Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/522601/1

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN No. I Chief Editor Dr. NATHMAL TATIA M. A., D. Litt.

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PRAKRIT JAIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 1 Chief Editor DR. NATHMAL TATIA, M. A., D. Litt. Director, Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsa, Vaishali, Bihar. VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsa, Vaishall, Bihar. 1971

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Editorial Board Dr. N. Tatia Dr. R. P. Poddar Dr. D. N. Sharma Dr. N. K. Prasad All Rights Reseroed Price : Rs. 1525 Published on behalf of the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology & Ahimsa, Vaishali, (Muzaffarpur), Bihar, by Dr. Nathmal Tatia, M. A., D. Litt., Director, Printed in India, at the Tara Printing Works, Varanasi,

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The Government of Bihar established the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology & Abimsa at Vaishali (Muzaffarpur) in 1955 with the olject, inter alia to promote advanced studies and research in Prakrit and Jainology, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Vaishali Research Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last few years namely the Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning at Darbhanga, the K. P Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, the Bihar Rasira Bhasa Parishad for Research and Advanced Studies in Hindi at Patna and the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist Learning and Pali (the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara) at Nalanda (Patna). As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship this is the Research Bulletin No. I, which comprise of several papers mainly by the staff of the Institute, The Govt. of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service to the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.

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CHIEF EDITOR'S NOTE A Research Journal was a kinly felt desideratum which is being fulfilled by the publication of this first volume of our Bulletin. All the papers published here are written by the members of the Institute excepting three which are by Sri Devkant Barua, frofessor N. K. Devraj and Pandit Sukhlalji. We are exceptionally fortunate to have a very lucid exposition of Jaina Logic by Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee as the first paper of the Bulletin. This is perhaps the first attempt at a critical evaluation of logical problems from a Jaina philosopher's standpoint. The treatment is based on the Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara and the commentary on it by Siddharsi Gani and the tippana of Devabhadrasuri. A student of modern logic will derive much benefit from this paper inasmuch as some of the main problems of Indian Logic have been presented in modern terminology which is current in present-day logical treatises. The paper has brought out clearly the epistemological standpoints of the realists, the idealists and the sceptic materialists as propounded in the ancient treatises of Indian logic. The Bulletin also contains a very illuminating talk in Hindi "The given extempore by Sri Devkant Barua, Rajyapal of Bihar on root of Religion: Intuition and Reasoning'. Intuition unsupported by reasoning is blind faith which is sometimes likely to be identified with helpless dependence on fate, which has done much harm to religion. Scholars will find here a very penetrating evaluation of intuition and reasoning illustrated by references to the rational outlook of Gautama Buddha as recorded in the Vinaya Pitaka of the Pali canon. The paper 'Dharma and Tattva' gives a historical survey of Indian religions in theory and practice the roots whereof are found in the Sutras of Kanada and Aksapada. In this paper Pandit Sukhlalji has emphasised the need of historical and comparative study of Indian philosophies in the absence of which our grasp of the subject is bound to remain narrow and partial. The Bulletin contains papers read at the annual seminar held to date at the Institute on the occasion of Mahavira Jayanti. The Sanskrit text of the Nyayavatara and its commentaries have been printed at the end of the Bulletin for ready reference by scholars who may like to consult the original text while going through Professor Mookerjee's paper.

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( vi ) Dr. R, P. Poddar and Dr. N. K. Prasad collected and arranged the material of the Bulletin and prepared the Press copy. Dr. Prasad acted as an amenuensis to Professor Mookerjee in preparing his paper. He is a fastidious scholar and played the same role as Gapesa did to Vyasa, to compare great things with small. We extend our hearty thanks to Sri Rama Shankar Pandya, the proprietor of the Tara Printing works, Varanasi for his co-operation in the speedy and fine printing of the Bulletin. NATHMAL TATIA Vaishali, Mahavira Jayanti, 1971.

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CONTENTS v-vi 1-144 145-160 161-168 169-178 179-180 181-186 187-196 197-199 200-207 208-216 217-221 1. Chief Editor's Note 2. A critical and comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the basis of the Nyayavatara of Siddhas ena Divakara 3. The Jain Ideal of Ahimsa and its Infiuence on other Indian Religions and Gandhi's Ahimza 4. Values and Religion 5. Progress of Prakrit and Jaina Studies 6. Kammasacca hu Papino 7. Prakrit Illustrations in works on Poetics 8. Uposatha 9. Seminars of Scholars 10. dharma ke mUla : anubhUti evaM tarka 11. The Root of Religion : Intuition and Reasoning 12. dharma ke mUla : anubhUti evaM tarka 13. vizvazAnti ke mUlAdhAra : ahiMsA evaM anekAnta 14. Foundations of World Peace : Ahimsa and Anekanta 15. Foundations of world Peace : Ahimsa and Anekanta 16. Arya banAma anArya 17. rASTrIya ekatA 18. dharmanIti aura rAjanIti 19. Religion and Secularism 20. Materialism versus Spiritualism 21. Anekanta and Madhyama-Pratipad 22. The Jaina view of Good and Evil 23. gRhastha-dharma 24. dharma aura tattva 25. dharma evaM badalate hue mUlya 26. dharmajJAna ke mUla : anubhUti evaM tarka 27. nyAyAvatAraH (zrI siddhasenadivAkaraviracitaH ) 222-224 225-234 235-239 240-242 243-246 247-250 251-252 253-255 256-257 258-260 261-269 270-288 289-301 302-306 1-95

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A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JAINA LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY ON THE BASIS OF THE NYAYAVATARA OF SIDDHASENA DIVAKARA SATKARI MOOKERJEE

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INTRODUCTION Siddhasena Divakara is an outstanding writer on Jaina logic and epistemology. The Noiyavat ara like other Dvatrimsikas consists of thirty-two stanzas. It is a wonderful achievement that Siddhasena Diva kara has comprised within this short compass all the important problems of logic and epistemology in consonance with the fundamental Jaina tenets. Each verse is pregnant with deep significance and it was left to subscquent scholars who wrote commentaries upo this work to bring out the implications. Siddhasena did not propose to write a standard text book on Jaina epistemology. But he has taken full advantage of the works of Dignaga and of the Brahmanical Nyaya school and criticised the Buddhist views in forcible language with cogent arguments. We have given a faithful rendering of the original verses and supplemented them with exhaustive exposition of the implications in the elucidation attached to each verse. Our interest is purely philosophical and we have noted the views of his predecessors and successors in order to make the recondite statements of Siddhasena intelligible to modern students of philosophy. We have followed the edition of Dr. P. L. Vaidya with the commentary of Siddharsi and the sub-commentary of Devabhadra Suri. These two commentaries are very learned works and have gone deep into the import of the original text. In our elucidation we have exploited the commentaries to the fullest extent, though we have not given a literal rendering. Siddhasena has criticised the Buddhist writers without express quotation of their names. There are pronounced resemblances with the wordings of Dignaga and also Dharmakirti. Prof. Jacobi and Dr. P. L. Vaidya have expressed their views that Siddhasena criticises Dharmakirti. Prof. D. Malvania has given full quotations from the previous Buddhist writers to show that the views criticised are older than those of Dharmakirti and that no decisive proof can be adduced to establish Divakara's posteriority to Dharmakirti. Powerful arguments have been put forward to prove that Siddhasena Divakara is the author of the Sanmatitarka and of the Nyayavatara and that he was not far removed from the time of Dignaga. We do not propose to enter into this chronological problem which has been discussed by Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. D. Malvania, who have tried to vindicate their position against the views of Jacobi and Vaidya. We have

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I no additional argument and documentary evidence to make the chronological problem surer and clearer. But there are certain problems which make us hesitate to express our perfect agreement with either side. Let us take the definition of Pratyaksa (perceptual cognition) as propounded by Dharmakirti in the Nyayabindu. It is entirely devoid of conceptual construction and is recognised to be a species of valid cognition (samyag jnana). Perceptual intuition (pratyaksa) is directly conversant with a specific particular individual (svalaksana) which stands completely isolated from other individuals and these individ uals have again no common character. Class concepts are supposed by the realists to be based upon objective universals inherent in each and all individuals belonging to a class. Dharmakirti has taken enormous pains to prove that these universals are nothing but conceptual constructions and have no truck with the objective real individuals. So perceptual intuition which envisages the particular is not a judgement. It is an intuition pure and simple which can be felt but not characterized. The character of the individual is entirely particularistic and is not anything distinct and different from the real. So the first negative qualification of perceptual intuition is said to consist in its negation of concepts which are expressed by words. Of course intuition of a self-characterized individual has no pragmatic consequence. It cannot be conceived, much less described as this or that. This points to the individual and each individual is 'this'. But there are so many thises'. They become impregnated with a universal concept and an expressive word and thus lose their individuality. The perceptual judgement that follows on intuition say, of blue, delivers itself in the form 'this is blue' or 'this blue'. Thus there is necessarily a dichotomy of the individual blue into this and blue. The predicate implicit or explicit stands for a general concept which is regarded as a subjective construct by Dignaga, Dharmakirti and their followers. Perceptual intuition is thus defined by Dignaga as one which is free from association with concepts and words. This is regarded as the self-sufficient characterization of perceptual intuition. But Dharmakirti in the Nyayabindu has added another qualifying adjective 'inerrant' or 'non-erroneous' (abhrantam). This innovation has given rise literally to a storm of controversy from a very ancient time. It is not yet free from its liability to misconception. Perceptual intuition being a species of valid cognition (samyag jnana) must be free from error and as such the specific qualification 'inerrant' seems liable to the charge of unwarranted tautology. If it is erroneous it cannot be 1. pratyaksam kalpanapodham.

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INTRODUCTION a species of valid cognition since a valid cognition cannot be erroneous and an erroneous cognition cannot be valid, as has been observed by Siddhasena." Vinitadeva and Santabhadra have explained "abhranta' in their commentaries on the Nyayabindu as standing for non-discrepant (avisamvadi). But Dharmottara criticises this interpretation as wrong explanation. Pratyaksa being a species of valid cognition (samyag jnana) must necessarily be free from discrepancy with the fact envisaged by it. Valid cognition is defined as one which is non-discrepant, i.e., consistent with its object. So the meaning of the adjective abhranta cannot be non-discrepancy. It would involve useless tautology since it would be reduced to the proposition: A non-discrepant cognition is nondiscrepant.' So the meaning of abhranta must be different. It means that perceptual cognition is one which is not contrary to the real individual. But this also involves tautology. A valid cognition cannot be wrong, that is contrary to the real envisaged by it. Dharmottara suggests that this additional adjective is significant and advisedly incorporated in the definition to combat a prevalent misconception. There are certain erroneous perceptions, namely, the perception of the moving tree by a person seated in a fast-running boat which is confirmed by verification. A curious person will alight from the vehicle and go forward and get hold of a tree. Of course the tree that is reached is stationary and not moving. But barring this deviation the attainment of the tree should be regarded as veridical perception. It has been counted as valid cognition by some. This conception of partial verification as the test of truth was prevalent among a section of philosophers and Dharmakirti felt the necessity of combating this view. According to Dharmakirti error is total error and truth is total truth. A cognition cannot be partially true and partially false. So a partial error is only a misconception. If it is error it must be so from end to end. It cannot be analysed into a true part and a false part. Further light has been shed on this problem by Santaraksita and Kamalasila. The observation of Siddhasena that perception being a valid cognition can not be erroneous is not to be interpreted as refutation of Dharmakirti's position. In fact Dharmakirti also endorses the truth of the contention. Siddhasena does not seem to refute Dharmakirti but only the Vijnanavadin, the Buddhist idealist, who regards all cognitions, 1. na pratyaksam api bhrantam pramanatvaviniscayat/ bhrantam pramanam ity etad viruddham vacanam yatah|| -Nyayavatara, 6. 2. Dharmottarapradipa (edited by D. Malvania), p. 47.

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4 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I perceptual or non-perceptual, as wrong so far as their reference to external objects is taken into account. Furthermore Buddhist Vijnanavada is much older than Dignaga and Dharmakirti. So the refutation of the proposition 'perception is wrong' does not determine the relative chronology of Siddhasena and Dharmakirti. From internal evidence it may be safely inferred that Siddhasena was posterior to Dignaga and we leave the relative chronology of Dharmakirti and Divakara an open question. I have discussed the logical value of the adjective 'unerring' (abhranta) in the definition of perceptual intuition in my work The Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux. Santaraksita and Kamalasila agree with Dharmottara that this amendment of Dignaga's definition of pratyaksa was made by Dharmakirti in order to rebut the contention of a section of Buddhist logicians who thought that partial verification was symptomatic of validity.' But this is regarded as a facile misconception as no verification is possible for error, partial or total. The verification is due to the previous or succeeding veridical knowledge of the stationary tree or the white conch and not to the false intuition of moving tree or yellow conch. We are not in a position to assess the logical value of the adjective abhranta incorporated by Asamga or Maitreyanatha. It is quite plausible that this qualifying clause might have been used for rebuttal of idealistic position. As for the contention that Siddhasena Divakara's criticism of the characterization of anumana (inference) as inherently erroneous by Dharmakirti it should be observed that it is only a deduction from Dignaga's position. Inference deals in concepts and concepts are unreal abstractions. But the probandum though a concept is necessarily bound up with and necessarily derived from and felt to be identical with the real individual. And so it leads to the attainment of a real individual as a matter of universal necessity which shows its objective affiliation. Accordingly inference is regarded as a valid cognition even by the Buddhist. Siddhasena's criticism of the coincidence of error and truth in inference endorsed by the Buddhist logicians need not have a pointed reference to Dharmakirti. What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena's reference to antarvyapti and the definition of hetu (probans) as anyathanupapanna in the verses 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing 1. Tathapyamsasamvadavadinamahatya vipratipattinirakaranartham kartavyamevabhrantagrahanamiti. Dharmottarapradipa, p. 45. 2. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, July 1927, p. 451.

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INTRODUCTION 5 short of an enigma that this innovation of the Jaina logicians did not evoke a reply from Dharmakirti. We have discussed the implications of antaroyapti in our elucidation of verse 20. If antarvyapti is understood to maintain that the concomitance of the probans with the probandum is integral to the constitution of the terms, this will not be any innovation. Dharmakirti lays exclusive stress on the fact that the relation of concomitance is essentially bound up with the nature of the probans. The probans cannot exist without the probandum by virtue of its very constitution. The concept of internal concomitance (antarvyapti) is a paraphrasis of this svabha vapratibandha.1 The unitary characteristic of the probans (incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum as proposed by the Jaina logicians) seems to be an improvement. It is noteworthy that Siddhasena refers to both these concepts, namely, antarvyapti and anyathanupapannatva as sponsored by previous Masters of logic and as enunciated by others." It is apparent that these amendments are not original creations of Siddhasena who rather sets his seal of approval on them. For the first time we find in the Tattvasamgraha and the Panjika a criticism of the unitary character of the probans 'incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum'. A number of extracts have been quoted from Patrasvamin who criticised the triple-character of the probans enunciated by Dignaga and elucidated by Dharmakirti. Both the forceful language and the logical cogency of the arguments of Patrasvamin are arresting. He has proved with convincing logic that the triple-character does not necessarily entail the concept of universal concomitance of the probans with the probandum and the lack of the latter reduces the triple-character to an irrational inflation.4 Dharmakirti has added a qualifying restriction (eva) to each character in order to save them from undesirable extension to fallacious instances. To be fair to Dignaga and Dharmakirti it must be endorsed that the triplecharacter is intended to emphasize the element of necessary concomitance. The Jaina logician seems to have secured greater clarity and cogency by his insistence on the unitary character. Santaraksita and Kamalasila have shown that though necessary concomitance is the essential characteristic of the probans it is not alone sufficient to bring 1. svabhavapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham gamayet. Nyayabindu, 2. 19. 2. Nyayavatara, 22. 3. nyayavido viduh. Ibid, 20; and iritam. Ibid, 22. 4. Tattvasamgraha & Panjika, Anuman apariksa, verses 1363-1428. 5. trairupyam punar lingasyanumeye sattvam eva sapaksa eva sattvam, asapakse casattvam eva niscitam. Nyayabindu. 2.5 (p. 91).

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6 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I home the conclusion. The minor premiss which sets forth the existence of the probans of necessary concomitance, implied by the absence of the probans in the absence of the probandum is liable to be abortive. To cite a concrete instance 'Word is impermanent because it is visible', the concomitance of visibility with impermance is endorsed by the Buddhist. But it cannot be effective in proving the impermance of words because the probans 'visible' is not predicable of it. So the existence of the probans in the subject inust be admitted as a necessary condition of inference. This gives two characteristics. As for the negative concomitance, 'the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum' (anyathanupapannatva) it necessarily presupposes the co-existence of the probans with the probandum. So the negative concomitance implies the necessary existence of the probans in all the cases of the existence of the probandum So the unitary character 'the non-existence of the probans without the probandum' is only an abbreviation of the dual concomitance, positive and negative, and this plus the minor premiss amounts to the admission of the triplecharacter. It must be admitted that Santaraksita and Kamalasila have succeeded in the justification of the triple-character of the probans. But it cannot be gainsaid that this triple-character is of value in so far as it is an exponent of necessary concomitance and this is emphasized by the Jaina logician. It is the element of necessary concomitance which invests a probans with its logical cogency. Though necessary concomitance is the exponent of triple-probans the converse is not necessarily true. The Jaina's insistence on the negative concomitance with its implication of positive concomitance must be regarded as an improvement on Dignaga's formulation of the logical probans. Dharmakirti in the Pramanavartika and in the Nyayabindu has not left any loop-hole for misconception. He has made it abundantly clear that necessary concomitance is ultimately reducible to and derives its sanction from causality and essential identity. Mere observation of concomitance in agreement or in disagreement, however frequent or extensive, does not yield fool-proof assurance of its necessity, unless it be shown that in case of succession the causal relation of the probans and the probandum, and in case of nonsuccession, the essential identity are present at the back. Thus the 1. karyakaranabhavad va syabhavad va niyamakat/ avinabhavaniyamo 'darsanan no na darsanat|/Pramanavartika, 3.31.

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INTRODUCTION inference of fire from smoke is legitimate because smoke is the effect and fire is the cause. It is inconceivable that anything can happen without a cause. The proposition 'Every event has a cause' is a truism. It is the belief in causality that is responsible for advanced and scientific investigation. So if the relation between two events can be explained as one of causality their necessary concomitance will be placed on a secure footing. Secondly between two simultaneous facts if the relation is shown to be founded on identity of essence (tadatmya), necessary concomitance of the two will be understood eo ipso. All the inferences in Euclid's Geometry are instances of concomitance based on identity of essence. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles follows from the very nature of the triangle. Unfortunately Dharmakirti did not give instances from geometry or arithmetic (e g. two plus two make four) and this has made this topic a source of misunderstanding. The relation of antarvyapti is thus a deduction from Dharmakirti's conception of natural concomitance (svabhavapratibandha).' It is quite plausible that Dharmakirti may have borrowed this formulation from his predecessors whose works are not available to us. But one thing creates a doubt. The Naiyayikas, the Mimamsakas and the Jaina logicians have sought to pick holes in the Buddhist position. They are very vocal in their protestations that there are relations other than these two which equally guarantee the universality of concomitance between the probans and the probandum. We shall briefly consider some crucial instances alleged by the non-Buddhist logicians. The inference of the rise of one constellation from that of another, of sea-tides from the rise of the moon, the inference of shadow on the opposite side of the hill from the lighted front are cases which are neither explicable in terms of causality nor can there be a minor premiss and so on and so forth. These animadversions have been met by Buddhist logicians with convincing arguments. The occurrence of sea-tides on the rise of the moon in the sky is governed by the relation of causality. The concatenation of causal conditions which leads to the rise of the moon furnishes the auxiliary conditions of the sea-tides. So the rise of the moon and the occurrence of sea-tides are the simultaneous co-effects of a uniform set of causal conditions. As for the shadow and the light on the opposite sides of a 1. svabhavapratibandhe hi saty artho' rtham gamayet. Nyayabindu, 2.19. tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabhicaraniyamabhavat. Ibid, 2.20. sa ca pratibandhah sadhye 'rthe lingasya. Ibid, 2.21.

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 mountain, they are due to interception of light on the other side and the incidence of light on the front. Light illumines an object on which it falls and the absence of light is responsible for darkness which may be understood either as negation of light according to the Vaisesika or a positive substance incompatible with the presence of light. As for the remote succession of one constellation to another this is also capable of explanation only on the basis of causality. The causes of the rise of one constellation continue to operate, eventually giving rise to the causal conditions ushering in the subsequent rise of another. In fact we cannot conceive of any other necessary relation than causality as governing the occurrence of two events in succession. The absurdity of the occurrence of an event without an antecedent cause is irresistibly felt as an apriori law. This is the sanction of causality as a necessary and universal relation. Without causality the co-association of events must be looked upon as a coincidence. If a cause be not apparent we have to isolate the accidental associates and find out the true cause. Science has made progress only on the postulation of causality as a determining principle. Science rules out accidents and coincidences of chance as due to ignorance. The minor premiss shows that an effect qua probans is necessarily co-existent with the cause qua probandum The rise of two constellations though separated by gap belongs to an identical period of time, Causality presupposes definite contiguity in spatio-temporal continuum. "Professor Broad has given the example of blowing of hooter both at Liverpool and at London at the same time. The sound of hooter is followed by the exit of the factory workers at both the places. Yet the Liverpool hooter is not regarded as the cause of the departure of the workers in London.". The continuum is supplied by the minor term (subject) in which the probans and the probandum ultimately coincide. The objection of Kumarila which is endorsed by Patrasvamin that the minor premiss is irrelevant is based on superficial reflection. It is contended that a river in spate presupposes rainfall in upper region. The spate is found below and rainfall has occurred a hundred miles apart. There is no common minor term. But why is rainfall inferred in the upper region of the self-same river and not of any other ? The flood in the Ganga cannot be accounted for by rainfall in England. So it is the common river connected with the upper and lower regions which is the logical subject. The inference of the Brahmanahood of the child from the Brahmanahood of the parents; or to take a current example the religion of parents determining the religion of the child 1. Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Vol. I, pp. 192-93.

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INTRODUCTION are alleged to be cases of inference without minor premiss. But these are not cases of the lack of minor premiss. The relation of the child with the parents is the decisive factor. The religion of the parents determines that of the child on the ground that the child is the progeny and inheritor of the parents' religious persuasion. If the parents are not related to the child it will be a case of non-sequitur, 9 Dharmakirti's influence on the development of Indian logic and philosophy is unchallangeable. The inductive logic of John Stuart Mill also banks upon causality. Dharmakirti's formulation of essential identity (svabhava) is a striking illustration of his or his predecessor's genius. It lays unerringly its finger on the logical basis of arithmetical and geometrical deductions. The affinities of Jaina's speculations with those of Dharmakirti deserve to be worked out by patient researches. Fortunately we belong to a scientific age which cares for the discovery of truth more than communal triumph regardless of facts. It will be a bad day for science and philosophy if religious bias or political interests are allowed to subdue the disinterested pursuit of truth which has enabled science to score unexpected triumphs. Dharmakirti's refutation of a unitary universal objectively inherent in each and every individaul of a class has divided philosophers in India into two warring groups, namely, realists and nominalists. The Jaina also does not believe in unitary universal. The universal according to him is only the development of similarity among individuals. But objectively this similarity is inherent in each individual. Thus the conception of common character underlying a number of individuals is nothing better than a subjective construction This might have been differently interpreted by the Jainas in conformity with their law of Anekanta which reconciles one and many without logical contradiction. The contention that a real is the unity of general and particular, individual and universal, thus loses much force. It is only in the individual substance that the law is found to operate on an objective basis. The position of the Mimamsist and that of Samkhya philosopher in the material plane are more faithful to the law of Anekanta. The Buddhist is a believer in unrelieved pluralism and the Jaina philosopher has not been able to transcend this pluralistic conception. It is individual substances according to the latter which are objective reals. But each of them stands in its solitary majesty. Dharmakirti denies objective relation among individuals, homogeneous or heterogeneous. The Jaina also affirms that there is no objective relation running through the individuals. There is the concep

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10 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 tion of relation. But it is not anything in excess of the individuals. The individuals develop certain characteristics which make them appear as related. The denial of common bond either supplied by the trans-individual universal or trans-individual relation makes the items of the universe objectively independent and unrelated. In these two fundamental conceptions one may not be accused of exaggeration or oversight if one finds essential uniformity between the Buddhist and Jaina philosophers. The law of Anekanta has been rather given a halfhearted recognition in the ontological plane. The Vedantist monist gives us a unified universe without the individuals. The Samkhya gives us the conception of material universe as a unity in diversity. Dharmakirti does away with the unity and leaves us with pure diversity of diverse individuals. It was expected that this pluralistic bias should have been contested by the law of Anekanta. It is a truth that Buddhist pluralism is not repudiated without prevarication. Siddhasena Divakara did not set himself the task of writing a manual on logic like Dignaga or Dharmakirti. Within the compass of thirty-two stanzas he has given us the salient topics of Jaina logic and epistemology which will continue to be an anthoritative work. His deliberate omissions enforced by the consideration of space and time have been supplied by the commentator Siddharsi. We have exploited the essential materials provided by this commentary and also have added our own data. The present exposition may be regarded as an expanding commentary on comparative and critical lines.

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NYA YA VA TARA The first karika of our text, along with the prefatory proposition, runs as follows: Text pramapavyutpadanartham idarnara bhyate pramapam svaparabhasi jnanam badhavivarjitam/ pratyaksam ca paroksam ca dvidha, meyaviniscayat 1 Translation "This (the following) is propounded with a view to the elucidation of pramana (valid cognition). A valid cognition is a cognition which illumines itself and an other object, provided) it is immune from contradiction. It falls under two heads namely, perceptual and extraperceptual, in pursuance of the way in which cognizables are determined (by the knowing subject)," ... (I) Elucidation Each assertion has a deep significance 'A cognition illumines itself and also an other is a proposition which though not an exclusive character of valid cognition has been stated with a view to rebutting the different theories of rival schools. Hemacandra takes exception to the inclusion of the adjectival determination 'self-illuminative', as it is common to invalid cognition also. He is of the opinion that the element which is the exclusive property of the defined object should alone be stated in the definition, the sole purpose of which is to set forth the defined object with its distinctive individuality and as such to distinguish it, (that is, the defined obiect) from similar and dissimilar things. The ancient doctors have stated this characteristic for critical appraisal. This objection of Hemacandra is justifiable on the assumption that the purpose of definition is to set forth an object with its distinctive character so that it may not be confused with others. A definition must possess three characteristics : (i) exemption from over-extension (ativyapti); (2) exemption from the charge of inadequacy (that is to say, its failure to include everything that comes within its sweep, avyapti); (3) exemption from the charge of absurdity (asambhava). A defining character must not be one which is not found in the object defined. The presence of any one of these defects makes the definition useless and ineffective.

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12 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I The definition propounded by Siddhasena is not exposed to any one of these charges. As for the charge of superfluity it should be noted that it does not make it overlap erroneous and doubtful cognitions as the saving clause immune from contradiction' rules out such possibility. The adage goes "Distinction from the opposite (vyavstti) or full conception (vyavahara) of the object is the consequence of definition".! The term vyavahara has a comprehensive significance. It means (1) full conception, (2) a clear statement, and (3) avoidance or acceptance. Now if one's knowledge of the defined object be confined only to its peculiar and exclusive property, the conception of the object and the consequential statement and physical activity following upon it could not be adequate in all cases. The inclusion o fthe adjective 'illumining itself and an other' serves a very useful purpose in that it gives a fuller conception and also serves to combat opposite views entertained by rival philosophers. Let us sum up the observations of Siddharsigani on this verse. He endorses the view that a definition serves to distinguish the defined object from homogeneous and heterogencous species. The definition stated by Siddhasena is devised to edify the philosophers of other schools who have imbibed their pre-conception from their respective tradition (vibratipanna) and also of average people (avyutpanna) who are not trained in logic and as such have confused notions. The definition so oriented is sound and adequate. The valid cognition is the subject. Everyone, whether a philosopher or an untutored layman is familiar with what is called valid knowledge. The philosophers have got their own conception of what is valid knowledge and the other qualifying adjectives are stated as the predicate for their consideration. As for the untutored layman, they are also acquainted with a cognition possessing the aforesaid qualification. The subject-predicate relation is to be stated in a reverse way for their enlightenment Everyman is familiar with a congnition which is immune from contradiction and illumines its own self and an object. If they were lacking in such ideas, their practical life and behaviour would become impos. sible. Behaviour presupposes knowledge and so such a cognition which illumines itself and an other and is immune from contradiction is not unfamiliar to them also. So the subject of the definition will be the cognition so qualified and the predicate will be valid cognition (pramana). 1. vyavsttir vyavaharo va laksanasya prayojanam. 2. See Pancapadikavivarana under adhyasabhas ya of Sankara's Brahmasutrabhasya.

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 13 In a logical proposition the subject is a fact which is known by the proponent and opponent both. In a debate there are two parties : the proponent (vadin) and opponent (prativa din). The subject is a known fact and there is no dispute about its factuality. The predicate must be a fact, -attribute or action which is under dispute and is either unknown as belonging to the subject or subject to dispute. In Sanskrit terminology the subject is called anuvadya and the predicate is called vidheya. Anuvada means statement of a known fact. If the subject were also unknown or unacceptable to the opponent, the debate would shift back to it and there will be no discussion possible so far as the predicate is concerned. The predicate must belong to the subject or be asserted to do so. If the subject is not an established and acknowledged fact the predicate will be a homeless floating attribute. So it must be acknowledged that the subject is a known fact and there is no difference of opinion possible regarding its existence. So it is called anuvadya, the object of statement of a fact already known by independent evidence. The statement of a known fact is superfluous because it will be pointless. There is no point in pressing a fact upon the opponent who accepts it as a fact. The predicate is an unknown or unrecognised attribute and the establishment of its validity is the aim of the proponent. It is called vidheya because it is the object of vidhi, the statement of a fact unknown or unrecognised, In the interpretation of the definition of valid cognition the commentator asserts pramara (valid cognition) as the subject and the cognition as qualified by the two adjectives as the predicate so far as the philosophers are concerned in the debate. All philosophers are unamimous on the existence of valid cognition and they differ only on the predicate under discussion as having relevancy to the subject. So it is the latter clause which should be regarded as the predicate by both the parties. As regards layrnan, they are not posted in logical terminology such as pramana, prameya and the like. But they are familier with valid experience which is the pre-condition also of practical day-to-day activity. Therefore what is stated to be predicate regarding philosophors is made the subject in their case. Such a cognition which is familiar to you is called pramana in the logician's parlance, So there is no inconsistency in the double interpretation of Siddharsi. The adjectives 'self-illuminative etc. are stated to rebut the views of rival philosophers, The Buddhist Idealist (Vijna navadin) does not 1. Cf. pramanantarvagatasya arihasya sabdena samkirtanam anuyadah Kasika on Astadhyayi, II. 4.3. ajnatarthajnapanam vidhih.

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14 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I believe in the existence of external objects. It is only consciousness (vijnana) which alone is real. An object purporting to exist outside independent of the subject is as illusory as the object of dream experience or perceptual illusion. The nacre is falsely perceived as silver and in dream one experiences many things which are grotesque and absurd. So these experiences are false as their contents are unreal. Our wakeful experience fares no better than dream-experience. They are illusions pure and simple and are sublated by subsequent experience. Even the realist admits that a false and erroneous experience is not valid knowledge which is endorsed by Siddhasena Divakara in the definition of pramasa. Now Siddhasena and other philosophers do not think that our perceptual experience which is not contradicted by a subsequent cognition is to be scouted as erroneous on the analogy of dream and illusion. As a matter of fact there is no contradiction by subsequent experience. Vasubandhu contends that external solid objects which are encountered in general experience are found to be riddled with contradiction. A solid object cannot be ultimate because it is divisible into parts. It cannot be infinitely divisible either. Infinite divisibility presupposes an infinite number of parts. The Himalaya mountain and a mustard seed, if each be composed of infinite parts, must not differ in dimension One appears big and another small. This can be accounted for on the hypothesis that they are composed of a definite number of indivisible particles called atoms in more or less number. This is the raison d'etre of the atomic theory propounded by the Vaisesikas and the Vaibhasikas. This is also endorsed by the Sautra ntikas. Vasubandhu contends that an atom cannot be indivisible and partless. Six atoms from six quarters-east, west, north, south, above and below-must be supposed to combine with the nuclear atom standing in centre. If they combine in one and the same point it will be a case of total merger. There will be no increase in dimension as all atoms coalesce inside a single atom. The resultant magnitude in that case would not be more than atomic. An atom is invisible to our ordinary vision, so also solid if identified with an atom will be imperceptible. If on the other hand they combine in different points that will amount to the admission that an atom has at least six parts which knocks down the raison d'etre of the assumption of atomic constitution of matter. The atomic theory thus fails to explain the formation of massive bodies. The hypothesis of the Sautrantika asserts that atoms stand in close succession without intermingling their identity and such a combination gives rise to the idea

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION of solids. But this is an argument of despair. The atoms existing side by side without coincidence or merger are not bereft of their size and hence any number of atoms so associated cannot give rise to a bigger dimension. One will have perforce to admit that solidity is only a false appearance.1 So the solid external objects which we encounter in ordinary experience must be dismissed as unreal figments of a pathological imagination. We are not unaquainted with experience of unreal objects as in dream or error. No body can ascribe to these contents of false experience an objective status independent of the subject. They are subjective appearances pure and simple. But the question necessarily arises 'why should there be so much diversity and multiplicity in the contents if they are all fanciful projections ?' The Buddhists answer that they are the outcome of the predispositions and memory traces deposited in consciousness by previous experiences which were also equally false. As these predispositions (vasana) stem from previous experiences and there is no first initial experience as the individual subjects have a beginningless career, there is no logical incompatibility in their previous existence and coming into existence as perceptual data. crucial But the realist as represented by Siddhasena poses a question. What is the nature of dispositions (vasanas)? Are they unconscious qualities or unconscious entities? If they are unconscious and independent of the knowing subject why should the Buddhists demur to accept the independent external objects, both being unconscious in nature. The Buddhist's postulate is that there is no reality outside and beyond consciousness. It is consciousness alone which masquerades as subject and object. simple, compact and there is no of solid material objects as has been found on examination of the atomic theory. But if the dispositions are nothing but consciousness why are they not felt as such? Consciousness is known by itself (svasamvedana). So the postulation of vasanas unperceived and unperceivable as the causes of diversified appearance of contents has no legs to stand upon. They are all consciousness pure, justification for the assumption 2 Furthermore the denial of external objects makes nonsense of all our experience and moral and intellectual activities. It makes a holo 1. tasmannarthesu na jnane sthulabhasas tadatmanah/ ekatrapratisiddhatvad bahusvapi na sambhavah// 15 Pramanavartika, II. 211. 2. Cittamatram bho jinaputra yaduta traidhatukamiti. Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, p. 1.

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16 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I caust of all the pre-suppositions of human existence. Not only this but the existence of other subjects as centres of consciousness (santanantara) is exposed to the same charge of absurdity. How can one know that there are other persons, if they are not real entities existing in their own right ? They must be dismissed as the contents of the experience of a subject, just like other external objects. And these subjects cannot be other than the knowing subject. The inference of the separate identity of different persons based upon the experience of their vocal and physical activities which are equally suspect, cannot be maintainable. The inevitable consequence of subiectivism is solipsism, 'I alone exist will be the only sound proposition. Though solipsism has been justified with arguments by the extreme Vedantic monists it does not carry conviction and satisfy our logical and practical conscience. The Buddhists will have to deny the existence of the Buddha as Nagarjuna has boldly declared. But negativism (sunyavada) in spite of its plausibility and respectability as a philosophical theory cannot be supposed to be the last word in philosophy. Dignaga, Dharmakirti and his followers have developed Vijnanavada as a logical corollary of the doctrine of momentariness of reals. They have arrived at the conclusion that consciousness is momentary and no two consciousness-moments are identical. But because the previous consciousness unit produces a subsequent homogeneous consciousness and the object or content is not different from the cognitive consciousness, the idea of continuity and identity is an illusion generated by the unbroken continuum of the causal series of consciousnessmoments. The lack of a perceptible interval between two consciousnessunits and the homogeneity of the causal series give rise to the illusion of identity and permanence. In point of fact consciousness is a momentary entity which exists only for a mathematical instant and perishes in the next moment utterly and irrevocably. The theory of the subjective idealist (Vijna navadin) has been summed up by Kamalasila, the commentator of the Tattvasamgraha in the following terms. The whole universe consisting of three spheres namely, the sensible world (kamadhatu), the pure material world (rupadhatu) and the immaterial world (arupadha tu) is nothing but consciousness. The centres of consciousness called santana (continuing subjects) are infinite in number. Each inevitably perishes in the next moment. As regards unenlightened subjects this consciousness is contaminated by moral and intellectual defects (klesa), and it is pure

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 17 and uncontaminated in the enlightened conscio usness centres." There are three propositions distinguishable in the extract quoted above and each of them deserves meticulous examination. The first proposition is that consciousness is momentary and there is no perdurable identical subject. The second one is that the subject consisting in a series of consciousness-units continues without break, one consciousness-unit followed by the subsequent one as its effect. The third proposition is that the subjective centres are numerically different from one another. The first proposition asserts that consciousness-units are momentary and infinite in number forming an unending continuum. Obviously the doctrine of momentariness is borrowed from the Sautrantikas who make causal efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) the sole criterion of existence. Rival philosophers have advanced powerful arguments against the conception of causal efficiency as the sole criterion of existence. It is found that even illusory experience such as the experience of snake in a rope produces trepidation and the relevant motor activities. The snake appearance makes the erring subject spring back from it to a safe distance and that of silver in the nacre induces a forward movement for its acquisition. The causal efficiency of these illusions is undeniable, yet it cannot be real, belonging as it does to a false appearance. Furthermore causality has been shown by Dharmakirti in his work Sambandhaparik sa3 to be a convenient figment of understanding. In brief, causality cannot be an objective relation because the terms, cause and effect, are not synchronous and relation must subsist between two terms. In the present case the cause ceases to be when the effect comes into being. The relation is imposed by the subject as a convenient expedient of systematization of experience. It is a form or way of understanding as Kant maintains. Dharmakirti has anticipated Kant. It follows that the conclusion of momentariness of existents based on the argument of causal efficiency must collapse with its basis cut asunder. Let us now examine the second postulate that the subject is an unending continuum of plural consciousness-units, one following on 1. Vijnaptimatramevedam traidhatukam, tacca vijnanam pratisattvasantana. bhedad anantam avisuddhancanadhigatatattvanam, visuddham ca prahinavarapanam pratiksanavisararu ca sarvapranabhstam ojayate, Tattvasaingraha (G.O.S.), p. 550. 2. For detailed discussion the reader is referred to my book The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux. 3. Reproduced in a large number in the Prameyakamalamartanda and Syad vadaratnakara. Sce also the Chapter entitled "Relations in The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism.

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18 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I the heels of another. It is based on the assumption that one consciousness as cause will produce another consciousness as effect without break and as a matter of inevitable necessity. But causal continua, when frustrated by obstructive agents, are found to cease. For instance, darkness which is a positive entity according to the Buddhist ceases to exist and vanishes into nothingness when confronted with light. Darkness has been regarded as negation of light by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school; but with due deference to these theories we may substitute light for darkness. Furthermore a jar is destroyed when it is crushed with a cudgel. There is no logical or ontological necessity that the series of cause and effect will continue without break. And this has been shown by the exarnpies cited by us. The Buddhist Fluxist (Ksanikavadin) and the Idealist (Vijnanavadin) cannot prove that consciousness-series, which functions as the knowing subject, will continue as a matter of universal necessity. The possibility of its meeting with extinction inakes havoc of the intellectual, inoral and religious discipline. The subject will be debarred by powerful disincentives from the pursuit of intellectual, moral and religious activities. So this theory of the Vijnanavadin cannot be acceptable as true estimate of subjective consciousness. The third proposition postulates the existence of other subjects. But we have already shown that it is based on uncritical faith, and solipsism is the logical consequence. The experience of objective facts is not liable to be dismissed in a cavalier fashion. If experience of the object is denied its validity, self-experience of the conscious subject will also be liable to be demolished like the experience of object having nothing to secure its survival. In fact the Sunyavadin has dismissed both consciousness and content as unrelieved appearence. The positive assertion of Siddhasena Divakara that consciousness necessarily illumines an object cannot therfore be challenged on pain of absurd consequences. Dharmakirti has produced a novel argument to prove the identity of cognition and the object. The object that is supposed to be standing independent of the subject cannot be apprehended by a cognition for want of a necessary nexus. The Sautrantikas suppose that the object imprints its image on the cognition and the object is inferred to be the original of it just as a person infers the existence of his face from the reflection in the mirror. But this analogy cannot stand scrutiny. A man sees the reflection of another man's image in the original and its reflection and their comparison enables a man to infer the likeness of his face to the image in the mirror. But there is no such comparison

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 19 possible between the image or form in the consciousness and the external object which remains always aloof and apart from it. The alleged image is nothing but the content of the cognition and being cognized with the cognition as a matter of universal coincidence, the content must be identical with the cognition. The blue and the cognition of blue must be one and the same thing. The blue content is derived from a previous disposition left by previous cognition. This is the sum and substance of the argument advanced by Dharmakirti to repudiate the independent existence of external objects. We have already examined the possibility of disposition (vasana) and found that it is a halting explanation based on the analogy of false experience. As regards the plea of simultaneous intuition of cognition and its content it will suffice to expose the hollowness of the argument, if it is realised that we do not feel that we see only an image or copy or reflection and not the object. It is the general consensus of all percipients that they see the external object standing outside and not the internal image. This universal agreement ought not to be brushed aside as illusion. The difficulties alleged to arise from the relation of internal cognition and external object are rather creatures of subjective bias. It is argued that the relation cannot be one of identity because the two are felt as distinct and different. It is again contended that it cannot be one of difference, because that will annu! the distinction of an object known from an object unknown. If the known object, say tree, is equally different from the cognition concerned and stands in its solitary majesty aloof and apart like the rest of the world, it is difficult to draw the line of demarcation between the alleged known object from an unknown object. Unless a special criterion is propounded in addition to the relation of difference to account for its amenability to the jurisdiction of consciousness and the want of it in case of an unknown object which stands in the same manner of isolation, it is impossible to account for the preferential treatment. But such a criterion is and cannot be formulated by the realist. This is the gravamen of the objection of the Buddhist idealist. The realist Naiyayika hawever posits the relation of visajata, that is, subject-object relation. He would contend that it is only a perversity of logic to reduce all relation to identity or difference. Identity 1. sahopalambhaniyamad abhedo nila-taddhiyoh--Vide Tattvasamgrahpanjika (G. O. S.), p. 567. Also cf. sakit samvedyamanasya niyamena dhiya saha / visayasya tato' nyatvam kenakarena sidhyati// Pramanavartika, II. 388.

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20 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I is not a relation at all since the very conception of relation presupposes two terms and the supposed identity as a relation will only be tantamount to denial of relation as the other term is non est. Nor can the relation be one of absolute difference. According to the Jaina logician the relation is one of identity-cum-difference, It partakes of the dual character and the incompatibility alleged by the Idealist will hold good if identity and difference be absolute. The Jaina endorses non-absolutism and regards all relation as identity-cum-difference, which is enforced and confirmed by experience and as such cannot be rejected on a priori grounds. It is experience alone which can be the determinant of the nature of things conceived. One must submit to the final verdict of experience and not dictate terms. Things do not conform to the tastes and preferences of the knower. The knower cannot alter the nature of things, otherwise a inan might contend that the blue should be perceived as white. It has been pointed out that the incompatibility of identity and difference is a deduction of the absolutist who regards them as absolutely different and mutually inconsistent. But the non-absolutist maintains that difference and identity are not necessarily incongruous. In deference to experience one must accept that difference and identity are not encountered in experience. They are rather conceived on a priori and abstract considerations which exist only in the muddled imagination of the logical purist who does not condescend to take stock of the objects of experience. Like King Canute who ordered the waves of the English channel not to encroach on the coast and felt the humiliation of discomfiture when the sea refused to oblige him, the Idealist logician will meet with similar disappointment. In response to the challenge of the Idealist that no relation between the subject and the object can be trotted out, the Naiyayika asserts that the subject-object relation is as ultimate as identity and differenee. The Naiyayika and also Kumarila do not subscribe to the view that cognition and its object are perceived together and at the same time. But the Jaina believes in self-awareness of all cognitions and therefore do not seek shelter in the subterfuge. The Jaina philosopher endorses the contention of the Idealist that cognition and its object are perceived at the same time as a matter of universal coincidence. But this synchronism and togetherness of the two awarenesses do not entail their identity. Simultaneous awareness is found to occur in the awareness of light and that of the object, say jar. The light is the auxiliary condition of visual perception of the jar but nobody would assert that light and the jar are identical. So the argument of Dharmakirti centred upon synchronism does not entail identity as a matter of necessity.

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 21 We have finished the examination of the justifiability of the adjective 'illuminating an other' ( parabhasi) in the definition of valid cognition. We now propose to subject the other adjectival expression 'illuminating itself' (svabhasi) to critical examination. A cognition can illumine an other (external object) only if it illumines itself. A thing unknown and unillumined cannot be proved to exist. Besides, from experience we find that the light of the lamp which illumines other things is not unillumined. On the contrary it can illumine an object if it is self-illumining. The Naiyayika holds that the first cognition is known by a second cognition following on its heels. The first cognition is called vyavasaya, * that is, the definite knowledge of the object and the second cognition is of the nature of introspection (anuvyavasaya). The first cognition is not known at the time when it cognizes the object. It functions like a sense-organ which remains unperceived at the time of the revelation of the object. But this analogy is based on superficial observation. It is not the eye which sees the object but the knowledge produced in the knowing subject. The sense-organs are as material as the objects which they are alleged to take stock of. One insensitive material fact cannot confer the light of cognition on another material fact because both of them are in the same predicament. As for the Naiyayika's plea that the first cognition is known by the second cognition, the following dilemma will topple the second also. Is it known or unknown when it performs its alleged function of illumination ? If it is known why should the first be supposed to remain unknown at the time of its illumination of the object. An unknown thing is as good as nonexistent so far as the subject is concerned. The Naiyayika also subscribes to the dictum that a thing can be proved only by knowledge. 1 In conformity with this law it must be held that the existence of the first cognition, which certifies the existence of its relevant object, cannot function without being known to exist. The assumption of the second cognition is exposed to the same objection and if the second cognition requires a third and if the latter be as unknown as its predecessors it will require a fourth cognition and the process will involve a regressus ad infinitum (anavastha). Citsukhacarya in his Tattvapradipika criticizes the Nyaya position by a novel argument and shows the absurdity of its stand. The perception of an object takes place according to the theory of the Nyaya 1. prameyasiddhih pramana ddhi-Samkhya-Karika. 2. For the logical absurdity involved in infinite regress, Vide Inductive Reason ing by Dr. S. Bagchi.

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22 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 Vaisesika school when there is fourfold contact viz. (i) the contact of the sense with the object, (ii) contact of the sense with the mind, (iiij contact of the mind with the knowing self, and (iv) the consequential contact with the cognition inherent in the subject. When the object to be known, e. g. cognition, pleasure, pain, volition and the like, is internally inherent in the subject, the first threefold contact will suffice. The most essential condition is that there must be contact of the mind with the self (that is attention). And as the mind is close to the self and competent to be in contact, the aforesaid contact takes place without hitch and this is the universal condition of all cognition. If the mind be not functioning or functioning elsewhere on another object, the cognition of the specific object wil take place. In the case of the first cognition the mind-soul-contact (atmamanahsamyoga) is present in full force. When the second cognition, supposed to take cognizance of the first one, occurs there must be soulmind-contact, which is the necessary condition of all mental events. If the first soul-mind-contact as the condition of the first cognition continues it will necessarily cognize the second cognition, beca use the cognition inheres in the self and the mind which is in conjunction with the self will automatically function on the former and so in every case the introspective cognition will be eo ipso cognized. But as this requiste condition is also present at the time of the occurrence of the first cognition, it is passing strange that the first cognition remains uncognized when it occurs and depends on the second cognition for proof of its existence. Cognition is competent to be perceived by the self and when the requisite condition viz. the soul-mind-object-contact is present in full, why should not the effect take place ? If on the other hand it is supposed that the first contact ceases and another such contact takes place to make the occurrence of the introspection possible, the result will be a fiasco. The second contact will take place in the following way. The occurrence of the mind-object-contact takes place in the first moment, the contact of the mind with the self occurs in the second and the contact of the former (the mind) with the cognition can take place in the third moment and thus complete the requisite condition. But as cognition and the like are momentary in the sense that they exist only for two moments and perish in the third moment as a matter of necessity, the first cognition will have ceased to exist when the introspective cognition arises. So introspection, even if it takes place in the third moment as supposed by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school, will have no object. Thus the theory that the first cognition functions as an unknown entity and is proved by a second cognition falls to the ground.

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 23 No difficulty arises if it is endorsed that a cognition comes into existence as self-certifying and is never unknown in its career. This is called self-illumination of the cognition (svaprakasatva or svabhasitua as worded by Siddhasena). It means that all cognitions are selfcognitions. A difficulty has been raised by the opponent that if the cognition or the knowing-self is cognized by itself it will come to mean that the subject of cognition is also its object. The object is one that receives a benefit from the act. Though Jknow is a transitive verb and as such necessarily involves an object to operate upon, the subject cannot be the object as it is not a different thing to receive the benefit of illumination from the cognitive act. If the subject were also the object the sword which cuts the tree will also cut itself. This is obviously absurd. However expert an acrobat may be, he cannot dance on his own shoulder. Such is the case with cognition. This is the line of objection taken by Nagarjuna and Candrakirti who quote statements of scriptures in their support. To avoid prolixity we must say that cognition is not an action though it is enunciated as a verb by the grammarian. But the meaning of all verbs is not action. Cognition is rather regarded as a quality by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. Without entering into the controversy whether it is an action or quality, we can dispose of the objection by the observation that the self or cognition (as the Buddhist does not believe in the knowing self) is not the object of the cognition but is self-revealing in the sense that it is never unknown. If the self were unknown at any time it would be subject to doubt. But nobody entertains the doubt about himself as to whether I exist or not' or the erroneous perception 'I do not exist'. However much the sceptic may try to deny the existence of the knowing self, he only stultifies himself The assertion of the doubt or the negation of the self presupposes the very existence of the self as the subject of assertion. He entangles himself in hopeless self-contradiction. When the sceptic asserts 'I do not know the knower', he asserts himself to be the knower of the non-existence of the knower. This means that the knower is known as the knowing subject and never as an alien object.! Pramara has been defined as a cognition having the above-noted characteristics. The word pramara in Samskrit means both the result and the instrument of knowledge. A thing is accepted to exist on the basis of the cognition serving as the proof of it. This cognition must be valid, otherwise it will fail to function as proof. But wh 1. For a further detailed exposition, the inquisitive reader is referred to the author's monograph: The Absolutist's Standpoint in Logic in the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Vol. I.

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. t instrumental condition of valid cognition? Siddhasena asserts that it is the cognition that is the instrument of proof. Both the condition of proof and proof as the result must be a cognitive act. Dharmakirti also asserts that it is cognition which is pramara qua act and qua instrument. It is the instrument of practical activity and is by itself a cognitive fact. Cognition necessarily means the revelation of an object, say water in a lake and the acts of bathing, drinking and the like are rather the consequences of this revelation. So if it is to be regarded as an instrument, it, that is, cognition, is the instrument of the practical behaviour following upon it. The condition of cognition such as the sense-organ or the sense-object-contact (sannikarsa) is not regarded as pramana, though it is the antecedent condition. If a brute fact like sense or sense-object-contact be regarded as a pramara (act of proof or the result of proof), it may be shifted to the entire physical organism which makes the function of sense-organs possible. Accordingly these remote or immediate antecedents of congnition are not given the status of pramana which means primarily and principally the act of proof or revelation. Here the Jaina logicians differ from the Naiyayika, in unison with the Buddhist. Pramana (valid cognition) qua an act of revelation or an instrumental condition of practical activity must be cognition. This is stressed by the inclusion of 'cognition' (jana) in the definition. 24 The next important ele nent in the definition is 'immune from -contradiction' (badhavarjita). A set of logicians makes verification (avisamvada) or to be precise, the want of incongruence and disharmony of the content with the object, the test of valid cognition. The successful behaviour resulting from cognition provides the confirmation of the validity of the cognition. But there are certain perceptions which though erroneous, do lead to the successful acquisition of the object considered to be envisaged by them and have been regarded as pramana. This is a misconception and as such is rebutted by the adjective 'immune from contradiction'. It is true that the cognition of a moving tree seen from a fast running train, steamer or motor car is not entirely unfounded in the sense that a person so inclined may move forward and perceive stationary tree. There is verification so far as the tree is concerned. Again such instances of doutt, for example, 'whether the object standing before is a man or a tree' is resolved by the perception of hands and feet which man and not to a settle the doubt as hands and feet can belong to a tree. But suppose that the person misperceives the foot for the hand, the cognition of the human being as the object of previous doubt is regarded as valid on account of its verifiability. So also perception of a stick immersed in water as bent while it is straight in fact is also susceptible of verification. So there is congruence of the cognition

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 25 with the object and its validity, though partial, cannot be denied. In pursuance of the pragmatic satisfaction of such experiences, verifiable cognition, whether fully authentic or partially authentic, was regarded as pramana (valid cognition). Dharmakirti had to incorporate the adiective 'non-erroneous' (abhranta) in the definition of valid perceptual cognition formulated by him. He differs from those logicians who pin their faith on verification by successful test as the criterion of valid cognition and accordingly excludes such cases from the purview of validity. Dharmottara and also Santaraksita in the Tattvasamgraha have offered this defence as the justification of incorporation of the adjective 'non-erroneous' in the definition. Dharmakirti and his commentators also make verification a plausible test of validity, but they insist that the verification must be total and relate to all the attributes perceived in the cognition As a moving tree is not perceived on verification but a stationary tree, the previous cognition of the moving tree, whatever may be its cause-swift locomotion or nervous disturbance due to a blow or wound--must be rejected as erroneous. But the qualifying epithet 'non-erroneous' is an absolutely uncalled for innovation. It is a negative expression and negation is called in request to combat possible erroneous affirmation. Dharmakirti proposes to define authentic cognition (samyag jnana) which is classified under two heads viz. perception and inference. It follows from the procedure that perception must be an authentic cognition and this alone is sufficient to preclude the disputed instances of verifiable cognition as they are erroneous. An erroneous cognition is error, and irrespective of its practical consequences, cannot be confounded with authentic cognition. This will be clear from our exposition of a subsequent verse of Siddhasena. Siddhasena has not incorporated the adjective 'cognition of a previously uncognized fact' (anadhigat artham) in the definition as has been done in a supplementary clause by Dharmkirti in the Pramanavartika, and the Mimamsakas. Siddharsi discusses the logical necessity of this supplementary qualification of valid cognition. What is the nature of the uncognized object ? Is it (i) substance, or (ii) mode, or (iii) substance qualified by mode, or (iv) mode qualified by substance, or (v) the universal, or (vi) the particular, or (vii) the universal qualified by the particular or (viii) the particular qualified 1. Nyayavatara, 6. 2. pramanam avisamvadi jnanam arthakriyasthitih / avisamvadanam... ..................... // Pramanavartika, 1. 3 ajnatarth aprakaso va .........Pramanavartika, I. 7. Jain Education International

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26 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I by the universal ? The first alternative is out of the question because it is a permanent entity and an identical principle irrespective of the modes which come and go. So substance cannot be the previously unknown datum of subsequent cognitions. The second alternative is also not tenable because it is momentary and vanishes when the perceptual cognition takes place. It is not plausible that a percipient would perceive the two elements, substance and mode simultaneously, if they are two facts existing side by side. And even if they are related as substantive and adjective the knowledge of either of the two would take place antecedently and so the second cognition will be conversant with a fact previously known. Perception occurs on the sense-object-contact in the second moment but by that time the mode has disappeared. So it does not come within the purview of the cognition of uncognized fact because it is neither cognized before nor attained after. The two other alternatives, namely, mode-qualified-substance or substance-qualified-mode cannot be supposed to be the object of such cognition simply because the mode either as a substantive or an adjective is not amenable to second cognition. If the object of the second cognitton be supposed to be the universal common entity then it will be on a par with substance. As for the particular, if it is persistent and identical with substance it will not be amenable to the proposed definition. The other two alternatives are consequential and so cannot be expected to yield better results. Furthermore the qualification 'previously uncognized' cannot have reference to the experience of other people. Everything is cognized by an omniscient whose existence is admitted both by the Buddhist and the Jaina and also by theists who must assert that God is omniscient. Even a thing cognized for the first time by a person may have been cognized by other subjects. So the adjective cannot be understood in an absolute reference. If however it refers to a particular percipient, that also does not make it more intelligible, as has been shown by us immediately in the previous discussion. The Mimamsakas and the Vedantists have insisted on the inclusion of this adjective of valid cognition with a deeper purpose in view. The Mimamsakas regard the Vedic text as authoritative because it yields the knowledge of a fact which is not attainable by perception or inference. Heaven, hell or ultimate salvation are facts which are not accessible to perception or inference. It is on the evidence of scriptural texts that a man comes to know that performance of a meritorious act leads to heaven and commission of sinful acts leads to hell or that ultimate salvation is attainable by realization of the ultimate reality. It is for this reason the Vedas are regarded as

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27 NATURE OF VALID COGNITION authoritative because the knowledge delivered by them is entirely related to facts which are unknown and unknowable by empirical organs of knowledge. This is the raison d'etre of the incorporation of the qualifying clause in the definition of valid cognition. So far as the Vedantists are concerned, the individual subject is identical with the Absolute Brahman impersonal and personal. The Personal Absolute is God and as such is omniscient because nescience (avidya) cannot conceal anything from His ken. The individual also has this prerogative in theory. But as he does not possess this perfection in practical experience, it is postulated that an individual person (jiva) suffers from super-imposition of nescience. When this nescience is dispelled by final enlightenment, omniscience dawns upon him automatically. It is this nescience which makes an individual unaware of his natural property, namely, fullknowledge. Knowledge in his case presupposes the removal of nescience. When a man sees a phenomenon, say a pen, a table or a chair and comes to have knowledge of an object, it means not the acquisition of new knowledge but the removal of the veil of nescience. The objects concerned were not previously known by the indiviqual because they were veiled by nescience. So every case of empirical cognition is the discovery of a fact previously shut out from his ken by the barrier of nescience. When a man searches for his pen which he uses on every occasion of writing and finds it out he thinks that he sees it again. The pen though known before has been in the interval again shrouded by nescience and its subsequent knowledge becomes possible on the elimination of the obstructive veil of ignorance. So there is no repetition even when it is a cognition of the substance. The substance and mode are not absolutely different entities as the latter cannot be ontologically separated from the former. That they are distinguished is only due to our failure to envisage them in their proper perspective. Accordingly, the difficulty raised by Siddharyi will not affect the epistemological position of the Vedantist. We think that the Vedantist and the Jaina philosophers do not hold irreconcilably divergent position The Jaina philosophers hold that knowledge of all things is inherent in the subject, but the obstruction caused by the karmic veil enveloping the potential knowledge makes it unknown. When on the operation of the requisite pramana, the karmic veil is eliminated (ksaya) or made to subside (upasama), the knowledge takes place. It is rather a case of discovery and not an acquisition of an unattained knowledge. This is the position of the Vedantists also to all intents. That Siddhasena did not incorporate

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28 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I this adjective, is not, it appears to us, due to his divergence but the realization of the futility of such a qualification. The removal of the veil of ignorance, whether imposed by karman or nescience, is the universal condition of all knowledge. Therefore he did not think it necessary to add this qualifying element as it follows from the universal presupposition of knowledge. Now the adjective 'non-discrepant' (avisamva daka) is to be examin. ed in all its bearings. Does it mean that the cognition of a datum must conform to and agree with its objective datum ? If so how can such congruence be tested by the subsequent cognition by way of verification. Verification is possible, if the objective datum persists at the time of the occurrence of the verifying cognition. But everything is momentary according to the Buddhist and as such it can neither be perceived nor verified. A momentary entity necessarily ceases when perception takes place. As has been shown, the object does not survive after the sense-object-contact and as perception is the result, it can occur in the second moment, but by that time the datum has ceased to exist. If however we concede that the object of verification is only the continuum (santana), i.e. series of successive moments and as such is amenable to subsequent verificatory cognition, this postulation fails in the case of such data as water-bubbles, lightning-flash which inevitably perish after their emergence and so cannot be verified. Verification means attainment by a physical activity. Not only evanescent entities but also supposed durable entities like the stars and planets are not amenable to verification as they are inaccessible. So the sense datum cannot be understood either as amenable to actual attainment or possibility of it. This verification is possible if the datum is a persistent entity which is stressed by the realists, namely, the Jainas, the Naiyayikas and others. The makeshift of santana is only a makebelieve and it has no objective reality. The adjective 'immune from contradition is comprehensive enough to embrace the possibility of verification. But verification as understood by academically untrained people is not a proof of the validity of the cognition. The sun is seen and believed to rise in the east and set in the west as attested and repeatedly verified by experience. But on the evidence of astronomical and mathematical calculations we know that it is a false cognition. Furthermore the appearance of the sun, moon, planets, and stars as small bodies is certainly erroneous in spite of repeated experience. So mere verifiability and non-discrepancy shown by the former experiences cannot be the adequate criteria of validity. It must be free from contradiction (badhavarjita). This badha,

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KINDS OF VALID COGNITION 29 that is, contradiction is furnished by a subsequent accredited cognition with opposite content which may be perceptual, inferential or verbal judgement. That Siddhasena's definition is more accurate than those of other logicians has been shown by the foregoing discussion. The Vedantist asserts that the concept of contradiction should not mean contradiction by a cognition at the present time or for a finite period. The experience of the moving sun remained uncontradicted till the advent of scientific knowledge. It must therefore be admitted that a cognition which is not contradicted in the three divisions of time past, present and future should be accepted as valid cognition. The fact that such experiences have not been contradicted in the past or in the present time does not give fool-proof assurance of its intrinsic validity. But this insistence on optimum evidence, though theoretically incontestable, is not quite relevant in empirical logic. The logician's approach, though theoretical and scientific, is tempered by pragmatic considerations. Such perfect valid knowledge is not attainable on this side of omniscience. We must submit to our limitations and not postpone our logical and scientific enquiry in the interest of perfection, Perfect enlightenment is infinite in its scope and logical discourse has no place in it. Logic and epistemology deal with perception, inference, verbal testimony which have their restricted sphere of operation and as such have value for persons of limited knowledge and mental equipment. So immunity from contradiction should be understood in a more or less pragmatic reference. Now this valid cognition falls under two heads, perceptual and extra-perceptual. This statement is a definitive assertion which implies the falsity of opposite assertion. There is wide divergence of views among philosophers regarding the nature, number, objects and results of valid cognition. The assertion that valid cognition is of two kinds means that it is not more or less. We shall embark upon this interesting topic after examining the meaning of the terms pratyaksa and paroksa. The word pratyaksa etymologically means that which is connected with aksa. Aksa means both the self or soul (atman) and also senses. But the real meaning of the terin is the direct intuition of the object. In empirical intuition it arises on the operation of the sense (indriya). But it is not necessarily dependent on the senseoperation. In transcendental intuition of the emancipated soul it does not depend on the good offices of the senses, Paroksa (extraperceptual or indirect) refers to cognition of objects which are beyond the range of the senses. Now a cognition is called perceptual when the object of it is directly perceived or perceptible. This conception

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30 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I of pratyaksa jnana (perceptual cognition) is not subject to the charge of vicious circle: 'Perceptual cognition is what has a perceptible object and the perceptible object is one which is the object of perceptual cognition'. This is a circular definition, one depending upon the other, and the latter depending upon the former. This is avoided by the formulation of an independent definition of either of the terms. In the definition given in the text, we start with perceptual cognition wich will be defined as a vivid, clear and direct intuition. The meaning of perceptual cognition is direct, vivid cognition of a thing which is close to the sense. And the object of this vivid cognition is called perceptible Perceptibility is an attribute of the object where as perceptuality stands for vivid cognition. The confusion arises from the use of the same word pratyak sa as the description of perceptible object and also of perceptual cognition. The definition of pratyaksa inana as a vivid cognition, which cognizes the object as 'this' without the intervention of another cognition, makes it independent of the conception of perceptibility. "Perceptible' means an object which is envisaged by perception. The independent status of perceptual cognition having intrinsic character of vividness and directness prevents confusion with perceptible object. The definition of perceivability and that of perceptual cognition as given in the Vedantaparibhasa has been a pons orum to the neophyte. But in the definition of Siddhasena Divakara, there is no room for confusion. Perceivability of the object is not defined because it derives this character from its status as the content or referent of vivid cognition. Now the designation of cognition as perceptual or extra-perceptual is not derived from its intrinsic character as modes of consciousness, All cognitions are self-cognized according to the Buddhist and the Jaina as has been demonstrated in the discussion of svaprakasatva, i. e., self-consciousness. This is an invariable characteristic of all cognitions, perceptual or extra-perceptual. Inference and verbal knowledge are also known as cognitions without the service of any other cognition. But this twofold classification has no reference to the intrinsic.character of the cognition concerned. It is called perceptual because the object is presented vividly and clearly, The extra-perceptual cognition (paroksajnana) does not mean that the cognition is per se unperceivable. But it is called such because it is a blurred, unclear cognition of an object lying outside the range of senses. Nor can the characteristic 'perceptibility' be an absolute attribute of objects. The object which is not perceptible to one person may be perceptible to others and re garding the omniscient subject everything is perceptible to him. So this characterization and classification of cognitions as perceptual (pratyaksa)

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KINDS OF VALID COGNITION and extra-perceptual (paroksa) and of objects as perceptible (pratyaksa) and imperceptible (paroksa) is relative to the knowing subject whose capacity for cognition is circumscribed by the veil of ignorance induced by the past karma of the percipient. 31 It has been shown that this classification is relative to the knowing subject to whom many things are imperceptible or, to be precise, do not fall within his range of perception. The knowledge of such an unperceived object is secured by inference or verbal testimony of a person of unquestioned veracity and unimpaired capacity who has first-hand cognition of those things which are for the present imperceptible to this specific person. The materialist Carvaka does not believe in the validity of extraperceptual cognition, inference and the like, But this scepticism of Carvaka is self-stultifying as it involves self-contradiction. As has been shown by Dharmakirti whose position has been endorsed by the Jaina and other philosophers that the very refutation of the rival thinker who asserts inference as valid cognition presupposes the belief of the Carvaka in the validity of inference. How can he know that another person entertains the view that inference is as valid as perception? Certainly the thought of another person cannot be known by perception of the sceptic who does not pretend to such occult power. A denial presupposes affirmation. And the denial of the validity of inference necessarily takes for granted the affirmation of such validity by another person. In fact no debate is possible if know. ledge of the other person is not subject to dispute. As this knowledge cannot be secured by ordinary perception, extra-perceptual cognition has to be posited as a matter of logical necessity. Furthermore the Materialist who believes only in the validity of direct perceptual knowledge alone cannot distinguish false perception from true perception. A man who has suffered from the illusion of water in the desert regards the appearence of water in the same situation on a subsequent occasion as false beforehand. Why should it be held to be false before actual verification ? The sceptic must answer that it is exactly similar to the previous illusion he perceived before. This is a case of inference on the basis of exact similarity or identity (tadatmya) as the Buddhist terminology goes. Exact similarity means identitiy in apparent difference. This cognition of falsity on the basis of identity with previous illusion is nothing but inferential in character. Again how does the sceptic know that the other party holds the opposite view which he

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32 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I seeks to refute. From his very assertion, he will say, the person's belief is understood. This is certainly a case of inference of the cause from the effect. It is admitted tacitly or explicitly that the assertion of a man is the exponent of his conviction just as the smoke is the exponent of fire. It is assumed that speech is the effect of corresponding belief, So this is nothing but inference. Again when the sceptic denies the existence of anything he does so on the strength of his non-perception. Well, he would argue that an object is not present because it is not perceived. Had it been present it must have been perceived like the other things present in the situation which are invariably perceived. This is an instance of inference as has been shown by Dharmakirti. So the denial of the validity of extra-perceptual cognition such as inference is only a make-believe and intentional fraud The Buddhist believes in perception and inference as valid cogni. tion and also accords to both the same logical status in respect of cogency. The Jaina agrees with the Buddhist so far. But he joins issue with the Buddhist when he denies the validity of verbal testimony. It is on the testimony of scriptures which have been composed by men of extraordinary powers of perception and who have condescended to impart the results of their knowledge to the unenlightened persons out campassion for their benefit, we come to know of heaven, hell and the existence of angels and gods. That there is life after death is also believed on the authority of such statement. Certainly the knowledge of such imperceptible objects cannot be secured by perception or even inference which derives its conditions, viz., the minor and major premises from perception. Had these been perceptible, there would not have been scope for scepticism. That the statements of veracious persons are true has to be admitted by the sceptic The field of our perceptual knowledge is limited and we know of other nations and countries and their war and alliance on the testimony of knowledgeable persons whose veracity is not open to doubt. That we rely on such testimony is evident from our acceptance of such knowledge. The denial of the validity of such testimony would make a person a total ignoramus and lead him to absurd situations, ence, if one bistence after deathance taken by the pra counter questio The materialist may contend that such things are believed on the testimony of other persons because they are verifiable by experience, if one takes the trouble of going to those places. But belief in heaven and existence after death stand in a different category. They are not verifiable. This is the stance taken by the present day materi. alists, sceptics and logical positivists. We would put a counter question

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 33 to the sceptic. Are all things that we believe verifiable by ourselves ? Does the sceptic believe that atoms can be fissioned and atom bombs are made by this process ? He may not have seen the atom bombs or the process of fission of atoms in the laboratory. But if a man disbelieves these scientific inventions, he only makes himself a target of ridicule. What is the basis of our belief in the truth of the scientific discoveries. ? It is certa inly the testimony of trustworthy persons who have first-hand knowledge. If so, why should the sceptic adopt a different attitude to the deliverences of such prophets and seers as the Buddha, the Christ and recent seers like Sri Ramakrspa whose veracity cannot be called in question. We know from the character of such exceptional persons that they are incapable of deceiving mankind and also that they must have had unerring know of these facts and they had no interest in bamboozling persons of limited knowledge. To entertain suspicion of their credentials is scepticism in excelsis. Such being the case the belief in the truth of assertions of holy persons of extraordinary powers does not argue blin superstition on the part of believers. Extreme scepticism should make a man speechless. He wants to convert other people to his way of thinking and combat illusion and superstition because he believes in his extra-perceptual acknowledge of thought of others. It must be admitted that the belief in the infallibility of Karl Marx ultimately red uces itself to faith and not reasoned conviction. If it were open to the test of inference and the like there would not have been difference of opinion among persons whose logical competency is out of question. The Jaina logicians differ from other philosophers in regard to the admissibility of other types of valid knowledge endorsed by the latter as independent genres. For instance, arthapatti (implication), upamana (comparison), abhava (negation), and others endorsed by the Mimamsakas and other thinkers are not regarded by the Jaina logicians as independent types. They are subsumed by them under extraperceptual or perceptual knowledge. As regards negation endorsed by Kumarila, they would not recognize its validity and if it is to be valid it must be included under perception. Kumarila holds that a thing is possessed of a positive and negative character (sadasadatmaka) by virtue of which it is hold to be what it is and distinguished from what it is not. So this assertion is a deduction from the existence of a plurality of entities. If there are many things each thing will have its distinctive individuality unshared by the rest. So negation of the opposite is inherent even in the positive entity. But when such an entity is perceived its negation eludes grasp. Kumarila contends

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34 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETION NO. I that perception is not competent for negation. Besides perception depends on the operation of senses and sense cannot operate on negation for want of a plausible relation. The knowledge of negation arises when one sees a particular object and remembers its opposite (pratiyogin) independently of the sense-object-contact. So knowledge of negation is non-perceptual and as it cannot be reduced to inference or verbal testimony, it must be recognised as a different species of cognition. The Naiyayika contends that negation of a perceptible ect is realised by sense-perception directly and abruptly. As for the contention of Kumarila that there is no relation between negation and sense, and between negation and the locus, the Naiyayika pleads that the relation is sui generis. It is a substantive-a djective relation. The Jaina logician on the other hand maintains that when the sense is in touch with the empty locus, it cognizes negation which is a component factor of the positive locus. The debate between Kumarila and other logicians on this point is too elaborate to be succinctly treated. Each party will stick to his position and not be willing to capitulate. The number of types of valid cognition is a popular subject matter among the philosophers. There is however a general consensus regarding perception, inference and verbal testimony. But the Buddhist refuses to believe in the intrisic validity of verbal testimony on the ground that a word does not stand in objective relation to its meaning. The relation is rather imposed by convention and as such is not objective. The Jaina along with other respectable philosophers believes that relation between word and meaning is not entirely conventional or entirely natural, but one that partakes of both. No do ubt the speaker or the auditor can understand the meaning of word only if he had the knowledge of the convention. But convention is not entirely arbitrary or accidental. The word must not be repugnant to the meaning signified by it. This stand disposes of the objection of Dharmakirti that there is no compelling relation like causality or identity of essence. A third necessary relation is not conceivable. The relation of denoter and denoted (vacyava cakabhava) is only conventional and ultimately depends upon the option of the original speaker. Here the Jaina joins issue with Dharmakit ti and offers certain convincing observations in support of his position. The Upamana, i. e. Comparison has been recognized as an independent species of valid cognition by the Mimamsakas. But the Jaina logician opines that the apprehension of similarity between the distant cow and the wild yak present before the perceiver is secured

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 35 by perceptual knowledge. It is a clear intuition and so is not liable to be called in question. The memory impression of the cow perceived before serves rather as a stimulating condition and does not detract from its intuitive character. This line of reasoning will account for the validity of recognition, recollection and inductive reasoning (uha) because there is no discrepancy between the deliverences of these types of cognition and their referents. They are included under non-perceptual cognition because something more than what is directly perceived is made known by them. Recognition is the apprehension of identity or similarity of a present datum with a past. This identity or similarity is not perceived if the datum previously cognized is not remembered. Thus recognition gives us an additional datum over and above the perceived fact. So it is called non-perceptual. Uha (inductive reasoning) is concerned with the necessary relation between the probans (sadhana) and probandum (sadhya) in universal reference. As it is cognizant of facts present, past and future, it is placed outside the category of perceptual cognition. So also artha patti (implication) by means of which the burning capacity of fire is understood on the basis of sharp sounds produced in the process of the combustion of the fuel. These explosive sounds emitted by the cambustible fuel can be accounted for on the pre-supposition of the capacity of fire for such combustion. This is a case of inference based on the consideration of the impossibility of the effects in the absence of such capacity in fire. Its validity is to be recognized but the implication or presupposition is only another name of inference and not a separate species. As regards inductive reasoning which gives us the knowledge of the universal and the necessary relation of the whole class of probantia with the whole class of probanda e. g. the relation between smoke as a class and fire as a class, it is not regarded as an independent species of valid cognition by the orthodox logicians of the Nyaya school and the Buddhist. They assert that the necessary relation is understood by a hypothetical reasoning in the following way : 'If there were not fire there would not be smoke in the hill'. But the absence of fire and the absence of smoke are hypothetical assertions in the context. So reasoning, though it delivers the knowledge of universal concomitance, is not an accredited species of valid cognition since the referents of the hypothetical propositions are only assumptions. But this contention does not satisfy the Jaina logicians. The difficulty of the Naiyayika arises from the consideration that such hypothetical reasoning is not capable of being su bsumed under the four types of valid cognition,

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36 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETION NO. I namely, perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony (sabda). The recognition of the validity of reasoning on the basis of its efficacy for the comprehension of universal concomitance (vyapti) would necessitate the admission of an additional species which militates against the categorical statement in the Nyayasutra. This is an intricate problem and it has been discussed threadbare by Dr. S. Bagchi in his momentous work Inductive Reasoning. It will suffice for our purpose to observe that the knowledge of universal concomitance cannot be delivered by perception which is necessarily confined to the present data distinct from past and future instances. Nor can it be apprehended by inference because inference is possible on the basis of universal concomitance set forth in the major premiss of Aristotelian syllogism and the third member of the Nyaya syllogism called illustration (udaharana). If inference were competent to deliver this knowledge it would presuppose another necessary concomitance and if another inference is requisitioned to account for the second concomitance, the result would be an infinite regress. So inductive reasoning (uha) must be recognized as a valid cognition in spite of its hypothetical character. In fact it is not hypothetical as has been shown by Dr. Bagchi, in his exposition of the Madhva position. It is asserted that the formal hypothetical proposition 'If there were no fire there would be no smoke' means that the admission of absence of fire necessarily entails the admission of absence of smoke. And as the smoke in the hill is perceived as a present fact, its absence, though not objective, which is inevitably entailed by the admission of the absence of fire is not a hypothetical assumption. It is highly creditable on the part of the Jaina logician that he boldly asserted the validity of inductive reasoning (uha or tarka) as an independent separate species. The assertion of Siddhasena that valid cognition falls under two heads, perceptual and extra-perceptual, is comprehensive of all species of valid knowledge. Siddhasena does not agree with the Buddhist logician in his assertion of perception and inference as the only two species. It has been shown that there are other varieties of extraperceptual cognition, the validity of which is not liable to denial. Verbal testimony and the like though extra-perceptual cannot be included under inference. If inference is broadly understood as a species of knowledge which derives its possibility from the impossibility of the opposite of the fact to be proved, verbal testimony and other types of extra-perceptual cognition which are also necessarily concomitant with their respective referents and impossible in the absence of the

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NATURE OF VALID COGNITION latter may be subsumed under inference. Even the verbal testimony is based on the relation of word and meaning. This relation, whatever may be the speculations on its character and origin, is a necessary relation so far as we are concerned. That a word denotes a particular meaning and that again by virtue of a relation which is not susceptible to alteration by us is admitted on all hands. This relation is a fait accompli and this is asserted in the Vartika of Katyayana on Paninisutra viz, siddhe sabdartha-sambandhe. The meaning of a word is fixed and must be accepted without demur. You cannot call in question the factuality of this relation of denotation between word and meaning in the same way as you cannot deny the relation between cause and effect. If the independence of such a relation is recognized and its necessity is accepted, Siddharsi asserts that all kinds of extra-perceptual knowledge are susceptible of comprehension under inference.1 In other words extra-perceptual cognition and inference will be regarded at synonymous. The treatment of extra-perceptual cognitions like uha (reasoning), sabda (verbal testimony), upamana (comparison) and pratyabhijna (reccognition) as separate sub-species has been dictated by the consideration of the divergence of opinion either on their validity or their separate status. If extra-perceptual cognition were alone stated, the doubt about the validity of these sub-species would not make them clearly intelligible. The difference of views on particular kinds of extra-perceptual cognition is unresolvable because the philosophers of different schools stubbornly cling to their tradition. Comparison, for instance, has been subsumed under perceptual cognition by the Jaina and some other logicians whereas the Naiyayika and Mimamsaka would insist upon their separate status. There is a necessary reference to the past datum and if the emphasis is placed on this element it would be difficult to reduce it to perception. Similar is the case with recognition. There are two discernible elements in it, the recollection of the past datum and the perception of the present. The Jaina logician gives prominence to the recollection as a component and hence place it under extra-perceptual cognition. The Naiyayika, on the other hand, lays greater stress on the perception of the present datum and thinks that the memory of the past datum is submerged in the perceptual cognition. There is thus a reasonable basis for divergence of views which is due to the logical and psychological proclivities of the thinkers. As we have observed before, the division of valid cognition into two classes, perceptual and extra-perceptual, is rather dictated by 37 1. yadi punah sadhyarthanyathanupapannahetusampa ditamanumanamisyeta,... parokgarthavigayapratiter abhavaditi, p. 25.

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38 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 subjective consideration. The perceptual cognition is the outcome of sense operation which is concerned with the fact present before the percepient. The perceptual cognition takes fuller and richer view of the perceived datum. It is clear, vivid and unequivocal, whereas the data perceived by verbal testimony and the like are situated beyond the ken of the senses and their cognition gives only a blurred generalized picture. But the Buddhist demurs to accept its objective validity and thinks general charcter as false abstraction. The Jaina position on this point differs toto caelo from the Buddhist's view. The Jaina asserts that an object is possessed of a generic and a specific character and they are both objective. The Buddhist's preference for the specific (svalaksana) and rejection of the generic aspect are rather the by-product of a preconception. When both are presented with equal prominence why should one aspect be rejected and another preferred ? The Buddhist's arguments for the unreality of generic character and the reduction of it to negation of the opposite (anyi poha) have been challenged by the realists of all schools and they all have criticized the fundamental postulate of the Buddhist that existents are momentary as a matter of necessity. If the generic character be suspect, the validity of inference which is only concerned with the conceptual generality will collapse and no amount of prevarication will save him from the charge of indulging in make-believe. We have alluded to these views in order to show that the logical procedure followed by the Jaina both in the classification of valid cognition and in the examination of different types of the same is not devoid of logical justification. Valid cognition has been defined in the first verse and this defini. tion is competent to eliminate the ignorance of the untrained novice and rebut the opposite conceptions of persons trained in other traditions. A person of clear understanding who is open to conviction and is not deluded by sophistry or prejudice will understand the nature of valid cognition from this definition and those who have got opposite preconceptions but are open to conviction will also be enlightened by this. But those who are of dull intellect will not be able to understand its full implication and for their edification the opposite views are shown to be erroneous. The refutation of these views will enable such a person to have an indubious conception of valid knowledge. It is with this purpose the author states in the next verse the position of some thinkers who are of the opinion that these definitions are useless intellectual excercises and serve no purpose. Text prasiddhani pramanani vyavaharasca tatketah/ pramapalaksapasyo ktau jnayate na prayoja namil

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PURPOSE OF DEFINITION 39 Translation "The species of valid cognition are quite familiar and so also the consequential activity generated by them. The purpose of the statement of the defining characteristic of valid cognition is therefore not known by us (and it is therefore useless, since no result is known to proceed from it." ... (II) Elucidation A wise man should first think whether his statement is calculated to produce an improvement in the knowledge of the person addressed by him or not. If his statement is thoughtlessly made without regard to its consequences, the speaker will not be entitled to serious consideration. In other words a statement should be made for imparting knowledge of a fact unknown to the persons addressed by him. So far as the different species of valid cognition are concerned they are quite well-known to all and sundry, and so there is no necessity of making such pointless observation. The definition of pramanas is therefore useless waste of one's energy and time as it does not give any benefit. The plural number in pramarani is used in order to show that species of valid cognition, perceptual and extra-perceptual, are different varieties though they share the common character of validity. The common character is distinct from the particular individual. This is evident from the consideration that when a man sees from a distance a tree or comes to know of it from description by another person, the resultant cognition is of the common tree, i. e., treeness common to all the different individual trees. It is the class-character which is distinct from the indiuiduals and is known distinctly when the tree is cognized in its generic character as tree in general and not as a banyan or a mango or an oak. When the individual trees are perceived, this common class-character is not perceived as distinct and different. This shows that this class-character is both different and not-different from the individuals. The class-character as not different from, i. e., as identical with the individ uals is a real entity and capable of producing practical results. Firehood as identical with the individual fire is capable of such effects as burning or cooking. So the individual and class-character as identical and different are two distinct reals blended together and not physically detachable. The Buddhist thinks that this common class-character is only a conceptual construction and not an objective fact as it lacks in causal efficiency. But causal efficiency is not regarded as a criterion of reals by the Jaina philosopher. He further observes that even the class-character which is also called universal has got a causal efficiency in that it produces a general notion

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40 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 and makes linguistic use possible. The Jaina position is that the universal (class-character) and the particular are both identical and different. It is for this reason that the plural number is used in pramanani. The different species of valid cognition have their distinctive identity and also are identical with the universal inherent in each of them. This discussion has been introduced by the commentator Siddharsi to justifiy the use of the plural number in pramanani, though the definition given in the first verse refers to valid cognition in the singular number. Now we have stated the contention of a class of logicians who think that pramanas are well-known and the definition does not give us a new insight into valid cognition and also its practical consequences. He says therefore 'the purpose and the result of such definition is not known by us' rather in a satirical vein. The implication is that it is useless since no worthwhile meaning is discerni. ble in it. Furthermore he would pose such questions : Is the defining character definitely known or not ? If not definitely known, it will fail to achieve its purpose like the fanciful utterence of a poet or an insane person. Certainly the poet's utterences are not regulated by logical thinking and so they are as unmeaning to the philosophers as the prattle of a mad man. In this connection we may refer to the opinion of Socrates as recorded in the Dialogues of Plato. If the defining character is definitely known by means of a species of valid cognition (pramana), the question crops up whether this pramana is known by another pramana or otherwise. In the latter case it will not produce any conviction since it is known to have been given by an invalid cognition (apramana). Again the same question will arise whether the second valid cognition has a defining character or not and what again is the source of its knowledge. Without pursuing this dialectic further and further we may sum up the opponent's position as follows: "The statement of the defining character is perfectly ineffective since the defining character cannot be determined." It may also be observed that if the defining character is alleged to be known by a species of valid cognition that will also not give us a new insight into the nature of the object defined, as it is known beforehand without such extraneous aid and so the statement of it in a formal definition will be as useless and infructuous as the attempt to paint a lily white. Such is the position taken by a class of thinkers It is not an entirely hypothetical problem since we see that Nagarjuna pursues

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PURPOSE OF DEFINITION 41 a similar line of argument to demolish the tradition that a thing can be proved by a relevant organ of valid cognition and the latter again by definition. Nagarjuna poses the problem in this way : "If the defining characteristic is different from the object defined, the latter will be without this characteristic per se. If it is not different, it will be one and the same thing with the object intended to be defined". The implication is the statement of a defining characteristic in a formal definition by philosophers is only an exercise in futility.2 But formal The justice of the contention is not totally denied. definitions are not entirly useless. Text prasiddhanam pramananam laksanoktau prayojanam/ tadvyamohanivrttih syad vyamudhamanasamiha// Translation "The utility of the statement of the defininig characteristic (in a formal definition) of the pramanas which are well-known (by all) is the elimination of the misconception and delusion of those whose minds are clouded by ignorance (or false beliefs)." (III) Elucidation It has been contended that valid cognition and its different ramifications are quite familiar to all and sundry who must possess a modicum of rationality, whether they are educated or not. So the convention of giving definitions in a scientific treaties (sastra) is useless and inspired by vainglorious pedantry and academic vanity. This contention is not totally untrue but its sweeping character betrays a half-truth, which is more insidious than utter falsehood. It is admitted by all that valid knowledge is a well-known fact and everybody is capable of distinguishing valid knowledge from the invalid one. If men were not endowed with this discerning capacity they would not be in a position to undertake any activity. Our practical behaviour, when successful, is made possible by valid knowledge of different objects. One goes to draw water from a well and is not disappointed. This shows that his knowledge of the situation is unerring. 1. laksanapramanabhsam vastusiddhih. Also, manadhina meyasiddhir manasiddhi's ca laksanat. 2. laksyal laksanam anyac cet syat tallak syam alaksanam. tayor abhayo' na nyatve vispastam kathitam tvaya. --Madhyamakavrtti, p. 64.

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I The failure of a plan in practical application disillusions a person and teaches him to exercise vigilance in regard to the choice of ways and means. Failure teaches him that false pre-conceptions are to be avoided and this is the raison d'etre of the adage : Failures are pillars of success'. It is obvious from this consideration that a man with a modicum of common sense is familiar with what is valid knowledge and what is not. The academic procedure of formulation of a definition in a scientific treaties betokens pedantry since it does give a new insight. This is the sum and substance of the contention of the opponent. But in spite of the element of truth in the contention it must be pointed out that it fails to take note of persons who have a dull understanding or who are misguided by the erroneous views fostered by philosophers of different schools on account of their uncritical faith in the tradition of the school they belong to. The tradition tends to acquire a character of prescriptive claim for acquiescense. But common sense is not sufficient for the purpose of discrimination of valid cognition from the invalid one. Education serves to clear the common sense from misconception and false notion which make it incapable of the task. Broadly speaking there are two classes of persons who are to be educated with a view to the certitude of valid cognition disentangled from false associations. (1) Professional philosophers who have been misled by wrong instruction of soi-disant experts (tirthya). These deluded persons are victims of the wrong tradition and they must be disabused of the false notions. The Jaina philosopher is motivated by compassion and sets about the task of disillusioning these misguided persons, and set them on the path of truth. The definition is efficacious in that it enables the misguided fellow to distinguish the valid cognition from the invalid one and truth from superstition. (2) There are other persons who have no definite conception at all. Their dull intellect has not been improved by academic discipline and the definition serves to give them a correct notion of validity. To sum up : if the defining and distinctive character of valid cognition were known from beginningless correct tradition and as such no person should be incapacitated by contrary beliefs, your contention that the statement of the defining character is a redundant procedure would hold the ground. But this is not universally true because there are persons who are victims of wrong tradition or incapacitated by their dull intellect to tell truth from falsehood, valid knowledge from invalid instances. As for the query whether the knowledge of validity

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PURPOSE OF DEFINITION 43 is secured by another valid cognition or not, it is a case of petitio principii or non sequitur. Valid cognition is known by itself and is self-proved. 1 So the question of another valid cognition to certify its validity does not arise. Definition does not seek to establish anything new but serves to exorcize the ghost of superstition and error from the minds of pretenders to knowledge and for the enlightenment of persons of poor intellect. That such a procedure is sanctioned by philosophical tradition and logical necessity will be apparent from the consideration of the negative inference based on non-perception of a perceivable fact. It has been shown by Dharmakirti that such judgement as there is no jar on the ground' is and ought to be secured by the perception of empty locus. The perception of the locus with other contents save and except the jar is tantamount to the perception of the absence of the jar. But there may be persons who fail to have this intuition owing to the dullness of their intellect or the false notion fostered by wrong theory. The syllogistic inference, 'The jar is not existent on the ground surface, because it is not perceived in spite of the presence of the full conditions of perception and its competency to be perceived' serves to remove doubt about the jar. The case of the definition of valid cognition is perfectly on a par with the situation. The definition serves, as has been repeatedly observed, to emancipate the victim of wrong tradition or ignorance induced by dull understanding, from the wrong notions. As for the contention of Nagarjuna whether the defining character is identical with or different from the object proposed to be defined, and if the former is different from the latter, it will be destitude of the characteristic per se, and if identical the two will be a futile dichotomy, it will suffice to observe that the Jaina philosopher holds that the 1. Both the Buddhist and Jaina lozicians hold that validity is known in unwonted instances of cognition by verification (artha-kriya-samvada). But the verification is known to be valid by itself and so also Belf-intuition of cognition. A cognition is known by itself not only as existent but also as valid. Inference which is determined by the assured conviction of the necessary concomitance is not liable to doubt and hence its validity is known by itself. So far as valid cognition (pramana) is concerned, it is known by itself and its validity is not questionable. But a doubt arises on account of the different conceptions of validity set forth in divergent definitions proposed by rival philosophers. Here mere verification does not suffice. A scientific assessment is necessary for resolving the differences which are the outcome of false notions. Here a scientific treatise is required to dispel the false notion. The arguments of Siddhasena Divakara are perfectly the same. Vide Com. of Manorathanandi on Pramanavartika, I. 7.

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44 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I defining character is both identical and different. The incongruence of identity with difference is the creation of abstract logic and as it is endorsed by incontestable experience, the concept of identity and of difference must be held to be not absolute but partial and not mutually exclusive. This line of argument is not a new-fangled procedure. Dharmakirti also observes regarding the question of validity of pramanas that definitions in a scientific treatise are given to combat the false notion of the persons who want to be enlightened.1 Dharmakirti is also not the first philosopher to offer this explanation. Katyayana; the author of the Vartika on Papini's grammar, also makes the same observation on the necessity and utility of scientific investigation.2 Now the definition of perceptual cognition and also of extraperceptual cognition is given in the following karika. Text aparoksatayarthasya grahakam jnanamidrsam/ pratyaksamitarajjneyam paroksam grahaneksaya// Translation "Perceptual cognition is such a cognition of an object which apprehends it as directly presented. A (discursive) cognition other than this is to be known as indirect (non-perceptual) on account of its comprehension (of an object existing outside the range of senseperception)." (IV) Elucidation Perceptual cognition (pratyaksa) is here the subject (laksya) and the rest, viz "a cognition which...directly presented" is the defining characteristic (laksana). In other words, perceptual cognition is one which directly and immediately, that is to say without intervention of any other cognition, takes stock of the object lying ahead. The qualifying clause aparoksataya etc. in the karika is not to be taken in its literal sense 1. sastram mohanivartanam - Pramanavaritika, I. 7; Vide also the commentary of Manorathanandi. 2. kimartham sastramiti cen nivartakatvat siddham. The Bhasya on it reads: nivartakam sastram. katham? mrjirasmayavisesenopadistah. tasya sarvatra mrjibuddhih prasakta, tatranena nivrttih kriyate mrjer aknitsu pratyayesu mrjeh prasange marjih sadhur bhavatiti. -Vyakaranamahabhasye navahnikam 1.1.3. (vrddhiradaie), p. 167.

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PERCEPTUAL AND EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL COGNITION 45 since it will be a case of mutual dependence (anyonyasraya) or logical seesaw: perceptual (immediate) cognition is not one that is extra-perceptual (mediate) and the latter is one that is not perceptual. Both presuppose one another. Therefore it has been interpreted as what is directly envisaged by Siddharsi. It is a determinate cognition and not indeterminate as the Buddhist maintains. It is for this purpose that the adjective idrsam (as such) is added. The assertion that perception is of the nature of cognition is significant and shows the difference of Jaina logician from those of Samkhya and Nyaya schools. The Samkhya defines perception as the transformation of the senses into the form of the objects to be perceived by them. But the senses are in their term the transformation of primodial matter (prakrti) and as such the operations of the senses are also material and unconscious, and consequently they cannot be supposed to take cognizance of the external object. If it is argued that it is the condition of such cognizance and therefore is called pramana, that will be to no purpose. It will extend to the other conditions such as light, space, etc., which are also the conditions of perception. It is maintained that it is not the material change but the same when illumined by the light of consciousness is cognizant of the object. But this practically amounts to the admission that perceptual cognition qua result or qua condition is a form of consciousness. This is the Jaina position. The predicative adjective cognition of an object is inserted in order to combat the Vijnanavadin who denies the existence of external objects. The denial of an external object is not however justifiable as the cognition and its external referent are equally felt facts. This form of subjectivism would annul the distinction of cognition from the cognizable object and thus will lay the axe at the root of logic and epistemology. The Buddhist idealist may plead : "My withers are unwrung. I do not believe in the ultimacy of logical and epistemological procedures They are simply convenient devices for pragmatic, empirical thought. The ultimate reality is subject-objectless consciousness". The realists of all schools have entered their protests against this blanket condemnation of thought-activity. It is held by the realist that our cognitions of external objects are real and valid, and cannot be scouted as objective aberrations. If cognition of an external object be rejected as false subjective projection why should not this doubt also assail the validity of cognition itself. Cognition and its content are both intuited with equal clearness and vividness, and so they should swim or sink together. The Buddhist argues that cognition as a felt fact cannot be denied its reality and validity because that will make the whole world unknown and unknowable. This is against experience. But this very contention will boomerang on the

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46 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I Buddhist. The denial of the object as unreal will make all our experience unreal and false. If one's experience of the object be suspect there is no ground for preferential treatment of cognition. The consequent deadlock and universal blindness will equally follow the denial of the object as it is alleged to follow on the denial of cognition. So it must be admitted on the strength of experience, that a valid cognition cannot arise without reference to the object. We have already discussed the untenability of the postulation of pre-disposition (vasana) in our elucidation of the first verse. So we do not elaborate the argument further as it will only result in repetition. Let us now examine the purport of the definition of perceptual and extra-perceptual cognition as apprehension of an (external) object. Here apprehension should be understood as definite and determinate cognition without which the object will not be determined as known. Perceptual cognition has been determined as determinate cognition of the nature of certitude. But Dharmakirti's definition of perceptual cognition as one devoid of conceptual knowledge and unerroneous is opposed to this interpretation. Though Dharmakirti is an intellectual giant, his definition is not supported by reason. We now set forth the arguments adduced by the Buddhist in support of the thesis that perceptual cognition is indeterminate and hence repugnant to the association of concepts. It is argued by the Sautrantikas that perceptual cognition is generated by the object standing ahead which is possessed of causal efficiency. The external object is a fact which is bereft of words and it gives rise to perceptual cognition endowed with its form. So such cognition which takes stock of the specific particular object should not be associated with words as there is no cause of such verbal expression. For instance visual perception cognizes an object but not the word expressive of it. Perceptual cognition therefore should take stock of the object per se. If it is supposed to wait for the association of a word expressive of it (object) that will make apprehension of the object impossible. Without apprehending the object one cannot remember the word expressive of it (object) and so one cannot associate the word with the object which can be known only by recollection. Without such association of words which mean only generalized concepts, the visual perception cannot take place according to your assertion that perceptual cognition is determinate and definite certitude which can only be secured by a conceptual and verbal judgement. But as there is no cause for such verbal conceptual association with the particular object envisaged, perceptual cognition will not

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PERCEPTUAL AND EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL COGNITION 47 arise if it is made to depend on verbal association and that will mean that the external object cannot be known at all according to your theory. Moreover, if the cognition generated by senses be associated with conceptual cognition supplied by memory and imagination it would disappear when another conception will arise but this is not the case. The visual cognition of the cow is not found to disappear on the rise of the conception of horse. A conceptual knowledge which is generated by imagination is seen to be superseded by an opposite conception. But sense-perception of an object cannot be dislodged by any amount of imagination. It is again realized that when the mind is free from all conceptions which are imaginary constructs, the object is seen clearly and vividly. A cognition which is directly generated by the senses cannot have any truck with words, i. e., concepts. A word only means a concept which is a general idea and refers to all such objects. The word cow, for instance, does not inean a particular cow but the universal cow which comprehends all the cows near and distant, present, past and future whthin its sweep. Perception gives the knowledge of the particular because it is generated by a particular fact and if it is conceptualized it will not envisage a particular entity but will only stand for a universal which is an unreal construction of imagination. The Buddhist position has been explained above; but the Jaina logician does not think that the contention is based on a correct assessment of experience. It has been contended that as word does not form a part of the object to be perceived there is no reason for association of word with the object which generates the cognition. But this does not appear to be sound. An object is no doubt independent of the expressive word. But that cannot mean that the resultant cognition will be unassociated with word. If the cognition is to take note of character of the object why is not the cognition insensitive and unconscious being generated by an unconscious material object? You argue that the cognition of the object is generated by attention which is a conscious mental activity and so the resultant cognition is not material and unconscious. If that is the case why do you insist that the mental activity which produces the cognition, as an auxiliary of the insensitive object, should, in respect of word, be denied its efficacy ? Moreover the very constitution of a material object which is nothing but a juxtaposition of a number of atoms existing side by side is supposed to give rise to a cognition of the solid object and this hypothesis knocks down your contention that the perceptual cognition only reflects the constitution of the

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48 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I If object. Atoms certainly do not possess solidity and mass but the cognition in the question envisages such a thing and not atoms. it is observed that it is an illusion, it follows that only that which is present in the object is envisaged in perception is not true since the solid structure is not present in the object. So you have to concede the possibility that word may be envisaged in perceptual cognition though it is not present in the object. Again it has been argued by the Buddhist that if the cognition of the object has to wait for the association of the word known by memory, there will be no perceptual cognition possible and unrelieved intellectual darkness will be the result. But this contention is suicidal since the difficulty alleged is seen to affect your position also. It is your thesis that the cognition generated by an object is indeterminate. But an indeterminate cognition cannot determine its object as 'this' or 'not this' unless confirmation or negation is provided by the conceptual knowledge following in its wake. It is your position that the indeterminate cognition can serve as the organ of proof of that feature of the object which is confirmed by the conceptual knowledge following in its trail. An indeterminate cognition cannot determine the object as 'this is and not that' which involves a judgement and judgement is necessarily conceptual and also associated with words.1 We may ask how can the indeterminate cognition can give rise to determinate conceptual judgement. A leap from the particular to the universal, from the indeterminate simple sense-datum to the determinate judgement cannot be intelligible without a connecting bridge. But unless this interpretative judgement arises to distinguish the sense datum from what it is not, the simple cognition will be totally abortive. You may reply that the indeterminate cognition stimulates the memory impression of the word to be associated with it. But if the object is incapable of stimulating a memory impression, how can the indeterminate cognition which is bereft of conception can stimulate the memoryimpression. The fundamental position of the Buddhist is that an object cannot give rise to a conceptual judgement which invariably refers to a general idea, i. e., universal. The indeterminate cognition is also in the same position and as such cannot revive the memoryimpression and without the revived memory-impression, it cannot give rise to recollection and so unborn recolletion cannot associate the word with the object. And if there be no verbal association, the cognition will not be able to determine it as such. Determination means the 1. tathahi-svalaksana visayendriyajanirvik alpakajnanasadbhave' pi... tatraivasya pramanata-iti vacanat. --Nyayavatara vivrti, p. 31.

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PERCEPTUAL AND EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL COGNITION 49 negation of the opposite with affirmation of the positive fact, as Spinoza observes determinatio est negatio. This is done by judgement which is facilitated by language. Until the indeterminate cognition is determined by judgement, it is as good as non-existent and so the subject will have no knowledge. In order to avoid this deadlock it must be admitted that the indeterminate cognition somehow stimulates the conceptual judgement through recollection of the word. By parity of reasoning it may be argued that the object as the alleged condition of indeterminate cognition may stimulate the memory-impression and give rise to perceptual judgement without the interposition of indeterminate cognition in between them. You have contended that conceptual knowledge is independent of the object and is only an imaginary construction and so like other imaginary constructions it is liable to be superseded by another such subjective judgement. But this is not a fair contention. You cannot place the perceptual judgement on the same level with imaginary construction since it is generated and controlled by the relevant sense-organ and the objective datum. It has been shown that though word is not a necessary consti. tuent of the object, there is nothing to obstruct its association with the perceived object. The jar concept in the perceptual judgement is associated with its expressive word as a matter of necessity or result of mental habit. If the association of word is banned in perceptual cognition it will not be determined as the cognition of a particular object, say, a jar and not of an other, say, a chair. So the denial of . verbal association with a perceived datum culminates in the denial of t he possibility of perceptual cognition itself, since it will remain undetermined and undistinguished, and as such be of no avail. It is a surd and the Buddhist has not vouchsafed a satisfactory explanation. The Naiya yika theory of perception is not subjected to such a meticulous examination by the commentator. He only differs from the Nyaya and Mimamsa school in respect of the nature of emergence of perceptual cognition. The Jaina believes that all cognitions are latently present in the conscious soul and perceptual cognition is not a new product, but rather a case of discovery happening on the elimination of the veil of ignorance. The Jaina holds with the Sankhya that a previously non-existent fact cannot be made existent by any amount of extertion. And this is based on the theory called satkaryavada, the production of the pre-existent effect. We think it necessary to draw the attention to the division of perceptual cognition into (l'indeterminate simple cognition unassociated with verbal designation (avyapayadesyam) and (2) another of the

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50 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I nature of determinate judgement (vyavasayatmakam) in the Nyaya theory. As we have observed before the Jaina epistemologist does not endorse indeterminate perceptual cognition. The latter-day Naiyayikas have essayed to establish the necessity of indeterminate cognition as a prelude to perceptual judgement by a novel line of argument. They maintain that a judgement, perceptual or otherwise, necessarily involves the qualification of subject by a predicate. In the first instance, the cognition of an object and its attribute takes place without relation. For instance, the jar and its qualifying attribute say "jarhood' or fredness etc. are not integrated. The integration takes pla perceptual judgement 'the jar is red' or 'it is a jar possessed of jarhood'. Now unless there be a previous cognition of the predicative adjective jarhood' or 'redness', the judgement will not arise as cognizant of a related whole. The knowledge of relation presupposes the cognition of the terms as its condition. The knowledge that a man is possessed of learning cannot arise, if it is not preceded by the knowledge of the adjective 'possessed of learning'. The man is not a simple unqualified individual, but one that is qualified by learning. The position is that the knowledge of a related fact is conditioned by the knowledge of the qualifying adjective. As all our perceptual cognitions are judgemental in character, they presuppose the previous knowledge of the predicate in isolation. If the conditioning knowledge were also relational and judgemental, the result would be an infinite regress. So indeterminate cognition is to be inferred as a pre-condition, though no such cognition is perceivable. In all knowledge of facts they are known as qualified by some adjectival determinations. The indeterminate cognition is thus posited though it is not known by perception. To be brief it may be observed that this rule that the knowledge of a qualified object is preceded by the indeterminate simple cognition of the qualifying adjective in isolation is not admitted as a universal rule. If the substantive and the adjective are both amenable to the same sense-organ and so also the relation between them, it is unthinkable that they are not perceived together when the conditions of cogni. tion are alike present in respect of both. This is the position of Prabhakara, Ramanuja and Madhva who do not believe in simple indeterminate cognition and also in the existence of an object which is bereft of a qualifying attribute. The Naiyayika also is constrained to admit that a negative judgement does not presuppose the knowledge of negation as pre-condition. There is no jar' is a negative judgement and the negation cannot be understood without reference to the object negated. So it is always judgemental and relational. The rule propounded by the Naiyayika derives its plausibility from the previous

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PERCEPTUAL AND EXTRA-PERCEPTUAL COGNITION 5) cognition of the qualifying attribute which is not amenable to perception by the sense-organ which cognizes the substantive. The Naiya yika agrees that all perceptual cognitions are judgemental in character and hence determinate. The precedence of indeterminate sense intuition is only a hypothetical assumption on the analogy of the substantive perceived by different sense-organs. But this is an irrational overextension. The Jaina position that all perceptual cognitions are determinate and judgemental is also endorsed by the Neologicians on the evidence of psychology. It is certainly simpler, clearer and most straight-forward to maintain that an object consists of a universal and particular rolled into one and perceptual cognition takes note of this dual character, as both of them are equally present and equally amenable to perception, The Jaina philosopher like Prabhakara, Ramanuja and Madhva does not believe in indeterminate perception. Thus the leap from the simple to the complex, indeterminate to determinate, non-conceptual to conceptual is not postulated. Now let us explain the meaning of the phrase "which apprehends it as directly presented' (aparoksa tayarthas yagrahakam) and 'such' (idssam). It means that perceptual cognition is a case of direct aquaintance with sense data. "Such' (idysam) implies that any other definition is not sound. We may also interpret idrsam (such) as referring to the object as 'this' as has been proposed by Hemacandra." And non-perceptual cognition is different from the perceptual in that it is indirect and mediate being dependent on other cognition. Though cognition by itself is never uncognized and thus amounts to self-cognition, the distinction between direct and indirect cognition is made with reference to the external object. Both direct and indirect cognition have reference to an external fact, but whereas one gives a vivid sense-impression, the other gives a blurred picture. So reference to an external object is not a distinguishing character of non-perceptual cognition, but its want of vividness and dependence on another cognition, as observed by Hemacandra. This non-perceptual cognition has again been divided into inferential and verbal judgement. In view of the precedent occurrence of the cognition of probans and the emergence of another in the wake of the knowledge of the necessary concomitance, the inference of fire from smoke arises as a sequel to the previous knowledge of the necessary concomitance of smoke and fire. But if we consider the question deeply, the relation of all kinds of indirect knowledge to '1. Vide Pramanamimamsa, I. 1. 14.

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52 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 their objects is fixed and unalterable and as such necessary and so the difference between verbal knowledge and the like from inferential knowledge is stressed for the sake of convenience. It has also been necessitated by the divergence of philosophers who skip over the element of necessity in the relation. Now the author proposes to formulate the definition of inference (anumana) in the following verse : Text sadhyavinabhuno liigat sadhyaniscayakam smstam / anumanam tadabhrantam pramapatvat samaksavat // Translation "Anumana (inference) is that species of knowledge which determines the probandum on the strength of the prabans (literally the characteristic mark) which stands to the probandum in the relation of necessary concomitance. It is unerring because it is an organ of valid cognition just like perceptual cognition." ... (V) Elucidation In the proposition stated above, the subject anumana (in ference) is the defined object and the predicate that which determines the probandum on the strength of the probans which stands in necessary relation to the probandum" sets forth the defining character (of it), because it is not definitely known and so stated as the predicate. It is called anumana (inference), literally a cognition which takes place subsequent to (anu) the apprehension (mana) of the probans and recollection of its necessary relation to the probandum and cognizes the inferable predicate such as fire. Probandum is that which is capable of being proved by inference on the basis of the probans which cannot exist without the presence of the probandum It cannot be supposed to overlap the definition of perceptual cognition and verbal knowledge because it determines the probandum on the basis of necessarily concomitant probans which is not found in the aforesaid species of valid cognition The clause 'which is necessarily concomitant with the probandum' serves to exclude the definitions of the probans given by 1. samanyalaksanasadbhavad ekakaramapi vipratipattinirakaranartham dvidba bhidyate. tadyatha anumanam sabdam ceti. yato'dyapi sabda. syarthanyathanupapannatyam eva pare na pratipadyante, na capsthakkstasya tadviviktam vaktum sakyam, ato bhedenopanyasah. Nyayavatura vivrti, p. 33,

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SUBJECTIVE INFERENCE DEFINED 53 others. For instance, the Buddhist (Dignaga) asserts that the number of probanses is three only, namely (1) non-perception, (2) essential identity and (3) effect, which are possessed of three characteristics, namely, (1) existence in the subject (minor term) and (2) in the homologous instances (sapaksa) and (3) non-existence in the heterologous instances (vipaksa). The Vaisesika asserts that inference follows on the knowledge of the probans (1) as the effect of, (2) as the cause of, (3) as one which is conjoined with, (4) as one that is inherent in, and (5) as one that is opposed to, the probandum. The aphorism is explained as follows: The effect leads to the inference of the cause. Thus when a river is seen in spate carrying logs of wood etc., it is inferred that there has been rainfall in the upper region through which the river makes its course. The cause also may be the probans of the effect as probandum. The particular gathering of cloud in horizon gives rise to inference of the impending rainfall as its effect. It may be urged that such inference is liable to be set aside on the ground of uncertainty. The emergence of cloud in the horizon is often found to fail in the production of a shower. It is also found that scorpion is generated by a scorpion, a cow-dung and a snake as popular belief goes. So the inference of the cause from the effect and the effect from the cause is found to be contingent. But the Vaisesika observes in defence that the effect and the cause with specific features never fail to produce correct inference of the cause and effect respectively. If one fails to notice this specific character of the effect and the cause and brings forward the charge of inconclusive probans, the fault lies at the door of the superficial observer and not on the part of the probans concerned. The illustration of the probans conjoined to the probandum is inference of fire from smoke which is conjoined with fire. It cannot be contended that conjunction is a relation which qualifies both smoke and fire. Why should then the smoke serve as the probans of fire and not fire as probans of smoke? This objection, the Vaisesika observes, is nothing but a cavil. The same objection may be raised against the concept of necessary concomitance which subsists between the probans and the probandum and as such belongs to both. So the counter question may arise why should smoke and fire, being possessed of concomitance alike be not regarded as mutually competent ground of inference? Clearly it is a captious objection and not entitled to serious consideration. The illustration of the inherent tattulye sadbhavo nastitasati/ niscitanupalambhatmakaryakhya hetavas trayah// 1. anumeye' tha Nyayavatara vivrti, p. 34.

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54 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 probans is furnished by the inference of the existence of fire in water on account of its hot touch. The example of the probans standing in opposition is found in the inference of the presence of the ichneumon on the sight of the snake in desperate fury or of absence of cold from the presence of fire. The Naiyayika also takes cognizance of three kinds of probans : (i) The first is known as purvavat i. e., inference based on the antecedent cause as the probans. The example is the rise of the lowering cloud with thundering sounds as the probans of impending rainfall. (ii) The second is sesavat i. e., having the probans as the subsequent effect. All cases of inference of cause from the effect fall under this head, e. g., the inference of rainfall from the river in spate or of fire from smoke. (iii) The third is called samanyatodr stam, i. e., one based on a probans which is neither cause nor effect, but yet stands in necessary concomitance. The inference of water in a lake from the sight of an acquatic bird like haron which is neither the cause nor the effect of the inferred lake. The Jaina observes that this inflated list of probanses is inspired by uncriticized experience. The triple characteristics of the three kinds of probans set out by the Buddhist also suffers from the charge of inflation. In all these cases cited above, it is the presence of necessary concomitance of the probans which is the decisive, crucial condition of inference, in the absence of which the inference is bound to be fallacious. The three characteristics of the probans namely, (i) existence in the subject (paksasattva), (ii) existence in the homologous cases possessed of the probandum (sapak sasattva,) and (iii) non-existences in heterologous cases (vipaksasattva) are of no consequence unless there is necessary concomitance at their back. For instance, the inference that the unobserved son of the the lady called Maitreyi must be of swarthy complexion, beause he is her son and her other sons are seen to be swarthy. The probans 'sonship of the lady' in question is not found in fairer persons. So here the triple character is present. Yet the conclusion does not follow, because there is no necessary relation between the probans and the probandum. Again the first characteristc (viz., paksasaltva) is not a universal condition of inference. The inference of other trees in flower on the observation of one such blossoming mango tree, of the enlivening of the lilies (kumuda) on the ground of the rise of the moon, and of the shadow from the tree, are all cases of the non-existence of the first. The inference of the presence of the moon from its image in the water of the lake and the future rise of one constellation from the rise of another are all cases of inference in which

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SUBJECTIVE INFERENCE DEFINED . 55 the first condition, the existence of the probans in the subject, is lacking. If it is argued that the subject is time, space, etc., and so the first condition is fulfilled, that will lead to absurd excesses. If such inevitably present facts may serve as the subject then the inference of impermanence of word from the blackness of the crow may also pass muster. Here also the universe and the like may be cited as a subject because both the probans and the probandum are related to the latter. The argument "word is impermanent because it is audible" is sound, though there is no homologue since audibility can only belong to the subject 'word' and nothing else. The soundness of this argument is however not liable to be impeached because audibility is the quality of a positive entity and as all positive entities are momentary according to Buddhist theory, audibility will also be a cogent reason of impermanence of the word. The existence in the homologue is thus not a universal characteristic of a probans. So the soundness of the argument "A living body is animated by a soul because it is informed with vitality and life; if it were devoid of soul, it would not have vitality like a jar" cannot be called in question on the ground of its lack of concomitance in agreement as illustrated in the homologue. This argument is an instance of purely negative probans being based on the negative concomitance, viz., the absence of soul with the absence of life. The Buddhist of course denies the validity of a probans which stands in exclusively negative concomitance. But the cogency of the argument is realized by unbiased persons. So one cannot deny its validity. The Buddhist posits essential identity and causality as the conditions of universal concomitance. But in all cases of inference the essential determining factor is found to consist in the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory of the probandum (anyatha nupapannat va). If a probans is considered as possessed of cogency and probative force without this incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum it would necessarily be fallacious. So the triple characteristic of the Buddhist and the quintuple characteristic of the Naiyayika must be reduced to one single determining condition as shown above. The Buddhist is confronted with a dilemma when he recognizes the inference as a valid cognition (pramana) and at the same time 1. The Naiyayika adds two other characteristics to the three recognized by the Buddhist. The absence of countervailing probans (asat prati paksatva), and the absence of a probans having a probandum contradicted by another valid cognition (abad hitatva) and thus the probans comes to have five characteristics in general.

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56 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I condemns it on the ground of its conceptual character (vikalpatmaka). The fire that is inferred is not an existent particular but a general concept which embraces all instances of fire-past, present and future. In other words, the inferable predicate is a universal and a universal is unreal according to the Buddhist. Accordingly this doctrine of the Buddhist enforces the conclusion that the inference is erroneous at bottom. How can it be a valid cognition, since validity and error are mutually contradictory ? The Buddhist (Dharmakiti) has defended the validity of inference on the ground that though the universal concept of fire which is the inferable predicate is unreal abstraction, yet it is remotely derived from the particular fire and also leads to the acquisition of the latter. The relation of causality and identity which makes the probans necessarily concomitant with the probandum is an objective relation. Unless the inference is believed to refer to the real fire, the relation of concomitance based on causality (or identity) cannot be realized. So on the ground of the necessary relation of the probandum with the probans the inference is recognized as valid cognition though it is erroneous per se. It has been observed by the Bd ddhist "A valid cognition differs toto caelo from error which is defined as apprehension of one thing as another. The apprehension of A as B which is quite other than A is error. And as such though inference which apprehends the universal as a particular in spite of their numerical and qualitative difference and thus falls within the purview of error, yet it is regarded as valid cognition because the universal stands in necessary relation (to the particular real individual) from which inference derives its genesis. The basic relation is one of causality since the concept of the universal, say fire, is generated by the particular fire in the ultimate resort. Siddhasena denies this laboured defence of the validity of inference on the ground of its pragmatic verification. As the concept of validity and the concept of error can never coincide without involving self-contradiction, he places inference on the same level with perceptual cognition. The objective existence of the universal has to be admitted on the evidence of experience which cannot be assailed by a barrage of apriori arguments under pain of self-contradiction. And as the universal and the particular are necessarily co-existent and one cannot be divorced from the other, the concept of the universal fire is as valid and objective as the perceived individual. The Jaina logician does not enter into controversy with the Sunyavadin who denies the existence of everything. Any argument advanced to prove a thesis will simply be dismissed by him on the ground of his

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VALIDITY OF PERCEPTUAL COGNITION belief that everything is non est. But if the Sunyavadin condescends to advance an argument in support of his position and not merely indulge in the game of refutation of other's views, he will be involved in self-contradiction. His assertion that everything is non-existent must be valid, otherwise it will fail to establish his theory. But the admission of even one valid assertion will contradict his fundamental position 'Nothing exists'. Now the Buddhist idealist (Vijnanavadin) maintains that pure consciousness which is absolutely bereft of subject-object-relation and is attested by itself is the only ultimate reality. And all empirical cognitions which have subject-object-character, being the outcome of false pre-dispositions (vasana) associated with pure consciousness from time immemorial, are entirely erroneous. These pre-dispositions are again erroneous being the traces left by previous false cognitions. And as there is no first cognition, the career of the individual subject being without a beginning, one cannot pose the question why should the original cognition be wrong? The answer is that pre-dispositions which are the outcome of nescience (avidya) are giving a false twist to pure consciousness in the direction of subject-object orientation. Being false per se these dispositions cannot affect the purity of consciousness-units in reality. The contamination affected by pre-dispositions is provisional and apparent. On the dawn of transcendental knowledge these dispositions are bound to disappear and pure consciousness will shine forth in its pure unsullied character. The example of perceptual cognition cited as the example of valid cognition is false appearance and thus is bereft of validity. Being itself invalid at bottom, perceptual cognition cannot prove the validity of inference. This theory of the Buddhist idealist is controverted by Siddhasena Divakara in the next verse. Text na pratyaksam api bhrantam pramanatvaviniscayat / bhrantam pramanam ity etad viruddham vacanam yatah // Translation "Perceptual cognition is also not erroneous because its validity is definitely determined (far beyond the range of doubt). The statement that a valid cognition is erroneous involves contradiction in terms." (VI) 57 Elucidation Your position that not only inference is erroneous but perception also is in the same predicament is a corollary of the thesis that all

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58 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I cognitions are wrong in respect of their object. But we differ from it since its validity is asserted beyond doubt. This assertion of validity of the realist may be regarded as futile so far as the idealist is concerned. The latter does not admit the validity of perception and so the mere assertion of validity cannot carry conviction to him. But the assertion of validity is reinforced by the consideration that a valid cognition cannot be erroneous since it is the means of the apprehension of an objective fact and as such it must be regarded as an organ of valid knowledge. The idealist also cannot repudiate its validity since he concedes its validity in the empirical plane. The distinction between empirical and transcendental truth is only dictated by a pre-conception which is not proved by experience. The Jaina realist asserts that to say that an organ of valid cognition is invalid involves contradiction in terms, since his first assertion that perception is a valid cognition is contradicted by a subsequent statement that it is erroneous and invalid. The empirical validity is true in the plane of experience which is said to be valid because of its pragmatic success. Verification which is the test of validity according to the realist is nothing but a case of one cognition being confirmed by another. The objective reference as has been said by the idealist is only the outcome of false dispositions which are the legacy of nescience. The idealist contends that the realist's objection is too naive to assail the profound philosophical truth of the idealist's position. The assertion that perception and inference are valid organs (pramana) is a provisional concession to the popular faith which is incompetent to envisage the distinction between absolute truth and practical empirical truth. The validity of perception and inference is conceded on the ground that their deliverence leads to the attainment of the object envisaged. But this verification is confined to the empirical plane which is only a false appearance. The idealist makes this concession out of compassion for the deluded persons. And when they are persua. ded of the relative validity of the cognitive organs, and their false pre-conceptions regarding the reality of the phenomenal world of plurality are weakened by powerful arguments, and their belief in the validity of the cognitive organs is shown to be inspired by superstition, they are made capable of receiving final enlightenment. The ultimate invalidity of empirical knowledge is asserted from the point of view of ultimate transcendental truth of pure consciousness bereft of subject object bifurcation. The invalidity of these empirical organs of knowledge is also proved by the consideration of the untena. bility of external objects supposed to be cognized by them.

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VALIDITY OF PERCEPTUAL COGNITION 59 This idealistic position is asserted to be unsound since it lacks confirmation. There is no evidence of the subject-objectless pure consciousness, so far as our experience is concerned. In our every day experience we encounter durable solid objects with diverse attributes and this experience cannot be condemned as unreal as that will lead to perfect deadlock of our physical and mental activities. Pure consciousness is not experienced by anyone of us in spite of the protestation of the idealist that such a transcedental unitary consciousness is realized by the mystic. There are mystics in every camp of philosophers and every community of men and the priests and the prophets swear by their experience. But there is vital difference between the experience of one mystic from that of another. So mysticism cannot be absolutely banked upon in our scientific and philosophical investigations. The contention of the idealist, if true, will provide powerful disincentives against cultivation of science and thought. However much may the world have been condemned one cannot escape from it and the limitations and imperfections of this earthy earth are being overcome step by step. The tangible results of science prove that world movements are governed by laws and not by chance, What is called chance is due to our lack of objective knowledge. The greatest charge against religion is that it fosters other-worldliness which is more often than not a device of escapism. The arguments of the idealist advanced to prove the impossibility of the constitution of solid material reals based on the atomic theory have now become trite and commonplace. As regards the difficulty relating to the combination of atoms one may say that it is only a destructive argument. Modern science has gone beyond the atoms which are proved to consist of electrons and protons. It is still a riddle how the intangible energy gives rise to the tangible material bodies. We must allow the scientist to carry on his researches further and further to throw light on this apparently baffling problem. To say beforehand that the world we inhabit is irrational and cannot be explained by science or philosophy will only beg the question. We may point out to the Buddhist idealist the difficulty consisting in the consciousness-atoms giving rise to the sense of personal identity. The logical difficulties alleged against personal identity are not weightier than those ensuing from denial of it. If consciousness-atoms can give rise to their coherence in personal identity, the material atoms also may have similar efficiency though we do not know how this occurs. The Buddhist asserts that awareness of personal identity and identity of material bodies are false appearances on the basis of his assertion that pure consciousness is the

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60 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 ultimate truth. But the aforesaid thesis the ultimacy of pure consciousness) can be established by a reductio ad absurdum of the phenomental plurality, and the latter (the falsity of the external world) can be establiihed on the assumption of the former (the ultimacy of pure consciousness ). There is thus a logical see-saw in these argu. ments. The Buddhist may protest that the truth and reality of ultimate consciousness is attested by the final experience of the saint and as such is not susceptible to denial. But, as has been said before, this is the concern of mystics and not of men of average mental and spiritual resources. Logic and even Buddhist logic is concerned with the empirical reality and steers clear of mysticism which often tends to mystification more than clarification. Furthermore the Buddhist wants to establish his position by arguments and arguments consist of a plurality of premises showing the incidence of probans, probandum, their relation, freedom from aberrations called fallacies and from contradiction by accredited knowledge. The Buddhist logician also employs these instruments to prove his thesis that these conceptions are wrong and erroneous. The discovery of inconsistencies and self-contradiction in the plurality of the apparatus of logic and science are more inspired by a priori considerations than the robust determination to find out the truth by means of our available resources. The arguments on the relation of part and whole are as old as the history of philosophy. They have been tackled by the Naiyayika realist, the Jaina realist and the Mimamsaka, who believe both in mind and matter, internal and external reals and their interaction. Without taking sides and without holding brief for any one of the contending parties, we may simply assert that these idealistic argunients with their perilous leanings to unrelieved scepticism advocated by the Sunyavadin have left the academic world cold. The Jaina philosopher and logician is a realist to the core and categorically asserts that a valid cognition or an organ of valid cognition cannot be erroneous. No doubt arises when one comes to have perceptual cognition that it is concerned with fiction. There are no doubt erroneous perceptions such as a perception of the double moon; but these are generated by some defect of the sense-organ. The optical illusions such as perception of silver in an oyster-shell are too notorious. But they are explained by objective conditions such as dimness of light or some defect in the senses inherent or induced by them. The appearance of water in a lake as up and down seen from different angles does not deceive anybody. And even in case of stubborn illusion like the perception of sun-rise and sun-set and solar movement in the horizon, the error has been exposed by the discoveries of science. The blanket

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DUALITY OF COGNITION AND OBJECT 61 condemnation of all perceptions on the ground of some perception being erroneous does not bespeak a healthy attitude. Verification is the proof of the validity of perception or inference. There is of course verification in dream experience, but that is not accepted as proof because dream experience is false from end to end. If we probe deeply the nature of the dream or illusion we shall find that even in dream we do not come across a datum which has not been seen in wakeful state. The contradiction by a philosophical pre-conception which is neither verifiable nor unverifiable should be kept apart from the province of logic. The Jaina realist does not maintain that metempirical truth necessarily contradicts empirical truth. All experiences should therefore be accepted as valid unless they are set aside by a contradictory experience or incontestable logical consideration. Whatever may be the case there is a sharp line of demarcation between error and truth, and error is only a false imitation of truth, otherwise it will lack its capacity for deception. But an accredited organ of valid cognition cannot be dubbed as erroneous except when it is set. aside by contradiction. The discovery of error is of the nature of direct experience in majority of cases and if the validity of the latter is impeached, there will be no distinction between valid and invalid cognition. Text sakalapratibhasasya bhrantatvasiddhitah sphutam/ pramapam svanyaniscayi dvayasiddhau prasidhyati // Translation "From the consideration of the failure to prove the erroneousness of all (each and every case of) cognitions, it is obvious that a valid cognition which is cognizant of its own self and another (object) can take place if the two (poles) are established (as verities)." ... (VII) Elucidation The Buddhist philosopher who propounds the thesis that all cognitions are erroneous can establish his position by adducing some proof, preferably inference in support of his contention Now if th supporting proof be false coming as it does under the category of cognition, he will fail to establish his position. If on the other hand the supporting argument is admitted to be true it will involve him in self-contradiction. The admission of the validity of one case of cogni. tion will perforce entail that of similar cognition. The dichotomy of cognition as such into metempirical and empirical classes is also to be proved by a valid cognition. So the blanket assertion of invalidity of

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62 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I all cognitions falls to the ground. Moreover error is a relative term and can be understood in contradistinction to valid cognition, Judged from every possible angle of vision, the idealist's assertion is riddled with self-contradiction. It follows as the corollary from this probe into the idealist's assertion that a cognition which defintiely knows itself and its object and is not contradicted by another experience must be accepted as a veritable valid cognition. The validity of the cognition again proves eo ipso the objective truth of the two poles of cognition, the selfcognition and the cognition of the object. To be explicit, the knowing cognition which has a necessary reference to the object proves that cognition and object both are true. The existence of cognition is established by self-awareness (svasamvedana) and that of the object on pain of absurdity. A cognition without an object is an impossibility. the existence of both (subject and object) must be accepted as the necessary presupposition of valid cognition. The denial of the truth of the object thus ends in the denial of the validity of the cognition which is alone accepted as true by the idealist They sail in the same boat and must swim or sink together. Now the author has dealt with subjective inference, that is to say, inference undertaken for one's own conviction and has also confuted the allegation of erroneousness of such arguments and their advocates. The treatment of syllogistic argument which is undertaken for the edification of other persons should come next in due order. But the author defers this topic for subsequent treatment and proposes to deal with the verbal testimony and its definition since the discussion will occupy lesser time and space, and also because the syllogistic inference involves verbal statement, and the consideration of the larger number of problems connected with the latter. Text drstesjavya hatad vakyat paramarthabhidhayinah tattvagrahitayotpannam manam sabdam prakirtitarn // Translation <Page #74
VERBAL TESTIMONY 63 the fact observed by means of a valid organ. The word 'uncontradicted' means not contradicted by the deliverance of another organ of valid cognition. "True meaning' stands for fact which is conducive to the well-being of men and also which is capable of being translated into action. The expression 'the meaning uncontradicted' is significant and serves to exclude the utterences of false teachers and also of ordinary imposters, because the meaning of their statements is contradicted by the deliverance of a valid cognitive organ. The clause 'apt to communicate true meaning' serves to exclude such a verbal proposition, which instruct the acquisition of the crest-jewel of Taksa ka, the king of divine serpents and most poisonous, as a remedy of tubercular fever. But this is humanly impossible to accomplish. So it cannot be true meaning. True meaning is as we have said what con duces to the wellbeing of man and capable of being accomplished. Apt to communicate etc.' implies exclusion of a false meaning understood by a person who is skilled in putting a wrong construction upon the sentence. The expression 'valid cognition' refutes the misconception of invalidity of the meaning of verbal proposition. If a verbal proposition as such is condemned as an invalid organ, the syllogistic inference which consists of words and sentences is to be thrown overboard as useless lumber. The contention that though the verbal propositions are not instruments of valid cognition, the sentences employed in syllogistic argument indicate the triple probans and hence are credited with validity by transference of epithet, cannot be accepted as a convincing explanation. What is invalid per se cannot indicate a valid meaning. It has again been urged that if the sentences in syllogistic argument be regarded as capable of communicating the probans, they will depend on other valid propositions for vindication of their validity. If so the latter will suffice to make the probans known and the statement of probans in the syllogism will be redundant. But this contention of the Buddhist will involve him in absurdity as perceptual cognition which is indeterminate will lose its validity because it depends upon the conceptual judgement following upon it for demonstrating its object and so the latter will have to be accepted as valid perception. The probans stated by a verbal proposition to exist in the subject 'minor term is certainly confirmed by the evidence of another valid cognition, but that does not annul its cogency or validity. Verbal testimony is of two kinds (i) profane, secular commonplace and pragmatic (laukika) and (ii) derived from sastra, sacred canon recognized by the school or sect in question. Now the author defines the kind of authentic knowledge which is derived from scriptura!

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64 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I texts of unimpeachable authority and such scripture is defined in the following verse. Text aptopajnam anullarghyam adrstestavirodhakam tattvopadesakst sarvam sastram kapathaghassanam || Translation "Sastra (scripture) is that which is directly composed by a person having first-hand knowledge, is indefeasible and not in conflict with the verdict of other organs of valid knowledge and with the testimony of other accredited texts; and which gives instruction on ultimate truth and is conducive to the benefit of all and is competent to crush the evil paths (inculcated by other sectarian teachers !." ... (IX) Elucidation Sastra', i. e. scripture is called such because it inculcates the ultimate categories.' 'A person having first-hand knowledge' means one who has completely eliminated the failings, attachment, malice, greed, etc. which disqualify a man for intuition of truth. The word apta' is defined in other texts as a person who is freed from intellectual and moral drawbacks and has envisaged the truth face to face. This emphasis on personal authorship implies the repudiation of the contention of the Mimamsaka that the authoritative texts of the Veda are uncreated by a person (apauruseya) and they are eternally existent and eternally true. This belief in the impersonal scripture is regarded by the protestant creeds such as the Jainas and the Buddhists as irrational. It is opposed to the universal experience of mankind that there can be a verbal assertion without an author. Even if such eternal uncreated text is conceded to be possible for the sake of argument that also does not give any advantage These texts are to be explained by a teacher and there is every likelihood that the teacher who is subject to prejudices and preferences fostered by attachment to these texts and hatred of other scriptures should give a distorted version and the pupils will be misled. So the assertion of uncreated text defeats its purpose. It may be rejoined that this contingency is common to all scriptures of all sects. Whether the scriptural text is created by a person of unimpeachable authority and intellectual capacity or uncreated, the interpretation of such scripture depends on average persons who are subject to human failings. But we should recognize the fact that the Jainas and the Buddhists repudiate the truth of the assertion of the advocate of impersonal scripture. 1. sasti siksayati jivajivadi tattvam grahayati. Nyayavatara viurti, p. 43.

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 65 Now we come to the consideration of the second adjective 'indefeasible'. It means that the scripture accepted by the Jainas is not capable of being challenged and confuted by any person. In other words, it is possessed of unsurpassable authority. The third adjective asserts that it is not in conflict with the deliverences of accredited organs of knowledge and also with the plain meaning of any canonical text. In one word, these texts give voice to truths which are incontrovertible. The aforesaid adjectives set forth the intrinsic merits of the scripture and its author. Now the rest of the qualifications which are stated in the verse set out the properties which are calculated to promote the well-being of the persons other than the author. The adjectival clause 'which gives instruction on ultimate truth' has pointed reference to the Jaina canon which sets out the categories, jiva (living creature), ajiva (inanimate objects) and the like. 'Conducive to the benefit of all' stresses the moral necessity of preservation of all living beings from injury and the attainment of the final goal of emancipation. The last clause means that the instruction of the texts sponsored by other rival schools only tends to lead all creatures astray from the right path. These teachers are impostors, conscious or unconscious, and mislead their followers and seek to deceive others for the sake of multiplying their supporters. An authentic scripture should be free from these limitations. It is noteworthy that the stance of each rival school an unbiased modern scholar has to exercise his own judgement on the respective claims. Now the author proposes to deal with syllogistic inference which is resorted to for the enlightenment of another person. This purpose is served by perceptual cognition also. So the author sets forth the definition of an organ of valid knowledge calculated to benefit all seekers of light and not only the speaker himself, in the next verse. Text svaniscayavadanyesan niscayotpadanam budhaih parart ham manamakhyatam vakyam tadupacaratah // Translation "An organ of valid cognition is said by. wise men to be one meant for others when it is apt to produce (the same) conviction in other persons in conformity with one's own conviction. It is effected through a verbal proposition (which is the instrument of such conviction and is thus regarded as equivalent to a valid cognitive organ) by transference of epithet (of the effect to the cause)." ... (X)

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66 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I Elucidation The subject of the proposition is 'an organ of valid cognition meant for others' and 'when it is apt etc.' is the predicate. The 'conviction' stands for the knowledge of a cognizable fact. The same conviction in other persons' means emergence of the cognition of the cognizable fact in conformity with one's own conviction. It is however knowledge of a fact which is produced in other people's mind by the knowledge of the speaker. Why should a verbal proposition be introduced as an intermediary. The purport is that the knowledge produced in other persons is effected through the instrumentality of a sentence because it is the immediate condition of such knowledge. And as such it is dubbed as an instrument of valid cognition. But a sentence also communicates the perceptual cognition and so perceptual cognition, like inference, is also said to serve the purpose of transference of knowledge. This assertion of the instrumentality of perceptual cognition as communicable to another person constitutes originality of the author. The Buddhist accepts inference for others through the instrumentality of language and Siddhasena Divakara asserts that in this respect perceptual cognition is on a par with inference. The Buddhist believes that perceptual cognition envisages the individual particular as a simple indeterminate fact and such a cognition cannot be produced in another person by language which necessarily means concepts and concepts are unreal construction. This contention of the Buddhist is combated in the next verse. Text pratyaksenanumanena prasiddharthaprakasanat / parasya tadupayatvat pararthatvain dvayorapi // Translation "Perception as well as inference serves to communicate one's knowledge of a fact to others as the necessary means of the emergence of such knowledge in their minds). And so both of them should be regarded as serving the purpose of other persons." ... (XI) Elucidation Perceptien also just like inference communicates a fact, which is cognized by it to another person. So both serving as the instr municating one's own knowledge to another person. The particles 1. vikalpayon ayah sabda vikalpah sabda yon ayah sprsantyapi / karya karamata tesam nartham sabdah sprsantyapi // Nyayavatara vivfti, p. 44

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 67 api (also) as well as iva (like) should be added after pratyaksena (perception) and anumanena (inference), though not stated in the original verse, to make the meaning complete and consistent. The contention of the Buddhist is that the content of perception is an indeterminate simple fact, is not communicable by words, and so perception cannot be placed on the same level with inference as equally competent to communicate its contents to other persons. But indeterminate perception has been criticized by the Jaina as an unintelligible invention of theBuddhist logician. According to the former, perception also envisages a determinate fact, i.e. one consisting of an individual and a universal rolled into one. This is also the content of verbal knowledge and as such it is communicable. The vehicle of communication in both cases is language. The inference is expressed as a syllogistic argument for another's conviction in the following way: 'There is fire ahead, because smoke is seen to arise from the place'. This statement of one's personal inference serves to produce the same inference in the person addressed. Similarly when a person communicates a fact envisaged by his own perception by pointing out with his finger : 'See the king is going in procession'. This verbal communication attendent with a physical gesture produces the same perceptual cognition in the other person addressed by him. So both of them serve as the means of communication of personal knowledge and there is no reason to single out inference as the only competent means of such communication. The Buddhist's objection that concepts are subjective and as such cannot be associated with the content of perception which is necessarily a self-characterized individual has been disposed of as an abstraction. But one may contend that the perceptual cognition of the other man is due to the operat his organ of sight. So the contention that the perceptual cognition of one man can be communicated to others is only a case of over-simplification due to oversight. Were the other man devoid of eye-sight, the communication of the perceptual cognition would not be possible simply because the perceptual cognition would not arise in him. But this contention is not fair. The difficulty may be alleged as regards inference if the addressed person has not the previous knowledge of necessary concomitance between smoke and fire. And even if the person addressed is aware of the necessary concomitance he will infer fire on the perception of smoke pointed out by the arguer, only on the strength of the necessary concomitance recollected by him. Here the argument on the part of the interlocuter may be regarded as not the condition of the inference of the other man. One may say that the statement of the competent probans is the condition of the other man's inferential knnwledge, and so the inference of A is the condition of

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68 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I the inference of B. And thus it becomes inference adduced for another. But the advocate of the communicative perception may also plead that the expression of his perceptual cognition serves to point to the object competent to be perceived. So there is no reason for differentiation between them except one's bias. The upshot of the discussion of the aforesaid contention is clarified in the following verse which sets forth the manner in which the perceptual cognition serves the purpose of communication. Text pratyaksapratipannarthapratipadi ca yadvacah/ pratyaksam pratibhasasya nimittatvat tad ucyate// Translation "A statement which communicates a fact known by perception is designated as perception inasmich as it serves as the means of the emergence of such perceptual communication (in another person)." (XII) Elucidation The meaning of the verse is quite obvious and can be easily deduced from the foregoing discussion. It is of course stated by way of inference for the conviction of a man who entertains a doubt about the possibility of the communication of perceptual knowledge to another person. The probans 'as the means of emergence etc' is meant to drive home the validity of the thesis maintained by the author designation of verbal statement as perception is a case of transference of epithet of the effect 'cognition' to the statement as the cause of it. Such transference of epithet is seen in the statement: 'Butter is life' (ayur vai ghrtam). Butter is the condition of longevity. But the condition is designated by the epithet of the effect, namely life. The Now the author sets forth the definition of syllogistic inference. Text sadhyavinabhuno hetor vaco yat pratipadakam/ parartha manumanam tat paksadi vacanatmakam// Translation "A statement which demonstrates a probans standing in the relation of necessary concomitance to the probandum is called inference for the sake of other (i.e. syllogistic argument). It consists in the statement of the subject (paksa) and others," (XIII) ***

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 69 Elucidation The necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum has been explained before. So we do not dwell upon the nature of such necessary concomitance which will only end in uncalled for repetition. The statement of the probans standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is designated as inference for the sake of another (parartham anumanam). A statement has necessarily the same true facts coming within its range as referents. These are the contents of the statement. For the satisfaction of the query 'what is the nature of such statement and its contents', the author clarifies the statement as consisting of the statement of the subject and the like (adi).' "The like' has restricted reference to the probans (hetu), illustration (dustanta), application (upanaya), conclusion (nigamana) and other relevant facts. These technical terms wtll be defined in due course There is apparently an inconsistency between the previous statement that syllogistic argument consists in the statement of the probans and the subsequent statement in the second line of the verse that it (the syllogistic argument) consists of the assertion of the thesis and the like. But Siddhari, the commentator, observes that there is no inconsistency or self-contradiction involved in the two apparently different assertions. In fact syllogistic argument is applied for the full conviction of another person and it depends on the latter's equipment and capacity for understanding whether the statement of the probans is adequate or inadequate for facilitating his understanding the drift of the arguinent. So there are different forms of syllogistic arguinent in confirmity with the requirements of the situation. The fullest syllogism consists of ten members, namely, (i) the proposition or thesis to be proved (pratijna), (ii) the probans (hetu), (iii) illustration 1. We have got four meanings of adi: Cf. prakaretha vyavasthayam samipe vayave tatha / catursvar thecu medhavi adi-sabdam tu laksayet // They are: (1) similarity (i. c. similar thing), (2) determinate reference, (3) proximity, and (4) constitutive members. For example we cite the following sentences: (1) Grass, plants and the like constitute the vegetable world (trnavsksudini udbhijjani). Here adi has the literal sense of likeness. All unspecified things coming under the description are the referent. (2) The Brahmin and the like are castes (brahman-adayo varna). Here adi only refers to three other castes and no more. (3) The army is at the commencement of the village (gramadau sena). Here adi means proximity, i.e. near the village. (4) Pillars and the like form the house (stambhad ayo grham). Here ali (and the like) means the constituent members (avayavas).

