas tatra vastu-yoga eva tatha. yatha dando gotvavan ity adau. ata eva dravya-yoga iti. upeksya vastu-yoga iti uktam. dittha"disabdah samjna. yadsccha-sabda-iti namantaram. ete sabda eka eva vyakti-vacino bhavanti. "hiranya-purvam kasipum pracaksate' (si. su. I. 42), dhanur upapadam asmai vedam abhyadidesa (Kirata. XVIII. 44), 'devapurvam girim te' (Megha. purva. 42) ity adi sthalesu nirdesa-sabdah santi. vacakavarnanam sva-paratvam nirdesatvam. uktodaharanesu 'hiranyapurva-kasipu' padabhyam hiranya-kasipu-varna-vatta eva vacya, vacakatavacchedika va. tenatra nirdesasabdatvam vijneyam. prastuta-granthakaramate nirdesa-sabdataya abhidhayarthapratitih. anye tv atra laksanam svikurvanti. The commentary tries to explain that by 'nirdesa' only the letters are meant. The individual is not referred to by this, as in a samjna sabda. For Personal & Private Use Only

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358 SAHRDAYALOKA Jayadeva, at X. 3 cites illustrations of all these six varieties of abhidha, such as - "gaur nilah pacako dandi ditthah kamsa iti kramat, kam samhinasti kamsarir naram ca kam samasritam." Here 'dandi' gives meaning by danda-sambandha i.e. vastu-yoga. In the illustration, viz. 'kamsam hinasti', etc., the term "kamsa' is nirdesa-vacaka. There is a question asked viz. "Who was killed by Krsna ? The answer is, "A person who was associated with 'ka'kara." This means krsna killed 'naraka' and also 'sa' associated with 'kam', i.e. ikamsa'. As only letters are mentioned, this is a case of 'nirdesa', and not samjna or yadrccha. When 'kamsa' is referred to by such letters it is 'nirdesa'. When he is referred directly as, "krsna killed kamsa" - it is samjna and not nirdesa. Jayadeva (X. 4) suggests that : "na yoga"der ayatanam na samketa-niketanam, vittya nirdesa-sabdo'yam mukhyaya svabhidheyaya." Jati' etc. are negated in the nirdesa-pada. This sort of an expression i.e. nirdesa, is neither capable of 'vyutpatti' nor is there any sanketa in it. Only letters are apprehended through abhidha. It makes only for 'sva-rupa' - "ato'yam nirdese svarupe sabdo nirdesa-sabdah kamsa"dih. svam varna-dvayam eva abhidheyam yasyam sa taya." Paurnamasi; pp. 303, ibid. In the Mahabhasya we have a four-fold scheme of words : "catustayi sabdanam pravrttih iti uktam. Here, for Jayadeva, abhidha is, six-fold - 'atra tu sa sadvidha iti visesah. (pp. 303, ibid) Vidyadhara (Ekavali II. 2) follows Mammata and holds that meaning of a word which conveys 'saksat samketa' - i.e. convention directly is 'mukhya' or primary and the power which directly conveys this 'samketita artha' - is 'abhidha' and is also 'mukhya' i.e. primary. Vidyanatha, the author of Pratapa-rudra-yaso-bhasana, holds that tatparyartha or purport is covered up by vyanjana only and supports only three powers of a word viz. abhidha, laksana and vyanjana. He does not accept, as is done by Hemacandra, 'gauni' as an independent power over and above laksana. He incorporates 'gauni in laksana and thus, like the kashmir school opts for the For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha 359 vrtti-traya' i.e. three powers or functions of a word. His definition of abhidha, viz. "that function of a word which has the conventional meaning as its object, is called abhidha" - (Pra. Ru. Kavyaprakarana, pp. 35) follows Mammata. He gives two varieties of abhidha, viz. (i) rudha-purvika and (ii) yoga-purvika. The first variety is one which makes for the conventional meaning of a word, and the second yields the etymological sense. The verse, viz. "tapo-visesaih prathitaih..." etc. illustrates the first one, while in "rajni rudra-naradhise." the 'yaugika' - etymological-meaning is resorted to. Visvanatha (Sahitya-darpana, Ch. II) explains the nature of a sentence and gives its varieties. Vakya or sentence for him is 'pada-samuha' or collection of words, and 'pada' is collection of letters capable of yielding sense. Then he gives three varieties of meaning such as vacya/expressed, laksya/indicated and vyangya/ suggested. Three powers of a word are accepted with reference to these three types of meaning, and they are respectively abhidha, laksana and vyanjana (S.D. II. 3). Visvanatha has used the term 'sakti' for all the three functions. Normally, by 'sakti' the alamkarikas refer only to abhidha. For Visvanatha these three powers are also 'vrtti' or vyapara' also. In fact the 'vrtti' is called 'sakti' because it has the power to Id a certain meaning. Abhinavagupta also takes 'sakti' as a synonym of 'vyapara'. Rucira explains that as they stay in a word they are called 'vrtti', but on account of their power to yield a particular meaning, they are termed 'sakti' : See, Rucira on S.D. II. 3 : "atra idam boddhavyam. artha-bodha-hetu-bhutarvat saktirupatvam, sabda-gatatvat tu vittitvam." Explaining the nature of abhidha Visvanatha observes - that, as it signifies the conventional meaning, the abhidha Sakti is called 'agrima' i.e. primary or 'mukhya' : "tatra samketitarthasya bodhanad agrima abhidha." (S.D. II. 49). He has discussed the factors such as vrddha-vyavahara etc., which make for the formation of convention-samketa. He has also explained that by the proximity of a famous word - 'prasiddha-pada-sannidhya' ., and also by aptopadesa i.e. instructions from seniors, conventional meaning is collected. This abhidha Sakti is without intervention from any other power. There are other factors also for collecting the convention and these are clarified by the vivstikara - (pp. 29-30, vivsti on S.D.). Visvanatha accepts samketa with reference to the four attributes such as jati, guna, etc., in conformity with Mammata. Kesava Misra in the third Mayukha of his Alamkara-sekhara talks of three vsttis such as (abhidha) sakti, laksana and vyanjana. Sakti is God's will - isvareccha-and For Personal & Private Use Only

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360 SAHRDAYALOKA is termed 'samketa' - "padanam vrttayas tisrah - tisro vrttayah padanam bhavanti, saktir-laksana-vyanjana ceti. tatra saktir isvareccha, ya samketa iti ucyate. sa padesu prasiddha eva. sa ca - "kosa-vyakarana-aptokti-vakya-sesa-upama"ditah prasiddha-pada-sambandhat vyavaharac ca budhyate." (pp. 9, Alam. se. Edn. N.S. Bombay, 1926) Thus, while others hold that sakti i.e. abhidhasakti gives samketita-artha, Kesava makes a simpler equation and calls sakti itself to be isvareccha or samketa. He does not elaborate. Appayya Diksita has given a serious thought to the concept of sabada-vrttis in his Vrtti-vartika (Vr. V. Edn. Avasthi, Indu Prakashan, Delhi - '77). Of course our Maha Siddhantin i.e. Panditaraja Jagannatha controverts Appayya at many places and this we have seen earlier, but that does not reduce the importance of the Vr. V. in the least. He, of course follows the Kashmir tradition but, to his credit it may be observed that he has gone much deeper in his discussions and has been very analytical in his observations and this provides the back ground and the heritage which ultimately flowers to its highest in Jagannatha. We will consider his thoughts in detail. In the beginning of his work, Appayya observes that the alamkarikas have thought of three vrttis such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, to arrange for alamkaras in the kavya-marga i.e. the path of poetry. In the first pariccheda (= chapter) he picks up abhidha for consideration. He holds that 'abhidha is apprehending meaning through sakti.': "saktya pratipadakatvam abhidha." (pp. 1, Vr. V.). This is three-fold viz. rudhi, yoga, and yoga-rudhi. Appayya observes that "rudhi-abhidha is that which gives a single meaning by akhanda-sakti (i.e. by the whole pada), i.e. without the power of avayava or parts of a word." "akhanda-sakti-matrena ekarthya-pratipadakatvam rudhih" (pp. 1, ibid). This giving of a single meaning, which is rudhi, is two-fold, viz. (i) by the nonmanifestation of the meaning of parts or (ii) by rejection of the apprehended meaning of parts. In the illustration viz. "yat te padambuja-ruha." etc. the meaning of the parts - i.e. avayavartha - of the words 'mani' and 'nupura', viz. to make noise from man, and 'to admire' from nu + pur, is not apprehended at all, and in case of the word 'atimukta', the meaning of, "transending the mukta i.e. free" is apprehended but is not considered and therefore rejected. In For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 361 both these illustrations the meaning is collected by the whole - akhanda-pada and hence it is 'rudhi. After that he treats of yoga-sakti. He observes that, "the capacity to apprehend a single meaning, through the avayava-sakti i.e. power of the parts, is yoga' : "avayavasakti-matra-sapeksah padasya ekartha-pratipadakatvam yogah." (pp. 2, ibid) - This yoga-sakti is also two-fold, viz. (i) the rendering of meaning by the meaning of the parts is due to the non-apprehension of the meaning of the whole, (i.e. the whole has no meaning of itself except the collected meaning of its parts), and (ii) even if the meaning of the whole is conveyed, it is not congruent with the meaning collected from parts. The first variety is illustrated by, "urdhvam viranciho..." etc., and the second by, "vastu-trayi-maya-tanus-tava." etc. The third viz. yoga-rudhi is explained by Appayya as - one in which one meaning is arrived at both with the help of avayava-i.e. parts and samudaya i.e. whole word, as in, "paksa-dvaya-krasima." etc. Here the word 'sura"laya' illustrates this variety word-meaning as a whole is 'The mount meru', and the meaning collected through the meanings of the parts is, - "The abode of gods", and these two taken together render the meaning of, "mount Meru, which is the abode of gods." Thus it is an illustration of "yoga-rudhi'. Appayya here picks up a longer discussion. The objector raises a question as follows :- In such illustrations as above, i.e. 'sura"laya', wherein if both the meanings, i.e. one derived through parts and one through whole, are found to be identical, why should we not accept here rudhi-sakti, and why should we think of yoga-rudhi in such cases at all ? For, if we do not accept this suggestion, there will follow the contingency of 'punar-ukti' or 'repetition'. To this Appayya's answer is as follows :- In accepting yoga-rudhi here, the reason is that in the meaning derived through parts in such cases, i.e. in 'avayavartha' here, there is possibility of a suggested sense here and this avayavartha actually rests in this implied sense alone. So, when we use a pada giving the whole meaning - i.e. samudayartha-vacaka-padantara - there is no fault of repetition. For example, in the illustration, viz. "tava prasadat kusuma"yudho'pi." etc. in the word 'pinaka-pani', we arrive at the apprehension of the greatness (= mahima) of the bow called 'pinaka'. The final apprehension rests in understanding this greatness of Siva's bow. So, the use of the word viz. 'hara' giving the samudaya-vaci-meaning, is not found to be faulty at all. Appayya here considers an objection also. The objection is as follows. As in 'pinaka-pani', so also in the word 'kusuma"yudha' also, we arrive at the For Personal & Private Use Only

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362 SAHRDAYALOKA apprehension of the greatness of the weapon in form of a flower i.e. 'kusuma'. So, why does the poet here not use another word also giving the meaning of 'cupid' or 'kama-deva'? The answer to this querry is that the poet has used the word 'kuryam' i.e. 'I shall do', in the first person signgular and thereby the implied word will be 'aham' i.e. "I" by which kamadeva will be implied. So, its separate mention is not required. Dixita observes that this reply follows the view of some 'sahitya-cintamanikara'. But Appayya further adds that there is no rule or regulation to the effect that when a poet wants to convey the implied sense with the help of the meaning of parts - avayavartha -, there must necessarily be the use of a samudayavaci pada or a word giving the whole meaning. For example, in "manye nija-skhalana." etc., we do not see this. To support this observation Appayya quotes the view of the Ekavalikara, i.e. Vidyadhara and says that, 'there is a two-fold narration such as, when there is apprehension of an implied sense, in case of a yoga-rudha pada, which springs with the help of yaugikartha-sakti, there may or may not be the use of a samudayarthavaci-pada, or a word giving only the meaning as a whole. So, there is no rule or regulation in this respect. After this Appayya proceeds to give such an illustration of yoga-rudha pada in which there is no anvaya or correlation of the avayavartha i.e. meaning of parts, with reference to the subject on hand i.e. visaya-visesa. Here the apprehension rests only in the collective meaning i.e. samudayartha alone. For example the verse, "ullasayati." etc. In this illustration, as with reference to the word 'amburuha', the correlation of the avayavartha viz. 'bhagavannabhi-padma' is not established, we find here only rudhi. And in the next illustration, viz. 'kalhara-kairava.' etc. there is no correlation with samudayartha, and the final apprehension rests only in the avayavartha alone. The word 'pankaja' here is not correlated with the samudayartha in form of kalhara, kumuda, etc., and so, we see here only 'yoga'. Appayya here quotes the views of Naiyayikas but does not give his own observation on the same. After this, covering up the topic of abhidha, Appayya observes that thus abhidha is explained as three-fold. Then he picks up the topic of words having a multiple sense; i.e. 'anekartha sabda'. He holds that a word having a mutiple sense is restricted to a single meaning with the help of factors such as 'samyoga', 'viprayoga', etc. etc. He explains each abhidha-niyamaka with illustration in a scientific way. He observes that in case of a word having multiple sense, if the abhidha-niyamaka or restricting factor is seen at more than one places in a general way i.e. in 'avisista' form, then there is no restriction of abhidha in any particular For Personal & Private Use Only

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Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha 363 meaning. For example the verse, "yena dhvastamanobha ." etc. In this verse both Lord siva and Lord Kesava are delineated as praiseworthy, the regulating factor viz., 'prakarana' or context is used in a general form i.e. not in a particular form-avisista-rupa. So, it is advisable to accept the figure, 'slesa' or paronomasia here. Thus both the meanings here are vacyartha i.e. expressed-sense only. Now, Appayya discusses a point further. He observes that in cases such as quoted above (i.e. in, "yena-dhvasta. etc.") let the abhidha power operate with reference to senses more than one; i.e. let there be a case of slesa alamkara. But when the meaning of regulatory factors such as prakarana etc. have a fixed sense, and even here if an out-of-context a-prakaranika-artha is conveyed, what shall we say? We know that Mammata and some others have accepted the apprehension of additional sense through vyanjana or suggestion. But Appayya has the following observation. He says that in instances such as "asau udayam arudhah." etc., the ancients hold that here vyanjana has to be accepted. But Appayya does not subscribe to this observation of the ancients. He says : "iti artha-dvayasya api prakaranikatvam eva, prakaranika-a-prakaranikarupatve api ubhayatra abhidha eva vyaparah, yathokta-samabhivyaharasya api sabdantara-sannidhi-rupatvena prakaranavad abhidha niyamakatvat." (pp. 12, ibid) - i.e. In instances such as, 'asau udayam arudhah." etc. in case of both the contextual and non-contextual senses, the words such as raja, kara, mandala, etc., the quality of being simultaneously cited - 'saha-uccaritatva-rupa-dharma' is also taken as restrictor of abhidha as in case of 'prakarana' and the like. So, both the contextual and non-contextual meanings are arrived at through abhidha alone. Appayya further explains this by an illustration such as for example in a water can flow both in intended and unintended region. Similar is the case of abhidha here which can give both the contextual and non-contextual meaning as well. We have seen that Jagannatha has also taken this line and elsewhere in a research paper we have indicated that Abhinavagupta in his Locana cites three views in such cases and is also inclined to favour this line of thinking. Normally if the poet intends to convey non-contextual sense to deliver charm-camatkara-in poetry, or when it is a case of obscene sense - 'a-slila-artha', there is scope for vyanjana. But this is not so always. Hence, the regulators such as samyoga and the like, and similar other factors also should be accepted. This way even the supporters of vyanjana also will have to accept vyanjana in such cases only. For Personal & Private Use Only

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364 SAHRDAYALOKA So, if there is abhidha, it is very much there even with reference to the noncontextual-sense as well. If according to Mammata, abhidha is a power yielding 'sakyartha', then it is there with reference to the non-contextual - 'aprakaranika'sense as well, for this aprakaranika sense is also derived through the word alone and not through any other means. If it is said that, "abhidha is that function, which proceeds to deliver meaning in accordance with sakti-graha' i.e. convention, then can we say that when there is apprehension of non-contextual meaning, the 'aglhita-sakti' meaning is not through abhidha ?" The answer is that it is through abhidha alone. The objector may say that, giving directly a meaning through sakti is abhidha. If the term 'saksat or direct' is not accepted, then laksana also will be called abhidha, for the indicated sense is arrived at by the vyavadhana - intervention - of the expressed sense through the primary power. In the same way through factors such as 'context' or 'prakarana', the meaning yielded by this factor will come first and after its intervention second meaning will be derived and thus here also it will not be a case of abhidha. So, the objector feels that to avoid such a contingency, the term 'saksatrva' - directness has to be accepted. Thus if we describe abhidh, as 'saksat pratipadakatva' - conveying a meaning directly, - then only laksana and also abhidha with reference to the non-contextual sense, both will be negated. Thus, we have to accept that the non-contextual meaning is arrived at through vyanjana or the power of suggestion alone. To this Appayya says that the objection of the objector, as well as its refutation, both are uncalled for here. In fact by the adjective viz. "saksatva", further difficulty will be created. The definition viz. "tad-visaya-saktigraham apeksya tatpratipadanam abhidha" - is sufficient even in the absence of the term, "saksatrva". For, there will be gaurava-dosa in taking this term viz. 'saksatrva', in such cases as when there is 'padantara-visesa' accepted due to 'pada-visesa' or 'pada-bhanga', especially when no obstruction i.e. vyavadhana is caused in form of apprehension of another meaning. On the other hand, by accepting this visesana i.e. 'saksatrva, there will be a-vyapti-dosa in illustrations such as "yena dhvasta-manobhavena." etc., for here the contextual meaning is with reference to Visnu and the noncontextual meaning is with reference to Siva. The words used in this verse are usly expressive of the meaning with reference to Lord Siva. The apprehension to this effect is also faster, though the meaning with reference to Lord Siva is noncontextual. The visnu-paraka meaning, though contextual, is arrived at in an asphuta - indirect-way. The terms such as "sasimacchirohara" and "andhaka-ksaya For Personal & Private Use Only

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365 Sabdavsttis the nature of : Abhidha kara", which make for the apprehension of meaning with reference to Visnu, are charged with defects such as 'a-prayuktatva', and 'nihatartharva'. So, when these words are 'a-prasiddha' with reference to meaning connected with Visnu, this meaning is derived late - So, if we accept abhidha with reference to the contextual meaning connected with Visnu here, due to its lateness, the adjective viz. 'saksattva' will be out of tune here, and the definition of abhidha will therefore tend to be too narrow i.e. 'a-vyapta'. . Take the case of a particular 'pada' i.e. word. Now, looking at the context, there may be a meaning which is contextual and another meaning which is noncontextual. But here, it may happen that a particular meaning which is noncontextual for the present, may actually be more current in daily affairs. So, this meaning will flash first in the mind and therefore it will be arrived at by abhidha. The contextual meaning which is less current will be the subject of vyanjana. It is exactly for such a case, that the alamkarikas have accepted the blemish called 'nihatartha' when a word having more than one sense is used in a non-current sense. Now, if through prakarana or context, a non-current meaning is also accepted, then there will not remain any reason to accept 'nihatartha dosa' whatsoever. So, this amounts to the fact, observes Appayya that, whether the more current meaning is contextual or otherwise, its apprehension always comes first, and this fact has to be accepted. Again there will be 'vyavadhana' i.e. obstruction by the first apprehension of the more current but non-contextual sense in the apprehension of less-current contextual sense. Thus, the adjective "saksatrva" does not stand a chance of being fitted in the definition of abhidha. So, for Appayya, the real reason of vrtti-bheda, i.e. difference in function, lies in dharma-bhada i.e. difference in the fact of the proximity or otherwise of the words that are useful in giving a meaning. The idea is that we either get abhidha or laksana depending on the fact of there being proximity or otherwise which is of the form of usage due to sequence of words having multiple sense in a single statement. We cannot decide upon the difference in vrtti or function without taking into account the above factor. The net conclusion is that we will accept abhidha where padas, which are sabda-visista are present and are in proximity. Here the apprehension of meaning could be either direct or indirect i.e. vyavahita. Where there is proximity of such words that are sabdartha-sambandha-visista, we have to accept laksana. So, the definition of abhidha viz. "tad-visayaka-sakti-graham apeksya, tat-pratipadakatvam abhidha" is the right definition, and thus even the non-contextual meaning also will be collected by abhidha. For Personal & Private Use Only

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366 SAHRDAYALOKA According to the Naiyayikas, 'prakarana' i.e. context and the like are not the limiting factors of abhidha, because even in their absence, due to the strength of currency (i.e. prasiddhi), the non-contextual meaning is also apprehended and in the absence of the said 'prasiddhi' i.e. currency, even the contextual meaning is also not remembered. Thus only the expertness (patuta) of the samskaras i.e. impressions of the sakti-graha or convention, is the sole limiting factor of abhidha. We have to accept, however, this much that 'samyoga' and the like, also help the cause of apprehending the meaning, only in form of 'linga' or mark. Thus, Appayya concludes that the presence or otherwise of 'prakarana"di' i.e. context and the like, can not be the limiting factors - 'niyamaka' - of abhidha. So, when both contextual and non-contextual meanings are present, the apprehension of the expressed sense is solely due to abhidha. - "tasmat prastutaprastutobhayapare'pi prastutaprastutobhaya-vacyarthe abhidha eva." - (pp. 43, ibid). In both the cases, whatever sense is conveyed through words, with the help of expectancy - akanksa etc., we arrive at the apprehension of sentence-sense, be they contextual or otherwise. Vyanjana should be accepted for the apprehension of word-sense or sentence-sence, only in case of non-contextual subject. Dixita is very clear here that when the ancients accept vyanjana in illustrations such as, "asau udayam arudhah..." etc. it is only with reference to the figure 'upama' which is suggested by comparision of the contextual and non-contextual matter. Now, the problem arises that what shall we do about sabda-sakti-mula-vastudhvani ? There is no suggestion of any figure of speech here. Only the non-contextual meaning is accepted as vastu-dhvani or suggested idea, or matter. So, if this is the position, then shall we have to totally let go sabda-sakti-mula-vastu-dhvani, where according to Dixita, even the non-contextual meaning is collected through abhidha alone ? Appayya's answer to this is that even here, both the non-contextual and contextual senses are arrived at through abhidha alone, but after that some implied fact - anabhidheya vastu - flashes forth which becomes the subject of dhvani, e.g. in the verse, "sanih asanis ca..." etc. For Dixita, Mammata's observation that the verse, "bhramim aratim..." etc. is an illustration of sabda-sakti mula-dhvani is not sound. It is only 'praudhivada' i.e. bold assertion. In reality, even in that illustration, the noncontextual meaning is arrived at through abhidha alone. Thus through a sound scientific discussion Appayya has widened the scope of abhidha so as to cover even a non-contextual sense also, and this is accepted by Jagannatha also. We have seen above, when we took up the discussion of the views of Jagannatha who for us is a maha siddhants that Appayya's all the three definitions For Personal & Private Use Only

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sabdavrttis the nature of : Abhidha 367 of the three varieties of abhidha are ably challanged and refuted by Jagannatha. (pp. 442, onwards) Dr. Prof. Bhagavatiprasad Pandya (Ahmedabad) who worked on Appayya Dixita for his doctoral thesis ("Appayya Dixita, Kavi ane Alamkarika" (in Gujarati), pub. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, '74), under the supervision of our great alamkara-guru Prof. R. B. Athavale who has produced in three volumes, - including the first volume comprising of the bio-data of Jagannatha and the critical appreciation of the R.G. in both Marathi and Gujarati, - has tried to defend Appaya's observations on abhidha against J.'s attack. The substance of the defence is as under. (Ref. pp. 196, ibid) - Jagannatha had pointed out the belmish, called atma"sraya or asangati in Appayya's definition. But Appayya's observation can be defended if we explain his definition as below. We have to take the meaning of the term 'sakrya' in Appayya's definition as "sakti of sanketa". If sakti called abhidha takes the help of this sanketa-sakti then only a special meaning can be directly apprehended from a special word; and not otherwise. So, if by 'saktya' we mean 'sanketa-saktya' then the blemish of atma"sraya or asangati as pointed out by Jagannatha will have no chance ! Thus, no 'sva-skandha"rohana' will take place. Of course, there is verbal gimmick in this defence, but then it does not cease to be convincing either. Dr. Pandya has tried to defend Appayya in one more context also (pp. 199, ibid). He observes that Jagannatha has enumerated a fourth variety of a word such as "yaugika rudha", which is not directly mentioned by Appayya. But then the latter, could have accomodated it under either 'rudha' or yaugika' variety. Jagannatha has given the word 'asvagandha' as an illustration. Appayya has also cited a word such as 'nisanta' which means grha or house as its rudha meaning and which has the sense of 'end of night as its yaugika sense. But he has not called it 'yaugika-rudha' by name, for here both the meanings are not simultaneously apprehended. Thus, Dr. Pandya argues that eventhough Appayya knows the fourth variety of 'yaugika, rudha' he did not enumerate it for want of justification. One and the same word, say, 'nisanta' here or 'asvagandha' there, can be taken either as rudha or yaugika as the context permits, and because both the meanings are not simultaneously apprehended no fourth variety should be considered. This is how Dr. Pandya justifies Appayya's three-fold scheme. We may not find it that convincing. Thus we have tried to sketch the full graph of 'abhidha'. We have seen how the original concept was inherited from the sastras such as the Vyakarana, Mimamsa, and Nyaya. We have seen how various disciplines tried to fix 'samketa' at various For Personal & Private Use Only

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368 SAHRDAYALOKA places and how ultimately the alamkarikas opted for the four-fold convention with reference to the attributes such as jati, or class, guna or quality etc. Thus the alamkarikas followed the dictates as laid down by the grammarians. We also saw how Anandavardhana and then Abhinavagupta, followed by the whole kashmir school of alamkarikas beginning with Mammata down to Jagannatha tried to evolve the nature and scope of abhidha and portrayed it as distinct from either gauni and laksana on one side, or vyanjana on the other. But we also observed in between how some successors of Anandavardhana such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahima and Dhananjaya tried to evolve a wider concept of abhidha so as to include laksana, and/or even vyanjana in its fold. All this makes a very interesting reading which is a glorious chapter not only in semantics as discussed in India but also in the subject as expounded even in the west, even to-day. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter VI "Tatparya" General Introduction : Some thinkers feel that through abhidha we arrive at the primary meaning of a word. Thus abhidha is a word-power, a sabda-sakti. It is capable of yielding individual meaning of an individual word or 'pada'. But this abhidha power can not give us the sentence-sense which is of the form of correlated meaning of all individual word-meanings in a given sentence. The sentence-sense is thus a total sense as against individual word-sense derived from words that are independent units having individual meaning not related to each other. So, according to these thinkers to arrive at this total sense of a statement, i.e. 'vakyartha' a separate function - vrtti or sakti of the sentence-unit has to be considered. This is named as tatparya-sakti or vakya-sakti, purport, which is supposed to deliver the sentencesense, which is a correlated sense of individual words that give individual meanings - i.e. padartha-through abhidha or vacaka-sakti which is thus a pada-sakti. The tatparya-vrtti, which is supposed to be a vakya-vrrtti thus gives the total meaning of a given statement and some thinkers suggest that it not merely a sum total of individual padas only, not just a 'samudaya' of 'padarthas', but is something specialvisista-over and above that. We will examine the concept of tatparya first in its historical context, i.e. how its separate recognition evolved in the thinking of various schools of thought such as the Vaiyakaranas, Mimamsakas, Naiyayikas etc. and then how this topic was handled by the alamkarikas. It is clear by now that tatparya sakti is supposed to be that power which assimilates the sense given by abhidha and renders a new meaning-abhinavartha "> which is not just the assimilation of vacyartha, i.e. not 'yoga-matra', but is something unique - "a-padartho'pi vakyarthah" as Mammata explains later. The Dhvanivadins have termed it as "tatparya-vrtti". We will go to see that in this For Personal & Private Use Only

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370 SAHRDAYALOKA observation of the Dhvanivadins, we may be able to read the influence of the abhihitanvaya-vada of Kumarila Bhatta. It may be noted at the outset that, though Kumarila recommends a separate function for sentence-sense i.e. vakyartha, as something different from and independent of abhidha, which is a word-power, we do not get the clear mentioning of 'tatparya-vstti' by name, in the Mimamsa works till we come to Mimamsa-Kaustubha of Khandadeva in the 13th or 14th Cen. A.D. (Ref. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja) Vakya-; its import : First, we will discuss the nature of a sentence or vakya and then its import. (courtesy, Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja) The sole purpose of the use of language is expression of thoughts, which is carried out best through the medium of sentence as such and not just by means of individual words. So a sentence is the real unit of significant speech. An idea resting in mind becomes definite only when expressed in form of a sentence. Thought in language will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in a coherent combination of words, called sentence, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. The Naiyayikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions. A logical proporition is, to all appearance, a sentence i.e. a combination of words connected together by mutual relation. Jagadisa explains that the so-called verbal cognition i.e. sabda-bodha is derivable only from a sentence, that is to say, when a number of significant words - (sarthaka) having expectancy akanksa, and compatibility - yogyata-with one another are related so as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term : "vakyabhavam avaptasya sarthakasyavabodhanah sampadyate sabda-bodho na tanmatrasya bodhatah." - (s. s. pra. 32) So, a logical proposition as an idea or judgement is expressed in form of a sentence. However, it should be carefully noted that the meaning of a sentence which follows from it as a whole, should be distinguished from that of its constitutent parts. Jagadisa notes that verbal cognition or sabda-bodha is not materially the same as sabdartha or the meaning of isolated words. The meaning of a sentence is something more than the mere sum total of the significations of component parts - 'vilaksano bodhah' - (s. s. pra. 32) For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 371 Vakya; definition - Before we discuss various views as per the import of a sentence, we will first try to understand the definition of a sentence. Patanjali is of the opinion that action - akhyata-along with the help of all or each of the following viz. an indeclinable, i.e. avyaya, karaka and visesana or adjective makes for a sentence : "Whyatam sa-vyaya-karaka-visesanam vakyam." - M. bh. II. i. 9 - He observes - (pp. 367 Edn. Keilhorn, Vol. I. '62, third Edn. Abhyankar) - akhyatam savyayam sa-karakam sa-karaka-visesanam vakya-samjnam bhavati iti vaktavyam. savyayam, ucsaih pathati, nicaih pathati. sa-karakam odanam pacati. sa-karakavicesanam-odanam mrdu-visadam pacati. sa-kriyavisesanam ceti vaktavyam. susthu pacati dustu pacati." etc. - A kriyavisesana i.e. an adverb is also included herein - sa-kriyavisesanam ca (ibid, pp. 367). Just action, aided by a visesana alone can also make for a sentence - akhyatam sa-visesanam. At times a sentence is of the nature of an action alone - "ekatin" (mbh. II. i. i., pp. 367). The grammarians hold that the pada-padamia aspect of a vakya is ultimately illusory; they accept the sentence-whole as a single unit and give us the concept of vakya-sphota. See Punyaraja on V.P. - "tad asman manyamahe padani asatyani ekam abhinnasvabhavakam vakyam. tad abudha-bodhanaya pada-vibhagah kalpitah iti. - For the Naiyayikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy : "mithah sa"kanksa-sabdasya vyuho vakyam caturvidham." s. s pra. 13 We know that later, alamkarika Visvanatha defines sentence as collection of words having expectancy, compatibility and proximity - "vakyam syat yogyata"kanksa"sattiyuktah padoccayah." S.D. II. i. ab. - We will discuss the views of the alamkarikas later. In the vedas we come across only consolidated sentences i.e. sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The Taittiriya Samhita supports this - "vag vai paraci avyakrta." The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of samhita or emphonic combination of letters as we find in the Rk-pratisakhya : "padaprakstih samhita." It is said that the samhita or the close combination of letters such as, "agnim lle" - is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up i.e. into 'agnim' and "lle", shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum - 'pada-prakrtih samhita' gave rise to a great controversy. The Mimamsakas i.e. the padavadins, and the Vaiyakaranas or Vakyavadins have explained it in different ways. The Padavadins take padas as real and For Personal & Private Use Only

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372 SAHRDAYALOKA significant and for them the sentence is only a combination of such padas i.e. inflected words. They explain the compound 'pada-praksti" as 'padani prakrtih yasyah' i.e. samhita which has 'padas as its original nature', and thus they try to prove the priority or being a source' - prakrtitva - of the padas or words. The Vakyavadins explain it as "padanam prakrtih" i.e. samhita is the original source or original form of padas or words which have no real existence. Thus they take the sentence, or say, Vakya-sphota to be the only significatory unit of speech. They simply reject the concept of the precedence or priority of the padas in preference to that of a sentence. It is difficult for us to say, which interpretation is more acceptable or which one was earlier. We may humbly add that if 'padas' have no real existence, how can a vakya--their prakrti-have any existence at all ? We know that Durgacarya on Nirukta I. 17 observes : "samhitayah prakstitvam jyayah. mantro samhitayaiva abhivyajyate, na padaih. atas ca samhitam eva purvam adhyayanti anucana brahmana adhiyate cadhyetarah. api ca yajne karmani samhitayaiva viniyujyante mantrah na padaih." Thus it is emphasized that the mantras, as they were revealed through the holy seers of yore, manifested themselves in the compact form of the samhita or combination and not in form of isolated words. The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the vedas in their samhita form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing vedic rites, the priest cites the mantra in their consolidated-samhita-form only. Now, can we think of word and sentence absolutely divorced from the said ritual ? What about those who have a complete disregard for vedic samhita and ritual ? Can we think of this topic independently of the ritual context ? Grammarians : They attach much importance to vakya-sphota as the really significant element of speech. Thus the sphota-vadins are the same as vakya-vadins. The author of the Sabda-kaustubha says that of the eight varieties of sphota, only vakya-sphota is accepted to be real and significant : "yady api iha astau paksah uktah, tatha'pi vakya-sphota-pakse tatparyam grantha-krtam" - (Sabda-kaustabha.) So, for the sphotavadin the sentence is an indivisible unit - akhanda - and analytical method of grammar that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people. - The V.P. II. 240, observes - "upayah siksamananam balanam apalapanah, asatye vartmani sthitva tatah satyam samihate." (II. 238 (pp. 19 appendix) in word-indext to V.P. - Saroja Bhate) For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 373 Punyaraja on V.P. II. 57 observes : "tasman manyamahe padani asatyani, ekam bhavakam vakyam. tad abudha-bodhanaya pada-vibhagah kalpitah." Punyaraaja also holds that this view is shared even by Panini and Patanjali : "evam sutrakarasya bhasyakarasya ca akhanda-pakso'bhirucitah." - on V.P. II. 37. So, "padani asatyani vakyam eva satyam iti arthah" notes Punyaraja on V.P. I. 174. Bhartrhari establishes this view very emphatically. He uses such vedantic terms as upadhi or attribute, and adhyasa or superimposition to explain the cognition of the diversity of words in the unity of a sentence. Punyaraja observes : "upadhibhedena eva bheda-pratibhaso, na svato nityatvat." on V.P. II. 228 See also: abhijanyatvam adhyasaruparvam agatah sabdah-Punyaraja on V.P. II. 129a. For Bhartrhari the 'akhanda' is real, and the divisible - khanda is unreal i.e. a-satya. The grammarians enter into the investigation of the nature of words, but they reach the supreme truth : "asatye vartmani sthitva tatah satyam samihate." (quoted as above). It is thus said as letters like vk, kh, etc. do not admit of further division into parts so there are no parts in a word, and words have no separate existence apart from a sentence : "pade na varna vidyante varnesu avayava iva, vakyat padanam atyantam praviveko no kascana." - V.P. I. 173. Again, just as we have recourse to an unnatural thing like the practice of analysing a word into stem (prakrti) and affixes or formative elements (pratyaya), in the same way, we disjoin the words from the sentence in pursuance of the principle of 'apoddhara' i.e. disintegration : yatha pade vibhaksyante praksti-pratyaya"dayah, apoddharas tatha vakye padanam upavarnyate." - V.P. II. 10. It is also stated that the sense conveyed by a sentence is also indivisible : "vakyasya arthasya api tathaiva nirvibhagatvam pratipadayitum aha... Punyaraja on V.P. II. 10. Just as a word (sabda-sphota) or a sentence does not really consist of any parts, so the meaning conveyed by it does not admit of any division : "sabdasya na vibhagosti kutorthasya bhavisyati ? vibhagaih prakriyabhedam a-vidvan pratipadyate." V.P. II. 13 For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA What is emphasised here in particular by the Vakyavadin is that words which seem to enter into the composition of a sentence do not retain their separate identity, either in their formal or material aspect. The meaning of each individual word is found to lose itself almost entirely in the sense that is finally expressed by the sentence in its harmoneous unity, e.g. the word 'Brahmana' has no separate meaning in the expression Brahmana-kambala : "brahmanartho yatha nasti kascid brahamana-kambale devadatta"dayo vakye tathaiva syur anarthakah." V.P. II. 14 Again we may beg to differ. If "brahmana" has no separate meaning in "brahmana-kambala", then it should have an indentical meaning with either a "vaisya-kambala" or a "sudra-kambala" etc. But this is not so. 374 What is Vakyartha ? As to the nature of Vakyartha we read different views (Ref. Dr. Kapil Dev Dwivedi; 'Artha-vijnana', quoting Jayanta Bhatta. This again is quoted by Dr. Bholashanker Vyas). The views are - (i) The sense of a sentence is 'jnana'. (ii) The vakyartha is 'kriya' or action, which is the most important element in a statement. (iii) The vakyartha is 'phala' - result or fruit as we perform any action with a view to some 'phala'. (iv) The vakyartha is 'purusa' (i.e. isvara) for the 'phala' of an action is directed towards him. (v) The vakyartha is 'bhavana' i.e. the activity or vyapara of the karta, the doer, or agent, with reference to some desired object such as heaven/'svarga'. (vi) The vakyartha is sabda-bhavana or vidhi. (vii) The vakyartha is 'niyoga' or prerana. (viii) The vakyartha is 'udyoga'. (ix) The vakyartha is 'pratibha'. The Naiyayikas hold phala to be the Vakyartha while the Vaiyakaranas believe it to be pratibha or intution. We may assume that, as is normally the case elsewhere, in this respect also the alamkarikas follow the lead of the Vaiyakaranas and accept 'pratibha' to be 'vakyartha'. For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 375 Thus for the grammarians the meaning expressed by a sentence is pratibha or intuition, which is innate or ingrained in all of us: "tatra akhanda-pakse pratibha vakyarthah." - observes Punyaraja on V.P. II. i. This pratibha is inborn and not postnatal; it is neither a sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience. It is termed as 'samskara' or 'bhavana', firmly seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Thus it is termed as purvavasana also. The Vaiyakarana has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of 'pratibha'. So, ultimately it comes to this that what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (bauddharthasya vacyatvam). Words may have different meanings and they may be taken individually, but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the padarthas or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called pratibha or intuition : "viccheda-grahanerthanam pratibha'nyaiva jayate, vakyartha iti tam ahuh padarthair upapaditam." V.P. II. 145 According to Punyaraja, the padarthas, unreal in themselves, help in the manifestation of pratibha. : "padair asatyair eva upadhibhutair upapaditam abhivyaktam iti." on V.P. II. 145. According to Bhartrhari the first thing that pratibha achieves is to bring about an association of the meanings which seem to be otherwise unconnected - 'asamsrsta' It is this objective (visaya) that is directly conveyed by a sentence : - "upaslesam iva arthanam sa karoti avicarita, sarva-rupam iva apanna visayatvena vartate." V.P. II. 147. This pratibha is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of previous lives: "saksat sabdena janitam bhavana'nugamena va iti kartavyatayam tam na kascid ativartate." V.P. II. 148 For Personal & Private Use Only

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376 SAHRDAYALOKA Pratibha is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable evidence determining the ultimate reason for one's particular inclination (pravstti) : "pramanatvena tam lokah sarvah samanupasyati." V.P. II. 149 It is seen in the human beings as well as in all creatures alike : "samarambhah pratiyante tirascam api tadisat." V.P. II. 14 cd. The swan, the moment it comes out of its egg, begins to swim, the younger-one of a monkey clings to the branch of a tree and the newly born babe sucks its mother. Thus, the existence of pratibha is self-certifying. It flashes upon a being as an intellectual heritage by the force of abhyasa i.e. practice, experienced in the long chain of previous cycles of births : Punyaraja observes - "janmantarabhyasa-hetuka iyam" - on V.P. II. 149. The cuckoo pours its music in the spring, the birds build their nests, and their simple mode of dancing, jumping, amusement, jealousy, and the very manner of their collecting food etc. are inborn with them, and all this is due to pratibha, according to Bhartrhari : "svaravsttim vikurute madhau pumskokilasya kah, jantv adayah kulaya"dikarane kena siksitah." - II. 151, ahara-prity-abhidvesaplavana"di-kriyasu kah, jatyanvaya-prasiddhasu prayokta mrga-paksinam." - II. 152 Thus, pratibha actually means the same as instinct. Bharthari concludes that the use of words rouses this innate intelligence : Punyaraja observes : - "pratibhayas ca sabda eva mulam iti aha." and also - "bhavananugatad etad agamad eva jayate, asatti-viprakarsabhyam agamas tu visisyate." V.P. II. 53 For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 377 This pratibha again, is six-fold, as arising from nature, exercise, repeated practice, concentration of mind, actions done in previous lives and special efficiency or aptitude : "svabhava-acarana-abhyasayogat drsta upapadita, visistopahita ceti pratibham sadvidham viduh." V.P. II. 54 It is really difficult to define precisely a sentence. From the logical point of view, it is not mereby a group of words as Jagadisa remarks rightly. The words that constitute a sentence should be having akanksa/expectancy, yogyata/compatibility and asatti or sannidhi i.e. proximity. These are indespensable for the making of a sentence. Proximity pertains to the formal closeness of words and has very little to do with meaning. Expectancy and Compatibility refer, on the other hand, to the logical aspect i.e. consistent correlation of meaning: The Laghumanjusa (pp. 497) observes : "ayam arthorthantara-sakanksa iti vyavaharat." Asatti or sannidhi implies the extreme proximity of words, without which the very idea of combination becomes impossible - The S.D. of Visvanatha puts it in this way : (S.D. II. I. vitti) - "yogyata padarthanam paraspara-sambandhe badhabhavah. padoccayasya tad abhavepi vakyatve, 'agnina' sincati" ity ady api vakyam syat. akanksa pratitiparyavasana-virahah. sa ca srotur jijnasarupah. nirakanksasya vakyatve, 'gaur asvah puruso hasti-ity adinam api vakyatvam syat. asattih buddhyavacchedah buddhi-vicchede'pi vakyatve idanim uccaritasya devadatta-sabdasya, dinantoccaritena gacchati iti padena sangatih syat. atra akanksa-yogyatayor atmarthadharmatve'pi padoccaya-dharmatvam upacarat." Thus, a mere combination, i.e. inconsistent group of words, whether subanta or tinganta, is not competent to be a sentence : "sup-tin-cayo naivam, ativyapta"di dosatah" - observes s. s. pra. pp. 13. This is why Jagadisa rejects the definition given by Amarasimha as ativyapta and avyapta or too-wide and too-narrow. There is some peculiarity in the logical conception of a sentence. Sometimes, a single inflected word (pada) is as good as a sentence. To the Naiyayikas, the form 'ghatam' is as good as a sentence, as it conveys karmatva, or the status of being an object, pertaining to a pot : 'ghatavrtti-karmatva'. Thus, according to this view, ghatam karoti' should therefore be regarded as a mahavakya or a compound-sentence. Mimamsakas : According to the Mimamsakas, a sentence is a combination of words, with oneness of sense : "arthaikatvad ekam vakyam, sakanksam ced For Personal & Private Use Only

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378 SAHRDAYALOKA vibhage syat." - Mi. Su. II. 146 and also see SB. on Mi. Su. II. 146 - "ekarthah padasamuhah vakyam." Here, oneness of sense is an important condition. It implies that a sentence in its synthetical form yields only one sense or a single idea, though on analysis it is found to be made up of words that are mutually expectant : V.P. II. 4 observes : "sakanksavayavam bhede paranakanksa-sabdakam, karma-pradhanam gunavad ekartham vakyam ucyate." A combination of words, though capable of being split up into many significant parts, is considered by the Mimamsakas as a single sentence, provided it is found to express only one connected idea. Not only is there a formal combination, but the meanings too are related to one another in such a way to produce one coherent idea resulting from the association of the meanings. The dictum that a sentence signifies either difference or association does not render the oneness of the meaning inconsistent, because a sentence as a whole is generally used for the purpose of conveying an idea that is complete in itself. : See SB. on Mi. Su. II. i. 45, - "bhedah samsargo va vakyartha iti yad ucyate." - The Mimamsakas attach the greatest importance to the verbal form i.e. 'kriya-pada' in a sentence. So, according to them, the verb 'yajeta' is the most predominant element in the sentence viz. 'svargakamo yajeta", in as much as the force of the object of the whole sentence i.e. 'attainment of heaven', is particularly determined by the verb. 'Apurva' or the unseen result, to which the action ultimately leads, is said to be conveyed by the verb and not by any other word in the sentence : Read SB. on Mi. Su. II. i. 4, - "tasmat tebhyah pratiyeta ascitarvat prayogasya." and also, "apurvasya akhyatapada-pratipadyatvam", and also - "bhava-sabda eva apurvasya codakah." - SB. ibid. Constitution of a sentence : Different Views : We come across a number of views with reference to the constitution of a sentence as noted down by Bhartrhari in the V.P. Nearly eight views are counted by him. "akhyatam-sabdasamghato jatih samghata-vartini, ekonavayavah sabdah For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 379 kramo buddhyanusamhstih. padam adyam, prthak, sarvampadam sa"kanksam (sapeksam) ity api, vakyam prati matir bhinna bahudha nyayavadinam." - V.P. II., 1-2, (nyaya-darsinam) From the point of view of linguistic studies, the first view is of great importance. It is - "akhyatasabdo vakhyam iti." - "akhyatasabde niyatam sadhanam yatra gamyate, tad apy ekam samapty artham vakyam iti abhidhiyate." - V.P. II. 327 It is said here that a verbal form - akhyatasabda is alone sufficient to constitute a sentence. This will remind us of the vartika that defines a sentence as "tin anta" or verbal form - eka tin. The verb 'varsati' may be used with the same significance as that expressed by "varsati devo jalam", - both the subject and object being understood from the very association of ideas. So, according to this view, the essence of a sentence is necessarily action i.e. 'kriya'. Punyaraja observes on V.P. II. 1, - "akhyatasabdo vakyam iti pakse, kriya vakyarthah." The definition enunciated by the vartika-kara has also put emphasis on the predominance of the verb : Vartika-9 on pa. II. i. i. reads : "akhyatam savyaya-karaka-visesanam vakyam." For Katyayana, a verb is efficient enough to constitute a sentence in combination with either an indeclinable, a karaka, an adjective or an adverb, as the case may be, e.g. 'uccaih pathati', where 'uccaih' is an indeclinable, i.e. avyaya. In 'odanam pacati', 'odanam' is a karaka, etc. Those who look upon indeclinables, cases (= karakas), and adverbs, as virtually the same as qualifying adjuncts in relation to the verb, are likely to reduce the above definition to a much simipler form such as that a verb with its possible adjuncts is competent enough to make a sentence : "apara ahaakhyatam sa-visesanam iti eva. sarvani hi etani kriya-visesanam iti eva. sarvani hi etani kriya-visesanani. - Mbn. on Vartika 9, (cited as above). (pp. 367, Vol. I. The Vyakarana Mahabhasya of Patanjali Edn. Keilhorn; third Edn. Abhyankar K.V. '62, Poona). The next vartika says that a sentence is just 'tin-anta' or 'eka-tin'. : "ekatin vakya-samjnam bhavati iti vaktavyam. bruhi, bruhi" - (pp. 367, ibid). These two vartikas lead to the assumption that a sentence should contain one and only one verb. But if there are more than one verb in a sentence, e.g. - 'purvam snati, pacati, For Personal & Private Use Only

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380 SAHRDAYALOKA tato vrajati.', we find it difficult to determine whether it is a single sentence or a number of sentences put together. The V.P. II. 6 observes : : "yathanekam api kvantam tingantasya visesakam, tatha tin-antam tatra"hus tinantasya visesakam." - (V.P. II. 6) Following the second vartika, we will find herein, at least three sentences as constituted by different verbs. But the sastrakara does not accept it. According to him vrajati' is the main verb with which the sense is completed and the rest are only subordinate to it, or are just qualifying attributes of the same-Punyaraja on V.P. II. 6 observes: "nasti atra vakyabhedah, 'vrajati' iti etat pradhanyena ekam kriyapadam atra sthitam anyani kriyantarani tin-visesanani eva., see also - "bahusvapi tin-antesu, sakanksesu ekavakyata." V.P. II. 450. For others, the full import of a sentence lies in the inflected word i.e. pada. Not only the verbal form as seen above, but also an inflected word is found capable of receiving the designation of a sentence, provided it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root : V. P. II. 326 observes - "vakyam tad api manyante yatpadam carita-kriyam, antarena kriyasabdam vaky ader dvitva-darsanat." We find certain sentences in which, some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature, as to denote the entire meaning by themselves, without the help of others. The meaning of the sentence, "gayako gayati", can be collected by a single word, "gayakah" the verbal form 'gayati' being unnecessary. Only in such cases, a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But, so far as the grammatical conception of a sentence is concerned, one can not just do away with 'vyapara' i.e. action. We can easily notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (i.e. either a nama or an akhyata), or a combination of words, must be, as a rule, indicative of some action, either expressed directly, or understood. To the grammarian, a sentence without a verb is an impossibility, For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 381 The Naiyayikas, however, have a different idea. Jagadisa maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion of a verb. It is not necessary that the verb should be explicitly mentioned, especially when kriya i.e. action is easily understood from the context. So, Jagadisa rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no sentence, without a verb - Read Sa. sa. pra. on Ka. 13 - "kriyarahitam na vakyam asti iti pracam pravado niryuktikatvat a-sraddheyah." - Jagadisa bases his contention on popular usage, such as, "kuto bhavan ?". This is an instance which is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet it is a perfect sentence. So, it is not correct to say, observes Jagadisa, that a sentence without a verb is ractically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein also, a verb viz. "agacchati", is implied and without it neither the sense is complete nor is the proper karaka (i.e. apadana) determinable. We have noticed that Bharthari has referred to as many as eight different views on the constitution of a sentence. These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories viz. akhanda-paksa and khanda-paksa. The sphotavadins, who take the sentence as an indivisible unit, support the akhanda-paksa, and the Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas, who take the sentence to be a combination of wordunits, favour the latter view, i.e. khanda-paksa. Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja (ref. Indian Theories of Meaning, Edn. '69) observes (pp. 6, 7, ibid) : "In Indian thought, we find two main approaches to the study of the problem of meaning; the 'khanda-paksa', and the 'akhanda-paksa', which are roughly analogous to the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology. According to the Khanda-paksa, or the analytical method, a word is considered as an autonomous unit of thought and sense, and language studies are made on the basis of words, and the sentence is taken to be a concatenation of words. In the early stages of liuguistic studies in India, as elsewhere, attention is found focused on individual words and their isolated meanings; the idea that an individual word possesses an individual word-meaning is generally current in all schools of Indian Philosophy in ancient times, and in the case of nouns the word is taken as a 'name' of the 'thing'. Thus, the regular philosophic term for a 'thing' viz. 'padartha' is literally 'the meaning of a word, that which a word means.' (J. Borough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', TPS. 1953, p. 163) - The Sanskrit term 'nama-rupa' which stands for the world of things also suggests the view that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes, and that the name and shape constitute the essence of a For Personal & Private Use Only

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382 SAHRDAYALOKA thing. The Nyaya-sutras discuss the nature of the individual words only : The discussions about the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence are found only in later Nyaya-Vaisesika works. Grammarians like Panini, Karyayana and Patanjati are mainly concerned with the derivation of the correct forms of words; and Yaska and his followers deal with the etymological study of wordmeanings. It is the Mimamsa school that started a detailed study of sentences and developed elaborate canons of interpretation (Hence Mimamsa is called the Vakyasastra. - ft. n. 1, pp. 7); but even this study was mainly on the basis of words and word-meanings, and consequently, the relationship between word and sentence, between word-meaning and sentence-meaning, remained a central problem." We have observed above, that to the sphotavadin, sphota represents the real word, i.e. the eternal word, sound being only a quality of it. Punyaraja observes : (on V.P. II. 1) - "sphotah sabdah, dhvanih sabda-gunah, iti." Sphota is two-fold, viz. external and internal - "sphotas ca dvividhah; bahyah abhyantaras ca" - observes Punyaraja on V.P. II. 1. The external sphota admits of further division into class and individual : "bahyopi jati-vyakti-bhedena dvividhah." Those who support the indivisibility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class - jati-sphota-pertaining to a combination-samghata-vartini-, or an individualvyakti-sphota-, that is to say that a sentence is one without parts - 'eko'navayavah' - or an intellectual assimilation - "buddhy-anusamhstih". Punyaraja on V.P. II. 1 observes : "tatra akhandapakse jatih samghata-vartini, ekonavayavah sabdah buddhy-anusamhstih iti trini laksanani." These three definitions according to the sphota-vadins are duly noticed and explained by Bhartphari. According to sphotavada, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts. - "evam nir-amsam eva vakyam vacakam iti eva yuktam.", observes Punyaraja on V.P. II. 12. It represents esther vyakti-sphota or jatisphota, i.e. an individual or a class, in so for as the outward manifestation of sphota is concerned. The formal difference seen in these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to upadhi viz. the operation of vocal organs employed in production of sound and so on. - Punyaraja observes, on V.P. II. 19, : "yas tu pratibhasah sosav upadhikrta eva ity arthah." Sphota has its internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual. The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the internal world of thought, remains essentially intelectual in its origin, before it is materialized into audible sound. It is 'nada' or 'sound', says Bhartshari, that turns For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 383 such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression of a sentence : V.P. II. 30 observes : "yadantah-sabda-tattvam tu bhagair ekam prakasitam, tam ahur apare sabdam tasya vakye tathaikatam." For the khanda-paksa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order, or succession, a collection of words, the first inflected word, i.e. pada, or inflected words i.e. padas having mutual expectancy with one another. For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama' is used in the following way. Though usually the word 'krama' implies a property of time such as 'paurvyaparya' - i.e. priority and posteriority - 'krama hi dharmah kalasya, tena vakyam na vidyate' - V.P. II. 51 - its particular use in grammar is explained by Bhartshari and Punyaraja as below. Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance as that of karmatva, kartstva, etc., which come to our notice in a successive or wellmarked order, together with similar meanings (visesa) conveyed by other words - "santa eva visesa ye padarthesu vyavasthita), te kramad anugamyante na vakyam abhidhayakam." - V.P. II. 50. For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a sentence like, 'devadatto gramam gacchati', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way - "the act of moving, which has devadatta as the agent, and the village as its object". Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which as a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'visesa' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order - Read .Punyaraja on V.P. II. 50 - "karmatvam ity adayo visesah santa eva padebhyah kramena pratitebhyo'vagamyanta iti krama eva vakyam." This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence. Again, it is stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order : Punyaraja observes - "kramavyatirekena sabda"tmakam na vakyam abhidhayakam asti iti ucyate." Thus, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order, in which words are combined together in such a way as to express an intended sense : Punyaraja, on V.P. II. 52, observes - "krama eva vakyam iti pada-kramo vakyam uktam." For Personal & Private Use Only

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384 SAHRDAYALOKA These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the khanda-paksa, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well-known schools of the Mimamsa system viz. Bhatta (i.e. of Kumarila) and 'guru', (i.e. of Prabhakara Bhatta.) Kumarila and his followers uphold the 'abhihitanvaya-vada', as against the anvitabhidhana-vada' of Prabhakara and his supporters. According to Kumarila, therefore, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (samghata), or as an order-krama, and according to Prabhakara, it is a verbal form (akhyata), or the first inflected word (adyam padam), or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy . sarvapadam sakanksam - that make for a sentence. - Punyaraja or V.P. II. 1 observes : "atra'pi samghatah kramah iti abhihitanvayapakse, sarvapadam sakanksam iti anvitabhidhana-pakse laksana-trayam iti vibhagah." These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. There is a great difference of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence. For the sphotavadin it is pratibha, to one who defines vakya as a verbal form, it is action (kriya), for the abhihitanvaya-vada it is association-samsarga, meaning that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (tatparyartha) when it conveys the intended sense : See Punyaraja - "tatra akhanda-pakse trisv api laksanesu pratibha vakyarthah (on V.P. II. 1), - and also, "akhyata-sabdo vakyam iti asmin pakse kriya vakyarthah, (on V.P. II. 1), "samghata-pakse kramapakse ca samsargo vakyarthah" (on V.P. II. 1) - and also read, "padanam parasparanvaye padarthavasad adhikyam samsargah sa vakyarthah. (on V.P. II. 41) and also read V.P. II. 42 - "sambandhe sati yat tu anyat adhikyam upajayate, vakyartham eva tam prahur aneka-pada-samsrayam." It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional significance, distinct from those of the constitutents. Thus, the sense that evolves out of such 'anvaya' or correlation of meaning is something more than a mere sum-total of them : Mammata explains - (K.P. II. 7) - "padanam samanvaye tatparyartho visesavapur apadarthopi vakyarthah samullasati iti abhihitanvayavadinam matam. - Jagadisa calls it, "vilaksano bodhah" i.e. special significance that results from the correlation of meanings. For the anvitabhidhanavadins, on the other hand, the For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 385 meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as signified by its component parts: "padartha eva vakyarthah" . observes Punyaraja., see also - "vacya eva vakyarthah iti anvitabhidhanavadinah" - K.P. II. 27, vrtti. - Thus the import or the tatparyartha of the anvitabhidhanavadins is nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves" - purvam ete yo vakyarthah sa vacyantargata eva ity arthah" - Punyaraja. As to what forms the 'Nimitta' of the vakyartha, there are different views. Vacaspati Mishra in the Tattvabindu refers to these views and establishes the Bhatta view as siddhanta. The views as recorded in the Tattvabindu are as below : (i) According to the sphotavadin the nimitta of the vakyartha is akhandavakya, the pada-varna-vibhaga being only the result of avidya : "anavagatam eva vakyam anady avidyopadarsita-alika-padavibhagasya nimittam iti kecit. Tattvabindu, pp. 6. (ii) According to some Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas, the nimitta for the vakyartha is the knowledge of that last letter, which is accompanied by the samskaras or impression of the experience of the meaning of the preceeding padas - "paramarthika-purvapurva-pada-padartha-anujanita-samskara-sahitam antya varna-vijnanam iti eke." - Tattvabindu pp. 6. (iii) According to some other Mimamsakas, it is the varna-mala i.e. series of letters, that is reflected in the mirror of memory, accompanied by the expression or 'anubhava-bhavana' or 'tat-tad pada-padartha', = those words and those letters - which is the nimitta. - "pratyeka-varna-pada-padartha-nubhava-bhavitabhavana-nicaya-labdha-janma-smrti- darpana"rudha varnamala iti anye." - Tattvabindu, pp. 6. (iv) or, Vakyartha is just the expressed meaning - abhidheyartha ,, of the words correlated with other words on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity. Thus anvita i.e. correlated pada or words make for the expression of vakyartha. This is according to Prabhakara - "padaih eva samabhivyaharavadbhih abhihitah svarthah akanksa-yogyata-asatti-sadhricina vakyartha-dhi-hetavah ity acaryah." - Tattvabindu, pp. 8. (v) The padartha, which is accompanied by akanksa, yogyata and sannidhi, and expressed by the words used, makes for vakyartha. Thus, first of all the padas give padarthas and then with the help of akanksa, yogyata, etc., they give vakyartha. This is the anvitabhidhanavada of Kumarila. Vacaspati Misra also accepts this view. On this abhihitanvayavada is based the Tatparya Vstti. For Personal & Private Use Only

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386 SAHRDAYALOKA Vacaspati takes up other views for further consideration and refutation. The first view is held by the sphotavadin, who holds that, if it be held that the varnas or letters in the 'vyasta' form make for the vakyartha, then the other letters become redundant - "sa na tavat pratyekam, anupalambha-virodhat, varnantaroccaranaanarthakya-prasangat" - Tattvabindu, pp. 25, ibid. If it is held that all the letters i.e. samastavarnas make for the vakyartha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (a) do you consider this correlation - samuha - as genuine or vastavika' or (b) artificial - i.e. aupadhika ? - "na'pi militah, tathabhav-abhavat. tatha hi vastavo va samuha etesam asriyate, anubhavopadhiko va ?- (Tattvabindu, pp. 25). The idea is that whether the varnas i.e. letters are naturally - vastutah i.e. genuinely, correlated to one another or not, we have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the hearer they become related. But as the varnas are nitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated. - "tatra sarvesam eva varnanam nityataya vibhutaya ca vastavi samgatir iti prasangini kesam cid eva pada-vakyabhavam na upapadayitum arhati. anubhuyamana nava-navanubhavasarini tat paryayena paryayavati na samuhabhag bhavati. na khalu eka-desa kala'nvacchinna samuhavanto bhavanti bhavah, atiprasangat." pp. 25, ibid - The sphotavadin also refutes the view of those who held the view, that 'purvapurva-samskarayukta antimavarna' makes for the vakyartha. The sphotavadin asks as to what do the varnavadins mean by the word 'samskara' or 'impression'. It is either the smrtibija or something like the purification of rice etc. by chaffing etc. - "ko nu khalu ayam-samskarobhimatah, ayusmatah ? kim smrti-bijam anyo va proksana"dibhya iva vrihy adeh ?" pp. 25, ibid. - Certainly the second alternative is not meant here. So, here the samskara stands for smoti-bija. But smrti itself being just a vasana or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the vakyartha-pratiti thus becomes the result of not the samkara but that of the power of the soul. Again, the sphotavadin says that even though we have identical letters in words such as nadi, dina, sara, rasa, etc., we have different meanings. So, letters in their akhanda form only, make for sense. Thus, akhandavakya should be accepted by the varnavadin. - "tasmat sva-siddhanta-vyamoham apahaya abhyupeyatam anu-samharabuddher ekapada-vakya-gocarata." (pp. 35, ibid). The sphotavadin cites the illustration of the word 'gauh' and says that the experience of the word 'gauh' suggests that there is ekata or oneness - and akhandata-or wholeness in this word. For, if we take the different letters to be objects of our For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 387 experience, it runs contrary to our day to day experience : "gauh iti ekam idam padam iti eka-padavabhasini dhir asti, laukika-pariksakanam." (pp. 49, ibid). If it is argued by the varnavadin that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different varnas make for a pada and thus 'pada' is aupadhika; to this we ask as to what is meant by this upadhi ? Upadhi or attribute can be two-fold viz. (i) eka-jnana-visayata i.e. becoming the object of one and the same experience, or (ii) ekabhidheya-pratyaya hetuta i.e. becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same bhava. Now, if the upadhi is meant as (i), then we will have to accept the padajnana even before varna-jnana which goes against the varna-vadin; and if by upadhi is meant as (ii), then, there is 'iteretara-asraya-dosa'. As artha-bhinnata or difference in meaning - is the cause of the distinction between one pada and another, and as pada bhinnata is gathered with the help of artha-bhinnata, the fault of 'itaretara"sraya' arises. Thus, the vakyartha should be connected only with the akhanda-sphota. This is the view of the sphota-vadin which forms the purva-paksa or prima facie view in the Tattva-bindu. After explaining the first view held by the Sphotavadin in detail, Vacaspati goes on refuting it. Vacaspati argues thus - Do the sphotavadins establish their view on the foundation of our (i) normal experience, or (ii) on the difference of senses of pada and vakya ? : "sa khalv ayam eko vakyartho vakyartha-dhi-hetuh anubhavad va vyavasthayate, artha-dhi-bhedad va anyatha anupapadyamanat ?" pp. 9, ibid. - If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein pt vakya to be avayavi, i.e. having avayavas or form of padas, or (b) you do not accept any avayavas or parts with reference to the vakyartha. Now (a) cannot be accepted as 'pada' is held to be 'vibhu' or allpervasive even by the objector, and in that case, it is not possible to dream of an avayavi vakya which is 'vibhu-tara' or more pervasive, for the very concept of 'vibhu-tara' is illogical. : na tavat purvah kalpah, avayavi-nyuna-parimanatvad avayavanam. parama-mahatam ca varnanam tad anupapatteh." (pp. 9, ibid) Again, the Naiyayikas take sabda to be the quality of akasa, and quality or 'guna' is avibhajya, i.e. incapable of division, and it cannot be the 'samavayi-karana' of anything else, it being always 'dravya' itself. Thus, padas cannot be the 'angas' or factors of the vakyartha : "gagana-gunatve ca adravyataya samavayikaranatvaabhavena avayavabhava-abhavat." (pp. 10, ibid) Now if you accept the second alternative, i.e. (b), viz. that there is no 'avayava' in a vakya, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the For Personal & Private Use Only

