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LOKÄYATAMATERJALISM.
905
Objection : "According to the view that Cognition has forms, the Blue and other things are of the very essence of the Cognition, and it is these that appear as external; what then is it that is meant by the assertion that
because they appear in the external form they cannot be properties of the Cognition'?"
True ; but the very fact of Cognition appearing in a form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it forms the essence-not of the Cognition,—but of the external object; as therein lies its own essence. In the Cognition it appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely adventitious.
From all this it follows that the Word in the form of Specific Individuality cannot be expressive ; nor can it be the property of the Cognition itseli.
As regards Word in the form of the Universal', -though that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the Cognition itself; because it is tacked on, not to the Cognition itself but, to that which is comprehended on the henring of the Specific Individuality of the Word apportaining to the external thing. The Universal' of one thing cannot be tacked on to another thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the Cognition; as in that case the Universal Cow could be tacked on to the Horse. And until the thing, in the shape of the Specifio Individuality has been apprehended, it is not possible to tack on to it that property which is expressive; for the simple reason that Properties are always dependent upon the Objects to which they belong, and as such cannot be apprehended by themselves. And the thing in the form of Specific Individuality cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought, as this latter always envisages the Universal'. Hence it becomes established that all Conceptual Thoughts have their source in the awakening of the Tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of 'Specific Individualities
(c) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought having the form of the expressive Word be due to the comprehension of what is expressed by the Word. Because words do not subsist in the object; nor are they of the nature of objects; for if they were so, they could be understood by the unlearned also ; and it would, in that case, be impossible to apply words to things according to one's own choice.
Further, though all objects are similar in so far as they are impermanent, yet Conceptual Thought cannot envisage them all at one and the same time; as each Conceptual Thought appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with special forms, as differentiated from other forms. Hence the Cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought that appertains to a single form. Such a cause cannot be indicated to be any other except Repeated Practice; as is found in the case of the Conceptual Thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?). Thus then as the Conceptual Thought proceeds through previous repeated practice, it becomes proved that the Conceptual Cognition is without beginning.
Nor can it be right to accept the alternative (set forth on p. 63, line 7 of the original) that 'the first Mental Cognition (or Subjective Consciousness)