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70 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 (drstanta); (iv) application (upanaya), (v) conclusion (nig amana) and a corroborating statement (suddhi) attached to each of these five members -the full syllogism thus coming to consist of ten propositions. The number of propositions may be reduced in consideration of the needs of the party to be convinced. If the latter happens to be a person who apprehends the subject, fully remembers the necessary concomitance and is capable of anticipating other members on account of his training and practice in logical procedure, he is in a position to comprehend the conclusion without further aid For such a person the statement of the probans only will serve the purpose of the syllogistic argument. To cite a concrete example, the single minor premise, "The hill is possessed of smoke' will suffice to drive home the conclusion The hill is possessed of fire' without the citation of other statements which are usually parts of syllogism. The sufficiency of the abridged syollogism has been noted by Dharmakirti.' For the sake of facilitating the arrival at the conclusion of the interlocutor who has not previous conviction of necessary concomitance of the probans and the probandum on the basis of essential identity or casual relation from experience of their incidence in concrete cases, three facts are set forth by way of example in the syllogism But so far as the adepts and knowledgeable persons are concerned, the statement of the probans alone will be sufficient to ineet the end. The commentator reproduces the argument of Dharmakirti in defence of the fast sta tement of Siddhasena Diva kara. But if the person to be convinced happens to be a tyro and as such requires to be posted in the niceties of the logical apparatus, the statement of the full-fledged syllogism becomes imperative. Thus if he has not understood the subject (minor term) and the proposition mooted for proof like the proposition in an Euclidean theorem, the statement of the subject in the proposition becomes a necessity. And if the necessary concomitance is not remembered, the illustration is to be stated for the realization of the cogency of the probans stated in the second member. And if again the party concerned has not the ability to apply the concomitant probans to the subject, such application is stated as the fourth member for helping his understanding. And if further he seems to waver about the upshot, the conclusion is stated to resolve the hurdle. This is the justification of the five propositions stated as necessary members of a syllogism in the Nyayasutra.? 1. tadbhava-hetubhavau hi drstante tadavedinah / khyapyete, vidusam vacyo hetur eva hi kevalah // Promanavartika, 3. 29. 2. Ibid., 1.1.32.

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 71 If even the statement of all these members do not remove the doubt about the cogency of the members, the removal of such lingering doubt is acomplished by corroborating statements. Thus all the ten propositions are necessarily members of a syllogistic argument employed for establishing the conclusion without hitch, since they serve the purpose of enlightenment of the other party as necessary expedients. The long and the short of this defence is to rebut the charge of inconsistency on the part of the author. Now another difficulty has been raised by some professors of logic. The author has stated (in the verse x) that the syllogistic argument is an instrument of the emergence of conviction of another person in conformity with the proponent's own conviction But so far as one's own conviction reached by one's own inference is concerned, there is no such sequence of the judgements as set forth in the syllogistic argument noted above. A person who knows the necessary concomitance at once derives the conclusion from the mere observation of the probans. Certainly such a person does not apprehend the thesis first and then observes the probans and thereafter remembers the concomitance confirmed in a concrete example. Such a procedure is not endorsed by experience. Moreover the conclusion is seen to be entailed by the probans alone as the sole and sufficient condition and this is confirmed by agreement and difference. When this probans is present the conclusion of the probandum follows as a matter of necessity and in its absence no such conclusion follows. The subject, illustration, and the like do not possess this competency because their omission does not affect the establishment of the conclusion. If despite the inefficiency and superfluity of these elements they are asserted to be necessary factors of the syllogism, that will only lead to an infinite regress, because any and every fact can be adduced as part of the argument owing to its remote relation with the probans. If the mere statement of the thesis were competent to drive home the conclusion, the assertion of the probans would be redundant. And so would also be the subsequent members. The competency of the thesis can be established only on this hypothesis. As this is not found to be the case, that alone which necessarily produces the knowledge of the conclusion without waiting for reinforcement by other factors should be regarded as the instrument of proof. As this instrument is the probans and not the subject and others, the statement of the probans alone should constitute the syllogism. The charge of inconsistency therefore stands unchallenged. The above argument is perfectly plausible and seems formidable. But one may address the objector as follows: Your quotation of the

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72 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I statement of the author "An organ of valid cognition is said by wise men to be one meant for others when it is apt to produce (the same) conviction in other persons in com formity with one's own conviction" is correct, but you fail to understand the meaning intended by it. The suffix vati in svaniscayavat (in conformity with one's own conviction) only stresses the sameness or similarity between one's own conviction and that of others. The analogy does not extend to all other factors involved in the psychological process resulting in one's own conviction. If such allround analogy were intended, even the utterance of the sentences in syllogistic arguments had to be ruled out of court since in subjective nce the utterance of the expressive words is not observed. you defend this on the ground that the other person cannot be convinced without resort to utterance of words, and therefore it has only to be admitted as a necessary condition. If so the upshot comes to be the production of conviction in the person addressed and so all factors which are necessary for another's conviction and without which such a conviction does not materialize should be deemed legitimate parts of the syllogistic argument. In the absence of the thesis (paksa), the incidence of the probans in a concrete instance and so also of the probandum may not be understood by the other party concerned. It is for the enlightenment and conviction of such a person, the thesis etc. are to be demonstrated and as necessary expedients of the enlightenment and conviction of the other party, they should be regarded as legitimate factors of the argument. Let us consider the objection that it is probans alone which is the necessary condition of the enlightenment of the other party as shown by the joint method of agreement and difference demonstrating the presence and absence of the probans followed by the presence and absence of the probandum. This objection is neither fair nor sound. It is not the probans alone which produces the enlightenment of another person, but also the statement of a person of unquestionable veracity and personality, viz., "There is fire here' also produces the same certitude. And so probans also will not be the necessary and sufficient condition of syllogistic inference. Let us now consider the contention that if the thesis alone could produce the knowledge of the probandum in another person, the assertion of a probans will be reduadant. This objection is more captious than the others. The same difficulty is to be confronted by your insistence on the statement of the probans alone as the self-sufficing condition. The probans is not without a local habitation. Such a homeless attribute proves nothing definitely as the probandum also is not a floating predicate. This incidence of the probans in the subject is made known by the

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENGE 73 thesis or any another cognitive organ. Your contention would make the recognition of this necessary relation set forth in the minor premise e. g., 'The hill is possessed of smoke', unnecessarily redundant. If you rejoin, this is necessary for the concrete functioning of the competency of the probans without which the probandum will not be understood as a predicate of the minor term (the logical subject), then the statement of the thesis etc.' will not be dispensed with since they are necessary for the enlightenment of a particular set of persons as demonstrated by us before. So 'the thesis etc. are also necessary factors of argument just like the probans, as it has been shown that the statement of the probans requires the services of such factors in particular situ. ations. The author had foreseen all these consequences and so states that syllogistic argument consists of the thesis etc.' Now the author sets forth the definition of the thesis (paksa)2 as follows: Text sadhyabhyupagamah paksah pratyaksadyanira krtah / tatprayoga 'tra kartavyo hetorgocaradipakah || Translation "The thesis consists in the acknowledgement of the probandum as a predicate of the subject (of the proposition to be proved as a theorem) which is not contradicted by the perception and the like. The statement of it (the thesis) should be made since it shows the locus of the probans." ... (XIV) Elucidation A syllogistic argument has been defined in verse xiii as consisting of thesis (paksa) and the rest. Now the author gives the definition of thesis (paksa) for clear and unequivocal conception of it in the verse under consideration. Paksa (thesis) is of the nature of the geometrical 1. Dignaga has also adopted, the same procedure. Cf. Nyayapravesa, p. 1: tatra paksadivacanam sadhanam, paksahetu-dystantayacanair hi prasni kanam apratito 'Ith ah pratipadyata iti. 2. The word paksa defined as the thesis which asserts the proposition to be proved just like the preliminary proposition in the Euclid's theorem, e. 8., The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles'. This is stated as a theorem to be proved. The thesis (paksa) of Indian Nyaya is equally a tentative assertion which is proved in the conclusion by means of the intermediate propositions. The word paksa is aleo used to denote the subject (the minor term) which forms a part of it by way of syncedoche.

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74 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I VAISHALL theorem which propounds the proposition to be proved by argument before the council consisting of the president, judges, and the debating parties both proponent and opponent. The argument of the proponent is introduced by the statement of the thesis in which the logical subject is qualified tentatively by the predicate as one that is to be established to the satisfaction of the council This initial statement has a logical necessity in that it sets forth the logical subjecs as the locus of the probans to ke adduced. The logical necessity of the explicit statement of the thesis has been called in question by a few logicians such as Dignaga and his followers. It has been shown in the Nya yasutra that a syllogistic argument consists of five members of which the statement of the thesis or the proposition mooted for proof (called pratijna or paksa), is the first. Dignaga, Dharmakirti and their followers have criticized this member as unnecessary and redundant. According to Kumarila Bhatta, the first or the last three propositions fully meet the purpose of the argument, namely, the establishment of the conclusion i. e., the vindication of the thesis. Dharmakirti goes one step further and observes that only the premises (i) the ud aharana setting out the universal concomitance, and the minor premise are quite adequate and the statement of the conclusion involves unnecessary repetition since a person who understands the two premises will necessarily understand the conclusion irresistibly following from them. But as we have observed in the course of the elucidation of verse xii, the commentator justifies Divakara's statement and also incidently the five members and the five corroborating statement (suddhi) as necessarily helping the person addressed to understand the issue. One may complain that this defence is inspired by pragmatic consideration of convenience. Their value is more psychological than logical. But the author agrees to differ from the Buddhist critic so far as the first member of the syllogism is taken into account. Now let us cite concrete examples. "The hill is on fire' (parvato vahniman), 'All things are indeterminate' (sarvam anekanta tmakam) i. e. to say, they cannot be determined or restricted to a particular determination, being possessed of infinitely multiple phases and attributes according to the Jaina. These are instances of the thesis (paksa) which are to be established by adducing fitting reason, i, e., probanses. Now the probans assigned must have a subject (dharmin) to belong to. But how can the subject be known without the statement of the thesis ? Of co it may be considered that the respondent may understand the su from the context. But this cannot be assumed as a matter of rule. In sollogistic argument one should not take anything for granted,

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 75 Without the subject the probans will be a homeless floating attribute, so also the probandum (major term). It is therefore insisted that the thesis should be explicitly stated, not left to be guessed. The minor premise of Aristotelian syllogism and the upanaya (application) state that the subject is possessed of the probans (paksadharma). If the respondent (prativadin) for whose edification the syllogistic argument is advanced does not come to know the subject of discourse, the argument will be liable to misunderstanding and erroneous judgement. Text anyathavadyabhipretahetugocaramohinah pratyayyasya bhaveddhetur viruddharekito, yatha || Translation "Otherwise the respondent who is to be convinced happens to be unaware or unsure of the subject intended by the proponent as the locus of the probans (adduced) and so this probans may be doubted as contradictory (belonging to the opposite of the subject), for instance." ... (XV) Elucidation 'Otherwise' means if the statement of the thesis is not made. 'The locus of the the probans' i. e. the logical subject if not definitely assigned in the thesis, the respondent may honestly happen to think that the probans assigned belongs to another possible subject which does not possess the predicate, the fact to be proved as belonging to the intended subject. We may cite a concrete example : 'It is firy because it is smoky'. If the probans smoky be misunderstood to belong to a lake in the absence of the statement of a definite subject, hill etc., the probans will be doubted as a case of contradictory fallacious reason. This contingency will be completely eliminated if the subject is definitely stated in the thesis. In a debate nothing should be left to chance or taken for granted as it does not suffice to plug all loopholes of misunderstanding. In one word, a syllogistic argument should be made fool-proof as far as practicable. It is to be noted that the thesis is also called sadhya, matter to be proved, and the terms paksa (thesis) and pratijna (proposition are all used to denote the thesis to be proved. But the word sadhya is used in the sense of the predicate (sadhyadharma) in the statement of the necessary concomitance. The word paksa is generally understood as the subject and in the expression paksadharmata vacana (statement of

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76 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETION NO. 1 the probans as an attribute of the subject), the word paksa stands for the subject alone. It is thus a case of synecdoche, the part standing for the whole. Text dhanuskagunasampreksijanasya parividhyatah / dhanuskasya vina la ksyanirdesena gunetarau // Translation "An archer who omits to declare the target and shoots the arrow and hits the mark (or wide of the mark) his merit or demerit is liable to be doubted as the opposite (of what it is by the persons assembled to watch the merit (success) or demerit (failure) of the archer." (XVI) Elucidation The failure to announce the target on the part of the archer will make his performance liable to doubt. It may be presumed by the spectators or the judges commissioned to adjudicate on the merit of the archers that the archer has hit the bull's eye or missed it as the target was not specified. The failure may be deemed as success and success as failure. Similarly when the proponent advances the probandum only without reference to the subject, it may be regarded as a case of fallacious reasoning or a sound argument owing to the lack of the necessary data for discrimination. The subject or the minor term must be assigned and this is done in the thesis propounded in the way of a theorem. Now the time for the definition of the probans has arrived after discussion of the subject and the thesis. This is the more essential topic but has been postponed for discussing the necessity and utility of the thesis as a member of syllogistic argument. The thesis as we have seen is a proposition tentatively asserted for proof by reason, that is to say, 1. The application of the simile of an archer to an argument and of arrows to the proban ses is a favourite and popular device. We find in the Byhadaranyaka U pani sad (III.8.2) that Gargi challenges yajnavalkya that she would pose two questions as sharp and pointed as arrows to him. Magha who flourished in the 6th or 7th century A. D. wrote his celebrated epic the Sisu palavadha, and he uses this very conceit in chapter 2,27 : anirloditakaryasya vagjalam vagmino vsthal nimittad aparaddhcsor dhanuskasyeva valgitam/ A speaker who has not thoroughly analyzed the issues involved in the proposed course of action, who indulges in a volley of meaningless words only likens himself to an archer who indulges in noisy boast after he has missed the mark. The similarity of Divakara's statement with Magha's use is quite pronounced. This simile has almost become a cliche and so no chronological question may be involved.

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 77 by the assignment of the probans. The probans has been defined with all its necessary characteristics in connection with subjective reasoning (svarthanumana). So these characteristics are not repeated, as they are implied, because there can be no probans without these characteristics. A syllogistic argument or literally inference for another (par arthanumana) consists primarily of words. As has been observed before a man can make his own inference communicable to another or to be precise, the emergence of such inference in another man's mind can be effected through the medium of language. One's thought cannot be bodily translated to another man's mind. Hence the necessity of syllogistic argument. Text hetostathopapattya va syat prayogo 'nyathapi va / dvividho 'nyatarenapi sadhyasiddhir bhaved iti // Translation "The verbal expression of the probans may be twofold either in the (positive) form, thus it is consistent (with the probandum, major term) or in the (negative) form since it is incompatible otherwise (i.e. with the contradictory of the probandum, thesis). This proof of the (thesis or probandum) is realized by either way." (XVII) Elucidation In our discourse on subjective inference it has been shown that the crucial and the solitary characteristic of a probans is its absence in its entire extension in the absence of the probandum (thesis). Other definitions of the probans proposed by different schools have been shown to be inadequate or fallacicus. This characteristic of the probans has to be demonstrated in the syllogistic inference also. As the ways of statement admit of variation it has been stated that the two forms, positive and negative, of the assignment of the probans are admissible. Thus 'It is consistent and possible only in the existence of the probandum, for example, there is fire in the place since the smoke observed can possibly occur only if fire is present'. This is the positive way of assertion of the probans. The statement 'otherwise' in the verse is a case of abbreviation, being the statement of a part for the whole. 'Otherwise' means that the existence of the probans is impossible in the absence of the probandum, that is to say, the absence of the probandum necessarily entails the absence of the probans. For instance, if there be no fire there can be no smoke. The concomitance of smoke with fire is understood as a case of necessary coincidence only if the absence of the probandum involves the absence of the probans.

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78 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I The two forms of statement have been endorsed but the statement of both is not only unnecessary but also will be regarded as a drawback on the part of the arguer, since anyone of these ways of statement will perforce establish the truth of the thesis, that is to say, the presence of the predicate, say fire in the subject. The syllogistic argument as a statement is called in request only for the proof of the thesis to the satisfaction of the Council (parisad) and the opponent. Either of these statements is sufficient to ensure the emergence of inference in the umpires and the other party. The statement of both on the other hand will be taken as symptomatic of the stupidity of the arguer, since another statement is useless for the purpose of carrying conviction. Superfluity of words is strictly tabooed in logic and even in literary composition it is regarded as a fault. Now the definition of illustration or example (dy stanta) is given in the next verse. It is of two kinds as it is based on similarity and on dissimilarity. Of these two the example based on similarity is defined as follows: Text sadhyasadhanayor vyaptir yatra nisciyatetaram/ sadharmyena sa drslantah sambandhasmarananmatah 11 Translation "The example, in which the necessary concomitance of probans and probandum is understood a fortiori (without leaving any room for doubt), is regarded as one based on similarity. It is endorsed in order to stimulate the memory of the necessary concomitance." ... (XVIII) Elucidation Similarity of the example with the subject is based on the possession of the similar coincidence of the probans and the probandum. To take a concrete instance 'There is fire in the hill because of the smoke, which can exist only on the existence of the fire, as in a kitchen'. The kitchen is a place where both smoke and fire are observed. The observation of the mere coincidence of smoke and fire even in a large number of cases does not ensure the necessary and universal occurrence of both smoke and fire, since it extends to all such cases past, present and future. The observation in question is a perceptual cognition and as such is confined to the present data. It will be discussed in the course of our deliberation that another organ of knowledge is necessary for the ascertainment of the universality and necessity of the relation between smoke as a class. and fire as a class. An example cited does not serve as proof of it but only as an aid

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE to memory. When a person has had the knowledge of the necessary concomitance, but owing to lapse of memory fails to recollect it, the example serves to stimulate the memory impression. The citation of the example makes the respondent conscious of the coincidence of the probans with the probandum and on the recollection of the necessary concomitance enables him to infer the presence of fire in the locus of smoke. If on the other hand the respondent is aware of the necessary concomitance and does not require any extraneous aid to stimulate his memory the citation of the example will be redundant in his case.' The statement of the probans alone will enable him to infer the probandum. It has been contended that necessary and universal concomitance of the probans as a class and probandum as a class can never be realized by a man with his limited resources. Perception, as we have already observed, is necessarily confined to the present datum and has no competency for past and future cases. Nor can it be supposed to be realized on the advice of a knowledgeable person, that will make subjective inference impossible. A man infers fire on observing smoke without waiting for instruction by another person. It cannot be supposed that it is known by inference, since inference itself is conditioned by the knowledge of the universal relation between the probandum and if for this purpose another inference is requisitioned it will also presuppose still another inference since an inference is possible only if the knowledge of the necessary relation is at its back. And this will make the process endless. Without the knowledge of the necessary relation between the probans and the probandum no inference can materialize and no ordinary human being has the power to secure it. Inference is thus based on mere analogy of the observed cases with unobserved ones, past or future and it is at the most a case of probability and not assured knowledge. In the practical conduct of our dayto-day business we make such inferences which are a little better than guess work. This has been the contention of sceptics in all ages. But a knowledge of probability is only a case of presumption which cannot perfectly eliminate the doubt lingering in an inquisitive person. And the impossibility of such knowledge will make any systematic construction impossible. In our experience an anticipation of the probandum is not a case of presumption. A peron who is 1. Cf. Dharmakirti : 79 tadbhava.hetubhavau hi drstante tadavedinah / khyapyate, vidusam vacyo hetur eva hi kevalah // --Pramanavartika, 3.29.

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80 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I not a confirmed sceptic is not assailed by the visitation of any such doubt. Doubt is a healthy attitude and Descartes made it the starting point of philosophical enquiry. In India it has been recognized from a very ancient time that inquisitiveness, i, e, desire for further knowledge is generated by doubt. But if it degenerates into unhealthy scepticism it will lay the axe at the very root of the possibility of the progress of knowledge. In order to obviate such an undesirable and self-stultifying scepticism, the Indian logicians and particularly the Jaina logicians have laid stress on another faculty called uha, inductive reasoning which will come in for discussion at later stage. Now we shall consider the example based on dissimilarity which is defined in the next verse. Text sadhye nivartamane tu sadhanasya pyasambhavah/ kh ya pyate yatra drstante vaidharmyeneti sa smrtah/l Translation "A concrete instance in which the absence of the probans is shown necessarily to follow the absence of the probandum is known as an example based on dissimilarity." ... (XIX) Elucidation In the case of inference of fire from smoke, a lake is cited as the example in dissimilarity. There is no fire in the lake and consequently no smoke also. It serves to bring home the necessity of the relation of the probans and the probandum by demonstrating the absence of the probans necessarily coinciding with the absence of the probandum. Necessary concomitance is a case of logical entailment In positive concomitance the knowledge of smoke entails the knowledge of fire because fire necessarily exists in which smoke is present. In negative concomitance the knowledge of the absence of fire entails that of the absence of smoke. It is to be borne in mind that necessary concomitance is not a case of reciprocal concomitance of both probans and probandum. The existence of fire is not necessarily coincident with 1. Cf. athato dharmajijnasa (MD, sutra 1) Also : visayo visayas caiva puryapaksas tathottaram nirnayas eeti pancangam sastre 'dhi karanam smotam || The subject, the doubt, the proposition, the prima facic reply and the final judgement, these are the five members of a discussion of which doubt is the foremost factor.

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 81 existence of smoke. The extension of fire is much greater than that of smoke since we see that fire exists in a red-hot iron ball or electric bulb without smoke. Smoke and fire can be totally coincident if fire is associated with a carbohydrate substance. But such association is not universal. We cannot infer smoke from fire though we can infer fire from smoke. The sphere of smoke is included in the sphere of fire which has greater extension. So the relation of concomitance may be a case of partial coincidence as exemplified by smoke and fire and total coincidence as seen in the case of impermanence and the property of being an effect. This is called concomitance in co-equal extension (samavyapti) and the other is called one of an unequal extension (visamavyapti). In formal logic the rule that the middle term (probans) must be distributed (taken in its entire extent), though not the major, is the rule based on the recognition of this unequal concomita nce. Smoke logically determines fire but not vice-versa. An example need not be cited for the conviction of a man whose memory of the necessary concomitance is quite fresh and living. But when his menory is revived after temporary lapse an example will be only an otiose appendix. This objection is prelude to the next karika. Text antarvyaptyaiva sadhyasya siddher bahir uda hstih / vyartha syat tadasadbhave' py evain nyayavido viduh || Translation "The establishment of the probandum is secured exclusively by internal concomitance and its citation outside (the subject) will be useless and such will also be the case if (the said concomitance) will be absent (or unknown). Such is the considered verdict of the adepts in logic." ... (XX) Elucidation The problem can be elucidated by a poser. Is the example called in requisition to bring home the necessary concomitance and what will be its service after the recollection of the same ? When the concomitance of the probans and the probandum is remembered, the example will have no use for the person, and if it is cited to help a respondent who is ignorant of their concomitance, the example will be of no help. As we have said in our discussion under the preceding verse that the observation of co-existence of the probans and the probandum in an example does not give the knowledge of the necessity of this co-presence, so the citation of an example will be entirely useless to such a person 6

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82 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I who has to be convinced of the necessary concomitance ab initio and the argument will be effective only after the education of the respondent in necessary concomitance. Considered from every possible point of view the tagging of example to the universal proposition is found to be an otiose appendix which is rather a survival of blind tradition. A similar line of argument has been followed by Hemacandra in the Pramanamimamsa.' It is therefore concluded that the necessary concomitance is apprehended inside the subject and no example is required for the purpose. Of the five members of syllogism, the first three, viz , the thesis, the probans and the illustration stating the universal concomitance with an example tagged on to it, have been considered by the author. The other two members, viz., "application' (upanaya) and "conclusion', and their corroborative proofs have not been taken into consideration. 'The author is not writing a standard book on logic and so he has avoided details which are not necessary conditions of inference. An intelligent student can infer these facts on the strength of his knowledge of what has been stated in the text here. The omission of these members which are endorsed in the Nya yasutra of Akshapada is due to the author's adoption of the middle path of discussion. There are three forms of syllogistic arguments current in the logical tradition of India : (i) the briefest, (ii) moderate and (iii) elaborate. The first only endorses the second member stating the probans which is regarded as sufficient for the purpose of a knowledgeable person who is posted in the univerral concomitance and therefore immediately infers the probandum. The second form is sufficient for a mediocre and the third is resorted to for the enlightenment of a person of slow understanding in whose case the statement of all the ten members is found necessary for his enlighten ment. Hemacandra does not find fault in the contention that the knowledge of the probandum is secured by internal concomitance. But he justifies the citation of example in special circumstances. We quote his observation : "That (i, e. the example) is the locus of the apprehension of necessary concomitance. Now it may be urged, if example is not a condition of inference (on your view), why should you take the trouble of propounding definition of the same. The answer is : (It is in pursuance of the recognition of) illustration which will be allowed for as a case of 1. Ibid, (Singhi Granthamala edition), 1-2-72. See also A Critique of Organ of Knowledge.

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 83 exception out of deference to a pupil (of slow understanding) in syllogistic argument (employed for the conviction of the other party to a debate). And even in the field of subiective inference (for arriving at subjective conviction) the definition of example is not entirely inappropriate in view of the fact that there may be a person who is helped to arrive at the knowledge of internal concomitance from the observation of external concomitance in an example." Now the Jaina logician has made a definite contribution to logical thought by his conception of internal concomitance. It is contended that this concomitance of the probans and the probandum is understood in the minor premise which states the probans belonging to the subject. This theory would thus eliminate the major premise (which is the 'illustration' of the Nyaya syllogism) which states the universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum plus the example. Dharmakirti has endorsed this position and we have quoted it. But Hemacandra in the aforesaid quotation only reproduces the view of DharmakIrti. A person who has already acquired his knowledge of the universal concomitance from experience of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum in concrete instances will necessarily infer the probandum on the basis of his previous knowledge of the universal concomitance, But the position of the Jaina logician is not so clear. Is the concomitance known for the first time in the subject or remembered from past experience ? Both the Buddhist and the Jaina logician and so also the modern Neo-logicians of Mithila and Bengal schools are agreed on the point that mere observation of concrete instances of co-presence is not sufficient to bring home the knowledge of necessary universal concomitance. Something else is necessary for the purpose. The Buddhists affirm that it is secured by the realization of the impossibility of the occurrence of the probans without the probandum. In one word the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory is secured by a reductio ad absurdum. This is called a case of inference by the Buddhist and inductive reasoning (tarka) by the Jaina and the Naiyayika. The difference between the latter two lies in their recognition of the status of the reductio ad absurdum which is regarded as a separate independent organ of valid knowledge by the Jaina and as an auxiliary to perceptual knowledge by the Naiyayika. The Jaina position that the concomitance is internal calls for further clarification. If it means that the necessary concomitance is an inherent property of the probans or the probandum or both, 1. A Critique of Organ of Knowledge, I, 2.20. 2. Vide supra, p. 79.

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84 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I it is not a new discovery since Dharmakirti has emphatically asserted that the relation of necessary concomitance is a natural and inherent property of the probans (hetu). It is also difficult to maintain how this necessary concomitance is realized for the first time in the minor premise, e. g., the hill is possessed of smoke. It is apparent from the qualifying clause of the probans stated in the Taina syllogism of the possibility of the probans (say smoke) with the possibility of the probandum (tathopapatti, see verse xvii), say fire; or the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum. This qualification presupposes the logical dependence of the probans on the probandum. The knowledge of this logical entailment is secured by another organ, viz., uha. Accordingly the realization of the necessary concomitance cannot possibly be supposed to follow from the mere observation of the probans or from the mere verbal statement in syllogism. So it must be admitted under pain of absurdity that this knowledge must be antecedently present in the arguer or the inferer. This has been definitely asserted by Dharmakirti. It is of course true on all accounts that the recollection of the necessary concomitance together with the observation or verbal knowledge of the probans establishes the probandum, Dharmarajadhvarindra, the author of the Vedantaparibhasa observes that the knowledge of the necessary concomitance is rather latent which he borrows from the Pancapadika of Padmapadacarya, As we have already rernarked, the qualifying clause added to the probans in Jaina syllogism only stresses the recollection of the necessary concomitance and not its first realization which is quite improbable in the course of argument, since it must be antecedently present to make the qualification of the probans possible. We cannot help adverting to the controversy which was popular among English and continental logicians whether the syllogistic argument involves a petitio principii. If the major premise, 'All men are mortal' can be true on the condition that all individual men (whose number is practically infinite) are known to be mortal, the minor premise will have automatically been known and so there will be no scope for inference. But the question arises how can this knowledge of the infinite number be secured. And if it is conceded to be possible on the part of an average man, will it not make the minor premise, "Socrates is a man' and the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal', redundant and nugatory? This contention sets out an evergreen problem. If the 1. Cf. paksadharmas tadamsen a vyapto hetus tridh aiva sah/ avinabhavaniyamad hetvabhasas tato'pare // --Pramanavartika, 3. 1.

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SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE 85 knowledge of the universal concomitance of men with mortality be understood to embrace each and every individual, then the knowledge of mortality of Socrates will have been already secured and there is no point in asserting the minor premise and the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal'. So every syllogistic argument will be condemned as vitiated by a petitio principii siddhasadhanata). It only pretends to prove what has already been known and proved. But whatever may be the contention. of the logician, it is not felt by any man that the syllogistic or even subjective inference is a case of useless tautology of the logicians and does not provide a new information. Dharmakirti does not regard any and every knowledge as pramara (valid cognition) unless it yields a new information and adds to the stock of knowledge. Inference is regarded as a species of valid cognition or an organ of it and as such is asserted to yield a new information, i. e. knowledge of a fact not known before. If however the universal necessary concomitance which is the invariable condition of inference includes the knowledge of the conclusion, inference will have no scope and must be condem. ned as a rechauffe. It pretends to give new knowledge while as matter of actual fact it dishes up the old material. a But our logical conscience refuses to acquiesce in this universal condemnation of inference. The argument is more ingenious than convincing. We must therefore refuse to believe that the major premise of Aristotelian syllogism or the udaharana of Nyaya syllogism takes stock of all individual instances falling under the universal class concepts set out as the middle and major terms. The Naiyayika asserts that the knowledge of the universal in the particular, perceptual and extra-perceptual, gives the knowledge of all particulars which are informed with the universal. The universal is necessarily embodied in concrete individuals and so the knowledge of one instance embodying the universal gives the knowledge of all such individuals. Srihar a has subjected this conception of samanyalaksana pratyasatti, i. e., the contact of the sense organ with the infinite number of individuals through the medium of the universal to devastating criticism. It has also been condemned by the celebrated Neo-logician Raghunatha Siromani as an impossible feat. It is true that when a triangle is described on the board and is proved to have its three angles as equivalent to two right angles, the people understand that this is the universal proposition and holds good of all triangles. It is a matter of everyday experience also and rather a truism. If a boy is offered a rupee or a dollar and knows the value of it, he will accept another coin of such denomination spontaneously believing that it has the

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86 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 same market value. Kumarila and Udayana make such knowledge a case of implicit inference. It has been maintained by Madhusudana Sarasvati that the knowledge of the universal is not tantamount to the knowledge of all specific individuals coming under the class concept. On the contrary, it is rather the knowledge that any individual possessing this universal class-character will have the same pattern of behaviour. The distinction is between any and all, whole and all. The knowledge that any such individual, say a man is mortal, is to be distinguished from all individual mortals understood distributively. So the knowledge of the vyapti (universal concomitance) does not necessarily entail the knowledge of all specific individuals. It is a fact that the universal concomitance does not yield insight into the specific characteristic of each man or the specific characteristic of the fire, its volume, temperature, colour, etc., but fire as typifying the class-character 'firehood.' So we deduce the conclusion that inference is not a re-production of a known fact but of an unknown individual or a number of individuals. This is intelligible on the assumption that the knowledge of the universal concomitance relates to the generic character and not the indefinite number of individuals embodying this generic attribute. So the charge of petitio principii or siddhasadhanata, proof of a proved fact, is wide of the mark and the criticism by the Jaina logician of the utility of the example smacks of logical puritanism and this has induced him to make the concession.' Having discussed the thesis, probans and example, the author proposes to deal with the false and fallacious simulations of each of them. He now defines the paksabhasa or the false thesis. Text pratipadyasya yah siddhah paksabhaso' sti lingatah / lokasvavacanabhyam ca badhito' nekadha matah // Translation "A proposition which is known and approved by the respondent and yet contradicted by another probans (inference), popular conviction and one's own statement is a fallacious thesis which has so many varieties." (XXI) Elucidation A proposition which is stated as a thesis and yet incapable of discharging the function of the latter is called a fallacious thesis or a 1. See the quotation supra, pp. 82-83.

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FALLACIES 87 simulation of it. It only has the external appearance of the thesis though it lacks its characteristic features and functions which are set forth expressly or implicitly in the definition of the true thesis. A thesis states that the subject has as its probandum a fact which is to be proved. So if the predicate asserted of the subject of the proposition be a known fact it will be useless since it does not require to be further proved by a probans. The attempt to prove a fact already proved is as silly as the attempt to pound powder, or to paint the lily white. This is also called proving of a proved fact (siddhasadhanata), and though not regarded as a fallacy of reason it makes further argument impossible or unnecessary. We may observe in this connection that the condition and the logical necessity of inference, subjective or syllogistic, lies in the consideration that the probandum, i. e. the predicate to be proved is a fact not known to the party concerned or disputed by it. In fact inference intends to give new knowledge or establish new fact which is either unknown or subject to doubt. An older school of logicians named doubt (as) the condition of such knowledge which is called paksata, the nature of the subject of the proposition to be proved. If the predicate is a known and undisputed fact the argument cannot proceed further. If there is difference of opinion regarding the probandum, i. e. the predicate, that gives rise to doubt in a person not committed to any theory, and this doubt is the justification of the argument. In subjective inference the antecedent knowledge of the predicate belonging to the subject also debars inference. The problem of paksata has given rise to a heated discussion in the Neo-logical school. Dharmakirti in his Nya yabindu also stresses this fact, the tentative nature of the predicate to be proved, in his definition of paksa and in this he rather elaborates the position adumbrated in the definition of paksa or pratijna in the Nyayasutra. The upshot is that the probandum must not be antecedently known. The cases of the false thesis as indicated by contradiction by other accredited cvidences are manifold and various The examples given in the commentary are stated as follows: The thesis "The earth and jar are made of material atoms' is a case of the attempted proof of a proved fact. The proposition 'All things are momentary' is also redundant if the respondent be a Buddhist. Contradiction by inference is illustrated by the proposition "There is no omniscient person' which is proved by inference. As the examples given in the commentary are not exhaustive, we take the examples given in the Nvayapravesa. The proposition Sound is inaudible' is contradicted by perception. A jar is eternal' is also contradicted by

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88 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 perception. The assertion 'Sound is eternal' by the Vaisesika is contradicted by the accredited views of the school. Contradiction by popular conviction is illustrated in the statement 'A human skull is ceremonially clean and pure' because it is a part of a past living organism. This is contradicted by popular belief that it is impure and untouchable, which is also endorsed by scriptural texts. Contradiction by one's own statement is 'My mother is barren'. The falsity of the thesis is also constituted by the falsity of the adjective of the predicate. In the assertion 'Word is perishable', the predicate is unproved and deemed false by a respondent holding Samkhya theory according to which nothing is liable to destruction. Likewise a thesis in which the substantive is not endorsed by the respondent is inadmissible. Thus 'A self is a unitary conscious principle (soul)' is in admissible to the Buddhist who does not believe in soul. When again both the substantive and adjective are not acceptable, it is a false thesis. For instance the argument of the Vaisesika addressed to the Buddhist 'The self is the inherent cause of pleasure, pain, cognition and the like'. The Buddhist believes neither in the 'self' nor in the adjective `inherent cause'. The assertions 'A jar is visible' and 'A word is audible' are instances of futile thesis being not subject to doubt. The thesis has been justified as a necessary member of syllogistic argument on the ground that it provides the starting point of discussion. The false thesis being its opposite will only serve to prevent the occurrence of debate. In subjective inference, the thesis is not a necessary constituent of the process but the subject is an indispensable part and so the word thesis should be regarded as the subject or the minor term of which the probans is asserted and the probanduin is established as a necessary predicate. The next topic of discussion is hetvabhasa, i. e. false and fallacious reasons (probanses). Text anyatha nupapannatyam hetor laksapamiritam! tadapratitisamdehaviparyasais tadabhata! Translation "The defining characteristic of the probans has been stated to consist in its incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum). The aforesaid probans is said to be a fallacious simulation if it is subject to indecision, doubt and definite error." .. (XXII)

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FALLACIES Elucidation The general definition of fallacy has been set forth as the lack of the fundamental character of probans, namely, the absence of the probans entailed by the absence of the probandum, that is, the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory of the probandum. If the alleged probans is not definitely ascertained to have this character, or to be one possible only in the absence of the probandum or doubt of its possibility and consistency with the absence of the probandum, they are regarded as fallacious reasons. Now the author states the nomenclature of each of these cases of fallacious reasons. Text asiddhastvapratito yo yo'nyathaivopapadyate / viruddho yo'nyathapy atra yukto' naikantikah sa tu !/ Translation 89 "(i) Now the (alleged) probans which is not definitely known is called unproved or non-existent (asiddha); (ii) a similar probans if found to be compatible only with the contradictory, i. e. the absence of the probandum, is called viruddha; (iii) one which is also susceptible of being associated with the contradictory of the probandum, i. e. absence of the probandum, is called inconclusive (anaikantika)." (XXIII) Elucidation terms. It is true that fallacy as set forth in the two consecutive verses A reason cannot properly be said to affect the probantia defined. cannot be called a probans unless it is valid, and if valid it cannot be fallacious. The so-called fallacies are rather characteristics of reasons which falsely simulate the valid probantia. To call such cases as instances of fallacious probans is therefore a case of contradiction in But Hemacandra admits this charge of inconsistency as valid. he offers the apology that this has been the custom among logicians and he only follows it to avoid a break in the tradition. A fallacy arises only if the alleged probans lacks in character of the valid probans. The three fallacies of reason, namely, unproved, contradictory and inconclusive have been endorsed by Siddhasena Divakara. Hemacandra asserts their number to be three and neither more nor less and in this he is in complete agreement with the Buddhist logician. This marks out the difference from the Nyaya-Vaisesika school which admits two other fallacies, namely (i) the probans of which the probandum is contradicted (badhita) and (ii) a reason countervailed by

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90. VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I another (satpratipaksa). The example of the first is 'Fire is not-hot because it is a product like a jar?. The probandum 'not-hot' is contradicted by tactual perception. The Buddhist and the Jaina logicians do not regard them fallacies of reason but as fallacies of thesis. The proposition 'The fire is not-hot' is not a thesis proper since it is contradicted by a perception, an accredited organ of valid cognition. As for the countervailed probans, i. e., one which has an equally competent rival proving the opposite of what is supposed to be proved by the first probans, both Dharmakirti and Hemacandra and other logicians of the Jaina school who are Hemacandra's predecessors and successors, do not lend countenance to such a fallacy. It is not possible that a valid probans can be countervailed by other reason, valid or invalid. Dharmakirti however recognizes the tradition which is confined to two contradictory positions maintained by different philosophers. It cannot have any scope in cases of accredited valid probantia.' The assertion of the definition of unproved probans of Siddhasena Divakara is rather too wide. Hemacandra points out that indecision, doult and error are not possible in a valid cognition; when these contingencies occur they will suffice to prove that the cognition in question is invalid. Doubt or error or indecision are rather defects of valid cognition in general and not of any particular species of it He therefore gives the definition of unproved or non-existent probans (asiddha) as follows: "The non-existent probans arises from lack of proof or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be nonexistent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance." The fallacy called 'non-existent probans' arises when there is no proof of its existence, that is to say, when the reason is found to be nonexistent and to lack in necessary concomitance; in other words, when the reason is found to be non-existent eo ipso. "Word is perishable, since it is visible'' is a typical instance. It must not be supposed that it is called non-existent, since it is not a necessary attribute of the subject and so the author adds the phrase 'found to lack in necessary concomi. tance' (to rebut the prevailing misconception). The reason is 'nonexistent' not because it is not the attribute of the subject, but because it lacks in necessary concomitance which is the sole and sufficient) characteristic of valid probans. It is not the necessary characteristic of 1. Cf. Nyayabbindu, III. 110 ff. (concerned with viruddhavyabhicarin). 2. A Critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 144.

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FALLACIES 91 a probans that it must belong to the subject as its attribute. That an attribute can function as a valid probans, even in spite of the lack of its existence in the subject provided it is armed with necessary concomitance has been sufficiently indicated. As has been observed by Bhatta (Kumarila) also: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the son is inferred to be a Brahmana on the ground of the Brahmanahood of his parents and for this the subsistence of the probans in the subject is not required". Likewise, a reason 'which is lacking in definite proof of its existence', that is to say, whose existence is subject to doubt and (also) is lacking in necessary concomitance' is also a case of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' even when its existence is subject to doubt. It is also called 'doubted-cum-non-existent'. Thus, for instance, (this fallacy occurs when) a rising column of smoke doubted to be stream of vapour is adduced to establish fire, or when the ubiquity of the soul which, though by itself is a proved fact, is sought to be proved on the ground of 'its having a quality perceived everywhere', (the fallacy being) due to the fact that there is no proof (in support of the truth of the reasons advanced).1 It As neither the original writer Siddhasena nor its commentator has given specific instances of fallacious reasons, we have to quote from other manuals of Indian logic, the examples for the edification of the students uninitiated in the niceties of logical classification. seems that these authors presume that the readers of the Nyajavatara will supplement their knowledge with further details from other works. At any event a student who wants to have the knowledge of the fallacies and their sub-divisions will be disappointed as these things are not treated in the karika. It was expected that the commentator would supply these details as is done elsewhere. But he presupposes that only advanced scholars who are well posted in the logical discipline and their nice divisions, definitions and classifications will study this work. The commentator engages in the discussion of the philosophical positions of the Buddhist and the logicians of the Nyaya-Vaisesika schools and shows that all their arguments and concrete illustrations are exposed to these fallacies. Let us take a typical example of the Buddhist : 'All existents are momentary, the jar is an existent, therefore the jar is momentary'. The commentator quotes all the arguments of the Buddhist to prove his thesis by making existence equal to causal efficiency. It is argued 1. A Critique of Organ of Knowledge, pp. 144-45.

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92 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I by the Buddhist that a non-momentary permanent entity cannot exercise causal efficiency either simultaneously or successively. If an eternal entity possessing eternal causal efficiency produces all the effects of which it is capable at one and the same particular moment, it will be a functus officio in the next moment and thus bereft of causal efficiency which is the only criterion of existence, and it will thus cease to exist since existence is proved by causal efficiency alone. In other words, the so-called eternal entity will cease to exist and thus be momentary in character. All the reasons adduced by rival philosophers will thus be instances of contradictory probantia having proved the opposite of permanence. Nor can it be supposed that a thing discharges its causal efficiency in succession, i. e in association with other accessory factors. The Buddhist thinks that this is a lame argument since an accessory cannot confer any benefit on the principal entity functioning as the cause. The benefit supposed to be produced will be an event and as such a momentary product. If it coalesces with the entity, it will make it as impermanent as the benefit. Besides if the supposed permanent be causally efficient, it should produce its effect at once and there is no reason that it should lie in wait for the service of others. The lines of argument of the Buddhist as well as the Naiyayika are regarded by the Jaina as fraught with fallacies. A real is anekanta, i. e. the opposite of ekanta having a single character, say permanent or momentary. A thing is possessed of an infinite number of attributes, functions and phases, permanent, impermanent and all the rest. The Naiyayika's argument to prove that a thing is exclusively permanent and not impermanent at all is bound to be fallacious. It will be inconclusive (anaikantika) because a permanent substance is also impermanent in that it is changing its modes every moment. And if the impermanent aspect is denied, the probans implied will prove what is not true i, e., the opposite of the thesis. Thus it will be a case of contradictory reasoning (vir uddha). It will also be a case of unproved, non-existent reason (asiddha) if the probans, say 'bereft of origin and cessation' is adduced for the proof of exclusive permanence. This probans will not belong to the subject, say atom or so, since the supposed permanent is undergoing change every moment and thus coming into being and going out of existence. Such is the line of argument adopted by the commentator to illustrate the fallacies. But the procedure and method of treatment are not calculated to benefit a neophyte. Furthermore the elaborate divisions and sub-divisions of each fallacy are not thought fit for treat

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FALLACIES 93 ment perhaps on the ground that they are known from the works of logic composed by other authors. We also refer the curious student to the works the Nyayapravesa of Dignaga or his disciple, Nyayabindu of Dharmakirti, Prama namimamsa of Hemacandra and the like. The fallacies of reason have been disposed of in the foregoing verses, namely 22-23, by the author and the commentator. Now he proposes to deal with fallacious examples in the following verses : Text sadharmiyen atra dsstatantadosa nyayavidiritah/ apalaksapahetutthah sadhya divikaladayah || Translation "The fallacies of example based on similarity (positive agreement) arising from probanses lacking in essential part or parts (of the defining characteristic) have been enunciated by experts on logic as consisting of the instances lacking in probandum and the like." ... (XXIV) Elucidation Examples are added in syllogistic arguments to facilitate the comprehension of the necessary concomitance of the probans and probandum and thus indirectly show the cogency of the probans employed for proof of the probandum. According to the Jaina logician necessary concomitance arising from the consideration of the incompati- . bility of the probans with the absence of the probandum (anyathanupapanna) is the sole and solitary characteristic of a sound probans. Consequently the lack of such necessary concomitance will make the alleged probans fallacious. The examples cited in positive agreement are undisputed cases of the positive concomitance. Counter-examples are the opposite of the positive ones in which the absence of the probandum is seen to be necessarily concomitant with the absence of the probans. The fallacies of the positive examples arise from (1) the lack of the probandum or (2) the probans or (3) both. They also occur if either (4) the probans, (5) probandum or (6) both are liable to doubt. The definite knowledge of the opposite shows that the probans is defective and the case of the indefinite knowledge such as doubt equally thwarts the anticipated inference because the latter can take place only when the elements of necessary concomitance are definitely known to be true. Likewise the fallacies of negative example will also be six which will be defined in the next verse. Now we are concerned with the defects of the positive examples. The fallacies of positive examples are given as of five types in the

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94 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I Nyayapravesa, namely (i) lacking in the probans, (ii) lacking in the probandum, (iii) lacking in both, (iv) lacking in necessary concomitance, and (v) case of opposite concomitance (of the probandum with the probans stated in the reverse way) (i) The first is illustrated as follows: 'Word is eternal because it is amorphous like an atom'. The atom is regarded as eternal but is not amorphous because it has a definite size however infinitesimal. (ii) The second is the following case : 'Word is eternal as it is amorphous like intellect'. The example is possessed of the probans but not of the probandum as it is known to be perishable (iii) The example of a jar added to the above illustration instead of the previous ones will be a case of defection of both probans and probandum. For example, Word is eternal as it is amorphous as a jar is'. Here the jar lacks both the probans and the probandum. (iv) The fourth is illustrated as follows, namely 'A jar is a product and non-eternal'. The two attributes are stated simply as co-existent in a particular case and not backed by necessary concomitance. (v) The fifth is stated to occur when the concomitance is stated reversewise, e.g. "Whatever is non-eternal is seen to be a product. The proper form would be "Whatever is a product is non-eternal'. Hemacandra in the Pramanamimamsa sets out eight varieties of fallacies of example in each kind of positive and negative concomitance. (i) The stock example The word is eternal because it is amorphous like action' will illustrate the fallacy of lack of probandum, as action is necessarily non-eternal. (ii) The fallacy lacking in probans will occur if an atom is cited as an example. (iii) The example of jar will make it a case of destitution of the probans and probandum both, since jar is noneternal and also possessed of shape (non-amorphous). The other three types of fallacious examples in agreement occur when the probans and the probandum or both are subject to doubt. (iv) The example of doubtful concomitance with the probandum in agreement is: 'The person under contemplation is subject to attachment (to worldly things), as he makes a speech like the man in the street'. (Here it is doubtful whether the man in the street is actually possessed of attachment because speech is not necessarily concomitant with attachment). (v) The example of doubtful concomitance of the probans in agreement is : "The person in question is subject to mortality being possessed of attachment like the man in the street'. (It is doubtful whether the man in the street is possessed of attachment). (vi) The example of doubtful concomitance of both in agreement is: The person concerned possesses limited knowledge since he is possessed of attachment like the man in the street'. (It is a matter of doubt since the mental conditions

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FALLACIES 95 of another person are not easily accessible to an outsider)".1 (vii) The seventh fallacy of example is found in the case of the reversed statement of the probans and the probandum, e. g., 'Whatever is noneternal is a product'. It should be stated as 'Whatever is a product is non-eternal'. (viii) The eighth fallacy under question is found when the concomitance in agreement is not set forth in the example. This has been illustrated before (p. 91) from the Nyayapravesa. The fallacy consists in the omission of the proof of necessary concomitance and not in the unemployment of such expressions as 'all', 'whatever' and the like. In Indian logic the necessary concomitance must be an acknowledged matter of fact, that is to say, must be based on material truth. Mere formal consistency as required in formal logic is not deemed sufficient. The two other varieties, namely want of necessary concomitance (ananvaya) and the reversal of necessary concomitance (viparitanvaya) are also set forth by Dharmakirti in the Nyayabindu. The example of the first is 'Whoever is a speaker is subject to attachment like a specified person'. It lacks in necessary concomitance, though they are found together in the person concerned. The second is illustrated in the following statement of necessary concomitance reversewise 'Whatever is impermanent is a product'. The concomitance holds between the probandum and the probans, and this is reversed in the above proposition. Though Hemacandra adopts all the instances and illustrations from the Nyayabindu, he does not set out these two cases as instances of fallacious example. He does not differ from Dharmakirti in respect of the propriety of the two cases in the context, but he asserts that these two cases are covered by the types and instances stated by him. Our author Siddhasena Divakara does not specify instances. They are supplied by the commentator. The commentator does not recognize the three varieties of fallacies, namely lack of positive concomitance, undemonstrated concoinitance in agreement, and the reversal of such concomtiance as recognized by Dharmakirti and Hemacandra. He opines that these are not cases of false example because an example by itself is not competent to prove the probandum It is the necessary concomitance which can deliver the goods. They are rather cases of fallacious reasons and not of examples. As regards the reversal of the concomitance and non-demonstration of it, they are rather 1. A critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 155.

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96 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I symptoms of the inefficiency of the arguer. If the personal defects of the arguer be occasions of fallacies, there will be no end of the process because the number of personal defects is legion. It may be argued that whatever be the reason of such statements of deficient examples, they fail to carry full conviction. Siddharsi rejoins, if such personal drawbacks be taken into account as logical defects, the defects of speech as of a stammerer should be entitled to consideration. We may observe that this contention of Siddharsi is more ingeneous than convincing. The defective examples are necessarily cases of fallacious reasons. If the probanses employed be correct and possessed of necessary concomitance, they would not be liable to censure. Moreover, an example is needed for the demonstration of the necessary concomitance as has been stated by Hemacandra : 'An example is the locus of the observation of necessary concomitance'. The defects of example are thus derived from fallacious reasons and they serve to bring home the lack of necessary concomitance for the correction of the erring arguer. Now the fallacies of examples in respect of concomitance in difference are going to be treated in the next verse. Text vaid harmyepatra drstantadosa nyayavidiritah / sadhyasadhanayugmanam anivsttesca samsayat // Translation "The fallacies of example based on dissimilarity (concomitance in difference) have been enunciated by experts on logic as consisting of the instances lacking in absence of the probandum, the probans and both and also when such absence is subject to doubt." ... (XXV) Elucidation In negative concomitance an example is cited to show that the absence of the probandum involves the absence of the probans. If the example cited is fouud to lack or doubted to lack in the absence of the probandum, or the probans, or both it will be fallacious since it will fail to prove that the probans cited in the main argument is possessed of necessary concomitance with the probandum. As the examples given in the commentary are of controversial nature and not intelligible to the average student of logic who has not cultivated the different systems of philosophy we propose to give the treatment of this topic with the examples from Hemacandra's Pramanamimamsa. The commentator

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FALLACIES 97 recognizes six types of fallacies of example not in opposition with (i) the probandum, (ii) the probans, (iii) both, and when the opposition with (iv) the probandum, (v) the probans, and (vi) both is in doubt. We prefer the treatment of this topic and examples given by Hemacandra as they are uncontroversial and more intelligible. Siddharsi's objection to the two other topics, namely, the want of negative concomitance and non-demonstration of the negative concomitance is on a par with his attitude to the similar cases in respect of concomitance in agreement. As we have dealt with this topic before, we do not think it necessary to dwell on the matter in respect of negative concomitance. We now quote from Hemacandra's Pramanamimamsa the following passage which gives fuller treatment of the matter. "In the very syllogism "Sound is eternal being destitute of finite magnitude', atom, action and ether are false examples being not in opposition with the probandum, probans and both. Whatever is not eternal is not destitute of finite magnitude to put it in the positive form: Whatever is perishable is possessed of finite magnitude'). for instance (in opposition), an atom'. The example (viz. atom) is not possessed of concomitance in opposition with the probandum (in other words, is not concomitant with the opposite of the probandum), inasmuch as atoms are eternal. Were action cited (as the opposite example), it would be one lacking the absence of the probans since action is destitute of finite magnitude (and not lacking in the probans as it should have been). Were ether (cited as an example in opposition it would be one) lacking the absence of both the probans and the probandum), for ether is both eternal and bereft of finite magnitude. Thus these three are the types of false examples in opposition".. The author has dealt with syllogistic argument and analyses its constituent members into the statement of the thesis, probans, example and also their false simulations. This elabrorate treatment of the fallacies is justified because it enables the parties to the debate to expose the defects of other's arguments and avoid them in their own arguments. Now the author proposes to give a definition of confutation and its false simulations in the next verse. Text vadyukta-sadhane proktadosapamudbhavanam / dusanam niravadye tu dasanabhasanamakam // Translation "Confutation consists in the exposure of the aforesaid defects in the syllogistic argument propounded by a debator (for the proof of 1. A Critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 154. 1

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98 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I his thesis). But in an argument destitute of these defects, such a procedure is designated as fallacious confutation." ... (XXVI) Elucidation The syllogistic argument seeks to produce the conviction of the existence of the probandum (the predicate) in the subject. It assumes various forms as has been shown before. For instance, in specific situation it may consist in the statement of (1) the probans alone, (2) its subject and probans, (3) subject, probans and example, (4) the three with application (the minor premise), (5) the four with conclusion added, and each again may be supplemented by a corroborative argument (suddhi), if the situation demands it. The purpose of syllogistic argument is to convince the other party of the truth of the thesis and for this recourse may be had to various steps, otherwise the argument will not be regarded as an instrument of proof. Now confutation of a sound syllogism is not possible and so it relates to a false and fallacious argument. This fallacious argument is not entitled to be considered as an argument proper but on account of its assertion as a false claimant, it passes for an apparent argument before the discovery of the fallacy. The exposure of the defects may consist in the demonstration before the judges of the contradiction of the subject of the thesis by perception and other cognitive organs, demonstration of fallacious reasons or of the defects of the illustrations as consisting in the lack of probans, probandum or both; and if successful it culminates in proving the failure of the argument to bring home the probandum. The exposure of the alleged defects found to be nonexistent will be a false, fallacious confutation. The defects alleged or proved must be of a logical nature and such extra-logical drawbacks as grammatical mistakes or rhetorical defects which are worthy of censure in a literary composition should not be trotted out as proof of the incompetency of the arguer, since they have no bearing on the cogency of the argument and so do not detract from its logical efficacy. If such extra-logical defects are allowed to serve as defects of reasoning, the resort to logical defects would be of no purpose. The author has dealt with the empirical organs of knowledge such as perceptual cognition, extra-perceptual cognition serving the subjective interest of the party or those of the other party, and all their sub-divisions. Now he proposes to establish the ultimate truth of transcendent knowledge which occurs on the elimination of all karmic veils (stemming from nescience) and which is cognizant of all existing facts. This is the true perception par excellence in its own right. The designation and consideration of empirical perception in a locical

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99 treatise is rather a concession to weak intellects. There have been powerful opponents who do not belive in this saving knowledge and accordingly advance plausible arguments by way of opposition. Now this contention is to be refuted and for this purpose the author defines the transcendent intuition as follows: TRANSCENDENT INTUITION Text sakalavarapamuktatma kevalam yat prakasate / pratyaksam sakalarthatmasatatapratibhasanam // Translation "The transcendent intuition (pratyaksam) which shines in its pure uniformity and is cognizant of all things that exist without interruption or break at any period of time is characterized by its intrinsic nature as emancipated from all obscurative veils." (XXVII) Elucidation ... Our ordinary cognitions are occasioned by the partial elimination and suspension of karmic veils which obscure the knowledge of the self. It is asserted by the Jaina philosopher that the self of a man is a pure conscious subject and as such all cognitions that seem to occur are rather revelation of internal cognitions inherent in the self. Knowledge is neither imported from outside nor produced as a new event. When therefore all the obscurative veils are finally eliminated, perfect enlightenment manifests itself. This enlightenment is the birthright of the self and not a new acquisition. This is the true pratyaksa (perception). The word aksa means the individual self and when this self directly and immediately functions upon the object, the latter is revealed for all the time. The service of the sense-organs or other cognitions as required in perception, inference and the like is not at all in operation. Empirical cognition which depends on the exercise of sense-organs and the presence of accessory condition is dubbed as non-perceptual cognition in the canon. Considered deeply, the so-called empirical cognition is immediately present to the subject but intervened by sense-operation and the like. The soul is possessed of natural capacity for knowledge of all things, but on account of karamic veils which act as barrier, knowledge of things come piecemeal in a graduated scale. Our senses are rather the windows in the prison of the body and as such act more as hindrance than as aids. Transcendent knowledge which is the equivalent of omniscience is a reality. But what is the proof of it? You have made it subject of the definition and this is unwarranted as the subject must be beyond

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100 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I dispute, a proved fact. To this contention the Jaina proposes the following consideration as an effective rejoinder. Now it must be admitted that clear, vivid perception of all existent facts is possible, because these facts are amenable to inference. Whatever is inferred must be capable of being known by perception just as fire is inferable and perceivable both. The existence of all things can be proved by inference. Whatever exists is subject to the transition of origin, cessation and continuity, because a thing to be real must have these incidents as inalienable characteristics. The nature of things is like a fingerbent, straightened and so on. In all the states the finger persists as a continued substance through these transitions. This inference of the relativity of all existents points to the possibility of direct transcendent intuition. It may be urged that if a person does not feel inclined to verify this inference by perceptual cognition, the argument of the inevitable co-occurrence of perception and inference breaks down. Well, this is no objection at all since our contention is that a thing which is amenable to inference is also amenable to perception. If perception does not materialize, it does not affect the validity of the argument. We may arrive at the same conclusion by following another line of argument. The self is susceptible of total purification by the application of suitable expedients. Whatever is susceptible to the application of purificants is competent to reach the state of purification. Gold, jewels and such-like things are susceptible to purification by application of soda, rubbing with mud, and burning heat in a hermetically sealed vessel. The self is susceptible to the application of the purificatory method of repeated contemplation, knowledge and also practice of austerities. But how can you posit that these mental excercises are the competent condition of the purification of the self? The answer is that it is the clear testimony of our experience. We know that by repeated perception a thing is known to become progressively clearer and clearer. By the application of specifically efficient processes of closer perception a thing can be known in its entirety. It has been contended by Kumirila and his followers that there is no proof of an omniscient person. But the dogmatic denial of omniscience presupposes omniscience on the part of the arguer. A thing can be denied if it is possible and known to be such. When you take the agnostic attitude and deny that all the infinite plurality of things cannot be cognized by any person, your denial betrays your knowledge of those things which you deny. Certainly a man with a modicum of sanity cannot feel the necessity of denying a fiction. It is only a fact and an existent fact at that which can be asserted or

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RESULT OF VALID COGNITION denied. So one should not assume a dogmatic attitude regarding the possibility or impossibility of omniscience. Hemacandra has given other arguments for the proof of omniscience. The progressive development of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere since this is the way of all progression. This argument proves knowledge ne plus ultra. We refer the curious student to the works of Jaina logicians, the Pramanamimamsa, Syadvadaratnakara, etc. The Buddhist also believes in the omniscience of the Buddha and has waged a relentless war against the Mimamsakas. I may refer the reader to my paper "The omniscient as the founder of Religion' published in the third volume of the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication. It is an intriguing problem of religion and nobody who believes in religion and in the infallibility of a prophet or a scripture has to face the barrage of arguments of the sceptic or the practical work-a-day man who believes in the testimony of his resources. Scepticism is now in the air and anything that smacks of super-sensuous beliefs is held to be suspect. We may observe that if belief in transcendent reality be held to be a dogmatic, superstitious and uncriticized article of faith, the unqualified denial of this possibility is equally open to the accusation of dogmatism. It may not be possible to prove the existence of God, after-life, immortality of soul with mathematical certainty, but the denial of these concepts is also liable to be arraigned on the charge of dogmatism. Arguments of philosophers who exult in their scepticism have not been able to disabuse the honest believer of his unwavering faith. And perhaps these matters are not competent to philosophical treatment. Philosophy is guided by logic and logic, as we understand, is derived from experience. It is empirical per se and not competent to prove metempirical facts. It is more rational to hold one's doubt in abeyance and adopt a non-committal attitude, if he is not satisfied with the professions of scriptures. The author has disposed of the question of definition and number of cognitive organs and the differences of philosophers on these topics, The subject matter of valid cognition now deserves to be treated and so also the consequences of it. But as the former requires elaborate treatment and there is sharp difference of opinion among different schools of philosophers, he defers its treatment and immediately takes up the question of the results and consequences which emerge from valid cognition. Text pramapasya phalam saksadajnanavinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekse Sesasyadanahanadhih // 101

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102 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 Translation "The immediate consequence of valid cognition or a cognitive organ (for that matter) is the elimination of ignorance (of the subject). The consequences of transcendent cognition are supernal bliss and equanimity, and the awareness of (feasibility of) acceptance and avoidance are (the consequences) of the rest." ... (XXVIII) Elucidation A cognitive organ or a valid cognition for that matter which are ontologically the same thing produces twofold result, immediate and mediate. The immediate result is the elimination of ignorance of the object of proof. It is apparent that the object was unknown before its revelation by a cognitive organ. This emphasis on the expulsion of ignorance furnishes the raison d'etre of the inclusion of the adjective 'previously unknown' to the object of valid cognition. The object of valid cognition must be one that was not known immediately before the cognition. This is regarded as the universal condition of valid cognition by the Buddhist, the Vedantist and the Mimansaka. The admission of the necessity of the expulsion of ignorance as the innmediate result of valid cognition on the part of the Jaina logician is tantamount to the admission of the logical necessity of the adjectival clause 'previously unknown'as qualifying the object of valid cognition. The objection of the Jaina to this additive qualification is therefore not to be understood as a case of rigid exclusion. It is implied that the object of cognition must be previously unknown; otherwise a cognitive organ would have no specfic function of its own which consists in the elimination of antecedent ignorance. The objection of the Jaina logician to the inclusion of the specific adjective in the definition of valid cognition is inspired by the consideration that the previous ignorance of the object is a common universal characteristic of all valid cognition and so specific statement is pointless. The knowledge of a known fact is regarded by the Mimansaka and so also the Buddhist and the Vedantist as a useless repetition which does not make any special contribution, though the repetitive experience cannot be convicted of intrinsic invalidity. It is for this reason Dharmakirti does not accord the status of valid cognition to reflective judgement (vikalpa) falling upon immediate perception of the sense-datum. For instance, the jar is perceived as a unique fact (svalaksana) and the perception, though indeterminate, is vivid and lively. It is not analysed into a substantive and adjective, subject and predicate, because the Buddhist thinks that the quality of a thing is not and cannot be sundered without doing violence to the unity of the object.

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RESULT OF VALID COGNITION 103 But without this disintegration the object or sense-datum cannot be used as a concept or a term and thus cannot place it on a basis of certitude. The perceptual judgement 'It is a jar' with its unique character, universal 'jarhood' makes it productive of pragmatic consequences. But it is not regarded as a valid cognition by the Buddhist because of its conceptual character. The admission of validity of inference of fire, for instance, though not intrinsically valid, being conversant with the concept of fire, i.e. the 'fire-universal', by the Buddhist logicians is inspired by the consideration of its pragmatic verification which confirms the deliverance of inference. But the denial of validity to the reflective perceptual judgement involves self-contradiction on the part of the Buddhist. The reflective judgement in the trail of immediate perception of the sense-datum is confirined by pragmatic test of verification and is thus perfectly on a par with inference. The admission of validity of inference in spite of its conceptual character and denial of validity to perceptual judgement in spite of its confirmation by pragmatic verification savour of self-contradiction. But the Buddhist defends his position on the ground that perceptual judgement does not give a novel insight into a real but only reproduces and clarifies the content of sense-intuition. It is on account of this repetition that perceptual judgment is not accorded the status of valid cognition which is accorded to inference. Inference, though a judgement, points to the individual fire, say on the hill, which was not known before. So it yields knowledge of a fact previously unknown and thus makes an advance on the previous stock of knowledge. Though perceptual judgement also refers to, and leads to the verification of, the individual just like inference, it does not give us any new information and thus lacks in the fundamental characteristic of valid cognition which consists in the new knowledge of an unknown fact. It should be borne in mind that the question of previous knowledge of the object of valid cognition has relevancy only to perception. 'The continuous perception of an object (dharavahika) is a moot question of epistemology. The difficulty centres on the second and subsequent cognitions which only apprehend the object already known the first instance. Are these cognitions to be condemned as invalid or not? The. Naiyayika has no difficulty because he does not make absence of previous knowledge, the condition of validity. Hemacandra in the Pramanamimamsa does not hesitate to accord validity to such perceptions as he does not think that previous cognition detracts from validity. 1. Pramanaminamsa, 1.1.4.

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I But we may draw the attention of a critical scholar to this epistemological problem by trotting out the question from the point of view of the result. If all valid cognition culminates in the elimination of ignorance, that is, previous absence of knowledge of the object, the difference between the Jaina on the one hand and the Buddhist, Vedantist and Mimamsaka on the other becomes too tenuous. Besides past writers of logic who preceded Hemacandra added this adjectival clause to the definition of valid knowledge. 104 Now we should consider the case of transcendent intuition of the enlightened saint. As we have observed before, the Jaina philosopher believes that all knowledge is the knowledge of the self and its properties. The perceptual knowledge of jar is not a new experience. It has been existent in the soul of the subject. The operation of sense-organs or conditions of other species of valid cognition only help to suspend or eliminate the ignorance imposed by karmic veils, and it is rather a question of discovery and not acquisition of a new piece of knowledge. The Jaina position resembles the Vedantist's theory of knowledge subject to the fundamental difference of the Realist from the Vedantist that even the objects of empirical knowledge are real according to the Jaina and unreal phenomena according to the Vedantic Monists. Whatever be the status of the phenomenal objects, there is perfect agreement between the Jaina and the Vedantist that the result of all valid cognition is the elimination of ignorance. As for the transcendent intuition of the omniscient Arhat saint it is the result of the total elimination of all karmic veils which hide the intrinsic light of the soul, and when such a consummation is reached the entire gamut of reality, be it small and great, gross and subtle, near and distant, all become revealed in one sweep. Nothing remains unknown to such perfect intuition. We have already alluded to the controversy on the possibility of omniscience. Whether it be an article of faith or a well-reasoned out conclusion, the possibility of infinite knowledge cannot be denied on a priori grounds. The irrepressible quest of knowledge on the part of scientists and philosophers is inspired by the tacit or explicit presupposition of this possibility. It is the ideal and final consummation of all enquiries into truth. Now an interesting question crops up. Granted that omniscience is realizable by a person, but what will be the result of it and its benefit to the possessor of such knowledge? As we have said, the content of such intuition is the entire gamut of reality and truth. The enlightened saint has come to the journey's end and comes to have knowledge ne plus ultra. As he is free from

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RESULT OF VALID COGNITION 105 attachment and prejudice, he is not affected by the perpetual manifestation of the real universe with its seamy side. According to the Vedantist the plurality of the phenomena has simply vanished and the perfect saint is fully engulfed in the enjoyment of his infinite plenum of knowledge and joy. The Jaina saint is not in the least disturbed by the noise and discordant voices of the world. His attitude is one of serene unconcern and perfect equanimity. The enlightened saint is restored to his own domain, i. e., his infinite self possessed of infinite intuition, infinite cognition (discursive knowledge), infinite energy and infinite bliss. He has reached the consummation. A man cannot rest content with his limitations of knowledge, bliss and also energy. Frustration is the inevitable outcome of limitation and unless these limitations are totally transcended a man cannot be happy. It is the divine discontent with limited possession, finite power and finite happiness, that supplies the vis a tergo of all our ambitious plans a nd undertakings. Man has dreamed of this perfection from the dawn of civilization. Finitude connotes unhappiness. In the Chandog ya Upanisad (vii. 23) we come accross a revealing dialogue between Narada and Sanatkumara. Narada wanted to be released from the bonds and limitations which have engulfed him in grief and misery. The way out of this morass has been pointed out by Sanatkumara to consist in the attainment of the infinite plenitude. Infinite plenitude is happiness and there can be no happiness in anything finite, "bhumaiva sukham nalpe sukhamasti". The Jain philosopher is in perfect agreement with the Vedantist in this regard. When one has attained infinite knowledge, ignorance does not cause him distress. He has attained infinite power and energy and so all obstructions and hindrances (antara yakarma) cannot cause frustration of his will. He is in possession of infinite bliss which is part and parcel of his own being. He has now become self-contained and self-sufficient and independent of all extraneous aids. The question "What is the result of such perfect vision of omniscience?' has been answered in the foregoing paragraph. To be more explicit we should observe that perfect happiness and serenity of disposition are the benefits which accrue from this perfection. His equanimity is perfect and is not liable to disturbance. As regards the consequences of empirical cognition we have already said that the immediate result is knowledge. The reward of knowledge is the knowledge itself. But as finite living beings are concerned with their environment which they cannot completely control or change according to their desire or needs he has to be

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I satisfied with partial benefits. Knowledge of an agreeable thing induces his conative impulse for its acquisition to his advantage. As regards unpleasant and disagreeable objects which cause his distress and discomfort, he now comes to have the know-how to get rid of them. So acquisition of a pleasant thing and avoidance of an unpleasant object are the advantages reaped by his achievement of knowledge. These benefits are rather consequential. A person who has no craving for such things will feel no urge to secure possession of it. A saint who is inured to the discomforts and inconveniences caused by climatic conditions and environmental changes does not seek refuge in escapism. He has realized that the acquisition of one material advantage necessarily involves submission to another disadvantage as has been observed by Emerson in his essay Compensation "Every advantage has a tax upon it". The saints all over the world and particularly in India have therefore delved deep into their own inner self to find out the wherewithal to combat the evils of this world. To external disadvantages he adjusts himself and does not think it worthwhile to be deflect ed from his purpose of achieving final remedy. As has been observed in the Samkhyakarika (karika 1), all observable remedies provided by science and human ingenuity are neither infallible nor final. 106 A cognition has a necessary reference to an object, The truth of this position is inevitably demonstrated by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose a man says that he knows. The question will inevitably arise 'what do you know?' If he says that he does not know anything and yet insists on having knowledge, he reduces himself to an absurd position. To know is to know something. If the knowledge has no referent, it is no knowledge at all. Knowledge therefore must be admitted to have a bi-polar reference to the subject on the one hand and the object on the other. There must be a subject who knows and an object which is known. Though this is an obvious proposition, philosophers have differed from one another regarding the nature of the subject and the object. Now the author introduces the question of the object, common to all cognition. Text anekantatmakam vastu gocarah sarvasamvidam / ekadesavisisto' rtho nayasya visayo matah // Translation "An entity possessed of infinite number of attributes as constitutive factors of its essence is the common object of all sorts of cognition. But a fragment of a real isolated from the rest is the object of a partial assessment which is styled naya." (XXIX) ...

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OBJECT OF VALID COGNITION 107 Elucidation An entity (vastu) has a multiplicity (aneka) of facets and aspects (anta) which together constitute its essence (atma). An object is therefore multiform in nature. Multiplicity is rather an abbreviated expression for infinity. An entity exists as one unitary substance from infinite past and will continue to do so eternally for future. Change is an essential characteristic and change implies the dissolution of a past mode, the emergence of a novel mode and continuity of the substratum. If a mode comes into being in supersession of its predecessors and without belonging to an underlying reality, the modes will be independent events each occurring and ceasing to be at its own time. There will be no change. A thing is thought to change only if it relinquishes its present mode and appropriates another. The modes by themselves have no history because they have no career, past or future. A change necessarily presupposes a past and a future. A mode was not existent before and will not be existent after and as such is changeless. The Buddhist fluxist swears by change and yet reducing every thing to an atomic moment repudiates the concept of change as a chimera. The Jaina philosopher asserts change to be the integral character of all reals. As change occurs every moment, the number of modes is infinite. So understood from the perspective of change an entity has an endless series of modes as its characteristic attributes. Again considered as a member of an infinite expanse of reality which is an ordered system the relational attributes of a single entity must be practically infinite. Thus judged both by internal and external standards of calculation, even the smallest unit, say a particle of dust, comes to be known as possessed of an infinite number of qualities and modes which can be fully judged by none but an omniscient. And this fullest knowledge is the aim and objective of all rational beings. A thing cannot be divorced from its attributes and qualities and modes because they are parts and parcels of its being, and from the point of view of persons of limited vision they appear as so many facets. When one stumbles upon a fact and becomes aware of the whole situation which refuses to be divided into segments and fractions and thus to undergo total disintegration in the process, the thing presented to our view is a total entity with its infinite characteristics. The different aspects in which things seem to present themselves are rather the resultant factors of human judgement and as this judgement is determined and directed by preconceived ideas, interests, -

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108 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I inclinations and dispositional attitudes, the judgement varies from man to man. Our judgements are no better than the blindman's estimation of the elephant. One such blind person touches the trunk, another the leg, the third one the belly and the fourth man touches the ear and each gives a different account. This is called by the Jaina philosopher knowledge by naya, i.e. diverse approaches leading to diverse appraisals; we shall presently have occasion to dwell upon this interesting topic at full length. Now we must face the question What is the warrant of the assertion that a thing is possessed of an infinite number of aspects and perspectives and this infinite complex forms a unit which confronts even the meanest understanding". Why should a thing not be dissolved into infinite particulars. What is the cementing bond holding together these apparently recalcitrant plural units in one integrated whole ? The answer to this problem will be found in the course of our deliberation on the different nayas which culminate in abstract and partial assessment. The Jaina asserts that not only valid cognition but all cognitions, valid and invalid, alike necessarily confront an indeterminate complex. A cognition is called invalid not because it fails to cognize a complex real but because it disagrees in certain parts and attributes from the valid cognition. Cognition as such irrespective of the logical label must take stock of an indeterminate complex consisting of an infinite number of attributes. A valid cognition has necessarily to apprehend a multiple real in which the parts and the attributes are found together integrated in one whole. Of course there are philosophers who demur to accept the position of the Jaina epistemologist, but it will be found on closer examination that the assessment of reals as definite, determinate and simple entities is due to false pre-conceptions and theories which have received the imprimatur of their respective tradition. But it has to be endorsed that whatever is presented to the perceptual cognition free from defects should be accepted as the true object with all its characteristic features. In all our intuitions internal and external things are apprehended as unitary facts in which the qualities and attributes are blended together. The Vaisesika and Naiya yika philosophers assert the existence of substance and attributes and their relation as distinctive entities and so refuse to subscribe to the position of the Jaina logician that all entities are complexes of substance, attributes and relations rolled into one. But their position is not as invulnerable as they think. The flaw in their theory will be exposed by a poser. If the numerically different attributes are supposed to subsist in

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ANEKANTA 109 one substance though they are different from the substratum, what would be the manner of their existence ? If these characteristics exist in a substance without partaking of a common nature with the latter, why should they occur in a particular substance and not another ? There is no ontological nexus between the substance and the attributes. It is argued that they belong to the substratum by the relation of inherence. But does this inherence make a change or confer a benefit on the related facts ? If there is no such benefaction it could exist anywhere else. If however it is admitted that there is a relation of benefactor and beneficiary, then you will have to admit that inherence confers benefit on the terms and this mode of benefaction must differ with the terms. The way in which inherence benefits the substance must be different from the way in which it benefits the attributes. But this admission would invest inherence with a dual character, if not more, and this also will be the case with the beneficiary which receives an additional attribute from the relation. The postulation of different potencies in the relation and the relata will further complicate the issue. How would this potency relate to the terms in relation ? If these terms and the relations are absolutely different from one another and have no intrinsic foundation in their very nature, they will all fall apart and the real qua whole will simply vanish. The Naiyayika realist who swears by the independence of the categories must admit that an entity is possessed of multiple characters by its very nature. If so the entity under consideration ceases to be a simple fact without intrinsic difference. It is more honest and straightforward to admit that the constitution of entities intrinsically and ontologically is a complex in which these apparently different and recalcitrant facts, substances, attributes and relations are accommodated without conflict. A pure simple with no characteristic attribute and no internal and external relation is uncharacterizable, that is to say, without any character. To erect such a non-descript abstraction into ontological real is condemnable on the very face of it, as neither experience nor logic can vouch for its existence as proof. It must therefore be admitted under pain of self-contradiction that entities which are apprehended by experience without a flaw, that is to say, without any defect in the organs of perception, must be accepted in terms of experience. To deny the validity of experience which is neither vitiated by defective conditions nor superseded by contrary experience will lead to unrelieved scepticism, endorsed by the Madhyamikas or to a large extent by Vedantic monism.

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I So far as the Samkhya philosophers are concerned, the position of anekanta, endorsing multiple real with varying conflicting attributes as constitutive elements, will be seen to be endorsed by them in spite of their protestation to the contrary. They believe in the unitary consciousness as reflected in the mental modes (vrtti) which become practically identical with consciousness and each such mode envisages pleasure, pain and indifference in succession or simultaneously. As regards its external referent, say jar, it is found to vary in its transition from novelty by wear and tear. The globular shape of the jar and its colour etc. constitute its very body. The varying states are all predicable of the jar which maintains its identity throughout the transition. Internally the internal modes and externally the objects with their varying multiple character are attested facts of experience. The problem of the unification of one and many raised by the advocates of pure apriori logic is present in full in every such content of experience. To say that 'many' is an appearance and the one unitary substance is real essays to cut the Gordian knot and not to untie the tangle-strings. When both sides, the unity and plurality, are equally encountered, why should the plurality be guillotined? There is no ground for preferential treatment of the one at the expense of the other. It has been argued in defence that the substances qua spirit and qua matter are found to be unities without change, whereas the qualities and attributes are found to be transitory phases, and so if either of them is to be sacrificed in the interest of truth, the plurality must be jettisoned. The phases are not constant. They change, i. e. come and go. But the unity is persistent and ineluctable. There is a good deal of plausibility in this argument, but it cannot be accepted as the clincher. In spite of their transitional and temporary character, the reality of modes cannot be impugned. An unbaked jar is black and after its calcination in the furnace it becomes red and the red is relatively more durable. But that does not warrant us to suppose that the black colour of the uncalcinated jar is a false appearance. If one is to go by the rule of unity and persistency as the criterion of reality, one will have to accept a drab, unchanging, colourless and bloodless substance as the only reality. But substance without a quality as its content is equivalent to a blank cartridge with its content eviscerated. It is more straightforward to endorse the uncontradicted deliverance of experience and accept the things as they are found to be. This is the contention of the Jaina and he thinks that the Samkhya has to submit to this conclusion so far as prakrti (prima materia), which is asserted to be a unitary principle and at the same time composed of three recalcitrant 110

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ANEKANTA 111 factors (sattva, rajas and tamas), is taken into account. It is therefore one and many at the same time. . Let us now examine the Sautrantika position which is noted for its unrelenting opposition to the Jaina theory of anekanta. But the Sautrantika can maintain his position only by ignoring the snags and ds in his own theory. For instance, the Sautrantika is a believer in extra-mental reality. He believes in the independent existence of rupa (matter) which has a structure (samsthana) and colour (varna) of its own. The structure and colour cannot be dissociated. They are one and at the same time two. Furthermore the reality of a thing is believed to be tested by its causal efficiency. The rupa produces its own facsimile in the second moment and also its idea in the mind of the spectator, It discharges double causal function at the same time. If this dual operation is explained by references to different causal conditions, mind and matter, i. e., in the mental and material plane, how can the Sautrantika consistently and honestly controvert the position of the realist that a permanent can also discharge different function in succession under different conditions ? The permanent can appropriate the different transitional states without forfeiting its unchanging character. Moreover the Sautrantika believes that only atoms are real and they exist side by side. The juxtaposition of atoms gives rise to the idea of a massive body such as we encounter in actual experience. The atomic character is not noticed and what is noticed is the abiding gross material form which is believed to be derived from the atoms. This admission of noticeable and unnoticeable character of matter shows that it is possessed of dual character, gross and subtle, though apparently incompatible. Coming to internal experience we notice the same situation. A cognition is an internal fact and yet has an external referent. Even when it is determinate (savikalpaka) its self-intuition is indetermi nate. When again it is erroneous with reference to the external object, it is believed to be unerroneous qua self-intuition (svasamvedana). Thus it is found to comprise contradictory characters and yet is believed to be real. Further when cognition takes stock of a number of things present together in a situation with its white, black, red, blue colours and 1. Praksti (prima materia) of the Samkhya is an eternal entity but is composed of three forces or factors namely sattva (the principle of stability and serenity), rajas (the principle of activity) and tamas (the principle of inertia and darkness) na varnavyatiriktam ea samsthanam upapadyate-Tattvasangraha (karika, 1327). .

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112 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I different shapes reflected in the content, the cognition is believed not to shed its unity. The cognition and its contents are not ontologically different and therefore unity and diversity must subsist together without a hitch. So the denial of the multiple character of reals cannot be a true estimation of reals internal and external, as the plurality of contents and the unity of cognition have to be reconciled consistently with extra-mental reality. This is achieved by implicit endorsement of multiformity of reality and the protestation of the Sautrantika only betrays his desperate attempt to pass the buck. Let us now examine the position of the Buddhist subjectivist (vijna navadin). The subjectivist does not believe in the reality of extern al objects and the perceived plurality, acording to him, has no existence outside the mental state. But the unity of consciousness and the plurality of its contents can be accounted for by the supposition that unity and plurality are not irreconcilable opposites. A cognition is neither absolutely one nor absolutely many but both together. This is the position of anekanta. But the subjectivist may contend that plurality of contents is only a false appearance and therefore does not affect the integrity of consciousness. This line of defence is adopted by all idealists. The subjectivist cannot therefore refute the claim of the Vedantic monists that one Absolute Brahman is the only reality and the plurality is only an appearance. But though subjectivism may lead to objective absolutism by natural logical transition, the realist does not accept this transition as the ultimate character of reality. Even in the Monistic theory the unity of consciousness is not directly realized. Were it so, all persons would achieve emancipation. The Vedantists assert that all our imperfections cease as soon as the unique reality of the Absolute is realized. But though the Absolute Brahman as consciousness compact is not realized, it is not unfelt altogether, since that would make the appearance of plurality imposssble as in dreamless sleep. However the Vedantist also will have to admit that absolute consciousness, though it is the only reality, is noticed as consciousness and at the same time remains unnoticed as one unitary principle. This combination of noticeable and unnoticeable traits will invest the Absolute with dual character in spite of their apparent incompatibility. As for the Sunyavadin, the Absolute Negativist, it is un profitable to enter into a controversy with him since he does dot believe in the validity of knowledge. But how can he distinguish between truth and error, valid and invalid cognition ? The falsity of the cognition is proved by its subsequent contradiction. One sees water in the mirage,

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ANEKANTA 113 but as the water is not verified it is believed to be false. But if this be the position of the Negativist, he must honestly admit that the cognition of light is valid. In that case he cannot deny the validity of all cognitions. But it has been contended that even the cognition of the shimmering expanse of sand is not valid because it is not perceived as a series of atoms. But what is the proof of the atomic constitution of things ? From the Sautrantika standpoint it may be answered that the first sense-intuition grasps a real as consisting of a number of atoms existing for a moment and being replaced by another set of similar atoms. But if intuition be cognizant of the momentary atoms, then there would be no need for inference. A thing is perceived as a jar, a chair, a table and the like and not as a series of atoms. The Sautrantika contends that the first indeterminate intuition apprehends these facts as atoms, but the determinate perceptual judgement misses this fact and concentrates on other characteristics. But why should determinate perceptual judgement which makes the first intuition of things effective be suspect ? It is never felt by any. body that he sees only momentary atoms. It is maintained by the Sautrantikas that the immediate perceptual judgement which clarifies the perceived object as possessed of a distinctive character is only a clarification of the sense intuition and not a new experience. But it is not nacessary that a subsequent judgement should clarify all the facts envisaged in the first sense-intuition. The momentariness though envisaged in the first intuition is not clarified by the perceptual judgement following upon it. So pragmatically considered, the indeterminate intuition is believed to be cognizant of these traits which are clarified by perceptual judgement. As momentariness is not cognized and ascertained in the interpretative judgement, it requires to be proved by inference. But this argument is evidence of an after thought. It is no use to postulate a fact as a content of intuition when it is not ascertained at all. After all this postulation of indeterminate intuition is devoid of proof. Dharmakirti in his Nyayabindu affirms at the outset that valid cognition is the pre-condition of the satisfaction of all the aims and objects of human beings, So a cognition which does not lead to successful activity is of no use. Indeterminate intuition can justify its claim to validity by giving rise to determinate judgement which makes activity possible. It is better and siinpler to hold that it is determinate perception which satisfies the pragmatic test. That alone should be regarded as valid cognition. And even if indetcrminate intuition be regarded as the 1. samyagjnanapurvika sarvapurusarthasiddhih-Nyayabindu, I. 1.

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114 VAT VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I condition of determinate perception, the former should be regarded as a remote antecedent like sense-object-contact. It has been contended that determinate perception only reproduces the content of the indeterminate intuition and as such has no independent status. But even if this contention be considered to be true, determinate perception and judgement, may be regarded as superfluo us. It is on the contrary productive of activity and at any rate of the certitude of the content. Without this certitude indeterminate intuition is of no value and is as good as non-existent. Furthermore, it is supposed that the indeterminate sense-intuition fully envisages the real with all its features. The momentariness, for instance, of the real is also cognized by it. But it generates the perceptual judgement in respect of a few specific traits and so momentariness is not judged. But does not this postulation of the indeterminate intuition of which there is no decisive perceptual evidence merely complicate the process ? Is it not a simpler explanation of the process to say that the object produces perception of a certain number of its traits in pursuance of the operation of the sense-organ, light, proximity and the like ? But it has been objected that these traits such as blueness, non-momentariness, circularity and the like are mutually incompatible in an indivisible unitary entity and so they are not regarded as real facts. But even on your supposition, indeterminate intuition is efficient only in respect of its blue-content and not its momentariness. Furthermore the intuition is held to be a case of consciousness indeterminate, unerroneous and the like. So these different attributes namely efficiency and inefficiency, blueness, indeterminacy and unerroneousness should militate against the simplicity and unity of the Tf these different attributes or traits can belong to sense-intuition without jeopardizing its integrity, they should not be regarded as incompatible associates in the external object also. It must b then that so far as our perceptual cognition is concerned it does not prove that things are only a series of momentary atoms. The plain deliverance of perception must not be distorted by sophistical arguments. Even in the case of er roneous cognitions they are not entirely erroneous, and authentic cognitions are also not entirely authentic. We see only the front part and not the inside of an object. The percep. tion of a false thing, say of snake in a rope, is not false in respect of its own self. That it is a cognition in spite of the falsity of its content is obvious. The perception of double moon is false but it is authentic in regard to the whiteness and its location in the sky. We have examined the Sautrantika theory of perception which has been employed as a'n argument by the Negativist. The Sanyavadin

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ANEKANTA 115 condemns all conditions of validity on the analogy of dream'experience. But this is an irresponsible and unwarranted generalization. As there is no limit to irresponsible assertion one might contend that all cognitions are valid like the cognitions of wakeful experience. The Sunyavadin may rejoin 'You also admit that dream.experience is false and you cannot challenge the assertion of invalidity of all cognitions on the analogy of dream-experience. But the Sunyavadin takes the assertion of the opponents regarding the invalidity of dreamexperience as true. Why should he not accept his another assertion of validity of wakeful experience? The realist may confront the Sanyavadin with a dilemma. Do you believe that our beliefs are cognizant of truth or not? On the former alternative, the Sunyavadin will abandon his theory. On the latter alternative, he should not go further a field to adduce dream-experience as the instance of false belief. But if he does not believe in the authenticity of any proposition, the proposition of universal invalidity will also be exposed to the same charge. If belief in the falsity of all beliefs will end in selfcontradiction, this belief at least will not be false according to him. And so at least one belief is found to be true and this makes the blanket contradiction self-contradictory. If he admits that his belief is false, it will not prove the falsity of other beliefs. Even in the assertion of the falsity of all beliefs, the truth of the assertion will remain uncontroverted. The upshot will be the assertion of truth and falsity in the same breath and this will indirectly pay tribute to the fundamental position of the Jaina that things are possessed of dual character which though apparently incompatible has yet to be accepted as the true assessment of facts. We however think that an argument with the Sunyavadin is unprofitable because whatever drawbacks may be exposed in his assertion he will simply parry it by the reply that it is not his position. He will always say 'My ridges are unrung'. But there is no scope for doubt whether a thinking person can rest content with contradiction of all assertions, positive and negative and yet refuse to be committed to the opposite alternative. The proposition 'nothing is true' is not a selfcontradictory proposition like a barren woman's son or a square circle. But the contradiction is at once encountered when one contemplates it. The contemplation and still more the assertion of the proposition are bound to involve the sceptic in self-contradiction. As Descartes has said that one cannot doubt that he is in doubt. He is anticipated by Gautama and Udayana (of the 10th century A.D.) who asserts that doubt presupposes certitude." 1, Nyayakusumanjali, Chap. 1. Nyayasutra, II 1-7,

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116 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I NAYAS The problem of valid cognition qua organ (pramana) understood in the instrumental sense and qua result as understood in the sense of an act or fact has been discussed from all possible points of view sponsored by the different schools of philosophers. There is sharp difference of opinion on the nature (svarupa or laksana) of valid knowledge and its number (samkhya), function (vpapara) and scope or jurisdiction (gocara). The Jaina philosopher entered the arena of formal logic rather late and thus had the advantage of making criticism of the different theories and propounded his own theory in consonance In the course with his fundamental metaphysical and religious creed. of deliberation and critical appraisment the Jaina logician sharpened and polished his own logical apparatus and with its help has been able to arrive at certain astonishingly original conclusions. Though much has been written on Jaina logic there is still room for elaborate consideration and evaluation of the logical theory. It is a matter of congratulation that many a work on Jaina logic and epistemology has been brought to light in original Sanskrit. The theory of multiform evaluation known as syadvada and the promulgation of nayas, i. e. different approaches and ways of assessment are rightly claimed by the Jaina logicians as their original contributions. We shall dwell on syadvada in the next section and pave the way for its correct appraisal by the examination of the different nayas which may be tentatively translated as ways of approach and assessment of reals. In the preceding discourse we have shown that each real is possessed of an infinite multiple character and all cognitions, valid or invalid, have to reckon with multiform and multinatured facts. Even illusions and errors are of necessity concerned with reality however much they may go astray. Error is not total error and there is an element of truth coupled with falsehood. The totalitarian conception of error sponsored by the Buddhist Madhyamikas has not been able to secure adherence from other schools of thought. It has also been shown that even accredited authentic cognitions are by their very nature concerned with segments of a real. And the total reality can be envisaged with all its fullness only by a super-intuition (kevalajnana) transcending all limits and barriers. This supernal intuition culminates in omniscience which is the final consummation of knowledge. A real has to be approached from all perspectives and the syadvada which is formulated in sevenfold predication is a typical 1. pramiyate anena. 2. pramiyate paricchidyata iti pramanam phalam bhavasadhanam.

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NAYAS 117 sample of total vision. Each perspective takes note of a real trait out of the infinite complex inspired and determined by the psychological interest, logical equipment, environmental influence, pragmatic need, volitional impulse and so on and so forth. So the assessment of an infinite real in respect of a particular aspect yielding logical conviction of its truth is called naya, a sectional and partial evaluation. Even a minute fact is possessed of an infinite number of attributes and functional qualities. It will require an infinite number of observations for its fullest assessment. But the Jaina philosopher has classified them under seven denominations and think that the sevenfold categorization will succeed in grasping a full picture of reality. The formulation of this sevenfold categorization in verbal propositions is called syudvada, bacause of the necessary qualification of each proposition by the prefix syat meaning 'possibly judged from the point of view of subtantiality, time, place and unique individuality'. Each proposition of the sevenfold predication represents a particular perspective, naya. This naya is intrinsically a judgement and not a hypothetical assumption. These nayas have been designated (i) naigama (pantoscopic), (ii) sangraha (unitive), (iii) vyavahara (the analytic and particularistic perspective), (iv) rjusutra (the straightline perspective) and (v) sabda (the verbalistic perspective) which has three sub-divisions, namely (a) samprata, the present fact with its distinctive appellation. (b) samabhir udha, etymological evaluation, and (c) edambhuta, evaluation by actualized connotation. These nayas will be fully distinguished by the consideration of their specific character, scope and application The first naya called naigama has been interpreted variously by writers of established authority. The etymological meaning is not fixed, and from the Prakrit expression it is asserted to be an approach and assessment front more than one direction. The approach adumbrated by the word is pantoscopic. It takes stock of reality in all possible dimensions and the Jaina writers have dubbed the philosophy of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school as pursuant of this naya. The school acknowledges the reality of supreme universal (mahasamanya) called existence or being (satta) which inheres with other sub-universal in substance, quality and action. It is the highest generalized concept of being and is one in number without any allusion to particularity. Though it inheres in an infinite number of individuals, it is ontologically one and the same principle. It typifies the highest generalization and in this conception it agrees with Monistic Vedanta which regards it as the only category. But the Nyaya. Vajsesika school acknowledges other categories, namely, substance

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118 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I universal (dravyatva), quality-universal (gunatva) and action-universal (kriyatva). These universals are equally independent categories and are not to be regarded as subordinate species included under the category of existence. But each higher univeral occupies a larger extension than the sub-universals. Existence in heres in all the three categories mentioned above whereas substance-universal inheres only in substances, the quality-universal in qualities and action-universal in action. Substance-universal as a category includes an indefinite number of species. Thus, for instance, there may be cowuniversal, man-universal, chair-universal et hoc genus omne. This also holds good of the other two universals. If there be more than one individual, that is to say, from two to nth number it must have a universal as its common character. If the individual be sui generis entity, it will have no universal. Thus time, space, ether (akisa) are substances but as they are all singular in number they cannot have any universal. A universal is needed to serve as a unitive bond among an indefinite number of individuals. Thus, for instance, though the number of individual substances is incalculable they share in the substanceuniversal as the common character. These universals are objective entities and not mere concepts or names as maintained by the conceptualists and nominalists. The problem of universal has very seriously exercised the minds of mediaeval philosophers of Europe, the Schoolmen and also thinkers of India. It is still an evergreen problem and has divided philosophers in rival camps, namely the Realists, the Conceptualists and the Nominalists. Curiously enough, long before the scholastics of Europe began to speculate on this problem, it engaged the minds of philosophers in India. Of course the Schoolmen took their cue from Plato and other philosophers of Greece. But we are not interested in tracing the genealogy of philosophical ideas, which has an irresistible appeal to the antiquarians. We only propose to draw the attention of students of philosophy to the curious phenomenon that almost the same results were achieved in India. Universal as a category has divided philosophers in India also into three antagonistic groups as spoken above. The Nyaya-Vaisesika school is marked for its stub. born advocacy of realism. Whatever is an object of thought must be a real object existing in its own right and is capable of being conceived in thought and expressed in language. The extension of universal is confined to the three categories-substance, quality and action. But universals, ultimate differentia (visesa) of eternal substances, namely atoms and souls, and inherence as relation are three catogories which exist in their own right without participating in the existence-universal. In other words, their existence is integral to their specific character and

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NAYAS 119 not borrowed. Inherence is ontologically a unitary fact which maintains its identity in spite of its incidence in an indefinite number of entities. Again a universal cannot have another universal. Though substanceuniversal, quality-universal and action-universal are all called universal, yet they have not any super-universal inherent in them. The universal per se exists as a unique entity and the postulation of a superuniversal to bring the different universals under one class would lead to a regressus ad infinitum, since the unifying super-universal being a universal per se will require another higher universal to bring it into line with other universals. But though existence makes the individuals participating in it existent, the existence pertaining to the three latter categories namely, simanya, visesa and samava ya is rather a reflex of the coincidence of existence with the latter. To cite concrete instances, the existence-universal exists in the first three categories in which the other universals substance-hood, quality-hood and action-hood also inhere. The co-inherence of the substance-universal, quality-universal and the action-universal along with existence in their specific loci confer objective existence on those universals without entailing any additional relation, We are not pursuing the problem further and our interest is to demonstrate the attitude of these realistic philosophers towards reality. The vision ranges from the highest universal-existence to the lowest possible universal in respect of denotation. It then comes down to unique individuals and particulars which have no truck with universal. So its approach is purely synthetic, synthetic-cum-analytic and purely analytic. The first purely synthetic approach results in existenceuniversal which has no specific particular attached to it; the second method, synthetic-cum-analytic gives rise to substance-hood, qualityhood and action-hood of which the first universal unifies the infinite number of substances and differentiates them from other universals. Substance-universal is different from quality-universal, and they differentiate their substrates from those of the other types. Furthermore a man is a substance, a cow is a substance, a horse is a substance and each of them possesses specific universal, namely, man-universal, cow-universal, horse-universal and so on. In this way the syntheticcum-analytic method of approach results in discovering so many universals. Ultimately the philosophers of the school come down to visesas, the differentiating properties of eternal substances. Atoms of earth are members of one and the same class and their earthiness distinguishes them from water-atoms, air-atoms, fire-atoms and the like. But what will distinguish the atoms of the same class from one another? They possess the same universal and similar qualities. So these cannot serve as the distinguishing properties. But earth-atom number one is

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120 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 different from the earth-atom number two. What is the differentia ? A red cow is distinguished from a black cow by virtue of difference in quality. But all earth-atoms have same or similar qualities, so the latter cannot be the distinguishing characteristics. They cannot be selfdistinguished either as that would rob the qualities and the like of their differentiating function. To solve this problem of differentiation the Vaisesika posits ultimate differentia (visesas) in each atom, which is peculiar to each. So the number of visesas are numerically as many as the number of atoms. Again emancipated souls have the same universal soulhood and similar qualities. Yet one soul differs from another soul and this is possible because of the visesas attached to it. These visesas (ultimate differentiae) are pure particulars and co-eternal with their substrates, It is highly creditable that the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher approaches and studies reality from various perspectives. He has discovered generalities, that is, the universals in their varying range from the summum genus to the infima species. He has also discovered particulars of varying classes combining generality with particularity with their progressive diminution down to the lowest rung of ultimate differentia (visesa) with no universal. It has also spotted out individual substances which stand out as pure individuals without any specific universal. Thus ether (akasa), time (kala), inherence (sama vaya) are specific individuals without the specific universal etherhood and the like. The philosophers of the school have also discovered substances, attributes, including universals and qualities which are eternal, permanent entities and also impermanent. The Jaina philosopher has characterized this approach as multi-track' observation. He also pursues a similar track and has discovered a plurality of categories. But their assessment is quite different and this difference will be clearly demonstrated in the criticism of the different nayas. We now address ourselves to the second naya called sangraha which stands for synthetic, unitive and universalistic approach and perspective. The Nyaya-Vaisesika assessment of reals as a plurality of permanent, im permanent and semi-permanent entities, and infinite, finite, and intermediate entities has produced varying results. The synthetic, analytic, synthetic-cum-analytic approaches have discovered diverse entities and also a thread of unity running through the different groups. On the positive side, it has classified all entities under six 1. naikena manena minotiti naikama iti nairuktah......... Auto-Commentary to Visesavasykabhasya, 2657. naikagamo naikapathah anek amargah, samanyadimarganekatvat-Auto-Commentary to Visesavasy akabhasya 2638.

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NAYAS 121 categories, namely, substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), universal (samanya or jati), ultimate differentia (visesa) and inherence (samavaya), and on the negative side four varieties of negation. It is after all the vision of a pluralistic universe consisting of infinite entities though grouped under several classes or categories. It has not endeavoured to put all the different classes under one comprehensive principle and the different universals are bound to clash and conflict with one another. This constitutes its limitation according to the way of synthetic approach. The Samkhya philosophers were opposed to the atomic theory of matter which is the corner-stone of the material world according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. It dismissed the infinite plurality of atoms and the six categories as irrational complexities. Broadly speaking, it divides reality under two heads -spirit (purusa) and matter (prakrti). The infinite variety of material forms is derived from one prakyti by a graduated scale of evolution. It however endorsed the infinite number of purusas. The synthetic tendency of thought has triumphed over the pluralistic universals of the Nyaya-Vaiseska school. But the postulation of two infinites, infinite matter and infinite spirit, was regarded by the Vedantist as a half-way house between the pluralistic universe of analysts and the monistic tendency of finding the all-round unity amidst the plurality. The Sankhya has failed to bridge the gulf between spirit and matter. The Vedantists cut the Gordian knot by demolishing insentient matter and relegating it to the realm of appearance. The infinite individual spirits are regarded as a paradoxical concession to popular belief. There must be one infinite, and if two infinites are posited both of them will be reduced to finites. The postulation of two infinites is tantamount to the endorsement of two bests. There can be one best and one superlative infinite. So the plurality of spirits was reduced to one Infinite Absolute Brahman which embodies infinite existence, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. The plurality is only an appearance. But what is the logic behind this monistic conception ? The plurality of material forms and also the psychical subjects can pass for real entities in so far as they may appropriate existence. The existence of matter and the existence of spirits are the same common principle qua existence. The absolute unity of existence cannot be denied without self-contradiction. The denial must claim existence as its essential stuff ; otherwise it will be non-existent fiction. Each individual must have existence as its unfailing character. So whatever falls outside existence must be a figment of error. One can deny the individual facts and in

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122 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I point of fact one necessarily ignores the number of individuals when one moves away from one to another. One experiences a jar, a table, a chair and so on and so forth. But the experience of chair is shoved into the background when one experiences the table. These individual facts are even found to come into being and cease to be. So existence cannot be their essential character. Furthermore whenever we perceive an individual fact, we perceive its existence. The individuals vary, come into existence, and pass out of existence and in all our experience existence is the constant factor. Constancy must be the determining criterion of reality. So the plurality of evanescent facts that we come across cannot claim existence as their essential character. Whatever is existent must have existence as its inalienable character and cannot cease to be existent. But the phenomenal world is found to leap into being and cease to be. So the phenomena cannot be existent in their own right. Their existence is only a borrowed reflection. The numerical difference of entities again involves . contradiction. They must be one in respect of existence and can be many only in so far as they differ from existence. Difference from existence is tantamount to non-existence. Thus existence is found to be the only reality and plurality must be denounced as false pretenders. Furthermore existence must be identical with consciousness because unconscious existence cannot certify its reality. Uncertified reality has no proof and is thus bound to be relegated to the sphere of non-being. We affirin existence because we are aware of it. But it may be argued, well ! if we cannot do away with consciousness, let it be posited as the sole reality. But consciousness cannot be other than existence as this will amount to the admission of consciousness as non-existent. Consciousness must be an existent fact and as brute existence is bound to be an unproved assumption, existence and consciousness must be rolled into one principle. It is due to the limitation of our thought and capacity for linguistic expression that we use two concepts and two words for describing a self-identical real. Infinite consciousness and infinite existence are thus synonymous. And as regards ananda (bliss), it is the concomitant of infinitude. If consciousness be infinite existence, it must be infinite bliss, since want of bliss is only entailed by finitude. The Vedantist concludes that infinite consciousness, infinite existence and infinite bliss are the same identical fact and is the sole reality behind and in and through the plurality of appearances. The Jaina philosopher is a realist to the core of his being and accepts the plurality as undeniable datum. He charges the Vedantist

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NAYAS 123 with infidelity to experience which alone can be the determinant of reality. Let there be the infinite consciousness, infinite-existence and infinite bliss, but that cannot cancel the plurality of experience. Well, the proof of existence, consciousness and bliss is furnished by experience. Consciousness, existence and bliss are accepted as reals on the strength of experience without which these fundamental data will remain unproved. Accordingly we have to fall back upon experience as the criterion of reality. And when experience endorses the existence of infinite particulars with their infinitely varying complexion and complexity how can we deny their reality and dismiss them as unreal appearance like dream-experience? Dream-experience is denied its validity because it is contradicted by wakeful experience. But our wakeful experience is not found to be contradicted by another more powerful experience. A philosophy which fails to render an explanation of experienced facts and seeks to cover its failure under the camouflage of false appearance cannot be absolved from the charge of imperfect assessment. If the world-order be a false irrational show, it will rob the scientist of his incentive to pursue enquiry and examination of material reality. Science has discovered many laws in Nature But the and hopes to extend its field of enquiry to utmost limit. philospher who loves to live in his ivory tower and shut out the din and bustle of the world from his vision and affirms that the only hope of peace and bliss is to be found in his sequestered chamber, only gives the counsel of escapism. The Jaina philosopher concludes that this inordinate love for synthetic approach and zeal for unity at the cost of plurality is only an aberration-a false perspective. The unity emphasized by the Vedantist is not denied, but he denies the plea of its inconsistency with plurality. The plurality is as much a fact as unity. A unity without plurality is a blank and a bleak prospect and plurality without unity is only a chaos. The two must be reconciled by the law of Anekanta which avoids extremism. Unity is fulfilled in plurality and plurality owes its vitality to it. As regards the Nyaya-Vaisesika approach, it falls short in spite of its comprehensiveness. The belief in the absolute difference of universal and particular and individual and its changing modes, and the independent status of samavaya apart from the terms are snags. They are all integrated into one whole which is a system and not a jumble of isolated units. Each entity from the highest to the meanest particle of dust has a useful function and has a definite assigned place in the hierarchy. We have disposed of two nayas, naigama and sangraha. Now the third naya, vyavahara, which stands for the practical, popular approach

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124 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 and evaluation, will engage our attention. Pragmatism is a necessary and natural reaction against soaring idealism. The total absorption with the One Absolute in direct contempt of experience has every where in the world raised a revolt against its banner. Work-a-day people are confronted with various problems and wants and privations which can be satisfied by coming into close grip with the unpleasant reality. No amount of ratiocination and delivery of sermons on the unsubstantiality of the matter-of-fact world can hope to win over the masses. It must fail to afford consolation. The facile repudiation of plurality has produced unexpected reaction. The average people have suspected this extremistic bias for unity as wild chase for the will o'-the-wisp. These abstractions of philosophy are creatures of unpositivism. The so-called universals from the summum genus to the infima species are simply rejected as non-sense. Practical utility is made the sole test of truth. One requires milk for his nourishment and that of his children and for that purpose acquires a cow. The cow-universal does not give any practical result. One requires a pen for writing a letter and does not bother about penhood. So all common concepts and universals are thrown to the wind. The ideal of heaven and hell, hope of survival after death and all the wherewithal of the professional custodian of religion are suspect to him. Whatever satisfies a practical need is deemed real. The practical man does not want to be duped by the promises of eternal heaven and gets down to grapple with hard facts of the world. Science to him is valuable only in so far as it satisfies the needs of the flesh. If this attitude can be given a philosophical label, it may be called particularism and pragmatism of the gross variety. It does not care to build a system of thought which may beguile a contemplative man. No doubt this is an extremistic attitude and encourages philistinism. The poor man will prefer the path of least resistance to enrich himself by despoiling the rich. This weakness of the animal in man is now being exploited by the communistic creed. So long as poverty stalks the world and the majority of people are averse to hard labour and planned enterprise, the preoccupation with particulars and details will make culture an object of hatred. This attitude has been dubbed as behaviouristic and pragmatic approach (vyavaharanaya). This love of particular facts with a view to satisfying the elemental needs is not worthy of condemnation, provided it keeps an open mind to values which may not have an immediate tangible result. The thinking mind will not be satisfied with the rule of thumb. One may not have felt the urge of higher values-intellectual, moral, aesthetic and spiritual-and find his preoccupation with food, drink and clothing

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NAYAS 125 too imperious to have an occasion for the pursuit of these values. But ermined hostility to a man of culture on the score of his pursuit aterial ends is dangerous and if it seizes hold of the general mass of people, the consequences will be disastrous. A man of serious disposition and rational frame of mind is not content with the satisfaction of the animal needs. With acquisition of abundant physical resources, he will seek for higher happiness. The statisfaction of the demands of the senses creates other cravings. Temporal prosperity is a good thing, if it prepares the way for the pursuit of higher culture, but cannot be an end by itself. So the practical attitude is only an extremistic reaction against idealism in its extremest form. But, like all extremism, it must be a lop-sided way of life. The aberrations of philosophy cannot be answered by total repudiation of philosophy. It only encourages obscurantism which will shut the door to inquiry and progress. Extremism tends to give a distorted view of life. The parti. cularistic bias which finds favour with submerged sections of mankind does not stop with the repudiation of universals. The concept of universal emerges after the comparison of the past with the present and anticipation of the future. The common features of these data call for a synthesis which ends in positing universals. The positivistic attitude is impatient with these speculations and in the course of its growth concentrates on the living present. It refuses to take note of the past which it regards as dead and defunct and the future as unrealized and unborn uncertainty. The truth must be found in the immediate present moment. The test of practical utility is capable of being satisfied by the immediate present moment and not by the defunct past or by the hypothetical future. This approach has given rise to the Buddhist philosophy of flux. The real must be momentary. A thing comes to exist only for a moment and has no link with the past and no truck with the future. The belief in the permanent is only a superstition. The permanent is supposed to have a number of moments as its units. But we do not get permanent satisfaction of our needs from anything. It only gives one result and one advantage or disadvantage. We must avoid the unpleasant and catch hold of the pleasant and not delude ourselves with hopes of future happiness by neglecting the present. This line of approach is dubbed as the straightline approach (rjusutra) as performed by the rhinoceros. One must not look behind and sigh for the past joy and not sit idle with crossed fingers for the future millennium. The Buddhist fluxist has created a wonderful philosophy with its insistence on the momentariness of existents. A thing has neither

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126 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I past nor future but exists only for present and irrevocably dies in the next moment without any chance of resurrection. The test of reality is found in practical efficiency which boils down to causal activity. A permanent is only a figment of the imagination as it is not found to exercise permanent causal efficiency. The seed in the granary does not produce sprout but one planted in the irrigated soil does it. What is the explanation? If the permanent possesses a permanent capacity, it should produce a series of effects. The seed in the granary does not produce sprout because it does not possess the capacity for it. Possession of capacity is bound to end in the production of an effect. Power kept in abeyance is only a hoax. Why should the seed remain idle? If it is contended that the permanent produces an effect only when it is reinforced by auxiliary factors, the question crops up, what do these auxiliaries contribute to the permanent ? The permanent may wait for the auxiliaries if they are of service. A thing which does not confer any benefit, that is to say, an excess on the supposed permanent, it will not be wanted. Only that is wanted which produces a benefit, that is, gives an advantage which the beneficiary lacks. Suppose that the auxiliaries, e. g. soil, irrigation, free air, and light of the sun vest the seed with an additional efficacy, and so long as these auxiliaries are not available the seed will not sprout. But what will be the relation of the benefit concerned with the seed as the supposed recipient of benefit. Unless the benefit becomes identified with the seed it will not be of any avail. If the benefit remains apart and aloof from the seed as it is from other things, it will be useless. But if the benefit, say relaxation of the seed etc., be identified with the seed, the latter will be a momentary event like the benefit produced. So we must conclude that not the past enduring seed but the seed identified with the benefit conferred by auxiliaries produces the sprout. The sproutproducing seed then is a different entity from the past seed. In other words, it is the momentary seed which produces the sprout. It differs materially from the past bacause it successfully exercises its causal power, whereas the past seed remained absolutely ineffective so far as the sprout is concerned. It is causal efficiency which is the criterion of reality. A fiction has no causal efficiency. The sky-flower gives no scent. Causal efficiency is found in the present momentary entity. The jar that draws water is different from the empty jar in spite of their external physical likeness. The active jar has undergone a constitutional change which makes it capable of drawing water. But unthinking people are deceived by superficial appearance of similarity and think that the entity is permanent with deferred causality. So all that exist must be momentary. The approach is characterized by the

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NAYAS 127 Jainas as the way of the straightline. Its supposed extension into the past and continuity in the future will give it a crooked dimension. Real has only one dimension, the present, and not past or future as the latter dimensions are bereft of causal efficiency. If it is held that an entity has the capacity for a series of causal operation, why should it not produce them all at once and why should it keep power in reserve ? Power means execution and the proof of the power is furnished by the result produced. When a thing remains idle and does not exercise its causal power, it means it has not the power Power and deferred action go ill together. It is only a vain boast if a man affirms that he has power to do a thing but he does not do it for one reason or another. The man must be guilty of braggadocio. We have dealt with the four nayas occupied with the assessment of objective reals. The first naya gives a miscellany of independent categories coming into mutual relation. It is synthetic-cum-analytic in character. The second is purely synthetic and concentrates on the unity and simple identity of things with all particulars obliterated from its ambit. The third is the opposite extreme of it and ends in particularism, but stops short with individual substances. This is followed up in the fourth approach which ends in disruption of the individual into its component factors, the present living evanescent atoms. This particularistic assessment is carried on to further stages in the three verbalistic nayas which will now engage our attention. These verbalistic appraisals are all called sabdanaya. The fundamental line of argument pursued by the advocates of these nayas lies in the consideration of words and their meaning. Word is the ultimate principle according to the philosophy of grammar. The fact meant by word is only the other face of the word. Word and meaning are the obverse and reverse of the same coin. This is proved by the fact that whenever a word is presented to the mind its meaning is also invariably presented and vice versa. The word and fact are inseparable. So in the assessment of reals, the contribution of word must be taken into account. It may be urged that a man who does not know the meaning of a word or the word expressive of a fact, does understand the word and meaning in isolation. But this contention is not sound. If the particular word denoting the fact is not known, the latter will be described by a generic word. A man may find a pen but may not know its name. He will call it a substance or something like that. Moreover ignorance is not an argument. The blind man's denial of colour does not prove its non-existence. Besides there is a universal language, the language of concepts. This concept is made definite and externalized by a name which makes it communicable. So it

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128 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I must be concluded that all things have their definite descriptive names just like a jar or table. Things have been shown by the advocate of the I jusutra naya to be momentary and such is also the case with words which are sounds in point of fact and they are also uttered and perish. So they are equivalents of facts, and facts are the equivalents of words. The relation of word and fact is known by convention. Words are current coins and their value is fixed and equally made known by convention. But though word and meaning are identical, the synonyms do not denote different entities. They stand for one and the same fact. Thus the word indra, sakra, purandara are different names of the King of gods. But if there is difference of number and gender, then there is difference of meaning. This is in fact the first verbal assessment called samprata sabdanaya. The second verbal assessment is called samabhirudha which identifies the etymological meaning (vyutpattinimitta) and the conventional meaning (pravrttinimitta). According to the first naya, synonyms denote one and the same entity by convention and the etymological meaning derived from the analysis of a word into a root and a suffix is regarded as a symbolic explanation. But the second naya regards this unification of all the synonyms and their meanings as an uncritical appraisal. Thus, the word indra is derived from the vind which means 'excercise of sovereignty'. If the person now installed as the sovereign of gods ceases to excercise his paramountcy over gods he will forfeit his claim to this title. Again sakra comes from the sak meaning 'excercise of power'. Purandara means 'one who shatters the citadel of the enemy'. So the meanings of words are determined by their etymology and usage both. The popular usage, which disregards the etymological meaning and puts a blanket description on all synonyms because of the identity of the substance denoted by them, is an oversimplification which stems from the ignorance of the important nuances of difference which stand for difference of quality and function. A substance without its distinctive function and qualitative content is only an abstraction. The testimony of ignorant people is not accepted as a correct evaluation by the academic bar, The third verbal appraisal is called evambhuta, according to which there is truth in the theory that the etymological meaning should be the conventional meaning. But as words are derived from radicals (verbal roots) which denote particular action, it is the possession and exercise of the action meant which should justify the use of the word. If the etymological meaning, i. e., the function meant by

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CRITIQUE OF NAYAS 129 It is not exercised by the substance, it should not be appropriately expressed by the word. Thus, for instance, the word ghata is derived from the V ghat meaning exertion, effort, activity. So a pitcher which actually carries the water, poised on the head of a woman, should be called ghata. It is also called kuta because of its oblique shape. When bereft of this quality it should not be called by that name. Take for instance another word kumbha which being derived from ku+ Jumbha stands for the jar filled with water. If anybody calls the empty jar by this name he would be guilty of imprecision of speech. This naya is called evambhuta, i.e., which actualises the function meant by it. Thus there are no synonyms. The conclusion deduced by this approach is that each thing has got a distinctive name and each name stands for a distinctive entity and further the connotation of a word is always a function and action minus which the word becomes an empty sound, and its indiscri. minate use by ignorant people should not be cited as witness for obliterating the difference of semantic value of different words. The use of double entendre (slesa) is a popular rhetorical device with poets. But this indiscriminate identification of words in spite of difference of meanings is only a poetic licence which cannot be justified by a logical evaluation. Mahimabhatta in the Vyaktiviveka and, following him, Jagadisa Tarkalaukara have flatly and unceremoniously denied the logical possibility of paronomasia and their position is justified by the testimony of this last approach, evambhuta. The first verbalistic approach centres on the identity of denotation; the second emphasizes the identity of connotation with denotation; and the third lays definite stress upon the actual presence of the connotation as the determinant principle of the use of the words. The past and the future actuality of the connotation is dismissed as an irrational over-extension which, if indulged in, will lead to absurd excesses. A Critique of the Nayas It is affirmed by the Jaina philosopher and also proved by him that entities from the smallest to the highest are possessed of an incalculable number of attributes and the cognitive organ which apprehends such entities in their diverse dimensions and in all their bearings and aspects is entitled to the appellation of a valid organ of knowledge. But one-sided apprehension of it focussing on a particular aspect or attribute is called naya, i.e, a partial assessment. It does not cease to be valid and true if it makes the simple affirmation or negation without 1. yavantah sabdas tavantah arthah, yavantah arthas tayantah sabdah / sabdabhedena arthabhedah, arthabhedena sabdabhedah //

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130 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I the affirmation or denial of the remaining attributes. But when such an assessment is made categorical and commits itself to that particular aspect as the whole truth and denies the possibility of other attributes, it turns out to be wrong assessment, a false and fallacious naya (nayabhasa). Thus the Naiyayika and the Vaisesika are the advocates of naigama naya which takes stock of the plurality of the phenomenal world as real facts and place them under different categories. The Vedantist and also the Samkhya philosopher to some extent are the advocates of the second naya. The positivist and the materialist together with their unthinking blind followers among the unenlightened mass advocate the third naya and assess reality in its light. The Buddhist fluxist is the protagonist of the fourth naya. All these philosophers are guilty of false assessment, guided as they are by their exclusive approaches. These assessments should not be called instances of true naya which takes note of one aspect of a real for the sake of convenience and on account of limited equipment. They are true to the extent of the portion of reality they envisage. But they become false aberrations when the slice of reality envisaged by each of them is dogmatically and peremptorily erected into the whole truth with the implicit or explicit denial of the truth of the remaining aspects. Let us now examine the different nayas or rather their aberrations one by one. The naigamanaya as pursued by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school has been given a wrong twist. From the sameness of the individuals in respect of being they deduced existence as their common character as the underlying unity of things. And they also take stock of particularities and special features as contradistinguished from existence and other universals. Thus, for instance, the tree-universal is affirmed to be the common property of all individual trees and the individualities of the different species of trees--the oak, the mango, the palm etc.--constitute the distinctive features which distinguish them from one another. The aberration of the naya takes place when the universal and the particular are taken apart from one another as independent traits, mutually exclusive. But in actual experience we never find them as dichotomized. They are held together as inseparable facts. A universal without particulars is a mere abstraction and the particulars without the universal are apt to fall apart. So their asserton that these two should not be mixed together, each having an exclusive character, is a wrong evaluation. Moreover a universal has no causal efficiency of its own. It is a particular cow which yields milk and not universal cowhood. Again when a man is ordered to gather fuel by cutting a tree, he cuts any tree he finds convenient for the purpose of the fuel. He does not cut all the trees which fall under the universal

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CRITIQUE OF NAYAS 131 ence. concept. This shows that the universal and the particular are not mutually exclusive. It has however been urged that universal and particular have distinctive characteristics. If they are invariably united and not susceptible of differentiation, then all concepts and common names become unaccountable. The distinctive use of the particular and the universal is not based on ontological difference. It is rather dictated by the theoretical and practical needs of a person. When a person is interested in emphasizing the common character, the universal comes out in relief and the particular occupies a subordinate place in his thought. When however a person is interested in satisfying a practical need such as the procurement of milk, he assigns prominence to the particular relegating the universal to the background. The differentiation of the universal from the particular is rather conceptual and is determined by the theoretical interest or practical utility felt by a person concerned. This does not mean that the differentiation is purely subjective. The two are objective reals and their differentiation and distinction rest upon an objective basis. What the Jaina anekanta theory asserts is that the two are not exclusively different nor entirely identical. They stand in the relation of identity-cum-differFurthermore the endorsement of mutually independent universal and particular will open the flood-gate of the objections levelled by the Buddhist on the score of relation. The universal is supposed to exist in the whole and its members, but its manner of existence is not intelligible. If the universal exists in each part in its totality, it will not exist in other parts. Nor can it exist piecemeal because a universal has no part of its own. Again the relation of one part to the other part will be open to the same difficulty as parts excepting the atoms are divisible into minuter parts. Secondly the relation of a new-born individual with the universal presents an insurmountable difficulty. The universal is not present in the individual before its existence and it cannot migrate from other individuals. Again the death of the individual will entail the incidence of the universal either in a vacuum or its disappearance. Both these alternatives are unacceptable. Dharmakirti in his Pramanavartika has raised formidable objections which stand unrefuted. The Jaina philosopher averts these difficulties by positing the universal as a distinctive property of the individual inseparably combined with the particulars by the relation of identity and difference both. These objections are applicable only to the Nyaya-vaisesika conception of universal. We may add that the affirmation of unchanging entities fails to account for their relation with changing particulars. These eternals are not susceptible of change though the relation to changing particulars entails a new relational

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I quality. When A stands in relation to B, the former necessarily acquires the new quality of relatedness and this entails change. The Jaina philosopher insists in consonance with the Buddhist that causal efficiency is the criterion of normal existence and as such there can be nothing which is not liable to change. Everything changes and yet maintains its identity and identity is not incompatible with difference entailed by change. 132 The approach of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school to reality including spirit and matter is comprehensive and so we have called it pantoscopic. The Jaina metaphysician also follows this way of approach. But they differ in the assessment of the result. The Nyaya-Vaisesika school fails to give an all-round comprehensive system which is claimed by the Jaina as his achievement, directly resulting from the law of anekanta which asserts the dynamic nature of all entities by virtue of which things change to accommodate the relational qualities. We now deal with the sangrahanaya, the synthetic approach. The Vedantist monist is the representative advocate of this sangrahanaya. Existence alone is the real and all the particulars are the pseudo-claimants of existence. If the particulars are different from existence, they will be reduced to fiction. Moreover particulars are found to be and also not to be. Being and not-being are contradictorily opposed, and as the test of truth is non-contradiction, the particular must be dismissed as unreal appearance. Moreover the Vedantist insists that perception which is the primary source of knowledge of things always takes note of being and not of non-being.1 A pure negation is a fiction. It is intelligible only with a reference to the object negated and its positive locus. Negation is therefore only an idea and a false idea at that, since negation is never confronted qua negation bereft of its foundation in positive reality. And a positive real is repugnant to negation. The latter must therefore be rejected as a spurious claimant of truth. But the Jaina non-absolutist refuses to be impressed by these arguments. He asserts that each thing is possessed of a double facet, existence and non-existence. For instance, a jar is a jar and not a textile. It is qua itself and is not qua another. The two are not irreconcilable opposites as they are endorsed by experience. If experience be denied its validity, the Vedantist cannot affirm the existence of consciousness of which there is no other proof than experience. If pure a priori logic arrogates to itself the authority to dictate terms to reality it will yield the palm of 1. ahur vidhatt pratyaksam na nisedhr kadaeana-Mandanamisra.

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CRITIQUE OF NAYAS 133 victory to the Negativist. For instance, the jar is felt distinct from the textile. To be precise, the textile is the negation of the jar and the jar is the negation of the textile. As existence is opposed to nonexistence everything felt as distinct particular must be a manifestation of negation. Thus absolute negativism will be the only respectable philosophy. In order to reject the Negativist, the Vedantist must affirm that uncontradicted experience is the sole evidence of reality. But experience does not endorse pure being as maintained by the Vedantist. In experience we encounter particulars which are both existent and non-existent, existent as it is by itself and nonexistent as another. So neither absolute being nor absolute non being can be the character of reality. But a question has been raised how can being and non-being co-exist together in one substratum. The answer is given by the Jaina that they exist by relation of identity (tadatmya). And being a relation it must subsist between two terins existent and non-existent. The reals as being and non-being are iden tical as substances. But viewed as attributes they are felt to be different. A thing is existent taken by itself and non-existent as understood with reference to another. Being and non-being are one qua substance and felt as two when considered as attributes. A jar is existent as jar and non-existent as water. Existence and non-existence are therefore felt as attributes of the jar which is numerically one and the same substance. The acceptance of this philosophical appraisal brings about a reconciliation between the warring and conflicting reals and preserves the plurality consistently with their unity of being. Vedanta thrives by excluding non-being and Sunyavada gloats over the holocaust of being and non-being both. The verbalistic approach and its three varieties start with the assumption that word is more fundamental than matter. An entity can be understood thoroughly in the light of word. The monistic conclusion of Bhartshari is not accepted by all the advocates of sabdanaya (verbal approach). But their whole perspective has been given a uniform orientation by the tradition of the philosophy of grammar. The fundamental contention that each entity must have a descriptive name is rather a too sweeping proposition. The grammarian makes awareness identical with verbal expression. But there are facts which are too subtle to admit of verbal expression. However much one may combat the contention of the Buddhist philosophers headed by Dignaga and Dharmakirti that individuals are beyond the range of words, one cannot deny that the idea given by a word is a pale representation of an individual. The full-blooded individual can be known by direct intuition. This is the true assessment of experience. Another consideration also

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134 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 exposes the weakness of the verbalist. As has been stated by Dandin, the difference of the quality of sweetness in sugarcane, milk, sugar and the like is a felt fact, but it cannot be adequately described by words." As regards the second verbalistic naya which denies synonyms and makes out each word to be expressive of a different fact with a different connotation, it has the support of the Mamamsist who insists that each word must have a different meaning. But as we have observed, the poets make use of double entendre as a striking literary genre. Whatever may be its logical value, the contention that a word should be used for a thing which has the actualized connotation is rather an extreme position. Both the Naiyayika and Alaukarika (literary critic) have classified expressive words under four heads. Thus words are (i) yaugika, i. e, entirely derivative. Such words as pacaka=cook, pathaka= reader, denote meanings which are derived from the root and the suffix. But there are words called (ii) rudha which have meanings entirly underived from simpler elements. For instance, mandapa= pandal (Hindi) is a whole word. There are words called (iii) pogarudha which, though they may be derived from verbal roots. have an ad ditional meaning fixed by convenion. For instance, the word pankaja, with its derivative meaning 'one born from mud' or jalaia, 'one born from water', stand for lotus, a particular species of plants, though there are many things which are similarly traceable to the same origin. The contention of the verbalist which becomes more and more particular. istic in each succeeding assessment is inspired by extremistic bias and unilateral approach. The Jaina logician does not commit himself to any such appraisal but keeps an open mind and does not seek to offend against the convention of the majority of philosophers. Though language is intimately combined with thought, the former cannot be given a higher status than the latter. Knowledge by description falls short of knowledge by acquaintance because the fullblooded particular refuses to be handled by language. These verbalistic assessments have been given a place in the scheme of nayas heir importance is not metaphysically co-ordinate with that of other nayas. The recognition of these nayas is prompted by the consideration that words may be twisted and turned to the advantage of the speaker and demagogues, politicians, lawyers like the ancient sophists of Greece have distinguished themselves by their notorious manipulation of words. Philosophers are also not immune from this 1. iksuksiragudadinam madhuryasyantaram mahat / tathapi na tadakhyatum sarasvatya 'pi sakyate //

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SYADVADA 135 temptation and so this recognition of the role of verbal assessments is not entirely without a philosophical justification. I have dealt with the nayas and shown that they are to be interpreted with due qualification and unqualified application of them gives distorted version of the truth. But even in a regcognized canonical text we come across statements which deal with some particular aspect of reality and these are to be understood as provisional assertions of facts (nayasruta). It is only syidvada unfolded in sevenfold predication which gives insight into the truth of a proposition with all its bearings. Test nayanam ekanisthanam pravstteh srutavartmani sampurparthaviniscayi syadvadasrutam ucyate/ Translation "Nayas which are cognizant of one aspect of a real are found to occur in the scriptural canon. The full knowledge of real fact is afforded by the canonical text in the form of syadvada. ... (XXX) Elucidation There are three kinds of canon: (i) false or perverted statement; (ii) the statement unfolding a partial appraisal; and (iii) the statement of syadvada, i. e, sevenfold propositions which give a full description of a fact with all its bearings. The special characteristic of syadvada is its freedom from dogmatism. Each proposition in it is qualified by the proviso syat, meaning provided that it should be understood as true in relation to the context determined by the fourfold consideration as substance, its time, place and functional character (dravya-kala-ksetra. bhava). The doctrine of syadvada or sevenfold predication is a difficult subject. We have dealt with this problem in our work The Jaina philosophy of Non-Absolutism, and refer the curious reader to it for fuller understanding of the Jaina theory. We quote from the same work the following observation. "The full formulation of the predicates will assume the form as follows: (1) existence (in a specific context); (2) non-existence in another specific context); (3) successive occurrence of both the attributes; (4) inexpressibility; 15) inexpressibility as qualified by the first predicate; (6) inexpressibility as qualified by the second; (7) inexpressibility as qualified by the third. These are seven attributes which are expressed by seven propositions. The same rule holds good of any other attribute. The seven propositions distinctly stated will be as follows: (1) The pen exists in certain context);

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136 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I (2) the pen does not exist (in another context); (3) the pen exists and does not exist (respectively in its own context and in a different context); (4) the pen is inexpressible (qua having both existence and nonexistence as its attributes at the same time); (5) the pen exists (in its own context) and is inexpressible; (6) the pen does not exist (in other than its own context) and is inexpressible; (7) the pen exists and does not exist and is inexpressible. All these assertions are to be understood as subject to the conditions which objectively demarcate the attributes. Thus, existence can be predicated of the pen only in a definite context. The pen exists in so far as it is a substance and a specific substance at that, that is to say, in so far as it is a pen. Thus, existence can be predicated of it conformably to reality only by qualifying it by a necessary proviso indicated above. Again, the pen exists in its own space which it occupies and in the time in which it is known to endure. Further, the pen has a particular size, colour and shape and so on. The pen is not the pen if it is abstracted from these attributes which give it a definite individuality. Thus, substance (dravya), attribute (bhava), time (kala) and space (ksetra) form the context in relation to which an attribute, existence etc, can be predicated." "Thus Jaina asserts that even knowledge of a single attribute in respect of a substance must assume the form of seven modes, if it is to from obscurity and inadequacy. The sevenfold predication is, thus, a representation of this sevenfold conception and is expressed in a set of seven distinct propositions from which the knowledge of mutually consistent predicates, affirmative or negative, in respect of one subject, is derived. The full predication of an attribute, it is asserted, requires seven distinct propositions and an additional proposition is superfluous and the suppression of any one results in incomplete knowledge." The logical justification of each proposition has been demonstrated in my book under reference and we refrain from dilating on the subject to avoid undue inflation of the present dissertation. The treatment of pramana and naya and relevant problems has been attempted in the preceding portion of our dissertation. But it must be incomplete without a discourse on the nature of the epistemic subject (pramata) in which all these epistemological processes find their initial source and final repository. Our author Siddhasena Divakara describes the nature of the self in the next verse. 1. Op. cit. pp. 129-30, 2. Ibid., p. 128. ,

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EPISTEMIC SUBJECT 137 Text pramata svanyanirbhasi karta bhokta vivsttiman svasamvedanasamsiddho jivah ksityadyanatmakah || Translation "The epistemic subject reveals its own self and another (object), is the agent, experient, and the unitive bond running through all the different modes and transitions (which occur in it), is attested by self-experience, and is the living principle and is not of the nature of matter consisting of earth and other elements." ... (XXXI) Elucidation The full nature of the self has been summed up by these adjectival predicates. The self is the living principle. So life is the necessary predicate of the self and not of any material fact however subtle and refined it may be. Life has been described as the exercise of five sense-organs and the mind, the speech, the body, the respiratory functions and endurance for the stated period of time (ayus) allotted to each embodied self. These ten functions are collectively described as life. But this aggregate of the vital functions cannot be predicated of the emancipated soul and so this characterization is not fully comprehensive, though it holds good of the souls which are held in bondage of karma. And as these functions were exercised by the emancipated souls prior to their dissociation from karmic veils, it was their antecedent condition, and so their description as living beings is not incorrect though it is not a necessary concomitant of the pure emancipated self. But if the term life is understood as the exercise of spiritual functions namely, possession of intuition and knowledge consequent upon the total elimination of karmic bondage and as this is the true inner meaning of life, the description of the soul as a living principle may be justified without recourse to metaphorical interpretation. Senses, life, mind, etc. are derived from and ultimately inherent in the consciousness of the self and physical functions are only symptoms of the conscious principle associated with a psychophysical organism. The self is not numerically different from the principle of consciousness and as such it reveals, i. e., is aware of its own intrinsic nature and extrinsic objects. Consciousness is always self-consciousness and has a necessary reference to an external object. The Jaina conception of self as the very stuff of consciousness, though identical with that of the Samkhya and Vedanta philosophy, differs from their views in that it has necessary reference to an object. Pure objectless

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138 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 consciousness is not endorsed by the Jaina at any stage. The emancipated soul being free from all hindrances imposed by karmic limitations is perpetually aware of the entire extent of the subjective and objective pla nes of the universe. Accordingly, the qualifying adjective reveals itself and others' expresses a necessary ontological fact. Now we propose to examine the logical necessity of the other attributes specified in the original text. The first adjective 'revealing its own self and another also serves to rebut the views of the Mimansaka who believes that the different stages of the evolution of the self as congnition, feeling, and will are unperceivable, and that of the Vijnanavadin who denies the reality of external objects. The self is 'the agent' and also 'the experient' of pleasure, pain, etc. These two adjectives are calculated to rebut the Samkhya theory that an atman is not an agent but is an enjoyer of pleasure and pain. But the Jaina contends that the concept of enjoyment necessarily presupposes the agent of the act of enjoying. It has been, however, contended by the Samkhya that the concept of the enjoyer, experiencer is rather to be understood as the revealer of the reflection of the changes of the intellect (buddhi) upon the self. The self is pure spirit and without activity. It only reveals the changes of the intellect as cognition, feeling and the like and this is regarded as the experience of the self by transfer of epithet on account of their close association. But even this act of revelation presupposes some agency and activity on the part of the self. If the self does not relinquish its previous state of inactivity, how can it reveal the cantent of the intellect as a new event? The example of the crystal which takes the reflection of the red flower and appears as red does not support the position of the unchanging self. The crystal undergoes a change and has the aptitude for such change and therefore its appearance of redness is an actual transition. Certainly other opaque stones do not exhibit such changes. If the self is to be understood as absolutely inactive and totally repugnant to a change, it should not be believed to reveal the mental states. There are two theories of reflection as quoted by the commentator Siddharsi. The intellect is compared to a mirror and the images of objects which are the contents of the intellect, presuppose primary reflection. The intellect again endowed with the reflected objects as its contents casts its reflection on the pure self. This second reflection is called enjoyment (bhoga) by Vadamaharnava,' a work lost, and it is now 1. See Nyayavatara, p. 97.

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EPISTEMIC SUBJECT 139 sponsored by Vijnana-Bhiksu. The second interpretation is said to be given by Vindhyavasin' and his followers and is at present sponsored by Vacaspati Misra in the Samkh yatattvakaumudi. According to the second interpretation, the self (purusa) is absolutely static and unchanging, but being transparent, it casts its light on the mind or intellect by its mere presence. The colouring of the crystal owing to its contact with the red flower is an example. The red colour is only an appearance. So also the mental states appear to be conscious on account of the reflection of the self upon them. The self remains absolutely unaffected and there is no reflection of the mental states upon it. The reflection in this case is a false appearance, but the self remains immune from the contamination of false appearance. But whether the self is qualified by the appearance of the mental activity or entirely dissociated from it, the manifestation of the reflection either in the pure self or in the mind cannot be understood without some sort of activity on the part of the self. The incorporation of the psychical modes nnd transitions as the properties of the self marks out the Jaina conception of the self from the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. The latter maintains that cognition, feeling, volition, and their subtle traces actually occur in the self. But they do not induce any change in the cognizer. But the fact that these psychical events emerge and disappear in the very being of the self entails necessarily the transition of the self. It is asserted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika that these mental states become related to the self by means of inherence (samavaya). But the conception of inherence is not free from logical difficulty. After all it must be admitted that these states are the properties of the self and as they emerge and perish in the self, the self must be believed to have the capacity for appropriation of new mental states and abandonment of the previous ones and this is the connotation of change. The self is known by its own experience, that is to say, it is always self-conscious. This also constitutes its difference from the self as conceived by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. The last adjective 'not of the nature of earth' emphasizes the immateriality of the self. This runs counter to the theory of the materialists who dogmatically assert that consciousness is a by-product of the four or five elements, earth, water, fire, air and also ether (akasa) when they are combined in the form of the physical organism, in terms of modern physiology in the constitution of the cerebrum and 1. Ibid.

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140 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 connective sensory and efferent nerves. Matter and consciousness are diametrically opposed to one another. Matter is absolutely unfeeling and unconscious and consciousness is an internal spiritual fact. Now the question arises whether each of these material elements is endowed with consciousness or they collectively produce consciousness. But there is no instance of matter giving rise to consciousness. It is particularly in the human body that this causal efficiency of matter is believed to come into play as an emergent evolute. But if the peculiar combination of the material elements constituting the human body be accredited with this causal efficiency, the materialist should explain how the combination takes place. It must be the product of a cause. The Jaina theory of the association of the previously existent self with the new-born body rather furnishes the raison d'etre of the combination of material elements in a bodily organism. Moreover it is the most satisfactory theory of causation that what is produced is not entirely new. Production means the manifestation of a latent fact. The materialists are known for their dogmatism. They cannot prove that consciousness is a property of matter. Nor again can they prove that the conscious self suffers total death with the death of the body. The survival of the self after physical death has greater plausibility than the opposite theory. The denial of after-life and of the efficacy of moral virtues robs all the incentives for virtuous life, self-restraint, tem perance and justice. As this matter cannot be demonstratively proved with a podeictic certainty of mathematical processes, it will remain more or less an article of faith on either side. If the researches of the Psychical Research Society can reach the certitude of discoveries of other sciences, the scepticism of materialists will be successfully combated. But before this consummation is reached we must agree to differ and not try to convert the unbeliever to this or that creed. As for the theory of the Buddhists that there is no identical conscious principle known as the self and it is only a congeries of moment. ary psychical events, it ought to suffice to say that in spite of the ingenuity of the Buddhist arguments, the belief in the identity of the self is not an unfounded article of faith. The Buddhists believe in unrelieved plurality and denies the under-current of unity either in the psychical or in the material plane. But it is an acknowledged fact of experience that unity and diversity are perceived together both in the material bodies and in the psychical subject. The combination of unity and diversity has been accounted for by the law of anekanta. The Vedantist has shown that the consciousness cannot be denied self-contradiction, though the denial of plurality does not involve any such consequence. Even the Buddhists believe in the

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SUMMING UP 141 unity of a moment and unity is the presupposition of plurality which means plural units. If either of them is to be sacrificed, the Vedantist jettisons plurality. The realists of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school have tried to reconcile unity with plurality by means of inherence (samavaya) and the Jaina theory of anekanta succeeds with greater plausibility in preserving the coherence of matter and spirit, unity and plurality. The author of the Nyayavatara sums up the net results of his dissertation in the concluding verse. Text pramapadivyavastheyam anadinidhanatmika sarvasamvyavahartrnam prasiddhapi prakirtita // Translation "The determinate conception (and implied classification) of cognitive organs and the like (relevant facts) is without a beginning and without an end. It is much too familiar to all human beings engaged in (theoretical an practical) activities, and this has been discussed (in this treatise)." ... (XXXII) Elucidation The science of epistemology dealing with different cognitive organs such as perception, inference, verbal testimony and the rest together with the nayas has been surveyed in outline in this treatise. These matters are not entirely unknown even to men of average understanding and are too familiar and favourite objects of discussion by logicians of all schools. In fact scientific investigation and systematization are rather the natural consequence of human thinking as the condition of all purposeful activity. Man is a rational animal and he exercises his faculty of reasoning as a natural process of activity quite as he exercises his respiratory functions. Man is a born logician and the academic training in logic is not the condition of his rationalizing activity. Unless a man exercises his reasoning faculty in the organiza. tion of experience and forecasts the probable results of his behaviour, he cannot move an inch. Even day to day activities of the uneducated wage-earner presuppose a modicum of reasoned thinking, evaluation of his past experience, his previous success and failure, truthful verification and disappointment caused by mistakes. Academic education cannot pretend to be a source of such knowledge and activity. But it is not a fruitless waste of time and sisyphean labour. The ideas of uneducated persons are rather confused and not properly distinguished from their opposite counterparts. The academic discipline unavoidably involves an arduous course of intellectual and physical

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142 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I are drill. But one has to pay this price for the sake of precision and proper systematization. As physical exercise properly guided by scientific process results in the improvement and invigoration of the body and its several organs, intellectual exercise also leads to similar improvement in the human intellect. There are men who are chronic victims of indecision and are exploited by clever men who find it profitable to accelerate their tizzy. But professors and teachers are a class of people who help their unfortunate fellow-beings out of this morass of ignorance. They clear away their cobwebs of misconception by imparting true instruction. But unfortunately even among teachers there found persons who want to derive wealth by sophistical arguments. They also professedly teach their pupils to use sophistry in order to gain undue advantage by puting a wrong complexion on the truthful testimony of honest persons. In ancient Greece, these professional sophists had a respectable place in society. More often than not the professional politicians are found to misguide the uninformed masses and by holding out rosy prospects of easy prosperity hoodwink them to gain their votes in a democracy and lull them into sense of security in a totalitarian state. The effects of such bad education or want of education are eliminated and in most cases mitigated by the gift of true knowledge and stimulation of true insight. The academic processes such as the definitions of the terms and the exhibition of fallacies go a long way in the cultivation of the intellect. Education does not claim to generate new faculties of knowledge, but it regenerates the existing resources and next makes the trainees fitter for the struggle for existence. The religious teachers inculcate the harmful consequences of moral depravity. They show the bright side of life, the wholesome effects of moral discipline. They teach them to be unselfish and compassionate and sympathetic to the people in humbler station of life. Logic like ethics has a practical side. Theoretical knowledge makes the victims of the rule of thumb realize the reasons underlying this success of blindfolded processes. The crucial test of sincerity enlightened by knowledge is the freedom from secular motives of private self-aggrandizement. There have been persons who sacrifice or subordinate their private ambitions for power and wealth and find the fulfilment of their mission in the emancipation of their fellow creatures from the shackles of ignorance, superstition and ego-centric preoccupation. The pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge becomes a passion. They are the salt of the earth as has been said by Jesus Christ. The Jaina Tirthankaras, the Bodhisatvas of the Mahayana school and the Sthitaprajnas (men of unwavering wisdom) of the Gita are embodiments of selflessness, for whom the

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SUMMING UP 143 welfare of living beings is the sole interest and passion. The weal of the common man is their own weal. They do not want to enjoy their own happiness when the rest of mankind is entangled in suffering due to want of the light of knowledge. The unceasing cultivation of knowledge is only a reflex of selflessness. Those who make it an instrument of personal aggrandizement are guilty of committing profanity of a sacred mission. The propagation of science and the cultivation of humanities owe their inception to disinterested love of knowledge and love for fellow-beings. It will be a bad day for mankind if the centres of education are annihilated and men are taught to become misologists. This will lead to total degeneration and atavism to primitive savagery. The present-day wanton crusade against educational centres carried on by teen-agers at the behest of disgruntled politicians in India must be smashed to pieces and no quarter is to be shown to the misguided enemies of culture. We hope that these orgies of madness will prove to be a temporary lapse and not a permanent holiday from sanity.

