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1452
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
not in reference to different things. Certainly the Existence of the Horse is not in any way 'contrary to the non-existence of the Cow.-Nor is there any contrariness between existence and non-existence, if taken in reference to different points of time; for instance, if one thing did not exist at some previous time, its non-existence or existence at some future time is not deducible. It is only in regard to the same thing and the same time that both existence and non-existence are found incompatible; and not after being cognised and then found to be mutually exclusive.--It might be asked-"How can there be exclusion of what has not been cognised " The answer is that it is for this same reason,-i.e. because it is not cognised in connection with the particular thing that its exclusion would be possible. Otherwise, how could there be any exclusion of what has been definitely cognised ? In fact, this cognition itself of the existence of the thing that constitutes the exclusion of its non-existence; and the cognition of the non-existence of one thing also constitutes the exclusion of the existence of the thing other than that. Hence when the non-existence of a certain thing is excluded, and its existence is cognised-then they must be regarded as perceptible'; because what is not perceptible cannot be cognised, and what is not cognised cannot have the contrary character excluded.
All this is not possible in the case of the Omniscient Person. In the first place all men are not perceived by any one ; in view of which the presence of non-omniscience could be cognised in them, and the exclusion of omniscience could be secured ; because that same man would have to be regarded as omniscient.--Thus then, there can be no 'contrariness' (incompatibility) between omniscience and non-omniscience in connection with a person who is not capable of being apprehended. It is possible, however, within one's own 'chain'; but there also, not with regard to the future, because the future is not perceptible at the time. Thus the fact remains that the relation of cause and effect and the like is possible only in that which is perceptible.
As also the nature of a thing, with a qualification is possible should be construed here. Nature' here stands for the character of the thing; and this is to be taken along with its qualification; and this qualification consists in freedom from the three kinds of remoteness.
All these non-apprehensions i.e. the non-apprehensions of the 'Cause' ("Nature' and 'Pervader'), are not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person ; because the Omniscient Person can have no such relationship with anything as that of Cause and Effect, of Contrariness, and of Pervader and Pervaded; also because, even when there are other causes of apprehension present, the said Person cannot be perceptible.
Any other factor of negation, there is none',-.e. barring the particular kind of Non-apprehension.-(3280-3281)
The Author again proceeds to point out the Inconclusiveness of the Reason adduoed by the other party-by pointing out the incongruity involved in the putting forward of one's own non-apprehension, without any qualification
