Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

Page 24

NATURE OF VALID COGNITION
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In a logical proposition the subject is a fact which is known by the proponent and opponent both. In a debate there are two parties : the proponent (vādin) and opponent (prativă din). The subject is a known fact and there is no dispute about its factuality. The predicate must be a fact, -attribute or action which is under dispute and is either unknown as belonging to the subject or subject to dispute. In Sanskrit terminology the subject is called anuvadya and the predicate is called vidheya. Anuvāda means statement of a known fact. If the subject were also unknown or unacceptable to the opponent, the debate would shift back to it and there will be no discussion possible so far as the predicate is concerned. The predicate must belong to the subject or be asserted to do so. If the subject is not an established and acknowledged fact the predicate will be a homeless floating attribute. So it must be acknowledged that the subject is a known fact and there is no difference of opinion possible regarding its existence. So it is called anuvädya, the object of statement of a fact already known by independent evidence. The statement of a known fact is superfluous because it will be pointless. There is no point in pressing a fact upon the opponent who accepts it as a fact. The predicate is an unknown or unrecognised attribute and the establishment of its validity is the aim of the proponent. It is called vidheya because it is the object of vidhi, the statement of a fact unknown or unrecognised,
In the interpretation of the definition of valid cognition the commentator asserts pramāra (valid cognition) as the subject and the cognition as qualified by the two adjectives as the predicate so far as the philosophers are concerned in the debate. All philosophers are unamimous on the existence of valid cognition and they differ only on the predicate under discussion as having relevancy to the subject. So it is the latter clause which should be regarded as the predicate by both the parties. As regards layrnan, they are not posted in logical terminology such as pramāna, prameya and the like. But they are familier with valid experience which is the pre-condition also of practical day-to-day activity. Therefore what is stated to be predicate regarding philosophors is made the subject in their case. Such a cognition which is familiar to you is called pramāņa in the logician's parlance, So there is no inconsistency in the double interpretation of Siddharşi.
The adjectives 'self-illuminative etc. are stated to rebut the views of rival philosophers, The Buddhist Idealist (Vijñā navadin) does not
1. Cf. pramāṇāntarvagatasya arıhasya sabdena samkirtanam anuyādah
Kašikā on Astādhyāyi, II. 4.3. ajñātārthajñāpanam vidhiḥ.