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OTHER INDIAN RELIGIONS AND GANDHI'S AHIMSA NATHMAL TATIA 1. The Jaina saints and philosophers completely identified their religion with ahimsa which is also the keynote of their scripture. Ahimsa is the principal virtue prescribed in the moral code of Jainism, the other virtues-viz. truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and nonpossession-being only subordinate in that they are for the purpose of protecting and strengthening ahimss. Though the moral law na himsyat sarva bhutani (one should not cause injury to any living being) is accepted also in Brahmanism and Buddhism, it is only in Jainism that the rule is universally applied and the entire life of its followers, both ascetics and householders, is governed by this ethical principle observed fully or partially according to their spiritual status. Knowledge of botany and biology is inculcated in the disciples to enable them to refrain from doing injury to living beings classified as onesensed, two-sensed, and the like The Jaina doctrine of anekanta (nonabsolutism) is also an outcome of ahimsa as applied in the field of speculative thought. In fact, everything that is Jainistic is directly or indirectly connected with this principle. 2. 'The Vedic sacrifices (yajnas ) performed for worldly prosperity and the attainment of heaven gradually gave way to the yamas and niyamas which were found out as their substitutes. The concept of dharma radically changed in course of time. The means must be as lofty as the end. If the means to the attainment of heaven involved killing of animals, it should be discarded. If the end was a transient heaven, it was not an object worthy of pursuit. The meaning of the term yajna (sacrifice) was also widened to cover 'acts of selfiess service dedicated to God' as exemplified in the following verse of the Bhagavadgita (III. 9). yajnarthat karmapo'n yatra loko'yam karmabandhanah tadartham karma kaunteya muktasangah samacara / That is, this world of men suffers bondage from all action save that which is done for the sake of sacrifice; to this end, O Kaunteya, 1. Read at the All India Seminar on "Theory and Technique of Ahimsa" organized by the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, October 11-15, 1989. 10

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146 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 perform action without attachment. The Mimamsaka philosopher finally identified his heaven with unhindered and eternal bliss. The Jainas and Buddhists regarded heaven as the fruit of a discipline (consisting of austerity, meditation, etc.) which was impure and motivated, while their highest goal of salvation (moksa or nirvana) was achieved by the total eradication of passions through the selfless pursuit of the spiritual discipline which was pure and unmotivated. The Samkhya-Yoga philosopher's attitude towards the Vedic rituals and his summum bonum are expressed in the Samkhyakarika (verse 2) which runs as follows: distavad anusravikah sa hyavisuddhiksayatisayayuktah / tadviparitah sreyan vyaktavyaktajnavijnanat // That is, the result of the Vedic rituals is (as useless) as ( that of) the customary (remedy), because the former is attended by impurity (due to killing of animals), cessation (after the predetermined period) and gradation as high (and low); the contrary (that is, salvation) is better, which is achieved through the knowledge of the manifest and unmanifest (states of the prakrti) and the principle of conciousness (that is, purusa). The Vedantin's position in this respect is represented by the following assertion of the Bhagavadgita (II. 46): yavan artha udapane sarvatah samplutodake / tavan sarvesu vedesu brahmapasya vijanatah 11 That is, to the extent that a well is of use when there is a flood of water on all sides, to the same extent are all the Vedas of use to an enlightened Brahmana, The Vedic rites are needless for a person who has realized the Brahman. The foundation of the sacrificial cult was shaken by the relentless crusade by the Jainas (vide Uttaradhyayana, XII and XXV) against it. The Buddhists joined hands with the Jainas in this enterprise (Suttantpata-Brahmanadhammikasutta) which was continued through the ages of our history. The tenth and eleventh pacittiyas (expiatory rules, vide Vinaya Pitaka, Pacittiyapali, pp. 52-56), which prohibit the digging of earth (pathavi-khanana) and selling of vegetation bhutagamapa tavyata, bhutaga ma being explained as five kinds of seeds, viz. mula-bija, khandha-blja, phala-bija, agga-bija, and bija-bija) by a Buddhist monk were prescribed by the Buddha under pressure from the people who believed in earth and vegetation as one-sensed living beings (ekendriya-jiva) and were obviously none other than the followers of Nigantha Nataputta. The influence of Jaina ahimsa on the contemporary.religions is, therefore, a truth founded on adequate knowledge and not a mere opinion based on insufficient data.

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA... 147 3. Ahimsa as a vow means 'desisting from himsa". The Jaina philosopher's concept of ahimsa is clearly understood from his analysis of himsa which he defines as 'the taking away of life under the influence of pramada' (Tattvarthasutra, VII. 13 : pramattayogat pranaoya paropanam himsa). Here pramada stands for "unrestraint, passions and perversities and is the most important factor being, indeed, the criterion by which an act is to be judged as himsa. Whether a living being is actually killed or not, a person without self-restraint has definitely committed himsa (technically called bhava-himsa): maradu va jiyadu va jiyo ayadacarassa nicchida himsa -- Pravacanas ara, III. 17a-b. There is, on the other hand, no karmic bondage consequent upon 'a mere act of himsa (technically called dravya-himsa) by a person observing unexceptionable self-restraint : Payadassa patthi bamdho himsamettepa samidassa -Ibid, III 17c-d. Thus a hunter, on account of his defiled state of mind, is considered a murderer, even though he has not actually committed any murder; but a surgeon, on account of his undefiled and pure condition of mind, is not regarded as a cruel person, even though the patient may feel pain or even die: ahapamto vi hu himso dutthattayao mao abhimaro vva) bahimto na vi himso suddhattapao jaha vijjo// - Visesavasyakabhasya, 1764. Suppose, again, a person is extremely careful for avoiding injury to life, his mind being saturated with compassion for all living beings. Now if in spite of his freedom from passions and extreme caution and carefulness, he chances to tread upon an insect and injure it, that is not an act of himsa. The Jaina monks and nuns accordingly claim that the strict observance of their moral code which prohibits even the taking of alms prepared for them--thus obviating even their indirect participation in himsa involved in the preparation of food, drink, etc.--guarantees the possibility of their lives being absolutely free from any kind of himsa. Akalanka has raised the interesting problem as to how a monk could be declared absolutely free from himsa when there are living beings in land, water and air, and the world is replete with clusters of living beings everywhere : jale jantuh sthale janturakase jantureva ca/ jantumalak ule loke katham bhikgurahinsakah// - Tattoarthara jadartika, VII. 13,

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148 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 His ingenious reply will not fail to amuse the discerning reader : suksma na pratipidyante praninah sthulamurtayah/ ye sakyas te vivarjyante ka himsa samyatatmanah// - Ibid. That is, the micro-organisms are, by nature, unamenable to molestation, and the macroscopic beings that are liable to torture are carefully avoided, and this leaves no occasion of himsa for the self-restrained ascetic. The Jaina laity is required to desist from all kinds of himsa that is capable of being avoided and is unnecessary for the maintenance of life. Intentional taking away of life of beings higher than the onesensed is stictly prohibited for all. Meat-eating is forbidden, because it is not unavoidable and involves killing of animals, which is not permissible even for a householder. Nobody however is absolved from sin consequent upon himsa, whether it was avoidable or unavoidable, the degree of seriousness of the sin committed varying with the intensity of passions at the moment of perpetrating the act. Even the unselfish or benevolent acts of himsa are not considered free from sin. Some Jaina thinkers have of course defended construction of temples, and other charitable acts as religiously meritorious, but others have unambiguously denounced them as sinful activities. As regards a Jaina layman's participation in war, of which there are many notable instances in history, specific prohibition is not available, though the martial acts of violence are ipso facto incompatible with the Jaina philosopher's concept of ahimsa, and the Bhagavatisutra (VII. 9) categorically rejects the notion that the fearless warrior dead in the battlefield attains heaven. The moral and religious sanction that wars enjoy in orthodox Brahmanism is conspicuous by its absence in Jainism. Justification of the means by the end is not accepted by the Jaina thinkers as a morally valid argument. A good end cannot be achieved by a bad means. The behaviour must be as pure as the intention. The Jainas consequently came to be regarded as staunch advocates of the philosophy of external behaviour as distinguished from the Buddhist and the Brahmanical thinkers who were the protagonists of the doctrine of internal intention. The moral difference between an injury done to a superior life and that inflicted on an inferior creature (Atthasalini, p. 80; Manusmrti, XI. 140-1) was not recognized in Jainism. The Jainas did not accept the utilitarian view of ahimsa. These considerations however did not stand in the way of a Jaina layman's participation in the activities of social and national welfare which were pursued by the Jaina laity as zealously as by the followers of other faiths.

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146 THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA... The highest ideal of compassion was however developed by the Mahayana Buddhists for whom redemption meant redemption of all and not of the individual self. The Buddha, according to them, has not entered into Nirvana at all, but is labouring for the spread of the knowledge of redemption. As long as living creatures suffer, there is no possibility of joy for those who are full of compassion. "All the enjoyments that I possess and all the merits that I earned in the past or am earning at present or shall earn in the future, I give up without hesitation for the welfare of all beings"-such is the determination of the bodhisattva: atmabhavamstatha bhogan sarvatryadhvagatam subham nirap eksas ty ajamyesa sarvasattvarthasiddhayell -Bodhicaryavatara, III. 10. 4. Let us now look at the orientation that the principle of ahimsa received in the life and activities of Mahatma Gandhi. But before doing so, a brief statement of the beliefs and values cherished by him would be found useful. The whole of his activity whether it was social, political, humanitarian or ethical was directed to the finding of Truth which was his God. He had a passion for the service of the suppressed classes. For him the road to salvation lay through incessant toil in the service of his country and therethrough of humanity. There were no politics devoid of religion (MMG, p 25). Means and end are convertible terms in Gandhi's philosophy. The means is likened to a seed, the end to a tree. Impure means result in impure end. One cannot reach Truth by untruthfulness. Truthful conduct alone can reach Truth (ib., p. 26). Gandhi was an irrepressible optimist. His aim was not to be consistent with his previous statements on a given question, but to be consistent with truth as it might present itself to him at a given moment. He believed in growth from truth to truth (ib., p. 28). Gandhi wished to live up to the age of 125 years 'while performing service without an eye on result (HD, p. 48). He did not want to be reborn. "But if I have to be reborn." says he, "I should be born an untouchable, so that I may share their sorrows, sufferings, and the affronts levelled at them, in order that I may endeavour to free myself and them from that miserable condition." (MMG, p. 33). The Mahayana ideal of self-sacrifice and service finds its reaffirmation in this sacred will and testament of Mahatma Gandhi, and also a practical vindication in his life. Now let us come to the relevant issue of ahimsa. Gandhi's exposition of ahimsa is as follows :

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150 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 .."Himsa means causing pain to or killing any life out of anger or from selfish purpose, or with the intention of injuring it. Refrainiug from so doing is ahimsa. "The physician who prescribes bitter medicine causes you pain but does no himsa. If he fails to prescribe bitter medicine when it is necessary to do so, he fails in his duty of ahinsa. The surgeon who, from fear of causing pain to his patient, hesitates to amputate a rotten limb is guilty of himsa. He who refrains from killing a murderer who is about to kill his ward (when he cannot prevent him otherwise) earns no merit, but commits a sin; he practises no ahimsa but himsa out of a fatuous sense of ahimsa. "Let us now examine the root of ahimsa. It is uttermost selflessness. Selflessness means complete freedom from a regard for one's body. When some sage observed man killing numberless creatures, big and small, out of a regard for his own body, he was shocked at his ignorance. He pitied him for thus forgetting the deathless soul, encased within the perishable body, and for thinking of the ephemeral physical pleasure in preference to the eternal bliss of the spirit. He therefrom deduced the duty of complete self-effacement. He saw that if man desires to realize himself, i.e. Truth, he could do so only by being completely detached from the body, i.e. by making all other beings feel safe from him. That is the way of ahimsa. "A realization of this truth shows that the sin of himsa consists not in merely taking life, but in taking life for the sake of one's perishable body. All destruction therefore involved in the process of eating, drinking, etc. is selfish and therefore himsa. But the destruction of bodies of tortured creatures being for their own peace cannot be regarded as himsa, or the unavoidable destruction caused for the purpose of protecting one's wards cannot be regarded as himsa" (HD. pp. 198-9). The definition of ahimsa given above substantially tallies with the one proposed by the Jainas who, however, would not agree all the illustrations adduced in this connection. To refrain from killing an otherwise uncontrollable murderer is not a sin according to Jainism Similarly the destruction of bodies of tortured creatures would also be regarded as himsa by the Jainas. The calf-incident and the proposal to kill the monkeys and rabid dogs were also not approved by the followers of Jainism. Referring to the calf-incident, a correspondent wrote: "Supposing my elder brother is suffering from a terrible and painful malady and doctors have despaired of his life and I too feel likewise, should I in the circumstances put him out of life ?"

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMA... 151 Gandhi's reply in this connection was in the negative. His agruments were as follows: In the first place, the human body being much more manageable in bulk is always easier to manipulate and nurse; secondly, man being gifted with the power of speech, more often than not, is in a position to express his wishes, and so the question of taking his life, without his consent cannot come within the rule. The question of animal sacrifice was also raised in this connection, on the plea that the animals sacrificed gained merit in the life to follow. But Gandhi rejected the plea on the ground that the sacrificial act, being not altogether disinterested, was to be spelt as himsa (ib., pp. 234-6). The possibility of a purely selfless and disinterested action is also discussed. Even the unavoidable destruction of life that a farmer has to commit in pursuit of his calling is not described as ahimsa. One may regard such destruction of life as unavoidable and condone it as such, but it cannot be spelt otherwise than as himsa. The underlying motive with the farmer is to subserve his own interest or, say that of society. Ahimsa on the other hand rules out such interested action (ib., p 226). This stand of Gandhi is fully endorsed by Jainism. The killing of the calf, though undertaken with nothing but its good as the motive, is not approved by the Jainas on account of a possible error of judgement on the part of the person taking the decision. But such error is considered irrelevant to the fact of the motive prompting the act' (ib., p. 209, though this refers to kllling of dogs). It is admitted that there is always a possibility of one's mistaking right for wrong and vice versa, but it is asserted at the same time that "often one learns to recognize wrong only through unconscious error. On the other hand, if a man fails to follow the light within for fear of public opinion or any other similar reason he would never be able to know right from wrong and in the end lose all sense of distinction between the two" (ib., p. 216). And Gandhi is also prepared to take the consequences of his error (ib., p. 224). Things appear as they are "only to a few who have perfected themselves after ages of penance." (ib., p. 196). A critic protested against the killing of the calf as a vain attempt to intervene with the operation of the law of karma. Gandhi's reply to the objection is representative of his philosophy of free-will and service as an imperative duty incumbent upon all human beings. "I firmly believe," says he "in the law of karma but I believe too in human endeavour. I regard as the summum bonum of life the attainment of salvation through karma by annihilating its effects by detachment. If it is a violation of the law of karma to cut short the

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152 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 agony of an ailing animal by putting an end to its life, it is no less so to minister to the sick or try to nurse them back to life. And yet if a man were to refuse to give medicine to a patient or to nurse him on the ground of karma, we would hold him to be guilty of inhumanity and himsa. Without therefore entering into a discussion about the eternal controversy regarding pre-destination and free-will, I will simply say here that I deem it to be the highest duty of man to render what little service he can" (ib., p. 224). The killing of the calf is a case, to use Jaina terminology for a non-Jaina concept, of dravya-himsa which is, truly speaking, bhava-ahisma. As regards the killing of the murderer, only the yogin who can subdue his fury may not kill him. But the duty of a society of ordinary erring human beings cannot but be otherwise (Cf. ib., p. 198). Similarly, although there can be no absolute duty to kill dogs, etc., it becomes a necessary duty for certain people at certain times and certain circumstances (ib., p. 200). The killing of microbes by the use of disinfectants is violence and yet a duty. But why even go as far as that ? The air in a dark closed room is full of little microbes, and the introduction of light and air into it by opening it is destruction indeed. But it is ever a duty to use that finest of disinfectants-pure air (ib., p. 194). The non-killing in these cases would be tantamount to, again to employ Jaina terminology for a non-Jaina concept, dravya-ahimsa, though in fact it is bhava-himsa. Gandhi did not believe in the possibility of absolute freedom from himsa. "Even the forest-dweller", says he, "cannot be entirely free from violence, in spite of his limitless compassion. With every breath he commits a certain amount of violence. The body itself is a house of slaughter, and therefore Moksa and Eternal Blsss consist in perfect deliverance from body, and therefore all pleasure, save the joy of Moksa, is evanescent, imperfect." (ib. p. 195). The Jaina ascetic's faith in his absolute observance of ahimsa is thus denied. The practical worth of ahimsa however remains unaffected in spite of its incompatibility with life in the body. "The very virtue of a religious ideal", says Gandhi, "lies in the fact that it cannot be completely realized in the flesh. For a religious ideal must be proved by faith, and how can faith have play if perfection could be attained by the spirit while it was still surrounded by its earthly vesture of decay' ? Where would there be scope for its infinite expansion which is its essential characteristic ?" (ib., p. 239). The difference between direct himsa such as that involved in agriculture and indirect himsa as that involved in the eating of

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA... 153 agricultural produce is not accepted, because then a votary of ahimsa must renounce agriculture although he knows that he cannot enounce the fruits of agriculture, and that agriculture is an indispensable condition for the existence of mankind. "The very idea", says Gandhi, "that millions of the sons of the soil remain steeped in himsa in order that a handful of men who live on the toil of these people might be able to practise ahimsa seems to me to be unworthy of and inconsistent with the supreme duty of ahimsa". (ib., 231). This is yet another argument against the claim of the Jaina monks and nuns that they live a life which is absolutely free from ahimsa. The question of intention or motive also receives a new orientation in Gandhian philosophy, "Whilst it is true", says Gandhi, that mental attitude is the crucial test of ahimsa, it is not the sole test. To kill any living being or thing save for his or its own interest is himsa, however noble the motive may otherwise be. And a man who harbours ill will towards another is no less guilty of himsa because for fear of society or want of opportunity he is unable to translate his ill will into action. A reference to both intent and deed is thus necessary in order finally to decide whether a particular act or abstention can be classed as ahimsa After all intent has to be inferred from a bunch of correlated acts." (ib.. p. 227). Gandhi was opposed to flesh-food. He was born and bred in Gujrat where the opposition to and abhorrence of meat-eating were in great strength among the Jainas and Vaispavas. He however abjured meat out of the purity of his desire not to lie to his parents (MET, p. 36). He held flesh-food to be unsuited to human species (HD. p. 192). But he did not make a fetish of vegetarianism. "It should be remembered", says Gandhi, "that mere jivadaya (kindness to animals) does not enable us to overcome the 'six deadly enemies' within us, namely lust, anger, greed, infatuation, pride and falsehood. Give me the man who has completely conquered self and is full of godwill and love towards all and is ruled by the law of love in all his action, and I for one will offer him my respectful homage even though he be a meat-eater." (ib, p. 240). One is here reminded of the dialogue between Kasyapa Buddha and the ascetic Tisya as recorded in the Amagandha Sutta of the Suttanipata (II.2). We reproduce here only two verses (3 & 7), one from the questions asked by Tisya and annother from the reply given by Kasyapa Budha. Question na amagandho mama kappatiti icceva tvam bhasasi brahma bandhu / salinamannam paribhunjamano sakuntamamsehi susamkhatehi | pucchami tam kassapa etamattham kathappakaro tava amagandho //

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154 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I Thou sayest, Obrahma-kinsman, that impure food (a magandha) is not acceptable to thee, although thou enjoyest food made of rice together with well-prepared flesh of birds. Of what sort then, O Kashyapa, is thy impure food ? I ask the this question. Answer kodho mado thambho paccutthapana ca maya usnya bhassasamussa yo ca/ manatimano ca asabbhi santhavo esamagandho na hi mamsabhojanam // Anger, intoxication, obstinacy, bigotry, deceit, envy, grandiloquence, pride and conceit, intimacy with the wicked - this is impure food, and not the eating of flesh. As regards war, Gandhi's non-violent substitute for it is satyagraha, self-purification-culminating in the vow of brahmacarya which he took in the year 1906-being a preliminary to it (MET, p. 389) The original term was passive resistance' which was however found 'too narrowly construed'. Maganlal Gandhi coined the word sadagraha (sat=truth, agraha = firmness), but in order to make it clearer, Gandhi changed it to satyagraha (ib). In the Boer War in the beginning of this century, in the Zulu Rebellion of 1906, and also in the First World War (1914-1918), Gandhi, however, offered his services for nursing the sick and the wounded soldiers, fully knowing that even 'those who confine themselves to attending to the wounded in battle cannot be absolved from the guilt of war' (ib., p. 429). He participated in the war because he lacked the capacity and fitness for resisting the violence of war' (ib., p. 428). Satyagraha was defined by Gokhale as follows (in 1909): "It is essentially defensive in nature and it fights with moral and spiritual weapons. A passive resister resists tyranny by undergoing suffering in his own person. He pits soul force against brute force; he pits the divine in man against the brute in man; he pits suffering against oppression; he pits conscience against might; he pits faith against injustice, right against wrong." (MG, p. 165). The victory of the moral force over physical violence and injustice is an ancient truth forcefully represented by Gandhi in The Doctrine of the Sword published in Young India of August 11, 1920. There he declares: "Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute. The spirit lies dormant in the brute and he knows no law but that of physical might. The dignity of man requires obedience to a higher law to the strength of the spirit.

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA... 155 "I have therefore ventured to place before India the ancient law of self-sacrifice. For satyagraha and its offshoots, non-cooperation and civil resistance are nothing but new names for the law of selfsuffering. The rsis, who discovered the law of non-violence were greater geniuses than Newton. They were themselves greater warriors than Wellington. Having themselves known the use of arms they realized their uselessness and taught a weary world that its salvation lay not through violence but through non-violence. "Non-violence in its dynamic conditon means conscious suffering. It does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant. Working under this law of our being, it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire to save his honour, his religion, his soul and lay the foundation for that empire's fall or its regeneration." Gandhi did not approve of the killing of evil-doer or tyrant on the analogy of killing of animal pests that destroy a farmer's crops, because the former is not considered beyond reform whereas society as yet knows of no means by which to effect a change of heart in the latter. (Cf. HD, 226-7). Gandhi's self-purification as a pre-condition of satyagraha and his 'participation' in war find their parallel in the life of a lay disciple of Lord Mahavira. It is recorded in the Bhagavatisulra, VII. 9, that Varuna, the grandson of Naga, was conscripted by the Ruling Chief of Vaisali for service in the Rathamusala War against King Kapika (Ajatasatru). In preparation for the war, he started observing his religious penances with redoubled vigour and entered the battlefield with the vow that he would strike in self-defence only at him who will at ack him first, and at none else. Being eventually shot with a deadly arrow by the enemy, he drew his bow and killed him. And realizing that the sands of life were running out, he retired to a solitary place, offered prayer, took the vow of absolute observance of ahimsa and drew his last breath to be reborn in heaven. Varuna fought the battle in fulfilment of a public duty that he thought he owed to the state, without however compromising his religious ideal of ahimsa. He did not go to war as an aggressor, but purely in self-defence. He retired from the war without the feeling of animosity against anybody and strived for the realization of perfect ahimsa. The example of revengeless war, set by Varuna, should be considered as an ancient prototype of Gandhi's satyagraha as explained above.

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156 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 Ahimsa is intertwined with truth, and it is practically impossible to disentangle them. Nevertheless, ahimsa is the means, truth is the end (MMG, p. 9. There is no means other than ahimsa to realize truth which is the supreme end. Himsa is no alternative to ahinsa as means, because it cannot lead one to truth. The means cannot be dissimilar to the end. The orthodox Brahmanical view of righteous war as justified by the demands of the situation and as propounded by Lokamanya Tilak (GR, pp. 42-3) in modern times is, therefore, not endorsed by Gandhi. End cannot justify the means. Count Harmann Keyserling has given a critical exposition of the problem, from the standpoint of the law of polarity, which will bear quotation in extenso : "This age of ours is one of accepted violence as no previous age ever was, for, this time, the majorities of absolutely all countries inhabited by white men are in some form or other in its favour, as are equally the majorities of most coloured races. Owing to this, it seems to me quite out of the question that this movement demanding change by means of force should end before having exhausted all its chances and possibilities; there will be wars and wars, struggles and struggles, in some place or other of the earth for many centuries to come. But precisely because that is and will be so, a movement inspired by the apparently merely negative ideas of non-violence can gain a vital and a historic importance that it could never have--and as a matter of fact never has--gained under other circumstances. All the more so, as the polar tension between the ideal of non-violence and its opposite implies another polarity; that of the supremacy of the importance accorded to the means employed versus the supremacy of importance accorded to the ends attained. And it is this latter polarity which, in my opinion, guarantees the immortality of Gandhi as a symbol, whatever may be the eventual success of the movement initiated by him on the plane of facts. Indeed, as long as the Jesuit maxim, "the end sanctifies the means'' (a maxim really also accepted by the Puritans in their dealings with Red Indians), prevails, a real and permanent betterment of the world's condition seems out of the question : destructive means employed engender corresponding counter-means and so forth ad infinitum. As the Buddha put it. "If hatred responds to hatred, when and where will hatred end ?" (MG. p. 133-4). Gandhi advised violence 'where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence' (MG, p. 382). He 'would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour' (ib.).

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA... 157 It became Gandhi's conviction that even venomous creatures may not be killed by a believer in ahimsa (HD, p. 151). He believed that the central teaching of the Gita was not himsa but ahimsa. Himsa is impossible without anger, without attachment, without hatred, and the Gita strives to carry us to the state beyond sattva, rajas and tamas, a state that excludes anger, hatred etc. (ib. p. 155). Gandhi also believed that the author of the Gita had extended the meanings of some of the important words. "We are able to discover this", say he, "even on a superficial examination. It is possible, that in the age prior to that of Gita, offering of animals in sacrifice was permissible. But there is not a trace of it in the sacrifice in the Gita sense. In the Gita continuous concentration on God is the king of sacrifices. The third chapter seems to show that sacrifice chiefly means body-labour for service. The third and fourth chapters read together will give us other meanings for sacrifice but never animal-sacrifice. Similarly has the meaning of the word sannyasa undergone, in the Gita, a transformation The sannyasa of the Gita will not tolerate complete cessation of all activity. The sannyasa of the Gita is all work and yet no work. Thus the author of the Gita by extending meanings of words has taught us to imitate him Let it be granted, that according to the Gita it is possible to say that warfare is consistent with renunciation of fruit. But after 40 years' unremitting endeavour fully to enforce the teaching of the Gita in my own life, I have in all humility, felt that perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observance of ahimsa in every shape and form" (ib., p. 164). Gandhi was an absolutist. "The fact is," says he, "that a votary of ahimsa cannot subscribe to the utilitarian formula. He will strive for the greatest good of all and die in the attempt to realize the ideal. He will therefore be willing to die so that the other may live ........... The utilitarian to be logical will never sacrifice himself. The absolutist will eyen sacrifice himself. The absolutist, when he kills a dog, does so either out of weakness or in rare cases for the sake of the dog himself. That it is a dangerous thing to decide what is or is not good for the dog, and that he may therefore make grievous mistakes is irrelevant to the fact of the motive prompting the act. The absolutist's sphere of destruction will be always the narrowest possible. The utilitarian's has no limit. Judged by the standard of non-violence, the late war (First World War) was wholly wrong. Judged by the utilitarian standard, each party had justified it according to its idea of utility" (ib., p. 209). Here Gandhi is in substantial agreement with the Jaina philosopher who does not believe in the killing of some for the benefit of many, or of the lower species in the interest of a higher one.

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158 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I 5. That the Jaina ideal of ahimsa is the starting point of Gandhi is indisputable. He was born in a society which had intimate connections with the Jainas. On his return from England in 1891, he was introduced by Dr P.J. Mehta to the Jaina Poet Raychandbhai who was a sata vadhani, and at the very first meeting with him, Gandhi was convinced that 'he was a man of great character and learning'. Raychandbhai's 'wide knowledge of the scriptures, his spotless character, and his burning passion for self-realization' cast their spell over him. Gandhi was convinced that the centre round which his life revolved was 'the passion to see God face to face' (MET, pp. 112-3). He saw him 'absorbed in godly pursuits in the midst of business, not once or twice, but very often'. "I have since met", says Gandhi, "many a religious leader or teacher. I have tried to meet the heads of various faiths, and I must say that no one else has ever made on me the impression that Raychandbhai did. His words went straight home to me. His intellect compelled as great a regard from me as his moral earnestness, and deep down in me was the conviction that he would never willingly lead me astray and would always confide to me his innermost thoughts. In my moments of spiritual crisis, therefore, he was my refuge." (ib., p. 113). But in spite of this high regard for him, he could not enthrone Raychandbhai in his heart as his Guru (ib.). Gandhi was in search of a perfect jnani, a Guru who could guide him in his 'ceaseless striving after perfection as one's right' (ib., p. 114) and lead the way to the Kingdom of Heaven 'through incessant toil in the service of his country and therethrough of humanity' (Cf. HD, p14). This at once sets forth the points of contact and departure between the Jaina and the Gandhian view of life. Gandhi could not reconcile himself to the faith that a particular theory should be the spring of action in any case. "You may commit himsa," says he, "not in order that you thereby realize in practice a pet theory of yours, but because you are driven to it as an imperative duty" (ib., p. 206). The Jaina saint's exclusively inward stress on personal perfection was not acceptable to Gandhi. Nevertheless, the impact of the saint on him was deep. "Three moderns," says Gandhi, "have left a deep impress on my life, and captivated me : Raychandbhai by his living contact; Tolstoy by his book, The Kingdom of God is within You; and Ruskin by his Unto this Last." (MET, p. 114). Raychandbhai's remark that 'no other religion has the subtle and profound thought of Hinduism, its vision of the soul, or its charity' pacified Gandhi's mind agitated about the pressingly visible defects of Hinduism' (ib., p. 171). The influence of Raychandbhai again was a predominant factor in setting Gandhi's thoughts in the direction of brahmacarya (ib.. p. 252). It was again from him that

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THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMSA... 159 Gandhi first learnt that milk stimulated animal passion (ib., p. 401). It was Raychandbhai's advice to Gandhi that rather than kill the serpent he should allow himself to be killed by it (HD., p. 204). Some people think that Gandhi's idea of satyagraha owes its origin to the practice of dharna whereby a creditor at an obstinate debtor's door, an aggrieved person at the door of an oppressor or enemy, sat fasting until death or redress released him (MG, p. 225). Whatever the origin, the satyagraha was forged into a soul force against brute force, the di vine in man against the brute in him. This is undeniable and indisputable. A Jaina muni once pointed out that Gandhi was not so much a votary of ahimsa, as he was of truth, that he put latter in the first place and the former in the second, and that he was capable of sacrificing non-violence for the sake of truth. Gandhi vouched for the rightness of the statement and averred that it was in the course of his pursuit of Truth that he discovered non-violence (MMIG, p. 10). The opponent must be weaned from error and established in Truth by patience and sympathy. Pursuit of Truth therefore did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent' (MMG, p. 17). Jainism as a religion of individual perfection postulated ahimsa as the spiritual means and also the end which was identical with moksa, whereas Gandhi took a comprehensive view of life in its different aspects, visualizing a comprehensive end which he characterized as Truth. And consequently he discovered the religious principle of ahimsa as the means to the realization of Truth. This also explains Gandhi's position that there are no politics devoid of religion, that politics subserve religion, and that politics bereit of religion are a death-trap because they kill the soul (HD, p. 14). I should end my paper by quoting a few verses from the Himsastaka of Acarya Haribhadra, which would be found to anticipate not only Gandhi's ideal of ahimsa, but also his exposition of himsa : avidhayapi hi himsam hinsaphalabhajanam bhavatyekah / kstvapyaparo himsam himsaphalabhajanam na syat //1// ekasyalpa himsa dadati kale phalamanalpam / anyasya mahahinsa khalvaphala bhavati paripake / 2 / kasyapi disati himsa himsaphalamekameva phalakale / anyasya caiva himsa disat yahimsaphalam vipulam /6/ hinsaphalamaparasya tu dadatyahimsa tu paripame / itarasya punarhimsa disatyahimsaphalam nanyat 11711

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160 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 The substance is this: One may sometimes have to enjoy the fruit of himsa even without having actually performed it. Sometimes one does not reap the fruit of himsa even when appearing to have performed it. (1). Sometimes an act which appears as weak himsa may produce a mighty result, and on other occasions, an act appearing as himsa of considerable dimension may have a result which is slight in proportion. (2). Sometimes an act of himsa produces only bad result, but on other occasions the same act could confer immense benefits of ahimsa. (6). Sometimes, again, ahimsa can produce the results of himsa, and on other occasions, an act appearing as himsa could confer exclusively the fruit of ahimsa. (7). GR HD = MET MG Abbreviations Gita Rahasya by B. G. Tilak, Poona, 1965. Hindu Dharma-M. K. Gandhi (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1950). An Autography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth -M. K. Gandhi (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1948). Mahatma Gandhi-Edited by S. Radhakrishnan (Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1957). MMG The Message of Mahatma Gandhi (Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1968).

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VALUES AND RELIGION NATHMAL TATIA na parvahpa-madhyandini-parahoan aphalan kuryad yathasakti dharinarthakamebhyah, tesu tu dharmottarah syat.-Gautamadharmasutra, IX. 48-49. One should not pass the mornings, the middays and the evenings in vain without performing religious duty (dharma), acquiring wealth (artha), and enjoying the pleasures of life (kama) to the best of one's ability. Among these (three), however, one should place religious duty first and foremost. 1. The nearest Sanskrit equivalent of 'value' is sreyas which is defined by Kumarila as human happiness (sreyo hi purusapritih-slokavarttika, codanasutra, 191). The Manusamhita (II. 224) characterizes dharma, artha and kama as sreyas and states the different ancient theories about them, along with its own, as follows: dharmarthavucyate sreyah kamarthau dharma eva ca. artha eveha va sreyas trivarga iti tu sthiti". That is, religious duty and wealth alone are considered sreyas 'conducive to human happiness' (by some thinkers); (according to others) it is pleasures and wealth alone (that are sreyas); (according to some) religious duty alone (is sreyas); wealth alone is sreyas here (in this world, according to others). The fact, however, is that the (entire) group of three is (the sreyas). In the Mahabharata (Sintiparva, Chapter 161, B.O.R.I. Edition, 1954), we find a detailed discussion of these theories. There Vidura places religious duty (dharma) at the top and pleasures (kama) at the bottom of the triad. Arjuna considers wealth as the sine qua non of both religious duty and pleasures. While endorsing Arjuna's advocacy for a strong economic foundation for the acquisition of pleasures, Nakula and Sahadeva regard religious duty and wealth as co-ordinates, the latter adding favour to the former which confers immortality (madhvivamstasa niyuktam). Bhima's approach to the problem is psychological. He finds kama (desire) at the root of all activities. A man 1. Read at the All India Seminar on "Religion and Changing values" organized by the centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, March 12-14, 1970:

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162 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 nor can such person free from desire cannot hanker after wealth, perform the religious duty. In fact, a man free from desire is incapable of desiring anything. Desire, therefore, is the supreme determinant of our activities, says Bhima: nakamah kamayatyartham nakamo dharmamicchati. nakamah kamayano' sti tasmat kamo visisyate. The consummation of kama (desire) is satisfaction even as nectar (madhu) is the essence of blossoms : puspato madhviva rasah kamat samjayate sukham. Even as butter comes out of curds, so does satisfaction (kama) is born of wealth and religious duty : navanitam yatha dadhnas tatha kamo'rthadharmatah. Even though he thus analyses kama as the spring as well as the product of the religious duty and wealth. Bhima strikes a balance between the three when he declares unequivocally that dharma, artha and kama are to be evenly pursued; the person addicted to any one of these exclusively is the worst, an adept in two is a mediocre, while a person engaged in the triad is the best : dharmarthakamah samameva sevya yastvekasevi sa naro jaghanyah. dvayostu daksam pravadanti madhyam sa uttamo yo niratastrivarge. Yudhisthira takes a transcendental view of the problem and decries the triad as of no help in achieving freedom from birth, decay and death, which can be effected only through a selfless pursuit of the highest end of nirvana (desirelessness). These (viz. birth, decay and death) are non-existent for a person free from the bond of attachmentthus declared Lord Svayambhu. The wise, engaged in the pursuit of nirvana, therefore, counsel that one should neither do what is pleasing nor do what is painful : snehe nabaddhasya na santi tani tyevam svayambhur bhagavanuvaca. budhasca nirvanapara vadanti tasmanna kuryat priyamapriyam ca. 2. We have rendered dharma as 'religious duty' which should be taken to include moral duty also. The Mahabharata, the source of our above discussion, forms a vast treasure of moral ideas. It represents more truly than any other similar literary composition the actual standard of morality prevailing at the period, which was a

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VALUES AND RELIGION more powerful trait of Indian religions than faith in the Divine Control of human affairs. The injunctions of the impersonal (apauruseya) Vedas were the ultimate authority, which were codified in the Dharmasastras by the Brahmana sages who virtually ruled the country through the Ksatriya Kings whom they appointed. The Ksatriyas and Brahmanas were required to work together in harmony for the protection and prosperity of the country and the development of spirituality. Political power and spirituality went hand in hand (Mahabharata, Santiparva, 74). Neither statecraft could flourish without spirituality, nor could spirituality advance without state-craft Manusamhita, IX. 332) : nabrahma ksatramrdhnoti naksatram brahma vardhate. 163 The religious motivation of political power in ancient India should be understood in this context. The idea of a jealous God protecting and preserving the rights of a faithful people is conspicuous by its absence in the Mahabharta which embodies the political thought of those days. The term dharma which, in common parlance, is used for 'reli gion', should also be understood here to connote political propriety, social welfare and individual aspirations in addition to spirituality for which it was popularly used. The personal aspect of dharma was emphasized by the Buddha who characterized it as of advantage to this life, immediate, to be directly approached and seen, leading to nirvana, and to be personally experienced by the wise (sanditthiko ayam dhammo akaliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo vinnuhi 'ti-Samyutta Nikaya, I, p. 10). Jainism defines dharma as the highest good consisting in non-injury to life, self-restraint and penance (Dasavaika lika, I. 1), which lay bare its exclusive stress on reverence for life and self-purification. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika thought, dharma is defined as 'what is conducive to abhyudaya (prosperity) and nihsreyasa (spiritual salvation)' (Vaisesi kadarsana, I. 1.1). While the Mimamsa school underlined the abhyudaya-aspect, the Vedanta and SamkhyaYoga schools upheld the nihsreysa-aspect of dharma, In the following statement of the Mahabharata (Santiparva, 110.11), we find the famous definition of dharma as the sustainer of life and people: dharanad dharma ityahur dharmena vidhrtah prajah. yatsyad dharanasamyuktam sa dharma iti niscayah. That is, the dharma is so called because it sustains (life). The people are sustained by dharma. That which is capable of sustaining (dharanasamyuktam) is called dharma-this is the considered view (of the sages).

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164 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLE IIN NO. 1 3. Religion was the main source of political power in the ancient world. Professor Mario A. Levi has summarized the role that God or gods played in determining the political authority as follows: "In Egypt the manifestation of the will of God was the word of the Pharaoh-God, in Mesopotamia the word of the delegate of gods. In the Indo-European world there was no such direct way of discovering God's will, and men had to use divination to understand the signs sent by God. Such practices were already known to the Hittites, and by various paths had reached the Etruscans, especially in the form of the interpretation of signs from the heavens, from animals and plants, and from dreams, all of which had been practised in various forms by the Semitic races." (Political Power in the Ancient World, 1965, pp. 40-1). The Greek society had its characteristic institution, the oracle, to make sure that in decision of general importance the Greeks should be guided by the will of the Gods to act according to the universal principle of right and justice (op. cit.). The intervention of oracles in human activities, the sovereignty of a supereme God of goods and men, were the solution of a civilization which had no idea of legitimacy apart from that deriving from the gods (op. cit., p. 52). Rome was governed according to a legal code of divine origins. The Romans believed that the validity of their laws was connected with their being formulated for a particular ethnic group, whose members worshipped the deities who belonged to them alone, or who were disposed to favour them particularly. The bonds of faith were the nationalist sentiments of the ancient world; men were linked by the same religion rather than by the same place of birth. In many places this resulted in serious exclusiveness; on the one hand were the elect, faithful to the one true God, and on the other hand, reprobates and infidels. Every war was a religious war, and those who did not belong to the community of the elect could never hope to become members, but were always excluded from the position achieved by the rest (op. cit., p. 112). The Vedic people did not distinctly recognize the divinity of the King as an individual, though the Mahabharata (Santiparva, 68) and the Manusamhita (VII) ascribe the functions of a number of gods to him. The Jainas and the Buddhists, in conformity with their doctrines of karman, accepted the superior states of the cakravartins (universal kings) and other eminent and powerful personages, due to their meritorious deeds in the past, their number being few, and advent far between. The primitive society is conceived, in all these religions, as regulated by the people themselves out of a spontaneous devotion to religion (Santiparva, 59,14 c.d: dharmenaiva prajah sarva raksanti ca parasparam), the institution of kingship arising at a later period,

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165 VALUES AND RELIGION Dharma was thus viewed by our ancient sages and lawgivers as an expression of spontaneous love binding one individual to another in a spiritual bond. It was not a lever to exert political power, but an impersonal law to regulate human relations and promote social, economic and spiritual welfare. Politics were required to be based on dharma which sanctifies them and also looks to them for its own preservation. The following quotations from the Mahabharata will bear us out : dharmamevanuvartasva na dharmad vidyate param. dharme sthita hi rajano jayanti prthivimimam. (Santiparva, 93.6). sarve dharmascasramanam gatah syuh ksa're tyakte rajadharme purane. (Ibid., 63.28 c.d.). 4. While in the field of politics, religion asserted itself through the powers that be, it was directly responsible for the growth of social institutions which however changed from time to time. The system of caste (varna) is an instance in point. It was intended to stabilize the society by defining the duties and responsibilities of the different strata of the people, best suited for particular tasks expected of them. But protests were voiced against it as early as the times of Mahavira. and Buddha, although their followers could not but pride themselves upon the Kstriya caste of their Masters. The system nevertheless remained effective for centuries with but minor variations and adjustWhat was a virtue in a particular context became a vice in another. The custom of widow-burning which was restricted to the warrior caste in the beginning became a universal practice in later times, though it has now almost completely died out. Untouchability is yet another instance of an irrational custom succumbing to the demands of the age. Religion in its ephemeral character formulates customs which are to be abandoned when their purpose is over. ments. 5. In its aspect of personal experience religion is responsible for the institution of the four stages of life (asramas). One has to reach the highest stage of complete renunciation of worldly interest and asceticim (sannyasa) through a number of others, viz. a life devoted to study (brahmacarya), a life dedicated to worldly affairs (garhasthya), and the life of a forest hermit engaged in acquiring spiritual knowledge (vanaprastha). In the religion of the Jainas and the Buddhists, and also in Hinduism in the case of an extraordinary aspirant, the order of the stages is however not strictly followed. One is allowed to renounce the world the moment one feels the urge for it from within. Such ideal of renunciation and asceticism is accepted in almost all the religions of the world

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166 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I although historians are at loggerheads with one another about the effects of this ideal on the well-being of the society and the political aspirations of a nation. Frazer contends that Oriental religions inculcating asceticism upon the spritual aspirants are essentially and incurably anti-social. "The saint and the recluse", says he, "disdainful of earth and rapt in ecstatic contemplation of heaven, became in popular opinion the highest ideal of humanity, displacing the old ideal of the patriot and hero who, forgetful of self, lives and is ready to die for the good of his country. The earthly city seemed poor and contemptible to men whose eyes beheld the City of God coming in the clouds of heaven." (Quoted in Toynbee's A Study of History, Abridgement by D. C. Somervell, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 636). Professor Toynbee, however, disagrees with Frazer. "Society has no existence, "Says he, "except in the activities of individuals who, for their part. cannot exist except in Society. Nor again is there a disharmony between the individual's relations with his fellow men and his relation with God. In the spiritual vision of Primitive Men there is manifestly solidarity between the tribesman and his gods which, so far from alienating the tribesmen from each other, is the strongest of the social bonds between them. The workings of this harmony between Man's duty to God and his duty to his neighbour have been explored and illustrated at the primitive level by Frazer himself, and disintegrating civilizations had borne witness to it when they had sought a new bond for Society in the worship of a deified Ceasar. Is the harmony converted into a discord by the 'higher religions' as Frazer contends ? In theory and in practice alike the answer would be in the negative". "In seeking God," he further asserts, "Man is performing a social act; and, if God's love has gone into action in This World in the redemption of Mankind by Christ, then Man's efforts to make himself less unlike a God who created Man in His own image must include efforts to follow Christ's example in sacrificing himself for the redemption of his followmen. The antithesis between trying to save one's own soul by seeking God and trying to do one's duty to one's neighbour is therefore false." (op. cit., pp. 637-8). The Jaina philosopher's doctrine of standpoints (nayas) as applied to the problems of social relations, and the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of bodhisattva as the last soul to attain nirvana confirm the contention of Professor Toynbee The salutary effects of a saint's life on the people and the potentates is too palpable to be gainsaid. Mahavira, Buddha and Saukaracarya were great powers that are to be reckoned with in any assessment of the culture of our country. Professor Toynbee is right when he says about the Christian anchorites

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VALUES AND RELIGION 167 that "in insulating themselves from their followmen, these saints were entering into a far more active relation with a far wider circle than any that would have centred round them if they had remained 'in the World' and had spent their lives in some secular occupation. They swa yed the World from their retreats to greater effect than the Emperor in his capital, because their personal pursuit of holiness through seeking communion with God was a form of social action that moved men more powerfully than any secular social service on the political plane," (op. cit., p. 639). 6. We have now discussed the influence of religion on the political, social and personal aspects of life and seen that it permeates all spheres of human activity. Religion, therefore, is an all-pervasive value, or rather the value of all values, if by value, we mean 'whatever is valuable to life'. In its generic aspect, religion also pervades artha and kama--the last two kinds of sreyas mentioned at the outset of the paper; in its specific aspects, it is limited only to the sreyas, viz. dharma which stands for religion as applied to different spheres of life. The trinity of dharma, artha and ka na is thus to be viewed as consisting of values subordinate to the supreme value of dharma in its generic aspect which is eternal and unchanging. The constituents of the trinity are the three classes of values--there being scope for change in each class within its range. Thus the multiplication and diversification of valuable objects by the development of industry and commerce do not necessitate any addition to the list. Similarly, dharma in its specific aspects provides full scope for change of values consequent upon an increased socialization of human life. The above classification of values, therefore, may be considered comprehensive and elastic enough to accommodate fresh values that may arise on account the 'change in the environing medium' and 'changes in ourselves'. 7. The trinity of canonized values known as "the True, the Beautiful and the Good" or the tetrad in which to these three is added the higher unity of God finds its parallel in the Vedantic trinity of sat (existence), cit (sentience) and ananda (bliss) as the three aspects of the non-dual Brahman (Tejobind upanisat, VI. 1-2; 30-31) -a trinity which is a unity in that its components are inaliena ble, nay, one without the other is unreal. Anything in order to be a value must be existent and of the nature of sentience and bliss. This is a transcendental view of value similar to the one propounded by Yudhisthira for whom nirvana is the only end worthy of attainment (vide supra). 8. There is yet another mode of classification accepting as units those values or groups of values which have acquired an institutional

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168 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. i form, such as cognitive, moral, economic, political, aesthetic and religious values. Perry has characterized this method as 'historical' classification (General Theory of Value, 1954, p. 694). All these groups are found, on analysis, to have a religious base. Both the logician who finds truth to consist in the right or obligatory jugment and the pragmatist who finds it to consist in the prudent or useful judgment are evidently using ethical conceptions. Ethics again refers beyond itself to religion when it regards salvation as a supermoral value. The employment of ethical concepts is proved necessary in formulating a programme of economic reform or in dealing with current economic problems. The claim of the humanists that art is the supreme human achievement is disputed by the humanitarians who regard compassion as the highest value, which approximates the Jaina saint's principle of non-injury to life (ahimsa). The great works of art, including literary compositions, were also inspired by religious themes in ancient times. The social and political values have been found by us to be based on or influenced by religious ideals. Dharma thus, which is an ethicoreligious concept, is the source of all values- a fact which has found a powerful expression in the following proclamation of the Mahabharata (Svargarohanaparva, 5.49) with which we conclude our paper : urdhvabahur viraumyesa na ca kascicchrrnoti me. dharmad arthasca kamasca sa kimartham na sevyate. "I cry with arm uplifted, yet none heedeth. From righteousness (dharma) flow forth wealth and pleasures. Why then do ye not follow righteousness ?"

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PROGRESS OF PRAKRIT AND JAINA STUDIES1 NATHMAL TATIA Friends, I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the All-India Oriental Conference for inviting me to preside over the Prakrit and Jainism Section of this, the twentyfourth Session of the Conference, being held in Varanasi, the eternal city of Lord Visvanath. I turn, on this occassion, to my illustrious predecessors for inspiration, and if I fall short of your expectations in discharging adequately the onerous duties of a Sectional President, I know that my learned audience will be indulgent to me and their benevolence will assist me in tiding over my failings. 1. At the outset, I have on your behalf to place on record our deep sense of grief at the premature and sudden death, December 23, 1967, of the great patron of Jaina learning, Narendra Singh Singhi of Calcutta. A master of Science with a First in the First class in Geology from Calcutta University, celebrated indusrialist, and a lover of art, Shri Singhi enchanced the lustre of a family already reputed for its extraordinary collection of rare antiquities, and as the founder of the Singhi Faina Series published from the Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, under the General Editorship of Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. He had a passion for beautiful things and his desire for knowledge was insatiable. His death is an irreparable loss to the patronage of culture and learning. We have also to record our grief at the passing away on May 12, 1968, of Hirakumariji, Vyakarana-Samkhya-Vedantatirtha, who dedicated her whole life to the study of Prakrit and Jaina philosophy. The death of Acharya Vijaya-Prema-Surisvaraji Maharaj, on May 22, 1968, is a sad news to the world of Jaina scholars. May these departed souls rest in peace. on 2. We felicitate Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya, Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, on his appointment as Visiting Professor to the Department of East Asian Studies at Toronto University, Canada. Pandit Malvaniya, who belongs to the class of scholars headed by 1. Presidential Address of the Prakrit and Jainism section at the 24th AllIndia Oriental Conference, Varanasi, October 12-14, 1668.

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170 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 Pandit Sukhalalji and Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, combines in himself the qualities of a lovable teacher and a dispassionate scholar. He will no doubt promote the cause of Prakrit and Jaina phillosophy during his sojourn at the foreign centres of study and research. The Research Institutes 3. As early as 1937, the Parshwanath Vidyashram was established at Varanasi through the efforts of Shri Harjas Rai Jain on the advice of Pandit Sukhalalji. By 1945, the Vidyashram had developed into a centre of higher studies and research in Prakrit and Jainism, and the presnt speaker had the privilege of preparing his doctoral thesis at its Library named as Satavadhani Ratnachandra Pustakalaya. At present the institution is known as the P. V. Research Institute with Dr. Mohanlal Mehta as its whole-time Director. Guidance of doctoral research, organization of extension lectures and publication of researches done by their scholars are the main activities of the Institute. Another centre of Post-Graduate teaching and research in Prakrit and Jaina learning was established by the Government of Bihar in 1956. This is now known as the Research Institute of Prakrit. Jainology and Ahimsa and is functioning at Vaishali, the birthplace of Lord Mahavira. Specialized Post-Graduate teaching in Prakrit Literature, Jaina Philosophy and Jaina Logic and Epistemology, admission of research scholars for Ph. D. and D. Litt. degrees, publication of research works and critical editions of unpublished texts are some of the main functions of the Institute. Foreign scholars from the South-East Asian countries and Japan also come to Vaishali for Post-Graduate studies and doctoral research in Prakrit and Jainism. A third research and publication centre came into existence in 1959 at Ahmedabad. This is the L. D. Intitute of Insdology, which has a very fine library of manuscripts as well as printed books. Collection and preservation of manuscripts, works of art, paintings and sculptures, publication of Catalogues of Manuscripts and unpublished texts written by Jaina authors and critical studies and translations prepared by competent men are included in the programme of the Institute. A band of dedicated scholars, all of whom are monks, under the Pontifical authority of Acharya-Shri Tulsi, constitute a mobile centre of learning, whose scholarly activities are now well known. Their devotion to learning is deep and concentred, and the researches conducted by them deserve special attention Their patience and perseverance which is the sine qua non of scholarship is extraordinary. The

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ThROGRESS OF PRAKRIT AND JAINA STUDIES is research scholars will do well to look up to them for inspiration and emulate their example. Seminar in Prakrit Studies 4. The organization of a Seminar in Prakrit Studies by the Shivaji University, Kolhapur, with the support of the U.G.C., under the Directorship of Professor Dr. A. N. Upadhye was a momentous event. It was held from May 22 to May 25, 1968, and attended by more than forty scholars working in the field of Prakrit learning. The message from Dr. G. Roth, received on the occasion, emphasized that the scholars in Prakrit should "sit together to cooperate in the field which, in many ways, is undiscovered new land, which deserves much more attention" Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjes directed attention to the Gandhari and Sinhala Prakrits, while Professor H. W. Bailey referred to the importance of Niya Prakrit, Dr. Tucci averred that research in Prakrit studies would no doubt lead to a deeper knowledge and understanding of modern languages. The consensus of opinion at the seminar was that the study of Apabhramsa be more intensively cultivated to grasp the essential unity of the modern Indian languages, and that the Prakrit literature stood on an equal footing with Sanskrit and Pali. For the promotion of Prakrit studies, the seminar suggested a number of concrete steps which include enrichment of the contents of the Pre-University syllabus, prescription of a specialized course in Prakrit at the graduate level, and introduction of a research-oriented course for Post-Graduate teaching, fostering the ability for doctoral research. A number of research projects are also suggested, which include a Middle indoAryan Dictionary, an Encyclopaedia of Prakrits and painology, critical monographs and comprehensive bibliography. Another heartening news is of the annual Reports published by the Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Mahasabha, Calcutta, which embody the research papers read at the Jain Darsan aur Samskriti Parisad held every year in the presence of Acharya-Shri Tulsi. Scholars engaged in the field of Prakrit and Jainology all over the country are invited to participate in the deliberations of the Parisad and ventilate their views on the subject. The third significant occurrence of the period under review is the appearance of the Jain Journal -a quarterly on Jainology, published by the Jain Bhawan, Calcutta. The Editor Shri Ganesh Lalwani is an able scholar of wide interests, penetrative power and critical acumen. The background and aims of the quarterly are laid down as follows (Vol. I, No. 1):

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172 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I "There is no dearth of Jaina Journals, particularly in vernacular, in this country, but there is hardly any that claim the modern outlook, still less the modern technique of journalism. This Journal intends to fill up this long-felt gap. Its various sections devoted to Jaina art, literature, philosophy, religion, bookreviews and digests, current notes, etc, are carefully prepared under expert supervision so that everyone, no matter whether he be the follower of the Jaina path or not, may benefit from its reading. The outlook is strictly rational." The Journal is steadily, though slowly, moving towards its avowed objectives which it is bound to achieve. The Jaina Agamas 5. A number of schemes of publication of the Jaina Agamas are afoot. Shri Mahavir Jaina Vidyalaya of Bombay deserves our congra. tulations for their Ten Year Plan to publish the Jaina Agama texts in 17 volumes with the active assistance of Muni Shri Punyavijayaji. The Jaina Swetambar Terapanthi Mahasabha of Calcutta sponsored, as early as 1956, a scheme to publish the entire Jaina Agama, critically edited, annotated and provided with scholarly introductions. A Council of Scholars, all of whom are Jaina monks, headed by Acharya-Shri Tulsi as the Vachana-Pramukha and Muni Shri Nathmalji as the editor-in-chief, have started, in all earnestness, the work of collating the texts contained in the manuscripts that are available to them from different parts of the country and made successfull progress. Five such texts, critically edited, have already been published by the Mahasabha under the Managing Editorship of Shri Shreechand Rampuria, a reputed author and prolific writer of books and journals. These texts are : 1. Dasavea liyam. 2. Uttarajjhayanani. 3. Ayaro taha Ayara-cuta 4. Nistihaj jhayanam, 5. Ovavaiyam, In editing these texts, the editors have been cautious about all the possible sources of manuscript corruption, which are enumerated as six by the Agamic Scholiast Abhayadeva Suri, in his Thananga commentary. viz. (1) absence of a genuine tradition, (2) lack of right reasoning, (3) ignorance of one's own as well as other's sastras, (4) loss of memory, (5) conflicting versions of texts, and (6) corrupt manuscripts.

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PROGRESS OF PRAKRIT AND JAINA STUDIES 173 The editions are enriched with introductions, detailed contents and appendixes including an appendix specifying the loci of full texts which usually appear abridged by means of java (up to), and exhaustive word-indexes which are done for the first time and will provide a solid basis for compilation of the much-needed Prakrit lexicon. Of the above five texts, the first two are each supplemented by five accessory volumes of (1) critical study, (2) the text with learned prefaces, Sanskrit rendering, Hindi translation and index of verses or sutras, and (3) annotations based on the Nijjuttis, Chunnis and Tikas, exploited for the first time for such purpose. (4) The story-contents of the texts are published in a fourth volume, (5) an abridged edition of the text with excerpts classified topicwise constituting the fifth. These volumes are already published, and similar accessories to the other texts are under preparation. The annotations, critical studies, and translations, as also the skill with which the appendixes are compiled reveal the depth and devotion of the monks and nuns, the profound scholarship of Muni Shri Nathmalji and the genius of Acharya-Shri Tulsi as the learned VachanaPramukha. The annotations are prepared with extreme care, clearing many a term of its hoary obscurity. The critical studies are each worth a doctorate. Publications 6. The outstanding publication of the period is the Duadasaram Nayachakram of Acharya-Shri Mallavadi-ksamasramana with the commentary Nyayagamanusarini of Shri Simhasuri-gani-va di-ksamasramana, Part I, edited with critical notes by Muni Jambuvijayaji. It is published by Shri Jain Atmanand Sabha. Bhavnagar. The editorial art renovated by Pandit Sukhlalji and sedulously pursued by the late lamented Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya and Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya in editing manuscripts and restoring the lost texts, has attained a new dimension in the hands of Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji, which has compelled even the western critics to bow to the scholar in recognition of hls learning. In his Introduction to the edition, Dr. Erich Frauwallner, Professor of Indology and Iranian Philology at the University of Vienna, appreciates the intractable difficulties of the work and the Herculean labours of the Editor in reconstructing the original text from Simhasuri's commentary, and coinmends his achievement in the following words which bear out my appraisal : "I am very happy to say that the editor of the present edition, Muni Jambuvijaya, has mastered to perfection all these diffi

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174 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I culties, and has given us a text as best as can be achieved at the present time. Clarity has been gained on the extant manuscripts and Muni Jambuvijaya's notes to the text give reliable information as to the tradition, so that a stable basis is supplied for further research. His reconstruction of the original makes it possible to follow Mallava di's trends of thought also in passages, where absolute certainty cannot be achieved... At any rate, the text of the commentary is reliable and has been made legible by means of various corrections. Above all, this text gains greatly by numerous notes and cross-references related texts, thus aiding in the comprehension of the original itself. Here special mention should be made of the Bhotaparisistam, which contains the relevant passages from Dignaga's Pramana-samuccayah, Thus the author's painfully accurate labours have opened a way of approach to such an extraodinarily difficult text. The warmest thanks of all interested in Indian philosophy and specially in Jaina doctrines are due to the editor who has taken such a tremendous amount of work upon himself". The Sugandhadasami-katha published by the Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Varanasi, bears a stamp of mature editorship of Dr. Hiralal Jain who provides it with an excellent introduction embodying his vast studies in world literature. The Hindi translation of the Aptaminamsa, by the nonagenarian savant Acharya Jugalkishor Mukhtar is a work of perfect scholarship. The Lesya-kosa compiled by Sri Mohanlal Banthia will inspire the scholars of Jainism for a critical study of the subject, leading to a clear formulation and evaluation of the doctrine and its bearing on the metaphysical speculations of ancient India. The Ganadharavada by Dr. Esther A. Solomon, pubished by the Gujrat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad, is based entirely on Maladhari Hemachandra's commentary on the Visesavasyaka-bhasya. Dr. Harisatya Bhattacharya's Reals in Jaina Metaphysics published by the Seth Santi Das Khetsy Charitable Trust, Bombay, has been reviewed in the Jain Journal (Vol. II. 1). His another work, the English translation of the Pramana-naya-tattva -lokalankara of Vadi-Deva. suri with a commentary, mainly following the Ratnakara vatarika puulished in 1967 by the Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, is a work of great industry,

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PROGRESS OF PRAKRIT AND JAINA STUDIES The texts with English translation and notes of Haribhadra's Yogabindu and Yogadrstisamuccaya and Dr. Nagin Shah's Akalanka's Critcism of Dharmakirti's Philosophy: A Study are important publications of the L. D. Institute of Indology. Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya's Agam Yuga ka Jain Darsan published by the Sanmati Jnana Pitha, Agra, is an attempt to reconstruct Jaina philosophy in its original shape. 175 Dr. Devendra Kumar Jain's Apabhramsa Bhasa aur Sahitya and Pandit Kailash Chandra Sastri's Jain Nyaya are published by the Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Varanasi. The P. V. Research Institute has published the first three volumes of Jain Sahitya ka Brhad Itihas, written by Pandit Bechardas Doshi, Dr. J. C. Jain and Dr. Mohanlal Mehta. The first two volumes of the series have been critically reviewed in the Jain Journal (Vols. II. 3 and III. 1) and the 3rd awaits review in the January 1969 issue of the same Journal. The Institute has also published Studies in Hemachandra's Desinamamala by Dr. H. C. Bhayani, Jain Achar by Dr. Mohanlal Metha, Bauddha aur Jain Agamo me Narijivan by Dr. Komal Chandra Jain and Yasastilak ka Samskrtik Adhyayan by Dr. Gokul Chandra Jain-the last two being doctoral theses approved by the Banaras Hindu University. The publication of Presentation, Commemoration and Jubilee Volumes, which has become an important activity of the intellectuals, is now attracting the attention of the Jainas also. I have before me three such volumes published during the period. The first is Shri Mahabir Jain Vidyalaya Golden Jubilee Volume, sumptuously produced, in two parts by the Vidyalaya itself. The other two volumes are the Babu Chhotelal Jain Smrti Granth and Marudharkeshari Muni Shri Mishrimalji Maharaj Abhinandan Granth. These publications provide a useful opportunity to the scholars working in the field of Prakrit and Jainism to make their researches available to the people interested in the subject. We are familiar with the literature on Jainism published in the English, French and German languages, but very few of us know the valuable work done by the Japanese scholars in the field of Prakrit and Jainology. It might not therefore be considered redundant if I add here the following list of Japanese publications on the subject, arranged authorwise: S. Matsunami : (1) A Study on "dhyana" in Digambara Sect, 1961. (2) Ethics of Jainism and Buddhism, 1963.

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176 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I (3) Critical translation of Isibhasiyaim into Japanese, 1966. (4) Critical translation of Dasaveyaliyasutta into Japanese, 1968. (5) Buddhistic Variants of two Portions of the Isibhasiyaim, 1961. (1) Introduction to the Original Jainism, 1939. (2) Study of Spiritual Culture of India, 1944. Contains translation of Tativarthadhigama sutra and that of Nyaya vatara, Shigenobu Suzuki : Japanese translation of Tattvarthadhigama sutra and Kalpa-sutra, 1921. A. Uno : Karma Doctrine in Jainism, 1961. A Japanese scholar, Taiken Hanaki, is preparing an English translation of the Anuyogad ara Sutta, with annotations and introduction at the Research Instiute of Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsa, Vaishali. The work is proposed to be published in the near future. Prakrit and Jainology 7. Prakrit and Jainology are evidently two different subjects. But sometimes the latter is mistaken for the former with the result that researches in Jainism are often carried within the limits of the Prakrit texts which constitute only a part of the literary heritage of the Jainas. The illusion, created by the overlapping characters of the t elusive to permit the scholar with a bias towards Prakrit to appreciate the depth and vastness of the contribution of the Jainas to Sanskrit. In fact, the entire literature on Jaina logic developed after the systematization of Jaina thought in Sanskrit language by Umasvati and his successors. The Jaina thinkers had to learn the language to defend their philosophy and logic against the onslaughts of the Buddhist logicians headed by Dignaga. The Jainas as well as Buddhists derived inspiration from Aksapada's Nyayasutra composed in terse Sanskrit in forging their logical weapon. A wonderful Sanskrit literature, embodying the best in logical thinking of the country, was the consequence. Vidyananda's Astasahasri is an example in point, which met the challenge of Dharmakirti and Kumarila with whom Indian logic attained its adolescence. Yasovijaya enriched Jaina logic with the latest achievements of the neo-logicians headed by Gangesa, thus continuing the tradition created by Mallavadi who compassed and presented, in his Dvadasara Nayacakra, the complete range of thought that had emerged before

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PROGRESS OF PRAKRIT AND JAINA STUDIES 177 his advent. The Jaina philosopher's intense love for new knowledge, irrespective of the language of its revelation, enabled him to bequeath a glorious heirloom of logical literature to posterity, Language is after all a means to expression and not an end in itself. The early Jaina literature, though mainly written in Prakrit, was the storehouse of all sorts of knowledge. The Anuyogadara Sutta, for instance, though primarily concerned with the possible ways of exposition, discusses topics like weights and measures, atoms and molecules, music and musical instruments, grammar, epistemology, logic and a motley of other subjects which are apparently unconnected with its central theme. Likewise, there are other Prakrit texts such as the Viyahapannatti, Thananga, etc., which deal with a number of problems only distantly connected with religion and philosophy. The contents are thus unrestricted, though the vehicle of their expression is limited to Prakrit which appears to have been the popular medium of educa. tion. But the growing demand of the intellectuals was also to be satisfied. The Jainas, therefore, had to switch over to Sanskrit much in the same fashion as the Buddhists had to change over to Sanskrit when their Prakrits (Pali being only one among them) had failed to serve their purpose. The Jainas had to write Sanskrit commentaries to explain the Prakrit texts--a phenomenon which reveals the inadequacy of the Prakrits to satisfy the needs of the intellectuals of those days. There is no doubt that, at some stage, the best thought of the time crystallized in Prakrit and Apabhramsa texts. But the necessity to explain even such texts through Sanskrit at a later period shows that those texts had no appeal to the common man. Sanskrit enjoyed constant patronage on account of its being intelligible to the intellectuals of the different parts of the country and being able to function as the lingua franca acceptable to the people engaged in higher learning in art and science. While the Prakrits functioned as regional languages, Sanskrit provided the linguistic norm for the propation of the essence of our thinking among the people at large. The relation between the Prakrits on the one hand and Jainology on the other is to be appreciated in the context of this wider perspective. The study of Jainism without the knowledge of Prakrits is as much impossible as the researches in Buddhism in the absence of a grounding in Pali, though the relation between Pali and Buddhism is slightly different from that obtaining between Prakrits and Jainology. While the entire Pali literature is Buddhist, all Prakrits do not owe allegiance to Jainism, though the latter comprises the major portion of it. Jainism, like Buddhism, goes to Sanskrit in order to fulfil a larger interest and satisfy the demands of a higher stratum of the society. 12

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178 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, 1 Studies in the Prakrits and researches in Jainology will benefit immensely by being viewed from this naya, to use a Jaina terminus technicus, which means "a way of approach and observation". The Pressing Needs 8. The most pressing need of the workers in the field of Prakrit and Jainology is a comprehensive Prakrit Dictionary of the nature of the P. T. S. Pali-English Dictionary. An Encyclopaedia of Proper Names in Prakrit and Jaina literature is another urgent need. The dearth of properly qualified students interested in Prakrit learning is vitiating the quality of research in the field. A student without a sound schooling in the Sanskrit language and the fundamentals of Indian thought and culture is incapable of any sort of education in Prakrit and Jainism. But sometimes this axiomatic truth is forgotten and we land ourselves in embarassing situations by admitting students who, because they lack these basic requirements, are incompetent to conduct higher research independently. It is futile to expect a flowering where there are no branches, or to expect branches where there are no roots. Advanced research in the very nature of things is the apex of a pyramid : the base must be a widespread interest in the language and the literature concerned. This base has, for Prakrit and Jainology, now almost ceased to exist and only a proper and adequate recognition of it in the curricula can restore it. Industry and perseverance, which are the pre-conditions of research, are difficult to cultivate. The seeking of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, the relentless pursuit of truth at the cost of comfort, of gain, of convenience-these were the essence of the Indian tradition of scholarship. Alas, we must now turn to other lands, say to Japan and to Germany, for examples of such diligent scholarship and such devotion to truth. Our inability to compile a Dictionary or produce an Encyclopaedia which are the basic needs of the field under review is, I suggest, a manifest instance of our inactivity. May I thank my learned audience for their patient attention, and resume my seat in the hope that the opinions I have offered and the contentions I have set forth will be received with tolerance. We, who are assembled here, and countless others in our fraternity of scholars, must sail together on these uncharted seas of knowledge assisting each other, often necessarily criticizing each other, but conscious of the worth of our endeavour and the necessity of co-operation specially in a troubled social milieu often lukewarm to all learning and hostile to all culture. Thank you, once again, ladies and gentlemen, for your kindness and your patience.

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KAMMASACCA HU PANINO1 NATHMAL TATIA The caption of the article is the last foot of the twentieth verse of Adhyayana VII of the Uttaradhyayana Sutra, which runs as follows: vemayahim sikkhahim, je nara gihisuvvaya / uvemti manusarp jonim, kammasacca hu panipo // The Adhyayana under reference gives the five similes of the fattened ram, the forgotten farthing (kagini), the unwholesome mango fruit, the capital fund (mula) and the vast ocean in order to deprecate worldly pleasures and glorify heavenly life. Our verse occurs in connection with the simile of the capital fund, which is a parable of three merchants, reminding us of the Biblical parable of the telents. The human life is the capital fund. The dividend earned from it is the state of gods and the loss suffered is the fall from human life into the states of hell and animal life. The continuation of human life stands for mere safeguarding of the capital fund without any kind of gain or loss. In the verse under reference, it is said that the attainment of human birth is effected by the observance of the moral precepts and the vows of a pious householder. The word vemaya has been explained in the commentary of Sri Santyacarya as follows: vividha matra parimapamasam vimatrah, vicitraparimanah, parimanavisesamasritya visadrsibhih siksabhih tabhih prakrtibhadrakatvadyabhyasarupabhih. The expression vemayahim sikkhahim accordingly means 'through moral precepts observed in various measures'. But, to us, the word vemaya appears to stand for 'absence of maya (deceit)'. If this is so, the expression 'vemayahim sikkhahim' would mean 'by (the observance of) the moral precepts, accompanied by the absence of deceit'. This interpretation should appear plausible because deceit is a condition of the birth in animal life (cf. maya tairyagyonasya' TS, VI. 17), which is averted by the absence of deceit in the observance of the moral precepts. The most difficult portion of the verse is however the last foot, namely, kammasacca hu panino. The commentator gives an alternative reading, viz., karmasaktah (Pkt. kammasatta). His interpretation of the two words is as follows: 1. Read on June, 23-27, 1969 at the Seminar on Prakrt Studies organised by the centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Poona.

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180 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I (a) karmana manovakkayakriyalaksanena satya avisamvadinah karmasatyah, that is, 'persons who are true by their mental, vocal and physical acts'. (b) karmasu arthan manusyagatiyogyakriyarupesu sakta abhisvangavantah karmasaktah, that is, 'persons who are engaged in acts that lead to human life'. None of these two interpretations however directly follows from the word kammasacca. Nor do they appear plausible in view of the obvious intention of the author, in this context, to give a general maxim of the doctrine of karman in its aspect of a moral force determining the good or bad effects of an action. The word kammasacca here is most probably a careless scribe's substitute for kammassaka, derived from the Sanskrit expression karmasvaka meaning "possessed of the property (heritage) of the karmans". In support of our guess, we quote he following from the Majjhimanikaya, part III, p. 280 (Nava Mahavihara Edition): "kannmassaka, mapava, satta kammadayada kammayoni kammabandhu kammappatisarapa, kammam satte vibhajati yadidam hinappapitataya" ti. This Pali passage lucidly sets forth the view that the karman is the property (sva), inheritance (daya), creative base (yoni), friend (bandhu) and shelter (pratisarana) of living beings. It is again the karman that divides beings as of low and high status. The Prakrit expression kammasacca is obviously connected with the Pali word kammassaka in the above passage, which is derived from Sanskrit karmasvaka. The Pali expression kammabandhu reminds one of the popular verse of the Man usmoti (VIII. 17): eka eva suhed dharmo nidhane 'py anuyati yah/ sarirena samam nasam sarvam anyad hi gacchati// The meaning of many a technical term in the Prakrit language can similarly be determin@d with reference to the Pali language. Thus the meaning of the Prakrit word parisaha of the Uttar a dhyaynna. Adhyayana II, could be related to the Pali word parissaya of the Sariputtasutta of the Sultanipata, the word dhuya of the Acaranga Sutra, Srutaskandha I, Adhyayana VI, to the dhuta of the Vinaya Pitaka (Mahavagga, p. 43, and Parivara, p. 338). The study of Prakrit will remain incomplete without the study of Pali, each being considered as essentially complementary to the other. In fact, Prakrit and Pali are languages that embody the thought and culture which originated and developed pari passu in respect of both time and place.

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PRAKRIT ILLUSTRATIONS IN WORKS ON POETICS R. P. PODDAR It is often felt, and not without justice, that Prakrit has been neglected in the study of ancient Indian Language and literature. In early times Grammarians of Sanskrit prescribed Sanskrit for the elite and put a discount upon the use of Prakrit. The advocates of Prakrit also condemned Sanskrit as the language of the coterie in contrast with Prakrit which they described as the universal language comprehensible even to birds and beasts. The dichotomy persisted and it persists even today as evidenced in the syllabi of our universities in general and in the establishments of isolated Institutions for the study of Prakrit, Pali and Sanskrit, in particular. In this context it is encouraging to note that the dramatists and the critics have given due share to the Prakrits in their works and treatises, though their later commentators underlined the chaya vis-a-vis the original Prakrit passages. The dramatists represented different strata of characters by putting into their mouths different sort of languages--Sanskrit or someone of the Prakrits. So with the dramatists use of Prakrit was sort of a necessity which in some cases does not seem to have been relished. With the critics of poetry it was otherwise. They must have been overwhelmed with the exuberance of Prakrit poetry and thus tempted to illustrate their points with Prakrit verses. Hence these illustrations are capable of giving a glimpse into the variety and excellence of Prakrit poetry. Among the critics of poetry such eminent masters as Anandavardhana and Mammata have quoted abundantly from Prakrit poetry. Most of these quotations pertain to the domain of love poetry and delineate subtle nuances of feelings. A young woman deceived in love bids her lover go to his new love and let her alone with her sighs and lamentations, lest he also suffers the same, in staying away from his new love, just in showing curtsey towards her: vacca mahavina ekke ihontu NIsAsa roiavvAI / mA tujjha vi tIna viraNA dakviNNahassa jAantu // 1. Read in the Seminar on Prakrit and Pali held at Bodh-Gaya from 22-3-71 to 25-3-71, 1971. 2. Dhy. 1-4, gatha 5.

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182 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I There is a similar context in another verse in which the deceived lady bids her lover go and not wipe her tears. It is just fit that the eyes that turned mad at the first sight and did not care to fathom his heart should be cursed to weep: avasara rouM citra NimmizrAiM mA puMsa me NaNAI | daMsaNamettummatehi jehi hizrazraM tuha Na NAtraM || In some verses the deceived ladies do not explicitly or even feelingly resent the conduct of their faithless lovers but just throw a hint to assert their knowledge of the perfidy. A lady cautions her lover who has misplaced his love that he will be only laughed at in his errand of offering protection to the thorny berry that stands out of the way and is ugly and devoid of fruit or flower : uppaha jAtrAe prasohiNIe phalakusumapatta rahizrAe / verIe vaI dento pAmara ho mohasijjihisi // | 2 The verses addressed by their friends to frolicsome young women, sometimes to caution them in the stolen dalliance and sometimes to vindicate their honour, are ingenious, though not always of very refined taste. A lover's bite on the lip is concealed under the pretext of smelling a lotus with a black bee in it, the bee happening to sting the lady's lip: kassa va gahoI roso daTaThUraNa pilAe savvaraNaM praharaM / sabhamara paumagghAiNi vArizravAme sahasu ehiM // " Most of these verses are extremely sensuous and suggest a mood of wild jubilations. Lovely women are said to captivate the heart with their smiles as well as tears, with their appeasement as well as anger : kuviprAo pasaNNAzro zroruNNamuhImro vihasa mANAmro / jaha gahi taha himazraM haranti ucchinna mahilAo || The beloved is kissed a hundred times and embraced a thousand times but she never grows stale, age cannot wither her, nor custom stale her infinite variety. cumbajjai sazrahutaM varUndhijjai sahassahuMtaM vi / viramizra puNo ramijjai pie jaNe Natthi puNarutaM // Sometimes the amorous sentiment is taken to forbidden heights. One verse describes Parvati stripped of her clothes by Siva as closing latter's two eyes with her two plams and the third one with a kiss: 1. Dhv. 3-16; 2. Dhv. 3-41; 3. Dhv, 1-4, KP. 135; 4. Dhv. 1-14; 5. Dhy 1-14,

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ThRAKRIT ILLUSTRATIONS IN WORKS ON POETICS 183 raikelihiariNavasaNa karakisalayarUddhapraNajubhalassa / rUddassa taima epraNaM pavvaIparicumviyaM jnaai|| It favourably compared seems to be a calculated improvement upon Kalidasa's zUlina: karataladvaya na sA saMnirUddhaya nayane hRtAMzukA / tasya pazyati lalATalocane moghayatnavidhurA rahasyabhUt / / In some verse women are shown stooping to conquer. An impatient woman throws a clever hint to a traveller that he could not get a bed in that village, nevertheless, he could spend the night there apprehending the vising clouds or her ponderous breasts: paMthiyaNa ettha sattharamatthi maNaM pattharatthale gAme / uNNana poharaM pekkhikaraNa jai vasasi tA vasasu / / " The general atmosphere suggested by these quotations is one of love but at times other sentiments also are seen jostling for room. A verse describes a hero in a fix between the tears of the beloved the war-trumpets: ekanto rupai piyA aNNanto smrtuurnnigdhoso| NeheNa raNaraseNa a bhaDassa dolAiaM hia // ' While in another a hero prefers the heads of the elephants painted with vermillion to the breasts of his beloved painted with saffion: vIrANa ramai ghusiNArUNammi Na tahA pipraathnnucchNge| diTThI riu-gana kuMbhatthalammi jaha vahalasindUre // Some verses are extremely ingenious in their far-reaching suggestions. One such is the oft-quoted : mama ghammina vIsaddho so suNo ajja mAriyo deNa / golANa i kaccha kuDaMga vAsiNA daria sIheNa // In one verse it has been said that the latest wife of a hunter decked with a peacock's feather feels proud among the co-wives, though the latter are decorated with pearls : sihipiccha kaNNakarA jAnA vAhassa gaThivarI bhamai / muttAhala raina pasAhaNANaM majjhe sakttINaM // " The fact is that earlier the hunter devoted more time in outdoor sports and killed elephants and hence his former wives are decorated with pearls from the elephants' heads. Now he is engrossed with sporting 4. Dhv. 3-24; 5. Dhv, 2-279 . 1. KP. 97; 2. KS. VIII-73; 3, KP. 58; 8. Dhy.1-4, KP. 1383; 7. Dhv. 2-24.

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184 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I with his latest wife that he can find time and energy only to hunt upon the peacocks and this is time and energy only to hunt upon the peacocks and this is really a matter of pride for her. This verse seems to be a deliberate improvement upon the following similar one : vANi hatthidantA kudo zramhANaM bAdhakitti na / jAva lulicAlanamuhI gharammi parisakkae suNahA // and its variation : kariNI vevvaro maha putto ekaka kANDaviNivAI | hama soNhAe taha ko kaNDakaraNDa bahai || 2 A very subtle hint is thrown to the infirmity of a lover in the following verse in which he has been compared to the full moon in relation to the evening dusk. The relation of the full moon to the evening dusk is a fleeting one and so is his to his lady-loves : Nava puNNimA mizraMkassa suhana ko taM si bhaNasu maha saccaM / kA sohagga samaggA patrosa ragraNi vva tuha prajja || " In such cases it gives almost a sense of triumph to discover the suggestion which it is difficult to do without the aid of the commentary. Some verses reveal a wealth of imagery and vie with the finished verses of the great masters of Sanskrit poetry. The following illustrates sahokti :-- sahadivasaNisAhidIharA sAsadaNDA saha maNibala ehi vAhadhArA galanti / tuha suha viproe tIe ubvibarIe saha- taNuladAe dubalA jIvidAsA || 4 The following shows a wide range of the poet's imaginative activity : je laMkA girimehalAhiM khalidA saMbhograkhiSNoraI phAraphulla phaNAvalI kavalaNe pattA dariddattaNaM / te ehi malAlA virahiNINIsAsa saMpavikaraNo jAdA katti sisuttaNe vi bahalA tArUNNa puSNA vizra || 5 The imagery is some cases is worked out to such a subtlety that it assumes the nature of conceit. A lady says to her faithless love that on account of anger, they are a the red threads in her eyes are not 1. Dhv. 3-1. 4. KP. 495; KM. II 9. 2. Dhv.4-4. 5. 3. KP. 88, cf Mechk. IV 15. KP. 68; KM. I-19.

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PRAKRIT ILLUSTRATIONS IN WORKS ON POETICS 185 sort of garment provided by the red nail-scars upon his body given by his new love in amorous sports : prollolla karaara akvaehiM tuha loaNesu maha diNNaM / rattaMsumo pasAo koveNa puNo ime raNa pravakkamizrA // 1 A lady though slender bodied yet allows herself to be emaciated further to find accommodation in the crowded corridor of her lover's heart : mahilA sahassa bharie tuha hipae suhana sA amaaantii| aNudiNa maNaNNakammA aMgaM taNugraM vi taNuei / ' There are others which excel in a child-like simplicity as the following: e ehi dAva sundari kaNNaM dAUNa suNasu vaNijja / tujjha muheNa kisopari cando uvamijjai jaNeNa // " It seems to be an improvement upon the following similar one : emena jaNo tissA deu kavolovamAI sasibimbaM / paramattha vipAre uraNa cando cando vina vraatro|| There are some beautiful verses in praise of poetry and the following tops the list : Na a tANa ghaDai prohI raNa a te dIsanti kahavi punnruuttaa| je bimbhamA pinANaM atthA vA sukai vANINaM / / / The bulk of these quotations is not, however, free from that one great demerit common in all poetry having close kinship with the masses, viz. vulgarity. Not to talk of ordinary women Parvati and Lakshmi themselves are described in the inverse posture of copulation. These verses have survived in spite of their vulgarity on account of the ingenuity of the poets' creative imagination that brings in a pleasant surprise. The following one is worth quoting : vivarIarae lacchI bamhaM daTaLU NAhi kamalaTaThaM / ___ hariNo dAhiNa NaNaM rasAulA jhatti Dhakke i // Here covering of Hari's right eye implies sunset for Hari's right eye is the sun, which implies closing of Hari's naval lotus and hence disappearance of Brahma seated on it. A complete lack of moral and spiritual ideas is conspicuous in these quotations. Poetry on the evidence of these lines seems to be the 1. KP.70. 4. Dhy.3.1. 2. KP. 71. 5. Dhv.4-7. 3. KP.554. 6. KP. 137.

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186 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 least concerned with thoughts. There is no denying that such poetry is incomplete and its cultural background sink in the scale. But they reflect the depth of life where the primeval passions hold their sway and assert their existence defying the so-called higher and sophisticated cultivations of the mind. Abbreviations Dhv.-Dhvanyaloka Gathas-Gatha Saptasati K P.-Kavya prakasa K S.-Kumarasambhava Mcchk. Mrccha katika KM.-Karpuramanjari.

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UPOSATHA NAND KISHORE PRASAD There is nothing incredible in the fact that there were some customs which were commonly prevailing in Indian religious life, and uposatha was one of such customs. Here follows a study of the same in the light of the three main faiths of India, the Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism. (a) Brahmanical : The earliest reference to 'upavasatha', the Sanskrit original of the Pali 'uposatha1 and Prakrit 'posaha', is made in the Satapatha Brahmana which prescribes the sacrificial rites called Darsa and Puranamasa on the occasion. The term upavasatha stands for a fast-day, specially the day preceding a Soma sacrifice, and also for the period of preparation for the Soma sacrifice. Again the Katyayana-Srautasutra appears to subscribe to the same view when it asserts that the upavasatha implies to live close to (the deities) which is possible only by performing certain sacrifices accompanied by upavasa (fast) twice a month, i. e., on the last days of the dark-half (amavasya) and the bright-half (paurnamasa) of a month. The fasting is to be observed by the sacrificer on the instruction of the priests, and as such it is the duty of the householder. Hiranyakesin, while dwelling upon the significance of the upavasatha, opines that the upavasatha means 'to avoid the company of impious and to seek the company of virtuous'. This much we read about the ceremony of upavasatha in the Brahmanical sources. The Jaina as well as the Bdddhist sources, on the other hand, contain elaborate rules as regards the different facets of the ceremony which will follow in the coming pages. (b) Buddhist : According to an early tradition, the institution of the uposatha is ascribed to the request made by Bimbisara, the king of Magadha, to the Buddha. The king himself, according to the same tradition, owed 1. Op. cit, II, 1. 4; I. 1. 2. SED, Sub voce "upavasatha'. 3. Op. cit, IV. 15. 35; Cf DC II. p. 109. 4. upavrittastu papebhyo yastu vaso gunaih saha upavasah sa vijneyah--as quoted in EBJ, p. 134.

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188. VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 this idea to the titthiyas (heretics). On the suggestion of the king, the Buddha enjoined upon the monks to assemble and hold uposa tha. Novices as the monks were, they kept mum when they assembled, and thus invited scandalous remarks from the people. Consequently, in order to appease the people they were advised to recite the Dhamma' which in due course was replaced by the recitation of the Patimokkha and was known as uposatha-service (uposathakamma)". The obvious reason of the introduction of the ceremony was to acquire lay devotee by promoting faith in them through religious preaching on certain dates of every month as the heretics were doing from before. But not very late, this privilege was denied to the laity as it was converted into out and out a monastic observance. The reason for this abrupt change in its nature from social to monastic seems to be that the monks did not like to expose their omissions and commissions before the laity. Originally the eighth, the fourteenth and the fifteenth days of a fortnight were regarded as uposatha days. But in due course the eighth day was dropped from the list and only the last two were retained. Not only this, the Patimokkha was to be recited only once a fortnight, i.e., on either of the two remaining dates." But finally, as it appears from the expression, 'ajjuposatho pannaraso', it became a fashion with the Order to recite the Patimokkha only on the fifteenth day of a fortnight. As a rule, uposatha was to be held at a place fixed by the Saigha. Five kinds of buildings-a vihara, an addhayoga (a kind of house), a pasada (storeyed building), a hammiya (attic) and a guha (cave) were ordinarily selected for the purpose. Holding uposatha in one's own cell or fixing two uposatha-halls (uposathagrara) in one avasa (residence) was in no case allowed. If there happened to be several avasas within the same boundary (sima), then uposatha was to be held at a place unanimously selected or in the uposathagara of the avasa inhabited by the senior monks. Under unavoidable circumstances it could be solemnised even at the residence of a monk.? 1. MV, 2.1, pp. 105-6. 2. Ibid, 2.1, p. 106. 3. Ibid, 2.2.2, p. 106. 4. Ibid, 2.2.5, p. 108. 5. Vide PM, Nidana. 6. MV, 2. 5. 10, pp. 109.10. 7. Cf.sace k ho mayam gilanam thana cavessama avadho va abhivaddhissati kalam kiriya va bhavissati "ti na, bhikkhave, gilano bhikkhu thana cavetabbo. sarighena tattha gantva kammam katabbam--Ibid, 2, 20, 33, pp. 121-22; 2. 21. 34, p. 123.

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UPOSATHA 189 In this connection, the terms sima and avasa, just referred to, deserve some amplification. Sima was the circuit or the extent of the jurisdiction of an avasa or a number of avasas. The Christian equivalent of it is a diocese or parish. The uposatha could only be performed, if all the monks living wihin the sima of an avasa were either present or would have sent their consent (chanda) in absentia.1 Sima was decided by the usual kammavaca process by fixing some landmarks on the boundary of the jurisdiction. A mountain, a rock, a wood, a tree, a path, an anthill (vammika), a river and a tank (udaka), etc. were some of the conspicuous marks generally used for the purpoe.2 In case the sima of an ava sa had not been settled, then the boundary of the adjacent village was supposed as its sima; and if the residence was situated in a forest without any nearby village, then the sima was extended up to seven abbhantaras all around.4 In case of a river, sea or the like, the sima ran as far as an average man could throw water5 or even to the opposite side of a river, if there was any regular communication. Normally a boundary either of more than three yojanas (yojana a distance of about seven miles) in expanse, or overlapping or incompassing another ones was not to be fixed. The uposathagara was furnished with the necessary articles, before the monks assembled there to hold uposatha. The senior members as a rule, were obliged to assemble first, while the juniors were assigned with the duties of sweeping the hall; providing seats for the assembly; putting a lighted lamp, for most often the uposatha was held till very late in the night; and furnishing with drinking water and food for the incoming monks.10 When all had assembled, a duly qualified monk proclaimed the following natti-'Venerable monks should proclaim the parisuddhi (purity), I will recite the Patimokha'. Those guilty of any offence 1. Ibid, 2. 21. 34, pp. 122-23. 2, Ibid, 2. 4. 7, p. 109. 3. Abbhantara is a linear measure, equal to 28 hands.-BD, Part I1, Introduction, pp. 51-52. 4. MV, 2. 9. 16, p. 113. 5. Ibid, 2. 9. 16, p. 113.. 6. Ibid, 2. 4. 9, p. 109. 7. Ibid, 2. 4. 9, p. 109. 8. Ibid, 2. 9. 17, p. 113. 9. Ibid, 2. 6. 11, p. 111. 10. samajjani padipo ca udakam asanena ca / uposathassa etani pubbakaranam ti vuccati //-Kankha, p. 11; MV, 2. 18. 28-31, pp. 119-20.

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190 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I confessed it in course of the recitation of the section concerned, and those who were free remained silent which indicated their purity.' The confession of faults (uposatha) by one deserving recommencement of the penal discipline (mulayapatikassanaraho) or the sentence of manatta discipline was done according to seniority (yathavuddham). Preaching the Dhamma of one's own accord, putting questions about the Vinaya or answering them without one's appointment by the assembly and rebuking anybody for his offence without the permission of the person concerned' were unlawful. The recitation of the Patimokkha was one of the special features of the uposatha. In normal circumstances, it was recited in its full extent. But in case of trouble (antaraya) either from a king or a thief or the like, it could be recited abridged. So also, it was recited normally by a senior monk (ther adhikam patimokkham). In case all the theras of an assembly were incapable to do so, then even a junior member could be entrusted with the job. Moreover, it should not be recited in an assembly where there was a nun (bhikkhuni), a nun under training (sikkhamana), a novice (samarera), a female novice (samanert), a renegade (sikkhapac cakkhataka), a person guilty of an extreme offence (antimavatthum ajjhapannaka), a eunuch (pandaka) or the like or in an assembly otherwise impure. 10 Of the four types of uposathakamma, namely, a service held unlawfully by an incomplete chapter, held unlawfully by a complete chapter, held lawfully by an incomplete chapter and held lawfully by a complete chapter, only the fourth type was deemed legal,11 In the beginning, the Patimokkha was recited by the monks on behalf of the nuns in the uposatha meetings convened by the nuns. In due course, on account of the scandalous remarks of the people they were taught to recite it themselves.12 But the nuns, even then, could 1. MV, 2. 2. 3, p. 106. 2. CV, 2. 2. 10, p. 72. 3. Ibid, 2. 3. 14, p. 75. 4. MV, 2. 11. 19, p. 115. 5. Ibid, 2. 12. 20, p. 115. 6. Ibid, 2. 13. 21, pp. 115-16. 7. Ibid, 2. 14. 22, p. 116. 8. Ibid, 2. 11. 19, p. 114. 9. Ibid, 2. 16. 24, pp. 117-18. 10. Ibid, 2. 38. 52, pp 141-42. 11. Ibid, 2.10.18, pp. 115-16. 12. CV, 10.5.6, pp. 379-80.

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191 not get rid of the subjugation of monks as they had to ask two or three days beforehand on what day the uposatha would be.1 If during or after the recitation of the Patimokkha by an incomplete assembly being conscious or unconscious of its incompetency to hold uposatha, there arrived monks belonging to the same residence whose number was greater than those holding the uposatha, then the Patimokkha must be recited again. If on the other hand their number was either equal to or less than those holding the uposatha, then it was not to be recited anew.2 Anybody guilty of an offence was not allowed to perform uposatha. A person doubtful of his offence was, however, permitted to attend it provided that he was ready to atone for his offence as soon as his doubt was removed. Neither a common confession of an offence nor a common acceptance of such confession was regarded lawful. On the uposatha day, if all the resident monks were guilty of a common offence, then one of them had to confess his guilt before a monk of a nearby avasa and the rest before him after his return. If even this much was not possible, then they had to atone for it even after the solemnisation of the ceremony.3 UPOSATHA It was essential for all to attend the uposatha personally, if not so, then at least by proxy. Absence from the ceremony was allowed under circumstances beyond control only. No laxity in this respect was permissible on the plea of personal purity, how much great it might be. The virtuous members, on the contrary, were considered more responsible than ordinary monks or nuns. Buddha's admonition to Mahakappin, an arahata, when he was hesitating to attend the ceremony may be cited as an instance in point: "If you Brahmanas do not honour, do not regard, do not revere, do not pay reverence to the uposatha, who will then honour, regard, revere, pay reverence to the uposatha? Go to the uposatha, O Brahmanas, do not neglect to go, go to the functions of the Order, do not neglect to go.""4 So also on the uposatha day, the monks were debarred from leaving a residence or non-residence inhabited by monks for a residence or non-residence without monks; or a residence or non-residence 1. CV, 10 2.2.3, p. 375; PM (Bhikkhuni), 4.59. 2. MV, 2.28.41, pp. 129-31; 2.29.42, p. 132; 2.30.43, pp. 132-33; 2.31.44, pp. 133-34; 2.32.45, pp. 134-37. Ibid, 2. 27. 40, pp. 127-29. 3. 4. Ibid, 2. 3. 6, p. 108.

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192 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 inhabited by monks belonging to different districts (sima), except with a Sargha (i. e, with a number of monks sufficient for holding uposatha) or in case of danger. But they were allowed to leave on uposatha day a residence or non-residence inhabited by monks for a residence or non-residence inhabited by monks belonging to the same districts provided that they could reach the place in due time.2 Out of the three types of uposatha referred to in the Mahavagga, the uposatha just discussed is the sangha-uposatha, the other two being the parisuddhi and the adhitthana. The uposatha held by four or more than four monks or nuns is called sangha-uposatha as the minimum quorum for performing an Ecclesiastical Act is four. The recitation of the Patimokkha is one of the essential features of sangha-uposatha. The declaration of parisuddhi in order of seniority with the usual formality, if there be less than four monks in an avasa on the uposatha day, is called parisuddhi-uposatha and the concentration of one's mind on the thought-Today is my uposatha day', if there be only one monk in an avasa on that day, is designated adhitthana-uposatha. The concluding passage of the Uposathakkhandhaka4 refers to a special type of uposatha held on any other day than the uposatha days for the sake of reconciliation of the Order which was known as sanghasamaggi-uposatha. Besides these, the Anguttara Nikaya gives three types of uposatha known as gopalaka, nigantha and ariya. The first two types make a reference to the uposatha performed by the Jaina laity in which they, on the uposatha day indulge in merriments", and copy temporarily the life of an ascetic by renouncing family ties and household duties respectively. The third type is the uposath a observed by the Buddhists themselves. (c) Jaina : In Jainism the expression posaha' or 'posadha' stands for uposatha. The Jaina Sanskrit rendering of the term is pausadha? or sometimes prausadha.8 Umasvati gives the word parva as the synonym of pausadha and includes a stami, caturdasi and pancadasi or any other day tithi) 1. MV, 2. 37, 51, p. 141. Ibid, 2. 36. 50, pp. 140-41. 3. Ibid, 2. 24. 37, pp. 125-26. 4. na ea, bhikkhave, anuposathe uposatho katabbo, annatra,sangha-samag giya ti.--Ibid, 2. 38. 52, p. 142. 5. Cf. Bhag, 12, 1, p. 553a. 6. Cf. Ibid, 12. 1, p. 555a. 7. Tattoa, auto commentary, 7.16. 8. Sarda, 7.21.

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UPONATHA 193 of the month as suitable for pausadha. The comentator Siddhasena. gapin explains this statement of Umisvati as implying that on astami, caturdasi and pancadasi, the pausadha is to be necessarily observed, while any other day is to be selected according to the convenience of the person concerned. The pausadha in Jainism is meant exclusively for the laity. In the Jaina Scripture, we find references to posahasala, that is a place or hall set apart for performance of the pau sadha. A Jaina upasaka was required to fast on the day and live in posahasila like a monk abstaining from bath, powder, garlands and ornaments. He was also required to desist from all kinds of sinful activities and sit and sleep on kusa-grass-mats or wooden planks procured for the purpose. He was also expected to practise various meditational postures and remain awake as far as possible meditating on religious principles and the nature of self. Generally the pausadha was observed for one day. But one could be allowed to continue it for more than one day also. In the Bhagavatisutra" we find reference to a kind of pausadha (bakkhiya-pasaha) when people went out and prepared food and drink and passed the day in merriments. But this type of pausadha was not considered religious. It was called pausadha perhaps because it was associated with the parva days, such as aslami or caturdasi. It appears that the ceremonies, secular or religious, which were performed on bausadha or parva days were indiscriminately called pausadhas. And this explains the Anguttara reference to gopalaka-uposatha." In Jainism two kinds of tapah (austerity) is recognised, namely internal and external, each of which is of six kinds. Among the six kinds of internal austerities, the first is called prayascitta which has ten varieties, the second of which is called pratikramana meaning recoil from the sins committed. The second internal austerity is called vinaya which has five varieties, the fifth being called tapovinaya. This tapovinaya? includes six obligatory acts (avasyaka), namely samayika (the practice of the equanimous mood of mind), caturvimsatistava (hymns in praise of the twenty-four Tirthankaras), vandana (showing respects to the superiors), pratikramana (condemnation of the transgressions committed by the monk), pratyakhyana (determination to give up all sinful and unmonkly activities) and kayotsarga suspension of physical movements accompanied by mindfulness). Our main concern 1. Uva, 1.79, p. 18. 3. Vide Infra, p. 193. 5. Ibid, 7.83ff. 2. Bhag, 12.1, p. 553a 4. Anag, 7.4. 6. Ibid, 7.60ff. 7. Ibid, 7.75. 19

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194 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 here is the nature and the content of pratikramana. In the pratikramana, the monk condemns himself for the sins and transgressions of the monastic rules committed by him. He makes confession of the transgressions before his preceptor. In other words, in the pratikramana the monk is required to remember all the vows and rules of monastic life undertaken by him for lifelong observance. He exerts himself to examine the shortcomings of monastic life and make atonement for them. To be exact the whole process beginning froin sama yika and ending in kayotsarga is the Jaina equivalent of the uposatha of the Buddhists. In the Patimokkha, the punishments for the crimes committed are also mentioned. But in the Jaina Pratikramana the specific punishments are not mentioned, though, of course, monks are required to recoil from their sinful deeds; condemn himself privately (ninda) and publicly (garha), and ultimately beg pardon of their respective preceptors by means of confession of their crimes alocana. Unlike the Buddhist uposatha, the pratikramana is done daily-in the morning for the transgressions done at night, and in the evening for the same committed during the day. There is also the provision of prati kramana after a journey or similar act involving inadvertent commission of crime. Besides these, there are prescribed the fortnightly, four-monthly and yearly pratikramanas, in addition to the uttamartha-pratikramana done for the attainment of the supreme goal of life, namely, moksa. 2 It is thus found that there are essential points of agreement between the Buddhist uposatha and the Jaina pratikramana, rather the complete obligatory monastic act beginning from simiyika and ending in kayotsarga. In this connection the problem why in Jainism the pausadha was exclusively meant for the householders, while in Buddhism it was exclusively prescribed for the monks deserves consideration. The Jaina monks performed pratikramang on the last day of every fortnight in which they recited all possible omissions and commissions, and transgressions and expressed their purity. The pratikramana was obviously performed on the parva days. The contents of the Buddhist Patimokkha is very similar to the contents of the Jaina pratikramana and it appears that the Buddhists introduced the Patimokkha for a puopose 1. Anag, 8. 62. alocanam divasiyam raiyam iriyavaham ca boddhavvam pakkhaya cadummasiya samvaccharamuttamattham ca // Idid.

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UPOSATHA similar to that of the Jainas. The Patimokkha was recited on the uposatha day and was in due course identified with the latter, though the identification was never complete inasmuch as we find uposathas performed on other days and for other purposes as well, as mentioned above. As regards Jainism there was no occasion for identifying pratikramana with pausadha which was left exclusively for the laymen. 195 It has already been stated that upavasatha stood for a fast-day and the fasting was observed on the purnimi and amavasya. It appears that purrima and amavasya were in due course recognised as upavasathu or fasting days, and thus there was a kind of necessary association between upavasa and the purnima and the amavasya days. Consequently purnima and amavasya came to be designated as upavasatha days. Various religious sects accepted the uposatha day as specially suited date for religious observances, fasting being one of their essential features. This is perhaps the reason why we find the word upavasa necessarily associated with pausadha. The Buddhists were not in favour of such fasting and so we find Pali uposatha never associated with upava sa (d) Conclusion : It is almost certain that the uposatha owes, in some form or other, a pre-sramanic origin. Pt. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghavi also holds the same opinion which is manifest in his following words: "There is no material before us for determining how one tradition influenced another a thousand years ago. Nevertheless we may venture to observe that the upavasatha (fasting) in the Vedic tradition was considered to be the means of acquisition of a pleasant con dition (heaven ?). In the Sramanic tradition on the other hand uposatha1 or posaha was regarded as the instrument of the good (salvation). Viewed from the course of evolution it is found that the conception of the good (blessed condition) has come about among mankind after that of the pleasant. If this be true the custom of upava sa (fast) or posaha in the Sramanic tradition however ancient it may be, must be held to bear the impress of the fasting ceremony of the Vedic cult of sacrifice."" One point more which may be gathered from this study is that the Buddhists were the last to adopt this practice, firstly, because they 1. The uposatha ceremony in the Buddhist tradition did not include fasting though it might be the original content of it. 2. Translated into English, cf. DC, II, p. 107.

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196 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I admit frankly enough that the ceremony was already in vogue among the titthiyas, and secondly, the Jaina posaha, like the Vedic upavasatha, was a sole concern of the householders rather than of the mendicants as we find in the case of the Buddhist. This adherence of the Jainas to the original form takes the Jaina posaha to greater antiquity than the uposatha of the Buddhists who wrought a change in the original form (i.e. from social to monastic), in all probability, to claim a greater antiquity and novelty. Abbreviations Anag-Anagaradharmamrta. BD-Book of Discipline (English Translation of Vinaya Pitaka by I.B. Horner). Bhag Bhagavatisutra (Agamodaya Samiti Bombay). CV-Cullavagga (Nalanda-Devanagari-Pali-Series). DC-Darshana Aur Chintana (Pt. Sukhalalji Sanghavi). EBJ-Early Buddhist Jurisprudence (Miss Bhagwat). Kankha-Kankhavitarani, Edited by D.M. Stede. MV-Mahavagga (Nalanda-Devanagari-Pali-Series). PM-Patimokkha, Edited by Dr. P. L. Vaidya. SED-Sanskrit-English-Dictionary (M.M. Williams). Tattva-Tattvart hadhigama sutra. Uva-Uvasagadasao, Edited by Dr. P. L. Vaidya.

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SEMINAR OF SCHOLARS A Seminar of Scholars is held every year at the Institute on Mahavira's birthday. The first such Seminar was held in 1963 when Shri J. C. Mathur, 1. C. S., Commissioner of Tirhut Division, took the initiative in proposing it, and since then it is being held regularly. In the pages that follow, some of the papers read and lectures delivered on the occasion are being published. Unrecorded lectures or speeches delivered extempore could not be included in the Bulletin. The first Seminar was held in two sittings on April, 6, 1963, Scholars came from the sister Institutes in the State. Shri J. C. Mathur welcomed the scholars. Dr. Yogendra Mishra, Principal Shri Bhagwan Prasad Sinha of L. N. College, Bhagwanpur, and others participated in the deliberations of the first sitting. Principal Shri Mahendra Pratap of L, S. College, Muzaffarpur, presided over the second sitting at which the Director read a paper on Gthastha Dharma (householder's duties) according to Mahavira, Buddha, Manu and Gandhiji, which was discussed at length by the scholars present. Besides the staff and students of the Institute, the local people took a keen interest in the Seminar. The first sitting of the second Seminar was held on 1964, in the presence of Muni Shri Dhanrajji Maharaj, a senior disciple of Acharya-Shri Tulsi. Shri Mahesh Prasad Sinha, a Cabinet Minister in the Government of Bihar, presided over the sitting, the subject of discussion being The Jaina view of Good and Evil Shri J. S. Bali, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division, welcomed the scholars and Principal Krishneshwar Jha, Pandit Rupnath Jha, Pandit Kanhaiya Sharma, Pandit Sobhakant Jha and others took part in the discussions. Dr. D. N. Sharma and Shri R. P. Poddar also read papers on the subject. The third Seminar was held on April 14, 1965, and was presided over by the Governor of Bihar, Shri M. Anantasayanam Ayyangar Shri Satyendra Narayan Sinha, Educa. tion Minister of Bihar, sent a good will message expressing his desire that the Seminar should be a permanent feature of the Institute. Shri J. S. Bali and Shri M.P.N. Sharma, Deputy Education Secretary, a interest in organizing the Seminar. Among the participants in the deliberations were Shri S. V. Sohoni, I.C.S., Shri J.C, Mathur, I.C.S., Dr. P. L. Srivastava, Vice-Chancellor, Bihar University, Professor D. Malvania, Dr. B. P, Sinha, Professor A.L. Thakur, Pandit

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I Darbarilal Kothia, Pandit Sobhakant Jha, Principal Mahendra Pratap and Shri N. C. Jain. The Director read a paper on Materialism versus Spiritualism and also on Anekan!a and Madhyama Pratipad. Dr. B. P. Sinha spoke on the Cultural Heritage of Vaishali Prof. D. Malvania gave a talk on the contribution of the Jainas to Indian Philosophy. At the fourth Seminar which was held on April 3, 1966, the subject of discussion was Religion and Secularism. Shri Satyendra Narayan Sinha, Education Minister, presided. Shri J. C. Mathur, Dr. Sukumar Sen, Dr. G. C. Chaudhary, Pandit Kanhaiya Sharma, Professor A. L. Thakur and others participated. Religion and Politics (Dharmaniti aur Rajaniti) was the topic of discussion at the fifth Seminar which was held on April 22, 1967. Shri Nageshwar Prasad Sinha, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division, welcomed the scholars and Shri Karpuri Thakur, Deputy Chief Minister of Bihar, presided. Shri J. C. Mathur, Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Pandit Ram Padarath Sharma, Shri L. C. Jain, Shri L. P. Sahi and Vice-Chancellor Shri B. M. K. Sinha of Bihar University participated in the discussions. Rastriya Ekata (National Unity) was the subject of discussion at the sixth Seminar held on April 11, 1968. Sadhvi Kasturaji, a learned nun under Acharya-Shri Tulsi, who graced the Seminar by her presence, emphasized the role of language as an ingredient of national integration. Shri Krishna Kant. Singh, Minister, was the Chief Guest, and Pandit Vidyadhara Shastri of Bikaner presided over the Seminar. Dr. P. S. Muhar, Vice-Chancellor, Bihar University, Shri L. C. Jain, Shri L. P. Sahi and others participated in the discussions. The seventh Seminar, presided over by Dr. A. N. Upadhye, was held on April 1, 1969. The subject of discussion was the connotation of the words Arya and Anarya. Dr. N. C. Shastri, Principal Ram Karan Sharma and others participated. 198 The A two-day Seminar was held on April 18-19, 1970, which was inaugurated by Professor Dr. N. K. Deoraj, Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University. subject discussed at the Seminar was Foundation of world peace: Ahimsa and Anekanta. Shri Daroga Prasad Rai, Chief Minister of Bihar, presided over the second session of the Seminar held on April 19, Shri S. K. Ghose, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division, welcomed the scholars. Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee read a learned paper on the subject and was followed by Principal Ram Karan Sharma. Shri L. C. Jain and others. Shri Nitishwar Prasad Sinha, State Education Minister, also spoke. The ninth Seminar, which was held on April 8, 1971, was presided over by Shri D. K. Barooah, Rajyapal

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SEMINAR OF SCHOLARS 199 of Bihar, who gave an illuminating talk on the subject of Dharma ke: Mul: Anubhuti Evam Tarka with which our publication of the papers read at the Seminars begins. Shri K. K. Srivastava, 1. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division took keen interest in organizing the Seminar. Shri J. C. Mathur, Shri L, C. Jain, Shri L. P. Sahi, Dr. Yogendra Mishra, Dr. Jayamant Mishra, Pandit Ram Karan Sharma and Dr. Darbarilal Kothia participated in the deliberations of the Seminar.

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dharma ke mUla anubhUti evaM tarka * devakAnta baruzrA paNDitagaNa aura bandhugaNa, maiM Apase mAphI mA~ganA cAhatA hU~ ki merI jo hindI hogI, vaha calatI hindI hogI / lekina merA khyAla hai, merI calatI hindI prApa prAkRta kA artha hI hai prakRti yA svAbhAvikatA se sambaddha | isalie prAkRta bhASA kA artha humA janagaNa dvArA vyavahRta aisI svAbhAvika bhASA, jo sAdhAraNa janatA ke lie kathya aura bodhagamya - donoM ho / prAkRta bhASA ke tAtparya ko vyakta karane vAlI yaha ukti prasiddha hai - " prakRtyA svabhAvena siddhamiti prAkRtam" athavA "prAkRtajanAnAM bhASA prAkRtam" / rudraTa kI kAvyAlaMkArasUtra - vRtti meM namisAdhu ne yahI mata vyakta kiyA hai / yoM vaiAkaraNoM' aura alaMkArikoM ne 'prakRti' aura 'prAkRta' se kaI khIMcatAna vAle Azaya nikAle haiM / jaise, 'siddha hemacandra' meM kahA gayA hai-" prakRtiH saMskRtam tatra bhavam tata Agatam vA prAkRtam" aura mArkaNDeya ke 'prAkRta sarvasva' meM kahA gayA hai--" prakRti: saMskRtaM tatra bhavam prAkRtamucyate" / kintu vaiyAkaraNoM aura pralaMkArikoM dvArA kahI gaI ye bAteM aitihAsika aura bhASA vaijJAnika dRSTi se grAhma nahIM haiM / aitihAsika dRSTi se to prAkRta prakAza ke lekhaka vararuci kI hI vyAkhyA grAhya hai, jisake mutAbika saMskRta kA vikRta rUpa hI prAkRta hai / isalie saMskRta kA jo niyama hai, usakA prAkRta meM lAgU honA anucita hai, kyoMki saMskRta se jo azuddha huA, vahI rUpa prAkRta hai / prAkRta bhASA meM jo loga vyAkaraNa lagAte haiM, ve mere khyAla meM jabardastI karate haiM / trivikrama ne bhI apane vyAkaraNa meM dezya bhASAtroM ko vyAkaraNa ke bAhara hI rakhA thA / vaha saMskRta paNDitoM kI hindI nahIM hogo / loga samajha leMge | hindI 'prAkRta' bhASA hai / * vidvadgoSThI, 8 aprIla 1971 meM mAnanIya zrI barUA, rAjyapAla, bihAra dvArA diyA gayA adhyakSIya bhASaNa / 1. vaiyAkaraNoM dvArA prastuta kI gaI vyAkhyAoM ke kucha udAharaNa isa prakAra haiM- (ka) 'prakRteH saMskRtAd Agatam prAkRtam / - siMhadevagaNa, vAgmaTAlaMkAra kI TIkA / (kha) 'saMskRtarUpAyA: prakRteH utpannatvAt prAkRtam / - rAmacandra tarkavAgIza kRta arorarza-TIkA / ( ga ) ' prakRterAgataM prAkRtam / prakRtiH saMskRtam / ' - dhanika, dazarUpa kI TIkA / (gha) 'prakRtiH saMskRtam / tatra bhavatvAt prAkRtaM smRtam / - prAkRtacandrikA ( pITarsana kI tIsarI riporTa meM uddhRta ) / 2. prAkRta prakAza prAkRta bhASA kA purAnA grantha hai / isa para bhAmaha, vasantarAja, sadAnanda ityAdi kI kaI prasiddha TIkAeM milatI haiM / 3. trivikrama prAdityavamaMna ke pautra aura mallinAtha ke putra the / inhoMne hemacandra ko zrAdhAra mAnakara prAkRta vyAkaraNa kI TIkA likhI /

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DHARMA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA 201 pahale, Aja se sau sAla pahale hamAre baMgAla aura AsAma meM paNDita loga saMskRta to zuddha likhate the aura pIche ina paNDita logoM ne jaba aMgrejI sIkhI, to ye aMgrejI bhI zuddha likhate the| lekina dezI bhASA likhane meM, prAkRta likhane meM ye galatI kara dete the aura kucha paravAha nahIM karate the| magara Izvaracandra vidyAsAgara ne varNa-paricaya likhakara bAMgalA bhASA meM saMskRta niyama lAga kara diyaa| tabase dezaja bhASA ko-prAkRta bhASA ko bhI vyAkaraNasaMgata banAne kA prayAsa cala rahA hai aura usakA natIjA yaha huA ki Ajakala paNDitoM ke samAja meM jo hindI cala rahI hai, vaha gAMva meM kisI ko samajha meM nahIM AtI / Aja isa bAta kI carcA huI ki dharma kI buniyAda kyA hai ? anubhUti yA taka ? Ajakala hindI bhASA meM tarka kA mAne kucha halkA ho gayA hai / hama aksara bahasa karane vAle ko tArkika kaha dete haiM yAnI Ajakala 'tArkika' / zikAyata kA zabda ho gayA hai| kintu, saMskRta meM tarka ke lie dUsarA zabda hai 'yukti'| yAnI yuktivAdI ko hI tArkika kahA jAtA hai / isa taraha saMskRta meM 'tarka' zabda kA jo artha thA, usake mutAbika yukti se cintA karake yA yukti kI buniyAda para nirNaya karane vAle ko tArkika kahA jAtA thaa| mujaphpharapura kA jo yaha vaizAlI hai, vaha purAne samaya meM tArkikoM kA pIThasthAna thaa| isalie usakA asara abhI bhI vaizAlI para hai jo acchA hai, burA nhiiN| phalasvarUpa, svAdhIna cintana kI zakti abhI bhI vaizAlI meM pravahamAna hai / vaizAlI kI jo khUbI hai, isakA jo gaurava hai, vaha kevala isalie nahIM ki yaha mahAvIra tIrthakara kA janmasthAna hai yA bhagavAna buddha ne yahA~ apane dharma kA pracAra kiyA thaa| nizcaya hI vaizAlI ke gaurava ke kaI kAraNoM meM ye bAteM bhI zAmila haiN| lekina vaizAlI ke gaurava kA sabase bar3A kAraNa yaha hai ki isI jagaha para bhAratavarSa / mastiSka kI prathama mukti huI thii| magadha, kosAMbI, kozala-saba jagaha kI cintAdhArA saMkIrNa thI, lekina vaizAlI kA jo cintA-pravAha thA, vaha unmukta thA, svatatra thaa| aura usakA vikAsa bhAratavarSa meM hI nahIM, sArI duniyA~ meM huaa| eziyA meM maiM kAphI ghUma cukA hai| maiM jaba cIna gayA to vahA~ tunahvAMga uttarI cIna meM maiMne eka mUrti dekhii| usakI tasavIra mere pAsa rakhI duI hai| vahA~ likhA huA hai apsarAphlAiMga deva / jahA~ dharmakIrti kA mandira hai, maiM vahA~ bhI gyaa| jApAna jAkara maiMne vahA~ kA sAgarotsava ( sI seremanI ) bhI dekhaa| vahA~ lagabhaga saba kucha bauddha dharma se AyA huA hai| unakI jo vinaya hai, baiThane-baiThAne kA DhaMga hai, vaha bauddha dharma se AyA huA hai| unakA jo saundarya-bodha hai, bAga-bagIcA vagairaha lagAne kA sanIkA hai, vaha bhI bauddhadharma se ho AyA huA hai| itanA hI nahIM, maiM thAilaiMDa gayA, aMkoravATa gayA, kamboDiyA aura kaMboja gayA / maiM eziyA meM jahA~ bhI gayA, vahIM maiMne vaizAlI meM vikasita huI cintA-dhArA kA 'impaikTa', jise hindI meM prabhAva kahate haiM, spaSTa dekhaa| cUMki samUce eziyA para maiMne yaha prabhAva dekhA, isalie maiM kahatA hU~ ki vaizAlI mere lie zraddhA kA sthAna hai-jIrthasthAna hai / yaha isalie bhI tIrthasthAna hai ki yahIM para pahalI bAra yuktivAdiyoM ne, jaisA ki maiM pahale bhI kaha cukA hU~, hamAre mastiSka ko-pUre bhAratavarSa ke mastiSka ko mukti pradAna kii| ___ ApalogoM ne isa bAta kI bhI carcA kI ki dharma kyA hai ? dharma kI aneka vyAkhyAeM haiN| usake to bahuta matalaba haiN| sanAtanapaMthI jo kahate haiM, vaha bhI dharma hai| varNAzrama ko

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202 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 bhI hamaloga dharma hI kahate haiM / lekina varNAzrama ko jo nahIM mAnate, ve bhI eka prakAra ke dharma ke hI AcaraNa kA dAvA karate haiM / bhagavAn buddha kA jo dharma hai, usakA nAma to saddhamaM hai acchA dharmaM / kabhI bhI bhagavAn buddha ne bauddhadharma nahIM kahA saddharma khaa| isI taraha aneka bhinnatAoM yA vizeSatAoM ke rahane para bhI mahAvIra tIrthaMkara dvArA calAyA mata bhI dharma hI hai / itanA hI nahIM, jo mata bhagavAd ko bilkula nahIM mAnatA, vaha bhI dharma 1 kahalAyA / isa taraha dharma kI vyAkhyA aura rUpa aneka hai, eka nahIM / vidvadgoSThI meM bahuta logoM ne zloka ko pramANa mAnakara kaI bAteM khiiN| lekina kisI eka zloka ko pramANa mAnA jAya, to kaise ? saMskRta meM aneka paraspara virodhI zloka milate haiM / saMskRta vAGmaya to samudra jaisA hai / usameM hAMgara ( magara ) bhI hai, jo machalI khAtA hai aura muktA - motI bhI hai / jaise samudra meM aise jAnavara bhI hote haiM, jo dUsare samudrI jAnavara ko khA jAte haiM, vaise tI saMskRta meM aise zloka haiM, jo dUsare saMskRta zloka ko hajama kara jAte haiM / dharmakIrti ke zloka kA Azaya maiM Apako sunA detA hU~, jo isI vaizAlI kI sRSTi hai / usakA kahanA hai ki bhraSTabuddhi ke pAMca lakSaNa hote haiN| pahalA lakSaraNa hai 'vedaprAmANyaM', arthAt veda ko pramANa mAnanA / dUsarA lakSaNa hai 'kasyacit kartR vAdaH', yAni yaha mAnanA ki Izvara ne duniyA ko banAyA hai / tIsarA lakSaNa hai 'snAne dharmecchA, yaha vizvAsa karanA ki nahAne se dharma hotA hai / cauthA lakSaNa hai 'jAtivAdAvalepaH--jAtivyavasthA yA varazrama ko mAnanA / aura, pAMcavAM lakSaNa hai 'saMtApArambha pApahAnAyaceti'-- zrarthAt zarIra ko kaSTa dekara dharbha-lAbha mAnanA / isa taraha jo bhraSTabuddhi hai, jisakA dimAga bilkula kharAba ho gayA hai, usakI mUrkhatA ke ye uparyukta ) pA~ca lakSaNa haiM - ' dhvasta prajJAne paJcaliMgAni jADye' / to, yaha mI saMskRta meM likhA huA hai aura dharmakIrti jaise bar3e mI kA likhA huA hai / aba inakA zloka mAnUM yA vedavAdiyoM athavA AstikoM kA zloka mAnU~ / batAiye / bhagavAn buddha ne jise dharmaM kahA hai, usake bAre meM maiM thor3A jAnatA hUM / jisako Apa dharma kahate haiM, usake prasaMga meM aksara yaha vicAra kiyA jAtA hai ki Izvara hai yA nahIM, sRSTi kisane kI yA sRSTi svayaM ho gaI, vagairaha / magara bhagavAn buddha ne inake bAre meM kucha kahA hI nahIM / bhagavAn buddha ne dharma kA jo mAne lagAyA thA, vaha thA AcaraNa - vinaya / unakA dharma to thA ASTAMgika mArga, jisameM hai samyag dRSTi, samyak saMkalpa, samyag vAcA, samyak karma, samyag ajIva, samyaka prayatna, samyak smRti aura samyak samAdhi / yAni bhale-bure ThIka jJAna honA tAhie, hara manuSya kA saMkalpa ThIka honA cAhie, usakA vacana hI nahIM karma bhI ThIka honA cAhie, use acchI taraha se jIvana nirvAha karanA cAhie, ityAdi / sacamuca, AcaraNa hI sabase bar3hakara mahatvapUrNa hai / Apa corI karake saddharma kA pAlana nahIM kara sakate haiM / isalie bhagavAn buddha kA jo dharma hai, vaha AcaraNa kA dharma hai / isameM hai puruSakAra / merI samajha bauddha dharma aura jaina dharma kA jo sabase bar3A guNa hai, vaha hai puruSakAra meM vizvAsa | Apa meM acchA kAma karane kI jo kSamatA hai, usake dvArA Apa apane bhaviSya kA nirmANa kara sakate haiM / yaha nizcita hai ki Apa jo kareMge, usIse ApakA bhaviSya nirmita 1. pramANavArtika svavRtti, 1.342 /

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DHARMA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA prathanA nirNIta hogA, kisI aura kucha se nahIM / yahA~ ThIka kAma karane ke sAtha ThIka-ThIka bolanA bhI zAmila hai| tabhI to bhagavAn buddha ne kahA hai- 'samyag vAcA' | Aja apane kaI taraha kI bAteM sunIM : saundayaM kI ArAdhanA karanI cAhie, sAhasa se bolanA cAhie, bar3hiyA~ aura sArthaka kAma karanA cAhie / lekina bhagavAn buddha ne isase bhI Age bar3hakara kahA ki bhAI, kevala satya vAk bolane se nahIM hoMgA, satya kriyA bhI karanI hogii| kriyA meM - kAma meM hI tumhArA satya pratiphalita hogA, khAlI bAta meM nahIM / isalie satya vAcA hI nahIM, satya kriyA bhI honI cAhie / satya kriyA para buddha ne zAyada isalie bhI jora diyA ki bhagavAn meM pragAr3ha vizvAsa -- andhavizvAsa rakhane ke bAvajUda vyakti acche zrAcaraNa se dUra raha sakatA hai | bahuta se loga aise haiM, jo dharmaM meM kAphI vizvAsa karate haiM, lekina karma -- kAma kucha nahIM karate / aise aneka bhaktivAdI hameM milate haiM / yoM bhakti meM bhI do pakSa haiM / eka to yaha hai ki bhakti meM karma aura vizvAsa donoM kA samanvaya honA cAhie / lekina eka dUsarA pakSa bhI hai, jisameM kahA gayA hai ki bhagavAn meM vizvAsa karane ke alAvA tumako kucha karanA dharanA hI nahIM hai : ajagara kare na cAkarI, paMchI kare na kAma / dAsa malUkA kaha gae, sabake dAtA rAma // bhAgavata' meM bhI prajAmila kA upAkhyAna hai / prajAmila eka brAhmaNa thA / usane jIvana bhara pApa hI kiyaa| marane ke vakta usako pakar3ane ke liye yamadUta AyA / ajAmila ke lar3ake kA nAma thA nArAyaNa / so usane pukArA 'AIso putra nArAyaNa' / usa pukAra ko sunate hI viSNudUta ko zaMkA huI ki yaha vyakti toM nArAyaNa kA, viSNu bhagavAn kA bhakta hai / phira kyA thA / viSNudUta ne ajAmila ko yamadUta se chIna liyA- use mRtyu ke mukha se bacA liyaa| samUcI jindagI bhara jisane pApa kiyA, marane ke samaya galatI se usake mu~ha meM nArAyaNa A gayA, to usakI mukti ho gii| acaraja hai ki samyag prAcaraNa ke binA aisA bhI hotA hai / kevala bhaktivAdiyoM meM hI nahIM, nirIzvaravAdiyoM yA nAstikoM meM bhI kaI loga mAnate haiM ki kucha karane gharane kI jarUrata nahIM hai / aise logoM meM sabase bar3A thA makAli gozAlauM / ve saba kucha mAnate the - duniyA ko mAnate the zraura punarjanma bhI 1. mriyamANo harernAma gRNan putropacAritam / ajAmilo'pyagAddhAma kiM punaH zraddhayA gRNan // 203 - bhAgavata purANa, 6. 2. 46 / 2. natthi, mahArAja, hetu, natthi paccayo sattAnaM saGkilesAya / mahetu zrapaccayA sattA saGkilirasanti / natthi hetu, natthi paccayo sattAnaM visuddhiyA / ahetU apaccayA sattA vinti / natthi prattakAre, natthi purisakAre, natthi balaM, natthi viriyaM, natthi purisathAmo, natthi purisaparakkamo / sabbe sattA sabbe pANA sabbe bhUtA sabbe jIvA zravasA abalA aviriyA niyatisaMgati bhAvapariNatA, chasvevAbhijAtI sukhadukAM paTisaMvedenti / -dIghanikAya, nAlandA devAnAgarI - pAli-granthamAlA, 1968, pR0 47 //

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204 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 mAnate the| lekina ve kahate the ki karane-gharane se kucha nahIM hotA hai| yadi tuma kisI kA galA kAToge, to usase pApa nahIM hogA aura yadi tuma garIboM meM rupayA bAMTa doge, to usase puNya bhI nahIM hogaa| yAnI tumhAre karane-dharane kA koI asara tumhAre punarjanma para nahIM hogA / kisI bhI jIva ke lie sabase bar3I cIja hai bhAgyacakra / jIva to apane bhAgyacakra ke anusAra caurAsI lAkha yoniyoM meM gujarane ke bAda apane Apa arhata ho jAyagA / ve Izvara meM vizvAsa nahIM karate the, punarjanma meM vizvAsa karate the, lekina prakriyAvAdI the| kintu, bhagavAna buddha ne aisI dhAraNA ko svIkAra nahIM kiyaa| unhoMne spaSTa kahA ki jisa dharma meM puruSakAra nahIM hai, vaha dharma janatA ke lie maMgaladAyaka nahIM ho sktaa| isIlie bhagavAn buddha ne dharma kA uddezya batAyA-bahujanahitAya c'| jisa dharma meM puruSakAra ko sthAna nahIM hai, vaha dharma 'bahujanahitAya ca' nahIM ho sktaa| isa taraha dharma kA jo sabase bar3A kSetra hai, vaha hai, AcaraNa aura AcaraNa kI buniyAda hai, jaisAki maiM samajhA hU~, yukti / isa prasaMga meM maiM ApalogoM ko bauddhadharma kA eka vAkiyA batalAnA cAhatA huuN| Apa jAnate hI hoMge ki kucha saMnyAsI ekadama kapar3A pahanate hI nahIM / kucha saMnyAsI pahanate bhI haiM to eka yA do kapar3e pahanate haiN| kintu, bhagavAna buddha ne bauddha mikSuoM ke lie tIna kapar3e pahanane kA niyama kara diyaa| unhoMne kyoM aisA kara diyA ? unhoMne prayoga kara dekhA ki kitanA kapar3A pahananA cAhie / hemanta Rtu meM-zItakAla meM unhoMne mahasUsa kiyA ki bahuta ThaMDhA par3atA hai| usameM unhoMne svayaM apane para prayoga kara dekhA, eka kapar3A liyA, dUsarA kapar3A liyA, tIsarA kapar3A liyaa| unhoMne pAyA ki tIna kapar3e meM ArAma to nahIM hotA, lekina kaSTa-nivAraNa hotA hai| bhagavAn buddha to madhyapaMthI the, madhyamA pratipadA ko mAnane vaale| isalie unhoMne bhikSuoM se kahA ki tIna kapar3e liyA kro|' isa taraha bhagavAna buddha kA yA bauddha dharma kA jo 'vinaya' haiM, usakI buniyAda yukti hai| isa prasaMga meM eka dUsarA udAharaNa liijie| bhagavAna buddha ne khar3AU~ pahananA banda kara diyA', kyoMki khar3AUM se bahuta AvAja hotI hai aura usa AvAja se dhyAna tathA ekAgra-cintA meM vyAghAta hotA hai| isalie unhoMne taya kara diyA ki bhikSugaNa khar3AU~ nahIM pahaneMge / lekina vinA khar3AUM ke paidala calane-phirane meM jaba takalIpha mahasUsa huI, to unhoMne kahA ki eka parata kI carmapAdukA pahana sakate haiM / hA~, vizeSa paristhiti meM koI kaThinAI upasthita hone para 1. bhagavA sItAsu hemantikAsu rattIsu antaratukAsu himapAtasayaye ratti prajjhokAse eka cIvaro nisI di | na bhagavantaM ahosi / niklante paThame yAme sItaM bhagavantaM ahosi / dutiyaM bhagavA cIvaraM pArUpi / na bhagavantaM sItaM ahosi / niklAnte majjhime yAme sItaM bhagavantaM ahosi / tatiyaM bhagavA cIvaraM pArupi / na bhagavantaM sItaM ahosi...'ye pikho te kulaputtA imasmi dhammavinaye sItAlukA sItabhIrukA tepi sakkonti ticIvarena yApetuM' / mahAvagga, 8. 15. 21 ( pRSTha 304 ) / 2. mahAvagga- 5. 7. 15 ( pRsstth-208)| 3. eka paratavAlI carmapAdukA ko pAli meM ekapalAsika kahA gayA hai| mahAvaga, 5. 3. 7 ( pRSTha 204 ) /

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DHARMA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA ekAdhika paratavAlI' yA moTe camar3e kI pAdukA bhI pahanI jA sakatI hai / isa taraha bhagavAna buddha ne tarka se yukti se soca-vicAra kara AcaraNa aura vyApAra ke sabhI niyamoM ko W banAyA | 205 S vaizAlI meM jo gaNataMtra thA, usake nirNaya kI bhI to yahI prakriyA ajAtazatru vaizAlI para AkramaNa karanA cAhatA thA, usa samaya bhagavAn buddha eka daphe kahA thA ki jabataka licchavI loga apane santhAgAra meM niyamapUrvaka jAte raheMge, tabataka ajAtazatru unako nahIM jIta sakegA / licchavIgaNa apane santhAgAra meM jAkara tarka- yukti se Apasa meM AlocanA karake hI koI nirNaya karate the / isa taraha dharma - AcaraNa ke dharma kI buniyAda hai yukti / maiM AdhyAtmika dharma ke bAre meM nahIM jAnatA hU~; kyoMki vaha mere vaza ke bAhara kI bAta hai | isa AcaraNa-dharma kI carcA upaniSada meM bhI milatI hai / abhI-abhI mAthura sAhaba TI0 esa0 iliyaTa kI carcA kara rahe the / TI0 esa0 iliyaTa kI sarvottama kavitA vesTalaiMDa kA antima khaNDa hai, 'What the thunder said isameM unhoMne vRhadAraNyakopaniSad ke hI eka sUtra ke AdhAra para AcaraNa dharma kA kAvyAtmaka saMketa kiyA hai| nara, asura, aura deva ne eka-eka kara prajApati se pUchA ki hamAre lie dharma kyA hogA, hamArA anuzAsana kyA hogA ? prajApati ne kahA--da, da, da-datta, dayadhvam aura dAmyata / cUMki AdamI parigrahI hotA hai, isalie prajApati ne prAdamI se kahA ki dAna karo / asura kucha krUra hote the, isalie prajApati ne unase kahA ki dayA karo aura devatA cU~ki indriya-sukhoM meM DUbe rahate the, isalie prajApati ne unako kahA ki bhAI thor3A damana karo -- Atma niyaMtraNa karo | isa taraha upaniSad meM bhI AcaraNa kA hI upadeza hai ki hameM kyA karanA cAhie, manuSya-jIvana kA kyA kartavya honA cAhie / matalaba yaha ki AcaraNa kA nirNaya karanA dharma kA sabase bar3A thI / jisa samaya 1 1. eka se adhika paratavAlI carmapAdukA ko garagaraNa upAhana kahA gayA hai: mahAvagga, 5. 5 12 (pRSTha 206 ) / 2. vajjI abhihaM sannipAtA sannipAtabahulAvajjI samaggA sannipatanti samaggA vuduhanti samaggA vajjikaraNIyAni karonti ..... vajjI apaJcattaM na paJJApenti paJJattaM na samucchindanti yathApaJJate porANe vajjidhamme samadAya vattanti .. ekamekena pi bho gotama, aparihAniyena dhammena samannAgatAnaM vajjInaM vuddhiyeva pATikaM, to parihAni ko pana vAdo sattahi aparihAniyehi dhammehi // dIghanikAya - 2 3 1 4-5 (pRSTha 59-61 ) / 3. The Waste Land and Other Poems. T. S. Eliot, Faber and Faber, London. 1968, pages 42-43, 4. tadetadevaiSA devI vAganuvadati stanayitnudaM da da iti dAmyata datta dayadhvamiti / tadetat trayaM zikSet damaM dAnaM dayAmiti / bahAdAraNyakopaniSad, 5 2 3. Eliot ne ise Deussen dvArA kiye gaye jarmana anuvAda Sechzig Upanishads des Veda se graha kiyA thA /

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206 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 1 kAma hai / kucha loga pUjA-pATha karate haiM, lekina garIba ke Upara atyAcAra bhI karate haiM / merI samajha meM yaha dharma nahIM huA / dharmaM to manuSya ke prati, eka dUsare ke prati hamAre vyavahAra meM nihita hai aura isa dharma kI buniyAda 'yukti' hai / jisa dharma se hamAre roja dina ke jIvana kA koI matalaba nahIM hai, usa dharma kI buniyAda yukti ke alAvA kucha aura ho sakatI hai, jisake bAre meM na merI jAnakArI hai aura na jisa para kucha kahane kA maiM pradhikArI hU~ | merI nizcita rAya hai ki jisa dharma se hama jIvana-yApana karate haiM, jo dharma hama sabako eka sUtra meM gUMtha karake rakhatA hai aura jo pUre samAja kA dhAraraNa-poSaNa karatA hai, usa dharma kI buniyAda yukti para hI kAyama hai| Akhira dharma hai kyA ? jo dhAraNa karatA hai, vahI to dharma hai / sacamuca, jo isa duniyA kA dhAraNa-poSaNa karatA hai, jo isako ThIka rAste para acchI taraha se calAtA hai, vahI dharma hai / jina mahApuruSoM ne dharma ke bAre meM koI mahattvapUrNa bAta kahI yA dharma sambandhI dhAraNAoM meM kucha parivartana kiyA, usakA prAdhAra 'yukti' hI hai / kyA ucita hai aura kyA anucita hai-- isake bAre meM cintana karake unhoMne taya kiyA ki yaha niyama honA cAhie aura yaha nahIM honA cAhie / phira jo niyama ho, use vajra kI lakIra nahIM banAnA cAhie / usameM bhI jarUrata ke mutAbika samaya-samaya para yukti ke dvArA parivartana kI guMjAiza rahanI cAhie / bhagavAn buddha dvArA calAye niyamoM kI yahI khUbI hai kahIM kaThora niyaMtraNa kiyA, to kahIM kucha ghaTA bhI diyaa| snAna ke bAre meM 'snAne dharmecchA' | hamAre deza meM aneka aise AdamI the aura abhI bhI haiM, jo binA nahAye cAya-pAna bhI nahIM karate; tIna-daphe -- subaha, dopahara, zAma nahAte haiN| itanA hI nahIM, bahuta loga khAnA bhI bhIMge kapar3e meM hI khAte haiM / lekina bhagavAn buddha ne bhikSuoM se kahApandraha dinoM meM eka daphe nahAo / " aisA kyoM kara diyA unhoMne ? isalie ki snAna karane meM hI AdamI lagA rahegA, to dUsare Avazyaka kAma kaba karegA / hamAre sanAtanI hindU dharma meM loga samajhate the aura abhI bhI kucha loga samajhate haiM ki hama jitanA hI nahAyeMge utanA hI puNya hogA | hameM aisI dhArmika dhAraNAtroM meM sAmAjika avasthA aura sAmAjika samasyAoM ko dekhate hue parivartana karanA hai / yaha parivartana kaise kiyA jAyagA ? anubhUti se yA yukti se ? mere vicAra meM ise yukti se honA caahie| aisA maiM isalie kahatA hU~ ki jo dharma manuSya ke sAmAjika jIvana se koI tAlluka nahIM rakhatA hai, usakI buniyAda anubhUti ho sakatI hai, lekina jo dharma manuSya-jIvana ke nikaTa samparka meM hai, jo dharma manuSya jIvana ko saMyamita karake ekatA, hisA, maitrI aura sAmya ke rAste para le jAnA cAhatA hai, usa dharma kI buniyAda 'yukti' para hI kAyama rahegI aura 'yukti' hI usa dharma ke prArambha aura parivartana kA AdhAra banI rahegI / / bhagavAn buddha ne kahA gayA hai --- vaizAlI meM Aja jo carcA huI, baha bahuta acchI huI / maiM samajhatA hU~, isase bhI bezI carcA honI cAhie thI / dharma-samanvaya kI bAta bhara kaha dene se samanvaya nahIM hotA 1 kathaM hi nAma te, miklave, modhapurisA rAjAnaM pi passitvA na mattaM jAnityA nAssinti / taM bhiksAve, appasannAnaM vA pasAdAya pe0 evaM ca pana, bhikkhave imaM sikkhApadaM uddiseyyAtha - yo pana bhikkhu orenaddhamAsaM nahAyeyya, pAcittiyaM / --pAcittiya, 5.57.357 ( pRSTha 160 ) /

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DHARMA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA 207 hai| aura, vaizAlI kA yaha rAstA thA bhI nhiiN| yahAM kA to rAstA thA ki hamArA jo pratipAdya viSaya hai, usake sambandha meM hama vAda-vivAda kareMge-vicAra ke stara para lar3eMge, saba milakara AlocanA-pratyAlocanA kareMge, taba eka samanvaya nikalegA-eka tattva-bodha paidA hogaa| vahI samanvaya saccA samanvaya hogA aura vahI vaizAlI kI paramparA ke lAyaka samanvaya hogaa| kevala yaha kaha denA ki hama saba eka haiM, samanvaya nahIM hai aura aisA samanvaya kabhI vaizAlI meM huA nhiiN| vaizAlI to gaNataMtra kA janma sthAna hai-khAlI rAjanItika gaNataMtra kA hI nhiiN| yahA~ sabako svataMtra cintana karane kA adhikAra thA aura sabhI isa adhikAra kA prayoga karate the- ise vyavahAra meM lAte the| yaha vaizAlI cintanazIla logoM kI jagaha thii| isameM zaka mahIM ki vaizAlI zaukIna logoM kI bhI jagaha thii| garIbI dUra ho jAne para loga zaukIna ho hI jAte haiN| jaba bhagavAn buddha yahA~ Aye aura licchavI loga unase milane gaye, taba bhagavAn ne dekhA ki yahAM ke loga kitane zaukIna haiM : jisakA ghor3A lAla raMga kA hai, usakA kapar3A bhI lAla hai aura jisakA kapar3A nIlA hai, usakA ghor3A bhI nIlA hai| taba bhagavAna buddha ne prasanna hokara bhikSuoM se kahA thA ki tumalogoM ne devatA to nahIM dekhA hai| dekha lo, ina licchaviyoM ko| devatA kI zaklasUrata aisI hI hotii| ___ maiM ApalogoM se milakara bar3A prasanna huaa| bar3I bAMchA thI ki vaizAlI ko dekha AU~, jisake bAre meM meMne itanA par3hA hai| vaha vAMchA Aja pUrI huii| mere vicAra se vaizAlI meM aisA anuSThAna barAbara karanA cAhie, jisase svAdhIna cintAdhArA vikasita ho / cintA aura anubhUti alaga-alaga nahIM haiN| AdamI kI anubhUti usake sAmAjika paripArzva meM usako cintAdhArA se banatI hai| acche AdamI kI anubhUti acchI hotI hai, duSTa kI duSTa / jisakI cintAdhArA duSTa hai, usakI anubhUti kA zuddha honA nAmumakina hai aura jisakI cintAdhArA zuddha hai, usako anubhUti zuddha hogI hii| agara aApa dArzanika tattvanirUpaNa meM jAie, to pApa pAeMge ki anubhUti aura yukti meM koI maulika pArthakya nahIM hai / donoM meM praNAlI-bheda hai, lekina donoM kA janma to manuSya se hI hotA hai| cintA aura anubhUti donoM hI manuSya ke andara haiM, bAhara nhiiN| yAnI jisakI cintA sat hogI, usakI anubhUti bhI sat hogii| isalie Apa cintAmukti kA prabandha kIjie, svAdhIna aura sacintA kA prabandha kIjie / dekhie ApakI anubhUti zuddha hogii| namaskAra / 1-mahAvagga, 6. 18. 30 ( pRSTha 247 ) /

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THE ROOT OF RELIGION: INTUITION AND REASONING.' SATKARI MOOKERJEE The subject of the present seminar has a perennial interest both for the believer and the sceptic. The sceptic must be thankful to the pious believer for providing him with the staple for his criticism. After all his attitude is primarily, if not mainly, negative. He wants to demolish the very foundation of the belief of the follower of a religion. He can succeed in his task by showing that the faith and practice of a religious man are based on hoax invented by the intellectuals of a country for thriving at the expense of credulous fools. The professional custodians of religion do prescribe certain ceremonies and ways of worship which can be performed with valued materials such as food, cloth, aromatics. These things are covetable to men of all walks of life and consequently grateful to the Deity. The Deity of course does not consume them but leaves them intact for the use of priests and their family. The sceptics are mostly intellectual people who have carried on their crusade against religion as social institution with formidable arguments in all ages and countries which focus on the utilitarian value of the Votive offerings. India produced a class of intellectuals who prided themselves on their freedom from superstitions and independent thinking. Scepticism is almost as old as religion. The Buddha had a contemporary called Ajita Kesakambali who preached the materialistic doctrine that there is no life after death, the soul dies with the body and conciousness is only a byproduct of the physical elements-earth, water, air and fire. It is on a par with the heat of the body. The Buddha believed in life after death, heaven and hell and transmigration. His chief concern was the promulgation of a way of discipline which would ultimately lead to emancipation from the cycle of birth and death. He had to fight these materialists and prove their tenets as false heresy. The purpose of my mention of this historical fact is to show that faith and scepticism have run pari passu without being able to extinguish each other. It is not an unprecedented novel phenomenon. The present day communist creed of dialectical materialism sponsored by Karl Marx is only a revival of old materialism and scepticism with ingenious trappings. We shall give our evaluation of this respectable philosophical doctrine in due course. 1. Read on April 8, 1971, at Seminar of Scholars.

