Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1
subjective consideration. The perceptual cognition is the outcome of sense operation which is concerned with the fact present before the percepient. The perceptual cognition takes fuller and richer view of the perceived datum. It is clear, vivid and unequivocal, whereas the data perceived by verbal testimony and the like are situated beyond the ken of the senses and their cognition gives only a blurred generalized picture. But the Buddhist demurs to accept its objective validity and thinks general charcter as false abstraction. The Jaina position on this point differs toto caelo from the Buddhist's view. The Jaina asserts that an object is possessed of a generic and a specific character and they are both objective. The Buddhist's preference for the specific (svalakşaņa) and rejection of the generic aspect are rather the by-product of a preconception. When both are presented with equal prominence why should one aspect be rejected and another preferred ? The Buddhist's arguments for the unreality of generic character and the reduction of it to negation of the opposite (anyi poha) have been challenged by the realists of all schools and they all have criticized the fundamental postulate of the Buddhist that existents are momentary as a matter of necessity. If the generic character be suspect, the validity of inference which is only concerned with the conceptual generality will collapse and no amount of prevarication will save him from the charge of indulging in make-believe. We have alluded to these views in order to show that the logical procedure followed by the Jaina both in the classification of valid cognition and in the examination of different types of the same is not devoid of logical justification.
Valid cognition has been defined in the first verse and this defini. tion is competent to eliminate the ignorance of the untrained novice and rebut the opposite conceptions of persons trained in other traditions. A person of clear understanding who is open to conviction and is not deluded by sophistry or prejudice will understand the nature of valid cognition from this definition and those who have got opposite preconceptions but are open to conviction will also be enlightened by this. But those who are of dull intellect will not be able to understand its full implication and for their edification the opposite views are shown to be erroneous. The refutation of these views will enable such a person to have an indubious conception of valid knowledge. It is with this purpose the author states in the next verse the position of some thinkers who are of the opinion that these definitions are useless intellectual excercises and serve no purpose.
Text prasiddhani pramāṇāni vyavahārasca tatkệtaḥ/ pramäpalakṣapasyo ktau jñāyate na prayoja namil