Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
The definition propounded by Siddhasena is not exposed to any one of these charges. As for the charge of superfluity it should be noted that it does not make it overlap erroneous and doubtful cognitions as the saving clause immune from contradiction' rules out such possibility. The adage goes “Distinction from the opposite (vyāvstti) or full conception (vyavahăra) of the object is the consequence of definition".! The term vyavahara has a comprehensive significance. It means (1) full conception, (2) a clear statement, and (3) avoidance or acceptance. Now if one's knowledge of the defined object be confined only to its peculiar and exclusive property, the conception of the object and the consequential statement and physical activity following upon it could not be adequate in all cases. The inclusion o fthe adjective 'illumining itself and an other' serves a very useful purpose in that it gives a fuller conception and also serves to combat opposite views entertained by rival philosophers.
Let us sum up the observations of Siddharşigani on this verse. He endorses the view that a definition serves to distinguish the defined object from homogeneous and heterogencous species. The definition stated by Siddhasena is devised to edify the philosophers of other schools who have imbibed their pre-conception from their respective tradition (vibratipanna) and also of average people (avyutpanna) who are not trained in logic and as such have confused notions. The definition so oriented is sound and adequate. The valid cognition is the subject. Everyone, whether a philosopher or an untutored layman is familiar with what is called valid knowledge. The philosophers have got their own conception of what is valid knowledge and the other qualifying adjectives are stated as the predicate for their consideration. As for the untutored layman, they are also acquainted with a cognition possessing the aforesaid qualification. The subject-predicate relation is to be stated in a reverse way for their enlightenment Everyman is familiar with a congnition which is immune from contradiction and illumines its own self and an object. If they were lacking in such ideas, their practical life and behaviour would become impos. sible. Behaviour presupposes knowledge and so such a cognition which illumines itself and an other and is immune from contradiction is not unfamiliar to them also. So the subject of the definition will be the cognition so qualified and the predicate will be valid cognition (pramāna).
1. vyāvșttir vyavahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam. 2. See Pañcapadikāvivarana under adhyāsabhāş ya of Sankara's Brahmasūtrabhāsya.