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THE ROOT OF RELIGION : INTUTION AND REASONING 209 I now propose to examine the thesis that religion owes its inception to the deliberate fraud of a class of intellectuals who a dopted the priestly profession as a source of livelihood. But these priests are themselves believers in efficacy of religion and the religious practices. They also practise these ceremonies with all these paraphernalia. They invoke the services of other priests and make a gift of the offerings to them. It may be argued that these people are the victims of past impostors. But the question arises with regard to these alleged professional cheats. They also were sincere believers.' It may be contended that the series of impostors in generation after generation are responsible for the emergence of an institutional religion. The so-called prophets are also victims of pious fraud. But we cannot light upon any historical individual who may have been the first impostor. If the whole series of religious persons are supposed to have been the victims of deception, the theory of deception will not hold water. If religion were outcome of fraud and deception on the part of a person or a community it must have been discovered long ago and the culprits brought to book. But religion is not an institution of a particular age, a country or a nation but is found to be present wherever men live, as modern anthropologists have shown. So the hyothesis of fraud cannot be seriously entertained. If, on the other hand, it is supposed to owe its origin to error or false belief, it ought to have been corrected by discovery of the opposite truth just as all errors are found to be cancelled by the opposite finding. Even if it is supposed to be based on a mistaken notion and a pipedream, the mistake must be enormously powerful to hold all the diverse races of mankind from time emmemorial under its sway. So neither the hypothesis of deception nor error will be acceptable as a satisfactory explanation of the origin of religion. It must again be recognized that in spite of the preachings of the prophets of scepticism, religion continues to be a powerful force with mankind in general. This faith in religion is not confined to ignorant uneducated people but has adherence among the best intellects of every generation. The great prophets and apostles of religion, to name a few, Srikssna, Buddha, the Jain Tirthaakaras, Jesus Christ, cannot be dubbed as men of weak intellect. Even the greatest men of science in modern age Newton, Einstein, Eddington and others were believers in God. The line of defence may however be regarded as an argumentum ad hominem. But this is mentioned by us as a matter worthy of serious consideration by the materialist philosopher and we expect an explanation from him. 1. See Nyayakusumanjali, Chap. I. 14

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210 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I We now propose to approach this subject from two different angles of vision, namely, religion as a matter of personal intuition and religion as a social institution. We find in the Rgueda and also in other Vedic Samhitas that man offers sacrifices which consist in the oblation of clarified butter and other food-grains into fire. Fire was not a mere natural phenomenon but was animated by an exalted spirit called God. Fire-God carries this oblation to the deities and the sacrificer's desires and wants are fulfilled. The ancient Aryans were a virile people and were constantly engaged in their war against the aborigines who resisted them as interlopers. Victory in the battle was fondly desiderated. Sons were sincerely wanted to maintain their possessions and fight the enemies who wanted to rob them. Broadly speaking the gods were to be gratified for the grant of fulfilment of their various wants. A good harvest, cattle, horses, good health, a large number of progeny were necessary for their communal life. Religion was thus regarded as the means securing the good things of this world and also of heavenly life after death. The Aryans believed that their personal prowess was not alone sufficient; they wanted to reinforce it with the superior power of gods. Fulfilment of personal desires and wants was the visa tergo of religious performance. In course of time men and women came to form a community which with progressive growth developed into nation-hood. The good and the prosperity of the whole community was sought to be realized by big sacrifices attended with prayers and utterances of spells. Consciousness of the limitations of human prowess and efforts inspired them to seek the alliance of God for the fulfilment of their personal and national wants. We may safely draw the conclusion that consciousness of helplessness or frustration due to limitations of finitude is the source of religion as a cult. Divine discontent with finite achievement drives man to the attainment of infinite perfection. The irrepressible urge for transcending the limitations of finite knowledge, finite power and finite happiness is the genesis of religion. It finds expression in science and philosophy and will cease to operate till the realization of the goal. The finite man must become infinite God. The intuition of the infinite, articluate or inarticulate, is present in every man and this is the beginning of religion, the pursuit of spirituality. Not only in India but also among the Hebrews of Palestine, we find the same realization of the necessity of the help of superior So also in Greece. The worship of many gods was ultimately power. superseded by the conception of one God to whom prayers addressed with devotion and faith for the satisfaction of temporal wants. With the development of philosophical speculation the conception are

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THE ROOT OF RELIGION : INTUTION AND REASONING 211 of God was more and more spiritualized. Fear of punishment was tempered with feelings of love, confidence and personal intimacy. With the establishment of prosperity and growth of power for self-defence and national security, satisfaction of temporal wants and achievement of worldly success were regarded as things of inferior value. The philosophers and wise men wanted the fulfilment of higher values. They wanted to transcend their spiritual limitations. And contemplation of the divine mystery was resorted to as the means to higher realization. Man's ambition was not satisfied with the acquisition of temporal prosperity which only satisfies the animal needs. It came to be realized that eternal good and absolute freedom from all limitations were to be achieved. For this a life of contemplation and meditation on the inner mysteries of the spirit was adopted by aspiring men and women. The flesh is after all subject to decay and death and the superiority of spirit over the flesh was realiz ed. No finite power or glory could satisfy the spiritual aspirant. All finite achievements are fraught with misery. These men wanted to be immortal and free from all limitations. The physical passions and weaknesses were to be subdued as the preliminary step to higher life. The quest of the infinite came to be the ruling passion. All temporal goods, plenty of food, drink, youthful vigour, physical strength were found to be inadequate. These aspiring souls forsook wordly life. The comforts of family, the security of national power and possession of abundant material prosperity were weighed in the balance and found tole wanting in their power to secure the highest value which was not subject to decay and death, wax and wane. Worldly prosperity, powers of arms and ammunition, military superiority are not eternal values and cannot give permanent satisfaction. They are subject to growth and decay. The paths of glory lead but to the grave. Life that is immortal, full in every dimension beyond the ravages of time, perfect security, serenity and plenum of bliss--that is the summum bonum, than which nothing can be greater or higher. This state of infinite perfection is called Mok sa, emancipation from all bonds and limits. The Nirvana is only another name of this highest state. We do not want to enter into the controversy whether this highest condition is positive life or mere negation of suffering. Fits of swoon, epileptic fits and the coma induced by narcotic drugs are free from the visitation of pain. If Nurvana or Moksa were an eternal sleep and a never ending coma, it would not be a covetable state. Buddhagosa in his Visuddhimagga quotes passages from the Pali canon to show that Nirvana is a positive state of bliss in

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212 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I which all wants are satisfied and pain and suffering are totally extinguished. It has been argued that this state of perfection is only a bunkum, a figment of the imagination or a deliberate fraud devised to afford solace to the exploited proletariat who are deprived of all the good things of the world. This fantastic dream is held out before the working men and women in order to blunt the edge of their resistance. The apostles of spiritual life are allies of the capitalists and their mission is to keep the down-trodden, persecuted, exploited labouring class in perpetual subjection. The salvation of the working men and women lies in their struggle against the privileged class. The bourgeoisie and the capitalists must be annihilated and the rule of the proletariat established. From reports of newspapers we are given to understand that this has been achieved in Russia and China and the other communist countries. This is an unfailing temptation for the poor people of all countries. Communism is defined as vesting of property in the community, each member working according to his capacity and receiving according to his wants. This is no doubt the utopia which is to be realized as the ultimate goal and socialism is the penultimate stage. This is a respectable philosophy and is a covetable price for the sections of people which are lagging behind in the struggle for existence. Let us suppose that conditions of society are so adjusted that none will be deprived of the legitimate share of the food, drink and housing accommodation, in fact all things that are necessary for comfortable and healthy life. When this state of society is reached, there would be no class struggle, all men being placed on an equal footing. Whether all men and women can be made equal partners of life so far as the material advantages are concerned is a moot question. Again it is problematic whether all men can be intellectually and morally made perfectly equal. In the existing state of affairs we find blatant inequalities in intelligence, capacity for physical and intellectual labour and moral dispositions. Let us suppose that these inequalities will be obliterated by means of social adjustment and reforms in the education system. Let us also suppose that all poverty, deformity and drawhacks, physical and intellectual, will be made good by progress of science and people will cease to have any worry regarding the necessities of physical existence. Suppose this utopia is realized. But will all men be content with the good things of the earth? As we have observed before nothing finite can satisfy a man. The higher and higher a man rises in the scale of civilization and culture his wants

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THE ROOT OF RELIGION INTUTION AND REASONING 213 become more and more refined. We have seen that man's aspiration is infinite. He wants to rise superior to his intellectual, moral and spiritual values. The Buddha sacrified his life of luxury and plenty in which the satisfaction of all the passions and desires of humdrum life were available beyond measure. He embraced the life of the beggar not out of frustation. He was not a jilted lover or subjected to any physical malady. On all accounts he was a very handsome youngman and had a loyal wife of exceeding beauty bubbling over with youthful grace and also a new born baby. Yet he gave up the pleasure of the palace and went out as homeless ascetic in quest of infinite consummation which was beyond the control of time. Men come to be fed up as much with prosperity as with poverty. Is there such a thing as spiritual poverty and spiritual wealth? If these be not fantasy of morbid imagination, it will not cease to have its attraction for some rare souls. This has been the historical testimony of India's spiritual life. That this state of perfection and freedom is not a stupid fantasy is proved by the powerful philosophy that both preceded and followed it. We cannot dismiss it as an idle dream or the fraud of wicked gangster. That will be doing less than justice to these exceptional persons whose influence is still working among large sections of men and women. But a problem stares us in the face. One cannot be such a churlish boor as to challenge the credentials of prophets and founders of religion in the past. But if all these super-excellent persons were directly acquainted with the ultimate truth, why should there be such pronounced divergence of views among them. The difference of the Buddha from the Upanisadic seers and from other prophets such as Mahavira and prophets of other countries is unambiguous. Kumarila, the most powerful advocate of Vedic religion, put this poser-"If the Buddha was omniscient, why should Kapila be not, when they openly profess their superior wisdom? If both are omniscient why should there be difference of opinion between them". This is a challange. I have discussed this problem in a paper entitled "The Omniscient as a founder of Religion" See Research Volume III, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara). It may suffice to say that barring the differences in liturgy and rituals which are mainly influenced by environment and social conditions, there is fundamental unanimity in respect of the essentials of religion. The different forms 1. sugato yadi sarvajnah kapilo ne'ti ka prama / ubhau yadi ca sarvajnau matabhedastayoh katham //

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214 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 and ceremonies are rather the external vesture and in spite of their bearing on spiritual life, they cannot be allowed to arrogate equal or superior status over the moral and religious thought and disposition. It is high time that these external differences of the physical aspect of religion were sized up and given their due place. As regards the so-called atheistic creeds such as Buddhism and Jainism which have no place for personal God as creator and sustainer of the world order, we must face the question whether they can be given the status of religion. The question can be answered by definition we put upon religion. Popular religion Christianity, Islam are theistic. They posit a personal God with varying attributes. Buddhism and Jainism however do not affirm the existence of God as creator. The Semitic creeds assert that God created not only the world order but also the souls of men. Even popular Hinduism holds that souls are eternal verities coeval with God. So the conception of God as creator is not entirely the same or similar. Buddhism and Jainism are rather interested in the accomplishment of individual perfection. According to the Jain as the soul is a nascent and potential God and when emancipated from the bonds of the heritage of karma, the soul manifests infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. The Buddhist does not believe in personal soul and maintains ultimate dissolution of the individuality in infinite impersonal state called Nirvana. However they may differ from theistic believers, they believe in afterlife, transmigration and ultimate achievement of spiritual perfection. The followers of these creeds, at least their best exponents do not worship a personal God for winning His favour and grace. They entirely depend on their unaided efforts for reaching the highest consummation. If we make due allowance for personal-equations, we may find essential identity or similarity in the conception of ultimate reality. The Vedantist believes in both personal and impersonal Godhead. The next question which demands our attention is the issue whether morality can be a substitute for religion. Though our ideas of morality as embodied in concrete acts differ from nation to nation, country to country, followers of one religion from those of others, morality must be traced to the necessity of subordinating lower passions to higher values. Ultimately morality finds its higher expre ssions in the sacrifice of personal interest for the good of the majority of mankind leading to spiritual elevation. I use the word spiritual in contradistinction to the pleasures of the body. The intellectual pleasure that is found in the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, cultivation of science and philosophy, literature and arts, is certainly higher

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THE ROOT OF RELIGION : INTUTION AND REASONING 215 than the pleasure accruing from the satisfaction of the demands of physical senses. Spirituality rather consists in the , cultivation of super-personal values, goodness, beauty and truth. Love of truth is one of its exponents. Now morality cannot entirely account for this spiritual life. Morality is concerned with struggle of good and evil and the ultimate triumph of the good over evil is the aim of religion. Swami Vivekananda has defined religion as consisting in drawing out the spiritual majesty of the soul. This definition fits in with the theistic and the so called atheistic religions both. If this evolution of spirituality be the essence and purpose of religion there is no cause for antagonism and hostility to it. But in its external manifestation religion takes the form of ceremonies and rituals which differ from one another. The average man attaches supreme importance to these external factors and thinks that a person who follows different observances and liturgies is mistaken. Herein lies the conflict and clash of one religion with another. To crown all, religious communities have their relative political and economic interests which are not all reconcilable. To identify religion with politics becomes a natural transition. In the medieval age religions were faught with fanatical zeal between the Moslims and the Christians and the result had been huge bloodshed and forcible conversion. This has been unhappy consequence of formalistic and institutional religion which must be deplored by every cultured man. Fortunately India has saved herself from the pursuit of this calamitous aberration, and this has been possible because of her philosophy. India's philosophical culture is characterized by a sincerity of purpose and seriousness of outlook which cannot fail to extort the unstinted admiration of all but cynic. Another characteristic of Indian speculation is the unfettered freedom of thought which was unknown in other climes. There was no state persecution for philosophical opinions, and censorship of thought was unknown, provided it did not instigate the subversion of the moral order. The same was true of religions, India has been the land of freedom of religon, which is however a recent growth in the west. This was made possible in India for the reason that Indians did not seek to make political and economical capital out of their religious persuasion. They never confounded things of Caesar with things of God. Another reason seems to be the perfect agreement and unanimity on the necessity of moral discipline, Indian thought was agreed on the moral condition that the animal in man was to be supplanted by the divine. There may be some truth in the contention that

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216 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I India's tolerance of other faiths has resulted in the weakening of her political power. Indians are not even today intolerant of other creeds; but the political consequences are to be set down to the account of the proselytizing zeal of alien faiths which seek to strengthen their political interests by multiplication of converts. India in the past has effected the solution of religious differences by pinning ther in their respective spheres of influence as spiritual forces and I am convinced that the solution of her present-day problems can be achieved if political lables cease to be put on the difference of faith - religious, philosophical and intellectual. Nowadays politics has turned out to be the most dominating influence in India. I wish spirit of toleration should also prevail in the arena of active politics. The philosophy of murder and violence which is regarded as a legitimate weapon of defence and offence by the Naxalites must be quashed and no quarter should be shown to the perpetrators of these orgies of violence. As we have said the religion is a living spiritual force. It is a prerogative of a man which distinguishes him from brutes. If one forswears religion he will revert to the level of brutes. If politics and religion be kept apart and not allowed to overstep their respective jurisdiction, religion will have no reason to be persecuted. It is intriguing that churches are now functioning in cominunist Russia. The impulse to worship is an ineradicable instinct. Buddhism and Jainism have no place for personal God and therefore rationally speaking cannot lend countenance to ritualistic worship. But the prophets of the Jaina religion are worshiped by laymen as gods. In the Buddhist church the Buddha and Bodhisatvas are receiving worship with a vengeance. Poets have sung the glory of sexual love and the sufferings and sacrifices undergone by lovers. But the self-inflicted torments and ascetic self-mortification cast the sufferings of human love into the shade. It is the source of strength and inspiration for the common man and woman and the more drastic are the measures employed for its suppression, it returns and recoils with far greater intensity and redoubled vigour. Religion is a formative principle in man's character and carries him to the apex of perfection. A true religion does not encourage obscurantism and the quest of truth is its key-note, its alpha and omega. Science and philosophy are bound to be its allies and not opponents as misguided people are prone to think. 1. dharmo hi tesam adhiko visego dharmena hinah pasubhih samanah.

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dharma ke mUla-anubhUti evaM tarka - nathamala TATiyA gata varSa isa vidvadgoSThI kA viSaya thA-vizvazAnti ke mUlAdhAra : ahiMsA aura anekAnta / isa varSa ahiMsA, satya Adi jaise dharmatattvoM ke AdhArabhUta pramANoM para hama vicAravimarza kara rahe haiN| hamAre jJAna ke sAdhana mukhyatayA tIna haiM--pratyakSa, anumAna evaM Agama / pratyakSa kA artha hai sAkSAt anubhUti / anumAna meM tarka kA samAveza hotA hai / prApta puruSoM kI anubhUti jisa mAdhyama se hameM prApta hotI hai, use Agama yA zruti kahA gayA hai| ataH yaha Agama mUlataH anubhUti hI hai| isa prakAra jJAna ke sAdhana vastutaH do hI raha jAte haiM -anubhUti evaM tarka / anubhUti kI yathArthatA yA ayathArthatA nirbhara hai anubhava karanevAle vyakti kI yogyatA para / anAsakta tattvAnveSI RSi hI satya kA darzana kara sakate haiM / evaM apane pUrvaja RSiyoM dvArA anubhUta satyoM kA, jo Agama yA zruti meM lipibaddha haiM, saMvAda bhI unhIM dvArA saMbhava hai| nijI anubhUti ke dRr3hIkaraNa meM bhI AgamoM se sahAyatA milatI hai| isI bAta ko bhartRhari apane vAkyapadIya (1.30 ) meM isa prakAra kahate haiM-RSINAmapi yada jJAnaM tadapyAgahetukam, arthAt RSiyoM kI bhI jo anubhUti hai vaha Agama para hI nirbhara hai / bhartRhari ke anusAra isa pArSa anubhUti kA khaNDana tarka dvArA nahIM kiyA jA sakatA hai / ve kahate haiM ( vAkyapadIya, 1.38) atIndriyAnasaMvedyAm pazyantyArSeNa ckssussaa| ye bhAvAn vacanaM teSAM nAnumAnena bAdhyate // arthAt, ArSa cakSudvAra atIndriya evaM dUsare upAyoM se agamya tattvoM ko dekhane vAle puruSoM ke vacana anumAna dvArA bAdhita nahIM kiye jA sakate / maharSi manune bhI dharmajJAna meM Agama ko hI mukhya pramANa mAnA hai| manusmRti (2.13) meM kahA gayA hai artha kAmeSvasaktAnAM dharmajJAnaM vidhIyate / dharma jijJAsamAnAnAM pramANaM paramaM zrutiH // arthAt, artha aura kAma meM anAsakta vyaktiyoM ke hRdaya meM hI dharmajJAna vyavasthita hotA hai / dharma jijJAsuoM ke lie zruti arthAt prAgama hI zreSTha pramANa hai| dharmajJAna ke maulika AdhAroM kI carcA ke prasaMga meM manusmRti (2.6 evaM 12) meM Agama ke alAvA paramparAgata smRti, sadAcAra evaM AtmatuSTi kA bhI ullekha kiyA gayA hai| Agama evaM smRti ko tarka dvArA khaNDana karanA mana (2.11) pasanda nahIM karate / samAja ke sAmUhika hita evaM loka-kalyANa ko dhyAna meM rakha kara hI unhoMne aisI vyavasthA kI hai| puNya aura pApa kI pahicAna koI vyakti AsAnI se apane hRdaya meM kara sakatA hai| isake lie zAstra kI AvazyakatA nahIM hai / bhartRhari spaSTa kahate haiM (vAkyadIya, 1.40)1. 8 aprIla 1971 ko vidvadgoSThI meM paThita nibandha /

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218 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 idaM puNyamidaM pApabhityetasmin pddvye| AcaNDAlaM manuSyANAmalpaM zAstraprayojanam / / arthAt, yaha puNya hai, yaha pApa hai-ina do padoM ke bodha ke lie adhama se adhama vyakti ko bhI zAstrajJAna kI koI AvazyakatA nahIM hai / tAtparya yaha hai ki pApa-puNya kA bodha pratyeka vyakti ke antaHkaraNa meM svataH siddha hai| isake lie kisI Agama yA taka kA prayojana mahasUsa nahIM hotaa| hA~ kabhI-kabhI kartavyAkartavya ke jJAna meM jaTilatA avazya prA jAtI hai, evaM vaisI paristhiti meM pApa-puNya viveka meM bhrama kI saMbhAvanA hai, jisake nirAkaraNa meM tarka sahAyaka banatA hai| tarka dvArA anubhUti kA spaSTIkaraNa evaM pariSkaraNa hotA hai, nirmANa nhiiN| bhagavAna buddha ne bhI anubhUti ko hI dharmajJAna kA mUlabhUta sAdhana mAnA hai / ahiMsA, adattAdAna Adi jaise vrata, evaM jyotiSa, agnihoma Adi jaisI vidyAoM ko unhoMne naitika tathA AdhyAtmika vikAsa ke akATya paricAyaka ke rUpa meM svIkAra nahIM kiyaa| buddha ne dharmoM kA svarUpa gambhIra, durdaza, duranubodha, vastubhUta, zreSTha, atakaMgocara, sUkSma, evaM paNDitavedanIya mAnA hai (brahmajAlasutta) evaM kahA hai ki vaise dharmoM kA darzana usI citta meM ho sakatA hai jo pUrNarUpeNa samAhita, parizuddha , paryavadAta, niSkampa, klezarahita, mRdubhUta, karma yogya evaM sthira hai (saamnyjphlsutt)| prajJA ke vikAsa ke vinA zIla evaM vrata saphala nahIM hote / gItA (2.56) meM bhI Atmadarzana ke abhAva meM sirpha indriyanigraha ko bhavatRSNA ke nivAraNa meM asamartha mAnA gayA hai| isa prakAra dharmajJAna meM svAnubhUti ko eka mAtra sAdhana mAnate hue bhI buddha ne apane ziSyoM ko yaha spaSTa rUpa se kaha diyA hai ki svayaM binA samajhe. bUjhe kisI bhI dharma ko svIkAra nahIM karanA caahie| ve kahate haiM (aMguttaranikAya, 3-653)-yadA tumhe kAlAmA attanA va jAneyyAtha-ime dhammA kusalA ime dhammA anavajjA ime dhammA vijRpasatthA ime dhammA samattA samAdinnA hitAya sukhAya saMvattantIti, atha tumhe kAlAmA upasaMmapajja vihareyyAthA ti / he kAlAmagaNa, jaba tuma yaha jAna lo ki ye dharma kuzala haiM, ye dharma anindita haiM, ye dharma vijJoM dvArA prazaMsita haiM, ye dharma gRhIta evaM anupAlita hone para tumhAre lie hitakara evaM sukhakara siddha hoMge, tabhI tuma unhe jIvana meM utAra kara vihAra karanA / bhagavAn buddha kI yaha unmukta dRSTi jJAnasArasamuccaya (31) meM isa prakAra prakaTa kI gaI hai tApAcchedAcca nikaSAt suvarNamiva paNDitaiH / parIkSya bhikSAvo grAhyamadvaco na tu gauravAta // jisa prakAra suvarNa ko tapA kara, kATa kara evaM kasauTI para kasa kara grahaNa kiyA jAtA hai, usI prakAra, he bhikSutroM, mere vacana kI parIkSA ke bAda hI svIkAra karo, mere prati gaurava buddhi se nhiiN| kisI dUsare ke anubhava ko satya mAnane se pUrva use apanI yukti se samajhanA evaM apane anubhava meM utAranA Avazyaka mAnA gayA hai| jaina AcAryoM ne bhI anubhava evaM tarka-ina donoM ko dharmajJAna meM pramANa mAnA hai| Apta puruSa ke lakSaNa ke prasaMga meM AcArya samantabhadra ( prAptamImAMsA, 6 ) kahate haiM

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DHARMA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAN TARKA 219 sa tvamevAsi nirdoSoH yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk / avirodho yadiSTaM te prasiddhena na bAdhyate // arthAt, vaha nirdoSa ( sarvajJa ) Apa hI haiM, kAraNa Apake vacana yukti evaM zAstra ke virodhI nahIM haiN| ( Apa ke vacanoM meM ) avirodha isaliye hai kyoMki Apa dvArA pratipAdita tattva sarvamAnya pramANoM se bAdhita nahIM haiM / AcArya siddhasena divAkara ne pAgama evaM hetuvAda ke pravRtti kSetra kA vibhAjana karake unameM sAmaMjasya sthApita kiyA hai / (sanmatitarka, 3.43-5) / kucha padArtha aise haiM, jinheM pAgama arthAt AptapuruSa ke anubhava ke AdhAra para hI jAnA jA sakatA hai, evaM hetuvAda ke viSayabhUta padArtha bhI niyata haiN| AcArya haribhadra ne apane lokatattvanirNaya (zloka 38) meM taka kI upAdeyatA isa prakAra siddha kI hai pakSapAto na me vIre na dveSaH kapilAdiSu / yuktima dvacanaM yasya tasya kAryaH parigrahaH / arthAt, mere mana meM na mahAvIra ke prati anurAga hai na kapila ke prati dveSa hai| jisake vacana yuktipUrNa hoM use hI svIkAra karanA caahie| nyAyavizArada upAdhyAya zrImad yazovijaya ne apane adhyAtmopaniSat ( 1,6 ) meM anubhUti evaM taka ke samanvaya ke prasaMga meM jainadarzana kA hRdaya spaSTa rUpa se hamAre sAmane nimnokta prakAra rakhA hai manovatso yuktigavI madhyasthasyAnudhAvati / tAmAkarSati pucchena tucchAgrahamanaH kapiH / / madhyastha puruSakA manarUpI bachar3A yuktirUpo ( apanI ) gomAtA kA anudhAvana karatA hai / ( para ) durAgrahI puruSa kA manarUpI bandara usa yuktirUpI gAya ko usakI pUcha pakar3a kara apanI tarapha khIMcatA hai| tAtparya yaha hai ki jaba koI vyakti anAsakta hokara satya anveSaNa karatA hai to usakI buddhi sahI yukti ke sahAre Age bar3hatI hai| vaha vyakti Arambha se hI tattvapakSapAtI hotA hai evaM usakI buddhi tarkaprasUta hone ke kAraNa AsAnI se yukti kA anusaraNa sakalatApUrvaka kara sakatI hai| durAgrahI kA mana zurU se hI kutarka ke vazIbhUta hone ke kAraNa apane pUrvAgrahoM ke samarthana meM hI tarka kA prayoga karatA hai| niSkarSa yaha hai ki brAhmaNa, bauddha evaM jaina paramparAyeM naitika evaM AdhyAtmika tattvoM ke AviSkAra meM anubhUti evaM tarka-ina donoM ko mahattva detI haiM, para unameM anubhUti ko prAthamikatA isalie dI jAtI hai kyoMki vaha dharmajJAna kA prAraMbhika bindu hai / vaise to koI bhI anubhUti yuktirahita nahIM hai / para yukti yA tarka prArambha meM use svayaM avyakta raha kara prabhAvita karatA hai, evaM apanI sUkSmatA ke kAraNa buddhigamya nahIM hotaa| __ dharmajJAna ke sAdhanoM ke bAre meM bhAratIya darzanoM kA aikamatya hamane dekhA / aba vicAraNIya haiM dharma ke svarUpa ke bAre meM ina darzanoM kI maanytaayeN| dharma zabda kA prayoga yahA~ atyanta vyApaka artha meM kiyA gayA hai| sAmAjika vyavasthA evaM vaiyaktika hita ke lie jitane prakAra ke vidhi-niSedha kiye gaye haiM, ve sabhI dharma ke antargata haiN| jAti, deza, kAla, Adi kI vibhinnatA ke kAraNa dharma kI vibhinnatA ko samucita mAnyatA hamAre dArzanikoM ne niHsaMkoca dI hai / paraspara virodhI AcAra-vyavahAroM ko bhI vibhinna paristhitiyoM meM vibhinna

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 sAmAjika guToM ke lie dharma meM samAveza kara diyA gayA hai / isa prasaMga meM jaina AcArya haribhadra ke vicAra mAnanIya haiN| ve kahate haiM ki jo kArya lokaraMjana ke lie kiyA jAtA hai evaM jisase anta:karaNa kI malinatA dUra nahIM hotI, use lokapaMkti kI saMjJA dI jAtI hai / yaha lokapaMkti bhI paramparayA dharma hI hai / ( yogabindu 90 ) / loka kalyANa ke lie jo bhI kiyA jAya vaha saba dharma hai / dharma dezanAoM kI vividhatA kA AdhAra ziSyoM kI yogyatAyeM haiM / prAcArya haribhadra kahate haiM ( yogadRSTisamuccaya, 132 ) - 220 citrA tu dezanaiteSAM syAdvineyAnuguNyataH / yasmAdete mahAtmAnoM bhavavyAdhibhiSagvarAH // arthAt, ziSyoM kI yogyatAoM ke anusAra RSiyoM kI dezanAoM meM vividhatA A jAtI hai, kyoMki ye RSi bhavavyAdhi ke vaidya haiM evaM rUgna vyakti kI AvazyakatAoM ke anurUpa prauSadhiyoM kA vidhAna karate haiM / ina vizeSa vizeSa dharmoM ke atirikta eka eka sarvajanasAdhAraNa dharma kI kalpanA bhI bhAratIya cintakoM ne kI hai, jo nimnokta udgAra vyakta hotI haizrUyatAM dharmasarvasvaM zrutvA caivAvadhAryatAm / Atmana: pratikUlAni pareSAM na samAcaret // dharma ke nIcor3a ko suno evaM sunakara zravadhArita kro| jo AcaraNa apane lie pratikUla pratIta ho vaisA AcaraNa dUsare ke prati nahIM karanA cAhie / Izvara tattva kI mAnyatA ke bAre meM bhI bhAratIya dharmo meM sabhI bhAratIya dharma IzvaravAdI nahIM hai / bhakta apane bhagavAn ko banA letA hai / para punarjanma, mokSa, pApa, puNya jaise tatva hamAre apanI nigUDhatama anubhUti meM RSi eka advitIya tattva kA darzana karate haiM- ekaM saddhiprA bahudhA vadanti / isI prakAra ziva, brahma, buddha, Izvara, arhatu, karma evaM viSNu jaise tattvoM meM bhAratIya dArzanika koI bhinnatA nahIM dekhate / ve spaSTa kahate haiM yaM zaivAH samupAsate ziva iti brahma eti vedAntino, bauddhA buddha iti pramANapaTavaH kartteti naiyAyikAH / arhannityaya jainazAsanaratAH karmeti mImAMsakA, so'yaM vo vidadhAtu vAJchitaphalaM trailokyanAtho hariH // jisakI zaiva loga ziva ke rUpa meM upAsanA karate haiM, jise vedAntI brahmatattva kahate haiM jise bauddha buddha kI saMjJA dete haiM, pramANa- zAstra meM niSNAta naiyAyika jise jagatkartA Izvara anurAgI jise arhatu kahate haiM, karmakANDI mImAMsaka jise prabhu bhagavAn hari Apako vAJchita phala pradAna kareM / apane upAsya hari ke rUpa ko hI dUsare dharmoM ke upAsya devoM bhAratI kA bhakta sabhI deviyoM meM apanI upAsyA devI ko ke rUpa meM dekhate haiM, jaina zAsana ke karma kahate haiM, vaha tIna lokoM ke jisa taraha eka viSNu bhakta ne meM dekhA, usI taraha mAtA hI dekhatA hai / vaha kahatA hai vividhatA dekhI jAtI hai / apanI kalpanA ke anurUpa sabhI dharmo ko mAnya haiM / tArA tvaM sugamatAgame bhagavatI vajrA kaulikazAsane jinamate gaurIti zaivAgame padmAvatI vizrutA /

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DHARMA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA 221 gAyatrI zrutazAlinAM prakRtirityuktAsi sAMkhyAyane mAtarbhArati ki prabhUtabhaNitAptaM samastaM tvayA // he mAtaH bhArati, tuma hI bauddha AgamoM meM tArA ho, zaiva AgamoM meM gorI ho, kaulika dharma meM vanA ho, jaina zAsana meM padmAvatI ke nAma se vikhyAta ho, vedAnurAgiyoM kI gAyatrI ho, sAMkhya darzana meM tumheM prakRti kahA jAtA hai, adhika kahane kA kyA prayojana, samasta ( carAcara jagat ) tumhAre dvArA vyApta hai| isI prakAra mukti, mokSa yA nirvANa tattva ke bAre meM bhI bhAratIya cintakoM meM ekavAkyatA dekhI jAtI hai| kisI sAdhaka kI sAdhanAlabdha anubhUti kA apalApa karanA mahAn aparAdha hai / jaina AcArya haribhadra apane yogadRpTisamuccaya ( 139 )meM kahate haiM na yujyate pratikSepa: sAmAnyasyApi tatsatAm / AryApavAdastu punajihvAcchedAdhiko mataH / / hamAre jaisoM ( carmacAvAloM ) ke lie samAnya jana kA bhI tiraskAra karanA ucita nahIM hai to phira AyaMjanoM kA apavAda phailAnA jihabAccheda se bhI adhika (daNDayogya aparAdha ) kyoM nahIM mAnA jAyagA ? yadi nirvANa eka sAdhanAlabdha anubhUti hai evaM vaha vastubhUta hai to vaisI sabhI anubhUtiyo avazya eka rUpa hoNgii| haribhadra isa prazna para vicAra karate hue apane (yogadRSTisamuccaya, 127-28 ) meM kahate haiM saMsArAtItatattvaM tu paraM nirvANasaMjJitam / tadvayakameva niyamAcchandabhede'pi tattvataH / / sadAzivaH para brahma siddhAtmA tathateti ca / zabdestaducyate'nvathairekamevaivamAdibhiH / / saMsAra se pare jo parama tattva hai use hI nirvANa kI saMjJA dI jAtI hai / vaha niyamataH evaM tAtvika rUpa se eka hI hai yadyapi minna-bhinna sAdhaka usakA varNana bhinna-bhinna zabdoM meM karate haiN| vaha eka hI tattva sadAziva, para-brahma, siddha prAramA tathA tathatA Adi zabdoM se varNita hotA hai, jo usake svarUpa ke paricAyaka hone ke kAraNa anvartha haiN| __isa prakAra hama dekhate haiM ki bhAratIya sAdhaka evaM cintaka vibhinna upAsya devoM evaM sAdhanAlabdha anubhUtiyoM meM ekarUpatA dekhate haiN| isa bAta kI puSTi ke lie aura bhI uddharaNa diye jA sakate haiM, para prastuta prasaMga meM unakI AvazyakatA nahIM hai| bhinna-bhinna sampradAya ke tArkika yuktioM dvArA apanI apanI paramparAmoM kI puSTi karate rahe para sAtha sAtha aise bhI cintaka hue jinhoMne una vibhinna paramparAoM meM bhI sAmaMjasya karane kA prayatna kiyA / vaise prayatnoM ke phalasvarUpa jaina dArzanikoM kA nayavAda paripuSTa huA, jo bhAratIya cintana dhArA ko unakI eka atyanta mahatvapUrNa dena hai| koI bhI vAda mithyA nahIM hai, yadi vaha apane pratidvandvI dUsare vAdoM kA nirAkaraNa nahIM karake apanI hI siddhi meM saMlagna rahatA hai| satyAnveSaNa hI tarkazAstra kA ekamAtra uddezya honA cAhie--yahI nayavAda kA niSkarSa hai / hamane prastuta viSaya ke kucha hI muddoM para apane vicAra Apake sAmane rakkhe / goSThI meM bhAga lene vAle vidvAna viSaya ke vibhinna pahaluoM para apane-apane vicAra Apake samakSa rakheMge /

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vizvazAnti ke mUlAdhAra - ahiMsA evaM anekAnta * ena0 ke0 devarAja mAnanIya adhyakSa, DA0 TATiyA aura mitroM, maiM isa zodha saMsthAna ke adhikAriyoM ke prati, jinhoMne mujhe Amantrita karake isa utsava meM sammilita hone kA avasara diyA, hRdaya se AbhAra prakaTa karatA hU~ / hamArA deza aura usakI saMskRti bar3I prAcIna hai / zurU se isa saMskRti meM do dhArAoM kA sammizraNa rahA hai / eka vaidika Arya saMskRti kI dhArA aura dUsarI zramaNa saMskRti kI dhArA / zramaNa saMskRti meM bauddha aura jaina paramparAoMoM kA antarbhAva hotA hai / isameM hiMsA ke pracAra kA sabase adhika zreya jaina saMskRti aura paramparA ko hai / jaina paramparA kI dUsarI mahatvapUrNa dena anekAntavAda kA siddhAnta hai / ukta saMskRti ke ye donoM tattva vizvazAnti ko agrasara karane vAle haiM / vaidika Arya mA~sa bhakSaNa se paraheja nahIM karate the / bhavabhUti ke uttara rAmacarita ke cauthe aMka meM zrApastambadharmasUtra ke eka uddharaNa ke sAtha yaha ullekha kiyA gayA hai ki vaziSTha muni ke satkAra ke liye do varSa kI bachiyA kA hanana kiyA gyaa| una dinoM mo mA~sa kA upabhoga viziSTa atithiyoM ke liye kiyA jAtA thA / saMskRta meM atithi kA nAma goghna mI hai-- arthAt vaha jisake liye gau kA vadha kiyA jAya jaina dharma kI vizeSa zikSA hai / thAilaiNDa Adi ke bauddha loga karate, buddhajI ke mAMsa-makSaraNa ke bhI ullekha milate haiM / / mAMsAhAra kA pUrNa parityAga mAMsa bhakSaNa se paraheja nahIM lekina ahiMsA kA artha kevala jIvoM ke vadha aura mAMsa bhakSaNa se paraheja nahIM hai / hamAre yahA~ ahiMsA ko dharma kA mUla kahA gayA hai, mahAbhArata meM ahiMsA kA sthAna satya se bhI Upara batAyA gayA hai / kahA gayA hai : 'hisArtha hi bhUtAnAM dharma-pravacanaM kRtam', arthAt dharma kA upadeza hiMsA ke nivAraNa ke liye hai / catuHzataka ke TIkAkAra candrakIrti ne eka uddharaNa diyA hai jisake anusAra tathAgata loga dharma ko ahiMsA pradhAna mAnate haiM / yogadarzana ke praNetA pataMjali ne dharmoM meM ahiMsA ko pahalA sthAna diyA hai / dharmo meM aparigraha kA bhI samAveza hai / hamAre apane yuga meM gAMdhIjI ne aparigraha para vizeSa jora diyA hai / vastuta: ahiMsA aura aparigraha meM ghanA sambandha hai / prazna hai, hama hiMsA kyoM karate haiM ? uttara hai, apane vyaktitva ke poSaNa ke lie, apane aura apanoM kI svArthapUrti ke lie / hamAre saba taraha ke galata AcaraNa ke mUla meM Atmaprema, Atmakendrita hone kI vRtti hotI hai / jabataka hama pUrNatayA nisvArtha na bana jAyeM- gAMdhI jI ke zabdoM meM jaba taka hama pUre-pUre aparigrahI na bana jAyeM - tabataka hama hiMsA se pUrNatayA virata nahIM ho sakate / isase jAhira hai ki ahiMsA kA pUrA-pUrA pAlana bahuta kaThina hai / kevala jIvoM ke vadha se virata honA * vidvadgoSThI, aprIla 18, 1970 meM diyA gayA uddhaghATana bhASaNa /

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VISVASANTI KE MULADHARA: AHIMSA EVAM ANEKANTA 223 ahiMsA kA bAhya rUpa hai, asalI hiMsA svArtha bhAvanA kA pUrNa uccheda hai / aisI zrahiMsA kA pAlana AdhyAtmika sAdhaka hI kara sakate haiM / ahiMsA kA sAmAjika nyUnatama rUpa yaha hai ki hama apane aura dUsaroM ke hitoM ke bIca nyAya bhAvanA kA pAlana karate hue sAmaMjasya rkheN| apane lie, apane sambandhiyoM aura jAti ke lie, anyAya karanA eka prakAra kI hiMsA hai- kyoMki usase dUsaroM ke hita kI hAni hotI hai / antarrASTrIya kSetra meM jaba eka deza dUsare ko dabAkara usakA zoSaNa karanA cAhatA hai to zoSaka deza kA vyavahAra hiMsA pUrNa bana jAtA hai| isase spaSTa hai ki antarrASTrIya zAnti ke lie ahiMsAmUlaka nyAya kA pAlana nitAnta jarUrI hai / jaina dharma aura darzana kI dUsarI mahatvapUrNa dena anekAntavAda kA siddhAnta hai / jJAna mImAMsA meM jaina darzana vastuvAdI hai, hinduoM kA nyAya darzana bhI vastuvAdI hai / vastuvAdI se tAtparya isa mAnyatA se hai ki jJeya padArtha jJAna aura jJAtA kA nirapekSa hotA | vijJAnavAdI bauddha kahate haiM ki nIla aura nIla buddhi eka hI hai, kyoMki unakA grahaNa sAtha-sAtha hotA hai; isa tarka ko sahopalambha niyama kahate haiM / vastuvAdI jJAna aura artha meM bheda mAnate haiM, aura yaha mAnate haiM ki artha ke anurUpa hI jJAna hotA hai / anekAntavAda ke anusAra pratyeka vastu meM ananta dharma hote haiM / unameM se kucha paraspara virodhI bhI ho sakate haiN| apane prayojana ke anusAra, yA apane dRSTikoNa ke anusAra, draSTA vastu meM eka yA dUsare dharma ko dekhatA aura usakA ullekha karatA hai / eka dRSTi se jo hai, dUsarI dRSTi se usakA abhAva bhI kahA jA sakatA hai / jaina tarkazAstra saptabhaMgI kI vacana zailI ko mAnatA hai / jainiyoM ke anusAra pratyeka satpadArtha utpAda, vyaya evaM dhruvatA se saMyukta hotA hai / kisI vastu kA dravya nahIM badalatA, jisase usameM 'vahI hai' kI bhAvanA hotI hai; kintu usake paryAya badalate rahate haiM / isalie eka hI vastu dhruva yA nitya bhI hai aura paryAyoM kI dRSTi se anitya bhI / syAdvAdamaJjarI ke anusAra vastu meM nAnA dharmoM kA svIkAra hI anekAntavAda hai, kathanoM ke rUpa meM isa siddhAnta ko prakaTa karanA hI syAdvAda hai / hamAre deza meM prAya: prAcIna zikSAtroM ko asamIkSita rUpa meM mAnakara calane kI prathA hai / lekina isa taraha kI svIkRti se vizeSa lAbha nahIM hotA / purAnI zikSAoM ko isa DhaMga se dekhanA aura A~kanA cAhie ki ve hamArI jIvanta cetanA kA aMga bana jaayeN| hamAre apane yuga meM, hara kSetra meM, naye prazna uTha rahe aura uThAye jA rahe haiM / aisI sthiti meM hamAre lie vahI prAcIna zikSAyeM upayogI ho sakatI haiM jo Aja kI samasyAoM ko hala karane meM madada de sakatI haiM / prAcIna jaina cintakoM ne anekAntavAda kA prayoga usa samaya ke dArzanika vivAdoM kA hala khojane meM kiyA thaa| udAharaNa ke lie nyAya-vaizeSika ke anusAra sAmAnyoM kA AbhAsa hotA hai / isake / isa vivAda kA, aura alaga astitva hai jisake kAraNa hameM samAna vastunoM meM anuvRtti kA viparIta bauddha vicAraka sAmAnya ko apoha rUpa meM kathita karate haiM aise dUsare vivAdoM kA anekAntavAda ne apanA samAdhAna prastuta kiyA / dUsare prazna aura vivAda cala rahe haiM / hamArA vicAra hai ki anekAnta kA siddhAnta una vivAdoM ke lie Aja bhI mahatva rakhatA hai aura usakA upayoga Aja ke vivAdoM ko sulajhAne Aja ke darzana-kSetra meM

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224 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 meM kiyA jA sakatA hai| cintana ke itihAsa meM hamezA hI aikAntika dRSTiyoM kA pratipAdana hotA AyA hai, ataeva hamezAhI anekAnta para gaurava dene kI jarurata hotI hai| udAharaNa ke lie tarkaniSTha anubhavavAdiyoM ( Logical Empiricists or positivists ) ne arthavAn kathanoM kI eka paribhASA dI, yaha paribhASA vijJAna ke kathanoM ko dekhakara banAyI gayI thii| isa paribhASA ke anusAra arthavAn kathana vaha hai jisakA indriyaanubhava ke jarie parIkSaNa ho sake-jise sahI mAnane kA artha gocara jagata meM kisI tathya kI pratyAzA karanA hai| arthavattAkI kasauTI kA prayoga karate hue unhoMne kahA-tattvamImAMsA ke kathana prAyaH gocara, anubhava dvArA parIkSaNIya nahIM hote, isalie ve nirarthaka hote haiN| isa dRSTi se "Izvara hai" aura "Izvara nahIM hai" ye donoM kathana nirarthaka haiM / galata nahIM nirarthaka / yahA~ prazna uThatA hai-yaha kyoM mAnA jAya ki saba taraha ke arthavAn kathana ekahI koTi ke hote haiM ? udAharaNa ke lie tarkaniSTha bhAvavAdiyoM kA yaha kathana ki "arthavAn kathana parIkSaNIya hote haiM" svayaM indriya-anubhava dvArA parIkSaNIya nahIM haiN| anekAntavAda ke anusAra pratyeka kathana kisI apekSA yA prayojana se niyantrita aura usI ke anurUpa satya hotA hai / matalaba yaha ki vibhinna kathanoM kI satyatA bhinna koTiyoM kI hotI hai, vaha vibhinna dRSTiyoM aura prayojanoM kI sApekSa hotI hai| ___ isa mata kI puSTi meM hama aitihAsika ghaTanAoM kI vyAkhyA meM saMketita kiye jAne vAle kAraNoM kA ullesa kara sakate haiN| aitihAsika ghaTanAoM aura sthitiyoM kI vyAkhyA ke aneka stara yA dharAtala hote haiM / eka dharAtala para hama kahate haiM ki hamAre deza ko gAMdhIjI ne svataMtra kiyA / vyAkhyA ke dUsare stara para kahA jAyagA ki gAMdhI kA vyaktitva aura unakI satyAgraha kI paddhati ve upakaraNa the jinake dvArA bhAratIya janatA ko bhaya kI sthiti se nikAla kara saMgaThita kiyA gyaa| antata: svataMtratA kA kAraNa isa saMgaThita janatA kA dabAba thA jo briTiza sarakAra para pdd'aa| yaha bhI saMbhava thA ki gA~dhIjI ke badale koI dUsarA netA janatA ko dUsare DhaMga se saMgaThita karatA / tAtparya yaha ki yadi gAMdhI kA janma na hA hotA, to bhI bhArata svataMtra hotA, lekina dUsare tarIke se aura zAyada pandraha ajJasta 1947 ke badale kisI aura varSa meM aura kisI dUsarI tithi meM / itihAsa kI vyAkhyA karate hue hama kaba kisa hetu ko kitanA mahatva deMge, yaha hamAre yAnI itihAsakAra ke, prazna ke svarUpa aura vyAkhyAtA ke prayojana para nirbhara karatA hai| hamAre kathana dRSTi-sApekSa yA prayojana-sApekSa hote haiM, yaha anekAntavAda kA mUla tAtparya hai| isa prakAra hama dekhate haiM ki ukta siddhAnta kI Aja bhI upayogitA hai| yadi kisI prAcIna mAnyatA meM bala hai to vaha Aja bhI upayogI hogI nahIM to zraddhApUrvaka usa mAnyatA ko duharAte rahane se koI lAma nahIM hai| __ maiM isa vaktavya ke sAtha ApakI saMgoSThI kI saphalatA ke lie zubha kAmanA karatA hai|

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE : AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA SATKARI MOOKERJEE I must observe at the outset even at the risk of being misunderstood and charged with patriotic bias that it is India's distinctive prerogative to have preached, promulgated and practised the cult of ahimsi i e. non-injury to life. All religious sects of Orthodox Vedic religion and the protestant creeds that emerged in India's soil have accepted this doctrine as the cardinal basis of spiritual life. The protestant creeds have arraigned Vedic religion on the charge of approval of violence and injury which is inevitable in sacrifices There is no doubt that aniinal sacrifice is a necessary part of the cult of Vedic sacrifice. But even the uncompromising advocates of orthodoxy could not plead for the cult of himsa, and had to plump for non-violence and non-injury as integral part of religion (ma himsyat sarva bhutani anyatra tirthebhyah). But sacrifices were placed in se parate category and it is maintained that the injury to animal in sacrifice is not inspired by personal greed or malice, and hence its semblance to himsa is a deceptive appearance. I shall have occasion to discuss the question of motive and intention in so far as they bear upon the essential character of ahimsa. Sarkhya philosophy is uncompromising in its advocacy of ahimsa and does not make exception or concession even for Vedic sacrifices. One has to suffer the unwelcome consequences of himsa involved in Vedic sacrifices, notwithstanding the purity of the motive. One may attain heaven as the reward of Vedic sacrifice but has to suffer the punishment of commitring himsa. So it is not absolutely pure (Cf. drstavadanusravikah sa hyavisuddhi-ksayatisayayuktahSankhyakarika, 2). Sankhya is an orthodox system and this vehement advocacy of ahimsa on its part shows that even orthodox Brahmapical faith was unyielding in its insistence on this fundamental ethical issue. The uncompromising, unhesitating and unambiguous advocacy of ahimsa not only as a religious tenet but as the very foundational principle of religious life is the line of demarcation between Indian religions and those of the Semitic origin. This question of injury to 1. Read at the Seminar of Scholars on April 19, 1970. 15

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226 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 life did not cause trouble to the Hebrew prophets, the Christian apostles, and Islam. Christianity has advocated friendship and love so far as it concerns human relationship. But the love and compassion do not reach down to the animal level. So far as Manu and the Jaina prophets are concerned, they have scruples even regarding vegetable life. It is the special characteristic of the Jaina community that they abstained from animal food since the inception of Jaina religion, which cannot be definitely assigned a historical date. I shall now be concerned with the difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina ethical attitudes so far as the moral value of ahimsa is considered. Physical violence per se has little moral value. Its moral value stems from a consideration of motive underlying it. Brutes and animals are therefore neither condemned nor excused for committing violence as they are incapable of cherishing ill will or malice. In point of fact violence is the rule of life in the animal kingdom; the stronger animal preys upon the weaker for its very subsistence. It is only among humans that the question has got any relevance. One of the reasons seems to be the possibility of finding substitutes for animal food. The well known verse of the Pancatantra gives the clue: "When a man can fill his stomach with vegetables spontaneously growing in wilderness, why should he commit the sin of killing another fellow creature". svacchanda-vanajatena sakenapi prapuryate / asya dagdhodarasyarthe kah kuryat patakam mahat // The Upali episode recorded in the Majjhima Nikaya of the Pali canon may or may not be a correct appraisal of the Jaina position on ahimsa. But whether it be a fake or a genuine historical incident it lays stress on an important ethical issue. The Buddha insists that the psychological motive is more important than the outward act. Death of millions of living animalculae is taking place every minute. An earthquake, an avalanche, a tornado and the like calamities take toll of hundreds of men and animals. We are not in a position to condemn anybody for these cruelties. If a man accidentally treads on a worm in spite of the best precaution he cannot be held responsible for the loss of life entailed. But when a man kills another out of malice or greed or by way of retaliation he is held guilty both by law court and the ethical philosopher. It appears from the Pali version that the psychological attitude which is the spring of the action was not taken into account in the early Jaina canon. But we find

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE : AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA 227 it definitely recorded in the definition of himsa as propounded by Umasvati viz. 'the deprivation of life caused by vanity or anger or malice (pramada) is deemed himsa'. In current Jaina ethics we find a revealing consciousness of the part played by the psychological motive in the distinction between unmotivated violence (dravjahimsa) and motivated violence (bhavahimsa). The Buddha, if we are to believe in the Pali version, did not abstain from animal diet, and so also his followers. The uproar of the Jainas against Buddha's partaking of meat in the feast given by the Licchavi general, Simhasenapati, may be a historical fact. The Buddha exculpated himself and his followers on the ground that animal food by itself is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, though it is the result of violence. If the animal is not slaughtered by a person for his own delectation or by another at his instigation or encouraged by his approval, the person partaking of the animal food is not to be blamed. Furthermore the difference between Buddha and Devadatta on the question of the permissibility of animal diet brought about a schism in the Buddhist church. But the Buddha did not yield for the sake of gaining popular applause. One must purify his mind and remove the debasing passions, ill will, malice, greed, vanity, selfaggrandisement and not be tempted or povoked to kill a living being. The present-day malaise of the nations stems from fear of aggression of the powerful nations on weaker ones. The weaker nations are for all practical purposes thought to be the proper objects of exploitation, if not extirpation. It is undesirable that any average man with undeveloped moral sense wants to enrich himself at the cost of his fellows. He does not believe in the principle of live and let live. Violence begets violence and there is no end of hostility as it is said in the Dhammapada : na hi verepa vera pi sanimantidha kudacana averena tu sammanti esa dhammo sanantano ti // "Hostility cannot be contained by hostility, but only by cessation from and forbearance of the hostility. Buddhism says that it is the perennial law of ethics." We have no reason to doubt the truth of this law in the relationship between different persons, though its validity is called in question in international affairs. Nowadys violence seems to be the basal law of political conduct. The cult of communism is founded on the cult of himsa involved in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the capitalists. When the capitalist exploits human labour for his profit, he must be

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I contained by law, if moral persuasion fails. But if the rich man employs his wealth for the amelioration of the poorer sections one should have nothing but admiration for him. After all everybody cannot gain money or save a capital. America is rich because she has been able to exploit the available resources and bring advanced scientific knowledge to bear upon it. Nature has favoured her and she has developed the capacity for turning it to account. Let each nation do its best and solve the problem of poverty. This will alleviate the distress of the common herd and take the wind out of the sails of the modern apostles of violence. Curiously enough this cult of violence of inevitable class-struggle has received the imprimatur of powerful nations. But unless there is a change in the human character and the aptitude for judicious use of one's income is developed, the prospect of the betterment of the lot of general mankind by division of wealth executed by force or law will recede farther. The ethics of the Jainas and other Indian schools of thought has therefore laid stress on the necessity of setting limits to one's possessions (parigraha). It will be no solution if the tables are turned on the capitalists. The enrichment of the proletariat at the impoverishment of the capitalists will only bring about the same problem in another form. The state and the individual must not lack in their exertion to bring about a state of affairs in which every man who is capable of work does his duty without grumble and has enough of creature comforts. 228 We have alluded to this economic problem because it has serious repercussions on the moral field. Our concept of ahimsa must not be negative, but fulfil itself in rendering necessary help to those who want it. Our charity must not encourage idleness, but end in helping others to stand on their own feet. The rich man must shed his love of wealth for its own sake or for the satisfaction of vanity. But economic betterment is not the be-all and the end-all. Only if it serves as the scaffolding to intellectual, moral and spiritual elevation, it will serve a real need. Different men are born with different capacities and it is necessary that each man should have a suitable field for the development of his powers. Each one of us has to be taught the salutary lesson that the individual and the community are integrally connected and each must help the other. The individual must not be sacrificed at the altar of supposed communal well-being, nor should the interests of the community be ignored or frustrated in the pursuit of individual uplift. What is more important than distribution of wealth is the growth and development of charitable disposition. The intellectually superiors must help those who are intellectually backward. The morally degraded sections should be won over by the

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA 229 gospel of love and friendship i.e. maitri and karuna. If we make definite beginning we shall start on the right track and ultimately succeed in eliminating the causes of jealousy, malice and international feud. Moral education combined with the kuowledge of science and technology will go a long way in the achievement of the goal. Let us not dismiss the ideal of ahimsa as a fantastic figment of a man living in ivory tower. It is not as impracticable as it appears and we shall have to find out the modus vivendi to avoid the catastrophe threatened by nuclear warfare. Now let us discuss the logic and psychology of anekanta i. e. nonextremism. The Jaina does not believe in the extremist a priori logic of the Absolutist. Leaving the metaphysical question apart, and pragmatically considered this logical attitude breeds dogmatism and if carried one step further engenders fanaticism, the worst and vilest passion of the human heart. The dogmatist concludes that his view is the only correct one and whoever differs from his standpoint must be condemned of heresy. But truth has many facets at least in the field of experience. If we see only one side of the coin and refuse to see the other side our assessment will suffer from imperfection. A is A and never B- this monolithic conception of reality refuses to entertain other interpretations. But things that we encounter in experience are seen to vary from time to time. The chair or the table fresh from the factory is seen to lose its charm after use. This change is integral to the real, To dismiss change as deceptive appearance on the to fit in with the Procrustean ground of its failure conception of uniformity fails to do justice to our experience. In philosophy the interpretation of the laws of thought viz the law of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle have received different interpretations inspired by different logical attitude and the result has been the deployment of philosophers in antagonistic groups. Change and identity are held to be irreconcilable opposites. Change necessarily entails the idea of identity in the midst of the emergence of different attributes. A man is seen to be angry on one occasion and pleased on another and also simultaneouly in relation to different persons. Now the question is raised whether an identical entity, as the person is supposed to be, can have two incompatible predicates viz. anger and pleasure. If the attributes are identical with the subject, the subject is to be deemed to vary with the change of attributes and thus be reduced to different atomic units. This is the position of the Buddhist fluxist (ksanabhamgavadi). It is the result of the law of contradiction which asserts that a thing cannot be both A

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230 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, 1 and not-A, which is implied by the occurrence of anger and pleasure which is the negation of the former. If both the predicates have to be true one has to admit that A is and is not. A is susceptible to anger and also to the negation of it in having pleasure. The two are contradictorily opposed being derived as they are from the basic contradiction of being and non-being. The Sankhya and the Vedantist are on the other hand not willing to surrender the unity of self-consciousness and in failing to reconcile identity with change they assert that the occurrence of contradictory attributes is to be predicated of the mind-stuff which is identified with the self (atman) by the fiat of transcendent illusion. But this shifting of the contradiction to the mind from self places the former in the same uncomfortable predicament. The mind cannot be real since it is found to be fraught with self-contradiction. The Vedantist accepts the consequence and unhesitatingly declares that not only the mind but also the rest of the phenomenal entities are only apperance. The phenomenal order is governed by the law of causation. But causation is logically indefensible. The cause cannot be identical with the effect since the latter must be different numerically and qualitatively, from the former. Nor can the cause and effect be absolutely different since that would render the affiliation of the effect to the cause meaningless, They are both identical and different to all appearances. This is held to be impossible by the Vedantist and the Negativists (Sunyavadi). The objective world is dismissed as a metaphysical impossibility by both of them. But whereas the Negativist refuses to believe in the duality of the mind and the self, for which there is no evidence in experience and thus declares the psychical subject as also appearance, the Vedantist, on the other hand, is adamant on the reality of the self. The self is held to be a transcendent unity which refuses to accommodate the different mental events as its attributes. The Sankhya on the other hand does not subscribe to the theory of illusion. The objective world from the mind to gross elements is real on its own account though it embodies the different attributes. There is difference and also identity running in and through the varying attributes. The entity which changes is one and changing attributes are different and the two together form one integral whole. In other words, the difference and identity are not absolute and mutually exclusive. The Jaina philosopher agrees with the Sankhya philosopher in his assessment of the objective real. But he differs from him in respect of the subjective plane. The contention of the Buddhist Negativist that

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE : AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA 231 the subject is also liable to the same charge of combining identity and difference as its traits is accepted as the correct appraisal by the Jaina philosopher. But he differs from the Negativist when the latter dismisses both the subject and the object as irrational appearance. The contention of the Jaina is that the criterion of reality or otherwise is to be discovered in experience. And when experience endorses the co. occurrence and co-existence of both we must conclude that reality is capable of accommodating these variations. This also holds good of causation. The effect is both identical with and different from the cause and there is not incompatibility in this combination. This ts called the law of anekanta. I am not holding brief for either a Buddhist or a Jaina philosopher. But whether one is prepared to accept the jaina's solution or not he must have the candour to admit that the Jaina philosopher has succeeded in justifying the existence of both the subject and the object and their relationship whereas the Vedantist sacrifices the objecive world and the negativist makes holocaust of both at the altar of a priori logic. The law of anekanta saves both. In religion, the extremist a priori attitude has produced terrible consequences in the past. The proselytizing creeds are responsible for huge bloodshed. If one believes that his mode of worship is the only correct way to win the love of God and all others are false heresies, one cannot have friendly feeling towards the other. Nowadays religion is shoved into the background in the so-called communist countries, but the fanaticism of the neo-gospel is equally adamantine. It will not listen to logic or the opposite opinion. Like Christianity or Islam it seeks to convert the whole world to its creed and declare jehad against the recalcitrants. The adherents of different political parties are equally intolerant of their rivals. An ordinary layman fails to understand the subtle nuances of difference between the diverse forms of socialism now preached in India. But the differences, small or great, subtle or obtuse, are inflaming the worst passions of hatred and intolerance. In the present day, politics is by and large supplanting religion, but it inherits the same spirit of intolerance as religions showed in the mediaeval times. The study of philosophy may produce one salutary effect. Philosophers differ from one another or criticize their opponents with vehemence. But fortunately their quarrels are confined to words or thoughts and do not culminate in physical fights. The argumen tum ad baculum is not considered in academic circles as the decisive instrument. So also we should cultivate this attitude in our day to day life and in politics. In politics the conflict

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232 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I of economic interests combined with the ideological dogmatism has made the confusion worse confounded. Jawaharlal Nehru evolved the formula of co-existence as the guiding principle of international politics. But unfortunately his doctrine of Pancasila did not cut ice with the other nations. This spirit of mutual concession and accommodation can have a chance of playing an effective role if the superpowers, Russia, America and China see their way to accept it as the guiding policy. It may be thought that we are uttering a platitude or expressing a pious wish. It is a counsel of perfection which has no being translated into actual practice. But with due deference to this assessment of practical politicians we may observe that we cannot lower our ideal. The ideal always outstrips the actual. But if it is uppermost in the mind of lead and light it lets loose a power to raise the level of communal morality What was thought to be an impracticable phantasy has been realized in concrete experience. Nobody could think in the past of the latest inventions in science and technology such as aeroplanes, rockets and atom bombs, etc., as practical propositions So also in the morality of international politics have occurred momentous changes. The bombing of civil population shocks our conscience and this exercises a restraining influence on the conduct of wanton warfare. In the present-day world situation, ideology plays not an inconsiderable part in the framing of policies of notions. There is a tug of war between socialism and democracy. Thus conflict derives its sanction from the economic conditions of nations. To the poor man, the unemployed educated youth, and persons su ffering from frustration due to relegation of merit in the interest of party politics, the word socialism' has an irresistible appeal. It is believed that socialism will usher in the millennium. Democracy also professes to afford equality of opportunity to all, Democracy favours freedom of speech and criticism whereas socialism tends to culminate in dictatorship which will not hesitate to use individuals as tools in the promotion of the welfare of the state. In communist countries violence is regarded as the legitimate means of achieving the goal. India is a poor country and is thus subject to all the evils that poverty brings in its train. What is matter of great concern is that the leaders of socialistic movements in India are in their speech and practice inciting the underprivileged people particularly agricultural labourers and workers in factories and mills to resort to violence. Democracy on the other hand is slow in its resolves and cautious in its policy. The so-called communist is noted for his fanaticism and his faith in the sacrosanct infallibility of the Marxist philosophy both in the national and international politics.

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE The conflict between socialism and AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA 233 democracy has assumed an alarming dimension. Communism is determined to bring about a revolution in every country and convert the peoples of the world to its creed. It manifests all the characteristics of fanaticism which marked the expansion of Islam in its political conquest. The catast rophe, the third world war, can be averted if the powers standing for different socio-political organizations realize the futility of extremistic policies. Let each nation follow its ideology and seek to achieve complete success within its frontiers. Let them accept the principle of live and let live if not as a creed at least as a practical policy. The problem of poverty and unemployment and the wastage of national energy must be solved by each nation. If a government fails to tackle this problem with sincerity of purpose it runs the risk of being supplanted by another promising better results. In the achievement of this task the attitude of Anekanta if properly and judiciously cultivated will play a momentous role. The doctrine of anekanta which counsels avoidance of extremes, need not be confined to speculative thought. Its application to the practical conduct of human affairs in the individual's field of activity or in the national plane is imperative. It may be argued that the spirit of moderation fostered by anekanta philosophy may breed self-complacency and latitudinarianism. If the possibility of the opposite ideology be conceded one may develop lukewarm attitude and not be enthusiastic and lack in zeal in the cause of his own accepted creed. It will undermine the robust faith necessary for the unwavering pursuit of the task enjoined upon him. Laxity in conviction will make a man liable to change his faith over to another under temptation or provocation. But this unwelcome upshot is not necessarily entailed by the psychology of anekanta. One may be unyielding in one's faith and yet not intolerant of other creeds. An orthodox Hindu, firm in his conviction and strictly observant of the discipline enjoined by his religion, may have the charity to believe in the sincerity of a Christian or a Muslim This is the secret of the unmolested co-existence of different faiths in India, though mutually antagonistic to all appearances. Unfortunately this spirit of accommodation is not appreciated by followers of creeds imported from foreign lands. We may however plead for the cultivation of this accommodative attitude not only in the field of religion but also in politics and pursuit of economic policies. None should develop a one-track mind and refuse to take into account the interests of the other party. In

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 economics the interests of labour should not be sacrificed nor should labour develop a hostile attitude to the capitalist. Labour cannot have scope of action if there is no capital to open new avenues of work. The interests of both can be adjusted. The unprivileged underdog must be lifted out of the morass of degradation and trained to develop his skill and efficiency to achieve a better and higher standard of life. In the political sphere tyranny and persecution have been seen to have had ephemeral success in the past. Let the apostles of communism lay to heart the lesson of history. The impending threat of aggression by stronger nations may serve purpose if it spurs the weaker nations to energetic activity in selfdefence. The spirit of anekanta does not put premium on idleness and self-complacency. That will be rather a travesty of anekanta. True anekanta fosters firmness consistent with tolerance. The cultivation of this attitude will ensure peace between individuals and nations. a 234 To sum up, let each man adhere to his ancestral faith or political conviction with as much tenacity as he is capable of. But for God's sake let him not fight with his neighbour if he pursues a different line. There have been two world wars before and the third is impending. Violence has not succeeded in stemming violence. War has not outlawed war. The third world war will be conducted with nuclear arms and nobody can forecast the future shape of things. It can be avoided only by the development of anekanta attitude which is the psychological counterpart of non-violence.

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE: AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA NAND KISHORE PRASAD The definition of real given in the Tatvarthadhigamasutra uns folds the dynamic nature of entities. A real is that which embodieorigination (utpada), cessation (vyaya) and continuity (dhrauya): utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat (op. cit., 5. 30). A real is always changing and change means the origination of a novel attribute preceded by the cessation of the previous attribute and the underlying reality running through them incorporates both. The relation of quality and substance is also identity in difference. The quality of A is not different from the underlying substance and yet is not entirely the same. There is difference between A and its quality, but it is not as different as the quality of B. In this process the dilemma of Bradley posed in the proposition confronts us: 'If you predicate something which does not belong to the subject, it is false. If you predicate what is not different from the subject, you predicate nothing". But in a proposition there must be a subject and a predicate. As a matter of fact all our statements are instances of subjectpredicate relation. But if the Bradlean dilemma be a true appraisal we must cease from making any statement at all. This is tantamount to putting a gag in our month. The Jaina along with the philosophers of Bhed a bheda schools solved the problem by asserting that the relation of the predicate to the subject is neither one of absolute indentity nor of absolute difference but both. Identity and difference can co-exist. If the real is to forfeit difference as one of its constitutents, it will be a blank of which nothing can be affirmed or defined. This is called the law of anekanta. It strikes a balance between two supposed opposites by steering a middle course between them. In the Jaina thought this law of anekanta is confined to philosophy and logic. It was however applied in ethics by the Buddha in his formula of Majjhima Patipada (Madhyama Pratipad). Buddha finds contradiction between extreme asceticism and extreme self-indulgence. The former enfeables a person and the latter degenerates him. The two extremes can be avoided by following the middle path of moderation. I. Read at Seminor of Scholars on April 19, 1970.

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236 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I In the, Bhagavadgita Sri Krishna counsels balanced diet, balanced recreation, balanced activity and balanced rest: yuktaharaviharasya yuktacestasya karmasu yuktasvapnavabodhasya yogo bhavati duhkhaha (op. cit., VI 17). Extremes must be avoided. Extremism means ekanta attitude, i. e. adherence to one extreme (anta) to the exclusion of the other. The doctrine of anekanta was applied to the ethical conduct of a person aspiring for higher values. But unfortunately its applicat day to day life of an individual and the mutual behaviour of nations has not been advocated with emphasis by any thinker, so far as our knowledge goes. The subject of our present discourse has been proposed by our Director, Dr. N. Tatia. He envisages this scope of the application of this principle in the political sphere and is persuaded that this anekanta attitude together with non-violence will serve as the foundation of world peace. The Jaina logician believes in relativity and non-absolutism and makes assessment of the truth of a proposition in sevenfold predication. We may take the following paradigm for illustration of the anekanta standpoint. There are so many divergent theories regarding causation. In answer to the question-'is the effect pre-existent in the cause ?' different answers have been given by different philosophers either in the affirmative or in the negative or in both, or in a non-committal manner. The Jaina answers this in the following manner : (1) it is (syad asti), (2) it is not (syad nasti), (3) it is and is not (syad asti ca nasti ca) (4) it is indefinable (syad avakiavya), (5) it is and is indefinable syad asti ca avaktavya), (6) it is not and is indefinable (syad nasti ca avaktavya) and (7) it is, is not and indefinable (syad asti ca nasti ca avaktavya). The first endorses the Sarkhya position called satkaryavada, subject to a qualification. It is pre-existent so far as it is identical with the cause but not as a full-fledged effect. The second proposition endorses the Nyaya position called asatkaryavada. The effect is not pre-existent as it is found to be after its emergence. So the acceptance is not unqualified Without further elaboration we may assert that a thing is true in its own character, taken by itself, in its own place and in its own time. I now propose to apply it to the examination of a political question. Is democracy the true universal form of government or socialism with perfect state control ? Is there a via media ? Consistent with the law of anekanta, the Jaina philosopher would say, 'nothing can be universally true for all the time'. It holds true under a specified set

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FOUNDATION OF WORLD PEACE : AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA 237 of circumstances and ceases to be valid when those circumstances disappear. Democracy believes in individual freedom of speech, freedom of action and also in his capacity of forming true judgement. It will be.a misfit in a country where the majority of people are illiterate, politically unconscious, have no civic sense, that is to say, have not any conception of the welfare of the entire nation and are concerned wholly with the satisfaction of their immediate biological needs. In such a country democracy formed on the basis of popular votes proves to be a travesty. So it is good for a people which is politically educated and has clear notion of the ultimate good. Democracy is good for it. Is monarchy good ? Yes, subject to a qualification. If the king is educated politically, morally and is not selfcentred, open to conviction and devotes himself to the promotion of the well-being of the people of all classes, it will be an ideal form of government. As a matter of fact all political thinkers of India in the past from the authors of the Ramayana, Mahabharata, down to Kautilya and his successors and also Plato and Aristotle have all shown their preference for constitutional monarchy. But if the king develops into a despot and is entirely negligent of the interest of the people, is intemperate and addicted to pleasures of the senses monarchy will prove to be a curse. Democracy again is apt to degenerate into tyranny of the majority and when this majority is composed of needy, greedy aud indolent people this will also prove to be a cause of misery. The intellectually advanced sections, the well-to-do merchants and industrialists, the morally sensitive people will suffer. So there must be checks and balancing factors. So no definite qualified answer can be given to the question whether a particular form of government is better than the other. The general mass of a nation have no idea of higher values and as such have a natural animus against the advanced section. They * will be easily duped by interested party politicians. Their policy will be directed to the efacement of classess and equalization by the achievement of universal poverty. But there will be a handful of clever men who as the leaders of people will live in luxury hold out hopes of higher standard of life. This is unfortunately found to be the tion in our country in the present day The remedy may be found if the leaders are self-sacrificing and find delight in promoting the well-being of all sections of people. But the general amelioration can be affected by true education of the entire nation. People must be taught to place the interest of the nation above individual prosperity, which will have no stability is the majority are sunk in abject poverty. Abject poverty and unutilisable surplus of wealth are two extremes and must be adjusted by the law of anekan ta.

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238 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I In the international sphere the rivalry of nations can be tempered by restraint of ambition. A powerful nation which has a superior military organization equipped with superior arms naturally feels tempted to aggrandize itself at the cost of weaker nations. This leads to war which inflicts untold suffering on the victims of aggression. And the aggressor too suffers in loss of man and materials if the resistance is sustained. The fate of Hitler's Germany should bring the lesson home to the aggressor that war is not as profitable as he thinks. There are so many risks and so many miscalculations inevitable in the prosecution of war. This shows the working of the law of anekanta below the surface. Too much of power is almost as bad as too much of weakness. The two extremes are equally detestable. The weaker nations must be stronger to foil the ambitious designs of the powerintoxicated aggressor. There must be sobering down of the pride of power on the one hand and the uplift of the weaker nations from the slough of despondency and degradation on the other. This is the significance of anekanta which denounces extremism of either. Intellectual and moral persuation is better than physical violence. One may be cowed down by the bully but cannot be expected to entertain feelings of loyality. It is by love, friendship and provision of succour that a powerful individual or an organisation can hope to win the love of poor and weak people. But this traffic in benevolence cannot be one-track affair. The beneficiary must appreciate the mental charity of the benefactor and free himself from moral degradation by cherishing feeling of gratitude. The present-day conflict of labour and capital is not entirely an economic problem. Without investment of capital there can be no development which means opening out new avenues of activity. The industrial enterprise is a cooperative concern. It can flourish only if the capitalist is not over ambitious and the labour is not avaricious There must be sincerity of purpose on both sides. It is extreme avarice on either side that is at the bottom of the trouble, which is as much a question of psychology as of economics. This malady can be redressed if there is appreciation of inter-dependence on the part of both, capital and labour. The advocacy of non-violence need not be dismissed as the fad of a dreamer. Violence may be effective for the time being, but unless it is re-inforced by non-violence its success will not be enduring, Non-violence on the part of the stronger man and nation will inspire admiration for the former's forbearence. The father's admonition is

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FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE AHIMSA AND ANEKANTA 239 effective because it is backed by love. Let the stronger and richer nations befriend the downtrodden and thus establish hegemony of love. We appeal to the ruling powers to make an experiment with love and friendship as moral weapons and keep the destructive nuclear weapons in cold storage. This was the ideal which moved Mahatma Gandhi. This ideal can produce tangible results if the powerful nations are induced to give a trial to this principle. The weaker nations too must not be misled to have recourse to violence as the means of selfamelioration. This pursuit of non-violence will play an effective role in national and international spheres if there is consciousness of the futility of extreme measures which is the objective of anekanta attitude of mind.

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Arya banAma anArya nathamala TATiyA [ 1 ] manusmRti ( 2 / 22 ) meM AryAvarta kI sImA kA nirdeza karate hue kahA gayA hai -- pUrva samudra tathA pazcita samudra aura himAcala evaM vindhyAcala parvata ke madhyasthita deza ko budhajana AryAvarta kahate haiM / vindhya ke dakSiNa meM AryoM ke vistAra kA ullekha manu ne nahIM kiyA hai| balki, unhoMne to AryAvarta ke hI antargata malla, licchavI Adi jAtiyoM ko vrAtya kSatriyoM se utpanna mAnA hai ( manu0 10 / 22 ) jo avrata arthAt yajJopavItahIna evaM sAvitrI se paribhraSTa hote the / AryalogoM ke virodhI ke rUpa meM dasyuoM tathA dAsoM ke ullekha Rgveda ( 5 / 34 / 6, 3 / 34 / 6 Adi ) meM Ate haiM aura yaha bAta yahA~ niHsandeha kahI jA sakatI hai ki uttara bhArata kI vaha prajA jo pazcima se pUrva kI aura apanA vistAra karatI gayI, apane ko Arya kahatI thI tathA pahale se basI huI eka bhinna saMskRti vAlI prajA ko dasyu kahakara use avrata yA anyavrata mAnatI thI / isa dasyu prajA ke vibhinna ghaTakoM ko Aryetara hone ke kAraNa hama anArya kaha sakate haiM / zranAyaM zabda kA artha asabhya bhI hotA hai, kintu, prastuta prasaMga meM vaha zramipreta nahIM hai / yahIM anAyaM zabda se hamArA tAtpayaM Aryetara prajA se hai, jo kAlakrama se AryoM me ghula-mila gayI / saccAI to yaha hai ki Aryo kI prAcIna saMskRti kramazaH badalatI gayI aura kAlAntara meM usane eka nayI saMskRti kA rUpa dhAraNa kara liyaa| Arya-anArya kA jAti-bheda sarvathA samApta hokara eka naI jAti meM pariNata huA, jise Aja hama hindU jAti kahate haiM / laukika saMskRta meM AyaM zabda eka vizeSaraNa pada mAtra banakara raha gyaa| Arya zabda ke mUlabhUta RR dhAtu ( R gati prApaNayoH 661 ) se utpanna Arya zabda kA artha pANini ne ( aSTAdhyAyI 3 / 1 / 103 meM ) svAmI evaM vaizya kiyA hai | pakSAntara meM, Arya zabda kA yaugika prathaM prAptavya hotA hai jisase zreSTha, pUjya zrAdi aupacArika artha nikala Ate haiM / ataH sajjana, sabhya, sAdhu Adi rur3ha arthoM meM isa zabda kA bahudhA prayoga dekhA jAtA hai / zrImadbhagavadgItA ( 22 ) ke 'anAryajuSTa' zrArga zabda kA artha zreSTha puruSa hai / kAlidAsa ne zrabhijJAnazAkuntalam ke 'yadAryamasyAmabhilASi me manaH' ( prathama aMka ) meM Arya zabda kA prayoga sAdhu artha meM kiyA hai | amarakoSa ( brahmavarga 5 ) sabhya, sajjana evaM sAdhu zabda samAnArthaka mAne gaye / kisI Arya zabda kA prayoga pANini kAla ke pUrva hI lupta ho gayA sA pratIta hotA hai / paravartI kAla meM yaha zabda apane yaugika aura rUr3ha arthoM meM hI simaTa kara raha gayA, aisA kahA jA sakatA hai / zabda meM mahAkula, kulIna, zrArya, prajA vizeSa ke lie [ 2 ] jaina zrAgama ( paNNavaraNA 97 - 138 ) meM karmabhUmi ke ( saMskRta - AyaM ) evaM mileccha yA milakkhu ( saMskRta - mleccha ) -- ina do 1. apraila 1, 1969, ko vidvadgoSThI meM par3hA gayA / manuSyoM ko Ariya bhAgoM meM bA~Ta diyA

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ARYA BANAMA ANARYA 241 gayA hai / mleccha jAtiyoM kI eka lambI sUcI dI gaI hai, jisameM saga, javaNa, cilAya, sabara Adi ginAye gaye haiN| AryoM para kaI dRSTiyoM se vicAra vahA~ kiyA gayA hai| Rddhi-prApta AryoM meM ahaMta, cakravartI, baladeva, vAsudeva, cAraNa evaM vidyAdharoM kA samAveza kiyA gayA hai / zeSa AryoM kA varNana nimnokta nau [ 8 ] zIrSakoM meM pAyA jAtA hai- 1. kSetra-Arya, 2. jAti-Arya, 3. kula-Arya, 4. karma-prArya, 5. zilpa-Arya, 6. bhASA-Arya, 7. jJAna-Arya, 8. darzana-Arya aura 9. caaritr-praayN| kSetra-Arya ke prasaMga meM nimnokta dezoM kA ullekha hai-magadha, aMga, vaMga, kaliMga, kAzI, kozala, kuru, kusaTTa, paMcAla, jaMgala, saurASTra, videha, vatsa, saMDilla, malaya ( malada ), matsya, accha, dasapaNa, cedI, siMdhusovIra, zUrasena, bhaMgI, vaTTa, kuNAla, lADha evaM kekayA / manusmRti meM nirdiSTa AryAvarta kI tulanA, dezoM kI isa sUcI se kI jA sakatI hai / jAti -AryoM ke antargata ina chaH jAtiyoM kA ullekha hai--aMbaTTha, kaliMda, videha, vedaga, hariya aura cuMcuNa / aMbaSTa evaM vaideha kI vyAkhyA manusmRti (1018 tathA 10 // 11) meM upalabdha hai| kula-AryoM meM-ugga, bhoga, rAinna ( saMskRta-rAjanya ), ikkhAga ( ikSvAku ), NAyA, ( jJAtR ) evaM kauravva-ye cha: kula ginAye gaye haiN| karma-Arya nAnA prakAra ke hote haiM, jinameM--dosiya (dauSyika, vastra kA vyApArI ), sottiya ( sautrika, sUte kA vyApArI ), kolAliya ( kaulAlika, miTTI kA pAtra banAne vAlA ) Adi pezevaroM kA samAveza kiyA gayA hai / zilpa-pAryoM meM tuNNAga ( raphU karane vAlA ), taMtuvAya ( julahA ), chattAra ( chAtA banAne vAlA), potyAra ( pothI likhane vAlA), cittAra ( citra banAne vAlA), Adi zilpiyoM kA ullekha kiyA gayA hai / bhASA-AryoM ke antargata ardhamAgadhI bhASA tathA brAhmIlipi kA upayoga karane vAle ginAye gaye haiM / jJAna-prAya, darzana-prArya evaM cAritra-AyaM kI vyAkhyA jainadarzana ke mAkSamArga kI apekSA se kI gayo hai / vastutaH mokSa-mArga ho Ayatva kA niSkarSa hai| kSetra, jAti, kula Adi upAdhimAtra haiN| paramparA se mAnya Aya-mleccha vibhAga ko jainoM ne aupacArika mAnyatA to avazya do, kintu, usake AdhArabhUta jAtivAda ke siddhAnta ko asvIkRta kara diyA tathA vyApaka dRSTi se saMskRti ke mUlabhUta tattvoM ko dhyAna meM rakhakara Aryatva kA punarmUlyAMkana prastuta kiyaa| vyAkaraNa-mahAbhASya meM uddhRta "na mlecchitavai nApabhASitavai" dvArA asphuTa uccAraNa karane vAloM para jo pratibandha lagAyA gayA thA, usakA nirAkaraNa bhASA-prArya kI vyAkhyA meM jainoM dvArA kara diyA gayA / yahA~ jainadarzana kI samanvayAtmaka dRSTi atyanta spaSTa rUpa meM nikhara AyI hai / [3] bhaganAn buddha ne to Arya zabda ko kisI prajA yA jAti-vizeSa ke artha meM liyA hI nahIM / unhoMne bodha prApta kara jina satyoM kA pracAra kiyA unheM Arya-satya ( pAlIariya sacca ) yAni 'satyadraSTAoM dvArA anubhUta satya' kI saMjJA dii| arthAt unako dRSTi meM satya kA sAkSAtkAra kara lene para hI manuSya Arya banatA hai| yaha dRSTi janadarzana ke mokSamArgagAmI Arya kI dRSTi ke samAna hI kahI jA sakatI hai| bauddha granthoM meM isa pAribhASika Aya pada kI vyAkhyA vistAra se milatI hai / Arya zabda kA viparItArtha bodhaka zabda pRthagjana hai, jo ajJAna rUpI andhakAra meM nimagna rahane kI avasthA kA bodhaka hai / anArya zabda kA prayoga bauddha granthoM meM hIna yA asabhya artha meM AtA hai| prasatpurUSa, duHzIla, 16

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242 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 pApadharmA Adi artho meM bhI isa pada ke prayoga pAli granthoM meM dekhe jAte haiN| Arya zabda kI vyAkhyA meM jisa vyApaka dRSTi kA Azraya jaina vicArakoM ne liyA vaisA bauddha vicArakoM ne nhiiN| vastutaH bhagavAna buddha prAcAra meM samanvaya ke pakSapAtI the, kintu, vicAra ke kSetra meM ve kisI prakAra ke samajhaute meM vizvAsa nahIM rakhate the / isake viparIta, bhagavAn mahAvIra AcAra meM tanika bhI zithilatA ko svIkAra nahIM karate hue vicAra ke kSetra meM madhyamArga arthAt anekAnta ko prazraya dete the| isI kAraNa Arya pada ke vibhinna pahaluoM para mahAvIra ke anuyAyiyoM ne vicAra kiyA tathA usakI vyAkhyA meM vikAsazIla sAmAjika tathA dArzanika tattvoM ke samAveza meM ve sAvadhAna rhe| kintu, Thoka isake viparIta, dUsarI tarapha, bauddha cintakoM ne Arya zabda ke vyAvahArika pahaluoM kI sarvathA upekSA kara, mAtra usake pAramArthika tattva kI ora hI dhyAna rkkhaa| [4] Arya zabda ke upayukta vivecanoM se yaha spaSTa ho jAtA hai ki brAhmaNaparamparA meM yaha zabda apanI prAcIna vizeSya-vAcakatA ko surakSita rakhatA huA vizeSaNa-vAcakatA kI ora agrasara huA, para bhUla se sarvadhA pRthak nahIM hokara apanI vyAvahArikatA ko maulikatA ke sAtha banAye rkhaa| jaina manISiyoM ne to sAmAjika vikAsa ko dhyAna meM rakha kara vyAvahArika evaM pAramArthika donoM hI dRSTiyoM kA samanvaya karate hue isa zabda kI eka vistRta vyAkhyA prastuta kii| kintu, bauddha cintakoM ne kevala pAramArthika niSkarSa ke AdhAra para hI isakA upayoga kiyaa| isa kAraNa bauddha paramparA meM yaha zabda eka artha-vizeSa kA vAcaka bana kara hI raha gyaa| isa prakAra Arya zabda kA arthagata vikAsa bhAratIya saMskRti ke antargata hindU, jaina tathA bauddha ina tInoM dRSTikoNoM kA yugapat pratinidhitva karatA hai|

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rASTrIya ekatA nathamala TATiyA 1. rASTrIya ekatA kA artha hai rASTravAsiyoM kI vaha ekatA jo rASTra ke yogakSema ke lie Avazyaka hai / ekatA kA artha hai avivAda yA abheda / pArasparika vivAda yA bheda (jisameM vaiSamya bhI samAviSTa hai) hI rASTra kI azAMti evaM adhogati kA kAraNa hotA hai| ye vivAda Arthika, vaiyaktika, varNagata, dalIya, jAtigata, sAmpradAyika, kSetrIya, nItigata tathA anya vividha prakAra ke ho sakate haiN| para ina sabhI vivAdoM ke mUla meM do tattva mukhyatayA kriyAzIla rahate haiM-(1) artha evaM kAma kI vAsanA, tathA (2) dRSTibheda, arthAt prAdarzagata bheda / artha-vAsanA ke antargata vittaM SaNA, prabhutvaiSaNA Adi kI gaNanA kI jA sakatI hai tathA prAdarzagata bheda meM Adhunika samAjavAda, sAmyavAda, lokatantravAda Adi rAjanItiyoM kA tathA varNagata, kSetrIya, sAmpradAyika tathA anya sabhI prakAra ke bhedoM kA samAveza kiyA jA sakatA hai| 2. isa prasaMga meM bauddha dArzanika AcArya vasubandhu kI eka abhiyukti vizeSa mAnanIya hai / isa carAcara jagat ke ghaTaka tattvoM ke rUpa meM bauddha darzana meM ye pAMca skandha (dharmoM ke puMja) mAne gaye haiM-rUpa, vedanA, saMjJA, saMskAra evaM vijJAna / usa para yaha prazna uThatA hai ki jaba jar3a jagat kI vyAkhyA eka rUpa-skaMdha se hI ho jAtI hai tathA cetana jagat kI vyAkhyA ke lie vijJAna-skaMdha ( jo sAmAnya mAnasika vRttiyoM kA bodhaka hai ), saMskAra-skaMdha ( jisameM anya sabhI viziSTa manovRttiyoM kA samAveza ho jAtA hai) hI paryApta haiM to phira svataMtrarUpa se vedanAskaMdha [ sukha-duHkha Adi vedanA meM ) evaM saMjJA-skaMdha ( dArzanika kalpanAyeM ) ko mAnane kI AvazyakatA hI kyA hai ? isa prazna kA uttara prAcArya vasubandhu ne nimnAMkita zloka (abhidharmakoza 1.21 ) meM diyA hai--- vivAdamUlasaMsArahetutvArakramakAraNAt / caittebhyo vedanAsaMjJe pRthak skandho niveshito|| svaracita bhASya meM isakI vyAkhyA unhoMne isa prakAra kI hai-- vivAdamale-kAmAdhyavasAnaM dRSTayadhyavasAnaM ca / tayorvedanAsaMze yathAkramaM pradhAnahetU / saMsArasyApi te pradhAnahetU / vedanAsvAdagRddho hi viparyastasaMjJaH saMsarati / isa bhASya kI vyAkhyA karate hue prAcArya yazomitra ne kahA hai vedanAsvAdazAddhi kAmAnabhiSvajante gRhiNaH / viparIta saMjJAvazAcca dRSTIrabhiSvajante prAyeNa prajitAH / - bhAvArtha yaha hai ki vedanA aura saMjJA''ye do skandha sAre vivAdamUloM ke aura sAMsArika jIvana ke hetubhUta haiN| skaghoM kI kramavvavasthA jo zAstra meM kI gaI hai vaha bhI skandhoM ko 1. 11 aprIla, 1968, ko vidvadgoSTI meM par3hA gayA /

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244 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 saMkhyA pAMca mAna kara hI kI gaI hai (jisakA vivecana prastuta prasaMga meM anAvazyaka hai)| citta ke sAtha utpanna dharmo ko caita kahA jAnA hai| ina caitoM ke tIna bheda kiye gaye haiMvedanA-skaMgha, saMjJA-skaMdha evaM saMskAra-skaMdha / saMskAra-skaMdha ke antargata sabhI prakAra ke caitoMudAharaNArtha smRti, manaskAra, loma, dveSa, moha, aloma, adveSa, amoha, krodha, IrSyA, Adi Adi-kA samAveza kiyA gayA hai| kintu jaisA ki Upara kahA gayA hai, vedanA-skaMdha evaM saMjJA-skaMdha-yadyapi ye caita hI haiM tathA inakA bhI samAveza saMskAroM meM kiyA jA sakatA thAalaga se isalie ginAye gaye ki ye do hI sabhI vivAdamUloM ke tathA saMsAra ke hetubhUta haiN| vivAdoM ke mUla meM pradhAnatayA do prakAra kI AsaktiyAM vidyamAna rahatI haiM-kAma bhogoM ke prati Asakti tathA apanI-apanI dRSTiyA~ arthAt siddhAntoM ke prati Asakti / pahalI Asakti kA pradhAna hetu hai vedanA jo gRhI jIvana meM bahudhA dekhI jAtI hai, aura dUsarI Asakti kA pradhAna hetu hai saMjJA jo prAyaH saMnyAsiyoM meM pAI jAtI hai| yadi ina do AsaktiyoM ko samanvita rUpa meM de dekhA jAya to yoM bhI kahA jA sakatA hai ki sukha duHkhAdi vedanAoM se prabhAvita hokara vyakti mithyA dRSTiyoM meM phaMsa jAtA hai aura eka avicchinna duHkhapravAha meM bhaTakatA rahatA hai| Adhunika yuga kI samasyAyeM bAharI rUpa meM bhinna dikhAI dene para bhI tattvataH ve hI haiM / Arthika pratispardhA tathA saiddhAntika matabhedoM ke kAraNa hI sabhI samasyAyeM uTha khar3I hotI haiM, aura sAtha-sAtha dalIya, sAmpradAyika tathA anya vivAda bhI upasthita hote haiM, jo rASTrIya ekatA ke liye ghAtaka siddha hote haiM / sabhI bhAratIya darzana saMsAra ko duHkhamaya mAnate haiM tathA sabhI vivAdoM ke mUla meM loma, dvaSa evaM moha kA prabhAva batAte haiN| ina vRttiyoM se chuTakArA binA pAye kisI prazna kA saMtoSaprada samAdhAna honA ina darzanoM meM asambhava mAnA gayA hai / 3. rASTrIya ekatA ke prazna para mahAbhArata meM adhika vyAvahArika DhaMga se vicAra kiyA gayA hai| gaNarAjyoM ke nAza kI carcA karate hue bhISma yudhiSThira ko kahate haiM ( zAMtiparva, 107, 14 ) : bhede gaNA binezurhi bhinnAstu sujayAH paraH / tasmAtsaMghAtayogena prayateran gaNAH sadA // arthAt Apasa meM phUTa hone se hI saMgha yA gaNarAjya naSTa hue haiN| phUTa hone para zatru unheM anAyAsa hI jIta lete haiM / ataH gaNoM ko cAhiye ki ve sadA saMghabaddha hokara hI vijaya ke lie prayatna kareM / bhISma saMghIya ekatA kI prazaMsA karate hue kahate haiM ( 107, 15) : ____ arthAzcaivAdhigamyante saMghAtabalapauruSedhaH / bAhyAzca maitrI kurvanti teSu saMghAtavRttiSu // / arthAt jo sAmUhika bala aura puruSArtha se sampanna haiM, unheM anAyAsa hI saba prakAra ke abhISTa padArthoM kI prApti ho jAtI hai / saMghabaddha hokara jIvana nirvAha karane vAle logoM ke sAtha saMgha se bAhara ke loga bhI maitrI sthApita karate haiN|

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RASTRIYA EKATA 245 bheda hI saMdhavinAza kA mUla kAraNa hai| saMghanAyaka hI saMdha ke yogakSema kA AdhArabhUta stambha haiM / nArada vAsudeva ko kahate haiM (zAMtiparva, 81.25 ): - bhedAdvinAzaH saMghAnAM saMghamukhyo'si kezava / yathA tvAM prApya nautsIdevayaM saMghastathA kuru // he kezava ! Apa isa yAdava saMgha ke nAyaka haiN| bheda ke kAraNa hI saMghoM kA vinAza hotA hai| ataH Apa aisA kareM jisase Apako pAkara isa saMgha kA-isa yAdava gaNataMtra rAjya kA- mUlocchedana na ho jAya / saMghanAyaka ke Avazyaka guNoM kA varNana nArada isa prakAra karate haiM (vahI, koka 26) nAnyatra buddhikSAMtibhyAM nAnyatrendriyanigrahAt / nAnyatra dhana-saMtyAgAdgaNa: prAjJe'vatiSThate / buddhi , kSamA aura indriyanigraha ke binA tathA dhana ke binA tathA dhana ke tyAga kiye binA koI gaNa athavA saMdha kisI buddhimAn puruSa kI AjJA ke adhIna nahIM rahatA hai / ___ vAsudeva jaise mahApuruSa hI vivadamAna saMgha kI ekatA ko akSuNNa rakha sakate haiM / isa prasaMga meM nArada kahate haiM ( vahI, zloka 23 ) : nAmahApuruSaH kazcinnAnAtmA nAsahAyavAn / mahatI dhuramAdhatte tAmudyabhyorasA vaha / / jo mahApuruSa nahIM hai, jisane apane AtmA ko vaza meM nahIM kiyA hai tathA jo sahAyakoM se sampanna nahIM hai, vaha koI bhArI bhAra nahIM uThA sakatA / ataH Apa hI isa gurutara bhAra ko hRdaya se uThAkara vahana kare / mahAbhArata ke ye ullekha rASTrIya ekatA tathA isa ekatA ke AdhArabhUta rASTranAyaka ke guNoM para mahatvapUrNa prakAza DAlate haiN| 4. rASTrIya ekatA ke abhAva meM samaya-samaya para dezoM meM mahAn saMkaTa Aye haiN| mauryakAla meM rASTrIya ekatA kI sthApanA huI jo azoka ke kAla taka vikAsa kI parAkASThA taka phuNcii| para isa ekatA ke naSTa hote hI phira saMkaTa AyA thaa| guptakAla meM phira se ekatA prAI aura deza samRddhi ke zikhara para pahuMcA, para ekatA kabhI sthira nahIM rhii| Adhunika yuga meM gAMdhIjI ne rASTrIya ekatA ke lie prANa diye, amarikI rASTrapati abrAhama liMkAna ne IsavI san 1858 meM kahA thA--- "A house divided against itself cannot stand'. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and balf free", unhoMne ekatA ke lie prAraNAhuti dI jisakI punarAvRtti rASTrapati keneDI ne kii| isI rASTrIya ekatA ko saMkaTagrasta pAkara hAla hI meM pahalI aprIla ko rASTrapati jAnasana ne ghoSaNA kI.

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246 VAISHALI INSTITUIE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. i "It is true that a house divided against itself-by the spirit of faction, of party, of region, of religion, of race-is a house that cannot stand." "Whatever the trials and tests ahead, the ultimate strength of our country and our cause will lie not in powerful weapons, or infinite resources or boundless wealth--but in the unity of our people." rAsTrIya ekatA kI surakSA eka atyanta duSkara kArya hai| hAla hI meM ahiMsAvAdI nIgro netA mArTina lUthara kiMga kI nirmama hatyA ke phalasvarUpa amerikA ke vibhinna zaharoM meM goroM aura azvetoM ke bIca bhayaMkara jAtIya daMge zurU hue haiN| isa ghaTanA se yaha spaSTa hai ki amerikI rASTrIya ekatA jisa saMkaTa meM Aja se karIba sau varSa pUrva-abrAhama liMkAna ke samaya meM thI, usI saMkaTa meM Aja bhI hai / zatruoM se pariveSTita bhAratavarSa kI sthiti bhI Aja vaisI hI hai| rASTrIya ekatA kA prazna ciraMtana hai aura isa para UhApoha karanA tathA rASTrIya ekatA ko jovita rakhane ke upAyoM ko DhUMr3ha nikAlanA hamArA pAvana kartavya hai|

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dharmanIti aura rAjanIti nathamala TATiyA 1. 'dharma' zabda kA prayoga kaI arthoM meM huA hai, para prastuta prasaMga meM sAkSAt rUpa se niHzreyasa evaM AnuSaMgika rUpa se abhyudaya ke sAdhana ko hI 'dharma' mAna kara hama usa para vivecana kreNge| 'nIti' zabda se hamArA abhiprAya hai naya arthAt AdhArabhUta dRSTi evaM usa dRSTi ke poSaka upAyabhUta niyama-upaniyamoM se / mahAbhArata ke zAMtiparva meM nItizAstra ke viSayoM ke bAre meM kahA gayA hai yaryarupAyarlokastu na caledAryavarmanaH / tatsarvaM rAjazArdUla nItizAstre'mivaNitam / / ( 59.74 ) arthAt jina jina upAyoM dvArA yaha jagat sanmArga se vicalita na ho una sabakA nItizAstra meM pratipAdana kiyA jAtA hai| 'rAjanIti' zabda ke paryAya ke rUpa meM hamAre prAcIna sAhitya meM 'daNDanIti' zabda kA prayoga AtA hai jise arthazAstra bhI kahA gayA hai| 'daNDanIti' zabda ko vyAkhyA mahAbhArata meM isa prakAra kI gaI hai---- daNDena nIyate cedaM daNDaM nayati vA puunH| daNDanItiriti khyAtA zrIna lokAnabhivartate / ( zAMtiparva, 59.78 ) arthAt jisa nItizAstra ke anusAra daNDa dvArA jagat kA sanmArga para sthApana kiyA jAtA hai athavA rAjA jisake anusAra prajAvarga meM daNDa kI sthApanA karatA hai, vaha daNDanIti ke nAma se vikhyAta hai, jisakA prabhAva tInoM lokoM meM vyApta hai| yadyapi rAjanIti kA sAkSAt phala hai abhyudaya arthAt laukika unnati, para paramparayA zAMti evaM samRddhi kI sthApanA dvArA vaha nizreiyasakA bhI sAdhaka banatA hai| niSkarSa yaha hai ki sAkSAt rUpa se AdhyAtmika tathA AnuSaMgika rUpa se laukika utkarSa ke sAdhanabhUta nItiyoM kA samAveza dharmanIti meM hai, evaM una nItiyoM ko kAryAnvita karanA tathA unakI maryAdAoM ko surakSita rakhakara laukika unnati kA sAdhana daNDanIti kA uddezya hai / vicArAlayoM kI daNDavyavasthA daNDanIti kA hI eka kSudra aMga hai| daNDanIti zAstra meM sAma, dAna, bheda, daNDa prAdi upAyoM kA pUrNataH samAveza hotA hai aura bhinna-bhinna rASTroM kA pArasparika sambandha aivaM eka hI rASTra ke antargata aMgIbhUta rAjyoM kI niyaMtraNa-vyavasthA bhI isI zAstra kA viSaya hai| rAjA-prajA kA sambandha, rASTrahitakara kArya, prajAoM kA pArasparika sambandha Adi viSaya bhI daNDanIti ke hI antargata haiN| para ina viSayoM kI carcA prasaMgaprApta nahIM hai, hameM to kevala dharmanIti aura daNDanIti ke pArasparika sambandha para vivecana karanA hai| 1. aprIla 22, 1967, kI vidvadgoSThI meM par3hA gyaa|

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248 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 2. prastuta viSaya ko samajhane ke lie mahAbhArata tathA kauTilya arthazAstra meM variNata cAra mUlabhUta vidyAoM para dRSTi DAlanA Avazyaka hai| brahmA dvArA racita nItizAstra meM varNita vidyAoM ke ullekha ke prasaMga meM mahAbhArata kahatA hai-- trayI cAnvIkSikI caiva vArtA ca bharatarSabha / daNDanItizca vipulA vidyAstatra nidarzitAH // ( vahI 59-33 ) / kauTilya arthazAstra ke vidyodveza prakaraNa meM bhI ina cAra vidyAoM kA ullekha hai| kauTilya ke abhiprAya kA spaSTIkaraNa mahAmahopAdhyAya DA0 yogendranAtha vAgcI ne apane "prAcIna bhArata ko daNDanIti" ( pRSTha 46-47 ) meM kiyA hai| nyAyabhASyakAra vAtsyAyana ne bhinna-bhinna vidyAoM ke jJAna aura phaloM kA viveka karate hue kahA hai- tadidaM tattvajJAnaM niHzreyasAdhigamazca yathAvidya veditavyam / isI bhASya kI vyAkhyA meM vAttikakAra udyotakara ne kahA hai ki pratyeka vidyA meM hI tattvajJAna hai aura niHzreyasa prApti bhI hai| trayI vidyA kA tattvajJAna hai agnihotrAdi karmoM ke kramika aMga Adi kA parijJAna evaM kisa prakAra karma karane para karma saphala hogA Adi vyauroM kI jaankaarii| evaM svarga prApti hai isa vidyA kA niHzreyasAdhigama / AnvIkSikI vidyA meM prAtmA Adi padArthoM kA parijJAna hI tattvajJAna, evaM mokSaprApti niHzreyasAdhigama hai| vArtA vidyA meM kRSi, vANijya, pazu-pAlana Adi kA jJAna tattvajJAna hai evaM ina sAdhanoM dvArA dhanalAbha hI isakA niHzreyasAdhigama hai| daNDanIti vidyA meM sAma, dAna, bheda, daNDa Adi upAyoM kA jJAna tattvajJAna evaM rAjyalAbha niHzreyasAdhigama hai / ___ina vidyAoM ke pArasparika sambandha ke bAre meM matabheda hai| kauTilya arthazAstra ke vidyoddeza prakaraNa meM kahA gayA hai ki manu ke ziSyavargoM ne trayI, vArtA aura daNDanIti ye tIna hI vidhAyeM mAnI hai, AnvikSikI ko trayI ke antargata mAnA hai / vRhaspati ke anuyAyiyoM ne vArtA aura daNDanIti do hI ko vidyA kahA hai| zukrAcArya kI ziSyaparamparA meM daNDanIti hI ekamAtra vidyA kahI gayI hai| kintu kauTilya ne cAra vidyAyeM mAnI hai| ( dekho-prAcIna bhArata ko daNDanIti, pRSTha 46-47) prastuta prasaMga meM hameM trayI aura prAnvIkSikI ko dharmanIti ke antargata evaM vArtA aura daNDanIti ko rAjanIti ke antargata mAnakara, dharmanIti aura rAjanIti ke pArasparika sambandhoM para vicAra karanA hai| vArtAvidyA aba rAjanIti kA hI aMga mAnI jAtI hai, isalie yadi hama 'rAjanIti' yA prAcIna 'arthazAstra' zabda kA prayoga sAmUhika rUpa se vArtA aura daNDanIti ke artha meM kareM to vaha prayoga asaMgata nahIM hogaa| 3. dharmanIti kA vidhAna dharmazAstroM meM kiyA gayA hai tathA rAjanIti kA arthazAstroM meM | ye donoM zAstra apane apane viSaya meM svataMtra haiN| satya to yaha hai ki arthazAstra dharmazAstra kA paripAlaka hai| arthazAstra yA daNDanIti ke nAza se anya saba dharma naSTa ho jAte haiM / mahAbhArata kahatA hai majjet trayI daNDanIto hatAyAM sarve dharmAH prakSayeyurvivRddhAH / sarve dharmAzcAzramANAM hatAH syuH kSAtre vyakte rAjadharma purANe //

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DHARMANITI AUR RAJANITI 249 sarve (yAgA rAjameMSu dRSTAH sarvA dIkSA rAjadharmeSu coktaaH| sarvA vidyA rAjadharmeSu yuktAH sarve lokA rAjadharma praviSTA : ( zAMtiparva, 63. 26-9 ) arthAt, yadi daNDanIti naSTa ho jAya to tInoM veda rasAtala meM cale jAyeM aura samAja meM pracalita sAre dharmo kA nAza ho jAya, purAtana rAjadharma, jise kSAtradharma bhI kahate haiM, yadi lupta ho jAya to AzramoM ke sampUrNa dharmoM kA hI lopa ho jaaygaa| rAjA ke dharmoM meM sAre tyAgoM kA darzana hotA hai, rAjadharmoM meM sArI dIkSAoM kA pratipAdana ho jAtA hai, rAjadharma meM sampUrNa vidyAoM kA saMyoga sulabha hai, tathA rAjadharma meM sampUrNa lokoM kA samAveza ho jAtA hai| ___ bhAratIya prAcIna zAstrakAroM kA dharmazAstra aura arthazAstra ke pArasparika sambandha nirdhAraNa karane vAlA yaha dRSTikoNa paravartI kAla meM badala gayA, jaba mitAkSarAkAra vijJAnezvara mahAraka jaise vidvAn rAjadharma ko arthazAstra ko koTi meM rakhakara dharmazAstra ke sAtha arthazAstra kA virodha hone para arthazAstra ko durbala aura hIna mAnane lge| yAjJavalkya smRti ke vyavahAra-adhyAya ko--arthazAstrAttu balavaddharmazAstramiti sthiti : ---isa ukti ke AdhAra para yaha mata pnpaa| isa mata kI asaMgati para "prAcIna bhArata kI daNDanIti" meM sUkSma vivecana prastuta kiyA gayA hai, jise dhyAnapUrvaka avazya dekhanA caahiye| jaina, bauddha, jaise zramaNa dharmo kI maulika vairAgya pradhAna bhAvanAoM kA isa mata ke udbhava meM prabhAva rahI hai| yadyapi somadeva sUri jaise jaina cintaka apane nItivAkyAmRta meM spaSTa kahate haiM-atha dharmArthaphalAya rAjyAya namaH--para yaha ukti prAcIna vaidika paramparA kI pratidhvani mAtra pratIta hotI hai / bauddha paramparA kI sthiti bhI isa viSaya meM jana paramparA jaisI hI hai| isa prazna para mahAbhArata kI vyAkhyA atyanta spaSTa evaM vivekapUrNa hai| aisI vyAkhyA atyanta durlabha hai| dharmazAstra meM varNita mokSa aura arthazAstra meM varNita daNDa ke aMgIbhUta viSayoM ke prasaMga meM mahAbhArata kahatA hai--- mokSasyAsti trivargo'nyaH proktaH sattvaM rajastamaH / sthAnaM vRddhiH kSayazcaiva trivargazcaiva daNDajaH // __( zAMti, 59.31) arthAt mokSa kA trivarga dUsarA batAyA gayA hai jisameM sattva, rajas aura tamas kI gaNanA hai / daNDajanita trivarga usase bhinna hai / sthAna, vRddhi, aura kSaya-ye hI usake bheda haiM (arthAt daNDa se dhaniyoM kI sthiti, dharmAtmAoM kI vRddhi aura duSToM kA vinAza hotA hai| 4. dharmanIti aura rAjanIti ke pArasparika sambandhoM ke bAre meM prAcIna bhArata ke dRSTikoNa ko hamane dekhA, ina donoM nItiyoM ko svataMtra mAnakara viSaya aura phala kI apekSA se unameM avirodha kI sthApanA karanA hamAre prAcIna cintakoM ko iSTa thaa| madhyayuga meM mitAkSarAkAra jaise vidvAnoM ne isake viparIta dharmanIti ko hI prAdhAnya dekara rAjanIti ko hIna btaayaa| rAjanIti meM bhAga lene ke kAraNa jainoM ne AcArya hemacandra jaise mahApuruSa kI bhartsanA kI, Adhunika yuga meM mahAtmA gAMdhI ne ina nItiyoM meM ghaniSTa sambandha sthApana kI

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250 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I dizA meM cintana tathA prayoga kiyA / dharmarahita rAjanIti ko unhoMne asvIkAra kiyA, tathA aise dharma ko bhI unhoMne nirathaMka mAnA jisakA upayoga rAjanIti meM nahIM ho sake, vaha rAjanIti kaisI, jisameM ahiMsA aura satya jaise dharmoM ko sthAna na ho / evaM vaha dharma hI kaisA, jo sAmAjika, Arthika tathA anya rASTrIya hitoM ke sAdhana meM samartha na ho, dharmaM sabhI paristhitiyoM meM dharma hI hai, evaM adhamaM sadeva adharma hI hai / ahiMsA sadaiva dharma hai, cAhe ahiMsA pAlana meM vaha ahiMsaka vyakti hiMsA kA pAtra bana jAya, ahiMsA kI sthApanA ke lie kI gaI hiMsA bhI hiMsA hI hai / sAdhya aura sAdhana meM vaiSamya gAMdhIjI ne svIkAra nahIM kiyA, vyAvahArika jIvana meM gAMdhIjI ke isa darzana kA saphala prayoga zAyada huA hai / para hiMsA zakti kI nirarthakatA kI anubhUti ho isa darzana ke satya ko mAnane meM zAyada koI kaThinAI nahIM hogI / abhI taka siddha nahIM mUla meM hai, isa

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RELIGION AND SECULARISM1 NATHMAL TATIA Religion is generally associated with belief in God. But there are religions, such as Jainism and Buddhis:n as also some branches of Hinduism, which do not believe in God, but are satisfied with postulation of individual selves as intelligent substances or series of moments capable of infinite perfection and exaltation. And consequently religion qua the path of perfection finds expression as worship of G bhaktimarga or pursuit of a moral code, called karma-marga. But a more fundamental principle of Indian mind is the consistency between thought and action and action and the basic attitude which determines the thought itself and is called Samyag-darsana in all branches of Indian thought. This samyag-darsana is the starting point of religious and spiritual life. We find many wandering teachers in the time of Mahavira and Buddha who were in search of the basic ideal which should determine spiritual life. The orthodox society wedded to Vedic ritualism was in the background. There were free thinkers who did not believe in ritualism, but were anxious to find a way out of the sufferings of worldly life. Vedic ritualism holding out future prospects was dharma for the orthodox people while the way out of worldly sufferings was the dharma for the new society that was struggling to emerge. The term dharma thus had two different connotations which were the two different ends of human life, technically known as abhyudaya and nihsteyasa. Eventually, there emerged an integrated conception of dharma which was the cause of worldly prosperity as well as spiritual elevation. It is in the context of this concept of religion as dharma that we have to discuss the subject of religion and secularism. Secularism is a belief that the state, morals, education, etc., should be independent of religion. But here religion has a very narrow connotation. The Indian concept of religion, which is identical with dharma, however, includes all activities of social welfare, statecraft, state polity, education, moral training, etc. Even the intellectual pursuits such as Logic and Metaphysics are considered dharma, Dharma thus stands for the basic principle that is the condition and also the justification of how one thinks and acts. Consequently, secularism, in order to be significant in this context, must have a special meaning, 1. Read at the Seminar of Scholars or April 3, 1966,

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252 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I It should be conceived as a detergent against anti-social and antihuman elements that might surreptitiously adulterate the dharma. Secularism is vitally significant and relevant to a society which has gathered prejudices and superstitions as part and parcel of religion. There are countries with a declared state religion, other religions being relegated to creeds of minorities. Conflicts are liable to arise in such situations, specially when sectarian ideals are sought to be injected in the public life of a composite people. Secularism is a vital force against anti-social tendencies in such circumstances. Religion in its essential character is a purifying force. But it fails to serve its purpose or rather disserves the society, when mixed up with idols and idiosyncrasies. There were periods of religious conflicts in the course of our history. But an understanding of the essential unity of all religions gradually emerged and reached its climax in Bhagavan Ramkrishna Paramahamsa and Swami Vivekananda and found its concrete fulfilment in the life and activities of Mahatma Gandhi who considered society without religion as body without soul. It is the Indian concept of dharma as the determining principle of all human activities, that was responsible for the manifestation of such unique personalties who brought about radical change in our concept of religion and its bearing on social and political life. The relation between religion and secularism should be considered in the light of the contributions of these great leaders of thought and action, who symbolized the best values of religion in harmony with the best demands of secularism. Secularism functions as a safeguard against imposition of a personal belief on public life, or exaltation of sectarian customs to the status of a universal code of conduct. The Pak representative at the XIth International Congress of the History of Religions at Claremont, California, which I attended last September, tried to justify the necessity of a separate state for the followers of Islam for cultivation of the values of Islamic culture in public life. But the Indian concept of cultural values is radically different. A religious tenet, such as ahimsa (nonviolence) or samyama, (self-restraint) is a universal principle of conduct, irrespective of caste, creed or sect. Secularism is necessary for a society imbued with sectarian outlook, but such necessity is transcended by cultivation of impersonal values which clean the society and elevate the individual.

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MATERIALISM VERSUS SPIRITUALISM NATHMAL TATIA, The two dogmas of materialism are--(1) the sole reality of matter and (2) the reign of law. In the field of ethics, pleasure and the fulfilment of desires is the only end Of course, sometimes intellectual pleasures are considered higher than the sensuous. It is further recognized that one cannot be happy unless one is just, wise and noble, as also that only a cheerful person can be just, noble and wise. The materialist morality is---enjoy your life and help others to enjoy it, without harming any one. This is what can be considered as materialism in its most commendable perspective of modern times. In ancient Indian thought, materialism is associated with: Bshaspati, the preceptor of gods, and Carvaka, both of whom are perhaps mythical figures. They are not mentioned either in the Jaina Agamas or the Buddhist pitakas. The Mahabharata, however, mentions Carvaka Raksasa by name, and in the Ramayana we find reference to Jabali who propounds hedonism. The Jaina Agamas refer to a doctrine which rejected the existence of soul and explained conscious. ness as a temporary effect of the mixture of material elements. This doctrine and others which accepted God and soul but did not agree to the Jaina doctrine are denounced as heresies in the second Agama of the Jainas. In the Pali Samannaphalasutta, we find mention of Ajitakesakambali as a protogonist of nihilism (ucchedovada). He did not believe in good and bad deeds and their results. Nor did he accept the authority of any person who has experienced the life hereafter. The human personality according to him is a combination of four material elements and nothing remains of it after death. Charity and benevolence are futile actions. But in spite of all these doctrines assigned to him, the fact remains that Ajitakesakambali was a recluse and had a moral code of his own. He was, therefore, a materialist in the modern acceptation of the term defined above, allowance being made to the modes of life and thinking of those times. It appears that anyone not believing in the established moral code was called a heretic, irrespective of his ontological convictions. The school of thought which believed in determinisn (niyativada) or naturalism (svabhavavada) was also looked at with contempt. The Buddha denounced determinism as the worst type of heresy which deserved unqualified condemnation. The opposition, therefore, was not between materialism and spiritua .. . Read at the Seminars of Scholars on April 14, 1965.

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254 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I lism, but between the established moral life and the subversion of it, materialism being only one of the forms of such subversion. The problem of materialism versus spiritualism, therefore, in order to be significant, should be narrowed to the ethical problem of good and bad ways of life and their justification, logical and metaphysical. In this connection, it will not be irrelevant to refer to the Buddha's insistence that the distinction between good and bad deeds must be accepted for living a civilized life. Akaravati Sraddha, that is, faith backed by reason is the minimum condition of social life, without which life itself will be meaningless. There were very many schools of thought propounding different moral codes and conceptions of spiritual emancipation (moksa). The Buddha did not like to enter into controversies about these concepts. He was satisfied if a man recognized the distinction between sucarita and duscarita and was true to his conviction. This was what he considered as the essential requirement of spiritual life. It is difficult to understand the opposition of materialism in the context of this simplified concept of spiritualism, except it is interpreted as a doctrine that denounced the established moral code of conduct. In later Indian thought, many criticisms of materialism were advanced by schoolmen, both orthodox and non-orthodox. But these criticisms centered round epistemological and ontological problems, only cursorily touching the social and moral outlook of materialism. t appears that they were fighting with a phantom. It is not denied that there were free thinkers who approached the problems with open mind. But it is difficult to accept that these thinkers were as perverse as they were represented to be. Materialism, as defined above, upholds the validity of only the two ends of life, viz. artha and kama that is, worldly possessions and fulfilment of desires. The other two accredited ends of life viz. dharma and moksa, that is, moral principles and spiritual freedom, are not accepted as necessary truths by materialism. Spiritualism on the other hand believes in all these four ends. Of course, the materialist has also a moral code. But his moral code has no solid foundation. The maximum good of the maximum number may be accepted as the criterian of conduct. But that does not fully satisfy our reason which demands a universal criterion free from exigencies of place and time. We love freedom and greatmen defended it even at the cost of their lives. The reason is not known, but every one of us aspires to preserve his freedom. This implies life before and after. Of course the materialist also is as much enthusiastic about his

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MATERIALISM VERSUS SPIRITUALISM 255 freedom as a spiritualist. But his enthusiasm is inconsistent with his presuppositions. It proves his implicit faith in immortality. The logical and also the metaphysical justification of self-sacrifice for the cause of freedom must be sought for in the immortality of soul and the conservation of human efforts culminating in what is called moksa or infinite freedom. Materialism at its best tends to obliterate the boundary of spiritualism and merge in it. Materialism believes in the reign of law, which is another name of causation. But what is the law determining the effects of good and bad thinking and behaviour of human beings ? If strategy and success are the only things that count-and this is the implication of materialism-all unselfish strivings in the sphere of arts and sciences will pass for vain activities. One can deny teleology by denying cosmological purpose, but one cannot deny good and bad acts and their fruits. One can and should deny determinism (niyativada) which envisages strivings determined by the future result (phalanukulapravrtti), but it is dangerous to deny purusakara which asserts that the future is determined by the conscious effort of persons (pravittyanukala-phala). The materialist's reign of law will be nothing but a form of determinism if the existence of free conscious agents is denied, and that will be an unacceptable dogma. The ancient doctrines of individual freedom unconcerned with the freedom of others is not acceptable to the modern mind. But the Mahayana conception of freedom as a joint endeavour is a welcome doctrine, Freedom, in order to be freedom, must be freedom of all. Freedom of some is no freedom. It must be universal and full and for all. This is the Mahayana concept at its highest. Whether it be materialism or spiritualism, the ultimate principle must be one unitary fact. Is it not then more reasonable to admit it as free spirit in order to explain our innate love for freedom, unselfish strivings, unsatiable thirst for knowledge and the possibility of infinite unfolding of the qualities of the head and heart ? God is not essential to spiritualism. Only soul and reincarnation are considered necessary to it. The Buddhists deny even the soul which they substitute by stream of consciousness, and there are others who deny even reincarnation in the Indian sense, and yet they are believers in spirituaism. Belief in independent conscious principle, as opposed to matter, was the miniinum requirement of spiritualism. But spiritualism in modern times has a wider connotation in that whatever is appreciative of freedom and dignity of the individual is accepted as spiritualism,

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ANEKANTA AND MADHYAMA-PRATIPAD NATHMAL TATIA Vardhamana Mahavira started with implicit faith in ahimsa and austerities, while Gautama Buddha was impressed by the practice of meditation. The supreme problem of Mahavira was the conflict of ontological doctrines of his time, which led him and his followers to formulate the doctrine of anekanta. The Budddha was troubled about the psycho-ethical discipline, specially the final end of meditation and the rational adjustment of various codes of life, hedonistic and ascetic, which he characterized as madhyaina-Pratipad (middle course). The ontological pursuits of Mahavira and his followers led to the discovery of the conflict in the nature of things, and the resolution of such conflict in their theory of anekanta. A real must change and this change is impossible without a mode that has originated, a mode that has passed, and also an aspect that continues to exist in order to make origination and passing possible. In other words, a real must have a persistent feature in order to appropriate change, that is, a real must be a substance capable of assuming modes. This is anekanta, that is the doctorine which accepts many-sidedness of a real which is necessarily continuity and change rolled into one. The Buddha singled out the moral aspect of life and discovered the causal doctrine of pratityasamutpada (dependent origination) which traced the final source of life and death in avidya (ignorance and false notions). This causal law determined the ontological speculation of the Buddha and his folowers. Substance, according to this law, was a myth raised up by imagination. The modes alone were real without any underiying unity. One mode replaces another in unbroken succession determined by causal nexus. The unity is replaced by an infinite chain of self-charged moments in this doctrine of pratityasamutpada which literally means (originatipn depending on relevant causes and conditions. Nothing is independent and self-sufficient in this view. The real is also sunya, that is, devoid of a character which is self-exaplanatory without any reference beyond itself. The concept of unity is a composite act of imagination, called upadaya-prajnapti, that is, a concept (prajnapti) depending upon (upadaya) other constituent concepts. Naga. rjuna, a Madhyamika Buddhist, equates madhyama-pra tipad with these three aspects of the real when he says: yaH pratItyasamutpAdaH zUnyatAM tAM pracakSmahe / sA prajJaptirupAdAya pratipatsava madhyamA / /

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ANEKANTA AND MADHYAMA-PRATIPAD 257 That is, what is known as pratityasamutpada is also called by us Sunyata. The same is also named upada ya-prajnapti which is identical with madhyama-prat ipad. Another aspect of pratityasamutpada and madhyami-pratipad is the non-acceptance of any of a set of two extreme concepts or views. Nagarjuna pays homage to the Buddha as the promulgator of the negation of all sets of conflicting concepts in the following verse anurodhamanutpAdamanucchedamazAzvata-- manekArthamanAnArthamanAgamamanirgamam / yaH pratityasamutpAdaM prapaMcopazamaM zivaM dezayAmAsa saMbuddhastaM vande vadatAM varam / / I offer my homage to the foremost among the speakers, the enlightened one, who promulgated the doctrine of pratityasamutpada which is idential with the quietening of worldly life and the supreme good, which is free from beginning and end, permanance and impermanence, unity and plurality, coming and going. The Yogacara Buddhist also eulogizes the Bnddha's doctrine as the negation of the cognized (grahya) and the cognizer grahaka. Thus, the madhyamapratipad, originally a doctrine of life came to be interpreted by later Buddhist thinkers as a doctrine of reality, from the ontological as well as the epistemological point to view. Anekanta, on the other hand, was an ontological doctrine from the beginning. It was an attempt to explain causation and also a doctrine of relation. A substance can have different modes and yet preserve its unity and identity with those modes. The criterion of unity is inseparability. There can be distinction without difference. Modes are different among themselves and disiinct from the substance, but they are not different from the latter. The relation between substance and modes is identity-cumdistinction. The Buddhist does not agree with the Jaina and consequently fails to find any unity in the knowing, feeling and willing of the same person, which leads him to the denial of the entitative character of personality. Knowing, feeling and willing also are finally rejected by the Madhyamika Buddhist as unreal. Thus, while the theory of anekanta was an attempt at the synthesis of the conffict apparent in experience and reason, the madhyama-pratipad, as inter: preted by later Buddhist thinkers, accentuated the conflict and denounced both the extremes as untenable and unacceptable. If anekanta gives an impression of eclecticism, the madhyama-pratipad was made to play a role which it was perhaps originally not intended to do. 17

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THE JAINA VIEW OF GOOD AND EVIL NATHMAL TATIA The problem of good and evil has exercised the mind of philosophers at all times. The difficulty arises when one endeavours to define absolute good and absolute evil. Good and evil, being relative, appear intermingled. What is good in one set of circumstances becomes evil in another and as such their nature remains elusive. Besides, there are thinkers, and the vast majority at that, who think every good mixed up with even greater evil. The Jaina philosopher is a protagonist of such thinking, and we propose here to give a succinct account of an import and facet of his theory of good and evil. The Taina thinker finds good and evil connected with the purity and impurity of the soul. Absolute purity is absolute good which is achieved in final salvation in the supramundane disembodied state of existence. At the mundane stage, absolute good is impossible. Of course, the Jaina believes in embodied beings who are perfect, but such beings, according to him, are not absolutely free because their bodily organism is regarded as a hindrance to perfect freedom. A problem pertinent to this aspect of the Jaina theory is the issue of bondage. Our good and evil acts induce association with matter, and such association is called bondage. The good or evil nature of the bondage is determined by the corresponding nature of the act which produced it. If the act is good, the bondage is good; and if the act is evil, the bondage is evil. But what is good and what is evil ? Let us define them in terms of bondage, The Jaina philosopher defines good (subha) and evil (asubha) bondage as follows: whatever varies directly with the passions (kasaya) is evil, and whatever varies inversely to the latter is good. This relation of variation is to be understood in the context of the intensity (anubhaga) and duration (sthiti) of the bondage. Ultimately the good is what we take to be good, and the bad is what we take to be bad, and the philosopher sets himself to define them only to give voice to the concepts peculiar to himself. The Taina thinker links bondage to passions in the main, and good and evil bondage is conceived accordingly. Bondage of all 1. Read at the Seminar of scholars on April 24, 1964.

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THE JAINA VIEW OF GOOD AND EVIL types is to be got rid of because of its relation to passions. Of course, even the soul which is free from passions is liable to bondage so long as it has not suspended all activity. But his bondage is momentary and got rid of automatically in the next moment. Such bondage is set down to the soul's coloration (lesya) which is an aftermath of passions. The Jaina philosopher regards activity (yoga)-physical, vocal and mental-as the preliminary condition of bondage which however derives its duration from the passions that accompany the activity. The coloration, being a mere aftermath of passion (and not passion itself), can condition only a momentary bondage devoid of any duration or, to be exact, possessed of only an apology for duration. To return to the point, the passions determine the intensity and duration of bondage. Now as the passions are evil in nature, their effects, viz. intensity and duration, should also be regarded as evil. But here the Jaina theory makes certain departures from the normal standard of the causal law. In the case of good bondage, both the intensity and duration are generally taken to vary inversely to the passions. But there are also cases of good bondage where the duration varies directly with the passions, e.g., all cases of good bondage except the human, heavenly and animal ayus (longevity). Similarly, though the duration of bondage is generally taken to increase only with the increase of passions and regarded evil', in the case of heavenly ayus (longevity), the duration of bondage increases with the diminution of passions, and is also regarded good. The relation between bondage and passions being thus determined, we come to the important problem of precise determination of the conditions of good and bad bondage. That the evil bondage is due to passions is not a matter of opinion. But as regards the conditions of good bondage the commentators of Umasvati regard it as a byproduct of spiritual exertions, such as penance and self-mortification, but Acarya Kundakunda considers such bondage as the effect of the spiritual efforts hindered by the rise of passions. Acarya Kundakunda's position appears more precise and regardful of the demands of the causal law. The inverse ratio of variation between good bondage and passions compels further thinking on the issue. It might be plausible to establish a causal relation between the measure of soul's purity induced by spiritual exertion and the measure of good bondage consequent upon the activity (yoga) of the soul. But whatever be the solution, the fact remains that the good bondage has no direct relation 1. Vide Karmagrantha V, p. 51, lines 10-11. 259

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260 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I with the so-called good acts at the mundane level of existence. And this is more or less true of very many schools of Indian thought. This trend of thought in Indian philosophy, particularly in Jainism and early Buddhism, has led the thinkers like Dr. Schweitzer and others dub our thought and culture as pessimistic in outlook. But in this crisis of thought and challenge of the modern scientific age, we could fruitfully look back to the maxim of the Bhagvaadgita : saMnyAsaH karmayogazca niHshreyskraavbhau| tayostukarmasaMnyAsAtkarmayogo viziSyate / / Which exhorts us to eschew the fruits of karman rather than the karman itself and thus saves our thought from the otherwise inductable trend of pessimism.

