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140
SAHRDAYĀLOKA kūpa-ārāma-ādivad asmaranam bhavitum arhati, purusa-viyogo hi tesu bhavati deśotsādena vā kulotsādena vā. na ca śabdārtha-vyavahāra-viyogah purusānām asti."
Now, it may be argued that the sambaddhā goes out of memory because it was not necessary to remember him in the śabdārtha-vyavahāra which could be continued even without remembering him. We tend to forget things which cease to be useful for our immediate purpose. It should not mean that they never existed before. So, mere non-remembrance does not prove the total absence of a coordinator or sambaddhā. But this point of the objector can be set aside as fallicious. It is true that people are primarily concerned with the relation or sambandha of word and meaning, and not with the sambaddhā or co-ordinator. But, it can not be said that the relation of sambaddhā is useless, as it is the pre-requisite of vyavahāra-siddhi, i.e. the common activity depends on that. For any vyavahāra to be fruitful, it should be necessarily preceded by the full agreement between sambandha-kartā and vyavahāra, because in the absence of either sampratipatti or agreement, or vipratipatti or disagreement, fruition i.e. artha-siddhi becomes impossible. Thus, the terms viddhi' and 'ma-kāra' will not convey the senses of 'ai' and 'an' and 'a-sarva-gurutrika' respectively, when used by somebody who does not agree with Panini or Pingala. Now, the point is that, if there is no smarana or remembrance of the kartā i.e. agent or doer, the sampratipatti illustrated as above, cannot follow. So, it is wrong to say that karty-smarana or remembering the agent is not necessary for immediate purposes. So, in the absence of smarana, it can be safely concluded that there was no kartā i.e. doer i.e. co-ordinator at all (see vrtti on pp. 53).
Jaimini and Sabara hold that the existence of a sambandha-kartā cannot be proved by arthāpatti i.e. implication. We can resort to it only in the absence of any other possible explanation. In arthāpatti we attempt to explain facts which are apparently inexplicable. Impossibility of application of any other pramāņa or means of knowledge forms the very basis of arthāpatti (see vștti on pp. 38, and also Śābara-bhāsya on Mi. Sū. II. 2. 1., pp. 462, and on VI. 6. 3., on pp. 481).
We will consider the objector's position in greater detail. According to the objector, no word was connected in the beginning with any meaning at all. Then, somebody, sometime, established the connection between word and meaning. Thus words came to be significatory of a given sense. This is one explanation of the sabdārtha-vyavahāra. Then, vrddha-vyavahāra forms yet another explanation. Even to-day we see the younger ones getting at a given sense from a given word,
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