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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1387
[The Author's answer to the above view of Ubeyaka]-All this is certainly not free from objections. For instance, it has been asserted that "the validity of cognitions consists in its being in conformity with the real state of things; and that it proceeds from the cause of the cognition itself ".This is superfluous, futile; because we also admit that that cognition alone is valid which is in conformity with the real nature of things',-which clearly means that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things. But the cognition' is specially mentioned as qualifying 'validity'; validity is not regarded as belonging directly to the Smoke and such other means of cognition, which are themselves not of the nature of cognition'; hence it cannot be admitted that validity consists only in being in conformity with the real state of things'. Specially because it is Cognition alone which is primarily operative towards things to be abandoned or acquired. For instance, oven though the Smoke, which is invariably concomitant with Fire, is there, the Agent does not have recourse to activity towards the securing of the Fire, until the cognition of the Smoke comes about; which shows that it is the cognition that is the direct and immediate prompting agent towards the man's activity. This has been thus declared-The Cognition must be valid, because that is the primary cause of activity towards things to be abandoned or obtained'.
As regards the character of 'being in conformity with the real state of things', which belongs to the Cognitions, and which is there in the form of the capacity to lead up to the thing cognised, this consists in this same getting at the thing; as it is only in regard to this that Invariable Concomitance is possible; and the capacity of things forms their very nature or essence; hence who could ever think of securing it from other things,-in view of which it would have to be specially denied? Because when the thing itself has been produced, it cannot be that its property and nature have not been produced. If this were so, then there would be incongruities.
This validity then, though being the very essence of the cognitions, cannot be recognised until the effects of the cognition have been brought about, because of the presence of causes likely to lead to wrong cognitions. Hence the effect is ascertained from extraneous causes such as the cognition of effective action. Hence when the validity is said to be extraneous, it is in reference to the said certainty regarding it, not in reference to its being produced. Consequently, there can be no useful purpose served by the denial of the production of the validity by other causes; as on that point there is no dispute at all. As regards the certainty, however, regarding the capacity of things, you also hold that it is brought about by extraneous causes. This has been declared thus (by Kumarila himself)-"The capacities of things are proved through Presumption based upon the fact that certain effects cannot be explained otherwise" [Shlo-Va., p. 341].
As regards the argument that "the capacity that does not belong to a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else",-which has been put forward in support of the denial of the idea of the validity being due to other circumstantial causes,-that is equally applicable to Invalidity also; so
