Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
of pratyaksa jñāna (perceptual cognition) is not subject to the charge of vicious circle: 'Perceptual cognition is what has a perceptible object and the perceptible object is one which is the object of perceptual cognition'. This is a circular definition, one depending upon the other, and the latter depending upon the former. This is avoided by the formulation of an independent definition of either of the terms. In the definition given in the text, we start with perceptual cognition wich will be defined as a vivid, clear and direct intuition. The meaning of perceptual cognition is direct, vivid cognition of a thing which is close to the sense. And the object of this vivid cognition is called perceptible Perceptibility is an attribute of the object where as perceptuality stands for vivid cognition. The confusion arises from the use of the same word pratyak sa as the description of perceptible object and also of perceptual cognition. The definition of pratyakşa iñana as a vivid cognition, which cognizes the object as 'this' without the intervention of another cognition, makes it independent of the conception of perceptibility. “Perceptible' means an object which is envisaged by perception. The independent status of perceptual cognition having intrinsic character of vividness and directness prevents confusion with perceptible object. The definition of perceivability and that of perceptual cognition as given in the Vedantaparibhasa has been a pons
orum to the neophyte. But in the definition of Siddhasena Divakara, there is no room for confusion. Perceivability of the object is not defined because it derives this character from its status as the content or referent of vivid cognition.
Now the designation of cognition as perceptual or extra-perceptual is not derived from its intrinsic character as modes of consciousness, All cognitions are self-cognized according to the Buddhist and the Jaina as has been demonstrated in the discussion of svaprakaśatva, i. e., self-consciousness. This is an invariable characteristic of all cognitions, perceptual or extra-perceptual. Inference and verbal knowledge are also known as cognitions without the service of any other cognition. But this twofold classification has no reference to the intrinsic.character of the cognition concerned. It is called perceptual because the object is presented vividly and clearly, The extra-perceptual cognition (paroksajñana) does not mean that the cognition is per se unperceivable. But it is called such because it is a blurred, unclear cognition of an object lying outside the range of senses. Nor can the characteristic ‘perceptibility' be an absolute attribute of objects. The object which is not perceptible to one person may be perceptible to others and re garding the omniscient subject everything is perceptible to him. So this characterization and classification of cognitions as perceptual (pratyakşa)