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388 SAHRDAYALOKA sense, and neither the 'varna', nor the 'pada', is important and therefore 'varna', or 'pada' has no independent existence in a language. Well, it will be true that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this akhanda paksa is manifested by 'dhvani, but all this is putting aside the reality, and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if the first dhvani reveals the sense, what would be the use of other dhvanis ? Again, your 'antimadhvani' also fails to reveal the sphota fully. So, this sphota and akhanda-vakya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis. The final dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. So, they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vakyartha, 'with the help of the final dhvani, aided by the impression of the preceeding dhvanis. It is because of this, that we, the padavadins, accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceeding letters, to be the cause of vahyartha : "purva-purvaabhivyakti-samskara-sacitra-uttara-uttara-abhivyakti-kramena tu anyo dhvanih sphusa-taram visista-sphota-vijnanam adhatte, iti na vaiyarthyam dvitiya"didhvaninam. na'pi purvesam, tad abhave tad-abhivyakti-janita-samskaraabhavena anyasya dhvaner asahayataya vyakty-avabhasa-vakyadhi-hetu-bhava. abhavat." (pp. 20, ibid). The varna-vadin refutes the theory of sphota, for according to him, for vakyartha-grahana i.e. collection of the sentence-sense, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of sphota. The varnas i.e. letters themselves, used in a pada, make for artha-pratiti or apprehension of meaning. When they are in a particular order, say - 'sarah', they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order say - rasah , they give a different meaning. Thus the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of 'krama/sequence, nyunatiriktatva, swara, vakya, sruti, smrti, etc. If different letters of the same pada are produced by different people, we do not get the meaning. If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say, 'rah', we do not get the idea of 'sarah'. Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, 'eka-kartstva' is an important factor in arthanubhava, and is the jnapaka-hetu of it. So, the vakyartha-jnana is the result of varna-samuha, and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an 'anavayava' vakya. : "tat siddham etad arthapatter anumanasya va nivsttis tad-ekagocara-pada-vakya-'vasadhani iti sthitam na-anavayavam ekam vakyam vakyarthasya bodhakam iti." (pp. 76, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 389 It may be noted that Mandana Misra in his sphota-siddhi finally establishes the sphotavada in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumarila and his supporters. We do not go into these details here. Vacaspati then considers the second view held by some Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first view as there is no postulation of any adrsta like sphota herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of vakyartha-pratiti. We get some trace of this view in the Nyayabhasya of Vatsyayana. According to Vatsyayana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas and therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of words, (= pada-vyavasayena), and with the help of memory, he correlates different words also, and gathers thereby the sentence-sense, 1.e. vakyartha. Read Vatsyayana bhasya on Nyaya-sutra III. 2.62 - "vakya-sthalesu khalu varnesu uccaratsu tavat sravanam bhavati srutam varnam ekam anekam va padabhavena pratisandhate, pratisamdhaya padam vyavasyati, pada-vyavasayena smrtva padartham pratipadyate, pada-samuha-pratisamdhanac ca vakyam vyavasyati, sambaddhansca padarthan grhitva vakyartham pratipadyate." So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish immediately, (asu-nasitva) and in a moment (ksanikatva), every first letter dissappears when the next one is uttered. Thus when the sentence - whole is completed, the listener hears only the last letter at the moment. But he undoubtedly gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even though the preceeding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered, they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With the hearing of the last letter, this impression comes up in form of memory and produces the sentence-sense, i.e. vakyartha-dhi. - "sa khalu ayam antyo varnah purva-purva-varna-pada-padarthavijnana-janita-vasana-nicaya-saciva- sravanendriya-samad higata-janma-grahana smarana-rupa-sad-asad-varna-nirbhasa-pratyaya-parivarti-pada-vakyartha-dhi hetur upeyate." (Tattvabindu, pp. 77, ibid) The siddhantin, viz. the Abhihitanvayavadin refutes the above view as below: Is it so that the last syllable explains the vakyartha after causing the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vakyartha ? Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its strength viz. the remembering of padarthas, the pada-pratyaksa etc., at this moment, the cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener remembers the correlation of pada and padartha he For Personal & Private Use Only

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390 SAHRDAYALOKA cannot clarify the position of the final syllable of a pada or vakya. So, the hearing of the last letter, accompanied by memory of the preceeding letter etc., cannot make for the vakya-dhi. : "na antya-varna-srutih, smrtya nita vakyartha-bodhini." - pp. 76, ibid. The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mimamsakas. According to the commentator of the Tattva-bindu, this view is not held by any particular acarya, but both this and the preceeding one are just placed as prima-facie views by Vacaspati Misra. : "etat tu mata-dvayam sambhavanamatrena upanyastam iti kecit." - (Tattabindu tika, Tattva-vibhavana, pp. 7) - According to some, this view is held by the earlier Mimamsaka Upavarsa, who is older than Sabara : "varna eva tu sabda iti bhagavan upavarsah." Mimamsa bhasya, on I. i. 5, and also see, "gaur ity ayam kah sabdah ? gakara-aukara-visarjaniya iti bhagavan upavarsah" - yogasutra-bhasya on III. 17. So according to Upavarsa, 'gauh' is constituted of 'g', 'au' and 'h' i.e. visarga. These varnavadins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people. Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters of words, but use sentence to convey meaning. But a sentence cannot be without parts (an-avayava). So sentence is just the correlation of letters - varna-samuha-left in memory. This varna-mala or dhvanimala is the cause and vakyartha-dhi is the effect. The knowledge of pada-padartha is held to be instrumental only - i.e. nimitta-matra, while the vakyartha-dhi follows genuinely from the varnamala or a group of 1 or phonemes or syllables : Read Tattvabindu : viddha-prayoga"dhinavadharano hi sabdartha-sambandhah. na ca padamatram vyavaharangam prayunjate veddhah, kimtu vakyam eva, tat ca anavayavam nyasedhi iti. smstisama"rudha varnamala parisisyate... naimittikam vakyarthabodham adhatte. paramarthikas tu pada-tad-artha-bodho nimitta-matrena avatisthate... tad eva vakyarthadhi-hetuh, iti. - Tattvabindu. pp. 83, 84, ibid. also read, "gauravad vinayabhavat tad-buddher eva bhavatah, vakyartha-dhiyam adhatte smstistha naksara"valih." - Tattvabindu, pp. 84. The Bhara Mimansakas do not accept this view. They find two faults with this viz. those of 'gauravadosa' and 'visayabhava-dosa'. - "iti astanam vakyanam astau For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 391 saktayah kalpaniyah tava iti kalpana-gauravam. pada-vadinas tu sapranam saptaiva sakyate iti kalpanalaghavam. suklam iti pada-praksepanena padavadinostanam padanam astau saktaya iti. tava tu sodasapara iti mahad gauravam apannam. (pp. 84, 85, ibid) Another fault that is seen in this view is that of vinayabhava. The varna-mala in a vakya can cause vakyarthadhih only when there is first padartha-dhih. Padartha-jnana is a must before vakyartha-jnana. It is only when the padarthas are correlated, that the vakyartha flashes upon our mind. Thus, padartha-jnana is necessary before their correlation i.e. 'anvaya'. In this case, how can we take varnamala as the cause of vakyartha-dhi ? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence, full of many words ? - "api ca tri-catura-panca-pada vakya-vartini-padartha-pratyaya-vyavahita'pi klesena varnamala smaryeta api, tadabhyadhika - padavati tu vakye sa ati-duskara." pp. 89, ibid - Thus, this (i.e. the third view) cannot be accepted. The fourth view is the one held by Prabhakara and his followers, who are known as 'anvitabhidhanavadins". For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position, are first correlated and then they yield the vakyartha, through the power called abhidha. : "padani akanksita"sanna-yogyatantara-samgatan, svarthan abhidadhanti iha vakyam vakyartha-gocaram." (pp. 90, ibid) The Bhasta Mimamsakas or the abhihitanvayavadins object against this view. Their objections are as below - when the anvitabhidhanavadin says that the abhidha power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation i.e. anvaya, is it so that the vakyartha is gathered through all the padarthas together or not? If they (i.e. the anvitabhidhanins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vakyartha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vakyartha. So, the use of other padas becomes redundant as the vivaksa i.e. intention of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone - "tatra anabhihita-svarthantara-anvita-svarthabhidhane padad ekasmad eva uccaritad vivaksa-pratite" vaiyarthyam itaresam." (pp. 93, ibid) Or, if it be said that other words also convey vakyartha, then in the sentence, "harih gam badhnati", wherein we get these words, the meaning of the action 'badhnati' will not become clear until it is connected with 'harih', the agent, and 'gam, the object. The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency of itaretara-asraya. The illustration cited by Vacaspati Misra is 'ukhayam paced'. For Personal & Private Use Only

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392 SAHKDAYALOKA Anvitabhidhanvadin may argue as follows : If we do not accept the anvitabhidhanavada, then, in that case, we will have to postulate two abhidha-saktis, viz. the one that conveys the sense of individual words, and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense. Again, there is no blemish in anvitabhidhanavada. Even though every word in a sentence with abhidha-sakti conveys the correlated meaning, still the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone. So, it should be held that a word, by abhidha, conveys its own meaning and correlation, and not the meaning of other words. The anvitabhidhanavadins again put the following question to the abhihitanvayavadins, viz. that when we get some knowledge from the words, what type of knowledge is it? The sastra speaks of four types of knowledge viz. pramana, samsaya, viparyaya and smota. Now, artha-pratiti cannot be taken as a pramana, because pramana occurs only with reference to that which is already existent. Padartha cannot be supposed to be exmstent before pada-sravana i.e. learing of a word. Nor cen we take padartha-jnana as either samsaya or viparyaya i.e. mithya-jnaha. As there is no fifth type of jnana, we should take pedartha-jnana as smrta only. - "na ca pancami vidha samastiti smrtih parisisyate" - (pp. 100, ibid) Thus, a pada depends on samskarodbodha and they make for the smrti in form of padartha-jnana. The fifth view is held by abhihitanvayavadins or by Kumarila and his followers. According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the vakyartha. Vacaspati Misra in his Tattvabindu refutes Prabhakara's anvitabhidhanavada and establishes abhihitanvayavada as the siddanta. The siddhantin i.e. anvitabhidhanavadin says that unless a contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceeding factor as the cause of it. - "evam tavad autsargiko nyayo yad asati balavad-badhakopanipate sahakarini karye ca, pratyasannam hi karanam. sati tad-bhava-bhavite tatha cartha-smrtih padat." . (pp. 111, ibid). Whenever there is vakyartha-jnana, it is preceeded by padartha which should be then recognised as its cause. Again, this padarthasmarana alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important. Thus the smarana of the padarthas in mind, qualified by akanksa, yogyata and sannidhi, makes for the vakyartha-dhi. : "tad amusam eva (manasinam) svartha-smotinam akanksa-yogyata-asatti-sahakarininam karanatyam vakyarthapratyayam pratyadhvasyamah." (pp. 112, ibid) - Again, the For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 393 abhihitanvayavadin holds that the mental impression (= manovasana) by itself does not create the smoti or memory of the objects of experiences that were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padarthas of a given pada-samuha qualified by akanksa, yogyata, etc., Thus, padartha-smrti goes with (i.e. is shaksta) akanksa"di, and thus only (i.e. akaksa"di-traya-sahakrta) makes for the knowledge of the vakyartha. As for the argument that if padartha-jnana is caused by smrti, which is different from padas, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vakyartha, for in case, if it is held capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramana over and above the six held by the Mimamsa darsana, or the sabda-pramana will have to be included in this novel pramana, and this is not noticed by Sabara and others, who have not accepted padartha as a separate pramana because they have already mentioned agama-pramana which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padartha-pramana., - "nanu uktam na manantaranubhutanam artha-rupanam vakyartha-dhi-prasava-samarthyam upalabdham, upalambhe va saptama-pramana-prasangah, agamasya va tatraiva antarbhavah. tad eva pratyaksa"dibhih saha tulya-kaksyataya upanyasaniyam, na tu agamah tadbhedah." - (tattvabindu, pp. 120) - and also that if agama-pramana is a sub-variety of padartha, then, padartha should be mentioned along with other five pramanas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship and omniscience (i.e. vidvatta and sarvajnatva) of Bhagavan Bhasyakara. Moreover, if we take padartha-jnana as the nimitta of vakyartha-jnana, then we will have to accept either three vrttis or two such as (i) the first sakti that helps the pada to give its individual meanings and (ii) the second that causes its memory and (iii) the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padartha-jnana and vakyarthajnana respectively, while on the part of the anvitabhidhana-vada, only one sakti is required and thus there is no kalpana-gaurava or the contingency of imagining many vittis : "tatha ca tisrah saktayah, dve va. padanam hi ravad artharupabhidhana-rupa saktih, tad artha-rupanam anyonyanvaya-saktih, tad-adhanasaktis ca apara padanam eva iti. smarakatva-pakse tu uktam sakti-dvayam. anvitabhidhana-pakse tu padanam eka eva Saktih, tat kalpanalaghavat - etad eva nyayyam." (pp. 123, ibid) - Vacaspati gives the following reply : The abhihitanvayavadin holds that only one sakti as mentioned by the Prabhakaras cannot be connected with the anvaya or correlation. For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the For Personal & Private Use Only

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394 SAHRDAYALOKA padas stand for one another as synonyms : "tanmatra-visaye tasya a-visesat sarvasabdanam paryayata-prasangah." (pp. 123, ibid) The abhihitanvayavada again asks the following question to the anvitabhidhanavadin - viz. - 'Is it so that a pada by its sakti conveys only the meaning as such (padarthasvarupa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also, which makes for the vakyartha-dhi ?, or, is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the vakyartha-dhi ? The knowledge of the correlation of one padartha with another padartha is born of some other pada, either known (i.e. spasta) or unknown (i.e. aspasta), and not by the padas themselves. Those who are learned in the vedas also hold this view, and according to them, kriya or action, by abhidha, cannot convey the karta or agent. : "ananyalabhyah sabdarthah iti trividya-vrddhah. ata eva akhyata"dau karma"dyabhidhayitam na"driyante." (pp. 131, ibid). Thus, the abhitanvayavadin accepts another sakti, different from abhidha. And it is termed as laksana-sakti. For them in laukika and vaidic sentences, the vakyarthadhi is caused by laksana. Vacaspati Misra clarifies the stages which the srota i.e. listener has to pass through while going from hearing of a sentence i.e. vakya-sravana to apprehension of sentence-sense - i.e. vakyartha-jnana. It is as follows - an individual listens to the sentences spoken by elderly people and thereby become conscious of activity i.e. pravrtti or inactivity i.e. nivrtti, joy or sorrow i.e. harsa and soka, etc. Thus, he records these sentences as the cause of pravrtti or nivstti, etc. As the elderly person goes on using one word (i.e. pada) after another, he collects newer and newer meaning i.e. an-upajata), and this new i.e. anupajata meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular words (i.e. visesa-pada) even though the words already spoken are very well there. This knowledge is only with reference to the padartha alone and as such it can not make for pravstti/nivstti etc. But when the whole sentence sense is gathered, then only it causes pravrtti, nivitti, etc. This visista artha goes with the whole sentence. The words used in vrddha-vyavahara have this conveying of the visista-artha i.e. specific sense, as its object, but by abhidha they convey only the individual padartha alone. Thus, as in the case of laukika vakyas i.e. sentences used in worldly context, so also in the case of the vaidika vakyas, the words convey the sentence-sense through laksana alone : "tatha hi, vrddha-prayukta-vakya-sravana-samanantaram pravstti-harsa-soka-bhaya-sampratipatteh vyutpannasya vyutpitsu-tad-hetupratyayam anumiyate. tasya satsu api anekesu anupajatasya pada-jata-sravanasamanantaram sambhavatah tad-hetubhavam avadharayati. na caisah pratyayah For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 395 padartha-matra-gocarah, pravrttyadi-bhyah kalpyate iti visistartha-gocaro'bhyupeyate, tad-vicistarthaparata avasita vrddha-vyavahare padanam... tasmat lokanusarena vaidikasya api pada-samdarbhasya visistartha-pratyaya-prayuktasya avisistarthabhidhanamatrena, laksanaya visistartha-gamakatvam." . pp. 153, il la-gamakatvam." - pp. 153, ibid. It becomes quite clear that for the Bhatta Mimamsaka, the grasping of the meaning of a sentence i.e. the vakyartha-grahana, is achieved with the help of laksana. Kumarila himself notes in his vartika that - "vakyartho laksyamano hi sarvatraiveti nah sthitih." Parthasarathi Mishra in his 'Nyaya-ratna-mala refutes the anvitabhidhanavada *and establishes that even though in a single sentence, we get many padas, still, with the help of akanksa"di we gather the correlation between different padas" - "sannidhya peksa yogyatvah upalaksana labhatah ananye'pyanvitanam syat sambandha-grahanam mama." - Nyaya-ratna-mala, Vakyartha-prakarana, pp. 78 Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for vakyartha-dhi. First of all, from the pada-svarupa we arrive at the padartha through abhidha, and then vakyartha becomes indicated i.e. laksita. : "tasmat na vakyam, na padani saksat vakyartha-buddhim janayanti, kintu, padartha-rupabhihitaih padarthaih, samlaksyate asau iti siddham etat." - pp. 79. In a sentence, there are many words, but when there is vakyartha-dhih, all the padarthas are united, just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains - "vrddha yuvanah sisavah kapotah khale yatha'mi yugapat patanti, tathaiva sarve yugapat-padarthah parasparena'nvayino bhavanti." - pp. 79, ibid. Vacaspati has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word - senses in a sentence, is quite different from abhidha, and it is laksana. But this laksana is different from laksana of the alamkarikas and thus we come across at least four vittis viz. abhidha, laksana, gauni and padarthanvaya-sakti. In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many vittis, the padarthavaya-sakti is also termed as laksana. : "evam ca, na ced iyam pada-vittir laksana-laksanam anveti, For Personal & Private Use Only

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396 SAHRDAYALOKA bhavatu tarhi caturthi, drstatvat. astu va laksana eva. - (Tattvabindu, pp. 157, ibid) - This laksana or padarthanvaya-sakti is different from laksana of the alamkarikas and probably because of this, others might have named it differently as Tatparya sakti - Alamkarikas : As seen above some of the later Bhatra Mimamsakas called it Tatparya vrtti in order to distinguish it from laksana as such. It is suggested by some scholars that probably the Mimamsakas in kashmir followed this tradition which was mentioned by Abhinavagupta and Mammata. These two have also placed gauni under laksana though of course Hemacandra revives gauni as an independent vitti. So, for the alamkarikas of the kashmir school in general, following the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammata, tatparya is an additional vrtti, with vyanjana as the fourth or turiya vstti. Abhinavagupta observes : (Locana on Dhv. I. 4) : "tena samayapeksa vacyavagamanasaktir abhidhasaktih, tad anyathaanupapatti-sahaya'rthavabodhanasaktis tatparya-saktih, mukhyartha badha'disahakaryapeksa'rtha pratibhasana-saktis laksana-saktih. tat-sakti-traya nita'rtha'vagama-mula-jatatpratibhasa-pavitrita-pratipatr-pratibhasahaya'rtha dyotana-saktir dhvanana-vyaparah, sa ca pragvittam vyaparatrayam nyakkurvan pradhanabhutah kavya"tma iti asayena nisedha pramukhataya ca prayojanavisayo'pi nisedha-visaya iti uktam." Visvanatha in his S.D. observes : "tatparyakhyam vittim ahuh padarthanvayabodhane, tatparyartham tad artham ca vakyam tad-bodhakam pare." (II. 20, S.D.) and also, - abhidhayah ekaika-padartha-bodhana-viramad vakyartha-rupasya padarthanvayasya bodhika tatparyam nama vrtcih. tad arthas ca tatparyarthah. tad bodhakam ca vakyam iti abhihitanvayavadinam matam. - (vstti on II. 20) and also, read K.P. II * akanksa-yogyata-sannidhivasad vaksyamana-svarupanam samanvaye tatparyartho visesavapuh a-padarthopi vakyarthah samullasati iti abhinitanvayavadinam matam. We will go to see in detail the nature of tatparya-vrtti and its acceptance or otherwise by different alankarikas as below. For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 397 Before we proceed, it may be noted that both Abhinavagupta and M also accept the view of the abhihitanvayavada. This becomes clear when we read the Balabod hini of Jhalkikar on the K.P. of Mammata, (pp. 27), which reads as - "abhihitanvayavadinam iti bahuvacanena ayam eva paksah pramanikah (granthakrtsammatah) (na tv anvitabhidhanavadi-paksah] iti sucitam iti sarasvatitirtha-krtatikayam spastam. ata eva mulakaro'sminnevollase 31 sutra-vrttau, pancamollase vyanjanasthapanavasare ca yathakramam vaksyati. "te ca abhidha-tatparyalaksanabhyo vyaparantarena gamyah." iti. "abhidha-tatparya-laksana"tmakavyaparatrayativarti dhvanana"di-paryayo vyaparo'napahnavaniya eva" iti ca. bahuvacana-nirdesasya sva-sammatarva-pradarsana-paratvad eva caturthollase 83 sutra-vittau "iti srimad abhinavagupta"caryapadah" ityanta-granthena upapaditasya abhinavagupta"carya-sammatapaksasya 'bahuvacana-srimad-pada"carya padaih sva-sammatatvam uktam' iti tikakaraih sarvaih uktam iti dik." We will go to see that lateron, certain dhvanivadins rejected this tatparya-vitti and Vidyanatha in his Prataparudriya includes it in vyanjana and mentions tatparyartha as indentical with vyangyartha. In the same way perhaps, the view viz. "so'yam isoriva dirgha-dirghataro-bhidha-vyaparah..." etc. supposedly mentioned by Bhatta Lollata, considers tatparya-vitti as just a part of abhidhavstti. Mahima chooses to arrive at the so called tatparyartha with the help of anumana i.e. poetic inference. He does not recognise tatparyavrtti in collecting the sense of 'nised ha' from the sentence viz. "bhrama dharmika... etc." or nisedha from the statement, viz. "visam bhaksaya, ma ca'sya grhe-bhunkthah..." etc. For him, the nisedhartha or sense of negation does not fall in the province of sabda-bodha or verbal cognition, but is gathered by the process of anumiti where the vacyartha becomes the hetu. For him, here we have an arthi prakriya and not sabdi prakriya. He observ I. 67, 68) (pp. 133, ibid) "visa-bhaksanad api param etad-gpha-bhaksanasya darunatam, vacyad ato'numinute prakarana-vaktr-svarupajnah." - I. 67 visabhaksanam anumanute na hi kascid akanda eva suhrdi sudhih, tenatrarthantaragatir arthi tatparya-saktija na punah." - I. 68 (V.V.) For Personal & Private Use Only

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398 SAHRDAYALOKA * The Nature and scope of Tatparyavstti As noted above the tatparyavrtti is intrumental in giving the sentence-sense and is therefore connected with the sentence-unit and not a word unit. Words in a sentence, to give a coherent meaning have to have three features such as 'akanksa' i.e. expectancy, 'yogyata' i.e. compatibility and 'asatti' or 'sannidhi' i.e. proximity or juxta-position. It is observed by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja (pp. 151, Indian Theories of Meaning, Edn. '69, Madras) that, "Next to the sphota theory of linguistic symbols advocated by Bhartrhari stressing the importance of taking the sentence or complete utterance as an integral and indivisible symbol conveying its meaning in a flash, the most important contribution of ancient Indian to general linguistics is the concept of "akanksa". The Mimamsaka school brought forward this concept to explain, from the analytical and associationistic standpoint, how syntactic unity is effected among the various isolated words which comprise the sentence. If the word is taken as an autonomous unit of sound and sense, it is necessary to point out the cementing factors which unite the different words, with their individual meanings, when they form a single sentence. The Mimamsakas first enunciated, and the other schools of thought later accepted with slight modifications, the three factors of phonetic contiguity or samnidhi, logical consistency or yogyata, and syntactic expectancy or akanksa among the parts of a sentence'as constituting the bases of syntactic unity. Of these three, akanksa is all-comprehensive and the most important." We have noticed earlier the simple definition of a sentence which takes it as a collection of words : "pada-samghatajam vakyam" as the Brhaddevata, II. 117, puts it. The Mi. Su. II. i. 46, as noticed earlier puts it on a real scientific basis when it observes : "arthaikatvad ekam vakyam, sa"kanksam ced vibhage syat." Thus words taken together and yielding a single meaning form a sentence. These words when taken separately are characterized by expectancy or akanksa. The Mimamsakas evolved this scientific approach to get at the exact sense of a given sentence in the yajurveda dealing with sacrificial ritual. Thus a single yajus-mantra was expected to be a single 'syntactical unit', giving a single sense : Here 'arthaikatva', as Sabara explains, means "serving a single purpose." . "eka-prayojanatvad upapannam." (SB. on Mi. Su. II. i. 46) - Bhartphari accepts this concept and states : "sa"kanksavayavam bhede paranakanksa-sabdakam, For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" karma-pradhanam gunavad ekartham vakyam isyate." V.P. II. 4 (pp. 9, Edn. 92 Dr. Bhate Saroja) - Delhi Eastern Book Linkers) Kumarila Bhatta also was prepared to apply sabara's idea to ordinary sentence also and not the yajus mantra alone. Ganganath Jha, [trans. Tantravarttika, pp. 586 f; (p. 190)] observes: "It must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognizant of a single idea must be regarded as one sentence... either ordinary or of the 'mantra' and 'brahmana'. As explained above, this understanding follows if we take the note, viz. "arthaikatvad" as meaning, 'because of its having a single sense." Parthasarathimisra follows Sabara and takes 'arthaikatva' to mean 'having a single purpose', but Somesvarabhatta in his Nyayasudha interpretes it liberally so as to cover a sense in ordinary worldly usage also. 399 Prabhakara observes that 'artha' stands for both 'meaning' and 'purpose'. Sabara insists on purpose, so Prabhakara also says that the words of a sentence must be related to purpose which is the most important factor in a sentence. When sentences are independent of one another they form distinct sentences and are therefore 'nir-akanksa'. Thus 'akanksa' or expectancy among words is an essential condition to form an independent sentence. The Katyayana-srauta-sutra (I. 3.2) also lays stress on mutual expectancy among words to form a single sentence and describes a sentence as a whole as 'nir-akanksa'. This is supported even by Satyasadha-srauta-sutra (Anandashrama skt. series, 53. part I., pp. 38) as observed by Dr. Raja. The Mimamsakas thus were perhaps the first to recognise this quality viz. akanksa among words as a basic one to form a sentence. But the necessity for independence. of words to give a unified sense, as in a compound word or a sentence, was recognized even earlier by the grammariaus as observed by Dr. Raja (pp. 154, ibid). Panini observes at II. i. 1: "samarthah pada-vidhih." Thus for him, words can form a compound word only if they have 'samarthya' i.e. 'capacity'. Now 'samarthya' is explained differently by various commentators. Some take it as 'vyapeksa' or 'mutual connection pertaining to the meaning.' - The Mbh. pp. 365 notes: "paras-para-vyapeksam samarthyam eke icchanti. ka punah sabdayor vyapeksa? na brumah sabdayor iti. kim tarhi ? arthayoh. This 'vyapeksa' seems to be closer in sense to the 'akanksa' of the Mimamsakas. The Varttika, under Pa. II. i. 1 observes - "prthag arthanam ekarthibhavah samartha-vacanam." (pp. 361 Mbn.) Thus, for some, samarthya' is 'ekarthibhava' i.e. unification of meaning. Thus words having independent meanings are made to signify a united sense, when taken together. Jaimini also recognizes this quality of a sentence when he mentions For Personal & Private Use Only

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400 SAHRDAYALOKA 'arthaikatva' of a sentence. Dr. Raja observes (pp. 155, ibid): "Panini discusses compound words, whereas Jaimini deals with a sentence, still the conditions referred to seem to be similar." We support this observation of Dr. Raja for on Varttika 4, Pa. II. i. 1, pp. 365, the Mbh. discusses the point with reference to the compound word 'raja-purusa'. Patanjali observes : "iha rajnah purusa iti ukte raja purusam apeksate mamayam iti, puruso'pi rajanam apeksate, aham asya iti." Patanjali explains these two views as mutually exclusive and accepts 'ekarthibhava' view-point as the correct one. This fekarthibhava' means that the words when united give up their individual meanings and acquire a special signification. The other view meaintains that the individual members retain their original meanings but they are mutually related. P. C. Chakravarti in his 'philosopy of Sanskrit Grammar, pp. 293, observes that for Haradatta both 'vyapeksa' and 'ekarthibhava are necessary in a compound word, for in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed to form a compound. Kaiyata in his M.bhpradipa, under Pa. II i. 1, observes that : "iha vyapeksayam samaso na bhavati, ekarthibhave vakyam neti." i.e. he seems to take them as conditions for a sentence and a compound only respectively. To this quality of 'akanksa' were added 'yogyata' or compatibility and 'asatti' or 'sannidhi' i.e. Juxta position or proximity as qualities of a sentence. The Mimamsakas were the first to promulgate these three conditions for a sentence to explain the correlation of words in a given sentence. Kumarila in his Ta Vol. I. pp. 455 observes - "akanksa sannidhanam ca yogyata ceti ca trayam, sambandha-karanatvena klptam nanantarasrutih." Thus for Kumarila, mere immediate sequence or 'anantarsruti' is not enough in the making of a sentence, but these three, i.e. mutual expectancy among words used in a given sentence, their compatibility and their proximity are all basic to form a given sentence. Other systems of thought later picked up these conditions with minor changes. To these some have later added a fourth condition viz. the knowledge of intention of the speaker or 'tatparya-jnana', which also means the general purport of a sentence. Akanksa' as observed earlier, consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word. Thus, it is the desire on the part of the listener to know the other unspoken words or their meanings to complete the sense. A word is said to be 'sa"kanksa' i.e. having 'akanksa' for another word, if by itself, it cannot, without the help of the latter, produce full sense or knowledge of its inter-connection in a given utterance. The Tarkasamgraha pp. 30 observes : "padasya padantara-vyatireka-prayuktanvayananubhavakatvam akanksa." Vedanta For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 401 paribhasa IV. 3 has - "tatra padarthanam paraspara-jijnasa-visayatva-yogyatvam akanksa, kriyasravane karakasya, karaka-sravane kriyayah, karana-sravane itikartavyatayasca jijnasa-visayatvat." Stray collection of words such as "gauh asvah puruso hasti", or 'dasa dalimani sad apupah kundam ajajinam palala-pindah adharorukam etat kumaryah sphaiyakstasya pita pratisinah" - as observed in the Mbh. pp. 1, and 38, do not make for a sentence. Dr. Raja (pp. 157) observes that the Mimamsakas are not quite clear in distinguishing between syntectic expectancy and psychological expectancy and Bharthari actually criticises their definition of a sentence on the ground that the 'akanksa' of the Mimamsaka, would imply that a passage of several grammatical sentences would have to be considered as one sentence. (V.P. II. 3) - Bhartrhari observes : "nighata"di-vyavasthartham sastre yat-paribhasitam, sa"kanksa-yayavam tena na sarvam tulya-laksanam." V.P. II. 3 and he further observes : "sa"kanksa-vayavam bhede paranakanksa-sabdakam, karma-pradhanam gunavad ekartham vakyam ucyate." - V.P. II. iv. Salikanatha, the follower of Prabhakara, holds that 'akanksa being the curiosity on the part of the listeners has to be explained by some on the basis of invariable association such as an action necessarily implying an agent, a place, an instrument etc. and an agent or an instrument implying an action to complete its sense. But this view is criticized on the ground that there is no end to the curiocities of the listeners through such associations. The Vakyartha-matnka-vstti (pp. 5) observes : "ka punar iyam akanksa ? pratipattur jijnasa. kim nibandhana punar asau ? avinabhava-nibandhana iti kecit. kriya hi karaka'vinabhavini iti tam pratitya karakam jijnasate. evam karakam api buddhva kriyam iti. tad ayuktam iti manyante. jijnasa tatha tadiya-janaka-tat-kriya-tat-karakantara"di-jijnasam api apadyate." Newer and newer expectancies are caused due to newer and newer and newer associations coming in the minds of listeners. This could be endless. So, only those curiosities that are essential for the accomplishment of the intended purpose For Personal & Private Use Only

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402 SAHRDAYALOKA need be taken as true requirements. The omission by the speaker of a particular nature of the instrument, place, etc., for the action recommended suggests that he is indifferent about it. Thus, "gam anaya" is a complete sentence eventhough the instrument viz. 'dandena' - 'with a stick' is not mentioned. It is added only if it intended. Thus the scope of 'akanksa' depends on the intention of the speaker. In case of an elliptical sentence like, "the door, door", - i.e. "dvaram dvaram", this requires some verb such as 'pidhana' or 'close for syntactic completeness. But in case of, "gam anaya" it is not so. For Advaita Vedantins this "akanksa' is two-fold viz. utthita-akanksa and utthapya-akanksa. The former takes place when it is actual or natural, i.e. when there is natural expectancy of one word for the other to complete sense. The other one is seen when there is potential expectancy which could be roused in case it is required. Thus, when one utters, "gam anaya", the listener may think of the cow being white, red, black and so forth. The possibility of such potential adjectives of a cow, is limitless. According to this view therefore, the akanksa that exists between words in a sentence, must be mutual and not one sided. For instance "dhavalam gam anaya", the adjective dhavala' has a direct and natural expectancy for the substantive "gam", whereas the latter i.e. the cow has only a postential expectancy for the adjective 'dhavala' i.e. white. The Mimamsakas explain akanksa also on the basis of psychological incompleteness of an idea. The Vakyartha-matrkavrtti, p. 7 has - "anvitasya bhidhanartham uktartha-ghatanaya va, pratiyogini jijnasa ya sa"kankseti giyate." abhidhana'paryavasanam abhidheyartha-paryavasanam ca jijnasodayanibandhanam." We may add that, if akanksa is with reference to artha-grahana, then necessarily it has to include the psychological aspect concerning the listener and perhaps even Bhartshari goes astray in his attack on the definition of a sentence as noted above. Actually a group of sentences stringed together are ruled out from the scope of being a single sentence as the akanksa of the Mimamsakas does take care of the psychological requirement of a listener. As to the nature of akanksa the two schools of Mimamsa, viz. the Prabhakara and the Bhatta seem to differ. Of course both are concerned with the interpretation For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 403 of vedic injunctions, but they differ with reference to the exact meaning or interpretation of an injunction. For the Prabhakaras every vedic injunction is a command - a niyoga - to be followed without considering the outcome i.e. the beneficial result. Neither fear of punishment nor greed for benefit should guide one to follow the injunction which is a command just to be followed - "There is not to reason why" is the spirit behind it. So, for the Prabhakara school of thought, the three essential psychological akanksas are for 'visaya' i.e. the act enjoined, for 'niyojya' i.e. the person who is enjoined to perform an act, and for 'karana' or the means to perform. Thus in a passage, say, "visvajita yajeta", there is no mentioning of the 'niyojya' or the person who is expected to perform a particular sacrifice, and so to complete the meaning we add the word "svargakamah" - a person desirous of heaven and arrive at complete sense. But for the Bhatta school of thought, the content of the injunction is the realization that the action enjoined will bring some special benefit. Kumarila, in his Sloka-varttika, p. 653, observes : "prayojanam anuddisya na mando'pi pravartate." - even a man with less than ordinary intelligence also does not proceed to do anything without keeping a purpose in mind. The akanksa of a vedic injunction therefore, is for the 'iti-kartavyata' of the act enjoined, for the sadhana or karana i.e. means, and also for the 'phala' or the result of the action. There is no 'akanksa' for the 'niyojya' or a person who is to perform an act. Anyone who has interest in a particular fruit or result, has to perform a particular action enjoined by the veda. So, in "visvajita yajeta", the word 'svargakamah' is meant to satisfy the expectancy concerning the fruit of the action. We may find an extention of this psychological expectancy in the Mimamsa definition of a compound sentence i.e. a 'mahavakya', with reference to the mutual expectancy of clauses that make for the whole compound sentence. This interdependence of sentences makes up for a 'prakarana' i.e. topic, in which sentences are related by anga-angin-bhava, i.e. one principal sentence and the rest being subordinate. When these - i.e. main clause and sub-clauses serve a single purpose, they are taken as a 'mahavakya'. (Mi. Su. III. 7.4). Here we see syntactic unity or 'eka-vakyata' based on a two-fold relation viz. "padaika-vakyata" i.e. that of a word to a sentence and vakyaika-vakyata, i.e. that of a sentence to another sentence. For the Mimamsakas, only the injunctive sentences carry direct For Personal & Private Use Only

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404 SAHRDAYALOKA significance and the others are mere fartha-vadas' i.e. only corroborative or eulogistic utterances, which are therefore dubbed as subordinate. The arthavadas carry their meanings only as syntactically connected with the principal injunctive statement. Just as a word is related to a sentence, an arthavada-vakya is related to the injunctive sentence i.e. vidhi-vakya. This is termed as 'padaika-vakyata', in a single sentence, and 'vakyaika-vakyata', in a compound sentence with individual subordinate clauses that carry individual self-sufficient meaning. Kumarila in his Tantravarttika pp. 366 reads : "svarthabodhe samaptanam angangitva"dy apeksaya, vakyanam ekavakyatvam punah samhatya jayate.". This is acceptable to the Vedantins also. But the akanksa that rests between words in a sentence is a grammatical one and therefore 'sabdr and not merely psychological. It is the exact need for the syntactic completeness of a given statement. Later on the Naiyayikas clearly distinguished between the grammatical and psychological 'akanksa'. They define akanksa as a kind of syntactic need which one word has for another in a given sentence, to convey interrelation of the words. It is therefore, the akanksa which causes the knowledge of the syntactic relation of words in a sentence. The Klaryayikas hold an opinion that even in case of a word there should be mutual expectancy between root or stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other. Nagesa in his Parama-laghu-manjusa, akanksa section, observes that - (pp. 33) - "sa ca ekapadarthajnane tad-arthanvaya-yogyarthasya yaj jnanam tad visayeccha; asyanvayy arthah ka iti evam-rupa purusa-nisthaiva, tatha'pi tasyah svavisaye'rthe aropah." This means that for Nagesa, akanksa is the desire on the part of listeners on hearing a word in a sentence, to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense; and thus the expectancy is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings. Thus it is a psychological one. For him, only metaphorically this akanksa has a concern with words and their meanings. Yogyata : This means logical compatibility of words with one another in a given sentence. This quality makes for mutual association. The Tarka-samgraha, For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 405 pp. 30 observes - arthabadho yogyata. Nagesa, in his parama-laghu-manjusa puts it as (p. 36) - "paraspara' nvaya-prayojaka-dharma-vattvam." The Tattvacintamani, Vol. III, sabda section, p. 262 - has - "badhaka-prama-virahah" (Nyayakosa, 675). This quality actually makes for the judgement concerning a sentence as to whether it is sense or non-sense. When the meaning of a sentence is not contradicted by experience it is said to have 'yogyata' or compatibility between its words. Salikanatha in his Vakyartha - matrka-vrtti, p. 9, observes : "kim punar idam yogyatvam nama ? yat sambandharhatvam. sambandharham iti katham jnayeta ? sambandhitvena drstatvat." This means that yogyata demands the words in a sentence to have mutual compatibility for their connection. This compatibility is known from experience. Thus, 'agnina sincati', he wets (the plants) with fire carries no sense as 'agni' is not compatible to the idea of sprinkling. But, "jalena sincati" makes sense as 'jala' or water has a sense compatible with the idea of sprinkling or wetting However, as Kuppuswami Shastri observes, in his 'A primer of Indian Logic, p. 257, there is difference of opinion about the exact function of 'yogyata' in the comprehension of meaning from a given sentence. Some Naiyayikas are of the opinion that a decisive knowledge of 'yogyata' is a pre-requisite for verbal cognition, while others suggest that since a decisive knowledge of incompatibility prevents verbal cognition, only the absence of such a counteracting agent is the real requirement. - The Nyayakosa p. 676 has - "badha-niscayabhavo yogyata iti navyah ahuh." For the former, it is a positive entity, for the latter it is only the absence of an impediment in verbal cognition. Dr. Raja (p. 165) observes that it is necessary to distinguish between such inconceivable combinations like, "the circular square", and the conceivable combinations such as, 'a rabbit's horn.' Kumarila suggests in a varttika quoted in Khandana-khanda-khadya p. 168, that, "atyanta'saty api hy-arthe jnanam sabdah karoti hi, abadhat tu pramam atra svatah-pramanya-niscalam." This means that incompatibility with actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension, but only the validity of knowledge prevents the same lack of co-rrelation with actual facts but the inconceivability of the mutual association of word-meanings renders the whole sentence nonsensical. The For Personal & Private Use Only

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406 SAHRDAYALOKA impossibility of connecting the word-meanings stands in the way of verbal comprehension. This other condition of yogyata' therefore, is not for mere verbal knowledge but for a valid judgement. At times lack of 'yogyata' is only apparent and is explained in metaphorical expressions such as 'simho manavakah', 'mancah krosanti', etc. by explaining the metaphorical sense. Actually, this apparent incompatibility or 'yogyata-abhava' is the essence of laksana. Samnidhi - or proximity or 'asatti' is a condition having reference to the time of pronouncement of words in a sentence. These words should be pronounced continuously at a given time. The Tarkasamgraha, p. 30 has. - "padanam avilambena ucsaranam samnidhih." The Vedantaparibhasa puts it as (IV. 10) "asattiscavyavadhanena pada-janya-padarthopasthitih" - Thus asatti or juxtaposition is the un-interrupted utterance or unbroken apprehension of words. Words pronounced at long intervals cannot produce the knowledge of any interrelation among them, even if there be 'akanksa' and 'yogyata'. If words are seperated by the intervention of irrelevant words, then also the connection of meaning is not grasped. Kumarila Bhatta in his Tantra-Vartika, p. 455 observes : "akanksa samnidhanam ca yogyata ceti ca trayam, sambandha-karanatvena klptam nanantarasrutih." Thus, he distinguishes between samnidhi and mere "immediate sequence of utterance." i.e. "anantara-sruti". Samnidhi is explained by him as the continuous moving about of the words or their meanings in the mind - "buddhau viparivrttih", Salikanatha in his Vakyartha-matnka-vstti, pp. 8, gives a similar explanation. According to the Bhatta school of Mimamsa, the lack of samnidhi is of two types. (i) not being uttered together, and (ii) not being signified by words. Manameyodaya, p. 99 has - "samnihitatvabhavat sabda-bodhitatvabhavac ca dvedha samnidhy abhavo bhavati." No syntactic relation is possible in case of words pronounced at distant time-gaps such as for instance "bring" is pronounced to-day and "the cow" is pronounced the day-after, no relation can be established. Again, a sentence such as "gam badhana" cannot have syntactic affinity with the word "asvam", even though the horse is also seen in front requiring to be tied up. Manameyodaya For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" observes - pp. 100 - "gam badhana" - ity atra bandhanapeksaya drsyamanasya asvasya sabda'bodhitatvat eva ananvayah." - Thus syntactic relation is possible only for what have been comprehended through words - see also, "sabda-pratipannanam eva anvaya iti niyamah siddhah" - (in Manameyodaya). (Dr. Raja; p. 167, ibid) The Prabhakara school, on the other hand holds that samnidhi is only the contiguity of cognition of the sense and not necessarily of words actually uttered - The Vakyartha-matrka-vrtti, p. 9. observes "samnidhih sabda-janmaiva - 407 vyutpattau nopalaksanam, adhyahrtena'pi arthena loke sambandha-darsanat." Thus in case of elliptical sentences the syntactic relation is known by supplying the necessary meaning. But the Bhatta school rejects this view and insists that even in elliptical sentences, the syntactic relation is known only by supplying the missing words themselves. The Manameyodaya p. 101, observes in this connection, viz. "sabdadhyahara eva syad ity evam madrsam matam." According to the Prabhakara school, samnidhi does not mean simultaneous mental comprehension of the words; as in case of akanksa it goes step by step, in order of sequence, in which they are cognized. The Vakyartha-matrka-vrtti p. 9 observes akanksavac ca samnidhau api samnidhapaka-kramena eva kramo veditavyah." The mutual connection of the meanings of words is comprehended step by step with the knowledge of akanksa, yogyata and samnidhi. For the early Naiyayikas, the recollection of the meanings of words is simultaneous. It is transient like perception and so, it is not possible to recollect the meanings of individual words one by one and then have a collective cognition. Simultaneous comprehension is explained on the analogy of 'khale kapota nyaya' i.e. pigeons on the threshing floor. The Siddhanta muktavali p. 305 observes : "vrddha yuvanah sisavah kapotah khale yatha'mi yugapat patanti, tathaiva sarve yugapat padarthah parasparenanvayino bhavanti." Like pigeons, young and old come down together to pick up grains, similarly, in a sentence, the meanings of words become interrelated simultaneously. For Personal & Private Use Only

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408 SAHRDAYALOKA But we feel that analogy is not necessarily a sound argument. For there are others, some Naiyayikas among them, who seem to explain differently. For them, in a sentence viz. "gam anaya, svetam, dandena", first of all, the word 'gam' is known as related to the verb 'anaya'. Then this connected sense gets related to the meaning of "svetam" or 'white', and then with the instrument viz. dandena'. This has the anvitabhidhana theory at its basis. The Siddhantamuktavali, pp. 306 puts it as - "yad yad akanksitam yogyam samnidhanam prapadyate, tena tenanvitah svarthah padair eva'vagamyate." The Navya Nyaya school defines samnidhi or asatti as an immediate recollection of meanings of words through their expressive power or laksana, and eventhough the words are separated, as in case of a verse at times, there is asatti if the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption. The Nyaya-siddhantamanjari, quoted in Nyayakosa p. 135, observes - "vrttya padajanya-padarthopasthitih." This 'asatti' is the cause of verbal apprehension, and not the knowledge of 'asatti' as believed by early Naiyayikas : sa ca "sva-rupasati sabda-bodha-hetuh, na tu jnata." observes the same source. This recollection is explained to be collective cognition viz. 'samuha"lambana-jnana'. Thus, the perception of every single word leaves its impression on the mind, and when the last word is uttered, its last letter serves as a stimulas to bring in collective recollection. It is thus, a single cognition arising out of the contact of senses with a collection of objects. Dr. Raja has at length discussed the problem of elliptical sentences also, giving a full record of the views of the various schools of Mimams, and also that of Bhartrhari at the end. Dr. Raja (pp. 169-176) has also considered the view of Bhoja the author of Srngaraprakasa. We feel it would have been more advisable to discuss the views of alamkarikas only at the end of the discussion concerning the topic as contained in the darsana and grammar sources. We are gratefully repeating the views concerning a word, its sense, a sentence, sentence-sense, various sabdavsttis etc., as laid bare by our great predecessors such as Dr. P. C. Chakravarti, Dr. K. K. Raja, Prof. Devasthali and the rest, only to explain the heritage of thought currents that shaped the views of alamkarikas. This heritage as explained by these savants is most important for us to grasp and fully understand then to further understand and explain the various thoughtcurrents concerning word, sense, sentence and sabda-yrttis and other For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 409 concepts of literary criticism in India. I have therefore fully accepted the discussion concerning these though-currents from works of very reliable scholars of great repute whom I honour and love. I have done it for it is absolutely required to grasp the same for an introduction to the understanding of thought-currents in literary criticism. But in all honesty I will confess, that I have personally varified and looked into practically all original material as far as possible, before accepting the same as laid down by these masters. One thing is clear, as suggested above that very often I have felt that something is lacking in the methodology adopted even by these great scholars for, without caring for the chronological aspects, I feel Dr. P. C. Chakravarty drags in the views of Gadadhara, Jagadisa and the rest while discussing the views as read in ancient scriptures. Similarly Dr. Raja quotes from Nyayakosa, Mana-meyodaya, Vedantaparibhasa, Siddhanta-muktavali, Vakyartha-matrka-vrtti, and also the Mahabhasya, Jaimini, Sabara, Bhartrhari and Mimamsa and Nyaya-sutras all in a single breath. However, I feel this is pardonable because the later writers on Nyaya and Vyakarana and also Mimamsa are absolutely faithful to the original sources and therefore the whole of it, i.e. the earliest sources as well as nearmodern interpretation of the same by stalwarts - forms a unitary whole which is indivisible and one. My accepting from Dr. Chakravarti, Dr. Raja. Prof. Devasthali and the rest therefore is justified in the same vein as I want to give all this at one and the same place, to be scaled at a glance for whatever follows as my humble contribution and interpretation of various alamkara sources beginning with Bharata and Bhamaha, down to Jagannatha. My work therefore belongs to the same type of effort, if not of the same class in terms of merit, to the one put in by Acarya Hemacandra in his Viveka on the Kavyanusasana, or the one put in the great Bala-bodhini by Jhalkikar on the Kavyaprakasa of Mammata. The sincerity and honesty of effort are the same, if not the class. - Tatparyajnana: Some of the later Naiyayikas believe that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker i.e. tatparya-jnana is most essential while arriving at any verbal comprehension. Some Naiyayikas giving great importance to the speaker's intention in fixing the meaning of an utterance hold that even in ordinary sentences like, "ghatam anaya", the intention of the speaker gives the meaning of 'pot' to the word 'ghata'. Given a different intention of the speaker, they say, that even the word 'ghata', through laksana, would yield the sense of 'pata'. The Nyayakosa p. 327, reads - * For Personal & Private Use Only

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410 SAHRDAYALOKA "pare tu ghata"di-sabda-sthale'pi ghata-padam kumbhaparam, laksanaya pataparam veti samsraye ghata-sabda-bodhabhavat sarvatra tatparya-niscayah karanam ity ahuh." - They also feel that the compatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker prompts the listener to interpret a passage by resorting to indication or laksana. Thus in an expression viz. "gangayam ghosah", it is the speaker's intention that gives the meaning of 'gangatata' to the word was intended by the speaker differently, perhaps 'gosa' would have yielded the meaning of a 'maha-mina' i.e. a big fish, and the 'ganga' would have retained its original meaning of the flow of a river. But then, driven to such extreme, this view flagrantly overlooks the status of language as an objective instrument of communication. Dr. Raja correctly observes that (pp. 177, ibid) linguistic discourse would be absolutely impossible if normal signification of words, independent of the speaker's intention is totally disrespected. It is therefore, that the Vedantins reject this extreme view. When a parrot, or say a recorded material, repeats the speech of an original speaker, there is no personal intention on the part of this second speaker or recorder. The Vedanta-paribhasa IV 38 explains it this way. But the Naiyayikas hold that intention of the actual speaker is the same as that of the original speaker and in Vedic utterances there is always the intention of God. But the Vedantins and Mimamsakas suggest that all people do not believe in God. So it is not advisable to accept the veiw that (Nyayakosa, p. 326) : "sukavakye bhagavad icchaiva gatih." They therefore feel that every word has an inherent capacity to express its meaning and even a sentence has a natural capacity to produce cognition of a unified sense in form of mutual association of the word-meanings (Vedanta-paribhasa, IV. 38-43). The primary meaning of a word therefore, is an innate power in the word itself which is there on the basis of the natural and permanent relation that exists between the word and the thing meant by it. The Vedantins of course acknowledge that the knowledge of the speaker's intention does play an important role in the comprehension of meaning in case of ambiguous expressions. So, in case of a double-meaning expression, the meaning is restricted to just one sense only, in the absence of the speaker's intention to convey another sense also. The Vedantaparibhasa IV. 41 observes that 'tatparya' has to be defined as : "tad-anya-pratiti-icchaya anuccaritatvam." This qualification is a must before", "tat-pratiti-janana-yogyatvam." Dr. Raja (pp. 179, ibid) observes that we have to keep in mind the fact that the difference in the views of the Naiyayikas on one hand, and Mimamsakas and Vedantins on the other, concerning the part played by the speaker's intention in For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 411 determining the meaning of a sentence is ultimately due to the difference in their VS as to the nature of the knowledge derived from language. For the Naiyayikas, sabda as a means of knowledge is valid verbal testimony which consists in the statement of a trustworthy person, an apta-jana. The Nyayasutra I. i. 7 reads : "aptopadesah sabdah." The agent may be either human or divine. But for the Mimamsakas and Vedantins the verbal testimony has self-evident validity i.e. "svatah-pramanya", i.e. it is irrespective of the speaker's intention. For the Mimamsakas, in case of word-meanings also, the significative power is inherent in the words themselves and for the Naiyayikas it is injected into the words by God's will or by that of the speaker. The Naiyayikas call this meaning intended by the speaker by the name 'tatparya', but the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins use the term 'tatparya' for the meaning conveyed by the capacity of the words themselves. We will go to see later that Anandavardhana while establishing vyanjana as a vrtti independent of abhidha or laksana, uses the term 'tatparya' to mean the intention of the speaker. Even for the Naiyayikas opinions differ regarding the importance of the speaker's intention as a factor in the understanding of the meaning of a given passage. Some are of the opinion that as the intention of the speaker is already covered up by 'akanksa', it need not be taken as an independent condition of verbal comprehension. Others hold that the knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is essential for verbal comprehension only in cases of equivocal terms and ambiguous expressions. For the former, in a statement such as "ayam eti putro rajnah puruso'pasaryatam" the knowledge of the speaker's intention only can decide whether the word 'rajnah' is to be construed with either 'putrah' or 'purusah', for the satisfaction of its akanksa. But for the latter only equivocal expressions such as, "saindhavam anaya" require the knowledge of the intention of the speaker as 'saindhava' would mean both 'salt as well as 'a type of horse'. The Nyayakosa p. 327, observes : "kecit tu "saindhavam anaya" ityadau nanartha-sthala eva tatparya-samsaya"deh sambhavena tatratya-sabda-bodha eva tatparya-niscayo hetuh... ity ahuh." The Siddhantamuktavali, p. 316 also passes a similar observation. Nagesa the grammarian, also accepts the importance of knowing the speaker's meaning in such equivocal expressions : The Laghumanjusa p. 524, has - "nanartha-pada-sthale padavisayo'pi sa tatha. tad-grahakam ca prakarana"dikam." Gangesa and Visvanatha take knowledge of tatparya as the fourth requisite over and above akanksa, yogyata and samnidhi, for verbal comprehension. For the Naiyayikas, "vaktur iccha tu tatparyam" i.e. tatparya is the meaning intended For Personal & Private Use Only

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412 SAHRDAYALOKA by the speaker (Siddhantamuktavali. pp. 315, as quoted in, 'A History of Indian Logic' by S. C. Vidyabhusana). Other Naiyayikas consider that tatparya is an allembracing factor and that it has an important part to play in the functioning of the first three factors viz. akanksa, yogyata and samnidhi. The Siddhanta muktavali pp. 303 observes - "tatparyagarbha ca"sattih". Even though, a speaker's intention is subjective, contextual factors can reasonably ascertain the speaker's intention. This intention is roughly termed 'tatparya' which for the Naiyayikas means what is intended to be conveyed, while for the Mimamsakas it means what is actually conveyed. It is only in the former sense that Anandavardhana uses the term while meeting with the purvapaksa in form of Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas while establishing vyanjana. Many ancients believe that the contextual factors should be taken as decisive in fixing the meaning of an utterance. Thus for them, these contextual factors are the causes of verbal comprehension. The Naiyayikas do not agree with this. The Siddhanta Muktavali p. 35, observes: "na ca tatparya-grahakanam prakarana"dinam sabda-bodhe karanatvam iti vacyam." They maintain that the contextual factors are not directly helping in the understanding of an utterance but they only indirectly show the meaning intended by the speakers. All philosophical systems accept the importance of getting at the speaker's intention in understanding a sentence. The difference lies in the proportion of importance they attach to this. Both viz. intention of the speaker as well as the objective strength of language are important in conveying the meaning. The Mimamsakas use the term 'tatparya' for the purport of a passage dealing with a topic and refer to six indications or 'lingas', by which we can arrive at the 'tatparya' of a given expression, objectively without reference to the speaker or author. These six lingas are * (i) upakramo-pasam-harau, i.e. 'upakrama' or introduction or beginning and 'upasamhara' or conclusion, (ii) 'abhyasa' i.e. repetition of the main topic, (iii) 'apurvata' or novelty of the theme or subject matter, (iv) 'phala' or the result intended, (v) 'arthavada' or eulogistic remarks, and (vi) 'upapatti' i.e. arguments in favour of the main theme - The Nyayakosa p. 714 observes : "upakramopasamharau abhyaso'purvata phalam, arthavadopapatti ca lingam tatparya-nirnaye." For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 413 The Mimamsakas hold that the real purport or tatparya of a given sentence can be studied objectively without reference to the subjective element, viz. intention of the speaker. Not unlike the Naiyayikas, the Mimamsakas also analyse the sentence into two parts such as the uddesya and the vidheya or roughly the subject and the predicate. The first part i.e. uddesya carries a sense which is siddha i.e. it is already existent and is known from other sources - The Nyayakosa p. 34, observes - "pramanantara-siddhasya kimcid dharmantara-vidhanartham punar upanyasyata." The second part consists of meanings that are brought into existance i.e. which are 'sadhya'. They are also termed as 'bhuta' and 'bhavya' or 'anuvadya' and 'vidheya' respectively. We know that Mammata while dealing with a purva-paksa against vyanjana uses these terms such as 'bhuta' and 'bhavya'. For the Mimamsakas the tatparya or real import of a sentence lies in the 'vidheya' element. Mammata has put it as "bhuta-bhavya-samuccarane bhutam bhavyaya vyapadisyate..." etc. The anuvadya - i.e. subject element is that which discloses to the listener what any utterance is about and is not always indispensable, and is used in a sentence only to help the listener to grasp the meaning clearly. It is actually 'vidheya' which is something newly stated and is to be known by the listener and from the standpoint of the speaker it is enough if the 'vidheya' alone is uttered. Normally in sanskrit the order of sequence of words indicating either subject or predicate is not fixed as a rule, but writers on Mimamsa and even literary critics want the subject to be mentioned first i.e. ahead of the predicate or vidheya. A wellknown maxim reads as-anuvadyam anuktva ca na vidheyam udirayet. This is supposed to be from Kumarila but is not actually found in the Sloka-vartika, Hemacandra (viveka, p. 244, Edn. Parikh and Kulkarni, '64, Bombay) also quotes it without mentioning the source. This is quoted by Mahima also (pp. 432, Karika 94, vya. vi. II. Edn. Rewaprasad). The violation of this untold subject-predicatesequence-rule makes for 'vidheya-avimarsa'-dosa or a poetic blemish in view of the alamkarikas. It is also called a-vimrsta-vidheyamsa-dosa. The Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas take the sentence to be a chain of individual words and so they have necessarily to depend on the power of tatparya to explain how a connected meaning is collected from a sentence. Thus for them a sentence necessarily conveys something over and above the meanings of individual words that go to form a sentence. The whole i.e. the sentence sense is always something more than the sum total of individual word-meanings. Some Naiyayikas explain this by resorting to the function of vrtti called tatparya-vrtti. For Personal & Private Use Only

