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TATTVASANGBAJA: CHAPTER XXVI.
proved is the absence of Omniscience in the non-conceptual state, then the Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'; because in that state, there is no speaking at all; for the simple reason that in that state there is no Conceptual Content that could prompt the Speaking.–(3359-3362)
Says the Opponent: "If it is held that in the conceptual state, the Lord is not omniscient,then His words would be words uttered by one who is not omniscient, and as such, not reliable."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3363-3365).
EVEN SO, IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD HIS WORDS AS THOSE UTTERED
BY ONE WHO IS NOT-OMNISCIENT; BECAUSE HIS NON-OMNISCIENCE HAS BEEN DISCARDED BY HIS OMNISCIENCE ; HENCE THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT. FOR INSTANCE, HAVING EXPERIENCED HEAT, ONE SPEAKS OF IT (AND THIS SPEECH IS RECONCILED, IN AGREEMENT, WITH THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OR COGNITION]; YROM THIS THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS, BECAUSE THE SPEROR IS THE OUTCOME OF THE DIRECT COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS. THUS THEN, AT THE TIME WHEN THE LORD IS OMNISCIENT, THE REASON ADDUCED BY THE OTHER PARTY IS NOT PRESENT ; AND AS REGARDS THE TIME OF ORDINARY USAGE, HIS ARGUMENT WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS.—(3363-3365)
COMMENTARY.
Though at that time the Lord is not omniscient,--.yet that does not mean that His words are such as have been uttered by one who is not-omnisoient ;-why because this non-omniscience has been set aside by Omniscience. It is on this account that the Words in question become reliable also, having been prompted by the Conceptual Content brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, and therefore connected, indirectly, with the real state of things; this reliability is just like the reliability of the Inferential Conception.
An example is cited in support of the said idea-For instance, etc. etc.'
Tasmåt'--from the speech coming after the experiencing of heat.
The speech is the outcome, etc. etc.'i.e. because the Conceptual Content has been brought about, indirectly, by the direct cognition of the Heat.
The following might be urged—“If the Omniscient Person has Conceptual Cognitions, then there is likelihood of His being mistaken; because, by its very nature, Conception is mistaken, wrong, because it appears as the Cognition of a thing as what is not that thing".
This is not so. The Lord could be mistaken, only if He did not know the distinction between the Real and the Imposed (Unreal). As a matter of
