Sahrdayaloka Part 01

SR No.: 006908
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 2005
Total Pages: 602
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 192

Sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra
ekā eva śabdānām pravṛttiḥ"-Helārāja; on V. P. III. 2. and also, "jatya'bhidhāyino jätyādiśabdā api jātivācina eva."- Thus, go-tva is capable of having 'gotva-tva', and this is not easily conceivable. The considered opinion viz. "niḥ-sāmānyāni ⚫ sāmānyānīti"-a class cannot have another class,-is violated. This theory results in a number of misconceptions. Thus, for them, even quality and action are liable to be considered as 'jati' for the simple reason of their being signified by their corresponding words "tathā ca'nvayi-rūpeṇa guno'py abhidhīyamāno jātir-eva. evam kriyām apy abhedena abhidhīyamānā jātiḥ." -Helārāja. on V. P. III. 12.
For the dravya-vādins all that is signified by words is essentially the property pertaining to dravya
"dravya-dharmā padarthe tu dravye sarvartha isyate,
dravya-dharmāśrayad dravyam
ataḥ sarvartha isyate."-V. P. III. 130
167
So, quality, action, number, class and gender-all might be looked upon as inherent properties of matter.- "sabdaiḥ pratyāyamānāḥ guṇadayo daivyadharmāṇaḥ. sarvo'rtho dravya-rūpeṇa abhidhīyate"-Helārāja. There are certain common features between these two views. Whether the meaning is either jāti or 'dravya', we have got to resort to 'upacara' or 'adhyāropa' i.e. transference of sense
"tathā mamā'pi jātivādino mukhyām jātim abhidadhati kecit upacarati tām anya iti mata-dvaye'pi samyam.-Helārāja.-Just as for the jātivädin things other than jāti are also treated as such by the help of upacara, so also with the other one, quality, action, etc. have been taken up as properties of matter by upacara.
Bhartṛhari also suggests that the problem of 'padartha,' especially by the jātivāda, can be approached from an epistemological point of view also.-"idānīm vijñānavādena api padartha-vyavasthām āha."-Helārāja, (on V. P. III. 19). The meaning of a word is exactly the same as is connected by it. This is accepted by the Vijñānavādī. It is suggested that the use of words gives rise to a kind of intelligence with a definite form which generally corresponds to the object of experience.
What actually is known by us whenever we hear the sound 'gauh' is the particular form in which the individual makes its impression on the mind. A dravya (i.e. thing) is, according to this philosophy, not necessarily a material object, but an intellectual image or form only.
"anupravṛtti-rūpām yām prakhyātām ākṛtim viduḥ,