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414 SAHRDAYALOKA Normally we use language to convey some sense. When words are used in juxtaposition viz. samabhivyahara, it is understood that the speaker wants to convey a connected sense. The Tattvabindu p. 131, has - "pratipitsitam khalu etad iti pratipadayisyantah padani uccarayanti." Kumarila also has - "visistarthaprayukta hi samabhivyahrtir jane" i.e. samabhivyahsti or use of words in juxtaposition is done with a special meaning (in mind). The anvitabhidhana theory holds that the intention or tatparya makes the primary significative power i.e. abhidha convey the additional significance of a sentence. According to the abhihitanvaya theory, abhidha or the power of expression has a limited capacity to yield only the samketita artha of a word. Thus, abhidha is restricted to wordmeanings alone. These word-meanings convey the additional significance through the power of 'laksana' based on the strength of tatparya along with the other three such as akanksa, yogyata and asatti or samnidhi. This function of the sentence to convey the sentence-sense on the basis of the speaker's intention is called tatparyavrtti by some ancient Naiyayikas and is termed 'samsarga-maryada' by later Naiyayikas. We come across these terms in the R.G. of Jagannatha also. Anvitabhidhanavada and Abhihitanvayavada : We will now go into a detailed understanding of the two principal ways of xing among the Mimamsakas and others who attempt to explain the fact of a correlated sentence-sense. These are termed as the anvitabhidhanavada and the abhihitanvayavada. For that we will have to begin with the relation of words in a sentence. The basic problem discussed by indian thinkers is that if every word in a sentence has its own specific meaning, how does a sentence, which is only a collection of these words, has a unified meaning ? This problem has relevance with compound word also having units with individual senses. For Vajapyayana, like the Mimamsakas, the meaning of a word is "jati' i.e. a class or a universal, and that of a sentence is the samsarga or mutual relation of the word-meanings. Helaraja (on V.P. III Jati-samuddesa) observes - "jativadino vajapyayanasya tu mate samsargo vakyarthah, samanyanam samslesamatra-rupatvat vakyarthasya." Kumarila (Tantravartika, p. 446) says - "samsargo'pi padarthanam anyonyena'nuranjanam... gotve suklatva-samsargah, suklatve va gotva-samsargah." - Thus, an expression 'sukla gauh', means the association of cowness and whiteness. As this association is one, words make for a syntactic unity. For Vyadi the meaning of a word was any particular i.e. dravya of a class. It is a concrete thing and not a quality. Thus Vyadi holds that the function of a word For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 415 is to distinguish the thing it stands for, from all similar objects. Kumarila observes at the same source that, "bhedo nama padarthanam vyavacchedah parasparam... Vyakti-padartha-pakse sarvavyaktinam sukla"dibhih krsna"di-vyavaccheda-matram vaktavyam." Helaraja also observes (there only) - "vyadi-mate bhedo vakyarthah, padavacyanam dravyanam dravyantara-nivrtti-tatparyena abhidheyatvat." Thus a 'cow' means not that object which is characteriszed by cowness, but that which is distinguished from a horse. Thus in a sentence words are not expected to signify things not having certain attributes but as excluding some. Vyadi's view can be understood to contain the germs of the Apoha theory of the Buddhists, provided Vyadi is taken as earlier. Anvitabhidhanavada : Prabhakara and his followers held that words convey a meaning only in the context of a sentence eventhough for them words are real and actual constitutents of language. Each word, though having its only meaning, serves only as part of a sentence. When we hear a sentence, we collect a unitary sense which follows as the sentence-sense. The basic problem is whether this sentence-sense or the unitary sense arises directly from the collection of words or whether it is arrived at indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of individual words that make for a sentence. The anvitabhidhana-vada opts for the former while the abhihitanvaya-vada supports the latter option. For the anvitabhidhanavada, the meaning of a sentence is made up of individual word-meanings and their mutual correlation, and these two i.e. individual word-meanings and their mutual relations are conveyed by the words themselves. For the abhihitanvaya theory, words convey only their individual meanings and the mutual relation is conveyed by these word-meanings and not the words themselves. Prabhakara and his followers emphasise the natural method by which children learn individual meanings of individual words. Mammata puts it brilliantly in his K.P. (V), when he observes : "ye'py ahuhsabda-vrddhabhidheyams ca pratyaksena'tra pasyati, srotus ca pratipannatvam anumanena cestaya. - 1 anyatha'nupapattya tu bodhet saktim dvaya"tmikam, For Personal & Private Use Only

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416 SAHRDAYALOKA arthapatya'vabodheta sambandham tri-pramanakam. - 2 iti pratipadita-disa, devadatta 'gam anaya' ityadi uttama-vrddha-vakya-prayogat desad desantaram sasnadimantam artham madhyama-vrddhe nayati sati, 'anena asmas vakyad ayam arthah pratipannah' iti taccestaya anumaya, tayor akhanda-vakya-vakyarthayor arthapattya vacya-vacaka-bhava-laksanam sambandham avadharya balas tatra vyutpadyate. paratah, 'caitra, gam anaya, devadatta asvam anaya, devadatta gam naya' ity adi vakya-prayoge tasya tasya sabdasya tam tam artham avadharayati iti anvayavyatirekabhyam pravstti-nivitti-kari vakyam eva prayoga-yogyam iti vakyasthitanam eva padanam anvitaih padarthaih anvitanam eva samketo grhyate iti vicista eva padartha vakyartho, na tu padarthanam vaisistyam. vady api vakyantara-prayuktani api pratyabhijna-pratyayena tani eva etani padani nisciyante iti padarthantara-matrena anvitah samketa-gocarah tatha'pi samanyavacchadito visesa-rupa eva asau pratipadyate, vyatisaktanam padarthanam tathabhutatvad iti anvitabhidhanavadinah." "And some others expound (the process of denotation) as follows : The word, the elderly men and the object denoted are directly perceived here (i.e. in the process of learning) by a child. The listener's understanding of it is deduced (by the child) through inference and action. The two-fold power (of the word to denote and of the object to be thus denoted by that particular word) is cognised by presumption based on otherwise in-explicability'. Thus the relationship (between word and its meaning) is known through three means of cognition (i.e. perception, inference and presumption). According to what is stated above when a sentence, such as, "Devadatta bring a cow", is uttered by an elderly man, the younger man is seen to bring from one place to another an object with the dewlap etc., the child then infers from this action that such and such meaning has been understood by the younger man from such a sentence. Thereupon the child makes out the denotative relationship between the above sentence and its meaning as one indivisible whole, and thus the child himself comprehends its meaning. Later on when sentences such as, "Caitra, bring the cow", "Devadatta, bring the horse", "Devadatta, take away the cow", are used, he makes out a particular meaning from a particular word on the basis of positive and negative considerations. From this it follows that a sentence alone, that For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 417 makes a man act or refrain from it, is fit for being used. Hence, the denotative convention is apprehended from the connected words occuring in a sentence only with the meanings of words (generally) connected with one another. To conclude, only the correlated meanings of words are the meaning of a sentence; it is not that there is correlation of (unconnected) word meanings. Though the individual words, found to be used in other sentences, are regarded to be the same by recognitive apprehension, and thus convention of word-meaning is found as connected with the other words (i.e. the denotative convention is comprehended as connected with particular word-meaning), yet, that particular. form itself is comprehended as qualified by generic character becaus intermixed word-meanings are of the said (i.e. of particular and not generic) character. (Since the particular and the generic cannot be divided, the comprehension of the particular form is not without the apprehension of its generic character). This is the view of the theorists of correlated denotation (anvitabhidhana)." - (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, K.P. pp. 159-161). The anvitabhidhana theory thus stands for 'conveying the meaning of the correlated words' i.e. "anvitanam abhidhanam". Normally, the injunctive sentences produce a visible reaction in a listener. So, only from such sentences in the imperative (or potential) mood, that the meanings of words can be naturally collected. For the Bhatta Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas, listerner's reaction can be noted even in case of indicative sentences such as, "putras te jatah" or "kanya te garbhini", producing joy or shock in the listener respectively. The Mimamsaka's preoccupation with vedic injunctions led to the view that a typical sentence should be in an imperative mood, since the whole direct denotation of the veda, according to them, must lie in enjoining something to be done. (codana-laksano dharmah). If such an interpretation is not seen in some cases, then the comprehension of meaning has to depend on something indirectly connected with the injunction. But for the Vedantins, the direct denotation of the important vedic texts is seen in pointing out some well-established facts, and not in commanding something. Thus for them, the importance lies in indicative sentences. Later Indian logic also deals with such indicative sentences. Prabhakara, however, is of the opinion that even in case of indicative sentences, the comprehension of the denotation of words can be obtained only by observing the usage of elders, and that this can be known only from injunctive sentences as seen in the passage quoted from Mammata as above. For Personal & Private Use Only

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418 SAHRDAYALOKA But, if the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in injunctive sentences, it follows that every word must express its meaning only as related to the other factors of injunction. Word expressing a verb involving a command would be taken as the principal word in a sentence. So, the Prabhakaras are of the opinion that no word can be comprehended as having an independent meaning when isolated from a sentence. The meaning of words for them, is to be understood only as related to something which has to be done i.e. karya. For Prabhakara the ng maxim is - 'vakyarthena vyavaharah' i.e. all usage is through a sentence and its meaning. For Prabhakara the relation of a sentence with its meaning is the only parmanent entity (Ref. Brhati, pp. 135, 188 etc.). Salikanatha elaborating on this observes that the word alone, by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only the sentence that does it; and this is clear from the fact that we learn individual word-meanings later after observing the usage of older people. This usage is necessarily in form of sentences. So, only sentence has to be accepted as expressive of meaning and never a word by itself. This does not mean that the followers of Prabhakara totally deny the existence of individual word-meaning. But they only insist that gathering of individual word-meanings is rendered possible only as part of the correlated sentence-sense alone. Collecting of isolated word-sense is impossible except from its relation with the sentence-sense. Words do yield their sense separately, but they do not end there. The listener knows the general meaning of words, but his experience leads him to believe that words are meaningful only when they are connected in a sentence, and certainly not when they are isolated. Thus words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the strength of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position. Words convey, thus, not only their individual meanings but also their syntactic relation. So, the sentencemeaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves. We may, say that for these theorists 'abhidha' or the power of expression is vested in a sentence only. The Vakyartha-matlka-vstti, pp. 5 observes - "akanksa-samnidhi-praptayogyarthantara-samgatan, svarthan ahuh padaniti vyutpattih samsrita maya." It seems that the ancient Mimansakas held this 'anvitabhidhana' theory. The Mi. Su. I. i. 25 seems to support this when it declares - "tad-bhutanam kriyarthena samamnayah, arthasya tan-nimittarvat." Dr. Raja, however observes (pp. 199, ibid) For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 419 that the Sabarabhasya passage explaining the comprehension of the sentence-sense seems to go against this. He observes - (Sabarabhasya on Mi. Su. I. i. 25) - "padani hi svam svam artham abhidhaya nivstta-vyaparani, athedanim padartha avagata santo vakyartham gamayanti." Prabhakara and his followers explain this passage as supporting their theory for according to them what is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing - the meaning of words as qualified by one another. For this we can consult Brhati on this passage and also Vakyartha-matrkavrtti p. 21. This interpretation however, is criticised in the Nyayaratnamala in its Vakyarthanirnaya section. However, we feel like going with the Prabhakara-school-explanation and not find contradiction for as Dr. Raja himself concedes that the ancient Mimamsakas were inclined towards anvitabhidhana theory. It will be interesting to quote from prof. G. V. Devasthali here, when he observes, (pp. 213 - in his, "Mimamsa the Vakyasastra of Ancient India" - Vol. I, - Booksellers' publishing Company, - Bombay-4, '59) - as follows - 15 - "From this discussion we thus arrive at another point which has been expressly stated by Sabara at Mi. Su. III. 2.1. There it is in clear terms declared by Sabara that a padartha, if it is not connected with another padartha, can't give rise to vakyartha. - "samanyavrtti hi padam, visesa-vitti vakyam. samanyena-abhipravsttanam padarthanam yad visese avasthapanam sa vakyarthah. tad etad uktam-tad bhutanam kriyarthena samamnayo'rthasya tan-nimittatvat, iti. tatra pratyaksatah padartho, vakyarthah punar anumanikah. tad etad avagamyatam. kevala-svartha vrtti padam anupadesakam iti padantarena samnihitena ekavakyatam abhyupaiti, na'nyatha iti." . This is obviously so because in the absence of any such connection the pada by itself will yield only the 'samanya', which is its signification, and not the 'visesa', which is the vakyartha, since there is no reason why it should do so. For, as we have already seen above, it is only to avoid 'anarthakya-prasanga' that a samanya-vaci pada is made to yield some visesa artha; while as long as the word stands by itself there is no such prasanga at all." Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. I. 4 (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi '97-'98, Ahmedabad) refers to this theory as the dirgha-dirghatara-vyapara-vada which holds that there is no limit to the extent of the meaning of a given expression. For these theorists abhidha power can extend itself to any limit and even cover the collection of an implicit sense as well. Bhartrhari - V.P. II. 329 also refers to this For Personal & Private Use Only

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420 SAHADAYALOKA when he has "apare tu padasyaiva tam artham pratijanate sabdantarabhi-sambandham antarena vyavasthitam." and also, V.P. II. 330 - "yasmin uccarite sabde yada yorthah pratiyate, tam ahur artham tasyaiva nanyad arthasya laksanam." This theory therefore chooses to explain the subtle implications and suggestions - the whole of pratiyamana artha i.e. implicit sense, as seen in poetry, also by this extended abhidha power. So, for the anvitabhidhana theory though there are many words in a sentence and therefore many word-meanings, they are meaningful only in the context of the total sentence-sense and therfore, through unity of purpose they give rise to unity of sentence - sense. This theory has been strongly criticized by the Bhatta-school of Mimamsakas. They argue as follows: Tattvabindu p. 93 - "padantarasya vaiyarthyam asrutanvayabodhane." If it is held that the first word or any word in its full sense means the unitary sense of the sentence itself, the other words in the sentence will be superfluous. This argument is similar to the one raised against the sphota theory also. It may be said that the subsequent words repeat the same sentence-sense and makes it clearer, or it can also be said that the other words are used to restrict the meaning indicated by the first word. Yet another objection against the anvitabhidhana theory is that it involves the fallacy of interdependence - (p. 93, ibid) : "srutanvitabhidhane tu vyaktam anyonya-samsrayam." Thus, if one of the words, say the first, in a sentence, is to convey its own meaning as well as its relation to the other words, the full meaning of the word can be collected only after understanding the other words; and in the same way, the meanings of the other words depend on this word. If it is suggested that the individual word-meaning and its relation to other words are not conveyed simultaneously, but gradually, the individual word-meaning being conveyed first, and the relation later, then there will not be the fallacy of interdependence, but in For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 421 this case, this explanation will involve the unwarranted assumption of two separate functions for the primary power called abhidha - (pp. 94, ibid) - It is therefore that the anvitabhidhanavadins hold that there is only one potency for words to express the meaning as related to the rest of the words. It is through recollection that we remember the meanings of words, and this is by rousing the mental impressions of previous experiences of the use of the words. As a matter of experience, normally we never come across words except as related in a sentence and that isolated words have no existence in normal speech-activity. The word-meaning and the relation to other words are both known through abhidha. The Bhatra school has objection to this position also (Tattvabindu, p. 95). They hold that eventhough we observe words functioning in different contexts of situations, in all of which they occur as related to a sentence, still we are able to understand the isolated senses of the individual words separately also. Otherwise, a word learnt through from its use in one context, cannot be applied in another context. Again, the very principle of recognition is based on our capacity to recognize something isolated from a given context. We are able to recognize a person in a place and time different from those when we had met him first. (Tattvabindu, pp. 116). It can be argued here, that we do recognize a person, may be for a second time, also in some given time and place, and not as isolated of all situations. A further obiection raised against the anvitabhidhana theory is that the meaning of a sentence can be known from the meanings of the words remembered eventhough the words might have been forgotten. Our experience says that in a long sentence we forget the earlier words used, but we remember their meanings and yet we arrive at the full sentence-sense. The Sastradipika p. 153, observes : "purvabhagesu vakyasya vismrtesy api droyate, vakyarthavagatih punsam padartha-smrtisalinam." The relation of the words in a sentence is not the same as that of the letters in a word; for in case of a word we do not arrive at word-sense if we forget the initial letters. Abhihitanvaya-vada : The Bhatta-school of Mimamsakas and some Naiyayikas support this theory. The Vakyartha section of the Nyayaratnamala and the Tattvabindu, Manameyodaya For Personal & Private Use Only

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422 SAHRDAYALOKA and the sabda section of the Siddhanta-muktavali suggest the acceptance of abhihitanvayavada by some Naiyayikas also. For these theorists the meaning of a sentence is a correlated meaning of individual word-senses. From the sentence, first we collect individual word-meanings one by one and then we correlate these meanings with the help of akanksa, yogyata and samnidhi. Sabara on MI. Su. I. i. 25, refers to this theory when he observes: "padani hi svam svam artham abhidhaya, nivrtta-vyaparani, athedanim padartha avagatah santo vakyartham gamayanti." - Thus in a sentence the words make for their individual senses and stop at that. So the meanings of the words thus known make for the meaning of a sentence. But the Prabhakaras explain this passage differently by taking 'artha' in the sense of 'anvaya' i.e. syntactic relation. Salikanatha thus explains in the Vakyartha-matrka-vrtti, pp. 22 that by the word 'artha' the bhasyakara means 'anvaya' "artha-sabdena bhasyakaro'nvayam aha." But Kumarila in his Tantravartitika, p. 445 has - "padarthaih padavijnatair, vakyarthah pratipadyate." - i.e. the meaning of a sentence is collected with the help of word-senses expressed through individual words. The sentence, like words, does not have a meaning of its own independently. It is observed "prthag-bhutair eva padair itaretara-nirapeksaih svesu padarthesu uktesu tatsamsargad eva padavyaparaanapekso vakyartha-pratyayo bhavati." - Thus, the meanings of words having been conveyed by each word, independently of one another, it is exclusively from the connection among word meanings, that there follows the apprehension of the sentence. The correlated meaning is brought about by the three factors such as akanksa, yogyata and samnidhi. Tantravarttika, pp. 455 has "akanksa samnidhanam ca yogyata ceti ca trayam, sambandha-karanatvena kiptam na-'nantara-srutih." We know that the grammarian Vajapyayana held that the sentence-sense is the 'samsarga' or mutual correlation of individual word-senses, expressed by words. The theory of Vyadi, as observed earlier, was a later one which held that the sentencesense is a mutual exclusion of word-meanings. This developed into Apoha theory. - For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 423 As to the nature of cognition produced by a word there are two views. The first one holds that by observing the contexts of situations we arrive at the word-sense. Thus a word indicates its meaning only by rousing the mental impressions of such contexts. So, ultimately, the knowledge of a word is only a kind of recollection. This view is held by the anvitabhidhana school of Prabhakaras and also by some from the abhihitanvaya school such as Cidananda, the author of Niti-tattva"virbhava. The Manameyodaya observes - (p. 93) "sabdo'pi samskarodbodhana-dvarena eva padartham bodhayati iti samsargam eva padarthajnanam iti cidanandaprabhrtayah (Nititattva" virbhava, p. 233). Kumarila also refers to this view when he says that a word is nothing more than a reminder of the meaning - Slokavartika, p. 432, sabda-section observes : "padam abhyadhikabhavat smarakam na visisyate." The Vakyartha-matnka-vitti, p. 15, quotes a varttika - "te'pi naivasmota yasmad vakyartham gamayanti nah, tasmat tatsmaranesv eva samhatesu pramanata." Vacaspatimisra also says that, the relation between the word and its meaning is, strictly speaking, that between a recollector and the recollected, and that a word does not produce the cognition of the meaning directly and independently, but by rousing the mental impressions of the things previously known. The Tattvabindu, p. 160 has - "vacya-vacakatvam ca pratyayya-pratyayakatvam tat ca vicaryamanam smarya-smarakatvam eva." also see p. 159 - "na ceyam saksad artha-dhiyam adhatte, yena na tat sadhika syat, api tu samskarodbodhana-kramena." - The Yogasutra-bhasya III. 17. also has - "samketas tu pada-padarthayor itaretaradhyasarupah smrtya"tmakah." But according to Parthasarathimisra and some others also, the meaning of a word is conveyed by the primary significative potency of the word i.e. by abhidha. The Manameyodaya pp. 93 has - "padaih padartha-bodhanam sabda-sakti-janyatvat abhidhanam eva iti parthasarathi-misra"dayah." Our experience suggests that the meaning is conveyed directly by a word and not indirectly through remembering the various contexts of situations in which a word was used. Again, it is easier to assume that the meaning flows directly from a given word through its power of expression, rather then to accept that it reminds us of our former experiences of situations when a particular word was used and thus gives us the meaning. The Nyaya-ratna-mala, p. 107, has - "sabdantaram artha For Personal & Private Use Only

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424 SAHKDAYALOKA pratyaya-darsanat tasyaiva tatra karanatvam kalpayitum yuktam, na tu sabdat samskarodbodhah, tatas ca artha-pratitir iti yuktam; pranalyam pramanabhavat. tasmat abhidhayakam eva padam, na smarakam." According to the Abhihitanvayavadins, when we hear a sentence, we first of all collect the individual meanings of words in a sentence. This we do one after the other. Then these word-meanings are cor-related on the basis of expectancy, consistancy and juxta-position. Thus we collect the unified meaning of a given sentence - as a whole. The expression of individual meanings comes before the knowledge of the logical connection among them. The collective memory - samuha"lambana-smrti-puts the isolated ideas together. The individual wordmeanings are remembered separately till all the words are heard. This is followed by the simultaneous cognition of the sentence meaning in which all wordmeanings are properly cor-related to one another on the strength of akanksa"di i.e. expectancy, etc. For the anvitabhidhana theory, as we know, each word in a sentence, when spoken, contributes to the meaning of the sentence which is thus gradually revealed, leading to its full grasping at the end. This revealation of sentence-sense is getting clearer and clearer with the utterance of each subsequent words. But for the abhihitanvayavada, the sentence-sense is something plus, i.e. something more than the sum total of individual word-meanings. This additional sense arises after the word-meanings get inter-related through akanksa"di. : "tatparyartho visesa-vapuh, apadartho'pi vakyarthah samullasati"-observes Mammata in the K.P. II. This unified sentence-sense is termed differently as 'vakyartha', i.e. sentence-sense, or 'samsarga' or association of word-meanings, or tatparyartha or purport or intention of the speaker. Where this speciality of signification comes from is difficult to explain. Some call it vakya-sakti or the power of a sentence. Others term it as 'samsarga-maryada' or the 'law of association'. Still others advance a power called tatparya-sakti i.e. purport, the power of a sentence to convey the intended sense in form of a related and unified meaning. The V.P. II. 42 observes : "sambandhe sati yattv anyad adhikyam upajayate, vakyartham eva tam prahur: aneka-pada-samsrayam." For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 425 Pynyaraja observes on this - "padanam parasparanvaye padartha-vasad yad adhikyam, samsargah, sa vakyarthah". See also M.bh. I. p. 462 - on Varttika 2 - on Pa. 2.3.46 "na va vakyarthatvat." - na va vaktavyam. kim karanam ? vakyarthatvat. yad atra adhikyam vakyarthah sah But how is this association or samsarga conveyed ? This is perhaps not satisfactorily explained. The individual words have completed their function of conveying their individual meaning. They cannot convey their inter-relation also and thus make for the sentence-sense. Words cannot convey their mutual relation directly because between the words and the sentence-sense, lie the individual wordsenses. Thus, it is only the word-meanings that can be held responsible to convey the sentence-sense and this also in their mutually related form. This is the view of the anvitabhidhanavadins. There is a slight difference between the Naiyayikas and the Bhatta Mimamsakas regarding as to how this mutual relation is conveyed. For the Naiyayikas the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation of meanings. But the Bhatta Mimamsakas hold that the sentence-sense is always conveyed by the secondary power of words : Tattvabindu p. 153 quotes Kumarila Bhatta - "vakyartho laksyamana hi sarvatraiveti nah sthiti)." The two conditions of laksana viz. mukhyartha-badha or incompatibility of the expressed sense, and 'tadyoga' i.e. relation between the primary sense and secondary intended sense are present here also. But this should not mean that the sentence-sense is not derived from words. Kumarila Bhatta observes that though the letters of words do convey the word-senses directly, but they do not stop at that. The knowledge of word-senses only is useless for the hearer. The co individual meanings by the words has to be there for the cognition of the sentencesense, as is the case of the generating of fire by fuel for cooking meals. The slokavarttika, p. 943, and also the Tattvabindu p. 153 which quotes the same, has - "saksad yady api kurvanti padartha-pratipadanam, varnas tatha'pi naitasmin paryavasyanti nisphale." vakyarthamitaye tesam pravrttau nantariyakam, For Personal & Private Use Only

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426 SAHKDAYALOKA pake jvaleva kasthanam padartha-pratipadanam." S. C. Chatterjee in his 'Nyaya Theory of knowledge', Uni. of calcutta, 1939, explains as shown by Kunjunni Raja (p. 211, ibid) that the abhihitanvaya theory gains support for the following reasons : "If the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, then the classification of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc., becomes meaningless. Further, in every case in which we are to understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first understand the meaning of its component words. Without a previous understanding of words no one can understand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover if the meaning of a sentence were quite independent of the meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence c convey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the basis of our knowledge of words and there separate meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding of the sentences, since they are new and unitelligible to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words Perhaps the anvitabhidhanavada is an advance over this. The fact is that the sentence-sense is more useful to both the speaker and the hearer. Later writers such as Mukula Bhatta tried to reconcile these two views. For him both these theories contain partial truth. He holds that if we look at from the point of view of a sentence, the anvitabhidhanavada stands to gain. He therefore suggests a combination of these views and calls it a theory of samuccaya. He also discusses the abhava of these two. We have discussed in detail these views while dealing with abhidh, in Mukula's Abhidhavrtta-matrka (Ch. V). Alamkarikas - Tatparya : Abhinavagupta is perhaps the first Alamkarika, who names tatparya as a separate vstti or function of words accepted by abhihitanvayavada. He speaks of four distinct functions of words such as abhidha, tatparya, laksana and vyanjana. Locana reads as follows: (under Dhv. I. 4, pp. 26, 28 Edn. Nandi) : ... "trayo hy atra vyapara samvedyante. padarthesu samanya"tmasu abhidhavyaparah, samayapeksayarthavagamana-saktir hy abhidha. samayas ca tayaty eva, na visesamse, anantyad vyabhicaracsaikasya. tato visesarupe vakyarthe tatparyasaktih parasparanvite, "samanyany anyathasiddher visesam gamayanti hi" iti nyayat. .... na caivam bhaktir eva dhvanih. bhaktir hi laksanavyaparas tetiyakaksya-nivesi. caturthyam tu kaksayam dhvana-vyaparah.... tena samayapeksa vacyavagamana- saktir abhidhasaktih. tad anyatha'nupaptisahayarthavabodhanasaktis tatparya-saktih. mukhyartha-badha"di-sahakary apeksartha-pratibhasana-saktir laksanasaktih. tat-sakti-trayopajanitarthavagama For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 427 mulajata-tat-pratibhasa-pavitrita-pratipattr-pratibha-sahayarthavadyotanasaktir dhvanavyaparah. sa ca pragvrttam vyaparatrayam nyakkurvan pradhanabhutah kavya"tmety asayena nisedhapramukhataya ca prayojana-visesopi nised ha-visaya ity uktam." Thus, abhidha is the power of the words to signify the primary meaning which refers only to the class-jati and not visesa or the particular. In a sentence the individual words give only the isolated word-meaning with the help of abhidha. The correlation or syntactic relation of these is conveyed by the tatparya-sakti of the words. The intention of the speaker, which is the general purport of a sentence is of course the unified sentence-sense. So, the words are considered to have a power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. This power is tatparyasakti. Laksana, the third power, comes in only when the primary word-meanings are not compatible with one another : "mukhyartha-badhayam laksanayah praklptih. badha ca virodha-pratitir eva." (Locana). Anandavardhana does refer to 'tatparya' or intention of the speaker while dealing with the Mimamsakas where he explains the difference in nature and scope of abhidha and vyanjana. But he never direcly mentions or discusses the tatparya sakti as a power of word or sentence. He has an occasion to mention the 'vakyartha-padartha-nyaya' also. But here also he does not talk of the tatparya-vrtti. He observes (pp. 312, ibid, under Dhv. III. 33) : "tad evam sabdavyavahare trayah prakarah. vacakatvam gunavrttir vyanjakatvam ca. tatra vyanjakatve yada vyangyapradhanyam tada dhvanih..." We will deal with Anandavardhana's views in greater detail when we will look into Dhanika, later. We have seen how Mukula has no business to talk about tatparya, however he has a detailed discussion concerning the abhihitanvayavada and the anvitabhidhanavada under his all encompassing abhidha, as noted above. Kuntaka also had no business to talk of tatparya-vrtti for his broader concept of vicitra abhidha covers everything. It is interesting to note that Dhananjaya and Dhanika pick up the case of tatparya against vyanjana or dhvani of Anandavardhana. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 181183) (sr. pra) gives the text of Dhanika's avaloka as read by Prof. Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. It reads as : "na'pi vakyarthatvam vyangyasya, trtiya-kaksa visayatvat. tatha hi - 'bhrama dharmika' ityadau padartha-visayabhidhalaksanaprathama-kaksatikranta-kriyakaraka-samsargatmakavidhivisaya-vakyartha kaksatikranta-trtiya-kaksatikranto nisedha"tma vyangya-laksanorthah vyanjakasaktyadhinah sphusam evavabhasate. ato na'sau vakyarthah. nanu ca trtiya-kaksa For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA visayatvam asruyamana-padartha-tatparyesu 'visam bhunkshva' itya"divakyesu nisedharthavisayesu pratiyate eva vakyarthe; na catra vyanjakatvavadina'pi vakyarthatvam nesyate, tatparyad ananyatvad dhvaneh. tanna; svarthasya dvitiyakaksyayam avisrantasya trtiyakaksabhavat, saiva nisedha-kaksa tatra dvitiyakaksa; vidhau kriyakaraka-samsarga-nupapatteh; prakaranat pitari vaktari putrasya visabhaksana-niyogabhavat. rasavad-vakyesu ca vibhava-pratipattilaksana-dvitiyakaksayam rasanavagamat. tad uktam - apratistham avisrantam 428 atrocyate svarthe yat paratam idam, vakyam vigahate tatra nyayya tatpartasya sa. yatra tu svartha-visrantam pratistham tavad agatam, tat prasarpati tatra syat sarvatra dhvanina sthitih. "vacya prakaranadibhyo buddhistha va yatha kriya, vakyarthah karakairyuktah sthayibhavas tathetaraih." yatha laukika-vakyesu sruyamanakriyesu 'gam abhyaja' itya"disu asruyamanakriyesu ca "dvaram dvaram", itya"disu sva-sabdopadanat prakarana"divasad' buddhisannivesini kriyeva karakopacita vakyarthah, tatha kavyesvapi sva-sabdopadanat kvacit, "prityai navodha priya" ityevam adau, kvacic ca prakarana"di-vasat niyata-vihita-vibhava"dyavinabhavad va, saksad bhavaka-cetasi viparivartamanah ratya"dih sthayi sva-sva-vibhavanubhava-vyabhicaribhih tat-tatsabdopanitaih samskara-paramparaya param praudhim aniyamanah ratya"divakyarthah. na ca apadarthasya vakyarthatvam nastiti vacyam. karya-paryavasayitvat tatparya-sakteh. tatha hi pauruseyam a-pauruseyam vakyam sarvam karyaparam, a-tatparatve'nupadeyatvat, unmatta"di-vakyavat. kavyasabdanam ca anvayavyatirekabhyam niratisaya-sukha"svada-vyatirekena pratipadya-pratipadakayoh pravrtti-visayayoh prayojanantaranupalabdheh svadodbhutir eva karyatvena avadharyate. tad udbhutinimittatvam ca vibhava"di-samsrstasya sthayina eva avagamyate. ato vakyasya-abhidhanasaktih tena tena rasena akrsyamana tat-tat For Personal & Private Use Only

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429 "Tatparya" svada'peksitavantara-vibhava"di-pratipadana-dvara sva-paryavasayitam aniyate, tad etad vibhava"dayah padartha-sthaniyah tat-samsesto rasa"dir vakyarthah, tad etad kavya-vakyam, yadiyau tav imau padartha-vakyarthau. na ca evam sati gita"divad vacya-vacaka-bhava'nupayogah, visista-vibhava"di-samagri-vidusam eva tatha-vidharatyadi-bhavanavaram eva svadodbhuteh. tad anena atiprasango'pi nirastah. idrsi ca vakyartha-nirupane parikalpitabhidhasakti-vasenaiva samstavakyartha-vagateh saktyantara-parikalpanam prayasah. yad avocama kavyanirnaye - tatparyanatirekac ca vyanjakarvasya na dhvanih, kim uktam syad asrutartha-tatparye'nyokti rupini. 'visam bhaksaya' vakye yac caivam pitr-suta"disu, prayujyate pradhanatvat dhvanitvam kena varyate. dhvanis cet svartha-visrantam vakyam arthantarasrayam, tatparatvam tv avisrantau, tanna, vieranty asambhavat. etavatyeva visrantis tatparyasyeti kim krtam, yavat karya-prasaritvat, tatparyam na tuladhrtam. bhrama dharmika visrabdham iti bhrami-ksta"spadam, nirvyavstti katham vakyam nisedham upasarpati. pratipadyasya visrantir apeksapuranad yadi, vaktur vivaksitaprapteh avisrantir na va katham ? pauruseyasya vakyasya vivaksa-paratantrata vaktrabhipreta-tatparyam atah kavyasya yujyate." iti - -ato na rasa"dinam kavyena saha vyangya-vyanjakabhavah. kim tarhi ? bhavyabhavaka-sambandhah. kayyam hi bhavakam, bhavvah rasa"dayah. te hi svato'bhavanta eva bhavakesu vieista-vibhava"dimata kavyena bhavyante. na canyatra sabdantaresu bhavya-bhavaka-laksana-sambandhabhavat kavya-sabdesvapi tatha bhavyam iti vacyam. bhavana-kriyavadibhih tathangikstatvat. kinca ma canyatra tatha'stu anvaya-vyatirekabhyam iha tathavagamat. tad uktam - "bhavabhinaya-sambaddhan bhavayanti rasan iman, yasmat tasmad ami bhavah vijneya natya-yoktlbhih." (N.S. VII. 4) For Personal & Private Use Only

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430 SAHKDAYALOKA iti. katham punar aglhita-sambandhebhyah padebhyah sthayya"di-pratipattir iti cet, tathavidha-cesta-yukta-stri-pumsadisu ratyadyavina-bhava-darsanat iha'pi tathopanibandhe sati ratyadyavinabhuta-cesta"di-pratipadaka-sabda-sravanad abhidheyavinabhavena laksaniki ratyadi-pratitih. yatha ca kavyarthasya rasabhavakatvam tatha agre vaksyamah." We will now look into this view. We know that for Anandavardhana the two senses viz. vacya and vangya are related to each other as subordinate and principal respectively when it is a case of dhvanikavya. The two senses being not of equal merit do not harm the principle of eka-vakyatva or 'vakyaikarthya'. But it is only when the suggested sense is principal, that the tatparyavadin would hold that it es under the intention of the speaker and as such it should be lebelled as 'tatparya' or purport and not dhvani. Dhananjaya and Dhanika are advocates of the tatparya-sakti or purport and challange the dictates of Anandavardhana. Dhanika first gives a brief exposition of dhvanivada. He observes that the suggested sense cannot be the sentence-sense, as it falls in the third stage. Thus 'dhvani' cannot be 'tatparya' of a sentence. In such examples as, "bhrama dharmika..." etc. the first stage is padartha i.e. word-sense, which is derived by abhidhasakti or power of expression. The second stage is that of vakyartha i.e. sentence-sense, i.e. tatparya in form of an injunction i.e. vidhi such as 'bhrama' or 'move around'. The suggested sense appears in the third stage and is different in nature, it being negation or nisedha. This 'nisedha' is arrived at with the help of a sakti or power called vyanjana or suggestion. This forms the view of Anandavardhana as presented by Dhanika in his Avaloka, as a prima facie view. Dhanika further argues as follows. He observes that all cases of tatparya are not cases of the second stage. In expressions such as, "visam bhunksva" addressed by a father to his son, the meaning is exactly the opposite. The expressed sense is an injunction viz. "eat poison". But the father's intention seems to be that his son should know that it is better to eat poison than to eat at the (enemy's) house. The sense is, "do not eat at his house; better eat poison than eat in his house." In this expression, viz. "eat poison", there are three stages wherein vidhi-injunction and nisedha/prohibition appear as second and third stages. Even the third stage here is only vakyartha and tatparya. So the vyapti or rule or invariable concomitance that vyangya is the third stage does not hold good. The reply to this is that a father's injunction to his own son to eat poison appears absolutely absurd. So, the sentence obviously would mean something else. The real meaning of this expression, viz. prohibition of eating at the enemy's place is also at the second stage only and not at the third stage. The rule that vyangya comes after For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 431 the second stage therefore stands. In case of rasa-realization, there is only the knowledge of vibhava"dis at the second stage. Only in the third stage the rasa is realized. It is proper to hold tatparya in those cases where there is no completeness of sense or exhaustion of expressed sense and the words tend to mean something else and stop only at that. But in such cases where words stop with conveying their expressed sense, and where no incompleteness or unintelligibility is noticed and yet from this complete expressed sense arises another meaning the case is one of dhvani. The point of discussion is this. The tatparyavadin presses that taparya is not exhausted with collection of the first expressed sense. It is a-visranta. For the dhvanivadin it is visranta, with the collection of the expressed sense. The further sense is arrived at through vyanjana. For the tatparyavadin this further meaning is also tatparya and projection of vyanjana is meaningless. For the tatparyavadin, there is no limit to tatparya. It is not the sum total of individual word-senses only. Tatparya for him extends over the whole range of the speaker's intention and covers all implications coming up with the directly expressed sense. 'tatparyam na tuladhitam'. You do not have to hold tatparya in a balance. In the illustration viz. 'bhrama dharmika, etc.' the stopping of the religious person from going to the banks of the river Godavari is the chief intention of the speaker and is therefore included in the tatparya. There is no need to postulate vyanjana/dhvani : "tatparya-anatirekac ca vyanjakarvatya, na dhvanih." The dhvanivadins may argue as follows : If it is held by the tatparyavadin that the intention of the speaker is the indication of extent of the tatparya of his utterance, and therefore the implied and suggested matter is also tatparya, the answer of the dhvanivadin is that the tatparya of a vakya, like abhidha of a pada is limited in its scope and can give only the bear meanings of all the words put together in a grammatical order, and that the suggested ideas are not invariably associated through convention or samaya, that dhvani exists also in sounds which do not convey dictionary meaning (i.e. which are a-vacaka), and that dhvani or suggestion is possible even in tunes of music and is conveyed by gestures also where there is no sound at all : Again dhvani must be accepted for cases of realization of rasas which cannot be experienced through abhidha or mention of the name of a particular rasa. If suggestion/dhvani is not accepted says the dhvanivadin, and if only tatparya is accepted, then the tatparyavadin will have to accept that rasa is realized by abhidha and tatparya also. Thus for the tatparyavadin 'sva-sabdavacyatva' of rasa will not only have to be discarded as a poetic blemish, but will have to be accepted as a possible way of rasa-experience. For Personal & Private Use Only

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432 SAHRDAYALOKA To this Dhanika says yes'. He says that ordinarily we speak two types of sentences such as one in which a verb is directly mentioned and the other one in which a verb is not mentioned. The instance of the first is, "gam abhyaja". i.e. drive away the cow. The verb is clearly mentioned in this. In the other instance, viz. "dvaram dvaram", meaning "door... door", the speaker wants to convey that the listener may please shut the door. Thus through context alone, the action of closing the door, which is at the mental level, is conveyed - "yatha laukika-vakyesu sruyamanakriyesu, 'gam abhyaja' ityadisu, a-sruyamanakriyesu ca dvaram dvaram' ityadisu, sva-sabdopadanat, prakarana"divasat buddhi-sannivesini kriyaiva karakopacita vakyarthah..." The case of rasa-realization is akin to this. Mostly in poetry 'rasa' is not directly expressed and rasa is arrived at through vibhavas etc. which have an invariable concomittance with rasa-experience. But at times, even in poetry there is mentioning of rasa through its name also e.g. in "pritya navodha priya". All sentences such as 'gam abhyaja' or 'dvaram dvaram', terminate in some activity. Similarly all poetic expressions end in a 'kriya' called 'svadodbhuti' or rasa/ taste-experience, i.e. the manifestation of relish which is the sthayin nourished to that extent. Towards this end, i.e. ralish, all poetry is addressed. Thus vibhava"dis form the word-units i.e. padarthas leading to the sentence-unit or vakyartha, the sthayin. This sthayin is enjoyed by the bhavaka. This is abhidhaniki-ratyadi-pratitih. Now Dhanika holds that if this apprehension does not clear the issue, then the understanding of the sthayin from the vibhavas etc. may be held as arriving through laksana, i.e. laksanika-ratyadi-pratitih, i.e. apprehension or rati etc. through secondary usage. This could resemble Kumarila's position which takes 'akhyatartha' as 'laksya'. Dhanika, in order to make the process less prosaic, calls it bhavyabhavaka-sambandha like Bhatta Nayaka. He quotes Bharata "bhavayanti rasan yasmat tasmad bhavah", (N.S. VII. 4) in his support. He says : "ato na rasa"dinam kavyena saha vyangya-vyanjaka-bhavah kim tarhi ? bhavya-bhavaka-sambandhah. kavyam hi bhavakam, bhavyah rasa"dayah. We know that for obvious difficulties in accepting this broder concept of tatparya, it could not hold good before vyanjanavada. The fourfold division of word powers into abhidha, tatparya, laksana and vyanjana by Abhinavagupta was so logical that Dhananjaya/Dhanika's onslaught could not stand. Actually if tatparya is inclusive of vyangya, over and above the sum-total of word-senses in a sentence, then it is another name of vyanjana. We will go to see how Visvanatha removes all air from the sail of tatparya later. We will now turn to Bhoja. For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" Tatparva' in Bhoja : We will first go along with Dr. Raghavan who has ably explained Bhoja's position. After that we will try to see if we can differ from or supplement the efforts of Dr. Raghavan. We will quote the full text in the beginning. (pp. 246, Sr. Pra. Edn. Josyer) : yatparah sabdah sa sabdarthah iti tatparyam. tac ca vakya eva upapadyate. padamatrena abhiprayasya prakasayitum asakyatvat. tac ca vakya-pratipadyam vastu trirupam bhavati; abhidhiyamanam, pratiyamanam, dhvanirupam ca. yatra yad upatta-sabdesu mukhya-gaunilaksana"dibhih sabda-saktibhih svam artham abhidhaya uparata-vyaparesu akanksa-sannidhi-yogyata"dibhir vakyartha-matram abhidhiyate, tad abhidhiyamanam. yatha-gaur gacchatiti vakyarthavagater uttarakalam vakyarthe upapadyamano'nupapadyamano vartha-prakaranaucitya"di-sahakrtau yat pratyayayati tat pratiyamanam. yatha 'visam bhunksva, ma casya grhe bhunkthah", ity ukte varam visam bhaksitam, na punar asya grhe bhuktam iti pratiyate. arthasabdopayad upasarjanikrta-svartho, vakyarthavagater anantaram anunadarupam pratisabdarupam va abhivyanjayati tad dhvanirupam. tac ca na sarvatrikam. tatha hi, yatha nivrtte abhighate kasyacid eva kamsya"der dravyasya anunado jayate, kasyacid eva kandara"deh pratisabdah., yatha kasyacid eva vakyasya pratiyamana'bhidhiyamana-vakyartha-pratiter anantaram dhvanir upalabhyate iti. 'nimisati esa' ityukte aksnor nimeso'bhidhiyate, devi na bhavati iti pratiyate. rupatisayas ca dhvanati. atha esam prayogah - vidhirupam, nisedharupam, vidhi-nisedha tatrabhidhiyamanam caturdha rupam, a-vidhi-nisedharupam ca. ... - pratiyamanam punar anekadha kvacid vidhau nisedhah..... kvacinnisedhe vidhih,...... kvacid vidhau vidhyantaram..... kvacinnisedhe nised hantaram..... kvacid vidhi-nisedhe nisedhah..... kvacid a-vidhi-nisedhe nisedhah..... kvacid vidhi-nisedhayor vidhyantaram..... 433 For Personal & Private Use Only

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434 SAHRDAYALOKA kvacid vidhi-nisedhayor nised hantaram..... kvacid vidhau an-ubhayam..... kvacin nisedhe anubhayam..... kvacid vidhinisedhayor anubhayam..... kvacid a-vidhi-nisedhe anubhayam..... .... pratiyamana-abhidhiyamana-vakyarthanam anantyad dhvanirupam api aneka-prakaram. dhvanis ca dvidha. artha-dhvanih, sabdadhvanic ca. tayor arthadhvanir anunada dhvanirupah pratisabda-dhvanirupas ca. ..... (pp. 253). evam laukike'pi vacasi abhidhiyamanam pratiyamanam tatparyam ca paryalocaniyam iti. etena kavya-vacasor dhvani-tatparyayos ca kvacit samplavo'pi vyakhyatah. - On pp. 251, 252 we read "evam anye'pi mahakaviprayogesu dhvani-visesa gavesaniyah, iti yad uktam, tatparyam eva vacasi, dhvanir eva kavye, ityadi : kah punah, kavya-vacasor dhvanitatparyayor visesah ? nanuktam purastat; yad avakram vacah sastre loke ca, vaca eva tat, vakram yad arthavada"dau tasya kavyam iti smrti). yad abhipraya-sarvasvam vaktur vakyat pratiyate, tatparyam arthadharmas tacchabdadharmah punar-dhvanih. saubhagyam iva tatparyam antaro guna isyate, vagdevataya lavanyamiva bahyas tayor dhvanih. adura-viprakarsat tu dvayena dvayam ucyate, yatha surabhi-vai akhau madhu-madhava-samjnaya." iti. Now we will first quote at length from Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, sr. pra) along For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 435 with our observations. He observes - "What is Bhoja's Tatparya ? The tatparya-sakti refuted by Anandavardhana is the Mimamsaka's. Upholding it, Dhanika says that it is not necessary to recognise a new function called dhvani." We may add that it could be true that Anandavardhana discarded tatparya of the Mimamsakas, without of course naming the same. We know that Ananda uses the term 'tatparya' meaning 'intention of the speaker and not the 'tatparya-vrtti', though of course Abhinavagupta mentions it in the strict Mimamsaka sense of the Abhihitanvayavadins and takes it to be the second sabda-vrtti, counted after abhidha and before laksana, vyanjana being the turiya. So, Dr. Raghavan's observation seems to be slightly off the mark. Actually 'tatparya' is used in various senses by Anandavardhana as quoted by Dr. Raghavan himself and we will go to see it later. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, ibid) proceeds, "Bhoja follows in the gap between the two and greets both with both his hands." We know that Dhanika's tatparya is more extended than that of the Mimamsakas. For Dhanika tatparya comes after abhidha and laksana and it includes the whole meaning of a given sentence, be it only abhidhartha, or one with laksyartha, or one charged with even vyangyartha on top of both these, i.e. abhidhartha and laksyartha. Thus Dhanika's and so also Dhananjaya's concept of tatparya is unique and it crosses the limits of mimamsaka's traditional tatparya, not acceptable to the dhvanivadins as a vehicle of the suggested sense. Dr. Raghavan is perhaps near the truth when he observes that 'Bhoja greets both' i.e. the dhvani-vadin and also Dhanika simultaneously. His observation is near the truth because Bhoja talks of both 'tatparya' and 'dhvani' in the same breath. Dhanika totally discards dhvani but Bhoja has a place for it. But we will have to carefully read between the lines and try to underline the exact difference between these two concepts of 'tatparya' and 'dhvani' as advocated by Bhoja. We will go to see further how we beg to differ from Dr. Raghavan. But for the present, a fuller quotation from Dr. Raghavan who observes... (pp. 161, ibid). "He accepts Anandavardhana's Dhvani and his adversaries' Tatparya. Tatparya is used by Bhoja in two meanings, one larger and another a more restricted one. While he speaks of tatparya as a one of the four kevala-sabda-sambandha-saktis, (vrtti, vivaksa, tatparya, and pravibhaga), he uses tatparya in a larger sense. Under it comes the Abhidhiyamana vakyartha, which Anandavardhana urges must be the For Personal & Private Use Only

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436 SAHRDAYALOKA proper meaning of tatparya. But Bhoja brings under it Anandavardhana's dhvani, as Dhanika and other earlier critics of Anandavardana urged. The abhidhiyamana is not called exactly tatparya. A special sakti like that is not called forth by Bhoja for the primary import of a sentence, as by the Mimamsakas. The primary sense of a sentence he says, is got by akanksa, sannidhi, yogyata etc., when the words themselves deliver the meaning of each through abhidha, laksana, or gauni, sakti. Or, as Kumarasvamin puts it, the very sentence in proper grammatical build gives its vakyartha by its own inherent nature. : "tarhy atra samsarga-rupo vakyarthah katham pratiyata iti cet, tarkikanam iva vakyamahimna, na punah tatparyena mimamsakanam iva iti brumah. ata eva te varnayanti akanksa"dimatve sati adanam padarthanam va samanvayasaktih vakyam. tad bala"yato vakyarthah." (pp. 32-33 Prataparudriya vyakhya, Balamanorama Edn.)." Now here we have to scrutinize this observation of Dr. Raghavan as supported by Kumarasvamin on the Prataparudriya. Dr. Raghavan's two remarks above need attention. As quoted above we read- "While he speaks of Tatparya as one of the four kevala-sabda-sambandha-saktis, he uses Tatparya in the larger sense. Under it comes the Abhidhiyamana vakyartha which Anandavardhana urges must be the proper meaning of Tatparya. .... The Abhidhivamana is not called exactly tatparya." Now these two statements seem to contradict one another. Bhoja's words as quoted above read - (pp. 246, Edn. Josyer, Sr. Pra) - "yatparah sabdah sa sabdartha iti tatparyam. tac ca vakya eva upapadyate padamatrena abhiprayasya prakasayitum asakyarvat. tacca vakya-pratipadyam vastu tri-rupam bhavati. abhidhiyamanam, pratiyamanam, dhvanirupam ca. yatra yad-upatta-sabdesu mukhya-gaunalaksana"dibhih sabda-saktibhih svam artham abhidhaya uparatavyaparenu akanksasannidhi-yogyata"dibhir vakyarthamatram abhidhiyate tad abhidhiyamanam." Thus for Bhoja there is clear recognition of what he calls abhidhiyamanatatparya arrived at as vakyartha. True, he has called tatparya to be "kevala-sabdasambandha sakti", thus we can equate it - at least so far as "abhidhivamana tatparya' goes, - with the 'tatparya' of the Mimamsakas. That Bhoja also calls, it a 'sabda-Sakti' is absolutely clear. So Dr. Raghavan's remarks as quoted above do not explain exactly what is intended by Bhoja. Even Kumarasvamin on Prataparudra as quoted by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 161, ibid) also seems to be off the mark. Bhoja clearly calls the four viz. vitti, vivaksa, tatparya and pravibhaga as "kevala-sabda For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 437 sambandha-sakrayah". The Vakyamahima' of the tarkikas is at least a recognition of the Mimamsakatatparya, be it not an overt one. But Bhoja has his own tradition and his own terminology. It should be very clear in our minds that Bhoja accepts three-fold tatparya viz. abhidhiyamana, pratiyamana and dhvani. The first one is purely the tatparya of the Mimamsakas. The second is reserved for implicit sense in sentences used in ordinary parlance, such as 'visam bhunksva..." etc. Pratiyamana thus should be equated with the unspoken intension of the speaker, not directly expressedi.e. abhidhiyamana-in a statement. The word 'dhvani' is reserved by Bhoja for 'poetic intention' covered by poetic expression. 'Dhvani-tatparya' for Bhoja is met with only in the domain of what we call poetry or literature and never in 'loka' - worldly context or in discourses of various disciplines, i.e. sastra. "tatparyam eva vacasi dhvanireva kavye" would mean only this. By 'vacas', Bhoja means language as used in loka and sastra alone, and 'kavya' is absolutely different from this 'vacas'. So, poetic intention of a kavya-vakya is 'dhvani-tatparya' for Bhoja. But we should again very carefully note that Bhoja never mentions 'wyanjana' in this context. So, his dhvani-tatparya i.e. poetic intention would equate with 'vicitra abhidha' of Kuntaka which embraces in its fold every poetic expressions at all levels such as abhidha, laksana and also vyanjana. Bhoja's 'prativamana' is a special term clubbed with intention of a speaker at worldly parlance. It is all implicit sense in ordinary conversation. It is anything but poetic. Everything that is poetic is all 'dhvanitatparva' for Bhoja. This is clear thinking. In view of the above, I would venture to observe with due respect for Dr. Raghavan that his observation, viz. "He even goes so far as to restrict the name tatparya to the suggested, that is, to Dhvani, within which we can include his na also. Therefore, Bhoja's position is a compromise and at a later stage, it deserts Dhanika and others to follow Anandavardhana and makes Tatparya a name for dvani" - (pp. 162) - is off the mark. Bhoja's 'pratiyamana' is implied sense i.e. sense not directly expressed in sentences used at ordinary parlance. This can never be identical with, or this can never be included in 'Dhvani' of Bhoja, which is for him "implicit sense in a poetic expression, i.e. kavya alone." Dr. Raghavan urther discusses Vidyanatha's view which we will pick up in due course later. Dr. Raghavan himself partly comes to realize what we have observed above when he says, (pp. 163, ibid) - "Both the sections on Dhvani in the 6th and 7th chapters of the Sr. Pra (pp. 221, and pp. 251-2 Edn. Josyer) close with the following verses - (Actually the Ch. 7 does For Personal & Private Use Only

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438 SAHRDAYALOKA not close with these verses) - "tatparyam eva vacasi, dhvanir eva kavye saubhagyam eva guna-sampadi vallabhasya. lavanyam eva vapusi svadate'nganayah srngara eva hrdi manavato janasya." and, yad-abhipraya-sarvasvam vaktur vakyat pratiyate tatparyam, artha-dharmas tat, sabda-dharmah punar dhvanih. saubhagyam iva tatparyam antaro guna isyate vagdevataya lavanyam iva, bahyas tayor dhvanih, adura-viprakarsat tu dvayena dvayam ucyate, yatha surabhi-vaisakhau madhu-madhava-samjnaya." In ordinary speech and writing, the purport is called Tatparya; but the purport in poetic expression is called Dhvani. It is even as the same Caitra and Vaisakha months are called, from another point of view, Madhu and Madhava, or to add a further illustration, the Karana, Karya and Sahakarin of the world are called in kavya, the Vibhava, Anubhava, and Sancarin. And what is the difference in the nature of the ordinary utterance and the poetic utterance, that the purports in the two cases must be called by two different names, Tatparya, and Dhvani ? Ordinary talk and writing is 'a-vakra' not beautiful; poetic expression is 'vakra', beautiful "yad avakram vacah sastre loke ca vaca eva tat vakram yad arthavadadau tasya kavyam iti smrtih." Dr. Raghavan further observes - (pp. 164) - "Therefore a more graceful name for tatparya is dhvani; this is the idea we get from the two verses of Bhoja, 'tatparyam eva vacasi' etc. and, 'yad avakram... etc. But suddenly he turns the statement the other way and says that the Abhipraya, the entire intended idea, is a quality of artha. That is, Tatparya is artha-dharma; Dhvani on the other hand is sabda-dharma. What does Bhoja mean by this? Does he mean that, looked at from the point of view of the sabda it is Dhvani and, from that of artha, Tatparya ? Or that Dhvani is the name of the vyanjaka-sabda and that Tatparya is the name of vyangya-Artha ? That Dhvani is the vyanjana sabda-vyapara and For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 439 Tatparya is its result ? Or, does he mean that sabda-dhvani is Dhvani and arthadhvani is tatparya ? The last is clearly impossible; for he speaks of Dhvani as pertaining to both sabda and Artha. Again, there is more poetry than scientific analysis when Bhoja says that Tatparya is internal, is the saubhagya of vak or speech, and Dhvani is external, the lavanya of vak. Another attempt, Bhoja makes to clarify the issue; he says in conclusion that you can call either by either name; they are identical; just as the months of Caitra and Vaisakha, so called from an astronomical point of view, are called Madhu and Madhava from another point of view, by two other names, so also purport of an expression can be called Tatparya or Dhvani. To sum up : (1) Bhoja accepts Anandavardhana's Dhvani (2) He first calls it a department of Tatparya, but finally says that the two are identical. In the latter stage, Tatparya does not include Abhidhiyamana-Vakyartha, but is a name of the pratiyamana and the Dhvanyamana Arthas. (3) Bhoja makes an artificial division of the suggested element to pratiyamana and the Dhvanirupa, which is unnecessary. (4) The distinction into Dhvani of Alamkara, Vastu and Rasa"di found in Anandavardhana is absent from Bhoja. (5) 'Upasarjanikrta-svartharva' is mentioned by Bhoja as part of the definition of Dhvani, but its implications are not realized and worked out. "Dhvanikavya where Dhvani is predominant, Gunibhuta-vyangya and citra-kavya or Avyangya" is other classification of Anandavardhana, missed in Bhoja." We will now try to discuss Dr. Raghavan's observations at length. Before we start analysing his observations, we may express our hunch, and perhaps the observation may be nearer the truth, that when Bhoja talks of "saubhagya" and "lavanya" in the above quotation, he borrows these terms and their connotation as seen in Kuntaka first. We know that Kuntaka talks of three margas such as sukamara marga, vicitra marga and madhyama marga. In both sukumara and vicitra margas we find lavanya with different connotation. 'Madhyama' as the name itself suggests is a pleasing mixture of the two having a separate identity of a mixed variety. But Kuntaka later adds 'aucitya' and 'saubhagya' as excellences common to the three margas. The 'auchitya' puts stress on fitness of words and ideas, while 'saubhagya' arises out of the realization of all the resources of a composition. We will examine this with apt quotations from Kuntaka as follows: a. For Personal & Private Use Only

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440 SAHRDAYALOKA 'lavanya' as manifested in the sukumara marga is defined as - (pp. 49, Edn. K. Kris.) "evam prasadam abhidhaya lavanyam laksayati - "varna-vinyasa-vicchittipada-samdhana-sampada, svalpaya bandha-saundaryam lavanyam abhidhiyate." (V.J., I. 32) bandho varna-vinyasah, tasya saundaryam ramaniyakam lavanyam abhidhiyate, lavanyam ity ucyate. kidnsam ? varnanam aksaranam vinyaso, vicitram nyasanam, tasya vicchittih, sobha vaidagdhya-bhangi, taya laksitam padanam sup-tinantanam samdhanam samyojanam, tasya sampat, sa'pi sobhaiva, taya laksitam. kidrsya ? ubhaya-rupaya'pi svalpaya manan matraya nati-nirbandha-nirmitaya, tad ayam atra arthah-sabdartha-saukumarya-subhagah sannivesa-mahima lavanyarupo gunah kathyate - (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 335, 336) - "After perspicuity, grace is explained - When even a little beauty in respect of alleterative syllables and in the choice of diction results in the charm of syntax and contributes to the strikingness of style. we have the excellence called 'grace'. (32) Syntax refers to effective sentence-construction. Its charm is designated 'grace'. It is characterised by the beauty of alleterative syllables on one hand and in the choice of striking diction on the other. But both these contributory elements remain only in the background and do not attract forced attention as they are created by the poet effortlessly. The idea is the charm in synctactic construction with striking edge and trenderness in words and meanings is regarded as excellence called 'grace'." The 'lavanya' as revealed in vicitra-marga is defined by Kuntaka at V.J. I. 47 - as "atralupta-visargantaih padaih protaih parasparam, hssvaih samyoga-purvais ca lavanyam atiricyate." (I. 47) - asminn evamvidhaih padair lavanyam atiricyate, pariposam prapnoti. kidrsaih ? parasparam anyonyam protaih samslesam nitaih. anyac ca kidrsaih ? For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 441 alupta-visargantaih, alupta-visargah sruyamana-visarjaniya anta yesam tani tathoktani, taih. hrsvais ca laghubhih. samyogebhyah purvaih. atiricyate iti sambandhah. tad idam atra tatparyam - purvokta-laksanam lavanyam vidyamanam anena atiriktatam niyate. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 348, 349, ibid) - "By words without elision of the final aspirates and in euphonic combination with each other, and by syllables which precede conjuncts, 'grace' is enriched." (I. 47) In the 'brilliant' style, the quality of 'grace' gets enriched by the use of the following : words which mutually coalesce in harmonious combination; which contain final aspirate sounds without elision, i.e. with fully intonated aspirates at the end, and with short syllables preceding conjunct consonants. The idea is that besides the features already noted of grace' under the 'elegant, these new additions will enrich it in the 'brilliant'. 'Aucitya' and 'Saubhagya' go with all the margas. 'Saubhagya' is defined at V.J. I. 55 as - (pp. 69, ibid) "evam aucityam abhidhaya saubhagyam abhidhatte - 'ity upadeya-varge'smin yad artham pratibha kaveh, samyak samrabhate tasya gunah saubhagyam ucyate." (I. 55) - ity evamvidhe asmin upadeyavarge sabda"dyupeya-samuhe yad artham, yannimittam kaveh sambandhini pratibha Saktih samyak, savadhantaya samrabhate, vyavasyati, tasya vastunah prastutatvat kavyabhidhanasya yo gunah sa saubhagyam iti ucyate bhanyate. tacca na pratibha-samrambha-matra-sadhyam, kintu tad-vihita-samastasamagri-sampadyam, iti aha - "sarva-sampat-parispandsampadyam sarasa"tmanam, alaukika-camatkara-kari kavyaika-jivitam." (I. 56) sarva-sampat-parispanda-sampadyam sarvasyopadeyaraser ya sampattiranavadyata-kastha tasyah parispandah sphuritatvam tena sampadyam nispadaniyam. For Personal & Private Use Only

