Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

SR No.: 522601
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 414
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Magazine, India_Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin, & India
File Size: 9 MB

Page 32

NATURE OF VALID COGNITION
21
We have finished the examination of the justifiability of the adjective 'illuminating an other' ( parabhāsi) in the definition of valid cognition. We now propose to subject the other adjectival expression 'illuminating itself' (svabhasi) to critical examination. A cognition can illumine an other (external object) only if it illumines itself. A thing unknown and unillumined cannot be proved to exist. Besides, from experience we find that the light of the lamp which illumines other things is not unillumined. On the contrary it can illumine an object if it is self-illumining.
The Naiyāyika holds that the first cognition is known by a second cognition following on its heels. The first cognition is called vyavasāya, · that is, the definite knowledge of the object and the second cognition is of the nature of introspection (anuvyavasaya). The first cognition is not known at the time when it cognizes the object. It functions like a sense-organ which remains unperceived at the time of the revelation of the object. But this analogy is based on superficial observation. It is not the eye which sees the object but the knowledge produced in the knowing subject. The sense-organs are as material as the objects which they are alleged to take stock of. One insensitive material fact cannot confer the light of cognition on another material fact because both of them are in the same predicament. As for the Naiyāyika's plea that the first cognition is known by the second cognition, the following dilemma will topple the second also. Is it known or unknown when it performs its alleged function of illumination ? If it is known why should the first be supposed to remain unknown at the time of its illumination of the object. An unknown thing is as good as nonexistent so far as the subject is concerned. The Naiyāyika also subscribes to the dictum that a thing can be proved only by knowledge. 1 In conformity with this law it must be held that the existence of the first cognition, which certifies the existence of its relevant object, cannot function without being known to exist. The assumption of the second cognition is exposed to the same objection and if the second cognition requires a third and if the latter be as unknown as its predecessors it will require a fourth cognition and the process will involve a regressus ad infinitum (anavastha).
Citsukhácārya in his Tattvapradipika criticizes the Nyāya position by a novel argument and shows the absurdity of its stand. The perception of an object takes place according to the theory of the Nyaya
1. prameyasiddhih pramāņa ddhi-Samkhya-Karikā. 2. For the logical absurdity involved in infinite regress, Vide Inductive Reason
ing by Dr. S. Bagchi.