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gRhastha-dharma' - nathamala TATiyA (mahAvIra, buddha, manu aura gAMdhI dvArA pratipAdita) 1. vardhamAna mahAvIra kA zrAvaka dharma : jaina dharma nivRtti-pradhAna dharma hai| vardhamAna mahAvIra dvArA pratipAdita gRhastha-dharma kA svarUpa unake sAdhu-dharma kA hI eka sthUla rUpa hai / sAdhuoM ke lie amaryAdita ahiMsA, satya, asteya, brahmacarya aura aparigraha vratoM kA vidhAna kiyA gayA hai, aura gRhasthoM ke lie unhIM vratoM kA sImita rUpa meM vidhAna kiyA gayA hai| sAdhunoM ke lie mAnasika, vAcika aura kAyika hiMsA, asatya Adi niSiddha haiM tathA aise karma svayaM karanA, dUsare se karAnA, tathA karate hue kA anumodana karanA bhI unake lie niSiddha hai| gRhasthoM ke lie sAMsArika sabhI karmoM se isa prakAra nivRtti saMbhava nahIM, ataeva aise karmoM kI sImA nirdhArita karane kA unheM upadeza diyA gayA hai / isa dRSTi se gRhasthoM ke lie aura bhI kaI vratoM kA vidhAna kiyA gayA hai| upAsakadazA nAmaka saptama ardhamAgadhI prAgama ke prathama adhyayana meM gRhasthoM ke lie nimnAMkita dvAdazavidha gRhadharma vihita hai--pAMca aNuvrata aura sAta shikssaavrt| pAMca aNuvrata isa prakAra haiM-(1) sthUla prANAtipAta (hiMsA) se virati arthAt yAvajjIvana mana, vacana aura kArya se na svayaM aisI hiMsA karanA, na dUsare se krvaanaa| jIvana dhAraNa ke lie anivArya hiMsA (prArambhajA evaM virodhajA2) se bacanA gRhastha ke lie saMbhava nahIM, ataeva yathAzakti saMkalpa-mUlaka hiMsaka pravRtti se virata rahanA hI vihita hai| kisI prANI kA bandhana, vadha, yA usa para atibhAra-pAropaNa prAdi isa vrata ke aticAra mAne gaye haiN| (2) syUla mRSAvAda se virati / gupta bAtoM ko kaha denA, mithyA upadeza, kUTa lekha prAdi isa vrata ke aticAra mAne gaye haiM / (3) sthUla pradattAdAna se virati / curAI huI vastu kA lenA, pAyAta-niryAta ke niyamoM kA ullaMghana karanA Adi isa vrata ke aticAra haiN| (4) svadArasaMtoSika vrata / aparigRhItA-gamana prAdi isa vrata ke aticAra haiN| (5) icchAparimANa vrata arthAta prigrh-mryaadaa| maryAdita parimANa se adhika kSetra, vAstu, dhana-dhAnya Adi kA saMgraha karanA isa vrata kA aticAra mAnA gayA hai| sAta zikSAvrata nimnAMkita haiM--(1) digvrata arthAt pUrva, pazcima Adi dizAnoM meM Apane kArya-kSetra ko sImita krnaa| isa prakAra maryAdita sImA ke bAhara kisI 1. aprIla 6, 1963, kI vidvadgoSThI meM par3hA gyaa| 2. jIvana-dhAraNa ke lie anivArya hiMsA prArambhajA, evaM samAja, rASTra Adi kI surakSA ke lie anivArya hiMsA virodhajA kahalAtI hai|

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262 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I prakAra kI pApa kriyA meM pravRtta honA isa vrata kA bhaMga karanA hai / (2) upabhogaparibhogavata arthAt sacitta AhAra aura prauSaSi evaM hiMsaka vyavasAya vANijya se virati / mAMsAdi kA bhakSaNa evaM aMgArakarma, vanakarma, dantavANijya Adi isa vrata ke aticAra ginAye gaye haiM / (3) zranarthadaNDa se virati prarthAt nirarthaka pApa pravRtti se virata rahanA / asabhya bhASaNa, mukharatA, zArIrika kuceSTA, AvazyakatA se adhika vastuoM kA saMgraha Adi isa vrata ke aticAra haiM / ( 4 ) sAmAyikavrata arthAt abhigRhIta samaya taka pApAcaraNa se nivRtta rahanA / saba prakAra kI sAvadya pravRttiyoM se nivRtta hokara zrAtmacintana kA abhyAsa hI sAmAyika vrata hai / ekAgratA kA vikSepa isa vrata kA praticAra mAnA jAtA hai / (5) dezAvakA zikavrata arthAt kisI sthAna - vizeSa meM avasthita rahane kA vrata / niyata sthAna meM raha kara bhI anya kisI vyakti dvArA yA zabdaprayoga yA saMketa dvArA maryAdita sthAna se bAhara kI kisI vastu ko ma~gavA lenA yA koI kAma karavA lenA isa vrata kA praticAra mAnA gayA hai / (6) pausadhopavAsa vrata arthAt zraSTamI, caturdazI, pUrNimA Adi tithi meM upavAsa dhAraNa kara upAzraya Adi meM raha kara dharmopAsanA karanA / sarva prakAra ke sAvadya karmoM se virata hokara nirdhArita samaya ke lie sAdhu jIvana kA pAlana isa vrata meM kiyA jAtA hai / sAdhu jIvana ke pratikUla kisI prakAra kI kriyA karanA isa vrata kA praticAra ginA gayA hai / ( 7 ) yathAsaMvibhAgavrata arthAt kalpya vastuoM kA yogya pAtroM ko dAna karane kA vrata / nahIM dene ke abhiprAya se vastu ko prakalpya banA denA yA mAtsaryavaza dAna denA, Adi isa vrata ke praticAra haiM / gRhasthoM ke nimitta vihita ye bAraha vrata spaSTataH nivRtti-pra - pradhAna haiN| sAMsArika pravRttiyoM se yathAzakti nivRtta hone kA inameM upadeza hai / prAdarzabhUta sAdhu jIvana ke hI nurUpa zrAvakadharma kI kalpanA kI gaI hai / ye vrata sAmAjika jIvana ko sarala ujjvala aura santulita karane meM sahAyaka hote haiM / para sAmAjika jIvana ke pArasparika vyavahAroM para ye prakAza nahIM DAlate / naye pApa karmoM se AtmA ko saMvRta rakhane ke nimitta gupti, mArdava, Arjava, Adi), anuprekSa, parISahajaya evaM cAritra tathA lie tapazcaraNa kA vidhAna kiyA gayA hai| gRhasthoM ke lie ye nahIM kiye gaye haiM / ataeva inakI carcA yahAM prAsaMgika nahIM hai / 2. gautama buddha kA zrAvaka dharma : aba hama gautama buddha dvArA pratipAdita gRhivinaya para dRSTi DAleM / pAli piTaka ke antargata dIghanikAya ke siMgAlovAda-suttanta meM gRhidharma pratipAdita kiyA gayA hai / ise gRhivinaya suttanta bhI kahA jAtA hai / buddhaghoSa kahate haiM - imasmi ca pana sutte yaM gihIhi kattabba- kammaM nAma taM kathitaM natthi, arthAt gRhasthoM kA aisA koI kartavya karma nahIM hai jo isa suttanta meM nahIM kahA gayA ho / eka samaya bhagavAn buddha rAjagRha ke veNuvana meM vihAra rahe the / usa samaya siMgAla nAmaka eka gRhapati putra ko buddha ne isa gRhivinaya kA samiti, dharma (kSamA, saMcita karmoM ke kSaya ke vizeSa rUpa se vihita

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GRHASTHA-DHARMA 263 upadeza diyaa| AryazrAvaka (gRhastha) ko ina cAra karmaklezoM se dUra rahanA cAhiye(1) prANAtipAta, (2) adattAdAna, (3) kAmesu mithyAcAra (arthAt abrahmacarya) aura (4) mRSAvAda / ina cAra kAraNoM ke vaza hokara pApakarma meM pravRtta nahIM honA cAhie(1) rAga, (2) dveSa, (3) moha aura (4) bhaya / ye chaH bhogoM ke apAyamukha (vinAza ke kAraNa) haiM-(1) nazIlI vastuoM kA sevana, dhanahAni, kalaha, roga, akIti prAdi isake duSpariNAma haiN| (2) akAla meM rAstoM meM ghUmanA / apanI arakSA, strIputra kI arakSA, sampatti kI arakSA, dUsaroM kI zaMkA kA pAtra bananA, Adi isake duSpariNAma haiM / (3) nRtya-gIta prAdi kA sevana / nRtya-gIta Adi meM prAsakta vyakti inhIM ke anveSaNa meM parezAna rahatA hai / (4) juA aura pramAda-kAraka vastuoM kA sevana / zatrutA, zoka, dhanahAni Adi isake duSpariNAma haiM / (5) pApamitroM kI saMgati / aisI saMgati ke pariNAma svarUpa dhUrta, zarAbI, vaMcaka, prAdi duSTa vyaktiyoM kA samAgama sulabha ho jAtA hai| (6) pAlasya meM par3anA / atizIta, atiuSNa, ati prAtaH, ati sAyaM, prati kSudhA, Adi kA bahAnA lekara kartavya karmoM kA nahIM karanA isakA duSpariNAma hai / aba hama buddha dvArA upadiSTa sAmAjika sambandhoM ke niyamoM para dRSTi ddaaleN| mAtA-pitA, prAcArya, strI, putra, mitra aura sAthI, dAsa-karmakara evaM zramaNabrAhmaNa ke prati gRhastha ke kartavya aura gRhastha ke prati unakI anukampA (pratyupakAra) kA varNana siMgAlovAda sutanta meM isa prakAra kiyA gayA hai : (1) mAtA-pitA ke prati putra ke pAMca kartavya-unakA bharaNa-poSaNa karanA, unakA kAma karanA, kula-vaMza kAyama rakhanA, dAyAdya pratipAdana karanA, pretoM ke nimitta zrAddha-dAna denaa| isa prakAra sevita mAtA-pitA putra para pAMca prakAra se anukampA karate haiMpApa se bacAte haiM, kalyANa meM sthApita karate haiM, zilpa sikhalAte haiM, yogya strI se sambandha karAte haiM tathA yathAsamaya dAyAdya dete haiN| (2) prAcArya ke prati antevAsI ke pAMca kartavya-utthAna (mAsana se uThakara pratyudgamana karanA), upasthAna (sevA), zuzrUSA, paricaryA, aura satkArapUrvaka zilpagrahaNa / __isa prakAra sevita hokara prAcArya antevAsI para pAMca prakAra se anukampA karate haiM-suvinaya se yukta karate haiM, acchI taraha se vidyAyeM sikhAte haiM, sabhI prakAra ke zilpa tathA vidyAnoM kA niHzeSa upadeza dete haiM-mitra aura sAthiyoM kA supratipAdana karate haiM tathA sabhI dizAoM meM surakSita rakhate haiN| (3) bhAryA ke prati svAmI ke pAMca kartavya-sammAna pUrvaka sambodhana, apamAna na karanA, parastrI gamana na karanA, aizvarya (kartRtva) pradAna karanA tathA AbhUSaNa mAdi pradAna krnaa| ___ isa prakAra pUjita hokara bhAryA nimnokta pratyupakAra karatI hai-vaha ghara kA kAma bhalI-bhAMti se karatI hai, naukara cAkara ko vaza meM rakhatI hai, anaticAriNI hotI hai, ajita dhana kI rakSA karatI hai tathA dakSatApUrvaka gRhakArya meM sadaiva tatpara rahatI hai /

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264 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I (4) mitra aura sAthiyoM ke prati AryazrAvaka ke pAMca kartavya-dAna, priyavacana, arthacaryA, (iSTAnuSThAna), samAnAtmatA, apratyAkhyAna arthAt mAMgane para kisI bhI vastu ke sambandha meM nA nahIM khnaa| isa prakAra anugRhIta mitra nimnokta prakAra se prArya zrAvaka ke sahAyaka banate haiMpramAdagrasta hone para usakI rakSA karate haiM, pramAdagrasta hone para usake dhanakI rakSA karate haiM, bhaya utpanna hone para use zaraNa dete haiM,prApadAnoM meM use chor3ate nahIM, tathA dUsare bhI aise zrAvaka kA satkAra karate haiN| (5) dAsa-karma karoM ke prati svAmI ke pA~ca kartavya-yogyatA ke anusAra kartavyoM kA saMvibhAga, yathAsamaya bhojana evaM vetana pradAna, rugNa hone para unakI sevA, uttama rasoM vAle padArthoM kA pradAna tathA samaya para avakAza denA / svAmI ke aise prAcaraNa karane para ve nimnokta prakAra se usakA pratyupakAra karate haiM---svAmI ke jagane ke pahale jaga jAte haiM, pIche sote haiM, corI nahIM karate, kartavyoM kA acchI taraha pAlana karate haiM tathA svAmI kA yaza aura kIti phailAte haiM / (6) zramaNabrAhmaNoM ke prati prAryazrAvaka ke pAMca kartavya-maitrIpUrNa kAyika karma, maitrIpUrNa vAcika karma, maitrIpUrNa mAnasika karma, anAvRtadvAratA arthAt unake liye dvAra sadaiva khulA rakhanA, tathA AhAradAna / ___isa prakAra pUjita hokara ve AryazrAvaka ko nimnokta prakAra se anukampita karate haiM-pApa karmoM se nivArita karate haiM, kalyANa karmoM meM niyojita karate haiM, kalyANa-bhAvanA se anukampita karate haiM, azrutapUrva upadeza sunAte haiM. zruta upadeza ko dRr3ha karate haiM, tathA sugati kA mArga pradarzana karate haiN| buddha pratipAdita ukta gRhidharma meM pApa karmoM se nivRtta hone kA tathA kalyANakAraka karmoM meM pravRtta hone kA vidhAna kiyA gayA hai| arthAt ye niyama nivRtti tathA pravRtti donoM kA santulita vidhAna karate haiM / buddha kahate haiM--ukta caudaha prakAra ke pApa karmoM se nivRtta hone vAlA tathA chaH kalyANa karmoM kA anuSThAna karane vAlA prAryazrAvaka donoM lokoM kA vijaya karatA hai, vaha ihaloka tathA paraloka donoM kI ArAdhanA karatA hai tathA mara kara sugati-- svarga loka ko prApta hotA hai| buddha kA yaha vidhAna unake madhyamA pratipat (madhyama mArga) siddhAnta ke anurUpa hI hai / ___ jaina paramparA meM vihita zrAvaka dharma kA prAdhAra nivRttyAtmaka ahiMsA hai / bauddha paramparA meM zrAvakadharma kA prAdhAra alobha, adveSa, evaM pramoha-ye tIna kuzalamUla haiM, jo vidhipradhAna haiM / alobha kA artha hai tyAga, adveSa kA artha hai maitrI evaM amoha kA artha hai pAramArthika jJAna / isa prAdhAra bhUmigata bheda ko dhyAna meM rakhane para ina do dharmoM kA maulika bheda spaSTa rUpa se samajhA jA sakatA hai / / kuzalamUloM kI vividha pradhAnatA buddha. pratipAdita gRhastha dharma ke ukta vivecana se bhI pratiphalita hotI hai / 3. manu pratipAdita gRhastha dharma : jaina evaM bauddha dharma kA Adarza saMnyAsa hai| manu bhI saMnyAsa ko yathocit mahatva

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GRHASTHA-DHARMA 265 dete haiM / aura kramazaH brahmacarya, gArhasthya, vAnaprastha, tathA saMnyAsa - ina cAra AzramoM ke vidhivat anuSThAna se parama gati kI prApti svIkAra karate haiM (manu0 6,87-88), para gRhastha - zrAzrama ko ve sarvazreSTha mAnate haiM / jisa prakAra sabhI nadiyA~ aura nada samudra meM prAMzraya lete haiM, usI prakAra sabhI zrAzrama vAle gRhastha meM hI saMsthita hote haiM ( manu06, 90 ) / jaise vAyu ke sahAre saba jIva jIte haiM, usI prakAra gRhastha ke sahAre saba zrAzrama jIvita rahate haiM ( manu0 3, 77 ) / manusmRti meM varNabheda tathA deza, kAla Adi ke bheda se gRhastha dharma kI vibhinnatA mAnI gaI hai / vyakti kI ruci ke anusAra dharma kI vyavasthA kI gaI hai / udAharaNArtha koI paMca yajJoM kA anuSThAna karate haiM to koI indriyanigraha tathA brahmajJAnAnuzIlana mAtra se hI gRhastha dharma ko caritArthaM samajhate haiM ( manu0 4.21-24) | gRhastha jIvana ko vividha paristhitiyoM ko dhyAna meM rakha kara hI manusmRti meM vividha niyamoM kA vidhAna kiyA gayA hai / para ina niyamoM kA AdhArabhUta maulika tattva bhI spaSTa rUpa se vahIM nirdiSTa haiM / mahAvIra aura buddha kI taraha manu yaha svIkAra karate haiM ki kAmAtmatA na prazastA ( manu0 2.2 ) arthAt karmaphala kI icchA prazasta nahIM hai, para sAtha-sAtha yaha bhI kahate haiMna caivehAsya kAmatA ( manu0 2 2 ) arthAt saMsAra meM zuddha prakAmatA saMbhava nahIM / kAmanA ke binA kisI prakAra kI kriyA saMbhava nahIM / ataeva vrata aura yamadharma kA pAlana karatA huA manuSya dharma, artha, kAma tathA mokSa - ina cAroM puruSArtha kI siddhi karatA hai / usake lie cUlhA, cakkI, gRhastha ko anivArya rUpa se kucha pApakarma karane par3ate haiM / jhADU, prokhalI aura jala kA ghaTa-ye pA~ca pApa ke sthAna haiM / ina anivArya pApoM se mukta hone ke nimitta gRhastha ke lie brahmayajJa (pradhyApana), pitRyajJa ( tarpaNa), devayajJa ( havana karanA ), bhUtayajJa ( balivaizvadeva ) tathA nRyajJa ( atithiyoM ko bhojana) kA manune vidhAna kiyA hai / ( manu0 3. 68-71) / svArthatyAga kA abhyAsa hI ina yajJoM kA lakSya hai / hiMsA mukta jIvana hI Adarza jIvana hai| jIvata yAtrA ke lie yadi hiMsA kA zrAzraya lenA par3e to kama se kama hiMsA karane kA prayatna karanA caahie| manu kahate haiMjIvoM ko binA pIr3ita kiye athavA yathAsaMbhava svalpa pIr3ita kara jo vRtti saMbhava ho, usakA Azraya kara vipra prapanI jIvana yAtrA kA nirvAha kare (manu0 4 . 2 ) / mahAvIra aura buddha kI taraha manu bhI gRhasthoM ke lie yama aura niyama kA vidhAna karate haiM / manu yama ko adhika maulika mAnate haiM / ve kahate haiM- vidvAn yamoM kA sarvadA sevana kare / niyamoM kA nitya na sevana kare, yamoM kA sevana nahIM karatA huA kevala niyamoM kA hI sevana karane vAlA patita hotA hai ( manu0 4. 204 ) / maharSi pataMjali ke anusAra zrahiMsA, satya, asteya, brahmacarya aura aparigraha ye pAMca yama, tathA zauca, saMtoSa, tapa, svAdhyAya evaM IzvarapraNidhAna ye pAMca niyama haiM / yAjJavalkya smRti ( 3. 312-13 ) Adi granthoM meM yama evaM niyaka ke bheda anya prakAra se ginAye gaye haiM / bhagavAn mahAvIra tathA buddha dvArA pratipAdita sadAcAra ke sabhI niyamoM kA samAveza inameM kiyA gayA hai / mAtA, pitA tathA AcArya ke prati gRhastha ke jaba taka ye tInoM jIvita raheM taba taka anya dharma kA kartavya ke bAre meM manu kahate haiManuSThAna na karake nitya inhIM kI

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266 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 sevA meM lage rahanA cAhie ( manu0 2.235) / bhAryA ke prati kartavya ke prasaGga meM manusmRti meM kahA gayA hai- ghara kI dIpti svarUpa striyA~ santAnotpAdanArthaM sammAna ke yogya haiM, ghara meM virAjamAna lakSmI aura strI meM koI antara nahIM hai (manu0 6.26) / manu ne mitra kI anivAryatA para jora dete hue unake ye lakSaNa batAye haiM- dhruva, vardhanazIla, dharmajJa, kRtajJa, saMtoSI, anurakta evaM sthira- parAkrama ( manu0 7.208 - 209 ) / manu ne dAsavarga se vivAda karane kA niSedha kiyA hai ( manu0 4.181 ) tathA unheM apanI chAyA samajha kara unake adhikSepoM kA bhI sahana karanA ucita mAnA hai ( manu0 4.185) / manusmRti meM nivRtti aura prabRtti para sUkSmatA se vicAra kiyA gayA hai / iha loka yA para loka ke sambandha meM kisI kAmanA vaza jo koI karma kiyA jAya use pravRtti karma aura jJAnapUrvaka niSkAma bhAva meM jo karma kiyA jAya use nivRtta karma kahate haiM / pravRtta karmoM kA bhalI-bhAMti anuSThAna karake manuSya devatAoM ke samAna ho jAte haiM / nivRtta karma karane se manuSya pA~ca mahAbhUtoM kA bhI atikrama kara sakatA hai - arthAt mokSa prApta apane meM aura apane ko saba prANiyoM ( manu0 12.86 - 61 ) / isa prakAra manu kara letA hai / AtmayAjI puruSa saba prANiyoM ko meM vyApta dekhatA huA brahmatva lAbha karatA hai ne nivRtti aura pravRtti meM samanvaya karane kA prayatna kiyA hai / 4. gAMdhIjI kI dRSTi meM gRhastha dharma : gAMdhIjI kA jIvana jaina sAdhaka zrImadrAjacandra TAlasTAya tathA raskina se prabhAvita thA aura bhagavAn mahAvIra, buddha, manusmRti evaM gItA kA dharma to unheM paramparA se prApta thA hI / manusmRti tathA gItA kI bhA~ti unhoMne bhI nivRtti aura pravRtti meM samanvaya kiyA / dharma aura artha ko do virodhI vastu ve nahIM mAnate the / anAsaktiyoga kI prastAvanA meM ve likhate haiM- "vyApAra ityAdi laukika vyavahAra meM dharma nahIM bacAyA jA sakatA, dharma ko jagaha nahIM ho sakatI, dharma kA upayoga kevala mokSa ke lie kiyA jA sakatA hai / dharma kI jagaha dharmaM zobhA detA hai aura artha kI jagaha zrartha / ' bahutoM se aisA kahate hama sunate haiM / gItAkAra ne isa bhrama ko dUra kiyA hai| usane mokSa aura vyavahAra ke bIca esA bheda nahIM rakhA hai, varan vyavahAra meM dharma ko utArA hai| jo dharma vyavahAra meM na lAyA jA sake vaha dharma nahIM hai, merI samajha se yaha bAta gItA meM hai / gItA ke matAnusAra jo karma aise haiM ki zrAsakti ke binA ho hI na sakeM ve sabhI tyAjya haiM / aisA suvarNa niyama manuSya ko aneka dharma saMkaToM meM se bacAtA hai / isa mata ke anusAra khuna, jhUTha vyabhicAra ityAdi karma apane grApa tyAjya ho jAte haiM / mAnava-jIvana sarala bana jAtA hai / aura saralatA meM se zAMti utpanna hotI hai / " prAsakti ke binA karma karane kA ekamAtra upAya hai karmaphalatyAga / AtmArthI ke lie prAtmadarzana kA eka advitIya upAya bhI vahI hai / isa prasaMga meM gAMdhIjI ne ukta prastAvanA meM likhA hai - "manuSya ko IzvararUpa hue binA caina nahIM par3atA, zAMti nahIM milatI / IzvararUpa hone ke prayatna kA nAma saccA aura ekamAtra puruSArtha hai aura yahI Atmadarzana hai / yaha prAtmadarzana saba dharmagranthoM kA viSaya hai, vaise hI gItA kA bhI hai / para gItAkAra ne isa viSaya kA pratipAdana karane ke matalaba, lie gItA nahIM racI, varana

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GRHASTHA-DHARMA 267 AtmArthI ko prAtmadarzana kA eka advitIya upAya batalAnA gItA kA Azaya hai| jo cIja hindU dharmagranthoM meM chiTaphuTa dikhAI detI hai, use gItA ne aneka rUpoM, aneka zabdoM meM, punarukti kA doSa svIkAra karake bhI, acchI taraha sthApita kiyA hai| vaha advitIya upAya hai karmaphalatyAga / ' karmamAtra meM kucha doSa to hai hI, taba karmabandhana meM se arthAt doSasparza meM se mukti kaise ? isake uttara meM gAdhIjI usI prastAvanA meM likhate haiM"isakA javAba gItAjI ne nizcayAtmaka zabdoM meM diyA hai-'niSkAma karma se, yajJArtha kAma karake, karmaphalatyAga karake saba karmoM ko kRSNArpaNa karake. arthAta mana, vacana aura kAyA ko Izvara meM homa krke|" niSkAmatA aura karmaphalatyAga jJAna evaM bhakti se utpanna hote haiN| bhakti andhazraddhA nahIM hai| sthitaprajJa hI bhakta ho sakatA hai| jJAna prApta karanA, bhakta honA hI prAtmadarzana hai| Atmadarzana usase bhinna vastu nahIM hai| isa prasaMga meM ukta prastAvanA meM gAMdhIjI likhate haiM-"jaise rupaye ke badale meM jahara kharIdA jA sakatA hai aura amRta bhI lAyA jA sakatA hai, vaise jJAna yA bhakti ke badale bandhana bhI lAyA jA sake aura mokSa bhI, yaha saMbhava nahIM hai / yahA~ to sAdhana aura sAdhya, bilkula eka nahIM to lagabhaga eka hI vastu haiM, sAdhana kI parAkASThA jo hai vahI mokSa hai aura gItA ke mokSa kA artha paramazAMti hai|" karmaphalatyAga kA artha karmatyAga nahIM hai| zuSka jJAnI aura bAhyAcArI bhakta honA gAMdhIjI ko iSTa nhiiN| hAtha se loTA taka uThAnA bhI zuSka jJAnI ke lie karmabandhana hai / bAhyAcArI bhakta khAne-pIne prAdi bhoga bhogane ke samaya hI mAlA ko hAtha se chor3atA hai, cakkI calAne yA rogI kI sevA zuzrUSA karane ke lie kabhI nahIM chodd'taa| gAMdhIjI ke pramusAra aise jJAnI aura bhaktoM ko lakSya kara gItAkAra ne sApha taura se kaha diyA hai-"karma binA kisI ne siddhi nahIM paaii| janakAdi bhI karma dvArA jJAnI hue| yadi maiM bhI Alasya rahita hokara karma na karatA rahU~ to ina lokoM kA nAza ho jAya / " karmamAtra baMdhana rUpa hai, yaha nirvivAda hai| taba karma karate hue bhI manuSya bandhanamukta kaise rahe ? isa para gAMdhIjI likhate haiM-"jahA~ taka mujhe mAlUma hai, isa samasyA ko gItA ne jisa taraha hala kiyA hai vaise dUsare kisI bhI dharmagrantha ne nahIM kiyA hai, gItA kA kahanA hai, 'phalAsakti chor3o aura karma kro'| 'AzA rahita hokara karma karo,' 'niSkAma hokara karma karo', yaha gotA kI vaha dhvani hai jo bhulAI nahIM jA sktii| jo karma chor3atA hai vaha giratA hai| karma karate hue bhI jo usakA phala chor3atA hai vaha car3hatA hai / phalatyAga kA artha yaha nahIM hai ki pariNAma ke sambandha meM lAparavAhI rhe| pariNAma aura sAdhana kA vicAra aura usakA jJAna atyAvazyaka hai| itanA hone ke bAda jo manaSya pariNAma kI icchA kiye binA sAdhana meM tanmaya rahatA hai vaha phalatyAgI hai|" karmAnurUpa phala avazya milatA hai| usa phala meM prAsakti nahIM rakhanA hI phalatyAga hai| phalatyAga meM aparimita zraddhA kI parIkSA hai| jo manuSya pariNAma kA dhyAna karatA rahatA hai vaha bahuta bAra kartavyabhraSTa ho jAtA hai| saMpUrNa karmaphalatyAgI dvArA bhautika yuddha ho sakatA hai yA nahIM, isa prazna ke bAre meM gAMdhIjI ukta prastAvanA meM likhate haiM---''gItA kI zikSA ko pUrNarUpa se amala meM lAne kA 40 varSa taka satata prayatna karane para mujhe to namratApUrvaka aisA jAna par3A hai ki satya aura ahiMsA kA pUrNarUpa se pAlana kiye binA sampUrNa karmaphalatyAga manuSya ke lie asaMbhava hai|" karma karane meM jo anivArya hisA hotI

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268 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 hai, vaha ahiMsA ke pUrNa pAlana meM bAdhaka hai yA nahIM? isa prakAra kA javAba gAMdhIjI sampUrNaphalatyAga ke prAdhAra para dete haiN| yadi sAdhya bhI ahiMsA hai aura sAdhana bhI ahiMsA to anivArya hiMsA sAdhana ke koTi meM Akara ahiMsA hI bana jAtI hai| hiMsA se ahiMsA kI siddhi gAMdhIjI svIkAra nahIM karate / anivArya hiMsA kI sImArekhA deza, kAla aura vyakti ke anusAra badalatI hai| vidhi niSedha kI sImA nirdhArita karanA sambhava nhiiN| ukta prastAvanA meM gAMdhIjI likhate haiM-"gItA vidhiniSeSa batalAne vAlI bhI nahIM hai| eka ke lie jo vihita hotA hai, vahI dUsare ke lie niSiddha ho sakatA hai, eka kAla, yA eka deza meM jo vihita hotA hai, vaha dUsare kAla meM, dUsare deza meM niSiddha ho sakatA hai| niSiddha kevala phalAsakti hai, vihita hai anAsakti / " gAMdhIjI ke jIvana-darzana kA mUla AdhAra ahiMsA hai isa bAre meM ve jainadarzana se prabhAvita haiN| bhagavAna buddha ke madhyama mArga ko bhI ve svIkAra karate haiN| tathA mana evaM gItA pratipAdita niSkAma pravRtti kI kalpanA bhI unheM mAnya hai| unake jIvana kA parama dhyeya Atmadarzana, ahiMsA dvArA ahiMsA kI siddhi hai| satya hI unakA Izvara hai (harijana, dinAMka 6-7-40) / satya aura ahiMsA Atmadarzana ke upAya haiM / brahmacarya ko zreSTha mAnate hue bhI gAMdhIjI gRhastha jIvana ko atyanta heya nahIM maante| sambhoga kA viveka karate hue ve kahate haiM-"santAnotpatti ke hI artha kiyA huA saMbhoga brahmacarya kA virodhI nahIM hai, kAmAgni tRpti ke kAraNa kiyA gayA saMbhoga tyAjya hai" (brahmacarya, pahalA bhAga, pR0 85-87) / manu0 (6.107) ko anusaraNa karate hue ve eka hI santati ko 'dharmaja' mAnate haiM, yadyapi ve putra aura putrI ke bIca bheda nahIM karate (vhii)| gAMdhIjI vivAhita ko avi. vAhita sA hone kA upadeza dete haiN| kAmaprerita prAkarSaNa ko ve svAbhAvika nahIM mAnate / strI-puruSa ke bIca kA sahaja AkarSaNa yaha hai jo bhAI aura bahina, mAM aura beTe bApa aura beTI ke bIca hotA hai| saMsAra isI svAbhAvika AkarSaNa para TikA hai (gAMdhIjI anIti kI rAha para,' pR0 70-1) / eka bAra mahAtmA gAMdhI se pUchA gayA-"kyA prApa vivAha ke viruddha haiM ?" unhoMne uttara diyA-"manuSya jIvana kA sArthakya mokSa hai| hindU ke taura para maiM mAnatA hU~ ki mokSa kA artha jIvana-maraNa kI ghaTa-mAla se muktiIzvara saakssaatkaar| mokSa ke lie zarIra ke bandhana TUTane caahieN| zarIra ke bandhana tor3ane vAlI hara eka vastu pathya aura dUsarI apathya hai| vivAha bandhana tor3ane ke badale use ulaTA adhika jakar3a letA hai / brahmacarya hI aisI vastu hai jo ki manuSya ke bandhana maryAdita kara IzvarApita jIvana bitAne meM use zaktimAna karatA hai / vivAha meM to sAmAnya rUpa se viSaya-vAsanA kI tRpti kA hI hetu rahA huA hai| isakA pariNAma zubha nhoN| brahmacarya ke pariNAma sundara haiM / " vikAra kI sambhAvanAmoM ke AdhAra para gAMdhIjI ne vivAhita jIvana ko heya mAnA hai / mokSa yA prAtmasAkSAtkAra ke antima prAdarza ke sAtha lokasaMgrAhaka pravRttiyoM kA mela baiThAne ke prayatnoM meM aise virodha sarvatra ho jAte haiM, jinakA bauddhika samanvaya eka jaTila dArzanika prazna hai jisake samAdhAna kI koziza sabhI dArzanika apane apane DhaMga se karate Aye haiN| karmaphalatyAga ko madhyabindu banAkara brahmacarya Adi cAroM AzramoM kA samanvaya

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GRHASTHA-DHARMA 269 'karmayoga' ke rUpa meM gAdhIjI karate haiN| unakA jIvana isI samanvaya kA pratIka hai / sadAcAra ke sabhI niyamoM kA samAveza isameM apane Apa hI ho jAtA hai / zrahiMsA satya aura brahmacaryaM kA ullekha hama kara cuke haiM / rasAsvAda - saMyama para gAMdhIjI kAphI jora dete haiM / nirbhayatA ahiMsA kA eka mukhya aMga hai / asteya aura aparigraha bhI ahiMsA se bhI phalita hote haiM / manuSya jIvikAmAtra kA adhikArI hai | svAmitva bhAva se usase adhika rakhanA corI hai / jIvana ke sabhI kSetroM meM anyAya kA sAmanA karane ke lie satyAgraha gAMdhIjI kA eka nayA zrAviSkAra hai / prAcIna bhArata ke sAre AdhyAtmika tathA naitika mUlyoM kA samanvaya hama gAMdhIjI ke darzana meM pAte haiM / jaina, bauddha evaM brAhmaNa paramparAmroM ke naitika mUlya gAMdhIjI ke jIvana meM eka rUpa lete haiM tathA pravRtti evaM nivRtti kI prAcIna bhedarekhA saMsAra evaM nirdhAraNa ko jor3ane vAlI kar3I bana jAtI hai /

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dharma aura tattva sukhalAlajI saMghavI mitro, avasthA bhI huI aura svAsthya bhI ThIka nahIM hai; ataH sAmAnya rUpa se tattvajJAna ke viSaya meM jo vicAra Ate haiM unhIM ko bhApa ke samakSa upasthita karake santoSa mAnatA hU~, aura sAtha-hI-sAtha Apa sabakA AbhAra bhI mAna letA huuN| bhAratIya tattvajJAna aneka sampradAyoM aura unakI zAkhA-prazAkhAmoM meM vibhakta hai| isakA itihAsa evaM vikAza-krama atyanta dIrgha hai| maiM yahA~ sarvaprathama kucha aise siddhAntoM ke viSaya meM kahanA cAhatA hU~ jo ki pratyeka sampradAya ko mAnya hai aura eka athavA dUsare rUpa meM una siddhAntoM ke AdhAra para hI una-una darzanoM evaM upadarzanoM ne auroM se alaga par3ane vAlI apanI mAnyatAoM kA samarthana kiyA hai| ve siddhAnta saMkSepa meM adholikhita haiN| (1) kAryakAraNabhAva, (2) lakSyalakSaNabhAva, (3) anumAnaprakAra athavA nyAyavAkya, (4) parIkSApaddhAte, (5) jJAna evaM vicArotpatti kA krama, (6) vacana-prAmANya kA mUla bIja, aura (7) prAmANya-praprAmANya kI smiikssaa| pichale do-DhAI sahasra varSoM meM pUrvapracalita aura nava-vikasita koI bhAratIya darzana aisA nahIM hai jisane upayukta mUla siddhAntoM kA prazraya liye binA apane mantavyoM kI sthApanA kI ho athavA itara mantavyoM kA khaNDana kiyA ho| ina siddhAntoM ke mahattva ko sabane mAnya rakhA hai aura isIlie pratyeka darzana evaM usakI zAkhAoM ne apane mantavyoM kI upapatti ke lie ina mUla siddhAntoM kA sahArA to liyA hI hai, sAtha hI ina siddhAntoM ko, apanI-apanI mAnyatA kA samarthana karane kI dRSTi se, ghaTAyA hai aura vikasita bhI kiyA hai| ina mUla siddhAntoM kA dArzanika vicAra vartula meM jisa kAlakrama se aura jisa paramparA ke mukhya prAzraya se spaSTa nirUpaNa huA hai tathA jina paramparAoM ne inake vikAsa meM sabase pahale aura sabase adhika mahatva kA yogadAna diyA hai unako bhUlakara yadi hama kisI bhI eka darzana kA adhyayana-cintana kareM to usa adhyayanacintana meM upayogI ho sake vaisI kar3I yA kuMjI hI hamAre hAtha meM se saraka jaaygii| hama bhale hI kisI eka abhipreta darzana kA athavA usakI zAkhA-prazAkhA kA prAmANika evaM sahI jJAna prApta karane kA prayatna kareM, parantu hameM ukta mUla siddhAntoM kA, unake 1. 14-15 akTUbara, 1961 ko akhila bhAratIya prAcyavidyA pariSad (21vAM adhivezana, zrInagara) ke "dharma aura tattvajJAna" ke vibhAgAdhyakSa kA abhibhASaNa /

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 271 vikAsa krama ke anusAra hI, jJAna prApta karane kA prayatna karanA cAhie aura usI ke anurUpa adhyayana-adhyApana kI praNAlI niyata karanI caahie| Aja to prAcIna aura arvAcIna donoM prakAra kI dArzanika adhyayana kI paripATI meM aisA krama zAyada hI dekhA jAtA hai| phalataH prAcIna pAThazAlAnoM meM tathA arvAcIna vidyAlayoM, mahAvidyAlayoM aura vizvavidyAlayoM meM-jahA~ kahIM dArzanika adhyayana-adhyApana calatA hai vahA~-prAyaH sarvatra ukta mUla siddhAntoM ke spaSTa evaM paripakva jJAna kI kamI hI dekhI jAtI hai| aba hama dekheM ki ukta siddhAntoM kA sarvAdhika prAcIna aura vyavasthita nirUpaNa kina-kina darzanasUtroM meM labhya hai tathA kisa darzana ne unake vikAsa meM vizeSa yoga diyA hai| jaisA maiM samajhA hU~, dArzanika sUtroM meM ukta siddhAntoM kA vaisA nirUpaNa karaNAvasUtroM aura akSapAvasUtroM meM hI pAyA jAtA hai| nyAya-vaizeSika darzana ke cintakoM ne hI ina siddhAntoM ko, dUsare kisI bhI darzana ke cintakoM kI apekSA, adhika gaharAI se carcA kI hai aura unameM vicAra kI sUkSmatA dikhalAI hai| isIlie hama dekhate haiM ki sAMkhyayoga, jaina-bauddha evaM pUrva-uttaramImAMsA ke sUtrakAroM ne tathA una sUtroM para vyAkhyA, anuvyAkhyA athavA upAnuvyAkhyA likhanevAloM ne nyAya-vaizeSika paramparA dvArA prastuta kI gaI ukta siddhAntoM kI vicArasamRddhi aura paribhASAtroM kA hI adhikAMzataH upayoga kiyA hai aura usameM apanI mAnyatA ke anurUpa prAvazyaka parivartana yA rUpAntara bhI kiyA hai / isa bAta ko katipaya dRSTAntoM ke dvArA spaSTa kreN| kaNAda evaM prakSapAda ke pUrvaja cintakoM ne aura svayaM kaNAda tathA akSapAda ne apane-apane sUtroM meM jo vicAraNA upasthita kI hai vaisI vicAraNA kaNAda aura akSapAda ke sUtroM se pahale kisI bhI grantha meM upalabdha nahIM hotii| kaNAda ne apane darzana kI nIva sAkSAt indriyAvalokana tathA tadAzrita manojJAna ke Upara rakhI hai / isa avalokana tathA tadAzrita cintana ke AdhAra para hI usane apane prameya-nirUpaNa meM kAryakAraNabhAva kA siddhAnta spaSTa kiyA hai / yaha prameya nirUpaNa itara darzanoM ko mAnya hai yA nahIM yaha alaga prazna hai, parantu usane kAryakAraNabhAva kA svarUpa itanA adhika spaSTa kiyA hai ki dusare dArzanikoM ko usI kA kAryakAraNabhAva kA siddhAnta aura usake sAtha saMkalita anyAnya bAteM jaisI kI taisI lenI par3I haiN| anvaya aura vyatireka ye do kAryakAraNabhAva ke niyAmaka tattva haiN| isI vicAra meM Age jAkara pratibadhya, pratibandhakabhAva evaM uttejyauttejakabhAva kI carcA kA samAveza humA, anyathAsiddhi evaM ananyathAsiddhi ke vicAra kI carvaNA huI, upAdAna athavA samavAyI aura nimitta kAraNa ke rUpa meM kAraNoM ke vaividhA kA nirUpaNa humA, svarUpakAraNatA tathA phalopadhAyakakAraNatA jaise mudde bhI carcA meM praviSTa hue tathA sAmagrIkAraNatyavAda bhI spaSTa humaa| lakSyalakSaNabhAva kI vistRta carcA kA, jo ki dArzanika yuga kA eka viziSTa svarUpa hai, vyavasthita AdhAra kaNAda ke sUtroM meM hI sarvaprathama upalabdha hotA hai, aura isIlie sadoSa-nirdoSa lakSaNa kI jaisI aura jitanI sUkSma carcA nyAya-vaizeSika sAhitya meM hama dekhate haiM vaisI aura utanI itara darzanoM ke vAGamaya meM upalabdha nahIM hotI aura

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272 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I yadi kahIM upalabdha honI bhI hai to vaha nyAya-vaizeSika kI paramparA ke prAdhAra para hI vikasita huI hai| lakSyalakSaNabhAva ke vicAra meM avyApti, ativyApti, asambhava jaise doSoM kA spaSTa nirUpaNa aura tadviSayaka granthoM kI racanA bhI nyAya-vaizeSika sAhitya kI eka dUsarI vizeSatA hai| yadyapi kaNAda sUtroM meM anubhAva kI carcA hai, parantu isa viSaya meM maulika aura apanI kahI jA sake vaisI vizeSatA to nyAyasUtroM kI hI hai| svArtha evaM parArthAnumAna - nyAyavAkya, usakA sAdguNya-vaiguNya athavA saddhetu-hetvAbhAsa, chala, jAti nigrahasthAna prAdi kI vizada aura maulika carcA bhI nyAyasUtroM kI hI vizeSatA hai| ___isI prakAra parIkSApaddhati se lekara prApANya-apramANya kI samIkSA taka ke pravaziSTa cAra mudde bhI jisa spaSTatA ke sAtha nyAyasUtroM meM nirUpita haiM usa spaSTatA ke sAtha dUsare kisI darzanasUtra meM sarvaprathama upalabdha nahIM hote| isa prakAra nyAyavaizeSika donoM darzanoM ne alaga-alaga aura saMyukta rUpa se jina ukta dArzanika siddhAntoM kI carcA kI hai aura ina donoM darzanoM ke vyAkhyAkAroM ne aThArahavIM-unnIsavIM zatI taka jinakA vikAsa apane-apane granthoM meM kiyA hai, unhIM kA upayoga dUsare dArzanika apane-apane DhaMga se karate rahe haiN| sAMkhya evaM yogadarzana ke abhyAsI ko yadi ina siddhAntoM kA prAmANika aura pUrNa jJAna prApta karanA ho to vaha nyAya-vaizeSika darzana ke prAmANika abhyAsa ke binA kabhI bhI prApta nahIM kara sktaa| isI prakAra bauddha aura jaina darzanoM meM jabase tarka aura nyAya kI nIva par3I aura Age jAkara una darzanoM meM usakA jo vikAsa huA usameM se yadi nyAya-vaizezika darzana ke dvArA kie gaye ina siddhAntoM ke cintaka ko kama kara deM to unakA tAkika AdhAra samajha meM hI nahIM pA sktaa| bauddhoMne bhale hI kSaNikatva, vAhyArthazUnyatva aura zUnyavAda jaise mantavyoM ko spaSTa karane tathA unakA vikAsa sAdhane ke lie kAryakAraNabhAva Adi siddhAntoM kI carcA meM apanI ora se bhI sUkSma vicAra kA yoga diyA ho aura isI prakAra bhale hI jaina tAkikoM ne pariNAminityatva evaM anekAntadRSTi ko spaSTa karane kI tathA unakA vikAsa karane kI dRSTi se ina siddhAntoM kI vizada carcA kI ho aura usameM apanA bhI yoga pradAna kiyA ho (aura vastuta: ina donoM darzanoM ne aisA pradAna vizeSa rUpa se kiyA bhI hai), to bhI unakA mUla prAdhAra to nyAya-vaizeSika darzana kI vicAra paddhati hI hai| pUrvamImAMsA ke sUtrakAra jaimini aura uttaramImAMsA ke sUtrakAra bAdarAyaNa kA vicArakSetra mukhyatayA anukrama se yajJakarma aura brahmasvarUpa kA nirUpaNa hai| svAbhAvika rUpa se hI unako apane-apane mantavya upasthita karane meM kAryakAraNabhAva Adi siddhAntoM kA prazraya lenA par3A hai, parantu unhoMne ina siddhAntoM ke viSaya meM apane sUtroM meM koI vizeSa carcA nahIM kI hai| aba, jo vyakti ina donoM mImAMsAoM kA jJAna prApta karanA cAhatA ho aura vaha bhI yathArtha rUpa se, use ukta sAta siddhAntoM kA yathAvat paricaya anivArya rUpa se karanA hI caahie| ina sUtroM ke bhASyakAroM ko tathA usa-usa bhASya ke uttaravartI vyAkhyAkAroM ko darzanAntaroM ke vAdoM kA prativAda karane meM tathA apane vAda

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 273 ko spaSTa rUpa se sthApita karane meM jaba kabhI kAryakAraNabhAva Adi siddhAntoM ke vikalpita jJAna kI prAvazyakatA huI hai, taba unhoMne nyAya-vaizeSika darzana kI isa vicArasamRddhi kI ora hI najara ghumAI hai / kumArila, prabhAkara aura vAcaspati mizra jaise vidvAn apanIapanI mImAMsA pada kI vyAkhyAnoM meM apane mantavya sabala rUpa se upasthita kara sake haiM isakA bhI AdhAra yahI hai / zrIharSa ne khaNDanakhaNDakAvya meM athavA madhusUdana ne pratisiddhi Adi meM jo kevalAdvaita kI sthApanA kI hai aura usa sthApanA meM jo bala dekhA jAtA hai vaha bala unhoMne pAyA kahA~ se? isI prakAra rAmAnuja ne athavA unake anuyAyiyoM ne viziSTAdvaita kI jo sabala sthApanA kI hai usakA bala unako kahA~ se milA hai ? upAdhyAya yazovijayajI ne jaina tarka aura anekAnta dRSTi kI sthApanA meM jo kauzala dikhalAyA hai vaha kisake AdhAra para ? ina aura inake jaise dUsare praznoM kA uttara eka hI hai aura vaha yaha ki una sabane nyAya-vaizeSika darzana ke mUla grantha aura una para kI uttarottara adhikAdhika sUkSma aura sUkSmatara vyAkhyAoM kA gambhIra adhyayana jitane parimANa meM kiyA utane parimANa meM unake nirUpaNa usa-usa samaya meM pratiSThita hue| merI yaha vicArasaraNI yadi ThIka ho to aisA sUcita karanA Avazyaka pratIta hotA hai ki isa samaya dArzanika adhyayana-adhyApana kI jo praNAlI DhIlI-DhAlI nIva para cala rahI hai aura jisa praNAlI kA avalambana lekara prati varSa tattada darzana ke aneka vidyArthI upAdhi prApta karate haiM, aura phira bhI cintana-manana kI dRSTi se koI Thosa evaM maulika kArya nahIM dIkhatA, usameM AmUlacUla parivartana kI anivArya AvazyakatA hai / yaha parivartana merI dRSTi se jaisA honA cAhiye usakI bhI saMkSipta rUparekhA yahA~ sUcita karU to yaha anucita nahIM samajhI jaaygii| ___ bhAratIya darzanoM meM se kisI bhI eka darzana kA mukhya rUpa se adhyayana karanA ho to sabase pahale jisa prakAra saMskRta bhASA evaM sAhitya kA paryApta jJAna Avazyaka hai usI prakAra nyAya-vaizeSika darzana ke mUla evaM mahatvapUrNa granthoM kA athavA usa darzana ke sarvasaMgrAhI kisI eka grantha kA talasparzI adhyayana anivArya rUpa se Avazyaka hai| vaha eka grantha bhI aisA honA cAhie jisameM ukta sAta muddoM ke bAre meM vizada carcA AtI ho tathA nyAyavaizeSika kI sabhI paribhASAe~ asandigdha bhAva se samajha meM A jAya~ usa prakAra jisameM unakI carcA ho| itanI cIja taiyAra hone ke uparAnta abhipreta eka darzana kA abhyAsI bhale hI usa darzana kA kramika abhyAsa zurU kare, parantu vaha abhyAsa kisI bhI prakAra se ekAMgI na rahe isake lie yaha Avazyaka hai ki vaha abhyAsI sAtha hI sAtha apane mukhya viSaya se bhinna itara bhAratIya darzanoM kA prAmANika jJAna prApta karane ke lie usa-usa darzana ke paricAyaka evaM maulika aise kama se kama eka-eka grantha kA talasparzI jJAna prApta kare, kyoMki bhArata meM dArzanika cintana isa prakAra uttarottara Age bar3hA hai ki usameM kisI eka darzana kI paramparA ko itara darzana kI paramparA se alaga kiyA hI nahIM jA sakatA / ataeva apane abhipreta darzana kA artha samajhane ke lie tathA usameM kiye gaye itara darzanoM ke mantavyoM ke prativAda kA mUlyAMkana karane ke liye yaha Avazyaka hai ki mukhya viSaya ke rUpa meM svIkRta darzana ke atirikta itara darzanoM kA jJAna bhI unhIM ke granthoM ke 18

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274 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I dvArA prApta karanA cAhiye / aisA na hone se bahuta bAra darzana kA abhyAsI itara darzanoM kA yathAvat evaM taTastha mUlyAMkana karane ke badale ekAMgI dRSTi kA zikAra ho jAtA hai aura apane abhipreta mukhya darzana ke mantavyoM se bhinna mantabyoM kI pUrI samajha ke binA hI, avagaNanA karanA hai phalataH vaise abhyAsI ke bhItara vAdakathA ke sthAna meM alpa evaM vilakSaNa kA praveza, ajJAta rUpa se bhI ho jAtA hai / yahA~ takakI carcA aba hamako 'tattvajJAna' padakA artha samajhane ke lie prerita karatI hai | darzanoM meM 'tattvajJAna' padakA sAmAnya artha aisA rUr3ha ho gayA hai ki jisake kAraNa darzana kA abhyAsI yA cintaka apane-apane darzana meM pratipAdita tattva hI yathAvat evaM paripUrNa haiM aisA mAnane lagatA hai / udAharaNArtha, nyAya-vaizeSika darzanakA abhyAsI chaH yA sAta padArtha athavA solaha padArtha jo anukrama se vaizeSika aura nyAyasUtra meM nirUpita haiM aura una tattvoM kA jisa rUpa meM evaM jisa prakAra se nirUpaNa huA hai usI ko paripUrNa mAnakara bhaura unhIM ke jJAna ko pAramArthika samajhakara unakA sambandha abhyudaya evaM niHzreyas ke sAtha jor3atA hai / vaha aisA mAnane lagatA hai ki ina tattvoM kA yathAvat jJAna ho jAya to niHzreyas siddha hogA hI, isI prakAra sAMkhya yoga, jaina-bauddha aura mImAMsAdvaya ke bAre meM bhI kahA jA sakatA hai / pratyeka darzana kA sUtrapAta mokSa ke dhyeya se huA hai aura isa dhyeya kI siddhi ke ananya upAya ke taura para tattad darzana ke hI prameyoM kA yathAvat jJAna paryApta samajhA jAtA hai / eka hI dhyeya kI siddhi ke upAya rUpa usa-usa darzana ke mantavyoM athavA prameyoM kA ekamAtra yathAvat jJAna hI yadi usa dhyeya ko siddha karane meM paryApta ho to isa parase aisA phalita hogA ki eka darzana kA tattvajJAna yathAvat hone se pUrNa hai aura itara darzanoM ke tattvoM kA jJAna yA to bhrAnta hai yA phira sarvathA nagaNya hai / yaha phalitArthaM 'tattvajJAna' pada ke rUr3ha artha kI samajhameM se svata: utpanna hotA hai / isIlie hama dArzanika abhyAsa evaM cintana ko pantha athavA cauke kI saMkucita sImA meM Abaddha dekhate haiM / dArzanika abhyAsa se jisa ujjvala evaM udAra prakAza kI AzA rakhI jAtI hai aura jo sambhavataH niHzreyas kI dizA kA eka prAthamika sopAna banane kI kSamatA rakhatA hai, vahI abhyAsa aura cintana prabhyAsI ko saMkucita kaTaghare meM banda karake tamisra ke garbha kI ora le jAtA hai / ata: 'tatva' pada ke tAtparya kA hameM vicAra karanA cAhie / merI samajha meM 'tattva' pada kA artha itanA hI honA cAhie ki tattad darzanake mUla cintaka athavA pravartaka ne jina prameyoM kA jisa rUpa meM jJAna prApta kiyA thA una prameyoM ko usane usI rUpa meM nirUpita karane kA prayatna kiyaa| vaha nirUpaNa usa cintaka athavA pravartaka kI vicArasImA taka to yathAvat hai, parantu usameM vicAra ke dUsare pravAhoM athavA vindunoM kA samAveza na hone se vaha utanI hada taka, eka dezIya hai; aura vaise ekadezIya jJAna ko tattvajJAna kahane kA artha itanA hI hai ki usa usa cintaka athavA pravartaka ne jo kucha jAnA- socA usakA prAmANika rUpase nirUpaNa kiyA aura nirUpaNa meM koI vipratAraNa athavA vipralambha kI dRSTi thI hI nahIM / jo kucha samajha meM AyA usIko, aura vaha bhI niHsvArtha bhAva se, anya jijJAsutroM ke bodha ke lie grathita kiyA tathA usakA sambandha abhyudaya evaM niHzreyas ke sAtha jor3A /

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 275 jisa samaya jisa samAja meM jisa dhyeya kI mukhya pratiSThA hotI hai usa samaya usa samAja meM mukhya cintaka aura pravartaka usa dhyeya ke sAtha apane upadeza kA sambandha jor3a de yaha svAbhAvika hai| isIlie svarga evaM mokSa ke dhyeya kI pratiSThA hone ke kAraNa pratyeka darzana ne apanA sambandha usa dhyeya ke sAtha jor3a diyA, parantu adhikAMzataH abhyAsI aura sAmpradAyika vyakti yaha bAta socanA prAyaH bhUla gaye ki yadi kisI darzana kA tattvajJAna mokSasAdhaka ho to usake virodhI pratIta hone vAle tattvajJAna kyA mokSasAdhaka nahIM ? isase 'tattvajJAna' pada kA jo artha maiMne Upara sUcita kiyA hai usa artha ko lekara yadi hama vicAra kareM to hameM jJAta hogA ki pratyeka prAmANika cintaka evaM pravartaka kA tattvajJAna usakI vicArasImAmeM yathAvat haiM aura saba milakara ke eka dUsare ke pUraka bhI haiM / ye saba vizAla tattvajJAna ke aMza-rUpa hone se ajJAnanivAraka haiM tathA satya jJAna kI dizA meM le pAte haiM / isa dRSTi se ve niHzreyas siddhi ke upAya bhI ho sakate haiN| __isa prakAra vicAra karane para aisA pratIta hotA hai ki darzana ke sacce abhyAsI ko apane abhyAsa meM tulanA evaM itihAsa kA dRSTibindu rakha karake hI prAge bar3hanA caahie| aitihAsika dRSTivindu isalie Avazyaka hai ki eka-eka darzana kA vikAsa jisa krama se huaA ho vaha samajha meM A sake tathA itara darzanoM ke sAthakA sambandha bhI avagata ho sake / tulanA dRSTi isalie Avazyaka hai ki usase dUsare ko galata samajhane ke bhrama se bacA jA sakatA hai| dUsare ke dvArA kiye gaye prativAdoM kA mUlyAMkana karane meM bhI tulanA evaM itihAsa kI dRSTi upakAraka hotI hai| isaliye merI to aisI pakkI dhAraNA hai ki pratyeka zAstra ke abhyAsIkI bhAMti darzanazAstra ke abhyAsI ko bhI abhyAsa ke kendra meM tulanA aura itihAsa kI dRSTi avazya rakhanI cAhiye / . pAThazAlAoM meM prAcIna praNAlikA ke asusAra tathA kAleja vidyAlayoM meM navIna praNAlikA ke amusAra adhyayana karane vAle abhyAsI pAge jAkara dArzanika praznoM ke Upara saMzodhana karane ke lie prerita hote haiN| adhikAMzataH vaise saMzodhana bahuta chichale aura mAtra varNanAtmaka athavA saMgrahAtmaka dekhe jAte haiN| isa kamI kA eka kAraNa, mere abhiprAya ke anusAra, yaha bhI hai ki saMzodhanakartA yogya rUpa se adhyayana-vAcana nahIM karate aura ekAMgI bana jAte haiN| maulikatA se zUnya saMzodhana prAya: nirarthaka aura punarukti rUpa hI hote haiN| bhAratIya darzanoM kI kisI bhI eka zAkhA athavA kisI bhI eka darzana ke kisI eka mudde para maulika saMzodhana karanA ho to, merI dRSTi se, kama se kama nimnAMkita taiyArI kA honA Avazyaka hai : 1. pratyeka darzana ke, vizeSatayA uddiSTa darzana ke, granthoM kA mUla se lekara hI paThana-manana honA cAhie; yahA~ taka ki usake prAcInatama upalabdha mUla se lekara usake bhASya, vyAkhyA Adi uttarakAlIna saba pramukha granthoM kA manana aura dhIrajapUrvaka avalokana karanA caahie| 2. saMzodhana kA mukhya viSaya cAhe jisa darzana kA ho, parantu itara darzanoM ke mahattvapUrNa aura saMzodhana ke sAtha sambaddha sAhitya kA, ho sake vahA~ taka mUla granthoM ke

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276 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 AdhAra para hI. parizIlana karanA Avazyaka hai / isake binA vicAraNIya prazna meM utpanna hone vAlI ulajhaneM sulajha nahIM sktiiN| 3. aisA avalokana aura cintana karate samaya tathA granthoM ke noTsa banAte samaya jisa prakAra tulanA aura itihAsa kI dRSTi Avazyaka hai usI prakAra usa avalokanacintana Adi meM panthagata saMkucita pUrvAgrahoM se mukti bhI anivArya rUpa se Avazyaka hai| ___ yadi kama se kama itanI taiyArI ke sAtha dArzanika saMzodhana ho to bhAratIya darzanoM kI upalabdha sAmagrI itanI adhika vizAla aura arthapUrNa hai ki usake AdhAra para kiyA gayA saMzodhana Aja kI nayI duniyA ke navajijJAsuoM ko bhI paryApta mAtrA meM santuSTa kara sakatA hai aura sAtha hI bhAratIya cintakoM kI gambhIra tapazcaryA ke prati cAhe jisa vyakti kA bahumAna utpanna kara sakatA hai, aisA merA pUrNa aura pakkA vizvAsa hai| dArzanikoM ke vicAra-cintana ke lie tatvajJAna se sambaddha ekAdha mudde kI bhI maiM yahA~ carcA karanA cAhatA hU~ / vaha muddA jJAna-prakriyA ke bAre meM hai| bhAratIya paramparAmoM meM laukika-lokottara, vyavahAra-nizcaya, saMvRti-paramArtha, mAyA-paramArtha, parikalpita-pariniSpanna jaise zabdayugala prasiddha haiN| ina saba yugaloM meM eka bhAva samAna hai aura vaha hai sthUla se sUkSma kI ora vicAra pragati / jaina paribhASA meM kareM to dravya se bhAva kI ora pragati / yaha pragati vicAra aura prAcAra donoM kSetroM meM mAnasika evaM AdhyAtmika vikAsakrama ke AdhAra para aura usI ke anupAta meM jo vastu sAmAnyataH sarvasAdhAraNagamya ho athavA sarvasAdhAraNagamya ho sake vaha laukika pradeza meM pAtI hai| isase ulTA, jo vastu sarvasAdhAraNagamya na ho aura phira bhI viziSTa adhikArI vyakti ko athavA vyaktiyoM ko hI gamya ho vaha lokottara kahalAtI hai / yahI bhAva, eka athavA dUsare rUpa meM, itara zabdayugaloM meM nirUpita hai / mAnavajIvana kA vikAsa dekhane para aisA pratIta hotA hai ki sarvaprathama laukika bhUmikA kI racanA hotI hai aura usameM pragati hone para bAda meM lokottara bhUmikA kI sthApanA hotI hai isIlie bhASA meM bhI hama dekhate haiM ki jo zabda laukika vicAra-AcAra meM sarvavidita hote haiM unameM se bahuta se kAlakrama se lokottara vicAra-AcAra ke bodhaka bhI bana jAte haiN| yajJa, pratyakSa jaise zabda, jo vyavahArabhUmi meM pracalita the aura haiM, ve hI kAlakrama se jJAna-yajJa, dhyAnayajJa, paramapratyakSa, yogipratyakSa jaise lokottara artha meM bhI rur3ha ___ laukika aura vyAvahArika bhUmikA kI apekSA lokottara aura pAramArthika bhUmikA kI pratiSThA atyanta ucca kakSA kI mAnI gaI hai| laukika meM se lokottara meM kramika saMkrama to prasiddha hai, parantu kabhI-kabhI lokottara aura pAramArthika bhUmikA kI pratiSThA rakhane vAle zabda bhI, usa pratiSThA ke sAtha hI, laukika aura vyAvahArika bhUmikA meM

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 277 praviSTa ho jAte haiM aura vaise praveza ke sAtha hI tattvacintana eka nayA mor3a letA hai| yaha kaise hotA hai isakA eka dRSTAnta prastuta mudde ke dvArA upasthita karane kA maiM yahA~ prayatna kruuNgaa| nyAya-vaizeSika, sAMkhya-yoga, jaina aura pUrvamImAMsaka jaise darzana jar3a-cetana ubhaya kI vAstavikatA meM mAnate haiN| inakA jJAna laukika bhUmikA vAle ko bhale hI aspaSTa, apUrNa aura ekAMgI ho, parantu lokottara bhUmikAvAle ko inhIM jar3a-cetana ubhaya padArthoM kA spaSTa, pUrNa aura sarvAMgINa jJAna hotA hai| jJAna meM tAratamya hai, parantu usase ina donoM tattvoM ke astitva meM koI tAratamya nahIM hai / jar3a evaM cetana donoM tattvoM kA astitva apane-apane svarUpa kI dRSTi se trikAlAbAdhita mAnA jAtA hai| parantu isase ulTA bauddha evaM vedAnta paramparAoM kI kucha zAkhAoM meM mAnA jAtA haiN| yogAcAra aura zUnyavAda tathA kevalAdvaita ye tInoM paramparAe~ to isa viSaya meM itanI prasiddha haiM ki unakA saMketabhara karanA paryApta hogaa| yogAcAra aura zUnyavAda ina mahAyAnI zAkhAoM ke mantavya se sarvathA bhinna mantavya rakhanevAlI bauddha paramparA kI hI theravAda, sarvAstivAda aura sautrAntika jaisI zAkhAe~ haiM / isI prakAra viziSTAdvaita, zuddhAdvaita jaisI vedAnta paramparAe~ kevalAdvaitI paramparA se sarvathA bhinna mantavya rakhatI haiM / mantavya kA yaha bheda bAhArya kA astitva vAstavika mAnanA athavA ajJAnakalpita isa para AdhArita hai| yogAcAra, zUnyavAda aura kevalAdvaita ina tInoM ke mantavyoM meM dUsarA cAhe jo aura cAhe jitanA matabheda ho, parantu ina tInoM kA eka bAta meM samAna mantavya hai aura vaha hai : bAhyArtha kA astitva vAstavika nahIM, kintu ajJAnakalpita hai| isa mantavya kA praspaSTa bIja to katipaya prAcIna upaniSadoM ke amuka vAkyoM meM tathA bauddha piTaka ke upalabdha kucha zabdoM meM hai, parantu isa mantavya kA spaSTa vicAra-vistAra to isa samaya hameM upalabhya sAhitya meM se yogAcAra aura zUnyavAda ke sAhitya meM hI milatA hai| laMkAvatAra jaise prAcIna satra. prajJApAramitA jaise prAcIna grantha aura madhyamakakArikA jaise dArzanika granthoM ke dekhane para yaha bAta spaSTa hotI hai ki una granthoM ke racayitAoM ne bAhya, indriyagamya evaM bhedapradhAna vizva ko avidyAmUlaka aura manovikalpaprasUta mAnA hai / jaba avidyA aura manovikalpa naSTa ho jAte haiM taba isa vizva kA koI astitva hI nahIM rahatA / saccA astitva manovikalpa aura vAkprapaMca se pare hone ke kAraNa nirvikalpa aura niSprapaMca hai| yogAcAra aura zUnyavAda ne jo sthApanA kI vahI sthApanA vedAnta paramparA ke brahmatattva ke nirUpaNa meM avatIrNa huii| isIlie kevalAdvaita paramparA meM bhI brahmatattva kA nirvikalpa aura niSprapaMca ke rUpa meM varNana huA hai / ___ bAhya aura Antarika athavA jar3a aura cetana ina donoM tattvoM ke vAstavika astitva ke mantavya meM se eka hI prAntarika jJAna athavA cetanAtattva ke vAstavika astitva kA jo mantavya bhinna-bhinna darzana paramparAoM meM sthApita evaM cacita huA usakA preraka bala kauna sA hai, yaha bhI eka prazna hai| isakA uttara bhAratIya paramparAoM kI prAcIna sampatti jaisI yogapraNAlI meM se upalabdha hotA hai| sAMkhya-yoga, jaina aura bauddha ina tInoM paramparAoM meM yoga-viSayaka ucca bhUmikA kI amuka mAnyatAe~

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278 VAISHALI INSTITUTE REASERCH BULLETIN No. 1 aura unakI parimASAe~ Aja taka samAna rUpa se surakSita rahI haiN| pAtaMjala yogasUtra meM savitarka, nirvitarka, savicAra aura nirvicAra ye cAra samApattiyAM prasiddha haiN| bauddha paramparA meM savitakkamavicArapItisukhaekaggatA Adi cAra athavA pA~ca dhyAna, navabheda se, upalabdha hote haiN| jaina paramparA meM bhI pRthaktvavitarkasavicAra, ekatvavitarka-pravicAra, sUkSmakriya apratipAtI tathA samucchinnakriya-apratipAtI ye cAra dhyAna pahale se hI pracalita haiN| inameM se nirvitarka evaM nivicArasamApatti ko yogasUtra aura usa para ke bhASya meM nirvikalpaka aura inhIM samApattikAlIna darzana ko paramadarzana evaM RtambharA prajJA kahA hai bauddha paramparAmeM bhI vitarka evaM vicAra kI upazAnti hone para jo jJAna hotA hai usI ko nirvikalpa kahA hai / jaina paramparA kI bhI aisI hI mAmyatA hai| dhyAna kI aisI ucca kakSA meM prakaTa honevAle jJAna ko hI pratyeka paramparA parama pramANa mAnatI hai| parantu yogAcAra mahAyAniyoM ne yoga kI nirvikalpabhUmi ko hI antima aura paramArtha mAnakara aura tatkAlIna nirvikalpa jJAna ke anusAra vizva kA nirvikalpa evaM niSprapaMca rUpa hI vAstavika hai tathA usake atirikta saba kucha manaHkalpita aura avidyAmUlaka hai aisA kahakara vijJAnacitta ke atirikta sabhI laukika aura bAhya padArthoM kA niSedha kiyA hai / zUnyavAdI aura kevalAdvaitI bhI isI mArga para gaye haiN| __ isa pratipAdana kA pariNAma jJAnaprakriyA meM yaha pAyA ki jo jJAna nirvikalpaka aura niSprapaMca vahI paramArthasatya aura jisa jJAna meM zabdavikalpa athavA mana kA anuvedha ho vaha bhrAnta yA sAMvRta / dhyAna kI amuka bhUmikA ke AdhAra para vizva ke svarUpa kA varNana to vijJAnavAdiyoM ne kiyA, parantu usake Age apane hI sage bhAiyoM kA bar3A bhArI morcA thaa| unhoMne kahA ki buddha ke upadezoM meM jo skandha, prAyatana, lokadhAtu, indriya Adi bAhya padArthoM kA nirUpaNa AtA hai usakA kyA hogA ? vijJAnavAdI aura zUnyavAdI ne kahA ki piTakoM meM jo vaisA upadeza hai vaha to buddha ne sthUla adhikAriyoM meM buddhibheda na ho aura kAlakrama se ve bhI samajhane lageMge aisA mAnakara laukika dRSTi se kiyA hai| buddha kI pAramArthika dRSTi to hama jo kahate haiM vahI thI, ityAdi / vijJAnavAdI, zUnyavAdI aura kevalAdvaitI ko do-do morcoM para lar3anA par3atA thaa| apanI-apanI paramparA meM jo bAhyArtha kA astitva mAnate unake sAtha apane purAne granthoM kA tAtparya apane DhaMga se spaSTa karake carcA karanI par3atI, to itara bAhmArthavAdI paramparAoM kI dalIloM kA jabAba bhI yukti-prayukti dvArA denA pdd'taa| isa carcA aura vivAda kI prakriyA kA nirdezaka sAhitya vipula pariNAma meM upalabdha hai| vijJAnavAdI ekamAtra dhyAnAtmaka lokottara bhUmi meM hone vAle nirvikalpaka jJAna ko hI mukhya aura pAramArthika pramANa mAnakara bAhyArthaM ke svatantra astitva kA khaNDana karate the aura laukika bhUmikA meM hone vAle savikalpaka, anumAna evaM mAgama jaise jJAnoM ko pAramArthika nahIM mAnate the| ataH svAbhAvika rUpa se hI bAhyArthavAdI nyAya-vaizeSika,

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 279 sAMkhya-yoga, pUrvamImAMsaka evaM jaina jaisI paramparAoM ne to vijJAnavAdI ko lalakArA; itanA hI nahIM, bauddha paramparA kI sthaviravAdI, sarvAstivAdI aura sautrAMtrika jaisI bAhyArtha kA apane DhaMga se bhI vAstavika astitva mAnanevAlI zAkhAmoM ne bhI vijJAnavAda ke mantavya kA prativAda kiyaa| aba vijJAnavAda ke lie nayA rAstA nikAle binA koI cArA nahIM thaa| isalie dhyAnAvastha nirvikalpa jJAna kI usake yahAM jo prAmANya-pratiSThA thI usake AdhAra para usane laukika bhUmikA ke jJAnakrama meM prAmANya kA vicAra vyavasthita kiyaa| usane apanI mUla mAnyatA ko surakSita rakhakara kahA ki jJAna to nirvikalpa hI pramANa hai; laukika bhUmikAyeM jo indriyArthasannikarSajanya sarvaprathama jJAna hotA hai vaha bhI kalpanApoDha hone se nirvikalpa hai aura isalie vaha bhI pramANa hai| parantu usake pazcAt honevAle savikalpaka pratyakSa, anumAna yA prAgama jJAna savikalpaka hone se sAkSAt prAmANyavAle nahIM haiM / unameM jahA~ kahIM prAmAya mAnA jAtA hai aura lokavyavahAra calatA hai yahAM unakA prAmANya paramparAgata athavA kaho ki nirvikalpaka jJAna ke AdhAra para hI mAnanA caahiye| vijJAnavAda ne yaha uttara to diyA, parantu usake samakSa prazna to yaha thA ki bAhyArtha ke vAstavika astitva ke binA indriyoM kA sannikarSa kisake sAtha hogA ? isa para usane sautrAntika dRSTi kA avalambana liyaa| usa dRSTi ke anusAra mAne jAne vAle kSaNika evaM niraMza bAhya padArtha kA astitva mAnakara aura usake sAtha indriyArthasannikarSako ghaTAkara usane nirvikalpaka jJAna kI prAmANya-pratiSThA laukika jJAna meM bhI kI, parantu usane savikalpaka jJAnoM kA nirvikalpaka jaisA sAkSAt prAmANya to mAnA hI nhiiN| isa prakAra vijJAnavAda ne apane sabandhu bauddhoM ko to eka prakAra se santuSTa kiyA aura mAtra nirvikalpa ko hI mukhya pramANa mAnane kI apanI sthiti bhI sarakSita rkhii| parantu itane se itara dArzanikavAdiyoM ko santoSa nahIM ho sakatA thA. kyoMki bAhyArthavAdI sabhI darzana savikalpaka pratyakSa, anumAna evaM Agama jaise savikalpaka jJAnoM kA mukhya prAmANya mAnate the| yaha matabheda aura isameM se phalita honevAlI vivAdapradhAna-carcA bhinna-bhinna dArzanikoM ke dvArA bhinna-bhinna dRSTi bindu se pravRtta huI hai| sarvaprathama hama nyAya-vaizeSika paramparA kA dRSTibindu lekara vicAra kreN| usane kahA ki jisakA hama svarUpAlocanamAtra athavA avyapadeza ke nAma se vyavahAra karate haiM vaha jJAna indriyArthasannikarSa se sarvaprathama avazya utpanna hotA hai aura usameM vizeSaNa-vizeSya bhAva kA avagAhana na hone se use nirvikalpa kahane meM bhI hameM koI khAsa harja nahIM hai, parantu yaha prAthamika nirvikalpa jJAna hI viSaya svarUpa kI dRSTi se pramANa hai aura usake pazcAt honevAlA viziSTa jJAna athavA savikalpaka jJAna mukhya pramANa nahIM hai-aisA vijJAnavAdI kA mantavya yathArtha nahIM hai| isI prakAra anumAna aura pAgama jJAnoM kA mukhya prAmANya bhI hama pratyakSa ke jitanA hI mAnate haiN| isa dRSTibinduko nyAya-vaizeSika paramparA anta taka mAnatI rahI hai| usane vijJAnavAda ke mantavya ko aneka yukti-prayuktiyoM se bAMdhita siddha kiyA hai|

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 sAMkhya yoga paramparA ne bhI pratyakSa, anumAna evaM Agama jJAna kI prakriyA eka taraha se nyAya-vaizeSika jaisI hI mAnI hai / phalataH usane bhI vijJAnavAda ke mantavya kA prativAda kiyA hai| alabattA, sAMkhya yoga paramparA antaHkaraNavRtti ko lekara apanI jJAnaprakriyA ghaTAtI hai / 280 kumArila Adi mImAMsakoM ne bhI kahA hai ki indriyajanya sarvaprathama AlocanAjJAna zrathavA nirvikalpajJAna zravazya iSTa hai, parantu sannikarSaparamparA meM se utpanna hone vAle savikalpaka pratyakSa, anumAna aura Agama Adi savikalpaka jJAnoM ke mukhya prAmANa kA niSedha kiyA hI nahIM jA sakatA / aisA kahakara ina jJAnoM kA mukhya prAmANya unhoMne aneka yukti- prayuktiyoM se sthApita kiyA hai / jaina paramparA ne bhI vijJAnavAda kA virodha karake kahA ki tuma jise nirvikalpaka kahate ho vaisA prAthamika jJAna vyaMjanAvagraha, arthAvagraha athavA darzana ke rUpa meM hameM mAnya hai, parantu sabhI savikalpaka jJAnoM kA prAmANya tuma jo nahIM mAnate vaha hameM kisI prakAra yuktisaMgata pratIta nahIM hotA / bhartRhari jaise zabdadarzana ke anugAmiyoM ne to vijJAnavAdI jaise nirvikalpaka jJAna para atyanta bhAra dene vAloM ko sunA diyA ki jJAnamAtra zabda- sambaddha hone se savikalpaka hI hai / yaha zAbdika darzana kA pakSa eka prakAra se vijJAnavAda kA sarvathA virodhI pakSa kahA jA sakatA hai / yadyapi zAbdika darzana apanI rIti se saba jJAnoM ko zabdAnuviddha mAnatA hai, phira bhI usakI parA, pazyanti zrAdi vAk kI catuvidha prakriyA vizeSa rUpa se vicAraNIya to hai hI / vijJAnavAda lokottarabhUmi meM sarvathA zabdasaMsarga se rahita jJAna kA astitva to mAnatA hai, to zAbdika darzana laukika aura lokottara kisI bhI bhUmikA meM zabdasamparka se virahita jJAna kAM astitva mAnatA hI nhiiN| ye hI ina donoM paramparAoM ke sarvathA bhinna dRSTibindu haiM / vijJAnavAdane sautrAntika dRSTi kA avalambana lekara aura kSaNika, niraMza evaM vartamAna vastumAtra ke sAtha indriyasaMsarga ko mAna kara tajjanya nirvikalpaka jJAnakI jaba mukhya pramANa ke rUpa meM sthApanA kI, taba usake pIche usakI dRSTi yaha rahI ki nirvikalpa jJAna jAti-guNa-kriyA kI kisI bhI kalpanA kA sparza kiye binA hI zrakhaNDa, kSaNika aura vartamAna vastumAtra kA avagAhana karatA hai; usameM kisI dharma-dharmI kA bheda bhAsita nahIM hotA aura na usameM kisI bhI prakAra kI kalpanA kA praveza hotA hai / isa prakAra usane lokottara bhUmi ke nirvikalpaka ko, apane DhaMga se, laukika bhUmikA meM ghaTA kara nirvikalpakamAtra ke mukhya prAmANya aura pAramArthikatva kI pratiSThA ke lie yena kena prakAreNa nasAdhAraNa prayatna kiyA / isa prayatna kA pratiSedha karanevAle itara vAdiyoM ne bhI utane hI bala tathA utanI hI sabala evaM sUkSma yuktiyoM se uttara diyA / isa prakAra nirvikalpa zrIra savikalpa kI carcA kevala pratyakSa jJAna taka hI maryAdita na rahI; usa carcA meM anumAna, zrAgama Adi jJAnoM meM tathA IzvarIya pratyakSa, sarvajJapratyakSa aura yogipratyakSa jaise alaukika jJAnoM meM zrI praveza kiyA hai /

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 281 parantu aba prazna yaha hai ki kevalAdvItI vedAntiyoM kI isa bAre meM kyA mAnatA hai ? yaha to sarvasvIkRta bAta hai ki kevalAdvaitI zuddha brahmacaitanya ke atirikta dUsarI kisI bhI vastu kA vAstavika astitva nahIM mAnate / yadi aisA hai to unake mata se jJAna-vyavasthA kaisI hai ? isakA uttara saMkSepa meM itanA hI hai ki mUla kevalAdvaitI cintakoM ne akhaNDa brahma-viSayaka nirvikalpaka jJAnako hI mukhya aura pAramArthika pramANa mAnA hai / aisA hone para bhI unakI sthiti vijJAnavAda aura zUnyavAda kI apekSA bhinna hai, kyoMki kevalAdvatI paramparA kA mukhya prAdhAra upaniSad haiN| prAgama rUpa se unakA samAveza to zabdapramANa meM hI hogA, aura jahA~ zabda pramANa hogA vahA~ savikalpaka jJAna to A hI jaaygaa| ataeva kevalAdvatI paramparA yadi brahmamAtra-viSayaka nirvikalpaka jJAna ko, vijJAnavAda kI bhAMti, pAramAthika pramANa mAne, to phira 'tattvamasi' ityAdi Agamajanya savikalpaka jJAna kA kyA ho ? vijJAnavAdI to anumAna aura buddhavacana jaise AgamoM ko bhI sAMvata kaha dete the, parantu kevalAdvaitI ke lie vahA~ taka pAnA, aneka kAraNoM se, zakya thA hI nhiiN| isase unhoMne dusarA mArga apanAyA aura kahA ki jJAna zabdajanya hone se hI savikalpaka nahIM ho jAtA / zabdajanya hone para bhI aupaniSada jJAna saMsaniya gAhI hone ke kAraNa nirvikalpaka hI hai aura isIlie vaha mukhya pramANa hai| isa prakAra kevalAdatavAdiyoM ne apane nirvikalpaka jJAna kI vyAkhyA kii| aisA lagatA hai ki kevalAdvaitI paramparAyeM nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka viSayaka carcA kA aura unakI vyAkhyAnoM kA jo praveza huA hai vaha cAhe jitanA prAcIna ho, parantu vaha praveza vijJAnavAda aura zUnyavAda ke bar3he hue tathA bar3hate jAte prabhAva ke bAda kA hI hai| isIlie kevalAdvaitI paramparAyeM isa prakAra kI carcA karane vAle prAcIna grantha nahIM haiM aura yadi haiM bhI to ye AgamazAstra se prAcIna nahIM haiN| isa prakAra dekhane se jJAta hotA hai ki jJAna kI prakriyAmeM lokottarabhUmikA kA prAzraya lekara vijJAnavAda aura zUnyavAda ne jo navaprasthAna kiyA usane itara sabhI dArzanikoM ko apanA-apanA pakSa sthApita karane ke lie bAdhya kiyA, aura una pakSoM ne bhI vijJAnavAdI Adi ko aisA to parezAna kiyA ki anta meM unako bhI lokottarabhUmi kI mAdakatA meM se mukta hokara aura laukika bhUmikA meM Akara jJAna kI prakriyA kA vicAra suvyavasthita karane ke lie bAdhya honA pdd'aa| isa prakAra dekheM to bhAratIya dArzanika aura tArkika vAGmaya meM isa carcA kA bahuta bar3A aura rasadAyI bhAga hai / yaha carcA usa-usa darzana ke cintaka aura sthApakoM kA sUkSmAtisUkSma buddhibala aura dRr3ha manoyoga sUcita karatI hai| yahA~ eka bAta kA ullekha karanA Avazyaka hai ki jisa prakAra vijJAnavAda aura zUnyavAda bauddha paramparA kI sarvAstivAda aura sautrAntika zAkhAoM ke bAda ke hI kramika vikAsa haiM aura isIlie unako apanI pUrvabhUmikA jaisI una zAkhAoM kA prAzraya kSekara hI zAstrIya carcA meM utaranA par3A hai, usI prakAra merI dRSTi se, mAtra kevalAdvaitI hI nahIM, parantu rAmAnuja, vallabha prAdi paramparAe~ bhI sAMkhya tattvajJAna kI pIThikA ke Upara hI vikasita huI haiM / isIlie unheM jaba kabhI paribhASAoM tathA anya bahuta-sI bAtoM kI AvazyajatA par3I taba unhoMne sIdhe taura para athavA kucha rUpAntara karake sAMkhya paramparA

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282 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I kA Azraya liyA hai| isakA eka udAharaNa prastuta nirvikalpa-savikalpakI carcA hai| kevalAdvaitI paramparA ke uttaravartI granthoM meM jaba pramANa nirUpaNa kI aAvazyakatA upasthita huI taba unhoMne sAMkhyasammata antaHkaraNa, usakI vRtti aura usa antaHkaraNa kA viSayadeza meM nirgamana ityAdi bAtoM ko svIkAra karake apanA kathana pUrA kiyA hai| dharma aura usake tIna pahalU bhAratIya bhASAoM meM jo katipaya zabda savizeSa vikhyAta haiM aura jinake artha kA vikAsa evaM vistAra bhI joroM se vaTavRkSa kI bhAMti huA hai tathA jo zabda prAyaH pratyeka bhAratavAsI ko zravaNa-paricita haiM ve zabda haiM : brahma, vrata Rta, jIva, AtmA, yajJa, karma, punarjanma aadi| inameM 'dharma' zabda kA bhI nirdeza karanA cAhiye / dUsare zabdoM kI apekSA 'dharma' zabda kA paricaya-kSetra tathA vividha arthoM meM usakA upayoga vizeSa dhyAna AkarSita karatA hai| 'dharma' zabda kevala prAcAra athavA kartavya ke artha meM hI vikasita nahIM huA, usane to bhakti evaM jJAna ke sabhI staroM aura sabhI sampradAyoM ko apane meM sameTa liyA hai| isIlie zramaNa-brAhmaNa sabhI paramparAoM ke sAhitya meM tattvajJAna, bhakti aura prAcArapradhAna grantha 'dharma' pada ke sAtha saMkalita upalabdha hote haiN| isa dRSTi se dekhane para dharma kA varNana karane vAle ko usakI pratyeka zAkhA meM jo arthavikAsa huA hai usakA AkaNTha prAkalana-saMkalana karanA caahie| maiM isa kArya ko apanI maryAdA se bAhara kA samajha kara usake kevala tIna pahalutroM kA sparza karake yahAM para kucha vicAra karanA cAhatA huuN| inameM se pratyeka pahalU kA kisa prakAra aura kisa krama se vikAsa, merI dRSTi ke anusAra, huA hai tathA ina pahaluoM kA pAramparika sambandha kaisA hai, yaha saMkSepa meM dikhalAne kA maiM prayatna kruuNgaa| jIvanamAtra akhaNDa hai| use samajhane ke lie buddhi se usako kucha bhAgoM meM bA~Takara manuSya usake viSaya meM jAnakArI prApta karane kA prayAsa karatA hai, parantu jIvana ke--antaH bAhya jIvana ke-ve vibhAga na to eka dUsare se sarvathA bhinna haiM aura na eka-dUsare ke prabhAva se nitAnta vimukta / vaise vibhAgoM meM do vibhAga aise haiM jo sarvavidita haiM aura jinakA kArya pratyeka vyakti saralatA se samajha bhI sakatA hai| ve do vibhAga athavA aMza haiM zraddhA aura buddhi / prANimAtra kA jIvana ina do mukhya taToM ke bIca pravAhita aura vikasita hotA hai| yaha vikAsa hI dharma hai. kyoMki yahI jIvana ko dhAraNa karatA hai| parantu hama isa samaya jisa kakSA ke dharma ke viSaya meM vicAra karane vAle haiM vaha kakSA to mAnava jAti ke prArambha kAla se zurU hotI hai aura itara prANiyoM kI jIvana-kakSA se prAyaH bhinna hI hai| Adima mAnava se lekara Aja taka ke vikasita evaM saMskRta mAnava meM jisa dharma kA vikAsa huprA hai usakI nIva yadyapi zraddhA evaM buddhi hI hai, tathApi usa vikAsa ke mukhya tIna pahalU haiN| pahalA pahalU bhakti, upAsanA, pUjA athavA prArthanA kA hai,

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DHARMA AUR TATIVA 283 jisakI AdhArazilA zraddhA hai aura jisameM se kramazaH sAmpradAyika evaM panthadharma kA vikAsa hotA hai tathA jo bhinna-bhinna caukoM meM rUpAntarita hotA hai| dUsare pahalU kA vikAsa mukhya rUpa se buddhi athavA vizeSa prakAra kI samajha meM se hotA hai / yaha samAjalakSI hai; arthAt aiti bhika baloM ke parivartana ke sAtha hI isa pahalU kA sambandha uttarottara vizAla mAnava-samAja ke sAtha bar3hatA jAtA hai| isI ko hama samAjadharma ke nAma se pahacAnate haiM / tIsarA pahalU vyaktigata antarlakSI nigUDha anubhava ke AdhAra para vikasita hotA hai, jise hama adhyAtmadharma kaha sakate haiM ! / prAdimAnava patthara, vRkSa athavA prANI kI pUjA karatA thaa| isake avazeSa Aja bhI aneka rUpa meM vidyamAna haiN| isake anantara vaha prakRti ke sUrya, candra, samudra, parvata, nadI aAdi svarUpoM kA pUjana-satkAra karane lgaa| isa pUjA upAsanA kA preraka tattva kisI agamya evaM alaukika zakti-viSayaka usakI zraddhA hI rahA hai / dhIre-dhIre yaha zraddhA kisI eka sarvazaktimAna, sarvajJa aura sRSTi-saMhArakartA divya evaM alaukika tattva ke viSaya meM sthira hotI gii| yahI zraddhA advaita brahma tathA saba meM prAtmaupamya kI bhAvanA kA paripoSa karake bhI pUjA-upAsanA ke vividha svarUpoM meM pariNata huI hai| isa prakAra hama dekheM to mAnavajAti ke sAMskRtika samutthAna meM zraddhA kI vRtti agamya evaM alaukika zakti ke prati, bhinna-bhinna prayojana ke anusAra, manuSya ko vinamra, bhakta tathA upAsanAzIla banAne kI hI rahI hai| bhUmaNDala para isa samaya jitane mukhya pantha vidyamAna haiM aura unakA jo itihAsa jJAta hupA hai usa para se aisA kahA jA sakatA hai ki prAyaH sabhI dharma-pantha, kamoveza aMzameM, zraddhA kI parivatiSNu evaM vikAsazIla vRtti meM se hokara gujare haiN| dharma kI prArambhika bhUmikAmeM zraddhA hI, phira vaha cAhe jisa kAraNa se utpanna huI ho, mukhya hotI hai| parantu jaba usa zraddhA meM koI sphoTaka tattva samAviSTa hotA hai. arthAt koI vyakti usa pracalita zraddhA ko zithila banAkara usameM kucha saMzodhana karatA hai aura usa purAnI zraddhA ke bAre meM mana ko, buddhibala ke sahAre, sAzaMka banAtA hai, taba usa puruSa ke AsapAsa bhI eka samudAya ikaTThA ho jAtA hai| yahI samudAya Age jAkara usa dharma kA eka sampradAya athavA upapantha bana jAtA hai| isa prakAra buddhi aura jJAna-vijJAna kA jaise-jaise vikAsa hotA gayA, logoM meM samajhadArI adhikAdhika bar3hatI gaI, pahale dUra-dUra rahane vAle mAnavasamudAya evaM samAja adhika samIpa pAte gaye aura eka-dUsare ke jIvana meM protaprota hote gaye, vaise-vaise prAcIna zraddhA, pUjAvidhi aura upAsanA ke svarUpoM meM avazya parivartana hotA gyaa| kabhI-kabhI manuSya buddhi evaM jJAna ke prakAza meM cauMdhiyAkara zraddhA kA kArya, jo ki antima AzvAsana pradAna karatA hai usako, bhUla bhI gayA; phira bhI zraddhA to sAmudAyika jIvana meM apanA nirdhArita kArya karatI hI rahI, kyoMki mAnava kA vyaktigata mana samaSTi-mana ke sAtha isa prakAra jur3A huA hai ki vaha prayatna kare to bhI samaSTimana se alaga hokara zAnti kA anubhava kabhI kara hI nahIM sakatA; aura samaSTi-mana to sAmudAyika jIvana ke pUjA-upAsanA Adi dhArmika pahaluoM meM bhI vyakta hotA hai / isIlie hama dekhate haiM ki bhinna-bhinna jAtiyoM, ToliyoM tathA dezoM meM basanevAle

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284 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 sabhI manuSya kisI-na-kisI dharma-pantha kA avalambana lekara gaharA santoSa anubhava karate haiN| ye dharma-pantha eka-dUsare kI mAnyatA evaM pUjApraNAlikA kI bhinnatA ke kAraNa bahuta bAra lar3e-jhagar3e bhI haiM, parantu anivArya rUpa se sahajIvana bitAne kA avasara upasthita hone para punaH eka-dUsare ke sAtha taTastha rahanA tathA sahiSNu bananA bhI sIkhe haiN| isa samaya jAnane yogya bar3e aura mukhya dharma-pantha lagabhaga teraha haiM, yadyapi isake avAntara bheda-prabheda to asaMkhya haiN| dharma ke isa pahalU kA svarUpa isa prakAra kahA jA sakatA hai : 1. isakA prAdhAra mukhyatayA zraddhA hai| vaha zraddhA bhI kisI agamya evaM alaukika divya zakti ke prati hotI hai phira bhale hI isake pratIka dRzya aura gamya prakAra ke hoN| 2. zraddhAjIvI dharma-panthoM kA eka lakSaNa yaha bhI hai ki ve anya panthoM ke sAtha jo mahatva kA sAmya hai usakI ora dhyAna na dekara unase apanA bheda dikhalAne vAle svarUpa para hI dhyAna kendrita karate haiM / isake pariNAmasvarUpa bheda kA hI poSaNa hotA rahatA hai / 3. koI bhI dharma-pantha apane AsapAsa samudAya jamA karake hI panapa sakatA hai / isalie usa-usa dharma-pantha ke anuyAyI vyakti ke mana meM sarvadA aisA hI vicAra aura utsAha ramamANa rahatA hai ki kisI bhI prakAra se dUsare pantha ke anuyAyiyoM ko apane pantha kI ora mor3anA cAhie / itanA hI nahIM, yadi koI vyakti usake pantha kA tyAga karatA ho to vaha usake prati ghRNAbhAva rakhatA hai athavA udAsInatA dhAraNa karatA hai / 4. dharma ke pAnthika athavA sAmpradAyika pahalU ke sAtha aneka tattva saMkalita hote haiN| unameM se pUjA-upAsanA ke amuka vizeSa prakAra, inake lie guru evaM purohitavarga kA astitva tathA usake nirvAha ke lie kucha vyavasthA, mandira aura tIrthaM jaise dharmasthAna, dharmapradhAna nantha, granthoM kI prArambha se hI pavitra mAnI jAnevAlI koI eka bhASA, pantha ke anuyAyiyoM kA kriyAkANDa evaM utsavapradhAna sAmudAyika jIvana, apane-apane pantha ke anuyAyiyoM meM pArasparika ekatva kI bhAvanA ityAdi lakSaNa pratyeka pantha meM dIye jaise spaSTa dikhAI par3ate haiN| __ isa zraddhApradhAna sampradAya kA astitva mAnavavarga ke sAtha, usake jIvana kI bhAMti avibhAjya rUpa se jur3A huA hai| isakA eka aura ananya kahA jA sake vaisA lAbha yaha hai ki manuSya kevala indriyagamya dRzya loka meM hI prAbaddha na rahakara dRSTimaryAdA se bAhara ke Urdhvaloka kI ora bhI dRSTikSepa karane lagatA hai, usako dhyAna meM rakhakara jIvana meM UrdhvagAmitA ke poSaNa ke lie yathAzakti puruSArtha karatA hai aura usameM eka prakAra kI Antarika tRpti kA bhI anubhava karatA hai, jisake binA usakA jIvana nIrasa aura zuSka ho jAne kI adhika sambhAvanA rhtii| isa UrdhvagAmI jIvana kI dizA meM prayANa karane para bIca meM aneka vahama ora saMkucitatA ke bhayasthAna bAdhA upasthita karate haiM, parantu anta meM buddhi evaM puruSArtha sahAyatA karake usakA uddhAra bhI karate |

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 285 haiN| isI kAraNa dharma kA sAmpradAyika pahalU sarvadA kucha na kucha siddhi dikhalAtA hI rahA hai| dharma kA dUsarA pahalU sAmAjika hai| samAja eka se kada kA aura eka hI prakAra kA sarvadA nahIM rahA hai hajAroM varSoM meM vaha parivartana aura vikAsa kI aneka bhUmikAoM meM se vyatIta hokara prAja kI sthiti para pahuMcA hai| manuSya guhAvAsI thA taba usakA samAja bahuta choTA aura idhara udhara vikharA huA thaa| isake pazcAt jaba vaha apane pazuoM ke sAtha bhinna-bhinna sthAnoM meM khAnAbadoza sthiti meM bhaTakane lagA usa samaya yadyapi usake sAmAjika svarUpa meM kucha parivartana to huA, kintu usake samAja kA kada to choTA hI rhaa| khAnAbadoza sthiti meM se jaba vaha khetI para AyA taba vaha kucha sthira huA aura usake choTe-bar3e yUtha banane lge| isImeMse Age jAkara choTe-bar3e gAMvoM kA vikAsa huaa| isa prakAra parivartita hote-hote mAnava samAja prAja kI sthiti para pahu~cA hai| Aja to bhinna-bhinna mahAdvIpoM, dezoM aura unake pradezoM meM rahane para bhI, vikasita yAMtrika vAhana-vyavahAra ke kAraNa, mAno eka hI bar3e nagara meM saba basate hoM aisA pratIta hotA hai| ___ Adima mAnava-kuTumboM se lekara Aja ke vizAla samAja kI sthiti meM manuSya pahuMcA hai to sahI, parantu yaha sarvathA sIdhe mArga se-ulajhana, saMgharSa aura mArakATa ke bavaNDaroM kI thaper3e khAye binA nahIM phuNcaa| aneka bAra bhinna-bhinna samAja aura dala, choTe-bar3e kAraNoM se raNakSetra meM utare haiM aura virodhI dala kA nAmo-nizAna na rahe isa prakAra kA unakA eka-dUsare ke sAtha vyavahAra rahA hai, phira bhI mAnavasamAja to uttarottara sampanna hI hotA gayA hai aura dina-pratidina vistRta hone vAle prApasI sambandhoM ke kAraNa unameM nikaTatA bhI adhikAdhika pAtI gaI hai| ___ anekavidha prAsurI saMgrAmoM ke hone para bhI bhinna-bhinna choTe-bar3e mAnava samudAyoM ke bIca saMvAda kA jo tattva Upara uThatA rahA hai usake mUla meM kyA hai-aisA prazna sahajamAva se ho sakatA hai| isakA uttara sAmAjika dharma meM se prApta hotA hai / itara prANiyoM kI apekSA manuSya meM prema, Atmaupamya aura ahiMsA kA bIja atyadhika mAtrA meM sannihita rahatA hai| yaha bIja cAhe jaise visaMvAdoM ko bhI anta meM zAnta karake apanA kAma karatA hI rahatA hai| jisa prakAra eka kuTumba meM athavA eka dehAta meM bahuta bAra vikaTa saMgharSa paidA hone para bhI anta meM eka dUsare se mile binA caina nahIM par3atA, usI prakAra choTe-bar3e sabhI mAnava samudAyoM kA hai| manuSya jaise apane Apako atyanta cAhatA hai, vaise hI vaha auroM ko bhI usI parimANa meM cAhakara santoSa kA anubhava karatA hai| yaha cAha premazakti kA bAhya rUpa hai / prema yA ahiMsA jaise-jaise, samajhadArI ke sAtha athavA lAcArI se, jIvana meM vikasita hotI hai, vaise-vaise virodhI samAjoM ke bIca saMvAda sthApita hotA jAtA hai / yaha mUlagata premavRtti hI samAjadharma kI Antarika aura Thosa nIva hai| jinhoMne isa AdhArabhUta tattva ko jIvana meM utArA thA aura jo isake lie vizeSa prayatna karate rahe una prajJAzIla evaM vivekI santoM ne mAnavavarga ko mukhya dharma ke isa sAmAjika pahalU kI Jain Education International

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286 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I ora modd'aa| isake phalasvarUpa mAnavajAti paralokalakSI evaM zraddhAjIvI sAmpradAyika dharma kI bhUmikAmeMse Age bar3hakara pratyakSagamya evaM ihalokalakSI sAmAjika dharma kI bhUmikA ko savizeSa samajhane ke lie prerita huI / samAjadharma ke bAhyaniyama deza evaM kAlabheda se badalate rahate haiM, parantu una niyamoM kA jIvAnubhUta tattva to prema athavA ahiMsA kA bIja hI hai| isa bIja kA poSaNa zraddhA se hI hotA hai, parantu usameM mAtA kI-sI sa~bhAla rakhane vAle vivekarUpI poSaka tattva kI vizeSa apekSA rahatI hai| isa samaya saba dezoM meM jaise samAjalakSI niyama haiM vaise hI pahale samaya meM bhI the| bhArata meM vaise niyamoM kA digdarzaka vizAla sAhitya upalabdha bhI hai / gautama dharmasUtra aura manusmRti jaise smRtigrantha isake nidarzana haiN| cAra varNa aura cAra Azrama ke DhAMce meM una granthoM meM usa samaya taka ke vikasita mAnava dharma kA nirUpaNa kiyA hai / unameM jaise jIvanavyavasAya kI bhinna-bhinna pravRttiyoM ko susaMvAdI banAne ke niyama haiM. vaise hI vyaktigata jIvana ko prAdyanta susaMvAdI banAne ke bhI vidhAna haiN| ijipta, yUnAna tathA anya prAcIna sabhyatA vAle dezoM meM bhI isI se milatI-julatI samAjadharma kI vyavasthA thii| Aja jaise-jaise vizva samIpa AtA gayA, vaisevaise mAnavasamAja ke lie zAntipUrvaka jIne ke naye niyama bhI banate gaye aura ve mAnya bhI hote rahe / yaha eka sAmAjika dharma kA AzIrvAda rUpa bAhya-dekhA jA sake vaisApahalU hai, parantu vAstava meM usakA mUla to mAnava ke citta meM avibhAjya evaM sahajasiddha hai| ___ jaba manu anekavidha varNa aura pAzrama-viSayaka vyAvahArika niyamoM kA varNana karate haiM taba ve usa aAntarika mUlagata dharma ke svarUpa ko tanika bhI nahIM bhuulte| isIlie ve manusmRti meM ahiMsA, satya Adi dasa prakAra ke dharma ke rUpa meM athavA satpuruSa ke viveka ke rUpa meM usa Antarika dharma kA bhI sUcana karate haiN| jaina, bauddha Adi aneka zramaNadharma bhI astitva meM prAte gaye aura unakA vikAsa hotA gyaa| unhoMne yadyapi samAja ke sabhI staroM ko lakSa meM rakhakara manu Adi smRtikAroM kI bhAMti sAmAjika dharmoM kA varNana to nahIM kiyA, parantu una dharmoM ke antaHprANatulya avara athavA prema dharma kA nirUpaNa karane aura usakA vikAsa karane meM unakA apekSAkRta adhika yogadAna rahA hai| dharma ke pahale pahalU ke rUpa meM nirUpita upAsanA athavA panthadharma ke tathA dUsare pahalU isa sAmAjika dharma ke bIca jo antara hai vaha khAsa ullekhanIya aura jJAtavya hai| pahalA panthadharma mukhyatayA paralokalakSI evaM anIndriya tattva kI kisI-na-kisI prakAra kI zraddhA para sthApita hotA hai aura TikatA hai, jabaki isa sAmAjika dharma kI racanA mukhyatayA dRzya ihaloka ko lakSa meM rakhakara huI hai| upAsanA aura panthadharma to usa-usa dharma ke anuyAyI taka hI maryAdita hote haiM, jabaki sAmAjika dharma vibhinna jAtiyoM aura logoM ko bhI eka-sA mAnya hotA hai / upAsanA aura panthadharma meM buddhi evaM jJAnazakti avazya sahAyatA karatI hai, parantu usakA mUla AdhAra zraddhA hai, jaba ki

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DHARMA AUR TATTVA 287 sAmAjika dharma meM mUla AdhAra buddhi, samajhadArI aura viveka kA hai| alabattA, isa AdhAra ko dRr3ha banAne meM zraddhA kA bala kAma to karatA hI hai / upAsanA aura panthadharmakA yadi bahuta vikAsa ho bhI to vaha kevala dUsare pantha ke prati sahiSNutA athavA taTasthatA dhAraNa karane kI sImA taka hI hotA hai, parantu sAmAjika dharma jaba apane sahI artha meM vikasita hotA hai taba vaha paMtha, jAti, deza aura varNa ke bhedoM ko bhI miTA DAlatA hai| jisa prakAra upAsanA aura panthadharma mAnavajIvana kA eka ujjvala pahalU hai usI prakAra sAmAjika dharma bhI usakA dUsarA ujjvala pahalU hai / ina donoM pahaluoM ke prAdhAra hI sAmudAyika jIvana tRpti kA anubhava karatA hai| sAmAjika dharma kI jo mUla nIva hai vaha upAsanA athavA paMthadharma kI virodhI nahIM hai; ulTA, vaha usake ujjvala aMga ko adhika samujjvala banAtI hai / dharma kA tIsarA pahalU AdhyAtmika hai| AdhyAtmika dharma kA udgama jIva meM jaba apane satya svarUpa kI jijJAsA aura usakI abhIpsA jagatI hai taba hotA hai / jaba aisA udgama hotA hai taba vaha jIva paramAtmA athavA vItarAga jaise atyanta vizuddha Adarza kI ora abhimukha hotA hai / yaha abhimukhatA hI use apane ApakA antanirIkSaNa karane ke lie satata preraNA detI rahatI hai, jisake kAraNa yaha AdhyAtmika jIva apane kisI bhI doSa athavA mala ko sahana nahIM kara sakatA aura usake nivAraNa kI dizA meM nirantara prayatnazIla rahatA hai| AdhyAtmika dharma kI isa yAtrA kA preraka bala hai zraddhA aura vivekabuddhi arthAt prajJA kA samatva / isa yAtrA meM zraddhA jIva ko sanmArga para TikAye rakhatI hai aura prajJA use unmArga meM jAne se rokatI hai| yaha sthiti hI zraddhA aura prajJA kI bhUmikA hai / jaise-jaise zraddhA aura prajJA kI bhUmikA vikasita hotI jAtI hai, vaise-vaise jIva ke mUlagata zuddha svarUpa kA adhikAdhika AvirbhAva hotA jAtA hai| taba aise AdhyAtmika dharma meM satya, ahiMsA Adi sadguNoM kA svataH vikAsa hone lagatA hai| AdhyAtmika dharma sAmpradAyika athavA sAmAjika dharma kI bhA~ti sAmudAyika nahIM hai| vaha hai to vyaktigata, parantu yaha sAmpradAyika aura sAmAjika donoM dharmoM ko ujjvala karatA hai| eka prakAra se dekheM to prAdhyAtmika dharma kA ina donoM dharmoM ke sAtha koI virodha nahIM hai, to dUsarI ora usakA ina dharmoM ke sAtha kabhI-kabhI virodha bhI paidA hotA hai / parantu AdhyAtmika dharma kI vizeSatA yaha hai ki vaise virodha ko kAlakrama se dUra karake yaha usameM se mAnavajAti ke lie eka nayA hI rasAyana paidA karatA hai aura sAmpradAyika dharma ke choTe-bar3e caukoM ko bhedakara sAmAjika dharma kI saMkucita sImAoM ko vizAla banAtA hai / isIlie hama dekhate haiM ki mUlata: vyaktigata hone para bhI yaha AdhyAtmika dharma mAnavajAti ke liye sadA AzIrvAda rUpa hI rahA hai / isa prakAra dharma ke ina tIna pahaluoM ke dvArA mAnavadharma kI samagra prAkRti aMkita huI hai|

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288 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 bhAratIya tathA vizva ke itara dharmoM ke bAre meM aMgrejI Adi bhASAmoM meM aneka pustakeM paThanIya haiN| kaI bhAratIya bhASAoM meM bhI isa viSaya kI pustakeM upalabdha haiM, tathApi maiM yahA~ to do pustakoM kA nirdeza karanA yogya samajhatA hU~, jo isa viSaya ke jijJAsuoM ke lie khAsa paThanIya haiN| pahalI pustaka hai zrI je0 e0 maeNkyUloza-likhita Religion : Its Origin and Forms (The Temple Primers, London, 1904). dUsarI pustaka gujarAtI meM jisakA nAma hai 'dharmavarNana' (prakAzaka : prAcyavidyA maMdira, bdd'audaa)| isake lekhaka suprasiddha vidvAn svargIya DaoN0 AnandazaMkara bApUbhAI dhruva haiM / nissandeha DaoN0 dhruva kI yaha pustaka itanI adhika prAmANika paura upayogI hai ki kama se kama sabhI jijJAsu bhAratavAsiyoM ke lie yaha paThanIya hai /

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dharma evaM badalate hue mUlya nathamala TATiyA (1) jo vastu hameM iSTa hai vahI hamAre lie mUlya hai| usa iSTa vastu kI prApti ke sAdhana bhI mUlya hI haiN| udAharaNArtha-putra, vitta evaM svargAdi loka mUlya haiM, evaM unakI prApti ke sAdhana rUpa se iSTa yAga-yajJa, vrata, tapasyA Adi bhI mUlya haiN| iSTa mUlyoM ko hama sAdhya-mUlya kaha sakate haiM evaM unakI prApti ke upAyoM ko hama sAdhana-mUlya kI saMjJA de sakate haiN| buddha ne avidyA evaM tRSNA ko sAMsArika jIvana kA hetu maanaa| bhagavAn mahAvIra ne isI bAta ko mohanIya karma mAnakara spaSTa kiyA / yoga-darzana meM tRSNA ko rAga kahA gayA hai / yoga-bhASya (1.7) meM rAga kI vyAkhyA isa prakAra hai sukhAbhijJasya sukhAnusmRtipUrvaH sukhe tatsAdhane vA yo garghaH, tRSNA, lobhaH, sa rAgaH / arthAt, jisa vyakti ne atIta meM sukha kA anubhava kiyA hai, usa vyakti ke mana meM, usa atIta anubhava ke smaraNa ke kAraNa, jo sukha evaM sukha ke sAdhanoM ke prati Asakti, tRSNA evaM lobha hai, vahI rAga hai / ki bhAratIya sabhI darzana saMsAra ko anAdi mAnate haiM, ata: yaha tRSNA bhI anAdi hai evaM koI bhI vyakti isake prabhAva se mukta nahIM hai| Adhunika yuga meM phrAyaDa ne isa tattva ko kAmatRSNA (libido) kI saMjJA dI hai, jise ve anAdi evaM ananta mAnate haiM, jabaki bhAratIya darzana usake prAtyantika unmUlana ke sAdhanoM meM bhI vizvAsa rakhate haiM / yaha tRSNA sabhI sAMsArika mUlyoM kA bIja hai| isake viparIta dUsare naitika evaM prAdhyAtmika mUlya bhI mAne gaye haiM, jo manuSya ko eka ucca stara para le jAte haiN| ina do prakAra ke mUlyoM ke bAre meM vaidika dArzanikoM meM maulika vivAda rahA hai, jisakI eka manoraMjaka carcA hama sAMkhya grantha yuktidIpikA (pRSTha 16-17. dillI, 1967) meM pAte haiN| prAcIna vaidika dharma meM trividha eSaNAoM ko yogya sthAna prApta thaa| para upaniSad kAla meM saMnyAsa ko pradhAnatA milI, jisakI parAkASThA hama sAMkhya-darzana meM dekhate haiM / mImAMsaka darzana sadaiva prAcIna vaidika dharma kA samarthaka rahA, yadyapi upaniSadoM kA prabhAva uttarottara bar3hatA hI gayA evaM zAMkara vedAnta meM usakA paryavasAna humA / yuktivIpikA meM ye do pakSa, atyAga-pakSa evaM saMnyAsa-pakSa ke rUpa meM ubhara Aye haiM / sAMkhya dArzanika bhI veda kA prAmANya asvIkAra nahIM karate haiM (vahI, pRSTha 16), para ve apanA siddhAnta vedoM ke una aMzoM se phalita karate haiM, jinameM saMnyAsa kA upadeza diyA gayA hai / apane pakSa meM vRhadAraNyaka (4. 4. 22) kA nimnokta vAkya uddhRta karate haiM : 1. jaina yuvaka saMgha, bambaI, ke tattvAvadhAna meM bhAratIya vidyA bhavana meM 18 agasta, 1971 ko diyA gayA bhaassnn| . 18

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290 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I etameva viditvA munirbhavati etameva pravrAjino lokamiJchantaH pravrajanti / etaddha sma vai tatpUrve vidvAMsaH prajAM na kAmayante kiM prajayA kariSyAmo yeSAM no'yamAtmA'yaM loka iti, te ha sma putraiSaNAyAzca lokeSaNAyAzca vyutthAyAtha bhikSAcayaM caranti / arthAt isa brahma ko hI jAna kara muni hotA hai, isI brahmaloka kI icchA se saMnyAsI loga saMnyAsa grahaNa karate haiM / yahI kAraNa hai ki pahale ke RSi santati kI kAmanA nahIM karate the hameM santati se kyA prayojana ? hamAre lie, yaha brahma hI AtmA hai, loka hai / aise RSi putra kAmanA, vitta-kAmanA evaM loka- kAmanA se pare hokara bhikSATana se jIvana yApana karate haiM / isake viparIta mImAMsaka apane pratyAga siddhAnta ke pakSa meM nimnokta vAkya uddhRt karate haiM : (ka) jarAmayaM matet satraM yadagnihotradarza paurNamAsI, jarayA ha etasmAt satrAdvimucyate, mRtyunA ca ( zAbara bhASya 2.4.4) / arthAt ye agnihotra evaM darzapaurNamAsa zAzvata yajJa haiM / jarA yA mRtyu Ane para hI ina karttavyoM se puruSa mukta ho sakatA hai / (kha) kurvanneveha karmANi jijIvizecchataM samAH ( IzAvAsyopaniSat 2 ) / arthAt vihita karmoM kA anuSThAna karatA huaa| sau varSa taka jIne kI kAmanA kare / ina uddharaNoM se yaha spaSTa ho jAtA hai ki donoM pakSa apane-apane dhyeya kI prApti ke lie do bhinna mArga apanAte rahe / mImAMsaka svarga ko hI uccatama dhyeya mAnate haiM yadyapi paravartI kAla meM unakA svarga mokSa jaisA hI bana gayA / sAdhya-bhUta mUlya badala gayA, para sAdhana-bhUta mUlya ke bAre meM naye mata ke sAtha prAcIna mata kA sAmaMjasya sthApita nahIM ho pAyA / jaina evaM bauddha dharma, jo mokSavAdI haiM, yajJa evaM brAhmaNa zabdoM kI navIna vyAkhyA prastuta karate haiM / uttarAdhyayana sUtra ke harikezIyAdhyayana (43-46) evaM yajJIyAdhyayana ( 16-33 ) isa prasaMga meM dRSTavya haiM / pAli piTaka ke sutanipAta ke brAhmaNa dhammika sutta (16-26) meM pazu-yajJoM kI utpatti ke kAraNa batAye gaye haiM tathA vahIM ( 12 ) cAvala, ghRta Adi se kiye jAne vAle prAcIna yajJoM kA bhI ullekha haiN| yajJa kI navIna vyAkhyA hama mAghasutta meM dekhate haiM / dhammapada ke brAhmaNavagga meM brAhmaNa kA svarUpa batAyA gayA hai / saMkSepa meM aisA kahA jA sakatA hai ki pradhAnatayA sAdhanabhUta mUlyoM ke prazna para hamAre dArzanika sampradAya ina do vibhAgoM meM baMTa gaye - ( 1 ) karmakANDI sampradAya evaM (2) saMnyAsI sampradAya / karmakANDI sampradAya ke udAharaNArtha hama durgAsaptazatI meM bhakta dvArA devI ko saMbodhita nimnokta prArthanA ko le sakate haiM : dehi saubhAgyamArogyaM dehi meM paramaM sukham / rUpaM dehi jayaM dehi yazo dehi dviSo jahi // arthAt, yujhe saubhAgya do, Arogya do, utkRSTa sukha do, jaya do, yaza do, mere zatruoM kA nAza karo /

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DHARMA EVAM BADALATE HUE MULYA 291 dUsarI ora, nivRtti-mArgI jaina AcArya samantamad svAmI kI nimnoddhRta stuti ko hama dekha sakate haiM, jisameM uparyukta pravRtti mArga ko tyAjya batAyA gayA hai (svayambhUstotra, 46) : apatyavittottaralokataSNayA tapasvinaH kecana karma kurvate / bhavAnpunarjanma-jarA-jihAsayA trayIM pravRti samadhIravAruNat / / arthAt, kitane hI tapasvI jana saMtAna, dhana tathA paraloka kI tRSNA ke vazIbhUta hokara karmakANDa meM rata rahate haiN| parantu Apa samabhAvI haiM evaM prApane punarjanma evaM jarA ko dUra karane kI icchA se mana, vacana tathA kAya-ina tInoM kI pravRtti ko rokA hai| hamane Upara kucha sAMsArika mUlyoM kI carcA kii| ina mUlyoM kA vargIkaraNa artha aura kAma ke rUpa meM bhI kiyA jAtA hai / dharma, artha kAma evaM mokSa ye cAra puruSArtha haiM / inameM mokSa parama puruSArtha hai, tathA dharma usa parama puruSArtha taka pahu~cane kA mArga hai / aise to artha evaM kAma kA prAdhAra bhI dharma hI hai, kyoMki dharma rahita artha evaM kAma anta meM ahitakara hI siddha hote haiN| dharma bhI artha evaM kAma ke binA panapa nahIM sktaa| isa artha meM dharma-puruSArtha artha evaM kAma kA mUla bhI hai aura phala bhii| zrImadbhagavadgItA upayukta cAroM puruSArthoM meM sAmaMjasya sthApana karane kA prayatna karatI hai| jaina evaM sthaviravAdI bauddha mokSa-puruSArtha ko hI pradhAnatA dete haiM evaM nivRttipradhAna dharma ko hI ekamAtra mokSamArga mAnate haiM / mahAyAnI bauddhoM kA mata isa viSaya meM karIba-karIba gItA jaisA hI hai| mokSa kevala eka vyaktigata prazna nahIM hai. usakA sambandha samAja ke sabhI aMgoM se hai jo avibhAjya rUpa se jur3e hue haiM / AdhyAtmika mUlyoM ke antargata ahiMsA, aparigraha Adi ginAye jAyeMge, jinakA parama sAdhya mokSa hai, yadyapi sAMsArika hita kI prApti ke lie bhI ve paramAvazyaka haiN| (2) mUlyoM kI isa sAmAnya carcA ke bAda aba dharma ke bAre meM kucha vicAra karanA Avazyaka hai| kucha dharma IzvaravAdI haiM, jo Izvara ko hI vizva-vyavasthA ke mUla niyantA ke rUpa meM mAnate haiN| ina dharmoM se bhinna kucha aise dharma bhI haiM, jo apane karma-siddhAntoM ke AdhAra para hI vizvavyavasthA kI vyAkhyA karate haiN| inake mata meM karmatattva hI carAcara jagat kA niyantA hai| kucha aise dharma bhI haiM jo aisA eka advaita tattva mAnate haiM, jo svayaM hI upAdAna evaM nimita kAraNa ke rUpa meM carAcara jagat ke mUla meM vidyamAna hai| Adhunika cintana isa antima vicAra-dhArA ke anukUla hai| IzvaravAdI dharma upAsya sarvazaktimAn Izvara ke binA dharma kI kalpanA hI nahIM kara skte| usI taraha nirIzvaravAdI, jaise jaina evaM bauddha dharma, yaha samajhane meM asamartha haiM ki Izvara kaise isa viSamatA pUrNa jagat ke kartA ho sakate haiN| jar3a jagat ke vaijJAnika niyama evaM manojagat ke kucha rahasyoM kA prAdhunika saphala vizleSaNa hameM tIsarI vicAra-dhArA kI aora svataH AkRSTa karate haiN| kucha bhI ho, para samAja-vyavasthA ke lie bhautika unnati, jisakA samAveza artha evaM kAma puruSArtha meM kiyA jA sakatA

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292 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I hai, ke sAtha ahiMsA, aparigraha, Adi naitika evaM prAdhyAtmika mUlyoM kI AvazyakatA anivArya hai| hama apanA yaha adhyayana, sahUliyata kI dRSTi se, bhAratIya dharmoM taka hI sImita rakheMge, tAki ina dharmoM meM vivecita mUlyoM ke itihAsa para hama vizeSa rUpa se prakAza DAla skeN| (3) mUlyoM ke vivecana ke prasaGga meM hamane Upara kucha mUlyoM kA ullekha kiyA hai, jaise yAga-yajJa, vrata, tapasyA, mokSa prAdi / aba hama dekheM ki kisa taraha mUlya badalate haiN| eka hI nAma se prasiddha mUlya kA svarUpa bhinna-bhinna dharmoM meM bhinna-bhinna prakAra kA ho sakatA hai| udAharaNArtha mokSa ko liijie| jaina, bauddha, vedAnta prAdi darzanoM meM mokSa ke svarUpa bhinna bhinna haiM, yadyapi una saboM ke lie mukti, mokSa, nirvANa jaise zabda nirvivAda rUpa se vyavahRta hote the| isa prakAra ke bheda ko hama tiryak bheda kaha sakate haiM, jo eka hI zabda ke samakAlIna vibhinna prarthoM kA dyotaka hai| samakAlIna dharmoM meM vibhinna arthavAcI yajJa zabda bhI isa tiryak bheda kA dRSTAnta hai| isI taraha yaha bhI dekhA jAtA hai ki eka hI zabda eka hI dharma-sampradAya meM bhinna-bhinna kAla meM bhinna-bhinna artha dhAraNa karatA huA gujaratA hai| udAharaNArtha yajJa zabda ko liijiye| zrImadbhagavadgItA meM sarvagata brahma hI yajJa meM sadA adhiSThita mAnA gayA hai-tasmAt sarvagataM brahma nityaM yajJe pratiSThitam (3.15) / anAsakta karma hI vaidika yajJa kA tAtparya hai (3.16) / gItA (4.24) spaSTarUpeNa kahatI hai-arpaNa arthAt havana karane kI kriyA brahma hai, haviH arthAt arpaNa karane kA dravya brahma hai, brahmAgni meM brahma ne havana kiyA hai-isa prakAra jisakI buddhi meM sabhI karma brahmamaya haiM, usako brahma hI milatA hai : brahmArpaNaM brahma havibrahmAgnau brahmaNA hutam / brahmava tena gantavyaM brahmakarmasamAdhinA // apane samaya taka vikasita vibhinna yajJoM kI sUcI gItA (4.28) meM isa prakAra prastuta kI gaI hai : dravyayajJAstapo yajJA yogayajJAstathApare / svAdhyAya-jJAnayajJAzca yatayaH saMzitavratAH / / arthAt, tIkSNa vrata kA AcaraNa karane vAle yati koI dravya rUpa, koI tapa rUpa, koI yoga rUpa, koI svAdhyAya rUpa aura koI jJAna rUpa yajJa kiyA karate haiN| isI prasaMga meM pAkhira (4.32-3) meM kahA gayA hai : evaM bahuvidhA yajJA vitatA brahmaNo mukhe / karmajAn viddhi tAnsarvAnevaM jJAtvA vimokSyase / / zreyAn dravyabhayAdyajJAjjJAnayajJaH parantapa / sarva karmAkhilaM pArtha jJAne parisamApyate //

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DHARMA EVAM BADALATE HUE MULYA 293 arthAt, "isa prakAra bhA~ti-bhA~ti ke yajJa brahma ke hI mukha meM arpita haiM / yaha jAno ki ve saba karma se niSpanna hote haiM / yaha jJAna ho jAne se tU mukta ho jAyagA / he parantapa ! dravyamaya yajJa kI apekSA jJAnamaya yajJa zreSTha hai, kyoMki he pArtha! saba prakAra ke samasta karmoM kA paryavasAna jJAna meM hotA hai / " bhaktimAgiyoM ke lie gItAkAra japayajJa kA vidhAna isa prakAra karate haiM (10.25) - ajJAnAM japayajJo'smi; arthAt, yajJoM meM maiM svayaM japayajJa hU~ / manusmRti (3.70 - 1 ) ke pA~ca mahAyajJa bhI isa prasaMga meM mananIya haiM / yajJa zabda kA pUrA itihAsa isa taraha spaSTa ho jAtA hai / isa prakAra ke kAlika bheda ko hama UrdhvagAmI parivartana kaha sakate haiM / ukta urdhvagAmI parivartana ke dRSTAnta ke rUpa meM yoga zabda ko bhI liyA jA sakatA hai / yoga zabda kA prAcIna artha thA cittavRttiyoM kA nirodha ( yogazcittavRttinirodhaH -- yogasUtra, 1.2 ) / parantu gItA (2.48 ) ke anusAra yoga kA artha hai kArya kI siddhi yA prasiddhi jo bhI ho, usameM samabhAva rakhanA / karma karane kI kuzalatA ko bhI gItA meM yoga kahA gayA haiH yogaH karmasu kauzalam (2.50 ) / yaha yoga zabda kA artha hai karmayoga / mImAMsakoM ke karmakANDa ke sthAna para karmayoga kI sthApanA karate hue gotAkAra ne saMnyAsamArga kA bhI punarmUlyAMkana kiyA jo isa prakAra hai (gItA, 5.2) : saMnyAsaH karmayogazca niHzreyasakarAvubhau / tayostu karmasaMnyAsAtkarmayogo viziSyate // dekhate haiM arthAt, karmasaMnyAsa evaM karmayoga -- ye donoM mArga mokSa prApta karA dene vAle haiM, parantu ina donoM meM karmasaMnyAsa kI apekSA karmayoga kI yogyatA vizeSa hai / isa taraha hama ki yoga zabda jo mUla meM citasamAdhi ke artha meM prayukta thA evaM mAtra vyaktigata mukti kA sAdhana thA, vaha uttaravartI kAla meM vyakti evaM samAja ke hita sAdhana kI dRSTi se kiye gaye sabhI prakAra ke kartavyoM kA vAcaka bana gayA / Adhunika yuga meM lokamAnya tilaka ( gItA rahasya, prakaraNa 11 ) evaM mahAtmA gAMdhI ke hAthoM meM to yaha karmayoga aura bhI vyApaka bana gyaa| gItA ke karmayoga para gAMdhIjI likhate haiM- "karma karate hue bhI manuSya baMdhana mukta kaise rahe ? jahA~ taka mujhe mAlUma hai, isa samasyA ko gItA ne jisa taraha hala kiyA hai vaise kisI bhI dharmagrantha ne nahIM kiyA hai| gItA kA kahanA hai, phalAsakti chor3o aura karma karo, AzArahita hokara karma karo, niSkAma hokara karma karo / yaha gItA kI vaha dhvani hai jo bhulAI nahIM jA sakatI / jo karma chor3atA hai vaha giratA hai / karma karate hue bhI jo usakA phala chor3atA haiM vaha car3hatA hai / phala tyAga kA yaha artha nahIM hai ki pariNAma ke sambandha meM lAparavAhI rahe / pariNAma aura sAghana kA vicAra aura usakA jJAna atyAvazyaka hai / itanA hone ke bAda jo manuSya pariNAma kI icchA kiye binA sAghana meM tanmaya rahatA hai vaha phalatyAgI hai" (anAsaktiyoga, prastAvanA) / likhate haiM- " sAdhAraNataH to yaha mAnA jAtA hai ki dharma aura artha vyApAra ityAdi laukika vyavahAra meM dharma nahIM ho sakatI, dharma kA upayoga kevala mokSa ke lie bacAyA jA sakatA, kiyA jA sakatA hai| gAMdhI jI Age virodhI vastu haiM, dharma ko jagaha nahIM dharma kI jagaha dharma

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294 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 1 zobhA detA hai aura artha kI jagaha arth| bahutoM se aisA kahate hama sunate haiM / gItAkAra ne isa bhrama ko dUra kiyA hai| usane mokSa aura vyavahAra ke bIca aisA bheda nahIM rakhA hai, varan vyavahAra meM dharma ko utArA hai| jo dharma vyavahAra meM na lAyA jA sake vaha dharma nahIM hai, merI samajha se yaha bAta gItA meM hai|" yoga zabda kI yaha prAdhunika vyAkhyA samayAnukUla mUlyoM ke utkramaNa kA eka spaSTa udAharaNa hai| mUlyoM ke UrdhvagAmI parivartana ke prasaMga meM brahmacarya, aparigraha, ahiMsA evaM mokSa tattva ke punarmUlyAMkana para bhI vicAra kiyA jA sakatA hai| jananendriya ke vikAroM para aMkuza rakhanA hI brahmacarya kA pAlana hai-aisA mAnA gayA thaa| para gAMdhIjI ne isa paribhASA ko vyApakatA pradAna kI, aura use jIvana meM utArane ke prayatna kiye / ve kahate haiM-"sAre viSayoM para aMkuza rakhanA hI brahmacarya hai / jo dUsarI indriyoM ko jahAM tahAM bhaTakane detA hai aura eka hI indriya ko rokane kI koziza karatA hai, vaha niSphala prayatna karatA hai, isameM kyA zaMkA hai" (saMyama aura saMtatiniyamana, navajIvana prakAzana maMdira, ahamadAvAda, 1962, pRSTha 113) / apane jIvana meM brahmacarya vrata utArane ke prasaMga meM gAMdhIjI kahate haiM :-"brahmacarya ke sampUrNa pAlana kA artha hai brhmdrshn| yaha jJAna mujhe zAstra dvArA nahIM huaa| yaha artha mere sAmane krama-krama se anubhavasiddha hotA gyaa| usase sambandha rakhanevAle zAstra-vAkya maiMne bAda meM pddh'e| aba brahmacarya ko eka ghora tatpazcaryA ke rUpa meM rahane dene ke badale use rasamaya banAnA thA, usI ke sahAre nibhanA thA isaliye aba usakI vizeSatAoM ke mujhe nita-naye darzana hone lage / isa prakAra yadyapi maiM isa vrata meM se rasa lUTa rahA thA, to bhI koI yaha na mAne ki maiM usakI kaThinAI kA anubhava nahIM karatA thA prAja mujhe 56 varSa pUre ho cuke haiM, phira bhI isakI kaThinatA kA anubhava to mujhe hotA hI hai| yaha eka prasidhArA vrata hai, ise maiM adhikAdhika samajha rahA huuN| aura nirantara jAgRti kI AvazyakatA kA anubhava kara rahA hU~" (vahI, pR0 100) / gAMdhIjI ke brahmacarya viSayaka isa punarmUlyAMkana kI dizA vahI hai jo unake dvArA kiye gaye karmayoga sambandhI vikAsa kI hai| aparigraha zabda kA artha hai parigraha nahIM rkhnaa| isa vrata ke pUrNa pAlana ke lie saMnyAsI loga vastra taka kA tyAga kara dete haiM, kyoMki vastra bhI to Akhira meM parigraha hI hai| yahAM taka to ThIka hai| para yadi koI aisA samajha le ki jIvanayAtrArtha apanI nyUnatama AvazyakatA kI pUrti ke lie jo vastra, pAtra Adi upakaraNa rakhatA hai vaha saMnyAsI hI nahIM hai, to paristhiti avyAvahArika bana jAtI hai| isa prazna ko lekara hI zAyada jaina saMgha zvetAmbara evaM digambara-ina do bhAgoM meM ba~Ta gyaa| jainAcArya vAcaka umAsvAti ne isa prazna kA samAdhAna-mUrchA parigrahaH (mUrchA arthAt Asakti hI parigraha hai, tattvArthasUtra 7.12) aisA kaha kara kiyaa| isa viSaya meM gAMdhIjI kahate haiM-"vAstava meM parigraha mAnasika vastu hai| mere pAsa ghar3I hai, rassI hai aura kaccha (laMgoTI) hai| inake abhAva meM yadi mujhe kleza hotA hai to maiM parigrahI huuN| yadi kisI ko bar3e kambala kI jarUrata hai to vaha use rakhe, para kho jAne para kleza na kare to vaha aparigrahI hai" (nItiH dharmaH varzana, gAMdhI-sAhitya-prakAzana, ilAhAbAda, 1968, pR0 27) /

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DHARMA EVAY BADALATE HUE MULYA 295 ahiMsA vrata kA artha hai hiMsA se virati / hiMsA kA sthUla artha hai prANi-vadha / isa prANi-vadha se bacane ke lie jaina dharma meM kaI niyama kiye gaye haiM, jinakA pAlana asaMbhava nahIM to atyanta duSkara to hai hii| bhAratIya dharmoM ke itihAsa meM ahiMsA-siddhAnta atyanta ghaniSTa rUpa se jaina dharma se sambaddha hai| dravya-hiMsA aura bhAva-hiMsA kA vizleSaNa jaina darzana kA eka mahattvapUrNa viSaya hai| ahiMsA para jaina dharma ne itanA adhika bhAra diyA ki jaina sampradAya nivRttimArga kI parAkASThA para pahu~ca gayA evaM avyAvahArikasA pratIta hone lgaa| phalasvarUpa jaineta ra cintaka jaina dharma ko ati duHsAdhya samajhane lge| dUsarI ora bauddha dharma meM ahiMsA ko itanA zithila kara diyA gayA ki bauddha dharma kI loga kaTu AlocanA karane lge| parantu paravartI kAla meM vAcaka umAsvAti ne hiMsA kA jo lakSaNa kiyA vaha bhAratIya darzana ko jaina darzana kI eka amUlya dena kahI jA sakatI hai| pAtaMjala-yoga-bhASya (2.30) meM ahiMsA kA lakSaNa nimnAMkita prakAra kiyA gayA thA-- ahiMsA sarvathA sarvadA sarvabhUtAnAmanabhidrohaH / arthAta, kisI prakAra se kisI jIva kA pIr3ana nahIM karanA hI ahiMsA hai| AcArya vasubandhu apane abhidharmakoza (4:73) meM prANAtipAta (= hiMsA) kI vyAkhyA isa prakAra karate haiM : prANAtipAta: saMcintya parasyAbhrAntimAraNam / arthAt, mArane kI icchA se dUsare prANI kA bhrAnti rahita (acUka) hanana karanA hI prANAtipAta hai| uparyukta donoM lakSaNoM meM pIr3ita yA hanana kriyA ko hI mahattva diyA gayA hai| parantu vAcaka umAsvAti ne hiMsA ke lakSaNa meM pramatta yoga kA hI prAdhAnya diyA hai| ve kahate haiM (tattvArthasUtra, 7.8) pramattayogAt prANavyaparopaNaM hisaa| arthAta, pramattayoga se hone vAlA prANavadha hiMsA hai| isa sUtra kA spaSTIkaraNa paMDita zrI sukhalAlajI ne isa prakAra kiyA hai-"hiMsA kI vyAkhyA do aMzoM dvArA pUrI kI gaI hai| pahalA aMza hai --pramattayoga arthAta rAgadveSayukta athavA asAvadhAna pravRtti, aura dUsarA hai-prANavadha / pahalA aMza kAraNa rUpa meM aura dUsarA kArya rUpa meM hai| isakA phalita artha yaha hai ki jo prANavadha pramattayoga se ho vaha hiMsA hai|" uparyukta carcA se yaha phalita hotA hai ki jaina darzana meM hiMsA-ahiMsA ke prazna ko jaisA mahatva diyA gayA hai vaisA jainetara darzanoM meM parilakSita nahIM hotaa| gAMdhIjI ne apane anAsaktiyoga meM ahiMsA ke svarUpa ko aura adhika vikasita kiyaa| gItA kA tAtparya phalatyAga tathA ahiMsA meM hai, na ki bhautika yuddha meN| gItA meM pazuhiMsA kA samarthana nahIM kiyA gayA hai| gItA kI gaharAI se naye-naye artha nikAle jA sakate haiM, kyoMki vaha eka mahAkAvya hai| apane samaya taka meM vikasita naitika tathA prAdhyAtmika mUlyoM kA navIkaraNa gItA ne kiyA evaM yuga-yuga meM hone vAle parivartanoM ko yotita karane kI zakti bhI usake mahAzabdoM meM vidyamAna hai| anAsaktiyoga

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296 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I kI zikSA gAMdhIjI ne gItA se prApta kI evaM usake tAtparya ko paryApta mAtrA meM vistRta bhI kiyaa| gAMdhIjI ke nimnokta kathana se yaha bAta spaSTa ho jAtI hai| ve kahate haiM-"gItA sUtragrantha nahIM hai / gItA eka mahAn dharmakAvya hai| usameM jitane gahare utariye utane hI usameM se naye aura sundara artha liijiye| gItA janasamAja ke lie hai, usane eka hI bAta ko aneka prakAra se kahA hai| prataH gItA meM Aye hue mahAzabdoM kA artha yuga-yuga meM badalatA aura vistRta hotA rhegaa| gItA kA mUlamaMtra kabhI nahIM badala sktaa| vaha maMtra jisa rIti se siddha kiyA jA sake usa rIti se jijJAsu cAhe jo artha kara sakatA hai| gItA vidhiniSedha batalAne vAlI bhI nahIM hai / eka ke lie jo vihita hotA hai, vahI dUsare ke lie niSiddha ho sakatA hai| eka kAla yA eka deza meM jo vihita hotA hai, vaha dUsare kAla meM, dUsare deza meM niSiddha ho sakatA hai / niSiddha kevala phalAsakti hai, vihita hai anAsakti' (anAsaktiyoma, prstaavnaa)| yuga, paristhiti evaM vaijJAnika prakAza ke anukUla dharma meM yA dhArmika mUlyoM meM parivartana honA svAbhAvika hai / yaha gItA kA niSkarSa hai| gAMdhIjI ke jIvana meM hama sabhI bhAratIya dharmoM kA mUrtimAna samanvaya pAte haiM, evaM yadi yaha kahA jAya ki gAMdhIjI hI ekamAtra aise mahApuruSa haiM jinake jIvana meM hindU, bauddha evaM jaina dharma ke ucca Adarza pUrNarUpeNa pratiphalita hue haiM to atyukti nahIM hogii| gAMdhIjI ati-karmI hote hue bhI ati-akarmI the| pravRtti evaM nivRtti kA pArasparika virodha, jo brAhmaNa evaM zramaNa paramparAoM ke dRSTibinduoM meM nihita thA, gAMdhIjI ke jIvana meM zAnta ho gyaa| jaina ahiMsA kI saccI vyAkhyA to vartamAna yuga meM gAMdhIjI ke jIvana meM hI dRSTigocara hotI hai| yuddha aura zAnti ke kSetra meM gAMdhIjI ne ahiMsA ke prayoga kie evaM phalasvarUpa satyAgraha kI kalpanA prAI / narasaMhArI yuddha kA koI pratidvandvI vikalpa ho sakatA hai to vaha satyAgraha hI hai / aba hama mokSa tattva ke vikAsa para dRSTi ddaaleN| mokSa kI kalpanA svarga kI kalpanA ke bAda hI prAI hogii| ho sakatA hai donoM kalpanAyeM svataMtra rUpa se utpanna huI hoN| kucha bhI ho, para mokSavAda kramazaH prabala hotA gayA evaM svargavAda saMkucita hotA gayA / prAyaH sabhI mokSavAdI saMsAra ko duHkhamaya mAnate haiN| sAMkhyakArikA (kArikA 1) kA nimnokta kathana sAmAnyataH prAyaH sabhI mokSavAdI dharmoM ko mAnya hai duHkhatrayAbhidhAtAjjijJAsA tadapadhAtake hetau| arthAt, AdhyAtmika, prAdhibhautika evaM Adhidaivika - ina trividha duHkhoM se pIr3ita hone ke kAraNa, una duHkhoM ko nAza karane vAle hetu ko jAnane kI icchA utpanna hotI hai / duHkha se sadA ke lie mukti pAnA ina sabhI dharmoM kA dhyeya hai, phira bhale hI mokSa yA nirvANa ko saccidAnanda rUpa mAnA jAya, yA zuddha cetanA rUpa mAnA jAya, yA jJAna, ajJAna, sukha, duHkha prAdi vizeSa guNoM se rahita prAtmA kI zuddha sthiti rUpa hI mAnA jAya / bhale bure sabhI prakAra ke karmoM se chuTakArA pAnA hI mokSa hai / saMsAra meM rahakara sAMsArika duHkhoM ko dUra karane tathA suvyavasthita samAja nirmANArtha prayatna karane kI dizA meM bhI ye dharma pravRtta rahe / para, cUMki nivRtti-pradhAna sAdhanA dvArA vyaktigata mokSa prApta karanA hI ina dharmoM kA mukhya uddezya thA, vaha sAmAjika pravRtti prAdhyAtmika dharma kA

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DHARMA EVAM BADALATE HUE MOLYA 297 manivArya evaM avibhAjya bhaMga nahIM bana sakI / parantu mahAyAnI bauddhoM ne aisI pravRtti ko dharma kA antaraMga mAnA / hInayAnI bauddhoM ne klezAvaraNa arthAt lobha, dveSa evaM moha se yukta hone ko hI nirvANa mAnA, jise mahAyAnI bauddhoM ne svIkAra nahIM kiyA / vizva ke sarvAMgINa hitasAdhana ko hI unhoMne dharma kA ekamAtra uddezya mAnA evaM usI uddezya se prerita hokara bodhicitta kI kalpanA kii| bodhicaryAvatAra (3.7-10) meM bodhicittagata saMkalpa kA varNana isa prakAra kiyA gayA hai glAnAnAmasmi bhaiSajyaM bhaveyaM vaidya eva ca / tadupazthAyakazcaiva yAvadrogApunarbhavaH / / kSutpipAsAvyathAM hanyAmannapAnapravarSaNaiH / dubhikSAntarakalpeSu bhaveyaM pAnabhojanam / / daridrANAM ca sattvAnAM nidhiH syAmahamakSayaH / nAnopakaraNAkArairupatiSTheyamagrataH // prAtmabhAvAMstathA bhogAn sarvatrayadhvagataM zubham / nirapekSastyajAmyeSa satvAsarvarthasiddhaye // arthAt, "vyAdhi pIr3itoM ke lie maiM prauSadha banUM evaM unakI roga nivRtti taka maiM unakA vaidya evaM paricAraka banA rhuuN| maiM prANiyoM kI kSudhA evaM pipAsA kI vyathA ko satata anna-pAna Adi ke sampAdana dvArA dUra karanA cAhatA huuN| durbhikSagrasta antarakalpoM meM maiM pAna tathA bhojana ke rupa meM pariNata honA cAhatA huuN| daridra prANiyoM ke lie maiM akSaya dhanarAzi bananA, tathA vividha upakaraNa banakara unake sAmane upasthita honA cAhatA huuN| maiM niSkAma bhAva se, apane zarIroM kA, bhogoM kA evaM pratIta, anAgata tathA vartamAna tInoM kAloM meM ajita puNya phaloM kA tyAga saba prANiyoM ke abhyudaya evaM nizreyasa kI siddhi ke nimitta karatA huuN|" bodhisattva taba taka mokSa prApta karanA nahIM cAhatA jabataka eka bhI prANI saMsAra meM kisI prakAra kA du:kha bhoga karatA ho| mokSa kI yaha udAtta kalpanA bauddha dharma kI eka apUrva dena hai| isa kalpanA ke mUla meM hai duHkhArta prANiyoM ke prati satata sakriya asIma karuNA evaM ananta prajJA / bhagavAn buddha ke saddharma kA vikAsa uttarottara hotA gayA, jisameM isa kalpanA ko eka pratyanta mahatvapUrNa sthAna . prApta huaa| badalate hue mUlyoM ke isa vivecana ke prasaMga meM paryuSaNa parva kI carcA karanA bhI asaMgata nahIM hogaa| paryuSaNa kA artha hai niyata sthAna meM vAsa karanA varSAvAsArtha upayukta sthAna kA cunAva bhAdra zuklA paMcamI taka kara lenA Avazyaka mAnA gayA thaa| ataH isa tithi ko anta meM yA prAdi meM rakha kara usake 8 dina pUrva yA 10 dina pazcAt taka paryuSaNa yA dazalakSaNI parva manAne kI prathA cala pdd'ii| hindU, jaina evaM bauddha granthoM se varSAvAsa kI carcAoM ke tulanAtmaka adhyayana se paryuSaNa parva ke kramavikAsa para kAphI prakAza DAlA jA sakatA hai| tAtparya yaha hai ki hamAre dhArmika parva ke svarUpa bhI yuga-yuga meM prayojanAnusAra badalate rahe haiN| 20

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298 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I .. (4) aba dharma evaM mUlyoM ke pArasparika sambandha para kucha vizeSa vicAra karanA prAvazyaka hai / jina dharmoM meM vizva ke sraSTA evaM niyantA ke rUpa meM Izvara yA prajApati kI kalpanA kI jAtI hai, una dharmoM meM sAMsArika, naitika evaM prAdhyAtmika sabhI mUlyoM kA AdhAra Izvara hI haiN| gItA (3.10-12) ke nimnokta zlokoM se yaha bAta spaSTa ho jAtI hai : sahayajJAH prajAH sRSTvA purovAca prajApatiH / anena prasaviSyadhvameSa vo'stivaSTakAmadhuk // devAn bhAvayatAnena te devA bhAvayantu vaH / parasparaM bhAvayantaH zreyaH paramavApsyatha / / iSTAnbhogAnhi vo devA dAsyanti yajJabhAvitAH / tairdattAnapradAyebhyo yo bhuGkte stena eva saH // arthAt, "prArambha meM yajJasahita prajA kI sRSTi karate hue brahmA ne unase kahAisa (yajJa) ke dvArA tumhArI vRddhi ho-yaha tumhArI kAmadhenu bane / tuma isase devatAoM ko santuSTa karate raho, aura ve devatA tumheM saMtuSTa karate rheN| isa prakAra paraspara eka dUsare ko saMtuSTa karate hue parama zreyaH prApta kara lo| yajJa se saMtuSTa hokara devatA loga tumhAre icchita bhoga tumheM dege| unhIM kA diyA huA unheM vApisa na dekara jo kevala svayaM upabhoga karatA hai vaha sacamuca cora hai|" deva, manuSya, pazu evaM vanaspati sahita sAre carAcara jagat ko Izvara saMcAlita karate haiM evaM unake karmAnusAra unheM phala dete haiN| prAtmA, punarjanma evaM karma ina IzvaravAdI dharmoM ko bhI mAnya haiM / anIzvaravAdI jaina, bauddha Adi dharmoM meM prAtmA yA vijJAna tattva ko hI Izvara ke sAre adhikAra de diye gaye haiN| prAtmA svataMtra hai| karmoM kA kartA evaM bhoktA vaha svayaM hai| prAtmA sarvazaktimAn hai| sarvajJa banane kI yogyatA bhI usameM hai| gItA ke uparyukta prajApati ke sthAna para jaina dharma ne apane prAdi tIrthaGkara bhagavAn RSabhadeva ko abhiSikta kiyA, jo apane hI prayatnoM se sarvajJatva prApta kara jagat ke prathama dharmapravartaka bane / unakI stuti karate hue jainAcArya svAmI samantabhadra kahate haiM :(svayambhUstotra, 1, 2, 5): svayambhuvA bhUtahitena bhUtale samaMjasa-jJAna-vibhUti-cakSuSA / virAjitaM yena vidhunvatA tamaH kSapAkareNeva guNotkare: karaiH / / 1 / / prajApatiryaH prathamaM jijIviSUH zazAsa kRSyAdiSu karmasu prajAH / prabuddhatattvaH punaradbhutodayo mamatvato nirvivide vidAMvara : // 2 // (punAtu ceto mama nAbhinandanaH paMkti 3, zloka 5) arthAta, "(vaha nAbhinandana zrI RSabhadeva mere antaHkaraNa ko pavitra kareM), jo svayambhU the (arthAt jo binA kisI dUsare ke upadeza ke prAtma-vikAsa ko prApta hue the), jo prANiyoM ke hita ke lie bhUmaNDala para samyak jJAna kI vibhUti rUpa netra ke dhAraka the aura apane guNasamUha rUpa kiraNoM se ajJAnAMdhakAra ko dUra karate hue pRthvItala para aise zobhAyamAna the jaise ki apanI prakAzakatvAdiguNaviziSTa kiraNoM se rAtri ke andhakAra ko dUra

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DHARMA EVAM BADALATE HUE MULYA 299 karatA huA pUrNa candramA suzobhita hotA hai; jinhoMne prathama prajApati ke rUpa meM (deza, kAla aura prajA paristhiti ke) tatvoM ko acchI taraha se jAnakara jIvanopAya ko jAnane kI icchA rakhanevAle prajAjanoM ko sabase pahale kRSi Adi karmoM meM zikSita kiyA, aura phira heyopAdeya tatva kA vizeSa jJAna prApta karake zrAzcaryakArI prakAza ko prApta hote hue jo mamatva se hI virakta ho gaye, evaM isa taraha jo tattvavettAtroM meM zreSTha hue / " ataH yaha spaSTa hai ki jaina dharma ke anunAra bhI mUlyoM kA udbhava dharma-pravartakoM se hI hotA hai / prAcIna bauddha dharma kI bhI isa viSaya meM yahI sthiti rahI / mahAyAna bauddha dharma meM avazya isameM AmUla parivartana hugrA / bodhisatva svayaM una mUlyoM ke rUpa meM sata avatarita honA cAhatA hai, jaisAki hamane Upara bodhicaryAvatAra grantha ke uddharaNa meM dekhA vedAnta darzana meM bhI aise vikAsa kI saMbhAvanA rahI, para zAyada vaha sAkAra nahIM ho pAI / / dharmoM ke sAtha mUlya abhinna rUpeNa saMzliSTha haiM / hamane yaha dekhA / hama yaha bhI kaha sakate haiM ki dharma mUlyagarbhita haiN| para jo dharma meM vizvAsa nahIM karate tathA zrAtmA, punarjanma evaM karma meM bhI zraddhA nahIM rakhate, unake lie mUlyoM kA kyA sthAna hai ? isa prazna para bhI vicAra kara lenA Avazyaka hai mUlyoM kA sraSTA evaM niyantA koI sarvazaktimAna puruSa hI ho sakatA hai / isa dRSTi se nAstikatA - vAdiyoM ke lie rASTra ke adhinAyaka yA jana-pratinidhiyoM ko hI Izvara yA karma kA sthAna prApta honA cAhie / vastusthiti bhI yahI hai / ye rASTranAyaka yA jana pratinidhi vibhinna dharmoM meM svIkRta lokasaMgrAhaka siddhAntoM se preraNA bhale hI leM, para zrAkhirI nirNAyaka to ve svayaM hI haiN| dharmanirapekSa mUlyoM ko mAnane meM bhI koI kaThinAI nahIM honI cAhiye, yadi ve mUlya bahujanahitAya bahujana sukhAya hoM / vAstava meM dharmaprasUta mUlyoM kA AdhAra bhI vahI bahujana hita evaM bahujana - sukha hai / (5) hamane mUlyoM para vicAra kiyA, evaM dharma para bhI vicAra kiyA / artha evaM kAma jaise sAMsArika mUlyoM kA bIja tRSNA hai / para ahiMsA, aparigraha, jaise naitika, evaM mokSa jaise AdhyAtmika mUlya tRSNArahita hone ke kAraNa ekAntataH lokahitakara hote haiM / ina lokahitakara tattvoM ke urdhvagAmI parivartana tathA vikAsa kI carcA hamane Upara kI hai / aba dekhanA hai ki ina tattvoM ko krama se sajAyA jA sakatA hai yA nahIM | isa prasaMga meM bauddha granthoM meM varNita chaH pAramitAoM para dRSTi DAla lenA Avazyaka hai / ye pAramitAyeM haiM- dAna, zIla kSAnti, vIrya, dhyAna evaM prajJA / inameM se prathama tIna se prabhyudaya prApta hotA hai, tathA zeSa tIna se niHzreyasa / ye saba citta kI avasthAyeM haiN| loka-hitArtha phalasahita sarvasva tyAga karane kI bhAvanA jaba parAkASThA ko pahu~ca jAtI hai evaM citta jaba mAtsarya rahita evaM anAsakta bana jAtA hai, taba citta kI usa avasthA ko dAnapAramitA kI saMjJA dI jAtI hai / prANAtipAtAdi sarva prakAra kI sAvadha pravRttiyoM se virati kI bhAvanA jaba apanI parAkASThA ko pahu~catI hai to mana kI usa sthiti ko zIla- pAramitA kahate haiM / krodhAdi se nivRtti ke abhyAsa kA carama utkarSa hI kSAntipAramitA kahalAtI hai / kuzala karmoM meM nirantara samudyama hI vIryaM hai / isa samudyama kI parAkASThA hI vIryapAramitA hai / kuzala pravRti meM satata saMlagna

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500 V AISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 rahane ke phalasvarUpa citta meM jo sthiratA pAtI hai, usakA carama utkarSa ko pahu~canA hI dhyAnapAramitA hai / ukta pAMcoM pAramitAyeM prajJApAramitA ke lie parikara kA kAma karatI haiN| prajJA zabda kA artha hai yathAvasthita vastutattva kI praviveka / isa praviveka kA parama prakarSa hI prajJApAramitA hai| isa prajJApAramitA kA gaNanA yadyapi sabase anta meM kI gaI hai, para yaha jAna lenA Avazyaka hai ki isake binA dAna, zIla, Adi kucha bhI parAkASThA taka nahIM pahu~ca skte| krama to vAstava meM yaha hai ki prajJA ke binA dhyAna nahIM, dhyAna ke binA vIrya nahIM, vIrya ke binA kSAnti nahIM, kSAnti ke binA zIla nahIM, evaM zIla ke binA dAna nahIM / prANAtipAtAdi se viramaNa rUpa zIla kA abhyAsa binA kiye koI niSkAma dAnI nahIM bana sktaa| isI taraha, kSAnti kA abhyAsa binA kiye zIlavAn bananA saMbhava nahIM, kAraNa kSamAvAn binA hue zIla kA pAlana duSkara hai| kSamA vIrasya bhUSaNam-yaha kathana sarvajanasvIkRta hai| ataH vIrya ke binA zAnti kI parAkASThA ko koI kaise pahuMca sakatA hai ? isI taraha dhyAna ke binA vIrya bhI saMbhava nahIM kyoMki samudyamI hone ke lie ekAgraMgA-janya saumanasya evaM prasannatA kI parama AvazyakatA hai / puna:, cUki dhyAna kI vizuddhi prajJA ke binA saMbhava nahIM, ataH prajJA kA vikAsa dhyAna ke lie anivArya mAnA jAtA hai| ina pAramitAnoM ke abhyAsa se cita-zuddhi prApta hotI hai, jo manuSya ko sahI rAste para le jAne meM sahAyaka hotI hai| bhautika, naitika tathA prAdhyAtmika sabhI prakAra kI unnati ke lie cittazuddhi kA honA ati Avazyaka hai / sacce vikAsa kI prAdhArazIlA cittavizuddhi hI hai / . aba hama ahiMsA, satya, asteya, brahmacarya evaM aparigraha para vicAra kreN| uparyukta dAnapAramitA kA samAveza asteya evaM aparigraha vratoM meM ho jAtA hai| zIlapAramitA kA samAveza brahmacarya vrata meM, evaM kSAntipAramitA kA samAveza ahiMsA vrata meM kiyA jA sakatA hai| prajJApAramitA kA antarbhAva sahaja hI satya vrata meM ho jAtA hai| isa dRSTi se hama ahiMsA prAdi vratoM ko nimnokta krama meM sajA sakate haiM-asteya, aparigraha, brahmacarya, ahiMsA evaM satya / isa krama meM satya hI sabhI vratoM kA niyAmaka tattva bana jAtA hai / jaina AgamoM kI nimnokta sUktiyAM bhI isameM caritArtha ho jAtI haiM (1) saccaM logammi sArabhUdaM (satya hI loka meM sArabhUta hai)| (2) paDhamaM gANaM to dayA (pahale jJAna, bAda meM dyaa)| gAndhI darzana meM bhI satya kA sthAna pahalA hI hai| prAcaraNa kI dRSTi se prAcIna zAstroM meM ahiMsA kI gaNanA prathama sthAna meM kI jAtI hai, para vAstava meM satya hI sarvopari hai / (6) aba hameM dharma evaM mUlyoM kI zAzvatatA evaM parivartanazIlatA para vicAra karanA hai| sabhI dharmoM ke anuyAyI apane-apane dharma ko zAzvata mAnate haiM, kyoMki ve sAdhAraNatayA parivartana pasanda nahIM karate, yadyapi parivartana anivArya rUpa se prA hI jAte haiM / kabhI-kabhI to aisA bhI dekhA jAtA hai ki sAmpradAyika manovRttivAle apane ko purAne hI dharma ke anupAlaka samajhate haiM, jaba ki unake dharma meM kAphI parivartana ajJAta rUpa se paristhitivaza mA gayA hotA hai| udAharaNArtha hama vaidika dharma ko mAnane vAloM ko le sakate haiN| prAcIna yAga-yajJa jaba prAyaH samApta ho rahe the, usa samaya bhI sAMkhya, vedAnta

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DHARMA EVAM BADALATE HUE MULYA 301 jaise darzanoM ke pracAraka apane ko prAcIna vaidika dharma ke anuyAyI hI mAnate the / isake viparIta kabhI-kabhI aisA bhI dekhA jAtA hai ki eka hI sampradAya ke anugAmI apane navIkRta dharma ko pahacAnane meM bhI asamartha rahate haiM / jainoM ke 23 veM tIrthaMkara pArzvanAtha ke ziSya apane ko bhagavAn mahAvIra ke ziSyoM se alaga mAnane lage / prAcIna cAturyAm evaM sacelaka dharma ke sthAna para jaba mahAvIra ne paMcazikSika evaM acelaka dharma kA pracAra kiyA to nirgrantha pantha ke anugAmiyoM ko apane hI dharma meM saMzaya utpanna hone lagA jisakA samAdhAna kezI gautamIya adhyayana (uttarAdhyayana sUtra, 23) meM kiyA gayA hai / mUlyoM kI paristhiti bhI aisI hI hai / mUlya badala jAte haiM, para unakA yaha badalanA zAbdika sAmya ke pIche pracchanna rahatA hai / cUMki bhagavAn buddha ne sabhI padArthoM ko anitya mAnA, zrataH bauddha dharma ke anuyAyI hamAre isa vizleSaraNa ko saharta svIkAra kareMge / zAMkara vedAnta anugAmI bhI isameM apanI sahamati prakaTa kareMge kyoMki unake darzana meM brahma hI ekamAtra mUlya hai, jisakI prabhA se dUsare mUlya, jo sabhI mAyika haiM, prabhAsvara hote haiM / para dUsare prAyaH sabhI darzana dharma tathA mUlya donoM ko zAzvata evaM parivartanazIla ubhayarUpa mAneMge / aikAntika rUpa se na dharma badalatA hai, na mUlya / dhruvatA evaM dhruvatA donoM paraspara jur3I huI haiM / na dharma apane maulika svarUpa ko kabhI chor3a sakatA hai, aura na mUlya hI / jabataka mAnavajAti rahegI taba taka mAnava dharma tathA mAnava mUlya bhI raheMge / yadi mAnava zramAnava nahIM bana sakate to mAnava dharma evaM mUlya kA bhI mAmUla parivartana kaise ho sakatA ? isa prazna kA samAdhAna kevala anekAnta dRSTi se hI ho sakatA hai / eka hI vastu kisa taraha nitya bhI ho sakatI hai zraura pranitya bhI isa samasyA ke samAdhAnArtha svayambhUstotra kA 43vAM zloka uddhRta karatA huA meM apanA vivecana samApta karatA hU~ / nityaM tadevedamiti pratIterna nityamanyapratipattisiddhaiH / na tadviruddhaM bahiranta raMga-nimitta nemitika-yogataste || arthAt 'yaha vahI hai' - isa prakAra kI pratIti hone ke kAraNa vastutastva nitya hai / punaH 'yaha vaha nahIM hai' - isa prakAra kI pratIti hone ke kAraNa vastutattva anitya bhI hai / he bhagavan ! Apake zAsana meM vastutatva kA nityaM dhaura anitya ubhayarUpa honA viruddha nahIM hai, kyoMki vaha bahiraMga nimitta (arthAt sahakArI kAraNa) antaraMga nimitta ( upAdAna kAraNa) evaM naimittika ( nimittoM se utpanna hone vAle kArya ke sambandha) ko apane meM eka sAtha samAviSTa kiye hue haiN|

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- dharmajJAna ke mUla : anubhUti evaM tarka' . devanArAyaNa zarmA vastutaH sacce dharma ke jJAna karAne vAle kyA tarka evaM anubhUti donoM haiM ? athavA kevala tarka yA kevala anubhUti--yaha prazna atyanta gambhIra hai| hama dharma kI vyAkhyA "AcAraprabhavodharmaH2" mAne athavA "dhAraNAddharmamityAhu" ise svIkAra kareM athavA mImAMsakoM ke anusAra "codanA lakSaNo'rtho dharmaH" kaheM, kintu, dharma-saMzaya kI sthiti meM inake dvArA kisI nirNaya para pahu~canA sarvathA kaThina hai| kyoMki ina vyAkhyAnoM meM se kisI ke dvArA bhI dharma-jijJAsu kisI spaSTa nizcita dizA ko nahIM prApta kara sktaa| usakI jijJAsA jyoM ke tyoM banI raha jAtI hai| kyoMki ye AcaraNa, dhArANAe~ aura preraNAe~ eka nahIM aneka prakAra kI haiM aura paraspara virodhI bhI haiN| ___ mahAbhArata ke antargata ThIka aisA hI prazna yakSa ke dvArA dharmarAja yudhiSThira ke sammukha upasthApita hama pAte haiM aura isa para dharmarAja kA uttara isa prakAra prApta hotA hai tarko'pratiSThaH zrutayo vibhinnAnaiko RSiryasya vacaH pramANam / dharmasya tattvaM nihitaM guhAyAM mahAjano yenagataH sa panthAH / / [ma0 bhA0 vanaparva 313, 117] arthAt yadi tarka ko dekheM to yaha caMcala hai, tAtparya yaha ki jisakI buddhi jaisI tIvra hotI hai, vaise hI aneka prakAra ke aneka anumAna tarka ke dvArA niSpanna hote haiN| zruti arthAt vedAjJA dekhI jAya, to vaha bhI bhinna-bhinna hai| aura yadi smRtizAstra ko dekheM to aisA eka bhI RSi nahIM hai, jisakA vacana anya RSiyoM kI apekSA adhika pramANabhUta samajhA jaay| aura yadi dharma kA mUlatattva dekhA jAya to vaha atyanta sUkSma rahasyamaya hone ke kAraNa sAdhAraNa logoM kI samajha meM A nahIM sktaa| isa kAraNa mahApuruSoM ke dvArA apanAyA gayA mArga hI dharmajJAna kA saccA mArga hai| yadyapi Upara kI yaha yukti sAmAnya logoM ke lie apekSAkRta sarala pratIta hotI hai, taba bhI sabhI bAtoM meM isakA nirvAha saMbhava nhiiN| kyoM ki 1. 8 aprIla 1671 ko vidvadgoSThI meM paThita nibandha / 2. ma0 bhA0 anu0 104, 156 (sampAdaka pa0 rAmacandra zAstrI, citrazAlA presa, pUnA se prakAzita). 3. ma0 bhA0 karNa0 66, 58. 4. mI0 sUtra0 1, 1, 2.