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442 SAHRDAYALOKA anyac ca kidesam ? sarasa"tmanam ardracetasam alaukika-camatkara-kari, lokottara"hlada-vidhayi. kim bahuna ?, tac ca kavyaika-jivitam, kavyasya parah paramarthah, ity arthah - [Trans. K. Kris. pp. 354, 355, ibid] "In the wide-ranging material before the poet, that which is pitched upon by the genius of the poet for its activity endows the whole with the quality of 'splendour'. (I. 55) The poet has before him a lot of raw material like words and so on, awaiting to be picked up. Now the poet's genius selects only one amidst them to show its wonderous capacity and since that becomes most relevant to the poetic acitivity as a whole, there arises a quality which is designated as 'splendour. In fact it is a quality which can not be achieved merely by the activity of creater nius either; one and all the different constituents will have to co-operate in bringing it about : 'It is something attained by the full co-operation of all the constitutent elements and it is something which surely results in an extra-ordinary aesthetic effect in the mind of the connoisseurs; in short, it is the whole and sole essence of poetry.' (I. 56) The first epithet explains how each and every constituent in the vast raw material available to the poet, should shine at its best without a single flaw. It is only then that the over-all literary quality of 'splendour' is achieved. The second epithet points out that its appeal to the sensitive tastes of connoisseurs is unfailing and extra-ordinary. In a word it deserves to be the life-essence or 'sine quanon' of poetry." Perhaps here lies Bhoja's original inspiration of his treatment of - 'prabandhagunas'. Dr. Raghavan observes about these (pp. 314) : "Bhoja gives here a list of features which go to make up the best poem. It is almost a statement of the criticism of work as a whole. sabda-gunas are the physical or formal features; Artha-gunas pertain to the content and theme; the ubhaya-gunas embrace both." ... (pp. 315 ibid) "These features of the Prabandha are called gunas by Bhoja because they contribute to the beauty of the poem". Though Bhoja does not directly name 'lavanya' and 'Saubhagya' as gunas, he does mention them here while treating 'tatparya'. Let us see it once again. He observes that, that which is 'tatparya' or purport in ordinary speech is termed dhvani' in poetry. Here we may say that Bhoja's 'dhvani' is not 'principal suggested sense' alone. But whatever is the puport of a beautiful poetic-expression, whatever For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 443 may be lebelled as 'aesthetic' in poetry at any level - expressed, indicated and also suggested - is dhvani' 'principal purport of a beautiful poetic expression.' Then Bhoja explains this 'dhvani' in 'kavya' as "saubhagyam eva guna-sampadi vallabhasya lavanyam eva vapusi svadatenganayah songara eva hrdi manavato janasya." Among the treasure of gunas only 'saubhagya' is tasted, (both) in case of a vallabha i.e. beloved person (as well as in the person of a kavya-purusa). Now 'saubhagya' as seen in Kuntaka above is everything in poetry. It is t everything. It is pratibha, it is pratibha's launching pad, it is suggested meaning, + + + + ... Among the wealth of gunas of a lover, 'Saubhagya' is the most praiseworthy. In case of a lady 'lavanya' is the quality which is tasted by the aesthetes. Abhinavagupta in his Locana mentions "lavanya-candrika" - "na ca avayavanam eva nirdosata va bhusanayogo va lavanyam. prthan-, nirvarnyamana-kana"di-dosasunya-sarira'vayavayoginyam api alamkrtayam api 'lavanya-sunya iyam' iti, atathabhutayam api kasyancil, lavyanyamrta-candrika iyam' iti sahrdayanam vyavaharat.' (pp. 24, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid; Locana on Dhy. I. 4) Bhoja also equates this 'dhvanireva kavye' with 'anganayah lavanyam', which for Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta was not a physical quality but something over and above mere physicality, a quality emerging from the total personality of a lady. Beauty is thus abstract, though revealed by physical and other features alike. Bhoja further gives one more explanation. He says - and this is by implication - that as is the quality of 'Srngara' - "rasobhimano'hamkarah songara iti giyate". the highest quality of an aesthete, so is this 'dhvani' in kavya. It is not just the dhvani' of Anandavardhana and it is not the charm of vyanjana alone, a name = vyanjana) Bhoja is never enthusiastic to mention. But this quality is that which emerges from 'total poetry. This can be equated with Kuntaka's 'Saubhagya'. Now we will be able to explain the other observations of Bhoja in a more satisfactory fashion. He says, "yad abhipraya-sarvasvam vaktur vakyat pratiyate, tatparyam; artha-dharmas tat, sabda-dharmah punah, dhvanih." We may add 'kavya' before 'vakyat to mean 'kavya-vakyat. The essence (abhipraya-sarvasva) which is understood from a poetic statement, that (we may For Personal & Private Use Only

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444 SAHRDAYALOKA add 'tat before tatparya) is tatparya, which is artha-dharma and also sabdadharma, and is termed 'dhvani' (sabdadharmah punah, sa dhvanih iti ucyate) Then Bhoja further observes that this (poetic) tatparya (which is 'dhvani") is like the quality of saubhagya (of a beloved person, 'vallabhasya'), an internal quality (of poetry). It is like the 'lavanya' or abstract beauty of the godess of speech (like lavanya' of a beautiful lady.) This is an external quality-bahya guna. It is something manifested at external level like 'having beautiful eyes' - 'sulocanatva' of a lady, - we may add. The fact is that this poetic tatparya i.e. dhvani is beauty both internal and external, for Bhoja. Both, observes Bhoja, are explained by both - 'dvayena dvayam ucyate'. The idea is that if we dig deeper we will realise that poetry or kavya itself being an abstract - amurta - entity, there is hardly anything which can be stamped as 'external or 'internal in the literal sense. Actually both are both, for both are beyond physicality. Just as caitra and vaisakha are also termed madhu and madhava, similarly the artha-dharma and sabda-dharma both make for the supreme beauty of poetry. So, this, we feel explains Bhoja's concept of tatparya satisfactorily and had he been alive, perhaps Dr. Raghavan would have accepted this explanation. Now we will see how Mammata and his followers deal with tatparya. Mammata in his K.P. II (pp. 25 observes that : Edn. Jalkikar '21) 'kramena sabdarthayoh svarupam aha. "syad vacako laksanikah sabdo'tra vyanjakas tridha." (Su. 5) atra iti kavye. esam svarupam vaksyate. (Su. 6) - "vacya'dayas tad arthah syuh." vacya-laksya-vyangyah. (Su. 7) "tatparyartho'pi kesu cit." |16|| akanksa-yogyata-sannidhi-vasad vaksyamana-svarupanam padarthanam samanvaye tatparyar'thopi vakyarthah samullasati iti abhihitanvayavadinam matam. vacva eva vakvarthah iti anvitabhidhanavadinah." Translation, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi - The Poetic Light - pub. Motilal Banarsidass, second Edn. '77, pp. 17, Vol. I): "Now the author states the nature of word and sense in order : 6ab - Word, here would be of three kinds -expressive, indicative and suggestive. novah. For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 445 'Here' means in poetry. The characteristic of these (three kinds of words) will be described later. 6c - The expressed and others would be their sense. That is, expressed, indicated and suggested. 60. There is also the purport - sense in the opinion of some. When owing to the force of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, after the word-meanings, whose nature will be explained later, have been correlated, there springs up the purport-sense, which possesses a special form and which, though not the sense of individual) words, is yet the sense of the sentence - this is the view of these who hold that the correlation is of the expressed words (abhihitanvayavadins). The primary sense itself is the sense of the sentence - thus hold the theorists of, 'expression of the correlated meaning.' (anvitabhidhana)." All this follows Abhinavagupta's explanation and the Mimamsaka view-points. Jhalakikar (pp. 26, ibid) has the following - "nanu padartha-vakyarthasya'pi vyanjana-vsttya"srayataya bhatramimamsakamatasiddha - tatparya"khya-vrtti-pratipadyataya ca tadvibhago'pi kartum ucita iti tad-akaranan nyunata iti ata aha - "tatparyartho'pi iti". tatparya"khyavrtti - pratipadyo'rtha ity arthah. samullasati iti adhyaharah, kesucid iti. sasthyarthe saptami'yam. abhihitanvayavadinam ity arthah. mate iti sesah. "abhitanvayavadinam matam" iti vrtty anurodhad iti bodhyam. ayam bhavah - vrttim vina arthabodhane'tiprasanga iti anvaye (vakyartharupe samsarge) sabdasya tatparyakhya vrttir abhyanugantavya. tatpratipadyorthas tatparyartha iti cakravartikamalakarabhatta - narasimha thakkura-krta-tika-sy amsatah spastam. Vidyadhara follows Mammata. He has a very brief remark : (Ekavali unmesa II, with Malinatha's Tarala; Edn. Trivedi K.P. Bombay Sanskrit Series, Bombay, 1903) - "anuvadyanam arthanam vidheyarthaparatvam tatparyam iti vyaparantaram parair abhyupagatam. yatha - "umam sa pasyam-rjunaiva caksuna pracakrame vaktum anujjhita-kramah." ity atra darsanasya caksuhkaranakatva'vyabhicarat tad upadanam tadvisesanartham tad eva catra vidheyam tatpartvam eva tatparyam." We have seen earlier that Mukula had incorporated tatparya in abhidha and Mahima takes it to be of no use as it is covered by inference, i.e. anumiti. He has discussed the same illustration viz. "visam bhunksva..." etc. as given by Dhanika. For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA Vidyanatha in his Prataparudra-yasobhusana (Edn. with Ratnapana of Kumarasvamin, S. Chandrasekhar Sastrigal, Madras, '14) equates tatparyartha with vyangyartha and thus incorporates tatparya in vyanjana. We will look into this as below. 446 Vidyanatha observes: (pp. 31, 32, Edn. ibid) atha kavya-svarupa-nirupanam. "gunalamkarasahitau sabdarthau dosavarjitau. gadya-padyobhayamayam kavyam kavya-vido viduh." - 1 a-dosau sa-gunau salamkarau sabdarthau kavyam iti kavya-samanya laksanam. "sabdarthau murtir akhyatau jivitam vyangya-vaibhavam, hara"divad alamkaras tatra syur upama"dayah." - 2 "slesa"dayo gunas tatra saurya"daya iva sthitah, atmotkarsa"vahas tatra svabhava iva ritayah. - 3 sobham aharyikim praptah vrttayo vrttayo yatha padanugunya-visrantih sayya sayyeva sammata. - 4 rasa"svada-prabhedah syuh pakah paka iva sthitah, prakhyata lokavad iyam samagri kavya-sampadah. - 5 vacaka-laksaka-vyanjakatvena trividham sabda-jatam. vacya-laksya-vyangyatvena arthajatam api trividham. tatparyarthopi vyangyartha eva, na punah prthak bhutah. abhidha-laksana-vyanjanakhyas tisrah sabda-vrttayah." For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 447 It is clear that Vidyanatha, coming after Vidyadhara and of course Mammata, almost accepts the tenets of the dhvani-school, the kashmir tradition. Here, we will see his treatment of tatparyartha and tatparyavrtti Kumaraswamin in his Ratnapana observes : (pp. 32, ibid) nanu caturthe tatparyarthe jagrati katham artha-traividhyoktir iti asankya tasya trtiye antarbhavah. ity aha. tatparyartha iti. atra vaktr-buddhi-sannidhapito vakyavagamyo vakyartho rasa"dirupas tacchabdena ucyate. tasmin paras tatparas tadasaktah tadvisaya iry arthah. tesam bhavas tatparyam. nanu abhidhitanam padarthanam arthabhidhayinam va padanam visistartha-pratyayanasaktis tatparyam iti matabhedena mimamsaka varnayanti. atas tanmate, 'devadatta gam anaya' ity adau devadatta-karteka-danda-karanaka-go-karmaka"nayana-rupo visistartha eva vangyatva-vidhurah tatparyad avagatatvat tatparyartha ity ucyate, katham asya vyangye antarbhavah, iti cet, satyam. na hi tavanmatre kavisamrambha-visrantih. kavya-sabdanam anvayavyatirekabhyam pravrtti-nivrtti-visayabhutasya pradhanasya prayojanantarasya asambhavat. kim tu tad artha-nyakkarena pratiyamane samajika"nanda"svadaphale rasa"dav arthantare. atah sa eva tatparyarthah, tatpratyayaka-padartha-saktir eva tatparyam, kavisamaye..." After this Kumaraswaming tries to suggest that this special tatparya is neither abhidha, nor laksana and says - "ato vaksyamana-laksanasya vyanjanasya eva idam namantara-karanam iti tad arthasya vyangyarthatvam eva." Now this is extending the original scope of tatparya. Kumaraswamin himself says that in "devadatta, gam anaya', the tatparya is what it is, because it is an expression of the ordinary worldly level. But in case of a poetic expression, the intention is higher and ends in rasa-experience. So, that should be taken as tatparya. But it is here exactly that Vidyanatha and Kumarasvamin are mistaken. The thought currents of Abhidha, Tatparya and Laksana were inherited from shastric literature and the sanctity of any inherited thought-current had to be preserved. It is exactly this scientific approach which characterizes the thinking of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Any liberty with the original concept would be unscientific. It is exactly such an erroneous approach which is pointed out in Locana when Abhinavagupta observes at one place that, "yad aha, khadgalaksanam karomi ity uktva atana-vitana"tma, pravriyamanah, sakala-dehaccha"dakah sukumaras' citra-tantu-viracitah samvartana-vivartanasahisnur acchedakah For Personal & Private Use Only

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448 SAHRDAYALOKA succhedyah utkrstah khadgah, iti bruvanah, paraih patah khalu evamvidho bhavati na khadga iti uktataya paryanuyujyamanah evam brurat idnsa eva khadgo maya abhimata iti tadrg eva etat." (Locana on Dhv. I. i., pp. 10, Edn. Nandi) So, this insistance on equating tatparya with vyanjana is like the above unscientific approach. Bhoja, as observed earlier called tatparvartha as 'dhvani' with reference to poetic expressions, but if we search with a microscope, it will be clear that here Bhoja's 'dhvani' is not identical with Anandavardhana's dhvani and he too, like Vidyadhara and Kumaraswamin commits the same blunder of explanding or narrowing the accepted connotation of a given word used as 'terminology or 'paribhasa'. The crime is lesser in case of Bhoja because he is not weded to wanjana, while it is greater in case of Vidyadhara and Kumaraswamin who vow in the name of dhvanivada and take liberty with the accepted terminology. We feel that flirting with age-old accepted terminology is a crime. Abhinavagupta has wisely called vyanjana to be a 'turiya', 'fourth' vitti. Again, when Anandavardhana tries to silence the Mimamsakas by suggesting that the intention of the speaker of a worldly statement or 'pauruseya vakya' is 'suggested' or 'vyangya', he knows the limitation of his own argument which he clears while silencing the Naiyayikas. Vidyadhara and Kumaraswamin, like Virocana, caught hold only of a portion of Anandavardhana's argument and tried to jump in. This is sad and unscientific. Now we will turn to Visvanatha, the author of Sahityadarpana. He clearly followed the lead of the kashmir school of thought and takes tatparya as a power delivering the sentence-sense. He accepts three powers of a word such as abhidha, laksana and vyanjana, but by the end of the first pariccheda, after talking about the three-fold classification of words also into vacaka, laksaka, and vyanjaka, he observes. (- S.D.I. 20, pp. 67, Edn. Chawkhamba Sanskrit Samsthana, Varanasi, 4th Edn. '85) - "tatparya"khyam vsttim ahuh padarthanvaya-bodhane, tatparyartham tad artham ca vakyam tadbodhakam pare." - (S.D.I. 20) "abhidhaya ekaika-padartha-bodhana-virama vakyartharupasya padarthanvayasya bodhika tatparyam nama vrttih. tad arthas ca tatparyarthah. tad-bodhakam ca vakyam iti abhihitanvayavadinam matam." For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" The Laksmi (pp. 67, ibid) on this passage reads - "ayam asayah "ghatam karoti" ity adau ghata-vrtti-karmatanukula krtir ity artho bodhyate, tatra ca ghata-sabdasya kambu-griva"dirupa-ghato'rthah, 'am'pratyayasya ca karmata, vrttita tu na kasyapy arthah, tat tadartham pratipadya virataya abhidhayah punar utthanasambhavat, tat-tat-sabdena punar vrttitarupo'rtho'padarthopi pratipadayitum sakyate. ato vrttita-rupartha-bodhika tatparyam nama vrttir avasyam angikaraniya. iyam eva tatparya-vrttir adhunikaih samsargamaryada ucyate. abhihitanvayavadinam padair upasthitanam arthanam anvaya iti vadinam bhatta-mimamsakanam pracina-naiyayikanam ca matam..." Visvanatha's position is clear and he mentions tatparya as a vakya-vrtti in keeping with the second tradition that he has inherited. But he knows that Dhanika had tried to incorporate vyanjana under tatparya, and so also a section of the Mimamsakas who were dirgha-dirghatara-vyaparavadins wanted to place vyanjana under abhidha. He controverts the views of both these prima facie views in his chapter on vyanjana-sthapana. He does not care for Vidyadhara, it seems. But his arguments to distinguish tatparya from vyanjana are very interesting and they proceed as follows: 449 (S.D. V. pp. 296, 297, 298, Edn. ibid): yac ca kecid ahuh - 'so'yam isor iva dirgha-dirghataro 'bhidha-vyaparah' iti. yac ca dhanikena uktam "tatparya-'vyatirekac ca vyanjakasya na dhvanih, yavat-karya-prasarittvat tatparyam, na tuladhrtam." iti. tayor upari 'sabda-buddhi-karmanam viramya vyaparabhavah' iti vadibhir eva pataniyo dandah. evam ca laksana'pyupasya ? dirgha-dirgha-abhidha vyaparena api tad artha-bodha-siddhih. kim iti ca, 'brahmana putras te jatah, kanya te garbhini ity adav api harsa-soka"dinam api na vacyatvam. yat punar 'pauruseyam a-pauruseyam ca vakyam sarvam eva karyaparam, atatparatve anupadeyatvad unmatta-vakyavat. tatas ca kavya-sabdanam niratisayasukha"svada-vyatirekena pratipadya-pratipadakayoh pravrttyaupayika-prayojanaanupalabdher niratisaya-sukha"svada eva karyatvena avad haryate. 'yatparah sabdah sa sabdartha' iti nyayat' iti. - tatra-prastavyam; kim idam tatparatvam nama ? tad arthatvam va, tatparyavrttya tad-bodhakatvam va ? adye na vivadah, vyangyatve'pi tad-arthata-anapayat. For Personal & Private Use Only

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450 SAHRDAYALOKA dvitiye tu - keyam tatparyakhya vittih ? abhihitanvayavadibhir angiksta tad anya va ? adye dattam eva uttaram. dvitiye tu-namamatre vivadah, tanmate'pi turiya-vrtti-siddheh. nanu astu yugapad eva tatparya-sakrya vibhava"di-samsargasya rasa"des ca prakasanam - iti cet ? na; tayor hetu-phala-bhavangikarat. yad aha munih - 'vibhavanubhava-vyabicari-samyogad rasa-nispattih', iti. sahabhaveca kutah savyetara-visanayor iva karya-karana-bhavah ?, paurvaparya-virahat. 'gangayam ghosah' ity adau tata"dy artha-matra-bodha-virataya laksanayas' ca kutah sitatvapavanatva"di-vyangya-bodhakata ? tena turiya vrtcir upasya eva iti nirvivadam etat." . So, any extention of the traditionally accepted connotation of 'tatparya-vitti' is not acceptable to Visvanatha, it being unscientific. We did not mention Hemacandra after Mammata, because he follows the footsteps of Mammata and observes : (pp. 58, Edn. 2nd '64, Dr. Kulkarni and Prof. Parikh, Bombay, and pp. 28, Edn. Nandi, L. D. Insti. publication, Ahmedabad A.D. 2000) : "abhidhanantaram ca yady api anvaya-pratipatti-nimittam tatparya-saktir apy asti, tadvisayas tatparya-laksano'rtho'pi, tatha'pi tau vakya-visayav eva iti na'tra uktau." In the 'Viveka' he adds only this much- " 'tav iti' - sa sa sa ca, tau. atreti saktimadhye arthamadhye ca". This suggests Hemacandra's absolute clerity concerning both the tatparya-sakti and the tatparyartha, which he is not in a mood to discuss because they concern themselves with a sentence only. Tatparya is for Hemacandra, a vakya-sakti and tatparyartha is vakyartha arrived at with the help of a sentence. So, these two - tau i.e. sa (= tatparya-sakti) and 'sa' (i.e. tatparyartha) were not to be considered when only word-powers and word-senses were discussed. But even for Hemacandra vyanjana continues to be a turiya = fourth power, because he accepts 'gauni' as a separate vrtti over and above laksana. Jayadeva and Kesava have nothing to say about tatparya-vrtti. It will be interesting to end this chapter with a long quotation from : Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, who in his 'Indian Theories of Meaning" observes (pp. 217, ibid) - "It is well known that the Bhatta-Mimamsakas who followed Kumarilabhatta are staunch supporters of the abhihitanvaya theory of verbal comprehension; as a result of this whenever the term is found, there is a tendency among commentators to associate it exclusively to the Bhatra school, without waiting to inquire whether the theory explained is the same as that adopted by the Bhattas. Some of the commentators, and modern scholars following them, have thus associated 'tatparya-vrtti' with the Bhatta-school of Mimamsa. For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 451 [In a foot-note no. 1 Dr. K. Kunjuni Raja (pp. 218, ibid) to support his finding mentions the names of Manikyacandra, Govinda Thakkur, Jhalakikar, P. V. Kane, K. C. Pandey, S. S. Sukthankar, - we may add even Gajendragadkar. We can add other names also.] [Dr. Raja then proceeds] - "But there is one difficulty in such an assumption; which many of the scholars have not noticed. All the great authoritative writers on Bhatta Mimamsa like Kumarilabhatta, Parthasarathi Mishra, Vacaspati Misra, Candidasa and Narayanabhatta have unequivocally stated that according to the abhihitanvaya theory advocated by them, the syntactically unified sentence-meaning is to be conveyed through the secondary power, laksana." [in foot note 2, pp. 218, 219, Dr. Raja quotes names of those who hold this view).. "Even critics like Salikanatha who tried to refute this theory have described it in that way. Narayanabhatta says that tatparya is not a separate factor in conveying the syntactic relationship of the word meanings." But, one thing is certain that this 'laksana' is not held as identical with normal laksana of the alamkarikas. This is for certain. So, this special laksana becomes so to say, another name of tatparya-vstti itself. Dr. Raja (pp. 219) proceeds - "It may be pointed out here that Jayanta Bhatta, the great Naiyayika scholar of the tenth cen. A.D., who wrote the Nyaya-manjari, was the first to bring forward the theory of tatparya being a separate vrtti. The abhihitanvaya theory is not the monopoly of the Bhatta Mimamsakas; we have seen that the Association theory of the grammarian Vajapyayana, that samsarga is vakyartha, is a kind of abhihitanvaya theory. Bhartphari has also referred to such views. Early Naiyayikas like Gautama and Vatsyayana have not discussed the problem of a sentence; they discussed only the exact import of words. Jayanta says that their silence is eloquent as it shows that they believed that the sentence is only a collection of words, and that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings. After discussing in detail the various theories about verbal comprehension held by various schools, Jayanta advocates a modified form of abhihitanvaya theory. The words express their isolated word-meanin power of abhidha; they have another power, the tatparya-sakti which indicates the mutual relationship among the word-meanings. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of the words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words in common and lasts till the independent judgement is produced. For Personal & Private Use Only

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452 SAHRDAYALOKA [foot-note 5 : "abhidhatri mata saktih padanam svartha-nisthata, tesam tatparya-saktis tu samsargavagamavadhih."] It may be noted that this tatparya-sakti is the same as the samsarga-maryada accepted by the later Navya Nyaya school. [Gadadhara's Vyutpatti-vada p. 1. : sabdabodhe caika-padartheparapadartha-samsargah samsargamaryadaya bhasate.] - "The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts - (padartha-samsarga), and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of verbal judgement (vakyartha) is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (samsarga-maryada), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (abhidha or laksana)." (S. Kuppuswami Sastri - A primer of Indian Logic, p. 258). What prompted Abhinavagupta to accept Jayanta's modified form of Abhihitanvaya theory and not that of the real followers of the Bhatta school seems to be the fact that the Alamkarikas of the dhvani school could not accept laksana to explain the syntactic relation among the word-meanings, since they accepted it only in cases of 'anvayanupapatti' and not in cases of 'tatparyanupapatti'." [Here, before we proceed further, we may ask a question as to who were these 'alamkarikas of the dhvani school who preceded Abhinavagupta and prompted him to accept whatever he accepted ?. Actually 'tatparyanupatti' in such illustrations as "kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam' has also been discussed by dhvanivadi alamkarikas.] Some of the discerning commentators of the alamkara texts have already pointed out that the view about tatparya-vstti being responsible for conveying the syntactic relation of the word-meaning does not refer to the Bhatta Mimamsaka theory, but only to the concient Naiyayikas, who were also abhihitanvayavadins. In the Sudhasagara commentary of the Kavyaprakasa Bhimasena Dixita explains this point in detail. He says that for all practical purposes this tatparya-vrtti may be identified with the laksana of the Mimamsakas and that it is the same as the samsarga-maryada of the Navya-nyaya-school. (kindly refer to our remarks above, before citing Dr. Raja's words on his page 219). The distinction between laksana and tatparya in this case is very subtle. Mere juxtaposition of isolated words, giving out a string of unconnected separate concepts, is of no use in linguistic discourse. It is certain that the co-utterance of words is with the intention of conveying a connected unified meaning. It is this apparent contradiction between the juxta-position of words in a sentence and their For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Tatparya" 453 not being related to serve some purpose that gives the power to the words to resort to laksana, through inference of the arthapatti type, and convey the syntactically related sentence meaning. The speaker's intention, taken in a general sense, is at the back of resorting to laksana. According to the Prabhakaras, on the other hand, the tatparya makes the primary significatory power, itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when tatparya is not taken as a separate vrtti, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation; in fact Parthasarathimisra himself refers to the function of tatparya; and Jayanta quotes Kumarila-bhatta in support of his theory that tatparya is a separate vrtti of the words which conveys the relation of the word meanings. Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri says that the 'samsarga' or mutual relation of the word-meanings is conveyed by a process of suggestion, and quotes Jespersen's views that, 'suggestion is impression through suppression'. A kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought; the individual words give only their own individual isolated meanings, leaving the samsarga or the mutual relation of the meanings to be conveyed by suggestion. The Naiyayikas may call it tatparya-vytti or samsargamaryada, the Bhatta Mimamsakas may call it laksana, and the ikaras may take it to be the extension of the primary power abhidha itself. Tatparya, the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance, has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension; but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called Tatparya-sakti. That is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers." We beg to differ and would like to follow the lead of Abhinavagupta and Mammata. We have seen how Hemacandra has dubbed it as a vakya-sakti, but actually the concept of vakya cannot be formed in the absence of words and hence it is all right if we call it as a power of words, i.e. one of the four, the fourth being vyanjana. For Personal & Private Use Only

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Chapter : VII 'Laksana 'Laksana' is broadly a metaphorical use of language. When a word in a sentence is not seen to carry its normal expressive meaning that we are accustomed to, through usage, dictionary etc., it adopts a secondary sense, of course given certain conditions. This is called laksana. Another power of a word called 'gauni is also mentioned by sanskrit theorists and some alamkarikas take it as a separate power, independent of laksana or secondary usage. But the normal tendency is to incorporate 'gauni into laksana, as a sub-variety. We will look into this in greater detail as below. We know that secondary usage is common to all languages spoken by humans, even in worldly use of language. When 'X' addresses someone as 'a donkey for example, the person addressed, we know, being a human being is not a donkey. So, when he is addressed as a 'donkey', the word can not convey its normal expressed meaning of a special four-legged animal. It has to be understood not literally but figuratively in a different sense. This makes for 'laksana'. Poets also resort to laksana in poetry. When a word, in ordinary parlance is used in a secondary sense, it excites special attention, interpretation and understanding. The purport of the speaker has to be understood in a proper context. This secondary sense has to be related to the primary sense in one way or the other. We come across terms such as 'upacara', 'amukhya vitti', 'gauni and 'bhakti' alternatively used for laksana, the secondary or indicative function. It is termed 'indication' also. Normally three conditions are accepted for the operation of laksana or indication by alamkarikas. They are (i) The primary meaning, under given context, looks inapplicable or unsuitable. (ii) as a result of (i), another meaning is resorted to and this meaning has to have some relation with the primary sense. This relation is of different types, as will be seen later. (iii) This secondary meaning should be based either on normal usage, i.e. rudhi, or a special motive - 'prayojana'. This third For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 455 condition, viz. of there being a motive behind resorting to such a usage, was not underlined by earlier writers and this is so with some later writers also who belong to different schools of thought. The alamkarikas however, are by and large unanimous in accepting these three conditions. The normally served example of laksana is "gangayam ghosah". i.e. 'a village on (the stream of the Ganga'. The word 'gangayam'in sanskrit is to be understood as 'in the stream of the river Ganga'. But we know that a village cannot be located on the stream and hence we have to resort to the secondary sense viz. 'on the bank of the river Ganga'. The primary meaning is thus unsuitable and hence the secondary meaning is resorted to. This secondary sense is not the dictionary meaning of the given word, i.e. it is not the directly expressed sense, but is understood only indirectly as somehow related to the primary sense. With this secondary sense the incompatibility so to say, is removed from the expression. Now the motive behind resorting to such apparently incompatible use of language remains vague and it depends mainly on contextual factors. Here the motive is perhaps to suggest that the qualities of coolness and sanctity prevelant in the Ganga are also experienced in the village situated on its bank. The relation is that of nearness. Another stalk illustration is "gaur vahikah" meaning 'the 'Vahika' (a resident of Balha;) is a bull.' But 'vahika' being a man cannot be a 'bull. So, through the relation of similarity in qualities such as laziness etc., the Vahika is called a bull, meaning he is similar to a bull on account of his laziness. As for the grammarians, we comes across usages of terms such as 'gauna' in Panini and Patanjali as follows : The word 'gauna' occurs at Pa. 1.1.15, pp. 71, M.bh (= Mahabhasya, Edn. Keilhorn, Edn. 3rd '72); Pa. 1.4.108, pp. 354; Pa. 6.3.46, pp. 161; and Pa. 8.3.82, pp. 445. We will examine these occurrences. Under Pa. 1.1.15 - 'Or, we have a varttika viz. "Otasvipratisedhah". The M.bh. on it reads as : "odanto nipata ity atra cvyantansya pratisedho vaktavyah. anadah adah abhavat adobhavat. nirobhavat. na vaktavyah. laksana-pratipadoktayoh pratipadoktasyaivaty evam na bhavisyati. evam apy agaur gauh samapadyata go'bhavat atra prapnoti. evam tarhi gaunamukhyayor mukhye karya-sampratyaya iti. tad yatha. gaur anubandhyo 'jo' gnisomiya iti na vahiko'nubadhyate. katham tarhi bahike vyddhyattve bhavatah. gaus tisthati. gam anayeti. arthasraya etad evam bhavati. yaddhi sabdasrayam sabdamatre tadbhavati. sabdasraye ca vrddhyattve. Under Pa. 1.4.108, pp. 354, we read - (M.bh.) "...gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. tad yatha gaur anubandhyo'jo'gnisomiya iti na vahiko'nubandhyate. kat am tarhi vahike vrddhyatrve bhavatah. gaustisthati, gam For Personal & Private Use Only

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456 SAHRDAYALOKA anayeti. arthasraya etad evam bhavati. yaddhi sabdasrayam, sabdamatre tad bhavati. sabdasrave ca vrddhyateve. a. 6.3.46. pp. 161. we have : "pradhanato va yato vrttih". 4. The M.bh. on this reads - "athava gaunamukhyayor mukhye karya-sampratyayah. tad yatha gaur anubandhyo'jo'gnisomiya iti na vahiko'nubadhyate... etc. Under Pa 8.3.82, on 'itaratha hyanista-prasangah-2, The M.bh. reads... "itaratha hyanistam prasajyeta. agnisomau manavakaviti. tat tarhi vaktavyam. na vaktavyam. gauna-mukhyayor mukhye sampratipattih. tadyatha. gaur anubandhyo jo'gnisomiya iti na vahiko'nubadhyate.... etc. etc. The occurrences show that the primary and secondary - i.e. mukhya and gauna or a-mukhya meanings were known to the ancient grammarians. In the Vakyapadiya (Edn. Bhate) We have 'gauna' at, V.P. II. 84 - prasajya-pratisedhoyam paryudasoyam atra tu, idam gaunam idam mukhyam vapidam guru laghvidam. V.P. II. 264 - artha-prakaranapeksau yo va sabdantaraih saha, yuktah pratyayayaty artham tam gaunam apare viduh. V.P. II. 267 - svarthe pravartamano'pi yasyartham yo'valambate, nimittam tatra mukhyam syat nimitti gauna ucyate. V.P. II. 273 - jati-sabdo'ntarena'pi jatim yatra prayujyate, sambandhi-sadrsaddharmat tam gaunam apare viduh. V.P. II. 274 - viparyasad ivarthasya yatrarthantakatam iva, manyante sa gavadis tu gauna ity ucyate kvacit. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 457 V.P. II. 278 - srutimatrena yatrasya samarthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante gaunam vatnopapaditam. V.P. II. 281 - agni-soma"dayah sabda ye svarupa-padarthakah, samjnibhih samprayujyante aprasiddhes tesu gaunata. V.P. II. 257. ekatvam tu sarupatvat cchabdayor gauna-mukhyayoh prahur atyanta bhede'pi bhedamarganudarsinah. We have 'gauna-mukhya-prakalpana', at V.P. II. 263d, and 'gaunarthabhinivesin' at V.P. II. 266d. We have 'laksana' at V.P. III. I. 50a, and III. 1.70d V.P. III. 1.50 reads as - "laksana sabda-samskare vyaparah karya-siddhyaye, samkhya-karma"di-saktinam sputisamyepi drsyate. V.P. III. 1.70 - "sammargasya vidheyatvat anyatra vihite grahe, vidhivakye sruta samkhya laksanayam na badhyate. We have 'laksanartha' at V.P. II. 384a, III. 14. 452d, etc. These occurrences prove that the ancient grammarians were fairly conversant with the concepts of a secondary sense and a secondary power of word, of course at worldly usage level. They were not concerned with the poetic usage of secondary power as they were not out to discuss the poetic use of language. But gauni or laksana is as old as hills. For Personal & Private Use Only

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458 SAHRDAYALOKA We have also noted earlier that Patanjali not only knows about the primary and secondary senses, but is fairly conversant with the various relations they may have between them. Thus, under Pa. 4.1.48, pp. 218 (Vol. II), Patanjali reads - "katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati ? caturbhih prakaraih a-tasmin sa ity etad bhavati, tatsthyat, taddharmyat samidyat sahacaryad iti. tatsthyat tavat mancah hasanti, girir dahyate, taddharmyat, jatinam yantam brabmadatta ity Wha brahmadatte yani karmani, jatiny api tani kriyante ity ato jati brahmadatta ity ucyate. tat-samipyat gangayam ghosah, kupe garga-kulam, tat sahacaryat kuntan pravesaya, yastih pravesaya. Thus the discipline of grammar was fairly conversant with the secondary use of language. We will now turn to the Nyaya discipline. Gautama in his Nyaya sutras applies the term 'upacara' to this secondary usage and holds it to be quite common. He also knows the various relations between the primary and the secondary senses. The Nyaya-sutra, II. 2. 62 reads as : sahacaranasthana-tadarthya.-vrtta-mana-dharana-samipyayoga-sadhana."dhipatyebhyo brahmana-manca-kata-raja-saktu-candana-ganga-sataka'nna-purusesv atadbhave'pi tad upacarah. - The relation of 'sahacarana' or association is illustrated as in yastikam bhojaya'. i.e. feed the stick. Now here by 'stick' a brahmin with a stick is meant for he is normally always associated with a stick which he carries in his hand while walking. Similarly in, 'kuntah pravisanti' by 'kuntah' or lances are meant the lance-bearers. 'Sthana' or location is illustrated as in 'mancah krosanti', i.e. the beds (or cradles) are making noise or crying. The term 'manca' is used for children sleeping in a cot or a cradle. "Tadarthya' or purpose is illustrated as in 'katam karoti' - 'he makes a mat', when actually he collects reeds for the preparation of a mat. Here the reeds used for making a mat are called a mat. 'Vrtta' or behaviour is illustrated as in 'yamo raja', i.e. the king is the God of death. Here the term 'yama' is used in the sense of a king who acts like yama i.e. who strikes terror among people. 'mana' or measure is illustrated as in 'adhaka-saktavah' - i.e. one adhaka (= say, a pound, or kg.) of floor. Here the term 'adhaka' signifying a measure, is used to mean that which is measured'. i.e. adhakena mitah saktavah. dharana' or wheighing, as in 'tula-candanam' meaning one tula of candana. Here tula or balance stands for that which is weighed in a balance : 'tulayam For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 459 dhrtam candanam'. Dr. Raja (pp. 234 ibid) observes in a foot-note (no. 1) and we agree with this fully that, "(e) [i.e. mana] and (f) [i.e. dharana] are similar; the former refers to the measurement of volume, and the latter to the measurement of weight. Adhaka primarily means the measure and secondarily the volume measured by it; tula primarily means the balance which gives a particular weight, and secondarily that which is weighed in it. According to Panini such shifts of meaning are included in the primary sense itself. See Panini II. 3.46." 'Proximity' - or samipya is illustrated as in 'gangayam gavah caranti.', meaning the cows are grazing on the Ganga. Here 'ganga' stands for the bank of ganga. Inherent connection or 'yoga' is seen as in 'krsnah satakah' or the black cloth. The word 'krsna' or black primarily means blackness, but here it means 'the thing having blackness'. Here the term suggesting quality is used for the thing qualified. Cause or 'sadhana' is seen as in 'annam pranah' i.e. food is life. In the Sahityasastra the illustration favoured is 'ayur ghrtam'. In 'annam pranah' 'anna' or food which is the cause of life is itself said to be life or breath itself. Prominance or adhipatya is illustrated as in 'ayam kulam', meaning 'He is the family'. Here 'kula' is used in the sense of highest authority in a family. A prominant person in a family is himself said to be 'kula' or family. Gautam has cited all illustrations of figurative usage from common usage. Again the list is supposed to be only illustrative and not exhaustive. At Nyayasutra II. 2. 64, he also refers to the Mimamsaka view that the primary meaning of any word is the class or universal i.e. jati and that the particular or vyakti to which it refers in a given statement is arrived at through the secondary function i.e. upacara. Gautam does not accept this because for him a word means jati, akrti and vyakti at a time. The Mimamsakas are primarily concerned with the basic rules of interpretation of Vedic injunctions. Among vedic passages, naturally there are some with metaphorical expressions. So, in the Mimamsa sutras, Jaimini enumerates six bases for metaphorical description which are explained in Sabara's bhasya in greater detail. The MI. Su. I. 4, 23 states - "tat-siddhi-jati-sarupya-prasamsa-bhumalinga-samavaya - iti gunasrayah. (Ref. Prof. Devasthali's work; "Mimamsa, or the Vakya-sastra of ancient India)". First we will get at these six bases in brief and later we will deal in greater detail about the Mimamsaka's general attitude towards gauna or secondary sense and laksana as a whole. For Personal & Private Use Only

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460 SAHRDAYALOKA 'Tat-siddhi' or acomplishment of purpose is seen as in, "yajamanah prastarah" - i.e. the grass-bundle or a grass-bed is the yajamana or sacrificer. Another illustration is, 'yajamano va eka-kapalah', i.e. the purodasa cake prepared in a single pan is the sacrificer. These vedic sentences do not make any sense when taken in the primary meaning. So, a figurative sense has to be resorted to. The grass-bed and the cake accomplish the purpose served by the sacrificer and hence are indicated by the term 'sacrificer'. "Jati' means 'same origin. Kumarila Bhatta in Tantravarttika (p. 362) explains : Jatir iti catra janmopadanam vivaksitam.' The illustration cited is - "agneyo vai brahmanah". This Brahmin is Agneya. This figurative usage is based on the fact that both the Brahmin and Agni are born of a common origin viz. 'prajapati'. 'Sarupya' or similarity is also a base of figurative expression as in, "adityo yupah", - 'the sacrificial post is aditya i.e. sun. This metaphorical expression is based on the similarity of the post to the sun in brightness and height and this statement is meant to eulogize the post. 'Prasamsa' i.e. praise as a base of a figurative expression is illustrated as in, 'a-pasavo va anye go-asvebhyah'. - i.e. 'Those other than cows or horses are not animals'. Again, 'yan malinam avasas tat' - 'That which is dirty is not clothing', and, 'yad aghstam abhojanam tat', - 'that which is without purified butter is no food', etc. are expressions of figurative usages based on praise. In these illustrations words such as pasu, vasas, bhojana etc. are meant only for genuinely praiseworthy animals, clothing and food. 'Bhuma' means preponderance. This is illustrated as in 'srstir upadadhati' - 'The srsti-bricks are placed'. Here the word 'Srsti' stands for the bricks that are associated with a group of vedic hymns with or without the word 'spsti'. 'Linga-samavaya' i.e. presence of indicative sign, is illustrated as in, 'chatrino yanti', i.e. people with umbrellas are going. Here the reference to the umbrella is just to indicate the people, not to describe them and even if there be few umbrellas such a statement can be used. Another illustration is, dandino gacchanti', 'people with sticks are going'. Actually we know that the Mimamsakas were aware of both the 'mukhya' or primary sense and the gauna' or secondary sense, and their relative strength. Sabara actually begins with the question as to whether this division of arthas into two classes such as 'mukhya' and 'gauna' can reasonably be admitted. With this For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 461 object in view, he first takes up the definitions of the terms 'mukhya' and 'gauna', saying that 'mukhya' or primary is that which is perceived from the word directly, and is so called because as it were it is the face of the word itself. On the other hand, that signification, the perception of which follows from the primarily perceived signification, on the strength of some connection, is said to be 'jaghanya' as it is, as it were, the hinder part of the sabda. This latter is also called 'gauna', owing to its being connected with some guna or quality. Sabara observes : "kah punar mukhyah ko va gauna iti. ucyate. yah sabdad eva avagamyate, sa prathamo'rtho mukhyah. mukham iva bhavati iti mukhya ucyate. yastu khalu pratitad arthat kenacit-sambandhena gamyate, sa pascad-bhavat jaghanam iva bhavati iti jaghanyah. guna-sambandhac ca gauna iti." These definitions of 'mukhya' and 'gauna' are not completely free from faults. It can be argued, for example, that all the senses are perceived from sabda only and hence this division into primary and secondary is futile. Say, for example, statements such as 'agnir jvalati', and 'agnir manavakah'. In both of these, the sense of 'fire' in the first illustration, and the sense of 'manavaka' i.e. his 'paingalya' or yellowness, the common source is the word 'agni' itself. So, as both the senses follow from the same word, viz. fagni', both will have to be termed 'mukhya' i.e. primary or principal : "yady evam sarva eva mukhyah. sarvo hi sabdas gamyate. yathaiva hi 'agnir jvalati' iti ukte jvalana-sampratyayah, evam eva 'agnir manavaka' iti sabda eva ucsarite manavakasampratyayah." - But such a conclusion can not be admitted for we know for certain that only one of these viz. the idea of fire is the mukhya artha, and the other is 'gauna'. To remove this defect, the above definitions may be revised by saying that 'mukhyartha' is that sense, which is perceived from the word independently of any attributive adjunct; while 'gauna' is that which is perceived from the word acompanied and aided by a qualifying adjunct. For, if not accompanied by qualifying adjuncts, a word is not supposed to convey a sense which it has no direct power to convey. So, if a word conveys a sense, even when accompanied by any adjunct, we will have to take that sense to the conveyed by the word itself, and the adjunct will be taken as a 'sahakari karana'. Thus the presence or absence of a qualifying adjunct can not give us ground enough to distinguish the mukhya sense from the gauna sense, for in either case the sense will be perceived from the same source, i.e. word itself ! It is the sabda which is the nimitta of artha jnana and as soon as the nimitta is there, whether accompanied by a qualifying adjunct or not, For Personal & Private Use Only

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462 SAHRDAYALOKA the naimittika i.e. the perception of artha follows from it. Thus there cannot be any distinction between the 'sopapada' and a 'nirupapada' sabda, which, therefore, in the light of the definitions under discussion, amounts to saying that there is no distinction between mukhya and gauna artha at all - "atha uchyeta yasmin nirupapadat sabdas sampratyayah sa mukhyah, yasmin sopapadat sabdat sa gauna iti. naitad yuktam. yasya hi sabdasya rupam kasyacid arthasya nimittam, sopapadasya'pi tad eva rupam, nirupapadasya'pi. na ca sakyam nimitte sati naimittikena na bhavitum. kim ato yady evam. idam saktate vaditum upapadad rte na sortho bhavati, upapade tu sanjate sorthah sanjanisyate iti. - An attempt to distinguish between the two by pointing out that the idea of fire is obtained from sabda, while the idea of manavaka is obtained from the samudaya viz. of both the words agnih and manavakah, would be of no use for the simple reason that 'agnih' and 'manavakah' can't be taken as a 'samudaya' in the same sense in which the word 'asva-karna' is called by the name. In case of 'agni' and 'manavaka' we realize the individual senses separately and not jointly as in case of 'asva' and 'karna' in 'asva-karna'. Again, it cannot be a vakyartha. In a sentence say 'nilam utpalam' the ideas of nilatva and'utpalatva are conved by two words 'nilam' and 'utpalam'. These are the attributes of one and the same individual. In 'agnih' and 'manavakah' however the attribute's agnitva and 'manavakatva', are quite distinct and separate from each other and normally they abide in two different individuals. Thus there is no plausible ground to distinguish between mukhyartha and gaunartha and the best course is to admit that agni expresses both fire as well as Manavaka and that there is no distinction between mukhya and gauna arthas : "na casau samudayarthah saktyate vijnatum. anvaya-vyatirekabhyam hi vibhagovagamyate. atha vakyartho 'yam ity ucyate. naivam sakyam. na hi ananvitah padartho bhavati vakyarthah. tad evam drsyatam. agni-sabda evayam jvalanavacanah. agni sabda eva manavakasya abhidhata iti. tasman na mukhyo gauna iti kascid visesah." It can be argued here that the distinction between the two arthas may be based on 'prasiddhi', so that the sense which is well known is taken to be 'mukhya'. The ess known is gauna. But this argument is not at all strong. 'Prasiddhi' is nothing but 'prajnana' or knowledge, or the quality of being well known. It is not possible to distinguish between one prajnana and another. 'Prajnana' is knowledge, whether extensive or limited i.e. susthu or manak. There is no difference in its character. Again, we should not argue that 'susthu prasiddhi', and 'manak prasiddhi', are used For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Laksana' 463 by us to singify frequency or otherwise of the use of expressions. - "atha ucyate, yah susthu prasiddhah sa mukhyah, yo manag iva sa gaunah iti. idam api nopapadyate. prasiddhir nama prajnanam. na ca prajnane kascid visesosti." - Even this explanation is unsatisfactory, for the very fact that a 'sabda' conveys an 'artha', is enough to show that it has the potentiality - the samarthya to convey it; and so long as there is samarthya, it does not matter whether its prayoga - practice - is 'susthu' or 'manak'. This alpatva' or 'bahutva' of 'prayoga' does not make any difference between the senses from the point of view of the samarthya of the word to convey a particular sense. In any case the sense will be conved by the word and so, will have to be branded as 'mukhya' only - "athocyeta, yasya bahusah prayogo''sti sa mukhyah, alpasah prayujyamano gaunah iti. naitad evam. alpasopi prayujyamano samrthye pratyayayet. atah sopi sabdat pratiyata iti mukhya eva." [SB. pp. 748] So, unavoidable conclusion follows that 'artha' is always mukhy there is only one type of meaning and that is 'mukhya' only. It is no use, therefore to talk of 'mukhya' and 'gauna' artha. [Mahima seems to follow this logic.] This purva-paksa or prima facie view is not totally unsound. For, we find that the idea of fire is conveyed by the word 'agni' but the idea of 'manavaka' is not conveyed by it. This is clear from the general rule that one word conveys one sense and when the word 'agni' conveys the meaning of 'fire', it can not convey the meaning of 'manavaka'. Now if it can be said that why should we not accept the idea of manavaka as directly conveyed by the word agni ? Why should we insist on the sense of fire being conveyed by the word 'agni'? The answer to this lies in our own day-to-day experience. We find people perceiving the idea of fire from the word agni without any reference to the idea of manavaka, and not vice versa. This is confirmed by usage. Again there is not even a popular usage supporting the use of the word agni to denote persons having similarity to fire. The pravrtti-nimitta is agni-sadrsya in such cases. But how can this agni-sadrsya be perceived if the thing in itself viz. fire is not perceived ? Thus, we have to conclude that the idea of fire is first perceived from the word 'agni' and then is perceived the idea of 'sadrsya' or similarity. Thus the word 'agni' is primarily the means to perceive the idea of fire and not of 'manavaka'. Thus we have to conclude that the word 'agni' primarily applies to fire and not to manavaka, to which it may apply only secondarily. In the same way, the word 'barhih' primarily applies to 'trna' or grass, and not to tona-sadrsa things. Thus it is unreasonable to say that there can be no distinction between one type of artha and another type of artha. - "SB. pp. 748 : For Personal & Private Use Only

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464 SAHRDAYALOKA atra ucyate. asti atra visesah. manavako na agni-sabdat pratiyate. katham avagamyate ? uktam, anyayascanekarthatvam. katham na viparyayah ? ucyate. anadstya eva manavaka-pratyayam jvalanam agni-sabdad pratiyanto drsyante. na tu anadetya jvalana-pratyayam manavakam agni-sabdat pratiyanti. kuta etat . yo yo agni-sadrs'o vivaksyate, tatra tatra agnisabdo niyata iti. ata eva agni-gatasadrsyad ayam tu drsyate. atah agni-sadrsyam asya pravsttau nimittam. na ca jvalane a-pratite tat-sadnsyam pratiyate. tasmat jvalanasya agnisabdo nimittam, na manavakasya. tasmat jvalane mukhyo, na manavake. evam eva trnety asya barhih sabdo nimittam, na trna-sadrsa-pratyayasya. From this discussion, it is now clear that all arthas or senses are not alike. Some are mukhya while the rest are jaghanya or gauna. Mukhya artha is that which is primarily conveyed by a sabda, while the gauna artha is that which of course is conveyed by the word but only through the mukhyartha. After establishing the twofold division of artha, we will now go to decide as to which of these arthas should be understood as regularly conveyed by the word. This problem is discussed by Jaimini and Sabara in an adhikarana called by the name, "barhir nyaya". This is so named due to the circumstance that the word they have chosen for theoratical consideration is "barhih", which occurs in the mantra, viz. "barhir deva-sadanam dami". The question raised by them is connected with the vedic mantra. The purpose of the mantra portion of veda is to bring to mind the enjoined act, at the time of ritual performance. This can be done by the mantra by yielding the artha. But when there are two types of arthas which one is to be understood as being conveyed by the words of the mantras ? Do we have to accept the mukhya or the gauna or both the arthas ? The prima facie view is that as both the mukhya and gauna arthas are perceived by a word, both should to be accepted. Again, there is nothing to prevent this position of both being accepted. There is no restrictive factor that limits our perception to only one and not the other artha. - SB. pp. 749 - "tad evam dvaite sati mukhyaparata sabdasya, uta gaunopi iti yukto vicarah. kim tavat praptam ? mukhye gaune ca viniyogah. kutah ? ubhayasya sakyatvat ubhayam api barhih sabdena sakyate pratyayayitum trnam ca, trna-sadrsam ca. trnam saksat, trnasadIsam tina-pratyayena. yac ca nama darsapurnamasayoh sadhanabhutena barhih sabdena sakyate pratyayayitum tat-sarvam pratyayayitavyam. vinigamanayam hetvabhavat." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 465 The Siddhantin does not accept this and shows that it is not possible to hold that the words of the mantras would convey both the arthas simultaneously inspite of the assertion of the purvapaks'in to that effect. Since the mantras occur in some context, it is natural therefore to assume a syntactical unit with the main sentence i.e. the vidhi vakya which lays down a particular act, so that ultimately the idea to be derived from the mantra comes to be that one should accomplish by the mantra whatever one is capable of accomplishing thereby. But for want of any other possibility it has to be admitted that the mantras help in the performance of an act by bringing to mind its several details which they can do only because they are endowed with an ever ready power to express an artha. But because, on account of context, and eka-vakyata with vidhi-vakya, it must convey the mukhya artha, and because it cannot convey both the arthas simultaneously, it is clear that the mantras are to be employed in their primary and not their secondary signification. - "SB. pp. 749 - "evam prapte brumah - mukhya eva viniyoktavyo mantro na gauna iti. kutah ? ubhayasya asakyatvat. prakarane hi samamnanat pradhanenaikavakyatam upaiti. tatraitad apatati, yat saknuyad anena mantrena sadhayitum tatha sadhayed iti. sa casav arthabhidhana-samyogat saknoti upakartum, na gaunam artham saknoti abhidhatum. tasman na gaune viniyogah. Prof. Devasthali (pp. 68) further elaborates, as follows. But, it may be argued, that the gauna artha is also conveyed by the mantra, after first conveying the mukhyartha. So, there is nothing wrong in holding that the mantra is also conveying the gauna artha, and is also employed in that sense also, for the gauna sense is also connected with it. But the point is that when the purpose of the mantra is served by conveying just the mukhyartha there is no need to proceed for the gaunartha. The conveying of meaning, i.e. arthabhidhana serves the purpose of proving that the mantra is not futile and this purpose of 'anarthakyaparihara' is served by conveying the primary meaning. Thus there is no motivation for further conveying the secondary sense also. So, it has to be concluded that 'mukhyartha' alone is conveyed by the mantra, and not the gaunartha also - SB. pp. 750 reads - "nanu mukhyapratyaya cchakyate gaunah pratyayayitum. satyam etat. mukhya-pratyayanena eva asya prayojanavatta nirvstta iti na gaunam prati viniyoge kincit pramanam asti. mukhye viniyogena tu anarthakyam parihryate. parihrte anarthakye na gaunabhidhanam apatati, na hy anabhidhaya mukhyam gaunam abhivadati sabdah. atah pramanabhavat na gaune viniyujyeta." For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA Over and above this, there are many different means by which the gaunartha can be conveyed, and if mantra is invariably accepted as one of these, it naturally means that the other ways of conveying the same have to be overlooked. But where shall we find a pramana for doing so? Mantramnana could not have the power to exclude the other means of arriving at the gaunartha, for fear of parisamkhya, which has no motive. Of course, it can be asked as to on what ground or pramana do you take the mantra to be the means of conveying the mukhyartha? The reply to this is that we do so to save the mantras from being meaningless i.e. anarthaka. For, if the mantra is not used even in its mukhyartha, then it will not be able to be of any help in the main sacrificial ritual and therefore will consequently be rendered totally useless. Thus the conclusion forces upon us that the mantras are to be employed in their primary signification only. - SB. pp. 750, "api ca. gaunasya pratyayane samarthyad bahavo'bhyupayah prapnuvanti. samarthyam ca sabdaikadese ityuktam. arthad va kalpanaikadesatvad iti. tatra mantre niyogato gaunam prati viniyujyamana upayantaram vina pramanena badhyeta. mantra"mnanam pramanam iti ced, na tasya upayantara-nivrttau samarthyam asti. nanu mukhyepi viniyujyamanasya esa eva dosah. na iti ucyate. yadi mukhyepi na viniyujyeta naiva pradhanasya upakuryat. tatra tasya utpattir anarthika eva syat. tasmad asti gaune mukhye ca visesah." 466 It can be further asked, why does the mantra convey its mukhyartha at all, if its gaunartha alone is to be ultimately employed? If it is argued that the mukhyartha has to be conveyed since the gaunartha can not otherwise be understood, then the reply is that, there do exist other means of getting at the gaunartha such as arthapatti etc. and mukhyartha of a given mantra is not the only means to it. Again, if it be argued that mukhyartha is to be accepted as one of the several alternative remedies for arriving at the gaunartha, the reply is that in this case, mantramnana does not become compulsory for our object is to convey the gaunartha and it necessarily may not be through the mantra, so the mantra may easily be neglected. But this goes against practice. On the other hand, if once the mantra is admitted as necessary for conveying the gaunartha by accepting a 'niyama', then there remains no purpose for the mantra to convey the gaunartha after it has once conveyed the mukhyartha. The purpose, viz. anarthakya parihara is served by the mukhyartha itself, as noted above. * SB. pp. 750 - api ca yo gaune mantram viniyunkte sa vaktavyah - kim artham mukhyam pratyayasiti. sa ced bruyad - For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 467 nanyatha gauna-pratyayo'stiti. pratibruyad enam anye'pi gaunapratyayasya abhyupayah santiti. atha sa evam abhiyuktah pratibruyat mukhya-pratyayo'pi paksiko'bhyupayah iti. bruyad enam, na tarhi niyogato gaune viniyojaniyah. yada gaunapratyayaya mukhyam upadatte, tada etad apatitam bhavati mukhya eva viniyoga iti. arthena ca pratitena prayojanam na pratyayakena mantrena. ato'nyenapyupayena gaunah pratyayayitavyah. na sa eva mantra adartavyah. atha'pi mantrena pratyayakena prayojanam syat tatha'pi mukhya - pratyayanenaiva nirvsttam prayojanamitinataram gauneviniyujyeta." (SB. pp. 750). The outcome of this discussion is that of the two senses viz. mukhya and gauna, it is only the mukhya which is to be accepted as being conveyed by the mantra and it is the mukhya alone which has to be connected with the enjoined act - "SB. pp. 751 - tasman mukhya-gaunayor mukhye karya-sampratyaya iti siddham" - Thus, words, as far as possible must be understood as conveying their mukhyartha alone, which as will be discussed later, supplies us with one of the pre-conditions of laksana, as held by the Mimamsakas. Thus as seen above, the Mimamsakas are fairly conversant with the primary and also the secondary sense of words in a sentence. We will now go to see their attitude towards laksana. As noted above, the mantra, according to the Mimamsa discipline, has to be taken in its mukhya or primary sense rather than in the secondary sense or gaunartha or laksyartha. For the Mimamsakas there are only two powers of a word, i.e. they recognize only two sabda-vittis i.e. abhidha or the power of expression and laksana or the power of indication which makes for the secondary sense. We will look into this problem in greater details as it is this central issue which forms the common heritage for the alamkarikas or aestheticians to start with. It may be observed that the mimamsaka means abhidha only when he uses the term sabda-sakti; but there are cases where even he has to pay attention to the fact that at times the sense rendered by abhidha does not serve the purpose and that he has to travel further. At this juncture he resorts to what he calls gauni-vstti or bhakti or laksana or the secondary power or function of a word. The mimamsaka has noted, as already discussed by us earlier, various means of determining the mukhyartha. It has also been noted that for the Mimamsaka, as For Personal & Private Use Only

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468 SAHRDAYALOKA a rule, it is not right to assume one word as having more than one senses. The Mimamsaka is generally, inclined to believe that where a word appears to have more that one senses, only one is the mukhyartha and the rest are conveyed only through sadrsya or other relations by laksana. So then, the word 'barhih' primarily means 'grass in general and is applied to "sanctified grass" only secondarily through sadrsya. Yet another illustration is the word 'parvan' which is used in the sense of 'kala' as well as of 'samudaya' (i.e. of the two sacrifices called 'darsa' and 'paurnamasa'.). But the context and derivation suggest the right view viz. that the word primarily denotes the samudaya and is only secondarily used in the sense of kala', owing to samudaya-sambandha - The SB., on Mi. Su. IX. 2.53, pp. 1739 - reads as - "nayam ubhayatra parvasabdo vartate. yadi kalavacanas tatsambandhat samudaye gamyate. yadi va samudayavacanas tat-sambandhat kale. anyataravacano nobhaya-vacanah. tatra samudaya vacane kalpyamane prakaranam anugrhitam bhavati. api ca prnateh parva-sabdah. prnatis ca dane prasiddhah. danani ca samudayah. tasmat samudaya"bhijya. evam sabdavayava-prasiddhir anugrhita bhavati." Same is the case with the word 'caru', which on the authority of the smrti texts is declared to convey primarily 'odana', and the 'sthali only secondarily. (See. Mi. Su. X. i. 34-43, and SB on the same). The case of the word 'mata' is, however, different. It means both, "mother" and, "one who measures (corn)." Both these are the vacyarthas of the word 'mata'. - The SB. on Mi. Su. X. 1.14 pp. 1810 reads - "anekasyapy ekah sabdo bhavati vacakah. tad yatha mateti mataram api vadati, mataram api. ataca paramam daivatam sama ca putresvity etair upabaddhamano jananivacano'vagamyate. mata samah ksiprascetyebhir anubudhyamano dhanyasya matur vacakah." In such cases, the context becomes helpful in deciding the exact meaning of a word in a given passage : SB. on Mi. Su. VI. 8.35, pp. 1519 reads - "chagopakaranam asya upadarsitam. yad upadamsane pasu-sabdas chagabhipraya iti gamyate. yatha yugavastra upadamsita isacakradi-sannidhane ced aksamanayety ucyate, tada yanaksam adhikrtya brute iti gamyate, na tu videvanaksam iti." Actually, though such a word appears to be one, it is not one but two. But what does our first perception refer to when we use or hear a word ? Does the form come first or its sense ? This problem is discussed by the Mimamsakas when the meaning of the text viz. 'rathantaram uttaryor gayati.' is discussed. The conclusion is that words are meant to convey primarily their senses and not only their forms. It is also observed that words primarily denote 'jati' and 'vyakti' is For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 469 conveyed only by implication, when action cannot be correlated with 'jati'. At times we come across words that convey two senses e.g. words such as 'asvakarna', 'kusala', or 'pravina'. Such words give two sets of meanings, one by etymology and the other by usage. So, these arthas are called 'yaugika artha' and 'rudhy artha'. Now, the question is, which one will be taken as primary meaning ? It can be said that as the etymological meaning is conveyed by the constituents it must be accepted as primary meaning and the rudhy artha which sets aside these meanings should be taken as gauna artha. But this is not the correct view. 'Prasiddhi' is the decider and here samudaya-prasiddhi is held higher than avayava-prasiddhi. Thus the mimamsakas conclude that rudhy artha is to be preferred to the yaugikartha. Sabara has made this clear at many places and Jaimini does the same while discussing the meaning of the term 'rathakara' in the adhikarana when he has discussed the text - 'varsasu rathakara adadhita'. Jaimini suggests that the term 'rathakara' must be taken to mean, 'a person of mixed caste called rathakara'. This rule is very often referred to as 'rathakara nyaya'. (Mi. Su. VI. 1. 44-50). Sabara also opines that words must be so construed as to convey only their natural meaning and not any other signification that the interpreter may find it necessary to assign to them. Thus for Sabara even samanya-vaci sabda can not denote visesa, at least not by abhidha : SB on Mi. Su. X. 8.16, p. 2073 reads - "na hi samanyavaci sabdo visesan abhivadati. yadica abhivaded adya-jate gavi navakalpeta. purvadarsanabhavat. samanye ca drstapurvatvat avakalpate. tasman na samanyam visesan abhivadati ... abhivadan va na mukhyaya vittya abhivadet. katham tarhi ? laksanaya. laksana ca srutya badhyate. This is how laksana comes up for consideration. First, let us see how Jaimini and Sabara interpret the text, "saptadasaratnir vai vajapeyasya yupo bhavati." The purva paksa view here favours laksana on the word 'yupa' and would choose to mean it to be sodasipatra; for he argues that vajapeya has no 'yupa' at all. But the siddhantin suggests that even if vajapeya has no yupa directly, it can be said to have yupa as its 'anga', for it is an 'anga' of pasu yajna, which itself is again the anga of vajapeya. The genitive ending applied to vajapeya expresses the sambandha with yupa and this is understood without resorting to laksana. Laksana is after all a dosa, a blemish, because to resort to laksana we have to put aside the natural expressed sense, and take up an indirect sense. So, it is only as a last resort that laksana has to be admitted. The S.B. on Mi. Su. III. i. 18 - "anarthakyat tad angesu" * reads as follows - yas ca yasyopakarina upakaroti bhavati sa tasya sambaddho mukhyena eva sambandhena. na caikantaritam iti krtva a-sambandho bhavati. For Personal & Private Use Only

