Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
believe in the existence of external objects. It is only consciousness (vijñāna) which alone is real. An object purporting to exist outside independent of the subject is as illusory as the object of dream experience or perceptual illusion. The nacre is falsely perceived as silver and in dream one experiences many things which are grotesque and absurd. So these experiences are false as their contents are unreal. Our wakeful experience fares no better than dream-experience. They are illusions pure and simple and are sublated by subsequent experience. Even the realist admits that a false and erroneous experience is not valid knowledge which is endorsed by Siddhasena Divakara in the definition of pramāsa.
Now Siddhasena and other philosophers do not think that our perceptual experience which is not contradicted by a subsequent cognition is to be scouted as erroneous on the analogy of dream and illusion. As a matter of fact there is no contradiction by subsequent experience. Vasubandhu contends that external solid objects which are encountered in general experience are found to be riddled with contradiction. A solid object cannot be ultimate because it is divisible into parts. It cannot be infinitely divisible either. Infinite divisibility presupposes an infinite number of parts. The Himalaya mountain and a mustard seed, if each be composed of infinite parts, must not differ in dimension One appears big and another small. This can be accounted for on the hypothesis that they are composed of a definite number of indivisible particles called atoms in more or less number. This is the raison d'etre of the atomic theory propounded by the Vaišesikas and the Vaibhāşikas. This is also endorsed by the Sautrā ntikas. Vasubandhu contends that an atom cannot be indivisible and partless. Six atoms from six quarters-east, west, north, south, above and below-must be supposed to combine with the nuclear atom standing in centre. If they combine in one and the same point it will be a case of total merger. There will be no increase in dimension as all atoms coalesce inside a single atom. The resultant magnitude in that case would not be more than atomic. An atom is invisible to our ordinary vision, so also solid if identified with an atom will be imperceptible. If on the other hand they combine in different points that will amount to the admission that an atom has at least six parts which knocks down the raison d'etre of the assumption of atomic constitution of matter. The atomic theory thus fails to explain the formation of massive bodies. The hypothesis of the Sautrāntika asserts that atoms stand in close succession without intermingling their identity and such a combination gives rise to the idea