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1368
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXTS (3077-3079).
WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF THE EXCELLENCE OF THE CAUSE AND OTHER CONDITIONS, THEN THERE FOLLOWS CERTAINTY ;--AND ALSO WHEN EFFECTIVE ACTION IS FOUND DIRECTLY, IN THE SHAPE OF burning, ETO. ;-OR REPEATED FUNCTIONING BRINGS ABOUT THE RESULT INDEPENDENTLY. WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF ALL THESE MEANS (OF CERTAINTY), THEN THERE IS NO CERTAINTY AT ALL. THUS EVEN IF VALIDITY WERE THERE, IT WOULD BE UNCERTAIN, AS GOOD AS NON-EXISTENT; THAT IS WHY IT IS SAID THAT IT IS NOT PRESENT.
(3077-3079)
COMMENTARY.
"If effective action is found '-"then there is cortainty'-this has to be construed with this.
Says the Opponent:"As the Cognition of effective action envisages an entirely different thing, the certainty regarding the validity of the preceding Cognition cannot be due to that. For instance, the visual Cognition of water can approhend colour only, as there is no composite substance ; as for the Cognition of effective action in the shape of Bathing and the like, it can bo secured only by means of Touch ; how can the Cognition of one thing confirm the validity of the Cognition of another thing! If it did, then there would be incongruitios".
Answer:- This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, when two objects occur in the same *chain', which are invariably concomitant, the Cognition of one object will certainly establish the validity of the Cognition of the other. In the instance cited, the Colour and tho Touch do not exist entirely apart from one another ; in fact both are placod under exactly the same circumstances. So that, even if the first Cognition is objectless, it proceeds on the basis of a dofinite objective; and the subsequent cognition apprehending the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the object of the previous Cognition is not needed for the bringing about of certainty of conviction.
Says the Opponent :-"Even so, as all things aro momentary, the funetioning of the lator Cognition cannot envisage tho Touch which is invariably concomitant with the Colour onvisaged by the previous Cognition ; how then could the certainty follow from that ?"
AnswerThis does not affoct our position; bocause the subsequent colour-moments have the samo offective action as tho colour-moments envisaged by the provious Cognition ; honeo all of these colour-moments stand on the sarne footing and share the sono fato ; and hence aro troatod as one and the same. In fact, people with limited vision do not deal with inoments' at all.
Or, the object onvisaged by the lator Cognition is invariably concomitant with the colour, etc. envisuged by the previous Cognition ; honoe even though
