Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1
probans is furnished by the inference of the existence of fire in water on account of its hot touch. The example of the probans standing in opposition is found in the inference of the presence of the ichneumon on the sight of the snake in desperate fury or of absence of cold from the presence of fire.
The Naiyāyika also takes cognizance of three kinds of probans : (i) The first is known as pürvavat i. e., inference based on the antecedent cause as the probans. The example is the rise of the lowering cloud with thundering sounds as the probans of impending rainfall. (ii) The second is seşavat i. e., having the probans as the subsequent effect. All cases of inference of cause from the effect fall under this head, e. g., the inference of rainfall from the river in spate or of fire from smoke. (iii) The third is called samanyatodr ştam, i. e., one based on a probans which is neither cause nor effect, but yet stands in necessary concomitance. The inference of water in a lake from the sight of an acquatic bird like haron which is neither the cause nor the effect of the inferred lake.
The Jaina observes that this inflated list of probanses is inspired by uncriticized experience. The triple characteristics of the three kinds of probans set out by the Buddhist also suffers from the charge of inflation. In all these cases cited above, it is the presence of necessary concomitance of the probans which is the decisive, crucial condition of inference, in the absence of which the inference is bound to be fallacious.
The three characteristics of the probans namely, (i) existence in the subject (pakşasattva), (ii) existence in the homologous cases possessed of the probandum (sapak şasattva,) and (iii) non-existences in heterologous cases (vipakşāsattva) are of no consequence unless there is necessary concomitance at their back. For instance, the inference that the unobserved son of the the lady called Maitreyi must be of swarthy complexion, beause he is her son and her other sons are seen to be swarthy. The probans 'sonship of the lady' in question is not found in fairer persons. So here the triple character is present. Yet the conclusion does not follow, because there is no necessary relation between the probans and the probandum. Again the first characteristc (viz., paksasaltva) is not a universal condition of inference. The inference of other trees in flower on the observation of one such blossoming mango tree, of the enlivening of the lilies (kumuda) on the ground of the rise of the moon, and of the shadow from the tree, are all cases of the non-existence of the first. The inference of the presence of the moon from its image in the water of the lake and the future rise of one constellation from the rise of another are all cases of inference in which