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CHAPTER XIX.
Section (E).
On Yukti' (Ratiocination)
and Anupalabdhi' (Non-Apprehension).
The author argues as follows, in connection with Non-apprehension' (as distinct Means of Cognition):
Ratiocination
and
TEXTS (1692-1695). (A) "THAT THING COMES ABOUT WHEN THIS THING IS THERE, AND IT
DOES NOT COME ABOUT, WHEN IT IS NOT THERE, THEREFORE IT PROCEEDS FROM THAT", THIS IS CALLED 'RATIOCINATION'. THE SAGE Charaka HAS DECLARED THAT IT IS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION ; BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE INFERENCE, AS NO CORROBORA
TIVE INSTANCE IS AVAILABLE". (B) "WHEN A CERTAIN THING IS COGNISABLE BY AN APPREHENSION,
THEN, FROM THE ABSENCE OF THAT APPREHENSION, ONE DEDUCES THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THAT THING THIS IS REGARDED AS NONAPPREHENSION' THIS ALSO IS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION, AS IT DOES NOT NEED A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE AND OTHER FACTORS. IN FACT, IN THE INSTANCE ALSO, NON-EXISTENCE WOULD BE COGNISED BY MEANS OF THIS SAME NON-APPREHENSION." (1692-1695)
COMMENTARY. When a thing is cognised as being the effect of a certain thing, on the ground of its being produced only when the latter is present, it is regarded as a case of 'Ratiocination',-As it is conceptual, it cannot be Perception ; nor can it be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance; and if there were an Instance, then also the notion of being an effect would be due to being produced only when the other is present; and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress.-Hence this is & distinct Means of Cognition ; so says the sage Charaka, the medical doctor.
Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the absence of its apprehension, it is a case of Non-apprehension'; and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of 'Ratiocination':-(1692–1695)
The above is refuted in the following