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1006
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
as envisaging ono and the same thing, and not as envinging several things because it appears in the form of. Jar-like the notion of the Jar appearing at the present inoment; and so forth. As a matter of fact, however, such one-ness of the Jar is neither desired nor vouched for by perception. Hence ell the Reasonings set forth above must be regarded as False (Fallacious).
The answer to this objection (from the Mimämsaka) is as follows:
TEXTS (2131-2132).
"IF TAR one-ness of the Jar, THAT IS URGED AS AN INDESTRABLE CON
TINGENCY, IS IN REFERENCE TO THE UNIVERSAL ASPECT', -THEN THE ARGUMENT IS SUPERFLUOUS-IY HOWEVER, ONE WERE TO URGR THE CONTINGENCY OF THE individual JARS BEING one, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS, THEN IT CAN BE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH AN IDEA WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ALL FORMS OP RIGHT COGNITION : BECAUSE THE MULTIPLICITY OF INDIVIDUALS HAS BEEN DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED BY ALL MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, SENSE-PERCEPTION AND THE REST.”—(2131-2132)
COMMENTARY.
If it is in reference to the Universal '—the genus', 'Jar'--that one-ness is sought to be proved by the above Reductio ad Absurdum, then, it is superfluous; as it has been declared that aspect of the object which is Universal, Common, is eternal, the other aspect is held to be perishable'.
On the other hand, if the Reductio ad Absurdum is meant to prove the one-ness of the Individual Jars, even so, that does not falsify our premisses. Because such a Proposition is directly annulled by Sense-perception and other Moans of Cognition ; specially as all the Reasons adduced in this connection have to be regarded as qualified by the condition that what they assert is not annulled'; how then could there be any falsity in our Reasons ?-Such is the sense of the passage.
Would be contrary, etc. etc.'-That is, the Proposition in question is so contrary,
The rost is easily understood.—(2131-2132)
Again, the Mimūmsaka proceeds to show that the Proposition that Words are non-eternal' is annulled by Inference and Presumption.-The Inference that he sets forth is-"When the relation between two things is not-artificial (eternal), the two things themselves must be regarded as notartificial (eternal); .g. Akasha and the Atom; and the relation of Denoter and Denoted between the Word and its denotation in the form of the
Universal is not-artificial hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things."