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470 SAHRDAYALOKA yatha devadattasya napteti putrena ca'savantaritah. atha devadattena mukhyena eva sambandhena sambandhyate, tasmad esa eva paksa asrayaniyah. na hi etasmin pakse kascid api laksanasabdo bhavati iti. But at times, the primary meaning of a word is inapplicable in some context. This results in 'anarthakya' of a vedic-text. This is seen quite often in laukika vakyas but for vedic texts anarthakya is an intolerable position. Veda is never a-pramana and hence not even a syllable, not to talk of a word, can be said to be 'anarthaka' i.e. bereft of meaning. Anarthakya is a-nyaya, and arthavattva is nyaya as emphasized at all places by both Jaimini and Sabara. So, when a literal sense is not found to be applicable, to avoid this greater anarthakya blemish, a lesser evil called laksana is admissible in special cases for the Mimamsaka. So, the figurative meaning is at times permissible. In a sentence, say, "simham alabheta" there is no need to resort to the secondary sense as the primary sense is quite applicable. But in statements like, "simho devadattah" or "agnau tisthati", or 'chatrino gacchanti', the vacyartha looks irrelevant in case of 'simhah', 'agnau' and 'chatrinah respectively. So, to avoid 'anarthakya dosa' we find another sense that would be congruous with the context on hand, and which sense of course could be indirectly conveyed by the words concerned. So, for the Mimamsakas, laksana is resorted to only to avoid the greater evil of 'anarthakya' in case of a vedic text which is always a highest 'pramana' or authority. Thus laksana is resorted to only if the literal sense is found to be unsuitable to the context, and this too only as a last resort. Read SB. p. 488 - "yadanjasyena sabdartho na'vakalpate, tada laksanaya'pi kalpyamanah sadhur bhavati. yatha 'agnau tisthati', 'avate tisthati', 'agni-samipe tisthati', 'avatasamipe tisthati', iti bhavati samvyavaharah.", again SB. p. 1485 - "sruty asambhave laksanaya'pi vyavaharo bhavati. yatha'gnau tisthaty avate tsthati. iti.', SB. p. 1551 - asati ssty arthe laksanartho grahyah., SB. p. 1280 - 'srtyasambhave laksana'pi nyayyaiva."; SB. p. 1437 - "mukhya'bhave gauno glhyate."; SB. p. 1560 - "sambhavati srutyarthe laksanaya'pi sabdarthah; SB. p. 2021 * tritvam hi catustva"dini sahacaryacchaknoti laksayitum. laksana tvasrita bhavati. kim kriyatam. agatya"sriyate. satyam gatau nasrayitavya.; SB. on IX. 1.13, pp. 1660 - "vrihin proksatiti, vrihi-jatir nirdisyate. vrihi-drava-laksanartha va, apurva-sadhanavisesa-laksanartha va." Prof. Devasthali (pp. 79, ibid) observes : "The first and the foremost principle to be borne in mind, in this connection is that between the two powers of a word, viz. sruti (or Abhidha) and laksana, the former being more conventional or direct is certainly stronger and hence preferable." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 471 Sabara insists on this principle at different places in varying expressions. - See 134 - sruti-laksanavicaye srutir iyayasi; SB. pp. 565, 1244, 1262 srutilaksana-visaye ca srutir nyayya; SB. p. 1210, 1222, srutisca laksanaya gariyasi. SB. p. 1260; srutisca laksanaya gariyasi; SB. p. 1278 - srutisca laksanaya baliyasi; SB. p. 1556 - sruti-laksanayos ca srutir nyayya; SB. p. 2243 - srutisca laksanato nyayya;. Thus laksana has some scope against sruti or abhidha, which is clearly favoured by the Mimamsaka. Laksana is admissible only as a strong weapon against 'anarthakya dosa'. So, 'sruty asambhava' or "mukhyabhava" is therefore, laid down as the most important pre-requisite of laksana. But this inapplicapility of 'vacyartha' is not the only basis for laksana. There is yet another basis for resorting to laksana. In a statement such as, for example, 'vedam adhitya snayat', meaning, "one should take a bath after studying the veda", the primary sense is not impossible. But the point is that if one takes a bath on the completion of vedic studies, what purpose can be served by this bath ? Perhaps, it can be said that here, 'snana' or bath serves an 'adrsta' purpose - an unseen reason. But as far as there is drsta-hetu we should not imagine an adrsta-hetu. Prof. Devasthali notes that, "It is for avoiding this 'adrstarthata' that in the text under consideration, we resort to laksana and take it to mean, "As soon as one finishes his vedic studies one should relinguish the vows of 'asnana' and others, but remain with his guru and prosecute the dharma-jijnasa." (pp. 80, ibid). - The SB. p. 7, on Mi. Su. I. i. 1, reads - "na va idam snanam adrstartham vidhiyate. kimtu laksanaya asnana"di-niyamasya paryavasanam vedadhyayana-samakalam ahuh. vedam adhitya snayad gurukulan ma samavartista iti, adrsta-pariharaya eva." The Mimamsaka is of the opinion that - "drste sati" i.e. when a 'drsta' reason can be imagined, the assuming of a-drsta, i.e. - 'adrsta kalpana' makes for a more serious draw-back than laksana. drste sati adrsta-kalpana' involves an assumption unwarranted by our experience, but laksana is comparatively a more acceptable thing, it being a matter of everyday experience and sanctioned by daily usage. - SB. pp. 324 has - "laksane ced varam laksana kalpita na yagabhidhanam. laukiki hi laksana, hatho'prasiddha-kalpana. - again, "laksana hi adrsta-kalpanaya jyayasi. pramanad hi sa bhavati; and also, "laksana ca'drsta-kalpanaya jyayasi." - Then, (pp. 80, ibid) - "Avoidance of conflict or contradiction between the several words of the text itself, or between several texts of scriptures affords yet another basis for resorting to laksana, as is seen in the case of text like, 'aditir dyaur aditir antariksam', or, 'rvam eva mata, tvam eva pita', etc. - See SB. on Mi. Su. I. 2.39 - "gunad a-vipratisedhah syat." Again, laksana is welcome in view of the context. For For Personal & Private Use Only

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472 SAHRDAYALOKA example, the word 'sarva' in texts like, "purnahutya sarvan kaman avapnoti", has to be taken to mean only those desires - i.e. kamas as intended at the time when the sacrifice is started - The Mi. Su. I. 12-16 reads, "sarvatvam adhikarikam", and the SB. p. 129, has, "sarva-kamapti-vacanam gaunam. a-sarvesu sarva-vacanam adhikrtapeksam." Thus, resorting to laksana is permissible under four different circumstances, which makes it impossible to avoid laksana. We have to let go the vacyartha and accept laksana if by sticking to vacyartha we find that (i) a vedic text, or any part thereof, is rendered useless or meaningless. This is a case of anarthakya. or (ii) Vacyartha yields a sense which is not congruent with the sense conveyed by other parts, or (iii) if vacyartha is found to no visible purpose and to support the same we have to resort to a-drsta-kalpana or assuming an invisible purpose, or (iv) it if is so required by the preamble, if we may so translate the word 'adhikara'. We may add that these conditions in general make for the 'mukhyartha-badha' and also. 'tatparya-anupapatti', of the later thinkers. After having decided the Mimamsaka approach as to under which circumstances laksana has to be resorted to in case of a word or words the question that comes up before us is that (i) what sense or senses are conveyed by laksana and (ii) how are they conveyed? The latter, i.e. the manner in which the laksyartha is conveyed has been fully answered and discussed by Sabara at several places. On MI. Su. VIII. 3. 34, Sabara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the word can't yet abandon it for good. For, if the primary sense, vacyartha, is totally abandoned, how can the laksyartha be conveyed at all? SB. on VIII. 3.34 MI. Su. reads - 'svarthe vartamanah sadrsyam gamayati. svartham jahat katham gamayet? - Thus even this laksyartha has to be sabdartha. We can observe that the condition of 'tad-yoga' finds acceptance here. A word, Sabara observes, even by laksana, has no power to convey 'a-sabdartha', i.e. some sense, which has no connection whatsoever with the sabda : SB. on Mi. Su. VIII. iii. 24, pp. 1622 reads - "na ca laksanaya prayoge a-sabdarthah paricchidyate. yatkaranam svarthe vartamano'rthantaram laksayati. svartham jahan naiva laksayet." And if the word has to have any connection with the indicated sense or laksyartha, it can have it only through its vacyartha. So, if the word does not first express its vacyartha, there is no possibility of its going further and conveying laksyartha. If stated simply, it means that the laksyartha must be connected with the mukhyartha in one way or the other, and this we can suggest in the words of later alamkarikas, by the term 'tad-yoga' i.e. "relation with that (= vacyartha)". This fact is beautifully For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 473 explained by Sabara, under Mi. Su. I. iv. 23. Sabara observes - (pp. 357, 360) katham nu svarthabhidhanena pratyavastha iti cet, artha-sambandhat. simha iti nirjnate prasahya-karita tatra prayena iti prasahyakariti gamyate, artha-pratyayasamarthyat. yo hi manyate prasahyakarinam pratyayaye yam iti, sa yadi simhasabdam uccarayati siddhyati asya abhipretam. simharthah pratitah, sambandhat itaram artham pratyayayati.' evam svarthabhidhane tad-guna-sambandhah pratiyate." Now we come to decide the exact nature of the secondary sense that we arrive at with the help of laksana. So, we will examine the different kinds of 'tad-yoga' which make laksana possible. In this context, it may be noted that, in general, a word may figuratively convey (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, i.e. - matvarthalaksana, (ii) the place - i.e. desa-laksana, (iii) the dharma or guna, i.e. dharmalaksana or guna-vada., (iv) the time or kala-laksana, (v) the action, i.e. karmalaksana, (vi) the karya or the sadhya (vii) the karana or sadhana, (viii) some sajatiya or (ix) the lingin. Which of these is conveyed in a given illustra depends on the will of the speaker, though some general indications regarding these can be pointed out with some amount of certainty. "Udbhida yajeta" is an illustration, which the purva-paksin holds to be one of natvarthiya laksana'. This means that that the sentence can be put as : udbhida yagena svargam bhavayet." . But how can we explain the apposition between 'udbhida' and yagena' ? The purva-paksin seeks explanation in matvartha-laksana and takes 'udbhida' to mean 'udbhidvata'. The argument is that laksana is a commonplace matter, laukiki, and hence it has to be preferred to a-prasiddha-kalpana or asuming an uncommon thing such as taking the word 'udbhid' as the name of a sacrifice. For the siddhantin the word 'udbhid', on the strength of etymology can signify the vaga, and hence no question of a-prasiddha kalpana ever arises. The appoisition can be satisfactorily explained by the vacyartha', or, say, the 'yaugikartha' only. So, for the siddhantin there is no scope for laksana in the text under discussion. Read SB. pp. 323, on Mi. Su. I. iv. 2 : yagena kuryad iti yajeta' ity asyarthah. karanam hi yagah. udbhidady api hi trtiya-nirdesat karanam. tatra udbhida yagena iti karmanama-dheyatvena samanadhikaranya'samanjasyam. dravyavacanatve matvarthalaksanaya samanadhikaranyam syat.... laksaneti ced varam laksana kalpita na yagabhidhanam. laukiki hi laksana, atho'aprasiddha-kalpana iti.... anuvada hy udbhidadayah. kutah praptir iti cet, tato bhidhiyate. ucshabda-samarthyad bhicchabda-samarthyat ca udbhid-sabdah kriyavacanah. udbhedanam prakasanam pasunam anena kriyate ity udbhid yagah... evam sarvatra. For Personal & Private Use Only

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474 SAHRDAYALOKA The purvapaksa is silenced but the observation that resorting to laksana is better than a-drsta-kalpana is a sound one. The illustration of matvarthiya laksana is, "somena yajeta", where the text is explained as, 'somavata yagena istam bhavayer. It is possible to explain the apposition i.e. samanadhikaranya between 'somena' and 'yagena' only through laksana. Desa-laksana is illustrated by such popular expressions as, "agnau tisthati" or, 'avate-tisthati'. A vedic illustration is seen in the text, viz. "kavatisu rathantaram gayati". Here the vacyartha of 'kavatisu' is a mis-fit. The purvapaksin suggests that by resorting to laksana 'kavatisu' should be taken as 'kavati-dese'. The siddhantin idea. He says that the word 'rathantaram' is not a samskara sabda and so there is no difficulty if we accept even the vacyartha of kavatisu'. So, for want of mukhyarthabadha, there is no scope for laksana at all in this text. However, the type of laksana suggested by the purva-paksin is noteworthy. Sabara has given another illustration of this variety in 'gangayam gavah', which, comes closer to our 'gangayam ghosah'. This, for the alamkarikas is "buddha laksana-laksana". a-paksin suggests another alternative. He says that the word 'rathantaram' should be taken to mean 'rathantara-dharmah' : SB. p. 1545 reads - "dharma-laksana va syat. rathantaradharma va kavatisu rathantara-sabdena atidisyante. yatha rathantare prastuyamane prthivim manasadhyayed ity evama"dayah. yatha acarye prosite acaryani bhavatam acarya iti acarya-susrusa "caryanyam atidisyate". But this proposal of dharma-laksana is also rejected by the siddhantin who refuses to accept any laksana in the said text. Sentences like 'simho devadattah' and 'agnir manavakah' are popular illustrations of this type of dharma-laksana. : SB. p. 755 - reads - "gunad va'py abhidhanam syat..." (Mi. Su. III. ii. 4) - guna-samyogat gaunam idam abhidhanam bhavisyati. bhavati hi gunad apy abhidhanam. yatha simho devadattah, agnir manavaka it." - Here the words 'simha' and 'agni' stand for their qualities. This type can be placed with 'gauni saropa laksana' of the alamkarikas, normally illustrated by, "gaur vahikah". For the alamkarikas, however, the laksyartha is 'vyakti', but for the mimamsakas, it is dharmas. Sabara here observes : 'para-sabdah paratra prayuktas san dharman atidisati. (on Mi. Su. VII. iv. 8). Sabara also observes, under Mi. Su. VII. 3.17, that, "sruty arthasambhavat ca laksanaya dharmanam grahaka ucyate. Jaimini, under Mi. Su. I. ii. 10, calls this dharma-laksana as gunavada. SB. p. 213 has - "gunavadas tu. gauna esa vado bhavati yat-sambandhini stotavye For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 475 sambandhy antaram stuyate." So, "stenam manah", is given as an example of guna-vada, and Sabara explains the sentence as - "yatha stenah pracchanna-rupa evam ca mana it gaunah sabdah." But we should note that the word 'guna-vada' is used by Jaimini and Sabara in a sense much wider than dharma-laksana. It means 'upacara' or secondary usage in general. This is borne out by the fact that, 'anrtavadini vak' is given as yet another example of gunavada where laksana does not convey dharma or guna but 'bahulya' or 'prasastya'. Sabara observes - (on Mi. Su. I. ii. 11, pp. 127) : "gunavadas tu rupat. yatha stenah pracchannarupah evam ca mana iti gaunah sabdah. prayac ca amstavadini vag iti." - Thus, it seems, Jaimini lays down 'rupa' and 'praya' as two possible grounds for gunavada, among others - "Mi. Su. I. ii. 11, - "rupayat prayat". Next variety of laksana is "kala-laksana" Quite often time is indicated by an incident which normally occurs at a particular hour. The popular illustration, is, "go-raja-muhurta". Sabara gives another illustration while commenting on Mi. Su. VI. iv. 42. A friend invites his intimate person with the words, "sankha-velayam agantavyam", though in fact a conch may not be blown in the village where both of them are staying. But the other person knows that actual blowing of conch is not meant but only the particular hour of blowing is meant. Sabara observes : (on Mi. Su. VI. iv. 42, pp. 1454) - "yatha sankha-velayam agantavyam iti. yasminn api grame sankho na'dhmayate tasminn api sa tatha kalo'stiti na"gamanam parihasyate." We may observe that even Sabara has not provided illustrations from vedic texts only for all sub-varieties of laksana which the Mimamsakas accept. So, in fact the difference between language patterns as seen in the veda and, in the popular usage are identical. Karma-laksana is opposite in nature to kala-laksana, which occurs when a word expressive of an incident or an act is used to indicate time. Karma-laksana requires that a word expressive of time is used to indicate an incident or act. In the text viz., "amavasyayam nisi", the word amavasya primarily expressing time is proposed to be understood as secondarily indicating sacrifice called 'darsa'. : SB. on Mi. Su. XII. ii. 14, pp. 2243 reads - "na'mavasya-sabdah karma-vacanah. kim tarhi ? kala-vacanah. kale srutih karmani laksana." Read also SB. on Mi. Su. IV iv. 19 - pp. 1278 - "atra kala evayam mukhyah sabdo na karmani, karmani laksana." Next comes a variety of laksana, where a word expressive of the sadhya or karya is used to indicate the sadhana or the karana, and vice versa. In the vedic For Personal & Private Use Only

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476 SAHRDAYALOKA text, viz. "prsthair upatisthate", the word 'prstha' is to be understood to signify, not the sacrificial act called 'prstha', but the mantras which are used during the performance of that act. Read Mi. Su. VII. iii. 36 and SB on it - "abhidhanopadesad va vipratisedhat dravyesu prstha-sabdah syat." In the text, viz. "atha yat tristubha paridadhati nantam gacchati", the word 'tristubh' stands for "usnik-kakubhau", on which Sabara observes - "karane karyavad upacarah kstah." He observes : (pp. 1323, on Mi. Su. V. iii. 6) - "tristubham evayam usnik-kakubhav iti brute. katham ? tristubho viryam ity evam ante samstuteh. tristubho va etad viryam yad usnikkakubhav iti. karane karyavad upacarah krtah." We come across a similar type of laksana in texts like, 'yajamanah prastarah yajamanah ekadasa-kapalah'. It is clear that this apposition of the two words 'yajamana' and 'prastara' or 'yajamana' and 'ekadasa-kapala', can not be adequately explained by sticking to the vacyartha of these words. So, by laksana, the word 'yajamana' has to be taken to mean 'yajamana-siddhi-kara'. T apposition between two words can be explained by adopting 'siddhi-karatvalaksana', which is explained by Sabara citing popular illustration viz. "raja pattiganakah". - Read SB. on Mi. Su. I. 4, pp. 360 : "iha tu yajamanah prastarah, yajamanah eka-kapala iti kidrso guna-sambandhah pratiyate. tat-siddhikara iti. sarvo hi atmanah karya-siddhim karoti. anyo'pi yas tasya karya-siddhim karoti sa tasmin uccarite hrdayam agacchati. yatha raja pattiganaka iti. patti-ganako rajnah karyam sadhayati. sa raja-sabda uccarite pratiyate. evam iha'pi yajamana-karyam prastaraika-kapalau sadhayatah. tasmat tau yajamanasabdena pratyayyete. Bhuma or bahulya is one more principle underlying laksana. There is a vedic expression viz. "srstir upadadhati". The literal meaning of this text is, 'srstimantraka upadadhati istakah'. All the mantras required for 'istaka-cayana', are normally given beforehand, and the text has to be understood as referring to them only. But, some of these mantras are, "a-srsti-linga" - (i.e. not containing the word srsti or Vsrj, in them). Yet they are to be in the srsti-mantras with the help of a-jahallaksana based on bhuma. Read SB. pp. 363, Mi. Su. I. iv. : bhuma; katham tu asrstisu ca srsti-sabdah iti. bhumna. bahavas tatra srsti-linga mantra, alpaso vi-lingah." 'Linga-samavayat' is a sutra in which, Jaimini notes a type of laksana having a widely different process involved. The text, by way of illustration is, "pranabhita upadadhati". If taken in its primary sense, it would mean, "pranabhinmantraka upadadhati istakah." This will not include the 'a-pranabhin-mantras' and lead to For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 477 the 'anarthakya' of such other mantras. Thus the word 'pranabhru' is to be taken in its secondary sense so as to contain all other mantras which are 'a-pranabhin' and which are placed in the same group of mantras, one or two of which are 'pranabhrn-mantraka'. This is known as chatri-nyaya, and the popular illustration is, "chatrino yanti', or 'chatrino gacchanti'. Here the underlying principle is not 'bhuma' or 'bahulya', but the 'pradhanya' or principality of the expressed sense. The basis then, in such cases of laksana is some peculiar or prominant mark or 'linga'. See Mi. Su. I. 4 - and Sabara on it - "linga-samavayat". - linga-samavayat para-sabdah paratra vartate. yatha 'chatrino gacchanti' iti ekena chatrina sarve laksyante. na ca'yam pranabhrcchabdah sssti-sabdas ca jahatsvartham mantraganam laksayet. yad-gane ca srsti-pranabhrcchabdau samavetau tau api parigrhyete. yatha chatri-sabdena svartha-laksanarthena so'pi chatri grhyate." Thus, this 'linga', the basis of this type of laksana, is noticed in any part or portion, of what is to be indicated. But this 'linga' has to be pradhana or principal among all. The last variety of laksana as explained by the Mimamsaka theorists is 'praise' or prasamsa-laksana. The illustration is the vedic text viz. "a-pasavo va anye goasvebhyah, pasavo va go-asvah." Other animals, excepting cows and horses are here said to be no animals at all. But this statement surely does not mean what it says. So, sabara explains it as, "gosvan prasamsitum anyesam pasunam ninda." (SB. on Mi. Su. I. 4 - prasamsa.). This prasamsa laksana comes closer to dharma-laksana for naturally the praise intended is addressed to some quality. At Mi. Su. VIII. ii. 6, Jaimini clearly says that the word 'soma' is used for prasamsa. Sabara takes one more illustration to explain this variety by taking, 'yatha simho devadatta iti' as an example. Sabara concludes with a remark that, "tasmat nama ayam dharmatidesah." All these varieties share some common traits such as, (i) there is mukhyarthabadha, (ii) laksyartha is conveyed by the word through its vacyartha and (iii) the laksyartha accepted meets the need of the context. Any meaning cannot be taken up as laksyartha. Sabara has a clear statement to this effect, viz. "yena ca tatra prayojanam sa laksyate." Thus the three conditions for laksana as laid down by the alamkarikas are met with here. But Prof. Devasthali makes an interesting observation (pp. 90. ibid) that, "prayojana (the third condition) spoken of by the Mimamsakas is not the same as the prayojana of the rhetoritians mentioned in connection with laksana. For the latter is 'wanga' i.e. conveyed by wanjan, which certainly can't find any place in the mimamsa view. which refuses For Personal & Private Use Only

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478 SAHRDAYALOKA to accept vyanjana as a sabda-sakti at all. Thus prayojana as spoken of by the Mimamsakas as a condition for laksana is not a technical term, but has the ordinary sense viz. the purpose in view. It is but natural therefore, that the Mimamsaka does not recognize 'rudhi' as one of the pre-requisites of laksana as the rhetoricians do it as an alternative for prayojana; for he does not accept rudhilaksana at all. As we have already seen above, 'kusala' and 'pravina' which are given as illustrations of rudhi-laksana by the rhetoritians are only cases of abhidha according to the Mimamsakas." (SB. on Mi. Su. VI. iv. 42). Prof. Devasthali's remarks are sound but we may add something to supplement the same. We know that there are some alamkarikas who also do not accept 'rudhi' in case of laksana. Acarya Hemacandra (ka. sa. pp. 22, Edn. Dr. Nandi) observes - "kusala-dvirepha-dvika"dayas tu saksat-samketa-visayatvat mukhya eva iti na rudhir laksyasya arthasya hetutvena asmabhir ukta." We feel that even 'gauni' which Hemacandra recognises as a separate vrtti from laksana, also does not seem to be 'rudhi-mula'. This apart, we feel that Prof. Devasthali's observation that for the Mimamsaka, the term 'prayojana' does not carry the 'technical sense' of the alamkarikas, but means just, "the purpose in view" - an 'ordinary sense', is debatable. He himself has quoted Sabara (pp. 89) saying "go-asvan prasamsitum anyesam pasunam ninda". - Now this 'prasamsa' is not directly stated and even 'ninda' is also, we may add, not directly stated. Even in ordinary speech, and also in scientific documents you come across the unmistakable undertone of vyanjana. Our humble argument is that the thinkers of various disciplines such as grammar, nyaya or logic, and Mimamsa did not talk about vyanjana because they were dealing with sastra - or discipline in which only the scientific use of language mattered. They did not concern themselves with aesthetic and the poetic use of language because they had no business to do it while discussing the sastra. Or else, if prasamsa or dharma is taken as 'vyangya', we are sure, the Mimamsaka would not commit suiside ! Prof. Devasthali further continues that the circumstance about laksana gives us another fact about it, viz. that it would be wrong, after taking up a laksyartha we are again required to resort to laksana for a second time in case of one and the same word. So, Prof. Devasthali here rules out what may be termed a case of laksitalaksana. Laksana once resorted to, will satisfy the purpose and there would be no question of resorting to laksana for a second time. We know that alamkarikas also reject this. Sabara on Mi. Su. X. iii. 23, and X. V. 58, gives two examples of laksitalaksana. The point is as to what exactly is indicated by the word agni, when it is used to enjoin the devata of a 'havih' i.e. - offering. If the word is taken to stand for the For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 479 meaning i.e. artha i.e. fire, and not for the sabda i.e. its form only, we find that the purpose of the passage remains unserved. As is known to us, it is by its verbal form, rather than its physical form, that a deity serves the purpose of sacrifice. So, if the word agni is accepted to stand for its artha, i.e. fire, we will have to put this position aside, it being not relevant for the purpose and we will have to go for laksana and get at the 'verbal form' as something indicated. Thus, we travel first from sabda to artha, and then again resort to sabda. But then it will be simpler to hold that the form of the word is itself directly expressed by the word and it is futile to get engaged in laksana. Another instance given by Sabara is exactly of the same type as is seen from Sabara's remark in that connection. He observes - "anyatha rathantara-samani adhyavasiya antarena padam laksyate padena sama, saisa, laksita-laksana syat." (SB. on Mi. Su. X. v. 58, 'dvitiya-varnakam'.) One more point to be noted concerning laksana is a natural outcome of the fact that laksana is laukiki. We notice that before we arrive at the laksyartha, we are acquainted with the requirement of the sentence in question. This shows that the laksyartha is already known. Now, it is obvious that what is already known can't be the concern of a 'vidhi'. It must be only, 'anuvada'. So, we come to the finding that laksana is possible in an 'anuvada' only, and never in 'vidhi'. This fact is differently stated when it is observed that a sentence where we have to resort to laksana shall not be construed as a vidhi' and that it must be taken as an 'anuvada' only. Sabara observes : (pp. 1278), "anuvade hi laksana nyayya, na vidhau." and (pp. 364) na'nuvadapakse laksanayam dosah; and also (pp. 1201) - yajna"yudhasabdasc a'nuvadapakse nyayyo, na vidhi-pakse. gauno hi sa ayudhasabdah sphyadinu.; and (p. 141) - vidhau hi na parah sabdarthah pratiyate." Sabara refers to this point at many places but at one place (Mi. Su. X. ii. 47) he has very clearly explained the truth behind this observation. The text concerned is - "tatah samvatsare asthini yajayet." The question is with reference to the sense of the word 'yajayet'. The observation is that as this is a 'vidhi', it is not allowed to resort to laksana, and take the term 'yajayet' to stand for something else. Sabara clearly says that a figurative signification is not perceived from a vidhi-sabda. He says that a figurative word is connected with a sense which is determined on the strength of some other thing i.e. laukika-pramana. - Read SB. on Mi. Su. X. ii. 47, pp. 1847 - "na ca gaunortho vidhi-sabdad avagamyate. anyena hi pramanena paricchinnerthe gaunah sabdah sambadhyate. yatha gaur anubandhyah iti go-jati-visistah pasur anubadhyate, na vahikah. gaurayam vahika iti tu samvade vahike gaunah sabdah pravartate." What is meant is that 'vidhi' is 'svatah-pramana' so the sense perceived For Personal & Private Use Only

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480 SAHKDAYALOKA through vidhi will have to be perceived from the words of the text only and from no other source beyond that. But the metaphorical sense is known from pramana other than the sabda i.e. words of the text. This shows that laksyartha cannot be the purport of a vidhi-vakya. This clearly amounts to say that laksana is not admissible, or it has no scope, in an injunctive statement. This rule is limited to vedic injunctions and it is not applicable to statements in ordinary parlance, wherein an injunction also can be laid down in a metaphorical style. All this discussion pertains to one single fact that as a discipline, the Mimamsa concerns itself only with direct statements where clear vacyartha predominates and where there are no overtones of senses to be countered. This is so because all such metaphorical expressions are likely to cause confusion as to the intention of a vedic text concerned. Precisely because of this that laksana is looked upon as a 'dosa' - a blemish. Setting aside the natural and direct mode of interpretation and resorting to an unnatural or indirect mode is a dosa', simply because, the latter involves 'gaurava' and is, as such, slow in its functioning. Any mode or construction, which yields us the required sense in a shorter span of time and with less trouble is certainly to be preferred and therefore we reject the other as being more elaborate and therefore faulty. Laksana thus involves a lengthier process than abhidha and is therefore a dosa when scientific literature is concerned. It is only to avoid a greater eventuality of 'anarthakya' that laksana is permitted by the Mimamsa. 'Anarthakya' is termed as a greater evil. To save a text from being stamped as nugatory, laksana is admitted. And naturally in a scientific use of language where things are expected to be placed only in the straightest way possible, it is 'abhidha or direction expression which scores over the figurative way of presentation. But laksana is preferable to anarthakya per se, or anarthakya caused by vipratisedha. Adrsta-kalpana is another evil which is also accepted to be greater than laksana. So, laksana is ever preferred here. For, laksana, after all, is laukiki and sanctioned by normal usage, while adrsta-kalpana or aprasiddha-kalpana has no such sanction behind it. Sabara also points out 'vyavadhana' and 'vakyabheda', as two other evils taken as worse than laksana which is to be preferred over them. In the text, viz. "khalevali yupo bhavati", there is a question regarding the construction of the word "khalevali". Is it to be construed with 'yupa' or 'bhavati' ? If it is construed with the word 'yupa', we shall have to take the word 'yupa' as indicating 'yupakarya' by resorting to karya-laksana. In this case, the construction of the word with 'bhavati' is vitiated by 'vyavadhana'. Thus we have to choose between two evils. We opt for a lesser evil by accepting the former construction. Here laksana is taken as For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 481 a lesser evil, as Sabara suggests that 'vakya' is 'pratyaksa' in 'laksana', but it is 'paroksa' in vyavadhana. - Read SB. on Mi. Su. X. ii. 69, pp. 1861 - "khalevalya yupata vidhiyate na yupasya khalevalita. tatha'vyavahitena bhavatina sambandhat pratyaksam vakyam. itaratha vyavahitena paroksam syat. khalevalisabdas ca yah khale varane pravartate tasya vacakah. tathabhutas ca yupakarye viniyujyate. yah khalevali sa yupa iti. sakyate ca yupakarye viniyoktum. yat tu yupa-sabdah karyalaksanartha iti. vyavadhanallaksana api jyayasi. pratyaksam vyavadhane vakyam." What Sabara aims to explain here is that in the former though we have to resort to laksana, yet the 'ekavakyata' we protect is direct, and does not involve any reshuffle of the constitutent words. In the latter case, there is absence of ekavakyata if we do not re-arrange the words in a different way. Thus the ekavakyata in the latter case is only indirect i.e. paroksa, while in the former it is direct or pratyaksa. Sabara suggests while commenting on Mi. Su. XI. ii. 2, that laksana is preferred to vakyabheda, where while discussing the meaning of the text - viz. "same darsa-purna-masabhyam yajeta...." etc., he points out that the word viz. darsa-purna-masabhyam' in the text, must be understood as indicating the whole group of sacrifices like the 'agneya', so that the text may be construed as one vakya. If we do not do this, we will have to admit the text as being 'anekartha' and thus admit 'vakyabheda' here. Here again two evils prop up, and we have to choose the lesser evil called 'laksana', as, ultimately, it being 'laukiki will yield good sense. 'Anekarthatva' of what surely is one vakya, will positively lead to confusion - SB. on Mi. Su. XI. ii. 2; pp. 2136 - "nanu evam api laksana"srita bhavati. varam laksana naika-vakyasya anekarthatvam. anekartharve a-gamakatvam. laksana'nugamika, laukikatvat." Thus for the Mimamsakas, anekarthatva or vakyabheda is a greater blemish as compared to laksana. This fact can be put in a different way also. Laksana, as is clear, is only a pada-dosa, i.e. it has reference to pada or sabda only to which it does some injustice by putting aside its vacyartha. But anekarthatva or vakyabheda is a blemish of a vakya, as we are doing injustice with the whole sentence in it. Thus a more serious nature as compared to laksana, and therefore, it should be considered as worse. Thus, laksana, a dosa in itself is preferred only as a last resort to avoid greater dosas. So, every acceptance of laksana has to be defended or justified by itself. It is not correct to hold that if one word is metaphorically used in a given text, it is so everywhere. This is so even in ordinary usage where the word 'gangayam' does not mean 'ganga tate' in all expression. For the Mimamsaka, a laksana, only if For Personal & Private Use Only

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482 SAHRDAYALOKA justified, is admissible. The word 'simha' is laksanika in an expression like, 'simho devadattah', but it is not so, holds Sabara, in statements like, 'simham alabheta'. Sabara observes under Mi. Su. II. 22, pp. 531, "tasmin vakye sa yatra samprayukta iti gamyate pramanantarena, na sabdena, yatra tu tat pramanantaram na'sti na tatra vartitum arhati. yatha simho devadatta iti devadatta-vacanah pramanantarena, na tu simham alabheta iti yatra. tatra tu pramanantaram nasti." So, another natural outcome of this thinking is stated very consisely in the statement, viz. "gune tu anyaya-kalpana." This then is the thought-heritage as obtained from various schools of thought such as the vyakarana, nyaya and mimamsa, that shaped the concept of laksana with reference to the aestheticians i.e. alamkarikas. Alamkarikas by and large accept the three vrttis, viz. abhidha, laksana and vyanjana and also refer to the tatparya vrtti casually. We have seen how 'abhidha' is taken in a broader or narrower connotation by different alamkarikas. We have also noted that Anandavardhana's predecessors did not take up the problem of sabda-vyapara-vicara in greater details but it was perhaps the demand of situation that Anandavardhana took upon himself the establishment of vyanjana as a separate and independent sabda-Sakti over and above the much heard of, of course in his times, sabdavrttis such as abhidha and laksana and also tatparya. But we know that even he does not spend time in defining clearly any sabda-vrtti and was perhaps not much interested in the classification and varieties of this or that sabdavrtti. He did not wait for this because perhaps it was not his prime concern or perhaps also because by his time an all acceptable formula was evolved. It was only after the great challanges to vyanjana surfaced in the works of some of his great successors that Mammata and some of his illustrious successors thought it pertinent to exactly define and differentiate and even classify the various sabdavrttis. So, the actual task of defining and describing fully various sabda-vrttis, given available documents, begins with Mammata; but prior to him, as seen in case of abhidha, a discordant note was heard as early as in Mukula. We have treated Mukula's approach in his famous Abhidha-vrtta-matrka earlier while dealing with abhidha. However a short resume here also will be able to freshen up our impressions about how Mukula moves about with his task. We know that for Mukula laksana is part of abhidha. Mukula quotes Bhartrmitra suggesting five relationships that exist between the primary and the For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Laksana 483 indicated meaning. As noted earlier, they are : "abhidheyena sambandhat sadrsyat samavayatah, vaiparityat kriyayogal laksana pancadha mata." (quoted in AVM.) We will catch up with what exactly is meant in brief as follows : Abhidheyena sambandha : means some kind of relationship with the primary meaning - e.g. dvirepha' - primarily meaning having two `r-s, indicates 'a bee', through the word 'bhramara'. Yet another example is, "turanga-kanta-"nanahavyavaha" meaning 'agni', through its relation to the word - vadavamukha'gnih - This sort of laksana is accepted only if it has the backing of popular usage, or if we can find a special motive in resorting to such involved expression. Else than this, it is a blemish, called 'neyartha'. Mukula considers that all cases of arriving at some other meaning through the agency of the primary sense, make for laksana. Thus, for Mukula, the so called arthapatti as illustrated in such an expression as. "pino devadattah diva na bhunkte", which leads to the understanding of his eating by night, also is a case of laksana. This is a far fetched application of "abhidheyena - sambandha", which is not acceptable to other thinkers. Actually we may say that abhidheyena-sambandha' is nothing else but the condition of 'tad-yoga' and this tad-yoga as we know from later alamkarikas is of various types such as sadrsya, samavaya, vaiparitya, samipya, sva-svamibhava, adhara"dheyabhava and what not ? So, actually Bhartsmitra's karika harps upon this condition of tadyoga only and broadly speaking the first condition may be taken as covering up the rest also, which hardly deserve separate mentioning. 'sadrsya' is illustrated as in, "simho manavakah", samavaya as in 'gangayam ghosah, vaiparitya as in, "brhaspatir ayam murkhah'; kriyayoga, as 'samare satrghnah tvam', and we may say that here through association with some action, someone is described to be 'satsghna' - the killer of foes, as well as the great hero of the Ramayana. Such other lists of conditions that make for laksana are also advanced by later writers. Nagesa, for example, in his Parama-laghu-manjasa (p. 7) names five such relations adding 'tadarthya' to the list of four as given by Patanjali earlier. They are - For Personal & Private Use Only

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484 SAHRDAYALOKA "tatsthyat tathaiva taddharmyat tat-samipyat tathaiva ca, tat-sahacaryat tadarthyat jneya vai laksana budhaih." We will go to see how actually Mammata, Hemacandra, Visvanatha and some others also mention these. Broadly speaking these relations between the primary sense and the indicated sense can be classified into two categories such as (i) sadrsyamulaka and (ii) sadrsyetara-mulaka relations. Kumarila clearly distinguishes between one based on similarity and the other based on anything else than that. He calls the former as 'gauni and the latter as 'laksana', but as we will later that eventhough Mammata has subsumed these two under laksana, Hemacandra has once again raised the bogie of an independent 'gauni which is not just based on similarity but which is something else. So, the traditionally accepted division of laksana into gauni or upacara laksana and suddha based on relations other than similarity is not seen in Kumarila and some Mimamsakas for whom gauni is a separate vstti. We will talk of this later. We have seen how Kuntaka in his 'vicitra abhidha' meaning just 'poetic expression' and not just either abhidha, or laksana or vyanjana, covers up even laksana. We have also noted how Bhoja also, in his wider concept of abhidha, covers up both gauni and laksana. Mammata in his Kavyaprakasa quotes Kumarila Bhatta saying, "abhidheya'vinabhutapratitir laksanocyate, laksyamanagunairyogat vstter ista tu gaunata." (K.P. II. pp. 50, Edn. Jalkikar), (Tantravarttika I. iv. 22) He adds, - "avinabhavo'tra sambandha-matram, na tu nantariyakatvam. tattve hi, 'mancah krosanti' ityadau na laksana syat. avinabhave ca"ksepena eva siddher laksanaya nopayoga ity uktam." (Tr. Prof. Dwivedi.) "Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication. (viz. vahika)." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 485 Here, 'the state of not being without' (avinabhava) means connection in general, but not an invariable relation. For, if it were so, there would be no indication in such cases as, "the cots cry"; and if invariable relation were to exist then the assumption (or inference) alone will do, there will be no use of indication." Mammara explains that if the relation is that of similarity, the transfer is qualitative (gauni); and if it is any other relation as for instance of cause and effect, owner and owned, measure and measured, part and whole, etc. etc., it is pure laksana. So, the secondary meaning is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be incompatible with the context. However, we will go to see later that not only mukhyartha-badha but even 'tatparya-anupapatti' or non-realization of the speaker's) intention is also taken to be at the root of laksana by later thinkers. The fact, hower, remains that the indicated sense, or secondary meaning is arrived at, not directly from the word itself but only through the primary meaning. We have seen the position of laksana in general in the thinking of various schools of philosophy such as the Vyakarana, Nyaya, Mimamsa etc. We have also clearly, seen the treatment of laksana under Sabara : Now, following Sabara, Kumarila discusses some of the theories about the real nature of secondary usage based on qualities, i.e. gauni in instances such as "simho devadattah". What follows is in the light of Dr. K. K. Raja's presentation. (i) The first theory holds that the word 'lion' is denotative of the whole aggregate of the class, its qualities and actions. Though, of course, all the elaments of this meaning are not applicable to the individual called 'devadatta', the word is applied to him indirectly on the basis of some elements found in him. - Tantravarttika, p. 356 observes - "anyesam tu darsanam sarva eva hi simha"di-sabda jati-guna-kriyasamudaya"disu katipaya-guna-kriyayogat upacaryanta iti." Sabara had rejected this view on the ground that an aggragate cannot refer to one part separately. Kumarila also notes that the term 'hundred' cannot refer to 'fifty' even if the latter is part of the total aggregate : "samudayartha-vacitve naikadese bhaved gatih, satasabdan na pancasan mukhya-rupena gamyate." The Mimamsakas again hold that, the primary meaning of a word is the class or universal, and not actions or qualities. For Personal & Private Use Only

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486 SAHRDAYALOKA (ii) Kumarila discusses another theory also. It holds that in a secondary usage based on quality, i.e. in qualitative metaphor, the character of one is imposed on another. - "kascit punar aha, samaropita-tadbhavo gauna iti." In the illustration viz., 'simho devadattah', the full nature of the lion is imposed on devadatta' on the basis of actions and qualities of this individual called 'devadatta', which are found to be similar to those of the lion. Sabara and following him Kumarilabhatta criticize this view on the ground that such an identity is totally impossible, since the man and the lion have distinct characteristics. Only under some delusion on the part of the speaker, or the hearer, or both, that the characteristics of one object can be superimposed on the other. Thus, for example, there is imposition of water on mirage. But in case of the secondary usage, there is no delusion, as both the speaker and the listener are aware of the difference between a man and a lion, and hence none can have the power to impose the character of the lion on the body - Tantravarttika p. 358 has "dvav api pratipadyete simha-pumsor viviktatam, nadhya"ropayitum saktis tenaikasya'pi vidyate." (iii) The Mimamsakas hold that a qualitative metaphor is based on the existence of some common qualities between the primary and the actual. They argue that all significations of a word are, in one way or the other, connected with its primary sense and that we should not assume any other potency in a word, if it is possible to explain the secondary meanings also as derived from the primary meaning. In the illustration, viz. simho devedattah, the word simha, conveys the universal simhatva which indicates such qualities as courage, and the presence of such qualities as courage in 'devadatta', justifies calling him a lion : Tantravarttika, p. 354 reads : "vahnitva-laksitad arthad yad paingalya"di gamyate, tena manavake buddhih sadnsyad upajayate." The Buddhist view : In Sthiramati's commentary on the Trimsika of Vasubandhu, there is some discussion on the metaphorical expression such as, "agnir manavakah". Three conditions for such a figurative expression are given as For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 487 (i) the primary thing referred to, (ii) the actual thing resembling the primary one and (iii) a common quality existing between the two. In the illustration on hand, the primary meaning of the word 'agni' is fire; the actual thing referred to is the boy Manavaka, who resembles the fire and the qualities common to both are the quality of brightness, tawny colour and fiery nature. A prima-facie view is presented. The point is that this figurative description cannot be applied to the boy either on the ground of universal common attribute of "fire-ness", nor on the basis of the qualities a particular fire. The colour or fiery nature is not the essential quality of fire, as, on that ground, 'fire-ness' will be present in the boy also and no need will arise for a figurative transfer. Again, it cannot be applied to the boy on the basis of qualities in a particular fire, for as the quality is inseparably linked with the substratum, the brightness of the boy is essentially different from that of the fire. What, at the most we can say is that the quality of the fire is similar to that of the boy and hence the qu figuratively applied to that of the boy, but not to the boy himself : Read - vijnana matrata-siddhi, pt. I. pp. 17 - "upacaro hi trisu bhavati, nanyatamabhave, mukhyapadarthe tatsadrse tayosca sadnsye. tad yatha mukhye'gnau tatsadese manavake tayosca sadharanadharme kapilatve, tiksanatve va saty agnir manavaka ity upacarah kriyate..." and also - avinabhavitve copacarabhavo'gnav iva manavake'pi jatisadhbhavat. tasman na manavake'pi jatisadbhavat. tasman na manavake jaty upacarah sambhavati. na'pi dravyopacarah, samanyadharma'bhavat. na hi yo'gnes tiksno gunah, kapilo va, sa eva manavake... evam agnigunasyaiva manavake... evam agnigunasyaiva manavakagune sadrsyad upacaro yuktah." Again, for the Buddhist logicians, there is no primary referent of a word, for the essential nature of an object transcends the pale of all forms of knowledge as noted by Prof. K. K. Raja (pp. 247, ibid). Each word, according to them, is applied to its object only indirectly by a sort of transfer or upacara. The thing-in-itself-i.e. - svalaksana-can never be directly denoted by a word. Read - "mukhya-padartho nasti, tasya sarvajnana-bhidhana-visayatikrantarvat... api ca sarva eva'yam gauna eva, na mukyo'sti." The same view is read even in Vigraha-vyavartani of Nagarjuna, a buddhist writer again : Read, there on p. 1, "sarvesam bhavanam sarvatra na vidyate svabhavas'cet, tvadvacanam asvabhavam na nivartayitum svabhavam alam." There, an objection is raised to the For Personal & Private Use Only

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488 SAHRDAYALOKA effect that, if the words are themselves devoid of essential nature, it should not be possible to apply them to refute that essential nature. Non-existent fire does not burn; then how could words which have no reality be used to prove that very unreality ? - Read pp. 2, ibid - "na hy asad agnina sakyam dagdhum, ... evam asata vacanena na sakyah sarvabhava-pratisedhah kartum". The answer is to be found in the Buddhist view that even though words have no direct connection with the ultimate reality, they have the power of practical utility - artha-kriya-karitva -, as they can refer to objects indirectly through figurative transfer i.e. upacara. We may also note that among the schools of thought which are opposed to the Buddhists and which accept the primary meaning of words to be a class, there are some mimamsakas who also accept that words denote the particular objects in a sentence, through the secondary power. For them the primary meaning of a word is universal which is the essential quality common to all the particular instances of the class. But when the word is used in a sentence, it has to refer to the particulars. Some are of the opinion that the particular comes from the universal because of invariable connection between the two, and still others explain it as being due to the secondary significative power i.e. transfer : Read - Vedantaparibhasa, IV. 17 - "katham tarhi gavadipadad vyakter bhanam iti cet, jater vyaktisamana-samvitsamvedyatvat iti bruma)... athava vyaker laksanayavagamah." So, according to Buddhists of the Yogacara school, and also according to some Mimamsakas, there is an element of transfer of meaning even in ordinary sentences. So, the normal cases of transfers like 'agnir manavakah', have to be taken as transfers of the second degree. Such metaphors based on quality are termed gauni by the Mimamsakas. But for the Buddists, the first type of ordinary usage is a metaphorical expression from the absolute point of view (i.e. paramarthika), whereas ordinary metaphors are metaphorical expressions from the worldly (vyavaharika) point of view, observes Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 249, ibid). We will continue to follow the lead of Dr. Raja till we start with alamkarikas, one by one, in their individual capacity, reviewing their esteemed works on poetics. Dr. Raja observes (pp. 249), that in all cases of metaphorical transfer of meaning, there has to be some intimate relation between the primary and the actual referents. Keeping in view the degree of intimacy to which the primary meaning is retained in the actual meaning, it is possible to note three types of laksanas. Though of course, the primary meaning of the word cannot be totally excluded in a transfer, we can observe its retention to a greater or lesser extent. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 489 * Samkara, in Brahma-sutra-bhasya on IV. 1.6, observes : "laksana ca yathasambhavam samnikrstena viprakrstena va svartha-sambandhena pravartate". Kumarila also observes - Tantravarttika, pp. 356 - "ajahatsvarthah sarvah sabdapravrttayah". The three kinds of laksana, generally accepted are - (i) Jahallaksana, or jahatsvartha laksana, (ii) ajahallaksana or ajahat-svartha laksana, and (iii) jahadajahallaksana. (i) Jahallaksana - In a sentence like 'gangayam ghosah', the primary sense of the word 'ganga', is abandoned and the secondary meaning, 'the bank of the ganges', is resorted to. This is called 'jahallaksana". In this variety, there will be nonintelligibility of the syntactical relation between the terms, if we take the primary meaning of the word. So, the primary sense has to be rejected to a great extent and another sense having some connection with the primary has to be accepted that can go with the context. We will go to see that Mammata calls it laksana-laksana. (ii) Ajahallaksana occurs when the primary sense is not completely rejected. The Tatrvabindu p. 155, observes - "na ca sarvatra svartha-parityagena eva laksana iti aikantikam. laksaniyanurodhenaiva hi sarvatra parigraha-parityagau." times, the primary sense is not substantially modified, but only specified by context, or is restricted by the function of the syntaxt, or is extended by the inclusion of another sense. In all such cases, the primary sense is not rejected but is included in the secondary sense. In the illustration, viz. "kuntah pravisanti", the word kuntah - meaning lances, - indicates, through indication, the lances themselves, and also the men who carry them. In the same way 'chatrino yanti' - i.e. people holding umbrellas are going', - indicates through laksana, a group of people, some with and others without umbrellas. We have seen above when we discussed the view of the Mimamsakas, that in the vedic text, viz.: srstir upadadhati', i.e. the srsti-bricks are placed, the word 'srsti' means by laksana, the bricks that are associated with a group of hymns with and without the word 'srsti'. This type of metaphorical transfer is called a-jahallaksana. We will go to see that Mammata will name it as 'upadana-laksana". According to the Bhatta Mimamsakas however, the primary meaning of a word is universal, and its power is exhausted in delivering this general sense only. So, for them, the sense of the particular has to be arrived at through laksana of the 'ajahat type. Mammata however, has no faith in this as we will see later. He seems to follow the prabhakaras in holding that, on account of the invariable connection between the universal and the particular, the latter is cognized as implied in the former. For Personal & Private Use Only

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490 SAHRDAYALOKA (iii) 'Jahad-a-jahad-laksana' is the third variety accepted by the Vedantins, in cases where only a part or an aspect of the primary meaning is retained while the rest stands rejected. In, illustrations such as 'pato dagdhah' (i.e. the cloth is burnt), or, 'gramo dagdhah', (i.e. a village is burnt), it is only a part of the cloth or village that is actually meant as burnt. Only a part of the primary meaning of the word 'pata' and 'grama' is retained. In a sentence, for example, 'so'yam devadattah', the term'sah' refers to 'devadatta' as determined by the past time and space, and the term 'ayam' refers to the same person as determined in the present time and place. Here, 'sah' and 'ayam' meaning 'that' and 'this' are two incompatible determinants and the sentence does not mean their identity. The sentence further does not mean also that the person as determined by 'this' is identical with the person determined by 'that. It simply means this much that there is identity of the substantive devadatta', by rejecting the elements that are incompatible. The two qualified entities, though not identical refer yet to the same substantive, viz. 'devadatta'. Thus the identity has relevance to the individual devadatta', who is not related to time, either past or present. The vedantins are keen on this type of laksana as they have to explain expressions like, 'tat tvam asi', 'aham bhrama asmi', etc. In the first sentence, 'tvam' does not mean 'Svetaketu the son of Uddalaka', but it refers to one who is stripped of all individual attributes such as limited intelligence etc. Again, 'tad' means 'universal soul, free from all qualifications such as omniscience etc. It is only the pure consciousness in the individual soul that is identified with the universal soul. Such instances, where a word signifying a qualified entity gives up a portion of its primary meaning and keeps up another portion, are taken as 'jahadajahad-laksana. Mallinatha, in his commentary on Ekavali observes : "svarthaikamsa-tyagad amsantaram eva laksyate yatra, sa jahad-ajahatsvartha 'tat tvam asity adivisaya-drsyeyam." Sadananda in Vedantasara calls it, bhagalaksana'. - (p. 95). Vedantaparibhasa, IV. 26 - has - "yatra hi visistavacakah sabdah svarthaikadesam vihaya, ekadese vartate, tatra jahadajallaksana. Appayya Dixit in Siddhantalesa-samgraha ls it to be - "bhaga-tyaga-laksana". The alamkarikas and the Naiyayikas have nothing to do with this third variety of laksana. All systems of philosophy have interest in laksana, as they try to define and explain the highest reality which in itself is beyond any explanation and our For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 491 language always falls short, or say fumbles in trying to explain the Supreme reality. Ordinarily speaking the word 'absolute' in the expression, say, 'absolute reality', is beyond definition. Sentences such as, "aham brahma asmi", "tat tvam asi", "sarvam khalu idam brahma", "vijnanam brahma", etc. are imperfect efforts to define the absolute and we see that first, second and third person-pronouns are all used to define, or say, explain the absolute. All this is metaphorical expression. Sankara observes in the Bshadaranyaka-upanisad-bhasya, that, - "nama va rupam va, karma va, bhedo va, jatir va, guno va, tad dvarena hi sabda-pravsttih bhavati; na caisam kascid viseso brahmany asti, ato na nirdestum sakyate." (Samkara, on Br. Up. II. 3.6) - This means that words denote things through one or ot! following : name, form, action, distinction, genus and quality, but in Brahman there is none of these differences and hence, It is beyond any description. But, to an extent, metaphorical expression, laksana becomes helpful in going beyond the limits of primary sense in matters concerning philosophical truths. Vyanjana has scope in poetry and also in worldly context to an extent, but is of no use in philosophical discourses and for this reason only the ancient thinkers have not talked of vyanjana in their writings concerning scientific disciplines. (iv) 'Laksita-laksana' is a fourth variety of figurative expression mentioned as accepted by some thinkers, but totally rejected, as we will go to see later, by alamkarikas of the eminence of Mammata and others. This occurs when the relation between the primary sense and the actual thing referred are not directly related, but have an indirect relation through some other word as in case of, say the word 'dvirepha' meaning, 'a word having two 'r-s', indicating the word 'bhramara' giving 'bee' as its primary meaning. According to the modern Naiyayikas, this can be subsumed under jahallaksana itself, and the Vedantaparibhasa is inclined to take even gauni laksana under this type, the relation being two referents being only indirect and brought about through the agency of the common qualities only. This then is the intellectual heritage with which alamkarikas start. We have noted that the earlier alamkarikas did not find it necessary, or perhaps compelling to define, describe and classify individual sabda-vrttis in their works, for reasons, perhaps best known to them. We have tried to screen their efforts and tried to suggest their know-how concerning the sabda-vsttis. Even Anandavardhana does not take upon himself the task of clearly defining the nature and scope of different sabda-vrttis, but while establishing vyanjana under Dhv. III. 33, in his Aloka, he distinguishes between vyanjana on one hand and abhidha and laksana, which he For Personal & Private Use Only

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492 SAHRDAYALOKA calls by the name of 'gunavrtti', on the other. This portion of Anandavardhana's thinking will be taken care of by us when we deal with vyanjana. In the same way, Abhinavagupta's brooding over sabda-vittis also will be subsumed under our general discussion on vyanjana. For the present, we will also note that we have dealt with even Mukulabhatta's treatment of laksana, under his wider concept of abhidha. However, being the first alamkarika after Anandavardhana to discuss the problem of Sabda-vrttis Mukula's views will be repeated here by way of a resume of the earlier lengthy discussion. Mukula, in his Abhidhayrtta-matrka has given a three-fold classification of laksana, such as (i) suddha, (ii) saropa and (iii) sadhyavasana. In suddha both the objects appear to be clearly distinct from each other, while in saropa, there is superimposition of one over the other, and in the third variety, the closeness between the two objects being so great, the difference is almost not apprehended. The object of superimposition is completely eclipsed or is swollowed by the object superimposed. The former i.e. the object of superimposition is not mentioned by a word, but only the other, the latter, i.e. the object superimposed is mentioned by a word. We have discussed Mukula's views on laksana on an ea occasion, so we will now begin with Mammata, who, as available written documents suggest, is the first great alamkarika, who clearly defines and classifies individual sabdavrttis in a very scientific way. Mammata :- In his K.P. II. 9 he observes : "mukhyarthabadhe tad yoge rudhito'tha prayojanat, anyo'rtho laksayate yat sa laksana"ropita kriya." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi) "Indication is that superimposed function whereby another meaning is conveyed either through usage or motive, when there is incompatibility of the primary meaning as well as its iterconnection." (Trans. R.C.D.; pp. 27, ibid) Thus, laksana or indication, or secondary usage, or metaphorical transfer in general takes place under certain conditions such as 'mukhyarthabadha' or incompatibility of the primary sense, tad yoga i.e. interconnection with the primary sense of the other sense dragged in, and finally rudhi i.e. usage or prayojana' i.e. motive make for the secondary usage coming into action. Mammata further elaborates in his vitti that - "karmani kusala ity adau darbha For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 493 grahana"dy ayogat, gangayam ghosa ity adau ca ganga"dinam ghosa"dy adhikaranatva'sambhavad mukhyarthasya badhe, vivecakatv adau samipy adau ca sambandhe, rudhitah prasiddheh, tatha gangatate ghosa ity adeh prayogad yesam tatha na pratipattis tesam pavanatv adinam dharmanam pratipadana"tmanah prayojanac ca, mukhyena'mukhyrtho laksyate yat, sa aropitah sabda-vyaparah, santarartha-nistho laksana." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi pp. 27. ibid) - "When owing to the absence of (logical) connection with the fetching of the grass etc., as in the cases like, 'expert in work, and owing to the impossibility of Ganga and the like being the site of a hamlet and the like in cases such as, 'a hamlet on the Ganga', there is the incompatibility of the primary meaning, and when there is the connection such as discrimination and proximity (respectively in the above cases), through usage i.e. through universal apprehension (in the first case), similarity ugh motive in the form of conveying in that manner those properties of coolness and holiness etc., which would not be so conveyed by the use of, 'a hamlet on the bank of the Ganga', (in the second case), that superimposed function of a word abiding in the intermediate sense is indication, conveying the secondary meaning through the primary." Govinda Thakkura (pp. 37, Edn. Anandashram SKT. Granthavalih - Pune, A.D. 1911, or pp. 256, Edn. Nag Prakashan, Dr. Jyotna Mohan, '95, Delhi) - in his Pradipa observes : "rudhih prasiddhih, prayojanam vyangyartha-pratipadanarupam. kriya vyaparah. atra, fanyo'rtho yal laksyate sa laksana iti laksanam laksyate pratipadyate ity arthah. ato na"tma"srayah. mukhyarthabadhah sakyarthasambandho rulhiprayojananyatarac ceti hetutraya-vacanam vyanjanayam saktismotau jati-vyapti-varanaya tadyoga iti laksanepi pravesaniyam. yogasya ca hetutvam vivaksitam. ato na mukhyartha-sambandhi-vyanjanayam ativyaptih. mukhyasya abhidharupa-mukhyartha-sambandhena pratipadyam sambhavati iti tadvaranayanya ity uktam. anyo'mukhyah. yad iti gunibhuta-laksana-kriya-matraparamarsah. tena, "sakya-sambandhena a-sakya-pritipattir laksana iti pracinamatena etal laksanam. 'tad-hetuh sakya-sambandho laksana' iti paramarthah.". pratipattih hetur hi vittih., na tu pratipattir eva. yat tu 'yadity asya 'yata' ity arthakataya sambandha-paratayaiva sutravyakyanam tad ayuktam. 'na bhidha samayabhavat hetvabhavanna laksana'ity atra 'mukhyartha-badha'di-trayam "hetuh', iti vyakhyanavirodhat, na hi sambandha-rupatve laksanayah sambandho hetur ghatate. nanu pratipadanam cel laksana tarhi sabda-dharmah. ganga"disabdanam nira"dikam upasthapya virame, nira"dy arthenaiva sambandhena tira"dy artha-pratipadanad ity ata aha, - 'aropita kriya' iti. sakya-vyavahita For Personal & Private Use Only

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494 SAHRDAYALOKA laksyartha-visayatvacchabde aropita eva sa vyaparah. vastuto'rthanistha eva ity arthah. tad etad uktam, 'santarartha-nisthah' iti." . The idea is that, 'yat anyah arthah laksyate sa kriya laksana' is the definition of laksana. "mukhyarthabadhe tadyoge rudhito'tha prayojanat" - talks about the three conditions under which laksana operates. "aropita" is descriptive part. "yah anyah arthah laksyate sa laksyarthah" is the definition of laksyartha that is indicated. This means that for Govinda Thakkura, according to Mammata, mukhyarthabadha etc. are the three factors placed in the 'nimitta' portion of laksana, while that by which another meaning is indicated', - is the only portion placed in the definition part of laksana. So, Mammata has not incorporated the 'tadyukta' pada in it, which is necessary. For, if this is not added in the definition, the definition will be wide enough to include even vyanjana in the fold of laksana. Thus the difinition will be too-wide or "ati-vyapta". We will go to observe that Visvanatha has taken greater care in defining laksana. It may be noted here that yat' means 'yaya kriyaya ity arthah'. 'yaya' ity arthe lupta-karana-trtiyantam avyayam. 'laksyate' means 'pratipadyate', and not ratipadyate'. For, if laksyate were to mean 'laksanaya pratipadyate', there would be the blemish called 'anyonya"sraya-dosa'. The presence of the word 'laksana' in the definition of laksana makes it impossible for us to understand the definition and thus leads to the blemish of 'mutual dependence' Jhalkikar (pp. 40, ibid) observes : - 'yad' iti 'yaya' ity arthe lupta-karanatltiyantam avyayam. yaya (vittya) anyo'rthah arthantaram (mukhyabhinnah) tata"dirupa iti yavat, laksyate pratipadyate sa (vrttih) laksanety ucyate ity arthah. yad va, 'yad' iti laksana-kriya-visesanam. anyor'tho yat laksyate, yat pratipadyate sa laksanety anvayah laksyate iti nijantad akhyatam. nijartho hetu-vyaparah. hetusca sabda iti anyartha-pratipatti-hetuh sabda-vyaparo laksanetyarthah sakyatavacchedaka"ropa-rupa, sakya-sambandha-rupa va, vaktstatparyarupa va iti anyad etat. 'aropite'ti, 'kriye'ti ca na laksana-ghatakam. kintu loksana-svarupakathana-param. sa hi aropita mukhyartha-vyavahita-laksyartha-visayatvat sabde kalpita. saksat-sambandhena mukhyarthanistha, parampara-sambandhena tu sabda-nistha ity arthah. kriya vyapara-rupa ca iti sutrarthah. yattv atra 'yad' iti kriya-visesanam. tatha ca yat laksyate yat pratipadyate sa pratipattir eva (jnanam eva) laksana iti kaiscid vyakhyatam, tad ajnana-vijrmbhitam. laksanaya abhidhavyanjanayor iva vrtti-rupataya vitti-janyayah pratipatter laksanarva-a-sambandhat. na hi vitter-vyaparatve kascid vivadah. asmat padad ayam artho boddhavya ity akarika isvareccha'pi preranagarbhatvena sadhyarupa eva iti pratibhavadbhih For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 495 suksmadrsa avadhatavyam - na ca "pratitir laksanocyate'iti agrima-granthavirodhah iti vacyam. tasyaikadesimatottankana-matra-paratvat. pratiti-padasya karana-vyutpannatvad va iti dik." It is clear that Jhalkikar explains yat by 'yaya vrttya', the power with which the secondary meaning is conveyed. 'yat laksyate' means that which is established, i.e. the power of words that is instrumental in conveying the secondary sense is 'laksana'. This 'laksana' is said to be an "aropita kriya" by Mammata and this can be explained as follows : It is 'sakyatavacchedaka"ropa-rupa' - sakya-sambandharupa va. The first attribute explains the fact that the meaning of 'vyakti' is implied by the meaning of 'jati'. The other explains that a meaning associated with sakyartha or mukhyartha is forced in as in 'gangayam ghosah'. This laksana is also said to be 'vaktr-tatparya-rupa', i.e. where the intention of the speaker is taken care of; as in case of viparita-laksana'. As Jhalkikar (pp. 40) clearly notes, the terms aropita kriya', are not part of the definition of laksana, but they merely describe its form. The idea is that through 'saksat' i.e. direct relation, it resides only in the 'mukhyartha' or 'primary meaning of a word', but through 'parampara-sambandha' through a chain-relation or indirect relation, it sticks with the word itself and hence it is termed 'aropita kriya', 'a superimposed function'. Here 'kriya' stands for 'vyapara' or 'function', 'activity'. Mammata terms laksana as 'kriya' i.e. 'vyapara'. Some people take 'yatra' as a 'kriya-visesana'; an 'adverb'. They define laksana as - "yat laksyate, yat pratipadyate sa pratipattir eva (= jnanam eva) laksana." i.e. the apprehension itself is laksana. But this is not correct, as laksana is of the form of vyapara, a function. It is a 'vrtti', and 'jnana' or apprehension is 'vrtti-janya' entity, i.e. that which is born of a 'vrtti'. It may be said that this will be in contradiction to the statement viz. "pratitir laksanocyate.", but this can be understood as follows. Here by 'pratiti' we understand the activity leading to congnition - "pratiyate anaya iti pratitih". That function by which a meaning is cognised is termed as 'pratiti'. Before we move to the topic of the varieties of laksana, here is something interesting from Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 258 etc.) - Regarding the condition, viz. mukhyartha-badha or incompatibility of the primary meaning, it is observed that without this, laksana is an impossibility. The moment a word is heard, its primary meaning flashes in our mind, it having a "direct and natural link with a given word. Only due to unsuitability of context, a resistance to our understanding of sentence-sense is caused and then to remove this resistance we resort to the secondary sense. Sabara, as seen above in detail, repeatedly points out that the secondary signification is to be resorted to only when For Personal & Private Use Only