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DHARMAJNANA KE MULA : ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA 303 ina mahApuruSoM ke AcaraNa meM bhI to koI ekatA nahIM, paraspara bhinnatA hai| aura ina AcaraNoM ko bhI to pUrNa svacha evaM niSkalaMka nahIM kahA jA sktaa| . isa prasaMga meM mahAbhArata ke antargata zyena aura rAjA zibi kA prasaMga bhI dhyAna dene yogya hai, isase dharmajJAna kA eka dUsarA pakSa prakAza meM AtA hai dharma yo bAdhate dharmo na sa dharmaH kuvarmatat / avirodhAtta yo dharmaH sadharmaH satyavikrama / virodhiSu mahIpAla nizcitya gurulAghavam / na bAdhA vidyate yatra taM dharma samupAcaret / / [ma0 bhA0 vana0 131] arthAt jisa dharma se dharma kA nAza ho, vaha dharma nahIM, kumArga hai| avirodhI dharma hI dharma kahalAne yogya hai| paraspara viruddha dharmoM kA tAratamya athavA laghutA aura gurutA dekhakara hI pratyeka mauke para apanI buddhi ke dvArA sacce dharma athavA karma kA nirNaya karanA cAhie / para, ise bhI hama dharmajJAna kA spaSTa AdhAra nahIM kaha skte| kyoMki aisA vyavahAra meM dekhA jAtA hai ki aneka vidvAn apanI-apanI buddhi ke anusAra dharmAdharma kA vicAra bhinna-bhinna prakAra se kiyA karate haiN| aura vastutaH "tarko'pratiSThaH" isa vacana kA rahasya bhI yahI hai / vastutaH inhIM kAraNoM se zAstrakAroM ne buddhivAda ko cauthA sthAna diyA hai| arthAt dharma ke nirNaya meM prathama sthAna zruti ko dUsarA smRti ko, tIsarA sadAcAra ko aura cauthA apanI priyatA' tAtparya apanI buddhi kI anukalatA ko| isa kAraNa zruti, smati, athavA sadAcAra se viruddha yadi buddhi kI anukUlatA ho, to vaha kadApi mAnanIya nahIM ho sktii| yahA~ yaha prazna uTha sakatA hai ki buddhivAda ko chor3a kara Akhira dharma-adharma kA nirNaya hogA kaise ? zruti, smRti Adi kA samajhanA bhI to buddhi para hI avalambita hai / buddhi zruti, smRti kA Azaya jaisA samajhegI, vaisA hI to mArga nizcaya kregii| isIlie to zruti, smati mAnane vAloM ke bhI to saiMkar3oM avAntara bheda bana gaye, kyoMki kisI kI buddhi ne zrutismRti kA Azaya kucha samajhA to kisI ne kuch| taba yadi anta meM jAkara bhI buddhi para hI ThaharanA par3atA hai to pahale se hI sIdhA buddhivAda hI kyoM na mAna liyA jAya ? vicAra karane para yaha tarka satya se dUra dRSTigata hogaa| zrutismRti kA Azaya buddhi se samajha kara usake AdhAra para dharmAdharma kA nirNaya karanA aura bAta hai aura kevala ucchRGkhala buddhi ko nirNaya kA AdhAra mAna lenA aura bAta hai| yoM to mUrkha, bAlaka, pazu Adi jo koI bhI kucha karatA hai, usameM buddhi kA AdhAra to rahatA hI hai| binA buddhi kI preraNA ke koI kriyA ho hI nahIM sktii| jaisI ki dArzanikoM kI mAnyatA hai-"jJAnajanyA bhavedicchA 1. manu0 a0 2 zloka 12.

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304 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I icchAjanyA katirbhavet / katijanyaM bhavet karma / " arthAta pahale kisI vastu kA jJAna hotA hai phira jJAna se icchA paidA hotI hai, icchA se AtmA meM prayatna hotA hai, phira prayatna se zarorAdi meM kriyA hotI hai| jJAna buddhi kI vRtti kA hI nAma hai athavA jJAna hI buddhi hai / taba binA buddhi ke kisI se bhI koI kAma nahIM ho sakatA / kintu, jar3a, bAlaka, pazu Adi buddhivAda para sthira haiM, aisA koI nahIM kaha sakatA, kyoMki vaha buddhi svayaM utpanna nahIM hotI, dUsare ke dvArA utpanna karAyI jAtI hai| ThIka isI taraha zAstra dvArA jo buddhi utpanna karAyI jAyegI, vaha isa buddhivAda kI sImA meM nahIM A sktii| aba rahI zAstra kA Azaya bhinna-bhinna samajhane kI bAta so hamAre zAstra meM kisa zabda kA kyA Azaya samajhanA-isake niyama bhI bahuta spaSTa aura vistRta rUpa meM bane hue haiM, jinheM hama mImAMsAzAstra kahate haiN| usakA AdhAra le lene para buddhi kI ucchRGkhalatA pUrNataH ruka jAtI hai| aba koI una niyamoM ko na mAnakara apanI dhIMgA-dhIMgI karatA rahe, taba to yaha bAta hI dUsarI hai| vastutaH jisa satya kA hamane anubhava nahIM kiyA, sAkSAtkAra nahIM kiyA, kyA, usa satya kI saritA anubhava kI U~cAI se pravAhita ho sakatI hai ? kavi kI kalpanAoM ko kAvya kI bhASA meM duharAne se hamArA kAma kucha cala sakatA hai, para, AdhyAtmika satyoM ko kevala tarka kI bhASA meM duharAne se kAma nahIM cala sktaa| jaba-jaba tarka kI duhAI bar3hatI hai aura anubhUti ghaTatI hai, taba-taba dharma nisteja ho jAtA hai| ataH dharma ko tejasvI banAne ke lie anubhUti ko protsAhana denA hogaa| vastutaH anubhUti meM jJeya aura jJAtA, dRzya aura draSTA kA sIdhA samparka hotA hai, kisI mAdhyama ke dvArA nahIM / kintu, tarka kA kSetra to parokSa anubhUti athavA dUsare mAdhyama se hone vAlA jJAna hai| vastutaH tarka aura pAMDitya se dharma kA nirNaya ho bhI nahIM sakatA, ThIka vaise hI jaise tarka aura pAMDitya se Izvara ko sattA siddha nahIM kI jA sktii| vastutaH dharmajJAna kA mUlAdhAra tarka nahIM sIdhI anubhUti hai| dharma paMDitoM kI nahIM, saMtoM aura draSTAnoM kI sRSTi hai| hamAre dArzanika satya soce aura samajhe nahIM gaye the, pratyuta RSiyoM ne AtmacakSu se unakA darzana kiyA thaa| vAda-vivAda, tarka aura pAMDitya se dharma kI siddhi nahIM hotii| dharma anubhUti kI vastu hai aura dharmAtmA hama unhIM ko mAnate Aye bhI haiM, jinhoMne dharma ke mahAsatyoM ko kevala jAnA hI nahIM, unakA anubhava aura sAkSAtkAra kiyA hai| dharma ke rahasya kevala buddhi se udghATita nahIM hote| isake lie eka adbhuta zakti apekSita hotI hai, jo paMDitoM meM nahIM santoM meM pAyI jAtI hai| anubhUti tarka se adhika zaktizAlinI vastu hai| rAmakRSNa paramahaMsa ne apane jIvana se yaha batA diyA ki dhArmika satya kevala bauddhika anumAna kI vastu nahIM, pratyakSa anubhava ke viSaya haiN| jaba Astika aura nAstika, hindU, IsAI aura musalamAna Apasa meM isa prazna para lar3a rahe the ki kisakA dharma ThIka hai

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DHARMAJNANA KE MULA: ANUBHUTI EVAM TARKA 305 aura kisakA nahIM, taba paramahaMsa rAmakRSNa ne sabhI dharmoM ke mUlatattva ko apane jIvana meM sAkAra karake mAnoM sAre vizva ko yaha saMdeza diyA ki dharma ko zAstrArtha kA viSaya mata banAo / ho sake to usakI sIdhI anubhUti ke lie prayAsa kro| unhoMne hindutva ke sabhI mArgoM kI sAdhanA kii| yahI nahIM, ve kucha dina sacce musalamAna banakara islAma kI bhI sAdhanA karate rahe aura kucha kAlataka unhoMne IsAiyata kA bhI abhyAsa kiyA thA / bhArata kI dhArmika samasyA kA jo samAdhAna rAmakRSNa ne diyA usase adhika vAstavika samAdhAna aura koI ho nahIM sakatA / krama-krama se vaiSNava, zaiva, zAkta, tAMtrika, advaitavAdI, musalamAna aura IsAI banakara paramahaMsa ne yaha siddhakara dikhAyA ki dharmoM ke bAharI rUpa to kevala bAharI rUpa haiM, unake mUlatattva meM koI antara nahIM AtA / kintu isakI prApti anubhUti se hotI hai, tarka athavA vAda-vivAda se nahIM / vastutaH dharma ke do rUpa hamAre sAmane Ate haiM / meM "dharma" zabda kA prayoga kevala "pAralaukika sukha kA kiyA jAtA hai / udAharaNArthaM jaba hama kisI se prazna sA dharma hai ? taba usase hamAre pUchane kA yahI hetu hotA hai ki tU apane pAralaukika kalyANa ke lie vaidika, bauddha, jaina athavA IsAI kisa mArga se calate ho aura vaha hamAre prazna ke anusAra hI uttara detA hai / isI taraha svarga prApti ke lie sAdhanabhUta yajJa-yAga Adi vaidika viSayoM kI mImAMsA karate samaya "athAto dharma jijJAsA" Adi dharma sUtroM meM bhI dharma zabda kA yahI artha liyA gayA hai / parantu, dharma zabda kA ekamAtra yahI artha nahIM dUsarA artha bhI hai| rAjadharma, prajAdharma, dezadharma, kuladharma Adi sAMsArika nItibandhana bhI to dharma hI haiM / caturvidha puruSArthoM kI gaNanA karate samaya hama dharma, artha kAma aura mokSa kahA karate haiM / yahA~ dharma aura mokSa ko spaSTataH pRthak pRthak kara diyA gayA hai| yahA~ dharma se tAtparyaM karttavya, karma, sadAcAra Adi hai / bhagavadgItA meM bhI jaba bhagavAn arjuna se yaha kaha kara lar3ane ke lie kahate haiM ki "svadharmamapi cAvekSya " taba aura isake bAda "svadharme nidhanaM zreyaH paradharmo bhayAvahaH' 2" isa sthAna para bhI dharma zabda cAturvarNya dharma ke hI artha meM prayukta huA hai / mahAbhArata, gItA Adi prArSagranthoM meM tathA Adhunika nIti-granthoM meM bhI vyAvahArika karttavya athavA niyama ke artha meM "dharma" zabda kA sadA prayoga huA hai| kuladharma aura kulAcAra donoM zabda samAnArthaka samajhe jAte haiM / karNa ke sAtha arjuna ke yuddha prasaMga meM karNa ke dvArA yaha kahe jAne para ki 1. gI0 2, 31. . 2. gI 3, 35. eka to nitya vyavahAra mArga" isI atha meM karate haiM, terA kauna

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306 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I "niHzastra zatru ko mAranA dharma yuddha nahIM" bhagavAn kRSNa ne use kaI pichalI bAtoM kA smaraNa dilAte hue, pratyeka prasaMga meM yaha prazna kiyA hai ki he karNa ! "kvate dharmastadAgata:" arthAt usa samaya tumhArA dharma kahA~ gayA thA ? isa prakAra hama dekhate haiM ki 'dharma' zabda kA prayoga una saba nIti-niyamoM ke bAre meM kiyA gayA hai jo samAjadhAraNA ke lie ziSTa janoM ke dvArA banAye gaye haiN| isa dRSTi se vicAra karane para nIti ke niyamoM athavA ziSTAcAra ko dharma kA mUla kaha sakate haiN| arthAt samAjadhAraNA ke lie mAnava ke ucchaGkhala AcaraNa kA pratibandha karanA hI dharma hai| uparyukta prakAra dharma ke do svarUpa pAramArthika aura bhautika, inako dRSTi meM rakha kara hI dharmajJAna ke mUla kramazaH anubhUti evaM tarka batAye gaye haiN| yadyapi sUkSmadRSTi se dekhane para jaise uparyukta dharma ke svarUpoM meM bhI vAstavika bheda nahIM hai, ThIka usI prakAra unake jJAna ke mUla sAdhana anubhUti evaM tarka meM bhI nhiiN| kintu, vyAvahArika dRSTi se ye vibhAjana kiye gaye haiN| vastutaH hetu se agamya sUkSma dharma kA samarthana zruti-anubhUti se aura hetugamya kA samarthana tarka se karanA caahie| kintu, jo ahetugamya sUkSma dharma ke lie tarka kA prayoga karate haiM aura hetugamya ke lie zruti-anubhUti kA ve sahI artha meM dharma ke tattva ko nahIM jAna skte| 3. ma0 bhA0 karNa0 61, 3-11.

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zrIsiddhasenadivAkaraviracitaH nyAyAvatAraH zrI devabhavasUrikRtaTippanasaMvalitazrIsiddharSigariNakRtaTIkAsahitaH / aviyutasAmAnyavizeSadezinaM vardhamAnamAnamya / nyAyAvatAravivRtiH smRtivIjavivRddhaye kriyate // 1 // natvA zrIvaramekAntadhvAntavidhvaMzabhAskaram / vRttau nyAyAvatArasya smRtya kimapi Tipyate // 1 // ihAbhISTadevatAnamaskArapuraHsaramanuSThIyAnaM samastamapi prAya: prayojanaM nirvighnAM siddhimadhyAsta iti manyamAno vyAkhyAteti prasiddhaH siddhaH pUrvArdhana bhagavato vardhamAnasvAmino namaskAraM tathAbhidheyAdipratipattimantareNa kvacidapi prekSAvatAM pravRttirnopapadyata ityuttarArdhanAbhidheyaprayojane ca pratipAdayannAha --aviyutetyAdi / saMbandhastUpAyopeyalakSaNaH sAmadivaseyaH / tatra samudAyArthasya pAtanikayaiva vyAkhyAtatvAdavayavArtho'bhidhIyate / yu mizraNe, vizeSeNakAntena yutI mizrIbhUto viyutau, na tathA evaMvidhau sAmAnyavizeSI dishtiityevNshiilstm| anena sAmAnyAdatyantAbhinnavizeSavAdinAM sAMkhyAnAM tathA vizeSebhyo'tyantAbhinnasAmAnyAbhidhAyinAM saugatAnAM ca nirAsaH kathaMcidabhinnayoreva sAmAnya vizeSayoviviktayuktyA puraH pratipAdayiSyamANatvAt / tathA kecid dhAtupArAyaNakRto yu amizraNe iti paThanti, tathA ca ayutasiddhAnAmAdhAryAdhArabhUtAnAM yaH saMbandha ihapratyayahetuH sa samavAyaH iti vaizeSikIyasUtre ayutasiddhAnAmapRthak siddhAmAmiti vyAkhyAtam / tathA loke'pi bhedAbhidhAyI yutazabdaH prayujyamAno dRzyate / yathA 'dvAvapi bhrAtarAvetI yutau jAto' ityAdi / tato vizeSeNa kAntena yutau pRthagbhUtau, na viyutau kthNcidbhinnaavityrthH| asmizca vyAkhyAne naiyAyikavaizeSikayoratyanta bhinnasAmAnyavizeSavAdinoH prtikssepH| evaM samastAdvaitavAdinAmapyanena vizeSaNena nirAso'vaseyaH tadekatvAbhyupagamasya pratyakSAdhupalabhyamAnAbhyAM sAmAnyavizeSAbhyAM bAdhitatvAt / varSa chedanapUraNayoH, caurAdikatvAdini vadhyate chidyate'sAviti svarAntatvAtakarmaNyal, tato varSazchinno mAno'haMkAro yena sa tathA tam / nipUrvAdiNaH sarve gatyarthA jJAnArthA iti nyAyato jJAnAdi nitarAmIyante yathAsthitasvarUpeNa paricchidyante jIvAjIvAdayo bhAvA aneneti "parinyornINodhUtAbhreSayoH" (pA0 3-3-37) ityanena ghami nyAyaH pramANamArga: / avataranti prANino'nenAsminniti vA "ave tustrorghaGa' (pA0 3-3-120) avatArayatIti vA kartayaMci avatArastIrtha, nyAyasyeti karmaNi SaSThI, tato nyAyasyAvatAro nyAyAvatAra iti sssstthiittpurussH| ayamabhiprAyaH / yathA tIrthAparanAmnAvatAreNa nadyAdiruttIryate, evamanenApyavatArakalpena zAstreNa nyAyAmbhodhiruttIryata iti / tasya vivRtiH vivaraNaM kriyate

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2 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I tasya cedamAdivAkyam pramANavyutpAdanArthamidamArabhyate / prmaannetyaadi| anena catAdAtmyatadutpattilakSaNasaMbandhavikalatayA dhvanebahira) prati prAmANyAyogAdabhidheyAdisUcanadvArotpannArthasaMzayamukhena zrotAraH zravaNaM prati protsAhyante iti dharmottaro manyate / tadayuktam / yadi hi zabdasyArthaprakAzanaM prati sAmarthyaM na samasti, tat kathamasAvabhidheyAdisUcane paTiSThaH syAt / na ca tasyAprAmANye etacchavaNAdarthasaMzayaM kurvanti prekSAvantaH, tadvattAhAneH mithyAjJAnAdapi pravRttyavirAmaprasaGgAzca / arcaTastvAha-na zrAvakotsAhakametat, prAmANyAbhAvAt, teSAM cAprAmANyAdapravRtteH, anyathA prekSAvattAkSateH, kiM tahi prakaraNArthakathanAvasaropasthitaparopanyastahetvasiddhatodbhAvanArtham / tathA hi-saMbhavatyevaMvAdInArabdhavyamidam, abhidheyAdizUnyatvAt, kAkadantaparIkSAdivaditi, tadanenAsya iti saMbandhaH / smRte/ja-saMskAraH smaraNAkurotpAdakatvena bIjamiva bIjamiti lakSaNayA bIjazabdena saMskArAbhidhAnAta, tasya vivardhanAya ! anyatra kila kSetrAdau bIjasya vizeSato vRddhaye viziSTA vRtirAvaraNaM vidhIyata iti pratIyamAnamarthAntaram // niratizayadevatAstavasyAbhipretArthasAdhakatvAbhAvAdaviyutasAmAnyavizeSadezinamityanena bhagavato vacanAtizayamAha / vacanAtizayazca jJAnAtizayamantareNa nopapadyata iti jJAnAtizayo'pyabhihito drssttvyH| vardhamAnamityanena tu apAyApagamAtizayaH sUcitaH, sarvAnarthahetorahaMkArasya bhagavatA nirmUlakASaM kaSitatvAt / evamatizayatrayAnyathAnupapattyA pUjAtizayo'pyAkSipta eva / yadvA vardhate azokAdyaSTamahAprAtihAryasaMpadA vRddhimAn bhavatIti vardhamAnaH / asyAM ca vyutpattAvanenApi vizeSaNena prajAtizayaH prAdurabhAvi / / anena cetyAdi / na tAvacchabdArthayostAdAtmyalakSaNa : saMbandhaH, tathA pratIterabhAvAta / yadi cApratIyamAnamapi tayostAdAtmyaM kalpyeta, tadAgnimodakAdidhvanidhvananAnantaraM vadanadahanapUraNAdayaH syuH, na ca dRzyante, tanna tayostAdAtmyam / nApi tadutpattilakSaNa: sambandho vicArabhArasahaH, yata: zabdenArtho'rthena vA zabdo janyate iti vikalpadvayam / tatra na tAvadAdyaH pakSaH, yataH zabdAdarthotpattyabhyupagame na kazcidapyasaMpUrNakAmaH syAt, suvarNakoTimeM bhUyAdityAdidhvanito'tyantadAridrayopadrutasyApi puMsaH suvarNakoTayAdilAbhaprasaGgAt / nApyarthena zabdo janyate iti dvitIyaH pakSaH, akRtasaMketasyApi puMsaH prathamapanasadarzane tacchabdotpattiprasaGgAt, tathA agulyane karizatamityAdidhvanInAmarthAbhAve'pyutpattezca / kiM ca / arthAd dhvanInAmutpAde artheSu yathAsvaM puruSabuddhinirapekSANA zabdAnAM zravaNaM syAt / na cArthamAtrAt puruSabuddhinirapekSAd dhvanayaH samutpadyamAnA vilokyante ghaTante vA / tathA hi-prathamamarthadarzanam, tatastatpratipAdanAbhiprAyaH, tato vivakSA, tataH sthAnakaraNAbhighAtaH, tataH zabdaniSpattiH, tanna shbdaanaamrthjnytaa| itthaM saMbandhadvayavaikalyato bahirarthe zabdAnAM prAmANyAbhAva: / abhidheyAdisUcaneti / yadAha dharmakItivinizcaye-vakturabhipretaM tu sUcayeyuH zabdA iti / arthasaMzayamukhena iti ca vadan arthasaMzayo'pi hi pravRttyaGgamiti darzayan anarthasaMzayasya pravRttyaGgatAM niSedhayati /

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NYAYAVATARAN tadvattAprakAzakena vacasA taddhetUnAmasiddhatodbhAvyata iti / tadayuktataram, yato yadIdamapramANamiti nAbhidheyAdIni sAkSAllakSayat pravartayati, tataH paropanyastahetvasiddhatAM kathayatIti yuktirikta pazyAmaH, apramANasyAkiMcitkaratvAt, anyathA pramANavicAraNamAnarthakyamaznuvIta / tasmAdidaM pramANabhUtaM sadabhidheyAdIni pratipAdayat prekSAvataH pravartayatIti prakaraNAdAvupanyastam / saMbandhazUnyatvAdasya kathamarthe pramANateti cet, pratyakSe'pi kathaM tahi seti vAcyam / grAhyagrAhakabhAvasaMbandhabalAditi cet, atrApi vAcyavAcakabhAvAditi bramaH / sa eva kathamiti cet, adhyakSe'pi vedyavedakabhAvaH kathamiti vAcyam / tadutpattitadAkAratAbhyAmiti cet, keyaM tdutpttirnaam| tajjanyateti ceta / pratikSaNaM bhaGguratve saiva durupapAdetyAcakSmahe / tathA hi kSaNanazvaro'rthaH svakSaNe-pUrva pazcAd vA kAryaM kuryAditi trayI gatiH / tatra na tAvadAdyaH pakSaH kakSIkaraNIyaH, samakAlabhAvinivyApArAbhAvAt, itarathaikakSaNavartinAM samastArthakSaNAnAmitarataraM kAryakAraNabhAvaH prasajyeta, tathA ca tatprayukto grAhyagrAhakabhAvazcetyasamaJjasamApanIpadyeta / atha svakSaNAtpUrvam, acAru etadapi, svayamasato bhaviSyacchaGkhacakravAderiva pUrvakAlavartini kArye vyApArAbhAvAt / atha svakSaNAdUrdhvaM kArya vidhatta iti manyethAH, etadapyasAdhIyaH, vinaSTasya kAryakaraNAkSamatvAt, anyathA matasya zikhina: kekAyitaM syAt / / tadAkAratApi kimarthAkArasaMkrAntyA, atha tatsadazatayotpatterjJAnasyeti / yadyAdyaH kalpaH, tadayuktama, jJAne svAkArArpaNAdarthasya nirAkAratAnuSaGgAt, svadehe pRthutarArthadarzanaprasaGgAt, ziraHsphoTanaplAvanAdyanarthaprasaktezca / atha dvitIyaH, tathA sati sAdRzyavazAdarthavyavasthetyAyAtam / na ca abhidheyAdisUcane iti / prAstAmabhidheyAdInAM prtipaadne| evaMvAdIti / evaM vakSyamANaprakAreNa vAdavAn evaM vadanazIlo vA / taditi tasmAdarthe avyayam / anenAdivAkyenAsya zAstrasya tadvattA abhidheyaadimttaa|| sNbndhshuunytvaadityaadi| iha yadyapi paramArthato janAnAM kathaMcittAdAtmyalakSaNa: zabdArthayoH sNbndhH| yadAha bhagavAn bhadrabAhusvAmI-- abhihANaM abhiheyAu hoi bhinnaM abhinnaM c| khurapaggimoyaguccAraNa mmi jamhA u vayaNasavaNANaM // 1 // vicchedo na vi dAho na pUraNaM teNa bhinnaM tu / jamhA ya moyaguccAraNammi tattheva pacco hoi / / 2 / / na ya hoi sa annatthe teNa abhinnaM tadatthAmro // iti / [abhidhAnamabhidheyAd bhavati bhinnamabhinna ca / khurAgnimodakoccAraNe yasmAttu vadanazravaNayoH // 1 // vicchedo nApi dAho na pUraNaM tena bhinnaM tu / yasmAd modakoccAraNe tatraiva pratyayo bhavati / / 2 / / na ca bhavati sa pranyArthe tenAbhinnaM tadarthAt / (chAyA) ]

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I sAdRzyaM bhavatAM darzane tAttvikamasti, viviktakSaNakSayiparamANulakSaNasvalakSaNAnAM pAramArthikatvAbhyupagamAt / anAdikAlAlInavAsanAprabodhasaMpAditasattAkanirvikalpakaviviktadarzanottarakAlabhAvivikalpavyavasthApitasAdRzyavazAdartha grahaNaniyame satyekanIlasvalakSaNe kSaNe sakalakAlakalApavyApikAkakuvalayAdigatanIlatAyA vyavasthiti ravizeSeNAnuSajyeta, tathA ca pratiniyato grAhyagrAhakabhAvo na ghaTAmaTATyeta / agulyagranirdizyamAnapurovartinIlasvalakSaNadarzanabalAyAtatvAt nailyavikalpasya tadevAdhyavasyati na bhUtaM bhAvi kAkakuvalayAdigataM vA iti cet, tarhi vikalpaH svalakSaNaniSThaH prAptaH, niyatadezadazAvacchinnArthakriyAsamarthArthagrahaNAt / tathA hitadadhyavasAyaH kiM tadvikalpanaM uta tadgrahaNam na tAvat tadvikalpanam vikalpAnAM bhavadabhiprAyeNa svalakSaNAntaHpravezAbhAvAt / taduktam - tenAnyApohaviSayAH proktAH saamaanygocraaH| zabdAzca buddhayazcaiva vastunyeSAmasaMbhavAt // 1 // iti / atha bra yAt-yadyapi vikalpAH sAmAnyaM gocarayanti tattvataH, tathApi pratyakSavikalpayoyogapadyena pravRttevimUDhaH pratipattA vikalpasyApi svalakSaNaniSThatAM vyavasyati / tathA coktam manasoryagapavatteH savikalpAvikalpayoH / vimUDho laghuvRttervA tayoraikyaM vyavasyati / / 1 / / iti / tathApi zaThaH zAThyena nirloThanIya ityabhiprAyavAn prAcAryastatprasiddhapratyakSadvAreNa zabde'pi prAmANyamAha -- pratyakSe'pItyAdi / trayIti / trayo'vayavA rUpANi yasyAM gatau / gatiriti prakAraH / asAdhIya iti / etadanayoH prakarSaNAsAdhu, guNAGgAdveSTheyasU (si0he. 7-3-6) / vivikteti / viviktAH parasparamatyantabhinnAH, na punaravayavyAdirUpeNa kathaMcidekarUpAH / anAdItyAdi / anAdikAlAdAlInA saMbaddhA yA vAsanA tasyAH prabodhastena saMpAditA sattA yasya sa cAso, nirvikalpaka vyavasAyazUnyaM viviktaM sphuTaM yaddarzanaM pratyakSaM taduttarakAlaM bhavanazIlo vikalpazca tena vyavasthApitaM yatsAdRzaM tasya vazaH sAmarthyam; yaduktaMprAyattatAyAmAyatte prabhutve ca vazaM viduH / tasmAt / tenetyAdi / yata evaM vastuni zabdArthe doSastena kAraNena, anyApohaviSayA vikalpabuddhipatibhAsaviSayA: zabdA buddhayazca proktA prAcAryadignAgena / kiMbhUtA buddhayaH ? sAmAnyagocarAH savikalpikAH na sarvAH, nirvikalpAdhyakSabuddhInAM vastuviSayAbhyupagamAt / buddhInAmevaitad vizeSaNaM na zabdAnAm, teSAM sAmAnyaviSayatvAvyabhicArAt; kiM kAraNaM, vastunyeSAM zabdAnAM vikalpAnAM cAsaMbhavAditi / etadarthazca vistarAthinA pramANavArtike kalyANacandrakRtaTIkAto'vaseyaH /

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NYAYAVATARAH tat kimidaM zapathaiH pratyeyaM yaduta mohAd vikalpena svalakSaNamadhyavasyati na punaviMzadanirbhAsena sAkSAtkaroti / evaM cAdhyakSamapi sakalArthavyaktIrgocarayati, vikalpamohAttu saMnihitaviSayaM lakSyate iti paro'nuSaJjayan durnivAraH syAt / uta tadgrahaNamadhyavasAyaH, tadA svalakSaNaniSThatA vikalpasya svavAcA bhavadbhiH pratipannA syAt / evaM ca vikalpayugale'pyarthaM kriyAsamarthArthaparyavasitasattAkatA vikalpasyADhakate / yadA ca vikalpaH svalakSaNasaudhamadhyamadhyAsta iti abhidadhyAH, tathA sati dhvanerapi tadantaH pravezo durnivAraH syAt, tatsahacaratvAt / yadAha bhavadAcAryaH- eva zabdAnAM viSayo yo vikalpAnAmiti / na ca vikalpaM vyatiricya sAdRzyavyavasthApakamanyadasti pratyakSasya sakalajagadvilakSaNasvalakSaNagrahaNapravaNatvAt / tad yadi tatsadRzatayotpattistadAkAratA, tadA pratipAditanyAyAd vikalpasya saMnihitArthagocaratorarIkartavyA, tathA ca dhvanirapi tadviviSayaH sidhyatIti siddhaM naH samIhitam / anyathA tadAkAratA na samasti, gatyantarAbhAvAt / tanna tadutpattitadAkArate grAhyagrAhakabhAvahetu saMstaH / saMstAM vA, tathApi vikalpata: paryanuyojyo bhavAn / kimete grahaNakAraNaM prArthakyena uta sAmastyena / tad yadyAdyaH pakSaH, kapAlakSaNo ghaTAntyakSaraNasya grAhakaH prApnoti tajjanyatvAt, jalacandro vA nabhazcandrasya grAhakaH syAt tadAkAratvAt / atha dvitIyaH, tathA sati ghaTottarakSaNaH pUrNakSaraNasya grAhaka: prasajati, tadutpattestadAkAratvAcca / jaDatvAdarthasya na grAhakatvamapi tu jJAnasya tadutpattitadAkAratayoH satyoriti cet, idamidAnIM viditamasmAbhiH, etadapi samAnArthagrAhiprAcInasaMvedanakSaNalakSaNamanaskArotpAdyajJAne grAhaka lakSaNaM vyabhicarati, utpAdakaprAktanakSaNavartimanaskArAgrAhakatvAt tadadhyavasAya sAhityena tadutpattitadAkAratayorgrahaNakAraNatvaM saMpUrNaM manaskAre tannAstIti cet kimidaM bhinnagocareNa saha 5 manasorityAdi / manyate jJAyate vastu grAbhyAmiti sarvadhAtubhyo'suna (pA0 uNAdi ) iti zrasuni manasI jJAne tayoH savikalpAvikalpayorekatvaM vikalpayati bhrAntaH pramAteti saMbandhaH / kuta ityAha, yugapadavRtteH gavAdisvalakSaNaviSaya nirvikalpAdhyakSAnantaraM punarnivikalpakena svalakSaNasya tatsamakAlameva vikalpena gakArAdivarNAnAM ca grahaNAt / yad bauddhAlaGkAraH -- kathaM tahi krameNa grahaNaM na bhavati, yugapadviSayasaMnidhAnAt, na hi varNavikalpakAle pratyakSa pratyayArtho na saMnihita iti / laghuvRtterveti / yathA bhavato laghuvRtteH zAkhAcandrAdiviSayasaMnidhau na krameNa grahaNAdhyavasAyastathA mamApi nirvikalpakasamanantaraM bhagityeva vikalpotpAdAt tayoraikyavyavasAyaH, na punastattvatastayoraikyam / vizeSatastvetaskArikArthI boddhAlaGkArAderavaseyaH // tadanta iti / tasya svalakSaNasyAntarmadhyaM tatra pravezastadviSayateti yAvat / jalacandro veti / yadyapi kathaMcinnabhazcandreNA mbhazcandrasya janyamAnatvAttadutpattirapyatra vidyate, tathApi tadAkArateva prAdhAnyena vivakSitA / tadadhyavasAyeti / tasyotpAdakasyA

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6 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I sAhityam / tathA hi-adhyavasAyo vAsanAprabodhavazAdutpannaH sAmAnyamanartharUpaM vikalpayati / pratyakSaM bahirAllabdhvAtmalAbhaM tadAkAraM tameva sAkSAtkarotiiti bhavatAM darzanam, tanna vikalpasAhityaM pratyakSasya kaMcana vizeSa puSNAti / tadidaM grAhyagrAhakabhAvakAraNaM pratyakSe'pi yad bhavadbhirabhyadhAyi, tad yathA yathA vicAryate tathA tathA vizIryata ityanapekSaNIyam / tad yathAkathaMcit pratyakSasya pratipAditagrAhyagrAhakabhAvalakSaNavaikalye'pi grAhakatvam arthasya grAhyatvam, tathA dRSTatvAt, anyathA nikhilavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAt bhavadbhirapi pratyapAdi / tathA zabdasya vAcakatvamarthasya vAcyatvaM pratipadyadhvaM yUyam, atrApi dRSTahAneH vyavahArocchesya samAnatvAt / atha itthamAcakSIthAH, yathA-nadyAstIre guDazakaTaM paryastaM, dhAvata dhAvata DimbhakAH - ityAdivipratArakapuruSavacanazravaNAt pravartamAnA vipralambhatAbhAjo jAyante, ataH sakalavacaneSvanAzvAsa iti / evaM tarhi cikicikAyamAnamarumarIcikAcakracumbi yajjalollekhi vizadadarzanamudayapadavIM samAsAdayati tadalIkamavalokitamiti, sakalAdhyakSeSvanAzvAsa ityabhidadhmahe / pAzcAtyaviparItArthopasthApakapramANavAdhitatvAd marIcikAsu jalajJAnamapramANaM na zeSasatyastambhAdijJAnAni, bAdhArahitatvAditi cet ; tarhi dhvanAvapyayaM nyAyaH ki kAkairbhakSitaH / na hi vayaM sarvazabdAnAM prAmANyaM pratipadyemahi, kiM tahi sunizcitAptapraNetRkANAmeva / tanna prAmANyaM prati pratyakSazabdayovizeSamupalabhAmahe / eSa tu vizeSaH syAt, pratyakSaM cakSurAdisAmagrIvizeSajanyatvAt saMnihitaniyatArthagrAhi spaSTapratibhAsam, zAbdaM tu tathAvidhakAraNavikalatvAd niyatAniyatArthagrAhi aspaSTapratibhAsam / na ca eSa vizeSaH prAmANyakSatikArI, itarathAnumAnasyApyaprAmANyamAsajyeta, tasyApyavizadAniyatArthagrAhitvAt / paramArthatastu trikAlavyApinaH sarvArthagrahaNasvabhAvatve'pi AvaraNatiraskRtasya jIvadravyasya cakSurAdisAmagrIsApekSAvaraNakSayopazamavazAt saMnihitaspaSTArthagrahaNapariNAmaH pratyakSami tyucyate / zabdasApekSakSayopazamAtta niyatAniyatAvizadArthagrahaNapariNAmastu zAbdamiti / tanna tadutpattitadAkArate pratyakSe zAbde'nyasmin vA jJAne vAstavyau staH / tasmAtpAramArthikAbhidheyaprayojanasaMbandhapratipAdakametadAdivAkya miti sthitam / / tatrAbhidheyaM vAcyaM, tacceha pramANam, tasyaiva prakaraNena pratipAdyatvAt, tatpramANa ityavayavena lakSayati / prayojanaM dvidhA, zrotuH kartuzca / punarapi dvividhaM dhyavasAyo vikalpanam / cikicikAyamAneti / cikicikAzabdo dedipyamAnArthaH; sa cAnukaraNe paTapaTAzabdavad DAjantaH tadvadAcarati / vAstavyAviti / vastuzabdAt vastuni paramArthe "bhave" (si0 he0 6-3-123) iti bhavArthANapratyayAntAdIpratyayaH, pAramArthikyAvityarthaH / vAstavyazabdAttu striyAmApratyaye vAstavye iti syAt / tatretyAdi / tatreti saptamyarthe vartamAno nirdhAraNe vartate, taccAbhidheyatvaguNena / dayamartha:--teSAmabhidheyAdIna madhye'bhidheyaM kimucyate / pAha-vAcyamiti / abhidheyazabdasya

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NYAYAVATARAT anantaraM vyavahitaM ca / tatra zroturanantaraprayojanaM pramANaviSayA vyutpattiH, kartultpadyamAnasya prAjJatvAt ziSyasya vyutpAdanam / tatrAtmaprayojanaM darzayannArabhyate iti asya mayetipadasavyapekSatvAt / ziSyaprayojanaM tu vyutpadityanenopasargadhAtusamudAyenaiva tadantargataM lapsyate ityabhiprAyavAn kartA AtmavyApAraM Nijantena nirdizati-pramANavyutpAdanArthamiti / vyavahitaprayojanaM dvadhA, vyAvahArikaM pAramArthikaM ca / vyAvahArikaM heyopAdeyopekSaNIyeSvartheSu hAnopAdAnopekSAlakSaNam / pAramArthika abhyudayaniHzreyasAvAptiriti / etattu sAkSAdanuktamapyanantaraprayojanaphalatvAt tdvcnenaivaakssiptmvgntvym| saMbandhastUpAyopeyalakSaNaH, tatropeyaM prakaraNArthaparijJAnam, prakaraNamupAyaH, tatastadabhilaSatA prakaraNamidamArambhaNIyamiti anukto'pi vacanena saMvandho'rthAd gamyate iti taatpryaarthH| adhunAkSarArtho viviyate -- tatra yadyapi pramANazabdasya sarvakArakairbhAvena ca vyutpatteH sukaratvAt "kRtyalyuTo bahulam" (pA0 3-3-113) anyatrApi (pA0 3-3-130) iti vacanAd yathAkramamamI katrAdikArakabhAvavyutpattyA pramANazabdavAcyAH, tad yathA-AtmArthajJAnArthakriyAkAraNakalApakSayopazamakriyArUpAH, tathApIha jJAnamevAdhikriyate, tasyaiva parIkSAkSamatvAt, itareSAM parIkSAyAH tatpuraHsaratvAt, vaiyarthyAcca / tathA hi-nArthastAvadAtmanaH parIkSayA, tasya bhrAntAbhrAntajJAneSu samAnatvAt / nApyarthasya, tasyopeyatvAt, upAyabhUtajJAnaparokSaNenaiva gatatvAt / nArthakriyAyAH tadavagatau parIkSAvaiyarthyAt / nApi kAraNakalApasya, jJAnotpatteH prAk svarUpAnavagateH, pazcAt tatsvarUpanirNayAdeva tatsAdguNyavaiguNyAvagate rarthakyAta / nApi kSapopazamasya, tasya jJAnotpAdonnIyamAnarUpatvAta / nApi pramitimAtrasya tasya pramANasAdhyatayA, taccArutAdvAreNaiva samIcInatA siddheriti / tadayamabhiprAyaH - yadyapi anantadharmAdhyAsite vastuni sarva eva zabdArthA nirupacaritA ghaTante, tathApi yenArthaM paricchidyArthakriyAsamarthArthaprArthanayA pravartante vAcyamiti nAma paryAya iti yAvat / tatraivaM sthite abhidheyaM vAcyaM-pratipAdanIyamiti / prAtmaprayojanamityAdi / prAtmaprayojanaM darzayan kartA, Atmano vyApAraM yathAkathaMcid vyutpatsyante ziSyAH, paraM mayA vyutpAdyamAnA vyutpadyantAmiti prayojakatvaminantena kathayatIti sambandhaH / nanu pramANavyutpAdamidanArthamArabhyate ityukte prayojanamAtraM darzitaM nAtmana iti cet, Aha-Arabhyate ityasya mayetipadasavyapekSatvAditi / nanu tathApi pUrva kartuH zrotuzca prayojanamabhihitam, atra katu reveti tatkathamityAha-abhiprAyavAn / kenollekhena yo'bhiprAyaH / aah-shissypryojnmityaadi| tadantargatamiti / vyutpAdanAntargat / abhyudayaniHzreyasAvAptiriti / abhyudayo'pavargaprAptarervAg devalokasukulalAbhAdikaM sAMsArika kalyANam, nizcitaM kevalaparamAnandamayatvAt zreyaH kalyANaM samAsAnte ati niHzreyasaM muktistayoH prAptiH / yadyapi cehAbhyudayasAmAnya grahaNena tadvizeSasvarUpasya niHzreyasasyApi grahaH siddhaH, tathApi gobalIvardanyAyenobhayorabhidhAnamiti / ___ nArtha iti / na prajojanam / nApyarthasyeti / atrAgrimeSu ca sthAneSu parIkSayA prayojanamiti saMbandhanIyam / unnIyamAnarUpatvAditi / utpUrvAnnayateH karmaNi yaNa,

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8 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I pramAtArastadeveha jJAnamAtmanA saha dharmirUpatayA tAdAtmye'pi dharmarUpatayA vyatirikta pramIyate'neneti pramANamityucyate / tasya vyutpAdanam paraparikalpitalakSaNAdivyudAsena svAbhipretalakSaNAdisvarUpaprakAzanam / tadartha-arthazabdaH prayojanaparyAyaH idam iti artharUpatayA svacetasi vivartamAnaprakaraNazarIraM praamRshti| dvividhaM hi prakaraNazarIram, zabdo'rthazceti, bahiH zabdarUpatayA prakAzayiSyamANatve'pyantastattvArthAkAreNa pratyakSatvAd / prArabhyate iti padavAkyazlokAdiracanayA prakriyate iti yAvat / . iha ca lakSaNasaMkhyAgocaraphaleSu pramANaM prati vipratipadyante pare / tathA hi lakSaNe tAvat, pramANamavisaMvAdi jJAnamiti saugatAH / anadhigatArthAdhigantR pramANamiti mImAMsakAH / arthopalabdhihetuH pramANamiti naiyAyikAdayaH / tathA saMkhyAyAM, pratyakSAnumAne dve eva pramANe iti saugatAH / pratyakSAnumAnazabdopamAnArthApattyabhAvAH pramANAnIti miimaaNskaaH| pratyakSAnumAnazabdopamAnAni pramANAnIti naiyaayikaaH| pratyakSAnumAnazabdAni pramANAnIti vaizeSikAH / etAnyeva sAMkhyAH / pratyakSamevaikaM pramANamiti cArvAkAH / / tathA gocare, paraspara niyamAnatvAdityarthaH / prakaraNazarIramiti / prakaraNasya svarUpam / pavetyAdi / padaM prasiddham, vAkyaM viziSTapadasamudAyaH / yadAha-- padAnAM saMhatirvAkyaM sApekSANAM parasparam / sAkhyAtAH kalpanAstatra pazcAtsantu yathAyatham / / zlokazchandomAtram / prAdigrahaNAt pratyakSAnumAnaprakaraNAdigrahaH / / saugatA iti / suSThu apunarAvRttyA gataM gamanaM, sarve gatyarthA jJAnArthA iti nyAyAt zobhanaM jJAnaM vA yasya sa tathA, sa devatA yeSAM "sAsya devatA" (pA0 4-2-24) iti araNa; yadvA sugatasya ime saugatAH, "tasyedam" (pA0 4-3-120) iti aN / mImAMsakA iti| mImAMsAzabdaH pUjitavicAravacanastAM vidantyadhIyate vA, kramAdibhyo vun (pA0 4-2-61) itykprtyyH| yatA mImAMsayanti vicArayanti yathAvasthitasvarUpeNa pramANaprameyAdivastujAtamiti mImAMsakAH kartari vuN / naiyAyikAdaya iti / nyAyaM vidantyadhIyate vA "RtUkthAdeSThaN" iti vizrAntasUtreNa ThaN 'ThasyekaH" itIkAdezaH / pratyakSAnumAnazabdopamAnArthApattyabhAvAH pramANAnIti / yadAhustadvAdidanaH -- pratyakSamanumAnaM ca zAbda copamayA saha / arthApattirabhAvazca SaT pramANAni jaimineH // iti / prabhAkarasya vA abhAvapramANaM pratyakSavizeSa vadataH paJca pramANAnIti / pratyakSAnumAnazabdAni pramANAnIti vaizeSikA iti / vyomazibAbhiprAyeNaitatpramANatritayamavocadAcAryaH / kandalIkArastu pratyakSAnumAne dve eva pramANe prAha / nityadravyavRttayo'ntyA vizeSAH, vizeSA eva vaizeSikam; "vinayAdeH" (pA0 5-4-34) iti svArthe ThaNa; tato vaizeSikaM vidantyadhIyate vA vaizeSikAH, 'tadvetyadhIte" ( siddha0 he0 6-2-117) ityaN / / etAnyeva sAMkhyA iti / saMkhyA paJcaviMzatitattvAni; yadAhuH sAMkhyA: -

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NYAYAVATARAH vinirluThitakSaNakSayaparamANulakSaNAni svalakSaNAni pramANagocarastAttvika iti bauddhAH / sAmAnyavizeSAtmakaM vastviti mImAMsakAH parasparavibhaktau sAmAnyavizeSAviti naiyAyikavaizeSikAH / traiguNyarUpaM sAmAnyamiti sAMkhyAH / bhUtacatuSTayaM pramANabhUmIti cArvAkAH / tathA phale'pi vipratipadyante, arthAdhigatiH pramANaphalamiti saugatAH / pUrvaM pUrvaM pramANamuttaramuttaraM tu phalamiti mImAMsakAdayaH / tatra tAvallakSaNasaMkhyAvipratipattI nirAcikIrSurAha pramANaM svaparAbhAti jJAnaM, bAdhavivarjitam / pratyakSaM ca parokSaM ca dvidhA, meyavinizcayAt // 1 // tatrApi pUrvArdhana lakSaNavipratipattimuttarArdhena tu saMkhyAvipratipatti nirAcaSTe / lakSaNaM ca pararUpebhyo vyAvartanakSamo'sAdhAraNadharmaH / lakSyate paricchidyate vijAtIyebhyo vyAvRttaM lakSyaM yena tallakSaNamityucyate / tacceha dvaye pratyAyyAH svadarzanAnuraktAntaHkaraNAstIrthAntarIyAH vipratipannAH, tathA mugdhabuddhayo laukikA avyutpannAzceti / tatazca yadAdau vipratipannAn prati lakSaNaM tadaivaM lakSyalakSaNabhAvo draSTavyaH / yadidaM bhavatAmasmAkaM ca pramANamiti prasiddham, tatsvaparAbhAsi jJAnaM bAdhavivarjitam mantavyam ; prasiddha pramANamanUdyAprasiddha svaparAbhAsitvAdi vidhIyate / yadA tu avyutpannamatIn pratIdaM lakSaNam, tadA pratiprANi svaparaprakAzino jJAnasya bAdhArahitasya kasyacit siddhatvAt, anyathA pratiniyatavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAt, evaM te bodhyante yadado bhavatAM kvacinniyatArthagrAhi svaparaprakAzakaM bAdharahitaM jJAnaM prasiddha tat pramANamiti budhyantAm / atrApi siddhasyAnuvAdo'siddhasya vidhAnaM yojyam / / - -- paJcaviMzatitattvajJo yatra tatrAzrame rataH / jaTI muNDI zikhI vApi mucyate nAtra saMzayaH // 1 // tAM vidantyadhIyate vA sAMkhyAH; pUrvavadaN / tAlavyAdirapi zAGkhayadhvanirastIti vRddhAmnAya : / tathAhi - zaGkhanAmA kazcidAdya: puruSavizeSaH tasyApatyaM pautrAdiriti gargAditvAdyapratyayaH / pratyakSamevaikaM pramANamiti cArvAkA iti / carva pradane carvanti bhakSayanti tatvato na manyante puNyapApAdikaM parokSaM vastujAtamiti cArvAkA:; mavAkazyAmAketyAdi siddhamogAdidaNDakena ( sU0 37) nipAtanAt // pramANa saMkhyA saMgrahAya zlokazcAtra cArvAkosdhyakSamekaM sugatakaNabhujo sAnumAnaM, sazAbdaM / tadvaitaM pAramarSaH, sahitamupamayA tattrayaM cAkSapAdaH // arthApatyA prabhAkRd vadati sa nikhilaM manyate bhaTTa etat / sAbhAvaM dve pramANe jinapatisamaye spaSTato'spaSTatazca // traiguNyarUpaM sAmAnyamiti / yo guNAH sattvarajastamAMsi tataH svArthe " Nyo'nantAdeH " iti NyaH, trayo lokAstrailokyaM SaD guNAH SADguNyam, tatastraiguNyaM rUpaM svabhAvo yasya sAmAnyasya tat traiguNyarUpam / bhUtacatuSTayamiti / pRthvyaptejovAyulakSaNam /

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10 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I adhunAkSarArthaH - tatra pramANamiti pUrvavat / sva AtmA svarUpaM, paro'rthaH, tAvAbhAsayituM prakAzayituM zIlamasya tattathA / jJAyate nirNIyate tattvaM yena tada jJAnam / bAdhyate'neneti bAdhaH, viparItArthopasthApakapramANapravRttiriti yAvat / tena vizeSeNa varjitaM rahitaM yajjJAnaM tat pramANamiti saMTaGkaH / / iha ca vyavacchedyApekSayA lakSaNe vizeSaNapravRtteH svaparAbhAsi ityanena ye svAbhAsyeva jJAnaM manyante jJAnavAdino bauddhavizeSAH, ye ca parAbhAsyeva mImAMsakanaiyAyikAdayaste nirastAH / te hi bahirarthAbhAvAt jJAnaM svAMzaparyavasitasattAkamittyAcakSIran, tadayuktam, jJeyArthAbhAve jJAnAbhAvaprasaGgAt / athArthAbhAve'pi svapnadazAyAM vanadevakulAdinAnApratibhAsaM jJAnamavalokitamiti tathAbhUtaM sakalaM brUSe, tanna, tasyApi jAgradavasthAbhAvisadbhUtArthadarzanasaMpAditAtmasaMskAramiddhAdikAraNakalApasaMnidhAnaprabodhavyapekSatvAta, itarathAtyantAnubhUtabhUtapaJcakAtiriktaSaSThabhUtapratibhAsaH syAt / kiM ca / kathamekaM jJAnaM sitapItAdyanekAkAravivartamiti praSTavyo bhavAn / anAdyavidyAvAsanAta iti cet , atrApi vikalpayugalamamalamavatarati, tato jJAnAt sA vAsanA byabhatsId na vaa| vyatyarakSIcced, evaM sati tadgrAhakapramANamabhidhAnIyam, jJAnavyatiriktAyAH saMvedanAbhAvAt, tatsaMvedane cArthasyApi vyatiriktasya saMvedanamiti sa duSpratiSedhaH syAt / vedyavedakAkArakaluSitAjjJAnAdeva vyatiriktA tatkAraNabhUtA jJAnarUpaiva sAnumIyate iti cenna, tayA saha saMbandhakecideva tu cArvAkaikadezIyA AkAzalakSaNaM paJcamaM bhUtamabhimanyamAnAH paJcabhUtAtmaka jagadAcakSate iti / tIrthAntarIyetyAdi / tIryate bhavAbdhiraneneti tIrtha dvAdazAGgatadAdhAro vA saMghaH, tasmAdanyattIrthAntaraM tatra bhvaastiirthaantriiyaaH| laukikA iti / loke bhavA adhyAtmAderAkRtigaNatvAt "adhyAtmAdeH" iti zaizikaSThaJ / / tasyApItyAdi / svapnadazAjJAnasyApi jAgradavasthAyAM bhavanazIlaM yatsadabhUtArthadarzanaM tena saMpAdito ya AtmanaH saMskArastasya middhAdikAraNakalApasaMnidhAnena yaH prabodhastaM vyapekSate, "karmaNyaNa" (pA0 3-2-1) tadbhAvastasmAt / middhAvIti / middhazabdo nidrAbhidhAyI npuNskH| yavinizcayaTIkAyAM dharmottaraH--middhaM nidreti / prAdizabdAdadRSTaM dadhyAdibhojanaM sajalAdidezo nizIthAdikAlo vAtAdiH prakRtirvAtAdiSitatvaM cetyAdi gRhyate / tathA cAtrArthe Agama:-- aNuhUyadicitiyasuyapayaivicAradevapANayA / sumiNassa nimittAI puNNaM pAvaM ca nAbhAvo // 1 // (vize0 bhA0 1703) [anubhUtadRSTacintitazrutaprakRtivikAradevatAnUpAH / svapnasya nimittAni puNyaM pApaM ca nAbhAvaH // 1 // ] atra 'aNUyeti' anUpaH sajaladezaH // vedya tyaadi| evazabdo bhinnakrame, tato'yamartha:--vedyavedakAkArakaluSitAdeva jJAnAd vyatiriktA na tu jJAnamAtrAdapIti, ata

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NYAYAVATARAH 11 grahaNAbhAvAt, dRSTahAnyadaSTaparikalpanAprasaGgAcca / kiM c| yathA vyatiriktavAsanAvazAdevamapi jJAnaM nAnAkAram, tathA jaDamapi tadvazAdeva bodharUpaM prakAzata iti viparItApatterartha eva siddhimAskanded na jJAnam / athAvyatiriktA, hanta jJAnameva tanna vAsanA tadavyatiriktatvAt tatsvarUpavadityAstAM tAvat / parAbhAsyapi svaprakAzAbhAvAdabhidadhIran, tadapyasaMbaddham / svaprakAzAbhAve paraprakAzAyogAt / na hi pradIpaH svarUpamanuddyotayan ghaTAdhuDhyotane vyApriyate / svayaM cApratItamapi yadyarthaM grAhayati jJAnam, devadattasyotpannaM (jJAnaM) yajJadatta grAhayet , vizeSAbhAvAt / anyacca / paraprakAzanamAtre'pi dUrAsannAdibhedaH prathamAnAnAmarthAnAM kimapekSazcakAsti, zarIrApekSa iti cet, na, tasyApi prakAzyatAvizeSAt, tasmAdantarmukhAkArasya bahirarthagrahaNe sati ayaM ghaTAmATIkate nAnyathA / athArthApattyAdinA pramANAntareNa tadanniviSTaM gRhyate, tatastadapekSayA yokSyate dUrAsannAdibheda iti cet, na, tatrApi vikalpayugalakAnativRtteH / tathA hitatpramANAntaraM svaprakAzamanyaprakAzaM vaa| svaprakAzaM cet, prathamasya kiM kSaNam / anyaprakAzaM cet, tatrApIyameva vArtA ityanavasthA, tasmAt svarUpamavabhAsayadeva jJAnamarthagrahaNAya vyApriyate iti sthitam // eva pAha--tatkAraNabhUtA vedyavedakAkArakaluSajJAnasya hetubhuutaa| jJAnarUpaiveti / ayamabhiprAya:-jJAnarUpA vAsanA pUrvakSaNavartinI vedyavedakAkArakaluSamutta rakSaNavati vijJAnaM janayatIti / tayetyAdi / tayA vAsanayA saha vedyavedakAkArakaluSajJAnasya kAryakAraNabhAvalakSaNasambandhagrahaNAbhAvAt tadabhAvazca bhavadabhiprAyeNa pUrvAparakSaNavatijJAnavyatiriktasya grAhakasyAtmano'satvAt / dRSTahAnItyAdi / ghaTAdisahitacakSurAdisAmagrIto'nvaya vyatirekAbhyAM jJAnamutpadyate iti dRSTasya pratyakSAdyanirAkRtasya vyavahArasya hAniH, tathA pratyakSAdibhiH pramAgairasaMvedyamAnAyAH vAsanAyAH sakAzAt sitapItAdinAnAkArakalitamadhyakSamutpadyate ityadRSTaM tasya parikalpanA tayoH prasaMgAt / jaDamapIti / acidrUpamapi jJAnam / nahIti / yaduktam dIpavannopapadyeta bAhyavastuprakAzanam / anAtmavedane jJAne jagadAndhyaM prasajyate // 1 // vizeSAbhAvAditi / devadattotpannajJAnasya devadattayajJadattAbhyAmasaMvedyamAnatvenAvizeSAt / prathamAnAnAmiti / prakAzamAnAnAm / antarmukhetyAdi / antarmukho'ntaHprakAzaka AkAro yasya jJAnasya tasyaiva bAhyArthaparicchede sati ayaM dUrAsannAdibhedaH saMgacchate / arthApattyAdineti / yadi jJAnaM mayi utpanna na syAt tahi arthaprakaTatA me na syAt tasmAdarthaprAkaTyAnyathAnupapattyA jJAnaM zarIrAnta niviSTamiti vyavasthApyate / yaduktam-- nAnyathehArthasadbhAvo dRSTaH sannupapadyate / jJAnaM cennetyataH pazcAtpramANamiti kalpyate // 1 / / iti / pAdizabdAnnaiyAyikamatAbhiprAyeNa pratyakSaM gRhyate / tathA hi teSAM mate ghaTAdiviSayaM pratyakSaM ghaTameva paricchinatti, yadA ca ghaTapratyakSaviSayaM mAnasAbhidhAnaM pratyakSAntaramutpadyate tadA tena ghaTAdiviSayaM pratyakSaM mama udapadyateti nizcIyeta / tathA yeSA mate'numAnAtpRthagapattirneSyate, tanmate'numAnena jJAnaM mamodapAdIti vyavasthApyate iti,

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12 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I 'jJAnam' ityanena tu yannaiyAyikAdibhiH paryakalpi saMnikarSaH pramANamiti, tasya prAmANyaM nirasyati / yataH snAnapAnAvagAhanAdyartha kriyAnirvartanakSamamarthaM nizcityAvyavadhAnena pravartante pramAtArastadeva jJAnaM pramANaM na saMnikarSo jaDatayAsti, avyavahitanirNayAbhAvAdityAkUtam / arthopalabdhihetutvAttasya prAmANyamiti cet, vizIrNedAnIM pramANeyattA, dehAderapi tatkAraNatayA prAmANyApatterityAstAM tAvat / 'bAdhavivajitam' ityamunA tu yattimirAditiraskRtanayanadIdhitiprasarAdinA nabhastalAvamvinizIthinInAthadvayAdipratibhAsam, yacca kutarka bhrAntacetasAM nijadarzanAkarNanaprabhavaM kSaNakSayisAmAnyavizeSaikAntezvarAdikRtabhuvanapratibhAsaM jJAnaM tatpratyanIkArthapratyAyakapramANAnta ropanipAtaplAvitatvAt pratikSipati / vizeSArthavizabdopAdAnAttu yaH khalu bahulakA malAvalepaluptalocanabalAnAM dhavale jalaje pItimAnamAdadhAno bodhaH samullasati, sa yadyapi sakalaM kAlaM taddoSAvyuparame pramAturnidarzanena bAdhyate, tathApi tajjalajadhavalatAgrAhiraNA janAntaradarzanena vAdhitatvAnna pramANamityuktaM bhavati / samastalakSaNena tu yatpare pratyapIpadan anadhigatArthAdhigantR pramANam avisaMvAdakaM pramANam, arthopalabdhihetuH pramANam ityAdi tannirAsthat, tathA hianadhigatArthAdhigantRtvaM kimabhidhIyate ? jJAnAntareNAnadhigatamarthaM yadadhigacchati tatpramANamiti cet, tarhi tajjJAnAntaraM parakIyaM svakIyaM vA / tadyadi parakIyam, tadayuktam, sarvajJajJAnasya sakalArthagocaratayA sarvaprAkRtaM lokajJAnAnAmadhigatArthAdhigantRtvenAprAmANyaprasaGgAt, tadarthagrAhijanAntaradarzanasaMbhavAcca / atha svakIyaM, tatrApi so'dhigamyo'rthaH kiM dravyamuta paryAyo vA ? dravyaviziSTaparyAyaH, paryAyaviziSTaM vA dravyamiti ? tathA kiM sAmAnyamuta vizeSaH ? Ahosvit sAmAnyaviziSTo vizeSaH vizeSaviziSTaM vA sAmAnyam ? ityaSTau pakSAH / tatra yadyAdyatadapyanumAnamatrAdizabdAd gRhyate / taccAnumAnaM dvedhA, dRSTaM sAmAnyatodRSTaM ca / tatra pratyakSaparicchedArthAnumApakaM dRSTam, yathA dhUmo dhUmadhvajasya / svarUpaviprakRSTArthaM tu sAmAnyatodRSTaM yathA gandhAdijJAnaM ghrANAdeH / tathA hi-gandhAdyupalabdhiH karaNa kAryA, kriyAtvAt, yA kriyA sA karaNakAryA yathA chidikriyA, kriyA ceyam, tasmAtkaraNakAryA; tathAtratyamapyanumAnaM svarUpa viprakRSTArthamiti sAmAnyatodRSTam / tathA hi-arthaM prAkaTyaM viziSTakAraNajanyam, viziSTakAryatvAt yad yad viziSTakAryaM tad tad viziSTakAraNajanyaM yathA citrAdi, viziSTakAyaM cedam, tasmAdviziSTakAraNajanyam / tatazca yadyapi paraprakAzyeva jJAnaM tathApi arthApattyAdinA pramANena jJAnaM me samutpannamiti nizcIyate / gata iti / jJAnAt / AkUtam abhiprAyaH / kSaraNakSayItyAdi / kSaNena kSayaH sa yasya vastuno'sti tacca samAnya vizeSayorekAntazca Izvara prAdiryasya prakRtyAtmasvabhAvAdestena kRtaM bhuvanaM ca teSAM pratibhAso yatra jJAne tattathA / plAvitatvAditi / bAdhitatvAt / jalaje zaGkha / atha dvitIyamiti / urarIkuruSe iti pAzcAtya vikalpasaMbaddha kriyApadamihApi saMbadhyate, evamuttara vikalpeSvapi /

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10 NYAYAVATARAH 13 murarIkuruSe, tadyuktam, dravyasya nityatvaikatvAbhyAmanadhigatatvAMzAbhAvAt / atha dvitIyam, tadapyacAru, paryAyasya prAcInasaMvedanodayasamayadhvastasya saMvedanAntaraprabhavakAlaM yAvatpratIkSaNAsaMbhavena vizeSaNAnarthakyAt / uta tRtIyam, tadapyasAdhIyaH, vikalpadvayAnatikramAt / sa hi dravyaviziSTaH paryAyaH samakAlabhAvinA jJAnenAnadhigato'tigamyate, yadvA kAlAntara bhAvineti / na tAvatsamakAlabhAvinA, tatsaMbhavAbhAvenavizeSaNavaiphalyAt / na hi saMbhavo'styekasya pramAturekakAlaM dravyakroDIkRtakaparyAyaviSayasaMvedanadvayapravRtta: tathAnubhavAbhAvAt, parasparamadhigatArthAdhigantRtvenAprAmANya prasaGgAcca / nApi kAlAntarabhAvinA, gRhyamANaparyAyasya kAlAntarAnAskandanAt, puurvottrkssnntruttitvrtmaankssnnmaatrsNbndhtvaattsy| etena paryAyaviziSTadravyapakSo'pi prativyUDhaH, samAnayogakSematvAt / atha sAmAnyaM, tadapyasaMbaddham, tadekatayA prathamajJAnena sAkalyagrahaNAduttareSAM sAmAnyajJAnAnAmadhigatArthagocaratayAprAmANyaprasaGgAt / atha vizeSaH, sa nityo'nityo veti vaktavyam / nityazcet, evaM satyAdyasaMvedanenaiva tasya sAmastyagrahaNAduttareSAM tadviSayANAmadhigatagocaratvenAprAmANyaprasaktiH / anityazcet, paryAyadUSaNena pratikSiptaH / atha sAmAnyaviziSTo vizeSaH, kAsya viziSTatA, kiM tAdAtmyamuta tatsaMnidhimAtram ? tAdAtmyaM cet, prathamajJAnena sAmAnyavattasyApi grahaNAt, anyathA tAdAtmyakSateH, tadviSayAnyajJAnAnAmaprAmANyaM prasajyeta / tatsAMnidhyapakSe'pi dvayorapi parasparaM vizakalitarUpatvAt pakSadvayoditaM dUSaNaM pazcAlagnaM dhAvati / vizeSaviziSTasAmAnyapakSe punaretadeva viparItaM yojyam / tanna anadhigatArthAdhigantatvaM jJAnasya kathaMcid vicArabhAragauravaM sahata ityalakSaNamiti sthitam / / avi saMvAdakatvamadhunA vicAryate - tatkiM pradarzitArthaprAptyA uta prAptiyogyArthopadarzakatvena pAhosvidavicalitArthaviSayatvena bhavAn jJAnasya prAmANyaM kathayati ? yadi prathamaH kalpaH, tadayuktam, jalabudabudAdimumUrSupadArthotpAditasaMvedanasyApramANatotpatteH, prAptikAle tasya dhvastatvAt / atha dvitIyaH, tadapyacAru, prAptyayogyadezasthitagrahanakSatrAdigocarajJAnasyAprAmANyaprasakteH, anucitadezAvasthAnenaiva prAptyanahatvAtteSAm / atha tRtIyaH pakSaH, tatrApyavicalitaviSayatAM kathamavaiSi ? jJAnAntareNa tadviSayanirAkaraNAbhAvAditi cet etadevAsmAbhiruditaM kiM bhavataH paruSamAbhAti ? na hi svaparaprakAzi jJAnaM bAdhArahitaM vimucyAnyasya viSayAnirAkaraNaM jJAnAntareNa prekSAmahe / tattadeva nyAyAtapramAraNaM bhavadbhirabhyupagatamiti / arthopalabdhihetuH pramANamityetadapi na parIkSA kSamate, zarIrAderapi tatkAraNAtayA prAmANyaprasaGgAt / avyavahitamarthopalambhakAraNaM pramANaM na dehAdikamiti cet, evaM tarhi jJAnameva svaparAvirbhAvakaM samAnayogakSematvAviti / alabdhasya lAbho yogaH, labdhasya paripAlanaM kSemaH, tathA samAnau dravyaviziSTaparyAyapakSaNa tulyau duSaNalAbhalakSaNo yogazca dUSaNasya duruttaratvAt paripAlanarUpaH kSemazca yasya paryAyaviziSTadravyapakSasya tasya bhAvastatvaM tasmAt / atha

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14 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I nirbAdhakaM ca pramANaM na saMnikarSAdi, tatsadbhAve'pyarthaparicchedAbhAvAt / tasmA. detadeva cAru pramANalakSaNamiti / / adhunA tatsaMkhyAmAha-pratyakSa cetyAdi / tatra siddhAntaprasiddhapAramArthikapratyakSApekSayAkSazabdo jIvaparyAyatayA prasiddhaH, iha tu vyAvahArikapratyakSaprastAvAdakSadhvanirindriyavacano gRhyate / tatazcAkSaM pratigataM pratyakSam / yadindriyamAzrityojjihIte'rthasAkSAtkAri jJAnaM tatpratyakSamityarthaH / etacca pratyakSazabdavyutpattinimittaM na tu pravRttinimittam / sAmAnyamiti / anadhigataH sannadhigamyo'rtho'bhidhIyata iti shessH| evamuttaratrApi siddhAntaprasiddhetyAdi / tathA ca bhagavAn bhadrabAhuH-- jIvo akkho taM pai jaM vaTTai taM tu hoi paccakkhaM / paramo puNa akkhassa vaTTantaM hoi pArokkhaM // 1 // kesiMci iMdiyAiM akkhAI taduvaladdhi paccakkhaM / taM tu na jujjai jamhA aggAhagamiMdiyaM visae // 2 // navi iMdiyAiM uvaladdhimaMti vigaesu visayasaMbharaNA / jaha gehagavakkhAiM jo aNusariyA sa uvaladdhA // 3 // dhUmanimittaM nANaM aggimmi ligiyaM jahA hoi / / taha iMdiyAI liMgaM taM nANaM liMgiyaM na kahaM // 4 // iti / [jIvo'kSaH taM prati yad vartate tattu bhavati pratyakSam / parata: punarakSasya vartamAnaM / bhavati parokSam // 1 // keSAMcidindriyANi akSANi tadupalabdhi pratyakSam / / tattu na yujyate yasmAt agnAhakamindriyaM viSaye // 2 // nApIndriyANi upalabdhimanti vigateSu viSayasaMsmaraNAt / yathA gehagavAkSA yo'nuspartA sa upalabdhA // 3 / / dhUmanimittaM jJAnamagnau laiGgikaM yathA bhavati / tathendriyANi liGga tajjJAnaM laiGgika na katham // 4 // ] laukikA adhyakSazabdena jIvamAhuH / yadAha gauDaH-- jJAnAtmacakrazakaTe pAzakavyavahArayoH / tuSe kare pumAnakSaM tucche sauvarcalendriye / / bibhItakabUtacakranAbhi gatAvayaveSvapi / puMsi--iti / idamiha siddhAnta rahasyama eganteNa parokkhaM liMgiyamohAiyaM ca paccakkhaM / iMdiyamaNobhavaM jaM taM saMvavahArapaccakkhaM // 1 // (vize0 bhA0 65) [ekAntena parokSaM laiGgikamavadhyAdi ca pratyakSam / indriyamanobhavaM yat tat saMvyavahArapratyakSam // ] atra 'pohAiyaM' iti avadhimanaHparyavakevalarUpaM jJAnatrayam /

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NYAYAVATARAH sa hyevaM vyutpAdito'pi sAkSAd grAhyagrAhakaM jJAnavizeSaM lakSayati, tatraiva rUDhatvAt, yathA gamanakriyAyAM vyutpAdito'pi gozabdaH kakudAdimantaM piNDavizeSaM gacchantamagacchantaM vA gocarayati, tatraiva tasya prasiddhatvAt, na gamana kriyAyuktamapi puruSAdikaM viparyayAditi / tatazca sarvajJajJAnAnAM yatsvarUpa saMvedanaM tadapi pratyakSamityukta bhavati / tatrApi svarUpasya grAhyasya sAkSAtkaraNasadbhAvAditi / akSebhyaH parato vartate iti parokSam, akSavyApAranirapekSamavyApAreNAsAkSAdarthaparicchedakaM yajjJAnaM tatparokSamiti bhAvaH / cazabdau pratyakSa parokSayostulyakakSatAM lakSayataH / tena yatpare prAhuH pratyakSaM sakalapramANajyeSThamityAdi tadapAstaM bhavati, dvayorapi prAmANyaM pratyavizeSAt, vizadAvizadapratibhAsavizeSasya sato'pi jyeSThatAM pratyanaGgatvAt / pratyakSasya puraHsaratvAtparokSasya kaniSThateti cet, nAyamekAntaH, sarvatrAnyathAnupapannatAvadhAritocchvAsaniHzvAsAdijIvaliGgasadbhAvAsadbhAvAbhyAM jIvasAkSAtkAripratyakSakSUNe'pi jIvanmRttapratItidarzanAt, anyathA lokavyavahArAbhAvaprasaGgAt / kvacit pratyakSagRhItasaMbandhavalAtparokSaM pravartata iti pratyakSasya jyeSThatvakalpane pazya mRgo dhAvatItya) dizabdavalAtkRkA TikAmoTanadvAreNa mRgaviSayaM tathA smaraNAtsaMketagrahaNAdvA apUrvA pUrvArthadarzanakutUhalAdinA vanadevakulAdigocaraM parokSapUrvaM pratyakSaM dRSTamiti parokSasya jyeSThatA sajyeta / dvidheti / sarvaM vAkyaM sAvadhAraNaM pravartate iti nyAyAt, anyathAniyatArthA pradarzakatvena taduccAraNavaiyarthyaprasaGgAt viparItAkAranirAkaraNacAturyAyogena nirA kAGkSa pravRttyasiddha eH dvidhaiva ityavadhAraNena paraparikalpitaviparIta saMkhyAntaraM 15 prakSaM pratigataM pratyakSamiti / zrakSazabdasya napuMsakatvAt tatpuruSasya cottarapadapradhAnatvAt napuMsakatvameva prAptamiti na vAcyam, paraliGgodvandva - ityadhikAre prazIti siddhamaliGgAnuzAsana sUtreNa zraMzyeva tatpuruSa uttarapadaliGgabhAk yathA - pippalyA ardhapippalIyam zrardhI jaratyA zradhaMjaratIyam / tenAnyatra vAcyaliGga eva tatpuruSaH / tatra pratyakSo bodhaH pratyakSA buddhiH pratyakSaM jJAnam / / ujjihIte utpadyate / viparyayAt puruSAdau gozabdasyAsiddhatvAt / tathA smaraNAdityAdi / apUrvA pUrvArthadarzanaviSaye kutUhalena zrAdizabdAtprayojanAdinA kRtvA hetunA vA vanaviSayaM devakulAdiviSayaM vA parokSapUrvamadhyakSamIkSitam, kutUhalAdyapi kuta ityAha- smaraNAt, anubhUtamarthaM hi smRtvotpanna kutUhala: pumAn pravartate iti tathA saMketagrahaNAt, gRhItasaMketo hi saMketite sthAne jAtadidRkSo draSTuM pravartate // dviSeti / savaM vAkyaM sAvadhAraNamityAdi / zratra kecidAhuH - yathA zratra dviSetyukte dviSaiva na tvekadhA tridhA vetyevamanyayogavyavaccheda:, tathA caitro dhanurdhara ityAdiSvapi caitrasya dhanuSaM ratvameva syAt na zauyaudAryadhairyAdayaH / tadayuktam, yataH sarvaM vAkyaM sAvadhAraNamiti nyAye'pyAzaGkitasyaiva vyavacchedaH / parArthaM vAkyamabhidhIyate, yadeva ca pareNa vyAmohAdAzaGkitaM tasyaiva vyavacchedaH, caitro dhanurdhara ityAdau caitrasya dhanurdharatvAyoga eva parerAzaGkita iti tasyaiva vyavacchedo nAnyadharmasya / iha tu cArvAkanaiyAyikAdaya aikadhyamanekadhA ca

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16 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I tiraskurute, tasya yuktibAdhitatvAt / tathA hi-pratyakSamevaikaM pramANamityasat, parokSAbhAve tasyaiva praamaannyaayogaat| sa hi kAzcitpratyakSavyaktIrarthakriyAsamarthArthaprApakatvenAvyabhicAriNIrupalabhyAnyAstaviparItatayA vyabhicAriNIzca, tataH kAlAntare punarapi tAdRzetarANAM pratyakSavyaktInAM pramANatetarate samAcakSIta / na ca pUrvAparaparAmarzazanyaM purovartyarthagrahaNaparyavasitasattAkaM pratyakSaM pUrvAparakAlabhAvinInAM pratyakSavyaktInAM sAdRzyanivandhanaM prAmANyamupalakSayituM kSamate / na cAyaM svapratItigocarANAmapi pratyakSavyaktInAM prAmANyaM paraM pratipAdayitumIzaH / tasmAdavazyaMtayA yathAdRSTapratyakSavyaktisAdharmyadvAreNAdhunAtanapratyakSavyaktInAM prAmANyapratyAyakaM parapratipAdakaM ca parokSAntargatamanumAnarUpaM prmaannaantrmurriikrtvym| parAvabodhArthaM ca pratyakSamevekaM pramANaMnAnyadastI tyullapana unmattatAmAtmano lakSayati / pratyakSeNa paracetovattisAkSAtakaraNAbhAvAda vyApAravyAhAraceSTA pramoNamAhuH ato niyatadvaividhyapradarzanena ekatvabahutve pramANasya prtikssipti| evaM cAyamevakArastridhA, prayogAnyayogAtyantAyogavyavacchedakAritvAt / yad vinizcayaH ayogaM yogamaparairatyantAyogameva ca / vyavacchinatti dharmasya nipAto vyatirecakaH // 1 // iti / nipAta evakAraH, vyatirecako nivrtkH| vizeSaNavizeSyAbhyAM kriyayA ca sahoditaH / vivakSAto'prayoge'pi tasyArtho'yaM pratIyate // 2 // vyavacche daphalaM vAkyaM yatazcaitro dhanurdharaH / pArtho dhanurdharo nIlaM sarojamiti vA yathA // 3 // iti / sa hotyAdi / sa pratyakSakapramANavAdI cArvAkaH / tAdRzetarANAmiti / tAdRzyazcetarAzceti dvandva puMvadbhAvAbhAvAt kathamidamiti na vAcyam, sAmAnyavizeSabhAvena saMbandhAt, yathA-bhUtamiyaM brAhmaNIti / tathA ca mAghaH tadavitathamavAdIryanmama tvaM priyeti priyatamaparibhuktaM yadukUlaM dadhAnaH / madadhivasatimAgAH kAminAM maNDanazrIvrajati hi saphalatvaM vallabhAlokanena ||iti|| (zizu0 11-33) pratra hi saphalasya bhAvaH saphalatvam, tataH kiM saphalatvaM yAti ityAkAkSAyAM maNDanazrIriti saMbandhaH / tathAtrApi samAcakSIta cArvAka:-ke pramANetarate / keSAM tAdRzetarANAm / iti jijJAsAyAmabhidhIyate-pratyakSavyaktInAm / kvacittAzItarANAmityapi pATho dRzyate / ayam cArvAkaH / parAvabodhArya cetyAdi / pratyakSamevaikaM pramANaM nAnyadastItyetat pratipAdyAvabodhArthamullapana unmattatAmAtmano lakSayatIti sNbndhH| kuta iti / etasmAd nyAyAt /

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17 NYAYAVATARAN vizeSadarzanAda bodhavizeSAvagatau parokSasya prAmANyaM balAdApatatIti nyAyAt / svargAdRSTadevatAdipratiSedhaM na pratyakSeNa kartumarhati, tasya saMnihitamAtraviSayatvAt / na cAyaM tadapratiSedhena kharakharakacArvAkatAmApnoti, pramANAntaraM ca tatpratiSedhArtha ca necchatIti viSamametatkathaM kuryAditi savismayaM nazcetaH / kiM ca / pratyakSamapi kathaM pramANatAM svIkarotIti vaktavyam, gRhyamANapadArthAnvayavyatirekAnukaraNAt / tathA hi-tatsamagrasAmagrIkapadArthavalenonmajjati, tadabhAve visphAritekSaNayugalasyApi pramAturnodIyate iti brUSa, parokSe'pi tarhi samAnamevaitat, tadapi bahirarthasAmarthyAdevollasati, tatsaMbaddhaliGgazabdadvAreNa tasyotpatteH, anyathA parokSAbhAsatAprasaGgAt / tasya cAlIkatve pAramArthikaparokSaprAmANyakSaterayogAt, anyathA pratyakSamapi gaganatalAvalambizazadharayugalAvalokanacaturamalIkamavalokitamiti / sakalavizadadarzanAni satyatAbhimatAnyapyalIkatAmaznuvIran / tanna pramANabhUtaM parokSaM kadAcana gRhyamANapadArthasattAM vihAyotpattumutsaheta, iti pratyakSavatpramANa koTimArohati balAditi sthitam // tathA yadapi parairuktadvayAtiriktaM pramANasaMkhyAnantaraM pratyajJAyi, tatrApi yatparyAlocyamAnamupamAnArthApattivatpramANatAmAtmasAkSAtkaroti, tadanayoreva pratyakSaparokSayorantarbhAvanIyam / yatpunarvicAryamANaM mImAMsaka parikalpitAbhAvavatprAmANyameva nAskandati, na tena bahirbhUtena vA kiMcinnaH prayojanam avastutvAdityapakarNanIyam / atha kathamupamAnasya prAmANyamiti brUSe / tducyte| prathamaM hi vizadadarzanAdhigatopiNDavizeSasya 'yathA gaustathA gavayaH' iti vAkyAkarNanAhitAtmasaMskArasya puMso'TavyAM paryaTato gavayapiNDavizeSaviSayaviviktadarzanapuraHsaraM yatpUrvAparagogavayapiNDagocaradarzanavyApArasaMpAditajanmakam 'ayaM tena sadRzo'nayorvA sAdRzyamiti' sAdRzyaviziSTa enameva ca nyAyamAha-pratyakSeNetyAdi / adhyakSeNa pratipAdyacetovRtteH pratyakSIkaraNAbhAvAt gobalIvardanyAyena vyApArazabdena ceSTAvizeSAdanyaiva kriyA gRhyate, anyathA ceSTAvizeSa iti punaruktaM syAt / vyAhArazabda: ceSTAvizeSo'kSipakSmasaMkocAdiviziSTakAyiko vyApAraH, teSAM darzanAt / bodhavizeSasya pratipAdyAbhiprAyasyAvagatAvabhyupagamyamAnAyAM haThAtparokSasya prAmANyamAgacchati / ayamabhiprAyaH-pratipAdyasyAvabodho bhavatu, etadathaM cArvAko vacanamuccArayati; parasya ca sacetanatayA stambhAmbhoruhAdibhyo vailakSaNya midaM ca boddhamabhipretamiti nAdhyakSeNa lakSayituM kSamate, vyApArAdidarzanAt pratipAdyasya caitanyAbhiprAyavizeSayoravagatAvaGgIkriyamANAyAM parokSasya prAmANyaM balAdAyAtIti / adRSTeti / puNyapApe / unmajjati utpadyate / udIyate / IG gatI devAdikaH udetItyarthaH / tatsaMbaddheti / anumeyavAcyarUpeNa bAhyArthena saMbaddhau linggshbdo| yathA gaurityAdi / yaduktam kIDaggavaya ityevaM pRSTo nAgarakairyadA / bravItyAraNyako vAcyaM yathA gauvayastathA / iti / (zlokavArtike 433 pRSThe)

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18 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 piNDaM piNDaviziSTaM sAdRzyaM gocarayatsaMvedanamudIyate tadupamAnamiti / yadAhustadvAdinaH tasmAdyadRzyate' tatsyAt sAdRzyena vizeSitam / prameyamupamAnasya sAdRzyaM vA tdnvitm||1|| iti / (zlokavAtike 444 pRSThe) tatazca pUrvAparadarzanayoH purovartigogavayapiNDagrahaNaparyavasitasattAkatvAt pUrvAparaparAmarzazUnyatvAd vizadanirbhAsitayA zabdollekharahitatvAt tadadhikamavyabhicaritaM vyavahArakAri sAdRzyamavasyadupamAnaM svaparaprakAzitayA nirbAdhakatvAcca pramANam / pUrvAparapiNDAtiriktamaparaM sAdRzyaM nopalabhyate iti cet, ko'yamupAlambho yadi pratyakSaM tat / yadi pratyakSe sAdRzyamupamAnagocaratvAnna pratibhAti, ko'syAparAdhaH / na hi jJAnAntare tadgocaro na pratibhAtIti nirgocaraM taditi vaktaM zakyam, itarathopamAne'pi pratyakSani hyA vyaktirna bhAtIti nirgocaramadhyakSamanuSajyeta / tad yathA svaviSaye'dhyakSaM pramANaM tathopamAnamapi / na hi dvayoH prathamAnayorekaM prati vizeSAbhAve pakSapAtaH kartuM yuktaH / etena pratyabhijJAjJAnasmatyahAdInAmavisaMvAdakAnAM parokSavizeSANAM prAmANyaM vyAkhyAtamavagantavyam, samAnanyAyAnupAtitvAt / tathA hi-prathamamarthadarzanamAtmani saMskAramAdhatte, tAdRzadarzanAdasau saMskAraH prabudhyate, prabuddhaH pUrvArthaviSayaM sa evAyaM tajjAtIyo vetyullekhena pratyabhijJAnamutthApayati, tasyordhvatirazcInabhedasAmAnyavyavasthApakatvAda asaMjAtapUrthigocaradarzanasya tadudayAbhAvAt, tathA sa eva saMskArastAdRzArtha darzanenAbhogAdinA vA prabuddho'nubhUtaviSayA saMpramoSalakSaNaM smaraNamupajanayati, adRSTArthasya piNDamiti / piNDazabdaH zarIravRttiH punapuMsakaH / yaduktam-'madhupiNDau surAtanvoriti' / yaditi / gavayapiNDam / dRzyate iti / aTavyAmaTatA puseti zeSaH / sAdRzyaM ceti / gogavayagatam / tadanvitamiti / gogavayapiNDasaMbaddham / tadadhikaM gogavayapratyakSamAhyAdutkalitam / avasyat nizcinvat / jJAnAntara iti / pratyakSe / tadgocaraH upamAnaviSayaH / daditi / upamAnam / vyaktiH svalakSaNam / tat tasmAt / eteneti / upamAnaprAmANyavyavasthApanena / tasyetyAdi / nanu kimiti saMskAraH sa evAyaM tajjAtIyo veti dvadha pratyabhijJAjJAnaM janayati ? pAha-tasya pratyabhijJAjJAnasya parAparavivartavyApi dravyamUrvasAmAnya mRdiva sthAsakozAdiSu sadRzapariNAmaH, tirazcInasAmAnyaM khaNDamuNDAdiSu gotvavat, tayodvaMyorapi nirNAyakatvAt / yadi puna, pratyabhijJAjJAnaM nojjambhate, tadordhvatirazcInabhedabhinnasAmAnyavyavasthA na syAditi / atha pUrvamarthadarzanam, tataH saMskAraH, tatastasya prabodhaH, tadanu pratyabhijJAjJAnamiti paraMparAzrayaNanibandhanAbhAvAt prathamAkSasaMnipAte eva pratyabhijJAjJAnaM ki notpadyate ityAha-na saMjAtaM pUrvArthagocaraM darzanaM yasya tasya puMsaH pratyabhijJAjJAnodayAbhAvAta, pratyabhijJAjJAnaM hi tAdRzadarzanata: saMskAraprabodhe, sa ca sati saMskAra, saMskArazca pUrvamarthadarzane eveti / AbhogAdItyAdi / prAbhogaH praNidhAnamavadhAnamiti yAvat, prAdizabdA [1 mudritapustake "smaryate" iti paThyate / ]

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NYAYAVATARAH 19 puMsaH smaraNAnupapatteriti / Uho'pi pratyakSAnumAnAsaMvedyasAdhyArthAnyathAnupapannatvalakSaNaliGgasaMbandhagrahaNapravaNaH pramANAntaramiti kthyissyte| arthApattistu pratyakSAdigocarIkRte sphoTAdipadArthAnyathAnupapattyA dahanazaktyAdikaM pAvakA derarthAntaraM pUrvadarzanagocarAt samadhikamavyabhicaritaM parikalpayatIti pramANatAM svIkarotyeva tallakSaNayogAt / evamanyadapi pratyakSagocarAdhikyasaMpAdakaM nirAkAGkSatayA vyavahArakAri yatsaMvedanaM tattatpramANamiti samarthanIyam, svaparaprakAzinidhitvAt, pUrvAparasopAnapaddhatidarzanottarakAlabhAvi tatsaMkhyAsaMvedanavat / sarveSAM caiteSAMparokSe'ntarbhAvaH, anyathAnupapannArthAntaradarzanadvAreNa prastutArthasaMvedanacaturatvAditi / kiMcidvizeSAttu pramANAntaraparikalpane pramANeyattA vizIryeta, AnantyaprApteH, AvaraNakSayopazamavicitratayA jJAnapravRttevicitratvAditi / nanu caivaM sati yatparokSasya dvaividhyaM vakSyamANamanumAnazAbdabhedena tadapi kathamupapatsyate, tatrApi hyAptapraNItavacanaprabhavajJAnasyArthAnyathAnupapannatvenAnumAnAntabhAvo na durupapAdaH / tatazcAnumAnamevaikamavaziSyate tadeva parokSazabdena yadyucyeta yuktamAste, viduSAmabhidhAnaM pratyanAdarAt; satyametat, evaM tu manyate tad yadyapi kayAcitprakiyayAnumAnAntabhavayituM zakyaM zAbdam, tathApi tatprati vipratipadyante pre| atastasyAhatya prAmANyaM samarthanIyam / na cApRthagbhUtasya tadvivikta vaktuM zakyam, ataH pArthakyenopanyAsaH / anena caitadupalakSayati-anyeSAmapi parokSavizeSANAma dabhyAsAdiparigrahaH / tathA ca nyAyazAstram-praNidhAnanibandhAbhyAsaliGgasAdRzyaparigrahAzrayAzritasaMbandhAnantaryaviyogakakAryAvirodhAtizayaprAptivyavadhAnasukhaduHkhecchAdveSakriyAthitvarAgadharmAdharmanimittebhya (gau0 3-2-43) iti / etadvyAkhyA ca tata eva nyAyazAstrAdavagantavyA, iha tu nocyate, sugamatvAt granthagauravabhayAcca / anubhUto viSayo yena tadanubhUtaviSayaM jJAnaM tasyAsaMpramoSo'bhraMzo jJAnAnuvRttiriti yAvat, sa eva lakSaNaM yasya tttthaa| UhopItyAdi / pratyakSAnumAnAbhyAmasaMvedyaH sAdhyArthAnyathAnupapannatvasvarUpo yo liGgasya sAdhyena sArdha saMbandhastasyAdAne sajjastatpara iti yAvat / tallakSaraNayogAditi / pramAraNalakSaNopapatteH / sarveSAmityAdi / eteSAmupamAnAdInAm / tathA hi-evamupamAne'nyathAnupapannArthAntaradarzanadvAreNa prastutArthavedanacaturatvaM smarya mANadRzyamAnayorgogavayapiNDayoravilakSaNaviSANAdyavayavayogitvamanyathA nopapadyate, yadi tayoH kiMcitsArUpyaM na syAt / evaM pratyabhijJAne idAnIM dRzyamAnaH paryAyo'nyathA nopapadyate, yadi pUrvAnubhUtaH paraMparayA etasya kAraNabhUto dravyarUpatayatadAtmA paryAyo na syAt tathA smaraNe'pi saMskAro'nyathA nopapadyate, yadi pUrvAnubhavo na bhavati / saMskAraprabodhazca pUrvAnubhavasmArakaH kvacittAdRzadarzanena, kvaciccAbhogAdibhiriti prAgevAbhihitam / evamUhe'pi katipayadhUmadhUmadhvajavyaktInAmavyabhicaritaM sAhacarya pratyakSeNopalabhyamAnamanyathA na jAghaTIti, yadi sarvatra dhUmAgnivyaktyoranyathAnupapannatvalakSaNa: saMbandho na syAt / arthApattau tu vahnisaMyogAtkaratalagataM sphoTalakSaNaM kArya pratyakSeNopalakSyamANamanyathA nopapadyate, yadi vahnaH kAciddAhikA zaktirna syAt / pUrvAparasopAnapaddhatidarzanottarakAlabhAvizatAdisaMkhyAsaMvedane tu paryantasopAnAnubhavaH pUrvAnubhUtanavanavatyAdisopAnasaMsmaraNasaMvalito'nyathA na saMgacchate, yadi zatAdisaMkhyA sopAnAnAM na

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 numAnAntarbhAvasaMbhave'pi yaM yaM prati pareSAM vipratipattistaM taM parokSAnniSkRSya viviktayuktyupanyAsena tasya tasya prAmANyamAvedanIyam / tathA ca zAstrAntare yahAdInAM lakSaNaM akAri AcAryaistad yuktamevetyuktam bhavati / kathaM tahi mImAMsakaparikalpito'bhAvo na pramANam ? nirgocaratvAditi brUmaH / tathA hipratyakSamevAnvayavyatirekadvAreNa bhUtalamevedaM ghaTAdirnAstIti vastuparicchedaprAvIyamAvibhrANaM tadadhikagrAhyArthAbhAvAt pramANAntaraM parikalpyamAnaM nirasyatIti kiM nazcintayA ? tasya sadasadrUpavastugrAhiNaH pratiprAriNa prasiddhatvAt / atha kadAcidabhidadhyAt, adhyakSaM bhAvAMzamevAkalayati, indriyadvAreNotpatteH, tasya ca bhAvAMze eva vyApArAt, nAstitAjJAnaM tu vastugrahaNottarakAlaM pratiyogismaraNasadbhAve mAnasamakSavyApAranirapekSa munmajjati / taduktam-- 20 na tAvadindriyeNaiSA' nAstItyutpAdyate matiH / bhAvAMzenaiva saMyogo yogyatvAdindriyasya hi // 1 // gRhItvA vastusadbhAvaM smRtvA ca pratiyoginam / mAnasaM nAstitAjJAnaM jAyate'kSAnapekSayA // 1 // iti ( zlo0 vA0, pR0 476 ) syAditi / evaM yathAbuddhi saMpradAyamupamAnAdiSvanyathAnupannArthAntaradarzanadvAreNa prastutArthavedanacaturatvaM bhAvitam zranyathApi kuzala raibhyUhyamiti / Ahatyeti / pUrvapakSAdibhiniSTaGkaya / UhAdInAM lakSaNamakArIti / yathA - upAlambhAnupalambhanimittaM vyAptijJAnamUhaH, yathedamasmin satyeva bhavati prasati na bhavatyeveti ca / zrAdizabdAtsaMskArodbodhanibandhanA tadityAkArA smRtiH, yathA sa devadatta iti / darzanasmaraNakAraNakaM saMkalanaM pratyabhijJAnam, yathA tadevedamiti / mImAMsakakalpita ityAdi / te hyevamAhuH - pratyakSAdipramANapaJcakagrAhyAd bhAvAd bhinnatvAdabhAvasya grAhakaM pRthagevAbhAvapramAraNam / na cAbhAvasyAvastutvena tadgrAhaka pramANAbhAvaH, abhAvasyAvastutve prAgabhAvAdibhedAnupapatteH, yadavastu na tasya bhedaH, yathA khapuSpAdeH, prastitvAbhAvasya bhedaH prAgabhAvaH pradhvaMsAbhAvo'nyonyAbhAvo'tyantAbhAvazceti / ki ca abhAvasyAvastutve'rthAnAmasAMkaryaM na syAt zrasAMkaryahetoH prAgabhAvAderavastutayAsattvAt, tathA ca pratiniyatavyavahArAbhAvaH / taduktam-- 1. mudrita pustake "indriyareSA" iti paThyate / ( zlo0 vA0, pR0 482 ) na cAvastuna ete syurbhedAstenAsya vastutA / kAryAdInAmabhAva: ko bhAvoH kAraNAdinaH || 1|| (zlo0 vA0 pR0, 474)

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NYAYAVATARAH atrocyate / bhAvAMzAdabhAvAMzastarhi abhinno bhinno vA ? abhinnazcet, kathamagrahaNam, bhAvAMzAdavyatiriktatvAdeva, tatsvarUpavat / bhinnazcet, ghaTAdyabhAvavinirluThitaM bhUtalamAdyadarzanena gRhyate iti ghaTAdayo gRhyante iti prAptam, tadabhAvAgrahaNasya tadbhAvagrahaNAnAntarIyakatvAt / tathA ca abhAve'pi pazcAt - pravartamAnastAnutsArayitumapaTiSThaH syAt, anyathA pratyakSamasaMkIrNasya saMkIrNatAgrahaNAt bhrAntamApanIpadyeta / kiM ca / pramANAbhAvAdarthAbhAvo'bhAvapramANena sAdhyate iti bhavato'bhiprAyaH pramANapaJcakaM yatra vasturUpe na jAyate / vastusattAvabodhArthaM tatrAbhAvapramANatA // 1 // iti vacanAt / tadyuktam / yataH pramANAbhAvaH kathaM grAhyaH ? tad grAhakapramANAntarAbhAvAditi cet, tasyApyabhAvagrahaNe tadgrAhaka pramANAntarAbhAvo grAhya ityanavasthA / zratha arthAbhAvAtpramANasya pramANAbhAvAccArthasyAbhAvaH pratipadyata iti manyethAH, tadetaditaretarAzrayaM durghaTamApadyeta / na yAvadarthAbhAvo gRhItaH tAvatpramANAbhAvaH sidhyati, arthAbhAvaH pramANAbhAvAtsetsyatItyAvartanAt / athendriyavat svayamavijJAto'pi pramANAbhAvo'rthAbhAvaM jJApayiSyatItyabhidadhIthAH, tadayuktam, tasya tucchatayA sakalazaktivirahalakSaNatvAt indriyasya tu tadviparyasta - tayA~ jJAnotpAdanakSamatvAt / tasmAt pratyakSameva bhUtalAdipratiniyatavastugrAhitAM 21 ( zlo0 vA0 pR0 473 ) vastvasaMkarasiddhizca tatprAmANya samAzritA / kSIre dadhyAdi yannAsti prAgabhAvaH sa ucyate ||2|| nAstitA payaso dadhni pradhvaMsAbhAvalakSaNam / gavi yo'zvAdyabhAvastu so'nyonyAbhAva ucyate ||3|| ziraso'vayavA nimnA vRddhikAThinyavajitAH / zazazRGgAdirUpeNa so'tyantAbhAva ucyate ||4|| kSIre dadhi bhavedevaM dadhni kSIraM ghaTe paTaH / zazazRGgaM pRthivyAdI caitanyaM mUrtirAtmani ||5|| prapsu gaMdho rasazcAgno vAyau rUpeNa tau saha / vyomni saMsparzitA te ca na cedasya pramANatA // 6 // tato'bhAvasya vastutve tadgrAhakaM SaSThaM pramANamabhyupagantavyamiti / vinirluThitam rahitam / tadabhAvetyAdi / ghaTAbhAvaparicchedasya ghaTasadbhAvajJAnaparatantratvAt / tAn ghaTAdIn / asaMkIrNasya kevalabhUtasya / saMkIrNatA ghaTAdisAhityam / pramANapazvakamityAdi / vastuno bhAvarUpasya sattAvabodhArthaM pramANapaJcakaM yatra vastumAtre notpadyate, tatra ghaTAdiviSaye'bhAvasya prAmANyam / kvacid 'vastvasatteti pAThaH, satvabhAvapramANatetyanena saMbandhanIyaH / (ilo0 vA0 pR0 473-474)

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22 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 barbhA / yadi tadviparItaghaTAdipratiyogivastvantaravaiviktyaM tasyAkalayati nAnyathA, vijAtIyavyavacchedAbhAve tasyaiva pratiniyatatvAsiddheH sakalasaMkIrNatayA grahaNaprasaGgAt, ato'dhigrAhyAbhAvAnnirviSayatayAbhAvAkhyaM pramANaM yat paraiH paryakalpi tadapramANamiti sthitam / " dvidhetyasmin satyapi 'pratyakSaM ca parokSaM ca' iti niyatadvaividhyapradarzanena saugataparikalpitaM 'pratyakSamanumAnaM ceti' dvaividhyamapakSipati, tadAkUtena tasyAyogAt / pratyakSAtirikta hi tAdAtmyatadutpattilakSaNa saMbandhopalakSitakAryasvabhAvAnupalabdhirUpaliGgatrayasaMpAditajanmakamanumAnameva pramANaM na zabdohAdikamU, saMbandhavikalatvAditi tadAkUtam / ayuktaM caitat, pratyakSAnumAnAtiriktapramANAntarAbhAvagrahaNopAyAbhAvAt / na tAvatpratyakSAt pramANAntarAbhAvAvagatiH, tasya svalakSaNaviSaya - tvenAbhAvagrAhitAvirodhAt / nApi svabhAvakAryAnumAnAbhyAm, tayorvastusAdhanatvAt / nApyanupalabdheH, tasyA apyatyantAbhAvasAdhanavirodhAt / sA hi caturvidhA varNyate mUlabhedApekSayA, tad yathA - viruddhopalabdhiviruddhakAryopalabdhiH kAraNAnupalabdhiH svabhAvAnupalabdhizceti / na tAvadviruddhopalabdheH pramANAntarasyAtyantAbhAvaH / dRzyAtmano viruddhasya vidhAnena itarAbhAvasAdhanAt, saMnihitadeza eva pratiyogyabhAvasiddheH / etena viruddha kAryAnupalabdhirapi vyAkhyAtA, tasyA api pratiSedhyavirodhisaMnidhApanadva / reNAbhAvasAdhakatvAt / kAryAnupalabdhirapi taddezAzaGkitakAryasyaivAbhAvaM sAdhayati na sarvatra, svayamasiddhatvAt / svabhAvAnupalabdhirapyekajJAnasaMsagipadArthopalambharUpA taddeza eva pratidvandvyabhAvaM gamayati / ataH pramANAntarasyApi kvacinniSedhaH syAt na sarvatra / tanna pramANAntarabAdhakaM samasti / pratyakSAnumAnayozca prAmANyaM kuta iti cintyam / na tAvatpratyakSAt nirvikalpakatayA sato'pyasatkalpatvAt / tatpRSThabhAvI vikalpastu na svalakSaNAmbhodhimadhyamavagAhate, tatkathaM tatrApraviSTastatsvarUpaM nizcinuyAt / apramANabhUtAcca tasmAtprAmANyanirNaya iti nibiDajaDimAviSkaraNaM bhavatAm / anumAnAtprAmANyanirNaya iti cet, na tasyApi svalakSaNAd bahiH plavanAt / aprAmANyavyavacchedastena sAdhyate iti cet, na, vyavacchedasya vyavacchinnAvyatirekAt, tasya taditi / pramANasya / tasyApi pramANAntarasya / evamiti / zramunA yadityAdinA vakSyamANaprakAreNa tadviparIteti / tato bhUtAdvilakSaNam / vaiviktyaM rAhityam / tasya bhUtalasya / tadyathetyAdi / viruddhopalabdhiryathA - nAtra zItasparzaH, agneriti 1 / viruddhakAryopalabdhiryathA -- nAtra zItasparzaH, dhUmAditi 2 / kAraNAnupalabdhiryathA - nAtra dhUmaH, agnyabhAvAditi 3 / svAbhAvAnupalabdhiryathA - nAtra dhUmaH, upalabdhilakSaNaprAptasyAnupalabdheriti 4 / zeSAstu saptAdi anupalabdhayo dharmabinduprabhRtizAstrapratipAditA eSveva caturSu bhedeSvantarbhavanti iti pratibhedarUpatvAnna na pRthagabhihitAH / dRzyAtmana iti / dRzyasvarUpasya viruddhasya vahnayAdeH /

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NYAYAVATARAH 23 itarathAndhakAranartanakalpamanumAnamAsajyeta nirviSayatvAt / kiM c| tatprAmANya nirNAyakamanumAnaM pramANamapramANaM vaa| na tAvadapramANam, tataH praamaannyaasiddhe|| nApi pramANam, tatprAmANyasAdhakAbhAvAt / na hi pratyakSAt tasiddhiH, vikalpazUnyatayAkiMcitkaratvAt, ityuktam / anumAnAttu tatsAdhane vikalpayugalaM tadavasthamevAvatiSThate tatprAmANyasAdhane'pyanumAnakalpanA ityanavasthA / kiM ca / gRhItasaMbandhasyAnumAnaM pravarteta, saMbandhastrikAlagocaro grAhyaH, na ca pratyakSaM taM lakSayituM kSamate, pUrvAparakSaNatruTitarUpavArtamAnikakSaNataduttarakAlabhAvino vikalpasyApi vyAvahArikAbhiprAyeNa tanniSThatAbhyupagamAt / anumAnAd grahISyati iti cet, nanu tadapi saMbandhapUrvakaM, pravartate. tadgrahaNe'pIyaM vArtA iti anavasthA / tasmAdanumAnamabhilaSatA gatyantarAbhAvAt tatsaMbandhagraharaNapravaNastrikAlagocaro'vyabhicArI vitarko'bhyupagantavyaH / tathA ca prastutadvaividhyasya vighaTitatvAt, anyadapi yadevaMvidhamavisaMvAdi jJAnaM tatpramANamastu ityalaM zuSkAbhimAneneti / yadi punaH sAdhyArthAnyathAnupapannahetusaMpAditamanumAnamiSyeta, tadA pratyakSamanumAnaM cetyapi dvaividhyaM dhaTAmaTedeva ; pratyakSavyatiriktajJAnasya sAmastyenAnumAne'ntarbhAvasaMbhavAt, anyathAnupapannArthAntaramantareNa parokSArthaviSayapratIterabhAvAditi / / sAMpratamanyathA sUtrAvayavenaiva prakRtaniyamakAraNamAha-meyavinizcayAditi / dvidhaiveti ca kAkAkSigolakanyAyenAtrApi saMbandhanIyam / tatazcAyamarthaHdvAbhyAmeva prakArAbhyAM meyasya grAhyArthasya nizcayAt svarUpanirNayAt, dve eva pramANe na nyUnamadhikaM ceti / ayamatrAbhiprAyaH-svasaMvedanaM prati nikhilajJAnAnAmekarUpatayA sAkSAtkaraNacaturatvAt nAstyeva bhedaH, bahirarthaM punarapekSya kazciccakSurAdisAmagrIvalalabdhasattAkaH svAvayavavyApinaM kAlAntarasaMcariSNuM sthagitakSaNavivartamalakSitaparamANupArimANDalyaM saMnihitaM vizadanirbhAsaM sAmAnyamAkAraM sAkSAtkurvANa: prakAzaH prathate, tatra pratyakSavyavahAraH pravartate / yaH punaliGgazabdAdi itareti / pratiSedhyasya shiitaadeH| svAbhAvAnupalabdhiriti dRzyAnupalabdhiH / eketyAdi / ekasya cakSurAdijJAnasya grAhyaM cakSurAdipraNidhAnAbhimukhaM bhUghaTAdivastudvayamanyonyApekSamekajJAnasaMsagi kathyate, tayohi sato kaniyatA pratipattiH syAt, paricchedayogyatAyA dvayorapyavizeSAt / jJAne vastudvayasaMsargazca tadAkArayorekasmin jJAne saMsargAd vastunorapyupacAreNa saMsargavyapadezAt / tata ekasmin jJAne saMsargaH saMbandho vidyate yasya bhUtalAderghaTAdineti prakaraNAt svayamUhyam, sa cAsau padArthazca tasyopalambhaparicchedo rUpaM yasyAH svAbhAvAnupalabdheH sA tathA: kevalabhUtalopalambharUpa iti yAvat / taddeza eveti / bhUtaladeza eva / pratidvandvino ghaTAdeH / svalakSaNAmbhodhIti / svalakSaNaM pratyakSAnumAne, te eva vikalpasya sAmAnya viSayatvenAviSayatvAd ambhodhiH / tatsvarUpaM pratyakSAnumAnasvarUpam / taditi / tayoH prtykssaanumaanyoH| tatprAmANyeti / tasya pratyakSAnumAnaprAmANya nirNAyakAnumAnasya / tatsAdhana iti / prAmANyanirNAyakAnumAnaprAmANyasAdhane / tadavasthamiti / tadapyanumAnaM pramANamapramANaM ceti / pArimANDalyamiti /

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24 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 dvAreNa niyatAniyatasAmAnyAkArAvalokI parisphuTatArahitaH khalvAtmano'rthagrahaNapariNAmaH samullasati sa parokSatAM svIkaroti / na cetau prakArau vihAya prakArAntareNa jJAnapravRtti pazyAmaH, na cApazyantaH pramANAntaraparikalpanaM kSamAmahe, na ca dvayoH prathamAnayorekaM niha nuvAnamupekSAmahe, vizeSAbhAvAt; tasmAdetadeva dvaividhyamurarIkartavyamiti sthitam // 1 // ____ sAMprataM yadasmAbhiH prAg vivRNvadbhiryudapAdi, yaduta vipratipannAvyutpannavyAmohApohasahamihedaM pramANalakSaNamiti tatsUtradarzanAdeva vimlbuddhyo'vgccheyuH| mandamatayastu tAvatA na bhotsyanta iti taddhitavidhitsayA vyaktaM pramANalakSaNAbhidhAnaphalaM pratipipAdayiSurapi sapUrvapakSaM nirAkAGkSa lakSayeyuste iti tAvat pUrvapakSamutthApayannAha prasiddhAni pramANAni vyavahArazca ttkRtH| pramAraNalakSaNasyoktau jJAyate na prayojanam // 2 // iha vacanamuccArayatA vimRzyabhASiNA pratyavamRzyam-kimidaM mAmakaM vacanaM zrotRsaMskArAdhAyakamuta neti / itarathA paryAlocitakAritAsya hIyate / zrotasaMskArAdhAyakaM cet, uccArayati anyathA viparyaya iti / etattu pramANalakSaNavAkyaM sakalajanAnAdiprarUDhArthapratyAyakatvAdazrotRsaMskArAdhAyakam / ata Aha-prasiddhAni prarUDhAni, nAdhunA sAdhyAnItyarthaH / pramANAni pratyakSAdIni, parokSagatabhedApekSayA bahuvacanaM vyaktibhede sAmAnyamapi kathaMcid bhidyate iti darzanArtham / tathA hi| tadavivakSitavyaktikamekarUpatAM bibharti pramANamiti; vyaktyavacchedena punaravacchidyamAnaM nAnAkAratAmAdatte pratyakSAnumAnazAbdAni pramANAnIti, vyaktivyatiriktAvyatiriktarUpatvAttasya / tathA hi-zabdAccakSurAdervA dUrAd vRkSa iti pratyaye dhavakhadirapalAzAdivizeSAnapekSayA sAdhAraNaM vRkSatvameva cakAsti, tasmAt tebhyo bhinnaM tad, vyatirekiNAkAreNa jJAne pratibhAsanAd ghaTAdivat / parisphuTaddhavakhadirapalAzAdivizeSAvalokanavelAyAM tu na tadatirekiNA rUpeNa prakAzate ityabhinnam, tadavyatiriktasya saMvedanAt, tatsvarUpavat / vizeSAbhinnameva rUpaM tAttvikaM sAmAnyasya, tasyaiva dAhapAkAdyarthakriyAkSamatvAt / bhinnaM punaH kalpanAbuddhiviThapitatvAdavasturUpamiti cet, na, dvayoH prakAzamAnayorekasya nihnotumazakyatvAt / anyathA bhinnameva rUpaM svabhAvikamitarattu kalpanAbuddhidarzitamityapi vadatAM na vadanabhaGgaH syAt / parimaNDalAH paramANavaH, teSAM bhAvaH, yaNi anuzatikAditvAt ubhayapadavRddhau pArimANDalyaM vartu latvam, nyAyakumudacandra prabhAcandreNApyevaM vyAkhyAtatvAt / anye tu pArimANDalyaM paramANuparimANameva ityaahuH| niyatAniyatetyAdi / vijAtIyebhyo vyAvRttatvAt niyataH, sajAtIyebhyazcAvyAvRttatvAt sarva evAniyataH, tato niyatAniyatazcAsau sAmAnyAkArazceti vigrahaH / etau pratyakSaparokSarUpau / 1 //

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NYAYAVATARAN 25 arthakriyAkAritAvizeSastu bhinne'pi rUpe na durupapAdaH, tasyApi jJAnasAdhAraNavyavahArakaraNadakSatvAt / na cArthakriyA vastulakSaNamiti nivedayiSyAmaH, tasmAt sarvatra bhinnAbhinnau sAmAnyavizeSAviti darzanArtho bhuvcnnirdeshH| AsatAM tAvatpramAraNAni, vyavahArazca tatkRtaH prasiddha iti saMbandhaH / cshbdo'pishbdaarthH| tenAyamarthaH- yadarthaM pramANaparIkSaNamasAvapi jalapAnazItatrANAdiLavahAro'nAdirUDhaH, tannirarthakaM pramANalakSaNAbhidhAnamityabhiprAyavAnapi para: paruSatAparijihIrSayAtmano'nyathA prAha--pramANalakSaNasyoktau pararUpavyAvartanakSamAsAdhAraNapramANadharmakathanarUpAyAM jJAyate nirNIyate'smAbhirna prayojanaM tatphalam, atisUkSmatvAttAvakAbhisaMdheriti kAkvA praznayatyulluNThayati ceti / kiM ca pramANalakSaNamanizcitaM vAbhidhIyate, nizcitaM vA svarUpeNeti pakSadvayam / na tAvadanizcitam, anizcitasya lakSaNatvAyogAt, unmattakavirutavat / atha nizcitam, tatkimapramANAtpramANAdvA / na tAvadapramANAt, apramANasya nizcAyakatvAyogAt / yadi punarapramANamapi nizcAyakamiti saMgIryeta, tadA pramANaparyeSaNaM vizIryata, nairarthakyApatteH, apramANAdapi nizcAyakatvAbhyupagamAt / atha pramANAta , tatkimalakSaNam, lakSaNopetaM vA / alakSaNaM cennizcAyakaM pramANam, tahi sarvapramANAnAM lakSaNAbhidhAnamanarthakam, tadvyatirekeNApyarthanizcayasiddheH, bhavadabhipretalakSaNanizcAyakapramANavat / atha lakSaNopetam, tatrApi vikalpayugalamanivAritaprasaramanudhAvati, tallakSaNaM nizcitamanizcitaM vA / na tAvadanizcitaM lakSaNaM lakSyaM lakSayati / nizcayo'pi prmaannaadprmaannaadvaa| apramANAnnizcayAsiddha : pramANAditi vaktavyam / tadapyalakSaNaM salakSaNaM vA / alakSaNatve pUrvasyArthagrahaNe kiM khUNam / salakSaNatve tvetallakSaNaM nirNItamanirNItaM ceti tadevAvartate / tanna pramANalakSaNAbhidhAnopAyo'sti, tasmAtprasiddhAni pramANAni ityaGgIkartavyamiti // 2 // adhunA cAryAgRhItastAvakIno'bhiprAyo'smAbhiriti paraM pratyAyayaMstanmatamanudrAvya tadevAnumanyamAnastathApi lakSaNokta : sAphalyamAvedayannAha prasiddhAnAM pramANAnAM lakSaNoktau prayojanam / tavyAmohanivRttiH syAdvyAmUDhamanasAmiha // 3 // viThapitvAditi / upArjane vipUrvaH Thap sotro dhAtuH / tasyApItyAdi / tasya vizeSabhinnasAmAnyasya jJAnaM ca sAdhAraNavyavahArazca tayovidhAne kuzalatvAt, tathA hi-- sAmAnyaM dUrAd dhavaladhAvaleyAdivizeSApratibhAse'pi sAmAnyena gaugauriti jJAnaM janayati, tathA ayaM gaurayaM gauriti sAdhAraNavyavahAraM ceti / yadi punavizeSebhyo bhinnaM nAbhyupagamyeta sAmAnyam, tadA tannibandhanaM jJAnaM sAdRzyavyavahArazca pralayaM yAyAditi // 2 // tanmatamanuvrAvyeti / Su su dra ha Rccha gama sR pa gatI anudravatyanugacchati tanmatam siddhAntI prayuGkte, hetau iti ktvApratyaye anugamayyeti zabdArthaH; tanmatasya cAnugamanamanuvAdamantareNa na saMbhavatItyanUdyeti tAtparyam / yadvA utprAbalyena drAvaNaM spheTanaM pUrvamuddAvya

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26 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 etadabhyadhAyi bhavatA yathA - prasiddhAni pramANAni tatasteSAM lakSaNoktau asAdhAraNadharmakathanaviSaye prayojanaM phalaM kimiti zeSaH / tadetadayuktam / yato yadyapi pratiprANi prasiddhAni pramANAni, anyathA tatkRtanikhilavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAt, taducchede ca dRSTahAnyAdyApatteH, tathApi kecid vitatamohAvaSTabdhAntaH karaNAstatsvarUpamanubhavanto'pi na lakSayanti tatastAnavalokayatAmasmAkaM tadviSaye kRpAparItacetasAM yathAvasthitapramANalakSaNAvirbhAvanadvAreNa vyAmohameteSAmapasArayAma iti pramANalakSaNAbhidhAnaM prati pravartate cetaH / tadidaM prayojanam - tadvyAmoha - nivRttiH syAd iti tasmin pramANalakSaNe vyAmoho visarItAbhyupagamavatAM viparyAsalakSaNastIrthyAnAM pramANApramANavivekavikalAnAm, anadhyavasAyAtmakastu mugdhabuddhInAM laukikAnAm, tasya nivRttiraviparItalakSaNAvagamAdapagama ityarthaH / sA syAd bhavet / keSAmityAha-vyAmUDhaM viparItagrahastaM vicittatAM gataM mano'ntaHkaraNaM yeSAM te tathA teSAm / iheti loke / tadayaM tAtparyArthaH-yadyanAdiprasiddha pramANalakSaNaM prati kecidapi na vyAmuhyeyustadA yad bhavadbhiH prAgudagrAhi nirarthakaM pramANalakSaNAbhidhAnamiti, tat yuktameva syAt / na caitadevam, tatra vyAmUDhAnAM darzanAt / etena yadadAyi dUSaNaM pramANalakSaNamanizcitaM nizcitaM vA abhidhIyeta ityAdi tadapi siddhasAdhyatAmadhyaprativaddhatvAnna bAdhAvidhAyi asmAkamiti mantavyam / vyAmUDhamanaso'pi prati pramANalakSaNaprakAzane tallagatIti cet, na svasaMvedanasiddhasya vacanena prakAzanAt tasya vyAmohApoha eva vyApArAt / yathA viviktabhUtalAvalokane'pi adhyakSAd yo ghaTAdivaivivatyaM na pratipadyate, kudarzanavyAmohAt, taM pratyucyeta nAstyatra ghaTaH, upalambhakAraNa samagratAyAmapyanupalambhAt / vaiviRRtyaM hi tatrAdhyakSasiddham, vacanAd vyAmoho nivartyeta; tathehApi vidvadbhirdraSTavyam / nirNItaM tallakSaNamadhyakSeNa, tasya vyavasAyarUpatvAt; vacanaM punarviparItAropanirAkaraNe vyApriyata iti sthitam / tadevaM pramANalakSaNaM sAmAnyena pratipAdya tadgatakucodyaM paryahAryAcAryeNa ||3|| adhunA tadviSayAmeva saMkhyAvipratipatti nirAcikIrSatA ye pratyakSa parokSa - lakSaNe pramANavyaktI prAk prakrAnte, tayorapi lakSaNaM prati vipratipadyante'pare / atastallakSaNamapi vaktavyam, iti tAvat pratyakSalakSaNamabhidhAtukAma Aha tato navyogAdi, nirAkRtyetyartha / tIrthyAnAmiti / yadyapi samyak saMsArasAgarottaraNIpAyabhUtatvAt tIrthaM jinazAsanamevocyate, tathApi tIrthamiva tIrtham, tatra sAdhavaH tIrthyAH, sAdhvarthe yaH / eteneti / vyAmUDhamanasaH pratilakSaNAbhidhAnena / siddhasAdhyatAmadhyapratibaddhatvAditi / zrayamabhiprAyaH -- yadi na pramANalakSaNAbhidhIyate'smAbhistadA yaduktaM -- pramANalakSaraNamanizcitaM vidhAnaM vAbhidhIyeta ityAdi tatsamastamapi dUSaNamasmAkaM lagedapi, yadA tu svataH sato vyavasAyarUpatvAt svasaMvedanena nirNItasya ca pramANalakSaNasya vyAmUDhAn prati prakAzaH, kastadA doSAMvakAzaH ? etacca vyAmUDhamanaso'pi pratItyAdi pUrvapakSamutthApya svata evAtispaSTamAcAryo'bhidhAsyati, tataH siddhametat na bAdhAvidhAyIti ||3||

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NYAYAVAJARAN aparokSatayArthasya grAhakaM jJAnamIdRzam / pratyakSamitarajjJeyaM parokSaM graharaNekSayA // 4 // tatra pratyakSamiti lakSya nirdezaH, aparokSatayArthasya grAhakaM jJAnamiti lakSaNanirdezaH parokSo'kSagocarAtItaH, tato'nyo'parokSastadbhAvastattA tayA, sAkSAtkRtatayeti yAvat / aryata ityarthaH avagamyate iti hRdayam / arthyata ityartho vA, dAhapAkAdyarthakriyArthibhirabhilaSyate iti yAvat / tasya grAhakaM vyavasAyAtmakatayA sAkSAt paricchedakaM jJAnaM tadIdazamiti, Idageva pratyakSamiti saMTaGkaH / tatra jJAnagrahaNena yat sAMkhyAH prAhaH-zrotrAdivattiHpratyakSamiti, tat tiraskaroti / zrotrAdInAM prakRtivikAratayA tadvatteApAralakSaNAyA jaDatayA pratyakSatvAyogAt, arthaparicchittihetutayA pratyakSatve AlokAdijaDakAraNakalApavyApArasyApi pratyakSatApadyeta, vize bhAvAditi / arthasya grAhakamityasya grahaNekSayA iti vkssymaannpdsaapeksstvaat| amunA bahirapi ye'rthakalAkalanavikalaM sakalamapi jJAnaM pralapanti taanirsyti| svAMzagrahaNe hyantaHsaMvedanaM vyApriyate yathA tathA bahirapi, itarathA arthavajjJAnasaMtAnAntarANyapi vizIryeran, svapnadRSTAntena tadanumAnasyopaplavamAtratApatteH, svavijJAnasyaiva tathA tathA vijRmbhaNAt / tathA ca pramANaprameyapratipAdyapratipAdakakAryakAraNabhAvAdayaH pralIyeran, AtmavyatirekeNAtmIyapUrvottarakSaNayorapi jJAnasya prvRttinirodhaaptteH| advayavijJAna zrotrAdIti / zrotraM tvak cakSuSI jihvA nAsikA ceti paJcamI-iti zrotrAdInIndriyANi teSAM vRttirvartanaM pariNAma iti yAvat / indriyANyeva viSayAkArapariNatAni pratyakSamiti hi teSAM siddhAntaH / arthasya grAhakamityAdi / grahaNekSayetyanena bAhyArthApekSayA yad grAhakaM tatpratyakSamiti darzayati / na cArthasya grAhakamityetAvataivaitat siddhamiti vAcyam, yata prAtmasvarUpasyArthasya grAhakamityetAvatApyarthasya grAhakaM bhavatyeva / na caivaM kevalasvAMzagrAhiNa: svasaMvedanasya pratyakSAvyavacchedaH, bahirarthanirAkaraNaparAn yogAcArAdInadhikRtyaiva grahaNekSayeti vakSyamANapadasyAyojanAt / bahirapIti / na kevalamantarmukhAkAreNa jJAnamarthagrahaNazUnyam, cidrUpasyaiva tathA pratibhAsanAt, api tu bhirmukhaakaarennaapi| ye iti / yogAcArAdayaH / itarathetyAdi / saMtAno jJAnapravAhaH, tasmAt vivakSitAdanye saMtAnAntarANi / tavanumAnasya saMtAnAntarasAdhakAnumAnasya, tathA hi-vivakSitadevadattAderanyatra yajJadattAdau vyApAravyAhArI buddhipUrvako, vyApAravyAhAratvAt, saMpratipannavyApAravyAhAravad, iti saMtAnAntarasAdhakAnumAnam / tasmin vyApAravyAhArayonikAryatvena pratibandhanizcayAt / etasya cAnumAnasya svapnadRSTAntenopaplavo bhrAntatvam / tathA hi-yathA sarve pratyayA nirAlambamAnAH, pratyayatvAt, svapnapratyavaditi bhavadabhiprAyeNa bahirarthasAdhanasya nirAlambanatayA bAhyArthAbhAvaH, tathA saMtAnAntarasAdhanasyApi nirAlambanatayA saMtAnAntarAbhAvaH / vyavahAreti / vyavahAro'balAbAlagopAlahAlikAdiprasiddhaH / na cAyaM bhrAntaH, kriyAvirodhaprasaGgAt / tathA hi-bhramAd bahalAmodamodakAdanamiva saugatAnAmupalazakalabhakSaNaM sugatapadadvayArAdhanavadvA kharoSTra dAsIpadaparyupAstizca prasajati; na caitad yugAnte'pi dRzyate, tannAyaM bhrAntaH / taddhasviti / tasya ghaTAderarthasya ye hetavo mRdAdayastebhyo'nyAni yAni tAlvA

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28 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 tattvasAdhanenAnukUlamAcarasIti cet, syAdetat, yadi bhavataH pramANaparidRSTasakalavyavahArocchedanakudarzanavAsanAhitAdRSTAdvayatattvaparikalpanAt, pratikUlaM na syAt / tannArthaviraheNa bahiH pramANabhUtajJAnollAso'sti, nirhetukatvaprasaGgAditi / grAhakamiti ca nirNAyakaM draSTavyam, nirNayAbhAve'rthagrahaNAyogAt / tena yat tAthAgataiH prtypaadi| pratyakSaM kalpanApoDhamabhrAntam [nyA0 vi0 4] iti tadapAstaM bhavati, tasya yuktiriktatvAta / tathA hi-te nirvikalpakatve'dhyakSasyAyuktIH kheTayanti-kiledamarthasAmathunodIyate, saMnihitArthakriyAsamarthArthagrAhakatvAta na cArthe dhvanayaH santi, taddhetuvilakSaNakAraNAntarajanyatvAta tatazcAsAvupanipatya svagocarasaMvedanamutthApayan svAkAramanukArayati / tanna tadgrAhiNi vijJAne zabdasaMzleSo yuktaH / kiM ca yadyutpAdakArthopayoge'pi taM tAvanna gRhNIyAta, saMvedanamapi tu smaraNasaMpAditaM tadamidhAyakadhvanisaMyojanaM pratIkSyamANaM tAvadAsIta, tahi datto jalAJjalirarthagrahaNasya / tathAhi-tamarthamapazyaMstasmin gRhItasaMketaM tadabhidhAyakaM dhvani nAnusmarati, upAyAbhAvAd, ananusmaraMzca purovartinyarthena na yojayati, smRtyupasthApanavyatirekeNa tadyojanAzakteH ayojayaMzca bhavadabhiprAyeNa na pazyatIti dhaandhyaadaandhymaapdyet| yadi vendriyajamapi jJAnaM vikalpakaluSitamiSyeta, tadA tadapi manorAjyAdivikalpavad vikalpAntarAvirbhAve sati nivarteta; nacaitadasti, saMnihitagopiNDagocarasya cakSurjasaMvedanasyAzvAdiviSayavikalpodayepyanivartanAta, saMhRtasakalavikalpasyApi ca parisphuTasaMnihitArthaviSayadarzanasiddheH / tannAkSajaM jJAnaM zabdasaMparkamanubhavati / atra pratividhIyate yattAvaduktam, azabdakArthasAmodbhavatvAd dhvanirahitamadhyakSamiti, tadayuktam, na hi zabdAsaMpRktArthajamityetAvataivAbhilApavinAkRtamiti vaktuM zakyam, anyathA jaDArthajanitamiti jaDamapi tat syAt / atha vodharUpamanaskArasAhityAd na jaDamiti braSe, tathA satyabhilApasaMsRSTamanaskArasaMniyogAta sAbhilApamapi syAta / kiM ca viviktAH paramANavaH svAkArArpaNadvAreNa svagocaraM jJAnamutpAdayantaH kathamasantamAtmani svAvayavavyApinaM kAlAntarasaMcariSNumAkAraM tatra dIni kAraNAni tajjanyatvAd asaavityrthH| upanipatyeti / nikaTIbhUya / svAkAram arthAkAram / tadgrAhiNi arthagrAhiNi / tamiti artham / dhAndhyAditi / dhandhyo jaDaH tasya bhAvo dhAndhyaM jADyam / vinizcayaTIkAyAm--dhandhyo jaDa iti / kvacit dhAndhyAditi pAThastadaivaM vyAkhyA--dhiyo buddhe rAndhyaM dhyAndhyaM jADyam, paraM nAyaM paurANikaH / saMhRtetyAdi / saMhRtavikalpAvasthAyAM saMnihitArthaviSayavizadadarzanAbhidhAnenendriyajabodhasya vikalparUpatAM nirasyati, tathA hi--indriyajo ghaTAdibodho vikalparUpo na bhavati, saMhRtasakala vikalpasyApi puso jAyamAnatvAt, ya: punarvikalparUpo nAso saMhRtasakalavikalpasya jAyate, yathA manorAjyAdivikalpaH, na cAyaM saMhRtasakalavikalpasya na jAyate, tasmAd vikalparUpo na bhavatItyatrAnumAnam / vikalparUpatAbhyupagame saMhRtasakala vikalpasya

