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EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1401
TEXT (3147).
"IF IT BE HELD THAT THINGS NOT SPOKEN OF IN THEIR TREATISES WERE KNOWN TO THE TEACHERS, THEN ALL POETS, BY THE OOMPOSING OF THEIR POEMS, MIGHT BE REGARDED AS
omniscient."-3147)
COMMENTARY.
If it be held, on the strength of Inference, that "oven when a certain thing is not mentioned in the works composed by the Tonchers, it must have been known to them, then those poets also who have composed works relating to stories created by their own imagination, could be assumed to be omniscient, on the ground of their powers of perception; there being no difference between the two cases.
Thus the Reason (of the Buddhist) becomes Inconclusive' (3147)
The following might be urged-In the case of Buddha, the Teachings are fonnd to be related to supersensuous things; not so the works of poets; hence the knowledge of all such things is inferred only in the case of Buddha, not in that of others. If it were not so, the person who does not possess the knowledge of all supersensuous things could not have the knowledge of even some of these things; as there would be no difference between the two cases. Consequently the addition of the qualification-being a person knowing supersensuous things' would prevent the Reason applying to the case of Poets and hence from 'Falsity' (Inconclusiveness).
The Mimāmsaka's answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3148).
“WHEN THERE ARE MANY OMNISCIENT PERSONS, PREACHING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY DOCTRINES, THE GROUNDS OF RELIABILITY BEING THE SAME IN ALL, WHICH ONE OF THESE SHOULD
BE ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE?"-(3148)
COMMENTARY.
There are many Teachers, Buddha, Kapila, Kanāda, Gautama and so forth-who are regarded by their respective devotees as omniscient; and each one of these is sought to be proved to be omniscient; which one of them is to be definitely recognised as reliable? The ground of omniscience, in the shape of having taught doctrines relating to supersensuous things, is equally present in all of them.-It cannot be right to regard them all as omniscient; because what is taught by them is mutually contradictory. When several persons propound teachings contrary to each other, they cannot all be regarded as knowing the truth; as the truth regarding any partioular thing can be one only; hence it cannot admit of mutually contradictory properties.-(3148)