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496 SAHRDAYALOKA the direct primary sense of a given word is inapplicable under a given context. He instists that whenever the direct statement and implied meaning are in conflict, the former has to be given preference. For this See Sabara-bhasya on Mi. Su. I. iv. 2, "sruti-laksana visaye ca srutir jyayasi; Mi. Su. IV. III-26 - "srutis' ca laksanaya gariyasi"; Mi. Su. VI. i. 51 - "sruti-laksana-visaye ca srutir nyayya, na laksana, Mi. Su. VII. ii. 13 - agatis' caisa ya laksana"srayanam." According to the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins, the secondary signification of a given word is apprehended through reasoning of the 'arthapatti' type, which makes for the postulation of a fact to explain two known facts which are apparently unaccountable. In the famous illustration viz. pino devadattah diva na bhunkte', - (The fat devadatta does not eat by day), the two known facts viz. of devatta being fat and his not eating by day, look to contradict each other if we do not postulate one more fact that he eats by night ! In the case of laksana, we have to find a way to reconcile two known facts, viz. the primary meaning of a given word known through remembrance and popular usage, and the intention of the speaker inferred from the context. When we here a boy being spoken of as lion, the primary meaning of the term lion looks impossible and the secondary meaning is known through immediate inference of the 'arthapatti' type and it is of the form of "the boy is similar to a lion in qualities such as courage, etc." This secondary meaning is related to the primary meaning and it can remove the apparent conflict between the primary and contextual meanings. Dr. Raja then tries to elaborate the exact meaning of 'mukhyarthabadha' or incompatibility of the primary meaning. According to ancient Naiyayikas and later alamkarikas (ref. pp. 259, ibid, Dr. Raja) - it is only the impossibility of the logical connection in the sentence. The Mimamsakas of the Prabhakara School also think alike. Salikanatha defines laksana as, "that which is resorted to for conveying a new sense which can be related to the sentence-meaning through the cognition of its primary sense, when that primary sense of the word has no logical connection with the sentence-meaning.' See, Vakyartha-matnka-vrtti, pp. 13 - "vacyasyarthasya vakyarthe sambandhan upapattitah, tat-sambandha-vasa-praptasya anvayal laksana mata." But for the later Naiyayikas and the Vedantins, as well as later grammarians, the incompatibility of the primary sense lies not merely in the difficulty of For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 497 establishing the logical connection in the sentence, but in the unsuitability of the primary sense with the intended sense in the context - "tatparyanupapatti". The Siddhanta-muktavali, p. 285, observes - "laksana sakya-sambandhas tatparya'nupapattitah", - The Laghumanjusa, p. 114, has "vastutas tu tatparyanupapattir eva tadbijam." - See also, Vedanta-paribhasa, IV. 30. - Dr. Raja proceeds to inform (p. 260, ibid) that the Mimamsakas of the Bhattaschool also favour this view. In the Tattvabindu, Vacaspati criticizes Salikanatha's definition of laksana and suggests that any kind of incompatibility of the primary sense should be taken as the condition of laksana and not merely its incompatibility with the sentence-meaning. We know that in all cases of jahallaksana, where the primary meaning of a word is not retained, the primary sense is unsuitable in establishing logical connection with the sentence sense. But in cases of a-jahallaksana, where the primary sense is not completely rejected, the sentence meaning can still be comprehended if the word is taken in the primary sense, and hence there will be no 'laksana', if the first condition of mukhyartha-badha is strictly applied. Thus the sentence, say, "chatrino yanti", can mean a group of people with or without umbella is marching, eventhough the literal sense refers only to people carrying umbrellas. Similarly in instances such as, 'kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam' (i.e. protect the curd from crows), the primary meanings of the term 'kaka' is not impossible in the context, but it is clear that the intension is to protect the curd from all curdeating bird's and beings! To include all such instances under laksana we have to take incompatibility with the intended sense as the condition of laksana. Again, all the cases of impossibility of establishing logical connection with the sentence-sense, can be explained by the incompatibility of the literal sense with the intention of the speaker or purport of a sentence. Those who hold impossibility of establishing a logical connection with the sentence meaning as the condition of laksana explain such instances by taking the words to be the upalaksana for the actual referents. Thus in 'kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam', the word 'kaka' is an upalaksana for all animals that might eat the curd i.e. for all 'dadhy upaghatakas'. 'Upalaksana' is the act of implying any analogous object where only one is specified. The word 'kaka' is an indication for the animals which might eat the curd; the word is a means of referring to the whole For Personal & Private Use Only

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498 SAHRDAYALOKA group including the crow to which the literal meaning of the word refers - (Nyayakosa, p. 172). Now here we will stop for a while and try to discuss a point raised by Dr. Raja in the foot-note no. 3, on pp. 241 wherein he seems to argue against 'tatparyanupapatti'. There he observes : pp. 241 (text) - "It is clear that the various Sision mana wanger mere must be some kind of relation between the primary and the actual referents." Then in the foot-note no. 3 he observes : "Hence it seems strange that some of the later writers should have overlooked this fundamental point in the course of their arguments. Thus to show that the condition for a transfer is not the impossibility of the literal sense in the context, but its incompatibility with the intention of the speaker, it is argued that in the well-known example of 'gangayam-ghosah', it is the intention of the speaker that gives the meaning, the bank of the Ganges', to the word Ganga, and that if the intention were otherwise, the implied meaning of the term 'ghosa' might be 'fish', since even by resorting to that sense the impossibility of the literal sense in the context could be removed. See Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 287 - yadi canvayanupaputtir-laksanabijam syat, tada kvacid ganga-padasya tire, kvacid ghosapadasya matsykdau laksaneti niyamo na syat." Also Laghumanjusa, p. 114. In this argument, they forget that there is no conceivable relation between the village and fish and that such a transfer of meaning is not at all possible." Now we have to apply ourselves to Dr. Raja's remark. For once, to begin with we can not agree that there is no relation - tadyoga - whatsoever between the primary meaning of 'village' and 'fish'. Actually, just as on account of samipyasambandha we can derive the meaning of 'ganga-tata' from the word 'ganga', similarly on account of "sadesya"-sambandha, i.e., relation of similarity we may be able to derive the sense, of 'mahamina' or 'a very big fish', from the meaning of a village. The fish in the Ganga is so big, that the speaker's intention goes to suggest, that as if a whole village is afloat on the flow of the Ganga ! So, Dr. Raja's remark is not acceptable. Again, even in instances of jahallaksana we cannot rule out the condition of 'tatparya-anupapatti', which occurs also in case of 'a-jahallaksana' such as illustrated in 'chatrino yanti'. Or, we may put such instances as 'kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam', under what the Vedantins recognized as, 'jahad-ajahad-laksana! Of course, this is open to critical discussion. Dr. Raja (p. 261, ibid) then proceeds to observe that 'yogyata' or congruity of sense is accepted to be one of the conditions of a sentence, the others as we know, being 'akanksa' and 'asatti'. Thus a statement, say, 'agnina sincati' observes Dr. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 499 Raja, is not a sentence, there being a breach of the condition of 'yogyata'. He then raises a point, (p. 262) "If there is any incompatibility of the primary sense, as we find in all cases of laksana, how can there be 'yogyata' in a sentence ? The explanation is that in the case of laksana, the incompatibility of the sense is only for the sense when taken literally, and not real. This could be removed by resorting to the secondary meaning of the word. Even in cases like 'agnina sincati', if the incongruity could be explained by resorting to a secondary meaning, the sentence would be regarded as correct." This remark also has to be supplemented by us. Yes, if by 'agnina sincati', we mean, "he is wetting by a highly, inflammable liquid or petrol, we can explain the incompatibility. To sprinkle such highly inflammable liquid, say kerosene, on an object, may be said to be 'agnina sincati'. But here also, it may be noted that by conceding such cases Dr. Raja accepts "tatparyanupapatti' as more basic to laksana. In all cases making sense, non-sense or half-sense involving laksana, we have to pay greatest importance to the condition of 'tatparyanupapatti', which in our opinion is a more fundamental 'laksana-beeja'. We have seen that for Mammata laksana has to be rooted either in local usage - rudhi-or a motive-prayojana'. The first i.e. laksana based on rudhi or usage is termed rudhi-mula or nirudha. laksana, i.e. faded metaphor. The writers in various disciplines paid more attention to this element of popular usage, and did not pay much respect to the factor of motive behind laksana as primarily they were concerned with scientific use of language and perhaps not at all with the poetic use. We have seen the position of various disciplines concerning laksana. For Sabara, laksana is based on usage in everyday life. Dr. Raja explains it as an arbitrary assumption of a sense by society," and, he adds, at times the newly assumed sense becomes so prominent through usage, that the primary, original sense of a word remains unnoticed, except by the grammarians. Read SB. on Mi. Su. I. iv. 2 : laksana iti ced varam laksana kalpita, na yagabhidhanam. laukiki hi laksana hatho'prasiddha-kalpana. We have already observed this point in greater details and the net outcome is that for the Mimamsaka laksana is a blemish, a dosa', resorted to only as a lesser evil, to avoid any greater evil such as anarthakya or a-prasiddha-kalpana. In certain cases the secondary sense is accepted as the primary sense itself while the original sense is treated only as a gimmik of etymology. Kumarila is of the opinion that old and deep-rooted laksanas expr secondary sense as if it were the primary sense itself, and in case of modern and For Personal & Private Use Only

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500 SAHRDAYALOKA newly made laksanas, some are possible, but some are impossible as they are disallowed by usage : Read Tantravartika, pp. 683 - "nirudha laksanah kascit samarthyad abhidhanavat, kriyante sampratam kascit kascin naiva tv asaktitah." Mammata also accepts this broad classification - Read, Sabda-vyapara-vicara, p. 7. "nirudha kacananya tu karya sa kacid anyatha..." In case of niruaha laksanas, the actual meaning is as good as normal meaning itself, and there is no need for incompatibility of the original meaning or any special motive for its usage. In the case of these faded metaphors, the association e word with the original i.e. primary meaning has almost disappeared and the word becomes an ordinary name for the actual thing referred with any cognitive or emotive association. Mukula is of the opinion that such cases of nirudha laksana are acceptable, as they are established by the usage of the ancients, and that analogous cases must also be warranted by usage, as otherwise any word will go to have any meaning. If there is a special clear motive, metaphors can be resorted to. For example on the analogy of the word dvirepha' for a bee, we cannot coin a word such as 'dvika' (= having two 'ka'-karas) for a 'cuckoo' (= kokila). Hemacandra dismisses nirudha laksana as abhidha only and so also, Visvanatha, the author of Sahityadarpana has a different note. Visvanatha says that such illustrations as given by Mammata, e.g. 'kusala', need not be taken as cases of nirudha laksana for, he argues, it is no use taking the etymological meaning as an original meaning - "anyac ca sabdanam pravstti-nimittam, anyac ca vyutpattinimittam". In case we accept 'kusala' as an illustration of nirudha laksana, then we will have to admit, on the same logic, laksana in case of expressions such as 'gauh sete' - the cow (or bull) sleeps, because here also by resorting to the etymology of the word 'gauh', we will have a sense such as, "that which goes, sleeps". Precisely because of such possibilities perhaps, as noted above, Hemacandra was inclined to take all cases of nirudha laksana as cases of abhidh, only and thus he dismisses 'kusala', and 'dvirepha' etc. as pure cases of abhidha. Read - Ka. Sa. (pp. 22, Edn. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 501 Nandi), - under I. 18 : kusala-dvirepha-dvika"dayas tu saksat-samketitarvat mukhya eva iti na rudhir laksyarthasya hetutvena asmabhir ukta. Later critics, that is those who followed the ancients such as Bhamaha and others, stressed the importance of prayojanavati laksana, or the one with a motive in appreciating instances of poetic beauty. But even the ancients such as Dandin and Vamana had also accepted the poetic beauty of prayojanavati laksana, though without naming or classifying it as the same. We have thoroughly screened the approach of these ancient masters towards the problem of various word-powers or sabda-vrttis and this includes even vyanjana, which is perhaps not even mentioned by name. We have seen that various disciplines such as those represented by Vyakarana, Nyaya and Mimamsa had, for their own reasons, not shown any interest in this motive-oriented-prayojanavati-laksana. We will discuss in greater detail the opinions of Anandavardhana, Mammata and the rest, regarding the actual understanding of the motive or prayojana, which for them by and large, is accepted to be suggested, i.e. is collected by a separate function of the word, a function, called by the name of 'vyanjana". An interesting case deserves attention. It is the case of compound-words. According to Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas, no special function may be accepted in case of compound words. They explain all cases of compounds where the intended sense is not arrived at directly from the members of the compound themselves as cases of laksana. So, in case of a Bahuvrihi compound such as 'citraguh' (a person possessing brindled cows), they accept laksana to obtain the sense of owner. But the grammarians go for a special power to explain the new meaning distinct from those of its members, because in their opinion, laksana with reference to either citra' or 'go', is not enough to bring about the signification of the owner of brindled cows. Read Vaiyakaranabhusana, p. 177, - "citragur ity adau svamy adipratitaye saktir avasyaki, na ca laksanaya nirvahah." (Also, the Mbh. under Pa. II. i. 1, may be referred - pp. 359, Vol. I., etc.) The word 'citra' cannot indicate the owner of brindled cows, and if we take the word 'go' to indicate this meaning, the meaning of 'citra' will not be compatible with that of the owner, as it is not the owner who is brindled. See Tattvacintamani, sabda-kanda, pp. 732 - na ca citrapadam citra-go-swami-laksakam; tatra 'go' padartha'nanvayat. na'pi 'go' padam laksakam go-swamini citra-padartha'nanvaya"patteh. The grammarians assign the power of expressing such additional senses to the compounds, taking the whole as an indivisible unit of speech - "samase khalu bhinnaiva saktih" - Vaiyakaranabhusana, V. 31. The Mimamsakas explain this difficulty by taking the whole sentence as For Personal & Private Use Only

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502 SAHKDAYALOKA laksana. In a tat-purusa compound like raja-purusa, (the king's man, officer), for rajnah purusah, the relation denoted by the genitive is known through laksana. The Naiyayikas resort to laksana only in case of one word, i.e. either in case of 'citra or 'go'; and take the other as suggestive of the purport - i.e. tatparya-grahaka': Read - sabda-sakti-prakasika, p. 238 - "na hi bahuvrihau samasta-padanam laksanikatvat, ... eka-pada matra-laksanaya'pi bahuvriher vyavasthapyarvat." The tatpurusa compound has laksana for the first word only; in the case of 'karmadharaya' compound, there is no necessity to resort to laksana, as the sense of identity of members is obtained from the relation of the meaning themselves. The Vaiyakarana-bhusana observes : (p. 157) - "karmadharaye ca na saktir na va laksana padarthayoh padabhyam abhedasya ca samsargataya labhat." The Mimamsakas are of the opinion that since the natural relation of a word is to its primary meaning, no recourse should be taken to the secondary function of words, if it possible to explain the passage concerned by recourse to the primary meaning itself. This they observe under the discussion concerning the te sthapati". (See. Mi. Su. VI. i. 51, 52), If it is taken as a karmadharaya compound, it means, 'a king who is a nisada'; but if it is taken as a tat-purusa compound, it means, 'king of the nisadas'. The Mimamsakas thus come to a conclusion that this word has to be taken as a karmadharaya compound, in which case the members retain their primary senses, and not as a tat-purusa compound, since that involves resorting to laksana. The Mimamsakas and the Vedantins accept that there can be laksana not only for words, but also for, sentences as well. The eulogistic portions of the Vedic texts containing 'arthavada' are taken as illustrations of sentence-laksana. Read Vedantaparibhasa - IV. 31-4; "laksana ca na padartha-matra-vrttih, kim tu vakya-vrttir api... evam arthavada-vakyanam prasamsarupanam prasastye laksana; The sabda-saktiprakasika, pp. 140 - also refers to this view. It is really not easy to explain say statements full of irony by assuming laksana for only a particular word in it. It is not a single word, but the whole passage that gives the implication. This is observed by Dr. Raja (pp. 269, ibid). But we feel that such cases of ironical statements, such as those exemplified by the famous speech of Vasanti in the Uttare-rama-carita, such as, "tyam jivitam, tvam asi me"...etc. are more instances of laksana, and we would rather make bold to assert that we may find traces of actually vakya-vyanjana, rather accept laksana, even in cases of sentences involving the vedic texts containing arthavada. The Naiyayikas, however, do not admit laksana for sentences, but they accept laksana only for words. In case, in some passages if there is difficulty in For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 503 understanding them, they consider that some other word is indicative of the intention of the speaker - i.e. 'tatparya-grahaka'. Thus in the example, say, "gambhirayam nadyam ghosah", (the village is on the deep river), the term 'nadi? or 'gambhira' is said to indicate through laksana, the bank of the deep river, the other word being taken as indicative of the intention of the speaker. The Sabdasakti-prakasika observes, pp.143 - "gambhira-padam nadi-padam va tatra gambhira-nadi-tira-laksanam, padantaram tu tatra tatparya-grahakam iti siddhanta-vidah." We have noted earlier, in the beginning of this chapter the views of the grammarians, particularly of Bhartshari concerning laksana. For Bhartephari, the unit of speech is a sentence and it is indivisible. So, the meaning of a se cannot be grasped from the knowledge of the meanings of individual words. We have seen that he does refer to the primary and secondary meaning and to distinguish between the two he cites different views. Thus, for those who accept multiplicity of the meaning of a word, the distinction between the primary and secondary meaning is based on the relative frequency of usage - Read V.P. II. 263 - (Edn. S. Bhate, word Index to... Ed. '92 Delhi) - "anekarthatvam ekasya yaih sabdasya'nugamyate, siddhy asiddhi-krta tesam gauna-mukhya-prakalpana." Those who hold that a word can have only one meaning consider that the word having primary sense and the word having secondary sense, are different, though they sound alike - V.P. II. 257 (Edn. Bhate) reads : "ekatvam tu sarupatvat chabdayor gauna-mukhyayoh, prahur atyantabhede'pi bheda-marga'nudarsinah." Punyaraja suggests that according to Vyadi, the primary meaning of a word is that which is well known and which depends only on its form. Secondary meaning is that which, with the help of context, is established with some effort. The primary is conveyed by the word itself, the secondary, whereas, is different from it and depends on the other words in the sentence on the context. For Personal & Private Use Only

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504 SAHKDAYALOKA Read, V.P. II 264, 265 (Edn., ibid) - and V.P. II. 278 (Edn. ibid) - "artha-prakaranapekso yo va sabdantaraih saha, yuktah pratyayayatyartham tam gaunam apare viduh." suddhasy occarane svarthah prasiddho yasya gamyate, sa mukhya iti vijneyo rupamatra-nibandhanah." (V.P. II. 264, 265) . and, V.P. II. 278 - "srutimatrena yatra'sya samrthyam avasiyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante gaunam yatnopapaditam." Still next view considers the words to refer to the qualities. That object which possesses these qualities to a greater degree is the primary one and the other is termed secondary. Bhartrhari does not accept this view as, according to him, it is against usage. Read V.P. II. 272 - "naivadhikatvam dharmanam nyunata va prayojika, adhikyam api manyante prasiddher, nyunatam kvacit." There are also others, who consider that the secondary usage is based on similarity, 'simho devadattah' only means that devadatta' possesses some qualities similar to those of the lion. Or, may be it is based on some confusion between the two because of similarity. V.P. II. 273-274 read as : "jatisabdo'ntarena'pi jatim yatra prayujyate sambandhi-sadrsad-dharmat tam gauna apare viduh." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 505 and, "viparyasad iva'rthasya yatrarthantaratam iva, manyante sa gavadis tu gauna ity ucyate kvacid." - (Edn. Bhate) For Bharthari the sentence has to be considered as a whole and in the particular context in which it is uttered. Therefore, it is meaningless to discuss the primary and secondary referents of an individual word. Bhartshari says that when, for example, a mother tries to stop her child from crying, by saying, "the tiger eats children who cry", she really does not mean it. When a traveller says to his friend, "we must go, look at the Sun", he simply means that it is getting late and that he does not insist on actually looking at the sun. When it is said, "kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam", it is implied that it is to be protected from dogs etc. also. Again, when it is said, "brahmana-kambala", there is nothing special about 'brahmana'. Thus, such usages cannot be explained by resorting to laksana. As seen earlier, ironic or sarcastic expressions carry a sense entirely different from the expressed one. Some later writers try to read laksana in these expressions but 'Bhartshari has clearly shown the imperfectness of the theory depending on word meanings, eventhough he recognizes the usefulness of the discussion of word-meanings. Read the references for all this from V.P. as follows : "vyaghra"divyapadesena yatha balo nivartyate, asatyo'pi tatha kascitpratyavayo bhidhiyate." (V.P. II. 321) "gantavyam disyatam surya iti kalasya laksane, jnayatam kala ity etatsopayam abhidhiyate." (V.P. II. 310) "kakebhyo raksyatam sarpir iti balo'pi coditah, upaghatapare vakye na svadibhyo na raksyati." (V.P. II. 312) For Personal & Private Use Only

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506 SAHRDAYALOKA "brahmanartho yatha na'sti kascid brahmana-kambale, devadatta"dayo vakye tathaiva syur anarthakah." (V.P. II. 14) "stuti-ninda-pradhanesu vakyesv artho na tadrsah, padanam pravibhagena yadrsah parikalpyate." (V.P. II. 247), (Edn. Bhate) We will now proceed with Mammata's classification of laksana as follows : karikas 10-12 K.P. II read as - "svasiddhaye para"ksepah parartham sva-samarpanam, upadanam laksanam ca ity ukta suddhaiva sa dvidha." (II. K.D.) "saropa'nya tu yatroktau visayi visayas tatha, visayyantah krte'nyasmin sa syat sadhyavasanika." (K.P. II. 11) "bhedav imau ca sadnsyat sambandhantaratas tatha, gaunau suddhau ca vijneyau laksana tena sad vidha." - (K.P. II. 12) We will have to go into greater details as to how the six-fold laksana is explained differently by different commentators, but for the time being we will follow the text of the K.P. - i.e. the karikas (II. 10-12) and the vrtti thereon. Mammata observes : (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid, pp. 29-37) 10 - "Assumption of another (i.e. secondary meaning) to establish itself (i.e. primary meaning) and the surrender of itself (i.e. primary meaning) are 'inclusive indication', and 'exclusive indication' (respectively). Thus, that pure indication alone is two-fold." For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 507 In cases like 'Lances enter' and, 'Staffs enter the (words) lances and others point to persons connected with them in order to make their own entrance possible. Therefore, this indication is by inclusion (of the primary meaning). In cases like, "A bull should be immolated', the individual (bull) is implied by the universal (bullness) for the reason, "how can the immolation, enjoined by the Veda, be possible in my case ?". But the individual bull) is not denoted by the word, on account of the rule - "Denotation world not go to (express) the qualified, when its power has been exhausted in (expressing) the qualification." But this (viz. a bull should not be immolated) should not be quoted as an example of inclusive indication. For, there is no motive here. Nor is this inclusive indication. Nor is this usage. The individual is implied by the universal on account of the universal being invariably connected with the individual. As for example, an agent is implied in, "Let (it) be done", and the object is implied in, "Do". And in cases like, "Enter", "Sweet-ball", etc. words like, "a house" and "eat" are understood. And in example, "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day" the eating at night is not indicated. For that (example) is a case of verbal presumption or factual presumption. In the example, "A hamlet on the Ganga", the word 'Ganga' surrenders its meaning in order to establish the bank as the location of the hamlet. Thus, in such cases the indication is by exclusion. And this two-fold (indication) is pure, as it is not mixed with fancied identification founded on resemblance. In these two divisions (of indication), there is no separateness amounting to distinction between the indicated (sense) and the indicative. For, when the words like Ganga and the like convey (the sense of) the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive while is sought to be established is obta the comprehension of the identity (of the Ganga with the bank). If (by the use of indication) merely a relation with Ganga (viz. stream) were to be apprehended then what difference would there be of indication and a direct mode of expression - "A hamlet on the bank of the Ganga" ? 11 ab - "But another (variety) is the superimponent indication wherein are expressed the object superimposed (visayin) as also the substratum of superimposition (visaya). Where the object superimposed and the substratum of superimposition are stated in the same case-ending with their distinction non-suppressed - that indication is-superimponent. For Personal & Private Use Only

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508 SAHRDAYALOKA 11 cd - Wherein the other, (viz. the substratum of superimposition) is swallowed by the thing superimposed - that would be introsusceptive (indication). When the other, namely, the substratum of superimposition, is put within, or swallowed by the object which is being superimposed, that would be introsusceptive (indication). 12 - abc. And these two divisions (of indication), arising from resemblance and from some other relation, should be known as qualitative (i.e. as divisions of Gauni laksana) and pure (i.e. - divisions of Suddha laksana). These two divisions (of Gauni laksana), characterized by the superimposition and introsusception and caused by resemblance, are (respectively) instanced in, "Vahika is a bull", and, "This is a bull". Here, for instance, the qualities like dullness and stupidity, associated with the primary sense, though indicated, serve the purpose of using the word 'Gauh' to express the other meaning (i.e. vahika)-thus hold some. Owing to their identity with the qualities associated with the primary sense, the qualities belonging to the other (i.e. Vahika) alone are indicated, but the other object is not expressed - SO say others. On account of being the substratum of common qualities, the other object itself is indicated-thus maintain others. And it is said elsewhere - "Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication (viz. Vahika)." (Tantravarttika. I. iv. 22) Here, 'the state of not being without' (a-vinabhava) means connection in general, but not an invariable relation. For, if it were so, there would be no indication in such cases as, 'The cots cry'; and if invariable relation were to exist then the assumption (or inference) alone will do, there will be no use of indication. In cases such as, "Ghee is life", "This is life itselp', there is a relation other than similarity, like the relation of cause and effect. And in such cases the superimposition and introsusception are based on relations such as the one found in cause and effect. Here in the two varieties of qualitative (indication), cognition of identity despite difference in substratum and the cognition of complete identity (respectively), is the purpose. But in the two varieties of pure (indication), the capability of bringing about the result in a way distinct from others and without fail is the purpose). For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 509 In some cases the secondary application is owing to subserviency; for example, sacrificial post for Indra is called Indra. In some cases (it is) owing to relation of oneself with one's master; for example, an officer of a king is (called) the king. In some cases (it is) owing to the relation of the parts with the whole; for example, in the foremost hand (i.e. palm). Here the word 'hand' stands for its foremost part only. In some cases (it is) owing to the sameness of occupation, for example, a non-carpenter (by caste) is, owing to carpentry, called carpenter. 12 d. Indication, therefore, is six-fold. - Along with the first two divisions (viz. suddha upadana laksana and suddha-laksana-laksana.) indication is of six kinds." This makes for the basic classification of laksana, according to Mammata. But commentators differ in interpreting the expression viz. "laksana tena sad-vidha". We will try to examine this in details, very carefully as below: It must be carefully noted in the beginning that 'rudhi' and 'prayojana' make for the conditions and not the divisions of laksana and hence, it is only the latter i.e. prayojanavati laksana, that is sub-divided into six varieties. Before we resort to the views of different commentators, a simple table can be seen expressing this six-fold division, and it is like this - rudhimula laksana gauni suddha + (i) saropa (ii) sadhyavasana (iii) upadana (iv) laksana (v) saropa (vi) sadyavasana prayojanamula The illustrations respectively are - (i) gaurvahikah, (ii) gaur eva'yam, (iii) kuntah pravisanti, (iv) gangayam ghosah (v) ayurghrtam, & (vi) ayur eva idam. Before we proceed with the views of different commentators on the classification of laksana, we will quote Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar's views (pp. 297 onwards, Edn. K.P., Bombay). The Numbers of karikas differ in Dwivedi and Gajendragadkar. He observes : "There is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the above represents the classification of laksana intended by Mammata. But commentators of the For Personal & Private Use Only

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510 SAHRDAYALOKA Kavyaprakasa, guided more, it seems to us, by extraneous considerations than by natural construction of Mammata's words, have advanced two other divisions, which they regard as intended by Mammata. That is why some discussion about this problem becomes necessary. We regard the above as Mammata's classification for three reasons, which are as follows - (1) This is the only classification that naturally and directly follows Mammata's words. In Karika 5, Mammata treats of two divisions, viz. upadana and laksana, which he states are, 'suddha'. Karika 6 gives two more divisions viz. 'saropa' and 'sadhyavasana', which are declared to be both 'gauna' and 'suddha'. From this it follows that suddha has four varieties viz. upadana, laksana, saropa, and sadhyavasana, and gauna has two viz. saropa and sadhyavasana. The above classification gives the divisions exactly in this manner. (2) In karika 7 abc, four varieties of laksana are mentioned and in karika 7d, laksana is stated to be six-fold. The vrtti explains this statement by pointing out that the six varieties are made up by adding previously mentioned two (adya-bhedabhyam saha) viz. suddha upadana and suddha laksana to the four referred to in karika 7 abc. From this it is clear that the previously mentioned two varieties viz. suddha-upadana and suddha-laksana, are on the same level as the four now mentioned viz. gauna saropa and gauna-sadhyavasana, suddha-saropa and suddha-sadbhyavasana. In other words the explanatiory addition, 'adya-bhedabhyam saha', shows that upadana and laksana are the final divisions of suddha and not merely intermediate divisions, which are each to be further divided into saropa and sadhyavasana, as the Pradipa understands and gauna two, viz. saropa and sadhyavasana. (3) karika 7 abc - ("bhedavimau ca sadrsyat sambandhantaratas tatha | gaunau suddhau ca vijneyau.") - corroborate the above view. From this it is clear that Mammata intends 'saropa' and 'sadhyavasana' to be different divisions of both gauna and suddha. It would therefore, not be correct to regard, as the Pradipa does, 'saropa' and 'sadhyavasam' as the direct divisions of only 'gauna' and as the indirect divisions of 'suddha' through the medium of 'upadana' and 'laksana'. There is no justification whatsoever for making a distinction between 'gauna' and 'suddha' in the matter of their subdivision into 'saropa' and 'sadhyavasana'. Thus we feel sure that the above is the classification of Mammata. It must, however, be remarked that Mammata's classification given above is not logically accurate, because the divisions are not mutually exclusive, but overlap. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 511 For example, 'ayur ghrtam' and "ayuh pibati", which are given as 'suddha saropa' and 'suddha-sadhyavasana' respectively, may well be regarded as 'laksana-laksana', because in both these illustrations 'yuh' completely gives up its mukhyartha. Similarly, 'gaur-vahikah', and 'gam ahvayati', which illustrate "gauna saropa" and "gauna sadhyavasana" respectively, can again be 'laksana-laksana' also, because 'gauh' completely sacrifices its primary sense for the sake of the secondary. Then again, it is pointed out that in 'gangayam ghosah', which is given as an illustration of 'laksana-laksana', there is an element of sadhyavasana laksana also. For, here the visayi (ganga) swallows the visaya (tatah). Similarly, in 'kuntah pravisanti', which illustrates upadana-laksana the visayi (kuntah) swallows the visaya (kuntinah purusah). Thus, these two viz. 'upadana' and 'laksana' can also be looked upon as 'sadhyavasana'. Though Mammata's classification of laksana is thus logically inaccurate, it is simple and useful from the practical point of view. Any example of laksana that we may come across can be classed under one or the other of his six divisions. To give a logically accurate and simple division is almost an impossibility. (we do not agree). With a view perhaps to remove the overlapping involved in the above classification, the Pradipa (p. 33) says : "laksana tavad dvividha. suddha gauni ca. tatra adya dvividha. upadana-laksana laksana-laksana ca; te api pratyekam saropa sadhyavasana ca iti dvividhe. iti suddha-bhedas' catvarah. gauni tu dvedha, saropa sadhyavasana ca. iti sadvidhatvam laksanayah. This will give us the following classification laksana suddha gauni laksana laksana upadana laksana saropa sadhyavasana (v) (gaur vahikah) (vi) (gaur ayam) (i) saropa (kuntah kuntinah pravisanti) (ii) sadhya-vasana (kuntah pravisanti) (iii) saropa (ayur ghetam) (gangayantate ghosah) (iv) sadhyavasana (ayur eva idam (gangayam ghosah) For Personal & Private Use Only

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SAHRDAYALOKA This classification is unsatisfactory for the following reasons: (1) The idea that 'upadana' and 'laksana' are intermediate and not final divisions of suddha finds no support in the text of the Kavyaprakasa. It seems to have been introduced by Pradipa in order to get rid of the overlapping which is involved in what we regard as Mammata's classification. (we feel Pradipa is right). (2) Though this classification removes overlapping from 'suddha saropa' and 'suddha sadhyavasana', still overlapping continues in gauna-saropa and gauna-sadhyavasana. So this classification also is not logically accurate. (3) Expressions like 'kuntah kuntinah pravisanti', and 'gangayam tate ghosah', which illustrate suddha-upadana-saropa and suddha-laksana-saropa in this classification, are such as are never used in the language. (We add, the expression 'kuntah kuntinah pravisanti' sounds senseless to us). (4) If this classification be supposed to represent the one intended by Mammata, we shall have to believe that Mammata forgot to give an illustration for one variety viz. suddha-upadana-saropa and gave two illustrations for another viz. suddha-laksana-sadhyavasana, separating them by a long interval." 512 Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar proceeds, (p. 300) "Mukulabhatta in his Abhidhavrtti (tta) matrka (pp. 6-9) speaks of the classification of laksana thus 2 "suddhopacara-misratvat laksana dvividha mata." "upadanallaksanac ca suddha sa dvividhodita." "aropa'dhyavasanabhyam suddha-gaunopacarayoh, pratyekam vidyamanatvad upacaras caturvidhah." 4. esa ca laksana tri-skandha, suddhatvat, adhyaropat, adhyavasanac ca. tatra suddha-skandhasya dvaividhyam upadana-laksanabhyam uktam. adhyaropa'dhyavasana-skandhayor api pratyekam dvi-prabhedata. suddha-gaunopacara-misratvat. - For Personal & Private Use Only

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513 'Laksana His scheme of division may be represented as follows : laksana Suddha Upacara-misra Upadana (kuntah pravisanti) Laksana (gangayam ghosah) suddhopacara Misra gaunopacara miera saropa sadhyavasana saropa sadhya-vasana (ayurghitam) (ayur eva idam) (gaur vahikah) (gaurevayam) The ancient commentators Manikyacandra and Jayanta think that Mammata follows Mukulabhatta in his classification of laksana. Consequently they interpret Mammata's words in such a way as to support the above classification. We think that this view is incorrect for the following reasons : (1) Mammata has nowhere stated, neither in any of the karikas nor in vrtti, that 'upacaramisra' forms a primary division of laksana, along with suddha. We have shown above that the natural and direct conclusion from his karikas and vrtti is that the primary divisions of laksana are 'suddha' and 'gauna'. The primary division upacaramiira is, however, deduced from the words, "ubhayarupa ceyam suddha, upacarena a-misratvat." But this deduction is unwarranted. What these sentences tell us is that suddha-laksana is upacarena amisrita, i.e. possesses no admixture of upacara. The whole question here is what er division of laksana Mammata has in view, when he says that suddha-laksana, is upacara-a-misrita or what other division of laksana is excluded by the characteristic "upacarena a-misritatvam" of suddha-laksana or what other division of laksana Mammata regards as "upacarena misrita". On the answer that we give to this question, will depend the meaning in which the word 'upacara' must be understood to have been used by Mammata. In this connection karika 7abc (i.e. bhedav imau ca sadrsyat, sambandhanta For Personal & Private Use Only

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d. 514 SAHRDAYALOKA ratas tatha. gaunau suddhau ca vijneyau...") appears to us to be decisive. There 'gauna' and 'suddha' are mentioned together, from which we conclude that here the other division intended by Mammata is 'gauna'. 'Gauna' then is 'upacara-misrita', - and is, therefore, vyavstta or excluded by the characteristic 'upacarena amisritatvam', which belongs to suddha-laksana. Note - 'ubhayarupa ceyam udahsta suddha, na tu gauni. Upacaramisra hi gauni ity ucyate." Pradipa. This being so, 'upacara' here evidently possesses its restricted sense, viz. "sadrsya-sambandhena pravrttih", for it is only in this sense that 'upacara' can distinguish 'gauna laksana' 'suddha'. Thus the sentences 'ubhaya-rupa ceyam suddha, upacarena amisritatvat, read along with karika 7 abc, show that 'suddha' and 'gauna' are the primary divisions of laksana, according to Mammata. On the other hand the passage 'ubhayarupa ceyam suddha. upacarena amisritatvat' is understood to imply, that while these two varieties viz. 'upadana' and 'laksana' are 'upacara-misra', the other four, to be presently mentioned, are 'upacara-misra'. Thus, it is held that suddha, covering 'upadana' and 'laksana', is one division of laksana, and 'upacaramisra' covering the other four, is another. If this be so, 'upacara' must mean, 'atacchabdasya tacchabena abhidhanam' or 'the identification of one thing with another generally. Only in this sense, upacara can be present in all four remaining divisions viz. suddha saropa, suddha sadhyavasana, gauna saropa and gauna-sadhyavasana. But as the division upacaramisra has not been mentioned by Mammata anywhere, the above implication cannot be accepted. (2) It is clear that in the passage "ubhaya-rupa ceyam suddha, upacarena amisritatvat", the characteristic 'upacara-amisritatvam' is intended to be vyavartaka i.e. to distinguish suddha-laksana from some other. If we understand that other to be 'gauna-laksana', upacara in the sense of 'sadrsya-sambandhena pravsttih' will distinguish 'suddha' from 'gauna' all right. For, while 'upacara' in this sense is absent in 'suddha', it is present in 'gauna'. But if, as is supposed to be th implication, 'upacara-a-misritatvam' be 'vyavartaka' of the other four kinds of laksana, it will be found that 'upacara' does not serve this purpose. We saw above that with this implication 'upacara' must be understood in its general sense viz. 'atacchabdasya tacchabdena abhidhanam'. But 'upacara' in this sense is not absent in (from?) suddha. For in 'kuntah pravisanti', and 'gangayam ghosah', we have 'atacchabdasya tacchabdena abhidhanam', in the words 'kuntah' which stands for 'kuntinah', and 'gangayam', which stands for 'tate'. In other words, even in suddha laksana we have 'upacara' in its general sense, viz. the identification of one thing For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 515 (kuntah and ganga) with another (kuntinah and tatah). Consequently 'upacara cannot distinguish the two varieties of suddha laksana from the four others, as it is supposed to do in the interpretation, which follows from the above implication. This is enough to show that the interpretation of the passage, "ubhayarupa ... amisritatvat", which sees in it an implied reference to 'upacara-misra', distinguished from 'suddha' on the ground of its being mixed with upacara, is incorrect. But this point does not seem to have struck any interpreter. (3) If the lead of Manikyacandra and Jayanta be followed in the matter of classification of laksana, we shall have to suppose that the words 'gaunau' and 'suddhau' in the karika 'gaunau suddhau ca vijneyau' are used in 'gaunopacara-misrau', and 'suddhopacara-misrau'. Similarly, the word 'gaunabhedayoh', and 'suddha-bhedayoh', will have to be understood as standing for 'gaunopacara-misra-bhedayoh', and 'suddhopacara-misra-bhedayoh'. This appears to us to be highly improbable. Mammata nowhere speaks of any divisions like 'gaunopacara-misra', and "suddhopacara-misra". (4) In the classification of Mukulabhatua the division of 'upacara' into 'suddha' and 'gauna' plays an important part. It is the principle on which 'upacaramisra' is further divided. But Mammata nowhere speaks of this division of upacara into 'suddha' and 'gauna'. He cannot, therefore, be regarded as subscribing to Mukulabhatta's classification of laksana. It is true, as we have already noted, that Mammata uses the word 'upacara' in its general as well as its restricted sense. But this cannot be supposed to imply that he wanted to divide 'upacara' into 'suddha' and 'gauna' in the manner of Mukulabhatta. If he had intended to do so, he would have specifically made that division and not left it to be understood by implication. (5) The word 'anya' in 'saropa'nya tu yatroktau' (karika 6a) is supposed to refer to 'upacaramisra' and the particle 'tu' to imply that 'upacara misra' alone is 'saropa', but not 'suddha'. This supposition is not correct. Upacarar been mentioned anywhere before, neither in karika 5, nor in the vstti thereon. Therefore, 'anya' cannot refer to it. 'anya' just means another variety, different from the two mentioned in the preceding karika. 'tu' suggests that a new topic viz. 'saropa laksana' is commenced. Mammata uses 'tu' in the sense of such suggestion several times in the tenth ullasa. See karika X. 6C, 106, 14a, 15d, 34d, etc. Or, 'tu' may suggest that the divisions 'upadana' and 'laksana', which have been mentioned in the preceding karika are possible in 'suddha' only and not in 'gauna". "suddhaiva upadana-laksanabhayam bhidyate, na tu gauny api iti 'tu'-sabdarthah". For Personal & Private Use Only

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516 SAHRDAYALOKA (6) Mammata apparently did not hold Mukulabhatta in very great esteem. (We beg to differ.) We have already seen that he controverts Mukulabhatta's views in two places (= in case of gaur anuvandhyah, and on Mukula's views on, "tatasthe laksana suddha" etc.). In his treatment of laksana he does not seem to follow Mukula. As a matter of fact, Mukula himself is not quite consistent in his classification of laksana. In his karikas he begins by dividing laksana in two ('suddhopacara-misratvat laksana dvividha mata) viz. 'suddha' and 'upacaramisra'. But in his vrtti, on pp. 9 he says that laksana is primarily three-fold (esa ca laksana tri-skandha). The classification given above is according to karika. The classification according to his vrtti, quoted above (on p. 300, Gadkar's Edn.) would be as follows : laksana suddha saropa sadhyavasana upadana laksana suddhopacara gaunopacara suddhopacara gaunopacara misra misra misra misra misra misra Mammata does not follow Mukula either in his two-fold primary division of laksana into suddha and upacara-misra, or in his three fold primary division of the same into suddha, saropa and sadhyavasana. It is therefore not proper, to discover in Mammata's words unintended implications so as to bring his classification of laksana in line with Mukula's. For these reasons, we think that the view of Manikyacandra and Jayanta that Mammata's classification of laksana is the same as Mukula's can not be accepted." Narahari Sarasvatitirtha in his Balacittanuranjani has the following remark : laksaneti. laksana prayojana-laksanetyarthah. tena uktaprakarena, anantaroktam bhedacatastayam eva pratiyate, katham sadvidha iti asankya vyavahitam bhedadvayam smarayati adyeti. tena sadbheda upadanalaksana (lal gauna-saropa, gauna-sadhyavasana, suddha-saropa, suddha-sadhyavasana ceti. vyangyarahita rulhi-laksana eka. ukta-sadvidha prayojana-laksana gudhagudhavyangyatvena dvadasa-vidha. evam laksanayas trayodasa-vidhatvam darsayati." (p. 322, Edn. Nag. Pub., 95) Narahari counts thirteen varieties of laksana including the six varieties of prayojanavati or one with motive which become twelve due to the concealed (i.e. gudha) suggested sense or the non-concealed suggested sense and the thirteenth is For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 517 the one based on usage and therefore which has no suggested sense. The six-fold classification goes as upadana-laksana, laksana-laksana, gauni saropa and gaunisadhyavasana, suddha-saropa and suddha-sadhyavasana. Ruyyaka in his samketa has not discussed this point but Manikyacandra's samketa has the following : "tena iti upasamhare. adyabhedabhyam saha sankalanena sodha. samksepenaivatra laksana-vicarah kstah, vistarena tu mukula"di-viracitabhidha-matrka"di-granthebhyah jneyah - Thus, Manikyacandra also cuts the discussion short, and refers it to Mukula. Somesvara's samketa or Kavyadarsa has a brief observation : (pp. 22, Edn. Parikh) - tena iti upasamhare. adyabhedabhyam iti upadana-laksanabhyam saropasadhyavasanayosca gauna-buddhabhedat pratyekam dvaividhyam iti. samkalane sodha." Thus with upadana and laksana, and with gauna-and sud each of saropa and sadhyavasana, Somesvara counts six varieties. The Viveka of Sridhara has - "sadvidheti. upadhi-samkalanam idam. tatranantaram caturnam eva prakaranam abhidhanat durantaritam prakaradvayam smaritam. adyeti-upadana laksana-laksana-laksanabhyam saha iti. tad ayam paramarthah - laksanadvayi rudha ca arudha ca. pratyekam upadanalaksana-laksana-laksanabhyam catvaro bhedah. tatra'pi prabhidya saropasadhyavasanabhyam astau. tatra'pi sadrsya-sambandhantarabhyam sodaseti. Thus Sridhara has sixteen varieties laksana rudha a-rudha upadana laksana upadana upadana laksana saropa sadhya-vasana sa. sadhya sa. sadhya. sa. sadhya sa sa.itara sa sa.itara sadrsya * mula sadrsyetara mula sa sa.itara sa sa.itara sa sa.itara sa sa.itara So, for him the expression sad-vidha points not to the six varieties only but to the basics of classification. This means rulhi, prayojana, upadana, laksana, saropa For Personal & Private Use Only

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518 SAHKDAYALOKA and sadhyavasana are six basics which explain the expression sad-vidha. Thus the base of classification is six-fold giving rise to sixteen varieties. Dipika of Jayanta-Bhatta has the following - sadbhir upadhibhi rudhiprayojanopadana-laksana-aropa-adhyavasanair vidhah prakarah kalpaniya asya iti sadvidha. na tu sat-pakara prakarantara-sambhavasya pratipaditatvat. bhidyate abhyam iti bhedau, upadanalaksane rudhi-prayojane-va adyau bhedau, tabhyam prakstabhyam aropa'dhyavasanabhyam prathamam uktatvat tabhyam adyabhedabhyam saha iti grantha-samgatih - Jayanta seems to follow Sridhara. He says that by sadvidha it is not suggested that laksana is six-fold only - na tu sat-prakara. But actually these six are the upadhis, the attributes, which are at the base of the classification of laksana which are rudhi, prayojana, upadana, laksana, aropa and adhyavasana. The Kavyaprakasa - darpana of Visvanatha has the following : esanca sodasanam laksana bhedanam iha a-darsitani udaharanani mama Sahityadarpane avagantavyani. - sadvidha iti. - rudhi - prayojana-upadana-laksana-aropa-adhyavasanaih sadbhir upadhibhir dvidha ukta. sodasaprakara yasyah sa salvidha na tu sat-prakara. Visvanatha also follows the lead of Sridhara and Jayanta, who as noted above take the six as the attributes or principles of classification. They do not take 'six' as the number of varieties, which for them is sixteen and not six. Visvanatha observes that illustrations which are not furnished by Mammata have to sought from his Sahitya-darpana. He also adds - adyabhedabhyam prathamoktopadhibhyam rudhi-prayojanabhyam saha, yad va prathamam rulhi-prayojanabhyam samanyata uktam laksanadvayam bhidyate. adya-bhedabhyam iti. bhedav upadana-laksana - [laksita) laksane. tabhyam saha iti grantha-samgatih. The Sahitya-cudamani of Bhatta Gopala has - nigamayati - laksaneti. - nanu saropa sadhyavasana iti dve gaunau, dve ca suddhe iti tascatasrah, tat katham va salvidhyam iti atra aha-adyeti. prag uktau bhedau upadana-laksana-laksanau tabhyam saha iti. Thus, he follows the earlier pattern as suggested by Prof. Gajendragadkar. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 519 Laksana upadana laksana saropa sadhyavasana gauni suddha gauni suddha The Sampradayaprakasini of Sri Vidya Cakravartin has - "atha laksanopasamharah. 'laksana tena' iti vyavahitam bheda-dvayam smarayati, adya-bhedabhyam iti. upadana-laksana, laksana-laksana gauna-saropa, gauna-sadhya-vasana, suddha-saropa, suddha-sadhyavasana ca iti. laksanapraghattako'yam asmabhir laghutikayam vitatya vivecita iti tatah avadharyah. iha'pi yatha yogam uktah. Srividyacakravarti also follows the lead of Sahityacudamani. He observes that he has discussed the topic of laksana in greater details in his 'laghutika' but here also whatever is useful is discussed. The Vistarika of Sri Vatsalanchana Bhattacarya has the following observation - nanu saropadhyavasanayor gauna-suddhata ca, tavad upadanadiyogena'pi bhedantaram sambhavati, tat katham nodahstam ityata aha-laksana teneti. sadvidha sadbhedah, saropadanadau upadanadyasaskarasya darsitatvat. nanu gauna-suddhabhedena caturvidhye katham salvidhyam ity aha-adyeti upadana-laksanabhyam saha ityarthah-tayor eva adyatvat. na ca rudha-prayojane eva adye, tayor laksana-svarupa-nirvahakayor bhedatvabhavat. He seems to follow the traditional line taking sadvidha as six-fold. This approach was set in vogue by Narahari Sarasvatitirtha, Govinda Thakkura's explanation in the Kavyapradipa is seen above while quoting from Prof. A. B. Gajendragadkar. Govinda in Pradipa reads as - laksana tena saovidha. - upadana-laksana-rupasuddha bhedabhyam saha. rudhi-prayojanabhyam bhede sambhavatyapi na te vibhajakatvena ukte, kintu hetutvena, iti na tatketo bhedah ganitah ata eva ca pascad 'vyangyatvena rahita' ityadina tat-kstam bhedam darsayisyati. anyatha punarukti-prasangat. evam ca yathokta-vyakhyanena sadvidhatve nirvyudhe yat 'sadvidheti rudhi-prayojanaupadana-laksana-aropa-adhyavasanarupaih sadbhih upadhibhih kalpitah vidhah For Personal & Private Use Only

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520 SAHRDAYALOKA prakara yasyam iti sadvidha' iti candidasa-vyakhyanam, tat, "suddhaiva sa dvidha. saropa'nya tu' iti 'eva-tu-sabdayor analocana-vijrmbhitatvad anadeyam." adyabhedabhyam upadana-laksana-laksana-bhyam ityarthah." Govinda criticizes the trend of thought set by Candidasa and others taking 'sadvidha' as 'having six attributes'. He seems to follow Narahari's line of thinking which seems to accept 'sadvidha' as 'sad-prakara' i.e. six-fold. Thus there are two distinct approaches in interpreting the term 'sad-vidha', and we are affraid, both are right! Sudhasagara of Bhimasena Dixit has : "atra ca sphuta eva laksanah. tena sadvidha. slokas chandah. upadana-laksanarupa-suddha-bhedabhyam saha. atropadana laksanabhyam arthantara-samkramitaatyanta-tiraskrta-vacyau, vivaksita-vacya-dhvanibhedau gaunibhyam saropasadhyavasanabhyam rupakatisayokti, suddhabhyam tabhyam hetvalamkaram nirupayisyati, iti sadvidha-nirupana-phalam iti dik." - He also takes sadvidha as six-fold and tries to connect various varieties with various types of dhvani and various alamkaras as the case may be ! Jhalkikar, (pp. 54, ibid) has the following observation - laksanam upasamharati-laksaneti - tena uktaprakarena. sadvidheti-buddhagauni-saropa-sadhyavasana-upadana-laksanai" sadbheda ityarthah." Thus he seems to follow the line of Pradipa and he likes to take 'sadvidha' - as six-fold. Jhalkikar Continues - nanu 'saropa'nya tu' ityadina prabheda-catustayam eva uktam atah katham sadvidhetyata aha-adyabhedabhyam saha iti. upadana-laksana-laksanalaksanabhyam saha ity arthah. laksana prathamato dvividha, suddha-gauni ca. suddha'pi punas' caturdha. upadana-laksana, laksana-laksana, saropa-sadhyavasana ceti. gauny api saropa sadhyavasana ceti dvividheti sadvidheti bhavah. vastutastu laksana tavad dvividha. suddha gauni ca. tatra"dy, dvividha. upadanalaksana-laksana-laksana ca iti. upadanalaksana-laksana-laksane api pratyekam saropa-sadhyavasana ceti dvividheti suddhaya bhedas catvarah. gauni tu dvedha, saropa-sadhyavasana sa. tatropadanasaropa yatha 'kuntah purusah pravisanti' iti. upadana-sadhyavasana yatha "kuntah pravisanti" iti. laksana-saropa yatha "ayur ghitam", iti. laksanasadhyavasana yatha ayur eva idam" iti, 'gangayam ghosa' iti ca. gauna-saropa For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 521 yatha 'gaurvahikah' it. gauna-sadhyavasana yatha 'gaur ayam' iti, iti pradipadyotayoh spastam. nanu suddhatva"dibhih sadbhir upadhibhir laksanayah sadvidharvopavarnanam ayuktam nirudhatva-prayojanavattvam adaya astavid hatvasya'pi sambhavad iti cet slnu - nirudha-prayojanavati ceti prathamato laksanayah vibhagah. tatah prayojanavatyah suddhatvady upadhibhih sodha vibhaga iti vibhakta-vibhago'yam iti na anupapattih. 'laksana tena sadvidha' iti atra laksanapadam prayojanavati ya laksana tatparam iti narasimha-thakkura"di matam. vastutas tu rug prayojanabhyam bhedadhikyam tu nasty eva tatkrtabhedasya iha anukteh. "vyangyena rahita ruohau" ityadina 18 sutrenagre eva vaksyamanatvat. yady api "rudhi-prayojanat" ity anena rudhi-prayojane ukte tatha'pi na te vibhajakatvena ukte, kintu hetutvena. anyatha punaruktiprasangah syad iti pradipodyotayoh spastam." Acarya Hemacandra, the author of Kavyanusasana revives a forgotton or let us say forsaken tradition of taking 'gauni and 'laksana' as independent wordpowers, separate and distinct from each other. We had seen earlier how Bhoja had clubbed 'gauni' and 'laksana' as part of abhidha. We will have to refer once again to Bhoja in brief because Hemacandra seems to come closer to Bhoja in his concepts of 'gauni and laksana, though of course Bhoja did not give these two any status independent of abhidha. Bhoja first of all enumerates 12 relations of word and sense. Bhoja (pp. 223, Josyer Edn.) observes : "tatra abhidha-vivaksa-tatparyapravibhaga-vyapeksa-samarthya-anvaya-ekarthibhava-dosahana, - gunopadana - alamkarayoga-rasa-aviyoga-rupah sabdarthayor dvadasa samarthah sahityam iti ucyate." tesu sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktir abhidha. taya svarupa iva abhidheye pravartamanah sabdah vitti-trayena vartate, tas ca mukhya, gauni, laksanas tisrah. tatra saksad avyavahitarthabhidhayika mukhya gamyamana-saurya"digunayogavyavahitartha gauni. svartha-avinabhutarthantaropalaksana tu laksaneti." .: Bhoja (pp. 226, ibid) continues - "gauni dvidha, gunanimitta, upacaranimitta ca. We have discussed these observations of Bhoja on an earlier occasion but here we will once again go through Bhoja's writing for attempting a comparative study of Bhoja and Hemacandra. Bhoja's abhidha is 'that power of word that expresses For Personal & Private Use Only

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522 SAHKDAYALOKA meaning and is termed abhidha'; Now here 'sabdasya arthabhidhayini saktir' can be one which directly expresses the meaning or indirectly also. When it directly expresses the meaning it is termed as 'mukhya' i.e. principal. Bhoja observes that a word operates in its meaning (this is strange, because we normally say that a meaning stays in a word) - "svarupe iva abhidheye pravartamanah sabdah" - in three-fold way. Thus there are three functions-vrtti-traya' of a word where in his 'mukhya' which directly and without any interference gives a meaning is sub-variety of abhidha', which is our normal abhidha of the alamkarikas of the Kashmir school, Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Hemacandra including. Bhoja's 'gauni' is peculiar. He observes : "gamyamana-saurya"di gunayogavyavahitartha gauni." So, for Bhoja 'gauni' is that variety of abhidha which has connection with a meaning which is 'gamyamana' - implied, and not saksat - or directly connected. Again this meaning is of the nature of such qualities as 'saurya' i.e., bravery and the like. Thus this variety of abhidha is connected with implied quality. Bhoja does not term it as subordinate but it is 'a-mukhya' in the sense that his mukhya variety of abhidha yields a direct meaning and his 'gauni yields gamyamana i.e. implied meaning. On the other hand we will go to see that for Hemacandra and even for the earlier Mimamsa thinking which talked of 'gauna' function, 'gauni was a secondary function i.e. 'a-mukhya' in the etymological sense, i.e. not-principal function. Again, Hemacandra's concepts of 'gauni and 'laksana' are not absolutely identical with those of Bhoja and this will be clear from the following discussion. But for the present we continue with Bhoja who observes : (pp. 226, ibid) : "gauni dvidha. guna-nimitta, upacara-nimitta." Thus 'guna' and 'upacara' are distinct entities with Bhoja. For the Kashmere tradition normally we have a division between sadharmya-mula identification and sadharmyetaramula i.e. upacara-mula identification. But Hemacandra, as we will go to analyse his concepts of gauni and laksana does not base his classification on similarity i.e. sadharmya on non-similarity. He has some other base of distinction. So, his 'gauni' thus viewed comes closer to that of Bhoja who has a 'guna-nimitta' and 'upacaranimitta' gauni. Bhoja observes that in his gauni, words are placed either in 'samanadhikaranya' or 'vaiyadhikaranya', and on account of the visesana-visesyabhava which is not understood otherwise - "anyatha-anupapattya" there emerges a sort of relation between two words through implied and stated quality. This relationship which is promoted or caused by guna and hence is termed guna-nimitta gauni. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 523 Bhoja explains 'upacara' (pp. 229, ibid) as that state of things where someone else's quality is superimposed on someone else. This 'upacara' for Bhoja takes place at both the levels i.e. at mukhya and gauna level : "mukhyaya gaunya va anya visesanasya sato'nyatra aropanam upacarah." "sa tu gauna-vyavahitarthatvat gauni bhavati." Qualities of say a solid substance, if superimposed on an abstract thing it is upacara for Bhoja. Basically anya-dharmasya anyatra-aropana may be or may not be inspired by similarity. As noted above in 'gunanimitta gauni two words either in samanadhikaranya or vaiyadhikaranya are brought together and there has to be established a relationship of visesana-visesyabhava, which as there is no other choice-anyatha anupapattya-has to be substantiated through the qualities these two words convey, in one case implicitely conveyed and in the other directly conveyed. So, a sort of similarity between these qualities is expected by Bhoja. In upacara there is no comparision but superimposition of say 'A's qualities on 'B'. It may be noted that 'B' has nothing of it, or say, 'B', is incapable of having these qualities. Thus, in "bhavatu rusi kathora, kintu ramya mrgaksi" or, in, "talaih sinjad-valayasubhagaih nartitah kantaya me" - the qualities of "kathora" and "subhaga" go with a physical entity-murtimad-dravya and prani-visesa, but they are superimposed on anger (rosa), and tinkling bangles (sinjad-valaya). Now in this 'upacara' the meaning is secondarily imposed and hence it is 'upacara-nimitta-gauni for Bhoja. Laksana for Bhoja is also two-fold viz. laksana and laksita-laksana. When for the realisation of meaning of a given word, on account of there being no other instrumentality available, a meaning indicates another meaning which is having a relation of 'a-vinabhava', it is a case of laksana which is six-fold. "tayor (i.e. between laksana and laksita-laksana)" yasyam upatta-sabdasyarthasya kriya-siddhau sadhanatva'yogat svartho'vinabhutam arthantaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sa laksana, tadvyatirikta tu vaksyamana'neka-rupa laksita-laksana, iti. Bhoja says that the farthantara' which is having a close-connection (= avinabhava) such as closeness or samipya, comes up in laksana. The illustrations are 'gangayam ghosah', 'mancah krosanti' etc. Sahacarya laksana is seen in 'kuntan pravesaya', 'chatrino gacchanti', etc. Bhoja's concept of laksita-laksana is hazy. It is certainly not laksana mounted on laksana - which is rejected by Mammata. Whatever is not guided by samipya, sahacarya, sahacarita, hetu, tadarthya, and parinama - is laksita-laksana, which includes rudha-laksana as in dvirepha-which is only abhidha for Hemacandra, and pratika-laksana, viruddha-laksana, tad-anya-laksana, prakirna-laksana etc. But for Hemacandra, 'gauni and 'laksana' are clearly distinct. For Personal & Private Use Only