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NYAYAVATARAN prathayanti / vibhramAditi cenna idAnImarthe yadasti tadeva pratibhAti, tatrAsato'pi sthUrAkArasya pratibhAsanAta / tathA zabdo'pi yadyavidyamAno'rthe tadgrAhiriNa jJAne pratibhAseta, kiM jhUyeta ? yaccokta-smaraNajanitazabdasaMyojanaM pratIkSamANamarthopayoge'pi yadyAsItetyAdi yAvadAndhyamApadyeta tat tAvakapakSe'pi samAnam / tathAhi-svalakSaNAviSayendriyajanirvikalpakajJAnasadbhAve'pi na tAvadidaMtayAnidaMtayA vArthavyavasthitiH, yAvadvidhipratiSedhadvAreNa vikalpayugalakaM pAzcAtyaM nodayate, yauvAMze vikalpaM janayati, tatraivAsya pramANatA-iti vacanAt / nirvikalpakasya sato'pi vyavahAraM pratyasatkalpatvAt / sa ca vikalpa: saMketakAlabhAvitamabhilApasAmAnyamanusmarata evotpattumarhati, abhilApasAmAnyasmaraNabIjaM ca kutaH prabudhyeta ? tAdRzadarzanAditi cet, nanu tadapi darzanaM nirvikalpakatvAdarthaM nAtizete, tatkathaM sAmAnyaviSayavikalpabIjaM prabodhayet ? arthaH punaH sAmAnyavyavasAyAtmikAM buddhi na janayediti bhavatAM kadAgrahaH / tadarthavat taviSayaM darzanaM vyavasAyazUnyatvAt nAbhilApasAmAnyagocarasmaraNabIjaM prabodhayati, tadaprabuddha na smaraNaM janayati, ajAtaM smaraNaM na zabdaM yojayati, ayojitaH zabdo nArthaM nizcAyayati, anizcito'rtho na vyavahAramavatarati, anavatIrNo nAdRSTAdviziSyate, aviziSTaH pramAturAndhyaM lakSayatIti / tasmAdyathAkathaMcinnirNayAbhAvAt svayamapratItamapi nivikalpakadarzanaM vAsanAprabodhadvAreNa vikalpamutthApyAtmavyApAramabhilApayati katicidaMzaviSayam, tathArtho'pi yadi cakSurAdisAmanyantaH pAtitvenApratIta eva svayam, tathAsvabhAvatvAt saMketakAlabhAvitAbhilApasAmAnyaviSayAtmasaMskAraprabodhadvAreNAtmaviSayamabhilApasaMsRSTaM saMvedanamullAsayet nAtyantamayukta pazyAmaH / na cAyaM savikalpako bodho manorAjyAdivikalpakalpaH / cakSurAdisAmagrIsaMpAdyatvAt / itarasya tu manomAtraprabhavatvAt / ataH kathaM tadvadvi na prAduHSyAditi bAdhakam / tatreti jJAne / tatrAsato'pIti / paramANulakSaNe'rthe'vidyamAnasyApi pratibhAsanAt, jJAne iti zeSaH / tAvakapakSe'pIti / ayamatrAbhiprAya:-- 1yazcobhayoH samo doSaH parihAro'pi vA smH| nakaH paryanuyojyaH syAt tAgarthavicAraNe // 1 // iti / [zlo0 vA0 pR0 341] nodayate iti / aya vayetyAdidaNDakadhAtuH, nodayatIti pAThe tu aTa paTa iTa kiTa kaTa i gatau ityasya prayogaH / smaraNabIjamiti / smRteH kAraNatvAd bIjamiva bIjaM saMskAraH / tasmAt yathA kathaMciditi / tasmAditi hetau paJcamI, yatheti dRSTAntopadarzanArthaH; kathaMcit kenacit prakAreNeti / prayamiti / indriyajaH / vikalpakalpaH vikalpasadRzaH, kalpazabdasya upamArthatvAt / yadAha sAmarthyavarNanAyAM ca chedane karaNe tathA / praupamye cAdhivAse ca kalpazabda vidurbudhAH // // 1 mudritapustake "tasmAdyatrobhayordoSaH", "paryanuyoktavyaH" iti paThyate /

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30 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 kalpAntarAvirbhAve nivarteta ? mAnasavikalpasyaiva vikalpAntareNa nivartanAt, asya tu kAraNasAmarthyena balAt pravRtteH / etena saMhRtasakala vikalpAvasthAyAM naiSa prAduHSyAdityetadapi pratikSiptam asya pramAturicchyA saMhartumazakyatvAt, mAnasa - vikalpasaMharaNa eva tatsAmarthyopapatteriti / etacca zabdasaMpRktapratyakSapakSAdapi ekAntanirvikalpaka pratyakSapakSasya pApIyastAM darzayadbhirasmAbhirugrAhi / paramArthataH punaH pratyakSe sAkSAcchndollekho neSyate, vizadavyavasAyenArthasAkSAtkaraNacaturatvAttasya / kevalaM tadapi saMnihitaM parisphuTaM svAvayavavyApinaM kAlAntarasaMcariSNuM sthagitakSaNavivartaM alakSitaparamANupArimANDalyaM padArthAntaraiH saha samAnAsamAnAkAraM svaparamANUnAM sAmAnyAkAraM stambhAdikaM padArthaM gocarayatIti savikalpamityucyate, paraparikalpitakSaNakSayiviviktaparamANulakSaNasvalakSaNagrahaNapravaNanirvikalpapratyakSapratiSedhArthaM kathaMcidabhilApasaMsargayogyagocaratAdarzanArthaM vA / evaM ca pratyakSagocarIkRte'rthe saMjJAsaMjJisaMbandhagrahaNAdayastadviSayAH zAbdavyavahArAH sarva eva nirupacaritA ghaTate ityuktaM bhavati / yadi punaH zabdasaMsarga yogyapratibhAsamadhyakSaM na syAt, tataH ko doSaH iti ced, vikalpAnutthAnena savikalpavyavahArocchedaprasaGgaH / tathA hi-nirvyavasAyaM darzanamityataH pATavopetamapi smRtibIjAdhAnaM taduttarakAlabhAvi vA tAdRzArthadarzanaM tatprabodhanamabhyAsavAsanApATave'pi na vidhAtumalam, yataH sAmAnyavikalpotpattyA vyavahAraH pravarteta, kSaNikatvAdiSu sakalakAlaM nirvikalpakAdhyakSa dRSTatayAbhyupagateSvapi tadadarzanAt / tasmAt yatra kutracidarthAMze pAzcAtyavyavahArapravRttistatra prAcInaM saMvedanaM nirNAyakamabhyupagantavyam, anyathA kSaNikatvAdyaMzavat sarvAMzeSu vyavahAraH pralIyeta / tanna kadAcana kalpanApoDhatvaM pratyakSasya pramAturapi pratItigocaracAritAmanubhavati / apratItaM cAstIti zraddhAtuM duHzakam atiprasaGgAdityalakSaNam / abhrAntatvamapi na jAghaTIti, bhavadabhiprAyeNa sthirasthUrArthagrAhiNa: saMvedanasya viparyastarUpatvAt, tadviparItasya tu svapnakAle'pyaprakAzamAntvAt / tadyadi yathAvasthitArtha grAhitvama cakSurAdIti / prAdizabdAd rUpAvalokamanaskArAdayo gRhyante / itarasyeti / manorAjyAdivikalpasya / tadvat manorAjyAdivikalpavat / eSa indriyajo vikalpaH / pApIyastAmiti / pApaM pAtakaM tadyogAt pakSo'pi pApaH / tato'yamanayoratizayena pApaH, guNAGgAdveSTheyas (siddha0 7-3-9) itIyas / udagrAhIti / upanyastam, utpUrva inanto grahirUpanyAse vartate / yadajayaHudagrAhitamupanyaste baddhAgnyAhitayorapi - iti / samAnAsamAnAkAramiti / sajAtIyaiH saha samAnAkAraM vijAtIyaiH punarasamAnAkAram / saMbandhagraharaNAdaya iti / prAdigrahaNAd vizeSaNavizeSyabhAvagraha / tathAhItyAdi / zramyAsavAsanApATa tre'pi abhyAsAdvAsanA abhyAsavAsanA / vAsaneti pUrvajJAnajanitAmuttarajJAne zaktimAhustadvidaH / tasyAH pATavaM tasminnapi sati, alam samartham, nirvyavasAyeti ca vizeSaNadvAreNa heturuktaH, nirvikalpatvAdAdyottaradarzane kartRNIti saMskArataddbodhanaM yathAkramaM kartuM na pArayata ityuktaM bhavati / yata iti / smRtibIjAdhAnatatpratibodhanAbhyAm / tadadarzanAditi / vyava+ hArAdarzanAt /

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NYAYAVATARAH bhrAntatvam, tanna_saMbhavatyeva, viviktakSaNakSayiparamANUnAM kadAcidapyapratibhAsAta,, teSAM ca pAramArthikatvAt / atha vyAvahArikAbhiprAyeNa yadidaM ghaTAdikaM svalakSaNamarthakriyAkSamam, tatra yanna bhrAmyati tadabhrAntamityabhipretam, tahi kalpanApoDhapadamutsAraNIyam, idAnImanena sahAvasthAnAbhAvAt / vyavahArAvatAriNo ghaTAdisvalakSaNasya nirNayenaiva grahaNAta, anyathA vyavahArApravRtteH, dRSTasyApyadRSTAnatizayinAt / tasmAt vyavasAyAtmakamadhyakSamityetadeva cAviti sthitam // aparokSatayA - ityanena tu parokSalakSaNasaMkIrNatAmadhyakSasya pariharati, tasya sAkSAtkAritayA arthagraharaNarUpatvAditi / IdRzam - ityamunA tu pUrvoktanyAyAt sAvadhAraNena vizeSaNakadambakasacivajJAnopadarzanAt paraparikalpitalakSaNayuktasya pratyakSatAM pratikSipati / evaM ca yadAhuH - indriyArthasaMnikarSotpannaM jJAnamavyapadezyamavyabhicAri vyavasAyAtmakaM pratyakSam, tathA, satsaMprayoge puruSasyendriyANAM buddhijanma tatpratyakSam ityAdi, tadayuktamityuktaM bhavati, apUrvaprAdurbhAvasya pramANabAdhitatvAt, atyantAsatAM zazaviSANAdInAmapyutpattiprasaGgAt / tasmAdidamAtmarUpatayA vidyamAnameva vizeSakRddhetukalApasaMnidhAnAta sAkSAdarthagrahaNa pariNAmarUpatayA vivarteta, tathA cotpannajanmAdivizeSaNaM na saMbhavet / athaivaMvidhArthasUcakamevaitad -- ityAcakSIthAH, tathA satyavigAnamevetyAstAM tAvat / adhunA parokSalakSaNaM darzayati- itaradityAdi / aparokSatayArthasya grAhakaM jJAnaM pratyakSamityuktam, tasmAditaradasAkSAdarthagrAhakaM jJAnaM parokSamiti jJeyamavagantabyam / etadapi svasaMvedanApekSayA pratyakSameva, bahirarthApekSayA tu parokSavyapadezamaznuta iti darzayannAha - grahaNekSayA iti, iha grahaNaM prakramAd bahiH pravartanamucyate, anyathA vizeSaNavaiyarthyaM syAt, tasyekSA apekSA tayA, vahiH pravRttiparyAlocanayeti yAvat / tadayamarthaH - yadyapi svayaM pratyakSam, tathApi liGgazabdAdidvAreNa bahirviSayagrahaNe'sAkSAtkAritayA vyApriyate iti parokSamityucyate / etacca bubhutsitArthAnyathAnupapannArthAntarapratItivazAdubhayadharmakamiti / sAmAnyalakSaNasadbhAvAdekAkAramapi vipratipattinirAkaraNArthaM dvidhA bhidyate / tadyathA anumAnaM zAbdaM ceti / yato'dyApi zabdasyArthAnyathanupapannameva pare na pratipadyante, na cApRthakkRtasya tadviviktaM vaktuM zakyam, ato bhedenopa " nyAsaH || 4 | anyathetyAdi / nirNayena grahaNAbhAve vyavahArApravRtteH, dRSTasyApi kSaNikasvalakSaNasya aSTAdatizAyanaM pravizeSaH pradRSTAdanatizAyanaM tasmAt / ghaJyupasargasya bahulam ( siddha0 3-2-86 ) iti bahulagrahaNAt kvaciduttarapadasya vA dIrghatvena narakanArakAdivadatizayanamatizAyanaM veti saMbhavati / indriyArtha saMnikarSetyAdi / atra sUtre yata ityadhyAhAryam, tato'yamarthaH - indriyArthaM saMnikarSotpannatvAdivizeSaNaM jJAnaM yata indriyArthasaMnikarSAdirbhavati tatpratyakSam ; jJAnaM tu pratyakSapramANaphalam hAnopAdAnAdibuddhayapekSayA tu tadapi jJAnaM pramANameva / avyapadezyaM vyavasAyAtmakamiti padadvayena nirvikalpasavikalpakabhedena pratyakSasya dvaividhyamAha zeSANi tu jJAnavizeSaraNAni / satsaMprayogetyAdi / satA vidyamAnena vastunA indriyANAM saMprayoge saMbandhe sati puruSasya yo jJAnotpAdastatpratyakSam zrAdizabdAt sAkSAt - kAripramAsAdhanaM pratyakSamityAdi gRhyate // 4 // 31

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32 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 tatra tAvadanumAnalakSaNamabhidhitsurAha-. sAdhyAvinAbhuno liGgAtsAdhyanizcAyakaM smRtam / anumAnaM tadabhrAntaM pramAraNatvAtsamakSavat // 5 // saadhyaavinetyaadi| ihApyanumAnamiti lakSyanirdezaH, tasyAprasiddhatayA anuudytvaat| sAdhyAvinAbhuno liGgAt sAdhyanizcAyakamiti lakSaNanirdezaH, tasyAprasiddhatayA vidheyatvAditi / atrApyanumAnazabdasya kAdikArakavyutpattikrameNArthakathanaM pramANazabdavad draSTavyam / tatazcehApi liGgagrahaNasAdhyAvinAbhAvitvalakSaNaliGgasaMbandhasmaraNakAlAta anu pazcAnmIyate paricchidyate'rtho'numeyapAvakAdiryena jJAnena tadanumAnamiti / tata kiMbhUtamityAha--sAdhyanizcAyakamiti / sAdhanamarhati sAdhayituM vA zakya iti sAdhyo'numeya ityarthaH, tasya nizcAyakaM tatsvarUpanirNAyakamiti yAvata / tatkuta ityAha-liGgAta, liGgayate gamyate'rtho'neneti liga hetuH tasmAta / kiMbhUtAdityAha sAdhyAvinAbhuna iti / vinA bhavatIti vinAbhu, tato'nyadavinAbhu, sAdhyenAvinAbhu sAdhyAvinAbhu, sAdhyaM vimucya yanna bhavatItyarthaH, tasmAta sAdhyanizcAyakaM jJAnaM tadanumAnaM smRtam amipretaM nItividbhiriti saMbandhaH / tatra liGgAta sAdhyanizcAyakamityanenAnumAnasya pratyakSazAbdalakSaNasaMkIrNatAM vArayati / sAdhyAvinAbhuna ityanena parapraNItaliGgalakSaNavyudAsamAcaSTe / tatazca yatpare procuH-- pakSadharmatvAnvayavyatirekalakSaNarUpatrayopalakSitAni trINyeva liGgAni anupalabdhiH svabhAvaH kArya ceti / taduktam anumeye'tha tattulye sadbhAvo nAstitAsati / nizcitAnupalambhAtmakAryAkhyA hetavastrayaH // iti / tathAnye asyedaM kArya kAraNaM saMyogi samavAyi virodhi ceti laiGgikamaiti, tathA, pUrvavat zeSavat sAmAnyatodRSTamityAdi / tadvAlapralapitaprAyamityava anUdyatvAditi / nanu vaderanupUrvasya nAmno vadaH kyap ca (si0 he0 5-1-35) iti kyappratyayo na prApnoti, anupasargAdityadhikArAnuvRtteH, tato vyaJjanAntatvAd vyaNi anuvAdyatvAdityeva syAt / satyam, anuvadanamanUta, saMpadAditvAt bhAve kvip, tato'nUdi anuvAdaviSaye sAdhu iti sAdhvarthe ye'nUdyatvAditi / pakSadharmAnvayetyAdi / pare bauddhAH / taduktamiti / dignAgeneti zeSaH / anumeyetyAdi / anumeyaH pakSaH, tatra sadbhAva: pratyakSatonumAnato vA hetodarzanam ; tatra pratyakSataH kasmizcita pradeze dhUmasya, anumAnataH zabde kRtakatvasya / tathA tattulye sAdhyasadbhAvAd anumeyasame sapakSe ityarthaH, asati vipakSe nAstitA nizcitA tRtIyaM rUpam / nizcita iti liGgavipariNAmena pUrvayorapi rUpayoryojyam / yadvinizcaye--ante vacanAnnizcitatvaM triSvapi rUpeSu draSTavyam iti, etallakSaNA anupalabdhisvabhAvakAryAkhyAsrayo hetavaH / yathA kvaciddeze na ghaTaH upalabdhilakSaNaprAptasyAnupalabdheH / vRkSo'yam, zizapAtvAt / agniratra, dhUmAt / anya iti vaizeSikA: / asyepadam kArya kAraNaM saMyogi samavAyi virodhi ceti / lainggikmiti| liGgAjjAtaM laiGgikam, liGgadarzanAd

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3 NYAYAVATARAH gantavyam, sarvatra sAdhyAvinAbhAvitvasyaiva gamakatvAt tadrahitasya tu trailakSaNyalakSitasyApyagamakatvAt, itarathA tatputratvAdInAmapi gamakatvaprasaGgAta, niyamavat / trailakSaNyaM lakSaNaM na yatkicita, tenAyamaprasaGga iti cenna, niyamena sAdhyAvinAbhAvitvasyaivoddIpanAta, taccedasti kiM trailakSaNyApekSayA, tasyaiva yadavyabhicAritvAdivizeSaNaM jJAnaM tad yataH parAmarzajJAnopalakSitAt kArakasamUhAd bhavati tallaiGgikamiti yAvat / tathA hi-kAryaM kAraNapUrvakatvenopalambhAdupalabhyamAnaM kAraNasya gamakam / yathA - viziSTanadIpUropalambhAdupari dRSTo megha iti / tathA hi-pracurataraphalaphenaparNakASThAdivanaviziSTasya nadIpUrasya vRSTikAryatvena pUrvamupalambhAt tadupalambhe sati yuktamanumAnam zrayaM nadIpUro vRSTikArya:, viziSTana dIpUratvAt, pUrvopalabdhaviziSTanadIpUravat, pUraubhayataTavyApaka dakasaMyogaH / kAraNamapi kAryajanakatvena pUrvamupalabdherupalabhyamAnaM kAryasya liGgam / yathA viziSTameghonnatirvarSa karmaNa iti / zratha kAraNasyAvazyaM kAryaMjanakatvenAnupalambhAt, kAryAraNAM cAniyatAt kAraNAdutpattervyabhicAraH / tathA hi-meghonnatisadbhAve'pyekadA vRSTinaM dRSTA, kAryaM cAniyatAt kAraNAdutpapadyamAnaM dRSTam / yathA vRzcikAd vRzciko jAyate gomayAt sarpAcceti, tatkathaM kAryAt kAraNa vizeSapratipattiH kAraNAcca kArya vizeSasyeti ? naitadevam, kAraNavizeSasya kAryavizeSagamakatvam, kAryavizeSasya tu kAraNa vizeSagamakatvamityabhyupagamAt / yastu vidyamAnamapi vizeSaM nAvabudhyate, tatra tasyAparAdho nAnumAnasyeti / tathA dhUmAgneH saMyogI / atha saMyogasyobhayaniSThatvAvizeSe kathamekaM niyamena heturaparaM ca sAdhyamiti vyavasthA ? satyamidam, pravinAbhAve'pi samAnamutpazyAmaH / tathA hi- avinAbhAvasyobhayaniSThatvAt kathameSA vyavastheti / atha yasyopalambhAdanumeye pravRttistadeva sAdhanaM nAnyaditi cet, saMyogitve'pi samAnametat / samavAyI coSNasparzo vAristhaM tejo gamayatIti / virodhI ca yathA - ahivisphUrjanaviziSTo nakulAderliGgam, vahnirvA zItAbhAvasyeti / naiyAyikAcAhu: - pUrva vaccheSavatsAmAnyato'dRSTamityanena sUtrAvayavena tatpUrvakaM trividhamanumAnaM pUrvavaccheSavatsAmAnyatosTaM ceti sakalaM sUtraM lakSayati / tatpUrvakaM pratyakSapUrvakaM trividhamiti; anvayI vyatirekI anvayavyatirekI ceti / prathavA sUtrAvayavenaiva prakArAntareNa trividhaM padaM vyAcaSTe, pUrvavat zeSavat sAmAnyato'dRSTamiti / pUrvaM sAdhyaM tadvyAptyA yasyAsti tatpUrvavat / sAdhyasajAtIyaM ca zeSaH, tad yasyAsti taccheSavat / sAmAnyatazca vipakSe'dRSTam cazabdAt pratyakSAgamAviruddhaM zrasatpratipakSaM ceti / evaM ca paJcarUpam, anvayavyatirekayoranyatararUpAbhAve ca tattadrUpamanumAnamiti / athavA pUrvavannAma yatra kAraNena kAryamanumIyate . yathAmeghonnatyA bhaviSyati vRSTiriti / prayogastu - zramI meghA vRSTimantaH, gambhIragarjitatve'ciraprabhAvatve ca satyunnatatvAt ye evaM te vRSTimantaH; yathA vRSTimatpUrvamedhAH, tathA cAmI, tasmAttathA / zeSavannAma yatra kAryeNa kAraNamanumIyate yathA nadIpUradarzanAd vRSTiH / prayogastu uparivRSTimaddeza saMbandhinI nadI, zIghratarastrotastve phalaphenakASThAdivAhanatve ca sati pUrNatvAt tadabhyanadIvat / sAmAnyatodRSTaM nAma prakAryakAraNabhUtena yatrAvinAbhAvinA vizeSaNena vizeSyamANo dharmo gamyate, yathA - balAkayA salilamiti / prayogo'yam balAkAjahadvRttipradezo jalavAn, balAkAvattvAt saMpratipannapradezavaditi / satputrAdInAmiti / 33

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34 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I gamakatvAt / tathA hi-jalacandrAnnabhazcandram, kRttikodayAcchakaTodayam / puSpitakacUtAtpuSpitAzeSacUtAn candrodayAtkumudAkaraprabodham, vRkSAcchAyAmityAdi pkssdhrmtvvirhe'pynumimiimhe| kAlAdikastatra dharmI samastyeva, tatra pakSadharmatA liGgasya gRhyate iti cenna, atiprasaGgAta / evaM hi zabdasyAnityatve sAdhye kAkakAAderapi gamakatvaprasakteH; tatrApi lokAderdharmiNaH kalpayitu zakyatvAt / tathA anvayavikale'pi anityaH zabdaH zrAvaNatvAt , ityayaM samyaghetutayA samarthayitu zakya iti / nAnvayo'pi hetorlakSaNam / tathA hi-tAvakAkUtenaiva sakalaM sattvamanityatayA kroDIkRtam, iti bhAvadharmaH zrAvaNatvaM kathamanityatAM vihAya vipakSe vartitumutsaheta, tadvikalpasya niHsvabhAvatApatteH, anityatAvinimuktasya sattvasyAsaMbhavAta / etena sAtmakaM jIvaccharIram, prANAdimattvAta , nirAtmakatve tavaikalyaprasaGgAt, ghaTAdivad, ityayamapi gamako vyAkhyAtaH, sAdhyArthAnyathAnupapannatvasyAtrApi sadbhAvAt / pakSadharmatvAnvayayostvalakSaNatayA pratipAdanAta / tathA kAryasvAbhAvAnupalabdhirUpaliGgatrayaniyamo'pi kila tAdAtmyatadutpattilakSaNasaMbandhAstitvameteSveveti yaH kriyate, so'pyayuktaH, prakRtasaMbandhadvayavikalasyApi rUpAde rasAdigamakatvadarzanAt / mA bhUttasya tAdAtmyatadutpattibhyAM gamakatvam, samavAyAdbhaviSyati; tathApi nAnyathAnupapannatvameva hetorlakSaNamiti yadi vaizeSiko manyeta, so'nyathA nirloThanIyaH / sa hi vikalpataH paryanuyojyaH, samavAyibhyaH samavAyo'bhinno bhinno vaa| yadyabhinnaH, samavAyina eva tahi, na samavAyaH; tadavyatiriktatvAta, tatsvarUpavata / bhinnazceta, sa kathaM teSu varteta sAmastyena Ahosvidekadezena / tadyadi sAmastyena, tadayuktam, samavAyabahutvaprasaGgAta, pratisamavAyi tasya parisamAptatAvApteH / athaikadezena, tadapyacAru, sAMzatAprasaGgana niravayavatvakSateH, svAMzavartane'pi sAmastyaikadezacodyAvatArAcca / tatrApi sAmastyapakSe bahutvaM tdvsthmev| ekadezapakSe tvaMzAntaraprasaGga naanvsthaa| tanna samavAyabalAd gamakatAM pratyAzA vidheyA, tasyaiva tatra duHsthitatvAta / etena saMyoginA'pi gamakatA pratyuktA, samAnadUSaNatvAt / virodhino'pi viruddhAbhAvagamakatvamanyathAnupannatvameva sUcayati, tadabhAve gmktvaayogaat| evaM paraparikalpitamanyadapi liGgalakSaNaM yadgamakatAGgatadanyathAnupapannatvaM na vyabhicarati, sAdhyaM vinApyupapadyamAnasya gamakatAvaikalyAditi, atraiva vyApake liGgalakSaNe antarbhAvanIyam, viparItaM tu nirasanIyamiti sthitam / tadeva sa zyAmaH, tatputratvAt, paridRzyamAnaputravaditi / AdIti / prAdizabdAt nirupAdhisaMbandhabodhasamutthasAdhyapramAsAdhanamanumAnamityAdigrahaH / prAdizabdAt pakvAnyetAni pAmraphalAni, ekazAkhAprabhavatvAt, upabhujyamAnAmraphalavadityAdiparigrahaH / virodhina ityAdi / virodhI vahniH svaviruddhasya zItasya asatvaM bodhayati / viruddhAbhAvagamakatvamityupalakSaNam , viruddhasadbhAvagamakatvasyApi darzanAt / ata eva pUrvamahivisphUjitaviziSTo nakulAdiliGgamityuktam, tasya ca sAmAnyasya tadrUpatayA ca tena tasyAdhyavasAyAditi, svalakSaNarUpatayA cAnumAnena sAmAnyasya vikalpanAt / atasmin asvalakSaNe

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NYAYAVATARAH manumAnalakSaNaM pratipAdyAdhunA yacchauddhodaniziSyairnyagAdi - yaduta bhrAntamanumAnam, sAmAnyapratibhAsitvAt / tasya ca bahiH svalakSaNe vyatirekAvyatirekavikalpAbhyAmapAkriyamANatayA ayogAt, tadrUpatayA ca tena tasyAdhyavasAyAd atasmiMstadgrahaNasya ca bhrAntilakSaNatvAt / prAmANyaM punaH praNAlikayA bahiH svalakSaNa balAyA tatvAdanumAnasya / tathA hi-nArthaM vinA tAdAtmyatadutpattirUpasaMbandhapratibaddhaliGgasadbhAvaH na tadvinA tadviSayaM jJAnam, na tajjJAnamantareNa prAgavadhAritasaMbandhasmaraNam, tadasmaraNe nAnumAnamiti, arthAvyabhicAritvAd bhrAntamapi pramANamiti saMgIryate / taduktam - tasmiMstad graho bhrAntirapi saMbandhataH pramA / iti / tadapAkartumAha-tadabhrAntamityAdi / tadanumAnaM bhrAmyati svagocare viparyasyatIti bhrAntam, tato'nyadabhrAntam, aviparItArthagrAhIti yAvat, iyaM ca pratijJA; pramIyate yathAvasthito'rthaH paricchidyate'neneti pramANam, tadbhAvastattvaM tasmAta, ayaM tu hetuH; saMgatamakSANAmiti samakSam, tadiva samakSavaditi dRSTAntaH tadidamanumAnasya bhrAntatAnirAkArakaM saMpUrNAvayam, upanayanigamanayoravayavatrayapratipAdanenaivAkSiptatvAt pramANaM sUcitam / prayogastvevaM draSTavyaH - abhrAntamanumAnam, pramANatvAt, iha yat yat pramANaM tattadabhrAntaM yathA samakSam, tathA ca pramANaM bhavadbhirabhyupagamyate anumAnam, tasmAtpramANatvAdabhrAntamiti pratipadyantAmiti / tatrArthavAdI tAvatsamakSalakSaNe dRSTAnte sAdhyavikalatAmAvirbhAvayituM na pArayati svayameva samakSasyAbhrAntatayAbhyupagamAt / zUnyavAdinaH samastApalA pitvAt pramANaprameyavyavahAraM pratyayogyataiveti na tamadhikRtya svasAdhanadoSAH parihartavyAH, svavacanabAdhitapratijJatvena tadvAdotthAnAbhAvAt / tathA hisarvAbhAvapratipAdakaM vaco'sti nAsti vA / yadyasti tahi pratijJAhAniH / atha nAsti, sakalabhAvasiddhiH, pratiSedhakAbhAvAt // 5 // jJAnavAdI punarvedyavedakAkAravikalaM sakalavikalpagocarAtItaM nirvikalpakaM viviktapAramArthikasvasaMvedanavedyaM saMvedanamAgUryAnAdikAlAlInavAsanAbalaprabhAvitaM grAhyagrAhakAkArakaluSitaM bahiSprathamAnaM nikhilamapi jJAnaM viparyastatayA pratijAnAnaH samakSalakSaNasya prakRtadRSTAntasya sAdhyazUnyatAmabhidadhyAt atastanmatavikuTTanArthamAha - 35 tadgrahasya svalakSaNatayA paricchedasya bhrAntirapi saMbandhataH prameti / zramumevArthaM dRSTAntapUrvakaM vinizcaye dharmakIrtirakIrtayat / yathA maNipradIpa bhayormaNibuddhayAbhidhAvatoH / mithyAjJAnAvizeSe'pi vize So'rthakriyAM prati // 1 // yathA tathA yathArthatve'pyanumAnatadAbhayoH / zrarthakriyAnurodhena pramANatvaM vyavasthitam ||2|| iti // 5 //

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36 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I na pratyakSamapi bhrAntaM pramANatvavinizcayAt / bhrAntaM pramANamityetadviruddhaM vacanaM ytH||6|| yadbhavatazcetasi vivartate, yaduta na kevalamanumAnaM bhrAntam, kiM tarhi yadbhavadbhirdaSTAntatayopAttaM pratyakSaM tadapi bhrAntameva, sarvamAlambane bhrAntamiti vacanAt / tadetanna, kuta ityAha-pramANatvavinizcayAditi / pramANabhAvanirNayAdityarthaH / nanu ca pramANatAmabhrAntatAnyathAnupapannAM yadi paraH pratipadyeta, tatastAmabhyupagacchan kathaM bhrAntatAvipratipatti vidadhyAditi pArzvasthitavacanAvakAzamAzaGkaya, bhrAntatApramANatayovirodhasAdhanena tataH pramANatAM vyAvartyAnanyazaraNatayA pratijJAtAbhrAntatAkrAntAM tAM darzayannAha--bhrAntamityAdi / bhrAntaM viparyasta atha ca pramANaM grAhyaparicchedaheturityetadvacanamevaMvidhArthapratyAyako dhvanirviruddhaM, pUrvAparavyAhatArthagarbhakatvAt / nanu ca naivAsya viruddhatA, tathA hiaviditaparamArthavyAvahArikAbhiprAyeNa lokasaMvati dhaTayanto vayaM dRDhataravAsanAprabodhasaMpAditasattAkayoH pratyakSAnumAnayoH pramANatAmAcakSmahe, tadabhiprAyeNa darzitArthaprApakatvena tayoravisaMvAdakatvAta, zithilavAsanaunmukhyanirmitajanmakayoH punarapramANatAm, tadAkUtenaiva darzite'rthe vipralambhanAditi, bhrAntatAM punastattvacintakAbhiprAyeNa sakalasya bahirupaplavamAnasya grAhyagrAhakAkArakAluSyadUSitasya pratibhAsasya pAramArthikAdvayasaMvedanaviparyastarUpatvAdabhidadhmahe, vahiH pratibhAsasya tadgrAhyArthavicArAkSamatayopaplutarUpatvAt / tathA hi-artho'vayavirUpaH avayavarUpo vA syAta, gatyantarAbhAvAt / na tAvadavayavirUpo vicAraM kSamate, avayavavirahe avayavitvAyogAta, teSu ca tadvattivikalpAnupapatteH / tathA hiteSu asAvekadezena vartate, sAmastyena vA / na tAvadekadezena, tasya svayaM niravayavatvAt / avayavavRttinimittamaMzAntarakalpane tadvattAvapyaMzAntarakalpanaprasaGgaH, tathA caanvsthaa| nApi sAmastyena, pratyavayavaM parisamAptarUpatayAvayavibahutvaprasaGgAt / bhedapakSe doSo'yam, abhedapakSe nAstIti ceta , na, tatrApyavayavamAtram avayavimAnaM vA syAta, itaretarAvyatiriktatvAta, itaretarasvarUpavat / kiM ca samastAvayavavyApino'vayavino'bhyupagame paTAde rekadezarAgakampadarzanAdiSu sakalarAgakampadarzanAdIni durnivArA riNa syuH, ekasya rAgArAgAdiviruddhadharmAdhyAsAyogAditi / nApyavayavarUpo'rtho vicAragocaracArI, karacaraNazirogrIvAdInAmavayavAnAM svAvayavApekSayA avayavirUpatayA tadUSaNenaivApAstatvAta / paramANanAM niraMzatayA avayavatvamupapadyata iti ceta , na, teSAmapi diSaTkasaMbandhena SaDaMzatApatteH, anyathAvasthAnAbhAvAt , tatazcArthavirahAttadunmukho grAhyAkAro'lIkaH, prAgUryeti pratijJAya / tato bhrAntatAyAm / tAM pramANatAm / saMvRtimiti kalpanAm / yadAhu : anirUpitatatvArthA pratItiH sNvRtirmtaa| aunmukhyamiti prAbhimukhyam / tadAkUtena vyAvahArikAbhiprAyeNa / dikSaketyAdi /

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NYAYAVATARAD 37 tadalIkatAyAM grAhakAkAro'pi nAvasthAnamAbadhnAti, grAhyAbhAve grAhakAyogAta, tadapekSayaiva tatsvarUpasthitiH, grAhyagrAhakAkAravilaye ca bodhAkAro'vaziSyate, tasya sarvatrAvyabhicaritarUpatvAta , tasmAta sa eva pAramArthika iti| atra pratividhIyate--yadavAdi saMvedanamadvayaM pAramArthikam, grAhyagrAhakAkArapravRttaM punaratAttvikamiti, tadayuktam, pramANAbhAvAt / tathA hi-bahirantazcAnekAkAratayA harSaviSAdAdibhiH sthirasthUratAdyanekadharmaparikaritArthagrahaNapariNAmaizca vivartamAnaM saMvedanamupalabhyate, na punarvedyavedakAkAravivikta yAdag bhavadbhirupavarNyate jJAnaM tAdRzaM kasyacita kadAcana pratItigocaracAritAmanubhavati, advayapratibhAsasya svapnadazAyAmapyananubhUteH / na ca tattvacintakA api pramANamantareNa svAtaM pratiSThApayantaH prekSAvatAmavadheyavacanA bhavanti, anyathaikamacetanamavyayamapi brahmAneka cetanaM kSaNabhaMguratAkrAntamavidyAtaH prathata iti bru vANo'nirAkAryaH syAt / yadapi bahirarthanirAkaraNadhiyA avayavyavayadvAreNa dUSaNamadAyi, tadapi bahirantaH prathamAnasakalAsumatpratItapratibhAsamugdaranirdalitazarIratayA bhaktamadhyaniSThyUtazinaH purato vipratAraNapravaNakuTTinIzapathaprAyamiti na vidvajjanamanAMsi raJjayati, pratyakSapratibhAsApahnave tanmUlakatvAta kuyuktivikalpAnAmutthAnAbhAvAt / kiM ca saMvedanasyApi sitAsitAdyanekAkAreSvekasya vartane bhedAbhedasAmastyaikadezAdicodyaM samAnameveti na dUSaNam / anekAkAravivartasyAlIkatvAnna tena saha saMvedanasya pAramArthikasya bhedAbhedAdicinteti ceta , nanu evamitaretarAzrayaM duruttaramADhaukate / tathA hi-tadIkatvasiddhAvadvayasaMvedanasiddhiH, tasiddhau ca taladIkatvamiti nyAyAt / anyacca advayamapyekakSaNati saMvedanaM yathA pUrvottarakSaNAbhyAM saMbandhamanubhavati, tathA niraMzA api yadi paramANavo digaMzaiH paramANvantararvA saMzleSamAgaccheyuH kimayukta syAt / na cAvayavyavayavayorekAntavyatirekapakSe yadUSaNaM tadasmatpakSabAdhAkaram, parasparAvini ThitarUpayovivakSayA saMdarzanIyabhedayostayorabhyupagamAta , bahirantazca tathaiva prakAzamAnatayA tayonihnotumazakyatvAta / etena rAgArAgakampAkampAdivirodhodbhAvanamapi prativyUDham, pramANaprasiddhe'rthe virodhAbhAvAt , pramANabAdhitasyaiva viruddhatvAta , kuyuktivikalpAnAM ca pratyakSApahnave nirmUlatayA bAdhakatvAyogAta , taduddalitatvenotthAnAbhAvAta , bhinnapravRttinimittatvAcca sarvadharmANAM tadviparyayasaMpAdyo virodho durApAsta eva / kiM ca, svayameva saMvedanaM paramArthasaMvyavahArApekSayA pratyakSApratyakSasavikalpakAvikalpakabhrAntAbhrAntAdirUpamabhyupayato bahirarthe viruddhadharmAdhyAsapratiSedhabuddhiH SadikasaMbandhAnyathAnupapattyA paramANUnAM sAvayatetyabhiprAyaH / avadheyavacanA prAdeyavacasaH / brahma tattvarUpam / saMvedanasyApItyAdi / ekasyeti / citrajJAnasya,jJAne hya kasminnaiva nIlapItAdayo bahava AkArA: pratibhAnti, tatasteSu nIlapItAdyAkAreSu kathamekaM jJAnaM vartate iti vicAraH pravartate eva / taduddalitatveneti / pratyakSApahnavena kuyuktivikalpAnAM nirdalitatvAdutthAnAbhAvaH,pratyakSAbhAvehi kvacit kasyApyadarzane kayaM kuyuktivikalpAnAM saMbhavaH? bhinnapravRttinimittatvAditi / paryAyarUpatayA hi ekatvapariNAmarUpasyAvayavinaH tantubhyo bhedaH, dravyarUpa

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38 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I kevalaM jADyaM sUcayati / tanna pramANaM kathaMcid bhrAntaM samasti, svarUpapracyavaprasaGgAditi sthitam / nanu ca taddarzitArthAlIkatayA jJAnasya bhrAntatA, na svarUpeNa, na ca tadudayasamaye kasyacididamalIkArtham, idaM tvanalIkArthamiti vivekenAvadhAraNaM samasti; bhrAntatAbhrAntatAbhimatayostadekarUpatayA prakAzanAt / yadA ca vizadadarzanapathacAriNo'pi zazadharayugalAdayo'lIkatAmAvizanto dRzyante, tadA sakalasatyArthatAbhimatapratibhAseSvapyalIkArthatAzaGkAnivRtteranAzvAsa eva / na ca tadarthaprAptyAdikamArekAnirAkaraNakAraNaM kalpanIyam, svapnAvasthAyAM tatsadbhAve'pyalIkArthatAsiddheH / bAdhakapratyayopanipAtAt tasyAsatyArthateti cet, na, tasya svagocaraparyavasitatvena bAdhakatvAyogAt / anyathA nIlamAdadAnA devadattabuddhiH prAkpravRttapItabuddherbAdhikApota, sarvapratibhAsasya bAdhakAbhAvasiddhezca smaantaa| tasmAd bhrAntAbhrAntajJAnabhrAntiriyaM bhavatAm, vivekAbhAvena sarvasyAlIkArthatvAditi // 6 // atrAha sakalapratibhAsasya bhrAntatvAsiddhitaH sphuTam / pramANaM svAnyanizcAyi dvayasiddhau prasidhyati // 7 // evaM manyate-yo'pi samastasaMvedanasya bhrAntatAM pratijAnIte, tenApi tatsAdhakasyAbhrAntatAbhyupagantavyA, tadbhrAntatve tatpratipAditArthAlIkatvena sakalajJAnAbhrAntatAprasaGgAta , anyathA tabhrAntatvAyogAta / evaM ca tajjAtIyamanyadapyabhrAnta syAta, tatazca sakalapratibhAsasya samastasaMvedanasya bhrAntatvAsiddhito viparyastatvAniSpatteH yat sphuTaM svAnyanizcAyi sunizcitatayA svapara tayA'bhedaH, evamutpAdAdidharmANAmapi virodhAbhAvo boddhavyaH, uttaraparyAyasya yudayaH pUrvaparyAyasya vyayaH dravyasya tvanuyAyinodhrauvyamiti / paramArthetyAdi / paramArthasaMvyavahArApekSayeti etad yathAsaMbhavaM yojyaM na yayAkramam, tena paramArthApekSayA saMvedanaM pratyakSam svasaMvedanarUpatvAt; saMvyavahArApekSayA tvapratyakSam, arthAbhAve'pyarthaparicchedAtmakatvena lokairadhya - vasAyAt, tathA paramArthApekSayA vikalparahitam, sarvavikalpAnAM svAtmani nirvikalpatvAt; saMvyavahArApekSayA tu vikalpakaluSitam, asato bahirarthasya tena vikalpanAt, tathA paramArthApekSayA abhrAntam, jJAnamAtrasya vAstavatvAt; saMvyavahArApekSayA ca bhrAntam, avidyamAnabAhya vastuni bahIrUpatayArthasya grAhakatvAt / prAdigrahaNAt paramArthApekSayA pramANam saMvyavahArApekSayatvapramANamityAdyapi drssttvym| bahirarthe bAhyavastuni bhedAbhedAdiviruddhadharmAdhyAsane kRtvA hetunA vA pratiSedhabuddhiH kevalaM mandatAM prakaTayati / tavarthaprAptyAvikamiti / tasya pratibhAsamAnastha jalAderarthasya prAptiH, AdizabdAt pAnAvagAhanAdyarthakriyAparigrahaH / tasyeti / svapnajJAnasya / tasya bAdhaka pratyayastha / samAnateti / na kazcitpratibhAso bAdhyo nApi ca bAdhakaH / vivekAbhAveneti / viveko bhrAntAt svapnajJAnAderabhrAntasya pArthakyena vyavasthApanam // 6 // yo'pIti / yogAcArAdiH / bhrAntatAmiti / sarvamAlambane bhrAntam iti vacanAt

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NYAYAVATARAH 39 prakAzakaM tatpramANamiti saMbandhaH / tacca dvayasiddhau svarUpArthalakSaNayugmaniSpattau prasiddhayati niSpadyate, anyathA prameyAbhAve pramANAbhAvAt / tasmAta pramANamurarIkurvANenArtho'pyabhyupagantavya ityabhiprAya iti // 7 // tadevaM svArthAnumAnalakSaNaM pratipAdya tadvatAM bhrAntatAvipratipatti ca nirAkRtyAdhunApratipAditaparArthAnumAnalakSaNa evAlpavaktavyatvAta tAvacchAbdalakSaNamAha dRSTeSTAvyAhatAdvAkyAtparamArthAbhidhAyinaH / tattvagrAhitayotpannaM mAnaM zabdaM prakIrtitam // 8 // atrApi zAbdam iti lakSyam, anudyatvAta / dRSTeSTAvyAhatAd ityAdi lakSaNam, vidheyatvAt / dRSTena pramANAlokitena iSTaH prati (vi?)pAdayiSato'vyAhato anirAkRtaH sAmarthyAdartho yasmin vAkye tattathA, pramANanizcitArthAbAdhitamiti yAvata , tasmAta / paramo'kRtrimaH pUruSopayogI zakyAnuSThAno vArtho vAcyastamabhidhAtuM zIlaM yasya tata paramArthAbhidhAyi, viziSTArthadarzakamityarthaH / tataH tattvagrAhitayotpannam prakRtavAkyapratipAdyArthAdAnazIlatayA labdhAtmasattAkaM yanmAnaM tacchAbdamiti prakIrtitam upariNataM pUrvAcAryairiti saMbandhaH / tatra dRSTeSTAvyAhatAd ityanena kutIthikavacasA laukikavipratArakoktInAM ca zAbdatAM nirasyati, pramANavAdhitatvAt / vAkyAta ityamunA tu vAkyasyaiva niyatArthadarzakatvAt paramArthAbhidhAyiteti darzayan padAcchAbdAbhAvamAha / paramArthAbhidhAyinaH ityanena jvaraharatakSakacUDAratnAlaMkAropadezAdivacanaprabhavajJAnasya niSphalatayA prAmANyaM niraacsstte| tattvagrAhitayotpannam ityamunA tvevaMbhUtAdapi vAkyAta zrotRdoSAd viparItAdyarthagrahaNacaturatayA prAdurbhUtasya zAbdatvaM vArayati / mAnam ityanena antarbhAvitapropasargArthena zAbde parasyAprAmANyabuddhiM tiraskurute, tadaprAmANye parArthAnumAnapralayaprasaGgAta , tasya vacanarUpatvAt / vyavayavahetusUcakatvenopacAratastasya prAmANyaM na tattvata iti ceta , na, aprAmANyasya sUcakatvAyogAt / nanu hetupratipAdane yadi tata pramANam, tato hetusamarthakapramANAntarapratIkSaNaM na vizIryaMta, tatsAdhakasya samastasaMvedanabhrAntatAsAdhakasya, nirAlambanAH sarve pratyayAH, pratyayatvAt, svapna pratyayavat, ityanumAnasya / tabhrAntatve nirAlambanatAsAdhakAnumAnAlIkatve // 7 // dRSTenetyAdi / ayaM bhinnAdhikaraNastripado bahubrIhiH, yadi vA iSTo'vyAhato'rtho'tra tadiSTAvyAhataM vAkyam, tadanu dRSTena pramANa nirNItena iSTAvyAhatamiti tatpuruSaH / paramo. 'kRtrimaH puruSopayogI zakyAnuSThAno veti / vAzabdaH samuccaye, tato'yamartha:--puruSopayogI zakyAnuSThAnazca yo'rthaH sa paramo'kRtrima ityucyate, tatra puruSopayogI ityanena zakyAnuSThAnAnAmapi zavazarIrodvartanAdInAM puruSAnupayogInAM nirAsaH, zakyAnuSThAna ityanena tu puruSopayoginAmapi jvaraharazeSazikhAratnAlaMkArAdInAM prtikssepH| vikalpArtho vAzabdaH, tadayamarthaH-puruSopayogI zakyAnuSThAno vA artho'kRtrima ityucyte| azakyAnuSThAnasya takSakAlaMkArAdeH paramArthataH puruSAnupayogitvAt; puruSAnupayoginazca mRtakodvartanAdestattvaH puruSadharmavadbhirvidhAtumazakyatvAditi / pdaacchaagdaabhaavmaaheti| pravRttiviSayavyavasthApakaM hi

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40 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 tenaiva nirNItasvarUpatvAttasya, pramANasiddhe punaH pramANAntaravaiyarthyAta / naitadasti, bhavatparikalpitAdhyakSasyAprAmANyaprasaGgAt, taddarzite'rthe vikalpapratIkSaNAttasyaiva prAmANyamAsajyeta / tadgRhItamevArthamasAvabhilApayatIti ceta , zabdapratipAditaM hetuM pramANAntaraM samarthayate iti samAno nyAyaH / / 8 / / zAbdaM ca dvidhA bhavati-laukika zAstrajaM ceti / tatredaM dvayorapi sAdhAraNaM lakSaNaM pratipAditam, samarthanaM punaravipratArakavacanaprabhavasyehAdivAkyaprastAva eva laukikasya vihitam, zAstrajasya tu vidhAtavyamiti yAdRzaH zAstrAttajjAtaM pramANatAmanubhavati taddarzayati prAptopajJamanulladhyamadaSTeSTavirodhakam / tatvopadezakRtsA zAstraM kApathaghaTTanam // 6 // zAsti zikSayati jIvAjIvAdi tattvaM nAhayati, ziSyate'neneti vA zAstram / tat kiMbhUtamiti tadvizeSaNAnyAha-AptaH prakSINAzeSarAgAdidoSagaNaH, tena upajJam AdAvupalabdham / anenApauruSeyApohamAha, tasya pramANavAdhitatvAta ; puruSavyApArAbhAve vacanAnupalabdheH, upalambhe'pi tadarthAnavagamAt, tadarthanizcayArtha puruSAzrayaNe gajasnAnanyAyaprasaGgAta , tasya rAgAdikaluSitatvena vitathArthakathanapravRtteH, tadanuSThAnAdapi svakAryasiddhau praNayanArthamapi puruSaH kiM neSyate ? vizeSAbhAvAt / tanna kSINadoSavacanaM vyatiricyAnyataH prekSAvatAM paralokAdAvadRSTe'rthe pravRttiryuktA, tat tadevazAstraM, nirupacaritazabdArthopapattarityAstAM tAvat / ata eva ullabhyate prAbalyena gamyate abhibhUyate anyarityulladhyam, tatonyad anulladhyam sarvavacanAtizAyIti yAvat / ata eva dRSTena pramANanirNIteneSTasya tadvAcyasya virodho yasmistat tathA tadeva, yadi vA, dRSTaH pramANena, pramANam, na ca padebhyo yaH padArthapratyayastena niyato viSaya upasthApyate, yena ghaTArthI kRtazcinnivRttya kvacit pravartate; niyatadeze hi vastuni pumAn pravartate, na ca kenaciddezena viziSTo ghaTo ghaTazabdenopadazitaH, tanna padaprabhavapratyayasya zAbdapramANatvam / taviti zAbdam / tena zabdena / tasya hetoH // 8 // - Apta ityAdi / upajJAyate Adau upalabhyate sma ityupajJA, pAtazcopasarge (pA0 3-1-131) iti karmaNyaGa, tata prAptasyopajJA prAptopajJamiti, tatpuruSAdhikAre upajJopakrame (pA0 2-4-21) iti sUtreNa upajJAntasya napuMsakatvam, tenopajJamiti tu nAvabudhyate; vAkye napuMsakatvavidhAmAbhAvAt / gajasnAnanyAyetyAdi / yathA-gajombhasA rajoviyuktamAtmAnaM vidhAya punareva rajobhirAtmAnaM malinayati, tathA tvamapi rAgadveSopahatapuruSapraNayanasamutthaM vedAnAM kAluSyamapauruSeyatvAbhyupagamena nirAkRtya vyAkhyAnArthaM punarapi tathAbhUtaM puruSamabhyupagacchan tadevAMgIkuruSe iti| tadanuSThAnAditi / anuSThAnaM vyAkhyAtAkhyAnalakSaNo vyApAratasmAt / svakAryasya paralokAdAvaSTe'rthe pravRttirUpasya siddhAviti amyupagamyamAnAyAmiti zeSaH / dRSTenetyAdi idamarthakathanamAtram, samAsavigrahastvayam - iSTasya virodhaH, dRSTena iSTavirodhaH na vidyate dRSTeSTavirodho yatra tttthaa| tadvAcyasyeti zAstrAbhidheyasya /

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___41 NYAYAVATARAT iSTo vacanAntareNa, tayovirodhakam, tadviruddhArthAbhidhAnAta , tato'nyadadRSTeSTavirodhakam, abAdhArthAbhidhAyItyarthaH / tadiyatA zAstrasya svArthasaMpaduktA, adhunA tattvopadezAdInAM parArthatvAt parArthasaMpadamAha-tattvaM jIvAdayaH padArthAH, pramANapratiSThitatvAta, teSAmupadezaH svarUpaprakAzanam, tadrakSaNAdividhAnaM vA, taM karoti tattvopadezakRta , ata eva sArvaM sarvasmai hitam, prANirakSaNopAyopadezaparamapadadAyitayA vizvajanInatvAta / etena parArthasaMpAdakatvamuktam / adhunA pareSAmevAnarthaparighAtitvamAha-kutsitAH panthAnaH kApathAH tIrthAntarANi, teSAM ghaTTanaM vicAlakaM nirAkArakam, sarvajanApakArikumatavidhvaMsakamityarthaH / IdazAdeva zAstrAjjAtaM zAbdaM pramANam, nAnyebhyaH, vipralambhakatvAtteSAmiti // 6 // adhunA parArthAnumAnalakSaNaM vaktavyam, tacca pratyakSe'pi pazyan ekayogakSematvAta sAmAnyenAha svanizcayavadanyeSAM nizcayotpAdanaM budhaiH / parArthaM mAnamAkhyAtaM vAkyaM tadupacArataH // 10 // atra parArthaM mAnamiti lakSyam, svanizcayavadityAdi lakSaNam, sva AtmA tasya nizcayaH prameyAdhigamaH, tadvadanyeSAM pratipAdyAnAM nizcayotpAdanaM prameyaparicchedajJAnaprAdurbhAvanam, yathA Atmano'rthanirNayastathA pareSAM nirNayajananamityarthaH / budhairvidvadbhiH / parasmai arthaH prayojanaM yena tat parArtham, mIyate'neneti mAnam, pAkhyAtaM kathitam / nanu ca yadi nizcayotpAdanaM parArthamAnam, tathA jJAnamapi parapratyAyanAya vyApriyamANaM parArthaM prApnotItyAha-vAkyaM parArthaM, na jJAnam, tasyaivAnantaryeNa vyApArAta , paraprayojanamAtratvAcca, itarasya tu vyavahitatvAta, svaparopakAritvAcca / kathaM vacanamajJAnarUpaM pramANa mityAha-tadupacArataH tasya jJAnasyopacAro'tadrUpasyApi tadaGgatayA tadrUpatvena grahaNam / tata idamuktaM bhavati-- pratipAdyagatamutpazyamAnaM yajjJAnaM tadavyavahitakAraNatvAd vacanamapyupacAreNa pramANamityucyate / tatrAnumAnasya pArAyaM parairabhyupagatameva pratyakSasya na pratipadyante kiledaM zabdapravezazUnyaM svalakSaNagrAhIti naitadgocaraH parebhyaH pratipAdayituM pAryate / na ca zabdAt parasya svalakSaNagrahaNadakSaM pratyakSamunmakSyati, zabdasya vikalpotpAditatvena parasyApi vikalpotpAdakatvAt / sarvasmai hitamiti / asmin vAkye sarvANNo vA (si0 he07-1-43) iti hite'rthe nnprtyyH| vizvajanInatvAditi vizve ca te janAzca vizvajanAstebhyo hitaM vizvajanInam paJcasarvavizvAjjanAtkarmadhAraye (si0 he. 7-1-41) iti khaH, tasya inAdeze carUpam / kApathA iti / kuzabdasya pathi zabde 'pathyakSeSadarthe' ityAkAraH / // 6 // paraprayojanamAtratvAditi / parasya prayojanaM paraprayojanam, tadeva paraprayojanamAtram, mAtra kAtsnye'vadhAraNe iti vacanAta, avadhAraNArtho'tra mAtradhvaniH / yadyapi kasyacittathAvidyAbhyAsAd vacanamuccArayata: svayamapyarthapratipattirvAkyasya prayojanatvam, tathApyalpatvAnneha vivakSitamiti / vyavahitatvAditi / jJAnAntaraM hi vivakSA, sthAnakaraNAbhighAtAdinA

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I taduktam vikalpayonayaH zabdA vikalpAH zabdayonayaH / kAryakAraNatA teSAM nArthaM zabdAH spRzantyapi // 1 // iti // nirvikalpakaM ca pratyakSam, ato na zabdajanyamityato'numAnaM dRSTAntIkRtya pratyakSasyApi parArthatAM sAdhayitumAha pratyakSeNAnumAnena prasiddhArthaprakAzanAt / parasya tadupAyatvAtparArthatvaM dvayorapi // 11 // pratyakSeNApyanumAneneva prasiddhArthaprakAzanAt svapratItaprameyapratyAyakatvAta parArthatvaM pratipAdyaprayojanatvaM dvayorapi pratyakSAnumAnayoH, tulyakAraNatvAta , nAnumAnasyaivaikasyetyabhiprAyaH / iha cAzrUyamANatvAt tadarthagamanAcca apIvazabdau luptanirdiSTau draSTavyau / pratyakSapratItArthapratyAyanaM ca pratijAnAnasyAyamabhiprAyaHyata paro manyate, naitad gocaraM parebhyaH pratipAdayituM pAryata iti / tadayuktam, nirvikalpakAdhyakSApohena vyasasAyarUpasya pratyakSasya prAgeva sAdhitatvAta , tadgocarasya kathaMcid vikalpagamyatvena zabdapratipAdyatvAt / tadyathA anumAnapratIto'rthaH parasmai pratipAdyamAno vacanarUpApannaH parArthamanumAnam, tathA pratyakSapratIto'pi parArthaM pratyakSam, parapratyAyanasya tulyatvAd, vacanavyAparasyaiva bhedAta / tathA hi-anumAnapratItaM pratyAyayannavaM vacanayati--agniratra, dhUmAta, yatra yatra ghUmastatra tatrAgniH, yathA mahAnasAdau, vaidhahNa vA, agnyabhAve na kvaciddhUmaH, yathA jalAzayAdau, tathA dhUmo'yam, tasmAd dhUmAdagniroti / avyutpannavismRtasaMbandhayostathaiva pratipAdayituM zakyatvAta , smaryamANe saMbandhe punarevam-agniratra dhuumopptteH| vaidhahNa-agniratra, anyathA dhUmAnupapatteH / pratyakSapratItaM punardarzayannetAvakti-pazya rAjA gacchati, tatazca vacanAdvividhAdapi samagrasAmagrIkasya pratipAdyasyAnumeyapratyakSArthaviSayA yataH pratItirullasati, ato dvayorapi parArthatetyAha-parasya tadupAyatvAt pratipAdyasya pratIti prati pratipAdakasthapratyakSAnumAnanirItArthaprakAzanakAraNatvAdityarthaH / etena pUrvakArikoktopacAra. kAraNaM ca lakSayati / yaccoktam-na zabdAta parasya pratyakSotpattiH, tasya vikalpajanakatvAta, pratyakSasya svalakSaNaviSayatvena nirvikalpakatvAt / tadayuktam, sAmAnyavizeSAtmakArthaviSayasya nirNayarUpasya tasya kathaMcidekaviSayatA zabdotpAdyatvAvirodhAta , evaMvidhasya ca prAgeva samarthanAta / cakSurAdisAmagrItastadutpadyate na zabdAditi cet / anumAnamapi pratyakSAdinizcitAd hetoravismRtasaMbandhasya zabdotpattau parasaMtAne jJAnotpAdAditi / vikalpayonaya iti / vikalpI yoni: kAraNaM yeSAM tathA // 10 // pratipAdakasthetyAdi / pratipAdakasthaM pratyakSAnumAnanirNItArthasya prakAzyate'rthaH parebhyoneneti prakAzanaM vacanaM kAraNaM yasya parasya, tasya bhAvastattvaM tasmAt / eteneti / parapratIti prati vacanasyopAyatApradarzanena pUrvakArikokteti vAkyaM tadupacArataH iti /

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NYAYAVATARA" pramAturullasati, na zabdAta , atastasyApi parArthatA vizIryeta / samarthahetukathanAta tatra vacanasya parArthateti ceta , atrApi darzanayogyArthapratipAdanAditi bramaH / tanna pratyakSaparokSayoH pArArthyaM prati vizeSopalabdhiriti mucyatAM pakSapAtaH // 11 // tadevaM dvayorapi parArthatAM pratipAdya tatsvarUpamAha pratyakSapratipannArthapratipAdi ca ydvcH| pratyakSa pratibhAsasya nimittatvAttaducyate // 12 // yadvacaH pratyakSapratipannArthapratipAdi sAkSAtkArijJAnagocarakathanacaturaM tat pratyakSamucyata iti saMbaMdhaH / tacca pratyakSarUpamevocyamAnaM pratyakSaM, vipratipannaM prati punaranumAnadvAreNocyamAnamanumAnameveti / cazabdenAnekArthatvAd darzayati-vacanaM kutaH pratyakSam ityAha-pratibhAsasya nimittatvAt pratipAdyapratyakSaprakAzahetutvAd upacAreNocyata ityarthaH / / 12 / / anumAnamAha sAdhyAvinAbhuvo hetorvaco yatpratipArakam / parArthamanumAnaM tatpakSAdivacanAtmakam // 13 // hinoti gamayati arthamiti hetuH, tasya sAdhyAvinAbhuvaH prAnirUpitasya yadvaca: pratipAdaka saMdarzakaM tad anumAnaprakAzahetutvAt parArthamanumAnam / tata kIdRzamityAha-pakSo vakSyamANalakSaNaH sa AdiryeSAM hetudRSTAntopanayanigamanAdInAM tAni tathA, teSAM vacanAni pratipAdakA dhvanayaH, tAnyevAtmA svarUpaM yasya tata pakSAdivacanAtmakam / nanu ca hetupratipAdakaM vacaH parArthamanumAnamityabhidhAya tat pakSAdivacAnAtmakamiti vadataH pUrvAparavyAhatA vAcoyuktiH, naitadasti, evaM manyate naikaH prakAraH parArthAnumAnasya, kiM tahi yathA parasya sukhena prameyapratItirbhavati tathA yatnataH prtyaayniiyH| tatra dazAvayavaM sAdhanaM pratipAdanopAyaH / tadyathA- pakSAdayaH paJca, tacchaddhayazca / tatra yadA pratipAdyaprakramAdeva nirNItapakSo'vismRtadRSTAntaH smAryapratibandhagrAhakapramANo vyutpannamatitvAta zeSAvayavAbhyahanasamarthazca bhavati, yadvA atyantAbhyAsena parimitamatitvAt tAvataiva prastutaprameyamavabudhyate, tadA hetupratipAdanameva kriyate, zeSAbhidhAnasya zrotRsaMskArA tasyeti / pratyakSasya / ekaviSayatayeti / zabdena saheti zeSaH, ayamabhiprAyaH-sAmAnyavizeSAtmakaM vastu zabdvAnAM gocaraH, pratyakSamapi kathaMcit sAmAnyavizeSAtmakavastuviSayam, tataH sAmAnyavizeSAtmako'rthaH pratyakSapratipannaH parasmai pratipAdyamAnaH parArthapratyakSaM bhavati // 11 // tacceti / vacaH pratyakSarUpamiti / pazya mRgo yAti iti pratyakSarUpatayA pratipAdakatvAdaco'pi yathocyate // 12 // __ vAcoyuktiriti / pazyadvAgdizo harayuktidaNDe (si0 he0 3-2-32) iti SaSThayA aluksamAsaH / avismRtetyAdi / dRSTAntena smAryaH sa cAsau pratibandho vyAptizca tasya grAhakam, tacca tatpramANaM ca, tato na vismRtaM tad yasya sa tthaa| parikamitamatitvAditi /

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44 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I kAritayA nairarthakyAdityAdau hetupratipAdanaM sUtrakRtA parArthamanumAnamuktam / yadA tu pratipAdyasya nAdyApi pakSanirNayaH, tadA akANDa eva hetUpanyAso'dRSTamudgarapAtAyamAnaH syAditi pakSo'pi nirdizyate / tathAsmaryamANe pratibandhagrAhiNi pramANe dRSTAnto'pi vayeta, anyathA hetoH sAmarthyAnavagateH / smRte'pi pramANe dArTAntike yojayitumajAnAnasyopanayo darzyate; tathApi sAkAGkSasya nigamanamucyate, anyathA niraakulprstutaarthaasiddheH| tathA yatra pakSAdau svarUpavipratipattistatra tacchuddhiH pramANena kartavyA, itarathA teSAM svasAdhyAsAdhanAt / sarveSAM cAmISAM sAdhanAvayavatvam, pratipAdyapratItyupAyatvAt / nanu ca svanizcayavata paranizcayotpAdanaM parArthamanumAnamuktam, na ca svArthAnumAnakAle kramo'yamanubhUyate saMbandhavedino hetudarzanamAtrAta sAdhyapratItisiddheH, na hi pratipattA pakSaM kRtvA tato hetu nibhAlayati, nApi dRSTAntikaM viracayati, tathA pratIterabhAvAta, kiM cAnvayavyatirekAbhyAM hetoreva sAmarthya munnIyate, na pakSAdInAm, tadvyatirekeNApi sAdhyasiddheH tathApi teSAM sAdhanAMzatvakalpane'navasthAprasaGgAta / yadi ca tatsAmarthyaM syAt , tadA pakSopanyAsamAtrAdeva sAdhyAvagateH heturAnarthakyamaznuvIta, uttarAvayavAzca; evaM hi tatsAmarthya siddhayennAnyathA / tasmAdya eva paranirapekSaM sAdhyaM bodhayati sa eva hetuH sAdhanam, na pakSAdaya iti / atrocyate-svanizcayavata paranizcayotpAdanaM parArthamanumAnamuktamityAdi yadukta tadayuktam, kevalaM tadarthaM na jAnISe, nizcayApekSayaiva vatinA tulyatAvidhAnAta, na punaH sarvasAmAnyamabhipretam, anyathA dhvanimanuccArayan svArthAnumAne sAdhyamavabudhyate iti, tadanuccAraNena paranizcayotpAdanaM prasajyeta, na caitadasti, zabdAnuccAraNe parapratipAdanAsaMbhavAta, tadarthaM zabdAGgIkaraNe yena vinA parapratipAdanAsaMbhavaH tattadurarIkartavyam, samAnanyAyAta , na ca pakSAdivirahe pratipAdya vizeSaH pratipAdayitu zakyaH hetugocarAditatsAdhyArthapratItivikalatayA tasya sAkAGkSatvAta , tathA ca bubhutsitArthabodhAbhAvAdapratyAyita eva tiSTheta , atastadbodhanArtha pakSAdayo darzanIyAH, iti te'pi sAdhanAMzAH syuH / yaccoktam-anvayavyatirekAnukaraNAbhAvAnna sAdhanam, hetumAtrAdapi sAdhya siddheH, tadayuktam, avipratArakatAnizcitapuruSavacanamAtrAdapi agniratra ityAdirUpAt kvacitprameyo'rthaH sidhyatIti hetorapyasAdhanatAprasaGgAt, tadviraheNApi sAdhyasiddheH, yuktaM caitat, avipratArakavacanasya prAgeva prAmANyaprasAdhanAt / yaccoktam-yadyamISAM sAmarthyaM syAt, tadA pakSamAtrAdeva sAdhyapratIterhetorvaiyarthyaM syAditi, tadayuktataram, bhavatpakSe'pi samAnatvAt, tatrApi samarthahetUpanyAsAdeva sAdhyAvagateH, anyathA samarthatAyogAt / pazcAttasyaiva pramANena samarthanaM sarvatra gRhIta vyAptikasya ca punaH pakSarmiNyu parikarma saMjAtamasyA iti, tArakAderAkRtigaNatvAditapratyayaH, tataH parikamitA matiryasyeti vigrahaH / akANDe aprstaave| tatsAmarthyamiti / pakSAdInAM sAmarthyam / tatsAdhyetyAdi / teSAM pakSAdInAM sAdhyaH pratipAdyo yo'rthastasya pratItivikalatA, tayA kRtvA hetubhUtayA vA tasya

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NYAYAVA TARAH pasaMharaNamanarthakatA prApnuvataM kena nivAryata / tadabhAve hetoH sAmarthyaM nAvagamyate tena sArthakamiti ceta , pakSAdInapi virahayya pratipAdyavizeSaH pratipAdayitna pAryate iti teSAmapi sArthakatAM naM durupapAdeti mucyatAmAgrahaH / tasmAddhetUvata pakSAdayo'pi sAdhanam, hetorapi kvacita pratipAdye tadapekSatayA tannirapekSatA'siddheriti, tadidaM sakalamAkalayyokta tatpakSAdivacanAtmakamiti / / 13 / / tadevamarthataH pakSAdIn prastutya tAvat pakSalakSaNamAhasAdhyAbhyupagamaH pakSaH pratyakSAdyanirAkRtaH / tatprayogo'tra kartavyo hetorgocaradIpakaH // 14 // pacyata iti pakSaH, vyaktIkriyate iti bhAvaH / kibhata ityAha-sAdhyasya anumeyasya abhyupagamo'GgIkaraNam, prAznikAdInAM purataH pratijJAsvIkAra ityarthaH / kimabhyupagamamAtram ? netyAha-pratyakSAdyanirAkRtaH iti / pratyakSaM sAkSAtkAri saMvedanam, AdizabdAdanumAnasvavacanalokA gRhyante, tairanirAkRto'bAdhitaH pakSa iti saMbandhaH / tadyathA-sarvamanekAntAtmakam, asti sarvajJaH ityAdi vA, ayaM ca . kevalameSTavyo na punaH parArthAnumAnakAle vacanenAbhidhAtavyaH iti yo manyeta taM pratyAha-tasya pakSasya prayogo'bhidhAnamatra parArthAnumAnaprastAve kartavyo vidheyaH / kuta ityAha-hetoH prAnirUpitasya gocaradIpaka iti, nimittakAraNahetUSu sarvAsAM prAyo darzanam iti vacanAt, bhAvapradhAnatvAcca nirdezasya, viSayasaMdarzakatvAdityarthaH / ayamatrAbhiprAya:-na hi sarvatra prativAdinaH prakramAdeva nirNItapakSasya kUrcazobhApuraH saraM heturupanyasyate, api tu kvacit kathaMcit // 14 // - tato yadAdyApi pratipAdyaH pakSArthaM na jAnIte, tadA akANDe eva hetAvucyamAne viSayavyAmohAd bhrAntilakSaNo doSaH syAdityAha anyathA vAdyabhipretahetugocaramohinaH / pratyAyyasya bhaveddha tuviruddhArekito, yathA // 15 // pratipAdyasya sAkAGkSatvAt / pazcAttasyaiva pramANena samarthanamiti / yat sat tatsarva kSaNikamiti vyAptyAliGgitahetUpanyAsAnantaraM akSaNike kramayogapadyAbhyAmarthakriyAvirodhAditi bAdhakapramANena sattvAkhyahetoH samarthanam / punaH pakSadharmiNyupasaMharaNamiti / kRtakazca zabdha ityAdirUpam / tadapekSatayA pakSAdyapekSatayA // 13 // nahItyAdi / ayamabhiprAya:-kvApi nirNItapakSe prativAdini hetuH prayujyate, kvApya- . nirNatapakSe / tatra yadA nirNItapakSe prativAdini hetuH prayujyate, yadA nirarthakatvAt pakSopanyAso'smAbhinaM kriyate eva / dvitIye tu pakSe viSayadarzakatvena saphalatvAdavazyaM kArya eva / kUrcazobhAyAH puraHsaraM prathamam , yasmin hetAvupanyaste kUcaMzobhA saMpadyate, tattvato vailakSyAbhAvaH, sAvaSTambhatA bhavatIti yAvat, athavA kurcazobhA puraHsaraM yatreti, asmin pakSe ayamabhiprAyaH-yadA samyagbhUtaM kiMcid dvitvAdikaM pratipAdayitumArabhyate tadA tatpratipAdanAdAgapi kurcazobhA sAvaSTambhatA, zmazrUparAmarzanaM vA bhavatIti // 14 //

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 anyathA iti uktaviparItAzrayaNe pakSaprayogAkaraNe ityrthH| vAdino hetUpanyAsakarturabhipreto'bhimataH sa cAsau hetugocarazca vAdyabhipretahetugocaraH, tatra muhyati dolAyate tacchIlazca yaH, tasya pratyAyyasya prativAdino hetuH viruddhArekito bhaved virodhazaGkAkalaGkitaH syaadityrthH| tatazca samyagahetAvapi vipakSe evAyaM vartate iti vyAmohAd viruddhadUSaNamabhidadhIta, pakSopanyAsAttu nirNItahetugocarasya naiSa doSaH syAdityabhiprAyaH / amumevArthaM spaSTadRSTAntenAha yathA iti / tadupanyAsArthaH / / 15 / / dhAnuSkaguNasaMprekSijanasya prividhytH| dhAnuSkasya vinA lakSyanirdezena guraNetarau // 16 // yathA lakSyanirdezaM vinA dhAnuSkasyeSu prakSipato yau guNadoSau tau taddazijanasya viparyastAvapi pratibhAtaH, guNo'pi doSatayA doSo'pi vA guNatayA, tathA pakSanirdezaM vinA hetumupanyasyato vAdino yau svAbhipretasAdhyasAdhanasamarthatvAsamarthatvalakSaNI guNadoSau tau prAznikaprativAdyAdInAM viparItAvapi pratibhAta iti bhAvArthaH / akSarArthastu dhanuSA carati dhAnuSkastasya guNo lakSyavedhaprAvINyalakSaNastatra prekSakANAM kutUhalamiti tasyaivopAdAnam, anyathA doSo'pi dRSTavyaH, tatsaMprekSijanasya tatsaMprekSaNazIlalokasya parividhyato yathAkathaMcid vANaM muJcata ityarthaH, dhAnuSkasya vinA lakSyanirdezena cApadharasya vedhyaniSTaGkanamRte yau guNetarau guNadoSau tau yathA viruddhArekitau bhavataH, tathA vAdino'pItyarthaH / tasmAdavijJAtatadarthe prativAdini vAdidhAnuSkeNa pakSalakSyaM nirdezyaiva hetuzaraH prayoktavya iti sthitam / / 16 // sAMprataM hetorlakSaNAvasaraH, tacca svArthAnumAnavad nivizeSaM draSTavyam, prayogastu tatra na darzitaH, svArthAnumAnasya bodharUpatvAt, iha tu darzanIyaH, parArthAnumAnasya vacanarUpatvAta , atastaM darzayati hetostathopapatyA vA syAtprayogo'nyathApi vaa| dvividho'nyatareNApi sAdhyasiddhirbhavediti // 17 // svArthAnumAnaprastAve hi parapraNItalakSaNAntaravyapohena sAdhyavyatirekAta sAmastyena hetorvyAvRttirevaikaM lakSaNamiti nirNItam, parArthAnumAne'pi tadeva prakAzanIyam, vacanaracanA tu kvacita kathaMcita pravartata ityabhiprAyavAMstavaividhyamAha hetodvividhaH prayogaH syAditi saMbandhaH / kathamityAha-tathaiva sAdhyasadbhAve viruddhadUSaNamabhivadhIteti / yat kRtakaM tadanityam, yathA ghaTaH, kRtakazca zabda ityukte hi yadyapi nityatve sAdhye kRtakatvamatra hetUkRtam, kRtakatvAnityAtvayozca vyAptirdazitetyevaM viruddhatAmabhidadhyAditi bhAvaH / / 15 / / dhanuSA caratIti / asmin vAkye tena iti sUtreNa caratyarthe Thak / itku ika iti bAdhanArtha ko zazcAtta'ddorisusaH ityanena kAdezaH / avijJAtatadartha iti / aviditapakSArthe // 16 //

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NYAYTVATARAH evopapattividyamAnatA, tayA tathopapattyA, yathA-agniratra, dhUmasya tathaivopapatteriti / anyathApi vA ityanena avayave samudAyopacArAdanyathAnupapatti lakSayati / anyathA sAdhyavyatireke anupapattiravidyamAnataiva tayA vA anyathAnupapattyA hetoH prayogaH syAta, yathA-agniratra, dhUmasyAnyathAnupapatteriti / ete ca dve apyekasmin sAdhye prayoktavye iti yo manyeta, tacchiSyaNArthamAha-anyatareNApi tathopapattiprayogeNa anyathAnupapattiprayogeNa vA sAdhyasya sAdhyapratipipAdayiSitArthasya siddhiniSpattiH pratipAdyapratItAvArohaNaM bhaved, iti yasmAta , tasmAnna dve api prayoktavye, prayogadvaye'pi yasmAd vacanaracanA bhidyate nArthaH, prayogasya ca sAdhyasAdhanaphalam, taccedekenaiva sidhyati, dvitIyaprayogaH kevalaM vakturakauzalamAcakSIta, nairarthakyAdityabhiprAyaH / / 17 / / adhunA dRSTAntalakSaNAvasaraH / sa ca dvedhA sAdharmyaNa c| tatra sAdharmyadRSTAntamadhikRtyAha sAdhyasAdhanayoAptiryatra nizcIyatetarAm / sAdhapUraNa sa dRSTAntaH sNbndhsmrnnaanmtH||18|| dRSTayoravalokitayoH sAmarthyAt sAdhyasAdhanayoH antaHpariniSThitiH anvayAd vyatirekAdvA sAdhyasAdhanabhAvavyavasthitinibandhanA yasminniti dRSTAntaH, samAno dharmo'syeti sadharmA tadbhAvaH sAdharmya tena sAdhamryeNa / sa kiMvidho bhavatItyAha-sAdhyaM jijJAsitArthAtmakam, sAdhanaM tadgamako hetuH, tayoH sAdhyasAdhanayoAptiH, idamanena vinA na bhavati ityevaMrUpA, yatra kvacinizcIyatetarAM atizayena nirNIyate sa sAdharmyadRSTAntaH / yathA-agniratra, dhUmasya tathaivopapatteH mahAnasAdivad iti / ayaM cAvismRtapratibandhe prativAdini na prayoktavya ityAha-saMvandhasmaraNAt iti / yablope paJcamI, prAggRhItavismRtasaMbandhasmaraNamadhikRtya yato'bhipreto'yaM nItividAm, naanythaa| yadA hi pratipAdyo'dyApi saMbandhaM sAdhyAvinAbhAvitvalakSaNaM nAvabudhyate; tadA pramANena saMbandho grAhaNIyaH, na dRSTAntamAtreNa, na hi sahadarzanAdeva kvacitsarvatredamamunA vinA na bhavatIti sidhyati, atiprasaGgAt / gRhIte ca pratibandhe smaryamANe kevalaM heturdarzanIyaH, tAvataiva bubhutsitArthasiddherdaSTAnto na vAcyaH, vaiyarthyAt / yadA tu gRhIto'pi vismRtaH kathaMcita saMbandhaH, tadA tatsmaraNArtha dRSTAntaH kathyate / nanu ca kathaM trikAlasamastadezavyApisaMbandhAvagatiH ? na tAvanirNayAtmakamapi pratyakSaM dezakAlAntarasaMcariSNunoH sAdhyasAdhanayoH saMbandhaM nirIkSitu kSamate, saMnihIte'rthe vizadAdhyavasAyena pravRtteH / nApi zabdAttannirNayaH tasya paropadezarUpatayA svArthAnumAnAbhAvaprasaGgAta , tatra paropadezAbhAvAt, tadabhAve saMbandhAsiddhaH, kvaciditi / pratipAdyavizeSe // 17 // sAdhyasAdhanayorityAdi / anvayena vyatirekeNa vA sAdhyasAdhanabhAvasya idamasya sAdhyamidamasya sAdhanamiti saMbandhasya vyavasthA nibandhanaM yasyAH pariniSThiteH sA tathoktA /

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48 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I tdsiddhaavnumaanaanutthaanaaditi| anumAnAtsaMbandhagrahaNe niravadhiranavasthAnuSajyeta, saMbandhagrAhiNo'pyanumAnasya punaH saMbandhAntaragrahaNasavyapekSatvAditi / atrocyatepratyakSAnumAne dve eva pramANe iti yeSAM mithyAbhinivezaH, teSAmeSa doSo nAsmAkam, anvayavyatirekagrAhipratyakSAnupalambhottarakAlabhAvino'vyabhicaritatrikAlavyApigocarasya matinibandhanasyohasaMjJitasya pramANAntarasya saMbandhagrAhitayeSTatvAta, tadaniSTau dRSTavyavahAravilopaprasaGgAta , tadvilope ca vicArAnarthakyaprApteriti / atra prakaraNe punaranumAnAt pArthakyenoho na darzitaH, saMkSiptarUcisattvAnugrahapravRttatvAdasya, zAbdaM tu pRthak samathitam; tasyAtraiva parArthAnumAnopayogitvAdityAstAM tAvat // 18 // idAnIM vaidharmyadRSTAntamupadarzanannAha sAdhye nivartamAne tu saadhnsyaapysNbhvH| khyApyate yatra dRSTAnte vaidhayeraNeti sa smRtaH // 16 // visadRzo dharmo'syeti vidharmA, tadbhAvo vaidharmyam, tena vaidhahNa dRSTAntaH / kIdRza ityAha-sAdhye gamye nivartamAne asaMbhavati, tuzabdo'vadhAraNArtho bhinnakramaH, sa ca sAdhanasyAsaMbhava evetyatra draSTavyaH / khyApyate pratipAdyate yatra kvacit dRSTAnte sa vaidhapeNa bhavati, itizabdena saMbandhasmaraNAditi // 19 // idamatrApi saMbadhnAti-asyApi smaryamANe saMvandhe prayogAyogAditi kimarthaM vismRtasaMbandhe eva prativAdini dRSTAntaH prayujyate nAnyadA, iti paravacanAvakAzamAzajhyAha antarvyAptyeva sAdhyasya siddharbahirudahRtiH / vyarthA syAttadasadbhAve'pyevaM nyAyavido viduH // 20 // anyadA hi smaryamANe vA saMbandhe prayujyeta, agRhIte vA / yadyAdyaH pakSaH, so'yuktaH, yadA sarvatra sAdhyAvinAbhAvinaM hetu smarati pratipAdyaH, tadA pakSe'pi tamavabudhya kathaM sAdhyaM na pratipadyata ? tatazcAntaH pakSamadhye vyAptiH sAdhanasya sAdhyAkrAntatvamantAptiH, tayaiva sAdhyastha gamyasya siddheH pratIteH vahirvivakSitadharmiNo'nyatra dRSTAntarmiNyudAhRtiH vyAptidarzanarUpA vyarthI niSprayojanA, tatpratyAyyArthAbhAvAditi / dvitIyapakSasyApi nirdoSatAM nirasyannAha-tadasadbhAve'pyevam saMbandhAgrahaNAdantAptyabhAve'pyevamiti vyarthaiva bahirudAhRtiH, na hi sahadarzanAt kvacit sarvatra tadrUpatA sidhyati, vyabhicAradarzanAt / tasmAdagRhItasaMbandhe pratipAce pramANena pratibandhaH sAdhyaH, tatsiddhau tata eva sAdhyasiddharakiMcitkarI sadharmeti / dharmAdan kevalAt iti bahuvrIhI dharmazabdAdana samAsAntaH / tanirNayaH saMbandhanirNayaH / tasyetyAdi / zabdasya paropadezarUpatayA kRtvA zabdajanyajJAnasya svArthAnumAnatvaM bhavatItyAha-tatretyAdi / tatra svArthAnumAne // 18 // vidharmeti / pUrvavadan / / 16 / / anyavAhIti / saMbandhavismaraNabhAve // 20 //

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NYAYAVATARAH dRSTAntodAhRtiriti nyAyavidvAMso viduravabudhyanta iti / iha ca prakaraNe zeSAvayavAnAmupanayanigamanazuddhipaJcakalakSaNAnAM saMkSipta ruci sattvAnugrahaparatvAdasya yadyapi sAkSAllakSaNaM noktam, tathApyata eva pratipAditAvayavatrayAd buddhimadbhirunneyam ; yato'vayavApekSayA jaghanyamadhyamotkRSTAstisraH kathA bhavanti / tatra hetu pratipAdanamAtraM jaghanyA / dvayAdyavayavanivedanaM madhyamA / saMpUrNadazAvayavakathanamutkRSTA / tatreha madhyamAyAH sAkSAt kathanena jaghanyotkRSTe arthataH sUcayati, tatsadbhAvasya pramANasiddhatvAditi // 20 // evaM pakSAdilakSaNaM pratipAdyedAnIM heyajJAne satyupAdeyaM viviktataraM vedyate iti tadvadastAH pakSahetudRSTAntAbhAsA vaktavyAH / tatra tAvat pakSalakSaNavyudastAn pakSAbhAsAnAha pratipAdyasya yaH siddhaH pakSAbhAso'sti liGgataH / lokasvavacanAbhyAM ca vAdhito'nekadhA mataH // 21 // pakSasthAnopanyastatvAt tatkAryAkaraNatvAcca pakSavadAbhAsata iti pakSabhAsaH / asAvanekadhA aneka prakAro mata iti saMbandhaH / kathamityAha - pratipAdyasya prativAdino yaH kazcit siddhaH pratItAvArUDha eva sa pakSAbhAsaH, sAdhyasyaiva pakSatvAt, siddhasya sAdhanAnarhatvAd, pratiprasakta eH / tathA akSaliGgato'dhyakSahetubhyAM lokasvavacanAbhyAM ca bAdhitastiraskRto yaH sa pakSAbhAsaH / tatra pratipAdyasiddho yathApaudgaliko ghaTaH, saugataM vA prati sarvaM kSaNikamityAdi / pratyakSavAdhito yathAniraMzAni svalakSaNAni, parasparaviviktau vA sAmAnyavizeSAviti / anumAnabAdhito yathA - nAsti sarvajJa iti / lokabAdhito yathA--gamyA mAtA iti / svavacanabAdhito yathA- na santi sarve bhAvA iti // 21 // 49 sAMprataM hetulakSaNaM smArayan tadapAstAn hetvAbhAsAnAhaanyathAnupapannatvaM hetorlakSaNamIritam / tadapratIti saMdehaviparyAsaMstadAbhatA // 22 // hetorlakSaNamasAdhAraNadharmarUpaM yadIritaM gamitam, anekArthatvAd dhAtoH pratipAditaM, svArthAnumAnaprastAve yadutAnyathAnupapannatvamiti, tasyApratItiranadhyavasAyaH, tadvadastA iti / padmAdilakSaNa rahitAH / adhyakSahetubhyAmiti / hetu liGga, kAraNe kAryopacArAt; tatprabhavaM jJAnamapi heturanumAnamityarthaH / anumAnabAdhita iti / tacca kvacidasarvajJe sarvajJazabdo mukhya sarvajJApekSaH, gauNatvAt mANavake'gnizabdavat yadvA jJAnatAratamyaM kvacidvizrAntam, tAratamyatvAt zrAkAzaparimANatAratamyavat yatratadvizrAntaM sa sarvajJaH / tathA sadasadvargaH kasyacidekajJAnAlambanaH zranekatvAt paJcAGgulavat / tathA kazcidAtmA sarvArtha sAkSAtkArI, tadgrahaNasvabhAvatve sati prakSINa pratibandhakatvAt yathA apagatatimirAdipratibandhaM cakSurjJAnaM rUpasAkSAtkAri / evaM jJAnaM kvacidAtmani prakarSavat, svAvaraNahAnyutkarSe sati prakAzAtmakatvAt cakSurdIpAdivat, svAvaraNahAnyutkarSastu zrAvaraNahAniH kvacijjIve parakASThA prAptA, prakarSatvAt parimANa vadityanumAnAt // 21 // 4

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50 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 saMdeho dolAyamAnatA, viparyAso vaiparItyanirNayaH, apratItizca saMdehazca viparyAsazceti dvandvaH, pazcAt tadA saha tatpuruSaH taistadapratItisaMdehaviparyAsaH, tadAbhatA AbhAnamAbhA tasyeva samyagahetorivAbhA asyeti tadAbhastadbhAvaH tattA, hetvAbhAsatA bhavatItyartha / / 22 / / adhunA yena lakSaNena yannAmA hetvAbhAso bhavati taddarzayati prasiddhastvapratIto yo yo'nyathaivopapadyate / viruddho yo'nyathApyatra yukto'nakAntikaH sa tu // 23 // yaH kazcidapratItaH pratItyA agocarIkRto'nizcitaH so'siddhanAmA hetvAbhAsaH / tuzabdaH trayasyApi bhedoddyotakaH / yastvanyathaiva sAdhyaM vinaiva, vipakSa eveti yAvata , upapadyate saMbhavati sa viruddhAbhidhAnaH / yaH punaranyathA'pi sAdhyaviparyayeNApi yukto ghaTamAnakaH, apizabdAt sAdhyenApi, so'tra vyatikare anekAntikasaMjJo jJAtavya iti / tatra pratiprANiprasiddhapramANapratiSThitAnekAntaviruddhabuddhibhiH kaNabhakSAkSapAdabuddhAdiziSyakairupanyasyamAnAH sarva eva hetavaH, tadyathA-ekAntena anityaH zabdo nityo vA, sattvAta , utpattimattvAt, kRtakatvAt, pratyabhijJAyamAnatvAt-ityAdayo vivakSayAsiddhaviruddhAnakAntikatAM svIkurvanti ityavagantavyam / tathA hi-anityakAnte tAvadasiddhAH sarva eva hetavaH, cAkSuSatvavat teSAM dhvanAvavidyamAnatvAta asadAdivyavacchedenAlIkasaMvati vikalpitatvAt, pAramArthikatve tvekasyAnekarUpApattyAnekAntavAdApatteH, kalpanAracitasattAkAnAM ca sarvazaktiviraharUpatayA niHsvabhAvatvAta , tathApi teSAM sAdhanatve sAdhyamapi niHsvabhAvamiti kharaviSANaM zazaviSANasya sAdhanamApadyata iti zobhanaH sAdhyasAdhanavyavahAraH / sarva evAyamanumAnAnumeyavyavahAro buddhayArUDhena dharmadharminyAyena na bahiH sadasattvamapekSate, tenAyamadoSa iti cet, evaM tarhi cAkSuSatvamapi zabde tasyetyAdi / tasyAnyathAnupapannatvasya / ihAyaM bhAvArtha:--vidyamAne hetovanyathAnupannatvasya saMdehe anaikAntikatA, viparyAse viruddhatA, tasmAt pArizeSyAt atra hetorasattAyAM saMdehe vAnyathAnupapannatvasyApratItiH / tathA cAsiddhatvalakSaNamanyatra-asatsattAnizcayo'prasiddha iti asantau sattAnizcayo yasmeti vigrahaH, ata evAnetanakArikAyAM sUtrakAro'pi vakSyatiprasiddhastvapratIto ya iti / dolAyamAnateti / dolo'ndolakaH, ubhayapakSagAmitvena tadvadAcaran saMdeho'pi dolAyamAnastasya bhAvaH tattA // 22 // vyatikare iti / prstaave| kaNabhakSetyAdi / karaNabhakSakaH kaNAdAparanAmA vaizeSika:, prakSapAdo naiyAyikAnAmAdyAcAryavaryaH, buddhaH sugataH, prAdizabdAt sAMkhyAdiparigrahaH, teSAM kutsitA alpA vA ziSyA: ziSyakAH prazastapAdoddayotakaradharmakIrtIzvarakRSNAdayastaiH / sattvAvityAdi / yathAsaMbhavaM nityAnityatvayoramI hetavo yojyAH / tathA hi ---sattvaM svAbhiprAyeNAnityatve ca sAdhye hetuH, utpattimattvaM kRtakatvaM cAnityatve eva, pratyabhijJAyamAnatvaM tu nityatve eveti / asavAdIti / prAdizabdAdanutpannatvAdiparigrahaH / anirUpitatattvArthA pratItiH sNvRtirmtaa| sA ca yadyapi sarvApi alIkaiva, tathApi alIketi svarUpavizeSaNam /

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NYAYAVATARAN 51 buddhayAdhyAropya hetutayocyamAnaM nAsiddhatayodbhAvanIyam, vizeSAbhAvAt / acAkSuSatvavyacchedena cAkSuSatvaM buddhayAdhyAropayituM pAryate, na yathA kathaMcit, na cAso zaddhe'sti, acakSuAhyatvAt tasya, tenAyamadoSa iti cet, ko'yamacAkSuSatvavyavacchedo nAma, vyavacchedamAtraM nIrUpaM vyavacchinnaM vA svalakSaNaM, vyavacchedikA vA buddhiH svAMzamagnApi bahirvastugrahaNarUpatayA plavamAnA, nAparo vastudharmo yatra bhedAbhedavikalpadvAreNa dUSaNaM ditsurbhavAniti cet, tarhi sa zaddhe nAsti iti kaiSA bhASA, evaM hi nabhaHpuNDarIkaM tatra nAstIti sattvAdikamapi kalpayituM na zakyamiti prasajyeta / kiM c| te sAdhanadharmA dharmiNi bhavanto'pi na bhavadarzane pratItimArohanti, pratyakSasya vikalpavikalatayA dharmanirNayazUnyatvAt, taduttarakAlabhAvinyA vAsanAvodhajanyAyA vikalpabuddheH svAMzagrahaNaparyavasitazarIratvena bahiH svalakSaNe pravezAbhAvAt, tatazcApratItatvAt sarvasyAsiddhatvam / nityakAnte'pi dharmiNo'tyantavyatiriktAnAmapAramAthikAnAM vA svasAdhanadharmANAM pramANenApratItatvAdasiddhatA draSTavyA, dharmiNo'vini ThitarUpANAM pAramArthikAnAM sakaladharmANAM pratyakSAdipramANaprasidvatvena nihnotumazakyatvAditi / tathA viruddhatApi pakSadvaye'pi sarvasAdhanadharmANAmunneyA, anekAntapratibaddhasvabhAvatvena tatsAdhanapravaNatvAt / etaccottare vakSyAmaH / evaM pakSadvaye'pi nirdizyamAnAH sarva eva hetavo'naikAntikatAmAtmasAtkurvanti, parasparaviruddhAvyabhicAritatvAt, samAnayuktyupanyAsena vipakSe'pi darzayituM zakyatvAt / tathA hi-anityavAdI nityavAdinaM prati pramANayati-sarva kSaNikam, sattvAt, akSaNike kramayogapadyAbhyAmarthakriyAvirodhAt, arthakriyAkAritvasya ca bhAvalakSaNatvAt, tato'rthakriyA vyAvartamAnA svakroDIkRtAM sattAM vyAvartayeditikSaNikatvasiddhiH / na hi nityo'rtho'rthakriyAyAM krameNa pravartitumutsahate, pUrvArthakriyAkaraNasvabhAvopamardadvAreNottarakriyAyAM pravRtteH, anyathA pUrvArthakriyAkAraNAvirAmaprasaGgAt, tatsvabhAvapracyave ca nityatA apayAti, atAdavasthyasyAnityalakSaNatvAt / nityo'pi kramavartinaM sahakArikAraNamarthamudIkSamANastAvadAsIt, pazcAt yathA--ekAntasukhadA muktiriti / asAviti acAkSuSatvapavacchedaH / vyavacchedamAtramityAdi / amunA vikalpatrayeNa cecchabdaparyantena jaina eva bauddhAbhiprAyamAzaGkate / nIrUpaM tuccham / svalakSaNaM ghaTAdi / ayaM ghaTAdiracAkSuSo na bhavati, iti ghaTAdikamacAkSuSebhyo vyavacchedayantI vikalpikA buddhiH svAMzamagnApi sarvacittacattAnAmAtmasaMvedanamiti svajJAnAdvA grAhikApi vastuno vastuni vikalpAnAmasaMbhavaH, tathApi anubhavAdijanyatvena bahirartha grAhakatayA svalakSaNajalasyopari trntii| sa iti / trividho'pi acAkSuSatvavyavacchedaH / kaiSA bhASeti / kima AkSepakatvAt akicitkArItyarthaH / akiMcitkaratvamevAtiprasaGgadvAreNa vyanakti-evaM hotyAdi / yathA gaganendIvaraM zabde nAstIti sattvAdikamapi tatra mA bhUditi na kiMcit / evaM tuccha vyavachedamAtra sarvathA bhinnaM sva nakSaNaM vastvasaMsparzinI vikalpabuddhizca zabde nAstIti cAkSuSatvamapi tatra na ityapyasArameveti bhAvaH / nityaikAnta ityAdi / dharmiNo'tyantavyatiriktAnAmiti naiyAyikavaizeSikAbhiprAyeNa / apAramArthikAnAM veti advaitavAdyabhiprAyeNa / tato'rthakriyA vyAvartamAnetyAdi / akSaNikAkramayogapadyanivRttyArthakriyAkAritvaM vartamAnaM satsvavyAptaM

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52 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 tamAsAdya krameNa kArya kuryAditi ceta, na, sahakArikAraNasya nitye'kiMcitakaratvAta, akiMcitkarasyApi pratIkSaNe'navasthAprasaGgAt / nApi yaugapadyena nityo'rtho'rthakriyAM kurute, adhyakSavirodhAt / na hyekakAlaM sakalAH kriyAHprArabhamANaH kazcidupalabhyate, karotu vA, tathApyAdyakSaNe eva sakalakriyAparisamAptedvitIyAdikSaNeSvakurvANasyAnityatA balAdADhaukate, karaNAkaraNayorekasmin viruddhatvAditi / nityavAdI punarevaM pramANayati-sarvaM nityam, sattvAt, kSaNike sadasatkAlayorarthakriyAvirodhAt, tallakSaNaM sattvaM nAvasthAM badhnAtIti tato nivartamAnamananyazaraNatayA nityatvaM sAdhayati / tathA hi-kSaNiko'rthaH sad vA kAryaM kuryAt, asad vA, gatyantarAbhAvAt / na tAvadAdyaH pakSaH, samasamayavartini vyApArAyogAt, sakalabhAvAnAM parasparaM kAryakaraNabhAvaprAptyAtiprasaGgAcca / nApi dvitIyaH pakSaH kSodaM kSamate, asataH kAryakaraNazaktivikalatvAt, anyathA zazaviSANAdayo'pi kAryakaraNAyotsaherana, vizeSA. bhAvAditi / tadevamekAntadvaye'pi ye ye hetavaste te yukta : samAnatayA viruddhaM na vyabhicaranti, avicAritaramaNIyatayA mugdhajanadhyAndhyaM cotpAdayantIti viruddhA vyabhicAriNo'naikAntikAH, sarvavastudharmANAM vastuto'nekAntapratibaddhatvAditi / tasmAdamI sarva eva hetavaH santo'nekAntamantareNa nopapadyante, iti tameva pratipAdayitumIzate / vimUDhabuddhibhiH punaH vipakSasAdhanArthamupanyasyamAnA vivakSayAsiddhaviruddhAnaikAntikatAmAbibhratIti sthitam / / 23 / / tadevaM hetvAbhAsAn pratipAdya dRSTAntalakSaNavyudastAn dRSTAntAbhAsAnAha-- sAdhapheraNAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritAH / apalakSaraNa hetUtthAH sAdhyAdivikalAdayaH // 24 // sAdhanaM sAdhyAkrAntamupadarzayitumabhipretaM yasmistat sAdharmyam tena, atra vyatikare, duSyanta iti doSAH dRSTAntA eva doSAH dRSTAntadoSAH, dRSTAntAbhAsA ityarthaH, nyAyavidIritA vidvadbhirgaditAH / sAdhyaM gamyam, AdizabdAt sAdhanobhayaparigrahaH, tadvikalAstacchanyAH, AdizabdAt saMdigdhasAdhyasAdhanobhayadharmA gRhyante / kiMbhUtA ete ityAha-apagataM lakSaNaM yebhyaste tathA ca te hetavazca tebhya utthAnaM yeSAM te'palakSaNahetUtthAH / idaM ca prAyikaM vizeSaNam, samyaghetAvapi vaktRdoSavazAt dRssttaantaabhaastopptteH| yathA-nityAnityaH zabdaH, zrAvaNatvAt ghaTavadityAdi / tatra sAdhya vikalo yathA-bhrAntamanumAnam, pramANatvAt, pratyakSavat / pratyakSasya sattvaM nivartayati / nanu cArthakriyAsAmarthya meva sattvaM nAnyat, tathA ca jJAnazrI:-"yadi nAma pratidarzanaM sattvabhedastathA'pIhArthakriyAsAmarthyameva sattvamabhipretamiti," tatazcArthakriyAsAmarthyatvayorghaTakumbhayoriva vyAvRttikRtasya bhedasyAbhAvAt kathaM vyApyavyApakabhAvaH / ucyate, kAraNasya kAryAtprAgbhAvitvamarthakriyAsAmarthya bhavanadharmakatvamAtraM tu sattvamiti vyakto vyAvRttikRto bhedaH / yattUktam-arthakriyAsAmarthya meva sattvamiti, tadarthakriyAsAmarthya vyabhicAritvAt sattvasyeti / / 23 // saMdigdhasAdhyadharmeti / saMdigdhazcAsau sAdhyazca saMdigdhasAdhyaH saMdigdhasAdhyo dharmo

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NYAYAVATARAH bhrAntatAvikalatvAt, tadbhrAntatve sakalavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAt, taducchede ca pramANaprameyAbhAvAt na kiMcit kenacit sAdhyata iti bhrAntavAdino mUkatAmApadyeta / sAdhana vikalo yathA-jAgratsaMvedanaM bhrAntam, pramANatvAt svapnasaMvedanavat / svapnasaMvedanasya pramANatAvaikalyAt tatpratyanIkajAgratpratyayopanipAtabAdhitatvAditi / ubhayavikalo yathA-nAsti sarvajJaH, pratyakSAdyanupalabdhatvAt, ghaTavat / ghaTasya sattvAt pratyakSAdibhirupalabdhatvAcca / saMdigdhasAdhyadharmo yathAvItarAgo'yam, maraNadharmatvAt rathyApuruSavat / rathyApuruSe vItarAgatvasya saMdigdhatvAt, viziSTacetodharmANAM viziSTavyAhArAdiliGgagamyatvAt rathyApuruSe tnnirnnysyaapybhaavaaditi| saMdigdhasAdhanadharmo yathA-maraNadharmAyaM puruSaH, rAgAdimattvAt, rathyApuruSavat / rathyApuruSe rAgAdimattvasya saMdigdhatvAta, vItarAgasyApi tathA sNbhvaaditi| saMdigdhobhayadharmo yathA-asarvajJo'yam, rAgAdimattvAt, rathyApuruSavat / rathyApuruSe pradarzitanyAyenobhayasyApi sNdigdhtvaaditi| nanu ca parairanyadapi dRSTAntAbhAsatrayamuktam, tadyathA--ananvayo'pradarzitAnvayo viparItAnvayazceti / tatrAnanvayo yathA-rAgAdimAn vivakSitaH puruSaH, vaktRtvAd, iSTapuruSavaditi / yadyapi kileSTapuruSe rAgAdimattvaM vaktRtvaM ca sAdhyasAdhanadhamauM dRSTau, tathApi yo yo vaktA sa sa rAgAdimAniti vyAptyasiddherananvayo'yaM dRSTAntaH / tathA aprazitAnvayo yathA--anitya : zabdaH, kRtakatvAt, ghttvditi| atra yadyapi vAstavo'nvayo'sti, tathApi vAdinA vacanena na prakAzita ityapradarzitAnvayo dRSTAntaH / viparItAnvayo yathA-anityaH zabdaH, kRtakatvAditi hetumabhidhAya yadanityaM tat kRtakaM ghaTavaditi / viparItavyAptidarzanAt viparItAnvayaH / sAdharmyaprayoge hi sAdhanaM sAdhyAkrAntamupadarzanIyam, iha tu vipryaasdrshnaadvipriittaa| tadetad bhavadbhiH kasmAnnoktamiti atrocyate, pareSAM na suparyAlocitametad dRSTAntAbhAsatrayAbhidhAnamiti jJApanArtham / tathA hi-na tAvadananvayo dRSTAntAbhAso bhavitumarhati / yadi hi dRSTAntabalena vyAptiH sAdhyasAdhanayoH pratipAdyeta, tataH syAdananvayo dRSTAntAbhAsaH, svakAryAkaraNAt, yadA tu pUrvapravRttasaMbandhagrAhipramANagocarasmaraNasaMpAdanArtha dRSTAntodAhatiriti sthitama, tadAnanvayalakSaNo na dRSTAntasya doSaH, kiM tarhi hetoreva, pratibandhasyAdyApi pramANenApratiSThitatvAt, pratibandhAbhAve cAnvayAsiddheH / na ca hetudoSo'pi dRSTAnte vAcyaH, atiprasaGgAditi / tathA apradarzitAnvayaviparItAnyAvapi na dRSTAntAbhAsatAM svIkurutaH, anvayApradarzanasya viparyastAnvayapradarzanasya ca vaktRdoSatvAt, taddoSadvAreNApi dRSTAntAbhAsapratipAdane tadiyattA vizIryeta, vaktRdoSANAmAnatyAt / vaktRdoSatve'pi parArthAnumAne tatkauzalamapekSate iti / evaM copanyAse na yasyeti bahuvrIhiH, na punaH saMdigdhaH sAdhyo dharmo yasyeti saMdigdhaH sAdhyadharmo yasyeti vA, dharmAdan vA kevalAt ityanena kevalAtpadAtparo ya : kevalo dharmazabdaH tasmAdano vidhAnAt / evaM saMdigdhasAdhanadharmAdiSvapi vAcyam / vyAhArAdIti / prAdizabdAcceSTAkAraparigrahaH / tannirNayasyeti / viziSTa vyApArAdiliGganizcayasyetyarthaH // 24 //

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I bubhutsitArthasAdhakau ato dRSTAntAbhAsAvetAviti cet, evaM tarhi karaNApATavAdayo'pi dRSTAntAbhAsA vAcyAH / tathA hi-karaNapATavavyatirekeNApi na parapratyAyanaM samasti vispaSTavarNAgrahaNe vyaktatayA tadarthAvagamAbhAvAdityAstAM tAvat / / 24 / / tadevaM sAdharmyeNa dRSTAntAbhAsAn pratipAdya vaidharmyeNAha - 54 vaidharmyeNAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritAH / sAdhyasAdhanayugmAnAmanivRttezca saMzayAt // 25 // sAdhyAbhAvaH sAdhanAbhAvavyAptau darzayitumabhipreto yasmin tad vaidharmyam, tenAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritA iti dattArtham / sAdhyasAdhanayugmAnAM gamyagamakobhayAnAM granivRttera nivartanAt ca zabdasya vyavahitaprayogatvAt saMzayAcca, nivRttisaMdehAccetyarthaH / tadanena SaDdRSTAntAbhAsAH sUcitAH / tadyathA-- 1, sAdhyAvyatirekI; 2, sAdhanAvyatirekI; 3, sAdhyasAdhanAvyatirekI; tathA 4, saMdigdhasAdhyavyatirekaH ; 5, saMdigdhasAdhanavyadireka: ; 6, saMdigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatirekazceti / tatra sAdhyavyatirekI yathA - bhrAntamanumAnaM pramANatvAd iti / atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaH - yat punarbhrAntaM na bhavati na tat pramANam, tadyathA - svapnajJAnamiti, svapnajJAnAd bhrAntatAnivRtteH sAdhyAvyatirekitvamiti / sAdhanAvyatirekI yathA-- nirvikalpakaM pratyakSaM pramANatvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaHyat punaH savikalpakaM na tat pramANam, tadyathAnumAnam, anumAnAt pramANatAnivRtteH sAdhanAvyatirekitvam / ubhayAvyatirekI yathA - nityAnityaH zabdaH sattvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaH-- yaH punarna nityAnityaH sa na san, tadyathA ghaTaH, ghaTAdubhayasyApyavyAvRtterubhayAvyatirekitvamiti / tathA saMdigdhasAdhyavyatireko yathA - asarvajJA anAptA vA kapilAdayaH AryasatyacatuSTayApratipAdakatvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaH - yaH punaH sarvajJa prApto vA asAvAryasatyacatuSTayaM pratyapIpadat, tadyathA zauddhodaniriti / ayaM ca sAdhyAvyatirekI vA AryasatyacatuSTayasya duHkhasamudayamArga-nirodhalakSaNasya pramANabAdhitatvena tadbhASa kasyAsarvajJatAnAptatopapatteH, kevalaM tannirAkArakapramANasAmarthyaparyAlocana , AryasatyacatuSTayamiti / zrArAd duraM yAnti pApAdityAryAH, niruktalakSaNaM, teSAM satAM sAdhUnAM padAnAM vA yathAsaMbhavaM muktiprApakatvena yathAvasthita vastusvarUpacintanena ca hitAni satyAti tattvAnItyarthaH teSAM catuSTayam / duHkhetyAdi / duHkhaM phalabhUtAH paJcopAdAnaskandhAH--rUpa vedanA saMjJA saMskAro vijJAnameva ceti; te eva tRSNAsahAyA hetubhUtAH samudayaH, samudeti skandhapaJcakalakSaNaM duHkhamasmAditi vyutpattita: / nirodha hetu nairAtmyAdyAkAracittavizeSo mArgaH, 'mArga anveSaNe', mArgyate'nviSyate yAcyate nirodhArthibhiriti curAdInantatvena svarAntatvAdalpratyayaH / niSklezAvasthA cittasya nirodhaH, nirudhyate rAgadveSopahatacittalakSaNaH saMsAro'neneti karaNe ghaJi muktirityarthaH / etacca duHkhAdirUpaM vistArArthinA pramANa vinizcayaTIkAdeniSTaGkanIyam / pramANabAdhitatveneti / duHkhAdInAM hi mUlamAtmA

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NYAYAVATARAN 55 vikalAnAM saMdigdhasAdhyavyatirekatayA pratibhAti iti tthopnystH| tathA hi-yadyapyAryasatyacatuSTayaM zauddhodaniH pratipAditavAn, tathApi sarvajJatAptate tasya na sidhyataH, tAbhyAM sahAryasatyacatuSTayapratipAdanasyAnyathAnupapatyasiddheH, asarvajJAnAptenApi parapratAraNAbhiprAyapravRttanipuNabuddhizaThapuruSeNa tathAvidhapratipAdanasya kartuM zakyatvAt / tasmAt zauddhodaneH sakAzAdasarvajJatAnAptatAlakSaNasya sAdhyasya : vyAvRttiH saMdigdheti saMdigdhasAdhyavyatirekitvamiti / saMdigdhasAdhanavyatireko yathA-anAdeyavAkyaH kazcid vivakSitaH puruSaH rAgAdimatvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaH yaH punarAdeyavAkyo na sa rAgAdimAn, tadyathA sugata iti| yadyapi taddarzanAnuraktAntaHkaraNAnAM sugatasyAdeyavacanatA siddhisaudhamadhyArUDhA, tathApi rAgAdimattvAbhAvastatpratipAdakapramANavaidhuryAt saMdehagocaracAritAmanubhavati, ataH sugatAd rAgAdimattAvyAvRttisaMzayAt saMdigdhasAdhanavyatirekitvamiti / saMdigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatireko yathA--na vItarAgAH kapilAdayaH karuNAspadeSvapyakaruNAparItacittatayAdattanijakamAMsazakalatvAditi / atra vaidhaya'dRSTAnta:-ye punarvItarAgAste karuNAparItacittatayA dattanijamAMsazakalAH, tadyathA bodhisattvA iti / atra sAdhyasAdhanadharmayorbodhisattvebhyo vyAvRttiH saMdigdhA, tatpratipAditapramANavaikalyAd na jJAyate kiM te rAgAdimantaH uta vItarAgAH, tathAnukampyeSu kiM svapizitakhaNDAni dattavanto neti vA, ataH saMdigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatirekitvamiti / parairapare'pi dRSTAntAbhAsAstrayo'vimRzyabhASitayA darzitAH / tadyathA--- avyatirekaH, aprazitavyatirekaH, viparItavyatirekazceti, te'smAbhirayuktattvAnna drshyitvyaaH| tathA hi-avyatirekastairdazitaH, yathA-avItarAgaH kazcid vivakSitaH puruSaH, vaktRtvAditi, atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaHyaH punarvItarAgo na sa vaktA, yathopalakhaNDa iti / yadyapi kilopalakhaNDAdubhayaM vyAvRttam, tathApi vyAptyA vyatirekAsiddheravyatirekitvamiti / ayuktazcAyaM vaktum, avyatirekitAyA hetudoSatvAt / yadi hi dRSTAntabalenaiva vyatirekaH pratipAdyeta, tadA tathAvidhasAmarthya vikalasya tadAbhAsatA yujyeta, na caitadasti, prAkpravRttasaMbandhagrahaNapravaNapramANagocarasmaraNasaMpAdanArthaM dRSTAntopAdAnAt ; . na hyekatra yo yadabhAve na dRSTaH sa tadabhAve na bhavatIti pratibandhagrAhipramANavyatirekeNa sidhyati, atiprasaGgAt; tasmAdasiddhapratibandhasya hetorevAyaM doSo na dRSTAntasyeti / tathApradarzitavyatirekaviparItavyatirekAvapi vaktumayuktI, tayorvaktRdoSatvAt / tathA hi-apradarzitavyatirekastairuktaH, yathA-nityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAdAkAzavat-iti / atra vidyamAno'pi vyatireko vAdinA vacanena nodbhAtadabhAve kathaM teSAM saMbhavaH / tathA hi-duHkhaM nAma dehadharmavilakSaNo'ntaHsaMvedyo dharmaH, dharmAzca dharmiNamantareNa na bhavanti, rUpAdaya iva ghaTam, nAsti ca bauddhAdInAM duHkhAdidharmAnuguNo jIvaH, mukhyaduHkhAbhAve ca du:khahetutvAt duHkhaM saMsAriNaH skandhA api na syuH tadabhAve ca na hetuH / evaM mArganirodhayorapi pramANabAdhitvamapi bhAvanIya miti / upalakhaNDa iti / khaNDadhvaniH punapuMsakaH // 25 //

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56 VAISHALI INSTITUIE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I vita iti dusstttaa| viparIta vyatirekaH punarabhihitaH, yathA-anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAntaH-yadakRtakaM tannityaM bhavati, yathA AkAzamiti, atra viparyastavyatirekapradarzanAdviparItavyatirekitvam, vaidharmyaprayoge hi sAdhyAbhAvaH sAdhanAbhAvAkrAntodarzanIyaH, na caivamatra, sAdhanAbhAvasya saadhyaabhaavvyaapttyaabhidhaanaaditi| vyatirekApradarzanaM viparItavyatirekapradarzanaM ca na vastuno doSaH, kiM tarhi vacanakuzalatAvikalasyAbhidhAyakasya / kiM ca yeSAM bhavatAmado darzanam-yaduta svArthAnumAnakAle svayaM hetudarzanamAtrAt sAdhyapratIteH parArthAtumAnAvasare'pihetupratipAdanamevakartavyam, "viduSAM vAcyo hetureva hi kevalaH"--iti vacanAt, teSAM kRtakatvAd itIyatA hetUpanyAsenaiva sisAdhayiSita. sAdhyasiddheH samastadRSTAntAbhAsavarNanamapi pUrvAparavyAhatavacanaracanAcAturyamAvirbhAvayati / AsAtAM tAvadeto, dRSTAntasya sAdhanAvayavatvenAnabhyupagamAt / athetthamAcakSIthAH-anvayavyatirekAparijJAne pratipAdyasya na dRSTAntamantareNaitau darzayituM zakyau, ato'nvayavyatirekadarzanArthaM dRSTAnto'bhidhAtavyaH, tatazca tatkAryAkAriNAM tadAbhAsateti cet, gale gRhItasyAyamullApaH tathApyapradazitavyatirekaviparItavyatireko dRSTAntAbhAsau na vAstavau, kiM tarhi vaktRdoSasamutthau, ato nAbhidhAtuM yuktau, tathAvidhasya vidyamAnavastuprakAzanasAmarthyarahitasya nibiDajaDimAvaSTabdhasya puMso vAdAnadhikAritvAd, mAtRkApAThazAlAyogyatayA viduSAM vAdayitumayuktatvAditi // 25 // tadevaM parArthAnumAnaM vyAcakSANena yaduktam-yaduta tatpakSAdivacanAtmakamiti tatpakSahetudRSTAntAnAM sAbhAsAnAM pratipAdanAt prAyaH paryantitam, kevalaM tatparokSadUSaNoddhArAdeva samIcInatAmAbibharti, ityamunA prastAvena dUSaNaM sAbhAsamabhidhAtukAma Aha vAdyukte sAdhane proktadoSANAmudbhAvanam / dUSaNaM niravadye tu dUSaNAbhAsanAmakam // 26 // badanazIlo vAdI pratyAyakastenokta upanyaste, kasmin ? sAdhane, sAdhyate pratipAdyapratItAvAropyate'numeyaM yena tatsAdhanam / taccAnekarUpaM prAk pratyapAdi / tadyathA kvaciddheturevaikaH, kvacitpakSahetU, kvacit pakSa hetudRSTAntAH, kvacitte eva sopanayAH, kvacit sanigamanAH, kvacidekaikatacchaddhivRddhati, pratipAdyasya kvacit kathaMcit pratyAyayituM zakyatvAt, tatpratyAyanopAyasya ca sAdhanatvAditi, tatraha samyaksAdhanasya * dUSayitumazakyatvAt sAdhanAbhAsa eva tatsAmopapatteH / sAdhanAbhAsameva dUSaNopanipAtAt prAgavasthAyAmanitiM sAmAnyena sAdhanadhvaninoktam, tatra proktadoSANAM pratyakSAdinirAkRtapakSAsiddhAdihetusAdhyAdivikaladRSTAntAdyupanyAsalakSaNAnAmudbhAvanaM prAznikAnAM purataH prakAzanaM yat tad dUSyate vadanazIlo vAdIti, vadatIti grahAdeNin iti Nin avazyaM vadatIti AvazyakArthe vA pAvazyakAdhamarNayoNi n iti nnin| vadanaM vAda; so'syAstIti vA vAdI; zIlArthe tUpapadA

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NYAYAVATARAN svAbhipretasAdhyapratyAyanavaikalyalakSaNaM vikRti nIyate sAdhanamaneneti dUSaNamiti jJeyam / adhunA tadAbhAsamAha-nirgataM samyakprayuktatvAdavadyaM pApaM pakSAdidoSalakSaNaM dauSTayamasmAditi niravadyam, tasmin sAdhane vAdinokta iti vartate, tathApi matsaritayA pramRdyodaraM yadavidyamAnAnAM doSANAmudbhAvanaM tadrUSaNasthAnopanyastatvAt tatkAryAkaraNAt samyaksAdhane doSodbhAvanasya pralApAyamAnatvAt dUSaNavadAbhAsate iti dUSaNAbhAsamiti, tadeva nAma saMjJA yasya tattathA, samarthasAdhanopanyastatvAt sAdhite sAdhye satAmapyapazabdAlaMkArAdidoSANAM yadudbhAvanaM tadapi dUSaNAbhAsanAmakamiti / tu zabdena vizeSaNArthena darzayati-vastusiddhayarthaM vAdapravRtteH, tasya siddhatvAt, apazabdAdInAmaprastutatayA taddvAreNa doSaprakAzanasyAsaMbaddhapralAparUpatvAt, itarathA tAvanmAtreNaiva parApAkaraNasiddheH samarthasAdhanAnveSaNaprayatnovizIryeta, prayojanAbhAvAditi / / 26 / / tadevaM vyAvahArikapramANasya pratyakSaparokSasvArthaparArthAdibhedabhinnasya lakSaNaM pratipAdyAdhunA yaiH pAramArthika samastAvaraNavicchedalabhyamazeSArthagocaraM kevalajJAnaM nAbhyupagamyate, tanmatoddalanArthaM tallakSaNamabhidhitsurAha--. sakalAvaraNamuktAtma kevalaM yatprakAzate / pratyakSaM sakalAtmasatatapratibhAsanam // 27 // sakalaM samastamAvRNotyAviyate vA anenetyAvaraNam, tatsvarUpapracchAdanaM karmetyarthaH, sakalaM ca tadAvaraNaM ca sakalAvaraNaM tena mukto rahitaH AtmA svarUpaM yasya tattathA, ata eva kevalamasahAyaM AvaraNakSayopazamavicitratayaiva vodhasya nAnAkAratayA pravRtteH, sAmastyena punarAvaraNanirdalane vivandhakakAraNavaikalyAdekAkAratayaiva tasya vivartanAt, ato jJAnAntaranirapekSaM yat prakAzate prathate nirupAdhikaM dyotate ityarthaH, tatparamArthataH pratyakSam / tadidaM sakalAvaraNamuktAtma iti hetudvAreNa tathA kevalaM yat prakAzate iti svarUpato nirUpyAdhunA kAryadvAreNa nirUpayannAhasakalArthAtmanAM samastavasturUpANAM satatapratibhAsanam---anavarataprakAzanaM sakalArthAtmasatatapratibhAsanamiti, pratibhAsyate'neneti pratibhAsanaM, Atmano dharmarUpatayA bhedavadvivakSitaM jJAnamiti yAvat / asya ca pAramArthikatvam, nirupacaritazabdArthopapatteH / tathA hi-akSazabdo jIvaparyAyastatazcAkSaM prati vartate iti pratyakSam, yatrAtmanaH sAkSAd vyApAraH, vyAvahArikaM punarindriyavyavahitAtmavyApArasaMpAdyatvAt paramArthataH parokSameva, dhUmAdagnijJAnavat, tirodhAnAvizeSAt / nanu ca prasiddhaM lakSyamanadyAprasiddha lakSaNaM vidhIyate, sarvatrAyaM nyAyaH, aprasiddha punarlakSye lakSaNamabhidhIyamAnamamvarAravindinIkusumalakSaNavanirgocaratAM yAyAt, tadidaM svarUpato'prasAdhya lakSaNamabhidhAnasya ko'bhiprAyaH iti / atrocyate-ye ye bhAvena NinpratyayasyAsaMbhavAdarthakathanamAtrametat / tAvanmAtreNaiveti / apazabdAlaMkArAdidoSodbhAvanamAtreNaiva / prayojanAbhAvAditi / samarthasAdhanasya hi paranirAkaraNaM prayojanam, taccedapazabdAdidoSodbhAvanA cakre tadA kRtaM vAdidUSaNArtha prativAdinaH samarthasAdhanopanyAsaprayAseneti // 26 //

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58 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN No. i mithyAvalepAdhmAtAntaHkaraNAH pramANaprasiddhamapyadaH prati vipratipadyante, teSAM dhAnyIkRtabuddhitvAdavadhAraNIyatAmanena darzayati / kimasya pratipAdakaM pramANamiti cet, ete bramaH- samasti samastavastuvicAragocaraM vizadadarzanam, tadgocarAnumAnapravatteH / iha yadyad gocaramanumAnaM pravartate, tasya tasya grAhakaM kiMcit pratyakSamudayapadavIM samAsAdayati, yathA citrbhaanoH| pravartate ca sakalArthaviSayamanumAnam, atastadavalokinA vizadadarzanenApi bhAvyamiti / sarvArthaviSayakaM kimanumAnaM pravartate iti cet / idamapi brama:--iha yadyadasti tat sarvaM sthityudayApavargasaMsargamanubhavati, vastutvAt, yadyadvastu tattat sthemajanmapralayaH kroDIkRtam / tadyathAaGguliraGagulitvavakratvarjutvApekSayeti, vastu ca yadasti, ata: prastutatrayAkrAntaM tadavagantavyam / idameva nikhilArthagocaramanekAntAnumAnaM jJAnakriyAbhyAsAtizayAnikhilAvaraNavicchede vivandhakakAraNAbhAvAd vizadadarzanIbhavati / na cAnumAnapravRttAvapyarthitvAdinA pramAturapravRttau anumeyagocarapratyakSAsaMbhavena vyabhicArazcodanIyaH, saMbhavasya sAdhyatayAbhipretatvAt / na ca saMbhavamAtre'sti vyabhicAraH, sarvAnumeyAnAM-saMbhavatpratyakSatayA vyAptatvAditi / athavAnyathAnumAnayAmaH-saMbhavatsamastazuddhika AtmA, vidyamAna zuddhathupAyatvAt, iha yo yo vidyamAnazuddhathupAyaH sa sa saMbhavatsamastazuddhikaH, yathA vidyamAnakSAramRtpuTapAkAdizuddha yupAyo ratnavizeSaH, tathA ca vidyamAnajJAnAbhyAsazuddhathupAya aAtmA, ataH saMbhavatsamastazuddhika iti / sAmastyazuddhazcAtmA jJAnajJAninoH kathaMcida. bhedAt kevala mabhidhIyate iti / jJAnAdyabhyAsaH kathaM vizuddhikAraNamiti cet, AvaraNamalapratipakSarUpatvAditi brUmaH / pratipakSarUpatA kathamavadhAritA iti ceta, tavaiva darzanAt / tathA hi-dRzyate jJAnAdyabhyAsataH pratikSaNamAvaraNavilayaH, viziSTaviziSTataratatkAryabodhAdyanubhavAt, tadatizaye punaH sAmastyocchedaH syAdityabhidadhmahe / etena yatpare procuH yathA-pratyakSAdi pramANapaJcakagocarAtikrAntatvAt sarvArthasaMvedanamabhAvAkhyaSaSThapramANagocaratAM pratipadyate tadayuktam, tatsaMbhavasyAnumAnena pratipAdanAt, pramANapaJcakapravartanAbhAvAsiddheH kiM ca / pramANapaJcaka tadgocaraM na pravartate iti kathaM bhavato nirNayaH kiM niyatadezakAlavyAptyA, yadvA samastadezakAlAskandaneneti ? yadyAdyaH pakSaH, tato yathA ghaTAdeH kvacita pramANapaJcakaM tad gocaraM nivartamAnamabhAvaM sAdhayati, evaM samastavastusaMvedanagocaramapi tannivartamAnaM niyatadezadazAvacchinnamabhAvaM sAdhayeta , na sarvatra, tatazca ghaTAdivata tadunirvAraM syAta / atha dvitIyaH pakSaH, asau asaMbhavyeva, samastadezakAlavartipuruSapariSatsaMvedanasAkSAtkAriNo hyevaM vaktuM yuktam-yaduta na kvacita samastArtha mithyAvalepAdhmAtAntaHkaraNA iti / alIkAbhimAnApUritamanasaH / citrbhaanoriti| vahnaH / sthemeti / sthirasya bhAvaH, pRthvyAditvAdimani sthAdeze dhrauvyamityarthaH / jJAnAdyabhyAsata iti / jJAnAbhyAsAt jJAnAvaraNavilaye jJAnAvaraNavilayakAryo jJAnavizeSo dRzyate / AdizabdAt darzanAbhyAsAt darzanAvaraNa vilaye darzanAvaraNa vilayakAryo darzanavizeSAnubhavo gRhyate / evaM cAritrAbhyAse'pi / tadatizaye jJAnAdyabhyAsAtizaye // 27 //

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NYAVAVATARAH saMvedanamasti iti, na bhavataH, tathAvidhapuruSasaMbhavAnabhyupagamAta , itarathA ya eva kazcinizcityevamabhidadhyAt, sa eva samastavastuvistAravyApijJAnAlokaH iti samastArthagocarasaMvedanasiddhirityAstAM tAvat / / 27 / / tadevaM pramANaviSaye lakSaNasaMkhyAvipratipattI nirAkRtyAdhunA kramaprAptAM gocaravipratipatti bahuvaktavyatvAdanirAkRtya tAvat phalavipratipatti nirAcikIrSurAha pramAraNasya phalaM sAkSAdajJAnavinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekSe zeSasyAdAnahAnadhIH // 28 // dvividhaM hi pramANasya phalam-sAkSAdasAkSAcca, anantaraM vyavahitaM cetyarthaH / tatra sAkSAdajJAnamanadhyavasAya: prameyAparicchittistasya vinivartanaM vizeSeNa pralayApAdanaM pramANasya phalam, ajJAnoddalanadvAreNa tasya pravRtteH, tasya ca sarvAnarthamUlatayA pramAtrapakAritvAt tannivartanasya prayojanatA yuktava, etaccAnantaraprayojanaM sarvajJAnAnAmekarUpatvAt saamaanyenoktm| vyavahitaprayojanaM punarvibhAgenAhakevalasya sarvajJajJAnasya sukhaM vaiSayikasukhAtItaparamAlAdAnubhavaH, upekSA sAkSAt samastArthAnubhave'pi hAnopAdAnecchAbhAvAnmadhyasthavRttitA, te sukhopekSe phlmityrthH| zeSasya tadvyatiriktaprAkRtalokapramANasyAdAnaM grahaNaM hAnaM parityAgastayorAdAnahAnayo(buddhirAdAnahAnadhIH sA phalaM iti yAvat / tatazcAdeyAnAM samyagdarzanAdi-strakcandanAdInAM yAditsA, tathA heyAnAM mithyAdarzanAdiviSakaNTakAdInAM yA jihAsA pramANasAdhyA, apramANAt tadasiddheH, prekSApUrvakAriNAM tataH pravRttyayogAdityukta bhavati // 28 // adhunA gocaravipratipatti nirAcaSTe anekAntAtmakaM vastu gocaraH sarvasaMvidAm / ekadezaviziSTo'rtho nayasya viSayo mataH // 26 // aneke bahavo'ntA aMzA dharmA vA AtmAnaH svarUpANi yasya tadanekAntAtmakam / kiM tat ? vastu bahirantazca, gocaro viSayaH sarvasaMvidAM samastasaMvittInAm / anenAnekAntamantareNa saMvedanaprasaravyavacchedaM darzayati, bhrAntasaMvedanAnAmapyanekAntodyotanapaTiSThatayA pravRttaH, kevalaM keSucidaMzeSu visaMvAdakatvAdapramANAni tAni saMgIryante / tadayamabhiprAyaH-yadA saMvedanasAmAnyamapyanekAntaviraheNa na ajJAnoddalanadvAreNeti / ajJAna muddala yadeva pramANaM pravartate iti / kimuktaM bhavati ? na pramANAt phalamekAntena bhinnamabhinnaM vA, bhedAbhedarUpatayaivAntararaMparabhedasya pratibhAsanAt / tathA hi-yasyaivAtmanaH phalarUpatayApi tasyaiva saH, ya eva pramimIte sa eva nivRtAjJAno jahAtyAdadAti upekSate ceti pratItaH / eSa caikapramApekSayA pramANa phalayorabhedaH, karaNakriyApariNAmabhedAcca bhedaH uktaM ca-- pAraMparyeNa sAkSAcca phalaM dvedhAbhyadhAyi yat / jinaibhinna mabhinnaM ca pramANAttadihoditam // 28 / /

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60 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. i pravartitumutsahate, tadA tadvizeSaNabhUtaM pramANaM ekAnte pravartayiSyate iti durApAstAvakAzA evaiSA vArtA, tathApyanAdimithyAbhinivezavAsitAntaHkaraNAH kudarzanavipralabdhabuddhayo bahavo'tra vipratipadyante iti sarva pramANAnAmanekAntagocaratvasAdhaka pramANamabhidhIyate / iha yatpramANaM tatparasparAvinirmuThitAnekadharmaparikaritavastuno grAhakam, tasyaiva tatra pratibhAsamAnatvAt, iha yadyatra pratibhAti, tadeva tadgocaratayAbhyupagantavyam / tadyathA-nirAdInavanayanaprabhavadarzane pratibhAsamAnaM pATalatayA japAkusumaM tathaiva tadgocaratayAbhyupagamyate, parasparAvibhaktAnekasvabhAvAkrAntamUrtikaM ca bahirantazca vastu sarvapramANeSu prathate iti, atastadeva teSAM gocaraH / na cetaretaravizakalitamidharmabhAvavAdibhiH kaNabhakSAkSapAdaziSyakaistAvadasya hetorasiddhatAdidoSaH pratipAdayituM zakyaH, tadabhyupagamamantareNa svAbhipretavastuno'vasthAnAbhAvAt / tathA hi-ekasmin dharmiNi bahavo ghastito bhinnatanavaH kathaM varteran ? bhedAvizeSeNa sarvatra tavattiprasaGgAt / tatraiva teSAM samavAyAnnAnyatra vartante iti cet, nanu so'pi samavAyo yadyupakAryopakArakabhAvavyatirekeNApi bhavati, tataH sarvatrAvizeSeNa prasajyeta, tadabhAvAvizeSAt astyevopakAryopakArakabhAva iti cet, hanta hato'si anekopakArakasyAnekasvabhAvatAprApteH, tadvirahe'nekopakArakatvAbhAvAt / na hi yena svabhAvenaikasyopakaroti tenaiva dvitIyasya, tasya tatraivopayuktAtvAt, dvitIyopakAraka svabhAvasya tadupamardanadvAreNotpatteH, itarathaikamevopakurvastiSThet, tadekasvabhAvatvAt / bhinnAbhiH zaktibhirupakaroti na bhinnaiH svabhAvaiH, tena nAnekAnta iti cet, tAstahi kathaM vartante iti vAcyam / samavAyAd ityuttare'sAvapyupakAryopakArakabhAvamantareNa kathaM na sarvatra iti prAcInaM codyaM pshcaallgnmnudhaavti| upakAryopakAraka bhAvAbhyupagame punarapyanekasvabhAvatAM pradarzitayukteH punaH zaktyupakArakabhinnazaktiparikalpane'pyanekAntAnmokSaH iti varamAdAveva matsaritAM vihAyAnekadharmAdhyAsitaM vastvabhyupagataM kiM bhedakalpanayAsthAna evAtmanA pariklezitena iti / kiM cAnekAntabhyupagame satyeSa guNaH-parasparavibhakta Su saMyogisaMyogasamavAyisamavAyaguNiguNAvayavAvayavivyaktisAmAnyAdiSu saMyogasamavAyaguNyavayavisAmAnyAdInAM saMyogisamavAyiguNAvayavizeSAdiSu vartanacintAyAM yadUSaNajAlamupanipatati, tadapi parihRtaM bhavati, ekAntabheda eva tadupapatteH, anekAnte tadutthAnAbhAvAt / tathA hi-bhinnAH khalu saMyogAdayaH saMyogyAdibhyo vikalpayituM pAryante-yaduta kathameta eteSu vartante iti / kimekadezena yadvA saamstyen| yadyekadezena, tadayuktam, teSAM niravayavatvAbhyupagamAt, sAvayavatve'pi tebhyo'vayavebhyo yadyabhinnAH, tato'nekAntAH pattiH, ekasyA nirAdInaveti / prAdInavo doSaH / itaretaretyAdi / vividhAni zakalAni yeSAM tAni vizakalAni, tAni karotIti ini vizakalyante pRthaka kriyante smeti karmaNi ktaH, vividhAni zakalAni saMjAtAni yeSAmiti tArakAderAkRtigaNa tvAt itacpratyayo vA, tat itaretaraM vizakalitAviti vizeSaNasamAse teSAM dharmamibhAvaM vadantItyevaMzIlAstaiH / parasparavibhakteSu saMyogisaMyogasamavAyisamavAyaguriNaguNAvayavAvayavivyaktisAmAnyAdiSviti pratra guNagrahaNe

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61 NYAYAVATARAN nekAvayavatvaprApteH / atha bhinnAsteSvapi te kathaM vartante iti vAcyam, ekadezena sAmastyena vaa| ekadeza pakSe tadevAvartate ityanavasthA / atha sAmastyenatadapyasAdhIyaH, pratyeka parisamAptatayA saMyogAdibahutvaprasaGgAttadabhinnAH puna saMyogAdayo na vikalpabhAjo bhavanti / abhedapakSe'pi saMyogAdimAtraM saMyogyAdimAtraM vA syAditi cenna, tasyApyekAntenAnabhyupagamAt, kiM tarhi anyAnyAvizliSTasvarUpA vivakSayA saMdarzanIyabhedAH sarve evaite'bhyupagamyante, tathAvidhAnAM kuyuktivikalpotthApitadUSaNasamUhanirAkaraNakSamatvAt, abAdhitapratibhAseSu sarvatra teSAM tathaiva pratibhAsanAta, anyathA pratibhAsamAnAnAmanyathA parikalpane dRSTahAnyadaSTaparikalpanAdvAreNAsamaJjasaprApteH, tathA ca brahmAdvaitazUnyavAdAdayaH siddhimaznuvIran, vizeSAbhAvAditi / / ___ etenAsya hetoH kApilA apyasiddhatAdidoSamabhidhitsavo maukyamAnItAH / tathA hi-antarekaM saMvedanamaparAparaharSaviSAdAdyanantadharmavivartAkrAntarUpaM vahizca ghaTAdikamarthaM navapurANAdivartulapArthivatvAdyanekasvabhAvAvaSTabdhazarIraM sAkSAllakSayantaH kathaM tadviparItakathane pravarteran ? prakRtipuruSAtmakaM dravyamevaikaM tAttvikam, paryAyabhrAntijanakaH punarvivarto'pAramArthika iti cenna, dvayorapi sarvapramANeSu prakAzamAnayoravAdhitayoH sarvavyavahAranivandhanayoH pakSapAtamantareNaikasya nihnotumazakyatvAt / tathA sati vivarta eva tAttvikaH, dravyaM punaralIkamiti paryAyapakSapAtI prasaJjayan duniSedhaH syAditi / athetthamabhidadhIthAH-dravyaM sarvatrAvyabhicaritarUpatvAt satyam, paryAyA: punarvyabhicAriNa ityasatyAH / tadayuktam, yadi nAma dravyamabhedarUpatvAt sarvatrAnuvartate, paryAyAstu bhedarUpatvAt vyavacchidyante, tathApi tatsatyam itare'lIkA iti vakta na pAryate, na hi nIlaM pItarUpatAM na viti ityetAvatA tadasatyam, atiprasaGgAt, sarvasya pararUpaparihArAvasthAyitayAlIkatvaprApteH / atha dravyameva paryAyAstadavyatiriktatvAt tatsvarUpavat, na santi vA dravyavyatirekiNaH paryAyAH niHsvabhAvatvAt khapuSpavat iti pramANayasi, tathA sati paryAyA eva dravyaM, tadavyatiriktatvAt tatsvarUpavat, nAsti vA paryAyavyatiriktaM dravyam niSparyAyatvAt AkAzakusumavaditi itaro'pi pramANayan kena vAryate / tanna pakSadvaye'pi kAcidvizeSopalabdhiriti / yathaivAnantasahakramavartiparyAyAdhyAsitaM vastu sarvapramANeSu prakAzate tathaivAbhyupagantavyam,tathA cAnyasyAbhAvAt tadeva tadgocara iti sthitam / / tathA sugatamatAnusAriNAmapi madhye sautrAntikastAvadasya hetorasiddhAtAmAvirbhAvayituM notsahate, tadabhyupagativyatirekeNa nijadarzanavyavasthAnupapatteH / tathA nava saMyoge labdhe gobalIvardanyAyenAtyanta prasiddhatvAt guNebhyo niSkRSya pRthak saMyogasyopAdAnama, guNAstu rUpAdayo draSTavyAH, prAdizabdAd dravye kampAdikarmaNo vRttau dUSaNaparigrahaH / teSAM saMyogAdInAm / dRSTetyAdi / saMyogyAdibhyaH kathaMcidbhinnAH saMyogAdaya iti dRSTama, ghaTapaTAdivadekAntabhedinaH saMyogAdaya iti svapne'pya inTam, tayorhAniparikalpane ta eva dvAraM tena // sautrAntika iti| 'sUtra avamocane' curAdAvadantaH, tataH sUyate niIyate tattvamaneneti svarAntatvAdali sUtramAgama: tasyAyaM sautraH, antaH pariniSThA; yadAhustadvAdina:

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62 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I 1 hi - bahistAvadekaM kAraNamaparAparasAmagrayantaH pAtitayAneka kArya kAryAvedyate, yathArUpaM svottarakSaNaM svAvagAhijJAnAdikaM ca yugapajjanayati / yadi cekakSaNavartinaH sAmagrIbhedena bhedamanubhavata eva bhinnadezanAnA kAryakAritA, tathA sati nityapakSoditaM dUSaNaM svamastakopanipAti syAt, tasyApi tathaiva bhinnakAlakAryanivartane'pi bhedAbhAvaprasaGgAt / tathA pratibhAsabhedena kSaNakSayirUpAdisvalakSaNatvAbhyupagamazcaivaM nirnibandhanaH syAt, kauTasthyamAvibhrato'pi dravyasyAparAparakAraNakalApAntargatatayAnavapurANAdiparyAyarUparasagandhasparzAvabhAsalakSaNakArya saMpAdanAvirodhaprasakta eH kiM cAyamekaM svAvayavavyApinaM kAlAntarasaMcariSNumAkAraM sAkSAllakSayan kSaNakSayiparamANu lakSaNAni svalakSaNAni vyAcakSIta nAnyathA, yathAkUtaM tadavabhAsasya svapnAntare'pyanupalakSaNAt, lakSitasya cAlakSitavyatirekanirAkaraNatastAdAtmyaM kathayan svagirAnekAntAvabhAsaM samarthayate / tathA hi-alakSitaparamANupArimANDalyapratikSaNavivartamapi svalakSaNaM sthirasthUrAdyAtmanA darzayati svarUpam, anyathA suSuptaM jagadAsajyeta tadaprakAzane pramANAntarasyApyatyanta vilakSaNasvalakSaNA vedakasyApravRttiprasaGgAt / tathAntaH saMvedanamarthaM svarUpApekSayA bahirmukhAntarmukhasavikalpavikalpa bhrAntAbhrAntAdipratibhAsamekamabhyupayataH kathamanekAntAvabhAso'siddhaH syAt ? tathA nAnAdezasthitArtha sArtha samarpitAkAroparaktamekamAkArabhede'pyanyathA yugapatprakAzamAna sitAsitAdyartha vyavasthityanupapatteH saMvedanamanumanyamAnaH kathaM bhitrasamayabhAvi harSaviSAdAdyanekavivartavazAt tadabhedamAtyantikamabhidadhIta, abhinnayogakSematvAt / yugapadbhAvinAM saMvidantarniviSTAkArANAmekatvaM na harSAdInAm tadviparyayAditi cenna tatsAmarthyavyavasthApyArthAbhedaprasaGgAt, tadeka 3 pratikSaNaM vizarAvo rUparasagandhasparza paramANavo jJAnaM cetyeva tattvam iti, tataH sotrazcAso antazca sautrAntaH, sa vidyate yasya zrato'nekasvarAt ( si0 he0 7-2-6) iti ikaH / yadvA sUtrAntaH prayojanaM pravartakaM yasya iti prayojanam (si0 he0 5-4- 117 ) itIkaN / svottaretyAdi / sva AtmIyaH sa cAsau uttarakSaNazca yadvA svasmAduttaraH svottaraH sa cAsau kSaNazceti, svasyottarakSaNaH svottarakSaNa iti vA / svamAtmAnamavagAhate viSayIkarotItyevaM zIlaM svAvagAhi tacca tat jJAnaM ceti / pradizabdAt sahakArikAraNabhAvena rasAlokAdikAryaM jananagrahaH / nityapakSoditamiti / ekasya bhinnakAlAnekakAryajanakasvabhAvatve viruddhadharmAdhyAsAdanekatvamiti / tathaiveti / yathekakAlamekamanekadezaM nAnAkAryaM kurvadapyekaneva, tathA zrabhinnakAlA kAryavartane'pyekameveti sthAyitvasiddhiH / alakSitetyAdi / parimaNDalAH paramANavaH teSAM bhAvaH pArimANDalyaM vartulatvaM paramANuparimANameva vA anuzatikAditvAd ubhayapadavRddhiH / pratikSaNaM pratisamayaM vivartaH pariNamanaM sa tathA paramANUnAM pArimANDatya pratikSaNa vivartI, tathA na lakSitau paramANupArimADalya pratikSaNa vivartau yasya svalakSaNasya tat / sthirasthUrAdIti / AdizabdAt pRthubudhnodarAdyAkAro gRhyate / tadaprakAzane sthirasthUrAdyAtmakavastvaprakAzane / bahirmukheti / bahirbAhyavastuviSaye mukhamArambhaH prakAzanapravRttiryasya tattathA bAhyavastvabhimukhamityartha: / evamantarmukhetyapyuktAnusArato vyAkhyeyam, zrAdizabdAt pramANApramANAdiparigrahaH / nAnAdezetyAdi / uparaktaM vizeSitaM ekaM saMvedanamiti saMbandha: / anyatheti / nAnAkAro

