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1086
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXIV,
with the last articulation, and when this seed has developed by repetition, the Shabda becomes cognised-6) According to Vindhyavasin, Shabda consists in similarity':-(1) According to the Bauddhas what expresses the meaning consists in the exclusion of others ', called ' Apoha of others'.
If what the Buddhist seeks to prove is the 'non-eternality' of these eight kinds of 'Shabdaas postulated by the Sankhya and others.--then the Subject' becomes open to the defect of being futile, which is expressed in its own form; as such 'Subject' has been rejected by us. Nor do the Mimūmsakas wish to prove the eternality of such Shabda as these.
Further, any such 'subject' as Shabda in the particular forms of the Three-Attribute entity and the rest is not admitted or known, so far as we are concerned ; hence the subject' becomes open to the charge of having its exact nature unknown. The Probans or Reason also, on that same account, becomes one whose substratum (in the shape of the Subject or Minor Term) is not admitted or known; and any such 'subject' is not admitted at all. (2310-2312)
TEXTS (2313-2314). “I THEN, YOUR 'SUBJECT OR MINOR TERM CONSISTS OF THE Shabda
AS POSTULATED BY US, THEN, BOTH THESE PALLACIES BECOME APPLICABLE TO YOU (WHO DO NOT ADMIT OF ANY SUCH Shabda as HELD BY US).-IY MERE Shabda (IN GENERAL, WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION) WERE ASSERTED AS THE 'SUBJECT' OF YOUR REASONING, THEN, IT WOULD MEAN THAT FOR YOU, THE Universal 'SHABDA' ITSELF IS NON-ETERNAL ; AND SUCH A VIEW WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE VIEW ACOEPTED BY ALL MEN THAT THE Universal 18 ALWAYS ETERNAL ; IN ONE FORM OR THE OTHER, THE UNIVERSAL' IS REGARDED BY EVERY ONE AS ETERNAL".- [Shlokavārtika-ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 321-323)-(2313-2314)
COMMENTARY.
We, Mimamsakas, hold that Shabda consists only in the Lottors Ga and the rest, it is not anything apart from these and if this is the Shabda which the Buddhist and others make the Subject of their Proposition, then both these fallacies--the Proposition having the exact nature of its Subject unknown and the Reason having no basis-woula befall them.
If mere Shabda' were asserted-i.e. as the subject of the Proposition, then for you the universal Shabda would itself be non-elernal ;-the phrase 'be non-eternal' is to be supplied. Because the epithet 'mere means the exclusion of all particular features, what olso-apart from the Universal-could it be that would be mere Shabda'? Thus by implication your proposition would be declaring the non-eternality of the Universal Shabda' itself.
Be it so, what then?"
That cannot be right; as such a view would be contrary, etc. etc.'--for instance, the Buddhists themselves, who postulate the Exclusion, 'Apoha,