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524 SAHKDAYALOKA Hemacandra at Ka. Sa. I. 17 explains 'gauna' artha and at I. 18 explains 'laksya' artha and at Ka. Sa. I. 20 he enumerates the functions of a word. We will examine 'gauni and 'laksana' that tend to deliver 'gauna' and 'laksya' meanings respectively as follows. Ka. Sa. I. 17 talks of 'gauna' meaning as : "mukhyarthabadhe, nimitte, prayojane ca bhedabhedabhyam aropito gaunah." This 'gauna' meaning for Hemacandra is caused when (i) primary meaning is contradicted, (ii) when there is 'prayojana' i.e. motive. This 'gauna' is superimposed either through non-identity or 'bheda', or through identity i.e. 'a-bheda'. Hemacandra explains in his vitti gaur vahikah', 'gaur eva'yamity adau mukhyasya arthasya sasna"dimattva"deh pratyaksa"dina pramanena badhe, nimitte ca sadrsya-sambandha"dau, prayojane ca sadrsya-tadrupya-pratipatti-rupe sati, aropya-aropa-visayayor bheda bhedena ca samaropito'tathabhuto'pi tathatvena'dhyavasito, gunebhya ayatatvad gaunah, tadvisayah sabdo'pi gaunah, upacarita iti cocyate." This meaning and the word conveying this meaning are both designated as 'gauna'. It is also called 'upacarita'. The illustrations are 'gaur vahikah' and 'gaureva'yam. The first clearly mentions both 'gauh' the object superimposed, and the person - vahika - The subject on whom the object is superimposed. Thus 'visaya' and 'visayin' are clearly mentioned - 'bhedena'. In the other illustration only the 'visayin' figures and so this is 'a-bhedena aropa'. The direct meaning of 'gauh' - an animal having dewlap, etc. - is contradicted by direct perception or pratyaksa-pramana as we can see that 'vahika' is a human being and not a bull. This superimposition is caused due to 'nimitta' - others call it tadyoga-in form of similarity in qualities possessed by both the vahika and the bull. The qualities are those of dullness and stupidity. They are similar in both the visaya and the visayin. The motive is to suggest the extreme similarity or one-ness between the subject through 'guna' and is therefore termed 'gauna'. The relation was that of sadnsya. But when the relation is that of karya-karana, i.e. anything other than sadrsya, then also 'gauni takes place, says Hemacandra. Thus karyakaranabhava is at the base of the illustration viz. 'ayur ghrtam' (bhedena) and 'ayur eva idam' (abhedena); tadarthya is illustrated in 'indrah', for 'indrartha sthuna', svasvamibhava is in, 'raja for rajakiyah purusah, or 'gramah' for 'grama-svami, agramatre avayave 'agrah' etc. Here, it may be noted that we have all cases of For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 525 abhedena-aropah as 'visaya' is not separately mentioned. These illustrations are in a way dubious. This will be seen when we discuss Hemacandra's 'laksya' artha and 'laksana vrtti'. Ka-Sa I. 18 says - "mukhyartha-sambadhas tattvena laksyamano laksyah." This means that the connected meaning which is indicated as identical with the primary meaning is called 'laksya'. While in 'gauni for Hemacandra there is superimposition of one object over another one either through complete identification i.e. a-bheda or through difference i.e. bheda, in 'laksana' there is superimposition of one meaning over 'another meaning through a-bheda or complete identity only. The two meanings denote two objects but they are derived from one and the same word. Say for example "gangayam ghosah", wherein there is identity between two objects viz. the current of the 'ganga' and the bank of the ganga. But these two objects are not separately or inseparately mentioned as in the case in 'gaur vahikah' or 'gaur eva ayam'. From the word 'ganga' these two ar understood and there is superimposition, through absolute identity, of the meaning of the current of ganga on the meaning of the bank of 'ganga', both of which are expressed through one and the same word i.e. 'gangayam'. Hemacandra observes in his vrtti - (pp. 45, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh) "mukhyo'rtho gangadisabdanam srotah-prabhstih, tena sambaddhah tatadir arthah tattvena abhedena laksyamano laksyah. tatevena laksyamana iti vacanad bhedabhedabhyam aropita iti na vartate. sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartate eva. tadvisayo sabdo laksakah yatha-gangayam ghosah, kuntah pravisanti. atra gangavam ghosadhikaranatvasya, kuntanam pravesasya ca asambhavat mukhyartha badhah. samipyam sahacaryam ca nimittam. gangatata iti kuntavanta iti ca prayogat yesam na tatha pratitih tesam pavanatva-raudratva"dinam dharmanam tatha-pratipadanam prayojanam." Thus, the difference between gauni and laksana for Hemacandra is that in gauni there is superimposition one object over another object; i.e. one thing over another thing. This is realised either through complete identification or through a state where both are separately mentioned. On the other hand in laksana there is also superimposition. But it takes place at meaning level. There is superimposition of the meaning of something over the meaning of another thing but both are mentioned through one and the same word. Again this superimposition is through absolute identity, 'ganga-tata' and 'ganga-pravaha' are not separately mentioned as For Personal & Private Use Only

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526 SAHRDAYALOKA in gaur-vahikah, but their meanings are identified through a common expression viz. 'ganga'. We observed that some illustrations of 'a-bhedena gaunartha' such as 'indrah'; 'taksa', 'adhakah', 'raktah', 'gramah, seem to be in a way dubious'. This is so because here also the meanings of two separate objects not directly and separately mentioned are taken as one. The colour is 'raktah', the cloth is 'red cloth' or 'raktah patah', but only one word is used for two meanings. Even in laksana this happens. Two meanings of two different words are identified through a common expression. Thus the sacrificial post for Indra is said to be Indra. This is gauni. But here also meanings indicated by an identical word are identified through complete identity -'a-bhedena'. It would have been better if like Mammata and many others Hemacandra also had mentioned 'gauni' as a subvariety of laksana, based on similarity, the rest being suddha laksana. Thus the classification of laksana into gauni and suddha as presented by Mammata seems more natural. Hemacandra's effort to distinguish between two sabda-vrttis such as gauni and laksana which for him are independent of each other, appears to be unnatural or acquired. May be Hemacandra was guided by one criterian. It can be this. In all illustrations of gauni of two varieties, the two objects were different from each other. In laksana the object is the same but two things connected with the same object are identified e.g. 'ghosa' and 'pravaha' - both belong to ganga. But this is also not applicable in kuntah pravisanti. So, it seems there is no logic in his approach. He finally observes (pp. 46). "yatra ca vastvantare laksya iti-vastvantaram upacaryate sa gaunah arthah, yatra tu na tatha sa vivekah." The only point of difference is that in laksana the meaning indicated is 'tattvena laksyamanah', i.e. is indicated through identity, while in 'gauni it is either through identity or through difference also i.e. 'bhedabhedena'. But the thin line demarketing "abhedena gauni" and "tattvena laksana" remains undefined clearly. For Hemacandra himself says "sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartata eva." At the same time one thing, for sure, is clear that Hemacandra's 'gauni is not the same as 'gauni variety of laksana as conceived by Mammata. Jayadeva, as seen earlier accepts three powers of a word and he treats vyanjana first (VIlth Mayukha) and then laksana (IXth Mayukha) and abhidha (Xth mayukha). These three functions are compared with the three currents of Ganga at Candraloka VII. 1. Jayadeva observes : For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 527 "vsttibhedais tribhir yukta srotobhir iva jhahnavi, bharati bhati gambhira, kutila sarala kvacit." Laksana then is termed 'kutila'. Rama tika explains 'kutilatva' as : sakyarthasya tyagena atyagena arthantara-pratiti-janakatvam kutilatvam' * 'kutilatva' i.e. deviation is apprehension of another sense with the primary meaning being either left out or not left out. Jayadeva defines laksana (IX. i) as - "mukhyarthasya'vivaksayam purva'rvaci ca rudhitah, prayojanac ca sambaddham vadanti laksana mata." "When 'mukhyartha' i.e. primary sense is not intended, laksana is that power which yields a sense which is related (to the primary). It is either (rudhitah) based on usage and is termed 'purva' or is based on motive, and is called 'arvaci. It may be noted here that Jayadeva lays down - "mukhyarthasya a-vivaksa" as the basic condition of laksana. This means that when the speaker's intention is different from the one appearing from the primary sense, laksana is resorted to. So, Jayadeva here seems to differ from the traditionally accepted thinking concerning laksana which, according to Mammata and many others, takes 'mukhyartha-badha' i.e. contradiction of the primary sense as the basic condition of laksana. Here Jayadeva seems to replace 'mukhyarthabadha' by 'tatparya-anupapatti', as we had observed while treating the views of early Mimamsakas though of course, there, in the Mimamsa thinking 'mukhyartha-badha' was not totally ruled out. The Rama commentary observes : "mukhyarthasya a-vivaksaya laksanabijatvam vadata mukhyartha-badhasya laksana-bijatvam nirastam." The 'Paurnamasi (pp. 270, Edn. Chawkhamba Sk. Sr. - Varanasi - Haridas Skt. Granthamala, '64) observes : "anvaya'nupapattis tatparya'nupapattis ceti dvau laksanavakasahetu pracina manyante. tanna. 'kakebhyo raksyatam annam' ity atra anvaya'nupapater abhavat, tatparya'nupapater eva ca karya-siddheh." Dr. Trilokinath Dwivedi (Edn. Candraloka, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi, Delhi, '92) pp. 373 observes in his sanskrit commentary - "mukhyas' casav artho mukhyarthah vacakena sabdena mukhyaya abhidhaya saktya pratipadito'rtho mukhyathah. tasya avivaksayam vastutatparya'visayi For Personal & Private Use Only

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528 SAHRDAYALOKA bhutayam, arthad yatra sabdasya mukhye arthe vaktus tatparyam na bhavati, api tu mukhyartha-bhinne mukhyarthatavacchedaka'-tirikta-dharmavacchinnatvarupe'rthe eva vaktus tatparyam bhavati, idam eva anyaih mukhyartha-badha ity uktam. tatparyabhava-rupa-mukhyarthabadhe sati iti bhavah." We do not agree. "Tatparyabhava' can never be equated with 'mukhyarthabadha', and 'intention of the speaker with reference to another sense' is not 'mukhyartha'. It is clear. The Rama Tika explains that Jayadeva seems to accept 'mukhyartha-badha' or contradiction of the primary sense through 'anvaya-anupapatti' i.e. when the correlation of words in a sentence is damaged. But Jayadeva seems to take 'tatparya'nupapatti' - 'not realizing the motive' as 'mukhyartha-avivaksa' i.e. 'lack of motive of (promoting) the primary sense'. Rama observes that even though there is absence of anvaya-anupapatti - i.e. even when the correlation of words in a sentence does not suffer, in varieties (of dhvani) such as 'arthantara-samkramitavacya' i.e. when the primary sense is merged in another meaning, there is tatparyaanupapatti-non-realization of motive - in form of mukhyartha-avivaksa i.e. 'the primary sense being not intended'. Thus, only tatparya-anupapatti or 'nonrealization of motive' is to be taken as the basis of laksana, i.e. 'laksana-bijam'. Rama observes that in all types of verbal cognition - i.e. in sabda-bodha-matra', - there is no causality vested in tatparyajnana or knowledge of motive. But only in "laksanika-sabdabodha" i.e. in verbal cognition of words charged with laksana alone, there is requirement of the knowledge of motive, because it stands as a cause - "ata eva na sabdabodha-matre tatparya-jnanasya hetuta, kimtu laksanika-sabdabodha eva." (Rama on Candraloka IX. 1) Jayadeva's two varieties of laksana such as purva and arvaci are respectively rudhi-mula and prayojanamula varieties only; observes Rama : "sa dvividha, purva arvacina ca. tayoh purva nirudha-laksana, prayojanapratity anuddesika; arvacina prayojanavati, tatparya-visaya-prayojana-pratity uddesyika ity arthah." (on IX. 1) Jayadeva (IX. 2) further classifies laksana into - "laksaniya-sva-sabdasya milana'milanad dvidha, laksana, sa tridha siddhasadhya-sadhyargabhedatah." For Personal & Private Use Only

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529 'Laksana When, the 'sva-sabda' of the implicit sense is mixed or not-mixed we have twofold laksana. The idea is that when in a word which is laksyartha-bodhaka i.e. one which gives the implicit sense the laksya-vacaka-pada is merged or not merged we get two varieties. By 'laksaniya' is meant the meaning intended to be indicated by laksana. Now the word giving that meaning is either merged or not merged. The idea is that at times in the indicated sense given by 'laksaka' word, the primary meaning of the laksaka is merged. Thus the indicative word totally leaves behind its primary sense and brings into light only the indicated sense. This is said to be laksana-laksana by others. At times the primary meaning continues along with the indicated sense. This is termed as upadana-laksana by others. Thus for Jayadeva the two are rudhi and prayojanavati. Both these are again three-fold on account of siddha, sadhya and sadhyanga-bhedas. Thus, for Jayadeva we have Laksana rudhi prayojanavati milana a-milana sphuta sphuta a-sphupa a-sphuta milana a-milana 1siddha 2sadhya 3sadhyanga 4siddha 5sadhya 6sadhyanga 7tatastha-sphuta prayojana Sarthagata-sphuta-prayojana Sarthanistha tatastha 10laksyanistha 11laksakanistha 12tatasthe-asphuta-prayojana Thus we have six varieties of rudhi-mula and six of prayojana-mula. Jayadeva further says (IX. 3) that the prayojana may be sphuta and asphuta. So we get a-gudha-vyangya and gudha-vyangya. The sphuta prayojana is tatastha and artha-gata, i.e. two-fold. Thus prayojanavati is divided into tatastha-prayojana and artha-gata-prayojana. Similarly asphuta-vyangya is also two-fold i.e. artha-nistha For Personal & Private Use Only

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530 SAHRDAYALOKA and tatastha. So, gudhavyangya is also two-fold. (IX. 4a). Again artha-gata-sphuta and asphuta vyangya is also either laksya-nistha or laksaka-nistha (IX. 4b) thus the prayojanavati is 36-fold ! When sphuta-prayojana is in 'laksaka' we get one variety. While giving three more varieties Jayadeva takes note of 'a-sphutatva' etc. The prayojana is either asphuta, sphuta, or tatastha, giving rise to three-fold laksana. Rama observes further that, laksana "which is different from sakti is four-fold" is intended here. As 'prayojana' is not apprehended by "sakti', so laksana has to be accepted as four-fold. This seems to be the ultimate idea. Rama (pp. 113, ibid) observes that in counting the varieties of laksana in Jayadeva there is some irregularity either due to 'bhrasta-patha' i.e. currupt reading, or due to patha-bheda i.e. different reading. Even Paurnamasi also feels that the portion beginning with "a-sphutatvam" and ending with "sa caturvidha" - is useless as it is additional and unnecessary. In short, even the commentators find the printed text difficult to explain. Jayadeva has furnished illustrations of different varieties of laksana. He has also indicated the various relations that are taken as the basis of laksana i.e. "laksanabija". The relations that make for laksana bija are 'abhimukhya', 'sannidhi', 'akarapratiti', karyakarana-bhava, etc. Jayadeva observes abhimukhyat sannidhanat tatha"karapratititah. (IX. 8b) karyakaranabhavat sa vacyavacakabhavatah, ity evam adeh sambandhat kincanyasmat catustayat. (IX. 9) sadrsyat samavayat-sa vaiparityat kriyanvayat, saropa'dhyavasana"khye gauna-buddhe prthak prthak." (IX. 10) After this Jayadeva talks about the accepted varieties of laksana, furnishing almost the stock illustrations. He speaks of saropa, sadhyavasana, these again are seen as gauni, and suddha. Two Varieties of suddha saropa and suddha sadhyavasana are termed as upadana-laksana and arpana-laksana. Thus, for For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 531 him, prayojanavati becomes six-fold. These are illustrated but not defined by Jayadeva. After this Jayadeva gives some other varieties bron of the speciality-vaisistya - of laksya and laksaka-padas. They are termed as visesanavati siddha, and visesanavati sadhya. The illustrations furnished are 'sarasam kavyam amstam', and "sa ca murtimati ratih". He also talks of varieties of laksana based on 'adhara' i.e., substratum, for example in words, word-sense, vakyartha, samkhya, karaka and in linga we find laksana. This rather sounds funny. Or perhaps Jayadeva overdoes this under the influence of Anandavardhana who read dhvani in sup, tin, vacana, sambandha, etc. (Dhv. II 16) and also Kuntaka who explained vakrokti in padapurvardha, pada-parardha, vakya, etc. Jayadeva observes in the end that a number of the varieties of laksana are seen as the basis of many a alamkara. He says: sabde padarthe vakyarthe samkhyayam karake tatha, linge ceyam alamkara nkura-bijataya sthita. (IX. 16). Vaidyanatha in Rama observes that the word 'alamkara', is an 'upalaksana' andtherefore even 'rasa"di' are covered by the same. Thus laksana is at the root of rasa"di also, according to Jayadeva. It may be noted that when Jayadeva, putting aside the current and accepted titles of the varieties of laksana, floats new names such as 'purva' and 'arvaci, perhaps either he is reviving an old forgotten tradition, or being a poet by temperament also, goes for these terms, which of course nobody of his successor accepted and promulgated. May be, at places, either through faulty readingbhrasta-patha-or some inexplicable variant, Jayadeva looks clumsy, but he has explained laksana with precision and beautiful illustrations. It is perhaps his treatment which inspires Visvanatha to explain an 80-fold laksana later. Perhaps a platform is built for the deep and thoughtful dilectics as seen in Appayya and Jagannatha later, through the efforts of Jayadeva. Vidyadhara in his Ekavali, Unmesa II. Observes that laksana is the function of a laksanika-word. He observes : For Personal & Private Use Only

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532 SAHRDAYALOKA "sabdo'yam laksaniko vyaparo laksana bhaved yasya, etallaksanam asyah samanyam laksyate purvam." (Ekavali II. 4) He proceeds, 'mukhyartha'nupapattau tadyoge rudhito'thava phalat, anyo'rtho yadi laksyo bhavati tada laksana'bhimata." (II. 5, ibid) "mukhyasya arthasya badhah, tena sambandhah, prasiddhih prayojanam va laksanayam upayujyate. tatas ca mukhyarthasya badhe tenaiva sambandhe mukhyena arthena a-mukhyartho yal laksyate, sa aropitah sabda-vyaparah, santarartha-nistho laksana. tatra kusala ity adau rudhito laksana, gangayam ghosa ity adau tu prayojanat. It may be noted that Vidyadhara uses the term "mukhyartha-nupapattau" for 'mukhyartha-badha' which of course he mentions in his vstti. Again he resorts to the titles such as jahat-svartha and a-jahat-svartha and later observes that the same are termed laksana-laksana and upadana-laksana. Vidyadhara observes (II. 6, 7, Ekavali) "sabdorpayati parartham yady atmanam tada jahat-svartha" (II. 6a) ... iyam eva aprastuta'der alamkarasya bijam. iyam tu laksana-laksaneti parair abhidhiyate. 'sa viparita yasyam laksayati padam sva-vacya-viparitam." (II. 6B) iyam eva vyajastuter bijam. "siddhi nija-kriyayah kartum yasyam parasya sabdena, aksepah kriyate'sav ajahat-svartha samakhyata." (II. 7) ... iyam eva samasokty ader bijam. iyam punar upadana-laksaneti matantare giyate... For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 533 More important point Vidyadhara makes is that he talks of jahad-ajahad-variety of laksana also. Dr. K. K. Raja (pp. 251, 252 ibid) mentions this variety as accepted by the vedantins who want to explain passages such as, "tat tvam asi" etc. But Dr. Raja has not suggested that even Vidyadhara, a later alamkarika also talks of this variety. Vidyadhara observes : amsenaikena punar jahati na jahati canyena, sabdah svartham yadi jahad-ajahat-svartha samakhyata. (Ekavali. II. 8) The illustration given is beautiful. It reads as - "yatkarnatala-prabhavaih samiraih pratapadipah samita ripunam, soyam tava nyakkrta-dikkarindra lilayito vira karenurajah." He reads this variety in the expression "soyam" which he explains as - " 'so'yam'ityatra tattamse jahati svartham idantamse tu na jahatiti' jahad-ajahtsvartha iyam". The general impression is that Vidyadhara accepts Mammata as his master. He also mentions saropa laksana which is both gauni and suddha. In gauni 'similarity prevails in form of super-imposition of qualities, while suddha is 'upacarayukta', 'upacara' being that identification which is not based on similariy in qualities. So suddha is sadrsyetara-sambandha-mula, for Vidyadhara. This upacara is five-fold. Vidyadhara observes : (pp. 70, ibid, under Ekavali. 2.8) - "suddha punar upacaravati. ... upacarasca karya-karana-bhava"der nimittasya pancavidhyat pancadh bhavati. He mentions (i) karyakaranabhava, (ii) tadarthya (iii) svasvamibhava-sambandha (iv) avayavavayavibhava & (v) tatkarmya among the fivefold upacaras. He says (II. 10, pp. 72, 73 ibid) - "ity asmabhir bhidah sapta laksanayah pradarsitah, samkarena tri-rupena samsrstya caika-rupaya (II. 10) For Personal & Private Use Only

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534 SAHRDAYALOKA asyah samkalanenyonyam astavinsatir iritah, panca-trimsat samakhyatah suddha-bhedaih samam punah." (II. 11) Thus according to Vidyadhara, laksana is basically seven-fold which multiples into 28 Varieties due to three-fold samkara and one type of samsrsti and if we add the seven suddha varieties, we arrive at 35 varieties of laksana. Vidyanatha in his Pratapa-rudra-yasobhusana, pp. 36 (Edn. S. Chandrasekhara Sastrigal, Madras, '14) observes : "vacyartha'nupapattya tat-sambandhinyaropitah sabda-vyaparo laksana" . Thus when the primary meaning is unacceptable laksana operates as 'aropita', 'sabdavyapara' - with reference to the primary one. This function is 'aropita' in the sense in which Mammata has called laksana an "aropita kriya". The fact is that laksana is not basically a sabda-vyapara but is an artha-vyapara and hence is described metaphorically as a function of a word. The Ratnapana o Kumaraswamin explains it as - (pp. 36, ibid) - "vacyartha'nupapattya mukhyarthabadhena hetuna, tatsambandhini mukhyartha-sambandhe visaye aropitah sabdavyaparo laksanety arthah. atra yady api svartham prattyyaya uparatavyaparasya sabdasya punar vyaparantara-ayogad artha eva laksakah, iti arthavyaparo laksana tatha'pi vacyadharmo vacaka upacryate iti laksanayah sabdavrttitva-vyavahara iti vijneyam." He talks of jahallaksana and ajahallaksana, without defining the same. He provides illustrations. Then he enumerates saropa laksana with an illustration and a remark later such as (pp. 37, ibid) - visaya-visayinor abhihitayor abheda-pratipattir aropah. Visaya-nigaranena abheda-pratipattir adhyavasayah. - He illustrates sadhyavasaya laksana also. Vidyanatha's laksana is both sadrsyanibandhana and (sadrsyetara) sambandhanibandhana. These two are sub-divided into saropa and sadhyavasana. It may be noted that by and large Vidyanatha follows Mammata but as he does not notice the two - i.e. saropa & and sadhyavasana as sub-varieties of suddha, he has four varieties of laksana in place of Mammata's six. Visvanatha in his Sahityadarpana meets out a fuller treatment of laksana. He has tried to furnish a comparatively better definition of laksana and has also counted 80-varieties of the same, thus furnishing a more scientific attempt at For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 535 classification. While defining laksana, he has also tried to improve upon Mammata. In his Sahityadarpana II. 5, (pp. 35, Edn. with Laksmi tika, Chawkhamba, Skt. Samsthana, Varanasi, '85, Acarya Krsnamohan sastri) - Visvanatha defines laksana as - "mukhyarthabadhe tadyukto yaya'nyorthah pratiyate, rudheh prayojanas va'sau laksana saktir arpita." (S.D. II. 5) - Laksmi (pp. 35, ibid) observes : "mukhyarthasy abhidheyarthasya badhe, anvaya'nupapattigrahe, tadrupyena, tatparyavisayatve va sati, rudheh anadivaddha-vyavahara-prasiddhi-vasat, prayojanad uddesya-visesad va, yaya saktya, tadyuktah mukhyartha-sambandha-yuktah, anyah, mukhyarthatavacchedaka'tiriktadharmavacchinno'rthah pratiyate, buddhyate, asau sa, arpita aropita, mukhyarthavyavahita-laksyartha-visayakatvad arvacinaih sabdesu kalpita ity arthah, saktir vittih, laksana laksyate, jnayate anya iti tadrsi ucyate iti sesah. tatha ca abhidheyartha'nvaya'nupapattigrahatve sati rudhi-prayojananyatara-prayojyamukhyartha-sambandhavat tad atiriktarthe-pratipadaka-saktitvam laksanatvam. karikaksarena tu, "yaya'nyorthah pratiyate'sau laksana" iti laksanaya laksanam. mukhyartha-badhah, mukhyartha-yoga), rudhi-prayojananyatarac ceti trayam laksanaya hetuh. adyayor danda-cakra'di-nyayena militayor eva karanatvam, rudhiprayojanayos tu 'trnarani-mani-nyayena pratyekam eva karanatvam." But we feel we cannot agree fully with Laksmi's observation, for, if 'yaya'nyorthah pratiyate sa laksana' is to be taken as the definition part, then, we are afraid, it can be made applicable to vyanjana as well. Even the word 'arpita' also cannot exclude vyanjana. So, the whole, - along with the conditions such as 'mukhyarthabadhe tadyuktah' and 'rudheh prayojanad va', - has to be taken as definition. Roughly, of course, we can says that, "yaya'nyorthah pratiyate" is the definition, the three nimitta-hetus are rudhi/prayojana, preceded by mukhyarthabadha and tad-yoga. 'arpita sakti' is the description of laksana. It cannot form part of the definition. Visvanatha goes to observe that 'mukhyartha-badha' i.e. the fact of the primary sense being contradicted is the first condition for laksana i.e. secondary or metaphorical usage. When the primary sense becomes inapplicable, either there is lack of correlation i.e. anvaya'nupapatti' in a sentence, or there is tatparya'nupapatti' i.e. non-realisation of the speaker's intention as in case of, For Personal & Private Use Only

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536 SAHKDAYALOKA "kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam". So, Visvanatha includes 'ta yo aaani raksyatam". So, visvanatha includes tatparya'nupapatti' also as condition of laksana, but he subsumes it under 'mukhyartha-badha' itself. It may be noted that some take 'badha' to mean 'tatparya-badha' only. For, if only 'anvaya-badha' is held as the cause of laksana, then instances such as "kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam' will cease to be illustrations of laksana. In reality this condition of "tatparya'nupatti" seems to be more basic to laksana. Jayadeva has tried to bring home this point. Jagannatha, we will go to observe, has discussed this point in greater details. 'Rucira' commentary on the Sahitya-darpana observes (pp. 43, ibid) that it has to be noted that anyatha'nupapatti i.e. sambandha'nupapatti, meaning absence of apprehension, is either detected in form of 'absence of direct relation', or by 'absence of gathering the intention i.e. 'tatparya'nupapatti'. ivananda Vidyasagar, the author of Vimala, a commentary on the Sahitya-darpana observes that, "it is because of this only that it is stated that laksana is a 'sakyasambandha' i.e. 'relation with a meaning' brought about by non-realisation of tatparya-i.e. 'tatparya'nupapatti' - "anvayasya sambandhasya anupapattih upapatty abhavah, sa ca kvacit saksat sambandhabhava-mukhena, kvacit punah tatparyavisaya-gata-taya va iti bodhyam." says Rucira, (pp. 43). At times 'anvayabadha' i.e. contradiction of correlation, as well as 'tatparyabadha' i.e. contradiction of motive-both these are seen together as, for example, in - "gangayam ghosah". It is clear that there is no correlation established. Again there is tatparya i.e. motive concerning the coolness and piousness of the hamlet. This is also important. Jivananda Vidyasagar observes in 'Vimala (pp. 37, ibid) - "ata eva ahuh, sakya-sambandhas tatparya'nupapattitah" and also - "tad ahuh-yadi va anvaya'nupapattir, laksanabijam syat tada 'gangayam ghosahity adau kvacid gangadipadanam niradau, kvacid ghosa"dipadanam matsyadau laksaneti niyamo na syad iti." If lack of correlation alone would be the cause of laksana, says, Vimala, then in case of 'gangayam ghosah, there will be the contingency of taking 'ganga' to mean the stream of water but 'ghosa' will be taken to mean 'a big fish'. In that case the piousness and coolness of the hamlet, which is the motive, will not be realised. Thus, by 'mukhyartha-badha' both anvaya-badha and tatparya-anupapatti must be understood. In the two basic divisions of laksana viz. rudhi-mula and 'prayojanamula', only in the first one, i.e. rudhimala there is only 'anvayanupatti' as there is no motive in it. But in prayojanavati variety there has to be 'anupapatti' or contradiction with reference to both i.e. correlation as well as motive. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 537 If, observes Visvanatha, 'mukhyarthabadha' is not held as the pre-condition of laksana, then there will be overlapping-ativyapti-of laksana in instances of meanings collected through vyanjana or suggestivity of words as in case of e.g. 'rajati uma-vallabhah'. Then he explains the utility of the second condition viz. 'tadyoga'. It is not proper if the secondary sense is having no connection at all with the primary sense. In the absence of 'tad-yoga', for example, we will have the apprehension of 'yamunatata' in place of 'gangatata', from the word, say, "gangayam". This is absurd. This way also there will be over-lapping - ativyapti - of laksana. It is precisely to do away with this contingency that Visvanatha has placed the term 'tad-yuktah' in the definition of laksana. By this, the defect in Mammata's definition is removed and the definition sounds more scientific. The third prerequisite of laksana is that it is based either on 'rudhi' i.e. usage, or 'prayojana' i.e. motive. Even in the presence of 'mukhyarthabadha', and dyoga', laksana will be able to indicate a secondary sense other than the primary one only if it based either on usage or motive. It may be asked that the apprehension of motive is done through vyanjana or suggestivity of words when the power of indication -i.e. laksana is exhausted. In that case how can this 'prayojana' which is realized only after the power of indication or laksana is over, be the 'cause of laksana ? To reply to this prima facie view, the commentator on the Sahityadarpana, Tarkavagisa observes in his 'Vivsti' commentary that, "avacaka-sabda-prayogah sa-prayojanakah, iti samanyatah prayojana-jnanas va" - i.e. A sound which is a-vacaka i.e. having no dictionary meaning (say, for example blowing the horn of a vehical) is produced only with a motive (in one's mind)." The horn is blown with a motive to suggest the people on road that a vehicle is arriving. The motive appears first in mind as a cause and the signal follows. Same is the case with laksana which is practiced first with a motive already present in the mind, eventhough the motive itself is realized later through vyanjana based on laksana in case of 'sahitya'. Thus knowledge of 'prayojana' precedes the actual result. So, in laksana the fact of there being a 'prayojana' precedes the actual process of laksana. Many commentators tend to explain the use of fifth conjugation (= pancami vibhakti) in the word 'prayojanat' as, "prayojanam uddisya" i.e. "taking into consideration the motive". But Udyotakara (pp. 37, ibid) explains it as "prayojaka'bhisamdhi-purvakam", i.e. "being connected with a motive", i.e. "with reference to the motive". From this point of view, a 'prayojana' or motive is the 'prayojaka' - sponsoring agency of the definition. Thus all the three i.e. "mukhyarthabadha, tadyoga, and rudhi or prayojana" - are unavoidable preconditions for For Personal & Private Use Only

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538 SAHRDAYALOKA laksana. The first two causes operate hand in hand through 'danda-cakra-nyaya', and the last one through "trnarani-mani-nyaya". Again this last condition suggests the basic two-fold classification of laksana also. The term "anyorthah" should not be taken to mean "mukhyartha-bhinnorthah". In this case the definition will be too broad as observed earlier and will take even vyanjana in its fold. But by 'anyorthah' what is intended is "sakyatvavacchedakatiriktad harmavacchinnatva-ruporthah". This is precisely 'laksyartha'. If 'mukhyartha-bhinna' is understood as the meaning of 'anyorthah', then in instances such as, 'kadali kadali', laksana will not operate and thus the definition, will be too norrow. So, by 'anyorthah' should be understood "that meaning which is having the quality different from the quality of the primary sense." By the term 'arpita' is meant that laksana is not a natural function of a word and hence it is said to be 'else than abhidha' and therefore, "svabhaviketara" - or 'else than natural. If some take abhidha to be one created by God, "svarodbhavita", then laksana, being artificial, is 'not' created by 'God', i.e. 'isvara'nudbhavita'. As the term 'arpita' is merely a descriptive term, it may not be feared that due to calling laksana as 'arpita saktih', it will cover even vyanjana in its fold! Visvanatha has carefully divided, laksana into 80 varieties. This is not 'love for hair-splitting' as commented by some scholars, but it is scientific and clean thinking. The table showing 80 sub-divisions of laksana runs as below: Laksana rudhimula The rudhimula is sub-divideded into 8 varieties such as : rudhimula laksana saropa upadana laksana suddha gauni sadhyavasana suddha gauni prayojanamula. laksana-laksana saropa For Personal & Private Use Only sadhyavasana suddha gauni suddha gauni

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'Laksana 539 The Prayojanavati has (32) varieties. When we add (8) varieties of rudhimula we arrive at (40) varieties which, all of them are either (i) padagata or (ii) vakyagata, thus taking to (80) sub-divisions in total. The (32) varieties of Prayojanavati are upadana saropa sadhyavasana suddha gauni suddha gauni gudhavangya a-gudhavangya (This sub-division goes with all eight divisions of prayojanavati.) and laksana saropa sadhyavasana suddha gauni suddha gauni All these 8 are two-fold, i.e. gudha-vyangya and a-gudha-vyangya. This makes for 16, which are again either (i) dharma-gata or (ii) dharmi-gata, making (32) in all. + 8 rudhimula = 40. These are (i) pada-gata or (ii) vakyagata making a total of (80). Kesavamisra in his Alamkara-sekhara, (pp. 9, Marici III Edn. N. S. Bombay, '26) talks of laksana as 'sakya-sambandhah'. He observes that laksana operates due to 'tatparya'nupapattya' and 'mukhyartha'nupapattya' - "sa ca tatparya'nupapattya mukhyartha'nupapattya va pravartate." This is clearly Visvanatha's influence. He gives an illustration such as, "nirmalyam nayanasriyah" etc. The word 'nirmalya' is charged with laksana. He does not go beyond this and is not interested in giving any classification. From this very brief delineation, it is clear that kesava is not greatly in favour of only mukhyartha-badha' as the condition of laksana. He also does not talk of either rudhi or prayojana' as the condition here. Perhaps for him the concept was so firmly and cleanly established that he does not care to discuss it in any detail. For Personal & Private Use Only

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540 SAHRDAYALOKA Appayya Dixit has discussed the topic of sabda-vrttis viz. - abhidha, laksana and also vyanjana in his brilliant work named "Vrtti-varttika", which unfortunately is available till day only upto the portion containing discussion on abhidha and laksana only. Though Appayya did recognize vyanjana, the portion containing vyanjana is not available. We will deal with his concept of laksana as below : For Dixit laksana is that power of a word wherein, through the relation with the primary sense, the word becomes a conveyer (of meaning): "sa ca mukhyarthasambandhena sabdasya pratipadakatvam" (pp. 50, Edn. Avasthi; Induprakasana, Delhi, '77). It may be noted that for Dixit also laksana is exactly the same as that defined by Mammata but the latter's definition is clearer and so also is Visvanatha's. While Mammata has laid down three causes of the secondary function called laksana i.e. indication, such as mukhyartha-badha, tad-yoga, and either rudhi or prayojana remaining at the base, and all these three connected to one another through the danda-cakra"di-nyaya i.e. analogy of the rod and the wheel (of a potter), Appayya on the other hand has not taken care to discuss mukhyartha-badha etc. - the factors being much debated by earlier authors. This means that he starts with the acceptance of these three basic factors which for him are clear to an advanced student. Appayya Dixit, like Mammata, takes laksana to be basically two-fold such as suddha and gauni. He has denounced the opinion of those who hold 'gauni' as an independent sabda-vrtti. He believes that as in both laksana as well as gauni, the meaning apprehended is that only which is connected with the primary sense, it is futile to take these two vittis, i.e. gauni and laksana as separate and independent of each other as is done by Mukula and Hemacandra. He feels that this relation with the primary sense gives rise to a secondary sense in both these vsttis, which therefore do not deserve independent reckoning : "atha laksana nirniyate, sa ca mukhyartha-samband hena sabdasya pratipadakatvam. tat-sadrsyena pratipadakatvarupa gauny api laksana-prabheda eva, tat-sadrsepi tannirupitasadrsyadhi-karanatva-parampara-sambandha-sattvat." (pp. 50, ibid) Mukula, as seen earlier accepts gauni as an independent power of word, separate from laksana. He is indebted to some Mimamsaka thinkers for this approach. Kumarila, as seen earlier, observes : "abhidhayavinabhutapratitir laksanocyate, laksyamana-gunair yogat vitter ista tu gaunata." (Tantravarttika I. IV. 22) For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 541 "Indication is said to be the cognition of what is connected with the primary sense. It is but desirable to admit the process to be qualitative on account of the connection (of the expressed sense, viz. bull) with the qualities of what is under indication." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 34, ibid) For Mammata gauni is a variety of laksan, in which 'upacara' or metaphor takes place due to similarity, while in other varity of laksana there is absence of this 'upacara', based on similarity and hence is termed 'suddha'. Mukula was of the opinion that 'upacara' is a broader term and it includes relations both based or similarity or any other factor else than similarity. Dixit accepts Mammata's verdict while his predecessor and Mammata's successor Hemacandra has a different attitude. We have seen above that Hemacandra accepts gauni as an independent sabda-sakti and the difference between gauni and laksana for him is so thin that it is hardly traceable. For Hemacandra 'gaunartha' is that secondary meaning which is superimposed, either through identity or otherwise, when contradiction of primary sense, (nimitta i.e.) tadyoga and motive are (as causes). - "mukhyarthabadhe nimitte, prayojane ca, bheda'bhedabhyam aropito gaunah." (Ka. sa. I. 17, pp. 44, Edn. 2nd, Prof. Parikh & Dr. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64). Now this 'aropita' artha or superimposed sense is brought about by 'nimitta' i.e. 'tadyoga' or relation with the primary sense, such as "sadrsya-samband i.e. through the relation of similarity and others. This is for the apprehension of similarity or identity etc. This is the motive, or 'prayojana'. The crux of the point is that this superimposition is, "aropya-aropa-visayayor bheda'bhedena" i.e. through either identity or difference between the subject of superimposition and the object (visayin) superimposed. Hemacandra independently of this 'gauna' meaning, also accepts 'laksyartha' which is also connected with the primary sense (mukhyartha) but is indicated through identity only. - "mukhyartha-sambaddhas tattvena laksyamano laksyah." (Ka. Sa. I. 18). He says that by 'tattvena' is meant that it is not superimposed either through difference or identity (as in the case with gauna artha). The rest of laksyartha is the same as gaunartha. "tattvena laksyamana iti vacanad bheda-bhedabhyam aropita iti na vartate. sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartata eva." (pp. 45, ibid. vrtti on ka. sa. I. 18). Though of course Hemacandra has not illustrated sadrsya-mulaka-laksyartha, but he has not ruled it out either. The illustration is 'gangayam ghosah' in which both the meanings of ganga-tata' and 'ganga-pravaha' are in absolute identity (tattvena). But in case of 'gauna' meaning as illustrated by him in 'Indrah' for 'indrartha sthuna, or in 'gramah' for 'grama-svami - etc. the same thing appers viz. For Personal & Private Use Only

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542 SAHRDAYALOKA (tattvena). Of course Hemacandra does mention, that in 'gaunartha' both 'bheda' and 'abheda' are seen, but the point is that how are we to distinguish between abheda-mulaka gaunartha and laksyartha which is necessarily abheda-mul only difference obvious is to believe 'gauna' as that meaning which is based on similarity of qualities. But then we arrive at a more logical presentation of Mammata and Appayya who take superimposition based on similar qualities, i.e. sadesya as 'gauni, a variety of laksana, the other being sadrsyetara-sambandhamula 'suddha' laksana. So, Appayya is very right when, like Mammata, he also observes that - "tat-sadisyena pratipadakatva-rupa gauny api laksana-prabheda eva." - i.e. as in case of suddha laksana in gauni also, because the meaning is apprehended through the primary meaning being discarded and through the relation of similarity, gauni also has to be taken as a variety of laksana, (over and above suddha). Appaya further observes that the objector may argue that, in places such as, 'simho manavakah', and 'gaur vahikah', there is no apprehension of the sadrsya but - in 'simha-sadrsah manavakah', there is apprehension of a similar object i.e. 'sadrsa' only, and in this case how can we call it 'sadrsya-mulaka-gauni-laksana' here? The reply to this is that even in 'a similar object, i.e. 'sadrsa', the idea of similarity or 'sadrsya' is inherent. Thus in the expression "Manavaka is similar to a lion or 'simhasadesah manavakah', the similarity is also between 'simha' and 'manavaka', through parampara or indirectly. The objector may argue that can such an indirect or 'parampara' relation be taken as a cause in gauni laksana ? The answer is 'yes'. Appayya here cites an illustration. Between the eye and a pot there is 'pratyaksa sannikarsa' or direct relation, i.e. samyoga-sambandha. Now the 'neela-varna' or colour in the pot is related to eye through indirect relation or parampara sambandha such as 'samyukta - samavaya-sambandha. Similarly in simhasardisamanavaka, the relation of sadnsya is parampara-siddha. Appayya Dixit observes : (pp. 50, ibid): na hi, 'saksat samband he visista-buddhi-yogya-samband he va saty eva laksana'itiniyamah, caksurader ghatanailya"disu samyuktasamavaya"divad-visista-buddhi-yogyasya parampara-sambandhasya'pi pratyasattitvopapatteh." Appayya Dixit also observes that in what he calls a vyatireka-laksana also, such a parampara relation i.e., indirect relation exists. In Instances such as, "upakstam bahu tatra..." etc., the relation of opposition with reference to both the opponents is collected only indirectly. The objector may argue that as in case of an illustration viz. "dandi devadattah" i.e. 'Devadatta is having a staff there is apprehension of a For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 543 qualified sense-visista-buddhi-such as danda-visista-devadatta' i.e. devadatta qualified by a staff, - in the same way there is no apprehension of such qualified sense - visista-buddhi-in case of sadisya or similarity. For if there is cognition of such a qualified apprehension in 'simho devadattah', then the words such as 'simhavan devadattah' should have been used. But there is no such use. So, 'sadrsya' cannot be taken as causing a qualified cognition i.e. visista-buddhi. Appayya refutes this argument in the following way - Through the indirect relation, i.e. parampara sambandha', even sadrsya makes for a qualified cognition - i.e. visista-buddhi. Thus, in 'simho manavakah', we can say that the similarity qualified by simhatva (i.e. simhatva-visista-sadrsya) qualifies on its part a similar object. Manavaka is non-different (abhinna) from such a qualified similar object. Dixit thus comes to the conclusion that though sadrsya-relation may not control the visista-buddhi or qualified cognition directly, but it causes such a cognition through parampara i.e. indirect relation, which also is a relation in itself. Laksana based on on is therefore said to be gauni-laksana. He observes : (pp. 50, ibid) * "...vyatireka-laksana-sthale, tannirupita-virodha'dhikaranatva"di-paramparasambandha - matrena tadrsena laksana klptes' ca. etena-'sadrsyam na sambandha iti gauni laksanato bhinna, visista-dhi-yogyasyaiva sambandhatvat. samyoge sati'dandi devadatta' itivat saty api sadrsye 'simhavan devadattah' iti visistabuddher adarsanat', iti nirastam; visista-buddhi-niyamaka-parampara-sambandha-matrasya pratyasattitvopapatteh tavata laksana-klptes' ca darsitatvat." - tasmat sadrsyagarbha-tad-anya-sambandha-nimittataya gauni suddha ca iti laksanaya eva dvaividhyam." (pp. 50, 51, ibid). Appayya Dixita then attempts the classification of laksana. He basically gives nine varieties of laksana. First of all laksana is divided into sadrsya-garbha (gauni) and tad-anya i.e. suddha. These two are again two-fold such as nirudha-laksana and phala-laksana (i.e. prayojanavati). That which is based or rudhi or usage is 'nirudha-laksana', while that based on motive i.e. 'prayojana' is phala-laksana, which is defined as that, "which has a motive, the apprehension of a sense other than the primary one." This phala-laksana is sub-divided into seven varieties such as (i) jahallaksana, (ii) a-jahallaksana, (iii) jahad-ajahllaksana, (iv) saropa (v) sadhyavasana (vi) suddha and (vii) gauni. Rudha-laksana is two-fold i.e. suddha and 'gauni'. Thus Dixit gives a nine-fold classificationas against Mammata's sixfold, though in case of the latter, commentators differ in explaining the term 'sadvidha' as explained earlier. The table for Dixit's varieties can be read as under : For Personal & Private Use Only

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544 SAHRDAYALOKA laksana gauni gauni suddha nirudha phalavati nirudha phalavati saropa sadhyavasana saropa sadhyavasana jahallaksana ajahallaksana jahad-ajahallaksana Mammata's upadana and laksana-laksana are termed respectively jahallaksana and a-jahallaksana by Dixita. In the vyakaranasastra we come across terms such as jahat-svartha and ajahat-svartha. May be Appayya sought inspiration from there. The third variety viz. jahad-ajahallaksana is an independent variety of phalalaksana and is termed as either bhaga-laksana or bhaga-tyaga-laksana in the sastras. We saw earlier that actually the Vedantins, to explain such sentences as, 'tat tvam asi' etc. have advanced this third variety. They leave the 'visesana' element (jahat) and continue with the 'visesya' element (a-jahat) in such upanisadic sentences. We have seen that works on Vedanta such as the Vedantasara discuss this variety. For this third variety viz. jahad-ajahallaksana, Appayya cites the illustrations ramo dagdhah" and "puspitam vanam". He observes (pp. 53, ibid) "gramaikadesa-daha"dau sati, "gramo dagdhah", "puspitam vanam", ityadi prayoge "grama"di padasya svarthaika-desa-parityagena tad ekadese vstter jahadajahallaksana, dagdha-bhuyastv adi dyotanam phalam." - When such statements are utterred it is not meant that the whole village is burnt, or that each and everytree in the forest is flowered, but in fact the burning takes place of some part of a village and some trees in a forest bear flowers. So, in such statements one portion of 'sva-artha' in case of the words viz. 'grama' and 'vana' are left out and some portion of the same is preserved and apprehended. Major portion of a village and majority of the trees in a forest are the obvious motive in these instances. Nagesa in his 'udyota' on the Pradipa of Govinda Thakkura on the Kavyaprakasa of Mammata denounces this variety viz. jahad-ajahallaksana by observing that this variety is covered under jahallaksana itself as here also the For Personal & Private Use Only

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"Laksana' 545 expressive word gives a meaning different from its primary sense. But it can be argued against this, that there is no clear apprehension in jahallaksana of the fact that only some portion of the primary sense is to be left out while some other is to be carried forward. Again, in sentences such as 'tat-tvam asi', this third variety is accepted by tradition and threfore also it does not deserve any repudication. Appayya Dixit has tried to establish 'gauni laksana' as a variety of laksana with special arguments. This speaks of his logical thinking. He has also mentioned nine sub-divisions as against the six advanced by Mammata. His establishment of jahadajahallaksana is also original. He has also contributed originally while discussing saropa and sadhyavasana varieties. In his Vrtti-varttika, in the very beginning he includes (suddha) sadhyavasana variety in suddha jahallaksana. For him it is useless to take (suddha) sadhya-vasana as independent of and separate from (suddha) jahallaksana. The obvious reason behind this is that in both these varieties, the 'laksanika pada' - i.e. word charged with laksana, gives up its primary meaning for apprehending some other sense. For example, in the illustration viz. 'gangayam ghosah', an instance of suddhajahallaksana, the word 'ganga' leaves its primary sense of 'ganga-pravaha' or the stream of the ganga, in order to convey 'parartha' or some other sense in form of 'ganga-tata' or the bank of the ganga. In the same way in suddha sadhyavasana as in 'ayam raja', where on sighting a king's officer, such a statement as, "Here is the king' is issued, the meaning viz. "king's man/officer" i.e. frajakiya-purusa", is swollowed up. Thus in both suddha jahallaksana and 'suddha sadhyavasana variety, the primary sense i.e. svartha is given up (= samarpita) for realizing another sense i.e. parartha. Thus, for Dixit, suddha jahallaksana and suddha sadhyavasana are identical with each other. It may be asked here that when suddha saropa and suddha jahallaksana are held as different what harm is there in differentiating suddha sadhya vasana and suddha jahallaksana also ? For this Appayya says that in both suddha saropa and suddha sadhyavasana the fact of non-difference i.e. a-bheda is one and the same, due to samana-vibhaktikatva i.e. apposition. But at the same time there is some speciality of this sort of a superimposition. This fact of speciality of superimposition distinguishes suddha saropa from suddha jahallaksana while there is no such distinction available with reference to superimposition that is taking place with both suddha sadhyavasana and suddha jahallaksana. So the former should be included in the latter. For Personal & Private Use Only

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546 SAHRDAYALOKA Again in writing off the variety called suddha sadhyavasana Appayya argues that if someone holds that in suddha sadhyavasana as illustrated by, "ayur eva idam", there is the relation of cause and effect i.e. karya-karana-sambandha, while in suddha jahallaksana, as in gangayam ghosah, the relation is that of nearness i.e. samipya-sambandha which is different from the karya-karana-sambandha, this argument is not valid. For if the difference is with reference to the karya-karanarelation, then due to such other relations as sva-svamibhava, tadarthya, tatkarmya, etc. also any number of varieties of laksana will prop up and in this case our basic stand that (phalavati) laksana is seven-fold will be vitiated. Due to this also it is not advisable to accept difference between suddha sadhyavasana and suddha jahallaksana. Appayya observes - (pp. 56-57, ibid) - "atredam pratibhati. - 'suddhasu sadhyavasayabheda-kathanam ayuktam, parartha-sva-samarpanasya a-visesena tasya jahallaksana-'natirekat. na hi tad avisesepi saropa-laksanayam visaya-vacaka-samanadhikaranya-krta-vaicitryantaram asti, yena tad-vad eva jahallaksanatah prthag udahriyeta. nanu-'karya-karana-bhava-sambandhena vrttih ity ata eva prthaktvam astu, karyakarana-bhavatiriktena ganga-tira"di-gata-samyoga"di-sambandhena yrttau jahallaksana'ity asamkaropapatte>>'; - ma evam - 'rajakiyah puruso raja' 'indrartha sthuna indrah, 'a-taksa'yam taksa', 'agra-hasto'yam hastah', iti sva-svamibhavatadarthya-tatkarmya-avayavavayavi-bhavesvapi karya-karana-bhava iva saropa'dhyavasaya-laksanayor akara-granthesuudaharanad, asrayasrayibhavasambandhe api alamkara-sudha-nidhau udaharanac ca, vaicitryantarabhavepi vidhantaropagame sambandha-bhedantaram avalambyapi vidhantaropavarnanasya pratyakhyatum a-sakyataya sapta-vidharva-niyama-a-samanjasya-prasangac ca." Now, says Appayya Dixita, that if it is argued that in suddha sadhyavasana the apprehension of suggested sense is preceded by that of identification, while it is not the case in suddha jahallaksana, and hence both are different on account of this speciality of suggested sense brought about by identification preceding it, then this also is not a sound argument. Appayya says that even in suddha jahallaksana also there is apprehension of suggested sense with the apprehension of identity preceding it. In 'gangayam ghosah', only after the apprehension of identity between the stream-pravaha-of ganga and the bank-tata-of ganga, the phala in form of the suggestion of coolness and piousness is apprehended. For this Dixit has quoted illustrations from 'Kavya-sarani', 'kavya-prakasa' and also 'Ratnakara'. It may be said, observes Prof. Dr. B. D. Pandya (Ref. Appayya Dixita, kavi ane alamkarika - in Gujarati - pp. 216. doctoral thesis, published by Guj. Uni. '74, Ahd.) that the For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 547 presentation of Dixitajee is 'revolutionary and original'. But the fact is that Appayya's views on laksana also are challanged and almost blasted at so many places by Punditaraja Jagannatha and this is not taken care of by Dr. B. D. Pandya but nicely presented by Prof. P. Ramacandrudu in his "The Contribution of Panditaraja Jagannatha to Sanskrit Poetics" (Vol. I. Edn. Nirajana publishers Delhi - 7, '83). This we will examine in due course. For the present we will continue with Appayya Dixit, when he comes to discuss saropa laksana. The famous illustration of saropa laksana is, 'mukham candrah'. Here 'mukha' is said to be 'visaya' or 'upameya', and 'candra' is 'visayi or 'upamana'. The relation between these two is that of similarity i.e. sadrsyasambandha. On the basis of this relation it is imagined that 'the face is itself the moon'. Thus identity is brought about between the two. This identification shows the relation of tad-rupya' between 'mukha' and 'candra'. This relation of identity i.e. tadrupya-sambandha is impossible to be established by the primary senses of 'mukha' and 'candra', because both these things are absolutely different from each other. So, to bring out the apprehension of identification, we have to resort to laksana or indication with reference to 'candra', and through laksana we have to arrive at a meaning viz. 'candra-sadrsa' i.e. 'similar to the moon'. The motive or prayojana behind this laksana is to suggest the 'tadrupya' abheda between 'mukha' and 'candra'. Now, Appayya holds that to begin with, in instances such as, 'mukham candrah', there is no need to resort to saropa laksana at all! In Vittivarttika as well as in the portion on rupaka alamkara in his Citra-mimamsa, he has vociferously argued to denounce saropa laksana in such cases. The gist of his argument is that the word 'candra' through its indicated sense of 'candra-sadrsa' i.e. 'similar to the moon', is incapable of the expression of 'mukhatva', because 'mukhatva' can never be found to be present in 'candra'. Even if you say that, the word 'candra' indicates the sense of one having kanti or beauty, through the samanya (i.e. class) in form of 'kantimatta' or 'the quality of having beauty', the apprehension of tadrupya or identity will not take place. Again, in 'mukham candrah', if it is said that there is scope for laksana on account of similarity residing in the moon, then as this meaning of similarity is dawned, this illustration viz. 'mukham candrah', will have to be taken as an illustration of upama i.e. simile. This being the situation in place of rupaka alamkara, the position of saropa (gauni) laksana becomes impossible. Again, in the illustration viz. 'mukham candrah', for the identification between the face and the moon, indication on the word candra giving the meaning candra For Personal & Private Use Only

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548 SAHRDAYALOKA sadrsa - i.e. 'similar to moon', is resorted to and the motive or prayojana here is said to be tadrupya i.e. abheda or identification between 'mukha' and 'candra'. The ancients hold that this tadrupya' is the 'phala' i.e. 'prayojana', of laksana here. But Dixit strongly objects to this 'phala' or 'prayojana' also. Appayya observes : (pp. 61, ibid) - "tasmat saropa-laksanodaharanesu sadharana-dharma"di-mukena laksana' ity uktam. tatha-'tadrupya-pratitir atra phalam'ity api uktam. samanya-dharmamukhena sadnsyamukhena va laksanopagame tadrupyabhivyakty ayogat, tatha hi 'kantiman mukham', 'candra-sadisam mukham', ity adir arthah sampadyate. Appayya has also objected to Mammata's illustration of slista-paramparitarupaka, such as 'vidvan-manasa-hamsa.' etc. in which according to Mammata laksana is resorted to. Appayya is of the opinion that in the illustration viz. 'vidvan manasahamsa..." etc., according to the ancients there is at the first stage, saropa laksana due to sadrsya or similarity in form of 'manasa-vasitva', i.e. staying in 'manasa' (i.e. both mind and manasa-lake). Then according to the ancients at the next step, when identification between the swan and the king is realized there is - the figure of speech called 'rupaka' i.e. metaphor. Here while realizing the metaphor of the swan in the king, in this illustration, viz. vidvan-manasa-hamsa. etc., first comes the slesa i.e. paronomasia in form of "manasa is manasa" - 'manasam eva manasam'. This slesa gives two meanings of the word 'manasa'. Thus here similarity is based on slesa. Without the realisation of this slesa, the similarity in form, of 'stay in manasa' or 'manasa-vasitva', can not be realized. And so the rupaka based on this realization also becomes impossible. But Appayya opposes this view of the ancients. He is of the opinion that in the illustration viz. vidvanmanasa, there is no sequence such as first comes slesa and next comes rupaka. Here, actually the rupaka takes place first, because the word 'manasa' itself, through the medium of rupaka or metaphor, is able to suggest the motive or intention of the poet. Thus in the apprehension of slesa through the agency of rupaka, slesa comes later then rupaka, thus it cannot be accepted that slesa is either instrumental in bringing about rupaka or in that of the similarity which is at the base of laksana : tallambhakasya slesasya rupakotthapyataya rupaka"peksa-laksana-dasayam tasya buddhipathanarohat. - (pp. 62, ibid), To substantiate his view Appayya quotes from acarya named Cakravarti. "rupakam purva-samsiddham slesam tajjnapayed yadi, tada rupakam eva syat anyatha slesa ucyate." (alamkara-sarvasva-nikrstartha karika - 21] For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 549 - iti slesa-rupakayor vibhagam vyavasthapitavata cakravartina'py asminnudaharane rupakopavarnanena'tra slesa-pascatryasya sphutikaranac ca." (pp. 62, ibid) In the illustration viz. "vidvan-manasa." etc., there is no requirement of resorting to laksana to realize the identity between 'raja' and 'hamsa' i.e. the king and the swan, because it takes place through 'samsarga-maryada' or apposition i.e. 'samanadhikaranya' itself. There is a rule that if two 'namarthas' - names have come together, they are correlated through the relation of identity only. Following this rule, the two words such as 'raja' and 'hamsa' which are placed in the same case (i.e. vibhakti), have their abheda-or identity realized through apposition or vakyartha itself and hence there is no need to resort to 'saropa laksana". Appayya observes - (pp. 62, ibid) : "atra idam tattvam, - 'vidvan'-manasa-hamsa'. - ityadau 'hamsa"di padanam varnye rajani laksana na'ngikartavya, samanadhikaranyena varnyasya rajnah prasiddha-hamsa-jatiya"dibhir abhedasya vakyartha-vidhayaiva pratity upapatteh." If it is argued against this that let there be identity-abhedarealized between 'raja' and 'hamsa', but the apprehension of tadrupya' or identity based on similarity or sadrya also cannot be prevented which occurs to the aesthetes. So, laksana is a necessity here. To this Dixit's reply follows like this. Rupaka takes place, at places of apposition even where there is intention of mere identity. He quotes a verse from Varadaraja-stava to illustrate this point. The verse is, "urdhvam virincibhavanat tava nabhi-padmat..." etc. In this verse, observes Appayya that, in the intention of conveying identity between "urah-sthala" the visaya and 'paramam padam' the visayi, their similarity-tadrpya-is underscored. And yet there is 'rupaka' here, and that only identity-abheda-is inteded by the poet is brought out by the words 'eva' and 'saksat'. Now here, if there is apprehention of 'abheda' or identity then, on the strength of the fact that rupaka takes place due to similarity - i.e. tadrupye rupakam', or that rupaka takes place when there is apposition between the visaya and the visayin - "visaya-visayi-samanadhikaranyasthale rupakam" - then here we will have rupaka. The ancients also think that, when there is apprehension of identity there is 'atisayokti' - "abhede atisayoktih", i.e. "visyyabheda-matra-nirdesa-sthale atisayoktih", i.e. atisayokti takes place when there is delineation of only the identity of visayi. So, in that case, in the illustration viz. "vidvan-manasa-hamsa", etc., as abheda or (total nigarana) is seen between visayin-hamsa and visaya-raja, we will have to go for atisayokti here. But Dixit first of all finds fault with the observation of the ancients itself. For, according to this rule, we will start apprehending 'atisayokti' in the illustration of rupaka, such For Personal & Private Use Only

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550 SAHRDAYALOKA as 'vidvan-manasa'. etc., as there is only identity between 'hamsa' and 'raja' and there is no 'tadrupya' or similarity observed. So, to denounce the belief of the ancients concerning the difference between rupaka and atisayokti, Appayya cites the illustration viz. "hrtpankajani." etc. The meaning of this illustration is this - "O lord, the light - jyotsna - (of the form of lustre of your nails) oozing out from the moon in form of your nails, acquires another nature as it blossoms the lotuses in rm of the hearts of vour devotees, and it dries up the ocean in form of worldly existence." In this illustration the visayi-pada in form of 'jyotsna' completely swallows up - (nigarana) the visaya-in form of nakha-kanti i.e. lustre of the nails - and hence there should be atisayokti in this illustration. But the ancients believe that there is rupaka when there is similarity - tadrupye rupakam' and there is 'atisayokti' when there is (total) identity, 'abhede-atisayoktih : Here, even if there is mentioning of only "jyotsna' which is a visayi-pada, this 'jyotsna' or moon-light pecial as it blossoms the lotuses and hence this visayin jyotsna is different from nakha-kantin-the luster of the nails, which is 'visaya' here. So, we will acquire apprehension of similarity or 'tadrupya' between the two and hence there will be realization of 'rupaka' here. So, it is advisable, argues Dixit, to dispense with the view of the ancients taking "tadrupye rupakam", and "abhede'tisayoktih". We should go for a new belief. Appayya here suggests this new arrangement such as - "visaya-visayi-pada-asamanadhikaranye rupakam" - i.e. rupaka takes place when visaya-pada and visayi-pada are clearly mentioned as separate entities. And, when their is mentioning of only the visayi-pada, there is atisayokti - "visayimatranirdese atisayoktih". If we accept this new arrangement there will not be any mixup, because in the illustration viz. "vidvanmanasa." etc. as there is separate mentioning of 'raja' and 'hamsa' clearly, it is a case for rupaka, and in "jyotsna tvad-anghri." etc. only the visayi-pada, viz. 'jyotsna' is clearly mentioned, it is a case for atisayokti only. Says he, (pp. 63, ibid) : "tatha ca, yadi 'tadrupye rupakam, abhede'tisayoktih, iti vyavastham parityajya 'visaya-visayi-pada-samanadhikaranye rupakam, visayi-pada-matra-nirdese'tisayoktih iti vyavastha adriyate, tada, "vidvan-manasa-hamsa." ityadau abheda-pratitau satyam api rupakam sambhavati iti na kacid anupapattih." Thus in case of rupaka, Appayya has established a new norm in dispensing with saropa laksana, and also in rejecting the belief of the ancients that we have 'tadrupye rupakam' i.e., rupaka in case of tadrupya, and 'abhede-atisayoktin'. With this we come to the end of Appayya's treatment of laksana. Jagannatha (R.G. pp. 464, Edn. Prof. Athavale, ibid) observes : "atha keyam laksana, For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 551 yanmulascaramam nirupito dhvanih, ucyate, sakya-sambandho laksana." i.e. what is the form of laksana based on which is enumerated dhvani which is laksanamula ? It is said, "The relation of the primary sense with other sense is laksana i.e. indication." Here 'sakyartha' is itself 'mukhyartha' or vacyartha. We have seen earlier that the Vaiyakaranas, Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas also discuss laksana and the alamkarikas also hold their own position in this case. As observed earlier, it was Mukula, so far as available written documents go, the first among alamkarikas who dealt with the topic of sabda-vrttis seriously and Mammata followed him in this respect. Though without dealing with the topic of sabda-vrttis separately Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also have considered this topic. Mammata is followed in this respect later by almost all alamkarikas beginning with Hemacandra down to Visvanatha, but Appayya and now Jagannatha have a special word on laksana. We have seen that many vaiyakaranas have accepted laksana as a separate sabda-vrtti, but there are some who take it only as an aspect of abhidha, as done by Mukula. Kaunda Bhatta - the author of Vaiyakarana-bhusana-sara is thus against laksana to be reckoned as a separate and independent sabda-vrtti. It is only an aspect, or an extension of abhidha for him. But majority of the grammarions are in favour of accepting laksana as an independent word-power as is evident from Nagesa's Vaiyakarana Laghu-Manjusa (pp. 94-133), where he finally takes up a stand in favour of laksana defining it as - 'sakyatavacchedakarupa. (pp. 112). The Naivaikas take laksana as 'sakya-sambandha' (see Muktavali, pp. 3-5) and Jagannatha seems to follow this. Jagannatha observes: "tasyasca arthopasthapakatve mukhyarthatavacchedake tatparyavisayanvayitavacchedakataya abhavo na tantram. sakyatavacchedaka-rupena laksyabhanasya svikarat. kimtu tatparya-visayanvaye mukhyarthatavacchedaka-rupena mukhyartha-pratiyogikataya abhavo rudhi-prayojanayor anyatarac ca tantram. mukhyarthanvaya--nupapatteh tantratve tu, 'kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam'ity atra laksanotthanam na syat. 'gangayam ghosah' ity atra samipyam, 'mukham candrah', ity adau sadrsyam, vyatireka-laksanayam virodhah, ayur ghetam' ity adau karanatva"dayas'ca sambandha yatha yogam laksana-sarirani." (pp. 464, R. G. Edn. ibid) - Through laksana we arrive at laksyartha, a secondary sense, which is other than the primary sense. But here the reason is not this that the quality of speciality of the primary sense i.e. muk avacchedaka dharma - is not present in the correlation (anvaya) with laksyartha or the secondary sense, which is the object of For Personal & Private Use Only