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NYAYAVATARA" tayA sitapItAdiSu jJAnasya bodharUpeNaivAviziSTatvAt / tadevaM bahirantazcaikAnekarUpatve pramANataH sthite svalakSaNasyAnyathA svAbhyupetadarzana vyavasthAyogAd nArthavAdyanekAntaprakAzaM pratikSeptumarhati / / tathorarokRtayogAcAramatamapi balAdanekAntaprakAzarajjurAveSTayati, ekasyApi jJAnasyAnekavedyavedakAkAratayA prathanopagateH / eka yogakSematvAta tadaikyamiti cenna, yugapadudayapralayavatAM sahavedinAM sakalasaMtAnAnAmekatvaprasaGgAt / saMvRtidazitatvAdanekatvasya na tena svasaMvedanasAkSAtkRtapAramArthikaiva tvakSatiriti cenna, brhmvaadimtaaprtissedhprsktH| yato'nAdyavidyAbalAdekamakramaM sacetanaM svasaMvedanasAkSAtkRtamapi brahmAnekaM kramavata cetanAcetanaM parokSAparokSaM lakSyate, bhavatparikalpitagrAhyagrAhakAkAraviviktasaMvedanavaditi tenApi na duruppaadm| astu cAyamanekAntAvabhAso bhrAntastathApi saMvedanasyAdvayatA na lakSyate, tallakSaNe sakalAsumatAmadhunaiva muktatAvApteH, lakSyate ca tatkathaMcit, itarathA suSuptadazAvat sarvavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAt, ityekasyApi saMvedanasya lakSitAlakSitatvenAnekAntaprati- . bhAso duHzako'pahnotumiti jJAnavAdyapyasya hetorasiddhatAvirbhAvanaM prati tUSNImAsIta // zUnyavAdinaH samastAbhAvAdasiddho'nekAntaprakAza iti cenna, tasyApi paraktabhAve / abhinnayogakSematvAviti / prAgvadbhAvanIyam / tdvipryyaaditi| bhinna kAlabhAvitvAt / tatsAmarthyAdityAdi / teSA saMvidantaniviSTAkAraNAM sitapItAdInAM sAmarthyam, tena vyavasthApyo yo'rthastasyaikyaprasaGgAt / tadekatayA prAkArANAmekatayA, sitapItAMdivastuviSayiNo jJAnasya bodharUpeNaiva vA viziSTatvAt, bodhasvarUpataiva jJAnasyodvAritA, na punaH sitapItAdayo bahirarthavyavasthApakA: kecidaakaaraa:| kvApi bodharUpeNaivAviziSTatvAt iti pAThaH, tadevaM vyAkhyA-- yathA vahuSvapi sitapItAdiSu vastuSu jJAnasya bodharUpeNAviziSTatvaM samAnatvam, tathA sitapItAdyAkArANAmekatayApItyarthaH / ayamabhiprAyaH-yadaikajJAnAntarvatinAM nAnAdezavyavasthitArthaprabhavAnAM bahUnAmapyAkArANAmekatvam, tadA tadekAkArajJAnavyavasthApyasya bahirvastustomasyApyekatvaM syAta; ekanIlAkArajJAnavyavasthApya bahinIlasvalakSaNa ekatvavat / bahirantazcetyAdi / pramANata ekAnekarUpatve svalakSaNaspa vyavasthite iti saMbandhaH / yathA ca vRkSAdivastUnAM saMnihitAsaMnihitAbhyAM spaSTAspaSTapratibhAsajanakatvena svalakSaNatvam, yasyArthasya saMnidhAnAgaMnidhAnAbhyAM jJAnapratibhAsabhedaH tat svalakSaNamiti tallakSaNAt, tathAntaHsaMvedanasyApi / tathA hi-smarya mANasaMvedanamasaMnihitatvAdasphuTaM pratibhAti, anubhUyamAnaM tu saMnihitatvAt sphuTam; yadvA parasaMtAnavati saMvedanamasaMnihitatvAdasphuTam, svasaMtAnavati tu saMnihitatvAt sphuTam, tasmAdantaHsaMvedanasyApi tallakSaNalakSitatvAt svalakSaNatvamiti / yogAcAreti yojanaM yogaH, jJAnAkArayoH saMbandhaH, tamAcaranti vyavaharanti iti karmaNyaN iti aN. sAkArajJAnamAtravAdina ityarthaH, yogaH samAdhiH sAkArajJAnamAtraikAgratA, tamAcaranti iti vA, pUrvavat aN / brahmeti jJAnAdvaitamiti / na tenApi durupapAdamiti / etat karmatApannaM tenApi brahmavAdinA na duHkhenopapAdyate, kiMtu sUpapAda-sukhenaiva ghaTayituM zakyamityarthaH / muktatAvApteriti tattvajJAnotpattirmuktiH iti muktilakSaNAbhidhAnAt, tattvaM ca jJAnAdvaitameveti

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64 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 pramANaprameyAbhAvena sarvAbhAvAvedanaM samasti, anyathApramANakaM sarvaM sarvatra vidyate iti parasyApi vadato na vadanabhaGgaH syAt, tadabhyupagame'bhyupagamakSatiH / tayozca darzitavadanekAntaprakAza iti nAsiddho hetuH / marumarIcikAni cayacumbini saMvedane jalollekhe'pi tadgocaratvAbhyupagamAbhAvAdanakAntiko'yamiti mA zatiSThAH, tasya bhrAntatvAt, abhrAntaH prakAzo hi tadabhyupagatihetuH / athAyamapi itaretaravinilaThitaparamANukSaNakSayivodhena vAdhyamAnatvAt bhrAnta ityAcakSIthAH, tadayuktam, yatastadbodhaH kimupalabdhimAtram yadvA nirNayo vaa| yadyAdyaH kalpaH, tadAnumAnaM vizIryaMta, nirgocaratvAta , prAthamakalpikenaiva nirvikalpakaviviktadarzanena virodhabhIrutayA sarvathA vastugrahaNAbhyupagamAt, pramANakalite ca mAnAntaravaiyarthyAdanavasthAprApteH / atha dvitIyaH, tathA sati sarvaM nirvikalpakamapramANatAmaznuvIta / na ca nirNayo'nekAntaprakAzaM bAdhate, api tu samarthayate, bahirantazca tathaiva tadviz2ambhaNAt / atha sarvathA vastugrahaNe'pi nirvikalpakaM yatrAMze pAzcAtyaM vyavahArakArivyavasAyamupajanayati, tatraiva pramANatAmAskandati nAnyatreti manyethAH, tathA sati yadanantaramarthakriyAsamarthArthaprArthanayA puruSaH pravartate sa eva nirNayaH prAmANyaM svIkuryAnna nirvikalpakam, tajjanakatve'pi saMnikarSAdivadityAsajyeta / nirvikalpakamanadhigatArthAdhigantRtvAt pramANaM na vyavasitiH tadvikalpatvAditi cenna, anumiterapi tadvadaprAmANyaprasaGgAt / na ca viparItAkAranirAkaraNacaturatayAnamitivizeSavatI, nirNIterapi tadapanodadakSatvAdasamAropaviSaye'pravRttaH / trirUpa teSAmabhiprAyaH / tasyApIti zUnyavAdinaH parasyApi sAMkhyasya / tavabhyupagame pramANaprameyayoraGgIkAre / tavabhyupagatiheturiti / pratibhAsamAnArtha gocaratvAGgIkAraNamanumAnamiti kSaNikatvasAdhakam / prAthamakalpikenaiveti / kalpaH pakSaH, prathamazcAsau kalpazca, tatra bhavaH prAthamakalpikaH tena, prathamapakSAbhihitenetyarthaH, adhyAtmAdeH iti Than / virodhabhIrutayedi / na hyakasya vastuno nIlatvAdi gRhyate / na punaH kSaNikatvAdIti bhaavH| apramAraNatAmiti / sadRzAparAparavipralambhena dRzya vikalpyayorakyAdhyavasAyAdvikalpAH kSaNikatAM na gRhNantIti tadviSayaM vastubalaprabhavaM nirvikalpamiti bhavatA paryakalpi / yadi cAdhunA nirNayena kSaNakSayiNaH paramANavo gRhyante ityabhyupagamaH, tato na kiMcinirvikalpakeneti bhAvaH / samarthayate iti / 'artha upayAJcAyAm" curAdAvAtmanepadI, yadi tu bahuSu pustakeSu samarthayatIti pAThaH, tadaivaM gamanikA samarthanaM samarthaH taM karoti in, anekAntaprakAzasya samarthanAM karotItyarthaH / athavA carca kaci ez2a mAz2a dIptau ityAtmanepadiSu paThitvA punaH bhrAjaTa bhrAsaTa bhrAtR dIptau iti AtmanepadiSu bhrAjaM paThan anyeSAmAtmanepadinAM dhAtUnAmAtmanepadaM ziSTaprayogAnusAreNa vyabhicaratIti darzayati, tena labhati labhate, sevati sevate, samarthayati samarthayate / zrotAramupalabhati na prazaMsitAram / svAdhIne vibhave'pyaho narapati sevanti kiM mAninaH / ityAdayaH sAdhava iti sthitam / athetyAdinA prAcyavikalpamevAGgIkurvannAha-- tajjanakatve iti / nirNayajanakatve saMnikarSAdivad iti / yathA pramANabhUtajJAnajanako'pi saMnikarSoM na pramANam, dehAdibhiratiprasaGgAt, tathA nirvikalpakamapItyarthaH / asamAropaviSaye'pravRtteriti / yatraiva kiMcidviparItamAropitaM bhavati, tatraka tadapanodadvAreNa nirNaya

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NYAYAVATARAH liGgajatayA vizeSo'numitermAnatAsAdhaka iti cet, sAkSAdanubhavAdutpAdastarhi nirNItermahAparAdha iti bhavato vAlatAmIkSAmahe / kiM ca, yathA nirvikalpakamalakSitaM sakalavyAvRttasvalakSaNagrahaNapravaNamapi katicidaMzaviSayaM vikalpamutthApayati, tathArtha evendriyAlokAdisaMnikRSTatayA katicinnijAMzaviSayaM sAkSAd vizadavikalpaM janayediti kimajAgalastanakalpanirvikalpakalpanayA ? tAvantoM'zA bahirarthe virudhyante iti cet, pATavApATavAdayo darzane'pyekasmin na virudhyante iti kiM rAjJAmAjJA tasmAnna kSaNakSayiparamANulakSaNasvalakSaNalakSakaM kvacit kadAciddarzanaM lakSayanti, bhavanto'pi kevalaM svadarzanAnuraktAntaHkaraNatayA na tadasattAM pratipadyante / svAMzavyApinaM kAlAntarAnuyAyinamekaM bahirantazcArthaM bodhaM ca prakAzayan prathamAno nirNayaH na punarnimUlakaiH kuyuktivikalpairbAdhyate iti na bhrAntaH / kiM cAsya bhrAntatAM kathayan sarvaprANaprameyavyavasthA munmUlayati / tathA hi--yatsattvabodharUpatvasukhatvAdiSu pramANaM tadeva kSaNakSayitvasvargaprApaNazaktiyuktatvAdiSu apramANam, tathA yadvastu nIlacaturasrordhvatAdirUpatayA prameyaM tadeva madhyabhAgakSaNavivartAdinAprameyam, tathA yad bahirarthApekSayA savikalpakaM svapnAdidarzanaM vA bhrAntaM tadevasvarUpApekSayAbhrAntam, tathA yannizIthinInAthadvayAdikaM dvitve'lIkaM tadapi dhavalatAniyatadezacAritAdAvalIkamiti nirNayaH / yadi tu virodhAd vibhyadbhirbhavadbhirayamapahanUyate, kimaparamaikAntikaM pramANaM prameyaM corarIkRtya svAkUtaM pratiSThApayeyuriti sakautukaM nazcetaH / atha jJAnavAdI advaitaprakAzamalakSitamabhyupetya tena bAhuvidhyaM dadhAno bodho bAdhyamAnatvAt bhrAnta ityabhidadyAt, tadayuktam, dRSTahAnyadRSTaparikalpanA 65 syApi pravRttirityarthaH / tathA cAgame - kimayaM sthANuH puruSo veti IhAnantarameva puruSa evAyamityapAyAbhidhAnAt / ata eva kSamAzramaNo'pi -- prababhatthe'vAzro cicaya katthai lakhijjai imo puriso iti pUrvapakSayitvA - uppaladalasyaveho vva duvvibhAvattaNeNa paDihAi / samayaM va sukkasakkuliDasaNe visayAraNamuvaladdhI || (vize0 bhA0 298 - 266 ) iti parihRtavAn / katicidaMzaviSayamiti / nIlAdiviSayam, kSaNikAdiviSayam / tAvantoM'zA iti / nIlatvAkSaNikatvacaturasratvordhvatvAdayo virudhyante iti niraMzekasvabhAvatvAd vastunaH / pATavApATavAdaya ityAdi / samAdhAnArthastu tarhi nirvikalpadarzanasyApi nIlAdivikalpaM janayato nIlAdivikalpajanane pATavam, kSaNikatvAdivikalpaM cAjanayatastatrApATavam / prAdizabdAttu bodharUpatvanirvikalpatvAbhrAntatvAdayo dharmA gRhyante / te ca pATavAdayaH parasparaviruddhAH, naikatradarzane saMbhavanti iti darzanasyApi na vikalpajanakatvamityabhiprAyaH / yaditi saMvedanam / sattvabodharUpatvasukhatvAdiSu pramANamiti / yathAsaMbhavamantarbahirgatAnAM sattvAdInAM tasyaiva saMvedanasya vikalpotthApanadvAreNa vyavasthApakatvAt, yadyasya vyavasthApana hetustatatra pramANamiti hi pramANasthitiH / zrAdizabdAnnIlatvAdigrahaH / zrapramANamiti / kSaraNakSayitvAdiviSaye vikalpotthApanAbhAvAt / tathA ca tarisaddhAntaH yatraiva janayedenAM tatraivAsya pramANatA iti / 5

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66 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 prasaGgAt, alakSitanirvikalpadarzanasya ca prAgeva pratikSiptatvAt / atha yuktirbodhasya vaividhyaM bAdheta, tathA hi-bhrAntAbhrAntasaMvedanavivekasya kartumazakyatvAt, saMvinmAtrasya tu sarvatrAvyabhicAritvAd advayaM saMvedanaM viviktayuktyA prakAzamAnamanAdikAlAlInavAsanAsamupajanitasaMvRtidarzitasattAkaM sitAsitAdivividhapratibhAsaM nirAkurute / atra pratividadhmahe-kimayamanekAkAro bodho'dvayasaMvedanAd vyatyarakSId vA na vA, kiM cAto yadi vyabhatsIt, kathamadRSTatatkAryatve vyatirikto'yaM tadadvayasaMvedanamanumApayet / avyatirekapakSe punaranekaH san ekasaMvedanatAdAtmyena prathamAnaH kathamadvaitaM noddalayet / atha saMvRtidarzitatvAdalIkatayA asya sitAsitAdyAkArabahirmukhakAluSyasya vodhena tAttvikena saha bhedAbhedavikalpAnupapattiriti brUSe; tathA sati paro bodhasyApAramArthikatvaM avidyArzitatvAt, arthasattAyAH punastattvarUpatA, sarvatrAvyabhicArAditi bra vANo dunivAraH syAt / jaDasya prakAzAyogAt saMvittiH satyA, nArtha iti cet, ekasyAnekatAvabhAsAbhAvAdanekAntaH satyaH, nAdvaitamiti pratijAnImahe / saMvatyAdvayasyApi nAnApratibhAso'viruddha iti cet, anAdyavidyAvalAjjaDasyApi cetanatayA prakAzo na viruddha iti parasyApi zaThottaraM nAtidurlabhaM bhavet / kiM ca nAnAkArakaluSitacaitanyasAmAnyasyAnyathAnupapattisAmarthyatastasya siddhatvAdadvayasaMvedanamasiddhaM sAdhayedayam, anyathA nirbandhanatayA sAdhanasyApravRttaH, tathA ca sthirasthUrAdyupalakSitArthAMzavazAd vizakalitaparamANukSaNakSayiparyAyatAdAtmyaM sAdhayantamanekAntavAdinaM na pratikSeptumarhati, yukterubhayatrApi tulyatvAt / kiM ca, yo'yaM sitapItAdyanekAkAranirNayo'sAvapi svasaMvedanApekSayAdvayarUpa iti bhavadabhiprAyaH, yathA cAnavasthAbhIrutayA sarvaM jJAnaM svaprakAzamabhyupetam, tathA sarvo nizcayaH svanizcAya svapnAdIti / AdizabdAt jAgradde zabhAvino marIcikAdau jalAdijJAnasya parigrahaH / ayamiti anekAntaprakAzaH / kathamadRSTetyAdi / tasyAdvayasaMvedanasya kArya tatkAryam, tatsvabhAvaH tatkAryatvam, na iSTaM tatkAryatvaM yasya sa tathA, ayamanekAkAro bodhaH / ayamabhiprAya:-- bhavadAzayenAyamanekAkAro bodhaH, ekasyAnekadharmatvAyogAd bAdhita eva; paramasau bAdhito'pyanekAkAro bodho'dvayaM na bhavati / advayamanumApayed yadyadvayasya kArya syAt / advaitamiti / dvAbhyAM prakArAbhyAmitaM sthitaM dvau vA prakArAvitaM prApta dvItam; tata: prajJAderAkRtigaNatvAt aN, yadi vA dvayorbhAvo dvitA tata: pUrvavat svArthe aNi "prakRteliGgavacane bAdhante svArthikA: kvacit" iti vacanAd napuMsakatvaM, tato nasamAsaH / asyeti / anekAkArabodhasya / sitAsitAdhAkArabahirmukhakAluSyasyeti / sitAsitAdaya prAkArA yasya tattathA, sitAsitAdyAkArabahirmukhaM kAluSyaM mAlinyaM yasya tasya / nAnAkArakaluSitetyAdi / ayaM jJAnAdvaitavAdI nAnAkArakaluSitacaitanyasAmAnyasyAdvayasaMvedanAnyathAnupattisAmarthyato'prasiddhaM sadadvayasaMvedanaM sAdhayet, na cAvayajJAnavAdino nAnAkArakaluSitasya caitanyasAmAnyasya hetutayAbhidhIyamAnasyAdvitvena tadasiddham, yadasiddhena sAdhyate iti doSaH, yata Aha tasya siddhatvAditi / yadyapi nAnAkArA alIkAstathApi nIlapItAdijJAneSvanugataM caitanyamAtraM siddhameva, prAkArAlIkatvAdeva ca na nAnAkArakaluSitamityuktam / anyatheti / tadA nAnAkArakaluSitaM caitanyasAmAnyaM siddha nAbhyupagamyate, tadA nirhetukatayA dvayavijJAnasAdhakamanumAnaM

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NYAYAVATARAH 67 , ko'bhyupagantavyaH, anyathA tatrApyanavasthAdoSo'nuSajyeta, nizcayAzca sarvathA svarUpaM nizcinuyuH, naikadezena yato nizvayairyanna nizcIyate rUpaM tatteSAM viSayaH kathamiti svayameva svavadhAya pralapitam, tathA cAdvayasya kSaNakSayirUpasya tairgrahaNe viparItAropAbhAvAdAdita eva anutthAnaM saMsArasyeti yuktirikta evAmuktAbhimAnaH syAt / na caivam, bhavabhAvasya pratiprANiprasiddhatvAt / tannAyamitaretarA vinirluThitadravyaparyAyaprakAzo bhrAntaH, tadviparItArthopasthApaka pramANAntarAbhAvAditi sthitam / yadA tu zUnyavAdI nirAlambanAH sarve pratyayAH pratyayatvAt svapnapratyayavaditi parAbhiprAyapravRttAnumAnabalAd bhrAntatAmasya kathayet, tadA taM prati sAlambanA: sarve pratyayAH pratyayatvAt jAgraddazApratyayavaditi viparItAnumAnamupaDhaukanIyam / sa yadi dRSTAntasya sAdhyavikalatAmudbhAvayet tadA taddRSTAnte'pi sA darzanIyA / yadi punarasau svapnapratyayasya nirAlamvanatvaM bhavadbhirabhipretamiti vilapannAsituM na dadyAt, tadAsa vikalpataH paryanuyojyaH - asmadabhyupagamaH pramANaM bhavato'pramANaM vA pramANaM cet, yathA tadbalAd dRSTAntasamarthanaM tathA jAgratpratyayagocarArthasamarthanamapi kiM na kuruSe, ko'yamardhajaratIyanyAyaH / athApramANam, evaM sati svapnapratyayanirAlamvanatAsAdhakaM pramANAntaraM mRgaNIyam, kimanena kuzakAzAvalambanena / tatrApi pramANAntare vikalpayugala mamalamavatarati, tat kiM nirAlambanam, sAlambanaM vA; nirAlambanaM cet, nAnyapratyayasya nirAlamvanatAM gadituM paTiSThaM nirgocaratvAt / atha sAlambanam, hanta hato'si, nirAlamvanAH sarve pratyayA iti pratijJAtakSateH, anenaiva vyabhicArAditi zaThaH pratizaThAcaraNena nirloThanIyaH / tannAsyAnaikAntikatvam / viruddhatAzaGkA punardurApAstaprasava, pramANaprakAzite'rthe sarvavAdinAM tathAbhyupagamAvigAnAditi / anena saMzayavirodhAnavasthAvaiyadhikaraNyAsaMbhavAdidUSaraNAni nirmUlakamithyAvikalpotthApitAni pratibhAsamudgaranipAtanirdalitamastakatvAnna jIvitumutsahate iti / tasmAdasiddhatAdidoSAdinA kRto'yaM tathApratibhAsalakSaNo heturanekAntagocaratAM pramANasya parAnabhyupagamayati, ityalaM vistareNa / tasmAttasyaiva tatra pratibhAsanAt sarvasaMvidAmanekAntAtmakaM vastu gocara iti sthitam / pravartata / kiM cetyAdi / zrayamabhiprAyaH kila - sitapItAdyanekAkAranirNayaH svasaMvedanApekSayA bhavadabhiprAyeNAdvarUpa:, anavasthAbhayAcca svayaM nirNayena svarUpaM nirNetavyam tadapi sarvathA, anyathA sitapItAdinirNayena yat sitapItAdinirNaya rUpaM svarUpaM na nirNIyate, zradvayAtmakamapi tadAtmanA tat svarUpaM tasya nirNayasya viSayaH katham ? naiva syAdityarthaH / evaM cAdvaye gRhIte anekAkArAropAbhAvAdanutthAnaM saMsArasyeti / parAbhiprAyeti / parobhyupagatAnumAno jainAdiH / zrananeti / pramANanirNIte'visaMvAdena / saMzayavirodhAnavasthA vaiyadhikaraNyAsaMbhavAditi / nityAnityAdyanekadharmakatve vastuno'bhyupagamyamAne nityavastuno'bhyupagamyamAne nityamidaM vastvanityaM cetyekasyAvadhAraNadvAreNa nirNIterabhAvAt saMzayaH / tathA yadeva vastu nityaM tadevAnityamiti virodhaH, nityAnityayoH parasparaparihAreNAvasthAnAt / yadi punarnityamanityAtmanA, anityaM nityarUpatayA vyavasthitaM syAt; tadA nityAnityatvayoravizeSAt pratiniyatavyavahArocchedaH / tathA yenAMzena nityaM tenAMzena kiM nityameva, prAhosvit tenApyaMzena nityamanityaM veti / tatrAdya

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 ayaM ca yathAvasthitapramANavyApAraparyAlocakapramAtrabhiprAyeNa pramANagocaro dazitaH / nayastahi kiMbhUtaM manyate iti vacanAvakAze satyAha-'eka' ityAdi / anantadharmAdhyAsitaM vastu svAbhipretaikadharmaviziSTaM nayati prApayati saMvedanamArohayatIti nayaH, pramANapravRtteruttarakAlabhAvI parAmarza ityarthaH / tasya viSayo gocaro'bhimataH abhipretaikadezenAnityatvAdidharmalakSaNena viziSTaH pararUpebhyo vyavacchinna ityrthH| arthaH prameyarUpaH, pramANamevaMvidhamevArthaM gRhNAti-iti svAkRtena tena vyavasthApanAditi / atha cApramANaviSayAM lakSaNasaMkhyAgocaraphalarUpAM caturvidhAM vipratipatti nirAkRtya atraiva nayagocaraM nirUpayannAha-eketyAdi / nanu cAdivAkyataH pramANavyutpAdanamAtra pratijJAtaM tat kimayamaprastuto'tra nayagocaraH pratipAdyate iti / satyam, evaM manyate-na nayaH pramANAdatyantaM dUrayAyI, kiM tarhi tadaMzabhUta eva, nayasamudAyasaMpAdyatvAt pramANasya, atastadvayutpAdanapratijJAte'sAvapi tanmadhyapatitastadgrahaNena gRhyate iti nyAyAd gRhIta eva, tannAyamaprastuta iti / atrApi padArthastveka eva, kevalaM vAkyArthabhedaH / tathA hiihaivaM ghttnaa| nayasya viSaya ekadezaviziSTo'rtho mato nItividAmiti / nanu ca yadi nayasya pramANAntaHpAtitve'pi pRthag gocaraH pratipadyate, tataH pramANavadetadviSayA lakSaNAdivipratipattirapi niraakrtvyaa| satyam, kiM tu na pareSAM nayavyavahAraH prasiddhaH, ato dharmiNo'bhAvAt tadgocarA vipratipattistyeiva / na ca te tena tattvaM pratipAdanIyAH, tattvapratipAdane pramANasyaiva vyApArAt, nayasya punarekadezaniSThatvena tatpratipAdanasAmarthya vikalatvAt, ata evAcAryasya na tallakSaNAdipakSe anekAntakSatiH / dvitIyapakSe punarapi yenAMzena nityaM tenAMzena kiM nityameva, pAhosvit tenApi nityamanityaM veti anvsthaa| evamanityapakSepi sarvametad bhAvanIyam / tathA bhinnapravRttinimittayoH zabdayorekasminnarthe vRtti : sAmAnAdhikaraNyam / yathA nIlotpalamityatra ekasmin utpaladravye nIlaguNaM nimittIkRtya nIlazabda: pravartate, utpalatvajAti cAzrityotpalazabdaH, tato bhavati nIlotpalazabdayobhinnapravRttinimittayorekasminnarthe vRttatvAt samAnAdhi karaNyam / atra tu nityatvAnityatvAdidharmANAM dravyAdabhede'myupagamyamAne yadeva nIladharmAtmakaM vastu nIla zabdapravRttinimittaM tadeva sadRzapariNAmalakSaNotpalatvajAtyAtmakatvamutpala zabdasyApi prvRttinimittm| tannAnekAntAbhyupagame'bhinnapravRttinimittatvAt sAmAnAdhikaraNyalakSaNaM ghaTate, tadabhAvAcca vaiyadhikaraNyamiti / tathAsaMbhavo'pi, saMzayavirodhAyuktayuktaH, ekasya vastuno nityAnityAdyanekadharmAliGgitatvAbhAvAt, ato na nityamanityaM ca tadeva vastu bhavati iti / prAdizabdAt pratyakSAdibAdhAparigrahaH / pramANapravRttarattarakAlabhAvIti / pratyakSAdipramANena yathAvasthitavastusvarUpagrahaNAdanantaramidaM nityamidamanityamityAdisvAzayena vastvaMzaparAmarza ityarthaH / evaMvidhamevetyAdi / nayadurnayayoH kiMcit sAmyAdibhedenaiva lkssnnaabhidhaanaadevmaah| yadvA 'gRhNAtyeva' ityatra evazabdo draSTavyaH / kevalaM vAkyArthabheda iti / tathA hi-pUrvasmin vAkyArthe nayasya kartRbhUtasyaikadeza viziSTo'rtho viSayo mataH, asmistu vAkyArthe nayasya saMbandhI viSayo nItividA kartabhUtAnAmevaMvidho'bhipreta iti spaSTo vAkyArthabhedaH /

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NYAYAVATARAH svarUpakathane'pi mahAnAdaraH / gocaraM punarvaiyapakSe kAkvA prakSipan sAkSAt pratipAdayati-mA bhUt svadarzanAntaHpAtinAM mandabuddhInAM pramANapratipanne'pyanekAntAtmake vastunyekadezasamarthanAbhinivezalakSaNaH kadAgraha iti / athavA svadarzanAntaHpAtinaH prati anenaiva gocarakathanenopalakSaNatvAllakSaNAdInyapi lakSayati / tatra pramANapratipannArthaMkadezaparAmarzo naya iti lakSaNam, sarvanayavizeSAnuyAyitvAtpararUpavyAvartanakSamatvAccAsya / saMkhyayA punaranantA iti, anantadharmatvAdvastunaH, tadekadezadharmaparyAyAvasitAbhiprAyANAM ca nayatvAta, tathApi ciraMtanAcAryaiH sarvasaMgrAhisattAbhiprAyaparikalpanAdvAreNa sapta nayA: prtipaaditaaH| tadyathA--naigamasaMgrahavyavahArarjusUtrazabdasamabhirUDhavaMbhUtA nayAH iti / ato'smAbhirapi te eva varNyante / kathamete sarvAbhiprAyasaMgrAhakAH iti cet, ucyate / abhiprAyastAvadarthadvAreNa zabdadvAreNa vA pravartata, gatyantarAbhAvAt, arthazca sAmAnyarUpo vizeSarUpo vA, zabdo'pi rUDhito vyutpattitazca, vyutpattirapi sAmAnyanimitta prayuktA tatkAlabhAvinimittaprayuktA vA syAt / tatra ye kecanArthanirUpaNapravaNA: pramAtrabhiprAyAste sarve'pyAye nayacatuSTaye'ntarbhavanti, tatrApi ye parasparavizakalitau sAmAnyavizeSAvicchanti tatsamudAyarUpo naigamaH / ye punaH kevalaM sAmAnyaM vAJchanti tatsamUhasaMpAdyaH saMgrahaH / ye punaranapekSitazAstrIyasAmAnyavizeSa lokavyavahAramavatarantaM ghaTAdikaM padArthamabhipreyanti tannicayajanyo vyavahAraH / ye saugatAstu kSaNakSayiNaH paramANulakSaNA vizeSAH satyA iti manyante, tatsaMghAtaghaTita RjusUtra iti / tathA ye mImAMsakAH rUDhitaH zabdAnAM pravRtti vAJchanti tannivahasAdhyaH zabda iti / ye tu vyutpattito dhvanInAM pravRtti vAJchanti nAnyathA, tavArajanyaH samabhirUDha iti / ye tu vartamAnakAlabhAvivyutpatti nimittamadhikRtya zabdAH pravartante nAnyatheti manyante, tatsaMghaTitaH khalvevaMbhUta iti / tadevaM na sa kazcana vikalpo'sti vastugocaro yo'tra nayasaptake nAntaryAtIti sarvAbhiprAyasaMgrAhakA ete iti sthitam / sAMpratameSAmeva pratyeka matamupavarNayAmaH-tatra gamanaM gamaH pariccheda ityarthaH, nizcito gamaH nigamaH viviktavastugrahaNaM, sa eva prajJAderAkRtigaNatayA svathikANapratyayavidhAnAd naigamaH / yadi vA, nigamyante niyataM paricchidyante iti nigamAH arthAsteSu bhavo'bhiprAyo niyata paricchedarUpaH sa naigama iti / ayaM hi sattAlakSaNaM mahAsAmAnyamavAntarasAmAnyAni ca dravyatvaguNatvakarmatvAdIni, tathAntyAn vizeSAn sakalAsAdhAraNarUpalakSaNAnavAntaravizeSAMzcApekSayA pararUpavyAvartana tatsamudAyarUpo naigama iti / pUrva hi ye parasparavizakalito sAmAnyavizeSAvicchanti iti bahuvacanena nirdeze naigame ityekavacanAntatvAt nAtra suzliSTo vAkyArthaH syAditi tatsamudAyarUpa ityuktam / evaM tatsamUhAdizabdeSvapi bhAvanIyam / tathA antyAn vizeSAniti / utpAdavinAzayorante vyavasthitatvAd antAni nityadravyANi tatra bhavAstAn / ayamarthaH-tulyarUparasagandhasparzeSu paramANuSu nityatvAmUrtatvasarva

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Mill!: 70 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I kSamAna sAmAnyAdatyantavini ThitasvarUpAnabhipreti / tathA hi kila-saMviniSThAH padArthavyavasthitayaH, na ca sAmAnyagrAhiNi vijJAne vizeSAvabhAso'sti, anuvartamAnakAkAraparAmarzena tadgrahaNAd, anyathA sAmAnyagrAhakatvAyogAt, nApi vizeSagrahaNadakSe saMvedane sAmAnyaM cakAsti, viziSTadezadazAvacchinnapadArthagrAhitayA tatpravRtteH, anyathA vizeSasaMvedanatvAyogAt / na cetau parasparavibhinnAvapi pratibhAsamAnau sAmAnyavizeSau kathaMcinmizrayituM yuktau, atiprasaGgAt, vibhinna pratibhAsinAmapi nikhilArthAtmanAmaikyaprApteH / evaM ca pramANayati-parasparavizliSTau sAmAnyavizeSau, pArthakyenopalabdheH, iha yadyat pArthakyenopalabhyate tattat parasparavizliSTaM dravyam, tadyathA-devadattayajJadattAviti, prArthakyena copalabhyete sAmAnyavizeSau, ataH prsprvibhinnaaviti| na sAmAnyAt pRthagvizeSopalambha iti cet, kathaM tarhi tasyopalambha iti vAcyam, sAmAnyavyAptasyeti cet, na tarhi sa vizeSopalambhaH, sAmAnyasyApi tena grahaNAt, tatazca tena bodhena viviktavizeSagrahaNAbhAvAt tadvAcakaM dhvani tatsAdhyaM ca vyavahAraM na pravartayet pramAtA, na caitadasti, vizeSAbhidhAnavyavahArayoH pravRttidarzanAt, tasmAdvizeSamabhilaSatA tatra ca vyavahAraM pravartayatA tadgrAhako bodho vivikto'bhyupagantavyaH / tathA sAmAnyamapi viviktakAratayA svagrAhiNi jJAne yadi na prakAzeta, tadA tadgocarAbhimatasaMvedanena vizeSasyApyAkalanAt sAmAnyAbhidhAnavyavahArayoH pravRtterucchedastathaiva vaktavyaH, viviktasAmAnyagrAhibodhamUlakatvAttayoH, tadaniSTau tayorapyabhAvApatteH / na ca sAmAnyaM vizeSa vA tiraskRtya kevalasya vizeSasya sAmAnyasya vAbhyupagamaH kartu yuktaH, dvayorapi svagrAhijJAne pratibhAsamAnatayA vizeSAbhAvAt / tasmAdetau dvAvapItaretaravizakalitAvaGgIkaraNAr2yAviti naigamaH // adhunA saMgrahAbhiprAyo vrnnyte| tatra saMgRhNAti azeSavizeSatirodhAnadvAreNa sAmAnyarUpatayA jagadAdatta iti saMgrahaH / ayaM hi manyate-bhAvalakSaNasAmAnyAd vyatiricyamAnamUrtayo vA vizeSAH parikalpyeran, avyatiricyamAnamUrtayo vA, gatyantarAbhAvAt / tatra yadyAdyaH pakSaH, tadA niHsvabhAvatAM te svIkuryuH, bhAvavyatirekitvAt, gaganakusumAdivat / atha dvitIyaH kalpaH, tahi bhAvamAtramApadyante / tathA gatatvAdibhistulyeSu sarvAtmasu cAyamasmAdvilakSaNa iti yato yoginAM pratyayaH sa pratiparamANu pratyAtma ca vizeSa iti / tayoriti ubhayatrApi sAmAnyAbhidhAnavyahArayoH / tadaniSTAviti / kevalasAmAnyagrAhibodhAniSTau / atra naigamAbhiprAyasaMgrahazloka: anyadeva hi sAmAnyamabhinnajJAnakAraNam / vizeSo'pyanya eveti manyate naigamo nayaH / / sAmAnyarUpatayA jagadAvatte iti / sarvamekam, sadavizeSAditi hi tasiddhAntaH / pratyakSa hIti / yadAhustadvAdinaH-- pAhuvidhAtR pratyakSaM na niSedhR vipazcitaH / naikatva prAgamastena pratyakSeNa prabAdhyate //

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NYAYAVATARAN hi-bhAvamAtraM vishessaaH| tadavyatiriktatvAda, iha yadyato'vyatiriktaM tattadeva bhavati, tadyathA bhAvasyaiva svarUpam, avyatirekiNazca vizeSAH, atastadrUpA eva / nanu ca yadi bhAvamAtrameva tattvaM tadA tasya sarvatrAvizeSAd ya ete pratiprANi prasiddhAH stambhebhakumbhAmbhoruhAdiviziSTavastusAdhyA vyavahAriNaste sarve'pi pralayamAporan, ato vizeSA api viviktavyavahArahetavo'bhyupagantavyAH / naitadasti, vyavahArasyApyanAdyavidyAbalapravartitatvAt, tena pAramArthikapramANapratiSThitatattvapratibandhAbhAvAt / kiM ca vizeSAgraho vizeSeNa tyAjyaH, vizeSavyavasthApakapramANAbhAvAt / tathA hi-bhedarUpA vizeSAH, na ca kiMcitpramANaM bhedamavagAhate, pratyakSaM hi tAvadbhAvasaMpAditasattAkaM tameva sAkSAtkartu yuktaM nAbhAvam, tasya sakalazaktiviraharUpatayA tadutpAdane vyApArAbhAvAt, anutpAdakasya ca sAkSAtkaraNe sarvasAkSAtkaraNaprasaGgAt, tathA ca vizeSAbhAvAt sarvo draSTA sarvadarzI syAt, aniSTaM caitad bhavatAm, tasmAd bhAvagrAhakameva tadeSTavyam / sa ca bhAvaH sarvatrAviziSTa iti tathaiva tena sAhyaH, taduttarakAlabhAvI punarvikalpo 'ghaTo'yaM paTAdirna bhavati' ityevamAkAro vyavahAraM racayan avidyAmUlatvAnna pramANam, tanna pratyakSAdvizeSAvagatiH / nApyanumAnAdeH, pratyakSamUlakatvAccheSapramANavargasya, tasmAt sAmAnyameva paramArtho na vizeSA iti saMgrahaH // sAMprataM vyavahAramatamucyate--tatra vyavaharaNaM vyavahriyate vAnena laukikairabhiprAyeNeti vyavahAraH / ayaM tu manyate-yathAlokagrAhameva vastvastU, kimanayAdaSTAvyavahriyamANavastuparikalpanakaSTapiSTikayA ? yadeva ca lokavyavahArapathamavatarati tasyAnugrAhakaM pramANamupalabhyate, netarasya, na hi sAmAnyamanAdinidhanamekaM saMgrahAbhimataM pramANabhUmiH, tathAnubhavAbhAvAta, sarvasya sarvazitvaprasaGgAcca / nApi vizeSAH paramANalakSaNAH kSaNakSayiNaH pramANagocaraH, tathA pravRtterabhAvAt / tasmAdidameva nikhilalokAbAdhitaM pramANaprasiddhaM kiyatkAlabhAvistharatAmAvibhrANamudakAharaNAdyarthakriyAnirvartanakSamaM ghaTAdikaM ca vasturUpaM pAramArthikamastu, pUrvottarakAlabhAvitatparyAyaparyAlocanA punarajyAyasI, tatra pramANaprasarAbhAvAt, pramANamantareNa ca vicArasya kartumazakyatvAt, avastutvAcca teSAM kiM tadgocaraparyAlocanena ? tathA hi-pUrvottarakAlabhAvino dravyavivartAH kSaNakSayiparamANulakSaNA vA vizeSA na kaMcana lokavyavahAramuparacayanti, tanna te vasturUpAH, lokavyavahAropayoginAmeva vastutvAt iti vyavahAraH // sAMprataM RjusUtrAbhiprAyaH kathyate tatra RjupraguNamakuTilamatItAnAgatavakraparityAgAdvartamAnakSaNavivarti vastuno rUpaM sUtrayati niSTaGkitaM darzayatIti - saMgrahazloka: sadrUpatAnatikrAntasvasvabhAvamidaM jagat / sattArUpatayA sarva saMgRhNan saMgraho mataH / / yathAlokagrAhamiti / grAhayatIti grAho'bhiprAyaH, pacAdyac, lokAbhiprAyavizeSaH, tsyaantikrmenneti|

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72 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 RjusUtraH / tathA hi- prasyAbhiprAyaH / atItasya vinaSTatvAt anAgatasyAlabdhAtmalAbhatvAt kharaviSANAdibhyo'viziSyamAraNatayA sakalazaktiviraharUpatvAnnArthakriyAnirvartanakSamatvam, arthakriyAkSamaM ca vastu tadabhAvAnna tayorvaM stutvamiti, vartamAnakSaNAliGgitaM ca punarvasturUpaM samastArthakriyAsu vyApriyate iti tadeva pAramArthikam / tadapi ca niraMzamabhyupagantavyam, aMzavyApteryuktiriktatvAd, ekasyAnekasvabhAvatAmantareNAnekasvAvayavavyApanAyogAt / anekasvabhAvataivAstviti cenna virodhAghrAtatvAt / tathA hi-yadyekaH svabhAvaH kathamanekaH anekazcet kathamekaH ? ekAnekayoH parasparaparihAreNAvasthAnAt tasmAt svarUpanimagnAH paramANava eva parasparopasarpaNadvAreNa kathaMcinnicayarUpatAmApannA nikhila - kAryeSu vyApArabhA iti te eva svalakSaNam, na sthUratAM dhArayatpAramArthikamiti / kiM ca pramANato'rthavyavasthA, na ca pramANaM dezakAlavyAptigrahaNe kiMcana pravartate, sarvapramANAnAM vartamAnaprakAzarUpatvAt / tathA hi- pratyakSaM tAvadrUpAlokamanaskAracakSurlakSaNakAraNacatuSTayAllabdhasattAkaM vartamAnakSaNe eva prakAzate, atIta vartsya - tkSaNayorasaMnihitatvAt tatazca tat tatkAlasaMbaddhameva vastuno rUpaM sAkSAtkartu kSamatena pUrvamaparaM vA, asaMnidhAnAdeva / yadi punarvinaSTamapi pUrvakSaNavartirUpa - saMgrahazlokaH- , vyavahArastu tAmeva prativastuvyasthitAm / tathaiva dRzyamAnatvAd vyavahArayati dehinaH // tAmiti sattArUpatAm / zeSaM sugamam / dezakAlavyAptIti / ekasyAnekAvayavavyAptirdezavyAptiH, etAvatA sthUratvamuktam, ekasyAnekakSaNavyAptiH kAlavyAptiH anena tu sthiratvamabhihitam / tatra kAlavyApteranantaratvena saMnihitatvAd yathAkathaMcidarthaprakAzasya vA vivakSitatvAt / sarvapramANAnAmityAdinA tAvat kAlavyApti dUSayitumArabhate - vartamAnaprakAzarUpatvAditi / vartamAna: pUrvAparasamayaviviktaH, prakAzaH paricchedo rUpaM yeSAM pramANAnAM teSAM pramANAnAM teSAM bhAvastatvaM tasmAt / idamatra hRdayam - paricchedakaM hi pramANamekakSaNavartyeva tatastena paricchidyamAno'rthopi svaikakSaraNavartyeva paricchettavyaH, na pUrvAparakSaNavartI, tasya paricchedakapramANakAle'bhAvAt, tatkAle ca paricchedakapramANasyAsattvAditi / vartamAnakAlaparigatavastu taditi pratyakSam / tatkAla saMbaddhaM vartamAnakAla saMgatam / grAhitvaM cAdhyakSasya vaibhASikAbhiprAyeNa, kSaNakSayAdyavasthitatvalakSaNatvAdvastunaH, anyathA cakSurindriyasaMnikRSTAdarthAdutpadyamAnasya dvitIyakSaNabhAvino jJAnasya na prAkkSaNavatirUpagrAhakatvena vartamAnavastugrAhakatvaM syAt / sautrAntikAbhiprAyeNa vastujanyajJAnagatagrAhyAkAralakSaNameva vastuno rUpaM sAkSAtkatu kSamate iti vyAkhyA / ' vastvAhitamAtmagatamAkAraM pratyakSaM paricchinatti' - iti hi sautrAntikAnAM siddhAntaH / yadAhustadvAdina:arthI jJAnasamanvito matimatA vaibhASikeraNocyate pratyakSo na hi bAhyavastuvisaraH sautrAntikairAzritaH / yogAcArAnurabhihitA sAkAra buddhi: manyante vata madhyamAH kRtadhiyaH svacchAM paraM saMvidam // iti // parA ' ,

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73 NYAYAVATARA" mAkalayeta , tadA vinaSTatvAvizeSAniravadhiH kSaNaparaMparA tatra pratIyeta, tathA ca sati saMkalikayA anAdijanmaparaMparAgrAhi pratyakSamanuSajyeta, evamanAgatakSaNagrahaNe'pi yojyam, aniSTaM caitata , tasmAt tadvArtamAnikakSaNagrahaNadakSamevetyabhyupagantavyam / nanu na yadi kSaNabhaGguratAmarthAtmanAmadhyakSameva lokayati, tadAnIlateva pratibhAsamAnA sA vipratipattigocaraM na yAyAditi tadviSayo laukikAnAM vyavahAraH pravarteta, na caitadasti, sthiratAdvAreNa vyavahArapravRtteriti / atra pratividhIyate-sAkSAtkurvANA api kSaNavinazvaratAM sadRzAparAparotpattivipralabdhabuddhayo mandA nAdhyavasyanti, anAdikAlaprarUDhavAsanAprabodhasamupajanitamithyAvikalpasAmarthyAcca viparyastasthiratAvyavahAraM pravartayanti, tannAyamadhyakSasyAparAdhaH, api tu pramAtaNAmeva / tathA hi-ghanAkAro'pi pratyakSapRSThabhAvimithyAvikalpasaMdarzita eva, viviktadarzane tatpratibhAsAyogAt, karacaraNazirogrIvAdayo hyavayavAH parasparavibhaktA eva tatra pratibhAnti, na vyApyAkAraH, na ca te'pi svAMzavyApinaH pratibhAnti, tadavayavAnAmapItaretaravizakalitarUpANAM pratibhAsatA tAvat yAvatparamANava eva prathante, vyApirUpasya vicArAkSamatvAdityuktaprAyam / nApyanumAnAsthirasthUravastusiddhiH, pratyakSaparigRhItaM hi saMbandhamAsAdyAnumAnaM pravartate, yadA ca tatkSaNabhaGguraviviktAMzagrahaNacAturyamAbimrad darzitaM tadAnumAnamapi tatpratibandhamUlakaM tadgocarameva pAraMparyeNa pratiSThApayati, svapratibhAsino rUpasyAlIkatayA tatpratiSThApanadvAreNaiva tasya praamaannyaat| nana ca smaraNapratyabhijJAnAdIni sthirasthUravastuvyatirekeNa nopapadyante, pUrvamadaSTe tadabhAvAt, puruSAdyavayavinAM smaraNAtpratyabhijJAnAcca / naitadasti, teSAmalIkavAsanAprabodhotthApitatvena prAmANyAyogAt / kiM ca, tAnyapi svayaM vartamAnakSaNe eva prakAzante, viplavavazAttu svarUpameva vAsanAsaMpAditAtItArtharUpatayA vyavasyanti, ghanAkAraM ca tasyAsantamadhyAropayanti, tanna tebhyo'pi vyApivastusiddhiH / tasmAda __ tatra sautrAntikayogAcArazabdau pUrvameva dttaaii| vaibhASikamadhyamazabdau tvevaM sautrAntikAdyapekSayA viruddhaM bhASaNaM catuHkSaNikaM vastvAdi vibhASA, gurozca niSThAyAM seTa iti apratyayaH, sa prayojanaM pravartakaM vaibhASikadhvaninimittaM yasya sa vaibhASikaH / prayojanam (pA0 5-1-106)-iti ThaJ / prabhAcandrastu nyAyakumudacandre -'vibhASA saddharmapratipAdako granthavizeSastAM vidanti adhIyate vA vaibhASikAH' itbhuvAca / tathA madhye bhavo madhyama: madhyAnmamaNa vA iti vizrAntasUtreNa mapratyayaH / pUrvottarakSaNAsaMsparzI nirAkAro jJAnakSaNastatsamarthanapravaNA vAdinI'pi mdhymaaH| mAdhyamika dhvanistu ittham-~-madhyamena, kSaNena caranti caratyarthe ikaN / yadvA madhyama prAdyapuruSavizeSastasya darzanaM madhyamam tatprayojanaM yeSAm, pUrvavat ThaJ, astyarthe vA ThaJ / dvAdyasvaravoto'sya prAya (?) iti pAThaH / ghanAkAro'pItyAdinA dezavyApti dUSayitumupakramate / svapratibhAsina: sAmAnyasya / tatpratiSThApanadvAreNa adhyavasAyavazAtsvalakSaNavyavasthApanadvAreNa / tasya anumAnasya / smaraNapratyabhijJAviti / prAdizabdAt saMkalanAjJAnAdigrahaH / tAnyapi smaraNapratyabhijJAnAdIni / viplava iti / sadRzAparAparosattidarzanakRto vibhramaH / svarUpamiti / smaraNAnugataM bodha

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74 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 vyApini rUpe pramANAnavatArAt parasparavizliSTAH paramANava eva paramArthata iti RjusUtraH // tadidamarthasvarUpanirUpaNanipuNAnAM nayAnAM matamupaNitam, adhunA zabdavicAracaturANAmupavarNyate-tatra trayANAmapi zabdAdInAmidaM sAdhAraNAkRtam, yaduta zabda eva paramArtho nArthaH, tasya tadavyatiriktatvAt / pArthakyena vastutvasiddheH kathamavyatireka iti ceta, pramANAditi bramaH / tathA hi-na vyatirikto'rthaH zabdAt, tatpratItau tasya pratIyamAnatvAt, iha yatpratItau yatpratIyate tata tato'vyatiriktaM bhavati, tadyathA zabde pratIyamAne tasyaiva svarUpam, pratIyate ca zabde pratIyamAne'rthaH, ato'sau tato'vyatirikta iti / atha agRhItasaMketasya ghaTazabdazravaNe'pi ghaTapratIterabhAvAd vyatirikta iti ceta , evaM tahi viSasya mAraNAtmakatvaM tadajJasya na pratibhAtIti tattato vyatiriktamApadyeta, na caitadasti, tadavyatirekAvizeSeNa guDakhaNDavadviSasyApyamArakatvApatteH, saMbandhasya ca vyatiriktena saha prAgevApAstatvAta , tanna abudhapramAtRdoSeNa vastuno'nyathAtvam, anyathAndho rUpaM nekSate iti tadabhAvo'pi pratipattavya iti / ye nirabhidhAnA vartante'rthAsteSAM zabdAtpArthakyena vastutvasiddhiriti cenna, nirabhidhAnArthAbhAvAta , kevalaM kecita vizeSazabdaiH saMkIrtyante, kecita sAmAnyadhvanibhirityetAvAn vizeSaH syAt / yadi vA sakalArthavAcakA vizeSadhvanayo na santIti nAstyatra pramAraNam / tatazca sarve'rthA vidyamAnasvavAcakAH, arthatvAta , ghaTArthavaditi pramANAta; sarveSAM svavAcakatvena pUrvoktayukteHzabdAdapArthakya siddhiH / tasmAnna paramArthato'rthaH zabdAdavyatirikto'sti, upacArataH punalaukikairaparyAlocitaparamArthairvyavahiyate / asAvapyaupacArikaH zabdAtmako vArthaH pratikSaNabhaGguraH svIkartavyaH, varNAnAM kSaNadhvaMsitApratIteH, RjusUtrapratipAditayuktikalApAcca / / sAMpratameteSAmeva pratyekamabhiprAyaH kathyate-tatra zabdo rUDhito yAvanto dhvanayaH kasmizcidarthe pravartante, yathA indrazakrapurandarAdayaH, teSAM sarveSAmapyekamarthamabhipraiti kila pratItivazAt yathA zabdAvyatireko'rthasya pratipAdyate tathaiva tasyaikatvaM vA naikatvaM vA pratipAdanIyam, na cendrazakrapurandarAdayaH paryAyazabdA vibhinArthavAcitayA kadAcana pratIyante, tebhyaH sarvadaivaikAkAraparAmarzotpatteH, askhala ruupm| vAsaneti / pUrvajJAnajanitAmuttarajJAne zaktimAhuH / tayA saMpAditamatItArtharUpamAkAro yeSAM smaraNAdInAM teSAM bhAvastayA, pratItArthAkAravanti vayaM sma iti smaraNAdIni vikalpayanti / tasyeti / svarUpasya / saMgrahazlokaH : tatrarjusUtranIti: syAt zuddhaparyAyasaMzritA / nazvarasyaiva bhAvasya bhAvAt sthiti viyogataH // __eka evetyAdi / yathA zabdanayaH paryAyazabdAnAmekamarthamabhipreti tathA taTastaTItaTamiti viruddhaliGgalakSaNadharmAbhisaMbandhAd vastuno bhedaM cAbhidhatte / na hi viruddhadharmakRtaM bhedamanubhavato vastuno viruddhadharmayogo yuktaH, evaM saMkhyAkAlakArakapuruSAdibhedAdapi bhedo'vagantavyaH / saMgrahazloka :

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NYAYAVATARAT dvattitayA tathaiva vyavahAradarzanAt / tasmAdeka eva paryAya zabdAnAmartha iti zabdaH / zabdyate AhUyate'nenAbhiprAyeNArtha iti niruktAdekArthapratipAdakatAbhiprAyeNaiva paryAyadhvanInAM prAyogAditi / sAMprataM samabhirUDhamatamupavarNyate-tatra sam ekIbhAvenAbhirohati vyutpattinimittamAskandati zabdapravRtau yo'bhiprAyaH saH samabhirUDhaH / ayaM hi paryAyazabdAnAM prativibhaktamevArthamabhimanyante, tadyathA-indanAdindraH, paramaizvaryamindrazabdavAcyaM paramArthataH, tadvatyarthe punarUpacArato pravartate, na vA kazcit tadvAn sarvazabdAnAM parasparapravibhaktArthapratipAdakatayA AzrayAzrayibhAvena pravRttyasiddheH / evaM zakanAcchakraH, pUrdAraNAt purandara ityAdi bhinnArthatvaM sarvazabdAnAM darzayati, pramANayati ca-paryAyazabdA vibhinnArthAH, prativibhaktavyutpattinimittakatvAt, iha ye ye prativibhaktavyutpattinimittakAste te bhinnArthAH, yathA indraghaTapuruSAdizabdAH, vibhinna vyutpattinimittakAzca paryAyazabdA api, ato bhinnArthA iti / yatpunaravicAritapratItibalAdekArthAbhidhAyakatvaM pratipAdyate tadayuktam, atiprasaGgAt / tathA hi-yadi yuktiriktA pratItireva zaraNIkriyate, tadA tadA mandamandaprakAze davIyasi deze saMniviSTazarIravibhinnA api nimbakadambAzvatthakapitthAdaya ekatarvAkAratAmAvibhrANAH pratIyante iti ekatayaivAbhyupagantavyAH / na caitadasti, viviktatatsvarUpagrAhipratyanIkapratyayopanipAtavAdhitatvena pUrvapratIteH viviktAnAmeva teSAmabhyupagamAt, tannaikArthavAcino dhvanayaH santi, rUDhiH punaravicAritatadarthAnAmiti samabhirUDhaH / / sAMpratamevaMbhUtAbhiprAya: pratipAdyate-tatraivaMzabdaH prakAravacanaH, tatazcaivaM yathA vyutpAditaH taM prakAraM bhUtaH prApto yaH zabdaH sa evaMbhUtaH, tatsamarthanapradhAnAbhiprAyo'pyevaMbhUtaH, tadviSayatvAta, viSayazabdena ca viSayiNo'bhidhAnAt / ayaM virodhe liGgasaMkhyAdibhedAd bhinnasvabhAvatAm / tasyaiva manyamAno'yaM zabdaH pratyavatiSThate / / ekIbhAveneti pratyekam / ayamabhiprAyaH yathA viruddhaliGgAd bhidyate vastu, tathA saMjJAbhedAdapiH tato yAvanto'rthasya svAbhidhAyakA dhvanayastAvanto'rtha bhedAH, pratyarthaM zabdanivAsAditi / tadvatIti / paramaizvarya yukte upacArasya ca nimittam, tatraizvaryasthAvasthAnam, na vA kazcit tadvAn zabdAnAmabhidheya iti zeSaH / davIyasIti dUratare / avicAritatavarthAnAmiti / teSAM zabdAnAmarthastadarthaH, na vicAritastadarthoM yaiste tathA teSAm / saMgrahazlokaH tathAvidhasya tasyApi vastunaH kSaraNavRttinaH / brUte samabhirUDhastu . saMjJAbhedena bhinnatAm / / tathAvidhasyeti viruddhaliGgAdiyogabhedinaH / / tadviSayatvAditi / sa evaMbhUtaH zabdo viSayo yasyAbhiprAyasya tadbhAvastattvaM tasmAt / viSayiNa iti / abhiprAyasya / yadvA yatkriyAviziSTa zabdenocyate sa ca kriyAM kurvad vastu

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76 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I hi yasminnarthe zabdo vyutpAdyate sa vyutpattinimittamartho yadaiva vivartate tadaiva taM zabdaM pravartamAnamabhipraiti na sAmAnyena / yathA udakAdhAharaNavelAyAM yoSidAdimastakArUDho viziSTaceSTAvAneva ghaTo'bhidhIyate, na zeSaH, ghaTazabdavyutpattinimittazUnyatvAt paTAdivaditi / zratItAM bhAvinIM vA ceSTAmadhikRtya sAmAnyenaivocyate iti cenna, tayorvinaSTAnutpannatayA zazaviSANakalpatvAt / tathApi taddvAreNa zabdaH pravartate, sarvatra pravartayitavyaH, vizeSAbhAvAt / kiM ca yadyatItavartsya - cceSTApekSayA ghaTazabdo'ceSTAvatyapi prayujyeta, kapAlamRtpiNDAdAvapi tatpravartanaM durnivAraM syAta vizeSAbhAvAta, tasmAd yatra kSaNe vyutpattinimittavikalamasti / tasminneva so'rthastacchabdena vAcya ityevaMbhUtaH / tadevamanekadharmaparItArthagrAhikA buddhiH pramANam, taddvArAyAtaH punarekadharmaniSThArthasamarthanapravaNaH parAmarzaH zeSadharmasvIkAra tiraskAraparihAradvAreNa varta - mAno nayaH / sa ca dharmANAmAnantyAdanantabheda:, tathApi sarvasaMgrAhakAbhiprAya parikalpanamukhenaiva saptabhedo darzitaH / ayameva ca svAbhipretadharmAvadhAraNAtmakatayA zeSadharmatiraskAradvAreNa pravartamAnaH parAmarzo durnayasaMjJAmaznute / tadbalaprabhAvitasattAkA hi khalvete parapravAdAH / tathA hi-naigamanayadarzanAnusAriNau naiyAyikavaizeSikau / saMgrahAbhiprAyapravRttAH sarve'pyadvaitavAdAH, sAMkhyadarzanaM ca / vyavahAranayAnupAti prAyazcArvAkadarzanam / RjusUtrAkUtapravRttabuddhayastAthAgatAH / zabdAdinayamatAvalambino vaiyAkaraNAdaya iti / athetthamabhidadhIthAH yathA -- - kathamete'vadhAraNadvAreNa svakamarthaM samarthayantastadviparItaM nirAkurvANA durnayatAM pratipadyante iti, atrocyate--- evaM pravRttau nirgocaratvAta, nirgocarasya nayatvAyogAt / tathA hi-nayati kenacidaM - zena viziSTamarthaM prApayati yo'bhiprAyaH sa nayaH, svAbhipretadharmAta zeSadharmapratikSepadvAreNa tu pravRttau na kiMcana nayati, ekadharmAliGgitasya vastuno'saMbhavAta, bahirantazcAnekadharmaparikaritasvabhAvasya tasya pratibhAsAt, tadapahnavakAriNAM kadabhiprAyANAM pratibhAsabAdhitatvenAlIkatvAt / tathA hi-yaH tAvannaigamanayaH paraspara vizliSTau sAmAnyavizeSau pratyapIpadata, tadayuktam, tayostathA kadAcana pratibhAsAbhAvAt / yaccoktam - anuvartamAnaikAkAraparAmarzagrAhyaM sAmAnyaM yatra na tatra evaMbhUta ucyate tatpratipAdanaparo nayo'pyevaMbhUtaH / tathA evaM yaH zabdenocyate ceSTAdikaH prakAra : tamevaMbhUtaH prApto'bhiprAyaH tadviziSTasyaiva vastuno'bhyupagamanAt / zrasmizca pakSe nirupacAro'pyevaM bhUtadhvanirabhidhIyata iti / yastvaceSTAvatyapi pRthubudhnodarAdyAkAre ghaTazabdaprayogaH sa mithyA, nirnimittatvAt / zazaviSANakalpatvAditi / ISadaparisamApte zazaviSANe zazaviSANakalpe, tayorbhAvaH tattvaM tasmAt / sarvatreti ceSTAdAvapItyarthaH / yadyatItetyAdinA zazaviSANakalpatvAbhAve'pi dUSaNAntaramabhidadhAti / saMgrahazloka : ekasyApi dhvanervAcyaM sadA tannopapadyate / kriyAbhedena bhinnatvAdevaM bhUto'bhimanyate // sadeti / pravRtti nimittakAlAdanyadApi / taditi vastu // vaiyAkaraNAdaya iti / grAdizabdAdabhidharmakozakartAro gRhyante /

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77 vizeSapratibhAsaH, yatra ca viziSTadezadazAvacchinnabodhanirgrAhyo vizeSo na tatra sAmAnyAvagatiH, tadvacanamAtrameva, dhavakhadirapalAzAdisamastavizeSA pasaraNe vRkSatvAdisAmAnyapratibhAsAbhAvAt / dUrAdvizeSAgrahaNe'pi kevalaM taccakAstIti cet, tatrApyabhyantarIbhUtavizeSapratibhAsAta, tadvirahe zazaviSANarUpatvAt / evaM vizeSA api na sAmAnyAdatyantavyatirekiNaH pratibhAnti, tannimagnAnAmeva teSAM grahaNAt, itarathA sattAto'tiricyamAnA bhAvA niHsvabhAvatAmAtmasAtkurvanti / tathA vRkSatvAdisAmAnyebhyo'pi bhedino vRkSAdayo na syuH, tadabhedanibandhanatvAt tat - svarUpasthiteH, tasmAttadeva saMvedanamupasarjanIkRtavaiSamyaM pradhAnIkRtaikAkAraM sAmAnyaM gRhNAti ityucyate, nyakkRtasamatvamutkalitanAnAtvaM punarvizeSagrAhIti, samatvanAnAtvayoH kathaMcid bhedAbhedinoH parasparaM sarvArtheSu bhAvAta, tadabhAve tathAvidhapratibhAsAnupapatteH / etena yadavAdi 'na caitau vibhinnAvapi pratibhAsamAnau sAmAnyavizeSau kathaMcid mizrayituM yuktAvityAdi' tadapAstamavagantavyam, vibhinnayoH pratibhAsAbhAvAta, vyavahAro'pi sarvapradhAnopasarjanadvAreNa kathaMciditaretarAvinirluThitasAmAnyavizeSasAdhya eva / na hi sAmAnyaM dohavAhAdikriyAyAmupayujyate, vizeSANAmeva tatropayogAta ; nApi vizeSA eva tatkAriNaH, gotvazUnyAnAM teSAM vRkSAdyaviziSTatayA tatkaraNasAmarthyAbhAvAt / kiM ca atyantavyatireke sAmAnyavizeSayoH 'vRkSaM chinddhi' iti coditaH kimiti tadvizeSe palAzAdau chedaM vidhatte ? tatra tasya samavAyAditi cenna / samavAyagrAhakapramANAbhAvAta, bhAve'pi vizliSTayorabhedabuddhayutpAdanAkSamatvAta, tasyApi vyatiriktatayA padArthAntarAvizeSAt nityatvakatvasarvagatatvAdibhizca sarvatra tatkaraNaprasaGgAt / yatpunaravAdI: 'yaduta yadi sAmAnyaM vizeSaniSTham, vizeSo vA sAmAnyavyAptaH samupalabhyeta tato viviktaH yostayoH kvacidanupalambhAt yo'yaM viviktaH sAmAnya vizeSeSu cAbhidhAnArthakriyAlakSaNo vyavahAraH sa samastaH pralayaM yAyAd, lolIbhAvena tadvivekasya kartumazakyatvAta', tadapyasamIcInam / yato yadyapi parasparAviviktayoH vizeSayoH sarvatropalambha:, tathApi yatraiva pramAturarthitvaM tadeva sAmAnyam, vizeSAnvA pradhAnIkRtya tadgocaraM dhvanimarthakriyAM vA pravartayati, itarasyApyupasarjanabhAvena tatra vyApArAta, tadvikalasyetarasthApi zazaviSANAyamAnatayA kvacidanupayogAt / kiM ca pratyantavyatirekiNi vizeSebhyaH sAmAnye vRttivikalpopalambhanUtana vizeSasaMbandhAdidvAreNa dUSaNamudgara kadambakaM mUrdhani patad durviSahaM syAt / tathA hitatteSu kathaM varteta sAmastyena ekadezena vA ? sAmastyapakSe prativizeSaM parisamAptatayA sAmAnyabahutvaprasaGgaH, aniSTaM caitad, ekatvAbhyupagamakSateH / ekadezena sAmAnya NYAYAVATARAH tadvirahe vizeSANAmabhAve / zazaviSANarUpatvAditi / yaduktam nirvizeSaM na sAmAnyaM bhavecchazaviSANavat / vizeSo'pi ca naivAsti sAmAnyena vinAkRtaH // iti / uvasarjanItyAdi / upasarjanIkRtaM gauNIkRtaM vaiSamyaM vizeSarUpatA yena tattathA nyakkRtasamatvamiti / tiraskRta sAmAnyam /

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78 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 punaryAvanto vizeSAstAvantastadaMzA: prasajanti, na caitadasti sAmAnyasya niravayavatvAta , sAvayavatve'pi punaste bhinnA abhinnA vA / yadya bhinnA vizeSAH, tamubhedinaH kiM neSyante, vizeSAbhAvAt / bhedapakSe punasteSvapi tatkathaM varteta-sAmastyena ekadezena veti ? tadeva codyamalabdhapariniSThamavatarati, tannAtyantabhedino vRttiH sNbhvti| kiM ca yadyekaM sAmAnyaM bhedavat samastavizeSeSu varteta, tadaikavizeSopalambhakAle tadupalabhyate na vA ? yadyAdyaH pakSaH, tasyaikatayA sarvatropalambhAta , vyApyagrahaNAbhAve vyApakagrahaNAsiddheH nikhilatadvayApyavizeSagrahaNamAsajyeta, na caitadasti, purovartivizeSasyaiva sAkSAtkaraNAta, zeSavizeSAraNAmasaMnidhAnAta, saMnihita vizeSaniSThameva tadupalabhyate, tasyaiva tadvayaJjakatvAt / itareSAM tadabhAvAditi cenna, ekasvabhAvasya khaNDazo vyaJjanAyogAta, saMnihitavizeSavyajitameva tatsarvatra svabhAvAntarAbhAvAt sarvavizeSagataM ca tadrUpamatastaddarzanaM kena vAryeta / atha dvitIyaH kalpaH, tathA sati yathA ekavizeSopalambhasamaye nopalabhyate, tathA vizeSopalabhbhakAle'pi nopalabhyeta, vizeSAbhAvAt, atastadabhAva evoktaH syAta, kevalasyopalambhAbhAvAt, upalambhe'pi svasvabhAvasthitevizeSarUpatApattiH, tathA ciraMtanavizeSavyavasthitasattAkaM tannUtanavizeSotpAde sati kathaM tena saha saMvandhamanubhavet ? na tAvadvizeSAntarebhyastadutpitsu vizeSadezaM gantumarhati, niSkriyatvAta , nApi tatraivAbhavat, vizeSotpAdAtprAk taddeze tadupalambhAbhAvAta , nApi vizeSeNa sahotpadyate, nityatvAta , nityasya cotpattinirodhAbhAvAt / atha etaddoSaparijihIrSayA tatsakriyakamabhidhIyate, tathApi pUrvavyaktityAgena vA nUtanavizeSadezamAkrAmeta tadabhAvena vA ? na tAvadAdyaH pakSaH, ciraMtanavyaktInAM sAmAnyavikalatayA tatsaMvandhasAdhyabuddhidhvanivirahaprasaGgAt, na caitadasti, aparAparavizeSotpAde'pi prAcInavyaktiSu taddarzanAt / atha dvitIyaH kalpaH, tadapyasaMbaddham, niravayavasya pUrvavyaktityAgavaikalyena samutpitsuvyaktipratigamanAbhAvAta , sAvayavapakSasya punaH prAgevApAstatvAta , naitadabhyupagamadvAreNa parihAraH zreyAn / anyacca vyatiriktasAmAnyasaMbandhAd yadi bhAvAH samAnAH, na svarUpeNa, tadA sattvasaMvandhAtprAg bhAvAH santo'santo vA / santazcedapArthakaH sattAsaMbandhaH, anyathAnavasthA prasajyeta, punaH sattAntarasaMbandhAnivAraNAt / asantazcedatyantAsatAmapi gaganAravindAdInAM sattAsaMbandhAta bhAvarUpatApadyeta / evaM dravyatvaguNatvakarmatvagotvAdisAmAnyeSvapi samastametadvAcyam, ekayogakSematvAta , tanna parasparamatyantavyatirekiNau sAmAnyavizeSau kathaMcana ghaTAmATIkete / ata eva tatsamarthanapravaNastattAdAtmyapratikSepako'bhiprAyo nirAlambanatvAnnaigamadurnayasya vyapadezamAskandati, tAdAtmyApekSayaiva sAmAnyavizeSavyatirekasamarthakasya naigamanayatvAt , vyatirekiNorapi tayorvastUni kathaMcid bhAvAta , itarathA vivakSayApi tathA darzayitumazakyatvAta , taddarzanamiti / sarvavyaktInAM pratyakSatA / nUtanavizeSasaMbandhAdItyAdizabdasUcitaM dUSaNamabhidhAtukAma prAha anyaccetyAdi / sttvsNbndhaaditi| sattvaM sAmAnya bhAvaH sattA jAtiriti paryAyAH /

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79 NYAYAVATARAN pradhAnopasarjanabhAvasya dvayaniSThatvAta , atyantatAdAtmyena tatkAriNyA vivakSAyA api nirgocaratAprasaGgAta / tasmAtkathaMcid bhedAbhedinAvevaito, tadanyatarasamarthakaH puna: nirAlamvanatvAt durnayatAM svIkarotIti sthitama / tathA saMgraho'pyazeSavizeSapratikSepamukhena sAmAnyamekaM samarthayamAno durnayaH, tadupekSAdvAreNaiva tasya nayatvAta , vizeSavikalasya sAmAnyasyAsaMbhavAta tathA hiyattAvaduktam-yaduta vizeSAH sAmAnyAd vyatirekiraNo'vyatirekiNo vaa| vyatirekapakSe niHsvabhAvatvama, niHsattAkatvAta / avyatirekapakSe bhAvamAtrama, tadavyatiriktatvAta , tatsvarUpavata / tadayuktam , vizeSavAdino'pyevaMvidhavikalpasaMbhavAt / tathA hi-vizeSebhyaH sAmAnya vyatiriktamavyatirikta vA / vyatirikta cenna tahi sAmAnyam , svasvarUpavyavasthitatayA vizeSarUpatvAt / avyatirikta ceta , tathApi na sAmAnyama , vizeSAvyatiriktatvAdeva, tatsvarUpavata / yadapyavAdi-anAdya vidyAvalapravatto vizeSavyavahAraH, tAttvikaM sAmAnyama, tadapi ca vacanamAtrameva, yuktiriktatvAta , sAmAnyamevAnAdyavidyAdazitam, vizeSAH punaH pAramArthikA iti vizeSavAdino'pi vadato vaktrabhaGgAbhAvAta / yatpunarvizeSagrAhakapramANAbhAvaM pratipAdayatA abhyadhAyi-yaduta pratyakSaM bhAvasaMpAditasattAka tameva sAkSAtkaroti nAbhAvaM tasyAnutpAdakatvAdityAdi, tadayuktataram, yataH kenedaM bhavato'tyantasuhRdA nivedita bhAva eva kevala: pratyakSamupasthApayati, na punarabhAvo'pi / abhAvavyApArAbhAvapratipAdakayuktikalApeneti ceta mugdha vipratArito'si, tadvyApArAbhAvAsiddheH, sadasadrUpavastunaH samastakriyAsu vyApArAt / bhAvatAdAtmyena vyavasthitasyAbhAvasya vyApAravirodhA bhAvAt / kathaM bhAvAbhAvayostAdAtmyam ? virodhAditi ceta, na, pramANaprasiddha virodhAbhAvAt / tathA hi-ghaTAdikaH padArthAtmA svarUpeNa san, na paTAdirUpeNApi iti bhAvAbhAvAtmakaH, yadi pUnaH kathaMcinnAbhAvAtmakaH syAt, tadA paTAdirUpeNApi bhAvAt sarvAtmakaH prApnoti, yuktametat, ata eva bhedaprapaJcavilayasiddhiriti ceta , syAdetat , yadi paTAdyabhAvaikAntAcchnya vAdino manorathapUraNaM na syAt / tathA hi--paTAdivivikto ghaTo'nubhUyate, na ca paTAdyabhAvo bhAvena saha tAdAtmyamanubhavati, tasmAdabhAvAtmaka evAyam, evaM paTAdayo'pItaretarApekSayeti zUnyatvApattiH, tasmAta svarUpamAvibhrANaM pararUpebhyo vyAvRttameva vastu sarvakriyAsu vyApriyate iti bhAvAbhAvAtmakasyaiva vyApAraH svarUpadhAraNasya svabhAvatvAta , pararUpavyAvartanasyAbhAvatvAditi / evaM svagocarapratyakSotpAdane'pi vyApriyate, tatazca tadrUpameva tatsAkSAtkuryAditi svarUpaniyate pararUpebhyo vyAvRtte eva vastuni pratyakSa pravartate, tajjanyatvAt , na bhAvamAtre, itaratheti / yadi kathaMcid vyatirekiNAvapi sAmAnyavizeSau na syAtAm / tatheti / vyatirekeNa / tatkAriNyA bhedavidhAyinyA / ___ yuktikalApeneti / bhAvAMzenaiva saMyogo yogyatvAdindriyasya hi / ityAdinA vyApriyate iti bhAvAbhAvAtmakaM vastviti zeSaH / tadrUpamiti / bhAvAbhAvAtmakavasturUpam /

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80 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I tasya kevalasya svarUpAvyavasthiterutpAdakatvAyogAt / na ca janakatvAdoM grAhyo janyatvAdvA jJAnaM grAhakamatiprasaGgAdityuktam, kiM tarhi AvaraNa vicchedAderlabdhasattAkaM grahaNapariNAmAta jJAnaM gRhNAti, arthastu saMnidhAnAdergRhyate, sa cAnuvartamAnavyAvartamAnarUpa eva pratIyate iti tathAbhUto'bhyupagantavyaH, na kevalaM sAmAnyarUpa iti / sadasadaMzayoH kathamekatrAvasthAnamiti cet , tAdAtmyeneti bramaH / nanu tAdAtmyaM bhAvamAtramabhAvamAtraM vApadyeta, itaretarAvyatiriktatvAta, itaretarasvarUpavata , tannobhayarUpavastusiddhiH / naitadasti, tAdAtmyasya saMbandhatvAta , saMbadhasya ca dvayaniSThatvAta , tadabhAve kasya kena saMbandhaH nirgocaratvAta / tasmAdetau sadasadaMzau dharmirUpatayA abhedinau, vastunaH sadasadrUpasyaikatvAd, dharmarUpatayA punarvivakSitau bhedamanubhavataH, svarUpeNa bhAvAta, pararUpeNa tvabhAvAditi / tadevaM pratyakSe viviktavastugrAhiriNa sakalapramANapraSThe prasAdhite zeSapramANAnyapi tadanusAritayA viviktameva svagocaraM sthApayantIti, tadapalApI kevalasAmAnyapratiSThApakaH kadabhiprAyaH saMgrahadurnayavyapadezaM svIkurute, vizeSApekSayaya sAmAnyasthApakasya saMgrahanayatvAditi / / tathA vyavahAro'pi pramANaprasiddha vastusvarUpaM nihanuvAno yuktiriktamavicAritaramaNIyaM lokavyavahAramArgAnusAri samarthayamAno durnayatAmAtmani nidhatte, lokavyavahAraprasAdhakasyApItarAniSTau vyavasthAnAbhAvAt / tathA hi-yadIdaM kiyatkAlabhAvi sthUratAmAvibhrANaM lokavyavahArakAri ghaTAdikaM bhavatastAttvikamabhipretaM tannAkasmikam, ki tahi nityaparamANughaTitam, itarathA niSkAraNatvena sarvadA bhAvAbhAvaprasaGgAt / na te paramANavastathA pratibhAntIti ceta , na, ata eva teSAmanumAnataH siddhiH, yadi punaryadeva sAkSAnna vizadadarzane cakAsti tatsakalamapalapyeta hanta bahvidAnImapalapanIyam, ghaTAdivastuno'pyarvAgbhAgavartitvaGmAtrapratibhAsAta madhyaparabhAgAdInAmapalApaprasaGgAta , tathA ca lokavyavahArakAritApi vizIryaMta, tAvatA tadasiddheH / athAtrAnumAnabalena vyavahArakSamasaMpUrNavastunaH sAdhanam, evaM tahi bhUtabhAviparyAyaparamANusAdhanamapi kriyatAm, vizeSAbhAvAt / tathA hitaditi / pratyakSam / pratiprasaGgAditi / cakSuSA janyamAnasyApi jJAnasya cakSuragrAhakatvAt / AvaraNavicchedAderiti / vicchedaH kSayaH, AdizabdAt kSayopazamaH taddhatavazca kAraNatvena dravyakSetrakAlAlokAdayaH gRhyante, tahi jJAnAvaraNakarmaNaH kSayopazame kRte tadanantaramavyavadhAnena jJAnamutpadyate iti / praSThe iti / vizadapratibhAsarUpatvena sklprmaarnnmukhye| anumAnataH siddhiriti / dvayaNukAdi skandho bhedyaH, mUrtatve sati sAvayavatvAt, kumbhavat / sAvayavarAkAzAdibhirvyabhicAraparihArArtha mUrtatve satIti vizeSaNam / ye ca dvayaNukAdibhedAdanantaramaMzAsamutpadyante avayavAste prmaannvH| athavAnyathAnumAnayAmaH-aNuparimANatAratamyaM kvacid vizrAntam, parimANatAratamyatvAt, aAkAzaparimANatAratamyavat / yatra aNuparimANatAratamyaM vizrAntaM ta eva paramANavaH / athAnumAnabaleneti / tathA hiarvAgbhAgaH sAMzaH, arvAgbhAgatvAt, saMpratipannArvAgbhAgavat / na ca vAcyaM yadyagbhiAgadarzanenAvayavI sAdhyante, tahi ghaTazakalamAtrasyApi sAMzatvasiddhiH prApnoti, yato ghaTazakalaM

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NYAYAVATARA yathA bAhyatvaGmAtrapratibhAse'pi sarvavastUnAM tAvatA vyavahArAbhAvAd madhyabhAgAdisAdhanena saMpUrNAni tatsamarthAni tAni sAdhyante, tathaiva kiyatkAlabhAvighanAkAradarzane'pyanAdyanantaparamANutAdAtmyavyavasthitazarIrANi tAni sAdhyantAm, tadabhAve'pi teSAmanupapatteH / tathA hi-vyavahArAvatAriNo darzanayogyasyAdyaparyAyasya tAvadatItaparyAyAnabhyupagame nirhetukatvam, tatra cokto doSaH, tadutpAdakAdantaraparyAyaSTau punastajjanakaparyAyo'bhyupagantavya iti anAdiparyAyaparaMparAsiddhi. madhyAsIta, tathA vyavahArAvatArivastuparyantaparyAyasya paryAyAntarAnutpAdakatve balAdavastutvamADhaukate, bhavannIterevArthakriyAkaraNavaikalyAta, tadutpAdakatve punarasAvapyaparaparyAyotpAdakatve ityanantaparyAyamAlopapadyate / tathA ghanAkAro'pi vizadadarzanena sAkSAkriyamANo niSpradezaparyantAvayavavyatirekeNa nopapadyate, karacaraNazirogrIvAdyavayavAnAM khaNDazo bhidyamAnatayAvayavirUpatvAta, tadavayavAnAmapyavayavAntaraghaTitatvAta / paramANava eva paryantAvayavAH paramArthato ghanAkArahetavaH, tadabhAve punarAkasmiko'sau sarvatropalabhyeta, na vA kvacita, vizeSAbhAvAta / etena yadavAdi-lokavyavahArAvatAriNaH pramANamanugrAhakamasti vastuno netarasyetyAdi tadapi pratikSiptamavagantavyam, dRzyamAnArthAnyathAnupapattyaiva tatsAdhanAta / yat punaruktam-kiM teSAmatItAnAgataparyAyaparamANvAdInAM paryAlocanena lokavyavahArAnupayogitayA (a) vastutvAdityAdi, tadayuktam, upekSayA vArtamAnikavastUno'nupayogitvenAvastutvaprApteH, sarvasya sarvalokAnupayogitvAta / kasyacidupayogitayA vastutve teSAmapi sA samastyeva, sarvajJAnAdigocaratvAd ityAstAM tAvata / tadevaM pramANaprasiddhArthApalApitvAd vyavahAro durnayaH, tadupekSayA vyavahArAnupAtivastusamarthakasya vyavahAranayatvAditi / atha RjusUtro'pi dRSTApalApenAdRSTameva kSaNakSayiparamANulakSaNaM vastusvarUpa paramArthatayA manyamAno durnayatAmAskandati, dRzyamAnasthirAsthUrArthApahnave nirmalatayA svAbhipretavastusamarthakaparAmarzasyotthAnAbhAvAta / tathA hi-svAvayavavyApinaM kAlAntarasaMcariSNumAkAraM sAkSAllakSayan pazcAt kuyuktivikalpena vivecayeta, yadutaSa sthirasthUro dRzyamAnaH khalvAkAro na ghaTAmiyati, vicArAkSamatvAdityAdinA ca dRSTamadRSTasaMdarzakaH kuyuktivikalpairbAdhitu zakyama, sarvatrAnAzvAsaprasaGgAta / athAbhidadhIthAH-mandamandaprakAze pradeze rajjo viSadharabhrAntiH prAktanI yathodIcInena tannirNayakAriNA vikalpena bAdhyate, tathedamapi sthirasthUradarzanaM kSaNakSayiparamANuprasAdhakaparAmarzana, kimatrAyuktam, naitadasti, rajjUpratibhAsasyaiva prAkpravRttaviSadharabhrAntyapanodadakSatvAta , tadabhAve ca vikalpazatairapi nivartayitumazakyatvAt / atrApyatItavaya'tovinaSTAnutpannatayA'saMnihi bhAgamAtraM na tvarvAgbhAga iti kathaM tena vyabhicAraH ? tAnIti / vastUni / prAdyaparyAyasyeti / vAtamAnikasya, tatra cokto doSa iti / nityaM satvamasasvaM vAhetoranyAnapekSaNAt / prapekSAto hi bhAvAnAM kAdAcitkatvasaMbhavaH // iti /

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82 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I tatvAta, stharAvayavAnAM ca svAvayaveSu bhedAbhedadvAreNa paryAlocyamAnAnAmavasthAnAbhAvAta kSaNakSayiparamANava eva pratibhrAnti, tatazca pratibhAsa eva sthirastharadarzanasya bAdhaka iti cet / evaM tarhi pratibhAsasyopadezagamyatAnupapatteH tathaiva vyavahAraH pravarteta / pAzcAtyamithyAvikalpaviplavAnna pravartate iti cet, na, anyatrApyasyottarasya viplavahetutvAt / tathA hi-dhavale jalajAdau pratibhAte'pi 'nIlo'yam' adhyakSeNAvalokitaH pAzcAtyamithyAvikalpaviplavAd dhavala: pratibhAtIti bhavannyAyana zaThaH pratijAnAnaH kena vAryeta / tanna dRSTApalApaH kartu zakya iti sthirasthUravastusiddhiH, tasyaiva darzanAt, itarasya daddarzanadvAreNa sAdhyamAnasyAnumeyatvAta, tadaniSTau tasyApyasiddheH / etena sthirasthUravastuno'rthakriyAvirahapratipAdanamapi prativyUDham, tathAvidhasyaiva sarvakriyAsu vyApAradarzanAta kSaNakSayiNo'rthakriyAniSedhAcca / yathokta prAkkSaNabhaGguro hyarthAtmA svakSaNe pUrvaM pazcAdvA kAryaM kuryaadityaadi| kiM ca sattvapuruSatvacaitanyAdibhirbAlakumArayuvasthaviratvaharSaviSAdAdibhizcAnuvartamAnavyAvartamAnarUpasya sarvasya vastunaH pratItevyaparyAyAtmakatvam. abhedasya dravyatvAt, bhedasya paryAyarUpatvAditi / tatazca bhUtabhAvikSaNayorasaMnidhAnadvAreNa vArtamAnikakSaNasyaivArthakriyAkAritvapratipAdanaM nAsmadvAdhAkaram, paryAyANAM kramabhAvitayA vartamAnaparyAyAliGgitasyaiva dravyasyArthakriyAkaraNacaturatvAta, kevalaM tattrikAlavyApi draSTApi dravyarUpatayA yathAbhUta eva, tatazca kSaNikaparyAyatirodhAnadvAreNa tapasaMkalanAta sthiramevedaM samastakriyAsu vyApriyate iti pratItivIthImavatarati, sthairyasyApi tAttvikatvAta , kSaNikaparyAyANAM vidyamAnAnAmapyagrahaNAta , prAkRtalokajJAnasyAvaraNakSayopazamApekSitayA katicidaMzaviSayatvAta / yadi punadravyabuddhiH paryAyaparaMparAdarzanabalAyAtatvAdatAttvikI kalpyeta, tadA pUrvaparyAyasyottaraparyAyotpAdane sAnvayatvaM niranvayatvaM vA vaktavyam, gatyantarAbhAvAt / sAnvayatve dravyaM paryAyAntareNAbhihitaM syAta, niranvayatvAcca punarnirhetutayottaraparyAyAnutpAdaprasaGgaH / tannobhayarUpavastuvyatirekeNArthakriyAsiddhiH / na cArthakriyA vastulakSaNam, zabdavidyatpradIpAdicaramakSaNAnAM kSaNAntarAmbhakatvenAvastutvaprApteH, tadavastutve punarupAntyakSaNasyApi vastuni vyApArAbhAvAta, evaM yAvatsarvakSaNAnAM saMkalikayAvastutvam / atha kSaNAntarAnArambhe'pi svagocarajJAnajanakatvamarthakriyA parikalpyeta, tathA sati atItabhAvaparyAyaparaMparApi yogijJAnagocaratAM yAtIti vastutvaM svIkuryAta, tannArthakriyAvastulakSaNam, api tu utpAdavyayadhrauvyayuktatA, pramANapratiSThitvAta / utpAdavyayau dhrauvyeNa saha viruddhAviti ceta, kuto'yaM virodhaH, pramANAdapramANAd itarasya kSaNakSayiparamANutattvasya / taddarzaneti / sthirasthUravastudarzanadvArega / vIthIM mArgam / paryAyAntareNa nAmAntareNa / na cArthakriyA vastulakSaNamiti / yadAha rAgAndhAvasthAyAmapi dharmakIrti : gacchatu kvApi te svAntaH kAnte kArya svayaiva ca / yadevArtha kriyAkAri. tadeva paramArthasat // iti / .

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83 NYAYAVATARAN vA / na tAvadAdyaH pakSaH, sarvapramANAnAM bahirantastathAvidhavastudyotanapaTiSThatayA prasAdhitatvAt / nApi dvitIyaH, apramANasyAkicitkaratvAt / etena sthUratAdUSaNamapi pratikSiptam, pratibhAsahatatvAta , tadapahnave virodhodbhAve tasya nirmUlatayA pralApamAtratvAt / yatpunarvartamAnaprakAzarUpatayA tatsaMbandhavastugrAhitvaM sarvapramANAnAmudagrAhi tadayuktam, teSAmekAntena vArtamAnikatvAsiddheH, kathaMcidAtmAvyatirekitvAta, tasya ca kAlatrayavyApakatvAt , tadrUpatayA teSAmapyavasthAnAta , tatazcAtmano'rthagrahaNapariNAmarUpatvAt / sarvapramANAnAM pariNAminyeva vastuni vyApAro na kssnnike| na cAtItAnAgatakSaNavartivastugrahaNepyanAdyanantajanmaparaMparAgrahaNaprasaGgaH, AvaraNa vicchedasApekSatvAta tasyaiva paramArthataH saMvedanA. virbhAvAntarakAraNatvAta , grAhyAdebahiraGgatvAta / sAmastyena punarAvaraNavilaye sati samastavastuvistArAnAdyanantakSaNaparaMparAgrahaNaprasaGgo nA (to)nAbAdhAkArI, iSTatvAt / tadekadezakSayopazame punastadanusAriNI bodhapravRttiriti kiyatkAlaM bhAvini sthUre vastuni prAkRtalokajJAnAni pravartante na sNpuurnne| na ca tAnyalIkAni, tadgrAhyAMzasyApi vastuni bhAvAta tAvataiva vyvhaarsiddheriti| yaccoktam--kSaNikatAM gRhNanto'pi sadRzAparAparotpattivipralabdhatvAd mandA nAdhyavasyanti, mithyAvikalpavazAta sthiratAvyavahAraM ca pravartayanti, tadayuktam, bhavadAkRtena sAdRzyAbhAvAta, tadabhAve tadutpAdyAbhimatabhrAntenirbIjatayotpattarasaMbhavAta / tathA sthiratAropo'pi kvacid gRhItasthiratvasyaiva yukto nAnyathA, yathA dRSTaviSadharasya mandaprakAze rajjudarzane viSadharAropaH, na ca bhavatAM kadAcana sthiratA pratItigocaracAritAmanubhavati, tatkathaM pratikSaNamudayApavargasaMsargiNi sakale vastuni pratyakSeNAvalokite'pi tadAropa iti tasmAttirohitakSaNavivartamalakSitaparamANavaiviktyaM vastu sAMvyavahArikapramANocarIkriyate / tattiraskAradvAreNa adRSTakSaNakSayiparamANupratiSThApako'bhiprAya RjusUtro durnayasaMjJAmaznute, tadupekSayava daddarzakasya nayatvAt / iti // ___tathA zabdAdayo'pi sarvathA zabdAvyatirekamarthasya samarthayanto durnayAH, tatsamarthanArthamupanyastasya tatpratItau pratIyamAnatvalakSaNasya hetoranaikAntikatvAta / tathA hi-nAyamekAnto yatpratItau yatpratIyate tattato'vyatiriktameva, vyatiriktasyApi pAvakAderanyathAnupapannatvalakSaNasaMbandhabalAd dhUmAdipratItau pratIyamAnatvAt / evaM zabdo'pi vyatiriktamapyarthaM vAcakatvAt pratyAyayiSyati, avyatirekasya pratyakSAdibAdhitatvAta, zabdAdvivekenaivAnubhUyamAnatvAt , asmizca hetAvanaikAntike sthite sarvArthAnAM svavAcakatvasAdhanadvAreNa zabdAvyatirekasAdhanamapi upAntyeti / antasya samIpamupAntaM tatra bhavamupAntyam digAdidehAzAd yaH (si0 he. 6-3-124) iti yH| sarvatheti / evaM vadan idamAha-kathaMcit zabdAdavyatireko'ryasyAbhyupagamyate eva jainaiH / ayaM cArthaH abhihAraNaM abhiheyAu hoi bhinnaM abhinnaM ca ityAdinA prAradarzita

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84 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I dUrApAstameva / na cAtrApi pratibandhagrAhi pramANaN-yo yo'rthastena tena savAcakena bhavitavyam, ghaTAdidRSTAntamAtrAttadasiddheH, kSaNikAlakSyadravyavivartAnAM saMketagrahaNopAyAbhAvenAbhilapitumazakyatayA anabhilApyatvasiddhezca kSaNabhaGguratApratijJAnaM punaramISAmapi RjusUtravanirasitavyam / tathA pratyekamatApekSayApi svAbhipretaM pratiSThApayantastadviparItaM zabdArthaM tiraskurvANA durnayatAmAtmasAtkurvanti / etAvaddhi pramANapratiSThitam, yaduta vidhimukhena zabdo'rthasya vAcaka iti, na punarayaM niyamo yathAyamasyaiva vAcako nAnyasya, dezakAlapuruSasaMketAdivicitrayA srvshbdaanaampraapraarthaabhidhaayktvopptteH| arthAnAmapyanantadharmatvAdevAparAparazabdavAcyatvAvirodhAta , tathaivAvigAnena vyavahAradarzanAta , tadaniSTau tallopaprasaGgAt / tasmAta sarvadhvanayo yogyatayA sarvArthavAcakAH, dezakSayopazamAdyapekSayA tu kvacit kathaMcita pratIti janayanti / tatazca kvacidanapekSitavyutpattinimittA rUDhitaH pravartante, kvacita - sAmAnyavyutpattisApekSAH, kvacitatkAlavartivyutpattinimittApekSayeti na tatra prAmANikena niyatArthAgraho vidheyH| ato'mI zabdAdayo yadA itaretarAbhimatazabdArthopekSayA svAbhimatazabdArthaM darzayanti, tadA nayAH, tasyApi tatra bhAvAt / parasparabAdhayA pravarta. mAnAH punardunayarUpatAM bhajanti, nirAlambanatvAditi / nanu ca yadyekakadharmasamarthanaparAyaNAH zeSadharmatiraskArakAriNo'bhiprAyA durnayatAM pratipadyante, tadA vacanamapyekadharmakathanadvAreNa pravartamAnaM sAvadhAraNatvAcca zeSadharmapratikSepakAri alIkamApadyate, tatazcAnantadharmAdhyAsitavastusaMdarzakameva vacanaM yathAvasthitArtha eveti / asmizca hetAviti / zabdapratItAvarthasya pratIyamAnatvAd ityevNruupe| alakSyadravyavivartAnAmiti / bAlAnAmapi atipratItatvAt alakSye ityuktam, yAvatA sphuTamanubhUyamAnA api kecana vastUnAM paryAyA anabhilApyA eva / yaduktam-- ikSukSIraguDAdInAM mAdhuryasyAntaraM mahat / tathApi na tadAkhyAtuM sarasvatyApi zakyate // siddhAntarahasyaM cAtra pannavaNijjA bhAvA aNantabhAgo u abhilappANaM / pannavaNijjANaM puNa aNantabhAgo suyanibaddho / (vize0 bhA0, 141) [prajJApanIyA bhAvA anantabhAgazcAnabhilApyAnAm / prajJApanIyAnAM punaranantabhAgaH zrutanibaddhaH // ] dezakAleti / dezakAlapuruSeSu saMketa prAdiryeSAM prastAvAdInAM te tathA, teSAM vicitratA, tyaa| yathA hi-karkaTIzabdo mAlavakAdau phalavizeSa rUDhaH, gurjarAdau tu yonyAmiti / evaM kAlAdAvapi draSTavyam / avigAneneti / vigAnaM vacanIyatA vipratipattiriti yAvat / taniSTAviti / tasya zabdAnAmaparAparArthAbhidhAyakatvasya, arthAnAM tvaparAparazabdAbhidheyatvasya / tallopaH vyvhaarlopH| saavdhaarnntvaacceti| "sarvaM vAkyaM sAvadhAraNam"

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NYAYAVATARAW pratipAdakatvAtsatyam, na caivaM vacanapravRttiH, ghaTo'yaM zuklo mUrta ityAdye kaikadharmapratipAdananiSThatayA vyavahAre zabdaprayogadarzanAt, sarvadharmANAM yogapona vakta mazakyatvAta, tadabhidhAyakAnAmapyAnantyAt / na caikaikadharmasaMdarzakatve'pyamUni vacanAnyalIkAni vakta pAryante, samastazAbdavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAta, tadalIkatve tataH pravRttyasiddheriti / atrocyate, iha tAvad dvaye vastupratipAdakAH, laukikAstattvacintakAzca / tatra pratyakSAdiprasiddhamarthamarthitvavazAllaukikAstAvad madhyasthabhAvena vyavahArakAle vyapadizanti-yaduta nIlamutpalaM sugandhi komalamiti, na tu tamigatadharmAntaramahaNanirAkaraNayorAdriyante, anathitvAta , tAvataiva vivakSitavyavahAraparisamApteH / na ca tadvacanAnAmalIkatA, zeSadharmAntarapratikSepAbhAvAta , tatpratikSepakAriNAmevAlIkatvAta / paraH sarvaM vacanaM sAvadhAraNamiti nyAyAta teSAmapi zeSadharmatiraskAritvasiddharbhavannItyAlIkatApadyate iti ceta , na, avadhAraNasya tadasaMbhavamAtrayavvacchede vyApArAta / anekapuruSasaMpUrNe sadasi dvArAdau sthitasya kimatra devadattaH samasti nAstIti vA dolAyamAnabuddheH kenacidabhidhIyate-yathA devadatto'stIti / atra yadyapyupanyastapadadvayasya sAvadhAraNatA gamyate, anyathA taduccAraNavaiyarthyaprasaGgAta, tathApyavadhAraNaM tadasaMbhavamAtraM vyavacchinatti, na zeSapuruSAntarANi / nApipararUpeNa nAstitvam, tadvyavacchedAbhiprAyeNa prastutavAkyaprayogAta , prayokta rabhiprAyAdisApekSatayaiva dhvaneH svArthapratipAdanasAmarthyAta / na ca vAcyavAcakabhAvalakSaNasaMbandhAnarthakyam, tadabhAve prayoktrabhiprAyAdimAtreNa rUpasyaiva niyokta mazakyatvAt / na ca samastadharmayuktameva vastu pratipAdayadvacanaM satyamityabhidadhmahe, yenaikaikadharmAliGkitavastusaMdarzakAnAmalIkatA syAta , kiM tarhi saMbhavadarthapratipAdakaM satyamiti, saMbhavanti ca zeSadharmApratikSepe vacanagocarApannA dharmAH, tasmAt tatpratipAdakaM satyameva / yadA durnayamatAbhiniviSTabuddhibhistIrthAntarIyaistaddharmigatadharmAntaranirAkaraNAbhiprAyeNaiva sAvadhAraNaM tat prayujyate, yathA nityameva vastu anityameva vetyAdi, tadA nirAlambanatvAdalIkatAM prApnuvata kena vAryeta ? tattvacintakAH punaH pratyakSAdipramANasiddhamanekAntAtmakaM vastu darzayanto dvedhA darzayeyuH, tadyathA-vikalAdezena sakalAdezena vaa| tatra vikalAdezo nayAdhInaH, sakalAdezaH pramANAyattaH / tathA hi-yadA madhyasthabhAvenAthitvavazAta kiMciddharma pratipipAdayiSavaH zeSadharmasvIkaraNanirAkaraNavimukhayA dhiyA vAcaM prayuJjate tadA tattvacintakA api laukikavata saMmugdhAkAratayAcakSate-yaduta jIvo'sti kartA pramAtA bhokta tyAdi, ataH saMpUrNavastupratipAdanAbhAvAd vikalAdezo'bhidhIyate, nayamatena saMbhavaddharmANAM darzanamAtramityarthaH / yadA tu pramANavyApAramavikalaM parAmRzya iti nyAyAt / tadvayavacchedAbhiprAyeNeti / tasya devadattAderasaMbhavamAtrasya vyavacchedAbhiprAyeNa, devadatto'stIti vAkyasyoccAraNAt / 'aprayogAda' iti tu pAThe kimityavadhAraNam / zeSapuruSAntarANi pararUpeNa nAstitvaM ca na vyavacchinatti ityAha taditi / teSAM zeSapuruSAntarANAM pararUpeNa nAstitvasya vyavacchedAbhiprAyeNa prastutavAkyAnabhidhAnAt / prayoktrabhiprAyAvIti / AdizabdAt sNketaadigrhH| aGgIkRtetyAdi / aGgIkRtA guNa.

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86 VAISHALI INSTITUTE KESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 pratipAdayitumabhiprayanti, tadAGgIkRtaguNapradhAnabhAvA azeSadharmasUcakakathaMcitparyAyasyAcchabdabhUSitayA sAvasAdhAraNayA vAcA darzayanti syAdastyeva jIvaH ityAdikayA, ato'yaM syAcchabdasaMsUcitAbhyantarIbhUtAnantadharmakasya sAkSAdupanyastajIvazabdakriyAbhyAM pradhAnIkRtAtmabhAvasyAvadhAraNavyavacchinnatadasaMbhavasya vastunaH saMdarzakatvAt sakalAdeza ityucyate, pramANapratipannasaMpUrNArthakathanamiti yAvat / taduktam sA jJeyavizeSagatirnayapramANAtmikA bhavettatra / ___ sakalagrAhi tu mAnaM vikalagrAhI nayo jJeyaH / / tadidamukta bhavati-nayapramANAbhijJaH syAdvAdI sakalavikalAdezAvadhikRtya vastusvarUpapratipipAdayiSayA yadyad brU te tattat satyam, saMbhavadarthagocaratvAt / durnayamatAvalambinaH punarekAntavAdino yadyadAcakSate tattadalIkam, asaMbhavadarthaviSayatvAditi / / 29 / / sAMpratamamumevArthaM draDhayan siddhAnte'pyekaikanayamatapravattAni sUtrANi na saMpUrNArthAbhidhAyakAnIti, api tu tatsamudAyAbhiprAyapravRttamavikalavastunivedakamiti darzayannAha nayAnAmekaniSThAnAM pravRtteH zrutavama'ni / saMpUrNArtha vinizcAyi syAdvAdazrutamucyate // 30 // iha trividhaM zrutam, tadyathA-mithyAzrutam, nayazrutam, syAdvAdazrutam / tatra zrUyate iti zrutamAgamaH, mithyA alIkaM zrutaM mithyAzrutam, tacca durnayAbhiprAyapravRttatIthikasaMbandhi, nirgocaratvAt / tathA nayahetubhUtaiH zrutaM nayazrutam, etaccAhadAgamAntargatameva, ekanayAbhiprAyapratibaddhaM, yathA-'paDuppanne neraie viNassai' ityAdi, RjusUtranayAbhiprAyeNa kSaNikatvasyApi tatra saMbhavAta / tathA nirdizyamAnadharmavyatiriktAzeSadharmAntarasaMsUcakena syAtA yukto vAdo'bhipretadharmavacanaM syAdvAdaH, tadAtmakaM zrutaM syAdvAdazrutam / tat kiMbhUtamucyate ityAhasaMpUrNo'vikalaH sa cAsAvarthazca tadvinizcAyi tannirNayahetutvAdevamabhidhIyate, pradhAnabhAvAbhyAmazeSAzca te dharmAzca teSAM sUcakaH kathaMcicchabdaH paryAyo nAmAntaraM yasya sa kathaMcitparyAyaH, sa cAso syAcchabdazca tenAlaMkRtayA / / 26 / / par3appanneti sAMpratamutpannastatkAlotpanna ityarthaH / nirayo durgatistatra bhavo narayiko nArakikaH sa nazyati / atha kathaM tatkSaNotpannasya tasya vinAzaH nArakikANAM jaghanyato'pi dazavarSasahasrasthAyitvasyAgame'bhidhAnAt ityAha RjusUtretyAdi / ayamabhiprAya:--yAvanto nayAstAvatsamudAyarUpo'rhadAgamaH, 'savvanayamayaM jiNamayaM" iti vacanAt / yato yathA yatsamayaviziSTaH saMpUrNasvasthitidharmA ca prathamasamaye nairayika pAsIt, na tathA dvitIyasamaye iti RjusUtrAbhiprAyeNa spaSTava kSaNikateti / syAteti / asteryAtpratyayAntasya pratirUpako'ne.

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NYAYAVATARAN paramArthataH punaH samastavastusvarUpapratipAdItyarthaH, zabdAtmakatvAta, nizcayasya bodharUpatvAditi / nayazrutaM tarhi saMpUrNArthavinizcAyi kasmAnna bhavati ityAhanayAnAM naigamAdInAmekaniSThAnAmekadharmagrahaNaparyavasitAnAM zrutavama'ni AgamamArge pravRtteH pravartanAta na tadekaikAbhiprAyapratibaddhaM saMpUrNArthavinizcAyi, tatsamudAyasyaiva saMpUrNArthavinizcAyakatvAdityAkUtam // 30 // tadevaM nayapramANasvarUpaM pratipAdyAdhunA zeSanayapramANavyApakaM teSAM tatra tAdAtmyenAvasthAnAta pramAtAramabhidhAtukAma Aha pramAtA svAnyanirbhAsI kartA bhoktA vivattimAn / . svasaMvedanasaMsiddho jIvaH kSityAdyanAtmakaH // 31 // tatra trikAlajIvanAjjIvaH, prANadhAraka AtmetyarthaH, sa pramiNotIti pramAtA prameyaparicchedakaH / kiM bhUtaH sannityAha-svAnyau Atmaparau nirbhAsayituM udyotayituM zIlamasyeti svAnyanirbhAsI, svasvarUpArthayoH prakAzaka iti yAvata / tathA karotIti kartA, bhuGkte iti bhoktaa| vivartanamaparAparaparyAyeSu gamanaM vivRttiH pariNAmaH, sA vidyate yasyeti vivRttimAn / sva AtmA saMvedyate'neneti svasaMvedanaM tena samyak siddhaH pratiSThitaH pratIto vA svasaMvedanasaMsiddhaH / kSitiH pRthivyAdiryeSAM tAni kSityAdIni, AdizabdAdambutejovAyvAkAzAni gRhyante / na vidyate AtmA svarUpamasyetyanAtmakaH, kiM svarUparUpApekSayA ? na, kSityAdInAmanAtmakaH kSityAdyanAtmakaH kSityAdisvarUpo na bhavatItyarthaH / tatra 'jIvaH pramAtA' ityanena ye pAramArthikaM pramAtAraM nAbhyupagacchanti api tu vijJAnakSaNaparaMparAnubhavabalaprabodhitAnAdiprarUDhavAsanAsaMpAditasattAkaM mithyAvikalpaparikalpitamapAramArthikaM taM manyante pratikSaNavilayavAdinaH tAnnirAcaSTe, kSaNavilayasya prAgeva pratiSiddhatvAta, bahirantazca pariNAmivastunaH prasAdhanAt / nanu ca ghaTAdayastAvadvinAzamAvizanto dRzyante, teSAM ca vinAzo lakuTAdikAraNakalApena avinazvarasvabhAvAnAM vA kriyeta vinazvarasvabhAvAnAM vaa| yadyAdyaH kalpaH, tadayuktam, svabhAvasya pracyAvayitumazakyatvAta, tasya niyatarUpatvAta , anyathA svabhAvatvAyogAta / athaivaMbhUta eva tasya svabhAvaH svakAraNabalAyAto yaduta vinAzakAraNamAsAdya vinaGkhyati iti brUSe, tathApi tadvinAzakAraNasaMni kAntArthavRttiH syAcchabdo'vyayaH, atra tu savibhaktikanirdezaH zabdarUpApekSayA; tena syAtA, syAdityanena zabdena yukto vAd ityarthaH // 30 // ___ trikAlajIvanAditi / jIvanaM paJcendriyamanovAkkAyocchavAsaniHzvAsAyurlakSaNadazavidhaprANadhAraNam, tacca yadyapi muktAnAM na saMbhavati, tathApi nAvyApakam, yato muktAtmAno muktervAga yathAsaMbhavaM dazavidhAnapi prANAn dhAritavantaH, ityupacArAd muktAvasthAyAmajIvitavanto'pi jIvanta ityucyante / yadvA kSAyikajJAnadarzanalakSaNaM dvividhabhAvaprANadhAraNaM jIvanam, asmizca pakSe trikAlaprANadhAraNaM nirupacAra muktajIvAnAM vispaSTameva / tatsvabhAveti vinAzyasvabhAvasaMpAdyam / tatsaMnidhApakahetUnAmiti / tasya vinAza kAraNamudgarAde

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88 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESHARCH BULLETIN No. i dhAnaM kiM yAdRcchikam, uta tatsvabhAvasaMpAdyameva / yadAdyaH kalpaH, tadA saMnihitasyApi tatpratyanIkapratyayopanipAtena nivartanAt tatsaMnidhApakahetunAmapi svasaMnidhApakakAraNakalApasApekSatvAta saMnihitAnAmapi pratidvandvinA nivartanAt, yAdRcchikatvAcca nAvazyaMbhAvi tatsaMnidhAnam, tatazcAsaMnihitasvavinAzakAraNakadambakaH kazcityaTAdirna vinazyedapi, aniSTaM caitat, sarvakRtakAnAM vinAzAvigAnAt / atha dvitIyaH pakSaH, tathA sati pazcAdapi tadvalAdvinAzahetavaH saMnidhAsyanti iti prathamakSaNe eva saMnidadhatu, tathApi kSaNikataivArthasya / svahetoreva niyatakAlAt parato'yaM svavinAzahetuM saMnidhApayiSyatIti evaMrUpo jAta iti ceta , na, evamapi kSaNabhaMguratAyAtA / tathA hi-svahetunA kilAsau varSAtparataH svavinAzahetusaMnidhApanakSamasvabhAvo vyadhAyi, sa ca tasyotpAdakSaNAta dvitIyakSaNe svabhAvo'sti na vA ? asti ceta , tathA sati punarvarSaM tena sthAtavyam, evaM yAvadvarSopAntyakSaNe'pi yadi tatsvabhAva evAsau tadAparamapi varSAntaraM sthitirApadyeta, tadA cAnantakalpasthAyI bhAvaH syAt, apracyutavarSasthAyisvabhAvatvAditi / atha dvitIyakSaraNe nAsti sa svabhAva iti brUSe, hanta kSaNikatvamevADhaukate, atAdavasthyasya tallakSaNatvAta / kiM ca / vinAzaheturbhAvasya vinAzaM vyatiriktamavyatirikta vA kuryAta, vyatiriktakaraNe na kiMcit kRtaM syAta, tatazca bhAvastAdavasthyamanubhaveta / tatsaMvandhaH kriyate iti cet, saMbandhasya tAdAtmyatadutpattivyatiriktasya pratiSedhAt / na cAnayoranyataraH saMbandho'tra samasti, vyatirekiNA sAdhU tAdAtmyAyogAta, anyahetukasya pazcAdutpannasya tadutpattivaikalyAta / tanna vyatirikto vinAzaH kartuM yuktaH / avyatiriktakaraNe punastameva bhAvaM vinAzahetuH karotIti prAptam, avyatirekasya tadrUpatAlakSaNatvAt / na cAsau kartavyaH, svahetoreva niSpannatvAta, tatkaraNe ca tasyAvasthAnameva syAnna prlyH| tanna avinazvarasvabhAvAnAM pazcAta kathaMcidapi vinAzaH kartuM zakyaH, vinazvarasvabhAvAnAM punaH svahetabalAyAtatvAta prAgapi pratikSaNabhAvI na kAraNAntarApekSaH, svabhAvasya niyatarUpatvAta, tasmAta prANiti adyApi pratikSaNavilaya iti / atrocyate-satyametata, kiM tu yathA vinAzakAraNAyogAta rUpasargahetavaH pANyAdayaH / nanu yadRcchA svecchAvRtti rucyate, tatkathamiha hetvapekSA yujyate ? satyam, vinAzasvabhAvAt yAdRcchikatamiha vivakSitaM na nihetukatvam, nirhetukatvamapi cAdhikRtyAbhidhAsyati yAdRcchiketyAdi / kalpasthAyIti / yugaM dvAdazasAhasraM kalpaM viddhi caturyagam-iti laukikAH kalpamAhuH / apreti / bhAvavinAzayoH / antyetyAdi / mudgarahetukasya vinAzyottarakAlabhAvino vinAzasya ghaTAdevinAzyAdutpattyabhAvAt / tathaiveti ! sthityutpattyoH pratikSaNabhAvitvaM bauddhasyAbhISTameva, paraM tathaiva nirhetukatvenaivetyatra sAdhyam / nanu cetyAdi / pUrva hi bauddhana vinAzasya nirhetukatve'bhihite paropanyaste yuktikalApenaiva matpakSaH setsyatIti manyamAnenAcAryeNotpAdasthitI api nirhetuke pratyapAdiSAtAm, taTasthaH punaH sarvatrApi sahetukatvaM pazyannevaM pUrvapakSayati / samAdhAnAbhiprAyastu sakalamapi For private & Personal Use Only

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NYAYAVATARAH pratikSaNabhAvIti nAzo bhavadbhiH pratipadyate, tathaiva sthityutpattI pratikSaNabhAvinyo kiM na pratipadyete, taddhetUnAmapi vicAryamANAnAmayogAt / tathA hi-sthitihetunA tAvatsvayama sthirasvabhAvA bhAvA: sthApyeran sthirasvabhAvA vA / na tAvatprathamaH pakSaH kSodaM kSamate, svabhAvasyAnyathA kartumazakyatvAt tasya pratiniyatarUpatvAt, cetanAcetanasvabhAvavat, anyathA svabhAvatAhAneH / dvitIyapakSe punaH svayaM sthirasvabhAvAnAM kiM sthitihetunA ? paraH sthitirneSyate eva tenAnabhyupagatopAlambha evAyamiti cet, hanta hato'si evaM hi bhAvAH kSaNamAtramapi na tiSTheyuH / kSaNabhAvinISyate eveti ceta sA tarhi prasthitisvabhAvAnAM hetuzatairapi kartuM na pAryate iti brUmaH / tatsvabhAvatve punarhetuvyApAranairarthakyAt / ahetukA satI sakalakAlaM bhavatIti datto jalAJjaliH pratikSaNavilayasya / tathotpAdaheturapi tatsvabhAvasyotpattiM vidadhyAta atatsvabhAvasya vA / na tAvadAdyaH pakSaH kakSIkartu yuktaH, svayamutpAdakasyotpAdane vyApriyamANo hi hetuH piSTaM pinaSTi, zaGkha dhavalayatIti, tadabhAve'pi svayogyatayotpatteH / nApi dvitIyaH kalpo'GgIkaraNArhaH, svayamanutpattidharmakasyotpAdayitumazakyavAt, anyathA zazaviSANAdayo'pyutpAdyakoTimadhyAsIran, vizeSAbhAvAta, tatazca na kazcidatyantAbhAvaH syAt / tadyathAnirhetukatvAt nAzaH pratikSaNabhAvI, tathaiva darzitayuktaH sthityutpattI apIti trayAkrAntaM sakalavastujAtamabhyupagantavyam, tathA sati jIvo'pi jIvatvacaitanya - dravyatvAdibhiH sthemAnamAvibhrANa eva harSaviSAdAdibhiraparAparArthagrahaNapariNAmaizcotpAdavyayadharmakaH pAramArthikaH pramAteti balAta siddhimadhyAste / nanu ca yadyutapAdavyavasthitInAM nirhetukatvAt sakalakAlabhAvitA bhavadbhiH sAdhyate, tadAnvayavyatirekAbhyAM pratyakSAdipramANaprasiddhaH khalvayaM tatkAraNakalApavyApAraH kathaM neyaH ? na cAyamapahnotuM zakyaH / tathA hi-kulAlAdikAraNatrAtavyApAre ghaTAdayaH samupalabhyante, tadabhAve ca nopalabhyante iti tajjanyA ityucyante, sthitirapi vinAzakAraNasaMnidhAnAt prAk tadvalAdeva, tathA nAzo'pi mudgarAdisaMnidhAnAsaMnidhAnAbhyAM sadasattAmanubhavatastatkRtaH pratIyate nAhetukaH, tatkathameta diti / atrocyate na vayaM sarvathA hetUtAM vyApAraM vArayAmaH, kiM tarhi svayamutpAdavyayasthityAtmanA vivartamAnasya dravyasya hetavastadvizeSakaraNe vyApAramanubhavanti, tenaiva sArdhaM teSAmanvayavyatirekAnukaraNadarzanAt, dRSTasya cApahnave'smAkamapravRttatvAta, pratItiyuktilakSaNadvayapakSapAtitvAta, kevalaM pratItivikalAM yukti yuktivinAkRtAM vA pratIti nAGgIkurmahe, asaMbhavadarthagocaratayA nirAlambanatvAttasyA ityAstAM tAvat / 'svAnyanirbhAsi' ityanena prAguktasvaparAbhAsi pramANavizeSaNavanmImAMsakAn parokSabuddhivAdino yogAcArAMzca jJAnamAtravAdinaH pratikSipati / katham ? jJAnajJAninoH kathaMcidabhedena taduktanyAyAvizeSAditi / 'kartA bhoktA' iti vizeSaNadvayena sAMkhyamataM vikuTTayati, kartA san bhoktApi iti kAkvopanyA trilokIgataM mRdAdidravyamAtmanaiva pratikSaNa mudayavyaya dhrauvyAtmakam, kulAla laguDAdayastu ghaTaghaTIkapAlAdivizeSakaraNe eva vyApriyante iti / akarturiti / yadAhuH sAMkhyA:- prakRti: 89

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50 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN No. i sAta, akaturbhogAnupapatteH, bhujikriyAnivartanasamarthasyaiva bhoktRtvAt / japAkusumAdisaMnidhAnavazAt sphaTike raktatvAdivyapadezavadakarturapi prakRtyupadhAnavazAta sukhaduHkhAdibhogavyapadezo yuktaH / tathA hi-'prakRtivikAradarpaNAkArabuddhisaMkrAntAnAM sukhadukhaHkhAtmakAnAmarthAnAM puruSaH saMnidhAnamAtreNa bhojako vyapadizyate, buddhayadhyavasitamarthaM puruSazcetayate'-iti vacanAditi cet , na, kathaMcita sakriyAkatAvyatirekeNa prakRtyupadhAne'pyanyathAtvAnupapatteH, apracyutaprAcInarUpasya vyapadezAnahatvAt, tatpracyave ca prAktanarUpatyAgenottararUpAdhyAsitatayA sakriyatva mApatatIti nyAyAta / sphaTikadRSTAnte'pi japAkusumAdisaMnidhAnAdandhopalAdau raktatAnAvirbhavantI tasya tathAvidhaM pariNAmaM lakSayati, anyathAndhopalavattatrApi na prAduHSyAta, tannAkriyasya bhoktRtopapadyate iti / 'vivattimAn' ityamunAtvekAntanityamapariNAminaM naiyAyikavaizeSikAdiprakalpitaM pramAtAraM nirasyati, sarvathA aviclitruupsyaarthgrhnnprinnaamaanupptteH| vyatiriktajJAnasamavAyAdekAntanityo'pi pramiNotIti ceta , na, samavAyasya prAgeva pratikSiptatvAt , saMbandhAntarasya ca vyatirekiNA sAkamanupapatteH, anyatraM anyathAnupapannatvAt / na ca vyatirekiNi jJAne samasti, tadgrAhakapramANAbhAvAta, avyatirekAnubhavasya ca tadbAdhakatvAt / kiM ca yadi samavAyabalAdAtmani jJAnaM samavaiti, tadA AtmanAM samavAyasya ca vibhutvAdekarUpatvAcca sarvAtmasu kiM na samavaiti ? vizeSAbhAvAta , tathA ca devadattajJAnena yajJadattAdayo'pyarthatattvaM buddhayeran / anyacca vijJAnodayasamaye'pi yAdRzaH prAgavasthAyAM tAdRza eva saMtiSThamAnaH prAgapramAtA pazcAta pramAteti bra vANaH khalUnmattatAmAtmani AvirbhAvayati, nAparamityAstAM tAvat / pazcArdhena punarbhUtavyatirekiNaM svasaMvedanapratyakSanirgrAhya jIvaM darzayaccArvAkadarzanaM tiraskurute, jaDAtmakabhUtAvyatirekehi taddhitalakSaNabodharUpaharSaviSAdAdivivartAnubhavAbhAvaprasaGgAt / nanu karoti puruSa upabhuGkte-iti / prakRtivikAretyAdi / sattvarajastamA sAmyAvasthA prakRtiH, tasyA vikAro vaiSamyam, sa cAso nirmalatvena pratibimbotpattiyogyatvAt darpaNAkArA cAsau buddhizca tatra pratibimbitAnAM sukhaduHkhAdirUpANAmarthAnAmAtmA prakRtisaMnidhAnAt bhoktaabhidhiiyte| ayamabhiprAya:--prastAvat prakRtyAtmake buddhidarpaNe pUrva pratibimbyante, prakRtyabhinnatvabhAvArthapratibimbavatI buddhiH, prAtmanItyeSa pratibimbalakSaNo bhogaH / vAdamahArNavo'pyasmin darzane sthitaH prAha-buddhidarpaNasaMkrAntasamarthapratibimbakaM dvitIyadarpaNakalpe puMsyadhyArohati, tadevaM bhoktRtvamasya, na tu vikArApattiH - iti / tathA cAhurAsuriprabhRtaya :-- viviktedakpariNatI buddhI bhogo'sya kathyate / pratibimbodayaH svacche yathA candramaso'mbhasi / / asyArtha :-viviktA spaSTA IDag viSayAkArapariNatendriyAkArA pariNatiryasyA buddheH sA tathA, tasyAM satyAmasyAtmano bhogaH kathyate / kiM svarUpaH ? pratibimbodayaH, na vAstavaH / pratibimbamAtre dRSTAntamAha-yathA candramaso nirmale jale pratibimbanam, evaM

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NYAYAVATARAD 91 ca kAyAkArapariNatAni bhUtAnyevAtmavyatirekiNI cetanAmutkAlayanti, sA ca tathAvidhapariNAmapariNateSu teSu saMtiSThate tadabhAve punasteSveva nilIyate iti tadvayatirekAnubhave'pi na paralokayA yijIvasiddhiH, iyataiva dRSTavyavahAropapatteH / naitadasti, dvayaM hi tAvadetata saMyogamanubhavadupalabhyate--paJcabhUtAtmakaM zarIraM cetanA ca / tatrApi zarIraM bahirmukhAkAreNa bodhanArtharUpatayA jaDamanubhUyate, cetanA punarantarmukhAkAreNa svasaMvedanapratyakSeNa sAkSAkriyate, ata evAvyatirekaH pakSaH prtibhaasniraakRttvaannshngkitH| vyatirekiNoH punaH prakAzamAnayoH yadi bhUtAnyeva cetanAmutkAlayantIti bhavadbhiH parikalpyate, tadA cetanaiva bhavAntarAdutpattisthAnamAyAtA paJcabhUtabhrAntijanaka zarIraM nivartayeta , punarbhavAntara yAtukAmA muJceta , tattayAdhiSThitaM gamanAdiceSTAM kuryAta, tadviyukta punaH kASThavattiSThediti jIvasaMpAdyameva zarIram, na punarasau tatsaMpAdya iti / etatparikalpanaM yuktataraM pazyAmaH, jIvasya cetanAvataH sakarmakatayAparAparabhavabhramaNaparAparazarIranirvartanayorupapadyamAnatvAta / bhavAntarAdAgacchannutpattisthAnaM jIvo'dhyakSeNa nopalabhyate iti cet , bhUtAnyapi tahi kAyAkAradhAraNadvAreNa cetanAmutkAlayantIti pratyakSeNa nopalakSyante iti samAno nyAyaH / atha kAyAkArapariNateSveva bhUteSu cetanopalabhyate nAnyadA ityanyathAnupapattivazAta tajjanyeti parikalpyate, evaM tahi mRtAvasthAyAM kAyAkAramAbibhrANeSvapi nopalabdhA, kAyAkArapariNAmo vA kAdAcitkayA hetvantarApekSI ityanyathAnupapattivazAdeva tannivata nakSamA cetanA bhavAntarAgatacetanA jIvasaMbandhinIti pratipadyAmahe / kiM ca, jIvastAvat karmacaitanyasaMbandhAccharIraMnirvartanArthaM pravartata iti yuktamevaitata , bhUtAni punaH kiMbhUtAni cetanAkaraNe pravarteran sacetanAni nizcetanAni vA ? yadyAdyaH kalpaH, tato vikalpayugalamavatarati taccaitanyaM tebhyo bhinnamabhinnaM vA ? yadi bhinnaM tadA puruSazarIravata tatrApi bhUtaH saha vartamAnamapi bhUtavilakSaNamAtmakAraNamanuviziSTAkArapariNatAyA buddhe rAtmanIti / vibhaktatyAdipAThAntareNa vyAkhyAnAntaraM tu haribhadrasUrikRtaM neha prakAzyate, bahu vyAkhyAne vyAmohaprasaGgAt / anye tu vindhyavAsiprabhRtayaH . puruSo'vikRtAtmaiva svanirbhAsamacetanam / manaH karoti sAMnidhyAdupAdhiH sphaTikaM yathA // iti bhogamAcakSate / vyAkhyA-yathopAdhirjapApuSpapadmarAgAdiratadrUpamapi sphaTikaM svakArAM raktAdicchAyAM karoti, evamayamAtmA svarUpAdapracyavamAnaH caitanyaM puruSasya svaM vacanamiti vacanAdacetanamapi mano buddhilakSaNamantaHkaraNaM svanirbhAsaM cetanamiva karoti sAMnidhyAt, na punarvastuto manasazcaitanyam, vikAritvAt / tathA hi-mano'cetanam, vikAritvAt ghaTavaditi / andheti / andhopala: pratibimbotpAdanAnaha : khakhaTa: pASANaH / taditi anyathAnupapannatvam / tadvApakatvAt vyatirekabAdhakatvAt / utkAlayantIti / kala-pila-Dipa kSepe curAdAvadantaH, adhikIkurvantItyarthaH tajjanyeti / kaayaakaarprinnaamjnyaa| tannirvartaneti kAyAkArapariNAmotpAdanasamarthA / purussshriiretyaavi| yathA puruSazarIre yaccaitanyaM tat svotpattaye

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92 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I mApayatIti tadavasthaiva jIvasiddhiH / prathAbhinnam, tathA sati samasta bhUtAnAmaikyaM prasajati, ekacaitanyAvyatiriktatvAt, tasvarUpavat / nijanijacaitanyAvyatirekINi bhUtAni tenAyamadoSa iti cenna, tatsaMpAdyapuruSazarIre'pi tajjanyapazvacaitanyaprasaGgAt / paJcApi saMbhUya bRhatpuruSacaitanyaM bahavastilA iva tailaghaTaM janayantIti cet, tattarhi puruSacaitanyaM kiM teSAmeva saMyogo yadvA tadutpAdyamanyadeva ? yadyAdyaH kalpaH, tadayuktam, caitanyAnAM parasparaM mizraNAbhAvena saMyogavirodhAt itarathA bahupuruSacaitanyAni saMbhUya bRhattamacaitanyAntaramArabheran / atha dvitIyaH pakSaH, tatrApi teSAM kimanvayo'sti nAsti vA ? yadyasti tadayuktam, prAgvattajjanyacaitanyapaJcarUpatApatteH / atha nAsti, tadapyacAru, niranvayotpAdasya pramANabAdhitatvAt tanna sacetanAni bhUtAni cetanA - karaNe vyApArabhAJji bhavitumarhanti / nApi nizcetanAni teSAmatyantavilakSaNatayA caitanyotpAdavirodhAta itarathA sikatAdayastailAdikaraNe vyApriyeran / ki ca tatsamudAyamAtrasAdhyaM vA caitanyaM syAt, viziSTatatpariNAmasAdhyaM vA ? na tAvadAdyA klRptiH, ilAjalAnalA nilanabhastala mIlane'pi cetanAnupalabdheH / dvitIya viklRptau punaH kiM vaiziSTyamiti vAcyam / kAyAkArapariNAma iti cet sa tahi sarvadA kasmAnna bhavati ? kutazciddhetvantarApekSaraNAditi ceta, tattarhi hetvantaraM bhavAntarAyAtajIvacaitanyamityanumimImahe, tasyaiva kAyAkArapariNAmasAdhya caitanyAnurUpopAdAnakAraNatvAt, tadvirahe kAyAkArapariNAmasadbhAve'pi mRtAvasthAyAM tadabhAvAt gamanAdiceSTAnupalabdheH tanna kAyAkArapariNAmajanyacaitanyam, api tu sa eva tajjanya iti yuktaM pazyAmaH / na pratyakSAdanyata pramANa 1 2 zarIrajanakeSu bhUteSu caitanyaM kalpayati / tathA tatrApIti / teSvapi bhUteSu tairbhUtaiH saha vartate yaccaitanyaM tadapi svajanakeSu bhUteSu tebhyo bhUtebhyo bhinnamAtmahetumaparaM caitanyaM gamayatIti / tadavastheti / zranavacchinnacetanyasaMtAnasya jIvarUpatvAdityabhiprAyaH / niranvayotpAdasya pramANabASitvAditi / anuvRttavyAvRtta vastugrahaNapariNAma: pratyakSaM yathA ca tena mRtpiNDAdutpadyamAnaM ghaTAdi mRdravyAtmanAnugatam, ghaTaghaTIzarAvodaJcanAdyapi paryAyApekSayA vyAvRttaM vIkSyate, te ca bhedAvizeSe'pi ghaTapaTASviva sthAsakozAdiSu vilakSaNaiva pratipattiH, tathA caitanyamapi pUrva caitanyAdutpadyamAnaM cidrUpatayAnuvRttaM sitapItAdibodharUpatayA tu vyAvRttaM svasaMvedana pratyakSeNaiva vyavasthApyate iti pratyakSasiddhAnvayaH tena ca niranvayotpAdakAnto bAdhitaH / tathA hi--pUrvI jJAnakSaNa utpadyamAnakSaraNAt kathaMcidabhedI, upAdAnatve sati kAraNatvAt, yaH punaH kathaMcidabhedI na bhavati nAsavupAdAnatve sati kAraNam, yathA prAlokaH, na cAyamupAdAnatve sati na kAraNam, tasmAt kathaMcidabhedIti / upAdAnatvaM hi kArye kathaMcit svakarmAropakatvena vyAptam, tacca sahakAriNAmapi prasaGgAdekAntabhede nopapadyate / tato bhedatannivartamAnaM svavyApyamupAdAnatvamapi nivartayatIti vyAptisiddhiH / tataH sthitametat pramANabAdhitatvAditi / atyanta vilakSaraNatayA caitanyotpAdavirodhAditi / zrayamabhiprAyaH -- bhUtaizcaitanyaM janyate iti bhUtAnyeva caitanyarUpatayA pariNamante iti pariNAma evotpAdArtho bhavatAmabhipretaH, na caikAntavailakSaNye pariNAmo ghaTAmiyati, etacca pratyakSasiddhameva, tathApi dRDhatvAd vipratipatteranumAnamadhyabhidhIyate -- caitanyaM vijAtIyapariNAmo na bhavati, utpattimatvAt yadutpatti 1

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NYAYAVATARAN 99 masti, na ca tena paralokagamanAgamanAdikaM caitanyasyopalakSyate, tena dRSTAnyeva bhUtAni tatkAraNatayA kalpanIyAnIti cet, na, kevalapratyakSapratikSepeNa pramANAntarANAM prAgeva prasAdhitatvAta , tathA ca bhUyAMsyanumAnAni paralokAnuyAyijIvasAdhakAni pravaran / tadyathA-tadaharjAtabAlakasya pAdyastanAbhilASaH pUrvAbhilASapUrvakaH, abhilASatvAta , dvitIyadivasAdistanAbhilASavata / tadidamanumAnamAdyastanAbhilASasyAbhilASAntarapUrvakatvamanumApayadarthApattyA paralokayAyijIvamAkSipati, tajjanmanyabhilASAntarAbhAvAta, evamanyadapyudAhAryamityAstAM tAvat / tadayaM svaparaprakAzaH kartA bhoktA nityAnityAtmako bhUtabilakSaNaH sAkSAta - kRtakaticinijaparyAyAnumitAnAdyanantakAlabhAvinijAnantaparyAyavivartaHpramANapratiSThitaH pAramArthiko jIvaH sakalanayapramANavyApaka: pramAteti sthitam // 31 // __sAMprataM paryantazlokena prakaraNArthamupasaMharannAha mat na tadvijAtIyapariNAmaH, yathA mRdAtmanA sajAtIyasya mRtpiNDasya pariNAmo ghaTa:, utpattimaccaitanyam, tasmAt na vijAtIyapariNAmaH utpattimattvaM sajAtIyapariNAmatvena vyAptam, tadviruddhaM ca vijAtIyapariNAmatvam / tata utpattimattvaM svavyApakAviruddhAd vijAtIyapariNAmatvAd vinivRttaM sat sajAtIyapariNAmatve'vatiSThate iti viruddhavyApakopalabdhiH / sajAtIyapariNAmatvaM vA sAdhyam / caitanyaM sajAtIyakAraNapariNAmam, utpattimattvAt, yadevaM tadevam, yathA mRtpariNAmo ghaTaH, tathA cedam sajAtIyapariNAmam / tanna nizcetanAni bhUtAni cetanAkaraNe pravRttibhAji bhavitumarhantIti sthitam / arthApattyeti / yathA karatalAgnisaMyogAt sphoTa: pratyakSeNopalakSyamANo vaDherdAhikAM zaktimupakalpayatIti, evametasmAdanumAnAdanumIyamAnojanmAdyastanAbhilASAt prAcIno'bhilASazcetanAvantamantareNopapadyate, stambhakumbhAmbhoruhAderapi prasaGgAt / yazcetanAvAn sa paralokayAyI jIva iti / evamanyadapyuvAhAryamiti / sAtmakaM jIvaccharIram, prANAdimattvAt, yat punanirAtmakaM na tat prANAdimat yathA kumbhaH, prANAdimacca jIvaccharIrama, tasmAt sAtmakamiti / sAkSAvityAdi / svasaMvedanapratyakSIkRtaiH sattvaprameyatvadravyatvacidrUpatvAdibhiH katipayaH svaparyAyaranamito'nAdyanantakAlabhAvinAmAtmIyAnantaparyAyAraNAM vyAvRttaH pariNAmo yasya jIvasya sa tathA / tathA hi--vartamAnAtmaparyAyAstadAramaparyAyAntarapUrvakAH, tAn vinA tadanupapatteH, yadvinA yanopapadyate tat tatpUrvakam yathA bIjamantareNAnutpadyamAno'Gkaro bIjapUrvaH, notpadyante ca pUrvaparyAyAnantareNa vartamAnaparyAyAH, ataste'pi tatpUrvakAH / nirhetukatvaprasaGgo viparyaye bAdhakaM pramANam / evaM vartamAnAH paryAyAH paryAyAntarajanakAH, vastutvAt, yad vastu tat paryAyAntarasya janakama, yathA ghaTa: kapAlAnAm, vastUni ca vivAdAdhyAsitAH, tasmAt pryaayaantrjnkaaH| pratrApyavastutvaprasaGgo viparpaye bAdhakaH, paryAyANaM ca paryAyiNo'bhinnatvAt vastu vastvantarasya janyaM janaka cetyuktaM bhavati / sakalanayapramANavyApaka iti / jJAturAzayAtmAno (nIyamAnA) nayAH, pramANAni prAgabhihitasvarUpANi, tataH sakalazabdena vizeSaNasamAse teSAM vyApakaH vRkSatvamiva zizapAtvasya / ayamabhiprAyaH-prAtmA hi jJAnarUpo nayapramANe tu jJAnavizeSarUpe, tato yathA vRkSatvavizeSaH zizapAtvaM vRkSatvasAmAnyena vyApyate, evaM jJAnavizeSAtmaka nayapramANe sAmAnyajJAnarUpeNAramanA vyApyete iti // 31 //

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94 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO, I prmaannaadivyvstheymnaadinidhnaatmikaa| sarvasaMvyavahartRNAM prasiddhApi prakIrtitA // 32 // pramANAni pratyakSAdIni, aAdizabdAta nayaparigrahasteSAM vyavasthA pratiniyatalakSaNAdirUpA maryAdA seyamanantaroktasthityA prakIrtiteti sNsrgH| kiMbhUtA ? Aha-AdiH prabhavaH, nidhanaM paryantaH, na vidyate Adinidhane yasyAsau tathAvidha AtmA svarUpamasyAH sA anAdinidhanAtmikA sarvasaMvyavahataNAM laukikatIthikAdibhedabhinnasamastavyavahAravatAM prasiddhApi rUDhApi, tadaprasiddhau nikhilavyavahArocchedaprasaGgAt , taducchede ca vicArAnutthAnena kasyacittattvasyana pratiSThitiH, prakIrtitA saMzabditA, avyutpannavipratipannavyAmohApohAyeti gamyate, pramANaprasiddhe'pyarthe pravalAvaraNakudarzanavAsanAditaH keSAMcidanadhyavasAyaviparyAsarUpavyAmohasadbhAvAta , tadapanodArthaM ca sati sAmarthya karUNAvatAM pravRtteriti / / 32 // syAdvAdakesarisubhoSaNanAdabhIteruttrastalolanayanAn prapalAyamAn / heturnayAzritakutIthimRgAnananyatrANAn vihAya jinameti tamAzrayadhvam // 1 / / bhaktirmayA bhagavati prakaTIkRteyaM tacchAsanAMzakathanAnna matiH svkiiyaa| mohAdato yadiha kiMcidabhUdasAdhu tatsAdhavaH kRtakRpA mayizodhayantu / / 2 / / ___ laukikatIthikAdIti / laukikA haladharAdayaH, tIthikA naiyAyikAdayaH, AdizabdAt zeSapAkhaNDiparigrahaH / vAsanAdita iti / prAdizabdAta vipratArakavacanAdigrahaH // 32 // sAmprataM zAstraparisamAptI zAstrakRt siddhaH paramamaGgalapade bhagavati jine svayamatyantAnurAgAdativatsalatayA pareSAmapi tadA tadAdhAnAya tAvadupadezamAha syAdvAdetyAdi / syAcchabdo asteryAtpratyayAntasya pratirUpako'vyayaH, sa ca yadyapi vidhivicAraNAstitvavivAdAnekAntasaMzayAdyarthavRttiH, tathA'pyanekAntavRttiriha gRhyate, ekAntapratikSepasyaivAtra prastutatvAt, tenopalakSito vAdo syAdvAdaH, sa eva kesarisiMhaH, ki kita jJAne-ityasya pauNAdike dantyAdau sarapratyaye kesaraH saTA, tathA ca zRGgAraprakAze'pi-ke mastake saratIti kesara ityakhaNDayat / sa cAyaM kesarazabda punapuMsakaH, matvarthIyenpratyayAntazca siMhe vartate, tasyAtibhairavaH parapravAdimRgapUgabhayaMkaratvAd nAdo vAdakAlabhAvI vAgavilAsastasmAt bhItistasyAH / ayamatra samudAyArthaH-zaraNavikalapuruSa iva hetuH sattvAdiH kamapi zaraNAya zaraNyaM mAryamANaH syAdvAdasiMhanAdabhayAt svayamapi palAyamAnAn kutIthimRgAn parityajyAnanyAzaraNatayAyaM jinamAzrayati / anyatra kvacit kathaMcit hetvAbhAsatopapattayA atraiva svarUpaM labhate, tameva jinaM yUyamapi bhavyAH bhajadhvam / yuktaM caitat pakSapAtarahitAnAM sarvahetupuraHsarameva matenivezAditi / yathaikAntakSaNikatve nityatve vA na kazcit heturupapadyate, tathA prAgeva svayameva vRttikRtA prapaJcitamiti / adhunA prauddhatyamAtmanaH pariharan sulabhatvAt kSamasthAnAM mohasya zAstrazodhane, tataH prArthayannAha bhaktirityAdi / tacchAsanAMzeti / tasya bhagavato jinasya zAsanamAgamaH, tasyAMzo lavastadabhidhAnAt / ata iti / yato bhaktivyaMktA kRtA, na tu garvoburakaMdharatayA svamanISikA prakAziteti // sAMprataM vaivagdhyabhidhInaM darzayana

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- 95 nyAyAvatAravivRti vividhAM vidhitsoH siddhaH zubho ya iha puNyacayastato me / nityaH parArthakaraNodyatamA bhavAntAd bhUyAjjinendramatalampaTameva ceta // 3 // iti nyAyAvatAravivRtiH samAptA / / kRtiriyamAcAryasiddhavyAkhyAnikasya / granthAgram 2073 // granthakAraH paramapadaprAptI bIjabhUtAM prArthanAmAha nyAyetyAdi / siddha iti / niSpannaH / atha ca vyAjena granthakartA svanAmAbhidhAnadvAreNa siddhavyAkhyAtA prakaraNamidamakaroditi prakAzitam / jinendramatalampaTa iti / nanu ca lAmpaTyaM sarvAnarthahetutvena na prekSAvatAM prArthanAviSayaH, tatkathaM tad bhUyAdityAzAsyate? satyam, viSayAdhabhiSvaGgarUpameva lAmpaTyamanarthaparaMparAhetutvena na prekSAvadbhirAkAjhyate / zravaNamananadhyAnAdirUpatayA tu bhagavadvacanaviSayaM tatparatvaM lAmpaTyamapi paraMparayA paramapadaprAptihetutvena dakSaM prekSAvatAmAkAkSyamANaM paramAbhyudaya hetureva / / prakSAmadhAmno'bhayadevasUre norivojambhitabhavyapamAt / prabhUttato harSapurIyagacche zrIhemacandraprabhuraMzurAziH // 1 // jIyAttuNIkRtajagatritayo mahimnA zrIhemasUririti ziSyamaNistadIyaH / kSIrodavibhramayazaHpaTalena yena zubhrIkRtA daza dizo maladhAriNApi // 2 // zaizavebhyasyatA taka rati tatraiva vAJchatA / tasya ziSyalavenedaM cakre kimapi Tippanam / / 3 // nyAyAvatAravivRtau viSamaM vibhajya kiMcinmayA yadiha puNyamavApi zuddham / saMtyajya mohamakhilaM bhuvi zazvadeva bhaTTai kabhUmiramunA tu samastalokaH // 4 // iti nyAyAvatAraTippanakaM samAptam ||grnthaanN 1053 / /

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