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- 552 SAHRDAYALOKA the motive 'tatparya-visayanvayita'vacchedakataya abhavah na tantram'. because laksyartha or secondary sense is realized through the avacchedaka dharma of the primary sense or through the form of the avacchedaka-dharma. This is accepted by all. - We will try to make this clear as follows. We have observed that Jagannatha following the Naiyayikas, and also the Vedantins, defines laksana very simply as, 'sakya-sambandho laksana'. The Sarala commentary (pp. 185, R.G.) explains it as an expression, by a word, of a secondary sense, as is related to the primary sense. As Prof. Athavale explains, (pp. 486, ibid) in instances like 'gangayam ghosah' the primary meaning of 'gangayam' i.e. on the stream of ganga, is inapplicable and hence we have to resort to another meaning such as, 'on the bank of ganga'. The primary meaning of 'stream of Ganga' is discarded but there is some relation of the primary sense with the newly accepted meaning of 'the bank of Ganga.' If there is no relation whatsoever between these two senses, then any meaning will start to flow from the word 'gangayam'. Thus the unavoidable condition for resorting to laksana is to show some relation between the primary sense and the secondary sense. Thus, Jagannatha terms such fixed relation only as laksana. In this illustration this relation is that of nearness or 'samipya'. Such other relations are also possible between the primary and the secondary sense. Now there is a subtle point to be considered. The point is whether, over and above such relations as samipya etc., is there any relation absolutely common to all, between the primary sense and the secondary sense? With regard to this, there are two views, which may be put as follows: Some are of the opinion that between the primary and the secondary sense there is no other relation beyond those such as samipya, etc., which are welknown. The primary sense is completely negated and in its place the secondary sense is resorted to. The special dharma or quality - avacchedaka dharma of the primary sense is not seen at all in this new secondary sense. Thus it is in fitness of things when there is no relation between the special quality of the primary sense with the secondary sense, the relations between the primary and the secondary senses must be totally different. This view is held by earlier alamkarikas. Jagannatha holds the view held by Mammata, which forms the second opinion. This view believes that it is not necessary that the special characteristics avacchedaka darma - of the mukhyartha and the laksyartha have got to be necessarily different. It is not so that the avacchedaka-dharma of the primary sense For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 553 is never observed in the secondary sense. On the contrary, this view holds that the special characteristic of the mukhyartha and that of the laksyartha should be one and the same. This means that there should be a relation of identity - abhedasambandha-between these two. Mammata and the like hold that between, mukhyartha and laksyartha there is no 'bheda-rupa-tatasthya' - i.e. difference. Jagannatha observes : "sakyatavacchedaka-rupena laksyabhanasya svikarat." He further adds - "kim tu, tatparya-visayanvaye mukhyarthatavacchedaka-rupena mukhyartha-pratiyogikataya abhavo rudhi-prayojanayor anyatarac ca tantram. mukhyarthanvaya'nupapatteh tantratve tu 'kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam'ity atra laksanotthanam na syat. 'gangayam ghosah' ity atra samipyam, 'mukha-candrah', ity adau sadrsyam, vyatireka-laksanayam virodhah, ayur ghrtam' ity adau karanatva"dayasca sambandha yathayogam laksana-sarirani." When the earlier alamkarikas counted the samipya, sadrsya and other relations, they held that these relations are of the form of non-identity or 'bheda'. For them, between the mukhyartha viz. 'stream of Ganga' and the laksyartha viz. 'the bank of Ganga', the relation was only of nearness i.e. samipya. Mammata pointed out a mistake in this view that if this bheda-sambandha is held in samipya etc., the qualities of coolness - saitya - and piousness i.e. pavanatva will not appear in the bank while the chief purpose of laksana is to make one apprehend these qualities in the bank also. Thus, it is inevitable to accept, in any variety of laksana, this relation of non-distinction or a-bheda between the primary and the secondary senses. If the apprehension of saitya and pavanatva does not occur in the bank through laksana, then the whole process becomes futile, as the speaker can use a sentence such as "gangatire ghosah", in place of 'gangayam ghosah". But one resorts to laksana only with a special motive in mind and in this case it is the apprehension of saitya and paranatva and this motive can not be realized without accepting non-distinction i.e. 'a-bheda' between mukhyartha and laksyartha. Though Jagannatha has not pointedly criticized Hemacandra here, but this discussion explains the futility of holding 'gauni as a separate vrtti from laksana, for in the latter, i.e. in laksana for Hemacandra the relation between the two senses is that of absolute identity, 'tattvena', while in the former i.e. gauni, it is through neda' and 'a-bheda'. Hemacandra's thinking and therefore his keeping 'gauni as a separate word-power, distinct from laksana, are both faulty. It so happens that in some instances of laksana there is absence of a motive. This is termed rudhi-laksana, or one based on popular usage, for example the word, 'kusala' primarily means 'kusan lati' i.e. one who cuts the kusa grass, and For Personal & Private Use Only

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554 SAHKDAYALOKA secondarily it means 'an expert in any activity, and it is in this sense only that the word is fixed through usage. Any person who uses this word, uses it in the sense of 'an expert only and there is no motive behind this usage. But it has to be borne in mind that there has to be some relation between the primary and the secondary senses as it is the first condition of laksana. Even in 'kusala' there is a relation of 'expert handling of any task. It is precisely for this end in view that Jagannatha defines laksana as 'sakya-sambandhah laksana." Thus relation between the two senses is very important. He goes a step further and says, as noted above, that in 'prayojanavati laksana, there has to be an apprehension of the special quality - avacchedaka dharma - of the mukhyartha in the laksyartha; and the relation between the two meanings has got to be that of non-difference or abheda' only. Without this the speaker's motive can never be realized. . So, the view of the ancients that between the two senses any relation whatsoever will do is thus negated by both Mammata and Jagannatha alike. . Jagannatha, however points out a defect in Mammata's definition of laksana. While Mammata has introduced 'mukhyartha-badha' as one of the basic conditions for laksana, this is not so in Jagannatha's view. The obvious reason is that if we accept this i.e. mukhyartha-badha as a pre-condition for laksana, then such instances as, "kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam" will fall out of the scope of laksana as there is no difficulty in correlating (anvaya) the words in this sentence. But it is clear that the purport of this statement is that curd is to be protected not only from crows but also from all agency that may foul it and cause disturbance. So, we have to resort to laksana in the word 'kakebhyah' and arrive at the secondary sense such as - "dadhyupaghatakapraninah." In the Kavyaprakasa, Mammata observes : "anayor laksyasya laksakasya ca na bhedarupam tatasthyam. tata'dinam gangadisabdaih pratipadane tattvapratipattau hi pratipipadayisita-prayojana-sampratyayah. gangasambandha-matra pratitau tu gangatate ghosah iti mukhya-sabdabhidhanal laksanayah ko bhedah." (vrtti; K.P. II) "In these two divisions (of indication) there is no separateness amounting to distinction between the indicated (sense) and the indicative. For, when the words like Ganga and the like, convey (the sense of the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive which is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Ganga with the bank). If (by the use of indication) merely a relation with Ganga (viz. stream) were to be apprehended, For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 555 then what difference would there be of indication and a direct mode of expression - "A hamlet on the bank of Ganga ? (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 31, ibid) The point is that to say that in the two varieties of suddha laksana such as 'upadana' and 'laksana', there is apprehension of 'bheda' or separateness, but in gauni laksan, there is 'a-bheda' or no apprehension of separateness, is not proper. On the contrary, the apprehension of motive in prayojanavati laksana takes place only if we apprehend a-bheda between mukhyartha and laksyartha, observes Mammata. This is acceptable to Jagannatha also but the condition of mukhyarthabadha is not acceptable as seen above as it keeps out such statements as 'kakebhyo.' etc. out of the scope of laksana. Similar is the case of a statement such as, "naksatram destva vacam visrjet." Thus, 'tatparya'nupapatti' or 'non-opprehension of motive' should be recognized as 'laksana-bija' or the condition for laksana. But even this 'tatparya'nupapatti' can be explained in two ways -, either as - "mukhyarthata'vacchedaka'dhikaranakah tatparya-visayanvayita'vacchedakatayah abhavah", or as, "tatparya-visayanvaya"dhi-karanakah mukhyarthata'vacchedakarupena mukhyartha-pratiyogitaya abhavah." (candrika commentary, pp. 150, Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Benares, '55). The idea is that what is meant by tatparya in these cases ? By 'tatparya'nupapatti' is it meant that laksana takes place only when the two conditions - viz. 'mukhyarthavacchedaka' and 'tatparya-visayanvayita'vacchedaka' - are present ? Or, is it meant that in the correlation - anvaya - meant by the speaker there is the state of being 'mukhyartha-pratiyogikata' i.e. of being 'mukhyarthiya' in what we know as mukhyarthavacchedaka ? The substance is that by 'tatparya'nupapatti' is it meant that the correlation of anvaya (which is the motive of the speaker) by its own form is not of the primary meaning ? Explaining the views in Candrika, Dr. Ramacandrudu (pp. 250, ibid) puts it as - "In simple language it may, be said that the 'mukhyarthavacchedaka (i.e. gangarva etc.) should not be the same as 'tatparya-visayanvayita'vacchedaka', and then only laksana arises. Or it may be explained that the mukhyartha, in its capacity of being mukhyartha should not be associated with the intended 'anvaya' while giving rise to laksana. But the first explanation of tatparya'nupapatti is against the accepted theory of Alamkarikas, because in places like 'gangayam ghosah', etc., they accept, in order to fecilitate the suggestion of pavanatva etc., that the cognition of the tata is only 'gangatva-rupa'. Thus, tatparyavisayanvayita'vacchedakata' rests with 'gangatva' itself. Therefore, the second explanation of the tatparya'nupapatti can be accepted, because, in the above For Personal & Private Use Only

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556 SAHRDAYALOKA example, we get the cognition of the 'tira' only, though in form of gangatva', and so 'tata' only (but not ganga) is the pratiyogin in the adhara'dheya-bhava. Thus the tatparya'nupapatti is one of the laksana-hetus, according to Panditaraja, the other being rulhi or prayojana. It is to be noted, Pandita-raja does not take mukhyarthayoga as one of the laksanahetus, because, as explained above, it is the laksanasvarupa but not its hetu." Following closely the discussion in Candrika (pp. 150, 151) Sri Ramachandrudu observes (pp. 252, ibid) *. "The above contention of the alamkarikas as presented by PR. (= Panditaraja) that the cognition of the laksyartha is 'sakyartha-prakaraka', is objected to by some critics on the following ground. In the verse - "kacatas trasyati vadanam vadanat kucamandalam bibheti, madhyad bibheti nayanam nayanad adharah samadvijati." The words 'kaca', 'vadana', 'kuca', 'madhya', 'nayana' and 'adhara', are used to mean by laksana, rahu, moon, lotus, lion, dear and sprout respectively. But if the 'sakyatavacchedaka' i.e. kacatva etc., also were to be included in the laksya-sabdabodha, the statement that the vadanam etc. are afraid of 'kaca' etc. would be improper. Such statement can be justified only when the 'kaca' etc. are taken completely as 'rahu' etc., without any tinge of 'kacatva', 'vadantva', etc. in them. This objection is voiced in the Darpana commenting on the following lines of Vaiyakarana-bhusana-sara - "laksanayam alamkarikanam sakyatavacchedakaprakaraka eva bodhah." (p. 65) While repeatiting the above objection, Candrika shows another objection also. In 'kakebhyo dadhi raksyatam' the word 'kakebhyah' means by laksana, 'dadhyupaghatakebhyah, and according to the contention of PR., the laksyartha 'dadhyupaghatakebhyah' will be 'sakyatavacchedakaprakaraka'. Now 'kaka' also being one of the dadhyupaghatakas, comes under the general laksyartha which is kakatvaprakaraka. Thus the mukhyartha (= kaka) is the pratiyogin (sambandha) in the 'tatparya-visayanvaya' (i.e. avadhyavadhi-mad-bhava in the present context) and this pratiyogita of the mukhyartha is mukhyartha-pratiyogita'vacchedaka-rupa (i.e. kakatva) only. Thus in the absence of such pratiyogita, how can it be accepted as an instance of laksana ? After posing this question, Candrika itself suggests a method to avoid this trouble. If it is said that the mukhyartha alone should not be For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 557 pratiyogin in such sambandha, the above objection can be got over, because in the present case 'kaka' only is not the pratiyogin of such sambandha, but the 'bidala"di' But even if this objection is met, Candrika contends, the first objection stands unanswered. (Candrika pp. 150-151) It may be pointed out here, this objection is not so formidable as is opined to be by Candrika. Even if the rahu and candra etc. are cognised in their kacatva"dyavacchinna-rupas, importance is to be given to their rahurva"di only, in view of the vidheya i.e. trasa, and the sakyatavacchedakta fades into insignificance. Thus there is nothing wrong in accepting the above theory. Moreover the same objection can be raised in the well-known example of laksana, 'gangayam ghosah', etc., because even after the tira-laksana, how can it be taken as the adhara of ghosa when the 'gangatva' is lurking in the mind of the hearer? Whatever answer is found to meet this objection, can be applied in this case also, because it is against the common experience that the kaca"di rupa'rtha would completely disappear from the mind of the hearer when he cognises the laksyartha. In fact it is doubtful if this comes under laksana at all. There is a possibility of taking it as an instance of gauni-laksana only; but even this does not seem to be justified here. For, it cannot come either under the saropa or sadhyavasana, because there is no mention of both the, visaya and the visayin as in 'mukham candrah', etc., or of the visayin alone as in, 'vapi ka'pi sphurati gagane', etc. (kuvalaya"nanda, p. 38), and the mention of visaya does not come under either category. Therefore it may have to be taken as 'bhrantimad alamkara-dhvani'. It is interesting to note, Nagesa meets this objection in an altogether different way. In the Vaiyakarana-laghu-manjusa, in the context of explaining laksana as 'sakyatavacchedaka', he states that there is nothing wrong in the 'kacatah trasyati' etc., because kacatva is ascribed to rahutya etc. Though Nagesa does not say like this directly, (he says that 'rahutva"di-visista' is expressed with kacatva"di) it should be the purport of his statement, in view of the context of his definition of laksana. "atra sarvatra tat-tad-dharma-visiste sakyatavacchedaka-dharma"ropah. ata eva 'kacatas trasyati vadanam' ity adina kacatva"dau rahutva"di-visistasya bodhat na trasa"dyanvaya'nupapattih." (Parama-laghu-manjusa - p. 122). Nagesa's statement appears to be self-contradicting, because when there is aropa of the sakyatavacchedaka on the laksyatavacchedaka, the possibility of anvaya'nupapatti is more, for the rahuva"di would be cognized in kaca"dirupa only. Even the commentary, Ratnaprabha, on the above passage does not try For Personal & Private Use Only

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558 SAHRDAYALOKA to give proper explanation. It simply says - rahutva-visiste kacatva"ropat rahutva-visistatvat trasopapattih, kacatva-vaisistyena camatkara-siddhir iti na dosah." (pp. 125) Jagannatha then proceeds to mention some relations following the famous karika of Bhartsmitra, as quoted by Mukula, viz."abhidheyena sambandhat, sadrsyat, samavayatah, vaiparityat kriyayogat, laksana pancadha mata." Jagannatha observes (pp. 464, Edn. Athavale, ibid) - "gangayam ghosah ity atra samipyam, "mukham candrah" ity adau sadesyam, vyatireka-laksanayam virodhah, 'yurghstam' ity adau karanatva"dayas' ca sambandha yathayogam laksana-sarirani." But, it may be noted that Jagannatha is not inclined to confine the number of relations to just five only. Jagannatha discards 'samavaya' and 'kriyayoga' for which Mukula has cited illustrations such as 'chatrino yanti' and 'satrughnah'. Jagannatha's understanding is that in what Mukula takes 'samavaya' as group and illustrates with 'chatrino yanti' it is better to take 'samipya' or nearness as the relation as those without umbrellas i.e. 'a-chatrinah' are near by or close to those having unbrellas and in the same way thinks Jagannatha that 'kriyayoga' can be discarded in favour of 'sadrsya' and therefore 'satrughna' - the distroyer of enemies is a king who can be compared with 'satrughna', Rama's brother as he had also destroyed the enemies. We have noted that Jagannatha calls these 'sambandhas' to be 'laksana Nagesa is dissatisfied with Jagannatha's, "sakyatavacchedaka-laksyartha-bodha" and therefore has this comment, viz. "laksanajnana-karyatavacchedakanca tadrsa-sakya-sambandha-prakaraka-visesyaka-sabdabuddhitvam iti pracinalamkarika-matam. tad anantaranca vyanjanaya tadrsasakyavacchedaka prakarakabodhah iti ca. (pp. 146, N.S. Edn. 1888) This means that laksyartha-bodha would consist of sakya-sambandha only but not sakyatavacchedaka. But, the vyanjana that follows laksana would produce the sabda-bodha consisting of sakyatavacchedaka also. This statement of Nagesa is approved and quoted by Candrika with a note (pp. 152, ibid) - etena sakyatavacchedaka-rupena laksyamanam muloktam kataksitam. Dr. Ramacandrudu observes (pp. 254, ibid) that it is not known, the views of which 'pracina-alamkarika-Nagesa is referring to. Mammata is favourable to accepting laksana-sthala, 'gangatva"di-prakaraka-tira'di-bodha for the purpose of vyangyartha, for only such laksyartha can suggest 'pavanatva"di' which stand as a prayojana. Mammata observes, as quoted above that, "tata"dinam ganga"di For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 559 sabdaih pratipadane tattva-pratitau hi pratipipadayisita-prayojana-sampratyayah." "For, when the words like Ganga and the like convey (the sense of the bank and the like, the apprehension of the motive which is sought to be established is obtained only after the comprehension of the identity (of the Ganga with the bank)." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 31, ibid) Here, it is clear that by 'tattva-pratipattau' we mean 'gangatva-pratipattau' which then means 'gangarva-prakaraka-bodha, which is required for the establishment - prati-pipadayisa - of the prayojana motive - which is vyangya. In this respect how can this apprehension of motive be attained through vyanjana - i.e. how can it be called, vyanjana-vrtti-sadhya' ? Pradipakara Govinda observes - "tatra gangatva"di-pratitir-eva bijam, na tu tiratva"di-pratitir eva. tire ghosa ity atra'pi tat-pratiti-prasangat." (pp. 44, Edn. Poona, Anandasrama, Skt. Granthavalih. A.D.). This supports the above understanding of Mammata's words. So, at least Nagesa is not supported by Mammata. Then who are these pracina - alamkarikas is yet not clear. Jagannatha proceeds with the classification of laksana with the words : "iyam tavad dvividha, nirudha prayojanavati ca. tatra'pi dvitiya dvividha, gauni, suddha ca tatra adya saropa sadhyavasana ca iti dvividha antya caturvidha - jahatsvartha, ajahatsvartha, saropa, sadhyavasana ca iti prayojanavati sadvidha sampadyate." (pp. 464, Edn. Athavale, ibid) So, his classification goes like this laksana nirudha prayojanavati saropa sadhyavasana gauni gauni sudah suddha saropa sadhyavasana jahatsvartha ajahatsvartha saropa sadhyavavasana The illustrations are cited as follows. Words such as anukula, pratikula, anuloma, pratiloma, lavanya etc. are examples of nirudha laksana. In expressions like - dharmasya ayam anukulah' the word 'anukula' cannot have its primary For Personal & Private Use Only

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560 SAHRDAYALOKA meaning of 'following the bank', it being unsuitable to context. Through usage this word means 'anu-guna', as there is similarity of 'eka-vastu-pravanatva' in both the meanings. Same is the case with 'anuloma', 'pratiloma' etc. Thus the sense such as 'anuguna' is apprehended through nirudha-laksana. Jagannatha observes : (pp. 464, ibid) : "tatra nirudha-laksanaya anukula-pratikula-anuloma-pratilomalavanya"daya udaharanam nila"dayasca. "dharmasya'yam anukulah" ity adau mukhyarthasya kulanugatatva"der badhat anadi-prayoga-pravaha-vasad eka-vastupravana"tmana kulanugata"dirupa-sakyasya sadrsyena sambandhena anukula"di sabdair anuguna"dayo laksante. ... tatra adyavarge sadesya-sambandhena dvitiyavarge ca tad itara-sambandhena laksanayah pravrtter nirudhayam api gaunitvasuddhatvabhyam dvaividhyam amananti." (pp. 464-465, ibid). Such words as 'nilah', 'raktah' originally stand for 'blue' or 'red' colour, but are used in expressions such as, "nulah ghatah" etc. Here, through laksana, 'nilah' stands for the thing having that particular colour, and the relation between the primary and the secondary senses is that of 'samavaya'. Thus there are two types of nirudha-laksana, the first being represented by such words as anukula, pratikula, etc., and the second by words suggesting quality as 'nilah', 'raktah' etc. In the first type the relation between 'mukhyartha' and 'laksyartha' is that of sadrsya or similarity, in the latter such relations as 'samavaya' etc., are located, which are other than 'sadrsya'. Jagannatha then proceeds to explain next varieties. He observes that places, where both 'visaya' and 'visayin' are clearly and separately mentioned, are places of 'aropa' i.e. superimposition. When they are not separately mentioned, it is case of 'adhyavasana' (or nigarana) i.e. 'swallowing'. The laksana with 'aropa' is 'saropa', while with 'adhyavasana' is termed 'sadhyavasana. Jagannatha then proceeds to give illustrations. Gauni saropa is illustrated by examples such as 'mukham candrah', while the other variety, viz. 'gauni - sadhyavasana is illustrated by, 'pure'smin saudha-sikhare candra-raji virajate', etc. He does not illustrate the four varieties of suddha-laksana which are to be taken from other sources, they being commonly acceptable. Thus, 'kuntah pravisanti 'gangayam ghosah', 'ayur ghrtam', 'ayuh idam', could serve as illustrations of ajahallaksana, jahallaksana, suddha saropa and suddha-sadhyavasana varieties respectively. Jagannatha's classification seems to be completely in tune with that of Mammata with difference in naming only. Mammata's suddha is two-fold such as upadana and laksana, which are termed as ajahat-svartha and jahat-svartha by Jagannatha. Mammata's saropa and sadhyavasana are both gauni and suddha. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 561 Thus Mammata has suddha-upadana-laksana equivalent to a-jahatsvartha, then -laksana-laksana which equates with jahatsvartha in the Rasa-gangadhara Suddha-saropa, suddha-sadhyavasana, gauni-saropa and gauni-sadhyavasana are found in common. As already discussed earlier, Jagannatha also accepts, following Mammata, the existence of a special relation over and above that of sadnsya, etc. between the mukhyartha and laksyartha. Jagannatha then proceeds to discuss the verbal explanation or 'sabda-bodha' that is seen in example of saropa-laksana, such as 'mukham candrah', which illustrates 'gauni saropa', and 'pure'smin saudha-sikhare...' etc. which illustrates 'gauni-sadhyavasana. He says that in gauni-saropa the sabda-bodha is of the form of 'candra-sadrsa bhinnam mukham ! He says that in gauni-saropa-laksana, there is secondary meaning collected from the visayi-pada viz. 'candra' and it means 'candra-sadrsa'. The relation between the two is that of 'abheda', or identity. The direct perception of 'bheda' or non-identity cannot obliterate this perception of identity arrived at through vyanjana. Thus the badha-buddhi is not 'pratibandhaka' of 'abheda-bodha'. Thus 'laksyartha' is correlated through abheda sambandha with objects such as 'mukha' which are characterized by such qualities as 'mukhatva' etc., brought about by words such as 'mukha'. Jagannatha observes that here, if we go for the laksyartha such as 'candrasadssya' or 'similarity with moon', which is expressive of quality - i.e. dharma-vacaka, in place of the dharmi-vacaka-laksyartha viz. 'candra-sadrsa' i.e. 'similar to the moon', then, that laksyartha (i.e. 'indicated sense which is dharma-vacaka) will not be correlated with 'mukha', i.e. correlation will not be possible here. The reason is that 'sadrsya' and 'mukha' can have only abheda-relation between them. Now if we resort to the laksana of sadesya-dharma then it will have only one relation with 'mukha' such as that of visesana-visesyabhava, which in its turn is necessarily bheda'-rupa. The idea is that as in a sentence viz. 'candra-sadrsam mukham''sadesam' and 'mukham' being in aposition or same vibhakti, there is 'a-bheda' relation between them and between 'candra-sadrsyam' and 'mukham', there can not be the same relation. So, 'sac be the same relation. So, 'sadrsvabhinnam mukham' is a sabda-bodha which is not possible here as between these two there is no 'abheda'relation. Dr. Ramachandrudu (pp. 262, 263 ibid) puts it as follows : "Here the upamanavacaka (candrah) expreses by laksana the sense 'candrasadriah', and the word 'mukha' expresses the sense 'face' by abhidh, only. Ultimately there will be an abhedanvaya between the laksanopasthitartha (candra-sadrsa) and the sense For Personal & Private Use Only

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562 SAHRDAYALOKA expressed by abhidha (mukha) according to the well-known rule - "namarthayor abhedena'nvayah." Thus the final sabda-bodha of the sentence 'mukham candrah', will be 'sadesyabhinnam mukham'. Now, the question arises, what is then the difference between rupaka which gives the sabda-bodha 'candra-sadrsabhinnam mukham' and upama in 'candra-sadssam mukham ? It may be argued that there is slight variation in the ultimate sabda-bodha of the rupaka and upama'lamkara which makes all the difference. While the sabda-bodha of rupaka is 'candrasadrsa bhinnam mukham', as explained above, the sabda-bodha in upama-sthala like 'candra-sadrsam mukham', is 'candra'bhinnam yat sadrsam tad abhinnam mukham'. The reason for the difference is this - According to the rule that only the 'samsarga' (relation) of the two padarthas expressed by two different words would appear in sabda-bodha by samsarga-maryada. 'Candra' in 'candra-sadrsam mukham', expresses the sense 'moon', and 'sadrsa' by laksana expresses 'candrasadrsa'. Now 'candra' and 'candra-sadrsa' being expressed by different words, there will be abhedanvaya' between them (by samsarga-maryada). Thus the ultimate - sabda-bodha will be, 'candra bhinna-candra-sadrsa'bhinnam mukham'. But in 'mukham candrah' (rupaka-sthala) 'candrah' itself conveys the meaning of candrasadrsa by laksana and there is no possibility of abheda-samsarga between 'candra and 'sadrsa' because both of them are expressed by one word only and therefore the ultimate sabda-bodha is - 'candra-sadrsabhinnam mukham'. Thus there is a difference in the sabda-bodhas of upama and rupaka. But the objector suggests that such a slight difference in the final sabda-bodha is not sufficient to distinguish between the two alamkaras. For, if it were so, due to difference in sabdabodha, two expressions viz. 'mukham candra iva', and 'mukham candra-sadrsam' should be taken as separate alamkaras. So, the original position that there is absence of difference between rupaka and upama remains as it is - "bodhasya vailaksanyena prthag alamkarataya a-siddheh. anyatha 'mukham candra iva' ity atra candrasadrsam ity etadgatat prthag alamkaratapartir iti cet." (pp. 465, ibid). In reply to this objection, some are of the opinion that, though there is no difference in the sabda-bodha of these two alamkaras, there is difference in the ultimate result - ... laksana-phalibhuta-tadrupya-samvedanam adaya vailaksanyam nirbadham. (pp. 465, ibid). As the visayitavacchedaka (i.e. candrarva etc.) is ascribed to visaya (i.e. mukha), there is a tadatmya-jnana in the rupaka-stala which is not observed in the upama-sthala. As pointed out above, the word 'candra' in 'mukham candrah', conveys the sense of candra-sadrsah by laksana and thus, as in slesa-sthala, there will be apprehension of identity i.e. abheda-sampratyaya between For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 563 the candra and sadrsa expressed by the same word. This abheda or tadatmyasampratyaya can not be obstructed by the bheda-jnana, because its antidote vyanjana also is present in the laksana-sthala, which is not found in the upamasthala: "slesasthalaiva'trapyekasabdopadanotthasya vyanjanasya upayatvad vaiyanjanika-bodhasya badha-buddy apratibadhyattvac ca." (pp. 465, ibid). Once andrahhinna-candra-sadrsabhinnatva' is accepted in mukha, also follows automatically, according to the maxim, 'tadabhinnabhinnam tad abhinnam'. In view of this, expressions such as, 'vaktre candramasi, sthite kim aparah sitamsur ujjrmbhate' etc., that express tadatmya between the visaya and visayin are to be supported. Thus, this view of some alamkarikas maintains the difference between the rupaka and upama because of the difference in their phala. Jagannatha used such words as, "atra kecit", in the beginning of the above view. This shows that he feels that there is no need of bringing in the difference of phala, when we can show the difference in sabda-bodha itself. Jagannatha then gives the view of still others. He says, 'anye tu, candra"dipadebhyah laksanaya candra-sadrsatvena'pi rupenopasthitanam mukha"dinam candratvena rupenaiva mukha"dipadopasthapitaih saha abhedanvayabodho jayate..." (pp. 466, ibid). These 'anye' or others hold that inspite of the general rule that the cognition of the meaning of the words - padarthopasthiti and the sabda-bodha that follows should be of similar form, it is suggested that, on the strength of the experience that laksyanvaya-bodha in the laksana-sthala will be having sakyatavacchedaka (i.e. gangatva) as its prakara; to be put in otherwise, the cognition of the laksyartha will be more in form of mukhyartha itself - "tat-tat-pada-laksana-jnanasya tat-tat-padasakyata'vacchedaka-prakaraka-laksyanvaya-bodhatvavacchinnam prati hetutayah, padarthopasthiti-sabdabodhayoh samana"karatvasya'nubhava-saksika-vailaksanyakalaksanika-bodha'tirikta-visayatayasca kalpanat." (pp. 466, ibid). Thus in places like 'gangayam ghosah', though the 'tata' (laksyartha) is first cognised with only tatatva, the final anvayabodha will be 'gangatva' to make it possible to suggest the saitya, pavanatva, etc. - 'ata eva gangayam ghosa ity atra tatatvena'pyupasthitasya tatasya gangatvena'nvayabodhas tatprayojyah saitya pavanatva"di-pratyayas ca samgacchate." (pp. 466, ibid). By applying this principle in 'mukham candrah', the apprehension of identity-abheda-bodhabetween the face that is conveyed by 'candra' by laksana (as candra-sadrsa) and the face that is expressed by the word 'mukha' (by abhidha) will be restricted by For Personal & Private Use Only

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564 SAHRDAYALOKA the 'mukhyarthata"vacchedaka' i.e. candratva, and this kind of abheda-bodha will be helpful in bringing about the realisation of the gunas or qualities of moon in the face. Thus the second view explains that the distinguishing factor between rupaka and upama is not only the ultimate result i.e. phala, but also the intermidiary sabda-bodha. "ittham krtas co'pamato rupakasya bhedah sphuta eva." iti vadanti. Yet another view of the ancients is put by Jagannatha as follows : "apare tu bheda-karambitam sadrsyam upama-jivatu-bhutam bheda-karambitam ca gaunasaropa-laksanaya iti sphute bhede ketam phala-ksta-vailaksanyaparyanta'nudhavanena.. etc." (pp. 466, ibid). This view holds that there is difference in sadrsya associated with both upama and rupaka. Upama is based on sadrsya which is embraced by 'bheda' i.e. non-identity, while rupaka has sadrsya rooted in 'a-bheda' or identity. Thus it is suggested here that there is no need to rest on the ultimate result i.e. phala. Jagannatha says that, "tad ittham pracam asayah matabhedena varnitah." (pp. 466, ibid). Now he considers the views of the 'Navyah', the group of modern alamkarikas. Candrika says - "appayya diksita"dayah". Here, the view held by such alamkarikas as Appayya Dixit is presented. These 'navyas' hold that there is no need of accepting laksana at all, in places such as 'mukham candrah' and 'vahiko gauh' : "navyas - 'mukham candrah", vahiko gaun' ity adau candra"dinam mukha"dibhih saha sambhavati, laksanam vinaiva, abheda-samsargena anvayabodhah." (pp. 466, ibid). In these illustrations the abheda-samsarga between the 'candra' and 'mukha', 'go' and 'vahika' can be effected by the general rule, viz. "namarthayor abhedena'nvayah", without resorting to laksana. If it is argued that such abhedasamsarga cannot take place due to some confirmation of incongruity - i.e. badhaniscaya in the form that the moon and the face cannot be indetical with each other, according to the rule-tadvatta-buddhim prati tadabhava-vatta"tmaka-badhaniscayah pratibandhakah." But the Navyas argue that this general rule can have exemption in the case of the sabda-jnana, as there was exemption granted in case of the 'aharya jnana', or intentional cognition. It is accepted, that 'badha-niscaya' cannot obstruct the 'tadvatta-jnana' when a man has an intention to have such jnana'. In the same way, Navyas suggest that the sabda-jnana also can not be obstructed by the badhaniscaya. So, the improved version of the above rule could be, as Candrika puts it (pp. 165, ibid) - "laukika-sannikarsajanya-dosa-visesajanya-anaharya-sabdanya For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 565 buddhitvavacchinnam prati badha-niscayah pratibandhakah." The navyas also claim that their theory is supported by the well-known observation, viz. 'atyantasatyapi hy arthe jnanam sabdah karoti hi', according to which such expressions as 'sasa-srngam pasya' etc. can also produce a sabda-jnana like 'gosongam pasya', etc. Now somebody may argue that according to this observation, expressions such as 'vahnina sincati' will also produce 'sabda-bodha'. The answer is 'No'. Navinas say that such expressions cannot produce sabda-bodha because there is no 'yogyatajnana' or knowledge of compatibility. But in case of 'mukham candrah', 'gauh vahikah', etc. there is no lack of yogyatajnana, at least the aharya one, on account of the strong intention to have such sabda-jnana for the ultimate camatkara from such bodha or apprehension. Such aharya-yogyata-jnana can not be accepted in the case of vahnina sincati', as there is no such desire. This thinking of the Navyas has the support of the Pracinas also, who have gone for the general rule that yogyatajnana is the cause for the sabda-jnana : "mukham candrah', 'gaur vahikah' itya"dau tvista-camatkara-prayojakata-jnana"dhinayah icchayah sattvad aharyayogyata-jnana-samrajyam ata eva sabdabodhe yogyata-jnanasya karanarvoktih pracam samgacchate.' (pp. 467, ibid). The Candrika has (pp. 166 ibid) : "sabda-buddhitvavacchinne yogyatajnanam karanam" iti karya-karana-bhavah pracinabhimatah... This rule would have been useless because the sabda-boodha in 'vahnina sincati' etc. can be averted by the badha-jnana itself, if the 'sabnanyatva' were not to be included in the 'badha-niscaya-prati-bandhyata'vacchedaka-koti'. When the 'sabdanyatva' is added, it justifies the above rule related to 'yogyata-jnana'. Because the badhajnana is not powerful enough to obstruct the sabda-bodha in 'vahninasincati', this rule comes in to stop this undesired bodha. Dr. Ramachandradu es (pp. 266, ibid). 'Even if the 'sabdanyatva' is not added in the "pratibaddhyatavacchedaka-koti, the Navinas contend, the abhedanvaya in 'mukham candrah', etc., will be taken as aharya-jnana, and so cannot be obstructed by the 'badha-niscaya? Thus there is no need of accepting the aharyajnana to facilitate the sabda-bodha in 'mukham candrah' etc. In fact, the rule 'sabda-buddhitvavacchinne yogyatajnanam karanam' is itself not necessary because the sabda-bodha in 'vahnina-sincati' etc., can be prevented by the badhaniscaya itself. It is baseless to say that aharya-jnana can be accepted only in pratyaksa-jnana, because we come across the aharya-sabda-jnana also in many places like atisayokti." For Personal & Private Use Only

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566 SAHRDAYALOKA The result of the discussion as above is that, in the illustration of saropa laksana, such as 'mukham candrah', there is no harm in accepting 'abhedanvaya' directly between the vacyarthas of the words 'mukham' and 'candrah'. There is no need to accept abhedanvaya between the expressed sense of 'mukham', and the indicated sense of 'candrah'. It is safe to accept abhedanvaya' between two vacyarthas only. For, if this is not done, i.e. if we do not accept the 'anvaya' between to vacyarthas, then there will be difficulty in accepting on one hand the alamkaras rupaka and upama respectively in illustrations such as, "raja-narayanam laksmih...", and "padambujam bhavatu..." etc., and the abhedanvaya' accepted between the vacya and laksya artha on the other. To remove this difficulty we have to accept anvaya between two vacyarthas themselves. We will try to understand this point in details. In the two illustrations we have upama and rupaka respectively, depending on the upamita-samasa and the visesanasamasa. Now if we accept these compounds, we will have to face some 'a-samgati' such as the embrace by Lakmi to the king, when upamita-samasa such as 'Narayanalike-king', is resorted to. The discrepancy arises when we say that Laxmi embraces the king and not Narayana. In the upamita-samasa the pradhanya is given to 'raja' the purva-pada. In the other illustration we have a rupaka-samasa in 'padambuja' with 'ambuja' the uttarapada being principal. Now the 'manoharita' or loveliness caused due to the sweet tinkling of the anklet cannot go with 'ambuja' and hence discrepancy will be there. So, if abhedanvaya is accepted with reference to vacya and laksya arthas, we will have difficulty in accepting 'upama' and 'rupaka' in the said illustrations. So, ultimately we have to accept rupaka and upama respectively, as done by Mammata, in the said illustrations. So only vacyartha'bhedanvaya has to be accepted in the so called saropa laksana illustrations. Jagannatha observes that even when there is no compound this fact operates. In 'krpaya sudhaya sinca...' etc., if vacya'bheda is not resorted to, importance cannot be given to 'sudha', to make it suitable for the act of sprinkling - i.e. sekakriya. In case laksana is accepted, importance would go to 'krpa' in the sabdabodha which follows. The crux of the matter is that in the illustration viz. 'raja-narayanam...' etc., for those who accept laksana, the sabda-bodha in form of, "the king is like Narayana', is identical even if either upamita or visesana-samasa is resorted to. Now if 'upama' is accepted the embrace by Laxmi cannot be explained but it can be explained if rupaka is accepted. So the an-upapatti resulting from the upama alamkara is decisive in favour of accepting rupaka. This is observed by Mammata. But this will For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 567 not be found tenable if the sabda-bodha remains identical, and it remains so if laksana is resorted to. Mammata did accept difference in the sabda-bodha here, and so the sabdabodha such as 'narayana-sadrsa' as seen in rupaka, through resorting to laksana, was not acceptable to Mammata, the obvious reason is that it is only by taking into account the anvaya of vacyartha that the upapatti or otherwise of anvaya is considered, and not by taking the anvaya of laksyartha into consideration. Because the vacyartha of upamita samasa is not congruent here, therefore only the vacyartha of rupakasamasa has to be accepted here. So, laksyartha has no business at all here. In the second illustration also, for the laksanavadins, if laksana is resorted to, or if rupaka is accepted, in both the cases, the sabdabodha will be of the form of 'ambuja-sadrsa-pada' only. So it will be futile to suggest any anupapatti such as absence of anvaya between the anklet and the foot, and therefore ruling out of rupaka in the end. The laksanavadin objector may now argue as follows. He may say that perhaps it is possible to arrive at the upapatti of sabda-bodha without resorting to laksana in such illustrations as 'mukha-candrah' which is a compounded construction. But when there is no samasa (such as in mukham candrah) there cannot be any objection to laksana. But the siddhantin says that even this observation is incorrect. For, in illustrations such as, "krpaya sudhaya sinca.." etc. which has noncompounded single words, the 'upapatti' of the correlation (anvaya) of 'artha' does not take place. The idea is that if laksana is resorted to in case of words such as 'sudha', and if it is taken to mean 'sudha-sadrsa', then also the 'secana' or 'sprinkling of sudha-sadrsa-krpa will not be possible. So, the sabdabodha caused by laksana will not be of any use. On the other hand, the Navinas believe in the abhedanvaya and tadrupya-pratiti between krpa and sudha and hence the sprinkling of krpa in form of sudha or nectar will give a meaning which will be congruent to the sabda-bodha. Now if the supporters of laksana here say that, if by resorting to laksana, the cogruence of the sabda-bodha of laksyartha is not seen, then in that case, take the dhatvartha of 'sincati' as visayin, and through this visayin, let there be swallowing nigarana - of 'kuru' (= visayartha), and now the upapatti i.e.-justification of the sabdabodha of laksyartha will be accomplished. The idea is that with 'sincana' as visayin, as it happens in case of 'atisayokti', let there be nigarana of the meaning of 'kuru'. So, the meaning of 'sprinkling with nectar' - will be, 'shower grace like sprinkling of nectar'. Thus the 'anvaya' will hold good. This is the argument in selfdefence by the laksana-supporters. For Personal & Private Use Only

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568 SAHRDAYALOKA But against this, the navinas observe that, putting aside certain alamkaras such as utpreksa and the like, in alamkaras such as atisayokti, apahnuti etc., merely on the strength of acquired knowledge - i.e. 'aharyajnana', the sabda-bodha can be justified (= upapatti). In the same way in rupaka also this key is applicable and hence there is no compulsion to resort to laksana here (bijabhava). To accept laksana at such places goes against common experience also. The idea is this. When the Navinas say that, 'utpreksady atirikta-atisayoktiapahnattva-adisu iva aharya-jnanena upapattau, laksanayam bijabhavad anubhavavirodhac ca (R.G. pp. 467, ibid) - it becomes clear that in such alamkaras as utpreksa, sa-samdeha, etc. there is no escape from laksana even according to the Navinas. The reason behind this is that in aharyajnana there should be the quality of certainty according to the normal opinion of the Naiyayikas, who define aharyajnana as - "badhakalinecchajanyam jnanam." (Nyayakosa, pp. 36). This means that, it is aharya-jnana, when we hold a clearly contradicted matter as not contradicted, through our desire or intelligence. For example the cognition such as 'the lake is on fire' - 'hrdo vahniman iti jnanam'. Now even in the absence of fire in a lake, if we hold that there is fire in it, this sort of belief is only acquired - aharya jnana. From this point of view, the figures such as utpreksa, sa-samdeha, etc. are purely aharya-jnana, because when one says that, 'the darkness is like smoke', one knows that darkness is not smoke. But he knowingly imagines the darkness to be smoke. But the fancy in utpreksa is not of the form of a certainty and in aharyajnana what is recquired is certainty-or niscaya, according to the Naiyayikas. Keeping this in mind the Navinas have suggested that it is advisable to accept laksana in utpreksa. Jagannatha further argues that in rupaka alamkara such as 'mukham candrah', according to the laksanavadins there is laksana on the upamana-vacaka word, viz. 'candra' in the sense of 'candra-sadesa'. This is the opinion of the pracinas : 'api ca upamanavacakasya candra"dipadasya rupake, upamanasadrse laksana iti hi pracam samayah - (R.G. pp. 467, ibid). Now, continues Jagannatha, in the laksyartha viz. candra-sadrsa, the avacchedaka dharma - i.e. speciality in quality is sadnsya : 'tatra laksyaravacchedakam sadrsyam'. It is of the form of 'common quality' naturally - 'tac ca samana-dharma-rupam'. This is so because if 'sadrsya' which is an avacchedaka-dharma is not explained as 'samana-dharma', then the rupaka alamkara based on 'common qualities' - 'or 'sadharmya', will not take place at all. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 569 Now, here, the point is - "sa ca laksyamse sundaratva"dina visesa-rupena pratiyate uta aho samanya-rupena ?" - i.e. is that samana-dharma of the form of sadnsya apprehended here in the special form of paritucularity of beautysundaratva - or in a general form ? These two options prop up here. The first alternative, viz. that sadrsya is apprehended in form of particularity such as 'sundaratva"di', is untenable. Because in such a case, there will be paunaruktyadosa in, 'sundaram mukham candrah', for saundarya, the sadharanadharma of a particular nature, is expressed by the word 'candra' itself by laksana, and is again mentioned by the word 'sundaram'. To avoid this blemish, it may be said, that in such cases where the sadharana-dharma is mentioned, some other dharma, i.e. other than what is mentioned, should be taken as 'laksyata'vacchedaka-dharma'. But, even if 'paunaruktya' dosa can be avoided by this argument, it goes contray to the common experience, because we do not generally understand any other dharma except saundarya in the expression 'sundaram mukham candrah'. Again, in some instances, there may not be any possibility of an additional dharma over and above the one mentioned in a given illustration. "na caivam adav upatta-dharmake rupake tad dharma'tirikto dharma eva laksyatavacchedakabhuta-sadrsyarupa iti vacyam. anubhava-virodhat. (pp. 467, ibid). As for example in the verse, "ankitany aksasamghataih..." etc. We do not find any other sadharana-dharma, over and above those based on slesa, i.e. aksa-sanghatankitatva' and 'sarogatva'. Thus the first alternative is unacceptable. In case, now, if the second atternative is accepted, it would be an illustration, not of rupaka, but of upama because the sadrsya is mentioned by sabda. It is not proper to hold that upama would arise only when the sadrsya is vacya, because in that case, in instances such as 'nalina-pratipaksam ananam', where sadrsya is not vacya but laksya, will cease to be illustrations of upama. Again, if laksana be accepted in rupaka, in the example of slista-paramparitarupaka such as, 'vidvanmanasa-hamsa. etc., where we know that 'sadrsya' will be apprehended only when slesa is accomplished first, and due to the abhedadhyavasaya brought about by slesa, sadrsya between the king who dwells in manasa (= mind) and the swan who dwells in manasa lake, will be apprehended and then only the rupaka - "rajahamsa" - will take shape based on sadrsya-mulakalaksyartha. Then only we will be able to say that here is an instance of rupakalamkara. As against this, when rupaka is derived as based on the la in 'hamsa-sadrsa', - i.e. when rupaka is formed with a laksana in form of hamsasadrsa at its base, then only the slesa on "manasa" meaning (i) manasa lake and For Personal & Private Use Only

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570 SAHRDAYALOKA (ii) mind will come into existence. Thus, by accepting laksana, there will be "anyonya"sraya-dosa". Now this can be avoided by accepting aharya'bheda-jnana between the king and the 'hamsa' for which we need not depend on slesa. This abheda-jnana would ultimately be justified by accepting slesa. Thus the slesa depends on rupaka but the rupaka does not depend upon slesa and there will be no 'anyonya"sraya-dosa'. Therefore, it is better to apply the general rule of abhedanvaya in rupaka-sthala also. - Again, the Navinas hold that the argument of the contenders of laksana, viz. that the phala of laksana, which indicates laksyartha in form of 'sadrsa', is the ultimate tadrupyapratiti or apprehension of identity in rupaka, is also not acceptable, for, if we accept this, then, as in the expression 'tat-sadrsa' also there is apprehension of similarity, i.e. even in cases of upama such as, 'candra-sadrsam mukham there will be tadrupyapratiti, or apprehension of identity even here (i.e. even in upama). Thus, the Navinas hold that there is no requirement for acceptance of laksana in the sabda-bodha of rupaka, - "ato namarthayor abhedanvaya-saranir eva rupakasthale ramaniya. sadrsa-laksanayah phalam rupake tradrupya-pratyaya ity api na hrdayangamam. tat-sadrsa iti sabdat-sadrsya-pratyaye saty api tadrupyapratyaya"-patteh" - ity ahuh." (pp. 468, ibid) Now Jagannatha proceeds to discuss the view of the Navinas also. Says he - "atra idam vicaryate'. (pp. 497, ibid) He refutes the view of the Navinas with some very important arguments supported by common sense and general experience. He observes: 'yat tavad ucyate namarthayor abhedanvaya-bodhena eva upapattau rupake na'sti laksana iti, tatra camatkari-sadharana-dharma'nupasthiti-dasayam upama'lamkarasya iva rupakalamkarasya'pi nasti nispattis' camatkaro va iti sakala-hrdaya-siddham." The general experience goes, argues Jagannatha, that there can be no existence of either upama-alamkara or rupaka-alamkara, till the 'camatkari' or lovely sadharana-dharma is cognised. If at all there is such an instance in the absence of a beautiful sadharanadharma, the alamkara does not take shape, as there is no charm in it. This is common experience. If we do not hold that rupakalamkara does not take shape in the absence of a beautiful sadharana-dharma, then such example as, "bharatam naka-mandalam" i.e. the Mahabharata is heaven", or 'nagaram vidhumandalam' i.e. this city is the orb of moon', will not cause the apprehension of rupaka, but this apprehension is surely caused when we hear such words as "suparvalamkrtam", and "sa-kala-kalam", respectively. What can be the reason behind this? Same is the case with reference to the famous illustration of rupaka, such as For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 571 'mukham chandrah'. There is however, some difference between the two slistarupakas, and this simple illustration viz. mukham candrah. It is that in the two instances of slista rupakas, the sadharana dharma being not known, i.e. aprasiddha, it is pertinent to express it in so many words. But in the illustration viz. 'mukham candrah' the sadharanadharma is well known and hence need not be expressed in so many words. But if abhedanvaya is held to be the cause of the apprehension of rupaka, and if we do not place sadrsya in form of sadharanadharma, i.e. if we hold that the dharma' is not mentioned, we do not get rupaka. How do we explain this ? Or, where the 'sadharana dharma' is not present there is no experience of camatkara in such rupakas. How do we explain this also ? On the contrary from the objector's point of view this should not happen, because at such places, the aharya-abheda-jnana between upamana and upameya, without having expectancy of anything else, stays here independently on its own in a perfect form. So, accordingly here rupaka also should take place and also the camatkara resulting therefrom. Now those who believe in the abhedanvaya' of namarthas may say that, "for the apprehension of the abheda-jnana between two padarthas, or for the camatkara caused thereby, it is required that there is an apprehension of a special or particular sadharana-dharma. But this also can not be held. For, in the verse, viz. "yady anusno bhaved vahnir..." etc., even in the absence of the apprehension of the sadharana-dharma, the aharya-abheda or identification between 'anusna' and 'vahnih', and asita and 'jala' is apprehended. Thus you cannot say that the apprehension of sadharana-dharma is a must for aharya abhedanvaya. Now, if you say that the special mark of the requirement of the apprehension of sadharana-dharma is only where it is a case of upamanopameya, i.e. when there is aharya-abheda only, but then this is untenable since there is no authority in suggesting that the apprehension of that particular sudharana-dharma is a must in case of upamanopameya only, when elsewhere there is apprehension of aharya-abheda independent of this. Again, in the absence of a sadharanadharma, all alamkarikas accept the apprehension of abhedanvaya between 'mukham' and 'candrah', in the illustration viz. "mukham yadi candrah syat tada bhumy avasthitam na syat." (In this sentence, there is no escape from accepting abhedanvaya because the rule of vyutpatti-sastra suggests that the anvaya between two namarthas is always through abheda-sambandha). You may suggest that if it is accepted that there is only sadrsyalaksana in rupaka, there will be no identity (i.e. tadatmya) between visaya and vinayin, because, the abheda that is expressed in rupaka, is only between the upameya and upamana For Personal & Private Use Only

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572 SAHRDAYALOKA sadrsa i.e. mukham and candra-sadrsa. In the obsence of such identity, statements like "simhena sadnso na'yam, kintu simho naradhipah", which are focussed on conveying abheda between the upameya and the upamana would be meaningless. But this argument does not stand because such tadatmya is acceptable even to the laksanavadins as explained while discussing the second and third views of the pracinas. It may again be held that according to the laksanavadins, sadrsya also is included in rupaka and as such, it may be wrong to deny the sadrsya (= simhena sadrsah na'yam) while having rupaka in 'simho naradhipah. This argument is rejected by saying that the negation meant here is only of the upama based on bheda-gharita-sadnsya, while favouring rupaka based on a-bheda-ghatita-sadrsya. Jagannatha now rejects an objection raised in case of "raja-narayanam', and 'padambujam', etc., as follows. As suggested above, the laksyanvayabodha will be only 'sakyatavacchedaka-prakaraka' and thus by accepting rupaka in 'rajanarayana', the 'rajan' would be understood only in form of 'narayanatva' so there will be nothing wrong in his having the embrace of Laxmi. In the same way if rupakalamkara is to be accepted in 'padambujam', the pada-jnana will be ambujatvaprakaraka and thus 'manjira-sinjita-manoharata in it will be incongruous. That is why upama is to be accepted here in order to give importance to 'pada' because the pada-jnana then, will be 'padatvavacchinna' "padambajam'ity adau api rupakasya svikare pradhanibhutottara-padasya'rthasya'mbujatvenaiva pratiter manju-manjira-sinjita-manoharataya anupapatteh. upamita-samasa"yattopamayam tu pradhanasya padasya padatvenaiva pratitasya na'sti tasya anupapattir iti, na kopi dosah." (R.G. pp. 498, ibid) Again, it is incorrect to hold that there would be no difference between upama and rupaka, on the ground that in both of them, the sadrsya is being expressed by sabda (though of course by laksana in rupaka); because the sadrsya in rupaka is abheda-ghatita while in upama it is bheda-karambita, and J. explains the difference between the two. - "bheda'karambita-sadrsya-visistasya rupake laksyatvad upamavyapadesasya a-prasakteh" (R.G. pp. 498, ibid). If it is argued that there can be an instance where the speaker makes a laksanika-prayoga like 'mukham candrah', etc., with the specific intention of conveying bheda-ghatita-sadrsya', and this will have to be accepted as upama, because sadrsya is bheda-karambita, but Jagannatha says that there cannot be any scope, in such places, for laksana at all, as the main purpose of laksana is to convey tadatmya which promises negation of bheda : For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana 573 "nanu yatra bheda-ghatita-sadrsyavati vaktra laksanaya mukham candra iti prayuktam, tatra tatha'pyupamalamkara"pattih sthitaiveti cet, bheda-ghatitasadrsya-pratipipadayisakale laksanaya tadvatisabda-prayogasya viruddhatvat. laksanayas tadrupya-pratipipadayisa"dhinatvat, na hi prayojanam anuddisya rudhi-vyati-riktaya laksanaya'rtham pratipadayanty aryah bhedatadrupyayor vipratisiddhatvena yugapat-pratipatr-buddhyuparoha'sambhavac ca." (R.G. pp. 498, ibid). The objector here raises a point as follows. In words like 'purusa-vyaghra', which are instance of upama, in the sense of 'tiger-like man', the uttara-pada has to be taken to mean 'vyaghra-sadrsa' by laksana, because there is no other word which expresses sadrsya. The acceptance of laksana results in the acceptance of tadatmya-pratiti also as its prayojana; and this tadatmya-pratipatti makes it as an instance of rupaka and not upama. Now, when the position is like this, how is it that it is taken by the ancients as an instance of dvi-luptopama ? Jagannatha answers this question in two ways. According to the grammarians who accept sakti in the whole of a samasa, the word purusa-vyaghra itself conveys the meaning viz. "vyaghra-sadrsya-visista-purusa", where the sadnsya is bheda-ghasita, or the upamana-sabda, i.e. vyaghra, expresses by nirudha-laksana, bheda-ghatitasadrsya-visista' and this 'bheda-ghatitatva' will explain how it has been taken as an example of upama by the pracinas. - "atrocyate-upamita-samasasya bhedaghatitopamana-sadssya-visistopameye saktes tad-ghatakibhutopamanasabdasya bheda-ghatita-sadrsya-visiste nirudha-laksanaya va svikarad adosah." (R.G. pp. 499, ibid). The anyonya"srayadosa which is raised in 'vidvan-manasa-hamsa' etc., holds Jagannatha, is of no consequence because everything in a poem, or say in art, being mainly based on fancy i.e. kalpana or pratibha, it is not a serious defect if one thing is dependent on another. In this connection Jagannatha gives an example of the beautiful construction by a mason, where the bricks are supported by each other. This is done in the discussion on rupaka alamkara later. Jagannatha now takes care of the last objection raised by the Navinas. It was suggested that the tadrupya-pratyaya or cognition of tadrpya-can not be the phala of sadrsya-laksana in rupaka, lest it should be accepted, in places like 'candrasadrsam mukham' also - "yad api uktam, rupake sadrsa-laksanayah phalam tadrsya-pratyayo na yujyate. tat-sadrsa iti sabdaja-bodha-nantaram api tathapratyaya"patter iti, tan na (R. G. pp. 499, ibid). Jagannatha holds that there is no For Personal & Private Use Only

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574 SAHRDAYALOKA fear of such tadrpya-pratyaya in the case of the latter, because there is no laksana in it; and tadrpya-pratyaya is only the phala of laksana. Jagannatha concludes that the contention of the ancient writers has thus to be accepted on the authority of the Mahabhasya and such other works. In the Mahabhasya, while commenting on Pa. IV. i. 48, viz. 'pumyogad akhyayam', Patanjali raises a question viz. how can abheda exist between two distinctly different things ? In reply he contends that the abheda is being ascribed on four grounds; viz. 'tatstya' (i.e. being on a particular thing), 'taddharmya' (i.e. having the quality of a particular thing), 'tat-samipya' (or being closer to a thing), and 'tat-sahacarya', (or being associated with a particular thing), and he furnishes four examples to illustrate these respectively. Here, the sentence, "tadrupyam aropyate na tu mukhyam", indicates that also in 'mukham candrah', the tadatmya is being ascribed by laksana. All this goes against the Navinas. Jagannatha thus defends the view of the ancients by refuting the views of the Navinas such as Appayya Dixita, of course here, without naming him . "tatsadrsa ity atra laksanaya abhavena tadrupya-pratyayasya'padana'yogat. tadrupyapratyayo laksanayah phalam iti pracam samayah. mahabhasya"di-granthanam asminneva'nukulatvac ca. navyamate tu tesam akulibhavah syad iti dik" - (R.G. pp. 499, ibid). See also Candrika (pp. 189), on this - "navya-mate vacyayor eva'bhede, 'caturbhih prakarais tadrupyam aropyate na tu mukhyam', ityader asamgatih spasta eva iti saramsah." After dealing with sabda-bodha of saropa-laksana, Jagannatha picks up the topic of sabda-bodha in sadhyavasana laksana. Here he discusses two views. In the illustration, viz. "candra-raji virajate", where the upameya is completely omitted, the 'candra' sabda expresses the 'mukha' with its 'dharma', viz. 'mukhatva', but the ultimate sabda-bodha will be 'candratvaprakaraka' only. The idea is that here, the 'mukha' will be cognized in the guise of 'candra', and not as 'mukha', and this difference between the padarthopasthiti and, sabda-bodha, as seen above, is the result of 'laksana-jnana.' : "sadhyavasanayam ca 'candra-raji virajate', candra"disabdaih laksanaya mukhyatvenopasthapitasya'pi mukha"deh sabda-bodhas candratva"dina bhavati, laksana-jnanasyaiva mahatmyat" iti eke. - (R.G. pp. 699, ibid). The other view is - "laksanaya mukhatvena mukha"deh sadba-bodhe vstte, vyanjanayaika-sabdopattatva-pradurbhutaya candratvena bodhah" ity apare. (R.G. pp. 499, ibid) - This second view holds that even after the laksana-jnana the sabdabodha will be mukhatva-prakaraka-bodha, which is brought about by one vyanjana, caused by 'eka-padopattatva'. For Personal & Private Use Only

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'Laksana' 575 According to both these views, there will be the apprehension of 'mukhatva' and candratva directly, where as in saropa-sthala the candratva is cognised indirectly through 'candra-sadrsa', which is taken as the differentiating factor between saropa and sadhyavasanika. - "matadvaye'py asmin mukha"dau' candrarvabhanasamagrya, mukhatva"deh svadharmasya bhanam na nivaryate. ittham caikasmin dharmini candratva"dinam mukhatva"dinam ca saksad bhanam eva saropato'sya vicchedakam". (R.G. pp. 499. ibid) - Thus the sabda-bodha in 'candra-raji., is "candratvavan mukhatvavan ca mukha-padarthah'. But for the alamkarikas, the 'mukhatva' is completely concealed by 'candratva' just like the suktitva at the time of the apprehension of silver in the mother of pearl, and so there can be no cognition of the same in the sabda-bodha. Accordingly, therefore, the difference between saropa and sadhyavasana is that mukhatva is cognized in the former while it is totally hidden in the latter. Thus, the discussion on laksana which started with the sastrakaras such as the Vaiyakaranas, Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas, and for whom it was only applied to the problem of language, takes a marvellous turn when discussed by the alamkarikas who discuss laksana from the point of view of a poetic expression. Laksana which started as a dosa with the Mimamsakas becomes a source of beauty with the poets, and later giants like Appayya and Jagannatha maintain the balance between sastra and aesthetics, while discussing the sabdabodha on one hand of some varieties of laksana, of course as evidenced in poetic illustrations, and the poetic beauty capped by the prayojana on the other, maintaining the aesthetic analysis. For Personal & Private Use Only

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